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Volume LXXVI • No. 1971 • April 4, 1977 

Excerpts From Transcript 305 

Statement by Under Secretary Habib 318 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke 322 


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Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971 
April 4, 1977 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

President Carter's News Conference of March 9 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the opening statement and the 
questions and answers of a news conference 
held by President Carter on March 9. 1 

I have long been concerned about our own 
nation's stance in prohibiting American citi- 
zens to travel to foreign countries. We also 
are quite eagerly assessing our own nation's 
policies that violate human rights as defined 
by the Helsinki agreement. 2 

Later on this year we'll go to Belgrade to 
assess the component parts of the Helsinki 
agreement. And I want to be sure that we 
don't violate those rights. So I've instructed 
the Secretary of State to remove any travel 
restrictions on American citizens who want to 
go to Vietnam, to North Korea, to Cuba, and 
to Cambodia. And these restrictions will be 
lifted as of the 18th day of March. 

I would like to point out that we still don't 
have diplomatic relationships with these coun- 
tries. That's a doubtful prospect at this time. 
So there will be some necessary precautions 
that ought to be taken by citizens who go 
there, since we don't have our own diplomats 
in those countries to protect them if they 
should have difficulty. 

I'd be glad to answer any questions that you 
might have. 

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, UPI]? 

Q. Mr. President, an American delegate to the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission has said 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 

2 For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 

that he believes and he hopes that his allega- 
tions concerning terror, suffering in Chile to- 
day, coincide with your human rights policy. 
Do they? 

The President: Well, I don't know which 
delegate this is or what his concerns are. But 
we are still concerned about deprivation of 
human rights in many of the countries of the 
world. I think Chile would be one of those 
where concern has been expressed. And I 
want to be sure that the American people un- 
derstand that this is a very sensitive issue. 

We've tried to be broad based in our ex- 
pression of concern and also responsible. At 
first, our policy was interpreted, I think im- 
properly, to deal exclusively with the Soviet 
Union. I've just pointed out how our own 
country has been at fault in some instances. 
Torture has been reported to us from some of 
the nations of the world. We are presenting 
these items to the Congress as required by 
law. But throughout the entire world, in 
Latin America, in our own country, in the 
Communist nations in Eastern Europe, and in 
the Soviet Union, we are very much aware of 
the concern about human rights. 

I think it's entirely appropriate for our own 
country to take the leadership role and let the 
world say that the focal point for the preser- 
vation and protection of human rights is in the 
United States of America. I'm proud of this. 
And I intend to adhere to it with the deepest 
possible personal commitment, and I believe I 
speak accurately for the American people on 
this subject. 

Q. Well, then, does that mean, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that you don't object to the remarks that 
were made by our delegate? 

The President: I think that the remarks 
made by the delegate concerning our past in- 

April4, 1977 


volvement in Chilean political affairs was in- 
appropriate. I didn't know about it ahead of 
time. It was a personal expression of opinion 
by that delegate. 

I think that the Church committee in the 
Senate has not found any evidence that the 
United States was involved in the overthrow 
of the Allende government in Chile. There 
were some allegations made, I think perhaps 
accurate, that we did have financial aid and 
other — I think financial aid to be 
restrictive — to political elements in Chile that 
may have contributed to the change in gov- 
ernment. But I don't think there has been any 
proof of illegalities there. And the statements 
made by our delegate were his own personal 
statements, not representing our govern- 

Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of 
talk about defensible borders lately and what 
that means in regard to the Middle East. 
Could I ask you, sir, do you feel that it would 
be appropriate in a Middle East peace settle- 
ment for the Israelis to keep some of the oc- 
cupied land they took during the 1967 war in 
order to have secure borders? 

The President: The "defensible border" 
phrase, the "secure borders" phrase, ob- 
viously are just semantics. I think it's a rela- 
tively significant development in the descrip- 
tion of possible settlement in the Middle East 
to talk about these things as a distinction. 

The recognized borders have to be mutual. 
The Arab nations, the Israeli nation, have to 
agree on permanent and recognized borders, 
where sovereignty is legal as mutually 
agreed. Defense lines may or may not conform 
in the foreseeable future to those legal bor- 
ders. There may be extensions of Israeli de- 
fense capability beyond the permanent and 
recognized borders. 

I think this distinction is one that is now 
recognized by Israeli leaders. The definition 
of borders on a geographical basis is one that 
remains to be determined. But I think that it 
is important for the world to begin to see, and 
for the interested parties to begin to see, that 
there can be a distinction between the two: 

the ability of Israel to defend herself by in- 
ternational agreement or by the sometime 
placement of Israeli forces themselves or by 
monitoring stations, as has been the case in 
the Sinai, beyond the actual sovereignty bor- 
ders as mutually agreed by Israel and her 

Q. Well, does that mean international zones 
between the countries? 

The President: International zones could 
very well be part of an agreement. And I 
think that I can see in a growing way, a step- 
by-step process where there might be a 
mutual agreement that the ultimate settle- 
ment, even including the border delineations, 
would be at a certain described point. In an 
interim state, maybe two years, four years, 
eight years or more, there would be a mutual 
demonstration of friendship and an end to the 
declaration or state of war. 

I think that what Israel would like to have 
is what we would like to have: a termination 
of belligerence toward Israel by her 
neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right to 
exist, the right to exist in peace, the opening 
up of borders with free trade, tourist travel, 
cultural exchange between Israel and her 
neighbors; in other words, a stabilization of 
the situation in the Middle East without a 
constant threat to Israel's existence by her 

This would involve substantial withdrawal 
of Israel's present control over territories. 
Now, where that withdrawal might end, I 
don't know. I would guess it would be some 
minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But 
that still remains to be negotiated. 

But I think this is going to be a long, tedi- 
ous process. We're going to mount a major ef- 
fort in our own government in 1977 to bring 
the parties to Geneva. Obviously any agree- 
ment has to be between the parties con- 
cerned. We will act as an intermediary when 
our good offices will serve well. 

But I'm not trying to predispose our own 
nation's attitudes toward what might be the 
ultimate details of the agreement that can 
mean so much to world peace. 

Q. At the risk of oversimplification, sir, I 


Department of State Bulletin 

believe I understand during the campaign you 
proposed a gradual withdrawal of American 
troops from Korea. 

The President: Yes. 

Q. Yet, after your revised budget went to 
Congress, the Army has gone to Congress and 
asked in fiscal 1978, for a doubling of mili- 
tary construction funds for Korea and in the 
three ensuing years, for more than $110 mil- 
lion for similar construction. How does that 
square with your withdrawal plans? 

The President: My commitment to with- 
draw American ground troops from Korea has 
not changed. I'll be meeting this afternoon 
with the Foreign Minister of South Korea. 
This will be one of the matters that I will dis- 

I've also talked to General Vessey [John W. 
Vessey, Jr.], who is in charge of our armed 
forces in South Korea. I think that the time 
period as I described in the campaign months, 
a four- or five-year time period, is appro- 
priate. The schedule for withdrawal of Ameri- 
can ground troops would have to be worked 
out very carefully with the South Korean 
Government. It would also have to be done 
with the full understanding and, perhaps, par- 
ticipation of Japan. 

I would want to leave in place in South 
Korea adequate ground forces owned by and 
controlled by the South Korean Government 
to protect themselves against any intrusion 
from North Korea. I would envision a con- 
tinuation of American air cover for South 
Korea over a long period of time. 

But these are the basic elements, and I'm 
very determined that over a period of time, as 
described just then, that our ground troops 
would be withdrawn. 

Q. Mr. President, Vd like to try to clarify 
the Israeli situation, if I might. A moment 
ago in answering the question, you spoke of 
the possibility of substantial withdrawal of 
Israeli control over territory and then, just a 
few seconds later, spoke of the possibility of 
minor territorial concessions by the Israelis. 
What is it exactly that you have in mind here? 
Are you really talking about some big with- 

drawals, or are you talking only about minor 

The President: I don't think I would use the 
word minor withdrawals. I think there might 
be minor adjustments to the 1967 — pre-1967 
borders. But that's a matter for Israel and her 
neighbors to decide between themselves. 

I believe that we will know by, I'd say, the 
middle of May, much more clearly the posi- 
tions of the interested parties. I've not yet 
met nor talked to the leaders in Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan, Egypt — Saudi Arabia, to a 
lesser direct-participation degree. 

I will meet with all these leaders between 
now and the middle of May. And I don't want 
to try to define in any specific terms the exact 
delineation of borders, but I think this is ob- 
viously one of the most serious problems. 

There are three basic elements: One is an 
ultimate commitment to complete peace in the 
Middle East; second, border determinations 
which are highly controversial and have not 
yet been defined by either side; and third, 
dealing with the Palestinian question. 

And I'm not trying to act as the one to lay 
down an ultimate settlement. I don't know 
what an ultimate settlement will be. But 
these matters will be freely and openly de- 
bated within our own country and within the 
countries involved. And I think I've described 
as best I can my own position. 

Q. Mr. President, last week in an interview 
you expressed concern about the disclosure of 
confidential and classified information. Ad- 
miral [Stansfield] Turner, your choice to 
head the CIA, has said, I believe in tes- 
timony, that he would favor criminal penal- 
ties for disclosure by government officials of 
that type of information, but Vice President 
Mondale said he's opposed to it. I wonder, sir, 
if you'd tell us where you stand on that issue 
and what, other than restricting access to 
classified information, you intend to do about 
this problem? 

The President: Well, my own interest would 
be to minimize the use of any criminal penal- 
ties for disclosure of information. There are 

April 4, 1977 


other penalties that can be used without crim- 
inal charges, and I think that Vice President 
Mondale drew that distinction. 

I don't know yet what procedure we will fol- 
low. My own hope would be that we could 
prevent the disclosure of intelligence informa- 
tion that might be damaging to our national 
security, rather than trying to control that 
problem by the imposition of legal criminal 

Q. Could you elaborate on how you might 
prevent that, Mr. President? 

The President: Well, I think, first of all, is a 
tighter control over the number of people who 
have access to material that's highly sensi- 
tive, that might damage the relationship 
between our own country and our friends and 
allies. We've already initiated steps to that 
degree and we'll be pursuing it. 

As you know, Admiral Turner has only re- 
cently been confirmed. He's just now getting 
his presence felt in the defense communities. 
I'll be going out to the CIA headquarters this 
afternoon to see the oath of office adminis- 
tered to him. 

But we'll make sure that the public knows 
what new policies we impose. But the one 
that's easiest to describe, and also very dif- 
ficult to do, is to make sure that we don't have 
too many people knowing about matters that 
they don't need to know and, also, that we can 
protect the legitimate confidentiality of 
agreements between ourselves and our allies. 

Now, I would never permit anything that 
was either illegal or improper. And we've got 
a very good arrangement that was primarily 
set up by President Ford to prevent abuses. 
The Intelligence Oversight Board is made up 
of three distinguished men appointed by Pres- 
ident Ford, who have complete access to any 
operation conducted by the intelligence 

Senator Inouye's committee in the Senate 
and, I think, six committees in the House also 
have access to this information. Of course, I'm 
monitoring it myself. And I think Admiral 
Turner's integrity is also a guarantee that 
there will be no future abuses. 

But that doesn't mean that everything that 
we do in gathering intelligence on which our 

security might very well depend has to be re- 
vealed to the public. And drawing of that dis- 
tinction is one that's my responsibility, and I 
think I can handle that. 

Q. What effect in your mind, if any, is the 
extent of debate in the Senate over Mr. [Paul 
C] Warnke's qualifications to be the chief 
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
negotiator going to have eventually on our 
negotiating position? 

The President: I don't believe that the 
exact vote in the Senate on Mr. Warnke's con- 
firmation will have a major effect on future 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT. 

The obvious impression that concerns me is 
a demonstration of lack of confidence of the 
Senate in my own ability and attitudes as a 
chief negotiator. Obviously, as President, any 
decisions made with the Russians on reduc- 
tion of atomic weapons would have to be ap- 
proved by me. 

I have promised the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
who in the past perhaps have been bypassed 
in the process, that they will always know 
ahead of time what our position will be at the 
negotiating table. I've not promised the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff that they would have the right 
to approve or disapprove every individual 
item in negotiations. 

But I hope that the Senate will give Mr. 
Warnke a strong vote. I think many of the 
people that oppose Mr. Warnke just do not 
want to see any substantial reductions in 
atomic weapons, even though they are agreed 
to mutually by us and the Soviet Union or 
even if they are designed to reduce the threat 
of nuclear destruction of the world. I feel very 
deeply that we ought to pursue with every 
possible means, an agreement with the Soviet 
Union for substantial reductions in atomic 
weapons. I think Mr. Warnke agrees; most of 
the Senators agree. 

So, there are a wide range of reasons for 
not voting for Mr. Warnke. I have complete 
confidence in him. And I might say there is 
one more very significant guard against any 
error that I and Mr. Warnke and the Secre- 
tary of State and others might make. The 
Senate has to approve, by a two-thirds vote 
after complete open debate, any agreements 


Department of State Bulletin 

signed with the Soviet Union. So, I think that 
the attacks on Mr. Warnke are primarily by 
those who don't want to see substantial reduc- 
tions in nuclear weapons in the world. 

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go just a little 
bit further in your discussion of the defensible 
borders issue. If I understood you correctly, 
you're talking about the possibility of some- 
thing like an Israeli defense line along the 
Jordan River and perhaps at some point on 
the Sinai Desert and perhaps at some point on 
the Golan Heights that would be defense 
forces but not legal borders. Have I under- 
stood that correctly, that your feeling is that 
the Israelis are going to have to have some 
kind of defense forces along the Jordan River 
and in those other places? 

The President: Well, you added a great deal 
to what I said. In the first place, I didn't men- 
tion any particular parts of the geography 
around Israel. And I didn't confine the de- 
fense capability to Israeli forces. These might 
very well be international forces. It might 
very well be a line that's fairly broad, say 20 
kilometers or more, where demilitarization is 
guaranteed on both sides. It might very well 
consist of outposts, electronics or, perhaps, 
personnel outposts as were established in the 
Sinai region as a result of the Egypt and Is- 
raeli agreement. 

I'm not going to try to get more specific in 
saying what will or will not be the case. But 
that is a possibility that might lead to the al- 
leviation of tension there, and it's one about 
which I will be discussing this matter with the 
representatives from the Arab countries when 
they come. 

Q. On several occasions, Mr. President, 
you have spoken in terms of the United States 
being ready to move to a quick SALT agree- 
ment, omitting cruise missiles, "Backfire" 
bombers, if necessary. I'm wondering, sir, 
have you had any indication yet of Russian 
intentions on this subject? 

The President: The Soviet Union, so far as I 
know, still would like to include the cruise 

missile question in the present negotiations. 
They don't want to discuss Backfire bomber at 
all. And my hope has been and is that by the 
exclusion of both those controversial items, 
which will require long and tedious negotia- 
tions, that we might move to a rapid agree- 
ment at SALT Two and immediately begin to 
discuss, for instance, the Backfire bombers, 
the cruise missiles, in subsequent negotia- 

But I do not have any indication yet that 
the Soviets have changed their position on 
that issue. 

Q. Mr. President, what about nuclear re- 
ductions ? 

The President: Again, I think you have two 
approaches to the question. 

I have proposed both directly and indirectly 
to the Soviet Union, publicly and privately, 
that we try to identify those items on which 
there is relatively close agreement — not com- 
pletely yet, because details are very difficult 
on occasion. But I have, for instance, 
suggested that we forgo the opportunity to 
arm satellite bodies and also to forgo the op- 
portunity to destroy observation satellites. 

We've also proposed that the Indian Ocean 
be completely demilitarized, that a com- 
prehensive test ban be put into effect, that 
prior notification of test missile launchings be 
exchanged. And I would like to see any of 
these items on which the Soviets will agree 
quickly be concluded and then get down to the 
much more difficult negotiations on much 
more drastic, overall commitments to atomic 
weapons, leading ultimately to the complete 
elimination of atomic weapons from the face of 
the earth. 

This is going to be a long, slow, tedious 
process. But I think if we and the Soviets 
could agree on the easier items — and none of 
them are very easy — quickly, it would show 
good faith. I think it would let the world know 
that we are serious in stopping once and for 
all what has been a continuous and rapid esca- 
lation in atomic weapon capabilities since they 
were first evolved. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. President. 

The President: Thank you very much. 

April 4, 1977 


Prime Minister Rabin of Israel 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State 
of Israel made an official visit to Washington 
March 6-9, during which he met with Presi- 
dent Carter and other government officials. 
Following is an exchange of remarks between 
President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin at 
a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of 
the White House on March 7. 1 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14 


I'd like to say first of all that I am very 
deeply grateful to welcome back to our coun- 
try an old friend of mine and a longtime friend 
of the United States, Prime Minister Rabin 
from Israel. 

We've had two foreign visitors already. 
This is a different kind of visit. This is going 
to be a series of working sessions. Because of 
the crucial nature of problems that face the 
Middle East and the close historic ties be- 
tween Israel and the United States, we've de- 
cided to minimize the amount of time spent in 
ceremony. We will have a meeting tonight at 
a banquet, but it will be a working banquet. 

And I believe that this is the kind of inter- 
relationship that will demonstrate to the 
world the seriousness with which we address 
our problems in the Middle East, our com- 
mitment to Israel, our longstanding friend- 
ship, our sharing of democratic principles and 
human liberty, and our constant search for 

As many of you may know, in the six-day 
war in Israel a number of years ago, the 
strategist and the tactician and the com- 
mander was Prime Minister Rabin. Later he 
was Ambassador to our country. 

And while I was Governor of Georgia, he 
and his wife visited me in Atlanta. He had 
political aspirations then, I imagine, in the 

1 For an exchange of toasts between President Carter 
and Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner at the White 
House on Mar. 7, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 323. 

back of his mind. His success in politics was 
much more rapid than I have achieved. When 
I went to Israel not too long ago, he came 
back from Africa to meet with me and to ex- 
plain to me in a two- or three-hour session in 
my hotel room some of the inner workings and 
hidden mechanism of the Israeli political 
structure. I didn't realize then how well he 
understood them, because shortly afterward 
he became the Prime Minister of that great 
country. Later, I've now become President of 
our country. 

But I think this longstanding relationship 
with him and a personal knowledge of him and 
his deep commitment to peace in a courageous 
way will stand us in good stead as we explore 
the future of our two countries. 

Recently, Secretary of State Vance took a 
trip to the Middle East, began his trip with a 
long conversation with Prime Minister Rabin 
and his Cabinet, members of the Knesset, 
other leaders of Israel, and then subsequently 
went to meet with the leaders of other coun- 
tries in the Middle East to try to explore some 
common ground for future permanent peace 
there, so that Israel might have defensible 
borders so that the peace commitments would 
never be violated, and that could be a sense of 
security about this young country in the fu- 

I can't think of any two nations on Earth 
that more narrowly focus deep commitments 
on a common way for the principles of gov- 
ernment based on mutual background, the 
present considerations on a common basis, 
and in the future a mutual commitment. 

This is a time of great joy for me to have 
Prime Minister Rabin and his wife, Leah, 
come to visit us. And I believe that the next 
two days of discussions between myself and 
him, his leaders and ours, the Cabinet-level 
officers and the leaders of Congress and the 
private community, will be very fruitful. 

Nineteen seventy-seven is a year that 
might very well bring a major step forward 
toward ultimate and permanent peace. And to 
a great degree, the success of this year's 
negotiations and hopes rest on the shoulders 
of a man who in the past has demonstrated his 
capability of dealing with complicated prob- 
lems in a frank and courageous fashion and 


Department of State Bulletin 

who has a vision that is very closely compati- 
ble with the visions of the people of the 
United States. 

So on behalf of our people, I welcome you 
back to our country, Mr. Rabin, and would 
like very much to express our complete com- 
mitment to an even greater interrelationship 
on a common basis with the courageous citi- 
zens whom you represent in the great nation 
of Israel. 

Thank you for coming. You are welcome 


Mr. President, Mrs. Carter: My wife and I 
deeply appreciate your personal welcome and 
your kind, warm words. 

May I say it is always a pleasure to me to be 
back in Washington and to see around me so 
many friends. I wish particularly to thank 
you, Mr. President, for the kind invitation 
that brings me here today. 

Your hospitality enables me to convey in a 
most personal manner the best wishes, the 
friendship, and the esteem of the people and 
the Government of Israel, to you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and to the great people you represent. 

Democratic Israel stands with you in your 
endeavor to foster peace and human rights 
within the family of nations. From this plat- 
form, let me say to you, Mr. President, that 
Israel shall continue to work tirelessly for the 
peace and welfare of our region, strengthened 
and encouraged by the special relationship 
that has long marked the ties between our 
two peoples. 

Let me emphasize to you, Mr. President, 
that I have come from Jerusalem, the City of 
Peace, with a sense of dedication to build a 
structure of peace between Israel and our 
neighbors. Peace is our highest aspiration. It 
is toward this end that Israel commits all its 
energies; for peace is the essence of the herit- 
age we share and the goal of policy we pursue. 
It is a heritage as old, as eternal, and as living 
as the Bible. 

Everything our people stand for, every- 
thing we believe in derives from the Biblical 
definition of what is right and good. In the 

words of Solomon in the Book of Proverbs: 
"Righteousness exalts a nation." 

It has been the moral standing of America 
that induces help among millions longing for a 
better, a more decent, and a more peaceful 
world. It is the understanding and support 
which America has throughout displayed for 
the security and welfare of my own nation 
that moves me now to express to you and 
through you to the American people our deep- 
est gratitude. 

Mr. President, I come knowing that our as- 
pirations and goals are one. It is in this spirit 
that I look forward to our forthcoming talks, 
and it is in this very same spirit that I bring 
to you from Jerusalem our sincere greetings 
of Shalom. 

British Prime Minister Callaghan 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister James Callaghan of the 
United Kingdom made an official visit to 
Washington March 9-12, during which he met 
with President Carter and other government 
officials. Following is an exchange of re- 
marks between President Carter and Prime 
Minister Callaghan at a welcoming ceremony 
on the South Lawn of the White House on 
March 10. l 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14 


It is with a great deal of pleasure person- 
ally, and on behalf of the American people, 
that we welcome to our country and to our na- 
tional capital our good friends from the 
United Kingdom, Prime Minister Callaghan 
and his wife, Audrey. 

I think it is not an exaggeration to say, nor 
is it any reflection on our other friends and 

1 For an exchange of toasts between President Carter 
and Prime Minister Callaghan at a dinner at the White 
House on Mar. 10, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 342. 

April 4, 1977 


allies to say, that we enjoy a special relation- 
ship with Great Britain, with the other coun- 
tries of the United Kingdom. They are our 
closest allies and friends. We share security 
agreements with them, trade agreements 
with them, that are not shared with any other 
country. There has been an intimate relation- 
ship for decades and generations with the 
people of Great Britain that has carved out 
between us an unshakable friendship and 
mutual commitment. 

We are honored today to have the Prime 
Minister with us because of his superb lead- 
ership capability, demonstrated in having 
held the three highest positions in the Gov- 
ernment of Great Britain, even before he be- 
came Prime Minister. 

He also comes here with a special honor 
paid to him by the other nations of the Euro- 
pean Community. He is the President of the 
European Community, and in my own discus- 
sions with him today and tomorrow and to- 
night, we will be talking about matters that 
are bilateral in nature, that involve our secu- 
rity based on the NATO interrelationships; 
and also he will represent the European 
Community itself — nine nations — there. 

We have just celebrated last year our 200th 
birthday, and the people of the entire United 
Kingdom participated in an extraordinary de- 
gree in helping us reconfirm our commitments 
to the essence of the American spirit. 

This is a silver jubilee for Great Britain, for 
the United Kingdom, and we will be honoring 
the Queen, who has served so well over the 
last 25 years. 

There has not been a visit by an American 
President to Great Britain since, I believe, 
1970. But because of our own interest in 
strengthening ties and because of the lead- 
ership capabilities of Prime Minister Cal- 
laghan, I and the leaders of several other na- 
tions will assemble in London in May to talk 
about matters of great mutual interest. 

I look forward to going back to my own 
mother country. Although we have people in 
our nation from many, many nations, I think 
that all of us recognize that, historically and 
politically, Great Britain is still America's 
mother country. 

So I look forward to going to London in 

May. I am very grateful to have Prime Minis- 
ter Callaghan come here. I look forward to- 
night to a banquet. I am going to ask the 
Prime Minister and the Vice President to sing 
a duet for us as they did when the Vice Presi- 
dent visited London not too long ago. 

And I think that this combination of very 
serious security matters, very important eco- 
nomic matters, a spirit of historical friendship 
and also personal friendship, will exemplify 
this visit of our most distinguished visitor. 

Thank you very much. 


Mr. President and Mrs. Carter: Thank you 
very much indeed for your very warm welcome 
this morning and for your very kindly words 
and for the weather, if I may say so, too. 

I am very grateful to you for what you said. 
I am not sure it is all true about me, but it is 
certainly true that I have held all the major 
offices. But I feel a little like the French aris- 
tocrat after the Revolution who was asked 
what he did. And he said, "I survived." And I 
have got a feeling that in politics, to survive is 
probably the most you can hope for. You can 
influence events a little, but that is about it. 

At any rate, I always arrive here, Mr. Pres- 
ident, as you well know, with a very keen 
sense of anticipation for the discussions that 
we have, and on this occasion it is especially 
invigorating to be here at the beginning of 
your new Administration. 

Now, you know, sir, as I know, that the 
friendship between our two countries em- 
braces all parties and all administrations on 
both sides of the Atlantic, whatever they may 
be. But nevertheless, in renewing the bonds 
of friendship — and I hope, sir, that you and I 
will be able to strike up a personal 
friendship — let me say that I do so with a par- 
ticular sense of excitement, an excitement of 
sharing your new hopes, your new aspira- 
tions, your intentions, your new policies, 
being here at the beginning of a new Adminis- 

And Vice President Mondale, whose words 
I found very valuable when he came to 
London — I am not sure that his singing was 


Department of State Bulletin 

quite up to that standard — but certainly he 
communicated to us some of the excitement of 
being in at the start of this new Administra- 
tion in the United States. 

You bear much of the burdens of the free 
world — military burdens, economic burdens, 
aid burdens. But what is more, Mr. President, 
what you can do and what you have already 
begun to do is to influence the political tone of 
the world in a very marked degree. And I 
would like to thank you, sir, and indeed the 
whole American people, that in the leadership 
that you give to the world today, that you 
carry your responsibilities with spirit and 
with a marked constructive thinking, and 
imaginative thinking, too. 

You referred, sir, to the fact that for the 
time being I am President of the European 
Community. Let me hasten to disabuse our 
friends who gather here — that has nothing to 
do with my capacity; it is as we say in the 
United Kingdom, "It just happened to be 
Buggins' turn," and I am Buggins. 

But what I can say on behalf of them all is 
that every member of the Community is de- 
sirous that there should be a close partnership 
and a strengthening of relations between the 
United States and Europe. 

You and I, Mr. President, will be holding 
our discussions in a world which has now ex- 
perienced four years of recession, the deepest 
since the 1930's. Of course, the free world can 
and will emerge from this recession, but we 
need concerted intergovernmental action if we 
are to do so as speedily as possible. 

No one group of nations and no one nation 
can survive permanently as an island of pros- 
perity if the remainder of the world is in re- 
cession. And our task, sir, if I may be bold 
enough to say so, is to see how we can help 
poverty and unemployment among the world's 
people in an era of rapid change that has been 
caused by the unprecedented speed of techno- 
logical development. 

This is going to cause us many problems. 
And I was heartened yesterday, sir, to see 
you calling for a new program to help the 
young people of the United States who need 
training and who are unemployed and who 
you wish to see trained and get back into 

Sir, we shall also need to discuss the eternal 
problem, the never-ending problem of how 
best to maintain and enhance the liberty for 
our own citizens and for people in all parts of 
the world. 

We shall have to consider how to 
strengthen our work for peace and enhance 
our own security, how we can live with the 
different systems, political systems, from our 
own, those that are not based on parliamen- 
tary democracy, as ours is; for if we don't learn 
how to live with them, then with the rapid 
advance of nuclear technology we shall cer- 
tainly die with them. 

And so we have much to talk about, and I 
look forward to our conversations on these 
and many other matters. 

We shall be able to carry the results of our 
discussions with us into the international 
gatherings to which we both belong and espe- 
cially, sir, to the Downing Street summit in 
London on May 7 and 8 to which you have 
kindly accepted my invitation. I hope that we 
shall be able to have prior discussions that 
will lead to positive results from that particu- 
lar conference. 

You, sir, have referred to the relationship 
between our countries. When I was young I 
used to say what I would like to do is have six 
months in the United Kingdom and six 
months in the United States. Getting a bit old 
now, but even so, it is a wonderful place to be. 

You have got an invigorating country here. 
You have problems, but your attitude is al- 
ways how can we lick them? That is what I 
like to see. That is why it is such a pleasure to 
be back here with you, sir, at the beginning of 
your Administration, to wish you every suc- 
cess in the tasks that you are going to have 
to carry through and which you will have our 
great support in all that you endeavor to do, 
because we know that as leaders of the free 
world you will get plenty of criticism. But you 
also need support and encouragement, too. 

So I can assure you, Mr. President, in con- 
clusion, you will receive a very warm wel- 
come when you come to London. We are very 
honored that you should do so on May 7 and 8. 
And I thank you again for your most kindly 
welcome, you and Mrs. Carter, here this 

April 4, 1977 


President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of March 5 

Following are excerpts from the transcript 
of President Carter's telephone call-in radio 
program, "Ask the President," of March 5. 
Walter Cronkite, of CBS News, was 
moderator. 1 

Joseph Willman, of Sterling Heights, 
Mich.: First, of all, Vd like to say good after- 
noon to President Carter and Mr. Cronkite. 
My question right now is, according to the 
UPI story in today's Detroit News, Idi Amin 
has sent squads that have killed 7,000 Chris- 
tians. With this and other happenings there, 
how can we with good conscience trust a man 
with such an ego [inaudible], and if the time 
arises will we use force to get them out, even 
though confrontation with this country is ex- 
pected by Amin? 

The President: Well, it's hard to know how 
to answer that question about future events. 
As you know, we had what was on the border 
of a crisis last weekend. The attitude that we 
took was constantly to monitor what is going 
on in Uganda to deal directly with Amin in a 
very forceful way, to let him know that we 
were expecting American lives to be 

We also got the help of several national 
leaders who are quite close to Amin. Primar- 
ily those are of the Moslem faith, and they 
contacted him directly. 

We also got the Federal Republic of 
Germany — West Germany — who has diplomat- 
ic leaders in Uganda, in Entebbe, Uganda, to 
contact Amin. 

And he was constantly giving me assurance 
through cables that the Americans would not 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 

be hurt. As you know, the outcome of that 
weekend's tension was that he eventually said 
that the meeting with the Americans was 
called off and that anyone who wanted to 
leave or come into Uganda from our country 
would be permitted to do so. 

I think that it's obvious that we'll do what- 
ever we can to protect American lives 
throughout the world. We have in the past, 
before I became President, informed the 
American people in Uganda — and I might say 
in several other countries around the world — 
that there was a potentially dangerous cir- 
cumstance for them and that if they were 
primarily concerned with a peaceful life, they 
ought to change countries. 

We do know that most of the persons who 
are Americans in Uganda are missionaries, 
deeply committed to their own religious faith. 
They've got an option to leave, and they've 
decided to stay. So, I think at this time I feel 
that the American lives there will be pro- 

We did act, I think, forcefully and effec- 
tively with Amin; we had a lot of help from 
other nations. And I can't say what I will do 
in the future except to try to handle the situa- 
tion similarly to what I did last weekend. 

Mark Fendrick, of Brooklyn, N.Y.: Good 
afternoon, Mr. President. What Pd like to ask 
is in relationship to the attempts for return- 
ing to a normal relationship with Cuba. Now, 
in the paper the last couple of days here in 
New York there's been talk about the Yankees 
baseball team going to Cuba. 

Do you think that this is a possibility in the 
near future, and do you think that normal re- 
lations to Cuba are possible again within the 
near future? 

The President: Well, there are varying de- 


Department of State Bulletin 

grees of relationships with Cuba. As you 
know, we have had some discussions with 
them in the past; for instance, on the anti- 
hijacking agreement which expires this 
spring. And we now have no visitation rights 
by American citizens to go to Vietnam, to 
North Korea, to Cuba, and one or two other 

We do have a procedure already in effect 
whereby a limited number of Americans can go 
into Cuba without using a passport because of 
a prior agreement with the Cuban Govern- 

I would like to do what I can to ease ten- 
sions with Cuba. It's only 90 miles, as you 
know, from the Florida coast. And I don't 
know yet what we will do. Before any full 
normalization of relationships can take place, 
though, Cuba would have to make some fairly 
substantial changes in their attitude. I would 
like to insist, for instance, that they not inter- 
fere in the internal affairs of countries in this 
hemisphere and that they decrease their mili- 
tary involvement in Africa and that they rein- 
force a commitment to human rights by re- 
leasing political prisoners that have been in 
jail now in Cuba for 17 or 18 years, things of 
that kind. 

But I think before we can reach that point 
we'll have to have discussions with them. And 
I do intend to see discussions initiated with 
Cuba quite early on reestablishing the anti- 
hijacking agreement, arriving at a fishing 
agreement between us and Cuba, since our 
200-mile limits do overlap between Florida 
and Cuba. And I would not be averse in the 
future to seeing our visitation rights per- 
mitted as well. 

Mr. Fendrick. In relationship, though, to 
the Yankees playing an exhibition game 
there, I've noticed that Secretary Vance has 
backed this idea. Do you think that that's a 
possibility this season? 

The President: It's a possibility, yes. 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, may I ask, it 
seemed that Secretary Vance indicated just 
the last day or so that there would be no pre- 
conditions in discussions with Cuba. Are you 
now saying that there will be? 

The President: No. The preconditions that I 
describe would be prior to full normalization of 
relationships, the establishment of embassies 
in both our countries, the complete freedom of 
trade between the two countries. 

But you couldn't possibly arrive at a solu- 
tion to some of those questions without dis- 
cussions. So, we will begin discussions with 
Cuba, if they approve the idea, fairly shortly 
on the items that I have described — increased 
visitation of Americans to and from Cuba, the 
fishing-rights question that has to be resolved 
for the protection of our own fishermen, and 
also the antihijacking agreement which has 
been in effect in the past but is about to 

John Melfi, of Johnson City, N.Y.: I know 
we have a foreign aid policy to help countries 
in need, but why do we spend so much on this 
when we have so much poverty, unemploy- 
ment, et cetera, in our own country? 

The President: Well, John, I am going to 
take a position that's not very popular, politi- 
cally speaking. We only spend about three- 
tenths of 1 percent of our gross national prod- 
uct on foreign aid, which is about half the 
proportion that is allotted to this purpose by 
other countries like France, Germany and so 

I don't particularly want to increase this 
greatly, but I would like for it to be predict- 
able. Also, in the past, we've not had foreign 
aid used in an effective way. As one of my 
friends has said quite often, I'm not in favor of 
taxing the poor people in our rich country and 
sending the money to the rich people in poor 
countries; and quite often that has been done 
in the past. 

We have also a need, in my opinion, to sup- 
port the lending institutions, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank. They 
give aid to other countries in the form of 
loans, sometimes low-interest loans. But in- 
stead of just handing gifts out that are kind of 
bad, as a basic philosophy — and also that are 
abused — I would favor contributing to the 
capital stock of these international or regional 

April 4, 1977 


lending agencies. I believe we will get a lot 
better return on our money. 

And I might say that my own experience in 
this first six weeks has been that the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, for instance, and the 
World Bank are quite strict on a nation that 
makes a loan. They make them work hard to- 
ward balancing their budget. Quite often they 
require them to clean up corruption. They 
make them assess very carefully their trade 

So, I believe that the lending procedure in 
foreign aid is much better than the gift proce- 
dure, and when direct grants are made, we 
ought to do more than we have in the past to 
get the grants to people who actually need it. 

Within those changes, I think that our 
present level of foreign aid is about right, 

Mr. Strickland: I am John Strickland from 
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and I want to 
thank you for this opportunity to talk with 
you. And I would like to know what your sen- 
timents are on the Panama Canal 190U 
treaty, and changing it. 

The President: Okay. It is good to hear 
from you, Mr. Strickland. My sister lives in 
Fayetteville, as you may know. I am glad to 
answer your question. 

We are now negotiating with Panama as ef- 
fectively as we can. As you may or may not 
know, the treaty signed when Theodore 
Roosevelt was President gave Panama 
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone it- 
self. It gave us control over the Panama Canal 
Zone as though we had sovereignty. So we've 
always had a legal sharing of responsibility 
over the Panama Canal Zone. 

As far as sovereignty is concerned, I don't 
have any hangup about that. I would hope 
that after that — and expect that after the 
year 2000 that we would have an assured 
capacity or capability of our country with 
Panama guaranteeing that the Panama Canal 
would be open and of use to our own nation 
and to other countries. 

So, the subject of the negotiation now — it 
has been going on quite a while — is to phase 
out our military operations in the Panama 

Canal Zone, but to guarantee that even after 
the year 2000 that we would still be able to 
keep the Panama Canal open to the use of 
American and other ships. 

President Carter Interviewed 
by Media Representatives 

President Carter met with a group of 22 
publishers, editors, and broadcasters from 20 
states on March U- Following is an excerpt 
from the transcript of the interview. 1 

Q. You spoke of the arms procurement as 
part of one of these bullet-biting operations. 
There has been a good deal of controversy 
about American arms sales abroad to other 
nations. The argument has been made re- 
peatedly by supporters of that, that it is 
necessary to maintain the balance of pay- 
ments and maintain our defense industry. 
What kind of look are you taking at that $12 
billion-a-year annual rate of sales? 

The President: A hard look. Here again, I 
think that if there is one person in the gov- 
ernment that ultimately has the responsibility 
to take a position and to make a decision and 
then explain the consequences of that decision 
to the American people, it's the President; not 
just because it's me — somebody has got to do 
it, and it has to be the President. 

When Cy Vance visited all the Middle East- 
ern countries early this month, there was one 
unanimous statement made by every head of 
state, and that was that we are spending too 
much of our money on weapons. 

Now, it's hard for one of those countries, 
for instance — I'm singling out that part of the 
world — unilaterally to stop buying weapons. 
But every one of them unilaterally said they 
would like to stop. And I think that this puts a 
responsibility back on our country, the major 
arms supplier of the world, to try to induce 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Iran and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Syria 
and Israel and Jordan to cut down on the 
quantity of arms they buy. 

Now, I've also been in touch with the Soviet 
leaders, with the French leaders, with the 
German leaders, and with the British, to join 
with us in an effort to cut down on the quan- 
tity of arms sold throughout the world. And 
they've responded favorably so far. We've not 
reached any tangible agreement, and I 
can't — I don't want to claim that we have. But 
there is a general concern around the world 
that the arms sales are excessive, and I think 
that our country can take some unilateral ac- 
tion. We can take a considerable amount of ac- 
tion bilaterally, when we get the buyer or the 
purchaser of arms to agree to cut down the 
quantity of their orders, and on a multilateral 
basis, it's going to be slower to come. But I 
think we can get our own allies and our poten- 
tial adversaries to minimize or to reduce their 
previous arms sales rates. 

So I feel very strongly about this. And I be- 
lieve that in the long run, our own economy 
and the world peace will be enhanced by shift- 
ing production and expenditure of funds to 
other services or goods. 

I'll just add one other thing: When you look 
at it on a job-cost ratio basis, how many jobs 
do you get for a million dollars spent? One of 
the most inefficient industries is the defense 
weapons industry. And I think that we need 
not continue with a supposition that in the 
long run the expenditure of the limited 
amount of financial resources of the whole 
world and of our own country is going to be 
increased or decreased. When you spend 
money for defense, you don't spend it on edu- 
cation or health or other services or goods. 
And I think the shift away from weapons to- 
ward peaceful goods and services in the long 
run is favorable for world peace, and also you 
get more jobs per dollar spent. 

Q. Mr. President, I am from the Rio 
Grande Valley in Texas. And there is a prob- 
lem there that affects the people that live in 
that area, but it also affects everybody else in 
the country. And that's the drug problem. A 
day doesn't pass when there are not arrests 
made for the drug smuggling, usually across 
the border of Mexico. Last week, nine tons of 

marijuana was confiscated. In your recent 
discussions with Mexican President Lopez 
Portillo, did you discuss this problem? 

The President: Yes. Yes, we did discuss it 
at length. I would guess that 70 percent of our 
heroin comes to our country now from Mexico. 
And the only way we can reduce that particu- 
lar influx of drugs to our country is to cooper- 
ate with the nations where it is grown. We 
can, by infrared photography, either we or 
the Mexican Government, for instance, iden- 
tify the fields where the heroin poppies are 
grown. And by going to the farms, the Mexi- 
can soldiers go into the farms, they can de- 
stroy those poppyfields before the harvest is 
complete. At the same time, many of those 
farmers are small, poverty stricken, live in 
remote areas of the mountains. I think you 
have to be above 3,000 feet to grow heroin 
poppies, and alternative crops need to be pro- 
vided for them. 

So we discussed this at length, President 
Lopez Portillo and I did, and we agreed that 
with subcabinet-level representatives that we 
would explore this question further. A part of 
it, obviously, is trying to stop drugs as they 
cross the border. But that's a very, very inef- 
ficient operation. The cost is enormous. And 
as you know, a tiny volume of a very large 
quantity of heroin makes concealment very, 
very easy. And so, to stop the drugs where 
they are being produced is by far the better 
approach. Lopez Portillo is also deeply con- 
cerned about this. He feels the same way I do. 

I've appointed as my own representative, 
here in the White House, Dr. Peter Bourne, 
who is probably the world's foremost expert 
on heroin, cocaine, and marijuana — even 
alcohol — all the drugs that are bad. He's trav- 
eled throughout the world at the invitation of 
other countries. He goes into countries that 
we can't even get into because we don't have 
diplomatic relationships with them. But be- 
cause of his knowledge about the subject, 
they bring him in to help them with their 
problems. And he is heading up our drug ef- 
fort in this country. And I think that with him 
and the equivalent leaders in the other na- 
tions, particularly Mexico, we can help a great 
deal in the future. 

April 4, 1977 



Southern Africa in the Global Context 

Statement by Philip C. Habib 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs 1 

I am pleased to be here today, Mr. Chair- 
man, to speak to this committee on a critical 
question: the importance for the world at 
large of achieving just solutions to the prob- 
lems of southern Africa and the role which the 
United States can play in contributing to 
those solutions. I believe that our time to- 
gether can be most productively spent in an 
exchange of ideas and will therefore keep my 
prepared remarks to a minimum. 

I particularly welcome the opportunity to 
appear before you at a time when the whole 
question of U.S. policy toward southern Af- 
rica is under urgent and comprehensive re- 
view within the Department of State and 
other concerned executive agencies. The 
views and concerns expressed by your com- 
mittee here today can help us to clarify the 
issues and to formulate policies to deal with 
those issues forthrightly and positively. 

I can tell you that the general thrust of our 
policy review has been to find ways of 
strengthening the commitment of the United 
States to social justice and racial equality in 
southern Africa and of demonstrating that 
commitment in tangible and meaningful ways. 
It is, regrettably, the case that our actions in 
the past have sometimes led others, both here 
in the United States and abroad, to question 
the depth and sincerity of that commitment. 
It is the Administration's earnest hope that 

1 Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
House Committee on International Relations on Mar. 3. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

when the historical record is finally written, 
there will be no shadow of a doubt as to where 
the United States stood on one of the great 
moral and political issues of our time. 

Perhaps the most concrete demonstration 
to date of that renewed sense of commitment 
is the Administration's unequivocal support 
for efforts to repeal the so-called Byrd 
amendment, under which the United States 
has since 1971 imported raw materials from 
Southern Rhodesia in open violation of its in- 
ternational obligations as spelled out in the 
U.N. Charter. Secretary of State Vance, tes- 
tifying before the Senate Subcommittee on 
African Affairs on February 10, stressed the 
importance which President Carter personally 
attaches to the repeal of this measure. 

I would like for a moment to focus on the 
broader context within which our policies to- 
ward southern Africa must be viewed. In con- 
structing a policy to deal with the problems of 
that region, we must have a sure understand- 
ing of our own national interests and act ac- 

What are those interests, and how do we 
serve them best in relation to southern Af- 

First, I believe that our foreign policy must 
be true to our own ideals as a nation. Presi- 
dent Carter has, on many occasions, stated 
clearly and forcefully his own personal com- 
mitment to human rights. That commitment 
requires our firm and clear opposition to ra- 
cial and social injustice wherever it exists. A 
policy toward southern Africa that is not 
firmly grounded on this principle would be in- 
consistent with our national character and 


Department of State Bulletin 

therefore would not command the support of 
the American people. Moreover, it would cast 
doubt on our commitment to social justice 
both here at home and elsewhere in the world. 

Secondly, we believe firmly that the people 
of Africa hold the key to the solution of Afri- 
can problems. The United States will remain 
fully committed to using its political and eco- 
nomic influence and its diplomatic offices to 
support racial and social progress on the Afri- 
can Continent. But it is not for us, or for any 
other external power, to attempt to impose its 
own ideas and solutions. It is for this reason 
that during his recent visit to Africa our Am- 
bassador to the United Nations, Andrew 
Young, stressed that U.S. policy toward 
southern Africa, and Africa as a whole, would 
be developed in the closest possible consulta- 
tions with African leaders. 

The other important reason for our prefer- 
ence for African solutions to African problems 
is to avoid situations which make Africa an 
arena for great-power rivalry, as happened in 
Angola. Prolonged violence in southern Af- 
rica, born out of racial discrimination and so- 
cial and political injustice, could create oppor- 
tunities for foreign intervention and confron- 
tation. We believe that our best defense 
against this possibility is to support policies 
that will limit the areas where potential con- 
flict may arise. 

The United States recognizes that other na- 
tions, most notably the developed countries of 
Europe and Asia, also have important inter- 
ests in the southern African region. In many 
instances, their interests and influence 
greatly exceed our own. We are convinced 
that our traditional friends are equally con- 
cerned and anxious to find solutions to the dif- 
ficult problems of the region. To the extent 
that we can combine and coordinate our ef- 
forts, the prospects for encouraging meaning- 
ful social and political change will be greatly 
enhanced. During his visit to Europe and Ja- 
pan, Vice President Mondale stressed that the 
United States intends to consult even more 
closely in the future on ways to bring our col- 
lective influence to bear in seeking solutions 
to the problems of southern Africa. 

From the standpoint of our own economic 
and strategic interests, we maintain firmly 

that the United States has no reason to fear 
the necessary and inevitable achievement of 
racial equality and social justice in southern 
Africa. To hold any other view would be to 
refute the history of the past three decades and 
to deny the obvious fact that the United States 
has been able to establish cooperative and 
constructive relations with newly emergent 
nations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
Indeed, it is only where progress toward so- 
cial, racial, and political justice is delayed or 
frustrated that the United States has any 
cause for concern that conditions may arise 
that are inhospitable to our basic national 
interests. It is for this reason as well that we 
must remain fully committed to helping those 
who seek rapid, peaceful, and orderly change 
in southern Africa. 

Finally, the United States has a stake in 
what happens in southern Africa because of 
our belief that political harmony can and must 
be achieved in diverse societies like our own. 
The world is afflicted with nations in which 
men of good will have not yet convinced their 
countrymen that ethnic, racial, and religious 
differences do not constitute a cause for dis- 
crimination and violence. Success in achieving 
orderly transitions to democratic rule in 
southern Africa, with protection of human 
rights for all, regardless of race, will help 
those everywhere who seek peaceful resolu- 
tions to conflict arising from ethnic, racial, or 
religious differences. 

Having outlined the considerations upon 
which we believe U.S. policy toward southern 
Africa should rest, I would like to review 
briefly the status of the Administration's ef- 
forts to date to develop a policy consistent 
with these general principles and goals. 

U.S. Position on Rhodesia and Namibia 

In early 1976 the United States, in consulta- 
tion with the frontline Presidents, began its 
active involvement in the search for settle- 
ments to the unresolved problems of Namibia 
and Rhodesia. As the committee is aware, the 
previous Administration achieved a major 
breakthrough when, after months of intensive 
diplomatic effort, it persuaded Ian Smith to 
announce publicly last September 24 his ac- 

April4, 1977 


ceptance in principle of majority rule in 
Rhodesia within two years. 

That announcement led to the convening of 
a conference of the Rhodesian parties under 
British chairmanship in Geneva last October. 
Regrettably, that conference adjourned in 
December without measurable progress being 
achieved on the central issue of the establish- 
ment of an interim government that would 
guide the territory to majority rule and inde- 

A mission to southern Africa led by Ambas- 
sador Ivor Richard, the British Chairman of 
the Geneva conference, was unsuccessful in 
bridging the gap between the Rhodesian au- 
thorities and the nationalists. On January 24 
Ian Smith publicly rejected proposals that en- 
visioned a British presence in Rhodesia dur- 
ing the transitional period. That presence was 
designed to serve as a balancing force be- 
tween whites and blacks, assuring the former 
of a tranquil transition and the latter of an ir- 
reversible process toward majority rule 
within a short, fixed time frame. 

This Administration's response to Smith's 
rejection was categoric. We stated our firm 
support for the British and our belief that the 
proposals put forward by them offered a 
sound basis for continued negotiations. We 
warned Smith that his intention to seek an 
internal solution from which leading 
nationalists would be excluded would clearly 
be unworkable and unacceptable. It remains 
our firm conviction that an internal settle- 
ment that excludes important nationalist 
leaders will not bring an end to the war and, 
on the contrary, could well fuel the fires of 
civil strife. 

On February 10 Secretary Vance repeated 
before the Senate Subcommittee on African 
Affairs our clear statement to Smith that 
under no circumstances can the Rhodesian re- 
gime count on any form of American assist- 
ance in its effort to prevent majority rule. In 
the same statement, the Secretary reaffirmed 
the Administration's unequivocal support for 
repeal of the Byrd amendment. He under- 
scored the importance that repeal would have 
in strengthening our own leverage in promot- 
ing a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and in 
disabusing Ian Smith and the present Rhode- 

sian authorities of any hope they might still 
have that the United States will assist them 
in their efforts to prevent majority rule. 

The Administration will not be content to 
end its efforts here, however. We are con- 
tinuing to seek other ways to bring our posi- 
tive influence to bear in encouraging rapid, 
peaceful, and orderly change in southern Af- 

Despite Smith's rejection, neither the 
British nor we have abandoned the search for 
a negotiated settlement. During February we 
have twice consulted with British officials 
here in Washington, most recently last week, 
to consider what new initiatives might be 
necessary to get negotiations going again. On 
those occasions we have reaffirmed our sup- 
port for the leading role that Britain, as the 
recognized constitutional authority in 
Rhodesia, must continue to play. 

We are urgently consulting with the African 
parties most interested and concerned on pos- 
sible next steps. Ambassador Young's recent 
visit to Africa afforded the Administration an 
early opportunity to establish contact at a 
high level on this and other issues of impor- 
tance to Africans and to stress our intention 
to develop our policies in close consultation 
with them. 

So long as there is no significant progress 
through peaceful means toward the achieve- 
ment of Africa's legitimate aspirations for ra- 
cial equality and social justice, Africa's com- 
mitment to armed struggle to achieve these 
ends will remain a real one. Nevertheless we 
believe that the leaders of Africa would all 
prefer a solution that prevents further 
bloodshed and destruction. It is the task of 
diplomacy, and particularly of British and 
American diplomacy in this instance, to help 
the parties involved find ways to make a 
negotiated solution possible. 

With respect to Namibia, the United States 
has supported and will continue to support 
U.N. resolutions calling for South Africa to 
end its illegal occupation of the territory and 
for free elections there under U.N. supervi- 
sion. We believe that all of Namibia's authen- 
tic political voices, including specifically 
SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization], must be given the opportunity to 


Department of State Bulletin 

express themselves on the country's political 
future. Any attempted solution that excludes 
important Namibian political groups or that 
fails to win the acceptance of the international 
community is no solution at all and will not 
receive the endorsement of the United States. 
During his visit to Africa, Ambassador 
Young found widespread support for the con- 
tinuation of American efforts to develop a 
negotiating framework within which the prin- 
cipal parties can establish the steps leading to 
independence and majority rule in Namibia. 
We have assured all of the interested parties 
that our diplomatic good offices will remain 
available and that our efforts to promote a 
settlement acceptable to the United Nations 
and the international community will con- 

South African Role 

A key factor in the success of American dip- 
lomatic efforts to date has been our ability to 
speak directly and frankly with all of the in- 
volved parties. By virtue of its proximity and 
ties with Rhodesia and its occupation of 
Namibia, South Africa's role in the resolution 
of both problems cannot be ignored. With re- 
spect to Rhodesia, we have recently received 
indications that the South African Govern- 
ment is still interested in a negotiated settle- 
ment. With respect to Namibia, we are at- 
tempting to ascertain whether South Africa is 
genuinely interested in moving toward an in- 
ternationally acceptable solution. 

So long as we are assured of the South Afri- 
can willingness to be helpful, the United 
States will be prepared to continue its consul- 
tations with South Africa's leaders on these 
issues. It should be made clear to all, how- 
ever, that the United States has no interest in 
any proposed solutions that would com- 
promise the legitimate interests of the people 
involved and their desires for majority rule 
with full sovereignty and independence. 

Moreover, our willingness to consult with 
South Africa on these issues should in no way 
be construed as an acceptance of that coun- 
try's domestic policies. The violence in So- 
weto and elsewhere bears grim testimony to a 
society that must change, and change radi- 

cally, or face the sure calamity of racial vio- 
lence and chaos. 

We will not hesitate to speak out publicly, 
as appropriate, on events in South Africa, and 
we will continue to make known to the South 
African authorities our views, urging peaceful 
and fundamental change. In addition, we will 
seek ways of persuading South Africa that 
such change is in the best interest of all its 
citizens, black and white alike. 

We are looking at the extent to which the 
United States and other nations can use their 
influence to both encourage and facilitate 
change. At the same time, however, we must 
remain sensitive to the danger that the at- 
titudes and reactions of the outside world to 
events in South Africa could have the unfor- 
tunate effect of engendering greater isolation 
and resistance to change. We must take care 
that our own actions nurture, rather than in- 
hibit, the changes that we believe can and 
must be made. 

The challenge that confronts our diplomacy, 
and that of other nations committed to the 
cause of social justice and racial equality in 
southern Africa, is to find ways of transcend- 
ing the barriers of fear and suspicion and to 
point the way to solutions that will allow all of 
the people of the region to live in dignity and 
peace. There can be no question but that the 
path ahead will be fraught with extreme dif- 
ficulties. But neither can there be any ques- 
tion of our dedication to continuing the 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Markup of S. 1439: Export Reorganization Act of 1976. 
Meeting before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy. August 26-September 14, 1976. 274 pp. 

United States Contributions to International Organiza- 
tions. Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1975. H. 
Doc. 95-11. January 1977. 126 pp. 

Messages from the President of the United States 
transmitting governing international fishery agree- 
ments. Agreement with the Republic of Korea; H. 
Doc. 95-78; February 21, 1977; 10 pp. Agreement 
with Japan; H. Doc. 95-79; February 21, 1977; 13 pp. 
Agreement with the European Economic Community; 
H. Doc. 95-80; February 21, 1977; 9 pp. Agreement 
with Spain; H. Doc. 95-81; February 21, 1977; 12 pp. 

April 4, 1977 


U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs in East Asia 

Following is a statement made before the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions on March 10 by Richard C. Holbrooke, 
then Assistant Secretary-designate for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, whose nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on March 23. l 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
testify today on our economic and security as- 
sistance programs in East Asia and the 
Pacific. I greatly look forward to establishing 
a constructive, compatible relationship with 
this subcommittee and to working closely with 
its members. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the end of 
U.S. involvement in Indochina signals a new 
era in East Asia. While tensions persist, they 
are confined in scope and there is no major 
conflict in progress. It appears that all of the 
major powers, at least for the present, favor a 
continuation of this situation. For many East 
Asian countries, economic prospects are bet- 
ter than ever before. 

There are, nevertheless, major uncertain- 
ties in the area. For example: Relationships 
among the three states of Indochina and be- 
tween Indochina and neighboring Southeast 
Asian countries are still ambivalent and could 
turn for the worse as easily as go for the bet- 
ter. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is 
presently quiet, compared to the upsurge of 
violence last year, but it, too, is unstable. 
Many countries are trying to cope, internally, 
with the unaccustomed absence of wartime 
pressures and the distortions these pressures 
tend to cause in both economic and political 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

life. In brief, East Asia is undergoing its own 
transition from an unfortunate past to an un- 
certain future, albeit with high hopes for what 
the future will hold. 

The changing circumstances in East Asia 
and our attitude toward this region obviously 
require us to take a fresh look at our present 
policies. As you know, we are considering new 
approaches to a number of issues, such as the 
reduction of our ground forces in Korea, the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China, the renegotiation 
of our use of military facilities in the Philip- 
pines, and more effective ways to improve ob- 
servance of human rights. While we will need 
additional time to formulate fully detailed po- 
sitions on these questions, several broad pol- 
icy guidelines are already clear: 

— The United States shall remain an 
Asian-Pacific power. 

— We shall preserve a balanced and flexible 
military posture in the western Pacific. 

— We shall maintain close ties to Japan. 

— We shall make efforts to normalize diplo- 
matic relations with the People's Republic of 
China, with due regard for the security of the 
people of Taiwan. 

— We have already moved forward on the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with 
Vietnam, with the forthcoming departure of a 
Presidential Commission to Hanoi. 

— Our security and economic ties with our 
allies in New Zealand and Australia remain 

— We intend to phase out our ground forces 
in Korea, while insuring that the security of 
Korea is in no way threatened. Our troop 
withdrawal will be carried out in close consul- 
tation with the Republic of Korea and with 


Department of State Bulletin 

— The United States continues to have an 
interest in Southeast Asia and will play an 
appropriate role there. We look forward, for 
example, to successful negotiations with the 
Philippines on the use of bases there. 

— The United States is dedicated to improv- 
ing the world economic structure and to this 
end will work with both developed and de- 
veloping countries in East Asia. At the same 
time, we will promote mutually beneficial 
bilateral trade and investment. 

— We expect continued cooperation with the 
individual countries of East Asia and eagerly 
await the opening of economic consultations 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Na- 
tions (ASEAN), comprising Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 

Purposes of Assistance Programs 

I will now address the more specific ques- 
tion of U.S. economic and security assistance 
in East Asia. With regard to AID [Agency for 
International Development], we have only 
development programs in this region. 

On March 2 Secretary Vance testified be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
of the House Appropriations Committee on 
our foreign assistance programs. I would like 
to reiterate several of the comments the Sec- 
retary made that are especially relevant to 
East Asia. 

First, he emphasized that the United 
States' foreign economic assistance reflects 
our nation's concern for the world's poor. 

Second, he noted that our own economic 
prosperity is intertwined with the fortunes of 
other nations and that we must move swiftly, 
in concert with developing countries, toward 
expanding global supplies of food, energy, and 
raw materials, toward coping with population 
growth, and toward fostering economic de- 

Third, he pointed out that our selective 
military assistance supports the security of 
our friends and allies, thus providing them 
with greater opportunities for social and eco- 
nomic progress. 

Finally, the Secretary set forth the De- 

partment's views on human rights, giving 
strong support to the observance of human 
rights throughout the world and favoring ex- 
pression of this principle in our foreign eco- 
nomic assistance programs; however, no sim- 
ple formula can be applied with regard to 
human rights violations, since economic and 
security goals must be taken into considera- 
tion along with our great concern for each in- 
dividual's case. 

In recent years, there has been greater 
economic growth in the East Asian region — an 
important market as well as significant source 
of such raw materials as petroleum, tin, rub- 
ber, and coconut — than in any other part of 
the world. Yet despite impressive progress in 
certain economic sectors, the nations of 
Southeast Asia still have far to go in their de- 
velopment efforts, particularly in meeting the 
needs of the rural and urban poor. 

We feel our bilateral economic assistance ef- 
forts are truly helping the most needy ele- 
ments of the Asian population as well as fur- 
thering our own policy objectives. 

In our own economic assistance programs, 
we have tried to enhance regional cohesion. 
Cooperative organizations for which we pro- 
vided the financial impetus several years ago 
are now functioning on their own with the full 
support of the Asians themselves. With this in 
mind, we are looking forward optimistically to 
economic consultations later this year with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
While we hope that these talks will emphasize 
the desirability of fostering close and mutu- 
ally beneficial trade and investment relations, 
we wish to hear views on other ways the 
United States can help ASEAN's regional 

Of course, in addition to these bilateral pro- 
grams we contribute substantially to multilat- 
eral financial institutions, such as the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment (IBRD) and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). These institutions are particu- 
larly important, and I urge the subcommittee 
to support the Administration's request for 
their full funding. As you know, our support 
encourages other donors, thus multiplying the 
effect of our contribution. 

April 4, 1977 


We propose six recipients for security as- 
sistance in fiscal year 1978: the Republic of 
China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. 

With regard to the Republic of China, we 
are in the process of phasing out our security 
assistance program and thus are proposing 
this year only $25 million in credits and a 
small sum for grant training. Korea and the 
Philippines will be discussed separately. In 
recent times Indonesia and Malaysia have 
emphasized economic development and have 
kept military spending to a minimum. How- 
ever, since the Communist victories in In- 
dochina, the Indonesians have become more 
concerned about their security and are mak- 
ing modest efforts to upgrade their own de- 
fenses. We feel our security assistance is an 
appropriate contribution to the preservation 
of the independence of these countries and to 
regional stability in the still-uncertain post- 
Vietnam period. 

Thailand is a country with obvious security 
concerns — stemming from both hostile 
neighbors and an active, externally supported 
insurgency — and one with which we have had 
a longstanding security relationship. Again, 
we believe assistance to Thailand is an impor- 
tant contribution under present circumstances 
to regional security and an expression of con- 
tinued U.S. interest in Southeast Asia. 

Turning to our economic assistance pro- 
grams, you will find them focused primarily 
on the rural poor, on those people who have 
not shared adequately in the relative prosper- 
ity of much of the region. Our first long-term 
objective is to attain a 3.5 percent growth 
rate in annual production of food grains by 
1985. Our second goal is to slow down the 
population increases which often cancel out 
increases in food production. Moreover, we 
have important health and education pro- 
grams which similarly are aimed at improving 
the quality of rural life and furthering agricul- 
tural development. I feel that this emphasis in 
our program reflects the needs of the recip- 
ient countries, as well as the concern for the 
poor expressed by Congress in assistance 

Assistance to Republic of Korea 

I understand you are especially interested 
in our assistance programs for Korea and the 

With regard to Korea, our policy decisions 
should be made in the light of our primary ob- 
jective: to maintain a deterrent that will in- 
sure peace on the peninsula. Although North 
Korea refuses to renew the dialogue with the 
South which was initiated in 1972, remains in- 
transigent on all the political issues which di- 
vide Korea, and continues to pursue its goal of 
reunification of the peninsula, we have deter- 
mined that a phased withdrawal of American 
ground forces can be undertaken while still 
meeting our security goal. This withdrawal 
will be carried out on a timetable yet to be 
determined. In order to maintain the military 
balance on the peninsula and deter renewed 
North Korean aggression, we will maintain 
our air capability in Korea and will continue to 
assist in the strengthening of the armed 
forces of the Republic of Korea through a pro- 
gram of foreign military sales assistance. This 
assistance is designed to concentrate on areas 
where Korean capabilities need improvement. 

The impressive economic development 
achieved by the Republic of Korea has allowed 
us to phase out our economic assistance, ex- 
cept for a proposed title I Public Law 480 
program in fiscal year 1978 of $109.3 million. 
Similarly, Korean economic progress led to 
the termination of grant military assistance in 
fiscal year 1976, except for a small sum for the 
costs of delivery of previously funded mate- 
riel. The Republic of Korea has formulated its 
own force improvement plan, which seems to 
be both militarily and economically feasible. 
This plan calls for expenditure of approxi- 
mately $5 billion for the period 1976-81, of 
which roughly $3.5 billion will be in foreign 
exchange. Most of this foreign exchange will 
be expended in the United States. We believe 
the sum proposed for credit sales — $275 mil- 
lion in fiscal year 1978 — is appropriate in view 
of our mutual security interests and our de- 
sire to strengthen Korean forces as we phase 
out our ground troops. 

As President Carter has made clear, we are 


Department of State Bulletin 

deeply concerned about human rights viola- 
tions in Korea. We are particularly concerned 
with restrictions on political activity which 
have led to the arrest of many Korean citizens 
voicing peaceful opposition to the present 
government. We will continue to express our 
concern in authoritative ways and to encour- 
age a human rights situation consistent with 
normally accepted international standards. 

At the same time, we believe it would be a 
serious mistake to cut back our longstanding 
assistance to the South Korean armed forces 
which helps these forces better cope with the 
formidable task of protecting their country 
against the threat from the north. Moreover, 
most South Koreans, including domestic critics 
of the government, strongly favor continuation 
of U.S. -Korean security ties and assistance. 
In brief, we will work for an improvement in 
South Korea's defensive capability while press- 
ing vigorously for an improvement in the 
human rights situation. 

Our Public Law 480 program in Korea is 
tied to an understanding we have with the 
Koreans on textiles. The United States has 
benefited from this arrangement. Cuts in this 
program would mostly affect agricultural de- 
velopment and would not, I feel, be an appro- 
priate or effective response to the human 
rights issue. 

Programs for the Philippines 

Turning to the Philippines, it may be useful 
to recall that the United States has strong 
and unique historical ties with the Philippines 
as well as an important military interest in 
that country because of its strategic location. 
Our security relationship is defined in three 
major agreements: the 1947 Military Base 
Agreement, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, 
and a Military Assistance Agreement, revised 
in 1953. The base agreement is currently 
under renegotiation. As you know, the Ad- 
ministration is currently studying the status 
of these negotiations with the Philippines. 
Pending the outcome of this review, it is dif- 
ficult to comment concerning these negotia- 
tions; but it is clear that if agreement is 

reached it will include an element of compen- 
sation beyond the programs I am presenting 
to you today. 

Our security ties with the Philippines and 
our military facilities there serve important 
U.S. national interests today, just as they did 
during World War II and during the war in 
Vietnam. They contribute significantly to the 
maintenance of stability in Southeast Asia and 
to our ability to keep vital sealanes open in 
the event of hostilities. Finally, our bases 
contribute to our ability to meet our obliga- 
tions under the bilateral mutual defense pact 
with the Philippine Government concluded in 

The Philippines views our security assist- 
ance program as evidence of continued U.S. 
interest in and commitment to the defense of 
that country and as an important factor in our 
contribution to the bilateral security relation- 
ship. As its contribution to a mutual security 
relationship, the Philippine Government 
grants us the use of a number of military 
facilities, the most important of which are 
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. 
Moreover, the Philippine Government is at- 
tempting to increase, with our help, its ability 
to meet its own defense needs. 

The security assistance proposed for fiscal 
year 1978 — $19.6 million in grant materiel, 
$800,000 for training, and $20 million in credit 
sales — represents a continuation of existing 
programs. These programs are aimed at im- 
proving the ability of the Philippine armed 
forces to defend their own country. 

The United States also has important eco- 
nomic ties with the Philippines: over $1 billion 
in investment, a flourishing trade relation- 
ship, and a large resident American business 
community. We are currently discussing with 
the Philippine Government a new agreement 
regarding economic and commercial relations 
that will replace the expired Laurel-Langley 

It is clear from our political, military, and 
economic relationship with the Philippines 
that we have a continuing interest in assisting 
that country's economic development. In the 
past, U.S. aid has not only contributed to 

April 4, 1977 


Philippine economic development but has also 
provided important encouragement for other 
foreign donors to continue and enlarge their 
contributions. At present, U.S. bilateral aid 
constitutes approximately 12 percent of the 
$500 million total of external assistance to the 
Philippines. The Japanese contribution is ap- 
proximately the same, while multilateral 
donors such as the ADB and IBRD supply al- 
most all of the balance. Our total proposals for 
fiscal year 1978 include loans of $51,190,000, 
grants of $11,781,000, and Public Law 480 
programs totaling $34,803,000, making a 
grand total of $97,774,000. 

We are obviously troubled by human rights 
abuses in the Philippines. Since the institution 
of martial law in 1972, there have been wide- 
ranging arrests and detentions without trial, in 
some cases for as long as four years. Recent 
government actions have included deportation 
of several foreign missionaries and newsmen, 
the closing down of several church radio sta- 
tions and publications, and arrests of church 
social workers accused of improper political 
activity. Our concern has been communicated 
to the Philippine Government, along with our 
strong view that there should be a marked 
improvement in the situation. 

However, we don't believe that security or 
economic assistance should be reduced be- 
cause of the human rights problem. As I have 
noted, the Philippines has strategic impor- 
tance, not only for our own country but also 
for nations friendly to the United States in 
the region, and thus we should continue our 

Our economic assistance programs are 
clearly directed toward aiding the rural poor. 
Termination of these programs would not lead 
to an improvement in the human rights situa- 
tion in the Philippines. Rather, it would most 
probably increase financial pressures on the 
government, raise doubts about our security 
and political relationships, and put pressures 
on the Philippine Government to take even 
more forceful domestic security measures. 
Given the importance of our bilateral political, 
security, and economic relations, we believe 
we will have more influence with the Philip- 
pine Government with regard to the human 

rights situation if we continue our assistance 
rather than if we reduce or terminate our 

We have gone through a traumatic experi- 
ence in Asia in the last decade from which we 
have finally emerged. While this part of the 
world is, fortunately, less volatile and preoc- 
cupying than during the Vietnam war, we still 
have important interests there. The signifi- 
cance of Japan, a key ally, is obvious. Im- 
proved relations with the People's Republic of 
China are crucial in both a global and bilateral 
context. We are still interested in the inde- 
pendence and development of our friends in 
Southeast Asia. 

I believe the Administration's economic and 
security assistance proposals for fiscal year 
1978 represent an appropriate contribution on 
the part of our government to peace, stability, 
and development in East Asia. Moreover, it is 
essential that we maintain our own credibility 
and sustain our old friends in the area as both 
we and they develop new policies to fit a new 
set of circumstances. 


United States and Brazil Conclude 
Shrimp Fishing Agreement 

Press release 95 dated March 3 

Brazil and the United States have success- 
fully concluded negotiations on a new agree- 
ment relating to shrimp fishing activities of 
U.S. -flag vessels off the coast of Brazil. The 
agreement, which sets forth the terms and 
conditions under which U.S. vessels may con- 
duct this fishery, was initialed by the chair- 
men of the U.S. and Brazilian delegations at 
Brasilia on March 1. It will come into force 
upon the completion of internal procedures 
and an exchange of notes between the two 

Under the agreement, U.S. vessels may 


Department of State Bulletin 

continue to conduct shrimp fishing operations 
during 1977 in a specified area off the coast of 
Brazil north of the mouth of the Amazon 
River. In addition to restricting the area 
which may be fished, the agreement reduces 
the number of U.S. vessels which may engage 
in the fishery. It also establishes fees which 
must be paid by U.S. vessels applying for 
fishing authorizations. The agreement will 
remain in force until December 31, 1977, dur- 
ing which time discussions will be held regard- 
ing new arrangements that could help Brazil- 
ian fishing enterprises achieve full utilization 
of the shrimp resources of the area. 

Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., was 
the chairman of the U.S. delegation, and 
Counselor Paulo Dirceu Pinheiro was the 
chairman of the Brazilian delegation. 

Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. ' 

Signatures: Korea, March 2, 1977; Panama, March 8, 


Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7. 1944. Entered into force April 4, 
1974. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Angola, March 11, 1977. 


Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. 
TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright conven- 
tion, as revised, concerning the application of that 
convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. 
Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 
10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright conven- 
tion, as revised, concerning the application of that 
convention to the works of certain international 
organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered 
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Poland, December 9, 1976. 


Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, 
relating to international expositions, with appendix 

and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972. ' 
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 17, 1977. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 
1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Accession deposited: Bolivia, September 23, 1976. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into 
force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Accession deposited: Bolivia, September 23, 1976. 

World Meteorological Organization 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Angola, March 16, 1977. 



Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of 
March 14, 1975, as extended, concerning shrimp 
(TIAS 8253). Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia 
March 1, 1977. Entered into force March 1, 1977. 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minutes and related letter. 
Signed at Washington December 17, 1976. 
Entered into force: February 28, 1977. 


Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration 
of justice in connection with the Boeing Company 
matter. Signed at Washington March 15, 1977. En- 
tered into force March 15, 1977. 

Agreement relating to cooperation in reconstruction of 
Canadian portions of the Alaska Highway. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Ottawa January 11 and February 
11, 1977. Entered into force February 11, 1977. 

Republic of China 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. 
Signed at Washington September 15, 1976. 
Entered into force: February 28, 1977. 


Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative 
efforts to protect crops from pest damage and dis- 
eases. Signed at Guatemala February 21, 1977. 
Entered into force February 21, 1977. 


Grant agreement to support and promote the economic 
stability of Jordan. Signed at Amman February 8, 
1977. Entered into force February 8, 1977. 


Agreement terminating the agreement of November 24, 

1 Not in force. 

April 4, 1977 


1972, concerning cooperation in fisheries (TIAS 7517). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
February 24 and March 3, 1977. Entered into force 
March 3, 1977; effective March 1, 1977. 
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Wash- 
ington January 4, 1977. 
Entered into force: March 3, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Mexico during calendar year 1977. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco January 10 
and February 10, 1977. Entered into force February 
10, 1977. 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and 
related letter. Signed at Washington August 2, 1976. 
Entered into force: February 28, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the continuation of international 
broadcast activities carried out in Portugal by 
RARET. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon 
February 15, 1977. Entered into force February 15, 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States. Signed at Washington February 16, 
Entered into force: March 10, 1977. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed 
at Khartoum February 21, 1977. Enters into force 
upon receipt by the U.S. Embassy of notification of 
the completion of the constitutional procedures for 
ratification required by Sudanese law. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of November 20, 1974 (TIAS 
8119). Signed at Damascus March 3, 1977. Entered 
into force March 3, 1977. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement concerning the translation and publication in 

English of Soviet journals and articles, with annexes. 

Signed at Washington February 14, 1977. Entered 

into force February 14, 1977. 
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 

United States, with agreed minutes and related letter. 

Signed at Washington November 26, 1976. 

Entered into force: February 28, 1977. 


Project loan agreement relating to North Shaba rural 
development. Signed at Kinshasa January 27, 1977. 
Entered into force January 27, 1977. 


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The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call at- 
tention to the following errors which appear in 
the March 14 issue: 

p. 210, col. 2: The second line of the eighth 
paragraph should read, "me to pass any judgment 
about the American". 

p. 2U0, col. 2, line 28: "it" should read "its". 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 4, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

President Carter Interviewed by Media Repre- 
sentatives (excerpt) 316 

President Carter's News Conference of March 9 
(excerpts) 305 

Asia. U.S. Economic and Security Assistance 
Programs in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Brazil. United States and Brazil Conclude Shrimp 
Fishing Agreement 326 

Chile. President Carter's News Conference of 
March 9 (excerpts) 305 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 321 

Southern Africa in the Global Context (Habib) . . 318 
U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs 
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Cuba. President Carter's Call-in Radio Program 
of March 5 (excerpts) 314 

Fisheries. United States and Brazil Conclude 
Shrimp Fishing Agreement 326 

Foreign Aid 

President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of 
March 5 (excerpts) 314 

U.S. Economic and Security -Assistance Programs 
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Human Rights 

President Carter's News Conference of March 9 
(excerpts) 305 

U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs 
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Intelligence Operations. President Carter's 
News Conference of March 9 (excerpts) 305 


President Carter's News Conference of March 9 
(excerpts) 305 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington 
(Carter, Rabin) 310 


President Carter's News Conference of March 9 
(excerpts) 305 

U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs 
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Mexico. President Carter Interviewed by Media 
Representatives (excerpt) 316 

Middle East. President Carter's News" Confer- 
ence of March 9 (excerpts) 305 

Namibia. Southern Africa in the Global Context 
(Habib) 318 

Narcotics Control. President Carter Interviewed 
by Media Representatives (excerpt) 316 

Panama. President Carter's Call-in Radio Pro- 
gram of March 5 (excerpts) 314 

Philippines. U.S. Economic and Security Assist- 
ance Programs in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322 

Presidential Documents 

British Prime Minister Callaghan Visits 
Washington 311 

President Carter Interviewed by Media Repre- 
sentatives (excerpt) 316 

President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of 
March 5 (excerpts) 314 

President Carter's News Conference of March 9 
(excerpts) 305 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington 310 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 328 

South Africa. Southern Africa in the Global Con- 
text (Habib) 318 

Southern Rhodesia. Southern Africa in the 
Global Context (Habib) 318 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 327 

United States and Brazil Conclude Shrimp Fish- 
ing Agreement 326 

Uganda. President Carter's Call-in Radio Pro- 
gram of March 5 (excerpts) 314 

U.S.S.R. President Carter's News Conference of 
March 9 (excerpts) 305 

United Kingdom. British Prime Minister Cal- 
laghan Visits Washington (Callaghan, Carter) 311 

Name Index 

Callaghan, James 311 

Carter, President 305, 310, 311, 314, 316 

Habib, Philip C 318 

Holbrooke, Richard C 322 

Rabin, Yitzhak 310 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*109 3/16 

tllO 3/16 

till 3/17 

*112 3/18 

*113 3/18 

tll4 3/18 

*115 3/18 

*116 3/18 

*117 3/18 

*118 3/18 

*119 3/18 

*120 3/18 

*121 3/18 

*122 3/18 

Vance: House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. 

U.S. -Yugoslav consultations on 
CSCE, Mar. 15-16. 

Vance, Irish Foreign Minister 
FitzGerald: joint statement. 

Program for official visit of Prime 
Minister Fukuda of Japan. 

Richard N. Gardner sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Italy (biographic data). 

Expiration of area passport restric- 

U.S. and Malaysia amend bilateral 
textile agreement, Feb. 9-25. 

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for Congres- 
sional Relations (biographic data). 

Richard M. Moose sworn in as Deputy 
Under Secretary for Management 
(biographic data). 

Australian Foreign Minister Peacock 
to visit Washington, Mar. 23-26. 

Study group 5 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), Apr. 13. 

Asian and Pacific student leaders to 
study citizen organizations in U.S. 

U.S. and Thailand amend bilateral 
textile agreement, Nov. 24. 

Study group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for CCITT, Apr. 14. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



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mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 







Volume LXXVI • No. 1972 • April 11, 1977 



Address by President Carter at the United Nations 329 



Statement by Secretary Vance 336 

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers 317 



For index see inside bad, 


Vol. LXXVI, No. 1972 
April 11, 1977 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights: 
Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy 

Address by President Carter 1 

Last night I was in Clinton, Massachusetts, 
at a town hall meeting where people of that 
small town decide their political and economic 

Tonight I speak to a similar meeting where 
people representing nations all over the world 
come here to decide their political and eco- 
nomic future. 

I am proud to be with you tonight in this 
house where the shared hopes of the world 
can find a voice. 

I have come here to express my own sup- 
port, and the continuing support of my coun- 
try, for the ideals of the United Nations. 

We are proud that for the 32 years since its 
creation, the United Nations has met on 
American soil. And we share with you the 
commitments of freedom, self-government, 
human dignity, mutual toleration, and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes — which the 
founding principles of the United Nations and 
also Secretary General Kurt Waldheim so well 

No one nation by itself can build a world 
which reflects all these fine values. But the 
United States, my own country, has a reser- 
voir of strength: economic strength, which we 
are willing to share; military strength, which 
we hope never to use again; and the strength 
of ideals, which are determined fully to main- 
tain the backbone of our own foreign policy. 

It is now eight weeks since I became Presi- 
dent. I have brought to office a firm commit- 
ment to a more open foreign policy. And I be- 

1 Made to representatives to the United Nations in 
the U.N. General Assembly Hall on Mar. 17 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
Mar. 21). 

lieve that the American people expect me to 
speak frankly about the policies that we in- 
tend to pursue, and it is in that spirit that I 
speak to you tonight about our own hopes for 
the future. 

I see a hopeful world, a world dominated by 
increasing demands for basic freedoms, for 
fundamental rights, for higher standards of 
human existence. We are eager to take part in 
the shaping of that world. 

But in seeking such a better world, we are 
not blind to the reality of disagreement nor to 
the persisting dangers that confront us all. 
Every headline reminds us of bitter divisions, 
of national hostilities, of territorial conflicts, 
of ideological competition. In the Middle East, 
peace is a quarter of a century overdue. A 
gathering racial conflict threatens southern 
Africa; new tensions are rising in the Horn of 
Africa. Disputes in the eastern Mediterranean 
remain to be resolved. 

Perhaps even more ominous is the stagger- 
ing arms race. The Soviet Union and the 
United States have accumulated thousands of 
nuclear weapons. Our two nations now have 
five times more missile warheads today than 
we had just eight years ago. But we are not 
five times more secure. On the contrary, the 
arms race has only increased the risk of con- 

We can only improve this world if we are 
realistic about its complexities. The dis- 
agreements that we face are deeply rooted, 
and they often raise difficult philosophical as 
well as territorial issues. They will not be 
solved easily. They will not be solved quickly. 
The arms race is now embedded in the very 
fabric of international affairs and can only be 

April 11, 1977 


contained with the greatest difficulty. Pov- 
erty and inequality are of such monumental 
scope that it will take decades of deliberate 
and determined effort even to improve the 
situation substantially. 

I stress these dangers and these difficulties 
because I want all of us to dedicate ourselves 
to a prolonged and persistent effort designed: 

— First, to maintain peace and to reduce the 
arms race; 

— Second, to build a better and a more co- 
operative international economic system; and 

— Third, to work with potential adversaries 
as well as our close friends to advance the 
cause of human rights. 

Working To Advance the Cause of Peace 

In seeking these goals, I realize that the 
United States cannot solve the problems of 
the world. We can sometimes help others re- 
solve their differences, but we cannot do so by 
imposing our own particular solutions. 

In the coming months, there is important 
work for all of us in advancing international 
cooperation and economic progress in the 
cause of peace: 

— Later this spring, the leaders of several 
industrial nations of Europe, North America, 
and Japan will confer at a summit meeting in 
London on a broad range of issues. We must 
promote the health of the industrial 
economies. We must seek to restrain inflation 
and bring ways of managing our own domestic 
economies for the benefit of the global econ- 

— We must move forward with multilateral 
trade negotiations in Geneva. 

— The United States will support the efforts 
of our friends to strengthen the democratic 
institutions in Europe, and particularly in 
Portugal and Spain. 

— We will work closely with our European 
friends on the forthcoming Review Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
We want to make certain that the provisions 
of the Helsinki agreement 2 are fully im- 
plemented and that progress is made to fur- 
ther East- West cooperation. 

— In the Middle East we are doing our best 
to clarify areas of disagreement, to surface 

underlying consensus, and to help to develop 
mutually acceptable principles that can form a 
flexible framework for a just and a permanent 

— In southern Africa, we will work to help 
attain majority rule through peaceful means. 
We believe that such fundamental transfor- 
mation can be achieved, to the advantage of 
both the blacks and whites who live in that 
region of the world. Anything less than that 
may bring a protracted racial war, with dev- 
astating consequences to all. This week the 
Government of the United States took action 
to bring our country into full compliance with 
U.N. sanctions against the illegal regime in 
Rhodesia. And I will sign that bill Friday in 

— We will put our relations with Latin 
America on a more constructive footing, rec- 
ognizing the global character of the region's 
problems. We are also working to resolve in 
amicable negotiations the future of the 
Panama Canal. 

— We will continue our efforts to develop 
further our relationships with the People's 
Republic of China. We recognize our parallel 
strategic interests in maintaining stability in 
Asia, and we will act in the spirit of the 
Shanghai communique. 3 

— In Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, we 
will strengthen our association with our tradi- 
tional friends, and we will seek to improve re- 
lations with our former adversaries. We have 
a mission now in Vietnam seeking peaceful 
resolution of the differences that have sepa- 
rated us for so long. 

— Throughout the world, we are ready to 
normalize our relationships and to seek recon- 
ciliation with all states which are ready to 
work with us in promoting global progress 
and global peace. 

Containing the Global Arms Race 

Above all, the search for peace requires a 
much more deliberate effort to contain the 
global arms race. Let me speak in this context 
first of the U.S. -Soviet Union relationship 
and then of the wider need to contain the pro- 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 

3 For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 


Department of State Bulletin 

liferation of arms throughout the global com- 

I intend to pursue the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks (SALT) between the United 
States and the Soviet Union with determina- 
tion and with energy. 

Our Secretary of State will visit Moscow in 
just a few days. 

SALT is extraordinarily complicated. But 
the basic fact is that while the negotiations 
remain deadlocked the arms race goes on; the 
security of both countries and the entire 
world is threatened. 

My preference would be for strict controls 
or even a freeze on new types and new gener- 
ations of weaponry and with a deep reduction 
in the strategic arms of both sides. Such a 
major step toward not only arms limitation 
but arms reduction would be welcomed by 
mankind as a giant step toward peace. 

Alternatively, and perhaps much more eas- 
ily, we could conclude a limited agreement 
based on those elements of the Vladivostok 
accord 4 on which we can find complete con- 
sensus and set aside for prompt consideration 
and subsequent negotiations the more conten- 
tious issues and also the deeper reductions in 
nuclear weapons which I favor. 

We will also explore the possibility of a 
total cessation of nuclear testing. While our 
ultimate goal is for all nuclear powers to end 
testing, we do not regard this as a prereq- 
uisite for the suspension of tests by the two 
principal nuclear powers, the Soviet Union 
and the United States. We should, however, 
also pursue a broad permanent multilateral 
agreement on this issue. 

We will also seek to establish Soviet will- 
ingness to reach agreement with us on mutual 
military restraint in the Indian Ocean, as well 
as on such matters as arms exports to the 
troubled areas of the world. 

In proposing such accommodations I remain 
fully aware that American-Soviet relations 
will continue to be highly competitive — but I 
believe that our competition must be balanced 
by cooperation in preserving peace and thus 
our mutual survival. I will seek such coopera- 
tion with the Soviet Union earnestly, con- 
stantly, and sincerely. 

For text, see Bulletin of Dee. 23, 1974, p. 879. 

However, the effort to contain the arms 
race is not a matter just for the United States 
and Soviet Union alone. There must be a 
wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to 
all the troubled spots of this globe. Accord- 
ingly, we will try to reach broader agree- 
ments among producer and consumer nations 
to limit the export of conventional arms, and 
we ourselves will take the initiative on our 
own because the United States has become 
one of the major arms suppliers of the world. 

We are deeply committed to halting the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons. And we will 
undertake a new effort to reach multilateral 
agreements designed to provide legitimate 
supplies of nuclear fuels for the production of 
energy while controlling the poisonous and 
dangerous atomic wastes. 

Working with other nations represented 
here, we hope to advance the cause of peace. 
We will make a strong and a positive contri- 
bution at the upcoming special session on dis- 
armament, which I understand will commence 
next year. 

Molding Global Economic Prosperity 

But the search for peace also means the 
search for justice. One of the greatest chal- 
lenges before us as a nation, and therefore 
one of our greatest opportunities, is to par- 
ticipate in molding a global economic system 
which will bring greater prosperity to all the 
people of all countries. 

I come from a part of the United States 
which is largely agrarian and which for many 
years did not have the advantages of adequate 
transportation or capital or management skills 
or education— which were available in the in- 
dustrial states of our country. So I can sym- 
pathize with the leaders of the developing na- 
tions, and I want them to know that we will 
do our part. 

To this end, the United States will be ad- 
vancing proposals aimed at meeting the basic 
human needs of the developing world and 
helping them to increase their productive 
capacity. I have asked Congress to provide 
%1V2 billion of foreign assistance in the coming 
year, and I will work to insure sustained 
American assistance as the process of global 
economic development continues. I am also 

April 11, 1977 


urging the Congress of our country to in- 
crease our contributions to the United Na- 
tions Development Program and meet in full 
our pledges to multilateral lending institu- 
tions, especially the International Develop- 
ment Association of the World Bank. 

We remain committed to an open interna- 
tional trading system, one which does not ig- 
nore domestic concerns in the United States. 
We have extended duty-free treatment to 
many products from the developing countries. 
In the multilateral trade agreements 
[negotiations] in Geneva we have offered sub- 
stantial trade concessions on the goods of 
primary interest to developing countries. And 
in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration, 5 
we are also examining ways to provide addi- 
tional consideration for the special needs of 
developing countries. 

The United States is willing to consider 
with a positive and open attitude the negotia- 
tion on agreements to stabilize commodity 
prices, including the establishment of a com- 
mon funding arrangement for financing buffer 
stocks where they are a part of individual 
negotiated agreements. 

I also believe that the developing countries 
must acquire fuller participation in the global 
economic decisionmaking process. Some prog- 
ress has been already made in this regard by 
expanding participation of developing coun- 
tries in the International Monetary Fund. 

We must use our collective natural re- 
sources wisely and constructively. We have 
not always done so. Today our oceans are 
being plundered and defiled. With a renewed 
spirit of cooperation and hope we join in the 
conference of the law of the sea in order to 
correct past mistakes of generations gone by 
and to insure that all nations can share the 
bounties of the eternal oceans in the fu- 

We must also recognize that the world is 
facing serious shortages of energy. This is 
truly a global problem. For our part, we are 
determined to reduce waste and to work with 
others toward a fair and proper sharing of the 
benefits and costs of energy resources. 

For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450. 

Respect for Basic Human Rights 

The search for peace and justice also means 
respect for human dignity. All the signatories 
of the United Nations Charter have pledged 
themselves to observe and to respect basic 
human rights. Thus, no member of the United 
Nations can claim that mistreatment of its 
citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no 
member can avoid its responsibilities to re- 
view and to speak when torture or unwar- 
ranted deprivation occurs in any part of the 

The basic thrust of human affairs points to- 
ward a more universal demand for fundamen- 
tal human rights. The United States has a his- 
torical birthright to be associated with this 

We in the United States accept this respon- 
sibility in the fullest and the most construc- 
tive sense. Ours is a commitment, and not just 
a political posture. I know perhaps as well as 
anyone that our own ideals in the area of 
human rights have not always been attained 
in the United States. But the American 
people have an abiding commitment to the full 
realization of these ideals. And we are deter- 
mined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies 
quickly and openly. We have nothing to con- 

To demonstrate this commitment, I will 
seek congressional approval and sign the 
U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cul- 
tural rights and the covenants on civil and 
political rights. And I will work closely with 
our own Congress in seeking to support the 
ratification not only of these two instruments 
but the United Nations Genocide Convention 
and the Treaty for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination as well. I have 
just removed all restrictions on American 
travel abroad, and we are moving now to 
liberalize almost completely travel opportuni- 
ties to America. 

The United Nations is a global forum dedi- 
cated to the peace and well-being of every 
individual — no matter how weak, no matter 
how poor. But we have allowed its human 
rights machinery to be ignored and sometimes 
politicized. There is much that can be done to 
strengthen it. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Human Rights Commission should be 
prepared to meet more often. And all nations 
should be prepared to offer its fullest coopera- 
tion to the Human Rights Commission, to 
welcome its investigations, to work with its 
officials, and to act on its reports. 

I would like to see the entire United Na- 
tions Human Rights Division moved back here 
to the central headquarters, where its ac- 
tivities will be in the forefront of our attention 
and where the attention of the press corps can 
stimulate us to deal honestly with this sensi- 
tive issue. The proposal made 12 years ago by 
the Government of Costa Rica — to establish a 
U.N. High Commissionfer] for Human 
Rights — also deserves our renewed attention 
and our support. 

Strengthened international machinery will 
help us to close the gap between promise and 
performance in protecting human rights. 
When gross or widespread violation takes 
place — contrary to international commit- 
ments — it is of concern to all. The solemn 
commitments of the United Nations Charter, 
of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
for Human Rights, of the Helsinki accords, and 
of many other international instruments must 
be taken just as seriously as commercial or se- 
curity agreements. 

This issue is important in itself. It should 
not block progress on other important matters 
affecting the security and well-being of our 
people and of world peace. It is obvious that 
the reduction of tension, the control of nuclear 
arms, the achievement of harmony in the 
troubled areas of the world, and the provision 
of food, good health, and education will inde- 
pendently contribute to advancing the human 

In our relationships with other countries, 
these mutual concerns will be reflected in our 
political, our cultural, and our economic at- 

These, then, are our basic priorities as we 
work with other members to strengthen and 
to improve the United Nations: 

— First, we will strive for peace in the 
troubled areas of the world; 

— Second, we will aggressively seek to con- 
trol the weaponry of war; 

— Third, we will promote a new system of 
international economic progress and coopera- 
tion; and 

— Fourth, we will be steadfast in our dedi- 
cation to the dignity and well-being of people 
throughout the world. 

I believe that this is a foreign policy that is 
consistent with my own nation's historic val- 
ues and commitments. And I believe that it is 
a foreign policy that is consonant with the 
ideals of the United Nations. 

President Signs Bill Restoring 
Embargo on Rhodesian Chrome 

Following is a statement by President, Car- 
ter issued on March 18. 1 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 21 

I have today signed H.R. 1746 [Public Law 
95-12], which restores executive authority to 
enforce sanctions against Rhodesian chrome. 

This measure is a central element in our Af- 
rican policy. Members of my Administration 
have supported it with one voice. With it, we 
are bringing the United States back in line 
with the decisions of the Security Council and 
with our obligations under the United Nations 

H.R. 1746 effectively reinstates an embargo 
against the importation of Rhodesian chrome 
and other minerals, as well as any steelmill 
product containing Rhodesian chromium. As a 
matter of equity, however, I am issuing an 
Executive order [No. 11978] which authorizes 
the Secretary of the Treasury to exempt 
shipments now in transit to the United 

Our country is committed to the concept of 
rapid transition to majority rule in Rhodesia 
under nonviolent conditions. I view this 
measure today as an appropriate and positive 
step toward that goal. We have consistently 
stated our belief that a peaceful solution in 

1 For President Carter's remarks at the signing 
ceremony, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p. 402. 

April 11, 1977 


Rhodesia depends upon negotiations that in- 
volve a full spectrum of opinion among its 
leaders, both black and white. With the 
enactment of this measure, there can be no 
mistake about our support for that principle. 

I hope that the present Rhodesian au- 
thorities, as well as the black African 
nationalist leaders, will accurately assess the 
vote of the Congress and this Administra- 
tion's stand on Rhodesia. The solution rests in 
their hands, not ours. Further delay in 
negotiations will invite more violence and in- 
crease the prospect of outside intervention — 
an outcome which every person of good will 
wishes to avoid. 

With the cooperation of the Congress, we 
have taken a step of great importance in our 
southern African policy. I want to thank the 
leadership of both Houses for their initiative 
in bringing about this encouraging 

President Carter's Remarks 

at Clinton, Mass., Town Meeting 

Following are excerpts from President 
Carter's opening remarks and a question-and- 
answer session at the Clinton, Mass., Town 
Hall on March 16. 1 

In the field of foreign affairs — and this is 
the last thing I want to talk about — I've done 
a lot of studying. I trust the American people. 
I've been criticized by some in the news media 
in the last eight weeks about telling the 
American people too much. 

I've removed the restrictions on American 
travel overseas. I believe that an American 
citizen ought to be able to go wherever that 
person wants to go without the government 
telling him. 

We're going to try to open up our borders 
for a change so visitors can come to our coun- 
try. They may not be popular people, but I 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p. 

think our system of government is strong 
enough to have someone come into our nation 
and make a speech at Yale, or Harvard or 
here in your own town, with whom you may 
not agree. 

I want to see our country set a standard of 
morality. I feel very deeply that when people 
are put in prison without trials, and tortured 
and deprived of basic human rights, that the 
President of the United States ought to have 
a right to express displeasure and to do some- 
thing about it. I want our country to be the 
focal point for deep concern about human 
beings all over the world. 

I am trying to search with the Soviet Union 
for a way to reduce the horrible arms race, 
where we've spent billions and billions and bil- 
lions of dollars on atomic weapons. We are no 
more secure now than we were 8 years ago or 
12 years ago or 16 years ago. We're much 
more deeply threatened by more and more 
advanced weapons. So, we are dealing with 
the Soviet Union, quietly and diplomatically, 
and I hope effectively, to search out a way to 
reduce dependence on weapons without 
damaging at all our nation's own security. 

We have problem areas around the world, 
as you know, in the Middle East, in southern 
Africa, in the Horn of Africa, in the eastern 
Mediterranean around Cyprus. We're not try- 
ing to impose our will on other people. But 
when we can add our good offices and the 
strength of our country to bring potential 
warring nations together, we'll do this. 

And I think the American people have 
enough intelligence and enough judgment to 
be told what's going on. In the past we've had 
too much of top government officials going off 
in a closed, locked room and evolving a 
foreign policy for our country and negotiating 
in secret and then letting the American people 
know about it when it's all over. I want you to 
know about it ahead of time, and you can de- 
pend on that when I tell you. 

Q. My name is Reverend Richard Harding, 
and, President Carter, it's a pleasure to wel- 
come you to the number-one everytown, 
USA— Clinton, Massachusetts. 

I would like to ask you, Mr. President — it 


Department of State Bulletin 

seems that world peace hinges greatly on the 
Middle East. 

The President: Yes. 

Q. What do you personally feel must be 
done to establish a meaningful and a lasting 
peace in that area of the world? Thank you. 

The President: I think all of you know that 
there has been either war or potential war in 
the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever 
since Israel became a nation. I think one of 
the finest acts of the world nations that's ever 
occurred was to establish the State of Israel. 

So the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is 
the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Is- 
rael's right to exist, Israel's right to exist 
permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. 
That means that over a period of months or 
years that the borders between Israel and 
Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, 
Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, 
to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so 
that no matter who the leaders might be in 
those countries, the people themselves will 
have formed a mutual understanding and 
comprehension and a sense of a common pur- 
pose to avoid the repetitious wars and death 
that have afflicted that region so long. That's 
the first prerequisite of peace. 

The second one is very important and very, 
very difficult; and that is the establishment of 
permanent borders for Israel. The Arab coun- 
tries say that Israel must withdraw to the 
pre-1967 borderlines. Israel says that they 
must adjust those lines to some degree to in- 
sure their own security. That is a matter to be 
negotiated between the Arab countries on the 
one side and Israel on the other. But borders 
are still a matter of great trouble and a mat- 
ter of great difficulty, and there are strong 
differences of opinion now. 

And the third ultimate requirement for 
peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. 
The Palestinians claim up till this moment 
that Israel has no right to be there, that the 
land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've 
never yet given up their publicly professed 
commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be 

There has to be a homeland provided for the 

Palestinian refugees who have suffered for 
many, many years. And the exact way to 
solve the Palestinian problem is one that first 
of all addresses itself right now to the Arab 
countries and then, secondly, to the Arab 
countries negotiating with Israel. 

Those three major elements have got to be 
solved before a Middle Eastern solution can 
be prescribed. 

I want to emphasize one more time, we 
offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to 
say that of all the nations in the world, we are 
the one that's most trusted, not completely, 
but most trusted by the Arab countries and 
also Israel. I guess both sides have some 
doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of 
as a catalyst to bring about their ability to 
negotiate successfully with one another. 

We hope that later on this year, in the lat- 
ter part of this year, that we might get all of 
these parties to agree to come together at 
Geneva, to start talking to one another. They 
haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can 
get them to sit down and start talking and 
negotiating that we have an excellent chance 
to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a 

I hope that we will all pray that that will 
come to pass, because what happens in the 
Middle East in the future might very well 
cause a major war there which would quickly 
spread to all the other nations of the world; 
very possibly it could do that. 

Many countries depend completely on oil 
from the Middle East for their life. We don't. 
If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle 
East, we could survive; but Japan imports 
more than 98 percent of all its energy, and 
other countries, like in Europe — Germany, 
Italy, France — are also heavily dependent on 
oil from the Middle East. 

So, this is such a crucial area of the world 
that I will be devoting a major part of my own 
time on foreign policy between now and next 
fall trying to provide for a forum within which 
they can discuss their problems and, hope- 
fully, let them seek out among themselves 
some permanent solution. 

Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the 
best answer I can give you to that question. 

April 11, 1977 


Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance 
of Foreign Assistance Programs 

Statement by Secretary Vance 1 

This is the fourth time in the short period 
since this Administration took office that I 
have come before committees of the Congress 
to describe and support our foreign assistance 
requests. That is a measure of the importance 
we give to these programs in the larger 
scheme of our foreign policy. 

In their diversity, our foreign assistance ef- 
forts meet a variety of American foreign pol- 
icy objectives. But a unity and common pur- 
pose binds them together. The components of 
the program amount to a humanitarian in- 
vestment in the social, economic, and techno- 
logical development of poor countries. The re- 
sult will be an expanding world economy with 
benefits for people of all countries, our own 

It should be clear to us all that the way 
American workers and consumers live, our 
standards of living, depends in large part on 
supplies of food, energy, and raw materials 
from the developing world — from countries 
we are helping to move ahead on their own 
courses of economic development. Fur- 
thermore, the expansion of our own economy 
is linked to the growth of demand abroad. 
Foreign buyers take some 40 percent of our 
grains; they take an eighth of everything we 
produce. The developing countries are in- 

1 Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist- 
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Mar. 23 (text from press release 127). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

creasingly vital markets for our industries 
and firms. Over a third of our trade is with 
these countries; that amounts to more than 
our trade with the European Community. Our 
raw materials come more and more from for- 
eign sources, especially from those developing 
countries we are now encouraging. 

We are investing in the cause of peace, as 
well, when our aid becomes part of an effort 
to resolve old, and potential, regional dis- 
putes. Our selective military and related se- 
curity assistance programs can enable our 
friends and allies to expend less of their na- 
tional energies on insuring their own security 
and to concentrate instead on their own eco- 
nomic and social development. 

We are investing through all aspects of our 
programs — bilateral assistance, multilateral 
assistance, security assistance — in a world 
that offers hope of decent lives and worthy 
goals to people whose common lot is privation 
and hunger. The danger of failing to address 
the legitimate aspirations of the developing 
world would be frustration in the poorer coun- 
tries that could take violent forms. Terrorism 
and confrontational economic demands are 
symptoms of such malaise. 

Support for economic development has be- 
• come particularly necessary in the face of es- 
calating energy costs and the effects of world 
recession. In 1974 the effect of quadrupled 
energy prices more than offset all assistance 
the developing countries received; and in 1975 
their exports fell by almost $5 billion, the 
biggest drop in the postwar period. 


Department of State Bulletin 

At the same time, what is called the 
North-South dialogue offers unprecedented 
opportunities for cooperation between the 
rich and poor regions of the world. Dedication 
of our joint efforts now to an effective eco- 
nomic development strategy is essential to its 
progress. We must keep in mind the impor- 
tance of the political as well as economic 
stakes in achieving this progress. This is ob- 
vious in terms of our bilateral relations. Addi- 
tionally, the developing nations are more 
likely to cooperate with us in addressing such 
longer term, global issues as halting the 
spread of nuclear weapons or protecting the 
environment if they are confident of our coop- 
eration in addressing their economic difficul- 

This may be a pivotal year. Particularly 
great opportunities bring with them greater 
demands on both our resources and the wis- 
dom of our diplomacy. 

The International Development Association 
now faces its fifth capital replenishment — a 
call to both the industrialized countries and 
the newly rich oil producers to address jointly 
the problems faced by the poorest countries. 
This is also the initial year of a multilateral 
long-term program to help develop the Sahel- 
ian region of Africa, which has been devas- 
tated by drought but which now shows prom- 
ise of recovery. 

Private banks have helped the developing 
countries bridge their financial gaps during 
recent economic hard times, but at higher cost 
than most of these countries can sustain. A 
substantial increase in governmental and mul- 
tilateral financing is necessary to sustain their 
development efforts and their access to pri- 
vate credit. 

As this committee was early to see, the best 
way to judge our assistance efforts is by their 
effectiveness in meeting basic human needs. 
You were instrumental in charting "new di- 
rections" in bilateral foreign assistance. The 
Carter Administration concurs with them 
wholeheartedly. "New directions" call for 
greater emphasis on delivering aid directly to 
the poor people of the world. Similarly, we 
are called upon to concern ourselves with the 
status of human rights in the countries we 

We seek to meet both of these goals, fully 
mindful of the problems of implementation. 
How, for instance, are we to proceed in a case 
where our commitment to development and 
economic human rights may come into conflict 
with our commitment to principles of indi- 
vidual justice? No pat formula can resolve 
such a dilemma. We believe we can best deal 
with these questions on a case-by-case, 
country-by-country basis, always applying the 
same set of general criteria. 

We hope that our example may influence 
other donors to multilateral aid organizations 
to adopt the pragmatic principles of "new di- 
rections." Meanwhile, we can and will strive 
for the most effective day-to-day administra- 
tion of our assistance programs. We will judge 
our programs by their results, and not just in 
terms of this year's or next year's funding 

To do our part in responding to the needs of 
the world's poor and to meet new opportuni- 
ties for development, we propose for fiscal 
year 1978 a total foreign assistance package of 
$7,271,000,000, an increase of $1,670,000,000 
over 1977. 

The bulk of that increase — a billion dollars, 
in fact — results from a procedural change. At 
the request of the Congress, we are in fiscal 
year 1978 seeking appropriations for the call- 
able capital of the international financial in- 
stitutions, which in the immediate past was 
authorized but not appropriated. But as you 
know, none of the callable capital has ever 
been called, and the appropriations will prob- 
ably never be spent. The remaining $670 mil- 
lion represents: 

— First, restoration of reductions made by 
the previous Administration in its request for 
security supporting assistance for the Middle 

— Second, substantial increases in our con- 
tributions to multilateral institutions; and 

— Third, moderate increases in our bilateral 
development assistance program. 

I submit a table for the record which out- 
lines our budget request. 2 We will be happy 
to provide more detail later if you wish. Now 

'For table, see Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1977, p. 238. 

April 11, 1977 


let me explain how the pieces of our aid pro- 
posals fit together and why we believe each of 
them is important. 

Bilateral Development Assistance 

While proposed increases in our bilateral 
development assistance programs are not so 
large as those for multilateral institutions, we 
believe that our bilateral programs are no less 
important an element in our general aid 

These bilateral programs are designed to 
address the basic human problems of food and 
agriculture, population and health, and educa- 
tion and human resources development in the 
world's poor countries. These programs are 
the most direct way to put American skills 
and resources to work improving the human 
condition around the world and spurring eco- 
nomic development. In concert with the recip- 
ient countries, we are seeking to promote 
growth with equity, and sound development 
policies. This is the core of the "new direc- 
tions" approach. This effort is complemented 
by our bilateral food aid programs, which also 
are aimed primarily at poor countries. 

Multilateral Assistance 

Our multilateral assistance programs 
through the international financial institutions 
complement the bilateral programs and serve 
the same broad purpose: to promote economic 
and social progress in the developing world. 

These institutions are mechanisms for shar- 
ing the aid burden. Donors contribute accord- 
ing to their ability to provide aid; the share of 
the United States has actually declined over 
the years. For instance, our share of the ini- 
tial subscription in the International De- 
velopment Association was almost 42 percent. 
In the proposed fifth replenishment, it will be 
less than 32 percent. Thus, other nations are 
providing a steadily increasing share of the 
capital requirements of these banks. 

These institutions also reinforce the concept 
of mutual responsibilities on the part of both 
developed and developing countries. When 
developing countries borrow from the interna- 
tional financial institutions, they are expected 
to adopt sound economic policies, to provide 
significant amounts of their own resources 

toward the common goal, and to accept the 
discipline imposed by obligations to repay 
their loans. 

The financial structure of these institutions 
serves the purpose of development well. They 
borrow funds in capital markets to finance 
their "hard" lending operations at commercial 
rates. This capital is an important source of 
growth for middle-income developing coun- 
tries that can service debt on commercial 
terms. These countries receive little U.S. cap- 
ital assistance. The capital funds borrowed far 
exceed the capital contributed by donor mem- 
bers and are secured by pledges of callable 
capital. This year, as stated, we are for the 
first time seeking appropriations for this call- 
able capital; these appropriations are unlikely 
to result in any budget outlays. For their 
soft-loan operations to the poorest countries 
unable to borrow at commercial rates, these 
institutions rely on donor contributions. 

Our leadership and influence in these in- 
stitutions come as a result of our sizable con- 
tributions and the system of weighted voting 
linked to those contributions. Although our 
measure of control over the policies of the in- 
ternational financial institutions is less than 
over our own bilateral programs, this diminu- 
tion of control is more than offset by the 
burden-sharing advantages that come with 
the participation of other major donors in 
these multilateral programs. 

We will remain vigilant in encouraging 
these institutions to maintain their own finan- 
cial soundness and to invest their resources 

We also want to expand our support of the 
United Nations Development Program and of 
the assistance given by the U.N. specialized 

Security Supporting Assistance 

Our security supporting assistance is a vit- 
ally important part of our diplomatic efforts to 
achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East and to provide the means to support a 
peaceful settlement in southern Africa. 

Our security supporting assistance request 
for Africa of $135 million includes these ele- 

— $100 million for a U.S. contribution to an 


Department of State Bulletin 

international Zimbabwe Development Fund 
to promote Zimbabwe's peaceful transition to 
majority rule. The Fund's purposes would be 
rapid restructuring of the economy and of 
government services to provide more train- 
ing, education, and economic opportunities for 
blacks and the maintenance of confidence 
among skilled whites to encourage them not to 
abandon their jobs and homes. Our goal is to 
prevent a collapse of the Zimbabwe economy. 

As part of our planning, we have consulted 
extensively with the British. We have solicited 
the views and support of 18 other potential 
donors. Initial responses have been encourag- 

Congressional support for this multilateral 
effort to promote economic development bene- 
fiting all segments of the Zimbabwe popula- 
tion could be a crucial factor in encouraging a 
negotiated political settlement. Its presence 
in this budget would be helpful in persuading 
other donors to contribute. We would of 
course consult closely with you as the outlines 
of the programs to be supported by this fund 
take shape, prior to any commitment of spe- 
cific amounts. 

— We also seek $35 million for current de- 
velopment programs in Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Zaire. These countries figure 
significantly in the political evolution under- 
way in southern Africa. For this reason, these 
programs have been included under security 
supporting assistance. 

The United States has played a major role 
in efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to 
majority rule in southern Africa. It is criti- 
cally important that this effort be reinforced 
by economic actions to promote political and 
economic stability and to demonstrate that 
the United States can be counted upon to 
cooperate in a constructive manner. This aid 
program therefore is directly linked to our 
broader foreign policy objectives. 

Military Assistance 

Our military security assistance programs 
enable friendly and allied countries to meet 
their basic security requirements, and thus 
add to our own security as well. We consider 
the funds we are requesting essential to 
reassure our friends and allies of our re- 

liability and consistency in their support. 

In his address to the United Nations on 
March 17, President Carter spoke of the need 
for "a wider effort to reduce the flow of 
weapons to all the troubled spots of the 
globe." He promised American initiatives to 
limit the exports of conventional arms. The 
Administration has in fact embarked upon a 
thorough reexamination of our arms transfer 

We have already begun to make important 
changes in both our security assistance pro- 
grams and our sales activities: 

— In support of the President's initiative, 
we have indicated to other supplier nations 
our intention to exercise restraint in exports 
and our hope that they will do so as well. We 
have also made clear to prospective buyers 
our hope that they will exercise their own re- 
straint in turn. 

— We are taking steps to require arms 
manufacturers to seek State Department ap- 
proval before they approach foreign govern- 
ments about prospective sales. It is not our 
intention to restrict legitimate business activ- 
ity. But we do have a responsibility to insure 
that the sales promotion activities of private 
American firms in the sensitive area of arms 
and instruments of war do not conflict with 
our national security interests and foreign pol- 
icy objectives. 

— Finally, we will provide the Congress 
with a statement justifying every foreign 
military sales proposal. These justifications 
will provide you with the basis for the Admin- 
istration's decision to approve the sale. We 
are now completing our review of pending 
sales cases. 

It may well be that the review of arms 
transfer policies which we are conducting and 
our consultations with you will reveal the 
need for changes in existing legislation. In the 
meantime, I believe it would be imprudent to 
try to change parts of our evolving military 
assistance effort and thus to threaten disrup- 
tive changes which could put heavy and unex- 
pected burdens on our friends and allies. 

I have welcomed this opportunity to pre- 
sent our foreign assistance programs. We be- 
lieve they are coherent in concept and repre- 
sent a justifiable level of effort. 

April 11, 1977 


President Carter Outlines Goals 
of Foreign Assistance Program 

Message to the Congress 1 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In the years since World War II, the 
United States has encouraged economic de- 
velopment throughout the world through a 
variety of economic assistance programs. 

Most of our efforts have succeeded. Some 
have failed. Now we have the opportunity, as 
with many of our domestic programs, to 
learn from our experience, and to improve 
our policies in the future. 

Members of my Administration are now 
testifying in support of our approach to 
foreign assistance. I am sending you this 
message to explain some of the principles be- 
hind our program — especially to outline the 
lessons we have learned about foreign 
assistance and the goals we now hope to 

The future of the United States will be 
affected by the ability of developing nations 
to overcome poverty, achieve healthy growth 
and provide more secure lives for their 
people. We wish to join with other nations in 
combining our efforts, knowledge, and re- 
sources to help poorer countries overcome 
the problems of hunger, disease, and illiter- 
acy. We are seeking important improvements 
in our program, some of which reflect 
changes in emphasis and approach: 

— We will ensure that lending agencies at- 
tach adequate self-help conditions to their 
loans so that borrowing nations will make ef- 
fective use of the funds they receive. 

— We will make certain that the Congress 
is able to exercise its legitimate responsibil- 
ity to monitor the effectiveness of our aid 

— We will encourage other wealthy nations 
to contribute a greater share to the multilat- 
eral aid effort, and we will reduce our own 
share where it has been too high. 

— In close cooperation with the Congress 

'Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House 
press release dated Mar. 18). 

we have made sure that our concessional aid 
goes to those who need it most; we will con- 
tinue this approach. 

— We are now reforming the policies which 
have, on occasion, awarded liberal grants and 
loans to repressive regimes which violate 
human rights. 

— We will root out mismanagement and in- 
efficiency where they exist in our foreign as- 
sistance programs in order to guarantee that 
benefits will always be delivered to those for 
whom the programs were designed. 

— We recognize that salaries and living styles 
of some employees have been too lavish, and 
we will insist that the international programs 
we support do more to control their 
administrative overhead. 

— I will work closely with the Congress to 
see that our aid efforts are more closely 
correlated to international economic and 
political circumstances and talk frankly to 
American citizens about the economic, 
political, and security benefits we receive 
from our foreign assistance programs. 

Close cooperation and support from the 
Congress is essential to the effectiveness of 
our efforts. In a few areas the program I 
have submitted requires a significant 
increase in funding — but I have asked for 
this only where I am sure that the increase 
will be worthwhile. 

To achieve our goals of helping the people 
of the world toward economic self- 
sufficiency, relieving the victims of 
disasters, investing in a healthy world econ- 
omy, and supporting the security of friendly 
nations, I ask your favorable consideration 
for the following: 

— Multilateral Development Assistance. 
International financial institutions such as 
the World Bank group — in particular the In- 
ternational Development Association — and 
the Inter-American and Asian Development 
Banks are major sources of assistance loans 
to the world's poor nations. These institu- 
tions have been highly professional in their 
work. They help remove political consid- 
erations from development efforts, and they 
encourage developing countries to pursue 
sound domestic policies. They enable many 


Department of State Bulletin 

donors to pool their efforts — including some 
of the oil-exporting nations. An initial, 
modest U.S. contribution to the African De- 
velopment Bank will provide our encourage- 
ment to this promising regional effort. 

We are asking $540 million in supplemental 
appropriations for fiscal year 1977 to fulfill 
past pledges to the international financial 
institutions, and $2.7 billion in new appro- 
priations for fiscal year 1978. This is an in- 
crease (of approximately one-third) for an 
effort which has proved to be very effective. 
The largest single expenditure is for U.S. 
participation in the 5th replenishment of the 
International Development Association, 
which makes loans on favorable terms to the 
world's poorest nations. 

The United Nations Development Pro- 
gram, which provides important technical as- 
sistance to the developing world, has also 
proven its effectiveness and worth. We are 
seeking an appropriation of $130 million for 
fiscal year 1978, a 30% increase over last 

— Bilateral Development Assistance. Con- 
gress has played a major role in developing 
our bilateral programs, which provide direct 
American support for development programs 
in the poorer countries. Through these 
programs we have shared our expertise and 
our resources with other countries. Our 
bilateral programs are directed at the 
poorest people in these countries' popula- 
tions; they emphasize food and nutrition, 
population and health, education and human 
resource development, and science and tech- 
nology, including energy development. 

We have certain expectations of the 
countries which we help. We have no inten- 
tion of running their governments or their 
economies, but we expect them to mobilize 
their own resources in the effort to develop, 
to ensure that the poor share in the benefits, 
and to respect basic human rights. 

I am asking the Congress to provide $1.3 
billion for the bilateral development assist- 
ance program for fiscal year 1978. This is a 
20% increase over the amount provided for 
fiscal year 1977, which I believe is clearly 

Last year, the Congress, on its own initia- 

tive, appropriated $5 million to help develop 
a comprehensive long-term recovery plan for 
the Sahel region, which had undergone a dis- 
astrous drought. As the first major U.S. con- 
tribution to this program, I am requesting 
$50 million for fiscal year 1978. We will coop- 
erate with other interested nations in making 
further contributions to the Sahel 
development effort in the future. 

— The PL-i80 Program. The enormous vi- 
tality of U.S agricultural production permits 
us to share a portion of our bounty in the 
form of food aid. Our PL-480 programs 
should not only help the poorer countries 
improve the quantity and quality of their nu- 
trition, but also encourage self-help pro- 
grams that will improve their capacity to 
feed their people in the future. And these 
programs let us offer relief from famine and 
privation in the wake of natural and 
man-made disasters. In fiscal year 1978, our 
food aid programs will distribute $1.4 billion 
in agricultural commodities. 

— Security Assistance Program. Only 
where peace and security are assured can 
free nations devote their full energies to 
development. Our security assistance pro- 
grams are keyed to these goals, and to ad- 
vancing the security interests of the United 
States in cooperation with our friends and al- 
lies. Nearly two-thirds of the funds re- 
quested for security assistance will be for 
economic supporting programs. I have in- 
creased the amounts proposed by the pre- 
vious Administration for the Middle East; 
this will strengthen the economic underpin- 
nings so essential to achievement of our goal 
of peace and stability in this vital region. 

For FY-1978 the major elements of my 
program on security assistance are: 

• Grant military aid — $284.6 million to 
eight countries, in most of which we also 
have U.S. military facilities essential to our 
global interests. This includes $224 million in 
programs plus $60.6 million in general and 
administrative costs, most of which will be 
reimbursed from other sources. 

• Grant military education — $35.7 million 
to train future military leaders. 

• Financing for foreign military 

April 11, 1977 


sales— $708 million, which will finance $2.2 
billion in loans to help foreign governments 
eventually to meet their essential security 
needs by themselves, instead of depending 
on U.S. handouts. 

• Security supporting assistance — $1.9 
billion to finance programs for countries 
whose economic condition is a factor in our 
efforts to assure international security. The 
two areas where most of these funds will be 
used — Middle East, and depending on 
events, Southern Africa — testify to the 
significance of these programs. 

These proposals are fully consistent with 
my wish to limit budget increases to 
essentials. My assistance program is part of 
an effort to combine support of our country's 
economic interests and security with 
compassion for the impoverished millions of 
fellow human beings who share the world 
with us. 

I hope that the economic assistance program 
now before you will receive your careful, 
prompt, and sympathetic attention. It 
represents a vital step toward partnership in 
a peaceful and equitable world order. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, March 17, 1977. 

U.S. Assistance Programs 
in Southeast Asia 

Following is a statement by Robert B. Oak- 
ley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Sub- 
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions on March 17. l 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
testify on the Administration's economic and 
security assistance programs in East Asia for 
fiscal year 1978. Since Mr. Holbrooke dis- 
cussed last week our general position on as- 
sistance to East Asia, I would like today to 
pay special attention to Southeast Asia — the 

area to which most of our assistance is di- 
rected. 2 

While the non-Communist nations of South- 
east Asia have in recent years become in- 
creasingly prosperous and independent, these 
countries face continuing problems of de- 
velopment and major uncertainties concerning 
their relationships with the Communist gov- 
ernments in Indochina. Still fearful of the 
regional intentions of Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia, they see a continuation of U.S. 
developmental, humanitarian, and military 
assistance as essential if they are to adapt to 
the new situation in Southeast Asia — to the 
demands of greater self-reliance. 

Our bilateral economic assistance goes to 
three nations in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand, while our secu- 
rity assistance covers these three as well as 
Malaysia. Since Mr. Holbrooke discussed the 
Philippines in his prepared statement, I will 
comment only on Indonesia and Thailand. 

For Indonesia in fiscal year 1978, we are 
proposing $57.2 million in economic assistance 
and $90.7 million in Public Law 480 programs, 
in addition to security assistance of $15 mil- 
lion in grant materiel, $3.1 million in training, 
and $40 million in FMS [foreign military sales] 

Indonesia's position as an important oil ex- 
porter should not obscure the fact that she 
remains one of the very poorest countries in 
the world. Her needs in critical fields such as 
developmental capital, technical assistance, 
and manpower training are vast and, accord- 
ing to the World Bank, can be met only with 
substantial external aid. 

The present government, which took power 
in 1966 following an attempted seizure of 
power by Communists, is led by the military 
but includes many civilians, particularly 
American-trained economists. Prior to the 
Communist victories in Indochina, it held 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For a statement before the subcommittee on Mar. 
10 by Richard C. Holbrooke, then Assistant Sec- 
retary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1977, p. 322. 


Department of State Bulletin 

military spending to a minimum in order to 
devote its maximum resources to economic 
development. But recently it has felt a need 
to pay somewhat more attention to improving 
its own security, particularly its mobility and 
surveillance capabilities. This need is re- 
flected in our proposed increase in FMS 
financing from $23.1 million in fiscal year 1977 
to $40 million in fiscal year 1978 and the ex- 
ceptional request to continue grant assistance 
for this next year. 

We feel it is in the U.S. interest to continue 
assistance to Indonesia, not only because it is 
a strategically located country which has 
maintained close and friendly ties with the 
United States during the last decade, but also 
because our economic assistance programs 
there directly benefit some of the poorest 
people in the world. The requested Indone- 
sian assistance program is, in our view, ap- 

For Thailand, we are proposing an economic 
assistance program for fiscal year 1978 of 
$4,405,000 and military assistance of $8 mil- 
lion in grant materiel, $1 million in training, 
and $29.5 million in credit sales. 

Thailand is obviously the nation most di- 
rectly concerned by developments in In- 
dochina, and its stability and independence 
are important to the maintenance and 
strengthening of peace in the region. The 
Thai face real security problems along the 
borders with their Communist neighbors as 
well as an active, externally supported in- 
surgency. However, in view of the increasing 
ability of Thailand to provide for its security 
and its economic progress, we have been 
steadily reducing economic assistance and 
phasing out grant security aid. The fiscal year 
1978 requests are well below those of the fis- 
cal year 1977 program and are in line with this 
trend. We feel the requested fiscal year 1978 
levels are an appropriate U.S. contribution to 
regional stability, as well as to the Thai Gov- 
ernment's own effort in specific key fields. 

In Southeast Asia, the human rights situa- 
tion varies from country to country. Mr. Hol- 
brooke's prepared statement last week de- 
scribed our concerns in the Philippines. 

In Indonesia, the human rights problem is a 

legacy of the attempt by Communists to seize 
power in 1965. At present, about 30,000 indi- 
viduals are still detained. The Government of 
Indonesia fears that mass release of these 
people will rekindle subversion and public 
disorders. In this connection, it is worth re- 
calling that in 1965 the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI) was the world's largest Com- 
munist party outside of the U.S.S.R. and 
China and that it has made three attempts to 
seize power by violence. This background con- 
tributes to Indonesian Government worries 
about the possible future intentions of the 
PKI's cadres. 

While the U.S. Government understands 
the background, this does not diminish our 
strong concern over the abuse of human rights 
and individual liberties. Our views have been 
made known to the Indonesian Government. 
In December 1976 the Government of In- 
donesia released 2,500 prisoners and an- 
nounced a three-year phased release of the 
remainder. We believe our efforts have been 
helpful and intend to continue them. We also 
believe that continued U.S. security and eco- 
nomic assistance at the requested levels 
enhances stability and furthers economic 
progress, thereby creating a more favorable 
climate for the observance of human rights. 

Concerning recent press reports on civilian 
casualties in East Timor, our information on 
the situation is limited, but we believe the 
casualty figures cited by the press are greatly 
exaggerated. These figures apparently relate 
to the casualties which occurred in late 1975 
and early 1976 and are not substantiated by 
any reliable observers of whom we have 

In Thailand we understand that all but 143 
of the several thousand persons who were ar- 
rested following the violence that immediately 
preceded the October 6 coup d'etat have been 
or will be soon released. Under the provisions 
of martial law some 2,000 other people remain 
in detention. The vast majority fall into 
categories of common criminals. No members 
of the previous democratically elected gov- 
ernment have been arrested or detained. 

Although this hearing primarily concerns 
our economic and security programs in coun- 

April 11, 1977 


tries that have been and continue to be close 
friends of the United States, we are at the 
same time attempting to normalize relations 
with our former adversaries in Vietnam. The 
Presidential Commission is in Hanoi at this 
moment, trying to achieve a satisfactory ac- 
counting of our MIA's in Southeast Asia so 
that we can move toward the normalization of 
relations. The Commission will also visit Laos 
to discuss the MIA issue. We hope for an 
eventual easing of tension and promotion of 
stability for the entire region, making it pos- 
sible for all nations to devote more of their 
own resources and of the assistance they re- 
ceive from abroad to the economic well-being 
of their peoples and to relax the restraints 
which today are in varying degree imposed 
upon individual liberties throughout the re- 

Department Discusses South Asia 
and U.S. Assistance Programs 

Following is a statement by Adolph Dubs, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
ern and South Asian Affairs, before the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 
of the House Committee on International Re- 
lations on March 22. l 

I am pleased to testify today in support of 
AID's [Agency for International Develop- 
ment] proposed fiscal year 1978 development 
assistance programs in Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and the Public Law 
480 commodity sales to those four countries 
and India. Since Mr. Adler [Michael H. B. 
Adler, Acting Assistant Administrator for 
Asia, AID] is concentrating on the details 
and specifics of our economic assistance pro- 
posals, I would like to present a brief over- 
view of recent political and economic 
developments in the region and how these 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

developments relate to U.S. policies, goals, 
and concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, the programs we are con- 
sidering today will affect countries with a 
combined population of over 800 million 
people, more than one-fifth of the inhabitants 
of the world. Most of the people in these 
countries are, by any standard, among the 
poorest individuals we are attempting to as- 
sist anywhere. 

South Asia is marked by its diversity. The 
vast majority of its inhabitants belong to 
three great religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Islam. The political systems are not 
uniform in structure. The area's economies 
range from subsistence farming to high- 
technology industries. Despite this diversity, 
the nations of South Asia share many things. 
In particular, they share common acute and 
pressing problems: They all confront the 
problems associated with rising populations, 
declining land-man ratios, low industrializa- 
tion, rapid urbanization, and severe 
problems in the fields of education and 

Two successive good crop years, and the 
absence of manmade or natural disasters, 
have reduced temporarily the acuteness of 
the basic challenges facing South Asia. 
Nevertheless, the overall system remains 
exceedingly fragile. The economies of all the 
states are heavily influenced by the vagaries 
of weather, and the region repeatedly has 
been confronted by cyclical food shortages 
which have threatened the lives of millions. 

Our goal is providing development assist- 
ance and food aid to help South Asia address 
these challenges. We recognize the limits of 
our ability to influence developments, par- 
ticularly in view of the massive difficulties 
faced, but we feel that we have an obligation 
to assist these countries in their developmen- 
tal efforts. Certainly, despite its many prob- 
lems the area has the potential to develop, to 
become self-sufficient in food production, and 
to satisfy the basic needs of its peoples. 

During the past year, South Asian states 
generally have improved their bilateral rela- 
tions. Efforts to do so have required political 
courage and foresight and have demonstrated 
a degree of flexibility on the part of the re- 


Department of State Bulletin 

gion's leaders. We welcome these efforts. 
South Asian nations, for the first time since 
1962, all enjoy full and normal diplomatic rela- 
tions. And outside the immediate region, India 
has made progress toward normalizing its rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of China, 
while Pakistan has done the same with Af- 
ghanistan. If the regional tensions which have 
characterized relations among South Asian 
countries continue to decrease, we hope that 
these countries will shift increasing resources 
to developmental purposes. 

India and Pakistan have made important 
strides in implementing the process of nor- 
malization under the Simla agreement, while 
India and Bangladesh have met on several 
occasions to discuss their dispute over the 
division of the Ganges' waters. Political prob- 
lems continue to exist, but these are being 
addressed by the nations of the region di- 
rectly, without outside intervention. This in 
itself is a most welcome development. 

The United States, Mr. Chairman, has 
only a limited ability to influence this process 
of regional accomodation, but we encourage 
it and have supported it where possible. Di- 
rect U.S. security interests in South Asia are 
limited. We have no military bases on the 
subcontinent, and we seek no bases. We have 
been following a policy of restraint on the 
sale of military equipment. We believe that 
this policy has served our interests well. 
Aside from modest military training pro- 
grams, we offer no grant military aid in 
South Asia. 

This is not to say that our political inter- 
ests in the region are insignificant, but 
compared with other areas of the world, our 
direct involvement is modest and our inter- 
ests can best be served by encouraging the 
evolution of a stable regional system, free of 
outside domination, in which the individual 
countries are able to devote increasing 
resources to their own development. 

Additionally, our political interest is en- 
hanced by the fact that South Asia has 
become increasingly important in interna- 
tional forums, where many of the more basic 
economic issues confronting the world are 
being addressed. The regional states partici- 
pate actively in the Group of 77, the 

Nonaligned Conference, the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation, the 
North-South dialogue, and in many other in- 
ternational forums. Within these groupings, 
South Asia counts for a great deal: India has 
long been an important spokesman for the 
Third World; Pakistan has been in the 
forefront on international economic issues; 
and Sri Lanka currently chairs the 
nonaligned group of nations. On the whole, 
South Asia has adopted a constructive and 
noncontroversial approach, seeking to pro- 
mote a genuine dialogue with the developed 
Our goals in South Asia continue to be: 

— Improving regional stability and 
enhancing the ability of the regional states to 
resolve their bilateral problems without out- 
side interference; 

— Strengthening the independence of 
South Asian nations and supporting their de- 
termination to avoid domination by any 
external power; 

— Providing economic assistance and hu- 
manitarian aid, when this is required, 
assisting the nations of the area in their ef- 
forts to attack poverty; 

— Encouraging these nations to adopt 
constructive policies on major world eco- 
nomic and political issues; 

— Limiting regional conventional arms 
acquisitions and preventing nuclear prolifer- 
ation in South Asia; 

— Fostering, so far as we are able, the 
promotion of human rights and the democratic 
process; and 

— Controlling the production of narcotics 
and their supply to the world's illicit market. 

Fortunately, trends in recent years within 
South Asia have shown substantial progress 
toward these goals, although the problems 
ahead remain formidable. Nuclear prolifera- 
tion, Mr. Chairman, is one such issue. 

As you are aware, India exploded a nuclear 
device in 1974, and Pakistan has contracted 
to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant 
from France. It is in our basic interest that 
both countries behave responsibly in this 
field. We have repeatedly stressed our 
opposition to the transfer of sensitive nuclear 

April 11, 1977 


technology. We are discussing this problem 
with the Pakistan Government in diplomatic 
channels. Prime Minister Bhutto recently 
stated that he would be prepared to discuss 
this matter with us, and we hope that it will 
be possible to reach a mutually satisfactory 

Narcotics, as you are well aware, Mr. 
Chairman, is another significant issue con- 
fronting U.S. policy in South Asia. Two of 
the regional states, India and Pakistan, are 
large producers of opium. So far as we are 
aware, no South Asian opium or opium prod- 
ucts have yet reached the United States, but 
as the suppression programs in Mexico and 
Burma bear fruit, international traffickers 
may turn their attention to South Asia. 

Mr. Chairman, recent internal political de- 
velopments in South Asia have received a 
considerable amount of press attention, and I 
would like to address myself to these de- 
velopments briefly. India and Pakistan have 
just completed general elections; Sri Lanka 
is scheduled to do so before the end of the 
year; and Bangladesh has had nationwide 
local elections. In the first two instances, 
there were broad-ranging, extremely free 
debates on the domestic issues confronting 
these countries, as well as on their basic 
political structures and leadership. With re- 
gard to Sri Lanka, the campaign in that 
country promises to afford the voters an op- 
portunity to openly examine the nation's 
priorities, goals, and direction, as has been 
the case in previous elections. 

Mr. Chairman, our proposed AID program 
is supportive of our political interests in 
South Asia. It is aimed at the most critical 
problems of the area: increasing food produc- 
tion and reducing population growth. A 
solution to these problems is crucial to im- 
proving the lives of the poor in this region. 
The challenge also has worldwide 

significance in our interdependent world. I 
know you will have specific questions on 
these proposals, as well as on the general 
situation in the region, which I will be happy 
to answer as fully and frankly as possible. 

Expiration of Area Restrictions 
on Use of Passports 

Press release 114 dated March 18 

On March 18 the restrictions against the use 
of the U.S. passport for travel to, in or 
through Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia expire. Therefore there will no 
longer be any bar to the use of the passport in 
those countries. 

It is important for would-be travelers to 
bear in mind, however, that the ability of the 
U.S. Government to extend the traditional 
protection to its citizens is very limited in 
those countries with which the United States 
maintains no diplomatic or consular relations. 
That is the case with the four aforementioned 
countries. Although it is possible for Ameri- 
can travelers to seek very limited assistance 
from the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which 
protects U.S. interests in Cuba, there is no 
protecting power in any of the other countries 
mentioned above. This and other inherent 
risks for Americans in traveling to these 
countries are described in greater detail in 
travel advisory notices which will be made 
available by the Passport Office and Foreign 
Service posts abroad to would-be travelers to 
those countries. 

Revisions of the Department of the Treas- 
ury licensing procedures affecting the expen- 
diture of funds in the aforementioned coun- 
tries are in preparation. Information may be 
secured from the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Department of the Treasury. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change 

Statement by William H. Luers 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 1 

On behalf of the Bureau of Inter-American 
Affairs, I welcome this series of hearings. I 
hope they can contribute to an illumination 
and to a better appreciation of the profound 
changes that have taken place in our hemi- 
spheric relations over the past generation. 

In this opening statement, I plan to de- 
scribe briefly: 

— How our perceptions of the hemisphere 
have lagged behind reality; 

— How differently we and the other nations 
of this hemisphere perceive our mutual inter- 

— How strikingly different our perceptions 
are from the Latin Americans' on the proper 
emphasis on rights; and 

— How we are setting out in this environ- 
ment to improve hemispheric cooperation. 

America's appreciation of and attitudes to- 
ward Latin America and the Caribbean have 
not kept pace with the dramatic changes that 
have taken place in this hemisphere since the 
early days of the Alliance for Progress. Symp- 
tomatic of this lag is the fact that a major 
U.S. newspaper carried an editorial on Brazil 
only last month and referred to its capital as 

Today the nations of Latin America and the 
Caribbean are more diverse, confident, inde- 

1 Made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs of the House International Relations Committee 
on Mar. 24 at a hearing on fiscal year 1978 foreign eco- 
nomic assistance for Latin America. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by the commit- 
tee and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 

pendent, and self-aware than any regional 
grouping in the Third World. But they also 
have a crushing burden of foreign debt, an 
alarming population growth, and a dizzy rate 
of urbanization. As change has transformed 
these societies, inequities have become 
exaggerated — stark poverty exists alongside 

Most of the nations of the hemisphere have 
given up one-man rule for more in- 
stitutionalized forms of government. But the 
dominant institution is the military. Democ- 
racy, never strongly rooted in Latin America, 
is less prevalent today than at any time since 
World War II. Yet, while there are repressive 
governments, many democratic freedoms 
coexist — paradoxically — with serious abuses 
of human rights. 

Latin America and the Caribbean present 
most dramatically the importance of the 
North-South issues to the people of this coun- 
try. From no other part of the world does 
foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our 
society or create such an implicit obligation to 

— As our living standards outstrip theirs, 
we become the illegal but logical haven for 
workers escaping the despair of poverty. 

— Regional proximity sharpens our human- 
itarian perceptions that poverty is a global 
rather than a national problem. 

— As our market for illicit drugs expands, 
our corruption and crime extends itself into 
the poor agricultural areas where the prod- 
ucts of the poppy and the coca plant become 
valued commodities. 

— As our interchanges of finance, trade, and 

April 11, 1977 


tourism grow, they impact deeply on citizens 
of this country. 

— And as citizens from our neighborhood 
enter the United States, our society is en- 
riched and our labor force expanded. 

The peoples of this hemisphere are no 
longer in awe of us. They respect our vitality, 
success, technology, and prosperity. But they 
charge that we have an insatiable thirst for 
the world's resources, that we are unwilling 
to share our expanding wealth, and that we 
have used our enormous power arbitrarily in 
the past. 

If Latin Americans are still described in 
cliches by us, so we, likewise, are little un- 
derstood by them. 

Differing Perceptions of Interests 

Let me turn now to discuss briefly how our 
interests in the nations of Latin America and 
the Caribbean contrast with their interests in 

The United States: 

— Hopes that this hemisphere remains free 
from military conflict, from arms races, and 
from the proliferation of nuclear weapons; 

— Depends on the expansion of two-way 
trade with a rapidly growing and industrializ- 
ing market; 

— Looks to the leaders of this hemisphere to 
play a mature and moderating role in the in- 
ternational councils now exploring the reor- 
dering of the world's economic institutions 
and procedures; 

— Desires to see the end to torture, perse- 
cution, arbitrary arrest, and violence from the 
left and the right; and 

— Hopes that economic development will be 
accompanied by the development of demo- 
cratic institutions which provide the most cer- 
tain guarantee of human rights. 

What the nations of Latin America and the 
Caribbean seek from us is quite different. 
From each nation of the hemisphere comes a 
different set of requests, reflecting the diver- 
sity of the region. You will be examining this 
diversity with my colleagues. There are com- 
mon threads, however: 

— Trade and resource flows are at the cen- 

ter of their concerns. They want expanded 
and preferred access to our markets and 
guarantees of stabilized earnings from their 
exports. They want financial backing for their 
heavy debt burdens. 

— They insist that we not intervene in their 
internal affairs. Their obsession with U.S. in- 
terventionism has a long history. By interven- 
tionism they often mean not only military in- 
tervention and subversion but also the 
ubiquitous U.S. products and television pro- 

— They also want our respect and our ap- 
preciation of their dignity, independence, and 
sovereignty. They want our understanding 
and our attention. 

Interdependence requires that we respond 
to these hemispheric interests. Otherwise we 
cannot expect responsiveness to ours. 

Differing Perspectives on Human Rights 

I would like here, Mr. Chairman, to make a 
comment on the differing perspectives that 
we and many Latin American nations have on 
human rights. 

Some governments see our urging respect 
for human rights as a new type of U.S. inter- 
ventionism. They are annoyed because they 
believe that our comments and program re- 
strictions reflect a failure to understand their 
particular domestic problems and security 
threats. We do not pretend to measure or 
judge the domestic threat. It is the type and 
severity of the response that concerns the 
American people. As President Carter said 
[at the United Nations on March 17], no sig- 
natory of the U.N. Charter "can avoid its re- 
sponsibilities to review and to speak when 
torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in 
any part of the world." 

And let it be said that other hemispheric 
governments and many people in this hemi- 
sphere welcome and are heartened by our re- 
newed attention to values that still form a 
unique part of this New World. In our in- 
creased interest in human rights, we are not 
imposing our political preferences on any na- 
tion. But we are summoning governments to 
respect the principles to which they have sub- 
scribed in numerous U.N. and OAS docu- 


Department of State Bulletin 

There is a second aspect of the rights ques- 
tion, the perception of which separates us 
from many governments, leaders, intellectu- 
als, and ordinary citizens in this hemisphere. 
We stress as fundamental the rights of liberty 
and freedoms from physical and mental perse- 
cution. Yet many in this hemisphere see the 
rights to food, shelter, work, and survival as 
fundamental. If the right to be free from tor- 
ture and persecution is vital to man's dignity, 
so are the economic and social rights. We 
must be alert to the charge that we justify our 
decision not to share our wealth on the 
grounds that others violate human rights. Our 
conscience thus eased, some charge, we con- 
tinue to devour a third of the world's re- 

I should like to quote here again from Pres- 
ident Carter's address to the United Nations. 
The human rights issue, he said: 

... is important in itself. It should not block prog- 
ress on other important matters affecting the security 
and well-being of our people and of world peace. It is 
obvious that the reduction of tension, the control of nu- 
clear arms, the achievement of harmony in the troubled 
areas of the world, and the provision of food, good 
health, and education will independently contribute to 
advancing the human condition. 

In our relationships with other countries, these 
mutual concerns will be reflected in our political, our 
cultural, and our economic attitudes. 

Mr. Chairman, if we are prepared to match 
our morality with our generosity, if compas- 
sion for the poor is equal to our passion for 
freedom, and if we pay as much attention to 
egalitarian as we do to libertarian issues, our 
message will be heard and understood. 

Toward Improved Hemispheric Cooperation 

Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic about our 
capacity to shape a more cooperative relation- 
ship with the other nations of this hemi- 

First, we have with our neighbors a long 
experience in shaping economic change and 
growth. The global North-South debate, in a 
real sense, began in this hemisphere. The 
leaders of Latin America are advanced in 
their ideas on how the United States might 
become a better partner in their economic de- 
velopment. We must address simultaneously 

global, regional, subregional, and bilateral is- 
sues. Our approach to many economic issues 
will depend on solutions developed in a global 
framework. Other issues we can best work 
out through a strengthened inter-American 
system with the Organization of American 
States at its center. Still others we can best 
approach cooperatively through existing sub- 
regional organizations. Finally, there will be a 
number of questions we can resolve most ef- 
fectively only on a bilateral basis. 

Second, this is a hemisphere whose nations 
are at peace with each other. Although there 
are repressive governments, there is no seri- 
ous threat of war. The nations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean spend less on ar- 
maments than any region in the world. And 
while violence is too often turned inward in 
the Americas, the governments have the 
interest and capacity to improve the lot of 
their people. Most people throughout the 
Americas respond instinctively to fundamen- 
tal humanitarian values. Even authoritarian 
governments accept these ideals and explain 
departures from them in terms of priorities 
rather than preference. Without war, gov- 
ernments and societies can devote their ener- 
gies to people. 

Third, we must make clear that the long era 
of U.S. interventionism has passed. Govern- 
ments will remain skeptical of our assurances. 
We must be open in our relations and abstain 
from our historic compulsion to design the fu- 
ture of our neighbors. We can convince them 
now only by our performance, not rhetoric. 

Fourth, there is a new sense of cooperation 
between the U.S. private sector and the gov- 
ernments of this hemisphere. Governments 
have better defined the terms under which 
foreign capital is wanted. U.S. companies, for 
their part, are demonstrating a new sensitiv- 
ity to the national pride and sovereign rights 
of their hosts. Improved cooperation with the 
private sector is critical to capital and tech- 
nology transfers. 

Fifth, the increasing role of Hispanic 
Americans and people from the Caribbean in 
our society is beginning to raise the American 
consciousness about our neighborhood. We 
must develop together with the Congress and 
the media new ways and new programs for 

April 11, 1977 


expanding our understanding of this hemi- 
sphere and its peoples. It is likewise essential 
that the nations of this hemisphere make 
greater efforts to understand us. 

Finally, President Carter has shown an 
unprecedented interest in Latin America: 

— His first Presidential visitor was, by no 
coincidence, from Mexico. We have already 
set an energetic and cooperative course with 
the Government of Mexico to manage the 
complex problems we share. 

— A first priority of this Administration 
after the inauguration was to give urgent at- 
tention to negotiating a new treaty with 
Panama for the canal. This is an issue of im- 
portance not just between us and Panama but 
for our relations with the entire hemisphere. 

— Several foreign ministers have visited 
Washington as a first step to rebuilding our 
relations with traditional friends. 

— We have indicated a readiness to talk to 
the Cuban Government without preconditions 
on a range of issues that divide us. 

— We are committed to continued strong 
support for international and regional finan- 
cial institutions and to sustaining significant 
bilateral assistance programs which are criti- 
cal to the development needs of the region. In 
this endeavor we shall need the support of the 

— And although we know it will be difficult 
to move rapidly on the many economic issues 
critical to this hemisphere, this Administra- 
tion is committed to engage the issues 

Mr. Chairman, we have an opportunity and 
obligation to cooperate constructively with 
this new hemisphere. We must do so without 
sentimentality but with a sense of strong tra- 
dition, without paternalism but with respect 
for the sovereignty, independence, and dig- 
nity of each nation to find its own future. 

Pan American Day and 
Pan American Week, 1977 


The people of the Western Hemisphere share a com- 
mon past and a common future. As friends and 
neighbors we have an obligation to help one another, in 
order to promote our common good and to solve the 
problems of each nation, and advance our mutual inter- 
est in global solutions to problems that confront all of 
humankind. The Organization of American States, the 
world's oldest regional organization, is one symbol of 
these shared aspirations. 

Since Pan American Day was first proclaimed in 1889, 
the nations of this hemisphere have undergone dramatic 
changes internally and in relationship to each other. 
The challenge for all of us in the coming year is to find 
ways to adapt our relationships to take into account 
these changes. At the same time, we should rededicate 
ourselves to the ideals of peace, cooperation, and social 
justice which continue to unite and inspire our peoples. 

It is appropriate that we set aside a special period to 
honor the heritage that unites us, to reaffirm our 
mutual desire for peace and international harmony, and 
to dedicate ourselves to shaping a relationship which 
looks to the future for inspiration. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Thursday, April 14, 1977, as Pan American Day, and 
the week beginning April 10, 1977, as Pan American 
Week. I call upon the Governors of the States and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Mayor of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia, and appropriate officials of all other 
areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to 
issue similar proclamations. 

I urge the communications media, educators, indi- 
viduals, and organizations to join together during this 
week to celebrate our friendship and to recognize the 
need for a continuing commitment to peaceful and pro- 
ductive relationships with our neighbors in this Hemi- 
sphere as a special part of our effort to forge equitable 
global frameworks for relations among nations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this twenty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the two hundred 
and first. 

Jimmy Carter. 

1 No. 4491; 42 Fed. Reg. 15677. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on Legislation 
on Illicit Payments Abroad 

Following is a statement by Secretary of the 
Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal made be- 
fore the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous- 
ing and Urban Affairs on March 16. 1 

Department of the Treasury press release dated March 16 

I would like to say at the outset that the 
Administration supports the aims of S. 305. 
The Carter Administration believes that it is 
damaging both to our country and to a healthy 
world economic system for American corpora- 
tions to bribe foreign officials. The United 
States should impose specific criminal penal- 
ties for such acts. The effective enforcement 
of U.S. criminal penalties for corrupt pay- 
ments abroad is a difficult matter and will re- 
quire close international cooperation. I will 
discuss these enforcement aspects later in my 

The problem of corrupt payments is one 
that is a cause of great concern to this Admin- 
istration. Paying bribes — apart from being 
morally repugnant and illegal in most 
countries — is simply not necessary for the 
successful conduct of business here or over- 
seas. I believe that the responsible elements 
of the business community agree, and it had 
been my hope that the business community it- 
self would formulate and implement a code of 
business ethics that would set high standards. 
Unfortunately, there has been little move- 
ment to date in the private sector. The Carter 
Administration has decided that strong gov- 
ernment action in the form of further legisla- 
tion is needed. 

In its assessment of legislative alternatives, 
the Carter Administration is reviewing care- 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

fully the record of recent regulatory action. 
We are finding this record a very useful guide 
against which new initiatives can be 
examined. I believe therefore that it would be 
worthwhile to review with you the consider- 
able regulatory action that has taken place 
during the past few years. 

1. The Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion has been impressively successful in ob- 
taining disclosure from issuers of registered 
securities who have engaged in these im- 
proper practices. It is already clear that these 
disclosures have compelled many firms to im- 
pose strict internal controls against these 
practices. I need not describe further the 
SEC's action, as I am sure that Chairman 
[Roderick M.] Hills will give you a thorough 
description in his testimony today. 

2. In June 1976 the Internal Revenue Serv- 
ice issued 11 questions to which corporate of- 
ficers and outside auditors are required to re- 
spond in affidavit form. These questions are 
designed to discover whether corporations 
have been illegally deducting bribes. As of 
December 31, 1976, the 11 questions had been 
asked in approximately 800 large case exam- 
inations. Indications of slush funds or illegal 
activity have been found in over 270 such 
cases. Most of these cases are still under ac- 
tive consideration, and over 50 criminal inves- 
tigations have been started. 

Also in the tax area, the Tax Reform Act of 
1976 eliminated the tax benefits (deferrals 
and deductions) associated with illegal pay- 
ments made by majority-owned subsidiaries 
and domestic international sales corporations. 
This new prohibition parallels longstanding 
prohibitions against deductions of illegal pay- 
ments made in the United States. 

I believe that this increased audit activity 
and new legislation will have an increasingly 
salutary effect. 

April 11, 1977 


3. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
now requires reports of payments (including 
political contributions and agents' fees) that 
are made or offered to secure the sale of de- 
fense items abroad. The data reported by 
U.S. firms is made available to Congress and 
to Federal agencies responsible for enforcing 
laws on this subject. The Department of State 
has issued detailed regulations to implement 
this requirement. 

Furthermore, 1976 amendments to the 
Foreign Military Sales Act require disclosure 
to purchasing governments and to the De- 
partment of Defense of any agents' fees in- 
cluded in contracts covered by the act. Fees 
determined to be questionable by the Defense 
Department or unacceptable by foreign gov- 
ernments will not be allowed costs under such 

4. Last year, the International Chamber of 
Commerce organized an international panel to 
formulate a code of ethics for businessmen. 
The panel is scheduled to present a code of 
ethics to the ICC Executive Board on March 
23. Subject to approval by the national cham- 
bers of commerce, the code could be adopted 
by the ICC council at its June 1977 meeting. 

5. The United States is actively pursuing in 
the United Nations a treaty on corrupt pay- 
ments in international transactions. The 
United States has formally proposed that the 
treaty be based on three concepts: (1) en- 
forcement of host-country criminal laws; (2) 
international cooperation on exchange of 
information and judicial assistance in en- 
forcement; and (3) uniform provisions for dis- 
closure of payments to foreign officials and 
agents made to influence official acts. 

The U.N. working group for this initiative 
has met twice and will meet again to begin 
drafting March 28-April 8. It has been di- 
rected to report by this summer on a possible 
treaty on illicit payments for consideration by 
the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council and possible action by the General 

A number of other governments have ex- 
pressed interest in international action, but 
there is much work still to be done. This 
treaty may be an essential complement to ef- 
fective enforcement of domestic legislation, 

such as S. 305. President Carter is giving this 
effort his fullest support. 

6. The Department of Justice, in coopera- 
tion with the Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission and the Bureau of Customs, has 
reviewed the foreign activities of approxi- 
mately 50 domestic corporations. This review 
has resulted in the opening of active criminal 
investigations on eight multinational corpo- 
rations. Several of these investigations are 
now in the grand jury stage. 

The United States is also continuing to 
cooperate through bilateral agreements in the 
law enforcement efforts of other govern- 
ments. Thirteen agreements on specific 
corporate groups have been signed, and dis- 
cussions are underway with other countries. 

Enforcement Problems 

The initiatives described above are collec- 
tively impressive. They add up to a significant 
deterrent to corrupt payments by American 
firms, both in the United States and abroad. 

Of equal importance, Mr. Chairman, is the 
change in the climate of public opinion in the 
United States. I am certain that any U.S. 
corporate executive faced with a choice of 
whether to make a corrupt payment in 1977 
will be much more reluctant than he would 
have been three years ago. 

However, the Administration believes that 
the recent initiatives must be complemented 
by new legislation. The Administration sup- 
ports the criminalization of corrupt payments 
made to foreign officials. 

But before turning to the criminalization 
aspects of S. 305, I would like to assure the 
committee that the Administration agrees 
with section 102 of title I concerning account- 
ing records and dealings with accountants. 
We note that the SEC has recently offered for 
comment proposed regulations which closely 
parallel section 102. We suggest that the 
committee consider comments received by the 
SEC concerning the proposed regulations 
when it marks up this section. 

Now turning to the central aspect of S. 
305 — the criminalization of corrupt payments 
made to foreign officials — as I said, we sup- 
port it. At the same time, the Administration 


Department of State Bulletin 

recognizes that great care must be taken with 
an approach which makes certain types of ex- 
traterritorial conduct subject to our country's 
criminal laws. Moreover, a law which pro- 
vides criminal penalties must describe the 
persons and acts covered with a high degree 
of specificity in order to be enforceable, to 
provide fair warning to American busi- 
nessmen. Mr. Chairman, I am seriously con- 
cerned about the enforcement problems aris- 
ing from the broad and sometimes vague 
reach of S. 305 as it is presently drafted. The 
Administration believes that the bill can and 
must be improved in a number of respects to 
insure that it will be fairly and effectively en- 
forced and, in its implementation, will not 
give undue offense to foreign countries whose 
officials would be implicated in cases brought 
under the U.S. criminal law. 

Aspects of the bill which we believe require 
improvement include the following elements: 

— The definition of a "domestic concern" 
should specify the degree of control which will 
bring a foreign corporation controlled by in- 
dividuals who are citizens or nationals of the 
United States within the purview of the law. 

— The definition of the term "domestic con- 
cern" should also make it clear when a foreign 
corporation which is owned directly or indi- 
rectly by a U.S. corporation is covered. 

— Foreign issuers of registered securities 
should not be subject to the criminalization 

— Requiring the SEC to take primary re- 
sponsibility for enforcing a criminalization 
program would be a dubious diversion from its 
primary mission of securing adequate disclo- 
sure to protect investors of registered securi- 

— The term "interstate commerce" should 
be more precisely defined to provide more 
specifically the certainty and the extent of 
contacts with the United States constitution- 
ally required in a criminal statute. 

I want to emphasize that our reservations 
do not represent an intent to weaken the 
thrust of the bill or to delay its passage. 
Rather, we want to work with your commit- 
tee to insure that legislation in this area is 
workable and fair. We have established an 

interagency group to recommend language 
which will satisfy our concerns. We will get 
that language to you as soon as possible. 

Further, the Administration believes that 
prompt disclosure of corrupt foreign pay- 
ments also may provide a highly effective de- 
terrent. We do not foreclose the possibility 
that disclosure provisions will be considered 
in our further review of the enforcement as- 
pects of this subject. 

Moreover, once the bill is enacted into law, 
the Administration plans to continue to seek a 
multilateral treaty and additional bilateral 
agreements on illicit payments. Such agree- 
ments will increase the enforceability of 
domestic legislation and will help to minimize 
any adverse effects of this law on our foreign 
relations. Our intent is to propose that a mul- 
tilateral treaty include an undertaking by 
each country to adopt the approach of S. 
305 — in other words, to apply a criminal pro- 
hibition against foreign corporate bribery. 

Disclosure of Shareholder Identity 

Let me turn now to a brief discussion of 
title II. First, I support its concept — 
increased disclosure where it will help inves- 
tors and serve public policy. In general, I 
believe that the benefits of increased disclo- 
sure outweigh its burdens. The trend in re- 
cent years toward both increased corporate 
disclosure and increased disclosure of share- 
holders themselves has benefited investors, 
and I have favored it. 

Concerning title II, however, it seems to us 
that the present reporting requirement, 
coupled with recent SEC actions, may be al- 
ready achieving its intended goal. Specifical- 
ly, we think that these regulations already 
disclose shareholders in positions of potential 
control. We particularly think that recent 
SEC administrative actions have helped im- 
prove disclosure of the identity of large 

Let me provide some specifics concerning 
our reservations over title II. First, the ap- 
parent intention of this legislation is to dis- 
close the ownership interests of persons with 
potential influence over corporate manage- 
ments. Presumably, the sponsors believe that 

April 11, 1977 


shareholders and the general public could be 
affected by these people and thus have a right 
to know their identity. I agree — disclosure of 
those who truly could exercise such control 
makes sense. 

The issue, however, is one of whether the 
present disclosure requirements already ac- 
complish this. It seems to me that the present 
requirement — that beneficial owners of 5 per- 
cent or more disclose their identities — already 
is effective. 

My own experience and observations in 
business have been that owners of less than 5 
percent rarely have potential control of man- 
agements. An ownership position of that size 
rarely threatens a management with being 
overruled or overthrown. I realize that the 5 
percent requirement doesn't reveal a large 
absolute number of owners in any given cor- 
poration, but nevertheless it seems to reveal 
those with potential control. 

Indeed, the area of greater abuse has been 
that of managements abusing shareholder 
rights — pursuing policies which aren't dis- 
closed to them and which may be contrary to 
shareholders' best interests. In contrast, 
there have been almost no examples of less- 
than-5-percent shareholders harmfully 
dominating managements. 

Second, I have some concerns over the ef- 
fects of this lowered reporting level on foreign 
portfolio investment in the United States. Our 
equity market benefits considerably from 
foreign transactions in U.S. securities. Any 
actions which might reduce the inflow of 
foreign capital or divert transactions offshore 
should be studied carefully. In particular, the 
amount of new equity capital available to 
American business in the past three years has 
been too small, and if this bill would reduce it 
further, I would be concerned. One reason for 
this concern is that the 1976 Treasury report 
to the Congress entitled "Foreign Portfolio 
Investment in the United States" concluded 
that disclosure requirements deterred foreign 
investors from our equity market. 

I also question the possible effects of title II 
on this Administration's objective of an open 
environment for international investment and 
removing existing obstacles to it. Freer in- 

ternational investment would benefit all na- 
tions, and especially the United States with 
our strengthening economy. Imposing a lower 
reporting requirement, however, is inconsist- 
ent with this goal of facilitating such invest- 
ment. Our report on foreign portfolio invest- 
ment noted that many foreign investors often 
fear filing ownership reports with the U.S. 
Government, since it might lead to reporting 
their ownership interests to their home gov- 
ernments. Disclosure of this information to 
home governments could have, and in some 
instances has had, serious consequences for 
foreign investors, including forced repatria- 
tion and confiscation of assets. 

As you know, portfolio investment ebbs and 
flows rapidly, and this tightened disclosure 
requirement might impede these flows. It 
seems to me that this impact of this legislation 
on overall portfolio investment should be 
evaluated more carefully. 

My third reservation, Mr. Chairman, re- 
flects this Administration's concern with 
costly reporting requirements imposed on 
American business by government. We be- 
lieve that before new regulations requiring 
more documentation are imposed, the need 
should be proven and the costs of compliance 
understood. I already have indicated uncer- 
tainty over the need; moreover, I don't be- 
lieve that any estimate has been made of the 
increased costs which title II would require. 
Ultimately, these costs probably will be borne 
by investors, since the financial inter- 
mediaries which must report will pass them 
through. Indeed, they may be borne particu- 
larly by individual investors, since securities 
firms recently have had difficulty in passing 
through costs to institutional investors. 

In summary, we don't think that there is 
sufficient evidence that the objectives of this 
legislation aren't already being met. We par- 
ticularly think that recent SEC initiatives 
may be making the 5 percent requirement 
more effective. 

Concerning the SEC, its recent broadening 
of the definition of beneficial ownership will 
produce more disclosure, and we should as- 
sess its effects. Furthermore, recent legisla- 
tion directed the SEC to require financial in- 


Department of State Bulletin 

stitutions to report their equity holdings. This 
may accomplish much of the purpose of title 
II. We will consult with the SEC on these de- 
velopments to assess their effect on overall 
disclosure. Afterwards, we would be willing 
to report back to the committee in writing 
concerning our findings. 


Current Actions 

Alan Boyd Named To Negotiate 
U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement 

Press release 88 dated February 28 

Alan Boyd has been designated by Presi- 
dent Carter as special U.S. representative to 
negotiate a new U.S.-U.K. air services 
agreement. Mr. Boyd will have the personal 
rank of Ambassador. 

The United Kingdom announced on June 22, 
1976, its intention to terminate effective June 
22, 1977, the current U.S.-U.K. air services 
agreement (the "Bermuda agreement"). Al- 
though the United States expressed its con- 
tinuing satisfaction with the Bermuda agree- 
ment, it accepted a British invitation to enter 
into negotiations. In the first phase of the 
negotiations, which took place during the fall 
of 1976, aviation officials of both governments 
exchanged data and views. The United States 
strongly defended the principles of competi- 
tion embodied in the Bermuda agreement and 
succeeded in laying the groundwork for what 
we are confident will be a productive second 
phase of negotiations, which began in London 
February 28. 

The United Kingdom has informed us that 
beginning with the second phase of the 
negotiations it also intends to be represented 
by an official of greater seniority and status. 

Ambassador Boyd is a former Secretary of 
Transportation and Chairman of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB). Until December 
31, 1976, he was vice chairman of Illinois Cen- 
tral Railroad. In his new capacity he will be 
supported by the Office of Aviation of the De- 
partment of State and will work closely with 
the Departments of Transportation and Com- 
merce and the CAB. 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
13, 1976. ' 
Signature: Philippines, January 5, 1977. 


Customs convention regarding E.C.S. (Echantillons 
Commerciaux-Commercial Samples) carnets for com- 
mercial samples, with annex and protocol of signa- 
ture. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into 
force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 
1969. TIAS 6632. 

Notification uf denunciation: Norway, January 31, 
1977; effective April 30, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Austria, March 1, 1977. 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, 
with related protocol. Done at Washington October 
11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 

Ceases to be separate member: St. Pierre and 
Miquelon, effective September 28, 1977. 2 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc- 
tober 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978. 
TIAS 8505. 
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, March 1, 1977. 


Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 

1 Not in force. 

2 Meteorological service being incorporated in that of 
France as of September 28, 1977. 

April 11, 1977 


execution. Done at Vienna January 10, 1964. Entered 
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Accession deposited: Angola, February 23, 1977, ef- 
fective March 3, 1977. 
Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general reg- 
ulations with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and de- 
tailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. 
Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Iraq, November 29, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Angola, February 23, 1977, ef- 
fective March 3, 1977. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Approved by the International Conference on 
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to 
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 
Acceptance deposited: Libya, February 16, 1977. 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc- 
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 16, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Zaire, February 10, 1977. 


Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro- 
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into 
force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 
21, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1977. 3 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annexes, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 1, 1974; for the United States 
April 21, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1977. 3 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to es- 
tablish a new frequency allotment plan for high- 
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes 
and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States 
April 21, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 18, 1977. 4 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 
1973. Entered into force February 20, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Malawi, March 14, 1977. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 18, 1977. 


German Democratic Republic 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and re- 
lated letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 1976. 
Entered into force: March 4, 1977. 


Loan agreement relating to a family planning oral con- 
traceptive project. Signed at Jakarta January 24, 
1977. Entered into force January 24, 1977. 

Loan agreement relating to the Surakarta potable 
water project. Signed at Jakarta January 24, 1977. 
Entered into force January 24, 1977. 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Wash- 
ington March 18, 1977. Enters into force on a date to 
be mutually agreed. 


Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange- 
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico March 8, 1977. En- 
tered into force March 8, 1977. 


Agreement amending the loan agreement of August 6, 
1976, relating to improvement of local waterworks 
systems. Signed at Manila February 7, 1977. Entered 
into force February 7, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a U.S. Air 
Force management training assistance team in Singa- 
pore, with appendices. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Singapore February 23 and 24, 1977. Entered 
into force February 24, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the deposit by Korea of 10 per- 
cent of the value of grant military assistance and ex- 
cess defense articles furnished by the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 12, 1972. 
Entered into force May 12, 1972, effective February 
7, 1972. TIAS 7351. 
Terminated: February 19, 1977. 

J With declarations 
4 With reservation. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 11, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1972 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

Peace. Arms Control, World Economic Progress, 
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Carter) 329 

President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass., 
Town Meeting (excerpts) 334 

Asia. U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast 
Asia (Oakley) 342 

Aviation. Alan Boyd Named To Negotiate 
U.S. -U.K. Air Services Agreement 355 

Bangladesh. Department Discusses South Asia 
and U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

Cambodia. Expiration of Area Restrictions on 
Use of Passports 346 


Department Discusses South Asia and U.S. As- 
sistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change 
(Luers) 347 

President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As- 
sistance Program (message to the Congress) . . 340 

President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on 
Rhodesian Cnrome (Carter) 333 

Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance of 
Foreign Assistance Programs 336 

Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on 
Legislation on Illicit Payments Abroad (Blu- 
menthal) 351 

U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia 
(Oakley) 342 

Cuba. Expiration of Area Restrictions on Use of 
Passports 346 

Economic Affairs 

Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, 
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Carter) 329 

President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on 
Rhodesian Chrome (Carter) 333 

Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on 
Legislation on Illicit Payments Abroad (Blu- 
menthal) 351 

Foreign Aid 

Department Discusses South Asia and U.S. As- 
sistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As- 
sistance Program (message to the Congress) . . 340 

Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance of 
Foreign Assistance Programs 336 

U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia 
(Oakley) 342 

Human Rights 

Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, 

Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. 

Foreign Policy (Carter) 329 

President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass., 

Town Meeting (excerpts) 334 

U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia 

(Oakley) 342 

India. Department Discusses South Asia and 
U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

Indonesia. U.S. Assistance Programs in South- 
east Asia (Oakley) 342 

Korea. Expiration of Area Restrictions on Use 
of Passports 346 

Latin America 

Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change 
(Luers) 347 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 
1977 (proclamation) 350 

Middle East. President Carter's Remarks at 
Clinton, Mass., Town Meeting (excerpts) 334 

Pakistan. Department Discusses South Asia and 
U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

Passports. Expiration of Area Restrictions on 
Use of Passports 346 

Presidential Documents 

Pan American Dav and Pan American Week, 
1977 (proclamation) 350 

Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, 
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. 
Foreign Policy 329 

President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As- 
sistance Program 340 

President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass., 
Town Meeting (excerpts) 334 

President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on 
Rhodesian Cnrome 333 

Southern Rhodesia. President Signs Bill Re- 
storing Embargo on Rhodesian Cnrome (Car- 
ter) 333 

Sri Lanka. Department Discusses South Asia 
and U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344 

Thailand. U.S. Assistance Programs in South- 
east Asia (Oakley) 342 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 355 

United Kingdom. Alan Boyd Named To 
Negotiate U.S. -U.K. Air Services Agree- 
ment 355 

Vietnam. Expiration of Area Restrictions on 
Use of Passports 346 

Name Index 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 351 

Carter, President 329, 333, 334, 340, 350 

Dubs, Adolph 344 

Luers, William H 347 

Oakley, Robert B 342 

Vance, Secretary 336 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 20-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*123 3/21 Public hearings to be held on continu- 
ation or termination of advisory 

*124 3/21 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCO. Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on radiocommunications, 
Apr. 26 (rescheduled). 

*125 3/21 SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship 
design and equipment, Apr. 14. 

*126 3/21 Government Advisory Committee on 
International Book and Library 
Programs, Apr. 21. 
127 3/23 Vance: Subcommittee on Foreign As- 
sistance, Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. 

*Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



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Volume LXXVI 

No. 1973 • April 18, 1977 

Excerpts From Transcript 357 



Remarks by President Carter, Mr. Woodcock, and Senator Mansfield 

and Text of Com/mission's Report 363 

Statement by Under Secretary Cooper 378 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXVI, No. 1973 
April 18, 1977 

ale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Seci ate has determined that the pub- 

is periodical is necessary in the transac- 
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of Management and Budget through January 31, 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OK STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN i- indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State. I nited Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

President Carter's News Conference of March 24 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on March 21*. 1 

I have a brief opening statement to make 
about the function of the Presidency and 
about the Secretary of State's upcoming 
visit to the Soviet Union. 

I think one of the most impressive obser- 
vations that I have understood so far about 
the Presidency and what it stands for is the 
need to derive its strength directly from the 
people. There have been some expressions 
of concern about my bringing on these news 
conferences and in other ways issues that af- 
fect foreign policy directly to the people of 
our country. 

I think it is very important that the 
strength of the Presidency itself be 
recognized as deriving from the people of 
this nation, and I think it is good for us, 
even in very complex matters when the 
outcome of negotiations might still be in 
doubt, to let the Members of Congress and 
the people of this country know what is 
going on and some of the options to be pur- 
sued, some of the consequences of success, 
some of the consequences of failure. 

I think in many areas of the world now we 
are trying to invest a great deal of time and 
attention and the good offices of our country 
to bring about a resolution of differences 
and to prevent potential conflict. 

Tomorrow, the Secretary of State will 
depart for the Soviet Union. We have spent 
weeks in detailed study about the agenda 
that has been prepared. This agenda is one 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 28, 1977, p. 

that's been derived by the Soviet Union and 
by our own country. I would say the central 
focal point will be arms limitations and 
actual reductions for a change. 

I have had long discussions with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and with other members of 
my own Cabinet to derive our potential pro- 
posals, which Cy Vance will put forward to 
Mr. Brezhnev and the Russian leaders. 

We will be talking about the limitation on 
arms sales. We are now the number-one ex- 
porter or salesman of arms of all kinds. We 
have been working with our own allies to 
cut down this traffic, and we hope to get the 
Soviet Union to agree with us on constraint. 

We'll be dealing with mutual and balanced 
force reductions in the NATO area, and on 
this trip Cy Vance will make a report on the 
attitude of the Soviet Union leaders concern- 
ing the European theater. 

We'll be trying to control the testing of 
nuclear devices, both weapons and peaceful 
nuclear devices, and we would like to elimi- 
nate these tests altogether if the Soviets 
will agree. 

We are going to try to move toward de- 
militarizing the Indian Ocean, and here 
again we'll be consulting closely with our al- 
lies and friends. And we are going to ex- 
press our concern about the future of Africa 
and ask the Soviet Union to join with us in 
removing from that troubled continent out- 
side interference which might contribute to 
warfare in the countries involved. And we 
will start laying the groundwork for cooper- 
ation with the Soviet Union at the Geneva 
conference, which we hope will take place, 
concerning the Middle East. 

These matters are extremely complex. We 
don't know whether or not we will be suc- 

April 18, 1977 


cessful at all, but we go in good faith with 
high hopes. The Soviets have been very 
cooperative up to this point, and we are 
pleased with their attitude. And I know that 
the prayers of the American people will go 
with Cy Vance, our Secretary of State, to 
the Soviet Union, in hopes that this trip 
might result in the alleviation of tension and 
the further guaranteeing of peace for our 
world in the future. 

Q. Mr. President, in terms*of bringing the 
American people in on the dialogue, you 
spoke of arms reduction. Does that mean 
that Vance will take a new set. of proposals 
on SALT? 

And. two, you spoke of the cooperative 
attitude of the Soviets. Does that mean that 
you don't think that any of Brezhnev's 
statements in the past week will have any 
bearing, in terms of your human rights 
stand, on the SALT negotiations? 

The President: Well, I think the first 
question is easily answered. Yes, we will 
take new proposals to the Soviet Union. We 
are not abandoning the agreements made in 
the Vladivostok agreement. As you know, 
all previous SALT agreements have been, in 
effect, limitations that were so high that 
they were, in effect, just ground rules for 
intensified competition and a continued mas- 
sive arms growth in nuclear weapons. 

We hope to bring not only limitations 
for — to continue in the past — but also actual 
substantial reduction that the Soviets will 
agree. That will be our first proposal. I 
spelled this out briefly in my U.N. speech. 

And the second fallback position will be, 
in effect, to ratify Vladivostok and to wait 
until later to solve some of the most difficult 
and contentious issues. We hope that the 
Soviets will agree to the substantial reduc- 

The other part of your question was what, 
Helen [Helen Thomas, UPI]? 

Q. It was in the question of this new — this 
cooperative attitude. 

The President : About Brezhnev's at- 

Q. Right. 

The President : Well, I study Mr. 
Brezhnev's speeches in their entirety. And I 
think the speech made this past week to 
their general trade union conference and one 
made previously at Tula — I consider them to 
be very constructive. 

There was a delineation in his speech be- 
tween human rights, which he equates with 
intrusion into their own internal 
affairs — and I don't agree with that 
assessment — that has been divided in his 
speeches from the subject of peace and arms 
limitation, including nuclear arms. So I have 
nothing that I have heard directly or indi- 
rectly from Mr. Brezhnev that would 
indicate that he is not very eager to see 
substantial progress made in arms lim- 

Q. Mr. President, in your opening state- 
ment you said you thought it was a good 
thing for you to speak out on negotiation 
details, but you didn't say why. As I under- 
stand the criticism, sir, it is that it impedes 
negotiations when you put out on the table, 
just in a range of thought, things that the 
parties haven't privately been able to work 
out. Why do you think it does not impede 

The President : Well, I think if anyone 
would analyze the details of the statements 
that I have made so far, they are not so nar- 
rowly defined or specific that they would 
prevent both parties to a dispute from 
negotiating in good faith with a fairly clean 
slate ahead of them. The Middle East is one 

I think, in many instances, the proposi- 
tions that I have promulgated publicly are 
generally conceded to be very important and 
legitimate, but the public expression of 
those matters has not been made to the 
American people over a period of years. 

The exact means of defining borders in 
the Middle East, the exact resolution of the 
Palestinian problem, the definition of 
permanent peace — all these things obviously 


Department of State Bulletin 

have to be decided between the Arab coun- 
tries and Israel. But to point out that they 
are matters in dispute and that we hope 
they will be solved this year I think is con- 

We have not intruded ourselves against 
the wishes of the interested nations in the 
eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and 
Greece welcomed our emissary, and I think 
we can be a good mediator to the extent 
that both parties trust us to act in good 

The same thing applies in southern Africa 
and the same thing applies to the MIA 
mission to Vietnam and Laos. 

And I believe that it is very important for 
the American people to know the framework 
within which discussions might take place 
and to give me, through their own approval, 
strength, as a party to some of the 
resolutions of disputes and also to make sure 
that when I do speak I don't speak with a 
hollow voice but that the rest of the world 
knows that on my stand, for instance, on 
human rights that I am not just speaking as 
a lonely voice but that I am strongly 
supported by the Congress and the people of 
the country. 

This week the Congress passed almost 
unanimously — I think with only two dissent- 
ing votes in both Houses — a strong confir- 
mation that my own stand expressed on 
human rights is indeed the stand of the 
American people. It's an unswerving com- 
mitment. It's one that will not be changing 
in the future. And I think for the rest of the 
world to know this and for the American 
people to participate in that expression of 
concern about human rights is a very con- 
structive thing. 

Q. Mr. President, you said that when you 
received the report from the Woodcock 
Commission that every hope you had for 
their mission had been realized. 

The President: Yes, that is true. 

Q. That report suggested that the best way 
to get an actual accounting of those still 
missing in Southeast Asia is for the nor- 
malization of relations; yet your position in 

the past has been that there must be an 
accounting first before relations can be 
normalized. Hart- you changed your posi- 
tion, and what hope does that give for the 

The President: No, I haven't changed my 
position. I have always taken the position 
that when I am convinced that the Viet- 
namese have done their best to account for 
the service personnel who are missing in 
action, at that point I would favor normali- 
zation, the admission of Vietnam into the 
United Nations, and the resumption of trade 
and other relationships with the Viet- 

I believe that the response of the 
Vietnamese leaders to the Woodcock Com- 
mission was very favorable. They not only 
gave us the bodies of 11 American 
servicemen, but they also promised to set up 
a Vietnamese bureaucracy to receive the in- 
formation that we have had about the date 
and the place that we think service people 
were lost and to pursue those investigations. 

I think this is about all they can do. I 
don't have any way to prove that they have 
accounted for all those about whom they 
have information. But I think, so far as I 
can discern, they have acted in good faith. 

They have also suggested, and we have 
agreed, that we go to Paris to negotiate 
further without any preconditions. In the 
past, the Vietnamese have said that they 
would not negotiate with us nor give us 
additional information about the MIA's until 
we had agreed to pay reparations. They did 
not bring this up, which I thought was an 
act of reticence on their part. 

They had claimed previously that Presi- 
dent Nixon had agreed to pay large sums of 
money to Vietnam because of damage done 
to their country. Our position had been, 
whether or not that agreement had been 
made, that the Vietnamese had violated that 
agreement by intruding beyond the de- 
militarized zone during the war. 

But they told Mr. Woodcock and sent 
word to me: We are not going to pursue past 
agreements and past disagreements. We are 
eager to look to the future. 

April 18, 1977 


And I am also eager to look to the future. 

If we are convinced, as a result of the 
Paris negotiations and other actions on the 
part of the Vietnamese, that they are acting 
in good faith, that they are trying to help us 
account for our MIA's, then I would aggres- 
sively move to admit Vietnam to the United 
Nations and also to normalize relationships 
with them. 

Q. As to the second part of my question, 
what about the families of the 2,500 people 
who have still not been accounted for, or 
remains have not been returned? 

The President : I have nothing but 
sympathy for the families involved, and I 
can assure them through this news confer- 
ence presentation that we will never cease 
attempting to account for those 2,500 
American servicemen who were lost. 

I might point out that at the conclusion of 
the Korean war and the Second World War, 
of those that were lost in action, we only ac- 
counted for — I think we still did not account 
for 22 percent. At the conclusion of the 
Vietnam war, my understanding is that we 
had accounted for all except about 4 

I can't certify that we have all the infor- 
mation available, and we are never going to 
rest until we pursue information about those 
who are missing in action to the final conclu- 
sion. But I will do the best I can. But I 
don't want to mislead anybody by giving 
hope about discovery of some additional in- 
formation when I don't believe that the hope 
is justified. 

Q. Mr. President , on the subject of 
Vietnam, if you feel the United States is not 
obligated to uphold the terms of the Paris 
peace accords because of the North 
Vietnamese offensive that overthrew the 
South Vietnamese Government, do you feel, 
on the other hand, any moral obligation to 
help rebuild that country? 

The President: I can't say what my posi- 
tion would be now on future economic 
relationships with Vietnam. I think that 
could only be concluded after we continue 

with negotiations to see what their attitude 
might be toward us. 

My own natural inclination is to have 
normal diplomatic relationships with all 
countries in the world. Sometimes there are 
obstacles. I believe there are now 14 nations 
with whom we do not have diplomatic 

I don't know what the motivations of the 
Vietnamese might be. I think part of the 
motivation might be to be treated along with 
other nations in economic assistance from 
our country and in trade and development of 
their fairly substantial natural resources, in- 
cluding oil. 

Other considerations might be political in 
nature. They might very well want to bal- 
ance their friendship with us with their 
friendship with the Soviet Union and not be 
completely dependent upon the Soviet 
Union. That is just a guess on my part. But 
I am willing to negotiate in good faith. But 
as far as describing what our economic rela- 
tionship might be with Vietnam in the fu- 
ture after the relationships are established, 
I just couldn't do that now. 

Q. Mr. President, with that understand- 
ing and your hesitancy to disclose a 
position before negotiations are started — 

The President: I don't have a position. 

Q. Beyond that, do you still feel that if 
that information on those American serv- 
icemen who are missing in action is forth- 
coming from the Vietnamese, that then this 
country has a moral obligation to help re- 
build that country, if that information is 
forthcoming ? 

The President: Well, the destruction was 
mutual. You know, we went to Vietnam 
without any desire to capture territory or to 
impose American will on other people. We 
went there to defend the freedom of the 
South Vietnamese. And I don't feel that we 
ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves 
or to assume the status of culpability. 

Now, I am willing to face the future 
without reference to the past. And that is 
what the Vietnamese leaders have proposed. 
And if, in normalization of relationships, 


Department of State Bulletin 

there evolves trade, normal aid processes, 
then I would respond well. But I don't feel 
that we owe a debt nor that we should be 
forced to pay reparations at all. 

Q. Mr. President, yesterday several Con- 
gressmen accused your economic policies as 
being dictated by New York banks. Now, 
your plans for bailing out New York 
through using the IMF [I nternational 
Monetary Fund] with a hyperinflationary 
process indeed does sound like a recent 
speech that David Rockefeller made in 
which he called for hyperinflating the ad- 
vanced sector and imposing so-called de- 
mand economies on the Third World, which 
means massive austerity. 

Now, at the same time, over recent weeks 
a number of our NATO allies — 

The President: What is your question? 

Q. My question is, over recent weeks a 
number of our NATO allies have indicated 
that they would rather see the problem of 
Third World debt resolved through a debt 
moratorium. And I am just wondering if 
there is any chance that you'd go along with 
our allies in that direction, or if you would 
insist on this kind of hyperinflationary 
bailing out. 

The President: Well, I have had no en- 
treaties from David Rockefeller concerning 
the New York problem, nor have I had any 
of our allies that have called on me to join 
them in a debt moratorium. I am not in 
favor of a debt moratorium. 

Q. Mr. President, would you mind telling 
us what our commitments are in Zaire and 
what the ramifications of those commit- 
ments might be to us? 

The President: We have no outstanding 
commitments in Zaire. Over a period of 
years, President Mobutu has been a friend 
of ours. We've enjoyed good relationships 
with Zaire. We have substantial commercial 
investments in that country. 

After the recent, very disruptive conflict 
within Zaire when the country was finally 
formed — a number of years ago — it has been 
fairly stable since then. Zaire was involved, 

I think at least indirectly, in the Angolan 
conflict, and there are some remaining hard 
feelings between Angola and Zaire on that 
part. Some of the Katangans who lived in 
the southern part of Zaire are now involved 
in trying to go back into the area where 
they formerly lived. 

We have no hard evidence, or any evi- 
dence as far as that goes, that the Cubans 
or Angolan troops have crossed the border 
into Zaire. We look on them as a friendly 
nation, and we have no obligations to them 
as far as military aid goes. But we have 
been cooperating in exchanging information 
with the Belgian Government, the French 
Government, and others, just to try to 
stabilize the situation and to lessen the 
chance of expanding the conflict. 

Q. Mr. President, I don't ask this ques- 
tion in a churlish way or an argumentative 

The President : I'm sure you don't. 

Q. But taking — recalling the un- 
willingness of the United States to inter- 
vene at the time of the Hungarian uprising 
or at the time of Dubcek's ouster in 
Czechoslovakia, what do you really think 
that you can accomplish for political dissi- 
dents in the Soviet Union, not in other parts 
of the world, but in the Soviet Union? And I 
have a followup I would like to ask. 

The President: Why don't you ask your 
followup now and I will try to answer. 

Q. My followup is this: You are saying 
that all of the evidence that you have from 
Mr. Brezhnev is that he is willing to go for- 
ward or he is receptive to SALT Two negoti- 

Mr. Brezhnev said before the labor con- 
gress that normal relations would be 
impossible — unthinkable was his word — if 
your human rights campaign continued. 
You have referred to private communica- 
tions with Mr. Brezhnev, and I would, like 
to know, in the followup question, whether he 
has given you any assurances in those pri- 
vate communications that he is indeed 
willing to go forward on SALT Two. 

April 18, 1977 


The President: Well, it is not just a mat- 
ter of private conversations. We are not 
trying to overthrow the Soviet Government 
nor to intrude ourselves into their affairs in 
a military way. 

I think it has been a well-recognized in- 
ternational political principle that interfer- 
ence in a government is not a verbal thing. 
There is an ideological struggle that has 
been in progress for decades between the 
Communist nations on the one hand and the 
democratic nations on the other. 

Mr. Brezhnev and his predecessors have 
never refrained from expressing their view 
when they disagreed with some aspect of so- 
cial or political life in the free world. And I 
think we have a right to speak out openly 
when we have a concern about human rights 
wherever those abuses occur. 

I think that Mr. Brezhnev has not said 
that he is concerned about my campaign on 
human rights. What he said is that he ob- 
jects to any intrusion into the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union. 

Now, I have tried to be reticent about it. 
I have tried to let my own position be clear 
in the speech at the United Nations and in 
my other actions. I have tried to make sure 
that the world knows that we are not 
singling out the Soviet Union for abuse or 

We are trying to move in our own country 
to open travel opportunities and to correct 
civil rights abuses and other abuses in our 
country. So I don't think this is a matter 
that is connected with the search for peace 
through the SALT negotiations, for in- 

The very fact that Mr. Brezhnev and his 
associates have welcomed Secretary Vance 
to the Soviet Union and have helped us 
prepare a very comprehensive agenda is 
adequate proof that he has not broken off re- 
lationships in any way and that he has hopes 
that the talks will be productive. My belief 
is that he is acting in good faith. We are not 
going to negotiate in such a way that we 
leave ourselves vulnerable. But if the Soviet 

Union is willing to meet us halfway in 
searching for peace and disarmament, we 
will meet them halfway. 

I think that this is a good indication that 
they are acting in good faith. If we are 
disappointed, which is a possibility, then 
we'll try to modify our stance. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Austria, Karl Herbert Schober, 
presented his credentials to President Car- 
ter on March 23. 1 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Chile, Jorge Cauas, presented 
his credentials to President Carter on March 

23. » 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Guinea, Daouda Kourouma, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Carter 
on March 23. 1 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Kenya, John Peter Mbogua, 
presented his credentials to President Car- 
ter on March 23. l 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland, Musa Simon Kunene, 
presented his credentials to President 
Carter on March 23. ' 

1 For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated Mar. 23. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos 
To Seek Information on Missing Americans 

The five-member Presidential Commis- 
sion on Americans Missing and Unac- 
counted For in Southeast Asia visited 
Vietnam and Laos March 16-20. Following 
are remarks to the press by President Carter 
and the transcript of a news conference by 
Leonard Woodcock and former Senator Mike 
Mansfield after the Commission's meeting 
with President Carter on March 23, together 
with the te.rt of the Commission's report, 
which was released by the White House that 


White House press release dated March 23 

President Carter 

I would like to make a brief report on 
what I consider to be a superb mission to 
Vietnam and Laos on the part of Leonard 
Woodcock and Senator Mike Mansfield, Mar- 
ian Edelman, Ambassador Yost, and 
Congressman Montgomery to inquire about 
the accounting for American service people 
who were missing in action and also to lay 
the groundwork for future normalization of 
diplomatic relationships with those two 

Every hope that we had for the mission 
has been realized. The Commission members 
and the staff were received with great 
friendship. The Vietnamese delivered to the 
Commission 12 bodies. Eleven of them have 
been identified as American servicemen. 
One body is not an American serviceman 
and will be returned. We have notified the 
Vietnamese Government about the error, 
and it was an honest mistake. 

Positive identification procedures are con- 
tinuing in Hawaii. We feel that without 
delay — this is a very careful and meticulous 
process — that we can notify the families 
when positive identification is assured. 

The other 11 bodies are American service 
people, and we think we know who they are, 
but before the families are notified we want 
to be absolutely certain. The one body that 
was in error, the family is being notified 
about that error. 

The Vietnamese have not tied together 
economic allocations of American funds with 
the MIA question. We believe that they 
have acted in good faith. They have prom- 
ised to set up a permanent study mechanism 
by which the U.S. Government can provide 
information that we have about the potential 
whereabouts or identity of servicemen who 
were lost, and the Vietnamese have 
promised to cooperate in pursuing the evi- 
dence that we might present to them in the 

They have also suggested that we reini- 
tiate diplomatic discussions in Paris without 
delay to resolve other issues that might be 
an obstacle to peace between our two coun- 
tries and friendship between our two coun- 
tries and normalization of relationships 
between our two countries. 

I will respond immediately to Premier 
Pham Van Dong that we accept their 
invitation and that these discussions will 
commence. There are no preconditions re- 
quested and there will certainly be no 
preconditions on our part for these talks in 

I would like to express on behalf of the 
American people my sincere thanks to 
Chairman Leonard Woodcock and to the 

April 18, 1977 


Commission members. They met with almost 
every conceivable interested group before 
they departed from the United States, in- 
cluding representatives of the families of 
servicemen who are missing in action, con- 
gressional leaders, and others. And they 
formed a team which worked in remarkable 
concert and performed their assignment in 
an absolutely superlative way. 

At this time I would like to introduce to 
the group Chairman Leonard Woodcock, 
who will be available to answer your ques- 
tions about the trip. Later on this afternoon, 
a complete written report by the Commis- 
sion to me will be made public. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Woodcock and Senator Mansfield 

Q. Can you tell us what body it was that 
was returned? Was that a Vietnamese? 

Mr. Woodcock: The indication is it is a 
person who is approximately 50 years old 
and a Vietnamese. I might emphasize, as far 
as all the members of the Commission are 
concerned, we are absolutely convinced that 
this was a human error and simply 
underscores the enormity of the task of re- 
covering those missing in action. 

I think it is in the public domain that 
those lost in World War II and in the Ko- 
rean war — 22 percent were finally not ac- 
counted for. In this war, the number is less 
than 4V2 percent. 

Of course, you have substantial land 
areas. In the case of Laos, it is a huge land 
area with a very small population, no more 
than 3V2 million; and the difficulties are con- 
siderable. We hope we have — I think we 
have placed on track the solution to this 

Q. Have you submitted the 12th name on 
our list to tell the Vietnamese that that par- 
ticular individual has not been returned? 
You have 11 that are accounted for from the 
list of those missing in action. 

Mr. Woodcock: That is correct. 

Q. Have you told them that the 12th 
name — 

Mr. Woodcock: When we were acquainted 
with this by the Central Identification 
Laboratory in Honolulu, a message was im- 
mediately sent from the Commission 
through our normal procedures through 
Paris to the Vietnamese, yes. 

Q. Are you and the Commission satisfied, 
convinced, that the Government of Vietnam 
has done its best, or reasonably done its 
best, to account for all of the MIA's? 

Mr. Woodcock: At this point? 

Q. Yes. 

Mr. Woodcock: We are satisfied that what 
has been done to date, particularly within 
the last few days, plus their assurance that 
there will be renewed efforts, which is still 
in the future — we are satisfied with the 
agreement to set up the process. 

We have recommended, among other 
things, that they be invited, for example, to 
send representatives to our Central Identifi- 
cation Laboratory in Honolulu because they 
do really quite extraordinary things with 
regard to identification on evidence that at 
first blush would seem to me to be very lit- 

Q. Let me try from the other way. Do you 
believe that they are holding back either in- 
formation or American men ? 

Mr. Woodcock: It is quite obvious, with 
regard, for example, to the 24th body, that 
they have known about that for some time. 
And on the last evening, late in the last 
evening, when they informed us that Mr. 
Gouglemann died in the South last June and 
they also said they would turn over that set 
of remains — it is quite obvious that had been 
held back. 

We believe from this point, particularly if 
we can have an ongoing relationship, that 
that will be ended. 

Q. Mr. Woodcock, did you bring back any 
information on any GI's who might have 
chosen to stay there? 

Mr. Woodcock: They were queried about 
the possibility of deserters who had joined 
the Vietnamese community. They said they 


Department of State Bulletin 

were not aware of any. They did say that all 
Americans who had registered with them 
had been allowed to leave. 

Q. Do you come away then with the view 
to the central question that the MIA's really 
arc all dead? 

Mr. Woodcock: That is the general conclu- 
sion of the Commission. 

Q. Mr. Woodcock, yesterday you refused 
to characterize your mission as a success. 
Today the President calls it a great success. 
Hare you changed your mind, by any 

Mr. Woodcock: I think it is a success in 
the terms of what we established for 
ourselves. I said on behalf of the Commis- 
sion when we left we were seeking a key to 
the solution of the MIA problem and 
through that hoping to build a bridgehead 
toward normalization. 

We think that has been done. But 
obviously what will happen from now on will 
depend upon future events — not unilateral 
future events, but bilateral future events. 

Q. The question is, what ivas uppermost 
in the minds of this government in sending 
you to get an accounting of the MIA's or to 
get started on the road toward normaliza- 
tion ? 

Mr. Woodcock : I don't think you can 
separate the one from the other. Obviously, 
there has to be a solution to the one to make 
the other possible. It is my own personal 
conclusion it is in the national interest of 
this country to have a stable Southeast 
Asia. You cannot have a stable Southeast 
Asia without having stability with regard to 
our relationship with the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. 

Q. When you said you believed the general 
conclusion is the MIA's are all dead, how 
many does that include besides the 11 that 
were brought back? 

Mr. Woodcock: The total number that 
were unaccounted for, including civilians, at 
the point when we went there was 2,546. 

Q. You believe that, all of these are dead? 

Mr. Woodcock: We do not think that there 
are any Americans left alive in either Viet- 
nam or Laos who are being held against 
their will. 

Q. Why can't their graves be found? 

Mr. Woodcock: That process we have 

When you consider the thick foliage of 
jungle over so much of the land area, when 
that total number includes those lost at sea, 
we start with a number of which based upon 
ordinary evidence there could be no hope of 

Q. When did the question of sending 
negotiators back to Paris come up, and in 
what context was it — ivhat kind of problem? 
Would that be sort of a start of diplomatic 
relations? What are the major questions? 
The aid question? 

Mr. Woodcock: With regard to the discus- 
sions in Paris, that has never been stopped. 
There was a discussion last November which 
was not continued. Then there were pre- 
paratory discussions leading to the visit of 
this Commission. So that continuing 
negotiations or discussions in Paris is not 
new. That is something that has been done 
sporadically now over several years. 

Q. When you said you established a 
bridgehead toward normalization of rela- 
tions, does that apply to Laos as well as 

Mr. Woodcock: With regard to Laos, we 
had a relatively brief formal discussion in 
which they laid down the position they had 
been holding. Our informal relationships and 
discussions were very frank. They indicated 
to us that they would set up an agency for 
the purpose of seeing what could be done 
relative to the recovery of those missing in 
action. Then they confirmed that in an offi- 
cial broadcast on the day after we had left. 

We came away with some hope, which we 
think has been confirmed, but all of that lies 
in the future. 

Q. I would like to ask Senator Mansfield 

April 18, 1977 


something. Senator, did you find any ex- 
traordinary amount of bitterness on the part 
of government officials with whom you 
talked, or do you think if we established 
normal relations we can have a very 
friendly relationship with Vietnam!' 

Senator Mansfield: Less bitterness than I 
thought would be noticeable. And the answer 
to the second part of your question: Yes. 

Q. Senator Mansfield, what do you think 
personally of the United States giving fi- 
nancial or economic aid to Vietnam? 

Senator Mansfield: It depends what chan- 
nels you want to use. I think the present 
channel through international agencies is the 
correct one. What will come out later will be 
determined by what will happen in the 

The press: Thank you. 


Presidential Commission on Americans Missing 
and Unaccounted For in Southeast Asia 

Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977 
I. Mandate of the Commission 

On February 25, 1977, the State Department an- 
nounced that the President was sending a Presidential 
Commission of distinguished Americans to Southeast 
Asia to help him obtain an accounting about missing 
Americans in that region. Mr. Leonard Woodcock, 
President of the United Auto Workers, was chosen by 
the President to head the five-member Commission. 
Other members were: Former Senator Mike Mansfield, 
former Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Congressman 
G. V. Montgomery, and Ms. Marian Wright Edelman, 
Director of the Children's Defense Fund. 

The Commission was charged with traveling to Viet- 
nam and Laos to meet with representatives of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic to seek information on our mis- 
sing personnel, including the return of recoverable 
remains. The Commission was also instructed to 
receive from these governments their views on mat- 
ters affecting our mutual relations. The Commission was 
requested by the President to report its findings 
directly to him on their return. 

The Commission was not a diplomatic mission in the 

usual sense, in that it was not empowered to negotiate 
on behalf of the U.S. Government on matters involving 
relations between the U.S. and the two countries 
which it was to visit. However, the Commission was 
given authority to reach agreement with the Viet- 
namese and Lao authorities on matters pertaining to 
the question of our missing personnel in order to 
obtain information and recoverable remains. 

Both White House and State Department announce- 
ments made clear that the U.S. Government remained 
concerned about all Americans lost in Southeast Asia, 
those still listed as missing as well as the larger 
number who have been presumed dead with no 
accounting being provided. The fact that a man has 
been declared dead for legal purposes did not affect 
the U.S. Government's determination to seek 
information about him and to arrange for the return of 
his remains if they could be recovered. 

The announcements also stated that the naming of 
the Commission and its trip to Indochina was a further, 
measured step which the U.S. Government was taking 
to put the recent conflict behind us and to establish 
more normal relations between ourselves and the coun- 
tries of that area. 

II. Preparations for the Trip 

After receiving the Presidential mandate for its mis- 
sion, the Commission immediately initiated a series of 
actions designed to insure careful preparation for its 

The Departments of State and Defense provided 
briefing material on the background and history of the 
MIA issue, including details on missing individuals and 
on past efforts to obtain information on them, as well 
as a review of U.S. relations with the countries of 

On Monday, March 7th, the Commission held its first 
formal meeting and briefing session at the Department 
of State. This briefing included discussions of previous 
dealings with the Vietnamese and Lao, in particular 
the Vietnamese position of linking their action on 
MIA's under Article 8b of the Paris Agreement to 
what they claim was the remaining U.S. obligation to 
help heal the wounds of war to Vietnam by providing 
aid as stipulated by Article 21 of the same accord. 2 
The Commission concluded that it would be better to 
approach the Vietnamese in a humanitarian spirit of 
mutual cooperation, looking to the future, rather than 
to engage in sterile, legalistic debate of the past which 
focused on the war. Dr. Henry Kenny, former staff 
member of the House Select Committee on Missing 
Persons in Southeast Asia, described that Committee's 
1975 trip to Hanoi and Vientiane to obtain the return 
of three American pilots and to discuss the MIA prob- 
lem with leaders of both countries. 

In cooperation with the Commission, the Depart- 

1 Released on Mar. 23 (text from White House press 

2 For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of Feb. 
12, 1973, p. 169. 


Department of State Bulletin 

merit of State arranged for U.S. representatives to 
meet with Vietnamese representatives in Paris to 
prepare further for the Commission's visit to Hanoi. 
Mr. James D. Rosenthal. Director of Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia Affairs, and chief of the Commission's 
staff for its visit to Southeast Asia, attended this 
meeting and reported back to the Commission in Wash- 
ington prior to its departure. 

The Commission also met with non-governmental or- 
ganizations and individuals who were concerned with 
the MIA problem and other matters pertinent to its 
mission. On March 7th, the Commission met with rep- 
resentatives of the National League of Families of 
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. 
The League said that they recognized an accounting 
for all the missing was impossible but that some men 
still missing were known to be alive at one time and 
the American people are entitled to know what hap- 
pended to them. They urged the Commission to seek 
all possible information on these men. Chairman 
Woodcock and the Commission members assured the 
League representatives that this was the primary pur- 
pose of the trip and the Commission would do the best 
it could. 

A meeting was also held on March 11th with repre- 
sentatives of the American Friends Service Commit- 
tee, who briefed the Commission on their recent visit 
to Vietnam and urged it to consider humanitarian aid 
to that country. Mr. Richard Dudman of the St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, who had been captured and released 
during the war in Cambodia, urged the Commission to 
approach Cambodia on the MIA issue, particularly in 
regard to the 25 international journalists missing in 
that country, four of whom are Americans. The Com- 
mission agreed to contact the Cambodians to try to ar- 
range a meeting with Cambodian representatives 
during its trip. 

Commission members also met or talked individually 
with persons and groups with a specific interest in 
their mission, such as MIA family members. 

The Commission was fortunate to have the recently 
published final report of the House Select Committee 
on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, which 
documented in detail past military and diplomatic ef- 
forts to obtain a resolution of the MIA problem and 
which included recommendations for future action. All 
Commission members read this report thoroughly and 
were told later in Vietnam by SRV Deputy Foreign 
Minister Phan Hien that he had also read it. 

On Saturday, March 12th, the Commission met with 
President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. 
The President expressed his deep concern about ob- 
taining a satisfactory MIA accounting and his hope for 
eventual normalization of relations with Vietnam and 
Laos. The Commission was directed not to apologize 
for past relations, but to emphasize the President's de- 
sire for a new beginning with these governments on 
the basis of equality and mutual respect. It was in- 
structed to seek all MIA information and to obtain all 
recoverable remains from the Vietnamese and Lao and 
to listen carefully to the concerns of these govern- 
ments on other matters of mutual interest. The Presi- 

dent asked Mr. Woodcock to deliver personal letters 
from him to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van 
Dong and to Lao President Souphanouvong. 

On March 13th the Commission departed Washington 
for Hawaii, where it received briefings by the De- 
partment of Defense, the Joint Casualty Resolution 
Center (JCRC) and the Central Identification 
Laboratory (CIL). The DOD briefer indicated there 
were 2,546 Americans w-ho did not return from the war 
in Indochina, of whom 758 are still listed as MIA or 
POW. "We have no evidence," he said, "to indicate 
that any American servicemen are being held as pris- 
oners in Southeast Asia, but whether a man is alive or 
dead does not relieve us of the responsibility to seek 
an accounting for him." The briefings described the 
many efforts made to obtain information and recover 
remains, since the end of U.S. involvement in the In- 
dochina War and the Paris Agreement of January 
1973. The Commission was impressed by data showing 
that the number unaccounted for in Indochina is about 
4% of those killed in that conflict. As indicated in the 
House Select Committee Report, this contrasts with 
the 22% unresolved cases in World War II and Korea. 
This impressed upon the Commission the need to be 
realistic in its expectations for a further Indochina 
accounting. The Commission also visited the CIL where 
it reviewed procedures for identifying recovered re- 
mains. The Commission was impressed by the CIL's 
capability of identifying even partial remains and 
noted that CIL expertise is one reason why there is 
not yet an unknown soldier from the Vietnam War. 

The Commission departed Hawaii on March 13th for 
the Philippines, where it remained overnight to rest 
and prepare further for its visit to Hanoi and 
Vientiane. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William 
H. Sullivan met with the Commission and provided it 
with the benefit of his many years of experience in 
negotiating with the Vietnamese. 

III. Visit to Vietnam 

Program in Hanoi 

The Commission arrived in Hanoi at 2:45 p.m., 
March 16, 1977 aboard a U.S. Air Force C-141 from 
Clark Air Base and departed at approximately 10:00 
a.m. March 19, 1977 aboard the same aircraft for Vien- 

Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien greeted the 
Commission at Gia Lam Airport upon arrival. The 
Commission and staff were housed in the official Gov- 
ernment Guest House as guests of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. 

The Commission was received by SRV Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh two 
hours after arrival. There were formal meetings on 
March 17 and 18 between the Commission and the 
Vietnamese delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister 
Phan Hien, a meeting with Prime Minister Pham Van 
Dong in the afternoon of March 17, and a separate 
meeting between technical experts concerned with the 

April 18, 1977 


development of MIA information and recovery of re- 
mains. Representative Montgomery was the only 
Commission member who attended the latter meeting. 

In addition. Minister Trinh hosted a formal dinner 
and cultural performance for the Commission on March 
17 and attended a dinner given in turn by the Commis- 
sion on the next night. Other Commission activities in- 
cluded: a visit to the Hanoi City cemetery, located in 
Ha Dong Province roughly 20 kilometers from Hanoi, 
to see the remains of the 12 pilots which the Viet- 
namese agreed to turn over to the Commission; and a 
dignified ceremony upon reception of the remains at 
Gia Lam Airport on March 19 just prior to departure. 

Members of the Commission also undertook 
individual activities. The Chairman had two private 
meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, 
and Ms. Edelman visited a kindergarten and had a 
meeting with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister of 

Atmosphere in Hanoi 

A significant aspect of the Commission's visit to 
Vietnam was the cordial atmosphere which prevailed 
throughout its stay. The Vietnamese Government 
appeared to have made a major effort to ensure that 
the Commission's stay was both pleasant and produc- 
tive and that the Commission was treated with respect 
and dignity. This point is of importance because in 
Asia the form of a visit and the level of attention given 
to a delegation often conveys an essential political 
message. Using this standard, the Commission con- 
cludes that the Vietnamese leadership was indicating 
by this treatment the importance it attached to the 
Commission's visit, and its genuine desire for a new 
and improved relationship with the United States. 
This did not, of course, mean that the Vietnamese 
were ready to concede on substantive issues, but it 
was — and is — an encouraging beginning to serious dis- 
cussions on them. 

The spirit of cordiality carried over into meetings as 
well. Phan Hien spoke in a spirit of conciliation during 
both of the formal meetings. There was a conspicuous 
absence of polemics or harsh rhetoric on either side. 

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong also received the 
Commission for a special meeting at which the 
President's personal letter was delivered to him. The 
talks with him were candid; he expressed his govern- 
ment's policy firmly but without rancor or harshness 
despite the recent bitter past. He expressed particular 
appreciation for the President's message and later 
asked the Commission to convey back to the President 
a letter from him in reply. 

There were sporadic attempts to restrict individual 
movement around Hanoi, but in general Commission 
members and staff were permitted to go where they 
wished. This was usually — but not always — under es- 
cort. Protocol officers explained that this was for 
security reasons, citing possible hostile acts by the 
populace which still remembers the "destruction 
caused by U.S. bombing." These restrictions eased as 
the visit progressed. This point is important because it 

reminded the Commission that, despite all the good 
will and cordiality which marked the visit, there will 
for quite a while be an element of reserve toward us 
because of the long period when we and the Viet- 
namese were adversaries. 

Substance of Talks in Hanoi 

Missi)ig i)t Action 

The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was 
the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. all 
available information on our missing men as it is found 
and to return remains as they are recovered and 
exhumed. This new commitment was contained in 
statements by top SRV officials and was further re- 
fined in the Technical Sub-Commission meeting with 
officials of the Vietnamese agency responsible for seek- 
ing information on the missing and recovering remains. 

The key elements in the Vietnamese statements 
were as follows; 

a) The remains of the 12 U.S. airmen announced last 
September as killed in action would be returned to the 
U.S. and could be taken back by the Commission if de- 

b) All living U.S. military POW's have been 

c) All U.S. civilians remaining in South Vietnam 
after April 30, 1975 who registered with the 
Vietnamese authorities have left the country. 

d) The SRV has established a specialized office to 
seek information on missing Americans and to recover 
remains. Although terrain and the tropical conditions 
of Vietnam have hindered search efforts, this office is 
actively seeking information and the remains of 
missing Americans. 

e) The SRV will give the U.S. "as soon as possible" 
all available information and remains as they are 

f) The Vietnamese would welcome U.S. assistance 
for this work in the form of information and 
documents, as well as material means helpful to the 
search efforts. 

Although the MIA undertaking was stated in 
unqualified terms, the Vietnamese made clear that 
they still considered this subject and other aspects of 
U.S. -SRV relations to be "interrelated." They stated 
that their actions on MIA's were in conformance with 
Article 8b of the Paris Accord, for example, and cited 
the need for comparable U.S. fulfillment of its alleged 
obligation under Article 21 to "heal the wounds of 
war" and provide reconstruction aid. They also raised 
the issue of normalization of relations in this context. 
They were careful to say that none of these three 
points (i.e., MIA's, normalization, and aid) should be 
considered as preconditions to the other two and it was 
not the SRV's intention to raise the question this way. 
But they did note that they were closely related to 
each other and that both sides should take them in an 
overall context and apply their position in a flexible 
way. This appeared to go farther than previous SRV 


Department of State Bulletin 

statements in reducing' the specific linkage between 
Vietnamese action on MIA's and U.S. agreement to 
provide aid. But it still suggests that actual Viet- 
namese performance on MIA's will probably be subject 
to our willingness to move concretely to implement the 
spirit of good will displayed by the Commission's visit. 

The Technical Sub-Commission meeting was 
requested by the U.S. side and agreed on by the Viet- 
namese for the morning of March 18, prior to the sec- 
ond formal session with Phan Hien. Representative 
Montgomery attended for the Commission with staff 
support by Mr. [Frank A.] Sieverts, Dr. [Roger] 
Shields, Dr. Kenny, and the JCRC representatives. 
Leading for the Vietnamese was Vu Hoang, Director 
of the Consular Department of the Vietnamese Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the office 
responsible for seeking information on the missing and 
the recovery of remains. He was supported by two 

The Vietnamese described their MIA office as or- 
ganized from central to provincial levels and said it re- 
lies on local citizen groups for much of its information. 
They noted that the forested and mountainous terrain 
of Vietnam hindered searches, and that even where a 
plane had been seen coming down it was often hard to 
find it. Pilots who bailed out might come down many 
miles from the downed aircraft and were often lost, un- 
less they landed in populated areas. Other 
impediments to successful searches noted by Mr. 
Hoang were the lack of specialized tools and transpor- 
tation, the "attitude of the people" reluctant to help 
with U.S. MIA's when so many of their own relatives 
had been lost, and the fact that in the South the search 
had only recently been organized. 

The Vietnamese noted that they had substantially 
increased their budget for this work and confirmed 
that they would be pleased to receive materials to aid 
the search process, including case folders, anthropologi- 
cal books, tools, medical supplies and antiseptics, and 
transportation equipment. They also said they would 
look into the possibility of providing items such as dog 
tags, aircraft numbers, and personal effects, as well as 
remains of Americans lost in the South. 

Mr. Hoang proposed that information and other ma- 
terials be exchanged directly with him at his address 
in the Foreign Ministry. He asked with whom he could 
correspond and was given Mr. Sieverts' name at the 
State Department as a point of contact. 

The Sub-Commission also worked out procedures for 
the return of the 12 remains. The full Commission 
later visited the cemetery where the remains were 
being kept following their exhumation. 

In a brief meeting following the final dinner, the 
Commission was told that American citizen Tucker 
Gouglemann had died in Saigon in June 1976, and that 
his remains would be returned as soon as they could be 
hygienically exhumed. The Commission had asked in 
its initial meeting about Mr. Gouglemann, the last 
known American remaining in Vietnam following the 
communist takeover who wished to leave. The Com- 
mission was also told at this final meeting that the 

Vietnamese believed another American may be buried 
in the Hanoi cemetery and promised to return his re- 
mains as well. Although they almost certainly have al 
least some additional MIA information available, they 
did not provide it to the Commission during its visit . 

Normalization of Relations 

Vietnamese officials expressed a strong desire to 
move toward normal relations with the U.S. and stated 
that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is prepared to 
establish diplomatic relations with us. At the same 
time they noted that obstacles still exist on the road to 
normalizing relations, although expressing hope that 
with good will they could all be removed. They said 
Vietnam is prepared to normalize on the basis of 
sovereignty, mutual respect, noninterference in each 
other's affairs and peaceful coexistence. Regarding 
diplomatic relations, they indicated Vietnam is pre- 
pared to establish them, but then added that this will 
depend on the attitude of the United States and 
"whether it will give up its erroneous policy of the 
past." They stated that the Vietnamese view is that 
actions such as the U.S. economic blockade and the 
veto of Vietnam's entry into the UN stem from this 
erroneous policy. Finally, they said that there are 
three key areas of discussion between us: the MIA's, 
normalization, and aid. They stated we should not con- 
sider any one as a precondition to the other two, but 
noted that they clearly are interrelated. 

The Vietnamese proposed negotiations between dip- 
lomatic representatives of the U.S. and SRV to discuss 
the elements and process of normalization. They 
suggested talks in Paris. The Commission said it would 
convey this proposal to the President for his 

Vietnamese leaders expressed clearly to the Com- 
mission their government's foreign policy, in 
particular regarding their neighbors in Southeast Asia. 
They presented to the Commission Foreign Minister 
Trinh's "Four Points" as the basis for their policy: 

"1. Respect for each other's independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. . 

2. Not to allow any foreign country to use one's ter- 
ritory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and 
intervention against the other country and other coun- 
tries in the region. 

3. Establishment of friendly and good-neighborly 
relations, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges 
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Settlement 
of disputes among the countries in the region through 
negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understand- 
ing and respect. 

4. Development of cooperation among the countries 
in the region for the building of prosperity in keeping 
with each country's specific conditions, and for the 
sake of genuine independence, peace and neutrality in 
Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to peace in the 

April 18, 1977 


The Vietnamese complained about the negative 
attitude of the new Thai authorities toward Vietnam 
and advised the U.S., as friends of Thailand, to urge 
the Thais to better their relations with the SRV by 
living up to the Thai-Vietnamese joint communique of 
last August <i. The Commission expressed the new 
U.S. Administration's desire for a stable, peaceful, and 
prosperous Southeast Asia. 

Economic anil Humanitarian Assistance 

In the Commission's meetings with them, the 
Vietnamese emphasized their strong interest in receiv- 
ing aid from the United States. This was expressed as 
an American "responsibility" and "obligation," and aid 
was generally categorized as something the United 
States "should" do. 

In their presentations, they cited three ways of 
looking at the U.S. "responsibility" to contribute to 
postwar reconstruction: legal, humanitarian, and on 
the basis of reciprocity. They said they were ready to 
be flexible in discussing the modalities of how we 
might provide aid to them, though they continued to 
cite Article 21 of the Paris Accord. 

Aside from the legal basis for our providing assist- 
ance, the Vietnamese discussed a humanitarian basis 
for aid. Suggesting they were performing a 
humanitarian act in working to alleviate the suffering 
of the MIA families, they stated that in fairness we 
should be willing to act humanely to repair some of the 
destruction caused during the war. They indicated that 
Vietnam has a pressing immediate need for food aid, 
fertilizer, farm machinery, building materials for 
schools and hospitals, raw materials for its factories, 
and medicines. 

In the third aspect — reciprocity — the Vietnamese 
made the point that actions cannot come from just one 
side. Obliquely referring to their accounting for the 
MIA's and providing aid, they indicated that each side 
must take steps which address the concerns of the 
other. As noted earlier, they did not specifically link 
the two issues, although they noted that aid, in MIA 
accounting, and normalization are "interrelated." 

At other times, the Vietnamese referred to our pro- 
viding aid to them as a matter of conscience or as a 
moral obligation. They said aid is an "obligation you 
should fulfill — an obligation to be fulfilled with all your 
conscience and all your sense of responsibility." They 
added that, "In brief, we have obligations which are 
related to each other. So we should start from this po- 

The Vietnamese also indicated their government's 
willingness to be flexible regarding the form aid might 
take. While not specifically stating which they might 
prefer, they referred to discussions with previous U.S. 
administrations in which various forms of aid were 
mentioned, including concessional, bilateral, and 

Refugees and Family Ramification 

The Vietnamese said they would be "generous" with 
regard to their citizens wishing to join relatives in the 

U.S., and to those wanting to return to Vietnam from 
abroad, providing they follow proper procedures. The 
Commission welcomed this statement and suggested 
continued efforts to resolve this problem through the 
Red Cross and UNHCR [United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees]. 

Social Problems 

In response to her request the Vietnamese arranged 
for Ms. Edelman to visit a kindergarten-child care 
center, and to meet with the Minister of Education, 
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh (formerly Foreign Minister of 
the PRO [Provisional Revolutionary Government]). In 
discussions with Ms. Edelman the Vietnamese de- 
scribed their efforts to care for orphans (who they said 
numbered 500,000 including those with one parent) and 
to rehabilitate "street children" in South Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese said nutrition was their main child care 
problem, reflecting their overall concern about their 
current food shortages. 

With Ms. Edelman and in discussions with the Com- 
mission, the Vietnamese referred to their continuing 
efforts to rehabilitate up to 400,000 former prostitutes, 
100,000 drug addicts, and to treat venereal disease. 
They also noted that over 4 million of their population 
remained unemployed, mainly in South Vietnam. 

IV. Visit to Laos 

Some 550 Americans are listed as missing or dead in 
Laos. The President therefore asked the Commission 
to visit that country as well to seek the cooperation of 
the Lao authorities in resolving these cases. Secretary 
of State Vance addressed a letter to Phoune Sipaseuth, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the 
Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), on 
February 24, 1977 asking that the Commission be re- 
ceived in Laos. Minister Phoune replied on March 12 
accepting the Secretary's proposal. 

Program in Vientiane 

The Commission went from Hanoi to Vientiane, capi- 
tal of Laos, early March 19 by U.S. military aircraft 
and remained until late afternoon March 20. The 
Commission met for two hours in formal talks with the 
LPDR delegation headed by Nouphan Sidphasay, 
Secretary of State (Deputy Foreign Minister) on 
March 19. The next day the Commission was received 
in separate meetings by Foreign Minister Phoune and 
by LPDR President Souphanouvong, to whom Chair- 
man Woodcock delivered a personal letter from Presi- 
dent Carter. The Commission was honored at a dinner 
given by the Lao Government March 19 and returned 
the hospitality with a luncheon March 20 attended by 
Minister Phoune and other high-level Lao officials. 

Atmosphere in Vientiane 

Although the U.S. maintains a small Embassy in 
Vientiane ably led by Charge d'Affaires Thomas J. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Corcoran, Lao-American relations have been cool since 
events in the spring of 1975 and the subsequent estab- 
lishment of the LPDR in December of that year. 
However, working in cooperation with our Embassy, 
the Lao arranged a warm reception for the Commis- 
sion and made it evident throughout the visit that the 
Commission was welcome. The Commission was 
greeted at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister 
Nouphan and escorted to accommodations provided by 
the Lao Government in Vientiane's largest hotel. In 
the Commission's meetings with President 
Souphanouvong and Foreign Minister Phoune, both 
expressed the view that the Commission's visit was 
evidence of a new American attitude toward their 
country, and a demonstration of the President's desire 
to improve relations with Laos. 

As in Vietnam, the tone and atmosphere of the 
Commission's visit to Laos was important. Chairman 
Woodcock made the point that the Commission had 
come not to replace the work of our Embassy but to 
underscore the President's desire to improve relations 
with Laos on the basis of mutual respect and benefit. 
He relayed the President's desire to help remove the 
obstacles to improved relations, such as the MIA 
question. This new spirit was apparently understood 
and accepted by the Lao, whose leaders responded in a 
similar vein. 

Substance of Talks in Vientiane 

The Commission made clear to the Lao authorities 
the great importance the President and the American 
people attach to obtaining the best accounting possible 
for the Americans listed as missing or dead in Laos. 
The Chairman stated that the Commission would 
welcome any definite information or remains the Lao 
may have on these men, and indicated U.S. willingness 
to cooperate fully with the Lao in casualty resolution. 
He expressed the hope that the two parties could 
agree, during the Commission's visit, on an orderly- 
procedure to resolve the issue. He noted to all the Lao 
leaders that progress on this issue would be a signifi- 
cant step toward improvement of U.S. -Lao relations. 

The Lao expressed to the Commission their 
sympathy with the MIA families and their wish to re- 
lieve the latter's suffering. They noted the great diffi- 
culty of finding MIA information and remains in the 
rugged terrain of Laos, particularly given the coun- 
try's small population and lack of material means. The 
Lao did assure the Commission that there are no 
Americans who have been captured and are alive in 
Laos, and that all Americans captured during the war 
had been returned to the U.S. They stated that the 
Lao Government had ordered before, and will now 
order again, the people of Laos to seek information 
and remains. But they regretted that they had no such 
information or remains now to provide the Commis- 

In both formal and informal meetings, responsible 
Lao officials agreed to receive further MIA case files, 
as well as other material that we could provide to as- 

sist their search. Commission members stressed that 
we understood the difficulties involved in Laos and 
were realistic in our expectations of what information 
could be developed. The Commission nevertheless 
emphasized the importance of all information, such as 
aircraft tail numbers, ID cards, dog tags, and even par- 
tial remains, as being helpful to the United States. 

The Lao made clear to the Commission that they 
connected the MIA problem with that of U.S. assist- 
ance to "heal the wounds of war" and rebuild their 
country. They expressed the belief that the two prob- 
lems should be resolved together, since both resulted 
from the war. They noted that if one speaks of 
humanitarian concern for the MIA's, one must also 
think of the damage Laos suffered at U.S. hands dur- 
ing the war. They said the Lao people could be 
expected to search for MIA information only when 
they see that the U.S. Government is interested in 
healing this damage and helping reconstruct the coun- 
try. In more general terms, they indicated that the 
MIA problem can be resolved when there is a new 
relationship between the two countries and when U.S. 
policy has changed from hostility to friendship. 

The Commission was informed during its visit of the 
problem of unexploded ordnance in Laos. One observer 
in Vientiane, who recently visited the Plain of Jars, 
reported that 15 persons had been killed during the 
past year in one village of 3400 people by such 
unexploded war material. The Commission believes the 
U.S. could provide advice and technical assistance on 
how to defuse such ordnance, and that the American 
people would understand and support such an effort. 

In this regard the Lao, in the formal talks, laid 
great emphasis on difficulties caused by what they 
termed "reactionaries" engaged in hostile activities 
against their government. They expressed particular 
concern at what they claimed was Thai hostility 
toward them and Thai support for anti-LPDR elements 
both within Laos and in Thailand. They noted that the 
previous U.S. administration had been hostile toward 
Laos, and charged that it had supported some of the*' 
elements. They said that in any case, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment has provided aid to the Thai, thus enabling 
the latter to support such elements. They expressed 
the belief that the U.S. should resolve this problem in 
order to provide a new atmosphere for relations 
between Laos and the U.S. 

The Commission assured the Lao that the U.S. has 
no hostile intentions toward them and does not support 
elements hostile to the LPDR either within Laos or 
outside the country. Senator Mansfield made a particu- 
larly forceful rebuttal of the Lao charges, based on his 
experience and previous visits to Laos. The Lao took 
careful note of these assurances, and they later wel- 
comed them as an indication of a new attitude on the 
part of the U.S. Government toward their country. 

The Commission concludes from its visit to Laos that 
the Lao probably have considerably less information on 
MIA's than the Vietnamese, and are less able to de- 
velop additional information or locate remains. They 
probably could produce some, however, and could 

April 18, 1977 


gather more if they so desired. For example, there are 
a very few MIA's who were known to be in Lao hands 
in the 1960's and there are recent reports of scattered 
aircraft parts in the countryside which may resolve a 
few more cast-.--. 

The Commission feels that this will most likely 
happen in the context of a general improvement of re- 
lations with Laos. The Commission's visit helped con- 
siderably in this regard, not only as a demonstration of 
the new Administration's interest, but also as a means 
of assuring the Lao that we have no hostile intent to- 
ward them. The Commission took note of the formal 
LPDR statement that no Americans are alive and pris- 
oner in Laos, which though tragic seems true in light 
of all the evidence available. The Commission finds 
encouraging the Lao expression of willingness to ac- 
cept further case files and other materials from us, and 
to cooperate more closely with us through our 
Embassy on the MIA problem. 

Thus, while disappointed that it was not able to ob- 
tain further information and remains from the Lao 
during its visit, the Commission feels the trip was 
worthwhile in that it set a new tone for U.S. -Lao rela- 
tions, emphasized to the Lao the importance we 
continue to attach to the MIA issue, and helped estab- 
lish procedures for obtaining further information. One 
press report after the Commissioner's departure 
indicated that the Lao were setting up a committee to 
search for information, though this could not be con- 
firmed at time of writing. 

V. Cambodia 

Due to the current lack of communication between 
the U.S. and the Cambodian Government and the 
apparent unsettled situation in Phnom Penh, the 
Commission decided it was best not to try to go to the 
Cambodian capital. Instead, it was decided to attempt 
to arrange a contact with an Ambassador of Democrat- 
ic Cambodia at a location in Southeast Asia. It was 
hoped that should such a meeting be possible, it would 
be a significant first step toward opening a dialogue 
with this new government, thus possibly improving 
our chances of obtaining information on those missing 
or killed in Cambodia, including the 25 journalists of 
various nationalities (four of whom are Americans). A 
representative of our Liaison Office in Peking 
delivered a formal request for such a meeting to the 
Democratic Cambodia Embassy in Peking. 

On March 19 Radio Phnom Penh carried the text of a 
press communique issued by the Cambodian Foreign 
Ministry refusing our request and hurling harsh invec- 
tive at the U.S. (the text is attached). 3 The 
Commission therefore was unable to meet with any 
representatives of the Cambodian government and was 
unable to provide any information about our people 
missing or killed there. 

Not printed here. 

VI. Press 

American media viewed the Commission's trip as a 
major news event. The MIA issue was still generating 
widespread interest, the prospects for normalization 
reflected a significant foreign affairs initiative, and a 
visit to Hanoi, the first by American newsmen in five 
years, offered obvious human interest angles. 

At the Commission's request, the State Department 
called Vietnamese attention to our media's strong 
interest in the visit and sought approval for their 
entry. Despite our effort to increase the number, the 
Vietnamese approved only five, who were selected by 
the State Department Correspondents' Association. 
NBC's John Hart served as pool reporter for American 
television and radio networks: CBS's Willis Brown was 
the pool TV cameraman. Time Magazine's Strobe 
Talbott represented the American news-magazines. 
AP's Peter Arnett and UPI's Richard Growald served 
their own companies. 

Because the Vietnamese insisted that our press ac- 
company the Commission, the trip proved unusual. 
Aboard the plane throughout the 24,000-mile journey, 
the press, the Commission, and the staff mixed freely. 
Both in Hanoi and Vientiane, the press was considered 
part of the delegation, was housed and ate with the 
Commission and staff, and attended all events except 
the talks themselves. The accessibility and frankness 
of the Commission with the press comported with the 
American public's great interest in the mission, and 
reflected the openness which characterizes the Admin- 
istration's approach to public affairs. 

American media coverage for the Commission was 
extensive, both in print and broadcasts. The Commis- 
sion believes the public has received a fair and full 
account of its activities which should aid in developing 
the public support necessary for future Administration 
actions. A continuation of this openness is 
recommended as we move ahead. 

The Vietnamese developed a fine appreciation of the 
importance of the American media during the war and 
afforded our accompanying press unusual cooperation. 
Special interviews were provided to them by the Viet- 
namese Prime Minister and the Deputy Foreign 
Minister for Press and Information. 

In their meeting with the latter, the newsmen re- 
quested approval to remain in Vietnam to cover 
developments in greater detail. They were told that 
adequate facilities were not available at this time, but 
the Deputy Foreign Minister also pointed out that 
while over the years there had been about a dozen 
American newsmen in Hanoi, no Vietnamese jour- 
nalists had ever been to the United States. The 
American newsmen offered to initiate an invitation. 
Should the Vietnamese seek visas as a result of this 
invitation, it will present the Administration with an 
opportunity to make a meaningful positive gesture by 
permitting them entry into the U.S. Although the 
Vietnamese media obviously reflect the constraints of 
a communist society, reciprocal visits would be in the 
interests of the normalization process generally. 


Department of State Bulletin 

While in Hanoi the American newsmen were usually 
free to walk around the immediate downtown area. At 
first, this had to be done in the company of English- 
speaking guides, but this gradually eased and 
enterprising newsmen found themselves able to 
explore their own interests on their own, when they 
chose to do so — within the obvious limits of language 
and lack of familiarity with the local scene. 

VII. Military Support for the Commission 

Military support for the Commission was excellent. 
In addition to arranging briefings in Washington and 
Honolulu, the Defense Department and military serv- 
ices provided excellent transportation and billeting 
arrangements. Both the VC-135 which carried the 
Commission to the Philippines and the C-141 for the 
trip to Indochina were well equipped for the extensive 
work which was done on board. Arrangements at 
CINCPAC and Clark Air Base were also fully satisfac- 

VIII. Commission's Conclusions 

Missing in Action 

Although the Commission was able to obtain only 
the 12 remains as well as information on Tucker 
Gougelmann and a promise to deliver another set of 
remains during its brief stay, the Commission's visit 
did appear to create a new and favorable climate for 
improved relations with both Vietnam and Laos. In the 
Commission's view, the best hope for obtaining a 
proper accounting for our MIA's lies in the context of 
such improved relations. The Commission believes that 
the creation of this new spirit is the most significant 
contribution to the accomplishment of the mission as- 
signed it by the President. 

The Commission also believes it impressed upon the 
Vietnamese and Lao our realistic attitude on the MIA 
issue and our intention to resolve it on a reasonable 
basis in order to remove it as an obstacle to 
normalization. The Commission believes this approach 
is more likely to elicit further information and remains 
than continuing past policies of confronting the 
Vietnamese and Lao on the issue. 

On the basis of its talks with Vietnamese and Laos 
officials at the highest level, and on other information 
available to it, the Commission specifically concludes: 

1. There is no evidence to indicate that any Ameri- 
can POW's from the Indochina conflict remain alive. 

2. Americans who stayed in Vietnam after April 30, 
1975, who registered with the Foreign Ministry and 
wished to leave have probably all been allowed to 
depart the country. 

3. Although there continue to be occasional rumors 
of deserters or defectors still living in Indochina, the 
Commission found no evidence to support this conjec- 

4. The Vietnamese have not given us all the 
information they probably have, in part because of 
their concentration on the return of remains. The 
Commission believes it succeeded in making clear to 
the Vietnamese the importance we attach to receiving 
all kinds of information, however slight or fragmentary 
it may be. 

5. The Vietnamese gave a clear formal assurance 
that they would look for MIA information and remains 
and that they would provide such information and 
remains to the U.S. They did not make this specifically 
contingent on our provision of aid, but they do see ac- 
tion on MIA's as related to resolution of other issues of 
concern to them. 

6. For reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of 
loss, and passage of time, it is probable that no 
accounting will ever be possible for most of the Ameri- 
cans lost in Indochina. Even where information may 
once have been available, it may no longer be 
recoverable due to the ravages of time and physical 

7. A new procedure has been established for the 
continuing exchange of MIA information between the 
U.S. and the SRV. The U.S. will use this mechanism 
to furnish additional information and materials to 
assist MIA searches. 

8. The Lao authorities called attention to the diffi- 
culty of MIA search efforts in view of the difficult 
terrain in their country, but undertook to provide in- 
formation and remains as they were found. 

9. The Commission was unable to meet with 
representatives of the Cambodian Government. That 
government has repeatedly denied that it holds any 
foreign prisoners, and the Commission considers it 
unlikely that additional MIA information will be forth- 
coming from that country. 

Normalization of Relations 

1. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders are clearly 
interested in establishing a new and friendlier rela- 
tionship with the United States. 

2. They indicate that they are willing to look to the 
future rather than the past in such a relationship, al- 
though they consider that the U.S. has remaining 
obligation to repair the damage caused by the war in 
their countries. This is likely to continue to be an im- 
portant factor in working out new or improved 
relations with these two countries. 

3. Both Vietnam and Laos have a clear interest in 
such a new relationship. Vietnam in particular 
apparently looks forward to benefits in such matters as 
trade and other long-term economic arrangements. 

4. The Vietnamese are willing to enter into 
immediate high-level diplomatic discussions with the 
U.S. on normalization. They made clear their interest 
in establishing formal diplomatic relations as quickly 
as possible. They indicated their desire to see past 
"erroneous" U.S. policies on such matters as UN 
membership and the trade embargo changed. 

5. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders appear to 

April 18, 1977 


view the present U.S. intentions toward them as more 
positive than in the past. They have a positive attitude 
themselves toward the new U.S. administration. They 
were pleased to understand that the U.S. is prepared 
to deal with them on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect, and that the U.S. has an interest in the stabil- 
ity and prosperity of Southeast Asia. 

6. The Lao appreciated the Commission's assurances 
that the U.S. Government has no hostile intentions 
toward their regime and is not supporting elements 
trying to overthrow it, but they are likely to remain 
sensitive and suspicious as long as indigenous insur- 
gent activity continues to give them significant prob- 

Economic and Humanitarian Assistance 

1. The Vietnamese clearly expect a significant U.S. 
contribution to their postwar economic reconstruction. 

2. At the same time they indicated flexibility about 
the form this aid might take and the basis on which it 
could be given. They listed concessional aid, bilateral 
aid, multilateral aid and long-term loans as forms of 
aid which have been discussed in the past, although 
they did not specify which of these they preferred or 
whether any one form alone would be acceptable. 

3. The Vietnamese seem prepared to deemphasize 
references to this aid as coming from U.S. obligations 
under the Paris Agreement. This remains clearly their 
own position, but they appear willing to discuss aid in- 
stead in humanitarian and moral terms. They indicated 
that they understand our domestic political constraints 
on this issue. 

4. While not specifically linking provisions of U.S. 
aid to either an MIA accounting or normalization, the 
Vietnamese stated that these three issues are "interre- 
lated" and indicated that they would expect both sides 
to take actions regarding the other's concerns. They 
did state that none of these three issues was a precon- 
dition to the other two. Nonetheless, it remains to be 
seen how forthcoming the Vietnamese may be in ac- 
counting for the MIA's if the U.S. does not take some 
steps on aid. 

IX. Recommendations 

1. The Commission believes that resumption of talks 
in Paris between representatives of the U.S. and 
Vietnamese Governments would be a most useful way 
of continuing the dialogue begun during its mission to 

2. The Commission believes that normalization of re- 
lations affords the best prospect for obtaining a fuller 
accounting for our missing personnel and recommends 
that the normalization process be pursued vigorously 
for this as well as other reasons. 

3. The Commission believes it most important to 
continue the technical exchanges with the Vietnamese 
agency on accounting for MIA's which were initiated in 

4. In addition to talks in Paris, consideration should 

be given to proposing that a U.S. representative per- 
sonally bring such information to Hanoi, and to 
inviting Vietnamese representatives to visit the U.S. 
Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu. 

5. In view of the Vietnamese statements that they 
would be glad to receive material assistance to aid their 
search for U.S. remains, the Commission recommends 
that this subject be considered promptly within the 
U.S. Government with a view to quickly providing 
whatever assistance is appropriate. 

6. Consideration should also be given to offering 
technical advice and assistance on defusing unexploded 
ordnance, which the Commission understands con- 
tinues to be a serious problem in some areas. An 
international agency such as UNHCR could be helpful 
in arrangements for providing such information. 

7. Another possible action would be to encourage 
private American groups to increase humanitarian aid 
programs for Indochina, in such areas as food and med- 
ical supplies, including prosthetic equipment. 

United States and Yugoslavia 
Hold Consultations on CSCE 

Press release 110 dated March 16 

U.S. and Yugoslav representatives met 
March 15-16 in Washington for consultations 
and discussions on the Belgrade followup 
meeting to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 
1975. The preparatory session for the Belgrade 
meeting will begin June 15, and the date for 
the main, substantive meeting, also to be held 
in Belgrade, will be set at that time. 

Ambassador Milorad Pesic, who is responsi- 
ble in the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for 
Foreign Affairs for the preparations for the 
Belgrade conference, led the Yugoslav delega- 
tion. Ambassador to the United States Dimce 
Belovski also participated on the Yugoslav 
side. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 
Arthur A. Hartman led the U.S. delegation. 

Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher received Ambassadors Pesic and 
Belovski on March 15. 

In addition to discussions in the Department 
of State, Ambassador Pesic met with members 
of the CSCE Commission, including Chairman 
Dante Fascell. 

The discussions and consultations were use- 
ful and timely and took place in a constructive 
and cordial atmosphere. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan 
made an official visit to Washington March 
20-23, during which he met with President 
Carter and other government officials. Fol- 
lowing is the text of a joint communique is- 
sued March 22. 1 

White press release dated March 22 

President Carter and Prime Minister 
Fukuda met in Washington March 21 and 22 
for a comprehensive and fruitful exchange of 
views on matters of mutual interest. 

They expressed satisfaction that through 
the meetings, a relationship of free and candid 
dialogue and mutual trust was established be- 
tween the new leaders of the governments of 
the United States and Japan. They agreed 
that the two Governments would maintain 
close contact and consultation on all matters 
of common concern. 

The President and the Prime Minister ex- 
pressed their determination that the two 
countries, recognizing their respective re- 
sponsibilities as industrialized democracies, 
endeavor to bring about a more peaceful and 
prosperous international community. To this 
end, they agreed that it is essential for the 
industrialized democracies to develop har- 
monized positions toward major economic is- 
sues through close consultation. They agreed 
further that it is important to sustain and de- 
velop dialogue and cooperation with countries 
whose political systems differ and which are 
in varying stages of economic development. 

The President and the Prime Minister noted 
with satisfaction that the friendly and cooper- 
ative relations between the United States and 
Japan have continued to expand throughout 
diverse areas in the lives of the two 
peoples — not only in economic and political in- 
terchange, but in such varied fields as science 

1 For an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and Prime Minister Fukuda at a welcoming 
ceremony at the White House on Mar. 21 and their ex- 
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House that 
evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated Mar. 28, 1977, pp. 415 and 420. 

and technology, medicine, education and cul- 
ture. They looked forward to further collab- 
oration on both private and governmental 
levels in all these areas. The President and 
the Prime Minister confirmed their common 
determination to further strengthen the 
partnership between their two countries, 
based on shared democratic values and a deep 
respect for individual freedom and fundamen- 
tal human rights. 

The President and the Prime Minister con- 
firmed their common recognition that the 
interdependence of nations requires that the 
industrial countries manage their economies 
with due consideration for global economic 
needs, including those of the developing na- 
tions. They agreed that economic recovery of 
the industrialized democracies is indispensa- 
ble to the stable growth of the international 
economy, and that nations with large-scale 
economies, including the United States and 
Japan, while seeking to avoid recrudescent in- 
flation, should contribute to the stimulation of 
the world economy in a manner commensurate 
with their respective situations. They agreed 
that both Governments would continue to con- 
sult closely to this end. 

They agreed that a liberal world trading sys- 
tem is essential for the sound development of 
the world economy, and in this connection ex- 
pressed their determination to seek signifi- 
cant early progress in the Tokyo Round of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and to bring 
those negotiations to a successful conclusion 
as soon as possible. 

They reconfirmed the need for the nations 
concerned, including the United States and 
Japan, to address constructively the issues 
posed in the North-South relationship. They 
noted the continuing seriousness of the global 
energy problem and reconfirmed the impor- 
tance of taking further steps to conserve 
energy and to develop new and alternative 
energy sources. They agreed on the necessity 
of intensified consumer country cooperation in 
the International Energy Agency and of con- 
tinued promotion of cooperation between the 
oil-importing and oil-producing countries. 
They agreed that both Governments would 
continue their efforts to identify and promote 
positive solutions to these issues, and would 

April 18, 1977 


endeavor to bring the Ministerial Meeting of 
the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation to a successful conclusion. 

The President and the Prime Minister wel- 
comed the convening in London in May of the 
summit conference of the major industrial 
countries. They expressed their expectation 
that the conference, in a spirit of cooperation 
and solidarity, would serve as a forum for a 
constructive and creative exchange of views 
on problems confronting the world economy. 

The President and the Prime Minister re- 
viewed the current international situation, 
and reaffirmed their recognition that the 
maintenance of a durable peace in the Asian- 
Pacific region is necessary for world peace 
and security. 

They agreed that the close cooperative rela- 
tionship between the United States and Ja- 
pan, joined by bonds of friendship and trust, 
is indispensable to a stable international polit- 
ical structure in the Asian-Pacific region. 
They noted that the Treaty of Mutual Cooper- 
ation and Security between the United States 
and Japan has greatly contributed to the 
maintenance of peace and security in the Far 
East, and expressed their conviction that the 
firm maintenance of the Treaty serves the 
long-term interests of both countries. 

The President reaffirmed that the United 
States as a Pacific nation, maintains a strong 
interest in the Asian-Pacific region, and will 
continue to play an active and constructive 
role there. He added that the United States 
will honor its security commitments and in- 
tends to retain a balanced and flexible mili- 
tary presence in the Western Pacific. The 
Prime Minister welcomed this affirmation by 
the United States and expressed his intention 
that Japan would further contribute to the sta- 
bility and development of that region in vari- 
ous fields, including economic development. 

Noting the activities of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, the President and 
the Prime Minister valued highly the efforts 
of its member countries to strengthen their 
self-reliance and the resilience of the region. 
They also reaffirmed that the two countries 
are prepared to continue cooperation and as- 
sistance in support of the efforts of the 

ASEAN countries toward regional cohesion 
and development. 

Taking note of the situation in Indochina, 
they expressed the view that the peaceful and 
stable development of this area would be de- 
sirable for the future of Southeast Asia as a 

The President and the Prime Minister noted 
the continuing importance of the maintenance 
of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula 
for the security of Japan and East Asia as a 
whole. They agreed on the desirability of con- 
tinued efforts to reduce tension on the Korean 
Peninsula and strongly hoped for an early re- 
sumption of the dialogue between the South 
and the North. In connection with the in- 
tended withdrawal of United States ground 
forces in the Republic of Korea, the President 
stated that the United States, after consulta- 
tion with the Republic of Korea and also with 
Japan, would proceed in ways which would 
not endanger the peace on the Peninsula. He 
affirmed that the United States remains 
committed to the defense of the Republic of 

The President and the Prime Minister em- 
phasized that, as a first step toward the most 
urgent task of nuclear disarmament, nuclear- 
testing in all environments should be banned 
promptly. With respect to the international 
transfer of conventional weapons, they em- 
phasized that measures to restrain such trans- 
fers should be considered by the international 
community as a matter of priority. In connec- 
tion with the prevention of nuclear prolifera- 
tion, the President welcomed the ratification 
by Japan last year of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

The President and the Prime Minister, rec- 
ognizing the important role the United Na- 
tions is playing in the contemporary world, 
agreed that Japan and the United States 
should cooperate for the strengthening of that 
organization. In this connection, the Presi- 
dent expressed his belief that Japan is fully 
qualified to become a permanent member of 
the Security Council of the United Nations, 
and stated American support for that objec- 
tive. The Prime Minister expressed his ap- 
preciation for the President's statement. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The President and the Prime Minister reaf- 
firmed that the use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes should not lead to nuclear 
proliferation. In this connection, the Presi- 
dent expressed his determination to develop 
United States policies which would support a 
more effective non-proliferation regime. The 
Prime Minister stated that for Japan, a party 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a highly 
industrialized state heavily dependent on im- 
ported energy resources, it is essential to 
progress toward implementation of its pro- 
gram for the development and utilization of 
nuclear energy. The President agreed to give 
full consideration to Japan's position regard- 
ing its energy needs in connection with the 
formulation of a new nuclear policy by the 
United States. The President and the Prime 
Minister agreed on the necessity for close 
cooperation between the United States and 
Japan in developing a workable policy which 
will meet Japan's concerns and contribute to a 
more effective non-proliferation regime. 

The President and the Prime Minister dis- 
cussed matters concerning bilateral trade, 
fisheries and civil aviation. They agreed on 
the importance of continued close consultation 
and cooperation between the two Govern- 
ments to attain mutually acceptable and 
equitable solutions to problems pending be- 
tween the United States and Japan. 

The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation 
from the Government of Japan to President 
and Mrs. Carter to visit Japan. The President 
accepted this invitation with deep apprecia- 
tion and stated that he looked forward to vis- 
iting Japan at a mutually convenient time. 

Secretary Vance Meets With 
Irish Foreign Minister 

Following is a joint statement, issued on 
March 17 following a meeting between Secre- 
tary Vance and Irish Foreign Minister Garret 

Press release 111 dated March IT 

1. The Secretary of State and the Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the 
situation in Northern Ireland and expressed 
concern about the continued violence there. 

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs ex- 
pressed appreciation to the Secretary of State 
for the continued efforts of the U.S. 
Administration to limit support for violence in 
Northern Ireland by persons mistakenly moti- 
vated in the United States, and for its wish to 
insure that legitimate concern for human 
rights is not misused by those who support vio- 
lence as a means to political ends in Ireland. 

3. The Secretary of State reaffirmed the 
longstanding U.S. Government policy of 
noninvolvement in the issue of Northern 

4. Both the Secretary of State and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed their 
commitment to the statement of President 
Carter made on October 28, 1976, which op- 
posed violence as part of a solution to the Irish 
question and expressed support for negotia- 
tions and peaceful means for finding a just so- 
lution involving the two communities of 
Northern Ireland and which would protect 
human rights. 

April 18, 1977 


The International Economic Situation 

Following is a statement made before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on March 18 by Richard N. 
Cooper, then Under Secretary-designate for 
Economic Affairs, whose nomination was 
continued by the Senate on April 6. 1 

It is my pleasure to be here today to 
present an overview of the international 
economic situation. As the first 
Administration witness to testify in this 
series of hearings, let me reiterate Presi- 
dent Carter's conviction that a coherent and 
effective foreign economic policy, supported 
by the American people, requires sustained 
cooperation between the Administration and 
Congress. It is in this spirit that I view the 
opportunity to appear before this key sub- 
committee today. 

In this opening statement I would like to 
cover several areas: 

— Events leading to our present situation; 
— The current state of the international 
— Foreign policy considerations; and 
— Our overall foreign economic strategy. 

I shall keep my oral presentation brief and 
look forward to your questions for an 
opportunity to more fully explain our 

A quick review of the recent past is help- 
ful in understanding the current environ- 
ment. Two developments are of particular 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

In the early 1970's the Western industrial 
economies began to experience a relatively 
synchronized economic expansion, the cul- 
mination of exceptionally rapid world 
growth during the previous decade. In 
1972-73 the growth rate of the OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] area exceeded 6 percent, 
approaching the limits of productive capac- 
ity in that area and outstripping the ability 
of many producers to expand supplies. By 
1973, in reaction to rising inflation, several 
countries were already pursuing contraction- 
ary policies to cool their overheated 
economies, accepting the prospect of a slow- 
down in growth. 

Then came the oil embargo and 
quadrupling of the price of oil in the winter 
of 1973-74. This was the largest single 
global economic shock in modern history. 
Because of the suddenness and magnitude of 
the impact, the increased price for oil acted 
as a major drain on purchasing power in the 
oil-consuming world. Coming on top of the 
mild slowdown already in progress, the oil 
price rise plunged the industrial economies 
into full recession. 

Individual countries reacted differently. 
The United States, Germany, and Japan 
accepted the recession and permitted aggre- 
gate demand to contract. Others, particu- 
larly the weaker European economies and 
several semi-industrialized developing na- 
tions, delayed domestic adjustment. They 
financed their balance-of-payments deficits 
with borrowings, gambling that the reces- 
sion would be short and that resumed eco- 
nomic growth would enable them to bring 
payments back into balance. The bet was 
understandable, even rational, but it turned 
out to be wrong; the recession was longer 


Department of State Bulletin 

and deeper than originally expected, large 
oil deficits added to the problem, and those 
attempting to ride it out by financing these 
deficits saw their indebtedness continue to 

The Current Situation 

Today the world is slowly emerging from 
the worst recession of the last 40 years. Re- 
covery, which had begun in the latter half of 
1975, picked up steam in the first half of last 
year but then began to slow in many coun- 
tries. This pause, combined with pressures 
in foreign exchange markets associated with 
external payments strains in a number of 
countries, created renewed uncertainty. The 
fear that simultaneous recovery in the 
OECD area would overheat the world econ- 
omy was replaced in the second half of the 
year with the concern that a flattening of 
the recovery might lead to insufficient 

As 1977 began, however, the outlook ap- 
peared more positive. The recovery began to 
pick up in many of the OECD countries. 
However, because of the different underly- 
ing conditions in various countries before 
the recession and the different ways they 
reacted to the recession, individual coun- 
tries are now emerging in widely different 
positions of strength. 

Several factors characterize the present 
state of recovery: 

Moderate But Sustained Growth 

First, we can expect moderate but sus- 
tained growth throughout the rest of this 

— Real growth rates in the industrial 
countries are projected to average about 4 
percent in 1977, somewhat lower than the 5 
percent attained in 1976. The stronger 
economies— the United States, Germany, 
and Japan — are well into the cyclical 
upswing. This year we may see a growth 
rate somewhat below last year's average for 
the group, which was above 6 percent. In 
several other major economies, such as the 
United Kingdom, France, and Italy, stabili- 

zation measures will lead to slower growth 
than the 1976 average growth rate of about 
4 percent. 

— Real growth in the oil-importing 
developing countries is likely to be some- 
what below the estimated 5.4 percent of 
1976. Brazil, India, and Korea were among 
the major countries helping to pull the LDC 
[less developed country] average up in 1976. 
This year, adjustment and slower growth in 
several larger countries will slightly reduce 
the overall average. 

— Aggregate inflation rates in the OECD 
area will remain disturbingly high, although 
less than the 8 percent rate of 1976. At the 
upper end of the OECD spectrum, consumer 
prices are likely to rise about 20 percent this 
year in some countries. At the opposite ex- 
treme, price increases in the order of 2-4 
percent might be expected. 

— Unemployment will remain a major 
problem as approximately 15 million men 
and women are out of work in the OECD 
area, half in the United States. 

Problem Areas 

Second, there are areas of the recovery 
that need to be strengthened: 

—Sluggish investment in the OECD area 
is perhaps the most important weakness in 
the recovery. The severity of the recession 
led to reduced real investment and a 
consequent lower growth in productive 
capacity. New capacity requirements in sev- 
eral key industries, the need to replace a 
portion of existing capital stock made obso- 
lete by high-cost energy, and special future 
requirements in energy and pollution-con- 
trol facilities require substantial new 

— Additional oil price increases, coming on 
top of the already high price levels, could 
also upset the current growth pattern. U.S. 
Government analysis in advance of the last 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] price decision in December indi- 
cated that each 5 percent increase in the 
cost of crude oil would cost oil-consuming 
countries approximately $6 billion in higher 
oil import bills, with the United States 

April 18, 1977 


paying about $1.7 billion of that total. Ab- 
sent compensating domestic policy actions, 
each 5 percent increase costs the seven 
largest industrial countries an average of 0.3 
percent of GNP [gross national product] 
growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to 
consumer prices. 

Payments Imbalances and External Debts 

Third, OPEC members can be expected to 
amass annual current account surpluses in 
excess of $30 billion for at least the next few 
years, and the accumulation of financial 
assets by several Arab oil exporters to- 
gether could easily surpass $300 billion by 
the end of 1980. The total oil import bill, 
which was $35 billion in 1973, will be on the 
order of $140 billion in 1977. The large 
chronic OPEC surplus is matched by 
aggregate deficits in both developed and de- 
veloping oil-importing countries, which can 
be reduced but not eliminated in the medium 
term. Only the distribution of the deficit 
among importers can change. 

Borrowings to finance balance- 
of-payments deficits each year have meant 
an increase in the external indebtedness of 
many nations in the OECD, the developing 
world, and the Eastern European nonmar- 
ket countries. 

The debt issue is complex. As an 
illustration of the situation, we can look at 
the developing countries. Those with access 
to private capital markets borrowed heavily 
to finance deficits, in preference to making 
difficult domestic adjustments, which, if un- 
dertaken, would have aggravated the world 

While in many cases the rate of inflation 
has reduced the burden of past debts, 
debt-service payments of the non-oil- 
producing LDC's are now in excess of $21 
billion in 1976, or an increase of about 75 
percent over the 1973 level. Over 80 percent 
relates to payments on private and official 
commercial debt. In 1976 these payments 
consumed about 20 percent of their income 
from merchandise exports as compared to 17 
percent in 1973. These large debt-service 
payments will cause several countries to 
continue the search for new financing at the 

same time that they make necessary internal 
adjustments. Collectively, debts must be ac- 
cumulated beyond present levels because of 
the OPEC surpluses. Absent sufficient 
financing, several countries would be forced 
to take the 1974-75 recession in 1977 and 

This could threaten the process of recov- 
ery itself, particularly in Europe, where de- 
pendence on external markets is 
considerably larger than is that of the 
United States. But the American economy 
would also be affected adversely by a major 
slump in export markets brought about by 
deflation and import restrictions. 

Danger of Protectionism 

Fourth, the danger of protectionism is 
growing and remains a constant threat to 
the recovery. The OPEC surpluses will lead 
to unaccustomed deficits. At the same time 
unemployment will exert pressure for ex- 
pansion, which, unless coordinated, will 
worsen deficits. Import restrictions would 
seem to be the way out, especially since im- 
ports are a natural scapegoat for what is 
basically deficient total demand. Import re- 
strictions, however, will never work 
collectively — unemployment will only be 

Thus far, governments have generally fol- 
lowed prudent trade policies, but the 
possibility of protectionism is real. Trade 
restrictions would spread in the current en- 
vironment, and it could easily take another 
decade to get back to where we are today. 

The Less Developed Countries 

Fifth, recession and weak export markets, 
inflation and higher cost imports, and high 
energy prices, have adversely affected many 
LDC's. Our own economic welfare is 
increasingly intertwined with trade with and 
investment in the developing world. Many of 
these critical issues are under discussion in 
the North-South dialogue, where a failure to 
maintain a constructive atmosphere could 
undermine global economic cooperation. 

This, then, is where we are in the recov- 
ery: modest growth ahead, which must be 


Department of State Bulletin 

reinforced by reduced inflation, increased 
employment, expanded investment, 
strengthened energy policies, adequate 
financing for payments imbalances and 
adjustment, turning back protectionism, and 
the improvement of global economic cooper- 
ation among all countries. 

Foreign Policy Considerations 

The current economic situation has major 
foreign policy implications. Two general 
considerations are paramount: 

— The growing interaction of national 
economies means that problems in some 
countries can easily become contagious and 
that they can be effectively addressed only 
by nations working closely together. Among 
the market economies the United States is 
relatively less dependent on the world econ- 
omy, but our economic welfare and security 
cannot be divorced from the economic health 
of other nations and are becoming increas- 
ingly intertwined with it. 

— Economic concerns preoccupy govern- 
ments everywhere. They require economic 
stability and progress to maintain the 
confidence of their electorates. Economic 
problems can generate political and social 
instability and undermine the network of 
international cooperative arrangements 
which have been painstakingly erected in 
the last 30 years. 

In the last few years the fabric of interna- 
tional cooperation has held together ex- 
traordinarily well despite severe economic 
strains. Indeed, we have made some major 
advances, including the first comprehensive 
reform of the international monetary system 
since Bretton Woods; an agreement by the 
industrial democracies to avoid unilateral 
trade restrictions despite the pressures of 
the recession; the conclusion of the OECD 
investment declaration, strengthening the 
framework for private investment among 
the Western democracies; and the provision 
of additional sources of finance to developing 
countries from the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] Trust Fund and a greatly 
expanded IMF compensatory financing 

The general foreign policy challenge be- 
fore us is not only to preserve this coopera- 
tive framework but to strengthen and 
extend it to insure global economic growth. 
I turn now to the specific issues we face and 
our strategy for dealing with them. 

Foreign Economic Strategy 

Let me discuss our overall strategy in the 
context of our broad macroeconomic 
objective: a strong recovery characterized 
by steady, sustained, noninflationary growth 
and expanding job opportunities in the 
OECD area and the developing world. The 
key elements of our approach are the coor- 
dinated stimulation of the stronger 
economies, adequate international financing 
conditioned on timely adjustment, reduced 
dependence on foreign energy sources, 
continued trade liberalization, and progress 
in the North-South dialogue. 

Coordinated Stimulatio n 

First, coordinated stimulation: We should 
look first at President Carter's recovery 
program, which is designed to strengthen 
the domestic economic performance and 
create jobs without triggering inflation. The 
program should not be seen only in domestic 
terms but as part of an overall plan in which 
those countries in a strong financial position 
expand as rapidly as they can consistent 
with sustained growth and the control of in- 
flation, thereby absorbing a greater portion 
of the aggregate deficit of the oil-importing 
countries and stimulating growth in the 
weaker economies. 

The Administration has formulated its 
program with both domestic and interna- 
tional considerations in mind. It contains tax 
features to provide quick injections of pur- 
chasing power into the economy as well as 
encouragement for increased private 
investment, and it includes programs to in- 
crease employment directly. The program 
will extend over two years and is adjustable 
as conditions warrant. 

We have been encouraging other strong 
economies to follow our lead in stimulating 
their economies. Thus far the degree of 

April 18, 1977 


stimulation varies widely among these coun- 
tries, and we will be paying close attention 
to the evolution of their policies. 

Financing and Adjustment 

Second, financing and adjustment: In 
some individual cases, countries which chose 
to rely heavily on external finance to cover 
their deficits over the past few years must 
take domestic adjustment measures to 
strengthen their payments position and 
avoid the risk of impairing their 
creditworthiness. As noted before, however, 
we must accept the need to sustain consid- 
erable increases in aggregate debt for the 
near future. 

Individual requirements vary consider- 
ably, but for many countries the economic 
adjustment process will take years and re- 
quire difficult economic decisions. For some, 
there is an immediate requirement to 
channel new funds away from financing con- 
sumption to expenditures which increase fu- 
ture production through investment. Over 
the last few years, ad hoc responses to the 
major international shocks resulted in large 
amounts of private borrowing being used to 
finance imports for consumption without 
adequate sums being directed to increase 
productive capacity. In addition, in some 
countries budget deficits must be severely 
reduced as government expenditures have 
exploded without comparable tax collections. 

Unless there is international growth, 
countries cannot make necessary adjust- 
ments without painful and severe 
dislocations. Adjustment and recovery thus 
go hand in hand. It is also imperative that 
those initiating adjustments are able to find 
external financial support for responsible 
stabilization programs. 

The necessary financing will have to be 
rechanneled one way or another from OPEC 
countries in surplus. In the past, private 
commercial institutions have been the 
principal mechanism for this intermediation. 
We will continue to rely primarily on the 
private sector to perform this function. But 
we are also examining new ways to insure 
adequate amounts of financing from interna- 
tional institutions and the proper mix of 

official and private financing in individual 
cases. The International Monetary Fund in 
particular is skilled at facilitating necessary 
domestic stabilization as a condition for fi- 
nancial support, which is the type of lending 
that will be most appropriate for many 


Third, energy: The events of the past four 
years have clearly demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the United States and its 
major allies to OPEC decisions to raise 
prices and to the threatened or actual use of 
an oil embargo by some oil-exporting coun- 
tries as an instrument of national policy. As 
already noted, uncertainty over the course 
of future OPEC price policy hangs over the 
recovery and prospects for global economic 
growth and stability. And for the longer 
term, there is more to the energy question 
than OPEC's actions. A profound shift in 
global supply-and-demand patterns has 
taken place. Oil is a depletable asset. We 
must not only reduce our short-term vul- 
nerability, but we must begin preparing for 
the post-oil age. 

The key element of U.S. energy strategy 
is the development of a comprehensive 
domestic energy policy. The full plan is 
evolving in close cooperation with Congress 
and our partners in the International 
Energy Agency and will be detailed by April 
20. Clearly one major thrust will be to re- 
duce dependence on imported oil. 

Internationally, we will be supporting 
several important efforts. The United States 
has made the International Energy Agency 
the principal vehicle for energy cooperation 
with the other industrialized countries; and 
we will continue our policies there to 
develop coordinated national programs for 
conservation, development, and reduced de- 
pendence. We shall continue our efforts to 
integrate key OPEC countries into the 
world economic structure so that decisions 
affecting international economic welfare and 
stability can be made cooperatively. And we 
shall focus attention and resources on assist- 
ing the non-oil LDC's to improve their 
energy positions. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Trade Policy 

Fourth, trade policy: I have already 
described the impact that renewed protec- 
tionism would have on the recovery. In ad- 
dition, we would undoubtedly pay the price 
of any resurgence of protectionism in other 
areas of international cooperation. 

In the next several weeks the 
Administration will face difficult decisions 
concerning trade policy toward such sensi- 
tive imports as shoes and color TV sets. Our 
own actions will have a major influence on 
the trade policy of other countries. We are 
also examining our trade strategy in the 
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, 
where we expect to make significant prog- 
ress before the authority of the Trade Act of 
1974 expires. 

North-South Dialogue 

Fifth, we plan to redouble our efforts in 
the North-South dialogue in order to 
strengthen global cooperation generally. 

Economic developments of the past four 
years have caused the developing nations to 
accelerate their search for international 
policies which increase resource transfers to 
them and enhance their role in international 
decisionmaking. They have called for in- 
creased levels of foreign assistance, 
permanent trade preferences, technology 
transfer on more favorable terms, 
commodity-price stabilization, and debt 

The Carter Administration is still review- 
ing its overall North-South policies, but 
several elements of our general approach 
are already clear: 

—The interests of all countries are best 
served in an open and buoyant world econ- 

— We have many mutual interests with 
the developing world and will emphasize 
those issues where all countries can derive 
benefit, as opposed to those where some 
countries' gain is others' loss. 

— The dialogue must be a two-way street. 
All countries must accept obligations to the 
world system. We shall approach problems 
of the developing world with a desire to as- 

sist in any reasonable way possible. But we 
shall also expect that within their 
capabilities they maximize their own re- 
sources for development, adhere to 
standards of basic human rights, and respect 
our interests. 

This coming year commodities and official 
debt will be particularly important to the 
overall discussions. 

Over the next several months we will be 
engaged in a series of meetings on ways to 
strengthen individual commodity markets 
and on the possibility of common funding for 
individual commodity stockpiles. 

A number of serious problems in the 
commodities area must be addressed 
cooperatively by producers and consumers. 
For a large number of developing countries, 
earnings from commodities are critical to 
economic development. At the same time, all 
countries have a major interest in assuring 
that our goal of a stable, expanding world 
economy is not threatened either by exces- 
sive fluctuations of commodity prices and 
export earnings or by an inadequacy of 

Within this framework of mutual interest 
we are prepared to act on commodities is- 
sues. The problems faced in the commodities 
area require an integrated approach, ad- 
dressing price stabilization, trade, the im- 
provement of market structures, the stabili- 
zation of export earnings, resource de- 
velopment, and investment. The new Ad- 
ministration is currently formulating policies 
toward all these issues. We are prepared to 
deal with them constructively in the coming 
months in a number of meetings including 
the work now underway in UNCTAD 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development] and elsewhere on a number of 
individual commodities. 

We believe the existing international in- 
stitutions can play a very helpful role here. 
The IMF compensatory financing facility, 
which lends for shortfalls in LDC export 
proceeds, has been a particularly key 
element; and we will be open to possible fu- 
ture improvements. In addition, the World 
Bank might usefully facilitate resource 

April 18, 1977 


A second major issue will be the demands 
for general debt relief for official debt of the 
low-income countries. The issue should not 
be confused with the indebtedness issue dis- 
cussed before, which involves mainly 
commercial borrowings of the higher income 
LDC's, none of whom have advocated any 
type of general debt relief. 

The developing countries have made for- 
giveness of official debt a principal demand in 
the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation in Paris, which is due to wind up 
late this spring. The United States and other 
industrialized democracies have remained firm 
that this would be a mistaken policy. 

In general, official debt burdens can be 
serviced and are not major impediments to 
development. In addition, generalized debt 
relief would provide indiscriminate benefits 
to those countries which had not pursued 
effective domestic policies and would be un- 
related to currently appropriate burden 
sharing among the aid-giving countries. 
Finally, since individual country situations 
differ so widely, debt relief can be meaning- 
fully considered only on a case-by-case 

As one examines demands for debt relief, 
however, it is clear that the developing 
countries' objective is to increase resource 
transfers. Looked at this way, the United 
States, in conjunction with other donor 
countries, can make a major contribution to 
development via higher levels of foreign as- 
sistance, both multilateral and bilateral. 

The Administration is convinced that 
larger resource transfers to the Third World 
are required in order to meet legitimate 
development requirements. Furthermore, 
we believe that foreign assistance is the 
most direct and effective way to do this, and 
that an improved economic assistance per- 
formance by the United States not only ad- 
vances global economic development but is a 
sensible alternative to LDC proposals for 
general debt relief, as well as other resource 
transfer schemes which we believe to be 
poorly conceived. However, we will want to 
insure that our foreign assistance resource 

transfers are efficiently used and actually 
reach the people who need them. 

In recent weeks Secretary Vance and 
other Administration officials have testified 
in support of a larger bilateral U.S. foreign 
assistance program and prompt U.S. par- 
ticipation in the capital replenishment of 
international development banks, particu- 
larly the International Development Associ- 
ation, the soft-loan window of the World 
Bank. The 1978 budget calls for budget au- 
thority of $1.35 billion for bilateral de- 
velopment assistance, $2.6 billion for the 
World Bank Group (of which $1 billion is 
callable capital), $130 million for the United 
Nations Development Program, and $1.9 
billion for security supporting assistance. 
The support of this subcommittee and your 
colleagues in Congress will be essential to 
fulfillment of the President's objective in 
this area. 

Reinforcing Structure of Cooperation 

Mr. Chairman, the economic situation will 
present a major challenge to our foreign 
economic policy in the coming years. We will 
have to deal with the complex interrelation- 
ships among the pace of economic expansion, 
the distribution of large trade deficits, the 
system of international financing, energy 
policy, the degree of protectionism, and the 
strengthening of cooperative relationships 
among all countries. If the deep strains in 
the international economy force each coun- 
try to go its own w T ay, everyone will be the 

To date the structure of international 
cooperation has worked well, thus justifying 
the continuing effort we and other countries 
have devoted to building it over the last 
quarter century. In the face of difficulty we 
must now preserve and reinforce this struc- 
ture. This will require the willingness of the 
United States and others to adapt to new 
circumstances. As in the past others will be 
looking to us to lead the way in fashioning 
effective policies. The Administration looks 
forward to working closely with the Con- 
gress in meeting this challenge. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Discusses Approach 
to Environmental Issues 

Following is a statement by Patsy T. 
Mink, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, Oceans, and International 
Environment of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on March 31. 1 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
on S. Res. 49, which urges the United 
States to seek agreement of other 
governments to a treaty requiring prepara- 
tion of an international environmental im- 
pact statement for any major project, 
action, or continuing activity which could 
reasonably be expected to have an adverse 
effect on the environment of another nation 
or a global commons area. 

The Department is in full agreement with 
the basic purpose of S. Res. 49, which I see 
as seeking responsible assessment by na- 
tions of the environmental effects of their 
actions upon other nations. 

We are embarked on a number of ac- 
tivities internationally to gain the support of 
other countries for implementation of this 
concept. Our efforts are meeting with some 
success; we also have encountered some 
basic resistance. 

For example, the United States has 
played a leading role in the development of 
the principles concerning transfrontier 
pollution which have been adopted by the 
Council of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
These principles, which are intended as 
guides to member states, call for provision 
of information to, and consultation with, 
other countries before activities are under- 
taken which may have transfrontier pollu- 
tion implications; provision is also made 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

for monitoring, research, and dispute 

I think our country can be justifiably 
proud of the arrangements we have de- 
veloped over the years with Canada and 
Mexico to identify and resolve transfrontier 
pollution issues. With Canada, we have the 
International Joint Commission, created in 
1909. With Mexico, we have the 
International Boundary and Water Commis- 
sion. Each of these is unique in its particular 
structure, but both of them have been 
invaluable in addressing environmental 
problems with our two close neighbors. I 
think one point to be learned from those 
experiences is that we should not be rigid as 
to the kinds of tools we develop. The impor- 
tant thing is to address the problem. 

We have also encouraged the European 
Communities (Common Market) in their ef- 
forts to develop Community-wide environ- 
mental assessment procedures. 

Another case in point is the United Na- 
tions Law of the Sea Conference. The 
United States has proposed and achieved 
consensus on a treaty article calling upon 
states to prepare environmental assessments 
of their activities which might adversely af- 
fect the marine environment. Such reports 
are to be published or provided to the 
competent international organizations to be 
made available to all states. 

And with respect to the possible 
development of Antarctic resources, we are 
actively engaged in cooperative environmen- 
tal studies w r ith our Antarctic Treaty 
partners. This includes expanded studies 
that could form the basis for effective en- 
vironmental measures related to marine 
living resources, as well as studies on the 
environmental implications of any mineral 
resource activities that may occur in 

The United States has been working 
within the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) on draft principles of con- 
duct for guidance of states in the conserva- 
tion and harmonious exploitation of shared 
natural resources. Included are provisions 
on notification, consultation, and environ- 

April 18, 1977 


mental assessment. These guidelines, 
specifically at U.S. initiative, would provide 

States should make environmental assessments 
before engaging in any activity with respect to a 
shared natural resource which may create a risk of 
significantly affecting the environment of another 
State or States sharing that resource. 

In addition, within the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe we are 
supporting a project to develop common in- 
ternational methodologies for analyzing en- 
vironmental implications of economic 
activities. A concrete example we hope to 
use is the problem of long-range atmos- 
pheric transport of pollutants and the 
resultant phenomenon of "acid rain." If we 
can develop a workable and internationally 
accepted means of designing and assessing 
the specific environmental impact of related 
factors such as power generation, the next 
step would be consultations between 
countries leading to introduction of remedial 
measures to diminish these environmental 

Such consultations are already called for 
under the OECD transfrontier pollution 
principles, but the problem is how to 
convert abstract principle into practice. We 
believe that our step-by-step approach is 
producing a strengthened international 
consensus on the importance of systematic 
environmental assessment; it is also increas- 
ing agreement among nations on how to go 
about this process. 

I have described a rather gradualistic ap- 
proach. It serves the purpose of developing 
an international consensus which we hope 
will encourage nations to be willing to adopt 
binding international obligations of the kind 
set forth in S. Res. 49. The reluctance of 
states to accept real or perceived restraints 
on their sovereignty is reflected in the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi- 
ronment, which sets forth the sovereign 
right of nations to conduct their own 
environmental policies. 

The issue goes right to the heart of na- 
tional economic survival. In Europe, the 
most dramatic current case of transfrontier 
pollution probably is that of acid rain. Acid 
rain in turn results from the production of 

energy from conventional fossil fuels. The 
states of Europe would be understandably 
reluctant to adopt any broad obligations 
which could affect their right to continue the 
production of energy. 

The proposed treaty could be read to 
require that if any activity of a state or its 
nationals or persons subject to its jurisdic- 
tion were to be challenged by another state 
or by UNEP as potentially having signifi- 
cant adverse effect upon the other state's 
physical environment or environmental 
interests or upon the global commons, such 
a challenge could halt the activity in ques- 
tion pending the outcome of a mandatory 
consultation, the preparation of an environ- 
mental impact statement for external review 
by the affected state and by UNEP, and 
submission of any related dispute to compul- 
sory international settlement. I do not be- 
lieve that other states would accept a 
binding obligation of this nature; moreover, 
we believe it would be difficult even for the 
United States to accept an obligation which 
might allow another state to halt, perhaps 
indefinitely, a domestic activity undertaken 
in accordance with U.S. laws. 

The issue that I am addressing is one of 
degree only. Unfortunately, we do not have 
the shared international perception of the 
importance of this issue to enable us to 
move yet toward such binding commitments. 

If you will accept the reservations I have 
expressed as to the specific details of the 
treaty text described in S. Res. 49, I am 
pleased to say that the concept has the 
support of the Department of State. 

We do believe that this is the direction in 
which we should be moving. I understand 
the injunction in the resolution to "seek the 
agreement of other governments to a 
treaty" to express a conceptual goal rather 
than a specific charter. 

I hope that the emphasis upon interna- 
tional environmental impact statements does 
not rule out the flexibility to pursue other 
means of achieving the purpose, such as the 
use of joint commissions like those we now 
have with Canada and Mexico. Moreover, I 
expect that the elaboration of cooperative 
procedures for assessing environmental 
impacts will be more palatable to foreign na- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tions than a proposal that countries do uni- 
lateral environmental impact statements on 
the effects of their actions in other coun- 
tries. For one thing, a nation is likely to 
want to do its own analysis of the impact 
within its jurisdiction. For another, it may 
believe that an analysis by the nation which 
is responsible for the potential damage 
would be less balanced than a cooperative 

I hope that you will accept the likelihood 
that we may be able to develop international 
machinery for exchange of information and 
consultation long before nations will 
be willing to accept compulsory dispute 

Finally, I am sure that you recognize that 
the development of any international con- 
vention on so important a subject will be 
a sustained process of give-and-take and 
that the final product will reflect other 
countries' views as well as the draft which 
we initially put forward. 

With these clarifications, may I again 
reiterate that the Department agrees with 
the goal of the resolution and wishes to 
compliment Senator Pell for having re- 
minded us all of the importance of the goal. 

Current Treaty Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. ' 
Signatures: Belgium, March 16, 1977; Bangladesh, 

March 17, 1977; El Salvador, Sudan, March 21, 1977; 

Romania, March 22, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, March 23, 1977. 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 
Acceptance deposited: Nicaragua, March 25, 1977. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 

1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 

Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17, 
Optional protocol, to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations, concerning the compulsory 
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 
1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the 
United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, March 17, 1977. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. 
TIAS 7502. 

Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17, 


Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development formulated at the 
Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Done at 
Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force 
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance: Guinea-Bissau, March 24, 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference 
July 1-22, 1944. Done at Washington December 27, 

1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 

Signature and acceptance: Guinea-Bissau, March 24, 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, January 31, 1977. 

Organization of American States — Charter 

Charter of the Organization of American States. 
Signed at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into force 
December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361. 
Signature: Surinam, February 22, 1977. 

United Nations — Privileges and Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 

1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the 
United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17, 

Accession deposited: Sudan, March 21, 1977. 


Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement relating to the security of information on 
the JT-10D aircraft engine. Effected by exchange of 

Not in force. 

April 18, 1977 


notes at Washington February 24 and March 18, 
1977. Entered into force March 18, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance and 
excess defense articles furnished by the United 
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala 
May 16 and July 19, 1972. Entered into force April 
26, 1973. TIAS7625. 
Terminated. March 2, 1977. 


Agreement amending the nonscheduled air service 
agreement of September 21. 1974 (TIAS 7954), and 
relating to scheduled air service. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington March 14 and 16, 
1977. Entered into force March 16, 1977. 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States. Signed at Washington February 16, 
Entered into force: March 10, 1977. 


Agreement amending and implementing the air 
transport agreement of April 28, 1947, as amended 
(TIAS 3285, 3818). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington March 14 and 16, 1977. Entered into 
force March 16, 1977. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Program of exchanges for 1977-79 and conditions 
governing exchanges. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington October 22, 1976. Entered into force 
October 22, 1976. 



of Department of State 




Press Releases: March 28 -April 3 



Richard C. Holbrooke sworn in as As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs (biographic data). 

Press releases mav be obtained from the Office of 



Vance: departure, Moscow. 


Relations, Department of State, Washington, 



Foreign Minister Genscher, Vance: ar- 
rival, Bonn. 





SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire 
protection, Apr. 26. 






Advisory Committee on the Law of the 



Vance: arrival, Brussels, Mar. 26. 

Sea, rescheduled, Apr. 25-26. 



Vance: remarks following special ses- 
sion of North Atlantic Council, Mar. 



SCC, SOLAS, working group on sub- 
division and stability's panel on bulk 
cargoes, New York, Apr. 28. 



Vance: press briefing on board aircraft, 
Mar. 26. 



Study groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the Interna- 



Vance: arrival, Moscow, Mar. 26. 

tional Radio Consultative Committee 



Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 

(CCIR), Apr. 28. 




Hodding Carter III sworn in as Assist- 



Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group 

ant Secretary for Public Affairs and 
Department spokesman. Mar. 25 
(biographic data). 

on life-saving appliances, Apr. 27. 



Chancellor Schmidt, Vance: news con- 



SCC, SOLAS, working group on inter- 

ference, Bonn. 

national multimodal transport and 



Vance: arrival, London. 

containers, Apr. 27. 



Vance: remarks, London. 



U.S. Advisory Commission on Interna- 
tional Educational and Cultural Af- 
fairs, Apr. 25. 



Lucy Wilson Benson sworn in as Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, 
Science and Technology, Mar. 28 

+ 136 


Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 

(biographic data). 




Program for visit of President Sadat of 



Patsy T. Mink sworn in as Assistant 

Egypt, Apr. 3-6. 

Secretary for Oceans and Interna- 



Phase 2 of Caribbean-American work- 

tional Environmental and Scientific 

shop seminar begins Mar. 26. 

Affairs, Mar. 28 (biographic data). 



Terence A. Todman sworn in as Assist- 

+ 139 


Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 

ant Secretary for Inter-American Af- 
fairs (biographic data). 

+ 140 


U.S. -Cuba joint communique, Mar. 29. 



Vance: arrival, Paris. 



Vance, Foreign Minister Gromyko: 
toasts, Moscow. 

+ 161 


Vance: news conference on London- 
Paris flight, Apr. 1. 

+ 142 


Vance: news conference, Moscow. 

+ 162 


Vance, Carter: arrival, Andrews AFB. 



Gale W. McGee sworn in as U.S. Per- 
manent Representative to the OAS 

(biographic data). 

*Not printed. 

+ 144 


U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique. 

+ Held for 

a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 18, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1973 

Arms Control and Disarmament. President Car- 
ter's News Conference of March 21 (ex- 
cerpts) 357 

Austria. Letters of Credence (Schober) 362 

Chile. Letters of Credence (Cauas) 362 

Commodities. The Internationa] Economic s^ 
tion (Cooper) 378 


Department Discusses Approach to Environmen- 
tal Issues (Mink) 385 

The Internationa] Economic Situation (Cooper) . . . -ITS 

Developing Countries. The International Eco- 
nomic Situation (Cooper) 378 

Economic Affairs 

The Intel-national Economic Situation (Cooper) . . . 
President Carter's News Conference of March 24 

(excerpts ) 357 

Energy. The International Economic Situation 
i ( '< ioper) 378 

Environment. Department Discusses Appn 

to Environmental Issues (Mink) 385 

Europe. United States and Yugoslavia Hold i 
sultations on CSCE 374 

Guinea. Letters of Credence (Kourouma) 362 

Human Rights. President Carter's News Confer- 
ence of March 24 (excerpts ) 357 

Ireland. Secretary Vance Meets With Irish 
Foreign Minister (joint statement) 377 

Japan. Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan Visits 

Washington (joint communique) 375 

Kenya. Letters of Credence (Mbogua) 362 

Laos. Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and 
Laos To Seek Information on Missing Americans 
(Carter, Mansfield. Woodcock. Commission re- 
port) 363 

Presidential Documents 

President Caller's News Conference of March 24 

cerpts) 357 

Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos 

To Seek Information on Missing Americans .... 363 
Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan Visits Washington 

(joint communique) 375 

Swaziland. Letters of Credence (Kunene) 362 

Trade. The International Economic Situation 

(Cooper) 378 

Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions 387 

U.S.S.R. President Carter's News Conference of 

March 24 (excerpts ) 357 


President Carter's News Conference of March 24 

(excerpts) 357 

Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos 
To Seek Information on Missing Americans (Car- 
lei-, Mansfield, Woodcock, Commission report) . 363 

Yugoslavia. United States and Yugoslavia Hold 
( 'onsultations on CSCE 374 

Zaire. President Carter's News Conference of 

March 24 (excerpts ) 357 

Name Index 

, 1 'resident 357, 363 

( 'anas, Jorge 362 

( neper, Richard N 378 

Kourouma, Daouda 362 

Kunene, Musa Simon 362 

Mansfield, Mike 363 

Mbogua, John Peter 362 

Mink, Patsy T 385 

Schober, Karl Herbert 362 

Woodcock. Leonard 363 

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Washington, D.C. 20402. 







Volume LXXVI • No. 1974 • April 25, 1977 

News Conference* and Text of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communique 389 

Remarks to the Press and Questions and Answers 409 



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Note: Contents of this publication are nut 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1974 
April 25, 1977 

The Department of State BILLET1S, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested ayencies of the yovernment 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreiyn relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreiyn Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreiyn policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerniny treaties and inter- 
national ayreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and Western Europe 

Secretary Venice visited Moscow March 
26-31. En route to Moscow, he met with the 
North Atlantic Council at Brussels on 
March 26. Following his visit to Moscow, he 
met with Federal German, British, and 
French officials at Bonn, London, and 
Paris March 31 -April 2. 

Following are transcripts of news confer- 
ences held by Secretary Vance at Moscow 
March 27-30, the text of a joint 
communique of the Government of the 
United States and the Government of the 
Soviet Union issued on March 30, a news 
conference held by Secretary Vance on April 
1 aboard the aircraft en route from London 
to Paris, and remarks by Secretary Vance 
and President Carter upon the Secretary's 
arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on April 
2. 1 


Press release 132 dated March 28 

Secretary Vance: We have been working 
today on fine-tuning our preparations for 
our discussions which start tomorrow. 
Really that is about all new that has hap- 
pened since we arrived here last night. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Pravda has an editorial 
today in which it says that the finalized ion 
of Vladivostok is not our fault — not ours, 
the Russians' fault — and that the United 
States has let this drag on for an unpardon- 
ably long time. Would you comment on 
that, sir? 

Secretary Vance: Well, whatever may 

have been the circumstances in the past that 
led to the fact that we do not yet have a 
SALT Two agreement, I consider that 
something of the past, and I am looking 
forward to the future and I hope that we can 
begin to make it move again and get a SALT 
Two agreement and get it promptly. 

Q. Could I follow up, sir? The editorial as 
well indicts the Carter Administration as 
well as the Ford Administration, saying 
there had been no deeds by the Democratic 
Administration to demonstrate its readiness 
to move forward. 

Secretary Vance: I think that we have 
been working diligently to get ourselves 
prepared for these talks. It has taken us not 
an unreasonable amount of time to get ready 
for the talks. We have only been in office 
some two months, and we are now here and 
prepared for serious discussion. 

Q. Would you — there has been a good deal 
of discussion, of confusion, over your 
statement made on the plane that the essen- 
tials of your comprehensive package about 
[inaudible]. 2 Could you clarify what you 
meant by that? I think you said that mi- 
nor details are negotiable, but not the 

Secretary Vance: Of course in any negoti- 
ations obviously you listen to whatever the 
other side has to say. We think that the 
proposals which we are making are sound 
proposals; and I hope and believe that they 
will be the basis for an agreement, that they 
should serve as the framework for the 
negotiations which will have to take place to 
lead to the final agreement. 

1 Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's 
trip are Nos 128-131 dated Mar. 28; 141 dated Mar. 
30; 146, 147,*153, and 154 dated Mar. 31; 155 and 160 
dated Apr. 1; and 163 and 164 dated Apr. 4. 

2 For Secretary Vance's news conference held aboard 
the aircraft on Mar. 26, see press release 130 dated 
Mar. 28. 

April 25, 1977 


Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the ques- 
tion of human rights to come up either from 
the other side or would you bring it up 

Secretary Vance: I think that it may come 
up; if it does come up, of course we will be 
prepared to discuss it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and the Carter 
Administration have frequently talked about 
deep cuts in the comprehensive package. I 
would like to ask you how deep is deep? 

Secretary Vance: I said yesterday I am 
not going to get into numbers. That is a 
thing which should be taken care of in the 
face-to-face discussions with the Soviets, 
and therefore I am going to stay away from 

Q. Is 2,000 in the ballpark? [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday you talked 
about what you might expect in the way of 
atmospherics. Now that you have arrived 
and you spent a little bit of time last night 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko, could you 
expand a little bit and tell us a little bit 
about, perhaps characterize, your reception 
and give us a little idea about what the 
Foreign Minister had to say? 

Secretary Vance: Sure. Let me repeat 
what I said yesterday — that I hope that 
the atmosphere would be cordial and 

The reception which we received last night 
was very cordial. We had a very good discus- 
sion, cordial discussion, with the Foreign 
Minister coming in and I am terribly happy 
with the reception which we received. 

Q. What is the schedule, Mr. Secretary? 
Are you going to see Mr. Brezhnev in the 
morning? Will you see him at every session, 
or will you be meeting with Mr. Gromyko? 

Secretary Vance: We will be meeting to- 
morrow morning in the Kremlin. As to who 
the participants will be, I think we will leave 
that until tomorrow. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you going to bring 
up the question of microwaves and radiation, 
the problem in the Embassy? 

Seo-etary Vance: That may come up as one 
of the topics. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a bit, 
sir, at this stage before the talks begin to- 
morrow as to why the United States believes 
it is necessary at this particular stage to 
make what amounts to a quantum jump in 
moving forward very rapidly into substantial 
reductions in the nuclear armed forces level? 

Secretary Vance: We look at the objective 
that both sides are trying to achieve. That 
objective is to make real progress in the field 
of arms control. It seems to us that the time 
has come to see if we cannot make some real 
progress. Obviously, progress has been made 
in SALT One and in the Vladivostok agree- 
ment, but we hope that we could see more 
rapid progress; because it is, as I said to you 
yesterday, not only in the interest of both 
ourselves and the Soviet Union but the world 
in general that we move these discussions 
more rapidly toward really true arms control 
and only by getting into deeper cuts are we 
making that kind of progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect your first 
meeting tomorrow to put forward the 
American SALT proposals and to thereby 
permit the Soviets a couple of days before 
giving you a reply, or do you expect some 
kind of a reply from the Soviets if these 
proposals have already been privately 

Secretary Vance: In our discussions tomor- 
row, I will put forward our proposals on 
SALT; and I would be prepared to go into 
detailed discussions, I and my colleagues, 
should the Soviets choose to do so, should 
they desire to defer till the next day, 
Tuesday, or even till Wednesday, to continue 
the detailed discussions or take up detailed 
discussion — that is all right with me. We are 
prepared to take whatever time that is re- 
quired to carry out these discussions, be- 
cause as I said, I do not know of anything we 
are doing which is more important. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any general 
sort of outline on what you are proposing to 
do in the first session? • 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Vance: I think from reading the 
newspapers you would have a pretty good 
idea of the general outlines of the proposal. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think you can 
expect to achieve a comprehensive agreement, 
the kind you would really like, by the Oc- 
tober deadline, or does that involve poten- 
tially extending SALT One until you 
complete the comprehensive SALT Two? 

Secretary Vance: I think it is possible to 
have a comprehensive one by October. It 
would mean that everybody would have to 
work very hard and that we would have to 
bend efforts on both sides to accomplish it. 
But I think it is possible. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what good do you think 
it does to speak out on behalf of human 
rights in the Soviet Union? What specific 
good does it do? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say on behalf of 
the question of human rights on the whole, 
that we have spoken out on the issue of 
human rights across the board, not solely 
with respect to the Soviet Union. We have 
indicated, as the President did in his speech 
at the United Nations, that this was 
something that transcended individual coun- 
tries or even regions. We have no intent to 
single out any country, and whenever we 
have spoken out it should not be interpreted 
as such. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect it to 
do? What good do you expect it to accom- 

Secretary Vance: We hope that it will over 
a period of time sensitize the international 
community to the problems of human rights 
and as a result of that we will see actual 
tangible progress being made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you this? In a 
reply to an earlier question on human rights, 
you said that you think it may come up, if it 
does you will be prepared to discuss it. My 
question to you, sir, is whether you plan on 
your own behalf to raise the issue of human 

Secretary Vance: I do not plan in my 
opening statement to touch on it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will yon be talking about 
southern Africa at all in the course of your 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I am sure the ques- 
tion of southern Africa will come up during 
the course of our discussions. I would assume 
it would come up later on during the week 
and not in any depth this first day, because 
the central focus, I believe from the 
standpoint of both sides, is going to be on the 
strategic arms question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what members of the 
delegation will actually sit in on the SALT 
talks? In connection with that will you do the 
vast bulk of the talking on the American 
side, or will some of the others — 

Secretary Vance: The answer is, yes, I 
will do the bulk of the talking on our side. 
We will have really a small group, probably 
four or five at most, including a notetaker. I 
do not think more than four or five. 

Q. Could you tell who they will be, sir? 

Secretary Vance: I will leave that until 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I do not believe you have 
had an opportunity to meet with General 
Secretary Brezhnev before. 

Secretary Vance: No, I have not. 

Q. Do you know whether you will be 
having private talks with him, sir? 

Secretary Vance: No, I do not know at this 
point whether I will or not. 

Q. Will you be seeing any human rights 
activists while you are here? 

Secretary Vance: No, I will not. 

Q. Mr. Carter laid out the agenda at his 
March 2i press conference. Do you feel that 
success of progress on the non-SALT parts of 
the agenda depends on having progress in the 
SALT talks? In other words, with no prog- 
ress in SALT, can there be progress on any 
other part of that agenda? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you were not 
going to raise the human rights issue. Can 
you tell me if you are going to raise the issue 

April 25, 1977 


of family reunification like the Ray 
McClellan cane? 

Secretary Vance: I believe that the ques- 
tion of family reunification could be one of 
the subjects for discussion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that issue, in 
followup, there are reports that you got a 
a list of 700 names. 

Secretary Vance: I am not going to com- 
ment on details or anything like that. 

Q. What are the subjects yon will raise in 
the opening statement? Yon mentioned 

Secretary Vance: I will touch briefly on 
each of the items in the agenda which we 
agreed upon with the Soviets; and as you 
know, that includes a number of items — the 
strategic arms items, the items dealing with 
other arms limitations, matters of trade, and 
a number of international issues, and in addi- 
tion to that, some bilateral questions. 

Q. On the subject of trade, do you see any 
movement or desire within the Congress to 
rescind the Jackson-Van ik amendment in 
favor of more trade with the Soviet Union 
and better relations? 

Secretary Vance: I think there are mixed 
views in Congress on this at this point in 
time. And we will just have to wait and see 
what happens. 

Q. On the whole, wouldn't you agree that 
there is not much desin in the Congress to 
do anything about that? 

Secretary Vance: I think that at this point 
it would be difficult to get it reversed in 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on subjects aside from 
SALT, would you bring forth any specific 
proposals, say on the Middle East, southern 
Africa, a)id the subject of arms trade? 

Secretary Vance: I think on the Middle 
East I would expect we would just merely 
have a general review of the situation that 
exists in the Middle East and a discussion of 
what has been said by the various leaders on 
both sides up to this point in time. I am of 
course prepared to discuss any matters relat- 
ing to it that may come up, but I would ex- 

pect it to be sort of a general overview as far 
as that is concerned. 

On southern Africa, I think we might very 
well discuss specific items having to do 
particularly with the questions of Rhodesia 
and Namibia. 

Q. Mr. Secretary , are there any 
possibilities of a summit Carter-Brezhnev 
meeting before formal agreement on a new 
SALT agreement , or is such a summit 
specifically tied to an agreement and would 
come after agreement? 

Secretary Vance: I do not think it is 
necessarily tied to that, but there has been 
no discussion yet between the parties with 
respect to any specific date when such a 
meeting would be held. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what have you thought 
of the Izvestia article of several weeks ago 
which accused several Jewish activists of 
being spies for CIA men working under Em- 
bassy cover? 

Secretary Vance: I did not read the article 
itself. I am familiar with the article. I am not 
familiar with the specific facts relating to the 
particular cases where the allegations were 

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you and the 
Administration encouraged by Secretary 
Brezhnev's comments on the Soviet plan for a 
Middle East peace settlement? 

Secretary Vance: I would like to explore 
that in further depth before giving you an 
answer on that. There are certain parts of it 
that appear on further reading to have some- 
thing new in it, and I would like to specif- 
ically ask whether there was indeed 
something new intended. 

Q. What parts struck you as new? You 
said there were some parts that appeared to 
be new. Which were those? 

Secretary Vance: The parts dealing with 
the question of boundaries appear to be new. 

Q. I am sorry, sir. May I go back to this? 
The Izvestia article accused Melvyn 
Levitsky, who is in the State Department 
right now, of specifically being a spy, one of 
your State Department officials, and im- 
plied — 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Vance: As far as that is con- 
cerned, that is certainly not true. 

Q. Certainly not true? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, certainly not true. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a specific technical 
point. The cruise missile — is it now the 
American feeling, is it your feeling, the test- 
ing and development of the cruise missile is 

Secretary Vance: The verification is ex- 
tremely difficult in the whole cruise missile 
field. That's one of the real problems of the 
cruise missile. At this point there are no 
methods of verification which provide the 
kind of verification I think both of us, both 
sides, would like to have. That has been one 
of the problems of the cruise missile all 
along. You can have some verification, but it 
is extremely difficult. 

Q. Are those remarks subject to deploy- 
ment or development, or both? 

Secretary Vance: Both. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets have said 
that they think the human rights question 
will complicate these negotiations. Do you 
think the human rights question will compli- 
cate them? 

Secretary Vance: I hope they would not 
complicate them. The subject of SALT is so 
important that I think that it can and should 
stand on its own two feet, and I hope very 
much that will be the case. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your ride yesterday 
back from the airport to town with Mr. 
Gromyko, was it mostly small talk, or did 
you discuss [laughter] anything of a more 
substantive nature? 

Secretary Vance: Mostly small talk except 
we discussed how we were going to proceed 
in terms of an agenda, et cetera, for the com- 
ing week and that we were going to go to the 
ballet tonight. 

Q. And you felt that Mr. Gromyko 
radiated a certain warmth? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Vance: He did. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have any Soviet dissi- 
dents or Jewish activists asked for a meeting 
with you? 

Secretary Vance: I believe some did, and 
my reply was that I was going to devote all 
of my time during the period that I was here 
to working on the matters which I came to 
discuss. That will keep me fully busy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hare you talked with 
President Carter since you have beoi here? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets are very 
disturbed about the gross imbalance in trade 
with the United States. Have you got any 
comfort that you can offer them while you 
are here to redress their [inaudible]? 

Secretary Vance: No immediate comfort, 
but the subject of trade will be a subject 
which will be on the agenda. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the subject of human 
rights does come up, will you or have you 
already expressed to the Soviets that the Ad- 
ministration may run into some difficulties 
with Congress in ratifying the SALT 
agreement should the Soviets' crackdown on 
dissidents continue? 

Secretary Vance: I have not yet expressed 
that view to the Soviet Union in answer to 
your specific question. When and if the ques- 
tion comes up tomorrow, I will respond at 
that time. 

Q. Is there an Administration fear that 
that may happen? 

Secretary Vance: I would prefer not to 
comment on that at this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of 
speculation in American magazines and 
newspapers on the ambassadorship to this 
country. Have you been able to tell Mr. 
[Malcolm] Toon, or in front of us — 

Secretary Vance: I have not discussed 
publicly the question of ambassadorships 
with anybody. I am not going to do that. 
When and until we, as a government, make 
the statements with respect to that issue, I 
am going to adhere to that. That properly 
comes from the President rather than from 
me, and when that time comes, we will let 
the public know. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the 
Soviets will make specific proposals on 

April 25, 1977 


SALT, or will they simply respond to 

Secretary Vance: No, I think they will 
undoubtedly want to know what we have to 
suggest, and I would not rule out — indeed, I 
would expect — that they would probably 
have some proposals to make. 

Q. I would like to revert to the review 
piece in Pravda again, in which they said 
more than two mouths later concrete steps 
were still not visible on the part of the 
Administration on arms reduction. Do you 
think this overlooks some of the statements 
and proposals that the President put 
forward, and if so, why do you think that 
Pravda might have taken this position? 

Secretary Vance: I do not know why any 
particular words were chosen by Pravda. I 
think that President Carter has made in 
general terms some concrete and very 
helpful proposals, and I think that when we 
flesh those out they will be seen to be very 
constructive proposals, and I hope that the 
Soviets will feel so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you were asked why 
the Carter Administration decided to double 
the funds for Radio Free Europe, what will 
you be answering? 

Secretary Vance: Well, even after we 
have doubled the funds, we will be spending 
less in this area than many other countries, 
I believe including the Soviet Union, for 
that purpose. 

A couple of more questions and then we 
will — 

Q. But they are spending more to broad- 
cast to America than we are spending to 
broadcast to them? 

Secretary Vance: No, I was talking in the 
general field of — 

Q. Of radio propaganda? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that is right. In- 
formation, I would call it. [Laughter.] 
One more question. 

Q. Have you talked to Mr. Gromyko on 
the trip in, did you mention the possibility 
of extending your talks for an additional 
day, and if so, what was his reply? 

Secretary Vance: I said I would be happy 
to stay here as long as was necessary in 
order to make progress and if we were mak- 
ing progress that I would be delighted to 
stay on for another day or two, three, 
whatever is required. 

Q. And his response? 

Secretary Vance: As to the exact words, I 
think he ought to make it. I was encouraged 
by his response. 

Thanks very much. 

[Following the news conference, the Secretary an- 
swered additional questions in the Embassy courtyard.] 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Vance: I want to put the past 
behind and talk about the future. I hope 
very much that we will be able to start some 
real progress now that we are here. I know 
that the editorial referred to the fact that 
the Carter Administration itself had al- 
legedly been slovenly. I cannot believe we 
have. This is quite a serious subject. It has 
taken us a period of time within the gov- 
ernment to review our position. We have 
done so. I think we are coming up with some 
very constructive and concrete proposals, 
and I really do not believe that we have 
been unduly long in getting ready for these 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the two proposals that you 
will make — one a comprehensive settlement 
and the other one a deferral — seem both to 
have been rejected, in one form or another 
at least, by the Soviets. What reason do you 
have to believe that they will find them con- 
structive at this time? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I hope that when 
we have a chance to sit down and discuss in 
detail the concrete proposals with respect to 
the comprehensive package, they will see 
that it really is a very constructive proposal 
which deals with substance, and that as we 
have a chance to discuss it in its full detail, 
they may see the merit of it. 

Q. What kind of an atmosphere are you 
anticipating now? You had a chance to talk 
briefly with Mr. Gromyko. 

Secretary Vance: I have been very 


Department of State Bulletin 

pleased with the cordial atmosphere which 
we have seen during our brief time here and 
the very cordial welcome when we came 
yesterday evening, and Gromyko was very 
kind and cordial on our ride in from the air- 
port. We are going to go to the ballet to- 
gether this evening, and I hope and expect 
that we will continue to be cordial and 


Press release 136 dated March 29 

Secretary Vance: We've had two meetings 
today. The first meeting was about two and 
a half hours in length, I believe. That was a 
meeting attended by General Secretary 
Brezhnev and the Foreign Minister. This 
afternoon the General Secretary did not at- 
tend; it was attended by the Foreign Secre- 
tary, the Deputy Minister. 

This morning we discussed the assessment 
of both sides with respect to U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations in the future. This was an exchange 
of views and then a dialogue back and forth 
with respect to various items which have 
been raised in what amounted to sort of the 
opening statements on the part of the Gen- 
eral Secretary and myself. This afternoon 
we devoted the whole afternoon to SALT. 
During the course of our discussions I put 
forward the two proposals which you are all 
familiar with. The Soviets, on their side, 
made certain suggestions. We discussed the 
various matters at considerable length. 

I don't think it's appropriate to go into the 
details of our discussion. There will come a 
time later on when we will be able to talk to 
you more about the details of the plans and 
the discussion; but I just don't think it is 
appropriate at this juncture to get into any 
of that kind of detail, because we are going 
to be resuming again tomorrow morning at 
11:00 to continue our discussions. 

Q. Can you characterize in general at all 
the Soviet response to the comprehensive 

Secretary Vance: I think it would be 
inappropriate to do so. Let me just say that 

the general atmosphere was businesslike. It 
was not rejected out of hand. 

Q. Without going into details, sir, could 
you tell us whether the Soviets offered a 

Secretary Vance: Well, they did offer a 
proposal. It is a proposal that we are famil- 
iar with. In essence they have suggested 
this proposal before. There were some vari- 
ations on it, but I don't want to go into details. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev raise 
the question of human rights this morning? 

Secretary Vance: He did. 

Q. hi what way? 

Secretary Vance: He made a statement 
with respect to the question of human 
rights. I responded to that, and again I 
really don't think it's appropriate to go into 
detail as to what was said. 

Q. Was his statement what you expected, 
or was it stronger than you expected? Did it 
take you off guard? 

Secretary Vance: It did not take me off 

Q. If we could turn to the public record 
for the moment: We were told that Foreign 
Minister Gromyko in his toast [at a lunch- 
eon on Mar. 28], in the part about 
Palestinian representation at Geneva, said, 
"Can't we decide on participation at the con- 
ference itself?" which would seem to imply 
that the Soviets were ready to attend Geneva 
without having as a prerequisite Palestinian 
representation. Is that your understanding 
of what he said? If so, do you feel that 
breaks with — 

Secretary Vance: He said something along 
those lines. What he meant by that I am not 
sure. We will be discussing the Middle East 
question later on during our talks, and 
during that portion of the talks I do intend 
to find out exactly what he did mean to say. 

Q. You don't want to talk about your 
response on the human rights issue; yet the 
Soviet press agency made public in some de- 
tail allegedly what Brezhnev said to you. I 
think it's only fair for our readers that we 
have some idea of your response to him. 

April 25, 1977 


Secretary Vance: I haven't seen what they 
said. I'll read what they said, and then I'll 
comment tomorrow. 

Q. Would you like us to read you what 
they said right now? The Soviets come on 
quite strong, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretai-y Vance: What did they say? 

Q. I've got it right here, if you'll wait just 
a moment. The key part went like this: 
TASS began by saying that Brezhnev made 
his statement, a)id then it went on to say: 
"At the sa))ie time an appropriate appraisal 
was given of those moments in U.S. policy 
which do not square with the principle of 
equality, non-interference in the internal af- 
fairs of each other, and mutual benefit, 
without the observance of which the con- 
structive development of relations between 
tin two countries is impossible." 

Secretary Vance: Let me simply say this: 
that I made reference to the fact that our 
human rights position springs out of 
fundamental values which we hold; that we 
are different societies, we have different 
values; that we do not intend to single out 
the Soviet Union in what we say about 
human rights; that our concerns are univer- 
sal in nature; and that we will continue to do 
what we believe is appropriate in the overall 
question of human rights. That, in essence, 
is what I said. 

Q. Do you feel that you cleared the air or 
that you are going to have more discussion 
about human rights? 

Seo'etary Vance: No, I think the air is 
pretty clear now. 

Q. Mr. Vance, is it your impression that 
as a result of this exchange that the subject 
is over with or is it going to play a part? 

Secretary Vance: No, I would expect it is 
over with for these discussions. 

Q. Mr. Vance, on SALT, when you said 
the Soviets made a position we're all 
familiar with — 

Secretary Vance: What I said was we all 
are familiar with. 

Q. So that there's no misunderstanding on 
our part, my assumption is that they pro- 

posed keeping the 2,400 limit and including 
the cruise missile in it. Is that a fair as- 

Secretary Vance: Yes, it is, including the 
cruise missile. 

Q. Do you regard it significant, sir, that 
Brezhnev did not show up this afternoon? 

Secretary Vance: No, not at all. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain at 
all — you said you laid out both proposals. 
Does that mean that you mentioned first the 
comprehensive proposal and then you went 
immediately to raise the second proposal as 
well? Could you tell us a little bit about 

Secretary Vance: They were both raised 
side by side. 

Q. Simultaneously? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Did they ask you — without you telling 
us the answer — but did they ask you what 
type of, how far the deep reduction could go 

Secretary Vance: I gave it to them in 

Q. Do you hope or have any reason to be- 
lieve that you might get a Soviet response 
before you leave Moscow? 

Seo-etary Vance: Yes. They indicated 
they would give us a response. 

Q. Will you discuss that tomorrow 
morning? Will this go on with SALT or 
move to other issues? 

Secretary Vance: I believe we'll start with 
SALT tomorrow. 

Q. Then your general appraisal is that it 
is an optimistic — 

Secretary Vance: I am not going to 
characterize it as optimistic or pessimistic. I 
will say that we had a businesslike 
discussion which will continue tomorrow. 

Q. Are they making progress on SALT 
dependent upon any actio?) by us on human 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Sir, Mr. Secretary, do you see any 


Department of State Bulletin 

progress as a result of one day's talk toward 
this framework which you've been talking 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think the fact 
that we're talking about it and serious ques- 
tions are being asked back and forth on it is 
some progress. But I don't want to blow it 
up as any great thing. 

Q . Do you think, sir, that yon' 1 1 be 
lea ring Thursday morning on schedule? 

Secretary Vance: As I've said all along, if 
we're making progress and there's a purpose 
in continuing on through Thursday, I'm pre- 
pared to stay through Thursday, Friday, or 
however long it takes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East and 
Gromyko's comments on that — did you feel 
that the Soviet position has become more 

Secretary Vance: I couldn't really tell; 
there wasn't that much of it in the toast to 
draw any conclusions. We are going to have 
to have a full discussion to really get an idea 
of what's involved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on SALT, will the pri- 
mary issue be trying to unravel with the in- 
hibitions that are on you — / assume from 
what you said we can safely assume that the 
Soviet position will be what must be very 
much as what it was at the end of January 
of 1976 and February 1976. 

Secretary Vance: That's a fair assumption. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Mr. Gromyko's toast 
he repeated their standard support of the 
Vladivostok agreement. Then he said, as we 
got it, "A constructive approach from the 
U.S. side will always be met with under- 
standing from the U.S.S.R." Did you regard 
that as an encouraging sign that they would 
be ready to consider something more than 
just a simple ratification of the Vladivostok 

Secretary Vance: I listened to that part 
with great interest. But I really don't know 
how to characterize it. 

Q. Well, was there anything in the talks 
that will give you the information to help 
you characterize it? 

Secretary Vance: No. It is too early in the 
talks to draw any conclusions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether 
tin Soviet representatives raised the basic 
question which we have heard — that they ob- 
ject to a new administration coming in with 
a fundamentally different approach? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that question was 
raised as one of the items. We discussed at 
some length as to whether or not the — well, 
I'm getting into too much detail. 

Q. Did Mr. Grornyko do most of the 
talking on the Soviet side i)i the afternoon? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, he did. 

Press release 1 'Ml dated March :lll 

Secretary Vance: Let me give you a brief 
fill-in on what we covered today. We had two 
meetings; one in the morning, and we met 
again this afternoon starting at 4:30 and just 
finished a few moments ago. In the morning 
we covered two areas — mutual balanced force 
reductions discussions, which have been 
going on in Vienna, and the Middle East. In 
the afternoon session, we covered a number 
of items — the comprehensive test ban, de- 
militarization of the Indian Ocean, nonprolif- 
eration, conventional arms transfers, the 
proposal of the Soviets with respect to 
weapons of mass destruction — and touched 
just very, very briefly at the end on southern 

As you can see, it was a full day with many 
subjects before us for discussion. We agreed 
in a number of these areas to set up follow-on 
working groups to continue the discussions 
that we started today. I won't try and give 
you a list of the various issues today, but be- 
fore the end of the mission I will indicate 
which are the areas in which we are going to 
have the follow-on working groups. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you disappointed 
by the fact that SALT did not become the 
centerpiece of today's discussion? 

Secretary Vance: No, I was not. Indeed, I 
was glad that it didn't come up today, 
because it indicates to me that serious con- 

April 25, 1977 


sideration is being given to the question of 
SALT and to the proposals which have been 
tabled. I am not trying to be optimistic about 
that, but I do think it indicates that serious 
consideration is being given to it. 

Q. Is there an indication that the Politburo 
perhaps is meeting on the SALT proposal? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. 

Q. On the Middle East, Mr. Secretary, did 
yon get the feeling, in general, that the 
Soviets were being helpful or constructive in 
any way, and particularly did you get any 
enlightenment on Mr. Gromyko's remark in 
his toast yesterday? 

Secretary Vance: I had the feeling that 
they were being constructive, that they 
wished to play a constructive and active role 
as Cochairman [of the Middle East Peace 
Conference at Geneva]. We welcome that 
fact. We think we both have a responsibility 
in this area to try and see that progress is 
made toward a Middle East settlement, and 
therefore I welcome that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the statement yes- 
terday mean what it seems to mean? 

Secretary Vance: Which one are you 
talking about? 

Q. On the Middle East — specifically, that 
the Soviet position currently is that the 
question of PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] participation can await discus- 
sion inside the conference. 

Secretary Vance: You had better let them 
speak to that. I do not want to — we both 
agreed that we will not comment on what the 
other side said and let them speak for them- 

Q. Let me just ask you generally on that 
point — are you somewhat more interested in 
the proposa I than without examining it fur- 

Secretary Vance: Well, all I want to say on 
the Middle East today is that I found the dis- 
cussion useful. We reviewed all of the issues, 
both procedural and substantive. I think I 
have a fuller and more complete understand- 
ing now of the Soviet position, and I will let 
it go at that today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how close do you think 
you are to a compreheyisive test ban? 

Secretary Vance: We had a good discussion 
on that today. There are some obvious issues 
in that area that have to be further explored, 
but I thought that the talks in that area were 
useful and constructive, as I did particularly 
in the area of nonproliferation. 

Q. Did anyone in the Soviet delegation in- 
dicate to you that they are now giving serious 
study to the proposal on SALT? 

Secretary Vance: I did not ask about it. 

Q. There are no other problems here? 

Secretary Vance: No other problems here. 

Q. Was there any allusion at all today to 
human rights? 

Secretary Vance: No allusion to human 
rights today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past the Russians 
have not ever seriously considered or 
responded to us when we have suggested a 
conventional arms reduction to areas such as 
the Middle East. Was that a subject of 
discussion today? Did you get the feeling 
that they would consider such an approach? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, it was a subject of 
discussion again today. As I indicated to you 
earlier, we have in the past discussed the 
question of conventional arms transfers in 
the Middle East. And as I have indicated 
previously, the problem there remains the 
unresolved political issue and my judgment is 
that it is going to be difficult to achieve any 
substantial reduction in arms transfers there 
until the political differences among the 
parties are resolved. 

Q. On the issue of southern Africa, did you 
discuss President Podgorny's recent 
statements in southern Africa at all? 

Secretary Vance: No, we just touched 
very, very briefly on it, and we really did not 
spend much time on it. 

Q. [Inaudible] conventional arms trans- 
fers, did you discuss it in reference to Africa 
as well? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Could you expand on that at all? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Vance: I really do not want to 
expand on it at this point other than to say 
that we touched both Middle East, Africa 
and the general problems of Africa. 

Q. On the Vienna talks, Mr. Secretary, is 
there any hope that you see now that the ice 
will be thawed? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think we both 
agreed that we felt it was important to try to 
get that out of the doldrums. It is something 
that, in my judgment, should be done. It 
would be very much in the interests of all of 
us to make that kind of movement. I do not 
want to make any predictions, however, on 
the basis of our discussions today that 
something is about to happen. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we are getting down now 
to the last two sessions. Could you give us 
some idea of your sense of when you expect 
the Soviets to respond, particularly to the 
American priority of a comprehensive 

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you a pre- 
cise answer on that, Mr. Kalb [Bernard Kalb, 
CBS News]. I wish I could. My best guess is 
that the subject will come up tomorrow. 

Q. Mr. Vance, the United Press was 
informed today by the Foreign Ministry that 
the Foreign Ministry will not grant a visa 
to one of our prospective Moscow 
correspondents. Two questions: Do you see 
any political significance in that, and sec- 
ondly, do you recall the Helsinki agreement 
clearly enough to be able to help me find out 
whether they are obliged under that agree- 
ment to give an answer for this rejection? 
They gave no explanation. 

Secretary Vance: The answer is I do not 
recall those provisions of the Helsinki 
agreement sufficiently to give you an answer, 
and secondly, I am not familiar with the inci- 
dent to which you refer. 

Q. How would you describe the atmos- 
phere, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Vance: Again, it was 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any clear 
ideas at this point as to whether you might 
stay over another day or two? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say I am still 
prepared to stay over if this will be useful, 
and I would think I would probably know by 
the end of the meeting tomorrow morning. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how does it feel for a full 
day to go by without you getting any indica- 
tion from the Russians on the central ques- 
tion to which you have come to Moscow? 

Secretary Vance: As I indicated, I think 
that that is not only expectable but in a way 
I am pleased by that, because it leads me to 
guess, at least, that serious consideration is 
being given to the proposals which we have 
put forward. As I say, I do not want to be 
optimistic about it, but at least I think that 
one can draw the kind of conclusions that I 
did from that. 

Q. There were no followup questions by the 
Russians on the proposal today? 

Secretary Vance: No. I think the proposal 
is really quite clear. Maybe there will be 
some questions tomorrow. 

Q. Can you tell us the numbers tonight, 
Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Vance: [Laughs.] Not tonight. 

Q. Do you expect to meet with Mr. 
Brezhnev tomorrow? Do you expect that he 
will be there? Have you been given an 

Secretary Vance: I have not been given an 

Q. Sir, do you expect to see him again be- 
fore you leave — Mr. Brezhnev? 

Secretary Vance: I do not know for sure, 
but I think probably I will. 

Q. In assessing these two days, Mr. Secre- 
tary, would you say you are making more 
progress than you expected, less, or about 
what you expected? 

Secretary Vance: I would answer by saying 
I found the discussions today to be useful and 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are these working groups 
you talk about — are these working groups 
that would be set up for the future or just 

April 25, 1977 


Secretary Vance: For the future. 

Q. Where would they meet? Here or Wash- 
ington or — 

Set-return Vance: Either place. Could meet 
in Geneva. That depends on what subject 
they deal with. 

Q. Is this our idea, the working groups? 

Secreta>-i) Vance: We both agreed to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, couldn't you be more 
precise on what areas they are going to work 
on and how many they are, because it makes 

it very difficult to write about? 

Secretary Vance: I realize that. Let me 
just say at this point there will be several. I 
do not want to announce, unilaterally 
announce, these. We will do it bilaterally 
when we do it. 


I'i-i ■ release 1-12 dated March SO 

Secretary Vance: Good evening. Let me 
fill you in on our meeting of this afternoon. 

We met this afternoon with General 
Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister 
Gromyko and other officials. At that meet- 
ing the Soviets told us that they had 
examined our two proposals and did not find 
either acceptable. They proposed nothing 
new on their side. 

Let me give you a brief outline, as I prom- 
ised I would when we reached this point, on 
the nature of the two proposals which we 
put forward. 

The first proposed what we had called our 
deferral proposal. Under this proposal we 
suggested the deferral of consideration of 
the cruise missile and the "Backfire" bomber 
issues and that we resolve all other 
remaining issues under the Vladivostok ac- 
cord and sign a new treaty. The proposal is 
only consistent with the agreement reached 
at Vladivostok, as you know, and there was 
no agreement reached at Vladivostok with 
respect to either cruise missiles or the 
Backfire bomber and therefore they have 
been and are open issues. So, in essence, 
our proposal was: Let's sign up what has 
been agreed at Vladivostok and put aside 

the cruise missile and get on with SALT 

As an alternative, and what we have re- 
ferred to as the comprehensive proposal, the 
one that we preferred and urged that they 
give serious consideration to, was a proposal 
which would have really made substantive 
progress toward true arms control. It had in 
it four elements — or has in it four elements. 
Let me run through them briefly with you. 

The first deals with aggregates. We 
proposed that there be a substantial reduc- 
tion in the overall aggregate of strategic de- 
livery vehicles. 

Second, we proposed that there be a re- 
duction in the number of what are called 
modern large ballistic missile launchers. 

Third, we proposed that there be a reduc- 
tion in the MIRV launcher aggregate. 

And fourth, we proposed that there be a 
limit on the launchers of ICBM's equipped 
with MIRV's. In other words, we proposed 
a sublimit in that area. 

Going on to ICBM restrictions, we pro- 
posed that there continue to be a ban on 
construction of new ICBM launchers. We 
proposed in addition a ban on modification of 
existing ICBM's. In addition to that, we 
proposed a limit on the number of flight 
tests for existing ICBM's. We proposed in 
addition a ban on the development, the test- 
ing, and deployment of new ICBM's. In 
addition to that, we proposed a ban on the 
development, testing, and deployment of 
mobile ICBM launchers. 

With respect to the cruise missiles, we 
proposed a ban on the development, testing, 
and deployment of all cruise missiles, 
whether nuclear armed or conventionally 
armed, of intercontinental range. In other 
words, we set a limit. I'm not going to give 
you that precise number, but there was a 
specific number over which they would be 
banned, and that limit was the limit between 
intercontinental and nonintercontinental. 

Finally, with respect to the Backfire 
bomber, we indicated that we want them to 
provide us with a list of measures to assure 
that the Backfire bomber would not be used 
as a strategic bomber. 

That, in essence, is the comprehensive 
package which we put forward. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We agreed to continue discussions in the 
future. Foreign Minister Gromyko and I will 
be meeting in May to discuss the Middle 
East and other items, including strategic 
arms limitation. 

In addition to that, we have agreed to set 
up a number of working groups in various 
areas to follow up on the discussions which 
we have had here in Moscow. 

Let me give you a list of the areas in 
which we will have these follow-on working 
groups. They include the area of comprehen- 
sive test bans; the area of chemical weapons; 
the area of prior notification of missile test- 
firing; the area of antisatellite weapons; the 
area of civil defense; the area of possible 
military limitations in the Indian Ocean; the 
area of radiological weapons; the area of 
conventional weapons; and we agreed to set 
up a regular schedule of meetings to deal 
with the whole question of proliferation. 

That is the summary of where we are at 
this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat effect do you think 
the outcome of these negotiations will have 
on U.S. -Soviet relations? 

Secretary Vance: I think we made prog- 
ress in these negotiations and they were 
useful. I think that U.S. -Soviet relations 
will continue to be good. I hope in the future 
we can strengthen those relations. 

Needless to say, I am disappointed that 
we have failed to make progress in what I 
consider to be the most essential of all these 
areas, namely, the area of strategic nuclear 
arms. But I think that our relationships will 
continue. We will certainly do everything 
we can to continue to try and strengthen 

Q. It must be very evident, sir, that 
without the specifics of the proposal that the 
United States presented, it will be impos- 
sible for any rational person to draw a 
conclusion as to whether the U.S. proposal 
was plausible or not as a proposal made be- 
tween adversary nations. Is there nothing 
that you can do, sir, to give us the specifics 
which would tell the American public 
whether the proposal made by the United 
States was a plausible proposal? 

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you, at 
this point, any specific numbers. I think that 
you have enough in terms of the outline of 
the proposal to answer the question which 
we put, Mr. Marder [Murrey Marder, 
Washington Post]. 

Q. I would defer with due respect, sir. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Soviet side give 
you any reason to hope that there may be 
some further negotiation on your proposal 
and on their proposal so that you might find 
a bridge between the two? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. We agreed that we 
would continue discussions. That is all. 

Q. To what extent do you think the issue 
of human rights might have played a role in 
the failure of these discussions? 

Secretary Vance: Well, human rights did 
not come up after the first day. We never 
discussed it again. 

Q. You don't think it in any way affected 
their thinking on your proposals? 

Secretary Vance: I do not believe it did. 
No, I think it stood on its own feet, but you 
will have to ask them. 

Q. I'm not clear what happens next. Is 
one side supposed to come up with a new 
proposal, or where do we go from here? 

Secretary Vance: Where we go from here 
is that I am hoping that they would consider 
the proposals which we have made. We 
think that they provide a reasonable basis 
for further discussions. 

We will be meeting again. I hope by that 
time there will be something to put on the 
table which will permit us to make progress. 

Q. Did they give you some indication that 
they think this is a basis, that your propos- 
als are a basis, for further negotiations? 

Secretary Vance: All they gave us today 
was that they said they did not find it ac- 

Q. Did they expand on that, sir, at all, or 
just say they did not find it acceptable? 

Secretary Vance: They said they did not 
find it acceptable because that did not coin- 

April 25, 1977 


cide with their view of what they thought 
was an equitable deal. 

Q. Is it still possible, sir, to think to re- 
place SALT One by October, when it 
expires ? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think it is still 
possible. I would come back to the point 
that the deferral proposal is a proposal 
which is based upon what was agreed to at 
Vladivostok and simply puts aside the very 
difficult issues of Backfire and the cruise 
missile and one could sign that and move 
immediately on to the more complex prob- 
lems which are contained in the 
comprehensive proposal in SALT Two. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did they then give you 
an indication that the deferral proposal 
might be a better basis for further talks than 
the comprehensive proposal? Did they make 
a distinction between the two rejected 

Secretary Vance: They did not make a dis- 
tinction between the two. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you be issuing a 
communique on other areas, such as the 
Middle East, southern Africa — 

Secretary Vance: We probably will be is- 
suing a communique, yes. 

Q. Are your meetings continuing tonight 
to start the communique? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Where will the meetings be between you 
and Mr. Gromyko? 

Secretary Vance: We have not finally 
agreed. It will be somewhere in Europe. 

Q. Could you amplify, sir, on the meet- 
ings that are continuing tonight? 

Secretary Vance: The only meeting is on 
the draft of the communique. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you leave Moscow 
without having achieved that general 
framework ? 

Secretary Vance: That is correct. We will 
leave without having achieved that general 
framework. I am very disappointed that we 
were unable to do so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you told us two days 
ago that the Soviets had put on the table a 
slightly modified version of the January 
1976 proposal. Is that still on the table — 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. We have two American proposals and a 
Soviet proposal? 

Secretary Vance: That is right. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that 
agreement on some strategic arms proposals 
now still remains a prerequisite, or a condi- 
tion, for a summit meeting between Presi- 
dent Carter and Leonid Brezhnev? 

Secretary Vance: I do not want to express 
an opinion on that now. I think that I should 
leave that for the future. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that to- 
day's failure will result in the acceleration 
of the arms race on the part of both 

Secretary Vance: I would certainly hope 
not. I think that it would be a tragedy if 
there would be an acceleration of the arms 
race. This would be in the interest of 
neither side, nor in the interest of peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did we express an opin- 
ion as to their proposal on the table, and if 
not, what is the state of play? Is it for us to 
come up with a new proposal, or for them, to 
amend their proposal, or — 

Secretary Vance: Yes, we have discussed 
the proposal. 

Q. That was discussed today? 

Secretary Vance: Not today, but we have 
had a discussion. 

Q. Mr. Vance, you were saying that our 
relations were nevertheless good, despite 
your inability to reach an agreement on 
SALT. I must say it seems to strain cred- 
ibility, that statement. It would seem to, I 
think, most of us that the main topic here 
was a collapse in the SALT negotiations. 
There seems to be no possible compromise 
on this, and I would think that relations 
were worse than any time in recent years. 
Where is the relationship good, given the 


Department of State Bulletin 

fact on the central question that there is ab- 
solutely no agreement! 1 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think, Mr. 
Gwertzman [Bernard Gwertzman, New York 
Times], that we have made, as I indicated 
earlier, progress in a number of other areas 
that I outlined to you. The nature of the 
talks was at no time acrimonious or unbusi- 
nesslike. I think that the task remains 
before us to try and find a way to reach 
agreement in the strategic area, and we 
both should bend our efforts to that end. 

Q. What progress do you mean? Are yon 
referring to the working groups or the sub- 
ject area of the Middle East — 

Secretary Vance: Yes, to these various 
other matters which we discussed. 

Q. Can you give me specifics on that? Did 
you find out what Gromyko meant the other 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I did. He did not 
mean what has been written in the papers. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did he mean? 

Secretary Vance: He did mean that he felt 
that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] should be included in any talks. 

Q. He did or did not? 

Secretary Vance: He did mean that they 
should be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you make any 
progress on reunification of divided 
families? And what was the answer? 

Secretary Vance: They are taking it under 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you reported to the 
President already tonight on the results of 
the talks? 

Secretary Vance: I have sent a message to 
him indicating that the proposals we put 
forward have been unacceptable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you help, sir, on 
some physical things? 
Secretary Vance: Yes, sure. 
Q. How long did the meeting last? 

Secretary Vance: You mean this 
afternoon? I think about an hour. 

Q. Did Mr. Brezhnev — was he present all 
the time? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, he was. 

Q. Did he participate much in the discus- 

Secretary Vance: Yes, he did. He did all 
the talking. 

Q. Could you tell us anything more, 
physically, about — 

Secretary Vance: Well, it was similar to 
the other meetings which we have had. On 
the Soviet side Mr. Brezhnev did the talk- 
ing, and on our side I did the talking for our 

Q. Was there any noticeable difference in 
mood between Monday's discussion by Mr. 
Brezhnev and today's discussion by him? 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think there 
was any major difference. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the central 
reason — perhaps you answered it somewhere 
in this discussion — that the Soviets gave you 
for their rejection for both proposals that the 
United States put forth? 

Secretary Vance: It was their view that 
the deferral proposal did not accord with 
Vladivostok. It is our very clear view that it 
does accord with Vladivostok because 
Backfire and cruise missiles were not 
included in the Vladivostok accord and they 
remained unsettled issues — so that there is 
a difference of view between the Soviets and 
ourselves on that matter. 

Q. Was there a central dispute, sir, on the 
difference between the two aide memoires 
out of Vladivostok, the one on ballistic mis- 
siles, and the American version mentioning 
ballistic missiles and the Soviet version 
mentioning just missiles? 

Secretary Vance: There was discussion of 
the aide memoire, yes. 

Q. Could you tell us, sir, what their rea- 
son was for rejecting the comprehensive 
package, sir? 

Secretary Vance: They really should speak 
on this themselves, but I will tell you that 

April 25, 1977 


their indication is that they do not feel that, 
as they put it, that it is an equitable pack- 
age. We believe that it is equitable and it 
does attack the central questions which are 
involved in seeking a real arms control 

Q. Is that proposal still on the table and 

Secretary Vance: It is. All proposals are 
still on the table. 

Q. It is in your view negotiable? Or did 
they reject it in the basic form as presented? 

Secretary Vance: I would hope as they 
reflect on it that they will find merit in it 
and we will find a way to get back together 
again and start talking pretty soon. 

Q. Sir, with respect, is that [inaudible] the 
reason yon feel we can still get an agree- 
ment by October? Is there anything more 
specific as to why you feel the October dead- 
line is still manageable? 

Secretary Vance: No, I think the reason 
that I feel it is still manageable is that if the 
parties get together and really put the polit- 
ical will behind it, an agreement can be 
achieved by October. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you get the statis- 
tics that we've been asking you for for the 
past three days? How deep is deep? 

Secretary Vance: I really don't think I can 
give this to you. I will try and give it to you 
at some point later if I can, but I just can't 
do it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you formally tell 
the Soviets that we also found their proposal 
unacceptable? And could you tell us why we 
do find their proposal unacceptable? 

Secretary Vance: The reason that we have 
found their proposal unacceptable is that it 
does not deal properly with the cruise 
missile issue. 

Q. Did you discuss the possibility of ex- 
tending the SALT One agreement beyond the 
end of October? 

Secretary Vance: We did not discuss that, 

Q. Any indication that they would settle 
for a reduction that was less deep than the 
one you proposed? A smaller reduction? 

Secretary Vance: As I say, no counter- 
proposals were made by them today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, was it suggested at all 
that at any time between now and the next 
several months that you would return to 
Moscow to continue negotiating on the 

Secretary Vance: No, but as I indicated, 
Mr. Gromyko and I are going to meet in 
May, and one of the subjects which will 
come up at that time will be the subject of 
deep arms limitations. 


Press release 1-14 dated March 30 

On March 28-30, 1977, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, L.I. Brezhnev and member of the Polit- 
buro of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the U.S.S.R., A. A. Gromyko, held talks with the 
Secretary of State of the United States of America, 
Cyrus R. Vance, who was in Moscow on an official 

In the course of the talks there was a general 
discussion of American-Soviet relations, as well as cer- 
tain international problems of mutual interest for the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 

Consideration of questions relevant to the comple- 
tion of the new agreement on the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms occupied the central place in 
the talks. The sides have agreed to continue the con- 
sideration of these issues. 

An exchange of views also took place on a number of 
other questions concerning the limitation of armaments 
and disarmament. It was agreed that bilateral con- 
tacts, including meetings of experts, would be held to 
discuss these matters. 

The discussion of international issues included the 
Belgrade preparatory conference, and the situation in 
Cyprus and southern Africa. They reaffirmed the im- 
portance of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 
1971. Special attention was given to the situation in 
the Middle East. The sides have agreed that coopera- 
tion between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as co- 
chairmen of the Geneva conference is essential in 
bringing about a just and lasting peace in the area. An 
understanding was reached to hold, in the first half of 
May, 1977 in Geneva, a meeting between the Secretary 
of State of the U.S. and the Minister of Foreign Af- 


Department of State Bulletin 

fairs of the U.S.S.R. for a thorough exchange of views 
on the Middle East problem, including the question of 
resuming the work of the Geneva conference. Some of 
the other issues discussed in the talks in Moscow will 
be reviewed at that time. 

The consideration of practical questions of bilateral 
relations produced several specific understandings. 


Press release l(il dated April 2 

Q. Do you mind if I start out by asking 
you the same question we started off with 
yesterday? Now that Mr. Gromyko has told 
us why he thinks the package is inequitable; 
namely, that it preserves the America>i lead 
in some areas and requires the Russians to 
cut down the area where they might 
expand — how do you answer that? 

Secretary Vance: I would answer it by 
saying that I think that you can take a look 
at the overall package; it is balanced and 

Let us start off in the ICBM field. In the 
ICBM field it requires both of us to reduce, 
and to reduce to the same number. 
Secondly, it is true that it requires the 
Soviets to reduce in the area of large ballis- 
tic missiles. That, however, is important 
because it increases the stability that would 
result as a result of consummation of the 
package. If you take a look at the totals that 
would result from the package you would 
see the Soviet Union ending up with a sub- 
stantial advantage in throw- weight 
still — but a reduced advantage in throw- 
weight — and it would show the United 
States ending up with a slight advantage in 
the warhead area. But both would have re- 
duced the numbers of weapons they have 
and accordingly have produced a more stable 

Insofar as freezes are concerned, the 
freezes would for the first time begin to get 
a handle on the qualitative improvement 
problem, which none of the previous agree- 
ments have touched. And I think this is a 
terribly important step forward. 

Insofar as the cruise missile is concerned, 
the United States in its proposal agreed to 
limitation on the cruise missile; insofar as 

"Backfire" is concerned, it made a move- 
ment or concession toward the Soviet 

And thus I think when you take a look at 
the whole package you can say it is a fair 
and evenly balanced package. 

Q. On the way over you said that on this 
particular package — you were prepared to 
discuss some minor aspects of it, and the 
essentials were fundamental and basically 
nonnegotiable. Is that still the case, or will 
there be some kind of modified proposal to 
make in Geneva? 

Secretary Vance: No. I would hope that 
the Soviets would study our proposals and 
come back with — and if they see specific as- 
pects of it, then that they would come back 
with specific counterproposals, which we of 
course would take under consideration. But 
as I said, it seems to me to be fair and 
equitable, and if there are specifics about it 
which they think are not, let them put them 
on the table and we will consider them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that look- 
ing back on it now, looking especially at the 
trade union speech and some of the 
comments by the Soviets leading up to your 
meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, that perhaps the 
American side may have misinterpreted the 
seriousness with ivhich the Soviets held their 
contention that the United. States was inter- 
fering in its internal affairs and that there 
was linkage between atmosphere and SALT? 

Secretary Vance: I indicated to you, I be- 
lieve, on the way over, that they would 
make their fundamental determination on 
the basis of the proposal itself, not upon the 
question of their views with respect to the 
human rights issues. I think Mr. Gromyko 
confirmed that. 

I indicated previously that I thought that 
their view with respect to human rights 
could affect the general atmosphere but 
would not affect their ultimate decision on 
the military questions involved in the pack- 
age. I still think that is correct. 

Q. Mr. Vance, do you think it's possible 
or likely that the Russians may have been 
put on the defensive by the publicity given 

April 25, 1977 


our approach before the United States ever 
got to Moscow? Is it possible that in an ef- 
fort to be sort of more open to the American 
people the President might have, in effect, 
given the wrong signal to the Russians and 
they may have interpreted that as a political 
gimmick or something? 

Secretary Vance: No, I do not really think 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you 
think the Soviets rejected the package on 
Wednesday for military reasons, and to 
what extent did they reject it to test the Car- 
ter Administration's resolve? 

Secretary Vance: I would make just a 
guess. At this point I have no idea. 

Q. You have no conception — 

Secretary Vance: No. It would be a total 
guess. No, as I indicated to you, he said 
that insofar as the comprehensive package 
was concerned that they considered it 
inequitable and one-sided and therefore re- 
jected it. Insofar as the other package was 
concerned they said that that was 
unacceptable because they did not believe it 
comported with Vladivostok. 

I told you on Wednesday night that I did 
not — we did not agree to either of those 
statements by the General Secretary; that 
we felt that the package was equitable and 
fair and we felt the second package com- 
ported fully with Vladivostok. 

Q. What do you think, in general, of the 
Gromyko news conference [inaudible]? 

Secretary Vance: Obviously he felt it 
necessary to hold a press conference to state 
their views. We felt that we owed it to the 
people to explain what it is that had been 
rejected, and therefore I outlined in general 
terms what our proposal was. And in light 
of that I think he felt it necessary to come 
out and express what the Soviet views 
were. I do not see any harm coming from it, 

I think the people are entitled to know. 
This is a very important issue for the 
American people and for the Soviet people 
and for the people of the world, and I think 
they are entitled to know what kind of pack- 
age it was we put on the table. 

Q. Did he violate any agreement? 

Secretary Vance: No, he did not. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated Wednes- 
day night that our approach to the cruise 
missiles was to put restrictions based on the 
range of the missiles. How would this work, 
in view of the fact that the air-launched and 
sea-launched missiles, for example, could be 
carried much closer to the Soviet borders by 
ship or by plane [inaudible]? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I am not sure I 
understand your question. 

Q. You put a restriction simply on the 
United States deploying a missile for a 
range of say 1,500 or 1,600 miles, for 
example. What would be the significance of 
that when an air-launched missile can be 
put on an airplane and carried by B-l, or 
by 71f7 even, to within 300 miles of the 
Soviet border? Or a sea-launched can be put 
on a ship and taken into the Baltic and 

Secretary Vance: Well, then you have to 
get into the whole question of what targets 
can be hit at what ranges, and it gets into a 
very complicated kind of equation. 

Q. It is the delivery system that matters 
more — the range of that — than the range of 
the missile itself, in terms of restriction. 

Secretary Vance: No, no more than the 
fact that an IRBM [intermediate-range bal- 
listic missile], which is not included, or an 
MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile], 
which the Soviets have, are not considered 
as intercontinental weapons. It is the same 
kind of a thing. 

Q. Mr. Secretary , after the first day of 
talks you said that you thought the air was 
cleared on the human rights issue. To get at 
that point of stability were the Soviets given 
some kind of assurance that there would not 
in the future be a direct approach in defense 
of one or another Soviet dissident by the 
President of the United States? 

Secretary Vance: No, no such assurance 
was given. 

Q. Well, why were they satisfied? 

Secretary Vance: I didn't say that they 


Department of State Bulletin 

were satisfied. They just didn't bring the 
subject up again. 

Q. But you said that you felt that after the 
first day that they would not bring it up 

Secretary Vance: I said that I felt that the 
air was clear because they had made their 
statement. I didn't say they were satisfied. 

Q. But you said that they merely were 
going to be satisfied by making a strong 
statement — 

Secretary Vance: You're using the word 
"satisfied." I never used the word "satis- 
fied." Next question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary , Mr. Gromyko's 
statement in Moscow seemed to be insisting 
that a neiv SALT agreement lead to the 
liquidation of some of our bases in 
Europe — Britain, NATO bases. Was the 
question raised with you, and are they going 
to start setting some new conditions before 
they start negotiating? 

Secretary Vance: If they should pursue 
that idea, then it would change the whole 
basis of SALT. In the past, as you know, 
the question of forward-based systems and 
the Soviet equivalent — namely, the IRBM's 
and the MRBM's — have not been included. 
And therefore, if this was to be interjected 
into the SALT talks, it would be a total 
change from the past. 

Q. Did he bring it up with you? 

Secretary Vance: As I said, yes he did, he 
brought it up on the last day. He made his 
statement, and I indicated to him exactly 
what I have told you. 

Q. Let's do the numbers now today. 
Gromyko said "1,800 to 2,000" and 1,100 on 
MIRV's. Since it's out, perhaps we can talk 
about it. The American people are entitled 
to know — 

Secretary Vance: What about it? 

Q. Are the numbers right? 

Secretary Vance: I'm not going to give 
you specific numbers. They are in the 

Q. Well, what does the 1 ,800-to-2,000 
range mean? 

Secretary Vance: It isn't a range. The 
1,800 to 2,000 as he describes it was the 
area of reduction — to a number in that area. 

Q. Is that a negotiable range? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. What about the MIRV numbers? 

Secretary Vance: Same thing. 

Q. [Inaudible]. 

Secretary Vance: I said I wasn't going to 
give you any specifics. It's still in the 

Q. The President said 550. Can you 
explain that to us? The President said 550 
on ICBM'x. 

Secretary Vance: The answer is, Yes, 
there is such a number in the package. 


Secretary Vance: That's all I'm going to 
say about numbers. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, am I right in believing 
that the Soviets gave you no reason to be 
hopeful on the reunification of divided 

Secretary Vance: I told you, on reunifica- 
tion of divided families, that I discussed the 
subject with them and they said they would 
take it under consideration. 

Q. That's basically like saying we are not 
going to do anything about it? 

Secretary Vance: No, it's not. I wouldn't 
draw that conclusion. I think that really 
that's all that one can say on that subject in 
the interests of the divided families. 

Q. Are you reticent that in speaking out 
you could queer a deal? 

Secretary Vance: I have said really all I 
want to say on that. 

Q. Is it possible that there was some kind 
of blunder in the American psychological 
approach to these negotiations — that is, you 
presented a firm proposal hoping that the 
Russians might negotiate; instead, they 
fownd it so outrageous that they rejected it 
out of hand and have really sort of taken 
your breath away? 

April 25, 1977 


Secretary Vance: They haven't taken my 
breath away. 

Q. You know what I wean, was there a 
blunder — 

Secretary Vance: I don't think so. 

Q. Do yon see any problem at all to the 
Administration's credibility the way that the 
situation stands at present? The 
Administration is saying from all depart- 
ments, so are congressional leaders, that the 
Administration was not surprised that the 
proposals were rejected by the Russians. 
Frankly, i)i logic, that means that your 
mission went with real probability that it 
was going to be rejected. It sets up a whole 
syndrome that the United States at least — it 
sets up a premise that this mission was 
doomed to failure from the start. Could you 
comment on that? 

Secretary Vance: I indicated that I was 
disappointed that we didn't make progress 
and establish a framework. That directly re- 
flects my views. 

Q. I recognize you said you were disap- 
pointed, sir. But others are saying — the rest 
of the Administration is saying something 
considerably different. They are sayitig that 
they were not surprised. If that holds true 
that >neaus in logic that they expected this 
mission to fail. 

Secretary Vance: I don't think it necessar- 
ily means that. What it probably means is 
that anything is possible in the negotiations 
and the fact that we were not successful 
didn't surprise them. And that's simply 
what — 

Q. Will we have an opportunity with some 
of the other officials — frankly, there are 
basic inconsistencies in the rationalization 
as it now appears for many of the American 
proposals; they appear to be inconsistent. 
I'm sure there must be an explanation for 
them. Well, I want to give you a small 
example. The United States calls for a ban 
on all new nuclear weapons. The cruise 
missile is a new nuclear weapon. 

Secretary Vance: It was dealt with 
specifically. What the proposal called for 

was with respect to ICBM's, not all new 

Q. But you see, we have not seen the lan- 
guage of the proposal as the President has 
stated — 

Secretary Vance: That answers your ques- 

Q. No, it doesn't, sir. The President said 
o>i Wednesday, or Tuesday, that his pro- 
posal calls for a ban on all new nuclear 
weapons systeyns. 

Secretary Vance: The accurate thing is 
that it called for a ban on the deployment of 
any new ICBM's. O.K.? 


Press release 162 dated April 2 

Secretary Vance 

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It's 
very good to be home, and I want to express 
my deep appreciation to the President and 
Mrs. Carter for coming out to meet us. 

I might just say a word about our recent 
trip. Arms control is an ongoing process. It 
has been going on for a long time; it will 
continue for a long time in the future. It is 
not for the short-winded. We did make some 
progress in a number of other arms control 
areas if not in the strategic area. We will 
have a number of working groups which will 
begin to work shortly in areas running from 
comprehensive test bans, to looking at the 
Indian Ocean and demilitarization, to a host 
of other areas. Our next meeting with the 
Soviets will be in May when I will meet with 
Mr. Gromyko to resume further discussions 
in the area of strategic arms. 

As I say, it is good to be home. Thank you 
for being here, Mr. President. 

President Carter 

Well, I am very glad to have the 
Secretary of State and Paul Warnke back 
home. We have put forward for the first 
time a comprehensive proposal to limit and 
then drastically reduce the atomic weaponry 
of the world. We look on this as a necessary 
first step. We are absolutely determined 


Department of State Bulletin 

without ceasing to work harmoniously with 
the Soviet leaders to reduce dependence 
upon atomic weapons. We will do everything 
we can to strengthen the ties of friendship 
and mutual trust with the Soviet leaders. 

I want to express my thanks for the good 
trip and the good negotiating position and 
the success of the trip that the Secretary of 
State has taken. And I want to express my 
thanks to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko 
and others in the Soviet Union for the very 
productive negotiations on many items that 
we raised. 

As the Secretary of State has said, 
negotiation for drastic elimination of atomic 

weapons after all these years — a quarter (if 
a century — is a very difficult undertaking 
but it is one that we will pursue with 
determination, with persistence, and with 
hope for success. Our whole Administration 
will be devoting a great effort to preparing 
for the continuation of the talks that will 
proceed in Geneva the first part of May. 
And I believe that the Soviets will 
ultimately agree with us that it is to the ad- 
vantage of the Soviet people, the American 
people, and the rest of the world to reduce 
our dependence upon this destructive 
Thank you very much. 

President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals 

Following is the transcript of remarks by 
President Carter and questions and answers 
with Jiews correspondents in the briefing room 
at the White House on March 30. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 4 

The President: Good afternoon. 

This has been an afternoon devoted to re- 
ceiving dispatches from Moscow, and I'd like 
to make a report to the American people 
about what has occurred. 

We have proposed to the Soviet leaders in 
the last two days a comprehensive package 
of agreements which, if concluded, will lay a 
permanent groundwork for a more peaceful 
world, an alleviation of the great threat of 
atomic weapons, that will retain the political 
and strategic weapon capability and balance 
between the United States and the Soviet 

One of our proposals on this nuclear 
weapons talks was very brief, and it was our 
second option. It was, in effect, to ratify the 
Vladivostok agreement that had already 
been reached. 

The difference between us and the Soviet 
Union on this point is that the Soviets claim 
that Secretary Kissinger and my predeces- 
sors in the White House — Presidents Ford 
and, earlier, Nixon — did agree to forgo the 

deployment of cruise missiles. Our position 
is that we have never agreed to any such 
thing. But we asked the Soviet Union to 
accept an agreement on all other matters 
and postpone the cruise missile and the Rus- 
sians' new bomber, the "Backfire" bomber, 
until continuing later discussions. They re- 
jected that proposal. 

The other one was much more 
far-reaching and has profound consequences 
that are beneficial, I think, to our own na- 
tion and to the rest of the world. It was to 
have substantial reductions in the level of 
deployment of missile launchers and the 
MIRV'ed missiles below the 2,400 level and 
the 1,320 level that were established under 
the Vladivostok agreements — substantial 
reductions; secondly, to stop the 
development and deployment of any new 
weapons systems. A third point was to 
freeze at the present level about 550 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, our Min- 
uteman and their missiles known as the 
SS-17, 18, and 19. 

Another was to ban the deployment of all 
mobile missiles, their SS-16 and others, or 
ours— that is under the development stage, 
the MX. 

Another one is to have a strict limit on 
the deployment of the Backfire bomber and a 

April 25, 1977 


strict limit on the range that would be per- 
mitted on cruise missiles. 

Another element of the proposal was to 
limit the number of test-firings of missiles to 
six firings per year of the intercontinental- 
range and also of the medium-range missiles 
and to ask the Soviet Union to give us some 
assured mechanism by which we could dis- 
tinguish between their intercontinental 
mobile missile, the SS-16, and their 
limited-range mobile missile, the SS-20. 

The sum total of all this proposal was a 
fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the 
arms race which would have guaranteed, I 
believe, a permanent lessening of tension 
and a mutual benefit to both our countries. 
The Soviets, at least at this point, have not 
accepted this proposal either. 

Both parties — which will be promulgated 
in a joint communique tomorrow — have 
agreed to continue the discussions the first 
half of May in Geneva. 

You might be interested in knowing that a 
few other points that we proposed were to 
have adequate verification, an end of con- 
cealment, and the establishment of a so- 
called data base by which we would tell the- 
Soviet Union the level of our own arma- 
ments at this point and they would tell us 
their level of armaments at this point so 
that we would have an assured mutually 
agreed level of weapon capability. 

I might cover just a few more things. In 
addition to discussing the SALT agreements 
in Geneva early in May, we have agreed to 
discuss other matters — south Africa, the 
upcoming possible Middle Eastern talks. 

And we've agreed to set up eight study 
groups; one to develop an agreement where 
we might forgo the development of a capa- 
bility of destroying satellite observation ve- 
hicles so that we can have an assured way 
to watch the Soviets, they can have an as- 
sured way of watching us from satellites. 

The second is to discuss the terms of a 
possible comprehensive test ban so that we 
don't test in the future any more nuclear 
weapons. And we've also asked the Soviets 
to join with us in a prohibition against the 
testing of peaceful nuclear devices. 

Another study group that has been 
mutually agreed to be established is to dis- 

cuss the terms by which we might de- 
militarize or reduce the military effort in the 
Indian Ocean. 

Another group will be set up of experts to 
discuss the terms by which we can agree on 
advanced notice on all missile test-firings so 
that, perhaps 24 hours ahead of time, we 
would notify the Soviets when we were 
going to test-fire one of our missiles, they 
would do the same for us. 

Another group will be studying a way to 
initiate comprehensive arms control in con- 
ventional weapons and also the sale of 
weapons to third countries, particularly the 
developing nations of the world. 

Another is to discuss how we might con- 
tribute mutually toward nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapon capability. Nations do need 
a way to produce atomic power for electric- 
ity, but we hope that the Soviets will join 
with us and our allies and friends in cutting 
down the capability of nations to use spent 
nuclear fuels to develop explosives. 

Another item that we agreed to discuss, 
at the Soviets' request, was the termination 
in the capability of waging radiological or 
chemical warfare. 

And the eighth study group that we 
agreed to establish is to study the means by 
which we could mutually agree on forgoing 
major efforts in civil defense. We feel that 
the Soviets have done a great deal on civil 
defense capability. We've done a less 
amount, but we would like for both of us to 
agree not to expend large sums of money on 
this effort. 

So the sum total of the discussions has 
been to lay out a firm proposal which the 
Soviets have not yet responded to on drastic 
reductions in nuclear capability in the 
future — these discussions will continue early 
in May — and to set up study groups to con- 
tinue with the analysis of the other eight 
items that I described to you. 

I'd be glad to answer just a few questions. 

Q. Mr. President, pardon me if I doti't 
stand, but I will block the camera there. 

Do you still believe that the Soviets in no 
way linked your human rights crusade with 
arms control negotiations? 

The President: I can't certify to you that 


Department of State Bulletin 

there is no linkage in the Soviets' minds be- 
tween the human rights effort and the 
SALT limitations. We have no evidence that 
this was the case. 

Secretary Vance thought it was quite 
significant, for instance, that when General 
Secretary Brezhnev presented a prepared 
statement on the human rights issue that it 
was done in a different meeting entirely 
from the meeting in which the SALT negoti- 
ations occurred. 

So our assessment is that there was no 
linkage, but I can't certify that there is no 
linkage in the Soviets' minds. 

Q. Mr. President, you've said that the 
Soviets contend that Secretary Kissinger 
and your predecessors had promised that we 
would not deploy, I believe, the cruise mis- 

The President: Yes. 

Q. Just where and how do they contend 
that this promise was given, and have you 
checked with them to see if in fact it was? 

The President: Yes. Both President Ford 
and Secretary Kissinger have maintained 
publicly and to me privately that there was 
never any agreement on the part of the 
United States to contain or to prohibit the 
deployment or development of cruise 

The language that was used in the early 
Vladivostok agreement, which, as you know, 
has not yet been ratified, was a prohibition 
against air-launched missiles. 

Secretary Kissinger's position has 
been — and he is much better able to speak 
than I am to speak for him — that that meant 
ballistic missiles, which was a subject of the 
Vladivostok talks. 

Two and a half years ago or so, when 
these talks took place, the cruise missile 
capability was not well understood and there 
was no detailed discussion at all of the 
cruise missile. The Soviets claim that when 
they did discuss air-launched missiles that 
they were talking about cruise missiles. 

Secretary Kissinger said that he was not 
talking about cruise missiles. 

Q. Sir, the point, just to follow, they are 

not contending that there was any secret 
understanding or discussion or anything? 

The President: No. 

Q. They're talking about the language that 
iriix in the Vladivostok agreement? 

The President: Exactly. 

Q. Did the Russians hare a 
counterproposal on SALT that they offered 
us, or were they content simply to listen to 
our proposals? 

The President: They listened to our two 
proposals. Of course, their proposal has 
been to ratify their understanding of the 
Vladivostok agreement, which includes their 
capability of developing the Backfire bomber 
and our incapability of developing cruise 
missiles. That's an agreement that we never 
understood to be part of the Vladivostok 

Q. Mr. Carter, if necessary to achieve any 
progress, are you willing to modify your 
human rights statemeiits — 

The President: No. 

Q. — or will you continue to speak out? 

The President: No. I will not modify my 
human rights statements. My human rights 
statements are compatible with the con- 
sciousness of this country. I think that there 
has been repeated recognition in interna- 
tional law that verbal statements or any sort 
of public expression of a nation's beliefs is 
not an intrusion in other nations' affairs. 

The Soviets have in effect ratified the 
rights of human beings when they adopted 
the United Nations Charter. The Helsinki 
agreement, which will be assessed at Bel- 
grade later on this year, also includes 
references to human rights themselves. 

So I don't intend to modify my position. It 
is a position that I think accurately 
represents the attitude of this country. 

I don't think that it's accurate to link the 
human rights concept with the SALT 
negotiations. I think that's an incorrect 
linkage. The SALT negotiations, I hope, will 
be successful as we pursue in laborious 
detail those discussions the rest of this year. 
They will be successful only if the Soviets 
are convinced that it's to their advantage to 

April 25, 1977 


forgo a continued commitment, and a very 
expensive commitment and a very threaten- 
ing commitment, to the arms race — and only 
if our own people believe that we derive the 
same advantage. That's what we hope for. 

Q. Mr. President, how would you 
characterize what happened today? How 
serious a setback is this? Did we expect that 
the Soviets might he more receptive to our 

The President: We had no indications 
either in direct or indirect communications 
with Brezhnev that they were ready to ac- 
cept our positions. We carefully prepared 
over a period of five or six weeks what we 
thought was a balanced and what we still 
think is a balanced proposal with drastic re- 

I might say that there is a unanimous 
agreement among the key Members of Con- 
gress, the State Department, my own staff, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, 
that this is a good and fair proposal. I have 
hopes that the substance of our proposal will 
be accepted by the Soviet Union in the fu- 
ture, because it's to their advantage and 
ours to do so. 

But I'm not discouraged at all. Cy Vance 
sent back the word that he was disappointed 
that we didn't reach immediate agreement 
but that he was not discouraged. And I 
think the fact that a joint communique has 
been prepared and will be released 
tomorrow morning spelling out the fact that 
our nations will continue without interrup- 
tion these discussions is very encouraging. 

Q. Mr. President, would it be fair to say 
that the talks broke down because the United 
States is now not prepared to accept 
restrictions on cruise missiles? 

The President: No. 

Q. Isn't that the heart of it? 

The President: That is not the heart of it 
at all. We are prepared to accept restric- 
tions on the cruise missile if it's part of an 
overall and balanced package. We are not 
prepared to accept a unilateral prohibition 
against the development or deployment of 
the cruise missile absent some equivalent 
response from the Soviet Union including 

the Backfire bomber. But we put together a 
package which was fair and balanced. But 
we are not prepared unilaterally to forgo an 
opportunity unless it's equivalent to a Soviet 

Q. Yes, sir, I didn't mean unilaterally, 
but on the January 1976 trip by Secretary 
Kissinger to the Soviet Union there was ac- 
tive negotiation regarding a balanced reduc- 
tion involving some limitations on cruise 

So when you say, sir, that the Soviets say 
we agreed to restrict cruise missiles, aren't 
they referring to 1976 and not to Vladivo- 
stok, when indeed the cruise missile was on 
the drawing board and not a real thing? 

The President: I don't believe that — I 
don't want to get myself into the position of 
speaking for Secretary Kissinger — I don't 
think there has ever been any insinuation of 
an American agreement that the Soviets 
could build and deploy the Backfire bomber 
without limitation while we limited cruise 
missiles. And that's the position that the 
Soviets adopted as the Vladivostok 

Q. Mr. President, have the Russians ex- 
plained why they were turning down the 
comprehensive proposal? Was it because 
they did not want such drastic reductions as 
you proposed, or was it because they felt the 
limitations on cruise were not adequate? 
Did they give any reasons? 

The President: I do not know yet. I've not 
received a definitive analysis from Secretary 
Vance. He a few minutes ago was in the 
American Embassy in Moscow preparing for 
me a detailed report on what has occurred. 
So far as I know at this point, there were 
not any specific reasons given for the 
Soviets turning down of our proposal. 

My guess is that this proposal is so sub- 
stantive and such a radical departure in 
putting strict limits and reductions on exist- 
ing missiles and a prohibition against the 
development or deployment of new missiles 
in the future that the Soviets simply need 
more time to consider it. Whether they'll ac- 
cept it or not, at the May meetings in 
Geneva or subsequently, I don't have any 
way to know yet. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. To follow that up — the Man meetings, 
are they to be between Mr. Gromyko and 
Mr. Vance? 

The President: That's correct. 

Q. Mr. President. Senator Baker, just 
outside a few moments ago, said that during 
your briefing of the congressional leadership 
you said you intended to "hang tough." Did 
you say that, and what did you mean by 

The President: Yes. I do. I think that it's 
important for us to take advantage of an op- 
portunity this year to negotiate not just a 
superficial ratification of rules by which we 
can continue the arms race, but to have a 
freeze on deployment and development of 
new missiles and an actual reduction in 
launchers and MIRV'ed missiles below what 
was agreed to previously. And on those 
items I intend to remain very strong in my 

I don't think it's to our nation's advantage 
to put forward in piecemeal fashion addi- 
tional proposals. Our experience in the past 
has been that the Soviet Union extracts 
from those comprehensive proposals those 
items that are favorable to them and want 
to continue to negotiate the other parts of 
the proposals that might not be so favorable 
to them. 

So I do intend to continue strong 
negotiations to let the leaders of our country 
know what we are proposing. And I'm not in 
any hurry; it's important enough to proceed 
methodically and carefully. But I hope that 
the Soviets will agree with us to drastic re- 
ductions and strict limitations in the future 
which have never been part of previous 

Q. Mr. President, could I follow that? 

The President: Please. 

Q. When you say you intend to continue 
negotiations, is there a chance that you 
might go to Geneva in May since you will 
already be in Europe in the early part of 
May anyway? 

The President: As a matter of fact, I'm al- 
ready scheduled to go to Europe not just to 
meet with the allies in London but to meet 
with President Asad of Syria. And where 

that meeting will be taking place I don't 
know. But I have no intentions at this time 
to meet with any Soviet leaders on that trip. 

Q. Mr. President, how will this data bast 
work? Will that include all conventional 
armaments as well? 

The President: That would be a separate 
matter of discussion. The data base has been 
for a long period of time a matter of dispute 
in the mutual and balanced force reductions 
talks taking place in Vienna, where we've 
asked the Soviets to give us an inventory of 
their arsenal among the Warsaw Pact na- 
tions. These are conventional weapons 

But the data base to which I was referring 
this afternoon is an inventory of nuclear 
weapons that have been included in the 
SALT talks — the strategic nuclear weapons. 
So far we have a fairly good way on both 
sides of inventorying weapons that are ac- 
tually deployed. But we would like to have a 
free and accurate exchange with the Soviet 
Union about how many weapons they have 
and how many we have, so that we can 
monitor much more closely any deviations 
from those figures in the future. 

Q. If I could follow, would that include 
any kind of verification? 

The President: Yes. We would like to 
have the subject of verification opened up 
dramatically. For instance, in a 
comprehensive test ban we would like to 
have onsite inspection. The Soviets have 
never agreed to this principle, but they have 
mentioned it a couple of times in the discus- 
sions. Foreign Minister Gromyko last year 
filed a statement at the United Nations that 
mentioned the possibility of onsite inspec- 
tions. But we feel that verification is a very 
crucial element in a comprehensive arms 
limitation agreement. Verification obviously 
includes an absence of concealment, and ver- 
ification, to a lesser degree, also includes 
the data base to which I just referred. 

One more question. 

Q. May I ask, please? Has the breakdown 
of these talks in any way influenced your 
thinking on development of future U.S. 
weaponry; that is, ivill you be now more 

April 25, 1977 


inclined to go for full production of the B-l 
or any other advanced weapon systems? 

The President: Obviously, if we feel at the 
conclusion of next month's discussions that 
the Soviets are not acting in good faith with 
us and that an agreement is unlikely, then I 
would be forced to consider a much more 
deep commitment to the development and 
deployment of additional weapons. But I 
would like to forgo that decision until I am 
convinced the Soviets are not acting in good 
faith. I hope they will. 

Let me answer one question from Wes. 
[Wes Pippert, United Press International]. 

Q. I was going to offer the "thank you." 

The President: Okay; fine. 

Q. Mr. President, one question about the 
deep cuts. Because the Soviets seem to have 
more delivery systems today than we do, is 

there objection that they would have to de- 
stroy more weapons than we would have to 
if you did get those deep cuts'? 

The President: Deep cuts would affect 
both of us about the same. Shallow cuts, 
say, from 2,400 down to 2,200, on launchers 
would affect the Soviets much more ad- 
versely than it would us. Part of our 
package involved the very heavy missiles, 
the SS-9, and SS-18, which now stand at a 
308 level. We included in our package a sub- 
stantial reduction below that figure. 

I think that the details of our proposal 
would probably best be revealed later. I am 
a little constrained about the details because 
Secretary Vance and Mr. Gromyko still have 
agreements among themselves about revela- 
tions of the negotiations with which I am not 
yet familiar. But I think later on those exact 
figures can be made available. 

Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Conference of April 1 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held on April 1 by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski , Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. 

White House press release dated April 1 

Dr. Brzezinski: What I would like to do is 
essentially give you as much information as 
I legitimately can on the proposal that we 
made in Moscow. In so doing, I don't pro- 
pose to engage in any recrimination but 
would merely like to lay out for you the kind 
of proposal we made and the thinking that 
went into that proposal, for I believe that 
the thinking that the proposal reflected is 
almost as important as the proposal itself. 

What we were trying to accomplish and 
what we intend to accomplish is to move 
forward to genuine disarmament; that is to 
say, to obtain a significant reduction in the 
level of the strategic confrontation. 

We believe that SALT agreements should 
not only set the framework for continued 

competition but that they should indeed 
limit that competition, reduce its scope, in- 
troduce greater stability into our relation- 

Our proposals were thus designed to ac- 
complish two basic purposes: to give both 
sides the political and the strategic parity to 
which each of them is entitled, and this 
means that there should be no self-evident 
advantage in the agreement which would be 
either of a strategic character or which 
would be susceptible to political perceptions 
as an advantage; and secondly, it was our 
basic purpose to seek an agreement which 
would provide to both sides again political 
and strategic stability. Parity in the first 
instance; stability in the second instance. 

By this, I mean a proposal which would 
take into account the fact that if you only 
have certain kinds of limits but do not an- 
ticipate technological dynamics, what may 
seem stable in 1977 or 1978 could become 
very unstable in 1980 or 1985. It was there- 


Department of State Bulletin 

fore felt that genuine strategic arms 
limitations — indeed, a genuine strategic 
arms reductions agreement — ought to take 
both of these elements into account. 

The proposal that we made was therefore 
very finely crafted. We attempted very de- 
liberately to forgo those elements in our 
strategic posture which threaten the Soviets 
the most, and we made proposals to them 
that they forgo those elements in their 
strategic posture which threaten us the 
most. We felt particularly by concentrating 
on the land-based ICBM's that are MIRV'ed 
we would take into account the greatest 
sources of insecurity on both sides. 

I truly believe that this proposal, if ac- 
cepted, or when accepted, could serve as a 
driving wedge, as a historical driving 
wedge, for a more stable and eventually 
more cooperative American and Soviet 
relationship. It is thus a proposal which is 
not only strategic but political in its charac- 
ter; and Secretary Vance, in his remarks in 
Moscow, placed a great deal of emphasis on 
the political significance of this proposal. 

It was a proposal which had strategic as 
well as political intentions very much in 
mind. Because of that, it was also a proposal 
which was accompanied by a series of other 
proposals designed to place the American- 
Soviet relationship not only on a more stable 
basis but to make the cooperative elements 
in that relationship more comprehensive. 

This is why we have deliberately matched 
or accompanied the SALT proposals with 
initiatives in regard to such matters as the 
Indian Ocean and the desirability of achiev- 
ing mutual restraint in regard to our 
respective military presence in that part of 
the world. This is why we proposed that we 
hold further discussions on conventional 
arms transfers to third parties. This is why 
we suggested that it would be in our mutual 
interest as a stability-producing initiative to 
talk and discuss our respective civil defense 
programs. This is why we suggested that we 
talk about a comprehensive test ban. This is 
why we suggested that there be controls on 
antisatellite capabilities and on prior notifi- 
cation of missile" test-flights. 

All of that cumulatively was designed to 
produce greater mutual stability, to widen 

areas of cooperation, to indeed offset the 
competitive elements in our relationship by 
a widening pattern of cooperation. And we 
are encouraged by the fact that eight 
working groups were set up on the basis of 
these proposals, as well as some that the 
Soviets made, in order to move forward on 
these issues. 

I should have added, incidentally, and I 
failed to do so, that we also proposed 
meetings on nonprolife ration. That was part 
of our proposal. 

It is in this context that we proposed a 
comprehensive package with negotiating 
flexibility inherent in it in order to structure 
a rather different and more stable and more 
equitable U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship. 

That package has two key elements in it. 
First of all, it called for reductions which 
were of a greater scope than just symbolic. 
And the second, equally important, part of 
the package involved a proposal for a freeze, 
for a halt on the modernization of ICBM's; 
and I will talk about that in more detail. 

You can well see how these two key 
fundamental elements are interrelated. We 
proposed the reduction so as to lower the 
level of the competition, and we proposed a 
freeze in order to halt it qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Thus, it is in many respects 
the first truly, genuinely disarmament- 
oriented proposal introduced into the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

We proposed more specifically that the 
present strategic aggregates, which were 
set at the high level of 2,400 for each side, 
be reduced to a range between 1,800 and 
2,000; and here again is a demonstration of 
the inherent flexibility of the package, be- 
cause this is something which we were 
prepared to discuss. 

We proposed, moreover, that within that 
framework the present level of MIRV's, 
which is set at 1,320, be reduced to some- 
thing between 1,100 and 1,200. And we also 
suggested that in that context it would be 
desirable that the total number of the so- 
called Soviet modern large ballistic missiles, 
particularly the SS-9 and SS-18, be 
reduced; because within the framework of 
lowered aggregates these large missiles 
with their potential for numerous 

April 25, 1977 


MIRV'ing— indeed the SS-18 can be 
MIRV'ed up to 8 to 10 warheads — becomes 
increasingly significant and introduces an 
asymmetrical aspect into the relationship. 

On that basis we proposed that both sides 
freeze the deployment of all of their ICBM's 
and ban modifications on existing ICBM's 
and indeed limit the number of annual flight 
tests for ICBM's, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of significant modifications, and 
also ban the development, testing, and de- 
ployment of new types of ICBM's and 
particularly ban the deployment, testing, 
and development of mobile ICBM's — a fac- 
tor, again, which if not checked, could 
introduce very major uncertainty into the 
U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship. 

This more specifically meant that on the 
U.S. side we were prepared to freeze our 
Minuteman III deployment — that is to say, 
the MIRV'ed ICBM— at 550, which is where 
it is currently. And we would forgo further 
improvements in all U.S. ICBM's, and we 
would abandon the MX program, both for 
silo and mobile basing. And we would forgo 
any plans for any other ICBM's. 

On the Soviet side we proposed that the 
Soviets freeze the number of their strategic 
ICBM's, the SS-17's, 18's, and 19's at a 
number not in excess of 550, which actually 
means that they could still go up because 
they are below that number, and these 
would be the Soviet MIRV'ed missiles. 

Given the size of some of them, this is an 
important point to bear in mind, for it raises 
the issue of equity; given the size of some of 
them, their total number of warheads even- 
tually could be greater than our land-based 
ICBM's would provide. And we would 
expect that the MLBM, or the modern large 
ballistic missile, component within the con- 
text of the 550 would not be greater than 
150. This is important because this would 
provide for a reduction. 

Q. Could you repeat that? 

Dr. Brzezinski: We also proposed that the 
total number of the modern large ballistic 
missiles, which we would expect would be 
the SS-18's because they are the most mod- 
ern Soviet ballistic missiles that are large, 
would not be greater than 150. And that 

would be a reduction from the present total, 
but that will be an important element of 
stability because that large number of the 
modern large ballistic missiles introduces 
the destabilizing potential inherent in large 
throw-weight and many, many warheads. 

Q. Do they currently have 320? 

Dr. Brzezinski: Three hundred and eight. 
We would also expect the Soviets to 
abandon the development and deployment of 
the SS-16, which is their mobile ICBM, just 
as we would abandon the MX. 

Q. How about the SS-20; would that also 
be abandoned? 

Dr. Brzezinski: The SS-20 in its precise 
configuration is not a strategic weapon; and 
we would want, in the course of the agree- 
ment, to develop arrangements which would 
permit us to have the needed assurance that 
the SS-20 is not being upgraded into the 
equivalent of the SS-16 because, as some of 
you clearly know, the SS-20, with a third 
stage, could be in effect the equivalent of 
the SS-16. We would therefore want to have 
some arrangements whereby we could 
clearly differentiate between the two. 

Finally, we would propose to make an 
arrangement with regard to the Backfire 
which would give us some assurances that it 
would not be used as a strategic weapon by 
the Soviet Union, and this is something that 
would be negotiated more fully within this 
framework; and we would propose to ban all 
strategic cruise missiles, and that, again, is 
something which would be negotiated. In 
that context, though, it is to be noted that 
the Soviet side has insisted that the 
Backfire is not a strategic weapon, though it 
has a radius of over 2,000 miles. We would 
presumably define the cruise missile as 
being strategic at a level lower than that in 
the context of our negotiations. 

I would say that if one analyzes this pro- 
posal in detail I think one is justified within 
the limits of human reason, within the 
confines of one's own background, tradition, 
and concerns which necessarily confine our 
ability to be absolutely certain about our 
judgments, that this was a genuine effort at 
an equitable arrangement. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We would constrain those aspects of our 
strategic programs which are threatening to 
the Soviets. We would want the Soviets to 
adjust similarly in those regards which are 
most threatening to us. 

We would cap the arms race; we would 
impose a limit on the numbers through a 
reduction, significant reduction; and we 
would impose restraints of a qualitative type 
on offensive systems. Thus, we would both 
take a giant step forward. I see a certain 
analogy between the situation in which we 
find ourselves today and the late 1960's. At 
that time, some of you might recall, we pro- 
posed to the Soviets that ABM's be banned 
because ABM's introduce an inherent 
element of instability into the relationship. 

The first Soviet reaction to that proposal 
by Prime Minister Kosygin was very 
negative, given their backgrounds, their 
traditions, their ways of looking at the 
strategic relationship. Yet, over time, 
through a continuing discourse, the Soviet 
side came to recognize the fact that indeed 
in the age of highly advanced strategic 
systems the introduction of the ABM ele- 
ment into the equation was truly destabi- 
lizing. And the most important 
accomplishment of SALT One was precisely 
that which the Soviets earlier had so indig- 
nantly rejected; namely, a ban on the ABM 
systems. We are thus in the first phase of 
an ambitious and far-reaching search for a 
significant American-Soviet accommodation. 

We believe in some respects we are in the 
earlier, educational part of the process in 
which both sides have to think through the 
implications both of an unchecked arms race 
and of the benefits of reductions and a 

We are going to continue these talks with 
the Soviets. You know that they will be con- 
tinued on a top-level basis in May by 
Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, and we expect to have contacts 
and exchanges prior to that date. We are 
hopeful that the search for something truly 
significant will bear fruit. 

I don't think anyone in this house or in 
this city engaged in this process expected 
the Soviet Union simply to accept these 
proposals instantly. 

We went to them in order to present to 
them our views regarding what might con- 
stitute a truly creative and historically novel 
framework for our strategic relations. We 
will persist in that effort, and we are hope- 
ful, on the basis of prior experience and 
given the overriding interest that both sides 
have in stability and accommodation, with 
patience and with persistence, and with 
good will on both sides, there will be signifi- 
cant progress made toward what could be a 
very significant turn in the American-Soviet 

Q. Would you please clarify two points? 
Your definition of — the American definition 
of the strategic cruise and would you go over 
again, please, I guess I just didn't hear it 
well, the MIRV idea? Were you talking 
simply about MIRV equivalency, or was 

Dr. Brzezinski: In regard to the cruise 
missile, our position is that a cruise missile 
which is not capable of employment either in 
a transcontinental operation, or which 
doesn't have a range in excess of weapons 
systems that are typically considered to be 
strategic, is nonstrategic. And since there 
has been an ongoing discussion with the 
Soviets as to what is and is not a strategic 
weapon, we would want to reach a more 
precise definition of that in the course of the 
negotiations, banning those cruise missiles 
which have as themselves a strategic range, 
and retain for both sides flexibility for those 
that are not. 

Specifically talking about the MIRV's, our 
proposal is to freeze the land-based ICBM's 
that can be MIRV'ed at 550 and to reduce 
particularly the number of those very large 
Soviet ICBM's which can be MIRV'ed into 
very numerous warheads, given their 
throw-weight, because that in the long run 
could introduce an element of instability for 
both sides. 

We would, at the same time, in that 
context, forgo those systems which are par- 
ticularly threatening to the Soviet land- 
based ICBM force. It is to be remembered 
in this context that, at least for the time be- 
ing, the Soviet strategic forces are heavily 
dependent on their land-based ICBM's. 

April 25, 1977 


Those American systems which could 
threaten these land-based ICBM's are natu- 
rally and understandably particularly 
threatening to the Soviets. 

So we try to take that concern of theirs 
into account while registering with them 
what we consider to be a legitimate concern 
of ours, namely, that we don't want them to 
acquire a capability to very significantly 
threaten our land-based systems. 

Q. Doctor, you didn't talk about the so- 
called data base, and I have a question 
about it. The President, at his press confer- 
ence here in this room, spoke of some form 
of verification of the data-base material, 
once it was submitted by either side to the 
other side, I guess. Can you elaborate on 
what verification we are talking about? 

Dr. Brzezinski: I don't want to go into too 
many specifics, because I would really like 
to confine myself to the broad package, to 
the broad framework within which we would 
negotiate. But specifically, with regard to 
the data base, let me limit myself to this 

We would hope and we would expect that 
in the context of this increasingly more 
stable and more accommodating relationship 
that we feel ought to develop between us 
and them in the strategic realm, the Soviet 
Union would become increasingly more 
forthcoming with regard to data base. 

Many of you know about this SALT 
relationship as much and I am sure, in quite 
a few cases, much more than I do; and 
therefore you will remember that 
throughout much of SALT One the data base 
on which these negotiations was based was 
largely American-provided and the pattern 
of the negotiations typically involved a situ- 
ation in which we would provide information 
about our systems, numbers, dimensions, 
characteristics, and then we would say to 
the Soviets, "And with regard to your sys- 
tems, which we estimate at being at so 
many and to possess the following dimen- 
sions and to have the following characteris- 
tics, we would propose the following." 

And the Soviets would respond and say, 
"With regard to the strategic information 
which you have provided us about yourself, 


our position is as follows. And with regard 
to the information that you have given 
us — the alleged information you have given 
us — about our systems, our position is as fol- 
lows." And they would comment on it, but 
without a truly equitable data base. 

I would hope and we would expect that in 
a symmetrical strategic relationship, which 
it has now become, the Soviet Union would 
provide us with all of the necessary data, 
just as we provided them with the necessary 
data, and we would each have and retain the 
needed means for verifying the accuracy of 
that data. 

Q. How? 

Dr. Brzezinski: For one thing, through 
satellites, which are very important sources 
of information. But beyond that, with 
regard to the cruise missile, we would have 
to perhaps explore some additional ways of 
verification; and I don't want to be too 
specific, because that is something which 
again would have to be negotiated, but let 
me merely note the difficulty with which, 
again, many of you are familiar. 

It is very difficult to differentiate between 
the cruise missiles which are strategic and 
nonstrategic; their sizes, dimensions are the 
same. It is very difficult to differentiate be- 
tween a cruise missile which has a nuclear 
warhead and those which do not. So we 
would have to have some additional, more 
comprehensive arrangements to give both 
sides the assurance that they need to have 
on this issue. 

Q. I am really not asking for details, but 
is this an onsite-inspection proposal, 

Dr. Brzeziyiski: I don't think we have yet 
reached the stage in which direct onsite 
examination of all weapons systems is feasi- 
ble; but certainly, if the Soviet side were 
prepared to accept some onsite verification, 
it would be a giant step toward mutual con- 
fidence, and we would certainly welcome 
onsite Soviet inspection of some of our 
weapons systems — so that this in itself would 
be something which would be a great contri- 
bution to mutual stability. And I would hope 
that as Soviet confidence grows, as Soviet 

Department of State Bulletin 

preoccupation with secrecy declines, that 
they will find this idea less and less 

Q. You talked about the Soviet concern for 
their land-based weapons, and there has al- 
ways been a lack of symmetry between then- 
perception of their defense needs and the 
U.S., which is why they came up with a 
freedom of choice within their weapons sys- 

Your proposal, the American proposal — 
according to what you say— would appear to 
take away a lot of their freedom of choice; 
and at the same time, it doesn't say any- 
thing about sea-based missiles, which also 
are a threat — or the Soviets perceive as a 
threat — to their land-based systems. 

Therefore, can you explain why, in your 
perception, this is equivalent, a third thing 
that they have to cut back from 308 to 150 in 
their superlaunch missiles and we don't 
have to cut back any land-based? 

Dr. Brzezinski: First of all, as far as the 
freedom to mix is concerned, that would still 
be retained by both sides, though there 
would be upper limits set on what you can 
do, particularly in regard to land-based 
ICBM's. That limit indeed would be set at 
550. But each side, or one of the sides, could 
decide that it prefers to have fewer of these 
and more sea-based. So, in that sense, there 
is some freedom to mix, no doubt about it. 

As far as the Soviet throw-weight or large 
ballistic missiles are concerned, their 
reduction is a necessary concomitant of 
mutual stability, because if they are not re- 
duced in numbers, then by MIRV'ing them 
the Soviet Union would gain, particularly 
within these lower aggregates, a very signif- 
icant advantage. 

I think one has to recognize the fact that 
if you have fewer total numbers then any 
asymmetry becomes increasingly significant, 
and the Soviets do have that asymmetry to 
their advantage in the possession of the 
large ballistic missiles which can be 
MIRV'ed up to 8 or 10 warheads. 

In addition to that, there is this other 
problem, which I don't want to exaggerate, 
but which has to be taken into account when 
we think of equity at the lower aggregates; 

namely, the Backfire. We were prepared to 
consider special arrangements for the 
Backfire; but again, the Backfire, however 
one defines it, whether it is a strategic or 
nonstrategic weapon, becomes more signifi- 
cant if you have lowered aggregates than if 
you have higher aggregates. 

If these aggregates are high, then you can 
say, well, it is more marginal; but if you go 
down to 1,800, then the introduction of the 
Backfire, at some number which is in excess 
of 100, becomes a factor. And yet we are 
prepared to accommodate on that, too. 

I am not going to argue that — it would be 
silly — that this was an infallible package 
which has to be taken in toto. All I am going 
to say is that we made the damnedest effort 
to produce a package which, within the lim- 
its of our own intelligence — and by 
intelligence, I not only mean information, I 
also mean what is in our heads — we could 
say was reasonably equitable for both sides. 
We did our best to define it that way and 
will be glad to discuss it, and we intend to 
discuss it. We would like to find out what 
aspects of this are particularly troubling to 
the Soviets, because that is what negotia- 
tions are about, and conceivably if the case 
is persuasive, this or that adjustment could 
be made in return for this or that adjust- 

Q. What was the Soviet reaction to the 
package in the general sense? Did they re- 
ject it out of hand or say that certain things 
were difficult? 

Dr. Brzezinski: To say that the Soviets 
rejected it out of hand gives it a dramatic 
and categorical quality which I really do not 
think the circumstances justify. 

The sequence was essentially as follows: 
Prior to the Vance mission, we did indicate 
to the Soviets that we would be making pro- 
posals for significant reductions. We did 
that deliberately because we wanted the 
Politburo to think about these issues. 

As you know, the Soviets do not have an 
arms control agency. The Soviets do not 
have influential groups in their society that 
are concerned with arms control. Arms 
control proposals are assessed in the Soviet 
Defense Ministry, which has certain in- 

April25, 1977 


teresting implications; and we felt it would 
not be particularly constructive to send in a 
detailed proposal which then is staffed out in 
the Soviet Defense Ministry and goes up to 
the Soviet Politburo with a categorical 
critique. We wanted the top Soviet leaders 
to focus on this issue. 

Therefore we drew their attention to the 
fact that we will be making proposals that 
call for reductions, that we think would have 
a significant impact on the broader nature of 
our relationship; and then Secretary Vance 
presented that and, as I said earlier, not 
only in its strategic setting but also in its 
political context when he made his opening 
statement to the Soviets. 

The Soviet leadership then expressed a 
preference for the discussion of other issues, 
during which time it presumably was 
undertaking at least its preliminary assess- 
ment of this proposal; and then in the final 
or the pre-final session, I forget which, 
General Secretary Brezhnev then informed 
Secretary Vance that this proposal was not 
acceptable to the Soviet Union, but he 
coupled it, at the same time, with a clear- 
cut indication that it is the Soviet expecta- 
tion, which is matched by us, that these 
talks, including the SALT aspects, will con- 
tinue and that, indeed, the Gromyko-Vance 
meeting will be resumed directly in Geneva 
in May. 

So, it is in this context that I think one 
ought to assess where we are — and again, I 
would like to draw your attention to the 
analogy that I made before; namely, to the 
initial reaction by Prime Minister Kosygin 
when, for the first time, he was confronted 
at the top level and not through bureaucrat- 
ic channels with the arguments why an 
ABM is mutually destabilizing. This was a 
new argument for him. It was not a convinc- 
ing argument initially, even though it was 
made very persuasively when he met in 
Glassboro with President Johnson and Sec- 
retary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara 
and then subsequently it became clear that 
such an arrangement was indeed in the 
mutual interest. 

Q. Dr. Brzezinski, in Mr. Vance's news 
conference in Moscoiv, he alluded to a Soviet 

counterproposal based on the 1976 
discussions with Dr. Kissinger. I am in- 
terested in why that counterproposal was 
not negotiable. What were its constituents, 
and win/ was it )iot negotiable? 

Dr. Brzezinski: I don't want to engage 
here in a critique of the Soviet position, 
because as I said at the beginning of my re- 
marks, I am really not going to engage in 
recriminations or a kind of side dialogue on 
their proposals versus our proposals, but 
really to try to explain the rationale and the 
content of ours. 

Let me limit myself, therefore, to one 
comment. It is our broad feeling that 27 
years after the beginning of the nuclear race 
the time is right in our relations for doing 
something more than just creating 
frameworks for continued competition. It is 
our feeling that the framework defined by 
Vladivostok is so high in its numbers, so 
open-ended in its consequences, so 
susceptible to quantitative as well as qual- 
itative improvements that in some respects 
it comes close to a misstatement to call any 
such arrangement arms limitations. All it is, 
really, is an arrangement for continued arms 
competition, and we have gone to the 
Soviets with a proposal which we crafted as 
best we could in order to convince them that 
maybe the time is right to take a significant 
step toward reductions. 

We gave them ranges so they could pick 
either the more ambitious or the less 
ambitious part of it, depending on their es- 
timate of the strategic consequences of cuts. 
They have very good analysts. They should 
be able, and I am sure they are able, to as- 
sess whether 2,000 is better for them or 
1,800, whether 1,200 MIRV's is better for 
them or 1,100, and so forth. So we weren't 
very categorical about it. 

Q. Dr. Brzezinski , you placed heavy 
stress at the beginning on the political as- 
pect of this, as well as this strategic aspect 
of the proposal. You said that no one 
expected them to accept it out of hand, but 
neither was there widespread, expectation of 
the kind of fierce reaction from the 
Russians, including the press conference 
yesterday by Mr. Gromyko. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Politically speaking, do you feel that the 
reception of the proposal and what has hap- 
pened has set back Soviet-American rela- 
tions, or were you surprised at what 
happened, and if yon weren't, teas this a 

Dr. Brzezinski : If I wasn't, then it 
couldn't be a miscalculation. It would be a 
miscalculation if I was. We did not expect 
the Soviets to accept this total framework 
on the basis of three days' talks. We ex- 
pected them to consider it. Our judgment — 
and I have talked by telephone with 
Secretary Vance when he was still in Mos- 
cow, I talked to some of the other members 
of the delegation since — was that the 
discussions were generally conducted in 
businesslike fashion, that the Soviet side, 
through little gestures, went out of its way 
to indicate that this is an ongoing relation- 
ship. They did not hide the fact that they 
took a negative view of this proposal, and 
they were quite explicit on it; but there 
were no nasty polemics in the meeting. 

You are absolutely right in saying that 
some of the statements, maybe even some of 
the gestures, that were made in the press 
conference by the Soviet Minister were of a 
more assertive type. But I would describe 
that perhaps as a reaction to the political 
perception that indeed the United States 
has come up with a proposal which, if ac- 
cepted, would have a significant contribution 
to disarmament. 

The Soviets over the years have prided 
themselves on being in the forefront of the 
disarmament proposals and perhaps there 
was just a tiny touch of defensiveness, 
therefore, in some of these gestures and 
some of these comments. I don't think that 
these gestures and these comments are 
really that important. What is important is 
that the relationship involves continued 
negotiations, that agreements were made in 
Moscow to develop working groups on a 
large number of highly sensitive issues — and 
I read you the list, and indeed, there was a 
further element in it, namely, radiological 
weapons, which is what the Soviets 
proposed— and that therefore the negotiat- 
ing process continues. And in the negotiat- 

ing process you expect to be turned down, 
to be pressed, to be asked to make accom- 
modations and concessions, but that is part 
of the game. 

Q. Doctor, what did we offer to forgo that 
they would hare found most threatening to 
their land-based missiles? I am not clear mi 

Dr. Brzezinski: Particularly the MX, 
which in its consequences, given its accuracy 
and so forth, by the early eighties, could be 
extremely, extremely threatening to them. 
And in that sense, I think that in itself 
would be a source of considerable assurance 
to them. 

Beyond that, if we were to limit the cruise 
missiles merely to tactical cruise missiles, 
this, too, in the longer run, would be a sig- 
nificant assurance to them. 

Beyond that, we would have to make some 
accommodations, given the total numbers in 
Minutemen I and II, and in the Poseidons. 

Basically, what it would give them is the 
sense of security that the United States is 
forgoing, as a basic strategic option, the 
acquisition of first-strike capability against 
their land-based systems. 

United States and Cuba Open Talks 
on Fisheries, Maritime Boundaries 

Joint Communique 1 

Negotiations between representatives of 
the Government of Cuba and the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America were 
held from the 24th to the 29th of March on 
matters concerning fisheries and maritime 
boundaries which arise from the laws passed 
by both parties on these subjects. In con- 
cluding today the first stage of these negoti- 
ations, it was agreed to continue them in the 
near future. The delegations of both Gov- 
ernments hope as a result of the progress of 
the negotiations to reach a satisfactory 
resolution of these issues. 

1 Issued at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 29 (text from 
press release 140 dated Mar. 30). 

April 25, 1977 



President Announces Measures 
To Control Marine Oil Pollution 

Message to the Congress l 

To the Congress of the United States; 

The recent series of oil tanker accidents in 
and near American waters is a grave reminder 
of the risks associated with marine transpor- 
tation of oil. Though we can never entirely 
eliminate these risks, we can reduce them. 
Today I am announcing a diverse but interre- 
lated group of measures designed to do so. 

These measures are both international and 
domestic. Pollution of the oceans by oil is a 
global problem requiring global solutions. I 
intend to communicate directly with the 
leaders of a number of major maritime na- 
tions to solicit their support for international 
action. Oil pollution is also a serious domestic 
problem requiring prompt and effective ac- 
tion by the federal government to reduce the 
danger to American lives, the American 
economy, and American beaches and 
shorelines, and the steps I am taking will do 

The following measures are designed to 
achieve three objectives: First, to reduce oil 
pollution caused by tanker accidents and by 
routine operational discharges from all ves- 
sels; Second, to improve our ability to deal 
swiftly and effectively with oil spills when 
they do occur; and Third, to provide full and 
dependable compensation to victims of oil 
pollution damage. 

These are the measures I recommend: 

• Ratification of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships. I am transmitting this far- 
reaching and comprehensive treaty to the 
Senate for its advice and consent. This Con- 

1 Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House 
press release dated Mar. 18). 

vention, by imposing segregated ballast re- 
quirements for new large oil tankers and 
placing stringent controls on all oil dis- 
charges from ships, represents an important 
multilateral step toward reducing the risk of 
marine oil pollution. In the near future, I will 
submit implementing legislation to the Con- 

• Reform of ship construction and equip- 
ment standards. I am instructing the Secre- 
tary of Transportation to develop new rules 
for oil tanker standards within 60 days. 
These regulations will apply to all oil tankers 
over 20,000 deadweight tons, U.S. and 
foreign, which call at American ports. These 
regulations will include: 

— Double bottoms on all new tankers; 

— Segregated ballast on all tankers; 

— Inert gas systems on all tankers; . 

— Backup radar systems, including 
collision avoidance equipment, on all tankers; 

— Improved emergency steering standards 
for all tankers. 

These requirements will be fully effective 
within five years. Where technological 
improvements and alternatives can be shown 
to achieve the same degree of protection 
against pollution, the rules will allow their 

Experience has shown that ship construc- 
tion and equipment standards are effective 
only if backed by a strong enforcement pro- 
gram. Because the quality of inspections by 
some nations falls short of U.S. practice, I 
have instructed the Department of State and 
the Coast Guard to begin diplomatic efforts 
to improve the present international system 
of inspection and certification. In addition, I 
recommend the immediate scheduling of a 
special international conference for late 1977 
to consider these construction and inspection 

• Improvement of crew standards and 
training. I am instructing the Secretary of 
Transportation to take immediate steps to 
raise the licensing and qualification 
standards for American crews. 

The international requirements for crew 
qualifications, which are far from strict, will 


Department of State Bulletin 

be dealt with by a major international con- 
ference we will participate in next year. I am 
instructing the Secretary of Transportation 
to identify additional requirements which 
should be discussed, and if not included, may 
be imposed by the United States after 1978 
on the crews of all ships calling at American 

• Development of Tanker Boarding 
Program and U.S. Marine Safety Informa- 
tion System. Starting immediately, the Coast 
Guard will board and examine each foreign 
flag tanker calling at American ports at least 
once a year and more often if necessary. This 
examination will insure that the ship meets 
all safety and environmental protection regu- 
lations. Those ships which fail to do so may 
be denied access to U.S. ports or, in some 
cases, denied the right to leave until the de- 
ficiencies have been corrected. The informa- 
tion gathered by this boarding program will 
permit the Coast Guard to identify individual 
tankers having histories of poor mainte- 
nance, accidents, and pollution violations. 
We will also require that the names of tanker 
owners, major stockholders, and changes in 
vessel names be disclosed and included in 
this Marine Safety Information System. 

• Approval of Comprehensive Oil Pollu- 
tion Liability and Compensation Legislation. 
I am transmitting appropriate legislation to 
establish a single, national standard of strict 
liability for oil spills. This legislation is 
designed to replace the present fragmented, 
overlapping systems of federal and state lia- 
bility laws and compensation funds. It will 
also create a $200 million fund to clean up oil 
spills and compensate victims for oil pollution 

• Improvement of federal ability to respond 
to oil pollution emergencies. I have directed 
the appropriate federal agencies, particularly 
the Coast Guard and the Environmental Pro- 
tection Agency, in cooperation with state and 
local governments to improve our ability to 
contain and minimize the damaging effects of 
oil spills. The goal is an ability to respond 
within six hours to a spill of 100,000 tons. 

Oil pollution of the oceans is a serious prob- 
lem that calls for concentrated, energetic, 
and prompt attention. I believe these 

measures constitute an effective program to 
control it. My Administration pledges its 
best efforts, in cooperation with the 
international community, the Congress, and 
the public, to preserve the earth's oceans and 
their resources. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, March 17, 1977. 

International Broadcasting Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Carter 1 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In my letters to the Speaker and to the 
President of the Senate of January 31, I 
stated that my advisers were reviewing a 
report on international broadcasting in 
compliance with Section 403 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 
1977. That review is now finished. 

This Administration firmly supports U.S. 
international broadcasting as part of our 
commitment to the freer flow of information 
and ideas. Among the most valuable instru- 
ments we have for this purpose are our in- 
ternational radios — the Voice of America 
(VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib- 
erty (RFE/RL) — which for many years have 
been a vital part of the lives of the peoples 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
My review of the U.S. international broad- 
casting effort has led me to the following 
conclusions, which are reflected in the at- 
tached report: 

(1) Present U.S. international broadcast 
transmission facilities are inadequate; 16 
additional 250 Kilowatt transmitters for 
broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe are needed by VOA and RFE/RL 
and can be installed in a period of three to 
five years; 

1 Transmitted on Mar. 22 (text from White House 
press release, which includes the text of the report); 
also printed as H. Doc. 95-107. 

April 25, 1977 


(2) There is no significant unused trans- 
mitter capacity available for sharing among 
U.S. broadcasters or between U.S. and 
other Western broadcasters; 

(3) A comprehensive outline of U.S. 
worldwide broadcasting needs indicates a 
requirement for 12 additional VOA trans- 
mitters for broadcast to Asia and Africa, 
beyond those required for European 

(4) Extending Board for International 
Broadcasting-type transmissions to other 
nations where access to information is re- 
stricted would be highly impractical for a 
variety of reasons. 

This report is transmitted pursuant to the 
requirements of P.L. 94-350, and I believe 
that implementation of its recommendations 
can assure the United States of effective 
broadcasting programs in the years ahead. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, March 22, 1977. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Abuses of Corporate Power. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Gov- 
ernment of the Joint Economic Committee. January 
14-March 5, 1976. 199 pp. 

South Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on South Africa — U.S. Policy and the Role 
of U.S. Corporations. September 8-30, 1976. 792 pp. 

U.S. Arms Sales Policy. Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and its 
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on proposed 
sales of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. September 
16-24, 1976. 155 pp. 

International Finance. Annual Report of the National 
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Fi- 
nancial Policies, July 1, 1975^June 30, 1976* H. Doc. 
95-67. January 31, 1977. 309 pp. 

Rhodesian Sanctions. Hearings before the Subcommit- 
tee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on S. 174, a bill to amend the 
United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt the 
importation of Rhodesian chrome; February 9-10, 
1977; 81 pp. Hearing before the Subcommittees on 
Africa and International Organizations of the House 
Committee on International Relations on H.R. 1746; 
February 24, 1977; 68 pp. Report to accompany S. 174; 
S. Rept."95-37; March 3, 1977; 14 pp. Report, together 
with additional, supplemental, minority, and dissent- 

ing views, to accompany H.R. 1746; H. Rept. 95-59; 
March 7, 1977; 19 pp. 

Annual Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and 
Other Internal Security Laws to the Senate Commit- 
tee on the Judiciary. S. Rept. 95-20. February 17, 
1977. 55 pp. 

Legislative Activities Report of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, January 14, 1975-October 1, 
1976. S. Rept. 95-21. February 21, 1977. 147 pp. 

Disapproval of the Presidential Determination To Deny 
Import Relief to the U.S. Honey Industry. Adverse 
report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to 
accompany H. Con. Res. 80. H. Rept. 95-25. February 
22, 1977. 4 pp. 

Subcommittee on Refugees. Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. Report on the subcommittee. S. Rept. 
95-27. February 22, 1977. 9 pp. 

The United States Response to the New International 
Economic Order; The Economic Implications for 
Latin America and the United States. A study 
prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Economic Relationships of the Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee. February 23, 1977. 32 pp. 

Human Rights Reports Prepared by the Department of 
State in Accordance With Section 502(B) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act, as Amended. Submitted to 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 1977. 
143 pp. 

U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United 
Kingdom, France, and West Germany. A staff report 
prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. March 1977. 32 pp. 

U.S. Information and Cultural Programs: Focus on 
Latin America, 1976. Report of a staff survey team to 
the House Committee on International Relations. 
March 1977. 46 pp. 

Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act Amend- 
ments. Report of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 3753. H. 
Rept. 95-31. March 1, 1977. 9 pp. 

Summary of Testimony and Findings and Conclusions 
Resulting From Oversight Hearings on Narcotic 
Abuse and Control. Interim report of the House Select 
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, together 
with additional views. H. Rept. 95-32. March 1, 1977. 
87 pp. 

Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement With Canada. Message 
from the President transmitting a proposed 
agreement. H. Doc. 95-90. March 1, 1977. 7 pp. 

Expulsion of George A. Krimsky From the Soviet Union. 
Report to accompany S. Res. 81. S. Rept. 95-35. 
March 3, 1977. 2 pp. ' 

Supplemental Military Assistance to Portugal. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to 
accompany S. 489. S. Rept. 95-43. March 9, 1977. 6 pp. 

Denial of Import Relief for Mushrooms. Message from 
the President transmitting his determination that 
import relief for the U.S. canned mushroom industry 
is not in the national economic interest, pursuant to 
section 203 (b) (2) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 
95-96. March 10, 1977. 2 pp. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization. 
Communication from the President of the United 
States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. 
H. Doc. 95-98. March 14, 1977. 4 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Carter ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and 
consent to ratification, the Agreement be- 
tween the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of Canada 
Concerning Transit Pipelines signed at 
Washington on January 28, 1977. I also 
transmit, for the information of the Senate, 
the report of the Department of State with 
respect to the Agreement, including copies 
of letters exchanged at the time the draft 
text of the Treaty was initialed. 

The Agreement was negotiated in re- 
sponse to a request made by the Congress in 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 
(P.L. 93-153) that the President determine 
the willingness of the Government of Canada 
to permit the construction of pipelines 
across Canada to carry oil and gas from 
Alaska's North Slope to markets in the 
lower 48 states, the terms and conditions 
which might apply to the operation of such 
pipelines and the need for inter- 
governmental agreements for this purpose. 
The Agreement negotiated in response to 
this request provides reciprocal protection 
against interruption in the flow of hy- 
drocarbons in transit, and against dis- 
criminatory taxation. The Agreement is 
applicable both to existing and future 
pipelines transiting the United States and to 
future pipelines transiting Canada. 

It became clear early in the negotiations 
that the Government of Canada was not 
prepared to conclude an arrangement which 

1 Transmitted on Mar. 30 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess., which includes the texts of the agreement, 
an exchange of letters, and the report of the Depart- 
ment of State. 

granted advance approval to a specific 
pipeline project. Consequently, the Agree- 
ment was drafted without reference to the 
specific proposals which have been made for 
the construction of pipelines to transport 
gas from Alaska's North Slope to the lower 
48 states. Its provisions would be applicable 
to both existing and future transit pipelines. 

The Agreement does not constitute 
Canadian approval of construction of a 
transit pipeline across its territory. Upon 
completion of studies currently in progress, 
the Government of Canada will announce 
whether or not it is willing to permit con- 
struction of a transit pipeline for Alaskan 

The Transit Pipeline Agreement provides 
a formal basis for United States-Canadian 
cooperation on hydrocarbon transportation 
systems, should both governments decide 
cooperation is advantageous. I urge the 
Senate to act favorably on this Agreement 
at an early date by giving its advice and 
consent to ratification. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, March 30, 1977. 

United States and Canada Amend 
Fraser River Salmon Convention 

Press release 82 dated February 25 

Representatives of the Governments of the 
United States and Canada signed on February 
25 in Washington a protocol amending the 
U.S. -Canada Fraser River Salmon Conven- 
tion of 1930. Russell McKinney, Minister in 
the Canadian Embassy in Washington, signed 
for Canada, and Ambassador Frederick Irving 
signed for the United States. 

The Convention, which established a Com- 
mission to regulate the salmon fishery of the 
Fraser River system, also provided for an 
Advisory Committee to the Commission con- 
sisting of representatives from the various 
branches of the salmon industry. The protocol 
increases the number of members from each 
country on that committee from six to seven. 

April 25, 1977 


U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement 
on Air Charter Arrangements 

Following is a joint U.S. -U.K. press re- 
lease issued at Washington and London on 

April 7. 

Press release 16S Haled April 7 

The United Kingdom and the United 
States have reached agreement on charter 
arrangements for the next months. 

The agreement covers all types of char- 
ters currently approved in both countries 
and includes for the first time the 
U.S. -originating Advance Booking Charters 
which were approved by the Civil Aeronau- 
tics Board in September 1976. It brings 
closer together the charter types on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

The two governments hope that this 
agreement will lead to an increase in charter 
traffic between their two countries without 
diverting traffic from the scheduled 

Some of the provisions of this agreement 
are regarded as experimental. The results 
will therefore be reviewed this autumn with 
a view to determining whether any changes 
would be desirable next year. 

United States and Hungary Sign 
Exchanges Agreement 

Press release 167 dated April 6 

The United States and the Hungarian 
People's Republic signed on April 6 at 
Budapest an intergovernmental Agreement 
on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Sci- 
ence and Technology. This is the first inter- 
governmental exchanges agreement which 
the United States has signed with Hungary. 
The agreement provides the formal 
framework for increased contacts and 
exchanges between individuals and institu- 
tions of the two countries in the areas of 
culture, education, technology, and science 
and provides a vehicle for the further im- 

plementation of many provisions of the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs Arthur A. 
Hartman signed for the U.S. side; Rudolf 
Ronai, President of the Institute of Cultural 
Relations, signed for the Hungarian side. 

The purposes of this agreement include 
the promotion of cooperation between in- 
stitutions of higher learning of the two coun- 
tries, the exchange of scholars and artists, 
and the translation, publication, and presen- 
tation of artistic works of each country in 
the other. It will also facilitate visits by 
scientists and researchers and the joint de- 
velopment and implementation of scientific 
programs and projects. 

Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
13, 1976. 1 

Signatures: Jamaica, March 24, 1977; Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, March 29, 1977; Australia, Kenya, 
March 30, 1977; Austria, Ecuador, April 1, 1977* 
Ratification deposited: India, March 28, 1977. 

Atomic Energy 

Protocol prolonging the agreement of December 9, 1970 
(TIAS 7010), for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Colombia 
of April 9, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5330, 6493), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Done at Vienna March 28, 1977. Entered into force 
March 28, 1977. 

Signatures: Colombia, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 


International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Austria, March 31, 1977; 
Cyprus, March 28, 1977; Israel, March 29, 1977. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 

'Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done 
at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force Jul v 
1, 1975. TIAS 8249. 
Ratification deposited: Paraguay, November 15, 

Accession deposited: Seychelles. February 8, 1977. 


Customs convention on the A.T.A. carnet for the tem- 
porary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brus- 
sels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 
1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, October 25, 1977. 


Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 17, 1976. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Australia, March 30, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. ' 
Acceptances deposited: Saudi Arabia, March 23, 
1977; Syria, March 25, 1977. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washing- 
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 
1975. TIAS 8165. 
Accession deposited: Libya, November 22, 1976. 


Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 1, 1977. 2 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En- 
tered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480. 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 1, 1977. 


International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; 
for the United States April 7, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Greece, 3 Poland, 3 January 
13, 1977; Cuba, January 14, 1977; 3 Argentina, 3 
Ghana, January 19, 1977; Senegal, January 21, 
1977; Burundi, January 25, 1977; Morocco, January 
28, 1977; Chile, January 31, 1977; 3 Afghanistan, 
Iran, February 3, 1977; Mauritania, February 4, 
1977; Kuwait, February 7, 1977; 3 Romania, Feb- 
ruary 8, 1977. 3 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to 
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high- 

frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with an- 
nexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the 
United States April 21, 1976. 
Notification of approval: Sweden, January 26, 1977. 3 


Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi- 
sionally July 1, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Zaire, April 1, 1977. 



Military assistance agreement. Signed at Rio de Janeiro 
March 15, 1952. Entered into force May 19, 1953. 
TIAS 2776. 

Notification of termination: March 11, 1977, by 
Brazil, effective March 11, 1978, except that the 
provisions of article I, pars. 2 and 4, and agree- 
ments made pursuant to the provisions of article I, 
pars. 3, 5, and 6, and of article III shall remain in 
force unless otherwise agreed by the two govern- 


Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the 
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington February 10, 1977. 
Entered into force: March 3, 1977. 


Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles 
and services to Jordan. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Amman October 20, 1976, and February 23, 1977. 
Entered into force February 23, 1977. 


Agreement concerning U.S. participation on a limited 
voluntary basis in the National Social Security Fund 
of Kenya. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi 
January 31 and March 21, 1977. Entered into force 
March 25, 1977. 


Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military as- 
sistance and training pursuant to the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 
1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur 
February 11 and March 14, 1977. Entered into force 
March 14, 1977. 

Saudi Arabia 

Agreement relating to a U.S. military training mission 
to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Jidda February 8 and 27, 1977. Entered into force 
February 27, 1977. 

Agreement providing for a military assistance advisory 
group. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda June 

1 Not in force. 

2 With declaration. 

3 Confirmed statements contained in final protocol. 

April 25, 1977 


27, 1953. Entered into force June 27, 1953. TIAS 


Terminated: February 27, 1977, with the exception of 
par. 7, which shall remain in force and shall con- 
tinue to apply in respect to activities under agree- 
ment of February 8 and 27, 1977. until such time as 
modified or replaced. 


Memorandum of agreement relating to the storage of 
ammunition in Thailand. Signed at Bangkok March 
22, 1977. Entered into force March 22, 1977. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordert d by catalog or stock numbt r 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, B.C. Wi02. A 25- 

percent discount is Hindi- on orders for 100 Or more 

copies oj any ont publication mailed to the same ad- 
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Documents, must accompany orders. Piices shown be- 
loic. which include postage, are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which de- 
scribe the people, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a 
list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic 
and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set 
of all Background Notes currently in stock — at least 
140 — $21.80: 1-year subscription service for approxi- 
mately 77 updated or new Notes — $23.10: plastic 
binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are 
available at 350 each. 

Cvprus Cat. 

Malta Cat. 

Mauritania Cat. 

Nepal Cat. 

Paraguay Cat. 

Philippines Cat. 

Qatar Cat. 

Tanzania Cat. 

Western Samoa Cat. 


Yemen, People's Cat. 

Democratic Republic of Pub. 

No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 
No. SI. 



4 pp. 

6 pp. 


4 pp. 

8 pp. 

4 pp. 

7 pp. 

4 pp. 

4 pp. 

Inter- American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplo- 
macy. This book deals with the beginnings of the U.S. 
Government's effort to foster and strengthen coopera- 
tive relations with the Latin American countries 
through long-term, two-way, person-to-person com- 
munication. The volume highlights the first years of the 
program of educational and cultural exchange, the 
pioneering period from 1936 to 1948. Pub. 8854. Inter- 
national Information and Cultural Series 110. 381 pp. 
$6.20. (Cat. No. Si. 67:8854). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft 
Products and Components. Agreement with Brazil. 
TIAS 8384. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8384). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Afghani- 
stan. TIAS 8390. 13 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8390). 

Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreements 
with Brazil extending the agreement of April 6, 1973. 
TIAS 8391. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8391). 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 
8392. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8392). 

Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreement 
with Brazil. TIAS 8393. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8393). 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Costa Rica. 
TIAS 8394. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8394). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles 
and Textile Products. Agreement with Haiti amending 
the agreement of March 22 and 23, 1976. TIAS 8395. 3 
pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8395). 

Weather Stations. Agreement with Mexico extending 
the agreement of July 31, 1970, as amended and ex- 
tended. TIAS 8397. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8397). 

Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation 
Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in 
Iceland. Agreement with other governments amending 
the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as 
amended. TIAS 8398. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8398). 

Whaling — International Observer Scheme. Agree- 
ment with Japan extending the agreement of May 2, 
1975. TIAS 8399. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8399). 

Space Cooperation — Remote Manipulator System. 

Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8400. 19 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:8400). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of August 7, 1975, as 
amended. TIAS 8401. 11 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8401). 

Transportation — Cooperation on Development of 
High Speed Ground Systems. Memorandum of under- 
standing with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 
8402. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8402). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Zaire. 
TIAS 8403. 25 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8403). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with In- 
donesia amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as 
amended. TIAS 8404. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8404). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile. 
TIAS 8405. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8405). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 25, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971, 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

ident ('alter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Proposals (remarks, questions and an- 
swers) 109 

Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Confer- 
ence of April 1 414 

tary Vance Visits Moscow and Western 
Europe (Carter, Vance, U.S.-U.S.S.R. com- 
munique) 389 

Aviation. U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement on Air 
Charter Arrangements (joint press release) . . . 426 


United States and Canada Amend Fraser River 

Salmon Convention 425 

Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 125 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy -124 

International Broadcasting Report Transmitted 
to the Congress (Carter) 423 

President Announces Measures To Control Marine 
< hi Pollution (message to Congress) 422 

U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 425 

Cuba. United States and Cuba Open Talks on 
Fisheries, Maritime Boundaries (joint com- 
munique) 421 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States 

and Hungary Sign Exchanges Agreement 42(i 

Energy. U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate (Carter) 425 

Environment. President Announces Measures To 
Control Marine Oil Pollution (message to Con- 
gress) -122 


United States and Canada Amend Fraser River 

Salmon Convention 425 

United States and Cuba Open Talks on Fisheries, 
Maritime Boundaries (joint communique) 421 

Human Rights. Secretary Vance Visits Moscow 
and Western Europe (Carter, Vance, U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. communique) 389 

Hungary. United States and Hungary Sign Ex- 
changes Agreement 426 

Information Policy. International Broadcasting 
Report Transmitted to the Congress 
(Carter) 423 

Maritime Affairs. President Announces Meas- 
ures To Control Marine Oil Pollution (message 
to Congress) 422 

Middle East. Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and 
tern Europe (Carter. Vance, U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. communique) 389 

Presidential Documents 

International Broadcasting Report Transmitted 
to the Congress 423 

President Announces Measures To Control Marine 
Oil Pollution 422 

President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Proposals 409 

etary Vance Visits Moscow and Western 
Europe 389 

U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans- 
mitted to the Senate -125 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 428 

Treaty Information 

( lurrent Actions 426 

1 States and Canada Amend Fraser River 
Salmon < invention 425 

United States and Hungary Sign Exchanges 
Agreement (26 

U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement on Air Charter 
Arrangements (joint pressrelease) 42ii 

U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 425 


President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Proposals (remarks, questions and an- 
swers) 109 

Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Confer- 
ence of April 1 414 

Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and Western 
Europe (Carter. Vance, U.S.-U.S.S.R. com- 
munique) 389 

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Reach Agree- 
ment on Air Charter Arrangements (joint press 
release) 42(i 

Name Index 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 114 

Carter, President 389. 4(19. 422. 423, 425 

Vance, Secretary 389 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 4—10 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations. Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 2052(1. 

No. Date Subject 

"163 4/4 Vance, Foreign Minister Guiringaud: 
remarks following meeting with 
President Giscard d'Estaing, 
Paris, Apr. 2. 
! 1(>4 4/4 Vance, Guiringaud: remarks follow- 
ing meeting, Apr. 2. 

165 4/4 U.S. -Canada discussions on St. Law- 
rence Seaway tolls. Apr. 1. 
tl66 4/5 "Foreign Relations," 1949. vol. VII, 
part 2. "The Far East and Aus- 
tralasia," released. 

167 4/(i U.S. and Hungary sign exchanges 

Ki.s 4/7 U.S. -U.K. air charter agreement. 
*169 4/8 Government Advisory Committee on 
International P.ook and Library 
Programs: cancellation of Apr. 21 

17n 1/8 U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter- 
national Educational and Cultural 
Affairs: revision of agenda for 
Apr. 25 meeting. 
*171 4/8 Matthew Nimetz sworn in as Coun- 
selor of the Department (bio- 
graphic data). 
*172 4/8 Herbert J. Hansell sworn in as Legal 
Adviser (biographic data). 

17". 4/8 Joseph I). Duffey sworn in as As- 
sistant Secretary for Educational 
and Cultural Affairs (biographic 

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Volume LXXVI • No. 1975 • May 2, 1977 


Statement by Charles Hugh Warren in the U.N. Water Conference 437 



Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Boeker 441 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXVI, No. 1975 
May 2, 1977 

Por sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 i - ■ miannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy '- 

The Secretary of State has I that the pub- 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
d Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will bi e<J. The 

BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature, 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the) 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government I 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and ' 
on the work of the Department and I 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
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the Department. Information is in- 
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I nited States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
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Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
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international relations are also listed 

President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy 

Following is a statement by President 
Carter issued on April 7, together with ex- 
cerpts from the transcript of his remarks and 
questions and answers with news corre- 
spondents at the White House that day. 


White House press release dated April 7 

There is no dilemma today more difficult 
to resolve than that connected with the use 
of nuclear power. Many countries see nu- 
clear power as the only real opportunity, at 
least in this century, to reduce the depend- 
ence of their economic well-being on foreign 
oil — an energy source of uncertain availabil- 
ity, growing price, and ultimate exhaustion. 
The United States, by contrast, has a major 
domestic energy source — coal — but its use is 
not without penalties, and our plans also call 
for the use of nuclear power as a share in 
our energy production. 

The benefits of nuclear power are thus 
very real and practical. But a serious risk 
accompanies worldwide use of nuclear 
power — the risk that components of the nu- 
clear power process will be turned to provid- 
ing atomic weapons. 

We took an important step in reducing the 
risk of expanding possession of atomic 
weapons through the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, whereby more than 100 nations have 
agreed not to develop such explosives. But 
we must go further. The United States is 
deeply concerned about the consequences for 
all nations of a further spread of nuclear 
weapons or explosive capabilities. We 
believe that these risks would be vastly in- 
creased by the further spread of sensitive 
technologies which entail direct access to 
plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or 

other weapons-usable material. The question 
I have had under review from my first day 
in office is how can that be accomplished 
without forgoing the tangible benefits of 
nuclear power. 

We are now completing an extremely 
thorough review of all the issues that bear 
on the use of nuclear power. We have 
concluded that the serious consequences of 
proliferation and direct implications for 
peace and security, as well as strong scien- 
tific and economic evidence, require: 

— A major change in U.S. domestic nu- 
clear energy policies and programs; and 

— A concerted effort among all nations to 
find better answers to the problems and 
risks accompanying the increased use of nu- 
clear power. 

I am announcing today some of my deci- 
sions resulting from that review: 

First, we will defer indefinitely the com- 
mercial reprocessing and recycling of the 
plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear 
power programs. From our own experience 
we have concluded that a viable and eco- 
nomic nuclear power program can be sus- 
tained without such reprocessing and re- 
cycling. The plant at Barnwell, South 
Carolina, will receive neither Federal en- 
couragement nor funding for its completion 
as a reprocessing facility. 

Second, we will restructure the U.S. 
breeder reactor program to give greater 
priority to alternative designs of the 
breeder and to defer the date when breeder 
reactors would be put into commercial use. 

Third, we will redirect funding of U.S. 
nuclear research and development programs 
to accelerate our research into alternative 
nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve 

May 2, 1977 


direct access to materials usable in nuclear 

Fourth, we will increase U.S. production 
capacity for enriched uranium to provide 
adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels 
for domestic and foreign needs. 

Fifth, we will propose the necessary legis- 
lative steps to permit the United States to 
offer nuclear fuel supply contracts and 
guarantee delivery of such nuclear fuel to 
other countries. 

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the 
export of equipment or technology that 
would permit uranium enrichment and chem- 
ical reprocessing. 

Seventh, we will continue discussions with 
supplying and recipient countries alike of a 
wide range of international approaches and 
frameworks that will permit all nations to 
achieve their energy objectives while 
reducing the spread of nuclear explosive ca- 
pability. Among other things, we will 
explore the establishment of an international 
nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program aimed 
at developing alternative fuel cycles and a 
variety of international and U.S. measures 
to assure access to nuclear fuel supplies and 
spent fuel storage for nations sharing 
common nonproliferation objectives. 

We will continue to consult very closely 
with a number of governments regarding 
the most desirable multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements for assuring that nuclear 
energy is creatively harnessed for peaceful 
economic purposes. Our intent is to develop 
wider international cooperation in regard to 
this vital issue through systematic and thor- 
ough international consultations. 


The second point I'd like to make before I 
answer questions is concerning our nation's 
efforts to control the spread of nuclear 
explosive capability. 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr! 11 1977 
p. 502. 

As far back as 30 years ago, our govern- 
ment made a proposal to the United Nations 
that there be tight international controls 
over nuclear fuels and particularly those 
that might be made into explosives. 

Last year during the Presidential cam- 
paign, both I and President Ford called for 
strict controls over fuels to prevent the 
proliferation — further proliferation of nu- 
clear explosive capability. 

There is no dilemma today more difficult 
to address than that connected with the use 
of atomic power. Many countries see atomic 
power as their only real opportunity to deal 
with the dwindling supplies of oil, the 
increasing price of oil, and the ultimate 
exhaustion of both oil and natural gas. Our 
country is in a little better position. We 
have oil supplies of our own, and we have 
very large reserves of coal. But even coal 
has its limitations. So we will ourselves con- 
tinue to use atomic power as a share of our 
total energy production. 

The benefits of nuclear power, particu- 
larly to some foreign countries that don't 
have oil and coal of their own, are very 
practical and critical. But a serious risk is 
involved in the handling of nuclear fuels — 
the risk that component parts of this power 
process will be turned to providing explo- 
sives or atomic weapons. 

We took an important step in reducing 
this risk a number of years ago by the im- 
plementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, 
which has now been signed by approx- 
imately a hundred nations. But we must go 

We have seen recently India evolve an 
explosive device derived from a peaceful 
nuclear power plant, and we now feel that 
several other nations are on the verge of be- 
coming nuclear explosive powers. 

The United States is deeply concerned 
about the consequences of the uncontrolled 
spread of this nuclear weapon capability. We 
can't arrest it immediately and unilaterally. 
We have no authority over other countries. 
But we believe that these risks would be 
vastly increased by the further spread of 
reprocessing capabilities of the spent nu- 
clear fuel from which explosives can be 
derived. Plutonium is especially poisonous, 


Department of State Bulletin 

and of course, enriched uranium, thorium, 
and other chemicals or metals can be used as 

We are now completing an extremely 
thorough review of our own nuclear power 
program. We have concluded that serious 
consequences can be derived from our own 
laxity in the handling of these materials and 
the spread of their use by other countries. 
And we believe that there is strong scien- 
tific and economic evidence that a time for a 
change has come. 

Therefore we will make a major change in 
the U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies 
and programs, which I am announcing 
today. We will make a concerted effort 
among all other countries to find better an- 
swers to the problems and risks of nuclear 
proliferation. And I would like to outline a 
few things now that we will do specifically: 

First of all, we will defer indefinitely the 
commercial reprocessing and recycling of the 
plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power 
programs. From my own experience, we 
have concluded that a viable and adequate 
economic nuclear program can be maintained 
without such reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South 
Carolina, for instance, will receive neither 
Federal encouragement nor funding from us 
for its completion as a reprocessing facility. 

Second, we will restructure our own U.S. 
breeder program to give greater priority to 
alternative designs of the breeder other 
than plutonium and to defer the date when 
breeder reactors would be put into commer- 
cial use. We will continue research and de- 
velopment, try to shift away from 
plutonium, defer dependence on the breeder 
reactor for commercial use. 

Third, we will direct funding of U.S. nu- 
clear research and development programs to 
accelerate our research into alternative 
nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve di- 
rect access to materials that can be used for 
nuclear weapons. 

Fourth, we will increase the U.S. capacity 
to produce nuclear fuels, enriched uranium 
in particular, to provide adequate and timely 
supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that 
need them so that they will not be required 

or encouraged to reprocess their own mate- 

Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the 
necessary legislative steps to permit us to 
sign these supply contracts and remove the 
pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear 
fuels by other countries that do not now 
have this capability. 

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the 
export of either equipment or technology 
that could permit uranium enrichment and 
chemical reprocessing. 

And seventh, we will continue discussions 
with supplying countries and recipient coun- 
tries, as well, of a wide range of international 
approaches and frameworks that will permit 
all countries to achieve their own energy 
needs while at the same time reducing the 
spread of the capability for nuclear explo- 
sive development. Among other things — and 
we have discussed this with 15 or 20 na- 
tional leaders already — we will explore the 
establishment of an international nuclear 
fuel cycle evaluation program so that we can 
share with countries that have to reprocess 
nuclear fuel the responsibility for curtailing 
the ability for the development of explo- 

One other point that ought to be made in 
the international negotiation field is that we 
have to help provide some means for the 
storage of spent nuclear fuel materials which 
are highly explosive, highly radioactive in 

I have been working very closely with and 
personally with some of the foreign leaders 
who are quite deeply involved in the deci- 
sions that we make. We are not trying to 
impose our will on those nations like Japan 
and France and Britain and Germany which 
already have reprocessing plants in opera- 
tion. They have a special need that we don't 
have in that their supplies of petroleum 
products are not available. But we hope that 
they will join with us — and I believe that 
they will — in trying to have some worldwide 
understanding of the extreme threat of the 
further proliferation of nuclear explosive 

Q. Mr. P)'esident, in the last Administra- 
tion there was some proposal to haw re- 

May 2, 1977 


gional reprocessing centers, which seem to 
some people to put the emphasis on the 
wrong thing. Does this mean that you are 
going to not favor regional reprocessing cen- 
ters? And secondly, would you be prepared 
to cut off supplies of any kind of nuclear 
material to countries that go nuclear? 

The President: Well, I can't answer either 
one of those questions yet. I have had 
detailed discussions with Prime Minister 
Fukuda, with Chancellor Schmidt, and also 
with Prime Minister Callaghan, for instance, 
just in recent days about a joint approach to 
these kinds of problems. 

Obviously, the smaller nations, the ones 
that now have established atomic power 
plants, have to have someplace either to 
store their spent fuel or to have it reproc- 
essed. And I think that we would very likely 
see a continuation of reprocessing 
capabilities within those nations that I have 
named and perhaps others. 

We in our own country don't have this re- 
quirement. It's an option that we might 
have to explore many, many years in the 

But I hope that by this unilateral action 
we can set a standard and that those coun- 
tries that don't now have reprocessing 
capability will not acquire that capability in 
the future. Regional plants under tight in- 
ternational control obviously is one option 
that we would explore. No decision has been 
made about that. 

If we felt that the provision of atomic fuel 
was being delivered to a nation that did not 
share with us our commitment to non- 
proliferation, we would not supply that fuel. 

Q. Mr. President, this carries an assur- 
ance, which you had said earlier, for an 
assured and adequate supply of enriched 
uranium to replace the need for plutonium. 
Do you foresee any kind of price guarantees 
also for underdeveloped and poorer 
countries so that the supply would not only 
be assured but at a reasonable price in case 
lack of reprocessing drove prices up? 

The President: I don't know what the 
future prices of uranium might be. At the 
present time, of the enriched uranium that 

we produce, about roughly a third of it is 
exported, roughly a third of it is used for 
our domestic needs, and about a third of it is 
put in storage. 

There has been an attenuation in recent 
years of the projected atomic power plant 
construction in our own country. Other na- 
tions, though, are moving more and more 
toward atomic power plants. But I can't tell 
you at this point that we will guarantee a 
price for uranium fuel that's less than our 
own cost of production; and that would be a 
matter of negotiation, perhaps even on an 
individual national basis. 

I think that a standard price would proba- 
bly be preferable, but then we might very 
well give a particular nation that was desti- 
tute or a very close friend of ours or who 
cooperated with us in this matter some sort 
of financial aid to help them with the pur- 

Q. You also said last year a couple of 
times that you hoped to call a world energy 
conference to discuss this as well as a lot of 
other things. Do you foresee that happening 
any tune in the near future? 

The President: The item of nuclear power 
plants and the handling of spent nuclear 
fuels and the curtailment of the possibility 
of new nations joining us in their capability 
for explosives will be on the agenda in the 
discussions in London early in May. And 
this will be a continuing process for us. 

I might add that Secretary Vance also 
discussed this question with the Soviet au- 
thorities on his recent visit to Moscow and 
asked them to join in with us in enhancing 
the nonproliferation concept. Their response 
was favorable. But it will entail a great deal 
of negotiation, and I can't anticipate what 
the results of those negotiations might be. 
We obviously hope for it to apply to all the 
nations in the world. 

Q. Mr. President, does your change in the 
domestic program mean that you will not 
authorize building the Clinch River breeder 
reactor in Tennessee? 

The President: The Clinch River breeder 
reactor will not be terminated as such. In 


Department of State Bulletin 

my own budget recommendations to the 
Congress, we cut back — I can't remember 
the exact figure — about $250 million out of 
the plutonium breeder reactor, the liquid 
metal fast breeder reactor program. 

I think that we would continue with the 
breeder reactor program on an experimental 
basis, research and development, but not 
move nearly so rapidly toward any sort of 
commercial use. 

We also, obviously, are concerned about 
the adverse economic impact of these 
changes. And in the areas that would lose 
employment that was presently extant, as 
we increase our capacity for producing nu- 
clear fuels, even using new techniques, 
other than gaseous diffusion, like centrifuge 
and laser beam use, then we would try to lo- 
cate those facilities over a period of time — 
it's a very slow-moving process — in areas 
like Clinch River where they might be 
adversely affected. 

Q. Mr. President, does this mean that 
Canada selling nuclear power equipment to 
France and others, and France selling to 
others — does this mean that we will supply 
those other countries so that they won't 
make more power? 

The President: Well, I might say that the 
two countries that most nearly share our 
commitment and even moved ahead of us in 
this field have been Canada — perhaps be- 
cause of their unfortunate experience with 
India — and Australia. Both those countries, 
along with us, have substantial supplies of 
nuclear fuel themselves. 

I would hope that we could develop an 
interrelationship with other countries to re- 
move the competitive aspect of reprocessing 
itself. There is obviously going to be con- 
tinued competition among our own nation, 
Canada, France, Germany, England, in the 
selling of atomic power plants themselves. It 
ought to be a clearly drawn distinction be- 
tween the legitimate and necessary use of 
uranium and other enriched fuels to produce 
electricity, on the one hand, and a prohibi- 
tion against the use of those fuels for explo- 

It would be impossible, counterproduc- 

tive, and ill advised for us to try to prevent 
other countries that need it from having the 
capability to produce electricity from atomic 
power. But I would hope that we and the 
other countries could form an alliance that 
might be fairly uniform in this respect. I 
know that all the other countries share with 
us this hope. 

The one difference that has been very 
sensitive, as it relates to, say, Germany, Ja- 
pan, and others, is that they fear that our 
unilateral action in renouncing the reproc- 
essing of spent fuels to produce plutonium 
might imply that we prohibit them or 
criticize them severely because of their own 
need for reprocessing. This is not the case. 
They have a perfect right to go ahead and 
continue with their own reprocessing ef- 
forts. But we hope they'll join with us in 
eliminating in the future additional countries 
that might have had this capability evolve. 

Q. Mr. President, is it your assessment, 
sir, that some of the smaller nations that 
are now seeking reprocessing technology are 
doing so in order to attain nuclear weapon 
capability as well as or in addition to meet- 
ing their legitimate energy needs? 

The President: Well, without going into 
specifics — I wouldn't want to start naming 
names — I think it's obvious that some of the 
countries about whom we are concerned 
have used their domestic nuclear power 
plants to develop explosive capability. There 
is no doubt about it. 

India, which is basically a peaceful nation, 
at least as far as worldwide connotations are 
concerned, did evolve an explosive capabil- 
ity from supplies that were given to them by 
the Canadians and by us. And we feel that 
there are other nations that have potential 
capacity already for the evolution of explo- 

But we are trying to make sure that from 
this point on that the increasing number of 
nations that might have joined the nuclear 
nations is attenuated drastically. We can't 
undo immediately the mistakes that have 
been made in the past. But I believe that 
this is a step in the right direction. 

May 2, 1977 


President Sadat of Egypt 
Visits Washington 

President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt made an official visit to 
Washington April 3-6, during which he met 
with President Carter and other government 
officials. Following is an exchange of re- 
marks between President Carter and Presi- 
dent Sadat at a welcoming ceremony in the 
East Room of the White House on April J,. ! 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 11 


First of all, let me say that the weather is 
not at all indicative of the warmth that we 
feel in our own hearts and minds for the 
visit of President and Mrs. Sadat. He said 
that he's very glad to see the rain, that in 
Egypt they don't get quite as much as we 
have here. And this is kind of a treat for 
him. I am looking forward to an opportunity 
to go to his great country. 

One of the most exciting experiences that 
I have had was to visit recently the 
tremendous exhibit of just a few of the pre- 
cious items from the tomb of King Tut- 
ankhamen, or King Tut as most of us refer to 
it. My wife and I and our family went to the 
National Gallery. And we were over- 
whelmed at its beauty and the ancient herit- 
age that belongs to Egypt. I believe that the 
sending of this exhibit to our country — and 
it is now moving from one great city to 
another — has been a good omen for the rela- 
tionship that is going to continue to improve 
between the people of Egypt and the people 
of the United States. 

President Sadat, people stood in line all 
night long, waiting to go in to see the 
exhibit. And I think I can truthfully say 
that of the almost one million Americans 
who visited this exhibit in Washington, none 
of them were disappointed and they thought 

1 For an exchange of toasts between President Car- 
ter and President Sadat at a dinner at the White 
House on Apr. 4, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Apr. 11, 1977, p. 490. 

that the wait in line was well worth it when 
they saw these treasures. 

I am very grateful that I have been lucky 
enough to be President during this year, a 
year when President Sadat and other 
leaders in the Middle East have established 
a very special goal of major achievements in 
bringing peace to that troubled region of the 

There are no easy answers. There have 
now been about 29 years of search for ac- 
commodation among the nations who inhabit 
that precious area of ground. And I think 
it's fair to say that with President Sadat's 
close relationship with his own people, their 
trust in him as a leader, his superb demon- 
stration of courage to make statements of 
hope and determination that 1977 will be a 
fruitful year for negotiations, that he has 
been an inspiration to us all. He under- 
stands the complexities of the issues there. 
But he also sees very clearly, as I am be- 
ginning to learn, the tremendous benefits 
that can be derived if leaders like him and 
others can meet with a common purpose to 
establish peace on a permanent basis in the 
eastern part of the Mediterranean and 
among those nations who share a common 
heritage, a common history, common 
ancestors, the opportunities for improved 
trade, economic benefits for citizens there, 
an end to the military arms race, and an op- 
portunity to live in harmony, one with 

I'd also like to say that I have been looking 
forward to a chance to establish a close and 
personal friendship with President Sadat. I 
have never talked to an American leader in 
this Administration or the past Administra- 
tions in the executive branch of government 
or in the Congress who had met him who 
didn't come away impressed with his sen- 
sitivity, his intelligence, his vision, and his 
courage. I hope to learn a lot from him and 
to share with him, as best we can, the 
prospects for the interested parties this 
year to search out a common basis for a 
peaceful and permanent solution to that 
troubled region of the world. 

Our own country will offer its good of- 
fices, when called upon to do so, to share 


Department of State Bulletin 

with nations located there to find this peace- 
ful resolution. We understand the common 
ground on which that peace might be 
brought. And I personally am willing to de- 
vote a great deal of my own time and the 
time of the American Government to 
cooperation in this worthwhile pursuit to- 
ward a great goal which might bring stabil- 
ity to the entire world. 

So, I would like to say in closing that 
President Sadat is received here in our own 
country with a warm welcome, appreciation 
for his great achievements in the past, and a 
hope that with his leadership and that of 
others in the Mideast region, that the 
achievements might be even greater this 

Thank you for coming to see us. I look 
forward to detailed discussions about many 
items that are on our agenda. And Mrs. 
Sadat, we are very grateful that you could 
come and be with us also. President Sadat, 


Mr. President: It is with great pleasure 
that I revisit your country and meet with 
such a statesman who is the personification 
of the new spirit that is emerging in 
America today. 

For so long we have been told that politics 
is amoral and that international relations are 
not the domain of idealism or spirituality, but 
one of expediency and the pursuit of selfish 
interests. But the unfortunate turn of 
events in the past decades and the suffering 
that has been inflicted upon many of our fel- 
low men have shaken the foundations of 
these premises and confronted us with a 
new challenge. 

We had to reexamine the postulates which 
we have taken for granted or acquiesced to 
for centuries. A process of soul-searching 
became inevitable for the salvation of man- 
kind. Only leaders with vision and exceptional 
wisdom were able to grasp the magnitude of 
the problem and recognize the pressing need 
for a bold change without delay. 

It is quite evident, Mr. President, that 

you were among those farsighted and 
perceptive leaders. On the first day you as- 
sumed the awesome responsibility of your 
office, you took pride in the fact that your 
society was the first one to define itself in 
terms of both spirituality and human liberty. 
You pledged to spare no effort to help shape 
a just and peaceful world that is truly 

It is in this spirit that I come to your 
great country with an open mind and an 
open heart in order to work with you for 
strengthening the structure of peace and 
promoting the revival of idealism in interna- 
tional relations. 

I am certain that you know, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that Egypt ever since its emergence 
as a state more than 7,000 years ago has 
been a land of ideals and principles. From 
time immemorial, the Egyptian has re- 
mained faithful to higher values and ideals 
which render human life more rewarding 
and fulfilling. His belief in the divine truth, 
the afterlife, and the day of judgment — all 
this has instilled in him an extraordinary 
sense of justice and a genuine conviction of 
the universal brotherhood of man. 

It is not a mere coincidence, therefore, 
that we share with you the belief that the 
only way to improve the quality of our life is 
to reinstall the long-neglected idealism and 
spirituality which enrich our existence indi- 
vidually and collectively. 

Mr. President, a few w T eeks ago, you 
pledged to devote a major part of your time 
this year to efforts toward a lasting peace in 
the Middle East. Undoubtedly, this genuine 
determination stemmed out of thoughtful 
realization on your part of the possibility as 
well as the necessity to establish peace in 
the area after 29 years of devastating wars 
and stifling tension. 

This also demonstrates your enlightened 
awareness that your country has a certain 
mission to fulfill and a major responsibility 
to contribute positively to the process of 
peace in the Middle East. More important, 
you registered your willingness and even 
enthusiasm to fully assume this 

In your speech at the United Nations on 

May 2, 1977 


March 17, you reiterated that your country 
has the strength of ideals and that you are 
determined to maintain these ideals as the 
backbone of your policy. I endorse this 
statement and hope to see it implemented in 
practice. Such ideals certainly coincide with 
the norms of legitimacy and legality in in- 
ternational behavior. 

Thus, you cannot support foreign occupa- 
tion of one's land or tolerate territorial 
expansionism. We know that attachment to 
one's land is a value which is deeply rooted 
in the fabric of the American society. It is 
the central force that made the realization of 
the American dream possible. 

Mr. President, I am sure that you concur 
with me that it would be a grave mistake to 
waste this golden opportunity to put an end 
to a state of affairs that has plagued our 
area for decades. 

There is every indication that you are 
aware of the centrality of the Palestinian 
cause to the entire dispute. It is the core 
and crux of the issue. No progress what- 
soever can be achieved so long as this prob- 
lem remains unsolved. 

In your public pronouncements in recent 
weeks, you came very close to the proper 
remedy. What is needed is the establish- 
ment of a political entity where the 
Palestinians can, at long last, be a commu- 
nity of citizens, not a group of refugees. The 
humanitarian dimension of their plight is 
merely one of the aspects of the problem. 
Their yearning to exercise their normal 
rights remains the heart of the issue. 

Mr. President, the Arab nation, with its 

long history of tolerance and cooperation 
with other nations, is eager to contribute 
further to the welfare and prosperity of 
mankind. It harbors no ill-feeling toward 
any people, nor has it ever experienced 
prejudice or hatred against any creed or 
peoples. We remain committed to peace in 
our area and in the world at large. 

Mr. President, over the past few years, I 
worked with your predecessors to develop 
ties of cooperation and mutual understand- 
ing between our two peoples. I am glad to 
say that we are satisfied with the 
development of our bilateral relations and 
are looking forward for an era of an ever- 
increasing exchange and interaction during 
your Presidency. In this respect, I must 
express my people's gratitude and mine, Mr. 
President, for the gallant action from your 
side, helping us in our economic problems 
lately. Really, it has shown the valiant 
American spirit after you have helped us in 
many ways in the last few years, especially 
in preparing the Suez Canal for the naviga- 
tion and for the prosperity of the whole 

Mr. President, I am carrying to every 
American a message of friendship and amity 
from 40 million Egyptians. We wish you all 
the success and gratification of fulfillment 
you are aspiring to. Let us pray to God Al- 
mighty so that the days ahead may witness 
a happy American family under every roof 
and a state of peace and solidarity in every 
community. Let us also pray that God 
grants us the strength to establish a better 
world for the generations to come. 



Department of State Bulletin 

I.S. Urges Global View of Water Resource Problems 

The United Nations Water Conference met 
at Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 14 -25. 
Following is the principal U.S. statement 
on world water problems, made in plenary 
session of the conference on March 15 by 
Charles Hugh Warren, Chairman of the 
Council on Environmental Quality, who 
headed the U.S. delegation. 

President Carter has asked our delegation 
to extend his greetings and express his per- 
sonal interest in the results of this confer- 
ence. He hopes, as do we, that our 
deliberations here will lead not only to the 
customary report but to an actual improve- 
ment in the lives of all people. Our subject 
here, of course, is water — its quality, its 
availability, and its use. Now, as in histori- 
cal times, it shapes the very framework of 
our lives. 

During the rule of Caesar Augustus, the 
population density of Italy was only 24 per- 
sons per square kilometer; and that of 
Greece, only 11 persons. By contrast, Egypt 
was able to support 280 persons per square 
kilometer. Later, in medieval times, Cor- 
doba, the capital of Moorish Spain, is esti- 
mated to have had a million inhabitants, 
while north of the Alps the most populous 
city was London — which had only 35,000. 

The greatest single factor in these re- 
gional population differences appears not to 
have been migration, the effects of war, or 
culture as we commonly define it; that factor 
was water. The northern regions practiced 
what is known as "rainfall farming"; the in- 
habitants watered their crops with what the 
skies offered. The southern regions, on the 
other hand, practiced "hydraulic agricul- 
ture"; they erected dams, dug canals, and 
built irrigation ditches to convey water into 
fields for intensive, continuous cultivation. 

Today the techniques of hydraulic 
agriculture — and indeed, of hydraulic life — 
have spread to virtually every nation. In 
this respect, the nations of the north have 
benefited from a technology pioneered by 
the nations of the south. We all know how to 
impound water; how to collect it in lakes and 
reservoirs; how to move it from one place to 
another through canals and pumps and irri- 
gation channels; how to probe deeper into 
the earth for it; how to drain it from places 
where it is plentiful and divert it to drylands 
for food or livestock. 

Yet the apparent success of our technol- 
ogy has seduced many of us into thinking 
that we have entirely tamed water and that 
its abundance is limited only by human in- 
genuity and technology. 

Events of the last few years, however, 
have made it clear that this is not so. A pro- 
longed drought in the Sahel took a terrible 
toll of human lives and rendered vast areas 
of land incapable of sustaining plant and 
animal life. In the western regions of the 
United States lack of rainfall and snow has 
prolonged drought conditions and reduced 
already short water supplies. Also in the 
United States, as in other parts of the 
world, shortsighted forest practices and 
overgrazing by livestock are destroying the 
capacity of land to absorb water, filter it, 
and recharge ground supplies. 

The basic lessons to be derived from these 
and other of man's misadventures with 
water are these: 

— First, despite our ingenuity in convert- 
ing natural resources to our own use and 
convenience, we still experience major fluc- 
tuations in the supply of water; 

— Second, though water seems inexhaus- 
tible, it is, in fact, limited; and 

May 2, 1977 


— Third, water is not entirely a passive 
resource to be extracted and d Q, ' o1 nppd as 
we see fit. The hydrologic cycle that 
supplies us with water has an integrity of its 
own, pursuing its way from the skies, across 
the land, and back to the sea in courses that 
were ancient before man emerged on the 
globe. Human activities can benefit from 
this cycle, but we should recognize that 
when we allow our activities to disrupt the 
cycle itself we do so at our peril. 

Today we more fully appreciate that the 
earth's processes of supply cannot indefi- 
nitely accommodate man's accelerating 
demand for water nor can they cleanse the 
pollutants and poisons which human ac- 
tivities cause to be discharged into surface 
and underground water bodies. 

In my country, a series of water short- 
ages, water problems, and indeed, water dis- 
asters is forcing us to reconsider policies 
heretofore considered farsighted and 
advanced. We are beginning to reduce our 
emphasis on water development and to give 
more thought to water management. We are 
beginning to distinguish human needs for 
water from human desires for water. In 
short, we are beginning to employ an en- 
vironmental perspective in evaluating water 
projects and water use, recognizing that the 
supply and quality of water are affected by a 
host of factors that have nothing to do with 
hydraulic engineering. 

Foremost among such other factors is 
population. We all know global population 
will double in the next 35 years. Our de- 
mand for water, however, will double in far 
less time, due to the increased need for 
water to support intensive agriculture and 
industrial expansion. 

The location of people is another factor. 
Instead of settling in places where safe 
water is abundant, people have been en- 
couraged to settle where they must rely 
upon complex systems to bring water to 
them. Sometimes such systems violate 
natural laws which set certain limits for the 
carrying capacity of the land and the water 
potential of underground aquifers. 

In addition, other human activities 
threaten the quality of our water. As rain 

falls, it picks up pollution in the air. After 
falling on the land it picks up fertilizer, pes- 
ticides, and silt from farms; it picks up acid 
from mine wastes and oil from highways and 
streets; it picks up a great diversity of 
chemicals from industrial and municipal 
establishments — especially human wastes. 
These pollutants and poisons find their way 
through the earth's water cycle. 

In pointing out that we have begun to 
move from water development to water 
management, I do not mean to suggest that 
the dimensions of the transition are the 
same for all countries. However, despite dif- 
ferences in population, geographic- 
advantage, and state of development, I do 
believe most nations share, in varying de- 
grees, water problems and experiences simi- 
lar to our own. 

At issue, then, is how the earth's fixed 
supply of water can be managed to meet fu- 
ture demands imposed by the worldwide 
growth of population, agriculture, and 
industry. Specifically, we need to identify 
our most likely water needs and problems 
and consider how best to avert a global 
water crisis. The United States takes this 
issue and this conference most seriously. We 
expect to learn more of and from your local 
and regional experience and assessments. 
The information we gather here, coupled 
with the formal findings of the conference, 
will be given by me directly to President 

We know that many topics will be 
discussed in our report to him. However, at 
this time I want to discuss but three vital 
issues of interest to us all: community water 
and health; water for food and fiber; and 
disaster assistance. 

First, community water and health. In 
many regions, population growth and shifts 
in population distribution resulting from 
intensive urbanization have led to abuses in 
consumption patterns and water shortages. 

We would hope, therefore, that countries 
with less than abundant water supplies or 
with high population growth in areas of 
marginal water availability would emphasize 
policies to reduce rates of population 
growth, encourage resource-oriented 


Department of State Bulletin 

settlements, stimulate reclamation and con- 
servation, and finally, adopt development 
technologies appropriate to specific water 

In addition to supply, water must be of 
such quality as to enhance health. The 
United States has supported community 
water supply and sanitation programs. Our 
support program for water and sanitation 
purposes to date totals $860 million. The 
United States intends to increase its em- 
phasis on and commitment to such 
programs, which have as their purpose the 
fulfillment of basic human needs. 

Benefits from non-health-oriented water 
development programs are, however, 
frequently diminished by the increased 
transmission of water-related diseases. As 
we all know, schistosomiasis, which is en- 
couraged by construction of dams and 
irrigation ditches, now infects between 100 
and 200 million people around the globe. 
Only by recognizing the relationships be- 
tween water and disease, and by supporting 
preventive management strategies, can we 
increase the well-being of people. 

It is essential that we explicitly consider 
the health impacts of each water resource 
project as part of our environmental review 
and that such review be as carefully consid- 
ered and measured as our cost-benefit 
analyses. As an example, the United States 
is currently funding the environmental anal- 
ysis of the Senegal River Basin and in sub- 
Sahelian Africa is supporting projects de- 
signed to assess the public health impacts of 
water resource development. Moreover, we 
will assist countries in training project man- 
agers to assess the environmental health 
consequences of their own development 

Second, water for food and fiber. Our 
analysis of crop yields, farming conditions, 
and water utilization around the world 
indicates that the overriding focus should 
not be on the amount of new land and water 
that might be developed for agriculture but, 
rather, on improving the effectiveness with 
which water and other production aids are 
applied and managed on land already under 
cultivation. Of course some countries will 
have to irrigate additional land in order to 

meet their food and fiber needs. However, 
because of the high cost of development and 
the danger of long-term environmental de- 
gradation, new irrigation projects should be 
planned carefully and thoroughly. 

In the United States we are emphasizing 
better water management of both irrigated 
and rain-fed lands. We are beginning to 
realize the need to protect our remaining 
prime agricultural lands from urban en- 
croachment. We do so in recognition of the 
need to increase the production of food and 
fiber. For the same purpose, the United 
States believes that the highest priority 
should be given to improving the utilization 
of water in existing irrigation projects and 
in projects under development. Efficiency of 
water use on these projects is generally re- 
markably low. Improvement will require 
that countries and regional and international 
organizations give increased attention to 
better irrigation practices on the farm, dis- 
tribution systems to fields, and provision of 

Third, disaster assistance. Despite our 
best efforts toward comprehensive planning 
and management of water resources, we 
continue to suffer from droughts and floods. 
Solutions to these and other natural disas- 
ters will not readily be found — but we 
should continue to seek ways to expand our 
cooperative efforts around the globe to 
predict and then to mitigate such disasters. 
When disasters occur, the United States 
pledges to continue its commitment to aid 
and assist stricken peoples everywhere, 
should that assistance be desired. 

If the world community is to avert water 
crises of local, national, or global dimen- 
sions, we must have accurate, pertinent, 
and timely water data and information at 
each of those levels. We should improve and 
share methods for collecting, storing, and 
exchanging data on ground and surface 
water quantity and quality and on current 
and projected water uses. We should use 
this information to inform our decisionmak- 
ers and their constituencies about the 
necessity for long-term management of lim- 
ited water resources. 

The United States is prepared to provide 

May 2, 1977 


technical aid and assistance to other nations 
interested in designing information systems 
to upgrade their own assessments of water 
resource needs. 

But water resource data and technology 
will be of little use without trained people. 
Because water resource management re- 
quires familiarity with the specific region 
and its resources, the training should be 
done in and by the countries concerned. 
Such training programs can, however, draw 
on the collective knowledge and expertise of 
many other countries whenever it is not 
readily available locally. The United States 
has had a strong commitment to such train- 
ing efforts in the past and we are prepared 
to continue and expand this commitment in 
the future. 

These comments also apply to the related 
question of technology transfer. Technical 
knowledge exists which can help solve many 
of the problems of concern to us all. Its use, 
however, must be appropriate to the human 

President Carter has asked me to express 
his conviction that, if this conference is to 
succeed in its aims, we must follow up our 
deliberations with action. Consequently, the 
U.S. delegation fully endorses Secretary 
General Mageed's [Yahia Abdel Mageed, of 
Sudan, Secretary General of the conference] 
desire to fix responsibility for acting on the 
specific recommendations of this conference. 

Our delegation will report back to Presi- 
dent Carter on the results of our efforts dur- 
ing the next several days. In addition, our 
government is planning a major national 
conference on water this May. We will make 
sure that the recommendations of the 
United Nations Water Conference are 
brought to the attention of our national 

Mr. President, it is in this spirit of com- 
mitment to the broad purposes of this con- 
ference, within the framework outlined, that 
we approach the work of the next several 

We hope and trust that our collective ef- 
fort will result in new perceptions for all of 
us, in a new global view of the water re- 
source field, and in a consensus on the ur- 
gent problems ahead, which we — 
mankind — must face and solve together. 

World Trade Week, 1 977 


We live in a world where all of us must depend on 
each other — a world divided by nationality and 
philosophy, but drawn together by common problems 
and common hopes. We share with all people a concern 
about unemployment, inequality, poverty, inflation, 
and the danger of war. And we share with all people 
the hope of a life free of hunger, disease, and repres- 
sion, and a determination to overcome international 
differences with mutual trust, respect and cooperation. 

Our desire for justice, stability, and peace finds 
practical expression in world trade. Trade generates 
forces of friendship and understanding, which in turn 
bring us closer to the kind of world we want. 

The United States is the unsurpassed leader in 
international commerce. Because our total trade is 
greater than that of any other nation, we can, by in- 
creasing our trade activities, make an enormous con- 
tribution to the health of the international economy, to 
the job market at home and abroad, to progressive re- 
lationships between rich and poor nations and, finally, 
to the cause of peace on our globe. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the 
week beginning May 22, 1977, as World Trade Week. I 
urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, profes- 
sional and civic groups, the communications media, and 
all concerned Americans, to observe World Trade 
Week with meetings, discussions, exhibits, cere- 
monies, and other appropriate activities that promote 
continuing awareness of the importance of world trade 
to our Nation and to our relations with other nations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this eighth day of April, in the year of our Lord nine- 
teen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the two hundred and 

Jimmy Carter. 

No. 4496; 42 Fed. Reg. 18855. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Discusses Debt Situations of Developing Countries 
and the Role of Private Banks 

Statement by Paul H. Boeker 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs x 

I would like to speak briefly about the na- 
ture of the current international financing 
problem and then provide my assessment of 
developing-country debt situations and the 
role being played in that situation by inter- 
national lending on the part of private 

Since the winter of 1973-74, the 
oil-importing countries have been forced to 
share a collective deficit on current account 
which corresponds to the surplus of the oil- 
exporting countries. 2 This pattern has 
clearly made the international economy a 
more sensitive system and one requiring 
greater attention to its management by all 
countries and by the international financial 
institutions. The magnitude of the collective 
deficit and the suddenness with which it de- 
veloped meant that while international pay- 
ments adjustment was certainly in order, 
adequate adjustment could be achieved only 
at a gradual pace and over a number of 
years. The size of the disequilibrium also 
meant that the financing requirements of 
deficit countries during the adjustment 
period would be exceptionally large. 

1 Made on Apr. 5 before the Subcommittee on Finan- 
cial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance 
of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 The current account balance is defined as the total 
of sales and purchases by a country of currently pro- 
duced goods and services, plus unilateral transfers, 
gifts, and donations, both public and private. 

Ultimate adjustment will depend upon the 
world reducing its energy dependence on the 
oil-exporting nations. Conservation and de- 
velopment of alternate energy resources by 
the major nations, particularly the United 
States, will be critical. 

Individual country problems will persist, 
especially where there are social and politi- 
cal constraints that curb the speed of 
balance-of-payments adjustment. Some of 
the industrial democracies, for example, 
have faced difficult adjustment needs. Such 
countries in particular will need the assur- 
ance that sufficient external financing will 
be available on reasonable terms to allow 
them to move with the speed which their so- 
cial and political conditions permit. 

The buildup of foreign debt has been the 
inevitable counterpart of the current ac- 
count surpluses generated by the oil- 
producing nations. Countries have wanted to 
maintain reasonable rates of economic 
growth during this period, thus avoiding 
overly harsh deflation and resulting pres- 
sures for protectionist trade policies that 
would spread deflation internationally. 

We have averted a crisis situation because 
countries' external financing needs have 
been met on adequate terms. Future crises 
can be avoided, we feel, so long as adequate 
financing continues and the system encour- 
ages adjustment by oil-importing nations. It 
is important in this regard that official 
financing should be accompanied by 
appropriate conditionality on the borrowers' 
own economic policies. 

May 2, 1977 


On the whole, the international financial 
system has held up well under the sudden 
strains that were imposed upon it. The 
share of the oil-importing developing coun- 
tries in the global account deficit has so far 
not been excessive, in my view. Some 
countries have, in fact, experienced consid- 
erable progress in their adjustment process. 
At the same time there have been numerous 
instances where balance-of-payments 
positions have weakened. 

Diversity of Debt Situations 

Since 1973, balance-of-payments manage- 
ment for most non-oil-exporting developing 
countries has become very difficult. In order 
to preserve development momentum, while 
in most cases attempting internal adjust- 
ment to the new situation, these countries 
have been financing their deficits by exter- 
nal borrowings on an unprecedented scale. 
It is estimated that the medium- and long- 
term foreign indebtedness of the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries rose 
from about $90 billion in 1974 to about $145 
billion in 1976. Debt-service payments in 
1976 were about $21 billion, an increase of 
about 75 percent since 1973. 

While the level of indebtedness has risen 
rapidly, this does not by itself pose a threat 
of acute debt-servicing difficulties. The 
nominal increases are, in fact, far less 
dramatic when one allows for, in this case, 
the favorable effect on debt service of infla- 
tion and for the growth of output and trade 
over the period. 

Nongovernment credits have played a sig- 
nificant role in the buildup of debt. In 1975 
and 1976, private markets are estimated to 
have supplied roughly one-half of the credit 
flows to the non-oil developing countries. As 
a result, an estimated 40 percent of the out- 
standing debt of these nations is now 
attributable to commercial banks. 

Aggregate debt statistics can be mislead- 
ing, however, in that they fail to reflect the 
wide diversity which exists in the situations 
of developing countries. A more meaningful 
picture of the debt situation is obtained by 
distinguishing three broad groups of 

developing-country debtors: the higher 
income, semi-industrial countries; second, 
the low-income developing countries; and 
third, a middle category of transitional 

The first category includes perhaps a 
dozen rapidly growing countries, with rela- 
tively high per capita income for developing 
countries, which depend largely on private 
markets for external capital. This dozen or 
so countries, of which Brazil and Mexico are 
the most important, have productive and di- 
versified economies which have been capable 
of generating adequate export earnings to 
service debt. However, these countries will 
face a substantial increase in debt-service 
obligations over the next few years, and 
their ability to attract new capital will be 
contingent upon domestic measures to keep 
their economies efficient and competitive. 
Since exports bear the brunt of financing 
debt service, access to and demand from 
industrial-country markets will also play a 
critical factor in their ability to meet their 
financial obligations over the coming years. 

At the other extreme of the developing- 
country spectrum is a second category, low- 
income countries. This is a group that has 
been particularly hard hit by recent 
economic events and confronts serious re- 
source problems. They are looking primarily 
to the developed world for concessional 
transfers of resources and increased foreign 
assistance to help them improve the invest- 
ment situation within their own economies. 
However, since they continue to benefit 
from such lending and have had little 
opportunity to attract significant amounts of 
commercial debt, very few, if any, of these 
countries have a significant debt problem as 

In the middle is a third category which in- 
cludes a number of developing countries 
with moderate per capita income which are 
in transition in that they have begun 
blending traditional aid-type financing with 
commercial borrowing. Many of these coun- 
tries are still largely dependent upon the 
export of a few- commodities with highly 
cyclical prices and have, therefore, external 
payment situations which can be quite vari- 


Department of State Bulletin 

able. Some of these countries have so far 
failed to take adequate domestic adjustment 
measures and to pursue fully efficient man- 
agement of their external debt. Total com- 
mercial bank exposure to this category of 
borrowers, however, is relatively small, and 
only one of these countries has thus far 
asked for a rescheduling of its official and 
private debt. 

Lending by Private Banks 

The shocks which confronted the world's 
economy in 1973 and 1974 gave many of the 
oil-importing developing countries two broad 
options. They could abruptly curb their 
development objectives by deflating their 
economies and imposing tight import restric- 
tions, a course of action which would entail 
significant political risk and have profound 
adverse consequences on the world economy 
as a whole. Alternatively, they could seek 
an increased level of external finance which 
would allow a more orderly adjustment 
process over a longer period of years. The 
latter course was clearly the option pre- 
ferred by most developing countries. 

Despite increased availabilities of official 
financing, the extent of developing-country 
financing requirements turned many of them 
toward the private market. This remark- 
able, although not entirely unexpected, 
expansion of private lending has generated 
concern regarding the position of banks and 
the prospects for loan repayment. These 
concerns are reinforced by an assumption 
that developing countries may face some 
kind of a general debt crisis. 

Careful reading of the situation, I feel, 
shows that despite some problems, the 
lending standards of international banks 
have been quite high and that general debt 
difficulties for developing countries are not 
likely. The selectivity of private lenders is 
clearly evidenced by the concentration of 
their lending to those developing countries 
whose diversified economies and strong ex- 
port performance provide the most 
promising growth prospects. 

As a result of generally prudent lending 
policies, losses on bank loans to developing 

countries have been small, with servicing 
problems confined to relatively few coun- 
tries. One of the characteristics of develop- 
ing countries active in private markets has, 
in fact, been their awareness that the 
creditworthiness which they are so anxious 
to sustain is inextricably conditioned by 
their own governments' economic policies. 

I believe that, on the whole, banks have 
acted prudently. I also believe that private 
lending, employing adequate lending stand- 
ards, should continue to have a significant 
role in assuring adequate capital flows to 
developing countries. We should not, how- 
ever, expect private creditors to maintain 
indefinitely the current or an increased level 
of lending to developing countries. In this 
context, I believe that a better mix between 
official and private lending is desirable, 
given the longer term maturity of official 
lending and its greater ability to facilitate 
economic policy changes within the borrow- 
ing countries. 

Outlook and Implications 

Although the 1977 payments deficit of the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries will 
approximate that of 1976, external borrow- 
ing requirements should be somewhat 
less — especially if, as expected, the 
exceptionally high rate of increase in re- 
serves that occurred in the past year is 
slowed. Given the expected impact of 
industrial-country growth on loan demand, it 
would appear that private financing for de- 
veloping countries will still be available at a 
level commensurate with the aggregate 
financing requirements they will have for 
this type of borrowing. Private lenders 
have, however, become increasingly cautious 
about their exposure in some individual de- 
veloping countries. The linkage of new 
lending to borrowing countries' action to 
manage efficiently their payments deficit 
should receive even more emphasis than in 
the past. 

The increasingly selective nature of pri- 
vate lending means that individual countries 
encountering unexpected difficulties or de- 
lays in their adjustment process could find 

May 2, 1977 


their accustomed access to private markets 
weakened. Such financing problems could 
become acute, especially in the event of any 
slackening in the export performance of 
developing countries, which means in turn 
slackening in the rate of growth in the in- 
dustrial countries and the world economy 
generally. Import restrictions by the major 
industrial-country markets on which de- 
veloping countries depend could be particu- 
larly significant in aggravating any financial 
difficulties of this group of countries. 

There are certainly grounds for caution, 
since the large surpluses accruing to oil- 
exporting countries will continue for several 
more years. The problem of economic 
adjustment to that deficit will be a continu- 
ing one, and developing countries should for 
several more years continue to have a 
balance-of-payments deficit roughly of the 
current magnitude. 

In this situation, several major conclu- 
sions emerge: 

1. Economic growth in the poorer 
developing countries will require a substan- 
tial rise in concessional lending. Their ex- 
ternal financial situation does not depend on 
private markets. 

2. In order to maintain creditworthiness 
in private capital markets, the middle and 
higher income developing countries must be 
prepared to improve their debt management 
and to make the adjustments necessary in 
their own economies, even in some cases at 
the cost of reducing recent growth. 

3. The growth of the exports of these 
countries and their access to industrial- 
country markets will be critical to their 
long-term process of adjustment. 

4. The linkage of new lending to 
performance criteria is increasingly impor- 
tant for all lenders. 

5. Close attention must be given to insure 
that the international financial mechanisms, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, 
have adequate resources to respond effi- 
ciently to the financing needs of developing 
and other countries facing temporary 
financing difficulties. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

U.S. Security Assistance Policy 
for Latin America 

Following is a statement by Terence A. 
Todman, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, before the Subcommittee 
oh Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Committee on International Relations on 
April 5. * 

I am pleased to appear before this sub- 
committee to discuss our security assistance 
programs for Latin America. 

The United States for many years has 
maintained close working ties with the Latin 
American military, both in purely military- 
to-military terms and in dealing with indi- 
vidual military leaders in their capacity as 
presidents and ministers of the various gov- 
ernments in the region. 

This long association has developed an 
arms relationship with the Latin American 
countries that has helped us maintain access 
to their military establishments, a matter of 
some importance since 15 Latin American 
and Caribbean nations today are governed 
by or under the aegis of the armed forces. 
Security assistance to these governments 
thus is a political tool that provides us an 
opportunity to exert some influence on their 
attitudes and actions. It is, in short, a 
means for protecting or advancing our inter- 
ests, which are many and varied. 

Among those interests in sharpest relief 
today is our commitment to the defense of 
human rights. President Carter has made 
that commitment a priority consideration 
that will help shape our foreign relations in 
the years ahead. His Administration is ad- 
justing the attitudes of the executive branch 
to conform to the demands of the country, 
which are reflected in this Congress, for a 
foreign policy that is based on values the 
United States prizes most highly. 

Another is his interest in limiting the role 
of the United States as arms supplier to the 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletin 

world and changing the thrust of our policies 
to the promotion of disarmament. 

In the region for which I have responsibil- 
ity for U.S. foreign relations, this means the 
United States will strongly support local ini- 
tiatives seeking to lessen the burden of ar- 
maments. We would hope that flowing from 
such initiatives will come a reduction of 
tensions and the strengthening of stability 
which has allowed the countries of Latin 
America to pursue their affairs at peace 
with one another. A specific case is our 
support for the Declaration of Ayacucho, 
signed in December 1974 by the Andean 
states plus Argentina and Panama. The in- 
tent of the signatories is to arrive at 
arrangements that restrict the acquisition of 
offensive weapons. 

We have more traditional interests in the 
region that engage our diplomatic energies. 
None could be classed as strategic concerns 
that are vital to the safety and well-being of 
the United States. Yet there are latent se- 
curity interests which must be attended 
with some care, among them the Panama 
Canal and its approaches, our lines of com- 
munication in the Caribbean, and the 
maintenance of important sealanes in the 

There is, finally, the range of economic 
interests we have in maintaining access to 
Latin American and Caribbean raw 
materials, our position in the foreign trade 
of the region, and the promotion and protec- 
tion of extensive investments of the Ameri- 
can private sector. 

In this brief review of our political- 
military relations in the hemisphere, I would 
like to take this opportunity to put our secu- 
rity assistance programs into some 

Ten or fifteen years ago, the United 
States was the principal source of arma- 
ments for the countries of the region. From 
the middle to the late 1960's, however, that 
relationship began to change radically, so 
that today we rank fourth or even fifth as 
the area's arms supplier. In fiscal year 1975, 
for example, new orders under our FMS 
[foreign military sales] program for Latin 

America totaled $174.9 million. In fiscal 
year 1976, a five-quarter year, they were 
under $100 million. We do not have figures 
for the current fiscal year, of course. The 
Carter Administration's request for new 
FMS credit financing for fiscal year 1978 is 
$140.5 million for the region as a whole. I 
would expect actual new orders to fall far 
short of this in fiscal year 1978. 

The U.S. share of the total Latin 
American market for the past two years has 
been under 15 percent. Of what we did sell 
in that period, only about 25 percent went 
for major items such as aircraft, ships, 
weapons, ammunition, and the like. The bal- 
ance is for spare parts, supporting noncom- 
bat equipment, and supporting services in- 
cluding training. 

A number of factors have contributed to 
this tailing-off in our arms transfers to the 
region in recent years. One that is impor- 
tant, but which is frequently overlooked, is 
our restrictive transfer policy of limiting the 
sophistication and quantities of armaments 
that we will permit to be sold in Latin 
America, particularly to the smaller and 
poorer countries. 

However, even for the larger and richer 
countries, we refuse to sell aircraft more 
advanced than the F-5 and A-4 level of 
sophistication. We also deny the sale of cer- 
tain advanced-technology weapons — smart 
bombs, laser-guided missiles — uncon- 
ventional munitions like napalm and flame- 
throwers, and major combatant naval ves- 
sels. Other munitions not prohibited by 
regional policy are still denied in some cases; 
these include certain short-range tactical 

Imposing limits of this kind often is 
widely seen in Latin America as arbitrary 
and patronizing, particularly with the larger 
countries which today have significant 
arms-manufacturing capabilities of their 
own. In any case, most governments in the 
area have developed important arms 
relationships with Western Europe, Israel, 
and the Soviet Union. In a real sense, our 
restrictive policies have been an incentive 
for the Latin American military to turn to 
these suppliers, even though in many cases 

May 2, 1977 


we know they would have preferred to deal 
with American suppliers. 

Recent actions by five governments 
rejecting fiscal year 1978 security assistance 
underscore the independence of Latin 
America in this and other fields. Their sharp 
reaction to our surveys of human rights 
practices in their countries, stipulated by 
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
reflected their deep attachment to the prin- 
ciples of sovereignty and noninterference in 
internal affairs. 

Quite apart from the requirements of the 
law for future security assistance programs. 
President Carter, as I said at the outset, 
has made it clear he believes that human 
rights considerations are a matter of proper 
international concern. The governments of 
Latin America know this. 

As we look at the wide scope of our inter- 
ests and concerns in the region, we face an 
important question: How do we, working to- 
gether with these governments, find ways of 
achieving improvements in the way the 
people of this hemisphere are treated? It is 
not a black-or-white proposition but, rather, 
a complex question which must be 
approached with great sensitivity. 

We submit that wholesale elimination or 
even substantial reduction of our security 
assistance programs in Latin America would 
be inadvisable. Such an abrupt approach 
now, after maintaining political-military re- 
lationships with these governments dating 
back to and beyond the Second World War, 
would produce widespread resentment and 
alienation. We cannot predict the results of 
such an approach — whether it might produce 
improvements in the human rights situation 
in these countries or, paradoxically, bring 
about even worse conditions. 

We hope therefore that the executive 
branch will be allowed leeway to work with 
the military in Latin America, using the 
traditional tools of a relatively modest secu- 
rity assistance program to take advantage of 
whatever opportunities we might have to 
advance the cause of human rights and our 
other real interests in the hemisphere. That 
remains the central issue. 

Fifth-Year Review of Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement Begins 

Joint U.S. -Canadian Statement 

Press release 177 dated April 1-1 

Senior Canadian and United States offi- 
cials met in Washington on April 13 to begin 
the joint review of progress made since 1972 
under the terms of the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement. The Agreement was de- 
signed to enable the two countries to under- 
take a coordinated effort to clean up and 
preserve the Great Lakes. Article IX of the 
Agreement stipulates that the two countries 
jointly review the effectiveness of programs 
carried out under terms of the accord during 
the first five years of its operation. The 
Canadian delegation consisted of represen- 
tatives of the Federal Government and the 
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 

Since 1972 substantial progress has been 
made under the Agreement. Many of the 
remedial programs are working well, but 
much remains to be done. The review will 
entail an indepth assessment of all of the 
measures undertaken by the two countries 
to restore the lakes and keep them healthy. 
It is anticipated that the review will be 
completed before the end of the year. 

Over the next several months, meetings 
with the public in Great Lakes communities 
will be held on both sides of the border. 
Those meetings, the results of the 
comprehensive review by the Governments 
and the work already undertaken by the In- 
ternational Joint Commission, will enable 
the two countries to determine how they 
may reaffirm their continuing commitment 
to the objectives of the Agreement and re- 
spond to various proposals to strengthen the 
Agreement to meet new water quality 

President Carter and Prime Minister 
Trudeau, in their meeting last February, 
emphasized the importance they attach to 
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Program 

Following is a statement by John A. 
Ferch, Director of the Office of Food Policy 
and Program*, submitted to the Subcommit- 
tee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutri- 
tion, and Forestry on April 5. 1 

I would like to speak about the future of 
the Public Law 480 program. I believe we 
can be proud of the past. The food aid ac- 
tivities of the United States since World 
War II, I believe, have been a major contri- 
bution to the welfare of all mankind. We 
must now, however, look to the future. Will 
there be a need for P.L. 480 over the next 
10 years, and if so, how should we structure 
its provisions? I believe there will be such a 
need. Our ultimate objective, to be sure, is 
a world in which U.S. food assistance is no 
longer necessary. However, we are still far 
from that situation. The food deficits of 
many developing countries are large and 
growing worse. P.L. 480 is more vital to 
them than ever. 

I therefore believe that the P.L. 480 pro- 
gram should be continued and strengthened. 
The latter objective can be furthered in 
several ways: 

— First, by gradually increasing the por- 
tion of food aid which we give for humanitar- 
ian purposes under title II. 

— Second, by improving the development 
focus of our P.L. 480 programs. 

— Third, by continuing the market de- 
velopment and foreign policy uses of P.L. 
480 which have served our country so well 
in the past. 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

I leave it to representatives from the De- 
partment of Agriculture to speak to the role 
of P.L. 480 in furthering domestic agricul- 
tural and market development purposes. I 
will address myself to its international as- 
pects, which can be divided into 
humanitarian, developmental, and foreign 
policy considerations. I also will offer a few 
remarks about P.L. 480 legislation and at- 
tempt to relate P.L. 480 to our emerging 
North-South policy. 

The title II humanitarian food aid pro- 
gram reflects the desire of the American 
people to see hunger, malnutrition, and 
suffering alleviated throughout the world. 
The program, which should be continued and 
strengthened in the years ahead, serves 
several important purposes. Title II food 
aid, through our management control sys- 
tem, can be targeted to the highest priority 
and neediest groups in recipient countries. 
Title II is the major U.S. emergency food 
aid response for victims of natural and 
manmade disasters. It also is our principal 
source of supply for world food projects op- 
erated by the World Food Program, 
UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], 
and other U.N. bodies. We look to the 
United Nations to continue to guide this as- 
pect of multilateral assistance, and we 
ourselves will maintain a generous contribu- 

As title II programs evolve in the years 
ahead, I believe we should emphasize 
projects with a maximum development link- 
age. While helping to feed hungry and needy 
individuals, U.S. food programs also should 
help them to grow food and better provide 
for themselves. 

This brings me to the broader issue of 
food aid and its contribution to development. 
American food assistance over the past 20 

May 2, 1977 


years has contributed significantly to the 
well-being and development of many Third 
World countries by combating hunger and 
maintaining minimum health levels. 
Productivity and income levels have been 
raised. In addition, provision of P.L. 480 
products has eased balance-of-payments con- 
straints. Their sale in the local market has 
supplemented limited budgets and thereby 
permitted many governments to direct a 
greater portion of their scarce resources to- 
ward development activities. 

Notwithstanding such achievements, 
donor governments have been under attack 
in recent years for failing to establish a 
more direct relationship between their food 
aid and recipient countries' economic and so- 
cial needs. It has been alleged that food aid 
has, on occasion, actually hindered develop- 
ment by depressing local food prices and 
thereby serving as a disincentive to local 
food production. Also, some argue that it 
has permitted recipient governments to 
postpone policy reform necessary to 
stimulate agricultural development. 

Although I believe that the evidence of 
actual situations in which P.L. 480 has had 
an adverse development impact is quite 
slim, I recognize the theoretical basis of the 
argument. Accordingly, the Administration 
supports without reservation efforts to make 
the P.L. 480 program contribute more 
directly to the economic development of re- 
cipient countries. Food aid is a particularly 
versatile means of supporting development 
programs since either it can be made 
available in kind to those sectors of the 
population engaged in the programs, or 
through sale in the commercial markets of 
the country, it can provide the financing 
necessary to sustain more sophisticated as- 
pects of the development plan. 

Importance of Multi-Year Commitments 

If we are to more strongly support 
long-term development objectives with our 
P.L. 480 programs, we need to be able to 
negotiate long-term multi-year food aid 
commitments. Several proposals have been 
made along these lines, which we wish to 

review carefully. Long-term commitments 
can help us assure that P.L. 480 programs 
foster and contribute to agricultural 
production and do not act as a disincentive. 
Stable and assured U.S. food aid supplies 
over a period of several years would facili- 
tate development planning and would enable 
countries to undertake more far-reaching 
agricultural reform programs. P.L. 480 
commodities provided in support of a de- 
velopment plan also can be more readily 
directed toward the poorest sectors of soci- 

In the past, P.L. 480 often has been 
treated as a variable by the United States. 
That is, commodities are made available for 
the program only when the Secretary of Ag- 
riculture determines that domestic require- 
ments, carryover, and commercial export 
needs have been met. These are valid con- 
cerns, but the Secretary should be given 
some flexibility to assure that P.L. 480 
commodities can be continued for multi-year 
commitments or for emergency situations. 
Inclusion of new authority along these lines 
in new P.L. 480 legislation, as proposed by 
Secretary of Agriculture [Bob S.] Bergland, 
would help to insure that the sharp cutbacks 
in volume which occurred in our P.L. 480 
programs in 1973 and 1974 during years of 
tight supply would not be repeated. 

In this connection, I believe it would be 
useful to examine the desirability of a small 
P.L. 480 reserve which could provide fur- 
ther assurance that multi-year commitments 
could be met and would help to stabilize 
P.L. 480 programing levels during years of 
short domestic supply. 

The question of how much P.L. 480 should 
be directed to multi-year developmental 
programs at this time is difficult to assess. 
Unfortunately, few Third World govern- 
ments today are undertaking the 
comprehensive agricultural development 
programs of the type I describe above. We 
estimate that the amount currently made 
available for "grant back" will more than 
adequately accommodate our needs for 
multi-year development programing in the 
years immediately ahead. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Foreign Policy Aspects 

Turning now to my third point, I recog- 
nize that the foreign policy aspect of P.L. 
480 often is spoken of as a misuse of the 
food aid program. I do not agree. I believe 
the authors of Public Law 480 were wise 
when they wrote into its preamble that 
among other things the program should be 
used "to promote in other ways the foreign 
policy of the United States." Most often 
people criticize using P.L. 480 assistance for 
foreign policy purposes when they disagree 
with the particular foreign policy goal being 
pursued. It is certainly valid to discuss the 
desirability of our various policies or even 
the efficacy of using P.L. 480 to help to 
achieve them, but it is not very realistic to 
suggest that P.L. 480 is somehow tainted by 
such use. If by use of the P.L. 480 program 
we can make some contribution to the pros- 
pect for peace in the Middle East, help to 
resolve the situation in southern Africa, as- 
sist Portugal's evolution into a prosperous 
European democratic nation, or make some 
other contribution to our overall foreign 
policy, we should do so. 

In a sense, of course, division of the in- 
ternational aspects of P.L. 480 into separate 
categories is misleading. Almost every 
program has aspects of all three — 
humanitarian, developmental, and 
political — intertwined in it. Which is the 
major motivation or result in any particular 
program could be, and often is, argued. In 
any case, though we should be sure that any 
program is justified on economic and human- 
itarian grounds, we should not regard those 
inspired mainly by foreign policy consid- 
erations as in any way undesirable. In terms 
of priority, I believe we should continue to 
give first emphasis to those programs 
predicated mainly on humanitarian and de- 
velopmental considerations. This is funda- 
mental to the philosophy which inspires our 
food aid programs. 

In discussing the foreign policy aspects of 
P.L. 480, I believe it would be appropriate 
to refer briefly to the question of human 
rights. It is not necessary for me to 
emphasize to you the Administration's con- 

cern for human rights throughout the world. 
President Carter and Secretary Vance, by 
their actions and words, have done so 
already. The Administration already has 
made plain that human rights considerations 
will be taken into account in all aspects of 
our foreign affairs. I can assure you that 
they also will be considered fully in the ad- 
ministration of the P.L. 480 program. 

Both Congress and the executive have 
made a distinction in the application of 
human rights criteria to various forms of in- 
ternational assistance between those forms 
of aid which are of direct benefit to the 
people and those which mainly assist the 
government apparatus and only indirectly 
affect the people. P.L. 480, both title I and 
title II, is in almost every instance of direct 
benefit to the people of a country. Either 
they receive food free, or the supply of food 
which they can purchase is expanded. I 
think this is an important consideration. 

Extension and Amendment of the Legislation 

Let me turn now to P.L. 480 legislation 
and make a few comments which I believe 
are important. 

Secretary Bergland indicated in his 
testimony that the Administration supports 
a four-year extension of the law and I want 
to explain the rationale for that request. A 
four-year extension is necessary if we are 
going to begin to negotiate the type of 
multi-year development-oriented food aid 
programs I have discussed above. It would 
help to integrate food aid into our emerging 
North-South strategy and would signal both 
recipient developing countries and other 
food aid donors that the United States in- 
tends to work seriously toward the food aid 
goals agreed to at the World Food Confer- 
ence of 1974. I believe a four-year extension 
would be consistent with Congress' own de- 
sire to make our food aid both more 
supportive of long-term development efforts 
in food-deficit countries and responsive to 
their immediate and growing food needs. 
Finally, it would permit the United States 
to participate in renegotiation of the Food 
Aid Convention, which expires in June 1978. 

May 2, 1977 


Our failure to participate would lead to the 
collapse of the convention, thereby 
undermining progress made at, and since, 
the World Food Conference to (1) make food 
aid a more universal responsibility and (2) 
rationalize the allocation of food aid. 

I also strongly support the Administra- 
tion's proposed amendment of section 111 of 
the law, which provides that at least 75 per- 
cent of title I programs be directed to 
countries with per capita GNP [gross na- 
tional product] under $300. We propose to 
use the IDA [International Development 
Association] poverty criterion — currently 
$520 per capita — to replace the $300 per 
capita GNP figure because the latter has 
caused programing difficulties this year 
which will become worse in 1978. 

Let me explain in more detail what I 

In fiscal year 1977, the food aid require- 
ments of a number of countries in the Indian 
Subcontinent will be less than anticipated in 
the initial allocations table which the Admin- 
istration sent to Congress in September 
1976. Our first priority has been to use this 
shortfall to increase programs for other 
countries in the 75 percent category. We 
have had some success in doing this, but 
there are limits to the number of countries 
in the under-$300 category which might be 
suitable candidates for title I food assist- 

Meanwhile, we have received a number of 
food aid requests from countries in the 25 
percent category. Our general policy has 
been to keep these requests under review 
until we can more accurately assess the 
future food aid requirements this year of 
countries in the 75 percent category. If we 
cannot effectively reprogram food aid to 
countries in the 75 percent category, we will 
then begin to act on new and expanded pro- 
grams for countries in the 25 percent cate- 
gory. The Administration is likely to make a 
judgment on this in the spring. Congress 
will be informed. 

Next year our programing situation will 
become even more complicated under the 
75/25 provision. One of largest food aid 
recipients, Egypt, is expected to cross the 
$300 per capita line, and other food aid re- 

cipients, or potential food aid recipients, 
may do so also. To maintain a large program 
for Egypt and still meet the 75/25 require- 
ments in these circumstances would require 
substantial reprograming to other countries 
in the 75 percent category and a very sharp 
cutback in the already limited food resources 
available for the 25 percent countries. In 
fact, the cutback to the 25 percent countries 
would be so sharp that we would have little 
or no food aid left for programing to other 
countries. Clearly this situation would be 
highly undesirable. 

Relations With the Developing Countries 

Before concluding, I would like to under- 
score the importance of P.L. 480 in the 
broader context of our relations with the 
developing countries. As you are all aware, 
the developing countries as a group criticize 
the structure of their relations with the de- 
veloped countries and demand change. Food 
aid has not been exempt from such criticism. 
While much of it has been emotional and ill 
founded, on certain points we must accept 
the merits of the argument. This is espe- 
cially true with regard to our previous 
inability to commit food aid to multi-year 

The food problems of many developing 
countries in the years immediately ahead 
are projected to reach very significant mag- 
nitudes for many reasons. P.L. 480 alone 
cannot meet those projected food needs. For 
this reason, our policy has been patterned 
on the conclusions of the World Food Con- 
ference of 1974. That is, food production in 
Third World food-deficit countries must be 
increased and world food trade liberalized in 
order to maximize world production, and 
world food security should be enhanced 
through an international system of nation- 
ally held grain reserves. We address the 
first point through the AID [Agency for In- 
ternational Development] program, the sec- 
ond through our stance in the trade negotia- 
tions in Geneva, and the third through our 
proposals at the International Wheat Council. 

At this time I would like to stress the 
complementarity of food aid and interna- 
tional grain reserves. Under normal 


Department of State Bulletin 

circumstances even food-deficit countries 
can afford to meet a portion of their food 
needs through commercial imports. How- 
ever, in 1973 and 1974 many Third World 
purchasers were forced to devote a signifi- 
cant portion of their earnings to food im- 
ports when grain prices increased sharply. 
An international system of grain reserves 
would moderate the price increases and 
would make available additional grain for 
commercial sales during low production 
years. Such a system thus would hold the 
need for food aid to a minimum. It also 
would have positive budgetary implications 
for both developed and developing countries. 

For an international system of reserves to 
function smoothly, however, it must treat 
the world market for grains as a whole and 
not attempt to deal directly with the food 
needs of the Third World market. Only in 
this way can reserves dampen the price cy- 
cle. With your support, the Administration 
intends to continue both to press for the 
adoption of an international system of grain 
reserves and to increase the funding of its 
food aid programs. 

In summary, I strongly support the ex- 
tension of the P.L. 480 Act. P.L. 480 has 
been one of the real successes among the 
programs begun by this nation in the wake 
of the Second World War. It can be im- 
proved, however, and I am confident that an 
even better law will emerge from Congress 
this year. 


Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976.' 
Signatures: United Kingdom, January 7, 1977; 

Uruguay, April 5, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Philippines, April 4, 1977. 


Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of 
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo 
June 20, 1975. ' 

Notification of approval: United States, April 8, 
1977, for recommendations VII 1—3, VIIU4, and 
VIII-6 through VIII-14; VIII-1, VIII-2, and 
Y 1 1 1-5 accepted as interim guidelines. 

Atomic Energy 

Protocol prolonging the agreement of April 4, 1975 
(TIAS 8051), for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Israel of 
July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 
5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for cooperation con- 
cerning civil uses of atomic anergy. Signed at Vienna 
April 7, 1977. Entered into force April 7, 1977. 
Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Israel, United States. 


International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into 
force October 1, 1976, provisionally. 
Ratification deposited: Tanzania, April 4, 1977. 


Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of as- 
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bac- 
teriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva 
June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928: 
for the United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061. 
Accession deposited: Jordan, January 20, 1977. 2 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Guinea, April 1, 1977. 


Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Filtered into force April 18, 1973; for the United 
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 
Ratification deposited: Holy See, April 4, 1977. 



Agreement relating to the establishment of an experi- 
mental Loran-C power chain in the vicinity of the 
St. Marys River, Michigan-Ontario, with annex. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 
29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977, effec- 
tive August 1, 1975. 


Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guaran- 
tee provisions of the agreement of April 9, 1962, as 

1 Not in force. 

2 With reservation. 

May 2, 1977 


amended (TIAS 5330, 6943), for civil uses of atomic 
energy. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota 
March 28, 1977. Entered into force March 28, 1977. 


Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guaran- 
tee provisions of the agreement of July 12, 1955, as 
amended, including associated understandings (TIAS 
3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for 
civil uses of atomic energy. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington April 7 and 8, 1977. Entered 
into force April 8, 1977. 


Loan agreement relating to housing for low-income 
families, with annex. Signed at Lisbon March 4, 
1977. Entered into force March 4, 1977. 


GPO Sales Publications 

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of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown 
below, which include domestic postage, are subject to 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A 
complete set of all Background Notes currently in 
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription serv- 
ice for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — 
$23.10; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those 
listed below are available at 350 each. 

Jamaica Cat. No. S1.123:J22 

Pub. 8080 4 pp. 

Mauritius Cat. No. SI. 123:M44 

Pub. 8023 4 pp. 

Senegal Cat. No. S1.123:SE5 

Pub. 7820 4 pp. 

Syria Cat. No. SI. 123:SY8 

Pub. 7761 8 pp. 

Hurricane Rural Reconstruction and Recovery. 

Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8366. 50 pp. 70(Z. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8366). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Korea 
amending the agreement of February 18, 1976, as 
amended. TIAS 8380. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8380). 

Inter-American Development Bank. Amendments to 
the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended, 
Washington, June 1, 1976. TIAS 8383. 155 pp. $2.20. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8383). 

Oil Pollution. Agreement with Bermuda. TIAS 8396. 
4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8396). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egypt. 
TIAS 8406. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8406). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft 
Products. Agreement with the Polish People's Repub- 
lic. TIAS 8407. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8407). 

Collecting and Conserving Water Supplies From 
Surface Runoff. Agreement with Abu Dhabi. TIAS 
8408. 26 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8408). 

Conservation of Polar Bears. Agreement with other 
governments. TIAS 8409. 15 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8409). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with El Salvador 
terminating the agreement of April 19, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 8410. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8410). 

Narcotic Drugs — Additional Equipment, Material 
and Technical Support to Curb Illegal Traffic. 

Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8411. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8411). 

Frequency Modulation Broadcasting. Agreement 
with Mexico amending the agreement of November 9, 
1972, as amended. TIAS 8412. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 

Organization of American States Convention on Ter- 
rorism. Convention with other governments. TIAS 

8413. 34 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8413). 

Telecommunications — Facilities of Radio Ceylon. 

Agreement with Sri Lanka extending the agreement of 
Mav 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended. TIAS 

8414. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8414). 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 8415. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 

Earthquake Assistance. Agreement with Italy. TIAS 
8416. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8416). 

Claims — Marcona Mining Company. Agreement with 
Peru. TIAS 8417. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8417). 

Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur- 
suant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. Agreement with Greece. TIAS 
8418. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8418). 

Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur- 
suant to the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Agreement with In- 
donesia. TIAS 8419. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8419). 

Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur- 
suant to the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Agreement with 
Ecuador. TIAS 8420. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8420). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 2. 197: Vol. LXXVI, No. 19'i 

Arms Control and Disarmament. I Car- 
ter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Pol- 
icy (statement, excerpts from remarks and 
questions and answers) 129 

Canada. Fifth-Year Review of Great Lai 
Water Quality Agreement Begins (joint U.S.- 
Canadian statement) 446 


Department Discusses Debt Situations of Develop- 
ing Countries and the Role of Private Banks 

ken Ill 

[Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Pro- 

>ch) 447 

Security Assistance Policy for Latin 
America (Todman) ill 

Developing Countries 

rtment Discusses Debt Situations of De- 
iping Countries and the Role of Private 

'i 441 

Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Pro- 
gram ( Fercn ) 447 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses Debt Situations of De- 
veloping Countries and the Role of Prix 
Ranks (Boeker) 441 

U.S. Urges Global View of Water Resource Prob- 
lems (Warren) 437 

Egypt. President Sadat of Egypt Visits Washing- 
ton (Cartel', Sadat ) 134 


Fifth-Year Review of Great Lakes Water Qu. 
Agreement Begins (joint L'.S. -Canadian state- 
ment ) 446 

U.S. Urges Global View of Water Ri Prob- 
lems (Warren I 137 

Food. Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food 
Aid Program (Fei'ch) 447 

Foreign Aid 

Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid I 
gram I Fercn I 147 

U.S. Security Assistance Policy for Latin 
America (Todman) 444 

Human Rights. U.S. Security Assistance Policy 

for Latin America (Todman ) 444 

Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. Security 
Assistance Policy for Latin America (Todman). . 444 

Nuclear Energy. President Carter Announces 

Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy (statement, 
excerpts from remarks and questions and 
answers ) 429 

Presidential Documents 

President Caller Announces Decisions on Nuclear 

Power Policy 429 

President Sadat of Egypt Visits Washington 434 

World Trade Week, 1977 (proclamation) 440 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 

Trade. World Trade Week, 1977 (proclamation) .. 440 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 151 

United Nations. U.S. Urges Global View of 
Water Resource Problems (Warren) 437 

Name /,. 

Boeker, Paul H 441 

Carter, President 42!). 434, 440 

h John A 447 

Sadat . Anwar al- '. 434 

Todman. Terence A 444 

Warren. ( lharles Hugh 137 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations. Department of State. Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*174 4/11 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Sab 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on bulk chemicals, Mav 18. 

175 4/13 SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship 
design and equipment, May 10. 

17(1 4/13 Barbara M. Watson sworn in as Ad- 
ministrator of the Bureau of Secu- 
rity and Consular Affairs (bio- 

177 4/14 Fifth-year review of Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement begins. 
*178 4/14 Charles William Maynes sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Organization Affairs (bio- 
| hie data). 
14 .James F. Leonard sworn in as Dep- 
uty Representative to the United 
Nations (biographic data). 

180 4/14 Donald F. McHenry sworn in as Dep- 

uty Representative in the l T .N. Se- 
curity Council (biographic data). 

181 4/15 International social workers prog 

begins Apr. 25. 

s Not printed. 

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Volume LXXVI • No. 1976 • May 9, 1977 


Address by Assistant Secretary Schaufele 464 



Statements by Ambassador Young and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bolen 471 


For index see inside back core. 


Vol. LXXVI, No. 1976 
May 9, 1977 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
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international relations are also listed. 

President Carter's Pan American Day Address 1 

Hace tres arios, tuve el honor y placer de 
hablar ante la Asamblea General de la OEA 
celebrada en mi estado de Georgia. Igual 
que en Atlanta, hoy seguire el consejo de 
mis comparieros, que opinan — para el be- 
neficio de buenas relaciones — seria mejor 
que no hablara en espahol hoy. 

[Three years ago I had the honor and 
pleasure of speaking before the General As- 
sembly of the OAS held in my State of 
Georgia. As I did then in Atlanta, I will 
today follow the advice of my friends, who 
have the opinion that — in the interest of 
good relations — it would be better for me 
not to speak in Spanish today.] 

Since I can also speak English, I will shift 
to that language. 

That day in Atlanta three years ago, I 
shared with you some of the thoughts that 
my wife and I had brought back from our 
visits to several of the American states. I 
spoke particularly for the need for constant 
cooperation, consultation, and harmony 
among the nations of this hemisphere. I be- 
lieve that just as strongly today as Presi- 
dent of the United States as I did three 
years ago as Governor of Georgia. 

I am delighted to be with you in this 
beautiful House of the Americas. For nearly 
three decades the OAS has stood for mutual 
respect among sovereign nations for peace 
and the rule of law in this hemisphere. The 
OAS Charter pledges us to individual liberty 
and social justice. I come here now to re- 
state our own commitment to these goals. 

The challenge before us today, however, 
is not just to reaffirm those principles but to 

1 Made before the Permanent Council of the Organi- 
zation of American States at the Pan American Union 
at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 14 (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18). 

find ways to make them a reality. To do 
this, we must take account of the changes in 
our relationships that have taken place over 
the last 10 years, and we must candidly ac- 
knowledge the differences that exist among 
us. We must adapt our current policies and 
institutions to those changes so that we can 
pursue our goals more effectively. 

As nations of the New World, we once be- 
lieved that we would prosper in isolation 
from the Old World. But since the Second 
World War in particular, all of us have 
taken such vital roles in the world commu- 
nity that isolation would now be harmful to 
our own best interests and to other coun- 
tries. Our joining in the International Mone- 
tary Fund, the World Bank, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are all 
signs that we understand this. So is the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, which Raul Prebisch of 
Argentina made into an important forum of 
the developing world. Venezuela is now 
cochairing the Paris Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America is a source of many creative ideas 
on development throughout the world. The 
leaders of many Latin American nations 
have been the driving force behind 
improving North-South negotiations. 

In all these ways, the nations of Latin 
America were among the first in our chang- 
ing world to see the importance of adapting 
global institutions to the new realities of our 

The problems and the promises of our re- 
gion have become as diverse as the world 
itself. The economies of most Latin Ameri- 
can nations have been developing rapidly, 
although of course at different rates. Some 

May 9, 1977 


have an impressive rate of growth. Some, a 
few, are among the poorest in the develop- 
ing world. Some have abundant energy re- 
sources; others are desperately short of 
energy. Some of our countries export 
primary products only. Some have become 
major exporters of advanced manufactured 
goods, while others export little at all. Your 
problems of market access, technology 
transfer, and debt management sometimes 
defy regional solutions. 

In addition to economic diversity, we have 
all developed widely varied forms and 
philosophies of government. This diversity 
has brought national pride and national 
strength. And as you've played more inde- 
pendent and important roles in world 
politics, we have all begun to construct more 
normal and more balanced and more equal 

Basic Elements of New Approach 

In the light of these changes, a single 
U.S. policy toward Latin America and the 
Caribbean makes little sense. What we need 
is a wider and a more flexible approach, 
worked out in close consultation with you. 
Together, we will develop policies more 
suited to each nation's variety and potential. 
In this process, I will be particularly 
concerned that we not seek to divide the na- 
tions of Latin America one from another or 
to set Latin America apart from the rest of 
the world. Our own goal is to address 
problems in a way which will lead to produc- 
tive solutions — globally, regionally, and 

Our new approach will be based on three 
basic elements: 

First of all is a high regard for the indi- 
viduality and the sovereignty of each Latin 
American and Caribbean nation. We will not 
act abroad in ways that we would not toler- 
ate at home in our own country. 

Second is our respect for human rights, a 
respect which is also so much a part of your 
own tradition. Our values and yours require 
us to combat abuses of individual freedom, 
including those caused by political, social, 
and economic injustice. Our own concern for 

these values will naturally influence our re- 
lations with the countries of this hemisphere 
and throughout the world. You will find this 
country, the United States of America, 
eager to stand beside those nations which 
respect human rights and which promote 
democratic ideals. 

Third is our desire to press forward on 
the great issues which affect the relations 
between the developed and the developing na- 
tions. Your economic problems are also 
global in character and cannot be dealt with 
solely on regional terms. 

However, some of our own global policies 
are of particular interest to other American 
states. When major decisions are made in 
these areas, we will consult with you. 

— The United States will take a positive 
and an open attitude toward the negotiation 
of agreements to stabilize commodity prices, 
including the establishment of a common 
funding arrangement for financing buffer 
stocks where they are a part of individual 
and negotiated agreements. 

— We will actively pursue the multilateral 
trade negotiations with your governments in 
Geneva, Switzerland. We are committed to 
minimize trade restrictions and to take into 
account the specific trade problems of de- 
veloping countries and to provide special 
and more favorable treatment where feasi- 
ble and appropriate. We believe that this is 
in our mutual interest and that it will create 
important new opportunities for Latin 
American trade. 

— Our own science and technology can be 
useful to many of your countries. For in- 
stance, we are ready to train your techni- 
cians to use more information gathered by 
our own satellites, so that you can make 
better judgments on management of your 
resources and your environment. Space 
communications technology can also be a 
creative tool in helping your national 
television systems to promote your educa- 
tional and cultural objectives. 

— I have asked Congress to meet in full 
our pledges to the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the other multilat- 
eral lending institutions which loan a high 


Department of State Bulletin 

proportion of their capital to the relatively 
advanced developing countries of Latin 

— And finally, we are directing more and 
more of our bilateral economic assistance to 
the poorer countries. We are also prepared 
to explore with other nations new ways of 
being helpful on a wide range of institu- 
tional, human development, and technolog- 
ical approaches which might enable them to 
deal more effectively with the problems of 
the needy. All of us have a special responsi- 
bility to help the poorest countries in the 
world as well as the poorest people in each 
of our countries. 

I would like to add a word about private 
investment. Your governments are under- 
standably interested in setting rules that 
will encourage private investors to play an 
important role in your development. We 
support your efforts and recognize that a 
new flexibility and adaptability are required 
today for foreign investment to be most use- 
ful in combining technology, capital man- 
agement, and market experience to meet 
your development needs. We will do our 
part in this field to avoid differences and 
misunderstandings between your govern- 
ments and ours. 

Global and Regional Challenges 

One of the most significant political trends 
of our time is the relationship between the 
developing nations of the world and the in- 
dustrialized countries. We benefit from your 
advice and counsel, and we count on you to 
contribute your constructive leadership and 
help guide us in this North-South dialogue. 

We also hope to work with all nations to 
halt the spread of nuclear explosive 
capabilities. The states of Latin America 
took the initiative 10 years ago when you set 
up the first nuclear-free zone in any 
populated area of the world. The Treaty of 
Tlatelolco is a model worthy of our own ad- 
miration. For our part the United States 
will sign, and I will ask the Senate to ratify, 
protocol I of the treaty prohibiting the 
placement of nuclear weapons in Latin 

However, banning the spread of nuclear 
explosives does not require giving up the 
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We 
mean to work closely with all of you on new 
technologies to use the atom for peaceful 

To slow the costly buildup of conventional 
arms, we are seeking global policies of re- 
straint. We are showing restraint in our own 
policies around the world, and we will be 
talking to supplier nations and to prospec- 
tive buyers about ways to work out a com- 
mon approach. We also believe that regional 
agreements among producers and pur- 
chasers of arms can further such a global ef- 

I spent most of this morning working on a 
new U.S. policy to reduce the sale of conven- 
tional arms around the world. Again, you in 
Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge 
of eight South American nations to limit the 
acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a 
striking example. If the eight nations can im- 
plement their pledge, their own people will not 
be the only ones to benefit. They will have 
set a standard for others throughout the world 
to follow. 

These are challenges that face us in the 
future. There are also problems that plague 
us from the past. And we must work 
together to solve them. 

One that addresses itself to us is the 
Panama Canal. In the first days of my own 
Administration, just a few weeks ago, I 
directed a new approach to our negotiations 
with Panama on a new canal treaty. In the 
light of the changes which I discussed be- 
fore, the treaty of 1903, which combines 
[defines] our relationship with Panama on 
the canal, is no longer appropriate or effec- 

I am firmly committed to negotiating in as 
timely a fashion as possible a new treaty 
which will take into account Panama's 
legitimate needs as a sovereign nation and 
our own interests and yours in the efficient 
operation of a neutral canal open on a non- 
discriminatory basis to all users. 

Another problem which we must in a way 
address together is that of Cuba. We believe 
that normal conduct of international affairs 

May 9, 1 977 


and particularly the negotiation of differ- 
ences require communication with all coun- 
tries in the world. To these ends, we are 
seeking to determine whether relations with 
Cuba can be improved on a measured and a 
reciprocal basis. 

I am dedicated to freedom of movement 
between nations. I have removed restric- 
tions on U.S. citizens who want to travel 
abroad. Today there are no restrictions im- 
posed by our country. Today I have also 
removed similar travel restrictions on resi- 
dent aliens in the United States. 

We seek to encourage international travel, 
and we must take greater account of 
problems that transcend national borders. 
Drugs and international crime, including 
terrorism, challenge traditional concepts of 
diplomacy. For the well-being of our 
peoples, we must cooperate on these issues. 
With each passing year they will occupy a 
more and more central place in our delibera- 

Constructive Role of the OAS 

I have a longstanding interest in the OAS, 
and I very much want to see it play an in- 
creasingly constructive role. 

The General Assembly of the OAS has 
been an important forum for the direct ex- 
change of views among our governments. 
Such ministerial consultations are extremely 
useful. They allow us to apply our own col- 
lective strength to political and economic 

The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has performed valuable serv- 
ices. It deserves increased support from all 
our governments. We believe deeply in the 
preservation and the enhancement of human 
rights, and the United States will work to- 
ward coordinated and multilateral action in 
this field. The United States will sign, and I 
will seek Senate approval of, the American 
Convention on Human Rights negotiated 
several years ago in Costa Rica. And we will 
support, in cooperation with international 
agencies, broadened programs for aiding 
political refugees. I urge this organization 

and all its member states to take a more ac- 
tive role in the care, protection, and the re- 
settlement of political refugees. 

The peacekeeping function is firmly em- 
bedded in the OAS Charter. I want to en- 
courage the Secretary General of the OAS 
to continue his active and effective 
involvement in the search for peaceable so- 
lutions to several longstanding disputes in 
this hemisphere. The United States will 
support his efforts and initiatives. 

The OAS, of course, is not the only in- 
strument of cooperation among the nations 
of the Americas. The Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank is among the most 
important multilateral mechanisms for 
promoting development of the world today. 
By bringing in nations outside the Western 
Hemisphere, the IDB bears testimony to 
Latin America's growing involvement with the 
rest of the world. 

Within this hemisphere, many of you are 
working toward regional and subregional 
integration efforts, including those in the 
Caribbean, in the Central American Com- 
mon Market, and the Andean Pact; and we 
favor such efforts. They are the first steps 
toward Bolivar's vision of a hemisphere 

Let me conclude by bringing up a mat- 
ter that is particularly close to me because 
of my long interest in inter-American af- 
fairs. My wife and I have traveled and made 
many friends in Mexico and Brazil, the two 
largest and most rapidly changing countries 
in Latin America. And we have traveled 
elsewhere and made many friends in Central 
and South America. My wife is presently 
studying Spanish, along with the wife of the 
Secretary of State, and I have tried to keep 
up with my own Spanish that I learned at 
school. I have seen clearly how greatly our 
country has been blessed and enriched by 
the people and cultures of the Caribbean and 
Latin America. And we are bound 
together — and I see it very clearly — in cul- 
ture, history, and by common purposes and 

The United States actually has the fourth 
largest Spanish-speaking population in the 


Department of State Bulletin 

■ world. I tried to meet many of them during 
,- my campaign the last two years. And they 

gave me their support and their encourage- 
ment and their advice. The novels we read, 
/the music we hear, the sports that we 
I play — all reflect a growing consciousness of 

■ each other. 

These intellectual, social, cultural, and 
(■educational exchanges will continue, either 
I with or without government help. But there 
• are steps that governments can take to 
speed up and enhance this process. In the 
I months ahead, therefore, we plan to explore 
(with your governments — individually and 
here in the OAS — new people-to-people pro- 
grams, an increase in professional and scien- 
|tific exchanges, and other ways of 
strengthening the ties that already link us. 

The challenge we face is to awake our in- 
stitutions to a changing world. We must 
focus our attention on the problems which 
face our countries and tailor each solution to 
its problem. 

As you know, I am a new President. I've 
got a lot to learn. My heart and my interest 
to a major degree is in Latin America. I 
welcome every opportunity to strengthen 
the ties of friendship and a sense of common 
purpose and close consultation with the 
nations and the peoples of the Caribbean 
and Latin America. 

Many of you are leaders representing your 
own governments. I ask for your advice and 
your counsel and your support as we face 
problems together in the future. This means 
a lot to our country, and it means a lot to us 
also to have intimate bilateral and direct 
relationships with you. 

We look on the OAS, headquartered 
thankfully here in Washington, as a -channel 
through which we might learn more and 
receive advice and make plans for the fu- 

Simon Bolivar believed that we would 
reach our goals only with our peoples free 
and our governments working in harmony. I 
hope that the steps that I have outlined 
today and the commitments that I have 
made will move us toward those goals of 
peace and freedom. 

President Carter's News Conference 
of April 15 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on April 15. 1 

Q. Mr. President , in view of the Soviet 
reaction and your own reassessment so far, 
do you see any reason to change your SALT 
proposals? Also, do you see any validity in 
meeting with Secretary Brezhnev from time 
to time, starting this year? 

The President: I think that the Soviet re- 
sponse has been predictable. I've been 
somewhat concerned lately that they've de- 
cided to go public as much as they have. But 
I have to say that there is a very important 
distinction that ought to be drawn between 
private and determined and continuing 
negotiations, which are being pursued on 
the one hand, and the education of the pub- 
lic, the presentation of issues to people in 
our own country, which has always been the 
case since I've been in office. And it's very 
encouraging to know that now Mr. Brezhnev 
and his other leaders, through Pravda, are 
explaining the Soviet position to the people 
of Russia. 

So I see nothing wrong with the Soviet 
leadership giving their arguments and their 
excuses for not agreeing immediately to our 
drastic cut proposals to the Soviet people, 
but I do feel encouraged about it. 

As far as the — the other part of your 

Q. I asked, did you see any reason to 
change your proposals and also, do you 
plan a summit meeting with Brezhnev, and 
will you be having them from time to time? 

The President: I see no reason to change 
our proposals. We had two, as you re- 
member. One is to ratify the basic 
agreements of the Vladivostok discussions, 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18, 1977, p. 

May 9, 1977 


and the other one is a much more drastic re- 
duction in overall weapon capability. I see 
no reason to change those proposals. 

I would welcome a chance to meet with 
General Secretary Brezhnev on a continuing 
basis, annually at least, and I hope that 
later on this year that he and I might meet 
in our own country. I think it's good, 
though, not to predicate each meeting with 
the belief that some dramatic conclusion 
might be reached or some dramatic 
agreement might be reached. 

I hesitate and am reluctant to work under 
the pressure of having to come up with an 
agreement each time. I think it makes too 
much of an inclination for us to agree to 
things that might be counterproductive for 
our own nation's benefit, just in order to 
have some publicity derived from the 
agreement itself. 

Q. Mr. President, another question on 
strategic arms limitations. At least on the 
public record, which is growing daily, there 
seems to be a total impasse between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the 
solution to the problem. 

Now, do you believe that a meeting be- 
tween you and Mr. Brezhnev could help 
overcome that impasse? And, more gener- 
ally, you've been meeting with a lot of lead- 
ers. Do you feel that in meeting with foreign 
leaders you can help change their perception 
of what is actually in their national inter- 

The President: I wouldn't ever expect to 
change a foreign leader's opinion if he 
thought it was contrary to his own national 
interests, no. I have found, though, in my 
meetings with a number of foreign leaders 
already to be very helpful to me in 
understanding their particular perspective 
in trying to find some common ground on 
which agreements can be reached. 

The Middle East is one of the more 
notable examples of this. And by the end of 
May, I intend to have met with all the 
foreign leaders who will be involved in the 
Middle Eastern settlement, which we hope 
to see make progress this year. 

I don't consider the SALT talks at this 
point to have reached an impasse. There are 
continual discussions going on through 
normal diplomatic channels. I think that 
when we reconvene the Secretary-of-State- 
level discussions in Geneva in just a few 
weeks, we will have made some basic 
progress. The 8 or 10 discussion groups that 
were agreed to jointly by Mr. Brezhnev and 
Mr. Vance will be put into effect within the 
next two or three weeks, and a wide range 
of discussion of strategic arms limitations, 
the comprehensive test ban, commitment 
not to destroy one another's satellite obser- 
vation posts, demilitarization of the Indian 
Ocean, and so forth, are going to proceed, I 
hope, with a moderate degree of hope for 
success. No one can guarantee success, but 
I'll be doing the best I can, and I'm sure Mr. 
Brezhnev will also, to find that common 
ground that will leave our national interest 
and the Soviet's national interest intact. 

Q. Mr. President, the House, as you 
know, just recently passed the Hark in 
amendment to the International Lending 
Institutions Act of 1977 — 

The President: Yes, I know. 

Q. — which stipulates that the U.S. repre- 
sentative must vote ">io" to countries who 
violate — loans to countries who violate 
human rights. Did the Administration ac- 
tively support — or why didn't the Adminis- 
tration actively support this amendment? 

The President: I think the Harkin 
amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amend- 
ment and the Senator Humphrey amend- 
ment, which are the same, provide me with 
an adequate authority to deal with the 
question of human rights as it relates to in- 
ternational and regional lending institutions. 

To have a frozen mandatory prohibition 
against our nation voting for any loan simply 
removes my ability to bargain with a foreign 
leader whom we think might be willing to 
ease off on the deprivation of human rights. 
But when the requirement is frozen into 
law, there is simply no reason for a foreign 
leader to try to comply. 


Department of State Bulletin 

I think we need to have the flexibility that 
we proposed. My heart is with the Harkin 
amendment because I want to do everything 
I can to assure a maximum amount of human 
rights commitment around the world. But I 
think that to give us the authority within 
the lending institutions to use our best 
judgment and to negotiate for an easing off 
of human rights restraints before a loan is 
made is the best approach to it. 

Interview With President Carter 
by Media Representatives April 1 5 

Following is an excerpt from the tran- 
script of an interview with President Carter 
on April 15 by 27 editors, publishers, and 
broadcasters from 21 states. 1 

Q. Mr. President, I a)n Vince Sanders 
from the National Black Network, and I 
would like to know if your Administration 
has got to the point where it has developed a 
policy toward Africa that gives you a course 
of action rather than reaction to trouble 
spots like Zaire and Rhodesia. Do you have 
a definitive policy toward Africa as of yet? 

The President: We are evolving one. I 
have spent an awful lot of time on the Afri- 
can question. I don't think I have announced 
this previously is the reason I am hesitating, 
but I have asked the Vice President particu- 
larly to concentrate on the African question. 
He has been doing a lot of detailed analysis 
of each country, its history, background, 
leadership, and how it relates to its 
neighbors and so forth. I meet with him fre- 
quently. We had a meeting just before lunch 
on Africa. 

I think that we do have a good policy 
evolving. We have deliberately decided as 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977, 
p. 551. 

part of that policy, though, to let the British 
Government retain the leadership role for 
the time being. 

On David Owen's present trip, the 
Foreign Minister of Britain, we authorized 
him to say that we backed his proposals and 
that we were prepared to participate for the 
first time in a Geneva conference, if one 
could be called. 

There are three interrelated items, as you 
know. One is what to do with Rhodesia. We 
think the Smith government should step 
down very shortly and permit majority rule 
in Rhodesia. My own preference is that the 
people of that country have a right to vote 
on who their leader should be. 

Obviously, the only country outside 
Rhodesia which has a major influence on the 
Smith government is South Africa. And we 
are maintaining communications with the 
South African leadership. 

The second question, that's related, is 
what to do about Namibia, or South West 
Africa. Here we again favor majority rule in 
Namibia. The United Nations has a major 
role to play here as do the British in 
Rhodesia. We have encouraged the South 
African Government to move expeditiously 
in releasing that country to its own 

Of course, in South Africa, which has a 
legally constituted government, what we 
need there of course is to pursue our own 
commitment of the ending of apartheid and 
move eventually toward majority rule. 

The difficult question is, you know, how 
much to push the South African Government 
and drive them into a corner and to alienate 
them from us, because to a major degree the 
South African Government is a stabilizing 
influence in the southern part of that 
continent and they have a major role to play 
in the peaceful resolution of Rhodesia and 

So I think we do have an evolving policy 
toward south Africa. David Owen will be 
back from his tour, having met with many of 
the African leaders, both black and white. 
On the 18th of this month, which I think is 
Monday, he will make his report to the 
British Cabinet and then make his report to 

May 9, 1977 


us as well. We get daily communiques from 
Foreign Minister Owen on this trip. 

Q. The Kissinger plan, it makes provi- 
sions for the whites who are there in 
Rhodesia. And my feeling is that Ian 
Smith, with the kind of control that he is 
retaining now, he could more or less im- 
plement a peaceful transition that will also 
provide some reparations for the blacks who 
are going to be displaced. 

I think my question is, Will the Kissinger 
plan be figured in a new conference that the 
United States will sponsor? 

The President: Certain component parts of 
it. As you know, one of the major questions 
is who is going to control the army or the 
military force that exists in Rhodesia. I 
think that in the past when a so-called 
reserve fund was set up to compensate 
white families and others who decided to 
leave, the reserve funds have not been 
used — in Kenya and some other countries. 
These kinds of reserves have been voluntar- 
ily contributed by nations. They have never 
been used, because in the history of those 
countries — it may be completely different in 
Rhodesia, of course — the land was simply 
transferred through routine, open market 

So the fact that Kissinger did agree, I 
think with substantial congressional ap- 
proval, to contribute to a fund to compen- 
sate white landowners and others, doesn't 
mean that we are putting that much money 
out for good. It just means we agreed back 
then to contribute our part to a fund that 
may or may not be used. It is obviously ex- 
tremely complicated, and we could talk for 
hours about it. 

Q. On the same subject of Africa, do you 
agree with Andy Young that the Cuba>t ex- 
peditionary force is a stabilizing influence 1 ? 

The President: I have called publicly for 
the Cuban expeditionary force to be with- 
drawn from Africa. I read the whole text, of 
course, of Andy's statement, and what he 
said, I do agree with it. It obviously 
stabilized the situation. And I think the 
present Angolan Government under Neto is 

likely to stay in power. The Cubans ought to 
withdraw their forces from Africa. 

Q. Would this be a precondition in the 
present talks of normalizing relations with 

The President: I wouldn't say that it 
would be a precondition to the talks. We are 
talking to Cuba now for the first time in a 
number of years. 

Q. Precondition of normalizing relations? 

The President: I would rather not say that 
before we ever had normal relations with 
Cuba they would have to withdraw every 
Cuban from other nations on earth. We 
don't do it. I think we have got probably 
1,200 different places around the world 
where we have some American troops. But 
the withdrawal of Cuban troops is a domi- 
nant factor in Angola and other places 
around Africa. They have troops in a lot of 
other countries besides — people, rather, I 
don't know about troops — in a lot of other 

I just rather would not be pinned down so 
specifically on it. But the attitude of Cuba to 
withdraw its unwarranted intrusion into the 
affairs of Africa and other nations would be 
a prerequisite for normalization, yes. 

Q. Do you maintain contact with the 
Chinese on SALT or the Korean with- 

The President: Yes, we do. I have met 
with the Chinese special representative 
here, who, as you know, is an Ambassador, 
for an extended conversation once. Cy 
Vance talks to him on a routine basis, in- 
cluding one substantial conversation since 
Vance came back from Moscow. We try to 
keep the Chinese informed about our own 
attitudes, and although we don't have dip- 
lomatic relations with them directly, with 
exchange of Ambassadors, we do have a 
friendly relationship with them. 

There have been numerous congressional 
delegations going to China. There is one 
over there now. I thought it would be good 
to let a member of my family go. So I asked 
my middle son, Chip, to accompany the con- 
gressional leaders when they went over. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We exchange ideas with the Chinese on 
SALT. We try not to violate confidences. If 
the Soviets tell us something in a negotiat- 
ing session which we consider to be of a 
confidential nature, we certainly don't tell 
the Chinese about it. But we tell them our 
basic position. I think we have as good a re- 
lationship as one could have with China 
short of full diplomatic relations. 

President Carter's Remarks 
at Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga. 

Following are excerpts from President 
Carter's questions and answers with news 
correspondents upon his arrival at Dobbins 
Air Force Base, Ga., on April 8. 1 

Q. Mr. President, do you think that the 
resignation of Prime Minister Rabin may 
throw off your timetable for the Geneva 
talks and a settlement in the Middle East? 

The President: No, I don't. Obviously, the 
Israeli Labor Party will now be searching 
for a replacement candidate for Prime 
Minister Rabin in May. And I believe that 
the outcome of the election might very well 
be affected; nobody can anticipate how. 

But there is a great realization among the 
Israeli leaders that 1977 is an important 
year. There is almost a unanimous commit- 
ment, I think, among all the Mideastern 
countries that if we don't succeed this year 
in some major step toward peace that it will 
be a long time before we can mount such a 
mammoth multinational effort again. 

So it may be affected — the chances for 
peace — but no one can predict how. And I 
believe the Israelis will push forward with 
their own strong desire to have a permanent 
and lasting peace with the Arab neighbors, 
to have borders that they can defend, and 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18. 
1H77. p. 515. 

that the Palestinian question be resolved. I 
don't think the identity of one particular 
political figure, even the Prime Minister, 
will affect that adversely. 

Q. Mr. President, when you were meeting 
with President Sadat and you were talking 
about this Palestinian question, did you get 
any impression that there is a way to get the 
Palestinians to Geneva as part of some 
delegation? And if so, can you give us some 
of your thinking on that? 

The President: Well, as you know, Presi- 
dent Sadat earlier had been the Arab leader 
that was courageous enough to espouse the 
idea that the Palestinians might be part of 
the Jordanian delegation. Whether or not 
that will evolve, I don't have any way to 

But I have good hope that we can resolve 
the question of Palestinian participation in 
some fashion or another. At this point, 
which is quite early in the year's efforts, I 
believe that it's primarily a responsibility of 
the Arab countries and the Palestinians. 
And for me to spell out what I think is a 
most likely prospect, I think would be coun- 
terproductive at this point. 

Q. Mr. President, do you think they 
should be represented? 

The President: Well, obviously, one of the 
three crucial decisions to be made in the 
Middle East concerns the Palestinian people. 
And there will have to be a spokesman for 
their viewpoint during the conference itself. 
Whether that would be done by a surrogate 
or by them directly is something that hasn't 
been evolved. 

The other two questions, obviously, are 
the definition of permanent peace and the 
assurance of it, and the border delineations. 

But I certainly think that in some fashion 
that the Palestinian people must be repre- 

Q. Mr. President, President Sadat used 
the word "entity" when he came to Washing- 
ton, instead of Palesti)iian nation or Pales- 
tinian state. 

The President: Yes. 

May 9, 1977 


Q. Did you get any impression from him 
that he is moving toward, or more willing 
now to accept a Jordanian-Palestinian 

nation; that is, a homeland that would be 
under the control of Jordan? 

The President: That's a question I 
wouldn't want to answer for President 
Sadat. I'll let him make his own statements 
publicly, and I don't intend to repeat what 
he tells me privately. 

But I think that it's obvious that that's 
one avenue of success. It's one that I have 
espoused even during the campaign 
months — that perhaps some confederation or 
some relationship between the Palestinians 
and Jordan might be advisable. 

As you know, there are approximately a 
million Palestinians who are part of the Jor- 
danian society now, in very high positions in 
the government, and I think this is a natural 
possibility. Whether or not it will be the ul- 
timate decision, I can't say. 

Mr. President, what significance should 
be placed on Ambassador Dobrynin's visit to 
the State Department [inaudible] SALT 
talks? Does this indicate any softening i>i 
your mind on the part of the Russians? 

The President: It confirms my own un- 
wavering opinion that the Soviets want a 
successful resolution of nuclear arms 
control, the same as we do. 

It's always inevitable that in a political 
campaign or a SALT negotiation or a debate 
between myself and Congress, that the 
degree of combat and dispute and differ- 
ences is the part that is emphasized. It's the 
most newsworthy part, and it's the part 
that's easier to understand. 

There was a great deal of progress made 
in the recent Moscow talks. As you know, 
study committees were set up to explore 
new ideas that had never been put on the 
SALT negotiating table. 

I believe that Mr. Dobrynin's conversation 
with Mr. Vance — and of course I've had a 
complete report on it — was encouraging. 
There is about a month between now and 
when the SALT negotiations will proceed in 

Geneva between Mr. Gromyko and Secre- 
tary Vance. 

And during that period of time, we'll be 
reassessing some of the objections that the 
Soviets have raised to see if there is some 
alternative that would be equally fair to 
both sides, and we are now making projec- 
tions of our own level of nuclear armaments 
in the number of missiles, the number of 
warheads, the throw- weight and the 
diversity of nuclear capability that would be 
in existence in 1985 if our proposal was ac- 

If during this reanalysis we show that 
there is any inequity there, we would be 
very eager to change it. My own opinion so 
far — and I've done a good bit of work on it, 
even since the Moscow talks — is that our 
proposal was fair and was equitable. And if 
the Soviets can give us some explanation 
about which we were not aware concerning 
their own capabilities or plans, I would 
certainly take that into consideration. 

But I believe that Dobrynin's visit to 
Vance is encouraging. I think if one reads 
Gromyko's entire text in his press 
conference, it was encouraging. And the 
private messages that I have had from Mr. 
Brezhnev have also been encouraging. 

I am not discouraged. And I'm determined 
that we'll succeed in having not only a ratifi- 
cation of the Vladivostok agreements but 
substantive commitments on both sides to 
actually reduce nuclear weapons below what 
they have been in the past. 

Q. Have you heard from Brezhnev lately, 
Mr. President? 

The President: No. I think that I've 
already said that was the last question. Let 
me say in closing that I'm very grateful to 
be home. Thank you for coming out here. 

There is a continual means by which I can 
communicate with Mr. Brezhnev, either 
through normal diplomatic sources or 
otherwise. It's a routine sort of exchange, 
nothing dramatic or startling, no new 
concepts that have been proposed, but just 
an assurance that the Soviet leadership is as 
determined as I am to continue with the 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Announces Measures 
To Assist U.S. Shoe Industry 

statement by President Carter 1 

I am very reluctant to restrict interna- 
tional trade in any way. For 40 years the 
United States has worked for the reduction 
of trade barriers around the world, and we 
are continuing to pursue this goal because 
this is the surest long-range way to create 
jobs here and abroad. Only problems as 
extreme as those faced by the American 
shoe industry could force me to seek even 
modest mandatory limits on imports. I have 
seen those special problems firsthand during 
visits to many shoe plants throughout the 

The number of firms in the shoe industry 
dropped from 600 in 1968 to 380 today— a 40 
percent decline. Employment in that same 
period fell by 30 percent, which represents a 
loss of 70,000 jobs. Imports from our two 
major overseas suppliers have increased by 
more than 100 percent in the last two years 
and seem to be increasing even more rapidly 
in recent months. 

I have decided to reject the restrictive 
tariff rate quota recommended by the Inter- 
national Trade Commission, because that 

•Issued on Apr. 1 (text from White House press 
release). For the President's memorandums of Apr. 1 
for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 
and for heads of certain departments and agencies, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
Apr. 4, 1977, p. 479; for his message to the Congress 
of Apr. 1 transmitting a report on the actions, see H. 
Doc. 95-117, Apr. 4, 1977. 

recommendation did not fairly balance our 
concerns for domestic jobs and production, 
inflationary pressures, and expanded world 

But I have also decided to grant import 
relief to our domestic shoe industry and 
have therefore instructed Special Trade 
Representative Robert Strauss to negotiate 
orderly marketing agreements with the 
appropriate foreign suppliers of shoes. 

Over the long haul, the solution to dif- 
ficulties in the shoe industry lies not in the 
restriction of imports, but elsewhere — in 
innovation and modernization of our own 
production facilities and the financing to 
make these possible. 

The American shoe industry needs an 
expanded and more effective program of as- 
sistance to help it meet foreign competition. 
I have directed the Secretary of Commerce 
to work directly with the Secretary of Labor 
and Ambassador Strauss in developing such 
a program. Toward this end, these officials 
will see that existing assistance programs 
work better. 

In addition, I will recommend to Congress 
within 90 days any legislation which may be 
needed to provide: 

— Technological aid to increase production 
efficiency and develop new production 

— Data and market research to pinpoint 
new marketing opportunities. 

— Assistance for affected communities and 

— Help with promotion and marketing 

— Financial assistance to support these 

May 9, 1977 


United States Relations in Southern Africa 

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 1 

A few years ago I would not have chosen 
this subject to provoke discussion among a 
distinguished group of academic scholars. 
The African Continent in general, and the 
southern part of it in particular, excited sus- 
tained attention and debate only among a 
small band of specialists in academia, busi- 
ness circles, and the government, except in 
time of crisis. This has all changed radically, 
and there are times when I look back with 
some nostalgia to a more tranquil life before 
I became so intimately acquainted with 
African airline schedules and charters last 

Probably never in the history of American 
diplomacy has the governmental and public- 
interest, even absorption, in one relatively 
small and remote area of the world in- 
creased at such a rapid pace, from quasi- 
academic to substantial. 

Our concern about southern Africa is quite 
unlike the basis for our interest in other 
parts of the world important to the United 
States, such as Europe, the Far East, and 
the Middle East. Our interest is not 
strategic. We have consistently made clear 
that the United States does not wish to play 
a military role anywhere in Africa. It is also 
not based on economic interests, although 
we do want to see that Western Europe as 
well as the United States retains access to 
the mineral wealth of southern Africa. 
Under the proper political circumstances I 
can visualize a very substantial growth in 
two-way trade with that part of the conti- 

1 Made before the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 16. 

nent. Our recent actions with respect to the 
Byrd amendment should make clear that we 
are fully capable of subordinating our eco- 
nomic interests to other, more vital con- 

U.S. policies in southern Africa are essen- 
tially founded on political interests. A signif- 
icant ingredient of that interest is our con- 
cern for human rights and human dignity. 
Our policy toward southern Africa is guided 
by our ideals of liberty and equality and by 
our commitment to oppose racial and social 
injustice. We believe that the minority 
governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and 
Namibia violate fundamental human rights 
as spelled out in the U.N. Declaration of 
Human Rights. We have spoken out on this 
subject forcefully and repeatedly so that 
there can be no mistaking our position. In 
conformity with our own fundamental prin- 
ciples as a nation, we have based our 
policies on the belief that the peaceful trans- 
fer of power to the black majority is not 
only necessary and desirable but also possi- 

The foreign policy of the United States, if 
it is to be successful, must be firmly 
grounded in our own fundamental beliefs. 
Lacking this vital element, it would not 
obtain the requisite backing from our 
people. It is self-evident, therefore, that the 
United States must be engaged in southern 
Africa if we want to remain true to 
ourselves. Given the dangers involved, we 
cannot remain an idle spectator while the 
decolonization process takes place in 
Rhodesia and Namibia. 

Similarly, I believe that our history dic- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tates that we have a role to play with re- 
spect to the system of apartheid in South 
Africa. It has been a long and frequently 
painful process for the black and white ele- 
ments of our population to work out their re- 
lationship based on the ideals of the Found- 
ing Fathers. Very substantial progress has 
been made in recent years in this respect, 
and more needs still to be done. But at least 
there is now hope where there once was 
only despair, and we are on the right road. 
Having come through this experience, we 
can, I believe, without resort to the zealotry 
of the converted, also contribute to the res- 
olution of the apartheid issue. Our history as 
a people of many races, able to live together 
more or less in harmony, can be, within lim- 
its, a guide and inspiration to others. 

Apartheid, of course, simply means 
"apartness." It enshrines the concept of 
separateness, without even the leavening 
thought of equality. The system of apartheid 
currently being practiced in South Africa is 
therefore still a considerable distance from 
the slightly more progressive concept finally 
struck down by our Supreme Court a quar- 
ter century ago. It is a measure of the 
distance South Africa must travel to over- 
come the burden of its racial heritage. 

The rapid changes in Portugal brought 
about the decolonization of the Portuguese 
empire in Africa. This development of the 
last few years has, in turn, hastened the 
demise of the remaining two vestiges of the 
era of empire, Rhodesia and Namibia. 

The policy of this Administration, and 
that of its predecessor, has been to try to 
insure that the changes which we consider 
inevitable for both Rhodesia and Namibia 
take place in a peaceful manner. There are 
those who believe that the transition to 
majority rule can come about only by force 
of arms. These advocates of violence believe 
that Ian Smith's record of procrastination in 
Rhodesia and South Africa's continuing im- 
portant role in Namibia preclude a peaceful 
settlement. I strongly disagree with that 
view. Progress has already been made, 
perhaps more than we had reason to hope 
for only a year ago. Ian Smith has agreed to 
the principle of turning over power to the 
black majority within two years. Although 

negotiations broke down in Geneva over the 
complex questions surrounding the mo- 
dalities of the transition to majority rule, 
I hope that talks can again be started. I am 
convinced there is a reasonable chance for 

The Question of Rhodesia 

We believe that the United Kingdom 
should continue to take the lead on the 
Rhodesian question since it is the sovereign 
power in Rhodesia. We have worked closely 
and well with them in the past; during Feb- 
ruary we had several intensive meetings 
with them in Washington to concert our 
policies. And Foreign Secretary [David] 
Owen is currently in southern Africa to as- 
sess further the situation, on a trip planned 
in agreement with the United States. 

It is also not an insignificant 
accomplishment that, in the course of work- 
ing toward a peaceful settlement of southern 
African issues, we have strengthened our 
ties with the frontline states of Zambia, 
Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. Am- 
bassador [Andrew] Young, on his trip to Af- 
rica during the early days of the Carter 
Administration, received valuable new 
insights into the thinking of the African 
leaders on those issues of mutual concern. I 
want to emphasize that the frontline states 
continue to support the view that a peaceful 
solution is desirable in Rhodesia and 
Namibia even as armed struggle goes on. 
We are working closely with them to that 

The advantages of a peaceful transition to 
majority rule should be manifest to all of us. 
The transfer of power is going to be difficult 
under any circumstances, and some 
disruption of the economic processes may be 
inevitable. But both Rhodesia and Namibia 
are potentially prosperous countries with 
existing structures upon which further 
sustained economic growth can be built. 
How much more desirable it would be for 
the black majority to inherit a country with 
a running economy than one so severely 
damaged or destroyed by prolonged strife 
that the immediate fruits of independence 
may be meager indeed. 

May 9, 1977 


Given the strength, on the one hand, of 
the Zimbabwe liberation forces, many of 
which are now in training camps in Mozam- 
bique and Tanzania, and the strength of the 
Rhodesian security forces on the other, we 
believe that a "solution" by combat of arms 
would inevitably be protracted. There would 
not be a quick knockout by either side. 
Therefore such a "solution" would be bloody 
and involve untold human suffering and mis- 
ery, which we want to avoid if at all possi- 

Prolonged violence would create a climate, 
moreover, conducive to intervention by 
forces from outside the African Continent. 
The frontline states have thus far success- 
fully resisted the counsel of those 
contending that only armed struggle can 
produce success in Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
We cannot be sure, however, that they will 
always see the situation this way. 

We firmly believe that African problems 
should be solved by the Africans them- 
selves. Our policy has been guided by the 
principle that the big powers or their 
surrogates should not play a military role on 
the continent. We have seen how long it 
takes an outside power, once engaged in an 
African conflict, to withdraw its forces, and 
we have seen the many undesirable con- 
sequences such involvement brings in its 
train in terms of African stability and 

Following rejection of the latest British 
proposals in January, Ian Smith has appar- 
ently decided to attempt what he euphemis- 
tically calls an "internal solution." This in- 
volves negotiations with certain black 
groups and individuals, some of whom were 
already members of the Smith regime, to 
bring about majority rule. We do not believe 
this will lead to a solution. It ignores not 
only the desires of the Zimbabwe guerrilla 
forces and important nationalist elements 
but also those of the frontline states. In our 
view this "internal solution" cannot last; to 
attempt it would inevitably lead to increased 
bloodshed and violence. 

Finally, we believe that a peaceful solu- 
tion in Rhodesia and Namibia would provide 
a useful stimulus to orderly change in South 
Africa itself. Conversely, the escalation of 

violence in the adjoining territories could 
well polarize opinion in South Africa and 
make more difficult the achievement of any 
progress in the direction of racial justice in 
that country. 

We recognize, of course, that our dedica- 
tion to a peaceful, rapid, and orderly transi- 
tion to majority rule needs to be backed up 
with concrete measures. We worked hard 
for the repeal of the Byrd amendment by 
the Congress, accomplished by a decisive 
margin in both Houses, placing the United 
States in observance with pertinent U.N. 
resolutions. Repeal should convince Prime 
Minister Smith, if he still had doubts, that 
he cannot count on the United States to bail 
him out when his policies fail. We hope now 
that he will give real negotiations another 

We intend to insure that the sanctions 
against Rhodesia are strictly enforced. We 
will be consulting with other nations to see 
what can be done about tightening com- 
pliance with sanctions. We are looking into 
additional measures that our government 
might undertake to place additional pressure 
on Rhodesia and to convince it of the gravity 
of the situation. 

We have provided economic assistance to 
the Governments of Zambia and Mozam- 
bique, in recognition of the economic losses 
suffered by these two countries owing to the 
closure of their borders with Rhodesia and 
the interruption of the hitherto profitable 
transit traffic in Rhodesian goods. 

I would like to make it clear that we have 
no solution that we wish to impose on the 
various elements of the Zimbabwean politi- 
cal scene. We have no favorites whom we 
support. We will not take sides, since we 
believe that the Africans want to work out 
African solutions to African problems. We 
will continue to counsel maximum flexibility 
and readiness to compromise, maximum 
unity among all of the nationalist liberation 
forces, and a maximum effort to create the 
kind of atmosphere that will allow the 
negotiations to succeed. Both sides should 
come to the conclusion that their objectives 
can be achieved more surely and effectively 
by negotiation rather than by resort to 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Namibian Issue 

While the contentious issue of Rhodesia 
tends to dominate the headlines, we have 
not been unmindful of the need for rapid 
progress on the Namibian issue as well. Our 
policy with respect to that territory has 
been consistent and clear. In 1966 we voted 
to terminate South Africa's mandate. We 
have supported the finding of the 
International Court of Justice that South 
Africa's occupation was illegal. We remain 
committed to U.N. Security Council Res- 
olution 385 calling for free elections under 
U.N. auspices, South African withdrawal of 
its illegal administration, and the release of 
all Namibian political prisoners. 

As in the case of Zimbabwe, we have 
cause for at least some optimism that the 
Namibian problem can be peacefully re- 
solved. Some progress has been achieved. A 
target date of December 1978 has been set 
for independence, and the South Africans 
have fully endorsed the concept that 
Namibia should become independent on that 

A major difficulty, as we see it, has been 
that the present efforts to establish an 
interim government for Namibia have 
excluded the South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO), which is recognized 
by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] 
and the United Nations as the sole 
Namibian nationalist movement. These ef- 
forts have centered on a meeting of Nami- 
bian groups in Windhoek seeking to estab- 
lish an interim government to lead the 
country to independence. For its part, 
SWAPO has not wished to participate and 
has insisted that independence could come 
about only as a result of direct negotiations 
between itself and the South African Gov- 
ernment. On this issue, also, we urge a 
spirit of compromise on both sides in the be- 
lief that what may be achievable in a 
peaceful manner would almost certainly be 
preferable to anything that can be won 
through the force of arms alone. 

In the case of Namibia, too, it seems to us 
that while the positions of some of the princi- 
pal contenders are far apart, good will on 
both sides can produce agreement. We be- 

lieve that all political groups in Namibia, 
specifically including SWAPO, have a role to 
play in the process leading to independence. 
We consider that the United Nations should 
have a role to play in giving birth to an 
independent nation from a territory which 
the community of nations accepts as being 
under U.N. authority, at least in theory. We 
have proposed that an international 
conference on a Namibian settlement take 
place under U.N. aegis at a neutral site with 
all the concerned parties. 

In support of our policy, the United 
States has since 1970 officially discouraged 
American investment in Namibia. The 
facilities of the Export-Import Bank are no 
longer available for trade with the territory. 
No future U.S. investments there, made on 
the basis of rights acquired from the South 
African Government following termination of 
the mandate, would receive U.S. 
Government protection against the claims of 
a future legitimate government in Namibia. 
We have urged American firms doing busi- 
ness in Namibia to assure that their 
employment practices are in conformity with 
the principles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

Policy Toward South Africa 

Our policy toward South Africa is neces- 
sarily different from our policy toward 
Rhodesia and Namibia. 

We have had diplomatic relations with 
South Africa since that country became in- 
dependent. In addition to our Embassy in 
Pretoria, we have three consulates general 
which keep us informed about what is going 
on in that country. 

South Africa is not a colonial remnant. 
Even the leaders of black Africa do not chal- 
lenge the right of the white minority to live 
in South Africa. The white settlers began to 
cultivate the lands of South Africa 300 years 
ago. They are also Africans, and they have 
no other place to go. The problems of South 
Africa should therefore be solved in South 
Africa — not by outside powers. 

Our maintenance of diplomatic relations 
with South Africa is by no means an 
indication that we accept that country's in- 

May 9, 1977 


stitution of apartheid. We have not minced 
our words in stating our unalterable opposi- 
tion to apartheid and shall not do so in the 
future. This system is a clear violation of 
fundamental human rights. Last summer the 
United States joined a consensus in the 
U.N. Security Council resolution "strongly 
condemning" the South African Government 
for its role in the Soweto violence. On that 
occasion, the acting U.S. representative 
called on South Africa to "take these events 
as a warning" and "to abandon a system 
which is clearly not acceptable under any 
standard of human rights." 2 

As elsewhere in southern Africa we are 
dedicated to the proposition that peaceful 
change must succeed, if only because the al- 
ternative is so unacceptable. We have 
watched with dismay the escalation of 
violence in South Africa, beginning with the 
Soweto riots last year. We are deeply con- 
cerned that unless the spiral of violence can 
be arrested and reversed, there will be such 
a polarization of forces within South Africa 
that peaceful change will become immeasur- 
ably more difficult than it is already. We 
shall employ all reasonable channels to get 
this message across to the South Africans 
and to facilitate this change to the maximum 
possible extent. 

It is appropriate, however, to insert here 
a cautionary word. Of all people, we Ameri- 
cans should probably be chary about provid- 
ing excessive and unsolicited advice to 
others about how they should solve their 
racial problems. True, we have made im- 
pressive progress within our own country in 
removing the stain of injustice and discrimi- 
nation based solely on race. But we must 
also admit that we have a considerable way 
to go before our achievements approach the 
ideals set forth in our Declaration of Inde- 
pendence and our Constitution. 

But perhaps more important, our recent 
history provides testimony to the fact that 
change in the racial sphere came about 
— gradually, unevenly, perhaps even 

2 For U.S. statements and text of Security Council 
Resolution 392, adopted by consensus on June 19, 
1976, see Bulletin of July 12, 1976, p. 59. 

grudgingly — not because outsiders or 
foreigners told us what was right, but be- 
cause the realization finally dawned on our 
people that the status quo was wrong and 
had to be changed for our own good. This 
self-realization must be given an opportunity 
to do its creative work in South Africa also, 
although I will readily agree that the time 
for results is limited. 

It is in no one's interest if the South Afri- 
cans move into an isolationist shell, closed 
against outside influences, there to defend 
themselves from all enemies foreign and 
domestic. Such a development would have 
an effect opposite from the one we wish to 

Our diplomacy toward South Africa must 
therefore be carried out with a good deal of 
finesse and skill. We shall have to weigh 
carefully the relative merits of speaking out 
and of restraint. 

In the circumstances I have described, the 
United States is necessarily pursuing a 
nuanced policy vis-a-vis South Africa, 
without compromising our principles. As I 
have already indicated, we have repeatedly 
made clear our opposition to a system under 
which an 18 percent minority limits the 
black majority economically, discriminates 
socially, and deprives the blacks of political 

As a corollary to this policy, the United 
States has opposed the South African Gov- 
ernment's policy of creating a series of "ban- 
tustans," or "homelands." The Transkei was 
the first of these homelands to become 
"independent," but others are expected to 
be given that status by South Africa. The 
United States has not recognized the Trans- 
kei, and aside from South Africa, neither 
have other members of the United Nations. 
We have no intention of recognizing any of 
the other homelands that will be declared 

In fact, the creation of these so-called 
states is an extension of the apartheid pol- 
icy. Stripped of all euphemisms and 
rationalizations the concept of the 
homelands is unfair to the black majority. 
The effect of their creation is to deprive 
substantial elements of the black urban 


Department of State Bulletin 

work force of their civil rights in South 
Africa and to force many urban blacks to 
take on citizenship of a "homeland" they 
have never known. The homelands were es- 
tablished without consulting the blacks. 
They are generally conglomerations of the 
remnants of tribal lands without contiguous 
borders, without the basis for economic via- 
bility, and without any basis for true 
political independence from South Africa. 

It is worth noting that there have been 
some encouraging signs on the South Afri- 
can scene. Events of the past year have not 
been without their effect on the white com- 
munity of South Africa. Many signs point to 
considerable soul-searching, even on the 
part of the Afrikaner community, which 
forms the primary political base of the rul- 
ing party. A number of leading Afrikaner in- 
tellectuals have urged that the government 
reconsider important elements of its policy, 
such as present plans for the homelands, the 
denial of all political rights to Africans out- 
side the homelands, and various forms of 
economic discrimination. 

South African businessmen, too, have 
begun to urge steps to improve the daily life 
of Africans in such areas as housing and 
training. In certain areas of activity which 
are not directly under government sponsor- 
ship, such as athletic and religious organiza- 
tions, we detect some breakdown in pre- 
viously rigid racial barriers. We have been 
encouraged by the actions of the Catholic 
Church to permit some integration of its 
schools and by the tolerance of this decision 
displayed by the South African Government. 
In terms of the daily life of an African in 
South Africa, these are small steps. But we 
believe they reflect that the faith of many 
South African whites in the possibility of 
maintaining indefinitely racial separation 
and white supremacy is being fundamentally 

The United States has adopted certain 
policies to demonstrate our opposition to the 
apartheid policy of South Africa. Since 1962 
we have maintained a voluntary embargo on 
the sale of military equipment to South 
Africa. U.S. naval vessels do not call at 
South African ports (except for emergen- 

cies), although they regularly make courtesy 
calls in some black African ports. 

We have redoubled our efforts to intensify 
our contacts with blacks in the South Afri- 
can population. President Carter recently 
invited Gathsha Buthelezi, a prominent 
black moderate, to the White House, under- 
lining the Administration's interest in es- 
tablishing better ties with black leadership in 
South Africa. 

Along these same lines, we have inten- 
sified the informational activities of the U.S. 
Information Service in South Africa, espe- 
cially among the black population. We have 
also expanded our exchange program, under 
which a cross section of the South African 
population, mostly blacks, visits the United 
States for monthlong visits. Our diplomatic 
and consular officers, including black 
Foreign Service officers, cultivate a wide 
range of contacts in South Africa. 

Steps by U.S. Business Community 

The United States has also encouraged 
American firms doing business in South Af- 
rica to improve working conditions for their 
black employees. We believe this could be a 
significant American contribution to the 
principle of social justice and provide a ve- 
hicle for promoting economic and social 
progress. We have been encouraged by the 
progress that many American firms have 
demonstrated in working toward the princi- 
ple of equal pay for equal work, adequate 
pensions, improved medical and insurance 
benefits, and expanded opportunities for ad- 
vancement based entirely on merit, rather 
than on the basis of race. Although there is 
clearly room for improvement in the 
performance of their labor practices, South 
African-based American companies have 
shown considerable sensitivity in dealing 
with their black employees. By their 
example they have already set in motion 
some of the kinds of changes that are so 
desperately needed. 

A recent step in the right direction was 
the March 1, 1977, announcement by 12 
major U.S. corporations with business 
interests in South Africa expressing support 

May 9, 1977 


for a set of principles designed to promote 
equal employment rights for blacks and 
nonwhite minority groups. These principles 
call for the nonsegregation of races in all 
dining facilities and places of work and the 
concept of equal pay for all employees doing 
equal and comparable work. We hope that 
these constructive steps will be emulated 
and expanded by other U.S. firms engaged 
in business in South Africa and perhaps 
even be adopted by the South African busi- 
ness community itself. 

We fully recognize that American 
corporations genuinely desirous of wishing 
to institute social changes in their labor 
practices may fear contravening South Afri- 
can laws and traditional practices which 
discourage evolutionary changes. Moreover, 
many of the white unions are resistant to 
change. They will not countenance having a 
black supervisor over a white worker, and 
they restrict the movement of black workers 
into the ranks of the skilled workers despite 
the fact that South African industry desper- 
ately needs more skilled workers. 

There is no reason why American firms 
cannot enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with black unions. Unlike the 
white unions, these are not officially 
registered. However, they are not illegal, 
and companies can deal with them. Several 
weeks ago the second largest supermarket 
chain in South Africa announced that it 
would recognize and negotiate with a black 
trade union. We hope this will encourage 
American corporations to follow suit where 
the existence of a black union makes this 

There are those, of course, who argue 
that American corporations in effect have no 
business being in South Africa in the first 
place, that they are either an impediment to 
social change or have no real effect on 
change, and that their net result is to but- 
tress the status quo elements that want 
apartheid to go on. 

Others have come forth with opposing ar- 
guments. They claim that U.S. investment 
assists the economic development of South 
Africa, which sets in motion certain power- 
ful currents of change that will be too pow- 

erful to withstand. Increased investment, 
the argument goes, helps create more jobs 
for blacks, inevitably some upgrading of 
their job skills, and this process has already 
resulted in new and different perceptions and 
attitudes that have made themselves felt on 
the South African political scene. 

The South African blacks seem to be di- 
vided in their views on this issue. Some 
favor foreign, including U.S., investment 
while others have opposed it. There is cer- 
tainly no clear consensus on the question. 

As a government we have stayed neutral 
on this issue so far. We have neither 
encouraged nor discouraged American in- 
vestment in South Africa. This is one of 
many facets of our policy toward southern 
Africa that is currently under review. 

Potential American investors have been 
free to decide the issue on their own, al- 
though if asked we provide them with all the 
information we have available. We make 
certain they are aware of the controversy 
about such investment, explain our official 
neutrality, note the moral and social as well 
as economic and political problems of 
working in an apartheid society, and urge 
that if they do invest they give priority at- 
tention to the matter of fair employment 

We have, however, placed some restric- 
tions on our bilateral economic relationship. 
For example, we restrict the Export-Import 
Bank facilities in South Africa. 
Export-Import Bank direct loans to South 
African importers of U.S. products are pro- 
hibited. However, the Bank does guarantee 
privately financed loans as a service to U.S. 

As I indicated at the outset of my re- 
marks, there are a number of positive ele- 
ments on the southern African scene. 
Perhaps the most promising aspect is the 
fact that unlike a number of African coun- 
tries, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa 
itself have strong economic assets. Southern 
Africa is richly endowed with a generally 
favorable climate and with natural resources 
that the world needs. We have already an- 
nounced that we stand ready to assist 
Zimbabwe and Namibia with training pro- 


Department of State Bulletin 

grams to promote further economic de- 
velopment when majority rule comes. 

The rest of the African Continent has, in a 
relatively short time, made tremendous 
progress from the colonial period to inde- 
pendence to collectively playing a major role 
on the world scene. The record has 
inevitably been an uneven one, but there are 
a number of African countries where Afri- 
cans and Europeans cooperate in harmony 
for the betterment of all. I would not suggest 
that the situation in southern Africa is analo- 

gous. But I do suggest that there are examples 
on the African Continent which give hope that 
political leaders can creatively build a future in 
which blacks and whites can coexist and pros- 
per in peace rather than have the future im- 
posed on them. 

For the sake of Africa, and for our sake, I 
hope that the leadership in southern Africa 
will choose wisely. For our part we wish 
them well, and we will remain committed to 
doing everything in our power to insure that 
the outcome will be a happy one. 


Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contributions 
to the African Development Fund 

Following are statements by Andrew 
Young, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, and David B. Bolen, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for African Affairs, before 
the Subcomm ittee on Africa of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on April 
18. l 


I very much appreciate this opportunity to 
appear before your subcommittee today. I 
must also commend this subcommittee for 
its past lead on examining issues that affect 
U.S. policy in Africa and for the forum it 
provides today to discuss future U.S. par- 
ticipation in the African Development Fund. 

Africa's problems are not new. 
Twenty-two of the 33 U.N. -designated 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

"most seriously affected countries," 13 of 
the world's 18 landlocked developing coun- 
tries, and more than half of the 29 least 
developed countries in the world are in Af- 
rica. These problems have been severely ag- 
gravated by the current energy and inflation 
problems. Millions of acres of arable African 
land remain unused because of physical inac- 
cessibility or lack of adequate roads, techni- 
cal knowledge deficiencies, and irrigation 

Current foreign policy dictates a clear 
need for addressing these problems by con- 
tributing to the economic, social, and tech- 
nological advancement of these countries 
through international organizations. To this 
end, the African Development Fund has al- 
located 33 percent of its credits to the ag- 
riculture sector during the last year, 27 
percent to public utilities, 14 percent to 
health, and 19 percent to transportation. 

In examining the African nations, the 
United States should recognize the 
significant roles these nations play in the 

May 9, 1977 


United Nations and in other world contexts 
rather than limiting itself to bilateral 
policies. Our exports to Africa in 1976, 
showing a clear trend toward greatly in- 
creased interests in the area by American 
business, reflect growing U.S. concern. This 
concern should be furthered by sharing U.S. 
technological advancements in transporta- 
tion, communication, and agriculture to as- 
sist the less developed countries in utilizing 
their increasingly valuable natural 
resources. The African nations are working 
toward a new economic order and are look- 
ing for assistance in this area from the de- 
veloped countries, particularly the United 
States, whose role in the past has not been 
commensurate with its ability to assist these 
countries on various levels. 

The African Development Fund was begun 
in 1973 as the concessional facility as- 
sociated with the African Development 
Bank. The Fund directs its loan resources 
toward economic and social development. It 
is able to loan to the neediest of the coun- 
tries because it has a 0.75 percent service 
charge with a 50-year repayment clause. At 
this time, the African Development Fund is 
unique in addressing the needs of the Afri- 
can countries; certainly this invaluable in- 
stitution deserves our cooperation and sup- 

In conjunction with this Administration's 
policy, we must demonstrate through in- 
creased participation in the Fund our con- 
cern for the development and prosperity of 
these countries. Repeal of the Byrd amend- 
ment recently indicates the Administration's 
good will and commitment to accept a more 
positive role toward African growth, 
prosperity, and independence. 

To date, the United States has contrib- 
uted only $15 million to the African De- 
velopment Fund although we have pledged a 
total of $25 million, thereby giving us less 
than 3 percent of the voting power in the 
Fund. If the United States is ever to obtain 
a significant voice in the Fund, it is 
essential that we contribute an amount that 
truly represents our commitment. I urge 
this subcommittee therefore to closely 

examine this matter and vote to authorize 
funding which will augment our role in the 
Fund and will enable our delegation to 
Mauritius [the 1977 meeting of the Boards of 
Governors of the African Development Bank 
and Fund, May 2-7] to speak from a position 
of strength and visible commitment. It is 
also my hope that appropriations would be 
forthcoming in fiscal year 1979 which would 
further demonstrate our commitment. 

I would also urge this subcommittee to 
overwhelmingly oppose the Wylie language 
adopted during the House debate on this bill 
which directs the Secretary of the Treasury 
to seek, in his discussions with other na- 
tions, a voting structure weighted to reflect 
the contributions made by donor countries. 
As a country which has the potential to con- 
tribute so much and yet contributes so little, 
we are hardly in a position to attempt to 
amend the current structure in a way which 
would greatly offend the members of the Af- 
rican Development Bank. 

Again, thank you for allowing me this op- 
portunity to share my thoughts on this very 
important matter with you. 


I welcome this opportunity to testify be- 
fore this committee on U.S. contributions to 
the African Development Fund, the conces- 
sional loan affiliate of the African Develop- 
ment Bank. 

U.S. contributions to the African 
Development Fund are of major importance 
to the Administration's Africa policy. They 
respond directly to the fundamental foreign 
policy objectives of the economic assistance 
efforts of the Carter Administration. Secre- 
tary of State Vance enunciated the following 
objectives for our foreign assistance before 
the Senate Appropriations Committee: 

— To demonstrate America's compassion 
for the poor and dispossessed around the 
world — those who, through no fault of their 
own, are exposed to daily suffering and 
humiliation and are struggling to survive; 

— To make our fair contribution to the 


Department of State Bulletin 

enormous task of the social, economic, and 
technological development of poor countries, 
an investment which in this interdependent 
world can pay us handsome dividends; 

— To foster a climate of constructive coop- 
eration, dialogue, and reciprocal benefit in 
our North-South diplomacy. 

As you know, 18 of the world's 29 least 
developed countries are in Africa. Also, 
many African countries have experienced a 
deterioration in economic conditions over 
the past 15 years. I know members of this 
committee will agree that a world of pov- 
erty, illiteracy, and disease cannot be safe 
for this or future generations. 

If we wish to demonstrate America's com- 
passion for the world's poor, clearly we 
must be prepared to act in Africa. If we 
wish to make a fair contribution to the 
enormous task of development of poor coun- 
tries, clearly we must be prepared to pro- 
vide our fair share in Africa. 

Nowhere in the world is the task so enor- 
mous, and nowhere is it more essential. 
Compared to other parts of the developing 
world, Africa is the least well endowed with 
the basic economic and social infrastructure 
essential to development generally. Only 
concessional finance can deal effectively 
with this situation. This was the underlying 
reason for the creation of the African De- 
velopment Fund in the first place. This is 
why Fund loans have been directed to the 
poorest African countries by common 
consent of its African members. 

I have no doubt that U.S. investment in 
our growing economic interdependence with 
Africa can pay us handsome dividends. For 
four years, our imports from Africa have 
been growing at a considerably faster pace 
than global U.S. imports — largely because of 
crude oil imports, particularly from Nigeria. 
Africa now accounts for over 38 percent of 
our crude oil imports. We are already de- 
pendent on Africa for other essential 
minerals — antimony, bauxite, chrome, 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and platinum. 
This dependence is likely to increase in 
years to come, as the continent possesses a 

substantial portion of the world's known 
reserves of the 53 most important minerals 
used in the industrial process today. 

During 1974 and 1975 our exports to Af- 
rica increased faster than the average rate 
of increase of global U.S. exports. Now that 
prices for many commodities exported by 
Africa have strengthened, we expect this 
favorable trend in our exports to Africa to 
resume, thus creating more jobs and eco- 
nomic opportunities for Americans. 

U.S. direct investment in Africa has also 
grown rapidly, expanding from an estimated 
. $600 million in 1960 to $3.4 billion in 1975. 

Additional contributions to the African 
Development Fund are consistent with the 
national interest in building cooperative 
economic relations with African countries. 
They are consistent with our efforts to fash- 
ion a more constructive and cooperative 
North-South dialogue. We need concrete 
actions to demonstrate to these countries 
that we are concerned with assisting them in 
achieving a better life and a greater role in 
an international economic order based on 
market forces. 

If we wish as a matter of humanitarian 
compassion and economic self-interest to 
make a fair contribution to the enormous 
task of African development, we must seek 
an appropriate role for the United States in 
the African Development Fund. The African 
Development Bank and Fund are the 
preferred development finance institutions 
of the Africans. They are the only pan- 
African development finance institutions and 
have proven themselves to have a unique 
and effective role in the economic develop- 
ment of the continent. The Africans view 
the degree of donor support for the African 
Development Fund to be an important 
measure of donor commitment to African 
development generally. 

However, present U.S. contributions to 
the African Development Fund total only 
$15 million, about 4.4 percent of total con- 
tributions to date. We are now eighth in 
donor rank — after Canada, Japan, West 
Germany, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, 
and Denmark. If the Administration's 

May 9, 1977 


$10 million fiscal year 1978 appropriation 
request for the Fund is approved by the 
Congress, our subscription would rise to $25 
million, or about 5 percent of total pledged 
and projected Fund contributions through 
July 1, 1978. We would then be about sixth 
in donor rank. 

We know that both the Africans and other 
donors consider this situation to constitute 
an inadequate role for the United States in 
the African Development Fund. The United 
States plays a leading role in all the interna- 
tional financial institutions except the Afri- 
can Development Fund. We hold executive- 
directorships in all these institutions except 
the African Development Fund. The political 
benefits we have already gained from mem- 
bership in the Fund will be undercut if we 
are unable to obtain an appropriate role 
within a reasonable length of time. We 
would also have no assurance of election to 
an executive-directorship in the Fund with- 
out increasing our relative voting power. 

We therefore request the committee to in- 
corporate in the legislation pending before 
you language already passed by the House 
which would authorize additional 
contributions to the African Development 
Fund. Negotiations for the Fund's second 
replenishment exercise are expected to 
begin at the end of this calendar year. We 
will seek to expedite those negotiations. If 
they are not completed prior to submission 
of the fiscal year 1979 budget, we would 
propose to seek an appropriation in fiscal 
year 1979. This would permit us to move 
toward an appropriate role in the Fund and 
significantly increase the prospects for U.S. 
election to an executive-directorship. 

Conversely, the Administration strongly 
opposes the amendment to the House ver- 
sion of the authorization bill which directs 
the Secretary of the Treasury to seek other 
donor support for the purpose of changing 
the voting structure within the Fund to re- 
flect actual contributions by Fund members. 
Relative donor-country voting power in 
the Fund already reflects actual donor- 
country contributions. Any U.S. attempt to 
modify the Fund's articles of agreement to 
reduce the African Development Bank's 
share of the voting power would be politi- 

cally unacceptable to the Africans and as 
such almost certainly would be rejected by 
the other donors. 

Since the United States helped negotiate 
the Fund's articles of agreement in the first 
place and just ratified them last November, 
we believe it to be inappropriate to be 
forced by legislation to seek their modifica- 
tion. The Fund's articles require approval of 
all transactions by 75 percent of the total 
votes and fully protect donor interests. We 
hope the committee will seek elimination of 
this amendment. 

Funding for Earthquake Relief 
to Romania Urged 

Following is a statement made before the 
House Committee on International Rela- 
tions on April J, by Matthew Nimetz, then 
Counselor-designate of the Department, who 
was sworn in on April 8. ' 

I am grateful for this opportunity to ex- 
press the views of the Administration on the 
question of humanitarian and relief assist- 
ance to Romania and on H.R. 5717, which 
would provide funds for such assistance. Let 
me also express my appreciation for the 
cooperation which members of this commit- 
tee have demonstrated in working with the 
Administration as we attempt to formulate a 
specific program of assistance which reflects 
traditional American responsiveness to in- 
ternational disasters and at the same time 
fits harmoniously into the overall recon- 
struction effort underway in Romania. 

I am sure that the committee is aware of 
the magnitude of the damage suffered by 
the Romanian people in the March 4 earth- 
quake: over 1,500 dead, 11,000 injured, 
32,000 buildings destroyed, and 34,000 
families homeless. In Bucharest alone, 
where the quake caused the greatest loss of 
life and property, nine hospitals were se- 
verely damaged. The Romanian Government 

1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletin 

has estimated that losses to the economy 
exceed $1 billion. 

In the immediate aftermath of this disas- 
ter, the U.S. Government reacted promptly 
and generously — as it has in the past in 
countries such as Yugoslavia, Italy, 
Guatemala, and Turkey — by providing 
emergency assistance in the form of medical 
supplies, 300 tons of dry milk, and the 
dispatch of a team of seismic experts to as- 
sist in on-the-spot evaluation of structural 
damage. This initial package of disaster re- 
lief assistance, which was funded out of the 
Foreign Assistance Act and Public Law 480 
title II, came to approximately $625,000. (In 
addition, private American voluntary agen- 
cies have contributed over $400,000 to assist 
in post-earthquake relief efforts.) Other 
governments have also responded gener- 
ously in providing assistance to Romania for 
both emergency relief and for longer term 

The Administration believes that the addi- 
tional assistance envisioned by H.R. 5717 
would provide an extremely important and 
timely followup to the emergency relief 
which this government has already supplied. 
The Romanians face a monumental task in 
restoring housing, medical facilities, and 
communal services to normal levels. The 
present bill would give the Administration 
the vehicle for putting together a package of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance 
which we would plan to administer according 
to the following set of priorities: 

(1) Hospital, medical and similar equip- 
ment, and commodities with a humanitarian 

(2) Equipment, commodities, and technical 
services required for clearing damaged 
buildings and the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of damaged housing, schools, 
and hospitals; and 

(3) Equipment and commodities required 
for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and 
replacement in other sectors. 

It goes without saying that we would ex- 
pect to work closely with this committee and 
with the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in working out a suitable pro- 
gram that corresponds both to the intent of 

the Congress and to the needs of the Roma- 
nian people. 

I must add in all candor, however, that we 
are concerned with the action taken by the 
Senate on April 1 in cutting by one-half the 
supplementary appropriation for S. 1124 for 
Romanian earthquake relief and rehabilita- 
tion. The Administration, in coordination 
with our Ambassador in Bucharest, has 
carefully considered the possible levels of 
funding needed to implement a meaningful 
program of assistance, within the very clear 
budgetary constraints, and we have deter- 
mined that $20 million should be allocated 
for this purpose. I wish to stress that this 
determination was made in consultation with 
the Office of Management and Budget and 
has the support of the highest levels within 
the Administration — including the Presi- 
dent. I also might add that the figure of $20 
million in grant aid is consistent with U.S. 
assistance provided to other countries which 
have suffered devastating earthquakes. We 
would therefore hope that the House and 
Senate can promptly work out the necessary 
authorizing and appropriating legislation 
which would permit the Administration to 
move forward with a $20 million package of 

Although the committee's present concern 
is the proposal for relief and rehabilitation 
assistance within the framework of H.R. 
5717, the Administration is also looking at 
the possibility of providing other forms of 
assistance to Romania to help in the recov- 
ery from the enormous losses sustained. We 
are reviewing, for example, the appro- 
priateness of low-interest credits to help 
finance Romanian purchases of U.S. equip- 
ment to repair or replace items damaged in 
the earthquake. We will consult with this 
committee after the Administration has had 
an opportunity to study this matter further. 

I think a word about Romania's relations 
with the United States would be appropriate 
here. Although Romania is a member of 
both the Warsaw Pact and the Communist 
economic group, the Council of Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance, Romania has forcefully 
pursued a policy of seeking friendly and 
constructive relations with the countries of 
the West, a policy which has distanced it 

May 9, 1977 


from the Soviet Union and the other mem- 
bers of the Warsaw Pact. Romania continues 
to pursue an independent line on a number 
of international issues of major concern to us 
and has consistently emphasized to this gov- 
ernment its interest in establishing even 
closer economic and political ties with the 
United States. This improvement in rela- 
tions has been underscored by the ex- 
changes of visits by heads of state that have 
taken place in 1969, 1973, and 1975. The pro- 
posed grant of assistance to Romania in the 
wake of the March 4 earthquake would be an 
extremely significant gesture of support for 
the efforts which Romania has been making 
to map out its future independently of out- 
side direction. 

In this regard, I believe it is also 
important to point out that the considerable 
economic toll which Romania suffered as a 
result of the earthquake may create pres- 
sures on the Romanian Government to 
modify this relatively independent stance. 
Substantive evidence of our readiness to as- 
sist would help the Romanians to maintain 
their present course. 

I am also aware of this committee's strong 
and commendable concerns with the prog- 
ress of human rights in countries to which 
the United States supplies assistance. I 
think that all of the members of this com- 
mittee are equally aware of the commitment 
of this Administration to keep this concern 
in the forefront in our dealings with other 
countries. The Administration is convinced 
that the proposal to provide relief and re- 
habilitation assistance to Romania is in no 
way inconsistent with our concerns over 
human rights. On the contrary, I can think 
of no better way to underscore our human- 
itarian concern with the conditions of human 
existence in other countries. 

In closing, I wish to express the Adminis- 
tration's gratitude to the sponsors of H.R. 
5717 for their initiative in proposing this 
package of assistance and to the committee 
for promptly taking up this urgent measure. 
I respectfully urge you to move just as 
quickly in translating it into law. 


Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. " 

Ratification deposited: Jamaica, April 13, 1977. 
Signatures: Argentina, April 14, 1977; Denmark, 
January 12, 1977; Sweden, January 11, 1977. 


Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Done at Washington, London, and Mos- 
cow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 
1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, April 15, 1977. 



Agreement providing for consultations should textile 
or apparel exports from Czechoslovakia cause mar- 
ket disruptions in the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Prague March 22 and 28, 1977. 
Entered into force March 28, 1977. 


Loan agreement relating to a commodity import pro- 
gram. Signed at Cairo March 6, 1977. Entered into 
force March 6, 1977. 

Project grant agreement for applied science and tech- 
nology research, with annexes. Signed at Cairo 
March 29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977. 


Memorandum of understanding relating to technical 
cooperation in geological, water resources, land-use, 
and related studies for the Capital Territory of 
Nigeria. Dated February 4, 1977. Entered into force 
February 4, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Second protocol amending the convention of December 
31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at 
London March 31, 1977. Enters into force 30 days 
after the date on which instruments of ratification 
are exchanged. 

Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

NDEX May 9, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1976 


Ldministration Supports Increased U.S. Contri- 
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo- 
len, Young) 471 

nterview With President Carter by Media Rep- 
resentatives April 1.3 (excerpt) 459 

Lrms Control and Disarmament 

'resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453 
'resident Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force 
Base. Ga. (excerpts) 401 

hina. Interview With President Carter by Media 
Representatives April 15 (excerpt) 459 


Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contri- 
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo- 
len, Young) 471 

Ending for Earthquake Relief to Romania Urged 
(Nimetz) 474 

]uba. Interview With President Carter by Media 
Representatives April 15 (excerpt) 459 

Developing Countries. President Carter's Pan 
American Day Address 453 

Sconomic Affairs 

'resident Announces Measures To Assist U.S. 

Industry (statement) 463 

'resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453 

foreign Aid 

Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contri- 
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo- 

len, Young) 471 

uruling for Earthquake Relief to Romania Urged 
(Nimetz) 474 

'resident Carter's News Conference of April 15 
(excerpts) 457 

iuman Rights 

'resident Carter's News Conference of April 15 

(excerpts ) 457 

^resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453 

atin America and the Caribbean. President 

Carter's Pan American Day Address 453 

Middle East. President Carter's Remarks at 
Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga. (excerpts) 4(il 

Vamibia. United States Relations in Southern 
Africa (Schaufele) 40 1 

Organization of American States. President 
Carter's Pan American Day Address 453 

Presidential Documents 

Intel-view With President Carter by Media Rep- 
resentatives April 15 (excerpt ) • ■ 450 

President Announces Measures To Assist U.S. 
Shoe Industry 463 

President Carter's News Conference of April 15 

(excerpts ) 457 

President Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 

President Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force 
Base, Ga. (excerpts) 461 

Romania. Funding for Earthquake Relief to 

Romania Urged (Nimetz) 474 

South Africa. United States Relations in South- 
ern Africa (Schaufele) 464 

Southern Rhodesia. United States Relations in 
Southern Africa (Schaufele) 464 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 476 


President Carter's News Conference of April 15 
(excerpts) 457 

President Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force 
Base, Ga. (excerpts) 461 

Name Index 

Bolen, David B 471 

Carter, President 453, 457, 450. 461. 4a; 

Nimetz, Matthew 474 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 464 

Young, Andrew 471 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*182 4/19 International Joint Commission au- 
thorized to establish Great Lakes 
Water Level Advisory Board. 

*183 4/121 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
May 12. 

"184 4/21 Program for visit of King Hussein I 
of Jordan. 

*185 4/22 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea, working group on radiocom- 
munications, May 19. 

*Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 

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Volume LXXVI • No. 1977 • May 16, 1977 


Message Front President Carter and White House Fact Sheet J,77 


Statement by Undo- Secretary Benson ^85 


Statement by Ambassador Young 494 


For index see inside hack coi-er 

2 5 W 


Vol. LXXVI, No. 1977 
May 16, 1977 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will he appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

The Department or State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S, foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
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Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Carter to the Congress dated 
April 27, together with a fact sheet issued by 
the White House that day. 


White House press release dated April 27 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The need to halt nuclear proliferation is 
one of mankind's most pressing challenges. 
Members of my Administration are now 
engaged in international discussions to find 
ways of controlling the spread of nuclear 
explosive capability without depriving any 
nation of the means to satisfy its energy 
needs. The domestic nuclear policies which I 
have already put forward will place our na- 
tion in a leadership position, setting a posi- 
tive example for other nuclear suppliers as 
well as demonstrating the strength of our 
concern here at home for the hazards of a 
plutonium economy. Today I am submitting 
to the Congress a bill which would establish 
for the United States a strong and effective 
non-proliferation policy. 

This bill relies heavily upon work which 
the Congress has already done, and I 
commend the Congress for these valuable 
initiatives. I look forward to working with 
the Congress to establish a strong, respon- 
sible legislative framework from which we 
can continue strengthened efforts to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

Among our shared goals are: an increase 
in the effectiveness of international 
safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear 
activities to prevent further proliferation of 
nuclear explosive devices, the establishment 
of common international sanctions to 

prevent such proliferation, an effort to en- 
courage nations which have not ratified the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so at the ear- 
liest possible date, and adoption of programs 
to enhance the reliability of the United 
States as a supplier of nuclear fuel. 

This bill differs from pending proposals, 
however, in several respects: 

1. It defines the immediate nuclear export 
conditions which we can reasonably ask 
other nations to meet while we negotiate 
stricter arrangements. The proposals 
currently before Congress would impose 
criteria that could force an immediate 
moratorium on our nuclear exports, ad- 
versely affecting certain allies whose 
cooperation is needed if we are to achieve 
our ultimate objective of non-proliferation. 

2. It defines additional nuclear export 
conditions which will be required in new 
agreements for civil nuclear cooperation. In 
particular, we will require as a continuing 
condition of U.S. supply that recipients have 
all their nuclear activities under IAEA 
[International Atomic Energy Agency] 
safeguards. I view this as an interim meas- 
ure and shall make it clear to all potential 
recipients and to other nuclear suppliers 
that our first preference, and continuing ob- 
jective, is universal adherence to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. 

3. For the near future, it attempts to 
tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear coop- 
eration through renegotiation of existing 
agreements to meet the same standards as 
those we will require in new agreements. I 
believe that this approach will better meet 
our non-proliferation objectives than will the 
unilateral imposition of new export licensing 

May 16, 1977 


4. It increases the flexibility we need to 
deal with an extremely complex subject. For 
example, instead of requiring countries that 
want our nuclear exports to foreswear fuel 
enrichment and reprocessing for all time, it 
allows us to draft new agreements using in- 
centives to encourage countries not to ac- 
quire such facilities. It also permits me to 
grant exceptions when doing so would fur- 
ther our basic aim of non-proliferation. All 
new cooperation agreements would, of 
course, be subject to Congressional review. 

This bill is intended to reassure other na- 
tions that the United States will be a reli- 
able supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment 
for those who genuinely share our desire for 
non-proliferation. It will insure that when 
all statutory standards have been met, ex- 
port licenses will be issued — or, if the judg- 
ment of the Executive Branch and the 
independent Nuclear Regulatory Commis- 
sion should differ, that a workable 
mechanism exists for resolving the dispute. 

Since I intend personally to oversee 
Executive Branch actions affecting non- 
proliferation, I do not think a substantial 
reorganization of the responsibility for nu- 
clear exports within the Executive Branch is 
necessary. This conclusion is shared by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The need for prompt action is great. Until 
domestic legislation is enacted, other coun- 
tries will be reluctant to renegotiate their 
agreements with us, because they will fear 
that new legislation might suddenly change 
the terms of cooperation. If the incentives 
we offer them to renegotiate with us are not 
attractive enough, the United States could 
lose important existing safeguards and 
controls. And if our policy is too weak, we 
could find ourselves powerless to restrain a 
deadly world-wide expansion of nuclear ex- 
plosive capability. I believe the legislation 
now submitted to you strikes the necessary 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, April 27, 1977. 



White House press release (later! Apl 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act 
of 1977, the domestic nuclear policies an- 
nounced by the President on April 7, and 
the additional policy decisions included in 
this fact sheet are key components of the 
Administration's nuclear nonproliferation 
policy. The President's policy decisions 

— New conditions we will require for the 
granting of nuclear export licenses. 

— Additional new conditions we will re- 
quire in new U.S. agreements for 
cooperation. These agreements are the for- 
mal bilateral undertakings which form the 
basis for civil nuclear interactions with 
other nations. 

— Policies the executive branch will follow 
in making recommendations to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission on the export of 
sensitive items such as plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium (the weapons-usable form 
of uranium, known as HEU). 

— Policies the executive branch will follow 
in deciding whether to approve a request by 
another nation to retransfer U.S. -supplied 
fuel to a third nation for reprocessing. 

— Policies to improve U.S. reliability as a 
nuclear fuel supplier by introducing greater 
clarity and predictability into the export li- 
censing process. 

Together, all these policies will place the 
United States in a leadership position among 
nuclear suppliers, and will establish a strong 
and effective nonproliferation policy. These 
policies have been developed, and must be 
evaluated, as a complete package. They are 
intended as a delicately balanced blend of: 

— Denials: for those items, such as re- 
processing plants, which we believe create 
such a large risk that their export should be 
avoided whenever possible; 

— Controls: over those items and technol- 
ogies, required by ongoing programs, where 
improved safeguards and conditions for 
physical security will substantially reduce 

Department of State Bulletin 

k the risk. These controls will be backed up by 
I stiff sanctions which would be imposed on 
I violators. 

— Incentives: The United States fully rec- 
ti ognizes that there is no such thing as an ef- 

fective unilateral nonproliferation policy. We 

■ must gain the support of other 

1 nations — both suppliers and recipients — if 
I we are to reach our common goal of limiting 
I the spread of nuclear weapons. Hence the 

■ Administration's program includes 
I substantial elements of incentives, particu- 
i larly in the areas of: uranium resource as- 
I sessment; guaranteed access to nonsensi- 
I tive, low enriched uranium (LEU) nuclear 
| fuel; and spent fuel storage. 

The following are key features of the Nu- 
I clear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977 
| and related Administration policies: 

1. The bill establishes for the first time a 
statutory requirement forbidding the inde- 
pendent Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) from granting a license to export 
nuclear materials or facilities until it has 
been notified by the executive branch of its 
judgment that the issuance of a license "will 
not be inimicable to the common defense and 
security." This judgment will be reached by 
the Departments of State, Defense, Com- 
merce, the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, and the Energy Research and 
Development Administration. 

In arriving at these judgments, the execu- 
tive branch will adhere to the following 
policies not detailed in the act: 

— Continue to embargo the export of en- 
richment and reprocessing plants. 

— Avoid new commitments to export sig- 
nificant amounts of separated plutonium 
except for gram quantities for research and 
analytical uses. 

— Avoid new commitments to export sig- 
nificant quantities of highly enriched 
uranium except when the project is of ex- 
ceptional merit and the use of low enriched 
fuel or some other less weapons-usable ma- 
terial is clearly shown to be technically 

— Require direct Presidential approval for 
any supply of HEU greater than 15 kilo- 
grams (the approximate amount needed for 
a bomb). 

— Undertake efforts to identify projects 
and facilities which might be converted to 
the use of LEU instead of HEU. 

— Take steps to minimize inventories of 
weapons-usable uranium abroad. 

2. The bill defines the immediate nuclear 
export conditions which we can reasonably 
expect other nations to meet while we 
negotiate stricter agreements for coopera- 
tion. These conditions include: 

— A requirement for International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all 
exported items and on any other plutonium 
or enriched uranium that might be used in 
the exported facility or produced through its 

— A requirement that no U.S. export be 
used for research or production of any nu- 
clear explosive device. 

— A requirement that no U.S. export be 
retransferred by a recipient nation to any 
other nation without the prior approval of 
the United States. 

— A requirement that no fuel exported 
from the United States be reprocessed with- 
out the prior approval of the United States. 

These criteria differ from proposals 
currently before Congress which include 
criteria that could force an immediate 
moratorium on U.S. nuclear exports. Such a 
moratorium would seriously damage U.S. 
relations with certain allies whose coopera- 
tion is essential if we are to achieve our 
nonproliferation objectives. 

3. The bill defines additional nuclear 
export conditions which will be required in 
new agreements for cooperation. These 

— A requirement, in the case of 
non-nuclear-weapons states, that IAEA 
safeguards cover all nuclear materials and 
equipment regardless of whether these have 
been supplied by the United States. 
Fulfillment of this requirement will be a 

May 16, 1977 


condition of continuing U.S. nuclear supply. 

The President has also directed that this 
requirement be viewed only as an interim 
measure and that the United States' first 
preference, and continuing objective, is uni- 
versal adherence to the Non-Proliferation 

— The stipulation that U.S. cooperation 
under the agreement shall cease if the recip- 
ient detonates a nuclear device or materially 
violates IAEA safeguards or any guarantee 
it has given under the agreement. 

— A requirement for IAEA safeguards on 
all U.S. -supplied material and equipment for 
indefinite duration, whether or not the 
agreement for cooperation remains in force. 

— The U.S. right of approval on retrans- 
fers extended to all special nuclear material 
produced through the use of U.S. 

— The U.S. right of approval on reprocess- 
ing extended to all special nuclear material 
produced through use of U.S. equipment. 

4. For the near future, the bill proposes 
to tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear 
cooperation through the renegotiation of 
existing agreements to meet the same 
standards as those we will require for new 
agreements (as specified in 3 above). This 
approach will better meet U.S. nonprolifera- 
tion objectives than would an attempt to 
impose unilaterally new export-licensing 

5. The bill provides the flexibility needed 
to deal with the many different situations 
and nations involved. For example, it makes 
the necessary exceptions for licenses under 
existing multilateral agreements. It also es- 
tablishes an efficient mechanism for the 
President and Congress to review cases 
where the executive branch and the inde- 
pendent NRC differ on the granting of a 
proposed export license. And it permits the 
President to grant exceptions from the stiff 
new conditions required for new agreements 
for cooperation, if he considers that this is 
in our overall nonproliferation interest. 

6. The bill creates sanctions against the 
violation of nuclear agreements by providing 
that no nuclear export shall be granted to 

any non-nuclear-weapons state that, after 
enactment of this legislation: 

— Detonates a nuclear explosive device. 

— Terminates or abrogates IAEA 

— Is found by the President to have mate- 
rially violated an IAEA agreement or any 
other guarantee it has given under an 
agreement for cooperation with the United 

unless the President determines that such a 
cutoff would hinder the achievement of U.S. 
non-proliferation objectives or would jeop- 
ardize the common defense and security. 

7. The legislation proposes the establish- 
ment of an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation Program, aimed at furthering 
the development of alternative nuclear fuel 
cycles which do not provide access to 
weapons-usable material, as announced by 
the President in his April 7 statement. 

8. As an essential element of the 
international evaluation program, the legis- 
lation proposes a number of policies to as- 
sure that adequate nuclear fuel supply will 
be available to all nations as a non- 
proliferation incentive. These include: 

— A policy to assure adequate U.S. 
uranium enrichment capacity. 

— A policy assuring that nuclear exports 
will be licensed on a timely basis once 
statutory requirements are met. 

— U.S. initiatives to promote international 
consultations to develop multilateral means 
for meeting worldwide nuclear fuel needs. 

The bill further requires the President to 
report to the Congress on the progress of 
these discussions and to propose any 
legislation he may consider necessary to 
promote these objectives. 

9. The bill commits the United States to 
work with other nations to strengthen the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
through: contribution of technical resources, 
support, and funding; improving the IAEA 
safeguards system; and by assuring that 
that IAEA receives the data needed for it to 
administer an effective comprehensive in- 
ternational safeguards program. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Carter's News Conference 
of April 22 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on April 22. 1 

Q. Mr. President, are we going to transfer 
American battle tanks to Zaire? And if so, 

The President: No. No decision has been 
made about that. The news stories that have 
come out recently about the possible sale of 
tanks to Zaire are a result of a study that 
was done a year or so ago before I became 

This question has never come to my atten- 
tion since I have been in office until this 
morning. I have made no decision about 
sending tanks to Zaire. And I think it's 
highly unlikely that I would advocate such a 

Q. But to take up another foreign policy 
question, your son Chip was on a trip to 
China, has come back. I think you sent a 
message with him and may have gotten a 
message back. I wonder if you could tell us 
about that communication, and specifically, 
are you planning a trip to China or are they 
planning, any of their leaders, to come here 
in the near future? 

The President: The nature of the message 
is one just of friendship and good will and a 
mutual agreement that it's in the best 
interests of the world and our own countries 
to increase communication, trade, and ulti- 
mately, through compliance with the Shang- 
hai agreement, to normalize relationships 
with China. 

I don't anticipate any trips outside the 
country this year except my trip early next 
month to London. And I'll go to Geneva to 
meet with President Asad of Syria. 

The Chinese Government have always 

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977, p. 

taken the position that their leaders coming 
to our country would not be appropriate so 
long as there is an Ambassador here which 
represents the Republic of China on Taiwan. 
So, I think even from the first visits there 
of President Nixon and Kissinger, this has 
been the Chinese position. I would certainly 
welcome the Chinese leaders to come to 
Washington to meet with me, as I would 
other leaders of nations, but I think I have 
described the situation now as best I can. 

Q. Mr. President, you have had your at- 
tention taken away from one of the alterna- 
tives that you have been working on, the 
Middle East peace, recently. But I wonder if 
there has been any progress, movement, or 
additional flow going on privately during 
this time, if you could tell us about it. 

The President: Well, yes. I've continued 
my own study of the Middle Eastern ques- 
tion. As you know, I have met now with the 
Prime Minister of Israel and also with 
President Sadat of Egypt. Today I'll be 
meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria. And 
early next month I'll meet with President 
Asad from Syria on a brief trip to Geneva. 
King Hussein [of Jordan] will be here Sun- 
day and Monday to meet with me. 

And I'm trying to learn as best I can the 
attitudes of the different nations that are 
involved in the Middle Eastern dispute and 
to try to at least observe and analyze some 
common ground on which a permanent 
settlement might be reached. 

I think it's best until I meet with all these 
leaders to minimize my own statements on 
this subject. I have outlined as best I could 
some of the options concerning borders; 
Palestine, the Palestinian people; the defini- 
tion of permanent peace — those are the 
three major issues. But now that the foreign 
leaders know my own suggestions, I am try- 
ing to get responses from them before I 
make further comments about it. 

Q. Mr. President, you described — Senator 
Clark has described Zaire as a military dic- 
tatorship. How can you regard this as a de- 
fender of human rights? 

May 16, 1977 


The President: I have never defined Zaire 
as a defender of human rights. I know that 
there are some problems in Zaire with 
human rights, as there are here and in many 
other countries. But our friendship and aid 
historically for Zaire has not been predi- 
cated on their perfection in dealing with 
human rights. I think, as you know, our 
military aid for Zaire has been very modest. 

We have observed some stabilizing of the 
situation in the southern part of Zaire 
lately, and I think our policy even in spite of 
the invasion from Angola by the Katangans 
has been compatible with our past policies. 

Q. Are you sure there are no Cubans in 
that group, Mr. President? 

The President: I am sorry? 

Q. Cubans. We hear reports from King 
Hassan [of Morocco] and General Mobutu 
[President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire] that 
there are Cubans there. 

The President: Let me — I can't certify to 
this, because we don't have observers all 
over the Shaba region. Our best information 
is that the Katangans have been trained 
within Angola by the Cubans. We have no 
direct evidence at all that there are Cubans 
within Zaire. 

Q. What will you seek to accomplish, Mr. 
President, when you go to London, in the 
energy field, and to what extent is coopera- 
tion among the major industrial countries 
in the West an important factor in the suc- 
cess of your own energy plan? 

The President: I think it's accurate to say 
that we've now taken the leadership in 
moving toward a comprehensive energy pol- 
icy for our nation. I would hope that the 
other nations around the world would do a 
similar thing. 

There are other aspects of the energy 
question, though, that must be addressed. 
One is atomic energy, reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuels, a move toward non- 
proliferation of atomic explosive capabil- 
ity. So there will be a very complicated in- 
terrelationship involving trade. 

I think to the extent that we do conserve 

in our own country it would make it easier 
for our European allies and for Japan to 
meet their own energy needs. We now sap 
so much extra oil from the international 
supplies that it makes it more difficult for 

I think this will, over a period of time, re- 
duce the intense competition that's 
inevitable for dwindling supplies of oil in the 
face of increasing demand. 

Western Summation of 1 1th Round 
of MBFR Talks 

The 11th round of negotiations on mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Central 
Europe was held at Vienna February 
S-April 15. Following is a statement made 
on behalf of the Western allies by Baron W. 
J. de Vos van Steenwyk, Netherlands Rep- 
resentative, at a news conference at Vienna 
on April 15. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 77-4 

During the past round, we have dealt with 
a number of general topics and with the 
problems of the discrepancy between East- 
ern and Western figures on Warsaw Pact 
military manpower. 

One of the general topics Western partici- 
pants have concentrated on during the round 
is the need for the East to move away from 
its basic conceptual approach to these 
negotiations; namely, that all 11 direct par- 
ticipants in these negotiations must submit 
to an identical reduction formula as though 
they were identical in all relevant respects, 
that is, identical in military importance, 
identical in their geographic situation, and 
identically affected by the consequences of 
reductions and limitations of their forces. 

Obviously, this approach is not a logical or 
realistic one if one looks at the important 
differences which actually exist among the 
different participants. Because of these dif- 
ferences, the East's insistence that all direct 
participants should be treated identically 


Department of State Bulletin 

would result in gross inequities and diminish 
Western security. 

What are these differences? They are, 
first of all, the enormous differences in the 
military strength of participants. The 
participants in these talks include the 
world's largest military powers, the United 
States and U.S.S.R., as well as countries 
with much less military potential. Both the 
United States and U.S.S.R. possess a large 
and varied strategic nuclear capability. 
None of the other participants possesses 
anything remotely comparable. Clearly, it is 
not realistic to expect participants to over- 
look this basic fact of these negotiations. 

Second, there are important differences 
between the different participants as to 
geographical situation. The Soviet Union, 
which is the largest power on the Eastern 
side, is situated in direct proximity to the 
area of reductions. The United States, on 
the other hand, which is the comparable 
Western power, is located at a distance of 
5,000 kilometers on the other side of the At- 
lantic Ocean. 

Another important difference is that some 
of the participants have substantially all 
their forces in the area; substantially all of 
their forces will therefore be affected under 
any limitation. But other participants have 
only a portion of their forces in the area, 
and it is only this portion of their forces that 
would in any way be limited under an 
agreement. The Soviet Union and the 
United States both fall in this second cate- 
gory, of course. But in the case of the Soviet 
Union, we are talking about the presence, 
on territory directly adjacent to the reduc- 
tion area, of extremely large forces with an 
imposing array of the most modern equip- 

Finally, there is the important difference 
between East and West with regard to the 
overall numerical levels of their forces in the 
area. The East possesses sizable numerical 
advantages in ground forces manpower and 
in overall military manpower in the area. It 
also has superiority in numbers of most 
types of major armaments. 

These are important realities which define 

the negotiating situation we are addressing 
in these talks. However, the East continues 
to press an approach which deliberately 
disregards these realities. In defiance of the 
facts, it has insisted that the reduction for- 
mula should be identical for all participants. 

The East continues to envisage 
equal-percentage across-the-board reduc- 
tions of all types of military personnel and 
armaments which would establish in treaty 
form a right for the East to maintain its 
considerable advantages in military man- 
power and armaments. 

This outcome would be inequitable and 
would seriously diminish Western security. 
Moreover, the East's contractualized numer- 
ical advantages inside the reduction area 
would be enhanced by the East's geographic 
advantages; inside the area the East would 
have more manpower and more armaments 
than the West, and adjoining the area of re- 
ductions is the Soviet Union, one of the 
most powerful countries in the world. Soviet 
forces in the U.S.S.R. are far larger than 
Western forces in the reduction area and 
would be subject to no numerical limitations 
under an agreement. 

Western participants would in addition 
have to accept national ceilings. This would 
seriously hamper the operation of NATO's 
integrated defense structure and could 
prejudice the future organization of Western 
European defense. National ceilings could 
limit the Western ability to maintain the 
overall number of their military manpower 
at an agreed level. It is evident that this 
Eastern approach would diminish Western 

We are determined to do everything we 
can to bring about an agreement. However, 
the East will have to realize that any 
agreement must be based on the realities of 
the situation and not on an artificial 
approach which insists on treating all 11 di- 
rect participants as though they were iden- 

In its proposals of December 1975, the 
West made significant additions to the re- 
ductions and limitations it has previously 
proposed. These proposals offered a reason- 

May 16, 1977 


able and equitable basis for agreement 
based on approximate parity in ground 
forces, including a collective common ceiling 
on both ground forces manpower and overall 
military manpower. We still consider that 
they deserve a positive and serious Eastern 

However, so far the East has given us no 
such response. In its February 1976 
proposal, which is not such a response, the 
East continued to insist on the same equal- 
percentage approach, with no change in the 
outcome which would result from its 
implementation. The only change was a 
change in the sequence of reductions. 

A major topic of our discussions during 
this round has been the data issue. 

Last June, 2Vfe years after the West tabled 
data in November 1973, the East put down 
figures on its forces in the area. There was a 
considerable discrepancy between Eastern 
and Western figures on Eastern forces in 
the area. Our discussions during this round 
have sought to clarify the underlying rea- 
sons for this discrepancy. These discussions 
have been carried on in a businesslike way. 
However, the sources of the discrepancy 
have not yet been identified. These discus- 
sions will have to be continued in view of 
the need for understanding on force levels, 
for solution of the size of the reductions to 
be taken by each side, and for resulting lim- 

To sum up, we are disappointed that there 
has not been more progress in the past 
round. However, we continue to believe that 

a basis for progress exists if the East moves 
to a more realistic approach which does take 
account of the real and important differences 
among the direct participants in these 
negotiations. The Western approach does 

U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement 
on Fisheries, Maritime Boundary 

Following is a joint U.S. -Cuba statement 
issued at Havana on April 27 and at Wash- 
ington on April 28. 

As a result of the negotiations held in 
New York City [March 24-28] and sub- 
sequently in the City of Havana [April 25- 
27], between representatives of the Gov- 
ernments of the United States of America 
and the Republic of Cuba, a governing in- 
ternational fisheries agreement on Cuba's 
participation in fisheries within the 200-mile 
zone of the United States and another 
agreement on a preliminary boundary be- 
tween the 200-mile zones arising from the 
laws passed by both parties were concluded. 

The delegations of the Governments of the 
United States of America and the Republic 
of Cuba were headed by Assistant Secretary 
of State Terence Todman and Vice Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Pelegrin Torras. 

The text of both agreements will be pub- 
lished at a later date. 

City of Havana, April 27, 1977. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Discusses Security Assistance Programs 

Statement by Lucy Wilson Benson 

Under Secretary for Security Assistance Science and Technology 

I had the pleasure of appearing before this 
Committee in February with Secretary 
Vance and Governor Gilligan [John J. Gilli- 
gan, Administrator, Agency for In- 
ternational Development] as you began your 
consideration of the Administration's re- 
quests for foreign assistance program 

Since that time President Carter has sent 
forward our specific legislative proposals for 
security assistance. He emphasized in his 
message that these programs are essential 
to the attainment of important foreign policy 
goals throughout the world and will reassure 
our friends and allies of the constancy of our 
support. He noted that adjustment had been 
made to reflect the importance which we at- 
tach to human rights considerations, and he 
committed this Administration to taking 
human rights considerations fully into 
account in determining the scope and nature 
of our security assistance programs. In view 
of the ongoing arms transfer policy review, 
the President also noted that he was 
requesting only minimal changes in the gov- 
erning legislation. 

I now would like to provide this commit- 
tee on behalf of the Administration a fuller 
justification of our requests. First I want to 

1 Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist- 
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Apr. 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

acknowledge the debt which we owe to this 
committee for the leadership which you 
exercised last year leading the way toward a 
policy of genuine restraint on arms transfers 
and toward the enunciation of a clear and 
forthright U.S. policy on human rights, dis- 
crimination, and other matters of principle. 
The Administration is deeply committed to 
the goals articulated in the International Se- 
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976. We intend to proceed toward 
those goals purposefully and steadily, with 
the careful planning which changes in such 
important policies both demand and deserve. 

In this context, our present proposals 
represent a transitional program. As the 
President stated, in the time available we 
were able to make only minimal changes in 
the budget prepared by the previous 
Administration, where it was necessary to 
bring the request into line with the basic 
principles of the new Administration and to 
indicate as fully as possible the new 
directions in which we intend to move. We 
need the programs and the funds requested 
to provide us the means to proceed toward 
our international goals, deliberately and in 
full consultation with the responsible com- 
mittees of the Congress. 

Mr. Nimetz, Counselor of the Department 
of State, is with me today to answer any 
questions you may have about the Adminis- 
tration's proposals for Greece and Turkey. 
Secretary Vance has just transmitted these 
proposals to the committee as a supplement 

May 16, 1977 


to the Administration bill sent to you last 
month by the President. 

General Fish [Lt. Gen. Howard Fish, Di- 
rector, Defense Security Assistance Agency, 
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Security Assistance] also has accom- 
panied me today to discuss the military se- 
curity assistance programs, for which the 
Department of Defense has administrative 
responsibility. I regret that I shall not be 
able to be with you tomorrow when Gover- 
nor Gilligan appears to answer your detailed 
questions about the administration by the 
Agency for International Development of 
the security supporting assistance 

As you know, my subject today is military 
assistance, which we provide under the aus- 
pices of three programs: foreign military 
sales (FMS), the military assistance 
program (MAP), and the international mili- 
tary education and training (IMET) pro- 
gram. These programs comprise 
$2,537,800,000 in program terms and 
$972,750,000 in new obligational authority. 
This represents, respectively, 57 percent 
and 34 percent of the total security assist- 
ance request. 

Military Assistance Program 

The law requires that grant military as- 
sistance programs must be terminated at the 
end of this fiscal year except as authorized 
by Congress to specified countries in speci- 
fied amounts. We are asking such authoriza- 
tion for eight countries in fiscal 1978 for a 
total MAP program of $284.6 million 
including general costs. Five of these 
(Spain, Turkey, Greece, Philippines, and 
Portugal) are countries where we have ac- 
cess to important base facilities and with 
which we have reached or are anticipating 
new agreements spelling out the terms for 
our continued access. We will submit each 
such defense cooperation agreement to the 
Congress for formal approval. 

In addition, we are proposing grant as- 
sistance for Jordan, a key moderating influ- 
ence among the Arab confrontation states. 
Our grant aid request for Jordan continues 
the effort of the U.S. Government to use se- 

curity assistance as an effective means of 
advancing the cause of peace in the Middle 

The other two proposed MAP recipients, 
Indonesia and Thailand, are strategically 
placed friends in Southeast Asia. These 
countries are acutely aware of the increased 
threats to their security following the U.S. 
withdrawal from Indochina. We expect the 
transition from grant aid to credit and cash 
sales for these two friendly nations will be 
completed by the end of fiscal year 1978. 

As we terminate MAP programs, there 
remains a backlog of grant materiel in the 
pipeline awaiting delivery. The Congress 
recognized this in the current law, which an- 
ticipates the need to provide for the pay- 
ment of such shipping costs. For 1978 we 
have estimated specific supply operations 
costs totaling $5,450,000 for eight countries 
where we have ended grant MAP. 

The largest single portion of the MAP 
request is for general costs, totaling 
$60,550,000. Fifty-two million dollars of this 
amount is for administrative expenses, in- 
cluding $38,295,000 for overseas man- 
agement of the program. The committee will 
recall that, effective July 1, 1976, all costs 
of overseas programs management are to be 
authorized under the MAP account, 
including costs which had been borne pre- 
viously by the military departments under 
the Department of Defense budget. We are 
anticipating continuing this arrangement, 
and the general-cost figure is therefore 
higher than it has been in past years, al- 
though the number of overseas personnel 
has been reduced. However, I hasten to 
point out that we expect almost 80 percent 
of these costs to be reimbursed, leaving a 
net charge to the U.S. taxpayer of 
$7,877,000 for the 966 U.S. military and 177 
U.S. civilian personnel for which we are ask- 
ing authority in fiscal 1978. 

Overseas Program Management 

Last year the Congress determined that 
Military Assistance Advisory Groups 
(MAAG's) and similar groups could continue 
to operate abroad after fiscal year 1977 only 
as specifically authorized by the Congress. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We are requesting such specific authority 
for the assignment of military personnel to 
25 foreign countries. These are countries 
where we continue to have sizable military 
security assistance or military supply rela- 
tionships or, in a few cases, where the im- 
portance of our overall security relations ar- 
gues for the maintenance of this form of 
military representation. However, these 
personnel will not be conducting MAAG 
business as usual under the proposed new 
title of Defense Field Office. As General 
Fish will explain at greater length, the em- 
phasis will be on management, to insure that 
our performance and that of the civilian con- 
tractors supporting the program fulfills the 
requirements of law and the contractual 
commitments of the U.S. Government. 

We are also asking for two other signifi- 
cant amendments to last year's provisions 
regarding overseas program management. 

First, we are requesting authority to as- 
sign up to six military personnel, instead of 
three, to carry out security assistance 
functions under the Ambassador, in cases 
where the job cannot be done adequately 
with three military persons. 

Second, we are proposing that the 
Congress allow the President to exercise his 
discretion in determining where Defense At- 
taches may perform security assistance 
functions. In some cases, it has been most 
efficient for the security assistance functions 
to be handled by the Defense Attache's of- 
fice. Barring them from performing such 
functions could require the assignment of 
additional military personnel to the mission. 
Our proposed amendment would require 
that the President's determinations be re- 
ported to the chairman of this committee, 
with details regarding the number of person- 
nel involved and the reasons for the 

I believe that these proposals are 
consistent with the intent of the legislation. 
We are reducing the number and size of 
military units assigned to security assist- 
ance program management overseas. But it 
is in our interest to insure that these pro- 
grams are managed efficiently, in accord- 
ance with U.S. law, and in support of our 
foreign policy objectives. 

Military Education and Training Program 

The international military education and 
training program is nine months old. This is 
the first budget year in which it stands 
alone. I am persuaded that this program has 
advanced our interests by contributing to 
greater communication and understanding 
between the United States and those 
countries with which we have security 

Presently, the program is in transition 
toward greater emphasis on the professional 
education and training of present and future 
foreign military leaders. In the past the 
program was heavily weighted toward tech- 
nical training in the operation and 
maintenance of U.S. military equipment 
provided under grant programs. For fiscal 
year 1978 we are asking for a program of 
$35.7 million. This will provide training 
opportunities for an estimated 5,267 stu- 
dents from 46 foreign countries. 

Foreign Military Sales Program 

The foreign military sales financing 
program totals $2,217,500,000 for fiscal year 
1978. One billion dollars, or 45 percent of 
the program, is intended for Israel. As you 
know, current law provides that Israel will 
be relieved of its obligation to repay one- 
half of the amount provided under the FMS 
financing program. 

We are proposing FMS programs for 32 
countries. These programs range in size 
from $500,000, with which we plan to pro- 
vide the Government of Liberia the means 
to purchase a patrol boat, to $275 million in 
loans for the Republic of Korea, to enhance 
the capability of that country to deter ag- 
gression from its Communist neighbor to the 
north and to facilitate the reduction of U.S. 
ground troops. 

In recent years, military credits provided 
under this program have supplanted grant 
assistance as the cornerstone of our 
worldwide security assistance effort. 

Over $10 billion in FMS credits have been 
provided to foreign governments under the 
FMS financing program over the years. 
There has never been an instance in which a 
foreign government has failed to repay or to 

May 16, 1977 


make acceptable arrangements to repay both 
principal and interest in U.S. dollars. Inci- 
dents of arrearages have also been remarka- 
bly few and have been satisfactorily re- 

Security Supporting Assistance 

Security supporting assistance is the final 
major element of the security assistance 
programs for which I have responsibility 
within the Department of State. You will 
have the opportunity to examine this pro- 
gram at greater length tomorrow with Gov- 
ernor Gilligan. I will only note that this eco- 
nomic aid program — which represents over 
42 percent of our entire security assistance 
request — is money spent not for arms or 
military support but for specific programs of 
assistance to friendly governments to 
promote economic or political stability. 

Again this year the largest portion of 
these moneys is intended for Israel and 
selected states in the Middle East, where 
security supporting assistance is designed 
to provide a foundation for the search for 
regional peace and stability. In addition the 
Administration is seeking authority for the 
provision of security supporting assistance 
to southern Africa, an area of potential con- 
flict between black majorities and white 
minorities, and for Jamaica, a friendly 
neighbor facing extraordinary economic dis- 
location which threatens its stability. 

Programs for Greece and Turkey 

Turning now from general comments on 
our overall security assistance proposals, I 
would like to call your particular attention 
to our important programs for Greece and 

In early March, Clark Clifford reported to 
the full committee on his mission to the 
eastern Mediterranean. He gave you his 
recommendations for achieving progress 
toward a Cyprus settlement and for 
rebuilding our relations with Greece and 
Turkey. U.S. security assistance is an im- 
portant element in this process. 

It is our view that given the history of 

U.S. defense relations with Greece and 
Turkey, defense cooperation agreements are 
the best way to structure our future secu- 
rity relationship with both countries. The 
agreement with Turkey, concluded in March 
1976, and the one currently under negotia- 
tion with Greece do not mark major depar- 
tures from U.S. security policy. Rather, 
these agreements build on the past and 
embody our commitment to mutual security 
cooperation in the NATO context. The 
agreements will improve and strengthen our 
ties with both Greece and Turkey and will 
help foster stability in the area. 

The Administration is therefore prepared 
to endorse in principle the U.S. -Turkish De- 
fense Cooperation Agreement. The 
Administration will also support and work to 
conclude a similar agreement with Greece. 
Though the Administration will defer for the 
present seeking congressional approval of 
either agreement, it is our considered opin- 
ion that interim measures are needed for 
both Greece and Turkey. 

For Greece, the Administration is 
requesting security assistance totaling $175 
million, of which $35 million is grant assist- 
ance and the remainder FMS credits and 

For Turkey the Administration is request- 
ing that Congress authorize $175 million in 
foreign military sales financing for fiscal 
year 1978 by FMS-guaranteed loans. We 
also ask that the ceiling on cash foreign mili- 
tary sales to Turkey be adjusted so that we 
can maintain on a government-to- 
government basis an ongoing Turkish 
procurement of 40 NATO-committed air- 
craft. These aircraft are already in produc- 
tion, and Congress previously has been 
notified of the FMS contracts involved. We 
are not requesting any additional U.S. fund- 
ing for this sale. We have also in our legisla- 
tive proposal retained all of the conditions 
regarding sales to Turkey imposed under 
section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance 

We think this is a balanced, moderate 
program — one designed to begin the process 
of restoring stability in the eastern Mediter- 
ranean, moving toward a Cyprus solution, 


Department of State Bulletin 

and resolving the many problems which cur- 
rently exist between Greece and Turkey. 
The Counselor of the Department, Mr. 
Nimetz, is prepared to go into further de- 
tails with respect to our program recom- 
mendations in this area. 

Proposed Changes in Legislation 

Finally, I would like to draw your attention 
to several changes we are proposing in security 
assistance legislation. 

We are requesting an increase in the ceiling 
on war reserve stockpiles for allied countries 
outside NATO from $125 million for the cur- 
rent year to $270 million for fiscal year 1978. 
The stockpiles for which the authorization is 
sought support Korean forces. This effort re- 
lates to the President's announced intention to 
withdraw American ground forces from the 
Korean Peninsula over the next five years. No 
funds are being sought under this ceiling for 
the procurement of defense articles and serv- 
ices. I understand that in large part the ceiling 
will be used to accommodate the book transfer 
of ammunition stockpiles situated in Korea and 
previously maintained for U.S. troops, which 
will henceforth be earmarked as war reserves 
for the Republic of Korea troops which have 
taken over the batteries as U.S. troops are 

We are asking for relaxation of the third- 
country transfer provisions to exempt transfers 
of maintenance and repair services and spare 
parts and NATO cross-servicing arrangements. 
It is frequently advantageous to pool repair 
and maintenance facilities; regional cooperation 
along these lines promotes closer security 
cooperation. Requiring 30 days' advance notice 
to the Congress before we authorize the fur- 
nishing of services or the use of spare parts 
would tend to frustrate such cooperation or 
give rise to unintentional violations. 

As for NATO cross-servicing, we have in- 
formed the committee of the problems which 
arose under the NATO Sea Sparrow project, 
and the committee has accepted our advance 
notification of future transfers of Sea Sparrow 
parts and service among all NATO partners. 
Although this precedent provides a means for 
handling this sort of problem within NATO, we 

would prefer that the law clarify this exception 
so that our allies will be reassured that such 
cross-servicing arrangements for U.S. weapons 
are feasible. 

We are also seeking to expand the exception 
from the limitation of $25 million on commer- 
cial sales of major defense equipment by in- 
cluding not only NATO countries as presently 
but also Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. 
We have security and military supply relations 
with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand simi- 
lar in character to our relations with members 
of NATO. These three countries are all demo- 
cratic and industrialized states which have 
demonstrated their commitment to world peace 
and regional stability. They have also in the 
past procured their defense requirements in 
part through substantial commercial purchases 
without U.S. Government participation, and 
they could well feel unjustly discriminated 
against by the present provisions of law ex- 
cepting only the NATO allies from the lim- 
itation on licenses for commercial export. 

We are requesting as well an exception to 
the $25 million limitation for exports under 
coproduction agreements duly approved and 
reported in advance to this committee and to 
the Speaker of the House. The issuance of ex- 
port licenses for the shipment of components 
and related equipment or services provides 
adequate U.S. oversight over the progress of 
the coproduction arrangements between the 
American manufacturer and the foreign pro- 
ducer. This procedure also avoids the kind of 
direct participation of U.S. agencies in pro- 
curement and delivery which would result from 
maintaining a requirement that purchases over 
$25 million of major defense equipment be 
handled under the foreign military sales sys- 
tem. We believe that an early amendment of 
this provision is consistent with the intent of 
the act and the responsibility of the executive 
branch for the regulation of exports of military 

In summary, gentlemen, the programs be- 
fore you have the wholehearted support of this 
Administration. We have made every effort to 
insure that they provide all that is required, 
but no more, to meet our foreign policy and 
national security goals. I urge you to approve 
them in full. 

May 16, 1977 


Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Following are texts of identical letters 
dated March 28 from President Carter to 
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the 
House, and Walter F. Mondale, President 
of the Senate, transmitting legislation to au- 
thorize foreign assistance programs for fis- 
cal gears 1978 and 1979. ' 


White House press release dated March 2<< 

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi- 
dent:) I am transmitting today a bill to au- 
thorize foreign development assistance pro- 
grams for the fiscal years 1978 and 1979. 

Enactment of this legislation will enable 
the United States to carry out an efficient 
and effective bilateral development assist- 
ance program which our international 
position and objectives require. This bill 
also authorizes appropriation of voluntary 
contributions to International Organizations 
whose programs are focused on the 
developing world. 

The bill provides that development assist- 
ance shall be made available to the poorest 
countries on a grant basis to the maximum 
extent that is consistent with the attainment 
of our development objectives. This proposal 
is consistent with the United States position 
at the UNCTAD IV Conference [United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment], which urged aid donor nations to 
provide the relatively least developed coun- 
tries on the UNCTAD list with assistance 
on a grant rather than a loan basis. The bill 
creates separate authorizations for popula- 
tion planning and health programs, and a 
requirement that all development assistance 
programs be reviewed to assure that proper 
attention is paid to the relationship of these 
programs to worldwide population growth. 
The bill also contains an authorization of 
$200 million for a long-term multidonor de- 
velopment plan for the Sahel. U.S. contribu- 

tions to this program will be based on equi- 
table burden-sharing with other donor 

Enactment of this legislation will be an 
important step in demonstrating our concern 
for the economic problems of the developing 
world. I urge its early passage. 


Jimmy Carter. 


White House press release dated March 2S 

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi- 
dent:) I am transmitting today a bill to au- 
thorize security assistance programs for the 
fiscal years 1978 and 1979. I consider these 
programs essential to the attainment of im- 
portant United States foreign policy goals 
throughout the world, and to reassure our 
friends and allies of the constancy of our 

The programs authorized by this legisla- 
tion include both military and economic 
forms of security assistance, with 
approximately two-thirds of the funds re- 
quested intended for nonmilitary programs. 
In addition, the bill provides for the con- 
tinuation of our important international 
narcotics control efforts. 

The authorizations I am proposing reflect 
downward adjustments this Administration 
has made in several programs in light of the 
human rights situations in the countries con- 
cerned. We are committed to a continuing 
effort to ensure that human rights consid- 
erations are taken fully into account in 
determining whether our security assistance 
programs serve our national security and 
foreign policy objectives. 

I am not at this time proposing major 
changes in the authorities and statutory 
procedures which now govern security as- 
sistance and arms export controls. I have 
made clear on several occasions my deep 

1 For texts of the bills transmitted, see H. Docs. 112 
and 113, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 


Department of State Bulletin 

concern over the burgeoning international 
traffic in arms. I am firmly resolved to bring 
greater coherence, restraint and control to 
our arms transfer policies and practices. To 
this end, I have ordered a comprehensive 
review of our policies and practices regard- 
ing both governmental and commercial arms 

We have already begun to discuss our pre- 
liminary ideas with members of the Con- 
gress, and will increase our consultations as 
we proceed with our policy review. When 
concluded, our review will provide the basis 
for the reports to the Congress mandated by 
sections 202 and 218 of the International Se- 
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976. 

Our goal is to develop, in close consulta- 
tion with the Congress, policies which re- 
spect our commitments to the security and 
independence of friends and allies, which re- 
flect fully our common concern for the pro- 
motion of basic human rights, and which 
give substance to our commitment to 
restrain the world arms trade. 

The completion of this process within the 
next few months will give both the Execu- 
tive Branch and the Legislative Branch a 
sound foundation on which they can base a 
thoughtful reexamination of existing law and 
fashion needed legislative revisions which 
will complement our common policy 
objectives, ensure appropriate participation 
and oversight by the Congress, and provide 
clear authority for the efficient conduct of 
approved programs. 

In the meantime, I urge the Congress to 
avoid legislative initiatives which could dis- 
rupt important programs or would hinder a 
future cooperative effort based on a 
thorough evaluation of the facts and policy 
considerations. In this spirit, I have re- 
quested only minimal changes in statutory 
authority and have amended my 
predecessor's budget only where necessary 
to bring the request into line with basic 
principles of this Administration. I urge the 
early passage of the enclosed legislation and 
look forward to joining in a productive effort 

with the Congress later this year to achieve 
constructive reform of the security assist- 
ance and arms export control laws. 


Jimmy Carter. 

President Carter's Second Report 
on Cyprus Submitted to Congress 

Message to the Congress 1 

To the Congress of the United States: 

As required by Public Law 94-104, this 
report describes progress which has been 
achieved during the last sixty days toward 
settlement of the Cyprus problem and the 
efforts the Administration has made to con- 
tribute to its resolution. 

In my first report, dated February 11, I 
emphasized the high priority we place on 
this effort and reaffirmed our intention to 
work closely with the Congress in deciding 
on our future course. I promised that my 
Special Representative, Mr. Clark Clifford, 
would consult with you both before and after 
his trip to the area. He has done so. Before 
his departure, Mr. Clifford discussed the 
Cyprus question, and other pertinent mat- 
ters, with a number of interested Senators 
and Congressmen. Leaving Washington 
February 15, he spent some two weeks 
visiting the eastern Mediterranean area to 
confer with leaders in Ankara, Athens and 
Nicosia. He also met with United Nations 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, under 
whose leadership the Cyprus intercommunal 
negotiations were subsequently reconvened. 
Returning from this series of intensive con- 
versations, Mr. Clifford stopped in London 
to share his impressions with leaders of the 
British Government which, as current in- 
cumbent of the European Community Presi- 
dency as well as former administrator of 

1 Transmitted on Apr. 15 (text from White House 
press release). 

May 16, 1977 


Cyprus, maintains a special interest in find- 
ing a just and speedy Cyprus solution. 

Upon his return, Mr. Clifford reported to 
me that the leaders of Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus correctly saw his mission as a signal 
of the deep interest this Administration 
takes in the problems of the eastern 
Mediterranean. He came away convinced of 
their clear understanding that the United 
States is firmly committed to the search for 
a fair and lasting Cyprus settlement as well 
as to the improvement of relations with our 
two important and valued NATO allies, 
Greece and Turkey, and to the creation of a 
more stable atmosphere in the eastern 

The tasks I gave Mr. Clifford were to 
make a first-hand assessment of current 
problems and attitudes in the three coun- 
tries so that we might better judge what 
contribution the United States might make 
toward encouraging progress in the long- 
festering Cyprus dispute; to identify ways in 
which the United States could improve its 
bilateral relationships with Greece and Tur- 
key; and to gain a better insight into the 
sources of the tensions that exist between 
these two NATO allies. 

In his visits to Ankara and Athens, Mr. 
Clifford held detailed discussions on a range 
of bilateral issues, as well as the subject of 
Cyprus. These talks were useful in creating 
a better understanding of the problems 
which have complicated our relations with 
Greece and Turkey. I was pleased to hear 
from Mr. Clifford that the leaders in Ankara 
and Athens support a serious attempt to 
negotiate a fair settlement of the Cyprus 
problem in 1977. 

On Cyprus, Mr. Clifford had lengthy 
meetings with Archbishop Makarios and 
with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf 
Denktash. These talks were frank and forth- 
right. Both leaders recognized that what 
would be needed to move the Vienna talks 
forward were specific discussions of the two 
central issues of the Cyprus problem: future 
territorial arrangements and the division of 
responsibility between the central and re- 
gional governments. Mr. Clifford found a 
new willingness to face the difficult deci- 

sions which both sides must now make if a 
settlement is to be reached. 

One indication of that willingness is the 
negotiations between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot representatives which took place in 
Vienna from March 31 through April 7. 
These meetings — the first such intercom- 
munal negotiations in more than a year — 
were chaired for the first several days by 
U.N. Secretary General Waldheim and fol- 
lowing his scheduled departure on April 4, 
the concluding sessions were held under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Cyprus, Ambas- 
sador [Javier] Perez de Cuellar. 

We had not expected any dramatic break- 
throughs at these meetings; and none 
occurred. The two sides are still far apart in 
their views. But the meetings did move for- 
ward the process of probing and clarification 
of each side's position by the other. Most 
important, in my view, is the fact that for 
the first time since 1974 concrete, detailed 
proposals were put forward by each side 
covering the two central issues. And finally 
the momentum achieved in these meetings 
has been preserved by the agreement of 
both sides to meet again in Nicosia about 
the middle of May to prepare for another 
round in Vienna and thus continue the proc- 
ess toward a peaceful Cyprus solution. 

In my first report I promised that the 
United States will do all that it can to help 
achieve a negotiated settlement for Cyprus. 
I believe that the United States should con- 
tinue to take a part in supporting the 
negotiating process revitalized by Secretary 
General Waldheim last month in Vienna. I 
believe that it is essential that we continue 
to work with the parties to encourage and 
insure a sustained and serious negotiating 
process and equally important that we work 
with our Greek and Turkish allies to 
strengthen the ties of friendship and cooper- 
ation between our countries. Working in 
close liaison with the Congress, we will de- 
vote whatever efforts may be required to 
bring about a truly just and lasting peace in 
the eastern Mediterranean. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, April 15, 1977. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution 
of Penal Sentences Sent to Senate 

Message From President Carter 1 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I 
transmit herewith the Treaty between the 
United States of America and Canada on the 
Execution of Penal Sentences which was 
signed at Washington on March 2, 1977. 

I transmit also, for the information of the 
Senate, the report of the Department of 
State with respect to the Treaty. 

The Treaty would permit citizens of either 
nation who had been convicted in the courts 
of the other country to serve their sentences 
in their home country; in each case the con- 
sent of the offender as well as the approval 
of the authorities of the two Governments 
would be required. 

This Treaty is significant because it rep- 
resents an attempt to resolve a situation 
which has inflicted substantial hardships on 
a number of citizens of each country and has 
caused concern to both Governments. I rec- 

1 Transmitted on Apr. 18 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. H, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and 
the report of the Department of State. 

ommend that the Senate give favorable 
consideration to this Treaty together with 
the similar treaty with the United Mexican 
States which I have already transmitted. 

Jimmy Carter. 
The White House, April is, 1977. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Duty-Free Treatment for Aircraft Engines Imported 
as Temporary Replacements for Certain Aircraft 
Engines Undergoing Overhaul. Report of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 
422. H. Rept. 95-77. March 15, 1977. 3 pp. 

Continuation of Temporary Duty Suspension on 
Importation of Certain Horses. Report of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 
3259. H. Rept. 95-79. March 15, 1977. 4 pp. 

Duty-Free Entry of Carillon Bells for Smith College, 
Northampton, Mass. Report of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 1404. H. 
Rept. 95-80. March 15, 1977. 2 pp. 

Supplemental Military Assistance for Portugal for 
Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the House Committee on 
International Relations to accompany H.K. 3976. H. 
Rept. 95-81. March 15, 1977. 6 pp. 

Authorizing Additional Appropriations for the 
Department of State for Fiscal Year 1977. Report of 
the House Committee on International Relations to 
accompany H.R. 5040. H. Rept. 95-84. March 16, 
1977. 13 pp. 

Amending the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock 
Piling Act, and for Other Purposes. Report of the 
House Committee on Armed Services to accompany 
H.R. 4895. H. Rept. 95-104. March 22, 1977. 12 pp. 

May 16, 1977 



The Challenge to the Economic and Social Council: 
Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its Aspects 

Statement by Andrew Young 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 

The fundamental importance of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council is obvious. The 
most critical task we confront, both as indi- 
vidual nations and collectively, is the 
advancement of the quality of life of human- 
kind in all its aspects. That is the business 
of this Council, and the peoples of the world 
are rightly looking to us for initiative and 
leadership in their quest for social justice. 

The question is whether we can, and will, 
respond to this challenge. I need not remind 
anyone in this room of the magnitude of the 
task; a brief glance at the program of work 
of ECOSOC for this year is sufficient evi- 
dence of the number, complexity, and inter- 
relatedness of the issues we confront. If we 
are to be successful, it will require a 
genuine, sustained effort by all of us: 

— To establish a common agenda based 
upon conscious priorities. Such an agenda 
and priorities should be directed against the 
basic human misery which is well within our 
capacity to eliminate. 

— To focus on the common enemies of 
humankind rather than on denunciation and 
polemics against each other. 

— To focus on problem solving rather than 
ideological arguments. 

— To work toward building an effective 
consensus founded on those basic commit- 
ments we have already undertaken in the 

1 Made before the United Nations Economic and So- 
cial Council (ECOSOC) at New York on Apr. 19 (text 
from USUN press release 23). 

Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
other major international instruments. 

It is because my government and people 
are so concerned with these problems, as 
are all governments and peoples of the 
United Nations, that I feel compelled to 
warn against what I sense is an impatience 
on the part of my people with international 
development programs, or what we call 
foreign aid programs. 

It is not that the American people, or the 
people of any nation, are basically opposed 
to helping other people or even making sac- 
rifices to aid other nations in their struggle 
against oppression and poverty. It is that 
too often the American people, and the 
peoples of other nations, have been disap- 
pointed that their efforts have not resulted 
in any appreciable help for the poor of the 
world nor the liberation of the oppressed. 
No one can doubt the idealism and generos- 
ity of the American people; for example, in 
the 10 years 1969-78 the United States will 
deliver more than 10 billion dollars' worth of 
food under our Public Law 480. But it is 
often asked why the poor of a rich nation 
should be taxed in order to aid the rich of a 
poor nation. A significant part of the 
dissatisfaction of the people of the United 
States with the programs of international 
development is that so much of this nation's 
efforts have been directed to giving military 
rather than economic and social aid and to 
bolstering repressive regimes. 


Department of State Bulletin 

If we are to maintain the commitment of 
our people, and if you are to maintain the 
commitment of your peoples, to the eco- 
nomic and social programs of development 
and to the human rights programs, we must 
be able to demonstrate that these programs 
really work, that they really affect in a real 
and positive way the lives of the hungry, the 
poor, the oppressed, the tortured, and the 

It is exactly against these timeless and 
basic enemies of all people that we, repre- 
sentatives of our various peoples, can meet 
and find an exciting and action-producing 
consensus. It is in the spirit of searching for 
this consensus that I would like to make 
some general comments as well as some spe- 
cific suggestions for the work of this 

The Inseparable Nature of Human Freedoms 

Some truths can never be repeated too of- 
ten. They must always be before us. The 
most fundamental truth of all is this: Man is 
born to be free, and all that we do must be 
devoted to the well-being of human 
beings — every type of human being, of 
whatever race or religion, of whatever sex, 
and in all societies, new and old, rich and 
poor. This truth, this great objective, be- 
longs equally to everyone — every nation 
represented in this chamber, every country 
in the United Nations, and those not in the 
United Nations. We are talking about an 
idea which is inherent in the human 
condition. It is humankind's nature to strive 
for dignity, to struggle for justice, to 
hunger for freedom, and to seek to live in 

There is yet another truth flowing from 
this reality which is equally compelling. It is 
the duty of public officials, and especially 
the governing elite, of every nation, to do 
their utmost to realize these common goals 
of humankind. All of us in official service 
must be constantly reminded, and must do 
our best constantly to remember, that the 
responsiveness of the governing elites to the 
popular will for justice, for peace, for dig- 
nity, and for freedom is the test by which 
we should be measured. 

This point has very recently been made by 
a man who has worked for justice and 
human dignity all his life. I refer to the new 
Prime Minister of India, Prime Minister 
Desai. Speaking on April 7 before a meeting 
of nonaligned nations in New Delhi, he said 

We have learned from Gandhi that there is no nobler 
quest than to work for' justice and a better life for 
one's fellow brethren. He taught us, too, that dedica- 
tion to the service of one's people must not be a con- 
cealed lust for power. What the people need today is a 
happy contented life fully utilizing the aids which sci- 
ence has placed and will continually place at the dis- 
posal of mankind. Life cannot be merely mechanized if 
the end is to be happiness and contentment. There has 
to be a moral and spiritual base for development along 
with its materialistic content. Freedom from want and 
freedom from fear have to be secured to make that 
base. We have dedicated ourselves to the task of 
achieving these freedoms along with the right to lib- 

It is hard to match the eloquence of this 
great Indian statesman. But let me try to 
say in a few simple words of my own what 
this means — and what it doesn't mean. It 
obviously doesn't mean that we and all our 
societies have to be perfect. Obviously we 
can't. No matter how hard we try, there is 
going to be a lot of room for improvement 
elsewhere. No system within societies, no 
amount of wealth, will create perfect jus- 

At the same time, there are some things 
which simply must never be accepted — the 
governing elites not doing their best to meet 
basic human needs, to avoid starvation and 
malnutrition — or utilizing the power of 
government to coerce and destroy people, or 
tolerating barbaric cruelties inflicted by 
lower level officials. 

The Western democracies have often been 
accused of giving the highest priority to 
political rights — as we see them — and paying 
insufficient attention to fundamental eco- 
nomic and social rights. I propose to you 
that this is not so. I would recall the very 
important document in the history of my 
country, President Roosevelt's 1941 message 
to Congress in which he described the world 
founded upon four essential freedoms. These 
included freedom of speech and expression, 
freedom of worship, and freedom from fear. 

May 16, 1977 


But there was one additional freedom: 
freedom from want for all inhabitants of 
every nation of the world. The present Ad- 
ministration confirms our country's commit- 
ment to all four, a commitment manifested 
over the past 30 years by our cooperation in 
a series of economic development programs. 

The inseparable nature of these human 
freedoms will always be borne in mind by 
policymakers in the United States. The very 
name of this Council clearly implies that the 
same should be done here. 

We have long since come to realize that 
development cannot be measured in terms of 
gross national product. The shine of steel 
from a new mill is quickly dulled if its work- 
ers or their brothers and sisters still in the 
countryside must live in fear, be it fear of 
political repression or fear of not being able 
to feed themselves and their children. 

I would like to speak to three basic fears 
today — the fear of hunger, the fear of tor- 
ture, and the fear of racism — and suggest 
that these three are basic problems that we 
could attack with near-unanimity and high 
expectations of significant success if we 
agreed to focus on them as our priorities. 

Combating World Hunger and Famine 

Hunger and famine are perhaps the 
problems that affect directly and most dras- 
tically the greatest number of human be- 
ings. Today as many as 400 million 
people — 15 percent of the world's 
population — are starving. Hundreds of mil- 
lions more receive only minimal food re- 
quirements. Perhaps 100 million children 
suffer chronic malnutrition. There are 
virtually no countries in the world where all 
the people have a healthy diet all the time. 

These problems are not simply the legacy 
of international manipulations and 
maneuverings, as some would have it. In- 
stead, they often reflect mistaken percep- 
tions of growth. We have all been guilty of 
ignoring our rural populations in pursuit of 
machines and methods to propel us along the 
path of industrialization. 

In our country we turned our back on the 
sturdy small farmer and skilled craftsman 

whom our President Thomas Jefferson 
acclaimed as the strength of our nation. 
Today millions of Americans have left the 
farms of rural America to seek their 
fortunes in our cities. There, crowded to- 
gether, depersonalized and hungry, too 
many have failed to find what they had 

If developing countries can learn some 
things from our mistakes, they will be able 
to adjust productive systems to meet their 
own special conditions of climate, 
geography, and human resources. 

The international community can and 
should do much to help. Food-surplus coun- 
tries can provide food aid. We in the United 
States hope to rework our own legislation so 
that our food assistance can help foster 
long-term development. Through the Inter- 
national Fund for Agricultural Development, 
we and other countries with the financial 
means are supporting efforts, and helping 
farmers, particularly small farmers in the 
poorer countries, to increase production. 

All food-producing countries can help by 
working to fulfill the goal we set at the 
seventh special session [of the U.N. General 
Assembly] to reduce by half the food now 
wasted because of poor storage and 
handling — food enough to feed the 400 mil- 
lion people who are starving. 

In the field of food grains we also need to 
establish a system of nationally held re- 
serves to provide basic food security. The 
United States is urgently reviewing this 
question to see how we might be able to 
help get negotiations moving. 

We need also to work harder to find tech- 
nologies and systems which take account of 
the relationships among food production, 
available resources, and environmental 
stresses on the land. We need new ideas and 
new systems which do not rely too heavily 
on products which have become very 
expensive. We must be better able to deal 
with natural disasters, which can strike 
with devastating and heartrending conse- 
quences. In this context, the creative 
initiative of France in establishing a Club 
des Amis du Sahel provides a good example. 

Without the freedom from want that these 


Department of State Bulletin 

efforts are aimed at securing, our words on 
economic development or on human rights 
will have little meaning to the great major- 
ity of the world's people. But the reverse is 
also true: We cannot attack the problems of 
hunger and famine without remembering 
justice as the goal of human society. Efforts 
at increasing food production will not be 
successful unless all nations face up to the 
problems of poor distribution of land owner- 
ship and income and inequity between tradi- 
tional groups. For without justice, there can 
be no true stability, and there cannot be 
true social stability until everyone has 
enough to eat. As long as there is hunger 
anywhere it will affect people everywhere. 
Hunger and famine are realities that 
threaten the work of men and women 
everywhere who seek for a better world. 

Hunger and famine are not ancient pesti- 
lences, but very modern plagues, stark 
possibilities that can arise almost any year 
and sweep away tens of thousands of inno- 
cent men, women, and children. The evident 
growing gap between the affluent minority 
in every nation and the sometimes great 
majority of poor in most nations only high- 
lights the problem: While poverty spreads 
and famine is a real possibility, small groups 
in almost every nation live lives of luxury 
and waste. 

We dare to say these things here because 
the silent poor majority of the world is not 
also deaf and blind; though they do not, out 
of fear and a sense of hopelessness, re- 
monstrate against the gross inequity in the 
distribution of the goods of the world, they 
see and they hear and they understand. 
They will not, and should not, be forever ig- 
nored, Mr. Chairman. 

Every country, including mine, has, at 
least sometimes, some hungry people; and 
every nation has some problem with waste 
of vital resources that could be used to feed 
the hungry. We are all on Spaceship Earth 
together, Mr. Chairman, and we are all 
neighbors in a Global Village. Surely our 
common humanity calls upon us in the Coun- 
cil meeting to find some new and effective 
means to combat world hunger and famine. 

So again I turn to the fact that economic 

and social development cannot be separated. 
We have two largely separate sections of 
ECOSOC dealing with these matters, two 
separate committees of the General Assem- 
bly, and in most countries two professional 
groups dealing with these problems. These 
are separations merely of natural conven- 
ience, and I do not propose to change them. 
But we must think of every possible way to 
increase the interface between the two 
approaches — in our national planning, in our 
bilateral cooperation for development, and 
in our work of the United Nations, most 
particularly in this Council. 

At this session we have before us a res- 
olution of the Commission for Social De- 
velopment which recommends that we invite 
the Secretary General to set up a small 
working group to recommend how we can 
better integrate social development efforts 
into the work of the U.N. system. 1 would 
like to reiterate my government's strong 
support for this resolution. We cannot seek 
a more just international economic order, a 
better system of economic progress and 
cooperation, without reference to man's 
basic needs and what we have come to call 
social considerations. 

The Problem of Torture 

I would like next to turn to the problem of 
torture. There's an obvious connection with 
the problem of fighting hunger. In each case 
the central focus is the same — the dignity 
and the worth of the human personality. If 
we are to mean what we say about promot- 
ing human rights, we should be concerned 
whenever a human being suffers, whenever 
his physical or spiritual existence is 
threatened, either through lack of food or 
through abuse of his body. 

To put it bluntly, it's nothing less than de- 
plorable that in our supposedly enlightened 
time some of the gravest offenses to the 
human person known throughout human 
history are still being committed. We know 
that torture exists in many parts of the 
world today. Not only is it practiced in its 
most debased and horrible forms; but sci- 
ence and technology have been perverted by 

May 16, 1977 


sick minds to invent unbelievably cruel, if 
highly sophisticated, modern methods. For 
example, advances in new kinds of drugs 
have brought with them advances in new 
kinds of mental torture. 

The struggle to eliminate torture is, in my 
opinion, of basic importance, Mr. Chairman, 
even though relatively few people are ac- 
tually tortured in comparison to those who 
suffer and sometimes die from hunger. Tor- 
ture is not used today primarily as a means 
of extracting information from a few hard- 
core-opposition militants, but, rather, is 
increasingly used as a means of intimidating 
masses of poor and oppressed people. Tor- 
ture is used as the leading edge of the whole 
system of intimidation, and such a system 
exists in almost every society in some form. 

And while we can dream of someday in 
the future being able to dismantle this whole 
system of terror — subtle and other- 
wise — that keeps people from being 
free to express their legitimate aspirations 
and complaints, at this moment in history 
we must attack the ugliest head of this 
hydra-headed monster: We must attack tor- 
ture. In so doing we will make it possible, 
perhaps, for the poor and oppressed to find 
more spokesmen so they can be more fully 
represented at the tables of deliberation of 
the world. 

I want to make it clear that we in the 
United States understand that our own soci- 
ety still has subtle but very strong systems 
of intimidation at work that inhibit the 
possibilities of our poor, our discriminated 
against, and our dissidents from speaking 
fully to redress themselves. The bright but 
poor young man from our ghettos is much 
more likely to go to jail and find himself 
abused there; for those few from affluent 
families who get in trouble with the law, 
lawyers are readily available, while for the 
majority of the poor, minimal legal assist- 
ance is very difficult indeed. 

One thing else needs to be mentioned, Mr. 
Chairman. The outcry against torture that 
has arisen in the last few years has, unfor- 
tunately, produced new and subtler ways of 
intimidating the spokesmen of the poor and 

the oppressed and of driving the 
dispossessed into even greater despair and 
passivity. In particular, it is now increas- 
ingly common to just murder a dissident or 
to illegally kidnap the dissident and quickly 
murder him. In such cases, the security 
forces of a nation often disclaim any knowl- 
edge of the act, and there is no tortured 
person left to later tell the sad story of 
suffering inflicted by other human beings. 
So when we speak about torture, we mean 
three things: physical torture, the general 
problem of "missing persons," and the 
problem of political assassinations. 

"Torture" is a word that is repugnant to 
all our ears, Mr. Chairman. There are some 
things we don't like to talk about in 
supposedly polite society. But do we not 
deny our own humanity, Mr. Chairman and 
my fellow delegates, as well as abandon 
others to lives of degradation and suffering, 
when we refuse to name that which is im- 
portant and significant and has a name? 
Perhaps our "politeness" is something of a 
mask for cowardice or for our basic 
unwillingness to do our duty as human be- 
ings as well as representatives of our 
peoples and governments. Can we allow "po- 
liteness" and protocol to stand in the way of 
a search for answers and solutions to this 
problem of torture? Its essence is 
barbarism — today increasingly associated 
with modern technology, unfortunately. 

In order to focus our attention firmly on 
the nature of the problem, a problem that I 
firmly believe we can help solve if we but 
have the will, let me mention some of the 
kinds of torture of which I have recently 
heard, from various parts of the world. 

In some cases, the prisoner is hung by his 
or her knees, with the mouth taped tightly 
shut. Then a piece of cotton is stuffed in the 
nostrils — then the head hanging down 
perhaps held tightly in place by the hair. 
And then water is dripped from an 
eyedropper on the cotton, until the prisoner 
nearly drowns with only a few drops of 
water applied. The terror — not to mention 
the great potential for permanent physical 
damage — is hardly imaginable to us. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We have all heard the stones of how elec- 
tric shocks are used to torment prisoners — a 
sad application of modern technology! Of 
how leather or canvas hoods are placed on 
the prisoners' heads. Of the sexual viola- 
tions of especially young female prisoners, 
that even has gone so far as the raping of 
people of religious orders before groups of 
security personnel. 

And then there are the more "subtle" 
kinds of torture, using drugs or enforced 
dehydration. I know of one case where a 
peasant leader was hung for over two days 
in a refrigerated room with a group of corp- 
ses, also suspended, but by meat hooks, and 
constantly bombarded by a loudspeaker de- 
nouncing him and telling him that if he 
didn't denounce his fellow peasant leaders he 
would be allowed to stay there until he, 
also, died. I know of a case today where 
Protestant pastors are imprisoned in a dark- 
ened cell, with one meal per day and no 
human contact allowed, apparently in the 
expectation that they will finally go mad. 

Such stories — there are many of them — I 
only mention them here to remind us that 
we are dealing with flesh-and-blood 
problems — problems we can help solve, 
problems of the greatest urgency and poig- 

Strengthening the Effort To End Torture 

For the past several years, the General 
Assembly has taken a number of unanimous 
decisions reiterating its total rejection of 
torture and endorsing measures to combat 
it. We now have a Declaration on the Pro- 
tection of All Persons From Being Subjected 
to Torture, unanimously adopted by the 30th 
Assembly. But in spite of these ringing 
pronouncements taken with unanimous sup- 
port, we have reports that torture still con- 

There is something gone wrong, I am 
convinced, in those societies in which tor- 
ture has taken hold, to whatever degree. No 
government which claims respect from the 
world community can endorse torture. I am 
sure that in most cases the practices that do 

occur are the result of the actions of dis- 
turbed or misguided individuals perverting 
governmental authority. Admittedly, in a 
few extreme instances the prevalence and 
persistence of torture suggests that it has 
been practiced as a deliberate weapon of 
governments' intimidation. 

But whatever the reasons for torture, our 
concern must be to do everything we can to 
see that this practice is brought to an end. 
We must find a way to make better use of 
the institutions that we have, because up to 
now what we have done has obviously not 
been enough. We have before us a challenge 
to find more effective ways to attack this 
problem and to bring help to many people 
who still suffer from torture. 

In saying this I do not for the moment den- 
igrate what has already been done. It was 
all to the good for us to proclaim the decla- 
ration against torture. It has been useful to 
strengthen the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners. We support as 
well the effort to draft a body of principles 
for the protection of all persons under any 
form of detention or imprisonment which is 
now before the Subcommission on 
Discrimination and Minorities. 

Every modest step taken to strengthen 
the fabric of law as it applies to persons 
under any form of detention is to be 
encouraged. Support for these legal ad- 
vances by all governments can be significant 
in strengthening the national barriers 
against mistreatment of persons, in making 
less likely the abuse of prisoners by low r er 
level officials. 

We have not yet fully exploited what is 
universally acknowledged to be the ultimate 
remedy at our disposal: publicity and public 
condemnation. Isn't this problem of torture 
of such gravity that we should seriously 
consider taking additional steps? I have in 
mind steps that w r ould help us to expose 
where torture has been a part of a consist- 
ent pattern of gross violation of human 
rights and to learn from the experience of 
some governments which have in- 
stitutionalized legal norms for the protection 
of dissidents. 

May 16, 1977 


This second element occurs to me because 
I think it gets us to the heart of the prob- 
lem. In some countries, governments have 
felt themselves threatened by subversive or 
terrorist forces, and that situation has led 
these governments to be less stringent than 
they might otherwise have been in control- 
ling the spread of torture. Several things 
need to be said about this aspect of the 

— First, no conditions which may threaten 
the existence of a government, however 
weak or insecure it may feel, are such as to 
justify resort to torture. This proposition is 
recognized by the United Nations Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which abso- 
lutely forbids derogation from the 
prohibition against torture, even in times of 
public emergency threatening the life of a 

— Second, as a practical matter, infliction 
of torture as a means to maintain order is 
ultimately self-defeating. This reaction of 
revulsion and the renewed determination to 
bring down regimes which grind down their 
populations almost always creates even 
greater problems of public order. 

— And third, looking at historical experi- 
ence, it has been true that many new and 
weak governments have taken hold and have 
survived without resort to such methods. 

These are some of the reasons we feel it 
would be worthwhile to consider how we 
might establish a group which would inves- 
tigate under U.N. mandate the problem of 
torture on a worldwide basis — to tell us 
where it exists and persists, to identify the 
most flagrant instances, and to inform us 
about cases in which governments have suc- 
cessfully resisted or curbed resort to tor- 
ture. It might be appropriate for the United 
Nations to establish a panel of distinguished 
nonpartisan experts. Such a special ad hoc 
body would be best able to carry out the 
sort of mandate I have in mind. An 
authoritative, comprehensive report from 
such a group would motivate us all, I am 
sure, in the direction of a new and more ef- 
fective effort to eliminate this evil. 

I want to mention another important area 
of work. I referred earlier to the perver- 
sions of science and technology which have 
led to new forms of assaults on the physical 
and intellectual integrity of human beings. 
The Subcommission of the Human Rights 
Commission has recently been asked to for- 
mulate guidelines for the protection of those 
detained on the grounds of mental ill health. 
This timely and humane initiative of the 
United Kingdom deserves our full support. 

U.N. Human Rights Machinery 

The problem of torture and the measures 
we take in the United Nations to combat it 
are part of a bigger problem; namely, the 
U.N.'s role in promoting human rights and 
the development of machinery to carry out 
that role. We attach great importance to 
strengthening the U.N.'s human rights 
machinery. My colleagues will recall the 
remarks of President Carter on this subject 
in his address on March 17. 

It has been more than 30 years now since 
this machinery first began to function 
through meetings of the Human Rights 
Commission. In this relatively short time, 
much valuable groundwork has been laid in 
an area which 30 years ago was unexplored. 
We are at a stage when we must persist in 
exploiting the advances which have been 
made and in strengthening the somewhat 
fragile structure of the newer procedural 
devices, like those provided for in ECOSOC 
Resolution 1503. 2 

Each member of the United Nations is 
now under a mandate from the Assembly to 
develop and propose new ideas for improv- 
ing the effective enjoyment of human rights 
through the United Nations. We take this 
assignment very seriously and will be 
proposing initiatives in the future. As the 
President indicated, we think there is much 
to be said for the idea of establishing a 
United Nations High Commissioner for 

2 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), entitled "Pro- 
cedure for dealing with communications relating to 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," 
was adopted by the Council on May 27, 1970. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Human Rights. In addition, we want to find 
ways to make the Commission on Human 
Rights a more effective body. We think the 
key lies in more complete cooperation with 
the Commission on the part of all nations. 
That will go a long way to make the United 
Nations much more effective in protecting 
the basic rights of all peoples. 

Racism and Racial Discrimination 

One of the most serious problems con- 
fronting humankind today is the problem of 
racism and racial discrimination. In this area 
the people of the United States have a pecu- 
liar responsibility: as a nation long afflicted 
with the problems of racism and racial dis- 
crimination, we feel a responsibility to 
contribute to the world struggle to eliminate 
all forms of racism and racial discrimination, 
and our President recently called upon the 
American people to move toward ratification 
of the convention of this name. Fur- 
thermore, we have been engaged in the 
United States for more than a century in a 
serious nationwide struggle, in many 
respects a successful struggle, against rac- 
ism. Our ongoing struggle, which is not 
completed by a long shot and which con- 
tinues, has been conducted in general in an 
open and problem-solving way which 
minimized violence to persons. 

The experience of the United States of- 
fers, we believe, many examples from which 
the rest of the world might selectively prof- 
it. We are still struggling to appreciate the 
richness of diversity and to purge ourselves 
of the curse of believing in conformity and 
uniformity in this country; nevertheless, 
perhaps no nation has made as much prog- 
ress in its struggle against racism as the 
United States. 

That this transformation took place over a 
relatively short time in the face of a problem 
many thought was insoluble is not only a 
source of pride for Americans but grounds 
for faith that fundamental changes can take 
place when people of good will, everywhere 
in the world, show determination to work 
for them. 

Without this faith, I would not have come 
here today. I believe that the United Na- 
tions provides all of us a very special 
opportunity — to help each other. It won't 
always be easy. There will sometimes be 
contentions and embarrassment. 

But all of us must know, as government 
officials and as individuals, that we will not 
be true to ourselves as human beings unless 
we make the most persistent, creative, and 
concerted attack possible on the problem of 
advancing the human dignity of the indi- 
vidual and social justice for all. As dele- 
gates, we have the responsibility to see that 
our world organization plays a central role 
in the process. I have suggested some 
priorities which I hope can unite us in a new 
consensus — a consensus that will enable us 
to move forward in the long struggle to 
realize the dream of a world of justice and 
freedom for all. It is a consensus that unites 
us in a struggle against evils which afflict us 
all — not a potential and polemic struggle 
against each other. 

The Economic and Social Council is one of 
the principal places where this consensus 
can be formulated, strengthened, and put 
into practice. Indeed, this is our mandate 
under the charter, and the people of the 
world — especially the hungry, the perse- 
cuted, and the tortured — expect no less from 
us. And it is, Mr. Chairman, exactly in 
these areas that real progress can be made. 
These are not areas in which the age-old, 
and sometimes new, political rivalries and 
conflicts make consensus impossible. These 
are not areas in which nationalism and racist 
ideologies can forever repel the great desire 
of the peoples of the world for justice. 

Political confrontation may be a fact of the 
life of the world, and the correct balancing 
of powers perhaps is a necessary prereq- 
uisite to the struggle for world justice and 
peace. But the struggle for justice and peace 
is also a necessary prerequisite to the build- 
ing of any real world order: Where there is 
no justice, order is tyranny. So political 
confrontation in ECOSOC is unnecessary 
and unhelpful. We must be able to unite 
against the common enemies of humankind 

May 16, 1977 


in the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations. 

Perhaps in the past we have been too 
timid, perhaps we have asked too little of 
ourselves, of our nation, of the United 
Nations. Before the massive problems of rac- 
ism, torture, and famine, we dare not be 
timid. We must try to measure ourselves 
against the challenge of the problems which 
confront us. 

United States Joins Consensus 
on U.N. Resolution on Benin 

Following is a statement made in the 
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
tive Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on April Ik, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Council that day. 


any person to recruit an American citizen in 
the United States for service as a soldier in 
foreign armed forces or for any American 
citizen to enlist in the United States for 
such service. In the event that there is evi- 
dence of such activity taking place in the 
United States, my government will move 
vigorously to investigate and, where suffi- 
cient evidence is available, to prosecute. We 
are opposed to the use of mercenaries to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other 
countries and are committed to the enforce- 
ment of our laws concerning the recruitment 
of American citizens as mercenaries. 

While a literal reading of paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the resolution would inevitably pose 
problems for any government in terms of ef- 
fectively controlling activities of its citizens 
outside its territorial jurisdiction, the 
United States will make every effort to in- 
sure that its laws on the subject are com- 
plied with strictly so as to discourage 
American citizens from becoming involved in 
any type of unlawful mercenary activity. 

USUN press release 21 dated April 14 

The United States was able to join in the 
resolution before the Council because of its 
concern at the armed attack on Benin and 
the loss of life and damage of property 
suffered by the people and Government of 
Benin. We want to extend our sympathy to 
the people of Benin through their distin- 
guished Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Thomas Boya. 

The United States also wishes to express 
its concern at the apparent violation of the 
territorial integrity of Benin. As members of 
this Council know very well, threats to the 
territorial integrity of African states have 
become a serious problem, whether by mer- 
cenaries or any other type of armed 
intervention. More than mere lipservice — 
and selective concern — must be paid to the 
principle of territorial integrity if interna- 
tional peace and security are to be 

I would also like to express briefly the 
views of my government on the question of 
mercenaries and comment on operative 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution. 

Under U.S. law it is a criminal offense for 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the report of the Security Coun- 
cil Special Mission to the People's Republic of Benin 
established under resolution 404 (1977) (S/12294 and 

Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial 
integrity, independence and sovereignty of the State 
of Benin, 

Deeply grieved at the loss of life and substantial 
damage to property caused by the invading force dur- 
ing its attack on Cotonou on 16 January 1977, 

1. Takes note of the report of the Special Mission 
and expresses its appreciation for the work 

2. Strongly condemns the act of armed aggression 
perpetrated against the People*s Republic of Benin on 
16 January 1977; 

3. Reaffirms its resolution 239 (1967) which, inter 
alia, condemns any State which persists in permitting 
or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and the 
provision of facilities to them, with the objective of 
overthrowing the Governments of States Members of 
the United Nations; 

4. Calls upon all States to exercise the utmost vigi- 
lance against the danger posed by international 
mercenaries and to ensure that their territory and 

1 U.N. doc. S/RES/405 (1977); adopted by the Coun- 
cil by consensus on Apr. 14. 


Department of State Bulletin 

other territories under their control, as well as their 
nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion 
and recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries 
designed to overthrow the Government of any Member 
State of the United Nations; 

5. F u ft her calls upon all States to consider taking 
necessary measures to prohibit, under their respective 
domestic laws, the recruitment, training and transit of 
mercenaries on their territory and other territories 
under their control; 

6. Condemns all forms of external interference in 
the internal affairs of Member States, including the 
use of international mercenaries to destabilize States 
and/or to violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty 
and independence of States; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide ap- 
propriate technical assistance to help the Government 
of Benin in assessing and evaluating the damage re- 
sulting from the act of armed aggression committed in 
Cotonou on 16 January 1977; 

8. Appeals to all States to provide material assist- 
ance to the People's Republic of Benin in order to ena- 
ble it to repair the damage and losses inflicted during 
the attack; 

9. Notes that the Government of Benin has re- 
served its right with respect to any eventual claims for 
compensation which it may wish to assert; 

10. Calls upon all States to provide the Security 
Council with any information they might have in con- 
nexion with the events in Cotonou on 16 January 1977 
likely to throw further light on those events; 

11. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely 
the implementation of the present resolution; 

12. Decides to remain seized of this question. 


Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. l 
Signatures: Brazil, April 13, 1977; Thailand, April 

19, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Panama, April 13, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Libya, April 15, 1977. 


Convention for the unification of certain rules relating 
to international transportation by air. Done at War- 
saw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 
13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 
Stat. 3000. 

Accession deposited: Oman, August 6, 1976. 

Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the convention for 
the unification of certain rules relating to interna- 
tional carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocols 
done at The Hague on September 28, 1955, and at 
Guatemala City on March 8, 1971. Done at Montreal 
September 25, 1975. » 
Signature: Denmark, December 1, 1976. 

Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the convention for 
the unification of certain rules relating to interna- 
tional carriage bv air signed at Warsaw on October 
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol 
done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at 
Montreal September 25, 1975. l 

Signatures: Denmark, December 1, 1976; Senegal, 
August 18, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, November 23, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted'at London Oc- 
tober 15, 1971. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, March 28, 1977. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc- 
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 
Extended by United States to: Puerto Rico, Guam, 
Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Midway, 
Wake, Johnston Islands, Palmyra Island, Kingman 
Reef, Howland Island, Baker Island, Jarvis Is- 
land, and Navassa Island, April 1, 1977. 
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 
1974. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, March 28, 1977. 


Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Greece, April 27, 1977. 


International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 
1975; for the United States April 7, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Somalia, February 11, 1977; 
Libya, February 22, 1977; Oman, February 24, 
1977. 2 
Accession deposited: San Marino, March 25, 1977. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to 
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high- 

1 Not in force. 

2 Confirmed statements contained in final protocol. 

May 16, 1977 


frequency radiotelephone coastal stations, with an- 
nexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the 
United States April 21, 1976. 

Notification of approval: Hungary. February 16, 




Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Dacca April 1, 1977. Entered into force 
April 1, 1977. 


Convention for the conservation of shrimp. Signed at 
Havana August 15, 1958. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 4, 1959. TIAS 4321. 

Notice of termination: April 27, 1977; effective April 
27, 1978. 

Agreement on the hijacking of aircraft and vessels and 
other offenses. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington and Havana February 15, 1973. Entered 
into force February 15, 1973. 
Terminated: April 15, 1977. 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Havana April 27, 1977. Enters into force on a date to 
be mutually agreed by an exchange of notes. 

Modus vivendi concerning a maritime boundary. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Havana April 27, 
1977. Entered into force April 27, 1977. 


Agreement relating to a cooperative program for the 
prevention of foot and mouth disease, rinderpest, 
and other exotic diseases in Guatemala. Signed at 
Guatemala March 3, 1977. Entered into force March 
3, 1977. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of November 30, 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince April 
13, 1977. Entered into force April 13, 1977. 


Agreement extending the air transport agreement of 
August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 
4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico and Tlatelolco March 11 and 18, 1977. En- 
tered into force March 18, 1977. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of June 15, 1976 (TIAS 8310). 
Signed at Dar es Salaam March 19, 1977. Entered 
into force March 19, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement renewing and amending the memorandum 
of understanding of April 28, 1976 (TIAS 8303), re- 
lating to passenger charter air services, with related 
letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
April 11, 1977. Entered into force April 11, 1977; ef- 
fective April 1, 1977. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
iiiou her from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be- 
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to 

American Women Today & Tomorrow. This report is 
an analysis of a survey conducted by Market Opinion 
Research for the National Commission on the Observ- 
ance of International Women's Year. The survey 
assessed women's attitudes and opinions, recorded 
their current activities, looked at the patterns of their 
lives, and asked about their views of the future. 79 pp. 
$1.25. Stock No. 052-003-00249-3. 

Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation 
Services in Iceland and in Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. Agreement with other governments amending 
the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as 
amended. TIAS 8421. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8421). 

Whaling — Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention of 1946. Adopted at the 
twenty-eighth meeting of the International Whaling 
Commission. TIAS 8422. 5 pp. 35(2. (Cat. No. 

Debt Consolidation and Rescheduling. Agreement 
with Bangladesh. TIAS 8423. 11 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8423). 

Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital — Grants-in-Aid 
for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and Re- 
habilitation of the Hospital Plant. Agreement with 
the Philippines amending the agreement of April 4, 
1974. TIAS 8424. 3 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8424). 

United States Naval Medical Research Unit. Agree- 
ment with the Philippines. TIAS 8425. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:8425). 

Nutrition Development. Agreement with Chile. TIAS 
8426. 42 pp. 550. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8426). 

Industrial and Agricultural Production. Agreement 
with Egypt. TIAS 8427. 14 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia 
amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as 
amended. TIAS 8428. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8428). 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium 
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 
1950. TIAS 8430. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8430). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 16, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1977 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of L977 

Transmitted to the Congress (message fi 

President Carter, fact sheet I 477 

-rii Summation of l It h Round of Ml 
Talks (news conference statement by Net! 
lands Representative) 482 

Benin. United States .loins Consensus on U.N. 
Resolution on Benin (Sherer, text of resolu 

tion) 502 

Canada. U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution of 

Penal Sentences Sent to Senate (message from 
President Carter) 493 

China. President Carter's News Conference of 
April 22 (excerpts) 481 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 493 

rtment Discusses Security Assistance Pro- 
grams ( Benson ) 485 

Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to 
the Congress (letters from President Carter) . . 490 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977 
Transmitted to the Congress (message from 
President Carter, fact sheet) 477 

President Carter's Second Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to Congress (message) 491 

Cuba. U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement on 

Fisheries, Maritime Boundary (joint si 

ment) 484 

Cyprus. President Carter's Second Report on 
Cyprus Submitted to Congress (message) 401 

Energy. President Carter's News Conference of 
April 22 (excerpts) 481 

Europe. Western Summation of 11th Round of 
MBFR Talks (news conference statement 
Netherlands Representative) 482 

Fisheries. U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement on 
Fisheries, Maritime Boundary (joint state- 
ment ) 4S4 

Food. The Challenge to the Economic and Social 
Council: Advancing the Quality of Life in All 
Its Aspects (Young) 494 

Foreign Aid 

Department Discusses Security Assistance 
Programs (Benson) 485 

Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to 

the Congress (letters from President Carter i . . 490 

Human Rights. The Challenge to the Economic 

and Social Council: Advancing the Quality of 
Life in All Its Aspects (Young) 494 

Middle East. President Carter's News Confer- 
ence of April 22 (excerpts) 481 

Military Affairs. Department Discusses Secu- 
rity Assistance Programs I Benson) 485 

Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Nonproliferation Pol- 
icy Act of 1977 Transmitted to the Congress 
(message from President Carter, fact sheet). . . 477 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to 
the Congress 490 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1077 

Transmitted to the Congress 

President Carter's News Conference of April 22 


President iort on Cyprus 

Submitted to Congress 

U.S. -Can y on Execution of Penal Sen- 

t ernes Sent to Senate 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 

U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution of Penal 

Sentences Sent to Senate (message from Pres- 

nt Carter) 

United Nations 

The Challenge to the Economic and 'oun- 
cil; Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its 
Aspects (Young) 

United States Joins Consensus on U.N. 
Resolution on Benin (Sherer, text of resolu- 

Zaire. President Carter's News Conference of 
April 22 (excerpts) 









Name In, 

in, Lucy Wilson 485 

Carter. President 477, 481, 49(1, 401, 403 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 502 

Young, Andrew 404 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 25-May 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



186 4/2G Fine Arts Committee, May 26. 

1ST 4/27 Meeting to report on Apr. 1 talks 
with repri es of Committee 

on Harmonization, Conference of 
European Posts and Telecommuni- 
cation Admiii! May 1". 

ISO 4/2N Program for working visit to Wash- 
ington of Prime Minister Suarez of 
Spain, Apr. 2S-29. 
4/28 Shipping Coordinating Commi 

U.S. National Committee for the 
mention of Marine Pollution, 
win-king' group on segregated bal- 
last in existing tankers, May 26. 
tl91 4/28 German-U.S. cultural talks, Apr. 
20-27: communique. 

102 4/29 U.S. and Czechoslovakia terminate 
textile agreement. Mar. 22-2S. 

193 4/20 W. Tapley Bennett, .Jr., sworn in as 
1 ,S. Ambassador to NATO (bio- 
graphic data). 
+ 104 4/30 Vance: University of Georgia, 
Athens, Ga. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



Third Class 

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXVI • No. 1978 • May 23, 1977 

Address by Secretary Venice 505 



Statement by Ambassador at Large Richardson 524 


Fo>- index see inside back 


ale by the Superintendent of Documents 

i tovernment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual inde 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53^15 

Single copy 86 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac- 
tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department- Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31, 

!\ote: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers" Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1978 
May 23, 1977 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President afid 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
L nited States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Human Rights and Foreign Policy 

Address by Secretary Vance 

I speak today about the resolve of this 
Administration to make the advancement of 
human rights a central part of our foreign 

Many here today have long been advo- 
cates of human rights within our own soci- 
ety. And throughout our nation that struggle 
for civil rights continues. 

In the early years of our civil rights 
movement, many Americans treated the 
issue as a "Southern" problem. They were 
wrong. It was and is a problem for all of us. 

Now, as a nation, we must not make a 
comparable mistake. Protection of human 
rights is a challenge for all countries, not 
just for a few. 

Our human rights policy must be under- 
stood in order to be effective. So today I 
want to set forth the substance of that pol- 
icy and the results we hope to achieve. 

Our concern for human rights is built upon 
ancient values. It looks with hope to a world 
in which liberty is not just a great cause, 
but the common condition. In the past, it 
may have seemed sufficient to put our name 
to international documents that spoke loftily 
of human rights. That is not enough. We 
will go to work, alongside other people and 
governments, to protect and enhance the 
dignity of the individual. 

Let me define what we mean by "human 

First, there is the right to be free from 
governmental violation of the integrity of 

1 Made at Law Day ceremonies at the University of 
Georgia School of Law at Athens, Ga., on Apr. 30 
(text from press release 194). 

the person. Such violations include torture; 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; and arbitrary arrest or impris- 
onment. And they include denial of fair pub- 
lic trial and invasion of the home. 

Second, there is the right to the 
fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shel- 
ter, health care, and education. We recog- 
nize that the fulfillment of this right will de- 
pend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's 
economic development. But we also know 
that this right can be violated by a govern- 
ment's action or inaction — for example, 
through corrupt official processes which 
divert resources to an elite at the expense of 
the needy or through indifference to the 
plight of the poor. 

Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and 
political liberties: freedom of thought, of re- 
ligion, of assembly; freedom of speech; free- 
dom of the press; freedom of movement both 
within and outside one's own country; 
freedom to take part in government. 

Our policy is to promote all these rights. 
They are all recognized in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a basic 
document which the United States helped 
fashion and which the United Nations ap- 
proved in 1948. There may be disagreement 
on the priorities these rights deserve. But I 
believe that, with work, all of these rights 
can become complementary and mutually 

The philosophy of our human rights policy 
is revolutionary in the intellectual sense, re- 
flecting our nation's origin and progressive 
values. As Archibald MacLeish wrote during 
our Bicentennial a year ago: ". . . the cause 

May 23, 1977 


of human liberty is now the one great rev- 
olutionary cause. ..." 

President Carter put it this way in his 
speech before the United Nations: 

All the signatories of the United Nations Charter 
have pledged themselves to observe and to respect 
basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United 
Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is 
solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid 
its responsibilities to review and to speak when tor- 
ture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of 
the world. 

Since 1945, international practice has con- 
firmed that a nation's obligation to respect 
human rights is a matter of concern in in- 
ternational law. 

Our obligation under the United Nations 
Charter is written into our own legislation. 
For example, our Foreign Assistance Act 
now reads: "... a principal goal of the 
foreign policy of the United States is to 
promote the increased observance of inter- 
nationally recognized human rights by all 

In these ways, our policy is in keeping 
with our tradition, our international obliga- 
tions, and our laws. 

In pursuing a human rights policy, we 
must always keep in mind the limits of our 
power and of our wisdom. A sure formula 
for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, 
hubristic attempt to impose our values on 
others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be 
as damaging as indifference. 

We must be realistic. Our country can 
only achieve our objectives if we shape what 
we do to the case at hand. In each instance, 
we will consider these questions as we de- 
termine whether and how to act: 

1. First, we will ask ourselves, what is 
the nature of the case that confronts us? For 

What kinds of violations or deprivations 
are there? What is their extent? 

Is there a pattern to the violations? If so, 
is the trend toward concern for human 
rights or away from it? 

What is the degree of control and 
responsibility of the government involved? 

And finally, is the government willing to 
permit independent outside investigation? 

2. A second set of questions concerns the 
prospects for effective action: 

Will our action be useful in promoting the 
overall cause of human rights? 

Will it actually improve the specific 
conditions at hand? Or will it be likely to 
make things worse instead? 

Is the country involved receptive to our 
interest and efforts? 

Will others work with us, including official 
and private international organizations dedi- 
cated to furthering human rights? 

Finally, does our sense of values and 
decency demand that we speak out or take 
action anyway, even though there is only a 
remote chance of making our influence felt? 

3. We will ask a third set of questions in 
order to maintain a sense of perspective: 

Have we steered away from the self- 
righteous and strident, remembering that 
our own record is not unblemished? 

Have we been sensitive to genuine 
security interests, realizing that outbreak of 
armed conflict or terrorism could in itself 
pose a serious threat to human rights? 

Have we considered all the rights at 
stake? If, for instance, we reduce aid to a 
government which violates the political 
rights of its citizens, do we not risk penaliz- 
ing the hungry and poor, who bear no respon- 
sibility for the abuses of their government? 

If we are determined to act, the means 
available range from quiet diplomacy in its 
many forms, through public pronounce- 
ments, to withholding of assistance. When- 
ever possible, we will use positive steps of 
encouragement and inducement. Our strong 
support will go to countries that are work- 
ing to improve the human condition. We will 
always try to act in concert with other coun- 
tries, through international bodies. 

In the end, a decision whether and how to 
act in the cause of human rights is a matter 
for informed and careful judgment. No 
mechanistic formula produces an automatic 

It is not our purpose to intervene in the 
internal affairs of other countries, but as the 
President has emphasized, no member of the 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations can claim that violation of 
internationally protected human rights is 
solely its own affair. It is our purpose to 
shape our policies in accord with our beliefs 
and to state them without stridency or apol- 
ogy when we think it is desirable to do so. 

Our policy is to be applied within our own 
society as well as abroad. We welcome 
constructive criticism at the same time as 
we offer it. 

No one should suppose that we are work- 
ing in a vacuum. We place great weight on 
joining with others in the cause of human 

The U.N. system is central to this cooper- 
ative endeavor. That is why the President 
stressed the pursuit of human rights in his 
speech before the General Assembly last 
month. That is why he is calling for U.S. 
ratification of four important human rights 
covenants and conventions and why we are 
trying to strengthen the human rights 
machinery within the United Nations. 

And that is an important reason why we 
have moved to comply with U.N. sanctions 
against Rhodesia. In one of our first acts, 
this Administration sought and achieved re- 
peal of the Byrd amendment, which had 
placed us in violation of these sanctions and 
thus in violation of international law. We are 
supporting other diplomatic efforts within 
the United Nations to promote basic civil 
and political rights in Namibia and through- 
out southern Africa. 

Regional organizations also play a central 
role in promoting human rights. The 
President has announced that the United 
States will sign and seek Senate approval of 
the American Convention on Human Rights. 
We will continue to work to strengthen the 
machinery of the Inter-American Commis- 
sion on Human Rights. This will include ef- 
forts to schedule regular visits to all mem- 
bers of the Organization of American States, 
annual debates on human rights conditions, 
and the expansion of the inter-American 
educational program on human rights. 

The United States is seeking increased 
consultation with other nations for joint 
programs on economic assistance and more 
general efforts to promote human rights. We 

are working to assure that our efforts reach 
out to all, with particular sensitivity to the 
problems of women. 

We will meet in Belgrade later this year 
to review implementation of the Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe — the so-called Helsinki confer- 
ence. We will take this occasion to work for 
progress there on important human issues: 
family reunification, binational marriages, 
travel for personal and professional reasons, 
and freer access to information. 

The United States looks to use of 
economic assistance — whether bilateral or 
through international financial institu- 
tions — as a means to foster basic human 

— We have proposed a 20 percent increase 
in U.S. foreign economic assistance for fiscal 
year 1978. 

— We are expanding the program of the 
Agency for International Development for 
"New Initiatives in Human Rights" as a 
complement to present efforts to get the 
benefits of our aid to those most in need 

— The programs of the United States In- 
formation Agency and the State Depart- 
ment's Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs stress support for law in society, a 
free press, freedom of communication, an 
open educational system, and respect for 
ethnic diversity. 

This Administration's human rights policy 
has been framed in collaboration and consul- 
tation with Congress and private organiza- 
tions. We have taken steps to assure 
firsthand contact, consultation, and observa- 
tion when Members of Congress travel 
abroad to review human rights conditions. 

We are implementing current laws that 
bring human rights considerations directly 
into our decisions in several international fi- 
nancial institutions. At the same time, we 
are working with the Congress to find the 
most effective way to fulfill our parallel 
commitment to international cooperation in 
economic development. 

In accordance with human rights 
provisions of legislation governing our secu- 

May 23, 1977 


rity assistance programs, we recently an- 
nounced cuts in military aid to several coun- 

Outside the government, there is much 
that can be done. We welcome the efforts of 
individual American citizens and private 
organizations — such as religious, hu- 
manitarian, and professional groups — to work 
for human rights with commitments of time, 
money, and compassion. 

All these initiatives to further human 
rights abroad would have a hollow ring if we 
were not prepared to improve our own per- 
formance at home. So we have removed all 
restrictions on our citizens' travel abroad 
and are proceeding with plans to liberalize 
our visa policies. 

We support legislation and administrative 
action to expand our refugee and asylum 
policies and to permit more victims of re- 
pressive regimes to enter the United States. 
During this last year, the United States 
spent some $475 million on assistance to 
refugees around the world, and we accepted 
31,000 refugees for permanent resettlement 
in this country. 

What results can we expect from all these 

We may justifiably seek a rapid end to 
such gross violations as those cited in our 
law: "torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, (or) 
prolonged detention without charges. ..." 
Just last week our Ambassador at the 
United Nations, Andrew Young, suggested 
a series of new ways to confront the practice 
of torture around the world. 

The promotion of other human rights is a 
broader challenge. The results may be 
slower in coming but are no less worth pur- 
suing. And we intend to let other countries 
know where we stand. 

We recognize that many nations of the 
world are organized on authoritarian rather 
than democratic principles — some large and 
powerful, others struggling to raise the lives 
of their people above bare subsistence 
levels. We can nourish no illusions that a 
call to the banner of human rights will bring- 
sudden transformations in authoritarian 

We are embarked on a long journey. But 
our faith in the dignity of the individual en- 
courages us to believe that people in every 
society, according to their own traditions, 
will in time give their own expression to this 
fundamental aspiration. 

Our belief is strengthened by the way the 
Helsinki principles and the U.N. Declaration 
of Human Rights have found resonance in 
the hearts of people of many countries. Our 
task is to sustain this faith by our example 
and our encouragement. 

In his inaugural address three months 
ago, President Carter said, "Because we are 
free we can never be indifferent to the fate 
of freedom elsewhere." Again, at a meeting 
of the Organization of American States two 
weeks ago, he said, "You will find this coun- 
try . . . eager to stand beside those nations 
which respect human rights and which 
promote democratic ideals." 

We seek these goals because they are 
right — and because we, too, will benefit. 
Our own well-being, and even our security, 
are enhanced in a world that shares common 
freedoms and in which prosperity and eco- 
nomic justice create the conditions for 
peace. And let us remember that we always 
risk paying a serious price when we become 
identified with repression. 

Nations, like individuals, limit their po- 
tential when they limit their goals. The 
American people understand this. I am con- 
fident they will support foreign policies that 
reflect our traditional values. To offer less is 
to define America in ways we should not 

America fought for freedom in 1776 and in 
two World Wars. We have offered haven to 
the oppressed. Millions have come to our 
shores in times of trouble. In time of devas- 
tation abroad, we have shared our re- 

Our encouragement and inspiration to 
other nations and other peoples have never 
been limited to the power of our military or 
the bounty of our economy. They have been 
lifted up by the message of our Revolution, 
the message of individual human freedom. 
That message has been our great national 
asset in times past. So it should be again. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Questions and Answers Following Secretary Vance's Address 
at the University of Georgia School of Law 

Pl'eas release 194A dated May :-i 

Q. Secretary Venice, if I may digress from 
your speech a little bit, you were quoted in 
the New Yorker magazine last August as 
saying that if our efforts to encourage pro 
bono work by lawyers voluntarily were un- 
successful, it might be necessary to impose 
a mandatory system on all private lawyers 
to do a certain amount of pro bono work. 
Would you comment on that, please, sir? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I would be de- 
lighted to comment on that. 

I think that lawyers have a special 
responsibility to the communities in which 
they live and to the peoples of those com- 
munities. In New York, where I practiced 
law, I came to the reluctant conclusion that 
the lawyers were not discharging their re- 
sponsibilities in terms of public service and 
meeting the needs of the poor and those who 
could not afford proper legal services. And I 
therefore urged that the lawyers in our 
community increase their efforts both in 
terms of time committed to pro bono ac- 
tivities and in terms of contributions to help 
support those activities. And I went on to 
say that if this voluntary response — which is 
what I pray would be the answer to this — 
does not succeed, then I think it may be 
necessary for the bar, the organized bar, to 
set down prescriptions with respect to con- 
tributions of time or other efforts to make 
possible the rendering of these services to 
those in the community who are not getting 
them. I do not think we can, in this great de- 
mocracy, have a situation where the courts 
and the processes of the law are not freely 
available to all. 

Q. Secretary Vance, I'd like to ask you a 
somewhat more general question and ask 

you to speculate, just a bit, if you will. 

First of all, do you think that in the 
course of this Administration there is a real 
possibility for significant and meaningful 
arms limitation, particularly in light of 
your recent conversations with the Soviets? 

And then in a more long-range vein, I'd 
like to ask you simply: Do you think that 
any of us will live to see a day when nuclear 
arms will in fact no longer exist? 

Secretary Vance: On the first question, I 
think it is possible during President Carter's 
Administration to see significant arms con- 
trol; but, I would caution, arms control is a 
process which takes time and a great deal of 
patience. It's not something for the 
short-winded or the faint of heart. 

These are extremely difficult problems 
that have to be dealt with, that in terms of 
the nations involved affect their very 
national security. And therefore it is inevi- 
table that they become a very time- 
consuming process. All we have to do is look 
back over the history of the past to see the 
facts that underlie that statement. 

But having said that, arms control — 
particularly nuclear arms control — is one of 
the major objectives of President Carter's 
Administration. It is, along with a few other 
items, at the very top of the list; and we will 
continue to put our full efforts behind seek- 
ing a fair and just settlement. And I think in 
time that settlement can be achieved. 

Now, your second question dealt with — I 
believe the question: Can, in your lifetime, 
we see the total elimination of nuclear 

I pray that that can happen. I'm not sure 
it can. But I think that all of us have got to 
bend our efforts in my generation and your 
generation, and the generation that will be 

May 23, 1977 


following on after that, to inexorably move 
us along the path to that time when we will 
be able to achieve that goal. 

Q. Secretary Ventre, 200 years ago the 
U.S. military came into being to protect the 
citizens of the United States of America. 
Two weeks before Abraham Lincoln was 
shot in 1865, he said that the worst aspect of 
the Civil War was that it enabled a handful 
of corporations to take over the economy of 
the United States and that if this trend 
wasn't stopped, the Republic would be de- 

Now, 112 years later, after Lincoln said 
that, a handful of American corpora- 
tions — mainly multinational oil corpora- 
tions — around the world are protected by 
U.S. military forces which outnumber any 
forces in the days of the Roman Empire. 

What is going to be done about our foreign 
policy of maintenance of empire? How are 
we going to return this country once again 
to being the democratic republic which it 
was founded as? 

Thomas Jefferson said that a standing 
army in peacetime is the greatest threat to 
the civil liberties of the people. 

We are officially i>i peacetime, and yet we 
have a big standing army which is going to 
equip divisions in Russian uniforms with 
captured Russian weapons. What use is a 
policy of human rights if we are going to 
press our policy of empire until we have a 
third world war with the Russians and 
everyone is obliterated in nuclear atoms? 

What I'm asking you is: Isn't it time to 
stop the multinational corporations from 
dictating governmental policy? Isn't it time 
to set up a public solar energy corporation 
of the people, by the people, and for the 
people, to break the power of the multina- 
tional oil monopolies which have risen to 
power since Lincoln's assassination and 
have turned our nation from a democratic 
republic into a military worldwide empire? 

Secretary Vance: Well, you've made a 
number of assumptions and asked a goodly 
number of questions. Let me say that I do 
not agree with a number of the assumptions 
which you have made, but you have asked 

some serious questions and I will try to an- 
swer them. 

I do not believe that it is fair or accurate 
to state that the multinational corporations 
control the policy of the United States. They 
do not. 

With respect to the development of 
foreign policy, this is developed within the 
government, without interference by corpo- 
rate action from without. That policy is 
being developed on the basis of the funda- 
mental values which have undergirded the 
founding of this country and its development 
through the years since then. 

Insofar as military forces are concerned, 
the military forces at this juncture are less 
than they have been in many years. They 
stand ready as a defensive organization to 
protect our country and our allies should the 
need arise. But there is no aggressive 
purpose on the part of the United States to 
use those forces, and that should be crystal 

We are bending our efforts in the military 
area to find ways to reduce the likelihood of 
conflict through arms negotiations. In the 
area of the spread of nuclear weapons, the 
United States has taken the leadership in 
moving to try and get a control on the 
spread of weapons through the policies 
which have been announced with respect to 
plutonium, the transfer of sensitive 
technology relating to reprocessing and en- 
richment, and the seeking of international 
mechanisms to control this. 

Let me just speak once more. And finally, 
with respect to the problems of the develop- 
ing world, I think that you will see in this 
Administration, in the years ahead, an in- 
creasingly important attention directed to 
trying to work with the developing countries 
to try and find ways to solve the common 
problems which we have and the needs and 
concerns which they have. 

Q. Secretary Vance, as Professor [Dean] 
Rusk has often explained to us, one of your 
hardest jobs is often to justify — and some- 
times even defend — our foreign policy to the 
people here at home. 

One of the areas that is always touchiest 
is foreign aid; and that's something that the 


Department of State Bulletin 

press and the public are always ready to 
criticize the Administration for, in light of 
the problems we have in this country, as far 
as sending money out of the country. When 
the Administration announces a 20 percent 
increase next year in owr foreign aid bill, 
what answer will the Administration, as I'm 
sure it's thought, have to the press and to 
the American public for justifying that 

Secretary Vance: I believe that it is of 
fundamental importance that we increase 
our assistance through foreign aid. The 
problems which face the developing world 
are immense in terms of the social and eco- 
nomic turmoil that have been caused over 
the last several years. 

Insofar as the developing world was con- 
cerned, these problems were intensified by 
the action taken by the OPEC countries 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] a couple of years ago, which 
came on top of a recession and which 
exacerbated the situation insofar as their 
economies were concerned. 

Also, as the world grows more tightly 
knit, the economic problems of countries — 
wherever they may be located — tend to af- 
fect those in other countries. One of the 
ways that we have of dealing with this is by 
increasing, in a sensible and measured way, 
the resources available to these developing 

In my own judgment, the best way of 
doing this is through the international finan- 
cial institutions — which is the area in which 
the greatest increase has been suggested in 
our budget. The international financial in- 
stitutions are, in my judgment, better able 
to impose the kind of fiscal controls and con- 
straints to make sure that the money is 
properly spent than can be done on a bilat- 
eral basis. Also, for every dollar that we put 
in, we get matching money from others, so 
that increases the funds available to meet 
these problems. 

There are always situations where we can 
help on a bilateral basis — help the poor and 
the needy in other parts of the world. And 
there I think that we can and should do this 
on a bilateral basis. 

May 23, 1977 

In the long run I think this does two 

First, I think it fills a world need for 
which we have a responsibility along with 
other nations. 

And secondly, we are so interrelated 
these days that in the end it helps us. We 
depend in great measure on these nations 
for commodities. If we're going to deal with 
the global problems — we're dealing with 
them now in international fora — we can't do 
this alone. We have to be working with 
other nations. And to the extent that we 
begin to know them and work with them, I 
think we strengthen our chances of dealing 
with them satisfactorily. 

Q. With Mr. Carter in the White House 
and Andy Young in the United Nations 
there will be a lot of changes in American 
policy toward Africa, but there have been 
charges by some African political analysts 
that the only people who can solve African 
problems are the African people, who refuse 
to get identified as Communist or 
capitalist — white or black. 

Within the last few months there have 
been some changes in some of the African 
nations— that African nations traded Com- 
munist friends for capitalist friends. 
Another nation may, next to that, trade, 
you know, capitalist friends for Coymnunist 
friends. In light of some of the developments 
since independence of some African nations, 
you see people here who will be represented 
by a bunch of other people that are not 
elected by African people and there have 
been changes that have been brought about 
either by their Comynunist friends or 
capitalist friends from outside of Africa, 
with the result that people keep killing 
each — one side keeps killing the other side, 
then somebody else comes to power and 
changes policy to the other side. 

Do you really think that if Africa will de- 
velop and grow in a peaceful environment 
that this Communist-capitalist influence 
can really help the nations in Africa? And, 
if you don't, do you see a time when the 
people of the capitalist and Comynunist 
world can walk together with other people 
instead of trying to tear each other apart 


solely on the basis of ideological differ- 

Secretary Vance: I believe that the future 
of Africa must be determined by the African 

Self-determination on their part is the an- 
swer, in my judgment, to their future. That 
does not mean that we should be indifferent. 
If we can help to move the process of self- 
determination in a constructive and peaceful 
way, then I think it's appropriate that we do 
so — as we are trying to do in the situation 
that afflicts Rhodesia and Namibia at this 
time. They themselves — the African 
nations — are asking that assistance be given 
in terms of trying to move the political 
process to a solution of the differences with- 
out having to resort to violence as a way of 
achieving that. And I think it's appropriate 
that the United States and the other nations 
of the world should assist in trying to bring 
about such a peaceful transition. 

Q. Mr. Secretary , in light of the 
Administration's recent mission to Hanoi 
and in light of the innovative negotiations 
which have been occurring with Hanoi, what 
do you foresee or predict to be the future of 
U.S. -Vietnamese relations with regard to 
rebuilding in that country or whatever? 

Secretary Vance: We have said to the 
North Vietnamese — both President Carter 
and I have said on many occasions — that we 
believe a return toward normalization of the 
relationships between Vietnam and the 
United States is in the interests of both our 

The first step was taken in the mission to 
Hanoi which was led by Mr. [Leonard] 
Woodcock and out of which came real 
progress in the field of dealing with the 

missing-in-action problem, which had been a 
major separating influence. 

We are meeting again, as you know, next 
week with the Vietnamese in Paris to dis- 
cuss the question of possible recognition of 
each other. I think that this would be a good 
second step along the way. 

There are other problems that separate 
our two countries. They will have to be dis- 
cussed over a period of time. And through 
those discussions I hope we will be able to 
find solutions which are commonly satisfac- 
tory to our two nations. 

Specifically with respect to the question of 
aid, as you know, we are prohibited from 
giving aid, other than a small amount of 
humanitarian aid, by virtue of the laws of 
the United States. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
To Resume at Geneva 

Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement ' 

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have 
agreed that their delegations will resume 
negotiations on strategic arms limitations in 
Geneva beginning May 11, 1977. The discus- 
sions will consider questions related to the 
text of a SALT agreement which were con- 
sidered but not settled in previous Geneva 

In addition to the Geneva negotiations, 
the two sides have agreed to continue to ex- 
change views at other levels in an effort to 
conclude a SALT agreement. 

1 Read to news correspondents on Apr. 26 by De- 
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III; also released 
that day at Moscow. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 

Press release -"- ilateil May 4 

Q. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How do 
we stand on our negotiations with the 
Soviets in SALT? Has the United States 
modified the packages that were presented at 
Moscow in the subsequent talks through Mr. 
Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet 
Ambassador to the U.S.]? And will there be, 
can there be, a summit meeting with Mr. 
Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec- 
retary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] 
sometime this year without an agreement on 

Secretary Vance: First, let me give you a 
rundown on where we stand since we had 
our meetings in Moscow. 

I have had several conversations with the 
Soviets here in Washington since we re- 
turned from Moscow. In those conversa- 
tions, we have discussed two matters. 

The first has been to set up the proce- 
dures and dates for the working groups 
which, you know, we agreed to establish as 
a result of the Moscow meetings. We have 
set up dates for almost all of the working 
groups now. The meetings will be held in 
three different places. One meeting will be 
held in Washington, one meeting will be 
held in Moscow, and several meetings will 
be held in Geneva, for the various working 
groups. I believe there are three working 
groups for which we still have not been able 
to set up a date because we have to ex- 
change further papers in preparation for 
those meetings. 

Secondly, we have reviewed the two 
proposals which we put on the table in Mos- 
cow and the longstanding Soviet proposal 
with respect to SALT which existed before 
we went to Moscow. We have put no new 
proposals on the table, nor have they. 

We have merely reviewed the existing 

We will be discussing SALT with the 
Soviets when I go to Moscow to meet with 
the Foreign Minister. I do not want to pre- 
dict at this time what may come out of those 
discussions. We will just have to wait and 
see what happens at the time. 

Q. You said when you would go to Mos- 
cow, you meant Geneva? 

Secretary Vance: Excuse me, yes. 

Q. And the second part of my original 
question, can there be or will there be a 
summit with Mr. Brezhnev in case there is 
no SALT agreement this year? 

Secretary Vance: I simply don't know the 
answer to that. That is up to the Soviets, 
and that has not been specifically discussed 
with them. 

Q. Five years have passed since the Shang- 
hai communique was signed. Is there any 
reason to believe that a solution to the 
Taiwan problem will be any less 
troublesome over the next five years than it 
has been since '72? 

Secretary Vance: First, let me say that 
since this Administration came into office, 
we have made clear that we are going to 
conduct our bilateral relations with the 
People's Republic of China in accordance 
with the principles of the Shanghai 

We have had a few discussions with the 
liaison officer for the People's Republic of 
China here in Washington. 

I hope that later in this year we will be 
able to set up a date for a trip when I will 
go to Peking to have discussions where we 
could explore in depth some of the issues 

May 23, 1977 


which need to be discussed between our two 

It is indeed a difficult problem to move 
toward normalization. As you all know, 
normalization as an ultimate goal is a princi- 
ple stated in the Shanghai communique, and 
a principle behind which we place our ac- 
ceptance. How one proceeds in terms of 
time and the modalities is a very difficult 
question and one which we will have to take 
time to discuss with them; and this can only 
be done through face-to-face discussions. 

Q. If I might follow up on the question 
about the SALT negotiations, do you believe 
that limits on the cruise missile could or 
should be included within the Vladivostok 

Secretary Vance: That is a question of the 
details of negotiations that I really don't 
want to get into now. As I said, we have 
discussed all three proposals which have 
been put forward. What you are asking is: Is 
there some combination of the various pro- 
posals that might be put together? I don't 
want to speculate on that at this time. 

Q. If I may make it more general, do you 
have any more hope today that you are 
closer to establishing a framework for 
resuming the negotiations? 

Secretary Vance: I guess when you put 
things in terms of hope, one tends to some- 
times create expectations and get oneself 
into problems. 

Let me say that this will be a subject of 
discussion, and I don't want to characterize 
it in terms of hope or lack of hope. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to re- 
turn to the Mideast, and do you expect the 
new Israeli Prime Minister to come here for 

Secretary Vayice: I expect to go back to 
the Middle East after the Israelis have put 
together a new government. As to exactly 
when that will be, it is a matter of 
speculation. The numbers that I have heard 
are that it could take anywhere from three 
weeks to a couple of months for that to hap- 
pen. It would not make sense for me to go 
back to the Middle East until after there is a 
new Israeli government in place. 

On your second question, I think it would 
be useful, once there is a new Israeli Prime 
Minister, for us to meet with the new Prime 
Minister before I go back to the Middle 
East, because by that time the new Prime 
Minister will be in a position where he will 
be able to speak with authority with respect 
to the Israeli position and what it may be 
and what flexibility there may be in that po- 
sition. To go back prior to that time, it 
seems to me, would not make sense. 

Q. You seem to imply that the United 
States does not plan to change its negotiat- 
ing position on SALT before the return to 
Geneva. Is that a correct assumption? And 
if so, why go, given the rapid communica- 
tions and the intimate communications with 
the Soviet Union? Do you have any reason 
to believe you are going to be able to achieve 
anything concrete? 

Secretary Vance: We are going to be 
doing several things while I am in Geneva. 
We will be signing the Environmental Mod- 
ification Treaty. In addition to that, we will 
be discussing the Middle East. 

I think it will be useful and constructive 
for the Foreign Minister [Andrei A. 
Gromyko] and me, at that level, to pick up 
the discussions with respect to SALT, as 
was indicated when I left Moscow. And I 
think that any time the parties sit down and 
start talking to each other, there is always a 
possibility that something constructive can 
come out of it, and therefore I am very 
much in favor of it. 

Range of Missiles Carried by Aircraft 

Q. Can you explain what modifications, if 
any, were made in the American proposal 
while the delegation was in Moscow, specif- 
ically referring to this question of nonheavy 
bombers carrying cruise missiles? 

Secretary Vance: I would be glad to talk 
to that. 

This relates to the question of whether or 
not there should be a limitation on the range 
of missiles that could be carried by tactical 

One of the elements of the proposal which 
we made to the Soviets in Moscow was that 


Department of State Bulletin 

any missile, air-launched cruise missile, with 
a range over 600 — in other words, between 
600 kilometers and 2,500 kilometers — could 
only be carried on heavy bombers. 

The reason for that was to meet the 
problem created by the "Backfire" bomber, 
which the Soviets maintain is an inter- 
mediate bomber. But if one were to be able 
to hang long-range missiles on it, it could, as 
you can obviously see, change the charac- 
teristics of that bomber. 

Now, coming to the specifics of how that 
provision came into being, the provision 
with respect to tactical aircraft not being- 
able to carry air-launched cruise missiles 
with ranges over 600 kilometers was first 
developed in 1975. 

When this Administration came into of- 
fice, we reviewed those studies. In the dis- 
cussions in the NSC [National Security 
Council] subsequently, one of the options 
which was considered was that option. The 
reason for its consideration is as I have indi- 
cated. It is a very important aspect of limit- 
ing or constraining the Backfire so that it 
cannot become an intercontinental bomber. 
And it was determined in the NSC and ap- 
proved by the President that this would be a 

That provision was not contained specif- 
ically in the very brief general instructions 
which I took with me to Moscow. But when 
we got to Moscow and put down on paper 
the specific proposal in all its detail, it was 
clear that that had to be spelled out so that 
there would be no ambiguity in dealing with 
the Soviet Union, and it was therefore 
included in the specific proposal which was 
put before the Soviets. 

Discussions With Vietnam and Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how close is the United 
States to normalizing relations with Viet- 
nam and Cuba, and what purpose does it 
serve? What is in it for the American 

Secretary Vance: Let me bring you up to 
date on the Vietnamese situation. 

We have just completed two days of talks 
with the Vietnamese in Paris. The meetings 
have been adjourned. The parties will meet 

again in two weeks in Paris. The meetings 
were useful. There were differences 
between us. 

We made clear to the Vietnamese that we 
will not pay any reparations. We indicated 
to the Vietnamese that we are prepared not 
to oppose their admission to the United Na- 
tions. In turn, we are pleased with the 
progress which is being made in the 
missing-in-action area. 

The ultimate goal of the parties is to see 
whether or not we can find a basis for nor- 
malization of relations between our two 

I have previously stated, as has the Pres- 
ident, that we believe that is in the interests 
of our two countries, and we will continue to 
see whether or not we can achieve that 

Q. Excuse me, I tucked Cuba intv that, 
too, trying to get two questions for the price 
of one. How close are we on Cuba? 

Secretary Vance: On Cuba, we have had 
several meetings, but those meetings have 
really dealt with the fisheries question. 

As you know, on the recent meeting that 
Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Af- 
fairs Terence] Todman had in Havana with 
the Cubans, we reached agreement with re- 
spect to a fisheries treaty. 

There were other subjects which were 
touched upon at the end of the meeting on 

Since that time, there have been follow-on 
technical meetings, and indeed I think one is 
going on today in New York, on technical 
fisheries questions. 

There remain a number of issues between 
our two countries, and I would expect that 
these issues will become the subject of dis- 
cussion at subsequent meetings. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is another question 
on the Middle East. Does the Administra- 
tion consider as an option at the end of the 
round of talks of presenting an American 
peace plan to the parties, a comprehensive 
American peace plan, without the element of 
compulsion or enforcement, just for discus- 

Secretary Vance: As the President has 

May 23, 1977 


indicated, we are going to go ahead and 
complete the round of discussions which we 
are having with the leaders of the various 
countries concerned. 

We will complete these discussions by the 
end of May with respect to all countries ex- 
cept the new leaders in Israel. And as I 
have said, we cannot consider that until we 
have seen who the new leaders will be and 
when we could meet with them. 

Following that, however, we will then 
complete our work, and we will be prepared 
to make suggestions to the parties with re- 
spect to what we believe would be a fair and 
equitable manner of dealing with the Middle 
East problems. We will then go and discuss 
these suggestions with the parties in an ef- 
fort to see how much common ground we can 
find among the parties. 

The ultimate decision, however, on a 
Middle East settlement, as we have said 
many times, must be made by the parties 

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your last 
question about Vietnam, you spoke of dif- 
ferences between the United States and 
Vietnam and also said that the United 
States will not pay reparations to Vietnam. 
Are the Vietnamese insisting on economic 
aid of some kind as a precondition to nor- 
malization at this time? 

Secretary Vance: They have talked about 
their view that there is a need for assistance 
to, quote, "heal the wounds of war." That is, 
in the terms of the language which was used 
before, essentially a repetition of a request 
for reparations. And so there is a difference of 
opinion between us on that, because we have 
said we will not pay reparations. 

Q. As a precondition to normalization are 
they insisting on this aid? Does that mean it 
would hare to be committed before? 

Secretary Vance: As a precondition to 
normalization, I think the answer is yes. If 
your question is, as a precondition to a dip- 
lomatic recognition on either side, I don't 
know the answer to that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the 
Middle East: One, did you mean to say that 
the suggestions you are talking about will in 

effect be a comprehensive American plan 
and then you will see how much agreement 
there is among the parties? And two, you 
and the President seemed earlier this year 
determined that the Geneva peace conference 
be reconvened by the end of this year, dur- 
ing the second half of the year. That deter- 
mination seemed to lessen somewhat after 
King Hussein' s visit, if I read the 
President's remarks correctly. Where do you 
stand on that? 

Secretary Vance: Let me take the latter 
question first. 

We have said right from the outset that it 
is terribly important that the proper base be 
laid before going to a Geneva conference so 
that one doesn't come to Geneva and then 
just start thrashing around because nobody 
has thought out how you are going to pro- 
ceed and how the issues will be dealt with 
and what the degree of commonality is with 
respect to the views on the core issues. 

Insofar as the timing is concerned, we still 
believe that it is very important to have a 
meeting before the end of 1977, indeed, in 
the fall of 1977. 

So our views remain unchanged on that. 
But I stress the fact that we feel that it is 
essential that adequate preparation be made 
and that we have some idea of what will 
come out of Geneva rather than just going 
to Geneva to be in Geneva. 

Now, I think you asked a second question? 

Q. When you answered the previous ques- 
tion you talked about American sugges- 
tions. Is that in the frameivork of a com- 
prehensive American plan? 

Secretary Vance: I would think we would 
have suggestions on the core issues. 
Whether you want to call it a comprehensive 
plan or not is a question that gets into 
semantics. But I think we will have sugges- 
tions on all the core issues. 

Q. What kind of persuasive power does the 
United States have when it runs into 
resistance on these suggestions? In other 
words, are we going to see another reas- 
sessment on Israel, will the United States 
review the question of aid to Egypt and so 
forth, to accelerate compliance or voluntary 


Department of State Bulletin 

compliance on the part of the pen-tics to the 
core suggestions? 

Secretary Vance: I would think that the 
first thing which one would have to do in 
moving between the parties is to try and put 
before the various parties the logic behind 
the position, why it appears to be fair, and 
have a dialogue with each of the individual 
countries with respect to whatever sugges- 
tions we may make in terms of why we be- 
lieve them to be fair and equitable. But again 
I stress that ultimately the decision for set- 
tlement has to be made by the parties. It can't 
be made by the United States. 

Prospects for New Initiative on Rhodesia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your assess- 
ment so far of the prospects for a joint 
Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia, and 
can you say will you be seeing African 
leaders in London while you are there and, 
if so, which ones? 

Secretary Vance: We are working very 
closely, as we have all through the last sev- 
eral months, with the British on the south- 
ern Africa questions and specifically with 
regard to Rhodesia. We have been in close 
touch with David Owen [British Foreign 
Secretary] and the members of his staff in 
developing ideas for a new initiative in 

We have had a group from the State De- 
partment which has been over there re- 
cently for several days working with Mr. 
Owen and the members of his staff. I have 
reviewed the results of that along with the 
Vice President. 

I will be going back to London, as you 
know, on Thursday, and on Friday I will be 
meeting with the Foreign Secretary and his 
staff to discuss the decisions which remain 
before us on how we are next going to pro- 
ceed in this area. I think we will reach those 
decisions in the near future. By the near fu- 
ture I would say about the middle of May, 
perhaps even a little earlier than that. 

Was there another part to your question? 

Q. Will you be seeing African leaders in 
London and, if so, which ones? 

Secretary Vance: I will be seeing Mr. 
Nkomo [Joshua Nkomo, President of the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union and Pres- 
ident of the African National Council- 
Zimbabwe] on Friday afternoon. Let me in- 
dicate I have already seen Bishop Muzorewa 
[Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of the United 
African National Council] when he was here 
in the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your comments about 
SALT suggest there is a deadlock; is that 

Secretary Vance: Nobody has moved from 
their position at this point, but the parties 
are talking to each other. So you can draw 
your own conclusions, use whatever words 
you want. We are talking to each other, and 
I hope out of this process we will be able to 
make some progress. 

Q. Well, do you find at this point as a re- 
sult of these talks that there has been any 
"give" in the positions of either side to 
suggest a compromise? 

Secretary Vance: I don't want to get into 
the details of our conversations at this 
point, and I am just going to leave it there. 

Expanding the Definition of Human Rights 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech at the 
University of Georgia on Saturday you 
suggested a number of questions that the 
United States should be asking itself about 
human rights. 

Is it the implication of those questions 
that in the future we will be hearing fewer 
Presidential statements and Department of 
State statements on human rights, or is that 
a false conclusion to draw from this? 

Secretary Vance: It doesn't necessarily 

What I tried to do in the speech which I 
gave at the University of Georgia was to 
define what we meant by human rights; and 
as you will notice, in the speech that I gave 
I expanded the definition of human rights in 
terms of the various subcomponents that are 
included within human rights. 

I secondly tried to set out the consid- 
erations that we would have to take into ac- 

May 23, 1977 


count in deciding how we were going to 
proceed in given cases on a country-by- 
country basis, which I have said all along is 
the way I believe that you are going to have 
to deal with the problem except when you 
are dealing in the international fora. 

I stressed also the importance of using the 
international and regional fora to have dis- 
cussions on these human rights questions. 

There is no lessening at all in terms of our 
conviction that this is absolutely essential to 
our foreign policy and that it must be car- 
ried forward. I did believe it was useful to 
define with greater precision than we have 
in the past both what we meant by human 
rights and how we intended to apply our- 
selves to dealing with those questions. 

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 

Q. Since the Vice President will be meet- 
ing with the Prime Minister of South Af- 
rica, could you define for us what this 
government's policy now is toward South 
Africa and particularly toward how rapidly 
we believe there should be moves toward 
majority government including all people in 
South Africa? 

Secretary Vance: Our policy with respect 
to South Africa is and remains that we are 
inalterably opposed to apartheid. 

We feel it would be constructive, how- 
ever, to meet with the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Vorster, to talk with him about the ques- 
tions of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South 
Africa and how they plan to move within 
South Africa in making progress in moving 
away from apartheid and in dealing with the 
problems of minorities within their country. 
That is a subject which will be discussed by 
the Vice President with Mr. Vorster when 
he meets with him shortly. 

Q. Sir, when you say there is no deadline 
on SALT, did you have in your mind that 
the interim agreement lapses in October? 
Isn't that a deadline of sorts? 

Secretary Vance: It is a fact that the 
interim agreement expires in October, but if 
we reach October and we have not had an 
agreement, we have two choices. We can 


either extend the agreement if the Soviets 
are willing to do so, or we can continue to 
proceed without an agreement but on the 
assumption that we will continue as if there 
were a continuing agreement. And I am not 
saying that we won't reach agreement or 
that we will reach agreement by October. 
But I don't feel we are fighting any deadline 
that is going to cause us to take actions that 
are not wise and prudent. 

Q. I am interested in the Policy Review 
Memorandum that the Administration is 
currently preparing on arms limitations. 

I understand that when you appeared be- 
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee last week you suggested that the United 
States should severely cut back its coproduc- 
tion agreements with other countries and 
you specifically limited future coproduction 
agreements to NATO, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand. 

Now, my specific question is, why won't 
you want to consider Israel as a partner in 
future coproduction agreements, and related 
to that, what is the specific status of Israel's 
request for coproduction for the F-16? 

Secretary Vance: Let me set aside the lat- 
ter question and talk about the discussions 
which I had with the Congress. 

I met last week in two sessions, one with 
the leadership on the House side and a sec- 
ond meeting with the leadership on the 
Senate side, to talk about a proposed direc- 
tive which would be issued by the President 
to govern our actions in the future in the 
area of arms transfers. That document is 
still in a draft stage. We are taking into ac- 
count the suggestions which have been made 
by the Members of the Congress. 

Incidentally, they were very helpful 
suggestions, and I think out of the process 
of meeting with them and discussing this 
paper we have improved substantially the 
end product which will be coming out of it. 

The President has not yet had a chance 
because of preparations for the summit to 
reach his final decisions with respect to that 
memorandum, and I don't want to go into 
detail until he has made his decisions. 

I will comment, however, that one of the 
items does deal with coproduction and that 

Department of State Bulletin 

this was a matter which was discussed at 
some length with members of both the Sen- 
ate and of the House. And we have their 
views and they have been taken into account 
and will be discussed with the President as 
he makes up his mind concerning the ulti- 
mate form of that memorandum. 

Developments in Zaire 

Q. Can you tell us ivhat are your views 
now on the present developments in Zaire 
and with the past and present involvement 
of France, Egypt, Morocco, and others in 
this conflict? 

Secretary Vance: The situation in Zaire 
has changed somewhat since we last met. 
There has been an active mediation effort 
led by the Nigerians, which we have been 
very strongly supporting since the outset. I 
discussed this a number of weeks ago with 
[Nigerian] Foreign Minister Garba when he 
came to the United States before it was 
decided to launch that effort. 

I believe that the solution will have to ul- 
timately be found by the Africans in a politi- 
cal solution, and therefore I very strongly 
support and welcome this effort which is 
being carried forward. 

On the military side, as all of you know as 
well as I do, the situation has somewhat 
changed in the last several weeks. As a re- 
sult of additional support which has been 
given to the Government of the Republic of 
Zaire, the military situation has appeared to 
change on the ground, and it has resulted in 
a movement back from the area nearest to 
the copperbelt closer down toward the bor- 
der where the fighting appears to be going 
on now. 

A number of nations, both African and 
non-African, have made contributions to the 
Republic of Zaire in terms of both nonlethal, 
nonmilitary equipment and assistance; and 
some of the other nations have made contri- 
butions of both soldiers and lethal equip- 

We will continue to follow the situation 
with great care and work with the parties in 
trying to bring about an ultimate resolution, 
which again I say I believe must be worked 
out by the Africans themselves. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you make any ef- 
fort, when you meet Mr. Gromyko in 
Geneva, to revitalize the MBFR [mutual 
and balanced force reduction] talks; and 
does that have a very high priority or not in 
the Administration's foreign policy? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, it does have a high 
priority. You know, I discussed the MBFR 
situation with the Soviets when we were in 
Moscow. And I subsequently have discussed 
it with a number of the heads of state whom 
I visited on my trip back from Moscow. 

In addition, there are discussions going on 
with respect to MBFR in the NATO con- 
text, which is the negotiating context, 
insofar as the West is concerned, for MBFR. 
Any decisions that have to be taken there 
must be alliance decisions taken among the 
NATO alliance members. There are subjects 
under discussion at this point, and we would 
continue in the United States to press to see 
that progress is made in this area, because 
we believe this whole question of the central 
balance — or the balance in the central part 
of Europe — is of great importance and one 
where we have to make progress. 

Situation in Horn of Africa 

Q. What is your assessment of U.S. rela- 
tions in eastern Africa, and are you con- 
cerned about the Communist influence 
there, particularly in the Horn? 

Secretary Vance: We have been following 
the situation in the Horn with great care. 
We have done a study and have completed 
our study within the government on the 
problems of the Horn of Africa. Recently, 
the situation has become more tense as a re- 
sult of a number of activities. 

As you all know, the Ethiopians have 
asked us to withdraw a number of our 
people and from a number of facilities, 
which we have done. We had previously in- 
dicated to the Ethiopians that we had 
already decided that we were going to close 
down our communications facility in As- 
mara and, at the same time, to reduce our 
military assistance mission in Ethiopia. 

We have kept in close touch with others in 
the area, including the other countries in the 
Horn of Africa, and with others who are in- 

May 23, 1977 


terested in the situation which is developing 
in the Horn of Africa. 

Everybody, of course, will be watching to 
see what happens in the elections which will 
be taking place in the Territory of Afars and 
Issas, which is coming up very soon — that's 
Djibouti — and we are prepared to send a 
consul general there immediately after the 
elections are held, should the decision be 
that it's going to become independent at 
that time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we talk a little bit 
about the European summit? We haven't 
mentioned it yet. This is the first summit, 
after all, of this Administration. What are 
the expectations generally? And 
specifically, do you feel that you will be able 
to smooth over some of the differences that 
have developed, particularly with West 

Secretary Vance: I think one of the main 
benefits that we hope will come out of the 
summit will be the opportunity for the heads 
of state to establish a close working 
relationship, a close personal working rela- 
tionship, between each other; and this will 
be possible not only in the full discussions 
but in bilateral discussions that the heads of 
state will be able to have between them. 

Insofar as the substantive items are con- 
cerned, as you know, the objective is to see 
whether or not we can develop a common 
perspective on the global economic situation 
so that the individual countries can better 
develop their domestic economic plans and 
policies within the framework of a generally 
agreed analysis, an evaluation, of the overall 
global economic situation as we see it during 
the next year or two. 

Secondly, we would hope that there would 
come out of it support for an augmentation 
of the resources of the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund]. 

Thirdly, we would hope that we would get 
agreement with respect to a joint intent 
among the parties to resist protectionist 
pressures and to expand trade. 

We would hope also that there would be a 
general agreement with respect to the steps 
which should be taken by all of us to im- 
prove the global balance between energy 

supply and demand, and we hope also that 
we can reach agreement with respect to set- 
ting up a follow-on study to evaluate the 
fuel cycle. And this would permit one then 
to see what the alternatives for the long run 
may be in terms of the fuel cycle and how 
one might proceed to try out these alterna- 
tives, while at the same time assuring a 
supply of fuel through international means 
to all of the countries concerned. 

And finally, we hope to reach agreement 
on a common approach to the upcoming dis- 
cussions which will take place in Paris at the 
end of May — the North-South dialogue — and 
as a result of that to more effectively help 
the developing countries. 

King Hussein of Jordan 
Visits Washington 

His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an of- 
ficial visit to Washington April 24-27, dur- 
ing which he met with President Carter and 
other government officials. Following is an 
exchange of toasts between President Carter 
and King Hussein at a dinner at the White 
House on April 25, together with President 
Carter's remarks to reporters following his 
meeting with King Hussein at the White 
House o)i April 26. ' 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 2 


President Carter 

The first thing I want to do tonight is to 
welcome all of you to the White House to 
join with me in expressing our appreciation 
to a courageous man who's come to visit our 
country again. 

This is his silver jubilee year. He's been 
in office now 25 years. And as I said this 

1 For an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and King Hussein at a welcoming ceremony at 
the White House on Apr. 25, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated May 2, 1977, p. 598. 


Department of State Bulletin 

morning when we had the welcoming- 
ceremony, he has been here to visit fre- 
quently; the first time, I believe, 18 years 

On this trip he is going to be traveling 
around the country. He is going down to one 
of the better parts of our nation, Atlanta, 
and then further south, a little too far south, 
perhaps, to Orlando. He's going to bring his 
young children over to join him and enjoy 
our beautiful country. 

For a number of years we've enjoyed his 
friendship, and the close interrelationship 
that has existed between Jordan and the 
United States has been a great stabilizing 
force in the Middle East. In spite of the dis- 
harmonies that have existed there now for 
29 years, there never has been a threat to 
the close cooperation and communication and 
friendship between Jordan and our country. 
And we are very delighted to have tonight 
the leader of that country come to see us. 

We had a very fruitful discussion today 
about past history — which I have just de- 
scribed briefly — and the future. We 
recognize the difficulty of resolving the his- 
torical animosities that have existed in the 
Middle Eastern region. But I think there is 
almost a unanimous belief among the leaders 
with whom I've discussed this subject that 
1977 can be a propitious year for major 
strides toward permanent peace. 

We are blessed with a deep awareness of 
the devastation of previous wars. There is a 
widespread sense of waste and frustration in 
spending so much of a country's resources 
on weapons when economic progress and 
better health care and education needs cry 
out to be met. And when Secretary Vance 
visited all the leaders in the Middle Eastern 
region, a unanimous statement was: "We 
wish that we could stop spending so much on 
the weapons of war." 

I think there is also a sense of hope in the 
character of the leaders this year. We are 
blessed with a sense of moderation and an 
inclination toward peace. 

And I think the last thing I'd like to men- 
tion is that all of us feel that because of 
these circumstances that an extraordinary 
effort is worthwhile during 1977. And unless 
we make some substantive progress toward 

resolving the historical differences, it may 
be a long time in the future before we can 
mount such an effort again. 

By the end of May, I will have met with 
all the leaders of the countries involved and 
will have listened to their thoughts, their 
hopes, and their dreams and their plans for 

I think there is a general sense that the 
countries there trust our nation, at least 
more than any other nation is trusted. And 
it puts a tremendous responsibility on me 
and the Vice President, the Secretary of 
State, and others not to betray that trust, 
to be fair and open and honest in our own 
discussions with the leaders who have hon- 
ored us by coming to our nation to visit. 

I don't know whether or not we will be 
successful this year. That's a very difficult 
thing to predict. But I believe that one of 
the great potential benefits that we can 
observe and use is the courage and sound 
judgment and experience and the seniority 
and a sensitivity and, I think I can say accu- 
rately, the unselfishness of King Hussein of 

He's a natural leader. He's quiet-spoken 
but firm. He's honest and courageous. He's 
our friend, and he's a good adviser and 
instructor for me, a new President, as I join 
with many of you around this table in 
searching for some opportunities to resolve 
differences that have divided peace-loving 
people too long. 

So I'd like to propose a toast now to a 
courageous King, to the people of Jordan, to 
King Hussein. Welcome to our country, sir. 

King Hussein 

Mr. President, my dear friends: It's a 
privilege and an honor for me to be here, to 
have this wonderfulopportunity to meet 
with you, sir, and to meet with friends once 
again, to bring you the sincerest wishes of 
the people of Jordan for every success not 
only in leading the people of this great 
nation, but in fulfilling the aspirations and 
hopes of so many throughout the world. 

I thank you, Mr. President, for the op- 
portunity you gave me today to speak to you 
frankly and to hear your views on many of 

May 23, 1977 


the problems that beset the part of the 
world from which I come. 

I can only say that despite the feeling that I 
have had which has caused me to be cau- 
tious in regard to the possibilities of real, 
genuine progress toward a solution to the 
Middle East problems, I have, as a result of 
meeting you, sir, and our friends today, felt 
more encouraged and more hopeful than I 
have for a very long time. 

To me, sir, humility is one of the most 
important qualities in this world and in life 
and one of the greatest signs of greatness. 
Your humility, your genuine interests in 
problems of others, your courage and your 
vision, your desire to know the truth, are all 
most encouraging to me and to those who 
have come with me from Jordan. 

I am sure this feeling is shared by others 
who have had the privilege of meeting you, 
and I am sure that many others will share 
with us these feelings. 

Twenty-five years have been short and 
long at the same time. Whatever remains, 
God willing, I will dedicate to one and one 
objective only: to do all I can that the future 
generations enjoy a better life than that 
which they would have had to live. 

My greatest hope and dream is to feel that 
in some way I may, in what remains of life, 
contribute toward a just, a lasting peace, 
one which would enable all the people in our 
area to divert their energies and resources 
to build and attain a brighter future with 
stability that is their right. I pledge to you, 
sir, that I will do all that I can to work very 
closely with you toward that end. 

Our faith in you is great, our pride and 
our friendship, and the pride in the fact that 
the same ideals are upheld by us, the same 
objectives are dear to us, and we share the 
same hopes for a better future. 

I wish you every success. I will pray for 
you, and you can rest assured of our genuine 
desire to do all we can for us to arrive at 
our common objectives. 

I thank you for your courtesy and your 
kindness and the warmth of your feelings. I 
treasure our friendship. 

Gentlemen, I'd like you to join me in 
drinking a toast to the President of the 
United States. 


Q. How did it go, Mr. President? 

The President: Just fine. It was one of the 
most productive and enjoyable visits we 
have had. 

Q. Mr. President, could you clarify a 
point? On the participation of the 
Palestinians and the possible participation 
in a Jordanian delegation, do you mean 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] 
representatives or Palestinians who are not 
part of the PLO? 

The President: Well, it's too early to start 
spelling out specifics about that. The one 
thing I might add, on which all the leaders 
seem to agree, is that the more agreement 
that we can reach before going to Geneva, 
the less argument there is going to be about 
the form of the Palestinian representation. 

And I think unless we see some strong 
possibility for substantial achievements be- 
fore a Geneva conference can be convened, 
unless we see that prospect, then I think it 
would be better not to have the Geneva con- 
ference at all. 

So far, though, I have been encouraged. I 
think it would be a mistake to expect too 
much. The differences are very wide and 
longstanding and deep. But I found a strong 
desire among all the leaders with whom I 
met so far to marshal extraordinary efforts 
during this year because of the moderate 
leadership that exists in the Middle East 
and because of the experiences that have 
been so devastating in the past. So we 
are all determined to do the best we can 
in 77. 

I think that the exact composition of the 
delegations, involving the Palestinians, of 
course, and the interrelationships that exist 
among the Arab nations — whether part of 
the discussions would be done as a group 
and part of them on a bilateral basis, those 
kinds of things have to be worked out. 

After I've finished meeting all the leaders 
in May, a strong likelihood is that we would 
consolidate our own analysis of the remain- 
ing problems and possible answers to 
questions, and then Secretary Vance would 
go back to the Middle East for another com- 


Department of State Bulletin 

plete round of talks with the leaders in- 

Those are our present plans, and so far 
the leaders in the Middle East have agreed 
with that. 

Q. May I follow that up, Mr. President!' 

The President: I think that is probably 
about all I need to say. 

Q. But you do see)» more pessimistic than 
before Hussein came. 

The President: No, I am not more pes- 
simistic. I think it would just be a mistake 
for us to be overly optimistic. To raise ex- 
pectations too high would be — I think would 
be potentially very damaging. I think after 
May, though, we'll have a much clearer con- 
cept of what can be done. 

Q. Did you learn anything new from 

The President: Yes, I did. He is a very 
good instructor, and I am a very eager stu- 

U.S., France Hold Annual Meeting 
of Cooperative Science Program 

Joint Statement 

Press release 203 dated May 5 

The Annual Review Meeting of the U.S.- 
France Cooperative Science Program was 
held in Washington, D.C., May 2, 1977. The 
purpose of the meeting was to underline the 
accomplishments of the ongoing bilateral 
programs in science and technology as well 
as to explore possibilities for expansion of 
the program in areas of mutual interest to 
both countries. 

Dr. Edward E. David, former Presidential 
Science Adviser, and U.S. Coordinator of 
the U.S. -France Cooperative Science 
Program, headed the U.S. delegation. The 

French Coordinators, Professor Bernard 
Gregory, Director of the General Delegation 
for Scientific and Technological Research 
(DGRST), and Xavier de Nazelle, Director 
for Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, led the French delegation. They 
were accompanied by Charles Maisonnier, 
Counselor for Foreign Affairs, Science 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and 
Philippe Peltier, Director, Division of 
Foreign Relations, DGRST. 

As a part of the review, reports on the 
status of cooperative activities were given 
by representatives from the Department of 
Agriculture, the National Bureau of 
Standards, National Oceanic and Atmos- 
pheric Administration, Energy Research 
and Development Administration, Health, 
Education and Welfare, National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, National Science 
Foundation, and the Department of Transpor- 

In addition, meetings were held with Dr. 
Frank Press, Presidential Science Adviser, 
and Mrs. Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Oceans and International En- 
vironmental and Scientific Affairs. Visits 
were also made to the National Science 
Foundation, National Bureau of Standards, 
Energy Research and Development Admin- 
istration, and the House of Representatives. 

The delegations agreed to work toward 
furthering cooperation between the two 
countries in the fields of alternative energy 
sources, energy conservation, toxicol- 
ogy, and agricultural research and food 

The U.S. -France Program was established 
in 1969 by agreement between the French 
Minister for Industrial and Scientific De- 
velopment and the President's Science Ad- 
viser. Collaborative programs in such fields 
as agriculture, oceanography, space, 
environment, transportation, basic and 
applied sciences, and health involve over 15 
agencies of the United States Government. 

May 23, 1977 



Administration Gives Views on Proposed Legislation 
on Deep Seabed Mining 

Following is a statement by Ambassador 

at Large Elliot L. Richardson, Special Rep- 
resentative of the President for the Lair of 
the Sea Conference, made before the 
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the 
House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries o« April 27. i 

Mr. Chairman [Representative John B. 
Breaux]: I am very pleased to have this op- 
portunity once again to address this commit- 
tee. I welcome your interest and concern 
regarding the Law of the Sea Conference, 
the purpose of which is to insure the orderly 
use and development of the oceans, which 
contribute so much to our security and eco- 
nomic, scientific, and environmental 
well-being. An internationally agreed 
framework which would accommodate the 
many different national interests in the 
oceans would, as this committee has many 
times acknowledged, be of great benefit. It 
is the purpose of the Law of the Sea Confer- 
ence, to which I head the U.S. delegation, 
to achieve such an agreement. 

At the same time, I recognize your con- 
cern over the slow pace with which the 
negotiations in the Law of the Sea Confer- 
ence have progressed with regard to 
providing a framework for mining of the 
deep seabed which lies beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. In particular, I can 
understand your concern, as evidenced in 
H.R. 3350, that U.S. nationals who have 
pioneered development of deep seabed tech- 
nology may be held up in moving forward to 

1 The complete transcript (if the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 2(1402. 

prove the technology and then, hopefully, to 
provide the world with additional sources of 
the minerals concerned. Our job, the Con- 
gress and the Administration together, is to 
find a way in which this can best be done. 

Since the question of legislation, and 
therefore H.R. 3350, about which I will 
comment in a moment, is intimately tied to 
progress at the Law of the Sea Conference, 
I would like first to outline briefly where I 
think we are. I will not, before this knowl- 
edgeable subcommittee, go into a lengthy 
history of the negotiations but will comment 
only on developments since the summer of 
1976 session. 

As you know, that session did not go well, 
with the seabed proving to be the major 
sticking point. Since the Carter Administra- 
tion took office and I was privileged to be 
named as the President's Special Represent- 
ative for Law of the Sea, we have 
undertaken an intensive review of our posi- 
tions and the problems facing the confer- 
ence. We have also conducted an extensive 
series of bilateral and multilateral 
consultations. These include the interses- 
sional consultations under Minister Evensen 
[Jens Evensen, of Norway, a Vice Chairman 
of the Law of the Sea Conference] which 
you, Mr. Chairman, attended and with re- 
spect to which I briefed the full committee 
March 17. 

In addition, I have made an extensive trip 
to the Far East, talking to leaders in Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Austra- 
lia. I have also visited Mexico and Canada 
and will this evening depart for a series of 
discussions in France, Saudi Arabia, India, 
the U.S.S.R., Norway, and the United 
Kingdom. Richard Darman and J. T. Smith, 


Department of State Bulletin 

my deputies, have also traveled widely, 
going first to Africa, where they visited 
Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, 
and Egypt, and Latin America, where they 
visited Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and 

I will not tell you that as a result we "see 
light at the end of the tunnel." But I can say 
that we believe we can see the outline of a 
solution which could accommodate the di- 
verse interests of conference participants. 
Whether or not we can strike a bargain 
along these or other lines is impossible now 
to predict and will depend in large measure 
on factors over which we have no control 
and limited influence. Paramount among 
these will be group dynamics within the 
Group of 77, which, as you know, is the 
developing-country caucus at the confer- 

But I am encouraged, Mr. Chairman, by 
what I have seen to date, and I hope to be 
able to return to this subcommittee and 
other congressional bodies and announce 
substantial progress toward a com- 
prehensive treaty covering the whole 
range of outstanding oceans issues. Such a 
treaty — establishing an ordered, agreed re- 
gime for 70 percent of the surface of the 
globe — would be a truly historic accom- 
plishment. It would prove by its very exist- 
ence that the nations of the world could in 
fact come together and in a spirit of mutual 
accommodation overcome their differences 
for the benefit of mankind. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States seeks a 
number of important objectives at the Law 
of the Sea Conference. We seek to: 

— Provide a framework of law within 
which competing oceans uses can be accom- 

— Preserve high seas freedoms, including 
navigation and similar uses, in the 200-mile 
economic zone; 

— Insure unimpeded passage through and 
over straits; 

— Maintain maximum freedom of scientific- 

— Provide a framework for protecting the 
marine environment; 

— Establish a comprehensive dispute- 
settlement mechanism; and 

— Establish a regime for mining the deep 

Mr. Chairman, it is because of the impor- 
tance of all of these objectives, particularly 
our security and international objectives, 
that we reaffirm our intention to seek 
agreement on a comprehensive treaty which 
protects our interests. As I have indicated, 
I believe this is a realistic objective. We do 
not, therefore, support legislation now. Pas- 
sage of legislation now, or indeed even Ad- 
ministration support for legislation, could 
disrupt the May-July conference session and 
jeopardize the prospect for progress at that 
session. We will be reviewing the overall 
question of our position on the enactment of 
legislation once again after that session. 

On the other hand, we must recognize 
that international agreement may not be ob- 
tained in the near future, in which event the 
United States must consider legislation. It 
is in that spirit that I offer the Administra- 
tion's preliminary views on the substantive 
provisions of H.R. 3350. 

H.R. 3350 or any other legislation must be 
judged with respect to its probable effect on 
the conference as well as its intrinsic merits 
as a vehicle to permit U.S. companies and 
U.S. -led consortia to mine the seabed. I 
believe Secretary [of Commerce Juanita M.] 
Kreps and others will be testifying in detail 
on the substance of seabed legislation, so I 
shall confine myself to a brief summary at 
this point. 

We believe there are certain basic ele- 
ments which should be provided for in any 
legislation. Many of these elements are 
present in H.R. 3350: 

— It is interim; that is, it would be super- 
seded by a comprehensive treaty; 

— Implicitly, it reaffirms our legal position 
that mining the deep seabed beyond the lim- 
its of national jurisdiction is a high seas 

— It provides that U.S. operators must 
pay reasonable regard to other marine ac- 

May 23, 1977 


— It provides for environmental and safety 

— It provides for duty-free entry of hard 
minerals recovered from the deep seabed; 

— It provides for harmonizing these 
requirements with those of other nations 
enacting similar legislation. 

The Administration also agrees with the 
concept embodied in H.R. 3350 that 
legislation, when enacted, should cover both 
prototype and commercial mining opera- 
tions. It appears that in the next year or 
two the mining consortia will be committing 
major sums to pilot programs in anticipation 
of commercial operations. In order to make 
these commitments, the companies must 
know, at least generally, what legal frame- 
work will govern their future operations. 

We believe, however, that authorizing the 
administering agency to issue at the outset 
the necessary rules and regulations to per- 
mit the companies to proceed with exploita- 
tion, as opposed to exploration, is prema- 
ture. Industry will not need to move 
forward with actual exploitation until the 
early eighties. This approach will provide 
regulations for exploration and a degree of 
certainty to permit companies to move 
forward toward exploitation without forcing 
the administering agency to promulgate 
exploitation regulations without an adequate 
data base. We thus believe it would be 
preferable to defer issuance of exploitation 

H.R. 3350 provides that any license shall 
be exclusive as against any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States or of 
any reciprocating state within a specified 
block. We believe there is an alternative ap- 
proach which would better serve our foreign 
policy, economic, and national security 
interests and still give the sort of assurance 
required by the miners and their banks. 
Permits to mine could be issued without 
regard to any specific mining site or block. 
But the legislation could provide that in 
regulating deep seabed mining the adminis- 
tering agency would set out specific criteria 
under which authorization to mine would be 

issued in accordance with sound resource- 
management and environmental principles. 

Under such an approach, prior to 
receiving a permit to mine — which would not 
be tied to a particular area — the applicant 
would be required to submit a plan of work 
which would include a description of the 
area to be mined. The permit, when issued, 
would limit the applicant's activities to the 
plan of work. Thus the legislation would not 
grant exclusive rights; yet it would at the 
same time be likely that the administering 
agency would, in applying sound resource- 
management and environmental principles, 
avoid conflicting mining operations, should 
the problem arise. Thus we believe that this 
system would reasonably accommodate the 
needs of the miners and their creditors and 
avoid the appearance of carving up the 
common heritage of mankind. 

On another issue, Mr. Chairman, the Ad- 
ministration shares with you and the other 
drafters of H.R. 3350 the desire to protect 
companies which begin mining operations 
prior to the entry into force of a comprehen- 
sive law of the sea treaty against any ad- 
verse effects of such a treaty. We would 
approach the problem somewhat differently, 

H.R. 3350 provides for compensation by 
the U.S. Government for any loss suffered 
in commercial operations as a result of the 
entry into force of a treaty. We believe this 
provision is unnecessary, potentially expen- 
sive (up to $2 billion in 1975 dollars), and 
potentially harmful to the negotiations. I be- 
lieve, in the interest of obtaining a treaty 
that protects our varied interests, our 
negotiators must have the flexibility to 
choose among a wide number of approaches 
that would, in different ways, protect our 
interests. Legislation providing for a U.S. 
Government obligation to compensate for 
any losses caused by a treaty could force our 
negotiators to assure that the treaty would 
conform to U.S. legislation. 

The alternative favored by the 
Administration would be to reaffirm that 
U.S. miners now have the right to mine the 
deep seabed under high seas principles and 


Department of State Bulletin 

therefore reaffirm our intention to seek 
provisions in the treaty which will insure 
that the integrity of prior investments in 
commercial mining operations will be pro- 
tected. Specifically, we will seek special 
grandfather protection for investments al- 
ready made. While difficult, I believe this is 
reasonable and can be done if we stress that 
it is investment and preparation for mining 
an area — rather than a specific claim — for 
which protection is sought. 

Mr. Chairman, the Administration also 
shares your concern that the benefits of 
deep seabed mining accrue to the United 
States to the maximum extent possible. 
However, H.R. 3350 approaches this prob- 
lem by providing that licenses will only be 
issued if the minerals recovered, to the ex- 
tent of the proportionate interest therein of 
all U.S. entities, are processed in the 
United States. The Administration considers 
this provision unnecessary since, initially at 
least, it is likely that our share, and proba- 
bly more, of the processing will take place in 
the United States anyway. More 
importantly, however, we consider such a 
provision to be potentially harmful since it 
will certainly irritate foreign countries 
whose nationals are participating in U.S. -led 
mining consortia. We believe, therefore, 
that the provision should simply be dropped. 
We are still studying the question of 
whether a requirement should be provided 
regarding use of U.S. -flag and/or U.S. -built 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to in- 
dicate the Administration's interest in 
having U.S. legislation provide for benefits 
for the international community. Such provi- 
sions would emphasize by our action, not 
only our words, that we are fully committed 
to the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind. It would also anticipate any future 
treaty, which will surely provide for certain 
international benefits. Such provisions could 
help mitigate any adverse international con- 
sequences by providing some inducement to 
developing countries to agree to a treaty. 

Benefits to the international community 
could take a variety of forms. An escrow ar- 

rangement could be established for collect- 
ing moneys for the benefit of developing 
countries. Mine sites, or portions of sites, 
could be reserved for the future use of the 
world community, or there could be provi- 
sions for the training of nationals of develop- 
ing countries. It is not necessary to decide 
now just what form such benefits should 
take. As the time for enactment of legisla- 
tion draws nearer, there will be time to 
work out specific proposals. But I believe it 
would be useful to agree to the principle 
from the outset. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by 
emphasizing the importance I attach to the 
closest cooperation between our negotiators 
and the Congress. Since I became the Presi- 
dent's Special Representative two months 
ago I have appeared five times before 
congressional committees and have had in- 
numerable private contacts. Members of my 
staff are in virtually daily contact with the 
staffs of various Members of Congress. 
Some of you and members of your staff par- 
ticipated in the deliberations of the Adviso- 
ry Committee earlier today and yesterday. 
You, Mr. Chairman, took the time to come 
to our meeting in Geneva and will, I trust, 
with others of your colleagues, be with us in 
New York. 

I consider this ongoing exchange 
absolutely essential to the success of my 
mandate — to negotiate a comprehensive 
treaty on the law of the sea which will protect 
and further not only our own interests but the 
interests of all mankind. For, while there are 
some interests in conflict at the conference, all 
participants share a common interest in pro- 
viding a rational regime for all uses of the 

A phrase President Kennedy was fond of 
using is particularly apt here: "A rising tide 
lifts all the boats." Our task, that of the 
Administration and the Congress, working 
together and with the leadership of the rest 
of the world, is to provide a framework to 
insure that the oceans will be managed to 
provide an ever-rising tide — hopefully, un- 
disturbed by conflicts — of benefits for all our 

Moy 23, 1977 


Department Discusses Proposal 
for Zimbabwe Development Fund 

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr. 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

I am delighted to testify today before the 
Senate Subcommittees on African Affairs 
and on Foreign Assistance in support of the 
President's request for funds to support the 
search for a peaceful resolution to the 
Rhodesian problem. 

This is a momentous occasion, one which 
is underlined by the gravity of the situation 
in Rhodesia. Today the balance is delicately 
poised between the forces of violence and 
those seeking to demonstrate that mankind 
has the capacity to bind up its wounds and 
to live together in peace and harmony. Only 
too rarely do we have the opportunity to 
move the forces of history into paths that 
demonstrate that men of all races and 
political persuasions can share common goals 
of human growth and friendly association. 
This occasion and this opportunity exists to- 

Gentlemen, I do not wish to minimize the 
complexities of the Rhodesian problem. Nor 
do I intend to minimize the many forces and 
difficult obstacles that must be overcome if 
we are to produce the type of multiracial so- 
lution that will bring peace to southern Af- 
rica. As one who has been intimately in- 
volved in the search for peace for the past 
year or more, I can testify amply to that. 
However, I also must point out the conse- 
quences that will follow if the United States 
proves unwilling to make its resources 
available to the processes of peaceful change 
and economic growth in Rhodesia. 

This Administration has made clear that it 
strongly supports the protection and 

1 Made before the Subcommittees on African Affairs 
and Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on Apr. 28. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

enhancement of basic human rights through- 
out the world. We are convinced that this 
principle must find expression in our foreign 
policy, including our foreign assistance, as 
current legislation indeed requires. We have 
already announced reductions, related to 
human rights, in assistance to three coun- 
tries. It behooves us, I firmly believe, to 
provide economic assistance where such as- 
sistance can tilt the balance in favor of 
human rights. Such is the case in Rhodesia, 
and much of Africa is watching to see if we 
have the capacity and the will to promote 
peaceful change in what could become one of 
the most turbulent regions of the world. 

With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I 
will review the current status of the Rhode- 
sian crisis. As the Senators know, violence 
has been spreading in that territory since its 
white minority declared, illegally, its 
independence from British rule in 1965. This 
action earned the Smith government the 
condemnation of the international communi- 
ty, and the United Nations, for its part, 
called for sanctions against this illegal re- 
gime. Three successive Administrations 
have endorsed actions taken by the interna- 
tional community to end the illegal status of 
the breakaway regime. In April 1976, with 
bipartisan support from the Congress, we 
visited southern Africa and launched a cam- 
paign to bring the principals involved in the 
Rhodesian dispute to the conference table. 

Despite the setback at Geneva, we remain 
committed to the search for a peaceful set- 
tlement. We will redouble our efforts 
toward that goal. We are prepared to bring 
to bear the influence and prestige of the 
United States in an attempt to foster a suc- 
cessful outcome of a second Rhodesia 
conference which the British Government 
has suggested convening. We are, if called 
upon to do so by the principal participants, 
willing to cosponsor the conference and 
act as an honest broker during its delibera- 

We are aware that the price of failure to 
negotiate a settlement will continue to be 
paid by the people of Rhodesia and its 
neighboring states in the currency of human 


Department of State Bulletin 

suffering. Further, continued violence will 
| spread instability and promote the possibil- 
ity of foreign intervention in the region. 
Such a denouement would throw into doubt 
prospects for accommodation between 
peoples of different races in Africa and could 
compromise efforts to establish confidence in 
relations between our government and that 
of the Soviet Union. 

We are consulting closely with British 
Foreign Secretary David Owen, who has 
recently returned from his mission to south- 
ern Africa. The Foreign Secretary reports 
that he was encouraged in his efforts to rec- 
oncile competing and conflicting forces in 
Rhodesia. His starting point has been the 
acceptance by Prime Minister Smith, in Sep- 
tember 1976, of the goal of majority rule for 
Africans within two years. Mr. Owen's 
principal objectives at this point are to es- 
tablish agreement that majority rule will 
come in 1978 and, through the proposed con- 
ference, to prepare a constitution which 
protects basic human rights and defines a 
democratic process for the transition to in- 
dependence. We hope that an independent 
Zimbabwe will be multiracial, will reflect a 
commitment to political and economic 
growth, and will demonstrate that modera- 
tion offers greater hope for the future than 
the forces of division and violence. 

In order to insure that the journey of 
Rhodesia to political stability and independ- 
ence has a reasonable prospect of success, 
the United States, in concert with the 
United Kingdom, has agreed to establish a 
special economic consortium — the Zimbabwe 
Development Fund. I cannot stress too 
strongly the essential element of trust which 
is embodied in the Fund. It represents an 
unprecedented international economic com- 
mitment in support of a Rhodesian settle- 

I wish to assure you at this juncture that 
the Fund is not a buy-out for whites who 
wish to leave Rhodesia. The central focus on 
the Fund is on economic and social 
development. Congressional support for the 
Fund would demonstrate to Africans and po- 
tential donors that the United States can be 

counted on to cooperate in a constructive 
manner in working for peaceful change in 
southern Africa. The Fund would encourage 
blacks and whites to work together for the 
future development of Zimbabwe and thus 
demonstrate that multiracialism is a viable 
option in southern Africa. I have no doubt 
that the Fund may well be an important fac- 
tor in the negotiating process and will 
contribute to promoting peace and progress 
in southern Africa. 

As to the nature of the Fund itself, our 
expectation is that we would be in a position 
to utilize it to insure a constructive transi- 
tion during the initial period of majority 
rule. The Fund would respond to requests 
from the Zimbabwe Government to support 
specific development projects and programs. 
We envisage, for example, substantial as- 
sistance requirements in agricultural and 
land reform, education and training, social 
and economic infrastructure. In brief, the 
Fund would represent an investment in 
Zimbabwe's human resources and a contri- 
bution to its future development. 

I recognize that you would like to have 
full particulars on the nature and scope of 
specific projects to be financed by the Fund. 
At present, we can only provide the broad 
outlines of the kind of projects which may be 
proposed by the new government. We know 
that the rural sector will require greatly ex- 
panded agricultural extension services for 
Africans, road construction, land reform, 
and resettlement for large numbers of Afri- 
cans. Large investments will also have to be 
made in training Africans to assume 
positions as managers, educators, planners, 
and directors of the many activities which 
independence bestows upon a hard-pressed 
people. In the fields of trade, finance, and 
development, large-scale support also will 
be required. Beyond these generalized 
guidelines, we will have to learn as we pro- 
ceed. However, I can assure you that we 
plan to keep the Congress fully apprised of 
the projects and programs supported by the 

The anatomy and financial underpinnings 
of the Fund are not as difficult to define. 

May 23, 1977 


Last December, the U.S. Government and 
the United Kingdom approached 18 nations 
to support a Zimbabwe economic program. 
Support is to be provided along the follow- 
ing lines: 

— Initial contributions of a minimum on 
the order of $1 billion and, at a maximum, 
approximately $U/2 billion. 

— The United States would contribute 40 
percent, or up to a maximum of $520 million. 

— It is envisaged that contributions to the 
Fund would be over a five-year period. 

— Flows of bilateral concessional aid could 
be counted as part of each nation's contribu- 
tion, but for the five-year period we assume 
that the majority of each contributor's as- 
sistance would be a direct contribution to 
the Fund. 

Thus far, initial responses to our appeal 
for support have been encouraging. If 
adequate progress is made in the political 
sphere, we would plan to organize a donors' 
conference. The purposes of such a 
conference would be to formalize pledges 
and to draft articles of agreement for the 

I wish to point out, gentlemen, that our 
own position has been put forth subject to 
the approval of Congress. Accordingly, 
favorable action by the Senate and the 
House of Representatives will make it 
possible to proceed with our plans for the 

Clearly, failure on the part of Congress to 
extend its support would be a serious 
setback to the Administration's efforts to 
work for a peaceful settlement of the 
Rhodesian problem. I firmly believe that we 
are at a critical turning point in our effort to 
restart the negotiating process and that a 
strong signal from the Congress is essential 
now. Without rapid progress toward settle- 
ment, we confront the prospect of chaos in 
southern Africa. Soviet President Podgor- 
ny's recent visit to the region and his 
pledges of arms aid are ample testimony to 
his government's commitment to a violent 
outcome. We now require a constructive 

alternative — one which the Congress of the 
United States can make credible in the test- 
ing weeks and months ahead. 

Gentlemen, we urge and welcome your 
support as we pursue the path of peace in 
southern Africa. With it we can accomplish 
much; without it, constructive action would 
be difficult, if not impossible. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Multinational Oil Companies and OPEC: Implications 
for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee. June 
2-8, 1976. 337 pp. 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu- 
tion From Ships, With Annexes and Protocols. Mes- 
sage from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting the convention. S. Ex. E. March 22, 1977. 
108 pp. 

United States Military Installations and Objectives in 
the Mediterranean. Report prepared for the Sub- 
committee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on International Relations by the 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Con- 
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
March 27, 1977. 95 pp. 

Urging the Canadian Government To Reassess Its Pol- 
icy of Permitting the Killing of Newborn Baby Harp 
Seals. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations to accompany H. Con. Res. 142. S. Rept. 
95-71. March 29, 1977. 10 pp. 

NATO Standardization: Political, Economic, and Mili- 
tary Issues for Congress. Report to the House 
Committee on International Relations by the 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Con- 
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
March 29, 1977. 58 pp. 

Protocol With Canada To Amend the Convention for 
the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the 
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River 
System, as Amended. Message from the President of 
the United States transmitting the protocol, signed 
at Washington on February 24, 1977. S. Ex. G. 
March 31, 1977. 4 pp. 

International Financial Institutions. Report of the 
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, together with minority, supplemental, addi- 
tional, and separate views, to accompany H.R. 5262. 
H. Rept. 95-154. March 31, 1977. 67 pp.' 

Report on the Activities of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, 94th Congress, First and Second 
Sessions. S. Rept. 95-85. April 5, 1977. 77 pp. 

Export Administration Amendments of 1977. Report of 
the House Committee on International Relations, to- 
gether with additional views, to accompany H.R. 
5840. H. Rept. 95-190. April 6, 1977. 58 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 

United States-Canadian Reciprocal Fisheries Agree- 
ment. Report of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, together with dissenting 
views, to accompany H.R. 5638. H. Rept. 95-193. 
April 7, 1977. 26 pp. 

Supplemental State Department Authorization for Fis- 
cal Year 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 5040. S. Rept. 
95-99. April 21, 1977. 13 pp. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 
1977. Report of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations to accompany H.R. 6179. H. Rept. 
95-219. April 25, 1977. 17 pp. 


Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (1FAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. ' 

Signatures: Iran, April 27, 1977: Ireland, Israel, 
April 28, 1977. 


Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 
1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United 
States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Extended by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, ef- 
fective April 21, 1977. 


Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 
4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Seychelles, April 25, 1977. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the 
convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires 
September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 
1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, May 3, 1977. 


International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 

Done at London December 3. 1975. Entered into 

force provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Extended by the United Kingdom to: Bailiwick of 

Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey, January 

21, 1977." 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 
1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Tanzania, April IN, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 62X5, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 
Enters n/to force: April 1, 197s. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. En- 
tered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Accession deposited: Mexico, April 27, 1977. 


Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condi- 
tion of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condi- 
tion of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members 
of armed forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prison- 
ers of war; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, December 10, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect 
to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 3, 1977. 



Convention for the prevention of smuggling intoxicat- 
ing liquors into the United States, and exchange of 
notes. Signed at Havana March 4, 1926. Entered into 
force June 18, 1926. 44 Stat. 2395. 
On April 27, 1977, the parties agreed that the con- 
vention had lapsed. 


Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975, 
as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399), concerning an inter- 
national observer scheme for whaling operations 
from land stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 27, 1977. 
Entered into force April 27, 1977. 

Not in force. 

May 23, 1977 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stork number 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. A 25- 
percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
iiipiis of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent oj 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be- 
low, which include domestic postage, <ice subject to 


Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran) Station at 
Keflavik, Iceland. Arrangement with Iceland. TIAS 
8429. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8429). 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribution by 
Japan. Agreement with Japan relating to the agree- 
ment of March 8, 1954. TIAS 8431. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8431). 

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with the 
World Meteorological Organization. TIAS 8437. 3 pp. 
350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8437). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Venezuela 
amending the agreement of August 14, 1953, as 
amended.' TIAS 8433. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8433). 

Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation 
Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. 

Agreement with Other Governments amending the 
agreement done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as 
amended. TIAS 8434. 1 p. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8434). 

Trade, Investment and Financial Matters. Joint 
communique with Brazil. TIAS 8435. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8435). 

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment. TIAS 8436. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8436). 

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with 
the Universal Postal Union. TIAS 8438. 2 pp. 350. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8438). 

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with 
the World Intellectual Property Organization. TIAS 
8439. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8439). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Civil 
Glider Aircraft. Agreement with the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Romania. TIAS 8440. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8440). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Socialist 
Republic of Romania extending the agreement of De- 
cember 4, 1973. TIAS 8441. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8441). 

Trade — Specialty Steel Imports. Agreement with 
Japan. TIAS 8442*. 28 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8442). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel 
amending the agreement of September 30, 1976, as 
amended. TIAS 8443. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8443). 

Claims of United States Nationals. Agreement with 
Egypt. TIAS 8446. 17 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8446). 

Visas for Correspondents. Agreement with the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8448. 3 pp. 350. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8448). 

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Aircraft to Curb Il- 
legal Production and Traffic. Agreement with 
Mexico. TIAS 8449. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8449). 

Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative Arrange- 
ments to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement with 
Mexico amending the agreements of August 9, 1976 
and February 4, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8451. 6 pp. 
350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8451). 

Social Security. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8452. 
5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8452). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 23, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1978 

Africa. Questions and Answers Following Secre- 
tary Vance's Address at the University of Geor- 
gia School of Law (Vance) 509 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

Questions and Answers Following Secretary 
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia 

School of Law (Vance ) .' 509 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks To Resume at 
Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement) 512 

China. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

May 4 513 


Administration Gives Views on Proposed Legisla- 
tion on Deep Seabed Mining (Richardson i 524 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Pol- 
icy 530 

rtment Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De- 
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 528 

Culm. Secretary Vance'- News Conference 

May 4 513 

Ethiopia. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
May 4 513 

Europe. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

May 4 '. 

Foreign Aid 

Department Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De- 
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 52!S 

Questions and Answers Following Secrel 
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia 
School of Law (Vance ) .' 509 

France. U.S., France Hold Annual Meeting of Co- 
operative Science Program (joint statement) . . . 523 

Human Rights 

Human Rights and Foreign Policy (Vance) 505 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513 

Jordan. King Hussein of ..Ionian Visits Washington 
(Carter, Hussein) 520 

Law of the Sea. Administration Gives Views on 
Proposed Legislation on Deep Seabed Mining 
(Richardson i 524 

Middle East. Secretary Vance's News Conference 
of May 4 .' 513 

Presidential Documents. King Hussein of Jordan 
Visits Washington 520 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 532 

Science and Technology. U.S., France Hold An- 
nual Meeting of Cooperative Science Program 
(joint statement) 523 

South Africa. Secretary Vance's News Confer- 
ence of May 4 .' 513 

Southern Rhodesia 

Department Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De- 
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 528 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 531 


tary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks To Resume at 
Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement) 512 


Questions and Answers Following Secretary 
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia 
School of Law (Vance) 509 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of May I ... 513 

Zaire. Secretary Vance's News C 

May I 513 

Name In 

Carter, President 520 

King Hussein I 520 

Richardson, Elliot L 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 528 

Vance, Secretary 505, 500, 513 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: May 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State. Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

194A 5/3 Vance: questions and answers follow- 
ing address at University of Geor- 
gia, Apr. 30. 

105 5/2 Overseas Schools Advisory Council, 

New York, June 1. 
MOO 5/2 Advisory Committee on International 

Intellectual Property, June 1. 
*197 5/2 Samuel W. Lewis sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Israel (biographic data). 

ION 5/3 Robert F. Goheen sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to India (biographic data). 
5/4 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
U.S. National Committee for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution, 
June 14. 

200 5/4 Six foreign officials begin 30-day 
study of local government and 
community leadership in U.S. 
+ 201 5/4 Vance: House Ad Hoc Committee on 

202 5/4 Vance: news conference. 

203 5/5 Meeting of U.S. -France Cooperative 

Science Program, May 2. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

us. government printing office 

washington, dc. 20402 



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\ 3 





Volume LXXVI • No. 1979 • May 30, 1977 

European Newspaper Journalists 533 
European Television Journalists 540 



Statement by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 558 



Statement by Ambassador Young 567 


For index see inside back cover 

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1979 
May 30, 1977 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by thi 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ot 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments ir, 
the field of U.S. foreign relations anc 
on the work of the Department anc 
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The BULLETIN includes selectee 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
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international relations are also listed. 

President Carter Interviewed by European Newspaper Journalists 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with President Carter by Fred Emery of the 
Times, London, Henri Pierre of Le Monde, 
Paris, H or st- Alexander Siebert of Die Welt, 
Bonn, and Vittorio Zucconi of La Stampa, 
Turin, held in the White House on April 25. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 9 

Mr. Emery: We tried to have a European 
unity parley here to get organized with ques- 
tions and order of sitting. It has proved im- 
possible. We are not going to unite. 

The President: We will make it informal. I 
am glad to have you here. I am looking for- 
ward to meeting with the leaders of your 
own countries when we go to Europe. I will 
defer to your questions. 

Mr. Emery: As I say, we have tried to 
prepare some things. Mr. President, you 
know that quite a few people in Europe are 
puzzled and some are refreshed by the way 
you are going about governing . How do you 
describe your first hundred days in office? 

The President: I have been pleased so far 
at the response of the American people to 
our Administration. I think we have at- 
tempted to address some very difficult 
questions which in the past have been either 
ignored or delayed. 

Last week I spent presenting our energy 
proposals to the American people. We have 
evolved and laid before the Soviet Govern- 
ment a comprehensive reduction proposal in 
nuclear armaments. We have begun to re- 
duce the effort to sell conventional arms 
around the world. We have spelled out a 
strong position, which has not been unani- 
mously accepted well, on nonproliferation of 
nuclear explosive capability. 

I have, I think, accurately mirrored the 

American people's beliefs on public espousal 
of human rights. We have begun to reor- 
ganize our own nation's government and to 
commence proposals which will ultimately 
transform our welfare system and our in- 
come tax structure. I have made some — 
sometimes controversial — decisions to 
prevent the raising of trade barriers and 
have had an almost unprecedented stream of 
distinguished visitors here from other coun- 
tries. This past week, four foreign leaders 
came to see me. 

So in all of these areas I think we have 
been fairly successful, either in beginning 
efforts or in some few accomplishments at 
this early time. The relationship between 
myself and the American people is very 
good now. 

Mr. Emery: May I interrupt to say — 

The President: Please. 

Mr. Emery: How about your relations 
with Congress — 

The President: That was the other clause 
in my sentence. 

Mr. Emery: — the business community 
and the unions? 

The President: I think the relationship 
with Congress has been steadily improving 
as we have gotten to know one another. The 
first time I was ever in the House of Repre- 
sentatives was Wednesday night when I 
made my speech. I had never visited there 
before. But I believe that within the Demo- 
cratic leadership now, there is a growing 
sense of mutual understanding and trust and 
consultation that has gotten to be a habit — 
and a good one. 

I think the business community has begun 
to recognize that my own background as a 
businessman will help to color the decisions 

May 30, 1977 


that I make about economics, and I think 
that I have a fairly good relationship with 
labor, as well. 

So in general, as a completely unbiased 
observer, I have been pleased. [Laughter.] 

We have got a long way to go. I have a lot 
to learn. And we are studying how to 
restore normal relationships with govern- 
ments where those relations have been 
strained in the past. We are exploring some 
possibilities for the resolution of the historic 
conflict in the Middle East. We are trying to 
work closely with Great Britain's leaders in 
describing a proper role for us in southern 
Africa. And I think we have got a possibility 
at the meetings in London to more strongly 
establish my personal friendship and under- 
standing with the European leaders as well. 
So I feel good about the Administration so 

Mr. Pierre: Ca7i I ask you a general ques- 
tion about Europe? Since you took office, we 
have the feeling in Europe that the 
relationship between the United States and 
Europe are now getting the same priority as 
the American-Soviet relationship. What is 
your general approach regarding Europe 
and, more precisely, regarding the Euro- 
pean Community? Some of your predeces- 
sors, we feel, seemed to fear that a united 
Europe, if it comes to be, might be a 
competitor, might be going against the polit- 
ical and economic American interests. Do 
you share those fears? 

The President: No. I think within 100 
hours of my becoming President, the Vice 
President had begun consultations with the 
leaders of many nations in Europe. I have 
already met with Prime Minister Callaghan 
[James Callaghan, of the United Kingdom], 
with the leaders of Portugal, with the Euro- 
pean Community, NATO. I will meet with 
the other leaders within the next two 
weeks. And this will likely be the only trip I 
shall take outside our country this year. I 
have no other plans at this time. 

I think all these items describe my deep 
concern about good relationships with 
Europe. I see no way that we can have a 
successful resolution of East-West problems 

without the full comprehension, un- 
derstanding, participation with our allies 
and friends in Europe. 

We have, in addition to that, demon- 
strated, I think, in my own budget proposals 
to the Congress, an increasing emphasis on 
military capability within NATO. And I in- 
tend to stay over after the conference with 
the heads of state, to meet with the NATO 
leaders as well. 

The people of our country, regardless of 
who happens to be President, have a natural 
sense that our historical ties and our future 
are intimately related with the European 

The other part of your question is that I 
strongly favor, perhaps more than my 
predecessors, a close interrelationship 
among the nations of Europe, the European 
Community, in particular. 

We have a legitimate reticence about 
trying to interfere, but I will do everything 
I can within the bounds of propriety to 
strengthen those natural ties — economically, 
politically, militarily — that do exist now 
among the countries of Europe and to 
strengthen them in the future. And when 
the nations involved consider it appropriate, 
I would certainly welcome the absorption 
within the European Community of Portugal 
and Spain. 

So I think that already I have both come 
to realize and also have begun to act on the 
premise of a strong Europe as essential to 
our own good future and have recognized 
the importance of the bilateral relationships 
with the nations involved. 

Mr. Zucconi: Mr. President, about 
NATO, do you think that NATO is still a 
viable alliance as it is now after 30 years of 
existence, and do you foresee or wish any 
change? Do you think the Europeans should 
do more in their own defense? You might 
share your thoughts on NATO with us. 

The President: Yes. I think the NATO 
military alliance is a cornerstone of our own 
national security. I think the degree of 
cooperation that has evolved from NATO 
since its inception has helped to tie our 
nations together in political and economic 


Department of State Bulletin 

and social ways. So the military alliance has 
been a core around which our good progress 
has been enhanced. 

I have been concerned about the need for 
a more fair sharing of military supplies and 
weapons among the countries involved. It 
ought to be a two-way street, and to the 
extent that we can have common under- 
standings about standardizing weapons sys- 
tems, I believe that we will increase the 
portion that does come from the European 

I would hope that within the next 12 
months, that the other leaders and I could 
acquire a renewed commitment to NATO 
principles and improvements on a multilat- 
eral basis. I am quite reluctant to move 
unilaterally in this field because I am so new. 
I have a lot to learn from the leaders of 
France and Germany and Great Britain and 
other countries where they have been in- 
volved so long. 

The last point is that the differences that 
we have had among us, I think, can only be 
resolved among the heads of state. And with 
the Leopard tank and the AWACS system 
[airborne warning and control 
system] — these matters are of tactical im- 
portance, but they don't endanger the total 
commitment of our countries to share in our 
future security. And although France is not 
a complete partner in the process as far as 
mutual defense is concerned, that is not a 
matter of great concern to us. 

We have among the American people an 
almost unanimous belief that NATO is a 
very beneficial commitment to us. So I see 
no danger of a deterioration in the NATO al- 

Mr. Zucconi: That leads inevitably to the 
question of the political situation, certainly, 
in the European countries, among which 
Italy and France — how do you react to the 
growth of the Marxist left, so-called Euro- 
Communists in those countries? How would 
you react to the possibility of coalition gov- 
ernments in a member's country, with a role 
for the Communists in it? 

The President: I think the first premise on 
which we function is that the European citi- 

zens are perfectly capable of making their 
own decisions about political matters 
through the free election process. 

Within my own memory, this is the first 
time that all the NATO countries have been 
democracies. And I think this is a very good 
evolution that we have already witnessed. 

Secondly, we prefer that the governments 
involved continue to be democratic and that 
no totalitarian elements become either in- 
fluential or dominant. And I would hope that 
the democratic parties would prevail during 
the coming years in the struggle for political 

I believe that the best way we can pre- 
vent the enhancement of Communist politi- 
cal strength in Europe is to show that 
democratically controlled governments can 
function effectively and openly and with 
humaneness and a genuine and continuing 
comprehension of what people need and 
expect from government. 

To the extent that we fail as democracies, 
as democratic leaders, to live up to the 
ideals that exemplify our own commitments, 
to that extent we open the opportunity for 
Communist parties to be more successful. 

So to summarize, I think each country has 
to make its own decisions in the electoral 
process. I am pleased at the enhanced de- 
gree of commitment to the democratic gov- 
ernments. We certainly prefer that the 
democratic parties prevail in the future. 
And we can encourage that process not by 
interfering in electoral procedures within 
countries themselves, but making the sys- 
tem work ourselves. 

Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, the economic 
summit is only a couple of days away. The 
meeting of the heads of state shows clearly 
how interdependent the economies are and 
that this interdependence is rapidly grow- 
ing. How much sovereignty is the United 
States willing to give up in the decisionmak- 
ing process? 

The President: None. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Siebert: None? 

The President: Not to give up 
sovereignty. I think within the bounds of 

May 30, 1977 


sovereignty to be maintained by all the na- 
tions, though, cooperation is very impor- 

As I search for a proper way to exemplify 
the sovereignty and independence of our 
own nation, I want to make the right deci- 
sions that are best for our own people. I 
don't think there is any doubt that our own 
people are best served when we do cooper- 
ate with our allies, when we have open and 
free trade, when we have a proper concern 
about the less developed nations, when we 
do have military security, when we have in- 
ternational lending institutions like the 
World Bank that can function effectively, 
when we have a proper and multilateral 
approach to solving the chronic and rapidly 
deteriorating energy circumstances — all 
those things that are multilateral in nature 
and require cooperation and unselfishness 
can enhance, I believe, the legitimate 
sovereignty of nations and the protection by 
leaders of the sovereignty. 

So with the exception of your use of the 
word "sovereignty," I think that we need to 
be sure that our actions are unselfish and 
predicated on proper consultation and a 
sharing of both opportunity and the 
resolution of problems. 

Mr. Siebert: The American economic 
growth has accelerated and you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, recommended a sharply reduced 
stimulus, fiscal stimulus, for 1977. 

The President: Yes. 

Mr. Siebert: Has the focus of the summit 
altered? Will you still press for higher- 
internal deficits and lower external 
surpluses by Germany and Japan? 

The President: We have left intact an eco- 
nomic stimulus package for the 1977-1978 
years, the 18-month period, of a little more 
than $20 billion, which we consider to be 

It still is a substantial amount of stimulus 
effort, and I would hope that the countries 
that are relatively affluent and economically 
strong might provide some stimulus for the 
rest of the free world economy. 

There is an element of trade which is of 
concern. The OPEC [Organization of Petro- 

leum Exporting Countries] nations have a 
positive trade balance of about $40 billion. 
All the other nations in the world who are 
their trading partners have to have a deficit 
of about $40 billion. To the extent that the 
strong nations like ourselves, Japan, 
Germany, and others, can absorb part of 
that deficit, it takes that requirement away 
from the much weaker nations who have to 
share it with us. 

So to that extent, I am willing for our 
country to experience some controllable in- 
ternational trade deficits for a while. And 
we have cut our own national budget deficit 
down from about $65 billion to $47 billion or 
$48 billion this year. Next year it is going to 
go up some. 

But I think that it is a matter of each 
nation deciding on its own what is best for 
its citizens but, at the same time, recogniz- 
ing that when we are selfish and try to have 
large trade surpluses and a very tight 
restraint on the international economy, that 
we make the weaker nations suffer too 

Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, are you 
carrying major proposals to London, and 
what kind? 

The President: I think those specific 
agenda items would best be reserved until 
we get there. You are perfectly at liberty to 
talk to the people in the offices of the Secre- 
tary of State and the Secretary of the 
Treasury. But as far as my own comments 
as President, I think I would rather wait 
until later to talk about that. 

Mr. Emery: Can I bring you back to 
energy? We are very struck by the fact that at 
the same time as you can mention an item 
like "unselfishness" on American commit- 
ments to help allies with their petroleum de- 
ficiencies in times of crisis, through this 
conference in Paris, at the same time energy 
always seems to be the biggest source of dis- 
content and discord between us. Look at the 
results of the Middle East war and the 
energy crisis that followed. 

Now, your own nuclear energy policy, 
which, while many leaders give lipservice 
to, they seem to be in some concern over, 


Department of State Bulletin 

ahead with their nuclear deals? 

The President: I think you would have to 
go back, to save time, and read the minutes 
of my press conference when I described our 
own reprocessing policy. I made it clear that 
I was not trying to tell Germany and 
France, Great Britain, Japan, what to do 
within their own countries. We have ac- 
tually built and attempted to operate two 
reprocessing plants unsuccessfully. 

We are blessed with moderate quantities 
of uranium ore and large quantities of coal 
and reasonable quantities of natural gas and 
oil. I don't believe that within the next 20 
years we will need to move to commercial 
use of the breeder reactor, which is the ini- 
tiation of the plutonium society. I cannot 
speak for other countries. 

I am very much aware that the waste 
products from our own light water reactors, 
using enriched uranium, are being held in- 
tact. They are not being destroyed or 
wasted. If we should need in the future, 
they will be there. 

The third point is that I am deeply con- 
cerned if nations who presently do not have 
the capability of building nuclear explosives 
should have them. And we are going to do 
what we can in the trade of nuclear fuels 
and nuclear power plants to reduce that 
number of nations who have the ability to 
build nuclear explosives. 

And the process has to start somewhere, 
and in our own nation's history, it happened 
to have started with me. It was a campaign 
commitment of mine, shared, by the way, 
with my opponent. President Ford, and I 
have no reticence about imposing it. 

This is a matter of contention. We would 
prefer that reprocessing plants not be sold 
to other nations of the world, particularly 
those who have not signed the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. But some of the 
trades or contracts had already been ini- 
tiated or consummated. 

May 30, 1977 

We have let our views be known, but we 
recognize the autonomy of nations to deal as 
they see fit. 

So I think that the present competition 
and some degree of disharmony among 
nations on energy might very well be 
exacerbated badly unless we all try to con- 
serve energy as much as possible. 

And I am not criticizing other nations 
when 1 say that I am very glad that we have 
finally moved, after being wasteful to the 
extreme degree for so long, toward a new 
policy that will be built around conservation 
of all kinds of energy supplies. And I would 
guess that our own action, as a very power- 
ful, influential nation, might induce other 
countries to join with us in a mutual 
commitment to both inventory energy 
supplies, a