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BOSTON 
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LIBRARY 


department 
of  State 


W    of State ]■  iLW  j    & 

bulletin 


April  197U 


'■)  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2013 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2013  /  April  1978 


Cover  Photos: 

Paul  C.  Warnke 
President  Carter 
Secretary  Vance 
Richard  C.  Holbrooke 
Arthur  J.  Goldberg 


The  Department  of  State  Bul- 
letin, published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to 
provide  the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions and  the  work  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
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Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Aff- 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 

Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


SALT 

I       An  Ongoing  Process  (Paul  C.  Warlike) 

10     Compliance  With  the  SALT  I  Agreements  (Administration  Report) 
15      Verification  of  the  Proposed  SALT  II  Agreement  (Administration  Report) 


THE  PRESIDENT 

17      National  Security  Interests 
19      News    Conferences,    February    17. 
March  2  and  9 

THE  SECRETARY 

24      U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 

AFRICA 

30     Security  Assistance  to  the  Sub-Sahara 

(Richard  M.  Moose) 
30     Southern  Rhodesia  (Joint  U.S. -U.K. 

Statement) 

30  Kenya  ( White  House  Statement) 

EAST  ASIA 

31  Security  Assistance  (Richard  C.  Hol- 

brooke) 
33      Letters  of  Credence  (Indonesia,  West- 
ern Samoa) 

ECONOMICS 

35  America's  Stake  in  an  Open  Interna- 
tional Trading  System  (Secretary 
Vance) 

37  International  Financial  Institutions 
(Richard  N.  Cooper) 

EUROPE 

40  Belgrade  Review  Meeting  Concludes 
(Arthur  J.  Goldberg,  Concluding 
Document,  White  House  Statement) 

42  CSCE  Semiannual   Report  (Depart- 

ment Statement) 

43  U.S.S.R.  (Department  Statement) 

43  Letter  of  Credence  (Bulgaria) 

44  Visit   of  Yugoslav  President  Tito 

(Joint  Statement) 

45  Yugoslavia — A  Profile 

47  Visit  of  Danish  Prime  Minister 
J^rgensen  f  White  House  Statement) 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

47  Country  Reports  (Mark  L.  Schneider) 

48  Human  Rights  Treaties 

MIDDLE  EAST 

48  U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  (Joint 
Communique) 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 

49  Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978  (Presi- 

dent Carter) 

50  Nuclear  Safeguards  Agreement  (White 

House  Statement) 

OCEANS 

51  Antarctic  Resource  and  Environmental 

Concerns  (Patsy  T.  Mink) 
54      Deep  Seabed  Mining  Legislation  (El- 
liot L.  Richardson) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

56      Southern  Rhodesia  (Andrew   Young, 
Resolution) 

58  Report  on  U.N.  Reform  and  Restruc- 

turing 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

59  Panama    Canal    Neutrality    Treaty 

Ratified  (President  Carter,   Secre- 
tary Vance) 

59     TREATIES 

62     PRESS  RELEASES 

INDEX 


!°^SS^ 


Superint 


MAY  -  fi 1S73 

DEPOSITORY 


U.S.  AND  U.S.S.R.  OPERATIONAL 
STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  DELIVERY  VEHICLES 


2,500 


2,000 


500 


67 


69 


71  73 

END  FISCAL  YEAR 


75 


i         i 
77 


U.S.  AND  U.S.S.R.  OPERATIONAL 
STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  WARHEADS/BOMBS 


12,000 


10,000 


8,000 


6,000 


i         i        i 1        i        i         *        i 

69  71  73  75 

END  FISCAL  YEAR 


1978 


SALT:    An  Ongoing  Process 


'tlC.  Warnke 

fit  is  SALT?  I  think  we  have  to 
|ize  that  SALT  has  become  an 
tig   process.    It's   not  any  one 
I  it  can't  be  judged  on  the  basis 
|  one  treaty.  It  has  to  be  judged 
:  basis  of  whether  or  not   the 
process  is  contributing  to  the 
y  of  the  United  States. 
SALT  talks  have  been  going 
:e  1969,  and  we  have  had  some 
.  SALT  I  did  have  the  very  ef- 
:  result  of  limiting  antiballistic 
;  systems.   We  and  the  Soviets 
pared  the  necessity  and  expense 
I  ng  ahead  with  more  offensive 
tus  for  the  purpose  of  countering 
fl  tiballistic  missile  defenses.   It's 
jh  the  crazy  logic  of  the  strategic 
lir  age  that  one  could  think  of 
fees  as  being  bad,  but  anything 
tiallenges  the  retaliatory  capabil- 
il  the  other  side  is  necessarily  de- 
fa  zing  and  contributes  to  the  arms 
I And  that's  really  what  SALT  is 

!  lUt. 

•  here  some  way  that  we  and  the 
It  Union — with  as  many  differ- 

I  as  we  have  beween  us — can 
lliehave  rationally  and  arrive  at 
live  agreements  that  will  protect 
agic  stability,  that  will  prevent 
Browth  of  apprehensions  about 
■  strike  capability  of  the  other 
I  and  hence  will  enable  us  to 
I  the  nuclear  arms  competition 
w  ally  to  a  halt?  I  think  we're  get- 
{here.  It's  a  slow  process  and,  no 
e  tep  is  going  to  be  the  final  step 
»  d  the  goal . 

IT  I  and  Vladivostok 

\iere  are  we  at  the  present  point? 
|iave  a  SALT  I  antiballistic  mis- 
fc;ABM)  treaty,  which  limits  an- 
■istic  missile  defenses.  We  also 
lout  of  SALT  I,  in  May  1972,  an 
I  im  Agreement  which  imposed 
I:  expectedly  short-term  con- 
ies on  strategic  offensive  forces. 
lar  as  it  went,  it  was  a  useful 
kement.  It  tended  to  freeze  the 
fcgic  missiles  on  both  sides. 
I  has  certain  defects.  Its  coverage 
jicomplete.  It  doesn't  prevent  the 
Hopment  of  new  technologies, 
J— a  defect  which  perhaps  was 
J:  important  from  the  public  rela- 
h  standpoint  than  from  the  mili- 
(  standpoint — it  provided  for  un- 


equal aggregates,  as  far  as  numbers 
of  missiles  were  concerned. 

Since  it  essentially  froze  existing 
programs,  the  Soviets  were  left  with  a 
lead  in  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
sile (ICBM)  silos  and  in  numbers  of 
launcher  tubes  on  ballistic  missile 
submarines.  This  was,  of  course,  a 
controversial  point  in  SALT  I.  It  led 
to  the  so-called  Jackson  resolution 
which  provided  that  any  subsequent 
agreements  on  control  of  offensive 
arms  had  to  contain  equal  aggregates 
for  the  Soviet  Union  and  for  the 
United  States  in  strategic  interconti- 
nental nuclear  delivery  systems. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  history 
of  SALT,  the  next  important  step  was 
the  so-called  Vladivostok  understand- 
ing between  President  Ford  and  Gen- 
eral Secretary  Brezhnev  in  Vladivos- 
tok in  late  1974. '  Because  more  than 
3  years  have  gone  by  since  then,  we 
tend  to  forget  this  was  a  very  signifi- 
cant breakthrough:  It  meant  that  the 
principle  of  equal  aggregates  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  Soviet  Union.  They 
agreed  that  in  SALT  II  there  would  be 
equal  ceilings  on  overall  strategic  nu- 
clear delivery  vehicles  and  also  a 
subceiling  on  the  number  of  those  de- 
livery vehicles  that  could  contain 
multiple  independently-targetable 
reentry  vehicles  (MIRV).  The  under- 
standing provided  for  a  total  of  2,400 
on  the  overall  delivery  vehicles.   It 


provided  that  1,320  of  those  could  be 
launchers  of  MIRV  missiles.  And  it 
did  so  without  containing  any  sort  of 
adjustment,  any  sort  of  compensation 
for  the  Soviet  Union  for  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  maintains  delivery 
systems  in  Europe  that  can  strike 
Soviet  targets. 

The  Road  to  SALT  II 

Since  1972  negotiations  have  been 
continuing  toward  a  SALT  II  agree- 
ment. Vladivostok  was  a  very  signifi- 
cant step  in  those  negotiations.  Other 
provisions  were  worked  out  in  great 
detail  in  the  more  than  4  years  before 
the  Carter  Administration  took  office. 

We  began  the  SALT  negotiations 
again  on  May  11,  1977.  At  that  time, 
we  were  the  beneficiaries  of  a  joint 
draft  text  approximately  50  pages 
long  which  did,  in  fact,  resolve  a 
number  of  very  knotty,  troublesome 
issues  involved  in  any  strategic  arms 
control  agreement.  So  we  have  to 
recognize  that  the  SALT  II  treaty, 
which  is  now  beginning  to  take  final 
form,  is  the  product  of  more  than  5 
years  of  careful  negotiation.  It's  not 
the  product  of  a  single  Administra- 
tion; it's  not  the  product  of  any  parti- 
san political  activity.  And  it  will,  at  a 
minimum,  contain  the  equal  aggre- 
gates that  were  called  for  by  the  Con- 
gress after  SALT  I.    It   will   contain 


Paul  C.  Warnke  was  born  January  31. 
1920.  in  Webster,  Massachusetts.  He  re- 
ceived his  A.B.  degree  from  Yale  (1941) 
and  his  LL.B.  from  Columbia  (1948).  He 
was  Editor  in  Chief  of  the  Columbia  Law 
Review  during  1948.  Mr.  Warnke  served  in 
the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  (1942-46)  as  a 
Lieutenant  (senior  grade)  in  the  Atlantic  in 
the  antisubmarine  service  and  in  the  Pacific 
on  tanker  and  LST's.  He  practiced  law 
from  1948  to  1966. 

Mr.  Warnke  was  appointed  General 
Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Defense  in 
September  1966  and  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense  for  International  Security  Affairs 
in  August  1977.  He  left  government  serv- 
ice in  February  1969  to  become  a  full  part- 
ner in  a  law  firm  in  Washington,  DC. 

On  March  9.  1977,  Mr.  Warnke  was 
confirmed  by  the  Senate  to  be  Director  of 
the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
and  chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 


Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks   with  the 
personal  rank  of  Ambassador. 


Department  of  State 


;. 


those  figures  of  2,400  and  1,320 
which  are  the  identical  ceilings  for 
both  sides.  It  will,  however,  do  a 
good  deal  more  than  that. 

The  objective  of  strategic  arms  lim- 
itation talks  is  to  protect  strategic  sta- 
bility: to  preserve  a  situation  in  which 
no  matter  what  the  provocation  might 
be  felt  to  be,  the  Soviet  Union  could 
at  no  time  feel  that  it  might  conceiva- 
bly be  in  its  interests  to  initiate  nu- 
clear war.  We  have  to  be  sure,  by  one 
means  or  another,  that  we  have  at  all 
times  the  assured  retaliatory  capabil- 
ity in  the  event  of  a  Soviet  attack  to 
respond  with  such  devastating  force 
as  to  destroy  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
going  society. 

You  can  keep  that  ability  in  one  of 
two  ways.  You  can  keep  it  by  an  un- 
restricted nuclear  arms  competition. 
And  there's  no  question  in  my  mind 
that  if  that's  the  way  we  have  to  go 
we  can  do  it — we  have  the  will,  we 
have  the  resources,  we  have  the  tech- 
nology. But  there  is  a  better  way,  and 
that  better  way  is  to  get  effective 
arms  control  that  preserves  strategic 
stability  and  avoids  the  risks  and  the 
costs  of  an  unrestricted  nuclear  arms 
competition. 

In  SALT  II  what  we're  trying  to  do 
is  to  take  a  major  step  forward;  to  go 
beyond  the  principle  of  equal  ceilings 
and  move  also  toward  quantitative 
reductions — an  actual  reduction  in 
these  figures  of  2,400  and  1,320— 
and  also  for  the  first  time  to  impose 
qualitative  constraints,  because  num- 
bers alone  won't  do  the  job.  If  we 
are,  in  fact,  going  to  put  an  end  to 
the  nuclear  arms  competition,  if  we're 
to  avoid  the  development  of  new 
technologies — new  weapons  systems 
that  might  be  destabilizing  because 
they  threaten  the  strategic  balance — 
we  have  to  have  qualitative  restraints 
as  well. 

In  March  1977.  when  Secretary 
Vance  took  his  first  trip  to  Moscow,2 
we  presented  to  the  Soviet  leadership 
alternate  plans  for  a  SALT  II  treaty. 
One  plan  was  the  so-called  "com- 
prehensive" approach,  in  which  we 
endeavored  really  to  shortcut  the  arms 
control  negotiating  process  and  move 
in  one  single  giant  step  toward  very 
significant  reductions  in  numbers  and 
toward  a  whole  series  of  qualitative 
restraints.  It  went  too  far  for  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  think  we  have  to  rec- 
ognize that  theirs  is  a  leadership 
which  is  very  conservative;  which 
hates  surprises  and  which  moves  in 
even  a  more  glacial  fashion  than 
sometimes  the  U.S.  Government  ap- 
pears to  move.  And  our  proposal  went 
too  far. 

Recognizing  the  distinct  possibility 


that  this  would  be  the  case,  we  pre- 
sented an  alternative  proposal.  This 
was  just  to  negotiate  a  simple,  bare- 
bones.  Vladivostok  treaty  moving  the 
2,400  figure  and  the  1,320  figure  into 
a  treaty  and  deferring  all  of  the  qual- 
itative restraints,  all  of  the  technical 
questions  and  constraints  over  the 
more  contentious  weapons  systems. 
That,  again,  not  necessarily  unexpect- 
edly, didn't  go  far  enough  for  the 
Soviets. 

SALT  II:  An  Improvement 
on  Vladivostok 

Where  we're  going  to  come  out  is 
somewhere  in  between  those  alterna- 
tives of  March  1977.  SALT  II  won't 
go  as  far  as  the  comprehensive  pack- 
age, but  it  will  be  distinctly  better — 
from  the  standpoint  of  arms  control, 
from  the  standpoint  of  protecting  the 
security  of  the  United  States — than 
the  alternative,  the  simple 
Vladivostok-type  treaty. 

For  a  considerable  period  of  these 
negotiations,  the  Soviet  delegation 
had  quite  restricted  authority.   They 


.  .  .  SALT  has  become  an  ongo- 
ing process.  It's  not  any  one 
treaty;  it  can't  be  judged  on  the 
basis  of  any  one  treaty.  It  has  to 
be  judged  on  the  basis  of  whether 
or  not  the  overall  process  is  con- 
tributing to  the  security  of  the 
United  States. 


could  deal  with  the  technical  ques- 
tions of  compliance  verification,  pro- 
hibitions against  deliberate 
concealment — very  important  provi- 
sions in  any  arms  control  treaty.  They 
did  not,  however,  have  the  authority 
to  negotiate  reductions.  They  did  not 
have  the  authority  to  negotiate  a  pro- 
hibition on  new  types  of  strategic  sys- 
tems. They  did  not  have  the  authority 
to  negotiate  subceilings  on  the  more 
dangerous  MIR  V  cd  K'BM's.  They 
dealt  up  through  September  with  what 
was  referred  to  as  the  secondary  is- 
sues. Then  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
came  to  Washington  in  the  latter  part 
of  September  1977. 3  And  as  a  result 
of  his  talks  with  President  Carter  and 
Secretary  Vance,  they  made  some 
quite  significant  moves.  They  agreed 
that  SALT  II  could  go  beyond  Vla- 
divostok; that  it  could  contain  subceil- 
ings on  the  more  dangerous  systems; 


that   it  could  contain   proviswhl 
reductions;  that  it  could  contaiH 
prohibitions  on  new  strategic  s;9 
As  a  result  of  those  meetinjp 
delegation  of  the  Soviet   Ur 
Geneva  received  much  more  ex 
negotiating   freedom   and,   duri 
last  quarter  of  1977,  we  were 
make  quite   significant   progr 
ward  completing  SALT  II. 

I  can't  really  predict  when 
be  completed.  If  we  continue  I 
the  same  sort  of  progress,  we 
very  well  be  through,  as  Pn 
Carter  indicated  at  a  news  con: 
on  December  31    in  Warsaw, 
time   in  the  relatively  early  ; 
But  as  someone  who  has  had  < 
erable  experience  with  comr 
negotiations,  I  find  that  even 
you  can  get  95%  of  the   w  " 
ward  your  eventual  objective,  b  de 
nition  the  issues  that  are  lefill 
remaining  59c — are  still  there  ha| 
they're  the  ones  on  which  the  I 
most  disagree.  I  think  that  you  I 
agree  that  no  negotiators  shoul  ha 
any  sort  of  deadline  in  mind.  Til 
position  of  deadlines  does  nothirl 
discourage  thoughtful   and   p  dfi 
negotiations. 

I  am,  however,  very  opti  isl 
about  the  final  content  of  SAL  II 
think  it's  going  to  be  a  good  trn 
think  it  will  move  us  forward  ■ 
our  goal  of  protecting  the  secu  n 
the  United  States  by  guaran  a 
strategic  stability.  I'm  confident 
its  provisions  will  be  verifiable  || 
also  confident  that  we  will  be  <l 
agree  with  the  Soviet  Union  H 
agenda  for  this  continuing  pin 
called  SALT  that  will  enable  u  n 
gradual,  but  nonetheless  effeB 
basis  to  begin  to  bring  the  strl 
nuclear  arms  competition  to  a  II 
to  the  benefit  of  both  countries  ■ 
the  great  relief  of  the  rest  cl 
world. 


Q.  What  inspection  method 
available  now  to  insure  tha 
Soviets  are  complying  will 
present  SALT  agreements? 

A.  The  present  SALT  agret 
doesn't  require  anything  other 
our  national  technical  means.  I 
go  into  the  details  of  what  the* 
tional  technical  means  arc.  I'rr 
that  you've  all  got  a  very  cleai 
of  what  I'm  talking  about. 

But  SALT  I  is  a  relatively  s 
arms  control  agreement.  It  deals 
with  numbers,  and  it  deals  with 
bers  of  things  that  are  clearly  ot 
able  and  clearly  countable.  As  a 
sequence  we  can  rely  on  our  na 
technical  means  in  SALT  I.  V. 
not   require   what   is   sometime 


1978 


"Hi,  k 
it  were 
1 

when 


to  as  cooperative  measures,  on- 
spection,  that  sort  of  thing, 
a  very  large  extent,  the  same 
e  true  of  SALT  II.  We  are  still 
lg  with   the  kinds  of  controls 

are  verifiable  by  our  national 
cal  means.  If,  in  this  continuing 
ss,  we  get  much  beyond  that. 
ve  are  going  to  have  to  consider 
gree  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
intrusive  measures  of  verifica- 


ess, 

as  Pi 

*S  C0| 

arsai 


Ir 


Mr.  Vest  [George  S.  Vest,  As- 

it  Secretary  for  European  Af- 

,  who  spoke  before  you,  said  it 

his  personal  belief  that  the 

•t  Union  was  a  very  insecure 

n  and,   therefore,   depended 

building  up  their  arms,  in 

r  to  become  secure.   Do  you 

jj  the  same  belief?  And  if  so, 

is  the  foundation  of  SALT, 

is  the  foundation  of  your  op- 

;m  that  the  SALT  agreement 

;ucceed? 

I  don't  believe  that  I  disagree 

Assistant  Secretary  Vest.  I  think 

our  positions  are  readily  recon- 

e.  You  could  regard  the  Soviet 

|  as  an  insecure  nation.  They've 

great  deal  to  be  insecure  about. 

lend  of  mine  once  pointed  out 

:he  U.S.S.R.  is  the  only  country 

;  world  completely  surrounded 

stile  Communist  neighbors,  and 

doesn't  make  for  a  great  degree 

nfidence. 

hink,  however,  that  that  insecu- 

is  entirely  consistent  with  the 

of  reaching  a  SALT  agreement 

the  United  States.  I'm  frequently 

d  why  it  is  that  I  feel  we  can 

the  Russians.  And  my  answer  is 

I  think  you  can  trust  any  country 

;have  in  its  own  interests.  And  I 

ve  that  the  Soviet  leadership  rec- 

zes  that  an  arms  control  agree- 

t  with  the  United  States  is  in  the 

(Tests  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

divide  the  reasons  for  that  into 

■  ;  categories:  economic,  political, 

"lB  military.  The  economic  reason  is 

"nably  the  least  important  of  the 

i  2,  but  there's  no  question  that  the 

fiet  Union  spends  more  than  the 

fj:ed  States — appreciably  more — on 

[(defense   capability,   including 

titegic  nuclear  arms.  We  now  esti- 

fce  that  something  in  excess  of 

h,  maybe  as  much  as  16%,  of  their 

3"P  is  spent  on  defense.  That's  a 

w  heavy  burden.  It's  one  that  they 

|  bear  in  their  kind  of  society. 

fry  don't  have  any  really  effective 

fisumer  protests  about  the  diversion 

>|resources,  so  they  can  do  it,  but 

i'y  certainly  can't  enjoy  it. 

"he  second  reason — and  I  think  this 


is  part  of  their  insecurity — is  that  I 
believe  they  derive  not  only  certain 
status  feelings  but  also  feel  their  in- 
ternational image  is  improved  if  they 
are  seen  to  be  dealing  as  equals  with 
the  other  military  superpower.  And 
they  can't  really  expect  to  continue  to 
deal  with  the  United  States  unless 
those  negotiations  yield  some  sort  of 
results. 

Finally,  and  I  think  perhaps  more 
important,  if  you're  in  an  insecure  na- 
tion, if  you  have  feelings  of  inferior- 
ity, if  you  feel  that  the  hands  of  most 
men  are  against  you,   and   if  you're 


faced  with  a  competitor  of  the  size 
and  strength  and  resources  and  tech- 
nological know-how  of  the  United 
States,  you  have  to  face  the  possibil- 
ity that  in  an  unrestricted  military 
competition  you  may  come  out  second 
best.  And  from  that  standpoint,  too,  it 
could  very  well  be  regarded  by  the 
Soviet  leadership,  and  I  believe  is  re- 
garded by  the  Soviet  leadership,  as 
being  the  better  course  to  try  and 
agree  with  the  United  States  on  some 
kind  of  reasonable  arms  control 
measures  that  will  provide  for 
strategic  stability. 


FACT  SHEET  ON 
SALT  NEGOTIATIONS 

The  United  Slates  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  been  engaged  in  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks  since  the  autumn  of  1969. 
The  goals  of  the  United  States  at  SALT  are 
the  enhancement  of  national  security, 
strategic  stability,  and  detente  through 
dialogue  and  agreements  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  negotiations  are  aimed  at  the 
limitation  and  reduction  of  both  offensive 
and  defensive  strategic  arms. 

The  first  phase  of  negotiations  (SALT  I) 
was  concluded  on  May  26,  1972.  On  that 
date  the  President,  on  behalf  of  the  U.S. 
Government,  signed  two  agreements  with 
the  Soviet  Union — the  Treaty  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Systems  and 
Interim  Agreement  on  Certain  Measures 
With  Respect  to  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Offensive  Arms  for  a  5-year  period.  Both 
the  treaty  and  the  Interim  Agreement  were 
approved  by  the  Congress  and  entered  into 
force  on  October  3.  1972. 

In  November  1972  a  new  phase  (SALT 
II)  was  begun.  Bilateral  discussions  con- 
tinued for  the  next  2  years  and  led  to  a 
joint  statement  on  SALT  at  Vladivostok  on 
November  24,  1974.  At  that  time,  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  and  the  General 
Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  concurred  in  several  principles 
for  a  new  agreement  to  cover  the  period 
until  December  31,  1985.  General  provi- 
sions of  the  new  agreement  included  limit- 
ing the  aggregate  number  of  strategic  de- 
livery vehicles  on  each  side  to  2,400  and 
establishing  a  sublimit  of  1,320  on  ICBM's 
and  SLBM's  (submarine-launched  ballistic 
missiles)  equipped  with  MIRV's. 

A  number  of  issues  were  not  resolved  in 
the  Vladivostok  statement.  The  most  im- 
portant were  whether  to  include  in  the  total 
delivery  vehicles  to  be  limited  a  Soviet 
bomber  called  Backfire  in  the  West  and 
what  limitations  should  be  placed  on  cruise 
missiles.  These  other  issues  have  been  the 
subject  of  continuing  negotiations  since 
November  1974. 


In  March  1977  the  Carter  Administration 
offered  two  alternate  proposals  for  resolv- 
ing the  impasse.  One  would  have  deferred 
the  Backfire  and  cruise  missile  issues  to 
later  negotiations.  The  second,  or  so-called 
comprehensive  proposal,  was  designed  to 
advance  SALT  well  beyond  the  agreement 
reached  at  Vladivostok.  It  called  for  more 
substantial  reductions  in  delivery  vehicles 
and  MIRV'ed  missiles  than  had  been  dis- 
cussed at  Vladivostok,  for  constraints  on 
Backfire  and  on  the  range  of  cruise  mis- 
siles, and  for  measures  to  slow  the  de- 
velopment and  deployment  of  new  strategic 
systems.  The  Soviet  Union  rejected  both 
proposals. 

In  May  1977  Secretary  Vance  and 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  met  in  Geneva 
and  agreed  on  a  three-part  framework  for 
the  SALT  II  agreement. 

•  A  treaty  of  8  years'  duration  would  es- 
tablish limits  on  strategic  systems  at  levels 
somewhat  below  those  agreed  on  in  1974. 
This  equal  ceiling  would  provide  for  clear 
overall  equivalence  in  strategic  forces.  The 
equal  aggregate  ceilings  with  freedom  to 
choose  the  mix  of  forces  within  the  overall 
limit  are  a  means  of  providing  for  equiva- 
lence despite  the  major  differences  in  the 
composition  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  forces. 
(Historically,  the  strategic  forces  of  the 
two  sides  have  evolved  along  different 
lines,  with  the  Soviets  emphasizing 
ICBM's.  and  the  United  States  deploying  a 
more  balanced  mix  of  ICBM's,  SLBM's. 
and  heavy  bombers.) 

•  A  protocol  will  cover  temporary  lim- 
itations on  a  number  of  systems  which  are 
not  ready  for  longer  term  resolution,  such 
as  new  types  of  ICBM's,  mobile  ICBM's, 
and  cruise  missiles.  These  will  be  the  sub- 
ject of  further  negotiations  in  SALT  III 

•  A  set  of  agreed  principles  will  com- 
plete the  "three-tier"  SALT  II  agreement 
and  will  serve  as  general  guidance  for  the 
continuation  of  SALT  negotiations.  The 
principles  will  include  commitments  to  fur- 
ther reductions,  more  comprehensive  qual- 
itative constraints  on  new  systems,  and 
provisions  to  enhance  verifications. 


Department  of  State  uH 


Q.  My  question  regards  the  con- 
cept of  qualitative  restraints  that 
you've  introduced.  I  wonder  if 
there  is  not  a  danger  in  that  ap- 
proach of  hurting  certain  kinds  of 
basic  scientific  research.  And  I'm 
thinking  in  particular  of  controlled 
thermonuclear  fusion  technology, 
both  of  the  laser  type  and  of  the  in- 
ertial  confinement  type,  which  is 
connected  to  the  frontier  areas  of 
military  technology  and  is,  at  the 
same  time,  going  to  be  extremely 
important  for  a  national  energy  pol- 
icy in  the  1990's  and  beyond.  And  I 
wonder  if  it  would  not  be  better  for 
the  United  States  to  concentrate  on 
developing  that  kind  of  technology 
and  perhaps  seeing  this  as  an  area 
in  which  cooperation  with  the 
Soviet  Union  might  be  possible,  as 
they  have,  I  think,  repeatedly  of- 
fered. 

A.  Let  me  hasten  to  reassure  you 
that  there  is  absolutely  nothing  con- 
templated that  would  result  in  an 
overall  restriction  on  the  development 
of  technologies  for  the  peaceful  use 
of  nuclear  energy. 

When  we  talk  about  a  freeze  on 
new  types,  it'd  be  a  very  limited  kind 
of  freeze.  It  would  freeze  the  testing 
and  the  deployment  of  new  types  of 
nuclear  weapons.  It  would  not  in  any 
way  interfere  with  laser  fusion  re- 
search or.  as  a  matter  of  fact,  with 
any  basic  research  whatsoever.  It 
would  be  a  step  forward  in  the  control 
of  nuclear  weapons,  but  it  certainly 
wouldn't  have  any  kind  of  overall  re- 
strictive impact  on  the  development 
of  nuclear  technology  generally. 

Q.  A  former  member  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  recently  made  a 
statement  in  our  state  which  is  of 
great  interest  to  me  because  I  live 
within  a  mile  of  a  major  military 
installation,  so  I  feel  fairly  certain 
that  one  of  those  Soviet  nuclear 
subs  has  a  missile  aimed  at  me 
right  now.  He  said  that  in  case  of  a 
Soviet  nuclear  attack,  the  United 
States  could  well  lose  160  million 
people,  but  because  the  Russians 
have  built  such  fantastic  under- 
ground civil  defense  areas — as 
many  as  a  thousand  of  them  of  huge 
size — that  Russia  could  well  survive 
any  retaliation  that  we  attempted. 
And  that  makes  you  wonder 
whether  SALT  is  getting  anywhere 
at  all  if  we  also  do  not  take  into 
consideration  the  civil  defense 
capabilities  of  our  country  as  well 
as  theirs. 

The  other  thing  is,  it  seems  to  me 
at  the  rate  that  they're  building 
submarines,  their  surface  naval 


vessels,  and  their  merchant 
marine — actually  an  arm  of  their 
navy — they  could  currently  really 
blanket  the  seas  of  the  world.  Are 
they  aiming  for  conventional  war  or 
nuclear  war?  Because  in  a  conven- 
tional war  they  could  quite 
adequately,  at  the  present  time,  cut 
off  the  flow  of  supplies  from  one 
nation  to  the  other  which  Hitler's 
inability  to  do  in  World  War  II  was 
the  only  thing  that  saved  Europe. 

A.  I  think  that  in  both  instances  if 
the  assumptions  were  correct  then  I 
would  be  far,  far  less  confident  than  I 
am.  But  I  think  that  the  assumptions 
in  both  instances  are  wrong.  I  know 
of  no  evidence,  and  none  of  our  intel- 


ft's  only  in  the  crazy  logic  of  the 
strategic  nuclear  age  that  one 
could  think  of  defenses  as  being 
bad,  but  anything  that  challenges 
the  retaliatory  capability  of  the 
other  side  is  necessarily  de- 
stabilizing and  contributes  to  the 
arms  race.  And  that's  really  what 
SALT  is  all  about. 


ligence  sources  reveal  any  evidence, 
that  the  Soviet  Union  has  an  effective 
civil  defense  program.  There's  no 
question  that  they're  spending  more 
money  on  civil  defense  than  we  are 
now.  They  appear  to  be  sort  of  in  the 
mood  that  we  were  in  the  early 
1960's — except  that  the  euphoria  that 
led  us  to  feel  a  fallout  shelter  pro- 
gram might  spare  us  most  of  the  nu- 
clear casualties  was  perhaps  some- 
what less  silly  than  any  such  reliance 
would  be  today  because  of  the  great 
growth  in  offensive  nuclear  capability 
that  has  taken  place  since.  There's  no 
question  that  if  the  Soviet  Union  were 
to  continue  to  go  ahead  with  great 
expenditures  on  civil  defense,  this 
would  be  an  undesirable  thing.  It 
would  put  us  back  into  the  same  posi- 
tion we  were  in  with  regard  to  an- 
tiballistic  missile  defenses  before 
SALT  I. 

The  real  problem  is  not  thai  they 
would  have  an  effective  defense  but 
that  they  might  kid  themselves  and, 
as  a  consequence,  feel  a  greater  free- 
dom to  brandish  the  nuclear  threat. 
No,  I  think  that  rather  than  worrying 
about  trying  to  develop  a  comparable 
civil  defense  program,  we  ought  to  be 
doing  two  things. 

First  of  all,  we  should  continue  (o 


:iil 


emphasize  that  there  is  no  d| 
that  there  is  no  way  in  whi 
Soviet  Union  could  spare  itsel 
lions  and  millions  of  casualtil 
the  destruction  of  its  organize™ 
ety,  if  they  were  to  start  a  nuca| 
tack  and  we  were  to  respond. 

And  second,  in  consequenceB 
Soviet  civil  defense  expenduusi 
undesirable  because  all  theyhl 
cause  concern  in  the  United  la 
interfere  with  more  effectiviiafl 
control,  and  challenge  the  conipj) 
which  nuclear  stability  depencH 
assured  retaliatory  capability  <  b 
sides.  But  I  believe  that  the  I 
that  they  have  an  effective  ciB 
fense  program  at  present  are  il 
ing  but  also  untrue. 

With  regard  to  the  developna 
naval  forces,  I  know  of  no  nil 
planner  in  the  United  State II 
thinks  that  the  Soviet  Navy  is  a  lai 
for  the  U.S.  Navy  at  presentfl 
doesn't  mean  that  they  couldn'li 
fere  quite  substantially  wi  || 
commerce.  If  they  develop  ;  ai 
enough  navy — and  they  are  diM 
ing  that  large  navy — they  ce  u; 
could  present  a  threat  to  the  se  m 
We  have  developed  forces  whjj 
designed  to  cope  with  that  thre;J 
fundamental  inhibition,  ho\|l 
against  Soviet  interference  wl 
sealanes  would  be  that  this  w^  d 
quite  a  flagrant  act  of  war  I 
would  invite  really  major  esc  I 
and  major  confrontation.  In  a  t  ie 
war,  I  think  that  we  can't  look  ii 
terms  of  the  World  War  II  el 
ence.  We're  not  going  to  be  d  i 
ent  again  on  the  Mirmansk  i  1. 
would  not  be  that  kind  of  pro  1 
conflict .  The  real  question  wo  1 
how  many  days  it  would  take  I 
major  conventional  war  esc  al 
through  the  tactical  nuclear  stajlf 
into  a  strategic  nuclear  exchang(|| 

Q.  Former  Wisconsin  I 
gressman  and  then  Secretary  <|J 
fense  Melvin  Laird  was  quot«l 
cently  as  saying  that  he  was  ;■ 
of  some  significant  violation 
SALT  I;  that  in  one  instance  h| 
not  told  President  Ford  about  k 
before  a  press  conference  wheiU 
President  answered  questions  (  i 

I  guess  that  gives  rise  top 
questions:  one,  what  is  the  res! 
to  Laird?  Was  he  correct  whtl< 
cited  those  violations  on  the  Sue 
part? 

And  two,  for  those  of  us  whel 
be  following  your  activities  I 
now  until  the  conclusion  of  Sf 
II,  what  do  you  see  as  the  n  j 
problems  that  lie  ahead?  And  I 
are  the  major  issues  that  we  si  i 


1978 

reading  carefully  about  as  we 
«l  the  reports  that  come  back 

i  Geneva? 

sua 

u 
inj 


lent 


Addressing  first  of  all  the  ques- 

as  to  whether  or  not  the  Soviets 

violated  the  SALT  I.  I  believe 

both   President   Ford  and  one  of 

nJij}redecessors,  Ambassador  Gerard 

h,  have  stated  in  their  view  there 

been  no  violations  of  SALT  I. 

problem — and  I  think  what  gives 

to  statements  such  as  those  by 

'«  ler  Secretary  Laird— is  that  SALT 

isofar  as  the  Interim  Agreement 

ontrol  of  offensive  arms  was  con- 

led,   was  just  that.    It   was   an 

im  agreement.  As  a  consequence, 

ad  a   number  of  ambiguities. 

>ng  the  many  ambiguities  was  the 

ication  of  restrictions  to  such 

gs  as  test  practices.  And  I  believe 

most  of  the  asserted  violations 

i  by  Secretary  Laird  had  to  do 

testing  practices. 

'hat  we  are  doing  about  it  is  mak- 
sure  that  SALT  II  has  no  am- 
ity in  that  regard;  that  it  will,  in 
,  ban  any  deliberate  concealment, 
interference   with   our  national 
ical  means,  whether  with  regard 
;sting  programs  or  with  regard  to 
ational  centers, 
'ith  respect  to  the  major  prob- 
s,  I  see  really  two  sets  of  prob- 
s.   One   of  them   is   finalizing  a 
.T  II  agreement,  which  requires 
we  get  the  Soviet  Union  to  move 
ard  us  on  both  the  quantitative  re- 
tions  and  the  extent  of  qualitative 
raints.  They've  agreed  in  principle 
both.  They  have  agreed  that  there 
!  be  reductions   below   the    Vlad- 
stok  levels.   They  have  agreed 
there  should  be  some  constraints 
new  strategic  systems.  But  we  are 
together,  as  yet,  on  the  degree  of 
se  qualitative  and  quantitative  re- 
J.ints.  I  think  that  that's  the  major 
)' blem  that  remains. 
I    think  another  problem  is  to  edu- 
I:  the  American  public  on  the  bene- 
»   of  SALT.   I  think  the  American 
p >lic  is  basically  torn  at  this  point. 
P    of  the  opinion  polls  seem  to  re- 
fl:t  this.   My  own  experience  would 
I'd  me  to  feel  that  it  is  the  case.  The 
Merican  public  wants  peace.  It  wants 
ins  control.   It  wants  tolerable  reta- 
ins with  the  Soviet  Union.  But  at  the 
fne  time,  it  doesn't  trust  the  Soviet 
l|iion.  At  any  point,  regrettably,  the 
'viet  Union  is  very  apt  to  do  some- 
:*ng  egregious  which  makes  it  more 
"ificult  to  continue  to  have  a  tolerable 
iiationship  with  it.   At  present,  of 
4urse,  one  item  of  great  concern  has 
ido  with  Soviet  activities  in  Africa. 
•  So  I  think  that  we  ought  to  make 


sure  that  the  American  public  recog- 
nizes that  arms  control  is  not  a  re- 
ward for  good  Soviet  behavior.  It's 
not  a  favor  that  we  do  for  the  Soviet 
Union.  It's  not  something  in  which 
we  are  being  kind  to  them  because 
they  are  behaving  the  way  we  want 
them  to  behave  elsewhere. 

Arms  control  has  got  to  be  consid- 
ered on  its  own  merits,  and  its  own 
merits  depend  upon  whether  it's  a 
step  forward  for  the  security  of  the 
United  States.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
were  to  stand  up  tomorrow  and  say, 
"Okay,  we're  getting  out  of  Ethiopia 
and  by  the  way,  Mr.  Carter,  we  agree 
with  your  position  on  human  rights," 
it  wouldn't  have  the  least  effect  on 
our  delegation  in  Geneva.  It  wouldn't 
lead  them  to  be  one  degree  softer  in 
terms  of  their  basic  positions.  You 
have  to  consider  that  an  arms  control 
agreement  is  a  deal  in  which  both 
sides  have  to  win;  each  side  has  to  be 
confident  that  the  agreement  is  a  step 
forward  in  its  own  security. 

All  this  sounds  simple.  Nonethe- 
less, it  is  something  which  the 
American  public  has  to  think  through. 
And  I  believe  that  this  is  a  major 
problem  that  we  still  have. 

Q.  I  represent  at  the  moment 
about  as  conservative  a  section  of 
the  United  States  as  you're  ever 
likely  to  have.  I'm  satisfied  that  the 
people  in  this  area  want  to  keep  the 
Panama  Canal;  that  they  look  with 
suspicion  on  reduction  of  troops  in 
Korea.  But  I  can  also  assure  you 
that  they  would  enthusiastically 
support  a  successful  SALT  II 
agreement,  because  they,  as  far  as 
we  can  measure,  believe  that  this  is 
the  overall  threat  that  needs  to  be 
reduced  and  taken  out  of  their  fu- 
ture to  the  extent  possible. 

What  message  can  we  take  to 
them  about  the  end  result  assuming 
that  there  is  a  successful  SALT  II 
agreement?  What  can  we  tell  them 
we  have  achieved  and  is  that  the 
end  of  the  path  or  is  there  a  chap- 
ter to  follow? 

A.  I  would  say  that  it  is  not  the  end 
of  the  book.  There  is  a  chapter  to  fol- 
low. And  there  will  be  a  chapter,  in 
my  opinion,  to  follow  that. 

We  can't  expect  to  have  effective 
control  over  the  strategic  arms  race  in 
one  step.  Let  me  give  you  just  one 
example. 

One  of  the  things  that  concerns  crit- 
ics of  the  SALT  process  is  the  poten- 
tial vulnerability  of  Minuteman,  a 
land-based  ICBM.  SALT  II  won't  put 
an  end  to  those  concerns.  It  will 
begin  to  bring  the  strategic  arms 
competition  to  a  halt. 


But  mathematically,  if  you're  con- 
cerned about  an  attack  on  our 
ICBM's,  you  would  have  to  have 
such  massive  reductions  in  the  Soviet 
ICBM's  as  to  prevent  them  from  hav- 
ing the  theoretical  capability  of  de- 
stroying our  Minuteman  silos,  and 
that  would  mean  more  than  a  50%  cut 
in  their  ICBM's.  They  can't  cut  50% 
of  their  ICBM's  and  come  anywhere 
near  to  the  ceilings  that  will  be  in 
SALT  II  because  so  much  of  their 
force  is  tied  up  in  ICBM's.  Whereas 
we  early  on  decided  that  land-based 
ICBM's  might  become  vulnerable  and 
so  invested  more  money  and  more  of 
our  total  strategic  resources  in 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles 
and  upgrading  our  strategic  bombers, 
the  Soviets  continued,  whether  by 
choice  or  by  necessity,  to  build  most 
of  their  strategic  strength  in  ICBM's. 

Over  a  period  of  time  we  would 
hope  that  their  emphasis  would  be 
less  on  these  most  destabilizing  sys- 
tems  and   more  on  the   so-called 


The  objective  of  SALT  is  to  pro- 
tect strategic  stability:  to  preserve 
a  situation  in  which  no  matter 
what  the  provocation  might  be 
felt  to  be,  the  Soviet  Union  could 
at  no  time  feel  that  it  might  con- 
ceivably be  in  its  interests  to  ini- 
tiate nuclear  war. 


second-strike  forces — those  forces 
that  would  not  challenge  the  other 
side's  retaliatory  capability  but  would 
provide  a  very  strong  retaliatory  ca- 
pability in  themselves.  But  that  will 
take  time.  And  so,  as  a  consequence, 
we're  going  to  have  to  take  this  step 
by  step. 

One  of  the  things  we're  doing  in 
SALT  II  is  negotiate  a  joint  statement 
of  principles  with  the  Soviet  Union 
which  will  be  basically  the  agenda, 
the  guidelines,  for  SALT  III.  And  we 
would  hope  in  that  joint  statement  of 
principles  to  get  their  agreement  to 
negotiate  more  effective  restraints — 
restraints  on  such  things,  for  exam- 
ple, as  the  flight  testing  of  missiles. 
So  we  do  feel  that  this  is  not  the  final 
chapter  in  the  book.  It'll  be  a  major 
advance,  but  there  will  be  more  and 
better  to  follow. 

As  far  as  what  we  can  expect  out  of 
SALT  II  is  concerned,  I've  tried  to 
outline  the  general  objectives. 

These  are,  first  of  all,  to  establish 
the  principle  of  equal  aggregates,  so 
that  there  will  no  longer  be  an  imbal- 


Department  of  State 


ance  under  which  the  Soviet  Union 
has  a  greater  entitlement  of  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles  than  we  do. 

Second,  we  will  try  to  get  signifi- 
cant reductions  in  the  Vladivostok  to- 
tals, so  that  the  quantitative  aspect  of 
the  arms  race  will  not  only  be  halted, 
it'll  be  turned  back — and  we  will 
have  taken  a  step  toward  eliminating 
the  nuclear  spectre  which  ought  to 
frighten  the  entire  world. 

And  then  third,  we  will  have  begun 
to  put  into  effect  restraints  on  the  de- 
velopment of  new  and  more  danger- 
ous technologies.  That  is  a  pretty  im- 
pressive list  of  accomplishments  out 
of  a  single  treaty. 

Q.  How  does  the  neutron  bomb 
fit  into  this  equation?  Do  you 
foresee  any  nation  at  this  particular 
time  actually  considering  the  build- 
ing of  such  a  bomb,  say  within  the 
next  20  years? 

A.  The  neutron  bomb  really  is 
something  which  is  entirely  outside 
the  SALT  context.  It's  not  a  strategic 
system.  What  it  would  be  is  a  modern- 
ization of  our  tactical  nuclear  force 
in  Europe.  There's  no  question  that 
from  the  standpoint  of  public  rela- 
tions, the  neutron  bomb  has,  indeed, 
been  a  bomb.  There's  no  question 
that  the  Soviets  have  been  able  to 
take  propaganda  advantage  from  it.  I 
think  that  that's  essentially  the  reason 
for  their  campaign;  they  realize  that 
this,  like  any  new  nuclear  weapon,  is 
an  awfully  unpleasant  kind  of  thing 
and  doesn't  arouse  any  pleasurable 
sentiments  in  the  world 

But  looking  at  it  in  context,  the 
neutron  bomb  basically  is  a  reaction 
to  a  Soviet  tank  buildup  in  central 
Europe.  And  I  think  that  rather  than 
criticizing  us  for  developing  what  we 
hope  will  be  a  more  effective  defense 
to  a  massive  Soviet  tank  attack,  I 
would  like  to  have  those  in  the  world 
who  are  concerned  with  peace  re- 
monstrate with  the  Soviet  Union 
about  the  tank  buildup. 

The  neutron  bomb,  whatever  its 
merits  or  demerits,  is  a  defensive  sys- 
tem. It  is  not  anything  with  which 
you  would  start  a  war.  It  would  be  a 
way  in  which  you  would  hope  that 
you  would  be  able  more  successfully 
to  deter  a  Soviet  tank  attack.  Like 
any  nuclear  weapon,  it's  a  dreadful 
thing.  It  kills  people,  there's  no  ques- 
tion about  it.  But  from  the  military 
standpoint  it  would  be  susceptible  of 
a  somewhat  more  restrained  utiliza- 
tion. 

The  arguments  that  have  been  made 
against  the  neutron  bomb  are  ba- 
sically three. 

•  One   of   them    is   that    it's    in- 


humane. I  agree.  But  so  is  an  SS-I8. 
a  multimegatonnage  weapon  that  will 
release  more  radiation  than  any 
number  of  neutron  bombs. 

•  A  second  objection  is  that  it  may 
lower  the  nuclear  threshold,  meaning 
that  its  possession  would  perhaps  lead 
more  inexorably  to  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons.  I  don't  think  that's  the 
case,  either,  because  what  deters  the 
use  of  nuclear  weapons  is  the  pros- 
pect of  retaliation.  In  the  event  that 
the  neutron  bomb  were  used  against 
us  or  against  the  Soviet  Union,  it  cer- 
tainly would  not  lessen  the  chances  of 
retaliation.  By  definition,  it's  a  more 
effective  killer  of  the  opposition's 
soldiers,  and  the  fact  that  it  spares 
more  civilians  is  not  really  going  to 
be  much  of  a  deterrent  to  retaliation. 
So  both  from  the  standpoint  of  lower- 
ing the  nuclear  threshold  and  from  the 
standpoint  of  inhumanity.  I  would  say 
that  the  campaign  against  it  is  ba- 
sically propagandistic. 

•  From  the  overall  standpoint  of 
arms  control,  in  my  opinion,  what  we 
ought  to  be  trying  to  do  with  the 
Soviet  Union  is  have  each  side  avoid 


.  .  .  you  can  trust  any  country  to 
behave  in  its  own  interests.  .  .  the 
Soviet  leadership  recognizes  that 
an  arms  control  agreement  with 
the  United  States  is  in  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Soviet  Union. 


the  kind  of  escalatory  development 
which  inevitably  leads  to  reciprocal 
action  on  the  part  of  the  other  side. 
When  the  threat  increases,  the  de- 
fense is  going  to  try  and  find  addi- 
tional ways  to  defend  itself.  As  far  as 
the  Soviets  developing  a  neutron 
bomb  is  concerned,  this,  of  course,  is 
something  which  Mr.  Brezhnev  has 
said  they  will  certianly  do  if  we  don't 
give  up  our  plans.  And  I  would  say 
let  them  go  ahead  and  do  it.  That's 
not  a  reason  why  we  should  not  de- 
velop the  neutron  bomb.  If  he  wants 
to  defend  against  a  nonexistent  NATO 
tank  attack  against  the  Soviet  Union, 
let  him  waste  his  money. 

Q.  Referring  to  your  earlier  jest 
about  the  Soviet  Union  being  sur- 
rounded by  Communist  enemies,  no 
one  today  really  has  addressed  him- 
self to  Red  China  and  our  improved 
relationship  with  Red  China.  And 
I'm  curious  as  to  whether  or  not 
that  is  a  factor  in  the  Soviet 
paranoia — the  concern  about  our 
improved  relations  with  Red  China. 


• 


Is  that  a  reasonable  conclusion 

A.  I  think  you're  perfectly  gd 
that  China  does  constitute  a  m 
plicating  factor  in  Soviet  del 
thinking.  When  you  ask  theirfl 
example,  why  it  is  they're  buiB 
up  their  forces  in  central  Europe  B 
say  China.  And  if  you  say,  "ChB 
in  that  direction,  not  over  here.'B 
say  "Yes,  but  in  the  event  ttul 
Chinese  were  to  attack,  we  vm 
have  to  anticipate  that  the  warlike* 
belligerent  West  would  pour  in  I 
the  other  side,  and  because  we  I 
this  threat  to  the  east,  we  have  til 
velop  our  forces  to  the  west." 

There  may  be  some  validity  tan 
contention.  I  think  there's  no  quiM 
of  the  fact  that  they  hate  the  ChiB 
They  fear  the  Chinese.  It's  recB 
cated.  I  don't  think  anybody  whihi 
been  in  China  could  doubt  the  s  m 
ity  of  the  Chinese  hatred  and  fe|l 
the  Soviet  Union. 

I  know  there  are  those  whoa 
that  we  ought  to  exploit  that  sitiB 
and  perhaps  make  more  conll 
cause  with  China  in  order  to  incH 
Soviet  apprehensions.  I'm  not  :■ 
sure  that's  a  wise  thing  to  dolt' 
never  been  American  policy,  .n 
don't  think  it  should  be  AmeB 
policy. 

In  my  view,  we  ought  to  cor  I 
to  try  and  have  useful  relations  m 
the  Chinese  and  useful  relations  rl 
the  Soviet  Union.  We  certainl  ai 
not  being  penalized  by  the  lac  n 
there  is  this  mutual  hatred.  Bette  hi 
they  should  hate  one  another  Dl 
than  they  hate  us.  But  I  think  Is 
that  we  have  to  recognize  that  I 
over  the  long  run,  could  be  a  resij| 
ing  factor  as  arms  control  proc  |dl 
With  regard  to  SALT  II  or  SAL  IB 
or,  I  suppose,  SALT  VIII,  I  n 
imagine  that  our  forces  would  lis 
constrained  that  either  one  clU 
would  have  to  fear  that  there  vfe: 
strategic  imbalance  as  compared  lil 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  Si 
at  some  point,  if  we  are  magnific  Itl 
successful,  we  will  have  to  try  in 
engage  the  Chinese  in  the  arms  I 
trol  dialogue. 

The  problem  comes  up  more  m 
mediately  in  connection  with  »l) 
comprehensive  test  ban  negotiatiti! 
We  have  been  negotiating  withth 
Soviet  Union  and  with  the  Un| 
Kingdom  looking  toward  a  com[Bl 
cessation  of  nuclear  explosives  I 
ing.  And  unquestionably,  the  I 
thing  that  concerns  the  Soviet  U| 
in  that  regard  is  whether  or  not  C| 
would  continue  to  test.  They're  rl 
worried  about  it  than  we  are  becl 
of  this  relationship  of  mutual  hate 
and  distrust.   But  it  is  something  « 


A  1978 


'. 


:M  concern  us  because  it  is  a  con- 
"'tilit  on  Soviet  negotiating  freedom. 
'eii 

i  i    Near  Seattle,  the  U.S.  Navy  is 

Ic     ling  a  Trident  submarine  base 

»,-.  angor.  Washington.  There's  a 

I    p  of  about  five  to  ten  thousand 

Wt.   ile  who  are  planning  to  physi- 

»  i   /  occupy  the  base  on  May  22, 

«f    :h  I  believe  is  the  day  before  the 

Jill  ed  Nations  has  a  conference  on 

rmament.  They're  arguing  that 

c  »i  |Trident  nuclear  submarine  has 

iave    st-strike  capability — that  owing 

s  range  and  to  the  accuracy  of 

In;  i  missiles  it  carries,  it  is  not  a 

o qi   nd-strike   vehicle  for  striking 

t  at  cities,  but  a  first-strike  ve- 

;  for  hitting  Soviet  silos.  Is  that 

?  Or  is  the  Trident  merely  a 

expensive  bargaining  chip  that 

,T  II  or  III  will  negotiate  away? 

.  I  would  say  that  it  is  neither.  In 

opinion  the  submarine-launched 

tstic  missile  is  a  stabilizing  sys- 

.  It's  stabilizing  because  of  its 

ent  invulnerability  to  attack  and 

because  it  does  have  less  accu- 

and  yield  than  the  warheads  on 

iand-based  ICBM's. 

imi  here's  no  question  that  the  Trident 

iile  will  have  more  range  than  the 

coi  (ting  Poseidon.  But  that,  again,  is 

on  tier  a  factor  in  first  strike  nor  a 

abilizing  attribute.    Let's  put   it 

way:  One  of  the  concerns  that's 

l  expressed  about  SALT  is  that  it 

/  prevent  us  from  doing  those 

gs  that  might  be  necessary  to  pro- 

our  deterrent.  It's  a  charge  that's 

lout  any  foundation  because  we 

[fi    preserve  all  of  the  options  that 

o(  (need  to  change  our  forces  if  arms 

Al  (trol  proves  to  be  ineffective. 

<ut  the  best  insurance  against  that 

3  have  a  system  which  is  invulner- 

from  any  first  strike.  Trident. 

ause  of  its  range,  means  that  the 

nets,  in  order  to  develop  an  an- 

iflibmarine  warfare  capability  against 

:;l  would  have  to  search  all  of  the 

ijans.  Trident  could  operate  very 

.  se  to  the  territorial  United  States. 

Id  it  does  not  have  the  combination 

a  accuracy  and  yield  that  would 

:Dke  it  a  first-strike  weapon. 

;  With  regard   to  the   second  part  of 

*  ir  question — is  Trident  a  bargain- 

'i  chip  that  would  be  bargained 

;  ay  in  SALT  II  or  SALT  III— in  my 

iinion,  no.  I  can  tell  you  it  won't  be 

ligained  away  in  SALT  II.   I  doubt 

nt  it  either  would  or  should  be  bar- 

,  ined  away  in  SALT  III.  We've  got 

■V  far  to  go  at  present. 

.  IWe  ought  to  be  concentrating  on 

.fose  systems  which  are  the  more  de- 

ijibilizing,   and  those  at  present  are 

e       ICBM's       with       multiple 


independently-targetable  reentry  ve- 
hicles. And  the  further  development 
of  accuracy  and  yield  in  the  MIRV'ed 
ICBM's  is  unfortunate.  It's  regretta- 
ble because  it  means  that  the  ICBM's 
on  both  sides  become,  at  the  same 
time,  more  deadly  and  more  vulnera- 
ble. As  a  consequence,  they  become 
more  attractive  first-strike  targets. 
And  there's  the  risk  that  at  a  time  of 
crisis,  if  you've  acquired  the  most 
valuable  part  of  your  strategic   force 

.  .  .  there  is  absolutely  nothing 
contemplated  that  would  result  in 
an  overall  restriction  on  the  de- 
velopment of  technologies  for  the 
peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy. 

in  weapons  which  are  usable  only  in  a 
first-strike,  both  sides  may  feel  that 
they  can't  afford  to  wait,  because 
they'll  never  be  able  to  strike  second. 
From  that  standpoint.  Trident  should 
not  be  regarded  as  a  bargaining  chip, 
but  rather  as  a  stabilizing  factor. 

Q.  What  effect  will  SALT  II  have 
on  our  missiles  in  Turkey? 

A.  It'll  have  none.  It  raises,  how- 
ever, a  very  interesting  point.  Up  to 
now,  we've  considered  SALT  as  deal- 
ing only  with  the  strategic  interconti- 
nental systems.  We've  insisted  that 
we  will  not  negotiate  with  regard  to 
our  forward-based  systems. 

That  was  difficult  to  get  the  Soviets 
to  accept.  They  would  have  preferred 
to  define  strategic  systems  as  being 
anything  that  can  strike  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  would  include  missiles 
stationed  in  Europe. 

The  question,  of  course,  is  how 
long  can  you  continue  with  a  defini- 
tion which  deals  only  with  the  inter- 
continental systems?  At  what 
point — and  I  think  it  is  inevitable  at 
some  point — will  you  begin  to  discuss 
also  restrictions  on  the  theater  nuclear 
forces'?  In  that  regard  all  I  can  say  is, 
certainly  if  we  were  ever  to  begin  to 
talk  about  our  missiles  in  Europe,  we 
would  insist  on  negotiating  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  their  forces  which 
can  strike  targets  in  Western  Europe, 
even  though  they  can't  strike  the 
United  States.  It  would  require  an 
overall  evaluation  of  theater  nuclear 
forces. 

Q.  I  understand  the  Soviets  have 
a  significant  advantage  over  us  in 
nuclear  throw-weight.  Would  it  be 
possible  to  negotiate  a  limitation  on 
throw-weight  or  is  that  ephemeral? 

A.  I  suppose  that  anything  is  possi- 
ble as  negotiations  go  on.  But  at  this 


point,  you  could  not  get  the  Soviet 
Union  to  negotiate  an  overall  limit  on 
throw-weight  that  would  put  them 
equal  to  us,  and  the  reason  is  that  our 
forces  have  evolved  in  different  direc- 
tions. There  are  asymmetries. 

At  one  point,  we  had  large,  liquid- 
fuel  missiles  and  so  did  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  decided — not  because  of 
SALT  since  there  was  no  SALT  at 
that  time,  not  because  of  any  restric- 
tions, but  in  the  exercise  of  our  inde- 
pendent military  judgment — to  go  for 
smaller,  solid-fuel  missiles  that  had 
greater  accuracy.  That's  the  way  the 
two  forces  evolved. 

As  a  consequence  of  that,  and  of 
the  fact  that  we  went  for  MIRV  tech- 
nology, we  have  ended  up  with  a 
situation  in  which  the  Soviets  have 
more  throw-weight  in  their  missiles, 
whereas  we  have  many,  many  more 
warheads.  We  have  more  than  twice 
as  many  nuclear  warheads  as  the 
Soviet  Union.  I'd  be  quite  sure  that  it 
we  tried  to  negotiate  a  restriction  on 
throw-weight,  they'd  want  to  have 
equal  limits  on  the  numbers  of 
warheads.  And  I  think  that  the 
warhead  number  is  a  more  significant 
indicia  of  strategic  capability  than 
throw-weight. 

Another  thing  that  sometimes  is 
overlooked  in  the  great  throw-weight 
argument  is  that  our  strategic  bombers 
have  immense  throw-weight  and  our 
strategic  bomber  force  dwarfs  that  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  As  a  possible  item 
for  subsequent  SALT  negotiations, 
we  might  very  well  feel  that  both 
warheads  and  throw-weight  were  ap- 

The  American  public  wants 
peace.  It  wants  arms  control.  It 
wants  tolerable  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  But  at  the  same 
time,  it  doesn't  trust  the  Soviet 
Union. 


propriate  subjects.  I  just  hope  that  we 
get  to  the  point  at  which  they  become 
the  relevant  factors,  but  we  aren't 
there  yet. 

Q.  Mr.  Vest  and  you  have  both 
acknowledged  your  basic  viewpoints 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  essentially 
an  insecure  nation. 

With  respect  to  the  Administra- 
tion's emphasis  on  human  rights 
and  the  discussions  that  we  have 
had  here  on  the  implications  of  that 
human  rights  policy  within  the 
Soviet  Union,  do  you  sometimes 
fear  that  that  Administration  policy 
could  make  your  job  more  difficult 


s 


at  SALT  by  making  the  Soviets 
more  intransigent  because  of  their 
basic  insecurity? 

A.  First,  let  me  make  an  admission 
which  is  probably  against  my  inter- 
ests: Arms  control  is  not  the  begin- 
ning and  end  of  foreign  policy.  There 
are  other  factors  that  have  to  be  in- 
volved in  any  comprehensive  foreign 
policy.  And  1  think  that  if  we  were  to 
be  recreant  to  our  concept  of  the  es- 
sentiality of  human  rights,  we  might 
have  better  arms  control  but  we 
would  have  worse  foreign  policy. 

Having  said  that,  let  me  also  ac- 
knowledge that  the  human  rights  is- 
sue, in  my  opinion,  has  not  affected 
the  SALT  negotiations  one  bit  during 
the  entire  time  that  I  have  been  as- 
sociated with  them.  And  that's  not 
surprising  because  both  sides  have  to 
look  at  arms  control  from  the 
standpoint  of  basic  national  security. 
For  example,  if  the  Soviet  Union  be- 
haved better  in  Africa  we  certainly 
wouldn't  give  them  any  concessions 
in  SALT. 

Similarly,  if  Mr.  Brezhnev  were  to 
stand  up  and  say,  "I  think  President 
Carter  is  right  and  1  hereby  adopt  the 
American  Bill  of  Rights."  that 
wouldn't  change  our  negotiating  posi- 
tions. Or  if  we,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  to  say,  "Your  position  is  per- 
fectly correct  and  the  right  to  a  job. 
etc.,  is  just  as  important  as  the  right 
to  freedom  from  torture."  I  would 
not  expect  that  that  would  lead  to  any 
greater  agreeableness  on  the  part  of 
the  Soviet  negotiators. 

These  negotiations  necessarily  have 
to  be  considered  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  overall  impact  on  the  strategic 
balance  and  the  overall  impact  on  the 
national  security. 

Q.  What  impact  will  our  decision 
to  go  full  steam  ahead  with  the 
cruise  missile  have? 

A.  The  cruise  missile  issue  is  ob- 
viously one  that  has  concerned  the 
Soviet  Union  very  much.  As  with  any 
new  technology,  I  think  there  is  al- 
ways the  question  in  their  minds  of, 
"Will  we  be  able  to  match  it?"  But 
you  have  to  consider  the  cruise  mis- 
sile issue  from  a  variety  of 
standpoints.  One  of  them  is  the  so- 
called  air-launched  cruise  missile. 

In  my  opinion,  the  air-launched 
cruise  missile  is  a  healthy  develop- 
ment. It's  healthy  tor  the  same  reason 
the  Trident  missile  is.  What  it  does  is 
bring  up-to-date  the  strategic  bomber 
part  of  our  deterrent.  It  means  we 
have  to  worry  less  about  the  potential 
vulnerability  of  Minuteman.  It  means 
we  have  to  worry  less  about  Soviet 
air  defenses.  But  at  the  same  time, 
it's   not  the   kind   of  a   weapon  that 


< 


either  threatens  the  retaliatory  force 
of  the  other  side  or  that  makes  arms 
control  impossible.  It  certainly  is  not 
a  first-strike  weapon.  The  B-52  has  to 
raise  its  ponderous  weight  from  an 
airfield  and  lumber  across  the  Atlan- 
tic Ocean  before  it  can  launch  its 
missiles.  It's  not  the  way  you  would 
start  a  nuclear  war.  And  the  Soviet 
Union  knows  it. 

From  the  standpoint  of  effect  on 
arms  control,  the  cruise  missile 
doesn't  make  arms  control  less  possi- 
ble,  because  you  still   have  a  con- 


.  .  .  arms  control  is  not  a  reward 
for  good  Soviet  behavior.  It's  not 
a  favor  that  we  do  for  the  Soviet 
Union.  It's  not  something  in 
which  we  arc  being  kind  to  them 
because  they  are  behaving  the 
way  we  want  them  to  be- 
have. .  .  . 


straint  on  the  platforms.  You  count 
the  heavy  bombers  that  would  launch 
the  cruise  missiles  against  the  overall 
totals  in  SALT  II.  You  don't  have  an 
indefinite  proliferation  of  cruise  mis- 
siles. Ground-launched  cruise  missiles 
and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles  raise 
different  kinds  of  questions.  And 
that's  the  reason  why  the  concept  of 
the  3-year  protocol  developed. 

In  May  1977,  as  a  result  of  a  series 
of  meetings  in  Geneva  involving  Sec- 
retary Vance  and  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko,  we  agreed  on  a  three-part 
framework  for  SALT  II.  One  part 
would  be  the  basic  treaty  lasting 
through  1985  that  would  have  such 
things  as  the  quantitative  limits,  the 
verification  provisions,  and  so  forth. 
A  second  part  would  be  a  3-year  pro- 
tocol in  which  you  would  try  and  deal 
with  the  systems  for  which  you  could 
not  develop  a  more  lasting  settlement. 
The  ground-launched  cruise  missiles 
and  the  sea-launched  cruise  missiles 
belong  in  those  categories.  We  have 
to  think  through  the  implications  of 
those  systems  in  determining  what 
kinds  of  constraints  we'd  be  willing 
to  adopt  on  a  more  lasting  basis.  And 
that's  what  we  will  do  as  a  part  of 
SALT  III. 

Q.  You  mentioned  the  B-52's 
lumbering  across  the  ocean,  which, 
of  course,  is  what  they  would  have 
to  do.  I'm  sure  the  President  put 
the  stop.on  the  B-l  as  a  bargaining 
point  with  the  Russians,  but  I  un- 
derstand that  they  have  a  new 
SS-20  weapon.  Can  we  do  a  little 


Department  of  State  B 


bit  of  bargaining  and  get  an  iH 
date  plane  that  is  not  a  VYorldfi 
II  relic? 

A.  The  B-52  would  hardly  ql 
as  a  World  War  II  relic,  and  the  ■ 
would  also  characterize  as  risingH 
derously  from  an  airfield  and  luil 
ing  across  the  Atlantic.  On  its  I 
sions,  it  would  be  a  subsonic  m 
and  as  compared  to  an  intercontiiH 
ballistic  missile,  of  course,  it  is  ■ 
terribly,  terribly  slow.  That's  ll 
makes  it  a  stabilizing  system.  Bil 
B-52  with  cruise  missiles  was  del 
upon  not  by  the  arms  control  ajH 
but  by  the  Pentagon  as  being  a  ■ 
effective  way  of  updating  our  bcB 
force  than  the  B-l. 

If  we  tried  to  bargain  on  this W 
obvious  answer  of  the  Soviet  ll 
would  be,  "You  made  that  decB 
not  as  a  favor  to  us  but  as  a  favB 
yourself;  you  decided  that  you  I 
better  off  with  the  B-52  with  cl 
missiles  than  you  were  with  the  I 
Since  you  have  made  a  decisionB 
has  saved  you  money  and  imprl 
your  strategic  forces,  why  shoiB 
give  you  anything  in  return?" 

With  regard  to  the  SS-20, 1 
SS-20  is  a  theater  nuclear  system  I 
theater  nuclear  systems  have  not  I 
a  subject  of  SALT  up  to  this  poii  I 
we  were  to  negotiate  about  the  SJ 1 
they  would  insist  on  negotiating  ;  I 
our  theater  nuclear  forces  such  a:  I 
FB- Ill's,  which  are  stationed  ill 
United  Kingdom  and  can  deva  I 
Soviet  targets. 

At  some  point  it  might  be  desi  I 
to  bring  all  of  those  theater  nuil 
forces  into  the  negotiations,  but  at  I 
stage  it  would  be  a  complicating  I 
tor.  It  would  tend  to  make  it  a  rrl 
national  negotiation  because  certJ 
we  would  have  to  involve  our  NjI 
allies,  and  we're  better  off  hancl 
bilaterally  what  we  can  handle  ori 
tercontinental  strategic  forces. 

Q.  Do  you  ever  just,  in  nego  it 
ing  with  the  Soviets,  sit  down  I 
philosophically  realize  the  folly  <l 
all,  and  just  exchange  views  ol 
personal  level?  I'm  curious  to  kU 
whether  this  rubber  room,  this  I 
uum  which  the  whole  thing  seem  I 
encompass,  isn't  a  little  bit  rid  I 
lous  to  you  when  you're  in  it? 

A.  On  the  rare  occasions  when  I 
do  sit  back  and  think  about  it,  yoil 
feel  that  there  is  a  certain  ludicna 
ness  about  the  entire  process.  I  nun 
we  shouldn't  have  to  be  sitting  d(W 
with  another  large,  powerful  nam 
and  agreeing  that  we  aren't  goingfl 
commit  mutual  suicide. 

But  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  I 
is  the  stage  we're  at  in  internatiol 
relations.  It  is  necessary  for  us  at  V 


htm 
K 

U..i 


1978 


I drjil  I0  have  strategic  stability  be- 
Wori  of  mutually  assured  destruction, 
:ronym  for  which  is  MAD.  But  at 
it,  some  such  '"madness"  is  in- 
>le;  it's  the  way  in  which  we  pre- 
a  bad  situation  from  getting 
indl 


'cm 


far  as  sitting  down   with   my 

erpart   and   philosophizing  about 
admittedly   basic   moral   and 
in  issues,   unfortunately  the 

iating  process  at  SALT  has  be- 
stylized   like   a  classic  ballet. 

have  the  plenary  sessions  at 
h  you  exchange  formal  written 
nents,  and  then  you  have  the  sub- 
tnt  sessions  which  are  supposed 

informal.  They're  informal  only 
comparative  basis.  There  is  noth- 
ipontaneous  about  them,   and   I 

if  there  can  be. 
;  Soviet  negotiator  has  been  there 

1969;  I  am  his  third  counterpart. 

't  think  that  in  the  case  of  any  of 
Tedecessors  that  they  have  been 
to  establish  any  sort  of 
■raderie.    My   Russian   is   really 

deficient,  and  so  is  his  English, 
as  a  consequence  there  isn't  much 
rtunity  to  deal  with  these  larger 
s.  It  would  be  desirable, 
/ould  hope  that  as  the  relationship 
res  that  we  would  find,  perhaps 

a  new  generation  of  negotiators 
oth  sides,  that  you  would  be  able 
iet  this  sort  of  exchange  and 
taps  as  a  consequence  begin  to 
I  more  sense  than  madness  out  of 
:lationship. 

What  is  the  dispute  about  the 
et  Backfire  bomber?  Is  there 
I  serious  consideration  of  dealing 
■  that  issue  in  an  exchange  of  let- 
■$.  and  if  you  did  deal  with  it  in 
J  exchange  of  letters,  would  you 
Jik  that  would  jeopardize  the 
Ity's  chances  of  passing  through 
I  Senate? 

|.  The  Backfire  bomber  issue  is 
that  remains  under  negotiation, 
one  of  the  major  remaining  prob- 
i,  one  of  the  major  remaining  dif- 
nces  between  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union. 

he  problem  with  Backfire  is  not 

we  have  any  question  about  its 

don;  I  think  that  there  is  no  doubt 

it  was  developed  as   a  medium 

iber,  as  a  theater  weapon.   The 

iC  trouble  is  that  it's  too  damn  big. 

bigger  than   a  decent   medium 

iber  ought  to  be,  and  our  intelli- 

ce  sources  indicate  that  if  you  fly  it 

b  enough  and  slow  enough,  it  could 

:h  the  United  States.  As  a  strategic 

tpon  it  certainly  is  not  a  very  good 

What  we're  trying  to  do  is  to  get 

kinds  of  constraints  that   would 

vent  its  adaptation  to  a  strategic  role. 


The  way  in  which  that  will  be  done 
has  not  been  decided.  But  whatever 
form  is  utilized,  it  would  be  legally 
binding.  We  would  insist  on  the  abil- 
ity to  enforce  that  provision  against 
the  Soviet  Union.  We  would  insist  that 
any  violation  of  those  assurances 
would,  in  fact,  violate  SALT  II  and 
permit  us  our  recourse.  Since  it  would 
be  legally  binding,  since  it  would  be  a 
part  of  the  overall  SALT  II  package. 


.  .  .  the  Soviets  have  more 
throw-weight  in  their  missiles, 
whereas  we  have  many,  many 
more  warheads.  .  .  the  warhead 
numbers  is  a  more  significant  in- 
dicia of  strategic  capability  than 
throw-weight. 


in  my  opinion  it  would  not  interfere 
with  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. 

Q.  Would  you  give  some  context 
to  the  so-called  killer  satellite?  Does 
that  represent  a  problem  with  verifi- 
cation? Is  it  a  strategic  weapon? 
How  would  it  be  used? 

A.  The  entire  question  of  antisatel- 
lite  capability  is.  of  course,  a  trou- 
bling one.  It  would  not  be  a  verification 
problem  because  the  use  of  any  an- 
tisatellite  capability  would  in  itself  be 
a  flat,  clear  violation  of  the  SALT 
agreement.  In  other  words,  if  we  have 
a  SALT  II  agreement,  it  will  contain 
provisions  of  the  same  exact  substan- 
tive effect  that  we  have  in  our  existing 
treaties  with  the  Soviet  Union,  which 
is  that  any  interference  with  our  na- 
tional technical  means  of  detection  is  a 
violation. 

The  problem  is  not  one  of  verifica- 
tion; the  problem  is  one  of  having 
a  capability,  which  at  a  time  of  crisis 
might  lead  the  Soviet  Union  to  violate 
the  treaty.  In  the  event  that  they  were 
to  do  so,  it  would  have  to  be  regarded 
as  a  very,  very  serious  provocation 
and,  indeed,  as  functionally  an  act  of 
war.  Since  it  is  of  such  grave  conse- 
quences, it  is  desirable  that  we 
negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
prevent  the  development  of  an  an- 
tisatellite  capability. 

In  March  in  Moscow  Secretary 
Vance  proposed  a  number  of  bilateral 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
One  of  those  was  the  question  of 
negotiating  restraints  on  the  develop- 
ment of  antisatellite  weapons.  That 
should  be  done.  It  would  not  be  a 
strategic  weapon,  but  it  would  be  a 
very  seriously  disruptive  weapon  as  far 
as  the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship  was 


concerned,  and  it  would  lead  you  to 
feel  that  there  was  a  possibility  of  an 
entire  breakdown  of  not  only  the  exist- 
ing treaties  but  of  the  overall  relation- 
ship. 

Q.  Isn't  the  SS-20  a  loophole  in 
SALT?  As  I  understand  it,  it's  a 
two-stage  missile  which  is  easily  con- 
vertible to  the  three-stage  SS-16, 
which  is  a  strategic  weapon. 

A.  That  has  been  a  problem  with 
which  we  have  had  to  deal  at  SALT. 
In  my  opinion  we  have  resolved  it 
satisfactorily.  The  SALT  agreement 
will  see  to  it  that  the  Soviet  Union 
cannot  deploy  a  mobile  missile  of 
ICBM  character  and  that  we  can't, 
which  would  prevent  their  use  of  the 
SS-16  or  any  comparable  weapon. 

Q.  While  we're  talking  about 
strategic  weapons,  what's  happening 
on  the  tactical  weapon  level? 

A.  We  have  not  as  yet  been  able  to 
get  into  negotiations  with  regard  to 
arms  control  on  tactical  nuclear 
weapons.  We  have,  as  you  know, 
many  thousands  of  tactical  nuclear 
weapons  deployed  in  Europe.  The 
neutron  bomb  would  be  one  means  of 
modernizing  those  existing  tactical 
nuclear  weapons.  They're  regarded  as 
a  very  important  part  of  the  overall  de- 
terrent against  war  in  central  Europe. 
NATO  has  developed  the  concept  of  a 
deterrent  triad,  where  we  have  a  con- 
ventional force  to  meet  a  Soviet  at- 
tack, and  if  that  were  to  continue  to 
escalate,  we  do  have  the  option  of  tac- 
tical nuclear  weapons. 

They  raise,  of  course,  very  serious 
risks,  because  no  one  could  be  sure 
what  would  happen  when  you  first 
cross  the  nuclear  threshold. 

Looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  de- 
terrence, they're  good;  looked  at  from 
the  standpoint  of  what  happens  in  the 
event  deterrence  fails,  they're  very 
risky.  It's  one  of  the  reasons  why  we 
would  hope  that  if  we  are  successful  at 
this  level  in  developing  controls  on 
strategic  nuclear  weapons,  we  could 
move  on  and  try  and  reach  some  fur- 
ther agreement  that  would,  by  arms 
control  techniques,  lessen  the  chances 
of  anything  happening  in  Europe  that 
could  lead  to  conventional  war  and 
possible  escalation  past  the  nuclear 
threshold.  □ 


Informal  remarks  and  a  question-and-answer 
session  before  a  National  Foreign  Policy  Con- 
ference for  Editors  and  Broadcasters  held  at 
the  Department  of  State  on  Jan.  19.  1978. 

'For  texts  of  the  joint  statement  on  strategic 
offensive  arms  and  the  joint  communique  of 
Nov.  24.  1974.  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  23, 
p.  879. 

2See  Bulletin  of  Apr.  25.  1977.  p.  389. 
3See  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  1977.  p.  643. 


10 


Department  of  State  B I 


i  oniplitinee  Willi  the  SALT  I  Agreements 


The  Department  of  State  and  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
February  28,  1978,  released  an  Administration  report  summarizing  experience 
in  monitoring  compliance  with  the  SALT  I  agreements  of  1972.  The  report, 
forwarded  h\  Secretary  Vance  to  Senator  John  Sparkman.  Chairman  of  the  Sen- 
ale  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  was  prepared  in  response  to  questions  about 
possible  Soviet  violations  of  the  agreements. 

The  Administration  has  released  the  report  on  compliance  with  the  SALT 
agreements  in  order  to  inform  the  public  fully  on  this  important  matter.  The  re- 
port reviews  in  detail  each  of  the  questions  which  has  arisen  under  the  agree- 
ments. The  report  demonstrates  how  carefully  the  United  States  monitors  Soviet 
compliance  with  the  SALT  agreements. 

It  was  anticipated  in  the  drafting  of  the  SALT  agreements  in  1972  that  ques- 
tions could  arise  regarding  the  implementation  of  the  agreements,  and  a  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  Standing  Consultative  Commission  was  established  to  resolve  such 
questions.  It  is  clear  from  this  review  that  the  United  States  has  raised  promptly 
with  the  Soviets  any  unusual  or  ambiguous  activities  which  could  be  or  could 
become  grounds  for  concern.  The  Soviets  also  raised  a  number  of  questions  about 
U.S.  activities.  In  each  case,  the  activity  in  question  has  ceased  or  additional 
information  has  allayed  the  concern. 


The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  pro- 
vide a  brief  account  of  the  back- 
ground, discussion,  and  status  of  those 
questions  related  to  compliance  with 
the  SALT  agreements  of  1972 — the 
ABM  treaty  and  the  Interim  Agreement 
on  strategic  offensive  arms — which 
have  been  raised  by  the  United  States 
and  the  U.S.S.R.'  It  also  provides  a 
brief  discussion  of  matters  which  have 
been  mentioned  in  the  press  but  which 
have  not  been  raised  with  the 
U.S.S.R. 

Even  before  talks  with  the  U.S.S.R. 
on  the  subject  of  strategic  arms  limita- 
tion began,  the  United  States  estab- 
lished, in  the  framework  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council  (NSC)  system, 
an  interagency  group  known  as  the 
Verification  Panel  to  study  questions 
concerning  SALT,  with  special  atten- 
tion to  matters  of  verification  of  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  oi  possible 
agreements.  During  the  preliminary 
talks  in  November  and  December  of 
1969,  the  United  States  proposed,  and 
the  U.S.S.R.  agreed,  to  create  a  spe- 
cial standing  body  to  deal  with  ques- 
tions of  implementation  of  agreements 
which  might  be  concluded,  including 
questions  which  might  arise  concern- 
ing compliance.  This  reflected  early 
recognition  and  agreement  that  such 
matters  would  require  special  attention 
in  connection  with  any  agreement  as 
complex  as  one  limiting  the  strategic 
weapons  of  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R. 

Article  XIII  of  the  ABM  treaty  of 
May  26.  1972,  provides  for  a  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  (SCC)  to, 
among  other  things,    "consider  ques- 


tions concerning  compliance  with  the 
obligations  assumed  and  related  situa- 
tions which  may  be  considered  am- 
biguous. " 

Article  VI  of  the  Interim  Agreement 
provides  that  the  parties  use  the  SCC 
in  a  similar  manner  in  connection  with 
that  agreement.  In  December  1972, 
during  the  first  session  of  SALT  II, 
the  SCC  was  formally  established. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  1972 
SALT  agreements,  procedures  have 
been  established  within  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment for  monitoring  Soviet  per- 
formance and  for  dealing  with  matters 
related  to  compliance.  All  intelligence 
information  is  carefully  analyzed  in 
the  context  of  the  provisions  of  those 
agreements,  and  recommendations  on 
questions  which  arise  are  developed  by 
interagency  intelligence  and  policy  ad- 
visory groups  within  the  NSC  system. 
Currently,  these  are  an  Intelligence 
Community  Steering  Group  on 
Monitoring  Strategic  Arms  Limitations 
and  the  Standing  Consultative  Com- 
mission Working  Group  of  the  NSC 
Special  Coordination  Committee. 
Should  analysis  of  intelligence  infor- 
mation indicate  that  there  could  be  a 
question  concerning  compliance,  this 
latter  group  reviews  and  analyzes  the 
available  information  and  provides 
recommendations.  The  President  de- 
cides whether  a  particular  question  or 
issue  is  to  be  raised  with  the  U.S.S.R. 
based  on  the  study  and  recommenda- 
tions of  the  Working  Group  and.  if 
necessary,  the  department  and  agency 
principals  who  comprise  the  Special 
Coordination  Committee  or  the  NSC 
itself.  After  discussion  of  any  question 


is  opened  with  the  U.S.S.R. 
Standing  Consultative  Commi 
the  positions  and  actions  taken  I 
U.S.  representatives  are  also  guii 
the  same  manner. 

Questions  Raised  by  the  U.S. 

Launch  Control  Facil 
(Special-Purpose  Silos).  Article 
the  Interim  Agreement  states: 
Parties  undertake  not  to  start  con 
tion  of  additional  fixed  land-basi 
tercontinental  ballistic  missile  (I< 
launchers  after  July  1,  1972." 

In  1973  the  United  States  c 
mined  that  additional  silos  of  a  I 
ent  design  were  under  constructi 
a  number  of  launch  sites.  If  thes 
been  intended  to  contain  ICBM 
chers,  they  would  have  constitu 
violation  of  Article  I  of  the  In 
Agreement. 

When  the  United  States  raise! 
concern  over  this  construction  wi  I 
Soviet  side,  the  U.S.S.R.  respcl 
that  the  silos  were,  in  fact,  har«B 
facilities  built  for  launch-controll 
poses.  As  discussions  proceedecB 
additional  intelligence  became  .  I 
able,  the  United  States  concluded 
the  silos  were  built  to  serve  a  la 
control  function. 

In  early  1977,  following  furthe 
cussions  during  1975  and  1976  ; 
review  of  our  intelligence  on  this 
ject,  the  United  States  decided  to 
discussion  of  this  matter  on  the 
that  the  silos  in  question  are  curr 
used  as  launch-control  facilities. 
will,  of  course,  continue  to  watc 
any  activity  which  might  wai 
reopening  of  this  matter. 

Concealment  Measures.  Artie 
of  the  Interim  Agreement  and  Ai 
XII   of  the   ABM  treaty  provide 
each   party   shall   not    ".  .  .  intei 
with  the  national  technical  mean 
verification  of  the  other  Party 
nor   "...  use  deliberate  conceal! 
measures  which  impede  verificatio 
national   technical   means  of  c 
pliance  with  the  provisions.  .  ."  o 
agreement  or  the  treaty.   Both  art 
provided   that  the  latter  obligal 
"...  shall  not  require  changes  in  I 
rent  construction,   assembly,  conl 
sion,  or  overhaul  practices." 

The  United  States  has  closely  ml 
tored  Soviet  concealment  practices  I 
before   and   after  conclusion   of  Q 


Slaiel 


S.I 


1978 

SALT  agreements.  During  1974 

tfent  of  those  concealment  activ- 

issociated  with  strategic  weapons 

rams   increased   substantially. 

of  them  prevented  U.S.  verifica- 

)f  compliance  with  the  provisions 

le  ABM  treaty  or  the  Interim 

Ipment,  but  there  was  concern  that 

jcould  impede  verification  in  the 

if  the  pattern  of  concealment 

ires  were  permitted  to  continue 

>and. 

United  States  stated  this  con- 
and  discussed  it  with  the  Soviet 
In  early  1975  careful  analysis  of 
igence  information  on  activities 
U.S.S.R.  led  the  United  States 
>nclude  that  there  no  longer  ap- 
Jd  to  be  an  expanding  pattern  of 
j;alment  activities  associated  with 
fgic  weapons  programs.  We  con- 
to  monitor  Soviet  activity  in  this 
jclosely. 

dern  Large  Ballistic  Missiles 
■19  Issue).  Article  II  of  the 
im  Agreement  states:  "The  Par- 
undertake  not  to  convert  land- 
i  launchers  for  light  ICBM's,  or 
CBM's  of  older  types  deployed 
to  1964,  into  land-based  launch- 
er heavy  ICBM's  of  types  de- 
ed after  that  time." 
lis  provision  was  sought  by  the 
d  States  as  part  of  an  effort  to 
:  limits  on  Soviet  heavy  ICBM's 
9  and  follow-ons).  We  did  not, 
ever,  obtain  agreement  on  a  quan- 
ve  definition  of  a  heavy  ICBM 
h  would  constrain  increases  in  the 
of  Soviet  light  ICBM's  (SS-11 
follow-ons).  Thus,  the  U.S.  side 
id  on  the  final  day  of  SALT  I 
tiations  [May  26,  1972]: 

:  U.S.  Delegation  regrets  that  the  Soviet 
;ation  has  not  been  willing  to  agree  on  a 
non  definition  of  a  heavy  missile.  Under 
circumstances,  the  U.S.  Delegation  be- 
s  it  necessary  to  state  the  following:  The 
:d  States  would  consider  any  ICBM  having 
ume  significantly  greater  than  that  of  the 
st  light  ICBM  now  operational  on  either 
to  be  a  heavy  ICBM.  The  U.S.  proceeds 
le  premise  that  the  Soviet  side  will  give 
account  to  this  consideration. 

line  U.S.S.R.  delegation  maintained 
position  throughout  SALT  I  that  an 
:ed  definition  of  heavy  ICBM's  was 

essential  to  the  understanding 
:hed  by  the  sides  in  the  Interim 
eement  on  the  subject  of  heavy 
IM's  and  made  clear  that  they  did 

agree  with  the  U.S.  statement 
>ted  above.  When  deployment  of  the 
-19  missile  began,  its  size,  though 

a  violation  of  the  Interim  Agree- 
nt  provisions  noted  above,  caused 
United  States  to  raise  the  issue  with 


the  Soviets  in  early  1975.  Our  purpose 
was  to  emphasize  the  importance  the 
United  States  attached  to  the  distinc- 
tion, made  in  the  Interim  Agreement 
between  "light"  and  "heavy" 
ICBM's,  as  well  as  the  continuing  im- 
portance of  that  distinction  in  the  con- 
text of  the  SALT  II  agreement  under 
negotiation  at  the  time.  Following 
some  discussion  in  the  SCC,  further 
discussions  of  this  question  in  that 
forum  were  deferred  because  it  was 
under  active  consideration  in  the  SALT 
II  negotiations. 

Since  that  time,  the  U.S.  and 
U.S.S.R.  delegations  have  agreed  in 
the  draft  text  of  the  SALT  II  agreement 
on  a  clear  demarcation,  in  terms  of 
missile  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight,  between  light  and  heavy 
ICBM's. 

Possible  Testing  of  an  Air  Defense 
System  (SA-5)  Radar  in  an  ABM 
Mode.  Article  VI  of  the  ABM  treaty 
states:  "To  enhance  assurance  of  the 
effectiveness  of  the  limitations  on 
ABM  systems  and  their  components 
provided  by  this  Treaty,  each  Party  un- 
dertakes: (a)  not  to  give  missiles,  laun- 
chers, or  radars,  other  than  ABM  inter- 
ceptor missiles,  ABM  launchers,  or 
ABM  radars,  capabilities  to  counter 
strategic  ballistic  missiles  or  their  ele- 
ments in  flight  trajectory,  and  not  to 
test  them  in  an  ABM  mode  .  .  .  .  ' 

On  April  7,  1972,  the  United  States 
made  a  statement  to  clarify  our  in- 
terpretation of  "tested  in  an  ABM 
mode."  We  noted,  with  respect  to 
radars,  that  we  would  consider  a  radar 
to  be  so  tested  if,  for  example,  it  makes 
measurements  on  a  cooperative  target 
vehicle  during  the  reentry  portion  of  its 
trajectory  or  makes  measurements  in 
conjunction  with  the  test  of  an  ABM  in- 
terceptor missile  or  an  ABM  radar  at 
the  same  test  range.  We  added  that 
radars  used  for  purposes  such  as  range 
safety  or  instrumentation  would  be 
exempt  from  application  of  these 
criteria. 

During  1973  and  1974,  U.S.  obser- 
vation of  Soviet  tests  of  ballistic  mis- 
siles led  us  to  believe  that  a  radar  as- 
sociated with  the  SA-5  surface-to-air 
missile  system  had  been  used  to  track 
strategic  ballistic  missiles  during  flight. 

A  question  of  importance  in  relation 
to  this  activity  was  whether  it  repre- 
sented an  effort  to  upgrade  the  SA-5 
system  for  an  ABM  role.  The  Soviets 
could  have  been  using  the  radar  in  a 
range  instrumentation  role  to  obtain 
precision  tracking;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  activity  could  have  been  part  of  an 
effort  to  upgrade  the  SA-5  system  for 
an  ABM  role  or  to  collect  data  for  use 
in  developing  ABM  systems  or  a  new 


11 


dual  SAM/ABM  system.  Although 
much  more  testing,  and  testing  signifi- 
cantly different  in  form,  would  be 
needed  before  the  Soviets  could 
achieve  an  ABM  capability  for  the 
SA-5,  the  observed  activity  was, 
nevertheless,  ambiguous  with  respect 
to  the  constraints  of  article  VI  of  the 
ABM  treaty  and  the  related  U.S.  stated 
interpretation  of  "testing  in  an  ABM 
mode."  If  the  activity  was  designed  to 
upgrade  the  SA-5  system,  it  would 
have  been  only  the  first  step  in  such  an 
effort.  Extensive  and  observable  mod- 
ifications to  other  components  of  the 
system  would  have  been  necessary,  but 
these  have  not  occurred. 

The  United  States  raised  this  issue 
based  on  the  indications  that  an  SA-5 
radar  may  have  been  tracking  ballistic 
missiles  during  the  reentry  portion  of 
their  flight  trajectory  into  an  ABM  test 
range. 


February  21,  1978 
Honorable  John  Sparkman 
Chairman.  Committee  on 

Foreign  Relations 
U.S.  Senate 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

As  you  know  there  has  been  a  great 
deal  of  interest  in  recent  months  over 
the  question  of  the  Soviet  record  of 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
SALT  I  agreements.  I  understand  that 
members  of  your  Committee  have  ex- 
pressed concern,  most  recently  in  the 
course  of  hearings  to  approve  the  Am- 
bassadorial nomination  of  Robert  Buch- 
heim,  the  US  Commissioner  to  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission  in 
Geneva. 

The  issue  of  Soviet  compliance,  al- 
though important  in  its  own  right,  takes 
on  an  increased  urgency  at  a  time  when 
we  are  nearing  completion  of  a  new 
SALT  II  agreement. 

I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  statement 
prepared  by  the  Administration  which 
deals  with  the  broad  range  of  issues 
raised  by  both  sides  regarding  com- 
pliance with  the  first  SALT  agreements. 
In  addition  the  statement  addresses  a 
number  of  charges  which  have  been 
raised  in  the  press  but  which  in  fact 
were  not  the  subject  of  discussion  be- 
tween the  two  sides. 

I  hope  that  this  statement  will  lay  to 
rest  many  of  the  concerns  of  members 
of  your  Committee  and  will  serve  to  an- 
swer the  questions  raised  by  members 
of  the  Committee. 

With  warmest  regards. 
Sincerely, 

Cyrus  Vance 


12 


Department  of  State  B  | 


The  Soviets  maintained  that  no 
Soviet  air  defense  radar  had  been  tested 
in  an  ABM  mode.  They  also  noted  that 
the  use  of  non-ABM  radars  for  range 
safety  or  instrumentation  was  not  lim- 
ited by  the  ABM  treaty. 

A  short  time  later,  we  observed  that 
the  radar  activity  of  concern  during 
Soviet  ballistic  missile  tests  had 
ceased. 

The  United  States  has  continued  to 
monitor  Soviet  activities  carefully  for 
any  indications  that  such  possible  test- 
ing activity  might  be  resumed. 

Soviet  Reporting  and  Dismantling 
of  Excess  ABM  Test  Launchers.  Each 
side  is  limited  under  the  ABM  treaty  to 
no  more  than  15  ABM  launchers  at  test 
ranges.  During  1972,  soon  after  the 
ABM  treaty  was  signed,  the  Soviets 
dismantled  several  excess  launchers  at 
the  Soviet  ABM  test  range. 

On  July  3,  1974,  the  agreed  proce- 
dures, worked  out  in  the  SCC,  for  dis- 
mantling excess  ABM  test  launchers 
entered  into  force.  After  the  detailed 
procedures  entered  into  effect,  the 
U.S.S.R.  provided  notification  in  the 
SCC  that  the  excess  ABM  launchers  at 
the  Soviet  test  range  had  been  disman- 
tled in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  agreed  procedures.  Our  own  in- 
formation was  that  several  of  the 
launchers  had  not,  in  fact,  been  disman- 
tled in  complete  accordance  with  those 
detailed  procedures. 

Even  though  the  launchers  were 
deactivated  prior  to  entry  into  force  of 
the  procedures,  and  their  reactivation 
would  be  of  no  strategic  significance, 
the  United  States  raised  the  matter  as  a 
case  of  inaccurate  notification  or  re- 
porting to  make  known  our  expectation 
that,  in  the  future,  care  would  be  taken 
to  insure  that  notification,  as  well  as 
dismantling  or  destruction,  was  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  agreed  procedures. 

Soviet  ABM  Radar  on  Kamchatka 
Peninsula.  Article  IV  of  the  ABM 
treaty  states:  "The  limitations  provided 
for  in  Article  III  [on  deployment]  shall 
not  apply  to  ABM  systems  or  their 
components  used  for  development  or 
testing,  and  located  within  current  or 
additionally  agreed  test  ranges  " 

In  October  1975  a  new  radar  was  in- 
stalled at  the  Kamchatka  impact  area  of 
the  Soviet  ICBM  test  range.  Since  arti- 
cle IV  exempts  from  the  limitations  oi 
article  III  only  those  ABM  components 
used  for  development  or  testing  at  cur- 
rent or  additionally  agreed  ranges,  lo- 
cation of  this  radar,  which  the  United 
States  identified  as  an  ABM  radar,  on 
the  Kamchatka  Peninsula  could  have 
constituted  establishment  of  a  new 
Soviet  ABM  test  range. 


This  situation,  however,  was  made 
ambiguous  by  two  facts. 

( 1 )  Just  prior  to  the  conclusion  of 
the  SALT  negotiations  in  1972,  the 
United  States  provided  to  the  Soviet 
delegation  a  list  of  U.S.  and  Soviet 
ABM  test  ranges  which  did  not  include 
the  Kamchatka  impact  area.  The  Soviet 
side  neither  confirmed  nor  denied  the 
accuracy  or  completeness  of  the  U.S. 
listing  and  indicated  that  use  of  na- 
tional technical  means  assured  against 
misunderstanding  of  article  IV. 

(2)  The  presence  of  an  older  type 
ABM  radar  could  be  viewed  as  having 
established  the  Kamchatka  impact  area 
as  an  ABM  test  range  at  the  time  the 
ABM  treaty  was  signed. 

Though  the  location  of  a  new  ABM 
radar  on  Kamchatka  was  not  strategi- 
cally significant,  it  was  decided  that 
this  matter  should  be  raised  with  the 
Soviet  side  in  order  to  set  the  record 
straight. 

We  brought  the  situation  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Soviet  side.  The  U.S.S.R. 
indicated  that  a  range  with  a  radar  in- 
strumentation complex  existed  on  the 
Kamchatka  Peninsula  on  the  date  of 
signature  of  the  ABM  treaty  and  that 
they  would  be  prepared  to  consider  the 
Kamchatka  range  a  current  test  range 
within  the  meaning  of  article  IV  of  the 
ABM  treaty.  The  United  States  con- 
tinued the  exchange  to  establish  that 
Kamchatka  is  an  ABM  test  range,  that 
Sary  Shagan  and  Kamchatka  are  the 
only  ABM  test  ranges  in  the  U.S.S.R., 
and  that  article  IV  of  the  ABM  treaty 
requires  agreement  concerning  the  es- 
tablishment of  additional  test  ranges. 

The  Soviet  side  has  acknowledged 
that  Kamchatka  is  an  ABM  test  range 
and  that  it  and  Sary  Shagan  are  the  only 
ABM  test  ranges  in  the  U.S.S.R.  On 
the  third  point,  discussions  are  continu- 
ing on  how  properly  to  satisfy  the  need 
for  discussing  and  agreeing  upon  the 
establishment  of  an  ABM  test  range. 
Agreement  appears  near  on  this  matter. 

Soviet  Dismantling  or  Destruction 
of  Replaced  ICBM  Launchers.  Under 
the  Interim  Agreement  and  the  protocol 
thereto  of  May  26,  1972,  the  U.S.S.R. 
was  permitted  to  have  no  more  than 
950  SLBM  launchers  and  62  modern, 
nuclear-powered  ballistic  missile  sub- 
marines. In  addition  it  was  provided 
that  Soviet  SLBM  launchers  in  excess 
of  740  might  become  operational  only 
as  replacements  for  older  ICBM  and 
SLBM  launchers,  which  would  be  dis- 
mantled or  destroyed  under  agreed  pro- 
cedures. 

Such  procedures  were  developed  in 
the  SCC  and  became  effective  on 
July  3,    1974.  The  procedures  include 


detailed  requirements  for  the  di:| 
tling  or  destruction  actions  to  bj 
complished,  their  timing,  and  nc 
tion  about  them  to  the  it 
party. 

By  early  1976  the  Soviets  ha  dr 
veloped  a  requirement  to  dismanill 
replaced  launchers.  It  soon  becanl 
parent  to  the  United  States  thai 
Soviets  would  probably  not  conlei 
all  the  required  dismantling  actioB 
all  of  the  launchers  on  time.  TherrB' 
the  United  States  decided  to  raisfl 
question  with  the  Soviets,  but  tfl 
we  could  do  so,  the  notification ■ 
cerning  dismantling  or  destructioiB 
vided  by  the  Soviet  side  in  the  SCB 
knowledged  that  the  dismantling  I 
older  ICBM  launchers  had  not  I 
completed  in  the  required  time  ptl 
The  Soviet  side  explained  the  sitil 
and  predicted  that  all  the  disma>» 
actions  would  be  completed  by  Jul 
1976,  and  agreed  to  the  U.S.  de* 
that  no  more  submarines  with  rerl 
ment  SLBM  launchers  begin  sea  1 
before  such  completion.  Both  c  if 
tions  were  met. 

Since  that  time,  although  we 
observed  some  minor  procedural  I 
crepancies  at  a  number  of  those  dM 
vated  launch  sites  and  at  others  z  I 
replacement  process  continued,  a  I 
launchers  have  been  in  a  conditioi  I 
satisfied  the  essential  substantiv  I 
quirements,  which  are  that  they  c  I 
be  used  to  launch  missiles  and  c  I 
be  reactivated  in  a  short  timel 
necessary  we  have  pursued  the  quel 
of  complete  and  precise  accompl 
ment  of  the  detailed  requiremen  I 
the  agreed  procedures. 

Concealment  at  Test  Range.  Pi 

sions  of  the  Interim  Agreement  |l 
nent  to  this  discussion  are: 

•  Article  V  (3):  "Each  Party  ml 
takes  not  to  use  deliberate  conceal  I 
measures  which  impede  verificatiol 
national  technical  means  of  complil 
with  the  provisions  of  this  Int<l 
Agreement. " 

•  Agreed  statement  concerrl 
launcher  dimensions:  "  ...  in  hi 
process  of  modernization  and  repll 
ment  the  dimensions  of  land-b.l 
ICBM  silo  launchers  will  not  be  sijl 
icantly  increased." 

•  Agreed  statement  concerning  I 
and  training  launchers:  "...  til 
shall  be  no  significant  increase  inl 
number  of  ICBM  and  SLBM  test  I 
training  launchers,  or  in  the  numbed 
such  launchers  for  modern  land-b;3l 
heavy  ICBMs  .  .  .  construction  or  il 
version  of  ICBM  launchers  at  I 
ranges  shall  be  undertaken  only  I 
purposes  of  testing  and  training." 

In  early  1977  we  observed  the  usB 


41  1978 


net  covering  over  an  ICBM  test 
her  undergoing  conversion  at  a 


itS 


E! 
lilt 


ange  in  the  U.S.S.R. 

iere  was  agreement  in  the  United 

s  that  this  subject  could  be  appro- 

e  for  discussion  in  SALT  in  the 

sit:   *xt  of  the  ongoing  discussions  on 

ubject  of  deliberate  concealment 

li  mres  in  connection  with  a  SALT  II 

H«   ;ment.  The  subject  was  initially 

I   d  in  this  context. 

addition  we  also  expressed  our 
that  the  use  of  a  covering  over  an 
M  silo   launcher  concealed   ac- 
es from  national   technical  means 
erification  and  could  impede  verifi- 
n  of  compliance  with  provisions  of 
Interim  Agreement;   specifically, 
provision  which  dealt   with   in- 
«:   ses  in  dimensions  of  ICBM  silo 
chers  as  recorded  in  the  agreed 
ment  quoted  above.  The  United 
:s  took  the  position  that  a  covering 
:    h  conceals  activities  at  an  ICBM 
from  national  technical  means  of 
"ication  could  reduce  the  confi- 
e  and  trust  which  are  important  to 
lal  efforts  to  establish  and  maintain 
igic  arms  limitations, 
has  been  the  Soviet  position  that 
provisions  of  the  Interim  Agree- 
were  not  applicable  to  the  activity 
mestion.   Nevertheless,   they  sub- 
ently  removed  the  net  covering. 

stions  Raised  by  the  U.S.S.R. 

oelters  Over  Minuteman  Silos. 

graph  3  of  article  V  of  the  Interim 
eement  states:  "Each  Party  under- 
s  not  to  use  deliberate  concealment 
sures  which  impede  verification  by 
onal  technical  means  of  compliance 
l  the  provisions  of  this  Interim 
eement.  This  obligation  shall  not 
lire  changes  in  current  construction, 
:mbly,  conversion,  or  overhaul 
:tices." 

he  United  States  used  shelters 
ch  were  either  300  or  700  square 
in  size  over  Minuteman  iCBM 
s  to  provide  environmental  protec- 
during  initial  construction  as  well 
modernization,  from  1962  through 
2.  Beginning  in  1973,  in  connec- 
with  modernization  and  silo- 
ening  work,  prefabricated  shelters 
about  2,700  square  feet  were  used, 
m  four  to  twelve  of  these  shelters 
e  in  place  over  silos  at  any  given 
e,  for  from  10  days  to  4  weeks  de- 
iding  upon  the  severity  of  the 
Rather, 
'he  Soviets  raised  this  subject,  tak- 
the  position  that  the  activity  was 
onsistent  with  article  V  of  the 
:rim  Agreement  since  it  could  be 
ssified  as  deliberate  concealment 
1  that,  therefore,  it  should  cease. 


The  United  States,  based  on  the  nature 
of  the  shelters  and  their  use  strictly  for 
environmental  purposes,  not  for  con- 
cealment, believed  that  their  use  was 
consistent  with  article  V. 

In  early  1977  the  United  States  de- 
cided to  modify  the  use  of  environmen- 
tal shelters  over  Minuteman  ICBM 
silos  based  on  explicit  confirmation  of 
the  common  view  shared  by  us  and  the 
Soviets  that  neither  side  should  use 
shelters  over  ICBM  silos  that  impede 
verification  by  national  technical 
means  of  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Interim  Agreement.  Our 
use  of  shelters  has  recently  been  mod- 
ified by  reducing  their  size  almost  507c 
in  recognition  of  that  understanding. 

Atlas  and  Titan-I  Launchers.  The 

protocol  developed  in  the  SCC  governing 
replacement,  dismantling,  and  for 
strategic  offensive  arms,  as  noted  above, 
provides  detailed  procedures  for  dis- 
mantling ICBM  launchers  and  associated 
facilities,  one  principle  of  which  is  that 
reactivation  of  dismantled  launchers 
should  take  substantially  more  time  than 
construction  of  a  new  one. 

There  are  177  former  launchers  for 
the  obsolete  Atlas  and  Titan-I  ICBM 
systems  at  various  locations  across  the 
continental  United  States.  All  these 
launchers  were  deactivated  by  the  end 
of  1966. 

The  Soviet  side  apparently  perceived 
an  ambiguity  with  respect  to  the  status 
and  condition  of  these  launchers,  based 
on  the  amount  of  dismantling  which 
had  been  done  and  its  effect  on  their 
possible  reactivation  time.  They  raised 
this  issue  in  early  1975. 

The  U.S.  view  was  that  these  laun- 
chers were  obsolete  and  deactivated 
prior  to  the  Interim  Agreement  and 
were  not  subject  to  that  agreement  or  to 
the  accompanying  procedures  for  dis- 
mantling or  destruction.  However,  we 
did  provide  some  information  on  their 
condition  illustrating  that  they  could 
not  be  reactivated  easily  or  quickly. 
The  discussion  on  this  question  ceased 
in  mid-1975. 

Radar  on  Shemya  Island.  Article 
III  of  the  ABM  treaty  states:  "Each 
Party  undertakes  not  to  deploy  ABM 
systems  or  their  components  except 
.  .  .  within  one  ABM  deployment  area 
.  .  .  centered  on  the  Party's  national 
capital  .  .  .  and  within  one  .  .  .  de- 
ployment area  .  .  .  containing  ICBM 
silo  launchers  .  .  .  .  ' 

In  1973  the  United  States  began  con- 
struction of  a  new  phased-array  radar 
on  Shemya  Island,  Alaska,  at  the  west- 
ern end  of  the  Aleutian  Island  chain. 
This  radar  is  to  be  used  for  national 
technical  means  of  verification,  space 
track,  and  early  warning. 


The  Soviets  raised  a  question  in 
1975.  suggesting  that  the  radar  was  an 
ABM  radar  which  would  not  be  per- 
mitted at  this  location. 

The  U.S.  side  discussed  this  matter 
with  the  Soviets  and  as  a  result,  we  be- 
lieve, eliminated  any  concern  about 
possible  inconsistency  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  ABM  treaty.  The  radar  be- 
came operational  in  early  1977. 

Privacy  of  SCC  Proceedings.  Para- 
graph 8  of  the  regulations  of  the  SCC 
states:  "The  proceedings  of  the  Stand- 
ing Consultative  Commission  shall  be 
conducted  in  private.  The  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  may  not 
make  its  proceedings  public  except 
with  the  express  consent  of  both  Com- 
missioners. " 

Prior  to  the  special  SCC  session  held 
in  early  1975  to  discuss  certain  ques- 
tions related  to  compliance,  several  ar- 
ticles appeared  in  various  U.S.  publica- 
tions with  wide  circulation.  These  arti- 
cles speculated  about  the  possibility  of 
certain  Soviet  "violations"  of  the 
SALT  agreements  which  would  be  dis- 
cussed and  tended  to  draw  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  were  violations,  based 
on  what  was  purported  to  be  accurate 
intelligence  information. 

The  Soviets  have  expressed  to  us 
their  concern  about  the  importance  of 
confidentiality  in  the  work  of  the  SCC 
and  about  the  publication  of  such 
items.  They  were  apparently  particu- 
larly concerned  about  press  items  that 
may  appear  to  have  official  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment sanction. 

We  have  discussed  with  the  Soviets 
the  usefulness  of  maintaining  the  pri- 
vacy of  our  negotiations  and  discus- 
sions and  limiting  speculation  in  the 
public  media  on  SCC  proceedings,  as 
well  as  the  need  to  keep  the  public 
adequately  informed. 

Dismantling  or  Destruction  of  the 
ABM  Radar  Under  Construction  at 
Malmstrom  AFB.  When  the  ABM 
treaty  was  signed  on  May  26,  1972,  the 
United  States  had  ABM  defenses  under 
construction  in  two  deployment  areas 
for  the  defense  of  ICBM's.  Since  the 
ABM  treaty  permitted  each  party  only 
one  such  ABM  system  deployment 
area,  the  United  States  immediately 
halted  the  construction,  which  was  in 
the  early  stages,  at  Malmstrom  AFB, 
Montana.  Specific  procedures  for  the 
dismantling  or  destruction  of  the  ABM 
facilities  under  construction  at 
Malmstrom  were  negotiated  as  part  of 
the  protocol  on  procedures  for  ABM 
systems  and  their  components,  signed 
on  July  3,  1974. 2 

Dismantling  of  the  ABM  facilities 
under  construction  at  Malmstrom  was 
completed  by  May  1,  1974. 


14 


Department  of  State  Bi 


In  late  1974  we  notified  the 
U.S.S.R.  in  the  SCC  that  dismantling 
activities  at  the  Malmstrom  site  had 
been  completed.  Somewhat  later,  the 
Soviet  side  raised  a  question  about  one 
detailed  aspect  of  the  dismantling 
which  they  apparently  felt  had  not  been 
carried  out  in  full  accord  with  the 
agreed  procedures 

We  reviewed  with  the  Soviet  side  the 
actions  taken  by  the  United  States  to 
dismantle  the  Malmstrom  site  and  also 
showed  them  some  photographs  of  the 
before-and-after  conditions  there.  The 
question  was  apparently  resolved  on 
the  basis  of  that  discussion. 


Other  Questions  and  Charges 

The  process  of  monitoring  Soviet 
activity  and  analyzing  the  information 
obtained  in  order  to  decide  whether 
any  particular  matter  needs  to  be 
raised  with  the  Soviet  side  has  been 
described  above.  Activities  not  raised 
with  the  U.S.S.R.  as  ambiguous  or  of 
possible  concern  have  also  been 
examined  by  the  United  States.  In 
those  cases,  analysis  of  the  available 
intelligence  information  showed  that 
they  did  not  warrant  discussion  or 
categorization  as  inconsistent  with  the 
agreements.  Generally,  it  has  been  the 
practice  to  avoid  public  discussions  of 
these  matters. 

From  time  to  time,  articles  have  ap- 
peared in  U.S.  periodicals  and  news- 
papers alleging  Soviet  violations  of  the 
provisions  of  the  SALT  I  agreements. 
As  indicated  earlier,  these  reports  or 
commentaries  have  been  generally 
speculative  and  have  concluded  or  im- 
plied that  violations  or  "cheating"  by 
the  Soviets  had  taken  place. 

Among  the  subjects  most  recently  or 
frequently  mentioned  are  those  listed 
below. 

"Blinding"   of  U.S.   Satellites. 

Soviet  use  of  something  like  laser 
energy  to  "blind"  certain  U.S.  satel- 
lites could  be  an  activity  inconsistent 
with  the  obligations  in  article  XII  of 
the  ABM  treaty  and  article  V  of  the 
Interim  Agreement  "not  to  interfere 
with"  or  "use  deliberate  concealment 
measures"  which  impede  verification . 
by  national  technical  means,  of  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  those 
agreements. 

In  1975  information  relevant  to  pos- 
sible incidents  of  that  nature  was 
thoroughly  analyzed,  and  it  was  de- 
termined that  no  questionable  Soviet 
activity  was  involved  and  that  our 
monitoring  capabilities  had  not  been 
affected  by  these  events.  The  analysis 
indicated  that  the  events  had  resulted 


from  several  large  tires  caused  by 
breaks  along  natural  gas  pipelines  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  Later,  following  several 
reports  in  the  U.S.  press  alleging 
Soviet  violations  and  in  response  to 
questions  about  those  reports,  the  U.S. 
press  was  informed  of  those  facts  by 
several  U.S.  officials. 

Mobile  ABM.  From  time  to  time,  it 
has  been  stated  that  the  U.S.S.R.,  in 
contravention  of  article  V  of  the  ABM 
treaty,  has  developed,  tested,  or  de- 
ployed a  mobile  ABM  system,  or  a 
mobile  ABM  radar,  one  of  the  three 
components  of  a  mobile  ABM  system. 

The  U.S.S.R.  does  not  have  a 
mobile  ABM  system  or  components 
for  such  a  system.  Since  1971  the 
Soviets  have  installed  at  ABM  test 
ranges  several  radars  associated  with 
an  ABM  system  currently  in  develop- 
ment. One  of  the  types  of  radars  as- 
sociated with  this  system  can  be 
erected  in  a  matter  of  months,  rather 
than  requiring  years  to  build  as  has 
been  the  case  for  ABM  radars  both 
sides  have  deployed  in  the  past. 
Another  type  could  be  emplaced  on 
prepared  concrete  foundations.  This 
new  system  and  its  components  can  be 
installed  more  rapidly  than  previous 
ABM  systems,  but  they  are  clearly  not 
mobile  in  the  sense  of  being  able  to  be 
moved  about  readily  or  hidden.  A 
single  complete  operational  site  would 
take  about  half  a  year  to  construct.  A 
nationwide  ABM  system  based  on  this 
new  system  under  development  would 
take  a  matter  of  years  to  build. 

ABM  Testing  of  Air  Defense  Mis- 
siles. Article  VI  of  the  treaty  specif- 
ically prohibits  the  testing  in  an  ABM 
mode  of  missiles  which  are  not  ABM 
interceptor  missiles,  or  giving  them 
ABM  capabilities.  Our  close  monitor- 
ing of  activities  in  this  field  have  not 
indicated  that  ABM  tests  or  any  tests 
against  strategic  ballastic  missiles  have 
been  conducted  with  an  air  defense 
missile;  specifically,  we  have  not  ob- 
served any  such  tests  of  the  SA-5  air 
defense  system  missile,  the  one  occa- 
sionally mentioned  in  this  connection 
in  the  open  press. 

Mobile  ICBM's.  The  developemnt 
and  testing  of  a  mobile  ICBM  is  not 
prohibited  by  the  Interim  Agreement, 
but  the  United  States  staled  in  SALT  I 
that  we  would  consider  deployment  of 
such  systems  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  objectives  of  the  agreement.  We 
do  not  believe  the  Soviets  have  de- 
ployed an  ICBM  in  a  mobile  mode. 

The  possibility  that  the  Soviet 
SS-20,  which  is  a  mobile  inter- 
mediate-range ballistic  missile  system, 


has  been  given  or  could  be  gi 
ICBM  range  capabilities  has  beer 
cussed  in  the  press.  The  SS-^B 
being  deployed  to  replace  oil 
medium-  and  intermediate-range  I 
siles.  It  is  judged  to  be  capabll 
reaching  the  Aleutian  Islands! 
western  Alaska  from  its  presentB 
likely  deployment  areas  in  the  call 
U.S.S.R.;  however,  it  cannot  rl 
the  contiguous  48  States  from  arl 
its  likely  deployment  areas  inl 
Soviet  Union. 

While  the  range  capability  of| 
missile  system,  including  the  SS 
can  be  extended  by  reducing  the 
weight  of  its  payload  or  ad« 
another  propulsion  stage,  there  i 
evidence  that  the  Soviets  have  i 
any  such  modifications  to  the  SS 
We  have  confidence  that  we  wouh 
tect  the  necessary  intercontint 
range  testing  of  such  a  modi 
system. 

Denial  of  Test  Information.  It 

been  reported   in  some  article: 
SALT  that  the  Soviets  have  viol 
the  Interim  Agreement  by  encoi 
missile-test  telemetry  and  that  sue! 
tivity  is  contrary  to  the  provisio 
article  V  of  the  Interim  Agreerrl 
Such  activity  would  be  inconsb* 
with  those  provisions  of  the  Int  | 
Agreement  if  it  impeded  verific; 
of  compliance   with  agreement  pi 
sions;  it  has  not  been  considere 
have  done  so.  In  the  SALT  II  neg 
tions.   we  have  treated  this  subjecl 
considerable  detail,  since  such  act  I 
could  affect  verification  of  compli  | 
with   certain  provisions  of  the  ag 
ment  under  negotiation. 

Antisatellite  Systems.  It  has  1 

alleged  that  Soviet  development  o 
antisatellite  system  is  a  violatioi 
the  obligation  not  to  interfere  with 
tional   technical  means  of  verificai 
of  compliance  with  SALT  provisi'l 
Since  development  of  such  system  I 
not  prohibited,  this  program  does  I 
call   into  question   Soviet  complial 
with  existing  agreements.  The  acl 
use  of  an  antisatellite  system  agal 
U.S.   national  technical  means  is  || 
hibited,  but  this  has  not  occurred 


ACDA  presi  releas,    I  oj  I  eb    28,  IV78. 

1  For  texts  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Limit, 
of   Anti-Ballistic    Missile   Systems   and 
Interim  Agreement  on  Certain  Measures    1 
Respect   to  the   Limitation   of  Strategic  Oil 
sive   Arms,   signed   in   Moscow  on  May  I 
1972,  see  Bulletin  of  June  26,  p.  918. 

2For  text  of  protocol,   see   BulletinI 
July  29,  1974,  p.  216. 


1978 


15 


Verification  of  the 
Proposed  SALT  II  Agreement 


ie  following  is  a  portion  of  a  re- 
prepared  by  the  Administration 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
mittee,  as  released  by  that  com- 
e  on  February  24,  1978.  The  ex- 
ts  are  taken  from  a  longer,  clas- 
d  report  giving  more  detailed  in- 
tation  on  the  verification  aspects 
he  proposed  SALT  II  agree- 
>. 

'ie  report  was  originally  requested 
he  committee  on  November  2, 
7,  pursuant  to  a  provision  of  the 
s  Control  and  Disarmament  Act, 
'.mended  last  year,  which  requires 
the  Director  of  the  Arms  Control 
Disarmament  Agency  provide  a 
>rt,  upon  request,  as  to  the  ade- 
cy  of  verification  of  compliance 
each  provision  of  significant  arms 
rol  proposals  made  to  or  by  the 
fed  States.  The  request  was  reiter- 

I  February  I . 
ie  anticipated  SALT  II  agreement 
lequately  verifiable.  This  judgment 
ased  on  assessment  of  the  verifia- 
y  of  the  individual  provisions  of 
1  agreement  and  the  agreement  as  a 
lile.  Although  the  possibility  of 
I  e  undetected  cheating  in  certain 
tr  s  exists,  such  cheating  would  not 
I'  the  strategic  balance  in  view  of 
I  .  programs.  Any  cheating  on  a 
lie  large  enough  to  alter  the 
t  egic  balance  would  be  discovered 
M  ime  to  make  an  appropriate  re- 
vise. There  will  be  areas  of  uncer- 
,a  .ty ,  but  they  are  not  such  as  to 
Knit  the  Soviets  to  produce  a  signif- 
«nt  unanticipated  threat  to  U.S. 
n  rests,  and  those  uncertainties  can, 
amy  event,  be  compensated  for  with 
I  flexibility  inherent  in  our  own  pro- 
|ms. 


Piposed  Agreement 

'.  ne  proposed  SALT  II  agreement 
i  three  principal  elements: 

"A  treaty  to  last  until  1985  em- 
ilying  basically  the  Vladivostok  ac- 
jd  with  some  reductions  below  the 
•jidivostok  ceilings; 

A  protocol  to  last  until  September 
30  temporarily  limiting  certain  as- 
;ts  of  cruise  missiles,  new  types  of 
listic  missiles,  and  mobile  ICBM's; 


i 

Principles  and  guidelines  for 
iLT  III. 


The  proposed  treaty  includes  the  fol- 
lowing major  provisions: 

•  An  initial  overall  aggregate  level 
of  2.400  strategic  systems  to  be  re- 
duced to  an  agreed  number  between 
2,160  and  2,250  during  the  term  of  the 
treaty: 

•  A  1,320  sublimit  on  MIRV'ed 
ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers  and  air- 
craft equipped  with  long-range  cruise 
missiles; 

•  A  sublimit  of  an  agreed  number 
between  1,200  and  1,250  on  MIRV'ed 
ballistic  missiles;  and 

•  A  sublimit  of  820  on  MIRVed 
ICBM  launchers. 

The  proposed  protocol  includes  the 
following  provisions: 

•  A  ban  on  deployment  of  mobile 
ICBM  launchers  and  on  the  flight  test- 
ing of  ICBM's  from  such  launchers; 

•  Limitations  on  the  flight  testing 
and  deployment  of  new  types  of  ballis- 
tic missiles;  and 

•  A  ban  on  the  flight  testing  and  de- 
ployment of  cruise  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  2,500  km.  and  on 
the  deployment  of  cruise  missiles  capa- 
ble of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  km.  on 
sea-  or  land-based  launchers. 

The  agreement  is  still  under  active 
negotiation.  Unless  otherwise  stated, 
the  verification  assessment  for  unre- 
solved issues  addresses  only  the  U.S. 
position. 

Verification 

Verification  is  the  process  of  deter- 
mining, to  the  extent  necessary  to 
safeguard  our  national  security,  that 
the  other  side  is  complying  with  the 
SALT  agreement.  We  must  have  high 
confidence  in  our  ability  to  detect 
Soviet  noncompliance  before  it  could 
significantly  affect  our  interests.  This 
process  of  judging  the  adequacy  of 
verification  must  take  into  account  the 
capabilities  of  existing  and  future 
intelligence-collection  systems  and  the 
ability  of  the  other  side  to  evade  detec- 
tion if  it  should  attempt  to  do  so. 

Equally  important  is  the  U.S.  ability 
to  respond  to  Soviet  cheating,  should 
it  occur.  The  U.S.  technological  base, 
its  research  and  development  pro- 
grams, and  the  substantial  capabilities 
of  its  strategic  forces  provide  this 
hedge. 


This  process  must  also  assess  the 
political  and  military  significance  of 
potential  violations  and  the  costs, 
risks,  and  gains  to  the  Soviets  of 
cheating.  It  also  takes  into  account  the  de- 
gree to  which  the  advantages  conferred 
on  the  United  States  by  a  particular 
provision  outweigh  the  disadvantages 
caused  by  problems  of  verification.  In 
such  cases,  we  must  consider  the  po- 
tential gains  to  the  United  States  of 
being  allowed  the  flexibility  to  take 
certain  actions,  even  though  allowing 
the  Soviets  the  same  options  may  com- 
plicate verification.  Cruise  missile  lim- 
itations constitute  a  prime  example  of 
such  a  situation. 

Assessing  the  adequate  verifiability 
of  the  proposed  SALT  agreement  is 
most  heavily  based  on  our  confidence 
in  U.S.  monitoring  capabilities.  Such 
monitoring  is  carried  out  by  the  intel- 
ligence community  and  involves  data 
collection  and  assessment  of  what  the 
other  side  is  doing  or  not  doing.  For 
the  most  part,  the  intelligence  commu- 
nity has  performed  and  would  continue 
to  perform  these  functions  even  in  the 
absence  of  a  SALT  agreement.  Many 
of  the  uncertainties  that  are  discussed 
below  would  also  exist  in  our  intelli- 
gence assessments  of  Soviet  strategic 
programs  without  an  agreement. 

Monitoring  tasks  in  SALT  can  be 
divided  into  three  categories: 

(1)  Counting  numerically  limited 
systems,  such  as  ICBM  and  SLBM 
launchers  and  heavy  bombers; 

(2)  Measuring  limited  quantities, 
such  as  the  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM; 
and 

(3)  Monitoring  for  evidence  that  a 
prohibited  activity  is  being 
undertaken. 

(Classified  Text  Deleted) 

Our  monitoring  judgments  assume 
the  availability  of  present  and  pro- 
grammed collection  assets.  However, 
these  assessments  are  conservative  in 
that  they  do  not  take  into  account  the 
possibility  of  unusual  or  unpredictable 
intelligence  successes  or  fortuitous  blun- 
ders by  the  Soviets  which  could  have  the 
effect  of  enhancing  verification. 

We  have  had  over  5  years'  experi- 
ence in  monitoring  Soviet  compliance 
with  the  ABM  treaty  and  the  Interim 
Agreement.  We  have  demonstrated  our 
ability  to  verify  compliance  with  the 
SALT  I  agreements  with  high  confi- 
dence. This  experience  reinforces  our 
assessment  of  the  capabilities  of  U.S. 
national  technical  means  to  verify 
compliance  with  SALT  agreements. 
The  United  States  has  promptly  raised 
with  the  Soviets  any  unusual  or  am- 


16 


biguous  activities  which  gave  rise  to 
U.S.  concern.  Consequently,  the 
Soviets  are  well  aware  that  the  United 
States  will  call  them  into  account  for 
any  questionable  activities  related  to 
their  strategic  programs  and  will  expect 
satisfactory  clarification  or  resolution 
of  the  problems  involved. 

Since  monitoring  will  always  be 
subject  to  some  degree  of  uncertainty, 
we  must  also  assess  the  likelihood  that 
the  Soviets  would  cheat,  taking  into 
account  the  benefits  that  would  accrue 
to  them  from  such  cheating,  as  well  as 
the  risks  of  their  being  detected.  As  a 


February  23,  1478 

Honorable  John  Sparkman 
Chairman.  Committee  on 

Foreign  Relations 
U.S.  Senate 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

This  letter  is  in  response  to  your  re- 
quest of  February  1  for  a  report  on  the 
verifiability  of  the  proposed  SALT 
TWO  agreement  as  provided  for  in  the 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Act 
Amendment  of  1977. 

As  you  know,  the  SALT  TWO 
agreement  is  still  under  active  negotia- 
tion. It  is  therefore  not  possible  at  this 
time  to  make  a  final  assessment  of  the 
verifiability  of  the  agreement  that  may 
emerge  from  these  negotiations. 
Nevertheless,  on  the  basis  of  an  exten- 
sive and  continuing  review  that  has 
been  conducted  by  all  involved  agencies 
in  the  Executive  Branch,  it  is  my  judg- 
ment that  the  anticipated  SALT  TWO 
agreement  is  adequately  verifiable  by 
existing  national  technical  means.  This 
judgment  is  based  on  an  assessment  of 
the  verifiability  of  the  individual  provi- 
sions of  the  agreement  and  of  the 
agreement  as  a  whole.  The  consid- 
erations leading  to  this  judgment  are  re- 
flected in  the  attached  report  which  has 
been  prepared  and  agreed  to  by  the 
agencies  in  the  Executive  Branch  con- 
cerned with  this  issue.  I  commend  this 
report,  which  has  my  personal  endorse- 
ment, to  you  for  your  consideration  of 
this  important  issue- 
Very  truly  yours. 

Paul  C.  Warnki 


matter  of  prudence,  therefore,  we 
analyze  scenarios  involving  altered  or 
covert  Soviet  practices  that  could  ad- 
versely affect  our  confidence  in  Soviet 
compliance.  The  following  consid- 
erations are  some  that  the  Soviets  must 
take  into  account  before  making  a  de- 
cision to  cheat  or  not  to  cheat: 

(1)  Their  uncertainty  about  our 
overall  capability  to  monitor  and 
analyze  their  activities; 

(2)  The  potential  U.S.  reaction  to 
discovered  cheating;  and 

(3)  The  possible  strategic  gains  from 
cheating. 

It  must  be  stressed  that,  as  noted 
previously,  the  United  States  does  not 
rely  on  trust,  on  Soviet  intentions,  or 
on  political  incentives  for  the  Soviets 
to  comply  in  assessing  whether  verifi- 
cation of  a  SALT  agreement  is 
adequate.  Such  judgments  must  be 
based  most  heavily  on  our  monitoring 
capabilities,  especially  with  regard  to 
potentially  significant  Soviet  non- 
compliance and  on  the  U.S.  ability  to 
respond  in  a  timely  manner  to  possible 
Soviet  cheating. 

Finally,  as  with  all  aspects  of  a 
treaty,  we  must  decide  whether  par- 
ticular provisions  and  the  agreement  as 
a  whole  represent  a  net  gain  for  U.S. 
security  compared  to  the  absence  of 
such  provisions  or  to  the  no-treaty 
case.  The  projected  higher  levels  of 
Soviet  capability  in  the  absence  of  a 
treaty  would  have  to  be  matched  or 
countered  by  expanded  U.S.  programs, 
probably  with  no  net  increase  in  U.S. 
security.  So  long  as  U.S.  programs 
that  may  be  required  to  hedge  against 
lower  monitoring  confidence  are  not 
unduly  restricted  by  the  treaty,  some 
uncertainties  can  be  accepted  in  an 
overall  agreement  that  serves  U.S.  se- 
curity interests. 

As  stated  previously,  the  verifica- 
tion tasks  of  the  anticipated  SALT 
II  agreement  can  be  grouped  into 
three  categories — counting,  measuring 
capability,  and  other  tasks  which,  in 
general,  are  bans  on  certain  types  of 
systems  and  conduct.  The  scope  of 
these  tasks  are  illustrated  in  the  at- 
tached table.  (Deleted)  Our  judgment 
that  the  proposed  agreement  is 
adequately  verifiable  is  based  on  an 
analysis  of  these  tasks.  The  reasons  for 
this  judgment  are  reflected  in  the  fol- 


Department  of  State  Bt 

lowing  discussion  of  the  major  ver 
tion  tasks  posed  by  the  agreement 


Overall  Verifiability  of  Agreeme 

In  assessing  the  adequacy  of  vi 
cation  of  the  agreement,  it  is  impo 
to  consider  its  totality  and  not 
particular  provisions. 

A  consideration   in  determii 
whether  the  agreement  as  a  who 
adequately  verifiable  has  been  whi 
the  Soviets  could  exploit  the  mon 
ing  uncertainties  of  several  indivi 
provisions,  each  of  which  is  judge 
adequately   verifiable,  in  a  way 
would  affect  our  national  sect 
interests.  We  have  confidence  thai 
can  adequately  verify  complianc 
such  a  context  because  the  probat 
of  detecting  the  fact  of  cheating, 
creases  markedly  if  the  numbe 
provisions  being  violated  increa 
Combined  with  the  likelihood  of 
tecting  significant  cheating  on  i 
vidual  limitations,  the  ability  to  dil 
the  fact  of  small  cheating  on  a  nur  I 
of  provisions  enhances  our  monitol 
confidence. 

The  Soviets  cannot  be  sure  of  | 
overall  capability  to  monitor  a  S, 
II  agreement.  Thus,  Soviet  plan 
would  be  expected  to  make  car 
conservative  assumptions  regan 
U.S.    verification   capabilities, 
example,  a  slightly  less  than  .' 
chance  of  detection,  which  is  con 
ered   "low  confidence"  in  monito 
capability  to  the  United  States,  w 
probably  appear  as   "high  risk" 
Soviet  planner  contemplating  cheat 
Given  U.S.  research  and  developrl 
hedges  and  our  greater  industrial  I 
technological  base,  the  Soviets  w<| 
not  likely  undertake  this  risk 
the     attendant    danger    of    U 
abrogation. 

In  sum,  although  the  possibility 
some  undetected  cheating  in  cer 
areas  exists,  such  cheating  would  I 
alter  the  strategic  balance  in  viewl 
U.S.  programs.  However,  any  ch<| 
ing  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  af 
the  strategic  balance  would  be  disc 
ered   in  time  to  make  an  appropri 
response.    For  these  reasons,  ; 
others  noted  in  this  paper,  we  beli  t 
that  the  SALT  II  agreement,  taken  ;a 
whole,  is  adequately  verifiable. 


ACDA  press  release  5  of  Mar.  I,  1978. 


%il978 


17 


THE  PRESIDENT:      National  Security  Interests 


i 


b 


hundred  and  ninety-eight  years 
n  the  southern  part  of  your 
,  400  North  Carolina  militiamen 
up  arms  in  our  own  war  of  inde- 
ence.  Against  a  force  of  1,300 
sh  soldiers,  the  North  Carolinians 
died — and  their  battle  at  Ram- 
s  Mill  became  a  step  on  the  road 
ctory  at  Yorktown  1  year  later. 
>ur  ancestors  in  North  Carolina 
mine  in  Georgia  and  their 
hbors  throughout  the  Thirteen 
inies  earned  our  freedom  in  corn- 
That  is  a  sacrifice  which  Ameri- 
have  had  to  make  time  and  time 
in  our  nation's  history.  We've 
ed  that  strength  is  the  final  pro- 
r  of  liberty. 

is  is  a  commitment  and  a  sac- 
that  I  understand  well,  for  the 
tion  of  military  service  has  been 
ing  deep  for  generations  in  my 
family.  My  first  ancestor  to  live 
eorgia,  James  Carter,  who  moved 
:  from  North  Carolina,  fought  in 
Revolution.  My  father  was  a  first 
■enant  in  World  War  I.  My  oldest 
volunteered  to  go  to  Vietnam. 
I  spent  1 1  years  of  my  life  as  a 
essional  military  officer  in  the 
.  Navy.  This  is  typical  of  Ameri- 
families. 

own  through  the  generations,  the 
poses  of  our  Armed  Forces  have 
tys  been  the  same,  no  matter  what 
iration  it  was:  to  defend  our  secu- 
when  it's  threatened  and,  through 
onstrated  strength,  to  reduce  the 
nces  that  we  will  have  to  fight 
n.  These  words  of  John  Kennedy 
still  guide  our  actions,  and  I 
te  him:  "The  purpose  of  our  arms 
>eace,  not  war — to  make  certain 
they  will  never  have  to  be  used." 
t  purpose  is  unchanged.  But  the 
Id  has  been  changing  and  our  re- 
nses  as  a  nation  must  change  with 

his  morning  I  would  like  to  talk  to 
i  about  our  national  security — 
;re  we  now  stand,  what  new  cir- 
nstances  we  face,  and  what  we  are 
ng  to  do  in  the  future. 

rrent  Standing 

^et  me  deal  at  the  beginning  with 
ne  myths.  One  myth  is  that  this 
antry  somehow  is  pulling  back 
m  protecting   its  interests  and   its 

I'inds  around  the  world.  That  is  not 
■  case,  as  will  be  explained  in  this 


speech  and  demonstrated  in  our  actions 
as  a  nation. 

Another  myth  is  that  our  defense 
budget  is  too  burdensome  and  con- 
sumes an  undue  part  of  our  federal 
revenues.  National  defense  is,  of 
course,  a  large  and  important  item  of 
expenditures,  but  it  represents  only 
about  5%  of  our  gross  national  prod- 
uct and  about  a  quarter  of  our  current 
federal  budget. 

It  also  is  a  mistake  to  believe  that 
our  country's  defense  spending  is 
mainly  for  intercontinental  missiles  or 
nuclear  weapons.  Only  about  10%  of 
our  defense  budget  goes  for  strategic 
forces  or  for  nuclear  deterrence.  More 
than  50%  is  simply  to  pay  for  and 
support  the  services  of  the  men  and 
women  in  our  Armed  Forces. 

Finally,  some  believe  that  because 
we  do  possess  nuclear  weapons  of 
great  destructive  power,  that  we  need 
do  nothing  more  to  guarantee  our  na- 
tion's security.  Unfortunately,  it's  not 
that  simple.  Our  potential  adversaries 
have  now  built  up  massive  forces 
armed  with  conventional  weapons — 
tanks,  aircraft,  infantry,  mechanized 
units.  These  forces  could  be  used  for 
political  blackmail,  and  they  could 
threaten  our  vital  interests  unless  we 
and  our  allies  and  friends  have  our 
own  military  strength  and  conven- 
tional forces  as  a  counterbalance. 

Of  course,  our  national  security 
rests  on  more  than  just  military  power. 
It  depends  partly  on  the  productive 
capacity  of  our  factories  and  our 
farms;  on  an  adequate  supply  of  natu- 
ral resources  with  which  God  has 
blessed  us;  on  an  economic  system 
which  values  human  freedom  above 
centralized  control;  on  the  creative 
ideas  of  our  best  minds;  on  the  hard 
work,  cohesion,  moral  strength,  and 
determination  of  the  American 
people;  and  on  the  friendship  of  our 
neighbors  to  the  north  and  south.  Our 
security  depends  on  strong  bonds  with 
our  allies  and  on  whether  other  na- 
tions seek  to  live  in  peace  and  refrain 
from  trying  to  dominate  those  who 
live  around  them. 

But  adequate  and  capable  military 
forces  are  still  an  essential  element  of 
our  national  security.  We,  like  our 
ancestors,  have  the  obligation  to 
maintain  strength  equal  to  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  world  in  which  we  live, 
and  we  Americans  will  continue  to  do 
so. 


New  Circumstances 

Let  us  review  briefly  how  national 
security  issues  have  changed  over  the 
past  decade  or  two.  The  world  has 
grown  both  more  complex  and  more 
interdependent.  There  is  now  a  divi- 
sion among  the  Communist  powers. 
The  old  colonial  empires  have  fallen, 
and  many  new  nations  have  risen  in 
their  place.  Old  ideological  labels 
have  lost  some  of  their  meaning. 
There  have  also  been  changes  in  the 
military  balance  among  nations.  Over 
the  past  20  years,  the  military  forces 
of  the  Soviets  have  grown  substan- 
tially, both  in  absolute  numbers  and 
relative  to  our  own. 

There  also  has  been  an  ominous  in- 
clination on  the  part  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  use  its  military  power — to 
intervene  in  local  conflicts,  with  ad- 
visers, with  equipment,  and  with  full 
logistical  support  and  encouragement 
for  mercenaries  from  other  Com- 
munist countries,  as  we  can  observe 
today  in  Africa. 

This  increase  in  Soviet  military 
power  has  been  going  on  for  a  long 
time.  Discounting  inflation,  since 
1960  Soviet  military  spending  has 
doubled,  rising  steadily  in  real  terms 
by  3  or  4%  a  year,  while  our  own 
military  budget  is  actually  lower  now 
than  it  was  in  1960.  The  Soviets,  who 
traditionally  were  not  a  significant 
naval  power,  now  rank  number  two  in 
world  naval  forces. 

In  its  balanced  strategic  nuclear  ca- 
pability, the  United  States  retains  im- 
portant advantages.  But  over  the  past 
decade,  the  steady  Soviet  buildup  has 
achieved  functional  equivalence  in 
strategic  forces  with  the  United 
States. 

U.S.  Responses 

These  changes  demand  that  we 
maintain  adequate  responses  — 
diplomatic,  military,  and  economic — 
and  we  will. 

As  President  and  as  Commander  in 
Chief,  I  am  responsible,  along  with  the 
Congress,  for  modernizing,  expanding, 
and  improving  our  Armed  Forces 
whenever  our  security  requires  it. 
We've  recently  completed  a  major 
reassessment  of  our  national  defense 
strategy.  And  out  of  this  process  have 
come  some  overall  principles  designed 
to  preserve  our  national  security  during 
the  years  ahead. 


18 


•  We  will  match,  together  with  our 
allies  and  friends,  any  threatening 
power  through  a  combination  of  mili- 
tary forces,  political  efforts,  and  eco- 
nomic programs.  We  will  not  allow 
any  other  nation  to  gain  military 
superiority  over  us. 

•  We  shall  seek  the  cooperation  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  other  nations  in 
reducing  areas  of  tension.  We  do  not 
desire  to  intervene  militarily  in  the 
internal  domestic  affairs  of  other 
countries  nor  to  aggravate  regional 
conflicts.  And  we  shall  oppose  inter- 
vention by  others. 

•  While  assuring  our  own  military 
capabilities,  we  shall  seek  security 
through  dependable,  verifiable  arms 
control  agreements  wherever  possible. 

•  We  shall  use  our  great  economic, 
technological,  and  diplomatic  advan- 
tages to  defend  our  interests  and  to 
promote  American  values.  We  are 
prepared,  for  instance,  to  cooperate 
with  the  Soviet  Union  toward  com- 
mon social,  scientific,  and  economic 
goals.  But  if  they  fail  to  demonstrate 
restraint  in  missile  programs  and  other 
force  levels  or  in  the  projection  of 
Soviet  or  proxy  forces  into  other  lands 
and  continents,  then  popular  support  in 
the  United  States  for  such  cooperation 
with  the  Soviets  will  certainly  erode. 

These  principles  mean  that,  even  as 
we  search  for  agreement  in  arms  con- 
trol, we  will  continue  to  modernize 
our  strategic  systems  and  to  revitalize 
our  conventional  forces.  And  I  have 
no  doubt  that  the  Congress  shares  my 
commitment  in  this  respect. 

We  shall  implement  this  policy  that 
I've  outlined  so  briefly  in  three  dif- 
ferent ways: 

•  By  maintaining  strategic  nuclear 
balance; 

•  By  working  closely  with  our 
NATO  allies  to  strengthen  and  mod- 
ernize our  defenses  in  Europe;  and 

•  By  maintaining  and  developing 
forces  to  counter  any  threats  to  our  al- 
lies and  friends  in  our  vital  interests 
in  Asia,  the  Middle  East,  and  other 
regions  of  the  world. 

Let  me  take  up  each  of  these  three  in 
turn. 

Strategic  Nuclear  Balance.  Our 

first  and  most  fundamental  concern  is 
to  prevent  nuclear  war.  The  horrors  of 
nuclear  conflict  and  our  desire  to  re- 
duce the  world's  arsenals  of  fearsome 
nuclear  weapons  do  not  free  us  from 
the  need  to  analyze  the  situation  objec- 
tively and  to  make  sensible  choices 
about  our  purposes  and  means. 

Our  strategic   forces  must  be — and 


must  be  known  to  be — a  match  for  the 
capabilities  of  the  Soviets.  They  will 
never  be  able  to  use  their  nuclear  forces 
to  threaten,  to  coerce,  or  to  blackmail 
us  or  our  friends. 

Our  continuing  major  effort  in  the 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
(SALT)  taking  place  every  day  in 
Geneva  are  one  means  toward  a  goal  of 
strategic  nuclear  stability.  We  and  the 
Soviets  have  already  reached  agree- 
ment on  some  basic  points,  although 
still  others  remain  to  be  resolved.  We 
are  making  good  progress.  We  are  not 
looking  for  any  one-sided  advantage. 

But  before  I  sign  any  SALT  agree- 
ment on  behalf  of  the  United  States,  I 
will  make  sure  that  it  preserves  the 
strategic  balance,  that  we  can  inde- 
pendently verify  Soviet  compliance, 
and  that  we  will  be  at  least  as  strong, 
relative  to  the  Soviet  Union,  as  we 
would  be  without  any  agreement. 

But  in  addition  to  the  limits  and  re- 
ductions of  a  SALT  II  agreement,  we 
must  take  other  steps  to  protect  the 
strategic  balance.  During  the  next  dec- 
ade, improvements  in  the  Soviet  mis- 
siles can  make  our  land-based  missile 
forces  in  silos  increasingly  vulnerable 
to  a  Soviet  first  strike.  Such  an  attack 
would  amount  to  national  suicide  for 
the  Soviet  Union.  But  however  remote, 
it  is  a  threat  against  which  we  must 
constantly  be  on  guard. 

We  have  a  superb  submarine  fleet 
which  is  relatively  invulnerable  to  at- 
tack when  it's  at  sea,  and  we  have 
under  construction  new  Trident  subma- 
rines and  missiles  which  give  our  sub- 
marine ballistic  missile  force  even 
greater  range  and  security.  I  have  or- 
dered rapid  development  and  deploy- 
ment of  cruise  missiles  to  reinforce  the 
strategic  value  of  our  bombers.  We  are 
working  on  the  M-X  intercontinental 
ballistic  missile  and  a  Trident  II 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missile  to 
give  us  more  options  to  respond  to 
Soviet  strategic  deployments.  If  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  guarantee  the  clear 
invulnerability  of  our  strategic  deter- 
rent, I  shall  not  hesitate  to  take  actions 
for  full-scale  development  and  deploy- 
ment of  these  systems 

Our  strategic  defense  forces,  our  nu- 
clear forces,  are  a  triad — land-based 
missiles,  sea-based  missiles,  and  air- 
breathing  systems,  such  as  bombers 
and  cruise  missiles.  Through  the  plans 
I've  described,  all  three  legs  of  this 
triad  will  be  modernized  and  improved. 
Each  will  retain  the  ability,  on  its  own. 
to  impose  devastating  retaliation  upon 
an  aggressor. 

Cooperation  With  NATO.  For  30 

years  and  more  we've  been  committed 
to  the  defense  of  Europe,  bound  by  the 


ii 


Department  of  State  B\ 

knowledge  that  Western  Europe's 
rity  is  vital  to  our  own.  We  contin 
cooperate  with  our  NATO  allies 
strategy  for  flexible  response,  cor 
ing  conventional  forces  and  nu 
forces  so  that  no  aggressor  can  thn 
the  territory  of  Europe  or  its  fret 
which,  in  the  past,  we  have  fough 
gether  to  defend. 

For  several  years  we  and  our 
have  been  trying  to  negotiate  m 
and  balanced  reduction  in  mil 
forces  in  Europe  with  the  Soviets 
with  the  Warsaw  Pact  nations  wh« 
their  allies.  But  in  the  meantime 
Soviets  have  continued  to  increase 
to  modernize  their  forces  beyo 
level  necessary  for  defense.  In  the 
of  this  excessive  Soviet  buildup 
and  our  NATO  allies  have  had  to 
important  steps  to  cope  with  short- 
vulnerabilities  and  respond  to  1 
term  threats.  We  are  significa 
strengthening  U.S.  forces  station 
Western  Europe  and  improving 
ability  to  speed  additional  ground 
air  forces  to  the  defense  of  Europe 
time  of  crisis. 

Our  European  allies — who  su 
the  major  portion  of  NATO's  coral 
tional  combat  strength  —  are 
improving  their  readiness  and  ll 
reinforcement  capabilities  and  ll 
antitank  defenses.  The  heads  of  I 
NATO  governments  will  be  here  ir  I 
country  attending  the  summit  met  I 
in  May,  where  we  will  address  I 
long-term  defense  program  which  I 
expand  and  integrate  more  closel)  I 
lied  defense  plans. 


Other  Vital  Interests.   For  ml 

years,  the  United  States  has  bet  | 
major  world  power.   Our  longstani 
concerns  encompass  our  own  seal 
interests  and  those  of  our  allies  I 
friends  far  beyond  our  own  shores 
Europe. 

We  have  important  historical  resf 
sibilities  to  enhance  peace  in  East  A 
in  the  Middle  East,  in  the  Persian  G 
and  throughout  our  own  hemispht 
Our  preference  in  all  these  areas  i 
turn   first   to   international   agreemi 
that  reduce  the  overall   level   of  a 
and  minimize  the  threat  of  conflict, 
we  have  the  will,  and  we  will  al 
maintain   the  capacity,   to  honor  I 
commitments  and  to  protect  our  in  ;■ 
csis  in  those  critical  areas. 

In  the  Pacific,  our  effective  secuil 
is  enhanced  by  mutual  defense  treaii 
with  our  allies  and  by  our  friends! 
and  cooperation  with  other  PaciJ 
nations. 

Japan  and  South  Korea,  clostf 
linked  with  the  United  States,  are  < 
cated  geographically  where  vital  int  - 
ests  of  great  powers  converge.  It  is  s| 


11978 


19 


ive  that  Northeast  Asia  remain 
;.  We  will  maintain  and  even  en- 
!  our  military  strength  in  this  area, 
wing  our  air  strength  and  reducing 
round  forces  as  the  South  Korean 
continues  to  modernize  and  to  in- 
e  its  own  capabilities, 
the  Middle  East  and  the  region  of 
ndian  Ocean,  we  seek  permanent 
e  and  stability.  The  economic 
h  and  well-being  of  the  United 
s,  Western  Europe,  Japan  depend 
continued  access  to  the  oil  from 
ersian  Gulf  area. 

all  these  situations,  the  primary 
nsibility  for  preserving  peace  and 
ary  stability  rests  with  the  coun- 
of  the  region.  But  we  shall  con- 
to  work  with  our  friends  and 
to  strengthen  their  ability  to  pre- 
threats  to  their  interests  and  to 
In  addition,  however,  we  will 
tain  forces  of  our  own  which  can 
tiled  upon,  if  necessary,  to  support 
al  defense  efforts.  The  Secretary 
efense  at  my  direction  is  improv- 
ed will  maintain  quickly  deploy- 
forces — air,  land,  and  sea — to  de- 
our  interests  throughout  the 
i. 

elusion 

•ms  control  agreements  are  a  major 
as  instruments  of  our  national  se- 
y,  but  this  will  be  possible  only  if 
naintain  appropriate  military  force 
ills.  Reaching  balanced,  verifiable 
gements  with  our  adversaries  can 
in  the  cost  of  security  and  reduce  the 
is  of  war.  But  even  then,  we  must — 
to  we  will — proceed  efficiently  with 
fliever  arms  programs  our  own  secu- 
(l  requires. 

'hen  I  leave  this  auditorium,  I  shall 
woing  to  visit  with  the  crew  aboard 

■  of  our  most  modern  nuclear- 
k  ered  aircraft  carriers  in  the  Atlantic 

■  an.  The  men  and  women  of  our 
lied  Forces  remain  committed  as 
m:  professionals  and  as  patriotic 
Bericans  to  our  common  defense. 
fly  must  stand  constantly  ready  to 

■  t,  in  the  hope  that  through  strength, 
:cibat   will   be  prevented.    We  as 

■  ericans  will  always  support  them  in 

■  r  courageous  vigil. 

Ihis  has  been  a  serious  and  a  sober 
I ,  but  there  is  no  cause  for  pes- 

■  ism.  We  face  a  challenge,  and  we 
■1  do  whatever  is  necessary  to  meet 

■  We  will  preserve  and  protect  our 

■  ntry  and  continue  to  promote  and  to 
■intain  peace  around  the  world.  This 
wans  that  we  shall  have  to  continue  to 
siiport  strong  and  efficient  military 
fees. 

For  most  of  human  history,  people 
we  wished  vainly  that  freedom  and 


News  Conferences,  February  17, 
March  2  and  9  (Excerpts) 


FEBRUARY  17 


Q.  Knowing  tension  already  exists 
over  the  Israeli  settlement  policy,  do 
you  have  any  second  thoughts  about 
the  timing  of  your  announcement  to 
sell  war  planes  to  Egypt,  or  was  the 
timing  of  that  announcement  and  our 
public  statements  about  the  Israeli 
settlement  policy  a  message  to  the  Is- 
raelis to  become  more  flexible  in  the 
current  negotiations? 

A.  The  two  were  not  interrelated  in 
my  decisionmaking  process.  When  I 
was  in  Saudi  Arabia  earlier  in  January, 
I  told  them  that  shortly  after  the  Con- 
gress reconvened  I  would  send  up  a 
recommendation  for  military  sales  to 
the  Middle  East. 

Every  time  I've  ever  met  with  Prime 
Minister  Begin,  both  in  the  public  ses- 
sions— that  is  with  staff  members — and 
also  in  my  private  sessions  with  just 
him  and  me  present,  this  has  been  the 
first  item  that  he's  brought  up:  "Please 
expedite  the  approval  of  the  sales  of 
military  planes  to  Israel." 

I  think  that  the  timing  is  proper. 
We're  not  trying  to  short  circuit  the  al- 
lotted time  for  the  Congress.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  we  will  not  begin  the  proc- 
ess until  after  the  Congress  reconvenes, 
the  Senate  reconvenes.  So  there  will  be 
a  full  50  days  for  the  Congress  to  con- 
sider the  matter.  Twenty  days  after  this 


coming  Monday,  I'll  send  up  official 
papers.  I  don't  think  it's  a  bad  time  to 
send  it  up. 

I  recognized  ahead  of  time  that  there 
would  be  some  controversy  about  it. 
And  we  did  give  it  second  and  third 
thoughts  before  I  made  a  decision 
about  the  composition  of  the  package 
and  the  date  for  submitting  it. 

Q.  On  the  Middle  East,  arms  to 
the  Middle  East,  I  want  to  ask  a  kind 
of  philosophic  question.  How  do  you 
rationalize  the  idea  of  selling 
weapons,  more  sophisticated 
weapons  of  war,  with  the  argument 
that  they  would  help  to  bring  about 
peace? 

Does  it  bother  you  that  these  more 
and  more  sophisticated  weapons  are 
being  sold  to  both  sides,  and  if  a  new 
war  were  to  break  out,  it  would  be  a 
more  violent  confrontation  than  any 
in  the  past? 

A.  As  you  know,  we  are  not  intro- 
ducing new  weapons  into  the  Middle 
East.  F-15's  are  already  being  deliv- 
ered into  the  Middle  East.  Also,  I  have 
pledged  myself  to  cut  down  on  the  vol- 
ume of  weapons  each  succeeding  year 
as  long  as  I  am  in  office,  barring  some 
unpredictable  worldwide  military  out- 
break. This  year  there  will  be  less 
weapons  sales  than  last  year.  This  will 
include,  of  course,  the  Middle  East. 

I  think  it's  very  good  for  nations  to 


the  flowering  of  the  human  spirit, 
which  freedom  nourishes,  did  not  fi- 
nally have  to  depend  upon  the  force  of 
arms.  We,  like  our  forebears,  live  in  a 
time  when  those  who  would  destroy 
liberty  are  restrained  less  by  their  re- 
spect for  freedom  itself  than  by  their 
knowledge  that  those  of  us  who  cherish 
freedom  are  strong. 

We  are  a  great  nation,  made  up  of 
talented  people.  We  can  readily  afford 
the  necessary  costs  of  our  military 
forces,  as  well  as  an  increased  level,  if 
needed,  to  prevent  any  adversary  from 
destabilizing  the  peace  of  the  world. 
The  money  we  spend  on  defense  is  not 
wasted  any  more  than  is  the  cost  of 
maintaining  a  police  force  in  a  local 
community  to  keep  the  peace.  This  in- 
vestment purchases  our  freedom  to  ful- 
fill the  worthy  goals  of  our  nation. 

Southerners,  whose  ancestors   100 


years  ago  knew  the  horrors  of  a  home- 
land devastated  by  war,  are  particularly 
determined  that  war  shall  never  come 
to  us  again.  All  Americans  understand 
the  basic  lesson  of  history:  that  we 
need  to  be  resolute  and  able  to  protect 
ourselves,  to  prevent  threats  and  domi- 
nation by  others. 

No  matter  how  peaceful  and  secure 
and  easy  the  circumstances  of  our  lives 
now  seem,  we  have  no  guarantee  that 
the  blessings  will  endure.  That  is  why 
we  will  always  maintain  the  strength 
which,  God  willing,  we  shall  never 
need  to  use.  □ 


Address  at  Wake  Forest  University  in 
Winston-Salem,  N.C..  on  Mar.  17,  1978  (in- 
troductory paragraphs  omitted);  for  full  text, 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Mar.  27. 


20 

turn  to  us  for  their  security  needs,  in- 
stead of  having  to  turn  to  the  Soviet 
Union  as  they  have  in  the  past.  I  am 
talking  specifically  about  Egypt.  You 
have  to  remember  that  Saudi  Arabia 
has  never  had  any  active  aggression 
against  Israel.  Saudi  Arabia  is  our  ally 
and  friend.  Egypt  is  our  ally  and 
friend.  Israel  is  our  ally  and  friend. 

To  maintain  security  in  that  region  is 
important.  Egypt  has  other  threats 
against  its  security.  The  Soviets  are 
shipping  massive  quantities  of  weapons 
into  the  Middle  Eastern  area  now,  into 
the  Red  Sea  area — Ethiopia,  into  Syria, 
Iraq,  Libya — and  we  cannot  abandon 
our  own  friends.  So  I  don't  think  it  is 
wrong  at  all  to  insure  stability  or  the 
right  to  defend  themselves  in  a  region 
with  arms  sales. 

We  are  continuing  multinational 
negotiations  with  other  sellers  of 
weapons  to  get  them  to  join  with  us  in 
a  constant  step-by-step,  year-by-year 
reduction  in  total  arms  sales.  If  they 
do,  I  think  the  world  will  be  much 
more  peaceful  in  the  future. 


MARCH  2 

Q.  What  are  you  going  to  do  about 
the  deteriorating  dollar  and  the  basic 
cause  of  its  collapse,  soaring  foreign 
oil  imports?  And  a  related  question, 
saying  that  European  financial  offi- 
cials say  the  United  States  should  de- 
fend the  dollar  more  vigorously. 

A.  I  spent  a  lot  of  time  studying 
about  the  American  dollar,  its  value  in 
international  monetary  markets,  the 
causes  for  the  recent  deterioration  as  it 
relates  to  other  major  currencies.  I  can 
say  with  complete  assurance  that  the 
basic  principles  of  monetary  values  are 
not  being  adequately  assessed  on  the 
current  international  monetary  markets. 
There  are  three  that  I  would  like  to 
mention  specifically. 

•  First  of  all,  the  attractiveness  of 
investment  in  our  own  country  com- 
pared to  other  nations  is  rapidly  in- 
creasing. One  of  the  reasons  is  the 
higher  interest  rates  that  can  be  paid  on 
investments  in  our  country. 

•  Another  one  is  the  rapidly  increas- 
ing consumption  of  oil  that  occurred 
during  1977.  This  caused  us  a  great 
deal  of  concern.  In  1978  we  will  not 
have  that  circumstance.  Present  trends 
and  future  projections  show  that  at  the 
worst  we'll  have  a  leveling  off  of  im- 
ports of  foreign  oil,  one  of  the  major 
causes  of  legitimate  deterioration  in  the 
quality  of  the  dollar. 

•  And  the  other  point  is  the  degree 
with  which  American  economic  recov- 
ery or  growth  compares  to  potential 


Department  of  State  Bi 


purchases  of  our  own  goods.  In  this 
last  year,  our  own  rate  of  growth  was 
about  37c  greater  than  the  average  of 
our  major  trading  partners.  That  differ- 
ence will  be  substantially  less  in  1978. 
We  will  still  have  adequate  growth,  but 
our  major  trading  partners  will  have 
better  growth  than  they  had  last  year. 

These  three  basic  causes  in  1977  for 
some  lowering  in  the  dollar's  value  will 
be  much  better  in  1978.  We  do  move 
aggressively  and  adequately  to  prevent 
disorderly  market  circumstances  when 
that  need  is  obvious  to  us.  We'll  con- 
tinue to  do  that.  But  my  own  belief  is 
that  these  basic  principles  that  assess 
the  legitimate  value  of  the  dollar  have 
not  been  adequately  observed  recently. 
My  guess  is  that  in  the  future  over  a 
longer  period  of  time,  what  I've  just 
told  you  will  be  observed  and  the  dollar 
will  remain  in  good  shape. 


Q.  Later  this  month  you'll  be 
meeting  with  Prime  Minister 
Menahem  Begin  from  Israel.  What 
do  you  hope  to  achieve  during  your 
meetings  with  the  Prime  Minister? 

A.  This  will  be  my  third  meeting 
with  Prime  Minister  Begin  since  he's 
been  the  leader  of  Israel.  In  addition,  I 
communicate  with  him  fairly  frequently 
by  personal  letter,  by  diplomatic  mes- 
sage, and  on  occasion  by  telephone. 
And  both  our  own  Secretary  of  State 
and  other  officials  and  his  secretary  of 
state  and  other  officials  come  here  fre- 
quently. Defense  Minister  Weizman 
will  be  here  shortly  to  consult  with  me 
and  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Sec- 
retary of  State,  and  others. 

We  are  looking  for  some  common 
ground  on  which  the  Egyptians,  the  Is- 
raelis, the  Jordanians,  the  residents  of 
the  West  Bank,  and  other  areas  can 
agree. 

This  is  a  difficult  and  sensitive  ques- 
tion. As  you  know,  the  Gaza  Strip  has 
had  an  affiliation  in  the  past  with 
Egypt,  the  West  Bank  with  Jordan, 
both  now  occupied  by  Israel.  And  we 
hope  to  search  out  at  the  top  level  of 
government  some  resolution  of  the  dif- 
ferences on  specifics  relating  to  the 
Sinai  and  also  on  a  statement  of  princi- 
ples relating  to  the  occupied  territories 
of  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip, 
hoping  at  that  time  that  Egypt  and  the 
Jordanians  and  the  Palestinian  Arabs 
who  live  in  the  West  Bank.  Gaza  Strip 
would  be  satisfied  to  conclude  perhaps 
some  agreements  and  to  proceed  with 
further  negotiations  leading  to  an  ulti- 
mate resolution  of  the  issue,  based  on 
U.N.  Resolution  242. 

One  of  the  crucial  elements  of  any 
progress  in  the  Middle  East  is  a  cleav- 


ing to  the  commitment  that  U.N.  2 
a  basis  for  continued  negotiations  i 
solution.   The  abandonment  of 
would  put  us  back  many  month 
years.  So,  this  is  what  I  hope  tc 
complish  with  Prime  Minister  Begi 
frankly  discuss  with  him  my  pre\ 
agreements  and  discussions  with  P# 
dent  Sadat,  to  encourage  direct  neg  a 
tions  to  be  resumed,  and  to  search^- 
common  ground,  based  on  advice  g 
to  me  by  Secretary  of  State  Vance 
also  by  Mr.  Atherton  [Alfred  L.  A 
ton,  Jr.,  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs] 
the  latest  possible  language  chai 
that  might  be  necessary  to  let  E 
and  Israel  agree.  This  is  what  I  ho[ 
accomplish,  and  I  believe  the  pers 
discussions  will  be  good. 

I   would   much   prefer  that 
personal  discussions  be  carried  on" 
tween  Sadat  and  Begin.  But  in  the| 
sence  of  that  possibility  at  this 
ment,  we  hope  to  restore  it  and  a( 
an  intermediary. 


Q.  With  the  Soviets  active  no' 
the  Horn  of  Africa,  and  with  ol 
strains  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations,  \f 
hope  do  you  have  for  early  resuJ 
tion  of  SALT  talks? 

A.  The  SALT  talks  have  never  1 9 
discontinued  or  delayed.  They  are  I 
going  now,  and  the  Soviet  involvei  I 
in  the  Horn  has  not  interrupted  I 
process.  We  do  not  initiate  any  ;l 
ernment  policy  that  has  a  linkage  I 
tween  the  Soviet  involvemen  I 
the  Ethiopia-Somalia  dispute  on  I 
one  hand  and  SALT  or  the  comprell 
sive  test  ban  negotiations  on  the  otl  |' 

Obviously  any  negotiation,  if  cl 
eluded  successfully  at  the  execu  \ 
level,  would  have  to  be  ratified  by  I 
Congress,  who  would  be  heavily  in  • 
enced  by  opinion  of  the  Ameri  t 
people.  And  the  fact  that  the  Sovl 
have  overarmed  to  the  teeth  the  So  I 
lians,  who  then  use  Soviet  weapon  b 
invade  Ethiopia  and  now  are  overal 
ing  Ethiopia  and  directing  their  miliil 
effort  has  caused  a  threat  to  peace  I 
the  Horn  area  of  Africa. 

We  have  added  our  own  impl 
tunities  for  a  peaceful  resolution  ;| 
our  own  caution  comments  to  I 
Soviets.  They  have  assured  me  direil 
through  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  t| 
the  Ethiopians  would  not  cross  I 
Somalia  border.  We  have  sent  a  dele.fe 
tion  to  meet  with  President  Mengil 
who  assured  me  personally  that  tl» 
would  not  cross  the  Somalia  border.  '■ 

We  have  three  hopes  there  that  J 
trust  and  certainly  hope  that  the  Sovil 
will  honor. 


1978 


21 


)ne  is  a  Somalian   withdrawal 
the  territories  which  they  occupy 

fstern  Ethiopia,  in  the  Ogaden  area, 
secondly,  a  removal  from  Ethiopia 
jban  and  Soviet  troops;  and 
Third,  a  lessening  of  the  tensions 
exist  between  those  countries  and 
snoring  of  the  sometimes  arbitrar- 

llrawn  international  boundaries  in 

ra. 


i  et 
,cet 


d   we   hope   that   the   OAU  — 

rganization  of  African  Unity — 

d  become  more  successful  in  their 

Jrts  to  resolve  this  dispute  in  a 

eful  way.  But  at  this  time,  Somalia 

invading  nation.  We  have  refused 

md  any  weapons  into  that  area  or 

lit  third  countries  who  bought 

)ons  from  us  to  transfer  them  into 

area,  and  I  think  our  policy  is  com- 

ly  accurate. 

le  Soviets'  violating  of  these  prin- 
s  would  be  a  cause  of  concern  to 
would  lessen  the  confidence  of  the 
•rican  people  in  the  word  and 
:eful  intentions  of  the  Soviet 
m.  would  make  it  more  difficult  to 
y  a  SALT  agreement  or  com- 
nsive  test  ban  agreement  if  con- 
ed, and  therefore  the  two  are 
ed  because  of  actions  by  the 
ets.  We  don't  initiate  the  linkage. 

We  have  several  questions  re- 
el i  to  the  Braniff  Airways  low-cost 
E  ice  between  Dallas  and  London, 
fi  t  of  all,  have  you  received  a  rec- 
linendation  from  the  CAB  [Civil 
v  onautics  Board]  for  retaliatory 
icon,  and  do  you  plan  to  take  such 
«  on  against  the  British  carrier? 
« I  secondly,  do  you  believe  that  the 
ILish  Government  is  abiding  by  its 
tiimitments  in  the  Bermuda  II  air- 
El  agreements? 

I..  I  have  not  received  a  recommen- 
lon  from  the  CAB  at  this  moment. 
•  en  the  recommendation  gets  to  me, 
fly  law,  will  have  to  act  and  will  act 

■  nediately. 

I  don't  know  enough  about  the  issue, 
I  details  of  the  British  Government 
ring,  to  know  whether  or  not  they 
le  violated  the  agreement  that  was 
I  eluded  this  past  year.  My  guess  is, 
knving  the  British,  that  they  have  not 
v.  lated  the  agreement  specifically. 
It,  as  you  know,  an  agreement  can't 

■  that  detailed  to  anticipate  every  in- 
ri  idual  ruling  that  will  be  concluded 
I  the  CAB  on  our  side  or  its  equiva- 
I  t  agency  on  the  British  side.  I  don't 
Idw  much  about  the  issue  yet. 

J  {But  if  there  is  a  violation,  we  would 
(press  our  concern  directly  to  Prime 

■  nister  Callaghan.  And  when  the 
tjvB  gives  me  a  report  and  a  recom- 
l»|:ndation,   the   chances   are   that   I 

mid  honor  it. 


We  have  had  notable  success  in  1977 
in  increasing  competition,  particularly 
in  international  routes  of  air  carriers. 
We  have  encouraged  the  additional 
competition  of  American  airlines  in 
this  area,  as  well.  We  hope  to  get  the 
Congress  to  act  on  substantial  deregula- 
tion in  the  airline  industry  within  our 
country.  I  believe  that  we've  made  not- 
able success  already,  and  we  have 
withstood  a  tremendous  pressure  from 
the  British  to  have  more  government 
protection,  which  would  be  contrary  to 
competition  in  the  agreement  that  we 
reached  last  year. 


MARCH  9 


I  have  another  statement  to  make. 
Last  night,  I  was  informed  by  President 
Siad  Barre  of  Somalia  that  he  was  ag- 
reeing to  withdraw  his  forces  from  the 
Ogaden  area,  the  occupied  areas  of 
Ethiopia,  and  just  the  last  few  minutes, 
he  confirmed  this  commitment  to  me 
with  a  public  statement. 

I  welcome  President  Siad  Barre's 
announcement  of  this  decision.  The 
United  States  hopes  that  this  decision 
will  result  in  an  immediate  halt  of  the 
bloodshed  in  that  area  of  the  Horn  of 
Africa.  We  hope  that  the  Organization 
of  African  Unity  can  move  quickly  to 
assist  all  parties  to  terminate  hostilities, 
to  agree  quickly  on  rules  that  can  be 
observed  so  that  Somali  forces  can  re- 
tire rapidly  into  their  own  territory  and 
to  insure  that  peaceful  conditions  are 
restored  among  the  civilian  population. 

As  soon  as  Somali  forces  have  with- 
drawn completely,  and  as  soon  as 
Ethiopian  forces  have  reestablished 
control  over  their  own  territory,  with- 
drawal of  the  Soviet  and  Cuban  combat 
presence  should  begin. 

The  United  States  looks  forward  to 
the  complete  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  the  two  countries — 
Ethiopia  and  Somalia — at  an  early 
date.  We  stand  ready  to  assist  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity  in  working 
out  the  basis  for  negotiations  between 
Ethiopia  and  Somalia  which  would  in- 
sure the  territorial  integrity  of  all  coun- 
tries in  the  region  and  the  honoring  of 
international  boundaries. 

Q.  Does  that  Somalia  announce- 
ment cause  you  to  look  any  more 
favorably  on  Somali  requests  for 
American  arms,  assuming  they  go 
through  with  it? 

A.  We  notified  Somalia  many 
months  ago  that  as  long  as  they  were  in 
occupied  territory,  that  there  would  be 
no  consideration  on  our  part  for  defen- 


sive arms  of  any  kind.  I  think  it  would 
require  a  tangible  demonstration  of  the 
carrying  out  of  this  commitment  on  the 
part  of  the  Somalians  and  also  a  re- 
newed commitment  not  to  dishonor  the 
international  boundaries  of  either 
Ethiopia  or  Kenya  before  we  would  be 
willing  to  discuss  with  them  economic 
aid  or  defensive  arms  supplies. 

In  this  case,  working  with  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity  and  the 
Congress,  we  would  consider  this  in  a 
routine  manner,  but  not  until — 


Q.  On  the  Middle  East,  the  State 
Department  today  reaffirmed  that 
U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  242 
remains,  in  our  view,  the  bedrock  of 
our  effort  to  bring  peace  to  that  area 
and  more  or  less  served  notice  on  the 
Israeli  Government  not  to  take  any 
decision  to  renounce  that.  Could  you 
state  for  us  what  your  understanding 
or  your  interpretation  of  Security 
Council  Resolution  242  is  and  what 
your  understanding  of  the  Israeli  po- 
sition on  this  is? 

A.  U.N.  Resolution  242  was  passed 
about  10  years  ago.  Since  then  it  has 
been  endorsed  with  practically  no 
equivocation  by  our  own  country,  by 
the  entire  international  community,  by 
the  Israeli  Government,  and  by  the 
Arab  countries  who  border  on  Israel.  It 
calls  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israel  from 
territories  occupied  in  the  1967  war.  It 
calls  for  the  restoration  of  security  of 
Israel  behind  recognized  and  defensible 
borders.  And  this  has  been  the  basis  on 
which  all  of  our  efforts  since  I've  been 
in  office,  and  also  my  predecessors'  ef- 
forts, have  been  based. 

For  any  nation  now  to  reject  the  ap- 
plication of  242  to  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories, including  the  West  Bank,  the 
Sinai,  the  Golan  Heights,  would  be  a 
very  serious  blow  to  the  prospects  of 
peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

In  addition  to  the  principles  that  I've 
just  described  to  you,  we've  also  been 
working  with  complete  commitment 
and  with  some  substantial  success,  par- 
ticularly in  the  case  of  Egypt,  to  insure 
that  Israel  will  not  only  be  blessed  with 
a  cessation  of  hostilities  but  also  with  a 
full  restoration  of  peace,  open  borders, 
diplomatic  relations,  free  trade,  ex- 
change of  tourism  and  students,  and 
cultural  exchanges.  This  is  a  prospect 
that  we  still  have.  But  the  abandonment 
of  U.N.  Resolution  242,  as  it  applies  to 
the  West  Bank  and  other  occupied  ter- 
ritories, would  be  a  very  serious  blow 
to  the  prospects  of  peace  and  a  com- 
plete reversal  of  the  policy  of  the 
Israeli  Government  and  other  govern- 
ments in  the  area. 


22 


Department  of  State  Bu 


Q.  You  have  spoken  many  limes  of 
the  commitment  that  the  United 
States  has  for  the  security  of  Israel. 
In  1975,  in  September,  the  Sinai  II 
agreement  said  specifically  that  the 
United  States  would  promise  to  give 
advanced  aircraft,  such  as  the  F-16, 
at  an  unspecified  time  and  number, 
to  Israel. 

Why  is  that  promise  of  the  United 
States  now  made  part  of  a  package 
deal?  In  other  words,  why  is  it  tied  to 
approval  for  aircraft  to  other  coun- 
tries, Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia? 

A.  We  are  honoring  completely  the 
commitments  made  to  Israel  in  the  fall 
of  1975  concerning  an  adherence  on 
our  part  to  the  adequate  defense 
capabilities  of  Israel,  including  ad- 
vanced aircraft  like  the  F-15  and  the 
F-16. 

Some  orders  of  this  kind  have  al- 
ready been  placed,  accepted,  and  de- 
liveries are  in  prospect.  Some  planes 
have  already  been  delivered.  And  the 
proposal  that  I've  made  to  Congress  on 
the  arms  sales  package  is  compatible 
with  that  commitment. 

In  the  fall  of  1975,  commitments 
were  also  made  to  the  Saudi  Arabians, 
to  provide  them  with  advanced  aircraft, 
to  replace  their  present  Lightning 
planes  which  are  becoming  obsolete. 

Later,  in  the  Ford  Administration  in 
1976,  in  the  fall,  a  commitment  was 
made  to  them  to  send  Defense  Depart- 
ment officials  to  Saudi  Arabia,  to  give 
them  some  assessment  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  F-15's  and  F-16's.  with 
a  commitment  then  made  that  they 
would  have  their  choice  between  the 
16's  and  the  15's. 

When  Crown  Prince  Fahd  came  to 
our  country  last  spring,  I  repeated  this 
commitment,  that  had  been  made  by 
my  own  predecessors  in  the  White 
House,  and  so  the  sale  of  F-15's  to 
Saudi  Arabia  is  consistent  with  the 
commitment  also  made  in  the  fall  of 
1975  and  repeatedly  reconfirmed. 

The  sale  of  the  F-5E's — a  much  less 
capable  airplane,  by  the  way — to  the 
Egyptians  is.  I  think,  a  very  legitimate 
proposal,  because  Egyptians  in  effect 
have  severed  their  supply  of  weapons 
that  used  to  come  from  the  Soviet 
Union  and  have  cast  their  lot  with  us. 
which  is  a  very  favorable  development 
in  the  Middle  East,  one  of  the  most 
profound  developments  of  all. 

I  have  no  apology  at  all  to  make  for 
this  proposal.  It  maintains  the  military 
balance  that  exists  in  the  Middle  Fast.  I 
can  say  without  any  doubt  that  the 
superior  capabilities  of  the  Israeli  Air 
Force,  compared  to  their  neighbors,  is 
maintained,  and  at  the  same  time,  it  re- 
confirms our  own  relationship  with  the 
moderate  Arab  leaders  and  nations  lor 


the  future  to  insure  that  peace  can  be 
and  will  be  maintained  in  the  Middle 
East. 

Q.  On  the  same  subject,  we've 
seen  reports  in  recent  days  from  the 
Middle  East,  from  both  Cairo  and 
Jerusalem,  that  in  effect  President 
Sadat's  initiative  has  come  to  an  end, 
that  it  has  come  aground.  We  also 
see  reports  from  Jerusalem  that 
ministers  in  the  Israeli  Government 
have  decided  that  there  is  no  deal  to 
be  made  at  this  time.  Could  you  give 
us  your  assessment  of  where  this 
stands  and  where  you  think  it's  going 
to  go? 

A.  As  is  the  case  in  the  White  House 
and  in  the  Congress,  and  in  the  United 
States,  there  is  a  difference  in  Israel,  a 
very  heated  debate  in  prospect  and  al- 
ready in  progress  about  what  should  be 
done  to  bring  about  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  There  are  obviously  differences 
also  between  nations,  between  Egypt 
and  Israel,  between  Israel  and  their 
other  neighbors. 

I  would  say  that  in  comparison  to  the 
situation  a  year  ago,  the  prospects  for 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  are  quite  good.  We  would  hope 
that  there  could  be  an  immediate  res- 
olution of  all  the  differences.  That's 
not  immediately  in  prospect. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  will  be  coming 
to  visit  with  me  this  coming  week.1  I 
know  him  very  well.  I've  met  with  him 
twice  before.  He  is  a  very  strong  advo- 
cate, a  very  dedicated  advocate  of  the 
position  of  the  Israeli  Government. 
He's  a  forceful  and  outspoken  person. 
And  I'm  sure  after  our  meeting,  we 
will  at  least  understand  each  other 
better. 

I  hope  we  can  move  another  step  to- 
ward peace.  I  had  an  equivalent  oppor- 
tunity this  year  to  meet  and  to  have 
long  discussions  with  President  Sadat. 

I  would  say  that  there's  been  a  great 
deal  of  progress  made.  Just  looking  at 
the  changes  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
Israelis,  we  have  now  the  major  Arab 
nation  who  has  recognized  Israel's 
right  to  exist,  right  to  exist  in  peace, 
right  to  exist  permanently,  has  offered 
the  full  definition  of  peace  which  I  de- 
scribed earlier.  They  have  been  meet- 
ing directly  and  personally.  Begin  and 
Sadat  and  their  representatives,  which 
was  not  in  prospect  at  all  a  year  ago. 

There  are  still  differences  between 
them — relatively  minor  differences  in 
the  Sinai,  more  major  strategic  kinds  ol 
differences  involving  the  Palestinian 
question  and  the  implementation  of 
U.N.  242.  So  we've  got  a  long  way  to 

go- 

It's  a  difficult  question  that's  been 
one  of  the  most  challenging,  I  guess,  in 


the  last  30  years  for  the  world,  to  h. 
about  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  ■ 
I'm  not  discouraged  about  it.  wl 
going  to  stick  with  it.  And  even  thcI'V. 
it  takes  a  lot  of  time  and  much  al 
and  much  debate  and  many  differei 
expressed  by  all  public  officials,  I 
tend  to  stay  with  it.  And  I  believe 
American  people  are  deeply  commi 
to  two  things:  one   is  the  securitj 
Israel  under  any  circumstances, 
secondly,   the   achievement   of  ci 
prehensive  peace. 


havi 


iitioi 


tl 


e; 


Q.  Mark  Seigel,  one  of  your  ai( 
quit  today,  and  you  accepted  his  it 
ignation  with  regret.  He  cited  as  f '  j 
reason,  differences  with  your  Midf^ 
East  policy. 

His  resignation,   to  many,  syf" 
bolizes  the  split   in  the  Ameritf[ 
Jewish  community  over  the  inter!  ' 
debate  that's  going  on  over  our  Ml* 
die  East  policy.  And  with  Begin  ccf  ' 
ing,  I  wonder  if  you  could  tell  i 
what  differences  there  are  betw  l 
the  two  of  us,  what  your  position  '  I 
be  on  these  differences,  and  a  cq  lJ 
ment  on  the  report  that  you're  go 
to  pressure  him  to  make  signific 
concessions? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  intention 
pressure  Prime  Minister  Begin.  I  d( 
have  any  desire  to  do  it  and  couldn 
I  wanted  to.  He's  a  very  strong  and 
dependent  person  representing  a  stro 
and  independent  nation.  Our  role 
been  that  of  an  intermediary.  And  < 
of  the  most  pleasant  respites  that  I  h; 
had  since  I've  been  in  office  was 
brief  time  when  Prime  Minister  Be 
and  President  Sadat  were  negotiat 
directly  and  I  was  out  of  the  role 
carrying  messages  back  and  forth. 

This  is,  however,  a  situation  that  1 
now  deteriorated  to  some  degree  sir 
President  Sadat  went  to  Jerusale 
Both  the  military  and  the  political  ta 
are  now  interrupted — we  hope  te 
porarily. 

One  of  the  things  I  will  be  doing 
to  repeat  to  Prime  Minister  Begin  p» 
sonally  the  request  and  the  negotiai ' 
positions  of  President  Sadat, 
we've  tried  to  do  this  through  our 
bassadors  and  through  our  negotiat 
Mr.  Atherton.  in  the  Mideast,  an- 
think  perhaps  I  can  do  it  perhaps  a  lit 
more  effectively. 

But  the  differences  that  exist  b 
tween  them  are  well-known.  In  tl 
Sinai,  as  I  said,  they  arc  relatively  ea: 
to  resolve — the  Jewish  settlements,  tl 
placement  of  Egyptian  forces  in  tl 
Sinai,  and  some  continuation  of  Israe 
control  over  some  airfields  or  aen 
dromes,   and  the  rapidity  with   whk 


1978 
1  would  withdraw  from  the  Sinai 

the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip,  this 
ves  implementation  of  U.N.  Res- 
on  242  and  some  resolution  of  the 
itinian  question.  We  do  not  and 
r  have  favored  an  independent 
stinian  nation,  but  within  that 
d  of  constraint,  how  to  give  the 
stinians  who  live  in  the  West 
Gaza  Strip  some  voice  in  the  de- 
ination  of  their  own  future,  is  an 

still  unresolved. 

at  outlines  very  briefly  the  situa- 
that  we're  presently  in. 


In  view  of  the  great  amount  of 
ssion  that's  going  on  now  about 
nal  Rhodesian  settlement,  which 

des  the  Patriotic  Front,  is  it 
ble  in  your  view,  to  have  a  set- 
ent  of  the  Rhodesian  crisis  with- 
including  Mr.  Nkomo  [Joshua 

o,  President,  Zimbabwe  Afri- 
m  People's  Union]  and  Mr.  Mugabe 

■  >ert  Mugabe,  Secretary  General, 
dfrbabwe  African  National  Union]? 
.13.  I  would  doubt  that  we  could  have 
/ilrmanent  settlement  without  includ- 
M  he  right  for  all  the  nationalist  lead- 
jl:o  participate.  That  would  include 

■  ;abe,  Sithole  [Reverend  Ndabanigi 
■ole,  head  of  the  African  National 
Ifncil/Sithole],  and  would  also,  of 
ijrse,  include  Nkomo  as  well, 
vl  orewa  [Bishop  Abel  Muzorewa, 
111  of  the  African  National  Council], 

■  'Other  leader,  was  here  yesterday 

■  met  with  Secretary  Vance.  We 
n:  had  a  meeting,  yesterday  after- 
i<n.  between  myself,  Secretary 
lice,  and  the  Foreign  Minister  of 

■  at  Britain,   David  Owen.   And  we 

■  infirmed  our  position,  which  has 
bt  n  consistent,  that  the  Anglo- 
I  erican  plan  is  the  best  basis  for  a 
[MTianent  resolution  of  the  Rhodesian 

■  Zimbabwe  question.  It's  one  that's 
I  stantially  supported  by  the  front-line 
pnidcnts,  presidents  of  those  nations 
1'ounding  Rhodesia.  And  it  has  not 
bi  n  accepted  completely  by  Nkomo 
I)  Mugabe,  the  freedom  force  leaders 
*side  of  Rhodesia. 

■tye  hope  now  that  we  can  have  a 
eiference  of  all  the  interested 
pjionalist  leaders  to  try  to  work  out 


the  disparity  between  the  internal  set- 
tlement proposal,  which  is  not 
adequate,  and  the  so-called  Anglo- 
American  plan,  which  we  believe  to  be 
adequate. 

We've  not  rejected  the  individual 
component  parts  of  the  so-called  inter- 
nal settlement  plan.  To  the  extent  that 
they  are  consistent  with  the  overall 
Anglo-American  plan  provisions,  they 
are  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  But  I 
think  that  it  must  be  that  any  permanent 
settlement  would  include  the  right  of 
all  the  interested  nationalist  leaders  to 
seek  the  leadership  of  Rhodesia. 


Q.  Can  you  tell  us  why  you  think 
the  dollar  is  declining  abroad?  What 
are  you  going  to  do  about  it,  and  do 
you  think  it's  time  for  more  tougher 
measures  to  curb  inflation  here  in  the 
United  States? 

A.  This  is  a  matter  with  interna- 
tional implications.  I  had  a  long  talk 
this  morning  on  the  phone  with  Chan- 
cellor Helmut  Schmidt.  This  was  one 
of  the  subjects  that  we  did  discuss.  And 
German  and  American  officials  will  be 
meeting  this  weekend  to  try  to  have  a 
common  -approach  to  eliminating,  or 
certainly  reducing,  the  disorderly  mar- 
keting of  the  currencies  of  the  world. 

We  have  had  a  policy  of  intervening 
in  the  monetary  markets  only  when 
disorder  did  occur,  when  there  were 
fluctuations  that  were  not  warranted  or 
that  caused  us  some  concern.  I  think 
recently  the  value  of  the  dollar  has 
been  fairly  well  stable  with  the 
deutsche  mark  at  about  2.02 

One  of  the  things  that  has  been 
pointed  out  to  me  is  that  the  factors  that 
caused  a  lowering  of  the  dollar's  value, 
compared  to  some  of  the  stronger  cur- 
rencies— Swiss  francs,  Japanese  yen, 
German  deutsche  marks — in  this  past 
year  are  being  alleviated. 

Higher  interest  rates  in  our  country 
now,  caused  by  various  factors,  make 
investments  in  the  United  States  more 
attractive  than  they  were  last  year.  We 
had  a  high  increase  in  1977  in  the 
amount  of  oil  imported.  My  guess  is 
that  this  year,  we  will  not  have  that  in- 
crease in  imported  oil. 

Last  year,  we  had  a  much  higher  in- 
crease in  our  gross  national  product,  a 


23 


much  more  vigorous  economy  that 
made  it  possible  for  us  to  buy  foreign 
goods  better  than  foreigners  could  buy 
our  goods. 

I  think  the  difference  was  about  a  3% 
rate  of  growth.  Because  of  the  more 
vigorous  economies  in  some  of  our 
foreign  trading  partners,  countries,  this 
year,  that  difference  is  certainly  likely 
to  narrow. 

Chancellor  Schmidt  told  me  that  the 
last  quarter  in  1977  in  Germany  the 
GNP  growth  was  69c.  This  was  higher 
than  he  had  anticipated,  and  he  didn't 
think  that  it  was  going  to  be  maintained 
constantly,  but  he  was  pleased  with 
that. 

I  think  those  factors  all  point  to  the 
very  good  strength  of  the  dollar  and,  on 
a  long-term  basis,  it  being  fairly  well 
priced  compared  to  foreign  currencies. 
But  any  shocks  to  the  market,  any  dis- 
orderly marketing  will  require  us  to 
intercede,  and  I  will  do  so.  □ 


For  complete  texts  of  news  conferences  of  Feb. 
17  (in  Providence.  Rhode  Island).  Mar.  2  fat 
the  National  Press  Club),  and  Mar.  9.  1978. 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments oj  Feb.  27.  p.  331;  Mar.  6.  p.  438;  and 
Mar.  13.  p.  489.  respectively. 

'Prime  Minister  Begin's  arrival  in  the  United 
States  was  delayed  until  Mar.  20. 


Presitlent 
Carter's  Trip 


As  the  Bulletin  goes  to  press. 
President  Carter  is  completing  his  trip 
to  four  countries  in  Latin  America  and 
Africa: 


Mar.  28 
Mar.  29 
Mar.  31 
Apr.  3 


Venezuela 
Brazil 
Nigeria 
Liberia 


The  May  issue  will  carry  complete 
documentation  of  this  trip,  including 
the  President's  addresses  in  Venezuela 
and  Nigeria  and  news  conference  in 
Brazil.  □ 


24 


Department  of  State  Bu 


THE  SECRETARY:     I/JS.  Foreign  Assistance  Program 


P  ■ 


I  am  delighted  to  present  the  Admin- 
istration's foreign  assistance  programs 
tor  fiscal  year  1979.  We  are  requesting 
an  authorization  of  $1.6  billion  for  our 
bilateral  development  assistance  pro- 
gram, $2.7  billion  for  our  security  as- 
sistance program,  and  $282  million  for 
programs  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Organization  of  American  States.  Al- 
though we  do  not  require  authorization 
in  FY  1979,  we  are  planning  to  con- 
tribute $3.5  billion  to  the  international 
financial  institutions  (IFI's)1  and  to 
undertake  a  $1.4  billion  program  in 
P.L.  480  Food  for  Peace  for  that  year. 

Today,  I  would  like  to  explain  to  you 
the  goals  which  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion seeks  to  achieve  with  these 
programs. 

This  is  the  first  foreign  assistance 
budget  which  fully  reflects  the  policies 
and  priorities  of  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion. It  was  developed  after  an  exten- 
sive Administration  review  of  our  rela- 
tions with  less  developed  countries 
(LDC's)  generally  and  of  our  foreign 
assistance  programs  in  particular. 

I  would  like  to  summarize  for  you 
the  results  of  our  assessments. 


Less  Developed  Countries 

First,  our  review  highlighted  the 
growing  importance  of  less  developed 
countries  to  U.S.  interests.  The  coop- 
eration of  Third  World  countries  is  es- 
sential in  helping  to  resolve  pressing 
global  problems  that  affect  all  nations: 
economic  instability  or  stagnation, 
rapid  population  growth,  adequate  food 
and  energy  production,  environmental 
deterioration,  nuclear  proliferation,  ter- 
rorism, and  the  spread  of  narcotics. 

The  less  developed  countries  are  in- 
creasingly important  to  the  economic 
welfare  of  the  United  States.  Last  year, 
for  example,  the  non-oil  producers 
alone  accounted  for  23*%  of  our  im- 
ports, including  a  very  high  percentage 
of  our  critical  raw  materials.  They  were 
also  the  market  for  25'!  of  our  exports 
and  25%  of  U.S.  direct  investment 
abroad . 

Earnings  from  U.S.  direct  invest- 
ment in  these  countries  in  1975 
amounted  to  $7.4  billion  — -  more  than 
our  total  foreign  assistance  that  year. 
Moreover,  in  recent  years,  non-oil- 
producing  less  developed  countries 
have  bought  more  from  us  than  we 
have  from  them,  thereby  improving  our 


trade  balance  and  helping  to  sustain 
American  production  and  jobs  during 
the  recent  recession. 

The  developing  countries  are  central 
participants  in  our  quest  for  peace. 
Their  cooperation  is  essential  to  re- 
gional stability  and  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  and  southern  Africa,  to  name  the 
most  obvious  cases.  Moreover,  we 
need  to  work  closely  with  these  coun- 
tries on  other  security  issues  as  well:  in 
deploying  our  armed  forces  effectively 
and  in  maintaining  access  to  straits, 
ports,  and  aviation  facilities,  for 
example. 

Second,  our  review  of  American 
relations  with  the  less  developed  coun- 
tries also  emphasized  that  their  inter- 
ests and  needs  vary  enormously  and  re- 
quire differing  responses  by  the  United 
States.  The  developing  world  is  really 
several  worlds: 

•  The  OPEC  nations  with  substantial 
financial  surpluses  and  the  ability  to 
pay  in  full  for  technical  assistance; 

•  The  rapidly  industrializing  "upper 
tier"  countries  such  as  Brazil  and 
Mexico  with  access  to  private  capital 
but  with  large  pockets  of  poverty; 

•  The  "middle-income"  nations  like 
the  Dominican  Republic  or  Tunisia 
which  still  require  some  concessional 
assistance  to  help  the  poor;  and 

•  The  low-income  nations,  such  as 
the  Sahel  countries,  which  rely  heavily 
on  concessional  aid  to  finance  their  de- 
velopment programs. 

Despite  their  differences,  however, 
the  developing  countries  have  worked 
closely  together  to  support  a  series  of 
ideas  which  found  expression  in  their 
call  for  a  new  international  economic 
order.  These  have  included  proposals 
for  price  stabilizing  commodity  agree- 
ments, automatic  debt  relief,  and  per- 
manent trade  preferences.  The  United 
States  has  endeavored  to  respond  posi- 
tively where  such  efforts  would  ac- 
tually promote  development.  We  have 
also  made  our  own  proposals — for 
example,  in  negotiations  on  a  common 
fund  for  buffer  stock  financing  and  on 
a  sugar  agreement. 

However,  we  cannot  respond  favora- 
bly to  a  number  of  LDC  demands, 
especially  their  desires  to  use  commod- 
ity agreements  or  blanket  debt  relief  as 
instruments  of  resource  transfer.  Yet 
we  share  the  aspirations  of  less  de- 
veloped countries  for  economic  growth 
and  development  and  understand  their 


•s 


need  for  additional  resources 

It  has  become  clear  to  us  that  fori 
assistance  is  among  the  most  impor 
and  effective  instruments  we  have 
promoting  economic  developmen'  i 
well  as  other  U.S.  interests  in  LDl   » 
It  addresses  problems  of  developi 
directly.   It  supports  an  open  inte 
tional  economy.   And,  as  the  last 
years   demonstrate,   international 
velopment  efforts  have  contrib 
substantially  to  the  growth  and  \ 
being  of  the  LDC's. 

•  The  per  capita  gross  national  pr  tit 
uct  of  LDC's  as  a  group  grew  at  an    ta 
erage  rate  of  3.4%  per  year  durl  lb 
1950-75,   faster  than  any  groupl 
countries  in  any  comparable  per 
prior  to  1950 

•  In  the  past  3  decades  LDC's  h 
experienced  increases  in  life  ex  pi 
ancy  which  took  the   industrials   a 
world  a  century  to  achieve. 

•  Significant  progress  has  been  im 

in  expanding  shelter,  education,  nw  1" 

tion,  and  food  production. 

r  ort£ 

' 
We  are  also  encouraged  by  the  i  |j, 
that  a  number  of  countries — for  ex;  :; 
pie,  Brazil  and  Taiwan — have  m  j( 
such  rapid  and  sustained  econoi  ,,, 
progress  that  they  have  outgrown 
need  for  our  bilateral  assistance.  l; 

Much  has  been  accomplished,  bu  si 
great  deal  more  still  needs  to  be  do 
There  remain  profound  problems 
poverty  and  underdevelopment 
many  parts  of  the  world:  over  1.2  t 
lion  people — 30%  of  the  work 
population — do  not  have  access  to  s. 
drinking  water  or  to  any  public  he; 
facility;  700  million  are  seriously  m 
nourished;  550  million  are  unable 
read  or  write;  over  half  the  children 
LDC's  suffer  from  debilitating  d 
eases.  These  are  difficult  proble 
their  solution  will  require  a  sustain 
effort  over  many  years.  Our  forei 
assistance  programs  are  a  critical  e 
ment  in  this  effort. 

Foreign  Assistance  Programs 

Having  reviewed  our  relations  wi 
less  developed  countries  generally,  1 
me  now  turn  to  our  review  of  U 
foreign  assistance  programs. 

First,   it  affirmed  that  these  pn 
grams  serve  a  variety  of  objectives 
the  Third  World. 


I  1978 


25 


ur  bilateral  economic   assistance 

rams  are  aimed  at  insuring  that 

ienefits  of  development  reach  the 

and   serve   their  basic   human 

s. 

U.S.  contributions  to  international 
cial  institutions,  in  addition  to 
sorting  projects  specifically  de- 
ed to  benefit  the  poor,  also  pro- 
loans  for  larger  scale  infrastruc- 
projects  crucial  to  development, 
se  institutions  provide  loans  on 
soft  terms  to  the  poorest  countries 
on  nearly  commercial  terms  to 
's  which  are  better  off  but  still 
i  additional  resources  to  support 
inued  growth  and  development. 
Our  voluntary  contributions  to 
.  programs  help  finance  technical 
stance  to  poor  countries  which  lack 
skills  essential  to  their  develop- 
t.  These  programs  also  provide  di- 
humanitarian  assistance  to  chil- 
m\,  refugees,  and  other  groups  in 
of  particular  relief. 
Finally,  our  security  assistance 
rams  serve  the  cause  of  peace  in 
M  troubled  areas  of  the  Middle  East 
southern  Africa  and  strengthen  the 
itary  capabilities  of  friendly  de- 
ping  countries. 

econd,  our  review  of  U.S.  foreign 
<stance  gave  special  attention  to  the 
ortance  of  improving  the  condition 
>olitical,  economic,  and  civil  rights 
"ldwide  and  of  integrating  these 
ic  considerations  more  fully  into 
decisions  on  foreign  assistance 
grams. 

Under  the  chairmanship  of  the 
Cauty  Secretary  of  State  [Warren 
C  istopher],  an  interagency  group  has 
b  n  established  to  review  all  eco- 
nnic  development  assistance  deci- 
■  ns  for  their  human  rights  impact. 

1  In  accordance  with  our  laws,  we 
h/e  opposed  loans  by  the  World 
lik  and  other  international  financial 
iititutions  to  countries  that  engage  in 
fgrant  violations  of  human  rights, 
insistent  with  legislation,  we  have 
go  made  exceptions  when  proposed 
1  ns  would  address  the  needs  of  poor 
piple. 

V*»  We  have  also  assessed  our  secu- 
cy  assistance  programs  in  light  of 
rman  rights  considerations. 

»)I  would  like  to  say  an  additional 
I  >rd  on  our  experience  with  imple- 
if:nting  our  human  rights  policies.  We 
Wve  made  progress  in  our  efforts  to 
ijrsuade  and  influence  other  govern- 
ments, sometimes  in  private  communi- 
i|tion,  sometimes  with  changes  in  our 
sistance  relationships. 
However,  we  recognize  that  there  is 
i  automatic  formula  for  the  applica- 


tion of  each  possible  diplomatic  tool, 
including  the  use  of  our  foreign  assist- 
ance programs.  Human  rights  condi- 
tions along  with  governmental 
attitudes  and  other  local  factors  in  in- 
dividual countries  differ  greatly.  If 
U.S.  efforts  to  improve  human  rights 
abroad  are  to  be  successful,  our 
policies  must  take  into  account  the 
needs  of  differing  situations. 

I  believe  that  any  additional  legisla- 
tive restrictions  should  be  reviewed 
carefully  to  insure  that  they  achieve 
the  desired  effect  of  promoting  human 
rights  goals  as  well  as  not  undermin- 
ing the  essential  functions  of  the  mul- 
tilateral insititutions.  If  and  when  addi- 
tional amendments  are  contemplated, 
we  will  work  with  you  to  develop  pro- 
visions which  serve  these  ends.  We 
believe  that  the  provisions  of  last 
year's  legislation  calling  on  us  to 
undertake  wide  international  consulta- 
tion on  this  complex  subject  were 
helpful,  and  we  have  begun  those  con- 
sultations. The  initial  responses  were 
sympathetic. 

Third,  our  policy  review  has  led  to 
the  firm  conclusion  that  the  effective- 


ness of  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams must  be  improved.  As  noted 
below  such  efforts  are  underway — in 
the  internal  reorganization  of  the 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  and  in  our  efforts  to  make  IFI's 
more  efficient.  In  addition  the  Admin- 
istration is  now  studying  several  pro- 
posals which  involve  the  overall  or- 
ganization of  our  foreign  assistance 
programs.  These  include  the  proposals 
contained  in  the  Humphrey  bill  under 
consideration  in  the  Senate  and  House. 

We  in  the  executive  branch  share 
with  the  Congress  the  goal  of  bringing 
greater  coherence  to  a  more  effective 
foreign  assistance  effort.  We  expect  to 
have  a  Presidential  decision  on  aid  or- 
ganizational issues  by  the  middle  of 
March  and  will  discuss  our  views  with 
Congress  at  that  time. 

Fourth,  based  upon  our  review  of 
foreign  assistance,  the  President  made 
several  decisions  on  the  future  size 
and  direction  of  our  foreign  assistance 
programs. 

•  Our  bilateral  development  assist- 
ance should  focus  even  more  sharply 


FOREIGN  AID  ITEMS  ' 

New  Budget  Authority 

($  millions) 

FY  1977 

FY  1978 

FY  1979 

Actual 

Appropriation 

Request 

Multilateral 

1,385 

2,157 

3,787 

International  Financial  Institutions 

1.141 

1,926 

3,505 

International  Organizations  and  Programs 

244 

231 

282 

Bilateral— AID 

2,879 

3,505 

3,505 

Security  Supporting  Assistance 

1,735 

2.21  1  - 

1.8543 

Middle  East  Special  Requirements  Fund 

23 

8 

(5)> 

Development  Assistance 

1.121 

1.286 

1,651 

Other  Bilateral 

193 

216 

236 

Peace  Corps 

80 

88 

95 

Migration  and  Refugee  Assistance 

47 

69 

71 

International  Narcotics  Control 

34 

37 

40 

Inter-American  Foundation 

— 

— 

8 

Israel-U.S.  Binational  Industrial 

Research  and  Development  Fund 

30 

— 

— 

Department  of  Transportation 

2 

22 

22 

Military  Assistance 

989 

926 

838 

Grant  Military  Assistance 

265 

220 

134 

Foreign  Military  Training 

25 

30 

32 

Foreign  Military  Credit  Sales 

699 

676 

672 

Total  Foreign  Assistance  Appropriations 

5,446              6,804              8,366 

s  appropriation  act — appropriation 

1  Included  in  foreign  assistance  and  related  program 

to  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  as  required  for  the  PL.  480  program  will  be  requested 

with  the  Department  of  Agriculture  appropriation. 

2  Includes  $300  million  balance-of-payments  loan  to  Portugal. 

3  FY   1979  Middle  East  Special  Requirements  Fund 

has  been 

included  in  the 

security 

supporting  assistance  account. 

26 


on  helping  poor  people,  largely  in 
poor  countries.  In  some  instances,  it  is 
appropriate  to  fund  projects  which 
benefit  poor  people  in  middle-income 
countries  if  the  governments  of  those 
countries  demonstrate  a  major  com- 
mitment to  meet  the  needs  of  their 
people. 

•  We  should  seek  substantial  in- 
creases in  our  foreign  assistance  dur- 
ing the  1979-82  period,  at  the  same 
time  insuring  that  such  aid  can  be  ef- 
fectively and  efficiently  used. 

I  would  like  to  turn  to  our  foreign 
assistance  programs  for  FY  1979  and 
relate  them  to  the  review  I  have 
described. 

Bilateral  Assistance 

We  are  requesting  an  authorization 
of  $1.6  billion  for  our  bilateral  de- 
velopment assistance  program  for 
1979.  This  would  mean  a  159?  in- 
crease over  the  FY  1978  program.  In 
accordance  with  the  Presidents  deci- 
sion to  focus  our  bilateral  program 
more  specifically  on  the  poorest  coun- 
tries. 85%  of  our  bilateral  grants  and 
loans  are  planned  for  countries  with 
annual  per  capita  incomes  of  less  than 
$550.  This  would  continue  the  grow- 
ing emphasis  in  our  aid  program  to- 
ward these  countries. 

The  principal  purpose  of  this  pro- 
gram is  to  meet  the  basic  human  needs 
of  poor  people  in  the  developing 
world.  It  directly  addresses  global 
problems  of  hunger  and  malnutrition, 
population  pressure,  disease,  and  ig- 
norance. When  we  talk  about  meeting 
basic  human  needs  we  are  not  talking 
about  an  international  welfare  pro- 
gram. We  are  talking  about  giving  the 
poor  a  chance  to  improve  their  stand- 
ard of  living  by  their  own  efforts,  to 
rise  above  the  extreme  poverty  levels 
that  degrade  and  brutalize  human 
existence. 

Food  and  Nutrition.  Reflecting  this 
locus,  S67.^  million,  or  over  5095  of 
the  FY  1979  loans  and  grants  under 
this  program  are  planned  tor  activities 
involving  food  and  nutrition.  These 
programs  are  designed  primarily  to 
help  small  farmers  by  providing  them 
with  the  means  to  expand  their  produc- 
tion, such  as  credit,  better  seeds, 
technical  advice,  farm-to-market 
roads,  small-scale  irrigation,  and  a 
host  of  other  activities. 

We  have  had  some  encouraging  suc- 
cesses in  helping  poor  farmers  expand 
their  production  and  improve  their 
standard  of  living.  For  example,  one 
of  the  principal  causes  of  food  short- 
age in  many  areas  is  loss  due  to  poor 
storage.  In  Rwanda,  grain  losses  from 


inadequate  storage  have  run  around 
25%.  Small-scale  grain  storage 
facilities  financed  by  AID  have  helped 
reduce  losses  for  some  small  farmers 
to  about  3%.  AID  and  the  Government 
of  Rwanda  will  expand  this  project  to 
provide  the  same  benefits  to  others. 

Another  problem  is  the  lack  of  good 
quality  seed  which  farmers  can  use. 
The  Tanzanian  Government,  with  AID 
support,  has  established  a  successful 
seed  multiplication  organization  that 
provides  improved  seed  for  the  main 
crops  grown  by  poor  people  through- 
out that  country. 

In  many  places,  research  is  needed 
to  develop  and  adapt  improved  crops 
which  will  provide  greater  yields  when 
used  in  small  farmers'  fields.  In 
Guatemala  AID  helped  to  establish  an 
effective  research  agency  which  works 
in  small  farmer  areas  and  produces 
improved  varieties  of  basic  crops  such 
as  corn  and  beans  and  more  productive 
planting  techniques  which  small  farm- 
ers can  utilize.  In  the  Philippines  the 
International  Rice  Research  Institute, 
which  is  partly  funded  by  AID,  has 
developed  high  yielding  varieties  of 
rice  which  are  now  planted  on  70%  of 
the  rice  acreage  and  thus  benefit  some 
9  million  Filipino  farmers.  Through  its 
greatly  increased  production,  the 
Philippines  has  become  virtually  self- 
sufficient  in  rice,  a  major  food  staple 
in  that  country. 

Still  another  difficulty  faced  by 
small  farmers  is  inability  to  obtain  and 
to  pay  for  the  inputs  needed  to  raise 
their  production.  In  Pakistan  small 
farmers  are  now  able  to  use  about  the 
same  amount  of  fertilizer  per  acre  as 
large  farmers,  in  part  because  of  an 
AID  loan  to  finance  fertilizer  imports 
as  well  as  Pakistan  Government  efforts 
to  improve  distribution  and  use  of  ag- 
ricultural inputs  to  small  farmers. 

Population  Planning.  A  second 
major  focus  of  AID  funding  is  popula- 
tion planning.  Bilateral  population 
programs  in  32  LDC's  currently  finance 
the  training  of  paramedics  to  pro\  ide 
family  planning  information  and  con- 
traceptives. AID  also  funds  continued 
research  to  develop  simple  but  effec- 
tive means  of  fertility  control,  the  col- 
lecting and  analysis  of  fertility  and 
other  demographic  data,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  improved  delivery  systems. 

Recent  statistics  on  declining  birth 
rates  in  Korea,  Taiwan.  Indonesia,  and 
Colombia  are  encouraging.  We  have 
had  substantial  family  planning  proj- 
ects in  each  of  these  countries.  It  must 
be  recognized,  of  course,  that  many 
economic  and  social  factors  influence 
a  country's  birth  rate.  What  is  impor- 
tant is  that  these  countries  are  having 


Department  of  State  Bui 

significant  success  in  achieving  ti 
objective  of  reducing  birth  rates 
are   hopeful   of  similar  succes 
elsewhere. 


; 


Health  Conditions.  A  third  imp  j, 
tant  objective  of  our  bilateral  ass 
ance  is  improving  health  conditio 
especially  among  the  rural  poor.  L 
health  assistance  is  targeted  mainly 
low-cost  basic  health  care  for  n 
areas,  clean  water  and  sanitation, 
projects  to  control  parasitic  diseases 

Let  me  cite  three  recent  successes 
this  field. 

•  An  experimental  project  in  TK 
land  has  brought  health,  nutrition,  ; 
family  planning  services  to  60%  of 
population  in  a  province  where  o 
15%  were  previously  covered.  It 
done  this  at  costs  affordable  by 
Thai  Government  which  now  plan>, 
extend  the  approach  to  the  ent 
country. 

•  In  Africa  AID  is  helping  to 
nance  the  successful  suppression  of 
disease  of  river  blindness  in  the  V( 
River  basin  in  Sahel  countries.  Peo 
are  already  beginning  to  resettle  th 
and  to  farm  these  fertile  areas  wh 
before  were  virtually  abandoned. 

•  In  Tanzania  the  government  h 
with  AID  assistance,  set  up  a 
equipped  18  regional  centers  to  te; 
personnel  to  provide  health,  nutnti 
and  family  planning  services  to 
rural  poor.  By  1982,  when  this  proj 
is  completed,  these  and  other  ru* 
health  centers  will  provide  the  Tan 
nian  Government  with  a  strong  ru 
health  delivery  system. 

Education.  The  fourth  major  fo< 
of  AID  funding  is  education.  Assi 
ance  in  this  area  centers  on  providi 
basic  skills  to  the  poor,  enabling  thi 
to  earn  a  better  living  and  impro 
their  lives  generally.  AID  projects 
nance  expanded  elementary  educati 
in  LDC's  and  nonformal  educati! 
projects,  such  as  radio  programs  | 
agricultural  techniques. 

An  evaluation  of  one  such  rai 
project  in  Guatemala  indicates  that 
ricultural  practices  have  improved 
yields  are   substantially  higher  in 
areas   served    by    the    broadcas 
Another  example  is  AID's  radio  m; 
project   in   Nicaragua   which  has  n 
suited  in  substantial  gains  in  arithm 
skills  among  primary  school-age  c 
dren   and   significant   reductions 
grade  repetition. 


Other  Programs.  Other  AID  pn 
grams  address  problems  of  energy 
vironmental  decay,  technology  tran 
fer,  and  urban  development.  AID 
giving  particular  attention  in  all  se> 
tors  to  the  development  and  use  of  ay 


;  ill  1978 


27 


mate  technologies  in  LDC's.  AID 
lects  in  Haiti,  Guatemala,  and 
stan  finance  the  development  and 
fibution  of  technology  appropriate 
tall-scale  farming  and  rural  enter- 
:s. 

jr  example  in  Honduras  the  small- 
er technology  loan  and  grant  pro- 
.11  of  $7.2  million  is  designed  to 
'ide  small  farmers  with  technical 
stance,  training,  and  investment 
Jit  so  they  may  benefit  from  such 
|t  capital  technology  as  a  successful 
seeder.  Seventy-five  hundred 
families  will  benefit  from  this 
;ct  over  the  next  4  years. 


proving  Programs.  Of  course, 
all  of  our  projects  have  been  suc- 
ful.  Poor  planning,  unexpected  de- 
>  in  obtaining  personnel  and 
fpment,  inadequate  knowledge  of 
J  factors  affecting  our  projects, 

a  number  of  other  problems  have 
Ited  the  effectiveness  of  some  of 

projects.  But  we  are  trying  to 
iuate  our  programs  better  and  learn 
l  our  past  mistakes, 
■ur  successes  are  encouraging.  But 
regard  them  as  a  beginning,  not  an 
,  in  insuring  that  our  aid  is  effec- 
ly  and  efficiently  managed, 
teflecting  the  high  priority  this 
ministration  puts  on  improving  the 
■ctiveness  of  our  assistance  effort, 
|)  Administrator  John  Gilligan  has 
•n  the  following  steps: 

The  Agency  for  International  De- 
>pment  has  been  reorganized  and 

■  number  of  bureaus  has  been  re- 
died,  resulting  in  fewer  administra- 
ti :  units  and  more  direct  lines  of 
rmonsibility. 

i  AID  has  decentralized,  shifting 
Aater  authority  to  its  field  officials  to 
led  its  responsiveness. 

|)  Finally,   AID  has   improved   its 

■  gramming  procedures  by  eliminat- 
fl  unnecessary  paperwork  and  im- 
fving  the  budgeting  for  operating 
e  lenses. 

\ID  plans  futher  improvements  over 
i  coming  year.  The  agency  is  en- 
licing  its  capability  to  review  and 
idyze  the  impact  of  AID  programs, 
lis  effort  —  while  a  long-term 
P>gram — will  include  a  much  more 
live  and  consistent  evaluation  of  the 
•stent  to  which  individual  aid  pro- 
Jims  make  a  difference  to  the  well- 
ling  of  the  people  to  whom  they  are 
<lected.  It  will  also  assist  us  in  trans- 
iting our  experience  into  future  pro- 
llunming  and  budgeting. 
SThese  are  first  steps  in  what  we  be- 
ftve  must  be  an  ongoing  effort  to  im- 
love  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness 
i  our  bilateral  assistance  programs. 


P.L.  480  Food  Assistance 

We  are  planning  a  program  of  $1.4 
billion  for  the  Public  Law  480  food 
assistance  program  in  FY  1979  to  fi- 
nance shipments  of  approximately  6.7 
million  tons  of  agricultural  com- 
modities to  less  developed  countries. 
This  is  the  same  tonnage  as  planned  for 
FY  1978. 

Our  food  aid  program  under  P.L. 
480  Title  I  provides  agricultural  com- 
modities at  concessional  terms  to  de- 
veloping countries.  The  Title  II  pro- 
gram provides  free  food,  primarily 
through  American  private  voluntary 
agencies  and  the  World  Food  Program, 
directly  to  the  poor  for  feeding  and 
food-for-work  programs,  as  well  as  for 
emergency  disaster  assistance.  Last 
year  5.5  million  poor  people  in  83 
countries  benefited  from  the  Title  II 
program. 

Our  project  to  feed  school  children 
in  Egypt  is  an  example  of  how  this 
program  can  be  effective — 32,000 
children  are  receiving  school  lunches 
as  a  result  of  American  grant  food  aid; 
the  Egyptian  Government  is  committed 
to  taking  over  this  program  entirely  by 
1982.  These  programs  illustrate  the 
way  in  which  our  food  aid  can  stimu- 
late a  growing  commitment  by  gov- 
ernments in  developing  countries  to 
meet  the  nutritional  needs  of  the  most 
vulnerable  groups  in  their  population. 

In  the  Philippines  a  similar  program 
is  reaching  about  1  million  primary 
school  children  and  about  600,000 
pre-school  children  and  pregnant  or 
lactating  mothers.  In  Brazil  a  national 
school  feeding  campaign  which  re- 
ceived similar  support  for  10  years  up 
to  1973  has  since  continued  effectively 
and  now  operates  almost  entirely  with 
national  resources. 

We  share  congressional  concerns 
that  the  developmental  impact  of  food 
aid  should  be  improved.  We  are  cur- 
rently implementing  the  new  Title  III 
legislation  which  we  believe  will  help 
to  accomplish  this.  This  new  program 
can  support  development  efforts  in 
poor  countries  by  providing  them  with 
assured  supplies  of  food  aid  on  conces- 
sional terms  for  periods  of  up  to  5 
years.  In  addition,  payment  for  the 
food  aid  can  be  waived  when  proceeds 
from  the  sale  of  the  food  aid  in  the  re- 
cipient country  are  used  to  finance  ad- 
ditional development  projects.  One 
Title  III  program  has  been  approved  for 
Honduras,  and  several  possible  pro- 
grams are  under  active  review. 

Financial  Institutions 

We  are  planning  contributions  of 
$3.5  billion  to  fulfill  U.S.  pledges  to 
the  international  financial  institutions. 


of  which  $1 .4  billion  is  callable  capital 
and,  as  such,  highly  unlikely  ever  to 
result  in  budget  outlays.  Thus,  actual 
government  expenditures  will  be  con- 
siderably smaller  than  our  total  request. 

These  institutions  are  a  vital  element 
in  our  overall  effort  to  support  de- 
velopment in  the  Third  World.  While 
no  authorizing  legislation  is  being 
sought  this  year,  a  description  of  the 
Administration's  foreign  assistance 
programs  would  be  incomplete  if  it  did 
not  spell  out  why  this  is  a  critical  com- 
ponent of  our  FY  1979  program. 

The  international  financial  institu- 
tions are  the  principal,  and  often  only, 
source  of  financing  for  large-scale 
loans  for  critical  infrastructure  projects 
in  LDC's  such  as  roads,  dams,  and  ir- 
rigation facilities.  These  projects  are 
both  crucial  to  a  country's  overall  de- 
velopment effort  and  to  improving  the 
lives  of  poor  people,  for  example: 

•  A  $50  million  World  Bank  irriga- 
tion project  in  the  Philippines  to  im- 
prove and  expand  irrigation  facilities  in 
some  of  the  poorest  regions  of  the 
country  will  benefit  about  250,000 
people; 

•  A  $48  million  rural  electrification 
project  in  Egypt  will  bring  electricity 
for  the  first  time  to  2  million  people; 

•  A  $35  million  road  construction 
project  in  Honduras  will  connect  the 
interior  with  the  main  port. 

The  IFI's  increasingly  serve  basic 
human  needs. 

•  In  Pakistan  a  $15  million  Interna- 
tional Development  Association  (IDA) 
loan  will  improve  access  to  primary 
and  secondary  education — particularly 
for  females  in  rural  areas — by  increas- 
ing the  number  of  qualified  teachers. 
This  project  will  also  reach  96,000 
adult  villagers  through  a  literacy 
program . 

•  In  Burma  a  $26  million  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank  loan  will  increase  fish 
production  for  domestic  consumption, 
thus  raising  the  low  protein  intake  of 
the  population.  The  project  will  sub- 
stantially improve  the  lot  of  900 
fishermen  and  will  directly  or  indi- 
rectly create  6,000  jobs. 

•  In  El  Salvador  a  $1.5  million  loan 
by  the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  is  providing  potable  water  to  102 
impoverished  rural  communities  with 
an  average  annual  per  capita  in  1971  of 
$55;  73,000  people  will  benefit. 

The  IFI's  facilitate  a  more  equitable 
sharing  of  the  development  burden 
among  donor  countries.  For  example, 
for  every  dollar  the  United  States  pro- 
vides to  IDA,  other  countries  provide 
two. 

IFI's  encourage  recipient  countries 


28 


to  adopt  sound  economic  policies  often 
essential  to  their  development.  As  rela- 
tively nonpolitical  institutions,  they 
can  exert  an  influence  for  domestic  pol- 
icy reform  more  persuasively  and  effec- 
tively than  can  bilateral  donors. 

In  their  role  as  financial  inter- 
mediaries they  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
world  economy.  In  1977,  for  instance, 
the  World  Bank  borrowed  a  total  of 
$4.7  billion  from  world  capital  markets 
for  ultimate  relending  to  LDC's  which 
often  do  not  yet  have  adequate  access 
to  world  capital  markets. 

We  are  facing  two  fundamental  prob- 
lems in  our  relationship  to  these  impor- 
tant institutions:  insuring  that  their 
nonpolitical,  multilateral  character  is 
maintained  and  fulfilling  our  pledged 
contributions. 

The  multilateral  character  of  the 
IFI's  has  important  advantages. 

•  They  can  mobilize  and  coordinate 
large  amounts  of  capital  for  develop- 
ment. 

•  They  can  build  consensus  between 
aid  donors  and  recipients  on  develop- 
ment goals. 

•  They  can  act  as  especially  effec- 
tive sources  of  advice  for  needed  policy 
reforms  in  developing  countries. 

In  performing  these  functions,  these 
institutions  serve  both  U.S.  interests 
and  those  of  developing  countries.  If 
these  institutions  are  to  continue  to 
make  an  effective  contribution  to  de- 
velopment, they  must  maintain  their 
multilateral,  nonpolitical  character. 
Restrictive  legislation,  which  prohibits 
U.S.  contributions  to  the  IFI's  from 
financing  loans  for  individual  countries 
or  projects,  would  be  a  first  step  in 
politicizing  these  institutions.  If  the 
U.S.  Government  takes  this  step,  other 
governments  may  do  likewise.  This 
would  undermine  the  effectiveness  of 
these  institutions  and  their  value  to  us 
in  multiplying  our  own  contributions 
and  strengthening  the  international 
economy. 

The  second  major  problem  facing  us 
is  fulfilling  our  pledges  to  the  IFI's. 
Our  contributions  for  the  IFI's  this  year 
fall  into  two  categories:  funding  to  ful- 
fill past  pledges  which  were  earlier  au- 
thorized but  not  appropriated  by  the 
Congress  and  appropriations  which  we 
are  seeking  for  the  first  time  this  year. 

It  is  critical  that  the  United  States 
satisfy  its  past  pledges  to  these  institu- 
tions in  order  to  maintain  institutions  to 
function  smoothly  in  supporting  de- 
velopment in  less  developed  countries. 
Our  past  pledges  amount  to  $835  mil- 
lion, nearly  one-half  for  the  fourth  re- 
plenishment of  IDA,  the  soft  loan  win- 
dow of  the  World  Bank. 

We  are  now  1  year  behind  in  fulfil- 


U>, 


ling  this  pledge.  IDA  has  already 
committed  all  the  funds  it  was  pledged 
under  this  replenishment.  Without  the 
U.S.  contribution,  IDA  may  have  dif- 
ficulties in  completing  these  projects. 
If  this  happens,  the  smooth  operation 
of  the  banks  will  be  disrupted  and  the 
beneficiaries  of  these  projects  in  poor 
countries  will  suffer. 

Other  unfunded  past  pledges  include 
the  selective  capital  increase  of  the 
World  Bank  and  the  capital  increase  of 
the  International  Finance  Corporation. 
If  we  do  not  fulfill  these  pledges  the 
capital  increases  of  these  institutions 
will  be  smaller  due  to  a  reduced  U.S. 
contribution.  Also,  the  U.S.  voting 
strength  and  influence  in  these  institu- 
tions inevitably  will  be  reduced. 

In  both  cases,  our  failure  to  contrib- 
ute our  full  share  means  that  we  are  re- 
pudiating the  principle  of  equitable 
burden  sharing.  Without  replenish- 
ments, the  role  in  world  development 
of  these  institutions  will  diminish  at  a 
time  when  the  need  for  their  skills  and 
investments  is  greater  than  ever. 

To  fulfill  our  current  pledges  to  IFI's 
we  are  planning  a  contribution  of  $2.6 
billion,  including  $800  million  for  the 
fifth  replenishment  of  IDA  and  $1.8 
billion  for  U.S.  pledges  toward  the 
World  Bank  selective  capital  increase, 
the  International  Finance  Corporation, 
the  Inter-American  Development  Bank, 
the  Asian  Development  Bank  and 
Fund,  and  the  African  Development 
Fund. 

International  Programs 

In  the  same  multilateral  context,  we 
are  also  requesting  an  authorization  of 
$282  million  for  U.S.  voluntary  contri- 
butions to  U.N.  assistance  programs 
and  the  Organization  of  American 
States. 

Our  contributions  to  U.N.  programs 
support  the  principles  of  multilateral 
cooperation  and  burden  sharing  and 
reinforce  the  constructive  trend  in  our 
relations  with  the  developing  countries 
within  the  United  Nations.  Moreover, 
they  represent  a  U.S.  response  through 
the  U.N.  system  to  the  real  needs  of 
people  in  the  developing  countries. 

These  contributions  support  pro- 
grams in  four  major  areas:  developmen- 
tal technical  assistance,  humanitarian 
needs,  international  scientific  coopera- 
tion, and  education  and  training.  Let 
me  discuss  these  major  programs 
briefly  and  give  examples  of  what  they 
do. 

We  propose  $133  million  for  the 
U.N.  Development  Program  (UNDP). 
As  the  largest  multilateral  source  of 
grant  technical  assistance,  UNDP  proj- 
ects benefit  over  130  nations.   In  Sri 


Department  of  State  Bui 

Lanka,  for  example,  UNDP  exptj 
have  developed  an  integrated  v/i\ 
basin  plan  that  is  expected  to  raise 
ricultural  production  by  $200  milli 
In  Central  America,  UNDP  experts 
working  in  four  countries  to  deve 
energy  from  volcanic  steam. 

To  meet  humanitarian  needs,  we 
requesting  $35  million  for  the  U 
Children's  Fund  (UNICEF),  one  of 
best  managed  and  most  effecive  U 
programs.   UNICEF  provides  child  i 
and  mothers  opportunities  for  a  nv 
productive  life.  It  also  works  to  m 
basic  subsistence  needs.  In  India,  \ 
example,   UNICEF  is  working  to 
store  and   improve  potable  wa  ■ 
sources  in  the  areas  hardest  hit  by 
November   1977  cyclone  and  t i • 
wave. 

We  propose  $52  million  for  the  U 
Relief  and  Works  Agency  (UNRW 
which  provides  needed  assistance 
over  1.5  million  Palestinian  refuge 
It  supplies  rations,  medical  servic 
and,  most  importantly,  secondary  e<: 
cational  and  vocational  training  p 
grams.  It  is  essential  that  UNRWA 
adequately  funded  in  order  to  contir 
its  present  level  of  services  wh I 
negotiations  proceed  for  a  political 
lution  to  the  conflict  in  the  Midi 
East. 

In  the  field  of  scientific  cooperatn 
the  $12  million  contribution  propo; 
for  the  International  Atomic  Enei 
Agency  will  support  its  role  in  our  ' 
forts  to  stop  nuclear  proliferatic 
through  its  safeguards  system  wh 
monitors  nuclear  materials  in  ma 
countries  to  insure  that  they  are  us 
for  peaceful  purposes.  The  $10  milli 
requested  for  the  U.N.  Environmen 
Program  will  sustain  its  continued  i 
fort  to  encourage  international  actic 
to  reduce  damage  to  the  natural  en'' 
ronment. 

As   with  the   international   financ: 
institutions,  we  are  concerned  with  ii 
proving  the  effectiveness  of  the  U. 
programs.  The  U.N.  system  has  gro\' 
rapidly  in  its  scope  and  responsibility 
As  this  has  occurred,  the  coordinatio 
management,  and  budgeting  procedur 
have  become  matters  of  increasii 
concern. 

We  and  other  nations  have  urgi 
broad  management  reforms,  and  son 
important  steps  have  been  taken  to  a' 
dress  these  problems.  The  General  A 
sembly  has  created  the  new  position 
Director  General  for  Development  ai 
International  Economic  Cooperatk 
with  particular  responsibility  for  pn 
viding  effective  leadership  and  coord 
nation  of  economic  and  social  ai 
tivities.  In  addition,  new  efforts  will  tj 
made  to  establish  maximum  uniformil 
in  administrative,  budgetary,  persov 


il  1978 


29 


land  planning  procedures  within  the 
.  development  system. 

ity  Assistance 

e  have  reviewed  carefully  our  se- 
:y  assistance  programs.   We  have 
lished  an  interagency  committee, 
ed  by  Undersecretary  of  State  for 
rity   Assistance   [Lucy   Wilson] 
son.  to  provide  coordinated  rec- 
endations  to  me  and  the  President 
1  aspects  of  our  arms  transfer  and 
ed  policies,  including  the  funded 
rity  assistance  programs  under  dis- 
ion  today  and  cash  foreign  military 
The  Arms  Export  Control  Board 
ts  in  insuring  that  all  arms  trans- 
are  consistent  with  the  President's 
transfer  policy  as  well  as  other 
vant  policies  and  considerations, 
ding  human  rights, 
e  general  purpose  of  our  security 
stance  programs   is  to  assist  our 
ds  and  allies  to  provide  for  their 
imate  defense  needs  without  de- 
ing  from  their  own  economic  and 
al  development.  These  programs 
ort  our  strategic-political  objec- 
of  reducing  tensions  and  promot- 
stability  in  areas  of  potential  con- 
tation  and  conflict. 

implement  these  programs  in  fis- 
ear  1979,  we  are  requesting  an  au- 
ization  of  $2,692.5  million  for  se- 
ffl ity  supporting  assistance  and  for 
m:iary  assistance. 

/e  are  requesting  $1,854.4  million 
k  security  supporting  assistance 

■  A)  to  provide  economic  as- 
9i  ance — administered  by  AID — to 
0<  ntries  which  are  experiencing  polit- 

■  and  economic  stresses  and  where 
Li.  security  interests  are  involved. 
I:  majority  of  SSA  funds  will  support 

0  peace  efforts  in  the  Middle  East  by 
p  viding  assistance  to  Israel  ($785 
nlion),  Egypt  ($750  million),  Jordan 
(!'3  million),  Syria  ($90  million), 
fine  regional  projects  ($9  million), 
Siport  for  the  Maqarin  Dam  project 
fciefitting  Jordan,  Syria,  and  Israel 
(.i0  million),  and  the  Sinai  Support 
ission  ($11.7  million) — the  American 
C  ilian  early-warning  system  in  the 
Siai.  These  programs  are  of  critical 
■portance  to  U.S.  national  interests  of 

■  ding  a  just  and  lasting  settlement  in 
I;  Middle  East.  These  SSA  programs, 
i irmly  believe,  continue  to  play  a  crit- 
i  il  role  in  that  search  for  peace. 

SSA  funds  also  support  our  objective 

1  relieving  tensions  and  fostering 
]|aceful  development  toward  majority 
[|le  in  southern  Africa  by  providing  as- 

itance  to  Zambia,   Botswana,   and 
>uth  African  refugees. 
We  are  proposing  a  total  program  of 
38.1   million,  down  from  $972.75 


requested  last  year,  for  military 
assistance — i.e.,  grant  materiel  under 
the  military  assistance  program,  grant 
international  military  education  and 
training  program,  and  foreign  military 
sales  credit  financing. 

Let  me  take  a  minute  to  examine 
what  is  happening  to  these  programs 
and  how  they  have  been  tailored  to 
meet  various  U.S.  objectives. 

We  are  requesting  a  total  of  $133.5 
million  for  grant  material  under  the 
military  assistance  program  (MAP) 
for  just  four  countries  (Spain,  Portugal, 
Philippines,  and  Jordan) — down  from 
seven  in  the  program  for  the  current 
year.  This  is  in  line  with  our  general 
aim,  which  I  know  the  Congress 
shares,  of  reducing  the  number  of  grant 
recipients  and  shifting  as  rapidly  as 
feasible  to  credit  financing  and  finally 
to  sales  on  a  cash  basis. 

We  have  terminated  the  grant  mili- 
tary materiel  assistance  programs  to 
Indonesia  and  Thailand,  two  valued 
friends  whom  we  will  continue  to  sup- 
port with  credit  financing.  You  will 
also  note  that  we  are  not  requesting 
grant  assistance  at  this  time  for  Greece 
and  Turkey,  two  NATO  allies  which 
provide  us  with  essential  facilities  for 
the  common  defense.  We  believe  that 
the  question  of  our  grant  security  as- 
sistance relationship  with  Greece  and 
Turkey  should  be  addressed  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  proposed  defense  coopera- 
tion agreements  with  each,  rather  than 
in  the  context  of  the  foreign  assistance 
programs  we  are  discussing  today. 

Our  MAP  request  for  Spain  is  con- 
sistent with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Friendship  and  Cooperation,  which  has 
been  endorsed  by  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress. After  discussion  with  the 
Spanish  Government,  we  are  asking 
this  year  for  $41  million,  the  major 
portion  of  our  remaining  MAP  com- 
mitment to  that  country.  In  following 
years  a  total  of  only  $4  million  in  MAP 
will  be  required  to  pay  the  costs  of  de- 
livery of  MAP  material  financed  with 
funds  made  available  in  prior  years. 

Portugal  and  the  Philippines  are,  like 
Spain,  countries  where  we  have  impor- 
tant military  facilities.  When  negotia- 
tions regarding  these  bases  are  com- 
pleted, we  will  be  reporting  to  the 
Congress.  In  the  meantime  we  are  seek- 
ing authority  to  continue  modest  levels 
of  grant  MAP  for  these  two  countries 
($27.9  million  for  Portugal;  $18.1  mil- 
lion for  the  Philippines).  The  only 
other  MAP  request  ($45  million  for 
Jordan)  represents  part  of  our  effort  to 
enable  Jordan  to  protect  its  security  and 
to  contribute  to  stability  in  the  Middle 
East. 

The  grant  international  military 
education  and  training  program 


(IMETP),  established  as  a  separate 
program  by  Congress  less  than  2  years 
ago,  provides  a  means  of  maintaining 
mutually  beneficial  relations  with  fu- 
ture military  leaders  of  40  friendly 
countries  throughout  the  world.  The 
emphasis  in  the  training  program  is 
shifting  rapidly  from  specialized  tech- 
nical training  to  the  broader  fields  of 
leadership  training,  resource  manage- 
ment, and  command.  This  program,  for 
which  we  are  seeking  $32.1  million, 
enables  foreign  military  officers  to  ob- 
tain instruction  in  U.S.  military  doc- 
trine and  concepts;  their  experience  in 
the  United  States  may  also  help  them  to 
appreciate  the  role  of  a  profession- 
al military  service  in  a  democratic 
society. 

We  also  have  continuing  need  to  fi- 
nance foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  to 
those  of  our  friends  and  allies  who  re- 
quire such  assistance  for  the  purchase 
of  military  equipment  that  they,  and 
we,  believe  necessary  for  their  own  de- 
fense. We  are  requesting  an  authoriza- 
tion of  $672.5  million  to  finance  a  total 
foreign  military  sales  credits  program 
of  $2,067.5  million. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  security  sup- 
porting assistance  program,  the  largest 
share  of  FMS  financing  will  support 
our  objectives  in  the  Middle  East;  Is- 
rael will  receive  $1  billion,  remaining 
the  largest  recipient.  As  in  the  past  few 
years,  we  intend  to  waive  repayment  on 
one-half  of  this  financing.  The  second 
largest  recipient  of  FMS  financing  is 
Korea  which  will  receive  a  $275  mil- 
lion program  for  additional  support  of 
purchases  to  be  made  pursuant  to  its 
Force  Improvement  Plan  initiated  in 
1975. 

In  addition,  in  recognition  of  the 
need  to  compensate  for  the  withdrawal 
of  U.S.  ground  combat  forces  from 
Korea  over  the  next  4-5  years,  you 
have  before  you  legislation  we  pro- 
posed last  year  which  would  authorize 
the  transfer  to  Korea  of  certain  U.S. 
equipment  which  is  presently  located 
there.  This  equipment — which  has  a 
value  of  approximately  $800  mil- 
lion— would  strengthen  the  firepower, 
mobility,  and  antiarmor  capabilities  of 
the  Korean  forces.  The  enactment  of 
this  special  legislation  is  an  integral 
part  of  our  policy  decision  to  withdraw 
U.S.  ground  combat  forces  from  Korea 
in  a  way  that  will  not  be  destabilizing 
to  the  security  of  Northeast  Asia. 


Conclusion 

I  would  like  to  conclude  my  tes- 
timony where  I  began — on  the  review 
which  this  Administration  has  made  of 
our  interests  in  the  Third  World  and  the 


30 

role  foreign  assistance  can  —  and 
should — play.  Our  examination  con- 
vinced us  that  our  programs  are  a  criti- 
cal element  in  relations  with  develop- 
ing countries  generally  and  in  our  ef- 
forts to  promote  peace  and  improve  in- 
dividual well-being  worldwide.  We 
strongly  believe  that  at  the  levels  re- 
quested these  programs  can  be  effec- 
tively implemented.  I  seek  your  full 
support  for  our  authorization  request 


and  I  welcome  your  views  and  your 
questions.  □ 


Statement  submitted  to  the  Senate  Committee 
mi  Foreign  Relations  on  Mar.  2.  1978.  The 
i  omplete  transt  ript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 

from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington . 
D.C.  20402. 

(il  this  total,    $1.4  billion  is  callable  capital 
and  will  not  result  in  budget  outlays. 


AFRICA:    Security  Assistance 
to  the  Sub-Sahara 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

The  African  program  we  propose  for 
next  year  is  consistent  with  the  Presi- 
dent's directive  of  May  19,  1977,  to 
restrict  arms  transfers.  At  the  same 
time,  it  insures  that  the  security  assist- 
ance we  do  provide  works  in  favor  of 
stability  in  an  increasingly  volatile  con- 
tinent. In  arriving  at  individual  country 
programs,  we  have  been  particularly 
conscious  of  the  legitimate  security 
needs  of  those  nations  which  feel 
threatened  by  the  increase  of  Soviet 


KtMII/ff 


White  House  Statement 

President  Carter  and  a  group  of  his 
senior  advisers  had  discussions  this 
morning  [March  2,  1978]  with  the  Ken- 
yan delegation  headed  by  Vice  Presi- 
dent Daniel  arap  Moi.  They  discussed 
the  situation  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and 
Kenyan-U.S.  relations.  President  Car- 
ter reaffirmed  the  U.S.  Government's 
longstanding  policy  of  close  support 
for  Kenya  and  assured  the  Kenyans  that 
the  United  States  will  continue  to  sup- 
ply Kenya  with  economic  and  military 
assistance.  Both  countries  share  a  deep 
concern  lor  the  conflicts  which  have 
developed  in  the  Horn  of  Africa. 
Measures  which  could  be  taken  to  bring 
the  conflict  to  an  end  were  discussed, 
and  it  was  found  that  Kenyan  and 
American  perceptions  of  the  fundamen- 
tal problems  of  the  area  arc  very  simi- 
lar. □ 


Issued  on   Mar.  2.    1978  (text  from   Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  6). 


arms  and  Cuban  troops  in  neighboring 
countries. 

Our  security  assistance  proposals  for 
Africa  contain  $38.4  million  in  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  financing,  $3.85 
million  for  the  international  military 
education  and  training  program,  and 
$45  million  for  security  supporting 
assistance — of  which  $14  million  is  for 
refugees  in  southern  Africa.  Our  pro- 
grams will  focus  on  a  relative  handful 
of  African  countries,  most  of  which 
have  received  security  assistance  in  the 
past. 

FMS  Credit 

The  FMS  credit  proposed  for  sub- 
Saharan  countries  is  slightly  less  than 
the  appropriation  we  received  from  the 
Congress  for  FY  1978.  The  bulk  of  our 
FMS  credit  assistance  would  go  to 
Zaire,  Kenya,  and  Sudan. 

Zaire.  We  propose  a  $17.5  million 
FMS  credit  program  for  Zaire  to  assist 
in  the  modernization  and  reorganiza- 
tion of  that  country's  armed  forces,  a 
program  in  which  France  and  Belgium 
are  taking  the  lead.  The  Shaba  war  a 
year  ago  disclosed  deficiencies  in  the 
Zairian  forces.  It  led  to  the  scrapping 
ol  plans  which  emphasized  expensive 
and  sophisticated  equipment  in  favor  of 
a  concentration  of  fundamental  needs 
for  defense.  The  U.S.  contribution  to 
this  multination  effort  will  be  in  com- 
munication equipment,  ground  and  air 
transportation,  aircraft  spare  parts  and 
support  equipment,  and  medical 
supplies. 

We  believe  that  our  long-range  inter- 
ests in  the  security  and  economic  via- 
bility of  Zaire  justify  the  provision  of 
this  credit.  Our  proposal  comes  at  a 
time  when  the  Government  of  Zaire  is 
showing  every  indication  that  it  is  pre- 
pared to  undertake  serious  and  basic 
economic  reforms  essential  to  the  eco- 
nomic and  financial  well-being  of  the 


' 


i 


Department  of  State  Bulh 

country,  including  the  key  step 
strengthening  of  the  role  of  the  cent 
bank. 

Kenya.  The  proposed  $10  milli 
FMS   credit   for  Kenya  would  enal 
that  country  to  complete  its  purchase  | 
a  squadron  of  F-5E/F  fighter  aircra. 
It  would  also  permit  Kenya  to  purcha> 
some  additional  equipment  required  I    j 
its   force   modernization   program 
Kenya's  neighbors — Uganda,  Ethiopi. 
and  Somalia — have  all  obtained  soph  j  i 
ticated  Soviet  arms  in  quantity  whi|> 
has  placed  Kenya's  armed  forces  at 
disadvantage.  We  believe  this  tangit  ( 
support  for  a  friendly  and  cooperati 
state  is  warranted. 

Sudan.  Sudan  is  the  only  proposi 
new  recipient  of  FMS  credit.  Sudan, 
large  and  economically  promisii 
country,  has  undertaken  domestic  r 
forms  and  is  playing  a  constructive  ro 
both  in  Middle  East  peace  efforts  ai 
in  East  Africa.  As  a  result,  our  bilater 
relations  have  improved  significantly 
recent  years.  Sudan  expelled  the  last 
its  Soviet  military  advisors  in  1977  at 
has  now  turned  to  Western  countri 
for  its  military  needs. 

It  appears  that  the  Sudanese  intend 
purchase  under  FMS  procedures  an  s 
defense  package  which  includes  F- 
aircraft  and  radars.  The  purchase  w 
be  for  cash,  and  Sudan  has  indicatf 
that  it  will  be  financed  by  Saui 
Arabia.  Although  most  addition 
Sudanese  military  requirements  wi 
probably  be  met  through  purchases 


Southern 
Rhodesia 


Joint  Statement 

Secretary  Vance  and  [Unite 
Kingdom]  Foreign  Secretary  [Davk 
Owen  met  on  March  8  with  Presidei 
Carter  and  then  held  further  convers; 
tions  at  the  Department  of  State.  Th 
discussions  were  concerned  primaril 
with  the  question  of  Rhodesia.  Ther 
was  full  agreement  that  the  two  gov 
ernments  will  jointly  continue  their  el 
forts  to  facilitate  a  settlement  among  a 
the  parties,  in  accordance  with  th 
principles  the  two  governments  hav 
previously  put  forward:  free  and  fai 
elections,  a  transition  to  majority  ruli 
and  independence,  and  respect  for  thi 
individual  rights  of  all  the  citizens  o 
an  independent  Zimbabwe.  L 


Issued  Mar.  8.   1978  (text  from  press  release 
110  of  Mar.  8). 


foil  1978 

:stern  Europe,  it  is  likely  that  there 
ill  be  some  other  items  which  the 
danese  will  want  to  obtain  in  the 
lited  States.  These  could  include  ar- 
ired  personnel  carriers,  engineering 
ipment,  and  items  related  to  air  de- 
ise.   For  these  sales  we  have  pro- 
;ed  $7.5  million  in  FMS  credit. 
ameroon  and  Liberia.   Smaller 
lounts  of  FMS  credit  have  been  pro- 
sed for  Cameroon  and  Liberia.  The 
million  program  in  Cameroon  would 
for  armored  cars,  rifles,  communica- 
•ns  equipment,  and  spare  parts.  The 
)0,000  credit  for  Liberia  will  enable 
it  country  to  purchase  rifles,  trucks, 
communications  equipment.   Both 
continuations  of  previously  au- 
trized  and  funded  programs. 


ilitary  Training 

Our  proposed  international  military 
ucation  and  training  programs  this 
ar  will  emphasize  the  technical  train- 
g  of  African  military  officers  in  our 
ilitary  schools.  We  are  requesting 
ni.85  million  for  this  purpose.  The 
Ik  of  these  funds  will  be  used  to  pro- 
e  training  in  professional  manage- 
nt  rather  than  equipment-oriented 
lining.  Officers  from  Zaire,  Sudan, 
nya,  Ghana,  Liberia,  Chad,  Mali, 
negal,  and  Upper  Volta  are  expected 
receive  training  under  this  program 
FY  1979. 


;curity  Supporting  Assistance 

We  are  also  requesting  $45  million 
t  security  supporting  assistance  for 
>uthern  Africa  this  year.  It  has  three 
)mponents: 

•  $20    million    in    balance-of- 
ayments  support  for  Zambia; 

•  $11  million  for  assistance  in  the 
ansportation  sector  for  Botswana;  and 

•  $14  million  for  refugees  in  the 
Duthern  Africa  area. 

The  proposed  security  supporting  as- 
istance  in  southern  Africa  in  FY  1979 
i  considerably  less  than  it  was  in  FY 

978,  although  this  reduction  is  par- 
ally  compensated  by  a  $23  million  in- 
crease in  development  assistance. 

)ther  donors,  both  bilateral  and  mul- 
ilateral,  have  responded  well  to  re- 
vests for  assistance  by  the  southern 
African  nations.  We  believe  that  our 
irograms  are  responsive  to  the  needs 
vhich  have  been  identified  for  FY 

979.  However,  if  the  political  situa- 
tion significantly  worsens  and  leads  to 
,i  large  increase  in  southern  African 

efugees,  we  would  seek  a  supplemen- 

al  appropriation. 

The  $20  million  for  Zambia's  bal- 
ince  of  payments  would  continue  the 


31 


EAST  ASIA:    Security  Assistance 


by  Richard  C.  Holbrooke 
MARCH  9 

I  will  be  talking  to  you  today 
primarily  about  Northeast  Asia.  Be- 
fore I  do  that,  however,  I  want  to  say 
a  few  words  about  the  situation  in 
East  Asia  as  a  whole.  It  is  one  we  can 
look  at  with  some  satisfaction.  There 
are  no  major,  immediate  threats  to  the 
peace.  Some  of  the  deep  divisions  of 
the  past  are  gradually  being  bridged. 
The  energies  and  talents  of  the 
peoples  of  the  area  have  fostered  a 
surge  of  economic  growth  to  which 
we  also  have  contributed,  from  which 
we — as  well  as  they — have  benefitted. 
Stable  and  effective  government,  an 
indispensable  ingredient  of  economic 
growth,  once  the  exception  in  the 
area  is  now  much  more  the  general 
rule. 

But  if  these  favorable  trends  are  to 
be  maintained,  the  United  States  must 
continue  to  play  the  role  that  our 
interests  as  a  great  Pacific  power  dic- 
tate. Our  military  presence,  the  cred- 
ibility of  our  commitments,  and  our 
security  assistance  to  friendly  gov- 
ernments are  indispensable  in  deter- 
ring threats  to  the  peace  of  the  area 
and  maintaining  a  stable  balance 
there.   Our  bases  in  Japan  and  the 


Philippines  are  important  constituents 
of  our  defenses,  supporting  our  allies, 
reassuring  our  friends,  and  protecting 
free  access  to  the  Indian  and  Pacific 
Ocean  sea  lanes. 

The  interests  of  four  great  pow- 
ers— the  United  States,  the  U.S.S.R., 
the  People's  Republic  of  China 
(P.R.C.),  and  Japan — intersect  in  Asia. 
Our  strength  there  is  a  significant 
component  of  our  global  relationship 
with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  of  our  im- 
proved relations  with  the  P.R.C.  For 
years  our  security  assistance  to  East 
Asia  was  designed  in  large  measure  to 
contain  what  was  then  perceived  as 
the  threat  of  Chinese  Communist  ex- 
pansionism. That  is  no  longer  the 
case.  As  a  result  of  the  beneficial  de- 
velopments in  our  relations  with  Pe- 
king over  the  last  few  years,  we  are  no 
longer  in  a  posture  of  confrontation 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 

We  now  recognize  that  China  has  a 
vital  role  to  play  in  maintaining  peace 
in  Asia  and  in  the  world,  and  we  con- 
sider friendly  relations  with  China  to 
be  a  central  part  of  our  foreign  pol- 
icy. As  Secretary  Vance  stated  last 
June,  we  recognize  and  respect  Chi- 
na's strong  commitments  to  inde- 
pendence, unity,  and  self-reliance, 
and  we  intend  to  move  toward  full 
normalization  of  relations  with  Peking 


FY  1978  program  and  represents  our 
contribution  to  a  multidonor  effort  to 
assist  the  Zambian  economy.  The 
Zambian  economy's  problems  stem 
from  a  variety  of  causes.  It  has  suffered 
severely  from  the  drop  in  the  price  of 
copper,  Zambia's  chief  foreign  ex- 
change earner.  This  problem  has  been 
exacerbated  by  the  disruption  of  the  re- 
gional transportation  network  as  a  re- 
sult of  conflicts  in  Rhodesia  and 
Angola. 

Botswana  is  fully  deserving  of  our 
support.  It  is  a  democratic,  multiracial 
society  which  in  many  ways  can  serve 
as  a  model  for  the  development  of  other 
countries  in  the  area.  Botswana  has 
played  a  consistently  constructive  role 
in  support  of  a  peaceful  resolution  of 
the  Rhodesia  conflict.  Bordering 
Rhodesia,  Namibia,  and  South  Africa, 
Botswana  is  particularly  vulnerable  to 
the  effects  of  violence  in  neighboring 
states.  Our  proposed  assistance  of  $11 
million  would  be  devoted  to  improving 
Botswana's  transportation  network  in 


order  to  allow  that  country  to  acceler- 
ate economic  development. 

The  final  element  of  the  $45  million 
security  supporting  assistance  package 
is  $14  million  for  the  relief  of  refugees 
in  the  southern  Africa  area.  As  vio- 
lence has  escalated  in  the  region,  the 
needs  for  refugee  relief  have  mounted 
sharply.  While  our  record  in  this  hu- 
manitarian area  is  good,  the  require- 
ments for  assistance  are  increasing — in 
large  part  because  those  in  need  are  the 
displaced  young.  By  joining  with  other 
donor  nations  to  provide  further  school- 
ing and  training  for  these  refugees,  we 
can  make  a  positive  investment  in  the 
future  of  the  region.  □ 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  African 
Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations  on  Feb.  28,  1978  (introductory  para- 
graph omitted).  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Mr.  Moose  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  African  Affairs. 


32 


in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
the  Shanghai  communique.'  We  be- 
lieve that  consolidating  a  constructive 
relationship  with  China  is  an  essential 
element  in  our  effort  to  promote  a 
prosperous,  peaceful,  and  secure 
Asia. 

Our  economic  growth  and  the  eco- 
nomic growth  of  the  Asian  and 
Pacific  countries  are  mutually  rein- 
forcing. Our  national  policies  must  be 
shaped  to  encourage  both.  We  con- 
duct roughly  one-quarter  of  our  world 
trade  with  East  Asia.  Every  year 
one-third  of  our  agricultural  exports 
go  there.  We  obtain  in  exchange  im- 
portant raw  materials — rubber,  tin, 
coconut  oil,  and  9%  of  our  imported 
petroleum  products. 

Japan 

Our  close  friendship  with  Japan  is 
central  to  our  position  in  Asia.  For 
over  a  quarter  of  a  century,  our  secu- 
rity treaty  and  our  base  structure  in 
Japan  have  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
deploy  our  forces  in  the  western 
Pacific  more  speedily  and  econom- 
ically than  if  we  operated  from 
American  territory.  For  Japan,  the 
treaty  provides  a  nuclear  shield  be- 
hind which  it  has  developed  signifi- 
cant capabilities  for  its  own  conven- 
tional defense.  We  are  encouraging 
qualitative  improvements  in  Japan's 
self-defense  forces.  Japan  expects  to 
spend  about  $6.5  billion  over  the  next 
5  years  on  U.S.  equipment,  including 
F-15  fighters  and  the  P-3C  ASW  [an- 
tisubmarine warfare]  aircraft. 

Japan's  confidence  in  the  security 
relationship  has  supported  its  efforts 
to  maintain  a  stable  balance  in  its  re- 
lations with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  China. 
Its  strict  adherence  to  constitutional 
prohibitions  against  any  but  defensive 
armaments  has  been  reassuring  to  the 
other  countries  of  Asia.  Meanwhile, 
its  nonmilitary  role  in  Asia  has  be- 
come increasingly  important.  A  prin- 
cipal trading  partner  for  most  of  the 
countries  of  the  area,  it  has  also  be- 
come the  largest  bilateral  aid  donor  in 
Asia  and  by  far  the  largest  contributor 
to  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  pro- 
viding about  one-third  of  the  Bank's 
resources  where  we  provide  less  than 
one-fifth.  In  addition,  it  has  moved 
toward  a  more  active  and  supportive 
relationship  with  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN), 
a  relationship  welcomed  by  the 
ASEAN  states. 

A  healthy  relationship  between  our 
two  great  economies  is  essential  not 
only  to  us  and  the  Japanese  but  also 
to  global  recovery  and  well-being.  In- 
evitably, frictions  arise  when  two 
huge  and  complex  economies  are  so 


closely  linked.  But  the  intimacy  that 
has  developed  between  us,  ''our 
mutual  respect  and  good  will,"  facili- 
tate amicable  adjustment  of  the  most 
serious  problems. 

The  negotiations  Ambassador 
[Robert  S.]  Strauss  [Special  Repre- 
sentative for  Trade  Negotiations]  re- 
cently completed  in  Tokyo  illustrate 
the  point.  So  do  our  earlier  agree- 
ments on  steel,  color  televisions,  and 
the  Tokai-Mura  nuclear  reprocessing 
facility.  We  are  also  moving  forward 
together  in  such  global  fora  as  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  We 
are  confident  that  Japan  will  take  the 
steps  necessary  to  reduce  its  trade 
imbalance  and  improve  access  to  its 
markets  and  that  it  will  do  its  share  in 
contributing  to  the  recovery  of  the 
global  economy. 

Korea 

The  state  of  affairs  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula  is  of  great  importance  to 
Japan,  and  our  policies  with  respect 
to  Korea  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  U.S. -Japanese  relationship.  In 
March  1977  Prime  Minister  Fukuda 
and  President  Carter  in  a  joint  com- 
munique noted  ".  .  .  the  continuing 
importance  of  the  maintenance  of 
peace  and  stability  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula  for  the  security  of  Japan 
and  East  Asia  as  a  whole."2 

At  the  time,  the  Japanese  and  our 
other  friends  in  Asia  were  concerned 
about  how  our  plans  for  withdrawing 
ground  combat  forces  from  Korea 
would  affect  regional  security.  They 
were  worried  also  about  the  implica- 
tions of  our  withdrawal  plan  for  our 
military  posture  elsewhere  in  Asia. 
We  have  done  much  to  reassure  them 
since  then. 

•  We  have  declared  that  except  for 
our  planned  withdrawal  from  Korea, 
we  will  maintain  our  combat  forces  in 
Asia  at  their  current  level  and  will  be 
strengthening  them  by  the  addition  of 
several  advanced  weapons  systems. 

•  We  have  reiterated  our  treaty 
commitment  to  the  Republic  of  Korea 
and  our  intention  to  defend  it. 

•  We  have  made  clear  that  our 
withdrawal  will  be  carefully  phased 
and  will  permit  a  continuing  assess- 
ment of  the  security  situation  on  the 
peninsula. 

•  We  have  made  clear  that  we  will 
maintain  an  important  military  pres- 
ence in  Korea.  Our  Air  Force  units 
will  remain  there  indefinitely  and  will 
be  increased  in  number.  Intelligence 
and  other  support  units  will  also  re- 
main indefinitely. 

In  addition,  in  close  consultation 
with  the  Republic  of  Korea,  we  have 


si 


:. 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

developed  plans  for  helping  it  ir 
prove  its  capabilities  so  that  it  can  d 
fend  successfully  against  any  Nor 
Korean  attack  with  the  aid  of  Amei 
can  naval,  air,  and  logistic  suppoi 
The  Administration  has  already  su 
mitted  two  important  elements  < 
these  plans  to  Congress: 

•  A  request  for  authorization  t 
transfer  to  the  Republic  of  Korea  sul 
stantial  quantities  of  equipment  para 
lei  with  our  ground  combat  fore 
withdrawals  and 

•  A  request  for  $275  million  i 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credi 
as  part  of  our  continuing  assistance  i 
South  Korea  in  carrying  out  its  fore 
improvement  program. 

We  anticipate  that  our  support  wi 
continue  to  be  needed  for  the  ne; 
few  years. 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  [Harol 
Brown]  has  already  described  thes 
programs  to  the  House  Committee  c 
International  Relations  in  some  detai 
What  I  want  to  emphasize  is  that  th 
way  in  which  we  carry  them  out  wi 
be  of  the  utmost  significance,  affec 
ing  not  only  the  prospects  for  peac 
on  the  peninsula  but  also  the  conf 
dence  in  the  United  States  of  ou 
other  allies  and  friends  in  Asia  am 
throughout  the  world. 

We  cannot  neglect  our  efforts  to  rt 
solve  problems  that  exist  betwee 
ourselves  and  the  Republic  of  Kore< 
It  is  important  that  the  South  Korea 
Government  continue  to  cooperate  i 
all  appropriate  ways  with  the  judich 
and  legislative  proceedings  that  ar 
intended  to  set  our  own  house  in  oi 
der.  And  we  must  leave  no  doub 
about  our  strong  desire  for  furthe 
improvements  in  the  government' 
human  rights  practices. 

But  we  must  deal  with  these  issue 
on  their  own  terms  and  withou 
jeopardizing  our  important  securit; 
interests  and  undermining  confideno 
in  Korea  and  elsewhere  in  our  firn 
commitment.  Americans  and  Korean: 
must  keep  foremost  in  our  minds  th( 
importance  to  us  both  of  a  close  anc 
cooperative  relationship. 

While  our  strategic  interest  is  oi 
crucial  importance,  many  other  inter 
ests  bind  us  together  as  well.  We 
have  developed  a  multibillion  dollai 
trade,  lending,  and  investment  rela- 
tionship in  Korea.  Some  1 , 5 OC 
American  firms  are  now  doing  busi 
ness  there.  As  Korea  itself  has  be- 
come a  developed,  industrialized  na 
tion,  its  international  responsibilities 
are  increasing.  The  United  States  and 
other  nations  must  now  ask  Korea's 
cooperation  in  dealing  with  multina- 
tional issues  such  as  international 
trade  policy,  monetary  reform,  Third 


pril  1978 


33 


1  world  assistance  programs,  nuclear 
iLoliferation,  environmental  pollution, 
d  law  of  the  sea. 

After  30  years  of  close  mutual  con- 
"PP  ict  the  people  of  our  two  nations 
■  ave  developed  a  complex  network  of 
l)  ersonal  and  professional  relation- 
hips.   Our  universities  have   mutual 
iiif,  jsearch  relationships  and  scholarly 
j,  xchange  programs;  alumni  from  all 
pai  tajor  American  universities  are  found 
f,,  i  all  the  professions.   Many  of  the 
jp  Korean  industries  have  joint  ven- 
o,   ire  or  other  formal  relationships  with 
[f[  vmerican  firms. 
»t{ 

Republic  of  China 

Our  only  other  military  assistance 
1 '  rogram  in  Northeast  Asia  provides 
«  or  $10  million  in  FMS  credits  to  the 

Republic  of  China,  mostly  for  air  de- 
ar<  ense  systems.  We  do  not  anticipate 
to  sking  for  additional  FMS  credits  for 
t  he  Republic  of  China  after  FY  1979. 
»  Ve  believe  that  the   Republic   of 

Thina,  with  its  very  healthy  economy 
«  md  substantial  trade  surplus  with  the 
te  Jnited  States,  will  be  able  to  finance 
a  is  defense   needs  from   its  own 

esources. 
To  sum  up,  let  me  reiterate — the 

ituation  in  Asia  is  a  favorable  one. 

But  only  if  the  United  States  carries 
>»ut  its  responsibilities  in  close  coop- 
«  :ration  with  its  allies  and  friends  can 
B  ve  hope  that  it  will  remain  so. 


VIARCH  14 

For  many  years,  our  preoccupation 
with  the  war  in  Indochina  made  us 
iess  conscious  than  we  are  today  of 
the  remarkable  strides  being  made  by 
the  other  countries  of  Southeast  Asia. 
[These  countries,  all  except  Thailand, 
colonies  of  Western  states  until  after 
World  War  II,  have  firmly  established 
their  national  identities  while  avoid- 
ing excessive  nationalism.  They  have 
maintained  their  independence  against 
outside  pressures  but  not  at  the  ex- 
ipense  of  developing  cooperative  and 
constructive  relations  with  countries 
elsewhere  and  with  each  other.  As  be- 
fits the  progress  they  have  made,  they 
are  playing  an  increasingly  important 
part  on  the  world  scene. 

Under  competent  and  moderate 
leadership,  Southeast  Asian  market 
economies  have  attained  impressive 
growth  rates  and  have  become  of  in- 
creasing importance  to  the  United 
States.  In  1977  our  imports  from 
Southeast  Asia  amounted  to  over  $7 
billion.  It  supplied  us  with  virtually 
all  of  our  copra  and  coconut  oil,  90% 
of  our  natural  rubber,  and  75%  of  our 
tin.    Southeast  Asian  countries,   in 


turn,  imported  almost  $4  billion 
worth  of  goods  from  us.  American  di- 
rect investment  in  Southeast  Asia  also 
amounted  to  over  $4  billion. 

But  we  should  not  measure  the  im- 
portance of  these  countries  to  the 
United  States  solely  in  terms  of  what 
we  buy  and  sell  there.  We  are  en- 
gaged with  them  in  many  other  signif- 
icant ways.  Southeast  Asian  coun- 
tries, for  example,  play  an  important 
and  constructive  role  in  the  North- 
South  dialogue.  They  are  active  par- 
ticipants in  the  campaign  against  drug 
traffickers.  And  in  the  effort  to  reset- 
tle refugees  from  Indochina,  Thailand 
is  now  sheltering  100,000  refugees  in 
camps,  while  another  10,000  have 
found  permanent  homes  there. 

With  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  Sin- 
gapore, astride  vital  passages  between 
the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans,  the 
policies  Southeast  Asian  countries 
adopt  in  law  of  the  sea  matters  is  ob- 
viously of  acute  importance  to  the 
United  States  and  its  allies.  Southeast 
Asian  countries  will  also  have  an  im- 
portant role  to  play  with  other  Pacific 
basin  states  in  developing  the  re- 
sources of  that  vast  seabed.  The  ties 
between  Southeast  Asian  countries 
and  our  major  allies  elsewhere  in  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific — Japan,  Austra- 
lia, and  New  Zealand — are  increas- 
ingly strong.  Our  bases  in  the  Philip- 
pines are  an  important  constituent  of 
our  Pacific  defenses  and  a  significant 
element  in  our  global  deterrent. 

It  is  thus  of  obvious  importance  to 
the  United  States  that  our  friends  in 
Southeast  Asia  should  continue  to  be 
able  to  bring  the  benefits  of  economic 
development  to  their  people,  to  cooper- 
ate with  each  other  and  with  other 
countries  in  pursuit  of  mutually  benefi- 
cial goals,  and  to  strengthen  the  na- 
tional and  regional  institutions  that 
support  the  achievements  of  these 
goals. 

While  great  progress  has  been  made 
in  this  regard,  we  must  not  overlook 
continued  and  serious  problems.  De- 
spite emphasis  on  human  needs  in  de- 
velopment programs  and  overall  im- 


Letters 
of  Credence 


On  February  15,  1978,  the  following 
newly  appointed  Ambassadors  pre- 
sented their  credentials  to  President 
Carter: 


Indonesia — Ashari  Danudirdjo 
Western  Samoa — Iulai  Toma 


□ 


provements  in  levels  of  living,  many 
are  still  the  victims  of  poverty  and  dep- 
rivation. The  race  between  population 
growth  and  economic  development  has 
not  yet  been  won. 

Insurgents,  some  externally  sup- 
ported, continue  to  seek  their  goals 
through  violence  and  terror,  threaten- 
ing human  rights  by  their  own  activities 
and  creating  a  climate  of  apprehension 
that  stimulates  reliance  on  restricting 
political  activity  as  the  alternative  to 
chaos.  Even  so,  there  has  been  signifi- 
cant movement  toward  wider  participa- 
tion in  the  political  process,  supported 
by  such  developments  as  the  spread  of 
literacy  and  the  diversification  of  cen- 
ters of  influence  and  power  as  modern 
economies  have  replaced  traditional 
ones. 

Moreover,  many  uncertainties 
shadow  the  future. 

•  How  will  developments  in  a  still 
faltering  global  economy  affect  the  re- 
gion's growth  and  development? 

•  How  will  the  relations  among  the 
great  powers  affect  the  region's  peace 
and  stability? 

•  Will  the  Communist  states  of  In- 
dochina play  a  constructive  role  in  the 
region  or  a  destabilizing  one? 

U.S.  Support 

In  facing  these  problems,  our  friends 
in  Southeast  Asia  look  to  the  United 
States  for  support.  And,  as  I  have 
sought  to  demonstrate,  it  is  in  our 
own  interests  to  help  to  strengthen  the 
highly  favorable  trends,  now  so  evident 
in  the  region,  and  to  prevent  their  re- 
versal. The  effort  required  of  us  is  not 
a  massive  one;  we  do  not  propose  to 
substitute  our  own  strength  for  the 
necessary  self-reliance  of  others.  But  it 
is  an  effort  that  requires  the  careful  or- 
chestration of  many  instruments  of 
policy — diplomatic,  economic,  and 
security. 

We  have  long  had  close  and  friendly 
relations  with  each  of  the  non- 
Communist  Southeast  Asian  countries. 
The  dialogue  into  which  we  have  en- 
tered with  ASEAN  will  supplement  and 
strengthen  our  relations  with  its  five 
members.  As  you  know,  Vice  Presi- 
dent Mondale  will  shortly  be  visiting 
Indonesia,  Thailand,  and  the  Philip- 
pines; the  Prime  Ministers  of  Malaysia 
and  Singapore  were  welcome  guests  in 
Washington  late  last  year.  In  recent 
years,  our  mutual  interest  in  suppres- 
sing the  drug  traffic  has  stimulated  a 
more  active  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Burma.  We  are  con- 
tinuing our  efforts  to  normalize  our  re- 
lations with  Vietnam  on  acceptable 
terms,  an  effort  that  is  regarded  by 
Vietnam's  non-Communist  neighbors 


34 


as  supportive  of  their  own  desires  tor 
peaceful  and  constructive  relations  with 
the  countries  of  Indochina. 

We  have  many  instruments  of  eco- 
nomic cooperation  at  our  disposal;  used 
in  careful  conjunction  with  each  other. 
their  effect  is  multiplied.  American 
business  activity  in  the  region  contrib- 
utes to  its  prosperity  and  ours:  The  ac- 
tivities of  the  Export-Import  Bank  are 
important  in  sustaining  our  market  po- 
sition and  promoting  our  exports;  the 
activities  of  the  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation  help  to  stimulate 
the  resource  flow,  the  transfer  of  tech- 
nology, and  the  strengthening  of  mana- 
gerial skills  that  are  essential  to  sus- 
tained development. 

Economic  Assistance 

Our  Southeast  Asian  bilateral  eco- 
nomic assistance  programs  are  modest 
in  their  amounts.  We  are  proposing 
roughly  $300  million  for  development 
assistance  and  food  aid  for  Indonesia, 
the  Philippines,  and  Thailand.  But  they 
are  important  in  their  impact.  They  are 
focused  primarily  on  the  rural  poor  in 
programs  directed  toward  increasing 
food  production,  slowing  population 
growth,  and  improving  the  quality  of 
life. 

The  major  amounts  for  development 
assistance  in  Southeast  Asia  are  now 
coming  from  the  World  Bank  and  the 
Asian  Development  Bank.  ADB  ap- 
proved loans  to  Asian  developing  coun- 
tries, for  example,  had  reached  $4.2 
billion  by  the  end  of  1977.  The  Banks, 
while  continuing  to  provide  the  bulk  of 
official  development  assistance 
required  for  infrastructure-related  proj- 
ects are  increasingly  focusing  on  proj- 
ects that  satisfy  basic  human  needs  ob- 
jectives. They  are  in  the  forefront  in 
coordinating  development  assistance, 
providing  technical  assistance,  and 
helping  recipient  countries  formulate 
their  development  plans. 

The  United  States,  of  course,  is  a 
major  contributor  to  these  institutions. 
but  our  share  of  the  total  is  diminish- 
ing, as  it  should  in  view  of  the  growing 
economic  capability  of  other  donors. 
Nevertheless  it  is  an  indispensable 
share.  It  sustains  the  essential  work  of 
these  institutions.  It  demonstrates  our 
continued  concern  with  the  well-being 
of  the  countries  whose  projects  are 
being  supported.  And  it  reaffirms  our 
support  for  cooperation  and  coordina- 
tion in  the  development  effort. 

Security  Assistance 

Our  defense  policy  and  our  security 
assistance  reinforce  the  contributions 
made  to  national  and  regional  stability 
by  economic  growth  and  the  equitable 


Department  of  State  BulU 


distribution  of  its  fruits.  The  American 
military  presence — including  our  base 
presence  in  the  Philippines — is  indis- 
pensable to  the  maintenance  of  a  peace- 
ful equilibrium  in  Asia  and  to  the  con- 
fidence of  our  friends  in  that  region. 
Our  security  assistance  programs  help 
them  to  fulfill  their  own  self-defei^c 
requirements  while  avoiding  excessive 
diversion  of  national  budgetary  re- 
sources from  priority  economic  de- 
velopment projects. 

Human  rights  considerations  have 
been  important  among  the  factors  that 
have  entered  into  our  decisions  con- 
cerning these  programs.  Positive  recent 
developments  in  this  regard  have  in- 
cluded large-scale  releases  of  political 
detainees  in  Indonesia  in  accordance 
with  the  schedule  the  Indonesian  Gov- 
ernment announced  in  December  1976 
and  the  opening  up  of  the  Thai  political 
process  under  Prime  Minister 
Kriangsak  Chamanan.  In  addition,  in 
their  development  programs  these 
countries  are  paying  increasing  atten- 
tion to  projects  directed  toward  fulfil- 
ling human  needs  objectives.  This  too 
enters  into  the  many  considerations, 
including  our  own  security  interests, 
that  we  must  factor  into  the  equation. 

On  our  proposed  military  assistance 
programs  in  Southeast  Asia,  the 
largest — that  for  the  Philippines — I 
have  already  discussed  with  you.  We 
are  also  proposing  more  modest,  but 
nevertheless  significant,  programs  for 
Indonesia,  Thailand,  and  Malaysia. 

Indonesia.  For  Indonesia  in  FY 
1979,  we  are  proposing  roughly  $43 
million  for  all  categories  of  security  as- 
sistance including  training.  This  is  a 
decline  from  FY  1978,  since  we  will  no 
longer  be  providing  grant  military  as- 
sistance program  .(MAP).  The 
Government  of  Indonesia  has  consist- 
ently subordinated  military  procure- 
ment to  the  requirements  of  economic 
development. 

However,  it  is  rightfully  concerned 
with  the  need  for  at  least  selective 
modernization  and  standardization  of 
its  extremely  antiquated  equipment  so 
as  to  improve  its  capabilities  for  sur- 
veillance and  defense  of  the  sea  and  air 
approaches  to  its  vast  archipelago.  Its 
plans  for  utilizing  FMS  credits  to  pur- 
chase a  single  squadron  of  F-5  aircraft 
to  replace  a  single  squadron  of  F-86 
aircraft  will  contribute  to  this  objective 
and  to  our  more  general  objective  of 
strengthening  the  self-defense 
capabilities  of  our  allies  and  friends. 

Thailand.  In  Thailand,  as  in  In- 
donesia, our  MAP  program  will  end 
with  FY  1978.  For  FY  1979,  we  are 
proposing  a  total  of  roughly  $31  mil- 
lion in  military  assistance,  almost  all  of 
which  falls  under  the  FMS  program. 


ill 


I 

; 


We  anticipate  that  Thailand  will  use  : 
FY  1979  FMS  credit  for  purchas 
primarily  intended  to  improve  its  d 
fensive  capabilities  but,  in  some  case 
also  to  support  its  efforts  against  arm 
insurgents.  Thailand's  long  and  vulne 
able  land  borders  make  the  question 
the  future  behavior  of  its  Communi 
neighbors — especially  heavily  armc 
Vietnam  —  a  matter  of  particul. 
concern. 

Given  the  potential  threat  to  Tha  I1 
land  from  the  Indochina  countries — ai 
we  cannot  ignore  the  Vietnam-Can 
bodia  conflict — as  well  as  the  e: 
ternal  support  to  its  insurgents,  tl 
United  States  should  continue  to  supp 
military  assistance  to  Thailand.  Its  s> 
curity  needs  and  the  confidence  of  i 
people,  as  well  as  that  of  its  not 
Communist  neighbors,  will  be  serve 
by  its  ability  to  maintain  a  military  e 
tablishment  adequate  for  defense  ar 
deterrence. 

Malaysia.  The  border  that  Thailar 
shares  with  Malaysia,  is  a  source  ( 
concern  because  of  the  continued  ai 
tions  there  of  armed  underground  an 
terrorist  elements.  The  two  govern 
ments  are  cooperating  to  deal  with  th 
problem.  The  Government  of  Malays 
is  making  modest  equipment  and  trail 
ing  improvements  in  support  of  its  e 
forts  against  these  elements  and  I 
improve  its  capabilities  against  any  e> 
ternal  threat.  To  assist  Malaysia  in  th 
effort,  we  are  proposing  roughly  $13. 
million  under  our  FMS  and  interm 
tional  military  education  training  pre 
grams.  We  regard  this  proposal,  lik< 
the  others  we  are  advancing  for  the  re 
gion,  as  a  useful  and  necessary  contr 
bution  to  overall  stability  and  self 
confidence. 

To  sum  up,  our  security  assistanc 
programs  are  only  one  element  of  th 
close  and  friendly  relations  we  main 
tain  with  these  governments.  But  the 
contribute  not  only  to  improving  th 
self-defense  capabilities  of  countrie 
important  to  the  United  States  but  alsc 
to  the  cooperative  atmosphere  in  whicl 
we  work  with  them  on  a  wide  range  o 
matters  of  both  bilateral  and  multilat 
eral  interest.  C 


Statements  belon  the  Subcommittee  on  Asiat 
and  Pacific  Affairs  o]  the  House  Committee  oi 
International  Relations  on  Mar.  9  and  14,  I97t 
(introductory  paragraphs  omitted).  The  com 
plete  transcript  ot  the  hearings  will  be  publishec 
by  the  committee  and  will  he  available  from  tin 
Superintendent  oj  Doi  uments,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington.  />  <  20402.  Mr. 
Holbrooke  is  Assistant  Secretary  lor  last  Asian 
and  Pacifil   Affairs 

1  For  text  of  the  Shanghai  communique,  see 
Bulletin  of  Mar.  20,  1972.  p.  435. 

-'  For  complete  text,  see  Bulletin  of  April 
18,  1977.  p.  375. 


jril  1978 


35 


ECONOMICS:        America's  Stake 
in  an  Open  international  Trading  System 


Secretary  Vance 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  oppor- 

nity  to  meet  with  you  today.  I  want 

i  talk   about  the   stake   of  every 

1  merican  citizen  in  maintaining  an 

>en  international  trading  system. 

In  the  30-plus  years  since  World 

'ar  II,  we  have  enjoyed  a  mounting 

"Pi  vel  of  prosperity.   Our  people  have 

ljoyed  the  fruits  of  an  outward- 

'•  'oking  economy  vigorously  engaged 

a  steadily  more  open  and  active 

orld  commerce.   We  have  grown 

om  a  $200-billion  economy  to  a 

1.9-trillion  economy,   in  no  small 

easure  because  we  have  seized  the 

Dportunities  afforded  by  our  superior 

;chnological      and      industrial 

ipabilities  to  expand  the  reach  of  our 

;onomy  to  every  corner  of  the  globe. 

/e  have  been  able  to  do  this  because 

e  have  succeeded  in  fostering  a  pro- 

ressively  more  open  world  trading 

i/stem,  one  that  has  enabled  us  to 

enerate  new  markets,  new  jobs,  and 

■ew    choices    for    the    American 

lonsumer. 

In   1962  President  John  Kennedy 

)ld  us  that  a  rising  tide  of  interna- 

onal  trade  would  lift  all  boats.   He 

'as  right.  Our  commitment  to  vigor- 

us  world  trade  has  served  us  well. 

At  this  moment,  however,  we  face 

nusually  difficult  strains  on  our 

.conomy.  There  is  a  strong  impulse 

a  abandon  our  commitment  to  an 

ipen  world  trading  system — to  draw 

ur  wagons  into  a  circle. 

Let  there  be  no  mistake  about  the 

ensitivity  of  this  Administration  to 

he  reality  of  those  strains  and  the 

necessity  to  deal,  constructively  and 

ffectively,   with  the  causes  and  the 

onsequences  of  current  economic 

lifficulties.   Unemployment  is  more 

'han  a  statistic  to  a  family  without  a 

ob.  Inflation  is  a  corrosive  that  eats 

iway  at  the  hope  of  every  American 

or  a  better  future.  The  damage  to  a 

:ommunity  when  a  factory  shuts  its 

*ates  can  be  devastating. 

As  the  President  indicated  in  his 
State  of  the  Union  message,  bolster- 
ing our  domestic  economy  is  at  the 
iop  of  this  Administration's  agenda.1 
tThe  comprehensive  economic  pro- 
gram which  the  President  submitted 
to  Congress  in  January  presents  the 
clear  outlines  of  a  coordinated 
strategy  to  expand  our  industrial  pro- 
ductivity, to  create  new  job  opportu- 


nities, and  to  develop  a  more  consist- 
ent and  dependable  economic  climate 
for  private  investment  and  trade. 

We  all  share  the  same  economic 
goals:  to  keep  our  recovery  on 
course,  to  enhance  the  economic  se- 
curity and  well-being  of  our  people, 
and  to  assure  that  the  benefits  and 
burdens  of  a  dynamic  economy  are 
equitably  shared. 

But  we  must  be  careful  how  we 
pursue  these  goals.  We  must  avoid 
short-term  responses  to  current  pres- 
sures that  mortgage  our  future  inter- 
ests. We  must  resist  the  temptation  to 
insulate  ourselves  from  international 
economic  competition  for  we  are  a 
nation  that  thrives  on  world  trade.  We 
cannot  lose  sight  of  one  simple  propo- 
sition: To  buy  from  us,  other  nations 
must  be  able  to  sell  to  us. 

It  is  essential  to  recognize  that  the 
economic  strains  that  we  feel  are  by 
no  means  confined  to  the  United 
States;  indeed,  our  economy  is  strong 
when  compared  with  most  of  our  trad- 
ing partners.  The  sharp  increase  in  oil 
prices  in  1973-74  sent  world  inflation 
rates  upward  and  helped  push  the 
world  economy  into  recession.  Re- 
covery has  been  slow.  Unemployment 
is  unacceptably  high.  Large  surpluses 
have  been  accumulated  by  some  of 
the  oil-exporting  countries  while  the 
consuming  countries  grapple  with  the 
corresponding  deficits.  These  deficits 
lead  countries  to  try  to  import  less 
and  export  more — something  which 
all  countries  obviously  cannot  do 
simultaneously. 

These  strains  create  pressures  here 
and  abroad  to  turn  to  policies  that  re- 
strict trade.  Until  now,  the  industrial 
countries,  despite  these  unprecedented 
economic  stresses,  have,  for  the  most 
part,  resisted  the  rush  toward  trade 
restriction.  But  if  we  should  turn 
down  the  road  toward  protectionism, 
our  major  trading  partners  would  face 
irresistible  demands  to  impose  their 
own  barriers.  And  the  developing 
countries,  caught  in  the  squeeze  be- 
tween high  energy  prices  and  narrow- 
ing export  prospects,  would  be  forced 
to  restrict  their  imports  as  well. 

Benefits  of  an  Open  System 

The  American  people  have  a  vital 
interest  in  a  progressively  more  open 
trading  system.  We  have  far  too  much 
at  stake   to  benefit,    in   any   lasting 


sense,   from   a  new  wave  of  interna- 
tional protectionism. 

•  One  out  of  every  eight  manufac- 
turing jobs  in  the  United  States  de- 
pends on  exports.  For  every  one  of 
those  jobs,  another  one — in  a  support- 
ing industry — is  created. 

•  Every  third  acre  of  U.S.  farmland 
produces  for  export.  Each  dollar  of 
those  agricultural  exports  stimulates 
more  than  a  dollar's  worth  of  output 
in  a  food-related  industry. 

•  Today  one  out  of  every  three  dol- 
lars of  U.S.  corporate  profits  is  de- 
rived from  international  activities. 

•  Exports  of  our  goods  and  services 
now  contribute  nearly  $200  billion  to 
our  gross  national  product. 

•  Two-thirds  of  our  imports  are  es- 
sential raw  materials  or  goods  we 
cannot  readily  produce.  From  au- 
tomobiles to  newspapers,  from  jet 
aircraft  to  household  appliances, 
many  of  our  industries  depend  upon 
imported  materials. 

What  I  have  just  described  is  the 
profile  of  a  nation  whose  prosperity 
depends  upon  an  open  trading  system. 
The  impact  of  America's  trade  with 
the  world  is  felt  in  each  of  your 
states.  Let  me  cite  just  a  few 
examples. 

•  For  the  State  of  Washington,  in- 
ternational trade  accounts  for  a  sub- 
stantial part  of  the  $5.6  billion  in  air- 
craft equipment  which  the  United 
States  exported  in  1977. 

•  Nebraska  contributed  about  11% 
of  the  $5.6  billion  of  feed  grains  we 
exported  in  1976. 

•  Ohio  has  a  vital  interest  in  inter- 
national trade  as  well.  The  tire,  steel, 
and  electrical  equipment  industries  in 
Ohio  depend  upon  imports  of  critical 
materials  such  as  natural  rubber, 
manganese,  and  cobalt. 

•  For  Oregon  the  importance  of 
trade  is  clear:  In  1976  more  than  8% 
of  total  U.S.  exports  to  Japan,  more 
than  12%  of  our  exports  to  Korea, 
and  more  than  25%  of  our  exports  to 
India  passed  through  Oregon's  ports. 

I  could  go  on — with  Arkansas, 
which  contributes  more  to  our  exports 
of  poultry  and  rice  than  any  other 
State;  with  Massachusetts,  which  con- 
tributes substantially  to  our  rapidly 
growing  exports  of  electrical  and 
health  care  equipment  as  well  as 


36 


computers  and  accounting  machines; 
with  Texas,  which  is  a  major  exporter 
of  cotton  and  industrial  chemicals; 
with  New  Jersey,  where  foreign  trade 
provides  a  livelihood  for  about  one  in 
five  workers. 

In  all,  22  States  have  established 
offices  in  Europe  and  Asia  to  promote 
trade  and  to  encourage  foreign  in- 
vestment in  the  United  States,  evi- 
dence of  the  direct  concern  you  have 
demonstrated  in  fostering  vigorous  in- 
ternational competition. 


Costs  of  Protectionism 

There  are,  of  course,  sectors  of  our 
economy  that  are  threatened  by  im- 
ports. It  is  tempting  to  think  that  we 
can  solve  many  of  our  economic  prob- 
lems by  insulating  these  industries 
from  import  competition.  But  the 
costs  to  the  American  public  would 
be  enormous. 

•  Consumers — particularly  poor 
and  middle-income  Americans  — 
would  suffer.  They  would  pay  more 
for  what  they  buy  and  they  would 
have  less  choice. 

•  Inflation  would  be  fueled.  Import 
restrictions  not  only  push  consumer 
costs  up,  they  add  substantially  to 
producer  costs  as  well,  driving  prices 
upward  and  undermining  the  competi- 
tiveness of  many  of  the  goods  we 
produce. 

•  Jobs  would  be  jeopardized.  If 
U.S.  consumers  have  to  spend  more 
on  some  items  because  of  import  re- 
strictions, they  will  have  less  to 
spend  on  other  goods  and  services, 
the  great  bulk  of  which  are  produced 
here  at  home  by  American  workers. 
And  just  as  important,  protectionism 
against  our  trading  partners  breeds 
protectionism  by  our  trading  partners 
against  us.  Nearly  10  million  Ameri- 
can jobs  depend  on  our  exports.  No 
Administration  committed  to  protect- 
ing the  jobs  of  every  American 
worker  should  embark  upon  a  course 
that  could  unleash  a  new  and  dangerous 
era  of  trade  warfare. 

In  short,  we  cannot  protect  jobs  in 
some  industries  without  endangering 
the  livelihood  of  more  workers  in  oth- 
er industries.  We  cannot  solve  the  prob- 
lem of  an  unemployed  steel  worker  in 
a  way  which  costs  a  machinist  his 
job.  Our  policy  must  look  to  the  fu- 
ture of  both. 

We  must  continue  the  momentum 
of  the  last  three  decades  toward  more 
open  trade  among  nations,  while  at 
the  same  time  we  deal  fairly  and 
humanely  with  short-term  disloca- 
tions. 


Department  of  State  Bulle* 


Course  of  Action 

Let  me  discuss  the  steps  this  Ad- 
ministration is  taking  to  pursue  both 
our  immediate  and  future  goals. 

First,  we  are  engaged  in  a  major 
and  comprehensive  effort  to  devise  a 
more  open  and  equitable  trading  sys- 
tem. We  are  seeking  in  the  multilat- 
eral trade  negotiations  in  Geneva, 
along  with  our  trading  partners,  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  reduction — 
and  sometimes  elimination — of  indus- 
trial tariffs  and  an  easing  of  barriers 
to  our  vital  agricultural  exports. 

This  effort,  if  successful,  will 
stimulate  expanded  opportunities  for 
world  trade.  But  more  than  tariffs  are 
involved  in  the  Geneva  negotiations. 

•  We  are  working  toward  interna- 
tional rules  that  limit  the  use  of  gov- 
ernment procurement  policies  and 
subsidy  practices  that  distort  trade. 

•  We  are  seeking  to  reduce  or 
eliminate  a  variety  of  other  nontariff 
barriers  which  impede  trade. 

•  We  are  making  a  serious  effort  to 
improve  international  procedures 
under  which  governments  take  actions 
to  protect  their  citizens  against  sud- 
den surges  of  imports. 

The  negotiations  in  Geneva  will  es- 
tablish the  framework  of  world  trade 
for  years  to  come.  This  will  involve 
tough  negotiating  in  the  months 
ahead.  Some  argue  that  we  should 
pull  back  and  wait  out  this  period  of 
economic  uncertainty.  We  believe  just 
the  opposite:  that  successful  comple- 
tion of  this  major  effort  to  expand 
trade  and  strengthen  its  international 
rules  will  increase  business  confi- 
dence and  spur  our  recovery.  Ambas- 
sador Bob  Strauss  [Robert  S.  Strauss, 
Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations]  is  determined  to  bring 
back  a  package  of  agreements  that 
will  bolster  our  economy  and  those  of 
our  trading  partners.  We  look  to  you 
for  guidance  and  support  as  this  proc- 
ess unfolds. 

Second,  as  we  work  to  secure  en- 
during improvement  in  the  world  trad- 
ing system,  this  Administration  will 
fully  and  vigorously  enforce  the  laws 
which  have  been  enacted  to  stop  un- 
fair trade  practices  aimed  at  American 
industries.  American  workers  must  be 
confident  that  their  government  will 
insist  that  all  nations  play  by  the 
rules. 

We  must  also  insure  that  our  en- 
forcement mechanisms  are  effective. 
In  the  case  of  steel,  where  widespread 
dumping  threatened  to  overtake  our 
enforcement  capabilities,  we  de- 
veloped a  "trigger  price"  device  to 
enable  us  to  respond  promptly  and  ef- 


fectively to  this  unfair  trade  practice 

Although  steel  has  been  the  mo 
prominent  case  recently,  it  is  not  tl 
only  action  we  have  taken  against  ui 
fair  practices.  We  have  moved  to  pn 
vent  dumping  of  other  products.  Ar 
have  taken  countervailing  duty  actk 
against  such  items  as  leather  gooc 
from  Latin  America  and  fish  fro' 
Canada. 

We  also  intend  to  carry  out  th 
mandate  of  the  Trade  Act  of  197 
which  provides  for  temporary  relict  i 
industries  injured  by  imports.  Th 
disruption  caused  to  families  an 
communities  by  particular  trade  pro!1 
lems  cannot  be  ignored.  Under  th 
authority,  the  Administration  durin 
the  past  year  negotiated  orderly  ma 
keting  agreements  with  Taiwan  an 
Korea  for  shoes  and  with  Japan  fc 
color  TV  sets. 

In  implementing  these  laws,  w 
will  adhere  to  the  principle  that  oil 
actions  must  be  temporary  and  limite 
only  to  the  minimum  relief  necessar) 
Such  measures  should  not  becom 
permanent.  Trade  relief  should  pn 
vide  breathing  space  for  adjustment 
not  a  subsidy  for  inefficiency. 

Third,  we  must  stimulate  laggin    • 
U.S.   exports.   On  December  21  thw 
President  announced  steps  that  wi  t 
enable  us  to  respond  more  creativel " 
and  energetically  to  export  opportun 
ties.  He  has  asked  Congress  for  ar 
unprecedented  $15  billion  expansio  if 
of  direct  lending  authority  for  th»: 
Export-Import  Bank  over  the  next    : 
years.   And  he  has  directed  the  De 
partment  of  Commerce  to  vigorousl  ,| 
assist  U.S.   exports  in  ways  that  ar 
consistent   with  an  open  tradin. 
system. 

Fourth,   we  must  insure  that  n<:- 
segment  of  the  population  is  forced  tdl 
bear  the  burden  of  a  more  open  trad  [: 
ing  system   without  being  helped  td|: 
find  new  opportunities.  The  Adminis 
tration  is  committed  to  making  tradt 
adjustment  assistance  more  effective 
The  delivery  of  benefits  to  displacec  ; 
workers  and  communities  must  be  ac- 
celerated. We  have  been  experiment- 
ing  with  new  types  of  programs,  such  i 
as  one  in  the  footwear  industry  where 
teams  from  government  and  industry 
are  working  together  to  improve  the 
competitiveness  of  our  firms. 

We  cannot  prevent  change.  Our 
economy  is  dynamic  and  it  must  re 
main  so.  But  we  can  and  must  hel 
affected  industries  and  workers  to  a 
just  to  change  through  modernizatio 
retraining,  and  facilitating  shifts  0 
resources  to  more  productive  sectors. 
Trade  policy  alone  cannot  carry  the 
entire  burden  of  solving  this  nation's 
economic  problems.   We  must  also 


is.  I 


ril  1978 

rati   /e  an  effective  energy  policy  and 

he r     must  have  it  soon.  Unless  we  curb 

r  unchecked  appetite  for  foreign 

— on  which  we  spent  $44.6  billion 

t  year,  or  30%  of  our  total  import 

1 — we  will  not  begin  to  reverse  the 

0  billion  U.S.   trade  deficit.   We 

o    ist  take  the  difficult  steps  that  are 

hi    [uired  to  reduce  our  requirements 

•  imported  oil  and  to  promote  the 

ji    velopment  of  other  energy  sources. 

th  for  our  energy  and  trade  needs, 

ssage  of  domestic  energy  legisla- 

n  is  imperative. 

Nor  can  we  solve  our  economic 
Dblems  by  ourselves.  No  single 
untry  or  group  of  countries  can 
pulder  the  adjustment  to  a  changing 
irld  economy.  Some  successful  ex- 
rting  countries  have  been  seen  as 
cing  advantage  of  the  relatively 
en  U.S.  market  while  at  the  same 
le  restricting  their  markets  to  im- 
rts.  This  contributes  to  protectionist 
ssures  among  their  trading 
ners. 

e  recently  concluded  a  series  of 
ensive  discussions  with  Japan  lead- 
to  its  commitment  to  open  its 
rkets  further.  Japan  has  also  an- 
unced  its  plans  to  accelerate  its 
wth.  The  fact  that  we  encouraged 
an  to  open  its  market  to  imports 
her  than  to  restrict  its  exports 
ustrates  a  basic  principle  of  our 
lide  policy:  that  whenever  possible 
ft  will  resolve  our  problems  with  an 
<  tward  or  trade-expanding  ori- 
i  tation. 


[inclusion 

An  outward-looking  trade  policy  is 
{.it  a  luxury  for  the  United  States.  It 
pure   economic   necessity.    Even 
i' ore  than  our  trade  is  at  stake;  for  if 
lie  let  ourselves  slide  into  the  unpre- 
I  ctable  business  of  protectionism,  in- 
rnational  investment,  monetary  af- 
liirs,   and  international  development 
ill  also  suffer.  We  would  be  foster- 
ig  a  kind  of  nationalism  which  could 
lake  our  alliances  and  undermine 
ur  efforts  to  build   international 
^operation  across  the  entire  range  of 
ressing  global  issues. 
Protectionism  is  a  dangerous  gam- 
le  in  which  everybody  loses.  That  is 
fie  indelible  lesson  of  history.   A 
k'ave  of  trade  restrictions  in  the  early 
930's  deepened  a  worldwide  depres- 
sion. The  desperate  economic  situa- 
on  that  existed  then  in  Europe  cer- 
iiinly  contributed  to  the  popularity  of 
luthoritarian  movements.   Today,   we 
jannot  close  our  eyes  to  the  relation- 
hip  between  economic  growth  and 
I'olitical  stability  around  the  world, 
i  Today,  as  much  as  in  any  period  of 


37 


international  Financial 
Institutions 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper 

Our  bilateral  programs  focus  on 
functional  and  geographic  areas  of 
particular  interest  to  the  United 
States.  The  international  development 
lending  institutions  are  one  of  the 
major  instruments  of  our  assistance 
programs.  They  play  a  leading  role  in 
the  direct  transfer  of  real  resources  in 
support  of  the  developing  countries' 
aspirations  and  the  objectives  of  the 
United  States  without  the  functional 
and  geographic  constraints  of  our 
bilateral  programs.  Let  me  briefly 
mention  each  of  these  institutions  be- 
fore addressing  in  some  detail  the  im- 
portant ways  in  which  they  promote 
development  and  how  our  national 
interests  are  served  by  these  institu- 
tions. I  will  begin  with  the  World 
Bank  group. 

World  Bank  Group 

The  International  Bank  for  Re- 
construction   and    Development 

(IBRD)  is  the  central  member  of  the 
entire  family  of  international  de- 
velopment lending  institutions.  Over 
the  30-odd  years  since  its  founding, 
its  increasingly  broad  membership 
(now  130  countries),  its  highly  com- 
petent staff,  and  its  proven  perform- 
ance have  established  it  as  the  leader 
of  the  global  development  effort.  Its 
activities  have  been  a  valuable  com- 
plement to  our  bilateral  aid. 

Traditionally,  it  has  focused  on 
infrastructure  projects  essential  to 
economic  growth.  More  recently,  its 
emphasis  has  shifted  substantially  in 
favor  of  projects  directly  benefiting 
the  poor,  especially  agriculture  and 
rural  development  projects.  Thanks  to 
our  position  as  the  IBRD's  major 
donor,   we  continue  to  be  able  to 


exercise  leadership  within  the  IBRD 
and  substantial  influence  over  its 
policies. 

The  IBRD's  major  borrowers  are 
middle-income  countries  relatively  far 
along  the  path  to  development.  Many 
countries — despite  having  made  im- 
portant economic  progress  in  recent 
years — will  continue  to  depend  on 
IBRD  loans  and  advice  for  some 
years  to  come,  all  the  more  so  be- 
cause of  the  setback  to  their  de- 
velopment inflicted  by  the  oil  crisis 
and  the  global  recession  from  which 
we  still  have  not  completely  recov- 
ered. Among  large  borrowers  from 
the  IBRD  are  such  countries  as 
Mexico,  Brazil,  Indonesia,  Spain,  and 
Yugoslavia — all  countries  of  consid- 
erable importance  to  the  United 
States,  all  countries  whose  prosperity 
is  important  to  our  own. 

Almost  all  of  the  funds  lent  by  the 
IBRD  are  borrowed  by  it  in  capital 
markets  and,  therefore,  involve  no  di- 
rect contribution  by  donor  country 
governments.  (Paid-in  capital,  10%  of 
total  subscriptions;  earnings  on  in- 
vestments; and  interest  on  earlier 
loans  provide  additional  funds  for 
IBRD  lending.) 

Last  year  Congress  authorized  our 
participation  in  a  selective  capital  in- 
crease for  the  IBRD  which  will  allow 
it  to  maintain  its  annual  lending  pro- 
gram at  about  present  levels.  Many 
IBRD  members  now  favor  an  addi- 
tional general  capital  increase  which 
would  allow  an  expansion  in  real 
terms  of  its  lending  programs  over  the 
coming  years,  and  President  Carter 
has  publicly  expressed  his  hope  that 
future  negotiations  will  allow  the 
realization  of  such  an  increase. 

The  International  Development 
Association   (IDA)   is  the  second 


our  history,  American  leadership  is 
called  for.  Others  are  looking  to  us. 
Unless  we  demonstrate  our  resolve  to 
move  toward  a  fairer  and  more  open 
trading  system,  such  a  system  simply 
will  not  evolve.  Unless  we  adjust  to  a 
changing  international  economy — an 
international  economy  in  which  we 
have  a  major  stake — America's  inter- 
ests will  seriously  suffer. 

We  will  need  your  help.  Together, 
we  can  meet  the  immediate  challenges 


that  face  us  without  endangering  our 
future.  And  together,  we  can  work  to 
build  an  international  economic  sys- 
tem that  expands  opportunity  and  fos- 
ters peace.  □ 


Address  to  the  National  Governors'  Associa- 
tion on  Feb.  27,  1978  (press  release  93A  of 
Feb.  27). 

'  For  excerpts  of  the  President's  State  of  the 
Union  message,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  1978, 
p.  20. 


38 


member  of  the  World  Bank  group. 
IDA  makes  loans  on  very  conces- 
sional terms  to  the  poorest  countries. 
Therefore,  its  resources  must  be  con- 
tributed directly  by  donor  govern- 
ments. India.  Pakistan,  Bangladesh, 
and  Egypt  have  been  major  recipients 
of  IDA  funds.  The  needs  of  the  coun- 
tries to  which  IDA  lends  are  varied 
and  vast.  IDA's  task  in  assisting  to 
meet  them  is  clearly  of  a  long-term 
nature. 

Congress  last  year  authorized  our 
participation  in  the  fifth  replenish- 
ment of  IDA's  resources.  We  will  be 
seeking  this  year  appropriations  for 
our  pledged  contributions  to  both  the 
fourth  and  fifth  replenishments.  For 
the  fourth  replenishment  we  still  need 
$750  million — our  third  and  fourth 
(final)  tranches.  These  two  U.S. 
tranches  represent  a  significant 
fraction — just  under  17% — of  the  en- 
tire fourth  replenishment.  (Pledges  to 
this  replenishment  totaled  $4.5  bil- 
lion; the  U.S.  share  was  one-third.) 
Congress  authorized  these  funds  years 
ago.  We  are  behind  schedule  in  ob- 
taining appropriations.  Inability  to 
provide  these  funds  to  IDA  would  be 
viewed  by  others  as  a  failure  to  live 
up  to  our  commitments. 

For  the  fifth  replenishment  we  need 
this  year  the  second  of  our  three  $800 
million  installments.  Obtaining  this 
amount  is  also  vital  because  the  fifth 
replenishment  cannot  continue  into  its 
second  year  without  the  appropriation 
and  commitment  from  the  United 
States,  on  the  same  terms  as  other 
countries,  to  provide  IDA  these 
funds. 

In  a  word,  our  contributions  are  es- 
sential to  allow  IDA  to  continue  to 
function  smoothly,  to  the  other  IDA 
donors  who  made  their  pledges  on  the 
assumption  that  we  would  fulfill  ours, 
and,  of  course,  to  the  poor  develop- 
ing countries  which  will  benefit  from 
IDA  lending.  Politically.  IDA  is  a 
central  indicator  by  which  developing 
countries  gauge  the  seriousness  of  our 
commitment  to  assist  them  in  their 
development  efforts.  Thus,  our  ac- 
tions concerning  IDA  are  central  to 
the  developing  countries'  perceptions 
of  our  general  attitude  toward  them. 
These  perceptions  have  a  major  effect 
on  the  overall  North-South  dialogue. 

Hie  International  Finance  Corpo- 
ration (IFC),  the  final  member  of  the 
World  Bank  group,  supports  directly 
the  development  of  the  private  sector 
in  developing  countries.  It  does  this 
through  syndication  efforts  aimed  at 
bringing  together  investment  opportu- 
nities, domestic  and  foreign  private 
capital,  and  experienced  management; 
and  it  participates  in  the  projects  di- 


Department  of  State  Bull; 


rectly   by   modest   loans   or  equity 
investments. 

Congress  last  year  authorized  our 
participation  in  a  capital  increase  for 
the  IFC.  This  increase  will  allow  the 
IFC  to  expand  its  activities  in  coming 
years,  notably  in  minerals  and  energy 
development. 


Regional  Development  Banks 

The  regional  development  banks 
serve  as  useful  complements  to  the 
global  reach  of  the  World  Bank 
group.  They  develop  particular  exper- 
tise in  their  respective  regions.  Our 
support  for  them  manifests  our  inter- 
est in  the  respective  regions  and  thus 
has  particular  political  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic significance. 

The  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  (IDB)  serves  an  area  with 
which  the  United  States  has  deep  his- 
torical and  cultural  ties  and  in  whose 
prosperity  we  have  a  significant  inter- 
est. The  IDB,  with  our  support,  has 
contributed  significantly  to  economic 
development  of  the  region  in  the  past 
and  requires  our  support  to  continue 
to  do  so  in  the  future.  Its  develop- 
ment efforts,  in  turn,  can  strengthen 
democratic  forces  and  further  the  ad- 
vancement of  human  rights  in  the 
region. 

The  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADB)  serves  a  region  of  great 
strategic  and  economic  interest  to  the 
United  States.  Its  membership  extends 
from  Korea  in  the  north  to  Afghani- 
stan in  the  west.  I  believe  the  ADB 
can  make  a  contribution  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  region  which  will 
enable  these  countries  better  to  resist 
external  pressures  and  help  bring  sta- 
bility and  true  peace  to  the  region.  In 
view  of  our  military  withdrawal  from 
Indochina  and  the  proposed  reduction 
in  our  forces  in  Korea,  our  support 
for  the  ADB  can  give  a  valuable  sig- 
nal of  continued  U.S.  interest  in  the 
area  and  support  for  the  aspirations  of 
its  people. 

The  African  Development  Fund 
(AFDF)  is  the  newest  of  the  regional 
institutions,  and  our  participation  in  it 
to  date  has  been  modest.  Our  interests 
in  Africa  are  clearly  growing,  how- 
ever. Guerrilla  and  conventional  con- 
flicts in  the  area  threaten  not  only  the 
local  populace  but  risk  growing  in- 
volvement of  outside  powers.  Our 
diplomatic  efforts  aim  to  resolve 
these  conflicts.  AFDF-assisted  de- 
velopment can  enhance  the  likelihood 
of  a  stable  peace.  Increased  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  the  Fund  is  an  important 
element  of  our  expression  of  interest 
in  the  African  Continent. 


r 


Contributions 

Let  me  turn  now  to  some  of  t 
specific  ways  in  which  these  instil 
tions  serve  both  development  and  t 
interests  of  the  United  State 
Through  their  role  in  assisting  t 
economic  and  social  progress  of  t 
developing  countries,  these  instit 
tions  foster  a  structure  of  cooperati 
between  developing  and  developi 
countries  characterized  by  mutual  r 
sponsibilities  and  joint  contributio 
to  the  health  of  the  international  ec 
nomic  and  political  system.  Tl 
cooperation  maintained  within  the 
organizations  contributes  positively 
the  substance  and  to  the  atmosphere 
the  broader  North-South  dialogue. 

They  contribute  to  an  equitab 
sharing  of  the  global  aid  burden.  Co 
tributions  of  individual  donors  a> 
based  on  their  economic  strength  ai 
ability  to  provide  aid.  Our  share 
contributions  to  these  organizatioi 
has  generally  shown  a  declining  trei 
over  the  years  as  the  shares  of  othi 
countries  have  increased.  For  i 
stance,  our  original  share  in  IDA  w 
43%;  in  the  current  replenishment 
is  31.4%.  In  the  Inter-American  Dl 
velopment  Bank's  ordinary  capiu 
our  original  share  was  41%;  in  t 
current  replenishment  it  is  32.3%.  A* 
important  and  justified  developme 
is  that  the  OPEC  countries  [Organiz 
tion  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countrie 
are  now  increasing  their  contributioi 
as  well.  We  welcome  these  trends  an 
expect  them  to  continue. 

To  support  their  hard-lending  ope 
ations   these   institutions   borrow 
many  countries,   including,  recentl 
OPEC   countries.    In   this   way   th 
have  mobilized  funds  for  developme 
far  in  excess  of  their  members'  ca; 
contributions  to  them.  They  contri 
ute   significantly  to  the  evolution  c 
an  efficient  global  economy  and 
necessary  structural  adjustments  of 
long-term  nature.   They  do  this  i 
several  ways. 

•  They   analyze   individual   project 
within  the  context  of  both  a  country' | 
development   plan  and  the   globai 
economy  and  select  for  funding  onl; 
the  soundest  projects. 

•  They  assist  countries  to  diversif; 
their  economies  by  providing  addi 
tional  capital  to  sectors  requiring  it 
for  instance  agriculture  and,  more  re 
cently,  energy. 

•  In  their  dialogues  with  develop 
ing  members,  they  advise  on  appro' 
priate  economic  policies.  Their  advice 
is  generally  consistent  with  our  own 
views  and  stresses  the  importance  of 
market  forces  and  of  an  open  interna 
tional  economic  system.   Because  of 


il  1978 


39 


multilateral  character  of  these  in- 
utions  this  advice  is  perceived  by 
recipients  as  apolitical  and  objec- 
i.  The  acknowledged  competence 
1  international  character  of  the  staff 
these  institutions  gives  it  additional 
hority.  As  a  result,  their  advice  is 
en  more  effective  than  advice  from 
ateral  aid  donors. 

They  contribute  to  the  efficient 
:  of  scarce  development  assistance 
ming  from  many  sources  through 
ir  leadership  and  participation  in 

aid  consultative  groups  and  con- 
tia  which  coordinate  bilateral  aid 
orts  on  behalf  of  numerous  coun- 
s.  The  existence  of  their  compe- 
it  staffs  lessens  the  need  for  similar 
ffs  in  each  donor  country,  thus  fur- 
r  contributing  to  the  efficiency  of 

international  aid  effort. 

These   institutions  can  also  serve 

Jgible  U.S.  interests.  Development 
the  minerals  sector  worldwide — 
Bth  fuel  and  nonfuel  minerals — is 
i  the  interest  of  the  United  States  be- 
iise  it  will  increase  supplies  and,  at 
1  same  time,  restrain  further  price 
i|:reases.  Unfortunately,  however, 
n:ertain  investment  climates  in  some 
■  veloping  countries  have  depressed 
|  vate  investment  in  development  of 
I  s  sector.  The  World  Bank,  with 
HS.  support,  is  moving  to  expand 
(nstantially  its  effort  in  the  sector, 
it  only  through  the  provision  of  ad- 
<  ional  financing  and  technical  as- 
s;tance  but  through  the  favorable 
'  atalytic"  effect  on  private  inves- 
ts which  the  Bank's  activities  in  a 
( untry  can  have.  The  regional  banks 
B  moving  in  the  same  direction. 

The  international  development 
links  can  contribute  in  many  ways  to 
V:  growth  of  markets  for  U.S.  ex- 
ists. They  do  this  through  policy 
I  vice  which  favors  an  open  interna- 
bnal  economic  system.  They  also 
(sist  the  developing  countries  to 
I  ercome  their  foreign  exchange  con- 
iraints  which  limit  their  ability  to 
Oport.  Development  Assistance 
bmmittee  statistics  indicate  that  in 
>76  multilateral  agencies — the  inter- 
itional  development  banks,  the 
nited  Nations,  and  other  minor 
imrces — provided  $6.2  billion  in  net 
mancial  resource  flows  to  non-oil 
:veloping  countries — about  10.6% 
I  total  receipts  by  these  countries  of 
J58.7  billion. 

Primarily  in  connection  with  spe- 
cie projects,  the  development  banks 
ind  the  money  needed  to  import  the 
iecessary  project  components — a  sub- 
i:antial  share  of  which  comes  from 
pe  United  States.  Over  time,  these 
rojects  can  contribute  to  the  saving 


and  earning  of  foreign  exchange  by 
these  countries  which  can  then  be 
used  to  purchase  U.S.  goods.  In 
1976,  for  instance,  non-OPEC  de- 
veloping countries  alone  imported 
526.2  billion  from  the  United 
States — 23%  of  our  total  exports. 
Major  components  of  our  exports  to 
these  countries  included  manufactures 
($19  billion),  agricultural  products 
($4.9  billion),  raw  materials  ($1.8 
billion),  and  fuels  ($586  million). 

These  institutions  are  placing  in- 
creasing emphasis  on  employment- 
creating  projects  in  connection  with 
their  efforts  in  both  the  agriculture 
and  rural  development  sector  and  in 
urban-oriented  industrialization  and 
development  efforts.  Creation  of  addi- 
tional jobs  in  the  countryside  can 
slow  migration  from  rural  to  urban 
areas.  Additional  jobs  in  urban  areas 
can  ease  pressures  to  emigrate  to 
other  countries.  We  fully  support 
these  efforts  by  the  banks  which  are 
directly  relevant  to  our  own  illegal 
immigration  problem.  These  are  some 
of  the  specific  ways  in  which  these 
institutions  serve  both  the  develop- 
ment effort  and  U.S.  interests. 

Successful  Activities 

In  India,  the  largest  single  compo- 
nent of  the  World  Bank  program  has 
been  directed  to  agriculture  and  rural 
development.  In  addition  to  fertilizer 
production  and  rural  electrification, 
this  includes  projects  to  improve  the 
organization  of  specialty  crops  (cot- 
ton, fish,  rubber,  coconut,  forestry). 
But  the  main  aim  of  the  program  is  to 
raise  the  productivity  of  the  mass  of 
Indian  farmers  growing  foodgrains  by 
financing  construction  and  moderniza- 
tion of  irrigation  schemes  and  pro- 
viding agricultural  extension  on  a 
sound  basis. 

In  the  earlier  projects  it  was  found 
that  roughly  50%  of  farmers  in  all 
size  groups  adopted  the  practices 
suggested  and  the  adopters  increased 
their  yields  60-80%  within  2  years. 
The  suggested  practices  were  kept 
simple  and  avoided  use  of  additional 
purchased  inputs,  with  the  result  that 
even  the  smallest  farmers  benefited. 
It  is  expected  that  about  6  million  of 
India's  70  million  farm  families  will 
benefit  from  improved  yields  under 
these  projects  in  the  next  few  years. 

In  the  past  year  and  a  half  alone. 
IDA  has  helped  in  the  reorganization 
of  the  extension  service  of  India's 
five  poorest  states  along  lines  tried 
earlier  in  other  states  in  the 
framework  of  command  area  de- 
velopment projects.  Three  of  these 
states  are  in  India's  eastern  region 


where  average  farm  size  and  per 
capita  incomes  are  about  half  those  of 
the  rest  of  the  country. 

In  the  Philippines,  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank  is  a  major  con- 
tributor to  the  Catabato  irrigation 
project  on  Mindanao.  The  farmers  in 
Mindanao  are  poor  even  by  Philippine 
standards.  The  lack  of  feeder  roads 
and  difficult  access  to  marketing  serv- 
ices and  irrigation  works  are  disincen- 
tives to  farmers.  This  project  is  one 
of  the  more  successful  of  its  type  to 
date.  The  project  had  exceeded  origi- 
nal targets  both  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  beneficiaries,  which  almost 
doubled,  and  the  extent  of  their  eco- 
nomic benefits.  Total  net  annual  farm 
income  in  the  project  area,  projected 
to  rise  in  7  years  from  $106  per  fam- 
ily to  $427,  actually  increased  to  about 
$830. 

In  Egypt,  the  World  Bank,  together 
with  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International 
Development  and  the  German  agency 
KfW  [Kreditanstalt  fur  Wiederaufbau-a 
credit  reconstruction  finance  cor- 
poration], is  financing  a  major  program 
of  four  projects  to  provide  Egypt's  ag- 
riculture lands  with  field  drainage  and 
to  alleviate  waterlogging  and  salinity. 
These  projects  bring  substantial  bene- 
fits to  780,000  farm  families  (about  4.4 
million  people) — most  of  whom  are 
near  to  or  below  the  poverty  level — and 
yield  a  very  high  economic  return. 
These  projects  also  provide  very  sub- 
stantial employment:  in  excess  of 
170,000  man-years  during  implementa- 
tion, mostly  for  the  landless  rural  poor, 
and  a  continuing  increased  need  for  ag- 
ricultural labor. 

Policy  Choices 

I  would  like  now  to  touch  on  two 
areas  in  our  relationships  with  these 
institutions  which  necessarily  involve 
trade-offs  between  conflicting 
objectives. 

The  first  involves  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  concept  of  sharing  the  bur- 
den of  development  financing  which  I 
described  above,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  ability  of  the  United  States  to 
exercise  control  over  the  activities  of 
these  institutions,  on  the  other.  A 
major  objective  of  our  participation  in 
these  institutions  has  been  to  transform 
what  was  once  a  predominantly  U.S. 
aid  effort  into  a  broadly  shared  one. 
We  have  succeeded  in  this  objective. 
But  in  these  institutions,  voting  power 
is  linked  to  contributions.  Thus,  in- 
evitably, as  our  share  in  these  institu- 
tions' resources  has  declined,  our  vot- 
ing power  and  our  ability  to  influence 
their  activities  has  too.  As  their  con- 
tributions rise,  the  objectives  of  other 


40 


Department  of  State  BulU 


donors  must  be  taken  increasingly  into 
account. 

Luckily,  within  these  institutions  a 
broad  consensus  exists  on  both  the  aim 
of  development  and  the  means  to  at- 
tain it.  This  allows  their  work  to  go 
forward  to  the  benefit  of  all  despite 
their  broad  and  varied  membership. 
Our  bilateral  aid  program  is  com- 
pletely under  our  control  and  can  be 
used  just  as  we  wish  to  advance  pre- 
cisely defined  national  objectives. 

We  must  recognize  that  in  the  inter- 
national financial  institutions  we  can- 
not exercise  this  degree  of  control.  We 
have  at  our  disposal  other  diplomatic 
and  economic  measures  which  can  be 
used  to  ameliorate  problems  of  particu- 
lar concern  to  us.  But  to  exert  undue 
influence  on  these  intitutions  would  be 
inappropriate  and  encourage  others  to 
do  so  as  well.  I  believe,  moreover, 
that  this  lack  of  complete  U.S.  control 
is  more  than  offset  by  the  many  ways 
in  which  these  institutions  serve  broad 
U.S.  interests. 

The  second  issue  is  related  to  the 
first.  It  is  the  conflict  between  the  es- 
sentially apolitical  nature  of  these 
institutions — specifically  stipulated  in 
their  charters — and  introduction  of 
political  considerations  into  their  de- 
liberations with  resultant  damage  to 
their  ability  to  execute  their  functions 
objectively  and  efficiently. 

The  concept  underlying  their  non- 
political  character  was  that  these  in- 
stitutions' work  should  go  forward 
substantially  unaffected  by  the  kinds 
of  considerations  which  can  cause 
bilateral  aid  flows  to  grow  or  decline 
abruptly  as  the  warmth  of  bilateral  re- 
lations between  particular  donor  and 
recipient  waxes  and  wanes.  By  and 
large,  separation  of  politics  from  eco- 
nomics in  these  institutions  is  a  con- 
cept which  has  served  both  the  United 
States  and  the  people  of  the  develop- 
ing countries  well. 

Last  year  restrictive  legislation  was 
introduced  in  the  Congress  which 
would  have  "earmarked"  our  contri- 
butions; that  is,  prohibited  the  institu- 
tions from  using  them  in  certain  coun- 
tries or  for  certain  projects.  The 
institutions  made  clear  to  us — the 
World  Bank  in  writing,  the  others 
orally — that  they  could  not  and  would 
not  accept  funds  under  those  condi- 
tions. 

Had  such  legislation  been  enacted, 
and  had  the  institutions  accepted  the 
funds,  this  would  have  marked  the 
first  step  in  the  outright  politicization 
of  these  institutions.  Other  countries, 
which  as  noted  above  are  increasingly 
important  contributors,  might  follow 
suit  and  the  restrictions  which  they 
might   impose  could  be  repugnant  to 


EUROPE:        Belgrade  Review 
Meeting  Concludes 


STATEMENT  BY 
AMBASSADOR  GOLDBERG' 

I  wish  to  thank  our  Yugoslav  hosts 
for  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
provided  for  us  at  this  conference.  The 
Secretariat — under  the  able  direction 
of  Ambassador  Bozinovic,  the  Yugo- 
slav delegation,  and  the  Government 
and  people  of  Yugoslavia — expended 
every  effort  to  make  our  conference  a 
success.  I  wish  particularly  to  express 


appreciation  to  His  Excellency,  Ait 
bassador  Pesic.  His  constant  steadfa:; 
ness  and  determination,  even  when  0| 
work  was  in  its  most  difficult  houii 
was  an  inspiration  to  all  of  us.  It  is 
source  of  gratification  to  the  Americ  i 
delegation  that  President  Tito  is  th| 
very  week  [March  6-9]  in  the  Unit| 
States  where  President  Carter  is  col 
veying  to  him  his  personal  apprecil 
tion  for  the  uniquely  constructive  re 
that  Yugoslavia  has  played  not  only 


the  United  States.  Clearly,  to  start 
down  this  path  runs  the  risk  of  great 
damage  to  future  U.S.  participation  in 
these  institutions,  to  the  institutions 
themselves,  and  to  the  global  de- 
velopment effort. 

We  must  accept  the  fact  that  these 
institutions  will  occasionally  act  in  a 
way  which  we  would  not  desire.  This 
is  the  price  we  must  pay  for  the  many 
benefits  we  derive  from  them.  Rather 
than  enacting  restrictive  legislation, 
the  Administration  and  the  Congress 
should  consult  closely  to  determine 
those  issues  relevant  to  these  institu- 
tions which  are  of  greatest  interest  to 
the  United  States.  Then,  even  in  the 
absence  of  legislative  requirements 
that  we  do  so,  the  Administration 
would  work  with  management  and 
other  members  of  these  institutions  to 
advance  these  important  goals. 

For  instance,  with  respect  to  human 
rights,  we  have  opposed  loans  by  these 
institutions  to  countries  with  serious 
human  rights  problems  unless  those 
loans  will  clearly  serve  basic  human 
needs.  We  are  consulting  with  man- 
agement and  with  other  members  to 
build  support  for  our  human  rights 
policies. 

We  have  encouraged  these  institu- 
tions to  channel  more  of  their  re- 
sources to  projects  serving  basic 
human  needs,  and  there  has  been  sub- 
stantial movement  in  this  direction. 
For  instance,  over  the  years  1973-76 
IBRD-IDA  loans  to  the  five  sectors 
most  likely  to  impact  on  basic  human 
needs — agriculture  and  rural  develop- 
ment, education,  population  and  nutri- 
tion, urbanization,  and  water  supply 
and  sewerage — averaged  39%  of  total 
IBRD-IDA  lending.  Lending  in  these 
sectors  is  projected  to  comprise  52% 
of  IBRD-IDA  lending  in  FY  1978. 

This  year  we  will  be  engaged  in  re- 
plenishment negotiations  affecting  the 


IBRD  and  each  of  the  regional  bank, 
We  will  want  to  consult  closely  wi  t 
the  Congress  in  the  process  of  for 
mulating  our  negotiating  positions.    | 
due  course  we  will  seek  from  yc;: 
legislation  authorizing  our  particip  ; 
tion  in  these  replenishments,  which  a 
necessary  if  the  banks  are  to  contini  i 
to  play  their  essential  role  in  the  w«ij 
we  envisage. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  like  to  rei  i 
erate  the  foreign  policy  significance  ■ 
our  continued  strong  support  for  tl  I 
international  development  lending  i 
stitutions.  This  support  represents  I 
major  part  of  our  foreign  progran  I 
which  are  designed  to  respond  to  thv 
legitimate  concerns  of  the  developirn 
nations — nations  of  great  econom 
and  political  importance  to  the  Unite  i 
States.  These  institutions  serve  U.5 
interests  in  many  ways,  in  particuM 
by  promoting  economic  developmei; 
abroad  and  the  growth  of  the  worl| 
economy  in  ways  which  benefit  th| 
United  States.  Our  support  allows  uj 
to  maintain  our  influence  within  thes 
institutions  and  facilitates  U.S.  lead i 
ership  in  a  broader  North-Sout ; 
dialogue  along  lines  more  acceptabli 
to  us. 

Strong  U.S.  support  of  these  institii' 
tions  will  continue  to  be  a  major  goat 
of  the  Carter  Administration.  I  urg; 
you  and  your  congressional  colleague  | 
to  join  the  Administration  in  providin; 
this  support.  C 


Based  on  statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Development  Institutions  am, 
Finance  of  the  House  Committee  on  Banking 
Finance  and  Urban  Affairs  on  Feb.  2H,  1978 
The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  bi 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  aval/' 
able  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.' 
U.S.    Government  Printing  Office.    Washing 
ton,  DC.  20402.  Mr.  Cooper  is  Under  Secre-\ 
tary  for  Economic  Affairs. 


1978 


41 


}1  Belgrade  meeting  but  in  the  entire 
■cess  of  building  security  and  coop- 
fltion  in  Europe.2 

I  consider  it  appropriate  in  this  final 
Aement  to  express  frankly  the  views 
>  the  U.S.  Government  on  the  Bel- 
ide  meeting  and  on  the  Conference 
a  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
BCE)  process  that  was  begun  in  Hel- 
~iki  and  will  continue  in  Madrid  and 
■reafter. 

i  The  Belgrade  meeting  of  the  Con- 
isnce  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
■rope — the  first  formal  sequel  to  the 
ilsinki  summit — is  now  at  its  end.  In 
I  judgment  of  the  delegation  of  the 
tited  States,  the  meeting  has  fulfill- 
1  its  basic  mandate  and  although  it 
I;  been  difficult,  it  has  also  been 
s  cessful. 

n  these  past  months — with  the  sup- 
jit  of  our  gracious,  patient  Yugoslav 
■  its  and  through  the  conscientious  ef- 
f  ts  of  the  delegates — our  meeting 
I;  confirmed  the  vitality  of  the  Hel- 
9'ki  concept.  Belgrade  has  tested  the 
v  idity  and  flexibility  of  the  CSCE 
pcess.  It  has  not  been  an  easy  pas- 
■:;e,  but  we  have  delineated  the  scope 
c  that  process  and  added  to  its  depth. 
j)st  important  of  all,  we  have  given 
cr  commitment  to  preserving  the 
pcess  and  to  making  its  growth  our 
c  nmon  enterprise. 

We  have  had  the  exchange  of  views 
t  which  the  Final  Act  mandates  on 
I:  implementation  of  its  provisions 
id  on  the  prospects  for  improved 
I  itual  relations.3  We  have  spoken  our 
en  minds  and  have  heard  out  the 
(inions  of  those  who  differ  from  us. 
]  doing  so,  we  have  been  able  to 
like  a  sober  assessment  of  past  ac- 
<mplishments,  continuing  shortcom- 
i  ngs.  and  future  challenges.  We  have 
Breed  to  continue  this  discourse  bilat- 
ii  ally  and  in  Madrid  in  1980. 
I  The  United  States  has  always 
''ewed  the  fulfillment  of  Final  Act 
i  mmitments  as  part  of  a  gradual  but 
«;adily  advancing  process  of  bridging 
|e  East-West  divide,  of  extending  the 
Inefits  of  security  and  cooperation 
) roughout  Europe  —  including  of 
l)urse  Berlin.  The  contribution  of 
ISCE  has  been  to  engage  35  states — 
Ifferent  in  size  and  system,  history 
wd  outlook — in  that  vital  effort.  The 
l>le  of  the  Belgrade  meeting  has  been 
i  deepen  that  engagement  and  to 
lake  specific  the  conduct  which  it 
iiitails. 

From  our  talks  has  emerged  a 
..earer  sense  of  the  tasks  before  us. 
o  country  can  be  allowed  to  single 
:ut  particular  sections  of  the  Final 
let  for  their  attention  while  ignoring 
Ithers.  Progress  in  the  area  of  human 
jghts  and  human  contacts  as  well  as 


disarmament  and  economic,  scientific, 
and  cultural  cooperation  are  inextrica- 
bly linked  together  in  the  Final  Act. 
The  significance  of  Final  Act 
implementation — and  of  the  Belgrade 
review  of  its  progress — lies  precisely 
in  combining  the  various  elements  of 
detente  in  a  coherent,  related  whole. 

Last  October  I  also  spoke  of  giving 
detente  a  humanitarian  face  and  a 
human  measure.4  That  has,  indeed, 
been  the  theme  of  this  conference.  For 
though  we  are  here  to  represent  gov- 
ernments, we  have  managed  to  address 
the  problems  of  people  as  well  as  of 
power.  We  have  weighed  the  claims  of 
individuals,  not  just  the  interests  of 
states. 

Thus  we  explored  the  promises 
made  at  Helsinki  to  respect  the  role  of 
the  individual  and  groups  in  monitor- 
ing the  implementation  of  the  Final 
Act;  to  heal  the   wounds  of  divided 


families;  to  facilitate  the  right  of  free 
emigration;  and  to  better  the  condi- 
tions in  which  scientists,  journalists, 
scholars,  and  businessmen  work. 
There  has  been  some  progress  in  some 
of  these  areas  but  not  nearly  enough 
and  regrettably  there  have  been  retro- 
gressions. 

The  favorable  resolution  of  such 
questions  in  the  days  to  come  will  do 
much  to  create  the  climate  of  openness 
in  which  detente  itself  will  flourish.  A 
detente  relationship  which  betters  the 
lot  of  individuals  and  smooths  contact 
between  them  is  also  certain  to  improve 
the  ties  between  the  states. 

Human  Rights 

Crucially,  of  course,  our  meeting 
dealt  at  length  with  the  question  of 
human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms.   Our  citizens'    freedom   of 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT 

The  President  on  March  3.  1978.  con- 
gratulated Justice  Goldberg  and  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Belgrade  review  confer- 
ence of  CSCE  on  their  successful  work  dur- 
ing the  past  few  months.  The  President  is 
particularly  gratified  that  the  delegation  has 
worked  in  close  harmony  with  the  U.S. 
[joint  congressional]  Commission  on  Secu- 
rity and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  chaired  by 
Representative  Fascell.  cochaired  by  Sena- 
tor Claiborne  Pell,  and  including  both  con- 
gressional and  Administration  members. 

The  United  States  has  achieved  its  basic 
goals  at  the  Belgrade  conference,  which 
will  conclude  its  work  next  week. 

•  We  conducted  a  full  and  frank  review 
of  the  implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  in  all  of  its  aspects.  This  included  de- 
tailed discussion  of  human  rights,  including 
specific  country-performance  and  individual 
cases.  Human  rights  has  now  been  firmly 
inscribed  as  a  legitimate  and  proper  concern 
on  the  agenda  of  international  discussion. 

•  We  maintained  unity  among  the  NATO 
allied  states. 

•  We  have  worked  with  other  nations  to 
insure  that  the  process  of  security  and  coop- 
eration in  Europe,  begun  at  Helsinki,  will 
continue  at  Madrid  in  2  years  time. 

•  We  took  all  of  these  steps  in  a  spirit  of 
seeking  to  enlarge  the  possibilities  for 
cooperation  among  all  the  35  states  repre- 
sented at  Belgrade,  and  we  will  agree  to  the 
final  document  only  to  permit  this  process 
to  continue. 

Following  the  achievement  of  these  basic 
goals  at  CSCE.  we  also  presented,  with  our 
allies,  a  number  of  specific  new  proposals, 
designed  to  make  more  effective  the  im- 


plementation of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  Re- 
grettably, the  Soviet  Union  was  not  pre- 
pared to  engage  in  a  serious  discussion  of 
new  proposals,  leading  to  agreement  among 
the  35  states  taking  part.  Nor.  under  the 
consensus  procedure  followed  at  Belgrade, 
was  the  Soviet  Union  prepared  to  agree  to  a 
final  document  that  would  take  note  of  the 
full  review  of  implementation — including 
human  rights — that  was  the  centerpiece  of 
the  conference. 

We  regret  that  the  Soviet  Union  failed  to 
permit  the  conference  to  proceed  to  its 
proper  conclusion.  We  intend  to  press  the 
Soviet  Union  to  fulfill  its  commitment  to  re- 
spect human  rights,  to  fulfill  the  Helsinki 
process,  and  to  adhere  to  the  final  Helsinki 
act  itself.  The  Soviet  refusal,  under  the  con- 
sensus procedure,  to  accept  a  full  final 
document  in  no  way  detracts  from  the  suc- 
cess of  the  conference  in  conducting  a  full 
review  of  implementation,  especially  in  the 
area  of  human  rights.  What  has  been  done 
cannot  be  ignored,  whether  or  not  the  Soviet 
Union  is  prepared  to  see  it  recognized  in  a 
formal  document. 

We  will  continue  to  build  on  the  success 
that  the  Belgrade  conference  as  a  whole  rep- 
resents. During  the  period  between  now  and 
the  Madrid  meeting,  we  will  continue  our 
efforts  to  promote  implementation  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act.  We  will  work  closely 
with  our  allies,  and  with  the  European 
community,  in  that  process. 

And  at  Madrid,  we  will  renew  the  process 
of  review,  seeking  always  to  raise  the  inter- 
national standard  of  behavior,  in  all  aspects 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  particularly  in 
the  area  of  human  rights. 


Issued  Mar.  J.  1978  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Mar.  6). 


42 

thought,  conscience,  religion,  or  be- 
lief; their  ability  to  exercise  their  civil 
rights  effectively — individually  or  in 
groups — raised  sensitive  issues  at  Bel- 
grade. Their  sensitivity  was  part  of 
their  significance.  Our  meeting  was 
the  first  to  put  those  questions  promi- 
nently and  legitimately  into  the 
framework  of  multilateral  East-West 
diplomacy. 

That  idea  is  a  powerful  one,  and  at 
Belgrade  it  has  won  powerful  support. 
It  has  also  aroused  strong  opposition. 
We  have  heard  the  contention  that 
human  rights  are  purely  internal  af- 
fairs, that  to  discuss  their  observance 
in  another  nation  is  to  violate  that  na- 
tion's sovereignty,  to  interfere  in  mat- 
ters that  are  no  outsider's  concern. 

The  Final  Act  refutes  that  reason- 
ing. The  Belgrade  meeting  has  made  it 
untenable.  By  virtue  of  Principle  VII, 
human  rights  are  direct  concerns  of  all 
Final  Act  signatories.  Under  the  terms 
of  the  U.N.  Charter,  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  the 
international  covenants — as  well  as  the 
Final  Act — they  are  the  subject  of  in- 
ternational undertakings.  They  are 
then,  without  question,  the  proper  sub- 
ject of  the  diplomatic  examination  and 
debate  we  have  had  in  Belgrade.  And 
they  will  remain,  after  Belgrade,  the 
proper  focus  of  continuing  comment 
and  efforts. 

For  the  pursuit  of  liberty  is  an  un- 
ending enterprise  for  man,  the  surest 
guarantee  of  this  security  and  of 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


peace.  What  the  Final  Act  obliged  us 
all  to  pursue  is  what  Aleksandr 
Pushkin  defined  long  ago  as  a  better 
kind  of  freedom.  That,  he  wrote,  is 
the  freedom  not  to  bow  your  consci- 
ence, thought,  or  neck  to  rank  or 
power.  That  concept  of  individual  dig- 
nity is  still  the  vision  offered  us  by  the 
Final  Act,  the  vision  all  of  us  pledged 
to  respect  and  promote. 

We  know,  however,  that  not  all  of 
us  have  fulfilled  that  pledge  in  full  or 
in  good  faith.  The  American  delega- 
tion has  spoken  forthrightly  at  Bel- 
grade of  the  broken  and  unfulfilled  prom- 
ises of  Principle  VII  and  basket  3. 
We  have  expressed  our  concern  and 
our  regret  and — at  times — our  outrage 
at  the  incidents  which  have  occurred 
in  direct  contravention  of  the  Final  Act 
and  in  profound  disregard  of  its  provi- 
sions in  the  area  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms. 

Our  meeting  could  not  overlook 
such  episodes,  especially  when  unwar- 
ranted repression  is  directed  against 
men  and  women  whose  only  offense 
seems  to  be  that  they  have  merely 
sought  to  monitor  or  enforce  or  im- 
plement the  provisions  and  the  prom- 
ises of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  Their 
activity  is  encouraged  by  the  Final 
Act.  It  needs  to  be  protected,  not 
punished. 

Similarly,  in  our  review  of  im- 
plementation, we  could  not  gloss 
over — and  cannot  now — the  plight  of 
men  and  women  persecuted  for  their 


CSCE 

Semiannual  Report 


Department  Statement 

On  behalf  of  President  Carter,  Secre- 
tary Vance  on  December  5,  1977, 
transmitted  to  Representative  Dante  B. 
Fascell,  chairman  of  the  joint  congres- 
sional Commission  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe,  the  third 
semiannual  report  on  implementation 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.1 

These  semiannual  reports  are  re- 
quired under  provisions  of  Public  Law 
94-304,  which  established  the  CSCE 
Commission.  Under  this  law,  the  State 
Department  is  required  to  monitor  im- 
plementation of  the  Final  Act  inde- 
pendently of  any  other  CSCE  discus- 
sions which  may  be  taking  place,  such 
as  the  follow-up  meeting  which  is  now 
underway  in  Belgrade.  The  judgments 
in  the  report  are,  therefore,  based  on  an 
analysis  of  the  report  during  the  past  6 
months  and  are  not  the  result  of  discus- 


sions  which  have   taken   place   in 
Belgrade. 

However,  as  the  report  points  out, 
the  most  important  development  related 
to  CSCE  during  the  reporting  period 
was  the  beginning  of  the  first  CSCE 
follow-up  meeting  in  Belgrade.  The 
Belgrade  meeting  cannot  be  fully  as- 
sessed until  it  has  concluded,  but  the 
introductory  chapter  of  this  report  pro- 
vides an  overview  of  our  objectives  and 
describes  some  major  developments  so 
far.  □ 


Made  available  to  the  press  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III  on  Dee  5.  1977. 
1  Single  copies  of  the  full  text  of  the  "Third 
Semiannual  Report  to  the  Commission  on  Secu- 
rity and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  June  1- 
December  1.  1977"  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Correspondence  Management  Division,  Office 
of  Public  Communication.  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Washington,  DC. 
20520. 


religious  beliefs  and  for  trying  to  pt 
those  beliefs  on  to  their  children.  N 
can  we  be  silent  now — or  in  the  i 
ture  —  when  numbers  of  ethn 
minorities  are  denied  their  equalit 
particularly  in  their  efforts  to  preser 
the  language  and  culture  which  are  t 
sential  to  their  special  identity. 

We  cannot  pretend  that  such  que 
tions  are  irrelevant  to  the  implement 
tion  of  the  Final  Act,  intrusive  at  tl 
meeting  and  injurious — if  discussed 
to  the  development  of  detente.  We  li 
in  the  real  world,  not  one  of  mak 
believe.  We  cannot  make  our  world 
better  one  if  we  turn  a  blind  eye  to 
faults. 

Those  faults — just  as  much  as  o 
accomplishments  and  opportunities 
were  the  legitimate  subject  of  the  B< 
grade  review.  That  review  dealt  pr 
ductively  with  real  shortcomings 
Final  Act  implementation  so  that  frc 
our  examination  we  could  each  and  , 
move  to  remedial  action. 

That  action  is  still  required  of  u 
Unfortunately,  it  is  not  detailed  in 
meeting's  concluding  document, 
reason  is  plain.  Consensus  was  deni 
and  this  I  profoundly  deplore. 

Efforts  to  squelch  the  truth  at  B 
grade  or  at  home  will  not  change  t 
truth.   And  they  will  not  deflect  t 
United  States  from  insisting  that  c 
dor  is  as  important  to  the  healthy 
velopment  of  international  confide 
as  is  respect  for  sovereign  equality 
individuality. 

Candor  and  respect  must  be  cor 
panion  elements  in  the  pursuit  of  sec 
rity  and  cooperation.  The  foundatit 
laid  down  in  the  Final  Act 
augmented  by  the  record  made 
Belgrade — enables  us  to  build  an  ev 
firmer  structure  of  detente.  Our  fit 
priority  —  always  our  overridir 
challenge — remains  simply  to  impl 
ment  the  Final  Act  in  all  of  its  pai 
to  do  so  in  good  faith  and  with  appn 
priate  speed.  The  initial  pace  is  not 
important  as  the  fact  of  continuity 
forward  movement. 

From  Belgrade,  the  United  States  ii 
tends  to  move  forward.  My  counti 
has  had  its  performance  questions 
here  and  some  of  the  questioning  h; 
been  constructive.  It  will  aid  my  coui 
try  to  improve  its  record.  I  wish  othei 
were  of  equal  mind. 

My  delegation  has  also  taken  carefi 
note  of  the  thoughtful  ideas  advance 
by  many  delegations  for  action  cor 
sonant  with  the  thrust  and  spirit  of  th 
Final  Act.  Some  such  proposals  can  b 
set  in  motion  by  unilateral  action 
many  can  be  refined  and  readied  fo 
decision  in  Madrid.  The  United  State 
is  prepared  to  participate  construe 
tively  in  such  enterprises. 


ril  1978 


43 


1  litical  Cooperation 

'We  especially  value  CSCE  as  a 
Mmework  for  increasing  political  in- 
Jcourse  among  all  participating 
■tes.  The  many  and  varied  specific 
■wisions  of  the  Final  Act  provide  a 
»;h  content  for  this  commerce.  The 
||ited  States,  in  its  efforts  to  deepen 
-lineal  relations  with  all  CSCE 
■tes,  will  contine  to  work  to  translate 
tit  potential  into  reality. 
In  the  area  of  confidence-building 
rasures,  for  example,  we  have  al- 
ridy  seen  in  practice  how  states  can 
tild  from  the  language  of  the  Final 
/t  to  implement  its  spirit.  In  notify- 
ii;  smaller  scale  maneuvers,  in  mak- 
i>  notifications  amply  informative, 
jd  in  affording  observers  good  over- 
I  views  of  maneuvers,  some  states 
Ive  set  an  example  others  can  pro- 
<ctively  emulate.  Such  experience 
is  been  constructive;  it  remains  to  be 
f  plied  to  major  troop  movements.  In 
ineral,  moreover,  we  can  all  think 
jesh  about  ways  of  "developing  and 
i  larging  measures  aimed  at 
lengthening  confidence,"  a  possibil- 
j  the  Final  Act  explicitly  sets  before 
I .  Although  CSCE  was  not  conceived 
I  a  forum  for  negotiating  disarma- 
::nt.  we  have  all  recognized  the  im- 
]tus  it  can  give  to  that  vital  process. 

onomic  Cooperation 

Further,   in  the  field  of  economic 
d  commercial  cooperation,  our  frank 
scussions  have  reinforced  the  aware- 
j'SS  of  the  need  to  reduce — indeed, 
rough  mutual  action,  to  eliminate — 
isting  impediments  to  trade.  The  po- 
ntial  for  cooperation  in  this  field  is 
jeat,  and  the  United  States  is  fully 
epared  to  explore  the  many  pos- 
Dilities  for  productive  unilateral  and 
ciprocal  action.  In  such  an  endeavor, 
course,  other  states  must  also  en- 
age  in  expanding  the  flow  of  timely 
id  accurate  economic  information  on 
hich  close,   broadened  contacts 


Letter 
of  Credence 


On  February  15,  1978,  the  follow- 
hg  newly  appointed  Ambassador  pre- 
|ented  his  credentials  to  President 
parte  r: 

.Bulgaria  —  Konstantin      Nicolov 
J   Grigorov  □ 


among  traders  and  investors  so  heavily 
depend. 

If  the  Belgrade  meeting  has  aided 
the  flow  of  people,  it  has  yet  to  make 
a  similar  impact  on  the  transmission  of 
information.  Too  many  Eastern  states 
continue  to  impede  access  to  what 
many  of  their  citizens  want  to  read  and 
see  and  hear. 

Finally  there  is  much  we  can  do  in 
bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation 
to  widen  the  range  and  improve  the 
quality  of  contacts  among  scientists 
and  scholars,  men  and  women  of  let- 
ters and  of  the  arts. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
be  especially  attentive  to  the  question 
of  human  rights.  We  are  greatly  con- 
cerned about  those  individuals  and  or- 
ganizations which  my  delegation  has 
mentioned  —  by  name  and  by 
country — in  the  course  of  our  discus- 
sions who  are  being  denied  their 
elementary  human  rights.  And  they  are 
by  no  means  the  only  ones.  The  list  of 
those  suffering  repression  is  far  too 
long.  And  their  fate  arouses  the  great- 
est anxiety.  Our  concern  is  not  limited 
to  one  country  or  one  set  of  individu- 
als. "Injustice  anywhere,"  said  Mar- 
tin Luther  King,  Jr.,  "is  a  threat  to 
justice  everywhere." 

The  Final  Act  enshrines  the  concept 
of  justice — not  privilege  or  power — 
ruling  the  affairs  of  men  and  the  rela- 
tions between  states.  The  Belgrade 
meeting  has  reaffirmed  that  central 
tenet  in  the  context  of  detente  in 
Europe.  Peace,  we  have  seen,  depends 
on  the  just  conduct  of  nations  to  each 
other  and  to  their  own  citizens. 

Helsinki  aroused  great  hopes.  In 
some  quarters  it  also  appears  to  have 
aroused  great  fear.  In  Belgrade  we,  on 
our  part,  have  attempted  forthrightly 
to  discuss  both  the  hopes  and  the  fears 
of  governments  and  peoples.  We  rec- 
ognize that  some  hopes  may  not  be  as 
high  as  they  might  have  been  when  we 
came  to  Belgrade.  But  we  have  always 
known  that  the  road  to  peace  and  secu- 
rity and  cooperation  is  a  long  and  ar- 
duous one. 

The  United  States  is  determined  to 
continue.  Between  now  and  at  Madrid 
and  thereafter  we  will  seek  to  further 
implementation  of  all  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Final  Act.  And  we  pledge  to  do 
all  in  our  power  to  keep  the  hopes  of 
Helsinki  alive. 


CONCLUDING  DOCUMENT5 

The  representatives  of  the  participating 
States  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
operation in  Europe,  appointed  by  the  Ministers 
of  Foreign  Affairs  of  these  States,  met  at  Bel- 
grade from  4  October  1977  to  8  March  1978  in 


accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Final  Act 
relating  to  the  Follow-up  to  the  Conference. 

The  participants  received  a  message  from  the 
President  of  the  Socialist  Federal  Republic  of 
Yugoslavia.  Josip  Broz  Tito,  and  were  ad- 
dressed by  Mr.  Milos  Minic.  Vice-President  of 
the  Federal  Executive  Council  and  Federal  Sec- 
retary for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Socialist  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Yugoslavia. 

Contributions  were  made  by  the  following 
non-participating  Mediterranean  States: 
Algeria,  Egypt,  Israel,  Lebanon,  Morocco, 
Syria  and  Tunisia. 

The  representatives  of  the  participating 
States  stressed  the  importance  they  attached  to 
detente,  which  has  continued  since  the  adoption 
of  the  Final  Act  in  spite  of  difficulties  and  ob- 
stacles encountered.  In  this  context  they  under- 
lined the  role  of  the  CSCE.  the  implementation 
of  the  provisions  of  the  Final  Act  being  essen- 
tial for  the  development  of  this  process. 

The  representatives  of  the  participating 
States  held  a  thorough  exchange  of  views  both 


I  »S.S.It. 


Department  Statement 

We  have  studied  with  interest  the 
reports  of  the  remarks  made  this  week 
by  President  Brezhnev  and  other 
Soviet  officials  on  the  present  state  of 
U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

President  Brezhnev's  positive  evalu- 
ation of  the  results  of  the  visit  by 
Politburo  member  Ponomarev  corre- 
sponds with  our  own  impression,  and 
we  are  pleased  that  the  Presidium  of 
the  Supreme  Soviet  desires  to  continue 
its  exchanges  with  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States. 

President  Brezhnev's  expressed  de- 
termination to  work  toward  a  prompt 
and  mutually  advantageous  SALT 
agreement  corresponds  with  our  own 
intentions,  and  we  believe,  as  he  does, 
that  such  an  agreement  can  be  an  im- 
portant step  toward  a  further  im- 
provement in  the  relations  between  our 
two  countries. 

It  is  evident  that  the  character  of  our 
general  relations  also  depends  upon  re- 
straint and  constructive  efforts  to  help 
resolve  local  conflicts,  such  as  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa.  Intervention  in  this 
tragically  embattled  area  by  the  con- 
tinued shipment  of  weapons  and  mili- 
tary personnel,  some  of  them  involved 
in  combat  roles,  inevitably  widens  and 
intensifies  hostilities  and  raises  the 
general  level  of  tension  in  the  world. □ 

Press  release  95  of  Feb.  27,  1978. 


44 

on  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Final  Act  and  of  the  tasks  defined  by  the  Con- 
ference, as  well  as,  in  the  context  of  the  ques- 
tions dealt  with  by  the  latter,  on  the  deepening 
of  their  mutual  relations,  the  improvement  of 
security  and  the  development  of  co-operation  in 
Europe,  and  the  development  of  the  process  of 
detente  in  the  future. 

The  representatives  of  the  participating 
States  stressed  the  political  importance  of  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Co-operation  in 
Europe  and  reaffirmed  the  resolve  of  their 
Governments,  to  implement  fully,  unilaterally, 
bilaterally  and  multilaterally,  all  the  provisions 
of  the  Final  Act. 

It  was  recognized  that  the  exchange  of  views 
constitutes  in  itself  a  valuable  contribution  to- 
wards the  achievement  of  the  aims  set  by  the 
CSCE,  although  different  views  were  expressed 
as  to  the  degree  of  implementation  of  the  Final 
Act  reached  so  far. 

They  also  examined  proposals  concerning  the 
above  questions  and  the  definition  of  the  ap- 
propriate modalities  for  the  holding  of  other 
meetings  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of 
the  chapter  of  the  Final  Act  concerning  the 
Follow-up  to  the  Conference. 

Consensus  was  not  reached  on  a  number  of 
proposals  submitted  to  the  meeting. 

In  conformity  with  the  relevant  provisions  of 
the  Final  Act  and  with  their  resolve  to  continue 
the  multilateral  process  initiated  by  the  CSCE, 
the  participating  States  will  hold  further  meet- 
ings among  their  representatives.  The  second  of 
these  meetings  will  be  held  in  Madrid  com- 
mencing Tuesday,  11  November  1980. 

A  preparatory  meeting  will  be  held  in  Madrid 
commencing  Tuesday,  9  September  1980,  to 
decide  on  appropriate  modalities  for  the  main 
Madrid  Meeting.  This  will  be  done  on  the  basis 
of  the  Final  Act  as  well  as  of  the  other  relevant 
documents  adopted  during  the  process  of  the 
CSCE. 

It  was  also  agreed  to  hold,  within  the 
framework  of  the  Follow-up  to  the  CSCE,  the 
meetings  of  experts  of  the  participating  States 
indicated  below. 

In  conformity  with  the  mandate  contained  in 
the  Final  Act  and  according  to  the  proposal 
made  to  this  effect  by  the  Government  of  Switz- 
erland a  meeting  of  experts  will  be  convened 
at  Montreux  on  31  October  1978,  charged 
with  pursuing  the  examination  and  elaboration 
of  a  generally  acceptable  method  for  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes  aimed  at  complementing 
existing  methods. 

Upon  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  meeting  of 
experts  envisaged  in  the  Final  Act  in  order  to 
prepare  a  "Scientific  Forum"  will  take  place  in 
Bonn  starting  on  20  June  1978.  Representatives 
of  UNESCO  [U.N.  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural  Organization!  and  the  United  Nations 
Economic  Commission  for  Europe  shall  be  in- 
vited to  state  their  views. 

Upon  the  invitation  of  the  Government  ol 
Malta,  a  meeting  of  experts  on  the  Mediterra- 
nean will  be  convened  on  13  February  1979  in 
Valletta.    Its  mandate   will   be.   within  the 


Department  of  State  Bull- 


Visit  of 
Yugoslav  President  Tito 


■ii 
it 


President  Josip  Broz  Tito  of  Yugo- 
slavia made  a  state  visit  to  Washington 
March  6-9  to  meet  with  President  Car- 
ter and  other  government  officials. 
Following  is  a  joint  statement  issued  by 
the  White  House  on  March  9. ' 

During  the  visit,  President  Tito  met 
with  members  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives and  Senate.  The  talks  re- 
flected a  high  degree  of  interest  in  the 
legislative  bodies  of  both  countries  to 
promote  understanding  and  contacts  be- 
tween the  peoples  of  Yugoslavia  and 
the  United  States,  including  a 
broadened  exchange  of  political  lead- 
ers. President  Tito  also  met  with  other 
distinguished  Americans. 

The  two  Presidents  held  extensive 
and  useful  talks  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
regard,  candor,  and  friendship.  They 
agreed  that  the  significant  improvement 
in  bilateral  relations  over  the  past  year, 
marked  by  a  series  of  personal  mes- 
sages between  them  as  well  as  by 
high-level  visits  and  consultations, 
should  be  continued  and  deepened, 
building  upon  the  basis  of  mutual  re- 
spect which  the  United  States  and  the 


f 


Socialist  Federal  Republic  of  Yuj 
slavia  hold  for  each  other  as  equal, 
dependent,  and  sovereign  states.  Tr 
confirmed  that  the  principles  contair 
in  previous  joint  statements  ( Washit 
ton,  October  1971  and  Belgrade.  A 
gust  1975)2  have  been  tested  in  pract 
and  that  they,  together  with  the  prest 
statement,  constitute  the  basis  for  t 
veloping  relations  between  the  t' 
countries.  The  two  Presidents  cons 
ered  this  meeting  a  major  step  in  re 
forcing  the  already  strong  foundatic 
of  US-Yugoslav  relations.  The  vie 
of  the  two  sides  reflected  wide  areas 
agreement  on  the  issues  discussed. 

The  two  Presidents,  noting  the  de 
historical  and  cultural  ties  betwe 
their  peoples,  agreed  that  Americans 
Yugoslav  descent  have  played  a  maj 
role  in  strengthening  the  bonds 
friendship  and  understanding  betwe 
their  past  and  present  homelands. 

The  two  Presidents  noted  with  sat 
faction  that  economic  exchanges  b 
tween  their  two  countries  have  d 
veloped  positively,  but  agreed  th 
there  was  potential  for  substantial  adt 
tional  interchange.   While  approvi 


framework  of  the  Mediterranean  Chapter  of  the 
Final  Act,  to  consider  the  possibilities  and 
means  of  promoting  concrete  initiatives  for 
mutually  beneficial  co-operation  concerning 
various  economic,  scientific  and  cultural 
fields,  in  addition  to  other  initiatives  relating  to 
the  above  subjects  already  under  way.  The 
non-participating  Mediterranean  States  will  be 
invited  to  contribute  to  the  work  of  this  meet- 
ing. Questions  relating  to  security  will  be  dis- 
cussed at  the  Madrid  Meeting. 

The  duration  of  the  meetings  of  experts 
should  not  exceed  4-6  weeks.  They  will  draw 
up  conclusions  and  recommendations  and  send 
their  reports  to  the  Governments  of  the  par- 
ticipating States.  The  results  of  these  meetings 
will  be  taken  into  account,  as  appropriate,  at 
the  Madrid  Meeting. 

All  the  above-mentioned  meetings  will  be 
held  in  conformity  with  paragraph  4  of  the 
chapter  on  "Follow-up  to  the  Conference"  of 
the  Final  Act. 

The  Government  of  the  Socialist  Federal  Re- 
public of  Yugoslavia  is  requested  to  transmit 
the  present  document  to  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  United  Nations,  to  the  Director-General 
of  UNESCO  and  to  the  Executive  Secretary  of 


the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  : 
Europe.  The  Government  of  the  Socialist  Ft 
eral  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  is  also  requested 
transmit  the  present  document  to  the  govei 
ments  of  the  Mediterranean  non-participati 
States. 

The  representatives  of  the  participate 
States  expressed  their  profound  gratitude  to  t 
people  and  Government  of  the  Socialist  Fedei 
Republic  of  Yugoslavia  for  the  excellent  c 
ganization  of  the  Belgrade  Meeting  and  t 
warm  hospitality  extended  to  the  delegatio 
which  participated  in  the  Meeting. 


1  Statement  at  the  final  plenary  meeting 
the  CSCE  on  Mar.  8,  1978,  in  Belgrade.  Ar 
bassador  Arthur  J.  Goldberg  is  chairman  of  tl| 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  CSCE. 

2  For  text  of  joint  statement  issued  on  Mar 
following  the  meetings  between  Presidents  Ca 
ter  and  Tito,  see  p.  44. 

3  For  text  of  CSCE  Final  Act.  see  BulleTI 
of  Sept.  I.  1975,  p.  323. 

4  For  statement  by  Ambassador  Goldberg  . 
the  opening  plenary  session  on  Oct.  6,  197' 
see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  14.  1977,  p.  674. 

5  Issued  in  Belgrade  on  Mar.  8,  1978. 


ril  1978 


45 


in  balanced  nature  of  trade  between 
tf  two  countries,  they  emphasized  the 
fid  for  further  efforts  to  expand  its 
flume,  to  strengthen  industrial  coop- 
.|<tion,  to  promote  travel  and  tourism, 
fcencourage  joint  ventures  and  to  im- 
pi'Ve  opportunities  for  business  repre- 
situtives  to  work  in  both  countries. 
f|;  two  Presidents  expressed  their  ap- 
p  ciation  for  the  contribution  of  the 
Bited  States-Yugoslav  Economic 
ftancil  to  the  development  of  eco- 
■nic  relations  and  welcomed  the  es- 
Blishment  of  joint  economic/commer- 

■  working  groups  which  will  serve  to 
fjilitate  increased  trade  and  economic 
operation. 

The  two  sides  confirmed  their  mutual 
i^rest  in  the  free  flow  of  information 
fll  people  between  their  two  societies 
.1 1  endorsed  both  governmental  and 
«i-governmental  cultural  and  infor- 
ntion  exchange  programs  which  fur- 
Mr  this  goal.  In  addition  the  two 
(fi'sidents  agreed  that  greater  under- 
snding  by  the  general  public  of  each 
ls|  iety's  culture  and  social  develop- 

■  nt  would  be  beneficial.  They  af- 
f  ned  the  importance  of  scientific  and 
t1  hnological  cooperation  as  well  as 
e  :hanges  in  the  field  of  social  and 


®        National  capital 

Railroad 

Road 
+        International  airport 


0        25      50      75      100  Kilometer 


A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  99.000  sq.  mi    (about  two-thirds  (he 

size  of  California). 
Capital:  Belgrade  (pop.  845,000). 
Other  Cities:   Zagreb   (602.000),   Skopje 

(389.000).  Sarajevo  (292, 000), Ljubljana 

(258.000). 

People 

Population:  21.6  million  (1977  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  1%. 

Density:  207  per  sq.  mi. 

Ethnic  Groups:  40%  Serbs,  22<7<-  Croats, 
87t  Slovenes,  8%  Bosnian  Muslims  (re- 
garded as  a  separate  ethnic  group),  6% 
Macedonians,  6%  Albanians,  2%  Mon- 
tenegrin Serbs.  2%  Hungarians.  1%  Turks. 

Religions:  Eastern  Orthodox  (Serbian  and 
Macedonian),  Roman  Catholic,  Islam. 

Languages:  Serbo-Croatian,  Slovene, 
Macedonian,  Albanian,  Hungarian. 

Literacy:  85%. 

Life  Expectancy:  66  yrs. 

Government 

Official   Name:   Socialist  Federal   Republic 

of  Yugoslavia  (SFRY). 
Type:  Federal  Republic. 
Independence:  Dec.  1.  1918. 
Date  of  Constitution:  Feb.  1974. 
Branches:    Executive — President  (Chief  of 

State,  elected  to  unlimited  term).   Pre- 


mier (Head  of  Government  and  President 

of  the   Federal   Executive   Council); 

Cabinet   (Federal   Executive   Council). 

Legislative — bicameral   SFRY   Assembly 

(278  delegates).  Judicial — Constitutional 

Court. 
Political   Party:  League  of  Communists  of 

Yugoslavia. 
Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 
Administrative  Subdivisions:  6  republics,  2 

autonomous  provinces. 

Economy 

GNP:  $37.7  billion  (1976). 

Annual  Growth  Rate  (76/75):  3.7%. 

Per  Capita  GNP:  $1,752  (1976). 

Annual  Per  Capita  Growth  Rate  [of  GNP] 
(76/75):  2.7%. 

Agriculture:  Land — 33%  arable;  labor — 
48%;  products — corn,  wheat,  tobacco, 
sugar  beets. 

Industry:  Labor — 52%;  products — wood, 
processed  food,  nonferrous  metals. 
machinery,  textiles. 

Natural  Resources:  Bauxite,  timber,  anti- 
mony, chromium,  lead,  zinc,  asbestos, 
mercury,  cadmium. 

Trade:  Exports— $4. 9  billion  (1976): 
timber,  nonferrous  metals,  machinery 
and  metal  products,  textiles,  iron,  and 
steel.  Partners  —  U.S.S.R.  ,  Italy, 
F  R.G..  U.S.  Imports  —  $7 .4  billion 
(1976):  machinery  and  metal  products, 
chemicals,   textiles,    iron,   petroleum. 


steel.      Partners  —  F.R.G..      Italy. 

USSR..  Iraq. 
Official   Exchange   Rate:   Fluctuates  around 

18  dinars  to  US$1.00. 
Economic  Aid  Received:  Total — $5  billion 

(1945-76).    U.S.    only  — $2.9  billion 

(1950-67),   including  $700  million   in 

grant  military  assistance  (1951-59).  U.S. 

economic  aid  ceased  Jan.  1.  1967. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  its  specialized  agencies,  GATT, 
IBRD,  IMF,  IAEA.  CEMA  (observer 
status),  EEC,  OECD. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Yugoslavia:  President  of  the  Republic — 
Josip  Broz  Tito;  Federal  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs — Milos  Minic;  Ambas- 
sador to  the  U.S. — Dimce  Belovski. 

United  States:  Ambassador  Lawrence  S. 
Eagleburger. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's  Feb- 
ruary 1978  edition  of  the  Background 
Notes  on  Yugoslavia.  Copies  of  the  com- 
plete Note  may  be  purchased  for  50t  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington, 
DC.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  allowed 
when  ordering  100  or  more  Notes  mailed 
to  the  same  address). 


46 


physical  sciences,  education,  culture, 
and  information  and  pledged  to  develop 
them  further. 

Presidents  Carter  and  Tito  examined 
major  international  issues.  They  de- 
voted special  attention  to  questions  of 
peace  and  security  in  the  world  and  to 
the  promotion  of  international  coopera- 
tion. They  affirmed  the  necessity  of  ex- 
tending the  policy  of  the  reduction  of 
tensions  to  all  regions  of  the  world  and 
all  areas  of  international  relations  and 
of  ensuring  an  opportunity  for  all  coun- 
tries to  contribute  to  the  resolution  of 
current  world  problems  and  to  the 
strengthening  of  peace  and  security. 
They  underlined  in  particular  that  all 
countries  should  seek  to  resolve  dis- 
putes by  peaceful  means  and  should 
deal  with  each  other  on  the  basis  of 
equality. 

They  also  affirmed  that  the  right  of 
all  states  to  determine  their  own  social 
systems  without  outside  interference 
must  be  respected  and  that  relations 
among  states,  regardless  of  differences 
or  similarities  in  their  social,  political, 
and  economic  systems,  must  be  based 
on  the  spirit  and  principles  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter. 

Presidents  Carter  and  Tito  agreed 
that  nonalignment  is  a  very  significant 
factor  in  world  affairs.  They  share  the 
view  that  the  nonaligned  countries  can 
and  should  make  an  active  contribution 
to  the  resolution  of  international  prob- 
lems and  to  the  more  favorable  evolu- 
tion of  international  relations.  Presi- 
dent Carter  reaffirmed  the  respect  of 
the  United  States  for  Yugoslavia's 
commitment  to  nonalignment  and  for 
the  role  Yugoslavia  plays  in  that 
movement. 

President  Tito  welcomed  the  steps 
taken  by  the  United  States  Government 
over  the  past  year  on  a  number  of 
long-standing  issues  of  concern  to  the 
nonaligned.  In  this  connection  Presi 
dent  Carter  thanked  President  Tito  for 
this  warm  message  of  support  for  the 
treaties  which  the  United  States  has 
negotiated  with  the  Republic  of 
Panama  concerning  the  future  status  of 
the  Panama  Canal.  President  Tito  real 
firmed  his  view  that  the  treaties  would 
serve  the  interest  of  peace  and  stability 
in  the  region  and  throughout  the  world. 

The  two  Presidents  reviewed  recent 
developments  and  pledged  renewed  ef- 
forts to  lower  the  barriers  to  under- 
standing and  contact  between  all 
peoples  of  Europe,  in  accordance  with 
their  common  aspirations.  In  this  re- 
gard, they  discussed  the  results  of  the 
Belgrade  Conference  and  agreed  that  it 
has  significantly  strengthened  the 
foundations  for  the  continuation  of 
multilateral  efforts  to  increase  security 
and  cooperation  in  Europe.  They  reaf- 


firmed their  commitment  to  the  success 
of  the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  process 
and  to  full  implementation  of  all  sec- 
tions of  the  Final  Act.  They  urged  all 
signatory  states  to  join  in  efforts  to 
achieve  full  implementation  in  order  to 
further  the  process  of  consultation  and 
contact  between  the  participating  coun- 
tries and  to  promote  mutual  understand- 
ing. They  pledged  continued  efforts  to- 
ward these  goals  in  the  period  leading  to 
the  next  Conference  in  Madrid  in  1980. 

Presidents  Tito  and  Carter  expressed 
their  special  concern  about  the  situation 
in  the  Middle  East  which  remains  a 
source  of  great  tension  in  international 
affairs.  They  agreed  on  the  urgent  need 
to  find  a  comprehensive,  just  and  last- 
ing solution  to  the  problems  of  the 
Middle  East  and  explained  in  detail 
their  respective  views  on  the  current 
situation. 

The  two  Presidents  also  agreed  that 
the  Ethiopia-Somalia  conflict  should  be 
resolved  by  peaceful  means,  taking 
account  of  the  need  to  respect  both  ter- 
ritorial integrity  and  the  legitimate 
aspirations  of  the  peoples  of  both  coun- 
tries, and  in  conformity  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Charter  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity  and  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  They  expressed 
their  belief  that  the  international  com- 
munity should  exert  greater  efforts  for 
securing  conditions  to  maintain  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity,  independence  and 
nonaligned  position  of  these  two 
countries. 

In  their  discussion  of  developments 
in  Southern  Africa,  the  two  Presidents 
expressed  support  for  the  legitimate  as- 
pirations of  the  African  peoples  to 
self-determination  and  majority  rule. 
They  condemned  racism  in  all  forms. 

The  two  Presidents  discussed  a  vari- 
ety of  aspects  of  human  rights  in  the 
contemporary  world  and  agreed  that  ef- 
forts toward  the  implementation  of 
human  rights  in  all  countries  should  be 
in  accord  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
and  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

Presidents  Carter  and  Tito  reviewed 
the  international  economic  situation 
with  particular  attention.  While  ap- 
proaching global  economic  problems 
from  different  perspectives,  they  rec- 
ognized their  gravity  and  stressed  the 
need  for  necessary  changes  in  world 
economic  relations  which  take  into  ac- 
count the  interests  and  equality  of  all 
countries.  They  noted  in  particular  the 
importance  of  increased  support  for  ac- 
celerated economic  development  for 
the  developing  countries  and  a  broader 
linkage  between  the  economies  of  the 
industrialized   and  developing  coun- 


H ' 
- 


J* 


i» 


Department  of  State  Bull.. 

tries.  They  emphasized  the  signif  icai 
of  the  global  economic  dialogue  a 
vital  element  in  fostering  cooperat 
between  the  industrialized  and  develi 
ing  countries,  which  is  an  indispen 
ble  precondition  for  the  settlement 
existing  economic  problems. 

The  two  Presidents  voiced  their  de  ;t 
concern  over  the  continuation  of 
arms  race,  which  renders  difficult 
solution  of  substantial  political,  a 
nomic,  and  other  problems  besetti 
mankind  today.  Both  governments  1  * 
lieve  that  durable  peace  in  the  world 
a  whole  can  only  be  assured  if  effect   f 
measures  are  undertaken  to  halt  I 
arms  race  and  to  take  concrete  steps 
nuclear  disarmanent  toward  the  u 
mate  goal  of  general  and  complete  d 
armament.  In  this  connection,  the  t 
Presidents  underscored  the  importar 
of  the  negotiations  on  strategic  ar 
limitations,  mutual  and  balanced  foi 
reductions  in  Central  Europe  and 
other  efforts  to  limit  the  arms  ra 
They  also  stressed  the  importance 
the  forthcoming  special  session  of  i 
General  Assembly  of  the  United  r- 
tions  devoted  to  disarmament. 

The  two  Presidents  emphasized  I 
decisive  importance  of  the  developrm 
of  energy  for  the  economic  growth 
all  countries,  and  of  the  developi 
countries  in  particular,  and  they  belie 
therefore  that  nuclear  energy  for  peai 
ful  purposes  should  be  made  accessil 
to  all  countries  without  discriminatu 
The  two  Presidents  also  pointed  to  l 
danger  of  the  proliferation  of  nuch 
weapons  and  agreed  that  this  danj 
can  be  diminished  through  an  effect! 
reduction  of  existing  nuclear  arrr 
ments  and  through  the  development  a 
application  of  nuclear  energy  f 
peaceful  purposes  and  the  implemem 
tion  of  measures  in  accordance  with  t 
provisions  and  objectives  of  the  Trea 
on  [the]  Non-Proliferation  of  Nucle 
Weapons  and  other  internation 
agreements  within  the  framework 
the  International  Atomic  Enerj 
Agency. 

The  two  Presidents  observed  that  te 
rorism  is  a  common  scourge  of  the  i 
ternational  community,  and  they  agiw 
that  effective  measures  must  be  takt 
to  eliminate  this  senseless  threat 
people  throughout  the  world.  Preside 
Carter  specifically  condemned  the  vi. 
lence  directed  against  Yugoslavia  t 
terrorists  in  the  United  States  an 
pledged  his  government's  commitmei 
to  take  firm  measures  to  prevent  and  i 
prosecute  such  criminal  activity  whic 
is  against  the  interests  of  the  Unit 
States  and  of  good  United  States 
Yugoslav  relations. 

President  Carter  reiterated  the  cort 
tinuing  support  of  the  United  States  fc 


1978 


47 


independence,  territorial  integrity 

unity  of  Yugoslavia.   During  the 

[  it  was  stressed  that  good  relations 

cooperation  between  the  United 

bs  and  Yugoslavia  constitute  an  es- 

(ial  element  of  American  foreign 

;v  and  that  the  United  States  is  in- 

i>ted  in  a  strong  and  independent 

loslavia  as  a  factor  for  balance, 

le  and  stability  in  Europe  and  in  the 

Id. 

resident  Tito  extended  an  invitation 

resident  Carter  to  pay  an  official 

I  to  Yugoslavia.  The  invitation  was 

|:pted  with  pleasure.  □ 

ntroductory  paragraphs  omitted;  for  full 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
iments  of  Mar.  13,  1978.  For  an  exchange 
marks  between  President  Carter  and  Presi- 
Tito  at  the  welcoming  ceremony  on  the 
Ih  Lawn  of  the  White  House  and  for  an  ex- 
ge  of  toasts  on  Mar.  7.  see  Weekly  Com- 
ion  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  13, 
3  and  475  respectively, 
or  texts  of  joint  statements,  see  Bul- 
is  of  Nov.  22,  1971,  and  Sept    8,  1975. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS: 

Country  Reports 


Visit  of  Danish 

Prime  Minister 

J  firyensen 


rime  Minister  Anker  Jijirgensen  of 
nmark  made  an  official  visit  to 
Wshington  February  21-23  to  meet 
m  h  President  Carter  and  other  gov- 
e  ment  officials.  Following  is  the 
h'  of  the  White  House  statement  is- 
S  d  on  February  21 . 

President  Carter  met  with  Prime 
I  nister  Anker  J^rgensen  of  Denmark 
<  February  21  at  the  White  House.1 
'  e  two  leaders  reviewed  economic 
tnds  in  their  two  countries,  in  the 
'est  generally,  and  in  the  world, 
'ley  agreed  that  continued  close 

•  operation  among  the  industrial  de- 
ocracies  is  necessary  to  increase 

•  onomic  growth,  resist  protec- 
)nism,  and  work  toward  resolving 
obal  economic  problems.  The  two 
aders  emphasized  the  importance  of 
e  multilateral  trade  negotiations  in 
icouraging  freer  trade  to  promote 

I  derly  growth  in  both  developed  and 
lj:veloping  nations. 

■  Prime  Minister  J^rgensen  gave  the 
i resident  his  assessment  of  develop- 
ments affecting  the  European  Com- 

| unity,  including  the  direct  elections 
li  the  European  Parliament  and  the 

oplications  by  Greece,  Portugal,  and 


by  Mark  L.  Schneider 


Let  me  emphasize  that  we  are  en- 
gaged in  a  continuing  process  of  incor- 
porating protection  of  human  rights  as 
a  first  priority  in  the  design  and  con- 
duct of  our  foreign  policy.  It  is  within 
that  framework  that  the  1978  Country 
Reports  [on  Human  Rights  Practices] 
should  be  examined.'  We  are  deter- 
mined to  obtain  the  most  up-to-date 
and  accurate  picture  of  human  rights 
conditions  in  individual  countries.  That 
picture  is  vital  to  our  decisionmaking, 
and  we  are  sure  it  also  will  aid  the 
Congress  in  coming  to  its  own  judg- 
ments. The  reports  were  compiled  in 
fulfillment  of  the  requirements  of  Sec- 
tion 502B(b)  and  Section  116(d)(1)  to 
cover  those  countries  receiving  eco- 
nomic development  assistant  under  Part 
I  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of 
1961,  as  amended,  or  countries  which 
were  proposed  as  recipients  of  security 
assistance  for  fiscal  year  1979.  There- 
fore, there  are  many  countries  omitted 
from  the  country  reports,  among  them 
some  of  the  worst  violators  of  human 
rights. 

These  105  reports  were  compiled 
over  a  period  of  some  6  months  and  in- 


volved our  embassies  in  each  country, 
the  regional  bureaus,  and  a  series  of 
functional  bureaus,  including  the 
Bureau  of  Human  Rights  and  Humani- 
tarian Affairs.  The  reports  drew  on  in- 
formation which  the  Department  had  in 
its  possession  but  required  special  re- 
porting on  current  conditions.  To  a 
substantial  degree  we  intensified  the 
reporting  requirements  over  the  course 
of  the  year,  resulting  in  continuing  ef- 
forts to  improve  the  quality  of  these 
submissions. 

Field  comments,  public  information 
from  the  media,  findings  of  congres- 
sional committees,  reports  and 
documentation  from  international  non- 
governmental organizations  all  were 
used  in  the  preparation  of  these  reports. 
Numerous  visits  abroad  of  high-level 
Department  officials  have  proved  fruit- 
ful in  obtaining  firsthand  information. 
We  also  receive  a  steady  stream  of  vis- 
itors from  many  countries  who  share 
their  impressions  with  us. 

The  regional  bureaus  synthesized  the 
reports  from  the  field  and  their  drafts 
were  then  reviewed  and  commented 
upon  by  the  various  functional  bureaus. 
The  Bureau  of  Human  Rights  and  Hu- 
manitarian Affairs  collated  all  of  the 
reports  attempting  to  assure  that  all  rel- 


Spain  for  Community  membership. 
President  Carter  reaffirmed  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  European  unity  and 
support  for  the  European  Community, 
as  underscored  by  his  visit  to  EC 
headquarters  in  January. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter reaffirmed  the  shared  commitment 
of  their  nations  to  NATO  and  to  the 
defense  of  Western  Europe.  The  two 
expressed  satisfaction  at  the  progress 
the  allies  have  made  in  implementing 
the  measures  agreed  at  last  May's 
NATO  summit,  and  they  discussed 
the  forthcoming  NATO  summit,  this 
May  in  Washington.  They  noted  close 
U.S. -Danish  cooperation  in  NATO 
programs,  including  joint  production 
with  other  NATO  countries  of  the 
F-16  aircraft. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister 
exchanged  views  on  major  issues  in 
East- West  relations.  They  noted  the 
close  coincidence  in  the  positions  of 
their  two  governments  on  the  CSCE 
[Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 


tion in  Europe]  review  conference  in 
Belgrade,  and  the  President  praised 
the  role  of  the  EC-Nine  within  the 
broader  NATO  consultations.  They 
stressed  the  continuing  need  in  the  fu- 
ture for  similar  frank  and  detailed  re- 
views of  the  implementation  of  the 
entire  Helsinki  Final  Act,  including 
its  important  provisions  regarding 
human  rights  and  humanitarian  mat- 
ters. 

The  two  leaders  exchanged  views 
on  current  developments  and  pros- 
pects for  progress  in  the  Middle  East, 
southern  Africa,  and  Cyprus.  The  two 
leaders  also  agreed  on  the  need  to  re- 
duce arms  sold  by  all  weapons- 
producing  nations.  The  President  wel- 
comed Denmark's  participation  in  the 
International  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation. □ 


Opening  paragraph  omitted;  for  full  text,  see 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Feb.  27.  1978. 

1  The  Prime  Minister  is  also  current  Presi- 
dent of  the  European  Council. 


48 

evant  information  had  been  taken  into 
account  and  trying  to  see  that  the  vari- 
ous regions  treated  countries  in  an 
equally  balanced  and  comprehensive 
manner. 

1  can  assure  the  subcommittee  that 
many,  many  hours  were  spent  in  trying 
to  pull  together  these  varied  sources  of 
information  to  produce  these  reports. 
There  undoubtedly  will  continue  to  be 
constructive  and  vigorous  debate  and 
disagreement  over  specific  statements 
or  over  the  weight  given  to  one  or 


Unman  Rights 
Treaties 


On  February  23,  1978,  President 
Carter  sent  four  human  rights  treaties 
to  the  Senate  for  ratification.  The  first 
three,  all  negotiated  at  the  United  Na- 
tions, are: 

•  The  International  Convention  on 
the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Ra- 
cial Discrimination,  signed  by  Arthur 
J.  Goldberg,  then  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations, 
on  September  28,  1966; 

•  The  International  Convenant  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights,  signed  by  President  Carter  on 
October  5,  1977; and 

•  The  International  Convenant  of 
Civil  and  Political  Rights,  signed  by 
President  Carter  on  October  5,  1977. 

The  fourth  treaty  is  the  American 
Convention  on  Human  Rights,  signed 
by  President  Carter  on  June  1,  1977. 
Adopted  by  the  Organization  of 
American  States  in  1969,  it  is  open 
only  to  members  of  that  Organization. 

In  urging  a  rapid  consent  to  ratifi- 
cation. President  Carter  reminded  the 
Senate  that  although  the  three  U.N. 
treaties  have  entered  into  force  and 
are  widely  approved  by  the  world 
community,  the  United  States  remains 
one  of  the  few  major  countries  not 
party  to  them.  This  failure,  he  said, 
prejudices  U.S.  participation  in  the 
development  of  the  international  law 
of  human  rights.  Ratification  will  be 
a  positive  expression  of  the  U.S.  de- 
sire to  work  in  concert  with  other  na- 
tions to  promote  a  greater  respect  for 
human  rights. 

The  President's  letter  of  transmittal 
to  the  Senate  is  printed  in  the  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  February  27;  the  texts  of  the 
State  Department  reports  and  the  four 
treaties  are  printed  in  S.Ex.  C,  D,  E, 
and  F  of  February  23.  □ 


another  aspect  of  a  particular  country's 
practices. 


As  the  chairman  is  aware,  these  re- 
ports were  being  prepared  during  the 
process  in  which  decisions  as  to  the  FY 
1979  security  assistance  budget  pro- 
posal also  were  being  decided.  The  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs  [Patricia  M.  De- 
rian]  is  a  member  of  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Board,  which  considers  all  as- 
pects of  the  U.S.  arms  transfers  policy. 
In  addition,  as  a  member  of  the  Secu- 
rity Assistance  Advisory  Group  which 
is  charged  with  advisory  respon- 
sibilities in  the  area  of  security  assist- 
ance proposals,  the  bureau  raised 
human  rights  questions  about  indi- 
vidual countries.  These  questions  were 
considered  along  with  other  U.S.  na- 
tional interests. 

It  should  be  emphasized  that  the 
process  of  review  of  the  security  assist- 


] 


Department  of  State  Bull 


ance  program  has  extended  throughB 
the  Department  so  that  proposals  i 
forward  by  country  officers  of  gl 
graphic   bureaus  have,   for  the  ffl 
time,  systematically  and  uniformly  i- 
eluded  human  rights  considerations." 


/  [i  erpts  from  a  statement  before  the  Subco, 
lee  an  International  Organizations  of  the  H 
Committee  on  International  Relations  on  i 
15,  1978.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  D, 
merits,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  W 
ington,  DC.  20402.  Mr.  Schneider  is  De, 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
Humanitarian  Affairs . 

1  The  report,  submitted  to  the  House  Com 
tee  on  International  Relations  and  the  Se 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  is  a  j 
committee  print  dated  Feb.  3,  1978.  It  is  a' 
able  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docume 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washin; 
DC.  20402,  for  $4.25. 


MIDDLE  EAST:    1/.S.-I rati 
Joint  Commission 


Joint  Communique 

The  U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  for 
Economic  Cooperation  held  its  fourth 
session  in  Washington  on  February  28, 
1978.  The  Delegation  of  the  United 
States  was  headed  by  the  Honorable 
Cyrus  Vance,  Secretary  of  State,  and 
the  Iranian  Delegation  was  led  by  H.E. 
Mohammed  Yeganeh,  Minister  of  Eco- 
nomic Affairs  and  Finance.  High  offi- 
cials of  both  governments  also  took 
part  in  the  discussions. 

During  his  visit  to  Washington, 
Minister  Yeganeh  also  met  with  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  Michael  Blumen- 
thal  and  other  U.S.  officials  for  discus- 
sions on  a  broad  range  of  economic  and 
other  issues  of  mutual  interest. 

Minister  Yeganeh  and  Secretary 
Vance  reviewed  the  current  interna- 
tional economic  situation  and  discussed 
bilateral  matters  in  the  spirit  of  mutual 
respect  and  understanding  that  has  long 
characterized  U.S. -Iranian  relations. 
The  U.S.  side  noted  with  satisfaction 
Iran's  recent  efforts  to  apply  a  freeze 
on  oil  prices  during  1978,  and  assured 
Iran  of  the  U.S.  determination  to  meet 
its  long-term  energy  needs  by  promot- 
ing conservation  and  the  development 
of  alternate  sources  of  energy,  and  also 
to  take  effective  measures  in  curbing 
inflation  and  improving  the  interna- 
tional monetary  situation. 

The  two  sides  emphasized  the  impor- 


tance of  carrying  out  the  recommen 
tions  of  the  Conference  on  Inter 
tional  Economic  Cooperation  (CII 
and  agreed  to  pursue  the  posit 
dialogue  in  the  United  Nations  ov 
view  mechanism  established  by  Uni 
Nations  General  Assembly  Resolut 
32/174  of  December  1977. 

The  U.S.  side  expressed  its  apprec 
tion  for  Iran's  efforts  in  the  Econon 
and  Social  Council  of  the  United  > 
tions  to  conclude  an  internatior 
agreement  on  illicit  payments.  The  V 
sides  explored  possibilities  for  furtl 
cooperation  towards  this  end. 

The  Joint  Commission  meeting  ft 
lowed  several  days  of  preparato 
meetings  by  its  five  standing  joi 
committees,  each  of  which  had  pr 
pared  detailed  proposals  for  the  ft 
Commission's  consideration.  The  tv 
sides  reviewed  the  status  of  progress 
the  programs  approved  at  the  last  Joi 
Commission  meeting  in  Tehran  in  A 
gust  1976,  and  considered  the  recor 
mendations  for  cooperation  in  ne 
areas  offered  by  the  committees.  T 
Commission  concluded  that  there  is 
vast  scope  for  cooperation  between  Ir 
and  the  United  States  for  their  mutu 
benefit. 

Economy  and  Finance.  Both  sid 
reaffirmed  their  belief  that  the  potenti 
for  expansion  of  commercial  relatio 
between  the  two  countries  is  ve 
great.  They  registered  their  determin 


1978 


49 


n  to   work   towards  that  end   and 

cussed  ways  of  doing  so.    In   this 

nection  the  Iranian  Delegation  ex- 

ssed  Iran's   interest  in  being  made 

gible  for  the  U.S.  Generalized  Sys- 

of  Preferences,  which  it  considers 

portant  for  the  development  of  future 

de    relations    between    the     two 

ntries. 

he  Commission  agreed  that  cooper- 
on  in  development  of  various  fields 
industries,  such  as  chemical,  phar- 
iceutical,  engineering,  basic  metals, 
trochemicals,  transportation  equip- 
nt,  electronics,  and  other  industries 
Iran  will  be  greatly  facilitated  if  it 
solved  capital  participation  as  well  as 
ancing,  transfer  of  technology  and 
port  financing. 

Both  sides  noted  with  pleasure  the 
oad  range  or  cooperative  activities 
visaged  in  the  field  of  health,  includ- 
the  establishment  of  the  Imperial 
sdical  Center  of  Iran.  The  Commis- 
>n  expressed  particular  satisfaction 
t  the  two  countries  had  successfully 
operated  in  the  establishment  of  the 
od  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA) 
Iran. 

Housing.  The  Commission  noted  the 
iority  attached  by  Iran  to  the  de- 
lopment  of  middle  and  low  income 
using,  and  agreed  that  there  are  sig- 
ficant  opportunities  for  cooperation 
this  area. 

Transportation.  The  Commission 
scussed  cooperation  of  the  two  coun- 
es  in  the  field  of  transportation,  in- 
uding  construction  of  toll  roads  in 
in  and  expressed  satisfaction  at  the 
>nclusion  in  June  1977  of  a  technical 
rvice  agreement  between  the  U.S. 
;deral  Aviation  Administration  and 
e  Iranian  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
upgrade  the  air  traffic  control  system 
Iran. 

Energy.  The  two  sides  expressed 
itisfaction  over  the  recent  progress 
iwards    conclusion    of    a    bilateral 


Editor's  Note 

Material  concerning  the  Palestinian  ter- 
rorist attack  inside  Israel  on  March  1  1  and 
Israel's  retaliatory  military  action  inside 
southern  Lebanon,  as  well  as  the  text  of 
la  U.N.  Security  Council  resolution,  will 
be  published  in  the  May  issue  of  the 
Bulletin. 


Most  Favored  Nation  basis,  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  International  Atomic 
[Energy]  Agency  (IAEA)  safeguards 
and  the  objectives  of  the  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  for  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  United  States  in  the 
Iranian  nuclear  power  program. 

The  Commission  reviewed  the  recent 
cooperation  between  the  two  countries 
in  the  training  of  Iranian  nuclear  power 
engineers  and  discussed  possible  future 
programs  for  the  establishment  of  an 
export  refinery  in  Iran  and  exchange  of 
information  in  respect  to  enhanced  oil 
and  gas  recovery  technology,  as  well  as 
uranium  exploration  and  solar  energy 
training  and  application. 

Agriculture.  The  Commission 
agreed  to  encourage  further  coopera- 
tion between  the  private  sectors  of  the 
two  countries  in  agriculture. 

Both  delegations  expressed  satisfac- 
tion with  the  current  and  proposed 
training  and  consultancy  programs  in 
extension,  soya  and  cotton  production, 
forestry,  veterinary  services,  plant 
quarantine  and  data  collection. 

Manpower  and  Technical  Cooper- 
ation.   The    Commission    reviewed 


cooperation  between  the  two  countries 
in  the  field  of  manpower  and  technical 
cooperation  and  noted  with  satisfaction 
the  completion  of  joint  activities  in  vo- 
cational training,  manpower  statistics, 
audio-visual  techniques,  on-the-job 
training  and  expatriate  employment 
practices. 

Experts  of  the  two  sides  will  meet  in 
Iran  in  the  near  future  to  initiate  several 
cooperative  programs  in  technical  edu- 
cation, productivity  improvement,  data 
processing  and  vocational  training. 

Science,  Technology  and  Educa- 
tion. The  Commission  noted  progress" 
achieved  since  the  August  1976  meet- 
ing in  Tehran,  particularly  in  the  fields 
of  education,  oceanography,  meteorol- 
ogy, remote  sensing  application  and 
environment.  Proposals  for  future 
cooperation  in  educational  technology, 
geological  research,  earthquake  effects 
mitigation,  arid  lands  sciences  and  es- 
tablishment of  links  between  research 
laboratories  and  industry  were  wel- 
comed by  both  delegations.  □ 

Issued  Feb.  28,  1978  (text  /rum  press  release 
98  oj  Feb   28) 


NUCLEAR  POLICY: 

\oii-f*i'«f if <»!'«! ion   lei  of  1978 


Agreement  for  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Nuclear  Energy,  which  should  be 
signed  in  the  near  future.  It  is  antici- 
pated that  the  final  accord  will  open 
an  era  for  wide  collaboration  under  a 


Statement  by  President  Carter 

I  am  pleased  to  sign  into  law  today 
H.R.  8638.  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act  of  1978.  Enactment 
of  this  legislation  takes  us  a  major  step 
toward  fulfillment  of  an  objective 
which  the  United  States  shares  with 
other  nations — a  halt  in  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  capability  while  pre- 
serving the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear 
energy. 

The  Congress  has  responded  to  this 
challenge  with  both  care  and  courage  in 
establishing  a  framework  for  insuring 
that  we  meet  these  objectives.  Senators 
Ribicoff.  Glenn,  and  Percy;  Represen- 
tatives Zablocki.  Bingham,  and 
Findley;  their  collegues  on  the  commit- 
tees which  developed  this  bill;  and 
their  staffs  have  my  respect  and  my 
thanks  for  their  leadership  on  this  is- 
sue. It  has  been  a  privilege  for  me,  as  it 
has  been  for  Secretary  Vance  and  other 
members  of  my  Administration,  to 
work  with  them  on  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act  of  1978. 

Our  efforts  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  began  more  than  30 
years  ago,  when  we  went  to  the  United 
Nations  with  an  offer  to  place  certain 


aspects  of  nuclear  energy  under  inter- 
national ownership  and  control.  The 
passage  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of 
1954  and  the  adoption  of  the  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  by  the  United  Na- 
tions in  1968  and  now  this  law,  each 
has  moved  us  further  toward  attainment 
of  our  nonproliferation  goals. 

On  April  7  and  27  of  last  year,  I  out- 
lined the  policies  and  programs  which 
we  would  implement  to  diminish  pro- 
liferation risks.1  Today,  I  want  to 
reaffirm  this  Administration's  strong 
commitment  to  that  policy.  We  also 
recognize  that  nuclear  power  technol- 
ogies now  in  operation,  which  do  not 
involve  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing,  can 
and  must  provide  an  important  source 
of  energy  for  our  nation  and  for  other 
countries.  Our  current  once-through 
fuel  cycle  is  and  will  continue  to  be  a 
significant  contributor  to  our  energy 
supply.  Properly  managed,  it  can  func- 
tion without  increasing  the  risks  of  pro- 
liferation. Our  policy  takes  a  responsi- 
ble course  between  forgoing  the  energy 
benefits  of  nuclear  power  and  becom- 
ing committed  to  commercialized  use 
of  plutonium  before  we  know  that  we 
can  deal  safely  with  its  risks. 

I  continue  to  oppose  making  prema- 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulhi 


ture  and  unnecessary  commitments  to 
commercialization  of  the  fast  breeder 
reactor  and  reprocessing,  as  exem- 
plified in  the  United  States  by  the 
Clinch  River  and  Barnwell  projects. 

We  and  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  must  use  the  time  we  now  have 
and  pause  to  develop  safer  technol- 
ogies, better  institutional  arrange- 
ments, and  improved  safeguards  which 
will  permit  all  nations  to  achieve  their 
energy  objectives  while  preventing  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 

More  than  40  nations  have  already 
joined  with  us  in  an  International  Nu- 
clear Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  [INFCE] 
to  explore  and  assess  our  means  of 
meeting  these  twin  goals.  During  this 
period  of  examination,  the  uranium- 
fueled  reactors  now  in  widespread  op- 
eration can  be  used  without  incurring 
new  proliferation  risks.  If  our  common 
search  for  improved  institutions  and 
technologies  is  to  be  successful,  how- 
ever, all  nations  will  be  required  to 
avoid  those  steps  which  prejudice  the 
outcome  of  the  INFCE. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act 
sets  the  conditions  and  criteria  which 
will  govern  U.S.  cooperation  with 
other  nations  in  our  efforts  to  develop 
the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy.  The 
encouragement  of  universal  ratification 
of  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  is 
central  to  the  act,  as  is  the  establish- 
ment of  a  comprehensive  set  of  con- 
trols, including  application  of  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency 
safeguards  and  provision  of  a  stable 
framework  for  international  nuclear 
cooperation  and  commerce.  The  act 
will  also  make  our  export  licensing 
process  more  predictable. 

We  also  will  be  taking  steps  to 
strengthen  the  safety  and  security  of 
the  fuel  cycle  we  now  have  in  operation 
and  to  insure  that  it  continues  to  be  an 
efficient  and  reliable  source  of  energy, 
both  domestically  and  abroad. 

Over  the  course  of  this  year,  we  will 
develop  comprehensive  policies  for 
management  and  disposal  of  radioac- 
tive waste,  including  implementation 
of  the  spent  fuel  storage  program  an- 
nounced last  October.  To  insure  our 
ability  to  continue  as  a  reliable  supplier 
of  uranium  fuel  to  those  who  share  our 
nonproliferation  objectives,  we  are 
moving  ahead  with  a  new  enrichment 
plant  at  Portsmouth,  Ohio. 

Preventing  nuclear  proliferation  will 
not  be  easy — some  have  called  this  task 
impossible.  I  believe,  however,  that 
halting  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
is  imperative.  We  must  press  forward 
in  our  efforts.  Fear  of  failure  cannot  be 
allowed  to  become  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 

In  our  first  year,  we  have  made  sub- 


stantial progress.  The  nuclear- 
supplying  countries  have  agreed  upon 
and  published  guidelines  for  the  export 
of  nuclear  fuel  and  technology.  The  In- 
ternational Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evalua- 
tion is  underway.  As  this  legislation 
now  becomes  law,  we  are  establishing 
clear  criteria  and  incentives  for  nuclear 
cooperation,  as  well  as  sanctions 
against  violations  of  safeguards. 

Although  I  still  have  reservations 
about  the  numerous  provisions  in  this 
act  which  state  that  Congress  may  in- 
validate or  approve  executive  branch 
action  by  concurrent  resolution,  I  am 
signing  it  because  of  its  overwhelming 
importance  to  our  nonproliferation  pol- 
icy. I  do  wish  to  make  clear,  however, 
that  by  signing  this  act,  I  am  not  agree- 
ing that  the  Congress  can  overturn  au- 
thorized executive  actions  through 
procedures  not  provided  in  the 
Constitution. 

In  conclusion,  I  am  persuaded  that 
the  new  criteria,  incentives,  and  proce- 
dures in  this  act  will  help  solve  the 
problems  of  proliferation.  They  will 
help  to  insure  that  access  to  nuclear 
energy  will  not  be  accompanied  by  the 
spread  of  nuclear  explosive  capability. 
While  I  recognize  that  some  of  these 


provisions  may  involve  adjustments  , 
our  friends  abroad,   this  more  cell 
prehensive  policy  will  greatly  inert  I 
international  security.   I  believe  tt 
they  will  ultimately  join  us  in  our  -J 
lief  that  improved  world  securitv    j 
tifies  the  steps  which  we  all  must  ti 
to  bring  it  about.   Control  over   kj 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons   on  <■ 
planet  is  one  of  the   paramount  qui 
tions  of  our  time. 

If  the  world  is  to  benefit  from  ; 
great  potential  of  nuclear  power,  I 
must  act  now  to  protect  ourselves  ;J 
future  generations  from  its  worst  d  - 
gers.  We  in  the  United  States  v*l 
dedicate  our  expertise  and  technical  M 
sources  to  this  task,  and  we  urge  ot  r 
countries  to  do  the  same.  Let  us  cJ 
tinue  to  work  together  to  achieve  th>: 
goals. 


Made   on   signing   H  R.   8638  into   law  > 
Mar.  10.  1978  (text  from  Weekly  CompilaM 
of  Presidential   Documents  of  Mar.    13).   I 
enacted  H.R.  8638  is  Public  Law  95-242. 
proved  Mar.  10. 

'For  text  of  President  Carter's  April  7.  19  . 
statement,  see  Bulletin  of  May  2.  p.  429;  ! 
text  of  his  message  to  the  Congress  of  April  , 
see  Bulletin  of  May  16.  p.  477. 


Safeguanls  Agreement 


White  House  Announcement 

President  Carter  on  February  9  ful- 
filled a  10-year  U.S.  pledge  for  nu- 
clear safeguards  by  submitting  to  the 
Senate  for  ratification  a  treaty  with  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA)  [Agreement  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
for  the  Application  of  Safeguards  in 
the  United  States  of  America  with  at- 
tached Protocol  J.  The  treaty  would 
make  all  U.S.  nuclear  facilities,  ex- 
cept those  with  direct  national  security 
significance,  eligible  for  the  applica- 
tion of  safeguards  by  this  international 
Agency. 

Under  the  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty  (NPT),  the  99  non- 
nuclear-weapon-member  states  are  re- 
quired to  accept  IAEA  safeguards  on 
all  of  their  peaceful  nuclear  facilities. 
While  the  NPT  does  not  impose  this 
duty  on  nuclear-weapon  states,  the 
U.S.  voluntary  offer  to  enter  into  such 
a  safeguards  agreement  has  been  ex- 
tremely important  in  inducing  other  na- 
tions to  adhere  to  the  treaty.  U.S.  will- 


ingness to  accept  the  same  safegua  I 
as  the  NPT  requires  for  non-nude- 
weapon  states  is  tangible  evidence  U 
our  belief  that  the  NPT  does  not  dtl 
criminate  against  non-nuclear-wean 
states.  It  also  demonstrates  the  U  f 
conviction  that  the  application  of  int  I 
national  safeguards  neither  hampers  (I 
development  of  nuclear  power  nor  pis 
the  safeguarded  party  at  a  commerc 
disadvantage. 

This  offer  by  the  United  States  I 
bring  its  nuclear  facilities  not  havi 
direct  national  security  significan 
under  international  safeguards  was  fiilj 
made  on  December  2,  1967,  by  Pre; 
dent  Lyndon  Johnson.  It  has  been  e 
dorsed  by  all  succeeding  Administr 
(ions 

Upon  entry  into  force,  this  trea 
will  be  an  additional  signal  to  tl 
world,  including  both  nuclear  supplii 
and  recipient  nations,  of  our  continuir 
support  for  the  universal  application  < 
IAEA  safeguards  and  our  desire  that  a 
nations  adhere  to  the  Nuclear  Noi 
Proliferation  Treaty. 

The  safeguards  call  for  inventory  an. 
design  information  to  be  submitted  t 


>ril  1978 


51 


>unet 


OCEANS:     Antarctic  Resource 
ci ml  Environmental  Concerns 


Palsy  T.  Mink 


It  has  been  over  2'/2  years  since  our 
;t  testimony  on  Antarctic  resources 
fore  this  committee,  and  there  have 
en  important  developments  in  the 
erim.  Since  you  last  held  Antarctic 
arings  on  May  15,  1975,  the  Antarc- 
■  Treaty  countries  have  held  two 
gular  consultative  meetings,  the 
hth  and  ninth  in  1975  and  1977, 
d  two  extended  preparatory  meet- 
gs,  one  in  1976  dealing  with  mineral 
sources  and  one  in  1977  devoted  to 
arine  living  resources  of  the 
itarctic. 

In  addition,  a  special  consultative 
;eting,  the  first  of  its  kind,  was  held 
1977  at  which  the  original  treaty 
natories,  who  are  also  consultative 
rties,  welcomed  Poland — the  first 
eding  party  to  achieve  consultative 
tus  and  thus  entry  to  the  treaty 
um.  Poland,  which  had  signed  the 
aty  in  1961,  became  the  13th  nation 
join  those  entitled  by  the  treaty  to 
eet  periodically  to  deal  with  ques- 
ts involving  Antarctica.  A  second 
>ecial  Antarctic  Treaty  consultative 
eeting  is  scheduled  to  start  on  Feb- 
ary  27  in  Australia.  It  will  deal  with 
ntarctic  marine  living  resources 
:   sues. 

ackground 

The  Antarctic,  long  the  domain  of 
ientists  whose  rights  to  unimpeded 
ovement    through    the   region    are 
aaranteed  by  the  Antarctic  Treaty, 
is  increasingly  become  the  focus  of 
!  tention  as  a  potential  source  of  valu- 
ole  resources.  This  attention  has  man- 
ested  itself  primarily  in  interest  in 
quatic  resources,  especially  krill,  be- 
ause  of  the  vast  quantities  believed  to 
xist  and  the  supposedly  relative  ease 
f  its  exploitation.  The  flurry  of  public 
iterest  in  mineral  resources,  espe- 
ially  petroleum,  that  stemmed  from 
lie  period  of  the  1973  OPEC  [Organi- 
|ation  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
ties] oil  embargo  and  the  coincidental 
|eports    of    possible    oil    reserves 
iffshore  of  the  Antarctic  Continent, 
.ppears  to  have  subsided  somewhat. 


Within  the  executive  branch,  how- 
ever, and  in  the  councils  of  other  An- 
tarctic Treaty  consultative  parties,  both 
the  mineral  and  living  resources  issues 
have  been  kept  under  scrutiny;  1978 
will  be  devoted  largely  to  marine  liv- 
ing resource  questions  while  1979  will 
probably  see  fuller  discussion  of  min- 
eral resource  issues. 

The  United  States  will  act  as  host  to 
the  tenth  Antarctic  Treaty  consultative 
meeting  in  1979,  the  20th  anniversary 
of  the  signing  of  the  treaty  in  Wash- 
ington. Between  now  and  then  it  is 
also  likely  that  there  will  be  as  many 
as  six  or  seven  multilateral  meetings 
on  Antarctic  matters  dealing  with 
things  ranging  from  improvement  of 
telecommunications  to  the  decisive 
meeting  to  negotiate  a  living  marine 
resource  conservation  regime. 

In  all,  I  can  say  that  the  interna- 
tional discourse  in  the  Antarctic  in  the 
past  few  years  has  been  fruitful.  U.S. 
policy  objectives  have,  in  the  main, 
been  achieved.  The  general  public  and 
the  private  sector  in  the  United  States 
have  also  made  their  views  known  to 
the  Department.  Indeed,  in  the  past 
year  consultations  with  conservation 
groups  in  particular  have  been  benefi- 
cial in  the  policy  formulation  process, 
and  their  adviser  role  on  U.S.  delega- 
tions dealing  with  Antarctic  matters 
has  been  solicited  and  accepted.  This 
is  a  departure  from  the  practice  of  ex- 
clusion of  public  members  prevalent  as 
late  as  1976  and  still  exercised  by  al- 
most all  other  consultative  parties. 

Resource  Issues 

Turning  now  to  resource  issues, 
U.S.  policy  is  governed  by  two  pri- 
mary considerations. 

•  First,  protection  of  the  environ- 
ment and  preservation  of  the  ecosys- 
tem from  undue  harm  is  essential. 

•  Second,  resources,  if  ever 
exploited,  must  be  used  wisely  and 
taken  only  under  appropriate  environ- 
mental safeguards. 

The  thrust  of  this  policy  can  be  seen 
in  the  recommendations  on  mineral  re- 
sources adopted  at  the  eighth  and  ninth 


he  IAEA.  The  Agency's  fundamental 
safeguards  measure  is  the  accounting  of 
Nuclear  materials.  The  United  States 
will  submit  to  the  Agency  accounting 


reports  on  nuclear  materials  subject  to 
safeguards .  □ 

Text  from   Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  13,  1978. 


Antarctic  Treaty  consultative  meet- 
ings. These  call  for  continued  efforts 
to  achieve  a  timely  international  re- 
gime to  regulate  resource  exploitation 
if  it  should  occur  and  for  nations  to 
exercise  and  urge  restraint  on  com- 
mercial exploitation  in  the  meantime. 

Mineral  Resources.  It  may  be  of 
interest  to  the  committee  to  learn  that 
the  widespread  support  among  consul- 
tative parties  in  the  first  half  of  the 
1970's  for  some  kind  of  moratorium 
on  mineral  resource  activities  has 
largely  evaporated.  Most  consultative 
parties  now  believe  that  a  moratorium 
would  simply  halt  all  constructive 
thinking  about  a  minerals  regime 
without  effectively  halting  an  oil  rush 
if  a  find  were  made.  Therefore,  a  U.S. 
offer  at  the  ninth  consultative  meeting 
to  work  toward  an  acceptable 
moratorium  if  a  consensus  for  one  de- 
veloped fell  on  virtually  deaf  ears.  A 
feeling  of  varying  degrees  of  urgency 
to  achieve  a  regime  prevails,  one 
which  we  welcome  because  without  it 
the  relatively  slow  pace  with  which 
the  consultative  mechanism  moves 
may  not  necessarily  produce  results  in 
a  timely  fashion. 

Marine  Living  Resources.  The 
question  of  marine  living  resources  is, 
in  fact,  more  immediate.  The  ninth 
meeting  of  Antarctic  Treaty  consulta- 
tive parties  held  last  fall,  and  the  pre- 
paratory meetings  held  prior  to  it, 
witnessed  the  emergence  of  Antarctic 
marine  living  resource  issues  as  a  pri- 
mary concern  to  the  consultative  par- 
ties. 

The  emphasis  upon  Antarctic  marine 
living  resources  derived  from  the  coin- 
cidence of  two  factors: 

•  First,  the  prospect  that  large-scale 
fishing  would  be  initiated  in  Antarctic 
waters  and 

•  Second,  recognition  of  the  poten- 
tial vulnerability  of  the  Antarctic 
marine  ecosystem  to  unregulated 
harvesting. 

It  has  long  been  known  that  Antarc- 
tic waters  are  highly  productive  and 
rich  in  marine  life.  Uncontrolled  har- 
vesting has,  in  the  past,  led  to  serious 
depletion  of  Antarctic  whale  and  seal 
stocks.  In  the  1960's  the  attention  of 
scientists  and  fisheries  experts  turned 
to  Antarctic  krill — small  shrimp-like 
crustaceans  (euphausiids)  which  are 
the  primary  food  for  the  great  whales 
and  which  are  found  in  Antarctic  wa- 


52 


ters  in  very  large  quantities.  One 
species  of  krill,  Euphausia  superba, 
forms  dense  swarms  at  or  near  the  sur- 
face. This,  combined  with  its  high 
protein  content,  has  made  krill  a  lead- 
ing candidate  for  commercial  harvest- 
ing either  for  direct  human  consump- 
tion or  for  fish  meal.  In  addition, 
certain  fish  species  and  squid  are 
considered  to  offer  potential  for  sus- 
tained catches. 

Exploratory  fishing  in  Antarctic 
waters  was  first  undertaken  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Japan.  More  recently 
other  nations  have  joined  in  such  ac- 
tivities, notably  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  a  nontreaty  party,  and 
Poland.  South  Korea  is  also  planning  a 
krill  expedition  in  late  1978.  The  large 
estimates  of  potential  yield  of  krill — 
from  tens  of  millions  to  over  100  mil- 
lion metric  tons  annually — combined 
with  excess  distant  water  fishing 
capacity  because  of  restrictions  in 
coastal  state  200-mile  fishery  zones 
make  commercial  harvesting  a 
probability — and  sooner  rather  than 
later. 

At  the  same  time  there  is  little  ex- 
perience in  large-scale  harvesting  of 
resources  such  as  krill  which  occupy 
so  low  and  central  a  role  in  the  marine 
ecosystem.  The  Antarctic  marine 
ecosystem  represents  a  finely  balanced 
adaptation  to  the  extreme  environmen- 
tal condition  of  the  southernmost 
ocean.  Uncontrolled  harvesting  of 
krill,  or  other  components  of  the 
ecosystem,  could  have  unforeseen  and 
perhaps  irreversible  impacts. 

Creating  a  Conservation  Regime 

In  recognition  of  these  factors,  the 
view  emerged  at  the  preparatory  meet- 
ings for  the  ninth  consultative  meeting 
that  adequate  conservation  of  Antarctic- 
marine  living  resources  was  an  objec- 
tive of  considerable  urgency.  The 
United  States  took  the  lead  in  propos- 
ing consideration  of  a  conservation 
regime — a  complete  system  with 
machinery  for  identifying  conservation 
needs  and  developing  necessary  con- 
servation measures. 

In  preparing  for  the  ninth  consulta- 
tive meeting,  the  United  States  deter- 
mined that  its  environmental  and  other 
interests  would  be  best  served  by 
negotiation  of  an  international  conven- 
tion to  establish  a  conservation  regime 
for  Antarctic  marine  living  resources. 
We  believe  that  the  initiative  for  the 
creation  of  such  a  convention  should 
come  from  within  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
system,  consistent  with  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  treaty.  We  hold 
that  the  convention,  however,  should 
be  concluded  by  a  separate  interna- 


tional conference  with  additional  par- 
ticipation by  nontreaty  parties  and  in- 
ternational organizations  with  direct 
interests  in  the  resources  concerned. 

The  representatives  to  the  ninth 
meeting  of  Antarctic  Treaty  consulta- 
tive parties  held  in  London,  Septem- 
ber 19-October  17,  1977.  adopted  Rec- 
ommendation IX-2  on  Antarctic  ma- 
rine living  resources.  The  recommen- 
dation provides  that  a  definitive  re- 
gime for  the  conservation  of  Antarctic 
marine  living  resources  should  be  con- 
cluded in  1978.  The  recommendation 
suggests  a  two-step  process: 

•  First,  a  special  meeting  of  consult- 
ative parties  (to  be  convened  in  Can- 
berra February  27-March  16,  1978);  and 

•  Second,  a  decisive  meeting,  the 
dates  for  which  have  not  yet  been 
fixed. 

The  recommendation  anticipates  that 
the  decisive  meeting  will  be  a  diplo- 
matic conference  and  that  states  other 
than  consultative  parties  with  direct 
interests  in  Antarctic  marine  living  re- 
sources will  participate  in  it,  as  well 
as  appropriate  international  organiza- 
tions on  an  observer  basis.  The  rec- 
ommendation also  elaborates  several 
principles  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
developing  the  regime.  Among  these  is 
the  principle  that  a  regime  should 
apply  to  the  entire  Antarctic  marine 
ecosystem. 

U.S.  Views 

The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  ninth 
consultative  meeting  supported  Rec- 
ommendation IX-2.  It  satisfactorily 
reflects  initial  U.S.  views  on  a  possi- 
ble regime  to  conserve  Antarctic  ma- 
rine living  resources,  specifically, 
that: 

•  First,  an  effective  system  for  the 
conservation  of  Antarctic  marine  liv- 
ing resources,  including  krill,  should 
be  in  place  prior  to  large-scale  harvest- 
ing of  such  resources; 

•  Second,  a  conservation  regime 
should  cover  the  entire  range  of  Ant- 
arctic marine  living  resources — that 
is,  cover  the  full  Antarctic  marine 
ecosystem;  and 

•  Third,  the  conservation  regime 
should  be  embodied  in  an  international 
convention  and  there  should  be  provi- 
sion for  participation  in  the  negotia- 
tions by  consultative  parties,  other 
countries  with  direct  interest  in  the  re- 
sources concerned,  and  by  appropriate 
international  organizations. 

Since  the  ninth  consultative  meet- 
ing, we  have  directed  our  attention  to 
the  development  of  our  specific  policy 
on  a  conservation  regime  for  the  spe- 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

cial  consultative  meeting  which  opi 
in  Canberra  3  weeks  from  toe 
[February  27], 

This  process  of  policy  developm 
involves  not  only  coordination  amc 
the  interested  federal  agencies,  such 
with  our  colleagues  here  present  fjjj 
the  National  Oceanic  and  Atmosphe 
Administration  and  the  National  S- 
ence  Foundation  but  also  incorporat 
of  the  views  of  the  interested  pub 
and  the  Congress  and  the  preparati 
of  an  environmental  impact  statemer 

The  Department  held  a  public  me 
ing  on  December  20,  1977,  at  wh 
both  individuals  and  representatives 
nongovernmental  organizations  p 
sented  their  views  on  a  possible  cc 
servation  regime  for  Antarctic  mar  : 
living  resources.  Another  will  be  hi 
on  February  10,  1978. 

We  believe,  however,  that  a  m< 
structured  means  of  obtaining  pubj 
input  is  required.  Therefore,  we  ha 
amended  the  charter  of  the  Depa 
ment"s  Oceans  Affairs  Adviso 
Committee  to  include  Antarctic  m 
ters,  and  we  are  setting  up  an  Anta: 
tic  affairs  section  of  this  committee 
advise  us  on  Antarctic  matters,  inck 
ing  Antarctic  resource  and  envirc 
mental  issues.  Our  present  thinking 
that  the  section  will  consist  of  15- 
members  drawn  from  various  pub 
sectors. 

A  draft  environmental  impact  sta 
ment  has  been  prepared  and  circulat 
to  interested  federal  agencies  and  nc 
governmental  organizations.  A  copy 
the  draft  environmental  impact  stai 
ment,  which  includes  a  number  of  a 
pendices,  is  provided  for  the  recor 
The  Department  has  scheduled  a  pa 
lie  meeting  on  February  10  to  recei 
oral  comments  on  the  draft  statemei 
Formal  comments  of  both  the  publ 
and  federal  agencies  and  organizatio 
are  not,  of  course,  due  until  45  da; 
after  the  publication  of  the  statemer 
However,  we  want  to  have  the  benei 
of  the  preliminary  comments  of  men 
hers  of  the  public  and  nongovernme 
tal  organizations  on  February  10  ! 
that  we  may  take  these  views  into  a> 
count  in  the  formulation  of  our  pos 
tion  for  the  Canberra  special  consult; 
tive  meeting  which  begins  on  Febn 
ary  27. 

The  proposed  federal  action — th 
negotiation  of  a  conservatio 
regime — set  forth  in  the  draft  e 
vironmental  impact  statement  als 
summarizes  our  current  thinking  o 
the  elements  of  a  conservation  regime 
With  your  permission  let  me  revie^ 
these  elements. 

The  regime,  which  would  be  in 
eluded  in  a  treaty,  would  set  forth  th 
objectives  of  the  regime  and  provid 


il  1978 


53 


obligations,  functions,  and  machin- 

necessary  to  fulfill  them. 

"he  proposed   conservation   regime 

aid  apply  to  all   the  species  which 

lprise  the  Antarctic  marine  ecosys- 
i,  except  that  it  would  not  provide 

direct  regulation  of  species  already 
/ered  by  existing  international 
eements,  specifically,  the  Interna- 
lal  Convention  for  the  Regulation 
haling  and  the  Convention  for  the 

servation  of  Antarctic  Seals. 

he  purpose  of  the  regime  would  be 
insure  that  any  harvesting  of  Ant- 
tic  marine  living  resources  takes 
ce  in  accordance  with  sound  con- 
vation  principles  and  practices,  spe- 
cally: 

»  To  prevent  overexploitation  of  any 

tarctic  marine  living  resource; 

»  To  insure  that  harvesting  of  any 

cies  does  not  adversely  affect  popu- 

ons  of  dependent  or  related  species; 

I 

»  To  insure  that  any  harvesting  of 

tarctic  marine  living  resources  is 

lducted  in  such  fashion  as  to  main- 

1  the  health  of  the  Antarctic  marine 

•system. 

n  order  to  accomplish  these  pur- 
jes,  the  conservation  regime  would 
|  d  to  provide  for: 

'  '  Acquisition  of  basic  scientific  data 

■  the  nature,  interrelationships,  and 
liamics  of  the  Antarctic  marine 
e  'system; 

■  »  Acquisition  of  quantitative  data  on 
t  standing  stocks  of  Antarctic  marine 
il  ng  resources  and  detailed  data  on 
f  levels  of  any  harvesting  of  such 
Icks; 

l'»  Assessment  of  the  status  of  the 
Icks  of  Antarctic  marine  living  re- 
1  trees; 

»  Identification  of  stocks  to  which 
tnservation  measures  should  be 
sMied;  and 

•  Development,  implementation, 
li  effective  enforcement  of  specific 
mservation  measures,  including  catch 
Imitations,  to  achieve  the  purposes  of 
I'  regime. 

The  functions  to  be  performed  by 
b:  conservation  regime  would  be  of  a 

gular  and  continuing  nature.  Their 
jrformance  would  require  establish- 
ment of  an  effective  organizational 

ucture.  This  structure  would  include 
j  plenary  body  or  commission  in 
Jnich  representatives  of  the  contract- 
ig  parties  to  the  regime  would  decide 
]>on  conservation  measures  and  take 
jher  actions  provided  for  in  the  inter- 
jitional  agreement.  This  organiza- 
;pnal  structure  would  also  require 
;:anding  bodies  to: 


•  Collect,  collate,  and  distribute 
necessary  basic  scientific  data; 

•  Collect,  collate,  and  distribute 
quantitative  data  on  standing  stocks 
and  catch  data; 

•  Assess  and  review  the  status  of 
stocks  of  Antarctic  marine  living  re- 
sources; 

•  Prepare  for  the  periodic  meetings 
of  the  plenary  body  or  commission; 

•  Monitor  the  effectiveness  of  con- 
servation measures; 

•  Coordinate  the  activities  of  the 
conservation  agreement  with  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  International  Whaling 
Commission  and  with  activities  pur- 
suant to  the  Convention  for  the  Con- 
servation of  Antarctic  Seals;  and 

•  Establish  cooperative  relationships 
with  other  international  bodies  which 
deal  with  Antarctic  marine  living 
resources. 

On  the  basis  of  the  comments  and 
suggestions  we  are  receiving  in  our 
discussions  with  the  public,  with  the 
Congress,  and  among  the  federal 
agencies,  we  will  be  defining  detailed 
positions  for  the  Canberra  meeting. 
Commitment  to  an  ecosystem  approach 
and  the  establishment  of  a  workable 
system  for  effective  conservation  lies 
at  the  heart  of  our  approach  to  the  is- 
sue. The  negotiations  in  Canberra  will 
be  complex  and  difficult,  but  the 
shared  emphasis  demonstrated  at  the 
London  consultative  meeting  upon 
maintenance  of  the  Antarctic  marine 
ecosystem  and  the  need  to  conclude  a 
conservation  regime  give  rise  to  cau- 
tious optimism. 

An  important  issue  with  regard  to 
satisfactory  resolution  of  the  resource 
issues — living  as  well  as  nonliving — is 
accommodating  the  juridical  positions 
of  claimants  and  nonclaimants.  A  gen- 
eral accommodation  of  the  issue  of  na- 
tional sovereignty  is  reflected  in  the 
Antarctic  Treaty.  The  U.S.  position 
under  the  treaty  is  that  we  do  not  as- 
sert or  recognize  claims  to  territorial 
sovereignty  in  Antarctica.  Since  the 
treaty  does  not  address  resource  is- 
sues, the  prospect  of  resource  activity 
raises  this  question  again  in  direct 
fashion.  We  believe  solutions  are  pos- 
sible. They  will  require  hard  work  and 
imaginative  thinking  on  the  part  of  all 
participants. 

Other  Developments 

Seals.  With  respect  to  other  Antarc- 
tic developments,  the  United  States  in 
December  of  1976  ratified  the  Conven- 
tion for  the  Conservation  of  Antarctic 
Seals.  We  were  the  fifth  country  to  do 
so.  Seven  ratifications  are  necessary  to 
bring  the  convention  into  force.   We 


made  several  diplomatic  approaches 
last  year  to  the  other  signatories  urg- 
ing their  ratification  of  the  convention. 
I  am  pleased  to  say  that  Belgium  and 
the  Soviet  Union  have  both  just  re- 
cently ratified  the  convention  and  are 
expected  to  deposit  their  instruments 
of  ratification  shortly.  The  convention 
will  become  effective  30  days  from  the 
deposit  of  the  seventh  ratification. 

Fauna  and  Flora.  The  Department 
has  presented  legislation  to  both 
Houses  of  Congress,  S.  1691  and 
H.  7749,  to  enable  the  U.S.  Government 
to  approve  the  measures,  agreed  upon 
by  the  Antarctic  Treaty  consultative 
parties  in  1964,  for  the  conservation  of 
Antarctic  fauna  and  flora.  Hearings 
were  held  before  the  appropriate  com- 
mittees of  the  House  last  fall,  and  the 
bill  is  expected  to  be  reported  out 
shortly.  No  action,  however,  has  yet 
been  taken  in  the  Senate,  although  we 
understand  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce,  Science,  and  Transporta- 
tion intends  to  hold  hearings. 

I  want  to  urge  the  passage  of  this 
legislation  by  the  current  session  of 
Congress  in  order  that  the  United 
States  can  approve  the  agreed  meas- 
ures before  the  tenth  consultative 
meeting  in  Washington  in  1979.  Our 
early  approval  would  permit  us  to 
suggest  to  Japan  and  Australia,  who 
together  with  us  are  the  last  consulta- 
tive parties  yet  to  take  action,  that 
they  make  every  effort  to  do  so.  We 
should  seek  to  make  the  agreed  meas- 
ures effective  before  the  tenth  meet- 
ing. 

Criminal  Legislation.  Another  mat- 
ter before  the  Congress  is  that  of  crim- 
inal legislation  for  Antarctica.  Since 
few  of  our  criminal  laws  extend  be- 
yond the  geographical  limits  of  the 
United  States,  a  draft  bill  to  extend 
U.S.  jurisdiction  to  certain  criminal 
cases  arising  in  the  Antarctic  has  been 
submitted  by  the  Department  to  each 
of  the  last  three  Congresses.  The  cur- 
rent submission  coincided  with  a  simi- 
lar congressional  bill,  which  the  De- 
partment supports.  Hearings  on  that 
bill,  H.  6148,  were  held  in  the  House 
last  fall.  No  action  has  been  taken  by 
the  Senate.  Rapid  passage  of  appro- 
priate legislation  is,  in  our  view,  es- 
sential. 

Although  this  hearing  is  largely  de- 
voted to  the  question  of  resources  and 
my  statement  is,  therefore,  primarily 
addressed  to  those  questions,  I  would 
not  wish  to  leave  the  impression  with 
this  committee  that  resource  concerns 
predominate  in  our  consideration  of 
Antarctic  policy.  An  overriding  con- 
tinuing objective  of  our  Antarctic  pol- 
icy  is  to  insure  maintenance  of  the 


54 


Deep  Seabed  Mining 
Legislation 


by  Elliot  L.  Richardson 

Deep  seabed  mining  is  probably  the 
key  to  determining  whether  or  not  a 
comprehensive  law  of  the  sea  agree- 
ment can  be  negotiated  that  will  serve 
the  national  interests  of  the  United 
States.  With  regard  to  deep  seabed 
mining,  the  last  session  of  the  Law  of 
the  Sea  Conference  was  distressing 
from  both  a  procedural  and  substantive 
point  of  view.  If  such  processes  and 
results  are  repeated  at  the  session 
commencing  March  28,  1978.  in 
Geneva,  the  conference  will  almost 
surely  fail.  The  tragedy  is  that  confer- 
ence failure  would  most  hurt  develop- 
ing nations  for  whom  agreed  rules  of 
international  law  provide  the  most  se- 
cure protection  of  their  ocean  inter- 
ests. 

I  should  add  that  there  is  an  increas- 
ing awareness  among  conference 
participants  of  the  need  to  change  sub- 
stantially the  deep  seabed  portion  of 
the  Informal  Composite  Negotiating 
Text  (ICNT).  This  was  evident  in  con- 
sultations last  November  and  De- 
cember which  culminated  in  a  meeting 
of  some  90  representatives  convened 
by  conference  President  [H.  Shirley] 
Amerasinghe  [of  Sri  Lanka],  The 
changes  needed  to  the  ICNT  on  deep 
seabed  mining  will  be  a  principal  sub- 
ject of  discussion  at  the  intersessional 
meeting  we  will  attend  in  New  York 
February  6-17. 

After  the  last  Law  of  the  Sea  ses- 
sion, I  announced  that  I  would  rec- 
ommend to  the  President  that  the 
United  States  thoroughly  review  its 
ocean  interests  in  light  of  the  proce- 
dures employed  and  the  substantive  re- 
sults of  that  session.  As  part  of  that 
review,  which  is  still  under  way,  we 
are  evaluating  various  alternatives 
available  to  achieve  our  ocean  objec- 


tives. Having  been  identified  as  the 
most  controversial  subject  in  the 
ICNT.  the  regime  for  deep  seabed 
mining  figures  prominently  in  our  con- 
sideration. 

Administration  Support 

Since  my  last  appearance  before 
members  of  this  committee,  the  Presi- 
dent has  decided  to  support  congres- 
sional efforts  to  develop  deep  seabed 
mining  legislation  consistent  with  our 
substantive  position.  The  decision  by 
the  President  to  support  interim  deep 
seabed  mining  legislation  is  a  shift 
from  the  Administration's  prior  disin- 
clination to  lend  its  support.  There  are 
many  reasons  for  this  change. 

First,  we  are  aware  that  legislation 
will  be  needed  with  or  without  a  suc- 
cessful law  of  the  sea  treaty.  After  a 
convention  is  concluded,  several  years 
will  undoubtedly  pass  before  the  con- 
vention becomes  effective.  The  length 
of  time  involved  will  depend  upon 
what  the  convention  requires  regarding 
the  number  of  states  that  must  ratify 
the  convention  prior  to  its  final  entry 
into  force  and  on  whether  or  not  it 
provides  for  provisional  entry  into 
force  of  the  deep  seabed  mining  re- 
gime. 

Second,  the  Administration  believes 
that  the  orderly  development  of  deep 
seabed  mining  should  not  only  be  con- 
tinued but  also  be  encouraged. 

Third,  we  believe  that  interim 
domestic  legislation  based  on  the  ele- 
ments in  the  Administration's  position 
will  not,  as  is  often  charged,  nega- 
tively affect  the  prospects  for  reaching 
agreement  at  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference. On  the  other  hand,  some  con- 
cern has  been  expressed  in  the  Con- 
gress  and   the  executive   branch   that 


Antarctic  Treaty  system  and  the  pics 
ervation  of  the  Antarctic  environment 
and  ecosystem. 

Our  concern,  and  that  of  our  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  consultative  partners,  man- 
ifests itself  in  the  study  of  questions 
such  as  the  establishment  of  sites  of 
special  scientific  interest,  examination 
of  the  environmental  problems  which 
may  be  caused  by  increasing  tourism, 
and  problems  relating  to  possible  con- 
sequences of  mineral  resource  explora- 


tion and  exploitation.  Meanwhile  the 
scientists  of  a  number  of  the  treaty  na- 
tions are  continuing  their  year-round 
work  in  Antarctica  in  a  spirit  of  coop 
eration  that  has  always  been  the 
hallmark  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty.         □ 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  <>n  Anns 
Control,  Oceans,  and  International  Environ 
mem  <<t  the  Senate  Committee  •■'<  Foreign  Kiln 
a, -us  ,'n  Feb  <>,  I97S  t/s  Mink  ii  issistant 
Secretary  foi  Oceans  mul  International  En 
vironmental  mul  St  ientifii    tffaii  I 


Department  of  State  Buli 

Administration  opposition  to  deep 
bed  mining  legislation  could  be  i 
understood  as  a  total  reliance  on 
Law    of    the    Sea    Conference 
achievement  of  our  seabed  objecti' 
In  this  regard,   if  efforts  to  achiev 
comprehensive    agreement    on 
oceans  are  not  now  successful, 
should  at   least  try  to  act   in  com 
with  nations  having  interests  simila 
our  own.  By  taking  a  leadership  i 
and  by  enacting  legislation   which 
eludes  reciprocating  states  provisic 
we  will  be  better  prepared  if  the  c 
ference  does  not  result  in  a  treaty. 

Among  the  principal  elements  of 
Administration's  position  are  that 
legislation: 

•  Should  be  transitional  pending 
ternational  agreement  on  a  regime 
the  deep  seabed; 

•  Should  proceed  on  the  legal  b; 
that,  notwithstanding  future  agreem 
on  an  international  regulatory  regii 
deep  seabed  mining  is  a  freedom 
the  high  seas; 

•  Should  provide  for  environmet 
protection,  sound  management,  safe 
of  life  and  property  at  sea,  and  eff 
tive  law  enforcement; 

•  Should  provide  for  the  establi 
ment  of  an  international  revenue  sh 
ing  fund  prior  to  the  issuance  of  ci 
mercial  recovery  permits; 

•  Should  encourage  enactment 
deep  seabed  mining  legislation 
other  nations  patterned  on  our  exam 
through   the  mechanism  of  reciproc 
ing  state  recognition  of  rights; 

•  Should  require  our  permittei 
mining  or  processing  vessels  to  fly 
flag  either  of  the  United  States  or  t 
of  a  reciprocating  state; 

•  Should  not  contain  investme 
guarantees  against  financial  losses  at 
consequence  of  future  federal  acta 
that  is,  ratification  of  an  internatioi 
treaty; 

•  Should  not  authorize  licenses 
permits   for  specific   mine   sites  th 
could  be  misinterpreted  as  an  asserti 
of  sovereignty  over  an  area  of  the  se 
bed; 

•  Should  not  require  process!) 
plants  to  be  located  in  the  Uniti 
States;  and 

•  Should  not  place  any  flag  r 
quirement  on  deep  seabed  ore  tran 
porting  vessels. 

Investment  Guarantees 

Perhaps  the  most  controversial  issi 
in  H.R.  3350  involves  investmei 
guarantees  Proponents  of  such  guaras 
tees  argue  that  licensees  or  permitte< 
should  be  compensated  for  investme 
losses  that  may  be  caused  by  the  entj 


1978 


55 


force  of  an  international  agree- 

'•llt  concerning  deep  seabed  mining. 

he  Administration  opposes  invest- 

t  guarantees  as  a  matter  of  princi- 

Our   view    is   that    the    Federal 

/ernment  should  not  provide  the 

edent  of  promising  in  advance  to 

ipensate  certain  segments  of  the 

ate  sector  for  financial  losses  that 

be  occasioned  by  possible  federal 

ons  taken  to  advance  the  national 

:rest.   Moreover,  our  negotiating 

ition  is  to  obtain  a  seabeds  regime 

does  not,   on  balance,  disadvan- 

:  U.S.  miners  as  compared  to  their 

ition  under  domestic  legislation. 

longer  the  negotiating  process,  the 

n,    e  firm  the  United  States  inevitably 

>t  be  on  the  recognition  of  existing 

ats  in  the  treaty. 

'he  most  obvious  point  is  that  if 

re  is  no  treaty,  there  is  no  problem. 

ny  of  those  who  are  most  ardent  in 

1 1  r  support  of  investment  guarantees 

reei   ie  with  equal  fervor  that  no  treaty 

'!   >ossible.  It  should  be  recalled  that 

only  must  the  treaty  be  agreed  to 

the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  confer- 

e,  but  also  it  must  receive  the  ad- 

and  consent  of  the  Senate  and  the 

lature  of  the  President.  The  treaty 

aid  still  not  enter  into  force  until 

required  number  of  other  nations 

also  deposited   instruments  of 

fication  indicating  acceptance. 

■'or  investment  guarantees  to  be 

essary,  the  treaty  must  fail  to  pro- 

e  for  terms,  conditions,  and  restric- 

«   is  for  licensees  and  permittees  as 

i    orable  as  those  provided  in  our 

nestic    legislation.    Finally,    the 

aty  would  have  to  prejudice  the 

its  of  licensees  and  permittees  at  a 

e  and  in  a  manner  meriting  finan- 

1  compensation.  We  do  not  believe 

t  the  sequence  of  events  just  de- 

ibed  warrant  the  conclusion  that  an 

'estment  guarantee  is  necessary, 

:n  if  it  were  desirable. 


ternational  Fund 

The  legal  basis  for  establishing  an 
ierim  mining  regime  stems  from  the 
i;h  seas  character  of  the  deep  seabed. 
fie  principles  of  high  seas  freedoms 
td  the  common  heritage  of  mankind, 
S  often  posed  as  contradictions,  are 
'  t,  in  fact,  incompatible.   Both  prin- 
Iples   stem   from   the   fundamental 
?j;mise  that  sovereignty  over  the  area 
mnot  be  claimed  by  an  individual  na- 
jm.  Accordingly,  both  principles  re- 
hire that  we  guard  against  such  asser- 
>ns.  So  long  as  our  legislation  is  re- 
acted to  persons  and  vessels  subject 
U.S.  jurisdiction  and  no  exclusive 
ghts  to  deep  seabed  areas  are  confer- 
d,  the  licensing  arrangements  are 


compatible   with  existing   international 
law. 

The  Presidential  decision  to  support 
deep  seabed  mining  legislation  in- 
cluded the  establishment  in  the  legisla- 
tion of  an  international  revenue  shar- 
ing fund.  Such  a  fund  is  an  essential 
feature  of  Administration  support  for 
legislation  and  provision  for  its  estab- 
lishment must  be  an  integral  part  of 
any  legislation  passed.  We  will  be 
prepared,  subsequent  to  the  enactment 
of  legislation,  to  submit  legislative 
recommendations  on  the  contributions 
required  to  the  fund.  But  we  would 
oppose  the  issuance  of  commercial  re- 
covery permits  before  the  fund  is  es- 
tablished. We  believe  such  a  fund 
would  demonstrate  U.S.  support  for 
the  principle,  now  included  in  the 
ICNT,  that  commercial  activities  in 
the  deep  seabed  should  benefit  all  na- 
tions when  the  treaty  enters  into  force. 

Environmental  Concerns 

A  principal  concern  reflected  in  the 
Administration's  attitude  toward  deep 
seabed  mining  legislation  is  that  the 
environment  must  be  protected.  In- 
deed, environmental  consequences 
must  be  one  of  the  foremost  factors  to 
be  considered  in  the  application  for 
and  issuance  of  a  license  or  permit. 
The  Administration  supports  the  re- 
quirement that,  prior  to  issuing  a 
license  or  permit,  the  Secretary  of  the 
lead  agency  should  determine  specif- 
ically that  there  will  be  no  significant 
effect  on  the  quality  of  the  environ- 
ment. 

This  determination  would  be  based 
on  information  gathered  in  an  en- 
vironmental impact  statement  prepared 
in  accordance  with  the  National  En- 
vironmental Policy  Act  and  other  pro- 
visions in  the  legislation.  The  Admin- 
istration's position  is  that  there  should 
be  adequate  monitoring  of  the  en- 
vironmental consequences  of  all  deep 
seabed  mining  activities  and  that  regu- 
lations be  continually  revised  and 
applied  to  ongoing  mining  operations 
as  environmental  information  becomes 
available. 

Reciprocating  State  Concept 

The  reciprocating  state  concept  is 
one  of  the  unique  features  of  the  deep 
seabed  mining  bills  before  the  Con- 
gress. The  idea  of  reciprocity  grows 
out  of  the  high  seas  character  of  deep 
seabed  mining.  It  is  important  to  un- 
derstand that  neither  the  United  States 
nor  any  other  nation  can  appropriate 
high  seas  areas.  The  deep  seabed  is, 
by  definition,  a  high  seas  area. 

Hence,  the  United  States  must  rely 


upon  its  jurisdiction  over  the  person  or 
vessel  involved  to  regulate  deep  sea- 
bed mining  activities.  Since  we  do  not 
own  the  area,  we  have  no  legal  basis 
to  confer  exclusive  rights  on  our  licen- 
sees or  permittees  that  would  be  valid 
against  persons  not  subject  to  our 
jurisdiction.  To  preclude  any  implica- 
tion that  we  are  appropriating  high 
seas  areas,  we  avoid  the  allocation  of 
specific  areas  of  the  high  seas  seabed 
in  licenses  or  permits. 

Instead,  the  procedure  we  support  is 
for  applicants  to  file  a  work  plan 
which  includes  details  about  the  pro- 
posed location  of  the  work  area.  As- 
suming other  requirements  are  met, 
the  administering  agency  would  only 
approve  nonconflicting  work  plans. 
The  reciprocating  state  giving  the  first 
notice  of  work  plan  submissions  would 
be  entitled  to  rely  upon  other  recip- 
rocating states  not  to  approve  work 
plans  which  conflict. 

The  reciprocating  state  concept  is 
also  useful  in  insuring  the  necessary 
enforcement  and  environmental  and 
other  monitoring  functions  are  carried 
out  aboard  vessels  or  with  respect  to 
crews  of  either  the  licensee  or  permit- 
tee's state  or  that  of  reciprocating 
states.  By  setting  standards  for  desig- 
nating reciprocating  states,  we  should 
insure  that  deep  seabed  mining  occurs 
with  approximately  the  same  concerns 
for  the  environment  and  the  safety  of 
life  and  property  at  sea. 

Supply  of  Minerals 

There  has  lately  been  much  discus- 
sion of  the  effects  of  the  legislation  on 
the  supply  of  critical  minerals  and  on 
the  economies  of  current  suppliers.  In 
our  view,  creating  the  conditions  that 
would  allow  seabed  mining  to  be  via- 
ble would  serve  the  U.S.  national 
interest  by  assuring  access  to  an  alter- 
native minerals  source.  We  are  de- 
pendent upon  imported  supplies  for 
almost  all  our  nickel  and  all  of  our 
cobalt  and  manganese.  The  establish- 
ment of  a  seabed  mining  industry  in 
the  United  States  would  diversify  and 
increase  our  sources  of  supply  for 
these  metals.  Therefore,  it  is  in  our 
interest  to  provide  a  framework  foster- 
ing our  long-term  interests  by  estab- 
lishing the  legal  and  administrative 
basis  for  seabed  mining  through  this 
legislation  and,  hopefully  later, 
through  a  law  of  the  sea  convention. 

Some  have  argued  that  we  should  not 
only  develop  seabed  mining  to  provide 
a  broader  resource  base  in  the  long  run 
but  that  we  also  should  artificially 
facilitate  the  development  of  seabed 
mining  in  the  short  and  medium  term 
in  order  to  protect  ourselves  from  the 


56 


UNITED  NATIONS: 

Southern  Rhodesia 


by  Andrew  Young 

Under  the  Administration  of  Presi- 
dent Carter,  Rhodesia  has  been  one  of 
the  priority  issues  of  U.S.  foreign  pol- 
icy. Together  with  the  United  Kingdom 
and  in  cooperation  with  the  front-line 
states  [Angola,  Botswana,  Mozam- 
bique, Tanzania,  and  Zambia],  the 
United  States  has  worked  extensively 
with  the  nationalist  leaders  in  an  effort 
to  reconcile  differences  and  to  bring 
about  a  peaceful  transition  to  majority 
rule. 

We  participated  in  the  development 
of  the  Anglo-American  proposals  for 
Rhodesia,1  because  we  felt  it  essential 
to  establish  a  coherent  plan  based  on 
the  following  goals. 

First,  the  initiation  of  an  irreversible 
process  leading  to  majority  rule  in  an 
independent  Zimbabwe. 

Second,  the  creation  of  a  neutral 
political  process  which  would  allow  all 
political  factions  in  Zimbabwe  to  com- 
pete fairly  for  political  leadership 
through  elections  which  truly  reflect 
the  will  of  the  majority. 

Third,  an  end  to  hostilities,  fol- 
lowed by  the  maintenance  of  stability, 
law,  and  order  during  the  transition 
period  to  insure  the  fairness  of  the 
process  and  thus  its  durability. 

Fourth,  agreement  on  an  independ- 
ence constitution  that  provides  for  a 
democratically  elected  government,  the 
abolition   of  discrimination,   and   the 


protection  of  individual  human  rights, 
including  the  right  of  members  of  the 
minority  as  well  as  the  majority. 

Fifth,  having  presented  a  proposal 
based  on  these  goals  to  the  Security 
Council,  the  United  States,  together 
with  the  United  Kingdom,  undertook  a 
series  of  discussions  and  negotiations 
with  all  of  the  principal  parties  con- 
cerned. We  have  been  pursuing  these 
efforts  vigorously.  In  particular,  we 
want  to  engage  the  Patriotic  Front  as 
well  as  the  nationalist  parties  inside 
Rhodesia  in  the  negotiating  process. 

We  sought — and  continue  to  seek — 
the  advice  and  support  of  the  concerned 
African  states,  whose  views  we  took 
into  account  in  formulating  the  propos- 
als initially.  And  we  met  with  the 
Smith  regime  [Ian  Smith,  Prime  Minis- 
ter of  the  white  regime  in  Rhodesia]  in 
an  effort  to  bring  them  into  the  negotia- 
tions within  the  framework  of  our  pro- 
posals. As  President  Carter  confirmed 
in  his  March  9  press  conference  [see 
p.  19],  we  remain  firmly  convinced  that 
the  Anglo-American  plan  is  the  best 
basis  for  a  peaceful,  just,  and  prompt 
transition  to  an  independent  Zimbabwe. 

An  internal  agreement  has  now  been 
announced  in  Salisbury.  A  new  point 
has  been  reached  in  the  search  for  a  set- 
tlement and  we  are  all  understandably 
caught  up  in  measuring  details  against 
the  standards  we  have  set.  But  we 
should  not  let  legitimate  concern  with 
detail  obscure  the  enormous  stakes  the 


possibility  that  land-based  producers  of 
nickel,  cobalt,  or  managanese  might 
form  cartels — along  the  lines  of  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries — that  would  artificially  re- 
strict supplies  and  raise  prices.  We  be- 
lieve, however,  that  the  danger  of  car- 
telization  has  been  overdrawn  because 
the  market  circumstances  are  quite  dif- 
ferent. 

Some  governments  have  questioned 
the  seriousness  of  our  support  for 
domestic  deep  seabed  mining  legisla- 
tion. They  would  be  mistaken  to  under- 
estimate our  resolve  to  establish  a 
timely  legal  regime  governing  deep 
seabed  mining.  As  I  have  repeatedly 
said,  the  United  States  much  prefers  a 
negotiated,  multilateral  regime.  But  we 
must  have  alternatives  for  pursuing  our 
oceans  interests. 


As  a  matter  of  policy,  we  seek  or- 
derly progress  toward  the  development 
of  a  deep  seabed  mining  capability  for 
the  United  States.  We  want  the  legal 
regime  applicable  to  these  activities  to 
be  as  internationally  acceptable  as  pos- 
sible. At  the  same  time,  we  want  to 
give  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 
every  chance  to  succeed.  But  if  agree- 
ment is  not  forthcoming  or  negotiations 
are  unduly  prolonged,  we  are  prepared 
to  support  domestic  legislation  consist- 
ent with  our  substantive  policy  goals  as 
the  basis  for  mining  by  our  citizens.  □ 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittees  on  Interna- 
tional Organizations  and  International  Eco- 
nomic Policy  and  Trade  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  on  Jan.  23. 
IV78;  Ambassador  Richardson  is  Special  Rep- 
resentative of  the  President  fur  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  Conference. 


Department  of  State  Bu) 

peoples  of  the  region  and  the  entii 
ternational  community  have 
Rhodesia. 

•  This  is  not  a  time  for  attemp 
advance  personal  self-interest  oi 
posturing  before  the  world. 

•  This      is      not      a      time 
Rhodesians — white  or  black — to  t 
only  of  defending  their  partisan  in 
ests. 

•  This  is  not  a  time  for  outside  jw. 
ers  to  be  considering  what  advargt 
they  can  extract  in  the  process  of  I 
sition. 

•  This  is  not  a  time  for  those  en 
who  have  worked  hard  to  bring  abel 
fair  settlement  to  lay  down  our  buei 
and  turn  our  backs. 

•  Most  important  of  all  we  musi  <» 
resign  ourselves  that  the  birth  of  a  4 
nation  must  be  bloody  and  violent.  I 
see  no  reason  that  we  cannot  fit  •! 
peaceful  solution  to  the  differe  ;s 
which  still  exist  among  the  parties.  > 

At  this  crucial  juncture  in  the  his  ry 
of  Africa  and  the  world  we  must  ta  I 
longer  perspective,  looking  to  the  I 
and  recognizing  the  progress  that  a 
been  made  while  holding  up  for  tht  j- 
ture  the  highest  standards  which  I 
insure  that  Zimbabwe  will  enter  ■ 
community  of  free  and  independeni  I 
tions  promptly  and  peacefully. 

Salisbury  Agreement 

We  must  examine  the  so-ca  I 
internal  settlement  dispassionatel  I 
am  the  first  to  recognize  that  anytl  f 
which  Mr.  Smith  has  negotiated  mi  3 
the  most  careful  scrutiny.  But.  I  A 
also  willing  to  credit  good  faith  to  I 
participating  nationalist  leaders.  Tl  \ 
as  much  as  the  other  nationalist  leai  t 
of  Zimbabwe,  want  freedom  and  ir  A 
pendence  for  their  country  and  9 
political  equality  for  all  the  peopk  if 
the  country.  It  is  fair,  then,  to  ask  wit 
they  have  achieved  in  Salisbury.  C(i- 
pared  with  the  kinds  of  settlement  f  K 
posals  which  Smith  has  entertainecn 
the  past,  the  Salisbury  agreem  t 
marks  some  progress. 

•  The  nationalist  leaders  have  got  a 
Mr.  Smith  to  agree  to  the  principle  f 
universal  adult  suffrage. 

•  Smith's  signature  has  been 
tained  on  a  commitment  eventually 
step  down.  There  is  still  no  ironclad 
surance,  however,  that  he  will  do  si 

•  Finally,   there  is  recognition 
during  the  transition  period  some  sh- 
ing  of  power  must  take  place  amc; 
the  participating  groups. 

That  being  said,  there  is  much  in  ll 
Salisbury  agreement  which  raises  qu<- 
tions  regarding  the  ability  to  withstal 


h 


•:|ril  1978 

political  pressures  which  have  built 

over  the  past  few  years. 

3erhaps  more  importantly  we  must 
ltiep  isider  whether  the  agreement  an- 
■es,    unced  in  Salisbury  takes  sufficiently 

o  account  the  enormous  difficulty  of 
.j,  i  naging  the  transition  period.  This 
_|.  icial  watershed  must  be  handled  in 
jSffl    :h  a  way  that  the  violence  of  the 

:sent  struggle  for  liberation  can  be 


nsformed  into  an  irreversible  politi- 
process  which  will  result  in  the  ap- 
)val  by  all  the  people  of  Rhodesia  of 
•ir  own  form  of  government  and  the 
ection  of  their  own  leaders. 


iglo-American  Proposals 


In  his  March  9  press  conference, 
ssident  Carter  described  the  Salis- 
ry  proposal  as  not  adequate.  I  be- 
ve  I  can  demonstrate  its  inadequacies 
comparing  the  Salisbury  agreement 
th  the  principles  of  the  Anglo- 
lerican  proposals. 
First  and  foremost,  the  Anglo- 
nerican  plan  is  based  on  the  principle 
participation  by  all  factions.  The 
ernal  settlement  does  not  include  all 
nationalist  leaders.  Thus  it 
eatens  to  further  divide  rather  than 
ify  the  people  of  Zimbabwe  and 
reatens  to  prolong  violence  rather 
an  end  it. 

Second,   the   Anglo-American  pro- 
sals  recognize  that  transitional  polit- 
i  il  institutions  must  not  be  subject  to 
ntrol  by  the  existing  illegal  regime  or 
■J,  y  one  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict. 
le  Salisbury  plan  would  introduce  a 
insitional  arrangement  of  shared  re- 
I:  onsibil ity   subject  to  the   rule  of 
lanimity  and  the  ultimate  authority  of 
jj)e  present  Parliament. 
ji  This  would  allow  Smith  to  hold  ef- 
rctive  power  and  to  wield  a  veto.  For, 
he  himself  said  in  an  interview  in  the 
i  mes  of  London  on  March  2,  whether 
•ople  liked  it  or  not,  the  present  Parlia- 
jient  was  the  sovereign  body  under 
le  existing  constitution  and  only  an 
i  ection  could  change  that.  That  is 
hat  Smith  said.  He  also  said  he  was 
ie  Prime  Minister  and  nobody  in  the 
orld  could  do  anything  about  it.   In 
fther  words,  although  others  may  be 
llssociated  with  him,   Smith  and  his 
Jirgely  white   Parliament  are   still   in 
pntrol  of  the  processes  of  government, 
lcluding  security  functions,   the  civil 
|;rvice,  and  the  passage  of  legislation. 
Third,  free  and  fair  elections  must 
je  assured  in  which  all  elements  of  the 
lopulation  and  all  Rhodesian  political 
iictions  would  participate  equally.  The 
Knglo-American  proposal  addressed  this 
•rinciple  by  proposing  that  the  British 
'Resident  Commissioner  would  help  in- 


sure that  result,  as  would  the  presence 
of  impartial  observers. 

Under  the  Salisbury  agreement  there 
appears  to  be  no  provision  for  interna- 
tional outside  participation  in  these 
elections  which  would  insure  their  fair- 
ness or  impartiality. 

Fourth,  in  order  to  insure  the  fair- 
ness and  irreversibility  of  a  transition 
process,  it  is  essential  to  maintain  law 
and  order  in  Zimbabwe.  The  record  of 
civil  strife  over  the  past  dozen  years 
precludes  reliance  on  the  Rhodesian 
Army  for  this  essential  purpose.  Con- 
sequently, it  was  suggested  that  a  U.N. 
peacekeeping  force  assist  the  Resident 
Commissioner  and  the  police  force  in 
maintaining  tranquility  during  the  tran- 
sitional period  and  in  insuring  the  im- 
partiality of  the  political  process. 

The  Salisbury  agreement  would  rely 
on  the  existing  Rhodesian  Army,  ab- 
sorbing into  it  those  guerrillas  capable 
of  passing  a  screening  process.  We 
cannot  but  conclude  that  such  a  provi- 
sion fails  to  take  into  account  the  his- 
tory of  bloodshed  which  makes  the 
Rhodesian  Army,  as  now  constituted, 
an  unsatisfactory  guarantor  of  the 
rights  of  all  Zimbabweans,  black  and 
white. 

Fifth,  provision  must  be  made  in 
Rhodesia  for  a  constitutional  system 
which  protects  the  rights  of  all.  The 
Anglo-American  proposal  provides  for 
an  independent  judiciary  and  an  en- 
trenched bill  of  rights.  The  bill  of 
rights  is  protected  against  change  to 
reassure  all  that  their  freedom  will  not 
be  overrun.  But  the  remainder  of  the 
constitution  can  be  changed  by  the 
process  of  law. 

The  constitution  outlined  in  Salis- 
bury also  envisages  an  independent 
judiciary  and  the  protection  of  certain 
rights.  However,  for  a  period  of  ap- 
proximately 10  years  changes  in  all  en- 
trenched aspects  of  the  constitution 
could  come  about  only  with  the  con- 
currence of  all  the  black  members  and 
six  of  the  white  members  of  Parlia- 
ment. Indeed,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
this  system  will  not  carry  over  after  the 
initial  10-year  period.  This  limitation 
of  the  ability  of  the  new  government  to 
bring  about  necessary  change  and  meet 
the  aspirations  of  the  majority  appear 
inconsistent  with  the  full  exercise  of 
sovereignty  by  an  independent  gov- 
ernment representing  all  the  people  of 
Zimbabwe. 

A  Catalyst  for  Renewed  Effort 

I  have  gone  into  some  detail  in  de- 
scribing what  we  think  should  go  into  a 
viable  plan  for  a  transition.  But  I  do 
not  believe,  however,  that  our  debate 
should  begin  and  end  on  this  theme. 


57 


My  government  hopes  that  these  Coun- 
cil meetings  can  serve  as  a  catalyst  to  a 
renewed  effort  to  bring  the  nationalist 
forces  together  in  a  new  attempt  to 
achieve  a  settlement  which  includes  all 
and  which  is  based  on  the  principles  of 
the  Anglo-American  plan.  We  are  pre- 
pared to  join  with  the  United  Kingdom, 
all  the  parties,  and  the  concerned  Afri- 
can states  in  a  new  effort  to  make  prog- 
ress and  remedy  the  inadequacies  of  the 
Salisbury  settlement  plans. 

We  have  no  illusion  that  this  will  be 
a  simple  task,  particularly  in  light  of 
the  evidence  that  the  Rhodesian  Armed 
Forces  continue  the  arrogant  practice  of 
raids  across  the  borders  of  neighboring 
countries.  The  recent  Rhodesian  am- 
bush of  a  patrol  of  the  Botswanan 
Army  well  within  the  borders  of  Bots- 
wana and  the  Rhodesian  raid  into  Zam- 
bia are  the  latest  examples  of  the  be- 
havior of  the  Smith  regime  which  must 
be  halted  if  we  are  to  believe  that  any 
kind  of  agreement  involving  him  is 
feasible. 

Success  in  a  new  effort  would  also 
require  the  support  of  this  Council 
and  of  the  African  states  most  directly 
involved.  We  would  need  a  consensus 
of  responsible  opinion  that  this  is  not 
the  time  for  actions  in  the  United  Na- 
tions or  elsewhere  which  would  fur- 
ther polarize  the  situation  but  the  time 
for  keeping  all  channels  of  communi- 
cation open.  Our  goal  would  be  to 
build  on  what  has  gone  before,  to 
produce  a  just  and  lasting  settlement 
for  Zimbabwe  whose  people  would  at 
last  know  the  blessings  of  independ- 
ence, freedom,  and  peace. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION2 

The  Security  Council. 

Recalling  its  resolutions  on  the  question  of 
Southern  Rhodesia  and  in  particular  resolution 
415  (1977)  of  29  September  1977. 

Reaffirming  that  the  continued  existence  of 
the  illegal  regime  in  Southern  Rhodesia  is  a 
source  of  insecurity  and  instability  in  the  re- 
gion and  constitutes  a  serious  threat  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Gravely  concerned  over  the  continued  mili- 
tary operations  by  the  illegal  regime,  including 
its  acts  of  aggression  against  neighbouring  in- 
dependent States, 

Indignant  at  the  continued  executions  of 
freedom  fighters  by  the  illegal  regime. 

Considering  the  need  for  urgent  measures  to 
terminate  the  illegal  regime  and  establish  a 
Government  based  on  majority  rule. 

1 .  Condemns  all  attempts  and  manoeuvres 
by  the  illegal  regime  aimed  at  the  retention  of 
power  by  a  racist  minority  and  at  preventing 
the  achievement  of  independence  by  Zim- 
babwe; 

2.  Declares  as  illegal  and  unacceptable  any 


58 


Department  of  State  Bull.| 


internal  settlement  under  the  auspices  of  the  il- 
legal regime  and  calls  upon  all  States  not  to 
accord  any  recognition  to  such  settlement; 

3.  Further  declares  that  the  speedy  termina- 
tion of  the  illegal  regime  and  the  replacement 
of  its  military  and  police  forces  is  the  first 
prerequisite  for  the  restoration  of  legality  in 
Southern  Rhodesia  so  that  arrangements  may 
be  made  for  a  peaceful  and  democratic  transi- 
tion to  genuine  majority  rule  and  independence 
in  1978; 

4.  Declares  also  that  such  arrangements  as 
envisaged  in  paragraph  3  include  the  holding 
of  free  and  fair  elections  on  the  basis  of  uni- 
versal adult  suffrage  under  United  Nations 
supervision; 

5.  Culls  upon  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  to  take  all  meas- 
ures necessary  to  bring  to  an  end  the  illegal 
racist  minority  regime  in  Southern  Rhodesia 
and  to  effect  the  genuine  decolonization  of  the 
territory  in  accordance  with  General  Assembly 
resolution  1514  (XV)  and  other  United  Na- 
tions resolutions; 


6.  Considers  that,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations,  the 
United  Kingdom  as  the  administering  Power 
should  enter  into  immediate  consultations  with 
the  parties  concerned  in  order  to  attain  the  ob- 
jectives of  genuine  decolonization  of  the  terri- 
tory through  the  implementation  of  paragraphs 
3,  4  and  5  above; 

7.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  report, 
not  later  than  15  April  1978,  on  the  results  of 
the  implementation  of  this  resolution.  □ 


Statement  in  the  U.N.  Security  Can/nil  on 
Mar.  14.  1978  (text  from  USUN  press  release 
10  of  Mar.  14):  Ambassador  Young  is  U.S. 
Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

'  For  text  of  Anglo-American  proposals,  see 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  3,  1977.  p.  417. 

-  U.N.  doc.  S/RES/423  (1978);  adopted  by 
the  Council  on  Mar.  14  by  a  vote  of  10  to  0, 
with  5  abstentions  (U.S.). 


Report  on  I  ..V 
Reform  and  Restructuring 


The  President  on  March  2  sent  to 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives [Thomas  P.  O'Neill.  Jr.] 
and  to  the  chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate 
[John  J.  Sparkman]  a  report  entitled 
"Reform  and  Restructuring  of  the 
United  Nations  System."1  In  the  re- 
port, the  President  called  the  United 
Nations  an  essential  instrument  of 
world  peace  and  U.S.  diplomacy  but 
proposed  a  number  of  concrete  steps 
for  the  U.S.  Government  to  pursue  in 
order  to  make  the  U.N.  system  more 
effective  in  the  future. 

Although  the  President  sends  an- 
nual reports  to  Congress  on  U.S.  ac- 
tivities in  the  United  Nations,  this  is 
the  first  report  concerning  reform  of 
the  U.N.  organization  itself  and,  ac- 
cordingly, contains  the  Administra- 
tion's recommendations  for 
realistically  strengthening  the  U.N. 
organization  in  a  number  of  areas. 
The  report  generally  indicates  the 
Administration's  commitment  to  giv- 
ing a  higher  priority  to  resolving  is- 
sues within  the  U.N.  framework  and 
its  belief  that  reforms  in  a  number  of 
areas  are  urgently  needed.  A  basic 
premise  of  the  report  is  that  under 
present  circumstances,  reform  by 
amending  the  U.N.  Charter  is  improb- 
able, and  it  is,  therefore,  more  pro- 


ductive to  seek  institutional  and 
administrative  reforms  within  the 
present  charter  framework. 

The  President's  report  (accom- 
panied by  a  longer  analysis  by  the 
Secretary  of  State)  is  organized 
around  seven  areas  of  concern  to  the 
Special  Committee  on  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  and  on  Strengthen- 
ing the  Role  of  the  Organization. 
These  are: 

•  Peace,  security,  and  strengthen- 
ing international  law; 

•  Decisionmaking  processes  in  the 
United  Nations; 

•  Human  rights; 

•  Financing  the  United  Nations; 

•  Achieving  greater  efficiency  in 
the  U.N.  system; 

•  Improving  U.S.  participation  in 
the  work  of  the  organizations  and 
programs  of  the  U.N.  system;  and 

•  The  Secretariat  of  the  U.N. 
system. 

Among  the  major  recommendations 
in   the    President's   report   are   the 

following: 

•  To  press  for  strengthening  of 
human  rights  procedures  in  the  United 
Nations; 

•  To  assist,  upon  request  from  the 
Secretary  General,   with  airlift  of 


troops  and  equipment  required  for 
tablishing  a  U.N.  peacekeeping  fo 
authorized  by  the  Security  Council; 

•  To  offer  factual  information  fr 
aircraft  reconnaissance  technology ^ 
the  Security  Council  when  the  pans 
to  a  dispute  agree  and  under  Secui 
Council  authorization; 

•  To  explore  the  possibility  of  i 
tablishing   a   special   peacekeepi 
fund  on  the  order  of  $100  million 
help  cover  initial  costs  of  operatii 
authorized  by  the  Security  Council; 

•  To  work  for  better  coordinat 
of  the  U.N.  technical  assistance 
tivities  by  making  the  U.N.  E 
velopment  Program  (UNDP)  t 
major  channel  for  U.S.  voluntary  c< 
tributions  and  helping  to  strengtl 
the  UNDP's  programing  and  co 
dinating  role; 

•  To  hold  periodic  meetings  of 
Security   Council   at   the   Forei 
Minister  level  as  part  of  a  general 
fort  to  strengthen  the  role  of  the  ! 
curity  Council  in  the  peaceful  sett 
ment  of  disputes; 

•  To  foster  greater  use  of  the  Int 
national  Court  of  Justice  by  a  varii 
of  means,  including  reevaluat 
existing  disputes  to  see  whether  tr 
are  appropriate  to  submit  to  t 
Court; 

•  To  give  substantially  greai 
weight  in  our  national  policy  to  de 
sions  arrived  at  by  consensus  in  U 
bodies; 

•  To  support  recent  General  / 
sembly  plans  to  restructure  and 
form  the  economic  and  social  fui 
tions  of  the  United  Nations;  and 

•  To  explore  new  ways  of  meeti 
the  U.N.  financial  deficit  and  explc 
the  possibility  of  supplementing  U. 
finances  from  sources  other  than  cc 
tributions  of  member  governments 

On  the  subject  of  weighted  votin  j 
the  President's  report  states,  there 
no  prospect  for  the  adoption  of  a  gel 
erally  applicable  weighted-voting  sy 
tern  in  the  General  Assembly.  The  r: 
port  suggests  that  instead  of  trying 
work  for  weighted  voting,  it  would  I 
better  to  employ  our  efforts  towai 
defining   voluntary   but   comrad 
standards  to  curtail  the  use  of  the  ve  f 
in  the  Security  Council  and  reduc 
the  necessity  of  invoking  it. 

The  report  notes  that  if  we  are  H 
develop  adequate  machinery  for  mai 
agement  of  the  world's  common  pro! 
lems,  a  central  concern  of  our  foreig 
policy  in  the  remaining  years  of  th 
century  must  be  the  building  of 
more  effective  U.N.  system.  To  th 
end,  this  Administration  is  committe 
to  working  for  a  stronger  and  moi 
effective  United  Nations. 


iril  1978 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE: 

Panama  Canal 
Neutrality  Treaty  Ratified 


President  Carter 

have  a  brief  statement  to  make. 

The  people  of  our  nation  owe  a 

)t  of  thanks  to  the  Members  of  the 

Senate  for  their  courageous  ac- 

n  taken  today   in  voting  for  the 

:iama  Canal  neutrality  treaty.1 

add  my  sincere  personal  congratu- 

ons  to  the  entire  Senate  and  espe- 

lly  to  the  three  men  who  have  led 

*;ir  colleagues   with  bipartisan 

rf  tesmanship  and  wisdom  through 

ki 


STATEMENT  BY 
SECRETARY  VANCE 

I  am  very  gratified  at  the  outcome  of 
this  first  crucial  vote  on  the  Panama 
Canal  treaties.  Passage  this  afternoon  of 
the  neutrality  treaty,  after  careful  and 
deliberate  consideration  by  the  U.S. 
Senate,  is  in  this  country's  highest  na- 
tional interest.  While  there  is  more 
work  to  do  and  another  treaty  to  con- 
sider, the  Administration  congratulates 
the  Senate  and  particularly  Majority 
Leader  Robert  Byrd,  Minority  Leader 
Howard  Baker,  and  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
John  Sparkman  on  this  major  step  for- 
ward. We  know  that  the  Government 
and  people  of  Panama  and  other  nations 
around  the  world  will  welcome  this  out- 
come. 


Made  on    Mar.    16,    1978   (text  from 
press  release  129  of  Mar.  29). 


is  long  debate — Senator  Robert 
/rd,  the  majority  leader;  Senator 
Dward  Baker,  the  minority  leader; 
id  Senator  John  Sparkman,  chairman 


of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 

As  a  nation,  we  also  owe  our 
gratitude  and  admiration  to  former 
President  Ford  and  to  Democratic  and 
Republican  leaders  who  have  served 
in  previous  Administrations  who,  by 
giving  the  treaties  their  support,  gave 
us  the  opportunity  to  judge  the 
treaties  on  their  merits  and  not  on  a 
partisan,  political  basis. 

This  vote  today  is,  of  course,  only 
the  first  step  in  the  process  of  ratifica- 
tion, but  I  am  confident  that  the  Sen- 
ate will  show  the  same  courage  and 
foresight  when  it  considers  the  second 
treaty.  This  is  a  promising  step  to- 
ward a  new  era  in  our  relationships 
with  Panama  and  with  all  of  Latin 
America. 

General  Torrijos  and  the  Panama- 
nian people  have  been  patient  and 
forbearing  during  the  negotiations 
and  during  the  Senate  debate. 
They've  earned  the  confidence  and 
respect  of  the  American  people.  Their 
actions  during  the  last  few  months  is 
proof  of  their  willingness  to  form  a 
partnership  with  us,  to  join  in  cooper- 
ation rather  than  confrontation. 

It's  been  more  than  14  years  since 
negotiations  began  with  Panama,  and 
we've  been  through  many  months  of 
discussion  and  debate  about  the  two 
treaties  that  the  Senate  has  consid- 
ered. This  has  been  a  long  debate,  but 
all  of  us  have  learned  from  it. 

The  basic  purpose  and  the  underly- 
ing principles  of  the  treaty  have  been 
affirmed  and  strengthened  by  the  ac- 
tions of  the  Senate.  Under  the  treaty 
as  approved,  the  United  States  and 
Panama  will  have  joint  responsibility 
to  assure  that  the  canal  after  the  year 
2000  will  remain  neutral  and  secure, 
open  and  accessible. 


In  the  context  of  consultations  with 
ongress,  the  United  States  will  pro- 
ved to  discuss  these  proposals  with 
Jther  members  of  the  United  Nations 
nd  with  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
nd  to  seek  their  support. 

The  presentation  of  this  report  was 
ursuant  to  Section  503  of  the 
oreign  Relations  Authorization  Act, 
Y  1978  (Public  Law  95-105).  □ 


Text  from   Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  6,  1978,  p.  449. 

1  Copies  of  the  report  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  D.C.  20520.  For  text  of  identical 
letters  transmitting  the  report  to  Speaker 
O'Neill  and  Senator  Sparkman.  see  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Mar.  6,  1978. 


59 


The  United  States  can  take  what- 
ever actions  are  necessary  to  make 
sure  the  canal  remains  open  and  safe. 
The  vessels  of  war  and  auxiliary  ves- 
sels of  the  United  States  and  Panama 
are  assured  of  transit  through  the 
canal  as  quickly  as  possible  and  can 
go  to  the  head  of  the  line  in  time  of 
emergency  or  need. 

While  the  right  of  the  United  States 
and  Panama  to  act  against  any  threat 
to  the  regime  of  neutrality  is  assured 
by  this  treaty,  it  does  not  mean  that 
there  is  a  right  of  intervention,  nor  do 
we  want  a  right  of  intervention  by  the 
United  States  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Panama. 

But  perhaps  the  most  encouraging 
lesson  of  all  in  these  last  long  months 
is  that  in  a  full  and  open  debate,  even 
in  a  very  controversial  and  difficult 
issue,  in  our  foreign  policy  objec- 
tives, we  can  still  reach  the  decisions 
that  are  in  our  nation's  long-term, 
best  interests. 

I  congratulate  again  the  Senators 
for  their  decision  and  give  them,  on 
behalf  of  the  nation,  my  sincere 
thanks.  □ 


Remarks  made  on  Mar.  16,  1978  {text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Mar.  20,  1978). 

1  By  a  vote  of  68  to  32,  the  Senate  gave  its 
advice  and  consent  on  Mar.  16,  1978,  to  the 
Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutrality 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty.  Adopted  at  Santiago  November  18, 
1966,  at  the  Fourth  Consultative  Meeting. 
Entered  into  force  October  30,  1968,  for 
IV-20  through  IV-28  in  English.  TIAS 
6668. 
Notification  of  approval:   Belgium,  January 

26,    1978,   for  Recommendations  IV-18, 

IV-19. 
Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Ant- 
arctic treaty.  Adopted  at  Tokyo  October  30, 
1970,  at  the  Sixth  Consultative  Meeting.  En- 
tered into  force  October  10,  1973,  for  Rec- 
ommendations VI-l-VI-7,  VI-ll-VI-15. 
TIAS  7796. 
Notification  of  approval:   Belgium,  January 

26,    1978,  for  Recommendations   VI-8, 

VI-10. 


60 


Department  of  State  Build 


Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  De- 
cember 16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October 
14.  1971.  TIAS  7192. 

Ratification  deposited:  Senegal,  February  3, 
1978. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  23,  1971.  En- 
tered into  force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS 
7570. 

Accession  deposited:   Senegal,   February   3. 
1978. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,  1944)  (TIAS  1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  30,  1977. ' 
Signature,  without  reservation  as  to  accept- 
ance: Italy,  March  13,  1978. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.  Done 
at  Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
March  19.  1967;  for  the  United  States  De- 
cember 24,  1969.  TIAS  6820. 
Ratification  deposited:  Peru.  February  17. 
1978. 

Cultural  Property 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  cultural  prop- 
erty in  the  event  of  armed  conflict  and  regu- 
lations of  execution.  Done  at  The  Hague 
May  14.  1954.  Entered  into  force  August  7. 
1956. 2 

Accession  deposited:   Oman.   October  26, 
1977. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  trans- 
port of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets. 
with  annexes  and  protocol  of  signature. 
Done  at  Geneva  January  15,  1959.  Entered 
into  force  January  7,  1960;  March  3,  1969, 
for  the  United  States.  TIAS  6633. 
Accession  deposited:  Malta.  January  31, 
1978. 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  trans- 
port of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets. 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  November 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  March  20, 
1978. 2 

Ratifications  deposited:    Finland.   February 
27,  1978;  Switzerland.  February  3,  1978. 

International  convention  on  mutual  administra- 
tive assistance  for  the  prevention,  investiga- 
tion, and  repression  of  customs  offenses, 
with   annexes.    Done   at   Nairobi    June   9, 

1977.  Open  for  signature   until  June  30, 

1978.  Enters  into  force  3  months  after  five 
States  Members  of  the  Customs  Cooperation 
Council  have  signed  without  reservation  of 
ratification  or  have  deposited  their  instru- 
ments of  ratification  or  accession. 

Energy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  co- 
operative information  exchange  relating  to 
the  development  of  solar  heating  and  cool- 
ing systems  in  buildings.  Formulated  at 
Odeillo,  France.  October   1-4.    1974.   En- 


tered into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS  8202. 
Signature:   Ministerio  de   Industria  y  Ener- 
gia,  Spain,  February  6.  1978. 

Expositions 

Convention  relating  to  international  exhibi- 
tions. Done  at  Paris  November  22,  1928. 
Entered  into  force  January  17,  1931;  for  the 
United  States  June  24,  1968.  TIAS  6548. 
Notification  of  denunciation  deposited:  Tan- 
zania, August  19,  1977;  effective  August 
19,  1978. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
November  30.  1977. 

Accession   deposited:   Guinea-Bissau. 
January  25.  1978. 

Fisheries 

International  convention  for  the   high  seas 
fisheries  of  the  North  Pacific  Ocean,  with 
annex  and  protocol.  Done  at  Tokyo  May  9, 
1952.   Entered  into  force  June    12,    1953 
TIAS  2786. 

Withdrawal  of  notice  of  termination:  United 
States,  February  6,  1978. 

International  convention  for  the  conservation  of 
Atlantic  tunas.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  May 
14,  1966.  Entered  into  force  March  21, 
1969.  TIAS  6767 

Adherence  deposited:    Benin.   January   9. 
1978. 

Human  Rights 

International   covenant   on   civil   and   political 
rights.   Done  at  New  York   December   16, 
1966.  Entered  into  force  March  23.  1976. 2 
Ratification  deposited:    Senegal,   February 
13,  1978. 

Optional  protocol  to  the  international  covenant 
on  civil  and  political  rights.  Done  at  New 
York  December  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force 
March  23.  1976. 2 

Ratification   deposited:    Senegal,    February 
13,  1978. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 
and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York  De- 
cember 16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  January 
3,  1976. 2 

Ratification  deposited:    Senegal,    February 
13,  1978. 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 
at  Vienna  February  21,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  August  16,  1976. 2 

Ratification  deposited:   Argentina.   February 
16.  1978. 

Patents 

Patent   cooperation   treaty,    with   regulations 
Done  at  Washington  June   19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  January  24,    1978  (except  for 
Chapter   II);   Chapter   II   entered   into   force 
March  29.   1978. 2  TIAS  8733. 
Ratifications    deposited:    Luxembourg   (ex- 
cept  lor  Chapter   II),  January   31.    197K. 
Sweden   (with  declaration).   February    17, 
1978. 


Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  produi 
phonograms  against   unauthorized  duplicai 
of  their  phonograms.   Done  at  Geneva 
tober  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force  April 
1973;  for  the  United  States  March  10.  1' 
TIAS  7808. 

Notification  from  World  Intellectual  Pi 
erty  Organization  that  ratification  de/ 
ited:  Israel.  February  1,  1978. 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Ur 
with  final  protocol,  signed  at  Vie 
January  10,  1964  (TIAS  5881).  as  ameni 
by  additional  protocol,  signed  at  To 
November  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  . 
1.  1971,  except  for  article  V,  which  entt 
into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Accession  deposited:  Grenada,  Novembe: 

1976. 

Denunciation:  Portugal  on  behalf  of  the  F 

tuguese   Provinces  in  Asia  and  Oceai 

December  28,    1977;  effective  Decern 

28.   1978.   Membership  of  the  Portugu 

Republic   in   the    Union   will   hencefc 

consist  of  "the  whole  of  National  Portuga 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitul 

of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July 

1964.  general  regulations  with  final  protc 

and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  conv 

tion  with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regi 

tions.  Done  at  Lausanne  July  5,   1974. 

tered   into  force  January    I,    1976.   1 

8231. 

Accession  deposited:  Grenada.  Novembei 

1976. 

Ratification  deposited:  Morocco.  Novem 
23,  1977. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  che> 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations.  Di 
at  Lausanne  July  5,  1974,  Entered  into  fo 
January  1.  1976.  TIAS  8232. 
Ratification  deposited:  Morocco,  Noveml 
23.  1977. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done 
New  York  December  21,  1965.  Entered  it 
force  January  4,  1969.2 
Accessions  deposited:  Nicaragua,  Februa 
15,  1978;  Seychelles.  March  7.  1978. 

Red  Cross 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  t 
condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  arm' 
forces  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva  Augu 
12.  1949.  Entered  into  force  October  2 
1950;  for  the  United  States  February 
1956.  TIAS  3362. 
Notification  of  succession:  Djibouti 
January  26.  1978. 

Refugees 

Convention  relating  to  the  status  of  refugee 
with  schedule  and  annex.  Signed  at  Gene\ 
July  28,  1951.  Entered  into  force  April  21 
1954. 2 

Accession  deposited:    Dominican  Republic 
January  4,  1978. 


1978 


61 


Unification    of  succession:    Lesotho. 

ifebruary  10.  1978. 

'■■"■      ol  relating  to  the   status  of  refugees. 

:     e  at  New  York  January  31,    1967.   En- 

i;    d  into  force  October  4.    1967;  for  the 

ted  States  November   1,    1968.   TIAS 

/. 

tssions  deposited:  Dominican  Republic, 
J    inuary  4.   1978;  Lesotho.  February    10, 
178 

ll-Antarctic 

■  Sntion  for  the  conservation  of  Antarctic 
■is,  with  annex  and  final  act.  Done  at 
Sdon  June  1,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
||ch  11.  1978. 

M-laimed  by  the  President:   February   24, 
178 

intion  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  January 
1975.  Entered  into  force  September  15. 

5.  TIAS  8480 

ification   deposited :    Switzerland. 

ebruary  15,  1978. 

ession  deposited:   Yugoslavia,   February 

t,  1978. 

jtional  sugar  agreement,  1977,  with  an- 
s.  Done  at  Geneva  October  7,  1977. 
tied  into  force  provisionally  January   1, 

i. 

ifications  deposited:   Jamaica.   February 

5,  1978;  Madagascar,  January  30.  1978. 
ifications  of  provisional  application  de- 
osited:   Paraguay,   January   24,    1978; 

Ilozambique,  January  24,  1978. 
rism 
ntion  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 

0  Times  against  internationally  protected 
p  ions,  including  diplomatic  agents.  Done 
a -lew   York  December   14,    1973.   Entered 

1  force  February  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
B>essf'on  deposited:   Iraq,  February   28, 

978. 


I    international   tin  agreement,   with  an- 
jies.  Done  at  Geneva  June  21,   1975.  En- 
Icd  into  force  June  14.  1977    TIAS  8607. 
Unification    deposited:    Netherlands, 
-ebruary  2.  1978. 

I  e 

teiration  on  the  provisional  accession  of  Co- 
Inbia  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
il  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  July  23,  1975.  En- 

Hed  into  force  January  22,    1976;  for  the 

lliited  States  May  1 .  1976.  TIAS  8322. 

mceptance  deposited:   Cuba,  January  6, 

(.1978. 

Wes-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
bvisional  accession  of  Colombia.  Done  at 

•  pneva  November  12,  1976.  Entered  into 
rce  December  17.  1976;  for  the  United 
ates  March  28,  1977.  TIAS  8664. 

'yceptances  deposited:  Cuba,  January  6, 
'1978;  Netherlands.  November  8.  1977. 

tfenth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declara- 


tion on  the  provisional  accession  of  Tunisia 

to  the  GATT.   Done  at  Geneva  November 

11.    1977.   Entered  into  force  December  22, 

1977;   for  the   United  States  January    11. 

1978. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Denmark.  December 

I.  1977;  Japan,  December  23,  1977; 
Korea.  January  5.  1978;  Tunisia,  De- 
cember 22,    1977;   United   States,   January 

II.  1978. 

Second  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration 
on  the  provisional  accession  of  the  Philip- 
pines to  the  GATT  (TIAS  7839).  Done  at 
Geneva  November  11,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  January  24,  1978. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Denmark,  December 

I,  1977;  Japan.  December  23,  1977; 
Korea.  January  5.  1978;  Philippines, 
January  24,   1978;  United  States,  January 

II,  1978. 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  December 
20,  1973  (TIAS  78401.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 14,  1977.  Entered  into  force  January 
1,  1978,  for  the  countries  which  accepted  it 
by  that  date. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Austria,  January  12. 
1978;3  Brazil.  December  30,  1977;4  Co- 
lombia. December  23,  1977;  European 
Economic  Community,  December  29, 
1977;5  Guatemala,  December  30,  1977;" 
India.  December  30,  1977;  Japan,  De- 
cember 27,  1977;  Mexico,  December  30, 
1977;  Pakistan.  January  25.  1978; 
Romania.  January  6,  1978;  Singapore. 
January  5.  1978;  Sri  Lanka,  January  4, 
1978;  Switzerland,  December  28,  1977;3 
Thailand.  December  21.  1977;  United 
Kingdom,  December  30,  1977;6  United 
States,  December  29,  1977. 

Wheat 

Wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  international 
wheat  agreement)  1971.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force  June 
18,  1971,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions; 
July  1,  1971.  with  respect  to  other  provi- 
sions. TIAS  7144. 

Accession  deposited:  Iran.  January  19, 
1978. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  March  17,  1976.  En- 
tered into  force  June  19,  1976,  with  respect 
to  certain  provisions;  July  1.  1976,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:   Iran.   January    19. 

1978. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Argentina,  February 
22,  1978;  Bolivia,  February  14.  1978;  Is- 
rael, February  16,  1978. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the   interna- 
tional wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144) 
Done  at  Washington  March   17,   1976.   En- 
tered into  force  June  19,  1976.  with  respect 
to  certain  provisions;  July  1,  1976,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 


Ratification  deposited:   Argentina.   February 

22.  1978. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  November  23,    1972.   Entered  into 
force  December  17.  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Costa  Rica.  August 

23,  1977;   India,   November   14,    1977; 
Tanzania,  August  2.  1977. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project  agreement  concerning  rural  develop- 
ment, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Kabul  Sep- 
tember 18,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 18.  1977. 

Project  grant  agreement  concerning  agricul- 
tural credit,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Kabul 
September  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 18,  1977. 

Australia 

Agreement  regarding  the  management  and  op- 
eration of  the  Joint  Geological  and  Geophys- 
ical Research  Station  at  Alice  Springs,  Aus- 
tralia. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Canberra  February  28.  1978.  Entered  into 
force  March  2.  1978. 

Bahamas 

Agreement  relating  to  U.S.  participation  in  the 
National  Insurance  Scheme  of  the  Bahamas, 
with  related  note.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Nassau  October  27,  1976,  May  6 
and  September  23,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
September  23,  1977;  effective  October  7, 
1974. 

Bolivia 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Signed  at  La  Paz  February  10.  1978.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  of  exchange  of  in- 
struments of  ratification. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement  on  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington February  9,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
February  9.  1978 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Costa  Rica  during  calendar 
year  1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  December  21  and  30,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  December  30,  1977;  effec- 
tive January  1 .  1978. 

Djibouti 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  agricul- 
tural commodities  to  Djibouti.  Signed  at 
Djibouti  January  9,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
January  9.  1978. 

Egypt 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  a  commodity  im- 
port program.  Signed  at  Cairo  February  27, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  February  27,  1978. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bu  | 


El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  El  Salvador  during  calendar 
year  1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  December  21.  1977  and  January 
19.  1978.  Entered  into  force  Januar>  14, 
1978;  effective  January  I,  1978. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
17.  1977  (T1AS  8677)  for  sales  of  agricul- 
tural commodities  and  the  exchange  of  let- 
ters of  December  16.  1977,  concerning  de- 
velopment projects.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Jakarta  February  23,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  February  23,  1978. 

Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization 

Agreement  relating  to  a  procedure  for  U.S.  in- 
come tax  reimbursements.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  London  May  18  and 
June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  June  8. 
1977. 

Israel 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  the  economic  and 
political  stability  of  Israel,  with  attach- 
ments. Signed  at  Washington  December  5, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  December  5,  1977. 

Agreement  concerning  a  program  assistance 
grant  to  promote  the  economic  and  political 
stability  of  Israel.  Signed  at  Washington 
December  5,  1977.  Entered  into  force  De- 
cember 5,  1977. 

Agreement  concerning  a  cash  grant  to  provide 
necessary  foreign  exchange  to  support  the 
economic  requirements  of  Israel.  Signed  at 
Washington  December  5,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  December  5.  1977. 

Jordan 

Project  loan  agreement  relating  to  the  Maqarin 
Dam  and  Jordan  Valley  irrigation  system 
design,  with  annexes  Signed  at  Amman 
September  21,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 21.  1977. 

Project  loan  agreement  concerning  rural  and 
urban  electrification,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Amman  September  21.  1977.  Entered  into 
force  September  21 ,  1977. 

Republic  of  Korea 

Agreement  relating  to  the  provision  of  medical 
treatment  to  Korean  veterans  of  the  Korean 
and  Vietnam  conflicts  in  Veterans  Adminis- 
tration hospitals  in  the  United  States.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Seoul  Feb- 
ruary 3.  1978.  Entered  into  force  February 
3,   1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  July 
31,  1970.  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
6941,  7927),  for  a  cooperative  meteorologi- 
cal observation  program  in  Mexico.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico  and 
Tlatelolco  January  31,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  January  31,  1978. 


Mozambique 

Agreement  relating  to  transfer  of  agricultural 
commodities  to  Mozambique.  Signed  at 
Maputo  December  2.  1977.  Entered  into 
force  December  2.  1977. 

Romania 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles, 
with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Bucharest  January  6  and  25,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  January  25.  1978:  effective 
January  1.  1978. 

Agreement  clarifying  certain  understandings 
relating  to  the  supply  of  enriched  uranium  to 
Romania  for  the  TRIGA  reactor.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  February 
13.  1978.  Entered  into  force  February  13. 
1978. 

Sri  Lanka 

Loan  agreement  concerning  Mahaweli  Ganga 
irrigation,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Colombo 
November  9.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
November  9,  1977. 


Loan  agreement  concerning  paddy  storasi 
processing,  with  annexes.  Signed  a! 
lombo  February  2,  1978.  Entered  intoi 
February  2.  1978. 

Syria 

Loan   agreement   relating   to  agricultura 
duction  and  economic  development.  Si 
at  Damascus  September  20.    1977.  Ei 
into  force  September  20,  1977. 

Project  grant  agreement  relating  to  teel 
services  and  feasibility  studies,  with  a) 
Signed   at   Damascus   September  20, 
Entered  into  force  September  20.  1977. 


1  Not  in  force. 

2  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

3  Subject  to  ratification. 

4  Signed  ad  referendum. 

5  With  a  declaration. 

*  Accepted  on  behalf  of  Hong  Kong. 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


.. 


March  2-15 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.      Date  Subject 

*  1 03     3/2        Inauguration    of    the    Family 

Liaison  Office.  Mar.   1. 

*  104    3/3       Galen  L.  Stone  sworn  in  as  Am- 

bassador to  Cyprus  (biographic 
data). 

*  105    3/6       Program  for  the  official  visit  to 

Washington,  D.C..  of  Yugoslav 
President  Tito.  Mar.  6-9. 
*106    3/6       David  T.   Schneider  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador   to   Bangladesh 
(biographic  data). 

*  107    3/7       U.S.,   Hungary  conclude  trade 

agreement  negotiations. 

*  108    3/8       Advisory  Committee  on   Music. 

U.S.   Advisory  Committee  on 
Classical  Music,  Apr.  3. 

*  109    3/9        Vance:  statement  before  the  Sub- 

committee on   Foreign  Opera- 
tions of  the  Senate  Committee 
on   Appropriations   concerning 
foreign  assistance  programs. 
1  10    3/8        Vance,  Owen:  joint  statement. 

*lll  3/10  John  P.  Condon  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Fiji  (biographic 
data). 

*112  3/11  Joint  statement  of  U.S.  and 
Netherlands  delegations  con- 
cerning North  Atlantic  air  serv- 
ices. 


*1I3     3/13     Advisory  Committee  on  P: 
International  Law,  Study  I 
on  Transnational   Bankr  | 
Problems.  Apr.  24. 

*  1 14    3/13     Thomas  J.  Corcoran  sworn   I 

Ambassador  to   Burundi.    ) 
10  (biographic  data). 

*I15  3/13  U.S.  Republic  of  Korea  ct  | 
bilateral  textile  agreement.  U 
24  and  Mar.  9. 

*116  3/15  International  Commission  f 0 1 
Conservation  of  Atlantic  T  1 
Advisory  Committee  tc  I 
U.S.  National  Section.  Apr  J 

*117  3/15  Shipping  Coordinating  Comn  * 
(SCO.  Subcommittee  on  S  I 
of  Life  at  Sea,  working  {  ■ 
on  ship  design  and  equipr  C 
Apr.   I  1. 

*118  3/15  Advisory  Committee  on  InL  fr 
tional  Intellectual  Propifl 
Apr.  11. 

*119  3/15  U.S.  Organization  for  the  InM 
tional  Radio  Consulta'C 
Committee  (CCIR).  St  J 
Group  4,  Apr.   I  1 . 

♦120    3/15     SCC,  Apr.  12. 

*121  3/15  U.S.  Organization  for  the  Inti 
tional  Telegraph  and  Telepl 
Consultative  Committee,  . 
12. 

*122  3/15  U.S.  Organization  of  the  C( 
Study  (iroup  1 .  Apr.   14. 

*  1 23     3/15     U.S.  Organization  for  the  C( 

Study  Group  5.  Apr.  19. 

*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


INDEX 


>l  L  1978 

I  78,  NO.  2013 


§ty     Assistance     to     the     Sub-Sahara 
ise) 


of    Yugoslav    President    Tito    (joint 


30 


ment) 


44 


.  t  :tica.   Antarctic  Resource  and  Environ- 

':M  tal  Concerns  (Mink)   '. .  .  .  51 

■  Control 
iance  With  the  SALT  I  Agreements  (let- 
from  Secretary   Vance,   Administration 
rt)    10 

ctheet  on  SALT  Negotiations   3 

al  Security  Interests  (Carter)    17 

f  An  Ongoing  Process  (Warnke)    1 

•t  .ation  of  the   Proposed  SALT  II  Agree- 

t  (letter  from  ACDA  Director  Warnke, 

ii      linistration  report)     15 

»JDf  Yugoslav  President  Tito  (joint  state- 


t) 


44 


it.  .al  Security  Interests  (Carter)     17 

ijity    Assistance    to    East    Asia    (Hol- 

bi  >ke) 31 

-viion.  President  Carter's  News  Con- 
H'nces,    February    17,    March    2   and   9 

*  erpts)     19 

il  ria.  Letter  of  Credence  (Grigorov)     ...  43 
ii  .  Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 

f  >ke) 31 

m  "ess 

lit  :tic  Resource  and  Environmental  Con- 

c  is  (Mink)    51 

S'  .     Semiannual     Report     (Department 

s  ement)    42 

o\  ry  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 

(.  ineider)    47 

e<   Seabed   Mining  Legislation  (Richard- 

I) 54 

it'iational   Financial   Institutions  (Coop- 

I   37 

4* ri ty  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
toke) 31 

Htrity     Assistance     to     the     Sub-Sahara 

(  oose)    30 

■i  Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)    ...  24 

nark.    Visit   of  Danish   Prime   Minister 

J  gensen  (White  House  statement)    47 

*  loping  Countries 

it  national   Financial   Institutions  (Coop- 

37 

Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)    ...  24 

<ti  omics 

i^rica's  Stake  in  an  Open  International  Trad- 
E  System  (Vance)   35 

II  national   Financial   Institutions  (Coop- 

I'  37 

I  Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)  ...  24 
I  -Iran    Joint    Commission    (joint    com- 

mique)    48 

trgy.  America's  Stake  in  an  Open  Interna- 
mal  Trading  System  ( Vance)    35 


Environment 

Antarctic  Resource  and  Environmental  Con- 
cerns (Mink)    51 

Deep  Seabed  Mining  Legislation  (Richard- 
son)   54 

Ethiopia.  President  Carter's  News  Confer- 
ences, February  17,  March  2  and  9  (ex- 
cerpts)      19 

Europe 

Belgrade  Review  Meeting  Concludes 
(Goldberg,  concluding  document.  White 
House  statement)    40 

CSCE  Semiannual  Report  (Department  state- 
ment)     42 

National  Security  Interests  (Carter)    17 

Food.  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 
(Vance)    24 

Human  Rights 

Belgrade  Review  Meeting  Concludes 
(Goldberg,  concluding  document,  White 
House  statement)    40 

Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 
(Schneider)    47 

Human  Rights  Treaties    48 

Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
brooke)   31 

U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)    ...  24 

Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  Tito  (joint  state- 
ment)     44 

Indonesia 

Letter  of  Credence  (Danudirdjo)   33 

Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
brooke)   31 

Iran.  U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  (joint  com- 
munique)     48 

Japan.  Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
brooke)   31 

Kenya.  Kenya  (White  House  statement)        .30 

Korea.  Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
brooke)   31 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Dee'p  Seabed  Mining  Legisla- 
tion (Richardson)   54 

Malaysia.  Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia 
(Holbrooke)  31 

Middle  East 

National  Security  Interests  (Carter)    17 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences.  February 
1  7.  March  2  and  9  (excerpts)   19 

Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  Tito  (joint  state- 
ment)     44 

Military  Affairs.  National  Security  Interests 
(Carter)    17 

Monetary  Affairs.  President  Carter's  News 
Conferences,  February  17,  March  2  and  9 
(excerpts)     19 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Na- 
tional Security  Interests  (Carter)   17 

Nuclear  Policy 

National  Security  Interests  (Carter)     17 

Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978  (Carter)    ....  49 

Nuclear  Safeguards  Agreement  (White  House 
announcement)   50 

Oceans 

Antarctic  Resource  and  Environmental  Con- 
cerns (Mink)    51 

Deep  Seabed  Mining  Legislation  (Richard- 
son)      54 

Panama.  Panama  Canal  Neutrality  Treaty 
Ratified  (Carter,  Vance)  59 


Presidential  Documents 

Human  Rights  Treaties    48 

National  Security  Interests  17 

Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978   49 

Panama  Canal  Neutrality  Treaty  Ratified     .  .  59 
President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  February 

17,  March  2  and  9  (excerpts)   19 

Security  Assistance 

Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 

(Schneider)    47 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  February 

17,  March  2  and  9  (excerpts)   19 

Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia  (Hol- 
brooke)     31 

Security       Assistance      to      the      Sub-Sahara 

(Moose)   30 

U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)    ...  24 
Somalia.   President  Carter's  News  Confer- 
ences, February    17,   March  2  and  9  (ex- 
cerpts)    19 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Southern  Rhodesia  (joint  statement)  30 

Southern  Rhodesia  (Young,  text  of  resolu- 
tion)      56 

Terrorism.  Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  Tito 
(joint  statement)   44 

Thailand.  Security  Assistance  to  East  Asia 
(Holbrooke) 31 

Trade.  America's  Stake  in  an  Open  Interna- 
tional Trading  System  (Vance)    35 

Treaties 

Current  Actions    59 

Human  Rights  Treaties    48 

Nuclear  Safeguards  Agreement  (White  House 
announcement)   50 

Panama  Canal  Neutrality  Treaty  Ratified 
(Carter,  Vance)    59 

U.S.S.R. 

SALT:  An  Ongoing  Process  (Warnke)    1 

U.S.S.R.  (Department  statement)  43 

United  Nations 

Report  on  U.N.  Reform  and  Restructuring   ....  58 

Southern  Rhodesia  (Young,  text  of  resolu- 
tion)     56 

U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (Vance)    ...  24 

Western  Samoa.  Letter  of  Credence 
(Toma)   33 

Yugoslavia 

Belgrade  Review  Meeting  Concludes 
(Goldberg,  concluding  document.  White 
House  statement)    40 

Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  Tito  (joint  state- 
ment)     44 

Yugoslavia — A  Profile    45 

Name  Index 

Carter,  President   17,  19,  49.  59 

Cooper,  Richard  N  37 

Danudirdjo,  Ashari    33 

Goldberg.  Arthur  J  40 

Grigorov.  Konstantin  Nicolov   43 

Holbrooke.  Richard  C   31 

Mink.  Patsy  T   51 

Moose.  Richard  M    30 

Richardson.  Elliot  L    54 

Schneider,  Mark  L   47 

Toma,  Iulai    33 

Vance,  Secretary    24,  35,  59 

Warnke,  Paul  C     1 

Young,  Andrew    56 


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m  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2014 


M04»partnt4>nt  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2014  /  May  1978 


Cover  Photo: 

With  President  Perez  in  Caracas 


The  Department  of  State  Bul- 
letin, published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to 
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on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions and  the  work  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Aff:  i 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A   YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


1     THE  PRESIDENT       Visit  to  Latin  America  and  Africa 


20 

23 


29 


31 


32 


33 


34 


35 


36 


39 


42 


46 


46 


47 


THE  SECRETARY 

Arms  Control  and  National  Security 
Question-and-Answer  Session  Follow- 
ing ASNE  Address 
News  Conference,  March  24 

ARMS  CONTROL 

U.N.  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 
(Report  by  Secretary  Vance) 

Enhanced  Radiation  Weapons  (Presi- 
dent Carter) 

INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION  AGENCY 

EUROPE 

Assistance  Programs  to  Greece,  Tur- 
key, and  Cyprus  (Secretary  Vance) 

Department  Statement  on  Eastern 
Mediterranean 

Seventh  Report  on  Cyprus  ( Message 
from  President  Carter) 

German  Democratic  Republic  (David 
B.  Bolen) 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

The  United  States  at  Belgrade  (Con- 
gressman Dante  B.  Fascell) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

A  Status  Report  on  the  Peace  Process 

(Alfred  L.  Atherton.  Jr.) 

Terrorist  Attack  in  Israel  (President 
Carter,  Secretary  Vance,  Letter 
from  President  Carter) 

Southern  Lebanon  (Department 
Statements,  Letter  from  Secretary 
Vance) 

Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  U.S. 
March  20-23  (White  House  State- 
ment. Exchange  of  Remarks) 


SOUTH  ASIA 

48     Recent   Developments   in   South  Asia 
(Adolph  Dubs) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

51  U.N.   Interim  Force  in  Lebanon   (An- 

drew Young,  Resolutions) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

52  Panama  Canal  Treaty  Ratified  (Presi- 

dent Carter,  Secretary  Vance) 
52     Senate  Additions  to  the  Panama  Canal 

Treaties 
54    Central  America  (Terence  A.  Todman) 

56  Cuba  (Foreign  Relations  Outline) 

57  TREATIES 

59    PRESS  RELEASES 
61     PUBLICATIONS 
INDEX 


.  „  public  Library 

80510   Int  of  Document* 
Superintendent  oi 

JIM  2  0  *73 
DEPOSITORY 


Secretary  Vance  and  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs  Brzezinski  in  Brasil 

President  Carter  with  Lt.  Gen  Obasanjo  in  Logo 

Mrs.  Carter  and  Amy  in  Badagri,  Nigeria 

President  Carter  and  A  my  with 
President  Tolhert  in  Monrovia 

A  newsman 

U.S.  "fan" in  Monrovia 


I47S 


- 


THE  PRESIDENT: 

Visit  to  Latin  America  and  Africa 


sident  Carter  left  Washington  March  28,  1978,  on  a  trip  to  Venezuela, 
!,  Nigeria,  and  Liberia.  He  returned  on  April  3,  1978. 
lowing  are  remarks  by  President  Carter  made  on  various  occasions  dur- 
<e  trip — including  his  addresses  in  Caracas,  Brasilia,  and  Lagos  and  his 
conference  in  Brasilia — as  well  as  texts  of  the  joint  communiques  with 
\uela,  Brazil,  and  Nigeria.   ' 


ARKS  TO 

SZUELAN  CONGRESS, 

^CAS,  MAR.  292 

honored  today  to  stand  in  this 
ssembly  of  one  of  the  greatest 
ns  on  Earth,  to  bring  warm 
ings  from  the  people  of  the 
j  States,  whose  love  of  liberty 
deep  as  your  own.  Our  nations 
ined  not  just  by  common  inter- 
ut  by  the  strongest  and  the  most 
g  bond  of  all — that  of  shared 

lezuela  stands  high  among  those 

lave  defended  the  cause  of  de- 

cy.   A  century  and  a  half  ago, 

•ave  to  the  world  Simon  Bolivar, 

tibol  of  liberty   whose  example 

es  far  beyond   the   Americas. 

Venezuela  provides  unmistaka- 

'roof  that  political  liberty  and 

mic  progress  need  not  be  con- 

g  ideals  but  can  strengthen  one 

;r. 

irly  200  years  ago.  General 
:isco  de  Miranda  traveled 
gh  my  own  country  as  he  pre- 

for  the  struggle  to  free  Ven- 
i.  And  last  year,  your  President 
ay  friend,  Carlos  Andres  Perez, 
ed  that  journey,  and  with  each 
tie  took  in  my  own  country,  he 
stood  even  better  our  traditional, 
ion  commitment  to  democratic 
s. 

ur  country  has  worked  tirelessly 
vith  success  for  wider  adoption 
ie  American  Convention  on 
in  Rights  and  strengthening  of 
nter-American  Commission  on 
in  Rights.  We  believe,  as  you 
lat  none  of  us  can  enjoy  true  lib- 
vhen  others  are  oppressed, 
ur  country  and  others  in  Latin 
"ica  and  in  the  Caribbean  have 

the  lead  in  another  area,  which 
have  an  equally  profound  effect 
ie  world  of  the  future:  the  rela- 
iip  between  the  advanced  indus- 
nations  which  have  the  greatest 

of  influence  and  material  goods 
ie  one  hand,  and  the  poor  and 
oping  nations  of  the  world  who 


are  understandably  seeking  a  larger 
and  more  equitable  share. 

Before  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States  (OAS)  last  year,  I  stated 
that  the  economic  issues  of  central 
concern  to  the  United  States  and  to 
Latin  America  are  global  issues  and 
that  they  need  to  be  addressed  in  a 
continuing  dialogue  between  the  rich 
and  the  poor  nations.3 

Closer  consultation  among  our  na- 
tions would  lead  to  greater  harmony, 
better  collective  judgment  which  can 
avoid  mistakes,  and  the  prevention  of 
inadvertent  injury  to  those  who  are 
weak  and  most  vulnerable. 

Shared  Responsibility 

Today  I  would  like  to  discuss  with 
you  the  responsibility  we  share — 
developed  and  developing  countries 
alike — for  creating  a  more  just  inter- 
national order.  I  want  to  discuss  a  vi- 
sion of  what  our  world  can 
become — whether  it  will  be  a  world 
of  inequality  and  want  or  one  of 
partnership  and  fulfillment;  whether 
we  anticipate  the  changes  that  must 
inevitably  come  and  adopt  them  or 
turn  our  backs  on  the  future,  vainly 
believing  that  change  can  be  forestal- 
led. 

Last  night,  as  President  Perez  said 
in  his  eloquent  and  significant  ad- 
dress, and  I  quote  him,  "Of  all 
Utopias,  the  most  dangerous  is  the 
one  of  those  who  think  that  the  world 
can  continue  as  it  is  or  as  it  was  con- 
ceived 30  years  ago."  These  reflec- 
tions lead  us  to  the  fundamental 
statement  that  the  crisis  that  affects 
the  world  now  has  very  deep  roots. 
We  are  living  through  a  moral  crisis, 
a  crisis  of  ethical  principles. 

Political,  economic,  and  social 
changes  have  already  transformed  our 
modern  world.  The  old  colonial  em- 
pires have  fallen,  and  more  than  100 
new  independent  nations  have  risen  in 
their  place. 

Our  nations  are  more  dependent  on 
one  another  economically,  more  will- 
ing to  deal  with  each  other  as  equals, 


more  able  to  influence  one  another — 
either  for  good  or  for  ill — than  ever 
before  in  human  history. 

We  must  all  acknowledge  this  basic 
fact:  that  we  share  responsibility  for 
solving  our  common  problems.  Our 
specific  obligations  will  be  different, 
our  interests  and  our  emphases  will, 
of  course,  vary,  but  all  of  us — North 
and  South,  East  and  West — must  bear 
our  part  of  the  burden. 

If  the  responsibility  for  global 
progress  is  not  shared,  our  efforts 
will  certainly  fail.  Only  if  the  respon- 
sibility is  shared  may  we  attain  the 
goals  that  our  people  want  and  that 
our  times  demand. 

We  share  three  common  goals: 

•  First,  to  accelerate  world  eco- 
nomic growth  through  greater  in- 
volvement of  the  developing  nations, 
for  their  progress  is  essential  to 
global  prosperity  for  us  all; 

•  Second,  to  make  the  most  benefi- 
cial use  of  the  world's  greatest 
wealth,  its  human  potential;  and 

•  Third,  to  insure  that  all  nations 
participate  fully  in  basic  decisions 
about  international  economic  and 
political  affaris.  Only  by  acting  to- 
gether can  we  expand  trade  and  in- 
vestment in  order  to  create  more  jobs, 
to  curb  inflation,  and  to  raise  the 
standard  of  living  of  our  peoples. 


World  Economic  Growth 

The  industrial  nations  share  the 
same  problems  and  cannot  by  them- 
selves bring  about  world  economic 
recovery.  Strong  growth  and  expan- 
sion in  the  developing  countries  are 
essential,  and  as  they  succeed,  they 
must  be  prepared  —  and  this  is 
difficult — for  the  responsibilities  of 
success  in  this  highly  competitive 
world  economy. 

There  are  five  steps  we  must  take 
together: 

•  Increasing  capital  flow  to  the  de- 
veloping nations; 

•  Building  a  fairer  and  a  more  open 
system  of  world  trade; 

•  Working  to  moderate  disruptive 
price  movements  in  the  world  econ- 
omy; 

•  Cooperating  on  energy  conserva- 
tion and  development;  and 

•  Strengthening  technological 
capabilities  in  the  developing  world. 


Meeting  President  Pere:  in  Ca 


None  of  these  tasks  is  simple,  and 
each  demands  efforts  from  all  sides. 
Private  institutions  and  investors  will 
continue  to  play  the  major  part  in  in- 
creasing capital  flows,  but  capital 
supplied  by  public  institutions  and 
governments  is  also,  of  course,  criti- 
cal to  development. 

We  in  the  United  States  will  do  our 
part.  In  managing  the  international 
economy,  we  place  particular  impor- 
tance on  the  expansion  of  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund,  which  helps 
both  developing  nations  and  also  the 
industrial  nations  to  overcome  their 
balance-of-payments  problems.  We  in 
the  United  States  will  press  for  swift 
congressional  approval  of  our  own 
substantial  contribution  to  the 
supplementary  financing  facility,  $10 
billion,  recommended  by  Mr. 
Witteveen. 

The  international  development 
banks  are  fundamental  to  the  health 
of  the  world  economy.  They  contrib- 
ute to  the  growth  and  development  of 
many  nations  and  thus  to  the  expan- 
sion of  world  trade.  In  the  years 
ahead,  the  United  Slates  plans  to  in- 
crease its  contributions,  and  we  will 
work  with  other  nations  to  insure  that 
these  institutions  receive  the  support 
they  need. 

Bilateral  economic  assistance  also 
has  a  major  role  to  play.  I've  re- 
quested, for  instance,  that  Congress 
approve  a  28%   increase   in  our  pro- 


gram just  for  the  coming  year  alone. 

I  applaud  the  efforts  of  Venezuela 
and  other  developing  countries  to  ex- 
pand your  own  programs  of  economic 
assistance.  All  of  the  OPEC  [Organi- 
zation of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries] nations  have  a  responsibility  to 
use  their  surplus  wealth  to  meet  the 
human  needs  of  the  world's  people. 

In  some  cases,  the  burden  of  re- 
payment of  official  development  aid 
has  become  an  impediment  to  de- 
velopment. My  Administration  is 
supporting  legislation,  now  before  the 
Congress,  which  will  allow  us  to  ease 
the  terms  of  past  American  aid  loans 
to  some  of  the  least  developed 
nations. 

We  must  work  toward  an  expanded 
and  more  equitable  trading  system.  In 
no  area  of  economic  relations  is  the 
opportunity  of  Latin  America 
greater — nor  the  responsibility  more 
serious — than  in  expanded  trade.  The 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  now 
going  on  in  Geneva  are  the  focal 
point  of  continued  efforts  to  liberalize 
trade  and  to  strengthen  the  rules  for 
international  commerce.  Both  de- 
veloped and  developing  nations  have 
an  enormous  stake  in  the  success  of 
these  negotiations. 

We  must  all  resist  the  temptation  to 
impose  new  restrictions  on  imports. 
We  must  all  strive  to  reduce  existing 
barriers  to  trade,  both  tariffs  and 
other  measures,   while  giving  special 


Department  of  State  B  I 

consideration  and  benefits  to  tn 
veloping  countries. 

We  must  also  work  to  mol 
disruptive  price  movements  ij 
world  economy  and  to  stabilii 
prices  of  primary  commodities, 
sonable  and  stable  export  price 
hold  down  inflation  and  encl 
belter  income  and  a  more  regula 
of  new  investment  capital  to 
who  produce  raw  materials. 

All  nations  can,  therefore, 
from  the  negotiation  and  eff« 
implementation  of  commodity  ; 
ments  and  from  the  creation,  wii 
help  of  the  United  States  and 
major  countries,  of  a  common 
for  price  stabilization. 

We've  already  begun  to  cooji 
and   plan   for   the   wise   use   8 
Earth's   limited   resources,   sm 
food,  and  now  we  must  do  the 
with  energy. 

Both  the  industrial  and  the  dev 
ing  countries  must  conserve  e 
and  devote  more  of  our  vast  tes 
logical  efforts  and  resourc 
worldwide  efforts  to  develop 
sources  of  energy,  such  as  the 
and,  as  Latin  American  nations 
already  shown  us,  even  from 
and  from  other  agricultural  proi 
We  must  do  so  without  either  de 
ing  our  environment  or  creati 
world  of  proliferating  nuclear  t 
sives. 

For  the  rest  of  this  century 
greatest  potential  for  growth  is 
developing  world.   To  become 
self-reliant,   developing  nations 
to  strengthen  their  technolo 
capabilities.    To   assist   them, 
proposing  a  new  U.S.  foundatic 
technological  collaboration. 

Through  private  and  public  foi 
tions  and  through  our  incres 
participation  in  the  U.N.  confere 
we  can  make  technical  and  sen 
cooperation  a  key  element  ir 
relationship. 


Human  Potential 

Our   main   task   as   members 
world   community   is  to   work  to 
the  day  when  every  person  has  a 
chance  to  achieve  a  full  measui 
human  potential 

The  population  of  the  world  i 
creasing  rapidly,  and  within  two 
ades.  it  is  expected  that  two-thirc 
the  world's  population  — e 
more — will  live  in  Asia,  Africa, 
Latin  America.  We  want  every  c 
to  be  a  wanted  child,  and  we  re; 
that  already  three  of  every  five  <i 
dren  in  the  developing  world  do 
receive  the  basic   requisites  t 


•• 


^'978 

ly  diet,  and  nearly  two-thirds  of 

orld's  population   in   the  Third 

i  do  not  have  access  to  water 

..    s  safe  to  drink. 

:,.  ;se  conditions  and  others  offend 


ititi 


onscience  of  mankind,   for  the 


n  rights  we  believe  in  so  deeply 
ie  not  only  the  right  to  be  free 
o  avoid  mistreatment  from  gov- 
ent  but  also  the  right  to  a  fair 
e  for  a  decent  life, 
roughout  the  world,  the  fruits  of 
:h  have  been  very  unequally  dis- 
:ed.  Among  nations  and  within 
ns  wealth  coexists  with  abject 
ty  and  suffering.  Our  economic 
ess  is  inadequate  if  its  benefits 
)t  reach  all  the  people.  Rich  and 
nations  alike  should  devote  more 
tion  to  raising  the  minimum 
iards  of  living  for  the  poorest  of 
ellow  human  beings. 
;  United  States  will  increase  its 


efforts,  particularly  in  those  countries 
where  governments  are  themselves 
most  committed  to  meeting  the  basic 
needs  of  their  people  for  health,  edu- 
cation, shelter,  and  to  increasing  their 
own  food  production. 

We  will  contribute,  for  instance,  a 
minimum  of  4.5  million  tons  of  grain 
to  a  new  food  aid  convention.  We 
support  the  international  food  aid 
target  of  10  million  tons,  and  we  are 
willing  to  join  other  nations  in  in- 
creasing the  amount,  particularly  in 
years  of  severe  food  shortages. 

As  for  the  political  liberties  that  are 
also  part  of  basic  human  rights,  we 
believe  that  democracy  provides  the 
best  system  to  attain  this  goal  and 
that  the  international  community  has  a 
special  responsibility  to  support  coun- 
tries that  are  moving  to  institute 
democratic  procedures  and  institu- 
tions. 


International  Participation 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the 
institutions  we  have  created  must 
adapt  to  a  changing  and  diverse 
world.  And  that  is  our  third  goal.  The 
individuality  and  the  sovereignty  of 
nations  must  be  respected.  Interven- 
tion in  the  internal  affairs  of  others 
must  be  opposed. 

There  must  also  be  a  reversal  in  the 


ITINERARY 

Mar 

28-29 

Caracas.  Venezuela 

Mar. 

29-30 

Brasilia.  Brazil 

Mar. 

30-31 

Rio  de  Janeiro.  Brazil 

Mar. 

3  I -Apr.  3 

Lagos,  Nigeria 

Apr. 

3 

Monrovia.  Liberia 
Washington.  DC. 

massive  and  excessive  weapons  sales 
that  are  being  made  from  my  own  and 
from  other  industrialized  countries  to 
the  poorer  nations,  which  still  have 
profound  and  unmet  social  and  eco- 
nomic needs. 

Just  as  all  people  should  participate 
in  the  government  decisions  that  af- 
fect their  own  lives,  so  should  all  na- 
tions participate  in  the  international 
decisions  that  affect  their  own  well- 
being. 

The  United  States  is  eager  to  work 
with  you,  as  we  have  in  the  past,  to 
shape  a  more  just  international  eco- 
nomic and  political  order.  Both  the 
industrialized  nations,  which  have 
greater  influence  in  institutions  like 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  and 
the  World  Bank,  and  the  developing 
nations  with  great  influence  in  or- 
ganizations like  the  U.N.  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development,  must 
share  the  responsibility  for  opening 
the  international  system  to  different 
views. 

The  Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation,  in  which 
Venezuela,  as  you  know,  plays  such  a 
major  and  pivotal  role,  was  a  useful 
start  toward  the  global  dialogue  which 
we  seek.  A  newly  created  committee 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  will 
carry  on  that  work. 

As  we  move  toward  an  improved 
international  economic  order,  we 
must  think  beyond  institutions  and 
measure  the  impact  of  change  on  the 
daily  lives  of  people.  We  recognize 
our  differences,  but  we  cannot  allow 
them  to  blind  us  to  the  problems  and 


the   tremendous  opportunities   which 
we  share. 


Conclusion 

When  I  was  growing  up  in  the  deep 
South  of  the  United  States,  we  farmed 
exactly  as  our  grandfathers  had 
farmed,  rising  before  dawn  and  labor- 
ing manually  until  sunset.  We  had  no 
tractors  and  little  machinery  of  any 
kind,  and  even  as  we  worked,  we 
often  knew  that  we  were  reducing  our 
future  yields,  that  the  richness  of  our 
land  was  blowing  away  in  the  wind  or 
washing  away  in  the  rains. 

When  we  farmed  out  our  land,  we 
had  no  choice  but  to  keep  on  farming 
it  and  working  in  the  same  fields,  be- 
cause many  of  us  lacked  the  knowl- 
edge or  the  means  to  make  it  fruitful 
again. 

I  remember  the  almost  unbelievable 
change  the  coming  of  electric  power 
made  in  the  farm  life  of  my  child- 
hood. Electricity  freed  us  from  the 
continuing  burdens  of  pumping  water 
and  sawing  wood  and  lighting  fires  in 
the  cooking  stove.  But  it  did  even 
more — it  gave  us  light  by  which 
to  read  and  to  study  at  night.  It  gave 
us  power — not  just  to  perform  the  old 
exhausting  tasks  but  power  to  make 
our  own  choices.  Because  electric 
power  came  to  us  through  coopera- 
tives, in  which  we  all  had  to  share  the 
responsibility  for  a  decision,  it 
changed  our  lives  in  other  ways. 

Farmers  began  to  meet  together  to 
discuss   local   needs  and   national   is- 


Presidenls  Curler  and  Perez  with  reporters  in  Caracas 


Department  of  State  Bu 

sues  and  to  decide  how  to  influ 
government  and  to  negotiate 
large,  far-off  companies  that  pro' 
their  supplies.  I've  seen  the  farrr 
that  I  knew  in  my  childhood  t 
formed  by  energy  and  by  technc 
and  increased  knowledge  and  bj 
opportunity  to  participate  in  the 
sions  that  affect  ourselves  and 
families. 

I  can  understand  the  unfulf 
yearnings  of  other  people  in  devi 
ing  nations  to  share  these  blessin; 
life.  All  nations  must  work  tog( 
to  acknowledge  the  validity  of  1 
yearnings,  to  take  into  full  ace 
the  need  and  diversity  of  develc 
nations,  and  to  promote  mutual 
ticipation  in  making  the  internat: 
decisions  that  affect  us  all. 

I've  spoken  to  you  of  shared  • 
gations.  The  industrial  nations 
provide  long-term  capital  and  red  I 
trade  barriers.  The  developing  na' 
must  assume  the  obligations  that 
company  responsible  participatio 
an  evolving  world  economy. 

Real  progress  will  come  thrc 
specific,  cooperative  actions  desi; 
to  meet  specific  needs — not  thn 
symbolic  statements  made  by  the 
industrial  nations  to  salve  our  i 
science  nor  by  the  developing  coun 
to  recall  past  injustices.  We  nee 
share  a  responsibility  for  solving  p 
lems  and  not  to  divide  the  blame 
ignoring  the  problems. 

I  believe  that  your  great  cob 
and  mine  share  a  vision  of  an  into 
tional  system  in  which  each  i 
vidual  and  each  nation  has  a  pari 
which  each  individual  and  each  na 
has  the  hope  of  a  better  future.  ( 
in  such  a  world  can  life  be  good 
all  its  people. 


JOINT  U.S.-VENEZUELA 
COMMUNIQUE, 
CARACAS,  MAR.  294 

The  visit  reflected  the  close  relations 
tween  Venezuela  and  the  United  States 
served  to  continue  their  dialogue  initiate 
1977  on  the  occasion  of  the  visits  which 
Venezuelan  President  made  to  Washington 

The  two  Presidents  reaffirmed  their  c 
mitment  to  the  preservation  and  strengthe 
of  democracy  and  placed  particular  emph 
on  the  importance  of  human  rights  as  a  dut 
all  societies  and  their  commitment  to  the  c 
ters  of  the  Organization  of  American  St 
and  the  United  Nations.  Both  Presidents 
pressed  the  hope  that  the  American  Con\ 
tion  on  Human  Rights  will  soon  enter  i 
force  and  manifested  their  Governments'  in 
est  in  seeing  both  the  autonomy  and  resoui 
of  the  Inter-American  Human  Rights  Comr 
sion  increased,  agreeing  in  their  belief  that 


Bt  1978 


ission  has  an  essential  role  to  play  in 
•It   fective   promotion   of  Human   Rights  in 
misphere. 

Presidents  discussed  the  ratification  of 
nama  Canal  treaties  signed  at  the  OAS 
Ml  uarters  in  Washington  [on  September  7, 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
ica  and  the  Head  of  Government  of 
a  which  is  now  being  considered  by  the 
of  the  United  States  of  America.  They 
sed  the  hope  that  the  process  will  be 
ktiisfully  concluded  to  strengthen  a  new 
of  cooperation  in  the  relations  between 
lited  States  of  America  and  the  Peoples 
in  America. 

Heads  of  State  examined  the  present 
jf  the  world  economy,  including  the 
cts  for  international  cooperation  on  the 
of  development,  trade,  basic  com- 
es, energy,  the  effects  of  inflation  and 
ernational  monetary  system, 
i  Presidents  agree  on  the  need  for  an  in- 
onal  code  of  conduct  relating  to  the  ac- 
5  of  transnational  corporations.  They 
nned  the  practice  of  bribes  and  illicit 
nts  and  called  for  support  of  an  interna- 
.-onvention  on  illicit  payments. 
Presidents  reaffirmed  the  importance 
te  utility  of  additional  consultations 
the  context  of  the  North-South  dialogue 
the  United  Nations  and  other  world  or- 
tions.  They  agreed  on  the  importance  of 
implementation  of  the  commitments 
at  the  Conference  of  International  Eco- 
Cooperation,  in  which  Venezuela 
I  a  leading  role.  Both  Presidents  ex- 
d  their  support  for  a  more  just  and 
ole  international  system,  with  both  de- 
d  and  developing  countries  sharing  re- 
■•bility  for  it. 

n  Presidents  examined  the  world's  politi- 
M  uation  and  condemned  the  presence  of 
I  n   forces   in   Africa.   They   reiterated 

■  rondemnation  of  apartheid  as  an  unac- 
I  le  negation  of  human  rights.  They  ex- 
:sd  their  total  support  for  the  independ- 
lif  Zimbabwe  in  accordance  with  norms 
I  United  Nations  and  for  the  independ- 
pof  Namibia   within   the   framework   of 

■  I  Nations  Resolution  385. 

I  Presidents  exchanged  views  concerning 
■uation  in  the  Middle  East  and  deplored 
I  cent  violence  which  occurred  in  that 

■  They  agreed  that  it  is  necessary  and  ur- 
lo  intensify  efforts  to  achieve  a  just. 
Irehensive  and  durable  peace  based  on 

I'  [U.N.  Security  Council]  Resolutions 
lid  338.  They  stressed  the  importance  of 
Brawal  on  all  fronts  pursuant  to  Resolution 
Ind  the  resolution  of  all  aspects  of  the 
Minian  question. 

By  noted  their  meeting  coincided  with  the 
Big  of  the  Seventh  Session  of  the  United 
lis  Conference  on  Law  of  the  Sea.  which 
Its  first  substantive  meeting  in  Caracas 
■ears  ago.  They  agreed  that  it  is  essential 

■  he  conference  reach  agreements  which 
i^st  and  fair  for  all  countries. 

|   two  Presidents  dedicated  an  important 


portion  of  their  time  to  the  consideration  of 
the  idea  already  agreed  to  in  Washington  in 
1977  concerning  the  development  program  for 
the  Caribbean  basin.  They  examined  the  role 
played  in  the  preliminary  studies  by  the  World 
Bank  as  well  as  by  other  international  institu- 
tions. Even  as  they  manifested  their  satisfac- 
tion with  the  process  already  under  way.  they 
agreed  that  it  is  urgent  to  bring  this  idea  to 
fruition  and  to  promote  cooperation  between 
the  countries  of  that  area  and  the  rest  of  Latin 
America  in  such  a  way  as  to  help  the  states  of 
the  Caribbean  in  their  effort  for  a  viable  de- 
velopment which  satisfies  their  own 
aspirations. 

The  themes  concerning  Latin  American  eco- 
nomic integration  were  the  object  of  particular 
attention.  The  Presidents  examined  the  prog- 
ress of  the  Andean  Pact,  its  important  program 
agreements  signed  in  1977.  the  functioning  of 
LAFTA  [Latin  American  Free  Trade  As- 
sociation] and  the  progress  of  SELA  [Latin 
American  Economic  System].  Both  Presidents 
recognized  the  important  cooperative  effort  of 
the  countries  of  the  area  reflected  in  the  dif- 
ferent programs  of  regional  integration  and 
manifested  their  sympathy  and  support  for 
these  programs. 

With  relation  to  nuclear  non-proliferation 
the  two  Presidents  took  note  of  the  necessity 
for  implementing  greater  safeguards  and  mak- 
ing greater  use  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful 
purposes  once  the  risks,  not  yet  resolved,  are 
taken  care  of.  The  Presidents  gave  special  im- 
portance to  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty 
of  Tlatelolco  [Treaty  for  the  Prohibition  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  in  Latin  America],  and 
noted  with  satisfaction  the  progress  in  the  In- 
ternational Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation. 

The  Presidents  exchanged  ideas  about  arms 
restraint  in  Latin  America.  They  expressed 
their  disquiet  with  growing  arms  purchases 
and  in  the  resurgence  of  old  conflicts.  They 
agreed  that  it  is  urgent  to  restrict  the  transfer 
of  conventional  weapons  as  was  envisaged  in 
the  1974  Ayacucho  Declaration. 

They  discussed  the  United  Nations  Special 
Session  on  Disarmament  and  agreed  that  the 
Session  should  provide  a  stimulus  to  further 
concrete  disarmament  efforts. 

Insofar  as  bilateral  matters  are  concerned 
they  confirmed  the  importance  of  cooperation 
in  the  field  of  energy  and  the  continuing  par- 
ticipation of  Venezuelan  petroleum  exports  in 
the  United  States  market.  They  considered 
useful  the  results  of  the  meeting  held  at  the 
beginning  of  March  between  the  Venezuelan 
Minister  of  Mines  and  Energy  and  the  U.S. 
Secretary  of  Energy  pointing  out  the  possibil- 
ity of  cooperation  for  the  development  of 
heavy  crudes.  The  two  Presidents  reaffirmed 
their  desire  to  continue  consultations  both  at 
the  technical  level  and  at  the  political  level  on 
energy  matters  as  well  as  to  establish  periodic 
consultations  on  economic  and  commercial 
matters. 

The  two  Presidents  took  note  with  satisfac- 
tion of  the  signature  during  the  visit  of  the 
Treaty  on   Maritime   Boundaries  between  the 


two  countries  and  a  Memorandum  of  Under- 
standing on  Narcotics  and  of  the  prospects  of 
negotiating  other  agreements,  reflecting  the 
spirit  of  cooperation  existing  between  the  two 
countries. 

The  two  Chiefs  of  State  expressed  their 
complete  personal  satisfaction  with  the  results 
of  their  conversations  and  took  note  that  this 
state  visit,  the  third  meeting  between  them 
during  the  last  year,  was  a  demonstration  of 
their  interest  in  continuing  their  consultations 
on  world  matters  of  importance  to  the  two 
countries. 

Upon  ending  his  stay  in  Venezuela,  Presi- 
dent and  Mrs.  Carter  thanked  President  Perez 
for  the  cordial  hospitality  offered  them  and 
their  official  party  by  the  Venezuelan  people 
and  government. 


REMARKS  TO 
BRAZILIAN  CONGRESS, 
BRASILIA,  MAR.  302 

One  of  the  greatest  honors  of  my 
life  is  to  meet  with  others  who  share 
with  us  in  the  United  States  a  com- 
mon background,  a  common  commit- 
ment to  the  common  future. 

I  particularly  want  to  thank  Senator 
Enrico  Rezende  and  my  good  and  old 
friend,  Deputato  Erasmo  Martins 
Pedro  for  these  inspirational  words. 
There  is  no  way  that  I  can  match  your 
eloquence.  There's  no  way  that  I  can 
improve  upon  what  you  have  said. 
And  your  complimentary  words  to 
me,  undeserved,  will  be  an  inspira- 
tion in  the  years  ahead. 

I've  been  here  before  in  this 
Chamber,  in  your  country.  I've  been 
impressed  with  the  greatness  of 
Brazil.  I've  seen  the  compatibility  be- 
tween your  own  people  and  ours — the 
origins  of  your  country;  the  struggle 
for  freedom  against  colonial  rule;  the 
courage,  the  tenacity,  the  dedication 
that  was  required  in  our  country  and 
yours  to  explore  new  frontiers,  to 
carve  out  for  ourselves  a  better  life,  a 
greater  life,  and  a  position  of  lead- 
ership throughout  the  whole  world. 

I  recognize  that  in  your  country  and 
in  mine  there  is  a  great  diversity  of 
interest,  differences  among  people, 
and  a  constant,  unceasing,  most  often 
successful  struggle  to  bring  harmony 
among  differences  and  to  carve  out 
common  commitments  that  will  add 
the  strength  of  all  those  different 
people  together  to  reach  a  destiny 
even  more  inspirational  than  the  past 
history  has  already  given  to  us. 

We  share  a  common  religion  among 
many  of  our  people,  a  common  hope 
for  peace.  We  share  a  feeling  that  our 
nations  are  bound  together  with  un- 
breakable chains.  We  share  a  realiza- 
tion  that  while  friendship  is  strong 


President  Carter  addressing  the  Brazilian  Congress 


enough  to  sustain  transient  differences 
of  opinion,  that  we  can  exchange 
ideas  freely  and  without  constraint 
and.  in  the  process,  learn  about  one 
another  and  perhaps  improve  the  at- 
titudes of  people  in  the  United  States 
and  also  in  Brazil. 

We  are  learning  together  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  which  still  has 
the  vigor  of  newness,  how  we  can 
exert  our  leadership  throughout  the 
rest  of  the  world  in  dealing  with 
hunger  and  despair,  in  dealing  with 
the  struggle  for  basic  human  rights. 

We  understand  the  broad  definition 
of  these  two  important  words — the 
right  to  freedom;  the  right  to  criticize 
a  government;  the  right  of  people  to 
contain  within  themselves,  collec- 
tively, the  ultimate  authority;  the 
right  to  an  education;  the  right  to 
good  health,  a  place  to  live,  food;  the 
right  to  share  more  equitably  the 
riches  with  which  God  has  blessed  us; 
the  right  to  express  opinions;  the  right 
lo  enhance  our  own  individuality;  the 
right  to  seek  collective  solutions  to 
private  and  public  problems;  the  right 
to  expose  the  greatness  of  our  own 
nations  which  we  love. 

I'm  grateful  for  the  invitation  to 
appear  before  this  great  Congress  as 
one  whose  own  political  career  began 
in  a  legislature.  I've  seen  the  impor- 
tance of  a  good  relationship  between 
a  Governor  and  a  State  legislature, 
between  a  President  and  a  national 
Congress.  And  I  join  you  in  honoring 
the  ultimate  purpose  of  any  legislative 
body;  that  of  insuring  that  individual 
people  who  have  small  voices  maj 
participate  through  you  in  the  deci- 
sions that  affect  their  lives. 


Thirty-one  years  ago.  another 
American  President  stood  before  the 
Brazilian  Congress,  another  Con- 
gress, in  a  different  city,  since  your 
vision  of  Brasilia  had  not  yet  been 
fulfilled.  I'd  like  to  quote  from  the 
words  of  Harry  Truman:  "It  is  not 
too  much  to  describe  our  relations  as 
those  of  'life-long  friendship.'  '  he 
said.  And  then  he  asked,  "Why  are 
the  ties  between  us  so  close?  The  dis- 
tance between  our  countries  is  great 
and  until  of  recent  years  communica- 
tion was  slow  and  difficult.  But  it  is 
not  physical  proximity  that  alone 
makes  friends  and  neighbors.  It  is 
rather  the  fact  that  we-  have  common 
interests,  common  principles,  and 
common  ideals.  " 

Those  words  still  apply  today,  and 
they  are  the  overriding  concepts 
which  bind  our  nations  together  per- 
manently and  on  which  we  base  our 
realization  and  our  hope  and  our  ex- 
pectation for  future  friendship,  stabil- 
ity, and  mutual  strengthening  in  the 
years  to  come. 

In  the  intervening  years.  Brazil  has 
come  into  an  even  fuller  realization  of 
your  rightful  place  in  the  world, 
though  it  has  not  yet  reached  the  lim- 
its of  your  enormous  potential.  And 
alter  all  those  years,  we  can  still  call 
on  one  another  as  friends,  for  that 
bond  recalls  the  sacrifices  that  we 
have  made  together  in  a  common 
struggle,  with  the  loss  of  Brazilian 
and  American  lives,  and  it  implies  the 
right  to  disagree  on  occasion — even 
vigorously — without  bitterness  or  mis- 
trust. 

As  I  said  when  I  met  your  Presi- 
dent yesterday,  the  world  needs,  the 


Department  of  State  BuMi 

world  expects,  and  the  world  I 
benefit  from  your  creativity,  j 
energy,  and  your  success.  Man 
the  problems  that  we  share  as  n 
bers  of  a  human  family  will  neve 
solved  unless  the  ablest  among  us 
vote  their  best  to  efforts  to  that  a 
Economic  development  with  a  f 
distribution  of  the  world's  richa 
trading  system  that  is  open  and  e 
able,  cooperative  solutions  to 
common  energy  problems,  peao 
use  of  atomic  power  without  the 
of  proliferation,  reducing  the  e> 
sive  trade  in  weapons,  and  encoi 
ing  consultations  and  negotiat 
about  even  the  most  troubling  iss 
advancing  the  cause  of  human  lib* 
democratic  government,  and  the 
of  law — these  are  efforts  in  whicl 
United  States  needs  your  friend; 
your  partnership,  and  the  world  n 
your  help  and  your  leadership. 
I'm  sure  we  will  not  be  disappoin 
Since  my  friend  has  quoted  the 
ble.  I  would  like  to  do  the  samel 
Portuguese,  as  well  as  English, 
Bible  tells  us  that  to  whom  muo 
given,  much  will  be  required, 
two  nations  have  been  greatly  blei 
by  God.  and  we  have  much  to  gn 
return. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE 
(EXCERPTS),  BRASILIA, 
MAR.  305 

I'm  very  delighted  to  be  her 
Brasilia  to  participate  in  a  live  j 
conference,  and  I  will  alternate  i 
tions  between  the  Brazilian  and 
American  press. 

Q  | in  Portuguese].  At  the  be 
ning  of  your  Administration  tl 
was  a  clear  tendency  to  isolate 
treat  Brazil  coldly  in  favoi 
democratically  elected  governme 
elected  by  the  people.  Yesterda 
the  airport  you  stressed  the  n 
for  cooperation  between  Brazil 
the  United  States  as  equal  partn 
Who  has  changed?  Brazil  or  you 

A.    I   certainly   have   not  chan| 
The  experience   that   I   have   hac 
Brazil  as  Governor  of  Georgia  be 
I  became   President  made  Brazil 
most   important   country   to  me. 
wife  and   I   visited   it  frequently, 
had   a  partnership  arrangement 
tween  m>   own  State  and  the  Stati 
Pernambuco. 

We   studied   the   background, 
history,   the  culture,   and  the  govt 
ment   of  Brazil.    And   there   has 
ever  been  any  inclination  on  my  ] 
or  the  part  of  my  Administration 
underestimate  the  extreme  importa 


[978 


Brazil  as  a  major  world  power,  nor 
Inderestimate  the  extreme  impor- 
pje  of  very  close  and  harmonious 
Itionships  between  the  United 
ks  and  Brazil, 
mere  are  some  differences  of  opin- 

■  between  ourselves  and  Brazil 
l:h  have  been  very  highly  pub- 
fced.  But  on  the  long  scale  of 
|es.  both  in  the  past  history  and  in 
■future,  the  major  factors  which 
I  us  in  harmony  with  Brazil  far 
■scend,   are  much  more  important 

I  the  differences  that  have  been 

■  ished  between  our  approach  to 
Ian  rights,  for  instance,  and  the 
■ect  of  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
loons. 

lit  our  commitment  to  Brazil  as  a 
lid.  our  need  for  Brazil  as  a  part- 
land  a  friend  has  always  been  the 
I  and  is  presently  very  important 
Is  and  will  always  be  that  impor- 
U  in  the  future. 

I.  In  recent  days,  you've  seen 
I  use  of  American  military 
Allies  to  invade  a  country  and  to 
lie  untold  suffering  to  hundreds 
thousands.  Some  say  this  is  the 
Wit  ion  of  U.S.  law.  In  view  of  the 
m  that  you  have  before  you,  is  it 
olation;  and  two,  has  it  caused 
I  to  reassess  your  warplane 
Stage  for  the  Middle  East? 

I.  Are  you  referring  to  the  Leba- 

0  question'.' 

y .  Yes. 

H.  As  you  know,  when  the  terrorist 

1  ks  in  Israel  precipitated  the  coun- 
liove   by   Israel   into  Lebanon. 

■  ■h  has  been  a  haven  for  the  Pales- 

■  in  terrorists,  the  United  States 
I:  the  initiative  in  the  United 
■ons — I  might  say.  without  the  ap- 
I  al  of  Israel — to  initiate  U.N.  ac- 
I  there  to  expedite  the  removal  of 
Bdi  forces  from  Lebanon. 

I  e  have  obviously  attempted  to 
■ply  with  the  law,  and  this  is  a 

■  :er  that  we  are  still  addressing. 
I  other  part  of  your  question? 

.  Has  it  caused  you  to  reassess 

■  r  package  of  warplanes  for  the 
idle  East,  and  how  do  you  say 
I  have  attempted  to  comply  with 

■  law? 

I.  We're  attempting  to  terminate 
B'apidly  as  possible  the  military 
■tence  of  Israel  in  southern  Leba- 
I  through  U.N.  action.  I  believe 
I  is  the  proper  way  to  do  it.  rather 
■i  unilateral  action  on  our  part, 
■ch  would  probably  be  unsuccess- 
ful any  case  to  get  Israel  to  with- 
■v.  The  presence  of  U.N.  forces — 
■French,  the  Swedes,  and  others — I 
■eve,  is  the  preferable  way,  and  it 


marshals  the  opinion  of  the  entire 
world,  through  the  United  Nations, 
against  the  Israeli  presence  being  re- 
tained in  Lebanon. 

This  has  not  caused  me  to  reassess 
the  American  position  on  the  sale  of 
warplanes  and  other  equipment  to  the 
Middle  East.  This  is  a  very  well- 
balanced  package.  It  emphasizes  our 
interest  in  military  security  of  the 
Middle  East.  It  does  not  change  at  all 
the  fact  that  Israel  still  retains  a  pre- 
dominant air  capability  and  military 
capability.  There  is  no  threat  to  their 
security.  But  it  also  lets  the  nations 
involved  and  the  world  know  that  our 
friendship,  our  partnership,  our  shar- 
ing of  military  equipment  with  the 
moderate  Arab  nations  is  an  important 
permanent  factor  of  our  foreign 
policy. 

Q.  The  American  commercial 
banks  are  the  main  Brazilian  source 
of  external  credit.  It  seems  to  some 
people  in  Washington  that  sooner 
or  later  a  Congressman  may  try  to 
establish  a  link  between  the  com- 
mercial banking  loans  and  the 
human  rights  policy.  I'd  like  to 
know  your  opinion  about  this 
subject. 

A.  Brazil  is  a  major  trading  partner 
of  the  United  States  in  commercial 
goods  and  also  in  loans  and,  I  might 
say,  timely  repayments.  The  debt  of 
Brazil  is  very  manageable.  The  loans 


Willi  President  Geisel  in  Brasilia 


of  the  American  banks  to  Brazil  are 
sound.  Additional  loans  are  being 
pursued  by  the  American  banks  as  an 
excellent  advantage  for  their  future 
investments  in  Brazil,  based  on  the 
strength  of  your  country.  It  would  be 
inconceivable  to  me  that  any  act  of 
Congress  would  try  to  restrict  the 
lending  of  money  by  American  pri- 
vate banks  to  Brazil  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. This  would  violate  the 
principles  of  our  own  free  enterprise 
system,  and  if  such  an  act  was  passed 
by  Congress,  I  would  not  approve  it. 

Q.  What  comes  in  the  first  place 
for  you:  the  private  enterprise  and 
the  private  system  or  the  human 
rights  policy? 

A.  They're  both  important  to  us. 
And  I  don't  see  any  incompatibility 
between  a  belief  in  a  free  enterprise 
system,  where  government  does  not 
dominate  the  banks  or  the  production 
of  agricultural  products  or  commer- 
cial products  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
deep  and  consistent  and  permanent 
and  strong  belief  in  enhancing  human 
rights  around  the  world. 

I  might  say  that  the  American  busi- 
ness community,  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  the  general  populace  of 
the  United  States  supports  completely 
a  commitment  of  our  nation  to  human 
rights.  It's  a  basic  element  of  our  na- 
tional consciousness  that  has  no  viola- 
tion  at  all — or  no  conflict   between 


8 


human  rights  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
free  enterprise  system  on  the  other. 

Q.  Tomorrow  you  fly  to  Africa. 
What  can  you  tell  us  today  about 
the  revised  five-power  proposals  on 
Namibia? 

A.  As  you  know,  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  United  Nations,  our  own 
country,  Canada.  Britain.  France,  and 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
have  been  working  jointly  to  present 
to  South  Africa  and  to  the  so-called 
SWAPO  organization — South  West 
Africa  People's  Organization  —  a 
compromise  solution  to  restoring 
majority  rule  in  Namibia. 

We  have  presented  this  proposal 
this  week  to  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment, which  now  controls 
Namibia,  and  also  to  the  SWAPO 
leaders.  We  are  hopeful  that  if  the 
proposal  is  not  completely  acceptable 
to  both  those  parties,  that  it  will  at 
least  be  acceptable  enough  to  prevent 
unilateral  action  on  the  part  of  South 
Africa  to  hold  elections  in  complete 
violation  of  the  U.N.  resolutions  and 
in  complete  violation  of  the  principle 
of  restoring  majority  rule  to  Namibia. 

I  can't  tell  you  what  the  outcome  of 
those  consultations  will  be.  I  will  get 
a  more  complete  report  when  I  arrive 
in  Lagos.  Ambassador  [to  the  United 
Nations  Andrew]  Young  has  been  in 
Africa  now  for  about  a  week.  This  is 
one  of  the  reasons  that  he  is  there. 
And  I  will  be  glad  to  give  you  a  more 
detailed  report  after  I  get  additional 
information. 

Q.  Now  that  you  have  a  broad 
nonproliferation  act  in  your  hands, 
do  you  expect  you  can  persuade 
Brazil  to  give  up  reprocessing  and 
enrichment  technology  being  ac- 
quired from  Germany?  And  in  that 
case,  what  are  the  carrots  you 
might  specifically  use  to  further  the 
power  of  your  arguments  in  your 
meetings  with  President  Geisel? 

A.  We  strongly  favor  the  right  of 
any  country  to  have  part  of  its  energy 
supplies  come  from  nuclear  power. 
As  you  know,  our  country  has  been 
the  leader  in  the  evolution  of  atomic 
power  for  peaceful  uses,  and  we 
would  do  nothing  to  prevent  this 
trend  from  continuing,  both  in  Brazil  and 
in  other  countries  around  the  world. 

Our  own  nuclear  nonproliferation 
policy,  however,  tries  to  draw  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  right  and  the 
meeting  of  need  of  countries  to  pro- 
duce energy  from  atomic  power  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  right  of  the 
country  to  evolve  weapons-grade  nu- 
clear materials  through  either 
enrichment  processes  or  through 
reprocessing. 


We  have  no  authority  over  either 
West  Germany  or  Brazil,  nor  do  we 
want  any.  But  as  a  friend  of  both 
countries,  we  reserve  the  right  to  ex- 
press our  opinion  to  them  that  it 
would  be  very  good  to  have,  and  pos- 
sible to  have,  a  complete  nuclear  fuel 
system  throughout  a  country  without 
having  the  ability  to  reprocess  spent 
fuel  from  the  power  reactors.  In  the 
United  States,  for  instance,  in  the  last 
25  years  or  so,  on  several  occasions 
major  investments — multibillion- 
dollar  investments  in  all — have  been 
made  in  reprocessing  plants.  So  far 
as  I  know,  for  the  civilian  nuclear 
technology,  all  those  plants  have 
now  been  abandoned  as  being  non- 
economical. 

This  is  a  difference  that  does  exist 
between  Brazil  and  the  United  States. 
The  right  of  Brazil  and  West  Ger- 
many to  continue  with  their  agree- 
ment is  one  that  we  don't  challenge, 
but  we  have  reserved  the  right  and 
have  used  the  right  to  express  our 
concern,  both  to  the  Brazilian  Gov- 
ernment and  to  the  West  German 
Government. 

1  think  it's  accurate  to  say  that  the 
European  nations  have  now  an- 
nounced that  in  the  future,  they  will 
not  make  reprocessing  plants  part  of 
their  overseas  sales  inventory.  And 
we  are  very  deeply  concerned  about 
this.  Of  course,  Brazil  has  announced 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  produc- 
ing nuclear  explosives.  Brazil  is  a 
signatory  to  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco. 
So  far,  however,  Brazil  has  retained  a 
caveat  that  it  will  not  apply  to  them 
until  all  the  other  nations  sign  it.  And 
Argentina,  Cuba.  France.  Russia  have 
not  yet  signed  the  Tlatelolco  treaty. 

We  would  hope  that  every  effort 
would  be  made  by  Brazil  and  other 
countries,  as  it  is  on  the  part  of  our 
own  country,  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
nuclear  explosive  capability  to  any 
nation  which  does  not  presently  have 
it. 

Q.  What  are  the  carrots? 

A.  We  have  no  specific  carrots  to 
offer,  except  that  we  are  making 
available  to  countries — and  now  in  a 
much  more  predictable  way  with  the 
new  congressional  law — enriched 
uranium,  which  is  suitable  for  produc- 
tion of  power  but  not  suitable  for  ex- 
plosives, and  technological  advice 
and  counsel  both  in  the  use  of 
uranium,  with  which  Brazil  is  not 
blessed  as  a  natural  resource,  and  also 
thorium,  which  we  have  in  our  own 
country  and  which  Brazil  already  has. 

The  new  thorium  technology  is  a 
much  safer  one  to  provide  power 
without  going  to  plutonium.  Recently 


k 


Department  of  State  Bui 

Brazil — and  I  think  very  wise 
signed  an  additional  agreement 
West  Germany  which  would  opei 
advice  and  technological  abilit 
use  thorium.  But  the  right  of  B 
and  the  advisability  of  Brazil  to  I 
a  very  advanced  nuclear  power  c 
bility  is  one  that  we  don't  disp 
but  on  the  other  hand,  approve. 

I  might  add  one  other  point, 
that  is  that  we  see  a  clear  need  fo 
nations  to  sign  the  Nonprolifera 
Treaty.  We're  signatories  of  it;  so 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  Germans,  i 
of  the  countries  in  the  world 
this,  combined  with  Internatic 
Atomic  [Energy]  Agency  safegua 
is  a  good  guarantee  within  a  cou 
and  throughout  the  developed  and 
veloping  world  that  there  will  no 
a  trend  in  the  future  toward  other 
tions  developing  nuclear  explo 
capability. 

Q.   Have  you  or  any  other 
U.S.  officials — Dr.   Brzezinski, 
instance — suggested   that   Pr 
Minister  Begin  may  not  be  the  r 
man  to  head  that  government  in 
present  circumstances?  And  aj 
from  what   may  or  may  not  h 
been  said,  do  you  now   think 
Begin  government  can  make 
hard  decisions  necessary  to  m 
the  peace  process  forward? 

A.  I  can  say  unequivocally  thai 
one  in  any  position  of  responsib 
in  the  U.S.  Administration  has  c 
insinuated  that  Prime  Minister  B< 
is  not  qualified  to  be  Prime  Mini 
or  that  he  should  be  replaced.  1 
report,  the  origin  of  which  I  do 
know,  is  completely  false. 

I  think  that  Prime  Minister  Be 
and  his  government  are  able 
negotiate  in  an  adequately  flexi 
way  to  reach  an  agreement  w 
Egypt,  later  Jordan  and  other  of 
neighboring  countries.  This  is 
hope  and  this  is  also  our  belief, 
have  not  given  up  on  the  possibi 
of  a  negotiated  peace  settlement 
the  Middle  East. 

Under  the  Begin  government.  v\ 
him  as  Prime  Minister,  recently 
rangements  have  been  made  betwi 
Israel  and  Egypt  for  [Israeli  Mini? 
of  Defense]  Ezer  Weizman  to  go 
Egypt  again,  which  will  be  a  contii 
ation  of  the  probing  for  a  compatal 
ity.  I  think  it  is  obvious  now  tl 
with  the  issues  so  sharply  drawn 
key  differences  remain  that  must 
addressed  on  the  side  of  Israel.  1 
things  that  are  of  deepest  concern 
Israel's  refusal  to  acknowledge  tl 
U.N.  Resolution  242  applies  clea 
to  the  West  Bank,  their  unwillingn 
to  grant  to  the  West  Bank  Pale 


1978 

,,  the  Palestinian  Arabs,  a  right 
irticipate  in  the  determination  of 

own  future  by  voting  at  the  end 

5-year  period,  and  so  forth,  for 
<ind   of  affiliation   they   would 

with  Israel  or  Jordan  or  under  a 
administration.  And  this  is  a  prob- 

or  which  I  have  no  clear  solution 
But  I  believe  that  the  Begin  gov- 
lent  is  completely  capable  of 
tiating  an  agreement  with  Egypt. 

In  connection  with  your  visit 
in  Latin  America,  do  you  ex- 
in  the  future — do  you  consider 
lossibility  of  another  visit  to  the 
r  countries  of  Latin  America, 

my  case,  to  Argentina,  and  do 
have  an  eventual  date  for  this 


We  have  not  yet  set  any  date 
Tiade  any  plans  for  future  visits, 
'ou  may  know,  I  have  visited 
ntina  in  the  past,  and  so  has  my 
And  this  year,  this  past  year, 
stary  of  State — our  Secretary  of 

,   Cyrus   Vance — visited  Argen- 

too  [November  20-22,  1977], 
/our  own  leader,  Videla.  came  to 

us  in  Washington.  I  have  no 
s  now  for  any  additional  trips 
'here  after  I  return  to  Washins- 


What's  the  purpose  of  this 

ing  that  you  are  having  in  Rio 

Cardinal  Arns  [a  leader  of  the 

lilian  human   rights  coalition] 

five  other  people?  I  mean,  what 

f  ificallv   are  you   intending  to 

Muss  with  them  and  hear  from 


I    I   don't  have  any  agenda  pre- 

■  1  for  my  visit  with  Cardinal  Arns 

■  the  others.  In  a  diverse  society 
I  you  have  here  in  Brazil,  it's  im- 
lint  for  me  to  visit  with  different 
Ions  who  represent  different 
Is.  I  will  have  thorough  discus- 
Is,  as  you  know,  with  President 
lei  and  his  administration,  and  I 
It  to  meet  with  as  many  other 
l>le  as  I  can.  I  have,  by  the  way, 
>e  and  talked  to  Cardinal  Arns  pre- 
Isly  in  the  United  States.  I  think 
I  is  typical  of  leaders  who  visit 
Ir  countries.  I  noticed,  for  in- 
l:e.  with  some  interest,  that  when 
lident  Geisel  visited  the  Federal 
lublic  of  Germany  recently,  he  not 
I  met  with  Chancellor  Schmidt  but 

■  let  with  the  leaders  of  the  opposi- 
«(  parties. 

Bid  as  a  leader  of  a  nation,  I  re- 
le  the  right  to  meet  with  whom  I 
Ise.  And  I  think  this  is  a  construe  - 
I  thing,  which  will  give  me  a  much 
ler  overall  understanding  of  what 
Bts  in  Brazil.  And  I  think  the  right 


&JaL 


m 


Mrs.  Carter  anil  Ann  in  Brazil 

of  people  to  speak  to  me  as  a  foreign 
visitor  is  one  that's  important  to 
Brazil  to  preserve  and  to  cherish.  And 
I  am  thankful  that  I  have  that  right 
when  I  visit  your  country. 


Q  [in  Portuguese].  I'd  like  to 
know  whether  in  your  meeting  with 
General  Figueiredo  [Chief  of  the 
Brazilian  National  Intelligence 
Service]  yesterday  you  discussed  the 
program  of  the  political  opening  up 
of  the  Brazilian  Government  and 
the  implementation  of  that  plan? 

A.  I  did  not  have  an  opportunity  to 
discuss  any  matters  of  importance 
with  General  Figueiredo.  1  only  met 
him  very  briefly  in  a  larger  group  of 
people — 30  or  40  people — and  in  the 
receiving  line  when  I  came  into  the 
airport.  So,  I've  not  had  a  chance  to 
discuss  this  with  him. 


Q  [in  Portuguese].  My  basic 
question  was  the  same  as  he  asked, 
but  I'd  like  to  know  how  you  view 
the  succession  here  in  Brazil,  and 
how  do  you  view  the  problem  of 
political  and  civil  rights  in  Brazil? 

A.  I  think  the  type  of  succession 
and  the  process  through  which  you 
choose  your  leaders,  or  your  leaders 
are  chosen,  is  one  to  be  decided  in 
Brazil.  I'm  not  here  to  tell  you  how 
to  form  your  government.  I  have  no 
inclination  to  do  that.  The  Brazilian 
people  are  completely  aware  of  the 
process,  and  that's  a  judgment  for 
you  to  make. 

Brazil,  like  the  United  States,  is 
struggling  with  the  very  difficult 
question  of  identifying  human  rights 
and  civil  rights  violations,  enhancing 
the  democratic  processes,  and  also 
encouraging  confidence  among  the 
people  in  my  government,  in  the 
United  States,  and  in  the  government 
here  in  Brazil  and  other  countries. 

The  differences  that  have  arisen  on 
the  human  rights  issue  are  not  based 
upon  the  lack  of  commitment  to  en- 


hance human  rights.  I  think  great 
progress  has  been  made  in  your  coun- 
try and  also  in  ours.  We  do  have  a 
sharp  difference  of  opinion,  however, 
on  how  the  human  rights  issue  should 
be  addressed,  how  specific  allegations 
should  be  investigated,  and  what  ac- 
tion can  be  taken  to  correct  any  de- 
fects that  exist  in  your  country  or 
mine  or  others. 

We  believe  that  this  is  an  interna- 
tional problem,  that  the  focusing  of 
world  attention  and  world  pressure  on 
us  and  other  countries  is  a  very  bene- 
ficial factor,  that  high  publicity 
should  be  given  to  any  proven  viola- 
tion of  human  rights.  It's  a  commit- 
ment that  our  nation  has  that  I  want 
not  to  abandon  but  to  enhance  and 
strengthen. 

Brazil,  on  the  other  hand,  also 
struggling  with  the  same  problem, 
trying  to  give  greater  human  rights, 
does  not  believe  that  the  international 
organizations  and  multinational  opin- 
ions should  be  marshaled.  However,  I 
do  note  that  recently  Brazil  did  vote 
for  an  increase  in  the  financing  of  the 
Inter-American  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission. 

We  think  that  when  an  allegation  is 
made  in  our  own  country,  in  Brazil, 
in  the  European  countries,  or  wher- 
ever, that  some  responsible  delegation 
from  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  or  the  United  Na- 
tions should  go  in,  get  the  facts, 
make  the  facts  public.  If  there  is  an 
actual  violation,  this  would  be  a  great 
incentive  to  the  government 
involved — ours  or  yours  or  others — to 
correct  the  defect.  If  the  allegation  is 
false,  then  the  exposition  of  the  error 
or  the  false  allegation  would  be  good 
for  the  world  to  know. 

So,  I  think  this  is  a  very  deep  and 
important  consideration.  One  of  the 
best  things  about  the  development  on 
human  rights  in  the  last  year  or  so  has 
been  the  worldwide  attention  to  it.  It 
was  kind  of  a  dormant  issue  for  too 
long,  and  now  I  doubt  that  there's  a 
world  leader  who  exists  who  doesn't 
constantly  feel  the  pressure  of  consid- 
ering the  human  rights  questions — to 
analyze  one's  own  administration, 
one's  own  country,  what  the  rest  of 
the  world  thinks  about  us,  and  how 
we  could  correct  any  defects  and  pre- 
vent allegations  in  the  future,  either 
true  or  false. 

Q.  With  the  new  movement  which 
is  now  apparent  in  the  Middle  East 
question,  is  there  any  possibility  of 
a  Middle  East  stop  on  your  way 
back  home? 

A.  No.  No,  I  have  no  intention  to 
stop  in  the  Middle  East.  I'll  go  from 


10 

here  to  Nigeria,  from  there  to  Liberia, 
and  then  back  home. 

Q.  [in  Portuguese].  The  re- 
straint of  your  public  words  until 
now,  your  specific  desire  to  meet 
with  a  new  President,  all  these  facts 
amount  to  a  virtual  blessing  of  the 
Brazilian  regime.  Is  your  interest  in 
civil  rights  and  political  dissidents 
fading  away,  or  are  American  eco- 
nomic interests  in  this  country  so 
strong  that  Brazil  is  already  a  spe- 
cial case? 

A.  I  might  say  that  the  history,  the 
culture,  common  defense  require- 
ments, trade,  common  purpose  binds 
the  people  of  Brazil — all  bind  the 
people  of  Brazil  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  together  in  an  unbreak- 
able commitment,  regardless  of  the 
identity  of  the  leaders  in  our  own 
country  or  yours.  The  people  of 
Brazil  and  the  United  States  are 
bound  together.  There  is  no  lessening 
of  our  commitment  to  the  principles 
that  you  described.  The  basic  free- 
doms to  democratic  government,  to 
the  protection  of  human  rights,  to  the 
prevention  of  nuclear  proliferation — 
these  commitments  are  also  very  deep 
for  us. 

Obviously,  the  overwhelming  re- 
sponsibility when  I  come  to  a  foreign 
country,  no  matter  where  it  is,  is  to 
meet  with  the  leaders  who  are  in  of- 
fice. But  I  also  will  be  visiting  the 
Congress  this  morning.  I'm  sure  that 
I  will  be  meeting  the  chairman  of  a 
Senate  foreign  relations  committee 
who's  also  a  candidate  for  President. 

We've  already  pointed  out  I  will  be 
meeting  with  religious  leaders,  and  I 
hope  that  in  this  process  that  I'll  have 
a  chance  to  get  views  from  all  ele- 
ments, at  least  some  of  the  major 
elements  of  the  Brazilian  society.  But 
I'm  not  endorsing  any  candidates,  and 
I  think  that  the  overwhelming  sense 
of  my  visit  already  has  been  that  the 
strength  of  our  friendship  and  the 
mutuality  of  our  purposes,  now  and  in 
the  future,  far  override  any  sharply 
expressed  differences  of  opinion  on 
even  the  major  and  very  important  is- 
sues of  human  rights,  nonprolifera- 
tion,  trade,  and  so  forth. 


JOINT  U.S. -BRAZILIAN 
COMMUNIQUE,  BRASILIA, 
MAR.  304 

The  President  of  the  Federative  Republic  of 
Brazil  and  Mrs.  Ernesto  Geisel  received  the 
President  of  the  United  States  and  Mrs  Carter 
as  official  guests  of  the  Brazilian  Government. 
President  Geisel  welcomed  the  visit  as  a  clear 
expression  of  the   importance  of  the  relation- 


ship and  the  historic  ties  that  link  the  two 
countries. 

During  the  course  of  their  stay  in  Brasilia. 
President  and  Mrs.  Carter  visited  His  Excel- 
lency, the  President  of  the  Supretne  Federal 
Tribunal,  and  other  members  of  the  Tribunal. 
President  Carter  also  called  on  the  National 
Congress  meeting  in  solemn  joint  session. 
President  and  Mrs.  Carter  expressed  their  deep 
appreciation  for  these  opportunities  to  meet 
with  the  Tribunal  and  the  National  Congress 

The  visit  testifies  to  the  desire  of  both  Pres- 
idents to  increase  their  mutual  understanding 
and  build  on  the  broad  areas  of  agreement  that 
exist  between  the  two  Governments  The  visit 
also  recognizes  the  growing  importance  and 
complexity  of  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries and  the  need  to  minimize  the  inevitable 
differences  in  perspective  that  flow  from  that 
complexity. 

The  conversations  between  the  two  Presi- 
dents took  place  in  an  atmosphere  of  frank- 
ness, cordiality  and  mutual  respect  They  re- 
viewed recent  international  developments  on 
the  global  and  regional  plane  and  exchanged 
views  on  the  policies  and  perceptions  of  their 
Governments.  Recognizing  the  respective  re- 
sponsibilities of  their  two  countries  in  the  res- 
olution of  important  global  issues,  the  two 
Presidents  stressed  the  common  interests  and 
goals  both  countries  share  for  the  construction 
of  a  just  and  peaceful  international  order. 
They  reaffirmed  their  strong  support  for  the 
principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
and  of  the  Organization  of  American  States, 
and  for  the  principles  of  sovereignty,  equality 
and  non-intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  ol 
states,  non-use  of  force  in  international  rela- 
tions and  for  other  principles  of  international 
law  governing  relations  among  states.  They 
agreed  on  the  need  to  persevere  in  efforts  to 
maintain  international  peace,  strengthen  world 
security,  intensify  cooperation  among  states 
and  settle  outstanding  international  issues  in 
accordance  with  the  peaceful  means  envisaged 
by  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 

In  the  context  of  this  global  review,  the  two 
Presidents  noted  the  importance  of  the  United 
Nations  and  other  international  and  regional 
institutions  in  the  resolution  of  international 
issues  and  disputes,  and  agreed  that  their  two 
Governments  should  maintain  and  expand  their 
cooperation  in  support  of  these  mechanisms 
and  their  increased  effectiveness  Thej  also 
agreed  to  expand  the  annual  consultations  be- 
tween their  two  Governments  preceding  the 
UN  General  Assembly  sessions,  and  to  bring 
within  the  purview  of  these  consultations 
negotiations  and  meetings  under  UN  auspices 
such  as  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  and  the 
United  Nations  Conferences  on  Technology 
and  Development  and  Technical  Cooperation 
among  Developing  Countries. 

The  Presidents  exchanged  views  concerning 
the  situation  in  the  Middle  East  and  deplored 
the  recent  violence  which  occurred  in  that 
area  They  agreed  that  it  is  necessary  and  ur- 
gent  to   intensity    efforts   to   achieve   a  just. 


Department  of  State  Bui 

comprehensive  and  durable  peace  base 
UNSC  Resolution  242  and  338.  They  stn 
the  importance  of  withdrawal  on  all  fi 
pursuant  to  Resolution  242  and  the  resol 
of  all  aspects  of  the  Palestinian  question 

The  two  Presidents  emphasized  their 
cern  with  the  arms  race  and  reaffirmed 
they  strongly  favor  the  adoption  of  disa 
ment  measures  under  strict  and  effective  i 
national  control.  Additionally,  the  Presit 
expressed  their  mutual  dedication  to  the 
tive  participation  of  their  respective  cour 
in  the  UN  Special  Session  on  Disa 
ment  and  affirmed  their  mutual  desire 
the  Special  Session  lead  to  positive  step 
wards  a  reduction  and  eventual  eliminate 
armaments  and  the  alleviation  of  internal 
tensions. 

Drawing  on  their  deep  common  heritaj 
respect  for  the  Rule  of  Law  and  their  detc 
nation  to  improve  the  conditions  ot  lit 
their  peoples,  both  Presidents  reaffirmed 
agreed  that  the  progress  of  mankind  wi 
measured  in  large  part  by  advances  mat 
guaranteeing  and  assuring  the  political, 
nomic  and  social  rights  of  all  peoples. 

President  Carter  emphasized  the  fumlai 
tal  commitment  of  his  country  to  the  pn 
tion  of  human  rights  and  democratic  freer 
as  basic  to  the  process  of  building  a  more 
world,  and  stated  that  the  Universal  Dec 
tion  of  Human  Rights  and  the  OAS  ('h 
provide  a  framework  for  international  cor 
in  this  area.  In  this  regard  President  Geisi 
called  that  international  cooperation  for  th 
firmation  of  human  rights,  in  all  their  asp 
is  one  of  the  noblest  tasks  of  the  United 
tions.  He  stressed  the  preoccupation  ol 
Brazilian  Government  with  the  observanc 
human  rights  and  noted  the  essential  rol 
economic,  social  and  political  developme 
attaining  progress  in  this  area. 

President  Carter  reviewed  the  global  s. 
of  the  non-proliferation  policy  of  the  Ut 
States,  illustrated  the  practical  implement! 
ol  this  policy  within  the  United  States  i 
and  described  the  ongoing  efforts  of  his 
ministration  to  prevent  both  vertical  and  I 
zontal  proliferation  on  a  worldwide  lusis 
emphasized  that  U.S.  policy  is  designei 
curb  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  while 
couraging  international  cooperation  in  the 
velopment  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  ato 
energy.  President  Geisel  noted  Brazil's  e 
concern  for  non-proliferation  of  nuc 
weapons,  both  vertical  and  horizontal.  In 
connection,  he  stressed  that  Brazil  strot 
supports  international  efforts  towards  di 
mament;  that  Brazil's  nuclear  program 
strictly  peaceful  objectives  and  is  designei 
meet  her  energy  needs,  and  that  Brazil  fa> 
the  adoption  of  the  lAl-A's  international  r 
discriminatory   safeguards. 

The  two  Presidents  reviewed  the  conditi 
and  prospects  of  the  world  economy  T 
discussed  the  critical  relationship  of  devel 
ments  in  the  U.S.  economy  to  global  stabi 
and  growth,  and  examined  Brazil's  rapidly 


1978 


11 


g  role  within  the  global  economic  sys- 
oth  Presidents  stressed  that  it  is  impor- 
lat  the  industrialized  countries  as  a  group 
e  appropriate  policies  to  ensure  the  re- 
ion  of  more  rapid  worldwide  economic 
th,  which  also  requires  appropriate 
es  in  the  developing  countries  to  main- 
lealthy  economies.  They  welcomed  the 
on  of  OPEC  taken  in  Caracas  in  De- 
:r  to  maintain  the  prevailing  level  of  pe- 
rn prices. 

sident  Carter  emphasized  his  Administra- 
commitment  to  freer  trade.  President 
stressed  the  importance  of  export 
h  to  Brazilian  development.  In  this  con- 
>n.  both  Presidents  emphasized  their  re- 
to  work  towards  a  more  open  and  fair 
I  trading  system,  to  fight  protectionism 

0  cooperate   in   bringing  the   Multilateral 
Negotiations  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

wo  Presidents  agreed  that  the  major  con- 
ions  in  this  field  should  be  made  by  the 
oped  countries.  President  Carter  em- 
zed  the  determination  of  the  United 
s  to  negotiate  special  and  differential 
nent  for  developing  countries,  where 
le  and  appropriate.  He  also  noted  the  de- 
lity  of  contributions  by  the  developing 
ies  towards  trade  liberalization.   President 

1  expressed  Brazil's  readiness  to  contrib- 
together  with  other  countries,  to  the 
ilization   of  world   trade.   The  two   Presi- 

agreed  on  the  importance  of  reaching  an 
standing  on  codes  on  export  subsidies, 
ervailing  duties,  safeguards  and  other 
policy  mechanisms.  They  also  agreed  on 
.•ed  for  close  consultations  as  the  Geneva 
iations  approach  the  final  stage, 
e  two  Presidents  agreed  that  the  Fifth 
.in  of  the  Brazil-US  Sub-Group  on  Trade 
I  take  place  in  Brasilia  in  May.  The  prin- 
purpose  of  the  session  will  be  a  bilateral 
tnation  of  the  substantive  issues  existing 
e  current  phase  of  the  Multilateral  Trade 
tiations. 

e  two  Presidents  strongly  endorsed  the 
■ole  of  international  financial   institutions 
as   the   World   Bank   and   the   Inter- 
rican  Development-  Bank.  In  this  connec- 
they  reviewed  the  various  measures  taken 
e  past  year  and  agreed  on  the  importance 
i  increased  level  of  funding  of  these   in- 
ions.  The  two  Presidents  emphasized  the 
irtance  of  the  contributions  of  the  de- 
Jed  as  well  as  of  the  developing  countries 
tese  institutions,  and  also  noted  and  wel- 
d  the  expanding  efforts  among   the   de- 
ping   countries   themselves  to   strengthen 
Jal   cooperation    in   support   of  their  de- 
pment.   They  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
rts  made  to  create  a  group  for  economic 
>eration  in  the  Caribbean. 
le  two  Presidents  agreed  on  the  impor- 
e  of  stabilizing  commodity  prices  at  levels 
to  producers  and  consumers  and  of  the 
which  well-designed  funding  arrange- 

I'ts  can  play  in  relation  to  commodity  price 


Both  Presidents  stated  that  they  would  con- 
tinue their  support  for  the  close  working  rela- 
tionships that  have  been  established  between 
the  economic  and  financial  authorities  of  the 
two  countries. 

The  two  Presidents  discussed  their  common 
interest  in  reducing  dependence  on  imported 
oil  and  reviewed  their  countries'  programs  in 
energy  research  and  development.  They  agreed 
to  establish  a  program  of  cooperation  that 
would  emphasize  both  nations'  areas  of  ad- 
vanced expertise  and  ensure  a  two-way  flow  of 
benefits:  in  coal  mining,  processing  and  con- 
version, the  production  of  alcohol  from  sugar 
and  other  agricultural  products  and  industrial 
and  transportation  energy  conservation.  This 
agreement  will  be  followed  by  meetings  of  ex- 
perts to  design  specific  cooperative  programs 
including  the  possibility  of  joint  funding  of 
such  programs. 

The  two  Presidents  also  noted  the  world  ag- 
ricultural situation  and  agreed  that  the  United 
States  and  Brazil,  as  the  world's  leading  ex- 
porters of  agricultural  products,  can  make  an 
important  contribution  to  easing  world  prob- 
lems in  this  field.  They  decided  to  establish, 
under  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
[Concerning  Consultations  on  Matters  of 
Mutual  Interest]  of  February  21,  1976,  a 
Sub-Group  on  Agriculture.  The  Sub-Group 
will  address  problems  of  mutual  interest  and 
will  hold  its  initial  meeting  in  the  near  future 

The  two  Presidents  also  noted  that  the 
shared  experiences  which  derive  from  private 
sector,  professional,  cultural  and  educational 
exchanges  constitute  a  valuable  base  of  lasting 
friendship  and  mutual  understanding  between 
the  two  countries.  The  two  Presidents  specif- 
ically noted  the  celebration  last  year  of  the 
Twentieth  Anniversary  of  the  Bilateral  Ful- 
bright  Exchange  Program  which  has  involved 
university  scholars  of  a  wide  variety  of 
disciplines. 

The  two  Presidents  emphasized  the  shared 
goals  of  their  peoples  in  a  new  era  of  peace 
and  progress  which  will  contribute  to  a  more 
just  economic  relationship  between  North  and 
South,  promote  increased  economic  security 
for  all  countries,  assure  a  better  quality  of  life 
for  all  peoples,  provide  a  more  equitable  shar- 
ing of  the  benefits  of  growth,  and  encourage 
more  rapid  national  development. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  on  the  impor- 
tance of  frequent  consultations  and  close 
cooperation  between  the  two  Governments. 
They  agreed  that  the  mechanisms  and  proce- 
dures of  consultation  established  under  the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  of  February 
21,  1976.  should  continue  to  be  used  and  in- 
structed their  Foreign  Ministers  accordingly. 
The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  intention  to 
continue  in  close  personal  communication  so 
as  to  permit  their  direct  and  prompt  address  to 
matters  of  special  interest  to  their  two 
countries. 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  great 
personal  satisfaction  that  their  conversations, 
conducted  in  an  atmosphere  of  friendship  and 


mutual  respect,  had  resulted  in  a  very  useful, 
comprehensive  and  mutually  beneficial  ex- 
change of  views  on  a  wide  range  of  multilat- 
eral and  bilateral  issues,  and  a  full  apprecia- 
tion of  each  other's  views. 

Upon  ending  their  visit.  President  and  Mrs. 
Carter  thanked  President  and  Mrs.  Geisel  for 
the  cordial  hospitality  offered  to  them  by  the 
Brazilian  people  and  government. 

REMARKS  AT  THE 
NATIONAL  ARTS  THEATRE, 
LAGOS,  APR.  I6 

I  come  from  a  great  nation  to  visit 
a  great  nation.  When  my  voice  speaks 
words,  they  are  not  the  words  of  a 
personal  person  but  the  words  of  a 
country. 

It's  no  coincidence  that  I  come  here 
to  this  institute,  where  free  and  open 
discussions  and  debate  contribute  to 
the  comprehension  and  understanding 
and  the  reaching  of  agreements  that 
solve  problems  that  have  separated 
people  one  from  another. 

It  is  no  coincidence  that  I  come  to 
Nigeria  to  talk  about  our  bilateral  re- 
lationships and  the  problems  of  Af- 
rica. And  it  is  no  coincidence  that  our 
nation  has  now  turned  in  an  unpre- 
cedented way  toward  Africa — not  to 
give  you  our  services  but  to  share 
with  you  a  common  future,  combining 
our  strengths  and  yours,  correcting 
our  weaknesses  and  correcting  yours. 
And  this  departure  from  past  aloof- 
ness by  the  United  States  is  not  just  a 
personal  commitment  of  my  own,  but 
I  represent  the  deep  feelings  and  the 
deep  interest  of  all  the  people  of  my 
country. 

I'm  proud  and  deeply  moved  to  be 
the  first  American  President  to  make 
an  official  visit  to  your  country.  And 
I'm  especially  grateful  for  the  warmth 
and  the  generosity  of  my  reception  by 
the  Government  and  by  the  people  of 
Nigeria.  I  don't  know  who's  doing 
the  work,  but  many  Nigerians  are 
standing  beside  the  roadway  to  make 
me  and  my  family  feel  welcome,  and 
I  thank  you  for  it. 

During  my  first  year  as  President  of 
the  United  States,  I've  been  pleased 
to  work  closely  with  General 
Obasanjo,  learning  from  him  and 
from  other  African  leaders.  Our 
cooperation  has  had  a  special  mean- 
ing for  me,  since  Africa  has  been  so 
much  in  my  thoughts  during  the  past 
15  months. 

Our  countries  have  much  in  com- 
mon. Nigeria  and  the  United  States 
are  vast  and  diverse  nations  seeking 
to  use  our  great  resources  for  the 
benefit  of  all  our  people.  That's  the 


12 


With  Lt.  Gen   Obasanjo  in  Lagos 


way  it  is  now;  that's  the  way  it  will 
continue  to  be  in  the  future. 

Americans  admire  the  energy,  the 
wisdom,  the  hard  work,  the  sense  of 
optimism  of  the  Nigerian  people,  for 
these  are  exactly  the  same  qualities 
which  we  admire  in  my  country.  The 
Nigerian  Government  has  shown  these 
qualities  in  your  own  national  accom- 
plishments and  in  your  efforts  for 
worldwide  peace  and  economic 
progress — in  the  Organization  of  Af- 
rican Unity,  in  the  United  Nations, 
and  in  other  councils  where  nations 
seek  common  ground  so  as  to  resolve 
differences  and  to  work  together. 

We  admire  also  the  humane  and  the 
creative  way  which  Nigeria  has  come 
through  a  divisive  time  in  your  own 
history.  Through  public  debate  and 
far-reaching  planning,  you  are  design- 
ing a  democratic  future  for  a  new 
"One  Nigeria,"  and  we're  grateful 
and  excited  about  this  prospect. 

Our  bonds  of  friendship  go  back 
many  years.  Nigerian  students  first 
came  to  the  United  States  in  the  19th 
century.  Your  first  President.  Nnamdi 
Azikiwe.  studied  in  our  country.  In 
applying  to  Lincoln  University,  he 
wrote  that  he  believed  in  education 
for  service  and  service  for  humanity 
Tens  of  thousands  of  young  Nigerians 
have  followed  him  to  America  to  pre- 
pare themselves  for  service  here  in 
their  homeland.  Many  are  present  or 
future  teachers  who  will  help  you 
achieve  your  goal  of  universal  pri- 
mary education. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  learn- 
ing from  you  as  well,  for  we  are  en- 
riched by  our  ties  and  heritage  in  Af- 
rica, just  as  we  hope  to  contribute  to 


the  realization  of  African  hopes  and 
African  expectations. 

Our  nations  and  our  continents  are 
bound  together  by  strong  ties  that  we 
inherit  from  our  histories.  We  also 
share  three  basic  commitments  to  the 
future  of  Africa. 

•  We  share  with  you  a  commitment 
to  majority  rule  and  individual  human 
rights. 

•  In  order  to  meet  the  basic  needs 
of  the  people,  we  share  with  you  a 
commitment  to  economic  growth  and 
to  human  development. 

•  We  share  with  you  a  commitment 
to  an  Africa  that  is  at  peace,  free 
from  colonialism,  free  from  racism, 
free  from  military  interference  by 
outside  nations,  and  free  from  the  in- 
evitable conflicts  that  can  come  when 
the  integrity  of  national  boundaries 
are  not  respected.  We  share  these 
things  with  you  as  well. 

These  three  common  commitments 
shape  our  attitude  toward  your  conti- 
nent. 


Majority  Rule 

You  have  been  among  the  leaders 
of  international  efforts  to  bring  the 
principles  of  majority  rule  and  indi- 
vidual rights  into  reality  in  southern 
Africa.  During  the  past  year,  we've 
worked  closely  with  your  government 
and  the  other  front-line  states  in  the 
quest  to  achieve  these  goals  in 
Namibia  and  in  Zimbabwe. 

Namibia.  Our  efforts  have  now 
reached  a  critical  stage.  On  Namibia, 
there   has  been  some  progress,   with 


k! 


Department  of  State  Bui 

the  parties  showing  some  degre 
flexibility.  It  is  important  that 
commodation  be  now  reached, 
past  week,  we  and  the  other  Wes 
members  of  the  U.N.  Security  G 
cil  have  presented  to  the  dispu 
parties  our  proposals  for  an  inte 
tionally  acceptable  agreement  b; 
on  free  elections. 

These  proposals  provide  the 
hope  for  a  fair  and  peaceful  solu 
that  will  bring  independence 
Namibia  in  a  manner  consistent  ' 
Security  Council  Resolution  385. 
group  is  favored  at  the  expenst 
another.  They  protect  the  right 
all.  They  should  be  accepted  witl 
further  delay.  The  tragic  assassina 
[on  March  27.  1978]  of  Chief  Kap 
[President  of  the  Democratic  T 
halle  Alliance,  a  Namibian  polii 
party]  should  not  lead  to  an  en 
violence  and  recrimination,  but  U 
internationally  supervised  choice 
the  people  of  Namibia  to  elect  li 
ership  that  will  unite  their  countr 
peace  and  not  divide  it  in  war. 


Southern  Rhodesia.  On  Rhode 
or  Zimbabwe,  Great   Britain  and 
United  States  have  put  forward  a 
for  the  solution,7  based  on  three 
damental  principles: 

•  First,  fair  and  free  elections; 

•  Secondly,  an  irreversible  tra 
tion  to  genuine  majority  rule  and 
dependence;  and 

•  Third,  respect  for  the  indivic 
rights  of  all  the  citizens  of  an  ii 
pendent  Zimbabwe. 

This  plan  provides  the  best  b. 
for  agreement.  It  is  widely  suppo 
within  the  international  commu! 
and  by  the  Presidents  of  the  front- 
nations  who  surround  Zimbabwe 
self.  Its  principles  must  be  honoi 
Let  there  be  no  question  of  the  ci 
mitment  of  the  United  States  to  il 
principles  or  our  determination 
pursue  a  just  settlement  which  bri 
a  cease-fire  and  an  internationi 
recognized  legal  government. 

The  present  challenge  to  our  ( 
lomacy  and  to  yours  is  to  help  all 
parties  get  together,  based  on 
Anglo-American  plan,  and  build 
areas  of  agreement.  Only  a  fair 
rangement  with  broad  support  ami 
the  parties  can  endure. 

The  transition  to  independence  c 
new  Zimbabwe  must  insure  an  opp 
tunity  for  all  parties  to  compete  in 
democratic  process  on  an  equal  ft 
ing.  The  past  must  lead  irrevocably 
majority  rule  and  a  future  in  wh 
the  rights  of  each  citizen  of  Zi 
babwe  are  protected,  regardless 
tribal  or  ethnic  origin  or  race.  Tha 


1978 

nation's  position.  We  will  not  de- 
from  it. 

he  hour  is  late  with  regard  both  to 
babwe  and  to  Namibia.  The  par- 
must  choose.  They  can  choose  a 
of  agreement  and  be  remembered 
^nen  of  vision  and  courage  who 
ted  new  nations,  born  in  peace, 
hey  can  insist  on  rigid  postures 
will  produce  new  political  com- 
ations.  generating  new  conflicts, 
wing  additional  bloodshed,  and 
y  the  fulfillment  of  their  hopes. 
'e  in  the  United  States  remain 
imitted,  as  do  the  people  of 
eria,  to  the  path  of  genuine  prog- 
and  fairness  for  the  sake  of  all 
nations  of  the  region  and  for  the 
•  of  international  peace. 

auth  Africa.  In  the  name  of  jus- 
.  we  also  believe  that  South  Afri- 
society  should  and  can  be  trans- 
led  progressively  and  peacefully, 
assured  respect  for  the  rights  of 
We've  made  it  clear  to  South  Af- 
that  the  nature  of  our  relations 
depend  on  whether  there  is  prog- 
toward  full  participation  for  all 
people,  in  every  respect  of  the 
al  and  economic  life  of  the  na- 
,  and  an  end  to  discrimination,  an 
to  apartheid  based  on  race  or 
lie  origin.  We  stand  firm  in  that 
sage  as  well. 

grew  up  in  a  society  struggling  to 
[  racial  harmony  through  racial 
ice.   Though  our  problems   were 

Ierent,  I  know  that  progress  can 
be  found  if  the  determination  to 
wrongs  righted  is  matched  by  an 
erstanding  that  the  prisoners  of  in- 
ice  include  the  privileged  as  well 
fa  he  powerless. 
II  believe  we  should  therefore  com- 

■  :  our  determination  to  support  the 
lits  of  the  oppressed  people  in 
iith  Africa  with  a  willingness  to 
Id  out  our  hands  to  the  white 
i.ority  if  they  decide  to  transform 
lir  society  and  to  do  away  with 

■  rtheid  and  the  crippling  burdens  of 
It  injustices.  I  also  believe  that 
igress  can  be  made.  As  Andrew 
lung  said  here  in  Lagos  last  Au- 
It.  a  belief  in  dreams  for  the  future 
liot  naive  if  we  are  ready  to  work 
lealize  those  dreams. 


■man  Rights 

lOur  concern  for  human  rights  ex- 
Ids  throughout  this  continent  and 
floughout  the  world.  Whatever  the 
jyology  or  the  power  or  the  race  of  a 
B/ernment  that  abuses  the  rights  of 
■  people,  we  oppose  those  abuses. 
$iVe  in  America  welcome  the  real 
JB'gress  in  human  rights  that  is  being 


made  in  many  countries,  in  Africa  as 
well  as  in  other  regions.  Americans 
were  particularly  encouraged  that  the 
African  group  at  the  U.N.  Human 
Rights  Commission  moved  this  year 
to  consider  the  oppressive  policies  of 
two  of  its  own  member  nations. 

We  are  encouraged,  too,  by  the 
movement  toward  democracy  being 
made  by  many  nations.  Nigeria  is  an 
outstanding  example.  The  free  and 
fair  elections  that  you  held  in  the  past 
year  leave  no  doubt  that  your  gov- 
ernment is  determined  to  pursue  its 
decision  to  establish  civilian  rule  in 
1979.  This  action  will  be  an  inspira- 
tion to  all  those  in  the  world  who 
love  democracy  and  who  love  free- 
dom. And  we  congratulate  you  on 
this. 

Each  country  must,  of  course, 
adapt  the  instruments  of  democracy  to 
fit  its  own  particular  needs,  a  process 
now  being  completed  by  your  con- 
stituent assembly.  The  basic  elements 
are  participation  by  individuals  in  the 
decisions  that  affect  their  lives,  re- 
spect for  civil  liberties  through  the 
rule  of  law,  and  thus,  protection  of 
the  dignity  of  all  men  and  women. 
Wherever  these  fundamental  princi- 
ples exist,  a  government  can  accom- 
modate to  necessary  change  without 
breaking,  and  its  people  can  demand 
such  change  without  being  broken. 

These  principles  are  necessary  for 
democracy,  and  they  sustain  de- 
velopment as  well.  For  in  a  democ- 
racy, the  people  themselves  can  best 
insure  that  their  government  will 
promote  their  economic  rights,  as 
well  as  their  political  and  civil 
liberties. 

I  believe,  as  I  know  you  do  as 
well,  that  every  person  also  has  a 
right  to  education,  to  health  care,  to 
nutrition,  to  shelter,  to  food,  and  to 
employment.  These  are  the  founda- 
tions on  which  men  and  women  can 
build  better  lives. 


Economic  Development 

This  is  our  second  great,  common 
goal  between  the  United  States  and 
Nigeria — human  development  made 
possible  by  fair  and  equitable  eco- 
nomic progress. 

My  country  is  ready  to  do  its  fair 
share  in  support  of  African  develop- 
ment, both  because  it's  in  our  own 
interest  and  also  because  it's  right. 
More  and  more,  the  economic  well- 
being  of  Americans  depends  on  the 
growth  of  the  developing  nations  here 
in  Africa  and  in  other  parts  of  the 
world.  A  good  example  is  our  rela- 
tionship with  Nigeria,  which  is 
marked  by  respect  for  each  other's 


13 

independence  and  a  growing  recogni- 
tion of  our  interdependence. 

Nigeria,  for  instance,  is  the  United 
States'  second  largest  supplier  of  im- 
ported crude  oil.  The  United  States  is 
the  largest  market  for  Nigeria's  petro- 
leum and  thus  the  largest  source  of 
the  revenue  which  is  so  vital  to 
Nigeria's  dynamic,  economic  de- 
velopment program. 

But  the  scope  of  our  commerce  is 
much  broader  than  in  petroleum 
alone.  Our  growing  trade  serves  the 
interests  of  both  countries.  When  we 
purchase  Nigerian  products,  we  con- 
tribute to  Nigerian  development.  But 
unless  we  can  also  share  our  technol- 
ogy and  share  our  productive  capacity 
with  you,  our  own  economy  slows 
down,  American  workers  lose  their 
jobs,  and  the  resulting  economic 
sluggishness  means  that  we  can  buy 
less  from  you. 

Financial  encouragement  to  de- 
veloping nations  is,  therefore,  in  our 
interest,  because  a  world  of  prosper- 
ous, developing  economies  is  a  world 
in  which  America's  economy  can 
prosper. 

We  are  increasing  our  bilateral  de- 
velopment assistance  to  Africa,  and 
on  my  return  to  Washington,  I  will 
recommend  to  the  Congress  that  the 
United  States  contribute  $125  million 
to  the  second  replenishment  of  the 
African  Development  Fund.  I'm 
happy  to  announce,  also,  that  just  be- 
fore leaving  Washington,  I  authorized 
our  [U.S.  Army]  Corps  of  Engineers 
to  offer  to  participate,  as  requested  by 
you,  in  the  comprehensive  develop- 
ment of  the  Niger  River  system. 

We  are  giving  new  priority  to 
cooperating  in  international  efforts  to 
improve  health  around  the  world.  We 
would  like  to  study  with  you  how  we 
can  best  work  with  Nigeria  and  other 
nations  of  Africa  to  deal  with  the  kill- 
ing and  the  crippling  diseases  that 
still  afflict  this  continent. 

Three  days  ago  I  spoke  in  Caracas, 
Venezuela,  about  our  commitment  to 
international  economic  growth  and 
equity.  All  of  us  can  gain  if  we  act 
fairly  toward  one  another.  Nigeria 
acted  on  this  principle  in  helping  to 
negotiate  the  Lome  convention  and 
the  birth  of  the  Economic  Community 
of  West  African  States. 

All  nations  can  act  on  this  principle 
by  making  world  trade  increasingly 
free  and  fair.  Private  investment  can 
help,  under  arrangements  benefiting 
both  the  investors  and  also  the  host 
countries  like  your  own.  And  sharing 
technology  can  make  a  crucial  differ- 
ence. We  are  especially  pleased  that 
Nigeria  is  sending  so  many  of  your 
young  people  to  the  United  States  for 


14 


f 


Conclusion  of  an  evening's  entertainment  in  Lagos 


training  in  the  middle-level  technical 
skills. 

There  must  be  fair  international 
agreements  on  such  issues  as  stabiliz- 
ing commodity  prices,  the  creation  of 
a  common  fund,  and  relieving  the 
debt  burden  of  the  poorest  nations. 

Every  government  has  the  obliga- 
tion to  promote  economic  justice 
within  its  own  nation,  as  well  as 
among  nations.  American  develop- 
ment assistance  will  go  increasingly 
to  those  areas  where  it  can  make  the 
greatest  contribution  to  the  economic 
rights  of  the  poor 

Peace  in  Africa 

Progress  toward  economic  de- 
velopment requires  the  pursuit  of  our 
third  goal  as  well — again  which  we 
share  with  you — a  peaceful  Africa. 
free  of  military  intervention,  for  eco- 
nomic progress  is  best  pursued  in 
times  of  peace.  Africans  themselves 
can  best  find  peaceful  answers  to  Af- 
rican disputes  through  the  Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity  and,  when 
needed,  with  the  help  of  the  United 
Nations. 

We  support  your  efforts  to 
strengthen  the  peacemaking  role  of 
the   Organization   of  African   Unit\  . 


and  we  share  Nigeria's  belief  in  the 
practical  contributions  the  United  Na- 
tions can  make.  U.N.  peacekeeping 
forces  are  already,  today,  playing  a 
crucial  role  in  the  Middle  East.  They 
can  help  bring  independence  and 
majority  rule,  in  peace,  to  Namibia 
and  to  Zimbabwe. 

The  military  intervention  of  outside 
powers  or  their  proxies  in  such  dis- 
putes too  often  makes  local  conflicts 
even  more  complicated  and  dangerous 
and  opens  the  door  to  a  new  form  of 
domination  or  colonialism.  We  op- 
pose such  intervention  by  outside 
military  forces.  We  must  not  allow 
great  power  rivalries  to  destroy  our 
hopes  for  an  Africa  at  peace. 

This  is  one  reason  we  applaud  the 
leading  role  of  Nigeria  in  seeking  to 
find  peaceful  solutions  to  such 
tragedies  as  the  recent  struggle  be- 
tween Ethiopia  and  Somalia  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa. 

We  are  concerned  that  foreign 
troops  are  already  planning  for  mili- 
tary action  inside  Ethiopia  against  the 
Eritreans,  which  will  result  in  greatly 
increased  bloodshed  among  those  un- 
fortunate peoples.  Although  I  will 
remain  careful  to  see  that  our  friends 
are  not  put  at  a  disadvantage.  I  am 
working  to  curb  our  own   role  as  a 


Department  of  State  Bui 

supplier  of  arms,  and  we  urge  ot 
to  show  similar  restraint. 

We  prefer  to  seek  good  relat 
with   African   and    other   n  a  t  i  | 
through  the  works  of  peace,  not  [ 
America's  contribution  will  be  to | 
and  development  and  not  to  deat 
destruction. 

Plainly,   military  restraint  by 
siders  can  best  be  brought  about  i 
nations,    including   those    who 
weapons,   actively   seek   that   c 
straint.  We  would  welcome  and 
port  voluntary   regional   agreem 
among  African  leaders  to  reduce 
purchase  of  weapons  as  a  major 
toward  peace  and  away  from  the  i 
nomic  deprivation  of  the  poor,  w 
badly  needed  money  that  could 
them  a  better  life  goes  to  pure 
weapons  to  take  lives. 

I've  talked  about  many  subji 
this  afternoon,  very  briefly,  bu 
one  way  or  another,  I've  been  tall 
about  change  in  the  world  that  wt 
share.  Sometimes  we  grow  impal 
or  cynical  about  that  change,  thinl 
that  it's  too  slow,  that  it  may 
come  at  all. 

I  know  something  about  soi 
change.  In  my  own  lifetime.  I've  s 
the  region  of  my  birth — the  soutl 
part  of  the  United  States — chan 
from  a  place  of  poverty  and  des 
and  racial  division  to  a  land  of  br 
promise  and  opportunity  and  incr 
ing  racial  harmony.  I've  seen  the  1 
ering  wall  between  the  races  ta 
down,  piece  by  piece,  until  the  wr 
and  the  blacks  of  my  countrj  C( 
reach  across  it  to  each  other. 

I  know  that  our  own  society  is 
ferent  from   any  other,   and   I   kr 
that  we  still  have  much  to  do  in 
United  States.   But  nothing  can  sh 
my   faith   that   in   every   part   of 
world,  peaceful  change  can  come 
bless  the  lives  of  human  bein 
Nothing  can  make  me  doubt  that 
continent   will   win   its   struggle 
freedom — freedom    from   racism  A 
the  denial   of  human  rights,   freed 
from  want  and  suffering,  and  freed 
from    the   destruction   of   war  a 
foreign  intervention. 

Nigeria  is  a  great  and  influent 
nation,  a  regional  and  an  internatio 
leader  We  stand  by  you  in  yc 
work  We  know  that  Africans  v 
always  take  the  lead  in  shaping 
destiny  of  your  own  people.  And 
know  that  this  continent  will  enj 
the  liberation  that  can  come  to  the 
who  put  racial  division  and  in j ust 
behind  them. 

I  believe  that  this  day  is  coming  I 
Africa.  And  on  that  day,  blacks  a 
whites  alike  will  be  able  to  say, 
the  words  of  a  great  man  from  f 


1978 

State,  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King. 
"Free  at  last,  free  at  last,  thank 
Almighty,  we  are  free  at  last." 


:STION-AND-ANSWER 
SION,  LAGOS, 

28 

Is  there  any  connection  be- 
en your  public   position   on 
Ihern   African  policy  and  how 
ntake  your  votes  at  the  Security 
Incil  on  southern  Africa? 


We  have,  as  you  know,  only  re- 
ly as  a  nation  been  deeply  in- 
ed  in  trying  to  bring  peace  to 
nern  Africa.  We  have  taken  the 
itive,  along  with  the  British,  in 
>abwe.  to  try  to  bring  out  a  res- 
ion  of  those  very  serious 
(ems — peace,  majority  rule,  and 
ing  of  the  liberation  forces  as  a 

in  the  future  security  of  Zim- 
e.  And  we  have  also  taken  the 
itive,  along  with  Germany  and 
ce.  Great  Britain  and  Canada, 
r  the  United  Nations,  to  bring  a 
lution  of  the  problem  in 
ibia — again,  majority  rule,  free 
ions,  the  right  of  the  blacks  to 
their  rights  honored, 
hink  that  is  accurate  to  say,  too, 
the  recent  action  by  the  United 
ins  to  implement  an  arms  em- 
)  against  South  Africa  was  pre- 
d  by  our  own  unilateral  action 
;menting  an  arms  embargo  long 
re  the  United  Nations  acted,  and 
support  that  arms  embargo 
iletely. 

Can  you  tell  us  if  you  talked 
t  the  oil  situation  and  the  fact 
Nigeria  wants  more  technology 

the  United  States? 


I  Yes.  We  discussed  the  oil  situa- 
lin  Nigeria.  We  also  discussed  the 
loect  of  purchasing  liquefied  natu- 
l.as,  which  Nigeria  will  be  ready 
I'oduce  by  1983.  and  the  need  of 
I  ria  for  technical  assistance  not 
I  in  petroleum  but  in  other  aspects 
I  onomic  development. 
Iiere  are  now.  as  I  said  in  my 
Ich  yesterday,  15,000  Nigerian 
l:nts  and,  in  addition,  1,000  more 
I  are  getting  specific  middle-level 
Inical  training  in  the  United 
les.  Five  hundred  are  already 
■  '.  500  more  are  coming.  In  addi- 
I,  the  Nigerians  have  requested 
lar  assistance — retired  executives 
li  the  United  States  who  have 
Ivledge  in  economic  development 
I  petroleum  to  come  here  to  work 
I  them.  And  we  will  pursue  that 
■Jgh  the  Secretary  of  State. 
lie  Eximbank  loans,  the  Overseas 


Private  Investment  Corporation 
(OPIC)  insurance,  which  I  think  we 
now  have  31  applicants  who  are  ready 
to  come  into  Nigeria  to  make 
investments — this  will  be  expedited. 

In  addition,  we  have  established, 
after  General  Obasanjo's  visit  to  the 
United  States  in  October,  detailed 
discussions  between  our  own  Com- 
merce Department  and  other  officials 
and  the  Nigerians  on  how  we  can  in- 
crease investment  and  technical  as- 
sistance for  Nigeria. 

It  is  a  very  good  country  in  which 
to  invest.  There  is  a  stable  govern- 
ment with  a  prospect  of  constitutional 
government  that  will  be  equally  sta- 
ble. I  think  the  past  problems  with 
American  investors  have  now  been 
overcome.  I  know  that  several  major 
companies  —  Ford,  Mack  Truck, 
Bechtel,  and  others — are  now  coming 
into  Nigeria  to  invest.  So,  I  would 
guess  that  all  the  needs  of  Nigeria — 
technical  assistance  and  devel- 
opment— will  be  met. 

Q.  Did  the  General  ask  you  to 
take  stronger  action  toward  South 
Africa  and  Rhodesia,  perhaps  more 
embargoes? 

A.  I  think  the  General  would  be 
more  inclined  to  take  additional  em- 
bargo action  against  South  Africa 
than  would  we.  As  I  have  said,  we 
have  cooperated  in  the  U.N.  actions, 
and  even  before  the  U.N.  action,  we 
took  unilateral  steps  to  declare  a 
complete  arms  embargo  against  South 
Africa. 

Q.  What  specific  areas  of  bilat- 
eral cooperation  would  you  like  be- 
tween your  country  and  Nigeria  on 
any  issue  or  on  any  important  proj- 
ect to  use  for  this  important  visit? 

A.  We  have  got  now  four  commit- 
tees set  up,  one  for  the  development 
of  Nigerian  agriculture.  This  is  a  joint 
effort  where  we  help  Nigeria  and  we 
learn  in  the  process.  Another  one  of 
the  subcommittees  is  on  education. 
And  we  have  always  had,  for  many 
years,  a  very  good  relationship  here. 
We  want  to  improve  it. 

Another  one  is  in  economic  de- 
velopment. I  mentioned  that  we  have 
31  applicants  right  now  of  American 
business  investments  that  are  waiting 
to  be  made  in  Nigeria.  And  the  fourth 
one  is  technical  assistance,  where  we 
will  provide  technical  training  in  the 
United  States  and  send  technicians 
here  who  are  expert  to  help  with  the 
future  development  of  the  Nigerian 
economy. 

These  efforts  are  all  very  fruitful, 
and  they  will  be  better  in  the  future. 
We  have  decided,   for  instance,   this 


15 

morning,  that  the  joint  study  commis- 
sion that  was  set  up  last  October,  that 
already  met  in  Nigeria  in  November, 
will  have  another  meeting  in  the 
United  States  in  April — this  month, 
the  last  of  this  month — will  make  a 
report  to  me  and  to  General  Obasanjo 
by  the  end  of  May  to  identify  any  re- 
maining problems,  so  that  he  and  I 
can  personally  resolve  those  problems 
and  remove  the  obstacles  to  the  fur- 
ther economic  development,  on  a 
joint  basis,  between  our  country  and 
Nigeria. 

Q.  You  said  the  General  would 
be  more  inclined  to  have  stronger 
embargoes.  Did  he  urge  you  to  do 
anything  that  your  Administration 
is  not  doing  now  to  take  steps  in 
other  areas  in  support  of  the  change 
in  South  Africa? 

A.  Yes.  We  have  had  a  very  thor- 
ough discussion  not  only  between 
myself  and  General  Obasanjo  and  his 
Ministers  (Foreign),  but  yesterday  we 
had  a  foreign-level  discussion  with 
other  nations,  including  the  front-line 
countries  around  Rhodesia. 

We  now  will  move  as  quickly  as 
possible  to  call  together  the  parties 
who  are  in  dispute  concerning  Zim- 
babwe, those  who  are  identified  as  a 
patriotic  front,  the  front-line  nations 
who  surround  Rhodesia,  and  also  the 
parties  to  the  internal  settlement — 
Smith,  Muzorewa,  Sithole.  and 
Chirau.q 

We  will  begin  now  to  explore  the 
earliest  date  when  this  might  be  ac- 
complished. We  and  the  British  will 
act  as  hosts  and  we  will,  of  course, 
encourage  U.N.  participation  as  well. 

In  the  case  of  Namibia,  the  five- 
nation  group  operating  as  a  committee 
of  the  U.N.  Security  Council — these 
are  the  permanent  committee  mem- 
bers in  the  Security  Council  that  I 
have  named  earlier,  the  Western 
members — will  contact  the  South  Af- 
ricans to  put  forward  our  proposal 
and  also  to  contact  the  SWAPO 
leaders. 

The  front-line  presidents,  then  the 
Nigerian  leaders  will  be  in  contact 
with  Sam  Nujoma,  who  is  head  of  the 
SWAPO  group.  So  in  these  two  major 
areas  of  dispute — Zimbabwe  and 
Namibia — we  will  expedite  our  action 
at  the  urging  of  and  with  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  Nigerian  officials. 

In  the  case  of  the  Horn  of  Africa, 
Nigeria  has  long  played  a  leading 
role,  has  been  chairman  of  the 
subcommittee — under  the  Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity — for  the  Horn 
of  Africa,  and  they  have  begun  now 
to  make  attempts  to  get  the  Ethio- 
pians and  the  Somalians  to  meet,  to 


16 

make  permanent  the  peace  that  has 
been  established  in  recent  weeks,  in 
recent  days. 

We  also  hope  that  there  will  be  an 
avoidance  of  bloodshed  as  it  relates 
to  the  Eritreans.  So  I  think  in  these 
three  major  areas,  we  have  reached  a 
common  purpose.  And  so  far  as  I 
know,  there  are  no  remaining  differ- 
ences between  myself  and  General 
Obasanjo. 

Q.  At  what  level  will  this  Rhode- 
sian  meeting  be? 

A.  At  the  Foreign  Secretary  level. 
The  plans  are  that  Secretary  Vance 
and,  perhaps,  David  Owen  from  Bri- 
tain would  be  present  and  in  person. 

Q.  Did  you  reach  an  agreement 
with  General  Obasanjo  about 
stabilizing  the  dollar? 

A.  I  wish  that  General  Obasanjo 
and  I  could  act  on  a  bilateral  basis  to 
completely  stabilize  the  dollar.  The 
dollar  is  a  very  sound  currency.  It  is 
based  primarily  upon  the  economy  of 
the  United  States,  which  is  strong, 
growing  stronger. 

There  are  several  factors  that  will 
tend  to  increase  the  value  of  the  dol- 
lar this  year.  Our  imports  of  oil  will 
be  level  this  year.  They  were  increas- 
ing rapidly  last  year,  which  was  a  bad 
factor  last  year.  The  interest  rates  in 
our  country  are  higher  now  than  they 
were  before,  which  will  encourage 
additional  investment  in  our  country 
which  will  also  help  the  dollar. 

We  need  very  urgently  to  have  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  act  on 
my  proposals  concerning  the  com- 
prehensive energy  policy.  This  will 
stabilize  the  dollar,  and  the  prospects 
for  that  success  in  the  Congress  are 
good.  And  I  believe  that  there  is  a 
general  feeling  that  our  economy  will 
continue  to  grow  at  about  the  same 
rate  that  it  did  last  year. 

Last  year,  we  were  growing  much 
faster  than  our  major  trading  partners: 
Germany.  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
France,  Japan,  and  others.  This  year 
those  other  nations  will  have  a  faster 
growth,  which  means  that  they  can 
buy  more  of  our  goods  and  cut  down 
on  our  adverse  balance  of  payments. 
So  for  all  these  reasons  and  others 
that  I  could  describe,  I  think  the 
prospects  for  a  stable  dollar  are  very 
good. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  human  rights 
and  any  specifics  at  all  and,  par- 
ticularly, did  you  discuss  Uganda 
and  Idi  Amin  in  regards  to  human 
rights? 

A.  We  did  not  discuss  Uganda.   I 


did  mention  in  my  speech  yesterday 
my  gratitude  that  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  has  shown  fit  not  only 
to  condemn  white  nations  when  they 
deprive  persons  of  human  rights,  but 
also  condemn  black  leaders,  as  well, 
where  human  rights  are  abridged. 

We  did  discuss  the  question  of 
human  rights.  There  is  no  difference, 
of  course,  between  our  govern- 
ments— Nigeria  and  the  United 
States — because  we  recognize  that 
within  our  own  countries,  we  have 
made  every  effort  to  enhance  human 
rights.  I  think  political  oppressions 
and  the  right  of  people  to  participate 
in  their  government  is  one  that  has 
good  prospects  of  even  greater  im- 
provement in  the  future. 

We  also  discussed  the  problem  of 
human  rights  that  accrue  because  of 
poverty — deprived  of  a  right  of  a 
place  to  live  and  to  adequate  food  and 
clothing  and  education  and  health 
care.  And  through  our  own  contribu- 
tions to  the  African  Development 
Bank;  our  own  contributions  to  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  the 
World  Bank;  through  direct  bilateral 
aid,  which  primarily  goes  to  the  very 
poor  countries;  and  through  increased 
trade  and  technical  service  to  coun- 
tries that  have  had  good  success,  like 
Nigeria,  we  are  trying  to  alleviate 
those  human  rights  and  deprivations 
that  come  from  poverty. 

We  have  a  very  close  relationship 
in  our  commitment  to  human  rights 
between  ourselves  and  the  Nigerians, 
and  also  we  have  a  very  good,  per- 
manent personal  friendship  between 
myself.  General  Obasanjo.  and  other 
leaders  of  our  government,  which  is 
very  helpful  to  us. 

We  have  benefited  just  as  much 
in  the  United  States  from  our  good  re- 
lationships with  Nigeria  as  have  the 
Nigerians,  and  although  it  has  been 
very  good  historically  and  at  the  pres- 
ent time,  we  believe  that  those  rela- 
tions are  going  to  be  even  better  than 
in  the  years  to  come. 


JOINT  U.S.-NIGERIA 
COMMUNIQUE, 
LAGOS,  APR.  210 

At  the  invitation  of  His  Excellency  Lt.  Gen- 
eral Olusegun  Obasanjo.  Head  of  the  Federal 
Military  Government.  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Nigeria,  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  His  Excellency  Jimmy  Carter,  and 
Mrs.  Carter  paid  a  State  Visit  to  Nigeria  from 
31st  March  to  3rd  April.  1978.  This  visit  re- 
ciprocated the  visit  to  the  United  States  ot 
America  by   the  Head  of  the   Federal   Military 


- 


Department  of  State  Bui  | 

Government  from  11th  to  13th  October.  , 
It  was  the  first  State  Visit  by  an  Ame 
President  to  sub-Saharan  Africa,  provi 
President  Carter  an  opportunity  to  wi 
firsthand  the  aspirations,  achievements 
problems  of  contemporary  Africa. 

In  the  course  of  the  visit,  the  two  Heacj 
State   met   in   plenary   sessions  during   w 
they   discussed   bilateral    and    internati 
issues. 

President  Carter  and   his  host,   Lt     Gel 
Obasanjo.  examined  extensively  the  cu| 
state  of  affairs  in  the  African  region   unc 
Voted  particular  attention  to  the  situatic 
Southern  Africa 

They  were  fully  agreed  on  the  neeo 
peace  and  stability  in  Africa  and  expresse> 
hope  that  a  spirit  of  reconciliation  will  pr 
in  those  areas  of  North- West  Africa  and  i 
Horn  of  Africa  that  are  still  victims  of  fra 
dal  conflicts. 

President  Carter  expressed  satisfaction 
Nigeria's  efforts  in  its  capacity  as  Chairm; 
the  OAU  Good  Offices  Commission  to  re 
peace  between  Ethiopia  and  Somalia.  It 
agreed  that  Nigeria  should  persevere  in  it 
forts  to  get  the  parties  in  the  disput 
negotiate  a  mutually  acceptable  and  then 
durable  solution.  With  the  fighting  in  the 
of  Africa  now  ended,  the  two  leader 
pressed  the  hope  that  the  remaining  prob 
in  that  region  will  be  settled  by  peat  U 
means. 

On  Zimbabwe,  the  two  Heads  of  State 
pressed  support  for  the  Anglo-American 
posal  and  reiterated  their  conviction  tha 
the  present  circumstances,  only  a  seltlei 
which  is  based  on  its  principles  can  b 
about  racial  harmony,  prosperity  and  i usi 
lasting  peace  in  Zimbabwe.  The  two  Heac 
State  agreed  that  the  arrangements  made  u 
the  Salisbury  Agreement  of  March  3  do 
change  the  illegal  character  of  the  prcseni 
gime  and  are  unacceptable  as  they  do 
guarantee  a  genuine  transfer  of  power  to 
majority  nor  take  into  consideration  the  vi 
of  all  the  Zimbabwean  nationalist  groups. 

The  situation  in  Namibia  was  also  caret 
examined.  Lt.  General  Obasanjo  emphas 
his  Government's  full  support  for  SWA  PC 
the  authentic  leaders  of  the  people  in  their 
struggle  for  the  genuine  independence 
Namibia,  with  its  unity,  sovereignty  and  ti 
torial  integrity  full  [sic]  guaranteed.  Presu 
Carter  stressed  the  need  for  a  settlement  of 
Namibian  issue  which  would  guarantee  that 
political  groups  would  have  an  equal  and 
opportunity  to  compete  in  free  elections 
which  the  people  of  Namibia  would  make  tl 
own  choice  about  their  future  government.  ' 
two  leaders  agreed  that  it  is  essential  lor 
peace  and  security  of  Africa  that  Nami 
achieve  its  independence  on  the  basis 
United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolut 
385. 

They  reviewed  the  current  efforts  of  i 
Five  Power  Western  Contact  Group  and  o 
cussed  the  settlement  proposal  which  the  f 


1  1978 


developed  as  a  means  to  a  prompt  and 
lul  transition  to  genuine  majority  rule  in 
pia. 

two  Heads  of  State  renewed  their  con- 
ition  of  the  evil  and  oppressive  system  of 
eid  in  South  Afriea.  They  pledged  their 
■fforts  to  work  inwards  the  elimination  of 
ystem   and   the  establishment   of  justice. 

ty  and   human   dignity   for  all   races   in 

Africa  within  a  free  society  where  all 
is  will  exercise  their  democratic  rights  to 

a  government  of  their  choice.  They  ap- 

I  to  all  States  to  do  their  part  towards  the 
ition  of  this  objective. 

Nigerian  Head  of  State.  Lt.  General 
njo.  expressed  his  Government's  strong 
lointment  at  the  lack  of  impact  of  the 
concrete  proposals  put  forward  in  the 
)  eradicate  the  obnoxious  system  of  apart- 
This  he  ascribed  to  the  inadequacy  of 
easures  adopted  as  well  as  the  lack  of 
:al  will  on  the  part  of  Nations  called 
to  implement  these  measures.  He  noted 
one  of  these  Nations  have  pursued 
ss  of  outright  collaboration   with  South 

in  both  military  and  economic  matters, 
the  Head  of  State  re-emphasized  his 
nment's  determination  to  continue  to  ex- 

II  possible  political  and  material  support 
nationalist   liberation   movements  in 

Africa,  to  ensure  an  early  end  of  the  ra- 
inority  domination. 

ident  Carter  and  Lt.  General  Obasanjo 
sed  the  intention  of  the  United  States  of 
ica  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria. 
imbers  of  the  Security  Council,  to  work 
ly  in  the  Council  in  the  interest  of 
thening  international  peace  and  security. 
expressed  particular  approval  of  the  Se- 

Council's  prompt  action  in  establishing 
ed  Nations  Interim  force  in  Lebanon  and 
:d  their  full  co-operation  to  achieve  the 
ives  of  the  mandate  granted  by  the  Secu- 
Duncil. 

two  Heads  of  State  exchanged  views 
rning  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East 
eplored  the  recent  violence  which  oc- 
1  in  that  area.  They  agreed  that  it  is 
Bary  and  urgent  to  intensify  efforts  to 
^e  a  just,  comprehensive  and  durable 
based  on  United  Nations  Security  Coun- 
solutions  242  and  338.  They  stressed  the 
tance  of  withdrawal  on  all  fronts  pur- 
to  Resolution  242  and  the  resolution  of 
oects  of  the  Palestinian  question. 

two  Heads  of  State  underscored  their 
itment  to  the  principles  of  the  United 
is  Charter,  particularly  those  concerning 
mportance  of  human  rights  in  all 
ies.  To  this  end  they  cited  the  irnpor- 

of  strengthening  the  human  rights 
nery  of  the  United  Nations, 
heir  review  of  the  international  economic 
ion.  the  two  Heads  of  State  stressed  the 
t  need  for  measures  to  secure  a  prosper- 
lust  and  equitable  international  economic 
.  The  two  leaders  placed  special  em- 
s  on  the  importance  of  close  consultations 


between  Nigeria  and  the  United  States  in  the 
North-South  Economic  Dialogue  and  in  the 
work  of  the  General  Assembly.  They  agreed 
on  the  value  of  the  United  Nations  Overview 
Committee  dialogue  in  the  enhancing  an  un- 
derstanding of  global  issues  of  common  con- 
cern and  in  promoting  development  coopera- 
tion. They  appealed  to  all  nations  to  strive 
vigorously  for  the  achievement  of  the  goals 
specified  in  the  Seventh  Special  Session  of  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly,  in  particu- 
lar with  respect  to  issues  of  vital  importance  to 
the  developing  countries.  In  this  regard,  Lt. 
General  Obasanjo  invited  attention  to  the  slow 
pace  of  progress  concerning  the  establishment 
of  the  Common  Fund  and  alleviation  of  the 
debt  problems  of  the  developing  countries. 
The  two  Heads  of  State  agreed  to  cooperate  in 
order  to  intensify  action  within  the  United  Na- 
tions system  towards  finding  solutions  to  the 
problem  of  global  inflation. 

The  two  leaders  discussed  the  United  Na- 
tions Special  Session  on  Disarmament  which 
opens  in  May  of  1978.  As  leaders  of  countries 
which  have  played  a  significant  role  in  United 
Nations  disarmament  matters,  both  Heads  of 
State  agreed  that  the  session  should  provide  a 
stimulus  to  further  concrete  disarmament  ef- 
forts. 

The  two  Heads  of  State  expressed  satisfac- 
tion at  the  progress  that  had  been  made  in  re- 
cent discussions  between  the  two  Governments 
on  bilateral  cooperation  in  economic,  commer- 
cial and  technical  fields  and  agreed  to  further 
strengthen  relations  in  these  areas.  Mutual  ef- 
forts will  be  made  to  expand  and  diversify 
trade  and  development  activities  and  to  facili- 
tate investment  in  areas  of  key  importance  to 
Nigeria's  economic  growth.  For  this  purpose 
the  two  leaders  agreed  to  set  up  joint  working 
groups  on  investment  and  trade,  technology 
transfer,  agriculture  and  rural  development  and 
education. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Mrs.  Carter  expressed  their  pro- 
found appreciation  to  Lt.  General  Obasanjo.  the 
Nigerian  Government,  and  all  the  people  of 
Nigeria  for  the  gracious  hospitality  afforded  to 
their  party  during  their  visit  to  Nigeria. 

The  President  was  impressed  by  the  visible 
evidence  of  the  pace  of  Nigerian  economic 
progress  and  the  vigorous  and  determined  ef- 
forts being  undertaken  by  the  Federal  Mili- 
tary Government  to  provide  for  the  social 
and  economic  development  of  the  people  of 
Nigeria. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS, 
WELCOMING  CEREMONY, 
MONROVIA,  APR.  311 

President  Tolbert 

Just  over  30  years  ago,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, on  January  27,  1943,  another 
American  President  transited  this  land 
in  connection  with  the  victorious  Al- 


17 

lied  effort  of  World  War  II.  Liberia's 
President  Edwin  James  Barclay  re- 
ceived President  Franklin  Delano 
Roosevelt  at  that  time  on  an  asphalt 
airstrip  of  7,000  feet.  In  the  interven- 
ing years,  U.S. -Liberia  cooperation 
has  here  afforded  one  of  the  most 
modern  and  expanding  civil  aviation 
facilities  in  West  Africa,  spanning  a 
reinforced  11.000  feet. 

And  today,  we  are  deeply  honored 
to  pay  homage  to  America's  first 
third-century  President  who  has  come 
in  the  larger  pursuit  of  permanent 
peace,  of  human  rights,  and  of  eco- 
nomic justice  in  our  one  world;  who 
has  come  in  furtherance  of  continuing 
friendship  and  closer  cooperation  be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Republic  of  Liberia. 

Standing  here  beneath  the  sunny 
expanse  of  Africa's  skies,  we  most 
heartily  salute  you,  Mr.  President, 
Mrs.  Carter,  Amy,  and  members  of 
your  suite,  and  with  intense  warmth, 
embracingly  welcome  you  on  behalf 
of  Mrs.  Tolbert.  our  family,  the  Gov- 
ernment and  people  of  Liberia,  to  this 
land  of  love  and  liberty  by  God's 
command. 

Mr.  President,  by  your  sincere 
leadership  you  are  restoring  to  a 
weary  world,  particularly  in  the  trou- 
bled Middle  East  and  in  Africa,  re- 
freshing new  hopes  of  enterprise  and 
prosperity,  of  liberty  and  morality. 

By  your  profound  example,  man- 
kind is  beginning  to  feel  again,  as 
Thomas  Paine  once  articulated,  I 
quote,  "'the  power  of  America  to 
create  a  happy  world,"  and  may  I 
add,  free  from  human  oppression, 
free  from  human  distinction. 

By  your  vision  and  love,  peoples 
and  nations  can  once  more  rejoice 
that  the  United  States  still  cares,  that 
its  actions  resound  of  lasting  verities. 

Upon  this  continent  where  the 
majority  of  least  developed  countries 
can  be  found,  nature's  fury  often 
fuels  unyielding  economic  frustrations 
upon  its  people.  On  this  continent 
where  persist  heinous  repression  and 
racism,  hatred  and  injustice,  human 
beings  appealingly  demand  justice 
against  human  cruelty,  against  brutal 
violence,  and  against  human 
indignity. 

On  this  continent  of  contemporary 
intrigue  and  intransigence,  bloody  as- 
sassinations and  fractricidal  conflicts, 
armed  proxy  interventions  and  poten- 
tial bigpower  confrontations  tend  to 
postpone  freedom  and  justice  and  the 
enjoyment  of  human  rights.  These 
further  imperil  the  solemn  pursuit  of 
international  peace  and  security. 

In  Africa,  yea  the  world,  we  can 


18 


Presidents  Tolberi  and  Carter  with  Peace  Corps 
Volunteers  in  Monrovia 


sense  through  your  dynamic  moral 
leadership,  fresh  evidences  of  positive 
change.  This  new  momentum  to  en- 
hance mankind  was  manifested  again 
by  your  outstanding  foreign  policj 
address  on  Africa,  recently  delivered 
in  Lagos,  Nigeria,  for  which  we  hear- 
tily commend  you.  And  we  earnestly 
hope  that  all  conditions,  both  political 
and  economic,  which  contribute  to 
permanent  global  reconciliation  and 
lasting  partnerships  can  be  sturdily  es- 
tablished in  the  coming  years. 

In  1943.  Liberia  stood  with 
America.  Mr.  President,  an  unswerv- 
ing friend  and  selfless  ally,  a 
developing  democracy.  We  are  confi- 
dent today  that  with  closer 
cooperation  and  more  fulfilling  crea- 
tive U.S.  policies  and  programs, 
Liberia  can  become  a  more  brilliant 
star  of  democratic  ideals  in  Africa,  a 
more  convincing  showpiece  of 
humanistic  capitalism  and  progressive 
development. 

Ottering  once  more  our  hands  m 
hearty  welcome  to  you,  Mr.  Presi 
dent,  Mrs.  Carter,  and  your  entour- 
age, we  affirm  and  pledge  our  best 
efforts  with  you  in  the  global  cam- 
paign of  extending  the  frontiers  of 
human   liberty   and   advancing   the 


principles  of  genuine  peace  and  sta- 
bility. 

We  will  remain  one  with  you.  Mr. 
President,  in  surmounting  the  tyranny 
of  energy  and  in  healing  the  injuries 
of  economic  uncertainties. 

Ever  steadfastly,  we  pledge  our 
total  resources  with  you  in  securing 
the  victory  we  courageously  seek  over 
inequity  and  injustice,  over  ignor- 
ance, disease,  and  poverty,  to  the 
lasting  benefit  of  our  children's  chil- 
dren and  even  endless  future  genera- 
tions, throughout  this  our  one  world. 

May  Almighty  God  bless  our  en- 
deavors and  hasteningly  bring  peace 
to  mankind  everywhere 

President  Carter 

I  am  very  happy  to  be  here  in 
Liberia,  a  country  which  is  one  of 
America's  oldest  friends,  and  to  ar- 
rive at  this  historic  airfield.  During 
the  Second  World  War.  as  President 
Tolbert  has  described,  when  it  was 
known  simply  as  Roberts  Field,  it 
was  a  vital  link  in  the  supply  line  to 
Europe  and  to  North  Africa  in  our 
common  tight  for  freedom.  Now,  re- 
born as  Roberts  International  Airport, 
with  a  new  terminal  recently  opened. 


.. 


\ 


Department  of  State  Bu/ 1 

it  symbolizes  the  pride,  the  aehii. 
ments.  and  the  great  potential  of  j 
nation. 

Liberia  was  born  out  of  manki 
eternal  desire  for  freedom,  and 
have  achieved  it  here.  The  free  bi 
people  who  came  from  Americi 
this  beautiful  coastline  in  the 
century  were  determined  to  bui 
society  which  reflected  the  dignit; 
their  souls  and  their  hope  in  t) 
hearts.  They  joined  here  in  Lib  I 
with  others  who  longed  for  a  be 
life.  These  two  streams  united 
form  the  first  independent  republi 
Africa. 

During  the  past  century  of 
lonialism,  your  independence  was 
served,  and  now  you  can  look  b; 
with  pride  on  130  years  of  unin 
rupted  independence  and  freedi 
which  gives  Liberia  a  respected  se 
status  among  the  nations  of 
continent. 

Franklin  Roosevelt  did  stop  hei 
the  airport  in  1943  to  meet  with  P 
ident  Barclay,  but  this  is  the  first 
ficial  state  visit  of  an  American  P 
ident,  and  it  is  long  overdue, 
bonds  between  our  two  countries 
too  strong  for  such  a  long  period  t 
to  elapse  again. 

We   have   been   very   grateful 
you  have  added  to  the  pleasure   j 
the   honor  I   feel   in  arriving  here  ji 
declaring  today   a   national   holitir 
It's  a  national  holiday  in  my  heart  f 
well. 

Our  friendly  relationship  is  of  g> 
mutual  advantage  and  exists  on  mf 
levels — in  the  intertwining  of  our  I 
tories,  in  the  democratic  tradition  J1 
tablished  in  our  own  Constitute " 
and  in  the  similarity  in  our  forms  f 
government.  It  exists  in  education  f 
trade,  and  religion.  It  was  pern '• 
most  meaningful  in  what  PresidR 
Tolbert  has  called  the  war  against 
norance,  disease,  and  poverty 

The  American  people  are  prom 
join  Liberians  in  this  effort  throi 
bilateral  relationships  between  t 
two  countries  and  in  multilateral 
grams  involving  many  countries.  ( 
two  governments  agree  that  t h> 
should  be  directed  toward  improv 
the  basic  conditions  of  life  for  th< 
who  most  need  help. 

In  coming  to  Liberia.  I  am  re 
firming  a  friendship  that  is  very  0 
but  I  am  also  drawing  to  a  clost 
series  of  visits  that  reflect  a  wo 
that  is  new.  Less  than  three  decac 
from  now.  four-fifths  of  all  t 
world's  people  will  live  in  Afrit 
Asia,  and  Latin  America — in  the  so 
of  developing  nations  that  I  have  v 
ited  this  year 


1978 


19 


fcly  three  decades  ago,   many  na- 

■  of  these  continents  were  largely 

Jfcies  of  foreign  powers.  Their  rise 

^dependence   means   a   world    in 

lih   we   must  treat  each  other  as 

lis.   and   one  of  the   purposes  of 

I    trips  has  been  to  demonstrate 

Aenuine  respect  my  nation  feels 

ilts  partners  around  the  world  and 

reposition  to  the  continuation  or 

•ablishment  of  colonialism  in  any 

M  whatsoever. 

le  world  economy  has  changed, 
ii:ing  the  hope  of  economic  im- 
nl:ment  and  justice  to  millions  and 
Jng  each  of  us  far  more  dependent 
■ever  before  on  the  cooperation  of 
Jieighbors.  If  we  create  a  world 
■Dmy  of  fairness  and  growth,  our 
iflal  well-being  will  be  insured.  If 
«re  shortsighted  and  let  inequality, 
■ll.hness.  and  injustice  persist,  all 
m  will  suffer. 

Een  the  ideas  that  motivate  man- 
ia have   been  changing.   The  tradi- 

■  1  rivalry  between  East  and  West 
itinues.  even  as  we  try  to  reduce 
Competition  and  expand  the  areas 
Itential  cooperation. 

it  other  visions,  those  of  national 
lijity,  of  self-determination,  of  ra- 
a  equality,  of  the  individual  rights 
ft  1  human  beings,   rise  more  and 

0  to  dominate  the  human  horizon. 

1  is  indeed  a  new  world,  and  I 
ltd  like  to  reemphasize  briefly  the 
I  themes  that  dominate  our  vision 
E  is  new  age. 

I  on  out  ic  Justice.  The  first  is 
:comic  justice,  both  among  the  na- 
is  of  the  world  and  for  those 
ii  n  each  nation  who  now  lack  the 
a  rial  requirements  for  a  decent 

I  onomic  justice  imposes  a  special 
fcation  on  nations  like  my  own, 
I'h  have  resources  to  share  with 

■  -est  of  the  world.  This  is  a  re- 
I'sibility  we  intend  to  honor.   But 

■  lining  the  world  economy  is  ulti- 
lily  a  shared  responsibility  in 
I'h  every  nation  must  do  its  part. 

lespect  for  Human  Rights.  The 

I'nd  element  is  a  respect  for  human 
Its — the  right  to  be  treated  prop- 
I  by  one's  own  government;  to  be 
I-  to  participate  in  the  decisions 
I  affect  one's  own  life;  to  have  the 
Ic  human  requirements  of  food, 
jitter,  health,  and  education. 
I  there  is  any  development  that  has 
I'tened  me  in  my  time  as  President, 
I  the  extent  to  which  the  cause  of 
Ijian  rights  has  taken   its  rightful 


Liberian  dancers 

place  on  the  agenda  and  in  the  con- 
science of  the  world.  This  is  a  cause 
that  the  United  States  and  Liberia  are 
proud  to  claim  as  our  birthright.  But 
we  know  that  it  is  now  spreading,  not 
because  of  our  efforts  but  because  the 
times  demand  it. 

Search  for  Peace.  The  third  ele- 
ment on  which  all  our  other  hopes 
eventually  depend  is  a  search  for 
peace.  My  nation  has  now,  as  it  has 
had  for  the  last  30  years,  a  responsi- 
bility to  work  constantly  for  peace 
with  its  powerful  rivals.  But  in  this 
new  age,  the  search  for  peace  leads  in 
other  directions  as  well.  It  means 
relying  on  mutual  conciliation, 
negotiation,  discussion  of  even  the 
most  intractable  and  difficult  interna- 
tional issues. 

In  this  area  your  own  President 
Tolbert's  philosophy  of  conciliation 
and  moderation  has  been  an  outstand- 
ing example.  It  marks  him  as  a  man 
with  a  profound  understanding  of 
human  nature  and  a  firm  commitment 
to  preventing  potential  conflicts 
through  wise  and  just  agreements. 

We  share  with  you  a  commitment 
to  an  Africa  that  is  at  peace,  an  Af- 
rica free  from  colonialism,  an  Africa 
free  from  racism,  an  Africa  free  from 
mijitary  interference  by  outside  na- 
tions, and  an  Africa  free  from  the  in- 
evitable conflicts  that  arise  when  the 
integrity  of  national  boundaries  is  not 
respected. 

And  the  search  for  peace  means  an- 
ticipating changes  that  must  inevita- 
bly come,  such  as  those  in  southern 
Africa,  so  that  they  can  come  peace- 
fully, rather  than  with  their  pent-up 
tensions  erupting  into  violence. 

These  are  the  goals  America  is  pur- 
suing, and  I  am  looking  forward  to 
discussing  them  with  one  of  Africa's 
leading  statesmen,  your  own  Presi- 
dent Tolbert.  His  idealism,  his  deter- 
mination, and  his  energy  have  won 
widespread  admiration  in  Africa,  in 


America,  and  around  the  world.  His 
recent  statesman-like  sponsorship  of 
the  reconciliation  summit  gathering  of 
West  African  heads  of  state,  here  in 
Monrovia,  has  helped  to  inaugurate  a 
new  era  of  cooperation  among  these 
nations  for  the  good  of  all. 

Next  year  he  will  be  hosting,  and 
will  become  a  major  leader  of.  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity  here  in 
Monrovia.  He  has  worked  tirelessly 
for  national  self-determination,  racial 
justice,  and  a  better  life  for  all  the 
people  of  the  African  Continent. 

As  we  go  now  together  to  Mon- 
rovia, we  will  in  a  sense  close  the 
circle  that  has  opened  between  our 
people  more  than  a  century  and  half 
ago.  On  behalf  of  the  people  of  the 
great  nation  of  the  United  States,  I 
would  like  to  say  to  the  people  of  the 
great  nation  of  Liberia,  this  is  a  jour- 
ney which  is  a  privilege  for  me  to 
make.  □ 


'  Remarks  by  President  Carter  made  on  oc- 
casions during  the  trip  other  than  those  printed 
here  are  in  the  Weekly  Compiliations  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  3  and  10,  1978. 

:  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  3. 

3  For  text  of  address,  see  Bulletin  of  May 
9,  1977,  p.  453. 

4  List  of  U.S.  officials  accompanying  the 
President  omitted;  for  full  text,  see  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Apr.  3. 

5  Held  in  the  Ballroom  at  the  Hotel  Na- 
cional.  It  was  broadcast  live  via  satellite  on 
radio  and  television  in  the  United  States.  Sev- 
eral reporters  spoke  in  Portuguese,  and  their 
questions  were  translated  by  an  interpreter  (for 
full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  3). 

b  Introductory  paragraphs  omitted;  for  full 
text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Apr.  10. 

7  For  text  of  proposals,  see  Bulletin  of 
Oct.  3,  1977,  p.  417. 

8  Held  with  reporters  at  the  State  House 
Marina  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  10). 

s  Chief  Jeremiah  Chirau  is  head  of  the  Zim- 
babwe United  Peoples'  Organization;  Bishop 
Abel  Muzorewa  is  head  of  the  United  African 
National  Council;  Reverend  Ndabanigi  Sithole 
is  head  of  the  African  National  Council/ 
Sithole;  Ian  Smith  is  Prime  Minister  of  the 
white  regime  in  Southern  Rhodesia.  These  in- 
dividuals comprise  the  Rhodesian  Executive 
Council  which  was  established  on  Mar. .3. 
1978,  with  a  rotating  chairmanship. 

10  List  of  U.S.  and  Nigerian  officials  omit- 
ted; for  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.   10. 

11  Exchange  of  remarks  was  made  at 
Roberts  International  Airport;  text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Apr.  10. 


20 


Department  of  State 


THE  SECRETARY:        Arms  Control 
and  National  Security 


I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity to  discuss  with  you  an  issue  that 
is  vital  to  this  nation's  security — the 
effort  to  slow  down  the  dangerous  and 
burdensome  arms  race  through  effec- 
tive arms  control. 

This  is  an  effort  in  which  I  deeply 
believe.  My  years  in  the  Defense  De- 
partment, my  activities  as  a  private 
citizen  in  studies  of  military  issues,  and 
my  experience  as  Secretary  of  State 
have  made  one  fact  increasingly  clear 
to  me:  A  strong  defense  and  effective 
arms  control  are  not  separate  paths  to 
national  security;  both  are  essential 
steps  along  the  same  path. 

Our  nation's  safety  continues  to  de- 
pend upon  a  strong,  modern  military 
defense  capable  of  meeting  the  full 
spectrum  of  our  military  needs.  We 
have  had  that  strength  in  the  past.  We 
have  it  now.  And  we  will  maintain  it. 

Yet  we  cannot  assure  our  security 
by  military  strength  alone.  New 
weapons  systems  acquired  by  one  side 
stimulate  the  other  side  to  develop 
more  sophisticated  countermeasures. 
The  net  effect  is  the  expansion  of 
weapons  systems  on  both  sides  without 
real  increase  in  the  security  of  either. 

As  I  have  met  with  leaders  around 
the  world  over  the  past  year,  I  have 
found  that  many  share  this  perception. 
They  too  cannot  and  will  not  allow 
their  nations  to  become  vulnerable  to 
military  threat.  But  they  also  recog- 
nize that  the  heavy  burden  of  military 
competition  diverts  limited  resources 
and  energies  from  social  and  economic 
development  on  which  peace  also 
rests. 

The  effort  to  slow  arms  competition 
through  mutual  and  balanced  restraints 
has  been  a  central  element  of  this  na- 
tion's security  policy  under  the  past 
seven  American  Presidents 
Democratic  and  Republican. 

•  President  Kennedy,  building  on 
the  efforts  of  Presidents  Truman  and 
Eisenhower,  concluded  the  first  arms 
control  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1963  —  halting  nuclear 
weapons  testing  in  the  atmosphere  and 
the  contamination  that  entailed.  Sub- 
sequently, we  concluded  agreements 
prohibiting  nuclear  and  other  weapons 
of  mass  destruction  from  the  ocean 
floor  and  from  outer  space. 

•  The  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty,  concluded  in  1968,  is  binding 
today  on   more   than    100  nations. 


Clearly,  it  has  not  ended  the  specter  of 
nuclear  proliferation,  but  it  has  signif- 
icantly advanced  that  objective. 

•  Since  first  proposed  by  President 
Johnson,  we  have  been  engaged  in 
broader  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT).  These  negotiations  suc- 
ceeded, during  the  Nixon  Administra- 
tion, in  severely  restricting  the 
deployment  of  antiballistic  missile  sys- 
tems by  either  the  United  States  or  the 
Soviet  Union.   Such  systems  would 

.  .  .  arms  control  will  not  dra- 
matically reduce  our  defense 
budget.  The  cost  of  an  adequate 
defense  will  remain  high.  But 
the  drain  on  our  resources  from 
an  unrestricted  arms  race 
would  be  much  greater. 

have  been  costly  to  build  and  would 
have  added  new  uncertainties  into  the 
strategic  balance.  SALT  I  also  placed 
the  first  limits  on  the  number  of  offen- 
sive weapons. 

We  are  engaged  today  in  a  broader 
range  of  arms  control  negotiations  than 
ever  before  in  our  history,  because  the 
opportunities  we  can  grasp  and  the 
challenges  we  face  are  greater  than 
ever  before. 

As  we  pursue  these  negotiations,  we 
must  be  realistic  about  what  effective 
arms  control  can — and  cannot — do  for 
our  security.  For  if  we  judge  arms 
control  measures  against  unrealistic 
standards,  we  may  lose  the  possibility 
of  making  any  practical  progress. 

•  No  single  arms  control  agreement 
will  eliminate  all,  or  even  most,  of  the 
potential  challenges  against  U.S.  and 
allied  forces.  But  by  controlling  the 
size,  nature,  and  direction  of  arms 
programs  on  both  sides,  we  can  reduce 
the  uncertainties  that  fuel  the  arms 
race. 

•  For  the  foreseeable  future,  arms 
control  will  not  dramatically  reduce 
our  defense  budget.  The  cost  of  an 
adequate  defense  will  remain  high. 
But  the  drain  on  our  resources  from  an 
unrestricted  arms  race  would  be  much 
greater. 

•  Arms  control  cannot  by  itself 
guarantee  stability  in  the  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship.  We  continue  to  compete. 


because  in  many  areas  we  have  <1 
ent  interests  and  values.  We  neeW 
be  sanguine  about  Soviet  power 
tentions.  however,  to  recognize  t|i 
inhabitants  of  the   same  planetp 
share  awesome   power,    we   h; 
common  interest  in  reducing  the  I 
serious  risks  to  our  survival. 

•  Arms  control  will  not  b\  itsc 
solve  the  regional  tensionsB 
threaten  peace.  But  by  lessening 
level  of  military  confrontatioiM) 
regulating  the  diffusion  ofW 
weapon  technologies,  we  can  en  m 
regional  stability  and  free  resolci 
for  the  task  of  improving  the  hha 
condition. 

There  are  clear  limits  to  wha 
should  expect  from  arms  control  Bill 
it  is  equally  clear  that  arms  eo  •<& 
pursued  in  a  deliberate  and  mea  rd 
way.  will  contribute  significant! 
reducing  the  prospect  of  war.  TflH 
why  I  believe  so  strongly  that  oil 
curity  is  best  protected  by  polieiH 
strength  in  our  national  defense  a  ill 
practical  arms  control  agreement:  hal 
limit  the  dangers  to  which  we  ifl 
and  always  will,  respond. 

As  President  Carter  said  irl 
Wake  Forest  speech:  "Arms  co<B 
agreements  are  a  major  goal  as  irl 
ments  of  our  national  security,  bu  hi! 
will  be  possible  only  if  we  mai  lit 
appropriate  military  force  levels.'' 

SALT 

Let  me  turn  first  to  the  Strat:i( 
Arms  Limitation  Talks  with  the  S<l 
Union. 

Any  SALT  agreement  must! 
measured  against  the  yardstick  otHJ 
national  safety.  It  must  clearly  n  H 
tain  or  improve  our  overall  securitlj 
compared  to  the  likely  situation  \JJ 
out  an  agreement.  It  must  take  t'ul  iC 
count  of  the  interests  of  our  al lie  a 
well  as  ourselves.  And  we  must  11 
confidence  in  our  independent  ablj 
to  verify  adequately  Soviet  complial 
with  an  agreement  and  to  detect  lj 
effort,  contrary  to  the  agreement,  a 
could  leave  us  at  a  strategic  disad'n 
tage.  We  should  not  and  we  will  o 
accept  any  agreement  that  docs 
meet  these  essential  requirements. 

We  have  made  substantial  prog* 
over  the  past  year  toward  such.! 
agreement.  Important  differences  I 
remain.   I  will  be  meeting  with  i< 


|y  1978 

iet  leaders  later  this  month  in  an 
rt  to  narrow  those  remaining  dif- 
ences.  I  hope  that  we  can  reach  an 
eement  in  the  near  future.  But  we 
1  continue  to  negotiate  for  as  long 
it  takes  to  achieve  a  SALT  agree- 
nt  which  enhances  our  security  and 
t  of  our  allies. 

t  me  explain  what  the  agreement 
t  we  are  seeking  to  negotiate  would 
.omplish     and     how     it     would 
:   mgthen  our  security. 

.  %st,  it  would  establish  equal  limits 

both  sides  on  the  overall  number  of 

ategic    missile    launchers    and 

ategic   bombers.    As   you   know, 

der  the  first  SALT  agreement  the 

iviets  maintained  greater  numbers 
n  the  United  States.  Following  that 
eement.  Congress  called  for  any 
v  agreement  to  be  based  on  equal 
nnbcrs.  This  agreement  would  firmly 
e  iblish  that  principle. 

iecond,  the  agreement  would  re- 
,<Je  the  number  of  strategic  weapons 
bow  the  level  that  the  Soviets  now 
D  e — and  very  much  below  what  they 
flild  have  without  an  agreement.  It 
Juld  require  the  Soviets  to  destroy 
s  eral  hundred  weapons.  We  would 
It  be  required  to  destroy  any 
yipons  currently  operational. 

i  Third,  the  agreement  would  estab- 
1 1  sublimits  on  those  systems  we  see 
tt  most  threatening  and  destabilizing, 

■  h  as  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
k.-s  (ICBM's)  equipped  with  MIRV'd 
[  ultiple  independently-targetable 
$  ntry  vehicles]  warheads  and  on 
IRV'd  ballistic  missiles  more 
I  lerally. 

Fourth,  we  are  trying  to  impose  re- 
S  lints  on  the  improvement  of  existing 
\  apons  and  the  development  of  new 
l(d  more  sophisticated  systems. 

Fifth,  the  agreement  we  are 
Uotiating  would  permit  the  United 
ilites  to  preserve  essential  options  for 
udernizing  our  forces.    Specifically, 

■  would  allow  us  to  continue  our 
Hjor  development  programs,  such  as 
H'  cruise  and  MX  missiles  and  Tri- 

<  nt  program . 

Sixth,  it  would  protect  the  interests 
I  our  allies.  Mindful  of  the  relation- 

ip  between  strategic  arms  negotia- 
Ins  and  our  security  commitments  in 
]\TO.  we  have  consulted  closely 
Rth  our  allies  at  each  step  of  the 

gotiations,  and  we  will  continue  to 
so. 

Finally,   we  are  insisting  on  an 

reement  which  is  independently  and 

jtisfactorily  verifiable.  Our  ability  to 

Jrify  must  have  sufficient  reliability 

deter  and  to  deal  with  possible  vio- 


lations before  they  have  a  significant 
effect  on  the  strategic  balance.  We 
must  be  able  to  assure  ourselves  that 
the  Soviets  are  living  up  to  their 
commitments. 

We  and  the  Soviets  both  know  the 
kind  of  terrible  destruction  that  would 
result  from  a  nuclear  war.  We  both 
know  that  each  will  ultimately  match 
the  other  if  the  race  continues. 

Therefore,  despite  the  fact  that  we 
are  both  intently  pursuing  our  own 
self-interests — despite  fundamental  dif- 
ferences that  exist  between  us — we 
hope  to  be  able  to  find  common 
ground  for  limiting  our  most  destruc- 
tive weapons.  The  essence  of  this 
negotiation  is  mutuality  of  benefits. 
An  arrangement  which  benefits  one 
side  at  the  expense  of  the  other  cannot 
be  agreed  on. 

Failure  to  achieve  an  equitable 
agreement  could  result  in  new 
weapons  programs  on  both  sides,  with 
a  corresponding  increase  in  costs  of 
several  billion  dollars  a  year  but  with 
no  more,  and  probably  less,  security. 
This  Administration  is  prepared  to  pay 
the  extra  price  of  maintaining  our  se- 
curity. I  am  convinced  that  the  Con- 
gress and  the  American  people  are 
prepared  to  pay  that  price.  But  an  ef- 
fective SALT  agreement  can  assist  us 
in  maintaining  the  strategic  balance  at 
reduced  levels  of  cost  and  risk. 

Antisatellite  Arms  Control 

Along  with  SALT,  there  are  numer- 
ous other  aspects  to  the  military  com- 
petition which  must  be  addressed.  An 

.  .  .  the  agreement  that  we  are 
seeking  to  negotiate  .  .  .  would 
require  the  Soviets  to  destroy 
several  hundred  weapons.  We 
would  not  he  required  to  de- 
stroy any  weapons  currently 
operational . 

expansion  of  the  arms  race  to  space 
would  undermine  our  security  as  well 
as  that  of  other  nations.  Evidence  that 
the  Soviet  Union  is  developing  an  an- 
tisatellite capability  is  disturbing.  We 
are  prepared  to  protect  ourselves 
against  such  a  threat  and  to  match  the 
Soviets  if  necessary.  But  a  far  prefera- 
ble course  is  to  prevent  an  antisatellite 
race  from  occurring. 

While  there  are  many  problems  in 
devising  effective  and  verifiable  lim- 
its, there  is  an  area  for  arms  control 
here  too.  We  have  proposed  talks  with 
the  Soviets  aimed  at  suspending  an- 


21 


tisatellite  testing  and  keeping  space 
open  for  free  and  peaceful  use  by  all.  I 
can  confirm  today  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  recently  accepted  our  pro- 
posal, and  talks  will  begin  next 
month. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

We  are  also  engaged  with  the 
British  and  Soviet  Governments  in 
negotiations  for  a  comprehensive  ban 
on  nuclear  testing.  These  talks  have 
made  some  progress,  although  prob- 
lems remain.  Achievement  of  such  a 
ban  would  reduce  the  likelihood  of 
further  nuclear  proliferation  by  dem- 
onstrating the  seriousness  of  the  nu- 
clear weapons  powers  in  accepting  re- 
straints on  their  own  activities. 

We  are  committed  to  seeking  such  a 
treaty.  It  must  be  adequately  verifi- 
able. And  we  will  assure  that  we 
maintain  confidence  »in  the  reliability 
of  our  nuclear  warheads. 

Arms  Control  in  Europe 

Just  as  we  are  negotiating  for 
agreements  that  can  further  allied  se- 
curity in  the  area  of  strategic  weapons, 
so  too  the  mutual  and  balanced  force 
reduction  talks  in  Vienna  are  intended 
to  enhance  our  mutual  security  in  the 
European  theater.  In  recent  years,  the 
Soviets  and  other  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
tries have  built  up  their  forces  and  ma- 
teriel to  the  point  where  the  regional 
balance  has  become  of  increasing  con- 
cern to  ourselves  and  our  allies. 

Our  central  goal  in  the  Vienna  talks 
is  to  codify  the  principles  of  parity  and 
collectivity  of  forces  in  central 
Europe.  We  and  the  NATO  allies  have 
made  clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  we 
will  only  accept  an  agreement  which 
enhances  the  security  of  the  region. 

These  talks  have  moved  extremely 
slowly.  It  is  important  that  we  work 
toward  an  agreement  in  this  area, 
however,  even  as  we  negotiate  on 
SALT.  We  and  our  allies  will  soon  be 
making  a  new  effort  to  get  the  talks 
moving  more  productively.  It  is  time 
for  the  Warsaw  Pact  nations,  through 
meaningful  actions,  to  help  move 
these  talks  forward. 

While  seeking  progress  in  these 
talks,  we  have  also  made  a  firm  com- 
mitment to  the  modernization  and 
strengthening  of  NATO  forces,  and  we 
are  taking  concrete  steps  to  that  end. 
The  United  States  has  sharply  in- 
creased the  emphasis  on  NATO  de- 
fense in  our  current  budget.  Along 
with  our  allies,  we  are  introducing 
new  tactical  aircraft,  new  generations 
of  armored  vehicles,  and  new 
precision-guided   munitions.    NATO 


22 


leaders  will  be  meeting  in  Washington 
in  May.  and  one  of  the  principal  topics 
will  be  a  long-term  program  to  im- 
prove alliance  defense. 

As  you  know,  the  President,  after 
having  consulted  our  allies  and  with 
their  full  backing,  has  deferred  pro- 
duction of  weapons  with  enhanced 
radiation  effects.  He  has  ordered  the 
modernization  of  the  Lance  missile 
nuclear  warhead  and  the  8-inch 
weapons  system,  keeping  open  the 
option  of  later  deciding  to  install  the 
enhanced  radiation  elements.  His  ul- 
timate decision  will  be  influenced,  as 
he  has  said.  ".  .  .  by  the  degree  to 
which  the  Soviet  Union  shows  re- 
straint in  its  conventional  and  nuclear 
arms  programs  and  force  deployments 
affecting  the  security  of  the  United 
States  and  Western  Europe." 

The  Global  Dimension 

Another  threat  to  the  peace  lies  in 
the  growth  and  spread  of  arms  around 
the  world. 

In  the  long  run,  the  peaceful  set- 
tlement of  regional  disputes  is  the 
surest  way  to  reduce  the  demand  for 
arms.  We  will  continue  our  efforts  to 
help  find  lasting  solutions  to  such 
disputes.  And  we  will  continue  to 
press  for  restraint  on  the  part  of  the 
great  powers  so  that  local  conflicts 
are  not  exacerbated.  But  we  must  also 
seek  restraint  in  the  growth  of  arms. 

First,  in  addition  to  our  efforts  to 
halt  further  nuclear  proliferation 
through  a  comprehensive  test  ban,  we 
have  begun  to  investigate  new  tech- 
nologies and  examine  new  institu- 
tional arrangements  that  will  enable 
the  nations  of  the  world  to  harness 
nuclear  energy  without  spreading  the 
most  deadly  instruments  of  war. 

Second,  we  are  giving  new  em- 
phasis to  controlling  the  international 
traffic  in  conventional  arms.  We  will 
continue  to  make  arms  transfers  to 
advance  our  own  security  and  that  of 
our  friends,  but  at  the  same  time,  we 
are  beginning  to  check  the  flow  of 
our  own  arms  exports. 

Because  we  recognize  that  slowing 
down  conventional  arms  races  cannot 
be  achieved  by  the  United  States 
alone,  we  are  discussing  possible 
multilateral  measures  with  other  arms 
suppliers,  and  we  are  encouraging  the 
purchasing  nations  to  adopt  regional 
agreements  that  limit  arms  competi- 
tion 

I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  state 
today  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
agreed  to  proceed  with  our  talks  on 
restraint  of  conventional  sales.  This  is 
an   important   step   in  our  efforts  to 


bring  about  a  serious  international 
discussion  on  multilateral  restraint. 

Third,  we  are  seeking  to  limit  and 
control  the  spread  and  the  use  of  new 
weapons  systems  whose  impact  on 
civilian  populations  is  particularly 
deadly.  Biological,  chemical,  and  en- 
vironmental weapons  treaties  have 
been  or  are  being  negotiated.  The  in- 
discriminate and  random  character  of 

We  have  proposed  talks  with 
the  Soviets  aimed  at  suspending 
antisatellite  testing  and  keeping 
spaee  open  for  free  and  peace- 
ful use  by  all  .  .  .[and]  the 
Soviet  Union  has  recently  ac- 
cepted  our  proposal  .  .  . 

many  weapons  in  these  categories  is 
so  great  that  virtually  all  nations 
agree  they  should  be  forsworn  forever 
as  instruments  of  war. 

Fourth,  we  are  seeking  to  prevent 
arms  competition  and  major  power 
rivalry  from  spreading  to  areas 
largely  free  of  them  in  the  past.  We 
have  launched  new  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  to  avert  an  arms 
race  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Our  objec- 
tive is  first  to  stabilize  the  military 
presence  of  both  sides  at  the  levels 
which  prevailed  until  recent  months 
and  then  to  consider  possible  reduc- 
tions. The  buildup  in  Soviet  naval 
forces  in  the  area,  however,  is  of 
deep  concern,  and  we  will  not  accept 
an  increased  Soviet  naval  presence  as 
part  of  such  an  agreement. 

Conclusion 

Each  of  the  arms  control  efforts  I 
have  discussed  is  devoted  to  increas- 
ing the  safety  and  well-being  of 
Americans  and  individuals  every- 
where. 

Military  competition  today  is  car- 
ried out  in  highly  technical  terms,  and 
military  judgments  must  often  be 
made  based  on  complex  calculations. 
But  we  cannot  let  technical  debates 
cloud  the  simple  truths  and  common 
sense  which  must  lie  behind  these 
calculations. 

•  We  must  maintain  a  military  de- 
fense that  is  second  to  none.  We  have 
the  human  and  physical  resources,  the 
knowledge,  and  the  will  to  do  so. 

•  We  must  also  recognize  that  no 
nation  gains,  none  is  more  secure 
when  all  continue  to  expend  their  re- 
sources on  ever  more  devastating 
weapons.  We  all  gain,  we  are  all 
more  secure  when  practical,  equitable 


Department  of  State  Bui 

agreements  can   be   reached   to  li 
the  arms  race. 

This   is   a  long-term   process, 
will  work   with  others  to  further 
effort — in  the  talks  between  East 
West,  at  the  U.N.  Special  Session) 
Disarmament  opening  in   New   Y 
next  month,  and  in  other  forums. 

I  have  spoken  to  you  today  ,ih 
arms  control  because  you  will  pla 
crucial  role  in  the  coming  months 
years.  Your  opinions  and  explanati 
will  help  decide  whether  we  maim 
our  sensible  and  historic  policies 
seeking  security  through  both  ai 
control  and  a  stable  military  equi 
rium. 

There  are  people  in  our  coun 
who  have  come  to  doubt  t 
course — some  because  they  expect 
much  of  arms  control  measur 
others  because  they  believe  too  li 
can  be  achieved.  Those  who  exp 
too  much  will  be  disillusioned  w 
such  agreements  do  not  put  an  enc 
military  competition.  Those  who 
lieve  such  agreements  are  not  wc 
pursuing  seriously  undervalue  th 
returns. 

I  hope  that  you  will  bear  in  m 
my  basic  message:  that  while 
benefits  of  arms  control  are  i 
boundless,  there  are  terribly  imp 
tant.  practical  advantages  that  o 
arms  control  measures  can  bring. 

I  ask  each  of  you  to  consider 
difference  between  a   world   witl 
SALT  agreement  of  the   kind   I   h; 
described  and  a  world  without  sue 
limitation   on   strategic   weaponry 
world   in   which   we   have   begun 
stabilize  in  an  acceptable  balance 
military    relationship   in    Cent] 
Europe  and  one  in  which   we  h 
not;  a  world  in  which  we  are  starl 
to  head  off  a  military  competitio 
space — or  to  put   some  limits  on 
international    flow    of  conventi 
arms — or  to  reduce  the  prospects 
nuclear  proliferation;  and  a  worl 
which  we  fail  to  achieve  such  steps. 

In   the    long   run.   the   security 
every   American   depends  on  our 
voting   the   same   determination, 
same  careful  planning  and  sustai 
energy   to  the  challenge  of  brin 
military   competition   under  sensi 
control    as   we   do   to  devising 
weapons   for  our   protection, 
challenge  —  the   challenge    to 
nations — is  to  make  sure  that  ma 
technical    ingenuity    is   guided  t 
wisdom. 

Address  before  the  American  Society  oj   \< 
paper  Editors  in   Washington,   D.C.,  on  A\ 
10.  1978  (press  release  154  of  Apr.  10). 

'For  full   text  of  the  President's  address 
Mar.    17,    1978.   see   BULLETIN  of  Apr     197 
p.  17. 


tf  1978 


23 


Oif<»fffioii-ffiiff-.ln*ir<»i*  Session 
Following  ASNE  Address 


There  has  been  considerable 
oversy  over  both  the  military 
diplomatic  value  of  the  neutron 
b.  Yesterday  your  colleague  at 
wDefense  Department,  Secretary 
rwn,   seemed   to  downplay   the 

■  ary  importance  of  that  weapon, 
■i  he  also  seemed  to  indicate  that 
ue  was  no  specific  corresponding 
nession  or  concessions  expected 
li  the  Soviet  Union.  Yet  today 
i  quoted   again  the   President's 

flise  where  he  said  the  ultimate 
etsion  will  be  influenced  by  the 
ejee  to  which  the  Soviet  Union 
i>s  restraint  in  its  conventional 
•I  nuclear  arms  program  and,  of 

■  se.  deployments. 

Ituld  you  be  a  little  bit  more  spe- 
(  in  outlining  what  you  consider 
re  evidence  of  such  restraint  on 
aOart  of  the  Soviet  Union? 

L.  The  kind  of  things  that  we 
lid  be  looking  toward  are  the  kind 
Brings  which  affect  the  security  of 
it  European  region  in  such  things  as 
it  ank  forces  in  the  area,  the  threat 
I  e  area  which  arises  from  weapons 
I  as  the  SS-20  ballistic  missile 
Oi  other  items  which  it  is  too  early 
e  o  delineate. 

luis  is  a  subject  which  we  will  be 
iiussing  with  our  allies  because 
lie  are  joint  concerns  which  we 
I  ,  and  we  will  follow  those  talks 
li  discussions  with  the  Soviet 
r  >n  on  the  kinds  of  steps  which  we 
l  k  would  be  an  appropriate  re- 
1  se.  We  hope  very  much  that  they 
I  be  responsive. 

s  the  President  said,  one  of  the 
inr  factors  affecting  his  ultimate 
p  sion  will  be  the  response  which 
leek. 

.  .  If  we  can  believe  what  we 
d  in  the  papers — and  this  audi- 
n.'  is  inclined  to  do  so — the  Presi- 

■  t  made  his  decision  on  the  neu- 
Ni  bomb  against  the  advice  of  most 
t lis  senior  advisers,  including 
r. 

o  you  feel  that  as  you  approach 
9!;e  forthcoming  talks  in  Moscow 
fit  you  have   lost  an  important 
;  gaining  chip   in  those  discus- 
is? 

..  No.    I  do  not  believe  that   we 
ie  lost  what  you  describe  as  an  im- 
ijant  bargaining  chip, 
iecondly,  let  me  say  that  the  Presi- 
i.t  has  indicated  quite  clearly  that 


the  decision  which  he  has  made  is  his 
decision  to  defer,  and  he  will  be  look- 
ing to  what  the  Soviet  response  may 
be  in  making  the  ultimate  decision  at 
some  point  in  the  future. 

The  decision  which  the  President 
made  is  a  very  difficult  decision,  and 
I  support  his  decision.  It  is  a  very 
awesome  kind  of  decision  to  have  to 
make,  but  I  think  he  made  the  right 
decision  on  this,  and  I  do  not  think  it 
will  in  any  way  hinder  the  discussions 
which  I  would  have. 

Q.  What  can  and  will  the  United 
States  do  if  Israel  does  not  with- 
draw all  its  forces  from  southern 
Lebanon? 

A.  I  believe  that  Israel  will  with- 
draw all  of  its  forces  from  southern 
Lebanon.  They  have  indicated  to  us 
that  they  will  abide  by  U.N.  Resolu- 
tion 425.  We  have  been  in  discus- 
sions with  them  about  the  pace  of  that 
withdrawal,  and  those  discussions  are 
still  continuing.  I,  therefore,  cannot 
accept  the  proposition  that  they  will 
not  withdraw  having  said  that  they 
would. 

Q.  The  fact  that  you  are  going  to 
Africa  immediately  before  what  is 
bound  to  be  a  very  arduous  mission 
to  Moscow  suggests  either  that  it 
can't  be  put  off  any  longer  or  that 
you  may  expect  some  kind  of  break- 
through. 

Do  you,  in  fact,  have  any  assur- 
ances from  any  of  the  parties 
involved — the  patriotic  front,  the 
Rhodesian  Executive  Council,  or 
the  front-line  presidents — that  they 
are  all  willing  to  sit  down  together 
and  work  out  a  political  and  mili- 
tary settlement? 

A.  No.  I  do  not  have  any  such  as- 
surances. The  issues  involved  in  the 
Rhodesian  situation  are  of  tremendous 
importance  to  the  peace  of  that  area 
and  to  the  well-being  of  the  people  of 
Rhodesia.  It  is  our  judgment  that  in 
order  for  a  cease-fire — a  lasting 
cease-fire — and  a  lasting  peace  and 
settlement  to  be  achieved,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  bring  all  of  the  parties 
together.  If  that  is  not  achieved,  then 
I  think  that  the  likelihood  of  civil  war 
is  great,  and,  therefore,  we  and  the 
British  and  others  believe  very  deeply 
that  we  should  do  everything  within 
our  power  to  work  with  the 
nationalist  leaders  and  others  involved 


to  see  if  we  can't  help  bring  the  par- 
ties together. 

We  believe  that  the  Anglo- 
American  proposals  are  a  fair  basis 
and  should  be  the  basis  for  a  solu- 
tion.1 However,  we  feel  that  the  only 
way  to  do  this  is  to  sit  down  with  all 
of  the  parties  and  see  whether  or  not 
common  ground  can  be  found  so  as  to 
bring  about  a  solution  that  all  can  ac- 
cept and  thus  prevent  continuing 
bloodshed  in  the  future. 

Q.  As  long  as  we  are  hopping 
around  the  globe,  I  will  land  in 
Panama  where  the  Panamanians 
seem  particularly  upset  with  the 
amendments  attached  to  the  first 
treaty  as  it  went  through  the  Sen- 
ate. With  the  likelihood  of  the  en- 
tire project  being  scuttled  with, 
somehow,  the  differences  and  the 
opposition  not  being  resolved,  can 
you  suggest  any  diplomatic  lan- 
guage that  might  be  added  to  the 
second  treaty  in  a  couple  of  weeks 
that  would  resolve  these  points  of 
contention? 

A.  No.  What  I  think  both  sides 
should  do  is  proceed  with  calmness  at 
this  point.  The  Panamanians  have  in- 
dicated that  they  will  not  make  up 
their  minds  until  both  treaties  have 
been  ratified,  at  which  time  they  will 
publicly  express  their  views. 

In  the  meantime,  I  believe  that  we 
should  continue  in  a  calm  way  the 
process  of  ratification  in  which  we 
are  involved,  and  I  am  hopeful  that  at 
the  end  of  that  process  we  will  find 
treaties  which  are  acceptable  to  both 
of  the  parties. 

Q.  The  President  himself  has,  in 
recent  days,  raised  the  possibility 
that  rejection  could  very  well  oc- 
cur. I  believe  the  timing  of  your 
trip  to  Moscow  was  such  that  you 
would  be  there  about  2  days  after 
the  Senate  vote. 

What  do  you  think  it  would  do  to 
your  credibility  as  a  representative 
of  this  Administration  and  spokes- 
man for  our  foreign  policy  if  that 
treaty  were  rejected  by  the  Senate? 

A.  I  think  that  rejection  of  the 
treaty  would  be  very  damaging  to 
American  foreign  policy.  I  believe 
that  the  treaties  are  very  much  in  the 
national  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  of  Panama  as  well.  Indeed,  I  be- 
lieve that  the  treaties  are  in  the  na- 
tional interests  of  the  world  commu- 
nity as  a  whole  and  particularly  those 
in  our  hemisphere.  I  think  that  failure 
to  ratify  the  treaties  would  have  a 
very  serious  effect  upon  our  relation- 
ships with  our  friends  and  allies  in 
our  hemisphere  and,  indeed,  not  only 


24 


in  the  Third   World   but  generally 
around  the  globe. 

Q.  Israel  is  especially  concerned 
about  the  sale  of  F-15's  to  Saudi 
Arabia.  What  in  your  judgment  will 
be  the  impact  on  Saudi  Arabian 
policy  if  Congress  doesn't  approve 
the  sale  of  the  F-15's? 

A.  I  think  it  would  be  a  serious- 
mistake  if  the  Congress  should  not 
approve  the  arms  package  which  we 
will  be  submitting  to  them  after  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  vote.  As  you 
know,  we  agreed  with  the  Congress 
that  we  would  withhold  sending  up 
the  arms  package  until  after  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  vote  so  that 
both  Houses  would  have  full  and 
adequate  time  to  consider  the  matter. 
But  we  will  be  sending  them  up  after 
that  vote  is  had. 

The  impact  of  a  turndown  of  the 
package  I  think  would  have  adverse 
effects  in  all  three  of  the  countries 
involved.  The  requirement  for  the 
various  weapons  which  are  included 
in  the  package  have  been  carefully 
examined  by  us  and  by  our  military 
people  in  the  Defense  Department, 
and  they  have  been  validated  as 
necessary  requirements. 

Secondly,  the  countries  involved 
have  turned  to  the  United  States  as  a 
friend  on  whom  both  sides  rely  and  in 
whom  both  sides  have  confidence.  If 
we  were  unable  to  carry  forward  in 
meeting  their  requirements,  I  believe 
that  this  would  not  only  have  an  ad- 
verse effect  upon  their  confidence  in 
us,  but  I  would  think  it  would  also 
damage  the  peace  process.  If  we  are 
to  be  helpful  in  bringing  the  parties 
together,  both  sides  have  to  have  con- 
fidence in  us.  Particularly  insofar  as 
Israel  and  Egypt  are  concerned,  they 
have  to  have  confidence  that  their 
military  needs  are  being  met  if  they 
are  going  to  take  the  kind  of  risk  that 
one  also  has  to  take  in  negotiating  a 
peace  agreement. 

Q.  You  mentioned  in  your  re- 
marks the  serious  differences  that 
still  remain  in  negotiating  the  SALT 
package.  Could  you  tell  us,  how- 
ever, whether  you  expect  that 
there's  a  reasonable  chance  that 
you  might  wrap  up  such  an  agree- 
ment while  you  are  in  Moscow? 
And,  secondly,  what  can  you  tell 
the  Soviets  about  the  effect  of  their 
activities  in  Africa — what  effect 
those  activities  may  have  on  the  ul- 
timate likelihood  of  getting  a  SALT 
III  treaty  through  Congress  here? 

A.  First,  let  me  say  I  do  not  expect 
to  wrap  up  a  SALT  agreement.  I 
think,   however,   we  hopefully  can 


Department  of  State  Bull 


News  Conference*  March  24 


Q.  Mr.  Begin  is  gone  now  and  by 
all  appearances  the  United  States 
and  Israel  are  at  some — not  dead- 
lock but  approaching  one  on  what  to 
do  next  in  the  Middle  East.  May  I 
ask  you  if  you  can  share  with  us 
what  new  departures,  if  any,  the 
Administration  might  be  consider- 
ing; and  is  it  your  feeling  that  there 
can  be  progress  in  negotiations  so 


H 

is 

■ 

long  as  Mr.  Begin  is  in  charge  of  \ 
Israeli  Government? 

A.  Let  me  say  first  that  I  should 
and  will  not  in  any  way  comment 
anything  that  has  to  do  with  the  inl 
nal  political  affairs  of  Israel.  It  wo1 
be  totally  inappropriate  for  me  to 
so. 

Now,     coming    to    your    m 


la 


make  some  progress  during  my  dis- 
cussions in  Moscow.  It's  important 
that  we  do  sit  down  at  the  highest 
levels  and  discuss  these  remaining  is- 
sues to  see  how  many  of  them  can  be 
agreed  upon  and  thus  removed  from 
the  list  of  our  differences. 

As  I  have  said  on  a  number  of  oc- 
casions before,  there  is  no  linkage  be- 
tween the  negotiation  of  a  SALT 
agreement  and  the  activities  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  Africa.  The  reason 
for  that  is  that  the  negotiation  of  a 
SALT  agreement  is  central  to  the  se- 
curity of  both  of  our  nations  and  to 
the  peace  of  the  world.  It  should  be 
negotiated  on  its  own  two  feet,  and 
we  will  do  that. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  made  it 
very  clear  that  we  are  concerned 
about  the  presence  of  such  large 
numbers  of  Cuban  and  Soviet  forces, 
particularly  in  the  Horn  of  Africa, 
and  I  would  assume  that  that  would 
be  one  of  the  items  that  will  come  up 
for  discussion,  because  I  will  be  dis- 
cussing not  only  SALT  but  a  number 
of  other  items. 

Q.  How  did  the  White  House  or 
the  State  Department  dispose  of  the 
moral  questions  relating  to  the  en- 
hanced radiation  device  against  the 
background  of  the  President's  em- 
phasis on  human  rights? 

A.  When  you  speak  of  the  moral 
questions,  I  assume  that  you  are  re- 
ferring to  the  allegations  which  have 
been  made  that  the  enhanced  radiation 
weapon  is  a  particularly  inhumane 
weapon.  Any  nuclear  weapon  is  a 
devastating  weapon.  Indeed,  the  dam- 
age to  individuals  would  be  less  with 
enhanced  radiation  weapons  than  with 
non-enhanced  radiation  weapons. 

It  is  also  true  that  there  would  be 
less  collateral  damage  to  structures 
and  the  like.  But  it  is  erroneous  to 
suggest  that  this  is  designed  only  to 
kill  people  and,  therefore,  is  a  more 
inhumane  weapon  than  any  other  nu- 


: 


clear  weapon.   I  think  quite  the  a 
trary  is  the  case. 

Q.  Can  you  say  how  long  it  won 
take  us  to  get  into  full  producti 
of  the  neutron  bomb  from  the  til 
of  planning  if  the  President  giv 
his  approval? 

A.  No,  sir.  I  do  not  have  that  f 
ure,  I'm  sorry  to  say. 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  a  catego 
cal  denial  that  there  are  Soviet  i 
fensive  weapons  in  Cuba  or  missi! 
in  Cuba  and  that  they  are  buildi 
a  submarine  base  at  Cienfuegos? 

A.  I  have  no  evidence  which  wot  I 
support  the  fact  that  there  are  a 
Soviet  nuclear  weapons  in  Cuba,  r 
do  I  have   any  information   whi    . 
would  support  an  affirmative  ansv\  I 
to  your  second  question. 

Q.  Could  you  give  any  example 
restraint  which  the  Soviet  Unii 
has  shown  as  a  result  of  our  sto 
ping  or  ending  the  entire  U.S.  a 
tiballistic  missile  (ABM)  project- 
the  decision  not  to  develop  the  B- 
bomber — which  would  indicate  th 
there  will  be  such  a  restraint  on  tl 
neutron  bomber? 

A.  The  Soviet  Union  has  abided  1 
the  terms  of  the  ABM  treaty  and  1 
the  terms  of  the  SALT  I  agreemen 
We  have  recently  done  a  study  m 
that,  which  we  gave  in  an  uncla., 
sified  form  to  the  Congress,  indica 
ing  that  they  have  abided  by  tho!; 
two  agreements. 

If  an  agreement  is  reached  with  rt 
spect  to  mutual  restraint  arising  out  (| 
the  decision  with  respect  to  the  et 
hanced  radiation  weapon.  I  would  e? 
pect  and  we  would  make  sure  bt 
adequate  verification  that  that  wouli 
be  the  case. 


Press  release  I54A  of  Apr.  10,  1978. 

1  For  text  of  proposals,  see  Bulletin  cf 
Oct.  3,  1977,  p.  424. 


1978 


25 


KStion — what  are  the  prospects  for 
k  future?  As  the  Prime  Minister  said, 

0  as  we  have  said,  we  had  very  full, 
Bnk.  and  candid  talks  over  the  last  2 

As — both  talks  in  which  the  Prime 
Wnister  and  the  President  participated 
A  talks  in  which  I  and  the  Foreign 
fcnistcr  and  other  members  of  the 
Pme  Minister's  staff  took  place. 
l\s  all  of  you  know,  the  talks  were 
ificult.  There  were  differences  of 
Iw  between  ourselves  and  the  Is- 
Mlis  on  certain  issues.   However,   in 

1  way  was  the  atmosphere  of  the 
tfks  unfriendly  or  ugly — I  want  to 
oke  that  very  clear.  They  were  frank 
ehanges  of  views  between  allies  and 
fiends.  We  remain  fully  and  un- 
eiivocally  committed  to  the  security 
olsrael,  and  there  should  be  no  doubt 
»)Ut  that. 

The  President  put  forward  some  ex- 
pratory  ideas  to  the  Prime  Minister 

■>  h  respect  to  possible  ways  of  bridg- 
it  the  gaps  which  remain  between  the 
pties  in  a  number  of  critical  areas.  I 

I  sure  that  the  Prime  Minister  and 
ti  Israeli  Government  will  reflect  on 
t!se.  We  will  be  maintaining  our 
citacts  with  them  and  with  the  Egyp- 
t] is,  and  we  will  remain  in  consulta- 
un  with  the  Members  of  our  Con- 
g  ss.  I  hope  that  as  a  result  of  this 
ppcess  we  will  be  able  to  continue  the 
n>mentum  which  has  clearly  been 
n  ch  slowed  down  by  recent  events. 

J.  At  what  point  do  you  do  these 
to  things:  one,  put  forward  a  set 
a  American  ideas,  and  two,  send 
Inbassador  Atherton  back  to  the 
Bddle  East?1 

\.  What  I've  said,  to  make  it  very 
c  ar:  We  have  already  suggested  some 
eDloratory  thoughts  which  I'm  sure 
l|  Israelis  will  reflect  on.  It  is  not  a 
fin  that  the  Americans  put  forward. 
I  was  a  way  of  exploring  various 
fws  and  alternatives  and  to  ascertain 
4:  Israeli  position  with  respect  to  a 
rmber  of  these  items. 

I'll  be  very  frank.  There  are  differ- 
l:es  of  views  on  such  issues  as  the 
aplication  of  Resolution  242;  242  has 
Isn  the  basis  of  negotiations  between 
t:  parties  for  many  years.  The  appli- 
Ction  of  Resolution  242  to  all  fronts 
Is  been  a  position  which  has  been 
icepted  by  all  of  the  parties  over  the 
tars. 

There  now  has  been  a  question 
used  as  to  whether  or  not  242  does, 
I  fact,  apply  to  all  fronts  and,  more 

ecifically.  to  the  West  Bank  and 
'aza.  In  our  judgment,  it  is  clear  from 
b  past  history — from  the  negotiating 

story — and  from  the  conduct  of  the 

irties  that  242  does,  indeed,  apply  on 

I  fronts.  The  whole  idea  of  242  was 


the  achievement  of  a  full,  normal,  and 
secure  peace  in  exchange  for  ter- 
ritories occupied  in  the  1967  conflict, 
and  that  applied  on  all  fronts. 

Another  difference  of  importance  is 
that  relating  to  the  question  of  settle- 
ments, both  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  with  respect  to  settle- 
ments in  the  Sinai  and  in  the  West 
Bank.  Those  are  two  of  the  main  prob- 
lem areas. 

Q.  Maybe  you  assumed,  but  you 
didn't  answer  the  question.  One,  are 
we  going  to  put  forward  any  Ameri- 
can plan?  And  two,  are  you  going  to 
send  Mr.  Atherton  back? 

A.  Insofar  as  putting  forward  any 
new  ideas,  let  me  say  that  we  have 
always  said — and  I've  said  it  to  you 
many  times  before — that  if  there 
comes  a  time  that  we  think  it  will  be 
useful  for  us  to  put  forward  our  ideas 
which  might  help  to  resolve  the  gaps 
between  the  parties,  we  would  feel 
free  to  do  so.  I  don't  have  any  time 
schedule  or  anything  like  that  in  mind 
at  this  time. 

Q.  We've  been  led  to  believe  that 
the  President,  in  discussing  the  situ- 
ation with  Members  of  Congress, 
discussed  with  them  the  ideas  he  put 
forth  and  indicated  that  Mr.  Begin 
had  expressed  only  negative  reac- 
tions to  them.  You  seem  to  be 
suggesting  that  there  was  no  reac- 
tion to  this,  or  am  I — 

A.  I  did  not  want  to  leave  you  with 
that  impression.  As  I  said,  certain  ex- 
ploratory ideas  were  put  forth  with  re- 
spect to  any  number  of  points — such 
as  the  question  of  settlement  policy — 
and  it  was  very  clear,  in  response  to 
that,  that  the  Israeli  position  is  that 
they  will  not  give  up  settlements  in  the 
Sinai  as  part  of  a  peace  with  Egypt  or 
let  the  Israeli  settlers  be  under  Egyp- 
tian protection  instead  of  Israeli  pro- 
tection. 

There  is  a  disagreement,  as  I  indi- 
cated before,  with  respect  to  the  appli- 
cation of  242  to  the  withdrawal  from 
at  least  part  of  the  occupied  West 
Bank  of  the  Jordan  and  the  Gaza  Strip. 
And  there  are  differing  views,  as  was 
indicated  in  some  of  the  newspaper  ar- 
ticles this  morning,  with  respect  to  ex- 
ploratory suggestions  about  an  interim 
agreement  that  would  apply  for  a 
period  on  the  West  Bank,  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  some  form  of  choice  at  the 
end  with  respect  to  the  possibility  of 
affiliation  of  that  territory  with  Israel 
to  maintain  the  interim  status  or  to  af- 
filiate with  Jordan.  Those  are  some  of 
the  differences. 

Q.  Now  on  most  of  these  positions 
we  have  already  known  that  dis- 


agreements existed  between  the 
United  States  and  Israel — on  the  set- 
tlements as  well  as  on  the  American 
ideas  on  the  West  Bank.  What  was 
different  about  this  visit?  In  other 
words,  why  was  the  impasse  sort  of 
taken  note  of  now,  rather  than,  say, 
a  month  ago? 

A.  I  think  that  it  is  best  explained 
by  emphasizing  that  there  was  a  de- 
tailed examination  in  the  frankest  kind 
of  fashion  between  the  two  heads  of 
government  where  it  became  very 
clear  without  any  ambiguity  where 
these  differences  lie.  To  a  degree, 
there  had  been  some  ambiguity  left 
prior  to  this  meeting.  I  think  that  am- 
biguity has  been  removed. 

Q.  Would  it  help  at  this  time  for 
Jordan  to  agree  to  enter  into  direct 
negotiations  involving  the  West 
Bank?  And  if  so,  are  there  efforts 
being  made  to  achieve  that? 

A.  It  would  help  to  have  as  many  of 
these  parties  as  we  could  get  to  par- 
ticipate in  discussions.  I  must  say  as  a 
practical  matter  I  do  not  think  at  this 
moment,  without  a  declaration  of  prin- 
ciples, that  there  is  any  real  likelihood 
that  Jordan  at  this  point  would  enter 
into  any  negotiations.  I  think  it  is  first 
necessary  to  establish  a  framework  for 
a  comprehensive  peace  before  one  can 
expect  other  parties  to  enter  into 
discussions. 

Q.  Mr.  Begin,  yesterday,  ap- 
pealed for  patience  from  the  United 
States.  He  also  appealed  for  fair 
play  from  the  American  people  and 
indicated  that  he  thought  the  Ad- 
ministration had  changed  its  attitude 
toward  his  peace  plan.  What  is  your 
reaction  to  his  appeals? 

A.  We  have  not  changed  our  posi- 
tion with  respect  to  Mr.  Begin 's  pro- 
posal for  self-rule.  At  the  time  that 
those  proposals  were  made — I  believe 
it  was  in  December  [14-19]  when  Mr. 
Begin  was  here — we  indicated  that  we 
believed  that  the  proposal  which  he 
had  made  was  a  constructive  pro- 
posal.2 It  provided  a  first  step  for 
negotiations,  and  we  welcomed  the 
fact  that  it  had  been  made. 

We  did  not  endorse  the  proposal. 
We  still  believe  that  it  was  a  construc- 
tive step — but  only  a  step — looking 
forward  to  further  negotiations  with 
respect  to  the  issues  relating  to  the 
whole  West  Bank  question. 

Q.  Has  the  United  States  not 
shown  enough  patience? 

A.  The  United  States  will  persevere. 
It  will  be  patient.  Let  me  make  it  crys- 
tal clear  that  we  have  not  given  up 
hope.    We   are  going  to  continue  to 


26 


Department  of  State  Bull.l 


work  with  the  parties.  Peace  is  essen- 
tial, not  only  to  the  people  of  the  area, 
but  to  the  United  States  and  to  the 
world,  and  we  will  continue  to  do 
whatever  we  can  to  work  with  the  par- 
ties to  try  and  achieve  that  ultimate 
end. 

Q.  Many  of  the  most  experienced 
diplomats  believe  that  at  this  point 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  at  the  most  precarious 
stage  that  they  have  been  in  since 
the  start  of  this  Administration. 
Now  President  Carter  has  referred 
to  the  Soviet-Cuban  pattern  of  de- 
velopments in  Africa  as  ominous. 
The  Soviet  press  has  responded  that 
this  appears  to  represent  a  U.S.  turn 
away  from  detente,  in  their  percep- 
tion. In  your  view,  are  we  now  in  a 
decisive  stage  in  our  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union?  And  could  you 
give  us  your  appraisal? 

A.  Let  me  say  I  think  we  are  at  a 
delicate  stage  in  our  relationships  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  The  various  matters 
which  we  are  dealing  with  in  consulta- 
tions and  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  are  mixed.  In  some  we  are  mak- 
ing progress.  In  others,  things  are 
standing  still.  In  still  others,  I  think 
there  has  been  retrogression.  And  I 
think  we  are  always  going  to  find  this 
kind  of  a  mix.  It  is  a  very  complex  set 
of  relationships. 

I  think  we  must  continue  to  pursue 
each  and  every  one  of  these  sets  of 
discussions  and  negotiations  because  I 
think  it  is  terribly  important — not  only 
for  our  bilateral  relationships  but  for 
world  peace  in  general — that  we  do, 
along  with  the  Soviets,  what  we  can  to 
reduce  the  tensions  between  us. 

Q.  To  be  more  specific,  on  the 
immediate  situation  in  Africa,  is  the 
Administration  particularly  con- 
cerned that  the  Cuban  forces  which 
are  now  there  might  be  used  in  what 
can  be  a  very  violent  civil  war  in 
Rhodesia? 

A.  We  are  concerned  about  the 
presence  of  foreign  troops  in  Africa. 
We  believe  that  African  problems 
should  be  resolved  by  Africans  them- 
selves. We  have  made  this  very  clear 
in  our  views  with  respect  to  the  con- 
flict in  the  Horn  of  Africa,  and  we  be- 
lieve that  applies  elsewhere  in  Africa. 

With  respect  to  the  question  of 
Rhodesia,  we  believe  that  the  answer 
must  be  found  in  a  negotiated  solution 
which  we  were  addressing  in  the 
Anglo-American  proposals  which  we 
have  put  forward.  We  still  believe  that 
that  should  be  the  yardstick  for 
measuring  any  proposals  for  the  res- 
olution of  that  problem;  and  we   still 


point  out  that  if  there  is  to  be  real 
peace,  we  believe  that  all  of  the 
nationalist  leaders  should  be  included. 

Q.  If  I  may  return  to  just  one 
more  question  on  the  Middle  East.  I 
am  a  little  bit  confused  about  what 
the  exploratory  ideas  that  we  have 
put  forward  are  intended  to  resolve. 
It  sounds  to  me  as  if  you  are  saying 
on  at  least  three  questions — the 
applicability  of  242,  the  question  of 
settlements  remaining  in  Sinai,  and 
that  the  issue  of  the  West  Bank  of 
the  Jordan  be  regarded  as  an 
interim  process  leading  to  some  kind 
of  referendum — that  the  United 
States  is  taking  rather  firm  positions 
on  those  three. 

Are  you  saying,  in  effect,  that  un- 
less the  Israelis  accept  what  is  our 
view  on  these  three  basic  fundamen- 
tal questions,  that  it  will  be  difficult 
or  impossible  to  move  forward  in 
the  negotiations?  I  don't  understand 
what  the  exploratory  ideas — if  we 
have  taken  such  firm  positions  on 
these  three  issues — are  intended  to 
resolve.  It  sounds  to  me  as  if  we 
are — 

A.  There  are  a  number  of  explora- 
tory issues  or  points  that  have  been 
discussed.  One  of  the  paramount 
questions — indeed  perhaps  the  most 
fundamental  question — is  that  of  the 
security  of  Israel.  And  we  have  made 
it  clear  to  them  and  to  the  Arabs  that 
any  settlement  must  protect  the  secu- 
rity of  Israel,  and  we  have  put  forward 
some  exploratory  ideas  of  how  this  can 
be  done. 

There  are  a  number  of  other  specific 
items,  or  ideas,  like  that  which  were 
discussed  on  which  there  was  agree- 
ment between  ourselves  and  the  Is- 
raelis. So  there  is  a  whole  range  of 
exploratory  ideas.  I  was  asked,  in  ef- 
fect, you  know,  where  the  differences 
lie,  and  that  is  why  I  picked  the  three 
critical  issues. 

Q.  Would  you  accept  my  assump- 
tion that  unless  there  is  agreement 
on  these  three  issues — the  settle- 
ments, the  applicability  of  242  to  the 
West  Bank,  and  that  there  be  some 
kind  of  a  referendum  or  freedom  of 
choice  following  an  interim 
process — that  it  would  be  difficult  to 
move  forward? 

A.  Certainly  insofar  as  the  question 

of  242  is  concerned,  this  is  absolutely 
fundamental.  It  is  the  basis  lor  the 
negotiations  that  have  taken  place  up 
until  now,  and  if  there  cannot  be  a 
resolution  of  the  interpretation  of  242, 
then  I  think  there  are  very  substantial 
obstacles  ahead. 
With  respect  to  the  question  of  set- 


tlements, this  is  a  fundamental  dif 
ence  between  the  two  parties, 
again  I  think  this  creates  a  substam1 
obstacle  to  any  progress. 

Q.   You  seem  to  be  talking 
around  this  question  of  the  exploi] 
tory  ideas  for  Israel's  security, 
precisely  have  you  suggested  to  thi, 
that  might  be  helpful  in  assuri  | 
them  of  their  security? 

I  would  like  to  add  another  relal 
question.  What  is  your  idea  now,    i 
the  U.S.   idea  now,  relative  tc.i 
mutual  defense  agreement  with  I 
Israelis? 

A.  In  regard  to  the  first  of  your  t 
questions,  the  details  of  the   items    . 
ideas  which  we  have  suggested  hi  ' 
been  conveyed  to  the  Israelis.  We  '] 
lieve  we  should  convey  these  kinds   i 
ideas  to  the  Egyptians  as  well.  An. 
don't  think  until  we  have  had  a  chai  I 
to  explore  them  with  both  that  it  will 
helpful  to  detail  the  specific  ideas  t 
we  have  put  forward  for  discussion.  || 

I  guess  your  second  question  w 
What  about  a  defense  agreement?  T! 
is  a  question   which  would  ultimat 
have  to  be  decided,  of  course,  by 
Congress  of  the  United  States.   Bui 
that  were  the  final  item  which  would  I 
required  as  the  linchpin  to  put  togel 
an  agreement  which  would  fail  with  | 
something  like  that,  then  that  is  soi 
thing  I  think  we  would  have  to  si 
ously  consider  recommending  to 
Congress. 

Q.  Israeli  officials  in  Jerusal 
are  making  the  charge  that  the  /  \ 
ministration,  through  what  it  is  s: 
ing  privately  and  implying  public  i 
is  trying  to  bring  down  the  Bei ' 
government  or  at  least  Menahem  1 1 
gin's  leadership  of  that  governme 
Would  you  respond  to  that  charge 

A.  I  am  very  happy  to  respond  , 
that.  That  is  totally  false.  The  Presidi, 
and  I  and  all  of  us  have  the  highest  | 
spect  for  the  Prime  Minister.  We  n^ 
have  differences  on  some  items  as   f 
have   agreements  on   many   items.  | 
would  be  totally   improper  for  us 
interfere  or  meddle  in  any  way  in  tl 
internal  politics  of  Israel.  We  will  t( 
do  so.  Nobody  has  done  so,  and  I  ;| 
sure  you  that  without  any  sense 
equivocation. 

Q.  The  State  Department  put  o 
a  statement  the  other  day  sayii; 
there  appeared  to  be  no  retributio 
in  the  Ogaden.  The  Somali  spokt 
man  has  now  challenged  this  ai 
said  there  were.  What  sort  of  info 
mation  do  we  have,  and  have  v 
really  been  able  to  carry  out  the  ir 
plicit  promises  of  trying  to  prote 
the  people  there? 


/  1978 

We  have  been  pressing  the  Or- 
ization  of  African  Unity  (OAU)  to 
e  action  to  put  individuals  into 
iopia  to  monitor  what  is  happening 
he  Ogaden.  At  this  point  there  has 
n  a  declination  on  the  part  of  both 
Ethiopians  and  the  Somalis  to  sup- 
t  such  action  in  the  OAU  and  as  a 
ilt  of  that  it  has  been  difficult  to 
ve  forward  with  that, 
still  believe  that  this  should  be 
e  as  part  of  the  process  of  the  OAU 
fsilitating  an  overall  settlement  in  the 
Mi  as  well  as  protecting  the  people 
■m  reprisals. 

}.  Will  you  address  the  state  of 
tl  SALT  negotiations  [Strategic 
Atis  Limitation  Talks],  specifically 
it  he  context  of  whether — well,  one, 
i  course,  obviously  whether  an 
ajeement  was  in  prospect  and,  two, 
wether  in  the  present  uncertain 
axed  state,  as  you  put  it,  of 
>  iet-Ameican  relations  you  would 
fl!  free  to  put  a  treaty  to  the  Con- 
g:  ss  and  what  you  think  its  pros- 
pf  ts  would  be  in  Congress? 

'}i.  We  have  made  progress,  substan- 
ti  progress,  in  the  SALT  negotia- 
nts.  There  are  some  remaining  items 
O varying  difficulty.  Two  or  three  are 
<ly  tough.  The  others  are  not  that  dif- 
13 lit,  quite  frankly. 

Ve  will  continue  to  press  ahead 
v  hout  any  time  constraint — no  target 
tit  we  have  to  meet — complete  our 
n;otiations  on  these  remaining  items. 
i  elieve  that  this  can  be  done.  I  be- 
l:ve  it  will  be  done.  When  that  is 
Siieved  we  will  lay  that  agreement  be- 
t  e  the  Congress  when  it  is  signed. 
J  d  if  that  can  be  done,  say,  for 
flimple — and  I  am  just  saying  for 
eimple — this  summer,  we  would  put 
loefore  the  Congress. 
J^et  me  say  that  this  treaty,  however, 
vuld  have  to  be  one  which  is  sound 
Jd  verifiable  and  which  would  en- 
tice the  national  security  of  our  coun- 
t  and  of  our  allies.  I  believe  it  is  pos- 
fcile  to  achieve  such  a  treaty. 

Q.  What  is  the  State  Department 
ding  for  its  part  in  cooperation 
Mh  the  Treasury  Department  to 
tip  the  alarming  drop  in  the  value 
c  the  dollar? 

i.'A.  We  have  been  working  very 
kpsely  with  the  Department  of  the 
rjeasury  and  with  other  elements  of  the 
.[ministration  to  work  upon  the  prob- 
TOS  of  the  dollar  and  the  related  issues 
'rich,  of  course,  involve  the  energy 
msis,  energy  program,  conservation, 
iflation,  and  the  question  of  exports, 
were  is  very  close  consultation  going 
at  this  point  within  the  government. 


Q.  Has  the  State  Department  yet 
decided  if  Israel's  invasion  of  Leba- 
non was  a  violation  of  the  Foreign 
Military  Sales  Act  in  that  it  was 
something  beyond  a  self-defensive 
measure? 

A.  We  have  received,  as  I  think 
most  of  you  know,  inquiries  from  sev- 
eral Members  of  the  Congress  asking 
us  to  express  a  legal  opinion  with  re- 
spect to  that  question.  We  are  examin- 
ing that  question  and  will  respond  to 
those  letters  in  the  very  near  future. 

Just  to  give  you  the  background  on 
this,  what  one  has  to  take  a  look  at  is 
the  Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Agree- 
ment which  was  signed  in  1952.  That 
provides  that  the  Government  of  Israel 
assure  the  United  States  that  such 
equipment,  materials,  or  services  are 
required  for — and  will  be  used  solely  to 
maintain — its  internal  security,  its 
legitimate  self-defense,  or  to  permit  it 
to  participate  in  the  defense  of  the  area 
of  which  it  is  a  part  or  in  connection 
with  the  U.N.  collective  security  ar- 
rangements. The  legal  question  is  a 
complex  one,  and  I  don't  want  to  ex- 
press a  judgment  on  the  question  at  this 
point  until  we  have  completed  our  legal 
work. 

Q.  Yesterday  Mr.  Begin  said  that 
if  we  supply  Saudi  Arabia  with  F-15 
fighter  bombers  it  will  make  them 
into  a  confrontation  state  against  Is- 
rael. Do  you  agree  with  that  estimate 
of  his? 

A.  No,  I  respectfully  disagree  with 
that  estimate  of  the  Prime  Minister's. 
Saudi  Arabia  is  not  a  confrontation 
state.  From  all  of  our  discussions  with 
them  at  the  highest  level  they  have  in- 
dicated that  they  do  not  and  will  not 
become  a  confrontation  state. 

Insofar  as  the  F-15's  are  concerned, 
they  have  indicated  that  they  would  not 
base  these  aircraft  at  Tabuk,  which  is 
the  base  near  Israel;  that  these  would 
be  put  in  bases  at  Dhahran.  Riyadh, 
and  in  the  south.  The  potential  threats 
they  face  would  be  in  these  areas.  The 
reasons  for  the  F-15's  are  that  they  are 
very  effective,  perhaps  the  world's 
most  effective  interceptor  aircraft. 

Saudi  Arabia  has  a  vast  land  mass;  it 
is  the  equivalent  of  everything  east  of 
the  Mississippi;  they  have  a  limited 
number  of  people.  The  problem  of 
ground-air  radar  coverage  is  a  very 
tough  one  for  them  because  of  the  lim- 
ited number  of  people  that  they  have  to 
man  such  radars  and  the  great  cost 
which  would  be  involved  in  setting  up 
such  a  system.  With  the  effective  radar 
that  the  F-15's  have,  they  can  operate 
over  this  vast  territory  in  a  way  which 
will  give  them  the  kind  of  air  defense 


27 


protection  which  is  required.  We  be- 
lieve this  to  be  a  valid  requirement.  We 
believe  that  it  will  not  upset  the  bal- 
ance of  the  region,  and  we  believe  that 
it  will  also  be  helpful  in  keeping 
movement  in  the  peace  negotiations. 

Q.  In  that  connection,  did  King 
Khalid  of  Saudi  Arabia  write  to  the 
President  saying  that  Saudi  Arabia 
might  have  to  increase  oil  prices  be- 
cause of  the  falling  dollar  value,  and 
was  there  any  linkage,  as  well,  to  an 
increase  in  oil  prices  relating  to  the 
F-15  sale? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  I  will  not  com- 
ment on  any  correspondence  between 
the  President  and  King  Khalid  or  any 
other  head  of  state.  But  let  me  answer 
your  question. 

The  Saudis  have  never  indicated  to 
us  that  they  would  link  progress  or  lack 
of  progress  in  these  areas  to  oil  prices. 
They  have  indicated  quite  the  contrary; 
that  they  will  make  their  independent 
judgments  on  these  issues.  They  have 
not  threatened  in  any  way  that  they  are 
going  to  take  punitive  action  of  any 
kind  whatsoever. 

Q.  Really,  in  terms  of  the  dollar 
and  the  value  of  the  dollar,  there  is 
nothing  to  that  as  well? 

A.  I'm  not  sure  I  understand  your 
question. 

Q.  I  was  asking  whether,  putting 
aside  a  letter  from  King  Khalid  to 
the  President,  whether  you  know  if 
Saudi  Arabia  has  raised  the  question 
of  raising  oil  prices  because  of  the 
falling  value  of  the  dollar  on  interna- 
tional markets? 

A.  Not  to  my  knowledge,  but  others 
in  the  area  have  raised  that  question. 

Q.  If,  despite  the  best  efforts  of 
diplomacy,  it  is  not  possible  to  go  any 
further  with  the  Middle  East  peace 
initiative  due  to  the  positions  which 
have  been  taken,  what  would  be  the 
consequences  in  the  Middle  East  and 
what  would  be  the  consequences  in 
terms  of  Israel's  relationships  in  the 
United  States? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  speculate  about 
the  assumptions  you  made  in  that  ques- 
tion. Let  me  say  I  do  not  think  we  are 
at  a  point  in  which  one  should  say 
we've  given  up  hope  of  moving  for- 
ward, because  we  haven't.  I  think  that 
there  is  still  a  real  chance  to  move  for- 
ward. There  are  many  obstacles  in  the 
way,  but  I  think  at  this  point  to  imply 
that  we  are  in  a  desperate  situation 
where  nothing  can  happen  and  that  it  is 
hopeless  is  not  an  accurate  assessment, 
and  I  just  don't  want  to  speculate  about 
what  may  happen. 


28 


Q.  There  was  a  new  presidential 
election  in  Taipei,  and  I  have  two 
questions  to  ask  you.  The  first  is,  is 
there  any  government  representative 
from  the  United  States  to  attend  the 
presidential  inauguration  which  is 
about  2  months  away?  And  another 
question  is,  what  is  your  estimate  of 
the  Taipei-Washington  relationship 
after  the  election? 

A.  I  haven't  focused  on  the  issue  of 
representation.  The  issue  hasn't  come 
to  my  desk  at  this  point.  Insofar  as  our 
relationships  are  concerned,  they  are 
the  same  as  they  have  always  been  in 
the  past. 

Q.  The  U.S.-Soviet  joint  statement  is 
still  the  basis  for  our  approach  to  a 
Mideast  peace.3  Is  there  any  chance 
that  we  would  try  to  reactivate  that, 
and,  in  particular,  is  there  any  pos- 
sibility that  we  would  try  to  reacti- 
vate that  in  context  of  looking  at  the 
Mideast  in  terms  of  the  kind  of  de- 
velopment program  that  the  Saudis 
in  particular  have  been  pushing,  as 
the  Soviets  have  indicated  they  would 
be  interested  in  as  well;  that  is  to 
say,  to  actually  develop  the 
region — using  petrodollars,  by  in- 
creasing U.S.  exports,  high  technol- 
ogy, etc. — and  in  that  way  essentially 
sidestep  certain  problems  that  now 
exist  by  being  able  to  guarantee  the 
kind  of  peace  that  everybody  in  the 
region  recognizes? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  we  have  always 
believed  that  an  essential  element  of 
a  final  peace  would  be  an  economic  de- 
velopment program  for  the  area.  We 
have  done  a  great  deal  of  research  and 
work  on  what  kinds  of  programs  might 
be  effective  in  this  area.  We  have  dis- 
cussed it  not  only  with  the  parties  to 
the  conflict,  but  we  have  discussed  it 
with  other  nations  in  the  area  and 
elsewhere  in  the  world. 

Now,  coming  back  to  your  first  ques- 
tion which  was  related  to  the  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement  which  was  is- 
sued. The  fundamental  principles 
which  we  stated  in  that  remain  princi- 
ples which  we  believe  are  sound  prin- 
ciples. Many  of  those  principles  are 
contained  in  the  discussions  which  we 
have  had  with  all  of  the  parties,  and  we 
still  stand  behind  those  principles. 

Q.  You  made  clear  that  you  are  not 


going  to  have  any  real  progress  with- 
out a  declaration  of  principles  for  a 
settlement  in  the  Middle  East.  It  also 
seems  clear  from  what  you  said  you 
can't  get  that  declaration  unless  Is- 
rael changes  some  of  its  views.  Al- 
though you're  determined  to  perse- 
vere, do  you  have  any  assurances 
that  the  others,  for  example  the 
Egyptians,  are  willing  to  persevere 
under  these  circumstances,  and  do 
you  feel  any  kind  of  deadline  pres- 
sure, like  October  of  this  year? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  speculate  on 
deadlines  or  anything  like  that.  I  think 
the  parties  all  still  are  willing  to  perse- 
vere, and  by  that  I  mean  the  Israelis 
and  the  Egyptians. 

Q.  About  your  reports  on  human 
rights,  your  Liberian  desk  tells  me 
their  original  draft  included  the  ra- 
cial restrictions  on  voting  and  prop- 
erty rights  that  are  in  Article  V  of 
the  Liberian  Constitution.  My  ques- 
tion is,  did  the  White  House  or  your 
office  or  someone  else  in  the  State 
Department  order  that  this  informa- 
tion be  deleted? 

A.  Not  to  my  knowledge.  I  don't 
have  any  information  on  that. 

Q.  Since  the  President  said  that  our 
commitment  to  human  rights  must  be 
absolute,  will  this  information  be  re- 
stored to  the  next  human  rights  re- 
port, and  do  you  believe  it  might  be 
discussed  next  week  during  the  Pres- 
idential visit  to  Monrovia?4 

A.  I'll  have  to  check  into  the  matter. 
I  simply  cannot  give  you  an  adequate 
answer  at  this  time. 

Q.  Can  you  clarify  please  whether 
your  position  on  the  Indochinese  ref- 
ugees is  that  all  the  boat  people 
should  be  admitted,  and  do  you  think 
that  your  view — if  that  is  your 
view — will  carry  the  day  within  the 
Administration?  Because  I  under- 
stand the  Attorney  General  doesn't 
agree  with  you.  He  wants  to  restrict 
them. 

A.  I  don't  think  you  ought  to  specu- 
late about  his  position  or  other  posi- 
tions at  this  point.  I  will  tell  you  it  is 
my  belief  that  we  should  take  in  such 
of  the  boat  people  as  are  not  able  to 


Department  of  State  Bull, 

find  refuge  elsewhere.  The  problcn, 
still  under  discussion  in  terms  of 
overall  policy  of  the  Administrate 
but  I  expect  a  decision  soon. 

Q.  [In  reference  to  the  Middle  E 
peace  process]  I  was  just  wonderi 
if  you  had  assurances  from  any 
these  people.  You  expressed  soi 
note  of  optimism  and  confidence 
the  process  that  may  not  be  appartt 
to  the  rest  of  us. 

A.  They  have  all  said  that  they  w 
to  continue  the  peace  process.  I  am  i 
suggesting  that  means  the  parties  c 
sit  down  and  talk  face-to-face  in  I 
near  future,  because  I  think  that  that 
unlikely  at  this  point. 

Q.  Do  you  foresee — with  the  intr 
duction  of  these  Soviet  and  Cub 
troops  into  Mozambique — a  deept 
ing  of  the  Rhodesian  civil  war  situ 
tion?  And  what  would  be  the  U. 
response  should  the  conflict  escalat 

A.  The  question  of  the  number 
outside  troops  in  Mozambique  is  o 
on  which  I  think  the  information  is  si 
ficiently  cloudy  at  this  point  thai 
don't  want  to  speculate  nor  accept  wl 
I  think  may  be  an  assumed  premi 
within  what  you  have  stated,  that  the 
is  a  large  number  there,  because  I 
not  believe  that  that  is  the  case 

Insofar  as  the  future  is  concern 
again  I  would  say  that  the  presence 
outside  troops  cannot  help  but  exac 
bate  the  situation,  and,  therefore, 
think  that  all  of  us — the  front-li 
states  and  others  in  the  area — must  r 
double  our  efforts  to  try  and  find 
negotiated  solution.  Otherwise,  I  a 
afraid  the  conflict,  the  fighting,  w 
increase  and  that  certainly  is  in  n 
body's  interest. 


r 

ne 


Press  release  135  of  Mar.  24,  1978. 

'  Alfred  L.  Atherton.  Jr..  Assistant  Secreta 
for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs,  H 
nominated  by  President  Carter  on  Mar. 
1978.  to  be  Ambassador  at  Large  with  speei 
responsibility  for  Middle  Hast  peace  negoti 
tions.  He  was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  Ap 
6  and  sworn  into  office  on  Apr.   1 1 . 

2  For  texts  of  White  House  statements  o 
Prime  Minister  Begin's  visit,  see  Bulleti 
of  Jan.   1978,  p.  48. 

'For  text  of  joint  statement,  see  Bulletin* 
Nov.  7.  1977.  p.  639. 

4For  material  relating  to  President  Carte 
four-nation  trip,  see  p.   1. 


1978 


29 


ARMS  CONTROL:         t/JV.  Special 
Session  on  Disarmament 


In    March    16,    1978,   Secretary 

nee  submitted  the  following  report 

U.S.  preparations  for  the  Special 

sion  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 

voted  to  Disarmament  to  the  Senate 

tommittees  on  Foreign  Relations  and 

fmed  Services  and  the  House  Com- 

mtees  on  International  Relations  and 

wned  Services  pursuant  to  Section 

jj?  of  the  1978  Foreign  Relations  Au- 

u  rization  Act.  This  special  session  is 

I  eduled  to  be  held  May  23 -June  28, 

l78,  at  U.N.   Headquarters  in   New 

H. 

The  Special  Session  of  the  U.N. 
C  neral  Assembly  on  Disarmament 
( >OD)  will  be  the  first  occasion  on 
v  ich  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  focus 
■  attention  of  virtually  all  states  of 
world — large  and  small — on  arms 
citrol  and  disarmament  since  the  1932 
(neral  Disarmament  Conference.  As  a 
i  que  event  it  has  generated  a  high 
1  el  of  interest  among  world  leaders, 
i  ny  of  whom  are  planning  to  attend, 
jj:  expect  the  SSOD  to  be  a  major 
e:nt  for  the  United  Nations,  for  dis- 
£  nament,  and  for  the  United  States. 

This  will  be  the  ninth  time  the  U.N. 
(  neral  Assembly  has  convened  a  spe- 
c  1  intersessional  meeting  on  a  particu- 
1  theme.  A  brief  2- week  special  meet- 
i ,  designed  to  promote  independence 
I  Namibia  (South  West  Africa)  is 
{tnned  for  late  April-early  May  of 
|78.  The  sixth  and  seventh  special 
s  sions  were  devoted  to  international 
onomic  questions.  Earlier  special 
i  isions  were  devoted  to  other  issues  of 
(icern  to  the  U.N.  majority — such  as 
llestine,  Tunisia,  and  Namibia. 


<  igins  of  the  SSOD 

The  SSOD  has  its  origins  in  the  dis- 

;:isfaction  among  many  of  the  U.N. 

umbers  with  what  they  regard  as  slow 

'Jgress  in  disarmament.   In  addition, 

•fleeting  the  absence  of  China  and 

ance  from  the  Conference  of  the 

>mmittee  on  Disarmament  (CCD)  in 

;neva,  many  at  the  United  Nations 

gan  to  search  for  a  forum  in  which 

states  could  participate.   For  more 

an  a  decade  the  Soviet  Union  has 

essed  for  a  world  disarmament  con- 

rence.   attended   by  plenipotentiary 

legates   with   the   authority   to 

gotiate  binding  decisions.  China  has 

garded  the  Soviet  initiative  as  a  prop- 


agandistic  proposal  to  use  the  dynamics 
of  large  conference  diplomacy  to  build 
up  pressure  and  support  for  Soviet  dis- 
armament positions.  The  United  States 
has  taken  the  position  that  it  is  prema- 
ture at  the  present  stage  of  the  disar- 
mament effort  to  convene  a  world  dis- 
armament conference. 

The  idea  of  a  special  session  of  the 
General  Assembly  devoted  to  disarma- 
ment evolved  over  the  past  few  years  as 
a  possible  alternative  to  a  world  disar- 
mament conference.  Although  similar 
to  a  world  disarmament  conference  in 
some  respects,  the  special  session  will 
adopt  only  recommendations  and  a 
program  of  action.  Moreover,  it  has  not 
been  identified  as  a  superpower  initia- 
tive. Many  countries  also  favored  the 
special  session  because  it  was  more 
likely  that  all  of  the  nuclear-weapon 
states  would  attend  a  General  Assem- 
bly session,  whereas  a  world  disarma- 
ment conference,  with  possible  anti- 
Chinese  undertones,  would  not  draw  as 
wide  an  attendance. 

Against  this  background,  at  the  30th 
session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly, 
several  nonaligned  delegations  stated 
that  if  progress  were  not  made  during 
1976  toward  the  convening  of  a  world 
disarmament  conference,  they  would 
ask  the  31st  U.N.  General  Assembly  to 
schedule  a  special  session  on  disarma- 
ment. The  idea  of  a  special  session 
gained  substantial  support,  in  part  due 
to  vigorous  campaigning  under  Yugo- 
slav leadership,  culminating  in  the  en- 
dorsement of  the  special  session  by  the 
nonaligned  summit  conference  at  Co- 
lombo in  August  1976.  A  resolution 
calling  for  the  convening  of  the  SSOD 
passed  by  consensus  at  the  31st  Gen- 
eral Assembly  in  1976  [Resolution  31/ 
189B  adopted  December  21,  1976]. 

Many  of  the  nonaligned  see  the 
SSOD  as  a  forum  in  which  they  can 
bring  their  concerns  to  the  attention  of 
the  leaders  and  peoples  of  the  major 
military  powers,  particularly  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  One  of  their 
interests  is  a  larger  role  in  disarmament 
and  arms  control  forums.  Their  main 
concern,  however,  centers  on  the  need 
for  the  superpowers  to  commit  them- 
selves more  specifically  than  heretofore 
to  steps  beyond  SALT  II  [Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks]  and  com- 
prehensive test  ban  negotiations,  halt 
the  buildup  of  their  nuclear  arsenals, 
and  begin  the  process  of  reductions. 
They  also  hope  to  achieve  wider  ac- 


ceptance of  their  belief  that  at  least 
some  of  the  savings  resulting  from  dis- 
armament should  go  to  assist  the  less 
developed  countries. 

A  longer  term  goal  of  many  is  a 
larger  voice  for  the  United  Nations  in 
disarmament  issues.  There  is  conse- 
quently considerable  support  for  a 
follow-on  SSOD  to  assess  progress  on 
the  program  of  action  which  will  be 
adopted  by  the  upcoming  special  ses- 
sion. The  United  States  has  gone  on 
record  as  prepared  to  support  another 
SSOD  in  about  5  years  but  is  not  com- 
mitted to  a  series  of  such  sessions  at 
regular  intervals. 


Forum  for  Discussions 

The  special  General  Assembly  ses- 
sion provides  a  welcome  opportunity  to 
involve  the  entire  U.N.  membership  in 
disarmament  discussions,  to  give  states 
more  insight  into  each  other's  thinking 
on  these  questions,  and  to  develop 
greater  consensus  on  how  to  deal  with 
them.  If  the  participants  succeed  in 
avoiding  polemics,  we  think  that  the 
session  can  have  a  significant  and  posi- 
tive impact  on  the  arms  control  and 
disarmament  agenda  during  the  next 
few  years. 

At  the  same  time,  there  are  inherent 
limitations  to  the  treatment  of  disar- 
mament issues  in  such  a  large  forum. 
The  participants  generally  recognize 
that  it  is  not  the  task  of  the  session  to 
negotiate  specific  agreements.  The 
special  session  will  be  too  brief  (only  5 
weeks,  with  2  of  those  taken  up  in  gen- 
eral debate)  to  permit  more  than  initial 
consideration  of  new  disarmament  pro- 
posals. We  should  recognize,  in  addi- 
tion, that  there  are  several  factors  at 
play  which  could  diminish  the  produc- 
tivity of  the  session. 

•  The  inclination  to  present  com- 
prehensive lists  of  measures  covering 
all  known  categories  of  arms  control 
and  disarmament  issues  could  lead  to 
confusion  rather  than  give  direction  to 
future  efforts. 

•  Insistence  on  sweeping  changes  in 
existing  disarmament  forums  could  re- 
duce efficiency  and  result  in  decreasing 
their  usefulness. 

Thus  the  success  of  the  SSOD  will 
depend  heavily  on  the  spirit  in  which 
the  participants  approach  it  and  the 
constructive  contributions  which  they 


30 


are  willing  and  able  to  make.  There  are 
wide  variations  among  countries  and 
groups  of  countries  in  their  interest  in 
disarmament  matters  and  their  capacity 
to  contribute.  During  the  first  four  ses- 
sions of  the  Preparatory  Committee, 
there  have  been  differences  of  views 
but  nevertheless  a  general  effort  to 
avoid  polemics.  Each  of  the  major  re- 
gional and  political  groupings  in  the 
United  Nations  have  established  the 
practice  of  meeting  together  to  discuss 
issues  before  the  Preparatory  Commit- 
tee. This  has  facilitated  a  more  infor- 
mal exchange  of  views  among  mem- 
bers of  these  groups  and.  together  with 
the  informal  discussions  among  mem- 
bers from  each  of  these  groups — as 
well  as  with  certain  states  not  members 
of  any  group — has  afforded  opportuni- 
ties to  carry  on  an  active  exchange  of 
views  beyond  that  which  takes  place  in 
the  formal  Preparatory  Committee 
meetings. 

The  work  of  the  Special  Session  on 
Disarmament  will  be  affected  in  part  by 
the  nature  of  the  representation.  Some 
countries  already  active  in  disarmament 


ACDA  ANNUAL  REPORT 

As  required  by  law.  President  Carter 
on  March  22,  1978,  transmitted  to  the 
Congress  the  17th  annual  report  of  the 
U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA). 

The  report  discusses  in  detail  the 
U.S. -Soviet  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT)  and  other  negotiations 
such  as  those  directed  to  achieving  a 
comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban,  force 
reductions  in  central  Europe,  and  pro- 
hibitions on  chemical  and  radiological 
weapons.  Chapters  on  these  negotia- 
nons  cover  current  status,  progress,  and 
obstacles  to  achievement. 

The  report  presents  (he  President's 
new  initiatives  in  the  fields  of  conven- 
tional arms  transfers  and  the  nonprolif- 
eration  of  nuclear  weapons  It  describes 
ACDA's  role  in  the  interagency  policy 
formulation  process  under  the  National 
Security  Council  and  discusses  ACDA's 
statutory  requirement  to  prepare 
analyses  of  the  arms  control  impact  of 
certain  proposed  weapons  systems. 

Single  copies  of  the  report  are  avail- 
able from  the  U.S.  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament  Agency.  Washington. 
DC.  20451.  The  text  of  the  President's 
letter  of  transmittal  is  printed  in  the 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  March  27,  1978. 


negotiations  in  various  forums  will 
send  specialists  in  the  field  to  New 
York.  The  majority  will  be  represented 
by  their  permanent  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly delegations  concerned  with  the 
range  of  political  and  economic  issues 
which  arise  in  the  United  Nations.  As 
is  the  case  with  regular  General  As- 
sembly sessions,  much  of  the  signifi- 
cant work  will  be  conducted  off  the 
floor  in  private  meetings.  In  fact,  this 
process  is  already  well  underway  in 
New  York  where  we  have  been  in  close 
contact  with  the  delegations  to  the  Pre- 
paratory Committee  meetings.  In  addi- 
tion, bilateral  discussions  will  be  tak- 
ing place  between  now  and  the  opening 
of  the  SSOD  between  U.S.  representa- 
tives and  officials  of  some  of  the  coun- 
tries which  are  expected  to  play  a  sig- 
nificant role  in  the  SSOD. 


Developments  to  Date 

Thus  far,  four  Preparatory  Commit- 
tee (PREPCOM)  meetings  for  the 
SSOD  have  been  held.  The  54  nations 
who  participate  in  the  PREPCOM  are 
broadly  representative  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  itself,  assuring  the 
presentation  of  a  nearly  full  spectrum  of 
views.  At  the  end  of  the  third  PREP- 
COM in  September,  a  provisional 
agenda  for  the  special  session  was 
adopted.  This  agenda  includes  provi- 
sions for: 

•  General  debate; 

•  Review  and  appraisal  of  the  pres- 
ent international  situation  in  light  of  the 
pressing  need  to  achieve  substantial 
progress  in  the  field  of  disarmament, 
the  continuation  of  the  arms  race  and 
the  close  interrelationship  between  dis- 
armament, international  peace  and  se- 
curity, and  economic  development; 

•  Adoption  of  a  declaration  on  dis- 
armament; 

•  Adoption  of  a  program  of  action 
Oil  disarmament;  and 

•  Review  of  the  role  of  the  United 
Nations  in  disarmament  and  of  the  in- 
ternational machinery  for  negotiations 
on  disarmament,  including  in  particu- 
lar, the  question  of  convening  a  world 
disarmament  conference. 

During  the  fourth  Preparatory  Com- 
mittee in  February  of  this  year,  drafts 
of  the  declaration  on  disarmament  and 
a  program  of  action  were  introduced  by 
a  large  number  of  states  or  groups  of 
states.  In  addition,  a  large  number  of 
proposals  were  submitted  concerning 
the  machinery  for  disarmament  discus- 
sions and  negotiations.  Also  during  the 
February  meeting,  the  various  propos- 
als on  the  declaration,  the  program  of 
action,  and  disarmament  machinery 
were  consolidated   into  one  document 


Department  of  State  Bui  iil 

for  purposes  of  future  considerat 
While  some  limited  progress  was  rr 
in  consolidating  some  of  the  vari 
texts  on  the  declaration,  the  docun 
generally  consists  of  a  single  I 
which  contains  the  provisions  of 
various  documents  submitted  earliei 
various  states  or  groups  of  states.  E 
ing  March  the  many  alternative  fori 
lations  will  be  evaluated  by  2ov< 
ments.  At  the  final  PREPCOM  sessi 
which  is  scheduled  for  April  4—21, 
attempt  will  be  made  to  eliminate 
the  extent  possible,  the  divergent 
guage  prior  to  consideration  of 
documents  by  the  SSOD  itself.  Hi 
ever,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  m< 
disagreements  on  key  substantive 
sues  will  be  resolved  before  the  SS 
itself. 


Key  Issues 

Virtually  every  aspect  of  arms  con  I ' 
will  receive  attention  at  the  SSOD.  I 
date,  the  key  issues  appear  to  be: 

•  Questions  relating  to  nuclt 
weapons,  such  as  calls  for  early  c 
elusion  of  SALT  II.  a  comprehens 
test  ban,  and  assurances  by  nucle 
weapons  states  not  to  use  or  threater 
use  such  weapons  against  non-nucl 
states; 

•  The  tension  between  nonprolif 
ation  concerns  on  the  one  hand  ; 
demands  for   "nondiscriminatory"' 
cess  to  peaceful  nuclear  technology; 

•  The  relationship  between  dis» 
mament  and  development,  i. 
what — if  any — commitments  can 
should  developed  countries  make 
channel  a  portion  of  the  savin 
realized  from  arms  control  measures 
development  assistance; 

•  Measures  to  deal  wtih  no 
nuclear  weapons  of  mass  destructk 
such  as  chemical  weapons; 

•  Measures  to  deal  with  certa 
conventional  weapons  which  may 
deemed  to  be  excessively  injurious 
to  have  indiscriminate  effects; 

•  Possible  limitations  on  the  pr 
dm  (ion  and  transfer  of  convention 
weapons; 

•  Regional  limitations  on  certa 
types  of  weapons  or  on  force  levels; 

•  Elaboration  and  extension  of  tl 
concept  of  confidence-building  mea 
ures,  such  as  notifications  to  neighbc 
ing  states  of  scheduled  military  mane 
vers;  and 

•  Possible  modifications  to  the  mui 
tilateral  mechanisms  for  dealing  wi 
disarmament  issues,  strengthening  tl 
role  of  the  United  Nations,  and  broade 
ing  participation  in  the  multilater 
negotiating  forum,  the  Conference 
the  Committee  on  Disarmament. 


pay  1978 
S.  Objectives 

In  line  with  this  Administration's  ac- 
ve  support  for  arms  control  and  dis- 
mament  initiatives  and  its  efforts  to 
rengthen  relations  with  the  develop- 
g  countries,  the  United   States  has 
lopted  a  positive  approach  to  the  spe- 
al  session.  On  March  17,  in  a  speech 
the  United  Nations,   the  President 
ated  that  the  United  States  "...  will 
ake  a  strong  and  a  positive  contribu- 
m  ..."  to  the  special  session.  This 
isition  was  reiterated  in  Ambassador 
Dung's  letter  of  April  22,   1977,  to 
cretary  General  Waldheim  respond- 
g  to  a  request  for  views  of  members 
i  the   SSOD   agenda.    Ambassador 
jung  said  the  United  States  believes 
at  "  .  .  .  the  central  objective  of  the 
ision  should  be  to  give  a  new  impetus 
productive  negotiations  on  issues — 
1  and  new — of  pressing  concern." 
cause  this  letter  set  forth  the  basic 
imework  for  U.S.  preparations  for 
:  SSOD,  it  is  attached  to  this  report. ' 
We  have  adopted   this  positive  at- 
ide  to  the  SSOD  because  we  believe 
'liolds  the  potential  for  making  signif- 
f  int  contributions  to  the  achievement 
i  our  arms  control  and  disarmament 
ijectives  while  furthering  a  more  pro- 
active North-South  relationship. 
Our  fundamental  objectives  at  the 
!  OD  are  these: 

'  •  To  develop  support  for  the  arms 

otrol  initiatives  that  this  Administra- 

t  n  has  undertaken  in  the  last  year  and 

iialf; 

{'*  To  work  with  other  countries  in 

I  ^eloping  new  and  realistic  arms  con- 

I I  proposals;  and 

I  •  To  insure  that  actions  taken  at  the 
SOD  are  compatible  with  basic  U.S. 
s  urity  interests  and  with  effective  and 
| ictical  arms  control  agreements. 

Turning  first  to  the  disarmament  as- 
£ :t  at  the  special  session,  we  propose 
<  work  toward: 

•  Creating  a  receptive  environment 
fid  wider  support  for  the  key  arms  con- 
#•  »1  agreements   which  may  emerge 

i>m  negotiations  now  underway  on 
IiLT  II,  the  comprehensive  test  ban. 
id  chemical  weapons; 

•  Developing  a  broad  consensus  on  a 
liilistic  agenda  for  negotiations  over 
R:  next  few  years; 

'*  Preserving  and  strengthening  exist- 
U  multilateral  negotiating  forums 
M:h  as  the  Conference  of  the  Commit- 
M  on  Disarmament  while  maintaining 
tlxibility  on  proposals  for  procedural 
«jange  which  would  accommodate  the 
•Incerns  of  nations  whose  active  par- 
'upation  is  essential  for  the  realization 
'^general  arms  control  objectives;  and 


•  Encouraging  better  understanding 
of  and  support  for  our  overall  arms 
control  objectives  on  the  part  of  our  al- 
lies, the  Warsaw  Pact  countries,  and 
the  nonaligned  countries.  The  SSOD 
will  provide  an  unusual  opportunity  for 
us  to  explain  our  objectives  to  key 
countries  which  have  previously  been 
skeptical  about  our  intentions. 

We  see  the  SSOD  as  an  opportunity 
for  entering  into  a  dialogue  with  certain 
other  countries  that  have  not  partici- 
pated in  disarmament  negotiations  thus 
far.  We  also  view  it  as  an  opportunity 
to  gain  greater  public  support,  both  in 
the  United  States  and  abroad,  for  our 
goals  in  the  arms  control  area. 

In  terms  of  our  relations  with  the  de- 
veloping world,  we  believe  that  the 
SSOD  would  be  able  to: 


Enhanced 

Radiation 

Weapons 

Statement  by  President  Carter 

I  have  decided  to  defer  production  of 
weapons  with  enhanced  radiation  ef- 
fects. The  ultimate  decision  regarding 
the  incorporation  of  enhanced  radiation 
features  into  our  modernized  battlefield 
weapons  will  be  made  later  and  will  be 
influenced  by  the  degree  to  which  the 
Soviet  Union  shows  restraint  in  its 
conventional  and  nuclear  arms  pro- 
grams and  force  deployments  affecting 
the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
Western  Europe. 

Accordingly,  I  have  ordered  the  De- 
fense Department  to  proceed  with  the 
modernization  of  the  Lance  missile  nu- 
clear warhead  and  the  8-inch  weapon 
system,  leaving  open  the  option  of  in- 
stalling the  enhanced  radiation 
elements. 

The  United  States  is  consulting  with 
its  partners  in  the  North  Atlantic  al- 
liance on  this  decision  and  will  con- 
tinue to  discuss  with  them  appropriate 
arms  control  measures  to  be  pursued 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  will  continue  to  move  ahead  with 
our  allies  to  modernize  and  strengthen 
our  military  capabilities,  both  conven- 
tional and  nuclear.  We  are  determined 
to  do  whatever  is  necessary  to  assure 
our  collective  security  and  the  forward 
defense  of  Europe.  □ 


Issued  on  Apr.  7,  1978  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Apr.  10). 


31 


•  Contribute  to  a  more  fruitful 
North-South  dialogue  on  disarmament. 
We  intend  to  use  the  SSOD  to  foster  a 
more  constructive  dialogue  on  our 
policies  in  two  areas  of  particular  inter- 
est to  us — nonproliferation  and  re- 
straints on  the  transfer  of  conventional 
arms,  subjects  which  have  been  a 
source  of  considerable  friction  in  the 
past  and 

•  Lead  to  acceptance  of  the  concept 
that,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
spread  of  military  technology  and 
hardware  to  all  regions  of  the  globe, 
arms  control  and  disarmament  are 
common  goals  for  all  U.N.  members 
and  that  all  nations,  including  the  de- 
veloping countries,  must  exercise  re- 
straint on  the  acquisition  of  arms. 

U.S.  Preparations 

U.S.  preparations  for  the  special  ses- 
sion got  underway  following  the  ap- 
proval by  the  1976  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly resolution  calling  for  the 
SSOD.  Beginning  in  early  1977,  ele- 
ments of  the  Department  of  State  and 
the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA),  acting  in  an  informal 
working  group,  began  developing  our 
general  approach  to  the  SSOD  with  a 
view  to  establishing  the  U.S.  positions 
for  the  session  on  specific  issues.  In 
August  of  1977,  Dr.  Lawrence  Weiler, 
former  Counselor  of  ACDA  and  sub- 
sequently Associate  Director  of  Stan- 
ford University's  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament  Program,  was  appointed 
Special  Coordinator  for  the  SSOD, 
with  responsibility  for  coordinating 
preparations  for  the  session.  Dr.  Weiler 
has  also  represented  the  United  States 
at  the  third  and  fourth  PREPCOM 
sessions. 

In  February  of  this  year,  at  the  direc- 
tion of  the  National  Security  Council, 
an  inter-agency  backstopping 
committee — chaired  by  Adam  Yar- 
molinsky.  Counselor  of  the  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament  Agency — was 
formed  with  participation  by  the  Nation- 
al Security  Council,  State,  ACDA, 
Defense,  CIA,  AID,  and  other  in- 
terested agencies.  The  committee  will 
be  responsible  for  providing  policy 
guidance  to  our  delegation  and  review- 
ing proposals  that  the  United  States 
might  advance  at  the  SSOD. 

The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  SSOD 
has  not  yet  been  named.  Present  plans 
are  for  Ambassador  Young  [Andrew 
Young,  U.S.  Permament  Representa- 
tive to  the  U.N.]  to  head  the  delegation 
assisted  by  Deputy  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative James  Leonard  and  Ambas- 
sador Adrian  Fisher  of  the  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament  Agency,  both  of 
whom  have  exceptional  qualifications 


32 


Department  of  State  Bullc 


INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION  AGENCY 


The  International  Communication 
Agency  (ICA),  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment's consolidated  organization  for 
conducting  the  nation's  public  diplo- 
macy, came  into  formal  existence  on 
April  1,  1978.'  This  new  Agency  rep- 
resents a  merger  of  the  functions  and 
personnel  of  the  U.S.  Information 
Agency  (USIA),  including  the  Voice  of 
America  (VOA),  and  the  Bureau  of 
Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs  in  the 
Department  of  State.  Its  creation  is  the 
result  of  President  Carter's  Reorganiza- 
tion Plan  No.   2  of   1977.   John  E. 


Reinhardt,  formerly  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  Nigeria  and  for  the  past  year  Direc- 
tor of  USIA,  was  sworn  in  as  ICA's 
first  Director  on  April  3  by  Vice  Presi- 
dent Mondale. 

President  Carter  has  charged  ICA 
with  five  main  tasks: 

•  To  encourage,  aid,  and  sponsor  the 
broadest  possible  exchange  of  people 
and  ideas  between  our  country  and 
other  nations; 

•  To  give  foreign  peoples  the  best 
possible  understanding  of  our  policies 


in  the  disarmament  field. 

In  addition,  we  will  ask  that  both 
Houses  of  Congress  be  represented, 
each  by  majority  and  minority  mem- 
bers. We  also  expect  additional  special 
congressional  advisers  will  want  to  join 
the  delegation  and  contribute  to  its 
work,  as  was  the  case  in  the  seventh 
special  session.  Public  members  who 
combine  a  commitment  to  arms  control 
and  national  security  interests  with  an 
ability  to  win  support  for  these  aims  at 
home  and  abroad  are  expected  to  be 
added  to  the  delegation.  Congressional 
and  public  members  of  the  delegation 
can  provide  an  essential  contribution. 

In  addition,  we  have  sought  the  ad- 
vice and  support  of  nongovernmental 
organizations.  We  have  scheduled  a 
1-day  conference  of  such  organizations 
in  Washington  on  March  1 1  to  discuss 
the  SSOD  and  receive  suggestions. 


Consultations  With  Other 
Governments 

We  have  recognized  from  the  outset 
that  consultations  with  other  govern- 
ments must  be  a  key  element  in  the  ef- 
forts to  insure  the  success  of  the  special 
session. 

Over  a  year  ago,  we  instructed  our 
missions  abroad  to  convey  to  host  gov- 
ernments and  other  delegations  to  mul- 
tilateral organizations  that  we  intend  to 
take  the  SSOD  seriously  as  an  opportu- 
nity for  progress.  We  urged  them  to 
seek  the  views  of  all  participants  and  to 
emphasize  our  willingness  to  listen  to 
others  as  well  as  contribute  ourselves. 

We  have  directed  special  attention  to 
consultations  with  our  Western  allies 
and  Japan — in  NATO,  at  the  United 
Nations,  and  through  bilateral  consulta- 


tions at  all  levels — in  order  to  insure 
that  our  shared  goals  of  reduction  and 
control  of  armaments  with  undi- 
minished or  improved  security  are  ad- 
vanced by  the  SSOD. 

And  we  have  kept  in  close  contact 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  recognizing  that 
we  have  a  joint  interest  in  an  SSOD 
outcome  which  is  supportive  of  the 
bilateral  and  multilateral  negotiations 
in  which  we  are  involved. 

As  the  special  session  approaches, 
these  discussions  with  other  govern- 
ments will  intensify  and  escalate  in 
level;  we  expect  that  discussions  be- 
tween policy-level  officials  during  the 
SSOD  itself  can  contribute  as  much  to 
a  successful  session  as  the  public 
proceedings. 


Conclusion 

In  summary,  the  United  States  sees 
the  SSOD  as  a  genuine  opportunity. 
Arms  control  cannot  be  an  exclusive  in- 
terest of  the  few  nor  can  it  be  an  obliga- 
tion only  on  the  major  military  powers. 
Even  though  a  wider  forum  increases 
the  difficulties  more  than  proportion- 
ately and  even  though  the  SSOD  cannot 
serve  as  a  forum  for  actual  negotiations 
on  specific  issues,  we  believe  it  can 
give  a  new  impetus  to  arms  control 
negotiations  in  a  variety  of  areas  and 
can  serve  as  an  occasion  to  stimulate 
new  ideas  which  could  open  opportuni- 
ties for  further  progress  in  disarma- 
ment. With  the  active  support  and  ad- 
vice of  Congress  and  the  public,  the 
U.S.  delegation  will  work  actively  to- 
ward this  end.  d 


1  Ambassador  Young's  letter  was  printed  as 
U.N.  doc.  A/AC.  137/17  of  Apr.  22.  1977. 


and  our  intentions  and  sufficient  infi 
mation  about  American  society  and  c 
ture  to  comprehend  why  we  have  ch 
sen  certain  policies  over  others; 

•  To  help  insure  that  our  governme 
adequately  understands  foreign  pub 
opinion  and  culture  for  policymaki 
purposes  and  to  assist  individu 
Americans  and  institutions  in  learni 
about  other  nations  and  cultures; 

•  To  assist  in  the  development  ai 
execution  of  a  comprehensive  natior 
policy  on  international  communic 
tions,  designed  to  allow  and  encoura 
the  maximum  flow  of  information  aj 
ideas  among  the  peoples  of  the  worl 
and 

•  To  prepare  for  and  conduct  nego 
ations  on  cultural  exchanges  with  otr 
governments. 

ICA  will  include  a  headquarters  st; 
and  the  Voice  of  America  in  Washin 
ton  and  at  some  189  posts  in  1 19  cou 
tries  around  the  world  comprised 
approximately  8,900  employees, 
whom  about  half  are  foreign  nation 
working  at  the  overseas  posts.  Abe 
25%  of  the  American  employees  w 
be  based  abroad  at  any  one  time.  ICA 
budget  request  for  FY  1979  is  appro 
imately  $413  million,  of  which  sor 
$20  million  would  be  used  for  ne 
VOA  transmitter  facilities. 

The  best  known  of  the  nation's  ol 
cial  exchange  activities  to  be  merg 
into  the  new  Agency — the  Fulbrig 
scholarships — will  continue  under  t 
supervision  of  the  Board  of  Forei 
Scholarships  in  order  to  preserve  th» 
academic  integrity  and  long-ran 
character.  The  12-member  board 
academicians  and  distinguished  citize 
is  appointed  by  the  President. 

Under  the  international  visitors  pr 
gram,  U.S.  Chiefs  of  Mission  abro 
annually  extend  invitations  to  abo 
2.000  foreign  leaders  in  governmer 
labor,  mass  media,  science,  educatio 
and  other  fields  to  visit  their  counte 
parts  in  this  country.  More  th; 
100.000  American  volunteers  and 
community  organizations,  workit 
primarily  through  the  National  Count 
for  Community  Services  to  Intern 
tional  Visitors  (COSERV),  coopera 
in  programming  these  people  in  tl 
communities  to  which  they  travel. 

The  American  specialists  progra 
each  year  sends  about  200  U.S.  exper 
in  a  wide  variety  of  fields  to  teach  ar 
demonstrate  their  knowledge  and  skil 
in  other  countries  in  response  to  spi 
cific  requests  from  U.S.  embassies. 

In  the  area  of  cultural  exchange, 
variety  of  performing  arts  groups, 
exhibits,   and  coaches  and  athlet 


ay  1978 


33 


EUROPE:        Assistance  Programs  to 
Greece^  Turkey*  and  Cyprus 


Secretary  Vance 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to 
jview  the  Administration's  security 
adstance  proposals  for  Greece,  Tur- 
|y,  and  Cyprus  for  FY  1979  and  to 
ci;cuss  more  generally  U.S.  relations 
vth  the  countries  of  the  eastern 
K'diterranean. 

U.S.  policy  in  that  sensitive  and 
\al  region  has  several  fundamental 
gals.  It  is  vital  that  we  strengthen 
tjr  bilateral  relationships  with  two 
fm  and  longstanding  friends  and 
aies — Greece  and  Turkey.  Further,  it 
ii  essential  to  strengthen  NATO's 
sithern  flank,  thus  enhancing  allied 
jhurity  interests  in  the  eastern 
I  diterranean.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Fsident  and  all  of  us  remain  fully 
cnmitted  to  help  in  the  search  for  a 
(prus  solution  that  will  permit  the 
to  Cypriot  communities  to  live 
picefully  together  within  one  nation. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  each  of 
Ise  goals  is  equally  important,  and 
g  at  effort  and  attention  must  be  paid 
t  them  if  we  are  to  succeed.  Their 
f  suit  has  been  complicated  by  the 
iy  in  which  history  has  interwoven 
i  issues  at  play  in  the  region. 
I  wish  to  outline  today  the  Admin- 
i  ation's  program  for  dealing  with 
t  se  issues  which  we  believe  will 
fa  ak  the  present  impasse.  We  urge 
a>roval  of  these  proposals.  The  con- 
s  uences  of  failure  would  be  enor- 
n  us  for  all  of  us. 

I  ateral  Relations 

The  Clifford  mission  to  the  region 
ii  the  first  weeks  of  the  new  Admin- 
L  ation  demonstrated  the  high  prior- 
h  which  the  Administration  placed 
ai  still  places  on  restoring  healthy 
«  ationships  with  our  eastern 
N  diterranean  friends. ' 


In  Greece  we  have  watched  with 
admiration  and  respect  as  that  country 
returned  to  its  place  as  a  leading 
member  of  the  family  of  Western  de- 
mocracies. Greece's  democratic  in- 
stitutions have  been  restored  and 
strengthened  under  the  sound  and 
confident  leadership  of  Prime  Minis- 
ter Caramanlis,  who  returned  in  July 
1974  to  guide  Greece  out  of  one  of 
the  darkest  periods  of  its  history.  We 
have  witnessed  the  economic  success- 
es of  Greece  and  the  steady  progress 
toward  Greek  entry  into  the  European 
Community,  an  entity  whose  ideals 
and  aspirations  we  share. 

Because  of  Prime  Minister 
Caramanlis'  international  stature  and 
the  dynamism  of  the  Greek  people, 
we  believe  Greece  can  and  will  play  a 
vital  role  in  European  and  world  af- 
fairs. We  value  Greece  as  an  old  and 
trusted  ally,  and  we  place  special  em- 
phasis on  building  an  even  stronger 
relationship  for  the  future.  In  Presi- 
dent Carter's  discussions  with  Prime 
Minister  Caramanlis  in  London  last 
May,  and  when  I  visited  Athens  in 
January,  we  were  struck  by  our  wide 
range  of  common  interests. 

Our  bilateral  relations  with  Turkey 
are  also  of  great  importance.  As  a  re- 
sult of  the  Clifford  mission,  the  meet- 
ing between  President  Carter  and 
Prime  Minister  Demirel  during  the 
London  summit  in  May.  my  visit  to 
Ankara  in  January  and  that  of  Deputy 
Secretary  Christopher  last  week,  some 
progress  was  made  toward  working 
out  a  revitalized  relationship. 

We  believe  that  the  United  States 
must  view  Turkey  from  fresh  perspec- 
tives for  the  relationship  has  many 
dimensions.  Our  common  security 
concerns  have  in  the  past  and  will 
continue  to  play  an  important  part  in 
our  evolving  relationship.  Turkey  is  a 


t  ms  will  travel  overseas  every  year 
fder  ICA  auspices. 

The  largest  single  element  of  ICA,  in 
I  ms  of  personnel  and  resources,  will 
( itinue  to  be  the  Voice  of  America. 
'  ith  all  of  its  programming  originating 
I  Washington,  the  VOA  broadcasts 
virldwide  about  800  hours  a  week  in 
1  glish  and  35  other  languages. 

The  new  Agency  will  also  maintain 
!•  former  USIA's  daily  radioteletype 
k  to  overseas  posts  of  official  state- 


ments and  interpretive  materials,  its 
program  of  publications  and  exhibits, 
and  its  videotape  and  film  services. 
The  253  libraries,  reading  rooms,  and 
information  centers  in  almost  100 
countries — and  the  English-teaching 
course  offered  at  many  of  them — will 
continue  to  operate  under  ICA.  □ 

1  For  text  of  Executive  Order  12048,  signed 
Mar.  27,  1978,  by  President  Carter  establishing 
the  ICA,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  3. 


major  democracy  with  a  robust  par- 
liamentary system.  It  is  also  an  im- 
portant developing  country — one  of 
the  few  that  has  maintained  the 
momentum  of  development  within  a 
strong  democratic  framework.  Turkey 
is  both  a  European  and  an  Asian  na- 
tion, and  it  is  likely  to  have  a  grow- 
ing role  in  the  region  and  the  world. 
Our  relationship  with  Turkey  has, 
however,  been  constrained  by  the 
embargo  provisions  of  Section  620(x) 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  and  the 
uncertainty  concerning  our  bilateral 
defense  relationship. 

Strengthening  NATO 

The  eastern  Mediterranean  is  the 
junction  point  of  several  critical 
areas — Western  Europe,  the  Balkans, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  Middle 
East.  The  continuing  strategic  signifi- 
cance of  this  area  is  clear.  To  protect 
our  interests  and  those  of  our  allies,  a 
strong  and  effective  NATO  southern 
flank  is  essential.  Unfortunately,  over 
the  last  several  years  the  effectiveness 
of  this  flank  has  been  eroded  in  a 
manner  that  is  of  grave  concern  to 
this  Administration  and  to  our  allies. 

The  United  States  has  a  number  of 
vitally  important  military  installations 
in  Greece  which  are  testimony  to  the 
strategic  value  of  that  country.  These 
bases  are  critical  to  the  operations  of 
the  6th  Fleet  and  to  a  variety  of  other 
activities  essential  to  our  security 
interests  in  the  area. 

The  Government  of  Greece  with- 
drew its  military  forces  from  NATO's 
integrated  military  structure  in  1974 
and  tied  its  full  reintegration  to  prog- 
ress on  those  issues  which  it  feels 
forced  its  decision  to  withdraw.  How- 
ever, I  should  note  that,  in  the 
interim,  U.S.  military  facilities  in 
Greece  have  continued  to  operate 
without  interruption.  Recently,  there 
have  been  serious  discussions  be- 
tween NATO  and  Greece  offering 
grounds  for  optimism  that  a  closer  re- 
lationship may  be  developed  in  the 
coming  months.  If  this  continuing  ef- 
fort is  successful,  it  will  be  a  major 
step  toward  a  healthy  normalization 
of  Greece's  participation  in  NATO. 

Turkey,  for  its  part,  remains  a  full 
NATO  member,  and  its  geographic 
position  is  critical  today — as  it  has 
been  throughout  history.   It  supplies 


34 

more  ground  forces  to  NATO  than 
any  other  nation.  Yet  the  material 
readiness  of  Turkish  forces  has  de- 
teriorated seriously  in  recent  years.  If 
Turkey  is  to  continue  to  play  its 
NATO  role,  our  relationship  must  be 
revitalized.  If  we  fail  to  do  so,  there 
will  be  those  in  Turkey  who  will 
question  the  basis  for  its  continued 
participation  in  the  Western  alliance. 

Seeking  a  Cyprus  Solution 

This  Administration  has.  from  its 
very  first  days,  placed  a  high  priority 
on  the  achievement  of  a  just  settle- 
ment of  the  Cyprus  problem.  We  re- 
main committed  to  that  goal. 

We  are  committed  to  this  goal  for 
two  reasons. 

•  So  long  as  Cyprus  is  divided  and 
its  status  uncertain,  it  constitutes  a 
very  serious  humanitarian  issue. 

•  So  long  as  the  Cyprus  problem 
remains  unsolved,  it  is  a  substantial 
impediment  to  good  relations  between 
Greece  and  Turkey. 

In  support  of  our  commitment  to 
the  achievement  of  a  Cyprus  settle- 
ment, the  Administration  has  made 
extensive  efforts  during  the  past  year 
to  encourage  realistic  and  meaningful 
negotiations  between  the  parties  under 
the  auspices  of  the  U.N.  Secretary 
General.  Those  efforts,  which  in- 
cluded many  high-level  visits,  meet- 
ings, and  discussions,  have  been  set 
forth  in  detail  by  the  President  in  his 
bimonthly  reports  to  the  Congress.  I 
will  not  repeat  them  here. 

Unfortunately,  despite  these  ef- 
forts, the  intercommunal  talks  have 
not  to  date  produced  any  tangible 
breakthrough.  There  has,  however, 
been  a  growing  consensus  as  to  a 
framework  for  a  solution.  The  two 
communities  in  Cyprus — as  well  as 
the  Governments  of  Greece  and  Tur- 
key and,  in  fact,  the  international 
community  as  a  whole — are  in  broad 
agreement  with  respect  to  the 
following. 

•  Cyprus  must  remain  a  sovereign, 
independent  nation  —  partition  has 
been  ruled  out  as  a  viable  solution. 

•  Cyprus  should  be  a  federation 
with  two  zones.  The  Turkish  zone 
should  provide  a  viable  area  for  the 
Turkish  Cypriot  community  but  re- 
duced in  size  from  that  now  adminis- 
tered by  the  Turkish  side. 

•  The  constitution  should  provide 
for  mutually  agreed-upon  respon- 
sibilities divided  between  central  and 
local  governments  with  adequate 
safeguards  respecting  the  rights  of  in- 
dividual Cypriots. 


The  task  now  is  to  move  from  this 
consensus  to  a  concrete  agreement 
that  will  be  acceptable  to  the  two 
communities  on  Cyprus.  As  a  part  of 
this  effort,  the  Greek  Cypriot 
negotiators  tabled  a  map  in  Vienna  in 
April  1977  and  described  their  con- 
stitutional concepts.  The  Turkish 
Cypriots  outlined  some  of  their  con- 
stitutional ideas.  The  Turkish  side  is 
now  formulating  constitutional  and 
territorial  proposals  which  they  be- 
lieve will  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  re- 
sumption of  active  intercommunal 
negotiations. 

We  believe  that  with  two  thought- 
ful constitutional  and  territorial  pro- 
posals on  the  table,  combined  with 
sufficient  goodwill  and  a  sense  of 
realism  on  both  sides,  there  is  an  op- 
portunity for  productive  negotiations. 
We  stand  ready,  if  requested,  to  assist 
the  Secretary  General  in  moving  these 
negotiations  forward. 


Recommendation 

We  have  mutually  agreed  with  the 
Government  of  Turkey  to  renegotiate 
the  matters  covered  by  the  defense 
cooperation  agreement  so  as  to  serve 
our  bilateral  security  interests  in  a 
manner  that  the  two  governments  can 
be  confident  will  reflect  the  broadest 
interests  of  our  two  democracies.  It  is 
not  easy  to  predict  when  new  ar- 
rangements will  be  concluded  since 
the  issues  are  complex.  However,  we 
have  agreed  with  the  Government  of 
Turkey  to  give  this  effort  prompt  at- 
tention and  to  act  promptly  to  imple- 
ment the  new  agreement  after  it  is 
concluded.  Of  course,  we  will  consult 
closely  with  the  Congress  concerning 
such  negotiations. 

Even  as  we  are  working  toward  this 
end,  we  believe  we  must  deal  with  is- 
sues of  immediate  concern  to  us  and 
the  region.  We  are,  therefore,  submit- 
ting, in  the  form  of  an  amendment  to 
the  Security  Assistance  Act.  proposed 
legislation  to  deal  with  this  new 
situation. 

For  Turkey  we  propose  the  fol- 
lowing with  respect  to  FY  79: 

1)  To  provide  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  loan  guaranties  of  $17? 
million  so  that  we  can  help  meet  the 
most  urgent  needs  of  the  Turkish  mili- 
tary. This  is  the  same  amount  as  was 
provided  to  Turkey  last  year. 

2)  To  lift  the  embargo  contained  in 
Section  620(x)  of  the  Foreign  Assist- 
ance Act  so  that  we  can  fully  cooper- 
ate with  Turkey  in  a  manner  conso- 
nant with  the  requirements  of  an 
alliance  important  to  our  mutual  secu- 
rity. This  would  facilitate   joint   and 


Department  of  State  Bulle, 

allied  defense  planning,  enhance  a 
lied  support  for  Turkey's  NAT; 
needs  via  third  country  transfers  ar 
improved  standardization  and  perrr 
the  delivery  of  items  impounded  sin< 
the  embargo  was  put  in  force. 

3)  To  provide  a  security  supportii 
assistance  loan  of  $50  million  to  Tu] 
key  to  assist  Turkey  in  resolving  il 
present  economic  difficulties.  I  wou 
note  in  this  connection  that  a  stabil 
zation  package  was  recently  workt] 
out  between  Turkey   and  the  Intern 
tional  Monetary  Fund's  staff  and 
pending  before  the  IMF  Board. 

For  Greece  we  would  likewise  coi 
tinue  the   level  of  FMS   financing 
last  year's  level — that  is,  $140  mi 
lion.   This  is  somewhat   higher  tlS 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 

The  Governments  of  (he  United 
States  and  Turkey  have  agreed  that  the 
4-year  $1  billion  defense  cooperation 
agreement,  signed  on  March  25,  1976, 
but  never  approved  by  either  (he  U.S. 
Congress  or  the  Turkish  Parliament. 
will  be  renegotiated.  New  and  mutually 
satisfactory  defense  cooperation  ar- 
rangements between  Turkey  and  the 
United  States  will  be  negotiated. 

In  order  further  to  strengthen  our 
bilateral  relations  with  Turkey,  and  the 
NATO  defense  posture  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  President  Carter  will 
ask  the  Congress  to  take  action  to  re- 
peal Section  620(x)  of  the  Foreign  As- 
sistance Act.  which  imposes  restriction! 
on  military  transfers  to  Turkey.  In  addi- 
tion, the  President  is  requesting  the 
Congress  to  authorize  $175  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits  to 
Turkey  for  fiscal  year  1979,  the  same 
amount  provided  by  the  Congress  for 
FY  1978.  Because  ol  (he  serious  eco- 
nomic situation  now  facing  Turkey,  the 
President  is  also  asking  the  Congress  to 
approve  a  $50  million  securit)  support- 
ing assistance  loan  for  Turkey  for  FY 
1979. 

The  Administration's  program  for 
rurke)  will  he  more  fully  described  in 
congressional  hearings  now  scheduled 
for  later  this  week.  At  that  time  the 
Administration  will  ask  for  $5  million 
in  refugee  assistance  for  Cyprus  and 
will  renew  its  commitment  to  work  tor 
,i  iust  and  lasting  solution  to  (he  Cyprus 
problem.  In  addition,  the  President  will 
also  ask  Congress  to  authorize  $140 
million  in  FMS  credits  for  FY  1979  for 
Greece,  the  same  amount  provided  by 
the  Congress  for  FY  1978. 


Press  release  145  of  Apr.  4.  1978. 


lay  1978 

e  Administration  requested  in  its 
jjdget  submission  and  reflects  our 
sire  to  maintain  both  Greece  and 
urkey  at  last  year's  FMS  credit 
vels.  No  grant  military  assistance  is 
;ing  requested  for  either  country  at 
is  time. 

The  lifting  of  the  embargo  and  the 
gotiation  of  new  defense  arrange- 
ents  with  Turkey  will  provide  a  core 
'  stability  to  our  bilateral  relations 
id  enable  us  to  establish  a  renewed 
nse  of  trust   so  that  we  may   work 
gether  to  resolve   important  prob- 
jms.  It  should  be  clear  that  this  does 
>t  signal  any  shift  in  U.S.  policy  as 
:gards  Greek-Turkish  differences. 
Iiey  are  both  friends  and  valued  ai- 
rs. We  support  their  efforts  to  re- 
ive all  problems  between  them- 
lves   in   a  peaceful  fashion.    We 
rongly  believe  that  our  national 
jterests  require  the  restoration  of 
lund.  normalized  bilateral  relation- 
iips  with  Turkey  and  with  Greece, 
jd  our  proposals  today  are  made  for 
[at  reason. 

:i  They  should  help  restore  a  stable 
id  peaceful  atmosphere  in  the  east- 
n  Mediterranean — something  which 
11  benefit  all  nations  in  the  region. 
.'  that  regard,  it  remains  the  position 
the  United  States  that  the  disputes 
liich  exist  in  the  area  must  be  set- 
id  through  peaceful  procedures,  that 
jch  side  should  avoid  provocative 
I  tions,  and  that  neither  side  should 
hk  a  military  solution  to  these  dis- 
|tes.  The  United  States  would  ac- 
rely  and  unequivocally  oppose  a 
]  litary  solution  and  would  make  a 
lijor  effort  to  prevent  such  a  course 
i  action. 


fting  the  Embargo 

It  has  been  suggested  that  lifting 

e  embargo,  or  even  proposing  fur- 

er  military  or  economic  assistance 

r  Turkey,   should  be  delayed  until 

ich  time  as  a  final  Cyprus  solution 

achieved.  The  Administration  does 

:>t  share  that  view,  and  does  not,  for 

E  important  reasons  I  have  outlined, 

lieve  U.S.   national  interests  would 

I  served  by  such  a  course.  The  Ad- 

(inistration   will   continue   to  make 

iery  effort  to  help  bring  about  a  just 

llution  to  the  Cyprus  problem.  The 

jtion  we  request  today  is  not.  in  our 

ew.  inconsistent  with  those  efforts. 

le  believe  it  can  actually  facilitate 

:e   negotiation   process.    With  the 

Vprus  negotiations  entering  a  critical 

Iriod,  the  United  States  can  play  a 

lore  useful  role  if  we  are  seen,  by  all 

Je  parties,  to  be  even-handed  in  our 

Siproach.    An  embargo  against  one 


side  makes  it  difficult  to  play  that 
role. 

Let  me  make  another  point  about 
the  embargo.  Section  620(x)  was 
enacted  by  the  Congress  to  demon- 
strate that  all  facets  of  agreements 
undertaken  with  the  U.S.  Government 
must  be  honored  or  serious  conse- 
quences faced.  This  is  a  point  of 
principle  which  has  had  its  impact 
both  in  Turkey  and  throughout  the 
world — demonstrating  the  seriousness 
with  which  the  American  people  view 
any  unauthorized  use  of  our  military 
equipment.  The  point  was  made 
dramatically  and  effectively.  Now  the 
time  has  come  to  look  forward  rather 
than  back.  Continued  maintenance  of 
the  embargo  would  be  harmful  to 
U.S.  security  concerns,  harmful  to 
NATO,  harmful  to  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions with  Turkey,  and  harmful  to  our 
role  as  a  potential  contributor  to  a 
Cyprus  settlement. 

Let  me  conclude  with  a  brief  fac- 
tual description  of  our  recommenda- 
tions for  assistance  to  Cyprus  for  the 
coming  year. 

Assistance  to  Cyprus 

As  you  will  have  noted,  the  Admin- 
istration is  requesting  $5  million  in 
FY  1978  security  supporting  assist- 
ance for  Cyprus  as  a  contribution  to- 
ward the  relief  and  rehabilitation  of 
displaced  persons  there.  As  in  the 
past,  these  funds  will  be  proportion- 
ately distributed  to  the  two  ethnic 
communities  on  Cyprus  and  will  be 
earmarked  for  projects  such  as  hous- 
ing construction,  health  care,  and  vo- 
cational education.  Since  FY  1975. 
the  United  States  has  contributed  a 
total  of  $87.5  million  for  Cyprus  re- 
lief and  over  $9  million  annually  to 
support  the  U.N.  peacekeeping  forces 
in  Cyprus. 

We  believe  that  these  new  funds 
will  be  effectively  utilized  by  Cypriot 
authorities  for  worthwhile  refugee  as- 
sistance programs  and  will  underscore 
our  continuing  concern  for  the  people 
of  Cyprus  and  our  strong  interest  in 
promoting  negotiation  of  a  just  and 
lasting  settlement  on  the  island. 

A  settlement  of  the  Cyprus  prob- 
lem, and  the  adoption  of  a  new  con- 
stitution with  the  concomitant  crea- 
tion of  two  zones,  will  require  some 
significant  expenses  involving  the  re- 
settlement of  people,  the  return  of 
refugees,  and  the  creation  of  new 
facilities.  This  Administration  wishes 
to  pledge  that,  when  a  settlement  is 
achieved,  we  will  reassess  the  ques- 
tion of  economic  assistance  and  are 
prepared  to  request  from  the  Congress 
additional  aid  to  assist  both  the  Greek 


35 


and  Turkish  Cypriot  communities  in 
making  the  necessary  economic,  so- 
cial, and  political  readjustment 
brought  about  by  a  solution  to  this 
troubling  problem.  □ 

Statement  before  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations  on  Apr.  6,  1978  (text 
from  press  release  151  of  Apr.  6).  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished In  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington. 
DC.  2041)2. 

'On  Feb.  3,  1977,  President  Carter  an- 
nounced that  Clark  M.  Clifford  would  under- 
take a  special  mission  to  Greece.  Turkey,  and 
Cyprus  as  his  personal  emissary. 


Seventh  Report 
on  Cyprus 

Message  to  the  Congress 

As  required  by  Public  Law  94-104.  this  re- 
port describes  the  progress  that  has  been  made 
during  the  past  sixty  days  toward  a  negotiated 
settlement  on  Cyprus. 

In  my  last  such  report  to  the  Congress, 
submitted  on  January  20,  I  outlined  the  con- 
tinuing efforts  that  we  and  other  nations  have 
been  making,  in  both  bilateral  and  international 
meetings,  to  promote  an  early  resumption  of 
productive  negotiations  between  the  two  Cyp- 
riot communities.  I  stressed  that  resolute  ac- 
tion was  still  required,  but  still  expressed  the 
belief  that  we  were  moving  in  the  right  direc- 
tion. 

Since  that  time  there  have  been  develop- 
ments of  potential  significance  for  Cyprus. 
Very  shortly  after  his  assumption  of  office  on 
January  5.  Turkish  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  pub- 
licly announced  his  intention  to  deal  promptly 
and  decisively  with  the  outstanding  foreign 
policy  issues  confronting  his  nation,  prime 
among  them  being  Cyprus.  Ecevit  acknowl- 
edged that  a  Cyprus  settlement  would  be  in 
Turkey's  own  best  interests.  "'We  want  to  see 
a  rapid  solution  in  Cyprus."  he  declared  in  a 
January  9  interview,  "not  because  the  U.S.  or 
other  friendly  countries  want  it.  but  because  it 
will  be  for  the  benefit  of  all  Cyprus  and  for 
the  benefit  of  peace  in  the  region."  Sub- 
sequently, in  both  public  statements  and  pri- 
vate conversations.  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  said 
that  he  hoped  negotiations  between  the  com- 
munities would  soon  resume,  and  he  declared 
that  the  Turkish  side  would  submit  concrete 
proposals  on  both  the  constitutional  and  ter- 
ritorial aspects  of  the  issue. 

United  Nations  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
visited  Ankara,  Athens  and  Nicosia  between 
January  8  and  18.  The  Secretary  General  was 
apparently  encouraged  by  his  conversations 
with  President  Kyprianou.  Prime  Ministers 
Ecevit  and  Caramanlis,  and  Turkish  Cypriot 
leader  Denktash.  and  afterwards  said  that  it 


36 


German  Democratic  Republic 


by  David  B.  Bolen 


President  Carter  recently  noted  that 
we  live  in  a  rapidly  changing  world;  a 
world  in  which  the  universal  desire  for 
freedom  and  a  better  life  is  being  ex- 
pressed more  strongly  and  in  more  ways 
than  ever  before;  a  world  in  which  polit- 
ical awakening,  economic  independ- 
ence, and  technological  progress  have 
created  new  demands  on  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  our  people. 

Today  the  world  community  involves 
more  than  160  independent  countries. 
This  community  includes  130-odd  de- 
veloping countries  which  have  changed 
the  character  of  international  affairs.  It 
is  a  world  characterized  by  population 
explosion  which  places  tremendous 
stress  and  strain  on  economic  develop- 
ment resources.  It  is  a  world  in  which 
80%  of  the  population  will  be  living  in 
Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America  by  the 
close  of  this  century.  It  is  a  world  of 
increasing  interaction  between  existing 
social  systems  and  national  values  and 
traditions.  It  is  a  world  in  which  a  single 
ideological  or  revolutionary  model  is 
fading. 

The  world  today  cannot  be  fully  un- 
derstood by  focusing  primarily  on 
East-West  competition  in  Europe.  This 
competition  is  continuing.  But  it  is  con- 


ceivable that  in  years  to  come  the  chief 
security  concerns  of  the  United  States 
may  not  evolve  around  this  East-West 
confrontation  at  all;  rather,  the  chief 
area  of  potential  conflict  will  be  where 
East-West  interests  clash  in  the  develop- 
ing countries. 

One  of  the  priorities  of  the  Carter 
Administration  is  to  help  shape  a  wider 
and  more  cooperative  world  commu- 
nity. Such  a  world  system  should  in- 
clude that  one-third  of  mankind  which 
lives  under  communism.  The  German 
Democratic  Republic  (G.D.R.)  is  one  of 
the  most  important  Communist  states. 
Full  normalization  of  relations  with  it 
would  facilitate  the  assimilation  of  this 
country  into  the  fabric  of  global  cooper- 
ation. 

The  German  Democratic  Republic  is 
a  country  of  central  importance  to  peace 
and  security  in  Europe.  It  is  the 
western-most  extension  of  Soviet  power 
and  influence.  It  is  a  member  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact.  There  are  some  20  Soviet 
military  divisions  in  the  G.D.R.  It 
shares  a  common  border  with  our 
NATO  ally,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  (F.R.G.). 

The  German  Democratic  Republic 
has  a  GNP  of  $70  billion.  Its  per  capita 
GNP  of  $4,000  exceeds  that  of  the 
Soviet  Union  or  any  other  East  Euro- 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

pean  country.  It  ranks  ninth  in  the  woi 
in  industrial  production.  It  has  a  ri. 
reservoir  of  scientific  and  technologic 
manpower.  The  G.D.R.  economy 
oriented  toward  the  Soviet  Union  a: 
other  East  European  members  of  tt 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assi: 
ance.  Like  all  industrialized  countrit 
it  is  increasingly  dependent  on  the  Thi 
World  for  raw  materials  and  markets. 

The  German  Democratic  Repub 
experienced  a  long  period  of  isolatr 
from  the  main  Western  channels  of  di 
lomatic  intercourse  following  its  pre 
lamation  as  a  separate  state  in  194 
This  isolation  reflected  opposing  « 
liances,  differing  ideologies,  and  a  ge 
eral  atmosphere  of  mistrust  whin 
characterized  East-West  relations  du 
ing  the  cold  war  era.  Western  perce 
tions  of  the  G.D.R.  were  shaped  by  t 
rigid  controls  exercised  by  the  G.D.i 
in  its  internal  affairs,  particularly  fc 
lowing  the  uprising  of  G.D.R.  work 
on  June  17.  1953,  and  the  erection 
the  Berlin  wall  on  August  13,  1961. 

Although  the  G.D.R.  continued 
place  severe  limitations  on  free  spee 
and  travel,  improvements  in  the  exti 
nal  political  and  psychological  dim 
following  the  Quadripartite  Agreem 
on  Berlin  and  the  Agreements  betwe^ 
the  F.R.G.  and  the  G.D.R.  and  its  Ea: 
ern  neighbors  facilitated  the  recognitl 
of  the  G.D.R.  by  the  leading  Weste 
Nations.  Finally,  on  September 
1974.  the  United  States  and  the  Germ 
Democratic  Republic  agreed  to  esta 
lish  diplomatic  relations,  a  move  whi 
we  considered  to  be  in  our  best  intert 
for  a  number  of  reasons. 


. 


might  be  possible  to  reconvene  the  stalled 
Cyprus  intercommunal  talks  sometime  early  in 
the  spring. 

My  Administration  has  welcomed  Prime 
Minister  Ecevit's  declared  intention  to  move 
forward  on  the  Cyprus  issue,  and  we  have  ex- 
pressed our  readiness  to  give  full  support  to 
the  initiatives  of  the  Secretary  General.  Secre- 
tary Vance  stopped  in  Ankara  and  Athens  on 
January  20-22.  following  a  visit  to  the  Middle 
East,  and  held  very  useful  discussions  on  a 
number  of  subjects,  including  Cyprus.1  The 
Secretary  returned  from  these  discussions  con- 
vinced that  both  the  governments  of  Turkey 
and  Greece  earnestly  desired  to  work  towards 
a  Cyprus  settlement 

The  Turkish  Cypriots.  assisted  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Turkey,  are  now  preparing  detailed 
constitutional  and  territorial  proposals  that 
could  serve  as  a  basis  for  resumed  intercom- 
munal negotiations.  Our  understanding  is  that 
these  proposals  may  be  completed  sometime  in 
March,  and  that  negotiations  between  the  two 
communities  could  be  resumed  by  the  Secre- 


tary General  sometime  thereafter.  Toward  that 
end.  the  Administration  has  recently  urged  the 
Turkish  Cyrpiot  leadership  and  the  government 
of  Turkey  to  develop  proposals  that  are  suffi- 
ciently substantive  and  forthcoming  to  form  a 
basis  for  genuine  negotiation.  We  have  at  the 
same  time  encouraged  the  Government  of  Cy- 
prus to  regard  the  new  Turkish  proposals,  to- 
gether with  the  proposals  tabled  by  President 
Makarios  last  year,  as  a  basis  for  initiating  a 
round  of  intensive,  goodfaith  negotiations 
which  can  lead  to  a  narrowing  of  differences. 

I  strongly  hope  that  productive  Cyprus 
negotiations  will  be  reconvened  very  soon  I 
am  sure  that  all  who  wish  to  see  peace,  jus- 
tice, and  stability  in  Cyprus  and  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  share  this  hope. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


Transmitted  on  Mar.  23.  I97H  (text  from 
II  eekl)  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Mar.  27). 

'  For  texts  of  Secretary  Vance's  remarks  to 
the  press  in  Ankara  and  Athens,  see  Bulletin 
of  Feb.  1978,  p.  30. 


Security  Concerns 

Our  principal  interests  in  the  Germ; 
Democratic  Republic  revolve  aroui 
security  concerns.  These  security  co 
cerns  relate  to  the  G.D.R. 's  close  ai 
"irrevocable"  relations  with  the  Sovi 
Union,  the  nature  of  relations  betwei 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  ar 
the  German  Democratic  Republic, 
the  behavior  of  the  G.D.R.  in  ar 
around  Berlin.  We  have  an  interest 
human  rights  improvement  and  deten 
which  we  see  as  mutually  reinforcii 
concepts.  We  want  a  good  atmosphe 
for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  pro] 
erty  of  American  citizens.  We  also  wa; 
the  G.D.R.  to  play  a  constructive  ro 
internationally  and  to  look  upon  th 
United  States  as  a  reliable  supplier  < 
agricultural  and  industrial  products. 

Therefore,  in  conducting  our  relt 
tions  with  the  G.D.R.  and  its  allies, 
hope: 

•  To  go  beyond  arms  limitation  to  a< 


ay  1978 


37 


,al  reductions  of  military  forces  and 
maments; 

•  To  go  beyond  uninhibited  competi- 
,)n  in  the  Third  World  by  developing 
iore  stable  and  equitable  North-South 

lations  and  by  encouraging  a  general 
.ittern  of  restraint  and  cooperation; 

•  To  look  beyond  the  postwar  divi- 
ipn  of  Europe  to  encourage  more  nor- 
lal  relations  between  governments  and 
joples  of  Western  and  Eastern  Europe; 

d 

••  To  gain  acceptance  that  discussion 
i  particular  human  rights  matters,  de- 
fied and  agreed  in  the  Helsinki  Final 
J:t  sections  on  principles  and  human 
intacts,  are  a  legitimate  part  of  bilat- 
til  and  multilateral  diplomacy.  This 
Muld  presuppose  both  a  G.D.R.  will- 
ijness  to  engage  in  discussions  with 
I:  United  States  on  these  matters  and  a 
tnscious  effort  to  move  in  the  direction 
i  greater,  more  positive  compliance  to 
fecific  Helsinki  provisions. 

Now  the  central  purpose  of  G.D.R. 
!  "eign  policy  is  to  create  and  secure  the 
«>st  favorable  international  condition 
1  •  the  development  of  a  Communist  so- 
t  ty  at  home.  This  means  the  G.D.R. 
HI: 

•  Maintain  a  firm  and  invariable  al- 
1  nee  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
(  mmunist  countries; 

•  Strengthen  the  Warsaw  Pact; 

■•  Define  and  use  detente  in  ways  that 
ill  advance  G.D.R.  objectives; 

•••  Seek  to  develop  and  maintain  mul- 
I  irious  and  stable  cooperation  with  all 
i  ions  while  promoting,  where  possi- 
I  ,  the  political,  social,  and  economic 
{ als  of  communism;  and 

•  Increase  its  influence  in  the  Third 
l3rld  by  posing  as  an  ally  of  national 
leration  movements. 

The  G.D.R.  society  and  its  foreign 
|licy  goals  make  it  quite  clear  that 
Ith  cooperative  and  competitive  ele- 
I'nts  will  be  present  in  our  relations  for 
■  ne  time  to  come.  The  competitive 
rments  stem  from  historical  forces, 
jilosophical  pressures,  geopolitical 
(tisiderations,  divergent  political  sys- 
1ns,  and  different  values.  At  the  same 
tie,  we  have  overlapping  interests 
Mich  constitute  a  basis  for  enlarging 
i  operation  and  regulating  the  competi- 
*  e  aspects  of  our  relations. 

The  G.D.R.   at  all   levels  has  ex- 

:ssed  a  profound  interest  in  develop- 
»l  closer  cooperation  with  the  United 
"iites.  This  is  probably  important  to  the 
1  D.R.  for  two  reasons.  First,  stronger 
ffls  would  enhance  the  G.D.R. 's  status 
;  Europe  and  elsewhere.  Secondly,  the 
1  D.R.  leaders  may  believe  that  the  de- 

lopment  of  cooperation  with  the 


United  States  will  bring  it  benefits  in 
trade  and  technology  and,  through 
selected  exchanges,  lead  to  a  better  un- 
derstanding of  the  United  States. 

In  the  conduct  of  our  relations 
through  bilateral,  multilateral,  and 
other  channels,  we  seek  to  engage  the 
G.D.R.  on  a  wide  range  of  issues  in- 
cluding disarmament,  inter-German  af- 
fairs, Africa,  Middle  East,  North-South 
dialogue,  human  rights,  humanitarian 
cases,  trade  development,  cultural  and 
scientific  exchanges,  consular  conven- 
tion, and  claims. 

The  G.D.R.  shares  the  view  of  most 
East  Europeans  that  good  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  are  a  key  factor  in  sustaining 
the  process  of  detente  which  they  see  as 
important  in  maintaining  a  good  atmos- 
phere for  the  conduct  of  bilateral  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States.  The  most 
important  single  aspect  of  Soviet- 
American  relations  is  the  Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks  (SALT).  In 
these  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  an  effort  is  being  made  to 
stabilize  the  military  competition,  to 
begin  a  downward  turn  to  more  sensible 
levels,  and  to  slow  down  the  introduc- 
tion of  new,  less  stable  military  tech- 
nologies. We  hope  these  negotiations 
will  succeed  this  year;  if  so,  they  will 
contribute  to  U.S.  security  and  improve 
the  climate  in  which  our  relations  with 
the  G.D.R.  can  better  develop. 

A  successful  SALT  negotiation  could 
also  enhance  prospects  for  other  arms 
control  problems.  We  have  made  it 
clear  that  we  favor  effective  measures 
which  bring  about  arms  limitation  and 
disarmament  based  on  the  principle  of 
undiminished  security,  a  principle  that 
is  essential  to  success  in  the  Vienna" 
talks  on  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions in  central  Europe.  The  G.D.R. 
views  with  satisfaction  the  progress 
which  has  been  made  in  negotiations  on 
a  comprehensive  ban  on  nuclear  explo- 
sions. The  G.D.R.  's  participation  in  the 
International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evalu- 
ation Organizing  Conference  is  evi- 
dence of  its  concern  and  willingness  to 
cooperate  on  nonproliferation. 

We  must  continue  efforts  to  enhance 
U.S.  security  through  negotiations  on 
disarmament  and  arms  control.  At  the 
same  time  we  must  maintain  NATO's 
relative  military  strength  and  promote 
Western  European  unity  as  the  keystone 
of  our  foreign  policy.  Success  in  arms 
control  and  disarmament  negotiations 
would  obviously  free  resources  to  meet 
the  growing  human  needs  in  both  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries  and 
thus  facilitate  the  construction  of  a  more 
durable  structure  of  global  cooperation. 

Our  efforts  to  promote  a  system  of 
global  cooperation  and  regulate  compe- 


tition also  includes  diplomatic  action 
and  political  negotiations. 

Bilateral  Relations 

Central  Europe.  Let  me  stress  here 
that  central  Europe  remains  the  most 
crucial  area  of  potential  conflict.  The 
German  question  has  been  the  focus  of 
much  East-West  conflict  during  the 
post-World  War  II  period.  Soviet  and 
G.D.R.  activities  in  and  around  Berlin 
have  an  important  bearing  on  worldwide 
peace,  security,  and  cooperation.  Rela- 
tions between  the  two  German  states 
also  affect  the  broader  East-West 
agenda  and  our  efforts  to  go  beyond  the 
postwar  division  of  Europe  to  promote 
greater  mutual  trust  and  cooperation. 

Central  Europe  has  been  relatively 
stable  since  the  four-power  agreement 
on  Berlin  in  1971 .  The  1972  basic  treaty 
between  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many and  the  German  Democratic  Re- 
public made  a  significant  contribution 
toward  political  detente  in  Europe. 
Under  this  treaty  both  states  recognized 
each  other's  borders;  they  acknowl- 
edged each  other's  internal  and  external 
sovereignty.  A  number  of  negotiations 
are  underway  calling  for  practical  coop- 
eration in  a  number  of  specific  fields. 
We  continue  to  encourage  peaceful 
cooperation  between  them  and  believe 
the  normalization  process  will  continue. 
We  have  also  made  it  absolutely  clear  to 
the  Soviets  and  the  G.D.R.  that  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  will  continue 
to  reject  activities  that  bring  into  ques- 
tion four-power  rights  and  respon- 
sibilities for  Berlin. 

Western  Europe  and  Japan.  In  ad- 
dition to  West  Germany,  the  G.D.R. 
has  been  making  a  concerted  effort  to 
improve  its  bilateral  relations  with  other 
West  European  countries  and  Japan. 
Generally  these  relations  are  less  than  5 
years  old.  In  a  relatively  short  period, 
there  has  been  a  step-by-step  develop- 
ment of  these  relations,  including  some 
state  visits,  political  consultations  at  the 
foreign  minister  level,  parliamentary 
delegations,  visits  of  religious  and  trade 
union  groups,  trade  expansion,  cultural 
exchanges,  and  cooperation  in  science 
and  technology. 

Detente  in  Europe  is  a  necessary  but 
not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  durable  structure  of  world 
peace  and  cooperation.  Detente  must  be 
reciprocal  and  comprehensive.  I  believe 
the  G.D.R.  recognizes  that  North-South 
issues  are  important  and  potentially  ex- 
plosive. Current  conflicts  in  Africa  and 
the  Middle  East  could  threaten  East- 
West  detente  and  international  peace. 

Africa.  In  Africa,  the  G.D.R.  has  not 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulk- 


been  helpful  or  sympathetic  to  allied  ef- 
forts to  bring  about  a  peaceful  transfer 
to  majority  rule  in  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  through  negotiated  settlement. 
It  has  consistently  backed  Soviet  and 
Cuban  activities  that  have  served  to  in- 
crease the  level  of  tension  in  other  parts 
of  the  continent. 

Middle  East.  In  the  Middle  East,  the 
G.D.R.  generally  hews  to  the  Soviet 
line.  It  supports  the  radical  Arab  states, 
demands  complete  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  occupied  Arab  territory,  and  is 
wary  of  the  peacemaking  efforts  of  Pres- 
ident Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin, 
although  it  has  so  far  refrained  from  at- 
tacking President  Sadat. 

For  our  part,  we  have  endeavored  to 
convince  the  G.D.R.  that  peaceful  set- 
tlements of  the  current  problems  in  the 
Middle  East,  the  Horn  of  Africa,  and 
southern  Africa  would  free  energy  and 
resources  for  more  humane  purposes. 

As  a  global  power,  the  United  States 
is  also  interested  in  a  more  just  interna- 
tional economic  system  in  order  to  meet 
human  needs.  Clearly  the  G.D.R.  can- 
not isolate  itself  from  global  economic 
trends  in  view  of  its  heavy  dependence 
on  foreign  trade.  As  an  industrial  coun- 
try short  of  raw  materials,  it  will  show 
increasing  interest  in  markets  and 
sources  of  supply  in  the  Third  and 
Fourth  Worlds.  I  believe  it  would  be  de- 
sirable to  encourage  the  G.D.R.  to  play 
a  more  constructive  role  in  meeting  the 
economic  and  social  aspirations  of  the 
developing  countries.  Cooperation  on 
North-South  economic  issues  in  pursuit 
of  common  interests  could  also  be  bene- 
fical  to  East-West  relations  in  addition 
to  fulfilling  social  and  economic  rights. 


Human  Rights 

In  the  conduct  of  our  relations  with 
the  G.D.R.  we  have  explained  that 
human  rights  in  general  are  a  central 
component  of  American  foreign  policy. 
The  G.D.R.,  like  other  Communist 
states,  tends  to  see  our  espousal  of 
human  rights  as  interference  in  internal 
affairs.  It  is  concerned  about  the  impact 
of  the  policy  on  internal  developments. 
We  have  explained  that  our  human 
rights  policy  is  not  directed  at  any  par- 
ticular country  but  applies  to  all  coun- 
tries, including  the  United  States.  Also, 
no  state  which  has  signed  the  U.N. 
Charter  or  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  can 
argue  that  its  behavior  toward  its  own 
citizens  is  a  matter  within  its  exclusive 
jurisdiction.  We  have  stressed  that  the 
Administration's  human  rights  policj  is 
consistent  with  fundamental  American 
values  and  reflects  the  transformation 
that  has  occurred  in  American  society. 


As  a  member  of  a  minority  group  in 
the  United  States,  it  is  my  hope  that  the 
G.D.R.  will  understand  that  the  com- 
mitment of  Americans  to  human  rights 
is  a  strong  moral  and  political  force  that 
must  be  taken  into  account  in  carrying 
out  our  foreign  as  well  as  domestic 
policies.  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that 
we  can  carry  on  a  dialogue  with  the 
G.D.R.  on  human  rights  in  the  spirit  of 
cooperation  and  understanding  rather 
than  as  a  matter  of  ideological  confron- 
tation. 

Despite  earlier  promises  of  coopera- 
tion by  the  G.D.R. ,  many  of  the  human- 
itarian cases  involving  American  citi- 
zens and  their  relatives  in  the  G.D.R. 
remain  unresolved.  G.D.R.  action  on 
these  divided  family,  marriage,  and 
emergency  visitation  cases  would  have 
a  positive  impact  in  creating  a  better 
climate  for  the  conduct  of  bilateral  rela- 
tions, and  I  hope,  therefore,  that  the 
G.D.R.  will  respond  favorably  in  pres- 
ent and  future  cases  of  this  type. 

Cultural  Exchanges 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  cultural  ex- 
changes between  the  United  States  and 
the  G.D.R.  which  are  expanding.  Here 
it  is  important  to  note  that  the  popula- 
tion of  the  G.D.R.  is  probably  the  best 
informed  among  the  peoples  of  East 
Europe  about  events  in  the  outside 
world  because  as  much  as  80%  of  the 
territory  of  the  G.D.R.  clearly  receives 
not  only  radio  broadcasts  from  across 
the  border  but  three  channels  of  televi- 
sion as  well,  and  about  10  million  West 
Germans  visit  relatives  annually  in  the 
G.D.R.  or  travel  as  tourists.  In  our  con- 
versations in  all  parts  of  the  G.D.R. — 
with  workers,  artists,  scientists,  and 
even  officials — we  experience  a  great 
interest,  hunger,  and  appreciation  for 
American  society  and  culture. 

In  1975  a  U.S. -G.D.R.  exchange 
agreement  was  negotiated  under  which 
some  five  academicians  annually  from 
both  countries  conduct  research  for 
periods  of  3-4  months  in  the  social  and 
natural  sciences.  It  is  a  mark  of  our 
progress  that  in  the  new  agreement  the 
number  of  exchanges  was  doubled. 

In  March  I  will  open  the  first  official 
cultural  program  we  have  arranged  with 
the  G.D.R. — an  exhibit  of  some  300 
photographs  by  the  famous  American 
artist  Paul  Strand.  It  will  be  on  display 
at  a  Berlin  museum  for  6  weeks.  In  May 
we  are  planning  two  projects  taking 
place  concurrently — a  week  of  Ameri- 
can films  covering  some  four  decades  of 
motion  picture  art  and  an  exhibit  of  in- 
dustrial design,  which  will  also  include 
a  seminar  conducted  by  five  American 
professors  of  design  technique. 

In  October,   the   United  States  will 


have  its  first  official  musical  present 
tion  in  the  German  Democratic  Repul 
lie  when  the  distinguished  compose 
string  quartet  will  perform  a  series 
concerts  throughout  the  country.  Th 
quartet,  known  throughout  Europe  ft 
its  performance  of  contemporai 
American  chamber  music,  will  gi\ 
concerts  not  only  in  Berlin  but  in  fi\ 
other  cities  as  well. 

These  programs  represent  the  fir 
cultural  attractions  arranged  official 
between  our  two  governments  an 
suggest  some  willingness  by  the  G.D.I 
to  have  its  citizens  experience  at  firs 
hand  some  of  the  cultural  accon 
plishments  of  our  country.  I  might  ac 
also  that  the  G.D.R.  has  arranged  oth 
events  through  commercial  channel 
such  as  two  concerts  by  the  Duke 
lington  orchestra,  led  by  his  sc 
Mercer.  At  the  Ellington  concert  la 
November  in  Dresden.  I  was  pleased 
witness  the  enthusiasm  of  the  your 
people  for  the  Ellington  music,  whii 
exceeded  anything  in  my  experience. 

An  outstanding  cultural  event  w 
take  place  this  year  in  the  United  State 
which  has  great  cultural  and  symbol 
importance  to  our  bilateral  relatio 
with  the  G.D.R.  It  is  a  magnificent  cc 
lection  of  paintings,  porcelain,  jewelr 
and  armor  from  the  Dresden  musciir 
that  will  open  the  new  wing  of  the  N 
tional  Gallery  of  Art  in  our  nation 's  ca 
ital.  After  3  months,  the  exhibition  w 
move  on  to  the  Metropolitan  Museum  i 
Art  in  New  York;  early  in    1979  th 
exhibition  will  move  to  the  fine  ar 
museums  in  San  Francisco,  thereby 
lowing  Americans  on  both  coasts 
view  what  G.D.R.  officials  point  out 
the  largest  collection  of  art  they  ha\ 
ever  sent  abroad  to  any  country.  I  ha\ 
seen  these  wonderful  objects  of  art 
Dresden  and  can  assure  you  of  the  ] 
beauty  and  artistic  value. 

Economic  Issues 

The  expansion  and  balancing  of 
bilateral  trade  is  probably  an  importa 
G.D.R.   objective  in  developing  ii 
bilateral   relations   with  the   Unite) 
States.  There  are  indications  that  its  ol| 
ficials   believe   that  enormous  pos 
sibilities  exist  that  would  be  benefici; 
to  the  G.D.R.  Given  the  G.D.R.  s  cu 
rent  economic  situation,  it  has  a  kee 
interest,   for  example,    in   importir 
western  technology,  expanding  cred 
from  our  banks,  and  increasing  expor 
to  the  United  States. 

The  United  States  has  a  very  substa 
tial  trade  surplus  with  the  G.D.R.- 
excess  of  $300  million.  This  is  helpf 
to  our  balance  of  payments  and  creati 
jobs  for  American  citizens.  Agricultur 
exports  alone  exceed  $360  million 


1978 


39 


HUMAN  RIGHTS: 

The  United  States  at  Belgrade 


I  Dante  B.  Fascell 

iFor  the  last  year  and  more  President 
(jrter's  human  rights  policy  has  been  a 
•ject  of  continual  comment,  concern, 
ail  controversy  in  Washington  and 
■und  the  world.  In  the  United  States, 
llecially.  the  Administration's  stand 
I;  been  repeatedly  put  through  the 
wnger  of  pragmatic  questioning.  Is  it 
vvrking?  What  are  the  results?  What 
I  it  cost?  Where  is  the  payoff? 

^hose  questions  are  proper,  of 
0).rse.  They  are  the  tests  we  would  use 
ii  judging  any  political  investment, 
w;ther  it  be  for  national  defense  or  in- 
Kiational  decency,  for  creating  jobs  at 


home  or  promoting  democratic  values 
abroad . 

Unfortunately,  when  we  try  to  judge 
the  efficacy  of  the  policy  against  this 
standard  of  tangible  achievement  we 
inevitably  get  bogged  down  in  partial 
and  contradictory  measurements. 
Which  matter  more — the  release  of 
thousands  of  political  prisioners  in  In- 
donesia or  the  thousands  more  still  de- 
tained in  brutalizing  conditions?  Was  it 
a  plus  to  have  martial  law  lifted  in 
Nicaragua,  or  do  we  score  it  as  a  debit 
that  people  have  been  killed  in  riots 
there?  Is  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
Jews  and  others  permitted  to  leave  the 
Soviet  Union  a  tribute  to  our  steadfast- 


ness or  a  temporary  and  cynical  gesture 
meant  to  buy  off  American  public  opin- 
ion for  a  few  months? 


Central  Aspects 

The  fact  is  that  facts  mislead.  The 
scorecard  on  human  rights  shifts  so 
often  that  tallies  which  can  be  made  to 
look  good  today  can  also  turn  dismal 
tomorrow.  And  the  attempt  to  keep 
count  of  successes  and  of  failures  di- 
verts us  from  what  I  think  are  the  two 
central  aspects  of  the  pursuit  of  human 
rights. 

The  first  has  been  cynically  de- 
scribed as  the  "feel-good"  quotient  of 


11\   and  play  a  major  role  in  our 

■  e.  It  is  of  some  significance  to  note 
I  the  G.D.R.  is  probably  the  world's 
n  ;t  advanced  country  in  coal  gasifica- 
ti  technology,  which  offers  a  poten- 
ti  for  easing  our  energy  problem. 

he  G.D.R.  desires  more  balanced 
giivth  in  trade  with  the  United  States. 
T  s  will  be  difficult  to  achieve  given 
tl  lack  of  most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
I  ft  treatment — a  status  that  the 
G).R.  has  not  been  able  to  achieve 
u  er  the  Jackson-Vanik  amendment 
I  ause  of  its  restrictive  emigration 
pt  cies. 

he  G.D.R.  is  taking  steps  to  develop 
tV  American  market  in  the  hope  of 
e<  ntually  receiving  MFN  treatment  to 
si  ance  its  competitive  position.  The 
G).R.  took  the  initiative  in  establish- 
il  the  U.S. -G.D.R.  trade  and  eco- 
ni  lie  councils,  which  involve  20  major 
Ii.  corporations.  It  has  also  sought  to 
I  and  U.S.  business  contacts  by 
m unting  technical  seminars  in  the 
U  ted  States  and  by  opening  an  office 
t\V\v  York  representing  the  WMW 
mhine  tool  works. 

'he  United  States  has  taken  a  number 
Ot.teps  to  expand  trade  with  the  Ger- 
Bli  Democratic  Republic.  We  partici- 

■  :  in  the  world-famous  Leipzig  Fair 
■h  government-sponsored  exhibits 
«i  business  development  offices.  We 
■ourage  private  trade  promotion  ef- 

■  s  at  Leipzig.  We  sponsor  technical 
«:s  seminars,  maintain  a  commercial 
Ijary,  and  provide  counseling  service 
9  other  assistance. 

'|)ur  efforts  to  increase  economic 
Operation  with  the  G.D.R.  also  in- 
flde  a  fisheries  agreement  signed  in 


1976.  Negotiations  are  underway  for  a 
parcel  post  agreement.  We  have  held 
talks  on  patents.  Our  National  Academy 
of  Science  and  the  G.D.R.  Academy  of 
Sciences  have  exchanged  drafts  for  an 
agreement  which  appears  imminent. 

All  these  activities  have  helped  pro- 
mote mutual  understanding  and  cooper- 
ation that  serve  our  mutual  interest. 

Discussions  are  underway  on  a 
number  of  other  steps  that  would  create 
a  better  framework  for  bilateral  coop- 
eration and  the  normalization  of  our  re- 
lations with  the  G.D.R.  We  are  still  in 
the  process  of  negotiating  a  consular 
convention,  an  agreement  that  will  be 
important  to  the  protection  of  Ameri- 
cans traveling  in  the  G.D.R.  While 
showing  some  responsiveness  to  our 
suggestions  for  moving  forward  on 
property  claims  arising  from  nationali- 
zation and  other  seizures,  the  G.D.R. 
has  been  far  less  forthcoming  in  meeting 
its  obligations  to  the  victims  of  Nazism. 

These  are  the  principal  elements  of 
our  relations  with  the  G.D.R.  from  the 
perspective  of  a  changing  world. 

In  conclusion,  I  hope  you  will 
carry  the  following  thoughts  with 
you. 

•  Ours  is  a  world  of  rapid  change, 
competing  ideals,  conflicting 
ideologies,  and  abiding  issues. 

•  It  is  a  world  in  which  mutual 
trust  does  not  yet  exist.  As  a  people 
and  as  a  nation  we  must  remain 
strong  at  home,  united  in  purpose, 
and  strengthen  cooperation  with  our 
allies  in  support  of  mutual  security 
and  our  fundamental  values. 

•  It  is  an  interdependent  world  in 


which  peace  and  progress  are  indivis- 
ible. 

•  Our  world  of  growing  interde- 
pendence calls  for  creative  and  in- 
novative approaches  in  using  overlap- 
ping interests  to  enlarge  areas  of 
cooperation  and  to  regulate  competi- 
tion in  Europe,  the  Middle  East,  Af- 
rica, and  other  areas  where  East-West 
interests  may  clash. 

•  It  is  a  world  in  which  East  and 
West  should  demonstrate  more  com- 
passion for  the  poor  and  disposses- 
sed— those  who,  through  no  fault  of 
their  own,  are  exposed  to  daily  suffer- 
ing and  struggling  to  survive  in  the 
less  developed  world. 

•  A  healthy  world  requires  that  we 
cooperate  with  our  allies  and  potential 
adversaries  in  limiting  arms  and  mak- 
ing progress  on  disarmament,  for 
there  is  no  realistic  alternative  to 
peaceful  coexistence. 

•  The  G.D.R.  is  part  of  this  rapidly 
changing  world,  with  a  heightened 
interest  in  developing  better  bilateral 
relations  with  the  United  States.  It 
remains  our  purpose  to  improve  the 
framework  for  the  conduct  of  our  re- 
lations with  the  G.D.R.,  recognizing 
differences  in  ideologies  and  social 
systems  and  taking  into  account  that 
detente  must  be  both  reciprocal  and 
comprehensive.  □ 


Based  on  an  address  at  the  University  of  Ken- 
tucky in  Louisville  on  Feb.  16,  1978,  in  the 
second  annual  scries  of  John  Sherman  Cooper 
distinguished  lectures  instituted  by  the  Pat- 
terson School  of  Diplomacy  and  International 
Commerce.  David  B.  Bolen  is  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador to  the  German  Democratic  Republic. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bull'. 


the  policy.  It  makes  Americans  feel 
good — after  Vietnam  and  Watergate 
and  other  episodes  of  governmental 
deceit — to  be  on  the  side  of  the  angels 
again. 

I  like  the  description,  but  I  reject  the 
cynicism  with  which  it  is  applied. 
There  is  nothing  wrong — and  a  great 
deal  right — about  a  policy  which  re- 
minds Americans  of  the  values  our  his- 
tory reflects.  There  is  nothing 
wrong — and  a  great  deal  right — with 
the  attempt  to  project  those  values 
again  into  the  international  arena  as  the 
expression  of  an  American  consensus 
about  ourselves  and  our  role  in  the 
world. 

The  second  aspect  of  the  policy  is  its 
nature  as  a  long-term  commitment. 
Advocacy  of  human  rights  is  not  a 
quick  fix.  The  renewed  American  de- 
termination to  defend  civil  and  reli- 
gious liberty,  to  seek  broadened  protec- 
tion of  individual  rights  and  welfare 
holds  no  promise  of  easy  victories.  The 
effort  is  certain  to  be  a  long  one,  but  so 
have  been  our  programs  to  aid  eco- 
nomic development  around  the  world. 
The  pursuit  is  likely  to  be  frustrating, 
but  so  are  trade  negotiations  or  disar- 
mament talks  or  the  search  for  cancer 
cures  or  treatments. 

We  do  not  draw  back  from  those  en- 
deavors just  because  the  price  is  high  in 
terms  of  patience  and  perseverance. 
Nor  can  we  turn  away  from  the  pursuit 
of  human  rights  because  the  goal  re- 
mains distant.  At  his  inaugural  17 
years  ago,  John  Kennedy  asked  Ameri- 
cans '*.  .  .  to  bear  the  burden  of  a 
long,  twilight  struggle,  year  in  and 
year  out  .  .  .  against  the  common 
enemies  of  man:  tyranny,  poverty,  dis- 
ease, and  war  itself."  The  struggle  is 
still  on.  and  it  is  too  early  to  say  for 
sure  who  is  winning  it. 

The  Belgrade  conference  [Confer- 
ence on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe  (CSCE)],  now  nearing  its  con- 
clusion, however,  gives  me  a  chance  to 
illustrate  the  conduct  of  human  rights 
policy  as  part  of  that  long,  frustrating, 
but  crucial  "twilight  struggle."  The 
first  formal  meeting  of  the  35  Eastern. 
Western,  and  neutral  states  which 
signed  the  1975  Helsinki  accords  on 
security  and  cooperation  in  Europe 
shows  up  all  the  problems  of  trying  to 
keep  a  storecard  on  human  rights.  It 
also  demonstrates  all  the  potential  for 
gradual  change  that  makes  American 
policy  one  of  hope  and  promise 


Background 

Let  me  go  back  over  some  basic,  re- 
cent history  to  put  the  Belgrade  talks  in 
perspective.  The  Helsinki  accords 
themselves  were  the  outgrowth  of  a 


20-year-long  Soviet  effort  to  obtain 
formal  recognition  of  the  postwar 
boundaries  of  Europe.  Moscow  sought 
a  peace  treaty.  It  got  instead  a  declara- 
tion of  political  resolve  in  which,  as 
trade-offs  for  the  recognition  of  the 
sanctity  of  existing  frontiers,  the  West 
insisted  on  provisions  for  "a  freer  flow 
of  people  and  ideas" — another  goal 
of  President  Kennedy — across  those 
frontiers. 

When  the  long  negotiations  ended  at 
the  Helsinki  summit,  most  Western  ob- 
servers thought  and  said  that  the 
Soviets  had  gotten  the  best  of  the  bar- 
gain. The  West  acceded  to  the  legiti- 
macy of  Communist  conquest  in 
Europe.  In  return,  the  East  made  under- 
takings to  respect  human  rights  and 
dignity  but  without  the  expectation  that 
it  could  be  held  to  the  promises  it 
made. 

What  happened,  instead,  was  a  re- 
markable turning  of  the  tables.  It  was 
accomplished  not  by  any  brilliant 
strategists  in  Washington  or  at  NATO 
but  by  a  small  band  of  intrepid  Soviet 
citizens  who  began  to  say  out  loud — so 
that  the  rest  of  the  world  could  hear — 
that  the  Soviet  Union  must  make  good 
on  its  own  laws  and  its  Helsinki  com- 
mitments. Their  demands  made  us  re- 
spond. It  was  they — members  of  what 
has  come  to  be  called  the  Soviet  Hel- 
sinki Watch  and,  later,  the  signatories 
of  Charter  '77  in  Prague — who  made 
the  West  aware  of  the  value  of 
Helsinki.1 

A  year  ago  yesterday  [February  23, 
1977]  when  the  Helsinki  Commission 
held  its  first  public  hearings  in  Wash- 
ington on  human  rights,  former  [U.S. 
Representative  to  the  U.N.  Commis- 
sion on  Human  Rights]  Ambassador 
Leonard  Garment  summed  up  what  had 
happened:  ".  .  .the  existence  of  a  for- 
mal, written  document,  to  which  the 
Eastern  regimes  gave  their  public  con- 
sent and  their  formal  stamp  of  legiti- 
macy, has  made  a  difference.  The 
words  matter  and  are  beginning  to 
move  human  minds,"  he  testified. 
Then  he  added:  "Perhaps  we  in  the 
West,  who  pay  such  frequent  tribute  to 
the  worth  of  ideas,  should  be  a  little 
embarrassed  that  at  the  time  of  Helsinki 
we  entertained  such  a  low  opinion  of 
their  power. " 

By  the  time  of  Belgrade — the  sub- 
stantive part  of  which  began  last 
October — our  opinion  had  changed. 
We  in  the  West  approached  the  confer- 
ence as  a  significant  test  of  our  ability 
to  give  and  get  an  account  of  the  prog- 
ress promised  in  the  Final  Act,  the 
formal  name  of  the  Helsinki  docu- 
ment.2 And  from  the  East — in  a  few 
areas  of  Helsinki  undertakings — 
we  could  already  see  surface  gestures 
of  compliance. 


Those  gestures  were  made  with  i 
eye  to  Belgrade,  out  of  concern   i 
what  would  be  said  there  if  there  wpl 
no  signs  of  movement.  The  gestures  J 
eluded  the  amnesty  of  political  prisi-j 
ers  in  Romania.  Poland,  and.  latij 
Yugoslavia.  The  rise  in  the  emigrat  ,i| 
figures  from   the   Soviet   Union  ali 
other  countries  were  also  gestures  I 
ward  the  Helsinki  promise  to  "facll 
tate"  the   reunification  of  dividjj 
families.  The  sale  of  a  few  more  We- 
ern  papers  and  magazines  and  the  e  •  j 
ing  of  travel  restrictions  on  some  We  J 
em  journalists  also  constituted  gestu  > 
in  the  field  of  information. 

For  the  scattered  positive  signal 
however,  there  were  balancing  negat  \\ 
acts.  Journalists  could  get  around  w| 
greater  ease  perhaps,  but  they  coii 
also  be  subjected — and  were  in  ui 
Soviet  Union  and  Czechoslovakia— I 
outrageous  harassment.  New  applica  H 
for  exit  visas  could  be  processed  v\  i 
greater  speed,  but  many  with  appli  • 
tions  long  pending  could  be — and  wt 
in  the  U.S.S.R. — treated   with  brutal 
and  renewed  contempt.   Finally,  a 
most  tragically,   16  of  the  43  memb 
of  the  Soviet  Helsinki  Watch  have  be 
jailed  for  daring  to  raise  their  voices 
demand  domestic  compliance  with 
ternational  human  rights  standards. 

On  the  second  anniversary  of  i 
signing  of  the  Final  Act.  the  U 
Commission  [on  Security  and  Coope 
tion  in  Europe]  issued  its  comprehi 
sive  report  on  compliance.3  In  a  c. 
sule  judgment,  it  found:  "Progress  . 
has  been  inadequate.  Measured  agai 
either  the  hopes  voiced  at  the  Hclsii 
summit  or  the  need  for  smoother  a 
more  stable  relations  among  the  s 
natories.  the  implementation  of  t 
Final  Act  has  fallen  short." 


U.S.  Goals 

That  judgment  formed  the  bac 
ground  of  the  U.S.  effort  at  Belgrac 
an  effort  made  up  of  two  parts.  T 
first  part  was  simply  to  register  our  d 
satisfaction  with  the  pace  and  qual 
of  progress  under  the  Final  Act,  esf 
cially  its  human  rights  and  humanit; 
ian  provisions.  But  beyond  holding  t 
Communist  states  to  account  for  thi 
nonperformance,  the  second  Americ. 
goal  was  to  seek  reaffirmation  of  t 
common  Helsinki  commitments  thet 
selves,  to  stimulate  better  behavior  c 
of  the  examination  of  the  imperft 
past  record. 

Registering  Dissatisfaction.  Tl 

first  goal  has  been  fully  met.  In  faij 
the  first  1  1  weeks  of  the  conferee 
brought  a  welcome  bonus.  In  th 
period  devoted  to  the  review  of  Fin 
Act  implementation,  the  firm  U. 


lav  1978 


41 


oice  of  Justice  Arthur  Goldberg 
Chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
tSCE]  was  joined  by  that  of  many 
l/estern  and  neutral  spokesmen  in  a 
lersuasive  chorus  of  concern  on  the 
|sue  of  human  rights. 
1  The  Communist  delegations  tried  to 
llunt  this  assault,  but  failed.  They  ar- 
ued  first  that  the  Final  Act  itself  made 
; hy  criticism  of  their  domestic  conduct 

f  limits,  because  the  accords  banned 

interference"  in  internal  affairs.  The 

est.  however,  showed  clearly  that 
Jinan  rights  are  matters  of  interna- 
pnal  agreement,  of  specific  Final  Act 
i  edges,  and  thus  not  purely  issues  of 
nmestic  competence. 
'  Then  when  Justice  Goldberg  cited 

le  treatment  of  specific  individ- 
'als — Charter   '77    signers  jailed  in 

rague  or  Soviet  dissenters  such  as 

uri  Orlov.  Aleksandr  Ginzburg, 
g.natoli  Shcharanskiy ,  and  Andrei 
'lakharov — the  Soviets  made  a  feeble 
ilttempt  to  rebut  us  with  "you're- 
iiother"  arguments.  Guilty  of  racial 
liscrimination.  of  imprisoning  the 
I  'ilmington  10.  of  letting  millions  go 
I 'bless — even,  they  said  in  apparent 
l-riousness.  of  executing  Sacco  and 
I  anzetti  50  years  ago — the  United 
l:ates  had  no  right  to  lecture  others  on 

spect  for  human  rights. 
t  I  do  not  claim  that  these  exchanges 
lake  up  a  dialogue.  Obviously,  on 
nth  sides,  there  was  much  more  give 
lian  take.  But  the  Belgrade  review 
i  ;riod  did  something  no  other  interna- 
li  Jnal  meeting  has  done:  It  broke  the  si- 
I  nee  barrier  on  human  rights.  Diplo- 
I  ats  found  themselves  talking  about  a 

ibject  they  generally  prefer  to  duck, 
f  it  having  been  confronted  with  the  is- 
lie,  they  found  no  way  to  put  it  aside, 
hstead.  because  the  Helsinki  process  is 

continuing  one  and  the  Belgrade  talk 
I  ill  be  revived  when  the  signatories 
I  eet  again  in  Madrid  in  1980.  human 
Ights  has  won  a  place  on  the  interna- 
pnal  agenda  it  should  have  had  long 


:  Reaffirming  the  Final  Act's  im- 
ortance.  I  want  to  discuss  the  impor- 
ince  of  that  precedent  in  a  moment, 
iJt  first  let  us  look  at  how  far  we  have 
ptten  with  our  second  goal:  reaffirm- 
lig  the  Final  Act's  importance  as  a 
jeans  of  stimulating  improved  per- 
jirmance.  Barring  new  developments 
liday,  the  Belgrade  conference's  con- 
juding  document  has  not  yet  been 
ureed  upon.4 

!  But  it  has  now  become  obvious  to 
111  that  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
josest  Warsaw  Pact  allies  are  inaltera- 
j!y  opposed  to  a  document  of  real  sub- 
lance.  We  have  worked  hard  for  such 
i  document  throughout  the  proceeding 
Ui  the  face  of  Soviet  intransigence.  At  a 


minimum  the  concluding  document  will 
note  that  delegates  met  and  talked  and 
that  they  will  meet  again  and  talk  again 
in  Madrid. 

So  brief  a  concluding  document 
would  be  a  disappointment  to  many. 
But  I  do  not  believe  that  the  final 
communique  should  be  considered  the 
sole — or  even  the  main — measure  of 
the  impact  of  the  Belgrade  meeting. 
Certainly,  it  would  have  been  better  to 
have  a  conference  document  of  real 
political  substance  that  gave  a  candid 
assessment  of  implementation,  reaf- 
firmed the  commitment  to  all  provi- 
sions of  the  Helsinki  accords,  and 
marked  out  specific  areas  for  improved 
performance.  But  given  the  rule  of 
consensus,  under  which  each  country 
has  effective  veto  power,  a  strong  Bel- 
grade concluding  document  was  never 
in  the  cards. 


Future  Courses  of  Action 

Nevertheless,  what  has  emerged  has 
the  potential  for  being  just  as  valuable. 
After  Belgrade  comes  Madrid,  another 
occasion  to  insist  on  implementation  of 
the  Final  Act,  to  hold  up  the  record  for 
candid  review,  to  try  and  win  the  fresh 
commitments  that  could  not  be 
achieved  at  Belgrade.  And  after  their 
experience  at  Belgrade — that  of  being 
forced  to  hear  out  their  critics — the 
Communist  states  must  be  even  more 
determined  than  before  to  avoid  a  sec- 
ond round  of  diplomatic  embarrass- 
ment. 

They  have  two  roads  to  choose  from. 
One  is  to  renounce  the  Helsinki  proc- 
ess, to  boycott  the  Madrid  meeting,  or 
so  rewrite  its  rules  that  it  becomes  an 
empty  exercise.  The  other  is  to  show  a 
measure  of  good-faith  implementation 
between  Belgrade  and  Madrid  that  de- 
flates criticism  and  lightens  the  interna- 
tional atmosphere. 

Neither  alternative  is  attractive.  The 
Helsinki  accords  were  meant  to  be  a 
capstone  of  the  Brezhnev  detente  pol- 
icy. To  turn  away  from  them  is  to  pro- 
nounce that  policy  a  failure. 

The  other  choice — that  of  heeding 
the  concerns  voiced  at  Belgrade  and 
moving  to  remedy  the  practices  which 
drew  such  heavy  fire — is  not  easy 
either.  It  would  mean,  over  the  long 
run,  according  the  individual  real  pro- 
tection against  monopoly  state  power. 
To  do  so  would  be  to  invite  more  chal- 
lenges against  Communist  rule  in  its 
present  form,  to  tolerate  that  very  di- 
versity which  every  dictatorship  must 
deny. 

There  is.  of  course,  one  other  way 
for  the  Soviet  Union  to  slip  from  be- 
tween the  rock  and  the  hard  place 
where,  on  the  human  rights-Helsinki  is- 
sue, it  is  now  held.  That  is  for  the  West 


and  the  United  States,  in  particular,  to 
relax  the  pressure  for  Helsinki  com- 
pliance so  forcefully  brought  to  bear  in 
Belgrade. 

We  could  slip  into  that  path  too  eas- 
ily. We  could  say  that  we  asked  too 
much  from  Belgrade,  got  too  little,  and 
need  to  try  another  course.  We  could 
go  further — in  our  impatience  for  re- 
sults that  can  be  totted  up  on  a 
scorecard — and  pronounce  the  whole 
push  for  human  rights  standards  a  prof- 
itless game.  And  thus  we  could  let  the 
Soviet  Union,  for  one,  off  the  hook. 

But  I  said  earlier  that  we  had  set  an 
important  precedent  at  Belgrade  in 
legitimizing  international,  diplomatic 
treatment  of  concrete  human  rights  is- 
sues. The  precedent  is  one  we  must  ob- 
serve as  well  as  insist  that  others  ac- 
knowledge. If  we  change  our  signals 
now  because  of  dissatisfaction  with  the 
Belgrade  outcome,  we  lose  the  new 
ground  onto  which  we  moved  ourselves 
and  the  East- West  relationship. 

The  precedent  set  at  Belgrade  is  only 
as  valuable  as  the  followup  to  it.  Hav- 
ing won  the  right  to  speak  out  on  the 
importance  of  our  values  to  our  secu- 
rity and  the  ordering  of  a  real  detente, 
we  cannot  afford  to  turn  away,  back 
into  silence. 

We  have  found  in  Helsinki  a 
framework  in  which  to  pursue  a  policy 
which  both  feels  good  and  can  do 
good.  The  patience  to  put  up  with  the 
slow  pace  of  results  from  that  policy  is 
something  Americans  have  yet  to  learn. 

Along  the  road  we  are  certain  to 
have  anxious  moments  and  even  set- 
backs of  our  own.  But  the  road  toward 
international  respect  for  human  rights 
is  the  right  one  for  us  to  be  traveling. 
At  Belgrade  we  began  the  trip  with 
honor  and  realism.  We  are  moving  in 
the  right  direction.  □ 


Address  to  the  Chicago  Council  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations on  Feb.  24,  1^78.  Congressman  Fas- 
cell  was  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  Belgrade  meeting  and  is  Chairman 
of  the  joint  congressional  Commission  on  Set  u- 
rity  and  Cooperation  in  Europe. 

'The  Helsinki  Watch  in  the  USSR,  and 
Charter  '77  in  Czechoslovakia  are  private 
groups  established  to  monitor  compliance  with 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

2For  text  of  the  Final  Act.  see  Bulletin  of 
Sept.  1.  1975.  p.  323. 

'The  report.  Implementation  of  the  Final  Act 
of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe:  Findings  and  Recommendations 
Two  Years  After  Helsinki,  was  transmitted  to 
the  House  Committee  on  International  Rela- 
tions. It  is  a  committee  print  dated  Sept.  23. 
1977,  available  from  the  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  Washington.  DC.  20402  at  a 
cost  of  $2.75. 

4The  conference's  concluding  document  was 
issued  in  Belgrade  on  Mar.  8.  1978;  for  text, 
see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  1978,  p.  40. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


* 


t 


MIDDLE  EAST: 

A  Status  Report  on  the  Peace  Process 


by  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr. 

The  30-year  search  for  peace  be- 
tween Arab  and  Jew  in  the  Middle 
East  has  been  called  a  history  of  lost 
opportunities.  I  leave  it  to  others  to 
argue  the  question  of  who  was  re- 
sponsible for  losing  which  opportu- 
nity in  the  past.  Our  concern  as  a  na- 
tion, and  as  a  friend  of  both  sides  to 
this  tragic  and  intractable  conflict, 
must  be  with  the  opportunity  of  the 
present  and  the  promise  of  the  future. 

For  a  brief  dramatic  moment  last 
November  [19-21]-  the  world  saw  a 
vision  of  what  that  future  could  be, 
when  President  Sadat  of  Egypt  met 
with  Prime  Minister  Begin  of  Israel  in 
Jerusalem,  and  in  December  [24-26] 
when  they  met  again  in  Ismailia. 
Today  many  ask — what  has  gone 
wrong?  Why  have  the  hopes  of 
November  turned  to  frustration  and 
disappointment,  to  charge  and  coun- 
tercharge? 

I  would  suggest  to  you  that  nothing 
has  gone  irretrievably  wrong.  Indeed, 
some  morning-after  reaction  to  the 
heady  experience  of  those  first  mo- 
ments of  genuine  breakthrough  was 
probably  inevitable.  What  has  hap- 
pened, quite  simply,  is  this:  The  ef- 
fort to  transform  those  moments  of 
vision  into  a  dynamic  process  of  rec- 
onciliation through  negotiations  has 
come  face-to-face  with  the  reality  that 
the  underlying  issues  which  have 
blocked  progress  for  so  long  are  still 
there — that  hard  decisions  involving 
fundamental  premises  and  policies  are 
ultimately  unavoidable.  But  the  op- 
portunity for  progress  is  still  there  to 
be  seized  because  of  one  overriding 
fact.  The  global  and  the  regional  con- 
text within  which  those  issues  arc- 
now  being  addressed  is  no  longer 
what  it  was  for  much  of  the  history  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  President 
Sadat's  offer  to  visit  Jerusalem,  and 
Israel's  spontaneous  response  to  that 
initiative,  have  transformed  the 
situation 

Whether  this  opportunity  is  lost  or 
won  depends  in  the  first  instance  on 
the  wisdom  and  courage  of  the  lead- 
ers and  peoples  of  the  Middle  last.  It 
depends  on  the  sense  of  responsibility 
of  the  international  community.  It  de- 
pends on  the  willingness  of  the  major 
powers,  above  all,  not  to  seek  unilat- 
eral  advantage   in  a  situation   fraught 


with  danger  for  the  entire  world.  And 
it  depends  upon  the  ability  of  this 
country  to  steer  a  steady  and  fair- 
minded  course,  true  to  our  commit- 
ments to  our  friends  in  the  area  and  to 
our  shared  vision  of  the  future,  even 
when  friends  on  one  side  or  the  other 
of  the  conflict  may  differ  with  us. 
President  Carter  has  charted  such  a 
course.  To  succeed,  he  needs  the  un- 
derstanding and  support  of  the 
American  people  and  of  their  repre- 
sentatives in  the  Congress. 

I  cannot  tell  you  today  what  will 
happen  in  the  future  or  even  precisely 
what  the  next  steps  in  our  diplomatic 
efforts  will  be.  These  will  depend 
upon  the  results  of  consultations  with 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  which  are 
still  in  progress.  I  can.  however,  use 
this  occasion  to  examine  with  you  the 
basic  issues  that  the  United  States  and 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  facing 
and  to  describe  the  active  role  the 
United  States  is  playing. 


U.S.  Concerns 

Let  me  first  talk  for  a  moment 
about  why  peace  in  the  Middle  East  is 
important  to  the  United  States  and  to 
the  world  community — and  about  why 
our  country  is  so  deeply  involved  in 
the  diplomatic  effort  to  achieve  the 
goal  of  peace. 

For  the  United  States,  involvement 
in  the  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  is  not  a  matter  of  preference  but 
a  necessity  and  a  major  responsibil- 
ity. A  responsible  American  policy 
for  the  Middle  East  must  assure  that 
we  retain  the  capacity  to  influence  the 
course  of  events  there  commensurate 
with  our  responsibilities  as  a  major 
power.  The  United  States,  with  the 
goodwill  which  it  uniquely  has  among 
all  the  parties  in  the  Middle  East,  is 
in  a  position  to  help  shape  events,  to 
help  prevent  wars,  and  to  help  the 
parties  find  their  way  along  the  hard 
road  to  a  negotiated  peace.  To  con- 
tinue to  play  this  role,  we  must  pur- 
sue policies  which  take  into  account 
the  broad  range  of  American  concerns 
and  interests  in  the  Middle  East. 

It  is  therefore  important,  as  a  start- 
ing point,  to  identify  what  those  con- 
cerns and  interests  are. 

First,  we  have  an  interest,  dictated 
by  our  global  responsibilities  in  this 


nuclear  age,  to  prevent  conflict  in  tl 
Middle  East  from  again  becoming 
flashpoint  of  superpower  confront 
tion.  More  basically,  we  have  ; 
interest  in  conducting  our  relatioi 
ships  with  other  great  powers  so  as 
prevent  a  shift  in  the  global  balani 
of  power  which  itself  could  invi 
confrontation. 

Second  is  our  strong  commitnie 
to  the  security  and  survival  of  Israe 
It  is  a  commitment  rooted  deeply 
history  and  in  our  moral  values  as 
nation.  It  has  been  reaffirmed  1 
every  Administration  in  this  count 
since  the  modern  State  of  Israel  can 
into  existence  30  years  ago.  It  is  o 
conviction  that  Israel's  security  ov 
the  long  term  can  best  be  assured  I 
peace  treaties  which  resolve  Israel 
differences  with  its  Arab  neighbo 
and  commit  them  to  live  at  peace  wi 
Israel. 


: 


Third,  a  mutually  beneficial  rel 
tionship  with  the  major  nations  of  tl 
Arab  world  is  essential.  They  ho 
the  key  to  their  own  defense  agai 
outside  domination  or  domination  1 
radical  forces  in  the  Middle  East,  ai 
they  look  to  us  for  help  in  maintai 
ing  their  own  security  and  indepen 
ence.  The  oil  which  some  of  the 
produce  is  literally  vital  to  our  alii 
in  Western  Europe  and  Japan  and 
creasingly  important  to  us.  Their 
nancial  power — through  the  level  ( 
oil  prices  and  their  large  financi 
reserves — makes  them  importa 
partners  in  the  effort  to  maintain 
worldwide  economic  order.  In  t 
course  of  our  relationship,  thousa 
of  Arab  students,  professionals, 
technical  experts  are  trained  ev 
year  in  the  United  States,  and  jo 
are  created  in  this  country  by  t' 
growing  volume  of  exports  to,  a: 
investment  in,  Arab  countries.  Our 
lations  with  the  Arab  world,  wis 
nurtured,  can  enhance  our  ability 
strengthen  the  forces  of  moderation  i 
the  Middle  East  and  advance  th 
cause  of  peace. 

Fourth,  in  the  deepest  sense,  ou 
concern  for  human  rights  also  dictati 
efforts  to  end  a  conflict  which  ha 
taken  countless  thousands  of  innocen 
victims  and  has  deflected  the  nation 
of  the  area  from  using  their  bountifi 
resources  and  talents  for  bettering  th 
lives  of  their  peoples. 


1978 


43 


tmdamental  Issues 

HNext,  what  are  the  fundamental  is- 
fcs  which  must  be  dealt  with  if  there 

■  to  be  tangible  progress  toward 
■ace?  Briefly  stated,  the  issues  are 

se 

fc»  Israel  seeks  from  the  Arabs  rec- 
■lition  of  its  legitimacy  and  right  to 

■  st.  with  all  this  implies — an  end  to 
■ligerency,   an  end  to  threats  of 

■  ce,   and  commitments  to   live  to- 

■  her  in  peace  and  security. 

''»  The  Arab  states  seek  the  restora- 
In  of  occupied  territories  and  a  just 
■ution  of  the  Palestinian  problem. 

\n  equitable  and  durable  solution 

0  these  issues  can  only  be  hammered 

1  through  a  process  of  negotiations 
Btween  the  parties.  Prior  to  the 
■a)  war  of  1967.  no  real  basis  for 
pice  negotiations  existed.  The  Arabs 
rused  to  accept  the  existence  of  Is- 
ril.  much  less  contemplate  making 
pice  with  it.  Since  no  basis  for 
Biotiations  existed.  U.S.  policy  had 
||  focus  more  on  containing  area  ten- 
sns  than  on  helping  to  resolve  them. 

rhe  1967  war  began  to  change  that, 
t)  6  days  Israel  not  only  proved  be- 
jlid  all  doubt  that  it  was  there  to 
s  \ .  but  it  also  ended  up  occupying 
Kb  territory  stretching  to  the  Golan 
fights  of  Syria,  the  Jordan  River, 
III  the  Suez  Canal.  Slowly,  meticu- 
Ij  sly,  painfully,  the  United  States 
a  I  other  like-minded  members  of  the 
|i:rnational  community  working  with 
t  parties  to  the  conflict  in  the 
n  nths  immediately  following  the 
v  r  launched  intensive  diplomatic  ef- 
f  ts  to  translate  this  new  situation 
lo  the  long-sought  basis  for  genuine 
f  ice  negotiations. 


IN.  Resolution  242 

The  result  was  U.N.  Security 
■  uncil  Resolution  242,  adopted 
lanimously  by  the  Council  in 
I  vember  1967.  Here  for  the  first 
t  le  in  20  years  was  spelled  out  the 
imework  for  a  settlement  of  the 
lab-Israeli  conflict.  That  resolution 
Is  and  remains  the  basis  for  all  the 
ficemaking  efforts  over  the  past 
|:ade.  At  its  heart  is  a  very  simple 
I  mula:  In  return  for  Israeli  with- 
ciwal  from  territories  occupied  in 
1967  conflict,  the  Arabs  will  rec- 
tnize  Israel  within  a  framework  of 
jjace  and  security  agreed  by  both.  It 
tils  for  a  just  and  lasting  peace 
Ised  upon  the  right  of  every  state  in 
I  •  area  to  live  in  peace  within  secure 
td  recognized  boundaries  and  upon 

aeli  withdrawal  from  territories  oc- 


cupied in  1967.  Resolution  242  is 
clearly  a  package.  The  parts  are 
linked  together  to  make  a  balanced 
whole,  to  be  carried  out  together  or 
not  at  all. 

That  having  been  said,  let  me  note 
what  Resolution  242  does  not  do.  It 
does  not  define  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries.  It  does  not  call  for  with- 
drawal from  "all'*  occupied  ter- 
ritories or  "the""  occupied  territories. 
It  does  not  require  Israel  to  give  up 
every  inch  of  occupied  territory. 
Neither,  however,  does  it  preclude  Is- 
raeli withdrawal  to  the  lines  of  1967. 

In  the  final  analysis,  this  issue  can 
only  be  resolved  in  agreements 
negotiated  by  the  parties.  The  em- 
phasis of  Resolution  242  taken  as  a 
whole,  however,  is  clear.  The  em- 
phasis is  on  establishing  conditions  of 
peace  and  security  based  upon  the 
concept  of  withdrawal-for-peace.  It  is 
also  clear  that  all  the  principles  of 
Resolution  242.  including  the  princi- 
ple of  withdrawal,  were  intended  by 
its  authors,  and  understood  at  the 
time  by  all   the  governments  con- 


fer the  United  States,  in- 
volvement in  the  search  for  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  preference  but  a  necessity- 
and  a  major  responsibility. 


cerned,  to  apply  wherever  territory 
was  occupied  in  1967.  In  other 
words,  the  withdrawal-for-peace  for- 
mula applies  to  all  fronts  of  the  con- 
flict. I  will  revert  to  this  point  later  to 
explain  its  relevance  to  the  current 
negotiations. 

That  brings  me  to  a  second  issue 
relating  to  Resolution  242.  That  res- 
olution does  not  deal  in  a  comprehen- 
sive way  with  a  solution  to  the  Pales- 
tinian problem.  In  the  decade  since 
the  passage  of  the  resolution  it  has 
become  inescapably  clear  that  a  solu- 
tion to  the  Palestinian  problem  is  es- 
sential in  reaching  a  lasting  settlement 
of  the  Middle  East  conflict.  No  party 
to  the  conflict  today.disputes  that  the 
Palestinians  have  a  sense  of  identity 
which  must  be  taken  into  account. 
President  Carter  has  recognized  this 
by  speaking  of  the  need  for  a  home- 
land for  the  Palestinians.  In  our  own 
view,  no  settlement  in  the  Middle 
East  can  endure,  for  Israel  and  Arab 
states  alike,  which  does  not  include  a 
just  solution  of  the  Palestinian  prob- 
lem in  all  its  aspects. 


U.S.  Role 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  role  of  the 
United  States  in  the  search  for  peace 
in  the  Middle  East.  Soon  after  Presi- 
dent Carter  took  office  he  decided  to 
seek  a  new  approach.  For  the  first 
time  in  30  years  all  the  major  parties 
to  the  dispute  were  ready  to  negotiate 
a  comprehensive  settlement.  One  of 
his  first  foreign  policy  decisions  was 
to  send  Secretary  Vance  to  the  area. 
The  Secretary  obtained  agreement 
from  the  governments  involved  that 
the  three  issues  I  have  outlined  lie  at 
the  core  of  the  dispute  and  have  to  be 
resolved  in  an  overall  settlement: 

•  The  nature  of  peace; 

•  Withdrawal  from  occupied  ter- 
ritories in  conjunction  with  security 
arrangements  that  will  make  recog- 
nized boundaries  also  secure  bound- 
aries; and 

•  Resolution  of  the  Palestinian 
problem. 

Beginning  in  March  1977  in  Clin- 
ton, Massachusetts,  the  President, 
and  subsequently  other  Administra- 
tion officials,  have  laid  out  our  think- 
ing on  these  issues.1  We  did  this  not 
to  put  forward  an  American  blueprint 
or  plan  for  a  settlement  but  to  help 
stimulate  the  thinking  of  the  parties 
about  new  ways  to  overcome  old  ob- 
stacles to  the  peace  process.  Let  me 
elaborate  a  bit  on  our  thinking  about 
each  of  these  three  issues. 

First,  the  definition  of  true  peace. 
Peace  does  not  mean  simply  a  cessa- 
tion of  hostility  or  belligerency.  It 
means  open  borders,  normal  com- 
merce and  tourism,  diplomatic  rela- 
tions and  a  range  of  official  and  unof- 
ficial contacts,  free  navigation 
through  waterways,  and  an  end  to  all 
boycotts. 

The  United  States  regards  normal 
relations  among  the  parties  as  an  in- 
dispensable component  of  a  lasting 
settlement.  The  keystone  of  this  is  the 
recognition  of  Israel's  right  to  exist 
permanently  and  formal  recognition 
of  its  nationhood. 

Second  is  the  dilemma  of  providing 
borders  that  are  both  secure  and  ac- 
ceptable to  all.  This  is  the  other  half 
of  the  withdrawal-for-peace  equation 
set  up  in  Resolution  242.  Israel, 
which  has  fought  for  its  very  exist- 
ence for  30  years,  must  be  able  to 
feel  secure  within  recognized  borders. 
But  borders  that  might  give  Israel  the 
greatest  sense  of  security  in  geo- 
graphic and  military  terms  are  not 
those  acceptable  to  Israel's  neighbors. 
They  could  not,  therefore,  provide 
true  security. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


We  understand  the  very  real  secu- 
rity concerns  posed  for  Israel  by 
withdrawal  from  occupied  territory. 
But  we  also  believe  that  without 
withdrawal,  coupled  with  meaningful 
security  arrangements,  there  can  be 
no  peace;  and  without  peace  between 
Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors.  Israel 
can  have  no  true  security.  The  goal 
has  to  be  the  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty  of  all  states  in  the  area. 

Third  is  the  issue  of  the  future  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  To  achieve  a 
durable  peace,  the  Palestinians  must 
demonstrate  a  willingness  to  live  in 
peace  with  Israel.  At  the  same  time,  a 
durable  peace  requires  meeting  the 
humanitarian  needs  of  the  Palestinian 
refugees,  responding  to  the  aspiration 
of  Palestinian  Arabs  for  an  identity  of 
their  own.  and  agreement  on  the  fu- 
ture status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
where  the  largest  single  group  of 
Palestinian  Arabs  live. 

This  is  not  a  simple  question.  It  in- 
volves vital  security  considerations 
for  Israel  which  must  be  taken  into 
account.  At  the  same  time,  it  also  in- 
volves interests  of  other  Arab  states, 
in  particular  Jordan  and  Egypt.  And  it 
involves  the  interests  of  the  Palestin- 
ian Arabs  themselves,  over  one  mil- 
lion of  whom  reside  still  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 

A  way  must  be  found  for  the  Pales- 
tinians to  participate  in  the  determina- 
tion of  their  own  future.  Any  solu- 
tion, if  it  is  to  be  viable  and  lasting, 
must  be  based  ultimately  on  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed. 

Because  this  issue  is  so  complex 
and  no  instant  solution  seems  possi- 
ble, we  have  suggested  that  there 
need  to  be  interim  arrangements  for 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  agreed  be- 
tween Israel  and  Jordan,  Egypt,  and 
Palestinian  representatives.  During 
this  interim  period  an  ultimate  solu- 
tion can  be  worked  out  combining  se- 
curity for  Israel  and  its  neighbors  and 
a  territorial  solution  which  will  not 
leave  a  residue  of  irredentism  to  fer- 
ment and  threaten  the  peace  in  the 
future.  Our  own  view  is  that  an  inde- 
pendent Palestinian  state  in  this  trun- 
cated territory  would  not  be  a  realistic 
or  durable  solution  and  that  its  future 
should  lie  in  a  close  link  with  Jordan. 

The  Approach  Toward  Peace 

These,  then,  are  the  issues,  and 
these  are  our  general  views  about 
them.  Let  me  now  discuss  briefly  how 
this  Administration  has  approached 
them  with  the  parties  in  the  peace 
process.  For  it  is  clearly  a  process. 
Nothing  stands  still   in  the  Middle 


East.  Matters  are  always  moving — 
toward  peace,  or  toward  war,  so  long 
as  the  basic  conflict  is  unresolved. 
Despite  the  apparent  deadlock,  the 
deep  differences,  and  the  cycle  of 
violence  so  tragically  reflected  in  the 
terrorist  attack  recently  in  Israel  and 
the  subsequent  Israeli  move  into 
southern  Lebanon,  we  still  believe  the 
dynamics  of  the  process  are  at  work 
toward  a  negotiated  peace. 

What  we  are  seeing  today,  for  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  the  con- 
flict, are  genuine  attempts  by  key  par- 
ties involved  to  come  to  terms.  Real 
negotiations  have  commenced.  We 
are  also  seeing  an  unprecedented  pub- 
lic debate  over  the  core  issues  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Given  the  depth 
of  hostility  and  suspicion  which 
underlie  that  conflict,  and  the  painful 
decisions  needed  to  make  negotiations 
succeed,  no  one  should  expect  results 
overnight. 

Efforts  to  get  the  negotiations  mov- 
ing have  gone  through  several  phases 
over  the  past  year.  Initially,  they  fo- 
cused on  seeking  to  reconvene  the 
Geneva  Middle  East  Peace  Confer- 


.  .  .the  key  differences  remaining 
to  be  bridged  relate  to  the  issue 
of  withdrawal  and  an  approach 
to  the  Palestinian  problem,  in- 
cluding the  future  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 


ence,  which  was  established  and  met 
briefly  after  the  1973  Arab-Israeli  war 
and  which  remains  the  ultimate 
framework  for  a  comprehensive  peace 
settlement. 

Efforts,  to  reconvene  the  Geneva 
conference  last  year,  however,  en- 
countered sharp  differences  among 
the  parties  on  a  number  of  procedural 
issues,  in  particular  the  question  of 
how  the  Palestinians  should  be  repre- 
sented. Israel  took  the  position  that 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  was  not  an  acceptable  negotiat- 
ing partner.  In  this  we  supported  Is- 
rael, in  view  of  the  PLO's  nonaccept- 
ance  of  Resolution  242  as  the  basis 
for  negotiations  and  its  refusal  to 
state  publicly  its  willingness  to  rec- 
ognize the  right  of  all  states  in  the 
area,  which  include  Israel,  to  live  in 
peace  within  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries. 

Then,  suddenly.  President  Sadat 
transformed  the  situation  with  his  his- 
toric trip  to  Jerusalem  last  November. 
His  initiative  did  not  resolve  the  basic 


issues  in  dispute.  But  at  one  stroke  he 
sought  to  break  down  the  psychologi- 
cal barriers  which  had  prevented  seri 
ous  negotiations. 

For  the  first  time,  the  leader  of  an 
Arab  state  demonstrated  not  by  words 
alone  but  by  a  tangible  act  his  coun- 
try's acceptance  of  the  peace-for- 
withdrawal  formula  of  Resolution  242. 
He  recognized  in  an  unprecedented 
official  and  public  act  Israel's 
sovereign  existence.  He  put  Egypt  in 
the  forefront  of  the  Arab  world  in  ac- 
cepting the  concept  of  the  nature  of 
peace  as  President  Carter  has  defined 
it.  and  as  Israeli  leaders  themselves 
over  the  years  have  envisaged  it  as  Is< 
rael's  goal  in  negotiations.  In  doing 
so.  President  Sadat  opened  up  pos- 
sibilities that  never  before  existed  tc 
break  out  of  the  30-year  cycle  of  wai 
and  truce  in  the  Middle  East. 

President  Sadat  made  clear,  and  Is- 
rael agreed,  that  what  he  had  done 
was  not  done  for  Egypt  alone,  but  tc 
create  a  new  psychological  climate  ir 
which  there  can  be  progress  towarc 
peace  between  Israel  and  all  it; 
neighbors.  Whether  other  Arab  lead- 
ers will  seize  the  opportunity  thus 
created  remains  to  be  seen.  Some 
have  reacted  with  open  hostility 
some  with  suspicion,  some  want  tc 
wait  and  see — but  some  also  have- 
wished  Egypt  well  and  are  giving  it; 
peace  initiative  their  support. 

What  is  important  today  is  to  insure 
that  this  moment  not  become  anothei 
lost  opportunity.  The  United  States 
from  the  beginning  has  supportec 
Egyptian-Israeli  negotiations.  Our  ef- 
forts are  directed  toward  assuring, 
first,  that  there  is  tangible  and  earl) 
progress  in  the  negotiating  process 
begun  by  Egypt  and  Israel  ir 
Jerusalem  last  November,  and  sec- 
ond, that  out  of  this  process  theft 
emerge  a  basis  and  an  incentive  foi 
the  negotiations  to  be  broadened  to 
include  other  Arab  parties.  Both 
Egypt  and  Israel  have  stated  that  this 
is  also  their  objective. 

Since  November,  the  negotiating 
process  has  proceeded  on  two  tracks. 
Following  an  initial  preparatory  con- 
ference in  Cairo  in  December,  at- 
tended by  Egyptian  and  Israeli  delega 
tions  and  also  by  representatives  oft 
the  United  States  and  U.N.  Secretary 
General  Waldheim,  Egypt  and  Israel 
agreed  to  establish  two  committees  at 
ministerial  level.2  A  Military  Com- 
mittee was  convened  in  Cairo  to 
negotiate  essentially  Egyptian-Israeli 
bilateral  issues.  A  Political  Commit- 
tee was  convened  in  Jerusalem  to ; 
negotiate  multilateral  Arab-Israeli  is- 
sues. The  United  States  participated 
in  the  Political  Committee  and.  when 


lay  1978 

esident  Sadat  withdrew  his  delega- 
on.  has  continued  as  a  middleman 
ith  the  support  of  both  to  seek  to 
dvance  the  work  of  the  Political 
ommittee  through  a  process  of  indi- 
;ct  negotiations. 

The  Immediate  focus  of  the  Politi- 

d  Committee  is  the  negotiation  of  a 

eclaration  of  principles  for  a  com- 

rehensive  peace  settlement,  building 

In  Security  Council  Resolution  242, 

hich  can  serve  as  a  framework  for 

egotiations  between  Israel  and  any 

f  its  other  neighbors  which  are  pre- 

ured  to  move  toward  peace,  as  Egypt 

as  demonstrated  it  is  prepared  to  do. 

With  a  large  measure  of  agreement 

ready  achieved  on  those  principles 

;aling  with  the  nature  of  peace  and 

cognition  of  Israel,   the  key  differ- 

lices  remaining  to  be  bridged  relate 

the  issue  of  withdrawal  and  an  ap- 

oach  to  the  Palestinian  problem,  in- 

uding  the  future  of  the   West  Bank 

id  Gaza. 

i  The  important  talks  which  Presi- 

iint  Carter  has  had  in  recent  months 

ith  President  Sadat  and  with  Prime 

:  inister  Begin  have  helped  clarify 

'  e  differences  that  have  to  be  re- 

I 'lved.  The  issues  to  be  decided  are 

it  on  the  table  for  all  to  see.  We  be- 

1  ;ve  the  point  has  come  where  pain- 

1  compromises  have  to  be  made  if 

e  promise  of  peace  is  not  to  be  lost. 

It  is  no  secret  that  we  have  differ- 

ices  with  the  Israeli  Government 

iout  what  is  required  to  move  for- 

ard  on  negotiations,  just  as  we  have 

id  in  the  past — and  expect  to  have  in 

e  future — with  Arab  governments 

l  negotiating  issues  of  critical   im- 

irtance  to  them.  The  fact  that  we 

in  talk  frankly  and  openly  with  Is- 

el  about  these  differences  testifies 

the  closeness  of  our  friendship. 

To  be  concrete,   we   have  a  basic 

fference   with  the  Israeli   Govern- 

ent  over  the  applicability  of  the 

ithdrawal   principle   in  Resolution 

\\2  to  all  fronts  of  the  conflict.   I 

)ted  earlier  that  the  authors  of  Res- 

ution  242  and  all  the  governments 

mcerned,  including  the  Government 

Israel,  understood  at  the  time  that 

e  withdrawal-for-peace   concept 

>plied   wherever  territory   was  oc- 

ipied  in  1967. 

The  present  position  of  the  Israeli 

lovernment  is  that  this  concept  does 

pt  apply  to  all  fronts.  Specifically,  it 

jis  not  so  far  agreed  that,  in  the  con- 

xt  of  a  final  peace  treaty  embodying 

>mmitments  to  normal  peaceful  rela- 

ons  and  agreed  security   arrange- 

ents  which  can  include  agreed 

order  modifications,    Israel   will 

ithdraw  from  any  of  the  West  Bank 

f  the  Jordan   River  and  Gaza — the 


parts  of  former  Palestine  lying  outside 
Israel's  1967  boundaries. 

This  new  Israeli  interpretation  of 
Resolution  242,  together  with  the  pol- 
icy of  establishing  Israeli  settlements 
in  occupied  territory,  has  complicated 
efforts  to  make  progress  in  the 
negotiations  between  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael. It  has  also  inhibited  efforts  to 
broaden  those  negotiations  to  include 
other  Arab  parties,  in  particular  Jor- 
dan and  Palestinian  representatives 
who,  together,  have  an  interest  in 
negotiations  relating  to  the  future  of 
the  West  Bank  and  its  Palestinian 
Arab  inhabitants. 

We  realize  that  the  withdrawal- 
for-peace  formula  as  it  applies  to  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  the  Palestin- 
ian issue  generally,  are  the  most  dif- 
ficult issues  for  Israel.  In  all  our  de- 
liberations, we  constantly  have  before 
us  the  very  real  security  questions 
posed  for  Israel.  We  cannot  conceive 
of  any  formula  the  United  States — or 
Israel — could  accept  which  did  not 
make  fullest  provision  for  these  secu- 
rity concerns  as  part  of  a  peace 
settlement. 

To  supplement  the  commitments 
and  security  arrangements  the  parties 
may  agree  to  incorporate  in  peace 
treaties  between  themselves,  and  if 
we  judge  it  essential  to  cement  final 
agreement,  we  have  said  we  are  pre- 
pared to  consider  whatever  bilateral 
U.S.  security  guarantees  Israel  may 
consider  desirable  as  part  of  the  peace 
settlement.  This  would,  of  course,  be 
done  in  close  consultation  with  the 
Congress  in  full  consonance  with  its 
constitutional  authority  and 
responsibilities. 

In  closing,  let  me  say  a  word  about 
where  the  negotiating  process  now 
stands.  During  his  recent  talks  in 
Washington  with  Prime  Minister  Be- 
gin, President  Carter  put  forward 
some  exploratory  ideas  on  how  to 
bridge  the  differences  in  the  negotia- 
tions. In  doing  so,  we  took  into  ac- 
count the  proposals — in  many  re- 
spects far-reaching  proposals — which 
Prime  Minister  Begin  advanced  in 
December  for  a  Sinai  agreement  with 
Egypt  and  for  a  self-rule  regime  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  We  said 
then,  and  say  now,  that  in  our  judg- 
ment those  proposals  represent  a  good 
first  step  and  a  basis  for  negotiations. 

We  understand  the  need  for  time 
for  our  ideas  and  these  issues  to  be 
discussed  and  debated  within  Israel's 
democratic  political  process.  We 
know  that  our  ideas — dealing  as  they 
do  with  the  key  issues  for  Israel  of 
security,  withdrawal,  the  Palestinian 
question,  and  the  future  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza — require  agonizingly 


45 


difficult  choices  to  be  made.  We  hope 
nevertheless  that  our  ideas  will  com- 
mend themselves  to  Israel,  because 
we  believe  they  offer  the  possi- 
bility— perhaps  the  only  possibility — 
for  renewing  the  momentum  of 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  and  ultimately 
the  overall  Arab-Israeli  negotiating 
process. 

We  are  meanwhile  gratified  that  di- 
rect Egyptian-Israeli  talks  were  re- 
sumed through  the  visit  last  week 
[March  30-31.  1978]  of  Defense 
Minister  [Ezer]  Weizman  to  Cairo. 
We  are  also  gratified  that  progress  is 
being  made,  with  the  help  of  the 
courageous  men  of  the  U.N.  Interim 
Force  in  Lebanon  and  the  efforts  of 
the  Lebanese  Government  itself,  to- 
ward calming  the  potentially  danger- 
ous situation  in  south  Lebanon — a 
situation  which  can  otherwise  have 
serious  adverse  effects  on  the  pros- 
pects for  regional  peace. 

I  return  in  the  end  to  where  I 
started.  When  an  Egyptian  President 
has  visited  Israel  and  an  Israeli  Prime 
Minister  has  visited  Egypt,  when  the 
President  of  the  United  States  has  en- 
gaged the  authority  of  his  office  and 
the  weight  of  the  United  States  in  the 
search  for  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
the  Middle  East,  can  there  be  any 
doubt  that  an  unprecedented  opportu- 
nity exists  to  make  progress  toward 
that  long  elusive  goal?  At  the  same 
time  there  are  strong  forces — forces 
of  historical  distrust  and  suspicion,  of 
bitterness  and  violence,  of  national 
ambition  and  ideological  commit- 
ment, of  perceived  injustices  on  both 
sides — which  are  working  against  the 
success  of  all  that  we  and  our  friends 
in  the  Middle  East  are  seeking  to 
achieve.  And  time  is  on  their  side, 
not  ours.  We  must  not,  we  do  not 
intend,  to  let  this  moment  in  history 
become  simply  another  lost 
opportunity.  □ 


Address  before  the  Atlanta  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  on  U.S.  Interests  in  the  Middle 
East  on  Apr.  5.  1978.  Mr.  Atherton  was  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs:  on  Apr.  6.  the  Senate  confirmed 
the  President's  nomination  of  Mr.  Atherton  as 
Ambassador  at  Large  with  special  responsibil- 
ity for  Middle  East  peace  negotiations. 

'  For  excerpts  relating  to  foreign  policy 
from  President  Carter's  opening  remarks  and 
question-and-answer  session  at  the  Clinton, 
Massachusetts.  Town  Hall,  see  Bulletin  of 
Apr.  11,  1977,  p.  334. 

2  For  a  chronology  of  Middle  East  events 
during  November.  December,  and  January, 
which  includes  participants  in  various  meetings 
and  committees,  see  Bulletins  of  Dec.    19. 

1977,  p.   880;  Jan.    1978,  p.  401;  and  Feb. 

1978.  p.  37.  respectively. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


Terrorist  Attack  in  Israel 


STATEMENT  BY 
PRESIDENT  CARTER1 

The  terrorist  attack  on  a  bus  today 
[March  1 1]  in  Israel  was  an  outrageous 
act  of  lawlessness  and  senseless  brutal- 
ity. Criminal  acts  such  as  this  advance 
no  cause  or  political  belief.  They  in- 
spire only  revulsion  at  the  lack  of  re- 
spect for  innocent  human  life. 


LETTER  TO 

PRIME  MINISTER  BEGIN2 

March  11,  1978 

Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 

It  was  with  a  sense  of  deep  personal 
shock  and  moral  outrage  that  I  learned 
of  the  cowardly  and  senseless  attack 
today  on  a  group  of  innocent  civilians. 
This  brutal  act  of  terrorism  will  surely 
be  met  with  universal  revulsion  by  all 
men  of  conscience.  I  know  the  pain  and 
distress  which  you  must  be  experienc- 
ing at  this  tragic  moment,  and  I  offer 
you  the  condolences  and  deep  sym- 
pathy of  myself,  and  all  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  who  share  your  sorrow. 
Please  give  my  personal  sympathy  to 
the  families  of  the  many  who  died  and 
to  those  who  were  wounded.  I  am  par- 
ticularly distressed  that  an  event  such 


as  this  should  occur  just  as  you  were 
preparing  to  depart  on  your  mission  of 
peace.  I  continue  to  look  forward  to 
talking  to  you  soon  and  relaying  to  you 
in  person  the  deep  emotions  which  this 
event  has  aroused  in  this  country.  In 
the  meantime,  please  accept,  Mr. 
Prime  Minister,  my  deepest  and  most 
heartfelt  condolences. 

Jimmy  Carter 


STATEMENT  BY 
SECRETARY  VANCE3 

We  condemn  the  outrageous  attack 
committed  by  terrorists  in  Israel  this 
morning,  which  resulted  in  extensive 
loss  of  life.  This  is  murder  and  cannot 
be  justified.  The  perpetrators  should 
receive  the  punishment  they  deserve. 

I  offer  my  condolences  for  this  tragic 
loss  of  life.  We  oppose  terrorism  in  all 
its  forms,  and  this  incident  only  serves 
to  strengthen  our  determination  to 
combat  terrorism  with  every  means  at 
our  disposal.  □ 

'Issued  on  Mar.  11,  1978  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Mar.  20). 

:Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Mar.  20,  1978. 

'Issued  on  Mar.  11,  1978. 


Southern  Lebanon 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 
MAR.  161 

The  President  and  Secretary   Vance 
have  been  in  close  touch  on  the  situa- 
tion in  southern  Lebanon,  and  the  Pas 
ident  instructed  the  Secretary  to  report 
our  position  to  the  American  public. 

At  the  outset  let  me  say  we  deplore 
this  new  cycle  of  violence  which 
erupted  in  the  tragic  killings  in  Israel 
on  March  I  1,  1978,  and  continued  with 
the  military  action  and  tragic  loss  of 
innocent  civilian  lives  in  Lebanon  over 
the  past  2  days. 

During  the  intensive  consultations 
with  other  governments  which  we  have 
already  described,  our  immediate  con- 
cern has  been  to  end  as  quickly  as  pos- 


sible this  most  recent  cycle  of  violence 
in  the  Middle  East  so  as  to  keep  atten- 
tion focused  on  the  basic  problems 
which  produced  it.  The  only  real  solu- 
tion to  these  problems  lies  in  the 
broader  search  for  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  in 
all  its  aspects  and  for  measures  which 
would  restore  long-term  stability  in 
Lebanon.  We  do  not  intend  to  be  dis- 
tracted from  efforts  to  resolve  these 
basic  problems. 

As  to  the  situation  in  southern  Leba- 
non, we  expect  Israel  to  withdraw,  and 
we  have  made  our  views  in  this  respect 
known  to  the  Israeli  Government.  We 
have  also  begun  consultations  on  ar- 
rangements that  could  promote  stability 
and  security  in  that  area  following  Is- 


raeli withdrawal.  At  the  United  Natiot 
and  elsewhere,  we  have  been  discu 
sing  possible  arrangements,  includir 
the  idea  of  a  U.N.  role,  and  will  coi 
tinue  urgent  exchanges  on  this  subje 
with  the  parties  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  territorial   integrity  of  Lebanc 
remains  a  matter  of  fundamental  coi, 
cern  to  the  United  States.  An  importa 
objective  in  our  current  efforts  is  tr 
extension  of  the  authority  of  the  Go\ 
ernment  of  Lebanon  to  south  Lebanoi 
Any  arrangements  will  have  to  be  com 
sistent  with  this  objective  and  with  tr 
decisions  of  that  government. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  202 

The  U.S.  Government  has  decided 
respond  immediately  to  the  request   j 
the  Government  of  Lebanon  for  assisl 
ance  in  dealing  with  the  tragic  situatii 
of  the  people  displaced  by  the  fightii 
in   Lebanon.   There  are  over    150.0( 
people  who  have  been  forced  to  flee  tl 
fighting.  They  are  in  urgent  need  i 
shelter,   blankets,   and  other  reli- 
supplies. 

The  U.S.  Government  intends  I 
make  a  substantial  contribution  to  a 
sisting  those  in  need.  As  a  first  step  v 
are  now  moving  to  send  tents  and  bla 
kets  to  Lebanon  by  air.  We  are  consul 
ing  with  the  Government  of  Lebanc 
about  additional  needs.  More  detai 
will  be  provided  on  the  exact  nature 
U.S.  assistance  and  its  magnitude 
the  days  ahead. 

LETTER  TO  THE 
SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE 

April?.  19' 

Honorable  Thomas  P.  O'Neill.  Jr.. 
Speaker,  House  of 
Representatives 
U.S.  Congress 

Dear  Mr.  Speaker: 

Pursuant  to  section  3  (c)  of  the  Ar 
Export  Control  Act,  I  am  providing  I 
following  information   with   respect 
Israel's  military  operations  in  Lebanc 
that  began  on  March  15. 

Those  operations  have  involved  us 
of  defense  articles  furnished  to  Israi 
by  the  United  States  under  the  foreig 
military  sales  program.  Sales  to  Israti 
under  this  program  are  governed  by 
Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Agreemei 
of  July  23,  1952,  which  provides: 

"The  Government  of  Israel  assure 
the  United  States  Government  that  sue 
equipment,  materials,  or  services  a 
may  be  acquired  from  the  Unite 
States  ...  are  required  for  and  will  b; 


ly  1978 


Prime  Minister  Begin 
Visits  the  L.S.  Mareh  20-23 


VHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT1 

President  Carter  and  Prime  Minister 
Egin  met  with  their  advisers  this 
nirning  in  the  Cabinet  Room  for  2 
h.irs. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister 
hi  a  thorough  diseussion  on  the  issues 
tit  must  be  resolved  in  order  to  assure 
citinuity  and  progress  in  the  peace 
motiations.  In  particular,  they  have 
n  iewed  the  status  of  negotiation  on 
ti  declaration  of  principles  for  a  com- 
phensive  peace,  and  they  have 
eimined  the  question  of  the  West 
Eik  and  Gaza. 

The  President  reiterated  his  pledge  to 

I  parties  to  support  and  assist  in 
e>  ry  way  the  process  of  peace  negotia- 
ths  and  reaffirmed  the  unswerving 
i*ierican  commitment  to  the  security 
o: Israel.  He  expressed  the  view  that. 
d  pite  the  recent  increase  in  violence 
Ij  he  area,  there  remains  a  deep  con- 
ation that  renewed  progress  toward 
p  ce  is  essential  and  that  the  door  to 
p  gress  remains  open.  He  urged  all 
tl  se  involved  to  seize  this  opportunity 
a  to  make  the  historic  decisions  on 
v»  ich  peace  now  depends. 

he  President  and  the  Prime  Minis- 
te  will  meet  again  this  evening  and 
tc  orrow. 

I  PARTURE  REMARKS2 

F  sident  Carter 

'he  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Begin 
a:  his  discussions   with  me  and  the 


other  Israeli  and  American  officials  has 
been  very  important.  These  2  short  days 
have  been  spent  in  a  comprehensive 
exchange  of  views  on  the  Middle  East 
peace  process.  I  have  reiterated  to  the 
Prime  Minister  the  profound  support  of 
all  Americans  for  the  security  and  the 
well-being  of  the  State  of  Israel  as  it 
approaches  its  30th  year  of  independ- 
ence. We  share  Israel's  pride  in  this 
milestone. 

Israel's  achievements  are  uniquely 
its  own,  a  mixture  of  high  idealism,  in- 
genuity, and  self-reliance.  Americans 
have  always  found  an  echo  of  our  own 
frontier  past  in  Israel's  energy  and  its 
strong  individualism. 

Thirty  years  ago,  Israel  was  born 
into  uncertainty  and  a  threatening  fu- 
ture. Since  that  time,  Israel  has  suf- 
fered more  hardship  and  tragedy  than 
most  nations  must  endure  in  a  century. 
Yet  today,  Israel  stands  as  a  powerful 
nation,  fiercely  independent  and  de- 
termined to  forge  its  own  political 
destiny. 

The  Israel  of  1978  is  strong  and 
more  secure  militarily  than  at  any  time 
in  its  history.  We  in  America  take 
satisfaction  in  the  knowledge  that  we 
have  contributed  in  some  small  meas- 
ure to  the  realization  of  that  dream  of 
strength.  We  have  stood  beside  Israel 
from  the  earliest  moments  of  its  birth, 
and  there  we  shall  continue  to  stand. 

This  visit  by  Prime  Minister  Begin 
has  had  only  one  purpose,  to  explore 
the  ways  in  which  we  can  build  our 
past  cooperation  into  a  true  partnership 
for  peace.  In  the  course  of  these  meet- 


u  d  solely  to  maintain  its  internal  se- 
city,  its  legitimate  self-defense,  or  to 
pmit  it  to  participate  in  the  defense  of 
t|  area  of  which  it  is  a  part,  or  in 
lited  Nations  collective  security  ar- 
r. gements  and  measures,  and  that  it 
wl  not  undertake  any  act  of  aggres- 
s  n  against  any  other  state . ' ' 

n  these  circumstances,  I  must  report 
t  t  a  violation  of  the  1952  Agreement 
I  y  have  occurred  by  reason  of  the  Is- 
rfli  operations  in  Lebanon. 

■Ve  have  discussed  with  senior  offi- 
I  Is  of  the  Israeli  Government  these 

•rations  and  the  use  of  US  origin 
eiipment  in  them.  The  Israeli  Gov- 
e  ment  has  said  that  it  intends  to  com- 
I  with  UN  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tjn  425,  which  among  other  things 


calls  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces  from  Lebanon.  We  are  actively 
engaged  in  discussing  with  officials  of 
the  Israeli  Government  the  date  for  the 
completion  of  such  withdrawal. 

In  these  circumstances,  including  the 
ongoing  efforts  to  restore  momentum  to 
the  vital  peace  negotiations  and  Israel's 
assurance  that  it  intends  to  withdraw 
from  Lebanon,  I  am  not  recommending 
to  the  President  any  further  action. 

Sincerely. 

Cyrus  Vance  □ 


■Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  on  Mar.  16,  1978. 

2Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  John  Trattner  on  Mar.  20, 
1978. 


47 


ings.  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  I  have 
had  an  opportunity  to  review  in  consid- 
erable detail  the  present  situation  and 
our  progress  to  date  on  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement  of  the  Middle  East  con- 
flict. As  always,  these  discussions  have 
been  detailed  and  frank,  as  is  to  be  ex- 
pected from  two  partners  in  the  peace 
process. 

I  have  reviewed  for  Prime  Minister 
Begin  my  recent  discussions  with  Pres- 
ident Sadat.  And  I  have  shared  with 
him  my  assessment  of  what  will  be  re- 
quired to  regain  momentum  in  the 
common  search  for  peace.  I  em- 
phasized to  him  the  importance  of  reaf- 
firming that  all  of  the  principles  of  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  242  must 
apply  to  all  fronts  if  peace  negotiations 
are  to  succeed. 

In  the  past  few  months,  we  have  had 
a  glimpse  of  what  a  peaceful  future 
might  hold.  We  have  come  to  ap- 
preciate what  it  can  mean  in  terms  of 
human  contact,  direct  contact,  and  lib- 
eration from  the  dangerous,  self- 
defeating  patterns  of  the  past. 

As  Prime  Minister  Begin  returns 
home,  he  will  carry  with  him  our 
hopes  and  our  dreams  for  a  future  free 
of  the  bitterness  and  violence  of  the 
past  generation. 

We  know  that  he  faces  both  a  chal- 
lenge and  an  opportunity — the  chal- 
lenge of  providing  security  for  his 
people,  and  the  opportunity  to  achieve 
that  security  through  a  true  and  endur- 
ing peace.  It  is  our  conviction  that  this 
opportunity  must  not  be  allowed  to  slip 
into  the  cycle  of  hatred  and  violence 
which  has  characterized  the  history  of 
the  Middle  East  for  the  past  30  years 
and  which  we  have  witnessed  again 
over  the  last  2  weeks. 

We  pray  with  him  that  all  peoples  of 
the  Middle  East  will  come  to  realize 
that  another  generation  must  not  be  al- 
lowed to  grow  up  learning  only  war 
and  despair. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  does  not  return 
alone  to  his  own  country.  He  carries 
with  him  our  deepest  hopes  and 
prayers.  We  stand  with  him  as  he  faces 
the  challenges  and  the  opportunities  of 
Israel's  great  dream.  At  this  historic 
moment,  when  peace  still  seems  far 
away,  we  rely  on  the  vision  and  the 
humanity  of  a  great  people,  born  of 
great  suffering,  to  triumph  once  again. 

In  this  mission.  Prime  Minister 
Begin  carries  with  him  the  good  wishes 
and  the  constant  support  of  all  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Prime 
Minister,  we  wish  you  Godspeed. 

Prime  Minister  Begin 

Mr.  President,  I  thank  you 
wholeheartedly  for  the  good  words  and 


48 


Department  of  State  Bull< 


the  expressions  of  friendship  and  un- 
derstanding for  our  people  and  country. 
This  is  a  new  reaffirmation  of  the 
mutual,  deep  amity  between  our 
peoples  and  our  countries. 

As  you  said,  Mr.  President,  our 
people  had  to  suffer  much  and  to  fight 
for  its  liberation  and  for  its  independ- 
ence. Great  sacrifices  were  given  so 
that  we  can  have  the  land  of  our 
forefathers  to  build  up  for  our  children. 
But  when  I  stand  here  in  Washington  in 
the  presence  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  our  great  friend  and 
ally,  it  is  my  duty  as  the  elected  Prime 
Minister  of  Israel  to  remind  public 
opinion  of  the  fact  that  Israel  is  still  the 
only  country  in  the  world  against  which 
there  is  a  written  document  to  the  effect 
that  it  must  disappear. 

There  is  no  country,  either  large  or 
small,  or  even  the  smallest,  against 
which  there  is  such  a  document,  de- 
manding, saying  publicly,  that  country 
should  not  exist,  should  be  wiped  off 
the  map,  and  behind  those  people  who 
carry  out  also  the  abominable  acts  to 
prove  that  they  mean  it,  there  is  an 
alignment  of  many  Arab  states,  armed 
to  the  teeth  by  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
sometimes  getting  modern  weapons 
also  from  the  West. 

This  is  the  decisive  problem  we  face, 
which  is  called,  sometimes,  security.  I 
would  like  to  reaffirm  what  security 
means  to  us.  It  means  the  preservation 
of  the  lives  of  our  elderly  people,  of 
our  women,  and  our  children — the  lives 
which  are  threatened  daily — so  that  to 
make  sure  that  the  future  generations, 
as  ours,  will  live  in  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent country.  This  is  the  great  issue 
we  face,  or  continue  to  face. 

Now,  Mr.  President,  what  is  our 
contribution  to  the  peacemaking  proc- 
ess? Yes,  indeed,  when  I  learned  that 
President  Sadat  is  ready  to  come  to 
Jerusalem,  I  immediately  sent  out  to 
him  an  invitation  to  come,  and  then  his 
visit  took  place.  After  that.  President 
Sadat,  in  the  wake  of  my  visit  to  you  in 
December,  Mr.  President,  invited  me 
to  come  to  Ismailia.  Both  meetings  of 
Jerusalem  and  Ismailia  were  charac- 
terized by  the  spirit  of  friendship  and 
openness.  We  knew.  President  Sadat 
and  I.  that  we  have  differences  of  opin- 
ion. But  we  both  agreed  that  we  shall 
discuss  them  freely,  we  shall  negotiate 
them,  because  such  negotiations  arc  the 
soul  of  any  attempt  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment and  to  conclude  a  peace  treaty. 

That  was  the  spirit.  In  that  spirit,  Is- 
rael contributed  three  documents,  mak- 
ing it  possible  to  deal  with  the  question 
how  to  reach  and  conclude  peace 
treaties.  We  made  a  peace  proposal  in 
two  parts — one  concerning  the  bilateral 
relations  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  and 


SOUTH  ASIA: 

Recent  Developments 


by  Adolph  Dubs 

I  am  delighted  to  appear  before  you 
once  again  to  discuss  recent  political 
and  economic  developments  in  the 
South  Asian  region  as  a  backdrop  to 
your  consideration  of  FY  1979  eco- 
nomic and  security  assistance  requests 
for  countries  in  this  area. 

While  South  Asia  is  not  problem 
free,  I  believe  it  would  be  no  exaggera- 
tion to  say  that  regional  tensions  are 
perhaps  at  the  lowest  level  since  1947. 
Favorable  developments  over  the  past 
year  have  contributed  to  this  state  of 
affairs.  These  developments  include  a 
continuation  of  the  normalization  proc- 
ess between  India  and  Pakistan,  re- 
flected very  recently  in  a  visit  by  In- 
dian Foreign  Minister  Vajpayee  to 
Pakistan;  a  continued  improvement  in 
relations  between  Afghanistan  and 
Pakistan;  the  negotiation  of  trade  and 


transit  agreements  between  Nepal  ;J 
India;  the  conclusion  of  an  In<p 
Bangladeshi  interim  agreement  on  e 
sharing  of  Ganges  water  flows  durg 
lean  periods;  and  a  positive  effort  y 
Iran  to  contribute  to  the  econorc 
well-being  and  stability  of  South  Am 
Moreover,  a  constructive  dialogue  !■ 
tween  India  and  China  now  seefl 
underway. 

The  credit  for  these  developmei 
goes  to  the  leadership  of  the  individ  .1 
countries.  All  have  made  a  signific  t 
effort  to  improve  relations  with  trr 
neighbors.  The  trend  that  we  are  \ 
nessing  is  one  we  have  noted  earli 
i.e.,  the  increasing  willingness  and 
pability  of  regional  countries  to  so 
their  own  problems  without  outs 
interference. 

The  stabilizing  effects  of  this  trt  i 
are  very  much  in  line  with  the  fore  l 
policy  objectives  of  the  United  Stat . 


the  other,  the  full  administrative  au- 
tonomy for  our  neighbors,  the  Palesti- 
nian Arabs  residing  in  Judea,  Samaria, 
and  the  Gaza  Strip. 

It  was  a  real  contribution  to  the 
thinking  and  making  of  peace,  positive, 
constructive;  and  so  it  was  appreciated 
here,  Mr.  President,  and  elsewhere, 
when  those  two  documents  were  pro- 
duced, a  forthcoming  proposal  to  make 
peace,  a  long  step  forward,  a  great  deal 
of  flexibility,  a  notable  contribution,  to 
quote  the  public  statements. 

We  added  another  document,  a  dec- 
laration of  principles  which  should 
make  it  possible  for  everybody  to  join 
in  the  peace  effort.  There  are  three  Is- 
raeli documents  contributing  to  go  for- 
ward in  the  process  of  reaching  peace 
in  the  Middle  East.  We  only  ask  to 
negotiate.  We  said  it  is  a  basis  and  a 
fair  basis  for  negotiations.  There  may 
be  counterproposals.  We  shall  also 
negotiate  them.  This  is  the  process. 

Mr.  President,  may  I  express  our 
hope  that  this  will  happen,  indeed,  and 
the  spirit  of  the  Jerusalem,  the  Wash- 
ington, and  the  Ismailia  meeting  will 
be  renewed,  and  in  that  spirit  of  under- 
standing and  openness,  the  negotiations 
will  be  resumed. 

As  I  will  be  leaving  your  great  coun- 
try, Mr.  President.  I  will  take  with  me 
the  expressions  of  your  friendship,  of 


your  humanity,  of  your  understanc  g 
of  our  problems.  We  are  very  grat  il 
to  you.  Israel  is  a  very  small  coun  I 
The  United  States  is  a  mighty  wi  d 
power.  But  there  are  bonds  which  tii  s 
together  in  understanding  and  frie  • 
ship  which  derive  from  our  traditi  I 
from  our  faith  in  divine  provider  . 
from  our  love  of  liberty,  from  our  I 
votion  to  democracy. 

These  are  the  values  which  make  e 
worthwhile  to  live.  And  therefore. $ 
we  say  to  each  other  from  time  to  tii  . 
we    are    not    only    friends,    we    8] 
partners,   we  are  allies.    And   in  I S  i 
spirit,   in  the  faith  that  we  shall  c  - 
tinue  our  partnership  for  peace,  for  1 
erty,  for  the  welfare  of  our  peoples  m 
of  mankind,  I  take  leave  of  you,  ll 
President,      expressing     my     d>p 
gratitude  for  your  hospitality,  for  yi 
warmth,    and    for    your    friendstv. 
Thank  you. 


'Issued  on  Mar    21.    1978;  list  of  U.S.  ■ 
Israeli  officials  omitted  (for  full  text,  ■ 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docum  s 
of  Mar.  27). 

2Made  on  Mar.  22,  1978  (text  from  Wety 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  N'.| 
27).  For  an  exchange  of  remarks  between  P  • 
idem  Carter  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  at  m 
welcoming  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of  4 
White  House,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pi"! 
idential  Documents  of  Mar.  27.  p.  544. 


(lay  1978 

o  believe  that  reduced  tensions  will 
•rmit  the  countries  to  devote  increas- 
|g  attention  and  resources  to  the  prob- 
ms  of  economic  development  and  to 
i  improvement  in  the  human  condition 
'the  reaion's  inhabitants. 


idia 

The  most  dramatic  development  of 
le  past  year  was  the  March  1977  na- 
nnal  election  in  India.  These  elections 
cmonstrated  the  strong  commitment  of 
le  Indian  people  to  the  democratic  sys- 
Im  with  its  emphasis  on  individual 
-edoms  and  economic  and  social  jus- 
e.  It  is  a  tribute  to  all  involved  that 
e  transfer  of  power  after  the  elections 
bk  place  peacefully  and  without  inci- 
int.  The  peaceful,  democratic  transi- 
nn  was  widely  acclaimed  by  the 
pelican  people  and  by  the  executive 
jd  legislative  branches  of  our  gov- 

oment. 

The  new  Janata  government,  headed 
|  Prime  Minister  Desai,  has  been 
"mulating  its  domestic  and  foreign 
ilicies.  The  budget  for  Indian  FY 
,79  indicates  that  the  new  government 
i  placing  greater  emphasis  on  rural  de- 
'lopment,  increased  agricultural  pro- 
<ction.  and  on  promoting  small-scale 
ilustry.  Efforts  to  implement  these 
]  )grams  have  only  begun,  and  it  re- 
1  :ins  to  be  seen  how  they  will  impact 
i  the  poverty  and  unemployment 
iiich  afflict  segments  of  Indian 
}:iety. 

The  Indian  Government's  efforts  in 
1  s  area  have  been  facilitated  by  the 
Ird  consecutive  year  of  good  crops. 
<  ficial  figures  are  still  not  available 
i  the  1977-78  crop  year,  but  it  is  ex- 
.]  :ted  that  food  grain  production  will 
itch  119-121  million  tons,  perhaps 
I    second  best  year  in  Indian  history. 

I  tal  economic  growth  has  not  been  so 
Cimatic  and  is  not  likely  to  exceed  5% 
'i  1977-78. 

Dn  the  external  side,  the  highlight  of 
d  past  year,  from  our  point  of  view, 
|\s  the  visit  by  President  and  Mrs. 
Crter  to  India  in  January  of  this  year, 
le  visit  went  very  well,  and  an  ex- 
tmely  warm  and  positive  relationship 
1;  developed  between  Prime  Minister 
Tjsai  and  the  President.  We  look  for- 
njrd  to  continuing  our  dialogue  with 

II  me  Minister  Desai  when  he  makes  a 
)  urn  visit  here  on  June  13-14. 


kistan 

Pakistan  has  been  governed  since 
jly  1977  by  a  martial  law  administra- 
|>n  headed  by  Gen.  Zia-al-Haq.  Gen. 
ja  stated  that  it  was  necessary  to  re- 
pve    Prime    Minister   Zulfikar    A. 


Bhutto  because  of  the  rigging  of  elec- 
tions, the  detention  of  political  prison- 
ers, widespread  corruption,  and  the 
threat  of  civil  war. 

Gen.  Zia  promised  to  return  the  gov- 
ernment to  civilian  control  after  free 
elections  were  held  in  October  1977. 
Those  elections  were  later  postponed, 
however,  on  grounds  that  various 
charges  against  Bhutto  should  be  re- 
solved by  the  courts  before  elections 
took  place.  Although  some  observers 
speculate  that  elections  may  be  held  in 
the  fall  of  1978,  no  dates  have  been 
mentioned  by  Pakistani  officials.  The 
military  leaders  continue  to  refer  to 


49 


themselves  as  an  interim  regime  which 
must  leave  most  policy  decisions  up  to 
a  successor  civilian  government. 

The  economy  began  to  drift  before 
the  end  of  the  Bhutto  period,  and  the 
martial  law  administration  has  taken 
few  actions  to  reverse  the  trend. 

Basic  to  the  economic  difficulties 
facing  Pakistan  is  the  disappointing 
performance  of  its  agricultural  sector 
which  grew  a  modest  2.2%  in  1977. 
Against  a  record  wheat  crop — which 
fell  short  of  covering  Pakistan's 
requirements — cotton  production  de- 
clined one-third  from  traditional  levels. 

On  the  public  finance  side,  Pakistan 


Colombor      J 


Afghanistan 

Bangladesh 

India 

Nepal 

Pakistan 

Sri  Lanka 

Area 

(sq.  mi.) 

260,000 

55,126 

1,211,000 

54,362 

307,374 

23,332 

Population 

(millions) 

GNP 

(billions  of 
U.S.  dollars) 

14 
(1977) 

83 
(1977) 

600 

(1976) 

13.2 

(1977! 

76 

(1978) 

14.3 

(1977) 

$2.5 

(1977) 

$9.8 

(1976) 

$80.2 
(1975) 

$1.4 
(1975) 

$13.7 

(1977) 

$24 

(1976) 

Annual 

Per  Capita 

Income 

(U.S.  dollars) 

$179 
(1977) 

$90 
(1976) 

$134 
(1975) 

$110 
(1975) 

$187 
(1977) 

$150 
(1976) 

Exports 

(U.S.  dollars) 

$340  million 
(1977) 

$382  million 
(1976) 

$4.4  billion 
(1976) 

$85.8  million 
(1975) 

$1.2  billion 
(1977) 

$560  million 
(1976) 

Imports 

(U.S.  dollars) 

$410  million 
(1977) 

$1.3  billion 
(1976) 

$5.9  billion 
(1976) 

$1  70.8million 
(1975) 

$2.4  billion 
(1977) 

$640  million 
(1976) 

2980  5-78  STATE)  RGE) 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


is  facing  a  mounting  debt  service  prob- 
lem and  a  domestic  budget  gap  that  can 
only  be  covered  if  politically  diffi- 
cult economic  policy  measures  are 
instituted. 

The  single  bright  spot  in  the  econ- 
omy is  the  growth  of  remittances  re- 
ceived from  Pakistanis  working  over- 
seas. They  are  predicted  to  climb  to  $1 
billion  this  year — up  by  $300  million 
from  the  most  optimistic  projection  of 
6  months  ago. 

Bangladesh 

President  Ziaur  Rahman,  known  as 
Zia.  is  gradually  dismantling  the  struc- 
ture of  his  martial  law  administration 
and  giving  increased  responsibility  to 
civilian  officials.  A  new  political 
party — the  National  Democratic  Party 
(Jagodal) — has  been  organized  by  sev- 
eral of  President  Zia's  top  advisors. 
President  Zia  is  expected  to  join  the 
new  party. 

General  elections  to  a  new 
parliament — the  last  was  dissolved  in 
1975 — are  promised  for  December 
1978,  and  a  presidential  election  is  ex- 
pected earlier.  If  Zia  becomes  a  presi- 
dential candidate,  his  main  opposition 
will  probably  come  from  the  Awami 
League  of  the  late  President  Mujib, 
which  seems  to  be  one  of  the  best  or- 
ganized and  popular  parties. 

Externally,  relations  with  all 
neighbors  are  quite  good  as  was  indi- 
cated by  President  Zia's  recent  success- 
ful visits  to  Burma,  India,  Pakistan, 
and  Nepal.  An  interim  agreement  of  the 
longstanding  water  dispute  involving  a 
sharing  of  the  Ganges  River  flow  was 
reached  last  fall  with  India. 

Economically,  Bangladesh  is  better 
off  now  than  at  any  time  since  inde- 
pendence. This  is  largely  due  to  3  years 
of  bctter-than-average  harvests.  (The 
aiiian  harvest,  which  began  last 
November,  was  the  best  on  record.) 
Self-sufficiency  in  food  grain  is  still 
some  way  off,  and  Bangladesh  remains 
dependent  on  the  donor  community  for 
some  of  its  food  grain  needs.  Foreign 
exchange  earnings  in  1977  were  about 
$470  million — a  new  high — owing  to 
good  world  demand  for  Bangladesh's 
exports,  mainly  jute,  tea,  and  animal 
products. 

On  the  negative  side,  the  economy  is 
relatively  static.  There  has  not  been 
much  domestic  or  foreign  investment. 
Despite  some  denationalization,  most 
important  industries  remain  in  the  pub- 
lic sector,  which  is  often  inefficient. 
Private  U.S.  investment  totals  only 
about  $5  million.  The  most  important 
outstanding  nationalization  compensa- 
tion case  (Belbagco)  seems  very  close 
to  resolution. 


Sri  Lanka 

For  the  sixth  time  since  independ- 
ence, Sri  Lankans  went  to  the  polls  in 
June,  and  the  incumbent  government 
was  defeated.  The  commitment  to 
democratic  principles  and  ideals  by  Sri 
Lankans  remains  firm  and  impressive. 

Sri  Lanka  continues  to  have  major 
economic  and  unemployment  prob- 
lems. Significant  new  programs  are 
being  devised  and  introduced  to  al- 
leviate and  to  overcome  these  prob- 
lems. The  United  States  and  other 
donor  countries  are  currently  examin- 
ing Sri  Lanka's  developmental  propos- 
als, and  we  hope  to  be  able  to  be  of 
greater  assistance  in  the  future. 


Nepal 

The  past  year  has  witnessed  a  con- 
tinued improvement  in  our  normally 
good  relations  with  Nepal.  For  some 
time,  the  Nepalese  Government  has  ex- 
pressed greater  interest  in  rural  de- 
velopment, particularly  in  the  areas 
outside  of  Kathmandu.  This  emphasis 
is  very  much  in  line  with  our  own  new 
directions  in  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  and  has  permitted 
us  to  propose  helpful  programs  that  we 
hope  will  have  a  favorable  impact  on 
the  acute  development  problems  this 
country  faces. 

On  the  political  side,  the  Nepalese 
Government  has  continued  its  policy  of 
liberalization.  Almost  all  persons  who 
have  not  been  charged  with  specific 
criminal  activities  have  been  released 
from  prison.  The  best  known  leader  of 
Nepal's  political  opposition — B.P. 
Koirala — was  acquitted  on  most  of  the 
charges  against  him  and  has  been  re- 
leased for  medical  treatment  in  the 
United  States.  Press  censorship  has 
been  reduced,  and  the  Nepalese  Gov- 
ernment is  seeking  to  develop  institu- 
tions which  will  open  the  way  to  ex- 
panded participation  in  the  economic 
and  political  processes  of  government. 


Afghanistan 

Internally,  the  political  situation  is 
stable.  President  Daoud  remains  very 
much  in  control  and  faces  no  signifi- 
cant opposition.  The  process  of  politi- 
cal institution-building  is  moving  ahead 
at  a  measured  pace.  In  the  past  year, 
the  Constitution  and  Party  Charter  were 
promulgated  and  a  Vice  President  was 
named. 

Afghanistan's  relations  with  its 
neighbors  are  good,  and  this  contrib- 
utes significantly  to  the  region's  politi- 
cal stability.  President  Daoud 's  recent 
trip  to  Pakistan  was  particularly  signif- 
icant,  and   Afghan-Pak   relations  are 


better  than  they  have  been  in  years,  I 
The  economic  situation  in  Afghat-I 
tan  is  mixed.  Afghanistan  remains  <e 
of  the  world's  poorest  countries  withn 
estimated  per  capita  income  in    e 
$150-180  range  and  a  literacy  re 
under   10%.  Growth  rates  are  low,  I- 
timated  by  the  International  Monet yJ 
Fund  at  3-4%  per  annum.    DrouW 
conditions  have  prevailed  over  mucflfi 
the  country  over  the  last  2  years.  ,  d 
the  domestic  private  sector  continue; d 
stagnate. 

However,  foreign  exchange  resell 
holdings  have  reached  record  levels  t 
almost  $300  million,  the  equivalent  if  I 
about  8  months  of  imports.  SubstanJ 
amounts  of  hard  currency  are  al 
being  repatriated  by  Afghan  m i g r  it | 
workers.  The  inflation  rate  is  oJ 
6-7%.  and  there  are  some  labor  shd- 
ages,  particularly  in  the  southern  n 
western  parts  of  the  country. 

In  appearing  before  this  subcomrli 
tee  a  year  ago,  I  stated  our  govt  - 
ment's  goals  in  South  Asia  to  be  ej 
following: 

•  Improving  regional   stability    ;  1 
enhancing  the  ability  of  the  region 
states  to  resolve  their  bilateral   pr  - 
lems  without  outside  intereference; 

•  Strengthening  the  independence  I 
South  Asian  nations  and  support  j 
their  determination  to  avoid  dominat  l 
by  any  external  power; 

•  Providing  economic  assistance    M 
humanitarian   aid.    when   this   is    f\ 
quired,  and  assisting  the  nations  of  ; 
area  in  their  efforts  to  attack  poverty  !^ 

•  Encouraging  these  nations  to  ad  t 
constructive  policies  on  major  wi  i 
economic  and  political  issues; 

•  Limiting  U.S.  sales  of  sophi  - 
cated  arms  and  preventing  nuclear  p  - 
liferation; 

•  Fostering,  so  far  as  we  are  al , 
the  promotion  of  human  rights  and  Sv 
democratic  process;  and, 

•  Reducing  the  production  of  narcl 
ics  and  their  supply  to  the  world's  - 
licit  market. 

These  goals  remain  applicable.  A 
much  has  been  accomplished   in    : 
past  year  as  a  result  of  initiatives  tall 
and  efforts  made  by  leaders  in  all  of  | 
countries  of  the  region. 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  A 
and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the  Housi  Committed 
International  Relations  on  Mar.  16.  1978. 
.  omplete  transi  ript  of  the  hearings  will  be  /<• 
lished  by  tin  ,  ommittee  and  will  be  availM 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  t>. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washingl,< 
DC.  20402.  Mr.  Duhs  is  Deputy  Assist 
Secretary  lor  Near  Eastern  and  South  A.' 
Affairs 


ay  1978 


51 


UNITED  NATIONS: 

interim  Force  in  Lebanon 


tfATEMENT  BY 
.V1BASSADOR  YOUNG  ' 

The  Security  Council  meets  today 
;ainst  a  background  of  tragedy  but 
»th  an  opportunity  to  play  a  construc- 
1e  role  in  restoring  security  and  sta- 
( ity  in  the  violence-torn  southern  part 
I  Lebanon.  The  aim  of  this  Council 
jjst  now  be  to  end  as  quickly  as  pos- 

■  ile  this  new  cycle  of  violence  and  to 
<al  with  some  of  the  immediate  under- 
]  ng  causes.  The  only  real  solution 
Is  in  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
i  Middle  East  issues.  At  the  moment, 
Iwever,  our  efforts  must  be  focused 

■  removing  the  sources  of  friction  and 
j.tability  in  southern  Lebanon. 

The  United  States  approaches  this 
jDate,  and  the  action  which  we  hope 
yil  stem  from  it,  with  three  fundamen- 
1^  principles  in  mind. 

•  We  expect  Israel  to  withdraw  from 

•  jthern  Lebanon,  and  we  have  made 
i(  r  views  in  this  respect  known  to  the 
1  aeli  Government. 

•  The  territorial  integrity  of  Lebanon 
list  be  fully  respected. 

•  The  United  Nations  has  a  vital  role 
play  in  assisting  the  Government  of 
banon  to  restore  in  southern  Lebanon 
iditions  that  will  facilitate  the  rees- 
'lishment  of  its  authority  and  provide 
eturn  to  security  and  a  peaceful  life 

the  people  of  the  south. 

Our  consultations  in  the  past  2  days 

d  us  to  believe  that  most  Council 

i  mbers  share  our  perception  of  the 

i  portance  of  these   principles.   Our 

•  :w  is  that  a  U.N.  peacekeeping  oper- 
on  is  needed  that  would  have  two 

|  mary  functions: 

•  First,  the  United  Nations  would 
ve  responsibility  to  establish  and 

pvide  security  in  the  southern  border 
i;ion  of  Lebanon;  and 

•  Second,  it  would  assist  the  Gov- 
siment  of  Lebanon  in  promptly  rees- 

>lishing  its  authority  in  that  area  and, 
ice  established,  relinquish  its  respon- 
>ilities  to  Lebanon. 

•  We  believe  all  members  of  this 
"jiuncil  wish  to  prevent  further  escala- 
j'n  of  violence  and  thereby  to  facili- 
je  a  return  to  peace  negotiations.  We 
j:  confident  that  this  Council  will 
jree  that  a  temporary  U.N.  presence 
|  southern  Lebanon,  remaining  only 
'til  the  Government  of  Lebanon  can 


exercise  full  authority,  will  help  to  ful- 
fill the  first  purpose  of  the  U.N. 
Charter — the  maintenance  of  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

In  order  to  give  concrete  expression 
to  the  principles  that  I  have  just  out- 
lined, the  U.S.  Government  is  intro- 
ducing a  resolution  for  consideration 
by  this  Council.  That  resolution,  in  its 
first  operative  paragraph,  calls  for 
strict  respect  for  the  territorial  integ- 
rity, sovereignty,  and  political  inde- 
pendence of  Lebanon.  May  I  say  that 
the  statements  made  in  this  chamber 
leave  no  doubt  that  the  preservation  of 
Lebanese  territorial  integrity  is  the 
Council's  primary  goal  in  this  debate. 
That  goal  is  made  explicit  in  the  third 
operative  paragraph  of  the  resolution 
sponsored  by  my  government.  That 
paragraph  describes  the  purpose  of  a 
U.N.  peacekeeping  force  as  confirming 
the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces,  restor- 
ing international  peace  and  security, 
and  assisting  the  Government  of  Leba- 
non in  insuring  the  return  of  its  effec- 
tive authority  in  the  area. 

The  second  operative  paragraph  calls 
on  the  Government  of  Israel  im- 
mediately to  cease  its  military  action 
against  Lebanese  territory  and  with- 
draw its  forces  from  Lebanese  terri- 
tory. Immediate  Israeli  withdrawal  is, 
in  my  government's  view,  one  of  the 
key  conditions  to  restoring  full  political 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  to 
Lebanon. 

The  third  operative  paragraph  de- 
cides to  set  up  immediately  a  U.N. 
force  for  southern  Lebanon.  Such  a 
force  should,  in  my  government's 
view,  be  of  temporary  duration.  It 
should  restore  peace  and  security  to  the 
area  and  transfer  effective  authority  to 
the  Lebanese  Government.  When  that 
is  done,  the  objectives  established  by 
this  resolution  will  have  been  fully 
achieved  and,  we  fully  expect,  the 
cause  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  substantially  advanced. 

We  have  consulted  widely  on  this 
resolution  and  have  tried  to  meet  most 
of  the  concerns  expressed.  The  repre- 
sentative of  the  Soviet  Union  has 
suggested  the  inclusion  of  a  reference 
to  the  time  frame  for  the  U.N.  interim 
force,  referred  to  in  operative  para- 
graph three.  It  is  our  view  and  expecta- 
tion that  in  keeping  with  past  practice 
any  time  frame  the  Council  may  decide 
upon  will  be  included  in  the  Council's 


action  on  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
General  referred  to  in  paragraph  four. 


TEXTS  OF  RESOLUTIONS 

Security  Council  Resolution  4252 

The  Security  Council, 

Taking  note  of  the  letters  of  the  Permanent 
Representative  of  Lebanon  (S/12600  and 
S/12606)  and  the  Permanent  Representative  of 
Israel  (S/12607), 

Having  heard  the  statements  of  the  Perma- 
nent Representatives  of  Lebanon  and  Israel, 

Gravely  concerned  at  the  deterioration  of  the 
situation  in  the  Middle  East,  and  its  conse- 
quences to  the  maintenance  of  international 
peace. 

Convinced  that  the  present  situation  impedes 
the  achievement  of  a  just  peace  in  the  Middle 
East, 

1.  Calls  for  strict  respect  for  the  territorial 
integrity,  sovereignty  and  political  independ- 
ence of  Lebanon  within  its  internationally  rec- 
ognized boundaries; 

2.  Calls  upon  Israel  immediately  to  cease  its 
military  action  against  Lebanese  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  withdraw  forthwith  its  forces  from 
all  Lebanese  territory; 

3.  Decides,  in  the  light  of  the  request  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon,  to  establish  im- 
mediately under  its  authority  a  United  Nations 
interim  force  for  southern  Lebanon  for  the  pur- 
pose of  confirming  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces,  restoring  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity and  assisting  the  Government  of  Lebanon 
in  ensuring  the  return  of  its  effective  authority 
in  the  area,  the  force  to  be  composed  of  per- 
sonnel drawn  from  States  Members  of  the 
United  Nations; 

4.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  report 
to  the  Council  within  twenty-four  hours  on  the 
implementation  of  this  resolution. 

Security  Council  Resolution  426 ' 

The  Security  Council. 

1 .  Approves  the  report  of  the  Secretary- 
General  on  the  implementation  of  Security 
Council  resolution  425  (1978)  contained  in 
document  S/12611  dated  19  March  1978; 

2.  Decides  that  the  Force  shall  be  established 
in  accordance  with  the  above-mentioned  report 
for  an  initial  period  of  six  months,  and  that  it 
shall  continue  in  operation  thereafter,  if 
required,  provided  the  Security  Council  so 
decides.  □ 


'Statement  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council  on 
Mar.  18.  1978  (text  from  USUN  press  release 
12  of  Mar.  18);  Andrew  Young  is  U.S.  Perma- 
nent Representative  to  the  United  Nations. 

2U.N.  doc.  S/RES/425  (1978);  adopted  by 
the  Council  on  Mar.  19  by  a  vote  of  12  (U.S.) 
to  0,  with  2  abstentions  (the  People's  Republic 
of  China  did  not  participate  in  the  vote). 

'U.N.  doc.  S/RES/426  (1978);  adopted  by 
the  Council  on  Mar.  19  by  a  vote  of  12  (U.S.) 
to  0,  with  2  abstentions  (the  People's  Republic 
of  China  did  not  participate  in  the  vote). 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE: 

Pciticfttiff  i  ttnttl  Treaty  Ratifieii 


terms  of  the  treaty  that  passed  the  Se| 
ate  this  afternoon.  I  want  to  reaffiil 
my  thanks  and  my  commitment  to  I 
true  partnership  with  General  Torriji 
and  the  people  of  a  great  natioj 
Panama. 


by  President  Carter 

This  is  a  day  of  which  Americans 
can  feel  proud  for  now  we  have  re- 
minded the  world  and  ourselves  of  the 
things  that  we  stand  for  as  a  nation. 
The  negotiations  that  led  to  these 
treaties  began  14  years  ago,  and  they 
continued  under  four  Administrations, 
four  Presidents.1  I  am  proud  that  they 
have  reached  their  conclusion  while  I 
was  President.  But  I  am  far  prouder 
that  we  as  a  people  have  shown  that  in 
a  full  and  open  debate  about  difficult 
foreign  policy  objectives  that  we  will 
reach  the  decisions  that  are  in  the  best 
interest  of  our  nation. 

The  debate  has  been  long  and  hard. 
But  in  the  end,  it  has  given  our  deci- 
sion a  firm  base  in  the  will  of  the 
American  people.  Over  the  last  8 
months,  millions  of  Americans  have 
studied  the  treaties,  have  registered 
their  views,  and,  in  some  cases,  have 
changed  their  minds.  No  matter  which 
side  they  took  in  this  debate,  most 
Americans  have  acted  out  of  sincere 
concern  about  our  nation's  interest. 

I  would  like  to  express  my  thanks  to 
a  few  for  the  job  they  have  done. 
Under  the  leadership  of  Senators  Byrd 
and  Baker  and  Sparkman  and  others, 
the  Senate  has  carried  out  its  responsi- 
bility of  advice  and  consent  with  great 
care.  All  of  us  owe  them  our  thanks.  I 
feel  a  special  gratitude  and  admiration 
for  those  Senators  who  have  done  what 
was  right  because  it  was  right,  despite 
tremendous  pressure  and,  in  some 
cases,  political  threats. 

The  loyal  employees  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Zone  and  the  Canal  Zone  Gov- 
ernment also  deserve  our  gratitude  and 
our  admiration  for  their  performance 
during  these  months  of  great  uncer- 
tainty, and  General  Torrijos  and  the 
people  of  Panama  who  have  followed 
this  debate  closely  and  through  every 
stage  have  been  willing  partners  and 
cooperative  and  patient  friends.  There 
is  no  better  indication  of  the  prospect 
for  friendly  relations  between  us  in  the 
future  than  their  conduct  during  the  last 
few  months. 

We  now  have  a  partnership  with 
Panama  to  maintain  and  to  operate  and 
to  defend  the  canal.  We  have  the  clear 
right  to  take  whatever  action  is  neces- 
sary to  defend  the  canal  and  to  keep'  it 
open  and  neutral  and  accessible.  We  do 
not  have  the  right  to  interfere  in  Pana- 
ma's internal  affairs.  That  is  a  right  we 
neither  possess  nor  desire. 


These  treaties  can  mark  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  era  in  our  relations  not 
only  with  Panama  but  with  all  the  rest 
of  the  world.  They  symbolize  our  de- 
termination to  deal  with  the  developing 
nations  of  the  world,  the  small  nations 
of  the  world,  on  the  basis  of  mutual  re- 
spect and  partnership.  But  the  treaties 
also  reaffirm  a  spirit  that  is  very 
strong,  constant,  and  old  in  the  Ameri- 
can character. 

Sixty-four  years  ago  when  the  first 
ship  traveled  through  the  canal,  our 
people  took  legitimate  pride  in  what 
our  ingenuity,  our  perseverance,  and 
our  vision  had  brought  about.  We  were 
a  nation  of  builders,  and  the  canal  was 
one  of  our  greatest  glories. 

Today  we  have  shown  that  we  re- 
main true  to  that  determination,  that 
ingenuity,  and,  most  of  all,  that  vision. 
Today  we  have  proven  that  what  is  best 
and  noblest  in  our  national  spirit  will 
prevail.  Today  we  have  shown  that  we 
are  still  builders  with  our  face  still 
turned  confidently  to  the  future. 

That  is  why  I  believe  all  Americans 
should  share  the  pride  I  feel  in  the  ac- 
complishments which  we  registered  to- 
day. 

When  I  was  coming  in  to  make  this 
announcement,  the  Ambassador  of 
Panama,  Gabriel  Lewis,  informed  me 
that  General  Torrijos  has  accepted  the 


Remarks  made  on   Apr.    18.    1978   (text  fn 
While  House  /new  release  of  Apr.  18). 

1  By  a  vote  of  68  to  32,  Ihe  Senate  gave 
advice  and  consent  on  Apr.    18  to  the  Pana  i 
Canal  Treaty.  On  Mar.  16  it  gave  its  advice  ; 
consent  to  the  neutrality  treaty;  for  the  text 
President  Carter's  remarks  made  on  that  oc<| 
sion,  see  Bulletin  of  April  1978,  p.  59. 


STATEMENT  BY 
SECRETARY  VANCE 

I  am  delighted  at  the  Senate's  ap-  I 
proval  of  the  new  Panama  Canal  treaties.  I 
We  intend  to  move  forward  as  rapidly  as  I 
possible  to  put  the  treaties  into  effect. 

The  treaties  are  in  the  national  inter-  I 
ests  of  both  our  nations  and  the  hemi-  I 
sphere  and  the  world  community.  We  I 
will,  in  the  sense  of  the  Senate,  avoid  I 
any  measures  designed  to  interfere  in  the  I 
internal  affairs  of  Panama  or  to  infringe  I 
on  its  independence  or  its  sovereign  in-  | 
tegrity. 

Working  together,  our  two  govern- 
ments can  make  the  canal  an  outstanding 
example  of  international  cooperation. 
This  will  provide  a  great  opportunity  to 
strengthen  the  ties  of  friendship  and  un- 
derstanding that  bind  us  to  Panama. 


Made  on  Apr.  18.  1978  next  from  press 
release  176  of  Apr.  18). 


Senate  Additions  to 
the  Panama  Canal  Treaties 


During  the  course  of  the  Senate  debate  on 
the  two  Panama  Canal  treaties,  a  number  of 
amendments,  conditions,  reservations,  and  un- 
derstandings were  considered.   Following  are 

the  texts  of  those  which  were  adopted  and  at- 
tached to  the  treaties. ' 


NEUTRALITY  TREATY 

Leadership  Amendment  20 

At  the  end  of  Article  IV.  insert  the  follow- 
ing: 

A  correct  and  authoritative  statement  of  cer- 
tain rights  and  duties  of  the  parties  under  the 
foregoing  is  contained  in  the  Statement  of  Un- 
derstanding issued  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  on  Oct.  14,  1977,  and 
by  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama 


on  Oct.  18,  1977,  which  is  hereby  incorpora 
as  an  integral  part  of  this  treaty,  as  follows: 

"Under  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Pert 
nent  Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the  Panu 
Canal  (the  Neutrality  Treaty),  Panama  and 
United  States  have  the  responsibility  to  ass 
that  the  Panama  Canal  will  remain  open  and 
cure  to  ships  of  all  nations.  The  correct 
terpretation  of  this  principle  is  that  each  of 
two  countries  shall,   in   accordance   with  tb 
respective  constitutional  processes,  defend 
Canal  against  any  threat  to  the  regime  of  n- 
trality  and  consequently  shall  have  the  right 
act  against  any  aggression  or  threat  direc 
against  the  Canal  or  against  the  peaceful  trar 
of  vessels  through  the  Canal. 

"This  does  not  mean,  nor  shall  it  be  ini 
preted  as  the  right  of  intervention  of  the  Uni 
States  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Panama. 
United  States  action  will  be  directed  at  insur 


y  1978 

the  Canal  will  remain  open,  secure  and  ac- 
ible,  and  it  shall  never  be  directed  against 
territorial  integrity  or  political  independ- 
:  of  Panama."  [Adopted  84  to  5  on  March 
1978.] 


dership  Amendment  21 

the  end  of  the  first  paragraph  of  Article 
'linsert  the  following: 

||  accordance  with  the  statement  of  Under- 
lying mentioned  in  Article  IV  above:  "The 
Wtrality  Treaty  provides  that  the  vessels  of 
ii  and  auxiliary  vessels  of  the  United  States 
^Panama  will  be  entitled  to  transit  the  Canal 
■ditiously.  This  is  intended,  and  it  shall  so 
eiterpreted,  to  assure  the  transit  of  such  ves- 
s  through  the  Canal  as  quickly  as  possible, 
riout  any  impediment,  with  expedited  treat- 
jl  ,  and  in  case  of  need  or  emergency,  to  go 
l  le  head  of  the  line  of  vessels  in  order  to 
rs  it  the  Canal  rapidly."  [Adopted  85  to  3  on 
Kb  13,  1978.] 

hn  Condition 

bject  to  the  condition  that  the  instruments 
f]  tification  of  the  treaty  shall  be  exchanged 
n  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  protocol  of  ex- 
hjge,  to  be  signed  by  authorized  representa- 

I  of  both  governments,  which  shall  consti- 
ii  in  integral  part  of  the  treaty  documents  and 
|h  shall  include  the  following:  that  nothing 
i  lis  treaty  shall  preclude  Panama  and  the 
li  ;d  States  from  making,  in  accordance  with 
li  respective  constitutional  processes,  any 
g  ;ment  or  arrangement  between  the  two 
6  tries  to  facilitate  performance  at  any  time 
6  Dec.  31,  1999,  of  their  responsibilities  to 
m  tain  the  regime  of  neutrality  established  in 
111  reaty,  including  agreements  or  arrange- 

II  s  for  the  stationing  of  any  United  States 
o  s  or  maintenance  of  defense  sites  after  that 
la  in  the  Republic  of  Panama  that  Panama 
a  the  United  States  may  deem  necessary  or 
ipjpriate.   [Adopted  82  to   16  on  March   15, 

9  •] 

)<  oncini  Condition 

fore  the  period  at  the  end  of  the  resolution 
i  tification,  insert  the  following: 

Subject  to  the  condition,  to  be  included  in 
hinstrument  of  ratification  of  the  treaty  to  be 
a  anged  with  the  Republic  of  Panama,  that. 

10  ithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article  V  or 
m  3ther  provision  of  the  treaty,  if  the  canal  is 
di ?d ,  or  its  operations  are  interfered  with,  the 
lied  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of 
Mima  shall  each  independently  have  the  right 
■ike  such  steps  as  it  deems  necessary,  in  ac- 
Wance  with  its  constitutional  processes,  in- 
kling the  use  of  military  force  in  Panama,  to 
Bqen  the  canal  or  restore  the  operations  of  the 
a^l  as  the  case  may  be."  [Adopted  75  to  23 
ttjlarch  16,  1978.] 

M  rvations 

i  Before  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
My.  the  two  parties  shall  begin  to  negotiate 


for  an  agreement  under  which  the  American 
Battle  Monuments  Commission  would,  upon 
the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  such  agreement 
and  thereafter,  administer,  free  of  all  taxes  and 
other  charges  and  without  compensation  to  the 
Republic  of  Panama  and  in  accordance  with  the 
practices,  privileges,  and  immunities  as- 
sociated with  the  administration  of  cemeteries 
outside  the  United  States  by  the  American  Bat- 
tle Monuments  Commission,  including  the  dis- 
play of  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  such  part 
of  Corozal  Cemetery  in  the  former  Canal  Zone 
as  encompasses  the  remains  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States. 

(2)  The  flag  of  the  United  States  may  be  dis- 
played pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
3  of  Article  VII  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty,  at 
such  part  of  Corozal  Cemetery  in  the  former 
Canal  Zone  as  emcompasses  the  remains  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States. 

(3)  The  President 

(a)  Shall  have  announced,  before  the  date 
of  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty,  his  intention  to 
transfer,  consistent  with  an  agreement  with  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  and  before  the  date  of 
termination  of  the  Panama  Canal  treaty,  to  the 
American  Battle  Monuments  Commission  the 
administration  of  such  part  of  Corozal  Ceme- 
tery as  encompasses  the  remains  of  citizens  of 
the  United  States;  and 

(b)  Shall  have  announced,  immediately 
after  the  date  of  exchange  of  the  instruments  of 
ratification,  plans,  to  be  carried  out  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  United  States  Government  for 

(i)  Removing,  before  the  date  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  treaty,  the  remains  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States  from  Mount  Hope  Ceme- 
tery to  such  part  of  Corozal  Cemetery  as  en- 
compasses such  remains,  except  that  the  re- 
mains of  any  citizen  whose  next  of  kin  objects 
in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  not  later 
than  three  months  after  the  date  of  exchange  of 
the  instruments  of  ratification  of  the  treaty 
shall  not  be  removed:  and 

(ii)  Transporting  to  the  United  States  for 
reinterment,  if  the  next  of  kin  so  requests,  not 
later  than  thirty  months  after  the  date  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  treaty,  any  such  remains  en- 
compassed by  Corozal  Cemetery  and,  before 
the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty,  any 
remains  removed  from  Mount  Hope  Cemetery 
pursuant  to  subclause  (i);  and 

(c)  Shall  have  fully  advised,  before  the 
date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty,  the  next  of 
kin  objecting  under  clause  (b)(i)  of  all  available 
options  and  their  implications.  [Reservations 
1-3  were  adopted  96  to  1  on  March  15,  1978] 

(4)  To  carry  out  the  purposes  of  Article  III  of 
the  treaty  of  assuring  the  security,  efficiency, 
and  proper  maintenance  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic 
of  Panama,  during  their  respective  periods  of 
responsibility  for  canal  operation  and  mainte- 
nance, shall,  unless  the  amount  of  the  operating 
revenues  of  the  canal  exceeds  the  amount 
needed  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  such  arti- 
cle, use  such  revenues  of  the  canal  only  for 


53 


purposes  consistent  with  the  purposes  of  Arti- 
cle III.  [Adopted  by  voice  vote  on  March  16, 
1978.1 


Understandings 

11)  Paragraph  1(c)  of  Article  III  of  the  treaty 
shall  be  construed  as  requiring,  before  any  ad- 
justment in  tolls  for  use  of  the  canal,  that  the 
effects  of  any  such  toll  adjustment  on  the  trade 
patterns  of  the  two  parties  shall  be  given  full 
consideration,  including  consideration  of  the 
following  factors  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
the  regime  of  neutrality: 

(a)  The  costs  of  operating  and  maintaining 
the  Panama  Canal; 

(b)  The  competitive  position  of  the  use  of 
the  canal  in  relation  to  other  means  of  transpor- 
tation; 

(c)  The  interests  of  both  parties  in  main- 
taining their  domestic  fleets; 

(d)  The  impact  of  such  an  adjustment  on 
the  various  geographical  areas  of  each  of  the 
two  parties;  and 

(e)  The  interest  of  both  parties  in 
maximizing  their  international  commerce. 

The  United  States  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  shall  cooperate  in  exchanging  informa- 
tion necessary  for  the  consideration  of  such  fac- 
tors. [Adopted  by  voice  vote  on  March  15, 
1978.] 

(2)  The  agreement  "to  maintain  the  regime 
of  neutrality  established  in  this  treaty"  in  Arti- 
cle IV  of  the  treaty  means  that  either  of  the  two 
parties  to  the  treaty  may,  in  accordance  with  its 
constitutional  processes,  take  unilateral  action 
to  defend  the  Panama  Canal  against  any  threat, 
as  determined  by  the  party  taking  such  action. 

(3)  The  determination  of  "need  or  emer- 
gency" for  the  purpose  of  any  vessel  of  war  or 
auxiliary  vessel  of  the  United  States  or  Panama 
going  to  the  head  of  the  line  of  vessels  in  order 
to  transit  the  Panama  Canal  rapidly  shall  be 
made  by  the  nation  operating  such  vessel. 

(4)  Nothing  in  the  treaty,  in  the  annexes,  or 
the  protocol  relating  to  the  treaty,  or  in  any 
other  agreement  relating  to  the  treaty  obligates 
the  United  States  to  provide  any  economic  as- 
sistance, military  grant  assistance,  security 
supporting  assistance,  foreign  military  sales 
credits,  or  international  military  education  and 
training  to  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

(5)  The  President  shall  include  all  amend- 
ments, reservations,  understandings,  declara- 
tions, and  other  statements  incorporated  by  the 
Senate  in  its  resolution  of  ratification  respect- 
ing this  treaty  in  the  instrument  of  ratification 
exchanged  with  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama.  [Understandings  2-5  adopted  by 
voice  vote  on  March  16,  1978] 


PANAMA  CANAL  TREATY 


Reservations 

(1)  Pursuant  to  its  adherence  to  the  principle 
of  nonintervention,   any   action   taken   by   the 


54 


United  Stales  of  America  in  the  exercise  ol  its 
rights  to  assure  that  the  Panama  Canal  shall 
remain  open,  neutral,  secure,  and  accessible, 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  this  treaty  and  the 
neutralii)  treaty  and  the  resolutions  of  advice 
and  consent  thereto,  shall  be  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assuring  that  the  canal  shall  remain 
open,  neutral,  secure,  and  accessible,  and  shall 
not  have  as  its  purpose  or  be  interpreted  as  a 
right  of  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  Republic  of  Panama  or  interference  with  its 
political  independence  or  sovereign  integrity. 
[Adopted  73  to  27  on  April  18,  1978.] 

(2)  Notwithstanding  any  other  provisions  of 
this  treaty,  no  funds  may  be  drawn  from  the 
United  States  Treasury  for  payments  under  Ar- 
ticle XIII,  paragraph  4,  without  statutory  au- 
thorization. |  Adopted  92  to  6  on  April  18. 
1978.] 

(3)  Any  accumulated  unpaid  balance  under 
paragraph  4(c)  of  Article  XIII  at  the  termination 
of  the  treaty  shall  be  payable  only  to  the  extent 
of  any  operating  surplus  in  the  last  year  of  the 
treaty's  duration,  and  that  nothing  in  that  para- 
graph may  be  construed  as  obligating  the 
United  States  of  America  to  pay  after  the  date 
of  the  termination  of  the  treaty  any  such  unpaid 
balance  which  shall  have  accrued  before  such 
date.  [Adopted  90  to  2  on  April  17,  1978.] 

(4)  Exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion shall  not  be  effective  earlier  than  March 
31,  1979,  and  the  treaties  shall  not  enter  into 
force  prior  to  October  1,  1979,  unless  legisla- 
tion necessary  to  implement  the  provisions  of 
the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  shall  have  been 
enacted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of 
America  before  March  31,  1979.  [Adopted  84 
to  3  on  April  17,  1978| 

(5)  The  instruments  of  ratification  to  be  ex- 
changed by  the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Panama  shall  each  include  provisions 
whereby  each  party  agrees  to  waive  its  rights 
and  release  the  other  party  from  its  obligations 
under  paragraph  2  of  Article  XII.  [Adopted  65 
to  27  on  April  17,  1978,  | 

id)  After  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
treaty,  the  Panama  Canal  Commission  shall, 
unless  it  is  otherwise  provided  by  legislation 
enacted  by  the  Congress,  be  obligated  to  reim- 
burse the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  as  nearly  as  possible,  for  the  interest 
cost  of  the  funds  or  other  assets  directly  in- 
vested in  the  Commission  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  America  and  for  the 
interest  cost  of  the  funds  or  other  assets  di- 
rectly invested  in  the  predecessor  Panama 
Canal  Company  by  the  government  and  not 
reimbursed  before  the  date  of  entry  into  force 
of  the  treaty  Such  reimbursement  of  such 
interests  costs  shall  he  made  at  a  rate  deter- 
mined bv  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  ot  the 
United  Si, ids  of  America  and  at  annual  inter- 
vals to  the  extent  earned,  and  if  not  earned, 
shall  be  made  from  subsequent  earnings.  For 
purposes  of  this  reservation,  the  phrase  "funds 
oi  other  assets  directly  invested"  shall  have  the 
same  meaning  as  the  phrase  "net  direct  in- 
vestment" has  under  section  62  of  Title  2  of 


Department  of  State  Bulle(| 


Central  America 


by  Terence  A.  Todman 

Central  America  is  a  microcosm,  in 
many  respects,  of  the  entire  inter- 
American  community.  Without  looking 
beyond  the  six  nations  of  the  isthmus. 
one  can  find  in  sharp  focus  the  dilem- 
mas that  challenge  many  Latin  societies 
as  they  pursue  the  important  but  some- 
times competing  goals  of  independ- 
ence, regional  cooperation,  security, 
human  rights,  economic  progress,  so- 
cial reform,  and  development  of  politi- 
cal institutions. 

The  resolution  of  these  dilemmas  is 
clearly  the  responsibility  of  the  people 


and  governments  of  the  Central  Amt- 
can  nations  themselves.  The  Unitf 
States  has  neither  the  right,  the  abili , 
nor  the  desire  to  impose  solutions  fni 
outside.  We  do  have  an  opportun} 
and  a  responsibility  to  make  our  o  i 
values  clear  and  to  respond  to  initt 
tives  that  advance  values  we  all  sharl 
As  we  look  at  Central  America  I 
day,  we  see  many  reasons  for  all  of  \ 
who  care  about  its  future  to  feel  (I 
couraged.  During  my  visit  in  Janutl 
to  the  area's  nations,  I  was  impress 
by  the  friendship  and  cooperation  ! 
ward  the  United  States  which  I  encoi 
tered  everywhere,  and  I  was  struck  I 


the  Canal  Zone  Code.   [Adopted  90  to   10  on 
April  18,  1978] 

Understandings 

(  1)  Nothing  in  paragraphs  3.  4,  and  5  of  Ar- 
ticle IV  may  be  construed  to  limit  either  the 
provisions  of  paragraph  1  of  Article  IV  provid- 
ing that  each  party  shall  act,  in  accordance  with 
its  constitutional  processes,  to  meet  danger 
threatening  the  security  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
or  the  provisions  of  paragraph  2  of  Article  IV 
providing  that  the  United  States  of  America 
shall  have  primary  responsibility  to  protect  and 
defend  the  canal  for  the  duration' of  the  treaty 
[Adopted  by  voice  vote  on  April  17,  1978   | 

1 2)  Before  the  first  date  of  the  three-year 
period  beginning  on  the  date  of  entry  into  force 
of  this  treaty  and  before  each  three-year  period 
following  thereafter,  the  two  parties  shall  agree 
upon  the  specific  levels  and  quality  of  services, 
as  are  referred  to  in  Article  III.  paragraph  5  of 
the  treats,  to  he  provided  during  the  following 
three-year  period  and,  except  for  the  first 
three-year  period,  on  the  reimbursement  to  be 
made  for  the  costs  of  such  services,  such  serv- 
ices to  be  limited  to  such  as  are  essential  to  the 
effective  functioning  of  such  canal  operating 
areas  and  such  housing  areas  referred  to  in  Ar- 
ticle III.  paragraph  5  of  the  treaty.  If  payments 
made  under  Article  III,  paragraph  5  of  the 
treaty  for  the  preceding  three-year  period,  in- 
cluding the  initial  three-year  period,  exceed  or 
are  less  than  the  actual  costs  to  the  Republic  of 
Panama  for  supplying,  during  such  period,  the 
specific  levels  and  quality  of  services  agreed 
upon,  then  the  Commission  shall  deduct  from 
or  add  to  the  payment  required  to  be  made  to 
the  Republic  o)  Panama  foi  each  of  the  follow- 
ing three  years  one  third  of  such  excess  or  deli 
cit.  as  the  case  may  be  there  shall  be  an  inde- 
pendent and  binding  audit,  conducted  by  an  au- 
ditor mutually  selected  by  both  parties,  of  any 


costs  of  services  disputed  by  the  two  par 
pursuant  to  the  reexamination  of  such  cc 
provided  for  in  this  understanding.  [Adopted 
to  3  on  April  17.  1978.] 

(3)  Nothing  in  paragraph  4(c)  of  Article  ) 
shall  he  construed  to  limit  the  authority  of 
United  States  of  America  through  the  Un 
States  Government  agency  called  the  Pan; 
Canal  Commission  to  make  such  financial  d 
sions  and  incur  such  expenses  as  are  reason; 
and  necessary  for  the  management,  operati 
and  maintenance  of  the  Panama  Canal.  In  ai 
tion,  toll  rates  established  pursuant  to  p; 
graph  2ldl  of  Article  III  need  not  be  se> 
levels  designed  to  produce  revenues  to  cc 
the  payment  to  Panama  described  in  paragr 
4(c)  of  Article  XIII. 

(4)  Any  agreement  concluded  pursuant 
Article  IX.  paragraph  11  with  respect  to 
transfer  of  prisoners  shall  be  concluded  in 
cordance  with  the  constitutional  processes 
both  parlies. 

(5)  Nothing  in  the  treaty,  in  the  annex, 
agreed  minute  relating  to  the  treaty,  or  in  ; 
other  agreement  relating  to  the  treaty  obliga 
the  United  States  to  provide  any  economic 
sist.ince.  military  grant  assistance,  secut 
supporting  assistance,  foreign  military  sa 
credits,  or  international  military  education  ; 
training  to  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

ioi  The  President  shall  include  all  reser 
tions  and  understandings  incorporated  by 
Senate  in  this  resolution  of  ratification  in 
instrument  of  ratification  exchanged  with 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  [I 
derstandings  3-6  adopted  by  voice  vote 
April  17,  1978] 


'For  texts  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  a 
the   Treaty   Concerning   the   Permaneni   N 
tralitv  and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  17,  1977,  p.  483. 


1978 


55 


(sense  of  progress  I  found  in  my  dis- 
_sions  with  both  public  and  private 
lor  leaders. 

Let  me  mention  briefly  six  major 
las   where   currents    in   Central 
jerica  merit  our  attention  and  our 
port. 

momic  Cooperation 

irst.  Central  America  has  pioneered 
concept  of  regional  economic  coop- 
ion  in  this  hemisphere.  The  Central 
erican  Common  Market,  launched 
he  early  1960's,  quickly  demon- 
ted  the  benefits  to  developing  na- 
is  of  a  cooperative  approach  to 
e.  Intraregional  as  well  as  external 
e  for  the  member  nations  increased 
stantially.  While  it  fell  short  of 
iting  a  true  common  market,  the 
■ement  produced  a  lowering  of  tariff 
iers  and  a  wide  range  of  coopera- 

efforts  among  the  parties, 
he  United  States  responded  by 
:turing  some  of  our  own  economic 
stance  programs  along  regional 
>.  In  addition,  the  Common  Market 
fitries  themselves  saw  their  new 
lomic  relationship  as  a  springboard 
new  proposals  and  institutions  for 
er  integration,  some  of  which  are 

under  consideration  by  the  Central 
;rican  governments, 
nfortunately,  the  experience  of  the 
tral  American  Common  Market  has 

provided  a  lesson  in  the  fragility 
egional  economic  institutions  and 
■  dependence  on  harmony  among 
iber  countries.  We  are  hopeful  that 
nt  progress  toward  settlement  of 
Honduras-El   Salvador  border  dis- 

will  enable  the  nations  of  the  re- 

to  give  the  Common  Market  a  new 
e  on  life  and  to  resume  progress 
ird  the  integrated  approach  to  eco- 
ic  development  whose  benefits  all 
gnize. 


»pute  Settlement 

his  leads  me  to  the  second  area 
fcre  encouraging  recent  develop- 
in:  its  in  Central  America  have  taken 
3l  e:  the  peaceful  settling  of  disputes. 
1  leaders  of  El  Salvador  and  Hon- 
lns  are  to  be  congratulated  for  put- 
U  8  years  of  strained  relations  behind 

n  and  moving  quickly  to  settle  the 
Mier  dispute  that  erupted  in  war  be- 
Iflen  the  two  countries  in  1969.  In  a 
Ejd  sequence  of  developments,  Hon- 
llis  and  El  Salvador  exchanged  ratifi- 
Mion  instruments  on  a  mediation 
Miement  last  November,  agreed  on 
8  selection  of  the  mediator  last  De- 
Biber,  and  underscored  their  com- 
•iment  to  peace  in  a  border  meeting 
Blheir  heads  of  state  in  January.  Dur- 


ing my  visit  shortly  thereafter,  I  ob- 
served the  strong  sentiment  among  citi- 
zens and  leaders  of  both  nations  in 
favor  of  restoring  good  relations  and 
getting  on  with  the  task  of  Central 
American  cooperation. 

Similar  good  will  and  mutual  re- 
straint have  marked  Central  American 
handling  of  other  potential  trouble 
spots — border  incidents  involving 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  and  the  more 
serious  territorial  dispute  involving 
Guatemala  and  Belize. 

Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  example 
of  pioneering  dispute  settlement  in  the 
Central  American  region  is  our  recent 
agreement  with  Panama  on  the  future 
of  the  Panama  Canal.  After  70  years  of 
tension  and  13  years  of  negotiation  to 
resolve  it,  the  United  States  and 
Panamanian  Governments  have  agreed 
on  a  new  relationship  making  them  true 
partners  in  the  canal's  operation  and 
defense  and  paving  the  way  for  the  as- 
sumption of  all  canal  operating  respon- 
sibilities by  Panama  at  the  end  of  this 
century. 

The  significance  of  this  achievement 
extends  far  beyond  the  bilateral  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
Panama.  U.S.  ratification  of  the 
Panama  Canal  treaties,1  which  I  am 
confident  will  occur  in  the  very  near  fu- 
ture, will  signal  throughout  this 
hemisphere — indeed,  throughout  the 
world — the  willingness  of  the  United 
States  to  seek  modern,  mature  relation- 
ships based  on  mutual  respect,  mutual 
interest,  and  negotiation. 


Inter-American  Institutions 

Development  of  Inter-American 
institutions  which  facilitate  coopera- 
tion is  another  area  where  Central 
American  initiatives  have  been  nota- 
ble. The  Central  American  Court  of 
Justice  in  the  early  decades  of  this 
century  was  a  pioneering  effort  to 
strengthen  international  law.  San 
Jose,  home  of  many  distinguished  in- 
ternational lawyers,  has  been  the  site 
of  major  developments  from  the  1975 
Protocol  of  Amendment  to  the  Rio 
Treaty  [Inter-American  Treaty  of  Re- 
ciprocal Assistance]  and  the  decision  to 
place  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  sanctions  against  Cuba  on 
a  voluntary  basis,  to  the  negotiation  of 
the  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.2  Costa  Rican  leadership  has 
also  been  a  strong  and  consistent  factor 
in  the  growth  of  the  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights.  Recent 
invitations  to  the  Commission  from 
Panama  and  El  Salvador,  and  their  ef- 
fective cooperation  during  the  visits, 
have  provided  an  additional  Central 


American  boost  to  its  strength  and  ef- 
fectiveness. 

Central  American  interest  in  the  af- 
fairs of  the  larger  inter-American 
community  has  been  further  reflected 
in  increasing  attention  to  the  links  be- 
tween their  own  nations,  the  rim  of  na- 
tions of  North  and  South  America,  and 
the  island  nations  of  the  West  Indies  in 
a  "greater  Caribbean  basin."  This 
theme  was  developed  with  force  and 
sensitivity  by  Costa  Rica's  President 
Oduber  at  a  Caribbean  conference  simi- 
lar to  this  Central  American  Confer- 
ence last  month  in  Miami  and  has  be- 
come an  important  part  of  our  own  ap- 
proach to  Caribbean  cooperation. 


Human  Rights 

A  fourth  area  to  watch  for  construc- 
tive changes  in  Central  America  is  that 
of  human  rights.  I  had  the  good  fortune 
of  spending  two  of  the  best  years  of  my 
life  in  one  of  the  hemisphere's  most 
admired  models  of  a  free  and  open  so- 
ciety. And  I  can  only  envy  [U.S.]  Am- 
bassador [to  Costa  Rica  Marvin] 
Weissman  the  experience  of  having 
been  on  the  scene  to  witness  the  unin- 
hibited, vigorously  contested  presiden- 
tial campaign  that  culminated  in  last 
week's  election,  demonstrating  once 
again  why  Costa  Rican  politics  is  a 
source  of  such  fascination  both  for  its 
own  citizens  and  for  its  outside  admir- 
ers. 

Less  widely  known  is  the  fact  that 
extensive  freedom  of  expression  is  in- 
creasingly becoming  the  norm  rather 
than  the  exception,  not  only  in  Costa 
Rica  but  in  its  neighbors  as  well. 
Panama's  plebiscite  on  the  canal 
treaties,  which  led  to  their  overwhelm- 
ing approval  by  the  people  of  Panama, 
was  the  more  impressive  because  it  was 
preceded  by  a  free  and  open  debate  in 
the  Panamanian  press.  In  Honduras,  in 
Guatemala,  in  Nicaragua,  in  El 
Salvador — in  short,  throughout  Central 
America — the  press  is  not  only  gener- 
ally unfettered  but  often  unusually 
vocal.  One  of  the  more  noteworthy  as- 
pects of  the  recent  tensions  in 
Nicaragua  has  been  the  ability  of  the 
government,  the  press,  and  most  sec- 
tors of  the  opposition  to  avoid  extremes 
or  the  resort  to  violence  in  dealing  with 
even  major  differences. 

A  more  serious  challenge  for  several 
Central  American  countries  is  insuring 
that  basic  rights  of  the  person  are  not 
sacrificed  in  an  effort  to  combat  serious 
threats  to  the  fabric  of  society — and  in- 
deed to  the  rights  of  the  individuals — 
from  terrorism  and  insurgency.  We  be- 
lieve violations  of  human  rights  are  a 
major  problem. 


56 


We  also  believe  the  performance  of 
each  challenged  country  in  Central 
America  has  improved,  reflecting  the 
desire  of  national  leaders  to  respect  in- 
ternational standards  and  to  discourage 
abuses  by  lower  echelon  units  often 
acting  contrary  to  official  policy.  The 
notable  restraint  shown  by  Guatemala 
under  President  Laugerud  in  the  face  of 
recent  acts  of  terrorism  has  improved 
the  human  rights  climate  in  that  coun- 
try in  many  respects.  Another  example 
of  important  human  rights  improve- 
ments in  the  face  of  continuing  prob- 
lems can  be  seen  in  El  Salvador,  which 
under  President  Romero  has  abandoned 
the  state  of  seige,  given  freer  rein  to 
the  press,  invited  political  exiles  to  re- 
turn, and  requested  on-site  inspection 
by  the  Inter-American  Human  Rights 
Commission. 

Political  Participation 

Increasing  public  participation  in  the 
political  process  is  a  fifth  area  where 
developments  in  Central  America  are 
particularly  encouraging.  Every  coun- 
try in  Central  America  has  either  just 
held  elections,  as  in  El  Salvador  and 
Costa  Rica,  or  is  preparing  to  hold 
them.  Guatemala,  which  faces  a  na- 
tional election  this  March,  has  a 
genuine  contest  among  candidates  and 
parties  of  differing  viewpoints.  Elec- 
tions are  scheduled  in  Panama  for  Au- 
gust of  this  year.  Honduras  is  now  ac- 
tively engaged  in  the  process  of  effect- 
ing a  transition  to  an  elected  civilian 
government.  In  Nicaragua — under 
normal  circumstances — according  to 
the  present  timetable,  elections  are  to 
be  held  in  1981.  We  hope  an  early 
dialogue  among  all  responsible  ele- 
ments will  lead  to  the  widest  possible 
participation  in  the  entire  electoral 
process. 

An  underlying  challenge  for  many 
Central  American  societies  is  how  to 
initiate  communication  to  heal  the  deep 
rifts  separating  social  groups  and  de- 
velop institutions  to  facilitate  full  par- 
ticipation in  the  political  choices  of  the 
nation.  Elections  in  which  major  por- 
tions of  the  electorate  are  excluded  or 
exclude  themselves  or  elections  in 
which  the  results  are  subverted,  reveal 
all  too  clearly  the  deep-seated  obstacles 
to  the  political  development  all  Central 
American  societies  seek. 

Meeting  Human  Needs 

Finally,  Central  American  nations 
are  making  major  efforts  to  meet  the 
human  needs  of  their  people.  They 
have  made  impressive  economic  prog- 
ress through  regional  cooperation,  na- 
tional development  policies,  responsi- 


Department  of  State  Bulli 


ble  fiscal  management,  and  a  friendly 
attitude  toward  investors.  Their  em- 
phasis on  the  development  of  their  tre- 
mendous energy  potential  will  provide 
reliable  supplies  of  electricity  and 
proper  water  control  to  power  their 
overall  future  economic  development. 
Nicaragua  and  Guatemala  have  made 
commendable  recovery  efforts  from  the 
earthquakes  that  ravaged  them  earlier 
in  this  decade,  with  Guatemala  winning 
special  praise  from  many  quarters  for 
its  handling  of  the  reconstruction  after 
the  most  recent  disaster. 

The  most  serious  economic  challenge 
facing  Central  American  nations,  like 
our  own,  is  how  to  distribute  the  fruits 
of  economic  progress  more  equitably 
among  the  people  of  the  society,  par- 
ticularly those  who  have  been  tradi- 
tionally cut  off  from  the  sources  of 
wealth,  power,  and  education  available 
to  others. 

Here  too  major  efforts  are  underway 
in  Central  America.  Honduras,  the 
third  poorest  country  in  the  hemi- 
sphere, has  a  reformist  government  that 
is  making  notable  progress  despite 
formidable  obstacles.  The  present  ad- 
ministrations in  Panama  and  Costa  Rica 
have  placed  strong  emphasis  on  pro- 
grams for  the  disadvantaged  and  for  a 
wider  sharing  of  power.  Throughout 
Central  America,  the  trend  toward 
more  equitable  and  participatory 
societies  is  evident — despite  the  resist- 
ance of  the  few  in  whose  hands  wealth 
and  power  have  been  concentrated  for 
so  long. 

Given  our  own  shortcomings,  the 
United  States  is  in  no  position  to 
preach.  But  we  are  in  a  position  to 
understand,  to  care,  and  occasionally, 
to  help. 

Although  so  far  I  have  spoken 
mainly  of  government  policies,  we  also 
recognize  the  responsibilities,  lead- 
ership, and  resources  of  our  private 
sector.  The  American  business  com- 
munity has  long  been  deeply  involved 
in  the  societies  of  Central  America. 
Today  it  has  new  opportunities  to  play 
a  major  and  mutually  beneficial  de- 
velopment role.  In  the  course  of  this 
conference  we  have  heard  repeatedly 
from  business  and  government  experts 
the  many  ways  in  which  increased  trade 
and  investment  in  Central  America  can 
produce  income  and  jobs  not  only  for 
the  host  countries  but  for  our  American 
workers  and  investors.  Economic  inter- 
dependence is  not  a  theory;  it's  a  fact. 

Beyond  economics,  however,  the 
creative  partnership  between  American 
enterprise  and  Central  American  na- 
tions can  strengthen  the  positive  forces 
within  our  societies  and  enrich  the 
human  side  of  all  our  lives.  Responsi- 
ble business  policies,  which  take  into 


Cuba 


Foreign  Relations  Outline 

From  the  early  days  of  our  Republ, 
the  United  States  has  had  a  close 
sometimes  difficult  association  w 
Cuba.   U.S.   relations  with  Cuba  < 
teriorated  sharply  following  the  rise 
power  in  1959  of  Fidel  Castro  and 
subsequent  turn  to  the  Soviet  Uni< 
Diplomatic    ties    were    severed 
January  1961.  The  Carter  Administ 
tion  has  begun  an  effort  to  improve 
lations  with  Cuba,  but  normalizati 
will  take  a  long  time  and  will  depe 
on  many  factors,  including  Cuba's 
ternational  behavior. 

U.S.  Policy 

The  United  States  is  convinced  tl 
its  best  interests  are  served  by  ma 
taining  communications  with  all  coi 
tries,  whether  it  approves  of  their 
ernments  or  not.  Steps  toward  nor 


>rn 


account  the  long-term  developmt 
priorities  set  by  Central  Americ 
societies  themselves,  can  offer  subst; 
tial  returns  not  only  in  profits  but  a 
in  fostering  the  kind  of  environment 
which  growth  is  sustained,  rights  ; 
respected,  tourism  and  other  forms 
human  interchange  thrive,  and  futi 
dealings  are  welcomed. 

All  of  us  here  today  have  a  role 
shaping  the  relationships  between  c 
own  nation  and  our  neighbors,  and  cc 
tributing  to  a  peaceful  and  humane  1 
ture  for  the  Central  American  and  t 
world  community.   It  is  a  task  calli 
upon  all  the  ingenuity  and  resourcefi 
ness  for  which  American  enterprit 
rightly  prides  itself.  And  it  is  a  task 
am  confident  you  will  find  worthy 
your  highest  personal  endeavor. 


Based  on  an  address  before  the  third  am 
Conference  on  U.S. -Central  American  Trc 
and  Investment  in  New  Orleans  on  Feb. 
1978.  Ambassador  Todman  is  Assistnal  Sec 
tary  for  Inter- American  Affairs. 

'The  Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent 
the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutral 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal  on  Mar.  1 
1978,  and  to  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  on  A| 
18.  For  texts  of  Panama  Canal  treaties,  I 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  17,  1977,  p.  481;  for  texts 
Senate  additions  to  the  treaties,  see  p.  52. 

2For  text  of  American  Convention  on  Hum 
Rights,  see  Bulletin  of  July  4,  1977,  p.  28. 


978 


57 


jjtions  with  Cuba,  however,  must  be 
insured  and  reciprocal.  Only  through 
^ogue  can  we  begin  to  resolve  the 
ijicult  problems  that  now  stand  be- 

(len  the  Cuban  Government  and  our . — 

4\.  The  United  States  desires: 
Improvement  in   human  rights  in     MULTILATERAL 


TREATIES:     Current  Actions 


t\  Release  of  political  prisoners, 
Uisands  of  whom  have  been  jailed  for 

s; 

More  responsible  international  be- 
iBior  by  Cuba,  particularly  in  Africa; 

[1  Compensation  to  U.S.  citizens  and 
<l  nesses  whose  property  was  taken 
lr  by  the  Cuban  Government. 

.!  >s  Toward  Normalization 

1 1  the  past  year,  the  Carter  Adminis- 
rson  has  taken  several  steps  to  im- 
S'e  relations  with  Cuba.  It  has: 

Granted  visas  to  selected  Cuban 
pens  to  visit  the  United  States; 
I Lifted  the  ban  on  U.S.  travel  to 

a; 
|  Negotiated  the  establishment  of 
■pmatic  "interests  sections";  and 

i  Further  modified  but  not  lifted  the 
J .  trade  embargo. 

1 1  mid-January  talks  were  held  in 
i  ana  between  our  two  Coast  Guards 
I  uch  issues  as  improving  communi- 
■ms,  cooperating  in  search  and  res- 
x  in  international  waters,  and  curbing 
k;  traffic  and  terrorism. 

ft  teries  and  Maritime  Boundary 

,  nly  90  miles  of  water  separate  the 
Ji  ed  States  and  Cuba,  and  both  coun- 
r  5  have  established  200-mile 
rfhore  fishery  zones.  Negotiations 
DM  Cuba  to  define  the  maritime 
xidary  began  in  March  1977  and  re- 
al :d  in  the  signing,  a  month  later,  of 
p/isional  maritime  boundary  and 
filing  rights  agreements. 

It  -rests  Sections 

he  United  States  opened  an  inter- 
e  section  in  the  Swiss  Embassy  in 
rl  ana  on  September  1,  1977,  while 
di Cubans  established  one  in  Washing- 
©  in  the  Czechoslovak  Embassy.  The 
t>n  purposes  of  our  interests  section 
a  to  facilitate  communications  be- 
Wen  the  two  governments  and  to  pro- 
•S:  a  broader  range  of  consular  serv- 


Uiatriation  Program 

i'he  United  States  has  urged  the  re- 
fc.e  of  political  prisioners  in  Cuba, 
*i  some  U.S.  citizens — imprisoned 


Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  re- 
turn of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS 
6599. 

Ratification  deposited:   Italy,  March  31, 
1978. 


Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  De- 
cember 16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October 
14.  1971.  TIAS  7192. 

Ratification  deposited:  Singapore,  April   12. 
1978. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  September  23,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570 
Ratification  deposited:  Singapore,  April  12, 
1978. 


Bills  of  Lading 

International  convention  for  the  unification  of 
certain  rules  relating  to  bills  of  lading  and 
protocol  of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels  Au- 
gust 25,  1924.  Entered  into  force  June  2, 
1931;  for  the  U.S.  December  29,  1937.  51 
Stat.  233. 

Adherence  deposited:  Senegal,  February   14. 
1978. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 6,    1977;   for  the   U.S.   January   3, 

1979. 
Accessions  deposited:   India,  January   27, 

1978;  Liberia,  Feburary  14.  1978. 
Ratification   deposited:   United   Kingdom, 

March  8,  1978. 

Energy 

Agreement  on  an  international  energy  program. 
Done  at  Paris  November  18,   1974.  Entered 
into  force  January  19,  1976.  TIAS  8278. 
Notification  of  consent  to  be  bound  depos- 
ited: Italy,  February  3,  1978. 


for  a  variety  of  offenses — have  been 
freed.  In  1977  a  number  of  American 
citizens  and  their  Cuban  families  were 
permitted  to  leave  the  country.  Another 
group  of  125  persons  with  dual  U.S.- 
Cuban citizenship  was  allowed  to  leave 
for  the  United  States  in  February  1978 
under  this  repatriation  program. 

Trade  Embargo 

In  1962  the  United  States  banned  all 
U.S.  trade  with  Cuba  except  for 
foodstuffs,  medicines,  and  medical 
equipment  needed  for  humanitarian 
reasons.  We  also  prohibited  foreign 
ships  that  traded  with  Cuba  from  land- 
ing at  U.S.  ports.  These  restrictions 
were  modified  in  1975  to  permit  busi- 
ness transactions  between  Cuba  and 
U.S.  subsidiaries  in  third  countries  if 
those  countries  agreed.  The  U.S.  ban 
on  foreign  shipping  calling  at  Cuban 
ports  was  rescinded  in  June  1977,  but 
U.S.  ships  still  cannot  trade  at  Cuban 
ports. 

Before  the  trade  embargo,  two-way 
trade  totaled  over  $1  billion  annually, 
and  it  has  been  estimated  that  we  could 
sell  $300  million  worth  of  agricultural 
commodities,  farm  machinery,  indus- 


trial equipment,  and  computer  hardware 
to  Cuba  each  year.  The  embargo  will 
not  be  ended,  however,  until  the  claims 
of  U.S.  citizens  and  corporations  for 
losses  suffered  through  expropriation 
are  resolved.  About  5,900  of  these 
claims,  amounting  to  $1.8  billion,  have 
been  certified  by  the  U.S.  Foreign 
Claims  Settlement  Commission.  We  re- 
gard their  settlement  as  essential  to 
normalizing  relations. 

African  Involvement 

Cuba's  involvement  in  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  and  other  parts  of  Africa  has 
continued  to  grow.  The  presence  in 
Ethiopia  of  10,000  Cuban  troops,  and  in 
Angola  of  some  19,000,  is  an  obstacle 
to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  dis- 
putes there.  There  cannot  be  any  signif- 
icant improvement  in  U.S. -Cuban  rela- 
tions until  the  level  of  these  military  ad- 
ventures is  sharply  reduced.  □ 


Based  on  a  Department  of  State  publication  in 
the  Gist  series,  released  in  March  1978.  This 
outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  reference  aid 
on  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not  intended  as 
a  comprehensive  U.S.  foreign  policy  statement. 


58 


Department  of  State  Buiij 


Environmental  Modification 

Convention   on   the  prohibition   of  military   or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.   Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.' 
Signature.  Ghana,  March  21,  147X 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Fund,  with  schedules  Done  at  Abidjan 
November  29.  1972.  Entered  into  force  June 
30,  1973;  for  the  U.S.  November  18,  1976. 
TIAS  8605 

Accession  deposited:  Kuwait,  December  15, 
1977 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  November 
30,  1977. 
Accession  deposited:  Fiji,  March  28,  1978. 

Human  Rights 

International   covenant   on   civil   and   political 
rights.    Done   at   New   York    December    16, 
1966.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1 976  - 
Accession   deposited:    Dominican   Republic. 
January  4,  1978. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social  and 
cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York  December 
16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  January  3, 
1976. 2 

Optional  protocol  to  the  international  covenant 
on  civil  and  political  rights.  Done  at  New 
York  December  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force 
March  23,  1976- 

Accession  deposited:   Dominican   Republic, 
January  4,  1978. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international 
maritime  traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don April  9,  1965.  Entered  into  force  March 
5,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  May  16.  1967  TIAS 
6251. 

Accession  deposited:    Liberia.   February    14, 
1978. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  on  civil  liability  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 
November  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June 
19.  1975- 

Accession  deposited:   German   Democratic- 
Republic   (with   statements),    March    13, 
1978. 
International   convention   on   the   establishment 
of  an  international  fund  for  compensation  for 
oil  pollution  damage.   Done  at  Brussels  De- 
cember 18,  1971.' 

Ratification  deposited:    Yugoslavia,  March 
16,   1978. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees. 
Done  at  New  York  January  31,  1967.  En- 
tered into  force  October  4.  1967;  for  the  U.S. 
November  I.  1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Costa  Rica  March  28, 
1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  foi 


preventing  collisions  at  sea,   1972.    Done  at 
London  October  20,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Accessions  deposited:   Dominican  Republic. 

March    15,    1978;   Tunisia,   February    1, 

1978. 
International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea,    1974,   with   annex.   Done  at   London 
November  1 .   1974  ' 
Accession  deposited     Panama,   March   9, 

1978. 
Ratification  deposited:    Denmark,   March   8, 

1978. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  dam- 
age caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Wash- 
ington, London,  and  Moscow  March  29. 
1972.  Entered  into  force  September  1,  1972; 
for  the  U.S.  October  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accessions  deposited:  Malta,  January  13, 
1978;  Seychelles,  January  5,  1978. 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  January 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  September  15. 
1976.  TIAS  8480. 

Ratification   deposited:    United   Kingdom. 
March  30,  1978. 

Terrorism 

Convention  to  prevent  and  punish  the  acts  of 
terrorism  taking  the  form  of  crimes  against 
persons  and  related  extortion  that  are  of 
international  significance.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton February  2,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oc- 
tober 16,  1973;  for  the  U.S.  October  20, 
1976. TIAS  8413. 

Ratification  deposited:   Uruguay,   March   17. 
1978. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships.  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.' 

Accession   deposited:    Panama,    March   9. 
1978. 

Whaling 

Amendments   to   the   schedule   to   the   interna- 
tional convention  for  the  regulation  of  whal- 
ing,   1946  (TIAS    1849).   Adopted   at   Tokyo 
December  7,  1977.  Entered  into  force  March 
21.  1978 

Wills 

Convention  providing  a  uniform  law  on  the 
form  of  an  international  will,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Washington  October  26,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  February  9,  1978. - 
/  (tended  to:  Ontario  effective  March  31, 
1978. 

World  Health  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization 
Done  at  New  York  July  22,  1946.  Entered 
into  force  April  7,  1948;  for  the  U.S.  June 
21,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Djibouti.    March    10, 
1978. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project  agreement  for  national  developi 
training.  Signed  at  Kabul  May  22,  1977. 
tered  into  force  May  22,  1977. 

Austria 

Air  transport  agreement.  Signed  at  Vienna 
23.  1966    Entered  into  force  July  23.  1 
TIAS  6066. 
Notice  of  termination:    Austria.   March 
1978,  effective  March  9,  1979. 

Agreement  regarding  mutual  assistance 
tween  the  U.S.  and  Austrian  Customs  5 
ices.  Signed  at  Vienna  September  15,  19' 
Entry  into  force:  July  3,  1978. 


Bangladesh 

Project  agreement  for  a  rural  electrific 
project.  Signed  at  Dacca  December  15,  1 
Entered  into  force  December  15.  1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sal 
agricultural  commodities  of  January 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  note 
Dacca  March  3,  1978.  Entered  into  I 
March  3,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  | 
to  Bangladesh.  Signed  at  Dacca  March 
1978.  Entered  into  force  March  16.  197! 

Bolivia 

Project  loan  agreement  to  finance  the  cos 
goods  and  services  required  for  the  Agi 
ture  Sector  II  project  Signed  at  La 
November  24,  1977.  Entered  into  1 
November  24,  1977. 


Canada 

Agreement   amending   and   supplementinj 
agreement  of  March  9,   1959  (TIAS  4  I 
5117,  5608,  6236,  7408),  governing  tol  | 
the  St    Lawrence  Seaway.   Effected  by 
change  of  notes  at  Washington  March 
1978.  Entered  into  force  March  20.  197: 

Chile 

Agreement    relating    to    a    coopera 
meteorological'  observation   program 
Chile    Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  I 
tiago  February    23.  June  2.  and  Septembi  I 

1977.  Entered  into  force  February  15.  I  il 
effective  January  I,  1977. 

China,  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  inlin 
agreement  of  December  16,  1977,  rel.ttino 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  I  ' 
textiles  and  textile  products  Effected  byjft 
change  of  notes  at  Washington  March  I 

1978.  Entered  into  force  March  30,  19781 

ER\P« 

Agreement  modifying  and  extending  '• 
agreement  of  October  28.  1975  (TIAS  8ll 
concerning  exhibition  of  the  "treasure* 
Tutankhamun"  and  other  items  » 
I'haraonic  art  to  include  the  Fine  /■ 
Museums  of  San  Francisco.  Effected  b> if 
change  of  notes  at  Washington  Februar;  I 


1978 

lid   March   29.    1978.    Entered   into   force 
•arch  29,   1978. 

Gambia 

eement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  grain 
The  Gambia  Signed  at  Banjul  January  12 
id  February  20,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
sbniarj  20,  1978. 

gary 

eement  relating  to  reciprocal  facilitation  of 
ansit  or  temporary  duty  visas  for  diplomatic 
id  official  passport  holders.  Effected  by  ex- 
tange  of  notes  at  Budapest  February  10. 
)78.  Entered  into  force  April  11,  1978. 
eement  on  trade  relations.  Signed  at 
udapest  March  17,  1978.  Enters  into  force 
i  the  date  of  exchange  of  written  notices  of 
ceptance  by  the  two  governments. 

eed  minutes  of  the  fourth  session  of  the 
nited  States-Iran  Joint  Commission  for 
conomic  Cooperation  Signed  at  Washing- 
n  February  28,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
february  28,  1978. 


«n  agreement  to  finance  the  foreign  ex- 
lange  costs  of  certain  commodities  and 
immodity-related  services.  Signed  at 
ingston  December  15,  1977.  Entered  into 
rce  December  15,  1977. 

tn 

ty  on  extradition,  with  exchange  of  notes, 
gned  at  Tokyo  March  3,  1978.  Enters  into 
rce  on  the  30th  day  after  the  date  of  ex- 
lange  of  instruments  of  ratification. 

K  ea.  Republic  of 

A  -ement  extending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
rstanding  of  December  19.  1975,  and 
nuary    15,   1976  (TIAS  8609),  relating  to 

:!  e  development  of  the  Korea  Standards  Re- 
arch  Institute.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
rs  at  Seoul  and  Washington  October  24  and 
;cember   12,   1977.  and  January  6,   1978. 

Ml  ltered  into  force  January  6,  1978. 

M  ico 

I  cement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 

iports  from   Mexico  during  calendar  year 

>78.   Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 

ashington   December  21,    1977,  and  Feb- 

iary  22,   1978.  Entered  into  force  February 

■  :,  1978;  effective  January  1,  1978. 
fiaement  extending  the  agreement  of  June  23, 

)76  (TIAS  8533),  concerning  procedures 
r  mutual  assistance  in  the  administration  of 

■  stice  in  connection  with  the  General  Tire 
id  Rubber  Company  and  the  Firestone  Tire 
id  Rubber  Company  matters  to  include  the 

IjcDonnell  Douglas  Corporation.  Effected 
*)'  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  Feb- 
Bary  23  and  March  6,  1978.  Entered  into 
-  [rce  March  6,  1978. 


Heement   for  sales  of  agricultural   com- 

odities,   relating  to  the  agreement  of  May 

■7,  1976  (TIAS  8309).  Signed  at  Rabat  Feb- 


59 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

l>«*f»eirf iim'iiI  of  State 


March  16-April  24 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*  124  3/16  U.S.,  Soviet  Union  agree  to 
increase  air  service.  Mar.  3. 

*125  3/17  Convention  for  the  Conserva- 
tion of  Antarctic  Seals  enters 
into  force.  Mar    1 1 . 

*126  3/17  U.S..  U.K.  announce  agree- 
ments on  North  Atlantic  air 
fares  and  charter  services. 


*  I  27         3/20       Program  for  the  official  visit  to 

Washington  of  Israeli  Prime 
Minister  Menahem  Begin 
and  Mrs.  Begin,  Mar. 
20-23. 

*128  3/20  St.  Lawrence  Seaway  toll 
agreement  . 

1 129  3/21  Vance:  statement  on  Senate 
passage  of  Panama  Canal 
neutrality  treaty.  Mar.   16. 

*  1 30        3/21        Advisory  Committee  on  Private 

International  Law.  study 
group  on  hotelkeeper's  lia- 
bility. Mar.  29. 


ruary  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force  February  3, 
1978. 

Netherlands 

Protocol  amending  the  air  transport  agreement 
of  April  3.  1957,  as  amended  (TIAS  4782. 
6797),  and  relating  to  charter  services  and 
other  matters.  Signed  at  Washington  March 
31.  1978.  Entered  into  force  March  31, 
1978. 

Niger 

Project  grant  agreement  relating  to  range  man- 
agement and  livestock  production,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Niamey  September  26, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  September  26. 
1977. 

Panama 

Project  loan  agreement  regarding  integrated 
rural  development.  Signed  at  Panama 
November  25,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
November  25,  1977. 

Treaty  concerning  the  permanent  neutrality  and 
operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  with  annexes 
and  related  protocol.  Signed  at  Washington 
September  7,  1977.' 

Senate  Advice  and  Consent  to  Ratification: 
March  16,  1978.' 

Paraguay 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  February  28.  1947  (TIAS  1753),  and 
relating  to  charter  air  services.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Asuncion  March  8  and 
9,  1978.  Entered  into  force  March  9,  1978. 

Portugal 

Loan  agreement  for  balance  of  payments  sup- 
port. Signed  at  Lisbon  March  1,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  March  1,  1978. 

Senegal 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  grain 
to  Senegal  Signed  at  Dakar  February  21, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  February  21,  1978. 

Sri  Lanka 

Loan  agreement  for  agricultural  base  mapping. 


Signed  at  Colombo  February  28,   1978.  En- 
tered into  force  February  28,  1978. 
Loan  agreement  regarding  malaria  control. 
Signed  at  Colombo  February  28.   1978.  En- 
tered into  force  February  28,  1978. 

Sudan 

Agreement   for  sales  of  agricultural   com- 
modities. Signed  at  Khartoum  December  24, 
1977. 
Entered  into  force:  January  24,  1978. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7, 
1976  (TIAS  8506).  Signed  at  Tunis  February 
3,  1978.  Entered  into  force  February  3, 
1978. 

U.S.S.R. 

Interim  agreement  amending  the  civil  air  trans- 
port agreement  of  November  4,  1966  (TIAS 
6135),  as  amended  by  the  protocol  of  June 
23,  1973  (TIAS  7658),  and  confirming  cer- 
tain understandings  relating  to  air  transporta- 
tion. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington March  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
March  3,  1978. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  relating  to  North  Atlantic  air  fares. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washing- 
ton March  17,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
March  17,  1978. 

Venezuela 

Maritime  boundary  treaty.  Signed  at  Caracas 
March  28,  1978.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date 
of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperation  in  the  narcotics  field.  Signed  at 
Caracas  March  28.  1978.  Entered  into  force 
March  28,  1978.  □ 


'Not  in  force. 

2Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

'With  amendments,  conditions,  reservations, 

and  understandings. 


60 

*  1 3 1 

*  132 


►133 


*134 


135 
"136 


►137 


"138 


'139 


*147 


»149 
"150 


151 


3/21 


3/21 


3/21 


3/21 


3/24 
3/28 


3/28 


3/29 


*I40        3/31 


*141 

3/31 

*142 

3/3 1 

*143 

3/31 

*I44 

3/31 

145 

4/4 

*146 

4/5 

4/5 


*  148        4/5 


4/5 
4/5 


4/6 


*152        4/6 


*  153 


4/7 


Robert  J  McCloskey  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Greece. 
Mar.  9  (biographic  data). 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO,  National 
Committee  for  the  Preven- 
tion of  Marine  Pollution, 
Apr    25 

SCC,  Subcommittee  on  Safety 
of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on  standards 
of  (raining  and  watchkeep- 
ing,  Apr.  26 

SCC,  SOLAS,  radio  group  on 
radio  communications, 
Apr.  27. 

Vance:  news  conference. 

Joint  report  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Canada  and  the 
U.S.  by  special  maritime 
negotiators  Marcel  Cadieux 
and  Lloyd  N.  Cutler. 

Study  Group  8  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization for  the  Interna- 
tional Radio  Consultative 
Committee  (CCIR),  Apr.  21 

Program  of  Atlanta  Conference 
on  U.S.  Interests  in  the  Mid- 
dle Easl,  Atlanta,  Apr.  5. 

U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on 
International  Educational 
and  Cultural  Affairs  releases 
14th  annual  report. 

Second  round  of  Great  Lakes 
water  quality  agreement 
negotiations,  Mar.  30. 

U.S.,  Singapore  sign  air  trans- 
port agreement 

U.S.,  Netherlands  sign  avia- 
tion agreement. 

CCIR.  study  groups  10  and  11, 
Apr.  21. 

SCC.  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  bulk  chemicals.  Apr.  24. 

U.S.  program  for  the  eastern 
Mediterranean. 

U.S.,  Republic  of  China  amend 
interim  agreement  on  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  textiles,  Mar.  30. 

National  Committee  of  the 
U.S.  Organization  for  the 
CCIR.  May  4. 

Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises.  Apr.  27. 

SCC,  June  7. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  subdivision  and  stability. 
May  9. 

Vance:  statement  before  'he 
House  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations  on  secu- 
rity assistance  proposals  lor 
Greece.  Cyprus,  and  Turkey. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  ad  hoc  winking 
group  on  nuclear  ships. 
May  3. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  ad  hoc  working 


154  4/10 

154A  4/10 

*  155  4/10 

+  156  4/10 

*  157  4/11 
♦158  4/11 

*  159  4/11 

*160  4/12 

*161  4/12 

*162  4/12 

*163  4/13 

*164  4/14 

*165  4/14 

*  1 66  4/15 

*  1 67  4/ 1  5 

*  168  4/16 

*  1 69  4/16 
+  170  4/17 

+  171  4/17 

172 

♦173  4/17 


group  on  nuclear  ships. 
May  31. 

Vance:  address  on  arms  control 
before  the  American  Society 
of  Newspaper  Editors 
(ASNE). 

Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  ASNE 
address. 

International  Center  to  house 
chanceries  of  foreign  embas- 
sies  in  Washington  and 
buildings  for  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  Slates 

Procedure  for  requesting  li- 
cences for  marlin  hillfish 
sportfishing  in  (he  Cuban 
fishing  zone 

Program  for  the  state  visit  of 
Romanian  President  and 
Mrs.  Ceausescu,  Apr.  11-17. 

Alfred  L.  Atherton.  Jr  .  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  at  Large 
(biographic  data) 

Harold  H  Saunders  sworn  in 
as  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs  (biographic 
data). 

Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises,  Apr.  27 
meeting  rescheduled  for 
May  4. 

Advisory  Committee  to  the 
U.S.  national  section  of  the 
International  Commission 
for  the  Conservation  of  At- 
lantic Tunas.  Apr.  26. 

SCC,  May  9. 

Vance:  departure  Andrews  Air 
Force  Base,  Apr    12 

William  G.  Bowdler  appointed 
Director  of  the  Bureau  of  In- 
telligence and  Research. 

Vance:  arrival  remarks,  Dar  es 
Salaam.  Apr.  13 

Vance:  remarks  following 
opening  session  of  joint  talks 
on  Rhodesia,  Dar  es  Salaam. 
Apr.   14 

Vance:  remarks  following  sec- 
ond session  of  the  joint  talks 
on  Rhodesia,  Dar  es  Salaam, 
Apr.  14. 

Vance:  response  to  questions  at 
the  close  of  the  Apr.  15  ses- 
sion of  the  joint  session,  Dar 
es  Salaam,  Apr.   15. 

Vance:  response  to  questions  at 
(he  close  of  the  joint  talks, 
Dar  es  Salaam,  Apr    15. 

Joint  statement  issued  at  con- 
clusion of  the  evening  meet- 
ing. Dares  Salaam,  Apr.  15 

Vance,  Owen:  joint  press  con- 
ference, Pretoria.  Apr.   16 

(Cancelled) 

SCC,  SOLAS,   working  group 


Department  of  State  Bui 

on  subdivision  and  stab 

May  1  I . 
+  174        4/17        Vance,  Owen:  remarks  fo 

ing  meeting  with  Rhod< 

transitional     governrr 

Salisbury 
+  175         4/18       Foreign  Relations  of  the  U 

States,   1951,  Vol.  VI.  1 

1      and     2:     Asia     and  « 

Pacific. 
176  4/18        Vance:   statement   on   rati  I 

lion      of      Panama      C  ll 

treaties. 

*  1 77        4/19       David  Newsom   sworn  il 

Under  Secretary  for  Poh  il 
Affairs  (biographic  data) 
*178         4/20        U.S..     India    amend    le 
agreement,  Apr.  18. 

*  1 79        4/20       Vance:  arrival  remarks,  [J< 

cow,  Apr.  18. 

*  1 80        4/20       Advisory  Committee  on  I  I 

national   Law,   study  gip 
on   transnational   bankru  > 
problems.  May  18. 
*181        4/20       Vance:  dinner  toast.  Mosci 
+  182        4/22       Joint    communique    on    L  - 

Soviet  talks. 
+  183        4/24       Vance:  departure  statem  , 
Moscow,  Apr.  23. 

*  184        4/24       Vance:     arrival     statem  , 

Washington,  DC. 

*  185        4/24       U.S.    Organization    for   ( 

CCIR.     study     group  , 
May  19. 


*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
+  To  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


I/JS.I/JV. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
lie  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the  Ui  i 
Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza,  New   "i 
NY     10017. 


No. 

*1 


Date 

2/9 


2/14 

2/15 

2  21 
2/23 


Subject 

Leonard:   Vietnamese  Ambass;  I 
Dinh   Ba  This  departure.  L  ■ 
Host    Country    Relations   C 
mittee. 

Hormats:  first  session  of  comi 
tee  established  under  UN 
Resolution  32/174  to  assess 
tablishment  of  new  internatii 
economic  order 

Doyle:  space  programs,  Comr- 
tee   on   the   Peaceful   Uses 
Outer  Space. 

Bitterman:  U.S.  pledge  to  FA' 
World  Food  Program. 

Young:  1  10th  anniversary  of 
birth   of   Dr     WEB     DuB< 


1978 


61 


Special   Committee   Against 
Apartheid. 

2/28  Itinerary  of  Amb.  Young's  trip  to 
East  Asia.  Mar.  3-16. 

3/3       Young:  death  of  Robert  Sobukwe. 

3/6  Mezvinsky:  work  of  U.N.  Com- 
mission on  Human  Rights. 
ECOSOC,  Geneva.  Feb.  22. 

3/9  Young:  Economic  and  Social 
Council  for  Asia  and  the 
Pacific,  Bangkok. 

3/14  Young:  Southern  Rhodesia.  Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/17  McHenry:  attack  on  Zambia  by 
Rhodesian  forces.  Security 
Council. 

3/18  Young:  U.N.  Interim  Force  in 
Lebanon,  Security  Council. 

3/19  Young:  southern  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/19  Leonard:  southern  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/22  Horbal:  improving  the  status  of 
women,  ECOSOC. 

3/23  Good:  implementing  the  program 
for  the  Decade  for  Women, 
ECOSOC. 

3/27  Horbal:  preparations  for  1980 
mid-term  conference  on  women, 
ECOSOC. 

3/28  Horbal:  status  of  women  in  U.S., 
ECOSOC. 

3/28  Horbal:  protection  of  women  and 
children  in  armed  conflict. 
ECOSOC. 

3/29  Horbal:  effects  of  apartheid  on 
status  of  women,  ECOSOC 

4/3  Horbal:  future  of  U.N.  Commis- 
sion on  the  Status  of  Women, 
ECOSOC. 

4/3  Horbal:  communications  on 
women,  ECOSOC. 

4/5  Horbal:  U.S.  proposed  topics  for 
28th  session  of  the  Commission 
on  the  Status  of  Women, 
ECOSOC. 

4/10  Purpose  of  Rep.  Mezvinsky's  visit 
to  Chile  beginning  Apr.  10. 

4/12  Matteson:  work  of  the  Committee 
on  Non-Governmental  Organiza- 
tions, ECOSOC. 

4/14  Wells:  review  of  reports  on  social 
development  of  the  ECOSOC 
Social  Committee,  ECOSOC. 

4/17  Falco:  U.S.  support  of  the  Com- 
mission on  Narcotic  Drugs, 
ECOSOC. 

4/20  Young:  financing  of  the  U.N. 
Interim  Force  in  Lebanon 
(UNIFIL),  Committee  V— Ad- 
ministration and  Budgetry. 

4/21  Young:  financing  of  UNIFIL, 
UNGA  plenary  session. 

4/25  Mezvinsky:  work  of  the  34th  ses- 
sion of  the  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission in  Geneva,  ECOSOC. 

4/27  Mezvinsky:  human  rights  situation 
in  Cambodia,  ESOSOC. 


t32  5/1  McHenry:  Namibia,  Cape  Town 
Press  Club,  South  Africa, 
Apr.  7. 

5/2      McHenry:     Namibia,     Security 
Council. 

5/4  Hormats:  committee  established 
under  UNGA  Resolution  32/174 
to  assess  establishment  of  new 
international  economic  order. 
"35  5/3  Young:  enlargement  of  UNIFIL. 
Security  Council.  □ 


*33 


►34 


*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
t  To  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


PUBLICATIONS 


International  Law  Digest1 

The  Department  of  State  released  on 
November  15.  1977.  the  Digest  of  United 
States  Practice  in  International  Law,  1976, 
edited  by  Eleanor  C.  McDowell  of  the  Office 
of  the  Legal  Adviser. 

This  fourth  annual  Digest  publishes  diplo- 
matic correspondence,  speeches,  treaties, 
legislation,  court  decisions,  and  other  docu- 
ments constituting  the  record  of  U.S.  practice 
in  international  law  in  the  calendar  year  1976. 

Of  special  interest  are  items  on  the  U.S. 
negotiating  position  on  the  law  of  the  sea 
treaty,  including  the  International  Seabed  Re- 
source Authority;  the  Treaty  (with  Mexico)  on 
the  Execution  of  Penal  Sanctions;  mediation 
efforts  in  southern  Africa;  the  Foreign 
Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of  1976;  a  Supreme 
Court  ruling  on  the  act  of  state  doctrine;  the 
Fishery  Conservation  and  Management  Act  of 
1976  extending  fishery  conservation  jurisdic- 
tion to  200  miles  off  U.S.  coasts;  legislation 
concerning  a  revision  of  the  Articles  of 
Agreement  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
and  U.S.  participation  in  the  African  De- 
velopment Bank;  initiatives  in  the  field  of 
human  rights;  the  International  Security  As- 
sistance and  Arms  Export  Control  Act  of  1976; 
implementing  legislation  enabling  the  United 
States  to  become  a  party  to  two  antiterrorist 
conventions;  and  legal  memoranda  on  such 
topics  as  nonintervention  in  internal  affairs 
and  widening  access  to  the  International  Court 
of  Justice. 

This  volume,  following  the  format  of  its 
three  predecessor  volumes,  includes  chapters 
on  the  individual  in  international  law,  treaty 
law,  aviation  and  space  law,  international  eco- 
nomic law,  environmental  and  health  affairs, 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes,  the  legal  regu- 
lation of  the  use  of  force,  and  many  other  sub- 
jects. 

Orders  for  the  Digest  of  United  Slates  Prac- 


tice in  Intel  national  Law,  1976,  accompanied 
by  checks  or  money  orders,  should  be  sent  to 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office.  Washington.  DC. 
20402. 

1976  Digest  of  U.S.   Practice  in  International 

Law  (850  pp.)  $9.50  (Stock  No.   044-000- 

01645-1) 
1975  Digest  of  U.S.   Practice  in  International 

Law    (947   pp.)   $11.00   (Stock   No.    044- 

000-01605-2) 
1974  Digest  of  U.S.   Practice  in  International 

Law   (796  pp.)  $11.00  (Stock  No.   044- 

000-01566-8)  (2d  printing) 
1973   Digest  of  U.S.   Practice  in  International 

Law  (618  pp.)  $7.50  (Stock  No.  044-000- 

01525-1) 


Treaties  in  Force2 

The  Department  of  State  released  on  March  1 . 
1978.  Treaties  in  Force:  A  List  of  Treaties 
and  Other  International  Agreements  of  the 
United  States  in  Force  on  January  I ,  I97S. 

This  is  a  collection  reflecting  the  bilateral 
treaty  relations  of  the  United  States  with  188 
countries  or  other  political  entities,  as  well  as 
multilateral  treaty  relations  with  other  con- 
tracting parties  to  more  than  380  treaties  and 
agreements  on  97  subjects. 

The  1978  edition  lists  some  500  new  treaties 
and  agreements  including  the  treaty  on  pris- 
oner transfer  with  Mexico;  the  agreement  con- 
cerning transit  pipelines  with  Canada;  the 
fisheries  agreements  with  Bulgaria.  Canada. 
Republic  of  China,  Cuba,  European  Economic 
Community.  German  Democratic  Republic. 
Japan,  Korea,  Mexico,  Poland,  Spain,  and  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 

The  bilateral  treaties  and  agreements  are  ar- 
ranged by  country  or  other  political  entity, 
while  the  multilateral  treaties  and  agreements 
are  arranged  by  subject  with  names  of  coun- 
tries which  have  become  parties.  Date  of  sig- 
nature, date  of  entry  into  force  for  the  United 
States,  and  citations  to  texts  are  furnished  for 
each  agreement. 

Treaties  in  Force  provides  information  con- 
cerning treaty  relations  with  numerous  newly 
independent  states,  indicating  wherever  possi- 
ble the  provisions  of  their  constitutions  and 
independence  arrangements  regarding  assump- 
tion of  treaty  obligations. 

Information  on  current  treaty  actions,  sup- 
plementing the  information  contained  in 
Treaties  in  Force,  is  published  monthly  in  the 
Department  of  State  Bulletin. 

The  1978  edition  of  Treaties  in  Force  (397 
pp.)  is  Department  of  State  Publication  8934 
(GPO  Cat.  No.  9.14:978).  It  is  for  sale  by  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC. 
20402,  for  $5.50.  D 


1  Press  release  517  of  Nov.  15.  1977. 

2  Press  release  100  of  Mar.  1.  1978. 


62 


Department  of"  State  Bull 


Congressional 
Documents 


Energy  Transportation  Security  Act  of  1977. 
Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Merchant 
Marine  and  Fisheries,  together  with  addi- 
tional views,  on  H  R  1037.  H.  Rept.  95-5X9 
Aug.  26.  1977.  84  pp. 

Delay  in  Decision  on  Alaska  Natural  Gas 
Transportation  System.  Communication  from 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  H.  Doc. 
95-210.  Sept.  7.  1977.   1  p. 

Duty-Free  Treatment  of  Aircraft  Engines  Used 
as  Temporary  Replacements  for  Aircraft  En- 
gines Being  Repaired  in  the  United  States, 
and  Other  Matters.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Finance  to  accompany  H.R 
422.  S.  Rept.  95-425.  Sept.  9.  1977.   13  pp. 

A  Resolution  Expressing  the  Sense  of  the  Sen- 
ate With  Respect  To  European  Communities' 
Restrictions  on  Processed  Fruit  and  Vege- 
table Imports.  Report  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Finance  to  accompany  S.  Res.  76.  S. 
Rept.  95-426.  Sept.  9.  1977.  3  pp 

Transfer  of  Offenders  for  the  Administration  of 
Foreign  Penal  Sentences.  Report  of  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  the  Judiciary  to  accompany 
S.  1682.  S.  Rept.  95-435.  Sept.  15.  1977. 
41  pp. 

Panama  Canal  Treaties.  Message  from  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  transmitting  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  the  Treaty  Con- 
cerning the  Permanent  Neutrality  and  Opera- 
tion of  the  Panama  Canal,  signed  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States  at  the  headquarters  ol 
the  Organization  of  American  States  on  Sep- 
tember 7.  1977.  S.  Ex.  N.  Sept.  16.  1977. 
38  pp 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  Supplementary 
Financing  Facility  of  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund.  Communication  from  the  Chair- 
man of  the  National  Advisory  Council  on  In- 
ternational Monetary  and  Financial  Policies 
H.  Doc.  95-224.  Sept.  20,  1977.  26  pp. 

Department  of  Defense  Supplemental  Appro- 
priation Authorization  Act.  1978.  Report  of 
the  House  Committee  on  Armed  Services, 
together  with  dissenting  views,  to  accom- 
pany H  R  8390  H.  Rept.  95-614.  Sepl  20. 
1977.  30  pp. 

Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  International 
Civil  Aviation.  Report  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  Ex 
A.  95-1.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  95  II  Sept  21. 
1977.  3  pp. 

Implementation  of  Convention  on  Cultural 
Property.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means  to  accompany  H.R.  564  3 
H.  Rept.  95   615    Sept.  21,   1977.  21  pp. 

Duty-Free  Treatment   of  Certain   Canadian    Pe 
troleum.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Ways  and   Means  to  accompany  H.R.   5858. 
H.  Rept    95-616.  Sept.  21.   1977    5  pp. 

Implementation  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Confei 
ence  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe: 


Findings  and  Recommendations  Two  Years 
After  Helsinki  Report  by  the  Commission  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  to  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations. 
Committee  Print.  Sept.  23,  1977.  194  pp. 
Alaska  Natural  Gas  Transportation  System 
Message  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States  transmitting  his  decison  and  report  on 
an  Alaskan  natural  gas  transportation  system. 
H.  Doc.  95-225.  Sept.  23,  1977.  271  pp. 


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Radio  Regulations,  Geneva,  1959.  Pari 
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Agreement  with  other  governments.  TI '• 
8683.  307  pp.  $4.50.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8683. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Philippines.  TIAS  8684.  13  pp.  800.  (Cat  [ 
S9. 10:8684  i 

Atomic  Energy — Power  Burst  Facility  (PI 
Research  Program.  Agreement  with  Austi 
TIAS  8685.  12  pp.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8685.) 

Atomic  Energy — Reactor  Safety  Experimcn 

Agreement  with  the  United  Kingdom  TI. 
8687.  15  pp.  $1.  (Cat    No.  S9. 10:8687.) 

Fisheries  Off  the   United   States  Coast 

Agreement  with  Cuba.  TIAS  8689.  46  p 
$1.50.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8689.) 

Technical  Assistance  in  Customs  Improv 
ment.  Agreement  with  Abu  Dhabi.  TIAS  869 

28  pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No    S9. 10:8690.) 

Educational   Cooperation.   Agreement  wi 
Venezuela.   TIAS   8691.   4  pp.   600     (Cat.   Nl 
S9. 10:8691.) 


INDEX 


||Y  1978 

L.  80,  NO.  2014 

fjanistan.    Recent   Developments  in   South 

Jia  (Dubs)    48 

ns  Control 

A  Annual  Report 30 

Us     Control      and      National      Security 

I  ance)   20 

n  need  Radiation  Weapons  (Carter)  ...  31 
I  tion-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 

dress  ( Vance)    23 

e  etary  Vance's  News  Conference, 
lirch  24  24 

Special  Session  on  Disarmament  (report 

I  Secretary  Vance)    29 

i  ladesh.    Recent    Developments    in    South 

,ia(Dubs)     48 

iiy.il.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin 
.  lerica  and  Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint 
i  nmuniques   with   Venezuela,    Brazil,   and 

geria)  1 

0  jress 

(  A  Annual  Report 30 

s  tance  Programs  to  Greece,  Turkey,  and 

(  prus  (  Vance)    33 

e  nt      Developments      in      South      Asia 

c  jbs)   48 

e  te    Additions    to    the    Panama    Canal 

'  .-aties   52 

t  nth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Pres- 

nt  Carter)   35 

Special  Session  on  Disarmament  (report 

Secretary  Vance)    29 

II 

u   (foreign  relations  outline)    56 

x  tion-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 

dress  (  Vance)    23 

i  us 

s  >tance  Programs  to  Greece.  Turkey,   and 

prus  ( Vance )    33 

« irtment   Statement   on   Eastern    Mediterra- 

an    34 

e  nth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Pres- 
et Carter)   35 

<  irtment    and    Foreign    Service.    Interna- 

>nal  Communication  Agency    32 

(cational   and    Cultural    Affairs.    Interna- 

mal  Communication  Agency    32 

r  Middle  East  Peace  Process — A  Status  Re- 
irt  (Atherton)  42 

eetary  Vance's  News  Conference, 
arch  24  24 

1  opia.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Confer- 
ee, March  24     24 

ope 

is     Control      and      National      Security 

;'ance)   20 

ian   Rights   Policy:   The   United   States   at 

:lgrade  (Fascell)   39 

many.    German    Democratic    Republic 

,'olen)    36 

,  ece 
stance   Programs   to   Greece,   Turkey,   and 

,! 


Cyprus  (  Vance)    33 

Department  Statement  on  Eastern  Mediterra- 
nean      34 

Human  Rights 

Central  America  (Todman)     54 

Human  Rights  Policy:  The  United  States  at 
Belgrade  (Fascell)   39 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin  America  and 
Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint  communiques 
with  Venezuela.  Brazil,  and  Nigeria)     ...      1 

India.  Recent  Developments  in  South  Asia 
(Dubs)    48 

Israel 

The  Middle  East  Peace  Process — A  Status  Re- 
port (Atherton)   42 

Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  U.S.  March  20-23 
(White  House  statement.  Begin,  Carter)   ...   47 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference, 
March  24  24 

Southern  Lebanon  (Department  statements,  let- 
ter from  Secretary  Vance)    46 

Terrorist  Attack  in  Israel  (Carter,  Vance,  letter 
from  President  Carter)    46 

U.N.  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (Young,  texts 
of  resolutions)    51 

Jordan.  The  Middle  East  Peace  Process — A 
Status  Report  (Atherton)    42 

Latin  America  and  Caribbean.  Central 
America  (Todman)     54 

Lebanon 

Southern  Lebanon  (Department  statements,  let- 
ter from  Secretary  Vance)    46 

U.N.  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (Young,  texts 
of  resolutions)    51 

Liberia.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin 
America  and  Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint 
communiques  with  Venezuela,  Brazil,  and 
Nigeria)   1 

Middle  East 

The  Middle  East  Peace  Process — A  Status  Re- 
port (Atherton)   42 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin  America  and 
Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint  communiques 
with  Venezuela,  Brazil,  and  Nigeria)       .  .      1 

Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  U.S.  March  20-23 
(White  House  statement.  Begin,  Carter)   ....   47 

Nepal.  Recent  Developments  in  South  Asia 
(Dubs)    48 

Nigeria.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin 
America  and  Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint 
communiques  with  Venezuela,  Brazil,  and 
Nigeria)   1 

Nuclear  Policy 

Arms  Control  and  National  Security 
(Vance)   20 

Enhanced  Radiation  Weapons  (Carter)    ....   31 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 
Address  ( Vance)    23 

Pakistan.  Recent  Developments  in  South  Asia 
(Dubs)    48 

Panama 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Ratified  (Carter, 
Vance)   52 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 
Address  (  Vance)    23 

Senate  Additions  to  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaties   52 

Presidential  Documents 

Enhanced  Radiation  Weapons   31 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Ratified 52 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Latin  America  and 
Africa     1 


Prime    Minister   Begin    Visits   U.S.    March 

20-23  47 

Seventh  Report  on  Cyprus   35 

Terrorist  Attack  in  Israel    46 

Publications 

Congressional  Documents    62 

GPO  Sales  Publications    62 

International  Law  Digest,  Treaties  in  Force    ..   61 

Saudi  Arabia 

Secretary      Vance's      News      Conference. 

March  24   24 

Security  Assistance 

Assistance   Programs   to   Greece.   Turkey,   and 

Cyprus  (  Vance)    33 

Department    Statement   on    Eastern    Mediterra- 
nean        34 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 

Address  ( Vance)    23 

Recent  Developments  in  South  Asia  (Dubs)    .     48 
Somalia.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference, 

March  24   24 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 

Address  (  Vance)    23 

Secretary      Vance's      News      Conference, 

March  24   24 

Space.    Arms   Control    and    National    Security 

(Vance)   20 

Sri    Lanka.    Recent    Developments    in    South 

Asia  (Dubs)     48 

Terrorism.  Terrorist  Attack  in  Israel  (Carter, 

Vance,  letter  from  President  Carter)    ....   46 
Treaties 

Current  Actions   57 

Panama     Canal     Treaty     Ratified     (Carter, 

Vance)  52 

Senate    Additions    to    the    Panama    Canal 

Treaties   52 

Turkey 

Assistance   Programs  to  Greece,   Turkey,   and 

Cyprus  (  Vance)    33 

Department    Statement    on    Eastern    Mediterra- 
nean       34 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms      Control      and      National      Security 

(Vance)   20 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  ASNE 

Address  (Vance)    23 

Secretary      Vance's      News      Conference, 

March  24  24 

United  Nations 

U.N.  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (Young,  texts 

of  resolutions)    51 

U.N.  Special  Session  on  Disarmament  (report 

by  Secretary  Vance)    29 

Venezuela.    President   Carter's   Visit   to   Latin 

America  and   Africa  (Carter,  Tolbert,  joint 

communiques   with   Venezuela,    Brazil,   and 

Nigeria)   1 

Name  Index 

Atherton,  Alfred  L.,  Jr  42 

Begin,  Menahem    47 

Bolen,  David  B    36 

Carter,  President  1,31,35,46,47.52 

Dubs,  Adolph  48 

Fascell,  Dante  B    : 39 

Todman,  Terence  A     54 

Tolbert,  William  R    1 

Vance,  Secretary     20,  23,  24,  33,  46,  52 

Young,  Andrew    51 


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department 
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wultetttt 


June  197 S 


te  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  201 5 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2015  /  June  1978 


Cover  Photos: 

Zbigniew  Brzezinski 
Vice  President  Mondale 
Secretary  Vance 
K.  Mathea  Falco 
Elliot  L.  Richardson 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  At  n 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A   YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 

Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


JAPAN 

1  The  United  States  and  Japan  (Zbigniew  Brzezinski) 

2  Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Fukuda 

3  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Japan  (Biographic  Data) 

4  Japan — A  Profile 

5  Japan  in  the  World  Economy  (Robert  D.  Hormats) 


THE  PRESIDENT 

12       News  Conference,  April  25 

THE  SECRETARY 

14       Foreign  Assistance  and  U.S.  Policy 
17       Question-and-Answer   Session    Fol- 
lowing Cincinnati  Address 

20  Remarks  to  the  Press  Following  Cin- 

cinnati Address 

21  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United  Kingdom, 

and  the  USSR. 
27       Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 

ARMS  CONTROL 

31  U.N.  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment Convenes  ( Vice  President 
Mondale) 

CONGRESS 

35  Its  Role  in  Foreign  Policymaking 

(Douglas  J .  Bennet,  Jr.) 

EAST  ASIA 

36  U.S.  Combat  Forces  in  South  Korea 

(President  Carter) 

EUROPE 

36  Visit    of    Romanian    President 

Ceausescu  (Joint  Declaration) 

37  Romania — A  Profile 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

38  Human   Rights   in  Cambodia  (Presi- 

dent Carter) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

38  Aircraft  Sales  to  Egypt,  Israel,  and 
Saudi  Arabia  (Secretary  Vance, 
President  Carter,  Department 
Statement,  Letter  from  President 
Carter) 

41  Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin 
(Exchange  of  Remarks) 


47 


NARCOTICS 

International    Control    Program 
(K,  Mathea  Falco) 

OCEANS 

Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  (Elliot  L. 
Richardson) 


PACIFIC 

49        Micronesia  (Department  Statement, 
Statement  of  Principles) 

49  Letter  of  Credence  ( New  Zealand) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

50  Namibia  (Canadian  Foreign  Secre- 

tary Donald  Jamieson,  Donald  F. 
McHenry,  Text  of  Proposal) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

56       Secretary  Vance  Visits  Mexico 

59       TREATIES 

61  PRESSRELEASES 

62  PUBLICATIONS 
INDEX 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superintend^  of  Documents 

m     71978 

DEPOSITORY 


I'ii  sident  Carter  and  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Fukuda  in  Washington. 


1978 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


ligniew  Brzezinski 

ould  like  to  speak  to  you  this 
ng  about  U.S.  relations  with  Ja- 
I  shall  begin  with  a  few  remarks 

the  Administration's  broader  in- 
ns in  foreign  policy,  for  this  de- 

the  context  of  our  bilateral  rela- 
lip.    Our   approach    reflects   both 

ntial  continuity  with  the  policies 
lr  predecessors  and  some  impor- 
tances of  change. 

VVe   seek  wider  cooperation   with 

cey  allies.   Close  collaboration 

Japan    and    Western    Europe    has 

been  the  point  of  departure  for 

ica's    global    involvement;    how- 

we  are  also  seeking  to  broaden 

patterns    of  cooperation    to    in- 

the  new  "regional  influentials," 

responding  to  changes  over  the 

|  5-20  years  in  the  global  distribu- 

Iif  power. 
We  are  seeking  to  stabilize  the 
i  -Soviet  relationship,  pursuing 
gh  a  broader  range  of  negotia- 
a  pattern  of  detente  which  is  to 
pth  comprehensive  and  genuinely 


'I'.ssing  cautious  but  more  explicit 
l|-ican  interest  in  Eastern  Europe. 
•  We  intend  to  maintain  sufficient 
||<ary  capabilities  to  support  our 
llil  security  interests.  Above  all, 
3  lall  maintain  an  adequate  strategic 
Irent;  preserve,  along  with  our 
40  partners,  the  conventional  bal- 
J  in  Europe;  and  develop  a  quick- 
l:ion  global  force  available  for 
I  redeployment  in  areas  of  central 
Irtance  to  the  United  States,  such 
^3rea. 

I  Politically  we  shall  remain  en- 
Id  in  all  regions.  In  the  Asia- 
llfic  area,  we  shall  preserve  a 
l;gic  and  economic  presence  con- 
Int  with  our  large  and  growing 
I:  in  the  region.  Above  all,  this 
lires  a  widening  of  our  cooperation 
I  Japan  and  an  expansion  of  our 
lionship  with  China.  We  shall  en- 
le  our  collaboration  with  the  mod- 
I  states  in  Africa  in  the  cause  of 
l:an  emancipation.  No  longer  tied 
Inly  a  regional  approach,  we  shall 
qigthen  our  bilateral  ties  with  the 
Ions  of  Latin  America  while 
iterating  with  them  more  fully  on 
"  global  concerns.  We  shall  con- 
h  to  pursue  a  genuine  settlement  in 
8  Middle  East  while  expanding  our 


relationship    with    the    moderate    Arab 
countries. 

•  We  shall  increase  our  efforts  to 
develop  constructive  and  cooperative 
solutions  to  emerging  global  issues. 
Above  all,  we  need  to  head  off  any 
drift  toward  nuclear  proliferation. 

•  We  shall  seek  to  sustain  domestic 
support  for  our  policies  by  rooting 
them  clearly  in  our  moral  values.  We 
believe  that  our  devotion  to  human 
rights  is  responsive  to  man's  yearning 
everywhere  for  greater  social  justice. 

This  is  an  ambitious  agenda.  We 
shoulder  the  responsibilities  it  imposes 
on  us  willingly.  But  obviously  we 
cannot  shoulder  them  alone.  Success 
will  require  greater  cooperation,  above 
all  with  our  closest  friends. 

Centrality  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations 

Japan  is  clearly  such  a  close  friend. 
We  have  been  impelled  toward  a  spe- 
cial relationship  with  Japan  by  the 
force  of  history  and  by  strategic  and 
economic  imperatives.  The  members 
of  this  Society  have  long  recognized 
the  basic  proposition  I  wish  to  affirm 
this  evening:  Close  partnership  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Japan  is  a 
vital  foundation  for  successful  pursuit 
of  America's  wider  objectives  in  the 
world.  If  relations  between  America 
and  Japan  are  strong,  we  benefit  and 


the  world  benefits;  when  we  run  into 
difficulties,  we  suffer  and  others  suffer 
with  us. 

Our  alliance  not  only  protects  the 
security  of  Japan  and  America;  it  has 
also  become  a  central  element  in  the 
equilibrium  in  the  Pacific,  which  all 
the  major  powers  share  a  stake  in 
preserving. 

Japan  is  our  largest  overseas  trading 
partner;  trade  between  us  exceeded 
$29  billion  in  1977.  Economic  cooper- 
ation confers  benefits  on  each  of  us;  it 
also  sustains  the  prosperity  of  the 
Pacific  basin  and  the  stability  of  the 
international  trade  and  payments  sys- 
tem. 

Effective  responses  to  pressing 
global  issues — whether  the  develop- 
ment of  alternative  sources  of  energy, 
expanding  food  production,  assuring 
equitable  access  to  the  riches  of  the 
ocean  area,  or  stemming  nuclear 
proliferation — demand  active  collab- 
oration between  us. 

In  short,  we  are  mutually  depend- 
ent. No  relationship  in  our  foreign 
policy  is  more  important.  None  de- 
mands more  careful  nourishment. 

While  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  is  indispensa- 
ble, it  is  not  automatically  assured. 
Managing  our  relationship  has  become 
more  challenging  as  our  links  have 
grown  more  numerous  and  more  com- 


Zbigniew  Brzezinski  was  born  on  March 
28,  1928,  in  Warsaw,  Poland.  He  came  to 
North  America  in  1938  and  to  the  United 
States  in  1953.  In  1958  he  became  a  natu- 
ralized U.S.  citizen.  He  received  a  B.A 
(1948)  and  an  MA.  (1950)  from  McGill 
University.  He  received  a  Ph.D.  from  Har- 
vard University  (1953)  where  he  then 
taught  and  researched  (1953-60)  He  was 
associate  professor  (1960-62),  Herbert 
Lehman  professor  of  government  (1962- 
77),  and  director  of  the  Research  Institute 
on  International  Change  (1961-77) — 
formerly  the  Research  Institute  on  Com- 
munist Affairs — at  Columbia  University. 

Among  his  other  activities,  Dr. 
Brzezinski  served  as  a  member  of  the  Pol- 
icy Planning  Council  of  the  Department  of 
State  from  1966  to  1968.  He  was  director 
of  the  Trilateral  Commission  from  1973  to 
1976  and  traveled  extensively  on  its  behalf 

Dr.   Brzezinski  became  Assistant  to  the 


President  for  National   Security   Affa 
January  20,  1977. 


plex  and  as  each  nation's  policies  have 
come  to  have  a  more  direct  impact  on 
the  welfare  of  the  other's  people. 
Moreover,  most  of  the  problems  we 
face  are  bigger  than  both  of  us — they 
are  not  susceptible  to  bilateral  resolu- 
tion, and  they  arise  most  frequently  in 
multilateral  forums. 

It  is  scarcely  surprising,  therefore, 
that  our  relations  have  not  been  en- 
tirely free  of  difficulties.  Over  the  last 
year,  for  example,  our  approaches  to 
nuclear  reprocessing  diverged  to  some 
extent,  and  we  experienced  a  large 
trade  imbalance. 

In  each  case  we  consulted  closely. 
We  devised  arrangements  for  manag- 
ing these  problems  which  reflected 
both  our  respective  concerns  and  the 
broader  interests  of  the  international 
community.  We  demonstrated  that  the 
test  of  effective  ties  between  societies 
as  dynamic  as  ours  and  economies  as 
competitive  as  ours  is  not  the  absence 
of  problems  but  the  spirit  in  which  we 
confront  them  and  the  competence 
with  which  we  resolve  them. 


Current  Challenge 

Our  interests  and  Japan's  require 
that  we  broaden  and  deepen  our  ties, 
adapting  our  relationship  to  an  era  in 
which  our  policies  have  a  global  im- 
pact. This  imposes  on  each  of  us  an 
obligation  to  take  each  other's  inter- 
ests and  perspectives  carefully  into  ac- 
count on  a  wider  and  wider  range  of 
issues. 

Japan's  extraordinary  economic 
growth  has  challenged  it  to  define  a 
wider  vision  of  its  role  in  the  world — 
in  Asia  and  beyond.  Japanese  deci- 
sions, which  once  would  have  been 
considered  domestic  in  character,  now 
impinge  directly  on  the  interests  of 
distant  nations.  Japan's  capacity  to 
promote  global  economic  develop- 
ment, to  aid  its  neighbors,  to  promote 
a  constructive  North-South  dialogue, 
to  encourage  the  reconciliation  of 
former  rivals,  and  to  provide  for  its 
own  defense  have  grown.  So  have  the 
expectations  of  Japan  on  the  part  of. 
the  international  community.  A  com- 
mitment of  Japan's  political  and  eco- 
nomic capabilities  to  the  achievement 
of  major  global  goals  is  essential  to  a 
strong  U.S. -Japanese  relationship. 

In  recent  years  the  United  States  has 
placed  its  relationship  with  Japan 
primarily  in  a  setting  of  collaboration 
among  the  advanced  democratic  coun- 
tries. This  is  entirely  appropriate.  It  is 
important  that  we  remember,  however, 
that  while  Japan  is  an  industrial 
power,  it  is  also  an  Asian  nation, 
acutely  interested  in  the  continuity  of 
America's  role  in  the  Pacific.   Uncer- 


tainties about  our  Asian  intentions 
have  inevitably  arisen  in  the  wake  of 
our  disengagement  from  Indochina  and 
our  planned  ground  force  withdrawal 
from  Korea.  A  strong  American  role 
in  the  Pacific  remains  essential  for  the 
protection  of  our  own  strategic  inter- 
ests. It  is  also  an  important  factor  in 
our  relationship  with  Japan.  We  must 
adjust  our  relationship  to  accommodate 
these  concerns. 


TEN  LARGEST 

U.S.  TRADING  PARTNERS  (1977) 

(millions 

of  dollars) 

Total 

Country 

Exports  and  Imports 

Canada 

55,507.7 

Japan 

29,424.0 

West  Germany 

13,340.8 

United  Kingdom 

10,490.5 

Saudi  Arabia 

9.932.7 

Mexico 

9.495.1 

Venezuela 

7,247.1 

Nigeria 

7,049.9 

France 

6,577.0 

Netherlands 

6,281.4 

il 


Broadening  Cooperation 

In  the  economic  field,  the  world  has 
had  to  accommodate  to  Japan's  grow- 
ing strength,  even  as  Japan  has  been 
adapting  its  own  policies  to  shoulder 
the  responsibilities  which  strength 
confers. 

Neither  we  nor  the  Japanese  have 
adjusted    policies    quickly    enough    in 


Department  of  State  Bl 

recent  years  to  avoid  major  dif 
ties.  Consequently  our  economic 
tions  have  been  marked  over  the 
year  by  a  growing  Japanese  cui 
account  surplus,  sharp  imbalanc 
our  bilateral  trade,  a  huge 
balance-of-payments  deficit,  and 
rency  disorders.  These  structural  ] 
lems  arise  particularly  out  oi 
dramatic  growth  in  U.S.  oil  im 
in  recent  years  and  from  Jap 
transition  to  an  era  of  lower 
nomic  growth.  They  have  gl 
consequences. 

Only  through  concerted  action  r. 
the  advanced  industrial  democr. 
can  we  deal  effectively  with  our 
mon  problems.  We  will  all  go  for 
together  to  lower  trade  barriers 
succumb  together  to  protection 
That  is  why  we  must  assure  a 
tinued  expansion  in  world  t 
through  the  successful  conclusio 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiat 
(MTN)  in  Geneva  this  summer. 
United  States  has  taken  the  lea< 
presenting  a  forthcoming  tariff 
which  we  expect  other  sti 
economies  to  match. 

The  United  States  and  Japan 
bear  special  responsibilities  for  ac 
which  will  not  only  reduce  barriel 
trade  through  a  fair  and  balanced  1 
agreement  but  also  promote  contl 
economic  recovery,  check  disor 
exchange  rate  movements,  encoi 
energy  conservation  and  the  dev* 
ment  of  alternative  sources,  anc 
crease  the  transfer  of  resource 
promote  growth  in  the  economic 
the  developing  nations.  We  cannc 
ford  to  pursue  beggar-thy-neig 
policies,  export  our  domestic  prob 


Visit  of  Japanese 
Prime  Minister  Fukuda 


Prime  Minister  Takeo  Fukuda  of 
Japan  made  an  official  visit  to  Wash- 
ington May  1-3  to  meet  with  President 
Carter  and  other  government  officials. 
The  two  leaders  last  met  in  May  1977 
at  the  economic  summit  conference  in 
London. 

In  their  discussions  on  May  3,  the 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  ex- 
changed views  on  global  economic  is- 
sues in  preparation  for  the  Bonn  sum- 
mit in  July  1978,  including  economic 
growth,  inflation,  balance  of  pay- 
ments, monetary  policy,  energy,  trade, 
and  aid  flows. 

The  two   leaders  consulted  on  ele- 


ments of  their  respective   policie 
Asia,  stressing  the  importance  of 
U.S. -Japan   relationship   and   touc 
upon  the   Korean   Peninsula,   Ch 
and  Southeast  Asia.  In  the  latter   I 
nection  the  Japanese  Government  I 
nounced    its   intention    to   increasel 
contribution   to  the  U.N.   High  Cl 
missioner  for  Refugees  by  $10  mill 
in   support  of  Indochina  refugees  I 
well  as  its  willingness  to  accept  uifl 
certain  conditions  refugees  for  perl 
nent  residence  in  Japan. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Mil 
ter  also  agreed  to  expand  coopera'l 
in  science  and  technology. 


□ 


978 


ers,  or  look  for  scapegoats.  We 
a  mutual  responsibility  to  deal 
the   fundamentals   of  these 

ems. 

e   United   States   must   take   deci- 

iction  in  several  areas: 

The   implementation   of  an   effec- 

:nergy  program  is  the  most  impor- 

step.    We   must    substantially   re- 

our   oil    imports    if   we    are    to 

:e  our  current-accounts  deficit, 

lish  pressures  on  the  dollar,  and 

lize  international  money  markets. 

e  Administration  presented  an 

y  bill  to  the  Congress  more  than 

ar  ago.    We   need  action,   and  if 

;ress  does  not  act,  then  the  execu- 

branch    must.    While   the    United 

s  has  the  largest  problem  in  this 

ct,  the  question  of  how  to  take 

action  to  conserve  and  develop 

tative  sources  of  energy  must  en- 

the  efforts  of  all  advanced  na- 

as  well — and  particularly   those 

lapan  which  experience  extraordi- 

dependence   on  external   sources 

pply. 

^We  must  bring  inflation  under 

^ol  not  only  for  domestic  reasons 

1  lso  to  bolster  our  competitiveness 

.1  ernational  trade. 

•  We   must   devote   more   effort   to 

jromotion  of  American  exports.  In 

sionths  to  come  the  Administration 

I  look   not  only  for  ways  to  en- 

lage  exports  but  to  reduce  or 

ii  nate    current    governmental    prac- 

.1  which  reduce  our  competitiveness 

ic  discourage   our  business   commu- 

t  from    searching   out    overseas 

i  ets. 

I  ese  adjustments  are  required  not 

■  to  underpin  our  economic  posi- 
|  in  the  world  but  to  enhance  the 

■  lity    and    growth   of   the    interna- 

I I  economy  and  thus  fortify  our 
lomic  ties  with  Japan.  Japan  must 
I:  comparable  structural  adjust- 
I  s  for  it  has  become  too  large  an 
sdomy  to  rely  on  export-led  growth. 
'ie  Japanese  Government  recog- 
1;  the  need  for  such  adjustments 
ii  has  begun  actions  designed  to 
i.'ve  sharp  reductions  in  its  current 
xunts  surplus  in  1978;  an  economic 
fc'th  rate  of  7%  this  fiscal  year;  an 
IK  agreement  assuring  the  U.S.  of 
lirocal  and  roughly  equivalent  ac- 
li  to  the  Japanese  market;  and  ex- 
iled long-term  capital  flows  to  the 
a  loping  countries.  These  measures 
ij  essential    to    the    vitality    of    the 

d  economy   as   well   as   the   con- 
id  health  of  our  bilateral  relations, 
must   be   decisive    in   action   and 
snt  in  awaiting  the  results. 

one    looks   beyond    current   eco- 
ic  problems,  there  is  a  remarkable 


U.S.  AMBASSADOR 
TO  JAPAN 

Michael  Joseph  Mansfield  of  Missoula, 
Montana,  was  born  on  March  16,  1903,  in 
New  York  City.  He  served  in  the  U.S. 
Navy  (1918-19).  the  U.S.  Army  (1919— 
20),  and  the  U.S.  Marines  (1920-22);  he 
worked  as  a  miner  and  mining  engineer  in 
Butte,  Montana  (1922-31).  He  received  an 
A  B  (1933)  and  an  MA.  (1934)  from  the 
University  of  Montana  where  he  was  then  a 
professor  of  history  and  political  science 
(1933-42). 

In  1943  Ambassador  Mansfield  was 
elected  to  Congress  and  served  until  1952 
when  he  was  elected  to  the  Senate  He  was 
a  U.S.  Senator  until  1977  and  was  Senate 
Majority  Leader  from  1961  to  1977,  the 
longest  tenure  in  U.S.  Senate  history.  He 
was  a  member  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  the  Appropriations  Committee, 
the  Policy  Committee,  and  the  Steering 
Committee. 

Ambassador  Mansfield  was  a  Presiden- 
tial representative  in  China  in  1944  He 
was  a  US.  delegate  to  the  IX  Inter- 
American  Conference  in  1948  and  attended 


the  6th  U.N.  General  Assembly  in  Paris 
(1951-52).  He  was  a  U.S.  delegate  to  the 
Southeast  Asian  Conference  in  Manila  in 
1954.  In  1958  he  attended  the  13th  U.N. 
General  Assembly  Ambassador  Mansfield 
has  traveled  on  Presidential  assignment  to 
West  Berlin,  Southeast  Asia,  and  Vietnam 
(1962)  and  to  Europe  and  Southeast  Asia 
(1965  and  1969);  he  visited  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  in  1972  at  the  invitation 
of  Premier  Chou  En-lai. 

He  was  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Japan  in  May  1977. 


consonance  of  view  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  on  virtually 
all  major  international  issues.  We  in- 
tend to  sustain  this  confluence  in  our 
approaches  toward  the  major  Com- 
munist powers,  toward  Asian  issues, 
toward  the  North-South  dialogue,  and 
toward  major  international  negotia- 
tions. We  look  for  Japan  to  play  a 
more  active  political  role  in  dealing 
with  such  matters.  It  is  neither  neces- 
sary nor  possible  to  preserve  identical 
policies  on  such  issues,  but  the  de- 
velopment of  compatible  approaches  to 
common  problems  should  be  an  objec- 
tive for  us  both. 


America's  Role  in  Asia 

Close  cooperation  between  us  is 
especially  important  in  Asia.  There 
have  been  recurrent  suggestions  that 
the  United  States  is  withdrawing  from 
Asia.  These  suggestions  are  untrue. 
The  United  States  will  maintain  a 
strong  and  diversified  military  pres- 
ence and  an  active  diplomacy  in  the 
Asian-Pacific  region  to  support  our 
growing  economic  and  political  stakes 
in  the  area. 

•  Above  all,  we  shall  sustain  the 
Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooperation  and  Se- 
curity with  Japan.  For  Japan  this  treaty 
offers  strategic  protection  and  firm 
moorings  for  its  diplomacy.  For  the 
United   States,    alliance   with   a  Japan 


steadily  improving  its  self-defense 
capabilities  provides  the  anchor  for 
our  position  in  East  Asia  and  extends 
the  reach  of  our  strategic  and  political 
influence  in  the  Pacific.  Beyond  these 
reciprocal  benefits,  our  alliance  con- 
tributes to  the  stability  of  Northeast 
Asia  and  the  Pacific,  and  it  threatens 
no  one. 

•  We  will  manage  ground  combat 
force  withdrawals  from  Korea  in  a 
prudent  fashion  and  help  build  up 
South  Korea's  capabilities  in  order  to 
assure  that  there  is  no  weakening  of  its 
defenses. 

•  We  shall  preserve  the  strength  of 
the  7th  Fleet  and  our  air  units  in 
the  Pacific  while  improving  them 
qualitatively. 

•  We  shall  strengthen  our  ties  with 
our  traditional  allies  in  Australia  and 
New  Zealand. 

•  We  shall  seek  to  assure  our  con- 
tinued access  to  military  facilities  in 
the  Philippines  through  arrangements 
which  take  full  account  of  Philippine 
sovereignty  over  the  bases. 

•  We  shall  deepen  our  bilateral  re- 
lations with  the  non-Communist  states 
of  Southeast  Asia  and  encourage  the 
growing  cohesion  of  the  Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations.  And  we 
shall  persevere  in  our  measured  efforts 
to  develop  constructive  relationships 
with  Indochina. 

•  In  recent  years  Asian  nations 
have    come    to   depend    more    heavily 


upon  U.S.  trade  and  investment  as  a 
result  of  our  strong  and  steady  growth 
and  the  comparatively  greater  access 
Asian  producers  of  manufactured 
goods  enjoy  in  our  market.  We  expect 
that  to  continue. 

•  The  American-Chinese  relation- 
ship is  a  central  element  of  our  global 
policy.  We  shall  endeavor  to  expand 
our  relations  with  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China.  It  is  important  that  we 
make  progress  in  normalizing  relations 
with  China,  and  we  shall  consult  with 
the  Chinese  on  major  international 
matters  that  are  of  importance  to  us 
both. 

The  steady  implementation  of  these 
policies  is  required  by  our  own  inter- 
ests and  should  converge  with 
Japanese  interests 

Our  defense  cooperation,  specif- 
ically, is  excellent.  Japan  is 
strengthening  its  air  and  naval  de- 
fenses. Cooperation  between  our  uni- 
formed services  is  growing.  Base  is- 
sues arise  less  frequently  and  are  re- 
solved amicably.  Last  fall  Japan 
agreed  to  help  with  some  of  the  ex- 
penses associated  with  our  military 
presence. 

We  look  for  these  trends  to  evolve 
further,  even  as  Japan  continues  to 
remind  the  world  that  security  cannot 
be  achieved  through  military  strength 
alone.  Through  such  measures  as 
Prime  Minister  Fukuda's  trip  to  South- 
cast  Asia  last  summer,  Japan  has  un- 
dertaken to  expand  its  role  in  Asian 
development,  speed  the  development 
of  a  strong  regional  grouping  in 
Southeast  Asia,  and  discourage  the 
emergence  of  polarization  between  two 
antagonistic  blocs  in  that  area.  These 
are  constructive  steps,  and  we  wel- 
come their  vigorous  implementation. 

In  the  weeks  ahead,  there  will  be 
visible  evidence  of  our  resolve  to  in- 
tensify America's  diplomatic  efforts  in 
Asia. 

Vice  President  Mondale  will  depart 
April  29  for  Southeast  Asia  and  the 
Southwest  Pacific.  He  will  visit  the 
Philippines,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Aus- 
tralia, and  New  Zealand  on  a  mission 
which  we  consider  of  great  impor- 
tance. Important  changes  are  taking 
place  in  that  region.  The  Vice  Presi- 
dent will  be  assessing  the  force  and 
direction  of  those  changes  in  order  to 
offer  recommendations  on  how  we  can 
continue  to  play  a  constructive  role 
commensurate  with  our  significant 
stake  in  the  prosperity  and  security  of 
that  area. 

On  May  3  Prime  Minister  Fukuda 
will  visit  Washington  for  consultations 
with  President  Carter.  We  welcome 
this  chance   to   harmonize   our  ap- 


proaches to  key  issues  in  advance  of 
the  Bonn  summit  in  July.  The  two 
leaders  know  and  respect  each  other;  I 
know  personally  that  they  work  well 
together. 

On  May  18  I  will  embark  on  a  trip 
to  Northeast  Asia.  In  Peking  I  will 
discuss  global  issues  of  parallel  con- 
cern with  Chinese  leaders.  Sub- 
sequently I  will  visit  Tokyo  and  Seoul 
to  hold  consultations  with  the  leaders 
of  Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea. 

Conclusion 

The  relationship  that  has  developed 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  is 
uniquely  significant.  Despite  differ- 
ences in  our  national  situation  and 
national  styles,  we  have  fashioned  ties 
that  are  rooted  in  shared  interests  and 
common    values — our   commitment    to 


Department  of  State  Bt 

democratic  procedures,  civil  ri 
the  market  system,  a  free  press, 
open  societies. 

The  attributes  of  the  Japa 
people  and  nation  are  formidable, 
people  and  a  nation,  we  have  cor 
respect,  admire,  and  often  learn 
Japan — even  as  we  compete.  Th 
the  essence  of  our  interdepend 
which  has  been  built  carefully 
trust,  vitality,  and  common  purpos 

Looking  back  at  what  we  1 
created  over  the  past  30  years,  we 
assert  with  confidence  that  we 
established  a  permanent  partnersh 
value  not  only  to  ourselves  but  to 
entire  world  community.  We 
work  to  assure  its  durability. 


Address  before  the  Japan  Society  in  ,Ven 
on  Apr.  27,  197S  (lex!  from  White  House 
release  of  Apr,  27). 


JAPAN— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  147.470  sq  mi.  (slightly  smaller 
than  Calif). 

Capital:  Tokyo  (pop.  I  1 .6  million). 

Other  Cities:  Osaka  (2.8  million). 
Yokohama  (2.6  million).  Nagoya  (2  mil- 
lion), Kyoto  (1.4  million). 

People 

Population:  1 13  million  i  147(1). 
Annual  Growth  Rale    1'. 
Density:  778  per  sq    mi. 
Religions:  Shintoism.  Buddhism 
Language:  Japanese- 
Literacy:  99'. 

Life  Expectancy:  72  >  rs  (males,  77  yrs. 
(females) 

Government 

Type:  Parliamentary  democracy. 

Date  of  Constitution:  May  3,  1947. 

Branches:  Executive — Prime  Minister 
(Head  of  Government)  Legislative  — 
bicameral  Diet  of  House  of  Represent.! 
tives  (511  seats)  and  House  of  Council- 
lors i  252  sens)  Judicial — Civil  law  sys- 
tem with  Anglo-American  influence 

Political  Parlies.  Liberal  Democratic  Party 
(LDP).  Japan  Socialist  Party  (JSP). 
Democratic  Socialist  Party  (  D S  P ) , 
Komeito  (Clean  Government  Part\). 
Japan  Communist  Party  (JCP).  New  Lib- 
eral Club(NLC). 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  20. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  47  Prefec- 
tures. 

Economy 

GNP:  $584  billion  (1977). 
Annual  Growth  Rate    6   !9S   I  1976). 
Per  Capita  GNP:  $5,000  (  1977) 
Agriculture:    Products — rice,   vegetables, 
fruits,  milk.  meat,  natural  silk. 


Industry:  Products — machinery  and  equi 
menl.  metals  and  metal  products,  te 
tiles,  autos,  chemicals,  electrical  ai 
electronic  equipment. 

Natural   Resources:   Negligible   mineral 
sources,  fish. 

Trade:  Exports  —  $80.5  billion  (197' 
machinery  and  equipment,  metals  a 
metal  products,  textiles.  Partners — U. 
(24.5%).  EC  (10.9%),  Southeast  Asp 
(31.5s"r).  Communist  countries  (69 
Imports— $70.8  billion  (1977):  fos 
fuels,  metal  ore,  raw  material- 
foodstuffs,  machinery  and  equipmei 
Partners— U.S.  (17.5%),  EC  (5.9SI 
Southeast  Asia  (49.9'r).  Communi 
countries  (4  7', '  i 

Official   Exchange   Rate:   ifloating)  appro  I 
225  yen=US$1.00  (May  1978). 

Economic  Aid  Extended:  Total  official  ai 
private   resource   flow   (1976) — $4 
lion;  official   development  assistan 
(1976)— $1.1  billion 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  its  specialized  agencies.  IC 
GATT.OECD.  IEA. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Japan:    Prime    Minister — Takeo   Fukud; 

Minister   of  Foreign    Affairs — Sun 

Sonada;    Ambassador   to   the    U.S.- 

Fumihiko  Togo 
United    States:    Ambassador   Michael   J 

Mansfield. 


Taken  from   the    Department   of  Stale' 
January   1978  edition   of  the    B\<  KGROUN 
Notes  on  Japan    Copies  of  the  comple 
Note  may  he  purchased  for  5()<t  from  th,. 
Superintendent    of   Documents,     U.S.    I"" 
eminent  Printing  Office.    Washington,   DC I 
20402    fa    2591    discount    is    allowed   wkeA 
ordering  100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the 
same  address  I 


11978 


Japan  in  the  llorlcf  Economy 


ibert  D.  Hormats 

United  States  and  Japan  are  the 
I's  two  largest  market  economies, 
GNP's  of  $1.8  trillion  and  $584 
n,  respectively,  in  1977.  Japan  is 
econd  largest  trading  partner  of 
Inited  States  (after  Canada).  Last 
our  two-way  trade  came  to  $29 
n. 

I  addition.  Japan  is  the  largest  ex- 
market  for  many  Asian  countries, 
senting  40%  of  the  exports  of 
esia,  about  30%  of  the  exports  of 
talia  and  Thailand,  and  20%  of 
■xports  of  Korea,  Malaysia,  and 
e  hilippines.  Japan's  growth,  there- 

■  helps  to   stimulate   U.S.   exports 

■  ly  and  through  its  positive  effect 
■per  economies. 

1;  economic  development  of  Japan 
rt'  last  30  years  has  been  dramatic. 
|J')52  Japan's  per  capita  GNP  of 
18  put  it  in  the  ranks  of  middle- 
I  developing  countries.  Its  per 
ipi  GNP  of  over  $5,000   in    1977 

■  it  close  to  the  top  among  indus- 
a  ed  democracies. 

J>an's  rapid  growth,  and  the  struc- 
N  of  Japan's  economy  which  de- 
:Ii  ed  along  with  that  growth,  may 
«i  hadow  future  developments  in 
b  economies.  Over  the  past  several 
a  economic  consultations  with  the 
piese  have  focused  on  our  joint 
B  s  to  manage  the  adjustments  to 

■  i's  increasing  economic  weight 
hn  the  framework  of  the  liberal 
a-  and  payments  system  set  up 
Wt  the  General  Agreement  on 
U  f s    and    Trade    (GATT)    and    the 

■  national  Monetary  Fund  (IMF). 
I:  look  at  the  increasingly  strong 
B  th  in  the  economies  and  exports 
Niore  advanced  developing  coun- 
ie  such  as  Korea.  Brazil,  Mexico, 
ic Taiwan  and  observe  also  the  rapid 
lis  in  comparative  advantage 
xght  about  by  rapid  communica- 
I  and  transportation,  we  may  ex- 
it that  these  and  similar  countries 
I  increasingly  pose  adjustment 
llems  for  the  United  States  as 
»  as  Japan  and  for  the  world  econ- 
I  as  a  whole.  We  and  the  other 
■strialized  democracies  will  have 
live  increasing  thought  to  this 
meet. 

rhaps  our  experience  with  the  de- 
Ibment  and  growth  of  Japan  will  be 
Buctive. 


Role  of  Exports 

Japan  is  a  country  which  has  indus- 
trialized with  virtually  no  resource 
base.  It  imports  all  of  the  crude  oil, 
iron  ore,  cotton,  wool,  bauxite,  and 
gum  rubber  it  uses;  nearly  all  of  its 
copper  and  roughly  75%  of  its  coal. 
This  nearly  total  dependence  on  im- 
ported raw  materials  means  that  Ja- 
pan's prosperity  depends  heavily  on 
international  trade.  It  accounts  in  large 
measure  for  Japan's  strong  concerns 
about  exports  and  the  importance 
placed  on  them  by  Japanese  society. 
Japan  has  a  natural  trade  deficit  in  raw 
materials  and  trade-related  services.  It 
seeks  a  surplus  in  trade  in  manufac- 
tured goods  to  balance  these. 

Yet,  as  in  the  U.S.  economy,  the 
share  of  trade  in  the  Japanese  economy 
is  surprisingly  low.  Over  the  1953-72 
period,  Japanese  exports  were  11.3% 
of  GNP,  and  imports  were  10.2%  of 
GNP,  compared  to  21.2%  and  20.9% 
for  the  European  members  of  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD).  In  1976, 
Japanese  exports  were  still  only  14% 
of  GNP  and  imports  only  12%. 

Increased  exports  have  accompanied 
Japanese  growth  and  have  contributed 
significantly  to  it,  but  they  have  not 
been  the  key  factor.  Japanese  growth 
and  industrial  policies  in  the  postwar 
period  have  focused  mainly  on  stimu- 
lation of  domestic  economic  expan- 
sion; strong  export  performance  pro- 
ceeded in  parallel  with  this  effort. 

Japan  has  had  to  husband  its  limited 
resources  carefully,  for  its  growth  de- 
pends on  making  the  most  efficient  use 
of  its  labor,  capital,  and  land.  To 
create  economic  growth  from  a  very 
small  capital  stock  after  World  War  II, 
the  Japanese  Government  encouraged 
debt  financing,  through  the  Bank  of 
Japan,  to  promote  investment.  The 
focus  has  been  on  a  few  key 
industries — especially  chemicals,  steel, 
shipbuilding,  and  autos.  Tax  policy 
encouraged  saving  and  investment  and 
gave  incentives  for  industries'  expan- 
sion. Import  competition,  at  least  to 
the  mid-1960's,  was  very  tightly  con- 
trolled by  protective  barriers.  Those 
firms  that  could  expand  rapidly  en- 
joyed the  greatest  benefits  by  borrow- 
ing heavily  and  by  taking  advantage  of 
tax  breaks,  such  as  accelerated  depre- 
ciation on  new  equipment.  Firms  that 


could  export  as  well  as  supply  the 
domestic  market  expanded  especially 
rapidly,  received  substantial  tax  bene- 
fits, and  enjoyed  significant  economies 
of  scale.  They  could  undersell  smaller 
competitors  without  sacrificing  return 
on  capital  and  so  expand  further  at  the 
expense  of  smaller  companies. 

These  carefully  designed  govern- 
ment programs  of  growth  incentives 
have  been  enormously  successful  in 
expanding  the  economy.  They  have 
stimulated  a  flow  of  resources  from  a 
huge  pool  of  savings  (about  35%  of 
GNP)  into  high-growth  industries, 
with  the  greatest  benefits  going  to  the 
most  price-competitive,  largest- volume 
firms.  The  growth  of  Japan's  domestic 
economy  has  led  the  export  sector. 

Exports  are,  however,  an  important 
factor  in  Japanese  growth.  They  have 
served  to  maintain  economic  activity 
in  times  of  slack  domestic  demand. 
Because  of  their  high-fixed  costs — 
particularly  levels  of  debt  and 
"lifetime  employment"  policies — 
Japanese  firms  place  a  premium  on 
maintaining  high  levels  of  output. 
Many  have  also  invested  a  great  deal 
of  time,  effort,  and  managerial  talent 
in  developing  and  servicing  their 
foreign  markets,  encouraged  in  part  by 
the  persistent  undervaluation  of  the 
yen  in  the  1960's.  When  domestic 
demand  drops  during  recession, 
Japanese  producers  understandably 
turn  to  export  markets  to  maintain  use 
of  capacity. 

The  largest  gains  in  Japanese  shares 
of  foreign  markets  have  coincided 
with,  or  followed  immediately  after, 
domestic  recessions.  The  ability  of 
Japanese  industry  to  turn  rapidly  to 
production  for  export  when  domestic 
demand  falls  has  helped  Japan  to  shor- 
ten downturns  in  the  business  cycle 
and  sustain  high  rates  of  growth. 

Why  have  Japanese  growth  and  ex- 
port policies  created  such  extreme  ten- 
sions among  the  industrialized  coun- 
tries when  other  countries,  including 
Western  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
have  also  experienced  a  rapid  growth 
in  exports  over  the  past  30  years? 
Major  reasons  are  the  phenomenal 
growth  in  the  Japanese  economy  com- 
pared to  other  economies  and  the  con- 
centration of  Japanese  exports  in  a 
relatively  few  product  areas. 

Part  of  the  answer  also  lies  in  the 
composition  of  Japan's  trade  in  man- 
ufactured goods.  In  North  America 
and  in  Western  Europe,  a  large  part  of 
the  growth  in  exports  in  manufactures 
since  the  mid-1950's  has  been  in  in- 
termediate goods.  There  has  been  a 
clear  trend  toward  increased  spe- 
cialization, a  trend  accelerated  by  the 
formation  and  expansion  of  the  Euro- 


Department  of  State  Bu, 


pean  Economic  Community  and  by 
close  economic  links  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  Over  half 
of  world  trade  in  manufactures  con- 
sists of  shipments  of  intermediate  in- 
puts, and  over  half  of  the  growth  of 
trade  in  manufactures  (1955-73)  has 
occurred  within  North  America  and 
within  Western  Europe  rather  than 
among  continents.  For  countries  in 
these  geographic  regions,  exports  of 
manufactures  include  a  high  percent- 
age of  foreign  inputs.  Thus  a  country's 
imports  may  actually  include  a  sub- 
stantial amount  of  intermediate  goods 
which  it  had  earlier  exported. 

Japan,  however,  is  not  part  of  an 
integrated,  geographic  trading  area  and 
for  a  time  was  significantly  insulated 
from  intermediate  products  from  other 
areas  by  trade  barriers.  Except  for  its 
dependence  on  raw  materials,  most  of 
its  economy  is,  therefore,  self- 
contained.  Its  main  trading  partners 
are  the  diverse  countries  of  the  Pacific 
rim,  the  United  States,  and  the  coun- 
tries of  Southeast  Asia.  Because  of  its 
geographic  position  and  its  trade  pol- 
icy, Japan  did  not  participate  as  fully 
as  others  in  the  process  of  interna- 
tional specialization  in  manufacturing 
which  occurred  in  the  1950's  and 
1960's.  Its  imports  of  manufactures 
are  unusually  low — about  20%  of  total 
imports  with  little  growth — so  that  its 
exports  of  manufactures  contain  a  very 
high  proportion  of  domestic  value 
added.  And  manufactures  are  over 
90%  of  Japanese  exports. 

In  other  words,  despite  the  rela- 
tively low  ratio  of  export  to  GNP,  an 
unusually  large  part  of  the  value  of 
Japanese  export  production  is  domes- 
tic. The  lack  of  Japanese  participation 
in  trade  in  intermediate  manufactured 
goods,  and  the  difficulty  in  penetrating 
the  Japanese  market  encountered  by 
intermediate  or  final  products,  has  re- 
duced the  benefits  that  other  indus- 
trialized countries  receive  from 
Japanese  growth. 

Trade  Barriers 

Trade  barriers  contributed  in  a 
major  way  to  the  low  share  of  man- 
ufactures in  Japan's  imports.  And 
while  Japan  has,  in  the  1970's,  em- 
barked on  a  constructive  and  sus- 
tained path  toward  reducing  these,  the 
legacy  of  the  1950's  and  1960's  has 
had  an  impact  on  the  structure  of 
Japanese  industry. 

In  the  1950's,  as  the  Ministry  of 
International  Trade  and  Industry 
(MITI)  moved  to  spur  development  of 
key  sectors  such  as  petrochemicals, 
automobiles,  electronics,  and  heavy 
machinery,  the  Japanese  Government 


Japan's  Exports  and  Imports  by  Destination  and  Origin  (1977) 


(in  millions  of  dollars  and  percent) 


Total     100  % 
U.S. 

EC 

EFTA 

Asia 

Latin 
America 

Africa 

Oceania 

Communist 
Countries 

Canada 

Other 


80.495 


ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ  70-809  '//////////////////. 


Tzzzzzzzzzzza  12,396 


]  19,717 


* 


EZZZ24A9S 

bi. 


8.736 


[2,373 
,051 


7ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ2ZZZ352E?ZZk 


I  6,292 
V/A  3.065 


1 6,643 


\/A  2,128 ' 

I 1  3,047 

W/?//\  6.213 


14,910 

zzzn,3i9 


SI,  708 
3  2,881 

F  11,714 
233 


I      I     I     l      I     I     I      I I L 


percent      0 


10       15       20       25      30       35      40      45      50 


Exports 

Import.;  \7?////. 


E 


Note:  Imports  on  cif  basis. 

Source:  Monthly  Foreign  Trade  Statistics  (Japan) 


imposed  quotas  to  block  imports  of 
competing  products.  These  quotas 
were  extremely  restrictive;  for  exam- 
ple, virtually  no  foreign  cars  entered 
japan  from  the  early  1950's  to  the 
late  1960's. 

This  high  degree  of  protection  also 
inhibited  Japanese  access  to  foreign 
markets.  Although  Japan  joined  the 
GATT  in  1955,  many  countries  (in- 
cluding the  United  Kingdom,  France, 
and  Austria)  contended  that  Japanese 
quotas  prevented  establishment  of  re- 
ciprocal most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
treatment  and  refused  (under  article 
XXXV)  to  assume  GATT  obligations 
toward  Japan.  Nevertheless,  because 
Japan  accounted  for  only  a  small 
share  of  world  trade  (3.2%  in  1960), 
Japanese  protection  did  not  create 
major  problems  for  the  world  trading 
system. 

Gradual  liberalization  of  Japan's 
import  regime,  and  full  acceptance  of 
Japan    as    an    MFN    trading    partner, 


came  in  the  1960's.  In  1962, 
items  were  still  under  Japanese  q 
restriction.  This  fell  to  229  in  1' 
to  122  by  1970,  and  stands  at 
today.  Many  other  industrialized 
tions,  it  must  be  noted,  have  rou 
the  same  number  of  quotas. 

Removal   of  quotas,   however, 
posed  other  trade  barriers.   In 
1950's,    tariffs    were    quite    high 
the  neighborhood  of   15%  on  ca|i 
goods  and  24%  on  consumer  good! 
nominal    terms.    And    because    Jai 
maintained    tariffs    on    goods    at  I 
vanced  stages  of  production  that  \m 
sharply    higher    than    tariffs    on    I 
materials,  the  effective  rate  of  t;a 
protection  was  much  higher  than  U 
nominal  rate. 

The  Kennedy  Round  produce  > 
noticeable  liberalization  of  Japarto 
tariff  barriers,  lowering  nominal  r* 
to  about  9.5%  on  capital  goods  ami 
about  12%  on  consumer  goods,  \1 
the  estimated  rate  of  effective  pro* 


1978 


falling    from    22%    to    13%    on 

al  goods  and  from  35%  to   14% 

onsumer  goods.   Unilateral  tariff 

:tions   of  20%   in   October    1972 

er  reduced  applied  tariffs  to  an 

ge    of    about    8%    on    industrial 

rts,  although  these  applied  rates 

not  bound  internationally  under 

iATT.  And  high  protective  tariffs 

tin  on  some  key  items,  e.g., 

on   computers   and   22.5%   on 

heral  equipment. 

J>anese  tariffs  on  industrial  goods 

Si  central  issue  in  the  multilateral 

n  negotiations  (MTN),  where  our 

■live,    as   stated    in    the    Strauss- 

-slba  joint  statement  [of  January 

'■],  is  to  achieve  comparable  aver- 

eevels  of  bound  tariffs  at  the  end 

le  negotiations.   We  will  also 

c|.  on  nontariff  barriers  and  other 

lpdiments   to   trade.    Major   reduc- 

>H  by  Japan  in  this  exercise  would 

!  Jill  another  step  in  improving  the 

tlj  ce  between  manufactured  goods 

id  aw  materials  in  Japanese  imports 

c  mprove  the  climate  for  Japanese 

;p-ts  as  well. 

5  uctural  barriers  to  imports  also 
>q  difficulties  for  importers.  Struc- 
xi  problems  include  the  complex 
ic  fragmented  Japanese  distribution 
■sm.  Japan  relies  for  distribution 
f  )ods  on  an  extraordinarily  large 
.iner  of  very  small  retail  outlets — 
ipi  has  about  twice  as  many  retail 

0  s  per  1 ,000  of  population  as  does 
leJnited  States.  The  chain  of  dis- 
ittion,  from  the  importer  to  the 
:t  ler,  involves  many  links,  and 
j(  s  passing  through  the  chain  must 
:  narked  up  at  every  stage.  An 
n]  rted  good  which  arrives  at  the 
M;r  with  a  price  advantage  over 
ijnese  domestic  production  may 
« this  advantage  through  these  suc- 
■  ive  mark-ups,  although  some 
ipese  firms  also  suffer  from  the 
il:  distribution  difficulties. 
Jjanese  consumers  also  appear  to 
iv-  domestically  made  goods.  This 
a  is  probably  a  question  of  taste,  a 
"clem  which  can  be  overcome  by 
i'ul  market  research  by  potential 
[Jrters  and  adaptation  of  produc- 
t  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  Japanese 
B:et.  Clearly,  American  producers 
b  want  to  export  to  Japan  must 
t^i  the  same  efforts  to  accommo- 
M  Japanese  tastes  as  Japanese  ex- 
Sirs  do  in  accommodating  Ameri- 
Wastes. 

■culture 

iriculture  is  the  most  inefficient 

1  highly  protected  sector  of  Japan's 
Momy.  Despite  very  high  prices, 
C average  fanner's  productivity   in 


Japan  is  only  about  one-fifth  that  of 
the  average  worker  in  manufacturing. 
Farm  income  is  correspondingly  low. 
Despite  protection,  however,  we 
should  not  forget  that  Japan  is  a 
large,  growing,  and  reliable  consumer 
of  U.S.  agricultural  products — it's 
our  best  agricultural  customer. 

The  barriers  to  agricultural  trade 
with  Japan  flow  directly  from  the 
social  and  political  situation  of  its 
farmers.  Farm  population  in  Japan, 
which  was  still  27%  of  the  total  in 
1960,  has  fallen  to  about  10%  in 
1976.  The  remaining  farmers  tend  to 
be  older  persons  with  little  interest, 
or  ability,  in  nanfarm  employment. 
They  constitute  an  important  political 
bloc,  largely  supportive  of  the  ruling 
Liberal  Democratic  Party  (LDP). 
Perhaps  80%  of  LDP  members  of  the 
Japanese  Diet  come  from  districts 
with  substantial  members  of  farm 
voters,  and  a  very  sizable  block  of 
LDP  Diet  members  is  totally  opposed 
to  any  liberalization  of  agricultural 
trade. 

In  addition,  Japan  feels  a  sense  of 
insecurity  about  access  to  food 
supplies,  a  concern  heightened  by  talk 
of  "agripower"  and  by  the  short- 
lived U.S.  embargo  on  soybean  ex- 
ports in  1973.  As  a  result,  Japanese 
self-sufficiency  in  agriculture  remains 
high — about  72%  overall — with  sharp 
declines  in  the  past  20  years  only  in 
wheat,  barley,  and  soybeans. 

The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  gets 
10-12%  of  the  national  budget,  and 
outlays  for  farm  price  supports — 
principally  for  rice — are  extremely 
high. 

The  import  quotas  still  maintained 
by  Japan  are  virtually  all  on  agricul- 
tural products.  Among  the  most  acute 
problems  for  U.S.  exports  are  the 
quotas  on  beef — which  sells  for  about 
$17  per  pound  in  Tokyo — and  citrus 
products.  Japanese  tobacco  imports 
are  heavily  restricted  by  state-trading 
practices.  State  trading  also  affects 
rice,  wheat,  barley,  and  rye;  many 
dairy  products;  salt;  and  alcohol.  The 
United  States  is  also  affected  by 
Japanese  restrictions  on  meat,  poul- 
try, dairy  products,  and  a  variety  of 
fruits  and  vegetables.  These  problems 
are  under  discussion  bilaterally  and  in 
the  MTN. 


Shifting  Comparative  Advantage 

But  while  some  sectors  of  Japan's 
economy  are  protected  and  ineffi- 
cient, many  others  are  extremely 
dynamic.  Consistent  with  its  desire  to 
make  the  most  efficient  use  of  its 
resources,  Japan  has  been  quick  to 
take  advantage  of  shifts  in  compara- 


tive advantage  between  it  and  certain 
developing  countries.  One  prominent 
economist  has  called  this  phenomenon 
the  "dynamic  international  division 
of  labor. " 

In  the  1930's  Japan  began  compet- 
ing internationally  with  the  United 
Kingdom  in  textiles.  It  moved  into  a 
wide  range  of  other  light  industrial 
exports  during  the  1950's.  In  the 
1960's  it  shifted  into  increasingly 
sophisticated  and  technologically  ad- 
vanced areas. 

These  shifts  have  taken  place  not 
only  because  there  is  demand  from 
advanced  markets  such  as  the  United 
States  for  high-technology  products 
but  also  because  there  is  increased 
export  competition  in  less  sophisti- 
cated product  areas  from  the  middle- 
level  developing  countries  such  as 
Taiwan,  Korea,  Hong  Kong,  and  Sing- 
apore. And  in  1977,  total  exports 
from  these  four  countries  were  almost 
half  of  total  exports  from  Japan. 

These  countries  have  moved  into 
three  different  geographical  markets 
formerly  occupied  almost  exclusively 
by  Japanese  products: 

•  Markets  in  the  developing  coun- 
tries themselves; 

•  Markets  in  Japan;  and 

•  Markets  in  developed  countries 
such  as  the  United  States. 

For  example,  Japan's  exports  of 
TV  receivers  to  Asian  markets  in 
Southeast  Asia  dropped  by  46%  be- 
tween 1970  and  1976,  while  Japan's 
imports  of  TV  receivers  from  the  four 
countries  mentioned  above  almost 
doubled. 

Similarly,  Japan's  share  of  the 
U.S.  textile  and  apparel  imports 
dropped  from  about  25%  to  around 
10%  between  1970  and  1976,  while 
the  four  Asian  countries  mentioned 
increased  their  share  from  about  25% 
to  over  40%.  Drops  in  Japanese  mar- 
ket shares  and  increases  in  the  other 
Asian  countries'  market  shares  also 
occurred  in  many  other  product 
categories,  including  clothing, 
plywood,  footwear,  radios,  and  tele- 
vision sets. 

With  Japanese  industries  increas- 
ingly feeling  the  pressure  of  Asian 
competition,  there  is  increasing  incen- 
tive for  them  to  move  into  higher 
value-added  industries.  There  are 
some  demands  for  protection  in  Ja- 
pan, but  imposing  new  restrictions  on 
imports  does  not  seem  to  be  the  sort 
of  policy  the  Japanese  Government  is 
interested  in  pursuing. 

Rather,  the  Japanese  Government  is 
moving  toward  speeding  the  process 
of  adjustment  of  Japanese  industries 
to  the  new  competititon,  moving 


8 


Department  of  State  Bui 


workers  out  of  less  competitive,  low- 
technology  industries  into  more  com- 
petitive, high-technology  areas. 
Japanese  leaders  are  recognizing  that 
the  structural  changes  in  the  other 
Asian  countries  are  quite  rapid,  with 
entirely  new  products  being  exported 
from  these  countries  during  a  period 
of  only  a  few  short  years.  In  addition 
to  industry-specific  adjustment  pro- 
grams to  relieve  pressures  on 
structurally  depressed  industries,  the 
Japanese  Government's  attainment  of 
its  growth  target  will  assist  Japanese 
industries  in  their  shift  from  lower- 
technology  to  higher-technology 
areas. 

Post-1973  Events 

The  1973  oil  embargo,  followed  by 
the  quadrupling  of  oil  prices,  led  to 
the  recession  that  has  contributed 
heavily  to  today's  situation. 


In  1971  and  1972,  Japan  experi- 
enced an  extraordinary  surge  in  ex- 
ports, a  large  balance-of-payments 
surplus,  and  a  huge  increase  in  hold- 
ings of  foreign  exchange.  Official  re- 
serves, which  stood  at  $4.8  billion  at 
the  end  of  1970,  rose  to  $14.1  billion 
by  the  end  of  1971  and  to  almost  $17 
billion  by  the  end  of  1972.  This  rise 
occurred  despite  the  17%  yen  revalua- 
tion of  December  1971  from  a  rela- 
tively constant  postwar  rate  of  360  to 
the  dollar  to  roughly  315.  These  de- 
velopments led  to  strong  international 
criticism  of  Japanese  policies  and  to 
pressure  on  Japan  to  liberalize  im- 
port barriers — a  situation  not  unlike 
today's. 

It  was  in  this  atmosphere  that  Japan 
reduced  industrial  tariffs  unilaterally 
by  20%  in  October  1972,  floated  the 
yen  (which  rose  to  roughly  271),  and 
hosted  the  meeting  of  ministers  that 
inaugurated   the    Tokyo   Round   of 


multilateral   trade   negotiation! 
September  1973. 

The  October  1973  oil  crisis  hi 
these  trends.  Japan  experienced 
mendous  inflationary  pressure  a 
drop  in  the  yen  against  the  dc 
Domestic  policies,  including  j 
controls  and  restrictive  fiscal 
monetary  policies,  were  introduct 
curb  demand,  and  GNP  fell  in 
terms.  The  yen  weakened  to  300. 

These  measures  took  some  tirr 
take  hold.  Inflation  in  consi 
prices  approached  a  peak  of  45' 
the  spring  of  1974.  The  Japanese 
ance  of  payments  shifted  into  di 
($4.7  billion  on  current  accour 
1974).  The  next  stage  of  the  Japa 
response  was  characterized  by  ef 
to  let  the  price  system  reflect 
increase  in  energy  and  other  comi 
ity  prices.  Direct  price  controls 
eliminated  by  the  end  of  1974. 
products,    power,    and    other    de 


71,944 


Japan's  Exports  and  Imports  by  Principal  Commodity  (Jan.-Nov.  1977) 

(in  millions  of  dollars  and  percent) 

Exports 

Total         100  % 

Motor  Vehicles 

Iron  and  Steel 

Ships 

Textiles 

Chemicals 


10,223 
9,484 


7,577 


Scientific  and 
Optical  Equipment 

Radios 
Other 


D 
□ 


4,138 
841 


2,268 
2,204 


32,209 


I        I        I        I         I        I        I         1        I        I 
percent       0      5     10     15     20    25    30     35    40   45 


Note:  Imports  on  cif  basis. 

Source:  Monthly  Foreign  Trade  Statistics  (Japan) 


Imports 

Total    100% 

Crude  Oil 

Foodstuffs 

Machinery 

Logs  and 
Lumber 

Coal 

Chemicals 

Iron  Ore 

Petroleum 
Products 

Textile  Raw 
Materials 

Soybeans 


v//////////^y/jm 


'///\  4,365 
^   3,483 
^   3,260 


2,735 


2j  2,338 


r 


2,033 


1,844 


977 


V////////A  ^.683 


_LJ I     I     I 


percent      0      5     10     15     20    25    30     35    40    45 


978 


A,  increased  in  price  by  30-50%. 
lit  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
led  hold  down  the  rate  of  inflation 
|fri2  this  period. 

R,  1975  the  atmosphere  of  crisis 
■lifted.  Inflation  was  held  to  10%, 
•jven-dollar  rate  settled  in  the 
fls,  the  current-account  deficit  was 
I  zero.  GNP  held  steady  in  real 
Es,  and  oii  imports  fell  slightly, 
bvertheless,  recovery  was  slow, 
fistrial  production  did  not  return  to 
lb  levels  until  mid-1976.  Un- 
■loyment  continued  to  rise.  And  as 
{happened  in  the  past,  slow 
lestic  growth  inspired  an  increase 
leports  as  manufacturers  attempted 
Maintain  production  levels.  In  1976 
an  again  had  a  current-account 
llus  of  $3.7  billion;  this  rose  to 
■billion  in  1977. 

rtJlus  in  Perspective 

■ie  present  period  of  current- 
junt  surplus,  as  just  noted,  is  not 
Ifirst  which  the  Japanese  have  ex- 
I;nced.  Japan  entered  a  period  of 
lained  trade  surpluses  in  1965  and 
furrent-account  surpluses  in  1968, 
Irell  as  1971.  It  should  be  instruc- 
I  to  look  at  the  causes  of  the 
llus  trend  and  the  policies  the 
ijnese  Government  developed  then 
>  djust  to  the  surplus  before  we 
I  at  the  present  situation. 
J  1961  Japan  had  a  current  ac- 
;|it  deficit  of  almost  $1  billion.  By 
9  it  had  a  surplus  of  $5.8  billion. 
I  ng    this    10-year   period,    Japan's 

■  irts  increased  from  $4.1  billion  to 
16  billion,  while  imports  increased 
ii  $4.7  billion  to  $15.8  billion.  A 
stnt  study  analyzed  the  causes  of 
i<  ncreases. 

|)ur  factors,  not  including  the  con- 
I:  of  the  undervalued  yen,  were 
kipally  responsible  for  the  $19.5 
ion  increase  in  Japanese  merchan- 
1  exports  during  1961-71. 

I  Growth  in  world  GNP  and  in 
■id  trade  accounted  for  $9  billion 
§4%)  of  the  increase. 

■  Japanese  export  prices  rising 
Ie  slowly  than  those  of  other  in- 
lurialized  countries  accounted  for 
Ii  billion  ( 12.4%)  of  the  increase. 

i  Shifts  in  Japan's  comparative  ad- 
ILage  and  development  of  new  ex- 
Kj  products  accounted  for  $6.8  bil- 
||  (35%)  of  the  increase. 
Benefits  from  lower  tariffs  (fol- 
ing  implementation  of  the  Ken- 
s' Round  cuts)  accounted  for  $1.3 
Bon  (6.2%)  of  the  total  increase. 

»n  the  import  side,  four  similar 
dors  explain  most  of  the  increase  in 
Bchandise    imports   from    $4.7    bil- 


lion in  1961  to  $15.8  billion  in  1971. 

•  Growth  in  Japanese  GNP  (con- 
sumption, investment,  etc.)  accounted 
for  $9.0  billion  (81.1%). 

•  Changes  in  import  prices  ac- 
counted for  $1  billion  (9%), 

•  Shifts  in  the  structure  of  Japanese 
manufacturing  accounted  for  $0.8  bil- 
lion (7.2%). 

•  Japanese  commercial  policy  (re- 
duction of  tariffs,  etc.)  accounted  for 
$0.3  billion  (2.7%). 

Simple  lessons  can  be  learned  from 
these  facts.  First,  Japanese  growth  is 
by  far  the  most  important  determinant 
of  its  import  levels.  Second,  growth 
abroad  is  the  most  significant  factor 
in  increased  Japanese  exports.  Third, 
product  innovation  is  a  major  feature 
of  Japanese  export  expansion. 

Japan's  surplus  remained  large  in 
1971.  In  June  of  that  year,  the 
Japanese  Government  announced  its 
eight  point  plan  to  avoid  yen  revalua- 
tion. The  plan  included  the  following 
measures: 

1)  Reduction  of  quantitative  import 
restraints; 

2)  Promotion  of  capital  exports; 

3)  Tariff  cuts; 

4)  Increase  of  government  expendi- 
tures; 

5)  Creation  and  enlargement  of  a 
generalized  system  of  preferences  to 
promote  imports  of  manufactures 
from  less  developed  countries; 

6)  Reduction  of  nontariff  barriers; 

7)  Promotion  of  foreign  aid;  and 

8)  Arrangements  for  orderly  mar- 
keting of  exports. 

In  addition  to  product-specific 
measures  to  stimulate  imports  and  re- 
strain exports,  relaxation  of  restric- 
tions on  capital  outflows  resulted  in 
an  increase  in  net  long-term  capital 
outflows  from  $155  million  in  1969 
to  $4.5  billion  in  1972. 

These  policies  were  not  successful 
at  curbing  the  pressure  for  yen  re- 
valuation. The  Japanese  revalued  the 
yen  by  16.88%  against  the  dollar  as 
part  of  the  Smithsonian  Agreement  on 
December  18,  1971,  and  agreed  to  let 
the  yen  float  in  early  1973.  These 
policy  measures  contributed  to  elimi- 
nation of  the  surplus  in  1973,  and  the 
oil-price  increase  brought  about  a 
$4.7  billion  deficit  in  1974. 

Japan  subsequently  returned  to  a 
current-account  surplus  of  $3.7  bil- 
lion in  1976  and  $11  billion  in  1977. 
This  dramatic  rise  had  several  causes. 

•  Japanese  firms  cut  their  prices  on 
exports,  maintaining  or  improving 
their  competitive  positions  overseas 
(export   prices   fell    in    yen    in    1975, 


rose  in  1976,  and  then  dropped 
sharply  in  1977  returning  to  1975 
levels). 

•  Energy  and  raw-material  conser- 
vation helped  slow  imports  and  made 
production  more  efficient  (Japanese 
oil  imports  have  been  nearly  constant 
in  volume  since  1974). 

•  Growth  in  Japan's  export  mar- 
kets, especially  in  the  United  States, 
increased  demand  for  Japanese  goods. 

In  the  past,  when  the  Japanese 
surplus  provoked  international  tension 
(as  in  1969,  1971,  and  1972),  the 
Japanese  tended  to  limit  their  re- 
sponse solely  to  the  field  of  foreign 
economic  policy.  For  example,  the 
1971  plan  to  avoid  yen  revaluation 
included  no  measures,  other  than  a 
small  increase  in  government  expendi- 
ture, that  were  directed  at  changing 
the  structure  of  Japan's  internal 
economy. 

Now,  however,  it  appears  that  the 
Japanese  leadership  has  come  to  rec- 
ognize that  the  Japanese  surplus  is  to 
a  large  degree — and  for  a  number  of 
reasons  pointed  to  earlier — a  product 
of  the  structure  of  the  Japanese  econ- 
omy. The  leadership  also  understands 
that  the  surplus  is  a  problem  which 
seriously  affects  other  nations  and  the 
international  economic  system  be- 
cause it  adds  to  the  burden  on  other 
oil-importing  countries  which  already 
must  finance  the  surplus  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries.  And  Japan  has 
seen  that  its  surplus  has  important 
repercussions  for  currency  markets. 

Because  the  problems,  as  noted 
above,  are  largely  structural,  the 
Japanese  Government  has  few  tools  at 
its  command  to  create  a  rapid  turn- 
around in  the  situation.  Japan  is  not, 
as  some  would  suggest,  a  planned 
economy  where  directions  can  be 
dramatically  altered  by  government 
fiat. 


What  Can  Reasonably  Be  Done? 

To  understand  the  genuine  policy 
dilemma  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment faces,  one  has  to  understand  the 
conflicting  effects  of  yen  apprecia- 
tion. The  immediate  effect  of  yen 
appreciation  is  to  increase  Japan's 
trade  surplus.  This  is  so  because  trade 
volumes  are  initially  affected  very  lit- 
tle by  the  change  in  exchange  values. 
Imports  into  Japan  cost  less,  but  it 
takes  time  to  increase  their  volume. 
Exports  from  Japan  cost  more,  but  it 
takes  time  before  orders  and  ship- 
ments fall  off.  Until  trade  volumes 
are  substantially  affected,  the  statisti- 
cal   result    is    a    larger    trade    surplus 


10 


after  than  before  yen  appreciation. 
Moreover,  the  increase  in  the  trade 
surplus  is  larger  if  the  trade  values 
are  expressed  in  dollars  than  if  they 
are  expressed  in  yen. 

Over  time,  yen  appreciation  will 
make  imports  into  Japan  more  attrac- 
tive and  will  make  Japanese  exports 
more  expensive  on  world  markets. 
This  should  work  to  increase  import 
volumes  and  reduce  export  volumes. 
But  the  full  effect  of  any  given  ap- 
preciation of  the  yen  may  take  up  to  2 
years  to  fully  work  itself  out. 

Another  factor  contributing  to  the 
delay  is  the  effect  of  yen  appreciation 
on  profits  and  investment.  As  noted 
above,  exports  are  only  about  14%  of 
Japanese  GNP.  But  they  account  for 
roughly  one-third  of  sales  in  the  man- 
ufacturing sector  and  for  over  one- 
half  in  certain  industries.  Manufactur- 
ing firms  in  Japan  have  high  fixed 
costs.  They  are  highly  leveraged, 
operating  with  70-80%  debt  capital. 
And  as  a  result  of  Japanese  "lifetime 
employment"  policies,  wage  bills  are 
relatively  inflexible.  Although  an  in- 
crease in  the  yen's  value  can  help  a 
firm  by  lowering  the  yen  cost  of  raw 
materials  and  energy,  it  can  also 
cause  a  harmful,  or  even  fatal,  drop 
in  cash  flow  by  squeezing  the  profits 
of  those  who  must  shave  prices  in 
order  to  export  or  compete  with 
imports. 

This  situation  has  provoked  a  major 
shakeout  in  Japanese  industry.  Busi- 
ness failures  have  climbed  steadily 
since  the  oil  crisis — from  14,000  in 
1974  to  almost  19,000  in  1977,  an 
historically  high  level.  Employment 
in  manufacturing  has  fallen  9%  since 
1973.  Reductions  in  exports  would 
accelerate  these  trends. 

On  the  import  side,  the  main  de- 
terminant of  demand  is  domestic 
growth.  Because  80%  of  Japanese 
imports  are  raw  materials  and 
semimanufactures,  imports  respond 
more  dramatically  to  changes  in 
domestic  income  than  to  changes  in 
price.  The  appreciation  of  the  yen 
lowers  the  price  of  imports,  but  it 
also  inhibits  domestic  growth  by  re- 
straining business  profits  and  invest- 
ment in  internationally  tradable 
goods. 

As  yen  appreciation  begins  to  take 
hold  in  the  export  sector,  businesses 
experiencing  lower  sales  and  profits 
will  trim  investment  and  inventory 
accumulation.  Industrial  production, 
employment,  and  personal  income 
slip,  and  thus  GNP  growth  and  import 
demand  are  reduced.  And  because  of 
the  nature  of  the  Japanese  distribution 
system,   price   reductions   on   imports 


Department  of  State  Bui 


U.S.  Trade  With  Japan 

(in  millions  of  dollars) 

LJ  Export 
YA  Import 


•: 


00 
co 

00 

cm" 


ID 

o 

V, 


to 
rv 
to 

oo  oS" 
f-t 
oo 
CO 


w  rr-x 


v, 


'A 


Z 


21 


CO 


s 

in 


1 


OOr 

in 


r 


J 


A 


00 
ID 
00 

1 


« 


1972 


1973 


1974 


1975 


1976 


1977 


Note:  Imports  on  F.A.S.  basis 

Source:  Highlights  of  U.S.  Export  and  Import  Trade 


may  not  be  passed  through  to 
consumers. 

The  net  effect  of  the  sharp  appreci- 
ation of  the  yen  on  import  demand 
has  been  positive,  but  it  is  not  so 
great  as  the  swing  in  the  value  of  the 
yen  would  initially  lead  one  to 
expect. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is 
clear  that  strong  domestic  demand,  to 
draw  in  imports  and  to  ease  the  pres- 
sure on  manufacturers  to  export,  is 
the  most  effective  remedy  in  the  short 
term  to  reduce  Japan's  current- 
account  surplus.  In  the  longer  term, 
elimination  of  the  Japanese  current- 
account  surplus  will  also  require 
structural  changes  in  the  Japanese 
economy.  Some  of  these  changes 
involve  trade  policy — including  elimi- 
nation of  barriers  to  import  compe- 
tition in  the  Japanese  market,  espe- 
cially for  manufactured  goods.  More 
importantly,  Japanese  firms  should  see 


it  in  their  interest  to  participate  r 
fully  in  trade  in  intermediate  g< 
which  in  turn  will  increase  the  shai 
manufactured  components  in  Japa 
imports.  And,  of  course,  firm 
other  countries  wishing  to  expot 
Japan  must  make  a  determined  el 
to  identify  and  take  advantage  of 
port  opportunities. 

Until  all  of  this  is  done,  Japan 
contribute  to  the  adjustment  pro< 
and  to  global  economic  health  by 
nificantly  increasing  its  aid  to  po 
countries,  and  it  has  pledged  to  m 
in  this  direction. 

What  Can  Be  Expected? 

The  Japanese  current-acco 
surplus    will    not    quickly    disapp' 
The  conditions  for  its  eliminatl 
include: 

•  Sustained   strong   growth 


' 


1978 


11 


gestic  demand  in  the  Japanese 
«omy; 

^Improvement  in  the  competitive 
jprtunities  for  imports  in  the 
ttnese  market  and  a  willingness  on 
aiart  of  exporters  to  exploit  those 
iprtunities; 

•  Reduction  in  the  level  of  protec- 
y.  afforded  to  Japanese  agriculture; 
c 

fA  shift  in  the  structure  of 
.pnese  manufacturing  toward  use  of 
rgher  percentage  of  imported  in- 
jt]  at  various  stages  in  the  produc- 
jiprocess. 

Te  present  situation  is  unstable, 
peciation  of  the  yen  works  to  ex- 
ii  imports  and  slow  exports  but 
0|  slowly  than  desired  and  with 
liful  effects  on  some  sectors  of  the 
ipnese  economy.  The  Japanese 
irlus  creates  pressures  for  protec- 
31  in  other  countries;  if  govern- 
ed succumb  to  these  pressures, 
ei  will    feed    inflation,    weakening 


their  currencies  and  hindering  pros- 
pects for  growth  and  structural  change 
in  Japan.  Our  present  course,  which 
relies  on  positive  Japanese  action 
rather  than  import  restrictions  and 
which  looks  for  structural  changes 
rather  than  a  quick  fix,  is  the  correct 
one. 

Following  intensive  consultations 
between  Japanese  and  U.S.  Govern- 
ment officials  in  the  last  quarter  of 
1977,  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Ex- 
ternal Economic  Affairs,  Mr. 
Nobuhiko  Ushiba  and  Ambassador 
Strauss  [Special  Representative  for 
Trade  Negotiations  Robert  S.  Strauss] 
announced  policies  designed  to  reduce 
the  surplus  substantially  during  1978. 

In  addition  to  product-specific 
measures  dealing  with  certain  prod- 
ucts such  as  beef,  citrus,  and  forest 
products,  the  Japanese  Government 
reiterated  its  real  growth  target  of  7% 
for  Japan  fiscal  year  1978;  announced 
that  domestic  economic  growth,  yen 
appreciation,   and  efforts  to  improve 


the  access  of  foreign  goods  to  the 
Japanese  domestic  market  would  sub- 
stantially reduce  Japan's  current- 
account  surplus  in  1978;  and  stated 
that  additional  steps  to  reduce  it  fur- 
ther would  be  taken  in  1979  with  the 
ultimate  goal  being  equilibrium  in  the 
current  account. 

We  recognize  the  difficulties  that 
the  Japanese  Government  faces  in  try- 
ing to  achieve  that  goal,  but  we  also 
recognize  the  importance  of  its  mak- 
ing every  effort  to  do  so. 

In  our  talks  with  the  Government  of 
Japan,  we  have  tried  to  maintain  a 
spirit  of  cooperation.  Our  economies 
are  too  closely  linked  for  either  side 
to  benefit  from  a  confrontation.  We 
are  pleased  that  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment has  recognized  that  the 
growth  of  its  domestic  economy  is  a 
matter  of  international  interest  and 
concern. 

In  a  broader  perspective,  we  and 
Japan  share  an  interest  in  progress 
and  cooperation  in  the  Pacific  area. 


Major  Products  in  U.S.-Japan  Trade  (1977) 

(in  millions  of  dollars  and  percent) 
U.S.  Exports 


Total     100% 

Nonelectrical 
Machinery 

Feedgrains 

Logs  and 
Lumber 

Soybeans 

Coal 

Agricultural 
Raw  Material 

Chemicals 

Consumer 
Goods 

Other 


percent 


10,522 


1,124 
1,061 


945 

938 
899 

861 


606 
591 


3,497 


U.S.  Imports 
Total       100% 


V////////////M&0M 


'  V////////////////fib** 


Parts  and  Engines 

Machinery 

Iron  and 
Steel  Products 


Y/////////A*™ 


V////////A*-™ 


Radio.  TV.  Phonos       V///////A  2|418 
and  Appliances  V////////\ 


Other  Consumer 
Goods 

Other 


V/////////A^ 


L_l I     I     I I LJ 

0         5         10       15       20       25       30      35 


percent 


10       15       20       25       30      35 


No;e:  Imports  on  F.A.S.  basis 

Source:  Highlights  of  U.S.  Export  and  Import  Trade 


12 


THE  PRESIDENT:   Mews 
Conference  of  April  25  (Excerpts) 


Q.  Where  do  you  stand  now  on 
the  possibility  of  imposing,  by 
Executive  order  or  administrative 
action,  oil  import  fees,  and  how 
soon  might  you  act?  I  understand  a 
couple  of  your  advisers  are  suggest- 
ing a  May  1  deadline. 

A.  No  one  has  suggested  a  deadline 
that  early.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
have  just  finished  the  fourth  major 
element  of  a  five-part  comprehensive 
fuel  or  energy  program  with  natural 
gas  deregulation.  And  now  this  is 
being  recommended  to  the  complete 
conference  committee. 

The  next  step  is  the  crude  oil 
equalization  tax,  which  will  be  ad- 
dressed by  the  Finance  Committee  in 
the  Senate  and  the  Ways  and  Means 
Committee  in  the  House  — 
representatives  of  them  in  a  conference 
committee.  I've  talked  to  the  chairmen 
of  both  those  committees  about  the 
crude  oil  equalization  tax,  the  fifth 
element  of  our  major  proposals. 

It's  too  early,  I  think,  to  consider 
administrative  action.  I  still  hope  and 
expect  that  the  Congress  will  act  and 
will  complete  the  fifth  element  of  our 
energy  plan  and  present  the  entire 


package  as  it  should  be  to  the  Con- 
gress in  one  body. 

Q.  President  Brezhnev  has  offered 
to  not  build  the  neutron  bomb  if  you 
agree  or  the  United  States  agrees  to 
do  likewise.  Is  that  the  word  you're 
looking  for  to  halt  the  program? 

A.  No.  The  Soviets  know  and  Pres- 
ident Brezhnev  knows  that  the  neutron 
weapon  is  designed  to  be  used  against 
massive  and  perhaps  overwhelming 
tank  forces  in  the  Western  and  Eastern 
European  area. 

The  Soviets,  over  a  period  of  years, 
have  greatly  built  up  their  tank  forces 
and  others,  stronger  than  have  the 
NATO  allies.  The  neutron  weapons 
are  designed  to  equalize  that  inequal- 
ity, along  with  many  other  steps  that 
our  country  is  now  taking. 

The  Soviets  have  no  use  for  a  neu- 
tron weapon,  so  the  offer  by  Brezhnev 
to  refrain  from  building  the  neutron 
weapons  has  no  significance  in  the 
European  theater,  and  he  knows  this. 

We  are  strengthening  NATO  in 
other  ways.  Ourselves,  our  NATO  al- 
lies, will  meet  here  in  Washington  the 
last  of  May  with  a  recommitment, 
which  is  already  well  in  progress,  for 
a  long-range  strengthening  of  NATO 
in  all  its  aspects. 


The  interdependence  of  the  Pacific 
nations  has  not  been  as  clearly  recog- 
nized as,  for  instance,  that  which 
exists  among  the  nations  of  Europe. 
Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  trade  has 
boomed  of  late  without  benefit  of  a 
common  market  or  free-trade  area.  In 
part  this  is  because  the  economies  of 
the  region  are  largely  complementary, 
in  part  because  of  the  drop  in  the  cost 
of  shipping,  and  in  part  because  these 
countries  have  provided  a  favorable 
climate  for  investment  and  export- 
oriented  production. 

These  nations  can  benefit  from 
closer  cooperation  in  trade,  com- 
modities, food  and  agriculture, 
energy,  investment,  and  development 
assistance.  More  intensive  consulta- 
tion among  these  nations  — 
particularly  the  OECD  countries  of 
the  area  and  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations — appears  to 
be  a  logical  outgrowth  of  these 
relationships. 


Beyond  this  we  and  Japan  collabo- 
rate closely  in  the  OECD,  the  eco- 
nomic summit  framework,  financial 
fora,  and  various  North-South  discus- 
sions to  deal  with  multilateral  issues 
of  common  concern.  As  vital  cogs  in 
the  world  economy,  the  United  States 
and  Japan  together  play  an  indispens- 
able role  in  the  orderly  evolution  of 
the  world  economy.  We  benefit  from 
our  economic  relationship  far  more 
than  we  are  harmed  by  occasional 
difficulties.  □ 


Statement  before  the  Subt  ommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Economic  Polic)  and  Trade  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Intel  national  Relations  on  Apr. 
4.  1978.  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear 
ings  will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  DC.  20402.  Mr.  Hormats  is 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs. 


Department  of  State  Bu> 

But  this  statement  by  Brezhnev 
cerning    the    neutron    weapon    has 
significance  at  all. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  heed  the  i 
of  the  congressional  leadership 
your  own  party  and  delay  the  for 
submission  of  the  package  salt 
warplanes  to  the  Congress  or  bi 
it  up  in  any  way? 


A.  I've  not  been  asked  by  the  1 
ership  in  the  Congress  to  delay.  1 1 
had  one  Senator  who  came  to  sea 
about  holding  off  on  this  propc 
Secretary  Vance  and  I  have  bee: 
close  communication,  both  with 
another  and  with  leaders  in  the  ( 
gress,  for  a  number  of  weeks  cone 
ing  the  arms  sales  package  that  wi 
presented  to  the  Congress  very  sho 
This  package  will  be  presented  ir 
dividual  component  parts  to  the  < 
gress.  It's  the  only  legal  way  to  do 

The  Congress  will  act  on  tb 
major  sales  proposals  individual! 
Israel,  to  Egypt,  and  to  Saudi  Ar; 
Each  one  is  important.  Each  one  t 
pletes  a  commitment  that  has 
made  by  either  me,  or,  even  in 
case  of  the  Saudis  and  Israel, 
predecessors  for  these  sales. 

I  look  upon  them  as  a  package, 
if  the  Congress  should  accept  a  po 
and  reject  another,  then  my  intent 
withdraw  the  sales  proposal  altoge 
But  the  Congress  will  not  receive 
act  on  these  proposals  as  a  pack 
They  have  to  act,  according  to 
law,  on  individual  items. 

These  proposals  are  in  the  nati> 
interest.  I  think  it's  important  to 
country  to  meet  our  commitments, 
one  that's  perhaps  the  most  contrc 
sial  is  the  sale  of  F-15's  to  the  S 
Arabians.  This  was  a' promise  that 
made  to  the  Saudi  Arabians  in 
tember  of  1975,  to  let  them  ha' 
choice  of  F-16's  or  F-15's.  They  ' 
these  weapons  for  defensive  purpos 

I  recommitted  this  nation  to  pro 
these  planes  both  last  year  and  a 
this  year.  And  my  deep  belief  is  i 
since  in  the  Middle  East  our  pre< 
nent  consideration  is  the  long-r; 
and  permanent  security  and  peac< 
ness  for  the  people  of  Israel,  thi 
treat  the  moderate  Arabs  with  fair 
and  with  friendship  and  to  streng 
their  commitment  to  us  in  return  i 
the  best  interests  of  our  own  cou 
and  of  Israel. 

We  are  negotiating  or  discus; 
these  matters  with  the  Congress, 
there  will  be  no  delay  of  the  s 
proposal  beyond  the  point  where  it 
be  completed  by  the  time  the  Cong 
goes  into  recess — maybe  2  or  3  d 
no  longer  than  that. 


1978 

Do  you  think  it  proper  or  do 

think    it    right   for    the   foreign 

ster   of  another   government   to 

fere  in  the  legislative  processes 

is  government?  I'm  talking  par- 

arly  about  your  Middle  East 

package  here,  legislation  which 

ijve  said  is  in  the  best  interest  of 

■{United  States.  Do  vou  think  it's 

:t? 

m  I  have  made  my  decision  about 
farms  sales  package  after  very  care- 
I consideration,  a  close  study  of 
lions  and  opinions  expressed  by 
■predecessors  in  the  White  House, 
i'ul  consultation  with  the  State  De- 
unent  and  our  Defense  Department, 
Imilitary  leaders,  and  I  made  my 
Immendation  to  the  Congress — I 
I  make  it  shortly — on  what  I  con- 
I  to  be  in  the  best  interests  of  our 
I  nation  with  a  well-balanced  and 
Idly  attitude  toward  our  allies  and 
Bds  in  the  Middle  East. 
I  each  one  of  these  instances,  the 
I  sales  proposals  were  made  as  a 
It  of  request  by  the  governments 
lived.  And  I  think  that's  the  basis 
I'hich  the  decision  should  be  made, 
liy  making  the  request  to  the  Con- 
|..  by  Congress  considering  my  re- 
|t  for  approval  of  the  sales  on  the 
a  interests  of  our  country  as  judged 
II ie  and  the  Congress. 


i.  Just  to  follow  up  on  the  Middle 
4  thing,  I  would  like  to  pursue  it 
i!  a  little  bit  more  maybe  from  a 
ii|itly  different  angle.  The  Israeli 
•  ign    Minister,    Mr.    Dayan,    has 

■  ested  that  Israel  might  be  will- 
:!(o  give  up  its  own  fighter  planes 
lour  package  if  the  sales  were 
toped  to  Saudi  Arabia  and  Egypt, 
jpw,  in  the  light  of  your  own  pro- 
a;d  interest  in  cutting  back  on 
ii  ign  arms  sales,  would  you  con- 
|r  withdrawing  the  entire  pack- 
i  to  prevent  a  new  escalation  of 
larms  race  in  the  Middle  East? 

I.  No,  I  would  not.  As  I  said 
ler,  the  process  through  which  we 
I  arms — and  this  sales  proposal 
lid  be  completed  5  years  in  the 
Ire  by,  I  think  the  last  deliveries 

■  Id  be  1983 — is  initiated  by  a  re- 
I  >t  from  governments,  foreign  gov- 
I  lents,  that  we  permit  the  sale  of 
1 5  to  them.  As  I  said  earlier,  we 
f  imitted  ourselves  to  help  Saudi 

bia  with  arms  sales  to  protect 
I  iselves  in  September  of  1975. 

t  the  same  time,  approximately,  in 
|  fall  of  1975,  our  government 
(imitted  to  help  Israel  with  their 
iwsal  by  making  arms  sales  avail- 


able to  them.  Obviously,  if  any  nation 
withdrew  its  request  for  arms  sales, 
that  would  change  the  entire  proce- 
dure. 

I  have  never  heard  of  Foreign 
Minister  Dayan 's  statement  that  they 
did  not  need  the  weapons  or  would 
withdraw  their  request  for  weapons 
until  today.  Mr.  Dayan  is  on  the  way 
to  our  country.  He  will  be  meeting 
shortly  with  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
others,  and  I  think  only  after  very 
close  consultations  with  them  can  we 
determine  whether  or  not  Israel  desires 
to  go  ahead  with  the  arms  sales  com- 
mitment that  I've  made  to  them. 

But  I  do  not  intend  to  withdraw  the 
arms  sales  proposals  after  they  are 
submitted  to  the  Congress,  and  I  do 
not  intend  to  delay. 

Q.  If  Mr.  Dayan  did  in  fact  tell 
you  that  Israel  would  withdraw  its 
request,  would  you  then  be  willing 
to  pull  back  the  whole  package? 

A.  I  can't  imagine  that  happening, 
and  I  would  rather  not  answer  a 
hypothetical  question  of  that  kind. 

Q.  You  mentioned  that  Mr.  Dayan 
is  coming.  I  just  wonder,  sir,  do  you 
have  any  reason  at  all  to  feel  op- 
timistic that  the  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt  can  somehow 
be  brought  off  dead  center?  I  know 
Mr.  Antherton's  [Alfred  L.  Ather- 
ton,  Jr.,  Ambassador  at  Large  with 
special  responsibility  for  Middle 
East  peace  negotiations]  been  in 
Cairo,  and  you've  had  consultations. 
What  is  the  outlook  now? 

A.  Yes,  I  have  reason  to  be  optimis- 
tic, but  I  can't  predict  success  any 
time  soon.  This  has  been  going  on  for 
30  years. 

I  think  compared  to  a  year  ago,  for 
instance,  remarkable  progress  has  been 
made.  After  the  visit  of  President 
Sadat  to  Jerusalem,  there  was  a  re- 
markable sense  of  excessive  hope  or 
euphoria  that  swept  the  world,  that 
peace  was  imminent.  Since  then,  I've 
met  extensively  with  President  Sadat 
and  with  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
also  with  the  foreign  ministers  of  the 
two  countries  involved.  And  there's 
still  hope  that  we  can  move  toward  a 
peaceful  settlement. 

I  think  if  there  were  not  hope,  that 
Foreign  Minister  Dayan  would  not  be 
coming  to  Washington  to  meet  with 
our  own  officials  to  explore  further 
avenues  for  progress. 

As  you  know,  since  Prime  Minister 
Begin  was  here,  Ezer  Weizman,  who 
is  the  Defense  Minister  of  Israel,  has 
been  to  Egypt  twice  to  meet  with 
President   Sadat.    So,   discussions 


13 

are  going  on  and  explorations  are 
continuing. 

And  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  both 
the  Israelis  and  the  Egyptians  want 
peace.  They  both  are  concerned  about 
the  terms  of  peace.  After  years  of 
hatred  and  even  active  combat,  there's 
still  an  element  of  distrust  about  the 
future  intentions  of  each  other. 

But  I  am  hopeful  that  we  can  con- 
tinue to  make  progress.  My  commit- 
ment is  deep  and  irreversible.  As  long 
as  I'm  in  the  White  House  as  Presi- 
dent, I  will  continue  to  pursue,  with- 
out any  slacking  of  my  interests  or 
commitment,  the  avenue  toward  peace. 

And  I  anticipate  that  now  and  in  the 
future  there  will  be  temporary  periods 
of  discouragement  and  withdrawal  of 
the  negotiating  parties.  So,  I  think 
every  evidence  that  I  have  both  pub- 
licly and  privately  known  is  that  both 
sides  want  peace  and  the  progress  to- 
ward peace  is  steady. 


Q.  Your  spokesmen  have  said  that 
there  will  be  written  assurances 
from  Saudi  Arabia  and  Egypt  that 
they  will  not  use  the  warplanes 
against  Israel  in  any  future  conflict. 
And  further,  various  Administration 
spokesmen  have  pointed  out  that  the 
Saudi  Arabian  Government  will  be 
dependent  on  the  United  States  for 
technical  support  for  these  planes, 
and  this  support  could  always  be  cut 
off  in  the  event  that  a  future  conflict 
would  start  and  that  the  Saudis  de- 
sired to  use  the  weapons  against  Is- 
rael. Is  it  your  understanding  that 
both  types  of  assurances  will  be  in 
effect? 

A.  We  would  not  sell  the  planes  to 
the  Saudi  Arabians  if  we  thought  that 
the  desire  was  to  use  them  against 
Israel.  I'm  completely  convinced  that 
the  Saudis  want  their  airplanes  to  be 
used  to  protect  their  own  country. 

The  Saudis  have  informed  officials 
in  our  government  that  they  do  not 
desire  to  deploy  them  at  Tabuk,  which 
is  the  airfield  nearest  to  Israel,  and  I 
know  for  a  fact  that  the  configuration 
of  the  weapons  on  the  F— 15  that  the 
Saudis  have  offered  is  primarily  a  de- 
fensive configuration.  And  for  those 
reasons  I  feel  sure  that  the  problems 
that  you  described  are  adequately  ad- 
dressed in  the  proposals  that  I've  made 
to  the  Congress  and  in  the  statements 
that  the  Saudis  have  already  made. 

□ 


For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  1 ,  1978.  p.  775.    D 


14 


Department  of  State  Bu 


THE  SECRETARY: 

Foreign  Assistance  and  U.S.  Pollen 


Today  I  want  to  discuss  with  you  a 
subject  about  which  I  care  deeply  be- 
cause of  its  importance  to  our  nation.  I 
speak  of  foreign  assistance. 

Over  the  years  the  League  of 
Women  Voters  has  endeavored  to  ex- 
plain and  support  our  foreign  assist- 
ance programs.  You  have  done  this  as 
an  essential  part  of  your  nonpartisan 
program  of  public  education.  Your 
interest  in  and  knowledge  of  foreign 
assistance  has  been  a  key  element  in 
making  people  aware  of  what  their 
government  is  trying  to  achieve  with 
these  programs. 

The  United  States  has  a  profound 
stake  in  its  relationships  with  the  na- 
tions and  peoples  in  developing  coun- 
tries. Our  response  to  their  problems, 
needs,  and  aspirations  tests  not  only 
the  quality  of  our  leadership  in  the 
world  but  our  commitment  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  justice. 

Let  me  begin  our  discussion  by  pos- 
ing three  questions.  First,  why  do  we 
have  foreign  aid  programs?  Second, 
what  are  these  programs  designed  to 
accomplish?  Third,  do  they  work? 

During  the  past  15  months  as  the 
Carter  Administration  fashioned  aid 
budgets,  reorganized  aid  programs, 
and  discussed  aid  issues  with  Con- 
gress, we  have  thought  with  great  care 
about  these  three  questions.  Today,  in 
discussing  our  conclusions,  I  want  to 
return  to  the  basic  elements  of  our  aid 
programs. 


Why  Foreign  Aid 

Our  foreign  policy  flows  from  what 
we  are  as  a  people — our  history,  our 
culture,  our  values,  and  our  beliefs. 
One  reason  this  nation  has  a  foreign 
aid  program  is  that  we  believe  we 
have  a  humanitarian  and  moral  obliga- 
tion to  help  alleviate  poverty  and  pro- 
mote more  equitable  economic  growth 
in  the  developing  world. 

We  cannot  be  indifferent  when  half 
a  billion  people  are  hungry  and  mal- 
nourished, when  700  million  adults  are 
illiterate,  and  when  one  and  a  half 
billion  people  do  not  have  minimal 
health  care.  As  free  people  who  have 
achieved  one  of  the  highest  standards 
of  living  in  the  world,  we  cannot  fail 
to  respond  to  such  staggering  statistics 
and  the  individual  lives  they  encom- 
pass. We  can  be  proud  that  we  are  a 
people  who  believe  in  the  development 
of  human  potential. 


The  answer  to  the  question  of  why 
we  have  foreign  aid  programs  also 
goes  beyond  our  system  of  values  and 
our  concern  for  the  less  fortunate. 
Foreign  aid  is  clearly  in  our  national 
economic  and  political  interest. 

The  success  or  failure  of  developing 
countries  to  grow  more  food,  develop 
new  energy  supplies,  sell  their  raw 
materials  and  products,  curb  their 


.  .  .  when  we  are  discussing  aid 
levels  ...  we  are  talking  about 
whether  or  not  we  can  fund  prac- 
tical projects  that  make  a  differ- 
ence to  people  in  need. 


birthrates,  and  defend  themselves 
against  aggression  will  matter  to 
Americans. 

Our  economic  health  and  our  secu- 
rity are  more  closely  tied  today  than 
ever  before  to  the  economic  well-being 
and  security  of  the  developing  world. 
Progress  there  means  more  jobs  and 
more  prosperity  for  the  United  States. 

•  The  non-oil-producing  developing 
countries  are  a  major  market  for 
American  goods,  taking  a  quarter  of 
our  total  exports  last  year.  About  the 
same  share  of  our  total  exports  goes  to 
Europe  and  the  Communist  countries 
combined. 

•  Products  from  less  developed 
countries — including  raw  materials 
such  as  tin,  copper,  bauxite,  and 
lead — accounted  for  nearly  a  quarter 
of  our  total  imports  last  year. 

•  Our  nation  gained  more  than  $7 
billion  from  our  direct  private  invest- 
ment in  the  developing  world  in  1975. 
And  in  1976  developing  countries  ab- 
sorbed nearly  $11  billion  of  our  direct 
foreign  investment. 

•  In  the  export  of  our  agricultural 
abundance  last  year,  developing  coun- 
tries purchased  half  of  our  exports  of 
cotton,  65%  of  our  wheat,  and  nearly 
70%  of  our  rice. 

•  Our  economy  benefits  substan- 
tially as  aid  dollars  are  spent  here  to 
buy  commodities  and  services.  For 
example,  for  every  dollar  we  have 
paid    into    such    organizations    as    the 


World   Bank   and  the  regional 
velopment  banks  for  Latin  Amen 
Asia,  and  Africa,  about  $2  has  1 
spent  in  the  U.S.  economy. 

The  economic  growth  of  the 
veloping  world  is  taking  place  prin 
ily  as  a  result  of  massive  effort; 
the  leaders  and  peoples  of  the 
veloping  nations.  For  many,  the  i 
critical  international  factors  in 
growth  and  development  are 
policies  toward  trade,  investm 
commodities,  and  technology, 
economic  aid,  as  well  as  that 
vided  by  other  developed  natiu 
also  makes  a  crucial  contributio 
their  well-being.  For  s< 
countries — particularly  the  1 
income  nations — it  is  the  princ 
source  of  foreign  exchange  and  t 
nical  assistance.  But  for  many  otl 
it  serves  as  an  essential  complei 
to  other  components  of  their 
velopment  strategy. 

In  addition  to  America's  econ( 
involvement  in  the  developing  w< 
our  political  interests  are  strongly 
gaged  as  well.  Developing  coun 
are  often  key  participants  in  the  c 
for  peace.  Regional  stability 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  sout 
Africa,  and  elsewhere  canno 
achieved  without  the  cooperatioi 
developing  nations.  Achieving  p 
ress  on  the  global  issues  which 
rectly  affect  peace — arms  restr 
and  nonproliferation — depend 
large  measure  on  strengthening  pc 
cal  ties  between  the  industrialized  l 
developing  worlds. 

Our  ties  to  developing  countries  e 
essential  in  many  other  areas  w  1 
affect  our  national  security:  in  dep^ 
ing  our  armed  forces  and  in  maintt- 
ing  access  to  straits,  ports,  and  a> 
tion  facilities. 

But  the  peace  and  stability  we  J 
in  the  world  cannot  be  obtained  so 
through  the  maintenance  of  a  str 
defense   in  concert   with  others, 
social    unrest    which    breeds    con* 
can    best    be    prevented    if   econol; 
growth  and  an  equitable  distribu  » 
of   resources    are   realized.    As   Pi 
John  XXIII  so  eloquently  stated:  I 
a  world  of  constant  want  there  is* 
peace  .  .  .  . " 

Foreign  Assistance  Programs 

In  view  of  the  stakes  involved,  I 
foreign  aid  goals  must  be  matched  H 


fc  1978 

M  performance.  The  Carter  Admin- 
lition  is  asking  the  Congress  to 
ujorize  and  appropriate  $8.4  billion 
fiour  economic,  food,  security  as- 
Ance  programs,  and  contributions 
>jhe  international  financial  institu- 
te this  fiscal  year.  About  16%  of 
M  sum  represents  government 
■rantees  and  will  not  result  in  ac- 

■  spending.  We  are  requesting 
lie   sums   because   we   believe   that 

■  ign  aid  can  and  does  work.  We 
eeve  it  can  have  a  direct  impact  on 
ciomic  growth  and  the  maintenance 
ifeace. 

et    me    give    you    a    summary    of 
i  i  we  are  trying  to  do. 

irst,  in  the  area  of  bilateral  eco- 
■iic  assistance,  we  are  trying  to 
ermine  the  most  effective  way  to 
■binel  this  aid  to  stimulate  economic 
;rwth  and  alleviate  poverty.  In 
flng  so  we  are  implementing  a 
U:egy  which  targets  our  resources 
tlctly  on  the  needs  of  the  poor. 
|j ed  the  "basic  human  needs"  ap- 
■ach,  this  development  strategy 
o:s  to  help  people  meet  such  basic 

■  Is  as  nutrition,  shelter,  education, 
in  health  care.  It  is  not  an  interna- 
kal  welfare  program.  It  is,  instead, 
in  approach  to  development  which 
I  s  the  poor  a  chance  to  improve 

■  r  standard  of  living  by  their  own 
!f  rts. 

Farmers  need  good  quality  seed  if 
b  are  going  to  escape  subsistence 
tg  culture  and  grow  enough  food  for 
h  r  families  and  to  sell  at  the  market 
s  ell.  Our  aid  program  in  Tanzania, 

0  instance,  is  helping  that  govern- 
ni  t  establish  a  seed  multiplication 
ir  ect  to  provide  improved  seed  for 
h  main  crops  grown  there.  The  im- 

■  on  the  lives  of  Tanzanian  farm- 
er should  be  large. 

1  In  vast  sections  of  West  Africa, 
Male  cannot  live  in  potentially  fer- 
U  agricultural  areas  because  of  a 
Bible  disease — river  blindness.  We 
hi  helping  to  finance  efforts  to  sup- 
m;s  this  affliction.  Some  success 
it  been  achieved.  Small  farmers  are 
ilady  beginning  to  resettle  in  areas 
•rich  had  been  virtually  abandoned. 

Education  is  critical  to  human 
fcelopment.  In  numerous  poor  coun- 
ts, our  aid  goes  to  training  people 
■jural  and  urban  areas  in  basic  skills 
^ch  permit  them  to  earn  a  better 
Kng.  Education  takes  place  in  many 
W's  besides  the  schoolroom.  It  can 
Carried  by  low  powered  local  radio 
■grams,  such  as  one  we  fund  in 
jitemala,  or  by  direct  broadcast 
■:llite  TV,  as  in  an  experiment  we 
*sted  in  India. 
iecond,  the  programs  of  the  World 


Bank  and  the  regional  development 
banks  through  which  we  channel  a 
significant  amount  of  our  foreign  aid 
range  from  large,  capital  intensive 
programs,  such  as  dams  and  roads,  to 
smaller  scale  programs  designed  to 
directly  improve  the  lives  of  the  poor. 
These  institutions  can  mobilize  and 
coordinate  large  amounts  of  capital 
for  development.  And  they  can  build 
consensus  between  aid  donors  and  re- 
cipients on  development  goals.  In 
performing  these  roles,  they  well 
serve  U.S.  interests.  The  work  of 
these  institutions  is  varied. 

•  In  Buenaventura,  Colombia — one 
of  the  poorest  cities  in  the 
hemisphere — the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank  is  trying  to  relocate 
slum  dwellers  and  provide  the  city 
with  safe  drinking  water  to  reduce 
disease. 

•  In  the  West  African  country  of 
Benin,  the  African  Development  Fund 
is  improving  rural  health  services  by 
constructing  dispensaries  in  remote 
areas  and  training  people  to  run  them. 

•  In  Burma,  an  Asian  Development 
Bank  loan  will  increase  fish  produc- 
tion for  domestic  consumption,  thus 
raising  the  low  protein  intake  of  the 
population. 


15 

about  whether  or  not  we  can  fund 
practical  projects  that  make  a  differ- 
ence to  people  in  need. 

There  is  another  important  aspect 
of  our  foreign  aid  program  which  I 
would  like  to  mention  very  briefly — 
our  security  assistance  programs. 

These  programs  have  three  impor- 
tant objectives.  First,  they  are  de- 
signed to  assist  our  friends  and  allies 
to  provide  for  their  legitimate  defense 
needs.  Second,  these  programs  sup- 
port our  strategic  and  political  objec- 
tives of  reducing  tensions  and  promot- 
ing stability  in  areas  of  potential  con- 
frontation and  conflict.  Third,  they 
provide  economic  assistance  to  coun- 
tries which  are  experiencing  political 
and  economic  stresses  and  where 
U.S.  security  interests  are  involved. 
The  vast  majority  of  our  security  as- 
sistance aid  goes  to  support  our  peace 
efforts  in  the  Middle  East  and  in 
southern  Africa.  In  providing  assist- 
ance to  such  nations,  we  help  them 
meet  the  economic  strains  imposed  by 
tensions  in  their  regions. 

Does  Foreign  Aid  Work? 

Do  all  these  programs  work? 
There   is   a   popular  myth   that 
foreign  assistance  often  does  not  pro- 


.  .  .  we  have  approved  aid  programs  when  they  would  directly  benefit 
the  poor  since  we  recognize  that  people  have  economic  as  well  as 
political  rights. 


Third,  we  support  the  development 
programs  of  the  United  Nations, 
which  finance  technical  assistance  to 
poor  countries  and  provide  direct  hu- 
manitarian assistance  to  children,  ref- 
ugees, and  other  groups  in  need  of 
particular  relief. 

•  In  India,  the  U.N.  Children's 
Fund  is  working  to  restore  and  im- 
prove potable  water  resources  in  the 
areas  hardest  hit  by  the  November 
1977  cyclone  and  tidal  wave. 

•  In  Central  America,  experts  from 
the  U.N.  Development  Program  are 
working  in  four  countries  to  develop 
energy  from  underground  volcanic 
steam. 

I  could  go  on  and  on,  citing  proj- 
ects in  various  countries  aimed  at 
specific  problems  and  particular 
groups.  The  point  is  that  when  we  are 
discussing  aid  levels,  we  must  re- 
member we  are  not  talking  about 
abstract  statistics:   we  are  talking 


duce   results.    The   record  shows 
otherwise. 

It  is  impossible  to  separate  foreign 
assistance  from  other  factors  that  pro- 
duce development.  But  foreign  assist- 
ance has  been  central  in  some  meas- 
ure to  the  following  achievements. 

•  Between  1950  and  1975  the  de- 
veloping countries  grew  more  rapidly 
than  either  they  or  the  developed 
countries  had  grown  in  any  time 
period  in  the  past. 

•  Substantial  increases  in  life  ex- 
pectancy are  taking  place  in  many 
developing  countries. 

•  The  number  of  children  in  pri- 
mary schools  in  the  developing  world 
has  trebled  since  1950,  and  the 
number  of  secondary  students  has  in- 
creased sixfold  during  the  same 
period. 

•  The  battle  against  communicable 
disease  has  produced  significant  re- 
sults. Smallpox  is  now  confined  to  a 


16 

small  area  of  Africa,  and  the  numbers 
of  people  suffering  from  Malaria  has 
been  reduced  by  80-90%  in  the  past 
three  decades. 

•  The  yields  of  rice  and  wheat  in 
Asia  are  estimated  to  be  substantially 
higher  today  because  of  the  introduc- 
tion of  high-yielding  varieties.  More 
than  a  billion  dollars  worth  of  grain 
each  year  is  ascribed  to  the  new  seed. 

Beyond  these  successes,  the  record 
reveals  countless  instances  in  which 
projects  funded  by  foreign  assistance 
have  improved  the  lives  of  people  in 
fundamental  ways. 

•  When  a  village  has  clean  water, 
its  children  are  no  longer  made  sick 
from  the  water  they  drink. 

•  When  couples  have  access  to 
family  planning  services,  there  are 
fewer  mouths  to  feed. 

•  When  a  clinic  is  constructed, 
modern  medicine  enters  lives  for  the 
first  time. 

•  And  when  a  job  program  begins, 
the  unemployed  can  find  work  and 
have  incomes. 

Progress  has  been  made.  But  more 
has  to  be  done.  Over  the  last  15 
months  the  Carter  Administration  has 
made  a  substantial  effort  to  further 
improve  the  management  and  effec- 
tiveness of  all  of  our  programs. 

Let  me  report  to  you  on  some  of 
the  steps  we  have  already  taken  or 
will  soon  implement  to  achieve  this 
objective. 

One  of  the  key  problems  with 
foreign  assistance  over  the  years  has 
been  a  lack  of  adequate  coordination 


Department  of  State  Bui; 


The  Carter  Administration  announced 
its  support  of  the  basic  purposes  of 
this  bill.  Although  the  Congress  will 
probably  not  consider  this  legislation 
in  the  current  session,  the  Administra- 
tion is  moving  to  put  into  place  a  new 
interagency  coordinating  mechanism 
which  we  believe  will  go  a  long  way 
toward  having  the  executive  branch 
better  coordinate  its  diverse  develop- 
ment efforts. 

The  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment has  been  reorganized  under 
the  leadership  of  Governor  John  Gil- 
ligan.  More  authority  is  being  dele- 
gated to  our  AID  missions  abroad. 
Tighter  controls  are  now  imposed  on 
financial  and  operational  procedures. 
In  addition,  AID  has  eliminated  some 
complex  and  cumbersome  procedures 
which  have  slowed  our  ability  to  de- 
sign and  implement  projects. 

The  United  States  has  encouraged 
the  multilateral  banks  to  better  take 
into  account  the  lessons  of  the 
past — both  successes  and  failures. 
The  Administration  has  also  shared 
congressional  concerns  about  high 
salary  levels  of  bank  employees.  We 
want  the  banks  to  look  especially 
hard  at  more  effective  ways  to  reach 
poor  people  directly,  as  well  as  to 
operate  in  the  most  cost  effective 
ways. 

In  our  security  programs  we  have 
tightened  management  controls  and 
have  instituted  an  interagency  com- 
mittee to  provide  coordinated  recom- 
mendations to  me  and  the  President 
on  all  aspects  of  our  arms  transfer 
and  security  assistance  programs. 

Finally,  because  we  recognize  that 


Helping  the  children  of  Pakistan  have  adequate  diets  does  not  mean 
that  we  need  neglect  the  children  of  Cincinnati,  Boston,  or  Los 
Angeles.  Helping  the  farmers  of  Mali  grow  more  food  does  not  mean 
we  need  to  abandon  the  farmers  of  Texas,  Illinois,  or  Colorado  .  .  . 
Both  foreign  aid  and  adequate  domestic  expenditures  are  essential  to 
the  national  interest. 


improve  the  management  and  deliv 
of  our  foreign  assistance  progra 
Accountability  to  the  Congress  anc 
the  public  is  an  essential  element 
our  approach. 


iti 


between  our  bilateral  programs  and 
our  activities  in  the  international  fi- 
nancial institutions.  Responsibility  for 
these  various  programs  is  spread 
throughout  several  Cabinet  Depart- 
ments and  agencies. 

Shortly  before  his  death,  Senator 
Hubert  Humphrey  introduced  legisla- 
tion which  called  for  a  sweeping 
reorganization  of  the  government's 
foreign  aid  programs  designed  to 
meet    these    defects    in    coordination. 


science  and  technology  offer  many 
opportunities  for  expanding  the  de- 
velopment process.  President  Carter 
has  proposed  the  creation  of  a  new 
U.S.  foundation  on  technological  col- 
laboration. This  foundation  will  sup- 
port the  application  of  our  research  to 
development  problems.  And  it  will 
improve  the  access  of  the  developing 
countries  to  American  science  and 
technology. 

We  will  continue  to  seek  ways  to 


: 


Other  Key  Issues 

There   are    several   other   impon 
questions  relating,  to  our  foreign 
sistance  programs  which  I  would 
to  discuss. 

First,  there  is  a  growing  belief 
we  are  both  giving  more  aid  anc 
the    same    time    losing    control    c 
where  it  goes.  Let  me  put  this  is 
in  perspective. 

Clearly,   we  are  not  shoulderin 
disproportionate  burden  of  global 
flows.    While    in    absolute   terms 
U.S.  aid  program  is  larger  than 
of  any  other  nation,  as  a  percent 
of  GNP  we  rank  in  the  bottom  259i 
all  non-Communist  country  donors. 

Concerning  control,  we  are  \ 
active  in  attempting  to  steer  multi 
eral  assistance  in  directions  we  tb 
best  for  our  nation  and  for  glc 
development.  We  have  often  b 
successful  in  encouraging  the  type 
projects  consistent  with  our  des 
policies.  We  will  be  working  clo: 
with  Congress  to  develop  procedi 
which  permit  the  United  States 
express  its  views  about  multilat 
lending  policies  as  effectively  as  \ 
sible.  But  in  doing  so,  we  must 
ognize  the  damage  that  would  be  d 
if  the  international  character  of  tr 
institutions  were  lost. 

Second,  our  foreign  assistance  f 
grams  must  be  consistent  with 
determination  to  improve  the  coi 
tions  of  political,  economic,  and  c 
rights  worldwide.  Over  the  past  > 
we  have  reviewed  all  of  our  aid  p 
grams  for  their  impact  on  hun 
rights.  In  some  cases  we  have 
duced  assistance  to  governments  w 
consistent  records  of  repression, 
have  also  increased  aid  to  others  w 
good  or  improving  human  rig 
policies. 

We  face  a  dilemma  when  apply 
human  rights  considerations 
foreign  assistance.  We  do  not  want 
support  governments  which  cons 
ently  violate  human  rights.  On 
other  hand,  we  do  not  wish  to  dc 
our  assistance  to  poor  people  w 
happen  to  live  under  repressive 
gimes.  We  must  resolve  this  dilem 
on  a  case-by-case  basis.  In  gener 
we  have  approved  aid  programs  wr 
they  would  directly  benefit  the  pi 
since  we  recognize  that  people  hi 
economic  as  well  as  political  rights. ! 


■1978 

Bird,  there  is  the  question  of 
m  countries  should  receive  our 
(The  President  has  decided  that 
Concessional  assistance  programs 
Id  focus  primarily  but  not  exclu- 
Mv  on  the  poorest  countries.  In  the 
I  advanced   developing   countries 

10  not  want  to  substitute  our  own 
■jrt  for  the  assistance  those  gov- 
■ents  should  be  giving.  On  the 
I  hand,  we  cannot  be  indifferent 
le  plight  of  people  who  are  no 
Spoor  because  they  live  in  middle 
kne  countries  and  who  need  our 
I  We  are  resolving  this  problem 
■sisting  that  our  efforts  to  mount 
Jams  in  middle  income  develop- 
liations  be  matched  by  efforts  of 
Most  country. 

f  urth,  it  is  sometimes  argued  that 
■:annot  afford  to  spend  large 
lints  of  money  to  help  solve  prob- 
I  abroad  when  we  have  many 
ling  domestic  needs.  But  I  firmly 
Ive    that    it    would    be    a    serious 

■  ke  to  try  to  trade  off  interna- 
aal  obligations  for  domestic 
lities.  Both  need  to  be  addressed, 
le  health  of  our  nation  is  increas- 
g  dependent  on  the  world  econ- 
I  If  we  neglect  international  prog- 

■  we  undermine  the  welfare  of  our 
I  society.  As  a  nation  we  have  a 

■  r  concern  with  improving  the 
I  of  poor  people.  I  do  not  believe 
Is  a  credible  commitment  if  made 

11  domestically.  And  as  a  percent- 
jJDf  the  Federal  budget  for   1979, 

■  economic  assistance  is  only 
H7c.  Adding  our  security  assist- 
K  programs  does  not  increase  this 
Be  substantially. 

Mi  can  afford  to  increase  foreign 
d  xpenditures  at  a  reasonable  rate, 
n;  must.  At  the  same  time,  we  can 
Id  to  increase  our  domestic  educa- 
Ibudget,  expand  programs  for  the 
Irly,  and  fund  other  critical 
l^stic  programs  as  we  are  now  do- 
I  Helping  the  children  of  Pakistan 
adequate  diets  does  not  mean 
I  we  need  neglect  the  children  of 
|innati,  Boston,  or  Los  Angeles, 
ling  the  farmers  of  Mali  grow 
1:  food  does  not  mean  we  need  to 
■don  the  farmers  of  Texas,  Il- 
ls, or  Colorado.  And  helping  the 
lins  of  the  Middle  East  remain  at 
le  does  not  mean  that  we  cannot 
1  meet  the  needs  of  our  cities.  We 
liot  have  a  choice.  Both  foreign 
land  adequate  domestic  expendi- 
Is  are  essential  to  the  national 
Best. 

pnator  Humphrey  raised  a  funda- 
Ital  issue  about  foreign  aid.  He 
I:  "The  question  we  must  decide 
H/hether  or  not  the  conditions  of 


social  and  economic  injustice — 
poverty,  illiteracy,  and  disease — are  a 
real  threat  to  our  security.  I  think 
they  are  and  they  require  the  same 
commitment  of  policy,  will,  and  re- 
sources as  does  our  conventional  na- 
tional defense."' 

As  someone  charged  with  helping 
to  protect  the  national  security,  I 
agree  with  Senator  Humphrey's  as- 
sessment of  the  role  of  foreign  aid  in 
the  scheme  of  our  national  priorities. 
I  agree  with  his  approach  to  the  tasks 
of  alleviating  poverty  and  working  for 
peace. 


17 


He  believed  in  harnessing  the 
energy  and  creativity  of  the  American 
people  to  solve  problems  which  have 
plagued  the  world  for  centuries.  I 
share  his  faith  in  our  abilities.  I  share 
his  optimism  that  we  can  do  the  job. 

I  ask  that  you  help  us  inform  the 
American  people  why  foreign  aid  is 
essential  to  the  nation's  economic 
health,  political  interests,  and  preser- 
vation of  its  humanitarian  tradition.    □ 


Address  before  the  national  convention  of  the 
League  of  Women  Voters  in  Cincinnati  on 
May  1 ,  1978  (press  release  195  of  May  1). 


Question~and'Answer  Session 
Following  Cincinnati  Address 


Q.  Would  you  please  give  your 
assessment  of  the  prospects  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  in  light  of 
the  most  recent  meetings  there? 

A.  You  certainly  started  me  off 
with  the  hardest  of  all  questions.  At 
the  current  point,  the  situation  in  the 
Middle  East  is,  I  would  say,  in  a 
stalemate.  That  does  not  mean  that  it 
is  impossible  to  make  progress.  I  be- 
lieve very  deeply  that  it  is  possible  to 
make  progress.  It  is  in  the  interests  of 
each  of  the  nations  in  the  Middle  East 
to  see  that  this  is  done.  It  is  in  our 
national  interests.  It  is  in  the  interests 
of  the  world  that  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  be  brought  to  the  Middle  East. 

There  are  basically  three  fundamen- 
tal issues  involved.  First,  the  need  for 
a  real  peace,  a  true  peace,  in  which 
we  will  have  not  only  the  end  of  a 
state  of  war  but  normal  relations  be- 
tween the  nations  of  all  the  countries 
of  that  region  will  be  restored. 

Secondly,  it  is  necessary  to  solve 
the  problem  of  withdrawal  from  ter- 
ritories occupied  in  the  1967  war, 
while  at  the  same  time  protecting  the 
security  of  the  State  of  Israel. 

Thirdly,  it  is  essential  that  the 
Palestinian  question  be  resolved  in  all 
of  its  aspects. 

These  are  all  very  difficult  prob- 
lems. Their  roots  are  deep.  They  have 
been  problems  which  the  countries  of 
that  region  have  been  wrestling  with 
for  a  long  time.  But  I  think  some 
progress  has  been  made.  If  one  looks 
back  a  year  ago,  it  wasn't  even  possi- 
ble to  conceive  that  people  would  start 
talking  to  each  other  about  how  to  sit 
down  together  and  solve  these  ques- 
tions. Now,  at  least,  we  have  some  of 
the  nations  talking  to  each  other. 


Insofar  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, the  United  States  has  a  deep 
interest  in  seeing  this  problem  re- 
solved. And  we  have  and  will  continue 
to  put  this  at  the  top  of  our  agenda  in 
terms  of  problems  in  the  foreign  pol- 
icy field  where  we  must  try  to  help. 

I  think  that  the  parties  on  both  sides 
do  have  confidence  and  trust  in  the 
United  States.  I  think  we  can  act  as  a 
catalyst  in  bringing  the  parties  together. 
Sometimes  our  role  must  be  one  of,  in 
effect,  carrying  messages  between  the 
two.  And  other  times,  when  the 
dialogue  becomes  stalemated,  then  I 
think  it  is  incumbent  upon  us  to  come 
forward  with  our  own  suggestions  and 
initiatives,  to  try  and  regain  the 
momentum  of  the  peace  process. 

That  is  the  course  we  have  followed 
during  the  last  year  and  a  few  months. 
That  is  the  course  we  will  continue  to 
follow  in  the  year  ahead,  and  I  think 
that  is  the  policy  that  the  people  in  the 
area  wish  to  follow. 

Q.  I  know  that  there  has  been 
Federal  assistance  to  the  Vietnamese 
refugees  in  the  past.  Do  you  have 
more  assistance  financially  coming 
to  the  boat  people  of  this  area? 

A.  Yes.  This  is  one  of  the  problems 
which  cries  out  for  help  and  for  ac- 
tion. Recently,  the  President  approved 
a  major  step  on  our  part  to  increase 
the  amount  of  help  that  we  can  give 
for  the  refugees  in  this  area,  and  par- 
ticularly the  boat  people.  This  is  a 
program  which  will  be  funded  over  a 
period  of  2  years.  And  I  think  by  the 
leadership  we  will  be  able  to  give  with 
the  funding  which  we  will  be  receiving 
that  we  will  be  able  to  help  stimulate 
others  to  work  with  us  to  take  care  of 
this  tremendous  humanitarian  problem. 


18 

It  is  a  vastly  difficult,  complicated 
one.  We  are  working  with  many  other 
nations  around  the  world,  with  the 
United  Nations,  and  others.  And  it  is  a 
problem  which  will  remain  very  im- 
portant to  us  and  which  we  are  going 
to  devote  our  full  efforts  to. 

Q.  There  has  been  much  in  the 
news  in  regard  to  the  exportation  of 
nuclear  technologies  to  the  develop- 
ing nations.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
this  has  been  declared  Energy  Con- 
servation Week  and  because  May  3d 
has  been  declared  Sun  Day,  could 
you  give  us  some  insights  into  what 
is  being  exported  from  this  country 
in  terms  of  the  decentralized  systems 
of  volume  mass,  solar  technology, 
wind  technology,  and  others,  for  the 
less  developed  countries? 

A.  Yes.  We  have  cooperative 
agreements  with  a  number  of  the  de- 
veloping countries  where  we  are  work- 
ing together  to  share  our  technology 
and  our  know-how  in  the  kinds  of 
areas  that  you  are  talking  about. 

Some  of  those  countries  have  a 
great  deal  to  contribute  to  us,  and  we 
are  learning  from  them.  And,  there- 
fore, I  feel  it  is  through  these  kinds  of 
cooperative  efforts  that  we  can  make 
the  most  progress.  Whether  it  be  the 
use  of  wind,  whether  it  be  solar 
energy  products  which  require  greater 
funding  capabilities — in  that  kind  of  a 
situation,  we  are  working  with  the 
countries  often  which  have  resources 
to  put  into  it,  such  as  countries  like 
Saudi  Arabia  and  others  who  have 
both  knowledge  and  funding  to  help 
on  it.  But  with  others,  we  have  to  be 
the  ones  who  provide  the  basic  fund- 
ing and  technology. 

And  this  is  an  area  in  which  I  think  we 
must  increase  our  efforts,  because  it  is 
essential  that  in  the  future  we  must  find 
other  forms  of  energy  which  will  be  able 
to  take  the  place  as  our  petroleum  re- 
sources continue  to  dwindle.  The  nuclear 
resources  with  the  problems  that  they 
present  can  never  find  or  provide  the 
total  solution  to  the  problem.  So  we  must 
be  looking  at  all  of  these  other  kinds  of 
energy-producing  resources  if  we  are 
going  to  cope  with  the  energy  problems 
of  the  world. 

Q.  There  have  been  several 
statements  the  past  few  days,  and  I 
was  wondering  whether  the  Carter 
Administration  is  going  to  withdraw 
their  plans  for  planes  to  Israel  if  the 
U.S.  Congress  does  not  go  along 
with  the  planes  for  Saudi  Arabia 
and  Egypt? 

A.  Let  me  try  and  answer  this  very 
clearly. 

Under  the  law,  we  are  required  to 


send  up  each  one  of  the  proposals — 
the  proposals  for  aircraft  to  Israel,  the 
proposals  for  transfer  of  aircraft  to 
Egypt,  and  the  proposals  for  the  trans- 
fer of  aircraft  to  Saudi  Arabia — 
separately  to  the  Congress.  Each  one 
of  those  will  be  examined  in  hearings 
separately  by  the  Congress,  and  the 
Congress  will  vote  separately  on  each 
one  of  them. 

However,  the  President,  in  exercis- 
ing his  responsibility,  must  take  into 
account  the  importance  of  each  one  of 
these  specific  proposals  and  the  mutu- 
ally reinforcing  nature  of  these  various 
proposals.  Therefore,  the  ultimate  de- 
cision to  be  made  by  the  President  can 
only  be  made  after  he  has  seen  what 
the  Congress  does  with  respect  to  each 
of  these  various  elements  of  the  pro- 
posals which  are  being  sent  forward.  I 
will  be  very  frank  in  saying  I  believe 
each  one  of  these  to  be  essential. 

We  did  not  arrive  lightly  at  the 
proposals  which  were  sent  forward. 
Each  one  of  the  countries  has  pressing 
needs.  They  came  and  sent  to  us  what 
they  consider  to  be  their  requirements. 
We  examined  each  of  these  require- 
ments to  determine  whether  or  not  we 
believe  they  were  justifiable  from  a 
military  standpoint.  We  concluded  that 
they  were. 

We  also  took  a  look  to  see  very 
carefully  whether  or  not,  if  we  went 
forward  with  these  proposals,  it  would 
upset  the  basic  military  balance  in  the 
Middle  East.  We  concluded  that  it 
would  not. 

Finally,  let  me  say  that  we  have  a 
deep  and  unshakable  commitment  to 
Israel  to  meet  its  security  needs.  We 
will  carry  out  that  commitment. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  Saudi 
Arabia,  a  commitment  was  made  in  1975 
to  provide  them  with  aircraft.  We.  in  this 
Administration,  reaffirmed  that  commit- 
ment. I  think  it  is  essential  that  we 
should  go  forward  with  it. 

With  respect  to  Egypt,  which  is  one 
of  the  principal  parties  in  the  peace 
negotiations,  they  have  needs,  not  be- 
cause of  the  relationships  between 
themselves  and  Israel  but  because  of 
other  military  needs,  because  of  the 
situations  which  exist  on  their  western 
and  southern  borders. 

I  believe,  as  I  said  earlier,  that  these 
are  all  mutually  reinforceable  and  that 
it  would  be  a  tragedy  if  the  Congress 
did  not  vote  affirmatively  on  each  one 
of  these  proposals.  I  think  it  would  be 
very  harmful  to  our  national  interests. 

Q.  In  referring  directly  to  your 
speech,  I  was  a  little  confused.  On 
the  one  hand,  we  have  the  altruistic 
desire  to  help  and  the  moral  obliga- 
tion bears  that  out,  and  on  the  other 


Department  of  State  Bui 

hand    you    pointed    out    how    m 
money  we  make  off  this. 

Later    on,    you    talked    about 
forming.  One  of  the  big  criticism 
something   like    AID    has   been 
the   money   is  given   or   lent,   as 
example,  perhaps,  for  building  u  || 
cedures  with  the  provision  t  ji 
perhaps  the  lumber  be  bought  fi   j 
the  United  States  when  there  m   \f 
be  a  local  supply.  Would  you  c    . 
ment  on  that? 

A.  I  think  that  there  are  two  asp 
to  it.  I  think  we  do  have  a  very  sti 
and  deep  moral  obligation  to  help 
poor  of  the  world.  That  is  why 
programs  are  addressed  to  the  need 
the  poor.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
reality,  it  is  a  fact,  that  this  is  als- 
benefit  to  the  United  States.  We  01 
to  recognize  it  is  a  benefit. 

Too  often  people  criticize  these 
grams  because  they  will  not  accepl 
fact  that  it  is  morally  right  to  do  thi: 

Even  if  they  reject  that,  they  01 
to  think  about  the  other  side  of  it 
also    good    for   the    United    States 
well,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  e 
omy  of  the  United  States. 

With  respect  to  the  kinds  of 
straints  which  I  think  you  were  n 
ring  to,  some  of  those  restraints 
imposed  by  congressional  stat 
which  require  that  the  goods  which 
to  be  provided  and  the  services 
are  being  provided  have  to  be  prov 
from  the  United  States.  These  are  1 
that  one  has  to  deal  with.  So  t 
may  seem  to  be  contradictions. 

I  think  these  contradictions 
really  reconcilable.  I  think  they 
important  facts  that  people  ough 
know  when  they  are  considering 
questions  of  foreign  assistance  and 
importance  of  foreign  assistance  t< 
and  to  the  people  of  the  world. 

Q.  I  happen  to  be  the  mothei 
a   17-year-old   daughter.   When 
was  born   in    1961,   there  were 
proximately  3  billion  people  in 
world.   Last  year,  on  her  birth 
in  April,  there  were  4  billion  pa 
in  the  world.  This  year,  there 
about   4.3   billion   people  in 
world.  In  22  short  years,  they 
estimating    7    billion    people.    W 
does  our  State  Department 
about  this?   How  do   we  cope  v 
this?  [Laughter.] 

A.  Let   me    say   the    State    Dep 
ment  does  have   something  to 
about  it.  [Laughter.] 

There   is   no  question    but   that 
population  problem  is  one  of  the  n 
severe  problems  facing  the  world 
day,  and  one  of  the  principal  thn 
of  the  aid  program  has  been   in  t 
population  field. 


1978 

viously  this  is  a  service  that 
be  made  available  that  cannot  be 
d  and  should  not  be  forced  on 
s.  But  it  is  one  of  the  principal 
ts  of  the  aid  program  and  has 
Jfor  the  last  several  years. 

I  If  I  heard  you  correctly,  you 
rd  that  $8.5  "billion  will  be  re- 
sted for  foreign  aid.  Was  that  in 
I  or  1979? 

I  That  is  in  '79. 

(  Approximately,  do  you  know 
lit  percentage  of  that  will  be 
a  able  for  foreign  countries  to 
ii'hase  arms  from  the  United 
as  in  that  year? 

I  As  I  recall  it,  the  $8.5  billion 
«  not  include  the  military  assist- 
I  and  that  figure  I  do  not  have 
aable  to  me.  If  you  are  talking 
m:  the  mutual  assistance  programs, 
bieve  it  is  somewhere  around  $2 

■  n.  That  is  my  best  estimate.  But 
nvould  be  over  and  above  the  kind 
^instance  that  I  was  talking  about. 

(  I  would  like  to  know  what  we 

mlo  as  individuals  or  as  a  nation 

s  >p  the  holocaust  in  Cambodia? 

id  I  am  afraid  to  say  that  I  don't 
n  a  good  answer  to  that.  The  situa- 
Dihere  is,  indeed,  a  tragic  one.  We 
n  no  contact  at  all  with  the  Cam- 
Ktns.  We  have  tried  to  establish 
I  contact  so  as  to  find  out  at  least 
b  is  going  on  there.  We  have  been 
lile  to  do  this. 

^iat  knowledge  we  have,  we  have 
iji  in  from  others.  I  think  that  what 
u  :an  do  is  to  focus  world  attention 
jitiis  situation  and  hope  that  the 
It  of  world  opinion  may  change 
edtuation  there.  But  in  terms  of 
I  we  actually  can  do  other  than 
ocing  with  others  in  the  world 
Mis,  such  as  the  United  Nations 
M other  international  fora,  there  is 
ijy  nothing  practically  that  I  can 
lest  that  we  can  do. 

i  It  seems  that  the  League  and 
H  government  had  the  same  prob- 
n  a  credibility  gap — we  concern- 

■  equal  rights  and  that  it  isn't 
Dig    to    harm    our    families;    and 

0,  as  the  government,  that 
nign  assistance  isn't  all  in  vain. 

the  government  planning  any 
j-ific  programs  to  educate  our 
«>le  at  the  grassroots  level  that 
i  hould  continue  this  aid? 

1.  They  certainly  are,  and  I  really 
Hint  it  when  I  said  that  I  hoped  that 
I  all  will  help  in  getting  this  in- 
itiation across  to  the  people. 

■am  going  to  speak  out  on  this  in 
■pus  parts  around  the  country.   A 


number  of  people  in  the  State  De- 
partment are  going  to  fora  in  cities 
and  towns  all  across  the  country  to 
talk  about  this  and  to  answer  ques- 
tions. Without  that  we  are  simply  not 
going  to  achieve  our  objective.  And 
without  getting  the  kind  of  support  at 
the  grassroots  that  we  need,  we  are 
not  going  to  get  the  kind  of  support 
that  we  have  to  have  in  the  Congress. 
We  are  then  going  to  fail  in  carrying 
out  what  I  think  are  the  fundamental 
obligations  that  we  have. 

Q.  When  John  F.  Kennedy  was 
running  for  the  Presidency,  he  said 
there  were  only  10  people  working 
on  disarmament  in  our  government. 
He  felt  there  should  be  100.  How 
many  people  today  are  working  on 
disarmament  in  the  government? 

A.  We  have  got  well  over  100.  We 
have,  I  would  say,  several  hundred 
people  working  on  disarmament  now. 
This  is  a  subject  on  which  I  spend  a 
great  deal  of  my  time,  working  to- 
gether with  people  in  the  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament  Agency  and 
with  people  within  my  own  Depart- 
ment directly. 

As  you  know,  the  State  Department 
gives  policy  guidance  to  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency, 
and  we  are  very  fortunate  to  have 
Paul  Warnke  heading  up  that  agency. 
I  think  he  is  doing  a  superb  job,  and 
we  in  the  State  Department  are  going 
to  do  all  we  can  to  work  with  him  and 
give  him  the  support  that  he  needs. 

We  are  also  getting  support  from 
people  in  the  Defense  Department. 
That  may  seem  strange  for  some  of 
you  here,  but  there  are  many  there 
who  care  deeply  about  arms  control 
as  well  because,  particularly  in  the 
strategic  field,  I  think  everybody 
realizes  that  a  nuclear  exchange  can 
result  only  in  a  holocaust  and  be  of 
benefit  to  no  one. 

We  have  got  to  find  ways  to  begin 
to  not  only  cap  but  to  reduce  the  arms 
spiral,  and  that  is  why  we  are  putting 
so  much  emphasis  on  trying  to  make 
progress  in  achieving  an  agreement  in 
the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks— the  so-called  SALT  II  talks— 
that  are  going  on. 

It  is  my  deep  belief  that  we  will 
reach  an  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  don't  want  to  try  and  give 
you  any  specific  date.  I  don't  think 
that  we  ought  to  negotiate  against  any 
fixed  given  time  deadline.  But  I  am 
convinced  the  SALT  agreement  which 
will  be  achieved  will  enhance  or 
maintain  our  security  and  that  of  our 
allies.  I  believe  it  is  very  much  in  our 
national  interests  and  that  we  should 
put  all  of  our  weight  behind  it. 


19 


Q.  You  have  discussed  the  im- 
portance of  population  control  in 
underdeveloped  countries.  What  is 
your  response  to  a  television  report 
last  week  that  millions  of  foreign 
aid  dollars  were  wasted  by  sending 
to  many  of  those  countries,  against 
their  specific  requests  to  decrease 
the  supply,  more  contraceptives 
than  they  can  possibly  distribute 
and  use  for  the  next  few  years? 
[Laughter.] 

A.  Let  me  say,  first,  I  am  not 
familiar  with  that  report,  but  it  could 
well  be.  [Laughter.] 

I  am  not  trying  to  say  in  any  way 
that  what  we  do  is  perfect — that  the 
aid  programs  are  without  fault. 

Obviously,  we  all  make  mistakes. 
[Laughter.]  I  think  we  are  getting  on 
top  of  some  of  these  problems. 
[Laughter.]  I  better  go  to  the  next 
question.  [Applause.] 

Q.  I  traveled  last  year  in 
Morocco,  and  I  have  a  feeling  that 
very  often  we  are  giving  things 
away  to  people  that  are  really  not 
prepared  to  handle  them  yet,  as 
happened  on  the  previous  question. 
[Laughter.]  I  was  driving  with  a 
retired  representative  of  our  gov- 
ernment from  Rabat,  and  there 
were  miles  and  miles  of  aqueducts 
along  the  way,  and  this  man  said: 
"Here  are  your  American  dollars. 
You  have  paid  for  all  this  clean 
water."  And  I  saw  two  children 
getting  pails  of  water,  and  I 
thought:  "Well  I  will  sleep  tonight; 
they  won't  have  some  dreadful 
disease." 

Half  a  mile  down,  I  saw  two  men 
voiding  in  the  same  trough  of 
water.  And  I  think  perhaps  we  are 
giving  people  things  in  our  big 
giveaway  that  they  are  not  ready  to 
accept  or  handle. 

A.  What  we  have  tried  to  do  is  to 
get  down  to  the  more  basic  kind  of 
things.  The  big  projects  we  are  trying 
to  turn  over  in  terms  of  what  they  call 
in  the  jargon  the  infrastructure  kind 
of  projects  to  the  world  institutions 
like  the  World  Bank  and  the  interna- 
tional financial  institutions.  And  we 
are  really  trying  to  get  down  to  things 
like  helping  on  agriculture  with  sim- 
ple kinds  of  tools,  to  help  on 
rudimentary  kinds  of  health  care 
which  can  be  helpful,  to  help  in  edu- 
cation, and  the  kind  of  things  that  we 
can  handle  and,  I  think,  that  they  can 
handle  too.  This  really  is  a  focus  of 
the  programs  these  days.  □ 


Press  release  195  A  of  May  1.  1978. 


20 


Remarks  to  the  Press 
Following  Cincinnati  Address 


Q.  [Inaudible]. 

A.  We  are  exploring  the  various 
possibilities  that  it  might  be  possible 
to  get  momentum  going  again  in  the 
peace  talks.  Both  of  us  will  be  reflect- 
ing on  the  exchange  of  views  and  will 
be  in  touch  with  each  other  as  we  will 
with  the  Egyptians. 

Q.  You  said  in  the  Q  and  A  on 
Friday  that  the  talks  in  the  Middle 
East  are  now  at  a  stalemate. 

A.  They  have  been. 

Q.  Can  you  elaborate  on  that? 

A.  There  has  been  a  lack  of  conver- 
sation directly  between  the  Egyptians 
and  the  Israelis  for  a  period  of  weeks 
now,  and  as  a  result  of  that  I  think  it 
is  necessary  to  find  some  way  to  get 
the  momentum  going  again  so  that  we 
can  get  the  talks  off  dead  center.  That 
is  why  we're  in  consultation  with  each 
other  to  see  what  we  can  do  to  move 
forward,  and  I'm  hopeful  that  we  can 
achieve  that. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  this  is  the 
time  for  the  United  States  to  step  in 
to  try  and  pry  the  talks? 

A.  Yes.  I  think  that  this  is  a  time 
we  can  be  helpful  in  prying  the  talks. 
That  has  been  our  feeling  in  the  past. 
If  the  parties  can  make  progress  talk- 
ing to  each  other,  fine.  That's  the  way 
one  should.  If  our  help  is  needed,  we 
will  give  it  a  stimulus.  And  we're  glad 
to  do  that. 

Q.  In  your  prepared  remarks  I 
noticed  that  you  deleted  reference  to 
Governor  Kelly. 

A.  I  didn't  delete  reference  to  any- 
thing. I  was  just  trying  to  save  time 
because  the  thing  was  too  long,  and  I 
thought  they  would  go  to  sleep  if  I 
read    the    whole    thing.    You    know    I 


stand  by  everything  that  is  in  the  writ- 
ten text. 

Q.  How  much  of  a  strain  on  the 
Mideast  situation  has  Mr.  Begin's 
objections  to  the  arms  proposals 
been? 

A.  On  the  arms  proposals,  I  don't 
know  how  to  say  it  any  clearer  than 
I've  said  it  on  many  occasions;  that  I 
believe  that  it  is  very  much  in  the 
interests  of  the  search  for  peace  that 
all  of  these  proposals  be  approved.  I 
also  believe  that  it  is  very  important 
from  the  standpoint  of  engendering 
confidence  in  all  of  the  three  countries 
involved  that  we  go  forward  and  meet 
commitments  which  we  have  made  to 
them.  I  think  that  it  is  possible, 
through  these  various  proposals,  to 
meet  the  basic  military  need  of  these 
countries  and  at  the  same  time  stimu- 
late the  peace  process  because  I  think 
people  are  going  to  be  willing  to  take 
the  risks  that  one  has  to  take  when  you 
are  negotiating  peace  if  they  feel  se- 
cure that  they  can  meet  their  prob- 
lems, their  security  problems. 

Q.  You  don't  feel  that  is  a 
contradiction — arms  for  peace? 

A.  No,  I  do  not. 

Q.  Can  you  elaborate  on  that 
point? 

A.  Sure.  There  are  certain 
minimum  requirements  that  a  country 
has  to  deal  with  in  terms  of  their 
security.  Now,  if  you  can  keep  the 
basic  balance  in  the  region  so  that  is 
not  changed,  if  you  can  then  stimulate 
that  confidence  which  will  give  them 
the  willingness  to  take  an  extra  risk 
for  peace,  then  I  think  clearly  there  is 
no  contradiction  but,  in  fact,  a  little 
reinforcement. 


Department  of  State  Bu 

Yemen,  I  understand  the  C 
munists  have  been  heavily  suppl 
that  country.  Do  you  see  the  suj 
ing  of  Saudi  Arabia  with  the  F- 
as  a  movement  to  balance  or  c 
terbalance  the  Soviet  action?  O 
you  see  it  as  trying  to  retain  fri 
ship?  Or  do  you  see  it  as  tryin 
prevent  a  country  which  faces  o 
instabilities  in  the  area  from  tur 
to  other  hostile  suppliers  of  arms 

A.  First  of  all,  I  think  the  11 
threat  that  the  Saudis  fear  is  n 
threat  from  Israel;  their  concerns 
basically  the  dangers  that  they 
from  their  Arab  neighbors — to 
north,  especially  Iraq;  the  cone 
that  they  have  in  the  south.  They 
had  three  border  incursions  from  S 
Yemen  in  the  past.  This  is  a  matti 
concern  to  them.  They  have  a  cot 
which  is  vast.  It  is  the  equivalet 
the  land  area  from  the  Atlantic  tc 
Mississippi.  They  have  very 
people  to  man  their  aircraft.  Tl 
fore,  it  is  important  that  they  hav< 
kind  of  an  aircraft  system  that 
give  them  the  defense  capability  wl 
does  not  require  vast  number! 
people.  And  the  F— 15  is  exactly 
kind  of  airplane. 

It  is  obviously  a  very  impoi 
country  because  it  is  one  of  the  le< 
of  the  moderate  group  in  the  M 
East.  And  I  think  that  it  is  in 
interests  and  in  the  interests  of 
Middle  East  that  we  should  help 
friends  who  are  moderates  in  that 
That  is  going  to  help  in  the  p 
process.  If  you  look  down  the  i 
what  kind  of  world  would  we  all 
to  see  at  the  end  of  5-10  years 
now?  We  would  like  to  see  a  w 
peace  where  Israel  could  be  li 
within  secure  and  recognized  bo 
aries,  where  the  other  moderate 
tions  again  also  would  be  livin, 
peace,  and  secure.  And  I  think 
kind  of  steps  that  we  are  talking  a 
here  would  lead  us  to  that  end — w>( 
lead  the  way. 


Q.   Speaking  of  balance,  in   South     Pressrelease  195 B  of  May  1,  1978. 


1978 


Visit  to  Africa, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  I  .ALS.lt. 


ecretary  Vance  visited  Africa,  the 
ted  Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
il  13-23.  He  and  British  Foreign 
retary  David  Owen  were  in  Dar  es 
■mm,  Tanzania  (April  13-16),  to 
t  with  Robert  Mugabe  (Secretary 
Krai,  Zimbabwe  African  National 
ion — ZANU)  and  Joshua  Nkomo 
esident.  Zimbabwe  African 
jple's  Union  —  ZAPU)  Secretary 
ice  met  also  with  Tanzanian  Presi- 
t  Nyerere.  The  two  Secretaries  met 
h  government  officials  in  Pretoria, 
tth  Africa  (April  16-17),  and 
Salisbury ,  Southern  Rhodesia 
ml  17). 

ecretary  Vance  then  headed  the 
>.  delegation  to  the  Central  Treaty 
ionization  (CENTO)  ministerial 
?ting  in  London  (April  18-19)  and 
ted  Moscow  (April  19-23). 
ollowing  are  the  texts  of  state- 
its  made  on  various  occasions  dur- 
the  trip,  the  joint  statement  and 
imunique  issued  in  Dar  es  Salaam 
(  Moscow,  and  Secretary  Vance's 
ss  briefing  at  the  White  House  on 
HI  24.' 


INT  STATEMENT, 
lR  ES  SALAAM,  APR. 


15s 


The  Malta  II  conference  between  the 
riotic    Front    and    the    British    and 
lerican    Governments    was    held    in 
r  es  Salaam  on  April  14-15,  1978. 
parties  expressed  appreciation  to 
:sident  Nyerere  and  the  Tanzanian 
vernment  for  the  kind  hospitality. 
The   British  and   the   United   States 
egation  were  led  by  Dr.   David 
Iven,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary, 
\d  Mr.   Cyrus   Vance,  the  United 
Idtes   Secretary   of   State,    while   the 
Itriotic  Front  delegation  was  led  by 
lesidents  Robert  Mugabe  and  Joshua 
Icomo.   General  Prem  Chand  rep- 
lanting the  Secretary  General  of  the 
iiited  Nations  also  attended. 
■  Representatives  of  Angola,   Bots- 
Btna,  Mozambique,  Nigeria,  Tanzania 
d  Zambia  were  present  as  observers. 
The  conference,  whose  purpose  was 
]  discuss  military  and  related  matters 
Rising  from  the  Anglo-American  pro- 
jisals,  was  held  in  an  atmosphere  of 
jndour  and  seriousness.3 
(The  United  States  and  British  Sec- 
taries of  State  reaffirmed  their  sup- 
Jirt  for  the  Anglo-American  propos- 
]s.   In  the  course  of  the  discussions, 


the  leaders  of  the  Patriotic  Front  put 
forward  a  number  of  proposals  aimed 
at  reaching  a  settlement  within  the 
principles  of  the  Anglo-American  pro- 
posals. For  their  part  the  U.S.  and 
British  Secretaries  of  State  took  note 
of  these  proposals  they  regarded  as 
fundamental  changes  in  the  Anglo- 
American  plan  which  would  have  to 
be  negotiated.  Progress  was  made  and 
there  was  broad  agreement  in  some 
important  areas. 

It  was  agreed  that  a  further  confer- 
ence be  held  as  soon  as  possible. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
PRETORIA,  APR.  164 

Secretary  Vance:  The  two  subjects 
which  we  discussed  this  evening  with 
the  Foreign  Minister  were  Namibia 
and  Rhodesia.  I  would  like  to  say  a 
few  words  about  the  first  and  then  Dr. 
Owen  will  speak  to  the  second. 

We  had  a  full  discussion  of  the 
Namibian  question.  We  pointed  out 
the  importance  which  we  addressed  to 
the  resolution  of  this  problem  and  to 
the  finding  of  an  international  solution 
of  the  problem.  We  also  stressed  the 
fact  that  we  believe  that  we  must  not 
only  initiate  the  action  but  follow 
through  and  make  sure  that  it  has 
a  successful  conclusion.  We  are  in 
it  to  stay,  to  see  that  it  works  out 
satisfactorily. 


Mr.  Botha  raised  a  number  of  ques- 
tions. We  took  note  of  those  matters. 
We  are  but  two  of  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters in  the  five,  and  we  must,  of 
course,  discuss  those  with  our  col- 
leagues and  we  plan  to  do  so. 

Foreign  Secretary   Owen:   On 

Rhodesia.  I  think  that  when  I  was  first 
in  South  Africa  last  April,  at  that  time 
we  discussed  both  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia,  and  I  don't  think  that  since 
that  time  in  April  I  have  been  under 
any  doubt  that  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment does  want  an  internationally 
acceptable  solution,  if  it's  possible, 
for  both  Namibia  and  for  Rhodesia.  I 
believe  this  is  extremely  important, 
and  I  think  it's  in  the  interests  of 
everybody  in  southern  Africa. 

The  problem  we  face  now  over 
Rhodesia  is  that  we  have  made  some 
progress  but  that  we  have  still  got  a 
situation  in  which  there  is  armed  con- 
flict. We  have  got  a  situation  in  which 
two  of  the  nationalist  leaders  are  not 
involved  outside,  and  the  armed  con- 
flict is  continuing,  and  we  feel  that  it 
is  an  extremely  important  responsibil- 
ity for  us  to  continue  to  work  on  the 
Anglo-American  plan;  to  try  and  bring 
about  a  peaceful  settlement. 

We  don't  underestimate  the  difficul- 
ties, but  all  we  ask  everyone — and  I 
think  this  particularly  applies  to  South 
Africans,  because  it  is  in  your  inter- 
ests to  have,  I  think,  a  stable  country 
on  your  borders.  But  we  should  try  to 
continue  the  path  of  negotiations,  and 
these  are  the  issues  we  discussed  with 
Foreign  Minister  Botha. 

All  we  can  ask  is  that  people  should 
encourage  the  process  of  negotiation 
and  work  toward  a  settlement  that  can 


Secretary  Vance  in  Dar  es  Salaam  with  Robert  Mugabe  (left).  Secretary  General  of  the  Zimbabwe 
African  National  Union,  and  Zambian  Foreign  Minister  Sitake  Mwale  (center). 


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Wmi  .H 

22 

be  internationally  acceptable  in  a  free 
and  fair  election  and  a  transfer  to 
independence  in  1978. 

I  know  that  some  people  say: 
"Well,  what's  the  point  of  going  on 
talking?"  The  point  of  going  on  talk- 
ing is  that  if  we  allow  the  armed 
conflict  to  just  continue,  I  think  we 
could  get  into  a  very  bitter  struggle.  If 
we  cease  to  pursue  the  Anglo- 
American  plan,  I  think  that  the  people 
will  give  up  talking  about  a  negotiated 
peaceful  settlement.  They  would  then 
just  fight  it  out,  and  with  that  there  is 
a  very  severe  risk  of  internationalizing 
the  situation. 

Other  countries  have  been  asked  to 
come  in  in  support,  and  we  could  find 
that  southern  Africa  would  be  a  center 
of  conflict,  as  we've  seen  in  other 
parts  of  Africa  in  recent  months.  So 
we  believe  very  strongly  that  despite 
the  obstacles,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to 
continue  to  try  to  bring  all  the  sides 
together  and  bring  them  around  a 
negotiating  table  and  get  them  to  rec- 
oncile their  difficulties  and  have  a 
negotiated  settlement. 

So  we  will  work,  over  the  coming 
weeks  and  months,  for  a  conference  of 
all  the  parties  to  try  and  resolve  this 
issue,  and  we  put  these  issues  to 
Foreign  Minister  Botha,  and  he  will 
decide  his  response.  I  gather  he  is 
talking  to  you  later.  I  don't  intend  to 
anticipate  this,  but  he  understands  the 
problem,  and  I  hope  that  you  under- 
stand what  we  are  trying  to  achieve. 
It's  not  going  to  be  easy. 

Q.  What  was  Mr.  Botha's  initial 
reaction  to  your  request  that  he 
support  or  endorse  the  call  for  an 
all-parties  conference  in  Rhodesia? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  We're 
not  asking  him  to  come  out  and  en- 
dorse all  this,  but  I  think  that  the 
South  African  Government  has,  in  the 
past,  seen  the  merit  in  trying  to  bring 
all  the  parties  together,  and  I  hope 
he'll  see  the  merit  in  doing  this  at  this 
present  moment  in  time.  It's  up  to  him 
how  he  expresses  it,  how  he  uses  his 
influence,  and  how  he  expresses  it  to 
the  South  African  Government. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  now  that  you 
are  hoping  that  South  Africa  will 
use  whatever  influence  it  has  in 
Salisbury  to  make  sure  that  the 
internal  people  there  are  willing  to 
continue  talking? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  think 
that's  a  question  up  to  them.  It's  not 
for  me  to  tell  them  how  to  conduct 
their  affairs.  They  are  in  touch  with 
the  situation,  and  they  must  decide  it. 

They've  often  made  it  clear  that 
they  will  not  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 


Rhodesia.  That's  up  to  them  how  they 
use  their  influence  or  what  they  decide 
to  do,  but  I  do  believe  it's  in  South 
Africa's  interests. 

Q.  To  try  and  understand 
better — then  is  it  correct  you  didn't 
suggest  a  particular  course  of  action 
to  South  Africa  today?  Just  gener- 
ally, you  restated  really  what  you've 
always  said:  that  you  want  them  to 
use  their  influence,  or  is  there  some 
new  twist  to  it  that  escapes  us? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  There's 
no  new  twist.  We  discussed  these 
problems  frankly  and  in  considerable 
detail  as  we've  been  doing  over  quite 
some  time.  I  mean,  we  came  back,  we 
discussed  this  in  September.  We've 
had  further  contact  all  through  the  last 
few  months  when  we've  been  dis- 
agreeing on  some  other  things.  We 
still  continue  to  work  in  a  way  keeping 
each  other  closely  in  touch. 

Q.  Have  they  not  used  their  influ- 
ence or  have  they  not  used  it  enough 
or  are  you  suggesting  a  specific 
course  of  action  that  you  can't  dis- 
cuss with  us? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  have 
long  taken  the  view  that  other  gov- 
ernments don't  usually  like  you  to  tell 
them  how  to  conduct  their  own  foreign 
policy. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  endorse 
what  Dr.  Owen  has  said. 

Q,  What  is  it  that  the  United 
States  would  particularly  like  to  see 
South  Africa  do? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  would  hope, 
all  of  us  working  together,  that  we 
find  a  solution  to  both  the  Namibian 
problem  and  the  Rhodesian.  As  Dr. 
Owen  pointed  out  in  connection  with 
the  Rhodesian  problem,  we  feel  that  a 
solution — an  internationally  approved 
and  acceptable  solution — of  the  Nami- 
bian problem  would  clearly  be  in  the 
interests  of  South  Africa  was  well  as 
the  people  of  the  region  and  the  world 
in  general. 

Q.  Could  I  follow  that  up  please 
by  asking  if  the  questions  that  were 
raised  by  Foreign  Minister  Botha 
represented  any  fundamental  new  is- 
sues raised  in  the  Namibian  discus- 
sions? 

Secretary  Vance:  They  raised  is- 
sues which  are  important  issues  as 
seen  by  South  Africa,  and  they  relate 
to  matters  which  are  covered  in  the 
proposal  of  the  five. 

Q.  Would  they  conceivably  have 
required  some  renegotiation  of  the 
proposals? 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  al 
should  go  into  at  this  point,  because 
I  said,  we  must  merely  take  them 
take  note  of  them  now  and  take  tht 
back  to  our  colleagues,  that  they  « 
important  issues. 

Q.  Would  it  be  fair  to  paraphra 
your  impression  of  the  South  Afi 
can  answer  on  that  that  their  answ 
is  inconclusive? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  th 
ought  to  speak  for  themselves  on  th; 
I  know  that  Foreign  Minister  Botha 
going  to  be  here  in  a  little  while 
speak  to  you,  and  I  really  don't  th\' 
that  I  ought  to  speak  for  him. 

Q.  But  you  are  not  able  to 
away  with  any  firm  indicatiii 
whether  they  have  not  accepted 
proposal  put  forward  by  the  fi 
Western  powers? 

Secretary  Vance:  It  is  my  imprt 
sion  that  they  have  not  accepted 
proposals  of  the  five  Western  powers 

Q.  On  Namibia,  you  have  se 
both  Mr.  Botha  and  Mr.  Nujor 
[Sam  Nujoma,  President  of  the  Sou 
West  Africa  People's  Organu 
tion— SWAPO]  in  the  same  12  hou 
Is  it  your  sense  that  they  are  nt 
coming  closer  together  on  the  basis 
the  revised  Western  proposals? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  real 
again,  that  they  have  to  speak 
themselves  on  this  thing  as  to  h> 
they  stand  with  respect  to  our  prop 
als.  It  is  not  for  me  to  speak  for  the 
and  I'm  sure  as  far  as  Mr.  Botha 
concerned  that  he  will  speak  to  t 
issue  as  far  as  Namibia  is  concernt 
and  I  would  be  surprised  if  W 
Nujoma  didn't  express  his  views. 

Q.  What  would  happen  if  the  i 
curity  Council  or  the  General 
sembly  of  the  United  Nations  rejei 
the  proposals,  doesn't  appro 
them?  What  will  happen  then? 

Secretary  Vance:  That's  an  assi 
tion  that  I  certainly  am  not  prepared 
accept.  They  have  not  been  discuss 
by  the  Security  Council.  They  will 
discussed  in  the  future  by  the  Secur 
Council,  and  I  hope  that  the  Secur 
Council  will  endorse  them. 

Q.  I  sense  that  neither  you  n 
Dr.  Owen  want  to  address  you 
selves  to  the  question  of  the  degr 
of  pressure  that  you  asked  Sou 
Africa  to  put  on  Rhodesia.  Ther 
fore,  I'd  like  to  put  the  question 
you  this  way.  Were  you  satisf 
with  Mr.  Botha's  response? 


Secretary    Vance:    1    feel    that 


e  1978 

cussions  were  important  discus- 
ns.  They  were  candid  discussions, 
1  I  think  it  was  useful  to  have  had 
discussions. 


23 


i 


Q.  You  will  be  seeing  Mr.  Smith 
Smith,   Prime   Minister   of  the 
ite    regime   in    Rhodesia]    tomor- 
w.  Will  what  you  were  told  yes- 
day   by   Mr.   Nkomo  and   Mr. 
igabe  make  your   date  with   Mr. 
Siith  any  more  difficult  than  it 
?>uld  have  been? 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  I  don't  think 
it  They  have  indicated  that  they  are 
p  pared  to  attend  the  meeting  of  all 
I  parties.  As  Dr.  Owen  has  said,  we 

i'|l  that  if  progress  is  going  to  be 
tide  on  the  Rhodesian  question,  it  is 
eential  that  all  of  the  parties  sit 
dAn  together  and  discuss  the  differ- 
a|:es  which  remain. 

\s  we  have  indicated  on  many  oc- 
c  ions,  we  believe  that  the  Anglo- 
^Terican  proposals  provide  a 
fimework  for  a  solution  which  should 

h  acceptable  not  only  to  the  parties 

M    internationally   acceptable,    which 

3'ery  important. 

J.  Mr.  Nkomo  was  quoted  out  of 
Isaka  today  as  saying  that  at  the 
meting  that  you've  just  concluded  in 

I  r,  the  patriotic  front  made  conces- 
s  ns  on  the  question  of  U.N.  forces 
td  resident  commissioner  power, 

I I  that  Britian  and  the  United 
Jites  failed  to  meet  them  halfway, 
i  led  to  make  any  concessions  on 

Kir  side.  Therefore,  everything  was 
ling  given  by  the  patriotic  front  and 
1  thing  given  by  you. 
Is  it  your  concept  or  is  it  Dr. 
(ven's  concept  that  you  were  there 
i  order  to  compromise  or  to  change 
te  Anglo-American  plan  that, 
terefore,  this  sort  of  question 
c  ises? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  Anglo- 
/nerican  proposals  were  put  forward, 
ley  were  amplified  and  modified 
aer  the  discussions  which  followed 
c  in  Malta.  We  have  always  said  that 
I  are  prepared  to  discuss  with  the 
grties,  because  they  must  ultimately 
tike  the  decision,  any  aspects  which 
t:y  feel  must  be  raised  in  connection 

th  it. 

Q.  Over  the  past  few  days  some 
I  the  newly  sworn  black  ministers 
'j  Salisbury  have  restated  their  will- 
Igness  to  see  Mr.  Nkomo  and  Mr. 
jugabe  take  places  on  the  Executive 
Ouncil  in  the  framework  of  the 
(ternal  settlement.  In  light  of  what 
iu  heard  in  Dar  from  the  patriotic 
lont  leaders,  what  is  your  evalua- 


British  Foreign  Secretary  Owen,    U.S.   Ambassador  to  the   U.N.    Young,   and  Secretary   Vance 
(from  left  to  right)  confer  in  Pretoria  with  South  Africa's  Foreign  Minister  Botha  (far  right). 


tion  of  the  obstacles  or  likelihood  of 
that  kind  of  a  compromise  solution? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  the  first 
step  is  to  get  everybody  to  sit  down 
together  so  that  they  can  discuss  their 
varying  views  with  respect  to  these 
problems,  and  I  think  they've  got  to 
speak  for  themselves  rather  than  my 
speaking  for  them. 


REMARKS  TO  THE  PRESS, 
SALISBURY,  APR.  17  5 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:   As  you 

know  we've  had  some  hours  of  de- 
tailed discussion,  both  this  morning 
and  this  afternoon,  and  the  atmos- 
phere has  been  a  good  atmosphere. 
The  expression  of  views  has  been 
clear  on  both  sides. 

As  you  know,  we  put  to  the  meet- 
ing that  we  thought  there  should  be 
roundtable  talks  at  which  all  the  par- 
ties could  come,  without  precondi- 
tion, to  try  and  see  if  we  could  build 
on  the  areas  of  agreement  that  already 
exist,  to  widen  the  areas  of  agree- 
ment, and  hopefully  to  work  toward 
an  agreed  cease-fire,  fair  and  free 
elections  to  be  conducted  this  year, 
and  a  granting  of  independence  to 
Zimbabwe  recognized  by  the  United 
Nations  and  the  whole  international 
community.  We  put  that  proposition 
to  them. 

I  think  they  understand  the  reasons 
why  we  think  it's  in  the  interests  of 
the  people  of  Rhodesia  and  all  the 
citizens  who  live  in  Zimbabwe  that 


such  talks  should  take  place.  I  think 
they  understand  our  fears  that  could 
come  if  this  opportunity  of  continuing 
the  negotiations  was  to  be  missed. 
We  are  under  no  illusions  about  the 
difficulty  that  would  be  faced.  They 
have  agreed  to  take  this  away  and 
give  serious,  detailed,  and  mature 
thought  to  the  proposition  that  we  put 
to  them.  That's  what  we  asked  them 
to  do.  We  didn't  come  here  asking 
them  to  make  a  snap  decision;  we 
recognize  that  they  will  want  to  con- 
sult amongst  themselves,  and  they 
have  agreed  to  do  so. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  have  very  little 
to  add  to  that  except  to  say  that  I 
have  found  the  discussions  today  to 
have  been  very  helpful,  and  I  am  glad 
that  we  have  had  the  opportunity  to 
exchange  ideas  and  views  in  a  good 
atmosphere.  We  shall  continue  to  work 
to  give  all  the  help  we  can  in  trying 
to  find  a  peaceful  solution  to  the 
problem  in  Rhodesia. 

Q.  Considering  that  the  date  of 
independence  is  now  only  about  8 
months  away,  have  you  issued  any 
kind  of  time  limit  to  the  decision 
you  are  hoping  they  will  make? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  The  an- 
swer is  no,  we  recognize  that  they 
will  want  to  talk  about  it,  that  maybe 
that,  between,  we  will  have  to  have 
further  discussions  in  order  to  try  and 
narrow  the  areas  so  that  people 
[inaudible]  with  agreements  as  far  as 
we  can  on  the  way  to  talks  will  be 
held,  where  they'll  be  held,  and  the 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


time  and  the  place,  so  that  we've  not 
put  them  under  any  tight  threshold. 
They're  going  to  go  ahead  and  carry 
on  their  proposals,  but  we  believe 
that  no  party  should  give  up  the 
negotiating  process. 

Q.  In  Dar  es  Salaam,  Mr. 
Mugabe  said  that  he  wanted  to  see 
a  one-party  Marxist  state  in  Zim- 
babwe. Do  you  have  any  comment? 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  I  do  have  a 
comment  about  that.  He  did  not  say 
that  to  me.  If  he  had  said  that.  I 
would  have  rejected  it  completely. 

Q.  Since  no  quick  agreement  has 
been  reached  to  call  a  Rhodesian 
conference,  I  wonder,  as  you  wind 
up  your  mission  to  Africa,  what  you 
see  developing  ahead? 

Secretary   Vance:   Let  me  say  I 

think  it  has  been  a  useful  trip.  I  think 
progress  has  been  made  during  the 
trip;  the  road  ahead  is  a  very  difficult 
one  and,  as  David  has  said,  none  of 
us  underestimate  those  difficulties. 
But  I  am  very  glad  we  came  and  will 
continue  to  work  at  it. 

Q.  After  the  Lagos  meeting  it 
was  announced  that  the  plan  was  to 
have  the  Dar  meeting  and  then  on 
the  25th  and  26th  of  April  the  all- 
parties  conference.  Would  you  ex- 
plain what  has  happened  since 
Lagos  that  you  have  not  arrived  at 
that  25th  (of)  April  date? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  Rhodesians 
have  indicated  to  us  that  they  wished 
to  take  time  to  reflect  seriously  upon 
our  proposals.  I  think  that  that  is  a 
fair  and  proper  suggestion  on  their 
part.  and.  therefore,  I  think  we  must 
proceed  and  will  proceed  along  those 
lines. 

Q.  What  is  your  impression  of 
the  interim  government,  as  you 
have  now  been  in  touch  with  it?  In- 
deed, this  is  the  first  visit  by  a  Sec- 
retary of  State  to  Rhodesia.  What  is 
your  impression  of  Rhodesia? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  it's  a 
lovely  country. 

Q.  Do  you  think  the  interim  gov- 
ernment is  functioning? 

Secretary  Vance  and  Foreign  Secretary  Owen 
in  Salisbury 


IIF 


Secretary  Vance:  I  was  very  glad 
to  have  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
them.  This  is  the  first  time  that  I 
have,  and  as  I  said  I  found  my  talks 
very  useful  today. 


CENTO  OPENING  SESSION, 
LONDON,  APR.  19  6 

This  ministerial  meeting  reaffirms 
the  commitment  of  CENTO  members 
to  enduring  and  important  common 
interests.  As  in  the  past,  the  United 
States  remains  committed  to  the  cen- 
tral objective  of  CENTO — protecting 
the  independence  and  territorial  integ- 
rity of  member  states.  My  country 
remains  committed  as  well  to  working 
with  each  of  you  on  a  number  of  crit- 
ical issues  which  are  of  special  inter- 
est to  CENTO  members  because  they 
have  a  direct  or  indirect  impact  on  the 
stability  and  security  of  the  CENTO 
region. 

U.S.  Defense  Policies 

The  United  States  has  recently 
completed  a  major  review  of  its  na- 
tional defense  strategy.  The  guiding 
principles  which  emerged  from  this 
study  were  first  stated  a  month  ago 
when  President  Carter  spoke  at  Wake 
Forest  University.  They  are  worth  re- 
stating today.  President  Carter  said: 

We  will  match,  together  with  our  allies  and 
friends,  any  threatening  power  through  a  com- 
bination of  military  forces,  political  efforts, 
and  economic  programs.  We  will  not  allow 
any  other  nation  to  gain  military  superiority 
over  us. 

We  shall  seek  the  cooperation  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  nations  in  reducing  areas  of 
tension.  We  do  not  desire  to  intervene  militar- 
ily in  the  internal  domestic  affairs  of  other 
countries  nor  to  aggravate  regional  conflicts 
And  we  shall  oppose  intervention  by  others 

While  assuring  our  own  military 
capabilities,  we  shall  seek  security  through 
dependable,  verifiable  arms  control  agree- 
ments wherever  possible. 

We  shall  use  our  great  economic,  technolog- 
ical, and  diplomatic  advantages  to  defend  our 
interests  and  to  promote  American  values 

This  statement  of  American  policy 
indicates  more  than  our  concern  for 
our  own  military  strength;  it  indicates 
our  readiness  to  act  in  concert  with 
others  to  achieve  a  more  peaceful  and 
more  stable  world.  This  is  why  my 
country's  association  with  CENTO  is 
(it  fundamental  importance  to  us. 

While  we  maintain  our  military 
strength,  we  are  also  working  for 
peace  in  a  number  of  areas.  These 
problems  remain  as  challenges  which 
must   be   addressed   directly   and   in 


common.  The  fact  that  they  are  on  oi 
agenda  this  year,  at  last,  indicat* 
their  complexity  and  suggests  the  di 
ficulty  we  will  face  in  achieving  the 
resolution.  But  in  each  case,  the  stakt' 
are  so  high  that  we  cannot  fail  to  c 
all  we  can  to  help  the  parties  to  di 
putes  to  find  just  resolutions. 

Middle  East 

A  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Mill 
die  East  remains  today  of  crucial  in 
portance  to  the  United  States  and  to  tr 
world.  The  past  year  has  brought  son- 
progress.  Working  with  the  parties,  w 
have  been  able  to  move  from  gener; 
concepts  to  a  precise  identification  ( 
areas  of  concern  on  which  agreemei 
must  be  reached.  We  have  witnessed 
narrowing  of  the  gap,  and  with  the  hi  ' 
toric  visit  of  President   Sadat  t 
Jerusalem  we  have  seen  the  initiatio 
of  direct  contacts  between  Egypt  arc 
Israel.  We  strongly  support  these  con 
tacts,  and  we  will  continue  to  encoui 
age  and  assist  the  parties  to  resolvi 
their  outstanding  problems  together. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  thre 
basic   issues  must  be   addressed   if 
lasting  settlement  is  to  be  achievec 
These  are: 

•  True  peace,  based  on  normal  reh 
tions  among  the  parties; 

•  Withdrawal  by  Israel  on  all  front 
from  territories  occupied  in   1967  an* 
agreement  by  all  parties  on  secure  an 
recognized  borders  in  accordance  wit. 
U.N.  Resolutions  242  and  338;  and 

•  A  just  resolution  of  the  Palestin 
ian  problem  in  all  its  aspects.  Th* 
resolution  must  recognize  the  legiti 
mate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peopl 
and  enable  the  Palestinians  to  partici 
pate  in  the  determination  of  their  owi 
future. 

These  are  complex  and  difficul 
questions.  The  progress  made  on  thl 
first  has,  unfortunately,  not  bee 
matched  in  the  other  two  areas 
Nevertheless,  the  United  States  re* 
mains  committed  to  a  continuation  o 
the  peace  process.  Statesmanship  am 
perserverance  will  yield  compro 
mise — and  compromise  will  open  th< 
door  to  a  resolution  of  the  conflict 
One  thing  is  clear:  If  the  process  o 
peace  remains  deadlocked,  the  inevita 
ble  regression  toward  conflict  will  bi 
difficult  to  halt — with  the  most  pro 
found  consequences  for  us  all 

The  United  States  will  continue  n 
assist  and  encourage  the  parties  to  re 
solve  their  differences.  We  are  unwill 
ing  to  let  slip  an  historic  opportunifj 
to  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace 
when  it  may  be  within  our  grasp. 


IH7S 


■> 


a 


other  area  of  great  concern  to  all 
s  Africa.   We  are  deeply  con- 

d  that  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba 
inwilling  to  recognize  the  funda- 
al  principle  often  stated  by  Afri- 
nations  that  they  can  solve  their 

problems  without  the  use  of  ex- 
I  force. 

e  presence  of  large  numbers  of 
n  combat  forces  and  Soviet  per- 
il in  the  Horn  of  Africa  does  not 
ote  stability, 
e  United  States  strongly  supports 

rritorial  integrity  of  all  states  in 
region,    including  particularly 
opia,    Djibouti.    Somalia,    and 
a. 
seek    the    withdrawal   of  all 

n  forces  from  Ethiopia  and  a 
;~ful  resolution  of  the  Eritrean  dis- 

It  is  clear  to  us  that  if  the  Eri- 

issue  is  determined  through  the 
of  force  by  foreign  troops, 
lshed  and  suffering  will  increase, 
nduring  solution  will  be  found, 
ensions  in  the  region  will  only  be 
itened. 

iw  that  Somali  forces  have  with- 
n  from  the  Ogaden  and  the  ter- 
ial  integrity  of  Ethiopia  is  not 
atened,  there  is  no  legitimate 
nale  for  the  maintenance  of  exter- 
ombat  forces  in  that  country.  We 
continue  to  consult  actively  with 
as  to  ways  we  can  work  together 
duce  tensions  in  the  Horn,  in  sup- 
of  the  efforts  of  the  Organization 
frican  Unity, 
southern  Africa,  my  country  has 

working  closely  with  the  United 
dom.   nations  of  the  region,  and 
Irs  to  help  bring  about  a  prompt 

■  fair  transition  to  independence  and 
lority  rule  without  further 
It  jshed  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia. 
l»reign  Secretary  Owen  and  I  have 
H  completed  talks  on  the  Rhodesian 
r<  lem  with  the  patriotic  front  and 
leparties  in  Salisbury.  We  are  con- 
iled  that  we  must  keep  the  negotia- 
I  door  open.  Otherwise  the  parties 
I  have  no  alternative  to  escalating 
llict  with  the  danger  of  increasing 
lide  involvement.  The  front-line 
Is  and  Nigeria  have  worked  closely 
■i  us. 

Ibelieve  our  recent  trip  to  Africa 
'J  well  worthwhile.  The  patriotic 
It  did  not  accept  all  the  Anglo- 
|:rican  proposals.  They  did  agree  to 
Hid  further  talks  at  which  all  parties 
lid  be  represented.  There  was  also 
N  progress  on  issues  that  are  central 
lissuring  free  and  fair  elections; 
He  was  general  agreement  on  U.N. 
Movement  in  peacekeeping  and  ob- 

■  ing  elections;  and,  contingent  on 


agreement  on  other  issues,  they  ac- 
cepted the  executive  authority  of  a 
neutral  resident  commissioner  in  the 
areas  of  defense  and  internal  security. 

Our  talks  in  Salisbury  and  Pretoria 
were  at  least  as  positive  as  we  had 
hoped.  South  Africa  appears  to  under- 
stand the  importance  of  achieving  an 
early,  internationally  acceptable  set- 
tlement which  will  bring  peace.  And 
while  the  Salisbury  parties  had  said 
before  our  visit  that  they  would  reject 
an  all-parties  meeting,  they  are  now 
willing  to  give  it  serious  considera- 
tion. At  least  some  realize  that  if  they 
close  the  door  to  negotiations,  they 
will  further  hurt  their  standing  in  the 
international  community  and  will  find 
it  difficult  to  achieve  the  cease-fire 
that  is  so  important  to  the  holding  of 
free  and  fair  elections. 

Our  primary  aim  is  to  achieve  a  set- 
tlement among  all  the  parties  that  will 
end  the  conflict.  We  remain  committed 
to  the  Anglo-American  proposals  as  a 
workable  basis  for  a  settlement.  We 
also  will  continue  to  try  to  bring  the 
parties  together  in  roundtable  talks. 

In  our  talks  on  the  Namibian  ques- 
tion with  the  South  Africans,  there 
was  recognition  of  the  importance  of  a 
settlement  which  would  have  interna- 
tional acceptance.  The  South  Africans 
have  requested  clarification  of  several 
of  the  proposals  of  the  contact  group. 
Foreign  Secretary  Owen  and  I  agreed 
to  discuss  these  matters  with  our  col- 
leagues in  the  contact  group  and  to 
make  a  prompt  reply  so  that  both 
South  Africa  and  SWAPO  may  re- 
spond soon  to  the  contact  group's  pro- 
posals. A  fair  settlement  in  Namibia 
would  do  more  than  protect  the  people 
of  that  territory;  it  would  also  help  to 
establish  a  sense  of  progress  in  south- 
ern Africa  that  would  assist  our  efforts 
in  Rhodesia. 

Eastern  Mediterranean 

With  respect  to  another  important 
regional  issue — that  of  Cyprus — my 
country  remains  fully  committed  to 
helping  the  parties  and  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations  in  the 
search  for  a  solution  that  will  permit 
the  two  Cypriot  communities  to  live 
peacefully  together  within  one  inde- 
pendent and  sovereign  nation.  We  are 
committed  to  this  goal  because  a  di- 
vided Cyprus  will  continue  to  be  an 
impediment  to  good  relations  between 
two  important  friends  and  allies — 
Turkey  and  Greece. 

The  United  States  views  both  Tur- 
key and  Greece  as  essential  to  the  col- 
lective self-defense  of  the  free  world. 
The  United  States  pledges  its  deter- 
mined efforts  to  strengthening  its  ties 


25 

in  this  vital  region  which  is  so  crucial 
to  the  long-term  interests  of  CENTO, 
and  of  NATO  as  well. 


Persian  Gulf 

We  remain  deeply  interested,  too,  in 
the  security  of  the  Persian  Gulf  region. 
The  cardinal  importance  of  this  region 
is  underscored  by  the  world's  increas- 
ing reliance  on  its  energy  resources 
and  by  the  growing  role  which  the 
Persian  Gulf  states  have  to  play  in 
supporting  the  stability  and  prosperity 
of  other  areas.  The  United  States 
places  great  importance  on  its  relation- 
ship with  Iran — a  CENTO  partner — 
and  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  other 
gulf  states. 

Iran,  buttressed  by  steadily  growing 
economic  and  defensive  strength,  re- 
mains of  fundamental  importance  as  a 
strategic  partner  within  the  CENTO 
framework.  Iran  is  playing  a  most  val- 
uable role  in  promoting  regional  prog- 
ress and  security. 

Pakistan,  too,  can  contribute  much 
to  the  stability  of  the  region.  We  have 
noted  its  significant  role  in  normaliz- 
ing relations  among  the  countries  of 
the  South  Asian  subcontinent. 


Economic  Progress 

While  the  swift  resolution  of  dis- 
putes necessarily  can  demand  the 
most  urgent  of  our  diplomatic  efforts, 
we  recognize  that  the  peace  and  sta- 
bility we  seek  will  ultimately  elude  us 
unless  we  are  willing  to  join  with 
others  in  promoting  global  economic 
progress. 

We  have  indicated  our  willingness 
to  work  with  others  to  increase  capital 
flows  to  the  developing  world;  to 
build  a  fairer  and  more  open  system 
of  world  trade;  to  work  to  moderate 
disruptive  movements  in  commodity 
prices;  to  cooperate  on  energy  con- 
servation and  development;  and  to 
strengthen  the  technological 
capabilities  of  developing  nations. 
We  are  pursuing  each  of  these 
policies  through  bilateral  and  mul- 
tilateral channels. 

We  believe  that  policies  which 
promise  economic  equity  are  strongly 
linked  to  the  prospects  for  protecting 
political  human  rights  more  fully.  My 
country  will  continue  to  work  with 
others  who  believe  that  common  secu- 
rity, though  dependent  upon  a  strong 
defense,  must  be  founded  as  well  on 
the  far-sighted  pursuit  of  economic 
and  political  justice. 

The  world  is  changing.  Diplomacy 
becomes  more  complex.  The  agenda 
of  issues  expands.  Increasingly,  no 
nation  acting  alone  can  resolve  its 


26 


problems.  In  such  a  world,  the  close 
relations  and  cooperation  among  the 
nations  represented  in  this  room  be- 
comes all  the  more  important.  Our  secu- 
rity depends  not  only  on  our  mutual  trust 
and  military  strength  but  also  on  our  abil- 
ity to  work  together  in  addressing  the 
problems  that  affect  us  all. 

JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
MOSCOW,  APR.  228 

US  Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  Vance 
visited  Moscow  from  April  20-22. 
He  was  received  by  CC  CPSU  USSR 
Supreme  Soviet  L.I.  Brezhnev  and  had 
several  meetings  with  A. A.  Gromyko, 
Member  of  the  Central  Committee  of 
the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet 
Union  Presidium  and  USSR  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs. 

An  exchange  of  views  took  place 
on  major  issues  of  US-Soviet  rela- 
tions and  also  on  certain  international 
problems  of  mutual  interest  to  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
particular  attention  was  devoted  to  the 
development  and  implementation  of 
further  measures  aimed  at  the  preven- 
tion of  nuclear  war  and  the  limitation 
of  armaments. 

In  this  connection  there  were  useful 
and  thorough  discussions  regarding 
the  preparation  of  a  new  agreement 
for  the  limitation  of  offensive 
strategic  weapons.  As  a  result  there 
was  a  narrowing  of  the  parties'  posi- 
tions on  some  of  the  remaining  unre- 
solved issues. 

Both  sides  expressed  the  intention 
to  work  intensively  to  conclude  an 
agreement  on  the  limitation  of  offen- 
sive strategic  arms  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible time.  Other  arms  limitation 
negotiations  were  also  discussed,  and 
both  sides  agreed,  in  particular,  to 
continue,  jointly  with  Great  Britain, 
to  work  toward  the  most  rapid  con- 
clusion of  an  agreement  on  a  full  and 
comprehensive  ban  on  nuclear 
weapons  testing. 

Both  sides  emphasized  the  great 
importance  they  attach  to  achieving 


Sipa  Press  from  Black  Slar 

progress  in  negotiations  on  the  mutual 
reduction  of  forces  and  armaments  in 
Central  Europe. 

During  the  discussion  of  arms  lim- 
itation issues,  the  parties  also  ex- 
changed views  on  the  forthcoming 
UN  General  Assembly  Special  Ses- 
sion on  Disarmament. 

It  was  agreed  to  continue  discus- 
sion of  the  questions  dealt  with  in 
Moscow. 


DEPARTURE  STATEMENT, 
MOSCOW,  APR.  23  9 

First,  I  would  like  to  express  my 
appreciation  to  President  Brezhnev 
and  to  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  for 
their  warm  hospitality  and  for  the 
friendly  and  constructive  spirit  which 
they  have  brought  to  our  meetings. 

I  would  in  particular,  as  a  Foreign 
Minister,  like  to  add  a  personal  word 
of  respect  for  Minister  Gromyko.  As 
a  thoroughly  professional  practitioner 
of  the  diplomatic  trade,  he  has  few 
peers  in  the  modern  world.  He  repre- 
sents his  country's  interest  with  great 
skill,  high  intelligence,  and  a  spirit 
tempered  in  decades  of  experience. 

Our  meetings  here  have  been  useful 
and  constructive.  The  structure  of 
peace  that  we  all  desire,  if  it  is  to  be 
enduring,  must  be  built  brick-by-brick 
with  workmanlike  and  realistic  steps. 
We  have  made  some  progress  during 
these  meetings  toward  a  SALT 
agreement,  and  we  hope  to  carry 
these  efforts  forward  in  subsequent 
meetings.  There  is  no  more  important 
task  before  the  nations  of  the  world 
than  this  critical  effort  to  bring  a 
sense  of  sanity  into  the  regulation  of 
the  military  competition,  especially  in 
regard  to  strategic  weapons. 

We  have  also  made  some  progress, 
I  believe,  in  moving  toward  a  better 
understanding  of  the  problems  in- 
volved in  the  bilateral  relations  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States.  We  are  realistic  about 
these  problems,  and  we  know  that 
they  will  not  be  dispelled  by  declara- 


Department  of  State  Buf 

In  Moscow  Secretary  Vance  and  U.S.  Am 
sador  Malcolm  Toon  (right)  meet  with  Pr 
dent  Brezhnev.  Foreign  Minister  Grant) 
ami  Soviet  Ambassador  to  the  U.S.  Dobr 
(across  table  from  left  to  right). 


tions  but  will  continue  to  require  pi 
tical  measures  and  continuous  eff> 
It  is  our  intention  to  work  at  th 
problems  with  determination,  rec 
nizing  that  the  relations  between 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  Stz 
are  a  central  factor  in  world  pe 
and  stability. 

PRESS  BRIEFING, 
WHITE  HOUSE,  APR.  24  10 


: 


I  just  reported  to  the  President 
my  trip  to  Africa  and  to  the  So* 
Union  and  to  Western  Europe. 

In  southern  Africa  David  Owen 
I  first  went  to  Rhodesia,  as 
know,  and  met  with  the  patrit 
front.  During  our  talks  with  the 
triotic  front,  we  made  some  prog 
on  a  couple  of  key  issues — nam 
the  powers  of  the  resident  comn 
sioner  with  respect  to  internal  secu 
and  defense.  They  are  two  key  arc 
and  it  was  agreed  with  the  patrii 
front,  as  proposed  in  the  Ang 
American  plan,  that  he  sho 
have — he,  the  resident  commissi 
er — exclusive  power  in  these  areas. 

The  patriotic  front  also  agreed  v 
the  principle  of  the  United  Nati 
supervising  the  cease-fire  and  suj 
vising  the  police  during  the  transit 
period. 

The  patriotic  front  also  agreed  v 
respect  to  an  all-parties  confere 
and  said  that  they  would  attend 
all-parties  conference. 

There  were  differences  of  views 
other  matters,  such  as  the  govern 
council  and  what  the  power-shar 
within  a  governing  council  should 
and  the  functions  of  the  gove 
ing  council  in  terms  of  legislat 
authority. 

We  went  from  there  down  to  So 
Africa.  We  discussed  with  the  So 
Africans  both  the  Rhodesian  situat 
and  the  Namibian  problem.  T 
Foreign  Minister  of  South  Afr 
asked  for  certain  clarifications  on 
proposal  of  the  five  Western  powe 
the  so-called  contact  group.  As  ) 
know,  that  group  has  put  those  p 
posals  into  the  U.N.  Security  Coun 
now  and  debate  is  starting  in  t 
General  Assembly  tomorrow 
Namibia. 

The  clarifications  asked  for  by  t 
Foreign  Minister  of  South  Africa,  a 
also  clarifications  asked  by  IV 


fil  1978 

|>ma  on  behalf  of  SWAPO,  will  be 
jjained  in  the  statement  which  is 
flg  made  by  Mr.  Jamieson,  the 
lign  Minister  of  Canada.  He  will 
Speaking  on  behalf  of  all  of  the 
^tomorrow  at  the  United  Nations. 
1,  the  Soviet  Union,  I  think  as  you 

(■enow,  I  indicated  that  I  believe 
talks  there  were  useful.  I  believe 
iwe  made  some  progress.  There  is 
g;at  deal  of  hard  work  ahead,  and 

.Agreed  that  both  sides  would  in- 
nfy  their  efforts  to  try  and  com- 
f  the  work  which  has  to  be  done 
eure  an  agreement  could  be 
•led. 

(.  How  long  do  you  think  it  will 
>efore  you  are  able  to  get  an 
;iement? 

j  I  honestly  don't  know.  I  would 
siuessing  if  I  tried  to  say.  There 
e;ome  difficult  issues  that  remain, 
mow  long  it  is  going  to  take — 

(  Are  they  the  issues  that  were 
hays  there  almost  from  the 
ejnning? 

•)l    Some  of  them  are. 

t  For  some  time  now,  since  this 
Ministration  has  been  in  office, 
■  Soviets  have  argued — 
a  icularly  in  the  SALT  talks — 
ki  all  the  goodwill  which  they 
e  anded  and  the  give  in  SALT 
a  to  come  from  the  American 
Id.  Did  you  see  any  moderation  of 
W  view,  that  the  Americans  must 
c  le  ones  who  do  all  the  giving? 

.  I  think  it  is  interesting  in  the 
iament  that  was  issued  by  President 
or  hnev  at  the  close,  after  our  meet- 

j  He  indicated  that  both  sides 
a  to  work  together  to  achieve  an 
glement. 

'■.  You  said  that  is  interesting. 
Hi  you  consider  it  significant?  Do 
o  consider  the  Soviets  will  not  be 
K  e  flexible? 

.  I  think  it  is  significant  that  it 
pi  ifically  stated  this  was  something 
li  both  sides  had  to  work  at. 

.  Pardon  my  ignorance,  but  is 
>ident   Brezhnev  coming  to  the 
i  ted  Nations  for  the  disarma- 
ii'.t — for  the  meeting? 

II .  He  didn't  indicate  that  he  was, 
n  the  last  that  I  had  heard  several 
Ijks  ago  is  that  probably  the  delega- 
i*l  would  be  handled  by  the  Foreign 
djister. 

».  You  say  you  don't  know;  you 
»iild  be  guessing.  This  year  for 
>  ^T, though? 


A.  Yes,  it  could  be  this  year. 

Q.  Could  be.  In  other  words,  it 
might  not  be? 

A.  I  am  not  going  to  predict  the 
date. 

Q.  The  President  has  predicted  a 
date  often. 

A.  I  am  not  going  to  predict  today. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  where  you  did 
make  progress  generally? 

A.  I  have  said  very  clearly  in  Mos- 
cow and  I  hav.e  said  since  leaving 
Moscow  that  I  am  not  going  to  go 
into  the  underlying  details.  All  I  am 
going  to  say  is  that  some  progress 
was  made.  Let  me  tell  you  the  reason 
for  it. 

In  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  mark  of  the  seriousness  of 
the  negotiation  is  the  confidentiality 
of  the  negotiations.  If  one  gets  into 
the  detail  in  public  discussion  of  mat- 
ters still  under  negotiation,  it  is  re- 
garded by  them  as  a  propaganda  exer- 
cise rather  than  a  serious  negotiation. 
I  do  not  want  to  do  anything  to 
jeopardize  serious  negotiations  that 
are  going  on  between  us.  Therefore,  I 
am  going  to  stick  to  what  I  have  said, 
which  is  in  general  that  the  talks  were 
useful  and  that  we  made  some 
progress. 

Q.  Would  you  say  that  the  at- 
titude about  public  discussion  is 
somewhat  of  a  shift  in  the  view  of 
this  Administration  from  last  year? 

A.  Yes,  it  certainly  is  insofar  as  I 
was  concerned  in  my  first  trip  to 
Moscow.  I  spoke  frequently  on  the  is- 
sues. A  year  later  I  am  convinced  that 
the  way  we  handled  it  this  time  in 
Moscow  is  the  preferable  way. 

Q.  You  are  saying  in  effect  that 
the  President  can  no  longer  discuss 
foreign  policy  openly  as  he  talked 
about  during  the  campaign? 

A.  I  am  not  saying  that  at  all.  I  am 
saying  in  a  particular  negotiation  like 
the  SALT  negotiation,  that  where  you 
are  dealing  with  very  complicated  and 
technical  matters  on  many  issues,  to 
talk  about  matters  which  are  still 
under  negotiation  is  liable  to  give 
misleading  information,  and  at  the 
same  time  it  also  has  the  problem  that 
I  referred  to  earlier. 

Q.  Does  that  extend  to  no  more 
discussion  of  human  rights  and  the 
Horn  of  Africa? 

A.  Of  course  not. 

Q.  When  do  you  expect  to  hear 


27 

from  the  internal  government  in 
Rhodesia  as  to  whether  they  will  go 
to  a  conference? 

A.  I  would  expect  we  will  proba- 
bly hear  from  them  in  the  next  couple 
of  weeks  would  be  my  guess.  I  don't 
know  for  sure,  but  they  said  they 
were  going  to  take  the  proposals  and 
give  them  serious  consideration.  They 
said  it  would  be — I  think  the  word 
was  irresponsible  not  to  give  them 
serious  consideration,  and  they  would 
be  back  in  touch  with  us.  □ 


'Other  press  releases  relating  to  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  are  Nos.  163  of  Apr.  13;  165  of 
Apr.  14;  166  and  167  of  Apr.  15;  168  and  169 
of  Apr.  16;  179  and  181  of  Apr.  20;  and  184 
of  Apr.  24. 

-"Pressrelease  170  of  Apr.  17,  1978. 

'For  text  of  the  proposals,  see  Bulletin  of 
Oct.  3.  1977,  p.  424. 

"Press  release  171  of  Apr.  17.  1978. 

5Made  following  their  meeting  with  the 
Rhodesian  transitional  government  (press  re- 
lease 174  of  Apr.  17,  1978). 

""Opening  paragraphs  omitted. 

'For  full  text  of  President  Carter's  address 
on  Mar.  17.  1978,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  1978, 
p.  17. 

"Press  release  182  of  Apr.  22.  1978.  (list 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  participants  in  the  meetings 
omitted). 

"Press  release  183  of  Apr.  24.  1978  (ex- 
change of  remarks  with  the  press  omitted). 

'"Press  release  187  of  Apr.  24,  1978. 


Interview)  on 
"Face  the  Nation" 


Secretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
the  CBS  television  and  radio  program 
"Face  the  Nation"  on  April  30  by 
George  Herman,  CBS  News  corre- 
spondent; Marvin  Kalb,  CBS  News 
diplomatic  correspondent;  and  Murrey 
Murder,  Washington  Post  senior  dip- 
lomatic correspondent. 

Q.  President  Carter  said  about 
the  sale  of  airplanes  to  Israel, 
Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia:  "I  look 
upon  them  as  a  package,  and  if 
Congress  should  accept  a  portion 
and  reject  another,  then  my  intent  is 
to  withdraw  the  sales  proposal  al- 
together." I  wonder,  listening  to 
some  Administration  statements 
since,  has  the  President  done  an 
about-face  on  this  as  a  package? 

A.  What  the  President  has  made 


28 

very  clear  is  that  each  one  of  these 
must  be  separate,  put  before  the  Con- 
gress separately,  considered  separately 
by  the  Congress.  That  is  the  law,  and 
that  is  the  way  that  it  will  be  done. 
However,  in  exercising  his  responsibil- 
ity, the  President  must  look  at  the  ac- 
tion taken  on  each  one  of  these  sepa- 
rate actions  before  he  makes  his  ulti- 
mate determination. 

Q.  In  your  first  answer,  you  sort 
of  explained  what  the  President  had 
said.  But  I'm  not  sure  I've  gotten 
the  whole  thing  yet,  because  another 
part  of  the  President's  quotation 
from  the  news  conference  was:  "If 
Congress  should  accept  a  portion 
and  reject  another,  then  my  intent  is 
to  withdraw  the  sales  package  al- 
together." Is  that  still  operative? 

A.  Yes.  He's  got  to  exercise  his 
judgment  as  he  sees  the  action  taken 
on  each  one  of  the  elements  of  this 
package.  These  separate  elements  are 
reinforcing. 

Let  me  say  a  word  by  way  of  back- 
ground on  this.  We  believe  that 
they're  an  important  part  of  the  search 
for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  They're 
important  because  they  fill  the  needs, 
the  requirements  of  each  one  of  these 
countries.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  they 
give  confidence  to  each  one  of  these 
countries  that  we  are  going  to  fulfill 
our  commitments  to  them  and  fill  their 
needs  when  they  have  legitimate 
needs. 

Now,  this  is  important  to  the  peace 
process.  Why  is  it  important  to  the 
peace  process:1  It's  important  not  only 
that  they  should  have  the  elements 
which  they  need  for  their  defense,  but 
it's  also  important  they  they  should 
have  confidence  in  the  United  States. 
If  we  are  going  to  play  an  effective 
role  in  the  peace  process,  then  we 
must  have  the  confidence  of  each  of 
the  parties.  We  are  committed  to  the 
defense  of  Israel,  to  its  security.  This 
is  an  unshakable  commitment. 

Insofar  as  Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia 
are  concerned,  each  of  them  has  an  im- 
portant role  to  play  in  the  peace  proc- 
ess. The  Egyptians  are  an  essential 
element  in  the  discussions  which  arc- 
taking  place.  The  Saudi  Arabians  are  a 
moderate  force,  a  moderate  force  for 
peace.  And,  therefore,  it's  important 
that  all  of  them  have  confidence  in  us 
and  that  we  will  help  them  in  what  they 
need  and  in  their  well-being. 

Q.  This  arms  sales  issue  has  taken 
on  implications  clearly  beyond  the 
normal  factor  of  weaponry.  Can  you 
tell  us  what  in  your  judgment  would 
be  the  damage  done  to  overall  U.S. 
policy  if  some  measure  of  weaponry 


is  not  provided  for  Saudi  Arabia? 

A.  Saudi  Arabia,  as  I  indicated,  is  a 
force  for  moderation  in  the  Middle 
East.  It  is  also  an  extremely  important 
country  in  terms  of  the  part  which  it  is 
playing  in  the  economy  of  the  world. 
Obviously  it  is  one  of  the  leaders  in 
OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries].  And,  thus,  it  is 
a  very  important  country  from  many, 
many  standpoints. 

Saudi  Arabia  is  also  a  long  and 
close  friend  of  the  United  States.  We 
have  made  a  commitment,  starting  in 
1975  and  reaffirmed  in  this  Adminis- 
tration, to  meet  their  needs  in  this  re- 
gard. We  have  carefully  examined 
their  request  for  60  F— 15  aircraft.  We 
have,  after  that  examination,  con- 
cluded that  this  is  a  valid  need  to  meet 
their  defense  requirements.  If  we  were 
now  not  to  go  forward  with  that.  I  think 
we  would  seriously  jeopardize  our  re- 
lationship not  only  with  Saudi  Arabia 
but  with  the  moderate  countries  in  the 
area  as  well. 

Q.  I  just  want  to  not  misun- 
derstand something.  Earlier  on  you 
used  the  term  again  "mutually  rein- 
forcing," which  was  the  language 
that  you  used  at  the  very  beginning 
at  that  news  conference  with  Defense 
Secretary  Brown.  And  then  you  fol- 
lowed that  news  conference  state- 
ment up  by  talking  about  a  package. 
I  know  that  you  are  now  stressing 
the  individual  nature  of  the  consid- 
eration of  Congress,  but  it  is  in  your 
mind — the  Administration — still  a 
package. 

A.  In  the  view  of  the  Administra- 
tion, they  are — each  of  them — self- 
reinforcing.  And  without  each  one  of 
them  being  acted  upon  positively,  I 
think  it's  going  to  produce  a  result 
which  will  be  damaging  to  the  peace 
process  and  damaging  to  our  relation- 
ships with  each  one  of  these  countries. 

Therefore,  I  believe  very  strongly 
that  the  Congress  should  act  positively 
on  each  one  of  those. 

Q.  To  what  extent  has  Adminis- 
tration policy  in  the  Middle  East  be- 
come hostage — you  talked  a  great 
deal  about  Saudi  Arabia  and  its 
importance — become  hostage  really 
to  oil — Saudi  Arabia  being  a  terrific 
and  principal  supplier  of  oil? 

A.  Obviously  oil  is  a  very  impor- 
tant commodity,  not  only  for  the 
United  States  but  for  the  world,  for 
Western  Europe,  for  our  friends  and 
allies  all  over  the  world,  for  the  poor 
nations  as  well  as  the  developed  coun- 
tries. And  no  one  should  try  and  belit- 
tle the  importance  of  oil. 


Department  of  State  Bu-f 

But  that's  not  the  sole  factor.  T 
are  other  factors  involved.  And  the 
factor  here  that  I  see  is  reinforcing 
peace  process.  And  I  stress  that  S 
Arabia,  as  a  moderate,  as  a  supp< 
of  the  search  for  peace  that  is  goin 
now — on  now  between  Israel 
Egypt — is  a  very  important  elem 
And  therefore,  that  must  not  be 
counted.  It  must  be  underlined. 

Q.  Feeling  the  way  you  do  al 
the  importance  of  the  arms  sale 
Egypt  and  to  Saudi  Arabia  as  m  I 
ally  reinforcing  and  so  forth,  w<| 
you  recommend  to  the  Presideni 
withdraw  the  package  in  what<J 
form — this  is  the  question  that  I 
trying  to  get  at — if  one  or  the  ot  | 
Egypt  or  Saudi  Arabia,  is  tur 
down   by   Congress?   Would 
recommend   to  the   Presideni 
withdraw? 

A.  I  think  I've  made  it  very  cj 
that  I  consider  each  one  of  these 
ments  to  be  essential. 

Q.  You've  had  a  series  of  t  | 
with  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  M< 
Dayan,  and  Israeli  Prime  Mini  I 
Menahem  Begin  is  coming  on  Nit 
day.  Have  you  made  any  spei  I 
headway  on  any  issue  in  the  Mi  1 
East,  in  the  Arab-Israeli  confl 
that  gives  you  any  further  re:  I 
for  believing  that  the  impasse  I 
we  have  experienced  on  the  A  I 
Israeli  negotiations  can  be  o  I 
come?  Anything  specific? 

A.  No,  I  cannot  give  you  anyt  I 
specific  coming  out  of  the  discuss  w 
which  I  had  with  Minister  Di  I 
which  gives  me  the  basis  for  sa  iff 
that  there  has  been  a  breakthroi  I 
that  I  see  new  light  at  the  end  of  I 
road.  We  did  have1  a  good  exchi  I 
of  views.  I  think  the  meeting  I 
useful.  I  asked  a  number  of  quest  I 
of  the  Foreign  Minister,  for  who  I 
have  great  respect,  as  you  know.  I 
is  going  to  discuss  those  questil 
with  his  Prime  Minister  and,  I  assuij 
with  other  members  of  the  Cabi  l\ 
And  we  shall  see  what  comes  f  I 
that. 

Let  me  say  I  have  not  given  1 
hope  with  respect  to  the  possibilit;! 
making  peace  in  the  Middle  Has  I 
believe  it  can  be  done,  because  I  I 
lieve  that  it's  in  the  interests  of  all 
the  countries  in  the  area  that  that v 
done.  And,  therefore,  we're  goinjd 
persevere,  and  I  believe  that  they  II 
persevere  as  well. 

Q.  Is  the  Egyptian  Forein 
Minister  coming  here  soon? 

A.  No,  not  at  this  point.  There  I 
no  plans  for  him  to  come. 


ne  1978 

Q.  On  another  related  issue  here, 
iere  are  a  number  of  members  of 
it-  Administration  who  have  been 
loted  as  saying  that  this  Adminis- 
lation  cannot  succeed  in  its  Middle 
tst  policy  unless  the  so-called  Is- 
lel  lobby  is  broken.  To  what  ex- 
nt  does  that  sentiment  govern  the 
|plicy? 

A.  I  don't  like  to  use  words  like 

Irael  lobby  or  anything  like  that.  I 

ink   that   individuals   are  going   to 

|ake  up  their  own  minds  on  this. 

Ihese  are  very  serious,  very  impor- 

ni   issues.    And   those   issues  are 

ping  to  be  weighed  individually  by 

dividual   Americans,  and  they're 

ping  to  make  up  their  own  mind  on 

lese. 

i  Q.  You  went  to  the  Soviet  Union 
ist  week  at  a  time  when  Soviet 
ader  Leonid  Brezhnev  was  se- 
;rely  criticizing  the  United  States 
Ir  vacillation  and  uncertainty  in  its 
uclear  arms  control  policy.  Were 
>u  able  to  convince  him  otherwise? 

A.  I  think  that  words  speak  for 
lemselves.  As  you'll  recall,  after  our 
Iks  President  Brezhnev  indicated 
at  he  believed  that  some  progress 
id  been  made.  He  indicated  further 
at  the  task  of  completing  the  re- 
aining  items  was  a  task  which  lay  in 
e  hands  of  both  of  us,  not  just  in 
e  hands  of  one.  Previously,  he  had 
ferred  to  the  fact  that,  in  effect,  it 
as  up  to  the  United  States  to  move. 
<e  said  after  our  discussions  that  it 
as  up  to  both  of  us  to  see  whether 
e  couldn't  take  the  necessary  steps 
i  close  the  gaps  on  the  remaining  is- 
les. And  I  think  that  speaks  for  itself. 

Q.  Can  you  give  us  any  specifics 
t  all,  about  the  degree  of  move- 
lent  you  made  which  will  enable 

iae  Administration  to  overcome  the 
uite  fierce  opposition  it  has  in 

i  ongress  on  a  SALT  treaty? 

|  A.  You've  touched  a  very  sensitive 
Ibint  with  me.  As  you  know,  I  feel 
I  pry  deeply  that  where  one  is  engaged 
li  sensitive  negotiations  on  a  very 

omplicated  matter  like  the  SALT 
negotiations — that's  the  Strategic 
Brms  Limitation   Talks — that   it   is 

rong  to  talk  publicly  about  the  de- 
liils  of  that  negotiation  while  the 
legotiation  is  ongoing. 
J  Let  me  further  say  that  insofar  as 
lie  Soviets  are  concerned,  they  con- 

ider  it  a  mark  of  seriousness  if  you 
;eep  the  talks  confidential  while  they 

re  still  in  the  discussion  stage.  And 
|f  it  immediately  becomes  public  and 
pu  go  into  the  details,  they  regard 
mat  as  a  propaganda  exercise.   So 


that's  another  factor  I  think  one  has 
to  take  into  consideration. 

Q.  I  recognize  the  problem  that 
the  Administration  has.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Carter  Administration  did 
take  office  pledging  a  considerable 
degree  of  openness.  And  frankly, 
from  your  own  standpoint,  from 
your  own  ability  to  develop  a  con- 
sensus to  support  your  policy,  how 
does  the  Administration  intend, 
while  this  process  is  underway,  to 
marshal!  the  consensus  that  is 
necessary  to  overcome  the  very 
strong  opposition  of  those  who  are 
opposed  to  any  SALT  treaty? 

A.  It's  a  very  good  question,  and 
let  me  answer  it.  I  think  we're  going 
to  have  to  talk  in  general  terms.  I 
think  we're  going  to  talk  about  what 
our  objectives  are  in  SALT.  What  are 
they?  First,  we  want  an  agreement 
which  is  a  sound  agreement.  We  feel 
under  no  time  deadline.  We  will 
negotiate  until  we  have  a  sound 
agreement. 

What  do  I  mean  by  a  sound  agree- 
ment? I  mean  one  which  will  maintain 
or  enhance  our  security  and  that  of 
our  allies  as  well. 

Now  I  think  that  if  we  can  get  such 
an  agreement,  then  obviously  we  will 
take  an  action  in  our  national  interest. 
And  I  think  when  the  time  comes 
when  we  have  completed  our  negotia- 
tions, then  we  can  lay  out  very 
clearly  all  the  elements  and  show  how 
these  do  enhance  not  only  our  secu- 
rity but  those  of  our  allies. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  as  a  result 
of  your  trip  to  Moscow  and  the 
forthcoming  talks  that  you  will  have 
in  May  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  in  New  York  that  a  sum- 
mit meeting  between  Presidents 
Brezhnev  and  Carter  is  now  likely? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  use  the  word 
"likely.  "  I  think  it's  possible. 

Q.  When? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  make  any 
guesses  on  that. 

Q.  Are  you  looking  toward  some- 
thing this  summer,  which  seems  to 
be  what  one  hears  in  the  State  De- 
partment? 

A.  I  think  it  would  be  unwise  for 
me  to  speculate  or  guess  on  some- 
thing like  that. 

Q.  Is  a  summit  meeting  impor- 
tant or  even  critical  at  this  point 
in  resolving  the  differences  that 
remain? 

A.  I  think,  first,  we've  got  to  see 
if  we  can't  resolve  the  remaining  dif- 


29 

ferences  in  the  Geneva  talks — that's 
between  our  two  delegations  there — 
or  between  the  Foreign  Minister  and 
myself  and  then  see  whether  anything 
remains  which  has  to  be  resolved  at  a 
summit. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  a  question 
which  may  sound  like  a  change  of 
subject  but  actually  isn't.  Is  there 
going  to  be  Sino-Soviet,  Chinese 
and  Russian  talks?  Is  there  going  to 
be  a  series  of  moves  toward  a  rap- 
prochement between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  China? 

A.  They  are  having  discussions,  I 
believe,  on  the  questions  relating  to 
the  border  disputes  on  the  Amur 
River. 

My  own  analysis  is  that  at  this  time 
that  the  relationships  between  the  two 
will  remain  about  the  same  as  they 
are  at  the  present  time.  Those  are  cor- 
rect relationships.  However,  they  are 
not  warm  relationships,  to  say  the 
least.  And  I  would  anticipate  that 
they  would  continue  at  about  that 
level  and  tone. 

Q.  President  Carter  had  said  a 
few  weeks  before  you  went  to  Mos- 
cow that  the  projection  of  Soviet 
power  into  Africa  was  a  very  omi- 
nous trend.  Your  predecessor,  Henry 
Kissinger,  said  recently:  "Another 
move  of  the  kind  we  have  seen  in 
Angola  and  Ethiopia  will  raise  the 
presumption  that  we  are  facing  a 
global  geopolitical  challenge  incom- 
patible with  any  definition  of  de- 
tente." Do  you  agree  with  that? 

A.  Let  me  say  a  word  first  about 
detente.  I  think  clearly  detente  is  a 
two-way  street.  It's  a  street  on  which 
there  must  be  a  recognition  of 
the  concerns  of  the  other  party  and 
action  that  is  consonant  with  such  a 
recognition. 

Having  said  that,  let  me  say  again, 
as  the  President  has  and  I  have,  that 
we  do  view  with  concern  the  actions 
of  outside  or  external  forces  within 
the  continent  of  Africa.  We  support 
very  strongly  one  of  the  fundamental 
tenets  of  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity,  which  is  that  African  problems 
should  be  solved  by  African  countries 
and  not  by  outside  interference — 

Q.  Was  your  concern  allayed  in 
any  way  as  a  result  of  your  talks  in 
Moscow? 

A.  All  I  can  say  on  that  is  that  we 
had  a  full  discussion.  They  clearly 
understand  our  views  on  this  issue. 
So  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
there  is  a  clear  understanding  of  how 
importantly  we  view  this  issue. 


30 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  even  if  you 
got  a  SALT  agreement  with  the 
Russians  that  you  could  get  it 
through  Congress  this  year? 

A.  I  believe  that  when  we  get  a 
SALT  agreement  we  will  be  able  to 
get  it  through  Congress,  because  I 
think  that  when  we  can  lay  out  all  of 
the  details  of  a  SALT  agreement,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  will  see 
that  it's  in  our  national  interest  to 
ratify  and  approve  that. 

As  to  when  the  Congress  will  act 
on  a  SALT  agreement,  first  it  de- 
pends on  when  the  agreement  is 
negotiated  and  signed.  And  as  I  said 
before,  I  can't  tell  you  when  that's 
going  to  be.  We  feel  under  no  spe- 
cific time  pressure  insofar  as  that's 
concerned.  What  we  want  is  a  good 
agreement,  and  I  assume  the  Soviets 
want  the  same  thing. 

It  will  then,  when  signed,  go  to  the 
Congress,  and  the  Congress  will  have 
to  determine  within  the  calendar 
which  it  has  how  soon  it  can  get  to 
that.  So  I  just  would  be  speculating  if 
I  tried  to  indicate  when  that  will  hap- 
pen. 

Q.  Is  the  Administration  now 
building  toward  normalization  with 
China?  And  I  ask  you  this  in  con- 
nection with  Mr.  Brzezinski's  [As- 
sistant to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski]  forthcoming  visit. 
There's  speculation  that  what  you 
are  seeking  to  do  is  to  normalize 
not  this  year,  because  Congress 
may  not  be  able  to  handle  it,  but 
perhaps  next  year. 

A.  Our  goal — and  it's  been  our 
goal  from  the  start  of  the  Carter 
Administration — is  to  normalize  rela- 
tionships with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  within  the  framework  of  the 
Shanghai  communique,  which  was  is- 
sued during  the  Nixon  Administra- 
tion. As  to  the  time  and  methods  in- 
volved in  bringing  about  normaliza- 
tion, that  is  something  which  we  are 
still  studying  and  considering. 

Now  let  me  just  answer,  please,  if  I 
might,  the  second  part  of  the  question, 
namely  Zbig  Brzezinski's  trip  to 
China.  This  is  an  important,  continu- 
ing step  in  our  dialogue  with  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  on  global 
issues.  China  is  one  of  the  major 
powers  in  the  world.  It  has  900  mil- 
lion people.  It  is  playing  an  increas- 
ing role  in  the  world  and  in  world 
councils.  And  it's  very  important  that 


we  keep  in  touch  with  them  to  discuss 
global  issues. 

Zbig  is  not  going  to  negotiate  any- 
thing about  normalization.  It  is  part 
of  this  continuing  global  exchange 
with  them. 

Q.  It  is  reported,  at  any  rate, 
that  you  opposed  the  timing  of  Mr. 
Brzezinski's  visit,  perhaps  even  the 
idea  iteslf.  Is  that  correct? 

A.  I'm  glad  you  asked  me  that 
question.  I  recommended  the  trip.  I  ap- 
prove it.  I  think  the  timing  fits  very 
well.  And  I  wholeheartedly  endorse  it. 

Q.  Would  you  consider  it  a  per- 
sonal defeat  for  the  Carter  Adminis- 
tration if,  at  the  end  of  its  4  years  in 
office,  it  has  not  succeeded  in  nor- 
malizing relations  with  China? 

A.  Normalization  of  relations  with 
China  is  one  of  the  fundamental  goals. 
I  would  hope  that  during  the  first  term 
we  would  be  able  to  normalize  rela- 
tions. But  let  me,  in  saying  that,  make 
one  further  point.  We  consider  to  be 
of  great  importance  the  security  and 
well-being  of  the  people  of  Taiwan. 
And  that  is  something  that  everybody 
should  have  very  clearly  in  their 
minds. 

Q.  In  connection  with  both  your 
visit  to  Moscow  and  Mr.  Brzezin- 
ski's forthcoming  visit  to  China, 
there  have  been  at  least  editorial 
suggestions  saying — portraying  a  vi- 
sion of  the  world  being  somewhat 
confused  by  an  Administration 
speaking  with  too  many  spokesmen 
and  perhaps  expressing  too  many 
differences  in  policy.  Is  this  a  prac- 
tice, now  that  the  President  has  con- 
cluded that  famous  Camp  David 
weekend  meeting,  that  is  going  to 
stop? 

A.  I  think  it's  important  that  we  do 
speak  with  clarity  and  with  a  voice 
that  is  recognized  as  representing  the 
views  of  the  country  so  that  people 
can  be  certain  that  when  they  hear 
something  being  said  on  one  of  the 
fundamental  issues  of  foreign  policy 
that  this  is  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
country.  I  think  we're  making  progress 
in  doing  this.  And  although  I  wasn't  at 
Camp  David,  I'm  sure  that  this  is 
probably  one  of  the  questions  which 
was  discussed  and  stressed. 

Q.  Were  you  disappointed  and  do 
you  now  have  any  real  hopes  what- 
soever that  a  black  on  black  civil 
war  can  be  avoided  in  Rhodesia? 
And  if  you  have  any,  could  you 


Department  of  State  Bullet(| 
please  tell  us  what  those  hopes  are? 

A.  I  think  there's  a  possibility  th 
it  can  be  averted.  But  I  think  in  ordi 
to  avert  it,  what  must  be  done  is  i| 
bring  the  parties  together. 

Who  are  the  parties  at  this  poin 
There's  the  patriotic  front  on  the  oi 
hand  and  the  Rhodesian  front  goven! 
ment  on  the  other.  Unless  these  tw 
groups  can  be  brought  together  to  n 
solve  the  remaining  differences,  then 
think  the  chance  of  a  civil  war — a  civ 
war  that  might  be  expanded  by  th 
presence  of  external  forces — is  grea 
This  would  be  a  tragedy  for  Rhodes 
and  for  all  the  countries  surroundir, 
Rhodesia. 


Q.  But  you  made  your  trip  wit 
the  hopes  that  you  could  make  soir 
progress  in  this  and  also  that  yo 
could  make  some  considerable  pro; 
ress  on  Namibia,  the  independent  j| 
for  what  is  otherwise  called   Soutl 
West  Africa.   I  recognize  that  th 
South  African  Government  whic 
rules  South  West   Africa  has  ad| 
cepted  the  Western  plan. 

A.  And  we're  very  pleased  to  s& 
that. 

Q.  But  Sam  Nujoma,  the  Pres 
dent  of  SWAPO  [South  West  Afrit 
People's  Organization],  has  not.  E 
you  regard  that  as  an  extricab 

situation? 

A.  Yes,  I  do.  I  think  it  is.  I  thir 
we  made  real  progress  on  the  Nam 
bian  situation.  We're  going  to  con 
tinue  to  work  on  that.  I  have  not  I 
any  means  given  up  hope  th<< 
SWAPO  will  agree  to  go  along  wit 
the  proposals  of  the  five  Wester 
powers.  I  think  those  proposals  an 
sound.  We  have  the  support  basicall 
of  the  front-line  states.  And  I  believ 
that  we  can  make  progress  there. 

Q.  What  is  your  present  state  c 
concern  about  the  probability  of  us 
of  Cuban  troops — large  numbers  c 
Cuban  troops — in  the  Ethiopia 
province  of  Eritrea  where  a  secej 
sionist  war  of  liberation  is  under 
way? 

A.  It  remains  to  be  seen  what  i 
going  to  happen  there.  So  far  they  d' 
not  appear  to  be  participating  in  th 
actual  conflict  that  is  going  on  there 
although  there  are  many  of  them  ii 
the  area.  This  is  a  problem  tha 
should  be  solved  by  the  Eritreans  am 
the  Ethiopians.  C 


Press  release  196  of  May  I,  1978. 


liie  1978 


31 


ARMS  CONTROL:        l/JV.  Special  Session 
on  Disarmament  Convenes 


Representatives  from  149 
mtries-each  member  of  the  United 
tions—met  in  New  York  for  the 
N.  General  Assembly  Special  Ses- 
n  on  Disarmament   May  23-June 

1978.  The  special  session  was 
ivened  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
wrtance  of  making  progress  in  the 
d  of  arms  control  and  to  provide 
oetus  for  future  arms  control 
>otiations .  Ambassador  Andrew 
mg,    U.S.  Permanent  Representa- 

to  the  United  Nations,  headed  the 
?.  delegation  to  the  special  session, 
ollowing  is  the  U.S.  address  to  the 
cial  session  delivered  by  Vice  Pres- 
nt  Mondale  on  May  24. 

am  honored  to  represent  the  Presi- 
•  t  of  the  United  States  at  this  Spe- 
'  Session  on  Disarmament  of  the 
-I.  General  Assembly.  The  nations 
he  world  are  gathered  here  today  to 
sue  the  most  vital  and  solemn  obli- 
on  of  the  U.N.  Charter — "to  save 
ceeding  generations  from  the 
tfurge  of  war." 
Ve  meet  today  at  the  initiative  of 

■  nonaligned  states.  These  nations, 
:nprising  the  bulk  of  the  world's 
pi  pie.  are  particularly  aware  of  the 
iolessness  and  hopelessness  spawned 
to  the  arms  race.  I  salute  them  for 
filing  us  together  to  confront  this 
ri  llenge. 

vnd  we  applaud,  as  well,  the  dedi- 
n  on  and  contribution  of  the  many 
hi  governmental  organizations  repre- 
ssed here.  The  arms  race  touches  the 
is  of  every  man,  woman,  and  child 
ir:he  world.  The  control  of  arms  is 
I  crucial  to  leave  to  a  few  govern- 

■  nts  or  even  all  governments 
i;ne.  You  are  our  conscience  and 
in  miration. 

'••Ay  beloved  friend,  Hubert  Hum- 
pi  ey,  was  one  of  the  earliest  voices 
ening  for  arms  control  and  disarma- 
tsnt.  He  spoke  of  the  challenge  we 
Uz  today.  He  said: 

a  urs  is  a  new  era.  one  which  calls  for  a  new 
$)\  of  courage.  For  the  first  time  in  the  his- 
tli  of  mankind,  one  generation  literally  has 
A  power  to  destroy  the  past,  the  present,  and 
1i  future;  the  power  to  bring  time  to  an  end. 

\nd  if  we  do  not  curb  the  arms 
Be,  we  not  only  threaten  the  future, 
V)  impoverish  the  present. 

■Vhile  the  people  of  the  world  cry 
f':  food  and  shelter,  for  medicine  and 
eication,  the  vast  resources  of  our 


planet  are  being  devoted  more  and 
more  to  the  means  of  destroying,  in- 
stead of  enriching,  human  life.  The 
global  cost  of  arms  has  reached  $400 
billion  a  year.  The  world  is  spending 
almost  $1  million  a  minute  for 
weapons.  Over  20  million  men  and 
women  are  in  military  service  around 
the  world. 

No  world  leader,  no  parent,  and  no 
individual  on  this  Earth  can  live  se- 
curely in  the  shadow  of  the  growing 
world  arsenal.  But  in  the  face  of  that 
mounting  danger,  this  conference  is  a 
symbol  of  hope.  This  Special  Session 
on  Disarmament  of  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  offers  hope  of  greater  prog- 
ress toward  disarmament  and  a  world 
in  which  the  threat  of  war  is  vastly 
diminished  and  the  security  of  each 
nation  more  fully  insured. 

U.S.  Commitment 

The  United  States  attaches  major 
importance  to  the  work  of  this  confer- 
ence. Last  October,  President  Carter 
made  a  special  trip  to  the  United  Na- 
tions to  emphasize  America's  strong 
commitment  to  arms  control  and  dis- 
armament.1 He  stressed  our  willing- 
ness to  work  toward  a  world  truly  free 
of  nuclear  weapons.  He  pledged  our 
total  commitment  to  reversing  the 
buildup  of  armaments  and  reducing 
their  trade. 

Since  that  time,  the  United  States 
has  been  engaged  in  the  broadest  set 
of  arms  control  negotiations  in  our  his- 
tory. Together  with  our  negotiating 
partners,  the  United  States  has  de- 


Vice  President  Mondale  addressing  the  U.N. 
Special  Session  on  Disarmament. 


veloped  an  agenda  more  extensive  than 
any  nation  has  ever  attempted.  We  are 
taking  concrete  actions  in  10  different 
areas — from  nuclear  weapons  accords, 
to  regional  restraint,  to  limits  on  con- 
ventional and  unconventional  arms 
such  as  antisatellite  and  radiological 
weapons.  Before  too  long,  the  United 
States  expects  to  take  part  in  two  his- 
toric achievements. 

•  For  the  first  time  since  the  dawn 
of  the  atomic  era,  we  will  reach  an 
agreement  to  reduce  the  combined 
total  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons  de- 
livery vehicles  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States. 

•  After  two  decades  of  negotiations, 
we  will  produce  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  controlling  nuclear  explosions  by 
the  United  States,  the  United  King- 
dom, and  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  United  States  welcomes  this 
opportunity  to  review  what  is  being 
accomplished,  to  chart  our  course  for 
the  years  ahead,  and  to  rededicate  our- 
selves to  further  success. 

Assuring  Security  Needs 

We  are  here  to  listen  to  the  voices 
of  other  nations,  as  well  as  to  raise 
our  own  in  behalf  of  arms  control  and 
disarmament.  For  this  session  is  a  part 
of  a  process  in  which  all  of  us  must 
work  together,  in  a  spirit  of  openness 
and  mutual  respect.  As  President  Ken- 
nedy once  said:  "Genuine  peace  must 
be  the  product  of  many  nations,  the 
sum  of  many  acts." 

To  avoid  a  world  a  decade  hence  in 
which  three-quarters  of  a  trillion  dol- 
lars is  spent  on  arms,  in  which  there 
are  more  nuclear-weapons  states,  we 
must  have  a  program  that  is  visionary 
in  concept  and  realistic  in  action. 

Realism  requires  that  we  face 
squarely  the  central  issue  of  the  arms 
race — the  concern  of  each  nation  and 
government  for  the  security  of  its 
people.  If  the  arms  race  were  driven 
by  madmen,  there  would  be  no  hope. 
Controls  would  be  beyond  the  reach  of 
rational  discourse.  Irrational  forces  no 
doubt  play  a  part,  but  the  arms  race  is 
driven  by  other  considerations  as 
well — technology,  international  ten- 
sions, legitimate  security  concerns. 

The  prudent  policy  of  any  nation 
must  include  both  sufficient  military 
preparedness  and  arms  control 
efforts — if  its  security  is  to  be  assured. 


32 

In  the  short  run,  no  nation  can  be 
asked  to  reduce  its  defenses  to  levels 
below  the  threats  it  faces.  But  without 
arms  control  among  nations,  in  the 
long  run  weapon  will  be  piled  on 
weapon  with  a  loss  in  security  for  all. 

These  meeetings  at  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  NATO  summit  next  week 
in  Washington  [May  30-31]  dramatize 
the  determination  of  the  United  States 
to  take  every  step  possible  toward 
greater  arms  control  while  at  the  same 
time  assuring  essential  security  needs. 

Today,  our  defense  budget  is  no 
larger  in  real  terms  than  in  the  late 
1950's  and  less  than  it  was  a  decade 
ago.  But  other  nations  have  increased 
their  military  budgets  in  real  terms  by 
more  than  one-third  over  the  past 
decade. 

We  and  our  NATO  allies  are  strong, 
and  we  will  remain  strong  to  provide 
for  the  defense  of  our  peoples.  But  we 
face  a  continuing  buildup  of  unpre- 
cedented proportions  in  Europe.  The 
Warsaw  Pact  has  developed  an  almost 
three  to  one  advantage  in  tanks.  The 
SS-20  nuclear  missile  now  being  de- 
ployed against  Western  Europe  is  a 
new  departure  in  destructive  power 
and  represents  a  substantial  increase  in 
the  nuclear  threat  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  NATO  summit  meeting  next 
week  in  Washington  will  recommit  the 
Western  democracies  to  a  military  pos- 
ture capable  of  deterring  and  defend- 
ing against  attacks.  We  will  remain 
prepared  to  resist  attack  across  the 
spectrum  of  conventional,  tactical  nu- 
clear, and  strategic  forces.  In  the  face 
of  the  continuing  buildup  of  Warsaw 
Pact  forces,  we  will  moderately  in- 
crease the  defense  budgets  of  our  na- 
tions. We  do  so  not  from  preference 
but  necessity. 

At  the  same  time,  the  NATO  sum- 
mit will  reaffirm  and  re-emphasize  the 
commitment  of  the  West  to  the  other 
dimension  of  our  common  security 
policy — the  pursuit  of  arms  control. 
We  will  address  the  arms  control  ini- 
tiatives the  West  has  recently  taken 
and  will  continue  to  take.  We  will 
offer  our  continued  strong  support  for 
the  success  of  the  special  session. 

In  his  Day  of  Peace  message  this 
January.  His  Holiness.  Pope  Paul,  in 
effect,  spoke  of  the  work  of  this  spe- 
cial session.  He  said: 

.  .  .  ihe  conscience  of  the  world  is  horrified 
by  the  hypothesis  that  our  peace  is  nothing  but 
a  truce  and  that  an  uncontrollable  conflagra- 
tion can  be  suddenly  unleashed 

We  would  like  to  be  able  to  dispel  this 
threatening  and  terrible  nightmare  by  pro- 
claiming at  the  top  of  our  voice  the  absurdity 
of  modern  war  and  the  absolute  necessity  of 
peace — peace   not   founded   on   the   power  of 


arms  that  today  are  endowed  with  an  infernal 
destructive  capacity  .  .  .  nor  founded  on  the 
structural  violence  of  some  political  regimes, 
but  founded  on  the  patient,  rational  and  loyal 
method  of  justice  and  freedom,  such  as  the 
great  international  institutions  of  today  are 
promoting  and  defending. 

Program  of  Action 

Today,  I  want  to  speak  to  that  mes- 
sage. I  want  to  set  forth  bold  objec- 
tives and  realistic  steps — a  vision  that 
should  guide  our  arms  control  efforts, 
and  that  can  help  us  develop  the  cen- 
terpiece of  our  work  over  the  next  few 
weeks — the  program  of  action. 

First,  we  should  substantially  cut 
the  number  of  strategic  nuclear 
arms  and  place  increasingly  strin- 
gent qualitative  limitations  on  their 
further  development. 


This  Special  Session  .  .  .  offers 
hope  of  greater  progress  toward 
disarmament  and  a  world  in 
which  the  threat  of  war  is  vastly 
diminished  and  the  security  of 
each  nation  more  fully  insured. 


The  United  States  recognizes  that  it 
bears,  together  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  other  nuclear-weapons  powers,  a 
very  special  responsibility.  The  SALT 
II  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
agreement  which  is  rapidly  taking 
shape  will: 

•  Reduce  the  number  of  strategic 
delivery  vehicles  now  in  existence  and 
put  a  ceiling  on  the  remainder; 

•  Establish  sublimits  on  those  sys- 
tems which  are  most  threatening  and 
destabilizing;  and 

•  Impose  restraints  on  the  improve- 
ment of  existing  weapons  and  the  de- 
velopment of  new  and  more  sophisti- 
cated systems. 

Equally  important,  the  SALT  II 
agreement  must  and  will  be  adequately 
verifiable.  Neither  side  can  be  per- 
mitted to  emerge  suddenly  superior 
through  undetected  cheating,  thus  up- 
setting the  strategic  balance  upon 
which  deterrence  of  nuclear  war 
depends. 

Successful  SALT  negotiations  will 
make  a  major  contribution  to  peace. 
SALT  II  serves  all  nations'  interests. 
It  deserves  universal  support.  But 
SALT  II  is  only  a  step  in  a  very  dif- 
ficult long-term  process.  We  hope  soon 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

to  begin  SALT  III.  The  United  Sta 
is  committed — and  I  emphasize  tl 
point — to  a  further  substantial  redt 
tion  in  nuclear  weapons  and  to  si 
stricter  limitations  on  modernizati 
and  new  types  of  delivery  vehicles. 

A  commitment  by  others  will  al 
be  required  if  SALT,  and  other  negc 
ations.  are  to  succeed. 

Yet,  Soviet  theater  nuclear  fore 
have  increased.  The  most  significi 
development  has  been  the  deploymt 
of  the  SS-20 — a  new,  mobi 
intermediate-range  ballistic  missi 
Each  one  of  these  missiles,  which  m 
number  in  the  hundreds  when  deplc 
ment  is  complete,  carries  three  nucli 
warheads,  each  with  an  estimat 
yield  of  500  kilotons.  This  high  yie 
coupled  with  the  SS-20's  accural 
has  significantly  increased  the  Sovie 
military  capability  against  both  mi 
tary  and  civilian  targets.  But  the  hi 
yield  also  means  that  damage  to  ini 
cent  civilians  would  be  extensive,  w. 
effects  extending  12  kilometers  fr< 
an  explosion. 

The  SS-20  missile,  while  not  targ 
ted  at  the  United  States,  is  capable 
striking  targets  not  only  in  Wests 
Europe  but  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  t 
Middle  East.  Its  deployment  runs 
tally  contrary  to  all  that  this  spec 
session  seeks  to  achieve.  What  c 
justify  this  escalation  in  nuclear  arm 

Second  on  our  agenda,  the 
should  be  an  end  to  explosions 
nuclear  devices. 

Soon  after  his  inauguration.  Pre 
dent  Carter  announced  his  intention 
proceed  quickly  and  aggressively  w 
a  comprehensive  test  ban  treat 
eliminating  the  testing  of  all  nucli 
devices  whether  for  peaceful  or  mi 
tary  purposes.  Subsequently,  t 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdo 
and  the  Soviet  Union  entered  ir. 
trilateral  negotiations  aimed  at  i 
complishing  this  historic  objective, 
successful,  this  will  represent  t 
culmination  of  a  process  which  beg 
in  the  late  1950's.  It  will  build  on  t 
interim  results  of  the  Limited  T< 
Ban  Treaty  of  1963  and  the  U.S 
U.S.S.R.  Threshold  Test  Ban  a 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treati 
signed  in  1974  and  1976. 

A  comprehensive  test  ban  wou 
make  a  major  contribution  to  curbi 
the  nuclear  competition  between  t 
superpowers.  It  would  lessen  ince 
tives  for  the  development  of  nucle 
weapons  by  states  which  do  not  nc 
possess  them  and  thus  re-enforce  t) 
Nonproliferation  Treaty. 

Trilateral  negotiations  are  unde 
way  in  Geneva.  Important  progre 
toward  an  adequately   verifiab 


1978 


33 


Agreement  has  been  made.  Once 
■greement  is  reached,  we  will  move 
vigorously  to  seek  a  multilateral  com- 
prehensive test  ban  treaty  accepted  by 
nil  states.    All   nations  must  be  per- 

uaded  to  foreswear  testing.  The  con- 
tinued explosion  of  nuclear  devices 
■Has  been  the  major  symbol  of  man's 

unwillingness  to  put  aside  the  further 
jievelopment  of  the  world's  most  dev- 
astating weapons.  It  can,  must,  and 
will  be  stopped. 

Third,  as  we  limit  and  reduce  the 
veapons  of  existing  nuclear  states, 
live  must  work  in  concert  to  insure 
hat  no  additional  nuclear-weapons 
tates  emerge  over  the  next  decade 
md  beyond. 
The  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  to 
In  ever-increasing  number  of  coun- 
tries and  regions  is  a  chilling  pros- 
l>ect.  It  brings  ever  closer  the  proba- 
bility of  their  use.  Such  proliferation 
Ivould  seriously  heighten  regional  and 
I:lobal    tensions.    It   would    impede 
flieaceful  commerce  in  the  field  of  nu- 
Ilear  energy.  And  it  would  make  the 
■  chievement  of  nuclear  disarmament 
lastly  more  difficult. 

The  United  States  understands  the 
I'oncerns  of  some  non-nuclear- 
Jveapons  states  that  they  are  being 
jiiscriminated  against.  To  help  meet 
Ihese  concerns  and  to  prevent  the  pro- 
iferation  of  nuclear  weapons: 

•  I  reiterate  today  the  solemn  dec- 
laration which  President  Carter  made 
j'rom  this  podium  in  1977.  The  United 
■States  will  not  use  nuclear  weapons 
J-xcept  in  self  defense — that  is,  in  cir- 
cumstances of  an  actual  nuclear  or 
Conventional  attack  on  the  United 
Ktates,  our  territories,  or  armed 
rorces,  or  such  an  attack  on  our  al- 
lies. I  call  on  other  nations  to  make 
I  his  pledge; 

•  The  President  will  propose  new 
lind  expanded  contributions  by  the 
■United  States  to  the  peaceful  nuclear 
programs  of  states  which  support 

rionproliferation; 

•  As  President  Eisenhower  said  as 
long  ago  as  1956,  we  must  ultimately 
work  out,  with  other  nations,  suita- 
ble, verifiable,  and  safeguarded  ar- 
rangements so  that  the  future  produc- 
tion of  fissionable  materials  anywhere 

lin  the  world  would  no  longer  be  used 
ho  increase  the  stockpiles  of  explosive 
(weapons;  and 

•  We  will  pursue  the  International 
JNuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  to 
(explore  further  how  to  insure  the 

benefits  of  nuclear  energy  to  all  with- 
out its  proliferation  risks. 

We  must  redouble  our  efforts  to  in- 
jcrease  still  further  the  distance  be- 


tween the  military  and  peaceful  uses 
of  nuclear  energy.  Nuclear  power  sta- 
tions should  produce  energy  for 
people — not  plutonium  for  bombs. 

Let  us  learn  from  the  example  set 
by  Latin  America.  Let  us  expand  the 
regions  of  the  Earth  where  nuclear 
weapons  will  be  banned.  At  the  initia- 
tive of  several  Latin  American  na- 
tions, the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  which 
bans  nuclear  weapons  from  the  area, 
was  signed  in  Mexico  City  in  1967. 
Since  then,  almost  all  potential  par- 
ties to  the  treaty,  including  the  United 
States,  have  signed.  The  United 
States  congratulates  the  Soviet  Union 
for  its  recent  signing  of  Protocol  II  of 
the  treaty.  There  is  now  only  one 
country  in  this  region  which  has  yet 
to  indicate  its  interest  in  signing 
[Cuba].  That  should  be  remedied 
now. 

It  is  our  hope  that  the  treaty  will 
come  fully  into  force  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, thereby  creating  the  first  major 
nuclear-weapons-free  zone  in  the 


The  prudent  policy  of  any  tuition 
must  include  both  sufficient  mili- 
tary preparedness  and  arms  con- 
trol efforts  .... 


world.  We  hope  that  Latin  America's 
bold  initiative  will  be  a  model  for 
other  regions  to  follow. 

Fourth,  as  we  move  to  gain  con- 
trol over  the  nuclear  threat,  we 
must  seek  mutual  agreement  to  ban 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 

The  horror  of  gas  warfare  during 
World  War  I  is  etched  in  the  memory 
of  mankind.  We  have  made  some 
progress  in  recent  years  by  prohibit- 
ing biological  weapons.  The  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  are  mov- 
ing closer  to  an  agreement  on  banning 
radiological  weapons,  which  we 
would  then  put  before  the  Conference 
of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament 
(CCD).  Our  discussions  on  chemical 
weapons  are  proving  more  difficult. 
Any  agreement  on  chemical  or  new 
and  exotic  weapons  must  be 
adequately  verifiable.  The  United 
States  is  committed  to  finding  a  solu- 
tion, assuming  there  is  a  fair-minded 
approach  on  the  other  side. 

Fifth,  we  must  immediately  slow 
down  and  then  reverse  the  sharp 
growth  in  conventional  arms. 

The  vast  bulk  of  the  $400  billion 
spent  for  military  purposes  in  1976 
was  spent  on  conventional  weapons. 
We  recognize  the  legitimate  concern 


of  nations  that  they  not  be  denied  ar- 
bitrarily access  to  arms  needed  for 
their  legitimate  defense.  Such  needs 
must  and  will  be  met.  At  the  same 
time,  our  common  interests  demand  a 
vast  reduction  in  the  flow  of  conven- 
tional arms. 

Fresh  thought  is  required  to  come 
to  grips  with  this  neglected,  increas- 
ingly important  dimension  of  arms 
control.  But  we  can  and  we  must  take 
action  now.  Fueling  the  conventional 
arms  race  is  the  rapidly  expanding  in- 
ternational trade  in  these  arms.  The 
value  of  arms  imports  by  the  develop- 
ing nations  has  increased  75%  from 
1967  to  1976.  A  limited,  but  grow- 
ing, number  of  suppliers  and  recip- 
ients accounts  for  most  of  this  $20 
billion  trade. 

The  United  States  has  on  its  own 
initiative  begun  to  reduce  the  volume 
of  the  arms  it  sells.  Under  President 
Carter's  conventional  arms  policy: 

•  We  have  placed  a  ceiling — a  re- 
duction of  8%  in  FY  1978— on 
weapons  and  weapons-related  items  to 
countries  other  than  NATO,  Austra- 
lia, New  Zealand,  and  Japan; 

•  The  United  States  will  not  be  the 
first  to  introduce  into  a  region  a 
newly  developed  advanced  weapons 
system  which  would  create  a  new 
or  significantly  higher  combat 
capability; 

•  We  will  not  sell  any  such 
weapons  systems  until  they  are  opera- 
tionally deployed  with  U.S.  forces; 

•  We  will  not  permit  development 
or  modification  of  advanced  systems 
solely  for  export;  and 

•  We  have  placed  strict  controls  on 
coproduction  and  retransfers. 

Recognizing  that  this  problem  re- 
quires action  by  all  suppliers,  we 
have  initiated  discussions  with  other 
major  suppliers  and  consumers.  The 
results  have  so  far  been  modest. 
Much  more  needs  to  be  done.  It  will 
be  increasingly  difficult  for  us  to  sus- 
tain our  policy  unilaterally  unless 
there  is  more  rapid  movement  toward 
a  meaningful  multilateral  effort  at 
restraint. 

Sixth,  regional  arms  control  ar- 
rangements and  capabilities  should 
be  expanded  and  strengthened. 

Regional  arms  control  is  at  a  very 
primitive  stage.  Few  negotiations  are 
underway.  Only  a  few  nations  have 
the  technical  competence  required  to 
verify  agreements.  Many  of  the  tech- 
niques, like  confidence-building 
measures  which  increase  predictabil- 
ity and  lessen  the  fear  of  sudden  at- 
tack, are  largely  untried. 

For  our  part,  in  Europe,  the  United 


34 

States  and  our  allies  have  recently 
taken  an  initiative  to  get  the  5-year- 
old  MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions]  talks  moving.  And 
we  are  considering  additional  meas- 
ures to  increase  stability  and  security 
in  central  Europe.  In  still  another  re- 
gion, while  we  have  proposed  and 
commenced  talks  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  arms  limitations  in  the  In- 
dian Ocean,  increases  in  the  Soviet 
naval  presence  there  have  hampered 
those  talks. 

Beyond  our  own  negotiations,  the 
United  States  would  like  to  stimulate 
regional  arms  control  efforts  by  offer- 
ing others  assistance  with  verification 
and  stabilizing  measures. 

•  Our  experience  in  the  Middle 
East  has  demonstrated  that  technical 
assistance  with  monitoring  systems, 
such  as  aerial  photography  and 
ground  detection  devices,  can  help 
create  the  confidence  necessary  to 
make  disengagement  and  stabilizing 
agreements  work. 

•  Building  on  that  experience,  we 
are  prepared  to  consider  joint  requests 
for  these  "eyes  and  ears  of  peace" 
from  countries  that  want  such 
monitoring  services.  Such  requests 
should  come  preferably  via  regional 
organizations  or  the  United  Nations. 

•  The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
provide  specialists  who  can  help  other 
nations  find  ways  to  use  confidence- 
building  and  stabilizing  measures,  in- 
cluding notification  of  maneuvers,  in- 
vitation of  observers  to  maneuvers, 
and  U.N.  machinery  to  promote  such 
measures. 

Seventh,  we  should  fully  develop 
the  institutions  and  expertise  re- 
quired for  arms  control. 

We  must  continue  to  strengthen 
U.N.  arms  control  institutions  without 
undercutting  those  institutions  we 
have  developed.  While  we  are  pre- 
pared to  consider  changes  in  the 
CCD,  our  major  concern  is  to  insure 
the  continued,  productive  activity  of  a 
serious  negotiating  body  operating  by 
consensus. 

The  peacekeeping  and  peacemaking 
capabilities  of  the  United  Nations  and 
of  regional  organizations  like  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  and  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity  should 
be  an  integral  part  of  arms  reduction 
efforts.  The  role  of  such  regional  or- 
ganizations is  critical  to  minimize  in- 
trusion by  outsiders.  We  encourage  a 
strong  and  prominent  role  for  these 
organizations. 

The  United  Nations  plays  an  essen- 
tial role.  At  this  moment  U.N.  forces 
in   Lebanon,   Cyprus,   the   Golan 


Heights,  and  Sinai  are  making  it  pos- 
sible for  negotiations  to  move  toward 
lasting  peaceful  settlements. 

To  make  these  U.N.  efforts  even 
more  effective,  we  propose  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  U.N.  peacekeeping  re- 
serve force.  Such  a  force  would  com- 
prise national  contingents  trained  in 
U.N.  peacekeeping  methods  and  ear- 
marked by  their  governments  for 
U.N.  duty.  This  peacekeeping  reserve 
would  be  drawn  upon  by  the  Secre- 
tary General  whenever  the  Security 
Council  decided  to  establish  a  U.N. 
force  to  maintain  international  peace 
and  security. 

There  is  also  a  critical  national  di- 
mension. Every  government  must 
strengthen  the  institutions  and  exper- 
tise needed  for  arms  control.  Let  each 
of  us  resolve  at  this  session  that  our 
nations  will  examine  the  priority 
which  we  now  give  disarmament  in 


The  tremendous  expenditure  of 
resources  devoted  to  building 
military  strength  stands  in  the 
path  of  development  today. 


organization,  budgets,  and  personnel. 

Eighth,  progress  in  arms  control 
agreements  should  release  addi- 
tional resources  for  economic  and 
social  development. 

Collectively,  we  have  the  capacity 
to  eliminate  the  worst  vestiges  of 
poverty  from  the  world  by  the  end  of 
the  century.  The  tremendous  expendi- 
ture of  resources  devoted  to  building 
military  strength  stands  in  the  path  of 
development  today.  The  developing 
countries  share  of  world  military  ex- 
penditures has  grown  from  15%  to 
23%  in  the  last  decade.  The  develop- 
ing nations  are  now  spending  a 
greater  portion  of  their  GNP  for  mili- 
tary purposes  than  the  developed 
countries. 

Just  1%  of  the  world's  annual  mili- 
tary budget  would  be  enough  to  pro- 
vide food  and  a  healthy  development 
of  200  million  malnourished  children 
today.  Let  us,  through  the  work  of 
this  conference,  begin  to  turn  the 
world's  resources  from  ever-growing 
stockpiles  of  destruction  to  ever- 
growing opportunities  for  life. 

Arms  control  agreements  can  help 
free  the  economies  of  industrial  as 
well  as  developing  nations  to  solve 
pressing  social  problems.  We  realize 
the  vast  potential  of  the  American 
economy.  The  American  people  have 
no  more  fervent  wish  than  to  turn 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

more  of  that  potential  from  the  man 
ufacture  of  arms  to  the  fulfillment  o 
human  needs. 

As  nations  conclude  arms  contro 
agreements  and  show  restraint  in  arm; 
expenditures,  the  United  States  favonl 
reallocating  funds  to  developmen 
projects  which  previously  were  ear 
marked  for  military  assistance. 

Our  ability  to  redirect  funds  for  de- 
velopment hinges  on  the  willingness 
of  other  nations  to  limit  their  current 
arming  of  developing  nations.  If  the 
United  Nations  is  to  deal  effectively 
with  the  problems  of  development 
we  cannot  have  countries  pouring 
arms  into  the  developing  world  while 
at  the  same  time  devoting  minimal 
funding  to  development  assistance 
We  cannot  have  nations  using  then 
military  power  to  exploit  difference; 
between  nations  and  to  exacerbate 
serious  conflicts. 

My  country  for  years  sought  to i 
limit  military  shipments  to  Africa 
Our  economic  development  assistance 
far  outstrips  the  amount  of  military 
assistance  we  have  provided.  In  1977. 
the  United  States  contributed  $327 
million  in  economic  assistance  to  Af- 
rican nations,  compared  to  only  $5C 
million  in  military  aid.  This  record, 
with  its  special  emphasis  on  funding 
for  food,  stands  in  marked  contrast  tc 
the  predominant  military  assistance 
extended  by  others.  Our  orientatior 
represents,  I  believe,  a  far  better  con- 
tribution to  the  long-term  future  ol 
the  people  of  Africa.  The  choice  here 
is  one  of  encouraging  the  constructive 
and  creative  capabilities  of  the  de- 
veloping world  or  of  encouraging 
those  tendencies  which  generate  con- 
flict. Let  us  place  our  hopes  in 
development. 

Our  recognition  of  the  relationship 
between  disarmament  and  develop- 
ment should  inform  and  give  urgency 
to  all  our  arms  control  objectives.  In 
addition: 

•  We  strongly  support  the  U.N. 
study  of  disarmament  and  develop- 
ment. This  study  should  include  con- 
sideration of  the  economic  problems 
which  may  result  from  disarmament; 

•  We  favor  efforts  to  reduce  mili- 
tary expenditures  and  have  volun- 
teered to  provide  our  own  accurate 
information  on  national  military  ex- 
penditures to  a  U.N.  pilot  project 
testing  a  method  to  measure  such  ex- 
penditures; and 

•  We  encourage  others  to  be 
equally  open.  Greater  openness  about 
military  expenditures  is  a  necessary 
companion  to  arms  restraint.  Over 
time,  openness  can  gradually  replace 


11 


:- 


t 


jne 


1978 


35 


ear  with  trust,  promote  confidence, 
ncourage  self-restraint,  and  eliminate 
eedless  sources  of  conflict. 


'he  Challenge 

Thirty-three  years  ago.  President 
larry  Truman  addressed  the  first 
.elegates  to  the  United  Nations  at 
jieir  meeting  in  San  Francisco.  And 
e  said:  "By  your  labors  at  this  Con- 
erence,  we  shall  know  if  suffering 
umanity  is  to  achieve  a  just  and  last- 
ig  peace. " 

That  is  our  challenge  at  this  special 
;sssion.  The  world  watches  what  we 
o  here,  and  mankind's  deepest  hopes 
re  with  us  today.  The  success  or 
rilure  of  our  efforts  will  determine, 
lore  than  any  other  endeavor,  the 
itiape  of  the  world  our  children  will 
lherit,  or  whether  they  will  inherit  a 
labitable  world  at  all.  And  it  is  their 
iterests  which  unite  us  today. 
No  matter  what  nation  we  are  from, 
Jo  matter  what  our  political  philos- 
ophy, our  children  are   100%  of  our 
jiture.  We  owe  them  100%  of  our  ef- 
j>rts  to  halt  the  arms  race  today. 
Arms   control   must   not  be   the 
jenda  only  of  this  session  or  this  year 
one.  It  must  be  the  moral  agenda  of 
jr  time.  Our  work  must  be  kept  in  full 
tew  of  the  world  community.  We  need 
ie  pressure  of  world  opinion  to  give 
-gency  to  our  task.  And  that  is  why 
ie  United  States  calls  on  this  confer- 
Ince  to  follow  up  our  efforts  with 
lother  special  session  of  the  General 
ssembly  in  1981.  Let  our  next  meet- 
ig  monitor  the  progress   we  have 
Jade.   And  let  it  press  upon  us  the 
>enda  of  issues  which  we  must  still 
solve. 

The  challenge  of  controlling  the 

|rms  race  is  awesome.   But  Emerson 

aid  we  measure  a  man's  wisdom  by 

lis  hope.   Let  us  proceed  with  hope 

xiay.  I  am  confident  that  if  each  of 

ur  nations  can  look  beyond  its  own 

mbitions;  if,  in  the  work  of  this  con- 

:rence,  we  can  bridge  the  distances 

|jf  geography  and  history  and  fear; 

>nd  if  all  of  us  can  bring  to  our  ef- 

i  orts  the  deepest  yearnings  of  the 

eoples  we  represent,  then  we  shall 

rerve  all  the  world's  children  with  our 

ibors  and,  in  the  words  of  Isaiah,  the 

I'/ork   of  righteousness   shall   be 

ieace.  □ 


CONGRESS:        its  Role  in 
Foreign  Policymaking 


by  Douglas  J.  Bennet,  Jr. 


'For  text  of  address  on  Oct.  4,   1977,  see 
iULLETiN  of  Oct.  24,  1977,  p.  547. 


The  emergence  of  Congress  as  a 
force  in  foreign  policy  is  a  good  thing 
for  two  reasons. 

First,  we  are  likely  to  get  better  pol- 
icy. Policy  made  in  a  vacuum  of  se- 
crecy and  without  the  diversity  of 
judgment  and  political  experience 
Congress  represents  is,  in  my  opinion, 
less  likely  to  represent  the  true  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  and  also  less 
likely  to  work  in  the  world  at  large. 

This  does  not  mean  that  Congress 
should  engage  in  the  day-to-day  busi- 
ness of  conducting  American  diplo- 
macy. That  is  not  its  function,  and  it 
is  not  equipped  for  it.  It  does,  how- 
ever, mean  that  the  fundamental  direc- 
tions of  American  policy  and  our 
commitments  in  the  world  should  be 
challenged  and  tested  by  Congress  just 
like  any  domestic  policy. 

The  second  benefit  of  Congress'  new 
participation  in  foreign  policymaking  is 
that  it  provides  some  hope  of  develop- 
ing a  public  consensus  which  will  sup- 
port active  American  participation  in 
this  changing  world.  Not  only  are 
policies  scrutinized  by  Congress  more 
likely  to  reflect  the  public  will,  but 
Members  of  Congress,  once  engaged  in 
the  policymaking  process,  are  better 
able  to  teach  and  lead  their  constituen- 
cies through  the  intricacies  of  foreign 
policy  in  a  world  where  the  United 
States  is  neither  chief  policeman  nor 
economic  tsar. 

Finally,  if  Congress  really  does  con- 
tribute actively  to  policy  formulation 
and  if  it  really  does  help  educate  the 
public,  the  result  should  be  greater 
stability  and  predictability  in  American 
foreign  policy — a  benefit  not  only  to 
us  but  to  the  entire  world.  Our  allies 
should  find  us  more  predictable,  and 
our  enemies  will  definitely  find  us 
stronger  as  a  nation. 

The  Senate  debate  on  the  two 
Panama  Canal  treaties  provided  an  im- 
portant test  of  the  resurgent  Congress 
and  public  diplomacy. 

For  10  weeks,  the  U.S.  Senate  de- 
bated the  Panama  Canal  treaties. 
Every  line  negotiated  by  the  executive 
branch  with  the  Panamanian  Govern- 
ment was  subjected  to  minute  scrutiny. 
The  value  of  every  concession  we  re- 
ceived from  the  Panamanians — and  the 
wisdom  of  every  concession   we 


granted  them — was  debated  in  detail 
and  in  the  open.  The  debates  were 
broadcast  over  nationwide  radio  here 
in  the  United  States  and  simultane- 
ously in  Spanish  in  Panama.  The  Sen- 
ate showed  the  American  people  and 
the  world  what  it  can  do  with  a  major 
foreign  policy  issue. 

I  am  a  strong  partisan  of  the  treaties 
and  have  worked  hard  to  insure  their 
ratification.  I  am  also  a  strong  partisan 
of  the  Senate  and  the  entire  Congress. 
But  the  test  before  the  Senate  went  far 
beyond  its  decision  on  this  contentious 
issue. 

Can  it  debate  our  future  relations 
with  Panama,  allowing  for  a  reason- 
able amount  of  rhetorical  excess, 
without  so  insulting  the  Panamanian 
Government  and  people  that  a  satisfac- 
tory relationship  will  be  impossible 
whether  or  not  the  treaties  were 
adopted?  I  don't  care  what  the  issue 
is  —  whether  it  is  Panama  Canal 
treaties  or  human  rights  in  Argentina 
or  trade  with  Japan  or  national  de- 
fense. A  Congress  which  seeks  to 
exercise  its  legitimate  authority  on 
foreign  policy  must  obviously  insure 
that  its  deliberations  are  helpful  rather 
than  damaging  to  U.S.  national  inter- 
ests abroad. 

Next,  do  congressional  procedures 
work  well  enough?  If  the  Congress  is 
to  play  a  major  role  in  foreign  policy, 
it  must  do  so  in  a  way  that  inspires 
confidence — at  home  and  abroad — in 
our  ability  to  move  with  changing 
times. 

Not  only  the  two-thirds  vote  on 
treaties,  but  many  other  Senate  proce- 
dures are  designed  to  protect  the  inter- 
ests of  the  minority  even  if  it  is  a 
minority  of  one.  In  our  system,  I  be- 
lieve this  is  healthy.  There  are  many 
Americans  who  heard  the  Senate  at 
work  for  the  first  time,  however — and 
many  foreigners  who  know  their  own 
security  and  livelihoods  depend  on  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  conduct 
its  foreign  policy  in  a  rational,  orderly 
way — who  could  well  find  the  proce- 
dures of  the  Senate  confusing  and  un- 
certain. The  same  goes  for  the  Con- 
gress as  a  whole. 

Finally,  can  Congress  really  help 
educate  the  American  public  to  the 
realities  of  this  changing  world? 

Because  of  the  live  radio  coverage 
and  the  intense  division  over  the 


36 

Panama  treaties,  the  public  had  a 
chance  to  learn  more  than  most 
people  could  conceivably  want  to 
know  about  the  Panama  Canal.  This, 
I  believe,  is  a  large  part  of  the  reason 
why  the  polls  indicated  public  at- 
titudes turning  in  favor  of  the  treaties. 

But  what  about  more  complicated 
and  more  subtle  issues  of  economics 
and  defense  which  do  not  attract  so 
much  public  attention?  Congress,  as  a 
foreign  policy  participant,  has  an 
enormous  teaching  job  to  do  back 
home  in  helping  to  build  a  consensus 
that  America  can  and  should  play  a 
forceful,  positive  role  in  the  changing 
world. 

These  cautions  should  not  be  read 
as  criticism;  they  are  not.  By  and 
large,  I  think  the  Senate  did  a  thor- 
oughly responsible  job  with  the 
Panama  treaties.  I  believe  the  entire 
Congress  is  capable  of  grappling  with 
the  issues  I  have  mentioned  today  and 
many  more.  It  is  precisely  because 
our  Congress  is  now  deeply  engaged 
in  foreign  affairs  that  the  United 
States  has  the  institutional  basis  for 
moving  with  the  times  in  a  changing 
world;  for  avoiding  unbridgeable  rifts 
between  foreign  policymakers  and 
the  people;  for  projecting  an  all- 
important  image  of  stability  and  pre- 
dictability to  the  rest  of  the  world.      □ 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


prove  a  program  to  help  strengthen 
South  Korean  military  capabilities, 
particularly  legislation  to  authorize  the 
transfer  to  South  Korea  of  a  significant 
portion  of  the  equipment  of  our  depart- 
in  ground  combat  forces.' 

In  view  of  the  crowded  legislative 
calendar,  and  also  because  of  other 
matters  concerning  Korea,  there  is  a 
possibility  that  the  Congress  may  not 
act  now  on  this  proposal.  In  the  light 
of  this  development,  I  believe  it  pru- 
dent to  adjust  the  scheduled  withdraw- 
als. 

•  The  redeployment  of  noncombat 
elements  will  continue  on  schedule; 
2,600  such  personnel  will  be  removed 
by  December  31,  1978. 

•  One  combat  battalion  from  the  2d 
Division  will  be  withdrawn  from 
Korea   in   December:   however,   the 


Excerpted  from  an  address  before  the  Sam 
Rayburn  Public  Affairs  Symposium,  East 
Texas  State  University  in  Commerce,  Texas, 
on  Mar  28,  1978;  Mr.  Bennet  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Congressional  Relations 


EAST  ASIA:  U.S. 

Combat  Forces 
in  South  Korea 

Statement  by  President  Carter 

Peace  and  stability  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula  and  in  Northeast  Asia  are 
vital  to  our  national  interest.  This  na- 
tion is  fully  determined  to  maintain  its 
commitment  to  the  Republic  of  Korea 
(ROK). 

In  announcing  my  decision  to  with- 
draw our  ground  combat  forces  from 
Korea  over  a  4—5  year  period,  I  stres- 
sed that  it  was  essential  to  improve 
South  Korea  defense  forces  so  as  to 
confidently  maintain  an  adequate  mili- 
tary balance  on  the  peninsula.  I  also 
announced  that  we  will  take  other 
measures  to  maintain  that  balance,  in- 
cluding increasing  our  air  force  in 
Korea  in  October  of  this  year.  I  also 
asked  the  Congress  last  October  to  ap- 


other  two  combat  battalions  of  th 
brigade  slated  for  withdrawal  this  yea 
will  remain  in  Korea  until  1979. 

•  The  plan  to  increase  the  U.S.  ai 
forces  in  Korea  will  not  be  changed. 

Peace  and  stability  in  Northeas 
Asia  are  vital  to  our  national  interest 
I  urge  the  Congress  to  enact  as  soon  a 
possible  the  authorization  for  $27; 
million  in  foreign  military  assistanc 
credits  for  the  ROK,  which  I  have  als< 
proposed,  and  to  move  expeditiousl; 
to  deal  with  the  $800  million  equip 
ment  transfer  legislation. 


Made  on  April  21,    1978  (text  from    Hcckl 
Compilation  of  Apr,  24). 

1  For  text  of  President  Carter's  message  t 
the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  ( 
Oct  21.  1977.  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  II 
p.  852. 


; 


EUROPE:        Visit  of 
Romanian  President  Cettnseseit 


President  Nicolae  Ceausescu  of 
Roma nia  made  a  stale  visit  to  the 
United  States  April  11-17.  While  in 
Washington  {April  11-14),  he  met 
with  President  Carter  and  other  gov- 
ernment officials.  Following  is  the  text 
of  the  joint  declaration  signed  by  the 
two  Presidents  on  April  13.  ' 


The  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  Jimmy  Carter,  and  the 
President  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of 
Romania,  Nicolae  Ceausescu, 

Having  noted  with  satisfaction  that 
the  political,  economic,  scientific,  cul- 
tural and  other  relations  between  the 
two  countries  have  developed  signifi- 
cantly in  recent  years. 

Having  determined  to  take  further 
steps  to  expand  bilateral  relations  and 
cooperation,  to  build  security  and  de- 
velop cooperation  in  Europe,  to 
strengthen  international  peace  and  se- 
curity and  to  seek  solutions  for  the 
manifold  issues  confronting  the  world. 

Agreed  on  the  following  Declaration: 

I  They  reaffirmed  the  commitment  to 
continue  the  development  and  expan- 
sion of  relations  between  the  two 
countries  on  the  basis  of  the  Joint 
Statement  signed  in  Washington  on 
December  5,  1973  and  of  the  Joint 
Statement  on  Economic,  Industrial  and 
Technical  Cooperation  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania  of  the 
same  (.late.  These  relations  are  based 
on  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the 


United  Nations  Charter  and  of  th 
Declaration  on  Principles  Guiding  Rt 
lations  Between  Participating  States  1 
the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on  St 
curity  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  arn 
consistent  with  these,  particularly  en 
the  following  interrelated  principles; 

The  right  of  each  state  to  existence, 
freedom,  independence  and  nation; 
sovereignn : 

The  equal  rights  of  all  states,  irrt 
spective  of  their  size,  level  of  de 
velopment  and  political,  economic  an' 
social  systems; 

The  right  of  each  state  freely  t 
choose  and  develop  its  political,  sc 
cial,   economic   and   cultural   systerr 

The  right  of  each  people  to  decid 
its  own  destiny; 

Refraining  from  the  threat  or  use  oi 
force  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  0' 
the  United  Nations; 

Respect  for  territorial  integrity  am 
inviolability  of  frontiers; 

Non-intervention,  direct  or  indirect 
for  anj  reason  whatever,  in  the  inter 
nal  affairs  of  any  other  state; 

Peaceful  settlement  of  internal iona 
disputes; 

Observance  of  and  promotion  of  re 
sped  for  human  rights  and  fundamen 
tal  freedoms,  including  all  the  condi 
tions  required  for  a  free,  dignified  ant 
prosperous  lite; 

Cooperation  among  states  in  orde 
to  promote  world  peace  and  securit; 
and  economic  and  social  progress. 

II.  They  stated  their  joint  determina 
tion: 


1978 


37 


I.  To  continue  meetings  at  the  high- 
|  level  and  consultations  at  other 
eels,  and  to  encourage  interchanges 
flween  members  of  legislatures  and 
l  resentatives  of  local  administration. 
B.  To  promote  and  facilitate  the  ex- 
■sion  of  trade  and  economic  coopera- 
Ui  between  the  two  countries,  taking 
m  account  Romania  *s  present  status 
Ei  developing  country. 

II.  To  promote  the  reduction  of 
affs  and  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  in 
■formity  with  the  Agreement  on 
f  de  Relations  between  the  two  coun- 
rs,  and  to  seek  to  increase  the  vol- 
ne  and  diversify  the  structure  of 
liiteral  trade. 

.  To  seek  ways  to  put  existing 
^-discriminatory  trade  relations  on  a 
gre  stable  and  long-term  basis,  in  par- 
iular  through  the  renewal  of  the 
^-eement  on  Trade  Relations. 

.  To  encourage  the  development  of 
operation  activities,  including  joint 
n  tures  and  cooperation  in  third  mar- 
as,  contracts  and  interchanges  be- 
v  en  American  firms  and  Romanian 
■nomic  organizations,  participation 
Specialized  exhibitions  in  both  coun- 
ts, increased  exchange  of  economic 
Drmation  and  data  and  other  meas- 
Is  for  the  implementation  of  the 
Lig-Term  Agreement  on  Economic, 
liustrial  and  Technical  Cooperation, 
4  led  in  1976;  and  to  support  in  this 
npect  the  activities  of  the  Joint 
American-Romanian  Economic  Com- 
■  ision  and  of  the  United  States- 
Snanian  Economic  Council. 
m.  To  cooperate  in  the  settlement  of 
llnanitarian  issues,  including  family 
unification,  in  the  spirit  of  mutual 
tilerstanding  and  good  will. 

'.  To  promote  cultural  and  scientific 
e:hanges  under  the  terms  of  the 
^reement  on  Cooperation  and  Ex- 
cmges  in  the  Cultural,  Educational, 
Sentific  and  Technological  Fields  of 
174.  as  well  as  relations  and  contacts 
hween  institutions,  organizations  and 
<jizens  of  the  two  countries,  and  to 
courage  tourism  in  order  to  increase 
i  tual  understanding  and  friendship 
fc  ween  the  two  peoples. 

fi.  They  also  expressed  their  joint  de- 
timination: 

ll.  To  strengthen  and  make  irreversi- 
b    the  process  of  detente  in  Europe 
Bi  throughout  the  world. 
ml.  To  work  for  ensuring  opportuni- 
l|s  for  all  countries,  big  or  small,  to 

<  itribute  to  the  settlement  of  complex 
Virld  issues  on  the  basis  of  equality. 
|]3.  To  promote  the  settlement  of  all 
(Kputes  among  states  by  peaceful 
ipans  and  the  elimination  of  the  threat 

<  use  of  force . 

|4.  To  contribute  actively  to  the  full 
plementation  of  all  the  provisions  of 


ROMANIA— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  91,699  sq.  mi.  (slightly  smaller  than 
N.Y.  and  Pa.  combined) 

Capital:  Bucharest  (pop.  1 .9  million). 

Other  Cities:  Constanta  (290,226).  Iasi 
(284.308).  Timisoara  (282,691).  Cluj- 
Napoca  (262.421).  Brasov  (262.041). 

People 

Population:  21.7  million  (1977  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  .9%. 

Density:  236  per  sq.  mi 

Ethnic    Groups:    88%    Romanians.    8  % 

Magyars.  2%  Germans. 
Religions:  Orthodox,  Roman  Catholic,  Cal- 

vinist,  Lutheran,  Jewish. 
Languages:  Romanian.  Hungarian,  German. 
Literacy:  98%. 
Life  Expectancy:  69  yrs.   (males);  72  yrs. 

(females). 

Government 

Official  Name:  Socialist  Republic  of 
Romania. 

Type:  Communist. 

Date  of  Constitution:  Aug.  21 ,  1965. 

Branches:  Executive — President  (Chief  of 
State),  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Govern- 
ment). Council  of  Ministers. 
Legislative — unicameral  Grand  National 
Assembly  (349  members)  and  its  Council 
of  State.  Judicial — Supreme  Court 

Political  Party:  Romanian  Communist 
Party . 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  18;  compulsory. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  40  Counties 
(includes  city  of  Bucharest). 

Economy 

GNP:  $27.8  billion  (1976). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  10.5%  ( 1975-76). 


Per  Capita  Income:  $1,300  (  1976). 

Agriculture:  Land  —  63%;  labor — 36%; 
products  —  corn,  wheat,  oil  seeds, 
potatoes. 

Industry:  Labor — 40%;  products — power, 
mining,  forestry,  construction  materials, 
metal  production  and  processing,  chemi- 
cals, machine  building,  food  processing, 
textiles. 

Natural  Resources:  Oil,  timber,  natural  gas, 
coal. 

Trade:  Exports— $7.02  hi  I  lion  (  1  977): 
foodstuffs,  lumber,  fuel,  manufactures 
Imports — $7.02  billion  (1977):  machin- 
ery, equipment,  rolled  steel,  iron  ore, 
coke  and  coking  coal,  cotton. 
Partners— U.S. S.R.,  F.R.G.,  G.D.R. 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  4.47  lei  =  US$l  00. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  most  of  its  specialized  agencies. 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance 
(CMEA).  Warsaw  Pact.  GATT.  Danube 
Commission,  Interpol. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Romania:  President  and  Chairman  of  the 
Council  of  State — Nicolae  Ceausescu; 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs — Stefan  An- 
drei; Ambassador  to  the  U.S. — Nicolae 
M.  Nicolae. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Romania — O. 
Rudolph  Aggrey. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's  March 
1978  edition  of  the  Background  Notes  on 
Romania.  Copies  of  the  complete  Note  may 
be  purchased  for  50(  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office.  Washington.  DC.  20402  (a  25% 
discount  is  allowed  when  ordering  100  or 
more  Notes  mailed  to  the  same  address). 


the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on  Se- 
curity and  Cooperation  in  Europe  and 
to  promote  the  multilateral  process  ini- 
tiated by  the  Conference.  They  agreed 
that  the  Belgrade  Meeting  provided  a 
firm  basis  for  continuation  of  this  proc- 
ess; at  the  same  time,  they  expressed 
disappointment  that  it  had  not  been 
possible  to  reach  agreement  on  the 
numerous  useful  proposals  which  had 
been  put  forward.  They  agreed  to 
cooperate  closely  so  that  the  1980  Ma- 
drid Meeting  should  take  effective 
steps  toward  strengthening  security  and 
developing  cooperation  in  Europe  in 
the  fields  of  economic  cooperation,  of 
cultural  exchanges  and  humanitarian 
problems  and  of  military  disengage- 
ment and  disarmament.  They  also 
agreed  that  the  development  of  friendly 
and  neighborly  relations  among  Balkan 
countries  will  be  a  positive  contribution 
to  re-inforcing  security  and  expanding 
cooperation  in  Europe. 


5.  To  act  resolutely  for  the  adoption 
of  a  wide  range  of  disarmament  meas- 
ures, including  nuclear  disarmament, 
such  as  halting  the  build-up  of  arma- 
ments and  reducing  military  budgets, 
armed  forces  and  armaments,  leading 
ultimately  to  general  and  complete  dis- 
armament under  effective  international 
control.  They  endorsed  a  more  effec- 
tive role  for  the  United  Nations  in  deal- 
ing with  international  disarmament  is- 
sues and  underlined  their  active  support 
for  the  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment of  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly. 

6.  To  work  toward  a  more  just  and 
equitable  international  economic  order, 
which  should  promote  the  accelerated 
economic  development  of  developing 
countries;  and  to  intensify  dialogue  and 
cooperation  among  all  countries,  di- 
rected toward  solving  major  economic 
problems,  on  the  basis  of  the  principles 
of  equality,  equity  and  mutual  benefit. 


38 

7.  To  encourage  efforts  aimed  at  a 
just,  comprehensive  and  lasting  peace- 
ful settlement  in  the  Middle  East,  based 
on  Israel's  withdrawal  from  territories 
occupied  as  a  result  of  the  1967  war, 
respect  for  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and  insurance  of  the 
independence,  territorial  integrity  and 
security  of  all  states  in  the  region.  To 
this  end,  they  expressed  themselves  in 
favor  of  negotiations  among  all  the  in- 
terested parties  for  solving  the  Middle 
East  situation,  with  appropriate  repre- 
sentation of  the  Palestinian  people. 

8.  To  support  the  legitimate  aspira- 
tions of  the  African  peoples  for  peace, 
freedom  and  independence.  They  reaf- 
firmed the  inalienable  right  of  the 
peoples  of  Zimbabwe  and  Namibia  to 
sovereignty  and  independent  develop- 
ment, and  the  necessity  of  ensuring,  as 
soon  as  possible,  the  transfer  of  power 
to  the  African  majority,  in  the  spirit  of 
pertinent  United  Nations  resolutions. 
They  also  expressed  deep  concern 
about  the  South  African  policy  of  apart- 
heid and  racial  discrimination  and 
stood  for  the  abolition  of  these 
practices. 

9.  To  strengthen  the  role  of  the 
United  Nations  in  the  maintenance  and 
consolidation  of  world  peace,  in  the 
development  of  cooperation  among  all 
nations,  and  in  furtherance  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  in  the  rela- 
tions among  states,  through  reforming 
and  restructuring  the  UN  system  in 
order  to  make  it  stronger  and  more  ef- 
fective; and  to  strengthen  cooperation 
between  their  two  countries  within  the 
United  Nations  and  other  international 
organizations  and  conferences. 

IV.  The  two  Presidents  expressed  their 
conviction  that  friendly  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Socialist  Republic  of  Romania, 
based  on  equality,  mutual  respect  and 
due  consideration  for  their  respective 
interests,  serve  the  cause  of  world 
peace,  security  and  cooperation.  They 
reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  expand 
and  deepen,  both  through  diplomatic- 
channels  and  meetings  at  all  levels,  the 
consultations,  contacts  and  exchanges 
that  have  become  an  important  and  last- 
ing element  of  their  cooperation.         □ 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  17,  1978.  For  an  ex- 
change of  remarks  between  President  Carter 
and  President  Ceausescu  at  the  welcoming 
ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House  and  an  exchange  of  toasts  on  Apr.  12. 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Apr.  17,  p.  734  and 
738,  respectively.  For  text  of  the  joint  com- 
munique issued  Apr  17.  see  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Apr.  24,  p   753 


MIDDLE  EAST:    Aircraft  Sales  to 
Egypt?  Israel,  and  Saudi  Arabia 


REMARKS  TO  THE  PRESS, 
SECRETARY  VANCE,  APR.  281 

The  Administration  is  today  trans- 
mitting to  Congress  formal  notification 
of  proposals  to  sell  aircraft  to  Israel, 
Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  As  indicated 
in  our  informal  notification  last  Feb- 
ruary, the  proposed  sales  involve  75 
F-16's  and  15  F-15's  to  Israel,  50 
F-5's  to  Egypt,  and  60  F-15's  to  Saudi 
Arabia. 

These  proposals  are  an  important 
part  of  our  search  for  peace  in  the  Mid- 
dle East.  They  maintain  and  enhance 
our  close  relationship  with  three  key 
governments  in  the  Middle  East.  Each 
of  the  three  countries  has  a  unique  con- 
tribution to  make  to  the  objective  of 
achieving  a  lasting  peace. 


As  a  nation,  we  have  a  strony  a 
unshakable  commitment  to  the  secu 
of  Israel.  The  proposed  sales  to  Isn 
will  help  preserve  Israel's  ability  to  c 
fend  itself. 

The  proposed  sales  to  Egypt  at 
Saudi  Arabia  have  been  based  u 
careful  analysis  of  how  best  to  mt 
their  defense  needs  while  maintaini 
the  military  balance  in  the  regio 
These  transactions  will  enhance  t 
confidence  in  and  friendship  toward  t 
United  States  on  the  part  of  each 
these  two  countries  with  which  > 
share  vital  mutual  interests. 

The  proposed  sales  make  it  possib 
for  the  United  States  to  maintain  c 
historic  commitment  to  the  security 
Israel  while  at  the  same  time  develo 
ing  closer  ties  with  moderate  Arab  n 


HUMAN  KIMI  IS:         Cambodia 


■ 


Statement  by  President  Carter 

America  cannot  avoid  the  responsi- 
bility to  speak  out  in  condemnation  of 
the  Cambodian  Government,  the  worst 
violator  of  human  rights  in  the  world 
today.  Thousands  of  refugees  from 
Cambodia  have  accused  their  govern- 
ment of  inflicting  death  on  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  the  Cambodian  people 
through  the  genocidal  policies  it  has 
implemented  over  the  past  3  years. 
Witnesses  have  recounted  abuses  that 
include  mass  killings,  inhuman  treat- 
ment of  the  supporters  of  the  previous 
government,  the  forced  deportation  of 
urban  dwellers,  and  the  total  suppres- 
sion of  recognized  political  and  reli- 
gious freedoms,  as  well  as  deprivation 
of  food  and  health  care  for  the  general 
population.  Summary  executions  con- 
tinue in  Cambodia  today,  and  fear  of 
the  authorities  is  pervasive. 

We  support  the  growing  international 
protest  against  the  policies  of  this  in- 
humane regime.  On  April  17  the  Cana- 
dian House  of  Commons,  in  a  unani- 
mous motion,  expressed  the  horror  of  all 
its  members  in  the  acts  of  genocide  car- 
ried out  in  Cambodia  and  called  on  all 
governments  which  maintain  relations 
with  Canada  to  protest  against  the 
slaughter. 


In  the  private  sphere,  a  Norwegi 
committee  supported  by  leaders  of  tl 
major  Norwegian  political  parties  w 
hold  hearings  in  Oslo,  beginning  toda 
to  illuminate  through  public  testimo 
the  tragic  situation  existing  in  Cn 
bodia.  Amnesty  International  has  i 
sued  an  appeal  to  the  Cambodian  Go 
ernment  to  respond  to  allegations 
continuing  summary  killings  in  th 
country.  We  welcome  and  applai 
these  initiatives. 

We  also  welcome  the  recent  actit 
taken  by  the  U.N.  Human  Righ 
Commission  which,  this  year,  in  co 
sequence  of  a  British  initiativ' 
adopted  by  consensus  a  resolution  as 
ing  the  Cambodian  Government  to  r 
spond  to  allegations  of  human  righ 
violations. 

The  American  Government  aga; 
condemns  the  abuses  of  human  righ 
which  have  occurred  in  Cambodia.  It 
an  obligation  of  every  member  of  tl 
international  community  to  protest  th 
policies  of  this  or  any  nation  whic 
cruelly  and  systematically  violates  tf 
right  of  its  people  to  enjoy  life  ai 
basic  human  dignities. 


Made  on   Apr.   21 .    1978;   text  from    Week\ 
Compilation   of  Presidential  Documents 
Apr.  24. 


; 


;  1978 

s  which  strongly  support  the  peace 
;ess.  They  reflect  our  best  judgment 

0  the  national  interest  of  the  United 
es. 

1  submitting  these  proposed  sales  to 
igress  on  the  same  day,  the  Admin- 
ition  is  not  attempting  to  place  con- 
ons  on  the  scope  of  the  congres- 
nal  review  or  the  action  by 
igress.  Indeed,  we  understand  that 
Congress  will  want  to  review  these 
ortant  transactions  separately  and 
ti  great  care.  We  stand  ready  to 

lilitate  that  process. 
It  the  same  time,  the  responsibility 
■the  President  for  the  conduct  of 
lign  affairs  requires  that  he  reserve 
»:ment  on  the  ultimate  action  to  be 
|:n  until  he  has  had  an  opportunity  to 
lew  the  action  taken  by  the  Con- 
Iss  on  the  proposals  announced 


j-ATEMENT  BY 

iCRETARY  VANCE,  MAY  32 

welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
^i  you  the  Administration's  propos- 

■  to  sell  jet  aircraft  to  three  Middle 
Lit  countries— 75  F-16's  and  15 
■S's  to  Israel,  60  F-15's  to  Saudi 
Ubia,  and  50  F-5's  to  Egypt.  We 
xsider  these  proposals  vitally  impor- 
H  to  the  foreign  policy  interests  of 
h  United  States.  These  sales  will  en- 
ice  U.S.  relations  with  three  coun- 
Vi  that  play  critical  roles  in  the  at- 
a  ment  of  two  essential  foreign  policy 
jlectives  in  the  Middle  East — the 
Jt  elusion  of  a  comprehensive  peace 
wlement  that  will  provide  the  best 
prantee  for  Israel's  long-term  secu- 
i  and  the  support  of  moderate  gov- 
jments  that  will  shape  the  future  of 

■  region. 

"'he  three  countries  involved  are 
■h  of  exceptional  importance  to 
jjerican  interests.  Our  commitment  to 
jiel's  security  and  well-being  is  an 
•luring  imperative  of  American 
l;ign  policy.  This  Administration, 
i  its  predecessors,  will  remain  un- 
slken  in  its  determination  to  help 
Isiel  meet  its  security  requirements. 
:  igypt  is  also  crucially  important  to 
\erican  interests.  Under  President 
fiat's  courageous  leadership,  Egypt 
••laying  a  key  role  in  the  search  for 
■idle  East  peace  and  in  the  promo- 
li  of  moderate  policies  globally.  The 
jjited  States  clearly  has  an  interest  in 
fjjcure  Egypt, 
laudi  Arabia  has  consistently  dem- 


39 


itrated  its  friendship  toward  the 
ited  States.  Saudi  Arabia  strongly 
•ports  a  negotiated  settlement  for 
Middle  East  conflict.  It  plays  a 
al  role  in  promoting  a  moderate 


Arab  consensus  on  the  difficult  ques- 
tions of  Middle  East  peace.  It  is  a 
major  stabilizing  force  in  interna- 
tional financial  matters  and  in  deci- 
sions affecting  the  pricing  and  supply 
of  oil. 

The  aircraft  which  we  propose  meet 
an  important  need  for  each  of  the 
three  countries  involved. 

Israel  is  stronger  now  than  at  any 
time  in  its  history.  In  order  to  main- 
tain its  substantial  margin  of  military 
superiority  in  the  region,  however,  Is- 
rael will  require  replacements  for  air- 
craft which  become  obsolescent  in  the 
1980s.  The  F-15's  and  F-16's  are 
intended  to  assure  that  Israel  retains 
its  lead  in  advanced  military  technol- 
ogy. 

Egypt,  having  ended  its  arms  supply 
relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union,  has 
not  received  significant  supplies  of  air- 
craft or  parts  in  about  3  years.  Egypt  is 
understandably  concerned  about  threats 
both  from  the  west  and  the  south.  The 
F-5's  will  help  Egypt  present  a  credible 
air  defense  posture  and  assure  confi- 
dence that  the  United  States  will  assist 
that  country  in  meeting  its  legitimate 
defense  needs. 

Saudi  Arabia  needs  an  adequate 
air  defense  system  to  protect  its  vast 
territory,  including  widely  scattered 
population  centers  and  vulnerable  oil 
facilities.  Saudi  Arabia,  whose  armed 
forces  are  among  the  smallest  in  the 
region,  has  a  long  history  of  ideologi- 
cal conflict  with  Iraq.  Iraqi  forces, 
well  supplied  with  the  most  modern 
Soviet  military  equipment,  will  have 
more  than  twice  the  number  of  com- 
bat aircraft  as  Saudi  Arabia  in  1983, 
even  after  the  Saudi  F-15's  are  deliv- 
ered. Moreover,  on  three  occasions  in 
the  recent  past,  Saudi  Arabia  has 
been  attacked  by  forces  from  South 
Yemen.  The  potential  threat  from  this 
quarter  is  a  matter  of  continuing 
Saudi  concern. 

We  are  assured  that  the  Saudis  in- 
tend to  use  the  F-15  aircraft  for  their 
own  national  defense  and  not  other- 
wise. The  Saudis  have  said  that  they 
do  not  plan  to  base  the  F-15's  at  any 
location  that  would  threaten  or  pro- 
voke Israel. 

In  our  best  judgment,  the  proposed 
sales  will  maintain  the  basic  military 
balance  in  the  region.  Israel  will  re- 
tain the  ability  to  defend  itself.  Saudi 
Arabia  and  Egypt  will  strengthen  their 
ability  to  defend  themselves  against 
nations  determined  to  undermine  re- 
gional stability. 

It  is  our  conviction  that  these  trans- 
fers will  support  the  Middle  East 
peace  process.   At  this  delicate  mo- 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 

We  welcome  former  President  Ford's 
expressed  support  on  May  4  for  the 
President's  proposals  for  aircraft  sales 
to  Israel,  Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  Mr. 
Ford's  support  is  in  the  best  tradition  of 
bipartisanship  in  key  foreign  policy 
decisions. 

President  Carter  and  Secretary  Vance 
have  often  noted  that  in  proposing  the 
sales  to  Israel  and  Saudi  Arabia  they  are 
following  through  on  commitments 
made  by  the  previous  Administration. 

The  support  for  the  legitimate  defense 
needs  of  Egypt,  the  key  moderate  Arab 
government  in  the  Middle  East  process, 
is  also  a  continuation  of  support  pro- 
vided by  the  previous  Administration. 

Like  our  predecessors,  this  Adminis- 
tration believes  that  the  U.S.  role  in 
that  peacemaking  process  dictates 
strong  support  both  for  the  security 
needs  of  Israel  and  for  moderate  Arab 
governments. 


Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Kenneth  Brown 
on  Ma\  5,  1978. 


ment,  we  need  the  maximum  coopera- 
tion, confidence,  and  trust  of  Israel, 
Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  The  prereq- 
uisite for  addressing  the  hard  choices 
for  peace  is  the  feeling  of  security 
and  confidence  on  all  sides.  The  crea- 
tion of  these  conditions  is  our  prime 
objective  in  proposing  the  aircraft 
sales. 

Of  course,  approval  of  these  sales 
will  not  in  itself  bring  peace  to  the 
Middle  East.  These  sales  will  main- 
tain essential  links  that  permit  us  to 
play  the  fundamental  role  of  a 
mediator  between  the  parties.  On  the 
other  hand,  failure  to  proceed  with 
the  sales  will  seriously  undercut  the 
American  role  in  the  peace  process 
and  raise  grave  doubts  about  U.S. 
readiness  to  work  with  moderate  gov- 
ernments in  the  region. 

I  urge  the  Congress  to  join  the 
Administration  in  sending  a  message 
to  the  Middle  East  that  is  clearly  and 
firmly  supportive  of  those  govern- 
ments that  have  committed  their 
countries  to  a  future  of  peace,  to 
orderly  economic  progress,  and  to 
moderation. 


STATEMENT  BY 

PRESIDENT  CARTER,  MAY  15  3 

I  am  deeply  gratified  by  the  Sen- 
ate's decision  today  which  will  permit 
the  proposed  arms  sales  to  Israel, 
Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia.4  That  ac- 
tion reaffirms  our  historic  and  un- 
shakable commitment  to  the  security 
of  Israel — a  commitment  which  will 


40 

continue  to  have  the  unwavering  sup- 
port of  this  Administration  and  the 
American  people. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Senate  vote 
strengthens  our  ties  with  moderate 
Arab  nations  who  share  our  goal  of 
peace  and  stability  in  the  region.  We 
also  honor  bipartisan  pledges  made  by 
the  previous  Administration,  as  well 
as  my  own,  to  help  our  friends  in  the 
Middle  East  meet  their  legitimate 
needs  for  self-defense. 

The  approval  of  these  sales  will  not 
violate  the  arms  limitation  policy  of 
this  Administration,  which  I  an- 
nounced last  May.  That  pledge  to 
limit  arms  sales  will  be  met.  If  and 
when  other  nations  are  willing  to  join 
with  us  in  mutual  restraint  on  the  sale 
of  conventional  weapons,  even 
greater  reductions  will  be  possible. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Senate's  ac- 
tion makes  it  clear  that  the  United 
States  stands  ready  to  provide  needed 
assistance  when  unrestrained  arms 
sales  by  other  nations  pose  a  threat  to 
the  securit)  of  our  friends  and  allies. 

With  this  issue  resolved,  the  sharp 
debate  over  the  proposed  sales  can 
now  be  put  behind  us.  That  debate 
has  been  among  friends  who  share  the 
same  goals.  All  of  us  can  now  con- 
centrate our  full  attention  on  finding  a 
sound  and  just  basis  for  permanent 
peace. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
play  a  responsible  and  active  role  in 
the'  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  will  intensify  our  effort  to 
help  the  parties  narrow  their  differ- 
ences Our  own  national  interest  and 
moral  values  permit  us  to  do  no 
less.  D 

'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  May  1 . 

2  Made  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  (text  from  press  release  202  of 
May  3).  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  he  published  b\  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C    211402. 

'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Ma)  22 

4On  May  15,  1978.  by  a  vote  of  44  to  54.  the 
Senate  rejected  Senate  Concurrent  Resolution  86 
to  disapprove  the  President's  proposal  for  the 
sale  ol  aircraft  and  related  defense  articles  to 
Egypt.  Israel,  and  Saudi  Arabia 


Department  of  State  Bull* 


LETTER  TO 

MEMBERS  OF  CONGRESS 

May  12,  1978 

The  motion  in  the  Senate  next  Monday  to 
block  all  of  the  proposed  aircraft  sales  to 
Israel.  Egypt,  and  Saudi  Arabia  presents  a 
vital  test  of  our  national  purpose.  In  the 
hours  before  the  Senate  voles,  n  is  mj  duty 
as  President  to  draw  attention  to  the  power- 
ful reasons  supporting  each  of  the  sales  and 
the  dire  consequences  of  rejecting  them. 

Our  basic  goal  is  to  secure  peace,  stabil- 
ity, and  harmonious  relations  among  the 
nations  of  the  Middle  East.  Since  becoming 
President.  I  and  my  chief  foreign  policy 
advisers  have  spent  more  of  our  time  and 
effort  on  this  subject  than  any  other  foreign 
policy  issue. 

The  number  of  aircraft  proposed  for  each 
of  the  countries  has  been  carefully  consid- 
ered to  insure  a  regional  balance,  but  the 
decision  before  the  Senate  transcends  the 
particular  transactions. 

The  choice  is  stark  and  fundamental. 
Shall  we  support  and  give  confidence  to 
those  in  the  Middle  East  who  work  for 
moderation  and  peace?  Or  shall  we  turn 
them  aside,  shattering  their  confidence  in 
us  and  serving  the  cause  of  radicalism'' 

It  is  my  considered  judgment  that  the 
aircraft  sales  to  Egypt  are  essential  to  ena- 
ble President  Sadat  to  continue  his  efforts 
for  peace.  At  great  personal  and  political 
risk.  President  Sadat  has  laken  an  initiative 
which  has  created  the  best  prospects  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  in  three  decades 
With  similar  risks,  he  has  turned  away 
from  a  relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  placed  his  trust  in  the  United  States 

To  reject  the  proposed  aircraft  sale  to 
Egypt  would  he  a  breach  of  that  trust.  Such 
a  rejection  would  be  a  devastating  blow  to 
President  Sadat,  to  the  military  forces  of 
Egypt,  to  the  people  of  Egypt,  and  to  the 
forces  of  moderation  in  the  Middle  East. 

Saudi  Arabia  has  become  a  firm  friend  of 
the  United  States  As  its  influence  dramat- 
ically expands  in  the  world.  Saudi  Arabia 
has  been  no!  only  a  firm  supporter  of  the 
peace  process  bin  a  moderating  and  con 
ciliatory  force  on  a  wide  range  of  global 
issues 

It  is  beyond  challenge  thai  ihe  Saudi  air 
defense  system  must  he  modernized  and 
augmented     The  United  Slates  has  an  op 


■j 


portunity  through  these  proposed  sales  n 
enhance  its  relationship  with  the  Saudis  as 
they  take  these  vital  steps  to  defend  them- 
selves against  their  radical  neighbors  armed 
by  ihe  Soviet  Union.  But  I  must  tell  you 
with  great  gravity  that  it  is  an  opportunity 
that  we  will  quickly  lose  if  we  do  not  grasp 
it  immediately. 

If  the  Saudis  are  forced  to  run  elsewhere 
to  meet  their  defense  needs,  it  will  unques 
tionably  impair  the  peace  process 
Moreover,  the  erosion  of  confidence  will 
inevitably  have  a  far  broader  — an 
adverse— impact  on  the  wide  range  of  is 
sues  on  which  we  have  been  working  ir 
close  harmony 

The  aircraft  sales  to  Israel  are  a  reflec- 
tion of  our  strong  and  unshakeable  com- 
mitment to  the  security  of  Israel  Tht 
American  people  fully  understand  that  ou 
commitment  to  Israel's  survival  and  secu-n 
nly  is  total,  unequivocal,  and  firmly  fixec 
in  our  national  policy. 

The  long-term  interests  of  Israel  are 
served  by  the  proposed  sales  to  Egy  pt  am 
Saudi  Arabia.  It  is  in  Israel's  interest  td 
encourage  the  forces  of  moderation  in  tht 
Middle  East,  and  to  promote  their  close  re 
lationship  with  the  United  States  It  woulc 
not  serve  Israel's  interest  if  we  were  to  fai 
to  keep  bi-partisan  commitments,  made  b; 
Ihe  prior  Administration  as  well  as  b; 
mine,  lo  provide  aircraft  for  the  defense  of 
Saudi  Arabia  It  would  be  against  Israel' 
interest  if  moderate  nations  are  brushei 
aside  by  the  United  States,  opening  va| 
possibilities  for  the  intrusion  of  hostile 
influences. 

In  the  end,  the  national  interesi  ot  ihi 
United  States  is  the  issue.  On  the  basis  o 
the  most  careful  and  serious  analysis  of  all 
factors.  I  am  convinced  that  the  proposec 
sales  will  enhance  U  S.  national  obje« 
tives.  contribute  to  our  national  security 
and  promote  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Jimmy  Cari  tu 


Text  oj  identical  letters  addressed  to  each 
Member  at  the  Senate,  Speakei  at  the  House 
Thomas  P  O'  Veill,  J' ..'  and  Clement  J. 
Zablocki,  chairman,  ami  William  S  Broom- 
field,  ranking  minority  member,  of  the  House 
Committee  an  International  Relations  [from 
Weekly  Compilation  ol  Presidential  Docu- 
ments oj  Ma\  12,  1978). 


jne  1978 


Visit  of 
Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin 


Prime  Minister  Menahem  Begin  of 
rael  made  a  private  visit  to  the 
lited  States  April  30-May  7;  he  was 
Washington,  DC,  on  May  1.  Fol- 
wing  is  an  exchange  of  remarks  be- 
een  President  Carter  and  Prime 
inister  Begin  at  a   White  House  re- 

Uption  honoring  the  30th  anniversary 

I  the  State  of  Israel. ' 

•esident  Carter 

It's  a  great  pleasure  for  me  and  for 
isalynn  to  hold  this  reception  for  my 
ends.  Prime  Minister  and  Mrs.  Be- 
n,  and  for  the  distinguished  Ameri- 
ns  who  have  joined  us  today  in 
•nor  of  the  30th  anniversary  of  the 
ate  of  Israel. 

We've  just  come  to  the  close  of  the 
.ssover  holidays,  an  annual  reminder 
the  exodus  and  dispersal  of  the 
wish  people.  Since  the  destruction  of 
Second  Temple  led  to  the  Diaspora 
arly  2,000  years  ago.  Jews  have  said 
prayer  ending  with  "Next  year  in 
rusalem." 

Through  all  these  years  we  shared 
>pe  of  a  homeland.  The  shared  hope 
a  homeland  held  together  in  spirit  a 
ople  who  were  scattered  all  over  the 
orld.  During  those  2,000  years,  Jews 
iten  suffered  religious  discrimination, 
quisitions,  pogroms,  and  death.  Jews 
re  too  frequently  treated  as  stran- 
trs,  even  after  living  for  generations 
inhabitants  of  countries. 
After  I  visited  Israel  in  1973,  I  read 
rthur  Morse's  book  "While  Six  Mil- 
)n  Died  [:  Chronicle  of  American 
pathy]."  the  tragic  account  of  the  ul- 
nate  in  man's  inhumanity  to  man, 
e  Holocaust.  Six  million  people  were 
lied,  most  of  European  Jewry.  They 
ed  not  only  because  of  Nazi  brutality 
it  also  because  the  entire  world 
rned  its  back  on  them  during  their 
;ars  of  suffering.  No  country  was 
illing  to  give  the  Jews  of  Europe  a 
)me  where  they  could  escape  from 
eir  torment. 

Out  of  the  ashes  of  the  Holocaust 
as  born  the  State  of  Israel,  a  promise 
"refuge  and  security  and  of  return,  at 
st,  to  the  Biblical  land  from  which 
le  Jews  were  driven  so  many  hun- 
■eds  of  years  ago. 

It  will  always  be  a  proud  chapter  in 
le  history  of  our  own  country  that  the 
jnited  States  was  the  first  nation  to 
pcognize  the  legal  existence  of  Israel 
i    1948-30  long,   fruitful,   sometimes 


seemingly  short  years  in  history. 

George  Santayana  wrote  that,  and  I 
quote,  "Those  who  cannot  remember 
the  past  are  condemned  to  repeat  it." 
The  past  brutality  against  the  Jewish 
people  throughout  the  world  and  the 
ultimate  tragedy  of  the  Holocaust  are 
events  that  Jews  will  always  re- 
member, but  they  are  also  lessons 
which  this  country  and  all  the  civilized 
world  should  never  forget. 

Through  the  indomitable  will  and 
character  of  its  own  people  and  with 
the  unshakable  commitment  of  the 
United  States  to  its  security,  the  exist- 
ence of  the  State  of  Israel  will  insure 
for  all  times  that  the  Jewish  people 
will  not  be  condemned  to  repeat  the 
Holocaust. 

The  policies  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment have  been  influenced  by  these 
indelible  memories  of  the  past.  We 
continue  to  provide  substantial  eco- 
nomic and  military  assistance  to  Is- 
rael. We  have  obtained,  this  past  year, 
tough  antiboycott  legislation  to  protect 
from  discrimination  American  Jews 
and  American  companies  doing  busi- 
ness with  Israel.  We  champion  the 
human  rights  of  Jews  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  in  other  nations  and  en- 
courage their  right  of  emigration. 

We  do  these  things  because  they  are 
right  and  because  they  are  necessary 
and  because  they  are  true  to  the  tradi- 
tions of  our  country . 

Many  nations  have  memorials  to  the 
Holocaust  victims.  There  is  no  such 
formal  memorial  in  the  United  States. 
To  insure  that  we  in  the  United  States 
never  forget,  I  will  appoint  im- 
mediately a  Presidential  commission  to 
report  to  me  within  6  months  on  an 
appropriate  memorial  in  this  country  to 
the  6  million  who  were  killed  in  the 
Holocaust. 

We  may  from  time  to  time  have  our 
transient  differences  with  the  leaders 
of  Israel  [laughter]  as  we  do  with 
leaders  of  other  countries  who  are  our 
close  friends  and  allies.  But  we  will 
never  waiver  from  our  deep  friendship 
and  partnership  with  Israel  and  our  to- 
tal, absolute  commitment  to  Israel's 
security. 

The  establishment  of  the  nation  of 
Israel  is  a  fulfillment  of  Biblical 
prophecy  and  the  very  essence  of  its 
fulfillment.  In  the  Jewish  tradition,  30 
stands  for  the  age  of  strength,  and  Is- 
rael, thank  God,  is  strong. 

There   is  a  Jewish   saying,    "From 


strength  to  strength."  And  I  trust  that 
Israel  will  indeed  evolve  from  a 
strength  rooted  in  determination  and 
vigilance  to  a  strength  that  is  rein- 
forced and  maintained  by  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  with  its  neighbors. 

That  prospect  is  coming  closer  to 
reality  today  than  at  any  time  since  the 
creation  of  a  State  of  Israel.  We  re- 
main deeply  committed  to  help  in  any 
possible  way  to  bring  the  day  closer 
when  Israel  will  live  in  security  and  in 
peace.  For  30  years  we  have  stood  at 
the  side  of  the  proud  and  independent 
nation  of  Israel.  I  can  say  without  res- 
ervation, as  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  that  we  will 
continue  to  do  so  not  just  for  another 
30  vears.  but  forever. 


Prime  Minister  Begin 

Mr.  President,  our  dear  friends,  may 
I  humbly  tell  you  that  today  we  heard 
from  the  President  of  the  United  States 
one  of  the  greatest  moral  statements 
ever. 

We  have  always  believed  in  the 
moral  greatness  of  America.  We  ap- 
peal to  it  in  difficult  times.  We  never 
lost  hope  that  it  will  win,  because  we 
have  always  remembered  the  famous 
moral  precept  of  your  predecessor, 
Mr.  President,  Abraham  Lincoln, 
"right  makes  might." 

On  behalf  of  right,  we  fought  for 
our  country  and  for  our  liberty.  In  the 
1930's,  our  people  looked  for  a  haven 
and  didn't  find  it.  In  the  1940's,  they 
cried  out  for  help  and  didn't  get  it. 
And  then  we  reached  the  conclusion 
that  if  we  don't  fight  and  conquer  our 
liberty,  nobody  will  give  it  to  us.  So, 
in  the  tradition  of  the  American 
people,  we  rose  to  fight.  There  were 
the  great  sacrifices,  the  suffering, 
but  today  is  a  day  of  rejoicing. 
Vesamachta  hechagecha! 

Although  in  the  life  of  her  people 
for  many  generations  sadness  and  joy 
are  intermingled,  yesterday  we  re- 
membered the  fallen  heroes  of  the 
ghettos,  the  helpless,  left  alone  to 
fight  not  even  for  their  lives,  not  even 
for  their  liberty  but  for  human  dignity 
and  for  the  dignity  of  their  people,  be- 
cause those  lone  fighters  indeed  fought 
for  all  humanity. 

But  today  is  a  day  of  rejoicing. 
Thirty  years  ago,  a  little  flag,  blue  and 
white,  was  hoisted  before  the  eyes  of 
all  the  nations  to  see,  namely,  Judea 
rose  again,  Israel  will  live. 

And  when  we  remember  what  hap- 
pened until  that  day — their  people, 
what  persecution  and  humiliation  they 
went  through  and,  ultimately,  mass 
physical  destruction,  then  we  can  ap- 
preciate what  an  effort  was  necessary 


42 


and  was  made  in  order  to  achieve  that 
day  of  our  national  renaissance. 

Let  us  rejoice.  The  blessing  of  free- 
dom is  incomparable  to  any  other. 
Only  he  who  lost  it  can  appreciate  it. 
And  we  had  lost  it;  we  regained  it 
with  the  efforts  and  the  self-sacrifice 
of  our  best  men.  So  today,  let  us  re- 
member our  heroes  who  made  our  vic- 
tory possible  and  our  independence  as- 
sured. 

Today  also,  my  dear  friends,  is 
from  another  point  of  view,  a  day  of 
rejoicing.  The  President  and  I  just 
finished  a  discussion  and  a  private 
talk,  and  earlier  we  had  a  talk  with  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

May  I  tell  you,  bringing  you  good 
tidings  with  all  my  heart,  thank 
God — baruch  hashem — these  discus- 
sions and  talks  are  characterized  with 
friendship,  with  understanding.  There 
is  that  feeling  that  America  and  Israel 
are  inseparable,  friends  and  allies. 

Mr.  President,  we  too,  as  you,  hope 
that  there  will  come  a  day  when  our 
brethren  in  the  Soviet  Union  will  be 
free  to  go  to  the  historic  homeland  of 
our  people.  The  Jewish  people  will 
never  give  up  a  fight  for  liberty  and 
for  justice.  Never. 

Now,  Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gen- 
tlemen, as  we  rejoice  in  the  achieve- 
ment of  Israel's  independence,  a  holi- 
day not  only  for  the  Jewish  people  but 
for  all  free  nations,  for  all  women  and 
men  of  good  will,  let  us  rededicate 
ourselves  to  the  great  concepts  of  our 
prophets — of  human  freedom  and  dig- 
nity and  justice  and  the  great  vision  of 
peace. 

Mr.  President,  we  shall  go  on  work- 
ing for  peace  with  all  our  heart  and  all 
our  soul,  because  we  yearn  for  it  and 
want  it.  And  let  us  hope  that  the  road 
for  peace  will  be  reopened  with  your 
help,  Mr.  President,  as  we  said  to 
each  other  just  awhile  ago. 

And  now,  Mr.  President,  having 
heard  your  most  moving  words,  which 
we  shall  never  forget,  I  would  like  to 
conclude  my  remarks  with  the  follow- 
ing short,  simple  statement:  For  free- 
dom, for  justice,  for  human  progress, 
and  for  human  dignity,  let  there  be 
everlasting  friendship  between  the 
great  United  States  of  America  and  the 
renewed  State  of  Israel.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bulle.l. 


Text  from    Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  May  8.  1978. 


NARCOTICS:        international 
Control  Program 


by  K.  Mathea  Falco 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to 
present  the  Department  of  State's  in- 
ternational narcotics  control  program 
appropriations  request  for  FY  1979. 
Drug  abuse  has  been  a  serious  problem 
in  the  United  States  for  over  a  decade. 
The  Federal  Government  spends  more 
than  $800  million  each  year  for  drug 
control  efforts  in  law  enforcement, 
treatment,  and  rehabilitation.  The  in- 
ternational narcotics  control  program 
(INC)  budget  represents  less  than  5% 
of  that  total  expenditure.  The  chal- 
lenge of  reducing  the  availability  of 
dangerous  drugs  in  the  United  States 
cannot  be  met  solely  by  efforts  within 
our  own  borders.  It  must  be  addressed 
as  well  in  the  developing  nations 
where  illicit  drug  crops,  such  as  opium 
and  coca,  are  cultivated  and  refined 
into  heroin  and  cocaine. 

The  President's  August  2,  1977, 
drug  abuse  message  marked  a  signifi- 
cant shift  in  drug  control  policy  from 
primarily  a  domestic  focus  to  truly  a 
global  concept.1  Victim  countries  are 
not  only  those  which  suffer  the  devas- 
tating health  and  social  consequences 
of  drug  abuse  but  also  those  whose 
political,  economic,  and  social  integ- 
rity are  threatened  by  the  illicit  drug 
traffic.  To  implement  this  new, 
broadened  perspective,  we  are  working 
through  diplomatic  and  program  initia- 
tives in  key  countries  to  curtail  illicit 
drug  production  and  traffic. 

Cooperative  Efforts 

Major  cooperative  program  efforts 
are  under  way  with  nine  countries 
which  are  the  principal  sources  of  il- 
licit drugs  coming  into  the  United 
States.  Because  of  its  devastating  im- 
pact on  the  health  and  welfare  of  our 
society,  heroin  is  our  primary  drug  of 
concern.  Mexico  continues  to  be  the 
primary  source  of  illicit  heroin,  al- 
though with  the  increasing  success  of 
the  Mexican  poppy  eradication  cam- 
paign, its  prominence  as  a  supplier  is 
decreasing. 

Southeast  Asian  heroin,  produced  in 
the  Golden  Triangle,  is  becoming  an 
increasingly  important  source  of  her- 
oin for  the  United  States  and  is  al- 
ready flooding  the  countries  of  West- 
ern Europe.  The  South  Asian  countries 
of  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  also  are 
of  serious  concern,  because  large 
quantities  of  opium  are  harvested  there 


in  remote,  mountainous  areas  whic 
often  are  not  subject  to  effective  cei 
tral  government  control.  Althoug 
most  of  this  opium  currently  is  cot 
sumed  within  the  region,  the  potenti 
for  a  massive  influx  of  South  Asia 
heroin  into  the  United  States  is  vei 
real.  Increasing  amounts  of  Sout 
Asian  opiates  are  now  reachin 
Europe. 

Current  levels  of  cocaine  use  do  m 
present  a  significant  public  heall 
threat  in  the  United  States.  Howeve 
if  cocaine  use  increases,  fatalitie 
overdoses,  and  other  adverse  heali 
and  social  consequences  might  it 
crease  dramatically.  The  goal  of  oi 
international  policy  is  to  restrict  tr 
usage  of  cocaine  through  curtailing  i 
availability. 

Bolivia  and  Peru  are  the  world 
two  largest  producers  of  coca  lea. 
from  which  cocaine  is  derives 
Ecudador  and  Colombia  figure  prom 
nently  in  cocaine  processing  and  tra  I 
fie,  and  it  is  in  these  four  countrii  I 
that  our  major  bilateral  cocaine  contrl 
efforts  are  presently  directed.  An  e| 
timated  15-17  tons  of  cocaine  reac 
the  United  States  from  South  Amerii 
each  year. 

Increased  emphasis  is  being  plact 
on  working  with  multilateral  and  r 
gional  organizations  to  strengthen  i 
licit  narcotics  production  and  traffi 
Through  these  international  and  t< 
gional  organizations,  such  as  tli 
U.N.  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Contn 
(UNFDAC),  the  Colombo  Plan,  ar 
the  Association  of  South  East  Asi& 
Nations  (ASEAN),  approaches  can  \ 
made  to  countries  unresponsive  t 
bilateral  overtures  by  the  Unite 
States  to  insure  that  they  do  nt 
themselves  become  victims  of  th 
ever-changing  patterns  of  the  illic 
drug  traffic. 


U.S.  Efforts 


During  the  past  year,  the  Depar 
ment  of  State — in  conjunction  wit 
the  President's  Strategy  Council  o 
Drug  Abuse,  the  White  House  Offic 
of  Drug  Abuse  Policy,  and  othe 
domestic  drug  agencies  —  ha 
evaluated  the  complex  and  difficu 
issues  involved  in  developing  an  el 
fective,  coherent  international  dru 
control  policy.  As  a  result  of  this  or 
going  evaluative  process,  the  Depari 
ment   has  intensified  its  activities  o 


IS1 


ici 


:BL|ne  1978 

if  itveral  different  fronts,  including  ex- 
fended   diplomatic   initiatives,    in- 
Ejased  emphasis  on  demand  reduc- 
fon    activities,    and    long-term 
.^jsearch.   The   Department  also  has 
rdertaken  a  major  reorganization  to 
iiprove  management  efficiency,  ac- 
;  liuntability.  and  coordination  of  the 
ernational  narcotics  control  program. 
is.  iPursuant  to  this  reorganization,  the 
cretary  of  State  has  directed  that 
>se  narcotics  control  functions  pre- 
>usly  performed  by  the  Agency  for 
ternational   Development  (AID)  be 
nsolidated  under  the  [State  Depart- 
snt's]   Senior  Adviser's   Office 
/NM)  to  insure  a  fuller  integration 
policy,  planning,  and  implementa- 
n.  The  consolidation  in  Washington 
s  already  taken  place;  the  changes 
overseas  missions  are  under  way 
d  scheduled  for  completion  by  the 
d  of  FY   1978.  To  insure  more  ef- 
:tive  coordination   among  the  prin- 
pal  agencies  operating  abroad  in 
rrying  out   programs  funded  under 
C  appropriations,  liaison  officers 
ve  been  detailed  to  S/NM  from  the 
•ug   Enforcement   Administration 
inPEA),  the  National  Institute  on  Drug 
ibuse.    and    the    U.S.    Customs 
-  >{rvice. 

Complementing  this  organizational 

-<»nsolidation,   the  Department   is  im- 

jementing  a  comprehensive  effort  in 

I   te  planning  of  INC  activities  on   a 

'Drldwide   basis.    In   collaboration 

'  th  the  regional  bureaus  within  State 

id  other  U.S.  agencies,  multifaceted 

;»tproaches   will   be  developed   to 

ng-term  issues  critical  in  the  resolu- 

>n  of  the  worldwide  drug  problem, 

ch  as  integrated  rural  development 

d  alternative  crop  identification  for 

■  imary  drug-producing  areas,  and 

lplementation  of  a  strategic  poppy- 

■Croin   forecasting   system.    At  the 

lime  time,  we  will  maintain  ongoing 

itiatives  in   improving  drug  control 

ipabilities  in   key  countries  through 

tchnical  and  logistical  assistance; 

aining,  treatment,  and  rehabilitation 

:monstration   projects;   and   by  en- 

juraging  expanded  interregional 

Dproaches  to  drug  abuse  control 

'forts. 

Our  program  request  for  FY  1979 
•  support  these  activities  is  $40  mil- 
on.  This  amount  is  allocated  on  a 
Jgional  and  functional  basis  in  the 
blowing  manner. 


Total 

Opium 

Cocaine 

atin  America 

$21.2 

$13.5 

$7.7 

ast  Asia 

7.8 

7.8 



ear  East 

1.5 

1.5 



)ther 

9.5 

— 

— 

$40.0   $22.8       $7.7 


The  amount  shown  as  "other"  in- 
cludes U.S.  contributions  to  interna- 
tional organizations,  substantial  train- 
ing programs  designed  and  im- 
plemented by  the  Drug  Enforcement 
Administration  and  U.S.  Customs 
Service,  the  demand  reduction  pro- 
gram implemented  largely  through  the 
National  Institute  on  Drug  Abuse,  and 
program  development  and  support 
costs. 

Mexico 

In  assisting  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment to  curtail  illicit  drug  production 
and  traffic,  we  also  seek  to  strengthen 
its  own  long-term  narcotics  control  ca- 
pability. Both  our  governments  agree 
on  the  necessity  for  joint  efforts  in 
eliminating  opium  production  in 
Mexico  and  in  breaking  up  major  traf- 
ficking networks.  The  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment wishes  to  avoid  a  domestic 
heroin  abuse  problem  and  is  acutely 
aware  of  the  corrosive  effects  that  un- 
restrained illicit  drug  trafficking  can 
have  on  the  political  and  economic 
stability  of  their  country. 

After  he  first  took  office,  Mexican 
President  Lopez  Portillo  met  with 
President  Carter  and  affirmed  his  per- 
sonal commitment  to  a  greatly  inten- 
sified effort  to  curtail  illicit  heroin 
production  and  traffic.  President 
Lopez  assigned  new  narcotics  control 
missions  to  the  Mexican  Defense  De- 
partment in  support  of  Attorney  Gen- 
eral Flores  Sanchez  who  has  overall 
responsibility  for  Mexico's  narcotics 
control  effort.  The  Mexican  Defense 
Department  is  using  more  than  20,000 
troops  in  the  primary  poppy  growing 
areas,  both  to  interdict  drug  traffic  and 
to  inhibit  planting  of  the  illicit  opium 
poppies. 

Dr.  Peter  Bourne  [Special  Assistant 
to  the  President  for  Health  Issues]  and 
I  met  twice  last  year  with  the  Mexican 
Attorney  General,  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense, and  other  Mexican  officials  to 
review  our  governments'  efforts  to 
curtail  illicit  narcotics  production  and 
traffic.  At  our  most  recent  meeting  last 
December,  the  Mexicans  discussed 
with  us  specific  elements  of  their  ex- 
panded national  narcotics  control  plan, 
which  calls  for  an  intensified  eradica- 
tion and  interdiction  effort  over  the 
next  3  years. 

Since  1973,  the  United  States  has 
provided  approximately  $50  million  in 
international  narcotics  control  assist- 
ance to  Mexico.  During  the  past  year 
(FY  1977).  approximately  30%  of  our 
total  program  budget,  $13.4  million, 
was  committed  to  assisting  the  Mexi- 
can effort.  An  additional  $16.8  mil- 
lion,  to   meet  immediate  program 


43 

needs,  is  projected  for  this  fiscal  year 
(FY  1978).  This  large  commitment  for 
1978  will  reduce  requirements  for  FY 
1979,  and  we  are,  accordingly,  request- 
ing $13.5  million  for  next  year. 

The  Mexican  Federal  Government 
estimates  that  it  spends  well  over  $40 
million  annually  in  its  drug  control  ef- 
forts. This  figure  does  not  include  per- 
sonnel and  resources  committed  at  the 
state  and  local  levels.  The  Mexican 
Attorney  General's  office  employs 
about  500  enforcement  agents,  pilots, 
mechanics,  managers,  and  administra- 
tive personnel  on  a  year-round  basis  in 
the  narcotics  control  effort.  During 
spring  and  fall,  when  the  poppy 
eradication  campaigns  are  intensified, 
70%  of  the  Attorney  General's  approx- 
imately 3,000  personnel  are  devoted  to 
the  program. 

The  Mexicans  have  also  paid  a 
human  toll  for  their  efforts.  Scores  of 
Mexican  enforcement  officials  and 
soldiers  have  been  injured  or  killed 
during  recent  years  while  carrying  out 
drug  control  activities.  Six  Mexican 
federal  judicial  agents  were  killed  in 
1977,  and  12  were  seriously  injured 
during  eradication  operations. 

During  the  1977  poppy  eradication 
campaigns,  approximately  47,000 
fields  of  opium  poppies  (comprising 
about  14,000  acres)  were  destroyed. 
These  figures  represent  an  increase  of 
almost  50%  over  the  previous  year's 
eradication  effort.  An  additional  7,847 
poppy  fields  were  destroyed  in  January 
and  February  of  this  year. 

The  real  success  of  the  Mexican  ef- 
fort can  be  measured  in  terms  of  re- 
duced amounts  of  heroin  reaching  the 
United  States.  DEA  estimates  that  in 
1977  the  Mexican  eradication  program 
prevented  the  equivalent  of  more  than 
10  tons  of  heroin  from  entering  the 
United  States.  The  scarcity  of  heroin 
supplies  in  Mexico  has  resulted  in  an 
upward  movement  of  wholesale  prices. 
According  to  DEA  data,  heroin  purity 
on  our  city  streets  has  dropped  to  the 
lowest  point  since  1973  (5%).  The  in- 
crease in  heroin  retail  prices  to  their 
highest  point  on  record  ($1.69  per 
milligram),  decrease  in  purity  levels, 
and  the  decline  in  heroin  overdose 
deaths  (44%  below  last  year)  to  the 
lowest  point  since  1973  are  significant 
signs  of  progress. 

The  Mexican  Government  is  pres- 
ently reviewing  economic  and  social 
studies  designed  to  develop  alternative 
sources  of  income  for  the  remote,  poor 
regions  where  poppy  is  grown.  The 
Mexican  Government  has  not  sought 
U.S.  assistance  for  such  programs  but 
might  turn  to  international  financial 
institutions  or  U.N.  organizations  for 
necessary  support. 


44 

Bolivia  and  Peru 

Coca  leaf  has  been  grown  on  the 
Andean  slopes  of  Bolivia  and  Peru  for 
thousands  of  years.  Use  of  the  leaf 
dates  from  the  Inca  era  when  it  was 
chewed  by  priests  during  religious 
ceremonies  It  is  a  deeply  ingrained 
cultural  habit  which  is  continued  today 
by  perhaps  2  million  residents  of  the 
region.  Although  chewing  of  the  leaf 
is  more  prevalent  in  rural,  high- 
altitude  areas,  coca  tea  is  consumed  by 
virtually  all  segments  of  Bolivian  so- 
ciety. Bolivia  and  Peru  are  the  world's 
two  largest  producers  of  coca  leaf  and 
both  permit  legal  cultivation. 

Bolivia.  Bolivia  is  in  the  second 
year  of  an  accelerated  program  to  limit 
coca  cultivation  to  levels  required  for 
legal  internal  use  while  strengthening 
the  capability  of  its  enforcement  agen- 
cies to  prevent  leakage  of  the  crop  to 
the  production  of  cocaine.  Experi- 
ments are  being  conducted  with  alter- 
native crops  to  replace  coca  which  will 
provide  the  basis  for  integrated  rural 
development  programs  in  the  Yungas 
and  Chapare  coca  growing  regions. 
Provision  of  economic  alternatives,  as 
well  as  improvement  of  existing  crops 
such  as  coffee  and  cacao,  food  proc- 
essing, and  marketing  structures  will 
allow  Bolivia  to  implement  a  phased 
ban  on  coca  cultivation.  As  part  of 
this  process.  Bolivia  has  recently 
completed  a  registry  of  all  coca  grow- 
ers and  banned  new  coca  cultivation. 
We  are  requesting  SI. 8  million  in  FY 
1979  to  assist  Bolivian  pilot  rural  de- 
velopment efforts  in  primary  coca 
growing  regions.  In  addition,  AID  will 
provide"  $8.5  million  in  rural  develop- 
ment assistance  to  expand  the  pilot 
projects 

The  Bolivian  National  Directorate 
for  Control  of  Dangerous  Substances 
(DNSP)  has  demonstrated  substantial 
progress  in  drug  enforcement  in  the 
last  year,  particularly  in  the  seizure  of 
cocaine  laboratories.  The  most  recent 
seizure,  in  February,  immobilized 
principal  elements  of  an  international 
trafficking  network. 

The  DNSP  has  also  placed  narcotics 
enforcement  and  intelligence  units  in 
coca  transit  and  production  areas  to 
enforce  the  ban  on  new  plantings  of 
coca  and  to  control  the  movement  of 
leaves  and  processed  coca.  For  FY 
1979  we  are  requesting  $1.7  million  to 
strengthen  the  DNSP  through  advisor) 
and  Training  services,  communications 
equipment,  vehicles,  and  a  utility  heli- 
copter. This  will  also  enable  the  DNSP 
to  target  effectivelj  major  trafficking 
organizations 

Peru.  The  Government   of  Peru  in 


early  March  promulgated  a  new  com- 
prehensive drug  law  which  prohibits 
plantings  of  coca  in  new  areas  and  re- 
quires conversion  of  larger  coca  fields 
to  other  crops  within  3  years.  Actual 
conversion  of  smaller  coca  plots  prob- 
ablj  will  depend  on  the  government's 
ability  to  provide  these  subsistence 
farmers  with  economic  alternatives. 

Implementation  of  the  new  drug  law 
will  be  entrusted  to  a  new  inter- 
ministerial  body  assisted  by  police 
units.  Our  Embassy  in  Lima  is  work- 
ing with  the  Peruvian  Government  on 
a  "number  of  projects  related  to 
licensed  coca  production  and  market- 
ing, illicit  crop  control,  and  law  en- 
forcement. In  FY  1979  we  are  request- 
ing $871,000  for  coca  crop  control. 
We  are  also  requesting  continued  sup- 
port ($566,000)  for  Peruvian  narcotics 
law  enforcement  agencies,  primarily 
for  training  and  communications 
equipment. 


Colombia  and  Ecuador 

Ecuador  is  the  receiving  point  for 
most  of  the  coca  paste  headed  north 
from  Peru.  Much  of  it  arrives  over- 
land, carried  by  all  types  of  con- 
veyances and  passengers.  Small  quan- 
tities of  the  paste  are  converted  to 
cocaine  in  Ecuador,  but  most  of  it  con- 
tinues to  Colombia  for  further  refine- 
ment. There  it  passes  into  the  hands  of 
the  professional  traffickers.  Colombia 
is  the  refining  and  transshipment  point 
for  the  major  portion  of  cocaine  reach- 
ing the  United  States.  The  income  de- 
rived by  the  criminal  networks  exceeds 
the  national  revenue  from  the  export 
of  coffee.  Colombia's  major  source  of 
foreign  exchange. 

In"  1977  the"  increased  commitment 
of  the  governments  in  the  major  nar- 
cotics program  countries  in  the  region 
and  a  growing  professionalism  in  the 
better  equipped  narcotics  enforcement 
agencies  resulted  in  many  more  signif- 
icant seizures  of  illicit  drugs  and  the 
arrest  of  key  violators.  One  of  the 
more  successful  cases  in  Colombia  re- 
sulted in  the  seizure  of  1.100  pounds 
ot  cocaine  base.  The  Colombian  sei- 
zures represent  a  greater  quantity  ot 
cocaine  than  the  total  amount  seized  in 
the  United  States  in  1977.  Ecuador 
also  showed  a  substantial  rise  in 
cocaine  seizures  in  1977  over  1976 
and  a  doubling  of  the  amount  of  proc- 
essed marijuana  seized. 

Colombia.  In  meetings  last  June. 
President  Lopez  of  Colombia  ex- 
pressed his  personal  commitment  to 
joint  narcotics  control  efforts.  Last 
December  he  established  a  select  nar- 
cotics enforcement  unit  under  the  At- 


Department  of  State  Bulle. 

torney  General,  for  which  we  are  prt  !' 
vidin»   training  through   DEA.   In  F 
1979  we   are  requesting  $180,000  t  » 
strengthen  the  Attorney  General's  ne< 
narcotics  unit.    Assistance  funds  wi ' 
continue  to  be  programmed   to  otht 
law  enforcement  entities  in   Colombi 
so    long    as   they    continue    to   hav  Sit 
narcotics     control     functions.     Fc  ^ 
FY    1979   we   are   asking   $830,00 
for    support    of    such    enforcemer  '■( 
organizations. 

Three  helicopters  provided  the  Co 
ombian  Government  last  Septembe 
have  been  effectively  used,  most  noM 
bly  in  an  October  raid  where  agent 
seized  1,100  pounds  of  cocaine  basi 
an  aircraft,  weapons,  several  vehicle; 
and  arrested  a  key  drug  trafficke 
More  recently,  the  helicopters  wet 
used  in  a  raid  which  netted  165  tons* 
marijuana.  We  are  requestin 
$300,000  in  FY  1979  for  continue 
maintenance  and  support  of  U.S 
provided  helicopters,  as  well  as  i 
other  aircraft  provided  by  the  Go 
ernment  of  Colombia. 


: 


I 

: 
I 
t 

Ecuador.  The  United  States  h; 
provided  financial  assistance 
Ecuador's  narcotics  enforcement  o 
ganizations  since  1973.  Such  suppc 
has  helped  that  country's  antinarcoti 
effort,  and  in  1977  drug  seizures  ai , 
arrests  by  Ecuador's  police  increasi 
substantially  over  those  in  1976.  B 
ginning  in  1978  we  have  expanded  o 
assistance  to  include  support  for  t| 
Ministry  of  Education's  campaign 
increase  public  awareness  of  the  dru 
problem.  In  FY  1979  we  are  reque; 
ing  $436,000  to  assist  Ecuador's  m 
cotics  enforcement  units  and  S  100.01 
for  demand  reduction  efforts. 

Mr.   Richard   Arellano.   Deputy   A 
sistant   Secretary   for   Inter- Amu  ic; 
Affairs,  and  I  have  just  returned  fro 
Quito.   While  there,   we  conveyed  tH 
high  priority  which  our  government  a 
taches  to  international  narcotics  co 
trol.   We  were  pleased  to  receive 
firm   commitment   from   the  Govel 
ment   of  Ecuador  to  cooperate   mo- 
closely  on  narcotics  matters,  while  v- 
assured   that  government  of  our  coi 
tinned  support  for  such  cooperation. 

In  the  coming  year,  regional  coo] 
eration  in  narcotics  control  will  | 
ceive  added  State  Department  impeti 
as  we  seek  to  encourage  Latin  Amer 
can  countries  to  coordinate  their  na 
cotics  efforts  more  closely.  Areas  < 
potential  cooperation  include  enforci 
ment,  crop  substitution,  demand  redui 
don,  and  research  efforts.  As  part  < 
this  cooperation,  a  regional  narcotii 
communications  network  in  Sout 
America  will  be  completed  and  a  prt 
gram  inaugurated  to  foster  joint  plai 


it  1978 

K  and  coordination  of  operations 
■nst  international  trafficking  net- 
Iks.  In  FY  1979  we  are  requesting 
IJO.000  to  support  joint  regional  nar- 
■cs  enforcement  projects  in  Latin 
Krica. 

Ijhanistan  and  Pakistan 

■he  cultivation  and  use  of  opium 
fcy  is  deeply  ingrained  in  the  cul- 
M  of  areas  of  Afghanistan  and  Paki- 
■  .  based  on  centuries  of  practice 
I  public  acceptance.  In  contempo- 
ii  Pakistan,  the  opium  gum  is  added 
»a  or  processed  to  a  primitive  stage 

I  smoked  as  a  relaxant  by  a  large 
■nent  of  the  older  peasant  classes  or 

II  as  a  medicine.  The  poppy  straw 
lised  for  animal  fodder  and  to 
Bigthen  the  adobe-type  building  ma- 
uls. In  certain  areas  of  Afghani- 
1,  opium  is  the  only  available  form 
■ledication,  and  the  oil  and  seeds  of 
lipoppy  are  used  in  cooking. 

ittle  or  no  capability  for  processing 
lim  into  heroin  exists  in  Afghani- 
ta  today,  and  most  of  the  opium  leav- 
■jthe  country  is  smuggled  in  ton  lots 
l)ss  the  border  into  Pakistan  and 
I  by  animal  caravans  and  vehicles, 
f  primates  which  place  Afghanistan's 
iiestic  consumption  of  opium  at 
Bind  100  tons  a  year  are  correct,  as 
I  h  as  270  tons  of  Afghan  opium 
i    he  exported  during  the  coming 

fghanistan.  The  Afghan  Govern- 
ttit's  antinarcotics  effort  has  been 
t  ely  directed  at  the  traffickers  in 
ifim.  In  1977,  Afghan  authorities 
led  13  metric  tons  of  opium.  How- 
Ni",  police  units  assigned  to  antitraf- 
ijing  duties  are  undermanned,  under- 
nied,  and  underequipped.  The  U.N. 
'I  d  for  Drug  Abuse  Control,  the 
ft  cipal  agency  through  which  inter- 
Uonal  narcotics  control  assistance  is 
ilnneled  to  Afghanistan,  is  assisting 
nhe  development  of  a  more  effective 
|:rdiction  capability.  We  have 
aplied  training  through  the  Drug  En- 
t:ement  Administration  and  the  U.S. 
Ji;toms  Service. 

Iv  joint  commission  consisting  of 
eresentatives  of  the  Afghan  Gov- 
nment,  the  United  Nations,  and  the 
Kited  States  has  been  established  in 
Gbul  to  coordinate  narcotics  control 
Ivities.  A  U.S.  development  expert 
londed  to  the  U.N.  Fund  for  Drug 
|use  Control  has  designed  an  infe- 
cted rural  development  project  for 
li  Upper  Helmand  opium  producing 
la,  which  will  be  financed  by  inter- 
ilional  donor  countries  and  financial 
i.titutions.  This  project  will  provide 
mers  alternatives  to  opium  cultiva- 
In  and  thus  allow  the  Afghan  Gov- 


ernment to  eliminate  opium  production 
from  the  area.  We  are  requesting 
$500,000  to  support  selected  crop  re- 
placement and  enforcement  activities 
to  complement  existing  multilateral  ef- 
forts. 

During  the  past  year,  AID  has  used 
side  letters  with  the  Afghan  Govern- 
ment to  require  that  AID  assistance 
not  be  used  to  foster  opium  cultiva- 
tion. We  received  a  report  from  the 
Afghan  Government  that  in  late 
January  it  plowed  under  70  hectares  of 
opium  poppy  discovered  in  one  of  the 
project  areas. 

Pakistan.  Pakistan  is  estimated  to 
have  produced  200  tons  of  opium  dur- 
ing 1977,  of  which  120  tons  were  con- 
sumed locally.  The  remaining  80  tons 
finds  its  way  into  Iran,  Turkey,  West- 
ern Europe,  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  As 
in  Afghanistan,  Pakistan's  opium 
poppy  fields  are  concentrated  in  re- 
mote border  areas  where  the  central 
government  exercises  minimal  control. 
Production  is  centered  in  the  desolate 
mountainous  regions  of  the  North 
West  Frontier  Province  bordering  Af- 
ghanistan, where  most  of  the  poppy 
farmers  live  at  a  subsistence  level  with 
opium  as  the  only  cash  crop. 

Our  narcotics  control  assistance  in 
Pakistan  is  directed  at  helping  develop 
the  local  capability  to  keep  Pakistan 
opium  and  its  derivatives  from  enter- 
ing the  international  market  and  to  as- 
sist in  the  development  of  alternative 
cash  crops  to  replace  opium.  We  are 
requesting  $850,000  in  FY  1979  for 
the  Swabi  Tehsil  project  which  will 
identify  economic  alternatives  to 
poppy  cultivation  in  that  area  of  the 
North  West  Frontier  Province.  This 
project  will  in  turn  serve  as  the  basis 
for  a  large-scale  rural  development 
undertaking  for  which  support  of  other 
major  donor  countries  will  be  sought. 

Political  instability  during  the  past 
year,  which  led  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
Bhutto  government  by  the  military, 
created  conditions  which  did  not  allow 
our  bilateral  efforts  to  progress  as  suc- 
cessfully as  we  had  hoped.  As  condi- 
tions in  the  country  stabilize  and  the 
military  leadership  devotes  its  attention 
to  the  narcotics  problem,  we  expect 
more  vigorous  control  of  both  traffick- 
ing and  production.  For  FY  1979  we 
are  requesting  $150,000  to  equip  Paki- 
stan's customs  service  with  vehicles 
and  patrol  craft  to  interdict  drugs  leav- 
ing the  country  through  the  Karachi 
seaport  and  adjacent  coast. 


Southeast  Asia 

Southeast  Asian  illicit  narcotics  pro- 
duction and  traffic  have  plagued  the 


45 


world  for  decades.  Despite  the  valiant 
efforts  of  law  enforcement  officers 
around  the  world,  tightly  organized  in- 
ternational trafficking  groups  continue 
to  profit  from  the  misery  they  bring  to 
others  in  the  form  of  drug  addiction.  In 
Southeast  Asia,  narcotics  control  ef- 
forts are  further  complicated  by  tradi- 
tional political  instability  and  in- 
surgency, creating  situations  in  which 
illicit  narcotics  traffic  can  flourish.  De- 
spite these  obstacles,  however,  prog- 
ress in  reducing  Southeast  Asian  nar- 
cotics production  and  traffic  is  being 
made.  My  January  visit  to  Southeast 
Asia  encouraged  me  that  prospects  of 
curtailing  the  illicit  narcotics  traffic  in 
that  region  are  more  favorable  now 
than  at  any  time  in  the  past. 

We  are  particularly  encouraged  by 
two  aspects  of  recent  Golden  Triangle 
narcotics  trafficking  developments:  the 
flow  of  raw  and  refined  narcotics  and 
the  prices  at  which  they  are  sold.  Dur- 
ing the  last  6  months,  shipments  of  raw 
or  processed  opiates  from  the  northern 
Shan  State  to  the  Thai-Burma  border 
refining  areas  have  declined  very 
sharply,  accompanied  as  well  by  signif- 
icant decreases  from  most  other  parts 
of  Shan  State. 

These  reductions  are  a  result  of  the 
aggressive  Burmese  narcotics  eradica- 
tion and  interdiction  program,  which 
has  drastically  reduced  opium  produc- 
tion and  led  to  the  virtual  disappear- 
ance of  the  large  narcotics  caravans  so 
common  in  the  past.  Narcotics  deliv- 
ered to  the  border  have  been  increas- 
ingly handled  by  relatively  small-time 
traffickers  dealing  in  limited  quantities. 
Moreover,  unlike  previous  years  of 
opium  surplus,  opiate  products  now 
reaching  the  border  area  go  directly 
.into  refineries,  bypassing  storage  sites. 
Despite  the  decline  in  border  deliv- 
eries, the  output  of  processed  heroin 
has  remained  high,  an  indication  that 
large  stockpiles  which  had  existed  for 
so  long  are  now  being  drawn  down.  If 
these  trends  continue,  the  result  will  be 
an  inevitable  drop  in  the  availability  of 
Golden  Triangle  heroin. 

Also  encouraging  has  been  the  be- 
havior of  narcotics  prices  in  the  Golden 
Triangle  in  the  past  year.  Border  prices 
for  narcotics  are  at  their  lowest  levels 
in  several  years.  These  low  prices  are 
an  indication  that  the  large  stockpiles 
which  had  been  cached  in  the  border 
areas  are  still  sufficient  to  meet  current 
demand.  To  understand  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  low  prices  at  the  border 
refinery  area,  they  must  be  compared 
to  the  price  of  finished  opiates  in 
Bangkok,  where  prices  are  up  sharply 
above  1976  levels.  The  current  price 
differential  per  kilogram  of  heroin  is 
nearly  $1,400  between  the  border  re- 


46 

finery  areas  and  Bangkok.  This  com- 
pares with  a  1976  price  differential  of 
slightly  over  $700.  A  price  spread  of 
this  magnitude  indicates  the  high-risk 
factor  in  moving  narcotics  from  the 
border  areas  to  Bangkok  created  by  ag- 
gressive enforcement  efforts  by  Thai 
police  organizations. 

Thailand.  In  Thailand  I  met  with  the 
Prime  Minister,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
and  other  government  officials  respon- 
sible for  narcotics  control.  During  our 
several  meetings.  Prime  Minister 
Kriangsak  expressed  to  me  his  firm 
commitment  to  move  against  the  illicit 
narcotics  traffic  which  transits  his 
country  to  reach  regional  and  interna- 
tional markets.  An  important  key  to 
suppression  of  this  traffic  is  coopera- 
tion among  countries  of  the  Golden 
Triangle,  particularly  Burma  and  Thai- 
land. During  our  meetings.  Prime 
Minister  Kriangsak  pledged  personally 
to  pursue  close  cooperation  with  the 
Government  of  Burma. 

On  a  bilateral  basis,  the  Department 
of  State  is  exploring  possible  support 
for  a  pilot  rural  development  project 
for  the  Mae  Chaem  watershed — an  area 
which  produces  approximately  one-half 
of  that  country's  estimated  annual 
50-ton  opium  crop — scheduled  for  im- 
plementation this  summer.  The  Agency 
for  International  Development  has  re- 
quested $2.2  million  for  this  highland 
integrated  rural  development  project. 

Thailand  and  the  United  States  have 
just  signed  a  5-year  agreement  under 
which  the  United  States  will  provide 
treatment  and  rehabilitation  assistance 
for  Thai  drug  addicts.  Over  the  term  of 
the  agreement,  the  Bangkok  metropoli- 
tan health  department  addict  treatment 
project  will  establish  detoxification 
programs  at  15  existing  public  health 
centers  for  treating  narcotics  addicts 
and  will  provide  training  for  Thai 
treatment  specialists.  The  accord  marks 
the  first  direct  U.S.  involvement  in 
supporting  Thai  Government  efforts  to 
rehabilitate  the  estimated  400,000  Thai 
narcotics  addicts. 

To  assist  Thai  efforts  in  FY  1979, 
we  have  requested  $1,674,000,  slightly 
more  than  the  $1,549,000  allotted  for 
FY  1978.  About  half  of  these  funds 
($866,000)  will  be  used  to  maintain 
ongoing  cooperative  programs  with 
Thai  police  and  customs,  particularly 
in  training  and  communications.  A  new 
aspect  of  our  program  in  Thailand  is 
the  Bangkok  treatment  project  men- 
tioned previously,  for  which  we  have 
requested  $274,000  in  FY  1979.  To 
support  crop  substitution  efforts  we 
have  requested  $400,000  in  FY  1979. 
Burma.  In  January,  Deputy  Assist- 


ant Secretary  [for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs  Robert  B]  Oakley  and  I  met 
with  Burmese  officials  and  visited  drug 
abuse  prevention  and  treatment  pro- 
grams in  Rangoon.  We  were  particu- 
larly impressed  with  the  extensive 
nationwide  preventive  education  cam- 
paign being  conducted  in  Burmese 
schools  at  all  levels. 

Our  discussions  with  Colonel  Sein 
Lwin,  Minister  of  Home  and  Religious 
Affairs  and  Chairman  of  the  Burmese 
Narcotics  Control  Board,  assured  us  of 
the  strong  Burmese  commitment  to 
suppress  illicit  narcotics  cultivation  and 
trafficking.  We  stressed  the  importance 
of  cooperation  with  Thailand  to  in- 
crease the  effectiveness  of  suppression 
efforts. 

From  Rangoon,  I  accompanied  sev- 
eral high-ranking  Burmese  enforcement 
officials  to  observe  large-scale  poppy 
eradication  projects  under  way  in  the 
Shan  State.  As  of  February  28,  more 
than  8,000  acres  of  opium  poppies  had 
been  destroyed  this  year,  eliminating 
an  estimated  potential  38  tons  of  opium 
from  the  illicit  traffic.  Fields  from 
which  poppies  had  previously  been 
eradicated  were  now  planted  with  food 
crops  such  as  rice,  potatoes,  and  vege- 
tables by  the  same  farmers  who  had 
previously  grown  poppies.  The  Bur- 
mese did  not  hesitate,  however,  to 
show  me  areas  where  illicit  poppies 
were  still  growing.  They  pointed  out 
that  those  fields  would  also  be  the  sub- 
ject of  their  eradication  campaigns  but 
that  resource  limitations  would  delay 
their  destruction. 

Our  FY  1979  budget  request  for 
Burma  is  $6,050,000,  an  increase  of 
approximately  $1.2  million  over  FY 
1978.  This  will  provide  for  six  helicop- 
ters ($3,800,000),  communications 
equipment  ($250,000),  and  aircraft 
maintenance  assistance  ($1,940,000)  to 
strengthen  the  Burmese  efforts  to  cur- 
tail illicit  narcotics  production  and  traf- 
ficking. Three  of  the  requested  helicop- 
ters will  replace  those  that  have 
crashed.  The  additional  three  will 
strengthen  the  Burmese  capability  to 
locate  illicit  poppy  fields  and  narcotics 
refineries. 

Malaysia.  We  have  recently  agreed 
to  assist  the  Malaysian  Government  in 
a  demand  reduction  project.  An  Ameri- 
can drug  abuse  adviser  will  work  for  a 
year  with  Malaysian  drug  experts  to 
develop  a  halfway  house  to  rehabilitate 
addicts  after  their  release  from  gov- 
ernment treatment  facilities.  At  the 
same  time,  a  three-member  training 
team  will  work  with  Malaysian  health 
authorities  to  train  specialists  in  vari- 
ous aspects  of  drug  treatment  and  re- 


Department  of  State  Bui; 

habilitation.  Our  contribution  to  > 
program  in  FY  1978  will  be  apprc 
mately  $200,000.  Requirements  for 
1979  have  not  yet  been  precisely  de 
mined,  pending  results  of  the  ini 
phase. 


U.N.  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Contro 

As  this  committee  knows,  the  Uni 
States  has  traditionally  been  the  ma 
financial  contributor  to  the  U.N.  Ft  J 
for  Drug  Abuse  Control.  One  of 
most  significant  developments  this  p 
year  was  the  broadening  of  the  Funj 
financial  base  through  major  contri 
tions  from  several  countries,  parti 
larly  the  substantial  $5.4  million  cc 
mitment  by  Norway  for  crop  substi 
tion  in   Burma.   As  a  result  of  th  I 
pledges,  our  contribution  to  the  Func  t 
1977  represented  slightly  less  than  rj 
of  the  total  financial  commitment:  J 
received.  At  last  month's  Commissi 
on  Narcotic  Drugs  meeting  in  Gene 
to  which  I  was  the  U.S.  representati 
I  expressed  our  government's  pleas 
at  that  development  and  our  hope  I 
major  contributions  from  other  CO' 
tries  would  continue  to  reduce  the  U 
share.  In  FY  1979,  we  are  request 
$3  million  for  UNFDAC,  the  sa 
amount  as  our  1978  contribution. 

In  Geneva  I  noted  the  increasing  i 
ognition  that  contributions  from  g 
ernmental  development  aid  funds 
appropriate  for  UNFDAC  projec 
which  further  the  socioeconomic 
velopment  of  primary  narcotics  prod 
ing  areas  while  at  the  same  ti 
eliminating  illicit  narcotics  crops.  ' 
increasing  availability  of  such  contri 
tions  to  UNFDAC  requires  careful, 
vance  planning  of  projects  for  subn 
sion  to  potential  donors.  We  have  p 
vided  the  services  of  a  developmer 
planning  expert  to  assist  the  Fund 
meeting  this  need,  as  with  the  in 
grated  rural  development  project  be 
developed  in  the  Upper  Helmand  V 
ley  in  Afghanistan. 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Fore 
Operations  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  App 
priations  on  Mar.  21,  1978.  The  compl 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
the  committee  and  will  he  available  from 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gove 
ment  Printing  Office,  Washington.  D 
20402 .  Ms.  Falco  is  Senior  Adviser  and  Dir 
tor  for  International  Narcotics  Control  M 
ters. 

"For   excerpts    of   the    message    relating 
foreign    policy,    see    Bulletin    of   Sept. 
1977. 


k 

i 


i-' 


1978 


OCEANS:     Law  oi  the 
Sea  Conference 


tElliot  L.  Richardson 


|ti  less  than  2  weeks  |  March  29-May 

■  1978]  representatives  of  156  coun- 
ts will  assemble  in  Geneva  at  the 
lenth  session  of  the  third  U.N.  Con- 
■■nce  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  to  try 

■  e  again  to  hammer  out  a  com- 
■tensive  treaty. 

■"he  last  attempt  to  reach  agreement, 
Ihe  sixth  session  held  in  New  York 
I  summer,  ended  in  disarray  and — 
tn  the  U.S.  point  of  view — setback 
I:  disillusionment.1  Through  the 
arcise  of  procedural  sleight-of-hand, 
•cipromises  on  the  exploration  and 
Iloitation  of  the  deep  seabed — an 
*ie  of  paramount  import  to  the 
■ted  States  and  a  host  of  other 
liions — were  summarily  discarded, 
r.'se  compromises — struck  after 
«ks  of  painstaking  effort  and  open 
Jjcussion — were  replaced  in  the 
I.otiating  text  by  provisions  de- 
niped  in  secret  that  are  clearly  inimi- 
:)  to  essential  U.S.  interests. 
)isturbed  by  this  abridgment  of  due 

■  cess,  and  unsure  of  the  advantages 

■  continued  participation,  I  felt  con- 
it  ined  to  recommend  to  the  President 
lit  the  United  States  undertake  a 
jerching  review  of  both  conference 
tacedures  and  the  substantive  matters 
Dure  it.  This  review  is  still  in  proc- 
K  It  is  so  advanced,  however,  that  I 
01  now  appropriately  share  with  you 
it  principal  conclusions  which  guide 

■  preparations  for  the  forthcoming 
Bion. 

I"he  first  issue  to  come  under 
BUtiny  was  the  continued  desirability 

■  working  toward  a  treaty.  In  light  of 
irouraging  reverses,  did  the  United 
Stes  still  believe  that  a  treaty  was  in 
I  national  interest?  The  response  to 
ttt  question  remains  affirmative.  We 
I  still  convinced  that  a  new  mag- 
nude  of  global  order  can  emanate 
fim  successful  negotiations  on  the  law 
ithe  sea.  A  treaty  deemed  just  and 
editable  by  the  world  community  can 
dlmatically  enhance  the  prospects  for 
I  rule  of  law. 

But  commitment  alone  carries  no 
girantee  of  success.  Agreement  at  the 
senth  session  can  come  only  through 
a;  exertion  of  political  will  and  a  de- 
tmination  by  all  nations  to  forge  an 
a.ommodation  that  leaves  no  nation 
wh  its  essential  interests  impaired. 


Deep  Seabed  Mining 

For  the  United  States,  success  of  the 
conference  will  depend  on  unraveling 
the  tangle  of  conflicts  surrounding  the 
deep  seabed  mining  issue.  More  than 
our  essential  interests  are  at  stake  in 
this  area;  there  is  opportunity  here  to 
establish  a  precedent  which  can  serve 
as  a  blueprint  for  the  development  of 
future  international  institutions  con- 
cerned with  common  resources.  The 
deep  seabed  beyond  areas  of  national 
jurisdiction  contains  vast  quantities  of 
nodules  that  can  become  a  major  source 
of  the  manganese,  nickel,  copper,  and 
cobalt  needed  by  an  increasingly  indus- 
trialized world. 

We  support  the  concept  of  an  Inter- 
national Seabed  Resource  Authority 
that  would  supervise  the  conduct  of 
deep  seabed  mining.  We  believe  that 
revenues  stemming  from  these  mining 
operations  should  be  shared  among  the 
nations  of  the  world.  Yet  the  current 
negotiating  text  would  discourage  entry 
into  the  deep  seabed  by  those  nations 
which  are  both  able  to  extract  its  min- 
erals and  have  a  growing  need  for 
them.  The  text  imposes  onerous  finan- 
cial conditions,  dictates  mandatory 
transfer  of  technology  as  a  condition  of 
access,  and  contains  several  other  fea- 
tures which  would  combine  to  deter  en- 
trepreneurs from  investing  the  $700- 
900  million  required  to  bring  a  single 
mining  site  into  production. 

Our  position  on  mining  the  deep  sea- 
bed is  clear. 


•  We  accept  a  dual  system  of  de- 
velopment which  will  give  states  and 
companies,  as  well  as  the  international 
Enterprise,  reasonable  assurance  of  ac- 
cess to  seabed  resources.  We  reject  the 
concept  of  rigid  state  centralism  pro- 
jected on  a  global  scale. 

•  We  accept  some  limitation  on  pro- 
duction of  seabed  minerals  in  deference 
to  the  essential  interests  of  land-based 
producers — but  not  to  the  extent  that  it 
excessively  restricts  the  availability  of 
resources  needed  by  an  expanding 
world  economy. 

•  We  believe  that  the  Authority 
should  be  controlled  in  ways  that 
adequately  take  into  account  such  fac- 
tors as  production,  investment,  and 
consumption — and  not  be  based  on  the 
simplistic,  ideological  platform  of  one 
nation,  one  vote. 


47 

There  is  room  for  compromise  in 
these  positions,  but  the  fundamental 
concerns  they  express  cannot  be  ig- 
nored. If  the  final  text  fails  to  recog- 
nize these  concerns,  the  United  States 
could  not  become  a  party  to  it. 

Unfortunately  we  cannot  be  confi- 
dent that  we  shall  be  able  to  achieve 
our  goals.  It  follows  that  the  United 
States  must  stand  ready  to  protect  its 
interests  should  an  unbridgeable  split 
appear  in  the  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  mining  will 
begin  during  the  next  decade  regardless 
of  the  outcome  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference.  The  forces  already  in  mo- 
tion have  an  irresistible  momentum. 
The  deep  seabeds  are  a  new  and  invit- 
ing frontier,  ready  for  exploitation. 
Technology  is  becoming  increasingly 
advanced.  Should  the  conference  fail  to 
reach  agreement  on  a  seabed  mining 
regime,  it  would  be  a  distortion  of  the 
concept  of  the  seabeds  as  the  common 
heritage  of  mankind  to  allow  this  con- 
cept to  prevent  the  development  of  this 
important  new  resource. 

On  the  domestic  front,  legislation  to 
facilitate  the  initiation  of  deep  sea  min- 
ing operations  by  American  corpora- 
tions is  moving  through  Congress. 
The  Administration  favors  this  legis- 
lation— not  for  use  as  a  club  to 
beat  down  opposition  in  Geneva — but 
in  the  belief  that  we  must  be  prepared 
to  provide  the  necessary  encourage- 
ment and  support  to  our  industry  in  its 
development  of  this  new  resource 
whether  or  not  a  comprehensive  treaty 
on  the  law  of  the  sea  can  be  negotiated. 
I  do  not,  however,  anticipate  congres- 
sional passage  of  a  seabed  mining  bill 
until  some  time  after  the  seventh  ses- 
sion closes  on  May  19th. 

Other  Major  U.S.  Interests 

Our  review  has  reached  certain  con- 
clusions regarding  other  major  law  of 
the  sea  interests. 

Navigation  and  Security  Interests. 

As  a  global  power  with  extensive  inter- 
ests in  the  maintenance  of  high  seas 
freedoms,  the  United  States  has  placed 
much  emphasis  in  the  negotiations  on 
maintaining  those  freedoms  in  the  face 
of  unilateral  actions  that  purport  to  as- 
sert national  jurisdiction  of  various 
kinds  over  the  high  seas. 

The  negotiating  text  before  the 
conference  provides  for  freedom  of 
navigation  through,  over,  and  under  in- 
ternational straits  by  military  and 
commercial  vessels  and  aircraft.  It  also 
meets  the  environmental  and  safety  of 
navigation  concerns  of  the  straits 
states. 


48 

The  text  makes  clear  that  beyond  a 
12-mile  territorial  sea,  the  high  seas 
freedoms  of  navigation  and  overflight 
and  the  laying  of  submarine  pipelines 
and  cables  and  other  traditional  uses  of 
the  sea  related  to  those  freedoms  shall 
be  fully  maintained. 

Although  our  maritime  interests  and 
responsibilities  would  in  any  case  com- 
pel us  to  insist  on  the  exercise  of  tradi- 
tional navigational  freedoms,  it  is  clear 
that  failure  to  achieve  a  comprehensive 
treaty  would  entail  less  stability  and 
higher  costs.  It  is  thus  our  conclusion 
that  a  law  of  the  sea  treaty  which 
adequately  safeguards  these  freedoms 
would  be  clearly  preferable. 

Fisheries.  The  United  States  seeks 
to  secure  wide  acceptance  of  interna- 
tional standards  for  conservation  and 
optimum  utilization  of  marine  living 
resources. 

In  addition,  we  have  specific  and 
important  commercial  interests  in  our 
own  coastal  fisheries  as  well  as  in 
salmon,  tuna,  and  species  off  the  coasts 
of  other  countries.  We  are  also  deeply 
concerned  about  the  protection  of  ma- 
rine mammals.  U.S.  interests  in  coastal 
species  within  200  miles  are  already 
protected  by  the  Fisheries  Management 
and  Conservation  Act  of  1976.  The 
negotiating  text  does,  however,  serve 
our  interests  in  regard  to  salmon,  tuna, 
and  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  other 
states. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  a 
comprehensive  treaty  will  not  of  itself 
fully  protect  these  U.S.  interests  but 
rather  will  foster  regional  and  bilateral 
agreements.  Finally,  the  negotiating 
text  does  promote  international  recog- 
nition of  the  need  to  protect  marine 
mammals. 

We  believe  that  the  understandable 
and  legitimate  interests  in  fisheries  of 
the  landlocked  and  geographically  dis- 
advantaged states  should  be  fairly  ac- 
commodated as  part  of  an  overall  pack- 
age . 

Continental  Shelf.  It  is  estimated 
that  there  are  significant  amounts  of 
exploitable  petroleum  beneath  the  con- 
tinental margin  off  our  coasts.  We  sup- 
port the  coupling  of  coastal  state  juris- 
diction over  continental  margin  re- 
sources beyond  2  00  miles  with 
revenue-sharing  tor  the  benefit  of  the 
developing  countries.  Although  the 
conference  has  not  yet  agreed  upon  a 
precise  definition  of  the  outer  limits  of 
that  jurisdiction,  we  have  every  reason 
to  believe  that  such  a  definition  can  be 
negotiated  The  open-ended  formula 
now  contained  in  the  negotiating  text  is 
undesirably  vague  and  might  be  so  in- 
terpreted as  to  lead  to  excessive  claims 
of  jurisdiction. 


Without  a  treaty,  the  U.S.  interest  in 
the  resources  of  the  continental  margin 
would  nevertheless  be  protected.  A 
comprehensive  treaty,  however,  would 
enable  us  to  protect  this  interest  with 
greater  predictability. 

Marine  Scientific  Research.  The 
United  States  places  a  high  value  on 
the  conduct  of  research  on  a  free  and 
bioad  basis,  accompanied  by  a 
maximum  flow  of  information  with  re- 
spect to  both  the  conduct  of  the  re- 
search and  its  results. 

Unfortunately,  the  United  States  has 
been  unable  to  find  more  than  minimal 
support  in  the  negotiations  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  free  and  open  marine  scien- 
tific regime  in  the  economic  zone  and 
on  the  Continental  Shelf.  The  conse- 
quence is  that  the  negotiating  text  con- 
tains undesirably  broad  provisions  re- 
quiring coastal  state  consent  for  re- 
search to  be  conducted  within  200 
miles.  While  the  negotiating  text  intro- 
duces a  degree  of  predictability  that 
would  make  the  administration  and 
planning  of  research  easier,  it  also 
creates  rather  complicated  conditions 
for  the  granting  of  consent.  In  weigh- 
ing the  prospective  benefits  of  a  com- 
prehensive treaty,  therefore,  science 
must  be  seen  as  a  neutral  factor.  At  a 
minimum  the  freedom  of  research  must 
be  maintained  beyond  the  economic 
zone  and  on  the  deep  seabed. 

Marine  Environmental  Protection. 

The  United  States  has  a  major  interest 
in  protecting  its  coastal  areas  from  all 
forms  of  pollution.  Regarding  vessel 
source  pollution,  the  negotiating  text 
establishes  a  mixed  system  of  port 
state,  coastal  state,  and  flag  state  juris- 
diction that,  given  shipping  patterns  off 
our  coasts,  would  afford  substantial 
protection  against  hazards  to  the  ma- 
rine environment  within  200  miles.  It 
must  be  noted  that  the  negotiating  text 
gives  flag  states  (he  right  to  preempt 
jurisdiction,  albeit  with  important  ex- 
ceptions. Protection  of  the  marine  envi- 
ronment will  thus  be.  in  part,  a  func- 
tion of  the  responsible  exercise  of  flag 
state  jurisdiction. 

At  the  same  time  the  negotiating  text 
makes  binding  on  all  participating 
states  those  standards  adopted  by  the 
Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization .  The  treaty  also  pro- 
vides protection  against  pollution  from 
Continental  Shelf  resource  activities, 
deep  seabed  mining,  and  ocean  dump- 
ing While  a  treaty  cannot  accomplish 
all  of  our  marine  environmental  objec- 
tives,  it  would  create  a  useful 
framework  tor  safeguarding  the  marine 
environment. 

Global  Order.  Our  review  has  rec- 
ognized  that  agreement   on  the   large 


Department  of  State  Buli 

number  of  issues  dealt  with  by  the  c  I 
ference  will  introduce  into  the  interl 
tional  system  a  greater  measure  of  <l 
bility  and  predictability  and  a  comnj 
ment   to   peaceful   settlement   of 
putes.  The  United  States  shares 
the  world  community  as  a  whole 
aim  of  avoiding  chaos  and  conflict j 
the  utilization  of  the  world's  oceans.  I 
If  the   conference   succeeds  I 
negotiating  a  treaty  that  serves  the  si 
cific  interests  under  discussion,  it  \ 
have  further  advanced  the  goal  of  I 
elimination  of  conflict  in  internatioj 
affairs.  Moreover,  it  will  have  done| 
largely  by  the  process  of  consensus. 
important  precedent  in  itself. 


Alternatives 

It  follows  that  the  United  States  m 
be  prepared  to  protect  its  interests 
other  means   than   a  comprehens 
treaty   if  an   acceptable  treaty  pro' 
unattainable.  Indeed,  it  would  be  ir 
sponsible  not  to  begin  consideration 
viable  alternatives.  In  the  case  of  di 
seabed  mining,  reciprocal  legislatior 
one  such  alternative  but  not  necessai 
the    most    desirable.    Another    p 
sibility — one    which    might    be 
garded  as  more  consonant  with 
concept   of  the   common   heritage 
would  be  a  multilateral  arrangement 
which  all   countries  could  join  << 
which  provided  for  revenue-shar 
with  developing  countries.  In  the  c 
of  other  subjects  such  as  military  ; 
commercial  navigation,  satisfactory 
ternatives  are   less  obvious,   and 
have   begun   an   examination   of 
measures  that  would  become  necesS' 
for  the  protection  of  these  intere 
should  the  conference  fail  to  achii 
asreement. 


Procedural  Issues 

The  law  of  the  sea  interests  of 
United  States  which  I  have  descril 
can  only  be  served  if  the  conferet 
operates  on  the  basis  of  open  disc 
sion  with  broad,  representative  parti 
pation.  Since  the  summer  of  1977  t 
objective  has  been  a  major  concern  o 
series  of  intersessional  meetings.  / 
though  a  substantial  measure  of  agr 
ment  on  these  procedural  matters  I 
been  developed,  difficult  questions 
main  to  be  resolved.  For  this  reason 
and  a  number  of  colleagues  intend 
go  to  Geneva  next  week  [March  2 
We  will  discuss  these  questions  w 
representatives  of  the  Group  of  7 
which  will  be  meeting  there  during 
same  week,  in  an  effort  to  find  acco 
modations  which  will  prevent  any  pi 
traded  delay  in  the  conference. 

In  sum,  our  review  of  U.S.  positic 


978 


49 


(forces  our  conviction  that  a  corn- 
tensive  treaty  is  the  clearly  prefera- 
jmeans  to  promote  orderly  use  of  the 
^ins  and  to  insure  responsible  and 
It t li  1  development  of  their  resources, 
j  world  community  has  before  it  a 
fcular  opportunity  to  consummate  a 
likthrough.  We  are  resolved  to  do 
|r\  thing  in  our  power  to  make  this 
lie  to  pass.  □ 


mment  made  to  the  press  on  Mar    16.  1978; 
Massador  at    Large   Richardson    is   Special 
Wresenlative  of  the  President  for  the  Law  of 
'ea  Conference. 

or  .i  statement  to  the  press  by  Ambassador 
ardson  on  July  20.  1977.  see  Bulletin  of 
.  19.  1977. 

he  Group  of  77  is  a  caucus  of  developing 
tries  formed  in  1964  at  the  first  U.N.  Con- 
ice  on  Trade  and  Development  to  present  a 
ed  bargaining  position  in  their  negotiations 
industrialized  countries 


PACIFIC: 
Micronesia 

PARTMENT  STATEMENT1 

n  interagency  team  led  by  Ambas- 
ir  Peter  R.  Rosenblatt,  the  Presi- 
t's  personal  representative  for  Mi- 
lesian status  negotiations,  met  with 
leadership  of  the  three  Micronesian 
tical  Status  Commissions  in  Hilo, 
vaii.  April  7-9.  1978: 

The  Congress  of  Micronesia 
nmission  on  Future  Political  Status 
Transition; 

The  Marshall  Islands  Political 
us  Commission;  and 

The  Palau  Political  Status  Colli- 
sion. 


The  heads  of  the  four  delegations 
signed  a  Statement  of  Principles  which 
will  form  the  basis  of  the  future  rela- 
tionship between  the  peoples  of  Mi- 
cronesia and  the  United  States.  Formal 
documents  reflecting  this  agreement 
will  be  prepared  in  the  coming  months. 

This  agreement  marks  a  major  break- 
through in  the  long  negotiations  to  seek 
agreement  on  the  future  status  of  the 
Trust  Territories. 

STATEMENT  OF  PRINCIPLES2 

1.  An  agreement  of  free  association  will  be 
concluded  on  a  government-to-government 
basis  and  executed  prior  to  termination  of  the 
United  Nations  trusteeship.  During  the  life  of 
the  agreement  the  political  status  of  the  peoples 
of  Micronesia  shall  remain  that  of  free  associa- 
tion as  distinguished  from  independence.  The 
agreement  will  be  subject  to  the  implementing 
authority  of  the  United  States  Congress. 

2  The  agreement  of  free  association  will  be 
put  to  a  United  Nations  observed  plebiscite 

3.  Constitutional  arrangements  for  the  gov- 
ernance of  Micronesia  shall  be  in  accord  with 
the  political  status  of  free  association  as  set 
forth  in  these  principles. 

4.  The  peoples  of  Micronesia  will  enjoy  full 
internal  self-government. 

5.  The  United  States  will  have  full  authority 
and  responsibility  for  security  and  defense  mat- 
ters in  or  relating  to  Micronesia,  including  the 
establishment  of  necessary  military  facilities 
and  the  exercise  of  appropriate  operating 
rights.  The  peoples  of  Micronesia  will  refrain 
from  actions  which  the  United  States  deter- 
mines after  appropriate  consultations  to  be  in- 
compatible with  its  authority  and  responsibility 
for  security  and  defense  matters  in  or  relating 
to  Micronesia.  This  authority  and  responsibility 
will  be  assured  for  15  years,  and  thereafter  as 
mutually  agreed.  Specific  land  arrangements 
will  remain  in  effect  according  to  their  terms 
which  shall  be  negotiated  prior  to  the  end  of  the 
trusteeship  agreement. 

6.  The  peoples  of  Micronesia  will  have  au- 
thority and  responsibility  for  their  foreign  af- 
fairs  including   marine   resources.   They   will 


consult  with  the  United  States  in  the  exercise  of 
this  authority  and  will  refrain  from  actions 
which  the  United  States  determines  to  be  in- 
compatible with  its  authority  and  responsibility 
for  security  and  defense  matters  in  or  relating 
to  Micronesia.  The  United  States  may  act  on 
behalf  of  the  peoples  of  Micronesia  in  the  area 
of  foreign  affairs  as  mutually  agreed  from  time 
to  time. 

7.  The  agreement  will  permit  unilateral  ter- 
mination of  the  free  association  political  status 
by  the  processes  through  which  it  was  entered 
and  set  forth  in  the  agreement  and  subject  to 
the  continuation  of  the  United  States  defense 
authority  and  responsibility  as  set  forth  in  Prin- 
ciple 5.  but  any  plebiscite  terminating  the  free 
association  political  status  will  not  require 
United  Nations  observation. 

8.  Should  the  free  association  political  status 
be  mutually  terminated  the  United  States'  eco- 
nomic assistance  shall  continue  as  mutually 
agreed.  Should  the  United  States  terminate  the 
free  association  relationship,  its  economic  as- 
sistance to  Micronesia  shall  continue  at  the 
levels  and  for  the  term  initially  agreed.  If  the 
agreement  is  otherwise  terminated  the  United 
States  shall  no  longer  be  obligated  to  provide 
the  same  amounts  of  economic  assistance  for 
the  remainder  of  the  term  initially  agreed.  An 
early  free  association  agreement  based  on  the 
foregoing  eight  principles  shall  be  pursued  by 
the  parties.  □ 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reston  on  Apr.  10, 
1978. 

^Issued  on  Apr.  10;  list  of  representatives 
deleted. 


Letter 
of  Credence 


On  April  6.  1978,  the  following 
newly  appointed  Ambassador  presented 
his  credentials  to  President  Carter; 

New  Zealand — Merwyn  Norrish.  □ 


50 


UNITED  NATIONS:     Namibia 


STATEMENT  BY  FOREIGN 
SECRETARY  JAMIESON » 

I  have  the  honour  to  address  this 
ninth  session  of  the  General  Assembly 
on  behalf  of  the  Governments  of 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, the  United  Kingdom,  the 
United  States,  and  Canada.  Our  five 
countries,  members  of  the  Security 
Council,  have,  over  the  last  year,  de- 
voted much  attention  and  effort  toward 
the  resolution  of  the  serious  issue 
which  is  the  very  reason  for  our 
gathering  here  today;  that  is  the  ques- 
tion of  the  independence  of  Namibia. 
We  would,  therefore,  like  to  present  to 
you  our  common  view  of  the  situation 
at  this  juncture  and  to  make  known 
our  common  belief  that  an  internation- 
ally acceptable  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem may  well  be  within  our  grasp,  if 
all  concerned  will  manifest  the  neces- 
sary determination  and  political  will  to 
put  an  end  to  years  of  injustice  in  that 
territory. 

With  all  of  you,  we  have  shared  the 
conviction  that  the  international  terri- 
tory of  Namibia  is  illegally  occupied 
by  South  Africa  and  that  this  occupa- 
tion must  come  to  an  end.  With  all  of 
you,  we  have  shared  an  intense  con- 
cern at  the  extension  into  Namibia  of 
apartheid  and  racial  discrimination  and 
at  the  continuing  repression  of  Nami- 
bians  under  that  system.  Like  many  of 
you,  we  have  been  concerned  that  the 
perpetuation  of  this  deplorable  situa- 
tion would  sooner  or  later  affect  the 
political  stability  of  the  entire  southern 
African  area.  It  is,  therefore,  in  full 
accord  with  the  aspirations  and  objec- 
tives of  the  international  community 
that  we  undertook,  as  the  members  of 
this  international  community  in  the 
best  position  to  do  so,  to  seek  out 
practical  ways  and  means  to  end  this 
30-year-old  stalemate. 

In  the  spring  of  1977,  it  became  ap- 
parent to  all  of  us  that  the  installation 
of  the  Turnhalle  constitution,  as  it  was 
called,  was  imminent.  The  adoption  of 
legislation  to  bring  it  into  effect,  fore- 
cast for  June  1977,  would  have  re- 
sulted in  the  unilateral  establishment 
of  a  government  based  on  ethnic 
groups  and  excluding  participation  by 
any  political  party,  and  most  impor- 
tantly by  one  of  the  major  political 
movements  in  the  territory.  SWAPO 
[South  West  African  People's  Or- 
ganization).  Such   an   action,   it  was 


clear,  would  not  result  in  an  interna- 
tionally acceptable  solution  to  the 
Namibian  question  and  would,  fur- 
thermore, by  dividing  the  population 
of  Namibia  among  itself  on  an  ethnic 
basis  and  by  ignoring  the  aspirations 
of  its  people  for  true  independence  and 
unity,  lead  to  increased  violence.  It 
would  have  perpetuated  the  unsatisfac- 
tory situation  which  has  prevailed  in 
that  territory. 

Security  Council  Resolution  385 

In  the  face  of  this  dismal  prospect, 
our  five  countries  decided  to  make  a 
concerted  effort  to  investigate 
whether,  by  means  of  the  existing  rela- 
tions between  themselves  and  South 
Africa,  it  might  not  be  possible  to  find 
a  practical  way  of  implementing  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolution  385  which  was 
adopted  unanimously.2  That  resolution 
comprises  the  most  comprehensive  ap- 
proach ever  adopted  by  the  Council  to 
the  desired  resolution  of  the  Namibian 
problem. 

The  General  Assembly  will  recall 
that  Resolution  385  embodies  in  its 
terms  the  following  essential  elements. 

•  It  calls  for  free  elections  under  the 
supervision  and  control  of  the  United 
Nations  to  be  held  for  the  whole  of 
Namibia  as  one  political  entity  in 
order  that  the  people  of  Namibia  may 
freely  determine  their  own  future. 

•  It  envisages  the  establishment  of 
the  necessary  machinery  within 
Namibia  by  the  United  Nations  for  the 
supervision  of  such  elections  and  of 
conditions  which  would  enable  the 
people  of  Namibia  to  organize  politi- 
cally for  the  purpose  of  such  elections. 

•  It  envisages  the  withdrawal  of  the 
illegal  administration  of  South  Africa 
and  a  transfer  of  power  to  the  people 
of  Namibia  with  the  assistance  of  the 
United  Nations. 

•  It  demands  that  South  Africa,  in 
the  interim,  comply  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights;  release  all  Namibian 
political  prisoners,  abolish  the  applica- 
tion of  all  racially  discriminatory  and 
politically  repressive  laws  and  prac- 
tices; and  accord  unconditionally  to  all 
Namibians  currently  in  exile  for  politi- 
cal reasons  full  facilities  for  return  to 
their  country  without  risk  of  arrest,  de- 
tention, intimidation,  or  imprisonment. 

From  the  outset,  our  five  govern- 


Department  of  State  Bui 

ments  have  recognized  that  we  ha< 
mandate  to  enter  into  negotiation 
to  make  any  agreements  regarc 
Namibia.  We  were  acting  as  a  re 
of  the  responsibilities  which  we  1 
as  members  of  the  U.N.  Secu 
Council.  We  have  acted  as  an  infoi 
contact  group,  and  it  has  been 
intention — clearly  expressed  to 
parties — to  bring  this  exercise  wi 
the  scope  of  the  Security  Counci 
the  earliest  feasible  time. 

The  Negotiating  Process 


I  believe  it  would  be  useful  for 
to  provide  to  the  Assembly  a  rest 
of  our  experience  over  the  past 
months  and  of  the  evolution  of 
matter. 

At  the  outset,   our  efforts  w 
greeted  with  mistrust  and  suspicion 
all  sides  and,  in  particular,  on  the 
of  the  principal  interested  parties, 
Government  of  South  Africa  . 
SWAPO.  Indeed,  each  was  convin 
that  our  efforts  were  designed  to 
liver  Namibia  into  the  hands  of 
other  without  regard  for  their  intere 
or  for  the  interests  of  the  Namib 
people  as  a  whole.   I  wish  to  t 
phasize  this  fact  as  it  serves  a 
benchmark  for  measuring  the  dista 
which  we  have  come  since  that  ti 
and  that  distance  is  very  considerab 

On  April  7,   1977,  our  five  govi 
ments  presented  to  South  Afri 
Prime    Minister   Vorster  an   ai. 
memoire  expressing  our  belief  in 
necessity  for  a  Namibian  settlemen 
keeping  with  Resolution  385  I 
thereby  acceptable  to  the  internatic 
community.  We  emphasized  that 
activities  of  the  Turnhalle  confere 
[South  African-sponsored  const] 
tional  conference  held  in  Windho 
Namibia,  beginning  September   19 
did  not  meet  those  standards  and 
formed  the  Government  of  South 
rica  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  ei 
South  African  agreement  to  pursue 
internationally  acceptable  solution, 
five  would  be  obligated  to  consi 
very  seriously  the  measures  to  be 
ken.  Initially,  the  South  African  G 
ernment  indicated  that  it  would 
willing  to  engage  in  further  talks  w 
the  five  governments  but  that  it  wo 
not  interfere  with  the  Turnha 
process. 

After  further  informal  exchang 
the  five  determined  it  would  be  nee 
sary  for  them  to  form  a  contact  grc 
and  to  embark  upon  more  detailed  c 
cussions  with  South  Africa  on  the  p 
sibilities  of  moving  toward  the  stall 
objectives.   To  this  end,   a  contJ 
group  comprising  senior  officials  I 
our  governments  and  including  sen! 


1978 


51 


resentatives  of  our  New  York  mis- 
Is  went  to  South  Africa  during  the 
jd  April  27-29  for  discussions  of 
t  of  the  issues  associated  with  the 
libian  question  and  of  the  elements 
odied  in  Resolution  385. 
:  the  conclusion  of  those  discus- 
s,  in  an  important  development, 
h  Africa  indicated  the  intention  to 
go  the  implementation  of  the 
lhalle  constitution  through  the 
osed  legislation;  to  instead  estab- 
a  central  administrative  authority 
amibia;  and  to  hold  territory-wide 
tions,  with  direct  U.N.  involve- 
t  for  a  constituent  assembly  whose 
it  would  be  to  decide  upon  a  con- 
tion  for  Namibia. 

wish  to  emphasize  that  during  the 
3d  April  1977  until  January  1978, 
five  governments  took  no  position 
soever  on  elements  which  might 
to  a  practical  implementation  of 
Dlution  385.  We  made  clear  to 
of  the  principal  parties  and  to  all 
rs  that  we  were  exploring  attitudes 
ideas  and  that  we  would  take  no 
tion.  Our  means  of  consultation 
exploration  evolved  as  the  exer- 
progressed.  For  example,  follow- 
the  first  round  of  discussions  by 
:ontact  group  in  South  Africa,  we 
equently  engaged  in  discussions 
l  SWAPO;  the  U.N.  Secretary 
eral;  representatives  of  Tanzania, 
bia,  Mozambique,  Angola,  Bots- 
a,  and  Nigeria;  and,  as  well,  other 
rnal  Namibian  groups  on  the  re- 
>  of  the  initial  exploratory  talks 

I  South  Africa.  Those  early  consul- 
ins  were  particularly  important  in 
iding  us  with  an  understanding  of 
Udus  concerns. 

I'arther  talks  took  place  in  southern 

lea  and  in  New  York  between  the 

II  act  group  of  the  five  and  the  prin- 

ii  1  interested  parties  as  follows;  with 

Cth  Africa  in  Capetown  June  8-10, 

7;  with  SWAPO  in  New  York  Au- 

8-11,  1977;  with  South  Africa  in 

oria  September  22-26,   1977;  and 

l  SWAPO  in  New  York  October 

19,  1977.  Following  each  round  of 

:ussions,  we  again  provided  full 

fings  to  all  parties  and  states  con- 

led,  including  the  members  of  the 

urity  Council  and  the  Council  for 

nibia. 

ii  late  November  and  early  De- 
iber,  the  contact  group  carried  out 
exhaustive  round  of  consultations 
discussions  with  African  countries 
i  position  to  assist  in  the  effort  to 
lg  about  a  negotiated  settlement  in 
riibia.  During  the  period  November 
-December  12,  they  met  in  the  rel- 
nt  capitals  with  President  Nyerere 
Tanzania,  Foreign  Minister  Chis- 
io  of  Mozambique,   President 


NAMIBIA     and    WALVIS     BAY 


Area:   823.61  7  square  kilometers 

318,000  square  miles 
Limits  of  territorial  waters  (claimed!:    6  n.m. 
Population:    915,000 
Largest  city     Windhoek  (61 ,260) 
Gross  National  Product:    $500  million  (1970) 
$790  per  capita 


2944  4-78STATEIRGE) 


Khama  and  Vice-President  Masire  of 
Botswana,  President  Kaunda  of  Zam- 
bia, Prime  Minister  Do  Nascimento 
and  Foreign  Minister  Jorge  of  Angola, 
and  with  Head  of  State  Obasanjo  of 
Nigeria.  They  met  once  more  with 
South  Africa  and  twice  during  that 
period  with  SWAPO. 

Following  these  consultations  and 
discussions,  the  five  governments  de- 
termined that  the  areas  of  concern  of 
the  different  parties  had  become  so 
apparent  that  the  differences  between 
them  sufficiently  narrowed  as  to  make 
it  advisable  for  the  five  to  take  a  posi- 
tion on  what  they  considered  to  be  a 
pragmatic,  reasonable,  and  fair  means 
of  implementing  Resolution  385. 
Therefore,  during  the  month  of  De- 
cember, the  five  governments  invited 
South  Africa  and  SWAPO  to  partici- 
pate in  discussions  with  them  in  New 
York.  Each  party  was  informed  that  it 


was  the  intention  to  hold  similar  dis- 
cussions in  New  York  during  the  same 
period  with  the  other  principal  parties. 

The  importance  which  the  five  gov- 
ernments attached  to  these  "prox- 
imity" talks  which  eventually  took 
place  on  February  11  and  12  was  re- 
flected in  the  participation  in  them  by 
my  colleagues,  the  Foreign  Ministers 
of  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
United  States,  and  myself.  At  the 
ministerial-level  meetings,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  South  Africa  was  repre- 
sented by  its  Foreign  Minister,  Mr. 
Botha,  and  SWAPO  by  its  president, 
Mr.  Nujoma.  I  might  add  that  the 
SWAPO  delegation  to  those  talks,  for 
the  first  time,  included  representatives 
of  the  internal  Namibian  branch  of 
SWAPO. 

Apart  from  the  talks  with  the  princi- 
pal parties,  ministerial-level  consulta- 


52 

tions  also  took  place  with  the  Secre- 
tary General  and  his  officials.  We  also 
held  discussions  with  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  the  frontline  states  present 
in  New  York — Mr.  Mwale  of  Zambia, 
Mr.  Mkapa  of  Tanzania,  Mr.  Mogwe 
of  Botswana — and  with  senior  repre- 
sentatives or  Ambassadors  of  Angola, 
Mozambique,  Nigeria,  Mauritius,  and 
Gabon.  Also  during  this  period  delega- 
tions from  other  Namibian  parties 
traveled  to  New  York  and  were  re- 
ceived by  officials  of  the  five  govern- 
ments. The  exercise  was  discussed 
with  them  in  considerable  detail,  and 
their  views  and  concerns  were  pre- 
sented to  my  colleagues  and  myself. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  February 
talks,  our  five  governments  were  con- 
vinced that  the  proposal  which  had 
been  put  to  the  parties  during  the  talks 
embodied  in  its  elements  a  very  rea- 
sonable means  of  implementing  Res- 
olution 385  in  a  manner  which  took 
into  full  account  the  real  and  the  per- 
ceived concerns  of  each  and  in  a  man- 
ner which  could  bring  about  in  the 
very  near  future  a  resolution  of  the 
Namibian  question.  There,  nonethe- 
less, remained  certain  areas  which 
demanded  further  study  on  our  part 
and  further  consultations  with  various 
parties.  Certain  of  the  provisions  re- 
quired clarification  or  improvement  in 
drafting.  This  process  of  clarification 
was  an  extremely  complicated  one  and 
required  numerous  exchanges  between 
our  capitals,  with  the  principal  parties 
through  Embassies,  with  some  African 
states,  and  with  the  Secretary  General. 
Our  proposals  were  finalized  at  the 
end  of  March  and  were  presented  to 
the  interested  parties  on  March  29  and 
30.  They  were  circulated  as  document 
S/12636  of  the  Security  Council  on 
April  10. 

Concerns  of  South  Africa 
and  SWAPO 

I  have  taken  the  time  to  describe 
this  process  in  order  that  all  should 
understand  the  measure  of  intense  dip- 
lomatic activity  that  has  been  involved 
in  this  consultation  process.  We  wish 
to  pay  tribute  to  the  seriousness  and 
conscientiousness  of  the  participation 
and  the  constructive  attitude  which  has 
emerged  on  the  part  of  all  with  whom 
we  have  dealt.  Whatever  their  initial 
hesitations,  they  have,  for  the  sake  of 
Namibia's  future,  suspended  to  a  de- 
gree their  suspicions  and  have  sought 
to  identify,  in  practical  terms,  their 
concerns  and  the  means  by  which 
those  concerns  might  be  met  while  tak- 
ing account  of — though  not  necessar- 
ily accepting — those  of  others. 


In  terms  of  substance,  initially  each 
of  the  parties  was  preoccupied  by  the 
conflicting  legal  and  political  positions 
on  this  issue.  At  the  outset  of  the  ini- 
tiative the  five  were  only  too  well 
aware  that,  as  it  was  these  contradic- 
tory legal  positions  which  had  for 
more  than  30  years  impeded  any  prog- 
ress toward  the  resolution  of  the 
Namibian  situation,  it  was  essential  to 
neither  endorse  nor  challenge  the  posi- 
tion of  any  party  but  rather  to  seek, 
without  prejudice  to  that  position,  a 
practical  means  of  implementing  the 
provisions  of  Resolution  385.  Our 
proposal,  therefore,  at  no  point  takes 
any  stand  which  prejudices  a  long-held 
legal  or  political  position;  rather  it 
moves  between  questions  of  legality  as 
the  only  effective  way  to  bring  about  a 
resolution  of  the  issue. 

The  positions  of  South  Africa  and 
SWAPO  have  evolved  substantially 
since  April  1977.  South  Africa,  origi- 
nally unwilling  to  contemplate  any  al- 
ternative to  the  Turnhalle  concept,  has 
come  to  accept,  in  the  context  of  an 
internationally  acceptable  solution, 
far-reaching  measures  involving  U.N. 
involvement  in  a  manner  as  to  guaran- 
tee the  impartiality  of  the  electoral 
process  and  the  necessity  of  full  ar- 
rangements to  insure  that  there  will  be 
no  intimidation  from  any  source  dur- 
ing that  process.  In  the  proposals 
which  it  put  forward  in  December 
1977,  South  Africa  acquiesced  in  the 
general  concept,  and  in  many  specif- 
ics, of  the  approach  embodied  in  our 
proposal.  Up  to  the  present  time  there 
have  remained  some  crucial  areas  of 
disagreement,  including  the  number 
and  location  of  the  residual  element  of 
the  South  African  forces.  On  these  is- 
sues, as  on  others,  however,  there  has 
been  a  considerable  narrowing  of  the 
differences  between  the  parties. 

On  the  SWAPO  side  there  has  been 
as  well  considerable  evolution  since  the 
exercise  was  undertaken.  SWAPO  s 
initial  position  was  that  the  South  Afri- 
can administration  in  its  entirety  should 
be  removed  from  the  territory.  SWAPO 
was  convinced  that  elections  could  not 
be  held  in  the  presence  of  South  Afri- 
can forces,  that  the  symbolic  presence 
of  even  one  South  African  soldier 
would  provide  a  counterproductive 
psychological  climate  in  the  territory. 

At  the  last  round  of  discussions  with 
SWAPO.  SWAPO  had  come  to  accept, 
without  prejudice  to  its  legal  position 
or  to  that  of  the  United  Nations,  that  it 
was  possible  to  envisage  an  election 
process  free  of  intimidation  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  de  facto  administration 
as  long  as  the  South  African  military 
presence  were  reduced  to  a  maximum 


Department  of  State  Bui! 

of  1 ,500  and  confined  to  one  base 
the  south  of  the  territory,  and  as  K 
as  the  police  were  appropriately  m< 
tored  and  supervised  and  that  th 
tasks  were  undertaken  by  a  substan 
U.N.  civilian  and  military  fon 
SWAPO,  futhermore,  indicated  a  re 
iness  to  envisage  the  release  of  Nai 
bians  wherever  they  are  held  in 
context  of  an  internationally  accepts 
solution.  SWAPO  has,  furthermo 
emphasized  its  commitment  to  part 
pate  in  free  and  fair  elections  un> 
U.N.  supervision  and  control  and 
abide  by  the  results  of  such  election 


Elements  of  the  Proposal 

I  would  like  to  describe  very  brie 
the  essential  elements  of  our  propc 
for  a  settlement  of  the  Namibian  qu 
tion.  On  the  basis  of  Resolution  3 
we  consider  that  the  key  to  an  inter 
tionally  acceptable  transition  to  ea 
independence  is  free  elections  for 
whole  of  Namibia,  as  one  political 
tity,  with  appropriate  U.N.  supervis 
and  control.  To  that  end,  we  will  si 
the  establishment  of  a  substantial  U 
presence,   both  civilian  and  milita 
which  we  have  tentatively  called 
U.N.    Transition   Assistance   Grc 
(UNTAG),  to  be  led  by  a  U.N.  spe<. 
representative,   appointed  by  and 
sponsible  to  the  U.N.  Secretary  G> 
eral.  Working  together  with  the  So 
African   Administrator  General,  t 
special   representative  would  have 
his  primary  task  to  satisfy  himself  t 
all  conditions  exist  to  insure  free  ; 
fair  elections.  Thus,  he  would  see  ti 
that  all  repressive  measures  or  regi 
tions  are  repealed,  all  freedoms 
stored,  and  all  Namibian  political  pi 
oners  or  detainees,  wherever  held, 
leased  so  that  they  can  participate  fi 
and  freely  in  the  electoral  process. 

Free  elections  cannot  be  held  in  ci 
ditions  of  repression;  neither  can  ti 
be  held  in  conditions  of  insecurity  z 
intimidation.  Until  an  independ< 
Namibia  assumes  responsibility  for 
own  security,  the  international  comn 
nity  must  insist  that  there  be  adequ 
means  to  assure  law  and  order  and  i 
overall  security  of  the  territory.  Tr 
the  proposal  calls  for  a  comprehensi 
cessation  of  all  hostile  acts.  It  mat 
provision  for  the  maintenance  of  1; 
and  order  and  for  the  introduction  o 
military  section  of  a  U.N.  Transiti 
Assistance  Group  combined  with  t 
phased  withdrawal  of  all  but  1,5 
South  African  soldiers.  These  1,5 
men  will  be  restricted  to  one  or  ti 
bases  and  monitored  by  the  United  N 
tions  pending  their  withdrawal.  V 
would  argue  for  a  firm  and  specil 


Q78 


53 


Jdate  to  insure  observance  of  the 
s»isions  of  the  agreement. 
we  believe  these  positions  are 
ftuate  for  security.  But  they  will  ob- 
-Isly  have  to  be  applied  in  light  of 
4loping  conditions.  It  is  our  hope 
|  the  parties  and  the  surrounding 
4s  will  take  the  necessary  measures 
fcsure  that  the  security  provisions  of 
Proposal  are  strictly  adhered  to.  For 

■  part,  as  members  of  the  Security 

■  ncil.  we  would  view  with  grave 
Aern  any  actions  during  the  transi- 
I  period  that  could  threaten  the  secu- 

I  of  Namibia  and  its  prompt 
levement  of  independence,  and  we 
lid  act  accordingly. 
Ince  the  elections  have  been  cer- 
oid, the  constituent  assembly  will 
■t  to  consider  the  remaining  steps 
lird  independence,  including  the 
■ting  of  the  future  constitution  for 
(libia. 

lie  Assembly  will  note  that  this 
■iosal  places  its  full  confidence  in 
lability  of  the  United  Nations  to  dis- 
■ge  the  substantial  and  complicated 
I  involved  in  assisting  the  process  of 
I  Namibian  elections  and  transition 
lidependence.  We  believe  that  the 

■  ed  Nations  will  show  itself  equal  to 

■  task.  The  important  role  that  it  will 
1  in  guaranteeing  the  stability  and 
lirity  of  the  territory  with  the  coop- 
lion  of  the  de  facto  administra- 
|  can  result  in  the  impartial  process 
l:h  is  envisaged.  It  is  important  to 
Biware  that  initially  some  Namibian 
aies  were  skeptical  about  the  ability 
fie  United  Nations  to  undertake  this 
u  with  impartiality.  We  believe  that 
I  have  been  persuaded  that  on  each 
cision  that  the  United  Nations,  under 
I  guidance  of  the  Secretary  General, 

■  been  involved  in  a  process  either  of 
Irekeeping  or  of  assisting  a  territory 
independence,  it  has  done  so  with 

0  petence  and  impartiality.  The  pro- 
Mil  calls  for  free  and  fair  elections  in 
lirdance  with  Security  Council  Res- 
lion  385  and  it  is  to  this  task  that  the 
ll.  Transition  Assistance  Group  will 
Iress  itself. 

1  he  General  Assembly  will  have 
|:d  that  we  have  omitted  from  our 
iposal  the  difficult  question  of  Wal- 
i  Bay  for  the  reason  that  we  see  no 
||'  of  settling  the  question  in  the  con- 

:  of  the  present  negotiations.  We 
i  strongly,  however,  that  the  issue 
uld  not  delay  the  long-sought-after 
ependence  of  Namibia.  We  consider 
i  all  aspects  of  the  question  of  Wal- 
Bay  must  be  subject  to  discussion 
ween  the  South  African  Government 
i  the  elected  Government  of 
mibia.  We  have,  furthermore,  ob- 
ted  assurances  that  the  strength  of 


the  South  African  force  in  Walvis  Bay 
will  not  be  increased  during  the  transi- 
tional period  and  that  Namibians  in 
Walvis  Bay  will  be  able  to  participate 
in  the  political  life  of  the  territory  dur- 
ing the  transitional  period,  including 
voting  in  the  elections. 

The  Governments  of  Canada,  France, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States 
give  our  unreserved  backing  to  the  pro- 
posal which  we  have  transmitted  to  the 
Security  Council.  We  believe  that  the 
proposal  provides  an  effective  and 
pragmatic  basis  for  implementing  Res- 
olution 385  while  taking  account  of  the 
interests  of  the  parties  involved  and  of 
the  special  circumstances  associated 
with  the  decolonization  of  Namibia.  So 
far  as  we  are  concerned.  South  Africa's 
presence  in  Namibia  is  illegal  and  must 
be  ended.  At  the  same  time,  we  have  to 
recognize  the  facts  of  life:  that  South 
Africa  controls  and  remains  in  Namibia 
and  has  done  so  for  60  years.  The  pro- 
posal is  the  result  of  lengthy  and  inten- 
sive consultations  with  the  interested 
parties. 

Our  five  governments  are  now  pre- 
senting this  proposal,  not  as  a  basis  for 
negotiation  but  as  a  practical  means  of 
implementing  Resolution  385  and, 
therefore,  bringing  about  the  independ- 
ence of  Namibia  in  an  internationally 
acceptable  manner  and  in  the  very  near 
future.  We  believe  it  is  essential  now  to 
proceed  urgently  in  order  to  forestall 
any  counterproductive  developments 
which  migh  precipitate  an  internal  set- 
tlement with  all  the  repercussions  for 
peace  in  the  area  that  would  follow  and 
which  would  result  in  the  continued 
suffering  of  the  Namibian  people. 

We  are  fully  aware  that  our  proposal 
will,  in  one  element  or  another,  cause 
difficulties  to  the  principal  parties. 
Nonetheless,  in  our  discussions,  we 
have  narrowed  the  differences  between 
the  parties  to  the  point  that  the  reason- 
able middle  ground  has  clearly 
emerged.  It  has  been  embodied  in  our 
proposal.  It  is  now  a  question  of  politi- 
cal will;  South  Africa,  SWAPO,  and  all 
other  Namibian  groups  must  decide 
whether  to  accept  this  proposal  as  a 
means  for  an  early  and  peaceful  resolu- 
tion of  the  question  or  face  the  tragic 
alternative  of  many  years  of  violence 
and  turmoil. 

We  must  appeal  to  all  members  of 
this  Assembly  to  devote  their  energy  to 
what  is  possible.  We  are  not  asking 
anyone  to  sacrifice  principles;  we  are 
not  advocating  the  perpetuation  of  cur- 
rent abhorrent  practices.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  urge  all  members  of  the 
international  community  to  seize  this 
opportunity  to  bring  to  a  very  early  end 


what  we  have  repeatedly  condemned  in 
this  hall.  We  wish  to  see  within  the 
next  few  months  the  people  of  Nami- 
bia— all  of  the  people  of  Namibia — 
enjoy  their  fundamental  right  to  a 
peaceful,  freely  determined,  and  viable 
existence  within  an  independent  and 
sovereign  Namibia.  We,  for  our 
part — and  we  hope  with  the  assistance 
of  every  member  of  the  international 
community — will  continue  to  exert 
every  effort  to  this  end.  Let  us  not  fail 
to  answer  the  call  of  the  Namibian 
people  in  their  hour  of  need. 

Shortly  before  arriving  in  this  hall 
this  morning,  I  was  informed  that  for- 
mal acceptance  of  our  proposal  by  the 
South  African  Government  was  com- 
municated to  our  Ambassadors  in  Cape 
Town.  As  our  five  governments  have 
not  had  sufficient  time  to  study  the 
statement  made  by  Prime  Minister  Vor- 
ster  in  South  Africa's  Parliament,  we 
do  not  propose  to  comment  on  it  at  this 
stage,  except  to  welcome  this  important 
development  in  the  position  of  one  of 
the  main  parties  concerned. 


TEXT  OF  PROPOSAL  FOR  A 
NAMIBIAN  SETTLEMENT3 

I.  Introduction 

1.  Bearing  in  mind  their  responsibilities  as 
members  of  the  Security  Council  of  the  United 
Nations,  the  Governments  of  Canada,  France, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States  have  consulted 
with  the  various  parties  involved  with  the 
Namibian  situation  with  a  view  to  encouraging 
agreement  on  the  transfer  of  authority  in 
Namibia  to  an  independent  government  in  ac- 
cordance with  resolution  385  (1976),  adopted 
unanimously  by  the  Security  Council  on  30 
January  1976. 

2.  To  this  end,  our  Governments  have  drawn 
up  a  proposal  for  the  settlement  of  the  Nami- 
bian question  designed  to  bring  about  a  transi- 
tion to  independence  during  1978  within  a 
framework  acceptable  to  the  people  of  Namibia 
and  thus  to  the  international  community.  While 
the  proposal  addresses  itself  to  all  elements  of 
resolution  385  (1976),  the  key  to  an  interna- 
tionally acceptable  transition  to  independence 
is  free  elections  for  the  whole  of  Namibia  as 
one  political  entity  with  an  appropriate  United 
Nations  role  in  accordance  with  resolution  385 
(1976).  A  resolution  will  be  required  in  the  Se- 
curity Council  requesting  the  Secretary-General 
to  appoint  a  United  Nations  Special  Representa- 
tive whose  central  task  will  be  to  make  sure 
that  conditions  are  established  which  will  allow 
free  and  fair  elections  and  an  impartial  elec- 
toral process.  The  Special  Representative  will 
be  assisted  by  a  United  Nations  Transition  As- 
sistance Group. 

3.  The  purpose  of  the  electoral  process  is  to 


54 

elect  representatives  to  a  Namibian  Constituent 
Assembly  which  will  draw  up  and  adopt  the 
Constitution  for  an  independent  and  sovereign 
Namibia.  Authority  would  then  be  assumed 
during  1978  by  the  Government  of  Namibia. 

4.  A  more  detailed  description  of  the  pro- 
posal is  contained  below.  Our  Governments  be- 
lieve that  this  proposal  provides  an  effective 
basis  for  implementing  resolution  385  (1976) 
while  taking  adequate  account  of  the  interests 
of  all  parties  involved.  In  carrying  out  his  re- 
sponsibilities the  Special  Representative  will 
work  together  with  the  official  appointed  by 
South  Africa  (the  Administrator-General)  to 
ensure  the  orderly  transition  to  independence. 
This  working  arrangement  shall  in  no  way  con- 
stitute recognition  of  the  legality  of  the  South 
African  presence  in  and  administration  of 
Namibia. 


II.  The  Electoral  Process 

5.  In  accordance  with  Security  Council  res- 
olution 385  (1976),  free  elections  will  be  held, 
for  the  whole  of  Namibia  as  one  political  entity. 
to  enable  the  people  of  Namibia  to  freely  and 
fairly  determine  their  own  future.  The  elections 
will  be  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  the 
United  Nations  in  that,  as  a  condition  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  electoral  process,  the  elections  them- 
selves, and  the  certification  of  their  results,  the 
United  Nations  Special  Representative  will  have 
to  satisfy  himself  at  each  stage  as  to  the  fairness 
and  appropriateness  of  all  measures  affecting  the 
political  process  at  all  levels  of  administration 
before  such  measures  take  effect.  Moreover  the 
Special  Representative  may  himself  make  pro- 
posals in  regard  to  any  aspect  of  the  political 
process  He  will  have  at  his  disposal  a  substan- 
tial civilian  section  of  the  United  Nations  Transi- 
tion Assistance  Group,  sufficient  to  carry  out  his 
duties  satisfactorily.  He  will  report  to  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations,  keep- 
ing him  informed  and  making  such  recommenda- 
tions as  he  considers  necessary  with  respect  to 
the  discharge  of  his  responsibilities.  The 
Secretary-General,  in  accordance  with  the  man- 
date entrusted  to  him  by  the  Security  Council, 
will  keep  the  Council  informed 

6.  Elections  will  be  held  to  select  a  Con- 
stituent Assembly  which  will  adopt  a  Constitu- 
tion for  an  independent  Namibia.  The  Constitu- 
tion will  determine  the  organization  and  powers 
of  all  levels  of  government.  Every  adult  Nami- 
bian will  be  eligible,  without  discrimination  or 
fear  of  intimidation  from  any  source,  to  vote, 
campaign  and  stand  for  election  to  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly.  Voting  will  be  by  secret  bal- 
lot, with  provisions  made  for  those  who  cannot 
read  or  write.  The  date  for  the  beginning  of  the 
electoral  campaign,  the  date  of  elections,  the 
electoral  system,  the  preparation  of  voters  rolls, 
and  other  aspects  of  electoral  procedures  will  be 
promptly  decided  upon  so  as  to  give  all  political 
parties  and  interested  persons,  without  regard  to 
their  political  views,  a  full  and  fair  opportunity 
to  organize  and  participate   in  the  electoral 


Department  of  State  Bull 


process.  Full  freedom  of  speech,  assembly, 
movement  and  press  shall  be  guaranteed.  The  of- 
ficial electoral  campaign  shall  commence  only 
after  the  United  Nations  Special  Representative 
has  satisfied  himself  as  to  the  fairness  and  ap- 
propriateness of  the  electoral  procedures.  The 
implementation  of  the  electoral  process,  includ- 
ing the  proper  registration  of  voters  and  the 
proper  and  timely  tabulation  and  publication  of 
voting  results  will  also  have  to  be  conducted  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  Special  Representative. 

7.  The  following  requirements  will  be  fulfill- 
ed to  the  satisfaction  of  the  United  Nations  Spe- 
cial Representative  in  order  to  meet  the  objective 
of  free  and  fair  elections: 

A.  Prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  electoral 
campaign,  the  Administrator-General  will  repeal 
all  remaining  discriminatory  or  restrictive  laws, 
regulations,  or  administrative  measures  which 
might  abridge  or  inhibit  that  objective. 

B.  The  Administrator-General  shall  make 
arrangements  for  the  release,  prior  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  electoral  campaign,  of  all  Namibian 
political  prisoners  or  political  detainees  held  by 
the  South  African  authorities  so  that  they  can 
participate  fully  and  freely  in  that  process,  with- 
out risk  of  arrest,  detention,  intimidation  or  im- 
prisonment. Any  disputes  concerning  the  release 
of  political  prisoners  or  political  detainees  shall 
be  resolved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Special 
Representative  acting  on  the  independent  advice 
of  a  jurist  of  international  standing  who  shall  be 
designated  by  the  Secretary-General  to  be  legal 
adviser  to  the  Special  Representative 

C.  All  Namibian  refugees  or  Namibians  de- 
tained or  otherwise  outside  the  territory  of 
Namibia  will  be  permitted  to  return  peacefully 
and  participate  fully  and  freely  in  the  electoral 
process  without  risk  of  arrest,  detention,  intimi- 
dation or  imprisonment.  Suitable  entry  points 
will  be  designated  for  these  purposes. 

D.  The  Special  Representative  with  the  as- 
sistance of  the  United  Nations  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees  and  other  appropriate  inter- 
national bodies  will  ensure  that  Namibians  re- 
maining outside  of  Namibia  are  given  a  free  and 
voluntary  choice  whether  to  return.  Provision 
will  be  made  to  attest  to  the  voluntary  nature  of 
decisions  made  by  Namibians  who  elect  not  to 
return  to  Namibia. 

8.  A  comprehensive  cessation  of  all  hostile 
acts  shall  be  observed  by  all  parties  in  order  to 
ensure  that  the  electoral  process  will  be  free 
from  interference  and  intimidation  The  annex 
describes  provisions  for  the  implementation  of 
the  cessation  of  all  hostile  acts,  military  ar- 
rangements concerning  the  United  Nations  Tran- 
sition Assistance  Group,  the  withdrawal  of 
South  African  forces,  and  arrangements  with  re- 
spect to  other  organized  forces  in  Namibia,  and 
with  respect  to  the  forces  of  SWAPO.  These 
provisions  call  for: 

A.  A  cessation  of  all  hostile  acts  by  all  par- 
ties and  the  restriction  of  South  African  and 
SWAPO  armed  forces  to  base. 

B.  Thereafter  a  phased  withdrawal   from 


Namibia  of  all  but  1500  South  African  tn 
within  12  weeks  and  prior  to  the  official  sta  II" 
the  political  campaign.  The  remaining  South 
rican  force  would  be  restricted  to  Grootfor 
or  Oshivello  or  both  and  would  be  withdr 
after  the  certification  of  the  election. 

C.  The  demobilization  of  the  citizen  for 
commandos,  and  ethnic  forces,  and  the  dismi 
ing  of  their  command  structures. 

D.  Provision  will  be  made  for  SWAPO 
sonnel  outside  of  the  territory  to  return  pe 
fully  to  Namibia  through  designated  entry  pc 
to  participate  freely  in  the  political  process 

E.  A  military  section  of  the  United  Nat 
Transition  Assistance  Group  to  make  sure 
the  provisions  of  the  agreed  solution  will  be 
served  by  all  parties.  In  establishing  the  mili 
section  of  UNTAG,  the  Secretary-General 
keep  in  mind  functional  and  logistical  reqi   .. 
ments    The  Five  Governments,  as  member 
the    Security   Council,    will    support 
Secretary-General's  judgment  in  his  disch; 
of  this  responsibility.   The  Secretary-Gen    til 
will,  in  the  normal  manner,  include  in  his  c 
sulfations   all   those   concerned   with   the 
plementation  of  the  agreement.  The  Special  F  I 
resentative  will  be  required  to  satisfy  himsel 
to  the  implementation  of  all  these  arrangem 
and  will  keep  the  Secretary-General  informe 
developments  in  this  regard. 


0 


■:.:■ 

; 

-.. 
lid 

Isoi 
Cei 

dS 

nil 


K 


ll 


11 


9.  Primary  responsibility  for  maintaining 
and  order  in  Namibia  during  the  transition  pe 
shall  rest  with  the  existing  police  forces. 
Administrator  General  to  the  satisfaction  of 
United  Nations  Special  Representative  shall 
sure  the  good  conduct  of  the  police  forces 
shall  take  the  necessary  action  to  ensure  I 
suitability  for  continued  employment  during 
transition  period  The  Special  Representa 
shall  make  arrangements  when  appropriate 
United  Nations  personnel  to  accompany 
police  forces  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties, 
police  forces  would  be  limited  to  the  carryin 
small  arms  in  the  normal  performance  of  ti 
duties. 

10  The  United  Nations  Special  Represe 
tive  will  take  steps  to  guarantee  against  the  | 
sibility  of  intimidation  or  interference  with 
electoral  process  from  whatever  quarter 

1  1  Immediately  after  the  certification  of  e 
tion  results,  the  Constituent  Assembly  will  n 
to  draw  up  and  adopt  a  Constitution  for  an  it 
pendent  Namibia.  It  will  conclude  its  work 
soon  as  possible  so  as  to  permit  whatever  a( 
tional  steps  may  be  necessary  prior  to  the  ins 
lation  of  an  independent  Government  of  Nami 
during  1978. 

12.   Neighbouring  countries  shall  be  reques 
to  ensure  to  the  best  of  their  abilities  that 
provisions  of  the  transitional  arrangements, 
the  outcome  of  the  election,  are  respected   Tl 
shall  also  be  requested  to  afford  the  necess 
facilities  to  the  United  Nations  Special  Rejl' 
sentative  and  all  United  Nations  personnel 
carry  out  their  assigned  functions  and  to  fac 
tate  such  measures  as  may  be  desirable  for  ens 
ing  tranquillity  in  the  border  areas. 


:fii    1978 


RESS  BY 

JASSADOR  McHENRY4 

lave  only  a  few  remarks  to  make, 
are  in  the  nature  of  general  com- 

s  about  where  we  are  in  a  search 
resolution  of  a  problem  with 

h  many  of  you  and  your  country 
been  dealing  for  more  than  30 
and  to  which  I  have  devoted  al- 

constantly  the  last  year  of  my  own 


hink  all  of  you  know  that  roughly 

ir  ago  the  five  Western  members  of 

iecurity  Council  [Canada,  France, 

Germany,  United  Kingdom,  and 

;d  States]  undertook  to  see  what 

could  do  to  bring  about  an  interna- 

Jly  acceptable  settlement  of  the 

:ion  of  Namibia.  It's  not  generally 

/n  how  that  initiative  started.  The 

is  that  Andrew  Young  [U.S.  Per- 

nt  Representative  to  the  United 

his],  in  one  of  his  early  initiatives, 

ed  some  African  and  nonaligned 

foers  of  the  United  Nations  to  an 

morning  breakfast.  It  was  one  of 

/  early  morning  breakfasts  which 

id.  He  asked  them  what  could  we 

iin  the  Namibian  question.  He  said 

eilon't  want  more  resolutions;  we 

Jj  a  serious  undertaking. 

•4  response,  the  African  and  the 

nligned  members  there,  stated  that 

j]as  necessary  to  enter  into  some 

m  of  discussions  with  the  South  Af- 

J  Government.  However,  they  said, 

jjiu  have   to  do   it,   you   Western 

e  bers  of  the  Council  have  to  do  it. 

0  have  to  do  it  because  you  are  the 

J  ones  who  maintain  communication 

it  both  groups.  We  don't  maintain 

i  kind  of  communication."  They 

1-d,  "You  have  to  do  it  without 
■  ng  to  us  for  any  kind  of  mandate, 
■use  if  you  come  to  us  for  a  man- 
I.  we  will  give  you  one  which  so 
lyour  hands  that  you  will  never  get 
Jvhere.  You  go  ahead  and  undertake 

1  "  And  so  we  did,  with  the  encour- 
gnent  of  the  African  and  nonaligned 
Mibers  of  the  Security  Council  and 
I  the  encouragement  of  the  Presi- 
I  of  the  United  States. 

l'e  talked  with  the  four  other  West- 
a  members  of  the  Security  Council 
I  formed  ourselves  into  what  we 
l:d  a  contact  group.  We've  been  re- 
l:d  to  by  many  names  since,  some 
1:  favorable  and  many  unfavorable. 
less  the  name  which  has  caught  on 
pie  international  community,  if  not 
louth  Africa,  is  to  refer  to  us  as  the 
Jmg  of  five."  I  hope  our  final  days 
rinot  as  uncomfortable  as  the  infam- 
H"gang  of  four." 

.1  our  efforts  we  have  tried  not  to 
•('  favorites  with  any  group.  We  have 


tried  to  use  our  middle  position  role  to 
talk  with  the  South  West  Africa 
People's  Organization  (SWAPO),  the 
South  African  Government,  and  the 
Democratic  Turnhalle  Alliance  (DTA), 
the  South  West  African  National  Union 
(SWANU),  and  with  any  other  organi- 
zation which  we  felt  had  an  interest  and 
a  role  to  play  in  this  undertaking.  We 
have  not  been  guided  by  favoritism  to- 
ward any  group  but  by  one  overriding 
goal:  We  want  the  people  of  Namibia 
to  elect  their  own  leaders  under  condi- 
tions of  free  and  fair  elections. 

We  were  fortunate — I  think  more 
fortunate  than  persons  working  on  this 
subject  will  ever  be  in  the  future — that 
the  U.N.  Security  Council  had  passed 
U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  385. 
It  was  not  the  usual  one-sided  resolu- 
tion of  the  General  Assembly  on  this 
subject  but  one  of  those  efforts  similar 
to  that  breakfast  discussion  at  the  Wal- 
dorf Astoria  when  there  was  an  effort 
to  treat,  objectively,  the  criteria  which 
were  necessary  for  a  resolution  of  this 
question.  We  have  been  fortunate  to 
work  with  a  resolution  which  enjoyed 
the  unanimous  support  of  the  Security 
Council. 

A  year  has  passed  during  which  we 
have  suffered  many  wounds.  I  under- 
stand from  reading  the  South  African 
press  that  I  have  been  fired  from  my 
own  position  many  times.  We  believe 
we  have  finally  concluded  a  set  of  pro- 
posals which  can  lead  to  free  and  fair 
elections  under  which  the  people  of 
Namibia  can  express  themselves  and 
hopefully  get  on  with  the  jobs  before 
them  of  governing  themselves;  the  very 
difficult  tasks  of  building  a  nation,  de- 
veloping themselves  economically, 
politically,  and  culturally;  and  of  learn- 
ing to  work  together. 

Contact  Group  Proposals 

I  would  be  the  first  to  say  to  you  that 
the  proposals  which  we  have  put  to- 
gether after  a  year  of  work  are  not  per- 
fect. If  Don  McHenry  were  writing 
these  proposals  without  regard  to  the 
views  of  others,  I  might  write  very  dif- 
ferently from  what  they  are  now.  But  I 
would  suggest  to  you  that  in  their  cur- 
rent form,  the  proposals  represent  the 
best  effort  which  we  can  make  in  the 
current  situation  toward  reconciling  the 
differences  which  exist.  I  leave  to  you 
to  speculate  whether  under  changed 
circumstances — more  time  for 
example — we  might  be  able  to  get  im- 
proved proposals  from  the  South  Afri- 
can point  of  view  or  from  the  view  of 
SWAPO,  the  DTA,  or  the  Namibian 
National  Front  (NNF)  or  any  number  of 
the  other  groups.  My  own  view  is  that 


55 

such  speculation  requires  the  dangerous 
use  of  a  crystal  ball.  The  future  pos- 
sibilities are  likely  to  be  more  difficult 
and  to  introduce  more  complexities. 
The  possibility  of  drastically  improved 
proposals,  without  unacceptably  high 
additional  cost,  is  not  great. 

I  hope,  therefore,  that  the  South  Af- 
rican Government  and  the  other  parties 
will  consider  these  proposals  as  a 
whole,  not  in  their  parts.  They  should 
not  pick  out  those  things  which  are  un- 
comfortable and  ignore  those  things 
which  are  valuable.  The  proposals  rep- 
resent an  effort  to  reconcile  sometimes 
irreconcilable  differences.  We  hope 
those  proposals  will  be  weighed  and 
that  the  parties  will  conclude,  as  we 
concluded,  that  on  balance  they  repre- 
sent the  best  that  can  be  done  in  the 
current  situation. 


Alternatives 

But  it  is  not  enough  simply  to  look  at 
what  can  be  done  in  the  current  situa- 
tion. We  must  also  look  at  the  alterna- 
tives. I  would  ask  you,  and  I  would  ask 
all  of  the  participants,  to  consider  the 
alternatives.  As  I  look  at  the  alterna- 
tives, there  is  no  question  in  my  mind 
that  these  proposals  are  those  which 
ought  to  be  accepted  by  the  parties  at 
this  time.  With  doubts,  to  be  sure,  with 
question  marks,  to  be  sure,  and  with 
concern  about  uncertainties  here  and 
there.  Uncertainties  are  going  to  be 
there  and  they  would  be  there  if  we 
worked  on  these  proposals  for  another 
10  days  or  for  another  10  years.  What 
we  have  to  do  is  to  consider  what,  on 
balance,  they  mean  and  what  are  the  al- 
ternatives. 

The  alternatives  to  me  are  clear.  We 
can  continue  with  the  current  situation 
in  the  territory,  with  its  constant  in- 
crease in  violence  and  the  constant  in- 
troduction of  such  new  complexities  as 
the  unfortunate  and  deplorable  murder 
[on  March  27,  1978]  of  Chief  Kapuuo 
[president  of  the  DTA];  the  unfortunate 
and  deplorable  series  of  incidents 
which  resulted  in  the  murder  of  four 
Ovambo;  the  increase  in  violence 
which  is  taking  place  on  the  northern 
border;  and  the  increase  in  distrust  in  a 
situation  of  unbelievable  existing  dis- 
trust. We  can  continue  along  that  path, 
and  I  can  guarantee  you  that  that  is  the 
path  of  further  violence,  further  dis- 
trust, and  further  difficulty  in  resolving 
this  question. 

There  is  another  alternative,  a  very 
attractive  alternative.  That  is  to  go  the 
so-called  internal  route,  to  say  that  we 
know  what  the  people  of  the  territory 
want,  even  though  the  people  of  the 
territory  have  never,  so  far  as  I  know, 


56 


been  in  a  position  to  express  them- 
selves under  conditions  which  are  man- 
ifestly free  and  fair  and  where  they 
clearly  have  the  right  to  choose  any  al- 
ternative they  wish.  My  suggestion  to 
you  is  that  that  path  is  likely  to  lead 
neither  to  acceptance  nor  to  a  resolu- 
tion but  to  a  further  conflict  among  the 
races  of  Namibia  and  to  the  possibility 
of  the  introduction  of  outside  forces 
that  we  all  want  to  see  stay  away.  The 
internal  settlement,  the  internal  path, 
inevitably  is  going  to  lead  to  that  kind 
of  difficulty. 

We  can  finally  take  the  risks,  the 
risks  which  are  inherent  in  any  propos- 
als. We  can  accept  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  guarantee  in  this  life  that  anything  is 
going  to  be  perfect,  that  any  conclusion 
is  going  to  be  absolutely  guaranteed. 
Under  those  circumstances,  we  can 
consider  and  look  at  the  proposals  that 
have  been  made  in  the  fair  and  objec- 
tive way  in  which  they  have  been 
drawn  together.  We  can  look  at  how 
one  part  balances  the  other  and  try  and 
rid  ourselves  of  the  predispositions 
which  have  existed  and  which  continue 
to  exist  in  this  and  other  societies. 

One  of  the  points  which  never  seems 
to  be  learned  is  that  which  today  or 
yesterday  might  have  been  the  basis  of 
a  compromise  is  tomorrow's  nonnego- 
tiable  demand.  We  have  the  chance  of  a 
compromise  now.  Let  us  wait  and  in- 
troduce new  complexities,  and  today's 
basis  of  compromise  will  be  gone, 
never  to  return.  Ten  years  ago  Ian 
Smith's  internal  settlement  would  have 
been  applauded  by  us  all.  Ian  Smith's 
internal  settlement  today  is  one  in 
which  the  possibility  is  in  great  doubt. 

These  alternatives  are  not  just  harsh 
alternatives  which  the  South  African 
Government  has  to  consider.  They  are 
also  the  harsh  alternatives  which  the 
people  of  Namibia,  the  people  who  live 
in  this  region,  and  which  the  world  at 
large  will  also  have  to  consider.  We  are 
as  those  astronauts  of  the  United  States 
said  when  they  made  their  journey  to 
the  moon  and  looked  back.  We  arc  on  a 
very  small  ship,  and  although  we  think 
of  ourselves  as  on  many  ships,  the  fact 
is  that  we  are  on  one  very  small  ship, 
and  we  are  on  it  together. 

The  Obstacle  of  Distrust 

Let  me  make  one  final  point.  There 
exists  in  Namibia,  in  South  Africa,  and 
among  the  parties,  the  most  amazing 
amount  of  distrust  I  have  ever  per- 
ceived. If  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment looked  up  at  the  sky  outside  this 
morning  and  said  it  was  raining, 
SWAPO  and  a  good  many  other  people 
I  know  would  say  that  it  must  be  a 
damn  lie;  the  sun  must  be  shining.  If 
SWAPO  looked  outside  on  a  bright. 


Department  of  State  Bu 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE: 

Secretary  Vance  Visits  Mexico 


Secretary  Vance  visited  Mexico  May 
3-5,  1978,  and  met  with  President 
Lopez  Portillo  and  other  government 
officials  on  May  4.  Following  are  a 
joint  news  conference  by  Secretary 
Vance  and  Secretary  of  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Santiago  Roel  on  May  4  and  the 
text  of  a  U .S .-Mexico  joint  com- 
munique issued  the  same  day. 

JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE1 

Secretary  Vance.  We  had  a  very 
fruitful  meeting  today.  We  reviewed 
the  work  of  the  consultative  mechanism 
during  the  past  year  and  heard  from  the 
various  committees  which  have  been 
established  under  the  form  of  the  con- 
sultative committee.  It  is  my  deep  con- 
viction and  that  of  President  Carter  that 
the  initiative  which  the  two 
Presidents — President  Lopez  Portillo 
and  President  Carter — started  a  little 
over  a  year  ago  has  been  a  very  con- 
structive one.  It  has  provided  us  a  for- 
mat for  dealing  with  important  and  dif- 
ficult problems.  We  have  been  able  to 
deal  with  them  in  a  concrete  fashion 
and  produce  concrete  results. 

I  think  this  is  extremely  important. 
In  addition  to  that,  the  political  com- 


r 


mittee,  which  Secretary  Roel  and  I 
ticipate  in,  gives  us  an  opportunit 
exchange  views  on  a  great  variet 
issues,  not  only  affecting  the  hi 
sphere  but  also  other  important  ma 
dealing  with  global  problems. 

The  Government  of  Mexico  is  ] 
ing  an  ever  increasingly  important 
as  a  leader  in  international  affairs, 
it  is  extremely  helpful  for  us  to  be 
to  exchange  views  on  these  issue 
that  we  may  work  together  in  inte 
tional  fora  to  try  and  cope  with  t 
problems  and  hopefully  lead  us  a 
the  road  to  a  more  peaceful  world 

Finally,  may  I  express  my  d 
thanks  to  Secretary  Roel  and  all  o 
colleagues  for  their  kindness  and 
warmth  of  their  reception  and  for 
very  helpful  and  fruitful  discuss 
which  we  have  had. 

Secretary  Roel.  We  are  basicall 

agreement  with  the  statement  that 
been  made  by  Mr.  Vance.  We  have 
finished  a  very  important  convers; 
with  President  Lopez  Portillo.  S 
last  night  when  we  had  the  honor  o 
ceiving  Mr.  Vance  and  the  membe 
his  party  in  the  name  of  the  Gov 
ment  of  Mexico,  we  felt  the  same 


sunny  day,  the  sun  beaming  down  on 
this  Earth,  there  are  people  in  this  soci- 
ety who  would  say  that  it  must  be  a 
damn  lie;  it  must  be  raining.  The  dis- 
trust which  exists  among  the  parties  is 
one  of  the  most  difficult  obstacles 
which  we  will  have  to  overcome. 

Distrust  extends  not  just  to  the  par 
ties;  it  extends  to  those  of  us  who  have 
been  working  on  this  question  night 
and  day.  The  point  has  been  made  in 
South  Africa  that  the  Western  countries 
favor  SWAPO.  are  unconcerned  about 
such  things  as  communism,  and  don't 
understand  the  situation  which  exists 
here.  We  have  not  approached  this 
question  with  favoritism  toward  any- 
one. I  have  said  before  that  if  SWAPO 
wins,  they  go  off  with  my  congratula- 
tions. If  the  DTA  wins,  they  go  off 
with  my  congratulations.  They  might 
also  go  off  with  my  prayers,  but  the 
fact  is  they  win.  They  win  an  election 
which  is  undertaken  under  conditions 
which  are  free  and  fair  and  where  the 
choice  is  that  of  the  people. 

It  seems  to  me  that  free  and  fair  elec- 
tions are  the  only  way  to  guarantee  or 
to  provide  some  chance  for  Namibia 


and  this  part  of  the  world  to  devek 
an  atmosphere  of  peace.  The  tin 
late.  The  decisions  must  be  made  t 
We  can  go  along  the  roads  of  certa 
the  internal  settlement  or  a  continu; 
of  the  current  situation.  They  are 
the  roads  of  certain  violence.  Or. 
can  take  a  chance  and  risk  the  roa 
peace.  The  road  of  peace  will  be 
ficult  at  best.  I  would  suggest  to 
that  the  two  other  roads 
impossible. 


'Statement  ai  the  U.N.  General  Assei 
Ninth  Special  Session  on  Namibia  made  on 
25.  1978.  on  behalf  of  ihe  contact  grou 
Namibia  (Canada.  France.  West  Germ 
United  Kingdom,  and  United  Stales)  bj 
Canadian  Secretary  of  State  for  External  At 
Donald  Jamieson 

:For  text  of  the  resolution  adoped  Jan. 
1976,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb    2.1.  197b.  p.  2- 

'U.N.  doc.  S/12636  of  Apr  10.  1978;  I 
of  transmittal  and  annex  not  printed  here. 

■•Address  before  the  Cape  Town  Press  C 
Cape  Town,  South  Africa,  on  May  I.  I 
(text  from  USUN  press  release  32  ol  Maj 
Donald  F  McHenry  is  Deputy  Represent; 
to  the  U.N.  Security  Council. 


978 


57 


friendship  which  was  established 

Eig  the  state  visit  paid  by  President 

tz  Portillo  from  the   14th  until  the 

J  of  February    1977  to  the  United 

Jes.   The  consultative   mechanism 

I   is   composed   of  three   com- 

fces — the  economic  committee,  the 

lal  committee,   and   the  political 

■mittee — has  worked  well. 

■f  course,   all  human   actions  have 

•possibility  of  being  perfected,  but 

•Irelationship  that  has  been  estab- 

ld  by  both  of  us  since  then  has  been 

■intercommunication  of  our  experi- 

Is  and  particularly  an  interdepend- 

|    between  the  two  countries.    We 

■  say,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
lico,  that  our  sovereignty  has  re- 
lied firm,  as  always,  and  that  the 
I:  great  concepts  on  which  our  con- 
Ince  was  based  was,  of  course,  first 
Iforemost,  the  desire  for  freedom  on 

■  part  of  our  country,  democracy, 
I  individual  and  social  justice.  I 
Ik  Mr.  Vance  for  what  he  said;  I 
Ik  the  members  of  his  delegation;  I 
Ik  Mrs.  Vance  who  honored  us  with 
(presence. 

I.  There  are  issues  between  the  two 
jjitries — one  of  them  is  the  sale  of 
liral  gas,  Mexican  natural  gas,  to 

■  United  States;  another  is  the  un- 
djmented  workers  in  the  United 
lies,  Mexican  workers;  and  fi- 
I  y,  in  the  context  of  the  U.S. 
D'mous  trade  deficit,  purchase  of 
I'riim  abroad.  In  view  of  the  vast 
B  rves  that  Mexico  is  said  to  have, 
ae  any  of  these  issues  been  dis- 
ii  ed  in  the  meetings  today  with  the 
Uretary  of  State  of  Mexico — 
Deign  affairs — and  with  the 
irident? 

j  ecretary  Vance.  Let  me  deal  with 
in  one  by  one.  The  issue  of  natural 
a  did  not  arise.  It  is  natural  that  it 
i  Id  not.  As  you  know,  we  in  the 
Ited  States  are  in  the  midst  of  a  de- 
I  on  our  energy  bill.  One  of  the  im- 

0  ant  aspects  of  that  is  the  question 
leas  prices  within  the  United 
t.es — our  domestic  prices.  Under 
l.e  circumstances,  until  that  debate 
8  ompleted.  it  would  not  be  appro- 
ve for  us  to  discuss  this  with  others 
i>ide  of  the  United  States. 

he  question  of  undocumented 
nrkers  did  come  up  for  discus- 
li.  This  has  been  a  matter  which  has 
Gsumed  a  great  deal  of  attention  by 

1  consultative  mechanism  and  its 
licommittees .  As  you  know,  a 
Inber  of  studies  are  going  on  at  this 
int  both  in  Mexico  and  in  the  United 
]tes  which  bear  upon  this  question. 
I  have  agreed  to  exchange  the  results 
']  hose  studies  which  will  be  mutually 
ijieficial.  In  addition,  as  I  believe 
iny  of  you  know,  the  President  of  the 


United  States  has  sent  forward  to  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  legisla- 
tion which  deals  with  this  issue.  Hear- 
ings have  just  commenced  in  our  Con- 
gress, and  I  assume  that  these  hearings 
will  continue  for  quite  a  long  period  of 
time. 

I  believe  your  last  question  had 
something  to  do  with  oil.  Would  you 
repeat  it? 

Q.  In  view  of  the  context  of  the  trade 
deficit  of  the  United  States,  a  large 
part  of  which  has  to  do  with  imports 
of  oil,  and  in  view  of  Mexico's  said- 
to-be  large  reserves  of  petroleum, 
was  this  question  discussed  at  all  in 
your  meetings  with  Secretary  Roel 
and  with  the  President? 

Secretary  Vance.  The  subject  was 
commented  on  in  general  terms,  but  let 
me  say  the  two  key  things  which  are 
necessary  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
United  States  at  this  point  is  to  get  on 
with  an  energy  bill  which  will  provide 
the  necessary  framework  for  cutting 
back  on  the  consumption  of  oil  in  the 
United  States. 

In  addition  to  that,  it  is  incumbent 
upon  the  United  States  for  us  to  take 
action  in  the  inflation  field.  And  I'm 
sure  you  all  know  that  the  President  has 
spoken  out  on  this  and  has  introduced 
an  anti-inflation  program  which  I  be- 
lieve is  going  to  be  not  only  important 
but  effective. 

Q.  You  talked  about  concrete  re- 
sults from  these  meetings.  Could  you 
give  us  some  examples? 

Secretary   Vance.   If  you  had  a 

chance  to  read  the  joint  report,  I  think 
you  will  see  a  wide  number  of  concrete 
items  that  have  been  accomplished  in 
the  last  year  in  each  one  of  the  areas 
and  the  subareas — namely,  in  the  area 
of  the  economic  working  group,  in  the 
social  group,  and  in  the  political  group. 
In  addition  to  that,  we  signed  today 
three  treaties,  one  dealing  with  the  ques- 
tion of  maritime  affairs  and  bound- 
aries, the  second  with  extradition;  and 
third  was  the  tourism  agreement.  I 
think  this  is  going  to  be  important  to 
both  of  our  countries  and  will  bring 
benefit  to  both  of  them. 

Q.  Every  once  in  a  while,  the 
Mexico  City  newspapers  raise  the 
question  on  the  bracero  program,  its 
pros  and  cons  and  so  forth  and  its 
feasibility.  There  seems  to  be  some 
feeling  here  that  a  renewal  of  the 
bracero  program  on  a  very  large  and 
very  regimented  basis  would  be  a 
more  feasible  response  to  the  prob- 
lem of  illegal  aliens  than  would  be 
the  amnesty  currently  being  dis- 
cussed in  Washington.  My  question 
is  this:  Is  there  any  serious  discussion 


going  on  right  now  in  Washington 
over  the  renewal  of  the  bracero  pro- 
gram on  a  large-scale  basis?  If  not, 
why  not?  And  if  so,  when  and  what 
do  you  think  would  be  the  final  out- 
come? 

Secretary  Vance.  The  answer  to 
your  question  is  a  very  simple  one:  no. 
The  President  made  this  very  clear,  that 
there  is  no  intention  to  reinstitute  the 
bracero  program.  The  reason  for  it  is, 
in  part,  the  fact  that  the  President  has 
put  before  the  Congress  a  comprehen- 
sive program  which  deals  with  the 
problem  of  undocumented  workers  in  a 
balanced  and  thoughtful  way.  We  will 
be  addressing  our  attention  to  that  bill 
and  the  reaction  of  the  Congress  to  it. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  a  question  of 
both  of  the  Secretaries.  Secretary 
Roel,  you  spoke  about  keeping  firm 
the  sovereignty  of  Mexico.  I  wonder 
what  you  meant  by  that?  Could  you 
explain  it  in  a  bit  more  detail? 

And  to  Mr.  Vance,  it  is  said  that 
Mexico  may  sell  oil  to  Cuba  and  that 
there  may  be  a  gas  pipeline  for  Cen- 
tral America.  How  does  the  United 
States  view  these  two  possible  proj- 
ects that  Mexico  has? 

Secretary  Roel.  Yes,  I  did  mention 
the  word  sovereignty  because  histori- 
cally Mexico  has  always  continued 
with  its  struggle  to  maintain  its 
sovereignty  firm.  In  a  state  of  law  such 
as  the  one  that  prevails  in  Mexico,  one 
of  the  important  concepts  of  legal 
philosophy — which  comes  from  Bodino 
both  as  a  concept  and  as  a  word — 
sovereignty  is  something  which  we  can 
consider  in  the  form  of  a  triangle. 
Sovereignty  must  be  had,  it  cannot  be 
divided,  and  it  cannot  be  ceded  to  any- 
one else. 

President  Lopez  Portillo,  after  he 
took  office  on  the  1st  of  December, 
1976,  very  clearly  stated  in  his  inau- 
gural address  precisely  that  Mexico 
would  always  maintain  the  principles  in 
international  policy  which  are  the 
product  of  our  history  and  which  you 
know  very  well — self-determination, 
nonintervention,  the  peaceful  resolu- 
tion of  conflicts,  and  the  sovereign 
equality  of  states.  He  added  two  other 
very  important  things.  The  treaties  at 
international  conventions — in  accord- 
ance with  the  rights  of  peoples — 
maintain  a  principle,  and  this  principle 
is  to  respect  the  good  faith  of  the  con- 
tracting parties. 

But  he  also  added  two  golden  rules 
which  are  very  important:  to  maintain 
friendship  with  all  countries  of  the 
world  and  not  to  ask  any  country  for 
what,  under  equal  circumstances, 
Mexico  is  not  willing  to  grant.  Within 
that   context,    the    sovereignty   of 


58 


Mexico,  clearly  established  by  interna- 
tional policy  and  by  our  own  theses 
which  come  from  the  historical  experi- 
ence of  Mexico — in  this  respect  I  can 
state  that  the  sovereignty  of  Mexico  has 
been  kept  firm  within  a  relationship  of 
perfect  interdependence  with  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Secretary  Vance.  I  believe  I  was 
asked  two  questions.  One  related  to  the 
potential  sale  of  oil  to  Cuba  by 
Mexico,  and  the  second  related  to  the 
possibility  of  Mexico  building  a 
pipeline  to  Guatemala.  Both  of  these 
decisions  are  obviously  decisions  that 
can  and  should  be  made  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Mexico. 

Q.  In  the  light  of  the  upcoming 
visit  of  the  Mexican  President  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  did  you  brief  him  on 
your  recent  experience  with  the 
Soviet  leaders,  and,  furthermore,  did 
you  ask  him  to  add  to  the  American 
policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union? 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  answer 
your  first  question.  I  don't  understand 
the  second  one.  The  answer  is  yes,  I 
did  discuss  with  both  President  Lopez 
Portillo  and  with  Foreign  Secretary 
Roel  the  subject  of  my  recent  trip  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  various  discus- 
sions that  I  had  with  the  Soviet  leaders 
during  that  period  of  time.  I  also  ex- 
pressed my  views  with  respect  to  the 
general  nature  of  East-West  relations 
and  the  general  tone  of  character  of  our 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  don't 
understand  the  second  question. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  him  to  support  the 
American  policy? 

Secretary  Vance.  The  decision  of 
what  the  Government  of  Mexico  says 
or  doesn't  say  is  clearly  their  decision 
to  make. 

Q.  I'm  just  a  bit  puzzled  by  why 
the  Governments  of  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  should  be  exchanging 
all  these  studies  on  the  question  of 
undocumented  migrants  when  the 
U.S.  Government  appears  to  have 
made  up  its  mind  about  what  its  pol- 
icy should  be.  I'm  just  wondering  to 
what  extent  the  Administration  is 
willing  to  take  into  account  Mexico's 
position  on  the  subject — above  all,  its 
apparent  opposition  to  the  proposals 
as  they  now  stand. 

Secretary  Vance.  This  has  always 
been  a  common  economic  and  social 
problem,  and  one  on  which  we  cer- 
tainly have  been  taking  into  account 
each  other's  views.  That  has  been  the 
case  in  the  past  and,  of  course,  will 
continue  to  be  the  case  in  the  future. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE2 

The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States, 
Mr.  Cyrus  R.  Vance,  made  an  official  visit  to 
Mexico  on  May  4,  during  which  he  was  received 
in  a  special  audience  by  the  President  of  the 
United  Mexican  States  Licenciado  Jose  Lopez 
Portillo,  and  held  conversations  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  Foreign  Relations  of  Mexico,  Licenciado 
Santiago  Roel,  on  various  bilateral  and  multilat- 
eral subjects  of  interest  to  both  governments. 

In  the  course  of  their  conversations  at  the 
Secretariat  of  Foreign  Relations,  Secretary  Roel 
and  Secretary  Vance  reviewed  the  results 
achieved  by  the  consultative  mechanism  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States,  established  by 
Presidents  Lopez  Portillo  and  Carter  during  their 
meeting  in  Washington  in  February  1977.  They 
concentrated  on  matters  dealt  with  by  the  consul- 
tative mechanism,  and  they  selected  priority 
areas  for  the  future  work  of  the  mechanism.  The 
two  Secretaries  approved  a  joint  report  for  Presi- 
dents Lopez  Portillo  and  Carter  on  the  work  of 
the  consultative  mechanism  during  its  first  year 
of  existence.  In  their  conversations.  Secretary 
Roel  and  Secretary  Vance  were  accompanied  by 
Mexican  and  United  States  officials  who  preside 
over  the  working  groups  of  the  consultative 
mechanism  on  economic  and  social  matters. 

Among  the  most  important  subjects  consid- 
ered by  the  two  Secretaries  were  trade,  invest- 
ment, financial  questions,  tourism,  and  the  seri- 
ous problem  of  Mexican  undocumented  workers. 
Both  Secretaries  agreed  that,  if  temporary  dif- 
ferences exist  regarding  the  method  of  solving 
specific  problems,  the  general  state  of  relations 
between  the  two  countries  is  excellent. 

Secretary  Roel  emphasized  the  importance  for 
Mexico  of  assuring  access  for  Mexican  products 
to  United  States  markets  under  fair  conditions. 
Secretary  Vance,  for  his  part,  gave  assurances 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  de- 
termined to  avoid  any  protectionist  tendencies. 
Also,  Secretary  Vance  expressed  his  firm  con- 
viction that  a  greater  liberalization  of  interna- 
tional trade  could  be  achieved  through  multilat- 
eral negotiations  in  good  faith.  Secretary  Roel 
indicated  that  Mexico  would  continue  cooperat- 
ing in  liberalizing  world  trade. 

Secretary  Vance  noted  that  the  United  States 
fully  recognizes  the  right  of  every  country  to  de- 
cide for  itself  the  conditions  for  admission  of 
foreign  investment  that  are  most  adequate  to  its 
needs.  The  United  States  will  continue  to  keep 
open,  without  discrimination,  access  to  United 
States  capital  markets.  Secretary  Roel  stated  that 
foreign  investment  has  a  role  to  play  in  Mexican 
development  and  that  the  Mexican  Government, 
in  keeping  with  its  priorities,  will  direct  the  re- 
sources of  foreign  investment  to  areas  which  will 
provide  the  best  stimulation  to  Mexican 
development. 

Both  Secretaries  examined  the  principal  world 
problems,  which  place  or  could  place  world 
peace  in  danger,  principally  the  problem  of  the 
Middle  East,  the  arms  race,  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion, and  the  need  for  limitation  or  prohibition  of 
the  use  and  transfer  of  certain  conventional 
arms.  These  measures  are  even  more  important 


Department  of  State  Bui1 

by  reason  of  the  capital  diverted  to  these  i 
which  could  be  used  for  the  economic  and  s 
development. 

On  these  problems.  Secretary  Vance  disci 
with  Secretary  Roel  the  results  of  his  receni 
its  to  the  Middle  East,  Africa  and  the  S 
Union. 

Both  Secretaries  exchanged  points  of  viei 
the  efforts  that  the  international  communi 
making  to  assure  that  nuclear  energy  is  usei  ^ 
clusively  for  peaceful  purposes,  which  rec 
not  only  the  strengthening  of  internati 
safeguard  systems,  negotiated  with  the  parti.  , 
tion  of  all  interested  states,  but  also  the  ado* 
of  effective  means  to  reduce,  and  ultim 
eliminate,  the  arsenals  of  nuclear  arms  that 
ently  exist. 

Other  subjects  discussed  during  the  conv 
tions  related  to  energy,  the  fight  against 
and  drug  smuggling  and  against  internati 
crime,  as  well  as  other  border  problems.  Ar 
other  problems  subject  to  consideration  in  i 
national  forums,  they  emphasized  the  in 
tance  that  both  countries  give  to  the  adoptit 
a  code  of  conduct  for  transnational  corpora 
and  to  the  preparation  of  an  international  a; 
ment  to  prevent  and  suppress  illicit  payn 
in  relation  to  international  commer 
transactions. 

The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  S 
and  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relation 
Mexico  emphasized  the  importance  of  pro 
ing  the  flow  of  tourism  in  both  directions 
of  maintaining  a  close  cooperation  for  tht 
velopment  of  their  respective  borders  ir 
common  border  zone.  For  this  reason,  the; 
cided  to  create  a  subgroup  on  border  prob 
under  the  bilateral  consultative  mechanism 

Secretary  Vance  expressed  his  admiratic 
the  success  achieved  to  date  by  the  Men 
economic  stabilization  program  and  reaffii 
that  the  United  States  would  continue  givin 
help  and  cooperation. 

The  two  Secretaries  signed,  on  the  occa 
of  the  visit  of  Secretary  Vance,  the  folloi 
agreements: 

•  Treaty  of  extradition  between  the  Ur 
Mexican  States  and  the  United  State 
America; 

•  Treaty  on  maritime  boundaries  between 
United  Mexican  States  and  the  United  State 
America;  and 

•  An   agreement  on  tourism  between 
United  Mexican  States  and  the  United  State 
America. 

Secretary  Roel  expressed  to  Secret 
Vance,  as  he  had  already  done  through  ap. 
priate  channels  to  the  Government  of  Pana 
the  satisfaction  of  Mexico  over  the  fact  that 
negotiations  between  the  United  States 
Panama  on  the  Canal,  by  which  Panama  w( 
recover  the  full  and  complete  sovereignty  < 
the  whole  of  its  territory,  had  come  to  a  g 
conclusion. 

Both  Secretaries  reaffirmed  the  view  that 
international  community  should  recognize 
responsibility  for  the  international  protectioi 
human   rights,   and,   in   this  context,   that  t 


1978 


59 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 


.TILATERAL 

rctica 

mmendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
aty.  Adopted  at  Oslo  June  20,  1975.  at  the 
>hth  Consultative  Meeting  of  Antarctic 
at\    ' 

tification  of  approval:  France,  September 
1977. 

ration 

ention  on  the  recognition  and  enforcement 

foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New  York 

le   10,    1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 

59:  for  the  U.S.  December  29,  1970.  TIAS 

97. 

cession   deposited:    Kuwait,    April   28, 

78. 

(ion 

'ention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
re  of  aircraft  Done  at  The  Hague  De- 
mber  16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October 

1971.  TIAS  7192. 
cession  deposited:   Peru  (with  a  reserva- 
tion), April  28,  1978. 
/ention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
ainst  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.   Done 
Montreal   September  23,    1971.   Entered 


d  continue  to  consult  on  measures  to  be 
ted  to  assure  a  proper  monitoring  of  indi- 
al  rights. 

considering  ways  to  strengthen  the  United 
ons  as  the  best  instrument  for  maintaining 
national  peace  on  a  just  and  equitable 
;,  both  Secretaries  took  note  of  the  propos- 
ormulated  by  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
lis  end  in  the  committee  on  the  Charter  of 
Jnited  Nations  and  strengthening  of  the  or- 
zation,  agreeing  on  mutual  consultation  so 
each  country  would  know  in  detail  the  po- 
tt that  the  other  was  maintaining  in  interna- 
al  forums. 

icretary  Roel  and  Secretary  Vance  renewed 
[  decision  to  keep  in  close  and  frequent  con- 
to  assure  high-level  coordination  with  re- 
1  to  measures  that  could  affect  the  two 
itries  The  visit  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
the  frank  and  positive  nature  of  his  conver- 
ts with  President  Lopez  Portillo,  Secretary 
oreign  Relations  Roel  and  other  high  Mexi- 
officials  have  emphasized  and  strengthened 
close  relations  between  good  neighbors  and 
cooperation  which  happily  exists  between 
(ico  and  the  United  States.  D 


Press  release  213  of  May  4,  1978. 
Press  release  215  of  May  4,  1978. 


into  force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Peru  (with  a  reserva- 
tion), April  28,  1978. 
Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,    1944)  (TIAS   1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  30.  1977.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Cuba,  May  2,  1978. 

Containers 

Internationa]  convention  for  safe  containers 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 6,  1977;  for  the  U.S.  January  3. 
1979. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  April  14,  1978. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  April  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  December 
13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 

Notification  of  succession:   Nauru,  May  5, 
1978. 

Environmental  modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18.  1977  ' 

Ratifications  deposited:    Cuba,    April    10, 
1978;  Denmark,  Hungary,  April  19,  1978; 
Sri  Lanka,  April  25,  1978 
Signature:  Laos,  April  13,  1978 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  Done  at  Washington  De- 
cember 27,  1945.  Entered  into  force  De- 
cember 27,  1945.  TIAS  1501 
Signature  and  acceptance:  Surinam,  April 
27,  1978. 

Fisheries 

Convention  for  the  establishment  of  an  Inter- 
American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission.  Done 
at  Washington  May  31.  1949.  Entered  into 
force  March  3,  1950.  TIAS  2044. 
Notice  of  denunciation:  Costa  Rica,  April 
27,  1978;  effective  April  27,  1978. 

Protocol  amending  the  international  convention 
for  the  high  seas  fisheries  of  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean  of  May  9,  1952,  as  amended 
(TIAS  2786,  5385),  with  agreed  minutes  and 
memoranda  of  understanding.  Done  at  Tokyo 
April  25,  1978.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date 
of  the  exchange  by  all  the  contracting  parties 
of  instruments  of  ratification  or  approval. 
Signatures:  Canada,  Japan,  U.S..  April  25, 
1978. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social  and 
cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York  December 
16.    1966.   Entered  into  force  January  3, 
1976. 2 
Ratification  deposited:  Peru,  April  28,  1978. 

International   covenant  on   civil   and   political 
rights.   Done  at  New  York  December   16, 
1966    Entered  into  force  March  23,  1976. 2 
Ratification  deposited:  Peru,  April  28,  1978. 


American  convention  on  human  rights.  Done  at 
San  Jose  November  22,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Dominican  Republic, 
April  19.  1978. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  Geneva 
March  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force  March  17. 
1958.  TIAS  4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Somalia,    April   4, 
1978. 

Amendment  of  article  VII  of  the  convention  on 
facilitation  of  international  maritime  traffic, 
1965  (TIAS  6251).  Adopted  at  London 
November  19,  1973." 

Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas,  March  22, 
1978. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  March 
25,  1972.  Entered  into  force  August  8,  1975. 
TIAS  8118. 

Accession  depositied:   Malaysia,   April  20, 
1978. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at 
New  York  December  21,  1965.  Entered  into 
force  January  4,  1969. 2 
Ratification  deposited:  Luxembourg,  May  1, 
1978. 

Reciprocal  Assistance 

Protocol  of  amendment  to  the  inter-American 
treaty  of  reciprocal  assistance  (Rio  Pact). 
Done  at  San  Jose  July  26,  1975. ' 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the  Pres- 
ident: April  17.  1978.' 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees. 
Done  at  New  York  January  31,  1967.  En- 
tered into  force  October  4.  1967;  for  the  U.S. 
November  1,  1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Panama.  April  26, 
1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780). 
Adopted  at  London  October  12,  1971.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,4  March 
30,  1978. 

Amendment  to  chapter  VI  of  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960 
(TIAS  5780).  Adopted  at  London  November 
20,  1973. ' 

Acceptance  deposited:   Netherlands,4   March 
30,  1978. 

Amendments  to  chapters  II,  III,  IV,  and  V  of 
the  international  convention  for  the  safety  of 
life  at  sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780).  Adopted  at 
London  November  20,  1973.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands.4  March 
30.  1978. 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  January 


60 

14,   1975.  Entered  into  force  September  I?. 

1976.  TIAS  8480 

Accession  deposited.  Cuba.  April  10,  1978. 

Sugar 

Internationa]  sugar  agreement.  1977.  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  October  7.  1977  En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  January  I, 
1978. 

Accessions   deposited.    Bolivia.   March   27. 
1978;  Pakistan.  April  3,   1978. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention 
with  annexes  and  protocols  Done  at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  October  25.  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  January  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S. 
April  7,  1976.  TIAS  8572 
Ratifications  deposited:  Italy.  January  23. 
1978;  Sri  Lanka.  January  5.  1978; 
Uruguay,  December  15.  1977. 
Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations, 
Geneva,  1959.  as  amended,  to  establish  a 
new  frequency  allotment  plan  for  high- 
frequency  radiotelephone  coast  stations,  with 
annexes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  8.  1974  Entered  into  force  January  1, 
1976;  for  the  U.S.  April  21,  1976.  TIAS 
8599. 

Notification  oj  approval  deposited:   Nether- 
lands,4 December  6,  1977. 
Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference    for    the    planning    of    the 
broadcasting-satellite    service    in    frequency 
bands    11.7-12.2  GHz   (in   regions   2   and   3) 
and    11.7-12.5  GHz  tin  region    1).   with  an- 
nexes.  Done  at  Geneva  February    13,    1977. 
Enters  into  force  January  1,  1979 
Notification   of  approval  deposited:    France, 
January  6,  1978. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 
of  crimes  against  internationally  protected 
persons,  including  diplomatic  agents  Done 
at  New  York  December  14,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  February  20.  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accessions  deposited  India.  April  II.  1978; 
Peru.  April  25.  1978 

Trade 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  December 
20.  197.3  (TIAS  78401.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 14.  1977  Entered  into  force  January 
1,  1978. 

Acceptances  deposited  Egypt.  February  14. 
I978;s  Finland.  March  31.  1978;'  Hun- 
gary. March  8.  1978;  Israel.  February  22. 
1978;  Jamaica.  February  10,  1978.  Korea. 
Republic  of.  February  16,  1978;  Peru, 
March  9.  1978;  Philippines.  February  21, 
1978;  Poland.  February  8.  1978;  Yugo- 
slavia. March  22.   1978. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  ot  treaties,  with 
annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  2.3.  1969  ' 
Notification  of  succession:    Nauru,    May   5, 
1978. 


U.N. — Privileges  and  Immunities 

Convention  on  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
the  United  Nations.  Done  at  New  York  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1946.  Entered  into  force  September 
17.  1946;  for  the  U.S.  April  29.  1970.  TIAS 
6900. 
Notification  oj  succession:  Djibouti,  April  6, 

I97X 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement).  1971  (TIAS  7144) 
Open  for  signature  at  Washington  April 
26-May  17.  1978.  Enters  into  force  June  24, 
1978,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions  and 
July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to  other  provi- 
sions. 

Signatures:    Austria,   May    11,    1978;   Iraq, 
May   9,    1978;    Korea,    May    II.    1978; 
Mauritius.   May   9.    1978;   Pakistan.    May 
11.  1978;  South  Africa.  May  2.  1978;  Vat- 
ican City  State.  May  5.  1978. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Tunisia,  May  4,  1978. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement).   1971   (TIAS  7144).  Open 
for  signature  at   Washington   April   26-May 
17.    1978.   Enters  into  force  June  24,    1978. 
with  respect  to  certain  provisions  and  July  1. 
1978,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Arrangement  relating  to  an  observer  scheme  for 
the  whaling  station  at  Cheynes  Beach.  West- 
ern Australia  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Canberra  January  26  and  April  3.  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  3.  1978, 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  January  13. 
1978.  Effected  bj  exchange  of  noies  at 
Dacca  April  11.  1978.  Entered  into  force 
April  II.   1978. 

Project  grant  agreement  for  the  operation  of  the 
Cholera  Research  laboratory  Signed  at 
Dacca  January  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
January  3.   1978. 

Canada 

Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Brussels  April  10  and 
I  I  .  1978  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  the 
later  of  the  two  notifications  wherehv,  the 
governments  notify  each  other  of  the  comple- 
tion of  their  internal  procedures 

Cuba 

Convention   for  the  conservation  of  shrimp. 
Signed  at  Havana  August   15.   1958.  Entered 
into  force  September  4.  1959   HAS  4321. 
Notice  of  termination:    Effective   April   27, 
1978 


Department  of  State  Bu) 
Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sa 
agricultural   commodities  of  Decembi 
1977.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
April  20.  1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr: 
1978. 

Guinea 

Project  grant  agreement  relating  to  agncu 
production  capacity  and  training.  Sign 
Conakry  September  27.  1977.  Entered 
force  September  27.  1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  project  grant  a 
ment  of  September  27.  1977.  regardin 
ricultural  production  capacity  and  trai 
Signed  at  Conakry  March  31.  1978.  En 
into  force  March  31.  1978. 

Ivory  Coast 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  memorandi 
understanding  and  exchange  of  notes  S 
at  Abidjan  February  24,  1978.  Enterec 
force  provisionally  February  24.  1978 
finitively  on  a  date  agreed  to  by  the  con 
ing  parties  in  an  exchange  of  diploi 
notes. 

Kenya 

Project  grant  agreement  providing  fundin 
the  rural  roads  system  project.  Sign 
Nairobi  September  30,  1977.  Entered 
force  September  30,  1977. 

Korea 

Memorandum  of  agreement  relating  t 
Kimpo  International  Airport  expansion 
ect,  with  attachments.  Signed  at  Washi 
and   Seoul  August    12  and   Decembe 

1977.  Entered  into  force  December  14, 
Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jul 

1977  (TIAS  8885).  relating  to  export  oM 
rubber  footwear  from  the  Republic  of  K 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Waa 
ton  May  8.  1978.  Entered  into  force  Mi 
1978. 

Lebanon 

Agreement    for   sales   of  agricultural   < 
modities.  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
25.    1977   (TIAS   8676).   with   minute 
negotiations.    Signed   at   Beirut   March 

1978.  Enters  into  force  upon  date  of  re 
by  the  U.S.  Government  of  the  commu  I 
tion  of  the  approval  of  the  agreement  b;  I 
competent  authorities  of  the  Governme  I 
Lebanon. 

Liberia 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  memorandu  m 
understanding.  Signed  at  Monrovia  Ml 
30.    1978.   Entered   into  force   March  I 

1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  training  for  helicB 
pilots  as  part  of  the  cooperative  effort  t  I 
duce  illegal  narcotics  traffic.  Effected  h  I 
change  of  letters  at  Mexico  April  3,  I  8 
Entered  into  force  April  3.  1978. 

Nigeria 

Air  transport  agreement.  Signed  at  Lagos    I 


1978 

1978.  Entered  into  force  provisionally. 

•■■  il   27.    1978;   definitively,   upon   an   ex- 

:t  nge  of  diplomatic  notes  confirming  the 

:  tpletion  of  any  necessary  constitutional 

lirements. 


na  Canal   treaty,   with  annex   and   agreed 

lute,   related   agreements,   notes,   and  let- 

i.   Signed   at   Washington   September  7. 

77.' 

alt-  advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 

ipril  18.  1978. 

a  New  Guinea 

;ment  relating  to  investment  guaranties. 
:ected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Port 
resby  and  Waigani  November  28,  1977, 
i  April  4,  1978  Entered  into  force  April 
1978. 

ppines 

ct  loan  agreement  for  rural  electrification 
Signed  at  Manila  January  13,  1978.  En- 
ed  into  force  January  13,  1978. 
ct  loan  agreement  for  crop  protection, 
ned  at  Manila  January  13,  1978.  Entered 
o  force  January  13,  1978 
ct  grant  agreement  for  the  economic  and 
•ial  impact  analysis/women  in  develop- 
nt.  Signed  at  Manila  April  19.  1978.  En- 
ed  into  force  April  19,  1978. 

ipore 

ransport  agreement,  with  exchanges  of 
es.  Signed  at  Singapore  March  31,  1978. 
tered  into  force  March  31.  1978. 

ilia 

ement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
idities.  Signed  at  Mogadiscio  March  20, 
78.  Entered  into  force  March  20,  1978. 

anka 

ement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
icultural  commodities  of  January  9.  1978. 
Fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Colombo 
>ril  12,  1978.  Entered  into  force  April  12. 
78. 

ed  Kingdom 

ement  amending  the  agreement  of  July  23, 
177  (TIAS  8641),  concerning  air  services, 
th  related  letters.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
tes  at  Washington  April  25,  1978.  Entered 
o  force  April  25,  1978;  effective  April  1, 
7S 

S.R. 

•ement  concerning  the  translation  and  pub- 

'tation   in   English   of  copyrighted   Soviet 

lloks,  with  form.   Signed  at  Washington 

sarch   21.    1978.    Entered   into  force   March 

j.  1978.  □ 


Wot  in  force. 
Jot  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
Vith  reservation. 

Applicable  to  Netherlands  Antilles. 
Subject  to  ratification. 
vVith  reservations  and  understandings. 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

!><»!>« riiiH'ii i  of  State 


April  24-May  12 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*  1 86        4/24       Fishery  Conservation   Man- 

agement   Act:    One    Year 
Later. 
187        4/24       Vance;  press  briefing.  White 
House. 

*  1 88        4/26       Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 

mittee (SCO,  Safety  of  Life 
at  Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  safety  of  naviga- 
tion. May  23. 

*189  4/26  SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  international  multimodal 
transport  and  containers, 
June  7. 

*190  4/26  SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radio  communications. 
May  18. 

*191  4/27  U.S. -U.K.  charter  air  services 
agreement,  Apr.  23. 

*  1 92        4/27       Robert   L.    Yost   sworn   in   as 

Ambassador  to  the  Domini- 
can Republic.  Apr.  24  (biog- 
raphic data). 
*193  4/27  Visit  of  Korean  Energy  and 
Resources  Minister  Chang 
Yie-joon  to  the  U.S. 

*  194        4/28       Program  for  the  official  visit  to 

Washington  of  Prime  Min- 
ister Fukuda  of  Japan, 
May  1-3. 

195  5/1         Vance:   address  to  national 

convention  of  the  League  of 
Women  Voters,  Cincinnati, 
on  foreign  assistance. 

195A  5/1  Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Cincinnati 
address. 

195B  5/1  Vance:  remarks  to  press  fol- 
lowing Cincinnati  address. 

196  5/1         Vance:    interview   on   CBS 

"Face  the  Nation,"  Apr.  30. 
*197  5/1  Advisory  Committee  on  Private 
International  Law,  study 
group  on  maritime  law  mat- 
ters. May  23. 

*  198         5/1        SCC,  committee   on   ocean 

dumping.  June  6. 

*199  5/1  U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 
ternational Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT).  study 
group  1,  June  1. 

*200         5/2        U.S.,  Nigeria  joint  statement. 


*201 
202 

*203 
*204 

*205 


210 


t216 

*217 

*218 

*219 
t220 

*221 


5/3 
5/3 

5/3 
5/3 

5/3 


*206 

5/3 

*207 

5/3 

*208 

5/3 

*209 

5/4 

5/3 


*211 

5/3 

*212 

5/4 

213 

5/4 

*214 

5/4 

215 

5/4 

5/8 

5/9 

5/9 

5/12 
5/12 

5/12 


61 

Special  foreign  policy  briefing 
for  labor  editors  and  press. 
May  16 

Vance:  statement  before  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions on  proposals  to  sell  air- 
craft to  Egypt,  Israel,  and 
Saudi  Arabia. 

U.S.,  Colombia  amend  textile 
agreement,  Apr.  4.  6. 

Detroit   conference   on    US 
Interests  in  the  Middle  East, 
May  10. 

25th  assembly  of  the  Interna- 
tional Rubber  Study  Group. 
June  19-23. 

U.S.,  Romania  amend  textile 
agreement.  Apr.  12. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  carriage  of  dangerous 
goods.  June  8. 

Overseas  Schools  Advisory 
Council,  June  8. 

U.S.,  Canada,  Japan  sign  pro- 
tocol amending  1972  Interna- 
tional Convention  for  High- 
Seas  Salmon  Fishery  of  the 
North  Pacific  Ocean, 
Apr.  25. 

Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises,  work- 
ing group  on  transborder 
data  flows.  May  23. 

27th  ANZUS  council  meeting, 
Washington,  June  7-8. 

Vance:  arrival  statement, 
Mexico  City,  May  3. 

Vance,  Roel:  joint  news  con- 
ference, Mexico  City. 

Vance:  luncheon  toast,  Mexico 
City. 

Joint  communique  issued  at 
conclusion  of  Secretary 
Vance's  visit.  Mexico  City. 

Foreign  fishery  allocations  for 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  of  Mexico 
sharks  determined  for  1978. 

Vance:  statement  before  House 
Committee  on  International 
Relations  on  proposals  to 
sell  aircraft  to  Egypt,  Israel, 
and  Saudi  Arabia. 

Robert  M.  Sayre  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Brazil  (bio- 
graphic data). 

Conference  for  Young  Political 
Leaders,  May  1 1-12. 

Great  Lakes  water  quality 
agreement  reached  with 
Canada,  May  1 1 . 

Program  for  the  state  visit  to 
the  U.S.  of  Dr.  Kenneth 
Kaunda,  President  of  Zam- 
bia, May  16-22. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


62 


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Atomic  Energy — Safety  Research  and  De- 
velopment. Agreement  with  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ire- 
land. TIAS  8688.  14  pp.  800.  (Cat  No. 
S9  10:8688.) 

Criminal  Investigation.  Agreement  with  In- 
dia. TIAS  8726.  5  pp.  60*.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8726.) 

Fisheries  off  the  United  States  Coast.  Agree- 
ment with  Japan.  TIAS  8727.  5  pp.  60*. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8727.) 

Fisheries  Off  the   United   States  Coasts. 

Agreement  with  Japan.  TIAS  8728.   58  pp. 

$1.80.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8728.) 
Cultural   Relations — Exchanges  for   1977- 

1979.   Agreement   with  the   Union  of  Soviet 

Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  8729.   26  pp 

$1.20.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8729.) 
Finance — Consolidation  and  Rescheduling  of 

Certain  Debts.  Agreement  with  Zaire.  TIAS 


8731.  31  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8731.) 

Space  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  TIAS  8732  21 
pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8732.) 

Patent  Cooperation  Treaty,  With  Regula- 
tions. Agreement  with  other  governments 
TIAS  8733.  363  pp.  $4.75.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8733.) 

Atomic  Energy — Reprocessing  of  Special 
Nuclear   Material.    Agreement   with   Japan 
TIAS     8734.     7     pp.     700.     (Cat.     No. 
S9. 10:8734.) 

Cooperation  in  Environmental  Protection. 
Agreement  with  the  Polish  People's  Repub- 
lic. TIAS  8735.  9  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8735.) 

Cooperation  in  Transportation.  Agreement 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS 
8736.  9  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8736.) 

Trade  in  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles.  Agree- 
ment with  Brazil.  TIAS  8737  5  pp.  600. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8737.) 

Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles.  Agreement  with 
Brazil.  TIAS  8738.  7  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8738.) 

Aviation — Provision  of  Materials  and  Serv- 
ices. Agreement  with  Bolivia.  TIAS  8740. 
4  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8740.) 

Road  Building  Equipment — Suez  Canal 
Area.  Agreement  with  Egypt.  TIAS  8741. 
22  pp.  $1.  (Cat. No.  S9. 10:8741.) 

Aviation — Provision  of  Services.  Agreement 
with  Cape  Verde.  TIAS  8742.  4  pp.  600. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8742.) 

Aviation — Provision  of  Parts  and  Services. 
Agreement  with  Pakistan.  TIAS  8743.  3  pp. 
600.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8743.) 

Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with 
Canada.  TIAS  8744.  3  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8744.) 

Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with  Aus- 
tralia. TIAS  8745.  5  pp    600 

Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with  New 
Zealand.  TIAS  8746.  4  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8746.) 

On-Farm  Water  Management.  Agreement 
with  Pakistan.  TIAS  8747.  41  pp.  $1  50. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8747.) 

Establishment  of  Trade  Center.  Agreement 
with  Brazil.  TIAS  8748.  5  pp.  600.  (Cat. 
No.  S9. 10:8748.) 

Scientific  Cooperation.  Agreement  with 
Brazil,  amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  December  1,  1971  TIAS  8749. 
6  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No    S9  10:8749  ) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative  Ar- 
rangement To  Curb  Illegal  Production  and 
Traffic.  Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS  8750. 
4  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8750.) 

Weather  Stations.  Agreement  with  Colombia 
TIAS  8752  14  pp  800  (Cat  No 
S9. 10:8752  ) 

Agricultural        Commodities — Transfers 
Under  Title   II.   Agreement   with  Bolivia 
TIAS     8753.      5  pp.      600.      (Cat.      No. 
S9. 10:8753.) 


Department  of  State  Bu. 

Atomic  Energy — Intense   Neutron   Soi 

Agreement   with  other  governments.  ' 
8754    16  pp   SI.  (Cat    No.  S9. 10:8754.) 

Rural  Sanitation  Manpower  Developn 
Agreement  with  Indonesia.  TIAS  8755 
pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8755.) 

Mapping.  Agreement  with  Iceland.  1 
8756.  6  pp.  600.  (Cat    No.  S9. 10:8756.) 

Training  of  Army   Units.   Agreement 
Australia.  TIAS  8757.  4  pp.  600.  (Cat. 
S9. 10:8757.) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Indemnification  for  Li 
ity   from   Flight  Operations.   Agreei 
with  Mexico,  amending  the  agreemei 
September  12,  1975.  TIAS  8758    4  pp. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8758.) 

Higher   Education   Development   Trail 

Agreement   with  Indonesia.   TIAS  8 
28  pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8759.) 

Small   Farmer   Training.   Agreement 

Colombia.  TIAS  8760.  18  pp.  $1.  (Cat 

S9. 10:8760.) 
Small   Farmer  Training   Loan   Guarai 

Agreement  with  Colombia.  TIAS  87f 

pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8761.) 
Rural    Health    Services.    Agreement 

Panama.  TIAS  8762.   94  pp.   $2.10. 

No.  S9. 10:8762.) 
Citanduy   River  Basin   Development.  A 

ment  with  Indonesia.  TIAS  8763.  3(| 

$1.20.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8763.) 
National  Energy  Control  Center.  Agree 

with  Egypt.   TIAS  8764     15  pp.   900. 

No.  S9. 10:8764.) 
Livestock   Production.   Agreement   wit 

Mutual  Aid  and  Loan  Guaranty  Fund  c 

Council  of  the  Entente  States.   TIAS  I 

66  pp.  $2.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8766.) 
Plant   Protection.   Agreement   with   Bt 

TIAS     8767.     5     pp.     600.     (Cat. 

S9. 10:8767.) 
Small   Farmer  Training.   Agreement 

Colombia.  TIAS  8768.  39  pp.  $1.50. 

No.  S9. 10:8768.) 
Small   Farmer  Training   Loan   Guarai 

Agreement  wilh  Colombia.   TIAS  87( 

pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8769.) 
Economic   Assistance.   Agreement   wilh 

bia.   TIAS  8770.    17  pp.   900.   (Cat. 

S9. 10:8770.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.   Agreement 

Zambia.  TIAS  8771.    19  pp.   $1.   (Cat. 

S9. 10:8771.) 
Fertilizer       Storage.       Agreement 

Bangladesh.  TIAS  8772.   20  pp.   $1.  i 

No.  S9. 10:8772.) 
Chiang    Mai    Seismic    Research    Stat 

Agreement  with  Thailand.   TIAS  8774 

pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8774.) 
NATO  Sea  Gnat  System.   Agreement 

other   governments.    TIAS    8776.    32 

$1.30.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8776.) 
Atomic   Energy — Information   Exchan 

Nuclear   Field.   Agreement   with  Can 

TIAS     8778.     8     pp      700       (Cat 

S9. 10:8778.) 


index 


E1978 

..78  NO.  2015 

i  Control 

trient  Carter's  News  Conference.  April  25 

Icerpts) 12 

■tion-and-Answer  Session   Following  Cin- 

Knali  Address  (Vance)    17 

■tary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
il"   27 

■tary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United 
ligdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  (Owen.  Vance, 

kit  statement  and  communique) 21 

I  Special  Session  on  Disarmament  Con- 
Jiies  I  Mondale)  31 

■Jnited  States  and  Japan  (Brzezinski)  ....  1 
Bnational    Narcotics    Control    Program 

Leo)    42 

iDodia 

ritn  Rights  in  Cambodia  (Carter) 38 

1(  ion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Cin- 

cinati  Address  (  Vance)    17 

■rO.  Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa. 
I  United  Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
■wen,   Vance,  joint  statement  and  com- 

re  liquel 21 

ill.  Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face 

tl  Nation"   27 

M  ress 

■  aft  Sales  to  Egypt,  Israel,  and  Saudi 
Hibia  (Carter,  Vance,  Department  state- 
lit,  letter  from  President  Carter)   38 

Bress:   Its  Role  in  Foreign  Policymaking 

■ennet)  35 

Bnational    Narcotics   Control   Program 

I  lco) 42 

p  in  the  World  Economy  (Hormats)  ....  5 
f|us.  Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa, 
I   United   Kingdom,   and  the  U.S.S.R. 

M*en,  Vance,  joint  statement  and  coin- 
unique)  21 

oping  Countries 
I  i  g  n     Assistance     and     U.S.     Policy 
Iince) 14 

■  ion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Cin- 

C  nati  Address  (  Vance)    17 

ci  omics.  Japan  in  the  World  Economy 
(  irmats)    5 

E< 

■  aft  Sales  to  Egypt,  Israel,  and  Saudi 
/ibia   (Carter.    Vance.    Department   state- 

nnt.  letter  from  President  Carter)   38 

fltary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
il"   27 

■opia.   Secretary   Vance  Interviewed  on 

'  ace  the  Nation " 27 

o  ign  Aid 

Align     Assistance     and     U.S.     Policy 

( ance) 14 


Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Cin- 
cinnati Address  (  Vance)    17 

Human  Rights.  Human  Rights  in  Cambodia 

(Carter) 38 

Israel 

Aircraft  Sales  to  Egypt,  Israel,  and  Saudi 
Arabia  (Carter,  Vance,  Department  state- 
ment, letter  from  President  Carter)   38 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion"   27 

Visit  of  Israeli  Prime   Minister  Begin  (Begin, 

Carter) 41 

Japan 

Japan — A  Profile 4 

Japan  in  the  World  Economy  (Hormats)  ....  5 
U.S.    Ambassador  to   Japan   (biographic 

data) 3 

The  United  States  and  Japan  (Brzezinski) ...  1 
Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Fukuda  ....  2 
Korea.  U.S.   Combat  Forces  in  South  Korea 

(Carter) 36 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  International 

narcotics  Control  Program  (Falco)    42 

Law   of  the  Sea.  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 

( Richardson)     47 

Mexico.  Secretary  Vance  Visits  Mexico  (Roel. 

Vance,  joint  communique)    56 

Micronesia.  Micronesia  (Department  state- 
ment, statement  of  principles)    49 

Middle  East 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  April  25 

(excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Cin- 
cinnati Address  (Vance)   17 

Remarks  to  the  Press  Following  Cincinnati 

Address  ( Vance) 20 

Military   Affairs.   U.S.   Combat  Forces  in 

South  Korea  (Carter)   36 

Namibia 

Namibia  (Jamieson.  McHenry.  text  of  pro- 
posal)     50 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion"   27 

Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  (Owen.  Vance, 

joint  statement  and  communique) 21 

Narcotics.   International   Narcotics   Control 

Program  ( Falco)    42 

New  Zealand.  New  Zealand.  Letter  of  Cre- 
dence (Norrish) 49 

Presidential  Documents 

Aircraft   Sales   to   Egypt.    Israel,   and   Saudi 

Arabia 38 

Human  Rights  in  Cambodia 38 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,   April 

25 12 

U.S.  Combat  Forces  in  South  Korea 36 

Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin   41 

Visit  of  Romanian  President  Ceausescu  (joint 

declaration)    36 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications 62 

Refugees.  Question-and-Answer  Session  Fol- 
lowing Cincinnati  Address  (  Vance) 17 

Romania 

Romania — A  Profile 37 

Visit  of  Romanian  President  Ceausescu  (joint 
declaration)   36 


Saudi  Arabia 

Aircraft  Sales  to  Egypt.  Israel,  and  Saudi 
Arabia  (Carter.  Vance.  Department  state- 
ment, letter  from  President  Carter)   38 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion"   27 

Security  Assistance 

Aircraft  Sales  to  Egypt.  Israel,  and  Saudi 
Arabia  (Carter,  Vance,  Department  state- 
ment, letter  from  President  Carter)   38 

Question-and  Answer  Session  Following  Cin- 
cinnati Address  (Vance)    17 

Remarks  to  the  Press  Following  Cincinnati 
Address  ( Vance) 20 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion"   27 

South  Africa 

Namibia  (Jamieson,  McHenry,  text  of  pro- 
posal)    50 

Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  (Owen,  Vance. 
joint  statement  and  communique) 21 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion"   27 

Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  (Owen,  Vance, 
joint  statement  and  communique) 21 

Tanzania.  Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa, 
the   United   Kingdom,   and  the  U.S.S.R 
(Owen,    Vance,  joint  statement  and  com- 
munique)   21 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 59 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on 
"Face  the  Nation" 27 

Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to  Africa,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  (Owen.  Vance. 
joint  statement  and  communique) 21 

United  Kingdom.  Secretary  Vance's  Visit  to 
Africa,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
U.S.S.R.    (Owen,    Vance,  joint   statement 

and  communique)  21 

United  Nations 

Namibia     (Jamieson.     McHenry.     text     of 

proposal     50 

U.N  Special  Session  on  Disarmament  Con- 
venes (Mondale)   31 


Name  Index 

Begin.  Menahem 41 

Bennet.  Douglas  J..  Jr    35 

Brzezinski,  Zbigniew    1 

Carter.  President    12,  36.  38.  41 

Falco.  K.  Mathea    42 

Hormats.  Robert  D     5 

Jamieson.  Donald  50 

McHenry ,  Donald  F     50 

Mondale,  Vice  President 31 

Norrish,  Merwyn 49 

Owen,  David  21 

Richardson,  Elliot  L    47 

Roel,  Santiago 56 

Vance.  Secretary    .  .14,  17,  20,  21.  27.  38,  56 


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