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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"




BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




department 
of State 



W of State ]■ iLW j & 

bulletin 



April 197U 



'■) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2013 




Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2013 / April 1978 






Cover Photos: 

Paul C. Warnke 
President Carter 
Secretary Vance 
Richard C. Holbrooke 
Arthur J. Goldberg 



The Department of State Bul- 
letin, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to 
provide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
tions and the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Aff- 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 

Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



SALT 

I An Ongoing Process (Paul C. Warlike) 

10 Compliance With the SALT I Agreements (Administration Report) 
15 Verification of the Proposed SALT II Agreement (Administration Report) 



THE PRESIDENT 

17 National Security Interests 
19 News Conferences, February 17. 
March 2 and 9 

THE SECRETARY 

24 U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs 

AFRICA 

30 Security Assistance to the Sub-Sahara 

(Richard M. Moose) 
30 Southern Rhodesia (Joint U.S. -U.K. 

Statement) 

30 Kenya ( White House Statement) 

EAST ASIA 

31 Security Assistance (Richard C. Hol- 

brooke) 
33 Letters of Credence (Indonesia, West- 
ern Samoa) 

ECONOMICS 

35 America's Stake in an Open Interna- 
tional Trading System (Secretary 
Vance) 

37 International Financial Institutions 
(Richard N. Cooper) 

EUROPE 

40 Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes 
(Arthur J. Goldberg, Concluding 
Document, White House Statement) 

42 CSCE Semiannual Report (Depart- 

ment Statement) 

43 U.S.S.R. (Department Statement) 

43 Letter of Credence (Bulgaria) 

44 Visit of Yugoslav President Tito 

(Joint Statement) 

45 Yugoslavia — A Profile 

47 Visit of Danish Prime Minister 
J^rgensen f White House Statement) 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

47 Country Reports (Mark L. Schneider) 

48 Human Rights Treaties 

MIDDLE EAST 

48 U.S. -Iran Joint Commission (Joint 
Communique) 



NUCLEAR POLICY 

49 Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Presi- 

dent Carter) 

50 Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (White 

House Statement) 

OCEANS 

51 Antarctic Resource and Environmental 

Concerns (Patsy T. Mink) 
54 Deep Seabed Mining Legislation (El- 
liot L. Richardson) 

UNITED NATIONS 

56 Southern Rhodesia (Andrew Young, 
Resolution) 

58 Report on U.N. Reform and Restruc- 

turing 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

59 Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty 

Ratified (President Carter, Secre- 
tary Vance) 

59 TREATIES 

62 PRESS RELEASES 

INDEX 



!°^SS^ 



Superint 



MAY - fi 1S73 

DEPOSITORY 



U.S. AND U.S.S.R. OPERATIONAL 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY VEHICLES 



2,500 



2,000 



500 



67 




69 



71 73 

END FISCAL YEAR 



75 



i i 
77 



U.S. AND U.S.S.R. OPERATIONAL 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WARHEADS/BOMBS 



12,000 



10,000 



8,000 



6,000 




i i i 1 i i * i 

69 71 73 75 

END FISCAL YEAR 



1978 



SALT: An Ongoing Process 



'tlC. Warnke 

fit is SALT? I think we have to 
|ize that SALT has become an 
tig process. It's not any one 
I it can't be judged on the basis 
| one treaty. It has to be judged 
: basis of whether or not the 
process is contributing to the 
y of the United States. 
SALT talks have been going 
:e 1969, and we have had some 
. SALT I did have the very ef- 
: result of limiting antiballistic 
; systems. We and the Soviets 
pared the necessity and expense 
I ng ahead with more offensive 
tus for the purpose of countering 
fl tiballistic missile defenses. It's 
jh the crazy logic of the strategic 
lir age that one could think of 
fees as being bad, but anything 
tiallenges the retaliatory capabil- 
il the other side is necessarily de- 
fa zing and contributes to the arms 
I And that's really what SALT is 

! lUt. 

• here some way that we and the 
It Union — with as many differ- 

I as we have beween us — can 
lliehave rationally and arrive at 
live agreements that will protect 
agic stability, that will prevent 
Browth of apprehensions about 
■ strike capability of the other 
I and hence will enable us to 
I the nuclear arms competition 
w ally to a halt? I think we're get- 
{here. It's a slow process and, no 
e tep is going to be the final step 
» d the goal . 

IT I and Vladivostok 

\iere are we at the present point? 
|iave a SALT I antiballistic mis- 
fc;ABM) treaty, which limits an- 
■istic missile defenses. We also 
lout of SALT I, in May 1972, an 
I im Agreement which imposed 
I: expectedly short-term con- 
ies on strategic offensive forces. 
lar as it went, it was a useful 
kement. It tended to freeze the 
fcgic missiles on both sides. 
I has certain defects. Its coverage 
jicomplete. It doesn't prevent the 
Hopment of new technologies, 
J— a defect which perhaps was 
J: important from the public rela- 
h standpoint than from the mili- 
( standpoint — it provided for un- 



equal aggregates, as far as numbers 
of missiles were concerned. 

Since it essentially froze existing 
programs, the Soviets were left with a 
lead in intercontinental ballistic mis- 
sile (ICBM) silos and in numbers of 
launcher tubes on ballistic missile 
submarines. This was, of course, a 
controversial point in SALT I. It led 
to the so-called Jackson resolution 
which provided that any subsequent 
agreements on control of offensive 
arms had to contain equal aggregates 
for the Soviet Union and for the 
United States in strategic interconti- 
nental nuclear delivery systems. 

From the standpoint of the history 
of SALT, the next important step was 
the so-called Vladivostok understand- 
ing between President Ford and Gen- 
eral Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivos- 
tok in late 1974. ' Because more than 
3 years have gone by since then, we 
tend to forget this was a very signifi- 
cant breakthrough: It meant that the 
principle of equal aggregates was ac- 
cepted by the Soviet Union. They 
agreed that in SALT II there would be 
equal ceilings on overall strategic nu- 
clear delivery vehicles and also a 
subceiling on the number of those de- 
livery vehicles that could contain 
multiple independently-targetable 
reentry vehicles (MIRV). The under- 
standing provided for a total of 2,400 
on the overall delivery vehicles. It 



provided that 1,320 of those could be 
launchers of MIRV missiles. And it 
did so without containing any sort of 
adjustment, any sort of compensation 
for the Soviet Union for the fact that 
the United States maintains delivery 
systems in Europe that can strike 
Soviet targets. 

The Road to SALT II 

Since 1972 negotiations have been 
continuing toward a SALT II agree- 
ment. Vladivostok was a very signifi- 
cant step in those negotiations. Other 
provisions were worked out in great 
detail in the more than 4 years before 
the Carter Administration took office. 

We began the SALT negotiations 
again on May 11, 1977. At that time, 
we were the beneficiaries of a joint 
draft text approximately 50 pages 
long which did, in fact, resolve a 
number of very knotty, troublesome 
issues involved in any strategic arms 
control agreement. So we have to 
recognize that the SALT II treaty, 
which is now beginning to take final 
form, is the product of more than 5 
years of careful negotiation. It's not 
the product of a single Administra- 
tion; it's not the product of any parti- 
san political activity. And it will, at a 
minimum, contain the equal aggre- 
gates that were called for by the Con- 
gress after SALT I. It will contain 



Paul C. Warnke was born January 31. 
1920. in Webster, Massachusetts. He re- 
ceived his A.B. degree from Yale (1941) 
and his LL.B. from Columbia (1948). He 
was Editor in Chief of the Columbia Law 
Review during 1948. Mr. Warnke served in 
the U.S. Coast Guard (1942-46) as a 
Lieutenant (senior grade) in the Atlantic in 
the antisubmarine service and in the Pacific 
on tanker and LST's. He practiced law 
from 1948 to 1966. 

Mr. Warnke was appointed General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense in 
September 1966 and Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs 
in August 1977. He left government serv- 
ice in February 1969 to become a full part- 
ner in a law firm in Washington, DC. 

On March 9. 1977, Mr. Warnke was 
confirmed by the Senate to be Director of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 







Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the 
personal rank of Ambassador. 



Department of State 



;. 



those figures of 2,400 and 1,320 
which are the identical ceilings for 
both sides. It will, however, do a 
good deal more than that. 

The objective of strategic arms lim- 
itation talks is to protect strategic sta- 
bility: to preserve a situation in which 
no matter what the provocation might 
be felt to be, the Soviet Union could 
at no time feel that it might conceiva- 
bly be in its interests to initiate nu- 
clear war. We have to be sure, by one 
means or another, that we have at all 
times the assured retaliatory capabil- 
ity in the event of a Soviet attack to 
respond with such devastating force 
as to destroy the Soviet Union as a 
going society. 

You can keep that ability in one of 
two ways. You can keep it by an un- 
restricted nuclear arms competition. 
And there's no question in my mind 
that if that's the way we have to go 
we can do it — we have the will, we 
have the resources, we have the tech- 
nology. But there is a better way, and 
that better way is to get effective 
arms control that preserves strategic 
stability and avoids the risks and the 
costs of an unrestricted nuclear arms 
competition. 

In SALT II what we're trying to do 
is to take a major step forward; to go 
beyond the principle of equal ceilings 
and move also toward quantitative 
reductions — an actual reduction in 
these figures of 2,400 and 1,320— 
and also for the first time to impose 
qualitative constraints, because num- 
bers alone won't do the job. If we 
are, in fact, going to put an end to 
the nuclear arms competition, if we're 
to avoid the development of new 
technologies — new weapons systems 
that might be destabilizing because 
they threaten the strategic balance — 
we have to have qualitative restraints 
as well. 

In March 1977. when Secretary 
Vance took his first trip to Moscow, 2 
we presented to the Soviet leadership 
alternate plans for a SALT II treaty. 
One plan was the so-called "com- 
prehensive" approach, in which we 
endeavored really to shortcut the arms 
control negotiating process and move 
in one single giant step toward very 
significant reductions in numbers and 
toward a whole series of qualitative 
restraints. It went too far for the 
Soviet Union. I think we have to rec- 
ognize that theirs is a leadership 
which is very conservative; which 
hates surprises and which moves in 
even a more glacial fashion than 
sometimes the U.S. Government ap- 
pears to move. And our proposal went 
too far. 

Recognizing the distinct possibility 



that this would be the case, we pre- 
sented an alternative proposal. This 
was just to negotiate a simple, bare- 
bones. Vladivostok treaty moving the 
2,400 figure and the 1,320 figure into 
a treaty and deferring all of the qual- 
itative restraints, all of the technical 
questions and constraints over the 
more contentious weapons systems. 
That, again, not necessarily unexpect- 
edly, didn't go far enough for the 
Soviets. 

SALT II: An Improvement 
on Vladivostok 

Where we're going to come out is 
somewhere in between those alterna- 
tives of March 1977. SALT II won't 
go as far as the comprehensive pack- 
age, but it will be distinctly better — 
from the standpoint of arms control, 
from the standpoint of protecting the 
security of the United States — than 
the alternative, the simple 
Vladivostok-type treaty. 

For a considerable period of these 
negotiations, the Soviet delegation 
had quite restricted authority. They 



. . . SALT has become an ongo- 
ing process. It's not any one 
treaty; it can't be judged on the 
basis of any one treaty. It has to 
be judged on the basis of whether 
or not the overall process is con- 
tributing to the security of the 
United States. 



could deal with the technical ques- 
tions of compliance verification, pro- 
hibitions against deliberate 
concealment — very important provi- 
sions in any arms control treaty. They 
did not, however, have the authority 
to negotiate reductions. They did not 
have the authority to negotiate a pro- 
hibition on new types of strategic sys- 
tems. They did not have the authority 
to negotiate subceilings on the more 
dangerous MIR V cd K'BM's. They 
dealt up through September with what 
was referred to as the secondary is- 
sues. Then Foreign Minister Gromyko 
came to Washington in the latter part 
of September 1977. 3 And as a result 
of his talks with President Carter and 
Secretary Vance, they made some 
quite significant moves. They agreed 
that SALT II could go beyond Vla- 
divostok; that it could contain subceil- 
ings on the more dangerous systems; 



that it could contain proviswhl 
reductions; that it could contaiH 
prohibitions on new strategic s;9 
As a result of those meetinjp 
delegation of the Soviet Ur 
Geneva received much more ex 
negotiating freedom and, duri 
last quarter of 1977, we were 
make quite significant progr 
ward completing SALT II. 

I can't really predict when 
be completed. If we continue I 
the same sort of progress, we 
very well be through, as Pn 
Carter indicated at a news con: 
on December 31 in Warsaw, 
time in the relatively early ; 
But as someone who has had < 
erable experience with comr 
negotiations, I find that even 
you can get 95% of the w " 
ward your eventual objective, b de 
nition the issues that are lefill 
remaining 59c — are still there ha| 
they're the ones on which the I 
most disagree. I think that you I 
agree that no negotiators shoul ha 
any sort of deadline in mind. Til 
position of deadlines does nothirl 
discourage thoughtful and p dfi 
negotiations. 

I am, however, very opti isl 
about the final content of SAL II 
think it's going to be a good trn 
think it will move us forward ■ 
our goal of protecting the secu n 
the United States by guaran a 
strategic stability. I'm confident 
its provisions will be verifiable || 
also confident that we will be <l 
agree with the Soviet Union H 
agenda for this continuing pin 
called SALT that will enable u n 
gradual, but nonetheless effeB 
basis to begin to bring the strl 
nuclear arms competition to a II 
to the benefit of both countries ■ 
the great relief of the rest cl 
world. 



Q. What inspection method 
available now to insure tha 
Soviets are complying will 
present SALT agreements? 

A. The present SALT agret 
doesn't require anything other 
our national technical means. I 
go into the details of what the* 
tional technical means arc. I'rr 
that you've all got a very cleai 
of what I'm talking about. 

But SALT I is a relatively s 
arms control agreement. It deals 
with numbers, and it deals with 
bers of things that are clearly ot 
able and clearly countable. As a 
sequence we can rely on our na 
technical means in SALT I. V. 
not require what is sometime 



1978 



"Hi, k 
it were 
1 

when 



to as cooperative measures, on- 
spection, that sort of thing, 
a very large extent, the same 
e true of SALT II. We are still 
lg with the kinds of controls 

are verifiable by our national 
cal means. If, in this continuing 
ss, we get much beyond that. 
ve are going to have to consider 
gree with the Soviet Union on 
intrusive measures of verifica- 



ess, 

as Pi 

*S C0| 

arsai 



Ir 



Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, As- 

it Secretary for European Af- 

, who spoke before you, said it 

his personal belief that the 

•t Union was a very insecure 

n and, therefore, depended 

building up their arms, in 

r to become secure. Do you 

jj the same belief? And if so, 

is the foundation of SALT, 

is the foundation of your op- 

;m that the SALT agreement 

;ucceed? 

I don't believe that I disagree 

Assistant Secretary Vest. I think 

our positions are readily recon- 

e. You could regard the Soviet 

| as an insecure nation. They've 

great deal to be insecure about. 

lend of mine once pointed out 

:he U.S.S.R. is the only country 

; world completely surrounded 

stile Communist neighbors, and 

doesn't make for a great degree 

nfidence. 

hink, however, that that insecu- 

is entirely consistent with the 

of reaching a SALT agreement 

the United States. I'm frequently 

d why it is that I feel we can 

the Russians. And my answer is 

I think you can trust any country 

;have in its own interests. And I 

ve that the Soviet leadership rec- 

zes that an arms control agree- 

t with the United States is in the 

(Tests of the Soviet Union. 

divide the reasons for that into 

■ ; categories: economic, political, 

" l B military. The economic reason is 

"nably the least important of the 

i 2, but there's no question that the 

fiet Union spends more than the 

fj:ed States — appreciably more — on 

[(defense capability, including 

titegic nuclear arms. We now esti- 

fce that something in excess of 

h, maybe as much as 16%, of their 

3"P is spent on defense. That's a 

w heavy burden. It's one that they 

| bear in their kind of society. 

fry don't have any really effective 

fisumer protests about the diversion 

>|resources, so they can do it, but 

i'y certainly can't enjoy it. 

"he second reason — and I think this 



is part of their insecurity — is that I 
believe they derive not only certain 
status feelings but also feel their in- 
ternational image is improved if they 
are seen to be dealing as equals with 
the other military superpower. And 
they can't really expect to continue to 
deal with the United States unless 
those negotiations yield some sort of 
results. 

Finally, and I think perhaps more 
important, if you're in an insecure na- 
tion, if you have feelings of inferior- 
ity, if you feel that the hands of most 
men are against you, and if you're 



faced with a competitor of the size 
and strength and resources and tech- 
nological know-how of the United 
States, you have to face the possibil- 
ity that in an unrestricted military 
competition you may come out second 
best. And from that standpoint, too, it 
could very well be regarded by the 
Soviet leadership, and I believe is re- 
garded by the Soviet leadership, as 
being the better course to try and 
agree with the United States on some 
kind of reasonable arms control 
measures that will provide for 
strategic stability. 



FACT SHEET ON 
SALT NEGOTIATIONS 

The United Slates and the Soviet Union 
have been engaged in the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks since the autumn of 1969. 
The goals of the United States at SALT are 
the enhancement of national security, 
strategic stability, and detente through 
dialogue and agreements with the Soviet 
Union. The negotiations are aimed at the 
limitation and reduction of both offensive 
and defensive strategic arms. 

The first phase of negotiations (SALT I) 
was concluded on May 26, 1972. On that 
date the President, on behalf of the U.S. 
Government, signed two agreements with 
the Soviet Union — the Treaty on the Limita- 
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and 
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures 
With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms for a 5-year period. Both 
the treaty and the Interim Agreement were 
approved by the Congress and entered into 
force on October 3. 1972. 

In November 1972 a new phase (SALT 
II) was begun. Bilateral discussions con- 
tinued for the next 2 years and led to a 
joint statement on SALT at Vladivostok on 
November 24, 1974. At that time, the Pres- 
ident of the United States and the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R. concurred in several principles 
for a new agreement to cover the period 
until December 31, 1985. General provi- 
sions of the new agreement included limit- 
ing the aggregate number of strategic de- 
livery vehicles on each side to 2,400 and 
establishing a sublimit of 1,320 on ICBM's 
and SLBM's (submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles) equipped with MIRV's. 

A number of issues were not resolved in 
the Vladivostok statement. The most im- 
portant were whether to include in the total 
delivery vehicles to be limited a Soviet 
bomber called Backfire in the West and 
what limitations should be placed on cruise 
missiles. These other issues have been the 
subject of continuing negotiations since 
November 1974. 



In March 1977 the Carter Administration 
offered two alternate proposals for resolv- 
ing the impasse. One would have deferred 
the Backfire and cruise missile issues to 
later negotiations. The second, or so-called 
comprehensive proposal, was designed to 
advance SALT well beyond the agreement 
reached at Vladivostok. It called for more 
substantial reductions in delivery vehicles 
and MIRV'ed missiles than had been dis- 
cussed at Vladivostok, for constraints on 
Backfire and on the range of cruise mis- 
siles, and for measures to slow the de- 
velopment and deployment of new strategic 
systems. The Soviet Union rejected both 
proposals. 

In May 1977 Secretary Vance and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva 
and agreed on a three-part framework for 
the SALT II agreement. 

• A treaty of 8 years' duration would es- 
tablish limits on strategic systems at levels 
somewhat below those agreed on in 1974. 
This equal ceiling would provide for clear 
overall equivalence in strategic forces. The 
equal aggregate ceilings with freedom to 
choose the mix of forces within the overall 
limit are a means of providing for equiva- 
lence despite the major differences in the 
composition of U.S. and Soviet forces. 
(Historically, the strategic forces of the 
two sides have evolved along different 
lines, with the Soviets emphasizing 
ICBM's. and the United States deploying a 
more balanced mix of ICBM's, SLBM's. 
and heavy bombers.) 

• A protocol will cover temporary lim- 
itations on a number of systems which are 
not ready for longer term resolution, such 
as new types of ICBM's, mobile ICBM's, 
and cruise missiles. These will be the sub- 
ject of further negotiations in SALT III 

• A set of agreed principles will com- 
plete the "three-tier" SALT II agreement 
and will serve as general guidance for the 
continuation of SALT negotiations. The 
principles will include commitments to fur- 
ther reductions, more comprehensive qual- 
itative constraints on new systems, and 
provisions to enhance verifications. 



Department of State uH 



Q. My question regards the con- 
cept of qualitative restraints that 
you've introduced. I wonder if 
there is not a danger in that ap- 
proach of hurting certain kinds of 
basic scientific research. And I'm 
thinking in particular of controlled 
thermonuclear fusion technology, 
both of the laser type and of the in- 
ertial confinement type, which is 
connected to the frontier areas of 
military technology and is, at the 
same time, going to be extremely 
important for a national energy pol- 
icy in the 1990's and beyond. And I 
wonder if it would not be better for 
the United States to concentrate on 
developing that kind of technology 
and perhaps seeing this as an area 
in which cooperation with the 
Soviet Union might be possible, as 
they have, I think, repeatedly of- 
fered. 

A. Let me hasten to reassure you 
that there is absolutely nothing con- 
templated that would result in an 
overall restriction on the development 
of technologies for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. 

When we talk about a freeze on 
new types, it'd be a very limited kind 
of freeze. It would freeze the testing 
and the deployment of new types of 
nuclear weapons. It would not in any 
way interfere with laser fusion re- 
search or. as a matter of fact, with 
any basic research whatsoever. It 
would be a step forward in the control 
of nuclear weapons, but it certainly 
wouldn't have any kind of overall re- 
strictive impact on the development 
of nuclear technology generally. 

Q. A former member of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recently made a 
statement in our state which is of 
great interest to me because I live 
within a mile of a major military 
installation, so I feel fairly certain 
that one of those Soviet nuclear 
subs has a missile aimed at me 
right now. He said that in case of a 
Soviet nuclear attack, the United 
States could well lose 160 million 
people, but because the Russians 
have built such fantastic under- 
ground civil defense areas — as 
many as a thousand of them of huge 
size — that Russia could well survive 
any retaliation that we attempted. 
And that makes you wonder 
whether SALT is getting anywhere 
at all if we also do not take into 
consideration the civil defense 
capabilities of our country as well 
as theirs. 

The other thing is, it seems to me 
at the rate that they're building 
submarines, their surface naval 



vessels, and their merchant 
marine — actually an arm of their 
navy — they could currently really 
blanket the seas of the world. Are 
they aiming for conventional war or 
nuclear war? Because in a conven- 
tional war they could quite 
adequately, at the present time, cut 
off the flow of supplies from one 
nation to the other which Hitler's 
inability to do in World War II was 
the only thing that saved Europe. 

A. I think that in both instances if 
the assumptions were correct then I 
would be far, far less confident than I 
am. But I think that the assumptions 
in both instances are wrong. I know 
of no evidence, and none of our intel- 



ft's only in the crazy logic of the 
strategic nuclear age that one 
could think of defenses as being 
bad, but anything that challenges 
the retaliatory capability of the 
other side is necessarily de- 
stabilizing and contributes to the 
arms race. And that's really what 
SALT is all about. 



ligence sources reveal any evidence, 
that the Soviet Union has an effective 
civil defense program. There's no 
question that they're spending more 
money on civil defense than we are 
now. They appear to be sort of in the 
mood that we were in the early 
1960's — except that the euphoria that 
led us to feel a fallout shelter pro- 
gram might spare us most of the nu- 
clear casualties was perhaps some- 
what less silly than any such reliance 
would be today because of the great 
growth in offensive nuclear capability 
that has taken place since. There's no 
question that if the Soviet Union were 
to continue to go ahead with great 
expenditures on civil defense, this 
would be an undesirable thing. It 
would put us back into the same posi- 
tion we were in with regard to an- 
tiballistic missile defenses before 
SALT I. 

The real problem is not thai they 
would have an effective defense but 
that they might kid themselves and, 
as a consequence, feel a greater free- 
dom to brandish the nuclear threat. 
No, I think that rather than worrying 
about trying to develop a comparable 
civil defense program, we ought to be 
doing two things. 

First of all, we should continue (o 



:iil 



emphasize that there is no d| 
that there is no way in whi 
Soviet Union could spare itsel 
lions and millions of casualtil 
the destruction of its organize™ 
ety, if they were to start a nuca| 
tack and we were to respond. 

And second, in consequenceB 
Soviet civil defense expenduusi 
undesirable because all theyhl 
cause concern in the United la 
interfere with more effectiviiafl 
control, and challenge the conipj) 
which nuclear stability depencH 
assured retaliatory capability < b 
sides. But I believe that the I 
that they have an effective ciB 
fense program at present are il 
ing but also untrue. 

With regard to the developna 
naval forces, I know of no nil 
planner in the United State II 
thinks that the Soviet Navy is a lai 
for the U.S. Navy at presentfl 
doesn't mean that they couldn'li 
fere quite substantially wi || 
commerce. If they develop ; ai 
enough navy — and they are diM 
ing that large navy — they ce u; 
could present a threat to the se m 
We have developed forces whjj 
designed to cope with that thre;J 
fundamental inhibition, ho\|l 
against Soviet interference wl 
sealanes would be that this w^ d 
quite a flagrant act of war I 
would invite really major esc I 
and major confrontation. In a t ie 
war, I think that we can't look ii 
terms of the World War II el 
ence. We're not going to be d i 
ent again on the Mirmansk i 1. 
would not be that kind of pro 1 
conflict . The real question wo 1 
how many days it would take I 
major conventional war esc al 
through the tactical nuclear stajlf 
into a strategic nuclear exchang(|| 

Q. Former Wisconsin I 
gressman and then Secretary <|J 
fense Melvin Laird was quot«l 
cently as saying that he was ;■ 
of some significant violation 
SALT I; that in one instance h| 
not told President Ford about k 
before a press conference wheiU 
President answered questions ( i 

I guess that gives rise top 
questions: one, what is the res! 
to Laird? Was he correct whtl< 
cited those violations on the Sue 
part? 

And two, for those of us whel 
be following your activities I 
now until the conclusion of Sf 
II, what do you see as the n j 
problems that lie ahead? And I 
are the major issues that we si i 



1978 

reading carefully about as we 
«l the reports that come back 

i Geneva? 

sua 

u 
inj 



lent 






Addressing first of all the ques- 

as to whether or not the Soviets 

violated the SALT I. I believe 

both President Ford and one of 

nJi j}redecessors, Ambassador Gerard 

h, have stated in their view there 

been no violations of SALT I. 

problem — and I think what gives 

to statements such as those by 

'« ler Secretary Laird— is that SALT 

isofar as the Interim Agreement 

ontrol of offensive arms was con- 

led, was just that. It was an 

im agreement. As a consequence, 

ad a number of ambiguities. 

>ng the many ambiguities was the 

ication of restrictions to such 

gs as test practices. And I believe 

most of the asserted violations 

i by Secretary Laird had to do 

testing practices. 

'hat we are doing about it is mak- 
sure that SALT II has no am- 
ity in that regard; that it will, in 
, ban any deliberate concealment, 
interference with our national 
ical means, whether with regard 
;sting programs or with regard to 
ational centers, 
'ith respect to the major prob- 
s, I see really two sets of prob- 
s. One of them is finalizing a 
.T II agreement, which requires 
we get the Soviet Union to move 
ard us on both the quantitative re- 
tions and the extent of qualitative 
raints. They've agreed in principle 
both. They have agreed that there 
! be reductions below the Vlad- 
stok levels. They have agreed 
there should be some constraints 
new strategic systems. But we are 
together, as yet, on the degree of 
se qualitative and quantitative re- 
J.ints. I think that that's the major 
)' blem that remains. 
I think another problem is to edu- 
I: the American public on the bene- 
» of SALT. I think the American 
p >lic is basically torn at this point. 
P of the opinion polls seem to re- 
fl:t this. My own experience would 
I'd me to feel that it is the case. The 
Merican public wants peace. It wants 
ins control. It wants tolerable reta- 
ins with the Soviet Union. But at the 
fne time, it doesn't trust the Soviet 
l|iion. At any point, regrettably, the 
'viet Union is very apt to do some- 
: *ng egregious which makes it more 
"ificult to continue to have a tolerable 
iiationship with it. At present, of 
4urse, one item of great concern has 
ido with Soviet activities in Africa. 
• So I think that we ought to make 



sure that the American public recog- 
nizes that arms control is not a re- 
ward for good Soviet behavior. It's 
not a favor that we do for the Soviet 
Union. It's not something in which 
we are being kind to them because 
they are behaving the way we want 
them to behave elsewhere. 

Arms control has got to be consid- 
ered on its own merits, and its own 
merits depend upon whether it's a 
step forward for the security of the 
United States. If the Soviet Union 
were to stand up tomorrow and say, 
"Okay, we're getting out of Ethiopia 
and by the way, Mr. Carter, we agree 
with your position on human rights," 
it wouldn't have the least effect on 
our delegation in Geneva. It wouldn't 
lead them to be one degree softer in 
terms of their basic positions. You 
have to consider that an arms control 
agreement is a deal in which both 
sides have to win; each side has to be 
confident that the agreement is a step 
forward in its own security. 

All this sounds simple. Nonethe- 
less, it is something which the 
American public has to think through. 
And I believe that this is a major 
problem that we still have. 

Q. I represent at the moment 
about as conservative a section of 
the United States as you're ever 
likely to have. I'm satisfied that the 
people in this area want to keep the 
Panama Canal; that they look with 
suspicion on reduction of troops in 
Korea. But I can also assure you 
that they would enthusiastically 
support a successful SALT II 
agreement, because they, as far as 
we can measure, believe that this is 
the overall threat that needs to be 
reduced and taken out of their fu- 
ture to the extent possible. 

What message can we take to 
them about the end result assuming 
that there is a successful SALT II 
agreement? What can we tell them 
we have achieved and is that the 
end of the path or is there a chap- 
ter to follow? 

A. I would say that it is not the end 
of the book. There is a chapter to fol- 
low. And there will be a chapter, in 
my opinion, to follow that. 

We can't expect to have effective 
control over the strategic arms race in 
one step. Let me give you just one 
example. 

One of the things that concerns crit- 
ics of the SALT process is the poten- 
tial vulnerability of Minuteman, a 
land-based ICBM. SALT II won't put 
an end to those concerns. It will 
begin to bring the strategic arms 
competition to a halt. 



But mathematically, if you're con- 
cerned about an attack on our 
ICBM's, you would have to have 
such massive reductions in the Soviet 
ICBM's as to prevent them from hav- 
ing the theoretical capability of de- 
stroying our Minuteman silos, and 
that would mean more than a 50% cut 
in their ICBM's. They can't cut 50% 
of their ICBM's and come anywhere 
near to the ceilings that will be in 
SALT II because so much of their 
force is tied up in ICBM's. Whereas 
we early on decided that land-based 
ICBM's might become vulnerable and 
so invested more money and more of 
our total strategic resources in 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and upgrading our strategic bombers, 
the Soviets continued, whether by 
choice or by necessity, to build most 
of their strategic strength in ICBM's. 

Over a period of time we would 
hope that their emphasis would be 
less on these most destabilizing sys- 
tems and more on the so-called 



The objective of SALT is to pro- 
tect strategic stability: to preserve 
a situation in which no matter 
what the provocation might be 
felt to be, the Soviet Union could 
at no time feel that it might con- 
ceivably be in its interests to ini- 
tiate nuclear war. 



second-strike forces — those forces 
that would not challenge the other 
side's retaliatory capability but would 
provide a very strong retaliatory ca- 
pability in themselves. But that will 
take time. And so, as a consequence, 
we're going to have to take this step 
by step. 

One of the things we're doing in 
SALT II is negotiate a joint statement 
of principles with the Soviet Union 
which will be basically the agenda, 
the guidelines, for SALT III. And we 
would hope in that joint statement of 
principles to get their agreement to 
negotiate more effective restraints — 
restraints on such things, for exam- 
ple, as the flight testing of missiles. 
So we do feel that this is not the final 
chapter in the book. It'll be a major 
advance, but there will be more and 
better to follow. 

As far as what we can expect out of 
SALT II is concerned, I've tried to 
outline the general objectives. 

These are, first of all, to establish 
the principle of equal aggregates, so 
that there will no longer be an imbal- 



Department of State 



ance under which the Soviet Union 
has a greater entitlement of strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles than we do. 

Second, we will try to get signifi- 
cant reductions in the Vladivostok to- 
tals, so that the quantitative aspect of 
the arms race will not only be halted, 
it'll be turned back — and we will 
have taken a step toward eliminating 
the nuclear spectre which ought to 
frighten the entire world. 

And then third, we will have begun 
to put into effect restraints on the de- 
velopment of new and more danger- 
ous technologies. That is a pretty im- 
pressive list of accomplishments out 
of a single treaty. 

Q. How does the neutron bomb 
fit into this equation? Do you 
foresee any nation at this particular 
time actually considering the build- 
ing of such a bomb, say within the 
next 20 years? 

A. The neutron bomb really is 
something which is entirely outside 
the SALT context. It's not a strategic 
system. What it would be is a modern- 
ization of our tactical nuclear force 
in Europe. There's no question that 
from the standpoint of public rela- 
tions, the neutron bomb has, indeed, 
been a bomb. There's no question 
that the Soviets have been able to 
take propaganda advantage from it. I 
think that that's essentially the reason 
for their campaign; they realize that 
this, like any new nuclear weapon, is 
an awfully unpleasant kind of thing 
and doesn't arouse any pleasurable 
sentiments in the world 

But looking at it in context, the 
neutron bomb basically is a reaction 
to a Soviet tank buildup in central 
Europe. And I think that rather than 
criticizing us for developing what we 
hope will be a more effective defense 
to a massive Soviet tank attack, I 
would like to have those in the world 
who are concerned with peace re- 
monstrate with the Soviet Union 
about the tank buildup. 

The neutron bomb, whatever its 
merits or demerits, is a defensive sys- 
tem. It is not anything with which 
you would start a war. It would be a 
way in which you would hope that 
you would be able more successfully 
to deter a Soviet tank attack. Like 
any nuclear weapon, it's a dreadful 
thing. It kills people, there's no ques- 
tion about it. But from the military 
standpoint it would be susceptible of 
a somewhat more restrained utiliza- 
tion. 

The arguments that have been made 
against the neutron bomb are ba- 
sically three. 

• One of them is that it's in- 



humane. I agree. But so is an SS-I8. 
a multimegatonnage weapon that will 
release more radiation than any 
number of neutron bombs. 

• A second objection is that it may 
lower the nuclear threshold, meaning 
that its possession would perhaps lead 
more inexorably to the use of nuclear 
weapons. I don't think that's the 
case, either, because what deters the 
use of nuclear weapons is the pros- 
pect of retaliation. In the event that 
the neutron bomb were used against 
us or against the Soviet Union, it cer- 
tainly would not lessen the chances of 
retaliation. By definition, it's a more 
effective killer of the opposition's 
soldiers, and the fact that it spares 
more civilians is not really going to 
be much of a deterrent to retaliation. 
So both from the standpoint of lower- 
ing the nuclear threshold and from the 
standpoint of inhumanity. I would say 
that the campaign against it is ba- 
sically propagandistic. 

• From the overall standpoint of 
arms control, in my opinion, what we 
ought to be trying to do with the 
Soviet Union is have each side avoid 



. . . you can trust any country to 
behave in its own interests. . . the 
Soviet leadership recognizes that 
an arms control agreement with 
the United States is in the inter- 
ests of the Soviet Union. 



the kind of escalatory development 
which inevitably leads to reciprocal 
action on the part of the other side. 
When the threat increases, the de- 
fense is going to try and find addi- 
tional ways to defend itself. As far as 
the Soviets developing a neutron 
bomb is concerned, this, of course, is 
something which Mr. Brezhnev has 
said they will certianly do if we don't 
give up our plans. And I would say 
let them go ahead and do it. That's 
not a reason why we should not de- 
velop the neutron bomb. If he wants 
to defend against a nonexistent NATO 
tank attack against the Soviet Union, 
let him waste his money. 

Q. Referring to your earlier jest 
about the Soviet Union being sur- 
rounded by Communist enemies, no 
one today really has addressed him- 
self to Red China and our improved 
relationship with Red China. And 
I'm curious as to whether or not 
that is a factor in the Soviet 
paranoia — the concern about our 
improved relations with Red China. 



• 



Is that a reasonable conclusion 

A. I think you're perfectly gd 
that China does constitute a m 
plicating factor in Soviet del 
thinking. When you ask theirfl 
example, why it is they're buiB 
up their forces in central Europe B 
say China. And if you say, "ChB 
in that direction, not over here.'B 
say "Yes, but in the event ttul 
Chinese were to attack, we vm 
have to anticipate that the warlike* 
belligerent West would pour in I 
the other side, and because we I 
this threat to the east, we have til 
velop our forces to the west." 

There may be some validity tan 
contention. I think there's no quiM 
of the fact that they hate the ChiB 
They fear the Chinese. It's recB 
cated. I don't think anybody whihi 
been in China could doubt the s m 
ity of the Chinese hatred and fe|l 
the Soviet Union. 

I know there are those whoa 
that we ought to exploit that sitiB 
and perhaps make more conll 
cause with China in order to incH 
Soviet apprehensions. I'm not :■ 
sure that's a wise thing to dolt' 
never been American policy, .n 
don't think it should be AmeB 
policy. 

In my view, we ought to cor I 
to try and have useful relations m 
the Chinese and useful relations rl 
the Soviet Union. We certainl ai 
not being penalized by the lac n 
there is this mutual hatred. Bette hi 
they should hate one another Dl 
than they hate us. But I think Is 
that we have to recognize that I 
over the long run, could be a resij| 
ing factor as arms control proc |dl 
With regard to SALT II or SAL IB 
or, I suppose, SALT VIII, I n 
imagine that our forces would lis 
constrained that either one clU 
would have to fear that there vfe: 
strategic imbalance as compared lil 
the People's Republic of China. Si 
at some point, if we are magnific Itl 
successful, we will have to try in 
engage the Chinese in the arms I 
trol dialogue. 

The problem comes up more m 
mediately in connection with »l) 
comprehensive test ban negotiatiti! 
We have been negotiating withth 
Soviet Union and with the Un| 
Kingdom looking toward a com[Bl 
cessation of nuclear explosives I 
ing. And unquestionably, the I 
thing that concerns the Soviet U| 
in that regard is whether or not C| 
would continue to test. They're rl 
worried about it than we are becl 
of this relationship of mutual hate 
and distrust. But it is something « 



A 1978 



'. 



: M concern us because it is a con- 
"'tilit on Soviet negotiating freedom. 
'eii 

i i Near Seattle, the U.S. Navy is 

Ic ling a Trident submarine base 

»,-. angor. Washington. There's a 

I p of about five to ten thousand 

Wt. ile who are planning to physi- 

» i / occupy the base on May 22, 

«f :h I believe is the day before the 

Jill ed Nations has a conference on 

rmament. They're arguing that 

c »i |Trident nuclear submarine has 

iave st-strike capability — that owing 

s range and to the accuracy of 

In; i missiles it carries, it is not a 

o qi nd-strike vehicle for striking 

t at cities, but a first-strike ve- 

; for hitting Soviet silos. Is that 

? Or is the Trident merely a 

expensive bargaining chip that 

,T II or III will negotiate away? 

. I would say that it is neither. In 

opinion the submarine-launched 

tstic missile is a stabilizing sys- 

. It's stabilizing because of its 

ent invulnerability to attack and 

because it does have less accu- 

and yield than the warheads on 

iand-based ICBM's. 

imi here's no question that the Trident 

iile will have more range than the 

coi (ting Poseidon. But that, again, is 

on tier a factor in first strike nor a 

abilizing attribute. Let's put it 

way: One of the concerns that's 

l expressed about SALT is that it 

/ prevent us from doing those 

gs that might be necessary to pro- 

our deterrent. It's a charge that's 

lout any foundation because we 

[fi preserve all of the options that 

o( (need to change our forces if arms 

Al (trol proves to be ineffective. 

<ut the best insurance against that 

3 have a system which is invulner- 

from any first strike. Trident. 

ause of its range, means that the 

nets, in order to develop an an- 

iflibmarine warfare capability against 

:;l would have to search all of the 

ijans. Trident could operate very 

. se to the territorial United States. 

Id it does not have the combination 

a accuracy and yield that would 

:Dke it a first-strike weapon. 

; With regard to the second part of 

* ir question — is Trident a bargain- 

'i chip that would be bargained 

; ay in SALT II or SALT III— in my 

iinion, no. I can tell you it won't be 

ligained away in SALT II. I doubt 

nt it either would or should be bar- 

, ined away in SALT III. We've got 

■V far to go at present. 

. IWe ought to be concentrating on 

.fose systems which are the more de- 

ijibilizing, and those at present are 

e ICBM's with multiple 



independently-targetable reentry ve- 
hicles. And the further development 
of accuracy and yield in the MIRV'ed 
ICBM's is unfortunate. It's regretta- 
ble because it means that the ICBM's 
on both sides become, at the same 
time, more deadly and more vulnera- 
ble. As a consequence, they become 
more attractive first-strike targets. 
And there's the risk that at a time of 
crisis, if you've acquired the most 
valuable part of your strategic force 

. . . there is absolutely nothing 
contemplated that would result in 
an overall restriction on the de- 
velopment of technologies for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. 

in weapons which are usable only in a 
first-strike, both sides may feel that 
they can't afford to wait, because 
they'll never be able to strike second. 
From that standpoint. Trident should 
not be regarded as a bargaining chip, 
but rather as a stabilizing factor. 

Q. What effect will SALT II have 
on our missiles in Turkey? 

A. It'll have none. It raises, how- 
ever, a very interesting point. Up to 
now, we've considered SALT as deal- 
ing only with the strategic interconti- 
nental systems. We've insisted that 
we will not negotiate with regard to 
our forward-based systems. 

That was difficult to get the Soviets 
to accept. They would have preferred 
to define strategic systems as being 
anything that can strike the Soviet 
Union, which would include missiles 
stationed in Europe. 

The question, of course, is how 
long can you continue with a defini- 
tion which deals only with the inter- 
continental systems? At what 
point — and I think it is inevitable at 
some point — will you begin to discuss 
also restrictions on the theater nuclear 
forces'? In that regard all I can say is, 
certainly if we were ever to begin to 
talk about our missiles in Europe, we 
would insist on negotiating with the 
Soviet Union on their forces which 
can strike targets in Western Europe, 
even though they can't strike the 
United States. It would require an 
overall evaluation of theater nuclear 
forces. 

Q. I understand the Soviets have 
a significant advantage over us in 
nuclear throw-weight. Would it be 
possible to negotiate a limitation on 
throw-weight or is that ephemeral? 

A. I suppose that anything is possi- 
ble as negotiations go on. But at this 



point, you could not get the Soviet 
Union to negotiate an overall limit on 
throw-weight that would put them 
equal to us, and the reason is that our 
forces have evolved in different direc- 
tions. There are asymmetries. 

At one point, we had large, liquid- 
fuel missiles and so did the Soviet 
Union. We decided — not because of 
SALT since there was no SALT at 
that time, not because of any restric- 
tions, but in the exercise of our inde- 
pendent military judgment — to go for 
smaller, solid-fuel missiles that had 
greater accuracy. That's the way the 
two forces evolved. 

As a consequence of that, and of 
the fact that we went for MIRV tech- 
nology, we have ended up with a 
situation in which the Soviets have 
more throw-weight in their missiles, 
whereas we have many, many more 
warheads. We have more than twice 
as many nuclear warheads as the 
Soviet Union. I'd be quite sure that it 
we tried to negotiate a restriction on 
throw-weight, they'd want to have 
equal limits on the numbers of 
warheads. And I think that the 
warhead number is a more significant 
indicia of strategic capability than 
throw-weight. 

Another thing that sometimes is 
overlooked in the great throw-weight 
argument is that our strategic bombers 
have immense throw-weight and our 
strategic bomber force dwarfs that of 
the Soviet Union. As a possible item 
for subsequent SALT negotiations, 
we might very well feel that both 
warheads and throw-weight were ap- 

The American public wants 
peace. It wants arms control. It 
wants tolerable relations with the 
Soviet Union. But at the same 
time, it doesn't trust the Soviet 
Union. 



propriate subjects. I just hope that we 
get to the point at which they become 
the relevant factors, but we aren't 
there yet. 

Q. Mr. Vest and you have both 
acknowledged your basic viewpoints 
that the Soviet Union is essentially 
an insecure nation. 

With respect to the Administra- 
tion's emphasis on human rights 
and the discussions that we have 
had here on the implications of that 
human rights policy within the 
Soviet Union, do you sometimes 
fear that that Administration policy 
could make your job more difficult 



s 



at SALT by making the Soviets 
more intransigent because of their 
basic insecurity? 

A. First, let me make an admission 
which is probably against my inter- 
ests: Arms control is not the begin- 
ning and end of foreign policy. There 
are other factors that have to be in- 
volved in any comprehensive foreign 
policy. And 1 think that if we were to 
be recreant to our concept of the es- 
sentiality of human rights, we might 
have better arms control but we 
would have worse foreign policy. 

Having said that, let me also ac- 
knowledge that the human rights is- 
sue, in my opinion, has not affected 
the SALT negotiations one bit during 
the entire time that I have been as- 
sociated with them. And that's not 
surprising because both sides have to 
look at arms control from the 
standpoint of basic national security. 
For example, if the Soviet Union be- 
haved better in Africa we certainly 
wouldn't give them any concessions 
in SALT. 

Similarly, if Mr. Brezhnev were to 
stand up and say, "I think President 
Carter is right and 1 hereby adopt the 
American Bill of Rights." that 
wouldn't change our negotiating posi- 
tions. Or if we, on the other hand, 
were to say, "Your position is per- 
fectly correct and the right to a job. 
etc., is just as important as the right 
to freedom from torture." I would 
not expect that that would lead to any 
greater agreeableness on the part of 
the Soviet negotiators. 

These negotiations necessarily have 
to be considered from the standpoint 
of the overall impact on the strategic 
balance and the overall impact on the 
national security. 

Q. What impact will our decision 
to go full steam ahead with the 
cruise missile have? 

A. The cruise missile issue is ob- 
viously one that has concerned the 
Soviet Union very much. As with any 
new technology, I think there is al- 
ways the question in their minds of, 
"Will we be able to match it?" But 
you have to consider the cruise mis- 
sile issue from a variety of 
standpoints. One of them is the so- 
called air-launched cruise missile. 

In my opinion, the air-launched 
cruise missile is a healthy develop- 
ment. It's healthy tor the same reason 
the Trident missile is. What it does is 
bring up-to-date the strategic bomber 
part of our deterrent. It means we 
have to worry less about the potential 
vulnerability of Minuteman. It means 
we have to worry less about Soviet 
air defenses. But at the same time, 
it's not the kind of a weapon that 



< 



either threatens the retaliatory force 
of the other side or that makes arms 
control impossible. It certainly is not 
a first-strike weapon. The B-52 has to 
raise its ponderous weight from an 
airfield and lumber across the Atlan- 
tic Ocean before it can launch its 
missiles. It's not the way you would 
start a nuclear war. And the Soviet 
Union knows it. 

From the standpoint of effect on 
arms control, the cruise missile 
doesn't make arms control less possi- 
ble, because you still have a con- 



. . . arms control is not a reward 
for good Soviet behavior. It's not 
a favor that we do for the Soviet 
Union. It's not something in 
which we arc being kind to them 
because they are behaving the 
way we want them to be- 
have. . . . 



straint on the platforms. You count 
the heavy bombers that would launch 
the cruise missiles against the overall 
totals in SALT II. You don't have an 
indefinite proliferation of cruise mis- 
siles. Ground-launched cruise missiles 
and sea-launched cruise missiles raise 
different kinds of questions. And 
that's the reason why the concept of 
the 3-year protocol developed. 

In May 1977, as a result of a series 
of meetings in Geneva involving Sec- 
retary Vance and Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, we agreed on a three-part 
framework for SALT II. One part 
would be the basic treaty lasting 
through 1985 that would have such 
things as the quantitative limits, the 
verification provisions, and so forth. 
A second part would be a 3-year pro- 
tocol in which you would try and deal 
with the systems for which you could 
not develop a more lasting settlement. 
The ground-launched cruise missiles 
and the sea-launched cruise missiles 
belong in those categories. We have 
to think through the implications of 
those systems in determining what 
kinds of constraints we'd be willing 
to adopt on a more lasting basis. And 
that's what we will do as a part of 
SALT III. 

Q. You mentioned the B-52's 
lumbering across the ocean, which, 
of course, is what they would have 
to do. I'm sure the President put 
the stop.on the B-l as a bargaining 
point with the Russians, but I un- 
derstand that they have a new 
SS-20 weapon. Can we do a little 



Department of State B 



bit of bargaining and get an iH 
date plane that is not a VYorldfi 
II relic? 

A. The B-52 would hardly ql 
as a World War II relic, and the ■ 
would also characterize as risingH 
derously from an airfield and luil 
ing across the Atlantic. On its I 
sions, it would be a subsonic m 
and as compared to an intercontiiH 
ballistic missile, of course, it is ■ 
terribly, terribly slow. That's ll 
makes it a stabilizing system. Bil 
B-52 with cruise missiles was del 
upon not by the arms control ajH 
but by the Pentagon as being a ■ 
effective way of updating our bcB 
force than the B-l. 

If we tried to bargain on this W 
obvious answer of the Soviet ll 
would be, "You made that decB 
not as a favor to us but as a favB 
yourself; you decided that you I 
better off with the B-52 with cl 
missiles than you were with the I 
Since you have made a decisionB 
has saved you money and imprl 
your strategic forces, why shoiB 
give you anything in return?" 

With regard to the SS-20, 1 
SS-20 is a theater nuclear system I 
theater nuclear systems have not I 
a subject of SALT up to this poii I 
we were to negotiate about the SJ 1 
they would insist on negotiating ; I 
our theater nuclear forces such a: I 
FB- Ill's, which are stationed ill 
United Kingdom and can deva I 
Soviet targets. 

At some point it might be desi I 
to bring all of those theater nuil 
forces into the negotiations, but at I 
stage it would be a complicating I 
tor. It would tend to make it a rrl 
national negotiation because certJ 
we would have to involve our NjI 
allies, and we're better off hancl 
bilaterally what we can handle ori 
tercontinental strategic forces. 

Q. Do you ever just, in nego it 
ing with the Soviets, sit down I 
philosophically realize the folly <l 
all, and just exchange views ol 
personal level? I'm curious to kU 
whether this rubber room, this I 
uum which the whole thing seem I 
encompass, isn't a little bit rid I 
lous to you when you're in it? 

A. On the rare occasions when I 
do sit back and think about it, yoil 
feel that there is a certain ludicna 
ness about the entire process. I nun 
we shouldn't have to be sitting d(W 
with another large, powerful nam 
and agreeing that we aren't goingfl 
commit mutual suicide. 

But the fact of the matter is that I 
is the stage we're at in internatiol 
relations. It is necessary for us at V 



htm 
K 

U..i 



1978 



I drjil I0 have strategic stability be- 
Wori of mutually assured destruction, 
:ronym for which is MAD. But at 
it, some such '"madness" is in- 
>le; it's the way in which we pre- 
a bad situation from getting 
indl 



'cm 



far as sitting down with my 

erpart and philosophizing about 
admittedly basic moral and 
in issues, unfortunately the 

iating process at SALT has be- 
stylized like a classic ballet. 

have the plenary sessions at 
h you exchange formal written 
nents, and then you have the sub- 
tnt sessions which are supposed 

informal. They're informal only 
comparative basis. There is noth- 
ipontaneous about them, and I 

if there can be. 
; Soviet negotiator has been there 

1969; I am his third counterpart. 

't think that in the case of any of 
Tedecessors that they have been 
to establish any sort of 
■raderie. My Russian is really 

deficient, and so is his English, 
as a consequence there isn't much 
rtunity to deal with these larger 
s. It would be desirable, 
/ould hope that as the relationship 
res that we would find, perhaps 

a new generation of negotiators 
oth sides, that you would be able 
iet this sort of exchange and 
taps as a consequence begin to 
I more sense than madness out of 
:lationship. 

What is the dispute about the 
et Backfire bomber? Is there 
I serious consideration of dealing 
■ that issue in an exchange of let- 
■$. and if you did deal with it in 
J exchange of letters, would you 
Jik that would jeopardize the 
Ity's chances of passing through 
I Senate? 

|. The Backfire bomber issue is 
that remains under negotiation, 
one of the major remaining prob- 
i, one of the major remaining dif- 
nces between the United States and 
Soviet Union. 

he problem with Backfire is not 

we have any question about its 

don; I think that there is no doubt 

it was developed as a medium 

iber, as a theater weapon. The 

iC trouble is that it's too damn big. 

bigger than a decent medium 

iber ought to be, and our intelli- 

ce sources indicate that if you fly it 

b enough and slow enough, it could 

:h the United States. As a strategic 

tpon it certainly is not a very good 

What we're trying to do is to get 

kinds of constraints that would 

vent its adaptation to a strategic role. 



The way in which that will be done 
has not been decided. But whatever 
form is utilized, it would be legally 
binding. We would insist on the abil- 
ity to enforce that provision against 
the Soviet Union. We would insist that 
any violation of those assurances 
would, in fact, violate SALT II and 
permit us our recourse. Since it would 
be legally binding, since it would be a 
part of the overall SALT II package. 



. . . the Soviets have more 
throw-weight in their missiles, 
whereas we have many, many 
more warheads. . . the warhead 
numbers is a more significant in- 
dicia of strategic capability than 
throw-weight. 



in my opinion it would not interfere 
with the ratification of the treaty. 

Q. Would you give some context 
to the so-called killer satellite? Does 
that represent a problem with verifi- 
cation? Is it a strategic weapon? 
How would it be used? 

A. The entire question of antisatel- 
lite capability is. of course, a trou- 
bling one. It would not be a verification 
problem because the use of any an- 
tisatellite capability would in itself be 
a flat, clear violation of the SALT 
agreement. In other words, if we have 
a SALT II agreement, it will contain 
provisions of the same exact substan- 
tive effect that we have in our existing 
treaties with the Soviet Union, which 
is that any interference with our na- 
tional technical means of detection is a 
violation. 

The problem is not one of verifica- 
tion; the problem is one of having 
a capability, which at a time of crisis 
might lead the Soviet Union to violate 
the treaty. In the event that they were 
to do so, it would have to be regarded 
as a very, very serious provocation 
and, indeed, as functionally an act of 
war. Since it is of such grave conse- 
quences, it is desirable that we 
negotiate with the Soviet Union and 
prevent the development of an an- 
tisatellite capability. 

In March in Moscow Secretary 
Vance proposed a number of bilateral 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
One of those was the question of 
negotiating restraints on the develop- 
ment of antisatellite weapons. That 
should be done. It would not be a 
strategic weapon, but it would be a 
very seriously disruptive weapon as far 
as the U.S. -Soviet relationship was 



concerned, and it would lead you to 
feel that there was a possibility of an 
entire breakdown of not only the exist- 
ing treaties but of the overall relation- 
ship. 

Q. Isn't the SS-20 a loophole in 
SALT? As I understand it, it's a 
two-stage missile which is easily con- 
vertible to the three-stage SS-16, 
which is a strategic weapon. 

A. That has been a problem with 
which we have had to deal at SALT. 
In my opinion we have resolved it 
satisfactorily. The SALT agreement 
will see to it that the Soviet Union 
cannot deploy a mobile missile of 
ICBM character and that we can't, 
which would prevent their use of the 
SS-16 or any comparable weapon. 

Q. While we're talking about 
strategic weapons, what's happening 
on the tactical weapon level? 

A. We have not as yet been able to 
get into negotiations with regard to 
arms control on tactical nuclear 
weapons. We have, as you know, 
many thousands of tactical nuclear 
weapons deployed in Europe. The 
neutron bomb would be one means of 
modernizing those existing tactical 
nuclear weapons. They're regarded as 
a very important part of the overall de- 
terrent against war in central Europe. 
NATO has developed the concept of a 
deterrent triad, where we have a con- 
ventional force to meet a Soviet at- 
tack, and if that were to continue to 
escalate, we do have the option of tac- 
tical nuclear weapons. 

They raise, of course, very serious 
risks, because no one could be sure 
what would happen when you first 
cross the nuclear threshold. 

Looked at from the standpoint of de- 
terrence, they're good; looked at from 
the standpoint of what happens in the 
event deterrence fails, they're very 
risky. It's one of the reasons why we 
would hope that if we are successful at 
this level in developing controls on 
strategic nuclear weapons, we could 
move on and try and reach some fur- 
ther agreement that would, by arms 
control techniques, lessen the chances 
of anything happening in Europe that 
could lead to conventional war and 
possible escalation past the nuclear 
threshold. □ 



Informal remarks and a question-and-answer 
session before a National Foreign Policy Con- 
ference for Editors and Broadcasters held at 
the Department of State on Jan. 19. 1978. 

'For texts of the joint statement on strategic 
offensive arms and the joint communique of 
Nov. 24. 1974. see Bulletin of Dec. 23, 
p. 879. 

2 See Bulletin of Apr. 25. 1977. p. 389. 
3 See Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1977. p. 643. 



10 



Department of State B I 



i oniplitinee Willi the SALT I Agreements 



The Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
February 28, 1978, released an Administration report summarizing experience 
in monitoring compliance with the SALT I agreements of 1972. The report, 
forwarded h\ Secretary Vance to Senator John Sparkman. Chairman of the Sen- 
ale Foreign Relations Committee, was prepared in response to questions about 
possible Soviet violations of the agreements. 

The Administration has released the report on compliance with the SALT 
agreements in order to inform the public fully on this important matter. The re- 
port reviews in detail each of the questions which has arisen under the agree- 
ments. The report demonstrates how carefully the United States monitors Soviet 
compliance with the SALT agreements. 

It was anticipated in the drafting of the SALT agreements in 1972 that ques- 
tions could arise regarding the implementation of the agreements, and a U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission was established to resolve such 
questions. It is clear from this review that the United States has raised promptly 
with the Soviets any unusual or ambiguous activities which could be or could 
become grounds for concern. The Soviets also raised a number of questions about 
U.S. activities. In each case, the activity in question has ceased or additional 
information has allayed the concern. 



The purpose of this paper is to pro- 
vide a brief account of the back- 
ground, discussion, and status of those 
questions related to compliance with 
the SALT agreements of 1972 — the 
ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement 
on strategic offensive arms — which 
have been raised by the United States 
and the U.S.S.R.' It also provides a 
brief discussion of matters which have 
been mentioned in the press but which 
have not been raised with the 
U.S.S.R. 

Even before talks with the U.S.S.R. 
on the subject of strategic arms limita- 
tion began, the United States estab- 
lished, in the framework of the Na- 
tional Security Council (NSC) system, 
an interagency group known as the 
Verification Panel to study questions 
concerning SALT, with special atten- 
tion to matters of verification of com- 
pliance with the provisions oi possible 
agreements. During the preliminary 
talks in November and December of 
1969, the United States proposed, and 
the U.S.S.R. agreed, to create a spe- 
cial standing body to deal with ques- 
tions of implementation of agreements 
which might be concluded, including 
questions which might arise concern- 
ing compliance. This reflected early 
recognition and agreement that such 
matters would require special attention 
in connection with any agreement as 
complex as one limiting the strategic 
weapons of the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. 

Article XIII of the ABM treaty of 
May 26. 1972, provides for a Standing 
Consultative Commission (SCC) to, 
among other things, "consider ques- 



tions concerning compliance with the 
obligations assumed and related situa- 
tions which may be considered am- 
biguous. " 

Article VI of the Interim Agreement 
provides that the parties use the SCC 
in a similar manner in connection with 
that agreement. In December 1972, 
during the first session of SALT II, 
the SCC was formally established. 

Since the conclusion of the 1972 
SALT agreements, procedures have 
been established within the U.S. Gov- 
ernment for monitoring Soviet per- 
formance and for dealing with matters 
related to compliance. All intelligence 
information is carefully analyzed in 
the context of the provisions of those 
agreements, and recommendations on 
questions which arise are developed by 
interagency intelligence and policy ad- 
visory groups within the NSC system. 
Currently, these are an Intelligence 
Community Steering Group on 
Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations 
and the Standing Consultative Com- 
mission Working Group of the NSC 
Special Coordination Committee. 
Should analysis of intelligence infor- 
mation indicate that there could be a 
question concerning compliance, this 
latter group reviews and analyzes the 
available information and provides 
recommendations. The President de- 
cides whether a particular question or 
issue is to be raised with the U.S.S.R. 
based on the study and recommenda- 
tions of the Working Group and. if 
necessary, the department and agency 
principals who comprise the Special 
Coordination Committee or the NSC 
itself. After discussion of any question 



is opened with the U.S.S.R. 
Standing Consultative Commi 
the positions and actions taken I 
U.S. representatives are also guii 
the same manner. 

Questions Raised by the U.S. 

Launch Control Facil 
(Special-Purpose Silos). Article 
the Interim Agreement states: 
Parties undertake not to start con 
tion of additional fixed land-basi 
tercontinental ballistic missile (I< 
launchers after July 1, 1972." 

In 1973 the United States c 
mined that additional silos of a I 
ent design were under constructi 
a number of launch sites. If thes 
been intended to contain ICBM 
chers, they would have constitu 
violation of Article I of the In 
Agreement. 

When the United States raise! 
concern over this construction wi I 
Soviet side, the U.S.S.R. respcl 
that the silos were, in fact, har«B 
facilities built for launch-controll 
poses. As discussions proceedecB 
additional intelligence became . I 
able, the United States concluded 
the silos were built to serve a la 
control function. 

In early 1977, following furthe 
cussions during 1975 and 1976 ; 
review of our intelligence on this 
ject, the United States decided to 
discussion of this matter on the 
that the silos in question are curr 
used as launch-control facilities. 
will, of course, continue to watc 
any activity which might wai 
reopening of this matter. 

Concealment Measures. Artie 
of the Interim Agreement and Ai 
XII of the ABM treaty provide 
each party shall not ". . . intei 
with the national technical mean 
verification of the other Party 
nor "... use deliberate conceal! 
measures which impede verificatio 
national technical means of c 
pliance with the provisions. . ." o 
agreement or the treaty. Both art 
provided that the latter obligal 
"... shall not require changes in I 
rent construction, assembly, conl 
sion, or overhaul practices." 

The United States has closely ml 
tored Soviet concealment practices I 
before and after conclusion of Q 



Slaiel 



S.I 



1978 

SALT agreements. During 1974 

tfent of those concealment activ- 

issociated with strategic weapons 

rams increased substantially. 

of them prevented U.S. verifica- 

)f compliance with the provisions 

le ABM treaty or the Interim 

Ipment, but there was concern that 

jcould impede verification in the 

if the pattern of concealment 

ires were permitted to continue 

>and. 

United States stated this con- 
and discussed it with the Soviet 
In early 1975 careful analysis of 
igence information on activities 
U.S.S.R. led the United States 
>nclude that there no longer ap- 
Jd to be an expanding pattern of 
j;alment activities associated with 
fgic weapons programs. We con- 
to monitor Soviet activity in this 
jclosely. 

dern Large Ballistic Missiles 
■19 Issue). Article II of the 
im Agreement states: "The Par- 
undertake not to convert land- 
i launchers for light ICBM's, or 
CBM's of older types deployed 
to 1964, into land-based launch- 
er heavy ICBM's of types de- 
ed after that time." 
lis provision was sought by the 
d States as part of an effort to 
: limits on Soviet heavy ICBM's 
9 and follow-ons). We did not, 
ever, obtain agreement on a quan- 
ve definition of a heavy ICBM 
h would constrain increases in the 
of Soviet light ICBM's (SS-11 
follow-ons). Thus, the U.S. side 
id on the final day of SALT I 
tiations [May 26, 1972]: 

: U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet 
;ation has not been willing to agree on a 
non definition of a heavy missile. Under 
circumstances, the U.S. Delegation be- 
s it necessary to state the following: The 
:d States would consider any ICBM having 
ume significantly greater than that of the 
st light ICBM now operational on either 
to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds 
le premise that the Soviet side will give 
account to this consideration. 

line U.S.S.R. delegation maintained 
position throughout SALT I that an 
:ed definition of heavy ICBM's was 

essential to the understanding 
:hed by the sides in the Interim 
eement on the subject of heavy 
IM's and made clear that they did 

agree with the U.S. statement 
>ted above. When deployment of the 
-19 missile began, its size, though 

a violation of the Interim Agree- 
nt provisions noted above, caused 
United States to raise the issue with 



the Soviets in early 1975. Our purpose 
was to emphasize the importance the 
United States attached to the distinc- 
tion, made in the Interim Agreement 
between "light" and "heavy" 
ICBM's, as well as the continuing im- 
portance of that distinction in the con- 
text of the SALT II agreement under 
negotiation at the time. Following 
some discussion in the SCC, further 
discussions of this question in that 
forum were deferred because it was 
under active consideration in the SALT 
II negotiations. 

Since that time, the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. delegations have agreed in 
the draft text of the SALT II agreement 
on a clear demarcation, in terms of 
missile launch-weight and throw- 
weight, between light and heavy 
ICBM's. 

Possible Testing of an Air Defense 
System (SA-5) Radar in an ABM 
Mode. Article VI of the ABM treaty 
states: "To enhance assurance of the 
effectiveness of the limitations on 
ABM systems and their components 
provided by this Treaty, each Party un- 
dertakes: (a) not to give missiles, laun- 
chers, or radars, other than ABM inter- 
ceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or 
ABM radars, capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles or their ele- 
ments in flight trajectory, and not to 
test them in an ABM mode . . . . ' 

On April 7, 1972, the United States 
made a statement to clarify our in- 
terpretation of "tested in an ABM 
mode." We noted, with respect to 
radars, that we would consider a radar 
to be so tested if, for example, it makes 
measurements on a cooperative target 
vehicle during the reentry portion of its 
trajectory or makes measurements in 
conjunction with the test of an ABM in- 
terceptor missile or an ABM radar at 
the same test range. We added that 
radars used for purposes such as range 
safety or instrumentation would be 
exempt from application of these 
criteria. 

During 1973 and 1974, U.S. obser- 
vation of Soviet tests of ballistic mis- 
siles led us to believe that a radar as- 
sociated with the SA-5 surface-to-air 
missile system had been used to track 
strategic ballistic missiles during flight. 

A question of importance in relation 
to this activity was whether it repre- 
sented an effort to upgrade the SA-5 
system for an ABM role. The Soviets 
could have been using the radar in a 
range instrumentation role to obtain 
precision tracking; on the other hand, 
the activity could have been part of an 
effort to upgrade the SA-5 system for 
an ABM role or to collect data for use 
in developing ABM systems or a new 



11 



dual SAM/ABM system. Although 
much more testing, and testing signifi- 
cantly different in form, would be 
needed before the Soviets could 
achieve an ABM capability for the 
SA-5, the observed activity was, 
nevertheless, ambiguous with respect 
to the constraints of article VI of the 
ABM treaty and the related U.S. stated 
interpretation of "testing in an ABM 
mode." If the activity was designed to 
upgrade the SA-5 system, it would 
have been only the first step in such an 
effort. Extensive and observable mod- 
ifications to other components of the 
system would have been necessary, but 
these have not occurred. 

The United States raised this issue 
based on the indications that an SA-5 
radar may have been tracking ballistic 
missiles during the reentry portion of 
their flight trajectory into an ABM test 
range. 



February 21, 1978 
Honorable John Sparkman 
Chairman. Committee on 

Foreign Relations 
U.S. Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

As you know there has been a great 
deal of interest in recent months over 
the question of the Soviet record of 
compliance with the provisions of the 
SALT I agreements. I understand that 
members of your Committee have ex- 
pressed concern, most recently in the 
course of hearings to approve the Am- 
bassadorial nomination of Robert Buch- 
heim, the US Commissioner to the 
Standing Consultative Commission in 
Geneva. 

The issue of Soviet compliance, al- 
though important in its own right, takes 
on an increased urgency at a time when 
we are nearing completion of a new 
SALT II agreement. 

I am enclosing a copy of a statement 
prepared by the Administration which 
deals with the broad range of issues 
raised by both sides regarding com- 
pliance with the first SALT agreements. 
In addition the statement addresses a 
number of charges which have been 
raised in the press but which in fact 
were not the subject of discussion be- 
tween the two sides. 

I hope that this statement will lay to 
rest many of the concerns of members 
of your Committee and will serve to an- 
swer the questions raised by members 
of the Committee. 

With warmest regards. 
Sincerely, 

Cyrus Vance 



12 



Department of State B | 



The Soviets maintained that no 
Soviet air defense radar had been tested 
in an ABM mode. They also noted that 
the use of non-ABM radars for range 
safety or instrumentation was not lim- 
ited by the ABM treaty. 

A short time later, we observed that 
the radar activity of concern during 
Soviet ballistic missile tests had 
ceased. 

The United States has continued to 
monitor Soviet activities carefully for 
any indications that such possible test- 
ing activity might be resumed. 

Soviet Reporting and Dismantling 
of Excess ABM Test Launchers. Each 
side is limited under the ABM treaty to 
no more than 15 ABM launchers at test 
ranges. During 1972, soon after the 
ABM treaty was signed, the Soviets 
dismantled several excess launchers at 
the Soviet ABM test range. 

On July 3, 1974, the agreed proce- 
dures, worked out in the SCC, for dis- 
mantling excess ABM test launchers 
entered into force. After the detailed 
procedures entered into effect, the 
U.S.S.R. provided notification in the 
SCC that the excess ABM launchers at 
the Soviet test range had been disman- 
tled in accordance with the provisions 
of the agreed procedures. Our own in- 
formation was that several of the 
launchers had not, in fact, been disman- 
tled in complete accordance with those 
detailed procedures. 

Even though the launchers were 
deactivated prior to entry into force of 
the procedures, and their reactivation 
would be of no strategic significance, 
the United States raised the matter as a 
case of inaccurate notification or re- 
porting to make known our expectation 
that, in the future, care would be taken 
to insure that notification, as well as 
dismantling or destruction, was in strict 
accordance with the agreed procedures. 

Soviet ABM Radar on Kamchatka 
Peninsula. Article IV of the ABM 
treaty states: "The limitations provided 
for in Article III [on deployment] shall 
not apply to ABM systems or their 
components used for development or 
testing, and located within current or 
additionally agreed test ranges " 

In October 1975 a new radar was in- 
stalled at the Kamchatka impact area of 
the Soviet ICBM test range. Since arti- 
cle IV exempts from the limitations oi 
article III only those ABM components 
used for development or testing at cur- 
rent or additionally agreed ranges, lo- 
cation of this radar, which the United 
States identified as an ABM radar, on 
the Kamchatka Peninsula could have 
constituted establishment of a new 
Soviet ABM test range. 



This situation, however, was made 
ambiguous by two facts. 

( 1 ) Just prior to the conclusion of 
the SALT negotiations in 1972, the 
United States provided to the Soviet 
delegation a list of U.S. and Soviet 
ABM test ranges which did not include 
the Kamchatka impact area. The Soviet 
side neither confirmed nor denied the 
accuracy or completeness of the U.S. 
listing and indicated that use of na- 
tional technical means assured against 
misunderstanding of article IV. 

(2) The presence of an older type 
ABM radar could be viewed as having 
established the Kamchatka impact area 
as an ABM test range at the time the 
ABM treaty was signed. 

Though the location of a new ABM 
radar on Kamchatka was not strategi- 
cally significant, it was decided that 
this matter should be raised with the 
Soviet side in order to set the record 
straight. 

We brought the situation to the atten- 
tion of the Soviet side. The U.S.S.R. 
indicated that a range with a radar in- 
strumentation complex existed on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula on the date of 
signature of the ABM treaty and that 
they would be prepared to consider the 
Kamchatka range a current test range 
within the meaning of article IV of the 
ABM treaty. The United States con- 
tinued the exchange to establish that 
Kamchatka is an ABM test range, that 
Sary Shagan and Kamchatka are the 
only ABM test ranges in the U.S.S.R., 
and that article IV of the ABM treaty 
requires agreement concerning the es- 
tablishment of additional test ranges. 

The Soviet side has acknowledged 
that Kamchatka is an ABM test range 
and that it and Sary Shagan are the only 
ABM test ranges in the U.S.S.R. On 
the third point, discussions are continu- 
ing on how properly to satisfy the need 
for discussing and agreeing upon the 
establishment of an ABM test range. 
Agreement appears near on this matter. 

Soviet Dismantling or Destruction 
of Replaced ICBM Launchers. Under 
the Interim Agreement and the protocol 
thereto of May 26, 1972, the U.S.S.R. 
was permitted to have no more than 
950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern, 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub- 
marines. In addition it was provided 
that Soviet SLBM launchers in excess 
of 740 might become operational only 
as replacements for older ICBM and 
SLBM launchers, which would be dis- 
mantled or destroyed under agreed pro- 
cedures. 

Such procedures were developed in 
the SCC and became effective on 
July 3, 1974. The procedures include 



detailed requirements for the di:| 
tling or destruction actions to bj 
complished, their timing, and nc 
tion about them to the it 
party. 

By early 1976 the Soviets ha dr 
veloped a requirement to dismanill 
replaced launchers. It soon becanl 
parent to the United States thai 
Soviets would probably not conlei 
all the required dismantling actioB 
all of the launchers on time. TherrB' 
the United States decided to raisfl 
question with the Soviets, but tfl 
we could do so, the notification ■ 
cerning dismantling or destructioiB 
vided by the Soviet side in the SCB 
knowledged that the dismantling I 
older ICBM launchers had not I 
completed in the required time ptl 
The Soviet side explained the sitil 
and predicted that all the disma>» 
actions would be completed by Jul 
1976, and agreed to the U.S. de* 
that no more submarines with rerl 
ment SLBM launchers begin sea 1 
before such completion. Both c if 
tions were met. 

Since that time, although we 
observed some minor procedural I 
crepancies at a number of those dM 
vated launch sites and at others z I 
replacement process continued, a I 
launchers have been in a conditioi I 
satisfied the essential substantiv I 
quirements, which are that they c I 
be used to launch missiles and c I 
be reactivated in a short timel 
necessary we have pursued the quel 
of complete and precise accompl 
ment of the detailed requiremen I 
the agreed procedures. 

Concealment at Test Range. Pi 

sions of the Interim Agreement |l 
nent to this discussion are: 

• Article V (3): "Each Party ml 
takes not to use deliberate conceal I 
measures which impede verificatiol 
national technical means of complil 
with the provisions of this Int<l 
Agreement. " 

• Agreed statement concerrl 
launcher dimensions: " ... in hi 
process of modernization and repll 
ment the dimensions of land-b.l 
ICBM silo launchers will not be sijl 
icantly increased." 

• Agreed statement concerning I 
and training launchers: "... til 
shall be no significant increase inl 
number of ICBM and SLBM test I 
training launchers, or in the numbed 
such launchers for modern land-b;3l 
heavy ICBMs . . . construction or il 
version of ICBM launchers at I 
ranges shall be undertaken only I 
purposes of testing and training." 

In early 1977 we observed the usB 



41 1978 



net covering over an ICBM test 
her undergoing conversion at a 






itS 



E! 
lilt 



ange in the U.S.S.R. 

iere was agreement in the United 

s that this subject could be appro- 

e for discussion in SALT in the 

sit: *xt of the ongoing discussions on 

ubject of deliberate concealment 

li mres in connection with a SALT II 

H« ;ment. The subject was initially 

I d in this context. 

addition we also expressed our 
that the use of a covering over an 
M silo launcher concealed ac- 
es from national technical means 
erification and could impede verifi- 
n of compliance with provisions of 
Interim Agreement; specifically, 
provision which dealt with in- 
«: ses in dimensions of ICBM silo 
chers as recorded in the agreed 
ment quoted above. The United 
:s took the position that a covering 
: h conceals activities at an ICBM 
from national technical means of 
"ication could reduce the confi- 
e and trust which are important to 
lal efforts to establish and maintain 
igic arms limitations, 
has been the Soviet position that 
provisions of the Interim Agree- 
were not applicable to the activity 
mestion. Nevertheless, they sub- 
ently removed the net covering. 

stions Raised by the U.S.S.R. 

oelters Over Minuteman Silos. 

graph 3 of article V of the Interim 
eement states: "Each Party under- 
s not to use deliberate concealment 
sures which impede verification by 
onal technical means of compliance 
l the provisions of this Interim 
eement. This obligation shall not 
lire changes in current construction, 
:mbly, conversion, or overhaul 
:tices." 

he United States used shelters 
ch were either 300 or 700 square 
in size over Minuteman iCBM 
s to provide environmental protec- 
during initial construction as well 
modernization, from 1962 through 
2. Beginning in 1973, in connec- 
with modernization and silo- 
ening work, prefabricated shelters 
about 2,700 square feet were used, 
m four to twelve of these shelters 
e in place over silos at any given 
e, for from 10 days to 4 weeks de- 
iding upon the severity of the 
Rather, 
'he Soviets raised this subject, tak- 
the position that the activity was 
onsistent with article V of the 
:rim Agreement since it could be 
ssified as deliberate concealment 
1 that, therefore, it should cease. 



The United States, based on the nature 
of the shelters and their use strictly for 
environmental purposes, not for con- 
cealment, believed that their use was 
consistent with article V. 

In early 1977 the United States de- 
cided to modify the use of environmen- 
tal shelters over Minuteman ICBM 
silos based on explicit confirmation of 
the common view shared by us and the 
Soviets that neither side should use 
shelters over ICBM silos that impede 
verification by national technical 
means of compliance with the provi- 
sions of the Interim Agreement. Our 
use of shelters has recently been mod- 
ified by reducing their size almost 507c 
in recognition of that understanding. 

Atlas and Titan-I Launchers. The 

protocol developed in the SCC governing 
replacement, dismantling, and for 
strategic offensive arms, as noted above, 
provides detailed procedures for dis- 
mantling ICBM launchers and associated 
facilities, one principle of which is that 
reactivation of dismantled launchers 
should take substantially more time than 
construction of a new one. 

There are 177 former launchers for 
the obsolete Atlas and Titan-I ICBM 
systems at various locations across the 
continental United States. All these 
launchers were deactivated by the end 
of 1966. 

The Soviet side apparently perceived 
an ambiguity with respect to the status 
and condition of these launchers, based 
on the amount of dismantling which 
had been done and its effect on their 
possible reactivation time. They raised 
this issue in early 1975. 

The U.S. view was that these laun- 
chers were obsolete and deactivated 
prior to the Interim Agreement and 
were not subject to that agreement or to 
the accompanying procedures for dis- 
mantling or destruction. However, we 
did provide some information on their 
condition illustrating that they could 
not be reactivated easily or quickly. 
The discussion on this question ceased 
in mid-1975. 

Radar on Shemya Island. Article 
III of the ABM treaty states: "Each 
Party undertakes not to deploy ABM 
systems or their components except 
. . . within one ABM deployment area 
. . . centered on the Party's national 
capital . . . and within one . . . de- 
ployment area . . . containing ICBM 
silo launchers . . . . ' 

In 1973 the United States began con- 
struction of a new phased-array radar 
on Shemya Island, Alaska, at the west- 
ern end of the Aleutian Island chain. 
This radar is to be used for national 
technical means of verification, space 
track, and early warning. 



The Soviets raised a question in 
1975. suggesting that the radar was an 
ABM radar which would not be per- 
mitted at this location. 

The U.S. side discussed this matter 
with the Soviets and as a result, we be- 
lieve, eliminated any concern about 
possible inconsistency with the provi- 
sions of the ABM treaty. The radar be- 
came operational in early 1977. 

Privacy of SCC Proceedings. Para- 
graph 8 of the regulations of the SCC 
states: "The proceedings of the Stand- 
ing Consultative Commission shall be 
conducted in private. The Standing 
Consultative Commission may not 
make its proceedings public except 
with the express consent of both Com- 
missioners. " 

Prior to the special SCC session held 
in early 1975 to discuss certain ques- 
tions related to compliance, several ar- 
ticles appeared in various U.S. publica- 
tions with wide circulation. These arti- 
cles speculated about the possibility of 
certain Soviet "violations" of the 
SALT agreements which would be dis- 
cussed and tended to draw the conclu- 
sion that there were violations, based 
on what was purported to be accurate 
intelligence information. 

The Soviets have expressed to us 
their concern about the importance of 
confidentiality in the work of the SCC 
and about the publication of such 
items. They were apparently particu- 
larly concerned about press items that 
may appear to have official U.S. Gov- 
ernment sanction. 

We have discussed with the Soviets 
the usefulness of maintaining the pri- 
vacy of our negotiations and discus- 
sions and limiting speculation in the 
public media on SCC proceedings, as 
well as the need to keep the public 
adequately informed. 

Dismantling or Destruction of the 
ABM Radar Under Construction at 
Malmstrom AFB. When the ABM 
treaty was signed on May 26, 1972, the 
United States had ABM defenses under 
construction in two deployment areas 
for the defense of ICBM's. Since the 
ABM treaty permitted each party only 
one such ABM system deployment 
area, the United States immediately 
halted the construction, which was in 
the early stages, at Malmstrom AFB, 
Montana. Specific procedures for the 
dismantling or destruction of the ABM 
facilities under construction at 
Malmstrom were negotiated as part of 
the protocol on procedures for ABM 
systems and their components, signed 
on July 3, 1974. 2 

Dismantling of the ABM facilities 
under construction at Malmstrom was 
completed by May 1, 1974. 



14 



Department of State Bi 



In late 1974 we notified the 
U.S.S.R. in the SCC that dismantling 
activities at the Malmstrom site had 
been completed. Somewhat later, the 
Soviet side raised a question about one 
detailed aspect of the dismantling 
which they apparently felt had not been 
carried out in full accord with the 
agreed procedures 

We reviewed with the Soviet side the 
actions taken by the United States to 
dismantle the Malmstrom site and also 
showed them some photographs of the 
before-and-after conditions there. The 
question was apparently resolved on 
the basis of that discussion. 



Other Questions and Charges 

The process of monitoring Soviet 
activity and analyzing the information 
obtained in order to decide whether 
any particular matter needs to be 
raised with the Soviet side has been 
described above. Activities not raised 
with the U.S.S.R. as ambiguous or of 
possible concern have also been 
examined by the United States. In 
those cases, analysis of the available 
intelligence information showed that 
they did not warrant discussion or 
categorization as inconsistent with the 
agreements. Generally, it has been the 
practice to avoid public discussions of 
these matters. 

From time to time, articles have ap- 
peared in U.S. periodicals and news- 
papers alleging Soviet violations of the 
provisions of the SALT I agreements. 
As indicated earlier, these reports or 
commentaries have been generally 
speculative and have concluded or im- 
plied that violations or "cheating" by 
the Soviets had taken place. 

Among the subjects most recently or 
frequently mentioned are those listed 
below. 

"Blinding" of U.S. Satellites. 

Soviet use of something like laser 
energy to "blind" certain U.S. satel- 
lites could be an activity inconsistent 
with the obligations in article XII of 
the ABM treaty and article V of the 
Interim Agreement "not to interfere 
with" or "use deliberate concealment 
measures" which impede verification . 
by national technical means, of com- 
pliance with the provisions of those 
agreements. 

In 1975 information relevant to pos- 
sible incidents of that nature was 
thoroughly analyzed, and it was de- 
termined that no questionable Soviet 
activity was involved and that our 
monitoring capabilities had not been 
affected by these events. The analysis 
indicated that the events had resulted 



from several large tires caused by 
breaks along natural gas pipelines in 
the U.S.S.R. Later, following several 
reports in the U.S. press alleging 
Soviet violations and in response to 
questions about those reports, the U.S. 
press was informed of those facts by 
several U.S. officials. 

Mobile ABM. From time to time, it 
has been stated that the U.S.S.R., in 
contravention of article V of the ABM 
treaty, has developed, tested, or de- 
ployed a mobile ABM system, or a 
mobile ABM radar, one of the three 
components of a mobile ABM system. 

The U.S.S.R. does not have a 
mobile ABM system or components 
for such a system. Since 1971 the 
Soviets have installed at ABM test 
ranges several radars associated with 
an ABM system currently in develop- 
ment. One of the types of radars as- 
sociated with this system can be 
erected in a matter of months, rather 
than requiring years to build as has 
been the case for ABM radars both 
sides have deployed in the past. 
Another type could be emplaced on 
prepared concrete foundations. This 
new system and its components can be 
installed more rapidly than previous 
ABM systems, but they are clearly not 
mobile in the sense of being able to be 
moved about readily or hidden. A 
single complete operational site would 
take about half a year to construct. A 
nationwide ABM system based on this 
new system under development would 
take a matter of years to build. 

ABM Testing of Air Defense Mis- 
siles. Article VI of the treaty specif- 
ically prohibits the testing in an ABM 
mode of missiles which are not ABM 
interceptor missiles, or giving them 
ABM capabilities. Our close monitor- 
ing of activities in this field have not 
indicated that ABM tests or any tests 
against strategic ballastic missiles have 
been conducted with an air defense 
missile; specifically, we have not ob- 
served any such tests of the SA-5 air 
defense system missile, the one occa- 
sionally mentioned in this connection 
in the open press. 

Mobile ICBM's. The developemnt 
and testing of a mobile ICBM is not 
prohibited by the Interim Agreement, 
but the United States staled in SALT I 
that we would consider deployment of 
such systems to be inconsistent with 
the objectives of the agreement. We 
do not believe the Soviets have de- 
ployed an ICBM in a mobile mode. 

The possibility that the Soviet 
SS-20, which is a mobile inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missile system, 



has been given or could be gi 
ICBM range capabilities has beer 
cussed in the press. The SS-^B 
being deployed to replace oil 
medium- and intermediate-range I 
siles. It is judged to be capabll 
reaching the Aleutian Islands! 
western Alaska from its presentB 
likely deployment areas in the call 
U.S.S.R.; however, it cannot rl 
the contiguous 48 States from arl 
its likely deployment areas inl 
Soviet Union. 

While the range capability of| 
missile system, including the SS 
can be extended by reducing the 
weight of its payload or ad« 
another propulsion stage, there i 
evidence that the Soviets have i 
any such modifications to the SS 
We have confidence that we wouh 
tect the necessary intercontint 
range testing of such a modi 
system. 

Denial of Test Information. It 

been reported in some article: 
SALT that the Soviets have viol 
the Interim Agreement by encoi 
missile-test telemetry and that sue! 
tivity is contrary to the provisio 
article V of the Interim Agreerrl 
Such activity would be inconsb* 
with those provisions of the Int | 
Agreement if it impeded verific; 
of compliance with agreement pi 
sions; it has not been considere 
have done so. In the SALT II neg 
tions. we have treated this subjecl 
considerable detail, since such act I 
could affect verification of compli | 
with certain provisions of the ag 
ment under negotiation. 

Antisatellite Systems. It has 1 

alleged that Soviet development o 
antisatellite system is a violatioi 
the obligation not to interfere with 
tional technical means of verificai 
of compliance with SALT provisi'l 
Since development of such system I 
not prohibited, this program does I 
call into question Soviet complial 
with existing agreements. The acl 
use of an antisatellite system agal 
U.S. national technical means is || 
hibited, but this has not occurred 



ACDA presi releas, I oj I eb 28, IV78. 

1 For texts of the Treaty on the Limit, 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and 
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures 1 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Oil 
sive Arms, signed in Moscow on May I 
1972, see Bulletin of June 26, p. 918. 

2 For text of protocol, see BulletinI 
July 29, 1974, p. 216. 



1978 



15 



Verification of the 
Proposed SALT II Agreement 



ie following is a portion of a re- 
prepared by the Administration 
the Senate Foreign Relations 
mittee, as released by that com- 
e on February 24, 1978. The ex- 
ts are taken from a longer, clas- 
d report giving more detailed in- 
tation on the verification aspects 
he proposed SALT II agree- 
>. 

'ie report was originally requested 
he committee on November 2, 
7 , pursuant to a provision of the 
s Control and Disarmament Act, 
'.mended last year, which requires 
the Director of the Arms Control 
Disarmament Agency provide a 
>rt, upon request, as to the ade- 
cy of verification of compliance 
each provision of significant arms 
rol proposals made to or by the 
f ed States. The request was reiter- 

I February I . 
ie anticipated SALT II agreement 
lequately verifiable. This judgment 
ased on assessment of the verifia- 
y of the individual provisions of 
1 agreement and the agreement as a 
lile. Although the possibility of 
I e undetected cheating in certain 
tr s exists, such cheating would not 
I' the strategic balance in view of 
I . programs. Any cheating on a 
lie large enough to alter the 
t egic balance would be discovered 
M ime to make an appropriate re- 
vise. There will be areas of uncer- 
,a .ty , but they are not such as to 
Knit the Soviets to produce a signif- 
«nt unanticipated threat to U.S. 
n rests, and those uncertainties can, 
amy event, be compensated for with 
I flexibility inherent in our own pro- 
|ms. 



Piposed Agreement 

'. ne proposed SALT II agreement 
i three principal elements: 

"A treaty to last until 1985 em- 
ilying basically the Vladivostok ac- 
jd with some reductions below the 
•jidivostok ceilings; 

A protocol to last until September 
30 temporarily limiting certain as- 
;ts of cruise missiles, new types of 
listic missiles, and mobile ICBM's; 



i 

Principles and guidelines for 
iLT III. 



The proposed treaty includes the fol- 
lowing major provisions: 

• An initial overall aggregate level 
of 2.400 strategic systems to be re- 
duced to an agreed number between 
2,160 and 2,250 during the term of the 
treaty: 

• A 1,320 sublimit on MIRV'ed 
ICBM and SLBM launchers and air- 
craft equipped with long-range cruise 
missiles; 

• A sublimit of an agreed number 
between 1,200 and 1,250 on MIRV'ed 
ballistic missiles; and 

• A sublimit of 820 on MIRVed 
ICBM launchers. 

The proposed protocol includes the 
following provisions: 

• A ban on deployment of mobile 
ICBM launchers and on the flight test- 
ing of ICBM's from such launchers; 

• Limitations on the flight testing 
and deployment of new types of ballis- 
tic missiles; and 

• A ban on the flight testing and de- 
ployment of cruise missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 2,500 km. and on 
the deployment of cruise missiles capa- 
ble of a range in excess of 600 km. on 
sea- or land-based launchers. 

The agreement is still under active 
negotiation. Unless otherwise stated, 
the verification assessment for unre- 
solved issues addresses only the U.S. 
position. 

Verification 

Verification is the process of deter- 
mining, to the extent necessary to 
safeguard our national security, that 
the other side is complying with the 
SALT agreement. We must have high 
confidence in our ability to detect 
Soviet noncompliance before it could 
significantly affect our interests. This 
process of judging the adequacy of 
verification must take into account the 
capabilities of existing and future 
intelligence-collection systems and the 
ability of the other side to evade detec- 
tion if it should attempt to do so. 

Equally important is the U.S. ability 
to respond to Soviet cheating, should 
it occur. The U.S. technological base, 
its research and development pro- 
grams, and the substantial capabilities 
of its strategic forces provide this 
hedge. 



This process must also assess the 
political and military significance of 
potential violations and the costs, 
risks, and gains to the Soviets of 
cheating. It also takes into account the de- 
gree to which the advantages conferred 
on the United States by a particular 
provision outweigh the disadvantages 
caused by problems of verification. In 
such cases, we must consider the po- 
tential gains to the United States of 
being allowed the flexibility to take 
certain actions, even though allowing 
the Soviets the same options may com- 
plicate verification. Cruise missile lim- 
itations constitute a prime example of 
such a situation. 

Assessing the adequate verifiability 
of the proposed SALT agreement is 
most heavily based on our confidence 
in U.S. monitoring capabilities. Such 
monitoring is carried out by the intel- 
ligence community and involves data 
collection and assessment of what the 
other side is doing or not doing. For 
the most part, the intelligence commu- 
nity has performed and would continue 
to perform these functions even in the 
absence of a SALT agreement. Many 
of the uncertainties that are discussed 
below would also exist in our intelli- 
gence assessments of Soviet strategic 
programs without an agreement. 

Monitoring tasks in SALT can be 
divided into three categories: 

(1) Counting numerically limited 
systems, such as ICBM and SLBM 
launchers and heavy bombers; 

(2) Measuring limited quantities, 
such as the throw-weight of an ICBM; 
and 

(3) Monitoring for evidence that a 
prohibited activity is being 
undertaken. 

(Classified Text Deleted) 

Our monitoring judgments assume 
the availability of present and pro- 
grammed collection assets. However, 
these assessments are conservative in 
that they do not take into account the 
possibility of unusual or unpredictable 
intelligence successes or fortuitous blun- 
ders by the Soviets which could have the 
effect of enhancing verification. 

We have had over 5 years' experi- 
ence in monitoring Soviet compliance 
with the ABM treaty and the Interim 
Agreement. We have demonstrated our 
ability to verify compliance with the 
SALT I agreements with high confi- 
dence. This experience reinforces our 
assessment of the capabilities of U.S. 
national technical means to verify 
compliance with SALT agreements. 
The United States has promptly raised 
with the Soviets any unusual or am- 



16 



biguous activities which gave rise to 
U.S. concern. Consequently, the 
Soviets are well aware that the United 
States will call them into account for 
any questionable activities related to 
their strategic programs and will expect 
satisfactory clarification or resolution 
of the problems involved. 

Since monitoring will always be 
subject to some degree of uncertainty, 
we must also assess the likelihood that 
the Soviets would cheat, taking into 
account the benefits that would accrue 
to them from such cheating, as well as 
the risks of their being detected. As a 



February 23, 1478 

Honorable John Sparkman 
Chairman. Committee on 

Foreign Relations 
U.S. Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This letter is in response to your re- 
quest of February 1 for a report on the 
verifiability of the proposed SALT 
TWO agreement as provided for in the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act 
Amendment of 1977. 

As you know, the SALT TWO 
agreement is still under active negotia- 
tion. It is therefore not possible at this 
time to make a final assessment of the 
verifiability of the agreement that may 
emerge from these negotiations. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of an exten- 
sive and continuing review that has 
been conducted by all involved agencies 
in the Executive Branch, it is my judg- 
ment that the anticipated SALT TWO 
agreement is adequately verifiable by 
existing national technical means. This 
judgment is based on an assessment of 
the verifiability of the individual provi- 
sions of the agreement and of the 
agreement as a whole. The consid- 
erations leading to this judgment are re- 
flected in the attached report which has 
been prepared and agreed to by the 
agencies in the Executive Branch con- 
cerned with this issue. I commend this 
report, which has my personal endorse- 
ment, to you for your consideration of 
this important issue- 
Very truly yours. 

Paul C. Warnki 



matter of prudence, therefore, we 
analyze scenarios involving altered or 
covert Soviet practices that could ad- 
versely affect our confidence in Soviet 
compliance. The following consid- 
erations are some that the Soviets must 
take into account before making a de- 
cision to cheat or not to cheat: 

(1) Their uncertainty about our 
overall capability to monitor and 
analyze their activities; 

(2) The potential U.S. reaction to 
discovered cheating; and 

(3) The possible strategic gains from 
cheating. 

It must be stressed that, as noted 
previously, the United States does not 
rely on trust, on Soviet intentions, or 
on political incentives for the Soviets 
to comply in assessing whether verifi- 
cation of a SALT agreement is 
adequate. Such judgments must be 
based most heavily on our monitoring 
capabilities, especially with regard to 
potentially significant Soviet non- 
compliance and on the U.S. ability to 
respond in a timely manner to possible 
Soviet cheating. 

Finally, as with all aspects of a 
treaty, we must decide whether par- 
ticular provisions and the agreement as 
a whole represent a net gain for U.S. 
security compared to the absence of 
such provisions or to the no-treaty 
case. The projected higher levels of 
Soviet capability in the absence of a 
treaty would have to be matched or 
countered by expanded U.S. programs, 
probably with no net increase in U.S. 
security. So long as U.S. programs 
that may be required to hedge against 
lower monitoring confidence are not 
unduly restricted by the treaty, some 
uncertainties can be accepted in an 
overall agreement that serves U.S. se- 
curity interests. 

As stated previously, the verifica- 
tion tasks of the anticipated SALT 
II agreement can be grouped into 
three categories — counting, measuring 
capability, and other tasks which, in 
general, are bans on certain types of 
systems and conduct. The scope of 
these tasks are illustrated in the at- 
tached table. (Deleted) Our judgment 
that the proposed agreement is 
adequately verifiable is based on an 
analysis of these tasks. The reasons for 
this judgment are reflected in the fol- 



Department of State Bt 

lowing discussion of the major ver 
tion tasks posed by the agreement 



Overall Verifiability of Agreeme 

In assessing the adequacy of vi 
cation of the agreement, it is impo 
to consider its totality and not 
particular provisions. 

A consideration in determii 
whether the agreement as a who 
adequately verifiable has been whi 
the Soviets could exploit the mon 
ing uncertainties of several indivi 
provisions, each of which is judge 
adequately verifiable, in a way 
would affect our national sect 
interests. We have confidence thai 
can adequately verify complianc 
such a context because the probat 
of detecting the fact of cheating, 
creases markedly if the numbe 
provisions being violated increa 
Combined with the likelihood of 
tecting significant cheating on i 
vidual limitations, the ability to dil 
the fact of small cheating on a nur I 
of provisions enhances our monitol 
confidence. 

The Soviets cannot be sure of | 
overall capability to monitor a S, 
II agreement. Thus, Soviet plan 
would be expected to make car 
conservative assumptions regan 
U.S. verification capabilities, 
example, a slightly less than .' 
chance of detection, which is con 
ered "low confidence" in monito 
capability to the United States, w 
probably appear as "high risk" 
Soviet planner contemplating cheat 
Given U.S. research and developrl 
hedges and our greater industrial I 
technological base, the Soviets w<| 
not likely undertake this risk 
the attendant danger of U 
abrogation. 

In sum, although the possibility 
some undetected cheating in cer 
areas exists, such cheating would I 
alter the strategic balance in viewl 
U.S. programs. However, any ch<| 
ing on a scale large enough to af 
the strategic balance would be disc 
ered in time to make an appropri 
response. For these reasons, ; 
others noted in this paper, we beli t 
that the SALT II agreement, taken ;a 
whole, is adequately verifiable. 



ACDA press release 5 of Mar. I, 1978. 



%il978 



17 



THE PRESIDENT: National Security Interests 









i 



b 



hundred and ninety-eight years 
n the southern part of your 
, 400 North Carolina militiamen 
up arms in our own war of inde- 
ence. Against a force of 1,300 
sh soldiers, the North Carolinians 
died — and their battle at Ram- 
s Mill became a step on the road 
ctory at Yorktown 1 year later. 
>ur ancestors in North Carolina 
mine in Georgia and their 
hbors throughout the Thirteen 
inies earned our freedom in corn- 
That is a sacrifice which Ameri- 
have had to make time and time 
in our nation's history. We've 
ed that strength is the final pro- 
r of liberty. 

is is a commitment and a sac- 
that I understand well, for the 
tion of military service has been 
ing deep for generations in my 
family. My first ancestor to live 
eorgia, James Carter, who moved 
: from North Carolina, fought in 
Revolution. My father was a first 
■enant in World War I. My oldest 
volunteered to go to Vietnam. 
I spent 1 1 years of my life as a 
essional military officer in the 
. Navy. This is typical of Ameri- 
families. 

own through the generations, the 
poses of our Armed Forces have 
tys been the same, no matter what 
iration it was: to defend our secu- 
when it's threatened and, through 
onstrated strength, to reduce the 
nces that we will have to fight 
n. These words of John Kennedy 
still guide our actions, and I 
te him: "The purpose of our arms 
>eace, not war — to make certain 
they will never have to be used." 
t purpose is unchanged. But the 
Id has been changing and our re- 
nses as a nation must change with 

his morning I would like to talk to 
i about our national security — 
;re we now stand, what new cir- 
nstances we face, and what we are 
ng to do in the future. 

rrent Standing 

^et me deal at the beginning with 
ne myths. One myth is that this 
antry somehow is pulling back 
m protecting its interests and its 

I'inds around the world. That is not 
■ case, as will be explained in this 



speech and demonstrated in our actions 
as a nation. 

Another myth is that our defense 
budget is too burdensome and con- 
sumes an undue part of our federal 
revenues. National defense is, of 
course, a large and important item of 
expenditures, but it represents only 
about 5% of our gross national prod- 
uct and about a quarter of our current 
federal budget. 

It also is a mistake to believe that 
our country's defense spending is 
mainly for intercontinental missiles or 
nuclear weapons. Only about 10% of 
our defense budget goes for strategic 
forces or for nuclear deterrence. More 
than 50% is simply to pay for and 
support the services of the men and 
women in our Armed Forces. 

Finally, some believe that because 
we do possess nuclear weapons of 
great destructive power, that we need 
do nothing more to guarantee our na- 
tion's security. Unfortunately, it's not 
that simple. Our potential adversaries 
have now built up massive forces 
armed with conventional weapons — 
tanks, aircraft, infantry, mechanized 
units. These forces could be used for 
political blackmail, and they could 
threaten our vital interests unless we 
and our allies and friends have our 
own military strength and conven- 
tional forces as a counterbalance. 

Of course, our national security 
rests on more than just military power. 
It depends partly on the productive 
capacity of our factories and our 
farms; on an adequate supply of natu- 
ral resources with which God has 
blessed us; on an economic system 
which values human freedom above 
centralized control; on the creative 
ideas of our best minds; on the hard 
work, cohesion, moral strength, and 
determination of the American 
people; and on the friendship of our 
neighbors to the north and south. Our 
security depends on strong bonds with 
our allies and on whether other na- 
tions seek to live in peace and refrain 
from trying to dominate those who 
live around them. 

But adequate and capable military 
forces are still an essential element of 
our national security. We, like our 
ancestors, have the obligation to 
maintain strength equal to the chal- 
lenges of the world in which we live, 
and we Americans will continue to do 
so. 



New Circumstances 

Let us review briefly how national 
security issues have changed over the 
past decade or two. The world has 
grown both more complex and more 
interdependent. There is now a divi- 
sion among the Communist powers. 
The old colonial empires have fallen, 
and many new nations have risen in 
their place. Old ideological labels 
have lost some of their meaning. 
There have also been changes in the 
military balance among nations. Over 
the past 20 years, the military forces 
of the Soviets have grown substan- 
tially, both in absolute numbers and 
relative to our own. 

There also has been an ominous in- 
clination on the part of the Soviet 
Union to use its military power — to 
intervene in local conflicts, with ad- 
visers, with equipment, and with full 
logistical support and encouragement 
for mercenaries from other Com- 
munist countries, as we can observe 
today in Africa. 

This increase in Soviet military 
power has been going on for a long 
time. Discounting inflation, since 
1960 Soviet military spending has 
doubled, rising steadily in real terms 
by 3 or 4% a year, while our own 
military budget is actually lower now 
than it was in 1960. The Soviets, who 
traditionally were not a significant 
naval power, now rank number two in 
world naval forces. 

In its balanced strategic nuclear ca- 
pability, the United States retains im- 
portant advantages. But over the past 
decade, the steady Soviet buildup has 
achieved functional equivalence in 
strategic forces with the United 
States. 

U.S. Responses 

These changes demand that we 
maintain adequate responses — 
diplomatic, military, and economic — 
and we will. 

As President and as Commander in 
Chief, I am responsible, along with the 
Congress, for modernizing, expanding, 
and improving our Armed Forces 
whenever our security requires it. 
We've recently completed a major 
reassessment of our national defense 
strategy. And out of this process have 
come some overall principles designed 
to preserve our national security during 
the years ahead. 



18 



• We will match, together with our 
allies and friends, any threatening 
power through a combination of mili- 
tary forces, political efforts, and eco- 
nomic programs. We will not allow 
any other nation to gain military 
superiority over us. 

• We shall seek the cooperation of 
the Soviet Union and other nations in 
reducing areas of tension. We do not 
desire to intervene militarily in the 
internal domestic affairs of other 
countries nor to aggravate regional 
conflicts. And we shall oppose inter- 
vention by others. 

• While assuring our own military 
capabilities, we shall seek security 
through dependable, verifiable arms 
control agreements wherever possible. 

• We shall use our great economic, 
technological, and diplomatic advan- 
tages to defend our interests and to 
promote American values. We are 
prepared, for instance, to cooperate 
with the Soviet Union toward com- 
mon social, scientific, and economic 
goals. But if they fail to demonstrate 
restraint in missile programs and other 
force levels or in the projection of 
Soviet or proxy forces into other lands 
and continents, then popular support in 
the United States for such cooperation 
with the Soviets will certainly erode. 

These principles mean that, even as 
we search for agreement in arms con- 
trol, we will continue to modernize 
our strategic systems and to revitalize 
our conventional forces. And I have 
no doubt that the Congress shares my 
commitment in this respect. 

We shall implement this policy that 
I've outlined so briefly in three dif- 
ferent ways: 

• By maintaining strategic nuclear 
balance; 

• By working closely with our 
NATO allies to strengthen and mod- 
ernize our defenses in Europe; and 

• By maintaining and developing 
forces to counter any threats to our al- 
lies and friends in our vital interests 
in Asia, the Middle East, and other 
regions of the world. 

Let me take up each of these three in 
turn. 

Strategic Nuclear Balance. Our 

first and most fundamental concern is 
to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of 
nuclear conflict and our desire to re- 
duce the world's arsenals of fearsome 
nuclear weapons do not free us from 
the need to analyze the situation objec- 
tively and to make sensible choices 
about our purposes and means. 

Our strategic forces must be — and 



must be known to be — a match for the 
capabilities of the Soviets. They will 
never be able to use their nuclear forces 
to threaten, to coerce, or to blackmail 
us or our friends. 

Our continuing major effort in the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) taking place every day in 
Geneva are one means toward a goal of 
strategic nuclear stability. We and the 
Soviets have already reached agree- 
ment on some basic points, although 
still others remain to be resolved. We 
are making good progress. We are not 
looking for any one-sided advantage. 

But before I sign any SALT agree- 
ment on behalf of the United States, I 
will make sure that it preserves the 
strategic balance, that we can inde- 
pendently verify Soviet compliance, 
and that we will be at least as strong, 
relative to the Soviet Union, as we 
would be without any agreement. 

But in addition to the limits and re- 
ductions of a SALT II agreement, we 
must take other steps to protect the 
strategic balance. During the next dec- 
ade, improvements in the Soviet mis- 
siles can make our land-based missile 
forces in silos increasingly vulnerable 
to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack 
would amount to national suicide for 
the Soviet Union. But however remote, 
it is a threat against which we must 
constantly be on guard. 

We have a superb submarine fleet 
which is relatively invulnerable to at- 
tack when it's at sea, and we have 
under construction new Trident subma- 
rines and missiles which give our sub- 
marine ballistic missile force even 
greater range and security. I have or- 
dered rapid development and deploy- 
ment of cruise missiles to reinforce the 
strategic value of our bombers. We are 
working on the M-X intercontinental 
ballistic missile and a Trident II 
submarine-launched ballistic missile to 
give us more options to respond to 
Soviet strategic deployments. If it be- 
comes necessary to guarantee the clear 
invulnerability of our strategic deter- 
rent, I shall not hesitate to take actions 
for full-scale development and deploy- 
ment of these systems 

Our strategic defense forces, our nu- 
clear forces, are a triad — land-based 
missiles, sea-based missiles, and air- 
breathing systems, such as bombers 
and cruise missiles. Through the plans 
I've described, all three legs of this 
triad will be modernized and improved. 
Each will retain the ability, on its own. 
to impose devastating retaliation upon 
an aggressor. 

Cooperation With NATO. For 30 

years and more we've been committed 
to the defense of Europe, bound by the 



ii 



Department of State B\ 

knowledge that Western Europe's 
rity is vital to our own. We contin 
cooperate with our NATO allies 
strategy for flexible response, cor 
ing conventional forces and nu 
forces so that no aggressor can thn 
the territory of Europe or its fret 
which, in the past, we have fough 
gether to defend. 

For several years we and our 
have been trying to negotiate m 
and balanced reduction in mil 
forces in Europe with the Soviets 
with the Warsaw Pact nations wh« 
their allies. But in the meantime 
Soviets have continued to increase 
to modernize their forces beyo 
level necessary for defense. In the 
of this excessive Soviet buildup 
and our NATO allies have had to 
important steps to cope with short- 
vulnerabilities and respond to 1 
term threats. We are significa 
strengthening U.S. forces station 
Western Europe and improving 
ability to speed additional ground 
air forces to the defense of Europe 
time of crisis. 

Our European allies — who su 
the major portion of NATO's coral 
tional combat strength — are 
improving their readiness and ll 
reinforcement capabilities and ll 
antitank defenses. The heads of I 
NATO governments will be here ir I 
country attending the summit met I 
in May, where we will address I 
long-term defense program which I 
expand and integrate more closel) I 
lied defense plans. 



Other Vital Interests. For ml 

years, the United States has bet | 
major world power. Our longstani 
concerns encompass our own seal 
interests and those of our allies I 
friends far beyond our own shores 
Europe. 

We have important historical resf 
sibilities to enhance peace in East A 
in the Middle East, in the Persian G 
and throughout our own hemispht 
Our preference in all these areas i 
turn first to international agreemi 
that reduce the overall level of a 
and minimize the threat of conflict, 
we have the will, and we will al 
maintain the capacity, to honor I 
commitments and to protect our in ;■ 
csis in those critical areas. 

In the Pacific, our effective secuil 
is enhanced by mutual defense treaii 
with our allies and by our friends! 
and cooperation with other PaciJ 
nations. 

Japan and South Korea, clostf 
linked with the United States, are < 
cated geographically where vital int - 
ests of great powers converge. It is s| 



11978 



19 



ive that Northeast Asia remain 
;. We will maintain and even en- 
! our military strength in this area, 
wing our air strength and reducing 
round forces as the South Korean 
continues to modernize and to in- 
e its own capabilities, 
the Middle East and the region of 
ndian Ocean, we seek permanent 
e and stability. The economic 
h and well-being of the United 
s, Western Europe, Japan depend 
continued access to the oil from 
ersian Gulf area. 

all these situations, the primary 
nsibility for preserving peace and 
ary stability rests with the coun- 
of the region. But we shall con- 
to work with our friends and 
to strengthen their ability to pre- 
threats to their interests and to 
In addition, however, we will 
tain forces of our own which can 
tiled upon, if necessary, to support 
al defense efforts. The Secretary 
efense at my direction is improv- 
ed will maintain quickly deploy- 
forces — air, land, and sea — to de- 
our interests throughout the 
i. 

elusion 

•ms control agreements are a major 
as instruments of our national se- 
y, but this will be possible only if 
naintain appropriate military force 
ills. Reaching balanced, verifiable 
gements with our adversaries can 
in the cost of security and reduce the 
is of war. But even then, we must — 
to we will — proceed efficiently with 
fliever arms programs our own secu- 
(l requires. 

'hen I leave this auditorium, I shall 
woing to visit with the crew aboard 

■ of our most modern nuclear- 
k ered aircraft carriers in the Atlantic 

■ an. The men and women of our 
lied Forces remain committed as 
m: professionals and as patriotic 
Bericans to our common defense. 
fly must stand constantly ready to 

■ t, in the hope that through strength, 
:cibat will be prevented. We as 

■ ericans will always support them in 

■ r courageous vigil. 

Ihis has been a serious and a sober 
I , but there is no cause for pes- 

■ ism. We face a challenge, and we 
■1 do whatever is necessary to meet 

■ We will preserve and protect our 

■ ntry and continue to promote and to 
■intain peace around the world. This 
wans that we shall have to continue to 
siiport strong and efficient military 
fees. 

For most of human history, people 
we wished vainly that freedom and 



News Conferences, February 17, 
March 2 and 9 (Excerpts) 



FEBRUARY 17 



Q. Knowing tension already exists 
over the Israeli settlement policy, do 
you have any second thoughts about 
the timing of your announcement to 
sell war planes to Egypt, or was the 
timing of that announcement and our 
public statements about the Israeli 
settlement policy a message to the Is- 
raelis to become more flexible in the 
current negotiations? 

A. The two were not interrelated in 
my decisionmaking process. When I 
was in Saudi Arabia earlier in January, 
I told them that shortly after the Con- 
gress reconvened I would send up a 
recommendation for military sales to 
the Middle East. 

Every time I've ever met with Prime 
Minister Begin, both in the public ses- 
sions — that is with staff members — and 
also in my private sessions with just 
him and me present, this has been the 
first item that he's brought up: "Please 
expedite the approval of the sales of 
military planes to Israel." 

I think that the timing is proper. 
We're not trying to short circuit the al- 
lotted time for the Congress. As a mat- 
ter of fact, we will not begin the proc- 
ess until after the Congress reconvenes, 
the Senate reconvenes. So there will be 
a full 50 days for the Congress to con- 
sider the matter. Twenty days after this 



coming Monday, I'll send up official 
papers. I don't think it's a bad time to 
send it up. 

I recognized ahead of time that there 
would be some controversy about it. 
And we did give it second and third 
thoughts before I made a decision 
about the composition of the package 
and the date for submitting it. 

Q. On the Middle East, arms to 
the Middle East, I want to ask a kind 
of philosophic question. How do you 
rationalize the idea of selling 
weapons, more sophisticated 
weapons of war, with the argument 
that they would help to bring about 
peace? 

Does it bother you that these more 
and more sophisticated weapons are 
being sold to both sides, and if a new 
war were to break out, it would be a 
more violent confrontation than any 
in the past? 

A. As you know, we are not intro- 
ducing new weapons into the Middle 
East. F-15's are already being deliv- 
ered into the Middle East. Also, I have 
pledged myself to cut down on the vol- 
ume of weapons each succeeding year 
as long as I am in office, barring some 
unpredictable worldwide military out- 
break. This year there will be less 
weapons sales than last year. This will 
include, of course, the Middle East. 

I think it's very good for nations to 



the flowering of the human spirit, 
which freedom nourishes, did not fi- 
nally have to depend upon the force of 
arms. We, like our forebears, live in a 
time when those who would destroy 
liberty are restrained less by their re- 
spect for freedom itself than by their 
knowledge that those of us who cherish 
freedom are strong. 

We are a great nation, made up of 
talented people. We can readily afford 
the necessary costs of our military 
forces, as well as an increased level, if 
needed, to prevent any adversary from 
destabilizing the peace of the world. 
The money we spend on defense is not 
wasted any more than is the cost of 
maintaining a police force in a local 
community t o keep the peace. This in- 
vestment purchases our freedom to ful- 
fill the worthy goals of our nation. 

Southerners, whose ancestors 100 



years ago knew the horrors of a home- 
land devastated by war, are particularly 
determined that war shall never come 
to us again. All Americans understand 
the basic lesson of history: that we 
need to be resolute and able to protect 
ourselves, to prevent threats and domi- 
nation by others. 

No matter how peaceful and secure 
and easy the circumstances of our lives 
now seem, we have no guarantee that 
the blessings will endure. That is why 
we will always maintain the strength 
which, God willing, we shall never 
need to use. □ 



Address at Wake Forest University in 
Winston-Salem, N.C.. on Mar. 17, 1978 (in- 
troductory paragraphs omitted); for full text, 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Mar. 27. 



20 

turn to us for their security needs, in- 
stead of having to turn to the Soviet 
Union as they have in the past. I am 
talking specifically about Egypt. You 
have to remember that Saudi Arabia 
has never had any active aggression 
against Israel. Saudi Arabia is our ally 
and friend. Egypt is our ally and 
friend. Israel is our ally and friend. 

To maintain security in that region is 
important. Egypt has other threats 
against its security. The Soviets are 
shipping massive quantities of weapons 
into the Middle Eastern area now, into 
the Red Sea area — Ethiopia, into Syria, 
Iraq, Libya — and we cannot abandon 
our own friends. So I don't think it is 
wrong at all to insure stability or the 
right to defend themselves in a region 
with arms sales. 

We are continuing multinational 
negotiations with other sellers of 
weapons to get them to join with us in 
a constant step-by-step, year-by-year 
reduction in total arms sales. If they 
do, I think the world will be much 
more peaceful in the future. 



MARCH 2 

Q. What are you going to do about 
the deteriorating dollar and the basic 
cause of its collapse, soaring foreign 
oil imports? And a related question, 
saying that European financial offi- 
cials say the United States should de- 
fend the dollar more vigorously. 

A. I spent a lot of time studying 
about the American dollar, its value in 
international monetary markets, the 
causes for the recent deterioration as it 
relates to other major currencies. I can 
say with complete assurance that the 
basic principles of monetary values are 
not being adequately assessed on the 
current international monetary markets. 
There are three that I would like to 
mention specifically. 

• First of all, the attractiveness of 
investment in our own country com- 
pared to other nations is rapidly in- 
creasing. One of the reasons is the 
higher interest rates that can be paid on 
investments in our country. 

• Another one is the rapidly increas- 
ing consumption of oil that occurred 
during 1977. This caused us a great 
deal of concern. In 1978 we will not 
have that circumstance. Present trends 
and future projections show that at the 
worst we'll have a leveling off of im- 
ports of foreign oil, one of the major 
causes of legitimate deterioration in the 
quality of the dollar. 

• And the other point is the degree 
with which American economic recov- 
ery or growth compares to potential 



Department of State Bi 



purchases of our own goods. In this 
last year, our own rate of growth was 
about 37c greater than the average of 
our major trading partners. That differ- 
ence will be substantially less in 1978. 
We will still have adequate growth, but 
our major trading partners will have 
better growth than they had last year. 

These three basic causes in 1977 for 
some lowering in the dollar's value will 
be much better in 1978. We do move 
aggressively and adequately to prevent 
disorderly market circumstances when 
that need is obvious to us. We'll con- 
tinue to do that. But my own belief is 
that these basic principles that assess 
the legitimate value of the dollar have 
not been adequately observed recently. 
My guess is that in the future over a 
longer period of time, what I've just 
told you will be observed and the dollar 
will remain in good shape. 



Q. Later this month you'll be 
meeting with Prime Minister 
Menahem Begin from Israel. What 
do you hope to achieve during your 
meetings with the Prime Minister? 

A. This will be my third meeting 
with Prime Minister Begin since he's 
been the leader of Israel. In addition, I 
communicate with him fairly frequently 
by personal letter, by diplomatic mes- 
sage, and on occasion by telephone. 
And both our own Secretary of State 
and other officials and his secretary of 
state and other officials come here fre- 
quently. Defense Minister Weizman 
will be here shortly to consult with me 
and with the Secretary of Defense, Sec- 
retary of State, and others. 

We are looking for some common 
ground on which the Egyptians, the Is- 
raelis, the Jordanians, the residents of 
the West Bank, and other areas can 
agree. 

This is a difficult and sensitive ques- 
tion. As you know, the Gaza Strip has 
had an affiliation in the past with 
Egypt, the West Bank with Jordan, 
both now occupied by Israel. And we 
hope to search out at the top level of 
government some resolution of the dif- 
ferences on specifics relating to the 
Sinai and also on a statement of princi- 
ples relating to the occupied territories 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
hoping at that time that Egypt and the 
Jordanians and the Palestinian Arabs 
who live in the West Bank. Gaza Strip 
would be satisfied to conclude perhaps 
some agreements and to proceed with 
further negotiations leading to an ulti- 
mate resolution of the issue, based on 
U.N. Resolution 242. 

One of the crucial elements of any 
progress in the Middle East is a cleav- 






ing to the commitment that U.N. 2 
a basis for continued negotiations i 
solution. The abandonment of 
would put us back many month 
years. So, this is what I hope tc 
complish with Prime Minister Begi 
frankly discuss with him my pre\ 
agreements and discussions with P# 
dent Sadat, to encourage direct neg a 
tions to be resumed, and to search^- 
common ground, based on advice g 
to me by Secretary of State Vance 
also by Mr. Atherton [Alfred L. A 
ton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] 
the latest possible language chai 
that might be necessary to let E 
and Israel agree. This is what I ho[ 
accomplish, and I believe the pers 
discussions will be good. 

I would much prefer that 
personal discussions be carried on" 
tween Sadat and Begin. But in the| 
sence of that possibility at this 
ment, we hope to restore it and a( 
an intermediary. 



Q. With the Soviets active no' 
the Horn of Africa, and with ol 
strains in U.S. -Soviet relations, \f 
hope do you have for early resuJ 
tion of SALT talks? 

A. The SALT talks have never 1 9 
discontinued or delayed. They are I 
going now, and the Soviet involvei I 
in the Horn has not interrupted I 
process. We do not initiate any ;l 
ernment policy that has a linkage I 
tween the Soviet involvemen I 
the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute on I 
one hand and SALT or the comprell 
sive test ban negotiations on the otl |' 

Obviously any negotiation, if cl 
eluded successfully at the execu \ 
level, would have to be ratified by I 
Congress, who would be heavily in • 
enced by opinion of the Ameri t 
people. And the fact that the Sovl 
have overarmed to the teeth the So I 
lians, who then use Soviet weapon b 
invade Ethiopia and now are overal 
ing Ethiopia and directing their miliil 
effort has caused a threat to peace I 
the Horn area of Africa. 

We have added our own impl 
tunities for a peaceful resolution ;| 
our own caution comments to I 
Soviets. They have assured me direil 
through Foreign Minister Gromyko t| 
the Ethiopians would not cross I 
Somalia border. We have sent a dele.fe 
tion to meet with President Mengil 
who assured me personally that tl» 
would not cross the Somalia border. '■ 

We have three hopes there that J 
trust and certainly hope that the Sovil 
will honor. 



1978 



21 



)ne is a Somalian withdrawal 
the territories which they occupy 

fstern Ethiopia, in the Ogaden area, 
secondly, a removal from Ethiopia 
jban and Soviet troops; and 
Third, a lessening of the tensions 
exist between those countries and 
snoring of the sometimes arbitrar- 

llrawn international boundaries in 

ra. 



i et 
,cet 



d we hope that the OAU — 

rganization of African Unity — 

d become more successful in their 

Jrts to resolve this dispute in a 

eful way. But at this time, Somalia 

invading nation. We have refused 

md any weapons into that area or 

lit third countries who bought 

)ons from us to transfer them into 

area, and I think our policy is com- 

ly accurate. 

le Soviets' violating of these prin- 
s would be a cause of concern to 
would lessen the confidence of the 
•rican people in the word and 
:eful intentions of the Soviet 
m. would make it more difficult to 
y a SALT agreement or com- 
nsive test ban agreement if con- 
ed, and therefore the two are 
ed because of actions by the 
ets. We don't initiate the linkage. 

We have several questions re- 
el i to the Braniff Airways low-cost 
E ice between Dallas and London, 
fi t of all, have you received a rec- 
linendation from the CAB [Civil 
v onautics Board] for retaliatory 
icon, and do you plan to take such 
« on against the British carrier? 
« I secondly, do you believe that the 
ILish Government is abiding by its 
tiimitments in the Bermuda II air- 
El agreements? 

I.. I have not received a recommen- 
lon from the CAB at this moment. 
• en the recommendation gets to me, 
fly law, will have to act and will act 

■ nediately. 

I don't know enough about the issue, 
I details of the British Government 
ring, to know whether or not they 
le violated the agreement that was 
I eluded this past year. My guess is, 
knving the British, that they have not 
v. lated the agreement specifically. 
It, as you know, an agreement can't 

■ that detailed to anticipate every in- 
ri idual ruling that will be concluded 
I the CAB on our side or its equiva- 
I t agency on the British side. I don't 
Idw much about the issue yet. 

J {But if there is a violation, we would 
(press our concern directly to Prime 

■ nister Callaghan. And when the 
tjvB gives me a report and a recom- 
l»|:ndation, the chances are that I 

mid honor it. 



We have had notable success in 1977 
in increasing competition, particularly 
in international routes of air carriers. 
We have encouraged the additional 
competition of American airlines in 
this area, as well. We hope to get the 
Congress to act on substantial deregula- 
tion in the airline industry within our 
country. I believe that we've made not- 
able success already, and we have 
withstood a tremendous pressure from 
the British to have more government 
protection, which would be contrary to 
competition in the agreement that we 
reached last year. 



MARCH 9 



I have another statement to make. 
Last night, I was informed by President 
Siad Barre of Somalia that he was ag- 
reeing to withdraw his forces from the 
Ogaden area, the occupied areas of 
Ethiopia, and just the last few minutes, 
he confirmed this commitment to me 
with a public statement. 

I welcome President Siad Barre's 
announcement of this decision. The 
United States hopes that this decision 
will result in an immediate halt of the 
bloodshed in that area of the Horn of 
Africa. We hope that the Organization 
of African Unity can move quickly to 
assist all parties to terminate hostilities, 
to agree quickly on rules that can be 
observed so that Somali forces can re- 
tire rapidly into their own territory and 
to insure that peaceful conditions are 
restored among the civilian population. 

As soon as Somali forces have with- 
drawn completely, and as soon as 
Ethiopian forces have reestablished 
control over their own territory, with- 
drawal of the Soviet and Cuban combat 
presence should begin. 

The United States looks forward to 
the complete withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from the two countries — 
Ethiopia and Somalia — at an early 
date. We stand ready to assist the Or- 
ganization of African Unity in working 
out the basis for negotiations between 
Ethiopia and Somalia which would in- 
sure the territorial integrity of all coun- 
tries in the region and the honoring of 
international boundaries. 

Q. Does that Somalia announce- 
ment cause you to look any more 
favorably on Somali requests for 
American arms, assuming they go 
through with it? 

A. We notified Somalia many 
months ago that as long as they were in 
occupied territory, that there would be 
no consideration on our part for defen- 



sive arms of any kind. I think it would 
require a tangible demonstration of the 
carrying out of this commitment on the 
part of the Somalians and also a re- 
newed commitment not to dishonor the 
international boundaries of either 
Ethiopia or Kenya before we would be 
willing to discuss with them economic 
aid or defensive arms supplies. 

In this case, working with the Or- 
ganization of African Unity and the 
Congress, we would consider this in a 
routine manner, but not until — 



Q. On the Middle East, the State 
Department today reaffirmed that 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 
remains, in our view, the bedrock of 
our effort to bring peace to that area 
and more or less served notice on the 
Israeli Government not to take any 
decision to renounce that. Could you 
state for us what your understanding 
or your interpretation of Security 
Council Resolution 242 is and what 
your understanding of the Israeli po- 
sition on this is? 

A. U.N. Resolution 242 was passed 
about 10 years ago. Since then it has 
been endorsed with practically no 
equivocation by our own country, by 
the entire international community, by 
the Israeli Government, and by the 
Arab countries who border on Israel. It 
calls for the withdrawal of Israel from 
territories occupied in the 1967 war. It 
calls for the restoration of security of 
Israel behind recognized and defensible 
borders. And this has been the basis on 
which all of our efforts since I've been 
in office, and also my predecessors' ef- 
forts, have been based. 

For any nation now to reject the ap- 
plication of 242 to the occupied ter- 
ritories, including the West Bank, the 
Sinai, the Golan Heights, would be a 
very serious blow to the prospects of 
peace in the Middle East. 

In addition to the principles that I've 
just described to you, we've also been 
working with complete commitment 
and with some substantial success, par- 
ticularly in the case of Egypt, to insure 
that Israel will not only be blessed with 
a cessation of hostilities but also with a 
full restoration of peace, open borders, 
diplomatic relations, free trade, ex- 
change of tourism and students, and 
cultural exchanges. This is a prospect 
that we still have. But the abandonment 
of U.N. Resolution 242, as it applies to 
the West Bank and other occupied ter- 
ritories, would be a very serious blow 
to the prospects of peace and a com- 
plete reversal of the policy of the 
Israeli Government and other govern- 
ments in the area. 



22 



Department of State Bu 



Q. You have spoken many limes of 
the commitment that the United 
States has for the security of Israel. 
In 1975, in September, the Sinai II 
agreement said specifically that the 
United States would promise to give 
advanced aircraft, such as the F-16, 
at an unspecified time and number, 
to Israel. 

Why is that promise of the United 
States now made part of a package 
deal? In other words, why is it tied to 
approval for aircraft to other coun- 
tries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia? 

A. We are honoring completely the 
commitments made to Israel in the fall 
of 1975 concerning an adherence on 
our part to the adequate defense 
capabilities of Israel, including ad- 
vanced aircraft like the F-15 and the 
F-16. 

Some orders of this kind have al- 
ready been placed, accepted, and de- 
liveries are in prospect. Some planes 
have already been delivered. And the 
proposal that I've made to Congress on 
the arms sales package is compatible 
with that commitment. 

In the fall of 1975, commitments 
were also made to the Saudi Arabians, 
to provide them with advanced aircraft, 
to replace their present Lightning 
planes which are becoming obsolete. 

Later, in the Ford Administration in 
1976, in the fall, a commitment was 
made to them to send Defense Depart- 
ment officials to Saudi Arabia, to give 
them some assessment of the charac- 
teristics of the F-15's and F-16's. with 
a commitment then made that they 
would have their choice between the 
16's and the 15's. 

When Crown Prince Fahd came to 
our country last spring, I repeated this 
commitment, that had been made by 
my own predecessors in the White 
House, and so the sale of F-15's to 
Saudi Arabia is consistent with the 
commitment also made in the fall of 
1975 and repeatedly reconfirmed. 

The sale of the F-5E's — a much less 
capable airplane, by the way — to the 
Egyptians is. I think, a very legitimate 
proposal, because Egyptians in effect 
have severed their supply of weapons 
that used to come from the Soviet 
Union and have cast their lot with us. 
which is a very favorable development 
in the Middle East, one of the most 
profound developments of all. 

I have no apology at all to make for 
this proposal. It maintains the military 
balance that exists in the Middle Fast. I 
can say without any doubt that the 
superior capabilities of the Israeli Air 
Force, compared to their neighbors, is 
maintained, and at the same time, it re- 
confirms our own relationship with the 
moderate Arab leaders and nations lor 



the future to insure that peace can be 
and will be maintained in the Middle 
East. 

Q. On the same subject, we've 
seen reports in recent days from the 
Middle East, from both Cairo and 
Jerusalem, that in effect President 
Sadat's initiative has come to an end, 
that it has come aground. We also 
see reports from Jerusalem that 
ministers in the Israeli Government 
have decided that there is no deal to 
be made at this time. Could you give 
us your assessment of where this 
stands and where you think it's going 
to go? 

A. As is the case in the White House 
and in the Congress, and in the United 
States, there is a difference in Israel, a 
very heated debate in prospect and al- 
ready in progress about what should be 
done to bring about peace in the Middle 
East. There are obviously differences 
also between nations, between Egypt 
and Israel, between Israel and their 
other neighbors. 

I would say that in comparison to the 
situation a year ago, the prospects for 
comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East are quite good. We would hope 
that there could be an immediate res- 
olution of all the differences. That's 
not immediately in prospect. 

Prime Minister Begin will be coming 
to visit with me this coming week. 1 I 
know him very well. I've met with him 
twice before. He is a very strong advo- 
cate, a very dedicated advocate of the 
position of the Israeli Government. 
He's a forceful and outspoken person. 
And I'm sure after our meeting, we 
will at least understand each other 
better. 

I hope we can move another step to- 
ward peace. I had an equivalent oppor- 
tunity this year to meet and to have 
long discussions with President Sadat. 

I would say that there's been a great 
deal of progress made. Just looking at 
the changes from the viewpoint of the 
Israelis, we have now the major Arab 
nation who has recognized Israel's 
right to exist, right to exist in peace, 
right to exist permanently, has offered 
the full definition of peace which I de- 
scribed earlier. They have been meet- 
ing directly and personally. Begin and 
Sadat and their representatives, which 
was not in prospect at all a year ago. 

There are still differences between 
them — relatively minor differences in 
the Sinai, more major strategic kinds ol 
differences involving the Palestinian 
question and the implementation of 
U.N. 242. So we've got a long way to 

go- 

It's a difficult question that's been 
one of the most challenging, I guess, in 



the last 30 years for the world, to h. 
about peace in the Middle East. ■ 
I'm not discouraged about it. wl 
going to stick with it. And even thcI'V. 
it takes a lot of time and much al 
and much debate and many differei 
expressed by all public officials, I 
tend to stay with it. And I believe 
American people are deeply commi 
to two things: one is the securitj 
Israel under any circumstances, 
secondly, the achievement of ci 
prehensive peace. 



havi 



iitioi 



tl 



e; 



Q. Mark Seigel, one of your ai( 
quit today, and you accepted his it 
ignation with regret. He cited as f ' j 
reason, differences with your Midf^ 
East policy. 

His resignation, to many, syf" 
bolizes the split in the Ameritf [ 
Jewish community over the inter! ' 
debate that's going on over our Ml* 
die East policy. And with Begin ccf ' 
ing, I wonder if you could tell i 
what differences there are betw l 
the two of us, what your position ' I 
be on these differences, and a cq lJ 
ment on the report that you're go 
to pressure him to make signific 
concessions? 

A. I don't have any intention 
pressure Prime Minister Begin. I d( 
have any desire to do it and couldn 
I wanted to. He's a very strong and 
dependent person representing a stro 
and independent nation. Our role 
been that of an intermediary. And < 
of the most pleasant respites that I h; 
had since I've been in office was 
brief time when Prime Minister Be 
and President Sadat were negotiat 
directly and I was out of the role 
carrying messages back and forth. 

This is, however, a situation that 1 
now deteriorated to some degree sir 
President Sadat went to Jerusale 
Both the military and the political ta 
are now interrupted — we hope te 
porarily. 

One of the things I will be doing 
to repeat to Prime Minister Begin p» 
sonally the request and the negotiai ' 
positions of President Sadat, 
we've tried to do this through our 
bassadors and through our negotiat 
Mr. Atherton. in the Mideast, an- 
think perhaps I can do it perhaps a lit 
more effectively. 

But the differences that exist b 
tween them are well-known. In tl 
Sinai, as I said, they arc relatively ea: 
to resolve — the Jewish settlements, tl 
placement of Egyptian forces in tl 
Sinai, and some continuation of Israe 
control over some airfields or aen 
dromes, and the rapidity with whk 



1978 
1 would withdraw from the Sinai 

the West Bank, Gaza Strip, this 
ves implementation of U.N. Res- 
on 242 and some resolution of the 
itinian question. We do not and 
r have favored an independent 
stinian nation, but within that 
d of constraint, how to give the 
stinians who live in the West 
Gaza Strip some voice in the de- 
ination of their own future, is an 

still unresolved. 

at outlines very briefly the situa- 
that we're presently in. 









In view of the great amount of 
ssion that's going on now about 
nal Rhodesian settlement, which 

des the Patriotic Front, is it 
ble in your view, to have a set- 
ent of the Rhodesian crisis with- 
including Mr. Nkomo [Joshua 

o, President, Zimbabwe Afri- 
m People's Union] and Mr. Mugabe 

■ >ert Mugabe, Secretary General, 
dfrbabwe African National Union]? 
.13. I would doubt that we could have 
/ilrmanent settlement without includ- 
M he right for all the nationalist lead- 
jl:o participate. That would include 

■ ;abe, Sithole [Reverend Ndabanigi 
■ole, head of the African National 
Ifncil/Sithole], and would also, of 
ijrse, include Nkomo as well, 
vl orewa [Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 
111 of the African National Council], 

■ 'Other leader, was here yesterday 

■ met with Secretary Vance. We 
n: had a meeting, yesterday after- 
i<n. between myself, Secretary 
lice, and the Foreign Minister of 

■ at Britain, David Owen. And we 

■ infirmed our position, which has 
bt n consistent, that the Anglo- 
I erican plan is the best basis for a 
[MTianent resolution of the Rhodesian 

■ Zimbabwe question. It's one that's 
I stantially supported by the front-line 
pnidcnts, presidents of those nations 
1'ounding Rhodesia. And it has not 
bi n accepted completely by Nkomo 
I) Mugabe, the freedom force leaders 
*side of Rhodesia. 

■tye hope now that we can have a 
eiference of all the interested 
pjionalist leaders to try to work out 



the disparity between the internal set- 
tlement proposal, which is not 
adequate, and the so-called Anglo- 
American plan, which we believe to be 
adequate. 

We've not rejected the individual 
component parts of the so-called inter- 
nal settlement plan. To the extent that 
they are consistent with the overall 
Anglo-American plan provisions, they 
are a step in the right direction. But I 
think that it must be that any permanent 
settlement would include the right of 
all the interested nationalist leaders to 
seek the leadership of Rhodesia. 



Q. Can you tell us why you think 
the dollar is declining abroad? What 
are you going to do about it, and do 
you think it's time for more tougher 
measures to curb inflation here in the 
United States? 

A. This is a matter with interna- 
tional implications. I had a long talk 
this morning on the phone with Chan- 
cellor Helmut Schmidt. This was one 
of the subjects that we did discuss. And 
German and American officials will be 
meeting this weekend to try to have a 
common -approach to eliminating, or 
certainly reducing, the disorderly mar- 
keting of the currencies of the world. 

We have had a policy of intervening 
in the monetary markets only when 
disorder did occur, when there were 
fluctuations that were not warranted or 
that caused us some concern. I think 
recently the value of the dollar has 
been fairly well stable with the 
deutsche mark at about 2.02 

One of the things that has been 
pointed out to me is that the factors that 
caused a lowering of the dollar's value, 
compared to some of the stronger cur- 
rencies — Swiss francs, Japanese yen, 
German deutsche marks — in this past 
year are being alleviated. 

Higher interest rates in our country 
now, caused by various factors, make 
investments in the United States more 
attractive than they were last year. We 
had a high increase in 1977 in the 
amount of oil imported. My guess is 
that this year, we will not have that in- 
crease in imported oil. 

Last year, we had a much higher in- 
crease in our gross national product, a 



23 



much more vigorous economy that 
made it possible for us to buy foreign 
goods better than foreigners could buy 
our goods. 

I think the difference was about a 3% 
rate of growth. Because of the more 
vigorous economies in some of our 
foreign trading partners, countries, this 
year, that difference is certainly likely 
to narrow. 

Chancellor Schmidt told me that the 
last quarter in 1977 in Germany the 
GNP growth was 69c. This was higher 
than he had anticipated, and he didn't 
think that it was going to be maintained 
constantly, but he was pleased with 
that. 

I think those factors all point to the 
very good strength of the dollar and, on 
a long-term basis, it being fairly well 
priced compared to foreign currencies. 
But any shocks to the market, any dis- 
orderly marketing will require us to 
intercede, and I will do so. □ 



For complete texts of news conferences of Feb. 
17 (in Providence. Rhode Island). Mar. 2 fat 
the National Press Club), and Mar. 9. 1978. 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments oj Feb. 27. p. 331; Mar. 6. p. 438; and 
Mar. 13. p. 489. respectively. 

'Prime Minister Begin's arrival in the United 
States was delayed until Mar. 20. 



Presitlent 
Carter's Trip 



As the Bulletin goes to press. 
President Carter is completing his trip 
to four countries in Latin America and 
Africa: 



Mar. 28 
Mar. 29 
Mar. 31 
Apr. 3 



Venezuela 
Brazil 
Nigeria 
Liberia 



The May issue will carry complete 
documentation of this trip, including 
the President's addresses in Venezuela 
and Nigeria and news conference in 
Brazil. □ 



24 



Department of State Bu 



THE SECRETARY: I/JS. Foreign Assistance Program 



P ■ 



I am delighted to present the Admin- 
istration's foreign assistance programs 
tor fiscal year 1979. We are requesting 
an authorization of $1.6 billion for our 
bilateral development assistance pro- 
gram, $2.7 billion for our security as- 
sistance program, and $282 million for 
programs of the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States. Al- 
though we do not require authorization 
in FY 1979, we are planning to con- 
tribute $3.5 billion to the international 
financial institutions (IFI's) 1 and to 
undertake a $1.4 billion program in 
P.L. 480 Food for Peace for that year. 

Today, I would like to explain to you 
the goals which the Carter Administra- 
tion seeks to achieve with these 
programs. 

This is the first foreign assistance 
budget which fully reflects the policies 
and priorities of the Carter Administra- 
tion. It was developed after an exten- 
sive Administration review of our rela- 
tions with less developed countries 
(LDC's) generally and of our foreign 
assistance programs in particular. 

I would like to summarize for you 
the results of our assessments. 



Less Developed Countries 

First, our review highlighted the 
growing importance of less developed 
countries to U.S. interests. The coop- 
eration of Third World countries is es- 
sential in helping to resolve pressing 
global problems that affect all nations: 
economic instability or stagnation, 
rapid population growth, adequate food 
and energy production, environmental 
deterioration, nuclear proliferation, ter- 
rorism, and the spread of narcotics. 

The less developed countries are in- 
creasingly important to the economic 
welfare of the United States. Last year, 
for example, the non-oil producers 
alone accounted for 23*% of our im- 
ports, including a very high percentage 
of our critical raw materials. They were 
also the market for 25'! of our exports 
and 25% of U.S. direct investment 
abroad . 

Earnings from U.S. direct invest- 
ment in these countries in 1975 
amounted to $7.4 billion — - more than 
our total foreign assistance that year. 
Moreover, in recent years, non-oil- 
producing less developed countries 
have bought more from us than we 
have from them, thereby improving our 



trade balance and helping to sustain 
American production and jobs during 
the recent recession. 

The developing countries are central 
participants in our quest for peace. 
Their cooperation is essential to re- 
gional stability and peace in the Middle 
East and southern Africa, to name the 
most obvious cases. Moreover, we 
need to work closely with these coun- 
tries on other security issues as well: in 
deploying our armed forces effectively 
and in maintaining access to straits, 
ports, and aviation facilities, for 
example. 

Second, our review of American 
relations with the less developed coun- 
tries also emphasized that their inter- 
ests and needs vary enormously and re- 
quire differing responses by the United 
States. The developing world is really 
several worlds: 

• The OPEC nations with substantial 
financial surpluses and the ability to 
pay in full for technical assistance; 

• The rapidly industrializing "upper 
tier" countries such as Brazil and 
Mexico with access to private capital 
but with large pockets of poverty; 

• The "middle-income" nations like 
the Dominican Republic or Tunisia 
which still require some concessional 
assistance to help the poor; and 

• The low-income nations, such as 
the Sahel countries, which rely heavily 
on concessional aid to finance their de- 
velopment programs. 

Despite their differences, however, 
the developing countries have worked 
closely together to support a series of 
ideas which found expression in their 
call for a new international economic 
order. These have included proposals 
for price stabilizing commodity agree- 
ments, automatic debt relief, and per- 
manent trade preferences. The United 
States has endeavored to respond posi- 
tively where such efforts would ac- 
tually promote development. We have 
also made our own proposals — for 
example, in negotiations on a common 
fund for buffer stock financing and on 
a sugar agreement. 

However, we cannot respond favora- 
bly to a number of LDC demands, 
especially their desires to use commod- 
ity agreements or blanket debt relief as 
instruments of resource transfer. Yet 
we share the aspirations of less de- 
veloped countries for economic growth 
and development and understand their 









•s 



need for additional resources 

It has become clear to us that fori 
assistance is among the most impor 
and effective instruments we have 
promoting economic developmen' i 
well as other U.S. interests in LDl » 
It addresses problems of developi 
directly. It supports an open inte 
tional economy. And, as the last 
years demonstrate, international 
velopment efforts have contrib 
substantially to the growth and \ 
being of the LDC's. 

• The per capita gross national pr tit 
uct of LDC's as a group grew at an ta 
erage rate of 3.4% per year durl lb 
1950-75, faster than any groupl 
countries in any comparable per 
prior to 1950 

• In the past 3 decades LDC's h 
experienced increases in life ex pi 
ancy which took the industrials a 
world a century to achieve. 

• Significant progress has been im 

in expanding shelter, education, nw 1" 

tion, and food production. 

r ort£ 

' 
We are also encouraged by the i |j, 
that a number of countries — for ex; :; 
pie, Brazil and Taiwan — have m j ( 
such rapid and sustained econoi ,,, 
progress that they have outgrown 
need for our bilateral assistance. l ; 

Much has been accomplished, bu si 
great deal more still needs to be do 
There remain profound problems 
poverty and underdevelopment 
many parts of the world: over 1.2 t 
lion people — 30% of the work 
population — do not have access to s. 
drinking water or to any public he; 
facility; 700 million are seriously m 
nourished; 550 million are unable 
read or write; over half the children 
LDC's suffer from debilitating d 
eases. These are difficult proble 
their solution will require a sustain 
effort over many years. Our forei 
assistance programs are a critical e 
ment in this effort. 

Foreign Assistance Programs 

Having reviewed our relations wi 
less developed countries generally, 1 
me now turn to our review of U 
foreign assistance programs. 

First, it affirmed that these pn 
grams serve a variety of objectives 
the Third World. 






I 1978 



25 



ur bilateral economic assistance 

rams are aimed at insuring that 

ienefits of development reach the 

and serve their basic human 

s. 

U.S. contributions to international 
cial institutions, in addition to 
sorting projects specifically de- 
ed to benefit the poor, also pro- 
loans for larger scale infrastruc- 
projects crucial to development, 
se institutions provide loans on 
soft terms to the poorest countries 
on nearly commercial terms to 
's which are better off but still 
i additional resources to support 
inued growth and development. 
Our voluntary contributions to 
. programs help finance technical 
stance to poor countries which lack 
skills essential to their develop- 
t. These programs also provide di- 
humanitarian assistance to chil- 
m\, refugees, and other groups in 
of particular relief. 
Finally, our security assistance 
rams serve the cause of peace in 
M troubled areas of the Middle East 
southern Africa and strengthen the 
itary capabilities of friendly de- 
ping countries. 

econd, our review of U.S. foreign 
<stance gave special attention to the 
ortance of improving the condition 
>olitical, economic, and civil rights 
"ldwide and of integrating these 
ic considerations more fully into 
decisions on foreign assistance 
grams. 

Under the chairmanship of the 
Cauty Secretary of State [Warren 
C istopher], an interagency group has 
b n established to review all eco- 
nnic development assistance deci- 
■ ns for their human rights impact. 

1 In accordance with our laws, we 
h/e opposed loans by the World 
lik and other international financial 
iititutions to countries that engage in 
fgrant violations of human rights, 
insistent with legislation, we have 
go made exceptions when proposed 
1 ns would address the needs of poor 
piple. 

V*» We have also assessed our secu- 
cy assistance programs in light of 
rman rights considerations. 

»)I would like to say an additional 
I >rd on our experience with imple- 
i f :nting our human rights policies. We 
Wve made progress in our efforts to 
ijrsuade and influence other govern- 
ments, sometimes in private communi- 
i|tion, sometimes with changes in our 
sistance relationships. 
However, we recognize that there is 
i automatic formula for the applica- 



tion of each possible diplomatic tool, 
including the use of our foreign assist- 
ance programs. Human rights condi- 
tions along with governmental 
attitudes and other local factors in in- 
dividual countries differ greatly. If 
U.S. efforts to improve human rights 
abroad are to be successful, our 
policies must take into account the 
needs of differing situations. 

I believe that any additional legisla- 
tive restrictions should be reviewed 
carefully to insure that they achieve 
the desired effect of promoting human 
rights goals as well as not undermin- 
ing the essential functions of the mul- 
tilateral insititutions. If and when addi- 
tional amendments are contemplated, 
we will work with you to develop pro- 
visions which serve these ends. We 
believe that the provisions of last 
year's legislation calling on us to 
undertake wide international consulta- 
tion on this complex subject were 
helpful, and we have begun those con- 
sultations. The initial responses were 
sympathetic. 

Third, our policy review has led to 
the firm conclusion that the effective- 



ness of our foreign assistance pro- 
grams must be improved. As noted 
below such efforts are underway — in 
the internal reorganization of the 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) and in our efforts to make IFI's 
more efficient. In addition the Admin- 
istration is now studying several pro- 
posals which involve the overall or- 
ganization of our foreign assistance 
programs. These include the proposals 
contained in the Humphrey bill under 
consideration in the Senate and House. 

We in the executive branch share 
with the Congress the goal of bringing 
greater coherence to a more effective 
foreign assistance effort. We expect to 
have a Presidential decision on aid or- 
ganizational issues by the middle of 
March and will discuss our views with 
Congress at that time. 

Fourth, based upon our review of 
foreign assistance, the President made 
several decisions on the future size 
and direction of our foreign assistance 
programs. 

• Our bilateral development assist- 
ance should focus even more sharply 



FOREIGN AID ITEMS ' 






New Budget Authority 






($ millions) 










FY 1977 


FY 1978 


FY 1979 




Actual 


Appropriation 


Request 


Multilateral 


1,385 


2,157 


3,787 


International Financial Institutions 


1.141 


1,926 


3,505 


International Organizations and Programs 


244 


231 


282 


Bilateral— AID 


2,879 


3,505 


3,505 


Security Supporting Assistance 


1,735 


2.21 1 - 


1.854 3 


Middle East Special Requirements Fund 


23 


8 


(5)> 


Development Assistance 


1.121 


1.286 


1,651 


Other Bilateral 


193 


216 


236 


Peace Corps 


80 


88 


95 


Migration and Refugee Assistance 


47 


69 


71 


International Narcotics Control 


34 


37 


40 


Inter-American Foundation 


— 


— 


8 


Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial 








Research and Development Fund 


30 


— 


— 


Department of Transportation 


2 


22 


22 


Military Assistance 


989 


926 


838 


Grant Military Assistance 


265 


220 


134 


Foreign Military Training 


25 


30 


32 


Foreign Military Credit Sales 


699 


676 


672 


Total Foreign Assistance Appropriations 


5,446 6,804 8,366 

s appropriation act — appropriation 


1 Included in foreign assistance and related program 


to Commodity Credit Corporation as required for the PL. 480 program will be requested 


with the Department of Agriculture appropriation. 








2 Includes $300 million balance-of-payments loan to Portugal. 






3 FY 1979 Middle East Special Requirements Fund 


has been 


included in the 


security 


supporting assistance account. 









26 



on helping poor people, largely in 
poor countries. In some instances, it is 
appropriate to fund projects which 
benefit poor people in middle-income 
countries if the governments of those 
countries demonstrate a major com- 
mitment to meet the needs of their 
people. 

• We should seek substantial in- 
creases in our foreign assistance dur- 
ing the 1979-82 period, at the same 
time insuring that such aid can be ef- 
fectively and efficiently used. 

I would like to turn to our foreign 
assistance programs for FY 1979 and 
relate them to the review I have 
described. 

Bilateral Assistance 

We are requesting an authorization 
of $1.6 billion for our bilateral de- 
velopment assistance program for 
1979. This would mean a 159? in- 
crease over the FY 1978 program. In 
accordance with the Presidents deci- 
sion to focus our bilateral program 
more specifically on the poorest coun- 
tries. 85% of our bilateral grants and 
loans are planned for countries with 
annual per capita incomes of less than 
$550. This would continue the grow- 
ing emphasis in our aid program to- 
ward these countries. 

The principal purpose of this pro- 
gram is to meet the basic human needs 
of poor people in the developing 
world. It directly addresses global 
problems of hunger and malnutrition, 
population pressure, disease, and ig- 
norance. When we talk about meeting 
basic human needs we are not talking 
about an international welfare pro- 
gram. We are talking about giving the 
poor a chance to improve their stand- 
ard of living by their own efforts, to 
rise above the extreme poverty levels 
that degrade and brutalize human 
existence. 

Food and Nutrition. Reflecting this 
locus, S67.^ million, or over 5095 of 
the FY 1979 loans and grants under 
this program are planned tor activities 
involving food and nutrition. These 
programs are designed primarily to 
help small farmers by providing them 
with the means to expand their produc- 
tion, such as credit, better seeds, 
technical advice, farm-to-market 
roads, small-scale irrigation, and a 
host of other activities. 

We have had some encouraging suc- 
cesses in helping poor farmers expand 
their production and improve their 
standard of living. For example, one 
of the principal causes of food short- 
age in many areas is loss due to poor 
storage. In Rwanda, grain losses from 



inadequate storage have run around 
25%. Small-scale grain storage 
facilities financed by AID have helped 
reduce losses for some small farmers 
to about 3%. AID and the Government 
of Rwanda will expand this project to 
provide the same benefits to others. 

Another problem is the lack of good 
quality seed which farmers can use. 
The Tanzanian Government, with AID 
support, has established a successful 
seed multiplication organization that 
provides improved seed for the main 
crops grown by poor people through- 
out that country. 

In many places, research is needed 
to develop and adapt improved crops 
which will provide greater yields when 
used in small farmers' fields. In 
Guatemala AID helped to establish an 
effective research agency which works 
in small farmer areas and produces 
improved varieties of basic crops such 
as corn and beans and more productive 
planting techniques which small farm- 
ers can utilize. In the Philippines the 
International Rice Research Institute, 
which is partly funded by AID, has 
developed high yielding varieties of 
rice which are now planted on 70% of 
the rice acreage and thus benefit some 
9 million Filipino farmers. Through its 
greatly increased production, the 
Philippines has become virtually self- 
sufficient in rice, a major food staple 
in that country. 

Still another difficulty faced by 
small farmers is inability to obtain and 
to pay for the inputs needed to raise 
their production. In Pakistan small 
farmers are now able to use about the 
same amount of fertilizer per acre as 
large farmers, in part because of an 
AID loan to finance fertilizer imports 
as well as Pakistan Government efforts 
to improve distribution and use of ag- 
ricultural inputs to small farmers. 

Population Planning. A second 
major focus of AID funding is popula- 
tion planning. Bilateral population 
programs in 32 LDC's currently finance 
the training of paramedics to pro\ ide 
family planning information and con- 
traceptives. AID also funds continued 
research to develop simple but effec- 
tive means of fertility control, the col- 
lecting and analysis of fertility and 
other demographic data, and the develop- 
ment of improved delivery systems. 

Recent statistics on declining birth 
rates in Korea, Taiwan. Indonesia, and 
Colombia are encouraging. We have 
had substantial family planning proj- 
ects in each of these countries. It must 
be recognized, of course, that many 
economic and social factors influence 
a country's birth rate. What is impor- 
tant is that these countries are having 



Department of State Bui 

significant success in achieving ti 
objective of reducing birth rates 
are hopeful of similar succes 
elsewhere. 



; 



Health Conditions. A third imp j, 
tant objective of our bilateral ass 
ance is improving health conditio 
especially among the rural poor. L 
health assistance is targeted mainly 
low-cost basic health care for n 
areas, clean water and sanitation, 
projects to control parasitic diseases 

Let me cite three recent successes 
this field. 

• An experimental project in TK 
land has brought health, nutrition, ; 
family planning services to 60% of 
population in a province where o 
15% were previously covered. It 
done this at costs affordable by 
Thai Government which now plan>, 
extend the approach to the ent 
country. 

• In Africa AID is helping to 
nance the successful suppression of 
disease of river blindness in the V( 
River basin in Sahel countries. Peo 
are already beginning to resettle th 
and to farm these fertile areas wh 
before were virtually abandoned. 

• In Tanzania the government h 
with AID assistance, set up a 
equipped 18 regional centers to te; 
personnel to provide health, nutnti 
and family planning services to 
rural poor. By 1982, when this proj 
is completed, these and other ru* 
health centers will provide the Tan 
nian Government with a strong ru 
health delivery system. 

Education. The fourth major fo< 
of AID funding is education. Assi 
ance in this area centers on providi 
basic skills to the poor, enabling thi 
to earn a better living and impro 
their lives generally. AID projects 
nance expanded elementary educati 
in LDC's and nonformal educati! 
projects, such as radio programs | 
agricultural techniques. 

An evaluation of one such rai 
project in Guatemala indicates that 
ricultural practices have improved 
yields are substantially higher in 
areas served by the broadcas 
Another example is AID's radio m; 
project in Nicaragua which has n 
suited in substantial gains in arithm 
skills among primary school-age c 
dren and significant reductions 
grade repetition. 






Other Programs. Other AID pn 
grams address problems of energy 
vironmental decay, technology tran 
fer, and urban development. AID 
giving particular attention in all se> 
tors to the development and use of ay 



; ill 1978 



27 



mate technologies in LDC's. AID 
lects in Haiti, Guatemala, and 
stan finance the development and 
fibution of technology appropriate 
tall-scale farming and rural enter- 
:s. 

jr example in Honduras the small- 
er technology loan and grant pro- 
.11 of $7.2 million is designed to 
'ide small farmers with technical 
stance, training, and investment 
Jit so they may benefit from such 
|t capital technology as a successful 
seeder. Seventy-five hundred 
families will benefit from this 
;ct over the next 4 years. 



proving Programs. Of course, 
all of our projects have been suc- 
ful. Poor planning, unexpected de- 
> in obtaining personnel and 
fpment, inadequate knowledge of 
J factors affecting our projects, 

a number of other problems have 
Ited the effectiveness of some of 

projects. But we are trying to 
iuate our programs better and learn 
l our past mistakes, 
■ur successes are encouraging. But 
regard them as a beginning, not an 
, in insuring that our aid is effec- 
ly and efficiently managed, 
teflecting the high priority this 
ministration puts on improving the 
■ctiveness of our assistance effort, 
|) Administrator John Gilligan has 
•n the following steps: 

The Agency for International De- 
>pment has been reorganized and 

■ number of bureaus has been re- 
died, resulting in fewer administra- 
ti : units and more direct lines of 
rmonsibility. 

i AID has decentralized, shifting 
Aater authority to its field officials to 
led its responsiveness. 

|) Finally, AID has improved its 

■ gramming procedures by eliminat- 
fl unnecessary paperwork and im- 
fving the budgeting for operating 
e lenses. 

\ID plans futher improvements over 
i coming year. The agency is en- 
licing its capability to review and 
idyze the impact of AID programs, 
lis effort — while a long-term 
P>gram — will include a much more 
live and consistent evaluation of the 
•stent to which individual aid pro- 
Jims make a difference to the well- 
ling of the people to whom they are 
<lected. It will also assist us in trans- 
iting our experience into future pro- 
llunming and budgeting. 
SThese are first steps in what we be- 
ftve must be an ongoing effort to im- 
love the efficiency and effectiveness 
i our bilateral assistance programs. 



P.L. 480 Food Assistance 

We are planning a program of $1.4 
billion for the Public Law 480 food 
assistance program in FY 1979 to fi- 
nance shipments of approximately 6.7 
million tons of agricultural com- 
modities to less developed countries. 
This is the same tonnage as planned for 
FY 1978. 

Our food aid program under P.L. 
480 Title I provides agricultural com- 
modities at concessional terms to de- 
veloping countries. The Title II pro- 
gram provides free food, primarily 
through American private voluntary 
agencies and the World Food Program, 
directly to the poor for feeding and 
food-for-work programs, as well as for 
emergency disaster assistance. Last 
year 5.5 million poor people in 83 
countries benefited from the Title II 
program. 

Our project to feed school children 
in Egypt is an example of how this 
program can be effective — 32,000 
children are receiving school lunches 
as a result of American grant food aid; 
the Egyptian Government is committed 
to taking over this program entirely by 
1982. These programs illustrate the 
way in which our food aid can stimu- 
late a growing commitment by gov- 
ernments in developing countries to 
meet the nutritional needs of the most 
vulnerable groups in their population. 

In the Philippines a similar program 
is reaching about 1 million primary 
school children and about 600,000 
pre-school children and pregnant or 
lactating mothers. In Brazil a national 
school feeding campaign which re- 
ceived similar support for 10 years up 
to 1973 has since continued effectively 
and now operates almost entirely with 
national resources. 

We share congressional concerns 
that the developmental impact of food 
aid should be improved. We are cur- 
rently implementing the new Title III 
legislation which we believe will help 
to accomplish this. This new program 
can support development efforts in 
poor countries by providing them with 
assured supplies of food aid on conces- 
sional terms for periods of up to 5 
years. In addition, payment for the 
food aid can be waived when proceeds 
from the sale of the food aid in the re- 
cipient country are used to finance ad- 
ditional development projects. One 
Title III program has been approved for 
Honduras, and several possible pro- 
grams are under active review. 

Financial Institutions 

We are planning contributions of 
$3.5 billion to fulfill U.S. pledges to 
the international financial institutions. 



of which $1 .4 billion is callable capital 
and, as such, highly unlikely ever to 
result in budget outlays. Thus, actual 
government expenditures will be con- 
siderably smaller than our total request. 

These institutions are a vital element 
in our overall effort to support de- 
velopment in the Third World. While 
no authorizing legislation is being 
sought this year, a description of the 
Administration's foreign assistance 
programs would be incomplete if it did 
not spell out why this is a critical com- 
ponent of our FY 1979 program. 

The international financial institu- 
tions are the principal, and often only, 
source of financing for large-scale 
loans for critical infrastructure projects 
in LDC's such as roads, dams, and ir- 
rigation facilities. These projects are 
both crucial to a country's overall de- 
velopment effort and to improving the 
lives of poor people, for example: 

• A $50 million World Bank irriga- 
tion project in the Philippines to im- 
prove and expand irrigation facilities in 
some of the poorest regions of the 
country will benefit about 250,000 
people; 

• A $48 million rural electrification 
project in Egypt will bring electricity 
for the first time to 2 million people; 

• A $35 million road construction 
project in Honduras will connect the 
interior with the main port. 

The IFI's increasingly serve basic 
human needs. 

• In Pakistan a $15 million Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA) 
loan will improve access to primary 
and secondary education — particularly 
for females in rural areas — by increas- 
ing the number of qualified teachers. 
This project will also reach 96,000 
adult villagers through a literacy 
program . 

• In Burma a $26 million Asian De- 
velopment Bank loan will increase fish 
production for domestic consumption, 
thus raising the low protein intake of 
the population. The project will sub- 
stantially improve the lot of 900 
fishermen and will directly or indi- 
rectly create 6,000 jobs. 

• In El Salvador a $1.5 million loan 
by the Inter-American Development 
Bank is providing potable water to 102 
impoverished rural communities with 
an average annual per capita in 1971 of 
$55; 73,000 people will benefit. 

The IFI's facilitate a more equitable 
sharing of the development burden 
among donor countries. For example, 
for every dollar the United States pro- 
vides to IDA, other countries provide 
two. 

IFI's encourage recipient countries 



28 



to adopt sound economic policies often 
essential to their development. As rela- 
tively nonpolitical institutions, they 
can exert an influence for domestic pol- 
icy reform more persuasively and effec- 
tively than can bilateral donors. 

In their role as financial inter- 
mediaries they play a crucial role in the 
world economy. In 1977, for instance, 
the World Bank borrowed a total of 
$4.7 billion from world capital markets 
for ultimate relending to LDC's which 
often do not yet have adequate access 
to world capital markets. 

We are facing two fundamental prob- 
lems in our relationship to these impor- 
tant institutions: insuring that their 
nonpolitical, multilateral character is 
maintained and fulfilling our pledged 
contributions. 

The multilateral character of the 
IFI's has important advantages. 

• They can mobilize and coordinate 
large amounts of capital for develop- 
ment. 

• They can build consensus between 
aid donors and recipients on develop- 
ment goals. 

• They can act as especially effec- 
tive sources of advice for needed policy 
reforms in developing countries. 

In performing these functions, these 
institutions serve both U.S. interests 
and those of developing countries. If 
these institutions are to continue to 
make an effective contribution to de- 
velopment, they must maintain their 
multilateral, nonpolitical character. 
Restrictive legislation, which prohibits 
U.S. contributions to the IFI's from 
financing loans for individual countries 
or projects, would be a first step in 
politicizing these institutions. If the 
U.S. Government takes this step, other 
governments may do likewise. This 
would undermine the effectiveness of 
these institutions and their value to us 
in multiplying our own contributions 
and strengthening the international 
economy. 

The second major problem facing us 
is fulfilling our pledges to the IFI's. 
Our contributions for the IFI's this year 
fall into two categories: funding to ful- 
fill past pledges which were earlier au- 
thorized but not appropriated by the 
Congress and appropriations which we 
are seeking for the first time this year. 

It is critical that the United States 
satisfy its past pledges to these institu- 
tions in order to maintain institutions to 
function smoothly in supporting de- 
velopment in less developed countries. 
Our past pledges amount to $835 mil- 
lion, nearly one-half for the fourth re- 
plenishment of IDA, the soft loan win- 
dow of the World Bank. 

We are now 1 year behind in fulfil- 



U >, 



ling this pledge. IDA has already 
committed all the funds it was pledged 
under this replenishment. Without the 
U.S. contribution, IDA may have dif- 
ficulties in completing these projects. 
If this happens, the smooth operation 
of the banks will be disrupted and the 
beneficiaries of these projects in poor 
countries will suffer. 

Other unfunded past pledges include 
the selective capital increase of the 
World Bank and the capital increase of 
the International Finance Corporation. 
If we do not fulfill these pledges the 
capital increases of these institutions 
will be smaller due to a reduced U.S. 
contribution. Also, the U.S. voting 
strength and influence in these institu- 
tions inevitably will be reduced. 

In both cases, our failure to contrib- 
ute our full share means that we are re- 
pudiating the principle of equitable 
burden sharing. Without replenish- 
ments, the role in world development 
of these institutions will diminish at a 
time when the need for their skills and 
investments is greater than ever. 

To fulfill our current pledges to IFI's 
we are planning a contribution of $2.6 
billion, including $800 million for the 
fifth replenishment of IDA and $1.8 
billion for U.S. pledges toward the 
World Bank selective capital increase, 
the International Finance Corporation, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank and 
Fund, and the African Development 
Fund. 

International Programs 

In the same multilateral context, we 
are also requesting an authorization of 
$282 million for U.S. voluntary contri- 
butions to U.N. assistance programs 
and the Organization of American 
States. 

Our contributions to U.N. programs 
support the principles of multilateral 
cooperation and burden sharing and 
reinforce the constructive trend in our 
relations with the developing countries 
within the United Nations. Moreover, 
they represent a U.S. response through 
the U.N. system to the real needs of 
people in the developing countries. 

These contributions support pro- 
grams in four major areas: developmen- 
tal technical assistance, humanitarian 
needs, international scientific coopera- 
tion, and education and training. Let 
me discuss these major programs 
briefly and give examples of what they 
do. 

We propose $133 million for the 
U.N. Development Program (UNDP). 
As the largest multilateral source of 
grant technical assistance, UNDP proj- 
ects benefit over 130 nations. In Sri 



Department of State Bui 

Lanka, for example, UNDP exptj 
have developed an integrated v/i\ 
basin plan that is expected to raise 
ricultural production by $200 milli 
In Central America, UNDP experts 
working in four countries to deve 
energy from volcanic steam. 

To meet humanitarian needs, we 
requesting $35 million for the U 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), one of 
best managed and most effecive U 
programs. UNICEF provides child i 
and mothers opportunities for a nv 
productive life. It also works to m 
basic subsistence needs. In India, \ 
example, UNICEF is working to 
store and improve potable wa ■ 
sources in the areas hardest hit by 
November 1977 cyclone and t i • 
wave. 

We propose $52 million for the U 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRW 
which provides needed assistance 
over 1.5 million Palestinian refuge 
It supplies rations, medical servic 
and, most importantly, secondary e< : 
cational and vocational training p 
grams. It is essential that UNRWA 
adequately funded in order to contir 
its present level of services wh I 
negotiations proceed for a political 
lution to the conflict in the Midi 
East. 

In the field of scientific cooperatn 
the $12 million contribution propo; 
for the International Atomic Enei 
Agency will support its role in our ' 
forts to stop nuclear proliferatic 
through its safeguards system wh 
monitors nuclear materials in ma 
countries to insure that they are us 
for peaceful purposes. The $10 milli 
requested for the U.N. Environmen 
Program will sustain its continued i 
fort to encourage international actic 
to reduce damage to the natural en'' 
ronment. 

As with the international financ: 
institutions, we are concerned with ii 
proving the effectiveness of the U. 
programs. The U.N. system has gro\' 
rapidly in its scope and responsibility 
As this has occurred, the coordinatio 
management, and budgeting procedur 
have become matters of increasii 
concern. 

We and other nations have urgi 
broad management reforms, and son 
important steps have been taken to a' 
dress these problems. The General A 
sembly has created the new position 
Director General for Development ai 
International Economic Cooperatk 
with particular responsibility for pn 
viding effective leadership and coord 
nation of economic and social ai 
tivities. In addition, new efforts will tj 
made to establish maximum uniformil 
in administrative, budgetary, persov 



il 1978 



29 



land planning procedures within the 
. development system. 

ity Assistance 

e have reviewed carefully our se- 
:y assistance programs. We have 
lished an interagency committee, 
ed by Undersecretary of State for 
rity Assistance [Lucy Wilson] 
son. to provide coordinated rec- 
endations to me and the President 
1 aspects of our arms transfer and 
ed policies, including the funded 
rity assistance programs under dis- 
ion today and cash foreign military 
The Arms Export Control Board 
ts in insuring that all arms trans- 
are consistent with the President's 
transfer policy as well as other 
vant policies and considerations, 
ding human rights, 
e general purpose of our security 
stance programs is to assist our 
ds and allies to provide for their 
imate defense needs without de- 
ing from their own economic and 
al development. These programs 
ort our strategic-political objec- 
of reducing tensions and promot- 
stability in areas of potential con- 
tation and conflict. 

implement these programs in fis- 
ear 1979, we are requesting an au- 
ization of $2,692.5 million for se- 
ffl ity supporting assistance and for 
m:iary assistance. 

/e are requesting $1,854.4 million 
k security supporting assistance 

■ A) to provide economic as- 
9i ance — administered by AID — to 
0< ntries which are experiencing polit- 

■ and economic stresses and where 
Li. security interests are involved. 
I: majority of SSA funds will support 

peace efforts in the Middle East by 
p viding assistance to Israel ($785 
nlion), Egypt ($750 million), Jordan 
(!'3 million), Syria ($90 million), 
fine regional projects ($9 million), 
Siport for the Maqarin Dam project 
fciefitting Jordan, Syria, and Israel 
(.i0 million), and the Sinai Support 
ission ($11.7 million) — the American 
C ilian early-warning system in the 
Siai. These programs are of critical 
■portance to U.S. national interests of 

■ ding a just and lasting settlement in 
I; Middle East. These SSA programs, 
i irmly believe, continue to play a crit- 
i il role in that search for peace. 

SSA funds also support our objective 

1 relieving tensions and fostering 
]|aceful development toward majority 
[|le in southern Africa by providing as- 

itance to Zambia, Botswana, and 
>uth African refugees. 
We are proposing a total program of 
38.1 million, down from $972.75 



requested last year, for military 
assistance — i.e., grant materiel under 
the military assistance program, grant 
international military education and 
training program, and foreign military 
sales credit financing. 

Let me take a minute to examine 
what is happening to these programs 
and how they have been tailored to 
meet various U.S. objectives. 

We are requesting a total of $133.5 
million for grant material under the 
military assistance program (MAP) 
for just four countries (Spain, Portugal, 
Philippines, and Jordan) — down from 
seven in the program for the current 
year. This is in line with our general 
aim, which I know the Congress 
shares, of reducing the number of grant 
recipients and shifting as rapidly as 
feasible to credit financing and finally 
to sales on a cash basis. 

We have terminated the grant mili- 
tary materiel assistance programs to 
Indonesia and Thailand, two valued 
friends whom we will continue to sup- 
port with credit financing. You will 
also note that we are not requesting 
grant assistance at this time for Greece 
and Turkey, two NATO allies which 
provide us with essential facilities for 
the common defense. We believe that 
the question of our grant security as- 
sistance relationship with Greece and 
Turkey should be addressed in conjunc- 
tion with the proposed defense coopera- 
tion agreements with each, rather than 
in the context of the foreign assistance 
programs we are discussing today. 

Our MAP request for Spain is con- 
sistent with the terms of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, which has 
been endorsed by both Houses of Con- 
gress. After discussion with the 
Spanish Government, we are asking 
this year for $41 million, the major 
portion of our remaining MAP com- 
mitment to that country. In following 
years a total of only $4 million in MAP 
will be required to pay the costs of de- 
livery of MAP material financed with 
funds made available in prior years. 

Portugal and the Philippines are, like 
Spain, countries where we have impor- 
tant military facilities. When negotia- 
tions regarding these bases are com- 
pleted, we will be reporting to the 
Congress. In the meantime we are seek- 
ing authority to continue modest levels 
of grant MAP for these two countries 
($27.9 million for Portugal; $18.1 mil- 
lion for the Philippines). The only 
other MAP request ($45 million for 
Jordan) represents part of our effort to 
enable Jordan to protect its security and 
to contribute to stability in the Middle 
East. 

The grant international military 
education and training program 



(IMETP), established as a separate 
program by Congress less than 2 years 
ago, provides a means of maintaining 
mutually beneficial relations with fu- 
ture military leaders of 40 friendly 
countries throughout the world. The 
emphasis in the training program is 
shifting rapidly from specialized tech- 
nical training to the broader fields of 
leadership training, resource manage- 
ment, and command. This program, for 
which we are seeking $32.1 million, 
enables foreign military officers to ob- 
tain instruction in U.S. military doc- 
trine and concepts; their experience in 
the United States may also help them to 
appreciate the role of a profession- 
al military service in a democratic 
society. 

We also have continuing need to fi- 
nance foreign military sales (FMS) to 
those of our friends and allies who re- 
quire such assistance for the purchase 
of military equipment that they, and 
we, believe necessary for their own de- 
fense. We are requesting an authoriza- 
tion of $672.5 million to finance a total 
foreign military sales credits program 
of $2,067.5 million. 

As in the case of the security sup- 
porting assistance program, the largest 
share of FMS financing will support 
our objectives in the Middle East; Is- 
rael will receive $1 billion, remaining 
the largest recipient. As in the past few 
years, we intend to waive repayment on 
one-half of this financing. The second 
largest recipient of FMS financing is 
Korea which will receive a $275 mil- 
lion program for additional support of 
purchases to be made pursuant to its 
Force Improvement Plan initiated in 
1975. 

In addition, in recognition of the 
need to compensate for the withdrawal 
of U.S. ground combat forces from 
Korea over the next 4-5 years, you 
have before you legislation we pro- 
posed last year which would authorize 
the transfer to Korea of certain U.S. 
equipment which is presently located 
there. This equipment — which has a 
value of approximately $800 mil- 
lion — would strengthen the firepower, 
mobility, and antiarmor capabilities of 
the Korean forces. The enactment of 
this special legislation is an integral 
part of our policy decision to withdraw 
U.S. ground combat forces from Korea 
in a way that will not be destabilizing 
to the security of Northeast Asia. 



Conclusion 

I would like to conclude my tes- 
timony where I began — on the review 
which this Administration has made of 
our interests in the Third World and the 



30 

role foreign assistance can — and 
should — play. Our examination con- 
vinced us that our programs are a criti- 
cal element in relations with develop- 
ing countries generally and in our ef- 
forts to promote peace and improve in- 
dividual well-being worldwide. We 
strongly believe that at the levels re- 
quested these programs can be effec- 
tively implemented. I seek your full 
support for our authorization request 



and I welcome your views and your 
questions. □ 



Statement submitted to the Senate Committee 
mi Foreign Relations on Mar. 2. 1978. The 
i omplete transt ript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available 

from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington . 
D.C. 20402. 

(il this total, $1.4 billion is callable capital 
and will not result in budget outlays. 



AFRICA: Security Assistance 
to the Sub-Sahara 



by Richard M. Moose 

The African program we propose for 
next year is consistent with the Presi- 
dent's directive of May 19, 1977, to 
restrict arms transfers. At the same 
time, it insures that the security assist- 
ance we do provide works in favor of 
stability in an increasingly volatile con- 
tinent. In arriving at individual country 
programs, we have been particularly 
conscious of the legitimate security 
needs of those nations which feel 
threatened by the increase of Soviet 



KtMII/ff 



White House Statement 

President Carter and a group of his 
senior advisers had discussions this 
morning [March 2, 1978] with the Ken- 
yan delegation headed by Vice Presi- 
dent Daniel arap Moi. They discussed 
the situation in the Horn of Africa and 
Kenyan-U.S. relations. President Car- 
ter reaffirmed the U.S. Government's 
longstanding policy of close support 
for Kenya and assured the Kenyans that 
the United States will continue to sup- 
ply Kenya with economic and military 
assistance. Both countries share a deep 
concern lor the conflicts which have 
developed in the Horn of Africa. 
Measures which could be taken to bring 
the conflict to an end were discussed, 
and it was found that Kenyan and 
American perceptions of the fundamen- 
tal problems of the area arc very simi- 
lar. □ 



Issued on Mar. 2. 1978 (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 6). 



arms and Cuban troops in neighboring 
countries. 

Our security assistance proposals for 
Africa contain $38.4 million in foreign 
military sales (FMS) financing, $3.85 
million for the international military 
education and training program, and 
$45 million for security supporting 
assistance — of which $14 million is for 
refugees in southern Africa. Our pro- 
grams will focus on a relative handful 
of African countries, most of which 
have received security assistance in the 
past. 

FMS Credit 

The FMS credit proposed for sub- 
Saharan countries is slightly less than 
the appropriation we received from the 
Congress for FY 1978. The bulk of our 
FMS credit assistance would go to 
Zaire, Kenya, and Sudan. 

Zaire. We propose a $17.5 million 
FMS credit program for Zaire to assist 
in the modernization and reorganiza- 
tion of that country's armed forces, a 
program in which France and Belgium 
are taking the lead. The Shaba war a 
year ago disclosed deficiencies in the 
Zairian forces. It led to the scrapping 
ol plans which emphasized expensive 
and sophisticated equipment in favor of 
a concentration of fundamental needs 
for defense. The U.S. contribution to 
this multination effort will be in com- 
munication equipment, ground and air 
transportation, aircraft spare parts and 
support equipment, and medical 
supplies. 

We believe that our long-range inter- 
ests in the security and economic via- 
bility of Zaire justify the provision of 
this credit. Our proposal comes at a 
time when the Government of Zaire is 
showing every indication that it is pre- 
pared to undertake serious and basic 
economic reforms essential to the eco- 
nomic and financial well-being of the 



' 






i 



Department of State Bulh 

country, including the key step 
strengthening of the role of the cent 
bank. 

Kenya. The proposed $10 milli 
FMS credit for Kenya would enal 
that country to complete its purchase | 
a squadron of F-5E/F fighter aircra. 
It would also permit Kenya to purcha> 
some additional equipment required I j 
its force modernization program 
Kenya's neighbors — Uganda, Ethiopi. 
and Somalia — have all obtained soph j i 
ticated Soviet arms in quantity whi|> 
has placed Kenya's armed forces at 
disadvantage. We believe this tangit ( 
support for a friendly and cooperati 
state is warranted. 

Sudan. Sudan is the only proposi 
new recipient of FMS credit. Sudan, 
large and economically promisii 
country, has undertaken domestic r 
forms and is playing a constructive ro 
both in Middle East peace efforts ai 
in East Africa. As a result, our bilater 
relations have improved significantly 
recent years. Sudan expelled the last 
its Soviet military advisors in 1977 at 
has now turned to Western countri 
for its military needs. 

It appears that the Sudanese intend 
purchase under FMS procedures an s 
defense package which includes F- 
aircraft and radars. The purchase w 
be for cash, and Sudan has indicatf 
that it will be financed by Saui 
Arabia. Although most addition 
Sudanese military requirements wi 
probably be met through purchases 



Southern 
Rhodesia 



Joint Statement 

Secretary Vance and [Unite 
Kingdom] Foreign Secretary [Davk 
Owen met on March 8 with Presidei 
Carter and then held further convers; 
tions at the Department of State. Th 
discussions were concerned primaril 
with the question of Rhodesia. Ther 
was full agreement that the two gov 
ernments will jointly continue their el 
forts to facilitate a settlement among a 
the parties, in accordance with th 
principles the two governments hav 
previously put forward: free and fai 
elections, a transition to majority ruli 
and independence, and respect for thi 
individual rights of all the citizens o 
an independent Zimbabwe. L 



Issued Mar. 8. 1978 (text from press release 
110 of Mar. 8). 



foil 1978 

:stern Europe, it is likely that there 
ill be some other items which the 
danese will want to obtain in the 
lited States. These could include ar- 
ired personnel carriers, engineering 
ipment, and items related to air de- 
ise. For these sales we have pro- 
;ed $7.5 million in FMS credit. 
ameroon and Liberia. Smaller 
lounts of FMS credit have been pro- 
sed for Cameroon and Liberia. The 
million program in Cameroon would 
for armored cars, rifles, communica- 
•ns equipment, and spare parts. The 
)0,000 credit for Liberia will enable 
it country to purchase rifles, trucks, 
communications equipment. Both 
continuations of previously au- 
trized and funded programs. 



ilitary Training 

Our proposed international military 
ucation and training programs this 
ar will emphasize the technical train- 
g of African military officers in our 
ilitary schools. We are requesting 
ni.85 million for this purpose. The 
Ik of these funds will be used to pro- 
e training in professional manage- 
nt rather than equipment-oriented 
lining. Officers from Zaire, Sudan, 
nya, Ghana, Liberia, Chad, Mali, 
negal, and Upper Volta are expected 
receive training under this program 
FY 1979. 



;curity Supporting Assistance 

We are also requesting $45 million 
t security supporting assistance for 
>uthern Africa this year. It has three 
)mponents: 

• $20 million in balance-of- 
ayments support for Zambia; 

• $11 million for assistance in the 
ansportation sector for Botswana; and 

• $14 million for refugees in the 
Duthern Africa area. 

The proposed security supporting as- 
istance in southern Africa in FY 1979 
i considerably less than it was in FY 

978, although this reduction is par- 
ally compensated by a $23 million in- 
crease in development assistance. 

)ther donors, both bilateral and mul- 
ilateral, have responded well to re- 
vests for assistance by the southern 
African nations. We believe that our 
irograms are responsive to the needs 
vhich have been identified for FY 

979. However, if the political situa- 
tion significantly worsens and leads to 
,i large increase in southern African 

efugees, we would seek a supplemen- 

al appropriation. 

The $20 million for Zambia's bal- 
ince of payments would continue the 



31 



EAST ASIA: Security Assistance 



by Richard C. Holbrooke 
MARCH 9 

I will be talking to you today 
primarily about Northeast Asia. Be- 
fore I do that, however, I want to say 
a few words about the situation in 
East Asia as a whole. It is one we can 
look at with some satisfaction. There 
are no major, immediate threats to the 
peace. Some of the deep divisions of 
the past are gradually being bridged. 
The energies and talents of the 
peoples of the area have fostered a 
surge of economic growth to which 
we also have contributed, from which 
we — as well as they — have benefitted. 
Stable and effective government, an 
indispensable ingredient of economic 
growth, once the exception in the 
area is now much more the general 
rule. 

But if these favorable trends are to 
be maintained, the United States must 
continue to play the role that our 
interests as a great Pacific power dic- 
tate. Our military presence, the cred- 
ibility of our commitments, and our 
security assistance to friendly gov- 
ernments are indispensable in deter- 
ring threats to the peace of the area 
and maintaining a stable balance 
there. Our bases in Japan and the 



Philippines are important constituents 
of our defenses, supporting our allies, 
reassuring our friends, and protecting 
free access to the Indian and Pacific 
Ocean sea lanes. 

The interests of four great pow- 
ers — the United States, the U.S.S.R., 
the People's Republic of China 
(P.R.C.), and Japan — intersect in Asia. 
Our strength there is a significant 
component of our global relationship 
with the U.S.S.R. and of our im- 
proved relations with the P.R.C. For 
years our security assistance to East 
Asia was designed in large measure to 
contain what was then perceived as 
the threat of Chinese Communist ex- 
pansionism. That is no longer the 
case. As a result of the beneficial de- 
velopments in our relations with Pe- 
king over the last few years, we are no 
longer in a posture of confrontation 
with the People's Republic of China. 

We now recognize that China has a 
vital role to play in maintaining peace 
in Asia and in the world, and we con- 
sider friendly relations with China to 
be a central part of our foreign pol- 
icy. As Secretary Vance stated last 
June, we recognize and respect Chi- 
na's strong commitments to inde- 
pendence, unity, and self-reliance, 
and we intend to move toward full 
normalization of relations with Peking 



FY 1978 program and represents our 
contribution to a multidonor effort to 
assist the Zambian economy. The 
Zambian economy's problems stem 
from a variety of causes. It has suffered 
severely from the drop in the price of 
copper, Zambia's chief foreign ex- 
change earner. This problem has been 
exacerbated by the disruption of the re- 
gional transportation network as a re- 
sult of conflicts in Rhodesia and 
Angola. 

Botswana is fully deserving of our 
support. It is a democratic, multiracial 
society which in many ways can serve 
as a model for the development of other 
countries in the area. Botswana has 
played a consistently constructive role 
in support of a peaceful resolution of 
the Rhodesia conflict. Bordering 
Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, 
Botswana is particularly vulnerable to 
the effects of violence in neighboring 
states. Our proposed assistance of $11 
million would be devoted to improving 
Botswana's transportation network in 



order to allow that country to acceler- 
ate economic development. 

The final element of the $45 million 
security supporting assistance package 
is $14 million for the relief of refugees 
in the southern Africa area. As vio- 
lence has escalated in the region, the 
needs for refugee relief have mounted 
sharply. While our record in this hu- 
manitarian area is good, the require- 
ments for assistance are increasing — in 
large part because those in need are the 
displaced young. By joining with other 
donor nations to provide further school- 
ing and training for these refugees, we 
can make a positive investment in the 
future of the region. □ 



Statement before the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs of the House Committee on International 
Relations on Feb. 28, 1978 (introductory para- 
graph omitted). The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. Mr. Moose is Assist- 
ant Secretary for African Affairs. 



32 



in accordance with the principles of 
the Shanghai communique.' We be- 
lieve that consolidating a constructive 
relationship with China is an essential 
element in our effort to promote a 
prosperous, peaceful, and secure 
Asia. 

Our economic growth and the eco- 
nomic growth of the Asian and 
Pacific countries are mutually rein- 
forcing. Our national policies must be 
shaped to encourage both. We con- 
duct roughly one-quarter of our world 
trade with East Asia. Every year 
one-third of our agricultural exports 
go there. We obtain in exchange im- 
portant raw materials — rubber, tin, 
coconut oil, and 9% of our imported 
petroleum products. 

Japan 

Our close friendship with Japan is 
central to our position in Asia. For 
over a quarter of a century, our secu- 
rity treaty and our base structure in 
Japan have made it possible for us to 
deploy our forces in the western 
Pacific more speedily and econom- 
ically than if we operated from 
American territory. For Japan, the 
treaty provides a nuclear shield be- 
hind which it has developed signifi- 
cant capabilities for its own conven- 
tional defense. We are encouraging 
qualitative improvements in Japan's 
self-defense forces. Japan expects to 
spend about $6.5 billion over the next 
5 years on U.S. equipment, including 
F-15 fighters and the P-3C ASW [an- 
tisubmarine warfare] aircraft. 

Japan's confidence in the security 
relationship has supported its efforts 
to maintain a stable balance in its re- 
lations with the U.S.S.R. and China. 
Its strict adherence to constitutional 
prohibitions against any but defensive 
armaments has been reassuring to the 
other countries of Asia. Meanwhile, 
its nonmilitary role in Asia has be- 
come increasingly important. A prin- 
cipal trading partner for most of the 
countries of the area, it has also be- 
come the largest bilateral aid donor in 
Asia and by far the largest contributor 
to the Asian Development Bank, pro- 
viding about one-third of the Bank's 
resources where we provide less than 
one-fifth. In addition, it has moved 
toward a more active and supportive 
relationship with the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
a relationship welcomed by the 
ASEAN states. 

A healthy relationship between our 
two great economies is essential not 
only to us and the Japanese but also 
to global recovery and well-being. In- 
evitably, frictions arise when two 
huge and complex economies are so 



closely linked. But the intimacy that 
has developed between us, ''our 
mutual respect and good will," facili- 
tate amicable adjustment of the most 
serious problems. 

The negotiations Ambassador 
[Robert S.] Strauss [Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations] re- 
cently completed in Tokyo illustrate 
the point. So do our earlier agree- 
ments on steel, color televisions, and 
the Tokai-Mura nuclear reprocessing 
facility. We are also moving forward 
together in such global fora as the 
multilateral trade negotiations. We 
are confident that Japan will take the 
steps necessary to reduce its trade 
imbalance and improve access to its 
markets and that it will do its share in 
contributing to the recovery of the 
global economy. 

Korea 

The state of affairs on the Korean 
Peninsula is of great importance to 
Japan, and our policies with respect 
to Korea have an important bearing 
on the U.S. -Japanese relationship. In 
March 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda 
and President Carter in a joint com- 
munique noted ". . . the continuing 
importance of the maintenance of 
peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula for the security of Japan 
and East Asia as a whole." 2 

At the time, the Japanese and our 
other friends in Asia were concerned 
about how our plans for withdrawing 
ground combat forces from Korea 
would affect regional security. They 
were worried also about the implica- 
tions of our withdrawal plan for our 
military posture elsewhere in Asia. 
We have done much to reassure them 
since then. 

• We have declared that except for 
our planned withdrawal from Korea, 
we will maintain our combat forces in 
Asia at their current level and will be 
strengthening them by the addition of 
several advanced weapons systems. 

• We have reiterated our treaty 
commitment to the Republic of Korea 
and our intention to defend it. 

• We have made clear that our 
withdrawal will be carefully phased 
and will permit a continuing assess- 
ment of the security situation on the 
peninsula. 

• We have made clear that we will 
maintain an important military pres- 
ence in Korea. Our Air Force units 
will remain there indefinitely and will 
be increased in number. Intelligence 
and other support units will also re- 
main indefinitely. 

In addition, in close consultation 
with the Republic of Korea, we have 



si 



:. 



Department of State Bulle 

developed plans for helping it ir 
prove its capabilities so that it can d 
fend successfully against any Nor 
Korean attack with the aid of Amei 
can naval, air, and logistic suppoi 
The Administration has already su 
mitted two important elements < 
these plans to Congress: 

• A request for authorization t 
transfer to the Republic of Korea sul 
stantial quantities of equipment para 
lei with our ground combat fore 
withdrawals and 

• A request for $275 million i 
foreign military sales (FMS) credi 
as part of our continuing assistance i 
South Korea in carrying out its fore 
improvement program. 

We anticipate that our support wi 
continue to be needed for the ne; 
few years. 

The Secretary of Defense [Harol 
Brown] has already described thes 
programs to the House Committee c 
International Relations in some detai 
What I want to emphasize is that th 
way in which we carry them out wi 
be of the utmost significance, affec 
ing not only the prospects for peac 
on the peninsula but also the conf 
dence in the United States of ou 
other allies and friends in Asia am 
throughout the world. 

We cannot neglect our efforts to rt 
solve problems that exist betwee 
ourselves and the Republic of Kore< 
It is important that the South Korea 
Government continue to cooperate i 
all appropriate ways with the judich 
and legislative proceedings that ar 
intended to set our own house in oi 
der. And we must leave no doub 
about our strong desire for furthe 
improvements in the government' 
human rights practices. 

But we must deal with these issue 
on their own terms and withou 
jeopardizing our important securit; 
interests and undermining confideno 
in Korea and elsewhere in our firn 
commitment. Americans and Korean: 
must keep foremost in our minds th( 
importance to us both of a close anc 
cooperative relationship. 

While our strategic interest is oi 
crucial importance, many other inter 
ests bind us together as well. We 
have developed a multibillion dollai 
trade, lending, and investment rela- 
tionship in Korea. Some 1 , 5 OC 
American firms are now doing busi 
ness there. As Korea itself has be- 
come a developed, industrialized na 
tion, its international responsibilities 
are increasing. The United States and 
other nations must now ask Korea's 
cooperation in dealing with multina- 
tional issues such as international 
trade policy, monetary reform, Third 



pril 1978 



33 



1 world assistance programs, nuclear 
iL oliferation, environmental pollution, 
d law of the sea. 

After 30 years of close mutual con- 
"PP ict the people of our two nations 
■ ave developed a complex network of 
l) ersonal and professional relation- 
hips. Our universities have mutual 
iii f , jsearch relationships and scholarly 
j, xchange programs; alumni from all 
pai tajor American universities are found 
f,, i all the professions. Many of the 
jp Korean industries have joint ven- 
o, ire or other formal relationships with 
[f [ vmerican firms. 
»t{ 

Republic of China 

Our only other military assistance 
1 ' rogram in Northeast Asia provides 
« or $10 million in FMS credits to the 

Republic of China, mostly for air de- 
ar < ense systems. We do not anticipate 
to sking for additional FMS credits for 
t he Republic of China after FY 1979. 
» Ve believe that the Republic of 

Thina, with its very healthy economy 
« md substantial trade surplus with the 
te Jnited States, will be able to finance 
a is defense needs from its own 

esources. 
To sum up, let me reiterate — the 

ituation in Asia is a favorable one. 

But only if the United States carries 
>»ut its responsibilities in close coop- 
« :ration with its allies and friends can 
B ve hope that it will remain so. 



VIARCH 14 

For many years, our preoccupation 
with the war in Indochina made us 
iess conscious than we are today of 
the remarkable strides being made by 
the other countries of Southeast Asia. 
[These countries, all except Thailand, 
colonies of Western states until after 
World War II, have firmly established 
their national identities while avoid- 
ing excessive nationalism. They have 
maintained their independence against 
outside pressures but not at the ex- 
ipense of developing cooperative and 
constructive relations with countries 
elsewhere and with each other. As be- 
fits the progress they have made, they 
are playing an increasingly important 
part on the world scene. 

Under competent and moderate 
leadership, Southeast Asian market 
economies have attained impressive 
growth rates and have become of in- 
creasing importance to the United 
States. In 1977 our imports from 
Southeast Asia amounted to over $7 
billion. It supplied us with virtually 
all of our copra and coconut oil, 90% 
of our natural rubber, and 75% of our 
tin. Southeast Asian countries, in 



turn, imported almost $4 billion 
worth of goods from us. American di- 
rect investment in Southeast Asia also 
amounted to over $4 billion. 

But we should not measure the im- 
portance of these countries to the 
United States solely in terms of what 
we buy and sell there. We are en- 
gaged with them in many other signif- 
icant ways. Southeast Asian coun- 
tries, for example, play an important 
and constructive role in the North- 
South dialogue. They are active par- 
ticipants in the campaign against drug 
traffickers. And in the effort to reset- 
tle refugees from Indochina, Thailand 
is now sheltering 100,000 refugees in 
camps, while another 10,000 have 
found permanent homes there. 

With Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sin- 
gapore, astride vital passages between 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the 
policies Southeast Asian countries 
adopt in law of the sea matters is ob- 
viously of acute importance to the 
United States and its allies. Southeast 
Asian countries will also have an im- 
portant role to play with other Pacific 
basin states in developing the re- 
sources of that vast seabed. The ties 
between Southeast Asian countries 
and our major allies elsewhere in East 
Asia and the Pacific — Japan, Austra- 
lia, and New Zealand — are increas- 
ingly strong. Our bases in the Philip- 
pines are an important constituent of 
our Pacific defenses and a significant 
element in our global deterrent. 

It is thus of obvious importance to 
the United States that our friends in 
Southeast Asia should continue to be 
able to bring the benefits of economic 
development to their people, to cooper- 
ate with each other and with other 
countries in pursuit of mutually benefi- 
cial goals, and to strengthen the na- 
tional and regional institutions that 
support the achievements of these 
goals. 

While great progress has been made 
in this regard, we must not overlook 
continued and serious problems. De- 
spite emphasis on human needs in de- 
velopment programs and overall im- 



Letters 
of Credence 



On February 15, 1978, the following 
newly appointed Ambassadors pre- 
sented their credentials to President 
Carter: 



Indonesia — Ashari Danudirdjo 
Western Samoa — Iulai Toma 



□ 



provements in levels of living, many 
are still the victims of poverty and dep- 
rivation. The race between population 
growth and economic development has 
not yet been won. 

Insurgents, some externally sup- 
ported, continue to seek their goals 
through violence and terror, threaten- 
ing human rights by their own activities 
and creating a climate of apprehension 
that stimulates reliance on restricting 
political activity as the alternative to 
chaos. Even so, there has been signifi- 
cant movement toward wider participa- 
tion in the political process, supported 
by such developments as the spread of 
literacy and the diversification of cen- 
ters of influence and power as modern 
economies have replaced traditional 
ones. 

Moreover, many uncertainties 
shadow the future. 

• How will developments in a still 
faltering global economy affect the re- 
gion's growth and development? 

• How will the relations among the 
great powers affect the region's peace 
and stability? 

• Will the Communist states of In- 
dochina play a constructive role in the 
region or a destabilizing one? 

U.S. Support 

In facing these problems, our friends 
in Southeast Asia look to the United 
States for support. And, as I have 
sought to demonstrate, it is in our 
own interests to help to strengthen the 
highly favorable trends, now so evident 
in the region, and to prevent their re- 
versal. The effort required of us is not 
a massive one; we do not propose to 
substitute our own strength for the 
necessary self-reliance of others. But it 
is an effort that requires the careful or- 
chestration of many instruments of 
policy — diplomatic, economic, and 
security. 

We have long had close and friendly 
relations with each of the non- 
Communist Southeast Asian countries. 
The dialogue into which we have en- 
tered with ASEAN will supplement and 
strengthen our relations with its five 
members. As you know, Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale will shortly be visiting 
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philip- 
pines; the Prime Ministers of Malaysia 
and Singapore were welcome guests in 
Washington late last year. In recent 
years, our mutual interest in suppres- 
sing the drug traffic has stimulated a 
more active relationship between the 
United States and Burma. We are con- 
tinuing our efforts to normalize our re- 
lations with Vietnam on acceptable 
terms, an effort that is regarded by 
Vietnam's non-Communist neighbors 



34 



as supportive of their own desires tor 
peaceful and constructive relations with 
the countries of Indochina. 

We have many instruments of eco- 
nomic cooperation at our disposal; used 
in careful conjunction with each other. 
their effect is multiplied. American 
business activity in the region contrib- 
utes to its prosperity and ours: The ac- 
tivities of the Export-Import Bank are 
important in sustaining our market po- 
sition and promoting our exports; the 
activities of the Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation help to stimulate 
the resource flow, the transfer of tech- 
nology, and the strengthening of mana- 
gerial skills that are essential to sus- 
tained development. 

Economic Assistance 

Our Southeast Asian bilateral eco- 
nomic assistance programs are modest 
in their amounts. We are proposing 
roughly $300 million for development 
assistance and food aid for Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. But they 
are important in their impact. They are 
focused primarily on the rural poor in 
programs directed toward increasing 
food production, slowing population 
growth, and improving the quality of 
life. 

The major amounts for development 
assistance in Southeast Asia are now 
coming from the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank. ADB ap- 
proved loans to Asian developing coun- 
tries, for example, had reached $4.2 
billion by the end of 1977. The Banks, 
while continuing to provide the bulk of 
official development assistance 
required for infrastructure-related proj- 
ects are increasingly focusing on proj- 
ects that satisfy basic human needs ob- 
jectives. They are in the forefront in 
coordinating development assistance, 
providing technical assistance, and 
helping recipient countries formulate 
their development plans. 

The United States, of course, is a 
major contributor to these institutions. 
but our share of the total is diminish- 
ing, as it should in view of the growing 
economic capability of other donors. 
Nevertheless it is an indispensable 
share. It sustains the essential work of 
these institutions. It demonstrates our 
continued concern with the well-being 
of the countries whose projects are 
being supported. And it reaffirms our 
support for cooperation and coordina- 
tion in the development effort. 

Security Assistance 

Our defense policy and our security 
assistance reinforce the contributions 
made to national and regional stability 
by economic growth and the equitable 



Department of State BulU 



distribution of its fruits. The American 
military presence — including our base 
presence in the Philippines — is indis- 
pensable to the maintenance of a peace- 
ful equilibrium in Asia and to the con- 
fidence of our friends in that region. 
Our security assistance programs help 
them to fulfill their own self-defei^c 
requirements while avoiding excessive 
diversion of national budgetary re- 
sources from priority economic de- 
velopment projects. 

Human rights considerations have 
been important among the factors that 
have entered into our decisions con- 
cerning these programs. Positive recent 
developments in this regard have in- 
cluded large-scale releases of political 
detainees in Indonesia in accordance 
with the schedule the Indonesian Gov- 
ernment announced in December 1976 
and the opening up of the Thai political 
process under Prime Minister 
Kriangsak Chamanan. In addition, in 
their development programs these 
countries are paying increasing atten- 
tion to projects directed toward fulfil- 
ling human needs objectives. This too 
enters into the many considerations, 
including our own security interests, 
that we must factor into the equation. 

On our proposed military assistance 
programs in Southeast Asia, the 
largest — that for the Philippines — I 
have already discussed with you. We 
are also proposing more modest, but 
nevertheless significant, programs for 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. 

Indonesia. For Indonesia in FY 
1979, we are proposing roughly $43 
million for all categories of security as- 
sistance including training. This is a 
decline from FY 1978, since we will no 
longer be providing grant military as- 
sistance program .(MAP). The 
Government of Indonesia has consist- 
ently subordinated military procure- 
ment to the requirements of economic 
development. 

However, it is rightfully concerned 
with the need for at least selective 
modernization and standardization of 
its extremely antiquated equipment so 
as to improve its capabilities for sur- 
veillance and defense of the sea and air 
approaches to its vast archipelago. Its 
plans for utilizing FMS credits to pur- 
chase a single squadron of F-5 aircraft 
to replace a single squadron of F-86 
aircraft will contribute to this objective 
and to our more general objective of 
strengthening the self-defense 
capabilities of our allies and friends. 

Thailand. In Thailand, as in In- 
donesia, our MAP program will end 
with FY 1978. For FY 1979, we are 
proposing a total of roughly $31 mil- 
lion in military assistance, almost all of 
which falls under the FMS program. 



ill 



I 

; 



We anticipate that Thailand will use : 
FY 1979 FMS credit for purchas 
primarily intended to improve its d 
fensive capabilities but, in some case 
also to support its efforts against arm 
insurgents. Thailand's long and vulne 
able land borders make the question 
the future behavior of its Communi 
neighbors — especially heavily armc 
Vietnam — a matter of particul. 
concern. 

Given the potential threat to Tha I 1 
land from the Indochina countries — ai 
we cannot ignore the Vietnam-Can 
bodia conflict — as well as the e: 
ternal support to its insurgents, tl 
United States should continue to supp 
military assistance to Thailand. Its s> 
curity needs and the confidence of i 
people, as well as that of its not 
Communist neighbors, will be serve 
by its ability to maintain a military e 
tablishment adequate for defense ar 
deterrence. 

Malaysia. The border that Thailar 
shares with Malaysia, is a source ( 
concern because of the continued ai 
tions there of armed underground an 
terrorist elements. The two govern 
ments are cooperating to deal with th 
problem. The Government of Malays 
is making modest equipment and trail 
ing improvements in support of its e 
forts against these elements and I 
improve its capabilities against any e> 
ternal threat. To assist Malaysia in th 
effort, we are proposing roughly $13. 
million under our FMS and interm 
tional military education training pre 
grams. We regard this proposal, lik< 
the others we are advancing for the re 
gion, as a useful and necessary contr 
bution to overall stability and self 
confidence. 

To sum up, our security assistanc 
programs are only one element of th 
close and friendly relations we main 
tain with these governments. But the 
contribute not only to improving th 
self-defense capabilities of countrie 
important to the United States but alsc 
to the cooperative atmosphere in whicl 
we work with them on a wide range o 
matters of both bilateral and multilat 
eral interest. C 



Statements belon the Subcommittee on Asiat 
and Pacific Affairs o] the House Committee oi 
International Relations on Mar. 9 and 14, I97t 
(introductory paragraphs omitted). The com 
plete transcript ot the hearings will be publishec 
by the committee and will he available from tin 
Superintendent oj Doi uments, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington. /> < 20402. Mr. 
Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary lor last Asian 
and Pacifil Affairs 

1 For text of the Shanghai communique, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972. p. 435. 

-' For complete text, see Bulletin of April 
18, 1977. p. 375. 



jril 1978 



35 



ECONOMICS: America's Stake 
in an Open international Trading System 



Secretary Vance 

I am delighted to have this oppor- 

nity to meet with you today. I want 

i talk about the stake of every 

1 merican citizen in maintaining an 

>en international trading system. 

In the 30-plus years since World 

'ar II, we have enjoyed a mounting 

"Pi vel of prosperity. Our people have 

ljoyed the fruits of an outward- 

'• 'oking economy vigorously engaged 

a steadily more open and active 

orld commerce. We have grown 

om a $200-billion economy to a 

1.9-trillion economy, in no small 

easure because we have seized the 

Dportunities afforded by our superior 

;chnological and industrial 

ipabilities to expand the reach of our 

;onomy to every corner of the globe. 

/e have been able to do this because 

e have succeeded in fostering a pro- 

ressively more open world trading 

i/stem, one that has enabled us to 

enerate new markets, new jobs, and 

■ew choices for the American 

lonsumer. 

In 1962 President John Kennedy 

)ld us that a rising tide of interna- 

onal trade would lift all boats. He 

'as right. Our commitment to vigor- 

us world trade has served us well. 

At this moment, however, we face 

nusually difficult strains on our 

.conomy. There is a strong impulse 

a abandon our commitment to an 

ipen world trading system — to draw 

ur wagons into a circle. 

Let there be no mistake about the 

ensitivity of this Administration to 

he reality of those strains and the 

necessity to deal, constructively and 

ffectively, with the causes and the 

onsequences of current economic 

lifficulties. Unemployment is more 

'han a statistic to a family without a 

ob. Inflation is a corrosive that eats 

iway at the hope of every American 

or a better future. The damage to a 

:ommunity when a factory shuts its 

*ates can be devastating. 

As the President indicated in his 
State of the Union message, bolster- 
ing our domestic economy is at the 
iop of this Administration's agenda. 1 
tThe comprehensive economic pro- 
gram which the President submitted 
to Congress in January presents the 
clear outlines of a coordinated 
strategy to expand our industrial pro- 
ductivity, to create new job opportu- 



nities, and to develop a more consist- 
ent and dependable economic climate 
for private investment and trade. 

We all share the same economic 
goals: to keep our recovery on 
course, to enhance the economic se- 
curity and well-being of our people, 
and to assure that the benefits and 
burdens of a dynamic economy are 
equitably shared. 

But we must be careful how we 
pursue these goals. We must avoid 
short-term responses to current pres- 
sures that mortgage our future inter- 
ests. We must resist the temptation to 
insulate ourselves from international 
economic competition for we are a 
nation that thrives on world trade. We 
cannot lose sight of one simple propo- 
sition: To buy from us, other nations 
must be able to sell to us. 

It is essential to recognize that the 
economic strains that we feel are by 
no means confined to the United 
States; indeed, our economy is strong 
when compared with most of our trad- 
ing partners. The sharp increase in oil 
prices in 1973-74 sent world inflation 
rates upward and helped push the 
world economy into recession. Re- 
covery has been slow. Unemployment 
is unacceptably high. Large surpluses 
have been accumulated by some of 
the oil-exporting countries while the 
consuming countries grapple with the 
corresponding deficits. These deficits 
lead countries to try to import less 
and export more — something which 
all countries obviously cannot do 
simultaneously. 

These strains create pressures here 
and abroad to turn to policies that re- 
strict trade. Until now, the industrial 
countries, despite these unprecedented 
economic stresses, have, for the most 
part, resisted the rush toward trade 
restriction. But if we should turn 
down the road toward protectionism, 
our major trading partners would face 
irresistible demands to impose their 
own barriers. And the developing 
countries, caught in the squeeze be- 
tween high energy prices and narrow- 
ing export prospects, would be forced 
to restrict their imports as well. 

Benefits of an Open System 

The American people have a vital 
interest in a progressively more open 
trading system. We have far too much 
at stake to benefit, in any lasting 



sense, from a new wave of interna- 
tional protectionism. 

• One out of every eight manufac- 
turing jobs in the United States de- 
pends on exports. For every one of 
those jobs, another one — in a support- 
ing industry — is created. 

• Every third acre of U.S. farmland 
produces for export. Each dollar of 
those agricultural exports stimulates 
more than a dollar's worth of output 
in a food-related industry. 

• Today one out of every three dol- 
lars of U.S. corporate profits is de- 
rived from international activities. 

• Exports of our goods and services 
now contribute nearly $200 billion to 
our gross national product. 

• Two-thirds of our imports are es- 
sential raw materials or goods we 
cannot readily produce. From au- 
tomobiles to newspapers, from jet 
aircraft to household appliances, 
many of our industries depend upon 
imported materials. 

What I have just described is the 
profile of a nation whose prosperity 
depends upon an open trading system. 
The impact of America's trade with 
the world is felt in each of your 
states. Let me cite just a few 
examples. 

• For the State of Washington, in- 
ternational trade accounts for a sub- 
stantial part of the $5.6 billion in air- 
craft equipment which the United 
States exported in 1977. 

• Nebraska contributed about 11% 
of the $5.6 billion of feed grains we 
exported in 1976. 

• Ohio has a vital interest in inter- 
national trade as well. The tire, steel, 
and electrical equipment industries in 
Ohio depend upon imports of critical 
materials such as natural rubber, 
manganese, and cobalt. 

• For Oregon the importance of 
trade is clear: In 1976 more than 8% 
of total U.S. exports to Japan, more 
than 12% of our exports to Korea, 
and more than 25% of our exports to 
India passed through Oregon's ports. 

I could go on — with Arkansas, 
which contributes more to our exports 
of poultry and rice than any other 
State; with Massachusetts, which con- 
tributes substantially to our rapidly 
growing exports of electrical and 
health care equipment as well as 



36 



computers and accounting machines; 
with Texas, which is a major exporter 
of cotton and industrial chemicals; 
with New Jersey, where foreign trade 
provides a livelihood for about one in 
five workers. 

In all, 22 States have established 
offices in Europe and Asia to promote 
trade and to encourage foreign in- 
vestment in the United States, evi- 
dence of the direct concern you have 
demonstrated in fostering vigorous in- 
ternational competition. 



Costs of Protectionism 

There are, of course, sectors of our 
economy that are threatened by im- 
ports. It is tempting to think that we 
can solve many of our economic prob- 
lems by insulating these industries 
from import competition. But the 
costs to the American public would 
be enormous. 

• Consumers — particularly poor 
and middle-income Americans — 
would suffer. They would pay more 
for what they buy and they would 
have less choice. 

• Inflation would be fueled. Import 
restrictions not only push consumer 
costs up, they add substantially to 
producer costs as well, driving prices 
upward and undermining the competi- 
tiveness of many of the goods we 
produce. 

• Jobs would be jeopardized. If 
U.S. consumers have to spend more 
on some items because of import re- 
strictions, they will have less to 
spend on other goods and services, 
the great bulk of which are produced 
here at home by American workers. 
And just as important, protectionism 
against our trading partners breeds 
protectionism by our trading partners 
against us. Nearly 10 million Ameri- 
can jobs depend on our exports. No 
Administration committed to protect- 
ing the jobs of every American 
worker should embark upon a course 
that could unleash a new and dangerous 
era of trade warfare. 

In short, we cannot protect jobs in 
some industries without endangering 
the livelihood of more workers in oth- 
er industries. We cannot solve the prob- 
lem of an unemployed steel worker in 
a way which costs a machinist his 
job. Our policy must look to the fu- 
ture of both. 

We must continue the momentum 
of the last three decades toward more 
open trade among nations, while at 
the same time we deal fairly and 
humanely with short-term disloca- 
tions. 



Department of State Bulle* 



Course of Action 

Let me discuss the steps this Ad- 
ministration is taking to pursue both 
our immediate and future goals. 

First, we are engaged in a major 
and comprehensive effort to devise a 
more open and equitable trading sys- 
tem. We are seeking in the multilat- 
eral trade negotiations in Geneva, 
along with our trading partners, to 
achieve a comprehensive reduction — 
and sometimes elimination — of indus- 
trial tariffs and an easing of barriers 
to our vital agricultural exports. 

This effort, if successful, will 
stimulate expanded opportunities for 
world trade. But more than tariffs are 
involved in the Geneva negotiations. 

• We are working toward interna- 
tional rules that limit the use of gov- 
ernment procurement policies and 
subsidy practices that distort trade. 

• We are seeking to reduce or 
eliminate a variety of other nontariff 
barriers which impede trade. 

• We are making a serious effort to 
improve international procedures 
under which governments take actions 
to protect their citizens against sud- 
den surges of imports. 

The negotiations in Geneva will es- 
tablish the framework of world trade 
for years to come. This will involve 
tough negotiating in the months 
ahead. Some argue that we should 
pull back and wait out this period of 
economic uncertainty. We believe just 
the opposite: that successful comple- 
tion of this major effort to expand 
trade and strengthen its international 
rules will increase business confi- 
dence and spur our recovery. Ambas- 
sador Bob Strauss [Robert S. Strauss, 
Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations] is determined to bring 
back a package of agreements that 
will bolster our economy and those of 
our trading partners. We look to you 
for guidance and support as this proc- 
ess unfolds. 

Second, as we work to secure en- 
during improvement in the world trad- 
ing system, this Administration will 
fully and vigorously enforce the laws 
which have been enacted to stop un- 
fair trade practices aimed at American 
industries. American workers must be 
confident that their government will 
insist that all nations play by the 
rules. 

We must also insure that our en- 
forcement mechanisms are effective. 
In the case of steel, where widespread 
dumping threatened to overtake our 
enforcement capabilities, we de- 
veloped a "trigger price" device to 
enable us to respond promptly and ef- 



fectively to this unfair trade practice 

Although steel has been the mo 
prominent case recently, it is not tl 
only action we have taken against ui 
fair practices. We have moved to pn 
vent dumping of other products. Ar 
have taken countervailing duty actk 
against such items as leather gooc 
from Latin America and fish fro' 
Canada. 

We also intend to carry out th 
mandate of the Trade Act of 197 
which provides for temporary relict i 
industries injured by imports. Th 
disruption caused to families an 
communities by particular trade pro! 1 
lems cannot be ignored. Under th 
authority, the Administration durin 
the past year negotiated orderly ma 
keting agreements with Taiwan an 
Korea for shoes and with Japan fc 
color TV sets. 

In implementing these laws, w 
will adhere to the principle that oil 
actions must be temporary and limite 
only to the minimum relief necessar) 
Such measures should not becom 
permanent. Trade relief should pn 
vide breathing space for adjustment 
not a subsidy for inefficiency. 

Third, we must stimulate laggin • 
U.S. exports. On December 21 thw 
President announced steps that wi t 
enable us to respond more creativel " 
and energetically to export opportun 
ties. He has asked Congress for ar 
unprecedented $15 billion expansio if 
of direct lending authority for th» : 
Export-Import Bank over the next : 
years. And he has directed the De 
partment of Commerce to vigorousl ,| 
assist U.S. exports in ways that ar 
consistent with an open tradin. 
system. 

Fourth, we must insure that n< : - 
segment of the population is forced tdl 
bear the burden of a more open trad [: 
ing system without being helped td|: 
find new opportunities. The Adminis 
tration is committed to making tradt 
adjustment assistance more effective 
The delivery of benefits to displacec ; 
workers and communities must be ac- 
celerated. We have been experiment- 
ing with new types of programs, such i 
as one in the footwear industry where 
teams from government and industry 
are working together to improve the 
competitiveness of our firms. 

We cannot prevent change. Our 
economy is dynamic and it must re 
main so. But we can and must hel 
affected industries and workers to a 
just to change through modernizatio 
retraining, and facilitating shifts 
resources to more productive sectors. 
Trade policy alone cannot carry the 
entire burden of solving this nation's 
economic problems. We must also 



is. I 



ril 1978 

rati /e an effective energy policy and 

he r must have it soon. Unless we curb 

r unchecked appetite for foreign 

— on which we spent $44.6 billion 

t year, or 30% of our total import 

1 — we will not begin to reverse the 

billion U.S. trade deficit. We 

o ist take the difficult steps that are 

hi [uired to reduce our requirements 

• imported oil and to promote the 

ji velopment of other energy sources. 

th for our energy and trade needs, 

ssage of domestic energy legisla- 

n is imperative. 

Nor can we solve our economic 
Dblems by ourselves. No single 
untry or group of countries can 
pulder the adjustment to a changing 
irld economy. Some successful ex- 
rting countries have been seen as 
cing advantage of the relatively 
en U.S. market while at the same 
le restricting their markets to im- 
rts. This contributes to protectionist 
ssures among their trading 
ners. 

e recently concluded a series of 
ensive discussions with Japan lead- 
to its commitment to open its 
rkets further. Japan has also an- 
unced its plans to accelerate its 
wth. The fact that we encouraged 
an to open its market to imports 
her than to restrict its exports 
ustrates a basic principle of our 
lide policy: that whenever possible 
ft will resolve our problems with an 
< tward or trade-expanding ori- 
i tation. 



[inclusion 

An outward-looking trade policy is 
{.it a luxury for the United States. It 
pure economic necessity. Even 
i' ore than our trade is at stake; for if 
lie let ourselves slide into the unpre- 
I ctable business of protectionism, in- 
rnational investment, monetary af- 
liirs, and international development 
ill also suffer. We would be foster- 
ig a kind of nationalism which could 
lake our alliances and undermine 
ur efforts to build international 
^operation across the entire range of 
ressing global issues. 
Protectionism is a dangerous gam- 
le in which everybody loses. That is 
fie indelible lesson of history. A 
k'ave of trade restrictions in the early 
930's deepened a worldwide depres- 
sion. The desperate economic situa- 
on that existed then in Europe cer- 
iiinly contributed to the popularity of 
luthoritarian movements. Today, we 
jannot close our eyes to the relation- 
hip between economic growth and 
I'olitical stability around the world, 
i Today, as much as in any period of 



37 



international Financial 
Institutions 



by Richard N. Cooper 

Our bilateral programs focus on 
functional and geographic areas of 
particular interest to the United 
States. The international development 
lending institutions are one of the 
major instruments of our assistance 
programs. They play a leading role in 
the direct transfer of real resources in 
support of the developing countries' 
aspirations and the objectives of the 
United States without the functional 
and geographic constraints of our 
bilateral programs. Let me briefly 
mention each of these institutions be- 
fore addressing in some detail the im- 
portant ways in which they promote 
development and how our national 
interests are served by these institu- 
tions. I will begin with the World 
Bank group. 

World Bank Group 

The International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development 

(IBRD) is the central member of the 
entire family of international de- 
velopment lending institutions. Over 
the 30-odd years since its founding, 
its increasingly broad membership 
(now 130 countries), its highly com- 
petent staff, and its proven perform- 
ance have established it as the leader 
of the global development effort. Its 
activities have been a valuable com- 
plement to our bilateral aid. 

Traditionally, it has focused on 
infrastructure projects essential to 
economic growth. More recently, its 
emphasis has shifted substantially in 
favor of projects directly benefiting 
the poor, especially agriculture and 
rural development projects. Thanks to 
our position as the IBRD's major 
donor, we continue to be able to 



exercise leadership within the IBRD 
and substantial influence over its 
policies. 

The IBRD's major borrowers are 
middle-income countries relatively far 
along the path to development. Many 
countries — despite having made im- 
portant economic progress in recent 
years — will continue to depend on 
IBRD loans and advice for some 
years to come, all the more so be- 
cause of the setback to their de- 
velopment inflicted by the oil crisis 
and the global recession from which 
we still have not completely recov- 
ered. Among large borrowers from 
the IBRD are such countries as 
Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Spain, and 
Yugoslavia — all countries of consid- 
erable importance to the United 
States, all countries whose prosperity 
is important to our own. 

Almost all of the funds lent by the 
IBRD are borrowed by it in capital 
markets and, therefore, involve no di- 
rect contribution by donor country 
governments. (Paid-in capital, 10% of 
total subscriptions; earnings on in- 
vestments; and interest on earlier 
loans provide additional funds for 
IBRD lending.) 

Last year Congress authorized our 
participation in a selective capital in- 
crease for the IBRD which will allow 
it to maintain its annual lending pro- 
gram at about present levels. Many 
IBRD members now favor an addi- 
tional general capital increase which 
would allow an expansion in real 
terms of its lending programs over the 
coming years, and President Carter 
has publicly expressed his hope that 
future negotiations will allow the 
realization of such an increase. 

The International Development 
Association (IDA) is the second 



our history, American leadership is 
called for. Others are looking to us. 
Unless we demonstrate our resolve to 
move toward a fairer and more open 
trading system, such a system simply 
will not evolve. Unless we adjust to a 
changing international economy — an 
international economy in which we 
have a major stake — America's inter- 
ests will seriously suffer. 

We will need your help. Together, 
we can meet the immediate challenges 



that face us without endangering our 
future. And together, we can work to 
build an international economic sys- 
tem that expands opportunity and fos- 
ters peace. □ 



Address to the National Governors' Associa- 
tion on Feb. 27, 1978 (press release 93A of 
Feb. 27). 

' For excerpts of the President's State of the 
Union message, see Bulletin of Feb. 1978, 
p. 20. 



38 



member of the World Bank group. 
IDA makes loans on very conces- 
sional terms to the poorest countries. 
Therefore, its resources must be con- 
tributed directly by donor govern- 
ments. India. Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Egypt have been major recipients 
of IDA funds. The needs of the coun- 
tries to which IDA lends are varied 
and vast. IDA's task in assisting to 
meet them is clearly of a long-term 
nature. 

Congress last year authorized our 
participation in the fifth replenish- 
ment of IDA's resources. We will be 
seeking this year appropriations for 
our pledged contributions to both the 
fourth and fifth replenishments. For 
the fourth replenishment we still need 
$750 million — our third and fourth 
(final) tranches. These two U.S. 
tranches represent a significant 
fraction — just under 17% — of the en- 
tire fourth replenishment. (Pledges to 
this replenishment totaled $4.5 bil- 
lion; the U.S. share was one-third.) 
Congress authorized these funds years 
ago. We are behind schedule in ob- 
taining appropriations. Inability to 
provide these funds to IDA would be 
viewed by others as a failure to live 
up to our commitments. 

For the fifth replenishment we need 
this year the second of our three $800 
million installments. Obtaining this 
amount is also vital because the fifth 
replenishment cannot continue into its 
second year without the appropriation 
and commitment from the United 
States, on the same terms as other 
countries, to provide IDA these 
funds. 

In a word, our contributions are es- 
sential to allow IDA to continue to 
function smoothly, to the other IDA 
donors who made their pledges on the 
assumption that we would fulfill ours, 
and, of course, to the poor develop- 
ing countries which will benefit from 
IDA lending. Politically. IDA is a 
central indicator by which developing 
countries gauge the seriousness of our 
commitment to assist them in their 
development efforts. Thus, our ac- 
tions concerning IDA are central to 
the developing countries' perceptions 
of our general attitude toward them. 
These perceptions have a major effect 
on the overall North-South dialogue. 

Hie International Finance Corpo- 
ration (IFC), the final member of the 
World Bank group, supports directly 
the development of the private sector 
in developing countries. It does this 
through syndication efforts aimed at 
bringing together investment opportu- 
nities, domestic and foreign private 
capital, and experienced management; 
and it participates in the projects di- 



Department of State Bull; 



rectly by modest loans or equity 
investments. 

Congress last year authorized our 
participation in a capital increase for 
the IFC. This increase will allow the 
IFC to expand its activities in coming 
years, notably in minerals and energy 
development. 



Regional Development Banks 

The regional development banks 
serve as useful complements to the 
global reach of the World Bank 
group. They develop particular exper- 
tise in their respective regions. Our 
support for them manifests our inter- 
est in the respective regions and thus 
has particular political as well as eco- 
nomic significance. 

The Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) serves an area with 
which the United States has deep his- 
torical and cultural ties and in whose 
prosperity we have a significant inter- 
est. The IDB, with our support, has 
contributed significantly to economic 
development of the region in the past 
and requires our support to continue 
to do so in the future. Its develop- 
ment efforts, in turn, can strengthen 
democratic forces and further the ad- 
vancement of human rights in the 
region. 

The Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) serves a region of great 
strategic and economic interest to the 
United States. Its membership extends 
from Korea in the north to Afghani- 
stan in the west. I believe the ADB 
can make a contribution to the de- 
velopment of the region which will 
enable these countries better to resist 
external pressures and help bring sta- 
bility and true peace to the region. In 
view of our military withdrawal from 
Indochina and the proposed reduction 
in our forces in Korea, our support 
for the ADB can give a valuable sig- 
nal of continued U.S. interest in the 
area and support for the aspirations of 
its people. 

The African Development Fund 
(AFDF) is the newest of the regional 
institutions, and our participation in it 
to date has been modest. Our interests 
in Africa are clearly growing, how- 
ever. Guerrilla and conventional con- 
flicts in the area threaten not only the 
local populace but risk growing in- 
volvement of outside powers. Our 
diplomatic efforts aim to resolve 
these conflicts. AFDF-assisted de- 
velopment can enhance the likelihood 
of a stable peace. Increased U.S. par- 
ticipation in the Fund is an important 
element of our expression of interest 
in the African Continent. 



r 



Contributions 

Let me turn now to some of t 
specific ways in which these instil 
tions serve both development and t 
interests of the United State 
Through their role in assisting t 
economic and social progress of t 
developing countries, these instit 
tions foster a structure of cooperati 
between developing and developi 
countries characterized by mutual r 
sponsibilities and joint contributio 
to the health of the international ec 
nomic and political system. Tl 
cooperation maintained within the 
organizations contributes positively 
the substance and to the atmosphere 
the broader North-South dialogue. 

They contribute to an equitab 
sharing of the global aid burden. Co 
tributions of individual donors a> 
based on their economic strength ai 
ability to provide aid. Our share 
contributions to these organizatioi 
has generally shown a declining trei 
over the years as the shares of othi 
countries have increased. For i 
stance, our original share in IDA w 
43%; in the current replenishment 
is 31.4%. In the Inter-American Dl 
velopment Bank's ordinary capiu 
our original share was 41%; in t 
current replenishment it is 32.3%. A* 
important and justified developme 
is that the OPEC countries [Organiz 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countrie 
are now increasing their contributioi 
as well. We welcome these trends an 
expect them to continue. 

To support their hard-lending ope 
ations these institutions borrow 
many countries, including, recentl 
OPEC countries. In this way th 
have mobilized funds for developme 
far in excess of their members' ca; 
contributions to them. They contri 
ute significantly to the evolution c 
an efficient global economy and 
necessary structural adjustments of 
long-term nature. They do this i 
several ways. 

• They analyze individual project 
within the context of both a country' | 
development plan and the globai 
economy and select for funding onl; 
the soundest projects. 

• They assist countries to diversif; 
their economies by providing addi 
tional capital to sectors requiring it 
for instance agriculture and, more re 
cently, energy. 

• In their dialogues with develop 
ing members, they advise on appro' 
priate economic policies. Their advice 
is generally consistent with our own 
views and stresses the importance of 
market forces and of an open interna 
tional economic system. Because of 






il 1978 



39 



multilateral character of these in- 
utions this advice is perceived by 
recipients as apolitical and objec- 
i. The acknowledged competence 
1 international character of the staff 
these institutions gives it additional 
hority. As a result, their advice is 
en more effective than advice from 
ateral aid donors. 

They contribute to the efficient 
: of scarce development assistance 
ming from many sources through 
ir leadership and participation in 

aid consultative groups and con- 
tia which coordinate bilateral aid 
orts on behalf of numerous coun- 
s. The existence of their compe- 
it staffs lessens the need for similar 
ffs in each donor country, thus fur- 
r contributing to the efficiency of 

international aid effort. 

These institutions can also serve 

Jgible U.S. interests. Development 
the minerals sector worldwide — 
Bth fuel and nonfuel minerals — is 
i the interest of the United States be- 
iise it will increase supplies and, at 
1 same time, restrain further price 
i|:reases. Unfortunately, however, 
n:ertain investment climates in some 
■ veloping countries have depressed 
| vate investment in development of 
I s sector. The World Bank, with 
HS. support, is moving to expand 
(nstantially its effort in the sector, 
it only through the provision of ad- 
< ional financing and technical as- 
s;tance but through the favorable 
' atalytic" effect on private inves- 
ts which the Bank's activities in a 
( untry can have. The regional banks 
B moving in the same direction. 

The international development 
links can contribute in many ways to 
V: growth of markets for U.S. ex- 
ists. They do this through policy 
I vice which favors an open interna- 
bnal economic system. They also 
(sist the developing countries to 
I ercome their foreign exchange con- 
iraints which limit their ability to 
Oport. Development Assistance 
bmmittee statistics indicate that in 
>76 multilateral agencies — the inter- 
itional development banks, the 
nited Nations, and other minor 
imrces — provided $6.2 billion in net 
mancial resource flows to non-oil 
:veloping countries — about 10.6% 
I total receipts by these countries of 
J58.7 billion. 

Primarily in connection with spe- 
cie projects, the development banks 
ind the money needed to import the 
iecessary project components — a sub- 
i:antial share of which comes from 
pe United States. Over time, these 
rojects can contribute to the saving 



and earning of foreign exchange by 
these countries which can then be 
used to purchase U.S. goods. In 
1976, for instance, non-OPEC de- 
veloping countries alone imported 
526.2 billion from the United 
States — 23% of our total exports. 
Major components of our exports to 
these countries included manufactures 
($19 billion), agricultural products 
($4.9 billion), raw materials ($1.8 
billion), and fuels ($586 million). 

These institutions are placing in- 
creasing emphasis on employment- 
creating projects in connection with 
their efforts in both the agriculture 
and rural development sector and in 
urban-oriented industrialization and 
development efforts. Creation of addi- 
tional jobs in the countryside can 
slow migration from rural to urban 
areas. Additional jobs in urban areas 
can ease pressures to emigrate to 
other countries. We fully support 
these efforts by the banks which are 
directly relevant to our own illegal 
immigration problem. These are some 
of the specific ways in which these 
institutions serve both the develop- 
ment effort and U.S. interests. 

Successful Activities 

In India, the largest single compo- 
nent of the World Bank program has 
been directed to agriculture and rural 
development. In addition to fertilizer 
production and rural electrification, 
this includes projects to improve the 
organization of specialty crops (cot- 
ton, fish, rubber, coconut, forestry). 
But the main aim of the program is to 
raise the productivity of the mass of 
Indian farmers growing foodgrains by 
financing construction and moderniza- 
tion of irrigation schemes and pro- 
viding agricultural extension on a 
sound basis. 

In the earlier projects it was found 
that roughly 50% of farmers in all 
size groups adopted the practices 
suggested and the adopters increased 
their yields 60-80% within 2 years. 
The suggested practices were kept 
simple and avoided use of additional 
purchased inputs, with the result that 
even the smallest farmers benefited. 
It is expected that about 6 million of 
India's 70 million farm families will 
benefit from improved yields under 
these projects in the next few years. 

In the past year and a half alone. 
IDA has helped in the reorganization 
of the extension service of India's 
five poorest states along lines tried 
earlier in other states in the 
framework of command area de- 
velopment projects. Three of these 
states are in India's eastern region 



where average farm size and per 
capita incomes are about half those of 
the rest of the country. 

In the Philippines, the Asian De- 
velopment Bank is a major con- 
tributor to the Catabato irrigation 
project on Mindanao. The farmers in 
Mindanao are poor even by Philippine 
standards. The lack of feeder roads 
and difficult access to marketing serv- 
ices and irrigation works are disincen- 
tives to farmers. This project is one 
of the more successful of its type to 
date. The project had exceeded origi- 
nal targets both in terms of the 
number of beneficiaries, which almost 
doubled, and the extent of their eco- 
nomic benefits. Total net annual farm 
income in the project area, projected 
to rise in 7 years from $106 per fam- 
ily to $427, actually increased to about 
$830. 

In Egypt, the World Bank, together 
with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the German agency 
KfW [Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau-a 
credit reconstruction finance cor- 
poration], is financing a major program 
of four projects to provide Egypt's ag- 
riculture lands with field drainage and 
to alleviate waterlogging and salinity. 
These projects bring substantial bene- 
fits to 780,000 farm families (about 4.4 
million people) — most of whom are 
near to or below the poverty level — and 
yield a very high economic return. 
These projects also provide very sub- 
stantial employment: in excess of 
170,000 man-years during implementa- 
tion, mostly for the landless rural poor, 
and a continuing increased need for ag- 
ricultural labor. 

Policy Choices 

I would like now to touch on two 
areas in our relationships with these 
institutions which necessarily involve 
trade-offs between conflicting 
objectives. 

The first involves the conflict be- 
tween the concept of sharing the bur- 
den of development financing which I 
described above, on the one hand, and 
the ability of the United States to 
exercise control over the activities of 
these institutions, on the other. A 
major objective of our participation in 
these institutions has been to transform 
what was once a predominantly U.S. 
aid effort into a broadly shared one. 
We have succeeded in this objective. 
But in these institutions, voting power 
is linked to contributions. Thus, in- 
evitably, as our share in these institu- 
tions' resources has declined, our vot- 
ing power and our ability to influence 
their activities has too. As their con- 
tributions rise, the objectives of other 



40 



Department of State BulU 



donors must be taken increasingly into 
account. 

Luckily, within these institutions a 
broad consensus exists on both the aim 
of development and the means to at- 
tain it. This allows their work to go 
forward to the benefit of all despite 
their broad and varied membership. 
Our bilateral aid program is com- 
pletely under our control and can be 
used just as we wish to advance pre- 
cisely defined national objectives. 

We must recognize that in the inter- 
national financial institutions we can- 
not exercise this degree of control. We 
have at our disposal other diplomatic 
and economic measures which can be 
used to ameliorate problems of particu- 
lar concern to us. But to exert undue 
influence on these intitutions would be 
inappropriate and encourage others to 
do so as well. I believe, moreover, 
that this lack of complete U.S. control 
is more than offset by the many ways 
in which these institutions serve broad 
U.S. interests. 

The second issue is related to the 
first. It is the conflict between the es- 
sentially apolitical nature of these 
institutions — specifically stipulated in 
their charters — and introduction of 
political considerations into their de- 
liberations with resultant damage to 
their ability to execute their functions 
objectively and efficiently. 

The concept underlying their non- 
political character was that these in- 
stitutions' work should go forward 
substantially unaffected by the kinds 
of considerations which can cause 
bilateral aid flows to grow or decline 
abruptly as the warmth of bilateral re- 
lations between particular donor and 
recipient waxes and wanes. By and 
large, separation of politics from eco- 
nomics in these institutions is a con- 
cept which has served both the United 
States and the people of the develop- 
ing countries well. 

Last year restrictive legislation was 
introduced in the Congress which 
would have "earmarked" our contri- 
butions; that is, prohibited the institu- 
tions from using them in certain coun- 
tries or for certain projects. The 
institutions made clear to us — the 
World Bank in writing, the others 
orally — that they could not and would 
not accept funds under those condi- 
tions. 

Had such legislation been enacted, 
and had the institutions accepted the 
funds, this would have marked the 
first step in the outright politicization 
of these institutions. Other countries, 
which as noted above are increasingly 
important contributors, might follow 
suit and the restrictions which they 
might impose could be repugnant to 



EUROPE: Belgrade Review 
Meeting Concludes 



STATEMENT BY 
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG' 

I wish to thank our Yugoslav hosts 
for the manner in which they have 
provided for us at this conference. The 
Secretariat — under the able direction 
of Ambassador Bozinovic, the Yugo- 
slav delegation, and the Government 
and people of Yugoslavia — expended 
every effort to make our conference a 
success. I wish particularly to express 



appreciation to His Excellency, Ai t 
bassador Pesic. His constant steadfa:; 
ness and determination, even when 0| 
work was in its most difficult houii 
was an inspiration to all of us. It is 
source of gratification to the Americ i 
delegation that President Tito is th| 
very week [March 6-9] in the Unit| 
States where President Carter is col 
veying to him his personal apprecil 
tion for the uniquely constructive re 
that Yugoslavia has played not only 



the United States. Clearly, to start 
down this path runs the risk of great 
damage to future U.S. participation in 
these institutions, to the institutions 
themselves, and to the global de- 
velopment effort. 

We must accept the fact that these 
institutions will occasionally act in a 
way which we would not desire. This 
is the price we must pay for the many 
benefits we derive from them. Rather 
than enacting restrictive legislation, 
the Administration and the Congress 
should consult closely to determine 
those issues relevant to these institu- 
tions which are of greatest interest to 
the United States. Then, even in the 
absence of legislative requirements 
that we do so, the Administration 
would work with management and 
other members of these institutions to 
advance these important goals. 

For instance, with respect to human 
rights, we have opposed loans by these 
institutions to countries with serious 
human rights problems unless those 
loans will clearly serve basic human 
needs. We are consulting with man- 
agement and with other members to 
build support for our human rights 
policies. 

We have encouraged these institu- 
tions to channel more of their re- 
sources to projects serving basic 
human needs, and there has been sub- 
stantial movement in this direction. 
For instance, over the years 1973-76 
IBRD-IDA loans to the five sectors 
most likely to impact on basic human 
needs — agriculture and rural develop- 
ment, education, population and nutri- 
tion, urbanization, and water supply 
and sewerage — averaged 39% of total 
IBRD-IDA lending. Lending in these 
sectors is projected to comprise 52% 
of IBRD-IDA lending in FY 1978. 

This year we will be engaged in re- 
plenishment negotiations affecting the 



IBRD and each of the regional bank, 
We will want to consult closely wi t 
the Congress in the process of for 
mulating our negotiating positions. | 
due course we will seek from yc;: 
legislation authorizing our particip ; 
tion in these replenishments, which a 
necessary if the banks are to contini i 
to play their essential role in the w«ij 
we envisage. 

In conclusion, I would like to rei i 
erate the foreign policy significance ■ 
our continued strong support for tl I 
international development lending i 
stitutions. This support represents I 
major part of our foreign progran I 
which are designed to respond to thv 
legitimate concerns of the developirn 
nations — nations of great econom 
and political importance to the Unite i 
States. These institutions serve U.5 
interests in many ways, in particuM 
by promoting economic developmei; 
abroad and the growth of the worl| 
economy in ways which benefit th| 
United States. Our support allows uj 
to maintain our influence within thes 
institutions and facilitates U.S. lead i 
ership in a broader North-Sout ; 
dialogue along lines more acceptabli 
to us. 

Strong U.S. support of these institii' 
tions will continue to be a major goat 
of the Carter Administration. I urg; 
you and your congressional colleague | 
to join the Administration in providin; 
this support. C 



Based on statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Development Institutions am, 
Finance of the House Committee on Banking 
Finance and Urban Affairs on Feb. 2H, 1978 
The complete transcript of the hearings will bi 
published by the committee and will be aval/' 
able from the Superintendent of Documents.' 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washing 
ton, DC. 20402. Mr. Cooper is Under Secre-\ 
tary for Economic Affairs. 



1978 



41 



}1 Belgrade meeting but in the entire 
■cess of building security and coop- 
fltion in Europe. 2 

I consider it appropriate in this final 
Aement to express frankly the views 
> the U.S. Government on the Bel- 
ide meeting and on the Conference 
a Security and Cooperation in Europe 
BCE) process that was begun in Hel- 
~iki and will continue in Madrid and 
■reafter. 

i The Belgrade meeting of the Con- 
isnce on Security and Cooperation in 
■rope — the first formal sequel to the 
ilsinki summit — is now at its end. In 
I judgment of the delegation of the 
tited States, the meeting has fulfill- 
1 its basic mandate and although it 
I; been difficult, it has also been 
s cessful. 

n these past months — with the sup- 
jit of our gracious, patient Yugoslav 
■ its and through the conscientious ef- 
f ts of the delegates — our meeting 
I; confirmed the vitality of the Hel- 
9'ki concept. Belgrade has tested the 
v idity and flexibility of the CSCE 
pcess. It has not been an easy pas- 
■:;e, but we have delineated the scope 
c that process and added to its depth. 
j)st important of all, we have given 
cr commitment to preserving the 
pcess and to making its growth our 
c nmon enterprise. 

We have had the exchange of views 
t which the Final Act mandates on 
I: implementation of its provisions 
id on the prospects for improved 
I itual relations. 3 We have spoken our 
en minds and have heard out the 
(inions of those who differ from us. 
] doing so, we have been able to 
like a sober assessment of past ac- 
<mplishments, continuing shortcom- 
i ngs. and future challenges. We have 
Breed to continue this discourse bilat- 
ii ally and in Madrid in 1980. 
I The United States has always 
''ewed the fulfillment of Final Act 
i mmitments as part of a gradual but 
«;adily advancing process of bridging 
|e East-West divide, of extending the 
Inefits of security and cooperation 
) roughout Europe — including of 
l)urse Berlin. The contribution of 
ISCE has been to engage 35 states — 
Ifferent in size and system, history 
wd outlook — in that vital effort. The 
l>le of the Belgrade meeting has been 
i deepen that engagement and to 
lake specific the conduct which it 
iiitails. 

From our talks has emerged a 
..earer sense of the tasks before us. 
o country can be allowed to single 
:ut particular sections of the Final 
let for their attention while ignoring 
Ithers. Progress in the area of human 
jghts and human contacts as well as 



disarmament and economic, scientific, 
and cultural cooperation are inextrica- 
bly linked together in the Final Act. 
The significance of Final Act 
implementation — and of the Belgrade 
review of its progress — lies precisely 
in combining the various elements of 
detente in a coherent, related whole. 

Last October I also spoke of giving 
detente a humanitarian face and a 
human measure. 4 That has, indeed, 
been the theme of this conference. For 
though we are here to represent gov- 
ernments, we have managed to address 
the problems of people as well as of 
power. We have weighed the claims of 
individuals, not just the interests of 
states. 

Thus we explored the promises 
made at Helsinki to respect the role of 
the individual and groups in monitor- 
ing the implementation of the Final 
Act; to heal the wounds of divided 



families; to facilitate the right of free 
emigration; and to better the condi- 
tions in which scientists, journalists, 
scholars, and businessmen work. 
There has been some progress in some 
of these areas but not nearly enough 
and regrettably there have been retro- 
gressions. 

The favorable resolution of such 
questions in the days to come will do 
much to create the climate of openness 
in which detente itself will flourish. A 
detente relationship which betters the 
lot of individuals and smooths contact 
between them is also certain to improve 
the ties between the states. 

Human Rights 

Crucially, of course, our meeting 
dealt at length with the question of 
human rights and fundamental free- 
doms. Our citizens' freedom of 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT 

The President on March 3. 1978. con- 
gratulated Justice Goldberg and the U.S. 
delegation to the Belgrade review confer- 
ence of CSCE on their successful work dur- 
ing the past few months. The President is 
particularly gratified that the delegation has 
worked in close harmony with the U.S. 
[joint congressional] Commission on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, chaired by 
Representative Fascell. cochaired by Sena- 
tor Claiborne Pell, and including both con- 
gressional and Administration members. 

The United States has achieved its basic 
goals at the Belgrade conference, which 
will conclude its work next week. 

• We conducted a full and frank review 
of the implementation of the Helsinki Final 
Act in all of its aspects. This included de- 
tailed discussion of human rights, including 
specific country-performance and individual 
cases. Human rights has now been firmly 
inscribed as a legitimate and proper concern 
on the agenda of international discussion. 

• We maintained unity among the NATO 
allied states. 

• We have worked with other nations to 
insure that the process of security and coop- 
eration in Europe, begun at Helsinki, will 
continue at Madrid in 2 years time. 

• We took all of these steps in a spirit of 
seeking to enlarge the possibilities for 
cooperation among all the 35 states repre- 
sented at Belgrade, and we will agree to the 
final document only to permit this process 
to continue. 

Following the achievement of these basic 
goals at CSCE. we also presented, with our 
allies, a number of specific new proposals, 
designed to make more effective the im- 



plementation of the Helsinki Final Act. Re- 
grettably, the Soviet Union was not pre- 
pared to engage in a serious discussion of 
new proposals, leading to agreement among 
the 35 states taking part. Nor. under the 
consensus procedure followed at Belgrade, 
was the Soviet Union prepared to agree to a 
final document that would take note of the 
full review of implementation — including 
human rights — that was the centerpiece of 
the conference. 

We regret that the Soviet Union failed to 
permit the conference to proceed to its 
proper conclusion. We intend to press the 
Soviet Union to fulfill its commitment to re- 
spect human rights, to fulfill the Helsinki 
process, and to adhere to the final Helsinki 
act itself. The Soviet refusal, under the con- 
sensus procedure, to accept a full final 
document in no way detracts from the suc- 
cess of the conference in conducting a full 
review of implementation, especially in the 
area of human rights. What has been done 
cannot be ignored, whether or not the Soviet 
Union is prepared to see it recognized in a 
formal document. 

We will continue to build on the success 
that the Belgrade conference as a whole rep- 
resents. During the period between now and 
the Madrid meeting, we will continue our 
efforts to promote implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act. We will work closely 
with our allies, and with the European 
community, in that process. 

And at Madrid, we will renew the process 
of review, seeking always to raise the inter- 
national standard of behavior, in all aspects 
of the Helsinki Final Act and particularly in 
the area of human rights. 



Issued Mar. J. 1978 (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Mar. 6). 



42 

thought, conscience, religion, or be- 
lief; their ability to exercise their civil 
rights effectively — individually or in 
groups — raised sensitive issues at Bel- 
grade. Their sensitivity was part of 
their significance. Our meeting was 
the first to put those questions promi- 
nently and legitimately into the 
framework of multilateral East-West 
diplomacy. 

That idea is a powerful one, and at 
Belgrade it has won powerful support. 
It has also aroused strong opposition. 
We have heard the contention that 
human rights are purely internal af- 
fairs, that to discuss their observance 
in another nation is to violate that na- 
tion's sovereignty, to interfere in mat- 
ters that are no outsider's concern. 

The Final Act refutes that reason- 
ing. The Belgrade meeting has made it 
untenable. By virtue of Principle VII, 
human rights are direct concerns of all 
Final Act signatories. Under the terms 
of the U.N. Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 
international covenants — as well as the 
Final Act — they are the subject of in- 
ternational undertakings. They are 
then, without question, the proper sub- 
ject of the diplomatic examination and 
debate we have had in Belgrade. And 
they will remain, after Belgrade, the 
proper focus of continuing comment 
and efforts. 

For the pursuit of liberty is an un- 
ending enterprise for man, the surest 
guarantee of this security and of 



Department of State Bulk 



peace. What the Final Act obliged us 
all to pursue is what Aleksandr 
Pushkin defined long ago as a better 
kind of freedom. That, he wrote, is 
the freedom not to bow your consci- 
ence, thought, or neck to rank or 
power. That concept of individual dig- 
nity is still the vision offered us by the 
Final Act, the vision all of us pledged 
to respect and promote. 

We know, however, that not all of 
us have fulfilled that pledge in full or 
in good faith. The American delega- 
tion has spoken forthrightly at Bel- 
grade of the broken and unfulfilled prom- 
ises of Principle VII and basket 3. 
We have expressed our concern and 
our regret and — at times — our outrage 
at the incidents which have occurred 
in direct contravention of the Final Act 
and in profound disregard of its provi- 
sions in the area of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 

Our meeting could not overlook 
such episodes, especially when unwar- 
ranted repression is directed against 
men and women whose only offense 
seems to be that they have merely 
sought to monitor or enforce or im- 
plement the provisions and the prom- 
ises of the Helsinki Final Act. Their 
activity is encouraged by the Final 
Act. It needs to be protected, not 
punished. 

Similarly, in our review of im- 
plementation, we could not gloss 
over — and cannot now — the plight of 
men and women persecuted for their 



CSCE 

Semiannual Report 



Department Statement 

On behalf of President Carter, Secre- 
tary Vance on December 5, 1977, 
transmitted to Representative Dante B. 
Fascell, chairman of the joint congres- 
sional Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the third 
semiannual report on implementation 
of the Helsinki Final Act. 1 

These semiannual reports are re- 
quired under provisions of Public Law 
94-304, which established the CSCE 
Commission. Under this law, the State 
Department is required to monitor im- 
plementation of the Final Act inde- 
pendently of any other CSCE discus- 
sions which may be taking place, such 
as the follow-up meeting which is now 
underway in Belgrade. The judgments 
in the report are, therefore, based on an 
analysis of the report during the past 6 
months and are not the result of discus- 



sions which have taken place in 
Belgrade. 

However, as the report points out, 
the most important development related 
to CSCE during the reporting period 
was the beginning of the first CSCE 
follow-up meeting in Belgrade. The 
Belgrade meeting cannot be fully as- 
sessed until it has concluded, but the 
introductory chapter of this report pro- 
vides an overview of our objectives and 
describes some major developments so 
far. □ 



Made available to the press by Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter III on Dee 5. 1977. 
1 Single copies of the full text of the "Third 
Semiannual Report to the Commission on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, June 1- 
December 1. 1977" may be obtained from the 
Correspondence Management Division, Office 
of Public Communication. Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Washington, DC. 
20520. 



religious beliefs and for trying to pt 
those beliefs on to their children. N 
can we be silent now — or in the i 
ture — when numbers of ethn 
minorities are denied their equalit 
particularly in their efforts to preser 
the language and culture which are t 
sential to their special identity. 

We cannot pretend that such que 
tions are irrelevant to the implement 
tion of the Final Act, intrusive at tl 
meeting and injurious — if discussed 
to the development of detente. We li 
in the real world, not one of mak 
believe. We cannot make our world 
better one if we turn a blind eye to 
faults. 

Those faults — just as much as o 
accomplishments and opportunities 
were the legitimate subject of the B< 
grade review. That review dealt pr 
ductively with real shortcomings 
Final Act implementation so that frc 
our examination we could each and , 
move to remedial action. 

That action is still required of u 
Unfortunately, it is not detailed in 
meeting's concluding document, 
reason is plain. Consensus was deni 
and this I profoundly deplore. 

Efforts to squelch the truth at B 
grade or at home will not change t 
truth. And they will not deflect t 
United States from insisting that c 
dor is as important to the healthy 
velopment of international confide 
as is respect for sovereign equality 
individuality. 

Candor and respect must be cor 
panion elements in the pursuit of sec 
rity and cooperation. The foundatit 
laid down in the Final Act 
augmented by the record made 
Belgrade — enables us to build an ev 
firmer structure of detente. Our fit 
priority — always our overridir 
challenge — remains simply to impl 
ment the Final Act in all of its pai 
to do so in good faith and with appn 
priate speed. The initial pace is not 
important as the fact of continuity 
forward movement. 

From Belgrade, the United States ii 
tends to move forward. My counti 
has had its performance questions 
here and some of the questioning h; 
been constructive. It will aid my coui 
try to improve its record. I wish othei 
were of equal mind. 

My delegation has also taken carefi 
note of the thoughtful ideas advance 
by many delegations for action cor 
sonant with the thrust and spirit of th 
Final Act. Some such proposals can b 
set in motion by unilateral action 
many can be refined and readied fo 
decision in Madrid. The United State 
is prepared to participate construe 
tively in such enterprises. 



ril 1978 



43 



1 litical Cooperation 

'We especially value CSCE as a 
Mmework for increasing political in- 
Jcourse among all participating 
■tes. The many and varied specific 
■wisions of the Final Act provide a 
»;h content for this commerce. The 
||ited States, in its efforts to deepen 
-lineal relations with all CSCE 
■tes, will contine to work to translate 
tit potential into reality. 
In the area of confidence-building 
rasures, for example, we have al- 
ridy seen in practice how states can 
tild from the language of the Final 
/t to implement its spirit. In notify- 
ii; smaller scale maneuvers, in mak- 
i> notifications amply informative, 
jd in affording observers good over- 
I views of maneuvers, some states 
Ive set an example others can pro- 
<ctively emulate. Such experience 
is been constructive; it remains to be 
f plied to major troop movements. In 
ineral, moreover, we can all think 
jesh about ways of "developing and 
i larging measures aimed at 
lengthening confidence," a possibil- 
j the Final Act explicitly sets before 
I . Although CSCE was not conceived 
I a forum for negotiating disarma- 
::nt. we have all recognized the im- 
]tus it can give to that vital process. 

onomic Cooperation 

Further, in the field of economic 
d commercial cooperation, our frank 
scussions have reinforced the aware- 
j'SS of the need to reduce — indeed, 
rough mutual action, to eliminate — 
isting impediments to trade. The po- 
ntial for cooperation in this field is 
jeat, and the United States is fully 
epared to explore the many pos- 
Dilities for productive unilateral and 
ciprocal action. In such an endeavor, 
course, other states must also en- 
age in expanding the flow of timely 
id accurate economic information on 
hich close, broadened contacts 



Letter 
of Credence 



On February 15, 1978, the follow- 
hg newly appointed Ambassador pre- 
|ented his credentials to President 
parte r: 

.Bulgaria — Konstantin Nicolov 
J Grigorov □ 



among traders and investors so heavily 
depend. 

If the Belgrade meeting has aided 
the flow of people, it has yet to make 
a similar impact on the transmission of 
information. Too many Eastern states 
continue to impede access to what 
many of their citizens want to read and 
see and hear. 

Finally there is much we can do in 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
to widen the range and improve the 
quality of contacts among scientists 
and scholars, men and women of let- 
ters and of the arts. 

The United States will continue to 
be especially attentive to the question 
of human rights. We are greatly con- 
cerned about those individuals and or- 
ganizations which my delegation has 
mentioned — by name and by 
country — in the course of our discus- 
sions who are being denied their 
elementary human rights. And they are 
by no means the only ones. The list of 
those suffering repression is far too 
long. And their fate arouses the great- 
est anxiety. Our concern is not limited 
to one country or one set of individu- 
als. "Injustice anywhere," said Mar- 
tin Luther King, Jr., "is a threat to 
justice everywhere." 

The Final Act enshrines the concept 
of justice — not privilege or power — 
ruling the affairs of men and the rela- 
tions between states. The Belgrade 
meeting has reaffirmed that central 
tenet in the context of detente in 
Europe. Peace, we have seen, depends 
on the just conduct of nations to each 
other and to their own citizens. 

Helsinki aroused great hopes. In 
some quarters it also appears to have 
aroused great fear. In Belgrade we, on 
our part, have attempted forthrightly 
to discuss both the hopes and the fears 
of governments and peoples. We rec- 
ognize that some hopes may not be as 
high as they might have been when we 
came to Belgrade. But we have always 
known that the road to peace and secu- 
rity and cooperation is a long and ar- 
duous one. 

The United States is determined to 
continue. Between now and at Madrid 
and thereafter we will seek to further 
implementation of all of the provisions 
of the Final Act. And we pledge to do 
all in our power to keep the hopes of 
Helsinki alive. 



CONCLUDING DOCUMENT 5 

The representatives of the participating 
States of the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, appointed by the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of these States, met at Bel- 
grade from 4 October 1977 to 8 March 1978 in 



accordance with the provisions of the Final Act 
relating to the Follow-up to the Conference. 

The participants received a message from the 
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito, and were ad- 
dressed by Mr. Milos Minic. Vice-President of 
the Federal Executive Council and Federal Sec- 
retary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Fed- 
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Contributions were made by the following 
non-participating Mediterranean States: 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria and Tunisia. 

The representatives of the participating 
States stressed the importance they attached to 
detente, which has continued since the adoption 
of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and ob- 
stacles encountered. In this context they under- 
lined the role of the CSCE. the implementation 
of the provisions of the Final Act being essen- 
tial for the development of this process. 

The representatives of the participating 
States held a thorough exchange of views both 



I »S.S.It. 



Department Statement 

We have studied with interest the 
reports of the remarks made this week 
by President Brezhnev and other 
Soviet officials on the present state of 
U.S. -Soviet relations. 

President Brezhnev's positive evalu- 
ation of the results of the visit by 
Politburo member Ponomarev corre- 
sponds with our own impression, and 
we are pleased that the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet desires to continue 
its exchanges with the Congress of the 
United States. 

President Brezhnev's expressed de- 
termination to work toward a prompt 
and mutually advantageous SALT 
agreement corresponds with our own 
intentions, and we believe, as he does, 
that such an agreement can be an im- 
portant step toward a further im- 
provement in the relations between our 
two countries. 

It is evident that the character of our 
general relations also depends upon re- 
straint and constructive efforts to help 
resolve local conflicts, such as in the 
Horn of Africa. Intervention in this 
tragically embattled area by the con- 
tinued shipment of weapons and mili- 
tary personnel, some of them involved 
in combat roles, inevitably widens and 
intensifies hostilities and raises the 
general level of tension in the world. □ 

Press release 95 of Feb. 27, 1978. 



44 

on the implementation of the provisions of the 
Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Con- 
ference, as well as, in the context of the ques- 
tions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening 
of their mutual relations, the improvement of 
security and the development of co-operation in 
Europe, and the development of the process of 
detente in the future. 

The representatives of the participating 
States stressed the political importance of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe and reaffirmed the resolve of their 
Governments, to implement fully, unilaterally, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions 
of the Final Act. 

It was recognized that the exchange of views 
constitutes in itself a valuable contribution to- 
wards the achievement of the aims set by the 
CSCE, although different views were expressed 
as to the degree of implementation of the Final 
Act reached so far. 

They also examined proposals concerning the 
above questions and the definition of the ap- 
propriate modalities for the holding of other 
meetings in conformity with the provisions of 
the chapter of the Final Act concerning the 
Follow-up to the Conference. 

Consensus was not reached on a number of 
proposals submitted to the meeting. 

In conformity with the relevant provisions of 
the Final Act and with their resolve to continue 
the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, 
the participating States will hold further meet- 
ings among their representatives. The second of 
these meetings will be held in Madrid com- 
mencing Tuesday, 11 November 1980. 

A preparatory meeting will be held in Madrid 
commencing Tuesday, 9 September 1980, to 
decide on appropriate modalities for the main 
Madrid Meeting. This will be done on the basis 
of the Final Act as well as of the other relevant 
documents adopted during the process of the 
CSCE. 

It was also agreed to hold, within the 
framework of the Follow-up to the CSCE, the 
meetings of experts of the participating States 
indicated below. 

In conformity with the mandate contained in 
the Final Act and according to the proposal 
made to this effect by the Government of Switz- 
erland a meeting of experts will be convened 
at Montreux on 31 October 1978, charged 
with pursuing the examination and elaboration 
of a generally acceptable method for peaceful 
settlement of disputes aimed at complementing 
existing methods. 

Upon the invitation of the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the meeting of 
experts envisaged in the Final Act in order to 
prepare a "Scientific Forum" will take place in 
Bonn starting on 20 June 1978. Representatives 
of UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization! and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe shall be in- 
vited to state their views. 

Upon the invitation of the Government ol 
Malta, a meeting of experts on the Mediterra- 
nean will be convened on 13 February 1979 in 
Valletta. Its mandate will be. within the 



Department of State Bull- 



Visit of 
Yugoslav President Tito 



■ii 
it 



President Josip Broz Tito of Yugo- 
slavia made a state visit to Washington 
March 6-9 to meet with President Car- 
ter and other government officials. 
Following is a joint statement issued by 
the White House on March 9. ' 

During the visit, President Tito met 
with members of the House of Repre- 
sentatives and Senate. The talks re- 
flected a high degree of interest in the 
legislative bodies of both countries to 
promote understanding and contacts be- 
tween the peoples of Yugoslavia and 
the United States, including a 
broadened exchange of political lead- 
ers. President Tito also met with other 
distinguished Americans. 

The two Presidents held extensive 
and useful talks in a spirit of mutual 
regard, candor, and friendship. They 
agreed that the significant improvement 
in bilateral relations over the past year, 
marked by a series of personal mes- 
sages between them as well as by 
high-level visits and consultations, 
should be continued and deepened, 
building upon the basis of mutual re- 
spect which the United States and the 



f 



Socialist Federal Republic of Yuj 
slavia hold for each other as equal, 
dependent, and sovereign states. Tr 
confirmed that the principles contair 
in previous joint statements ( Washit 
ton, October 1971 and Belgrade. A 
gust 1975) 2 have been tested in pract 
and that they, together with the prest 
statement, constitute the basis for t 
veloping relations between the t' 
countries. The two Presidents cons 
ered this meeting a major step in re 
forcing the already strong foundatic 
of US-Yugoslav relations. The vie 
of the two sides reflected wide areas 
agreement on the issues discussed. 

The two Presidents, noting the de 
historical and cultural ties betwe 
their peoples, agreed that Americans 
Yugoslav descent have played a maj 
role in strengthening the bonds 
friendship and understanding betwe 
their past and present homelands. 

The two Presidents noted with sat 
faction that economic exchanges b 
tween their two countries have d 
veloped positively, but agreed th 
there was potential for substantial adt 
tional interchange. While approvi 



framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the 
Final Act, to consider the possibilities and 
means of promoting concrete initiatives for 
mutually beneficial co-operation concerning 
various economic, scientific and cultural 
fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to 
the above subjects already under way. The 
non-participating Mediterranean States will be 
invited to contribute to the work of this meet- 
ing. Questions relating to security will be dis- 
cussed at the Madrid Meeting. 

The duration of the meetings of experts 
should not exceed 4-6 weeks. They will draw 
up conclusions and recommendations and send 
their reports to the Governments of the par- 
ticipating States. The results of these meetings 
will be taken into account, as appropriate, at 
the Madrid Meeting. 

All the above-mentioned meetings will be 
held in conformity with paragraph 4 of the 
chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" of 
the Final Act. 

The Government of the Socialist Federal Re- 
public of Yugoslavia is requested to transmit 
the present document to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, to the Director-General 
of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of 



the United Nations Economic Commission : 
Europe. The Government of the Socialist Ft 
eral Republic of Yugoslavia is also requested 
transmit the present document to the govei 
ments of the Mediterranean non-participati 
States. 

The representatives of the participate 
States expressed their profound gratitude to t 
people and Government of the Socialist Fedei 
Republic of Yugoslavia for the excellent c 
ganization of the Belgrade Meeting and t 
warm hospitality extended to the delegatio 
which participated in the Meeting. 



1 Statement at the final plenary meeting 
the CSCE on Mar. 8, 1978, in Belgrade. Ar 
bassador Arthur J. Goldberg is chairman of tl| 
U.S. delegation to the CSCE. 

2 For text of joint statement issued on Mar 
following the meetings between Presidents Ca 
ter and Tito, see p. 44. 

3 For text of CSCE Final Act. see BulleTI 
of Sept. I. 1975, p. 323. 

4 For statement by Ambassador Goldberg . 
the opening plenary session on Oct. 6, 197' 
see Bulletin of Nov. 14. 1977, p. 674. 

5 Issued in Belgrade on Mar. 8, 1978. 



ril 1978 



45 



in balanced nature of trade between 
tf two countries, they emphasized the 
fid for further efforts to expand its 
flume, to strengthen industrial coop- 
.|<tion, to promote travel and tourism, 
fcencourage joint ventures and to im- 
pi'Ve opportunities for business repre- 
situtives to work in both countries. 
f|; two Presidents expressed their ap- 
p ciation for the contribution of the 
Bited States-Yugoslav Economic 
ftancil to the development of eco- 
■nic relations and welcomed the es- 
Blishment of joint economic/commer- 

■ working groups which will serve to 
fjilitate increased trade and economic 
operation. 

The two sides confirmed their mutual 
i^rest in the free flow of information 
fll people between their two societies 
.1 1 endorsed both governmental and 
«i-governmental cultural and infor- 
ntion exchange programs which fur- 
Mr this goal. In addition the two 
(fi'sidents agreed that greater under- 
snding by the general public of each 
ls| iety's culture and social develop- 

■ nt would be beneficial. They af- 
f ned the importance of scientific and 
t 1 hnological cooperation as well as 
e :hanges in the field of social and 




® National capital 

Railroad 

Road 
+ International airport 



25 50 75 100 Kilometer 



A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 99.000 sq. mi (about two-thirds (he 

size of California). 
Capital: Belgrade (pop. 845,000). 
Other Cities: Zagreb (602.000), Skopje 

(389.000). Sarajevo (292, 000), Ljubljana 

(258.000). 

People 

Population: 21.6 million (1977 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: 1%. 

Density: 207 per sq. mi. 

Ethnic Groups: 40% Serbs, 22<7<- Croats, 
87t Slovenes, 8% Bosnian Muslims (re- 
garded as a separate ethnic group), 6% 
Macedonians, 6% Albanians, 2% Mon- 
tenegrin Serbs. 2% Hungarians. 1% Turks. 

Religions: Eastern Orthodox (Serbian and 
Macedonian), Roman Catholic, Islam. 

Languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, 
Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian. 

Literacy: 85%. 

Life Expectancy: 66 yrs. 

Government 

Official Name: Socialist Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
Type: Federal Republic. 
Independence: Dec. 1. 1918. 
Date of Constitution: Feb. 1974. 
Branches: Executive — President (Chief of 

State, elected to unlimited term). Pre- 



mier (Head of Government and President 

of the Federal Executive Council); 

Cabinet (Federal Executive Council). 

Legislative — bicameral SFRY Assembly 

(278 delegates). Judicial — Constitutional 

Court. 
Political Party: League of Communists of 

Yugoslavia. 
Suffrage: Universal over 18. 
Administrative Subdivisions: 6 republics, 2 

autonomous provinces. 

Economy 

GNP: $37.7 billion (1976). 

Annual Growth Rate (76/75): 3.7%. 

Per Capita GNP: $1,752 (1976). 

Annual Per Capita Growth Rate [of GNP] 
(76/75): 2.7%. 

Agriculture: Land — 33% arable; labor — 
48%; products — corn, wheat, tobacco, 
sugar beets. 

Industry: Labor — 52%; products — wood, 
processed food, nonferrous metals. 
machinery, textiles. 

Natural Resources: Bauxite, timber, anti- 
mony, chromium, lead, zinc, asbestos, 
mercury, cadmium. 

Trade: Exports— $4. 9 billion (1976): 
timber, nonferrous metals, machinery 
and metal products, textiles, iron, and 
steel. Partners — U.S.S.R. , Italy, 
F R.G.. U.S. Imports — $7 .4 billion 
(1976): machinery and metal products, 
chemicals, textiles, iron, petroleum. 



steel. Partners — F.R.G.. Italy. 

USSR.. Iraq. 
Official Exchange Rate: Fluctuates around 

18 dinars to US$1.00. 
Economic Aid Received: Total — $5 billion 

(1945-76). U.S. only — $2.9 billion 

(1950-67), including $700 million in 

grant military assistance (1951-59). U.S. 

economic aid ceased Jan. 1. 1967. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, GATT, 
IBRD, IMF, IAEA. CEMA (observer 
status), EEC, OECD. 

Principal Government Officials 

Yugoslavia: President of the Republic — 
Josip Broz Tito; Federal Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs — Milos Minic; Ambas- 
sador to the U.S. — Dimce Belovski. 

United States: Ambassador Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger. 



Taken from the Department of State's Feb- 
ruary 1978 edition of the Background 
Notes on Yugoslavia. Copies of the com- 
plete Note may be purchased for 50t from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington, 
DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed 
when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed 
to the same address). 



46 



physical sciences, education, culture, 
and information and pledged to develop 
them further. 

Presidents Carter and Tito examined 
major international issues. They de- 
voted special attention to questions of 
peace and security in the world and to 
the promotion of international coopera- 
tion. They affirmed the necessity of ex- 
tending the policy of the reduction of 
tensions to all regions of the world and 
all areas of international relations and 
of ensuring an opportunity for all coun- 
tries to contribute to the resolution of 
current world problems and to the 
strengthening of peace and security. 
They underlined in particular that all 
countries should seek to resolve dis- 
putes by peaceful means and should 
deal with each other on the basis of 
equality. 

They also affirmed that the right of 
all states to determine their own social 
systems without outside interference 
must be respected and that relations 
among states, regardless of differences 
or similarities in their social, political, 
and economic systems, must be based 
on the spirit and principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 

Presidents Carter and Tito agreed 
that nonalignment is a very significant 
factor in world affairs. They share the 
view that the nonaligned countries can 
and should make an active contribution 
to the resolution of international prob- 
lems and to the more favorable evolu- 
tion of international relations. Presi- 
dent Carter reaffirmed the respect of 
the United States for Yugoslavia's 
commitment to nonalignment and for 
the role Yugoslavia plays in that 
movement. 

President Tito welcomed the steps 
taken by the United States Government 
over the past year on a number of 
long-standing issues of concern to the 
nonaligned. In this connection Presi 
dent Carter thanked President Tito for 
this warm message of support for the 
treaties which the United States has 
negotiated with the Republic of 
Panama concerning the future status of 
the Panama Canal. President Tito real 
firmed his view that the treaties would 
serve the interest of peace and stability 
in the region and throughout the world. 

The two Presidents reviewed recent 
developments and pledged renewed ef- 
forts to lower the barriers to under- 
standing and contact between all 
peoples of Europe, in accordance with 
their common aspirations. In this re- 
gard, they discussed the results of the 
Belgrade Conference and agreed that it 
has significantly strengthened the 
foundations for the continuation of 
multilateral efforts to increase security 
and cooperation in Europe. They reaf- 



firmed their commitment to the success 
of the CSCE [Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] process 
and to full implementation of all sec- 
tions of the Final Act. They urged all 
signatory states to join in efforts to 
achieve full implementation in order to 
further the process of consultation and 
contact between the participating coun- 
tries and to promote mutual understand- 
ing. They pledged continued efforts to- 
ward these goals in the period leading to 
the next Conference in Madrid in 1980. 

Presidents Tito and Carter expressed 
their special concern about the situation 
in the Middle East which remains a 
source of great tension in international 
affairs. They agreed on the urgent need 
to find a comprehensive, just and last- 
ing solution to the problems of the 
Middle East and explained in detail 
their respective views on the current 
situation. 

The two Presidents also agreed that 
the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict should be 
resolved by peaceful means, taking 
account of the need to respect both ter- 
ritorial integrity and the legitimate 
aspirations of the peoples of both coun- 
tries, and in conformity with the prin- 
ciples of the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity and the Charter 
of the United Nations. They expressed 
their belief that the international com- 
munity should exert greater efforts for 
securing conditions to maintain the ter- 
ritorial integrity, independence and 
nonaligned position of these two 
countries. 

In their discussion of developments 
in Southern Africa, the two Presidents 
expressed support for the legitimate as- 
pirations of the African peoples to 
self-determination and majority rule. 
They condemned racism in all forms. 

The two Presidents discussed a vari- 
ety of aspects of human rights in the 
contemporary world and agreed that ef- 
forts toward the implementation of 
human rights in all countries should be 
in accord with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Helsinki Final Act. 

Presidents Carter and Tito reviewed 
the international economic situation 
with particular attention. While ap- 
proaching global economic problems 
from different perspectives, they rec- 
ognized their gravity and stressed the 
need for necessary changes in world 
economic relations which take into ac- 
count the interests and equality of all 
countries. They noted in particular the 
importance of increased support for ac- 
celerated economic development for 
the developing countries and a broader 
linkage between the economies of the 
industrialized and developing coun- 



H ' 
- 



J* 



i» 



Department of State Bull.. 

tries. They emphasized the signif icai 
of the global economic dialogue a 
vital element in fostering cooperat 
between the industrialized and develi 
ing countries, which is an indispen 
ble precondition for the settlement 
existing economic problems. 

The two Presidents voiced their de ;t 
concern over the continuation of 
arms race, which renders difficult 
solution of substantial political, a 
nomic, and other problems besetti 
mankind today. Both governments 1 * 
lieve that durable peace in the world 
a whole can only be assured if effect f 
measures are undertaken to halt I 
arms race and to take concrete steps 
nuclear disarmanent toward the u 
mate goal of general and complete d 
armament. In this connection, the t 
Presidents underscored the importar 
of the negotiations on strategic ar 
limitations, mutual and balanced foi 
reductions in Central Europe and 
other efforts to limit the arms ra 
They also stressed the importance 
the forthcoming special session of i 
General Assembly of the United r- 
tions devoted to disarmament. 

The two Presidents emphasized I 
decisive importance of the developrm 
of energy for the economic growth 
all countries, and of the developi 
countries in particular, and they belie 
therefore that nuclear energy for peai 
ful purposes should be made accessil 
to all countries without discriminatu 
The two Presidents also pointed to l 
danger of the proliferation of nuch 
weapons and agreed that this danj 
can be diminished through an effect! 
reduction of existing nuclear arrr 
ments and through the development a 
application of nuclear energy f 
peaceful purposes and the implemem 
tion of measures in accordance with t 
provisions and objectives of the Trea 
on [the] Non-Proliferation of Nucle 
Weapons and other internation 
agreements within the framework 
the International Atomic Enerj 
Agency. 

The two Presidents observed that te 
rorism is a common scourge of the i 
ternational community, and they agiw 
that effective measures must be takt 
to eliminate this senseless threat 
people throughout the world. Preside 
Carter specifically condemned the vi. 
lence directed against Yugoslavia t 
terrorists in the United States an 
pledged his government's commitmei 
to take firm measures to prevent and i 
prosecute such criminal activity whic 
is against the interests of the Unit 
States and of good United States 
Yugoslav relations. 

President Carter reiterated the cort 
tinuing support of the United States fc 



1978 



47 



independence, territorial integrity 

unity of Yugoslavia. During the 

[ it was stressed that good relations 

cooperation between the United 

bs and Yugoslavia constitute an es- 

(ial element of American foreign 

;v and that the United States is in- 

i>ted in a strong and independent 

loslavia as a factor for balance, 

le and stability in Europe and in the 

Id. 

resident Tito extended an invitation 

resident Carter to pay an official 

I to Yugoslavia. The invitation was 

|:pted with pleasure. □ 

ntroductory paragraphs omitted; for full 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
iments of Mar. 13, 1978. For an exchange 
marks between President Carter and Presi- 
Tito at the welcoming ceremony on the 
Ih Lawn of the White House and for an ex- 
ge of toasts on Mar. 7. see Weekly Com- 
ion of Presidential Documents of Mar. 13, 
3 and 475 respectively, 
or texts of joint statements, see Bul- 
is of Nov. 22, 1971, and Sept 8, 1975. 



HUMAN RIGHTS: 

Country Reports 



Visit of Danish 

Prime Minister 

J firyensen 



rime Minister Anker Jijirgensen of 
nmark made an official visit to 
Wshington February 21-23 to meet 
m h President Carter and other gov- 
e ment officials. Following is the 
h' of the White House statement is- 
S d on February 21 . 

President Carter met with Prime 
I nister Anker J^rgensen of Denmark 
< February 21 at the White House. 1 
' e two leaders reviewed economic 
tnds in their two countries, in the 
'est generally, and in the world, 
'ley agreed that continued close 

• operation among the industrial de- 
ocracies is necessary to increase 

• onomic growth, resist protec- 
)nism, and work toward resolving 
obal economic problems. The two 
aders emphasized the importance of 
e multilateral trade negotiations in 
icouraging freer trade to promote 

I derly growth in both developed and 
lj:veloping nations. 

■ Prime Minister J^rgensen gave the 
i resident his assessment of develop- 
ments affecting the European Com- 

| unity, including the direct elections 
li the European Parliament and the 

oplications by Greece, Portugal, and 



by Mark L. Schneider 



Let me emphasize that we are en- 
gaged in a continuing process of incor- 
porating protection of human rights as 
a first priority in the design and con- 
duct of our foreign policy. It is within 
that framework that the 1978 Country 
Reports [on Human Rights Practices] 
should be examined.' We are deter- 
mined to obtain the most up-to-date 
and accurate picture of human rights 
conditions in individual countries. That 
picture is vital to our decisionmaking, 
and we are sure it also will aid the 
Congress in coming to its own judg- 
ments. The reports were compiled in 
fulfillment of the requirements of Sec- 
tion 502B(b) and Section 116(d)(1) to 
cover those countries receiving eco- 
nomic development assistant under Part 
I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, or countries which 
were proposed as recipients of security 
assistance for fiscal year 1979. There- 
fore, there are many countries omitted 
from the country reports, among them 
some of the worst violators of human 
rights. 

These 105 reports were compiled 
over a period of some 6 months and in- 



volved our embassies in each country, 
the regional bureaus, and a series of 
functional bureaus, including the 
Bureau of Human Rights and Humani- 
tarian Affairs. The reports drew on in- 
formation which the Department had in 
its possession but required special re- 
porting on current conditions. To a 
substantial degree we intensified the 
reporting requirements over the course 
of the year, resulting in continuing ef- 
forts to improve the quality of these 
submissions. 

Field comments, public information 
from the media, findings of congres- 
sional committees, reports and 
documentation from international non- 
governmental organizations all were 
used in the preparation of these reports. 
Numerous visits abroad of high-level 
Department officials have proved fruit- 
ful in obtaining firsthand information. 
We also receive a steady stream of vis- 
itors from many countries who share 
their impressions with us. 

The regional bureaus synthesized the 
reports from the field and their drafts 
were then reviewed and commented 
upon by the various functional bureaus. 
The Bureau of Human Rights and Hu- 
manitarian Affairs collated all of the 
reports attempting to assure that all rel- 



Spain for Community membership. 
President Carter reaffirmed the U.S. 
commitment to European unity and 
support for the European Community, 
as underscored by his visit to EC 
headquarters in January. 

The President and the Prime Minis- 
ter reaffirmed the shared commitment 
of their nations to NATO and to the 
defense of Western Europe. The two 
expressed satisfaction at the progress 
the allies have made in implementing 
the measures agreed at last May's 
NATO summit, and they discussed 
the forthcoming NATO summit, this 
May in Washington. They noted close 
U.S. -Danish cooperation in NATO 
programs, including joint production 
with other NATO countries of the 
F-16 aircraft. 

The President and Prime Minister 
exchanged views on major issues in 
East- West relations. They noted the 
close coincidence in the positions of 
their two governments on the CSCE 
[Conference on Security and Coopera- 



tion in Europe] review conference in 
Belgrade, and the President praised 
the role of the EC-Nine within the 
broader NATO consultations. They 
stressed the continuing need in the fu- 
ture for similar frank and detailed re- 
views of the implementation of the 
entire Helsinki Final Act, including 
its important provisions regarding 
human rights and humanitarian mat- 
ters. 

The two leaders exchanged views 
on current developments and pros- 
pects for progress in the Middle East, 
southern Africa, and Cyprus. The two 
leaders also agreed on the need to re- 
duce arms sold by all weapons- 
producing nations. The President wel- 
comed Denmark's participation in the 
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation. □ 



Opening paragraph omitted; for full text, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Feb. 27. 1978. 

1 The Prime Minister is also current Presi- 
dent of the European Council. 



48 

evant information had been taken into 
account and trying to see that the vari- 
ous regions treated countries in an 
equally balanced and comprehensive 
manner. 

1 can assure the subcommittee that 
many, many hours were spent in trying 
to pull together these varied sources of 
information to produce these reports. 
There undoubtedly will continue to be 
constructive and vigorous debate and 
disagreement over specific statements 
or over the weight given to one or 



Unman Rights 
Treaties 



On February 23, 1978, President 
Carter sent four human rights treaties 
to the Senate for ratification. The first 
three, all negotiated at the United Na- 
tions, are: 

• The International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Ra- 
cial Discrimination, signed by Arthur 
J. Goldberg, then U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, 
on September 28, 1966; 

• The International Convenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, signed by President Carter on 
October 5, 1977; and 

• The International Convenant of 
Civil and Political Rights, signed by 
President Carter on October 5, 1977. 

The fourth treaty is the American 
Convention on Human Rights, signed 
by President Carter on June 1, 1977. 
Adopted by the Organization of 
American States in 1969, it is open 
only to members of that Organization. 

In urging a rapid consent to ratifi- 
cation. President Carter reminded the 
Senate that although the three U.N. 
treaties have entered into force and 
are widely approved by the world 
community, the United States remains 
one of the few major countries not 
party to them. This failure, he said, 
prejudices U.S. participation in the 
development of the international law 
of human rights. Ratification will be 
a positive expression of the U.S. de- 
sire to work in concert with other na- 
tions to promote a greater respect for 
human rights. 

The President's letter of transmittal 
to the Senate is printed in the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of February 27; the texts of the 
State Department reports and the four 
treaties are printed in S.Ex. C, D, E, 
and F of February 23. □ 



another aspect of a particular country's 
practices. 



As the chairman is aware, these re- 
ports were being prepared during the 
process in which decisions as to the FY 
1979 security assistance budget pro- 
posal also were being decided. The As- 
sistant Secretary of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs [Patricia M. De- 
rian] is a member of the Arms Export 
Control Board, which considers all as- 
pects of the U.S. arms transfers policy. 
In addition, as a member of the Secu- 
rity Assistance Advisory Group which 
is charged with advisory respon- 
sibilities in the area of security assist- 
ance proposals, the bureau raised 
human rights questions about indi- 
vidual countries. These questions were 
considered along with other U.S. na- 
tional interests. 

It should be emphasized that the 
process of review of the security assist- 



] 



Department of State Bull 



ance program has extended throughB 
the Department so that proposals i 
forward by country officers of gl 
graphic bureaus have, for the ffl 
time, systematically and uniformly i- 
eluded human rights considerations." 



/ [i erpts from a statement before the Subco, 
lee an International Organizations of the H 
Committee on International Relations on i 
15, 1978. The complete transcript of the 
ings will be published by the committee and 
be available from the Superintendent of D, 
merits, U.S. Government Printing Office, W 
ington, DC. 20402. Mr. Schneider is De, 
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
Humanitarian Affairs . 

1 The report, submitted to the House Com 
tee on International Relations and the Se 
Committee on Foreign Relations, is a j 
committee print dated Feb. 3, 1978. It is a' 
able from the Superintendent of Docume 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washin; 
DC. 20402, for $4.25. 



MIDDLE EAST: 1/.S.-I rati 
Joint Commission 



Joint Communique 

The U.S. -Iran Joint Commission for 
Economic Cooperation held its fourth 
session in Washington on February 28, 
1978. The Delegation of the United 
States was headed by the Honorable 
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, and 
the Iranian Delegation was led by H.E. 
Mohammed Yeganeh, Minister of Eco- 
nomic Affairs and Finance. High offi- 
cials of both governments also took 
part in the discussions. 

During his visit to Washington, 
Minister Yeganeh also met with Secre- 
tary of the Treasury Michael Blumen- 
thal and other U.S. officials for discus- 
sions on a broad range of economic and 
other issues of mutual interest. 

Minister Yeganeh and Secretary 
Vance reviewed the current interna- 
tional economic situation and discussed 
bilateral matters in the spirit of mutual 
respect and understanding that has long 
characterized U.S. -Iranian relations. 
The U.S. side noted with satisfaction 
Iran's recent efforts to apply a freeze 
on oil prices during 1978, and assured 
Iran of the U.S. determination to meet 
its long-term energy needs by promot- 
ing conservation and the development 
of alternate sources of energy, and also 
to take effective measures in curbing 
inflation and improving the interna- 
tional monetary situation. 

The two sides emphasized the impor- 






tance of carrying out the recommen 
tions of the Conference on Inter 
tional Economic Cooperation (CII 
and agreed to pursue the posit 
dialogue in the United Nations ov 
view mechanism established by Uni 
Nations General Assembly Resolut 
32/174 of December 1977. 

The U.S. side expressed its apprec 
tion for Iran's efforts in the Econon 
and Social Council of the United > 
tions to conclude an internatior 
agreement on illicit payments. The V 
sides explored possibilities for furtl 
cooperation towards this end. 

The Joint Commission meeting ft 
lowed several days of preparato 
meetings by its five standing joi 
committees, each of which had pr 
pared detailed proposals for the ft 
Commission's consideration. The tv 
sides reviewed the status of progress 
the programs approved at the last Joi 
Commission meeting in Tehran in A 
gust 1976, and considered the recor 
mendations for cooperation in ne 
areas offered by the committees. T 
Commission concluded that there is 
vast scope for cooperation between Ir 
and the United States for their mutu 
benefit. 

Economy and Finance. Both sid 
reaffirmed their belief that the potenti 
for expansion of commercial relatio 
between the two countries is ve 
great. They registered their determin 



1978 



49 






n to work towards that end and 

cussed ways of doing so. In this 

nection the Iranian Delegation ex- 

ssed Iran's interest in being made 

gible for the U.S. Generalized Sys- 

of Preferences, which it considers 

portant for the development of future 

de relations between the two 

ntries. 

he Commission agreed that cooper- 
on in development of various fields 
industries, such as chemical, phar- 
iceutical, engineering, basic metals, 
trochemicals, transportation equip- 
nt, electronics, and other industries 
Iran will be greatly facilitated if it 
solved capital participation as well as 
ancing, transfer of technology and 
port financing. 

Both sides noted with pleasure the 
oad range or cooperative activities 
visaged in the field of health, includ- 
the establishment of the Imperial 
sdical Center of Iran. The Commis- 
>n expressed particular satisfaction 
t the two countries had successfully 
operated in the establishment of the 
od and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Iran. 

Housing. The Commission noted the 
iority attached by Iran to the de- 
lopment of middle and low income 
using, and agreed that there are sig- 
ficant opportunities for cooperation 
this area. 

Transportation. The Commission 
scussed cooperation of the two coun- 
es in the field of transportation, in- 
uding construction of toll roads in 
in and expressed satisfaction at the 
>nclusion in June 1977 of a technical 
rvice agreement between the U.S. 
;deral Aviation Administration and 
e Iranian Civil Aviation Organization 
upgrade the air traffic control system 
Iran. 

Energy. The two sides expressed 
itisfaction over the recent progress 
iwards conclusion of a bilateral 



Editor's Note 

Material concerning the Palestinian ter- 
rorist attack inside Israel on March 1 1 and 
Israel's retaliatory military action inside 
southern Lebanon, as well as the text of 
la U.N. Security Council resolution, will 
be published in the May issue of the 
Bulletin. 



Most Favored Nation basis, and in ac- 
cordance with International Atomic 
[Energy] Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
and the objectives of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the par- 
ticipation of the United States in the 
Iranian nuclear power program. 

The Commission reviewed the recent 
cooperation between the two countries 
in the training of Iranian nuclear power 
engineers and discussed possible future 
programs for the establishment of an 
export refinery in Iran and exchange of 
information in respect to enhanced oil 
and gas recovery technology, as well as 
uranium exploration and solar energy 
training and application. 

Agriculture. The Commission 
agreed to encourage further coopera- 
tion between the private sectors of the 
two countries in agriculture. 

Both delegations expressed satisfac- 
tion with the current and proposed 
training and consultancy programs in 
extension, soya and cotton production, 
forestry, veterinary services, plant 
quarantine and data collection. 

Manpower and Technical Cooper- 
ation. The Commission reviewed 



cooperation between the two countries 
in the field of manpower and technical 
cooperation and noted with satisfaction 
the completion of joint activities in vo- 
cational training, manpower statistics, 
audio-visual techniques, on-the-job 
training and expatriate employment 
practices. 

Experts of the two sides will meet in 
Iran in the near future to initiate several 
cooperative programs in technical edu- 
cation, productivity improvement, data 
processing and vocational training. 

Science, Technology and Educa- 
tion. The Commission noted progress" 
achieved since the August 1976 meet- 
ing in Tehran, particularly in the fields 
of education, oceanography, meteorol- 
ogy, remote sensing application and 
environment. Proposals for future 
cooperation in educational technology, 
geological research, earthquake effects 
mitigation, arid lands sciences and es- 
tablishment of links between research 
laboratories and industry were wel- 
comed by both delegations. □ 

Issued Feb. 28, 1978 (text /rum press release 
98 oj Feb 28) 



NUCLEAR POLICY: 

\oii-f*i'«f if <»!'«! ion lei of 1978 



Agreement for the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, which should be 
signed in the near future. It is antici- 
pated that the final accord will open 
an era for wide collaboration under a 



Statement by President Carter 

I am pleased to sign into law today 
H.R. 8638. the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1978. Enactment 
of this legislation takes us a major step 
toward fulfillment of an objective 
which the United States shares with 
other nations — a halt in the spread of 
nuclear weapons capability while pre- 
serving the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. 

The Congress has responded to this 
challenge with both care and courage in 
establishing a framework for insuring 
that we meet these objectives. Senators 
Ribicoff. Glenn, and Percy; Represen- 
tatives Zablocki. Bingham, and 
Findley; their collegues on the commit- 
tees which developed this bill; and 
their staffs have my respect and my 
thanks for their leadership on this is- 
sue. It has been a privilege for me, as it 
has been for Secretary Vance and other 
members of my Administration, to 
work with them on the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1978. 

Our efforts to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons began more than 30 
years ago, when we went to the United 
Nations with an offer to place certain 



aspects of nuclear energy under inter- 
national ownership and control. The 
passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 and the adoption of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty by the United Na- 
tions in 1968 and now this law, each 
has moved us further toward attainment 
of our nonproliferation goals. 

On April 7 and 27 of last year, I out- 
lined the policies and programs which 
we would implement to diminish pro- 
liferation risks. 1 Today, I want to 
reaffirm this Administration's strong 
commitment to that policy. We also 
recognize that nuclear power technol- 
ogies now in operation, which do not 
involve nuclear fuel reprocessing, can 
and must provide an important source 
of energy for our nation and for other 
countries. Our current once-through 
fuel cycle is and will continue to be a 
significant contributor to our energy 
supply. Properly managed, it can func- 
tion without increasing the risks of pro- 
liferation. Our policy takes a responsi- 
ble course between forgoing the energy 
benefits of nuclear power and becom- 
ing committed to commercialized use 
of plutonium before we know that we 
can deal safely with its risks. 

I continue to oppose making prema- 



50 



Department of State Bulhi 



ture and unnecessary commitments to 
commercialization of the fast breeder 
reactor and reprocessing, as exem- 
plified in the United States by the 
Clinch River and Barnwell projects. 

We and the other nations of the 
world must use the time we now have 
and pause to develop safer technol- 
ogies, better institutional arrange- 
ments, and improved safeguards which 
will permit all nations to achieve their 
energy objectives while preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

More than 40 nations have already 
joined with us in an International Nu- 
clear Fuel Cycle Evaluation [INFCE] 
to explore and assess our means of 
meeting these twin goals. During this 
period of examination, the uranium- 
fueled reactors now in widespread op- 
eration can be used without incurring 
new proliferation risks. If our common 
search for improved institutions and 
technologies is to be successful, how- 
ever, all nations will be required to 
avoid those steps which prejudice the 
outcome of the INFCE. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
sets the conditions and criteria which 
will govern U.S. cooperation with 
other nations in our efforts to develop 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 
encouragement of universal ratification 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
central to the act, as is the establish- 
ment of a comprehensive set of con- 
trols, including application of Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards and provision of a stable 
framework for international nuclear 
cooperation and commerce. The act 
will also make our export licensing 
process more predictable. 

We also will be taking steps to 
strengthen the safety and security of 
the fuel cycle we now have in operation 
and to insure that it continues to be an 
efficient and reliable source of energy, 
both domestically and abroad. 

Over the course of this year, we will 
develop comprehensive policies for 
management and disposal of radioac- 
tive waste, including implementation 
of the spent fuel storage program an- 
nounced last October. To insure our 
ability to continue as a reliable supplier 
of uranium fuel to those who share our 
nonproliferation objectives, we are 
moving ahead with a new enrichment 
plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. 

Preventing nuclear proliferation will 
not be easy — some have called this task 
impossible. I believe, however, that 
halting the spread of nuclear weapons 
is imperative. We must press forward 
in our efforts. Fear of failure cannot be 
allowed to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 

In our first year, we have made sub- 



stantial progress. The nuclear- 
supplying countries have agreed upon 
and published guidelines for the export 
of nuclear fuel and technology. The In- 
ternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua- 
tion is underway. As this legislation 
now becomes law, we are establishing 
clear criteria and incentives for nuclear 
cooperation, as well as sanctions 
against violations of safeguards. 

Although I still have reservations 
about the numerous provisions in this 
act which state that Congress may in- 
validate or approve executive branch 
action by concurrent resolution, I am 
signing it because of its overwhelming 
importance to our nonproliferation pol- 
icy. I do wish to make clear, however, 
that by signing this act, I am not agree- 
ing that the Congress can overturn au- 
thorized executive actions through 
procedures not provided in the 
Constitution. 

In conclusion, I am persuaded that 
the new criteria, incentives, and proce- 
dures in this act will help solve the 
problems of proliferation. They will 
help to insure that access to nuclear 
energy will not be accompanied by the 
spread of nuclear explosive capability. 
While I recognize that some of these 



provisions may involve adjustments , 
our friends abroad, this more cell 
prehensive policy will greatly inert I 
international security. I believe tt 
they will ultimately join us in our -J 
lief that improved world securitv j 
tifies the steps which we all must ti 
to bring it about. Control over kj 
spread of nuclear weapons on <■ 
planet is one of the paramount qui 
tions of our time. 

If the world is to benefit from ; 
great potential of nuclear power, I 
must act now to protect ourselves ;J 
future generations from its worst d - 
gers. We in the United States v*l 
dedicate our expertise and technical M 
sources to this task, and we urge ot r 
countries to do the same. Let us cJ 
tinue to work together to achieve th>: 
goals. 



Made on signing H R. 8638 into law > 
Mar. 10. 1978 (text from Weekly CompilaM 
of Presidential Documents of Mar. 13). I 
enacted H.R. 8638 is Public Law 95-242. 
proved Mar. 10. 

'For text of President Carter's April 7. 19 . 
statement, see Bulletin of May 2. p. 429; ! 
text of his message to the Congress of April , 
see Bulletin of May 16. p. 477. 



Safeguanls Agreement 



White House Announcement 

President Carter on February 9 ful- 
filled a 10-year U.S. pledge for nu- 
clear safeguards by submitting to the 
Senate for ratification a treaty with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) [Agreement between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards in 
the United States of America with at- 
tached Protocol J. The treaty would 
make all U.S. nuclear facilities, ex- 
cept those with direct national security 
significance, eligible for the applica- 
tion of safeguards by this international 
Agency. 

Under the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty (NPT), the 99 non- 
nuclear-weapon-member states are re- 
quired to accept IAEA safeguards on 
all of their peaceful nuclear facilities. 
While the NPT does not impose this 
duty on nuclear-weapon states, the 
U.S. voluntary offer to enter into such 
a safeguards agreement has been ex- 
tremely important in inducing other na- 
tions to adhere to the treaty. U.S. will- 



ingness to accept the same safegua I 
as the NPT requires for non-nude- 
weapon states is tangible evidence U 
our belief that the NPT does not dtl 
criminate against non-nuclear-wean 
states. It also demonstrates the U f 
conviction that the application of int I 
national safeguards neither hampers (I 
development of nuclear power nor pis 
the safeguarded party at a commerc 
disadvantage. 

This offer by the United States I 
bring its nuclear facilities not havi 
direct national security significan 
under international safeguards was fiilj 
made on December 2, 1967, by Pre; 
dent Lyndon Johnson. It has been e 
dorsed by all succeeding Administr 
(ions 

Upon entry into force, this trea 
will be an additional signal to tl 
world, including both nuclear supplii 
and recipient nations, of our continuir 
support for the universal application < 
IAEA safeguards and our desire that a 
nations adhere to the Nuclear Noi 
Proliferation Treaty. 

The safeguards call for inventory an. 
design information to be submitted t 



>ril 1978 



51 



>unet 



OCEANS: Antarctic Resource 
ci ml Environmental Concerns 



Palsy T. Mink 



It has been over 2'/2 years since our 
;t testimony on Antarctic resources 
fore this committee, and there have 
en important developments in the 
erim. Since you last held Antarctic 
arings on May 15, 1975, the Antarc- 
■ Treaty countries have held two 
gular consultative meetings, the 
hth and ninth in 1975 and 1977, 
d two extended preparatory meet- 
gs, one in 1976 dealing with mineral 
sources and one in 1977 devoted to 
arine living resources of the 
itarctic. 

In addition, a special consultative 
;eting, the first of its kind, was held 
1977 at which the original treaty 
natories, who are also consultative 
rties, welcomed Poland — the first 
eding party to achieve consultative 
tus and thus entry to the treaty 
um. Poland, which had signed the 
aty in 1961, became the 13th nation 
join those entitled by the treaty to 
eet periodically to deal with ques- 
ts involving Antarctica. A second 
>ecial Antarctic Treaty consultative 
eeting is scheduled to start on Feb- 
ary 27 in Australia. It will deal with 
ntarctic marine living resources 
: sues. 

ackground 

The Antarctic, long the domain of 
ientists whose rights to unimpeded 
ovement through the region are 
aaranteed by the Antarctic Treaty, 
is increasingly become the focus of 
! tention as a potential source of valu- 
ole resources. This attention has man- 
ested itself primarily in interest in 
quatic resources, especially krill, be- 
ause of the vast quantities believed to 
xist and the supposedly relative ease 
f its exploitation. The flurry of public 
iterest in mineral resources, espe- 
ially petroleum, that stemmed from 
lie period of the 1973 OPEC [Organi- 
|ation of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
ties] oil embargo and the coincidental 
|eports of possible oil reserves 
iffshore of the Antarctic Continent, 
.ppears to have subsided somewhat. 



Within the executive branch, how- 
ever, and in the councils of other An- 
tarctic Treaty consultative parties, both 
the mineral and living resources issues 
have been kept under scrutiny; 1978 
will be devoted largely to marine liv- 
ing resource questions while 1979 will 
probably see fuller discussion of min- 
eral resource issues. 

The United States will act as host to 
the tenth Antarctic Treaty consultative 
meeting in 1979, the 20th anniversary 
of the signing of the treaty in Wash- 
ington. Between now and then it is 
also likely that there will be as many 
as six or seven multilateral meetings 
on Antarctic matters dealing with 
things ranging from improvement of 
telecommunications to the decisive 
meeting to negotiate a living marine 
resource conservation regime. 

In all, I can say that the interna- 
tional discourse in the Antarctic in the 
past few years has been fruitful. U.S. 
policy objectives have, in the main, 
been achieved. The general public and 
the private sector in the United States 
have also made their views known to 
the Department. Indeed, in the past 
year consultations with conservation 
groups in particular have been benefi- 
cial in the policy formulation process, 
and their adviser role on U.S. delega- 
tions dealing with Antarctic matters 
has been solicited and accepted. This 
is a departure from the practice of ex- 
clusion of public members prevalent as 
late as 1976 and still exercised by al- 
most all other consultative parties. 

Resource Issues 

Turning now to resource issues, 
U.S. policy is governed by two pri- 
mary considerations. 

• First, protection of the environ- 
ment and preservation of the ecosys- 
tem from undue harm is essential. 

• Second, resources, if ever 
exploited, must be used wisely and 
taken only under appropriate environ- 
mental safeguards. 

The thrust of this policy can be seen 
in the recommendations on mineral re- 
sources adopted at the eighth and ninth 



he IAEA. The Agency's fundamental 
safeguards measure is the accounting of 
Nuclear materials. The United States 
will submit to the Agency accounting 



reports on nuclear materials subject to 
safeguards . □ 

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 13, 1978. 



Antarctic Treaty consultative meet- 
ings. These call for continued efforts 
to achieve a timely international re- 
gime to regulate resource exploitation 
if it should occur and for nations to 
exercise and urge restraint on com- 
mercial exploitation in the meantime. 

Mineral Resources. It may be of 
interest to the committee to learn that 
the widespread support among consul- 
tative parties in the first half of the 
1970's for some kind of moratorium 
on mineral resource activities has 
largely evaporated. Most consultative 
parties now believe that a moratorium 
would simply halt all constructive 
thinking about a minerals regime 
without effectively halting an oil rush 
if a find were made. Therefore, a U.S. 
offer at the ninth consultative meeting 
to work toward an acceptable 
moratorium if a consensus for one de- 
veloped fell on virtually deaf ears. A 
feeling of varying degrees of urgency 
to achieve a regime prevails, one 
which we welcome because without it 
the relatively slow pace with which 
the consultative mechanism moves 
may not necessarily produce results in 
a timely fashion. 

Marine Living Resources. The 
question of marine living resources is, 
in fact, more immediate. The ninth 
meeting of Antarctic Treaty consulta- 
tive parties held last fall, and the pre- 
paratory meetings held prior to it, 
witnessed the emergence of Antarctic 
marine living resource issues as a pri- 
mary concern to the consultative par- 
ties. 

The emphasis upon Antarctic marine 
living resources derived from the coin- 
cidence of two factors: 

• First, the prospect that large-scale 
fishing would be initiated in Antarctic 
waters and 

• Second, recognition of the poten- 
tial vulnerability of the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem to unregulated 
harvesting. 

It has long been known that Antarc- 
tic waters are highly productive and 
rich in marine life. Uncontrolled har- 
vesting has, in the past, led to serious 
depletion of Antarctic whale and seal 
stocks. In the 1960's the attention of 
scientists and fisheries experts turned 
to Antarctic krill — small shrimp-like 
crustaceans (euphausiids) which are 
the primary food for the great whales 
and which are found in Antarctic wa- 



52 



ters in very large quantities. One 
species of krill, Euphausia superba, 
forms dense swarms at or near the sur- 
face. This, combined with its high 
protein content, has made krill a lead- 
ing candidate for commercial harvest- 
ing either for direct human consump- 
tion or for fish meal. In addition, 
certain fish species and squid are 
considered to offer potential for sus- 
tained catches. 

Exploratory fishing in Antarctic 
waters was first undertaken by the 
Soviet Union and Japan. More recently 
other nations have joined in such ac- 
tivities, notably the Federal Republic 
of Germany, a nontreaty party, and 
Poland. South Korea is also planning a 
krill expedition in late 1978. The large 
estimates of potential yield of krill — 
from tens of millions to over 100 mil- 
lion metric tons annually — combined 
with excess distant water fishing 
capacity because of restrictions in 
coastal state 200-mile fishery zones 
make commercial harvesting a 
probability — and sooner rather than 
later. 

At the same time there is little ex- 
perience in large-scale harvesting of 
resources such as krill which occupy 
so low and central a role in the marine 
ecosystem. The Antarctic marine 
ecosystem represents a finely balanced 
adaptation to the extreme environmen- 
tal condition of the southernmost 
ocean. Uncontrolled harvesting of 
krill, or other components of the 
ecosystem, could have unforeseen and 
perhaps irreversible impacts. 

Creating a Conservation Regime 

In recognition of these factors, the 
view emerged at the preparatory meet- 
ings for the ninth consultative meeting 
that adequate conservation of Antarctic- 
marine living resources was an objec- 
tive of considerable urgency. The 
United States took the lead in propos- 
ing consideration of a conservation 
regime — a complete system with 
machinery for identifying conservation 
needs and developing necessary con- 
servation measures. 

In preparing for the ninth consulta- 
tive meeting, the United States deter- 
mined that its environmental and other 
interests would be best served by 
negotiation of an international conven- 
tion to establish a conservation regime 
for Antarctic marine living resources. 
We believe that the initiative for the 
creation of such a convention should 
come from within the Antarctic Treaty 
system, consistent with the principles 
and purposes of the treaty. We hold 
that the convention, however, should 
be concluded by a separate interna- 



tional conference with additional par- 
ticipation by nontreaty parties and in- 
ternational organizations with direct 
interests in the resources concerned. 

The representatives to the ninth 
meeting of Antarctic Treaty consulta- 
tive parties held in London, Septem- 
ber 19-October 17, 1977. adopted Rec- 
ommendation IX-2 on Antarctic ma- 
rine living resources. The recommen- 
dation provides that a definitive re- 
gime for the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources should be con- 
cluded in 1978. The recommendation 
suggests a two-step process: 

• First, a special meeting of consult- 
ative parties (to be convened in Can- 
berra February 27-March 16, 1978); and 

• Second, a decisive meeting, the 
dates for which have not yet been 
fixed. 

The recommendation anticipates that 
the decisive meeting will be a diplo- 
matic conference and that states other 
than consultative parties with direct 
interests in Antarctic marine living re- 
sources will participate in it, as well 
as appropriate international organiza- 
tions on an observer basis. The rec- 
ommendation also elaborates several 
principles to be taken into account in 
developing the regime. Among these is 
the principle that a regime should 
apply to the entire Antarctic marine 
ecosystem. 

U.S. Views 

The U.S. delegation to the ninth 
consultative meeting supported Rec- 
ommendation IX-2. It satisfactorily 
reflects initial U.S. views on a possi- 
ble regime to conserve Antarctic ma- 
rine living resources, specifically, 
that: 

• First, an effective system for the 
conservation of Antarctic marine liv- 
ing resources, including krill, should 
be in place prior to large-scale harvest- 
ing of such resources; 

• Second, a conservation regime 
should cover the entire range of Ant- 
arctic marine living resources — that 
is, cover the full Antarctic marine 
ecosystem; and 

• Third, the conservation regime 
should be embodied in an international 
convention and there should be provi- 
sion for participation in the negotia- 
tions by consultative parties, other 
countries with direct interest in the re- 
sources concerned, and by appropriate 
international organizations. 

Since the ninth consultative meet- 
ing, we have directed our attention to 
the development of our specific policy 
on a conservation regime for the spe- 



Department of State Bulk 

cial consultative meeting which opi 
in Canberra 3 weeks from toe 
[February 27], 

This process of policy developm 
involves not only coordination amc 
the interested federal agencies, such 
with our colleagues here present fjjj 
the National Oceanic and Atmosphe 
Administration and the National S- 
ence Foundation but also incorporat 
of the views of the interested pub 
and the Congress and the preparati 
of an environmental impact statemer 

The Department held a public me 
ing on December 20, 1977, at wh 
both individuals and representatives 
nongovernmental organizations p 
sented their views on a possible cc 
servation regime for Antarctic mar : 
living resources. Another will be hi 
on February 10, 1978. 

We believe, however, that a m< 
structured means of obtaining pubj 
input is required. Therefore, we ha 
amended the charter of the Depa 
ment"s Oceans Affairs Adviso 
Committee to include Antarctic m 
ters, and we are setting up an Anta: 
tic affairs section of this committee 
advise us on Antarctic matters, inck 
ing Antarctic resource and envirc 
mental issues. Our present thinking 
that the section will consist of 15- 
members drawn from various pub 
sectors. 

A draft environmental impact sta 
ment has been prepared and circulat 
to interested federal agencies and nc 
governmental organizations. A copy 
the draft environmental impact stai 
ment, which includes a number of a 
pendices, is provided for the recor 
The Department has scheduled a pa 
lie meeting on February 10 to recei 
oral comments on the draft statemei 
Formal comments of both the publ 
and federal agencies and organizatio 
are not, of course, due until 45 da; 
after the publication of the statemer 
However, we want to have the benei 
of the preliminary comments of men 
hers of the public and nongovernme 
tal organizations on February 10 ! 
that we may take these views into a> 
count in the formulation of our pos 
tion for the Canberra special consult; 
tive meeting which begins on Febn 
ary 27. 

The proposed federal action — th 
negotiation of a conservatio 
regime — set forth in the draft e 
vironmental impact statement als 
summarizes our current thinking o 
the elements of a conservation regime 
With your permission let me revie^ 
these elements. 

The regime, which would be in 
eluded in a treaty, would set forth th 
objectives of the regime and provid 



il 1978 



53 



obligations, functions, and machin- 

necessary to fulfill them. 

"he proposed conservation regime 

aid apply to all the species which 

lprise the Antarctic marine ecosys- 
i, except that it would not provide 

direct regulation of species already 
/ered by existing international 
eements, specifically, the Interna- 
lal Convention for the Regulation 
haling and the Convention for the 

servation of Antarctic Seals. 

he purpose of the regime would be 
insure that any harvesting of Ant- 
tic marine living resources takes 
ce in accordance with sound con- 
vation principles and practices, spe- 
cally: 

» To prevent overexploitation of any 

tarctic marine living resource; 

» To insure that harvesting of any 

cies does not adversely affect popu- 

ons of dependent or related species; 

I 

» To insure that any harvesting of 

tarctic marine living resources is 

lducted in such fashion as to main- 

1 the health of the Antarctic marine 

•system. 

n order to accomplish these pur- 
jes, the conservation regime would 
| d to provide for: 

' ' Acquisition of basic scientific data 

■ the nature, interrelationships, and 
liamics of the Antarctic marine 
e 'system; 

■ » Acquisition of quantitative data on 
t standing stocks of Antarctic marine 
il ng resources and detailed data on 
f levels of any harvesting of such 
Icks; 

l'» Assessment of the status of the 
Icks of Antarctic marine living re- 
1 trees; 

» Identification of stocks to which 
tnservation measures should be 
sMied; and 

• Development, implementation, 
li effective enforcement of specific 
mservation measures, including catch 
Imitations, to achieve the purposes of 
I' regime. 

The functions to be performed by 
b: conservation regime would be of a 

gular and continuing nature. Their 
jrformance would require establish- 
ment of an effective organizational 

ucture. This structure would include 
j plenary body or commission in 
Jnich representatives of the contract- 
ig parties to the regime would decide 
]>on conservation measures and take 
jher actions provided for in the inter- 
jitional agreement. This organiza- 
;pnal structure would also require 
; : anding bodies to: 



• Collect, collate, and distribute 
necessary basic scientific data; 

• Collect, collate, and distribute 
quantitative data on standing stocks 
and catch data; 

• Assess and review the status of 
stocks of Antarctic marine living re- 
sources; 

• Prepare for the periodic meetings 
of the plenary body or commission; 

• Monitor the effectiveness of con- 
servation measures; 

• Coordinate the activities of the 
conservation agreement with the ac- 
tivities of the International Whaling 
Commission and with activities pur- 
suant to the Convention for the Con- 
servation of Antarctic Seals; and 

• Establish cooperative relationships 
with other international bodies which 
deal with Antarctic marine living 
resources. 

On the basis of the comments and 
suggestions we are receiving in our 
discussions with the public, with the 
Congress, and among the federal 
agencies, we will be defining detailed 
positions for the Canberra meeting. 
Commitment to an ecosystem approach 
and the establishment of a workable 
system for effective conservation lies 
at the heart of our approach to the is- 
sue. The negotiations in Canberra will 
be complex and difficult, but the 
shared emphasis demonstrated at the 
London consultative meeting upon 
maintenance of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem and the need to conclude a 
conservation regime give rise to cau- 
tious optimism. 

An important issue with regard to 
satisfactory resolution of the resource 
issues — living as well as nonliving — is 
accommodating the juridical positions 
of claimants and nonclaimants. A gen- 
eral accommodation of the issue of na- 
tional sovereignty is reflected in the 
Antarctic Treaty. The U.S. position 
under the treaty is that we do not as- 
sert or recognize claims to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. Since the 
treaty does not address resource is- 
sues, the prospect of resource activity 
raises this question again in direct 
fashion. We believe solutions are pos- 
sible. They will require hard work and 
imaginative thinking on the part of all 
participants. 

Other Developments 

Seals. With respect to other Antarc- 
tic developments, the United States in 
December of 1976 ratified the Conven- 
tion for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals. We were the fifth country to do 
so. Seven ratifications are necessary to 
bring the convention into force. We 



made several diplomatic approaches 
last year to the other signatories urg- 
ing their ratification of the convention. 
I am pleased to say that Belgium and 
the Soviet Union have both just re- 
cently ratified the convention and are 
expected to deposit their instruments 
of ratification shortly. The convention 
will become effective 30 days from the 
deposit of the seventh ratification. 

Fauna and Flora. The Department 
has presented legislation to both 
Houses of Congress, S. 1691 and 
H. 7749, to enable the U.S. Government 
to approve the measures, agreed upon 
by the Antarctic Treaty consultative 
parties in 1964, for the conservation of 
Antarctic fauna and flora. Hearings 
were held before the appropriate com- 
mittees of the House last fall, and the 
bill is expected to be reported out 
shortly. No action, however, has yet 
been taken in the Senate, although we 
understand the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transporta- 
tion intends to hold hearings. 

I want to urge the passage of this 
legislation by the current session of 
Congress in order that the United 
States can approve the agreed meas- 
ures before the tenth consultative 
meeting in Washington in 1979. Our 
early approval would permit us to 
suggest to Japan and Australia, who 
together with us are the last consulta- 
tive parties yet to take action, that 
they make every effort to do so. We 
should seek to make the agreed meas- 
ures effective before the tenth meet- 
ing. 

Criminal Legislation. Another mat- 
ter before the Congress is that of crim- 
inal legislation for Antarctica. Since 
few of our criminal laws extend be- 
yond the geographical limits of the 
United States, a draft bill to extend 
U.S. jurisdiction to certain criminal 
cases arising in the Antarctic has been 
submitted by the Department to each 
of the last three Congresses. The cur- 
rent submission coincided with a simi- 
lar congressional bill, which the De- 
partment supports. Hearings on that 
bill, H. 6148, were held in the House 
last fall. No action has been taken by 
the Senate. Rapid passage of appro- 
priate legislation is, in our view, es- 
sential. 

Although this hearing is largely de- 
voted to the question of resources and 
my statement is, therefore, primarily 
addressed to those questions, I would 
not wish to leave the impression with 
this committee that resource concerns 
predominate in our consideration of 
Antarctic policy. An overriding con- 
tinuing objective of our Antarctic pol- 
icy is to insure maintenance of the 



54 



Deep Seabed Mining 
Legislation 



by Elliot L. Richardson 

Deep seabed mining is probably the 
key to determining whether or not a 
comprehensive law of the sea agree- 
ment can be negotiated that will serve 
the national interests of the United 
States. With regard to deep seabed 
mining, the last session of the Law of 
the Sea Conference was distressing 
from both a procedural and substantive 
point of view. If such processes and 
results are repeated at the session 
commencing March 28, 1978. in 
Geneva, the conference will almost 
surely fail. The tragedy is that confer- 
ence failure would most hurt develop- 
ing nations for whom agreed rules of 
international law provide the most se- 
cure protection of their ocean inter- 
ests. 

I should add that there is an increas- 
ing awareness among conference 
participants of the need to change sub- 
stantially the deep seabed portion of 
the Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text (ICNT). This was evident in con- 
sultations last November and De- 
cember which culminated in a meeting 
of some 90 representatives convened 
by conference President [H. Shirley] 
Amerasinghe [of Sri Lanka], The 
changes needed to the ICNT on deep 
seabed mining will be a principal sub- 
ject of discussion at the intersessional 
meeting we will attend in New York 
February 6-17. 

After the last Law of the Sea ses- 
sion, I announced that I would rec- 
ommend to the President that the 
United States thoroughly review its 
ocean interests in light of the proce- 
dures employed and the substantive re- 
sults of that session. As part of that 
review, which is still under way, we 
are evaluating various alternatives 
available to achieve our ocean objec- 



tives. Having been identified as the 
most controversial subject in the 
ICNT. the regime for deep seabed 
mining figures prominently in our con- 
sideration. 

Administration Support 

Since my last appearance before 
members of this committee, the Presi- 
dent has decided to support congres- 
sional efforts to develop deep seabed 
mining legislation consistent with our 
substantive position. The decision by 
the President to support interim deep 
seabed mining legislation is a shift 
from the Administration's prior disin- 
clination to lend its support. There are 
many reasons for this change. 

First, we are aware that legislation 
will be needed with or without a suc- 
cessful law of the sea treaty. After a 
convention is concluded, several years 
will undoubtedly pass before the con- 
vention becomes effective. The length 
of time involved will depend upon 
what the convention requires regarding 
the number of states that must ratify 
the convention prior to its final entry 
into force and on whether or not it 
provides for provisional entry into 
force of the deep seabed mining re- 
gime. 

Second, the Administration believes 
that the orderly development of deep 
seabed mining should not only be con- 
tinued but also be encouraged. 

Third, we believe that interim 
domestic legislation based on the ele- 
ments in the Administration's position 
will not, as is often charged, nega- 
tively affect the prospects for reaching 
agreement at the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference. On the other hand, some con- 
cern has been expressed in the Con- 
gress and the executive branch that 



Antarctic Treaty system and the pics 
ervation of the Antarctic environment 
and ecosystem. 

Our concern, and that of our Antarc- 
tic Treaty consultative partners, man- 
ifests itself in the study of questions 
such as the establishment of sites of 
special scientific interest, examination 
of the environmental problems which 
may be caused by increasing tourism, 
and problems relating to possible con- 
sequences of mineral resource explora- 



tion and exploitation. Meanwhile the 
scientists of a number of the treaty na- 
tions are continuing their year-round 
work in Antarctica in a spirit of coop 
eration that has always been the 
hallmark of the Antarctic Treaty. □ 



Statement before the Subcommittee <>n Anns 
Control, Oceans, and International Environ 
mem <<t the Senate Committee •■'< Foreign Kiln 
a, -us ,'n Feb <>, I97S t/s Mink ii issistant 
Secretary foi Oceans mul International En 
vironmental mul St ientifii tffaii I 



Department of State Buli 

Administration opposition to deep 
bed mining legislation could be i 
understood as a total reliance on 
Law of the Sea Conference 
achievement of our seabed objecti' 
In this regard, if efforts to achiev 
comprehensive agreement on 
oceans are not now successful, 
should at least try to act in com 
with nations having interests simila 
our own. By taking a leadership i 
and by enacting legislation which 
eludes reciprocating states provisic 
we will be better prepared if the c 
ference does not result in a treaty. 

Among the principal elements of 
Administration's position are that 
legislation: 

• Should be transitional pending 
ternational agreement on a regime 
the deep seabed; 

• Should proceed on the legal b; 
that, notwithstanding future agreem 
on an international regulatory regii 
deep seabed mining is a freedom 
the high seas; 

• Should provide for environmet 
protection, sound management, safe 
of life and property at sea, and eff 
tive law enforcement; 

• Should provide for the establi 
ment of an international revenue sh 
ing fund prior to the issuance of ci 
mercial recovery permits; 

• Should encourage enactment 
deep seabed mining legislation 
other nations patterned on our exam 
through the mechanism of reciproc 
ing state recognition of rights; 

• Should require our permittei 
mining or processing vessels to fly 
flag either of the United States or t 
of a reciprocating state; 

• Should not contain investme 
guarantees against financial losses at 
consequence of future federal acta 
that is, ratification of an internatioi 
treaty; 

• Should not authorize licenses 
permits for specific mine sites th 
could be misinterpreted as an asserti 
of sovereignty over an area of the se 
bed; 

• Should not require process!) 
plants to be located in the Uniti 
States; and 

• Should not place any flag r 
quirement on deep seabed ore tran 
porting vessels. 

Investment Guarantees 

Perhaps the most controversial issi 
in H.R. 3350 involves investmei 
guarantees Proponents of such guaras 
tees argue that licensees or permitte< 
should be compensated for investme 
losses that may be caused by the entj 



1978 



55 



force of an international agree- 

'•llt concerning deep seabed mining. 

he Administration opposes invest- 

t guarantees as a matter of princi- 

Our view is that the Federal 

/ernment should not provide the 

edent of promising in advance to 

ipensate certain segments of the 

ate sector for financial losses that 

be occasioned by possible federal 

ons taken to advance the national 

:rest. Moreover, our negotiating 

ition is to obtain a seabeds regime 

does not, on balance, disadvan- 

: U.S. miners as compared to their 

ition under domestic legislation. 

longer the negotiating process, the 

n , e firm the United States inevitably 

>t be on the recognition of existing 

ats in the treaty. 

'he most obvious point is that if 

re is no treaty, there is no problem. 

ny of those who are most ardent in 

1 1 r support of investment guarantees 

reei ie with equal fervor that no treaty 

'! >ossible. It should be recalled that 

only must the treaty be agreed to 

the U.S. delegation to the confer- 

e, but also it must receive the ad- 

and consent of the Senate and the 

lature of the President. The treaty 

aid still not enter into force until 

required number of other nations 

also deposited instruments of 

fication indicating acceptance. 

■'or investment guarantees to be 

essary, the treaty must fail to pro- 

e for terms, conditions, and restric- 

« is for licensees and permittees as 

i orable as those provided in our 

nestic legislation. Finally, the 

aty would have to prejudice the 

its of licensees and permittees at a 

e and in a manner meriting finan- 

1 compensation. We do not believe 

t the sequence of events just de- 

ibed warrant the conclusion that an 

'estment guarantee is necessary, 

:n if it were desirable. 



ternational Fund 

The legal basis for establishing an 
ierim mining regime stems from the 
i;h seas character of the deep seabed. 
fie principles of high seas freedoms 
td the common heritage of mankind, 
S often posed as contradictions, are 
' t, in fact, incompatible. Both prin- 
Iples stem from the fundamental 
?j;mise that sovereignty over the area 
mnot be claimed by an individual na- 
jm. Accordingly, both principles re- 
hire that we guard against such asser- 
>ns. So long as our legislation is re- 
acted to persons and vessels subject 
U.S. jurisdiction and no exclusive 
ghts to deep seabed areas are confer- 
d, the licensing arrangements are 



compatible with existing international 
law. 

The Presidential decision to support 
deep seabed mining legislation in- 
cluded the establishment in the legisla- 
tion of an international revenue shar- 
ing fund. Such a fund is an essential 
feature of Administration support for 
legislation and provision for its estab- 
lishment must be an integral part of 
any legislation passed. We will be 
prepared, subsequent to the enactment 
of legislation, to submit legislative 
recommendations on the contributions 
required to the fund. But we would 
oppose the issuance of commercial re- 
covery permits before the fund is es- 
tablished. We believe such a fund 
would demonstrate U.S. support for 
the principle, now included in the 
ICNT, that commercial activities in 
the deep seabed should benefit all na- 
tions when the treaty enters into force. 

Environmental Concerns 

A principal concern reflected in the 
Administration's attitude toward deep 
seabed mining legislation is that the 
environment must be protected. In- 
deed, environmental consequences 
must be one of the foremost factors to 
be considered in the application for 
and issuance of a license or permit. 
The Administration supports the re- 
quirement that, prior to issuing a 
license or permit, the Secretary of the 
lead agency should determine specif- 
ically that there will be no significant 
effect on the quality of the environ- 
ment. 

This determination would be based 
on information gathered in an en- 
vironmental impact statement prepared 
in accordance with the National En- 
vironmental Policy Act and other pro- 
visions in the legislation. The Admin- 
istration's position is that there should 
be adequate monitoring of the en- 
vironmental consequences of all deep 
seabed mining activities and that regu- 
lations be continually revised and 
applied to ongoing mining operations 
as environmental information becomes 
available. 

Reciprocating State Concept 

The reciprocating state concept is 
one of the unique features of the deep 
seabed mining bills before the Con- 
gress. The idea of reciprocity grows 
out of the high seas character of deep 
seabed mining. It is important to un- 
derstand that neither the United States 
nor any other nation can appropriate 
high seas areas. The deep seabed is, 
by definition, a high seas area. 

Hence, the United States must rely 



upon its jurisdiction over the person or 
vessel involved to regulate deep sea- 
bed mining activities. Since we do not 
own the area, we have no legal basis 
to confer exclusive rights on our licen- 
sees or permittees that would be valid 
against persons not subject to our 
jurisdiction. To preclude any implica- 
tion that we are appropriating high 
seas areas, we avoid the allocation of 
specific areas of the high seas seabed 
in licenses or permits. 

Instead, the procedure we support is 
for applicants to file a work plan 
which includes details about the pro- 
posed location of the work area. As- 
suming other requirements are met, 
the administering agency would only 
approve nonconflicting work plans. 
The reciprocating state giving the first 
notice of work plan submissions would 
be entitled to rely upon other recip- 
rocating states not to approve work 
plans which conflict. 

The reciprocating state concept is 
also useful in insuring the necessary 
enforcement and environmental and 
other monitoring functions are carried 
out aboard vessels or with respect to 
crews of either the licensee or permit- 
tee's state or that of reciprocating 
states. By setting standards for desig- 
nating reciprocating states, we should 
insure that deep seabed mining occurs 
with approximately the same concerns 
for the environment and the safety of 
life and property at sea. 

Supply of Minerals 

There has lately been much discus- 
sion of the effects of the legislation on 
the supply of critical minerals and on 
the economies of current suppliers. In 
our view, creating the conditions that 
would allow seabed mining to be via- 
ble would serve the U.S. national 
interest by assuring access to an alter- 
native minerals source. We are de- 
pendent upon imported supplies for 
almost all our nickel and all of our 
cobalt and manganese. The establish- 
ment of a seabed mining industry in 
the United States would diversify and 
increase our sources of supply for 
these metals. Therefore, it is in our 
interest to provide a framework foster- 
ing our long-term interests by estab- 
lishing the legal and administrative 
basis for seabed mining through this 
legislation and, hopefully later, 
through a law of the sea convention. 

Some have argued that we should not 
only develop seabed mining to provide 
a broader resource base in the long run 
but that we also should artificially 
facilitate the development of seabed 
mining in the short and medium term 
in order to protect ourselves from the 



56 



UNITED NATIONS: 

Southern Rhodesia 



by Andrew Young 

Under the Administration of Presi- 
dent Carter, Rhodesia has been one of 
the priority issues of U.S. foreign pol- 
icy. Together with the United Kingdom 
and in cooperation with the front-line 
states [Angola, Botswana, Mozam- 
bique, Tanzania, and Zambia], the 
United States has worked extensively 
with the nationalist leaders in an effort 
to reconcile differences and to bring 
about a peaceful transition to majority 
rule. 

We participated in the development 
of the Anglo-American proposals for 
Rhodesia, 1 because we felt it essential 
to establish a coherent plan based on 
the following goals. 

First, the initiation of an irreversible 
process leading to majority rule in an 
independent Zimbabwe. 

Second, the creation of a neutral 
political process which would allow all 
political factions in Zimbabwe to com- 
pete fairly for political leadership 
through elections which truly reflect 
the will of the majority. 

Third, an end to hostilities, fol- 
lowed by the maintenance of stability, 
law, and order during the transition 
period to insure the fairness of the 
process and thus its durability. 

Fourth, agreement on an independ- 
ence constitution that provides for a 
democratically elected government, the 
abolition of discrimination, and the 



protection of individual human rights, 
including the right of members of the 
minority as well as the majority. 

Fifth, having presented a proposal 
based on these goals to the Security 
Council, the United States, together 
with the United Kingdom, undertook a 
series of discussions and negotiations 
with all of the principal parties con- 
cerned. We have been pursuing these 
efforts vigorously. In particular, we 
want to engage the Patriotic Front as 
well as the nationalist parties inside 
Rhodesia in the negotiating process. 

We sought — and continue to seek — 
the advice and support of the concerned 
African states, whose views we took 
into account in formulating the propos- 
als initially. And we met with the 
Smith regime [Ian Smith, Prime Minis- 
ter of the white regime in Rhodesia] in 
an effort to bring them into the negotia- 
tions within the framework of our pro- 
posals. As President Carter confirmed 
in his March 9 press conference [see 
p. 19], we remain firmly convinced that 
the Anglo-American plan is the best 
basis for a peaceful, just, and prompt 
transition to an independent Zimbabwe. 

An internal agreement has now been 
announced in Salisbury. A new point 
has been reached in the search for a set- 
tlement and we are all understandably 
caught up in measuring details against 
the standards we have set. But we 
should not let legitimate concern with 
detail obscure the enormous stakes the 



possibility that land-based producers of 
nickel, cobalt, or managanese might 
form cartels — along the lines of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries — that would artificially re- 
strict supplies and raise prices. We be- 
lieve, however, that the danger of car- 
telization has been overdrawn because 
the market circumstances are quite dif- 
ferent. 

Some governments have questioned 
the seriousness of our support for 
domestic deep seabed mining legisla- 
tion. They would be mistaken to under- 
estimate our resolve to establish a 
timely legal regime governing deep 
seabed mining. As I have repeatedly 
said, the United States much prefers a 
negotiated, multilateral regime. But we 
must have alternatives for pursuing our 
oceans interests. 



As a matter of policy, we seek or- 
derly progress toward the development 
of a deep seabed mining capability for 
the United States. We want the legal 
regime applicable to these activities to 
be as internationally acceptable as pos- 
sible. At the same time, we want to 
give the Law of the Sea Conference 
every chance to succeed. But if agree- 
ment is not forthcoming or negotiations 
are unduly prolonged, we are prepared 
to support domestic legislation consist- 
ent with our substantive policy goals as 
the basis for mining by our citizens. □ 



Statement before the Subcommittees on Interna- 
tional Organizations and International Eco- 
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations on Jan. 23. 
IV78; Ambassador Richardson is Special Rep- 
resentative of the President fur the Law of the 
Sea Conference. 



Department of State Bu) 

peoples of the region and the entii 
ternational community have 
Rhodesia. 

• This is not a time for attemp 
advance personal self-interest oi 
posturing before the world. 

• This is not a time 
Rhodesians — white or black — to t 
only of defending their partisan in 
ests. 

• This is not a time for outside jw. 
ers to be considering what advargt 
they can extract in the process of I 
sition. 

• This is not a time for those en 
who have worked hard to bring abel 
fair settlement to lay down our buei 
and turn our backs. 

• Most important of all we musi <» 
resign ourselves that the birth of a 4 
nation must be bloody and violent. I 
see no reason that we cannot fit •! 
peaceful solution to the differe ;s 
which still exist among the parties. > 

At this crucial juncture in the his ry 
of Africa and the world we must ta I 
longer perspective, looking to the I 
and recognizing the progress that a 
been made while holding up for tht j- 
ture the highest standards which I 
insure that Zimbabwe will enter ■ 
community of free and independeni I 
tions promptly and peacefully. 

Salisbury Agreement 

We must examine the so-ca I 
internal settlement dispassionatel I 
am the first to recognize that anytl f 
which Mr. Smith has negotiated mi 3 
the most careful scrutiny. But. I A 
also willing to credit good faith to I 
participating nationalist leaders. Tl \ 
as much as the other nationalist leai t 
of Zimbabwe, want freedom and ir A 
pendence for their country and 9 
political equality for all the peopk if 
the country. It is fair, then, to ask wit 
they have achieved in Salisbury. C(i- 
pared with the kinds of settlement f K 
posals which Smith has entertainecn 
the past, the Salisbury agreem t 
marks some progress. 

• The nationalist leaders have got a 
Mr. Smith to agree to the principle f 
universal adult suffrage. 

• Smith's signature has been 
tained on a commitment eventually 
step down. There is still no ironclad 
surance, however, that he will do si 

• Finally, there is recognition 
during the transition period some sh- 
ing of power must take place amc; 
the participating groups. 

That being said, there is much in ll 
Salisbury agreement which raises qu<- 
tions regarding the ability to withstal 



h 



• : |ril 1978 

political pressures which have built 

over the past few years. 

3 erhaps more importantly we must 
lt i ep isider whether the agreement an- 
■ es , unced in Salisbury takes sufficiently 

o account the enormous difficulty of 
.j, i naging the transition period. This 
_|. icial watershed must be handled in 
j Sffl :h a way that the violence of the 

:sent struggle for liberation can be 



nsformed into an irreversible politi- 
process which will result in the ap- 
)val by all the people of Rhodesia of 
•ir own form of government and the 
ection of their own leaders. 



iglo-American Proposals 






In his March 9 press conference, 
ssident Carter described the Salis- 
ry proposal as not adequate. I be- 
ve I can demonstrate its inadequacies 
comparing the Salisbury agreement 
th the principles of the Anglo- 
lerican proposals. 
First and foremost, the Anglo- 
nerican plan is based on the principle 
participation by all factions. The 
ernal settlement does not include all 
nationalist leaders. Thus it 
eatens to further divide rather than 
ify the people of Zimbabwe and 
reatens to prolong violence rather 
an end it. 

Second, the Anglo-American pro- 
sals recognize that transitional polit- 
i il institutions must not be subject to 
ntrol by the existing illegal regime or 
■J, y one of the parties to the conflict. 
le Salisbury plan would introduce a 
insitional arrangement of shared re- 
I: onsibil ity subject to the rule of 
lanimity and the ultimate authority of 
jj)e present Parliament. 
ji This would allow Smith to hold ef- 
rctive power and to wield a veto. For, 
he himself said in an interview in the 
i mes of London on March 2, whether 
•ople liked it or not, the present Parlia- 
jient was the sovereign body under 
le existing constitution and only an 
i ection could change that. That is 
hat Smith said. He also said he was 
ie Prime Minister and nobody in the 
orld could do anything about it. In 
fther words, although others may be 
llssociated with him, Smith and his 
Jirgely white Parliament are still in 
pntrol of the processes of government, 
lcluding security functions, the civil 
|;rvice, and the passage of legislation. 
Third, free and fair elections must 
je assured in which all elements of the 
lopulation and all Rhodesian political 
iictions would participate equally. The 
Knglo-American proposal addressed this 
•rinciple by proposing that the British 
'Resident Commissioner would help in- 



sure that result, as would the presence 
of impartial observers. 

Under the Salisbury agreement there 
appears to be no provision for interna- 
tional outside participation in these 
elections which would insure their fair- 
ness or impartiality. 

Fourth, in order to insure the fair- 
ness and irreversibility of a transition 
process, it is essential to maintain law 
and order in Zimbabwe. The record of 
civil strife over the past dozen years 
precludes reliance on the Rhodesian 
Army for this essential purpose. Con- 
sequently, it was suggested that a U.N. 
peacekeeping force assist the Resident 
Commissioner and the police force in 
maintaining tranquility during the tran- 
sitional period and in insuring the im- 
partiality of the political process. 

The Salisbury agreement would rely 
on the existing Rhodesian Army, ab- 
sorbing into it those guerrillas capable 
of passing a screening process. We 
cannot but conclude that such a provi- 
sion fails to take into account the his- 
tory of bloodshed which makes the 
Rhodesian Army, as now constituted, 
an unsatisfactory guarantor of the 
rights of all Zimbabweans, black and 
white. 

Fifth, provision must be made in 
Rhodesia for a constitutional system 
which protects the rights of all. The 
Anglo-American proposal provides for 
an independent judiciary and an en- 
trenched bill of rights. The bill of 
rights is protected against change to 
reassure all that their freedom will not 
be overrun. But the remainder of the 
constitution can be changed by the 
process of law. 

The constitution outlined in Salis- 
bury also envisages an independent 
judiciary and the protection of certain 
rights. However, for a period of ap- 
proximately 10 years changes in all en- 
trenched aspects of the constitution 
could come about only with the con- 
currence of all the black members and 
six of the white members of Parlia- 
ment. Indeed, there is no guarantee that 
this system will not carry over after the 
initial 10-year period. This limitation 
of the ability of the new government to 
bring about necessary change and meet 
the aspirations of the majority appear 
inconsistent with the full exercise of 
sovereignty by an independent gov- 
ernment representing all the people of 
Zimbabwe. 

A Catalyst for Renewed Effort 

I have gone into some detail in de- 
scribing what we think should go into a 
viable plan for a transition. But I do 
not believe, however, that our debate 
should begin and end on this theme. 



57 



My government hopes that these Coun- 
cil meetings can serve as a catalyst to a 
renewed effort to bring the nationalist 
forces together in a new attempt to 
achieve a settlement which includes all 
and which is based on the principles of 
the Anglo-American plan. We are pre- 
pared to join with the United Kingdom, 
all the parties, and the concerned Afri- 
can states in a new effort to make prog- 
ress and remedy the inadequacies of the 
Salisbury settlement plans. 

We have no illusion that this will be 
a simple task, particularly in light of 
the evidence that the Rhodesian Armed 
Forces continue the arrogant practice of 
raids across the borders of neighboring 
countries. The recent Rhodesian am- 
bush of a patrol of the Botswanan 
Army well within the borders of Bots- 
wana and the Rhodesian raid into Zam- 
bia are the latest examples of the be- 
havior of the Smith regime which must 
be halted if we are to believe that any 
kind of agreement involving him is 
feasible. 

Success in a new effort would also 
require the support of this Council 
and of the African states most directly 
involved. We would need a consensus 
of responsible opinion that this is not 
the time for actions in the United Na- 
tions or elsewhere which would fur- 
ther polarize the situation but the time 
for keeping all channels of communi- 
cation open. Our goal would be to 
build on what has gone before, to 
produce a just and lasting settlement 
for Zimbabwe whose people would at 
last know the blessings of independ- 
ence, freedom, and peace. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

The Security Council. 

Recalling its resolutions on the question of 
Southern Rhodesia and in particular resolution 
415 (1977) of 29 September 1977. 

Reaffirming that the continued existence of 
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia is a 
source of insecurity and instability in the re- 
gion and constitutes a serious threat to interna- 
tional peace and security. 

Gravely concerned over the continued mili- 
tary operations by the illegal regime, including 
its acts of aggression against neighbouring in- 
dependent States, 

Indignant at the continued executions of 
freedom fighters by the illegal regime. 

Considering the need for urgent measures to 
terminate the illegal regime and establish a 
Government based on majority rule. 

1 . Condemns all attempts and manoeuvres 
by the illegal regime aimed at the retention of 
power by a racist minority and at preventing 
the achievement of independence by Zim- 
babwe; 

2. Declares as illegal and unacceptable any 



58 



Department of State Bull.| 



internal settlement under the auspices of the il- 
legal regime and calls upon all States not to 
accord any recognition to such settlement; 

3. Further declares that the speedy termina- 
tion of the illegal regime and the replacement 
of its military and police forces is the first 
prerequisite for the restoration of legality in 
Southern Rhodesia so that arrangements may 
be made for a peaceful and democratic transi- 
tion to genuine majority rule and independence 
in 1978; 

4. Declares also that such arrangements as 
envisaged in paragraph 3 include the holding 
of free and fair elections on the basis of uni- 
versal adult suffrage under United Nations 
supervision; 

5. Culls upon the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to take all meas- 
ures necessary to bring to an end the illegal 
racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia 
and to effect the genuine decolonization of the 
territory in accordance with General Assembly 
resolution 1514 (XV) and other United Na- 
tions resolutions; 



6. Considers that, with the assistance of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
United Kingdom as the administering Power 
should enter into immediate consultations with 
the parties concerned in order to attain the ob- 
jectives of genuine decolonization of the terri- 
tory through the implementation of paragraphs 
3, 4 and 5 above; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report, 
not later than 15 April 1978, on the results of 
the implementation of this resolution. □ 



Statement in the U.N. Security Can/nil on 
Mar. 14. 1978 (text from USUN press release 
10 of Mar. 14): Ambassador Young is U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Na- 
tions. 

' For text of Anglo-American proposals, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1977. p. 417. 

- U.N. doc. S/RES/423 (1978); adopted by 
the Council on Mar. 14 by a vote of 10 to 0, 
with 5 abstentions (U.S.). 



Report on I ..V 
Reform and Restructuring 



The President on March 2 sent to 
the Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives [Thomas P. O'Neill. Jr.] 
and to the chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
[John J. Sparkman] a report entitled 
"Reform and Restructuring of the 
United Nations System." 1 In the re- 
port, the President called the United 
Nations an essential instrument of 
world peace and U.S. diplomacy but 
proposed a number of concrete steps 
for the U.S. Government to pursue in 
order to make the U.N. system more 
effective in the future. 

Although the President sends an- 
nual reports to Congress on U.S. ac- 
tivities in the United Nations, this is 
the first report concerning reform of 
the U.N. organization itself and, ac- 
cordingly, contains the Administra- 
tion's recommendations for 
realistically strengthening the U.N. 
organization in a number of areas. 
The report generally indicates the 
Administration's commitment to giv- 
ing a higher priority to resolving is- 
sues within the U.N. framework and 
its belief that reforms in a number of 
areas are urgently needed. A basic 
premise of the report is that under 
present circumstances, reform by 
amending the U.N. Charter is improb- 
able, and it is, therefore, more pro- 



ductive to seek institutional and 
administrative reforms within the 
present charter framework. 

The President's report (accom- 
panied by a longer analysis by the 
Secretary of State) is organized 
around seven areas of concern to the 
Special Committee on the Charter of 
the United Nations and on Strengthen- 
ing the Role of the Organization. 
These are: 

• Peace, security, and strengthen- 
ing international law; 

• Decisionmaking processes in the 
United Nations; 

• Human rights; 

• Financing the United Nations; 

• Achieving greater efficiency in 
the U.N. system; 

• Improving U.S. participation in 
the work of the organizations and 
programs of the U.N. system; and 

• The Secretariat of the U.N. 
system. 

Among the major recommendations 
in the President's report are the 

following: 

• To press for strengthening of 
human rights procedures in the United 
Nations; 

• To assist, upon request from the 
Secretary General, with airlift of 



troops and equipment required for 
tablishing a U.N. peacekeeping fo 
authorized by the Security Council; 

• To offer factual information fr 
aircraft reconnaissance technology ^ 
the Security Council when the pans 
to a dispute agree and under Secui 
Council authorization; 

• To explore the possibility of i 
tablishing a special peacekeepi 
fund on the order of $100 million 
help cover initial costs of operatii 
authorized by the Security Council; 

• To work for better coordinat 
of the U.N. technical assistance 
tivities by making the U.N. E 
velopment Program (UNDP) t 
major channel for U.S. voluntary c< 
tributions and helping to strengtl 
the UNDP's programing and co 
dinating role; 

• To hold periodic meetings of 
Security Council at the Forei 
Minister level as part of a general 
fort to strengthen the role of the ! 
curity Council in the peaceful sett 
ment of disputes; 

• To foster greater use of the Int 
national Court of Justice by a varii 
of means, including reevaluat 
existing disputes to see whether tr 
are appropriate to submit to t 
Court; 

• To give substantially greai 
weight in our national policy to de 
sions arrived at by consensus in U 
bodies; 

• To support recent General / 
sembly plans to restructure and 
form the economic and social fui 
tions of the United Nations; and 

• To explore new ways of meeti 
the U.N. financial deficit and explc 
the possibility of supplementing U. 
finances from sources other than cc 
tributions of member governments 

On the subject of weighted votin j 
the President's report states, there 
no prospect for the adoption of a gel 
erally applicable weighted-voting sy 
tern in the General Assembly. The r: 
port suggests that instead of trying 
work for weighted voting, it would I 
better to employ our efforts towai 
defining voluntary but comrad 
standards to curtail the use of the ve f 
in the Security Council and reduc 
the necessity of invoking it. 

The report notes that if we are H 
develop adequate machinery for mai 
agement of the world's common pro! 
lems, a central concern of our foreig 
policy in the remaining years of th 
century must be the building of 
more effective U.N. system. To th 
end, this Administration is committe 
to working for a stronger and moi 
effective United Nations. 



iril 1978 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 

Panama Canal 
Neutrality Treaty Ratified 



President Carter 

have a brief statement to make. 

The people of our nation owe a 

)t of thanks to the Members of the 

Senate for their courageous ac- 

n taken today in voting for the 

: iama Canal neutrality treaty. 1 

add my sincere personal congratu- 

ons to the entire Senate and espe- 

lly to the three men who have led 

*;ir colleagues with bipartisan 

rf tesmanship and wisdom through 

ki 



STATEMENT BY 
SECRETARY VANCE 

I am very gratified at the outcome of 
this first crucial vote on the Panama 
Canal treaties. Passage this afternoon of 
the neutrality treaty, after careful and 
deliberate consideration by the U.S. 
Senate, is in this country's highest na- 
tional interest. While there is more 
work to do and another treaty to con- 
sider, the Administration congratulates 
the Senate and particularly Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd, Minority Leader 
Howard Baker, and chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
John Sparkman on this major step for- 
ward. We know that the Government 
and people of Panama and other nations 
around the world will welcome this out- 
come. 



Made on Mar. 16, 1978 (text from 
press release 129 of Mar. 29). 



is long debate — Senator Robert 
/rd, the majority leader; Senator 
Dward Baker, the minority leader; 
id Senator John Sparkman, chairman 



of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 

As a nation, we also owe our 
gratitude and admiration to former 
President Ford and to Democratic and 
Republican leaders who have served 
in previous Administrations who, by 
giving the treaties their support, gave 
us the opportunity to judge the 
treaties on their merits and not on a 
partisan, political basis. 

This vote today is, of course, only 
the first step in the process of ratifica- 
tion, but I am confident that the Sen- 
ate will show the same courage and 
foresight when it considers the second 
treaty. This is a promising step to- 
ward a new era in our relationships 
with Panama and with all of Latin 
America. 

General Torrijos and the Panama- 
nian people have been patient and 
forbearing during the negotiations 
and during the Senate debate. 
They've earned the confidence and 
respect of the American people. Their 
actions during the last few months is 
proof of their willingness to form a 
partnership with us, to join in cooper- 
ation rather than confrontation. 

It's been more than 14 years since 
negotiations began with Panama, and 
we've been through many months of 
discussion and debate about the two 
treaties that the Senate has consid- 
ered. This has been a long debate, but 
all of us have learned from it. 

The basic purpose and the underly- 
ing principles of the treaty have been 
affirmed and strengthened by the ac- 
tions of the Senate. Under the treaty 
as approved, the United States and 
Panama will have joint responsibility 
to assure that the canal after the year 
2000 will remain neutral and secure, 
open and accessible. 



In the context of consultations with 
ongress, the United States will pro- 
ved to discuss these proposals with 
Jther members of the United Nations 
nd with Secretary General Waldheim 
nd to seek their support. 

The presentation of this report was 
ursuant to Section 503 of the 
oreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Y 1978 (Public Law 95-105). □ 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Mar. 6, 1978, p. 449. 

1 Copies of the report may be obtained from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. 
Washington, D.C. 20520. For text of identical 
letters transmitting the report to Speaker 
O'Neill and Senator Sparkman. see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Mar. 6, 1978. 



59 



The United States can take what- 
ever actions are necessary to make 
sure the canal remains open and safe. 
The vessels of war and auxiliary ves- 
sels of the United States and Panama 
are assured of transit through the 
canal as quickly as possible and can 
go to the head of the line in time of 
emergency or need. 

While the right of the United States 
and Panama to act against any threat 
to the regime of neutrality is assured 
by this treaty, it does not mean that 
there is a right of intervention, nor do 
we want a right of intervention by the 
United States in the internal affairs of 
Panama. 

But perhaps the most encouraging 
lesson of all in these last long months 
is that in a full and open debate, even 
in a very controversial and difficult 
issue, in our foreign policy objec- 
tives, we can still reach the decisions 
that are in our nation's long-term, 
best interests. 

I congratulate again the Senators 
for their decision and give them, on 
behalf of the nation, my sincere 
thanks. □ 



Remarks made on Mar. 16, 1978 {text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Mar. 20, 1978). 

1 By a vote of 68 to 32, the Senate gave its 
advice and consent on Mar. 16, 1978, to the 
Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality 
and Operation of the Panama Canal. 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty. Adopted at Santiago November 18, 
1966, at the Fourth Consultative Meeting. 
Entered into force October 30, 1968, for 
IV-20 through IV-28 in English. TIAS 
6668. 
Notification of approval: Belgium, January 

26, 1978, for Recommendations IV-18, 

IV-19. 
Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Ant- 
arctic treaty. Adopted at Tokyo October 30, 
1970, at the Sixth Consultative Meeting. En- 
tered into force October 10, 1973, for Rec- 
ommendations VI-l-VI-7, VI-ll-VI-15. 
TIAS 7796. 
Notification of approval: Belgium, January 

26, 1978, for Recommendations VI-8, 

VI-10. 



60 



Department of State Build 



Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague De- 
cember 16, 1970. Entered into force October 
14. 1971. TIAS 7192. 

Ratification deposited: Senegal, February 3, 
1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. En- 
tered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 
7570. 

Accession deposited: Senegal, February 3. 
1978. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal September 30, 1977. ' 
Signature, without reservation as to accept- 
ance: Italy, March 13, 1978. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done 
at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force 
March 19. 1967; for the United States De- 
cember 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Ratification deposited: Peru. February 17. 
1978. 

Cultural Property 

Convention for the protection of cultural prop- 
erty in the event of armed conflict and regu- 
lations of execution. Done at The Hague 
May 14. 1954. Entered into force August 7. 
1956. 2 

Accession deposited: Oman. October 26, 
1977. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international trans- 
port of goods under cover of TIR carnets. 
with annexes and protocol of signature. 
Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered 
into force January 7, 1960; March 3, 1969, 
for the United States. TIAS 6633. 
Accession deposited: Malta. January 31, 
1978. 

Customs convention on the international trans- 
port of goods under cover of TIR carnets. 
with annexes. Done at Geneva November 
14, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 
1978. 2 

Ratifications deposited: Finland. February 
27, 1978; Switzerland. February 3, 1978. 

International convention on mutual administra- 
tive assistance for the prevention, investiga- 
tion, and repression of customs offenses, 
with annexes. Done at Nairobi June 9, 

1977. Open for signature until June 30, 

1978. Enters into force 3 months after five 
States Members of the Customs Cooperation 
Council have signed without reservation of 
ratification or have deposited their instru- 
ments of ratification or accession. 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning co- 
operative information exchange relating to 
the development of solar heating and cool- 
ing systems in buildings. Formulated at 
Odeillo, France. October 1-4. 1974. En- 



tered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8202. 
Signature: Ministerio de Industria y Ener- 
gia, Spain, February 6. 1978. 

Expositions 

Convention relating to international exhibi- 
tions. Done at Paris November 22, 1928. 
Entered into force January 17, 1931; for the 
United States June 24, 1968. TIAS 6548. 
Notification of denunciation deposited: Tan- 
zania, August 19, 1977; effective August 
19, 1978. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at 
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force 
November 30. 1977. 

Accession deposited: Guinea-Bissau. 
January 25. 1978. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the high seas 
fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, with 
annex and protocol. Done at Tokyo May 9, 
1952. Entered into force June 12, 1953 
TIAS 2786. 

Withdrawal of notice of termination: United 
States, February 6, 1978. 

International convention for the conservation of 
Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 
14, 1966. Entered into force March 21, 
1969. TIAS 6767 

Adherence deposited: Benin. January 9. 
1978. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York December 16, 
1966. Entered into force March 23. 1976. 2 
Ratification deposited: Senegal, February 
13, 1978. 

Optional protocol to the international covenant 
on civil and political rights. Done at New 
York December 16, 1966. Entered into force 
March 23. 1976. 2 

Ratification deposited: Senegal, February 
13, 1978. 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Done at New York De- 
cember 16, 1966. Entered into force January 
3, 1976. 2 

Ratification deposited: Senegal, February 
13, 1978. 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done 
at Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into 
force August 16, 1976. 2 

Ratification deposited: Argentina. February 
16. 1978. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations 
Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered 
into force January 24, 1978 (except for 
Chapter II); Chapter II entered into force 
March 29. 1978. 2 TIAS 8733. 
Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg (ex- 
cept lor Chapter II), January 31. 197K. 
Sweden (with declaration). February 17, 
1978. 



Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of produi 
phonograms against unauthorized duplicai 
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva 
tober 29, 1971. Entered into force April 
1973; for the United States March 10. 1' 
TIAS 7808. 

Notification from World Intellectual Pi 
erty Organization that ratification de/ 
ited: Israel. February 1, 1978. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Ur 
with final protocol, signed at Vie 
January 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881). as ameni 
by additional protocol, signed at To 
November 14, 1969. Entered into force . 
1. 1971, except for article V, which entt 
into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accession deposited: Grenada, Novembe: 

1976. 

Denunciation: Portugal on behalf of the F 

tuguese Provinces in Asia and Oceai 

December 28, 1977; effective Decern 

28. 1978. Membership of the Portugu 

Republic in the Union will hencefc 

consist of "the whole of National Portuga 

Second additional protocol to the constitul 

of the Universal Postal Union of July 

1964. general regulations with final protc 

and annex, and the universal postal conv 

tion with final protocol and detailed regi 

tions. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. 

tered into force January I, 1976. 1 

8231. 

Accession deposited: Grenada. Novembei 

1976. 

Ratification deposited: Morocco. Novem 
23, 1977. 

Money orders and postal travelers' che> 
agreement, with detailed regulations. Di 
at Lausanne July 5, 1974, Entered into fo 
January 1. 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Morocco, Noveml 
23. 1977. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination 
all forms of racial discrimination. Done 
New York December 21, 1965. Entered it 
force January 4, 1969. 2 
Accessions deposited: Nicaragua, Februa 
15, 1978; Seychelles. March 7. 1978. 

Red Cross 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of t 
condition of the wounded and sick in arm' 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Augu 
12. 1949. Entered into force October 2 
1950; for the United States February 
1956. TIAS 3362. 
Notification of succession: Djibouti 
January 26. 1978. 

Refugees 

Convention relating to the status of refugee 
with schedule and annex. Signed at Gene\ 
July 28, 1951. Entered into force April 21 
1954. 2 

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic 
January 4, 1978. 



1978 



61 



Unification of succession: Lesotho. 

ifebruary 10. 1978. 

'■■"■ ol relating to the status of refugees. 

: e at New York January 31, 1967. En- 

i; d into force October 4. 1967; for the 

ted States November 1, 1968. TIAS 

/. 

tssions deposited: Dominican Republic, 
J inuary 4. 1978; Lesotho. February 10, 
178 

ll-Antarctic 

■ Sntion for the conservation of Antarctic 
■is, with annex and final act. Done at 
Sdon June 1, 1972. Entered into force 
||ch 11. 1978. 

M-laimed by the President: February 24, 
178 

intion on registration of objects launched 
outer space. Done at New York January 
1975. Entered into force September 15. 

5. TIAS 8480 

ification deposited : Switzerland. 

ebruary 15, 1978. 

ession deposited: Yugoslavia, February 

t, 1978. 

jtional sugar agreement, 1977, with an- 
s. Done at Geneva October 7, 1977. 
tied into force provisionally January 1, 

i. 

ifications deposited: Jamaica. February 

5, 1978; Madagascar, January 30. 1978. 
ifications of provisional application de- 
osited: Paraguay, January 24, 1978; 

Ilozambique, January 24, 1978. 
rism 
ntion on the prevention and punishment 

Times against internationally protected 
p ions, including diplomatic agents. Done 
a -lew York December 14, 1973. Entered 

1 force February 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. 
B>essf'on deposited: Iraq, February 28, 

978. 



I international tin agreement, with an- 
jies. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. En- 
Icd into force June 14. 1977 TIAS 8607. 
Unification deposited: Netherlands, 
-ebruary 2. 1978. 

I e 

teiration on the provisional accession of Co- 
Inbia to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
il Trade. Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. En- 

Hed into force January 22, 1976; for the 

lliited States May 1 . 1976. TIAS 8322. 

mceptance deposited: Cuba, January 6, 

(.1978. 

Wes-verbal extending the declaration on the 
bvisional accession of Colombia. Done at 

• pneva November 12, 1976. Entered into 
rce December 17. 1976; for the United 
ates March 28, 1977. TIAS 8664. 

'yceptances deposited: Cuba, January 6, 
'1978; Netherlands. November 8. 1977. 

tfenth proces-verbal extending the declara- 



tion on the provisional accession of Tunisia 

to the GATT. Done at Geneva November 

11. 1977. Entered into force December 22, 

1977; for the United States January 11. 

1978. 

Acceptances deposited: Denmark. December 

I. 1977; Japan, December 23, 1977; 
Korea. January 5. 1978; Tunisia, De- 
cember 22, 1977; United States, January 

II. 1978. 

Second proces-verbal extending the declaration 
on the provisional accession of the Philip- 
pines to the GATT (TIAS 7839). Done at 
Geneva November 11, 1977. Entered into 
force January 24, 1978. 
Acceptances deposited: Denmark, December 

I, 1977; Japan. December 23, 1977; 
Korea. January 5. 1978; Philippines, 
January 24, 1978; United States, January 

II, 1978. 

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles of December 
20, 1973 (TIAS 78401. Done at Geneva De- 
cember 14, 1977. Entered into force January 
1, 1978, for the countries which accepted it 
by that date. 

Acceptances deposited: Austria, January 12. 
1978; 3 Brazil. December 30, 1977; 4 Co- 
lombia. December 23, 1977; European 
Economic Community, December 29, 
1977; 5 Guatemala, December 30, 1977;" 
India. December 30, 1977; Japan, De- 
cember 27, 1977; Mexico, December 30, 
1977; Pakistan. January 25. 1978; 
Romania. January 6, 1978; Singapore. 
January 5. 1978; Sri Lanka, January 4, 
1978; Switzerland, December 28, 1977; 3 
Thailand. December 21. 1977; United 
Kingdom, December 30, 1977; 6 United 
States, December 29, 1977. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention (part of international 
wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washing- 
ton March 29, 1971. Entered into force June 
18, 1971, with respect to certain provisions; 
July 1, 1971. with respect to other provi- 
sions. TIAS 7144. 

Accession deposited: Iran. January 19, 
1978. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions; July 1. 1976, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Iran. January 19. 

1978. 
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, February 
22, 1978; Bolivia, February 14. 1978; Is- 
rael, February 16, 1978. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144) 
Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1976. with respect 
to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 



Ratification deposited: Argentina. February 

22. 1978. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris November 23, 1972. Entered into 
force December 17. 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica. August 

23, 1977; India, November 14, 1977; 
Tanzania, August 2. 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project agreement concerning rural develop- 
ment, with annexes. Signed at Kabul Sep- 
tember 18, 1977. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 18. 1977. 

Project grant agreement concerning agricul- 
tural credit, with annexes. Signed at Kabul 
September 18, 1977. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 18, 1977. 

Australia 

Agreement regarding the management and op- 
eration of the Joint Geological and Geophys- 
ical Research Station at Alice Springs, Aus- 
tralia. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Canberra February 28. 1978. Entered into 
force March 2. 1978. 

Bahamas 

Agreement relating to U.S. participation in the 
National Insurance Scheme of the Bahamas, 
with related note. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Nassau October 27, 1976, May 6 
and September 23, 1977. Entered into force 
September 23, 1977; effective October 7, 
1974. 

Bolivia 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at La Paz February 10. 1978. Enters 
into force on the date of exchange of in- 
struments of ratification. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement on scientific and technological 
cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Wash- 
ington February 9, 1978. Entered into force 
February 9. 1978 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Costa Rica during calendar 
year 1978. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington December 21 and 30, 1977. En- 
tered into force December 30, 1977; effec- 
tive January 1 . 1978. 

Djibouti 

Agreement relating to the transfer of agricul- 
tural commodities to Djibouti. Signed at 
Djibouti January 9, 1978. Entered into force 
January 9. 1978. 

Egypt 

Loan agreement relating to a commodity im- 
port program. Signed at Cairo February 27, 
1978. Entered into force February 27, 1978. 



62 



Department of State Bu | 



El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from El Salvador during calendar 
year 1978. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington December 21. 1977 and January 
19. 1978. Entered into force Januar> 14, 
1978; effective January I, 1978. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 
17. 1977 (T1AS 8677) for sales of agricul- 
tural commodities and the exchange of let- 
ters of December 16. 1977, concerning de- 
velopment projects. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Jakarta February 23, 1978. Entered 
into force February 23, 1978. 

Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization 

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. in- 
come tax reimbursements. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at London May 18 and 
June 8, 1977. Entered into force June 8. 
1977. 

Israel 

Loan agreement relating to the economic and 
political stability of Israel, with attach- 
ments. Signed at Washington December 5, 
1977. Entered into force December 5, 1977. 

Agreement concerning a program assistance 
grant to promote the economic and political 
stability of Israel. Signed at Washington 
December 5, 1977. Entered into force De- 
cember 5, 1977. 

Agreement concerning a cash grant to provide 
necessary foreign exchange to support the 
economic requirements of Israel. Signed at 
Washington December 5, 1977. Entered into 
force December 5. 1977. 

Jordan 

Project loan agreement relating to the Maqarin 
Dam and Jordan Valley irrigation system 
design, with annexes Signed at Amman 
September 21, 1977. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 21. 1977. 

Project loan agreement concerning rural and 
urban electrification, with annexes. Signed 
at Amman September 21. 1977. Entered into 
force September 21 , 1977. 

Republic of Korea 

Agreement relating to the provision of medical 
treatment to Korean veterans of the Korean 
and Vietnam conflicts in Veterans Adminis- 
tration hospitals in the United States. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Seoul Feb- 
ruary 3. 1978. Entered into force February 
3, 1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of July 
31, 1970. as amended and extended (TIAS 
6941, 7927), for a cooperative meteorologi- 
cal observation program in Mexico. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Mexico and 
Tlatelolco January 31, 1978. Entered into 
force January 31, 1978. 



Mozambique 

Agreement relating to transfer of agricultural 
commodities to Mozambique. Signed at 
Maputo December 2. 1977. Entered into 
force December 2. 1977. 

Romania 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Bucharest January 6 and 25, 1978. En- 
tered into force January 25. 1978: effective 
January 1. 1978. 

Agreement clarifying certain understandings 
relating to the supply of enriched uranium to 
Romania for the TRIGA reactor. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington February 
13. 1978. Entered into force February 13. 
1978. 

Sri Lanka 

Loan agreement concerning Mahaweli Ganga 
irrigation, with annexes. Signed at Colombo 
November 9. 1977. Entered into force 
November 9, 1977. 



Loan agreement concerning paddy storasi 
processing, with annexes. Signed a! 
lombo February 2, 1978. Entered intoi 
February 2. 1978. 

Syria 

Loan agreement relating to agricultura 
duction and economic development. Si 
at Damascus September 20. 1977. Ei 
into force September 20, 1977. 

Project grant agreement relating to teel 
services and feasibility studies, with a) 
Signed at Damascus September 20, 
Entered into force September 20. 1977. 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the United States. 

3 Subject to ratification. 

4 Signed ad referendum. 

5 With a declaration. 

* Accepted on behalf of Hong Kong. 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



.. 



March 2-15 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations. Department of State. 
Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

* 1 03 3/2 Inauguration of the Family 

Liaison Office. Mar. 1. 

* 104 3/3 Galen L. Stone sworn in as Am- 

bassador to Cyprus (biographic 
data). 

* 105 3/6 Program for the official visit to 

Washington, D.C.. of Yugoslav 
President Tito. Mar. 6-9. 
*106 3/6 David T. Schneider sworn in as 
Ambassador to Bangladesh 
(biographic data). 

* 107 3/7 U.S., Hungary conclude trade 

agreement negotiations. 

* 108 3/8 Advisory Committee on Music. 

U.S. Advisory Committee on 
Classical Music, Apr. 3. 

* 109 3/9 Vance: statement before the Sub- 

committee on Foreign Opera- 
tions of the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations concerning 
foreign assistance programs. 
1 10 3/8 Vance, Owen: joint statement. 

*lll 3/10 John P. Condon sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Fiji (biographic 
data). 

*112 3/11 Joint statement of U.S. and 
Netherlands delegations con- 
cerning North Atlantic air serv- 
ices. 



*1I3 3/13 Advisory Committee on P: 
International Law, Study I 
on Transnational Bankr | 
Problems. Apr. 24. 

* 1 14 3/13 Thomas J. Corcoran sworn I 

Ambassador to Burundi. ) 
10 (biographic data). 

*I15 3/13 U.S. Republic of Korea ct | 
bilateral textile agreement. U 
24 and Mar. 9. 

*116 3/15 International Commission f 1 
Conservation of Atlantic T 1 
Advisory Committee tc I 
U.S. National Section. Apr J 

*117 3/15 Shipping Coordinating Comn * 
(SCO. Subcommittee on S I 
of Life at Sea, working { ■ 
on ship design and equipr C 
Apr. I 1. 

*118 3/15 Advisory Committee on InL fr 
tional Intellectual Propifl 
Apr. 11. 

*119 3/15 U.S. Organization for the InM 
tional Radio Consulta'C 
Committee (CCIR). St J 
Group 4, Apr. I 1 . 

♦120 3/15 SCC, Apr. 12. 

*121 3/15 U.S. Organization for the Inti 
tional Telegraph and Telepl 
Consultative Committee, . 
12. 

*122 3/15 U.S. Organization of the C( 
Study (iroup 1 . Apr. 14. 

* 1 23 3/15 U.S. Organization for the C( 

Study Group 5. Apr. 19. 

* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



INDEX 



>l L 1978 

I 78, NO. 2013 



§ty Assistance to the Sub-Sahara 
ise) 



of Yugoslav President Tito (joint 



30 



ment) 



44 



. t :tica. Antarctic Resource and Environ- 

' : M tal Concerns (Mink) '. . . . 51 

■ Control 
iance With the SALT I Agreements (let- 
from Secretary Vance, Administration 
rt) 10 

ctheet on SALT Negotiations 3 

al Security Interests (Carter) 17 

f An Ongoing Process (Warnke) 1 

•t .ation of the Proposed SALT II Agree- 

t (letter from ACDA Director Warnke, 

ii linistration report) 15 

»JDf Yugoslav President Tito (joint state- 



t) 



44 



it. .al Security Interests (Carter) 17 

ijity Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 

bi >ke) 31 

-viion. President Carter's News Con- 
H'nces, February 17, March 2 and 9 

* erpts) 19 

il ria. Letter of Credence (Grigorov) ... 43 
ii . Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 

f >ke) 31 

m "ess 

lit :tic Resource and Environmental Con- 

c is (Mink) 51 

S' . Semiannual Report (Department 

s ement) 42 

o\ ry Reports on Human Rights Practices 

(. ineider) 47 

e< Seabed Mining Legislation (Richard- 

I) 54 

it'iational Financial Institutions (Coop- 

I 37 

4* ri ty Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
toke) 31 

Htrity Assistance to the Sub-Sahara 

( oose) 30 

■i Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 

nark. Visit of Danish Prime Minister 

J gensen (White House statement) 47 

* loping Countries 

it national Financial Institutions (Coop- 

37 

Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 

<ti omics 

i^rica's Stake in an Open International Trad- 
E System (Vance) 35 

II national Financial Institutions (Coop- 

I' 37 

I Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 
I -Iran Joint Commission (joint com- 

mique) 48 

trgy. America's Stake in an Open Interna- 
mal Trading System ( Vance) 35 



Environment 

Antarctic Resource and Environmental Con- 
cerns (Mink) 51 

Deep Seabed Mining Legislation (Richard- 
son) 54 

Ethiopia. President Carter's News Confer- 
ences, February 17, March 2 and 9 (ex- 
cerpts) 19 

Europe 

Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes 
(Goldberg, concluding document. White 
House statement) 40 

CSCE Semiannual Report (Department state- 
ment) 42 

National Security Interests (Carter) 17 

Food. U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs 
(Vance) 24 

Human Rights 

Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes 
(Goldberg, concluding document, White 
House statement) 40 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
(Schneider) 47 

Human Rights Treaties 48 

Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
brooke) 31 

U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 

Visit of Yugoslav President Tito (joint state- 
ment) 44 

Indonesia 

Letter of Credence (Danudirdjo) 33 

Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
brooke) 31 

Iran. U.S. -Iran Joint Commission (joint com- 
munique) 48 

Japan. Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
brooke) 31 

Kenya. Kenya (White House statement) .30 

Korea. Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
brooke) 31 

Law of the Sea. Dee'p Seabed Mining Legisla- 
tion (Richardson) 54 

Malaysia. Security Assistance to East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 31 

Middle East 

National Security Interests (Carter) 17 

President Carter's News Conferences. February 
1 7. March 2 and 9 (excerpts) 19 

Visit of Yugoslav President Tito (joint state- 
ment) 44 

Military Affairs. National Security Interests 
(Carter) 17 

Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News 
Conferences, February 17, March 2 and 9 
(excerpts) 19 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Na- 
tional Security Interests (Carter) 17 

Nuclear Policy 

National Security Interests (Carter) 17 

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Carter) .... 49 

Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (White House 
announcement) 50 

Oceans 

Antarctic Resource and Environmental Con- 
cerns (Mink) 51 

Deep Seabed Mining Legislation (Richard- 
son) 54 

Panama. Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty 
Ratified (Carter, Vance) 59 



Presidential Documents 

Human Rights Treaties 48 

National Security Interests 17 

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 49 

Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty Ratified . . 59 
President Carter's News Conferences, February 

17, March 2 and 9 (excerpts) 19 

Security Assistance 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 

(Schneider) 47 

President Carter's News Conferences, February 

17, March 2 and 9 (excerpts) 19 

Security Assistance to East Asia (Hol- 
brooke) 31 

Security Assistance to the Sub-Sahara 

(Moose) 30 

U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 
Somalia. President Carter's News Confer- 
ences, February 17, March 2 and 9 (ex- 
cerpts) 19 

Southern Rhodesia 

Southern Rhodesia (joint statement) 30 

Southern Rhodesia (Young, text of resolu- 
tion) 56 

Terrorism. Visit of Yugoslav President Tito 
(joint statement) 44 

Thailand. Security Assistance to East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 31 

Trade. America's Stake in an Open Interna- 
tional Trading System (Vance) 35 

Treaties 

Current Actions 59 

Human Rights Treaties 48 

Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (White House 
announcement) 50 

Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty Ratified 
(Carter, Vance) 59 

U.S.S.R. 

SALT: An Ongoing Process (Warnke) 1 

U.S.S.R. (Department statement) 43 

United Nations 

Report on U.N. Reform and Restructuring .... 58 

Southern Rhodesia (Young, text of resolu- 
tion) 56 

U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs (Vance) ... 24 

Western Samoa. Letter of Credence 
(Toma) 33 

Yugoslavia 

Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes 
(Goldberg, concluding document. White 
House statement) 40 

Visit of Yugoslav President Tito (joint state- 
ment) 44 

Yugoslavia — A Profile 45 

Name Index 

Carter, President 17, 19, 49. 59 

Cooper, Richard N 37 

Danudirdjo, Ashari 33 

Goldberg. Arthur J 40 

Grigorov. Konstantin Nicolov 43 

Holbrooke. Richard C 31 

Mink. Patsy T 51 

Moose. Richard M 30 

Richardson. Elliot L 54 

Schneider, Mark L 47 

Toma, Iulai 33 

Vance, Secretary 24, 35, 59 

Warnke, Paul C 1 

Young, Andrew 56 



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department 
of State 



m of State II ~im j ^ 

MUletiMl 



Mail IH7H 



m Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2014 




M04»partnt4>nt of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2014 / May 1978 



Cover Photo: 

With President Perez in Caracas 



The Department of State Bul- 
letin, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to 
provide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
tions and the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
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of the President and the Secretary of 
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sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Aff: i 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



1 THE PRESIDENT Visit to Latin America and Africa 



20 

23 



29 



31 



32 



33 



34 



35 



36 



39 



42 



46 



46 



47 



THE SECRETARY 

Arms Control and National Security 
Question-and-Answer Session Follow- 
ing ASNE Address 
News Conference, March 24 

ARMS CONTROL 

U.N. Special Session on Disarmament 
(Report by Secretary Vance) 

Enhanced Radiation Weapons (Presi- 
dent Carter) 

INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION AGENCY 

EUROPE 

Assistance Programs to Greece, Tur- 
key, and Cyprus (Secretary Vance) 

Department Statement on Eastern 
Mediterranean 

Seventh Report on Cyprus ( Message 
from President Carter) 

German Democratic Republic (David 
B. Bolen) 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

The United States at Belgrade (Con- 
gressman Dante B. Fascell) 

MIDDLE EAST 

A Status Report on the Peace Process 

(Alfred L. Atherton. Jr.) 

Terrorist Attack in Israel (President 
Carter, Secretary Vance, Letter 
from President Carter) 

Southern Lebanon (Department 
Statements, Letter from Secretary 
Vance) 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. 
March 20-23 (White House State- 
ment. Exchange of Remarks) 



SOUTH ASIA 

48 Recent Developments in South Asia 
(Adolph Dubs) 

UNITED NATIONS 

51 U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (An- 

drew Young, Resolutions) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

52 Panama Canal Treaty Ratified (Presi- 

dent Carter, Secretary Vance) 
52 Senate Additions to the Panama Canal 

Treaties 
54 Central America (Terence A. Todman) 

56 Cuba (Foreign Relations Outline) 

57 TREATIES 

59 PRESS RELEASES 
61 PUBLICATIONS 
INDEX 



. „ public Library 

80510 Int of Document* 
Superintendent oi 

JIM 2 * 7 3 
DEPOSITORY 




Secretary Vance and Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs Brzezinski in Brasil 

President Carter with Lt. Gen Obasanjo in Logo 

Mrs. Carter and Amy in Badagri, Nigeria 

President Carter and A my with 
President Tolhert in Monrovia 

A newsman 

U.S. "fan" in Monrovia 



I47S 



- 



THE PRESIDENT: 

Visit to Latin America and Africa 



sident Carter left Washington March 28, 1978, on a trip to Venezuela, 
!, Nigeria, and Liberia. He returned on April 3, 1978. 
lowing are remarks by President Carter made on various occasions dur- 
<e trip — including his addresses in Caracas, Brasilia, and Lagos and his 
conference in Brasilia — as well as texts of the joint communiques with 
\uela, Brazil, and Nigeria. ' 



ARKS TO 

SZUELAN CONGRESS, 

^CAS, MAR. 29 2 

honored today to stand in this 
ssembly of one of the greatest 
ns on Earth, to bring warm 
ings from the people of the 
j States, whose love of liberty 
deep as your own. Our nations 
ined not just by common inter- 
ut by the strongest and the most 
g bond of all — that of shared 

lezuela stands high among those 

lave defended the cause of de- 

cy. A century and a half ago, 

•ave to the world Simon Bolivar, 

tibol of liberty whose example 

es far beyond the Americas. 

Venezuela provides unmistaka- 

'roof that political liberty and 

mic progress need not be con- 

g ideals but can strengthen one 

;r. 

irly 200 years ago. General 
:isco de Miranda traveled 
gh my own country as he pre- 

for the struggle to free Ven- 
i. And last year, your President 
ay friend, Carlos Andres Perez, 
ed that journey, and with each 
tie took in my own country, he 
stood even better our traditional, 
ion commitment to democratic 
s. 

ur country has worked tirelessly 
vith success for wider adoption 
ie American Convention on 
in Rights and strengthening of 
nter-American Commission on 
in Rights. We believe, as you 
lat none of us can enjoy true lib- 
vhen others are oppressed, 
ur country and others in Latin 
"ica and in the Caribbean have 

the lead in another area, which 
have an equally profound effect 
ie world of the future: the rela- 
iip between the advanced indus- 
nations which have the greatest 

of influence and material goods 
ie one hand, and the poor and 
oping nations of the world who 



are understandably seeking a larger 
and more equitable share. 

Before the Organization of Ameri- 
can States (OAS) last year, I stated 
that the economic issues of central 
concern to the United States and to 
Latin America are global issues and 
that they need to be addressed in a 
continuing dialogue between the rich 
and the poor nations. 3 

Closer consultation among our na- 
tions would lead to greater harmony, 
better collective judgment which can 
avoid mistakes, and the prevention of 
inadvertent injury to those who are 
weak and most vulnerable. 

Shared Responsibility 

Today I would like to discuss with 
you the responsibility we share — 
developed and developing countries 
alike — for creating a more just inter- 
national order. I want to discuss a vi- 
sion of what our world can 
become — whether it will be a world 
of inequality and want or one of 
partnership and fulfillment; whether 
we anticipate the changes that must 
inevitably come and adopt them or 
turn our backs on the future, vainly 
believing that change can be forestal- 
led. 

Last night, as President Perez said 
in his eloquent and significant ad- 
dress, and I quote him, "Of all 
Utopias, the most dangerous is the 
one of those who think that the world 
can continue as it is or as it was con- 
ceived 30 years ago." These reflec- 
tions lead us to the fundamental 
statement that the crisis that affects 
the world now has very deep roots. 
We are living through a moral crisis, 
a crisis of ethical principles. 

Political, economic, and social 
changes have already transformed our 
modern world. The old colonial em- 
pires have fallen, and more than 100 
new independent nations have risen in 
their place. 

Our nations are more dependent on 
one another economically, more will- 
ing to deal with each other as equals, 



more able to influence one another — 
either for good or for ill — than ever 
before in human history. 

We must all acknowledge this basic 
fact: that we share responsibility for 
solving our common problems. Our 
specific obligations will be different, 
our interests and our emphases will, 
of course, vary, but all of us — North 
and South, East and West — must bear 
our part of the burden. 

If the responsibility for global 
progress is not shared, our efforts 
will certainly fail. Only if the respon- 
sibility is shared may we attain the 
goals that our people want and that 
our times demand. 

We share three common goals: 

• First, to accelerate world eco- 
nomic growth through greater in- 
volvement of the developing nations, 
for their progress is essential to 
global prosperity for us all; 

• Second, to make the most benefi- 
cial use of the world's greatest 
wealth, its human potential; and 

• Third, to insure that all nations 
participate fully in basic decisions 
about international economic and 
political affaris. Only by acting to- 
gether can we expand trade and in- 
vestment in order to create more jobs, 
to curb inflation, and to raise the 
standard of living of our peoples. 



World Economic Growth 

The industrial nations share the 
same problems and cannot by them- 
selves bring about world economic 
recovery. Strong growth and expan- 
sion in the developing countries are 
essential, and as they succeed, they 
must be prepared — and this is 
difficult — for the responsibilities of 
success in this highly competitive 
world economy. 

There are five steps we must take 
together: 

• Increasing capital flow to the de- 
veloping nations; 

• Building a fairer and a more open 
system of world trade; 

• Working to moderate disruptive 
price movements in the world econ- 
omy; 

• Cooperating on energy conserva- 
tion and development; and 

• Strengthening technological 
capabilities in the developing world. 




Meeting President Pere: in Ca 



None of these tasks is simple, and 
each demands efforts from all sides. 
Private institutions and investors will 
continue to play the major part in in- 
creasing capital flows, but capital 
supplied by public institutions and 
governments is also, of course, criti- 
cal to development. 

We in the United States will do our 
part. In managing the international 
economy, we place particular impor- 
tance on the expansion of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, which helps 
both developing nations and also the 
industrial nations to overcome their 
balance-of-payments problems. We in 
the United States will press for swift 
congressional approval of our own 
substantial contribution to the 
supplementary financing facility, $10 
billion, recommended by Mr. 
Witteveen. 

The international development 
banks are fundamental to the health 
of the world economy. They contrib- 
ute to the growth and development of 
many nations and thus to the expan- 
sion of world trade. In the years 
ahead, the United Slates plans to in- 
crease its contributions, and we will 
work with other nations to insure that 
these institutions receive the support 
they need. 

Bilateral economic assistance also 
has a major role to play. I've re- 
quested, for instance, that Congress 
approve a 28% increase in our pro- 



gram just for the coming year alone. 

I applaud the efforts of Venezuela 
and other developing countries to ex- 
pand your own programs of economic 
assistance. All of the OPEC [Organi- 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] nations have a responsibility to 
use their surplus wealth to meet the 
human needs of the world's people. 

In some cases, the burden of re- 
payment of official development aid 
has become an impediment to de- 
velopment. My Administration is 
supporting legislation, now before the 
Congress, which will allow us to ease 
the terms of past American aid loans 
to some of the least developed 
nations. 

We must work toward an expanded 
and more equitable trading system. In 
no area of economic relations is the 
opportunity of Latin America 
greater — nor the responsibility more 
serious — than in expanded trade. The 
multilateral trade negotiations now 
going on in Geneva are the focal 
point of continued efforts to liberalize 
trade and to strengthen the rules for 
international commerce. Both de- 
veloped and developing nations have 
an enormous stake in the success of 
these negotiations. 

We must all resist the temptation to 
impose new restrictions on imports. 
We must all strive to reduce existing 
barriers to trade, both tariffs and 
other measures, while giving special 



Department of State B I 

consideration and benefits to tn 
veloping countries. 

We must also work to mol 
disruptive price movements ij 
world economy and to stabilii 
prices of primary commodities, 
sonable and stable export price 
hold down inflation and encl 
belter income and a more regula 
of new investment capital to 
who produce raw materials. 

All nations can, therefore, 
from the negotiation and eff« 
implementation of commodity ; 
ments and from the creation, wii 
help of the United States and 
major countries, of a common 
for price stabilization. 

We've already begun to cooji 
and plan for the wise use 8 
Earth's limited resources, sm 
food, and now we must do the 
with energy. 

Both the industrial and the dev 
ing countries must conserve e 
and devote more of our vast tes 
logical efforts and resourc 
worldwide efforts to develop 
sources of energy, such as the 
and, as Latin American nations 
already shown us, even from 
and from other agricultural proi 
We must do so without either de 
ing our environment or creati 
world of proliferating nuclear t 
sives. 

For the rest of this century 
greatest potential for growth is 
developing world. To become 
self-reliant, developing nations 
to strengthen their technolo 
capabilities. To assist them, 
proposing a new U.S. foundatic 
technological collaboration. 

Through private and public foi 
tions and through our incres 
participation in the U.N. confere 
we can make technical and sen 
cooperation a key element ir 
relationship. 



Human Potential 

Our main task as members 
world community is to work to 
the day when every person has a 
chance to achieve a full measui 
human potential 

The population of the world i 
creasing rapidly, and within two 
ades. it is expected that two-thirc 
the world's population — e 
more — will live in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America. We want every c 
to be a wanted child, and we re; 
that already three of every five <i 
dren in the developing world do 
receive the basic requisites t 



•• 



^'978 

ly diet, and nearly two-thirds of 

orld's population in the Third 

i do not have access to water 

.. s safe to drink. 

:,. ;se conditions and others offend 



ititi 



onscience of mankind, for the 



n rights we believe in so deeply 
ie not only the right to be free 
o avoid mistreatment from gov- 
ent but also the right to a fair 
e for a decent life, 
roughout the world, the fruits of 
:h have been very unequally dis- 
:ed. Among nations and within 
ns wealth coexists with abject 
ty and suffering. Our economic 
ess is inadequate if its benefits 
)t reach all the people. Rich and 
nations alike should devote more 
tion to raising the minimum 
iards of living for the poorest of 
ellow human beings. 
; United States will increase its 



efforts, particularly in those countries 
where governments are themselves 
most committed to meeting the basic 
needs of their people for health, edu- 
cation, shelter, and to increasing their 
own food production. 

We will contribute, for instance, a 
minimum of 4.5 million tons of grain 
to a new food aid convention. We 
support the international food aid 
target of 10 million tons, and we are 
willing to join other nations in in- 
creasing the amount, particularly in 
years of severe food shortages. 

As for the political liberties that are 
also part of basic human rights, we 
believe that democracy provides the 
best system to attain this goal and 
that the international community has a 
special responsibility to support coun- 
tries that are moving to institute 
democratic procedures and institu- 
tions. 



International Participation 

There can be no question that the 
institutions we have created must 
adapt to a changing and diverse 
world. And that is our third goal. The 
individuality and the sovereignty of 
nations must be respected. Interven- 
tion in the internal affairs of others 
must be opposed. 

There must also be a reversal in the 





ITINERARY 


Mar 


28-29 


Caracas. Venezuela 


Mar. 


29-30 


Brasilia. Brazil 


Mar. 


30-31 


Rio de Janeiro. Brazil 


Mar. 


3 I -Apr. 3 


Lagos, Nigeria 


Apr. 


3 


Monrovia. Liberia 
Washington. DC. 




massive and excessive weapons sales 
that are being made from my own and 
from other industrialized countries to 
the poorer nations, which still have 
profound and unmet social and eco- 
nomic needs. 

Just as all people should participate 
in the government decisions that af- 
fect their own lives, so should all na- 
tions participate in the international 
decisions that affect their own well- 
being. 

The United States is eager to work 
with you, as we have in the past, to 
shape a more just international eco- 
nomic and political order. Both the 
industrialized nations, which have 
greater influence in institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, and the developing 
nations with great influence in or- 
ganizations like the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development, must 
share the responsibility for opening 
the international system to different 
views. 

The Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, in which 
Venezuela, as you know, plays such a 
major and pivotal role, was a useful 
start toward the global dialogue which 
we seek. A newly created committee 
of the U.N. General Assembly will 
carry on that work. 

As we move toward an improved 
international economic order, we 
must think beyond institutions and 
measure the impact of change on the 
daily lives of people. We recognize 
our differences, but we cannot allow 
them to blind us to the problems and 



the tremendous opportunities which 
we share. 



Conclusion 

When I was growing up in the deep 
South of the United States, we farmed 
exactly as our grandfathers had 
farmed, rising before dawn and labor- 
ing manually until sunset. We had no 
tractors and little machinery of any 
kind, and even as we worked, we 
often knew that we were reducing our 
future yields, that the richness of our 
land was blowing away in the wind or 
washing away in the rains. 

When we farmed out our land, we 
had no choice but to keep on farming 
it and working in the same fields, be- 
cause many of us lacked the knowl- 
edge or the means to make it fruitful 
again. 

I remember the almost unbelievable 
change the coming of electric power 
made in the farm life of my child- 
hood. Electricity freed us from the 
continuing burdens of pumping water 
and sawing wood and lighting fires in 
the cooking stove. But it did even 
more — it gave us light by which 
to read and to study at night. It gave 
us power — not just to perform the old 
exhausting tasks but power to make 
our own choices. Because electric 
power came to us through coopera- 
tives, in which we all had to share the 
responsibility for a decision, it 
changed our lives in other ways. 

Farmers began to meet together to 
discuss local needs and national is- 



Presidenls Curler and Perez with reporters in Caracas 




Department of State Bu 

sues and to decide how to influ 
government and to negotiate 
large, far-off companies that pro' 
their supplies. I've seen the farrr 
that I knew in my childhood t 
formed by energy and by technc 
and increased knowledge and bj 
opportunity to participate in the 
sions that affect ourselves and 
families. 

I can understand the unfulf 
yearnings of other people in devi 
ing nations to share these blessin; 
life. All nations must work tog( 
to acknowledge the validity of 1 
yearnings, to take into full ace 
the need and diversity of develc 
nations, and to promote mutual 
ticipation in making the internat: 
decisions that affect us all. 

I've spoken to you of shared • 
gations. The industrial nations 
provide long-term capital and red I 
trade barriers. The developing na' 
must assume the obligations that 
company responsible participatio 
an evolving world economy. 

Real progress will come thrc 
specific, cooperative actions desi; 
to meet specific needs — not thn 
symbolic statements made by the 
industrial nations to salve our i 
science nor by the developing coun 
to recall past injustices. We nee 
share a responsibility for solving p 
lems and not to divide the blame 
ignoring the problems. 

I believe that your great cob 
and mine share a vision of an into 
tional system in which each i 
vidual and each nation has a pari 
which each individual and each na 
has the hope of a better future. ( 
in such a world can life be good 
all its people. 



JOINT U.S.-VENEZUELA 
COMMUNIQUE, 
CARACAS, MAR. 29 4 

The visit reflected the close relations 
tween Venezuela and the United States 
served to continue their dialogue initiate 
1977 on the occasion of the visits which 
Venezuelan President made to Washington 

The two Presidents reaffirmed their c 
mitment to the preservation and strengthe 
of democracy and placed particular emph 
on the importance of human rights as a dut 
all societies and their commitment to the c 
ters of the Organization of American St 
and the United Nations. Both Presidents 
pressed the hope that the American Con\ 
tion on Human Rights will soon enter i 
force and manifested their Governments' in 
est in seeing both the autonomy and resoui 
of the Inter-American Human Rights Comr 
sion increased, agreeing in their belief that 



Bt 1978 



ission has an essential role to play in 
•It fective promotion of Human Rights in 
misphere. 

Presidents discussed the ratification of 
nama Canal treaties signed at the OAS 
Ml uarters in Washington [on September 7, 
by the President of the United States of 
ica and the Head of Government of 
a which is now being considered by the 
of the United States of America. They 
sed the hope that the process will be 
ktiisfully concluded to strengthen a new 
of cooperation in the relations between 
lited States of America and the Peoples 
in America. 

Heads of State examined the present 
jf the world economy, including the 
cts for international cooperation on the 
of development, trade, basic com- 
es, energy, the effects of inflation and 
ernational monetary system, 
i Presidents agree on the need for an in- 
onal code of conduct relating to the ac- 
5 of transnational corporations. They 
nned the practice of bribes and illicit 
nts and called for support of an interna- 
.-onvention on illicit payments. 
Presidents reaffirmed the importance 
te utility of additional consultations 
the context of the North-South dialogue 
the United Nations and other world or- 
tions. They agreed on the importance of 
implementation of the commitments 
at the Conference of International Eco- 
Cooperation, in which Venezuela 
I a leading role. Both Presidents ex- 
d their support for a more just and 
ole international system, with both de- 
d and developing countries sharing re- 
■•bility for it. 

n Presidents examined the world's politi- 
M uation and condemned the presence of 
I n forces in Africa. They reiterated 

■ rondemnation of apartheid as an unac- 
I le negation of human rights. They ex- 
:sd their total support for the independ- 
lif Zimbabwe in accordance with norms 
I United Nations and for the independ- 
pof Namibia within the framework of 

■ I Nations Resolution 385. 

I Presidents exchanged views concerning 
■uation in the Middle East and deplored 
I cent violence which occurred in that 

■ They agreed that it is necessary and ur- 
lo intensify efforts to achieve a just. 
Irehensive and durable peace based on 

I' [U.N. Security Council] Resolutions 
lid 338. They stressed the importance of 
Brawal on all fronts pursuant to Resolution 
Ind the resolution of all aspects of the 
Minian question. 

By noted their meeting coincided with the 
Big of the Seventh Session of the United 
lis Conference on Law of the Sea. which 
Its first substantive meeting in Caracas 
■ears ago. They agreed that it is essential 

■ he conference reach agreements which 
i^st and fair for all countries. 

| two Presidents dedicated an important 



portion of their time to the consideration of 
the idea already agreed to in Washington in 
1977 concerning the development program for 
the Caribbean basin. They examined the role 
played in the preliminary studies by the World 
Bank as well as by other international institu- 
tions. Even as they manifested their satisfac- 
tion with the process already under way. they 
agreed that it is urgent to bring this idea to 
fruition and to promote cooperation between 
the countries of that area and the rest of Latin 
America in such a way as to help the states of 
the Caribbean in their effort for a viable de- 
velopment which satisfies their own 
aspirations. 

The themes concerning Latin American eco- 
nomic integration were the object of particular 
attention. The Presidents examined the prog- 
ress of the Andean Pact, its important program 
agreements signed in 1977. the functioning of 
LAFTA [Latin American Free Trade As- 
sociation] and the progress of SELA [Latin 
American Economic System]. Both Presidents 
recognized the important cooperative effort of 
the countries of the area reflected in the dif- 
ferent programs of regional integration and 
manifested their sympathy and support for 
these programs. 

With relation to nuclear non-proliferation 
the two Presidents took note of the necessity 
for implementing greater safeguards and mak- 
ing greater use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes once the risks, not yet resolved, are 
taken care of. The Presidents gave special im- 
portance to the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco [Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America], and 
noted with satisfaction the progress in the In- 
ternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. 

The Presidents exchanged ideas about arms 
restraint in Latin America. They expressed 
their disquiet with growing arms purchases 
and in the resurgence of old conflicts. They 
agreed that it is urgent to restrict the transfer 
of conventional weapons as was envisaged in 
the 1974 Ayacucho Declaration. 

They discussed the United Nations Special 
Session on Disarmament and agreed that the 
Session should provide a stimulus to further 
concrete disarmament efforts. 

Insofar as bilateral matters are concerned 
they confirmed the importance of cooperation 
in the field of energy and the continuing par- 
ticipation of Venezuelan petroleum exports in 
the United States market. They considered 
useful the results of the meeting held at the 
beginning of March between the Venezuelan 
Minister of Mines and Energy and the U.S. 
Secretary of Energy pointing out the possibil- 
ity of cooperation for the development of 
heavy crudes. The two Presidents reaffirmed 
their desire to continue consultations both at 
the technical level and at the political level on 
energy matters as well as to establish periodic 
consultations on economic and commercial 
matters. 

The two Presidents took note with satisfac- 
tion of the signature during the visit of the 
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the 



two countries and a Memorandum of Under- 
standing on Narcotics and of the prospects of 
negotiating other agreements, reflecting the 
spirit of cooperation existing between the two 
countries. 

The two Chiefs of State expressed their 
complete personal satisfaction with the results 
of their conversations and took note that this 
state visit, the third meeting between them 
during the last year, was a demonstration of 
their interest in continuing their consultations 
on world matters of importance to the two 
countries. 

Upon ending his stay in Venezuela, Presi- 
dent and Mrs. Carter thanked President Perez 
for the cordial hospitality offered them and 
their official party by the Venezuelan people 
and government. 



REMARKS TO 
BRAZILIAN CONGRESS, 
BRASILIA, MAR. 30 2 

One of the greatest honors of my 
life is to meet with others who share 
with us in the United States a com- 
mon background, a common commit- 
ment to the common future. 

I particularly want to thank Senator 
Enrico Rezende and my good and old 
friend, Deputato Erasmo Martins 
Pedro for these inspirational words. 
There is no way that I can match your 
eloquence. There's no way that I can 
improve upon what you have said. 
And your complimentary words to 
me, undeserved, will be an inspira- 
tion in the years ahead. 

I've been here before in this 
Chamber, in your country. I've been 
impressed with the greatness of 
Brazil. I've seen the compatibility be- 
tween your own people and ours — the 
origins of your country; the struggle 
for freedom against colonial rule; the 
courage, the tenacity, the dedication 
that was required in our country and 
yours to explore new frontiers, to 
carve out for ourselves a better life, a 
greater life, and a position of lead- 
ership throughout the whole world. 

I recognize that in your country and 
in mine there is a great diversity of 
interest, differences among people, 
and a constant, unceasing, most often 
successful struggle to bring harmony 
among differences and to carve out 
common commitments that will add 
the strength of all those different 
people together to reach a destiny 
even more inspirational than the past 
history has already given to us. 

We share a common religion among 
many of our people, a common hope 
for peace. We share a feeling that our 
nations are bound together with un- 
breakable chains. We share a realiza- 
tion that while friendship is strong 




President Carter addressing the Brazilian Congress 



enough to sustain transient differences 
of opinion, that we can exchange 
ideas freely and without constraint 
and. in the process, learn about one 
another and perhaps improve the at- 
titudes of people in the United States 
and also in Brazil. 

We are learning together in the 
Western Hemisphere, which still has 
the vigor of newness, how we can 
exert our leadership throughout the 
rest of the world in dealing with 
hunger and despair, in dealing with 
the struggle for basic human rights. 

We understand the broad definition 
of these two important words — the 
right to freedom; the right to criticize 
a government; the right of people to 
contain within themselves, collec- 
tively, the ultimate authority; the 
right to an education; the right to 
good health, a place to live, food; the 
right to share more equitably the 
riches with which God has blessed us; 
the right to express opinions; the right 
lo enhance our own individuality; the 
right to seek collective solutions to 
private and public problems; the right 
to expose the greatness of our own 
nations which we love. 

I'm grateful for the invitation to 
appear before this great Congress as 
one whose own political career began 
in a legislature. I've seen the impor- 
tance of a good relationship between 
a Governor and a State legislature, 
between a President and a national 
Congress. And I join you in honoring 
the ultimate purpose of any legislative 
body; that of insuring that individual 
people who have small voices maj 
participate through you in the deci- 
sions that affect their lives. 



Thirty-one years ago. another 
American President stood before the 
Brazilian Congress, another Con- 
gress, in a different city, since your 
vision of Brasilia had not yet been 
fulfilled. I'd like to quote from the 
words of Harry Truman: "It is not 
too much to describe our relations as 
those of 'life-long friendship.' ' he 
said. And then he asked, "Why are 
the ties between us so close? The dis- 
tance between our countries is great 
and until of recent years communica- 
tion was slow and difficult. But it is 
not physical proximity that alone 
makes friends and neighbors. It is 
rather the fact that we- have common 
interests, common principles, and 
common ideals. " 

Those words still apply today, and 
they are the overriding concepts 
which bind our nations together per- 
manently and on which we base our 
realization and our hope and our ex- 
pectation for future friendship, stabil- 
ity, and mutual strengthening in the 
years to come. 

In the intervening years. Brazil has 
come into an even fuller realization of 
your rightful place in the world, 
though it has not yet reached the lim- 
its of your enormous potential. And 
alter all those years, we can still call 
on one another as friends, for that 
bond recalls the sacrifices that we 
have made together in a common 
struggle, with the loss of Brazilian 
and American lives, and it implies the 
right to disagree on occasion — even 
vigorously — without bitterness or mis- 
trust. 

As I said when I met your Presi- 
dent yesterday, the world needs, the 



Department of State BuMi 

world expects, and the world I 
benefit from your creativity, j 
energy, and your success. Man 
the problems that we share as n 
bers of a human family will neve 
solved unless the ablest among us 
vote their best to efforts to that a 
Economic development with a f 
distribution of the world's richa 
trading system that is open and e 
able, cooperative solutions to 
common energy problems, peao 
use of atomic power without the 
of proliferation, reducing the e> 
sive trade in weapons, and encoi 
ing consultations and negotiat 
about even the most troubling iss 
advancing the cause of human lib* 
democratic government, and the 
of law — these are efforts in whicl 
United States needs your friend; 
your partnership, and the world n 
your help and your leadership. 
I'm sure we will not be disappoin 
Since my friend has quoted the 
ble. I would like to do the samel 
Portuguese, as well as English, 
Bible tells us that to whom muo 
given, much will be required, 
two nations have been greatly blei 
by God. and we have much to gn 
return. 



NEWS CONFERENCE 
(EXCERPTS), BRASILIA, 
MAR. 30 5 

I'm very delighted to be her 
Brasilia to participate in a live j 
conference, and I will alternate i 
tions between the Brazilian and 
American press. 

Q | in Portuguese]. At the be 
ning of your Administration tl 
was a clear tendency to isolate 
treat Brazil coldly in favoi 
democratically elected governme 
elected by the people. Yesterda 
the airport you stressed the n 
for cooperation between Brazil 
the United States as equal partn 
Who has changed? Brazil or you 

A. I certainly have not chan| 
The experience that I have hac 
Brazil as Governor of Georgia be 
I became President made Brazil 
most important country to me. 
wife and I visited it frequently, 
had a partnership arrangement 
tween m> own State and the Stati 
Pernambuco. 

We studied the background, 
history, the culture, and the govt 
ment of Brazil. And there has 
ever been any inclination on my ] 
or the part of my Administration 
underestimate the extreme importa 



[978 



Brazil as a major world power, nor 
Inderestimate the extreme impor- 
pje of very close and harmonious 
Itionships between the United 
ks and Brazil, 
mere are some differences of opin- 

■ between ourselves and Brazil 
l:h have been very highly pub- 
fced. But on the long scale of 
|es. both in the past history and in 
■future, the major factors which 
I us in harmony with Brazil far 
■scend, are much more important 

I the differences that have been 

■ ished between our approach to 
Ian rights, for instance, and the 
■ect of nonproliferation of nuclear 
loons. 

lit our commitment to Brazil as a 
lid. our need for Brazil as a part- 
land a friend has always been the 
I and is presently very important 
Is and will always be that impor- 
U in the future. 

I. In recent days, you've seen 
I use of American military 
Allies to invade a country and to 
lie untold suffering to hundreds 
thousands. Some say this is the 
Wit ion of U.S. law. In view of the 
m that you have before you, is it 
olation; and two, has it caused 
I to reassess your warplane 
Stage for the Middle East? 

I. Are you referring to the Leba- 

question'.' 

y . Yes. 

H. As you know, when the terrorist 

1 ks in Israel precipitated the coun- 
liove by Israel into Lebanon. 

■ ■h has been a haven for the Pales- 

■ in terrorists, the United States 
I: the initiative in the United 
■ons — I might say. without the ap- 
I al of Israel — to initiate U.N. ac- 
I there to expedite the removal of 
Bdi forces from Lebanon. 

I e have obviously attempted to 
■ply with the law, and this is a 

■ :er that we are still addressing. 
I other part of your question? 

. Has it caused you to reassess 

■ r package of warplanes for the 
idle East, and how do you say 
I have attempted to comply with 

■ law? 

I. We're attempting to terminate 
B'apidly as possible the military 
■tence of Israel in southern Leba- 
I through U.N. action. I believe 
I is the proper way to do it. rather 
■i unilateral action on our part, 
■ch would probably be unsuccess- 
ful any case to get Israel to with- 
■v. The presence of U.N. forces — 
■French, the Swedes, and others — I 
■eve, is the preferable way, and it 



marshals the opinion of the entire 
world, through the United Nations, 
against the Israeli presence being re- 
tained in Lebanon. 

This has not caused me to reassess 
the American position on the sale of 
warplanes and other equipment to the 
Middle East. This is a very well- 
balanced package. It emphasizes our 
interest in military security of the 
Middle East. It does not change at all 
the fact that Israel still retains a pre- 
dominant air capability and military 
capability. There is no threat to their 
security. But it also lets the nations 
involved and the world know that our 
friendship, our partnership, our shar- 
ing of military equipment with the 
moderate Arab nations is an important 
permanent factor of our foreign 
policy. 

Q. The American commercial 
banks are the main Brazilian source 
of external credit. It seems to some 
people in Washington that sooner 
or later a Congressman may try to 
establish a link between the com- 
mercial banking loans and the 
human rights policy. I'd like to 
know your opinion about this 
subject. 

A. Brazil is a major trading partner 
of the United States in commercial 
goods and also in loans and, I might 
say, timely repayments. The debt of 
Brazil is very manageable. The loans 



Willi President Geisel in Brasilia 



of the American banks to Brazil are 
sound. Additional loans are being 
pursued by the American banks as an 
excellent advantage for their future 
investments in Brazil, based on the 
strength of your country. It would be 
inconceivable to me that any act of 
Congress would try to restrict the 
lending of money by American pri- 
vate banks to Brazil under any cir- 
cumstances. This would violate the 
principles of our own free enterprise 
system, and if such an act was passed 
by Congress, I would not approve it. 

Q. What comes in the first place 
for you: the private enterprise and 
the private system or the human 
rights policy? 

A. They're both important to us. 
And I don't see any incompatibility 
between a belief in a free enterprise 
system, where government does not 
dominate the banks or the production 
of agricultural products or commer- 
cial products on the one hand, and a 
deep and consistent and permanent 
and strong belief in enhancing human 
rights around the world. 

I might say that the American busi- 
ness community, the Congress of the 
United States, the general populace of 
the United States supports completely 
a commitment of our nation to human 
rights. It's a basic element of our na- 
tional consciousness that has no viola- 
tion at all — or no conflict between 




8 



human rights on the one hand and the 
free enterprise system on the other. 

Q. Tomorrow you fly to Africa. 
What can you tell us today about 
the revised five-power proposals on 
Namibia? 

A. As you know, under the aus- 
pices of the United Nations, our own 
country, Canada. Britain. France, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
have been working jointly to present 
to South Africa and to the so-called 
SWAPO organization — South West 
Africa People's Organization — a 
compromise solution to restoring 
majority rule in Namibia. 

We have presented this proposal 
this week to the South African Gov- 
ernment, which now controls 
Namibia, and also to the SWAPO 
leaders. We are hopeful that if the 
proposal is not completely acceptable 
to both those parties, that it will at 
least be acceptable enough to prevent 
unilateral action on the part of South 
Africa to hold elections in complete 
violation of the U.N. resolutions and 
in complete violation of the principle 
of restoring majority rule to Namibia. 

I can't tell you what the outcome of 
those consultations will be. I will get 
a more complete report when I arrive 
in Lagos. Ambassador [to the United 
Nations Andrew] Young has been in 
Africa now for about a week. This is 
one of the reasons that he is there. 
And I will be glad to give you a more 
detailed report after I get additional 
information. 

Q. Now that you have a broad 
nonproliferation act in your hands, 
do you expect you can persuade 
Brazil to give up reprocessing and 
enrichment technology being ac- 
quired from Germany? And in that 
case, what are the carrots you 
might specifically use to further the 
power of your arguments in your 
meetings with President Geisel? 

A. We strongly favor the right of 
any country to have part of its energy 
supplies come from nuclear power. 
As you know, our country has been 
the leader in the evolution of atomic 
power for peaceful uses, and we 
would do nothing to prevent this 
trend from continuing, both in Brazil and 
in other countries around the world. 

Our own nuclear nonproliferation 
policy, however, tries to draw a dis- 
tinction between the right and the 
meeting of need of countries to pro- 
duce energy from atomic power on 
the one hand, and the right of the 
country to evolve weapons-grade nu- 
clear materials through either 
enrichment processes or through 
reprocessing. 



We have no authority over either 
West Germany or Brazil, nor do we 
want any. But as a friend of both 
countries, we reserve the right to ex- 
press our opinion to them that it 
would be very good to have, and pos- 
sible to have, a complete nuclear fuel 
system throughout a country without 
having the ability to reprocess spent 
fuel from the power reactors. In the 
United States, for instance, in the last 
25 years or so, on several occasions 
major investments — multibillion- 
dollar investments in all — have been 
made in reprocessing plants. So far 
as I know, for the civilian nuclear 
technology, all those plants have 
now been abandoned as being non- 
economical. 

This is a difference that does exist 
between Brazil and the United States. 
The right of Brazil and West Ger- 
many to continue with their agree- 
ment is one that we don't challenge, 
but we have reserved the right and 
have used the right to express our 
concern, both to the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment and to the West German 
Government. 

1 think it's accurate to say that the 
European nations have now an- 
nounced that in the future, they will 
not make reprocessing plants part of 
their overseas sales inventory. And 
we are very deeply concerned about 
this. Of course, Brazil has announced 
that they have no intention of produc- 
ing nuclear explosives. Brazil is a 
signatory to the treaty of Tlatelolco. 
So far, however, Brazil has retained a 
caveat that it will not apply to them 
until all the other nations sign it. And 
Argentina, Cuba. France. Russia have 
not yet signed the Tlatelolco treaty. 

We would hope that every effort 
would be made by Brazil and other 
countries, as it is on the part of our 
own country, to prevent the spread of 
nuclear explosive capability to any 
nation which does not presently have 
it. 

Q. What are the carrots? 

A. We have no specific carrots to 
offer, except that we are making 
available to countries — and now in a 
much more predictable way with the 
new congressional law — enriched 
uranium, which is suitable for produc- 
tion of power but not suitable for ex- 
plosives, and technological advice 
and counsel both in the use of 
uranium, with which Brazil is not 
blessed as a natural resource, and also 
thorium, which we have in our own 
country and which Brazil already has. 

The new thorium technology is a 
much safer one to provide power 
without going to plutonium. Recently 



k 



Department of State Bui 

Brazil — and I think very wise 
signed an additional agreement 
West Germany which would opei 
advice and technological abilit 
use thorium. But the right of B 
and the advisability of Brazil to I 
a very advanced nuclear power c 
bility is one that we don't disp 
but on the other hand, approve. 

I might add one other point, 
that is that we see a clear need fo 
nations to sign the Nonprolifera 
Treaty. We're signatories of it; so 
the Soviet Union, the Germans, i 
of the countries in the world 
this, combined with Internatic 
Atomic [Energy] Agency safegua 
is a good guarantee within a cou 
and throughout the developed and 
veloping world that there will no 
a trend in the future toward other 
tions developing nuclear explo 
capability. 

Q. Have you or any other 
U.S. officials — Dr. Brzezinski, 
instance — suggested that Pr 
Minister Begin may not be the r 
man to head that government in 
present circumstances? And aj 
from what may or may not h 
been said, do you now think 
Begin government can make 
hard decisions necessary to m 
the peace process forward? 

A. I can say unequivocally thai 
one in any position of responsib 
in the U.S. Administration has c 
insinuated that Prime Minister B< 
is not qualified to be Prime Mini 
or that he should be replaced. 1 
report, the origin of which I do 
know, is completely false. 

I think that Prime Minister Be 
and his government are able 
negotiate in an adequately flexi 
way to reach an agreement w 
Egypt, later Jordan and other of 
neighboring countries. This is 
hope and this is also our belief, 
have not given up on the possibi 
of a negotiated peace settlement 
the Middle East. 

Under the Begin government. v\ 
him as Prime Minister, recently 
rangements have been made betwi 
Israel and Egypt for [Israeli Mini? 
of Defense] Ezer Weizman to go 
Egypt again, which will be a contii 
ation of the probing for a compatal 
ity. I think it is obvious now tl 
with the issues so sharply drawn 
key differences remain that must 
addressed on the side of Israel. 1 
things that are of deepest concern 
Israel's refusal to acknowledge tl 
U.N. Resolution 242 applies clea 
to the West Bank, their unwillingn 
to grant to the West Bank Pale 



1978 

,, the Palestinian Arabs, a right 
irticipate in the determination of 

own future by voting at the end 

5-year period, and so forth, for 
<ind of affiliation they would 

with Israel or Jordan or under a 
administration. And this is a prob- 

or which I have no clear solution 
But I believe that the Begin gov- 
lent is completely capable of 
tiating an agreement with Egypt. 

In connection with your visit 
in Latin America, do you ex- 
in the future — do you consider 
lossibility of another visit to the 
r countries of Latin America, 

my case, to Argentina, and do 
have an eventual date for this 



We have not yet set any date 
Tiade any plans for future visits, 
'ou may know, I have visited 
ntina in the past, and so has my 
And this year, this past year, 
stary of State — our Secretary of 

, Cyrus Vance — visited Argen- 

too [November 20-22, 1977], 
/our own leader, Videla. came to 

us in Washington. I have no 
s now for any additional trips 
'here after I return to Washins- 



What's the purpose of this 

ing that you are having in Rio 

Cardinal Arns [a leader of the 

lilian human rights coalition] 

five other people? I mean, what 

f ificallv are you intending to 

Muss with them and hear from 



I I don't have any agenda pre- 

■ 1 for my visit with Cardinal Arns 

■ the others. In a diverse society 
I you have here in Brazil, it's im- 
lint for me to visit with different 
Ions who represent different 
Is. I will have thorough discus- 
Is, as you know, with President 
lei and his administration, and I 
It to meet with as many other 
l>le as I can. I have, by the way, 
>e and talked to Cardinal Arns pre- 
Isly in the United States. I think 
I is typical of leaders who visit 
Ir countries. I noticed, for in- 
l:e. with some interest, that when 
lident Geisel visited the Federal 
lublic of Germany recently, he not 
I met with Chancellor Schmidt but 

■ let with the leaders of the opposi- 
«( parties. 

Bid as a leader of a nation, I re- 
le the right to meet with whom I 
Ise. And I think this is a construe - 
I thing, which will give me a much 
ler overall understanding of what 
Bts in Brazil. And I think the right 




&JaL 



m 




Mrs. Carter anil Ann in Brazil 

of people to speak to me as a foreign 
visitor is one that's important to 
Brazil to preserve and to cherish. And 
I am thankful that I have that right 
when I visit your country. 



Q [in Portuguese]. I'd like to 
know whether in your meeting with 
General Figueiredo [Chief of the 
Brazilian National Intelligence 
Service] yesterday you discussed the 
program of the political opening up 
of the Brazilian Government and 
the implementation of that plan? 

A. I did not have an opportunity to 
discuss any matters of importance 
with General Figueiredo. 1 only met 
him very briefly in a larger group of 
people — 30 or 40 people — and in the 
receiving line when I came into the 
airport. So, I've not had a chance to 
discuss this with him. 



Q [in Portuguese]. My basic 
question was the same as he asked, 
but I'd like to know how you view 
the succession here in Brazil, and 
how do you view the problem of 
political and civil rights in Brazil? 

A. I think the type of succession 
and the process through which you 
choose your leaders, or your leaders 
are chosen, is one to be decided in 
Brazil. I'm not here to tell you how 
to form your government. I have no 
inclination to do that. The Brazilian 
people are completely aware of the 
process, and that's a judgment for 
you to make. 

Brazil, like the United States, is 
struggling with the very difficult 
question of identifying human rights 
and civil rights violations, enhancing 
the democratic processes, and also 
encouraging confidence among the 
people in my government, in the 
United States, and in the government 
here in Brazil and other countries. 

The differences that have arisen on 
the human rights issue are not based 
upon the lack of commitment to en- 



hance human rights. I think great 
progress has been made in your coun- 
try and also in ours. We do have a 
sharp difference of opinion, however, 
on how the human rights issue should 
be addressed, how specific allegations 
should be investigated, and what ac- 
tion can be taken to correct any de- 
fects that exist in your country or 
mine or others. 

We believe that this is an interna- 
tional problem, that the focusing of 
world attention and world pressure on 
us and other countries is a very bene- 
ficial factor, that high publicity 
should be given to any proven viola- 
tion of human rights. It's a commit- 
ment that our nation has that I want 
not to abandon but to enhance and 
strengthen. 

Brazil, on the other hand, also 
struggling with the same problem, 
trying to give greater human rights, 
does not believe that the international 
organizations and multinational opin- 
ions should be marshaled. However, I 
do note that recently Brazil did vote 
for an increase in the financing of the 
Inter-American Human Rights Com- 
mission. 

We think that when an allegation is 
made in our own country, in Brazil, 
in the European countries, or wher- 
ever, that some responsible delegation 
from the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission or the United Na- 
tions should go in, get the facts, 
make the facts public. If there is an 
actual violation, this would be a great 
incentive to the government 
involved — ours or yours or others — to 
correct the defect. If the allegation is 
false, then the exposition of the error 
or the false allegation would be good 
for the world to know. 

So, I think this is a very deep and 
important consideration. One of the 
best things about the development on 
human rights in the last year or so has 
been the worldwide attention to it. It 
was kind of a dormant issue for too 
long, and now I doubt that there's a 
world leader who exists who doesn't 
constantly feel the pressure of consid- 
ering the human rights questions — to 
analyze one's own administration, 
one's own country, what the rest of 
the world thinks about us, and how 
we could correct any defects and pre- 
vent allegations in the future, either 
true or false. 

Q. With the new movement which 
is now apparent in the Middle East 
question, is there any possibility of 
a Middle East stop on your way 
back home? 

A. No. No, I have no intention to 
stop in the Middle East. I'll go from 



10 

here to Nigeria, from there to Liberia, 
and then back home. 

Q. [in Portuguese]. The re- 
straint of your public words until 
now, your specific desire to meet 
with a new President, all these facts 
amount to a virtual blessing of the 
Brazilian regime. Is your interest in 
civil rights and political dissidents 
fading away, or are American eco- 
nomic interests in this country so 
strong that Brazil is already a spe- 
cial case? 

A. I might say that the history, the 
culture, common defense require- 
ments, trade, common purpose binds 
the people of Brazil — all bind the 
people of Brazil and the people of the 
United States together in an unbreak- 
able commitment, regardless of the 
identity of the leaders in our own 
country or yours. The people of 
Brazil and the United States are 
bound together. There is no lessening 
of our commitment to the principles 
that you described. The basic free- 
doms to democratic government, to 
the protection of human rights, to the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation — 
these commitments are also very deep 
for us. 

Obviously, the overwhelming re- 
sponsibility when I come to a foreign 
country, no matter where it is, is to 
meet with the leaders who are in of- 
fice. But I also will be visiting the 
Congress this morning. I'm sure that 
I will be meeting the chairman of a 
Senate foreign relations committee 
who's also a candidate for President. 

We've already pointed out I will be 
meeting with religious leaders, and I 
hope that in this process that I'll have 
a chance to get views from all ele- 
ments, at least some of the major 
elements of the Brazilian society. But 
I'm not endorsing any candidates, and 
I think that the overwhelming sense 
of my visit already has been that the 
strength of our friendship and the 
mutuality of our purposes, now and in 
the future, far override any sharply 
expressed differences of opinion on 
even the major and very important is- 
sues of human rights, nonprolifera- 
tion, trade, and so forth. 



JOINT U.S. -BRAZILIAN 
COMMUNIQUE, BRASILIA, 
MAR. 30 4 

The President of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil and Mrs. Ernesto Geisel received the 
President of the United States and Mrs Carter 
as official guests of the Brazilian Government. 
President Geisel welcomed the visit as a clear 
expression of the importance of the relation- 



ship and the historic ties that link the two 
countries. 

During the course of their stay in Brasilia. 
President and Mrs. Carter visited His Excel- 
lency, the President of the Supretne Federal 
Tribunal, and other members of the Tribunal. 
President Carter also called on the National 
Congress meeting in solemn joint session. 
President and Mrs. Carter expressed their deep 
appreciation for these opportunities to meet 
with the Tribunal and the National Congress 

The visit testifies to the desire of both Pres- 
idents to increase their mutual understanding 
and build on the broad areas of agreement that 
exist between the two Governments The visit 
also recognizes the growing importance and 
complexity of relations between the two coun- 
tries and the need to minimize the inevitable 
differences in perspective that flow from that 
complexity. 

The conversations between the two Presi- 
dents took place in an atmosphere of frank- 
ness, cordiality and mutual respect They re- 
viewed recent international developments on 
the global and regional plane and exchanged 
views on the policies and perceptions of their 
Governments. Recognizing the respective re- 
sponsibilities of their two countries in the res- 
olution of important global issues, the two 
Presidents stressed the common interests and 
goals both countries share for the construction 
of a just and peaceful international order. 
They reaffirmed their strong support for the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and of the Organization of American States, 
and for the principles of sovereignty, equality 
and non-intervention in the domestic affairs ol 
states, non-use of force in international rela- 
tions and for other principles of international 
law governing relations among states. They 
agreed on the need to persevere in efforts to 
maintain international peace, strengthen world 
security, intensify cooperation among states 
and settle outstanding international issues in 
accordance with the peaceful means envisaged 
by the Charter of the United Nations. 

In the context of this global review, the two 
Presidents noted the importance of the United 
Nations and other international and regional 
institutions in the resolution of international 
issues and disputes, and agreed that their two 
Governments should maintain and expand their 
cooperation in support of these mechanisms 
and their increased effectiveness Thej also 
agreed to expand the annual consultations be- 
tween their two Governments preceding the 
UN General Assembly sessions, and to bring 
within the purview of these consultations 
negotiations and meetings under UN auspices 
such as the Law of the Sea Conference and the 
United Nations Conferences on Technology 
and Development and Technical Cooperation 
among Developing Countries. 

The Presidents exchanged views concerning 
the situation in the Middle East and deplored 
the recent violence which occurred in that 
area They agreed that it is necessary and ur- 
gent to intensity efforts to achieve a just. 



Department of State Bui 

comprehensive and durable peace base 
UNSC Resolution 242 and 338. They stn 
the importance of withdrawal on all fi 
pursuant to Resolution 242 and the resol 
of all aspects of the Palestinian question 

The two Presidents emphasized their 
cern with the arms race and reaffirmed 
they strongly favor the adoption of disa 
ment measures under strict and effective i 
national control. Additionally, the Presit 
expressed their mutual dedication to the 
tive participation of their respective cour 
in the UN Special Session on Disa 
ment and affirmed their mutual desire 
the Special Session lead to positive step 
wards a reduction and eventual eliminate 
armaments and the alleviation of internal 
tensions. 

Drawing on their deep common heritaj 
respect for the Rule of Law and their detc 
nation to improve the conditions ot lit 
their peoples, both Presidents reaffirmed 
agreed that the progress of mankind wi 
measured in large part by advances mat 
guaranteeing and assuring the political, 
nomic and social rights of all peoples. 

President Carter emphasized the fumlai 
tal commitment of his country to the pn 
tion of human rights and democratic freer 
as basic to the process of building a more 
world, and stated that the Universal Dec 
tion of Human Rights and the OAS ('h 
provide a framework for international cor 
in this area. In this regard President Geisi 
called that international cooperation for th 
firmation of human rights, in all their asp 
is one of the noblest tasks of the United 
tions. He stressed the preoccupation ol 
Brazilian Government with the observanc 
human rights and noted the essential rol 
economic, social and political developme 
attaining progress in this area. 

President Carter reviewed the global s. 
of the non-proliferation policy of the Ut 
States, illustrated the practical implement! 
ol this policy within the United States i 
and described the ongoing efforts of his 
ministration to prevent both vertical and I 
zontal proliferation on a worldwide lusis 
emphasized that U.S. policy is designei 
curb the spread of nuclear weapons, while 
couraging international cooperation in the 
velopment of the peaceful uses of ato 
energy. President Geisel noted Brazil's e 
concern for non-proliferation of nuc 
weapons, both vertical and horizontal. In 
connection, he stressed that Brazil strot 
supports international efforts towards di 
mament; that Brazil's nuclear program 
strictly peaceful objectives and is designei 
meet her energy needs, and that Brazil fa> 
the adoption of the lAl-A's international r 
discriminatory safeguards. 

The two Presidents reviewed the conditi 
and prospects of the world economy T 
discussed the critical relationship of devel 
ments in the U.S. economy to global stabi 
and growth, and examined Brazil's rapidly 



1978 



11 



g role within the global economic sys- 
oth Presidents stressed that it is impor- 
lat the industrialized countries as a group 
e appropriate policies to ensure the re- 
ion of more rapid worldwide economic 
th, which also requires appropriate 
es in the developing countries to main- 
lealthy economies. They welcomed the 
on of OPEC taken in Caracas in De- 
:r to maintain the prevailing level of pe- 
rn prices. 

sident Carter emphasized his Administra- 
commitment to freer trade. President 
stressed the importance of export 
h to Brazilian development. In this con- 
>n. both Presidents emphasized their re- 
to work towards a more open and fair 
I trading system, to fight protectionism 

cooperate in bringing the Multilateral 
Negotiations to a successful conclusion. 

wo Presidents agreed that the major con- 
ions in this field should be made by the 
oped countries. President Carter em- 
zed the determination of the United 
s to negotiate special and differential 
nent for developing countries, where 
le and appropriate. He also noted the de- 
lity of contributions by the developing 
ies towards trade liberalization. President 

1 expressed Brazil's readiness to contrib- 
together with other countries, to the 
ilization of world trade. The two Presi- 

agreed on the importance of reaching an 
standing on codes on export subsidies, 
ervailing duties, safeguards and other 
policy mechanisms. They also agreed on 
.•ed for close consultations as the Geneva 
iations approach the final stage, 
e two Presidents agreed that the Fifth 
.in of the Brazil-US Sub-Group on Trade 
I take place in Brasilia in May. The prin- 
purpose of the session will be a bilateral 
tnation of the substantive issues existing 
e current phase of the Multilateral Trade 
tiations. 

e two Presidents strongly endorsed the 
■ole of international financial institutions 
as the World Bank and the Inter- 
rican Development- Bank. In this connec- 
they reviewed the various measures taken 
e past year and agreed on the importance 
i increased level of funding of these in- 
ions. The two Presidents emphasized the 
irtance of the contributions of the de- 
Jed as well as of the developing countries 
tese institutions, and also noted and wel- 
d the expanding efforts among the de- 
ping countries themselves to strengthen 
Jal cooperation in support of their de- 
pment. They noted with satisfaction the 
rts made to create a group for economic 
>eration in the Caribbean. 
le two Presidents agreed on the impor- 
e of stabilizing commodity prices at levels 
to producers and consumers and of the 
which well-designed funding arrange- 

I'ts can play in relation to commodity price 



Both Presidents stated that they would con- 
tinue their support for the close working rela- 
tionships that have been established between 
the economic and financial authorities of the 
two countries. 

The two Presidents discussed their common 
interest in reducing dependence on imported 
oil and reviewed their countries' programs in 
energy research and development. They agreed 
to establish a program of cooperation that 
would emphasize both nations' areas of ad- 
vanced expertise and ensure a two-way flow of 
benefits: in coal mining, processing and con- 
version, the production of alcohol from sugar 
and other agricultural products and industrial 
and transportation energy conservation. This 
agreement will be followed by meetings of ex- 
perts to design specific cooperative programs 
including the possibility of joint funding of 
such programs. 

The two Presidents also noted the world ag- 
ricultural situation and agreed that the United 
States and Brazil, as the world's leading ex- 
porters of agricultural products, can make an 
important contribution to easing world prob- 
lems in this field. They decided to establish, 
under the Memorandum of Understanding 
[Concerning Consultations on Matters of 
Mutual Interest] of February 21, 1976, a 
Sub-Group on Agriculture. The Sub-Group 
will address problems of mutual interest and 
will hold its initial meeting in the near future 

The two Presidents also noted that the 
shared experiences which derive from private 
sector, professional, cultural and educational 
exchanges constitute a valuable base of lasting 
friendship and mutual understanding between 
the two countries. The two Presidents specif- 
ically noted the celebration last year of the 
Twentieth Anniversary of the Bilateral Ful- 
bright Exchange Program which has involved 
university scholars of a wide variety of 
disciplines. 

The two Presidents emphasized the shared 
goals of their peoples in a new era of peace 
and progress which will contribute to a more 
just economic relationship between North and 
South, promote increased economic security 
for all countries, assure a better quality of life 
for all peoples, provide a more equitable shar- 
ing of the benefits of growth, and encourage 
more rapid national development. 

The two Presidents agreed on the impor- 
tance of frequent consultations and close 
cooperation between the two Governments. 
They agreed that the mechanisms and proce- 
dures of consultation established under the 
Memorandum of Understanding of February 
21, 1976. should continue to be used and in- 
structed their Foreign Ministers accordingly. 
The two Presidents expressed their intention to 
continue in close personal communication so 
as to permit their direct and prompt address to 
matters of special interest to their two 
countries. 

The two Presidents expressed their great 
personal satisfaction that their conversations, 
conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and 



mutual respect, had resulted in a very useful, 
comprehensive and mutually beneficial ex- 
change of views on a wide range of multilat- 
eral and bilateral issues, and a full apprecia- 
tion of each other's views. 

Upon ending their visit. President and Mrs. 
Carter thanked President and Mrs. Geisel for 
the cordial hospitality offered to them by the 
Brazilian people and government. 

REMARKS AT THE 
NATIONAL ARTS THEATRE, 
LAGOS, APR. I 6 

I come from a great nation to visit 
a great nation. When my voice speaks 
words, they are not the words of a 
personal person but the words of a 
country. 

It's no coincidence that I come here 
to this institute, where free and open 
discussions and debate contribute to 
the comprehension and understanding 
and the reaching of agreements that 
solve problems that have separated 
people one from another. 

It is no coincidence that I come to 
Nigeria to talk about our bilateral re- 
lationships and the problems of Af- 
rica. And it is no coincidence that our 
nation has now turned in an unpre- 
cedented way toward Africa — not to 
give you our services but to share 
with you a common future, combining 
our strengths and yours, correcting 
our weaknesses and correcting yours. 
And this departure from past aloof- 
ness by the United States is not just a 
personal commitment of my own, but 
I represent the deep feelings and the 
deep interest of all the people of my 
country. 

I'm proud and deeply moved to be 
the first American President to make 
an official visit to your country. And 
I'm especially grateful for the warmth 
and the generosity of my reception by 
the Government and by the people of 
Nigeria. I don't know who's doing 
the work, but many Nigerians are 
standing beside the roadway to make 
me and my family feel welcome, and 
I thank you for it. 

During my first year as President of 
the United States, I've been pleased 
to work closely with General 
Obasanjo, learning from him and 
from other African leaders. Our 
cooperation has had a special mean- 
ing for me, since Africa has been so 
much in my thoughts during the past 
15 months. 

Our countries have much in com- 
mon. Nigeria and the United States 
are vast and diverse nations seeking 
to use our great resources for the 
benefit of all our people. That's the 



12 




With Lt. Gen Obasanjo in Lagos 



way it is now; that's the way it will 
continue to be in the future. 

Americans admire the energy, the 
wisdom, the hard work, the sense of 
optimism of the Nigerian people, for 
these are exactly the same qualities 
which we admire in my country. The 
Nigerian Government has shown these 
qualities in your own national accom- 
plishments and in your efforts for 
worldwide peace and economic 
progress — in the Organization of Af- 
rican Unity, in the United Nations, 
and in other councils where nations 
seek common ground so as to resolve 
differences and to work together. 

We admire also the humane and the 
creative way which Nigeria has come 
through a divisive time in your own 
history. Through public debate and 
far-reaching planning, you are design- 
ing a democratic future for a new 
"One Nigeria," and we're grateful 
and excited about this prospect. 

Our bonds of friendship go back 
many years. Nigerian students first 
came to the United States in the 19th 
century. Your first President. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe. studied in our country. In 
applying to Lincoln University, he 
wrote that he believed in education 
for service and service for humanity 
Tens of thousands of young Nigerians 
have followed him to America to pre- 
pare themselves for service here in 
their homeland. Many are present or 
future teachers who will help you 
achieve your goal of universal pri- 
mary education. 

We in the United States are learn- 
ing from you as well, for we are en- 
riched by our ties and heritage in Af- 
rica, just as we hope to contribute to 



the realization of African hopes and 
African expectations. 

Our nations and our continents are 
bound together by strong ties that we 
inherit from our histories. We also 
share three basic commitments to the 
future of Africa. 

• We share with you a commitment 
to majority rule and individual human 
rights. 

• In order to meet the basic needs 
of the people, we share with you a 
commitment to economic growth and 
to human development. 

• We share with you a commitment 
to an Africa that is at peace, free 
from colonialism, free from racism, 
free from military interference by 
outside nations, and free from the in- 
evitable conflicts that can come when 
the integrity of national boundaries 
are not respected. We share these 
things with you as well. 

These three common commitments 
shape our attitude toward your conti- 
nent. 



Majority Rule 

You have been among the leaders 
of international efforts to bring the 
principles of majority rule and indi- 
vidual rights into reality in southern 
Africa. During the past year, we've 
worked closely with your government 
and the other front-line states in the 
quest to achieve these goals in 
Namibia and in Zimbabwe. 

Namibia. Our efforts have now 
reached a critical stage. On Namibia, 
there has been some progress, with 



k! 



Department of State Bui 

the parties showing some degre 
flexibility. It is important that 
commodation be now reached, 
past week, we and the other Wes 
members of the U.N. Security G 
cil have presented to the dispu 
parties our proposals for an inte 
tionally acceptable agreement b; 
on free elections. 

These proposals provide the 
hope for a fair and peaceful solu 
that will bring independence 
Namibia in a manner consistent ' 
Security Council Resolution 385. 
group is favored at the expenst 
another. They protect the right 
all. They should be accepted witl 
further delay. The tragic assassina 
[on March 27. 1978] of Chief Kap 
[President of the Democratic T 
halle Alliance, a Namibian polii 
party] should not lead to an en 
violence and recrimination, but U 
internationally supervised choice 
the people of Namibia to elect li 
ership that will unite their countr 
peace and not divide it in war. 



Southern Rhodesia. On Rhode 
or Zimbabwe, Great Britain and 
United States have put forward a 
for the solution, 7 based on three 
damental principles: 

• First, fair and free elections; 

• Secondly, an irreversible tra 
tion to genuine majority rule and 
dependence; and 

• Third, respect for the indivic 
rights of all the citizens of an ii 
pendent Zimbabwe. 

This plan provides the best b. 
for agreement. It is widely suppo 
within the international commu! 
and by the Presidents of the front- 
nations who surround Zimbabwe 
self. Its principles must be honoi 
Let there be no question of the ci 
mitment of the United States to il 
principles or our determination 
pursue a just settlement which bri 
a cease-fire and an internationi 
recognized legal government. 

The present challenge to our ( 
lomacy and to yours is to help all 
parties get together, based on 
Anglo-American plan, and build 
areas of agreement. Only a fair 
rangement with broad support ami 
the parties can endure. 

The transition to independence c 
new Zimbabwe must insure an opp 
tunity for all parties to compete in 
democratic process on an equal ft 
ing. The past must lead irrevocably 
majority rule and a future in wh 
the rights of each citizen of Zi 
babwe are protected, regardless 
tribal or ethnic origin or race. Tha 



1978 

nation's position. We will not de- 
from it. 

he hour is late with regard both to 
babwe and to Namibia. The par- 
must choose. They can choose a 
of agreement and be remembered 
^nen of vision and courage who 
ted new nations, born in peace, 
hey can insist on rigid postures 
will produce new political com- 
ations. generating new conflicts, 
wing additional bloodshed, and 
y the fulfillment of their hopes. 
'e in the United States remain 
imitted, as do the people of 
eria, to the path of genuine prog- 
and fairness for the sake of all 
nations of the region and for the 
• of international peace. 

auth Africa. In the name of jus- 
. we also believe that South Afri- 
society should and can be trans- 
led progressively and peacefully, 
assured respect for the rights of 
We've made it clear to South Af- 
that the nature of our relations 
depend on whether there is prog- 
toward full participation for all 
people, in every respect of the 
al and economic life of the na- 
, and an end to discrimination, an 
to apartheid based on race or 
lie origin. We stand firm in that 
sage as well. 

grew up in a society struggling to 
[ racial harmony through racial 
ice. Though our problems were 

Ierent, I know that progress can 
be found if the determination to 
wrongs righted is matched by an 
erstanding that the prisoners of in- 
ice include the privileged as well 
fa he powerless. 
II believe we should therefore com- 

■ : our determination to support the 
lits of the oppressed people in 
iith Africa with a willingness to 
Id out our hands to the white 
i.ority if they decide to transform 
lir society and to do away with 

■ rtheid and the crippling burdens of 
It injustices. I also believe that 
igress can be made. As Andrew 
lung said here in Lagos last Au- 
It. a belief in dreams for the future 
liot naive if we are ready to work 
lealize those dreams. 



■man Rights 

lOur concern for human rights ex- 
Ids throughout this continent and 
floughout the world. Whatever the 
jyology or the power or the race of a 
B/ernment that abuses the rights of 
■ people, we oppose those abuses. 
$iVe in America welcome the real 
JB'gress in human rights that is being 



made in many countries, in Africa as 
well as in other regions. Americans 
were particularly encouraged that the 
African group at the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission moved this year 
to consider the oppressive policies of 
two of its own member nations. 

We are encouraged, too, by the 
movement toward democracy being 
made by many nations. Nigeria is an 
outstanding example. The free and 
fair elections that you held in the past 
year leave no doubt that your gov- 
ernment is determined to pursue its 
decision to establish civilian rule in 
1979. This action will be an inspira- 
tion to all those in the world who 
love democracy and who love free- 
dom. And we congratulate you on 
this. 

Each country must, of course, 
adapt the instruments of democracy to 
fit its own particular needs, a process 
now being completed by your con- 
stituent assembly. The basic elements 
are participation by individuals in the 
decisions that affect their lives, re- 
spect for civil liberties through the 
rule of law, and thus, protection of 
the dignity of all men and women. 
Wherever these fundamental princi- 
ples exist, a government can accom- 
modate to necessary change without 
breaking, and its people can demand 
such change without being broken. 

These principles are necessary for 
democracy, and they sustain de- 
velopment as well. For in a democ- 
racy, the people themselves can best 
insure that their government will 
promote their economic rights, as 
well as their political and civil 
liberties. 

I believe, as I know you do as 
well, that every person also has a 
right to education, to health care, to 
nutrition, to shelter, to food, and to 
employment. These are the founda- 
tions on which men and women can 
build better lives. 



Economic Development 

This is our second great, common 
goal between the United States and 
Nigeria — human development made 
possible by fair and equitable eco- 
nomic progress. 

My country is ready to do its fair 
share in support of African develop- 
ment, both because it's in our own 
interest and also because it's right. 
More and more, the economic well- 
being of Americans depends on the 
growth of the developing nations here 
in Africa and in other parts of the 
world. A good example is our rela- 
tionship with Nigeria, which is 
marked by respect for each other's 



13 

independence and a growing recogni- 
tion of our interdependence. 

Nigeria, for instance, is the United 
States' second largest supplier of im- 
ported crude oil. The United States is 
the largest market for Nigeria's petro- 
leum and thus the largest source of 
the revenue which is so vital to 
Nigeria's dynamic, economic de- 
velopment program. 

But the scope of our commerce is 
much broader than in petroleum 
alone. Our growing trade serves the 
interests of both countries. When we 
purchase Nigerian products, we con- 
tribute to Nigerian development. But 
unless we can also share our technol- 
ogy and share our productive capacity 
with you, our own economy slows 
down, American workers lose their 
jobs, and the resulting economic 
sluggishness means that we can buy 
less from you. 

Financial encouragement to de- 
veloping nations is, therefore, in our 
interest, because a world of prosper- 
ous, developing economies is a world 
in which America's economy can 
prosper. 

We are increasing our bilateral de- 
velopment assistance to Africa, and 
on my return to Washington, I will 
recommend to the Congress that the 
United States contribute $125 million 
to the second replenishment of the 
African Development Fund. I'm 
happy to announce, also, that just be- 
fore leaving Washington, I authorized 
our [U.S. Army] Corps of Engineers 
to offer to participate, as requested by 
you, in the comprehensive develop- 
ment of the Niger River system. 

We are giving new priority to 
cooperating in international efforts to 
improve health around the world. We 
would like to study with you how we 
can best work with Nigeria and other 
nations of Africa to deal with the kill- 
ing and the crippling diseases that 
still afflict this continent. 

Three days ago I spoke in Caracas, 
Venezuela, about our commitment to 
international economic growth and 
equity. All of us can gain if we act 
fairly toward one another. Nigeria 
acted on this principle in helping to 
negotiate the Lome convention and 
the birth of the Economic Community 
of West African States. 

All nations can act on this principle 
by making world trade increasingly 
free and fair. Private investment can 
help, under arrangements benefiting 
both the investors and also the host 
countries like your own. And sharing 
technology can make a crucial differ- 
ence. We are especially pleased that 
Nigeria is sending so many of your 
young people to the United States for 



14 




f 



Conclusion of an evening's entertainment in Lagos 



training in the middle-level technical 
skills. 

There must be fair international 
agreements on such issues as stabiliz- 
ing commodity prices, the creation of 
a common fund, and relieving the 
debt burden of the poorest nations. 

Every government has the obliga- 
tion to promote economic justice 
within its own nation, as well as 
among nations. American develop- 
ment assistance will go increasingly 
to those areas where it can make the 
greatest contribution to the economic 
rights of the poor 

Peace in Africa 

Progress toward economic de- 
velopment requires the pursuit of our 
third goal as well — again which we 
share with you — a peaceful Africa. 
free of military intervention, for eco- 
nomic progress is best pursued in 
times of peace. Africans themselves 
can best find peaceful answers to Af- 
rican disputes through the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity and, when 
needed, with the help of the United 
Nations. 

We support your efforts to 
strengthen the peacemaking role of 
the Organization of African Unit\ . 



and we share Nigeria's belief in the 
practical contributions the United Na- 
tions can make. U.N. peacekeeping 
forces are already, today, playing a 
crucial role in the Middle East. They 
can help bring independence and 
majority rule, in peace, to Namibia 
and to Zimbabwe. 

The military intervention of outside 
powers or their proxies in such dis- 
putes too often makes local conflicts 
even more complicated and dangerous 
and opens the door to a new form of 
domination or colonialism. We op- 
pose such intervention by outside 
military forces. We must not allow 
great power rivalries to destroy our 
hopes for an Africa at peace. 

This is one reason we applaud the 
leading role of Nigeria in seeking to 
find peaceful solutions to such 
tragedies as the recent struggle be- 
tween Ethiopia and Somalia in the 
Horn of Africa. 

We are concerned that foreign 
troops are already planning for mili- 
tary action inside Ethiopia against the 
Eritreans, which will result in greatly 
increased bloodshed among those un- 
fortunate peoples. Although I will 
remain careful to see that our friends 
are not put at a disadvantage. I am 
working to curb our own role as a 



Department of State Bui 

supplier of arms, and we urge ot 
to show similar restraint. 

We prefer to seek good relat 
with African and other n a t i | 
through the works of peace, not [ 
America's contribution will be to | 
and development and not to deat 
destruction. 

Plainly, military restraint by 
siders can best be brought about i 
nations, including those who 
weapons, actively seek that c 
straint. We would welcome and 
port voluntary regional agreem 
among African leaders to reduce 
purchase of weapons as a major 
toward peace and away from the i 
nomic deprivation of the poor, w 
badly needed money that could 
them a better life goes to pure 
weapons to take lives. 

I've talked about many subji 
this afternoon, very briefly, bu 
one way or another, I've been tall 
about change in the world that wt 
share. Sometimes we grow impal 
or cynical about that change, thinl 
that it's too slow, that it may 
come at all. 

I know something about soi 
change. In my own lifetime. I've s 
the region of my birth — the soutl 
part of the United States — chan 
from a place of poverty and des 
and racial division to a land of br 
promise and opportunity and incr 
ing racial harmony. I've seen the 1 
ering wall between the races ta 
down, piece by piece, until the wr 
and the blacks of my countrj C( 
reach across it to each other. 

I know that our own society is 
ferent from any other, and I kr 
that we still have much to do in 
United States. But nothing can sh 
my faith that in every part of 
world, peaceful change can come 
bless the lives of human bein 
Nothing can make me doubt that 
continent will win its struggle 
freedom — freedom from racism A 
the denial of human rights, freed 
from want and suffering, and freed 
from the destruction of war a 
foreign intervention. 

Nigeria is a great and influent 
nation, a regional and an internatio 
leader We stand by you in yc 
work We know that Africans v 
always take the lead in shaping 
destiny of your own people. And 
know that this continent will enj 
the liberation that can come to the 
who put racial division and in j ust 
behind them. 

I believe that this day is coming I 
Africa. And on that day, blacks a 
whites alike will be able to say, 
the words of a great man from f 






1978 

State, Dr. Martin Luther King. 
"Free at last, free at last, thank 
Almighty, we are free at last." 



:STION-AND-ANSWER 
SION, LAGOS, 

2 8 

Is there any connection be- 
en your public position on 
Ihern African policy and how 
ntake your votes at the Security 
Incil on southern Africa? 



We have, as you know, only re- 
ly as a nation been deeply in- 
ed in trying to bring peace to 
nern Africa. We have taken the 
itive, along with the British, in 
>abwe. to try to bring out a res- 
ion of those very serious 
(ems — peace, majority rule, and 
ing of the liberation forces as a 

in the future security of Zim- 
e. And we have also taken the 
itive, along with Germany and 
ce. Great Britain and Canada, 
r the United Nations, to bring a 
lution of the problem in 
ibia — again, majority rule, free 
ions, the right of the blacks to 
their rights honored, 
hink that is accurate to say, too, 
the recent action by the United 
ins to implement an arms em- 
) against South Africa was pre- 
d by our own unilateral action 
;menting an arms embargo long 
re the United Nations acted, and 
support that arms embargo 
iletely. 

Can you tell us if you talked 
t the oil situation and the fact 
Nigeria wants more technology 

the United States? 



I Yes. We discussed the oil situa- 
lin Nigeria. We also discussed the 
loect of purchasing liquefied natu- 
l.as, which Nigeria will be ready 
I'oduce by 1983. and the need of 
I ria for technical assistance not 
I in petroleum but in other aspects 
I onomic development. 
Iiere are now. as I said in my 
Ich yesterday, 15,000 Nigerian 
l:nts and, in addition, 1,000 more 
I are getting specific middle-level 
Inical training in the United 
les. Five hundred are already 
■ '. 500 more are coming. In addi- 
I, the Nigerians have requested 
lar assistance — retired executives 
li the United States who have 
Ivledge in economic development 
I petroleum to come here to work 
I them. And we will pursue that 
■Jgh the Secretary of State. 
lie Eximbank loans, the Overseas 



Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) insurance, which I think we 
now have 31 applicants who are ready 
to come into Nigeria to make 
investments — this will be expedited. 

In addition, we have established, 
after General Obasanjo's visit to the 
United States in October, detailed 
discussions between our own Com- 
merce Department and other officials 
and the Nigerians on how we can in- 
crease investment and technical as- 
sistance for Nigeria. 

It is a very good country in which 
to invest. There is a stable govern- 
ment with a prospect of constitutional 
government that will be equally sta- 
ble. I think the past problems with 
American investors have now been 
overcome. I know that several major 
companies — Ford, Mack Truck, 
Bechtel, and others — are now coming 
into Nigeria to invest. So, I would 
guess that all the needs of Nigeria — 
technical assistance and devel- 
opment — will be met. 

Q. Did the General ask you to 
take stronger action toward South 
Africa and Rhodesia, perhaps more 
embargoes? 

A. I think the General would be 
more inclined to take additional em- 
bargo action against South Africa 
than would we. As I have said, we 
have cooperated in the U.N. actions, 
and even before the U.N. action, we 
took unilateral steps to declare a 
complete arms embargo against South 
Africa. 

Q. What specific areas of bilat- 
eral cooperation would you like be- 
tween your country and Nigeria on 
any issue or on any important proj- 
ect to use for this important visit? 

A. We have got now four commit- 
tees set up, one for the development 
of Nigerian agriculture. This is a joint 
effort where we help Nigeria and we 
learn in the process. Another one of 
the subcommittees is on education. 
And we have always had, for many 
years, a very good relationship here. 
We want to improve it. 

Another one is in economic de- 
velopment. I mentioned that we have 
31 applicants right now of American 
business investments that are waiting 
to be made in Nigeria. And the fourth 
one is technical assistance, where we 
will provide technical training in the 
United States and send technicians 
here who are expert to help with the 
future development of the Nigerian 
economy. 

These efforts are all very fruitful, 
and they will be better in the future. 
We have decided, for instance, this 



15 

morning, that the joint study commis- 
sion that was set up last October, that 
already met in Nigeria in November, 
will have another meeting in the 
United States in April — this month, 
the last of this month — will make a 
report to me and to General Obasanjo 
by the end of May to identify any re- 
maining problems, so that he and I 
can personally resolve those problems 
and remove the obstacles to the fur- 
ther economic development, on a 
joint basis, between our country and 
Nigeria. 

Q. You said the General would 
be more inclined to have stronger 
embargoes. Did he urge you to do 
anything that your Administration 
is not doing now to take steps in 
other areas in support of the change 
in South Africa? 

A. Yes. We have had a very thor- 
ough discussion not only between 
myself and General Obasanjo and his 
Ministers (Foreign), but yesterday we 
had a foreign-level discussion with 
other nations, including the front-line 
countries around Rhodesia. 

We now will move as quickly as 
possible to call together the parties 
who are in dispute concerning Zim- 
babwe, those who are identified as a 
patriotic front, the front-line nations 
who surround Rhodesia, and also the 
parties to the internal settlement — 
Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole. and 
Chirau. q 

We will begin now to explore the 
earliest date when this might be ac- 
complished. We and the British will 
act as hosts and we will, of course, 
encourage U.N. participation as well. 

In the case of Namibia, the five- 
nation group operating as a committee 
of the U.N. Security Council — these 
are the permanent committee mem- 
bers in the Security Council that I 
have named earlier, the Western 
members — will contact the South Af- 
ricans to put forward our proposal 
and also to contact the SWAPO 
leaders. 

The front-line presidents, then the 
Nigerian leaders will be in contact 
with Sam Nujoma, who is head of the 
SWAPO group. So in these two major 
areas of dispute — Zimbabwe and 
Namibia — we will expedite our action 
at the urging of and with the coopera- 
tion of the Nigerian officials. 

In the case of the Horn of Africa, 
Nigeria has long played a leading 
role, has been chairman of the 
subcommittee — under the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity — for the Horn 
of Africa, and they have begun now 
to make attempts to get the Ethio- 
pians and the Somalians to meet, to 



16 

make permanent the peace that has 
been established in recent weeks, in 
recent days. 

We also hope that there will be an 
avoidance of bloodshed as it relates 
to the Eritreans. So I think in these 
three major areas, we have reached a 
common purpose. And so far as I 
know, there are no remaining differ- 
ences between myself and General 
Obasanjo. 

Q. At what level will this Rhode- 
sian meeting be? 

A. At the Foreign Secretary level. 
The plans are that Secretary Vance 
and, perhaps, David Owen from Bri- 
tain would be present and in person. 

Q. Did you reach an agreement 
with General Obasanjo about 
stabilizing the dollar? 

A. I wish that General Obasanjo 
and I could act on a bilateral basis to 
completely stabilize the dollar. The 
dollar is a very sound currency. It is 
based primarily upon the economy of 
the United States, which is strong, 
growing stronger. 

There are several factors that will 
tend to increase the value of the dol- 
lar this year. Our imports of oil will 
be level this year. They were increas- 
ing rapidly last year, which was a bad 
factor last year. The interest rates in 
our country are higher now than they 
were before, which will encourage 
additional investment in our country 
which will also help the dollar. 

We need very urgently to have the 
Congress of the United States act on 
my proposals concerning the com- 
prehensive energy policy. This will 
stabilize the dollar, and the prospects 
for that success in the Congress are 
good. And I believe that there is a 
general feeling that our economy will 
continue to grow at about the same 
rate that it did last year. 

Last year, we were growing much 
faster than our major trading partners: 
Germany. Great Britain, Italy, 
France, Japan, and others. This year 
those other nations will have a faster 
growth, which means that they can 
buy more of our goods and cut down 
on our adverse balance of payments. 
So for all these reasons and others 
that I could describe, I think the 
prospects for a stable dollar are very 
good. 

Q. Did you discuss human rights 
and any specifics at all and, par- 
ticularly, did you discuss Uganda 
and Idi Amin in regards to human 
rights? 

A. We did not discuss Uganda. I 



did mention in my speech yesterday 
my gratitude that the Organization of 
African Unity has shown fit not only 
to condemn white nations when they 
deprive persons of human rights, but 
also condemn black leaders, as well, 
where human rights are abridged. 

We did discuss the question of 
human rights. There is no difference, 
of course, between our govern- 
ments — Nigeria and the United 
States — because we recognize that 
within our own countries, we have 
made every effort to enhance human 
rights. I think political oppressions 
and the right of people to participate 
in their government is one that has 
good prospects of even greater im- 
provement in the future. 

We also discussed the problem of 
human rights that accrue because of 
poverty — deprived of a right of a 
place to live and to adequate food and 
clothing and education and health 
care. And through our own contribu- 
tions to the African Development 
Bank; our own contributions to the 
International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank; through direct bilateral 
aid, which primarily goes to the very 
poor countries; and through increased 
trade and technical service to coun- 
tries that have had good success, like 
Nigeria, we are trying to alleviate 
those human rights and deprivations 
that come from poverty. 

We have a very close relationship 
in our commitment to human rights 
between ourselves and the Nigerians, 
and also we have a very good, per- 
manent personal friendship between 
myself. General Obasanjo. and other 
leaders of our government, which is 
very helpful to us. 

We have benefited just as much 
in the United States from our good re- 
lationships with Nigeria as have the 
Nigerians, and although it has been 
very good historically and at the pres- 
ent time, we believe that those rela- 
tions are going to be even better than 
in the years to come. 



JOINT U.S.-NIGERIA 
COMMUNIQUE, 
LAGOS, APR. 2 10 

At the invitation of His Excellency Lt. Gen- 
eral Olusegun Obasanjo. Head of the Federal 
Military Government. Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, the President of the United States of 
America, His Excellency Jimmy Carter, and 
Mrs. Carter paid a State Visit to Nigeria from 
31st March to 3rd April. 1978. This visit re- 
ciprocated the visit to the United States ot 
America by the Head of the Federal Military 



- 



Department of State Bui | 

Government from 11th to 13th October. , 
It was the first State Visit by an Ame 
President to sub-Saharan Africa, provi 
President Carter an opportunity to wi 
firsthand the aspirations, achievements 
problems of contemporary Africa. 

In the course of the visit, the two Heacj 
State met in plenary sessions during w 
they discussed bilateral and internati 
issues. 

President Carter and his host, Lt Gel 
Obasanjo. examined extensively the cu| 
state of affairs in the African region unc 
Voted particular attention to the situatic 
Southern Africa 

They were fully agreed on the neeo 
peace and stability in Africa and expresse> 
hope that a spirit of reconciliation will pr 
in those areas of North- West Africa and i 
Horn of Africa that are still victims of fra 
dal conflicts. 

President Carter expressed satisfaction 
Nigeria's efforts in its capacity as Chairm; 
the OAU Good Offices Commission to re 
peace between Ethiopia and Somalia. It 
agreed that Nigeria should persevere in it 
forts to get the parties in the disput 
negotiate a mutually acceptable and then 
durable solution. With the fighting in the 
of Africa now ended, the two leader 
pressed the hope that the remaining prob 
in that region will be settled by peat U 
means. 

On Zimbabwe, the two Heads of State 
pressed support for the Anglo-American 
posal and reiterated their conviction tha 
the present circumstances, only a seltlei 
which is based on its principles can b 
about racial harmony, prosperity and i usi 
lasting peace in Zimbabwe. The two Heac 
State agreed that the arrangements made u 
the Salisbury Agreement of March 3 do 
change the illegal character of the prcseni 
gime and are unacceptable as they do 
guarantee a genuine transfer of power to 
majority nor take into consideration the vi 
of all the Zimbabwean nationalist groups. 

The situation in Namibia was also caret 
examined. Lt. General Obasanjo emphas 
his Government's full support for SWA PC 
the authentic leaders of the people in their 
struggle for the genuine independence 
Namibia, with its unity, sovereignty and ti 
torial integrity full [sic] guaranteed. Presu 
Carter stressed the need for a settlement of 
Namibian issue which would guarantee that 
political groups would have an equal and 
opportunity to compete in free elections 
which the people of Namibia would make tl 
own choice about their future government. ' 
two leaders agreed that it is essential lor 
peace and security of Africa that Nami 
achieve its independence on the basis 
United Nations Security Council Resolut 
385. 

They reviewed the current efforts of i 
Five Power Western Contact Group and o 
cussed the settlement proposal which the f 



1 1978 



developed as a means to a prompt and 
lul transition to genuine majority rule in 
pia. 

two Heads of State renewed their con- 
ition of the evil and oppressive system of 
eid in South Afriea. They pledged their 
■fforts to work inwards the elimination of 
ystem and the establishment of justice. 

ty and human dignity for all races in 

Africa within a free society where all 
is will exercise their democratic rights to 

a government of their choice. They ap- 

I to all States to do their part towards the 
ition of this objective. 

Nigerian Head of State. Lt. General 
njo. expressed his Government's strong 
lointment at the lack of impact of the 
concrete proposals put forward in the 
) eradicate the obnoxious system of apart- 
This he ascribed to the inadequacy of 
easures adopted as well as the lack of 
:al will on the part of Nations called 
to implement these measures. He noted 
one of these Nations have pursued 
ss of outright collaboration with South 

in both military and economic matters, 
the Head of State re-emphasized his 
nment's determination to continue to ex- 

II possible political and material support 
nationalist liberation movements in 

Africa, to ensure an early end of the ra- 
inority domination. 

ident Carter and Lt. General Obasanjo 
sed the intention of the United States of 
ica and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
imbers of the Security Council, to work 
ly in the Council in the interest of 
thening international peace and security. 
expressed particular approval of the Se- 

Council's prompt action in establishing 
ed Nations Interim force in Lebanon and 
:d their full co-operation to achieve the 
ives of the mandate granted by the Secu- 
Duncil. 

two Heads of State exchanged views 
rning the situation in the Middle East 
eplored the recent violence which oc- 
1 in that area. They agreed that it is 
Bary and urgent to intensify efforts to 
^e a just, comprehensive and durable 
based on United Nations Security Coun- 
solutions 242 and 338. They stressed the 
tance of withdrawal on all fronts pur- 
to Resolution 242 and the resolution of 
oects of the Palestinian question. 

two Heads of State underscored their 
itment to the principles of the United 
is Charter, particularly those concerning 
mportance of human rights in all 
ies. To this end they cited the irnpor- 

of strengthening the human rights 
nery of the United Nations, 
heir review of the international economic 
ion. the two Heads of State stressed the 
t need for measures to secure a prosper- 
lust and equitable international economic 
. The two leaders placed special em- 
s on the importance of close consultations 



between Nigeria and the United States in the 
North-South Economic Dialogue and in the 
work of the General Assembly. They agreed 
on the value of the United Nations Overview 
Committee dialogue in the enhancing an un- 
derstanding of global issues of common con- 
cern and in promoting development coopera- 
tion. They appealed to all nations to strive 
vigorously for the achievement of the goals 
specified in the Seventh Special Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, in particu- 
lar with respect to issues of vital importance to 
the developing countries. In this regard, Lt. 
General Obasanjo invited attention to the slow 
pace of progress concerning the establishment 
of the Common Fund and alleviation of the 
debt problems of the developing countries. 
The two Heads of State agreed to cooperate in 
order to intensify action within the United Na- 
tions system towards finding solutions to the 
problem of global inflation. 

The two leaders discussed the United Na- 
tions Special Session on Disarmament which 
opens in May of 1978. As leaders of countries 
which have played a significant role in United 
Nations disarmament matters, both Heads of 
State agreed that the session should provide a 
stimulus to further concrete disarmament ef- 
forts. 

The two Heads of State expressed satisfac- 
tion at the progress that had been made in re- 
cent discussions between the two Governments 
on bilateral cooperation in economic, commer- 
cial and technical fields and agreed to further 
strengthen relations in these areas. Mutual ef- 
forts will be made to expand and diversify 
trade and development activities and to facili- 
tate investment in areas of key importance to 
Nigeria's economic growth. For this purpose 
the two leaders agreed to set up joint working 
groups on investment and trade, technology 
transfer, agriculture and rural development and 
education. 

The President of the United States of 
America and Mrs. Carter expressed their pro- 
found appreciation to Lt. General Obasanjo. the 
Nigerian Government, and all the people of 
Nigeria for the gracious hospitality afforded to 
their party during their visit to Nigeria. 

The President was impressed by the visible 
evidence of the pace of Nigerian economic 
progress and the vigorous and determined ef- 
forts being undertaken by the Federal Mili- 
tary Government to provide for the social 
and economic development of the people of 
Nigeria. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
WELCOMING CEREMONY, 
MONROVIA, APR. 3 11 

President Tolbert 

Just over 30 years ago, Mr. Presi- 
dent, on January 27, 1943, another 
American President transited this land 
in connection with the victorious Al- 



17 

lied effort of World War II. Liberia's 
President Edwin James Barclay re- 
ceived President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt at that time on an asphalt 
airstrip of 7,000 feet. In the interven- 
ing years, U.S. -Liberia cooperation 
has here afforded one of the most 
modern and expanding civil aviation 
facilities in West Africa, spanning a 
reinforced 11.000 feet. 

And today, we are deeply honored 
to pay homage to America's first 
third-century President who has come 
in the larger pursuit of permanent 
peace, of human rights, and of eco- 
nomic justice in our one world; who 
has come in furtherance of continuing 
friendship and closer cooperation be- 
tween the United States of America 
and the Republic of Liberia. 

Standing here beneath the sunny 
expanse of Africa's skies, we most 
heartily salute you, Mr. President, 
Mrs. Carter, Amy, and members of 
your suite, and with intense warmth, 
embracingly welcome you on behalf 
of Mrs. Tolbert. our family, the Gov- 
ernment and people of Liberia, to this 
land of love and liberty by God's 
command. 

Mr. President, by your sincere 
leadership you are restoring to a 
weary world, particularly in the trou- 
bled Middle East and in Africa, re- 
freshing new hopes of enterprise and 
prosperity, of liberty and morality. 

By your profound example, man- 
kind is beginning to feel again, as 
Thomas Paine once articulated, I 
quote, "'the power of America to 
create a happy world," and may I 
add, free from human oppression, 
free from human distinction. 

By your vision and love, peoples 
and nations can once more rejoice 
that the United States still cares, that 
its actions resound of lasting verities. 

Upon this continent where the 
majority of least developed countries 
can be found, nature's fury often 
fuels unyielding economic frustrations 
upon its people. On this continent 
where persist heinous repression and 
racism, hatred and injustice, human 
beings appealingly demand justice 
against human cruelty, against brutal 
violence, and against human 
indignity. 

On this continent of contemporary 
intrigue and intransigence, bloody as- 
sassinations and fractricidal conflicts, 
armed proxy interventions and poten- 
tial bigpower confrontations tend to 
postpone freedom and justice and the 
enjoyment of human rights. These 
further imperil the solemn pursuit of 
international peace and security. 

In Africa, yea the world, we can 



18 




Presidents Tolberi and Carter with Peace Corps 
Volunteers in Monrovia 



sense through your dynamic moral 
leadership, fresh evidences of positive 
change. This new momentum to en- 
hance mankind was manifested again 
by your outstanding foreign policj 
address on Africa, recently delivered 
in Lagos, Nigeria, for which we hear- 
tily commend you. And we earnestly 
hope that all conditions, both political 
and economic, which contribute to 
permanent global reconciliation and 
lasting partnerships can be sturdily es- 
tablished in the coming years. 

In 1943. Liberia stood with 
America. Mr. President, an unswerv- 
ing friend and selfless ally, a 
developing democracy. We are confi- 
dent today that with closer 
cooperation and more fulfilling crea- 
tive U.S. policies and programs, 
Liberia can become a more brilliant 
star of democratic ideals in Africa, a 
more convincing showpiece of 
humanistic capitalism and progressive 
development. 

Ottering once more our hands m 
hearty welcome to you, Mr. Presi 
dent, Mrs. Carter, and your entour- 
age, we affirm and pledge our best 
efforts with you in the global cam- 
paign of extending the frontiers of 
human liberty and advancing the 



principles of genuine peace and sta- 
bility. 

We will remain one with you. Mr. 
President, in surmounting the tyranny 
of energy and in healing the injuries 
of economic uncertainties. 

Ever steadfastly, we pledge our 
total resources with you in securing 
the victory we courageously seek over 
inequity and injustice, over ignor- 
ance, disease, and poverty, to the 
lasting benefit of our children's chil- 
dren and even endless future genera- 
tions, throughout this our one world. 

May Almighty God bless our en- 
deavors and hasteningly bring peace 
to mankind everywhere 

President Carter 

I am very happy to be here in 
Liberia, a country which is one of 
America's oldest friends, and to ar- 
rive at this historic airfield. During 
the Second World War. as President 
Tolbert has described, when it was 
known simply as Roberts Field, it 
was a vital link in the supply line to 
Europe and to North Africa in our 
common tight for freedom. Now, re- 
born as Roberts International Airport, 
with a new terminal recently opened. 



.. 



\ 



Department of State Bu/ 1 

it symbolizes the pride, the aehii. 
ments. and the great potential of j 
nation. 

Liberia was born out of manki 
eternal desire for freedom, and 
have achieved it here. The free bi 
people who came from Americi 
this beautiful coastline in the 
century were determined to bui 
society which reflected the dignit; 
their souls and their hope in t) 
hearts. They joined here in Lib I 
with others who longed for a be 
life. These two streams united 
form the first independent republi 
Africa. 

During the past century of 
lonialism, your independence was 
served, and now you can look b ; 
with pride on 130 years of unin 
rupted independence and freedi 
which gives Liberia a respected se 
status among the nations of 
continent. 

Franklin Roosevelt did stop hei 
the airport in 1943 to meet with P 
ident Barclay, but this is the first 
ficial state visit of an American P 
ident, and it is long overdue, 
bonds between our two countries 
too strong for such a long period t 
to elapse again. 

We have been very grateful 
you have added to the pleasure j 
the honor I feel in arriving here ji 
declaring today a national holitir 
It's a national holiday in my heart f 
well. 

Our friendly relationship is of g> 
mutual advantage and exists on mf 
levels — in the intertwining of our I 
tories, in the democratic tradition J 1 
tablished in our own Constitute " 
and in the similarity in our forms f 
government. It exists in education f 
trade, and religion. It was pern '• 
most meaningful in what Presid R 
Tolbert has called the war against 
norance, disease, and poverty 

The American people are prom 
join Liberians in this effort throi 
bilateral relationships between t 
two countries and in multilateral 
grams involving many countries. ( 
two governments agree that t h> 
should be directed toward improv 
the basic conditions of life for th< 
who most need help. 

In coming to Liberia. I am re 
firming a friendship that is very 
but I am also drawing to a clost 
series of visits that reflect a wo 
that is new. Less than three decac 
from now. four-fifths of all t 
world's people will live in Afrit 
Asia, and Latin America — in the so 
of developing nations that I have v 
ited this year 



1978 



19 



fcly three decades ago, many na- 

■ of these continents were largely 

Jfcies of foreign powers. Their rise 

^dependence means a world in 

lih we must treat each other as 

lis. and one of the purposes of 

I trips has been to demonstrate 

Aenuine respect my nation feels 

ilts partners around the world and 

reposition to the continuation or 

•ablishment of colonialism in any 

M whatsoever. 

le world economy has changed, 
ii:ing the hope of economic im- 
nl:ment and justice to millions and 
Jng each of us far more dependent 
■ever before on the cooperation of 
Jieighbors. If we create a world 
■Dmy of fairness and growth, our 
iflal well-being will be insured. If 
«re shortsighted and let inequality, 
■ll.hness. and injustice persist, all 
m will suffer. 

Een the ideas that motivate man- 
ia have been changing. The tradi- 

■ 1 rivalry between East and West 
itinues. even as we try to reduce 
Competition and expand the areas 
Itential cooperation. 

it other visions, those of national 
lijity, of self-determination, of ra- 
a equality, of the individual rights 
ft 1 human beings, rise more and 

to dominate the human horizon. 

1 is indeed a new world, and I 
ltd like to reemphasize briefly the 
I themes that dominate our vision 
E is new age. 

I on out ic Justice. The first is 
:comic justice, both among the na- 
is of the world and for those 
ii n each nation who now lack the 
a rial requirements for a decent 

I onomic justice imposes a special 
fcation on nations like my own, 
I'h have resources to share with 

■ -est of the world. This is a re- 
I'sibility we intend to honor. But 

■ lining the world economy is ulti- 
lily a shared responsibility in 
I'h every nation must do its part. 

lespect for Human Rights. The 

I'nd element is a respect for human 
Its — the right to be treated prop- 
I by one's own government; to be 
I- to participate in the decisions 
I affect one's own life; to have the 
Ic human requirements of food, 
jitter, health, and education. 
I there is any development that has 
I'tened me in my time as President, 
I the extent to which the cause of 
Ijian rights has taken its rightful 




Liberian dancers 

place on the agenda and in the con- 
science of the world. This is a cause 
that the United States and Liberia are 
proud to claim as our birthright. But 
we know that it is now spreading, not 
because of our efforts but because the 
times demand it. 

Search for Peace. The third ele- 
ment on which all our other hopes 
eventually depend is a search for 
peace. My nation has now, as it has 
had for the last 30 years, a responsi- 
bility to work constantly for peace 
with its powerful rivals. But in this 
new age, the search for peace leads in 
other directions as well. It means 
relying on mutual conciliation, 
negotiation, discussion of even the 
most intractable and difficult interna- 
tional issues. 

In this area your own President 
Tolbert's philosophy of conciliation 
and moderation has been an outstand- 
ing example. It marks him as a man 
with a profound understanding of 
human nature and a firm commitment 
to preventing potential conflicts 
through wise and just agreements. 

We share with you a commitment 
to an Africa that is at peace, an Af- 
rica free from colonialism, an Africa 
free from racism, an Africa free from 
mijitary interference by outside na- 
tions, and an Africa free from the in- 
evitable conflicts that arise when the 
integrity of national boundaries is not 
respected. 

And the search for peace means an- 
ticipating changes that must inevita- 
bly come, such as those in southern 
Africa, so that they can come peace- 
fully, rather than with their pent-up 
tensions erupting into violence. 

These are the goals America is pur- 
suing, and I am looking forward to 
discussing them with one of Africa's 
leading statesmen, your own Presi- 
dent Tolbert. His idealism, his deter- 
mination, and his energy have won 
widespread admiration in Africa, in 



America, and around the world. His 
recent statesman-like sponsorship of 
the reconciliation summit gathering of 
West African heads of state, here in 
Monrovia, has helped to inaugurate a 
new era of cooperation among these 
nations for the good of all. 

Next year he will be hosting, and 
will become a major leader of. the 
Organization of African Unity here in 
Monrovia. He has worked tirelessly 
for national self-determination, racial 
justice, and a better life for all the 
people of the African Continent. 

As we go now together to Mon- 
rovia, we will in a sense close the 
circle that has opened between our 
people more than a century and half 
ago. On behalf of the people of the 
great nation of the United States, I 
would like to say to the people of the 
great nation of Liberia, this is a jour- 
ney which is a privilege for me to 
make. □ 



' Remarks by President Carter made on oc- 
casions during the trip other than those printed 
here are in the Weekly Compiliations of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 3 and 10, 1978. 

: Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 3. 

3 For text of address, see Bulletin of May 
9, 1977, p. 453. 

4 List of U.S. officials accompanying the 
President omitted; for full text, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Apr. 3. 

5 Held in the Ballroom at the Hotel Na- 
cional. It was broadcast live via satellite on 
radio and television in the United States. Sev- 
eral reporters spoke in Portuguese, and their 
questions were translated by an interpreter (for 
full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Apr. 3). 

b Introductory paragraphs omitted; for full 
text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Apr. 10. 

7 For text of proposals, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 3, 1977, p. 417. 

8 Held with reporters at the State House 
Marina (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 10). 

s Chief Jeremiah Chirau is head of the Zim- 
babwe United Peoples' Organization; Bishop 
Abel Muzorewa is head of the United African 
National Council; Reverend Ndabanigi Sithole 
is head of the African National Council/ 
Sithole; Ian Smith is Prime Minister of the 
white regime in Southern Rhodesia. These in- 
dividuals comprise the Rhodesian Executive 
Council which was established on Mar. .3. 
1978, with a rotating chairmanship. 

10 List of U.S. and Nigerian officials omit- 
ted; for full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 10. 

11 Exchange of remarks was made at 
Roberts International Airport; text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Apr. 10. 



20 



Department of State 



THE SECRETARY: Arms Control 
and National Security 



I am delighted to have this opportu- 
nity to discuss with you an issue that 
is vital to this nation's security — the 
effort to slow down the dangerous and 
burdensome arms race through effec- 
tive arms control. 

This is an effort in which I deeply 
believe. My years in the Defense De- 
partment, my activities as a private 
citizen in studies of military issues, and 
my experience as Secretary of State 
have made one fact increasingly clear 
to me: A strong defense and effective 
arms control are not separate paths to 
national security; both are essential 
steps along the same path. 

Our nation's safety continues to de- 
pend upon a strong, modern military 
defense capable of meeting the full 
spectrum of our military needs. We 
have had that strength in the past. We 
have it now. And we will maintain it. 

Yet we cannot assure our security 
by military strength alone. New 
weapons systems acquired by one side 
stimulate the other side to develop 
more sophisticated countermeasures. 
The net effect is the expansion of 
weapons systems on both sides without 
real increase in the security of either. 

As I have met with leaders around 
the world over the past year, I have 
found that many share this perception. 
They too cannot and will not allow 
their nations to become vulnerable to 
military threat. But they also recog- 
nize that the heavy burden of military 
competition diverts limited resources 
and energies from social and economic 
development on which peace also 
rests. 

The effort to slow arms competition 
through mutual and balanced restraints 
has been a central element of this na- 
tion's security policy under the past 
seven American Presidents 
Democratic and Republican. 

• President Kennedy, building on 
the efforts of Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower, concluded the first arms 
control agreement with the Soviet 
Union in 1963 — halting nuclear 
weapons testing in the atmosphere and 
the contamination that entailed. Sub- 
sequently, we concluded agreements 
prohibiting nuclear and other weapons 
of mass destruction from the ocean 
floor and from outer space. 

• The Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, concluded in 1968, is binding 
today on more than 100 nations. 



Clearly, it has not ended the specter of 
nuclear proliferation, but it has signif- 
icantly advanced that objective. 

• Since first proposed by President 
Johnson, we have been engaged in 
broader Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT). These negotiations suc- 
ceeded, during the Nixon Administra- 
tion, in severely restricting the 
deployment of antiballistic missile sys- 
tems by either the United States or the 
Soviet Union. Such systems would 

. . . arms control will not dra- 
matically reduce our defense 
budget. The cost of an adequate 
defense will remain high. But 
the drain on our resources from 
an unrestricted arms race 
would be much greater. 

have been costly to build and would 
have added new uncertainties into the 
strategic balance. SALT I also placed 
the first limits on the number of offen- 
sive weapons. 

We are engaged today in a broader 
range of arms control negotiations than 
ever before in our history, because the 
opportunities we can grasp and the 
challenges we face are greater than 
ever before. 

As we pursue these negotiations, we 
must be realistic about what effective 
arms control can — and cannot — do for 
our security. For if we judge arms 
control measures against unrealistic 
standards, we may lose the possibility 
of making any practical progress. 

• No single arms control agreement 
will eliminate all, or even most, of the 
potential challenges against U.S. and 
allied forces. But by controlling the 
size, nature, and direction of arms 
programs on both sides, we can reduce 
the uncertainties that fuel the arms 
race. 

• For the foreseeable future, arms 
control will not dramatically reduce 
our defense budget. The cost of an 
adequate defense will remain high. 
But the drain on our resources from an 
unrestricted arms race would be much 
greater. 

• Arms control cannot by itself 
guarantee stability in the U.S. -Soviet 
relationship. We continue to compete. 



because in many areas we have <1 
ent interests and values. We neeW 
be sanguine about Soviet power 
tentions. however, to recognize t|i 
inhabitants of the same planetp 
share awesome power, we h; 
common interest in reducing the I 
serious risks to our survival. 

• Arms control will not b\ itsc 
solve the regional tensionsB 
threaten peace. But by lessening 
level of military confrontatioiM) 
regulating the diffusion ofW 
weapon technologies, we can en m 
regional stability and free resolci 
for the task of improving the hha 
condition. 

There are clear limits to wha 
should expect from arms control Bill 
it is equally clear that arms eo •<& 
pursued in a deliberate and mea rd 
way. will contribute significant! 
reducing the prospect of war. TflH 
why I believe so strongly that oil 
curity is best protected by polieiH 
strength in our national defense a ill 
practical arms control agreement: hal 
limit the dangers to which we ifl 
and always will, respond. 

As President Carter said irl 
Wake Forest speech: "Arms co<B 
agreements are a major goal as irl 
ments of our national security, bu hi! 
will be possible only if we mai lit 
appropriate military force levels.'' 

SALT 

Let me turn first to the Strat:i( 
Arms Limitation Talks with the S<l 
Union. 

Any SALT agreement must! 
measured against the yardstick otHJ 
national safety. It must clearly n H 
tain or improve our overall securitlj 
compared to the likely situation \JJ 
out an agreement. It must take t'ul iC 
count of the interests of our al lie a 
well as ourselves. And we must 11 
confidence in our independent ablj 
to verify adequately Soviet complial 
with an agreement and to detect lj 
effort, contrary to the agreement, a 
could leave us at a strategic disad'n 
tage. We should not and we will o 
accept any agreement that docs 
meet these essential requirements. 

We have made substantial prog* 
over the past year toward such.! 
agreement. Important differences I 
remain. I will be meeting with i< 



|y 1978 

iet leaders later this month in an 
rt to narrow those remaining dif- 
ences. I hope that we can reach an 
eement in the near future. But we 
1 continue to negotiate for as long 
it takes to achieve a SALT agree- 
nt which enhances our security and 
t of our allies. 

t me explain what the agreement 
t we are seeking to negotiate would 
.omplish and how it would 
: mgthen our security. 

. %st, it would establish equal limits 

both sides on the overall number of 

ategic missile launchers and 

ategic bombers. As you know, 

der the first SALT agreement the 

iviets maintained greater numbers 
n the United States. Following that 
eement. Congress called for any 
v agreement to be based on equal 
nnbcrs. This agreement would firmly 
e iblish that principle. 

iecond, the agreement would re- 
,<Je the number of strategic weapons 
bow the level that the Soviets now 
D e — and very much below what they 
flild have without an agreement. It 
Juld require the Soviets to destroy 
s eral hundred weapons. We would 
It be required to destroy any 
yipons currently operational. 

i Third, the agreement would estab- 
1 1 sublimits on those systems we see 
tt most threatening and destabilizing, 

■ h as intercontinental ballistic mis- 
k.-s (ICBM's) equipped with MIRV'd 
[ ultiple independently-targetable 
$ ntry vehicles] warheads and on 
IRV'd ballistic missiles more 
I lerally. 

Fourth, we are trying to impose re- 
S lints on the improvement of existing 
\ apons and the development of new 
l(d more sophisticated systems. 

Fifth, the agreement we are 
Uotiating would permit the United 
ilites to preserve essential options for 
udernizing our forces. Specifically, 

■ would allow us to continue our 
Hjor development programs, such as 
H' cruise and MX missiles and Tri- 

< nt program . 

Sixth, it would protect the interests 
I our allies. Mindful of the relation- 

ip between strategic arms negotia- 
Ins and our security commitments in 
]\TO. we have consulted closely 
Rth our allies at each step of the 

gotiations, and we will continue to 
so. 

Finally, we are insisting on an 

reement which is independently and 

jtisfactorily verifiable. Our ability to 

Jrify must have sufficient reliability 

deter and to deal with possible vio- 



lations before they have a significant 
effect on the strategic balance. We 
must be able to assure ourselves that 
the Soviets are living up to their 
commitments. 

We and the Soviets both know the 
kind of terrible destruction that would 
result from a nuclear war. We both 
know that each will ultimately match 
the other if the race continues. 

Therefore, despite the fact that we 
are both intently pursuing our own 
self-interests — despite fundamental dif- 
ferences that exist between us — we 
hope to be able to find common 
ground for limiting our most destruc- 
tive weapons. The essence of this 
negotiation is mutuality of benefits. 
An arrangement which benefits one 
side at the expense of the other cannot 
be agreed on. 

Failure to achieve an equitable 
agreement could result in new 
weapons programs on both sides, with 
a corresponding increase in costs of 
several billion dollars a year but with 
no more, and probably less, security. 
This Administration is prepared to pay 
the extra price of maintaining our se- 
curity. I am convinced that the Con- 
gress and the American people are 
prepared to pay that price. But an ef- 
fective SALT agreement can assist us 
in maintaining the strategic balance at 
reduced levels of cost and risk. 

Antisatellite Arms Control 

Along with SALT, there are numer- 
ous other aspects to the military com- 
petition which must be addressed. An 

. . . the agreement that we are 
seeking to negotiate . . . would 
require the Soviets to destroy 
several hundred weapons. We 
would not he required to de- 
stroy any weapons currently 
operational . 

expansion of the arms race to space 
would undermine our security as well 
as that of other nations. Evidence that 
the Soviet Union is developing an an- 
tisatellite capability is disturbing. We 
are prepared to protect ourselves 
against such a threat and to match the 
Soviets if necessary. But a far prefera- 
ble course is to prevent an antisatellite 
race from occurring. 

While there are many problems in 
devising effective and verifiable lim- 
its, there is an area for arms control 
here too. We have proposed talks with 
the Soviets aimed at suspending an- 



21 



tisatellite testing and keeping space 
open for free and peaceful use by all. I 
can confirm today that the Soviet 
Union has recently accepted our pro- 
posal, and talks will begin next 
month. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

We are also engaged with the 
British and Soviet Governments in 
negotiations for a comprehensive ban 
on nuclear testing. These talks have 
made some progress, although prob- 
lems remain. Achievement of such a 
ban would reduce the likelihood of 
further nuclear proliferation by dem- 
onstrating the seriousness of the nu- 
clear weapons powers in accepting re- 
straints on their own activities. 

We are committed to seeking such a 
treaty. It must be adequately verifi- 
able. And we will assure that we 
maintain confidence »in the reliability 
of our nuclear warheads. 

Arms Control in Europe 

Just as we are negotiating for 
agreements that can further allied se- 
curity in the area of strategic weapons, 
so too the mutual and balanced force 
reduction talks in Vienna are intended 
to enhance our mutual security in the 
European theater. In recent years, the 
Soviets and other Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries have built up their forces and ma- 
teriel to the point where the regional 
balance has become of increasing con- 
cern to ourselves and our allies. 

Our central goal in the Vienna talks 
is to codify the principles of parity and 
collectivity of forces in central 
Europe. We and the NATO allies have 
made clear to the Soviet Union that we 
will only accept an agreement which 
enhances the security of the region. 

These talks have moved extremely 
slowly. It is important that we work 
toward an agreement in this area, 
however, even as we negotiate on 
SALT. We and our allies will soon be 
making a new effort to get the talks 
moving more productively. It is time 
for the Warsaw Pact nations, through 
meaningful actions, to help move 
these talks forward. 

While seeking progress in these 
talks, we have also made a firm com- 
mitment to the modernization and 
strengthening of NATO forces, and we 
are taking concrete steps to that end. 
The United States has sharply in- 
creased the emphasis on NATO de- 
fense in our current budget. Along 
with our allies, we are introducing 
new tactical aircraft, new generations 
of armored vehicles, and new 
precision-guided munitions. NATO 



22 



leaders will be meeting in Washington 
in May. and one of the principal topics 
will be a long-term program to im- 
prove alliance defense. 

As you know, the President, after 
having consulted our allies and with 
their full backing, has deferred pro- 
duction of weapons with enhanced 
radiation effects. He has ordered the 
modernization of the Lance missile 
nuclear warhead and the 8-inch 
weapons system, keeping open the 
option of later deciding to install the 
enhanced radiation elements. His ul- 
timate decision will be influenced, as 
he has said. ". . . by the degree to 
which the Soviet Union shows re- 
straint in its conventional and nuclear 
arms programs and force deployments 
affecting the security of the United 
States and Western Europe." 

The Global Dimension 

Another threat to the peace lies in 
the growth and spread of arms around 
the world. 

In the long run, the peaceful set- 
tlement of regional disputes is the 
surest way to reduce the demand for 
arms. We will continue our efforts to 
help find lasting solutions to such 
disputes. And we will continue to 
press for restraint on the part of the 
great powers so that local conflicts 
are not exacerbated. But we must also 
seek restraint in the growth of arms. 

First, in addition to our efforts to 
halt further nuclear proliferation 
through a comprehensive test ban, we 
have begun to investigate new tech- 
nologies and examine new institu- 
tional arrangements that will enable 
the nations of the world to harness 
nuclear energy without spreading the 
most deadly instruments of war. 

Second, we are giving new em- 
phasis to controlling the international 
traffic in conventional arms. We will 
continue to make arms transfers to 
advance our own security and that of 
our friends, but at the same time, we 
are beginning to check the flow of 
our own arms exports. 

Because we recognize that slowing 
down conventional arms races cannot 
be achieved by the United States 
alone, we are discussing possible 
multilateral measures with other arms 
suppliers, and we are encouraging the 
purchasing nations to adopt regional 
agreements that limit arms competi- 
tion 

I am pleased to be able to state 
today that the Soviet Union has 
agreed to proceed with our talks on 
restraint of conventional sales. This is 
an important step in our efforts to 



bring about a serious international 
discussion on multilateral restraint. 

Third, we are seeking to limit and 
control the spread and the use of new 
weapons systems whose impact on 
civilian populations is particularly 
deadly. Biological, chemical, and en- 
vironmental weapons treaties have 
been or are being negotiated. The in- 
discriminate and random character of 

We have proposed talks with 
the Soviets aimed at suspending 
antisatellite testing and keeping 
spaee open for free and peace- 
ful use by all . . .[and] the 
Soviet Union has recently ac- 
cepted our proposal . . . 

many weapons in these categories is 
so great that virtually all nations 
agree they should be forsworn forever 
as instruments of war. 

Fourth, we are seeking to prevent 
arms competition and major power 
rivalry from spreading to areas 
largely free of them in the past. We 
have launched new negotiations with 
the Soviet Union to avert an arms 
race in the Indian Ocean. Our objec- 
tive is first to stabilize the military 
presence of both sides at the levels 
which prevailed until recent months 
and then to consider possible reduc- 
tions. The buildup in Soviet naval 
forces in the area, however, is of 
deep concern, and we will not accept 
an increased Soviet naval presence as 
part of such an agreement. 

Conclusion 

Each of the arms control efforts I 
have discussed is devoted to increas- 
ing the safety and well-being of 
Americans and individuals every- 
where. 

Military competition today is car- 
ried out in highly technical terms, and 
military judgments must often be 
made based on complex calculations. 
But we cannot let technical debates 
cloud the simple truths and common 
sense which must lie behind these 
calculations. 

• We must maintain a military de- 
fense that is second to none. We have 
the human and physical resources, the 
knowledge, and the will to do so. 

• We must also recognize that no 
nation gains, none is more secure 
when all continue to expend their re- 
sources on ever more devastating 
weapons. We all gain, we are all 
more secure when practical, equitable 



Department of State Bui 

agreements can be reached to li 
the arms race. 

This is a long-term process, 
will work with others to further 
effort — in the talks between East 
West, at the U.N. Special Session) 
Disarmament opening in New Y 
next month, and in other forums. 

I have spoken to you today ,ih 
arms control because you will pla 
crucial role in the coming months 
years. Your opinions and explanati 
will help decide whether we maim 
our sensible and historic policies 
seeking security through both ai 
control and a stable military equi 
rium. 

There are people in our coun 
who have come to doubt t 
course — some because they expect 
much of arms control measur 
others because they believe too li 
can be achieved. Those who exp 
too much will be disillusioned w 
such agreements do not put an enc 
military competition. Those who 
lieve such agreements are not wc 
pursuing seriously undervalue th 
returns. 

I hope that you will bear in m 
my basic message: that while 
benefits of arms control are i 
boundless, there are terribly imp 
tant. practical advantages that o 
arms control measures can bring. 

I ask each of you to consider 
difference between a world witl 
SALT agreement of the kind I h; 
described and a world without sue 
limitation on strategic weaponry 
world in which we have begun 
stabilize in an acceptable balance 
military relationship in Cent] 
Europe and one in which we h 
not; a world in which we are starl 
to head off a military competitio 
space — or to put some limits on 
international flow of conventi 
arms — or to reduce the prospects 
nuclear proliferation; and a worl 
which we fail to achieve such steps. 

In the long run. the security 
every American depends on our 
voting the same determination, 
same careful planning and sustai 
energy to the challenge of brin 
military competition under sensi 
control as we do to devising 
weapons for our protection, 
challenge — the challenge to 
nations — is to make sure that ma 
technical ingenuity is guided t 
wisdom. 

Address before the American Society oj \< 
paper Editors in Washington, D.C., on A\ 
10. 1978 (press release 154 of Apr. 10). 

'For full text of the President's address 
Mar. 17, 1978. see BULLETIN of Apr 197 
p. 17. 






tf 1978 



23 



Oif<»fffioii-ffiiff-.ln*ir<»i* Session 
Following ASNE Address 



There has been considerable 
oversy over both the military 
diplomatic value of the neutron 
b. Yesterday your colleague at 
wDefense Department, Secretary 
rwn, seemed to downplay the 

■ ary importance of that weapon, 
■i he also seemed to indicate that 
ue was no specific corresponding 
nession or concessions expected 
li the Soviet Union. Yet today 
i quoted again the President's 

flise where he said the ultimate 
etsion will be influenced by the 
ejee to which the Soviet Union 
i>s restraint in its conventional 
•I nuclear arms program and, of 

■ se. deployments. 

Ituld you be a little bit more spe- 
( in outlining what you consider 
re evidence of such restraint on 
aOart of the Soviet Union? 

L. The kind of things that we 
lid be looking toward are the kind 
Brings which affect the security of 
it European region in such things as 
it ank forces in the area, the threat 
I e area which arises from weapons 
I as the SS-20 ballistic missile 
Oi other items which it is too early 
e o delineate. 

luis is a subject which we will be 
iiussing with our allies because 
lie are joint concerns which we 
I , and we will follow those talks 
li discussions with the Soviet 
r >n on the kinds of steps which we 
l k would be an appropriate re- 
1 se. We hope very much that they 
I be responsive. 

s the President said, one of the 
inr factors affecting his ultimate 
p sion will be the response which 
leek. 

. . If we can believe what we 
d in the papers — and this audi- 
n.' is inclined to do so — the Presi- 

■ t made his decision on the neu- 
Ni bomb against the advice of most 
t lis senior advisers, including 
r. 

o you feel that as you approach 
9!;e forthcoming talks in Moscow 
fit you have lost an important 
; gaining chip in those discus- 
is? 

.. No. I do not believe that we 
ie lost what you describe as an im- 
ijant bargaining chip, 
iecondly, let me say that the Presi- 
i.t has indicated quite clearly that 



the decision which he has made is his 
decision to defer, and he will be look- 
ing to what the Soviet response may 
be in making the ultimate decision at 
some point in the future. 

The decision which the President 
made is a very difficult decision, and 
I support his decision. It is a very 
awesome kind of decision to have to 
make, but I think he made the right 
decision on this, and I do not think it 
will in any way hinder the discussions 
which I would have. 

Q. What can and will the United 
States do if Israel does not with- 
draw all its forces from southern 
Lebanon? 

A. I believe that Israel will with- 
draw all of its forces from southern 
Lebanon. They have indicated to us 
that they will abide by U.N. Resolu- 
tion 425. We have been in discus- 
sions with them about the pace of that 
withdrawal, and those discussions are 
still continuing. I, therefore, cannot 
accept the proposition that they will 
not withdraw having said that they 
would. 

Q. The fact that you are going to 
Africa immediately before what is 
bound to be a very arduous mission 
to Moscow suggests either that it 
can't be put off any longer or that 
you may expect some kind of break- 
through. 

Do you, in fact, have any assur- 
ances from any of the parties 
involved — the patriotic front, the 
Rhodesian Executive Council, or 
the front-line presidents — that they 
are all willing to sit down together 
and work out a political and mili- 
tary settlement? 

A. No. I do not have any such as- 
surances. The issues involved in the 
Rhodesian situation are of tremendous 
importance to the peace of that area 
and to the well-being of the people of 
Rhodesia. It is our judgment that in 
order for a cease-fire — a lasting 
cease-fire — and a lasting peace and 
settlement to be achieved, it will be 
necessary to bring all of the parties 
together. If that is not achieved, then 
I think that the likelihood of civil war 
is great, and, therefore, we and the 
British and others believe very deeply 
that we should do everything within 
our power to work with the 
nationalist leaders and others involved 



to see if we can't help bring the par- 
ties together. 

We believe that the Anglo- 
American proposals are a fair basis 
and should be the basis for a solu- 
tion. 1 However, we feel that the only 
way to do this is to sit down with all 
of the parties and see whether or not 
common ground can be found so as to 
bring about a solution that all can ac- 
cept and thus prevent continuing 
bloodshed in the future. 

Q. As long as we are hopping 
around the globe, I will land in 
Panama where the Panamanians 
seem particularly upset with the 
amendments attached to the first 
treaty as it went through the Sen- 
ate. With the likelihood of the en- 
tire project being scuttled with, 
somehow, the differences and the 
opposition not being resolved, can 
you suggest any diplomatic lan- 
guage that might be added to the 
second treaty in a couple of weeks 
that would resolve these points of 
contention? 

A. No. What I think both sides 
should do is proceed with calmness at 
this point. The Panamanians have in- 
dicated that they will not make up 
their minds until both treaties have 
been ratified, at which time they will 
publicly express their views. 

In the meantime, I believe that we 
should continue in a calm way the 
process of ratification in which we 
are involved, and I am hopeful that at 
the end of that process we will find 
treaties which are acceptable to both 
of the parties. 

Q. The President himself has, in 
recent days, raised the possibility 
that rejection could very well oc- 
cur. I believe the timing of your 
trip to Moscow was such that you 
would be there about 2 days after 
the Senate vote. 

What do you think it would do to 
your credibility as a representative 
of this Administration and spokes- 
man for our foreign policy if that 
treaty were rejected by the Senate? 

A. I think that rejection of the 
treaty would be very damaging to 
American foreign policy. I believe 
that the treaties are very much in the 
national interests of the United States 
and of Panama as well. Indeed, I be- 
lieve that the treaties are in the na- 
tional interests of the world commu- 
nity as a whole and particularly those 
in our hemisphere. I think that failure 
to ratify the treaties would have a 
very serious effect upon our relation- 
ships with our friends and allies in 
our hemisphere and, indeed, not only 



24 



in the Third World but generally 
around the globe. 

Q. Israel is especially concerned 
about the sale of F-15's to Saudi 
Arabia. What in your judgment will 
be the impact on Saudi Arabian 
policy if Congress doesn't approve 
the sale of the F-15's? 

A. I think it would be a serious- 
mistake if the Congress should not 
approve the arms package which we 
will be submitting to them after the 
Panama Canal Treaty vote. As you 
know, we agreed with the Congress 
that we would withhold sending up 
the arms package until after the 
Panama Canal Treaty vote so that 
both Houses would have full and 
adequate time to consider the matter. 
But we will be sending them up after 
that vote is had. 

The impact of a turndown of the 
package I think would have adverse 
effects in all three of the countries 
involved. The requirement for the 
various weapons which are included 
in the package have been carefully 
examined by us and by our military 
people in the Defense Department, 
and they have been validated as 
necessary requirements. 

Secondly, the countries involved 
have turned to the United States as a 
friend on whom both sides rely and in 
whom both sides have confidence. If 
we were unable to carry forward in 
meeting their requirements, I believe 
that this would not only have an ad- 
verse effect upon their confidence in 
us, but I would think it would also 
damage the peace process. If we are 
to be helpful in bringing the parties 
together, both sides have to have con- 
fidence in us. Particularly insofar as 
Israel and Egypt are concerned, they 
have to have confidence that their 
military needs are being met if they 
are going to take the kind of risk that 
one also has to take in negotiating a 
peace agreement. 

Q. You mentioned in your re- 
marks the serious differences that 
still remain in negotiating the SALT 
package. Could you tell us, how- 
ever, whether you expect that 
there's a reasonable chance that 
you might wrap up such an agree- 
ment while you are in Moscow? 
And, secondly, what can you tell 
the Soviets about the effect of their 
activities in Africa — what effect 
those activities may have on the ul- 
timate likelihood of getting a SALT 
III treaty through Congress here? 

A. First, let me say I do not expect 
to wrap up a SALT agreement. I 
think, however, we hopefully can 



Department of State Bull 



News Conference* March 24 



Q. Mr. Begin is gone now and by 
all appearances the United States 
and Israel are at some — not dead- 
lock but approaching one on what to 
do next in the Middle East. May I 
ask you if you can share with us 
what new departures, if any, the 
Administration might be consider- 
ing; and is it your feeling that there 
can be progress in negotiations so 



H 

is 

■ 

long as Mr. Begin is in charge of \ 
Israeli Government? 

A. Let me say first that I should 
and will not in any way comment 
anything that has to do with the inl 
nal political affairs of Israel. It wo 1 
be totally inappropriate for me to 
so. 

Now, coming to your m 



la 



make some progress during my dis- 
cussions in Moscow. It's important 
that we do sit down at the highest 
levels and discuss these remaining is- 
sues to see how many of them can be 
agreed upon and thus removed from 
the list of our differences. 

As I have said on a number of oc- 
casions before, there is no linkage be- 
tween the negotiation of a SALT 
agreement and the activities of the 
Soviet Union in Africa. The reason 
for that is that the negotiation of a 
SALT agreement is central to the se- 
curity of both of our nations and to 
the peace of the world. It should be 
negotiated on its own two feet, and 
we will do that. 

On the other hand, we have made it 
very clear that we are concerned 
about the presence of such large 
numbers of Cuban and Soviet forces, 
particularly in the Horn of Africa, 
and I would assume that that would 
be one of the items that will come up 
for discussion, because I will be dis- 
cussing not only SALT but a number 
of other items. 

Q. How did the White House or 
the State Department dispose of the 
moral questions relating to the en- 
hanced radiation device against the 
background of the President's em- 
phasis on human rights? 

A. When you speak of the moral 
questions, I assume that you are re- 
ferring to the allegations which have 
been made that the enhanced radiation 
weapon is a particularly inhumane 
weapon. Any nuclear weapon is a 
devastating weapon. Indeed, the dam- 
age to individuals would be less with 
enhanced radiation weapons than with 
non-enhanced radiation weapons. 

It is also true that there would be 
less collateral damage to structures 
and the like. But it is erroneous to 
suggest that this is designed only to 
kill people and, therefore, is a more 
inhumane weapon than any other nu- 



: 



clear weapon. I think quite the a 
trary is the case. 

Q. Can you say how long it won 
take us to get into full producti 
of the neutron bomb from the til 
of planning if the President giv 
his approval? 

A. No, sir. I do not have that f 
ure, I'm sorry to say. 

Q. Could you give us a catego 
cal denial that there are Soviet i 
fensive weapons in Cuba or missi! 
in Cuba and that they are buildi 
a submarine base at Cienfuegos? 

A. I have no evidence which wot I 
support the fact that there are a 
Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, r 
do I have any information whi . 
would support an affirmative ansv\ I 
to your second question. 

Q. Could you give any example 
restraint which the Soviet Unii 
has shown as a result of our sto 
ping or ending the entire U.S. a 
tiballistic missile (ABM) project- 
the decision not to develop the B- 
bomber — which would indicate th 
there will be such a restraint on tl 
neutron bomber? 

A. The Soviet Union has abided 1 
the terms of the ABM treaty and 1 
the terms of the SALT I agreemen 
We have recently done a study m 
that, which we gave in an uncla., 
sified form to the Congress, indica 
ing that they have abided by tho! ; 
two agreements. 

If an agreement is reached with rt 
spect to mutual restraint arising out (| 
the decision with respect to the et 
hanced radiation weapon. I would e? 
pect and we would make sure b t 
adequate verification that that wouli 
be the case. 



Press release I54A of Apr. 10, 1978. 

1 For text of proposals, see Bulletin cf 
Oct. 3, 1977, p. 424. 






1978 



25 



KStion — what are the prospects for 
k future? As the Prime Minister said, 

as we have said, we had very full, 
Bnk. and candid talks over the last 2 

As — both talks in which the Prime 
Wnister and the President participated 
A talks in which I and the Foreign 
fcnistcr and other members of the 
Pme Minister's staff took place. 
l\s all of you know, the talks were 
ificult. There were differences of 
Iw between ourselves and the Is- 
Mlis on certain issues. However, in 

1 way was the atmosphere of the 
tfks unfriendly or ugly — I want to 
oke that very clear. They were frank 
ehanges of views between allies and 
fiends. We remain fully and un- 
eiivocally committed to the security 
olsrael, and there should be no doubt 
»)Ut that. 

The President put forward some ex- 
pratory ideas to the Prime Minister 

■> h respect to possible ways of bridg- 
it the gaps which remain between the 
pties in a number of critical areas. I 

I sure that the Prime Minister and 
ti Israeli Government will reflect on 
t!se. We will be maintaining our 
citacts with them and with the Egyp- 
t] is, and we will remain in consulta- 
un with the Members of our Con- 
g ss. I hope that as a result of this 
ppcess we will be able to continue the 
n>mentum which has clearly been 
n ch slowed down by recent events. 

J. At what point do you do these 
to things: one, put forward a set 
a American ideas, and two, send 
Inbassador Atherton back to the 
Bddle East? 1 

\. What I've said, to make it very 
c ar: We have already suggested some 
eDloratory thoughts which I'm sure 
l| Israelis will reflect on. It is not a 
fin that the Americans put forward. 
I was a way of exploring various 
fws and alternatives and to ascertain 
4: Israeli position with respect to a 
rmber of these items. 

I'll be very frank. There are differ- 
l:es of views on such issues as the 
aplication of Resolution 242; 242 has 
Isn the basis of negotiations between 
t: parties for many years. The appli- 
Ction of Resolution 242 to all fronts 
Is been a position which has been 
icepted by all of the parties over the 
tars. 

There now has been a question 
used as to whether or not 242 does, 
I fact, apply to all fronts and, more 

ecifically. to the West Bank and 
'aza. In our judgment, it is clear from 
b past history — from the negotiating 

story — and from the conduct of the 

irties that 242 does, indeed, apply on 

I fronts. The whole idea of 242 was 



the achievement of a full, normal, and 
secure peace in exchange for ter- 
ritories occupied in the 1967 conflict, 
and that applied on all fronts. 

Another difference of importance is 
that relating to the question of settle- 
ments, both the policy of the Govern- 
ment of Israel with respect to settle- 
ments in the Sinai and in the West 
Bank. Those are two of the main prob- 
lem areas. 

Q. Maybe you assumed, but you 
didn't answer the question. One, are 
we going to put forward any Ameri- 
can plan? And two, are you going to 
send Mr. Atherton back? 

A. Insofar as putting forward any 
new ideas, let me say that we have 
always said — and I've said it to you 
many times before — that if there 
comes a time that we think it will be 
useful for us to put forward our ideas 
which might help to resolve the gaps 
between the parties, we would feel 
free to do so. I don't have any time 
schedule or anything like that in mind 
at this time. 

Q. We've been led to believe that 
the President, in discussing the situ- 
ation with Members of Congress, 
discussed with them the ideas he put 
forth and indicated that Mr. Begin 
had expressed only negative reac- 
tions to them. You seem to be 
suggesting that there was no reac- 
tion to this, or am I — 

A. I did not want to leave you with 
that impression. As I said, certain ex- 
ploratory ideas were put forth with re- 
spect to any number of points — such 
as the question of settlement policy — 
and it was very clear, in response to 
that, that the Israeli position is that 
they will not give up settlements in the 
Sinai as part of a peace with Egypt or 
let the Israeli settlers be under Egyp- 
tian protection instead of Israeli pro- 
tection. 

There is a disagreement, as I indi- 
cated before, with respect to the appli- 
cation of 242 to the withdrawal from 
at least part of the occupied West 
Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. 
And there are differing views, as was 
indicated in some of the newspaper ar- 
ticles this morning, with respect to ex- 
ploratory suggestions about an interim 
agreement that would apply for a 
period on the West Bank, to be fol- 
lowed by some form of choice at the 
end with respect to the possibility of 
affiliation of that territory with Israel 
to maintain the interim status or to af- 
filiate with Jordan. Those are some of 
the differences. 

Q. Now on most of these positions 
we have already known that dis- 



agreements existed between the 
United States and Israel — on the set- 
tlements as well as on the American 
ideas on the West Bank. What was 
different about this visit? In other 
words, why was the impasse sort of 
taken note of now, rather than, say, 
a month ago? 

A. I think that it is best explained 
by emphasizing that there was a de- 
tailed examination in the frankest kind 
of fashion between the two heads of 
government where it became very 
clear without any ambiguity where 
these differences lie. To a degree, 
there had been some ambiguity left 
prior to this meeting. I think that am- 
biguity has been removed. 

Q. Would it help at this time for 
Jordan to agree to enter into direct 
negotiations involving the West 
Bank? And if so, are there efforts 
being made to achieve that? 

A. It would help to have as many of 
these parties as we could get to par- 
ticipate in discussions. I must say as a 
practical matter I do not think at this 
moment, without a declaration of prin- 
ciples, that there is any real likelihood 
that Jordan at this point would enter 
into any negotiations. I think it is first 
necessary to establish a framework for 
a comprehensive peace before one can 
expect other parties to enter into 
discussions. 

Q. Mr. Begin, yesterday, ap- 
pealed for patience from the United 
States. He also appealed for fair 
play from the American people and 
indicated that he thought the Ad- 
ministration had changed its attitude 
toward his peace plan. What is your 
reaction to his appeals? 

A. We have not changed our posi- 
tion with respect to Mr. Begin 's pro- 
posal for self-rule. At the time that 
those proposals were made — I believe 
it was in December [14-19] when Mr. 
Begin was here — we indicated that we 
believed that the proposal which he 
had made was a constructive pro- 
posal. 2 It provided a first step for 
negotiations, and we welcomed the 
fact that it had been made. 

We did not endorse the proposal. 
We still believe that it was a construc- 
tive step — but only a step — looking 
forward to further negotiations with 
respect to the issues relating to the 
whole West Bank question. 

Q. Has the United States not 
shown enough patience? 

A. The United States will persevere. 
It will be patient. Let me make it crys- 
tal clear that we have not given up 
hope. We are going to continue to 



26 



Department of State Bull.l 



work with the parties. Peace is essen- 
tial, not only to the people of the area, 
but to the United States and to the 
world, and we will continue to do 
whatever we can to work with the par- 
ties to try and achieve that ultimate 
end. 

Q. Many of the most experienced 
diplomats believe that at this point 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union are at the most precarious 
stage that they have been in since 
the start of this Administration. 
Now President Carter has referred 
to the Soviet-Cuban pattern of de- 
velopments in Africa as ominous. 
The Soviet press has responded that 
this appears to represent a U.S. turn 
away from detente, in their percep- 
tion. In your view, are we now in a 
decisive stage in our relations with 
the Soviet Union? And could you 
give us your appraisal? 

A. Let me say I think we are at a 
delicate stage in our relationships with 
the Soviet Union. The various matters 
which we are dealing with in consulta- 
tions and negotiations with the Soviet 
Union are mixed. In some we are mak- 
ing progress. In others, things are 
standing still. In still others, I think 
there has been retrogression. And I 
think we are always going to find this 
kind of a mix. It is a very complex set 
of relationships. 

I think we must continue to pursue 
each and every one of these sets of 
discussions and negotiations because I 
think it is terribly important — not only 
for our bilateral relationships but for 
world peace in general — that we do, 
along with the Soviets, what we can to 
reduce the tensions between us. 

Q. To be more specific, on the 
immediate situation in Africa, is the 
Administration particularly con- 
cerned that the Cuban forces which 
are now there might be used in what 
can be a very violent civil war in 
Rhodesia? 

A. We are concerned about the 
presence of foreign troops in Africa. 
We believe that African problems 
should be resolved by Africans them- 
selves. We have made this very clear 
in our views with respect to the con- 
flict in the Horn of Africa, and we be- 
lieve that applies elsewhere in Africa. 

With respect to the question of 
Rhodesia, we believe that the answer 
must be found in a negotiated solution 
which we were addressing in the 
Anglo-American proposals which we 
have put forward. We still believe that 
that should be the yardstick for 
measuring any proposals for the res- 
olution of that problem; and we still 



point out that if there is to be real 
peace, we believe that all of the 
nationalist leaders should be included. 

Q. If I may return to just one 
more question on the Middle East. I 
am a little bit confused about what 
the exploratory ideas that we have 
put forward are intended to resolve. 
It sounds to me as if you are saying 
on at least three questions — the 
applicability of 242, the question of 
settlements remaining in Sinai, and 
that the issue of the West Bank of 
the Jordan be regarded as an 
interim process leading to some kind 
of referendum — that the United 
States is taking rather firm positions 
on those three. 

Are you saying, in effect, that un- 
less the Israelis accept what is our 
view on these three basic fundamen- 
tal questions, that it will be difficult 
or impossible to move forward in 
the negotiations? I don't understand 
what the exploratory ideas — if we 
have taken such firm positions on 
these three issues — are intended to 
resolve. It sounds to me as if we 
are — 

A. There are a number of explora- 
tory issues or points that have been 
discussed. One of the paramount 
questions — indeed perhaps the most 
fundamental question — is that of the 
security of Israel. And we have made 
it clear to them and to the Arabs that 
any settlement must protect the secu- 
rity of Israel, and we have put forward 
some exploratory ideas of how this can 
be done. 

There are a number of other specific 
items, or ideas, like that which were 
discussed on which there was agree- 
ment between ourselves and the Is- 
raelis. So there is a whole range of 
exploratory ideas. I was asked, in ef- 
fect, you know, where the differences 
lie, and that is why I picked the three 
critical issues. 

Q. Would you accept my assump- 
tion that unless there is agreement 
on these three issues — the settle- 
ments, the applicability of 242 to the 
West Bank, and that there be some 
kind of a referendum or freedom of 
choice following an interim 
process — that it would be difficult to 
move forward? 

A. Certainly insofar as the question 

of 242 is concerned, this is absolutely 
fundamental. It is the basis lor the 
negotiations that have taken place up 
until now, and if there cannot be a 
resolution of the interpretation of 242, 
then I think there are very substantial 
obstacles ahead. 
With respect to the question of set- 



tlements, this is a fundamental dif 
ence between the two parties, 
again I think this creates a substam 1 
obstacle to any progress. 

Q. You seem to be talking 
around this question of the exploi] 
tory ideas for Israel's security, 
precisely have you suggested to thi, 
that might be helpful in assuri | 
them of their security? 

I would like to add another relal 
question. What is your idea now, i 
the U.S. idea now, relative tc.i 
mutual defense agreement with I 
Israelis? 

A. In regard to the first of your t 
questions, the details of the items . 
ideas which we have suggested hi ' 
been conveyed to the Israelis. We '] 
lieve we should convey these kinds i 
ideas to the Egyptians as well. An. 
don't think until we have had a chai I 
to explore them with both that it will 
helpful to detail the specific ideas t 
we have put forward for discussion. || 

I guess your second question w 
What about a defense agreement? T! 
is a question which would ultimat 
have to be decided, of course, by 
Congress of the United States. Bui 
that were the final item which would I 
required as the linchpin to put togel 
an agreement which would fail with | 
something like that, then that is soi 
thing I think we would have to si 
ously consider recommending to 
Congress. 

Q. Israeli officials in Jerusal 
are making the charge that the / \ 
ministration, through what it is s: 
ing privately and implying public i 
is trying to bring down the Bei ' 
government or at least Menahem 1 1 
gin's leadership of that governme 
Would you respond to that charge 

A. I am very happy to respond , 
that. That is totally false. The Presidi, 
and I and all of us have the highest | 
spect for the Prime Minister. We n^ 
have differences on some items as f 
have agreements on many items. | 
would be totally improper for us 
interfere or meddle in any way in tl 
internal politics of Israel. We will t ( 
do so. Nobody has done so, and I ;| 
sure you that without any sense 
equivocation. 

Q. The State Department put o 
a statement the other day sayii; 
there appeared to be no retributio 
in the Ogaden. The Somali spokt 
man has now challenged this ai 
said there were. What sort of info 
mation do we have, and have v 
really been able to carry out the ir 
plicit promises of trying to prote 
the people there? 



/ 1978 

We have been pressing the Or- 
ization of African Unity (OAU) to 
e action to put individuals into 
iopia to monitor what is happening 
he Ogaden. At this point there has 
n a declination on the part of both 
Ethiopians and the Somalis to sup- 
t such action in the OAU and as a 
ilt of that it has been difficult to 
ve forward with that, 
still believe that this should be 
e as part of the process of the OAU 
fsilitating an overall settlement in the 
Mi as well as protecting the people 
■m reprisals. 

}. Will you address the state of 
tl SALT negotiations [Strategic 
Atis Limitation Talks], specifically 
it he context of whether — well, one, 
i course, obviously whether an 
ajeement was in prospect and, two, 
wether in the present uncertain 
axed state, as you put it, of 
> iet-Ameican relations you would 
fl! free to put a treaty to the Con- 
g: ss and what you think its pros- 
pf ts would be in Congress? 

'}i. We have made progress, substan- 
ti progress, in the SALT negotia- 
nts . There are some remaining items 
O varying difficulty. Two or three are 
<ly tough. The others are not that dif- 
13 lit, quite frankly. 

Ve will continue to press ahead 
v hout any time constraint — no target 
tit we have to meet — complete our 
n;otiations on these remaining items. 
i elieve that this can be done. I be- 
l:ve it will be done. When that is 
Siieved we will lay that agreement be- 
t e the Congress when it is signed. 
J d if that can be done, say, for 
flimple — and I am just saying for 
eimple — this summer, we would put 
loefore the Congress. 
J^et me say that this treaty, however, 
vuld have to be one which is sound 
Jd verifiable and which would en- 
tice the national security of our coun- 
t and of our allies. I believe it is pos- 
fcile to achieve such a treaty. 

Q. What is the State Department 
ding for its part in cooperation 
Mh the Treasury Department to 
tip the alarming drop in the value 
c the dollar? 

i.'A. We have been working very 
kpsely with the Department of the 
r jeasury and with other elements of the 
.[ministration to work upon the prob- 
TOS of the dollar and the related issues 
'rich, of course, involve the energy 
msis, energy program, conservation, 
iflation, and the question of exports, 
were is very close consultation going 
at this point within the government. 



Q. Has the State Department yet 
decided if Israel's invasion of Leba- 
non was a violation of the Foreign 
Military Sales Act in that it was 
something beyond a self-defensive 
measure? 

A. We have received, as I think 
most of you know, inquiries from sev- 
eral Members of the Congress asking 
us to express a legal opinion with re- 
spect to that question. We are examin- 
ing that question and will respond to 
those letters in the very near future. 

Just to give you the background on 
this, what one has to take a look at is 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Agree- 
ment which was signed in 1952. That 
provides that the Government of Israel 
assure the United States that such 
equipment, materials, or services are 
required for — and will be used solely to 
maintain — its internal security, its 
legitimate self-defense, or to permit it 
to participate in the defense of the area 
of which it is a part or in connection 
with the U.N. collective security ar- 
rangements. The legal question is a 
complex one, and I don't want to ex- 
press a judgment on the question at this 
point until we have completed our legal 
work. 

Q. Yesterday Mr. Begin said that 
if we supply Saudi Arabia with F-15 
fighter bombers it will make them 
into a confrontation state against Is- 
rael. Do you agree with that estimate 
of his? 

A. No, I respectfully disagree with 
that estimate of the Prime Minister's. 
Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation 
state. From all of our discussions with 
them at the highest level they have in- 
dicated that they do not and will not 
become a confrontation state. 

Insofar as the F-15's are concerned, 
they have indicated that they would not 
base these aircraft at Tabuk, which is 
the base near Israel; that these would 
be put in bases at Dhahran. Riyadh, 
and in the south. The potential threats 
they face would be in these areas. The 
reasons for the F-15's are that they are 
very effective, perhaps the world's 
most effective interceptor aircraft. 

Saudi Arabia has a vast land mass; it 
is the equivalent of everything east of 
the Mississippi; they have a limited 
number of people. The problem of 
ground-air radar coverage is a very 
tough one for them because of the lim- 
ited number of people that they have to 
man such radars and the great cost 
which would be involved in setting up 
such a system. With the effective radar 
that the F-15's have, they can operate 
over this vast territory in a way which 
will give them the kind of air defense 



27 



protection which is required. We be- 
lieve this to be a valid requirement. We 
believe that it will not upset the bal- 
ance of the region, and we believe that 
it will also be helpful in keeping 
movement in the peace negotiations. 

Q. In that connection, did King 
Khalid of Saudi Arabia write to the 
President saying that Saudi Arabia 
might have to increase oil prices be- 
cause of the falling dollar value, and 
was there any linkage, as well, to an 
increase in oil prices relating to the 
F-15 sale? 

A. Let me say that I will not com- 
ment on any correspondence between 
the President and King Khalid or any 
other head of state. But let me answer 
your question. 

The Saudis have never indicated to 
us that they would link progress or lack 
of progress in these areas to oil prices. 
They have indicated quite the contrary; 
that they will make their independent 
judgments on these issues. They have 
not threatened in any way that they are 
going to take punitive action of any 
kind whatsoever. 

Q. Really, in terms of the dollar 
and the value of the dollar, there is 
nothing to that as well? 

A. I'm not sure I understand your 
question. 

Q. I was asking whether, putting 
aside a letter from King Khalid to 
the President, whether you know if 
Saudi Arabia has raised the question 
of raising oil prices because of the 
falling value of the dollar on interna- 
tional markets? 

A. Not to my knowledge, but others 
in the area have raised that question. 

Q. If, despite the best efforts of 
diplomacy, it is not possible to go any 
further with the Middle East peace 
initiative due to the positions which 
have been taken, what would be the 
consequences in the Middle East and 
what would be the consequences in 
terms of Israel's relationships in the 
United States? 

A. I don't want to speculate about 
the assumptions you made in that ques- 
tion. Let me say I do not think we are 
at a point in which one should say 
we've given up hope of moving for- 
ward, because we haven't. I think that 
there is still a real chance to move for- 
ward. There are many obstacles in the 
way, but I think at this point to imply 
that we are in a desperate situation 
where nothing can happen and that it is 
hopeless is not an accurate assessment, 
and I just don't want to speculate about 
what may happen. 



28 



Q. There was a new presidential 
election in Taipei, and I have two 
questions to ask you. The first is, is 
there any government representative 
from the United States to attend the 
presidential inauguration which is 
about 2 months away? And another 
question is, what is your estimate of 
the Taipei-Washington relationship 
after the election? 

A. I haven't focused on the issue of 
representation. The issue hasn't come 
to my desk at this point. Insofar as our 
relationships are concerned, they are 
the same as they have always been in 
the past. 

Q. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement is 
still the basis for our approach to a 
Mideast peace. 3 Is there any chance 
that we would try to reactivate that, 
and, in particular, is there any pos- 
sibility that we would try to reacti- 
vate that in context of looking at the 
Mideast in terms of the kind of de- 
velopment program that the Saudis 
in particular have been pushing, as 
the Soviets have indicated they would 
be interested in as well; that is to 
say, to actually develop the 
region — using petrodollars, by in- 
creasing U.S. exports, high technol- 
ogy, etc. — and in that way essentially 
sidestep certain problems that now 
exist by being able to guarantee the 
kind of peace that everybody in the 
region recognizes? 

A. Let me say that we have always 
believed that an essential element of 
a final peace would be an economic de- 
velopment program for the area. We 
have done a great deal of research and 
work on what kinds of programs might 
be effective in this area. We have dis- 
cussed it not only with the parties to 
the conflict, but we have discussed it 
with other nations in the area and 
elsewhere in the world. 

Now, coming back to your first ques- 
tion which was related to the U.S.- 
Soviet joint statement which was is- 
sued. The fundamental principles 
which we stated in that remain princi- 
ples which we believe are sound prin- 
ciples. Many of those principles are 
contained in the discussions which we 
have had with all of the parties, and we 
still stand behind those principles. 

Q. You made clear that you are not 



going to have any real progress with- 
out a declaration of principles for a 
settlement in the Middle East. It also 
seems clear from what you said you 
can't get that declaration unless Is- 
rael changes some of its views. Al- 
though you're determined to perse- 
vere, do you have any assurances 
that the others, for example the 
Egyptians, are willing to persevere 
under these circumstances, and do 
you feel any kind of deadline pres- 
sure, like October of this year? 

A. I'm not going to speculate on 
deadlines or anything like that. I think 
the parties all still are willing to perse- 
vere, and by that I mean the Israelis 
and the Egyptians. 

Q. About your reports on human 
rights, your Liberian desk tells me 
their original draft included the ra- 
cial restrictions on voting and prop- 
erty rights that are in Article V of 
the Liberian Constitution. My ques- 
tion is, did the White House or your 
office or someone else in the State 
Department order that this informa- 
tion be deleted? 

A. Not to my knowledge. I don't 
have any information on that. 

Q. Since the President said that our 
commitment to human rights must be 
absolute, will this information be re- 
stored to the next human rights re- 
port, and do you believe it might be 
discussed next week during the Pres- 
idential visit to Monrovia? 4 

A. I'll have to check into the matter. 
I simply cannot give you an adequate 
answer at this time. 

Q. Can you clarify please whether 
your position on the Indochinese ref- 
ugees is that all the boat people 
should be admitted, and do you think 
that your view — if that is your 
view — will carry the day within the 
Administration? Because I under- 
stand the Attorney General doesn't 
agree with you. He wants to restrict 
them. 

A. I don't think you ought to specu- 
late about his position or other posi- 
tions at this point. I will tell you it is 
my belief that we should take in such 
of the boat people as are not able to 



Department of State Bull, 

find refuge elsewhere. The problcn, 
still under discussion in terms of 
overall policy of the Administrate 
but I expect a decision soon. 

Q. [In reference to the Middle E 
peace process] I was just wonderi 
if you had assurances from any 
these people. You expressed soi 
note of optimism and confidence 
the process that may not be appartt 
to the rest of us. 

A. They have all said that they w 
to continue the peace process. I am i 
suggesting that means the parties c 
sit down and talk face-to-face in I 
near future, because I think that that 
unlikely at this point. 

Q. Do you foresee — with the intr 
duction of these Soviet and Cub 
troops into Mozambique — a deept 
ing of the Rhodesian civil war situ 
tion? And what would be the U. 
response should the conflict escalat 

A. The question of the number 
outside troops in Mozambique is o 
on which I think the information is si 
ficiently cloudy at this point thai 
don't want to speculate nor accept wl 
I think may be an assumed premi 
within what you have stated, that the 
is a large number there, because I 
not believe that that is the case 

Insofar as the future is concern 
again I would say that the presence 
outside troops cannot help but exac 
bate the situation, and, therefore, 
think that all of us — the front-li 
states and others in the area — must r 
double our efforts to try and find 
negotiated solution. Otherwise, I a 
afraid the conflict, the fighting, w 
increase and that certainly is in n 
body's interest. 



r 

ne 



Press release 135 of Mar. 24, 1978. 

' Alfred L. Atherton. Jr.. Assistant Secreta 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, H 
nominated by President Carter on Mar. 
1978. to be Ambassador at Large with speei 
responsibility for Middle Hast peace negoti 
tions. He was confirmed by the Senate on Ap 
6 and sworn into office on Apr. 1 1 . 

2 For texts of White House statements o 
Prime Minister Begin's visit, see Bulleti 
of Jan. 1978, p. 48. 

'For text of joint statement, see Bulletin* 
Nov. 7. 1977. p. 639. 

4 For material relating to President Carte 
four-nation trip, see p. 1. 



1978 



29 






ARMS CONTROL: t/JV. Special 
Session on Disarmament 



In March 16, 1978, Secretary 

nee submitted the following report 

U.S. preparations for the Special 

sion of the U.N. General Assembly 

voted to Disarmament to the Senate 

tommittees on Foreign Relations and 

fmed Services and the House Com- 

mtees on International Relations and 

wned Services pursuant to Section 

jj? of the 1978 Foreign Relations Au- 

u rization Act. This special session is 

I eduled to be held May 23 -June 28, 

l 7 8, at U.N. Headquarters in New 

H. 

The Special Session of the U.N. 
C neral Assembly on Disarmament 
( >OD) will be the first occasion on 
v ich an attempt will be made to focus 
■ attention of virtually all states of 
world — large and small — on arms 
citrol and disarmament since the 1932 
(neral Disarmament Conference. As a 
i que event it has generated a high 
1 el of interest among world leaders, 
i ny of whom are planning to attend, 
jj: expect the SSOD to be a major 
e:nt for the United Nations, for dis- 
£ nament, and for the United States. 

This will be the ninth time the U.N. 
( neral Assembly has convened a spe- 
c 1 intersessional meeting on a particu- 
1 theme. A brief 2- week special meet- 
i , designed to promote independence 
I Namibia (South West Africa) is 
{tnned for late April-early May of 
|78. The sixth and seventh special 
s sions were devoted to international 
onomic questions. Earlier special 
i isions were devoted to other issues of 
(icern to the U.N. majority — such as 
llestine, Tunisia, and Namibia. 



< igins of the SSOD 

The SSOD has its origins in the dis- 

;:isfaction among many of the U.N. 

umbers with what they regard as slow 

'Jgress in disarmament. In addition, 

•fleeting the absence of China and 

ance from the Conference of the 

>mmittee on Disarmament (CCD) in 

;neva, many at the United Nations 

gan to search for a forum in which 

states could participate. For more 

an a decade the Soviet Union has 

essed for a world disarmament con- 

rence. attended by plenipotentiary 

legates with the authority to 

gotiate binding decisions. China has 

garded the Soviet initiative as a prop- 



agandistic proposal to use the dynamics 
of large conference diplomacy to build 
up pressure and support for Soviet dis- 
armament positions. The United States 
has taken the position that it is prema- 
ture at the present stage of the disar- 
mament effort to convene a world dis- 
armament conference. 

The idea of a special session of the 
General Assembly devoted to disarma- 
ment evolved over the past few years as 
a possible alternative to a world disar- 
mament conference. Although similar 
to a world disarmament conference in 
some respects, the special session will 
adopt only recommendations and a 
program of action. Moreover, it has not 
been identified as a superpower initia- 
tive. Many countries also favored the 
special session because it was more 
likely that all of the nuclear-weapon 
states would attend a General Assem- 
bly session, whereas a world disarma- 
ment conference, with possible anti- 
Chinese undertones, would not draw as 
wide an attendance. 

Against this background, at the 30th 
session of the U.N. General Assembly, 
several nonaligned delegations stated 
that if progress were not made during 
1976 toward the convening of a world 
disarmament conference, they would 
ask the 31st U.N. General Assembly to 
schedule a special session on disarma- 
ment. The idea of a special session 
gained substantial support, in part due 
to vigorous campaigning under Yugo- 
slav leadership, culminating in the en- 
dorsement of the special session by the 
nonaligned summit conference at Co- 
lombo in August 1976. A resolution 
calling for the convening of the SSOD 
passed by consensus at the 31st Gen- 
eral Assembly in 1976 [Resolution 31/ 
189B adopted December 21, 1976]. 

Many of the nonaligned see the 
SSOD as a forum in which they can 
bring their concerns to the attention of 
the leaders and peoples of the major 
military powers, particularly the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. One of their 
interests is a larger role in disarmament 
and arms control forums. Their main 
concern, however, centers on the need 
for the superpowers to commit them- 
selves more specifically than heretofore 
to steps beyond SALT II [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] and com- 
prehensive test ban negotiations, halt 
the buildup of their nuclear arsenals, 
and begin the process of reductions. 
They also hope to achieve wider ac- 



ceptance of their belief that at least 
some of the savings resulting from dis- 
armament should go to assist the less 
developed countries. 

A longer term goal of many is a 
larger voice for the United Nations in 
disarmament issues. There is conse- 
quently considerable support for a 
follow-on SSOD to assess progress on 
the program of action which will be 
adopted by the upcoming special ses- 
sion. The United States has gone on 
record as prepared to support another 
SSOD in about 5 years but is not com- 
mitted to a series of such sessions at 
regular intervals. 



Forum for Discussions 

The special General Assembly ses- 
sion provides a welcome opportunity to 
involve the entire U.N. membership in 
disarmament discussions, to give states 
more insight into each other's thinking 
on these questions, and to develop 
greater consensus on how to deal with 
them. If the participants succeed in 
avoiding polemics, we think that the 
session can have a significant and posi- 
tive impact on the arms control and 
disarmament agenda during the next 
few years. 

At the same time, there are inherent 
limitations to the treatment of disar- 
mament issues in such a large forum. 
The participants generally recognize 
that it is not the task of the session to 
negotiate specific agreements. The 
special session will be too brief (only 5 
weeks, with 2 of those taken up in gen- 
eral debate) to permit more than initial 
consideration of new disarmament pro- 
posals. We should recognize, in addi- 
tion, that there are several factors at 
play which could diminish the produc- 
tivity of the session. 

• The inclination to present com- 
prehensive lists of measures covering 
all known categories of arms control 
and disarmament issues could lead to 
confusion rather than give direction to 
future efforts. 

• Insistence on sweeping changes in 
existing disarmament forums could re- 
duce efficiency and result in decreasing 
their usefulness. 

Thus the success of the SSOD will 
depend heavily on the spirit in which 
the participants approach it and the 
constructive contributions which they 



30 



are willing and able to make. There are 
wide variations among countries and 
groups of countries in their interest in 
disarmament matters and their capacity 
to contribute. During the first four ses- 
sions of the Preparatory Committee, 
there have been differences of views 
but nevertheless a general effort to 
avoid polemics. Each of the major re- 
gional and political groupings in the 
United Nations have established the 
practice of meeting together to discuss 
issues before the Preparatory Commit- 
tee. This has facilitated a more infor- 
mal exchange of views among mem- 
bers of these groups and. together with 
the informal discussions among mem- 
bers from each of these groups — as 
well as with certain states not members 
of any group — has afforded opportuni- 
ties to carry on an active exchange of 
views beyond that which takes place in 
the formal Preparatory Committee 
meetings. 

The work of the Special Session on 
Disarmament will be affected in part by 
the nature of the representation. Some 
countries already active in disarmament 



ACDA ANNUAL REPORT 

As required by law. President Carter 
on March 22, 1978, transmitted to the 
Congress the 17th annual report of the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA). 

The report discusses in detail the 
U.S. -Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) and other negotiations 
such as those directed to achieving a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban, force 
reductions in central Europe, and pro- 
hibitions on chemical and radiological 
weapons. Chapters on these negotia- 
nons cover current status, progress, and 
obstacles to achievement. 

The report presents (he President's 
new initiatives in the fields of conven- 
tional arms transfers and the nonprolif- 
eration of nuclear weapons It describes 
ACDA's role in the interagency policy 
formulation process under the National 
Security Council and discusses ACDA's 
statutory requirement to prepare 
analyses of the arms control impact of 
certain proposed weapons systems. 

Single copies of the report are avail- 
able from the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. Washington. 
DC. 20451. The text of the President's 
letter of transmittal is printed in the 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of March 27, 1978. 



negotiations in various forums will 
send specialists in the field to New 
York. The majority will be represented 
by their permanent U.N. General As- 
sembly delegations concerned with the 
range of political and economic issues 
which arise in the United Nations. As 
is the case with regular General As- 
sembly sessions, much of the signifi- 
cant work will be conducted off the 
floor in private meetings. In fact, this 
process is already well underway in 
New York where we have been in close 
contact with the delegations to the Pre- 
paratory Committee meetings. In addi- 
tion, bilateral discussions will be tak- 
ing place between now and the opening 
of the SSOD between U.S. representa- 
tives and officials of some of the coun- 
tries which are expected to play a sig- 
nificant role in the SSOD. 



Developments to Date 

Thus far, four Preparatory Commit- 
tee (PREPCOM) meetings for the 
SSOD have been held. The 54 nations 
who participate in the PREPCOM are 
broadly representative of the U.N. 
General Assembly itself, assuring the 
presentation of a nearly full spectrum of 
views. At the end of the third PREP- 
COM in September, a provisional 
agenda for the special session was 
adopted. This agenda includes provi- 
sions for: 

• General debate; 

• Review and appraisal of the pres- 
ent international situation in light of the 
pressing need to achieve substantial 
progress in the field of disarmament, 
the continuation of the arms race and 
the close interrelationship between dis- 
armament, international peace and se- 
curity, and economic development; 

• Adoption of a declaration on dis- 
armament; 

• Adoption of a program of action 
Oil disarmament; and 

• Review of the role of the United 
Nations in disarmament and of the in- 
ternational machinery for negotiations 
on disarmament, including in particu- 
lar, the question of convening a world 
disarmament conference. 

During the fourth Preparatory Com- 
mittee in February of this year, drafts 
of the declaration on disarmament and 
a program of action were introduced by 
a large number of states or groups of 
states. In addition, a large number of 
proposals were submitted concerning 
the machinery for disarmament discus- 
sions and negotiations. Also during the 
February meeting, the various propos- 
als on the declaration, the program of 
action, and disarmament machinery 
were consolidated into one document 



Department of State Bui iil 

for purposes of future considerat 
While some limited progress was rr 
in consolidating some of the vari 
texts on the declaration, the docun 
generally consists of a single I 
which contains the provisions of 
various documents submitted earliei 
various states or groups of states. E 
ing March the many alternative fori 
lations will be evaluated by 2ov< 
ments. At the final PREPCOM sessi 
which is scheduled for April 4—21, 
attempt will be made to eliminate 
the extent possible, the divergent 
guage prior to consideration of 
documents by the SSOD itself. Hi 
ever, it is highly unlikely that m< 
disagreements on key substantive 
sues will be resolved before the SS 
itself. 






Key Issues 

Virtually every aspect of arms con I ' 
will receive attention at the SSOD. I 
date, the key issues appear to be: 

• Questions relating to nuclt 
weapons, such as calls for early c 
elusion of SALT II. a comprehens 
test ban, and assurances by nucle 
weapons states not to use or threater 
use such weapons against non-nucl 
states; 

• The tension between nonprolif 
ation concerns on the one hand ; 
demands for "nondiscriminatory"' 
cess to peaceful nuclear technology; 

• The relationship between dis» 
mament and development, i. 
what — if any — commitments can 
should developed countries make 
channel a portion of the savin 
realized from arms control measures 
development assistance; 

• Measures to deal wtih no 
nuclear weapons of mass destructk 
such as chemical weapons; 

• Measures to deal with certa 
conventional weapons which may 
deemed to be excessively injurious 
to have indiscriminate effects; 

• Possible limitations on the pr 
dm (ion and transfer of convention 
weapons; 

• Regional limitations on certa 
types of weapons or on force levels; 

• Elaboration and extension of tl 
concept of confidence-building mea 
ures, such as notifications to neighbc 
ing states of scheduled military mane 
vers; and 

• Possible modifications to the mui 
tilateral mechanisms for dealing wi 
disarmament issues, strengthening tl 
role of the United Nations, and broade 
ing participation in the multilater 
negotiating forum, the Conference 
the Committee on Disarmament. 



pay 1978 
S. Objectives 

In line with this Administration's ac- 
ve support for arms control and dis- 
mament initiatives and its efforts to 
rengthen relations with the develop- 
g countries, the United States has 
lopted a positive approach to the spe- 
al session. On March 17, in a speech 
the United Nations, the President 
ated that the United States "... will 
ake a strong and a positive contribu- 
m ..." to the special session. This 
isition was reiterated in Ambassador 
Dung's letter of April 22, 1977, to 
cretary General Waldheim respond- 
g to a request for views of members 
i the SSOD agenda. Ambassador 
jung said the United States believes 
at " . . . the central objective of the 
ision should be to give a new impetus 
productive negotiations on issues — 
1 and new — of pressing concern." 
cause this letter set forth the basic 
imework for U.S. preparations for 
: SSOD, it is attached to this report. ' 
We have adopted this positive at- 
ide to the SSOD because we believe 
'liolds the potential for making signif- 
f int contributions to the achievement 
i our arms control and disarmament 
ijectives while furthering a more pro- 
active North-South relationship. 
Our fundamental objectives at the 
! OD are these: 

' • To develop support for the arms 

otrol initiatives that this Administra- 

t n has undertaken in the last year and 

iialf; 

{'* To work with other countries in 

I ^eloping new and realistic arms con- 

I I proposals; and 

I • To insure that actions taken at the 
SOD are compatible with basic U.S. 
s urity interests and with effective and 
| ictical arms control agreements. 

Turning first to the disarmament as- 
£ :t at the special session, we propose 
< work toward: 

• Creating a receptive environment 
fid wider support for the key arms con- 
#• »1 agreements which may emerge 

i>m negotiations now underway on 
IiLT II, the comprehensive test ban. 
id chemical weapons; 

• Developing a broad consensus on a 
liilistic agenda for negotiations over 
R: next few years; 

'* Preserving and strengthening exist- 
U multilateral negotiating forums 
M:h as the Conference of the Commit- 
M on Disarmament while maintaining 
tlxibility on proposals for procedural 
«jange which would accommodate the 
•Incerns of nations whose active par- 
'upation is essential for the realization 
'^general arms control objectives; and 



• Encouraging better understanding 
of and support for our overall arms 
control objectives on the part of our al- 
lies, the Warsaw Pact countries, and 
the nonaligned countries. The SSOD 
will provide an unusual opportunity for 
us to explain our objectives to key 
countries which have previously been 
skeptical about our intentions. 

We see the SSOD as an opportunity 
for entering into a dialogue with certain 
other countries that have not partici- 
pated in disarmament negotiations thus 
far. We also view it as an opportunity 
to gain greater public support, both in 
the United States and abroad, for our 
goals in the arms control area. 

In terms of our relations with the de- 
veloping world, we believe that the 
SSOD would be able to: 



Enhanced 

Radiation 

Weapons 

Statement by President Carter 

I have decided to defer production of 
weapons with enhanced radiation ef- 
fects. The ultimate decision regarding 
the incorporation of enhanced radiation 
features into our modernized battlefield 
weapons will be made later and will be 
influenced by the degree to which the 
Soviet Union shows restraint in its 
conventional and nuclear arms pro- 
grams and force deployments affecting 
the security of the United States and 
Western Europe. 

Accordingly, I have ordered the De- 
fense Department to proceed with the 
modernization of the Lance missile nu- 
clear warhead and the 8-inch weapon 
system, leaving open the option of in- 
stalling the enhanced radiation 
elements. 

The United States is consulting with 
its partners in the North Atlantic al- 
liance on this decision and will con- 
tinue to discuss with them appropriate 
arms control measures to be pursued 
with the Soviet Union. 

We will continue to move ahead with 
our allies to modernize and strengthen 
our military capabilities, both conven- 
tional and nuclear. We are determined 
to do whatever is necessary to assure 
our collective security and the forward 
defense of Europe. □ 



Issued on Apr. 7, 1978 (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Apr. 10). 



31 



• Contribute to a more fruitful 
North-South dialogue on disarmament. 
We intend to use the SSOD to foster a 
more constructive dialogue on our 
policies in two areas of particular inter- 
est to us — nonproliferation and re- 
straints on the transfer of conventional 
arms, subjects which have been a 
source of considerable friction in the 
past and 

• Lead to acceptance of the concept 
that, particularly with regard to the 
spread of military technology and 
hardware to all regions of the globe, 
arms control and disarmament are 
common goals for all U.N. members 
and that all nations, including the de- 
veloping countries, must exercise re- 
straint on the acquisition of arms. 

U.S. Preparations 

U.S. preparations for the special ses- 
sion got underway following the ap- 
proval by the 1976 U.N. General As- 
sembly resolution calling for the 
SSOD. Beginning in early 1977, ele- 
ments of the Department of State and 
the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA), acting in an informal 
working group, began developing our 
general approach to the SSOD with a 
view to establishing the U.S. positions 
for the session on specific issues. In 
August of 1977, Dr. Lawrence Weiler, 
former Counselor of ACDA and sub- 
sequently Associate Director of Stan- 
ford University's Arms Control and 
Disarmament Program, was appointed 
Special Coordinator for the SSOD, 
with responsibility for coordinating 
preparations for the session. Dr. Weiler 
has also represented the United States 
at the third and fourth PREPCOM 
sessions. 

In February of this year, at the direc- 
tion of the National Security Council, 
an inter-agency backstopping 
committee — chaired by Adam Yar- 
molinsky. Counselor of the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency — was 
formed with participation by the Nation- 
al Security Council, State, ACDA, 
Defense, CIA, AID, and other in- 
terested agencies. The committee will 
be responsible for providing policy 
guidance to our delegation and review- 
ing proposals that the United States 
might advance at the SSOD. 

The U.S. delegation to the SSOD 
has not yet been named. Present plans 
are for Ambassador Young [Andrew 
Young, U.S. Permament Representa- 
tive to the U.N.] to head the delegation 
assisted by Deputy Permanent Repre- 
sentative James Leonard and Ambas- 
sador Adrian Fisher of the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency, both of 
whom have exceptional qualifications 



32 



Department of State Bullc 



INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION AGENCY 






The International Communication 
Agency (ICA), the Federal Govern- 
ment's consolidated organization for 
conducting the nation's public diplo- 
macy, came into formal existence on 
April 1, 1978.' This new Agency rep- 
resents a merger of the functions and 
personnel of the U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA), including the Voice of 
America (VOA), and the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs in the 
Department of State. Its creation is the 
result of President Carter's Reorganiza- 
tion Plan No. 2 of 1977. John E. 



Reinhardt, formerly U.S. Ambassador 
to Nigeria and for the past year Direc- 
tor of USIA, was sworn in as ICA's 
first Director on April 3 by Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale. 

President Carter has charged ICA 
with five main tasks: 

• To encourage, aid, and sponsor the 
broadest possible exchange of people 
and ideas between our country and 
other nations; 

• To give foreign peoples the best 
possible understanding of our policies 



in the disarmament field. 

In addition, we will ask that both 
Houses of Congress be represented, 
each by majority and minority mem- 
bers. We also expect additional special 
congressional advisers will want to join 
the delegation and contribute to its 
work, as was the case in the seventh 
special session. Public members who 
combine a commitment to arms control 
and national security interests with an 
ability to win support for these aims at 
home and abroad are expected to be 
added to the delegation. Congressional 
and public members of the delegation 
can provide an essential contribution. 

In addition, we have sought the ad- 
vice and support of nongovernmental 
organizations. We have scheduled a 
1-day conference of such organizations 
in Washington on March 1 1 to discuss 
the SSOD and receive suggestions. 



Consultations With Other 
Governments 

We have recognized from the outset 
that consultations with other govern- 
ments must be a key element in the ef- 
forts to insure the success of the special 
session. 

Over a year ago, we instructed our 
missions abroad to convey to host gov- 
ernments and other delegations to mul- 
tilateral organizations that we intend to 
take the SSOD seriously as an opportu- 
nity for progress. We urged them to 
seek the views of all participants and to 
emphasize our willingness to listen to 
others as well as contribute ourselves. 

We have directed special attention to 
consultations with our Western allies 
and Japan — in NATO, at the United 
Nations, and through bilateral consulta- 



tions at all levels — in order to insure 
that our shared goals of reduction and 
control of armaments with undi- 
minished or improved security are ad- 
vanced by the SSOD. 

And we have kept in close contact 
with the Soviet Union, recognizing that 
we have a joint interest in an SSOD 
outcome which is supportive of the 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
in which we are involved. 

As the special session approaches, 
these discussions with other govern- 
ments will intensify and escalate in 
level; we expect that discussions be- 
tween policy-level officials during the 
SSOD itself can contribute as much to 
a successful session as the public 
proceedings. 



Conclusion 

In summary, the United States sees 
the SSOD as a genuine opportunity. 
Arms control cannot be an exclusive in- 
terest of the few nor can it be an obliga- 
tion only on the major military powers. 
Even though a wider forum increases 
the difficulties more than proportion- 
ately and even though the SSOD cannot 
serve as a forum for actual negotiations 
on specific issues, we believe it can 
give a new impetus to arms control 
negotiations in a variety of areas and 
can serve as an occasion to stimulate 
new ideas which could open opportuni- 
ties for further progress in disarma- 
ment. With the active support and ad- 
vice of Congress and the public, the 
U.S. delegation will work actively to- 
ward this end. d 



1 Ambassador Young's letter was printed as 
U.N. doc. A/AC. 137/17 of Apr. 22. 1977. 



and our intentions and sufficient infi 
mation about American society and c 
ture to comprehend why we have ch 
sen certain policies over others; 

• To help insure that our governme 
adequately understands foreign pub 
opinion and culture for policymaki 
purposes and to assist individu 
Americans and institutions in learni 
about other nations and cultures; 

• To assist in the development ai 
execution of a comprehensive natior 
policy on international communic 
tions, designed to allow and encoura 
the maximum flow of information aj 
ideas among the peoples of the worl 
and 

• To prepare for and conduct nego 
ations on cultural exchanges with otr 
governments. 

ICA will include a headquarters st; 
and the Voice of America in Washin 
ton and at some 189 posts in 1 19 cou 
tries around the world comprised 
approximately 8,900 employees, 
whom about half are foreign nation 
working at the overseas posts. Abe 
25% of the American employees w 
be based abroad at any one time. ICA 
budget request for FY 1979 is appro 
imately $413 million, of which sor 
$20 million would be used for ne 
VOA transmitter facilities. 

The best known of the nation's ol 
cial exchange activities to be merg 
into the new Agency — the Fulbrig 
scholarships — will continue under t 
supervision of the Board of Forei 
Scholarships in order to preserve th» 
academic integrity and long-ran 
character. The 12-member board 
academicians and distinguished citize 
is appointed by the President. 

Under the international visitors pr 
gram, U.S. Chiefs of Mission abro 
annually extend invitations to abo 
2.000 foreign leaders in governmer 
labor, mass media, science, educatio 
and other fields to visit their counte 
parts in this country. More th; 
100.000 American volunteers and 
community organizations, workit 
primarily through the National Count 
for Community Services to Intern 
tional Visitors (COSERV), coopera 
in programming these people in tl 
communities to which they travel. 

The American specialists progra 
each year sends about 200 U.S. exper 
in a wide variety of fields to teach ar 
demonstrate their knowledge and skil 
in other countries in response to spi 
cific requests from U.S. embassies. 

In the area of cultural exchange, 
variety of performing arts groups, 
exhibits, and coaches and athlet 



ay 1978 



33 



EUROPE: Assistance Programs to 
Greece^ Turkey* and Cyprus 



Secretary Vance 

I am pleased to be here today to 
jview the Administration's security 
adstance proposals for Greece, Tur- 
|y, and Cyprus for FY 1979 and to 
ci;cuss more generally U.S. relations 
vth the countries of the eastern 
K'diterranean. 

U.S. policy in that sensitive and 
\al region has several fundamental 
gals. It is vital that we strengthen 
tjr bilateral relationships with two 
fm and longstanding friends and 
aies — Greece and Turkey. Further, it 
ii essential to strengthen NATO's 
sithern flank, thus enhancing allied 
jhurity interests in the eastern 
I diterranean. At the same time, the 
Fsident and all of us remain fully 
cnmitted to help in the search for a 
(prus solution that will permit the 
to Cypriot communities to live 
picefully together within one nation. 

Let me emphasize that each of 
Ise goals is equally important, and 
g at effort and attention must be paid 
t them if we are to succeed. Their 
f suit has been complicated by the 
iy in which history has interwoven 
i issues at play in the region. 
I wish to outline today the Admin- 
i ation's program for dealing with 
t se issues which we believe will 
fa ak the present impasse. We urge 
a>roval of these proposals. The con- 
s uences of failure would be enor- 
n us for all of us. 

I ateral Relations 

The Clifford mission to the region 
ii the first weeks of the new Admin- 
L ation demonstrated the high prior- 
h which the Administration placed 
ai still places on restoring healthy 
« ationships with our eastern 
N diterranean friends. ' 



In Greece we have watched with 
admiration and respect as that country 
returned to its place as a leading 
member of the family of Western de- 
mocracies. Greece's democratic in- 
stitutions have been restored and 
strengthened under the sound and 
confident leadership of Prime Minis- 
ter Caramanlis, who returned in July 
1974 to guide Greece out of one of 
the darkest periods of its history. We 
have witnessed the economic success- 
es of Greece and the steady progress 
toward Greek entry into the European 
Community, an entity whose ideals 
and aspirations we share. 

Because of Prime Minister 
Caramanlis' international stature and 
the dynamism of the Greek people, 
we believe Greece can and will play a 
vital role in European and world af- 
fairs. We value Greece as an old and 
trusted ally, and we place special em- 
phasis on building an even stronger 
relationship for the future. In Presi- 
dent Carter's discussions with Prime 
Minister Caramanlis in London last 
May, and when I visited Athens in 
January, we were struck by our wide 
range of common interests. 

Our bilateral relations with Turkey 
are also of great importance. As a re- 
sult of the Clifford mission, the meet- 
ing between President Carter and 
Prime Minister Demirel during the 
London summit in May. my visit to 
Ankara in January and that of Deputy 
Secretary Christopher last week, some 
progress was made toward working 
out a revitalized relationship. 

We believe that the United States 
must view Turkey from fresh perspec- 
tives for the relationship has many 
dimensions. Our common security 
concerns have in the past and will 
continue to play an important part in 
our evolving relationship. Turkey is a 



t ms will travel overseas every year 
fder ICA auspices. 

The largest single element of ICA, in 
I ms of personnel and resources, will 
( itinue to be the Voice of America. 
' ith all of its programming originating 
I Washington, the VOA broadcasts 
virldwide about 800 hours a week in 
1 glish and 35 other languages. 

The new Agency will also maintain 
!• former USIA's daily radioteletype 
k to overseas posts of official state- 



ments and interpretive materials, its 
program of publications and exhibits, 
and its videotape and film services. 
The 253 libraries, reading rooms, and 
information centers in almost 100 
countries — and the English-teaching 
course offered at many of them — will 
continue to operate under ICA. □ 

1 For text of Executive Order 12048, signed 
Mar. 27, 1978, by President Carter establishing 
the ICA, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Apr. 3. 



major democracy with a robust par- 
liamentary system. It is also an im- 
portant developing country — one of 
the few that has maintained the 
momentum of development within a 
strong democratic framework. Turkey 
is both a European and an Asian na- 
tion, and it is likely to have a grow- 
ing role in the region and the world. 
Our relationship with Turkey has, 
however, been constrained by the 
embargo provisions of Section 620(x) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act and the 
uncertainty concerning our bilateral 
defense relationship. 

Strengthening NATO 

The eastern Mediterranean is the 
junction point of several critical 
areas — Western Europe, the Balkans, 
the Soviet Union, and the Middle 
East. The continuing strategic signifi- 
cance of this area is clear. To protect 
our interests and those of our allies, a 
strong and effective NATO southern 
flank is essential. Unfortunately, over 
the last several years the effectiveness 
of this flank has been eroded in a 
manner that is of grave concern to 
this Administration and to our allies. 

The United States has a number of 
vitally important military installations 
in Greece which are testimony to the 
strategic value of that country. These 
bases are critical to the operations of 
the 6th Fleet and to a variety of other 
activities essential to our security 
interests in the area. 

The Government of Greece with- 
drew its military forces from NATO's 
integrated military structure in 1974 
and tied its full reintegration to prog- 
ress on those issues which it feels 
forced its decision to withdraw. How- 
ever, I should note that, in the 
interim, U.S. military facilities in 
Greece have continued to operate 
without interruption. Recently, there 
have been serious discussions be- 
tween NATO and Greece offering 
grounds for optimism that a closer re- 
lationship may be developed in the 
coming months. If this continuing ef- 
fort is successful, it will be a major 
step toward a healthy normalization 
of Greece's participation in NATO. 

Turkey, for its part, remains a full 
NATO member, and its geographic 
position is critical today — as it has 
been throughout history. It supplies 



34 

more ground forces to NATO than 
any other nation. Yet the material 
readiness of Turkish forces has de- 
teriorated seriously in recent years. If 
Turkey is to continue to play its 
NATO role, our relationship must be 
revitalized. If we fail to do so, there 
will be those in Turkey who will 
question the basis for its continued 
participation in the Western alliance. 

Seeking a Cyprus Solution 

This Administration has. from its 
very first days, placed a high priority 
on the achievement of a just settle- 
ment of the Cyprus problem. We re- 
main committed to that goal. 

We are committed to this goal for 
two reasons. 

• So long as Cyprus is divided and 
its status uncertain, it constitutes a 
very serious humanitarian issue. 

• So long as the Cyprus problem 
remains unsolved, it is a substantial 
impediment to good relations between 
Greece and Turkey. 

In support of our commitment to 
the achievement of a Cyprus settle- 
ment, the Administration has made 
extensive efforts during the past year 
to encourage realistic and meaningful 
negotiations between the parties under 
the auspices of the U.N. Secretary 
General. Those efforts, which in- 
cluded many high-level visits, meet- 
ings, and discussions, have been set 
forth in detail by the President in his 
bimonthly reports to the Congress. I 
will not repeat them here. 

Unfortunately, despite these ef- 
forts, the intercommunal talks have 
not to date produced any tangible 
breakthrough. There has, however, 
been a growing consensus as to a 
framework for a solution. The two 
communities in Cyprus — as well as 
the Governments of Greece and Tur- 
key and, in fact, the international 
community as a whole — are in broad 
agreement with respect to the 
following. 

• Cyprus must remain a sovereign, 
independent nation — partition has 
been ruled out as a viable solution. 

• Cyprus should be a federation 
with two zones. The Turkish zone 
should provide a viable area for the 
Turkish Cypriot community but re- 
duced in size from that now adminis- 
tered by the Turkish side. 

• The constitution should provide 
for mutually agreed-upon respon- 
sibilities divided between central and 
local governments with adequate 
safeguards respecting the rights of in- 
dividual Cypriots. 



The task now is to move from this 
consensus to a concrete agreement 
that will be acceptable to the two 
communities on Cyprus. As a part of 
this effort, the Greek Cypriot 
negotiators tabled a map in Vienna in 
April 1977 and described their con- 
stitutional concepts. The Turkish 
Cypriots outlined some of their con- 
stitutional ideas. The Turkish side is 
now formulating constitutional and 
territorial proposals which they be- 
lieve will serve as a basis for the re- 
sumption of active intercommunal 
negotiations. 

We believe that with two thought- 
ful constitutional and territorial pro- 
posals on the table, combined with 
sufficient goodwill and a sense of 
realism on both sides, there is an op- 
portunity for productive negotiations. 
We stand ready, if requested, to assist 
the Secretary General in moving these 
negotiations forward. 



Recommendation 

We have mutually agreed with the 
Government of Turkey to renegotiate 
the matters covered by the defense 
cooperation agreement so as to serve 
our bilateral security interests in a 
manner that the two governments can 
be confident will reflect the broadest 
interests of our two democracies. It is 
not easy to predict when new ar- 
rangements will be concluded since 
the issues are complex. However, we 
have agreed with the Government of 
Turkey to give this effort prompt at- 
tention and to act promptly to imple- 
ment the new agreement after it is 
concluded. Of course, we will consult 
closely with the Congress concerning 
such negotiations. 

Even as we are working toward this 
end, we believe we must deal with is- 
sues of immediate concern to us and 
the region. We are, therefore, submit- 
ting, in the form of an amendment to 
the Security Assistance Act. proposed 
legislation to deal with this new 
situation. 

For Turkey we propose the fol- 
lowing with respect to FY 79: 

1) To provide foreign military 
sales (FMS) loan guaranties of $17? 
million so that we can help meet the 
most urgent needs of the Turkish mili- 
tary. This is the same amount as was 
provided to Turkey last year. 

2) To lift the embargo contained in 
Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act so that we can fully cooper- 
ate with Turkey in a manner conso- 
nant with the requirements of an 
alliance important to our mutual secu- 
rity. This would facilitate joint and 



Department of State Bulle, 

allied defense planning, enhance a 
lied support for Turkey's NAT; 
needs via third country transfers ar 
improved standardization and perrr 
the delivery of items impounded sin< 
the embargo was put in force. 

3) To provide a security supportii 
assistance loan of $50 million to Tu] 
key to assist Turkey in resolving il 
present economic difficulties. I wou 
note in this connection that a stabil 
zation package was recently workt] 
out between Turkey and the Intern 
tional Monetary Fund's staff and 
pending before the IMF Board. 

For Greece we would likewise coi 
tinue the level of FMS financing 
last year's level — that is, $140 mi 
lion. This is somewhat higher tlS 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT 

The Governments of (he United 
States and Turkey have agreed that the 
4-year $1 billion defense cooperation 
agreement, signed on March 25, 1976, 
but never approved by either (he U.S. 
Congress or the Turkish Parliament. 
will be renegotiated. New and mutually 
satisfactory defense cooperation ar- 
rangements between Turkey and the 
United States will be negotiated. 

In order further to strengthen our 
bilateral relations with Turkey, and the 
NATO defense posture in the eastern 
Mediterranean. President Carter will 
ask the Congress to take action to re- 
peal Section 620(x) of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act. which imposes restriction! 
on military transfers to Turkey. In addi- 
tion, the President is requesting the 
Congress to authorize $175 million in 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits to 
Turkey for fiscal year 1979, the same 
amount provided by the Congress for 
FY 1978. Because ol (he serious eco- 
nomic situation now facing Turkey, the 
President is also asking the Congress to 
approve a $50 million securit) support- 
ing assistance loan for Turkey for FY 
1979. 

The Administration's program for 
rurke) will he more fully described in 
congressional hearings now scheduled 
for later this week. At that time the 
Administration will ask for $5 million 
in refugee assistance for Cyprus and 
will renew its commitment to work tor 
,i iust and lasting solution to (he Cyprus 
problem. In addition, the President will 
also ask Congress to authorize $140 
million in FMS credits for FY 1979 for 
Greece, the same amount provided by 
the Congress for FY 1978. 



Press release 145 of Apr. 4. 1978. 



lay 1978 

e Administration requested in its 
jjdget submission and reflects our 
sire to maintain both Greece and 
urkey at last year's FMS credit 
vels. No grant military assistance is 
;ing requested for either country at 
is time. 

The lifting of the embargo and the 
gotiation of new defense arrange- 
ents with Turkey will provide a core 
' stability to our bilateral relations 
id enable us to establish a renewed 
nse of trust so that we may work 
gether to resolve important prob- 
jms. It should be clear that this does 
>t signal any shift in U.S. policy as 
:gards Greek-Turkish differences. 
Iiey are both friends and valued ai- 
rs. We support their efforts to re- 
ive all problems between them- 
lves in a peaceful fashion. We 
rongly believe that our national 
jterests require the restoration of 
lund. normalized bilateral relation- 
iips with Turkey and with Greece, 
jd our proposals today are made for 
[at reason. 

:i They should help restore a stable 
id peaceful atmosphere in the east- 
n Mediterranean — something which 
11 benefit all nations in the region. 
.' that regard, it remains the position 
the United States that the disputes 
liich exist in the area must be set- 
id through peaceful procedures, that 
jch side should avoid provocative 
I tions, and that neither side should 
hk a military solution to these dis- 
|tes. The United States would ac- 
rely and unequivocally oppose a 
] litary solution and would make a 
lijor effort to prevent such a course 
i action. 



fting the Embargo 

It has been suggested that lifting 

e embargo, or even proposing fur- 

er military or economic assistance 

r Turkey, should be delayed until 

ich time as a final Cyprus solution 

achieved. The Administration does 

:>t share that view, and does not, for 

E important reasons I have outlined, 

lieve U.S. national interests would 

I served by such a course. The Ad- 

(inistration will continue to make 

iery effort to help bring about a just 

llution to the Cyprus problem. The 

jtion we request today is not. in our 

ew. inconsistent with those efforts. 

le believe it can actually facilitate 

:e negotiation process. With the 

Vprus negotiations entering a critical 

Iriod, the United States can play a 

lore useful role if we are seen, by all 

Je parties, to be even-handed in our 

Siproach. An embargo against one 



side makes it difficult to play that 
role. 

Let me make another point about 
the embargo. Section 620(x) was 
enacted by the Congress to demon- 
strate that all facets of agreements 
undertaken with the U.S. Government 
must be honored or serious conse- 
quences faced. This is a point of 
principle which has had its impact 
both in Turkey and throughout the 
world — demonstrating the seriousness 
with which the American people view 
any unauthorized use of our military 
equipment. The point was made 
dramatically and effectively. Now the 
time has come to look forward rather 
than back. Continued maintenance of 
the embargo would be harmful to 
U.S. security concerns, harmful to 
NATO, harmful to our bilateral rela- 
tions with Turkey, and harmful to our 
role as a potential contributor to a 
Cyprus settlement. 

Let me conclude with a brief fac- 
tual description of our recommenda- 
tions for assistance to Cyprus for the 
coming year. 

Assistance to Cyprus 

As you will have noted, the Admin- 
istration is requesting $5 million in 
FY 1978 security supporting assist- 
ance for Cyprus as a contribution to- 
ward the relief and rehabilitation of 
displaced persons there. As in the 
past, these funds will be proportion- 
ately distributed to the two ethnic 
communities on Cyprus and will be 
earmarked for projects such as hous- 
ing construction, health care, and vo- 
cational education. Since FY 1975. 
the United States has contributed a 
total of $87.5 million for Cyprus re- 
lief and over $9 million annually to 
support the U.N. peacekeeping forces 
in Cyprus. 

We believe that these new funds 
will be effectively utilized by Cypriot 
authorities for worthwhile refugee as- 
sistance programs and will underscore 
our continuing concern for the people 
of Cyprus and our strong interest in 
promoting negotiation of a just and 
lasting settlement on the island. 

A settlement of the Cyprus prob- 
lem, and the adoption of a new con- 
stitution with the concomitant crea- 
tion of two zones, will require some 
significant expenses involving the re- 
settlement of people, the return of 
refugees, and the creation of new 
facilities. This Administration wishes 
to pledge that, when a settlement is 
achieved, we will reassess the ques- 
tion of economic assistance and are 
prepared to request from the Congress 
additional aid to assist both the Greek 



35 



and Turkish Cypriot communities in 
making the necessary economic, so- 
cial, and political readjustment 
brought about by a solution to this 
troubling problem. □ 

Statement before the House Committee on 
International Relations on Apr. 6, 1978 (text 
from press release 151 of Apr. 6). The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished In the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington. 
DC. 2041)2. 

'On Feb. 3, 1977, President Carter an- 
nounced that Clark M. Clifford would under- 
take a special mission to Greece. Turkey, and 
Cyprus as his personal emissary. 



Seventh Report 
on Cyprus 

Message to the Congress 

As required by Public Law 94-104. this re- 
port describes the progress that has been made 
during the past sixty days toward a negotiated 
settlement on Cyprus. 

In my last such report to the Congress, 
submitted on January 20, I outlined the con- 
tinuing efforts that we and other nations have 
been making, in both bilateral and international 
meetings, to promote an early resumption of 
productive negotiations between the two Cyp- 
riot communities. I stressed that resolute ac- 
tion was still required, but still expressed the 
belief that we were moving in the right direc- 
tion. 

Since that time there have been develop- 
ments of potential significance for Cyprus. 
Very shortly after his assumption of office on 
January 5. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit pub- 
licly announced his intention to deal promptly 
and decisively with the outstanding foreign 
policy issues confronting his nation, prime 
among them being Cyprus. Ecevit acknowl- 
edged that a Cyprus settlement would be in 
Turkey's own best interests. "'We want to see 
a rapid solution in Cyprus." he declared in a 
January 9 interview, "not because the U.S. or 
other friendly countries want it. but because it 
will be for the benefit of all Cyprus and for 
the benefit of peace in the region." Sub- 
sequently, in both public statements and pri- 
vate conversations. Prime Minister Ecevit said 
that he hoped negotiations between the com- 
munities would soon resume, and he declared 
that the Turkish side would submit concrete 
proposals on both the constitutional and ter- 
ritorial aspects of the issue. 

United Nations Secretary General Waldheim 
visited Ankara, Athens and Nicosia between 
January 8 and 18. The Secretary General was 
apparently encouraged by his conversations 
with President Kyprianou. Prime Ministers 
Ecevit and Caramanlis, and Turkish Cypriot 
leader Denktash. and afterwards said that it 



36 



German Democratic Republic 



by David B. Bolen 



President Carter recently noted that 
we live in a rapidly changing world; a 
world in which the universal desire for 
freedom and a better life is being ex- 
pressed more strongly and in more ways 
than ever before; a world in which polit- 
ical awakening, economic independ- 
ence, and technological progress have 
created new demands on the foreign pol- 
icy of our people. 

Today the world community involves 
more than 160 independent countries. 
This community includes 130-odd de- 
veloping countries which have changed 
the character of international affairs. It 
is a world characterized by population 
explosion which places tremendous 
stress and strain on economic develop- 
ment resources. It is a world in which 
80% of the population will be living in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America by the 
close of this century. It is a world of 
increasing interaction between existing 
social systems and national values and 
traditions. It is a world in which a single 
ideological or revolutionary model is 
fading. 

The world today cannot be fully un- 
derstood by focusing primarily on 
East-West competition in Europe. This 
competition is continuing. But it is con- 



ceivable that in years to come the chief 
security concerns of the United States 
may not evolve around this East-West 
confrontation at all; rather, the chief 
area of potential conflict will be where 
East-West interests clash in the develop- 
ing countries. 

One of the priorities of the Carter 
Administration is to help shape a wider 
and more cooperative world commu- 
nity. Such a world system should in- 
clude that one-third of mankind which 
lives under communism. The German 
Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) is one of 
the most important Communist states. 
Full normalization of relations with it 
would facilitate the assimilation of this 
country into the fabric of global cooper- 
ation. 

The German Democratic Republic is 
a country of central importance to peace 
and security in Europe. It is the 
western-most extension of Soviet power 
and influence. It is a member of the 
Warsaw Pact. There are some 20 Soviet 
military divisions in the G.D.R. It 
shares a common border with our 
NATO ally, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (F.R.G.). 

The German Democratic Republic 
has a GNP of $70 billion. Its per capita 
GNP of $4,000 exceeds that of the 
Soviet Union or any other East Euro- 



Department of State Bulle 

pean country. It ranks ninth in the woi 
in industrial production. It has a ri. 
reservoir of scientific and technologic 
manpower. The G.D.R. economy 
oriented toward the Soviet Union a: 
other East European members of t t 
Council for Mutual Economic Assi: 
ance. Like all industrialized countrit 
it is increasingly dependent on the Thi 
World for raw materials and markets. 

The German Democratic Repub 
experienced a long period of isolatr 
from the main Western channels of di 
lomatic intercourse following its pre 
lamation as a separate state in 194 
This isolation reflected opposing « 
liances, differing ideologies, and a ge 
eral atmosphere of mistrust whin 
characterized East-West relations du 
ing the cold war era. Western perce 
tions of the G.D.R. were shaped by t 
rigid controls exercised by the G.D.i 
in its internal affairs, particularly fc 
lowing the uprising of G.D.R. work 
on June 17. 1953, and the erection 
the Berlin wall on August 13, 1961. 

Although the G.D.R. continued 
place severe limitations on free spee 
and travel, improvements in the exti 
nal political and psychological dim 
following the Quadripartite Agreem 
on Berlin and the Agreements betwe^ 
the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. and its Ea: 
ern neighbors facilitated the recognitl 
of the G.D.R. by the leading Weste 
Nations. Finally, on September 
1974. the United States and the Germ 
Democratic Republic agreed to esta 
lish diplomatic relations, a move whi 
we considered to be in our best intert 
for a number of reasons. 



. 



might be possible to reconvene the stalled 
Cyprus intercommunal talks sometime early in 
the spring. 

My Administration has welcomed Prime 
Minister Ecevit's declared intention to move 
forward on the Cyprus issue, and we have ex- 
pressed our readiness to give full support to 
the initiatives of the Secretary General. Secre- 
tary Vance stopped in Ankara and Athens on 
January 20-22. following a visit to the Middle 
East, and held very useful discussions on a 
number of subjects, including Cyprus. 1 The 
Secretary returned from these discussions con- 
vinced that both the governments of Turkey 
and Greece earnestly desired to work towards 
a Cyprus settlement 

The Turkish Cypriots. assisted by the Gov- 
ernment of Turkey, are now preparing detailed 
constitutional and territorial proposals that 
could serve as a basis for resumed intercom- 
munal negotiations. Our understanding is that 
these proposals may be completed sometime in 
March, and that negotiations between the two 
communities could be resumed by the Secre- 



tary General sometime thereafter. Toward that 
end. the Administration has recently urged the 
Turkish Cyrpiot leadership and the government 
of Turkey to develop proposals that are suffi- 
ciently substantive and forthcoming to form a 
basis for genuine negotiation. We have at the 
same time encouraged the Government of Cy- 
prus to regard the new Turkish proposals, to- 
gether with the proposals tabled by President 
Makarios last year, as a basis for initiating a 
round of intensive, goodfaith negotiations 
which can lead to a narrowing of differences. 

I strongly hope that productive Cyprus 
negotiations will be reconvened very soon I 
am sure that all who wish to see peace, jus- 
tice, and stability in Cyprus and in the eastern 
Mediterranean share this hope. 

Jimmy Carter D 



Transmitted on Mar. 23. I97H (text from 
II eekl) Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Mar. 27). 

' For texts of Secretary Vance's remarks to 
the press in Ankara and Athens, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 1978, p. 30. 



Security Concerns 

Our principal interests in the Germ; 
Democratic Republic revolve aroui 
security concerns. These security co 
cerns relate to the G.D.R. 's close ai 
"irrevocable" relations with the Sovi 
Union, the nature of relations betwei 
the Federal Republic of Germany ar 
the German Democratic Republic, 
the behavior of the G.D.R. in ar 
around Berlin. We have an interest 
human rights improvement and deten 
which we see as mutually reinforcii 
concepts. We want a good atmosphe 
for the protection of the rights and pro] 
erty of American citizens. We also wa; 
the G.D.R. to play a constructive ro 
internationally and to look upon th 
United States as a reliable supplier < 
agricultural and industrial products. 

Therefore, in conducting our relt 
tions with the G.D.R. and its allies, 
hope: 

• To go beyond arms limitation to a< 



ay 1978 



37 



,al reductions of military forces and 
maments; 

• To go beyond uninhibited competi- 
,)n in the Third World by developing 
iore stable and equitable North-South 

lations and by encouraging a general 
.ittern of restraint and cooperation; 

• To look beyond the postwar divi- 
ipn of Europe to encourage more nor- 
lal relations between governments and 
joples of Western and Eastern Europe; 

d 

•• To gain acceptance that discussion 
i particular human rights matters, de- 
fied and agreed in the Helsinki Final 
J:t sections on principles and human 
intacts, are a legitimate part of bilat- 
til and multilateral diplomacy. This 
Muld presuppose both a G.D.R. will- 
ijness to engage in discussions with 
I: United States on these matters and a 
tnscious effort to move in the direction 
i greater, more positive compliance to 
fecific Helsinki provisions. 

Now the central purpose of G.D.R. 
! "eign policy is to create and secure the 
«>st favorable international condition 
1 • the development of a Communist so- 
t ty at home. This means the G.D.R. 
HI: 

• Maintain a firm and invariable al- 
1 nee with the Soviet Union and other 
( mmunist countries; 

• Strengthen the Warsaw Pact; 

■• Define and use detente in ways that 
ill advance G.D.R. objectives; 

••• Seek to develop and maintain mul- 
I irious and stable cooperation with all 
i ions while promoting, where possi- 
I , the political, social, and economic 
{ als of communism; and 

• Increase its influence in the Third 
l 3rld by posing as an ally of national 
leration movements. 

The G.D.R. society and its foreign 
|licy goals make it quite clear that 
Ith cooperative and competitive ele- 
I'nts will be present in our relations for 
■ ne time to come. The competitive 
rments stem from historical forces, 
jilosophical pressures, geopolitical 
(tisiderations, divergent political sys- 
1ns, and different values. At the same 
tie, we have overlapping interests 
Mich constitute a basis for enlarging 
i operation and regulating the competi- 
* e aspects of our relations. 

The G.D.R. at all levels has ex- 

:ssed a profound interest in develop- 
»l closer cooperation with the United 
"iites. This is probably important to the 
1 D.R. for two reasons. First, stronger 
ffls would enhance the G.D.R. 's status 
; Europe and elsewhere. Secondly, the 
1 D.R. leaders may believe that the de- 

lopment of cooperation with the 



United States will bring it benefits in 
trade and technology and, through 
selected exchanges, lead to a better un- 
derstanding of the United States. 

In the conduct of our relations 
through bilateral, multilateral, and 
other channels, we seek to engage the 
G.D.R. on a wide range of issues in- 
cluding disarmament, inter-German af- 
fairs, Africa, Middle East, North-South 
dialogue, human rights, humanitarian 
cases, trade development, cultural and 
scientific exchanges, consular conven- 
tion, and claims. 

The G.D.R. shares the view of most 
East Europeans that good U.S. -Soviet 
relations are a key factor in sustaining 
the process of detente which they see as 
important in maintaining a good atmos- 
phere for the conduct of bilateral rela- 
tions with the United States. The most 
important single aspect of Soviet- 
American relations is the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In 
these negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, an effort is being made to 
stabilize the military competition, to 
begin a downward turn to more sensible 
levels, and to slow down the introduc- 
tion of new, less stable military tech- 
nologies. We hope these negotiations 
will succeed this year; if so, they will 
contribute to U.S. security and improve 
the climate in which our relations with 
the G.D.R. can better develop. 

A successful SALT negotiation could 
also enhance prospects for other arms 
control problems. We have made it 
clear that we favor effective measures 
which bring about arms limitation and 
disarmament based on the principle of 
undiminished security, a principle that 
is essential to success in the Vienna" 
talks on mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions in central Europe. The G.D.R. 
views with satisfaction the progress 
which has been made in negotiations on 
a comprehensive ban on nuclear explo- 
sions. The G.D.R. 's participation in the 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalu- 
ation Organizing Conference is evi- 
dence of its concern and willingness to 
cooperate on nonproliferation. 

We must continue efforts to enhance 
U.S. security through negotiations on 
disarmament and arms control. At the 
same time we must maintain NATO's 
relative military strength and promote 
Western European unity as the keystone 
of our foreign policy. Success in arms 
control and disarmament negotiations 
would obviously free resources to meet 
the growing human needs in both de- 
veloped and developing countries and 
thus facilitate the construction of a more 
durable structure of global cooperation. 

Our efforts to promote a system of 
global cooperation and regulate compe- 



tition also includes diplomatic action 
and political negotiations. 

Bilateral Relations 

Central Europe. Let me stress here 
that central Europe remains the most 
crucial area of potential conflict. The 
German question has been the focus of 
much East-West conflict during the 
post-World War II period. Soviet and 
G.D.R. activities in and around Berlin 
have an important bearing on worldwide 
peace, security, and cooperation. Rela- 
tions between the two German states 
also affect the broader East-West 
agenda and our efforts to go beyond the 
postwar division of Europe to promote 
greater mutual trust and cooperation. 

Central Europe has been relatively 
stable since the four-power agreement 
on Berlin in 1971 . The 1972 basic treaty 
between the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many and the German Democratic Re- 
public made a significant contribution 
toward political detente in Europe. 
Under this treaty both states recognized 
each other's borders; they acknowl- 
edged each other's internal and external 
sovereignty. A number of negotiations 
are underway calling for practical coop- 
eration in a number of specific fields. 
We continue to encourage peaceful 
cooperation between them and believe 
the normalization process will continue. 
We have also made it absolutely clear to 
the Soviets and the G.D.R. that the 
United States and its allies will continue 
to reject activities that bring into ques- 
tion four-power rights and respon- 
sibilities for Berlin. 

Western Europe and Japan. In ad- 
dition to West Germany, the G.D.R. 
has been making a concerted effort to 
improve its bilateral relations with other 
West European countries and Japan. 
Generally these relations are less than 5 
years old. In a relatively short period, 
there has been a step-by-step develop- 
ment of these relations, including some 
state visits, political consultations at the 
foreign minister level, parliamentary 
delegations, visits of religious and trade 
union groups, trade expansion, cultural 
exchanges, and cooperation in science 
and technology. 

Detente in Europe is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the con- 
struction of a durable structure of world 
peace and cooperation. Detente must be 
reciprocal and comprehensive. I believe 
the G.D.R. recognizes that North-South 
issues are important and potentially ex- 
plosive. Current conflicts in Africa and 
the Middle East could threaten East- 
West detente and international peace. 

Africa. In Africa, the G.D.R. has not 



38 



Department of State Bulk- 



been helpful or sympathetic to allied ef- 
forts to bring about a peaceful transfer 
to majority rule in Rhodesia and 
Namibia through negotiated settlement. 
It has consistently backed Soviet and 
Cuban activities that have served to in- 
crease the level of tension in other parts 
of the continent. 

Middle East. In the Middle East, the 
G.D.R. generally hews to the Soviet 
line. It supports the radical Arab states, 
demands complete Israeli withdrawal 
from occupied Arab territory, and is 
wary of the peacemaking efforts of Pres- 
ident Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, 
although it has so far refrained from at- 
tacking President Sadat. 

For our part, we have endeavored to 
convince the G.D.R. that peaceful set- 
tlements of the current problems in the 
Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and 
southern Africa would free energy and 
resources for more humane purposes. 

As a global power, the United States 
is also interested in a more just interna- 
tional economic system in order to meet 
human needs. Clearly the G.D.R. can- 
not isolate itself from global economic 
trends in view of its heavy dependence 
on foreign trade. As an industrial coun- 
try short of raw materials, it will show 
increasing interest in markets and 
sources of supply in the Third and 
Fourth Worlds. I believe it would be de- 
sirable to encourage the G.D.R. to play 
a more constructive role in meeting the 
economic and social aspirations of the 
developing countries. Cooperation on 
North-South economic issues in pursuit 
of common interests could also be bene- 
fical to East-West relations in addition 
to fulfilling social and economic rights. 



Human Rights 

In the conduct of our relations with 
the G.D.R. we have explained that 
human rights in general are a central 
component of American foreign policy. 
The G.D.R., like other Communist 
states, tends to see our espousal of 
human rights as interference in internal 
affairs. It is concerned about the impact 
of the policy on internal developments. 
We have explained that our human 
rights policy is not directed at any par- 
ticular country but applies to all coun- 
tries, including the United States. Also, 
no state which has signed the U.N. 
Charter or the Helsinki Final Act can 
argue that its behavior toward its own 
citizens is a matter within its exclusive 
jurisdiction. We have stressed that the 
Administration's human rights policj is 
consistent with fundamental American 
values and reflects the transformation 
that has occurred in American society. 



As a member of a minority group in 
the United States, it is my hope that the 
G.D.R. will understand that the com- 
mitment of Americans to human rights 
is a strong moral and political force that 
must be taken into account in carrying 
out our foreign as well as domestic 
policies. I have no reason to doubt that 
we can carry on a dialogue with the 
G.D.R. on human rights in the spirit of 
cooperation and understanding rather 
than as a matter of ideological confron- 
tation. 

Despite earlier promises of coopera- 
tion by the G.D.R. , many of the human- 
itarian cases involving American citi- 
zens and their relatives in the G.D.R. 
remain unresolved. G.D.R. action on 
these divided family, marriage, and 
emergency visitation cases would have 
a positive impact in creating a better 
climate for the conduct of bilateral rela- 
tions, and I hope, therefore, that the 
G.D.R. will respond favorably in pres- 
ent and future cases of this type. 

Cultural Exchanges 

Let me turn now to the cultural ex- 
changes between the United States and 
the G.D.R. which are expanding. Here 
it is important to note that the popula- 
tion of the G.D.R. is probably the best 
informed among the peoples of East 
Europe about events in the outside 
world because as much as 80% of the 
territory of the G.D.R. clearly receives 
not only radio broadcasts from across 
the border but three channels of televi- 
sion as well, and about 10 million West 
Germans visit relatives annually in the 
G.D.R. or travel as tourists. In our con- 
versations in all parts of the G.D.R. — 
with workers, artists, scientists, and 
even officials — we experience a great 
interest, hunger, and appreciation for 
American society and culture. 

In 1975 a U.S. -G.D.R. exchange 
agreement was negotiated under which 
some five academicians annually from 
both countries conduct research for 
periods of 3-4 months in the social and 
natural sciences. It is a mark of our 
progress that in the new agreement the 
number of exchanges was doubled. 

In March I will open the first official 
cultural program we have arranged with 
the G.D.R. — an exhibit of some 300 
photographs by the famous American 
artist Paul Strand. It will be on display 
at a Berlin museum for 6 weeks. In May 
we are planning two projects taking 
place concurrently — a week of Ameri- 
can films covering some four decades of 
motion picture art and an exhibit of in- 
dustrial design, which will also include 
a seminar conducted by five American 
professors of design technique. 

In October, the United States will 



have its first official musical present 
tion in the German Democratic Repul 
lie when the distinguished compose 
string quartet will perform a series 
concerts throughout the country. Th 
quartet, known throughout Europe ft 
its performance of contemporai 
American chamber music, will gi\ 
concerts not only in Berlin but in fi\ 
other cities as well. 

These programs represent the fir 
cultural attractions arranged official 
between our two governments an 
suggest some willingness by the G.D.I 
to have its citizens experience at firs 
hand some of the cultural accon 
plishments of our country. I might ac 
also that the G.D.R. has arranged oth 
events through commercial channel 
such as two concerts by the Duke 
lington orchestra, led by his sc 
Mercer. At the Ellington concert la 
November in Dresden. I was pleased 
witness the enthusiasm of the your 
people for the Ellington music, whii 
exceeded anything in my experience. 

An outstanding cultural event w 
take place this year in the United State 
which has great cultural and symbol 
importance to our bilateral relatio 
with the G.D.R. It is a magnificent cc 
lection of paintings, porcelain, jewelr 
and armor from the Dresden musciir 
that will open the new wing of the N 
tional Gallery of Art in our nation 's ca 
ital. After 3 months, the exhibition w 
move on to the Metropolitan Museum i 
Art in New York; early in 1979 th 
exhibition will move to the fine ar 
museums in San Francisco, thereby 
lowing Americans on both coasts 
view what G.D.R. officials point out 
the largest collection of art they ha\ 
ever sent abroad to any country. I ha\ 
seen these wonderful objects of art 
Dresden and can assure you of the ] 
beauty and artistic value. 

Economic Issues 

The expansion and balancing of 
bilateral trade is probably an importa 
G.D.R. objective in developing ii 
bilateral relations with the Unite) 
States. There are indications that its ol| 
ficials believe that enormous pos 
sibilities exist that would be benefici; 
to the G.D.R. Given the G.D.R. s cu 
rent economic situation, it has a kee 
interest, for example, in importir 
western technology, expanding cred 
from our banks, and increasing expor 
to the United States. 

The United States has a very substa 
tial trade surplus with the G.D.R.- 
excess of $300 million. This is helpf 
to our balance of payments and creati 
jobs for American citizens. Agricultur 
exports alone exceed $360 million 



1978 



39 



HUMAN RIGHTS: 

The United States at Belgrade 



I Dante B. Fascell 

iFor the last year and more President 
(jrter's human rights policy has been a 
•ject of continual comment, concern, 
ail controversy in Washington and 
■und the world. In the United States, 
llecially. the Administration's stand 
I; been repeatedly put through the 
wnger of pragmatic questioning. Is it 
vvrking? What are the results? What 
I it cost? Where is the payoff? 

^hose questions are proper, of 
0).rse. They are the tests we would use 
ii judging any political investment, 
w;ther it be for national defense or in- 
Kiational decency, for creating jobs at 



home or promoting democratic values 
abroad . 

Unfortunately, when we try to judge 
the efficacy of the policy against this 
standard of tangible achievement we 
inevitably get bogged down in partial 
and contradictory measurements. 
Which matter more — the release of 
thousands of political prisioners in In- 
donesia or the thousands more still de- 
tained in brutalizing conditions? Was it 
a plus to have martial law lifted in 
Nicaragua, or do we score it as a debit 
that people have been killed in riots 
there? Is the increase in the number of 
Jews and others permitted to leave the 
Soviet Union a tribute to our steadfast- 



ness or a temporary and cynical gesture 
meant to buy off American public opin- 
ion for a few months? 



Central Aspects 

The fact is that facts mislead. The 
scorecard on human rights shifts so 
often that tallies which can be made to 
look good today can also turn dismal 
tomorrow. And the attempt to keep 
count of successes and of failures di- 
verts us from what I think are the two 
central aspects of the pursuit of human 
rights. 

The first has been cynically de- 
scribed as the "feel-good" quotient of 



11\ and play a major role in our 

■ e. It is of some significance to note 
I the G.D.R. is probably the world's 
n ;t advanced country in coal gasifica- 
ti technology, which offers a poten- 
ti for easing our energy problem. 

he G.D.R. desires more balanced 
giivth in trade with the United States. 
T s will be difficult to achieve given 
tl lack of most-favored-nation (MFN) 
I ft treatment — a status that the 
G).R. has not been able to achieve 
u er the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
I ause of its restrictive emigration 
pt cies. 

he G.D.R. is taking steps to develop 
tV American market in the hope of 
e< ntually receiving MFN treatment to 
si ance its competitive position. The 
G).R. took the initiative in establish- 
il the U.S. -G.D.R. trade and eco- 
ni lie councils, which involve 20 major 
Ii. corporations. It has also sought to 
I and U.S. business contacts by 
m unting technical seminars in the 
U ted States and by opening an office 
t\V\v York representing the WMW 
mhine tool works. 

'he United States has taken a number 
Ot.teps to expand trade with the Ger- 
Bli Democratic Republic. We partici- 

■ : in the world-famous Leipzig Fair 
■h government-sponsored exhibits 
«i business development offices. We 
■ourage private trade promotion ef- 

■ s at Leipzig. We sponsor technical 
«:s seminars, maintain a commercial 
Ijary, and provide counseling service 
9 other assistance. 

'|)ur efforts to increase economic 
Operation with the G.D.R. also in- 
flde a fisheries agreement signed in 



1976. Negotiations are underway for a 
parcel post agreement. We have held 
talks on patents. Our National Academy 
of Science and the G.D.R. Academy of 
Sciences have exchanged drafts for an 
agreement which appears imminent. 

All these activities have helped pro- 
mote mutual understanding and cooper- 
ation that serve our mutual interest. 

Discussions are underway on a 
number of other steps that would create 
a better framework for bilateral coop- 
eration and the normalization of our re- 
lations with the G.D.R. We are still in 
the process of negotiating a consular 
convention, an agreement that will be 
important to the protection of Ameri- 
cans traveling in the G.D.R. While 
showing some responsiveness to our 
suggestions for moving forward on 
property claims arising from nationali- 
zation and other seizures, the G.D.R. 
has been far less forthcoming in meeting 
its obligations to the victims of Nazism. 

These are the principal elements of 
our relations with the G.D.R. from the 
perspective of a changing world. 

In conclusion, I hope you will 
carry the following thoughts with 
you. 

• Ours is a world of rapid change, 
competing ideals, conflicting 
ideologies, and abiding issues. 

• It is a world in which mutual 
trust does not yet exist. As a people 
and as a nation we must remain 
strong at home, united in purpose, 
and strengthen cooperation with our 
allies in support of mutual security 
and our fundamental values. 

• It is an interdependent world in 



which peace and progress are indivis- 
ible. 

• Our world of growing interde- 
pendence calls for creative and in- 
novative approaches in using overlap- 
ping interests to enlarge areas of 
cooperation and to regulate competi- 
tion in Europe, the Middle East, Af- 
rica, and other areas where East-West 
interests may clash. 

• It is a world in which East and 
West should demonstrate more com- 
passion for the poor and disposses- 
sed — those who, through no fault of 
their own, are exposed to daily suffer- 
ing and struggling to survive in the 
less developed world. 

• A healthy world requires that we 
cooperate with our allies and potential 
adversaries in limiting arms and mak- 
ing progress on disarmament, for 
there is no realistic alternative to 
peaceful coexistence. 

• The G.D.R. is part of this rapidly 
changing world, with a heightened 
interest in developing better bilateral 
relations with the United States. It 
remains our purpose to improve the 
framework for the conduct of our re- 
lations with the G.D.R., recognizing 
differences in ideologies and social 
systems and taking into account that 
detente must be both reciprocal and 
comprehensive. □ 



Based on an address at the University of Ken- 
tucky in Louisville on Feb. 16, 1978, in the 
second annual scries of John Sherman Cooper 
distinguished lectures instituted by the Pat- 
terson School of Diplomacy and International 
Commerce. David B. Bolen is U.S. Ambas- 
sador to the German Democratic Republic. 



40 



Department of State Bull'. 



the policy. It makes Americans feel 
good — after Vietnam and Watergate 
and other episodes of governmental 
deceit — to be on the side of the angels 
again. 

I like the description, but I reject the 
cynicism with which it is applied. 
There is nothing wrong — and a great 
deal right — about a policy which re- 
minds Americans of the values our his- 
tory reflects. There is nothing 
wrong — and a great deal right — with 
the attempt to project those values 
again into the international arena as the 
expression of an American consensus 
about ourselves and our role in the 
world. 

The second aspect of the policy is its 
nature as a long-term commitment. 
Advocacy of human rights is not a 
quick fix. The renewed American de- 
termination to defend civil and reli- 
gious liberty, to seek broadened protec- 
tion of individual rights and welfare 
holds no promise of easy victories. The 
effort is certain to be a long one, but so 
have been our programs to aid eco- 
nomic development around the world. 
The pursuit is likely to be frustrating, 
but so are trade negotiations or disar- 
mament talks or the search for cancer 
cures or treatments. 

We do not draw back from those en- 
deavors just because the price is high in 
terms of patience and perseverance. 
Nor can we turn away from the pursuit 
of human rights because the goal re- 
mains distant. At his inaugural 17 
years ago, John Kennedy asked Ameri- 
cans '*. . . to bear the burden of a 
long, twilight struggle, year in and 
year out . . . against the common 
enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, dis- 
ease, and war itself." The struggle is 
still on. and it is too early to say for 
sure who is winning it. 

The Belgrade conference [Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE)], now nearing its con- 
clusion, however, gives me a chance to 
illustrate the conduct of human rights 
policy as part of that long, frustrating, 
but crucial "twilight struggle." The 
first formal meeting of the 35 Eastern. 
Western, and neutral states which 
signed the 1975 Helsinki accords on 
security and cooperation in Europe 
shows up all the problems of trying to 
keep a storecard on human rights. It 
also demonstrates all the potential for 
gradual change that makes American 
policy one of hope and promise 



Background 

Let me go back over some basic, re- 
cent history to put the Belgrade talks in 
perspective. The Helsinki accords 
themselves were the outgrowth of a 



20-year-long Soviet effort to obtain 
formal recognition of the postwar 
boundaries of Europe. Moscow sought 
a peace treaty. It got instead a declara- 
tion of political resolve in which, as 
trade-offs for the recognition of the 
sanctity of existing frontiers, the West 
insisted on provisions for "a freer flow 
of people and ideas" — another goal 
of President Kennedy — across those 
frontiers. 

When the long negotiations ended at 
the Helsinki summit, most Western ob- 
servers thought and said that the 
Soviets had gotten the best of the bar- 
gain. The West acceded to the legiti- 
macy of Communist conquest in 
Europe. In return, the East made under- 
takings to respect human rights and 
dignity but without the expectation that 
it could be held to the promises it 
made. 

What happened, instead, was a re- 
markable turning of the tables. It was 
accomplished not by any brilliant 
strategists in Washington or at NATO 
but by a small band of intrepid Soviet 
citizens who began to say out loud — so 
that the rest of the world could hear — 
that the Soviet Union must make good 
on its own laws and its Helsinki com- 
mitments. Their demands made us re- 
spond. It was they — members of what 
has come to be called the Soviet Hel- 
sinki Watch and, later, the signatories 
of Charter '77 in Prague — who made 
the West aware of the value of 
Helsinki. 1 

A year ago yesterday [February 23, 
1977] when the Helsinki Commission 
held its first public hearings in Wash- 
ington on human rights, former [U.S. 
Representative to the U.N. Commis- 
sion on Human Rights] Ambassador 
Leonard Garment summed up what had 
happened: ". . .the existence of a for- 
mal, written document, to which the 
Eastern regimes gave their public con- 
sent and their formal stamp of legiti- 
macy, has made a difference. The 
words matter and are beginning to 
move human minds," he testified. 
Then he added: "Perhaps we in the 
West, who pay such frequent tribute to 
the worth of ideas, should be a little 
embarrassed that at the time of Helsinki 
we entertained such a low opinion of 
their power. " 

By the time of Belgrade — the sub- 
stantive part of which began last 
October — our opinion had changed. 
We in the West approached the confer- 
ence as a significant test of our ability 
to give and get an account of the prog- 
ress promised in the Final Act, the 
formal name of the Helsinki docu- 
ment. 2 And from the East — in a few 
areas of Helsinki undertakings — 
we could already see surface gestures 
of compliance. 



Those gestures were made with i 
eye to Belgrade, out of concern i 
what would be said there if there wpl 
no signs of movement. The gestures J 
eluded the amnesty of political prisi-j 
ers in Romania. Poland, and. latij 
Yugoslavia. The rise in the emigrat ,i| 
figures from the Soviet Union ali 
other countries were also gestures I 
ward the Helsinki promise to "facll 
tate" the reunification of dividjj 
families. The sale of a few more We- 
ern papers and magazines and the e • j 
ing of travel restrictions on some We J 
em journalists also constituted gestu > 
in the field of information. 

For the scattered positive signal 
however, there were balancing negat \\ 
acts. Journalists could get around w| 
greater ease perhaps, but they coii 
also be subjected — and were in ui 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia— I 
outrageous harassment. New applica H 
for exit visas could be processed v\ i 
greater speed, but many with appli • 
tions long pending could be — and wt 
in the U.S.S.R. — treated with brutal 
and renewed contempt. Finally, a 
most tragically, 16 of the 43 memb 
of the Soviet Helsinki Watch have be 
jailed for daring to raise their voices 
demand domestic compliance with 
ternational human rights standards. 

On the second anniversary of i 
signing of the Final Act. the U 
Commission [on Security and Coope 
tion in Europe] issued its comprehi 
sive report on compliance. 3 In a c. 
sule judgment, it found: "Progress . 
has been inadequate. Measured agai 
either the hopes voiced at the Hclsii 
summit or the need for smoother a 
more stable relations among the s 
natories. the implementation of t 
Final Act has fallen short." 



U.S. Goals 

That judgment formed the bac 
ground of the U.S. effort at Belgrac 
an effort made up of two parts. T 
first part was simply to register our d 
satisfaction with the pace and qual 
of progress under the Final Act, esf 
cially its human rights and humanit; 
ian provisions. But beyond holding t 
Communist states to account for thi 
nonperformance, the second Americ. 
goal was to seek reaffirmation of t 
common Helsinki commitments thet 
selves, to stimulate better behavior c 
of the examination of the imperft 
past record. 

Registering Dissatisfaction. Tl 

first goal has been fully met. In faij 
the first 1 1 weeks of the conferee 
brought a welcome bonus. In th 
period devoted to the review of Fin 
Act implementation, the firm U. 



lav 1978 



41 



oice of Justice Arthur Goldberg 
Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 
tSCE] was joined by that of many 
l/estern and neutral spokesmen in a 
lersuasive chorus of concern on the 
|sue of human rights. 
1 The Communist delegations tried to 
llunt this assault, but failed. They ar- 
ued first that the Final Act itself made 
; hy criticism of their domestic conduct 

f limits, because the accords banned 

interference" in internal affairs. The 

est. however, showed clearly that 
Jinan rights are matters of interna- 
pnal agreement, of specific Final Act 
i edges, and thus not purely issues of 
nmestic competence. 
' Then when Justice Goldberg cited 

le treatment of specific individ- 
'als — Charter '77 signers jailed in 

rague or Soviet dissenters such as 

uri Orlov. Aleksandr Ginzburg, 
g.natoli Shcharanskiy , and Andrei 
'lakharov — the Soviets made a feeble 
ilttempt to rebut us with "you're- 
iiother" arguments. Guilty of racial 
liscrimination. of imprisoning the 
I 'ilmington 10. of letting millions go 
I 'bless — even, they said in apparent 
l-riousness. of executing Sacco and 
I anzetti 50 years ago — the United 
l:ates had no right to lecture others on 

spect for human rights. 
t I do not claim that these exchanges 
lake up a dialogue. Obviously, on 
nth sides, there was much more give 
lian take. But the Belgrade review 
i ;riod did something no other interna- 
li Jnal meeting has done: It broke the si- 
I nee barrier on human rights. Diplo- 
I ats found themselves talking about a 

ibject they generally prefer to duck, 
f it having been confronted with the is- 
lie, they found no way to put it aside, 
hstead. because the Helsinki process is 

continuing one and the Belgrade talk 
I ill be revived when the signatories 
I eet again in Madrid in 1980. human 
Ights has won a place on the interna- 
pnal agenda it should have had long 



: Reaffirming the Final Act's im- 
ortance. I want to discuss the impor- 
ince of that precedent in a moment, 
iJt first let us look at how far we have 
ptten with our second goal: reaffirm- 
lig the Final Act's importance as a 
jeans of stimulating improved per- 
jirmance. Barring new developments 
liday, the Belgrade conference's con- 
juding document has not yet been 
ureed upon. 4 

! But it has now become obvious to 
111 that the Soviet Union and its 
josest Warsaw Pact allies are inaltera- 
j!y opposed to a document of real sub- 
lance. We have worked hard for such 
i document throughout the proceeding 
Ui the face of Soviet intransigence. At a 



minimum the concluding document will 
note that delegates met and talked and 
that they will meet again and talk again 
in Madrid. 

So brief a concluding document 
would be a disappointment to many. 
But I do not believe that the final 
communique should be considered the 
sole — or even the main — measure of 
the impact of the Belgrade meeting. 
Certainly, it would have been better to 
have a conference document of real 
political substance that gave a candid 
assessment of implementation, reaf- 
firmed the commitment to all provi- 
sions of the Helsinki accords, and 
marked out specific areas for improved 
performance. But given the rule of 
consensus, under which each country 
has effective veto power, a strong Bel- 
grade concluding document was never 
in the cards. 



Future Courses of Action 

Nevertheless, what has emerged has 
the potential for being just as valuable. 
After Belgrade comes Madrid, another 
occasion to insist on implementation of 
the Final Act, to hold up the record for 
candid review, to try and win the fresh 
commitments that could not be 
achieved at Belgrade. And after their 
experience at Belgrade — that of being 
forced to hear out their critics — the 
Communist states must be even more 
determined than before to avoid a sec- 
ond round of diplomatic embarrass- 
ment. 

They have two roads to choose from. 
One is to renounce the Helsinki proc- 
ess, to boycott the Madrid meeting, or 
so rewrite its rules that it becomes an 
empty exercise. The other is to show a 
measure of good-faith implementation 
between Belgrade and Madrid that de- 
flates criticism and lightens the interna- 
tional atmosphere. 

Neither alternative is attractive. The 
Helsinki accords were meant to be a 
capstone of the Brezhnev detente pol- 
icy. To turn away from them is to pro- 
nounce that policy a failure. 

The other choice — that of heeding 
the concerns voiced at Belgrade and 
moving to remedy the practices which 
drew such heavy fire — is not easy 
either. It would mean, over the long 
run, according the individual real pro- 
tection against monopoly state power. 
To do so would be to invite more chal- 
lenges against Communist rule in its 
present form, to tolerate that very di- 
versity which every dictatorship must 
deny. 

There is. of course, one other way 
for the Soviet Union to slip from be- 
tween the rock and the hard place 
where, on the human rights-Helsinki is- 
sue, it is now held. That is for the West 



and the United States, in particular, to 
relax the pressure for Helsinki com- 
pliance so forcefully brought to bear in 
Belgrade. 

We could slip into that path too eas- 
ily. We could say that we asked too 
much from Belgrade, got too little, and 
need to try another course. We could 
go further — in our impatience for re- 
sults that can be totted up on a 
scorecard — and pronounce the whole 
push for human rights standards a prof- 
itless game. And thus we could let the 
Soviet Union, for one, off the hook. 

But I said earlier that we had set an 
important precedent at Belgrade in 
legitimizing international, diplomatic 
treatment of concrete human rights is- 
sues. The precedent is one we must ob- 
serve as well as insist that others ac- 
knowledge. If we change our signals 
now because of dissatisfaction with the 
Belgrade outcome, we lose the new 
ground onto which we moved ourselves 
and the East- West relationship. 

The precedent set at Belgrade is only 
as valuable as the followup to it. Hav- 
ing won the right to speak out on the 
importance of our values to our secu- 
rity and the ordering of a real detente, 
we cannot afford to turn away, back 
into silence. 

We have found in Helsinki a 
framework in which to pursue a policy 
which both feels good and can do 
good. The patience to put up with the 
slow pace of results from that policy is 
something Americans have yet to learn. 

Along the road we are certain to 
have anxious moments and even set- 
backs of our own. But the road toward 
international respect for human rights 
is the right one for us to be traveling. 
At Belgrade we began the trip with 
honor and realism. We are moving in 
the right direction. □ 



Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Re- 
lations on Feb. 24, 1^78. Congressman Fas- 
cell was Deputy Chairman of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the Belgrade meeting and is Chairman 
of the joint congressional Commission on Set u- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe. 

'The Helsinki Watch in the USSR, and 
Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia are private 
groups established to monitor compliance with 
the Helsinki Final Act. 

2 For text of the Final Act. see Bulletin of 
Sept. 1. 1975. p. 323. 

'The report. Implementation of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe: Findings and Recommendations 
Two Years After Helsinki, was transmitted to 
the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions. It is a committee print dated Sept. 23. 
1977, available from the U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington. DC. 20402 at a 
cost of $2.75. 

4 The conference's concluding document was 
issued in Belgrade on Mar. 8. 1978; for text, 
see Bulletin of Apr. 1978, p. 40. 



42 



Department of State Bulle 



* 



t 



MIDDLE EAST: 

A Status Report on the Peace Process 



by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. 

The 30-year search for peace be- 
tween Arab and Jew in the Middle 
East has been called a history of lost 
opportunities. I leave it to others to 
argue the question of who was re- 
sponsible for losing which opportu- 
nity in the past. Our concern as a na- 
tion, and as a friend of both sides to 
this tragic and intractable conflict, 
must be with the opportunity of the 
present and the promise of the future. 

For a brief dramatic moment last 
November [19-21]- the world saw a 
vision of what that future could be, 
when President Sadat of Egypt met 
with Prime Minister Begin of Israel in 
Jerusalem, and in December [24-26] 
when they met again in Ismailia. 
Today many ask — what has gone 
wrong? Why have the hopes of 
November turned to frustration and 
disappointment, to charge and coun- 
tercharge? 

I would suggest to you that nothing 
has gone irretrievably wrong. Indeed, 
some morning-after reaction to the 
heady experience of those first mo- 
ments of genuine breakthrough was 
probably inevitable. What has hap- 
pened, quite simply, is this: The ef- 
fort to transform those moments of 
vision into a dynamic process of rec- 
onciliation through negotiations has 
come face-to-face with the reality that 
the underlying issues which have 
blocked progress for so long are still 
there — that hard decisions involving 
fundamental premises and policies are 
ultimately unavoidable. But the op- 
portunity for progress is still there to 
be seized because of one overriding 
fact. The global and the regional con- 
text within which those issues arc- 
now being addressed is no longer 
what it was for much of the history of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. President 
Sadat's offer to visit Jerusalem, and 
Israel's spontaneous response to that 
initiative, have transformed the 
situation 

Whether this opportunity is lost or 
won depends in the first instance on 
the wisdom and courage of the lead- 
ers and peoples of the Middle last. It 
depends on the sense of responsibility 
of the international community. It de- 
pends on the willingness of the major 
powers, above all, not to seek unilat- 
eral advantage in a situation fraught 



with danger for the entire world. And 
it depends upon the ability of this 
country to steer a steady and fair- 
minded course, true to our commit- 
ments to our friends in the area and to 
our shared vision of the future, even 
when friends on one side or the other 
of the conflict may differ with us. 
President Carter has charted such a 
course. To succeed, he needs the un- 
derstanding and support of the 
American people and of their repre- 
sentatives in the Congress. 

I cannot tell you today what will 
happen in the future or even precisely 
what the next steps in our diplomatic 
efforts will be. These will depend 
upon the results of consultations with 
the parties to the conflict which are 
still in progress. I can. however, use 
this occasion to examine with you the 
basic issues that the United States and 
the parties to the conflict are facing 
and to describe the active role the 
United States is playing. 



U.S. Concerns 

Let me first talk for a moment 
about why peace in the Middle East is 
important to the United States and to 
the world community — and about why 
our country is so deeply involved in 
the diplomatic effort to achieve the 
goal of peace. 

For the United States, involvement 
in the search for peace in the Middle 
East is not a matter of preference but 
a necessity and a major responsibil- 
ity. A responsible American policy 
for the Middle East must assure that 
we retain the capacity to influence the 
course of events there commensurate 
with our responsibilities as a major 
power. The United States, with the 
goodwill which it uniquely has among 
all the parties in the Middle East, is 
in a position to help shape events, to 
help prevent wars, and to help the 
parties find their way along the hard 
road to a negotiated peace. To con- 
tinue to play this role, we must pur- 
sue policies which take into account 
the broad range of American concerns 
and interests in the Middle East. 

It is therefore important, as a start- 
ing point, to identify what those con- 
cerns and interests are. 

First, we have an interest, dictated 
by our global responsibilities in this 



nuclear age, to prevent conflict in tl 
Middle East from again becoming 
flashpoint of superpower confront 
tion. More basically, we have ; 
interest in conducting our relatioi 
ships with other great powers so as 
prevent a shift in the global balani 
of power which itself could invi 
confrontation. 

Second is our strong commitnie 
to the security and survival of Israe 
It is a commitment rooted deeply 
history and in our moral values as 
nation. It has been reaffirmed 1 
every Administration in this count 
since the modern State of Israel can 
into existence 30 years ago. It is o 
conviction that Israel's security ov 
the long term can best be assured I 
peace treaties which resolve Israel 
differences with its Arab neighbo 
and commit them to live at peace wi 
Israel. 



: 



Third, a mutually beneficial rel 
tionship with the major nations of tl 
Arab world is essential. They ho 
the key to their own defense agai 
outside domination or domination 1 
radical forces in the Middle East, ai 
they look to us for help in maintai 
ing their own security and indepen 
ence. The oil which some of the 
produce is literally vital to our alii 
in Western Europe and Japan and 
creasingly important to us. Their 
nancial power — through the level ( 
oil prices and their large financi 
reserves — makes them importa 
partners in the effort to maintain 
worldwide economic order. In t 
course of our relationship, thousa 
of Arab students, professionals, 
technical experts are trained ev 
year in the United States, and jo 
are created in this country by t' 
growing volume of exports to, a: 
investment in, Arab countries. Our 
lations with the Arab world, wis 
nurtured, can enhance our ability 
strengthen the forces of moderation i 
the Middle East and advance th 
cause of peace. 

Fourth, in the deepest sense, ou 
concern for human rights also dictati 
efforts to end a conflict which ha 
taken countless thousands of innocen 
victims and has deflected the nation 
of the area from using their bountifi 
resources and talents for bettering th 
lives of their peoples. 



1978 



43 



tmdamental Issues 

HNext, what are the fundamental is- 
fcs which must be dealt with if there 

■ to be tangible progress toward 
■ace? Briefly stated, the issues are 

se 

fc» Israel seeks from the Arabs rec- 
■lition of its legitimacy and right to 

■ st. with all this implies — an end to 
■ligerency, an end to threats of 

■ ce, and commitments to live to- 

■ her in peace and security. 

''» The Arab states seek the restora- 
In of occupied territories and a just 
■ution of the Palestinian problem. 

\n equitable and durable solution 

these issues can only be hammered 

1 through a process of negotiations 
Btween the parties. Prior to the 
■a) war of 1967. no real basis for 
pice negotiations existed. The Arabs 
rused to accept the existence of Is- 
ril. much less contemplate making 
pice with it. Since no basis for 
Biotiations existed. U.S. policy had 
|| focus more on containing area ten- 
sns than on helping to resolve them. 

rhe 1967 war began to change that, 
t) 6 days Israel not only proved be- 
jlid all doubt that it was there to 
s \ . but it also ended up occupying 
Kb territory stretching to the Golan 
fights of Syria, the Jordan River, 
III the Suez Canal. Slowly, meticu- 
Ij sly, painfully, the United States 
a I other like-minded members of the 
|i:rnational community working with 
t parties to the conflict in the 
n nths immediately following the 
v r launched intensive diplomatic ef- 
f ts to translate this new situation 
lo the long-sought basis for genuine 
f ice negotiations. 



IN. Resolution 242 

The result was U.N. Security 
■ uncil Resolution 242, adopted 
lanimously by the Council in 
I vember 1967. Here for the first 
t le in 20 years was spelled out the 
imework for a settlement of the 
lab-Israeli conflict. That resolution 
Is and remains the basis for all the 
ficemaking efforts over the past 
|:ade. At its heart is a very simple 
I mula: In return for Israeli with- 
ciwal from territories occupied in 
1967 conflict, the Arabs will rec- 
tnize Israel within a framework of 
jjace and security agreed by both. It 
tils for a just and lasting peace 
Ised upon the right of every state in 
I • area to live in peace within secure 
td recognized boundaries and upon 

aeli withdrawal from territories oc- 



cupied in 1967. Resolution 242 is 
clearly a package. The parts are 
linked together to make a balanced 
whole, to be carried out together or 
not at all. 

That having been said, let me note 
what Resolution 242 does not do. It 
does not define secure and recognized 
boundaries. It does not call for with- 
drawal from "all'* occupied ter- 
ritories or "the"" occupied territories. 
It does not require Israel to give up 
every inch of occupied territory. 
Neither, however, does it preclude Is- 
raeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967. 

In the final analysis, this issue can 
only be resolved in agreements 
negotiated by the parties. The em- 
phasis of Resolution 242 taken as a 
whole, however, is clear. The em- 
phasis is on establishing conditions of 
peace and security based upon the 
concept of withdrawal-for-peace. It is 
also clear that all the principles of 
Resolution 242. including the princi- 
ple of withdrawal, were intended by 
its authors, and understood at the 
time by all the governments con- 



fer the United States, in- 
volvement in the search for peace 
in the Middle East is not a mat- 
ter of preference but a necessity- 
and a major responsibility. 



cerned, to apply wherever territory 
was occupied in 1967. In other 
words, the withdrawal-for-peace for- 
mula applies to all fronts of the con- 
flict. I will revert to this point later to 
explain its relevance to the current 
negotiations. 

That brings me to a second issue 
relating to Resolution 242. That res- 
olution does not deal in a comprehen- 
sive way with a solution to the Pales- 
tinian problem. In the decade since 
the passage of the resolution it has 
become inescapably clear that a solu- 
tion to the Palestinian problem is es- 
sential in reaching a lasting settlement 
of the Middle East conflict. No party 
to the conflict today.disputes that the 
Palestinians have a sense of identity 
which must be taken into account. 
President Carter has recognized this 
by speaking of the need for a home- 
land for the Palestinians. In our own 
view, no settlement in the Middle 
East can endure, for Israel and Arab 
states alike, which does not include a 
just solution of the Palestinian prob- 
lem in all its aspects. 



U.S. Role 

Let me now turn to the role of the 
United States in the search for peace 
in the Middle East. Soon after Presi- 
dent Carter took office he decided to 
seek a new approach. For the first 
time in 30 years all the major parties 
to the dispute were ready to negotiate 
a comprehensive settlement. One of 
his first foreign policy decisions was 
to send Secretary Vance to the area. 
The Secretary obtained agreement 
from the governments involved that 
the three issues I have outlined lie at 
the core of the dispute and have to be 
resolved in an overall settlement: 

• The nature of peace; 

• Withdrawal from occupied ter- 
ritories in conjunction with security 
arrangements that will make recog- 
nized boundaries also secure bound- 
aries; and 

• Resolution of the Palestinian 
problem. 

Beginning in March 1977 in Clin- 
ton, Massachusetts, the President, 
and subsequently other Administra- 
tion officials, have laid out our think- 
ing on these issues. 1 We did this not 
to put forward an American blueprint 
or plan for a settlement but to help 
stimulate the thinking of the parties 
about new ways to overcome old ob- 
stacles to the peace process. Let me 
elaborate a bit on our thinking about 
each of these three issues. 

First, the definition of true peace. 
Peace does not mean simply a cessa- 
tion of hostility or belligerency. It 
means open borders, normal com- 
merce and tourism, diplomatic rela- 
tions and a range of official and unof- 
ficial contacts, free navigation 
through waterways, and an end to all 
boycotts. 

The United States regards normal 
relations among the parties as an in- 
dispensable component of a lasting 
settlement. The keystone of this is the 
recognition of Israel's right to exist 
permanently and formal recognition 
of its nationhood. 

Second is the dilemma of providing 
borders that are both secure and ac- 
ceptable to all. This is the other half 
of the withdrawal-for-peace equation 
set up in Resolution 242. Israel, 
which has fought for its very exist- 
ence for 30 years, must be able to 
feel secure within recognized borders. 
But borders that might give Israel the 
greatest sense of security in geo- 
graphic and military terms are not 
those acceptable to Israel's neighbors. 
They could not, therefore, provide 
true security. 



44 



Department of State Bulletii 



We understand the very real secu- 
rity concerns posed for Israel by 
withdrawal from occupied territory. 
But we also believe that without 
withdrawal, coupled with meaningful 
security arrangements, there can be 
no peace; and without peace between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors. Israel 
can have no true security. The goal 
has to be the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all states in the area. 

Third is the issue of the future of 
the Palestinian people. To achieve a 
durable peace, the Palestinians must 
demonstrate a willingness to live in 
peace with Israel. At the same time, a 
durable peace requires meeting the 
humanitarian needs of the Palestinian 
refugees, responding to the aspiration 
of Palestinian Arabs for an identity of 
their own. and agreement on the fu- 
ture status of the West Bank and Gaza 
where the largest single group of 
Palestinian Arabs live. 

This is not a simple question. It in- 
volves vital security considerations 
for Israel which must be taken into 
account. At the same time, it also in- 
volves interests of other Arab states, 
in particular Jordan and Egypt. And it 
involves the interests of the Palestin- 
ian Arabs themselves, over one mil- 
lion of whom reside still in the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

A way must be found for the Pales- 
tinians to participate in the determina- 
tion of their own future. Any solu- 
tion, if it is to be viable and lasting, 
must be based ultimately on the con- 
sent of the governed. 

Because this issue is so complex 
and no instant solution seems possi- 
ble, we have suggested that there 
need to be interim arrangements for 
the West Bank and Gaza agreed be- 
tween Israel and Jordan, Egypt, and 
Palestinian representatives. During 
this interim period an ultimate solu- 
tion can be worked out combining se- 
curity for Israel and its neighbors and 
a territorial solution which will not 
leave a residue of irredentism to fer- 
ment and threaten the peace in the 
future. Our own view is that an inde- 
pendent Palestinian state in this trun- 
cated territory would not be a realistic 
or durable solution and that its future 
should lie in a close link with Jordan. 

The Approach Toward Peace 

These, then, are the issues, and 
these are our general views about 
them. Let me now discuss briefly how 
this Administration has approached 
them with the parties in the peace 
process. For it is clearly a process. 
Nothing stands still in the Middle 



East. Matters are always moving — 
toward peace, or toward war, so long 
as the basic conflict is unresolved. 
Despite the apparent deadlock, the 
deep differences, and the cycle of 
violence so tragically reflected in the 
terrorist attack recently in Israel and 
the subsequent Israeli move into 
southern Lebanon, we still believe the 
dynamics of the process are at work 
toward a negotiated peace. 

What we are seeing today, for the 
first time in the history of the con- 
flict, are genuine attempts by key par- 
ties involved to come to terms. Real 
negotiations have commenced. We 
are also seeing an unprecedented pub- 
lic debate over the core issues of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the depth 
of hostility and suspicion which 
underlie that conflict, and the painful 
decisions needed to make negotiations 
succeed, no one should expect results 
overnight. 

Efforts to get the negotiations mov- 
ing have gone through several phases 
over the past year. Initially, they fo- 
cused on seeking to reconvene the 
Geneva Middle East Peace Confer- 



. . .the key differences remaining 
to be bridged relate to the issue 
of withdrawal and an approach 
to the Palestinian problem, in- 
cluding the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza. 



ence, which was established and met 
briefly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
and which remains the ultimate 
framework for a comprehensive peace 
settlement. 

Efforts, to reconvene the Geneva 
conference last year, however, en- 
countered sharp differences among 
the parties on a number of procedural 
issues, in particular the question of 
how the Palestinians should be repre- 
sented. Israel took the position that 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) was not an acceptable negotiat- 
ing partner. In this we supported Is- 
rael, in view of the PLO's nonaccept- 
ance of Resolution 242 as the basis 
for negotiations and its refusal to 
state publicly its willingness to rec- 
ognize the right of all states in the 
area, which include Israel, to live in 
peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries. 

Then, suddenly. President Sadat 
transformed the situation with his his- 
toric trip to Jerusalem last November. 
His initiative did not resolve the basic 



issues in dispute. But at one stroke he 
sought to break down the psychologi- 
cal barriers which had prevented seri 
ous negotiations. 

For the first time, the leader of an 
Arab state demonstrated not by words 
alone but by a tangible act his coun- 
try's acceptance of the peace-for- 
withdrawal formula of Resolution 242. 
He recognized in an unprecedented 
official and public act Israel's 
sovereign existence. He put Egypt in 
the forefront of the Arab world in ac- 
cepting the concept of the nature of 
peace as President Carter has defined 
it. and as Israeli leaders themselves 
over the years have envisaged it as Is< 
rael's goal in negotiations. In doing 
so. President Sadat opened up pos- 
sibilities that never before existed tc 
break out of the 30-year cycle of wai 
and truce in the Middle East. 

President Sadat made clear, and Is- 
rael agreed, that what he had done 
was not done for Egypt alone, but tc 
create a new psychological climate ir 
which there can be progress towarc 
peace between Israel and all it; 
neighbors. Whether other Arab lead- 
ers will seize the opportunity thus 
created remains to be seen. Some 
have reacted with open hostility 
some with suspicion, some want tc 
wait and see — but some also have- 
wished Egypt well and are giving it; 
peace initiative their support. 

What is important today is to insure 
that this moment not become anothei 
lost opportunity. The United States 
from the beginning has supportec 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Our ef- 
forts are directed toward assuring, 
first, that there is tangible and earl) 
progress in the negotiating process 
begun by Egypt and Israel ir 
Jerusalem last November, and sec- 
ond, that out of this process theft 
emerge a basis and an incentive foi 
the negotiations to be broadened to 
include other Arab parties. Both 
Egypt and Israel have stated that this 
is also their objective. 

Since November, the negotiating 
process has proceeded on two tracks. 
Following an initial preparatory con- 
ference in Cairo in December, at- 
tended by Egyptian and Israeli delega 
tions and also by representatives oft 
the United States and U.N. Secretary 
General Waldheim, Egypt and Israel 
agreed to establish two committees at 
ministerial level. 2 A Military Com- 
mittee was convened in Cairo to 
negotiate essentially Egyptian-Israeli 
bilateral issues. A Political Commit- 
tee was convened in Jerusalem to ; 
negotiate multilateral Arab-Israeli is- 
sues. The United States participated 
in the Political Committee and. when 



lay 1978 

esident Sadat withdrew his delega- 
on. has continued as a middleman 
ith the support of both to seek to 
dvance the work of the Political 
ommittee through a process of indi- 
;ct negotiations. 

The Immediate focus of the Politi- 

d Committee is the negotiation of a 

eclaration of principles for a com- 

rehensive peace settlement, building 

In Security Council Resolution 242, 

hich can serve as a framework for 

egotiations between Israel and any 

f its other neighbors which are pre- 

ured to move toward peace, as Egypt 

as demonstrated it is prepared to do. 

With a large measure of agreement 

ready achieved on those principles 

;aling with the nature of peace and 

cognition of Israel, the key differ- 

lices remaining to be bridged relate 

the issue of withdrawal and an ap- 

oach to the Palestinian problem, in- 

uding the future of the West Bank 

id Gaza. 

i The important talks which Presi- 

iint Carter has had in recent months 

ith President Sadat and with Prime 

: inister Begin have helped clarify 

' e differences that have to be re- 

I 'lved. The issues to be decided are 

it on the table for all to see. We be- 

1 ;ve the point has come where pain- 

1 compromises have to be made if 

e promise of peace is not to be lost. 

It is no secret that we have differ- 

ices with the Israeli Government 

iout what is required to move for- 

ard on negotiations, just as we have 

id in the past — and expect to have in 

e future — with Arab governments 

l negotiating issues of critical im- 

irtance to them. The fact that we 

in talk frankly and openly with Is- 

el about these differences testifies 

the closeness of our friendship. 

To be concrete, we have a basic 

fference with the Israeli Govern- 

ent over the applicability of the 

ithdrawal principle in Resolution 

\\2 to all fronts of the conflict. I 

)ted earlier that the authors of Res- 

ution 242 and all the governments 

mcerned, including the Government 

Israel, understood at the time that 

e withdrawal-for-peace concept 

>plied wherever territory was oc- 

ipied in 1967. 

The present position of the Israeli 

lovernment is that this concept does 

pt apply to all fronts. Specifically, it 

jis not so far agreed that, in the con- 

xt of a final peace treaty embodying 

>mmitments to normal peaceful rela- 

ons and agreed security arrange- 

ents which can include agreed 

order modifications, Israel will 

ithdraw from any of the West Bank 

f the Jordan River and Gaza — the 



parts of former Palestine lying outside 
Israel's 1967 boundaries. 

This new Israeli interpretation of 
Resolution 242, together with the pol- 
icy of establishing Israeli settlements 
in occupied territory, has complicated 
efforts to make progress in the 
negotiations between Egypt and Is- 
rael. It has also inhibited efforts to 
broaden those negotiations to include 
other Arab parties, in particular Jor- 
dan and Palestinian representatives 
who, together, have an interest in 
negotiations relating to the future of 
the West Bank and its Palestinian 
Arab inhabitants. 

We realize that the withdrawal- 
for-peace formula as it applies to the 
West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestin- 
ian issue generally, are the most dif- 
ficult issues for Israel. In all our de- 
liberations, we constantly have before 
us the very real security questions 
posed for Israel. We cannot conceive 
of any formula the United States — or 
Israel — could accept which did not 
make fullest provision for these secu- 
rity concerns as part of a peace 
settlement. 

To supplement the commitments 
and security arrangements the parties 
may agree to incorporate in peace 
treaties between themselves, and if 
we judge it essential to cement final 
agreement, we have said we are pre- 
pared to consider whatever bilateral 
U.S. security guarantees Israel may 
consider desirable as part of the peace 
settlement. This would, of course, be 
done in close consultation with the 
Congress in full consonance with its 
constitutional authority and 
responsibilities. 

In closing, let me say a word about 
where the negotiating process now 
stands. During his recent talks in 
Washington with Prime Minister Be- 
gin, President Carter put forward 
some exploratory ideas on how to 
bridge the differences in the negotia- 
tions. In doing so, we took into ac- 
count the proposals — in many re- 
spects far-reaching proposals — which 
Prime Minister Begin advanced in 
December for a Sinai agreement with 
Egypt and for a self-rule regime in 
the West Bank and Gaza. We said 
then, and say now, that in our judg- 
ment those proposals represent a good 
first step and a basis for negotiations. 

We understand the need for time 
for our ideas and these issues to be 
discussed and debated within Israel's 
democratic political process. We 
know that our ideas — dealing as they 
do with the key issues for Israel of 
security, withdrawal, the Palestinian 
question, and the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza — require agonizingly 



45 



difficult choices to be made. We hope 
nevertheless that our ideas will com- 
mend themselves to Israel, because 
we believe they offer the possi- 
bility — perhaps the only possibility — 
for renewing the momentum of 
the Egyptian-Israeli and ultimately 
the overall Arab-Israeli negotiating 
process. 

We are meanwhile gratified that di- 
rect Egyptian-Israeli talks were re- 
sumed through the visit last week 
[March 30-31. 1978] of Defense 
Minister [Ezer] Weizman to Cairo. 
We are also gratified that progress is 
being made, with the help of the 
courageous men of the U.N. Interim 
Force in Lebanon and the efforts of 
the Lebanese Government itself, to- 
ward calming the potentially danger- 
ous situation in south Lebanon — a 
situation which can otherwise have 
serious adverse effects on the pros- 
pects for regional peace. 

I return in the end to where I 
started. When an Egyptian President 
has visited Israel and an Israeli Prime 
Minister has visited Egypt, when the 
President of the United States has en- 
gaged the authority of his office and 
the weight of the United States in the 
search for a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East, can there be any 
doubt that an unprecedented opportu- 
nity exists to make progress toward 
that long elusive goal? At the same 
time there are strong forces — forces 
of historical distrust and suspicion, of 
bitterness and violence, of national 
ambition and ideological commit- 
ment, of perceived injustices on both 
sides — which are working against the 
success of all that we and our friends 
in the Middle East are seeking to 
achieve. And time is on their side, 
not ours. We must not, we do not 
intend, to let this moment in history 
become simply another lost 
opportunity. □ 



Address before the Atlanta Foreign Policy 
Conference on U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East on Apr. 5. 1978. Mr. Atherton was As- 
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs: on Apr. 6. the Senate confirmed 
the President's nomination of Mr. Atherton as 
Ambassador at Large with special responsibil- 
ity for Middle East peace negotiations. 

' For excerpts relating to foreign policy 
from President Carter's opening remarks and 
question-and-answer session at the Clinton, 
Massachusetts. Town Hall, see Bulletin of 
Apr. 11, 1977, p. 334. 

2 For a chronology of Middle East events 
during November. December, and January, 
which includes participants in various meetings 
and committees, see Bulletins of Dec. 19. 

1977, p. 880; Jan. 1978, p. 401; and Feb. 

1978. p. 37. respectively. 



46 



Department of State Bulle' 



Terrorist Attack in Israel 



STATEMENT BY 
PRESIDENT CARTER 1 

The terrorist attack on a bus today 
[March 1 1] in Israel was an outrageous 
act of lawlessness and senseless brutal- 
ity. Criminal acts such as this advance 
no cause or political belief. They in- 
spire only revulsion at the lack of re- 
spect for innocent human life. 



LETTER TO 

PRIME MINISTER BEGIN 2 

March 11, 1978 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

It was with a sense of deep personal 
shock and moral outrage that I learned 
of the cowardly and senseless attack 
today on a group of innocent civilians. 
This brutal act of terrorism will surely 
be met with universal revulsion by all 
men of conscience. I know the pain and 
distress which you must be experienc- 
ing at this tragic moment, and I offer 
you the condolences and deep sym- 
pathy of myself, and all of the Ameri- 
can people, who share your sorrow. 
Please give my personal sympathy to 
the families of the many who died and 
to those who were wounded. I am par- 
ticularly distressed that an event such 



as this should occur just as you were 
preparing to depart on your mission of 
peace. I continue to look forward to 
talking to you soon and relaying to you 
in person the deep emotions which this 
event has aroused in this country. In 
the meantime, please accept, Mr. 
Prime Minister, my deepest and most 
heartfelt condolences. 

Jimmy Carter 



STATEMENT BY 
SECRETARY VANCE 3 

We condemn the outrageous attack 
committed by terrorists in Israel this 
morning, which resulted in extensive 
loss of life. This is murder and cannot 
be justified. The perpetrators should 
receive the punishment they deserve. 

I offer my condolences for this tragic 
loss of life. We oppose terrorism in all 
its forms, and this incident only serves 
to strengthen our determination to 
combat terrorism with every means at 
our disposal. □ 

'Issued on Mar. 11, 1978 (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Mar. 20). 

: Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Mar. 20, 1978. 

'Issued on Mar. 11, 1978. 



Southern Lebanon 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT 
MAR. 16 1 

The President and Secretary Vance 
have been in close touch on the situa- 
tion in southern Lebanon, and the Pas 
ident instructed the Secretary to report 
our position to the American public. 

At the outset let me say we deplore 
this new cycle of violence which 
erupted in the tragic killings in Israel 
on March I 1, 1978, and continued with 
the military action and tragic loss of 
innocent civilian lives in Lebanon over 
the past 2 days. 

During the intensive consultations 
with other governments which we have 
already described, our immediate con- 
cern has been to end as quickly as pos- 



sible this most recent cycle of violence 
in the Middle East so as to keep atten- 
tion focused on the basic problems 
which produced it. The only real solu- 
tion to these problems lies in the 
broader search for a comprehensive set- 
tlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
all its aspects and for measures which 
would restore long-term stability in 
Lebanon. We do not intend to be dis- 
tracted from efforts to resolve these 
basic problems. 

As to the situation in southern Leba- 
non, we expect Israel to withdraw, and 
we have made our views in this respect 
known to the Israeli Government. We 
have also begun consultations on ar- 
rangements that could promote stability 
and security in that area following Is- 



raeli withdrawal. At the United Natiot 
and elsewhere, we have been discu 
sing possible arrangements, includir 
the idea of a U.N. role, and will coi 
tinue urgent exchanges on this subje 
with the parties in the Middle East. 

The territorial integrity of Lebanc 
remains a matter of fundamental coi, 
cern to the United States. An importa 
objective in our current efforts is tr 
extension of the authority of the Go\ 
ernment of Lebanon to south Lebanoi 
Any arrangements will have to be com 
sistent with this objective and with tr 
decisions of that government. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 20 2 

The U.S. Government has decided 
respond immediately to the request j 
the Government of Lebanon for assisl 
ance in dealing with the tragic situatii 
of the people displaced by the fightii 
in Lebanon. There are over 150.0( 
people who have been forced to flee tl 
fighting. They are in urgent need i 
shelter, blankets, and other reli- 
supplies. 

The U.S. Government intends I 
make a substantial contribution to a 
sisting those in need. As a first step v 
are now moving to send tents and bla 
kets to Lebanon by air. We are consul 
ing with the Government of Lebanc 
about additional needs. More detai 
will be provided on the exact nature 
U.S. assistance and its magnitude 
the days ahead. 

LETTER TO THE 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE 

April?. 19' 

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill. Jr.. 
Speaker, House of 
Representatives 
U.S. Congress 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to section 3 (c) of the Ar 
Export Control Act, I am providing I 
following information with respect 
Israel's military operations in Lebanc 
that began on March 15. 

Those operations have involved us 
of defense articles furnished to Israi 
by the United States under the foreig 
military sales program. Sales to Israti 
under this program are governed by 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreemei 
of July 23, 1952, which provides: 

"The Government of Israel assure 
the United States Government that sue 
equipment, materials, or services a 
may be acquired from the Unite 
States ... are required for and will b ; 



ly 1978 



Prime Minister Begin 
Visits the L.S. Mareh 20-23 



VHITE HOUSE STATEMENT 1 

President Carter and Prime Minister 
Egin met with their advisers this 
nirning in the Cabinet Room for 2 
h.irs. 

The President and Prime Minister 
hi a thorough diseussion on the issues 
tit must be resolved in order to assure 
citinuity and progress in the peace 
motiations. In particular, they have 
n iewed the status of negotiation on 
ti declaration of principles for a com- 
phensive peace, and they have 
eimined the question of the West 
Eik and Gaza. 

The President reiterated his pledge to 

I parties to support and assist in 
e> ry way the process of peace negotia- 
ths and reaffirmed the unswerving 
i*ierican commitment to the security 
o: Israel. He expressed the view that. 
d pite the recent increase in violence 
Ij he area, there remains a deep con- 
ation that renewed progress toward 
p ce is essential and that the door to 
p gress remains open. He urged all 
tl se involved to seize this opportunity 
a to make the historic decisions on 
v» ich peace now depends. 

he President and the Prime Minis- 
te will meet again this evening and 
tc orrow. 

I PARTURE REMARKS 2 

F sident Carter 

'he visit of Prime Minister Begin 
a: his discussions with me and the 



other Israeli and American officials has 
been very important. These 2 short days 
have been spent in a comprehensive 
exchange of views on the Middle East 
peace process. I have reiterated to the 
Prime Minister the profound support of 
all Americans for the security and the 
well-being of the State of Israel as it 
approaches its 30th year of independ- 
ence. We share Israel's pride in this 
milestone. 

Israel's achievements are uniquely 
its own, a mixture of high idealism, in- 
genuity, and self-reliance. Americans 
have always found an echo of our own 
frontier past in Israel's energy and its 
strong individualism. 

Thirty years ago, Israel was born 
into uncertainty and a threatening fu- 
ture. Since that time, Israel has suf- 
fered more hardship and tragedy than 
most nations must endure in a century. 
Yet today, Israel stands as a powerful 
nation, fiercely independent and de- 
termined to forge its own political 
destiny. 

The Israel of 1978 is strong and 
more secure militarily than at any time 
in its history. We in America take 
satisfaction in the knowledge that we 
have contributed in some small meas- 
ure to the realization of that dream of 
strength. We have stood beside Israel 
from the earliest moments of its birth, 
and there we shall continue to stand. 

This visit by Prime Minister Begin 
has had only one purpose, to explore 
the ways in which we can build our 
past cooperation into a true partnership 
for peace. In the course of these meet- 



u d solely to maintain its internal se- 
city, its legitimate self-defense, or to 
pmit it to participate in the defense of 
t| area of which it is a part, or in 
lited Nations collective security ar- 
r. gements and measures, and that it 
wl not undertake any act of aggres- 
s n against any other state . ' ' 

n these circumstances, I must report 
t t a violation of the 1952 Agreement 
I y have occurred by reason of the Is- 
rfli operations in Lebanon. 

■Ve have discussed with senior offi- 
I Is of the Israeli Government these 

•rations and the use of US origin 
eiipment in them. The Israeli Gov- 
e ment has said that it intends to com- 
I with UN Security Council Resolu- 
tjn 425, which among other things 



calls for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Lebanon. We are actively 
engaged in discussing with officials of 
the Israeli Government the date for the 
completion of such withdrawal. 

In these circumstances, including the 
ongoing efforts to restore momentum to 
the vital peace negotiations and Israel's 
assurance that it intends to withdraw 
from Lebanon, I am not recommending 
to the President any further action. 

Sincerely. 

Cyrus Vance □ 



■Read to news correspondents by Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter on Mar. 16, 1978. 

2 Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman John Trattner on Mar. 20, 
1978. 



47 



ings. Prime Minister Begin and I have 
had an opportunity to review in consid- 
erable detail the present situation and 
our progress to date on a comprehen- 
sive settlement of the Middle East con- 
flict. As always, these discussions have 
been detailed and frank, as is to be ex- 
pected from two partners in the peace 
process. 

I have reviewed for Prime Minister 
Begin my recent discussions with Pres- 
ident Sadat. And I have shared with 
him my assessment of what will be re- 
quired to regain momentum in the 
common search for peace. I em- 
phasized to him the importance of reaf- 
firming that all of the principles of Se- 
curity Council Resolution 242 must 
apply to all fronts if peace negotiations 
are to succeed. 

In the past few months, we have had 
a glimpse of what a peaceful future 
might hold. We have come to ap- 
preciate what it can mean in terms of 
human contact, direct contact, and lib- 
eration from the dangerous, self- 
defeating patterns of the past. 

As Prime Minister Begin returns 
home, he will carry with him our 
hopes and our dreams for a future free 
of the bitterness and violence of the 
past generation. 

We know that he faces both a chal- 
lenge and an opportunity — the chal- 
lenge of providing security for his 
people, and the opportunity to achieve 
that security through a true and endur- 
ing peace. It is our conviction that this 
opportunity must not be allowed to slip 
into the cycle of hatred and violence 
which has characterized the history of 
the Middle East for the past 30 years 
and which we have witnessed again 
over the last 2 weeks. 

We pray with him that all peoples of 
the Middle East will come to realize 
that another generation must not be al- 
lowed to grow up learning only war 
and despair. 

Prime Minister Begin does not return 
alone to his own country. He carries 
with him our deepest hopes and 
prayers. We stand with him as he faces 
the challenges and the opportunities of 
Israel's great dream. At this historic 
moment, when peace still seems far 
away, we rely on the vision and the 
humanity of a great people, born of 
great suffering, to triumph once again. 

In this mission. Prime Minister 
Begin carries with him the good wishes 
and the constant support of all the 
people of the United States. Mr. Prime 
Minister, we wish you Godspeed. 

Prime Minister Begin 

Mr. President, I thank you 
wholeheartedly for the good words and 



48 



Department of State Bull< 



the expressions of friendship and un- 
derstanding for our people and country. 
This is a new reaffirmation of the 
mutual, deep amity between our 
peoples and our countries. 

As you said, Mr. President, our 
people had to suffer much and to fight 
for its liberation and for its independ- 
ence. Great sacrifices were given so 
that we can have the land of our 
forefathers to build up for our children. 
But when I stand here in Washington in 
the presence of the President of the 
United States, our great friend and 
ally, it is my duty as the elected Prime 
Minister of Israel to remind public 
opinion of the fact that Israel is still the 
only country in the world against which 
there is a written document to the effect 
that it must disappear. 

There is no country, either large or 
small, or even the smallest, against 
which there is such a document, de- 
manding, saying publicly, that country 
should not exist, should be wiped off 
the map, and behind those people who 
carry out also the abominable acts to 
prove that they mean it, there is an 
alignment of many Arab states, armed 
to the teeth by the Soviet Union, and 
sometimes getting modern weapons 
also from the West. 

This is the decisive problem we face, 
which is called, sometimes, security. I 
would like to reaffirm what security 
means to us. It means the preservation 
of the lives of our elderly people, of 
our women, and our children — the lives 
which are threatened daily — so that to 
make sure that the future generations, 
as ours, will live in a free and inde- 
pendent country. This is the great issue 
we face, or continue to face. 

Now, Mr. President, what is our 
contribution to the peacemaking proc- 
ess? Yes, indeed, when I learned that 
President Sadat is ready to come to 
Jerusalem, I immediately sent out to 
him an invitation to come, and then his 
visit took place. After that. President 
Sadat, in the wake of my visit to you in 
December, Mr. President, invited me 
to come to Ismailia. Both meetings of 
Jerusalem and Ismailia were charac- 
terized by the spirit of friendship and 
openness. We knew. President Sadat 
and I. that we have differences of opin- 
ion. But we both agreed that we shall 
discuss them freely, we shall negotiate 
them, because such negotiations arc the 
soul of any attempt to reach an agree- 
ment and to conclude a peace treaty. 

That was the spirit. In that spirit, Is- 
rael contributed three documents, mak- 
ing it possible to deal with the question 
how to reach and conclude peace 
treaties. We made a peace proposal in 
two parts — one concerning the bilateral 
relations between Egypt and Israel, and 



SOUTH ASIA: 

Recent Developments 



by Adolph Dubs 

I am delighted to appear before you 
once again to discuss recent political 
and economic developments in the 
South Asian region as a backdrop to 
your consideration of FY 1979 eco- 
nomic and security assistance requests 
for countries in this area. 

While South Asia is not problem 
free, I believe it would be no exaggera- 
tion to say that regional tensions are 
perhaps at the lowest level since 1947. 
Favorable developments over the past 
year have contributed to this state of 
affairs. These developments include a 
continuation of the normalization proc- 
ess between India and Pakistan, re- 
flected very recently in a visit by In- 
dian Foreign Minister Vajpayee to 
Pakistan; a continued improvement in 
relations between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; the negotiation of trade and 



transit agreements between Nepal ;J 
India; the conclusion of an In<p 
Bangladeshi interim agreement on e 
sharing of Ganges water flows durg 
lean periods; and a positive effort y 
Iran to contribute to the econorc 
well-being and stability of South Am 
Moreover, a constructive dialogue !■ 
tween India and China now seefl 
underway. 

The credit for these developmei 
goes to the leadership of the individ .1 
countries. All have made a signific t 
effort to improve relations with trr 
neighbors. The trend that we are \ 
nessing is one we have noted earli 
i.e., the increasing willingness and 
pability of regional countries to so 
their own problems without outs 
interference. 

The stabilizing effects of this trt i 
are very much in line with the fore l 
policy objectives of the United Stat . 



the other, the full administrative au- 
tonomy for our neighbors, the Palesti- 
nian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria, 
and the Gaza Strip. 

It was a real contribution to the 
thinking and making of peace, positive, 
constructive; and so it was appreciated 
here, Mr. President, and elsewhere, 
when those two documents were pro- 
duced, a forthcoming proposal to make 
peace, a long step forward, a great deal 
of flexibility, a notable contribution, to 
quote the public statements. 

We added another document, a dec- 
laration of principles which should 
make it possible for everybody to join 
in the peace effort. There are three Is- 
raeli documents contributing to go for- 
ward in the process of reaching peace 
in the Middle East. We only ask to 
negotiate. We said it is a basis and a 
fair basis for negotiations. There may 
be counterproposals. We shall also 
negotiate them. This is the process. 

Mr. President, may I express our 
hope that this will happen, indeed, and 
the spirit of the Jerusalem, the Wash- 
ington, and the Ismailia meeting will 
be renewed, and in that spirit of under- 
standing and openness, the negotiations 
will be resumed. 

As I will be leaving your great coun- 
try, Mr. President. I will take with me 
the expressions of your friendship, of 



your humanity, of your understanc g 
of our problems. We are very grat il 
to you. Israel is a very small coun I 
The United States is a mighty wi d 
power. But there are bonds which tii s 
together in understanding and frie • 
ship which derive from our traditi I 
from our faith in divine provider . 
from our love of liberty, from our I 
votion to democracy. 

These are the values which make e 
worthwhile to live. And therefore. $ 
we say to each other from time to tii . 
we are not only friends, we 8] 
partners, we are allies. And in I S i 
spirit, in the faith that we shall c - 
tinue our partnership for peace, for 1 
erty, for the welfare of our peoples m 
of mankind, I take leave of you, ll 
President, expressing my d>p 
gratitude for your hospitality, for yi 
warmth, and for your friendstv. 
Thank you. 



'Issued on Mar 21. 1978; list of U.S. ■ 
Israeli officials omitted (for full text, ■ 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docum s 
of Mar. 27). 

2 Made on Mar. 22, 1978 (text from Wety 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of N'.| 
27). For an exchange of remarks between P • 
idem Carter and Prime Minister Begin at m 
welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of 4 
White House, see Weekly Compilation of Pi"! 
idential Documents of Mar. 27. p. 544. 



(lay 1978 

o believe that reduced tensions will 
•rmit the countries to devote increas- 
|g attention and resources to the prob- 
ms of economic development and to 
i improvement in the human condition 
'the reaion's inhabitants. 



idia 

The most dramatic development of 
le past year was the March 1977 na- 
nnal election in India. These elections 
cmonstrated the strong commitment of 
le Indian people to the democratic sys- 
Im with its emphasis on individual 
-edoms and economic and social jus- 
e. It is a tribute to all involved that 
e transfer of power after the elections 
bk place peacefully and without inci- 
int. The peaceful, democratic transi- 
nn was widely acclaimed by the 
pelican people and by the executive 
jd legislative branches of our gov- 

oment. 

The new Janata government, headed 
| Prime Minister Desai, has been 
"mulating its domestic and foreign 
ilicies. The budget for Indian FY 
,79 indicates that the new government 
i placing greater emphasis on rural de- 
'lopment, increased agricultural pro- 
<ction. and on promoting small-scale 
ilustry. Efforts to implement these 
] )grams have only begun, and it re- 
1 :ins to be seen how they will impact 
i the poverty and unemployment 
iiich afflict segments of Indian 
}:iety. 

The Indian Government's efforts in 
1 s area have been facilitated by the 
Ird consecutive year of good crops. 
< ficial figures are still not available 
i the 1977-78 crop year, but it is ex- 
.] :ted that food grain production will 
itch 119-121 million tons, perhaps 
I second best year in Indian history. 

I tal economic growth has not been so 
Cimatic and is not likely to exceed 5% 
'i 1977-78. 

Dn the external side, the highlight of 
d past year, from our point of view, 
|\s the visit by President and Mrs. 
Crter to India in January of this year, 
le visit went very well, and an ex- 
tmely warm and positive relationship 
1; developed between Prime Minister 
Tjsai and the President. We look for- 
njrd to continuing our dialogue with 

II me Minister Desai when he makes a 
) urn visit here on June 13-14. 



kistan 

Pakistan has been governed since 
jly 1977 by a martial law administra- 
|>n headed by Gen. Zia-al-Haq. Gen. 
ja stated that it was necessary to re- 
pve Prime Minister Zulfikar A. 



Bhutto because of the rigging of elec- 
tions, the detention of political prison- 
ers, widespread corruption, and the 
threat of civil war. 

Gen. Zia promised to return the gov- 
ernment to civilian control after free 
elections were held in October 1977. 
Those elections were later postponed, 
however, on grounds that various 
charges against Bhutto should be re- 
solved by the courts before elections 
took place. Although some observers 
speculate that elections may be held in 
the fall of 1978, no dates have been 
mentioned by Pakistani officials. The 
military leaders continue to refer to 



49 



themselves as an interim regime which 
must leave most policy decisions up to 
a successor civilian government. 

The economy began to drift before 
the end of the Bhutto period, and the 
martial law administration has taken 
few actions to reverse the trend. 

Basic to the economic difficulties 
facing Pakistan is the disappointing 
performance of its agricultural sector 
which grew a modest 2.2% in 1977. 
Against a record wheat crop — which 
fell short of covering Pakistan's 
requirements — cotton production de- 
clined one-third from traditional levels. 

On the public finance side, Pakistan 




Colombor J 





Afghanistan 


Bangladesh 


India 


Nepal 


Pakistan 


Sri Lanka 


Area 

(sq. mi.) 


260,000 


55,126 


1,211,000 


54,362 


307,374 


23,332 


Population 

(millions) 

GNP 

(billions of 
U.S. dollars) 


14 
(1977) 


83 
(1977) 


600 

(1976) 


13.2 

(1977! 


76 

(1978) 


14.3 

(1977) 


$2.5 

(1977) 


$9.8 

(1976) 


$80.2 
(1975) 


$1.4 
(1975) 


$13.7 

(1977) 


$24 

(1976) 


Annual 

Per Capita 

Income 

(U.S. dollars) 


$179 
(1977) 


$90 
(1976) 


$134 
(1975) 


$110 
(1975) 


$187 
(1977) 


$150 
(1976) 


Exports 

(U.S. dollars) 


$340 million 
(1977) 


$382 million 
(1976) 


$4.4 billion 
(1976) 


$85.8 million 
(1975) 


$1.2 billion 
(1977) 


$560 million 
(1976) 


Imports 

(U.S. dollars) 


$410 million 
(1977) 


$1.3 billion 
(1976) 


$5.9 billion 
(1976) 


$1 70.8million 
(1975) 


$2.4 billion 
(1977) 


$640 million 
(1976) 



2980 5-78 STATE) RGE) 



50 



Department of State Bulk 



is facing a mounting debt service prob- 
lem and a domestic budget gap that can 
only be covered if politically diffi- 
cult economic policy measures are 
instituted. 

The single bright spot in the econ- 
omy is the growth of remittances re- 
ceived from Pakistanis working over- 
seas. They are predicted to climb to $1 
billion this year — up by $300 million 
from the most optimistic projection of 
6 months ago. 

Bangladesh 

President Ziaur Rahman, known as 
Zia. is gradually dismantling the struc- 
ture of his martial law administration 
and giving increased responsibility to 
civilian officials. A new political 
party — the National Democratic Party 
(Jagodal) — has been organized by sev- 
eral of President Zia's top advisors. 
President Zia is expected to join the 
new party. 

General elections to a new 
parliament — the last was dissolved in 
1975 — are promised for December 
1978, and a presidential election is ex- 
pected earlier. If Zia becomes a presi- 
dential candidate, his main opposition 
will probably come from the Awami 
League of the late President Mujib, 
which seems to be one of the best or- 
ganized and popular parties. 

Externally, relations with all 
neighbors are quite good as was indi- 
cated by President Zia's recent success- 
ful visits to Burma, India, Pakistan, 
and Nepal. An interim agreement of the 
longstanding water dispute involving a 
sharing of the Ganges River flow was 
reached last fall with India. 

Economically, Bangladesh is better 
off now than at any time since inde- 
pendence. This is largely due to 3 years 
of bctter-than-average harvests. (The 
aiiian harvest, which began last 
November, was the best on record.) 
Self-sufficiency in food grain is still 
some way off, and Bangladesh remains 
dependent on the donor community for 
some of its food grain needs. Foreign 
exchange earnings in 1977 were about 
$470 million — a new high — owing to 
good world demand for Bangladesh's 
exports, mainly jute, tea, and animal 
products. 

On the negative side, the economy is 
relatively static. There has not been 
much domestic or foreign investment. 
Despite some denationalization, most 
important industries remain in the pub- 
lic sector, which is often inefficient. 
Private U.S. investment totals only 
about $5 million. The most important 
outstanding nationalization compensa- 
tion case (Belbagco) seems very close 
to resolution. 



Sri Lanka 

For the sixth time since independ- 
ence, Sri Lankans went to the polls in 
June, and the incumbent government 
was defeated. The commitment to 
democratic principles and ideals by Sri 
Lankans remains firm and impressive. 

Sri Lanka continues to have major 
economic and unemployment prob- 
lems. Significant new programs are 
being devised and introduced to al- 
leviate and to overcome these prob- 
lems. The United States and other 
donor countries are currently examin- 
ing Sri Lanka's developmental propos- 
als, and we hope to be able to be of 
greater assistance in the future. 



Nepal 

The past year has witnessed a con- 
tinued improvement in our normally 
good relations with Nepal. For some 
time, the Nepalese Government has ex- 
pressed greater interest in rural de- 
velopment, particularly in the areas 
outside of Kathmandu. This emphasis 
is very much in line with our own new 
directions in the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development and has permitted 
us to propose helpful programs that we 
hope will have a favorable impact on 
the acute development problems this 
country faces. 

On the political side, the Nepalese 
Government has continued its policy of 
liberalization. Almost all persons who 
have not been charged with specific 
criminal activities have been released 
from prison. The best known leader of 
Nepal's political opposition — B.P. 
Koirala — was acquitted on most of the 
charges against him and has been re- 
leased for medical treatment in the 
United States. Press censorship has 
been reduced, and the Nepalese Gov- 
ernment is seeking to develop institu- 
tions which will open the way to ex- 
panded participation in the economic 
and political processes of government. 



Afghanistan 

Internally, the political situation is 
stable. President Daoud remains very 
much in control and faces no signifi- 
cant opposition. The process of politi- 
cal institution-building is moving ahead 
at a measured pace. In the past year, 
the Constitution and Party Charter were 
promulgated and a Vice President was 
named. 

Afghanistan's relations with its 
neighbors are good, and this contrib- 
utes significantly to the region's politi- 
cal stability. President Daoud 's recent 
trip to Pakistan was particularly signif- 
icant, and Afghan-Pak relations are 



better than they have been in years, I 
The economic situation in Afghat-I 
tan is mixed. Afghanistan remains <e 
of the world's poorest countries withn 
estimated per capita income in e 
$150-180 range and a literacy re 
under 10%. Growth rates are low, I- 
timated by the International Monet yJ 
Fund at 3-4% per annum. DrouW 
conditions have prevailed over mucflfi 
the country over the last 2 years. , d 
the domestic private sector continue; d 
stagnate. 

However, foreign exchange resell 
holdings have reached record levels t 
almost $300 million, the equivalent if I 
about 8 months of imports. SubstanJ 
amounts of hard currency are al 
being repatriated by Afghan m i g r it | 
workers. The inflation rate is oJ 
6-7%. and there are some labor shd- 
ages, particularly in the southern n 
western parts of the country. 

In appearing before this subcomrli 
tee a year ago, I stated our govt - 
ment's goals in South Asia to be ej 
following: 

• Improving regional stability ; 1 
enhancing the ability of the region 
states to resolve their bilateral pr - 
lems without outside intereference; 

• Strengthening the independence I 
South Asian nations and support j 
their determination to avoid dominat l 
by any external power; 

• Providing economic assistance M 
humanitarian aid. when this is f\ 
quired, and assisting the nations of ; 
area in their efforts to attack poverty !^ 

• Encouraging these nations to ad t 
constructive policies on major wi i 
economic and political issues; 

• Limiting U.S. sales of sophi - 
cated arms and preventing nuclear p - 
liferation; 

• Fostering, so far as we are al , 
the promotion of human rights and Sv 
democratic process; and, 

• Reducing the production of narcl 
ics and their supply to the world's - 
licit market. 

These goals remain applicable. A 
much has been accomplished in : 
past year as a result of initiatives tall 
and efforts made by leaders in all of | 
countries of the region. 



Statement before the Subcommittee on A 
and Pacific Affairs of the Housi Committed 
International Relations on Mar. 16. 1978. 
. omplete transi ript of the hearings will be /<• 
lished by tin , ommittee and will be availM 
from the Superintendent of Documents, t>. 
Government Printing Office, Washingl,< 
DC. 20402. Mr. Duhs is Deputy Assist 
Secretary lor Near Eastern and South A.' 
Affairs 



ay 1978 



51 



UNITED NATIONS: 

interim Force in Lebanon 



tfATEMENT BY 
.V1BASSADOR YOUNG ' 

The Security Council meets today 
;ainst a background of tragedy but 
»th an opportunity to play a construc- 
1e role in restoring security and sta- 
( ity in the violence-torn southern part 
I Lebanon. The aim of this Council 
jjst now be to end as quickly as pos- 

■ ile this new cycle of violence and to 
<al with some of the immediate under- 
] ng causes. The only real solution 
Is in a comprehensive settlement of 
i Middle East issues. At the moment, 
Iwever, our efforts must be focused 

■ removing the sources of friction and 
j.tability in southern Lebanon. 

The United States approaches this 
jDate, and the action which we hope 
yil stem from it, with three fundamen- 
1^ principles in mind. 

• We expect Israel to withdraw from 

• jthern Lebanon, and we have made 
i( r views in this respect known to the 
1 aeli Government. 

• The territorial integrity of Lebanon 
list be fully respected. 

• The United Nations has a vital role 
play in assisting the Government of 
banon to restore in southern Lebanon 
iditions that will facilitate the rees- 
'lishment of its authority and provide 
eturn to security and a peaceful life 

the people of the south. 

Our consultations in the past 2 days 

d us to believe that most Council 

i mbers share our perception of the 

i portance of these principles. Our 

• :w is that a U.N. peacekeeping oper- 
on is needed that would have two 

| mary functions: 

• First, the United Nations would 
ve responsibility to establish and 

pvide security in the southern border 
i;ion of Lebanon; and 

• Second, it would assist the Gov- 
siment of Lebanon in promptly rees- 

>lishing its authority in that area and, 
ice established, relinquish its respon- 
>ilities to Lebanon. 

• We believe all members of this 
"jiuncil wish to prevent further escala- 
j'n of violence and thereby to facili- 
je a return to peace negotiations. We 
j: confident that this Council will 
jree that a temporary U.N. presence 
| southern Lebanon, remaining only 
'til the Government of Lebanon can 



exercise full authority, will help to ful- 
fill the first purpose of the U.N. 
Charter — the maintenance of interna- 
tional peace and security. 

In order to give concrete expression 
to the principles that I have just out- 
lined, the U.S. Government is intro- 
ducing a resolution for consideration 
by this Council. That resolution, in its 
first operative paragraph, calls for 
strict respect for the territorial integ- 
rity, sovereignty, and political inde- 
pendence of Lebanon. May I say that 
the statements made in this chamber 
leave no doubt that the preservation of 
Lebanese territorial integrity is the 
Council's primary goal in this debate. 
That goal is made explicit in the third 
operative paragraph of the resolution 
sponsored by my government. That 
paragraph describes the purpose of a 
U.N. peacekeeping force as confirming 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restor- 
ing international peace and security, 
and assisting the Government of Leba- 
non in insuring the return of its effec- 
tive authority in the area. 

The second operative paragraph calls 
on the Government of Israel im- 
mediately to cease its military action 
against Lebanese territory and with- 
draw its forces from Lebanese terri- 
tory. Immediate Israeli withdrawal is, 
in my government's view, one of the 
key conditions to restoring full political 
independence and territorial integrity to 
Lebanon. 

The third operative paragraph de- 
cides to set up immediately a U.N. 
force for southern Lebanon. Such a 
force should, in my government's 
view, be of temporary duration. It 
should restore peace and security to the 
area and transfer effective authority to 
the Lebanese Government. When that 
is done, the objectives established by 
this resolution will have been fully 
achieved and, we fully expect, the 
cause of peace and justice in the Mid- 
dle East substantially advanced. 

We have consulted widely on this 
resolution and have tried to meet most 
of the concerns expressed. The repre- 
sentative of the Soviet Union has 
suggested the inclusion of a reference 
to the time frame for the U.N. interim 
force, referred to in operative para- 
graph three. It is our view and expecta- 
tion that in keeping with past practice 
any time frame the Council may decide 
upon will be included in the Council's 



action on the report of the Secretary 
General referred to in paragraph four. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

Security Council Resolution 425 2 

The Security Council, 

Taking note of the letters of the Permanent 
Representative of Lebanon (S/12600 and 
S/12606) and the Permanent Representative of 
Israel (S/12607), 

Having heard the statements of the Perma- 
nent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, 

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the 
situation in the Middle East, and its conse- 
quences to the maintenance of international 
peace. 

Convinced that the present situation impedes 
the achievement of a just peace in the Middle 
East, 

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and political independ- 
ence of Lebanon within its internationally rec- 
ognized boundaries; 

2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its 
military action against Lebanese territorial in- 
tegrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from 
all Lebanese territory; 

3. Decides, in the light of the request of the 
Government of Lebanon, to establish im- 
mediately under its authority a United Nations 
interim force for southern Lebanon for the pur- 
pose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, restoring international peace and secu- 
rity and assisting the Government of Lebanon 
in ensuring the return of its effective authority 
in the area, the force to be composed of per- 
sonnel drawn from States Members of the 
United Nations; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report 
to the Council within twenty-four hours on the 
implementation of this resolution. 

Security Council Resolution 426 ' 

The Security Council. 

1 . Approves the report of the Secretary- 
General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 425 (1978) contained in 
document S/12611 dated 19 March 1978; 

2. Decides that the Force shall be established 
in accordance with the above-mentioned report 
for an initial period of six months, and that it 
shall continue in operation thereafter, if 
required, provided the Security Council so 
decides. □ 



'Statement in the U.N. Security Council on 
Mar. 18. 1978 (text from USUN press release 
12 of Mar. 18); Andrew Young is U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the United Nations. 

2 U.N. doc. S/RES/425 (1978); adopted by 
the Council on Mar. 19 by a vote of 12 (U.S.) 
to 0, with 2 abstentions (the People's Republic 
of China did not participate in the vote). 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/426 (1978); adopted by 
the Council on Mar. 19 by a vote of 12 (U.S.) 
to 0, with 2 abstentions (the People's Republic 
of China did not participate in the vote). 



52 



Department of State Bulk 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 

Pciticfttiff i ttnttl Treaty Ratifieii 



terms of the treaty that passed the Se| 
ate this afternoon. I want to reaffiil 
my thanks and my commitment to I 
true partnership with General Torriji 
and the people of a great natioj 
Panama. 



by President Carter 

This is a day of which Americans 
can feel proud for now we have re- 
minded the world and ourselves of the 
things that we stand for as a nation. 
The negotiations that led to these 
treaties began 14 years ago, and they 
continued under four Administrations, 
four Presidents. 1 I am proud that they 
have reached their conclusion while I 
was President. But I am far prouder 
that we as a people have shown that in 
a full and open debate about difficult 
foreign policy objectives that we will 
reach the decisions that are in the best 
interest of our nation. 

The debate has been long and hard. 
But in the end, it has given our deci- 
sion a firm base in the will of the 
American people. Over the last 8 
months, millions of Americans have 
studied the treaties, have registered 
their views, and, in some cases, have 
changed their minds. No matter which 
side they took in this debate, most 
Americans have acted out of sincere 
concern about our nation's interest. 

I would like to express my thanks to 
a few for the job they have done. 
Under the leadership of Senators Byrd 
and Baker and Sparkman and others, 
the Senate has carried out its responsi- 
bility of advice and consent with great 
care. All of us owe them our thanks. I 
feel a special gratitude and admiration 
for those Senators who have done what 
was right because it was right, despite 
tremendous pressure and, in some 
cases, political threats. 

The loyal employees of the Panama 
Canal Zone and the Canal Zone Gov- 
ernment also deserve our gratitude and 
our admiration for their performance 
during these months of great uncer- 
tainty, and General Torrijos and the 
people of Panama who have followed 
this debate closely and through every 
stage have been willing partners and 
cooperative and patient friends. There 
is no better indication of the prospect 
for friendly relations between us in the 
future than their conduct during the last 
few months. 

We now have a partnership with 
Panama to maintain and to operate and 
to defend the canal. We have the clear 
right to take whatever action is neces- 
sary to defend the canal and to keep' it 
open and neutral and accessible. We do 
not have the right to interfere in Pana- 
ma's internal affairs. That is a right we 
neither possess nor desire. 



These treaties can mark the begin- 
ning of a new era in our relations not 
only with Panama but with all the rest 
of the world. They symbolize our de- 
termination to deal with the developing 
nations of the world, the small nations 
of the world, on the basis of mutual re- 
spect and partnership. But the treaties 
also reaffirm a spirit that is very 
strong, constant, and old in the Ameri- 
can character. 

Sixty-four years ago when the first 
ship traveled through the canal, our 
people took legitimate pride in what 
our ingenuity, our perseverance, and 
our vision had brought about. We were 
a nation of builders, and the canal was 
one of our greatest glories. 

Today we have shown that we re- 
main true to that determination, that 
ingenuity, and, most of all, that vision. 
Today we have proven that what is best 
and noblest in our national spirit will 
prevail. Today we have shown that we 
are still builders with our face still 
turned confidently to the future. 

That is why I believe all Americans 
should share the pride I feel in the ac- 
complishments which we registered to- 
day. 

When I was coming in to make this 
announcement, the Ambassador of 
Panama, Gabriel Lewis, informed me 
that General Torrijos has accepted the 



Remarks made on Apr. 18. 1978 (text fn 
While House /new release of Apr. 18). 

1 By a vote of 68 to 32, Ihe Senate gave 
advice and consent on Apr. 18 to the Pana i 
Canal Treaty. On Mar. 16 it gave its advice ; 
consent to the neutrality treaty; for the text 
President Carter's remarks made on that oc<| 
sion, see Bulletin of April 1978, p. 59. 



STATEMENT BY 
SECRETARY VANCE 

I am delighted at the Senate's ap- I 
proval of the new Panama Canal treaties. I 
We intend to move forward as rapidly as I 
possible to put the treaties into effect. 

The treaties are in the national inter- I 
ests of both our nations and the hemi- I 
sphere and the world community. We I 
will, in the sense of the Senate, avoid I 
any measures designed to interfere in the I 
internal affairs of Panama or to infringe I 
on its independence or its sovereign in- | 
tegrity. 

Working together, our two govern- 
ments can make the canal an outstanding 
example of international cooperation. 
This will provide a great opportunity to 
strengthen the ties of friendship and un- 
derstanding that bind us to Panama. 



Made on Apr. 18. 1978 next from press 
release 176 of Apr. 18). 



Senate Additions to 
the Panama Canal Treaties 



During the course of the Senate debate on 
the two Panama Canal treaties, a number of 
amendments, conditions, reservations, and un- 
derstandings were considered. Following are 

the texts of those which were adopted and at- 
tached to the treaties. ' 



NEUTRALITY TREATY 

Leadership Amendment 20 

At the end of Article IV. insert the follow- 
ing: 

A correct and authoritative statement of cer- 
tain rights and duties of the parties under the 
foregoing is contained in the Statement of Un- 
derstanding issued by the Government of the 
United States of America on Oct. 14, 1977, and 
by the Government of the Republic of Panama 



on Oct. 18, 1977, which is hereby incorpora 
as an integral part of this treaty, as follows: 

"Under the Treaty Concerning the Pert 
nent Neutrality and Operation of the Panu 
Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and 
United States have the responsibility to ass 
that the Panama Canal will remain open and 
cure to ships of all nations. The correct 
terpretation of this principle is that each of 
two countries shall, in accordance with tb 
respective constitutional processes, defend 
Canal against any threat to the regime of n- 
trality and consequently shall have the right 
act against any aggression or threat direc 
against the Canal or against the peaceful trar 
of vessels through the Canal. 

"This does not mean, nor shall it be ini 
preted as the right of intervention of the Uni 
States in the internal affairs of Panama. 
United States action will be directed at insur 



y 1978 

the Canal will remain open, secure and ac- 
ible, and it shall never be directed against 
territorial integrity or political independ- 
: of Panama." [Adopted 84 to 5 on March 
1978.] 



dership Amendment 21 

the end of the first paragraph of Article 
'linsert the following: 

|| accordance with the statement of Under- 
lying mentioned in Article IV above: "The 
Wtrality Treaty provides that the vessels of 
ii and auxiliary vessels of the United States 
^Panama will be entitled to transit the Canal 
■ditiously. This is intended, and it shall so 
eiterpreted, to assure the transit of such ves- 
s through the Canal as quickly as possible, 
riout any impediment, with expedited treat- 
jl , and in case of need or emergency, to go 
l le head of the line of vessels in order to 
rs it the Canal rapidly." [Adopted 85 to 3 on 
Kb 13, 1978.] 

hn Condition 

bject to the condition that the instruments 
f] tification of the treaty shall be exchanged 
n upon the conclusion of the protocol of ex- 
hjge, to be signed by authorized representa- 

I of both governments, which shall consti- 
ii in integral part of the treaty documents and 
|h shall include the following: that nothing 
i lis treaty shall preclude Panama and the 
li ;d States from making, in accordance with 
li respective constitutional processes, any 
g ;ment or arrangement between the two 
6 tries to facilitate performance at any time 
6 Dec. 31, 1999, of their responsibilities to 
m tain the regime of neutrality established in 
111 reaty, including agreements or arrange- 

II s for the stationing of any United States 
o s or maintenance of defense sites after that 
la in the Republic of Panama that Panama 
a the United States may deem necessary or 
ipjpriate. [Adopted 82 to 16 on March 15, 

9 •] 

)< oncini Condition 

fore the period at the end of the resolution 
i tification, insert the following: 

Subject to the condition, to be included in 
hinstrument of ratification of the treaty to be 
a anged with the Republic of Panama, that. 

10 ithstanding the provisions of Article V or 
m 3ther provision of the treaty, if the canal is 
di ?d , or its operations are interfered with, the 
lied States of America and the Republic of 
Mima shall each independently have the right 
■ike such steps as it deems necessary, in ac- 
Wance with its constitutional processes, in- 
kling the use of military force in Panama, to 
Bqen the canal or restore the operations of the 
a^l as the case may be." [Adopted 75 to 23 
ttjlarch 16, 1978.] 

M rvations 

i Before the date of entry into force of the 
My. the two parties shall begin to negotiate 



for an agreement under which the American 
Battle Monuments Commission would, upon 
the date of entry into force of such agreement 
and thereafter, administer, free of all taxes and 
other charges and without compensation to the 
Republic of Panama and in accordance with the 
practices, privileges, and immunities as- 
sociated with the administration of cemeteries 
outside the United States by the American Bat- 
tle Monuments Commission, including the dis- 
play of the flag of the United States, such part 
of Corozal Cemetery in the former Canal Zone 
as encompasses the remains of citizens of the 
United States. 

(2) The flag of the United States may be dis- 
played pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 
3 of Article VII of the Panama Canal Treaty, at 
such part of Corozal Cemetery in the former 
Canal Zone as emcompasses the remains of 
citizens of the United States. 

(3) The President 

(a) Shall have announced, before the date 
of entry into force of the treaty, his intention to 
transfer, consistent with an agreement with the 
Republic of Panama, and before the date of 
termination of the Panama Canal treaty, to the 
American Battle Monuments Commission the 
administration of such part of Corozal Ceme- 
tery as encompasses the remains of citizens of 
the United States; and 

(b) Shall have announced, immediately 
after the date of exchange of the instruments of 
ratification, plans, to be carried out at the ex- 
pense of the United States Government for 

(i) Removing, before the date of entry 
into force of the treaty, the remains of citizens 
of the United States from Mount Hope Ceme- 
tery to such part of Corozal Cemetery as en- 
compasses such remains, except that the re- 
mains of any citizen whose next of kin objects 
in writing to the Secretary of the Army not later 
than three months after the date of exchange of 
the instruments of ratification of the treaty 
shall not be removed: and 

(ii) Transporting to the United States for 
reinterment, if the next of kin so requests, not 
later than thirty months after the date of entry 
into force of the treaty, any such remains en- 
compassed by Corozal Cemetery and, before 
the date of entry into force of the treaty, any 
remains removed from Mount Hope Cemetery 
pursuant to subclause (i); and 

(c) Shall have fully advised, before the 
date of entry into force of the treaty, the next of 
kin objecting under clause (b)(i) of all available 
options and their implications. [Reservations 
1-3 were adopted 96 to 1 on March 15, 1978] 

(4) To carry out the purposes of Article III of 
the treaty of assuring the security, efficiency, 
and proper maintenance of the Panama Canal, 
the United States of America and the Republic 
of Panama, during their respective periods of 
responsibility for canal operation and mainte- 
nance, shall, unless the amount of the operating 
revenues of the canal exceeds the amount 
needed to carry out the purposes of such arti- 
cle, use such revenues of the canal only for 



53 



purposes consistent with the purposes of Arti- 
cle III. [Adopted by voice vote on March 16, 
1978.1 



Understandings 

11) Paragraph 1(c) of Article III of the treaty 
shall be construed as requiring, before any ad- 
justment in tolls for use of the canal, that the 
effects of any such toll adjustment on the trade 
patterns of the two parties shall be given full 
consideration, including consideration of the 
following factors in a manner consistent with 
the regime of neutrality: 

(a) The costs of operating and maintaining 
the Panama Canal; 

(b) The competitive position of the use of 
the canal in relation to other means of transpor- 
tation; 

(c) The interests of both parties in main- 
taining their domestic fleets; 

(d) The impact of such an adjustment on 
the various geographical areas of each of the 
two parties; and 

(e) The interest of both parties in 
maximizing their international commerce. 

The United States and the Republic of 
Panama shall cooperate in exchanging informa- 
tion necessary for the consideration of such fac- 
tors. [Adopted by voice vote on March 15, 
1978.] 

(2) The agreement "to maintain the regime 
of neutrality established in this treaty" in Arti- 
cle IV of the treaty means that either of the two 
parties to the treaty may, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take unilateral action 
to defend the Panama Canal against any threat, 
as determined by the party taking such action. 

(3) The determination of "need or emer- 
gency" for the purpose of any vessel of war or 
auxiliary vessel of the United States or Panama 
going to the head of the line of vessels in order 
to transit the Panama Canal rapidly shall be 
made by the nation operating such vessel. 

(4) Nothing in the treaty, in the annexes, or 
the protocol relating to the treaty, or in any 
other agreement relating to the treaty obligates 
the United States to provide any economic as- 
sistance, military grant assistance, security 
supporting assistance, foreign military sales 
credits, or international military education and 
training to the Republic of Panama. 

(5) The President shall include all amend- 
ments, reservations, understandings, declara- 
tions, and other statements incorporated by the 
Senate in its resolution of ratification respect- 
ing this treaty in the instrument of ratification 
exchanged with the Government of the Repub- 
lic of Panama. [Understandings 2-5 adopted by 
voice vote on March 16, 1978] 



PANAMA CANAL TREATY 



Reservations 

(1) Pursuant to its adherence to the principle 
of nonintervention, any action taken by the 



54 



United Stales of America in the exercise ol its 
rights to assure that the Panama Canal shall 
remain open, neutral, secure, and accessible, 
pursuant to the provisions of this treaty and the 
neutralii) treaty and the resolutions of advice 
and consent thereto, shall be only for the pur- 
pose of assuring that the canal shall remain 
open, neutral, secure, and accessible, and shall 
not have as its purpose or be interpreted as a 
right of intervention in the internal affairs of 
the Republic of Panama or interference with its 
political independence or sovereign integrity. 
[Adopted 73 to 27 on April 18, 1978.] 

(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this treaty, no funds may be drawn from the 
United States Treasury for payments under Ar- 
ticle XIII, paragraph 4, without statutory au- 
thorization. | Adopted 92 to 6 on April 18. 
1978.] 

(3) Any accumulated unpaid balance under 
paragraph 4(c) of Article XIII at the termination 
of the treaty shall be payable only to the extent 
of any operating surplus in the last year of the 
treaty's duration, and that nothing in that para- 
graph may be construed as obligating the 
United States of America to pay after the date 
of the termination of the treaty any such unpaid 
balance which shall have accrued before such 
date. [Adopted 90 to 2 on April 17, 1978.] 

(4) Exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion shall not be effective earlier than March 
31, 1979, and the treaties shall not enter into 
force prior to October 1, 1979, unless legisla- 
tion necessary to implement the provisions of 
the Panama Canal Treaty shall have been 
enacted by the Congress of the United States of 
America before March 31, 1979. [Adopted 84 
to 3 on April 17, 1978| 

(5) The instruments of ratification to be ex- 
changed by the United States and the Republic 
of Panama shall each include provisions 
whereby each party agrees to waive its rights 
and release the other party from its obligations 
under paragraph 2 of Article XII. [Adopted 65 
to 27 on April 17, 1978, | 

id) After the date of entry into force of the 
treaty, the Panama Canal Commission shall, 
unless it is otherwise provided by legislation 
enacted by the Congress, be obligated to reim- 
burse the Treasury of the United States of 
America, as nearly as possible, for the interest 
cost of the funds or other assets directly in- 
vested in the Commission by the Government 
of the United States of America and for the 
interest cost of the funds or other assets di- 
rectly invested in the predecessor Panama 
Canal Company by the government and not 
reimbursed before the date of entry into force 
of the treaty Such reimbursement of such 
interests costs shall he made at a rate deter- 
mined bv the Secretary of the Treasury ot the 
United Si, ids of America and at annual inter- 
vals to the extent earned, and if not earned, 
shall be made from subsequent earnings. For 
purposes of this reservation, the phrase "funds 
oi other assets directly invested" shall have the 
same meaning as the phrase "net direct in- 
vestment" has under section 62 of Title 2 of 



Department of State Bulle(| 



Central America 






by Terence A. Todman 

Central America is a microcosm, in 
many respects, of the entire inter- 
American community. Without looking 
beyond the six nations of the isthmus. 
one can find in sharp focus the dilem- 
mas that challenge many Latin societies 
as they pursue the important but some- 
times competing goals of independ- 
ence, regional cooperation, security, 
human rights, economic progress, so- 
cial reform, and development of politi- 
cal institutions. 

The resolution of these dilemmas is 
clearly the responsibility of the people 



and governments of the Central Amt- 
can nations themselves. The Unitf 
States has neither the right, the abili , 
nor the desire to impose solutions fni 
outside. We do have an opportun} 
and a responsibility to make our o i 
values clear and to respond to initt 
tives that advance values we all sharl 
As we look at Central America I 
day, we see many reasons for all of \ 
who care about its future to feel (I 
couraged. During my visit in Janutl 
to the area's nations, I was impress 
by the friendship and cooperation ! 
ward the United States which I encoi 
tered everywhere, and I was struck I 



the Canal Zone Code. [Adopted 90 to 10 on 
April 18, 1978] 

Understandings 

( 1) Nothing in paragraphs 3. 4, and 5 of Ar- 
ticle IV may be construed to limit either the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article IV provid- 
ing that each party shall act, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes, to meet danger 
threatening the security of the Panama Canal, 
or the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article IV 
providing that the United States of America 
shall have primary responsibility to protect and 
defend the canal for the duration' of the treaty 
[Adopted by voice vote on April 17, 1978 | 

1 2) Before the first date of the three-year 
period beginning on the date of entry into force 
of this treaty and before each three-year period 
following thereafter, the two parties shall agree 
upon the specific levels and quality of services, 
as are referred to in Article III. paragraph 5 of 
the treats, to he provided during the following 
three-year period and, except for the first 
three-year period, on the reimbursement to be 
made for the costs of such services, such serv- 
ices to be limited to such as are essential to the 
effective functioning of such canal operating 
areas and such housing areas referred to in Ar- 
ticle III. paragraph 5 of the treaty. If payments 
made under Article III, paragraph 5 of the 
treaty for the preceding three-year period, in- 
cluding the initial three-year period, exceed or 
are less than the actual costs to the Republic of 
Panama for supplying, during such period, the 
specific levels and quality of services agreed 
upon, then the Commission shall deduct from 
or add to the payment required to be made to 
the Republic o) Panama foi each of the follow- 
ing three years one third of such excess or deli 
cit. as the case may be there shall be an inde- 
pendent and binding audit, conducted by an au- 
ditor mutually selected by both parties, of any 



costs of services disputed by the two par 
pursuant to the reexamination of such cc 
provided for in this understanding. [Adopted 
to 3 on April 17. 1978.] 

(3) Nothing in paragraph 4(c) of Article ) 
shall he construed to limit the authority of 
United States of America through the Un 
States Government agency called the Pan; 
Canal Commission to make such financial d 
sions and incur such expenses as are reason; 
and necessary for the management, operati 
and maintenance of the Panama Canal. In ai 
tion, toll rates established pursuant to p; 
graph 2ldl of Article III need not be se> 
levels designed to produce revenues to cc 
the payment to Panama described in paragr 
4(c) of Article XIII. 

(4) Any agreement concluded pursuant 
Article IX. paragraph 11 with respect to 
transfer of prisoners shall be concluded in 
cordance with the constitutional processes 
both parlies. 

(5) Nothing in the treaty, in the annex, 
agreed minute relating to the treaty, or in ; 
other agreement relating to the treaty obliga 
the United States to provide any economic 
sist.ince. military grant assistance, secut 
supporting assistance, foreign military sa 
credits, or international military education ; 
training to the Republic of Panama. 

ioi The President shall include all reser 
tions and understandings incorporated by 
Senate in this resolution of ratification in 
instrument of ratification exchanged with 
Government of the Republic of Panama [I 
derstandings 3-6 adopted by voice vote 
April 17, 1978] 



'For texts of the Panama Canal Treaty a 
the Treaty Concerning the Permaneni N 
tralitv and Operation of the Panama Canal. 
Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1977, p. 483. 






1978 



55 



(sense of progress I found in my dis- 
_sions with both public and private 
lor leaders. 

Let me mention briefly six major 
las where currents in Central 
jerica merit our attention and our 
port. 

momic Cooperation 

irst. Central America has pioneered 
concept of regional economic coop- 
ion in this hemisphere. The Central 
erican Common Market, launched 
he early 1960's, quickly demon- 
ted the benefits to developing na- 
is of a cooperative approach to 
e. Intraregional as well as external 
e for the member nations increased 
stantially. While it fell short of 
iting a true common market, the 
■ement produced a lowering of tariff 
iers and a wide range of coopera- 

efforts among the parties, 
he United States responded by 
:turing some of our own economic 
stance programs along regional 
>. In addition, the Common Market 
fitries themselves saw their new 
lomic relationship as a springboard 
new proposals and institutions for 
er integration, some of which are 

under consideration by the Central 
;rican governments, 
nfortunately, the experience of the 
tral American Common Market has 

provided a lesson in the fragility 
egional economic institutions and 
■ dependence on harmony among 
iber countries. We are hopeful that 
nt progress toward settlement of 
Honduras-El Salvador border dis- 

will enable the nations of the re- 

to give the Common Market a new 
e on life and to resume progress 
ird the integrated approach to eco- 
ic development whose benefits all 
gnize. 



»pute Settlement 

his leads me to the second area 
fcre encouraging recent develop- 
in: its in Central America have taken 
3l e: the peaceful settling of disputes. 
1 leaders of El Salvador and Hon- 
lns are to be congratulated for put- 
U 8 years of strained relations behind 

n and moving quickly to settle the 
Mier dispute that erupted in war be- 
Iflen the two countries in 1969. In a 
Ejd sequence of developments, Hon- 
llis and El Salvador exchanged ratifi- 
Mion instruments on a mediation 
Miement last November, agreed on 
8 selection of the mediator last De- 
Biber, and underscored their com- 
•iment to peace in a border meeting 
Blheir heads of state in January. Dur- 



ing my visit shortly thereafter, I ob- 
served the strong sentiment among citi- 
zens and leaders of both nations in 
favor of restoring good relations and 
getting on with the task of Central 
American cooperation. 

Similar good will and mutual re- 
straint have marked Central American 
handling of other potential trouble 
spots — border incidents involving 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica and the more 
serious territorial dispute involving 
Guatemala and Belize. 

Perhaps the most dramatic example 
of pioneering dispute settlement in the 
Central American region is our recent 
agreement with Panama on the future 
of the Panama Canal. After 70 years of 
tension and 13 years of negotiation to 
resolve it, the United States and 
Panamanian Governments have agreed 
on a new relationship making them true 
partners in the canal's operation and 
defense and paving the way for the as- 
sumption of all canal operating respon- 
sibilities by Panama at the end of this 
century. 

The significance of this achievement 
extends far beyond the bilateral rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Panama. U.S. ratification of the 
Panama Canal treaties, 1 which I am 
confident will occur in the very near fu- 
ture, will signal throughout this 
hemisphere — indeed, throughout the 
world — the willingness of the United 
States to seek modern, mature relation- 
ships based on mutual respect, mutual 
interest, and negotiation. 



Inter-American Institutions 

Development of Inter-American 
institutions which facilitate coopera- 
tion is another area where Central 
American initiatives have been nota- 
ble. The Central American Court of 
Justice in the early decades of this 
century was a pioneering effort to 
strengthen international law. San 
Jose, home of many distinguished in- 
ternational lawyers, has been the site 
of major developments from the 1975 
Protocol of Amendment to the Rio 
Treaty [Inter-American Treaty of Re- 
ciprocal Assistance] and the decision to 
place the Organization of American 
States (OAS) sanctions against Cuba on 
a voluntary basis, to the negotiation of 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 2 Costa Rican leadership has 
also been a strong and consistent factor 
in the growth of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. Recent 
invitations to the Commission from 
Panama and El Salvador, and their ef- 
fective cooperation during the visits, 
have provided an additional Central 



American boost to its strength and ef- 
fectiveness. 

Central American interest in the af- 
fairs of the larger inter-American 
community has been further reflected 
in increasing attention to the links be- 
tween their own nations, the rim of na- 
tions of North and South America, and 
the island nations of the West Indies in 
a "greater Caribbean basin." This 
theme was developed with force and 
sensitivity by Costa Rica's President 
Oduber at a Caribbean conference simi- 
lar to this Central American Confer- 
ence last month in Miami and has be- 
come an important part of our own ap- 
proach to Caribbean cooperation. 



Human Rights 

A fourth area to watch for construc- 
tive changes in Central America is that 
of human rights. I had the good fortune 
of spending two of the best years of my 
life in one of the hemisphere's most 
admired models of a free and open so- 
ciety. And I can only envy [U.S.] Am- 
bassador [to Costa Rica Marvin] 
Weissman the experience of having 
been on the scene to witness the unin- 
hibited, vigorously contested presiden- 
tial campaign that culminated in last 
week's election, demonstrating once 
again why Costa Rican politics is a 
source of such fascination both for its 
own citizens and for its outside admir- 
ers. 

Less widely known is the fact that 
extensive freedom of expression is in- 
creasingly becoming the norm rather 
than the exception, not only in Costa 
Rica but in its neighbors as well. 
Panama's plebiscite on the canal 
treaties, which led to their overwhelm- 
ing approval by the people of Panama, 
was the more impressive because it was 
preceded by a free and open debate in 
the Panamanian press. In Honduras, in 
Guatemala, in Nicaragua, in El 
Salvador — in short, throughout Central 
America — the press is not only gener- 
ally unfettered but often unusually 
vocal. One of the more noteworthy as- 
pects of the recent tensions in 
Nicaragua has been the ability of the 
government, the press, and most sec- 
tors of the opposition to avoid extremes 
or the resort to violence in dealing with 
even major differences. 

A more serious challenge for several 
Central American countries is insuring 
that basic rights of the person are not 
sacrificed in an effort to combat serious 
threats to the fabric of society — and in- 
deed to the rights of the individuals — 
from terrorism and insurgency. We be- 
lieve violations of human rights are a 
major problem. 



56 



We also believe the performance of 
each challenged country in Central 
America has improved, reflecting the 
desire of national leaders to respect in- 
ternational standards and to discourage 
abuses by lower echelon units often 
acting contrary to official policy. The 
notable restraint shown by Guatemala 
under President Laugerud in the face of 
recent acts of terrorism has improved 
the human rights climate in that coun- 
try in many respects. Another example 
of important human rights improve- 
ments in the face of continuing prob- 
lems can be seen in El Salvador, which 
under President Romero has abandoned 
the state of seige, given freer rein to 
the press, invited political exiles to re- 
turn, and requested on-site inspection 
by the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission. 

Political Participation 

Increasing public participation in the 
political process is a fifth area where 
developments in Central America are 
particularly encouraging. Every coun- 
try in Central America has either just 
held elections, as in El Salvador and 
Costa Rica, or is preparing to hold 
them. Guatemala, which faces a na- 
tional election this March, has a 
genuine contest among candidates and 
parties of differing viewpoints. Elec- 
tions are scheduled in Panama for Au- 
gust of this year. Honduras is now ac- 
tively engaged in the process of effect- 
ing a transition to an elected civilian 
government. In Nicaragua — under 
normal circumstances — according to 
the present timetable, elections are to 
be held in 1981. We hope an early 
dialogue among all responsible ele- 
ments will lead to the widest possible 
participation in the entire electoral 
process. 

An underlying challenge for many 
Central American societies is how to 
initiate communication to heal the deep 
rifts separating social groups and de- 
velop institutions to facilitate full par- 
ticipation in the political choices of the 
nation. Elections in which major por- 
tions of the electorate are excluded or 
exclude themselves or elections in 
which the results are subverted, reveal 
all too clearly the deep-seated obstacles 
to the political development all Central 
American societies seek. 

Meeting Human Needs 

Finally, Central American nations 
are making major efforts to meet the 
human needs of their people. They 
have made impressive economic prog- 
ress through regional cooperation, na- 
tional development policies, responsi- 



Department of State Bulli 



ble fiscal management, and a friendly 
attitude toward investors. Their em- 
phasis on the development of their tre- 
mendous energy potential will provide 
reliable supplies of electricity and 
proper water control to power their 
overall future economic development. 
Nicaragua and Guatemala have made 
commendable recovery efforts from the 
earthquakes that ravaged them earlier 
in this decade, with Guatemala winning 
special praise from many quarters for 
its handling of the reconstruction after 
the most recent disaster. 

The most serious economic challenge 
facing Central American nations, like 
our own, is how to distribute the fruits 
of economic progress more equitably 
among the people of the society, par- 
ticularly those who have been tradi- 
tionally cut off from the sources of 
wealth, power, and education available 
to others. 

Here too major efforts are underway 
in Central America. Honduras, the 
third poorest country in the hemi- 
sphere, has a reformist government that 
is making notable progress despite 
formidable obstacles. The present ad- 
ministrations in Panama and Costa Rica 
have placed strong emphasis on pro- 
grams for the disadvantaged and for a 
wider sharing of power. Throughout 
Central America, the trend toward 
more equitable and participatory 
societies is evident — despite the resist- 
ance of the few in whose hands wealth 
and power have been concentrated for 
so long. 

Given our own shortcomings, the 
United States is in no position to 
preach. But we are in a position to 
understand, to care, and occasionally, 
to help. 

Although so far I have spoken 
mainly of government policies, we also 
recognize the responsibilities, lead- 
ership, and resources of our private 
sector. The American business com- 
munity has long been deeply involved 
in the societies of Central America. 
Today it has new opportunities to play 
a major and mutually beneficial de- 
velopment role. In the course of this 
conference we have heard repeatedly 
from business and government experts 
the many ways in which increased trade 
and investment in Central America can 
produce income and jobs not only for 
the host countries but for our American 
workers and investors. Economic inter- 
dependence is not a theory; it's a fact. 

Beyond economics, however, the 
creative partnership between American 
enterprise and Central American na- 
tions can strengthen the positive forces 
within our societies and enrich the 
human side of all our lives. Responsi- 
ble business policies, which take into 



Cuba 



Foreign Relations Outline 

From the early days of our Republ, 
the United States has had a close 
sometimes difficult association w 
Cuba. U.S. relations with Cuba < 
teriorated sharply following the rise 
power in 1959 of Fidel Castro and 
subsequent turn to the Soviet Uni< 
Diplomatic ties were severed 
January 1961. The Carter Administ 
tion has begun an effort to improve 
lations with Cuba, but normalizati 
will take a long time and will depe 
on many factors, including Cuba's 
ternational behavior. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States is convinced tl 
its best interests are served by ma 
taining communications with all coi 
tries, whether it approves of their 
ernments or not. Steps toward nor 



>rn 



account the long-term developmt 
priorities set by Central Americ 
societies themselves, can offer subst; 
tial returns not only in profits but a 
in fostering the kind of environment 
which growth is sustained, rights ; 
respected, tourism and other forms 
human interchange thrive, and futi 
dealings are welcomed. 

All of us here today have a role 
shaping the relationships between c 
own nation and our neighbors, and cc 
tributing to a peaceful and humane 1 
ture for the Central American and t 
world community. It is a task calli 
upon all the ingenuity and resourcefi 
ness for which American enterprit 
rightly prides itself. And it is a task 
am confident you will find worthy 
your highest personal endeavor. 



Based on an address before the third am 
Conference on U.S. -Central American Trc 
and Investment in New Orleans on Feb. 
1978. Ambassador Todman is Assistnal Sec 
tary for Inter- American Affairs. 

'The Senate gave its advice and consent 
the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutral 
and Operation of the Panama Canal on Mar. 1 
1978, and to the Panama Canal Treaty on A| 
18. For texts of Panama Canal treaties, I 
Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1977, p. 481; for texts 
Senate additions to the treaties, see p. 52. 

2 For text of American Convention on Hum 
Rights, see Bulletin of July 4, 1977, p. 28. 



978 



57 



jjtions with Cuba, however, must be 
insured and reciprocal. Only through 
^ogue can we begin to resolve the 
ijicult problems that now stand be- 

(len the Cuban Government and our . — 

4\. The United States desires: 
Improvement in human rights in MULTILATERAL 



TREATIES: Current Actions 



t\ Release of political prisoners, 
Uisands of whom have been jailed for 

s; 

More responsible international be- 
iBior by Cuba, particularly in Africa; 

[1 Compensation to U.S. citizens and 
<l nesses whose property was taken 
lr by the Cuban Government. 

.! >s Toward Normalization 

1 1 the past year, the Carter Adminis- 
rson has taken several steps to im- 
S'e relations with Cuba. It has: 

Granted visas to selected Cuban 
pens to visit the United States; 
I Lifted the ban on U.S. travel to 

a; 
| Negotiated the establishment of 
■pmatic "interests sections"; and 

i Further modified but not lifted the 
J . trade embargo. 

1 1 mid-January talks were held in 
i ana between our two Coast Guards 
I uch issues as improving communi- 
■ms, cooperating in search and res- 
x in international waters, and curbing 
k; traffic and terrorism. 

ft teries and Maritime Boundary 

, nly 90 miles of water separate the 
Ji ed States and Cuba, and both coun- 
r 5 have established 200-mile 
rfhore fishery zones. Negotiations 
DM Cuba to define the maritime 
xidary began in March 1977 and re- 
al :d in the signing, a month later, of 
p/isional maritime boundary and 
filing rights agreements. 

It -rests Sections 

he United States opened an inter- 
e section in the Swiss Embassy in 
rl ana on September 1, 1977, while 
di Cubans established one in Washing- 
© in the Czechoslovak Embassy. The 
t>n purposes of our interests section 
a to facilitate communications be- 
Wen the two governments and to pro- 
•S: a broader range of consular serv- 



Uiatriation Program 

i'he United States has urged the re- 
fc.e of political prisioners in Cuba, 
*i some U.S. citizens — imprisoned 



Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the re- 
turn of astronauts, and the return of objects 
launched into outer space. Done at Washing- 
ton, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. 
Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 
6599. 

Ratification deposited: Italy, March 31, 
1978. 



Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague De- 
cember 16, 1970. Entered into force October 
14. 1971. TIAS 7192. 

Ratification deposited: Singapore, April 12. 
1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into 
force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570 
Ratification deposited: Singapore, April 12, 
1978. 



Bills of Lading 

International convention for the unification of 
certain rules relating to bills of lading and 
protocol of signature. Done at Brussels Au- 
gust 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 
1931; for the U.S. December 29, 1937. 51 
Stat. 233. 

Adherence deposited: Senegal, February 14. 
1978. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers 
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva De- 
cember 2, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 6, 1977; for the U.S. January 3, 

1979. 
Accessions deposited: India, January 27, 

1978; Liberia, Feburary 14. 1978. 
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, 

March 8, 1978. 

Energy 

Agreement on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris November 18, 1974. Entered 
into force January 19, 1976. TIAS 8278. 
Notification of consent to be bound depos- 
ited: Italy, February 3, 1978. 



for a variety of offenses — have been 
freed. In 1977 a number of American 
citizens and their Cuban families were 
permitted to leave the country. Another 
group of 125 persons with dual U.S.- 
Cuban citizenship was allowed to leave 
for the United States in February 1978 
under this repatriation program. 

Trade Embargo 

In 1962 the United States banned all 
U.S. trade with Cuba except for 
foodstuffs, medicines, and medical 
equipment needed for humanitarian 
reasons. We also prohibited foreign 
ships that traded with Cuba from land- 
ing at U.S. ports. These restrictions 
were modified in 1975 to permit busi- 
ness transactions between Cuba and 
U.S. subsidiaries in third countries if 
those countries agreed. The U.S. ban 
on foreign shipping calling at Cuban 
ports was rescinded in June 1977, but 
U.S. ships still cannot trade at Cuban 
ports. 

Before the trade embargo, two-way 
trade totaled over $1 billion annually, 
and it has been estimated that we could 
sell $300 million worth of agricultural 
commodities, farm machinery, indus- 



trial equipment, and computer hardware 
to Cuba each year. The embargo will 
not be ended, however, until the claims 
of U.S. citizens and corporations for 
losses suffered through expropriation 
are resolved. About 5,900 of these 
claims, amounting to $1.8 billion, have 
been certified by the U.S. Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission. We re- 
gard their settlement as essential to 
normalizing relations. 

African Involvement 

Cuba's involvement in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and other parts of Africa has 
continued to grow. The presence in 
Ethiopia of 10,000 Cuban troops, and in 
Angola of some 19,000, is an obstacle 
to the peaceful settlement of the dis- 
putes there. There cannot be any signif- 
icant improvement in U.S. -Cuban rela- 
tions until the level of these military ad- 
ventures is sharply reduced. □ 



Based on a Department of State publication in 
the Gist series, released in March 1978. This 
outline is designed to be a quick reference aid 
on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as 
a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. 



58 



Department of State Buiij 



Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977.' 
Signature. Ghana, March 21, 147X 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the African Develop- 
ment Fund, with schedules Done at Abidjan 
November 29. 1972. Entered into force June 
30, 1973; for the U.S. November 18, 1976. 
TIAS 8605 

Accession deposited: Kuwait, December 15, 
1977 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. Entered into force November 
30, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, March 28, 1978. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York December 16, 
1966. Entered into force March 23, 1 976 - 
Accession deposited: Dominican Republic. 
January 4, 1978. 

International covenant on economic, social and 
cultural rights. Done at New York December 
16, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 
1976. 2 

Optional protocol to the international covenant 
on civil and political rights. Done at New 
York December 16, 1966. Entered into force 
March 23, 1976- 

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, 
January 4, 1978. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international 
maritime traffic, with annex. Done at Lon- 
don April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 
5, 1967; for the U.S. May 16. 1967 TIAS 
6251. 

Accession deposited: Liberia. February 14, 
1978. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 
19. 1975- 

Accession deposited: German Democratic- 
Republic (with statements), March 13, 
1978. 
International convention on the establishment 
of an international fund for compensation for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels De- 
cember 18, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 
16, 1978. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York January 31, 1967. En- 
tered into force October 4. 1967; for the U.S. 
November I. 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Costa Rica March 28, 
1978. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations foi 



preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at 
London October 20, 1972. Entered into force 
July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Accessions deposited: Dominican Republic. 

March 15, 1978; Tunisia, February 1, 

1978. 
International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
November 1 . 1974 ' 
Accession deposited Panama, March 9, 

1978. 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, March 8, 

1978. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for dam- 
age caused by space objects. Done at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow March 29. 
1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; 
for the U.S. October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accessions deposited: Malta, January 13, 
1978; Seychelles, January 5, 1978. 

Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York January 
14, 1975. Entered into force September 15. 
1976. TIAS 8480. 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom. 
March 30, 1978. 

Terrorism 

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of 
terrorism taking the form of crimes against 
persons and related extortion that are of 
international significance. Done at Washing- 
ton February 2, 1971. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 16, 1973; for the U.S. October 20, 
1976. TIAS 8413. 

Ratification deposited: Uruguay, March 17. 
1978. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships. 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969.' 

Accession deposited: Panama, March 9. 
1978. 

Whaling 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of whal- 
ing, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Tokyo 
December 7, 1977. Entered into force March 
21. 1978 

Wills 

Convention providing a uniform law on the 
form of an international will, with annex. 
Done at Washington October 26, 1973. En- 
tered into force February 9, 1978. - 
/ (tended to: Ontario effective March 31, 
1978. 

World Health Organization 

Constitution of the World Health Organization 
Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948; for the U.S. June 
21, 1948. TIAS 1808. 

Acceptance deposited: Djibouti. March 10, 
1978. 



BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project agreement for national developi 
training. Signed at Kabul May 22, 1977. 
tered into force May 22, 1977. 

Austria 

Air transport agreement. Signed at Vienna 
23. 1966 Entered into force July 23. 1 
TIAS 6066. 
Notice of termination: Austria. March 
1978, effective March 9, 1979. 

Agreement regarding mutual assistance 
tween the U.S. and Austrian Customs 5 
ices. Signed at Vienna September 15, 19' 
Entry into force: July 3, 1978. 



Bangladesh 

Project agreement for a rural electrific 
project. Signed at Dacca December 15, 1 
Entered into force December 15. 1977. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sal 
agricultural commodities of January 
1978. Effected by exchange of note 
Dacca March 3, 1978. Entered into I 
March 3, 1978. 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food | 
to Bangladesh. Signed at Dacca March 
1978. Entered into force March 16. 197! 

Bolivia 

Project loan agreement to finance the cos 
goods and services required for the Agi 
ture Sector II project Signed at La 
November 24, 1977. Entered into 1 
November 24, 1977. 



Canada 

Agreement amending and supplementinj 
agreement of March 9, 1959 (TIAS 4 I 
5117, 5608, 6236, 7408), governing tol | 
the St Lawrence Seaway. Effected by 
change of notes at Washington March 
1978. Entered into force March 20. 197: 

Chile 

Agreement relating to a coopera 
meteorological' observation program 
Chile Effected by exchange of notes at I 
tiago February 23. June 2. and Septembi I 

1977. Entered into force February 15. I il 
effective January I, 1977. 

China, Republic of 

Agreement amending and extending the inlin 
agreement of December 16, 1977, rel.ttino 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade I ' 
textiles and textile products Effected byjft 
change of notes at Washington March I 

1978. Entered into force March 30, 19781 

ER\P« 

Agreement modifying and extending '• 
agreement of October 28. 1975 (TIAS 8ll 
concerning exhibition of the "treasure* 
Tutankhamun" and other items » 
I'haraonic art to include the Fine /■ 
Museums of San Francisco. Effected b> if 
change of notes at Washington Februar; I 



1978 

lid March 29. 1978. Entered into force 
•arch 29, 1978. 

Gambia 

eement relating to the transfer of food grain 
The Gambia Signed at Banjul January 12 
id February 20, 1978. Entered into force 
sbniarj 20, 1978. 

gary 

eement relating to reciprocal facilitation of 
ansit or temporary duty visas for diplomatic 
id official passport holders. Effected by ex- 
tange of notes at Budapest February 10. 
)78. Entered into force April 11, 1978. 
eement on trade relations. Signed at 
udapest March 17, 1978. Enters into force 
i the date of exchange of written notices of 
ceptance by the two governments. 

eed minutes of the fourth session of the 
nited States-Iran Joint Commission for 
conomic Cooperation Signed at Washing- 
n February 28, 1978. Entered into force 
february 28, 1978. 



«n agreement to finance the foreign ex- 
lange costs of certain commodities and 
immodity-related services. Signed at 
ingston December 15, 1977. Entered into 
rce December 15, 1977. 

tn 

ty on extradition, with exchange of notes, 
gned at Tokyo March 3, 1978. Enters into 
rce on the 30th day after the date of ex- 
lange of instruments of ratification. 

K ea. Republic of 

A -ement extending the memorandum of un- 
rstanding of December 19. 1975, and 
nuary 15, 1976 (TIAS 8609), relating to 

:! e development of the Korea Standards Re- 
arch Institute. Effected by exchange of let- 
rs at Seoul and Washington October 24 and 
;cember 12, 1977. and January 6, 1978. 

Ml ltered into force January 6, 1978. 

M ico 

I cement relating to the limitation of meat 

iports from Mexico during calendar year 

>78. Effected by exchange of notes at 

ashington December 21, 1977, and Feb- 

iary 22, 1978. Entered into force February 

■ :, 1978; effective January 1, 1978. 
fiaement extending the agreement of June 23, 

)76 (TIAS 8533), concerning procedures 
r mutual assistance in the administration of 

■ stice in connection with the General Tire 
id Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire 
id Rubber Company matters to include the 

IjcDonnell Douglas Corporation. Effected 
*)' exchange of letters at Washington Feb- 
Bary 23 and March 6, 1978. Entered into 
- [rce March 6, 1978. 



Heement for sales of agricultural com- 

odities, relating to the agreement of May 

■7, 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat Feb- 



59 



PRESS RELEASES: 

l>«*f»eirf iim'iiI of State 



March 16-April 24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

* 124 3/16 U.S., Soviet Union agree to 
increase air service. Mar. 3. 

*125 3/17 Convention for the Conserva- 
tion of Antarctic Seals enters 
into force. Mar 1 1 . 

*126 3/17 U.S.. U.K. announce agree- 
ments on North Atlantic air 
fares and charter services. 



* I 27 3/20 Program for the official visit to 

Washington of Israeli Prime 
Minister Menahem Begin 
and Mrs. Begin, Mar. 
20-23. 

*128 3/20 St. Lawrence Seaway toll 
agreement . 

1 129 3/21 Vance: statement on Senate 
passage of Panama Canal 
neutrality treaty. Mar. 16. 

* 1 30 3/21 Advisory Committee on Private 

International Law. study 
group on hotelkeeper's lia- 
bility. Mar. 29. 



ruary 3, 1978. Entered into force February 3, 
1978. 

Netherlands 

Protocol amending the air transport agreement 
of April 3. 1957, as amended (TIAS 4782. 
6797), and relating to charter services and 
other matters. Signed at Washington March 
31. 1978. Entered into force March 31, 
1978. 

Niger 

Project grant agreement relating to range man- 
agement and livestock production, with an- 
nexes. Signed at Niamey September 26, 
1977. Entered into force September 26. 
1977. 

Panama 

Project loan agreement regarding integrated 
rural development. Signed at Panama 
November 25, 1977. Entered into force 
November 25, 1977. 

Treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and 
operation of the Panama Canal, with annexes 
and related protocol. Signed at Washington 
September 7, 1977.' 

Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification: 
March 16, 1978.' 

Paraguay 

Agreement amending the air transport agree- 
ment of February 28. 1947 (TIAS 1753), and 
relating to charter air services. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Asuncion March 8 and 
9, 1978. Entered into force March 9, 1978. 

Portugal 

Loan agreement for balance of payments sup- 
port. Signed at Lisbon March 1, 1978. En- 
tered into force March 1, 1978. 

Senegal 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain 
to Senegal Signed at Dakar February 21, 
1978. Entered into force February 21, 1978. 

Sri Lanka 

Loan agreement for agricultural base mapping. 



Signed at Colombo February 28, 1978. En- 
tered into force February 28, 1978. 
Loan agreement regarding malaria control. 
Signed at Colombo February 28. 1978. En- 
tered into force February 28, 1978. 

Sudan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Khartoum December 24, 
1977. 
Entered into force: January 24, 1978. 

Tunisia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 
1976 (TIAS 8506). Signed at Tunis February 
3, 1978. Entered into force February 3, 
1978. 

U.S.S.R. 

Interim agreement amending the civil air trans- 
port agreement of November 4, 1966 (TIAS 
6135), as amended by the protocol of June 
23, 1973 (TIAS 7658), and confirming cer- 
tain understandings relating to air transporta- 
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington March 3, 1978. Entered into force 
March 3, 1978. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to North Atlantic air fares. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing- 
ton March 17, 1978. Entered into force 
March 17, 1978. 

Venezuela 

Maritime boundary treaty. Signed at Caracas 
March 28, 1978. Enters into force on the date 
of exchange of instruments of ratification. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation in the narcotics field. Signed at 
Caracas March 28. 1978. Entered into force 
March 28, 1978. □ 



'Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

'With amendments, conditions, reservations, 

and understandings. 



60 

* 1 3 1 

* 132 



►133 



*134 



135 
"136 



►137 



"138 



'139 



*147 



»149 
"150 



151 



3/21 



3/21 



3/21 



3/21 



3/24 
3/28 



3/28 



3/29 



*I40 3/31 



*141 


3/31 


*142 


3/3 1 


*143 


3/31 


*I44 


3/31 


145 


4/4 


*146 


4/5 



4/5 



* 148 4/5 



4/5 
4/5 



4/6 



*152 4/6 



* 153 



4/7 



Robert J McCloskey sworn in 
as Ambassador to Greece. 
Mar. 9 (biographic data). 

Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO, National 
Committee for the Preven- 
tion of Marine Pollution, 
Apr 25 

SCC, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on standards 
of (raining and watchkeep- 
ing, Apr. 26 

SCC, SOLAS, radio group on 
radio communications, 
Apr. 27. 

Vance: news conference. 

Joint report of the Govern- 
ments of Canada and the 
U.S. by special maritime 
negotiators Marcel Cadieux 
and Lloyd N. Cutler. 

Study Group 8 of the U.S. Or- 
ganization for the Interna- 
tional Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), Apr. 21 

Program of Atlanta Conference 
on U.S. Interests in the Mid- 
dle Easl, Atlanta, Apr. 5. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational 
and Cultural Affairs releases 
14th annual report. 

Second round of Great Lakes 
water quality agreement 
negotiations, Mar. 30. 

U.S., Singapore sign air trans- 
port agreement 

U.S., Netherlands sign avia- 
tion agreement. 

CCIR. study groups 10 and 11, 
Apr. 21. 

SCC. SOLAS, working group 
on bulk chemicals. Apr. 24. 

U.S. program for the eastern 
Mediterranean. 

U.S., Republic of China amend 
interim agreement on trade 
in cotton, wool, and man- 
made textiles, Mar. 30. 

National Committee of the 
U.S. Organization for the 
CCIR. May 4. 

Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises. Apr. 27. 

SCC, June 7. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on subdivision and stability. 
May 9. 

Vance: statement before 'he 
House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on secu- 
rity assistance proposals lor 
Greece. Cyprus, and Turkey. 

SCC, SOLAS, ad hoc winking 
group on nuclear ships. 
May 3. 

SCC, SOLAS, ad hoc working 



154 4/10 

154A 4/10 

* 155 4/10 

+ 156 4/10 

* 157 4/11 
♦158 4/11 

* 159 4/11 

*160 4/12 

*161 4/12 

*162 4/12 

*163 4/13 

*164 4/14 

*165 4/14 

* 1 66 4/15 

* 1 67 4/ 1 5 

* 168 4/16 

* 1 69 4/16 
+ 170 4/17 

+ 171 4/17 

172 

♦173 4/17 



group on nuclear ships. 
May 31. 

Vance: address on arms control 
before the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors 
(ASNE). 

Vance: question-and-answer 
session following ASNE 
address. 

International Center to house 
chanceries of foreign embas- 
sies in Washington and 
buildings for the Organiza- 
tion of American Slates 

Procedure for requesting li- 
cences for marlin hillfish 
sportfishing in (he Cuban 
fishing zone 

Program for the state visit of 
Romanian President and 
Mrs. Ceausescu, Apr. 11-17. 

Alfred L. Atherton. Jr . sworn 
in as Ambassador at Large 
(biographic data) 

Harold H Saunders sworn in 
as Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs (biographic 
data). 

Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises, Apr. 27 
meeting rescheduled for 
May 4. 

Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. national section of the 
International Commission 
for the Conservation of At- 
lantic Tunas. Apr. 26. 

SCC, May 9. 

Vance: departure Andrews Air 
Force Base, Apr 12 

William G. Bowdler appointed 
Director of the Bureau of In- 
telligence and Research. 

Vance: arrival remarks, Dar es 
Salaam. Apr. 13 

Vance: remarks following 
opening session of joint talks 
on Rhodesia, Dar es Salaam. 
Apr. 14 

Vance: remarks following sec- 
ond session of the joint talks 
on Rhodesia, Dar es Salaam, 
Apr. 14. 

Vance: response to questions at 
the close of the Apr. 15 ses- 
sion of the joint session, Dar 
es Salaam, Apr. 15. 

Vance: response to questions at 
(he close of the joint talks, 
Dar es Salaam, Apr 15. 

Joint statement issued at con- 
clusion of the evening meet- 
ing. Dares Salaam, Apr. 15 

Vance, Owen: joint press con- 
ference, Pretoria. Apr. 16 

(Cancelled) 

SCC, SOLAS, working group 



Department of State Bui 

on subdivision and stab 

May 1 I . 
+ 174 4/17 Vance, Owen: remarks fo 

ing meeting with Rhod< 

transitional governrr 

Salisbury 
+ 175 4/18 Foreign Relations of the U 

States, 1951, Vol. VI. 1 

1 and 2: Asia and « 

Pacific. 
176 4/18 Vance: statement on rati I 

lion of Panama C ll 

treaties. 

* 1 77 4/19 David Newsom sworn il 

Under Secretary for Poh il 
Affairs (biographic data) 
*178 4/20 U.S.. India amend le 
agreement, Apr. 18. 

* 1 79 4/20 Vance: arrival remarks, [J< 

cow, Apr. 18. 

* 1 80 4/20 Advisory Committee on I I 

national Law, study gip 
on transnational bankru > 
problems. May 18. 
*181 4/20 Vance: dinner toast. Mosci 
+ 182 4/22 Joint communique on L - 

Soviet talks. 
+ 183 4/24 Vance: departure statem , 
Moscow, Apr. 23. 

* 184 4/24 Vance: arrival statem , 

Washington, DC. 

* 185 4/24 U.S. Organization for ( 

CCIR. study group , 
May 19. 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 
+ To be printed in a later issue. 



I/JS.I/JV. 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
lie Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the Ui i 
Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New "i 
NY 10017. 



No. 

*1 



Date 

2/9 



2/14 

2/15 

2 21 
2/23 



Subject 

Leonard: Vietnamese Ambass; I 
Dinh Ba This departure. L ■ 
Host Country Relations C 
mittee. 

Hormats: first session of comi 
tee established under UN 
Resolution 32/174 to assess 
tablishment of new internatii 
economic order 

Doyle: space programs, Comr- 
tee on the Peaceful Uses 
Outer Space. 

Bitterman: U.S. pledge to FA' 
World Food Program. 

Young: 1 10th anniversary of 
birth of Dr WEB DuB< 



1978 



61 



Special Committee Against 
Apartheid. 

2/28 Itinerary of Amb. Young's trip to 
East Asia. Mar. 3-16. 

3/3 Young: death of Robert Sobukwe. 

3/6 Mezvinsky: work of U.N. Com- 
mission on Human Rights. 
ECOSOC, Geneva. Feb. 22. 

3/9 Young: Economic and Social 
Council for Asia and the 
Pacific, Bangkok. 

3/14 Young: Southern Rhodesia. Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/17 McHenry: attack on Zambia by 
Rhodesian forces. Security 
Council. 

3/18 Young: U.N. Interim Force in 
Lebanon, Security Council. 

3/19 Young: southern Lebanon, Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/19 Leonard: southern Lebanon, Secu- 
rity Council. 

3/22 Horbal: improving the status of 
women, ECOSOC. 

3/23 Good: implementing the program 
for the Decade for Women, 
ECOSOC. 

3/27 Horbal: preparations for 1980 
mid-term conference on women, 
ECOSOC. 

3/28 Horbal: status of women in U.S., 
ECOSOC. 

3/28 Horbal: protection of women and 
children in armed conflict. 
ECOSOC. 

3/29 Horbal: effects of apartheid on 
status of women, ECOSOC 

4/3 Horbal: future of U.N. Commis- 
sion on the Status of Women, 
ECOSOC. 

4/3 Horbal: communications on 
women, ECOSOC. 

4/5 Horbal: U.S. proposed topics for 
28th session of the Commission 
on the Status of Women, 
ECOSOC. 

4/10 Purpose of Rep. Mezvinsky's visit 
to Chile beginning Apr. 10. 

4/12 Matteson: work of the Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organiza- 
tions, ECOSOC. 

4/14 Wells: review of reports on social 
development of the ECOSOC 
Social Committee, ECOSOC. 

4/17 Falco: U.S. support of the Com- 
mission on Narcotic Drugs, 
ECOSOC. 

4/20 Young: financing of the U.N. 
Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), Committee V— Ad- 
ministration and Budgetry. 

4/21 Young: financing of UNIFIL, 
UNGA plenary session. 

4/25 Mezvinsky: work of the 34th ses- 
sion of the Human Rights Com- 
mission in Geneva, ECOSOC. 

4/27 Mezvinsky: human rights situation 
in Cambodia, ESOSOC. 



t32 5/1 McHenry: Namibia, Cape Town 
Press Club, South Africa, 
Apr. 7. 

5/2 McHenry: Namibia, Security 
Council. 

5/4 Hormats: committee established 
under UNGA Resolution 32/174 
to assess establishment of new 
international economic order. 
"35 5/3 Young: enlargement of UNIFIL. 
Security Council. □ 



*33 



►34 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 
t To be printed in a later issue. 



PUBLICATIONS 



International Law Digest 1 

The Department of State released on 
November 15. 1977. the Digest of United 
States Practice in International Law, 1976, 
edited by Eleanor C. McDowell of the Office 
of the Legal Adviser. 

This fourth annual Digest publishes diplo- 
matic correspondence, speeches, treaties, 
legislation, court decisions, and other docu- 
ments constituting the record of U.S. practice 
in international law in the calendar year 1976. 

Of special interest are items on the U.S. 
negotiating position on the law of the sea 
treaty, including the International Seabed Re- 
source Authority; the Treaty (with Mexico) on 
the Execution of Penal Sanctions; mediation 
efforts in southern Africa; the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976; a Supreme 
Court ruling on the act of state doctrine; the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 
1976 extending fishery conservation jurisdic- 
tion to 200 miles off U.S. coasts; legislation 
concerning a revision of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
and U.S. participation in the African De- 
velopment Bank; initiatives in the field of 
human rights; the International Security As- 
sistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; 
implementing legislation enabling the United 
States to become a party to two antiterrorist 
conventions; and legal memoranda on such 
topics as nonintervention in internal affairs 
and widening access to the International Court 
of Justice. 

This volume, following the format of its 
three predecessor volumes, includes chapters 
on the individual in international law, treaty 
law, aviation and space law, international eco- 
nomic law, environmental and health affairs, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the legal regu- 
lation of the use of force, and many other sub- 
jects. 

Orders for the Digest of United Slates Prac- 



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1973 Digest of U.S. Practice in International 

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Treaties in Force 2 

The Department of State released on March 1 . 
1978. Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of the 
United States in Force on January I , I97S. 

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral 
treaty relations of the United States with 188 
countries or other political entities, as well as 
multilateral treaty relations with other con- 
tracting parties to more than 380 treaties and 
agreements on 97 subjects. 

The 1978 edition lists some 500 new treaties 
and agreements including the treaty on pris- 
oner transfer with Mexico; the agreement con- 
cerning transit pipelines with Canada; the 
fisheries agreements with Bulgaria. Canada. 
Republic of China, Cuba, European Economic 
Community. German Democratic Republic. 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Spain, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

The bilateral treaties and agreements are ar- 
ranged by country or other political entity, 
while the multilateral treaties and agreements 
are arranged by subject with names of coun- 
tries which have become parties. Date of sig- 
nature, date of entry into force for the United 
States, and citations to texts are furnished for 
each agreement. 

Treaties in Force provides information con- 
cerning treaty relations with numerous newly 
independent states, indicating wherever possi- 
ble the provisions of their constitutions and 
independence arrangements regarding assump- 
tion of treaty obligations. 

Information on current treaty actions, sup- 
plementing the information contained in 
Treaties in Force, is published monthly in the 
Department of State Bulletin. 

The 1978 edition of Treaties in Force (397 
pp.) is Department of State Publication 8934 
(GPO Cat. No. 9.14:978). It is for sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
20402, for $5.50. D 



1 Press release 517 of Nov. 15. 1977. 

2 Press release 100 of Mar. 1. 1978. 



62 



Department of" State Bull 



Congressional 
Documents 



Energy Transportation Security Act of 1977. 
Report of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, together with addi- 
tional views, on H R 1037. H. Rept. 95-5X9 
Aug. 26. 1977. 84 pp. 

Delay in Decision on Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation System. Communication from 
the President of the United States. H. Doc. 
95-210. Sept. 7. 1977. 1 p. 

Duty-Free Treatment of Aircraft Engines Used 
as Temporary Replacements for Aircraft En- 
gines Being Repaired in the United States, 
and Other Matters. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Finance to accompany H.R 
422. S. Rept. 95-425. Sept. 9. 1977. 13 pp. 

A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Sen- 
ate With Respect To European Communities' 
Restrictions on Processed Fruit and Vege- 
table Imports. Report of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Finance to accompany S. Res. 76. S. 
Rept. 95-426. Sept. 9. 1977. 3 pp 

Transfer of Offenders for the Administration of 
Foreign Penal Sentences. Report of the Sen- 
ate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany 
S. 1682. S. Rept. 95-435. Sept. 15. 1977. 
41 pp. 

Panama Canal Treaties. Message from the Pres- 
ident of the United States transmitting the 
Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Con- 
cerning the Permanent Neutrality and Opera- 
tion of the Panama Canal, signed on behalf 
of the United States at the headquarters ol 
the Organization of American States on Sep- 
tember 7. 1977. S. Ex. N. Sept. 16. 1977. 
38 pp 

U.S. Participation in the Supplementary 
Financing Facility of the International Mone- 
tary Fund. Communication from the Chair- 
man of the National Advisory Council on In- 
ternational Monetary and Financial Policies 
H. Doc. 95-224. Sept. 20, 1977. 26 pp. 

Department of Defense Supplemental Appro- 
priation Authorization Act. 1978. Report of 
the House Committee on Armed Services, 
together with dissenting views, to accom- 
pany H R 8390 H. Rept. 95-614. Sepl 20. 
1977. 30 pp. 

Protocol to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation. Report of the House Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex 
A. 95-1. S. Ex. Rept. 95 II Sept 21. 
1977. 3 pp. 

Implementation of Convention on Cultural 
Property. Report of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 564 3 
H. Rept. 95 615 Sept. 21, 1977. 21 pp. 

Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Canadian Pe 
troleum. Report of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 5858. 
H. Rept 95-616. Sept. 21. 1977 5 pp. 

Implementation of the Final Act of the Confei 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 



Findings and Recommendations Two Years 
After Helsinki Report by the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe to the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
Committee Print. Sept. 23, 1977. 194 pp. 
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System 
Message from the President of the United 
States transmitting his decison and report on 
an Alaskan natural gas transportation system. 
H. Doc. 95-225. Sept. 23, 1977. 271 pp. 



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-1 



Agricultural Sector Loan. Agreement witfj. 
Dominican Republic. TIAS 8579. 151 I 
$2.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8579.) 

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1959. Pari 
Revision — Maritime Radio. Agreement \l 
other governments. TIAS 8599. 553 pp. !■ 
(Cat No. S9. 10:8599.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with! 
Hungarian People's Republic, extending ■ 
agreement of May 30. 1972. as amended Ti 
8617. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8617.) 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with On . 
TIAS 8651. 6 pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:865 1 

Water Supply System. Agreement »i 

Panama. TIAS 8656. 30 pp. $1.20. (Cat. I 
S9. 10:8656.) 

Defense — Development of an Advanl 
Surface-To-Air Missile System. Memoram I 

of Understanding with the Federal Republr ( 
Germany. TIAS 8658. 26 pp. $1.20. (Cat. . 
S9. 10:8658.) 

Small Farmer Development. Agreement \ n 
Paraguay. TIAS 8665. 88 pp. $2.10. (Cat. i 
S9. 10:8665.) 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fi 
Textiles. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS S67 
pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8674.) 

Improved Water and Land Use in the Sier 

Agreement with Peru. TIAS 8682. 87 pp. $2. 2 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8682.) 

International Coffee Agreement, 19 

Agreement with other governments. TI '• 
8683. 307 pp. $4.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8683. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Philippines. TIAS 8684. 13 pp. 800. (Cat [ 
S9. 10:8684 i 

Atomic Energy — Power Burst Facility (PI 
Research Program. Agreement with Austi 
TIAS 8685. 12 pp. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8685.) 

Atomic Energy — Reactor Safety Experimcn 

Agreement with the United Kingdom TI. 
8687. 15 pp. $1. (Cat No. S9. 10:8687.) 

Fisheries Off the United States Coast 

Agreement with Cuba. TIAS 8689. 46 p 
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8689.) 

Technical Assistance in Customs Improv 
ment. Agreement with Abu Dhabi. TIAS 869 

28 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No S9. 10:8690.) 

Educational Cooperation. Agreement wi 
Venezuela. TIAS 8691. 4 pp. 600 (Cat. Nl 
S9. 10:8691.) 



INDEX 



||Y 1978 

L. 80, NO. 2014 

fjanistan. Recent Developments in South 

Jia (Dubs) 48 

ns Control 

A Annual Report 30 

Us Control and National Security 

I ance) 20 

n need Radiation Weapons (Carter) ... 31 
I tion-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 

dress ( Vance) 23 

e etary Vance's News Conference, 
lirch 24 24 

Special Session on Disarmament (report 

I Secretary Vance) 29 

i ladesh. Recent Developments in South 

,ia(Dubs) 48 

iiy.il. President Carter's Visit to Latin 
. lerica and Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint 
i nmuniques with Venezuela, Brazil, and 

geria) 1 

jress 

( A Annual Report 30 

s tance Programs to Greece, Turkey, and 

( prus ( Vance) 33 

e nt Developments in South Asia 

c jbs) 48 

e te Additions to the Panama Canal 

' .-aties 52 

t nth Report on Cyprus (message from Pres- 

nt Carter) 35 

Special Session on Disarmament (report 

Secretary Vance) 29 

II 

u (foreign relations outline) 56 

x tion-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 

dress ( Vance) 23 

i us 

s >tance Programs to Greece. Turkey, and 

prus ( Vance ) 33 

« irtment Statement on Eastern Mediterra- 

an 34 

e nth Report on Cyprus (message from Pres- 
et Carter) 35 

< irtment and Foreign Service. Interna- 

>nal Communication Agency 32 

(cational and Cultural Affairs. Interna- 

mal Communication Agency 32 

r Middle East Peace Process — A Status Re- 
irt (Atherton) 42 

eetary Vance's News Conference, 
arch 24 24 

1 opia. Secretary Vance's News Confer- 
ee, March 24 24 

ope 

is Control and National Security 

; 'ance) 20 

ian Rights Policy: The United States at 

:lgrade (Fascell) 39 

many. German Democratic Republic 

,'olen) 36 

, ece 
stance Programs to Greece, Turkey, and 

,! 



Cyprus ( Vance) 33 

Department Statement on Eastern Mediterra- 
nean 34 

Human Rights 

Central America (Todman) 54 

Human Rights Policy: The United States at 
Belgrade (Fascell) 39 

President Carter's Visit to Latin America and 
Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint communiques 
with Venezuela. Brazil, and Nigeria) ... 1 

India. Recent Developments in South Asia 
(Dubs) 48 

Israel 

The Middle East Peace Process — A Status Re- 
port (Atherton) 42 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. March 20-23 
(White House statement. Begin, Carter) ... 47 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, 
March 24 24 

Southern Lebanon (Department statements, let- 
ter from Secretary Vance) 46 

Terrorist Attack in Israel (Carter, Vance, letter 
from President Carter) 46 

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (Young, texts 
of resolutions) 51 

Jordan. The Middle East Peace Process — A 
Status Report (Atherton) 42 

Latin America and Caribbean. Central 
America (Todman) 54 

Lebanon 

Southern Lebanon (Department statements, let- 
ter from Secretary Vance) 46 

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (Young, texts 
of resolutions) 51 

Liberia. President Carter's Visit to Latin 
America and Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint 
communiques with Venezuela, Brazil, and 
Nigeria) 1 

Middle East 

The Middle East Peace Process — A Status Re- 
port (Atherton) 42 

President Carter's Visit to Latin America and 
Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint communiques 
with Venezuela, Brazil, and Nigeria) . . 1 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. March 20-23 
(White House statement. Begin, Carter) .... 47 

Nepal. Recent Developments in South Asia 
(Dubs) 48 

Nigeria. President Carter's Visit to Latin 
America and Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint 
communiques with Venezuela, Brazil, and 
Nigeria) 1 

Nuclear Policy 

Arms Control and National Security 
(Vance) 20 

Enhanced Radiation Weapons (Carter) .... 31 

Question-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 
Address ( Vance) 23 

Pakistan. Recent Developments in South Asia 
(Dubs) 48 

Panama 

Panama Canal Treaty Ratified (Carter, 
Vance) 52 

Question-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 
Address ( Vance) 23 

Senate Additions to the Panama Canal 
Treaties 52 

Presidential Documents 

Enhanced Radiation Weapons 31 

Panama Canal Treaty Ratified 52 

President Carter's Visit to Latin America and 
Africa 1 



Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. March 

20-23 47 

Seventh Report on Cyprus 35 

Terrorist Attack in Israel 46 

Publications 

Congressional Documents 62 

GPO Sales Publications 62 

International Law Digest, Treaties in Force .. 61 

Saudi Arabia 

Secretary Vance's News Conference. 

March 24 24 

Security Assistance 

Assistance Programs to Greece. Turkey, and 

Cyprus ( Vance) 33 

Department Statement on Eastern Mediterra- 
nean 34 

Question-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 

Address ( Vance) 23 

Recent Developments in South Asia (Dubs) . 48 
Somalia. Secretary Vance's News Conference, 

March 24 24 

Southern Rhodesia 

Question-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 

Address ( Vance) 23 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, 

March 24 24 

Space. Arms Control and National Security 

(Vance) 20 

Sri Lanka. Recent Developments in South 

Asia (Dubs) 48 

Terrorism. Terrorist Attack in Israel (Carter, 

Vance, letter from President Carter) .... 46 
Treaties 

Current Actions 57 

Panama Canal Treaty Ratified (Carter, 

Vance) 52 

Senate Additions to the Panama Canal 

Treaties 52 

Turkey 

Assistance Programs to Greece, Turkey, and 

Cyprus ( Vance) 33 

Department Statement on Eastern Mediterra- 
nean 34 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control and National Security 

(Vance) 20 

Question-and-Answer Session Following ASNE 

Address (Vance) 23 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, 

March 24 24 

United Nations 

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (Young, texts 

of resolutions) 51 

U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (report 

by Secretary Vance) 29 

Venezuela. President Carter's Visit to Latin 

America and Africa (Carter, Tolbert, joint 

communiques with Venezuela, Brazil, and 

Nigeria) 1 

Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 42 

Begin, Menahem 47 

Bolen, David B 36 

Carter, President 1,31,35,46,47.52 

Dubs, Adolph 48 

Fascell, Dante B : 39 

Todman, Terence A 54 

Tolbert, William R 1 

Vance, Secretary 20, 23, 24, 33, 46, 52 

Young, Andrew 51 



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department 
of State 



wultetttt 



June 197 S 



te Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 201 5 




Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2015 / June 1978 






Cover Photos: 

Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Vice President Mondale 
Secretary Vance 
K. Mathea Falco 
Elliot L. Richardson 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
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developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
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of the President and the Secretary of 
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and other senior State Department of- 
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leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
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States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
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of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public At n 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 

Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



JAPAN 

1 The United States and Japan (Zbigniew Brzezinski) 

2 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda 

3 U.S. Ambassador to Japan (Biographic Data) 

4 Japan — A Profile 

5 Japan in the World Economy (Robert D. Hormats) 



THE PRESIDENT 

12 News Conference, April 25 

THE SECRETARY 

14 Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy 
17 Question-and-Answer Session Fol- 
lowing Cincinnati Address 

20 Remarks to the Press Following Cin- 

cinnati Address 

21 Visit to Africa, the United Kingdom, 

and the USSR. 
27 Interview on "Face the Nation" 

ARMS CONTROL 

31 U.N. Special Session on Disarma- 
ment Convenes ( Vice President 
Mondale) 

CONGRESS 

35 Its Role in Foreign Policymaking 

(Douglas J . Bennet, Jr.) 

EAST ASIA 

36 U.S. Combat Forces in South Korea 

(President Carter) 

EUROPE 

36 Visit of Romanian President 

Ceausescu (Joint Declaration) 

37 Romania — A Profile 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

38 Human Rights in Cambodia (Presi- 

dent Carter) 

MIDDLE EAST 

38 Aircraft Sales to Egypt, Israel, and 
Saudi Arabia (Secretary Vance, 
President Carter, Department 
Statement, Letter from President 
Carter) 

41 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin 
(Exchange of Remarks) 



47 



NARCOTICS 

International Control Program 
(K, Mathea Falco) 

OCEANS 

Law of the Sea Conference (Elliot L. 
Richardson) 



PACIFIC 

49 Micronesia (Department Statement, 
Statement of Principles) 

49 Letter of Credence ( New Zealand) 

UNITED NATIONS 

50 Namibia (Canadian Foreign Secre- 

tary Donald Jamieson, Donald F. 
McHenry, Text of Proposal) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

56 Secretary Vance Visits Mexico 

59 TREATIES 

61 PRESSRELEASES 

62 PUBLICATIONS 
INDEX 



Boston Public Library 
Superintend^ of Documents 

m 71978 

DEPOSITORY 




I'ii sident Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda in Washington. 



1978 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 



ligniew Brzezinski 

ould like to speak to you this 
ng about U.S. relations with Ja- 
I shall begin with a few remarks 

the Administration's broader in- 
ns in foreign policy, for this de- 

the context of our bilateral rela- 
lip. Our approach reflects both 

ntial continuity with the policies 
lr predecessors and some impor- 
tances of change. 

VVe seek wider cooperation with 

cey allies. Close collaboration 

Japan and Western Europe has 

been the point of departure for 

ica's global involvement; how- 

we are also seeking to broaden 

patterns of cooperation to in- 

the new "regional influentials," 

responding to changes over the 

| 5-20 years in the global distribu- 

Iif power. 
We are seeking to stabilize the 
i -Soviet relationship, pursuing 
gh a broader range of negotia- 
a pattern of detente which is to 
pth comprehensive and genuinely 



'I'.ssing cautious but more explicit 
l| - ican interest in Eastern Europe. 
• We intend to maintain sufficient 
||<ary capabilities to support our 
llil security interests. Above all, 
3 lall maintain an adequate strategic 
Irent; preserve, along with our 
4 partners, the conventional bal- 
J in Europe; and develop a quick- 
l:ion global force available for 
I redeployment in areas of central 
Irtance to the United States, such 
^3rea. 

I Politically we shall remain en- 
Id in all regions. In the Asia- 
llfic area, we shall preserve a 
l;gic and economic presence con- 
Int with our large and growing 
I: in the region. Above all, this 
lires a widening of our cooperation 
I Japan and an expansion of our 
lionship with China. We shall en- 
le our collaboration with the mod- 
I states in Africa in the cause of 
l:an emancipation. No longer tied 
Inly a regional approach, we shall 
qigthen our bilateral ties with the 
Ions of Latin America while 
iterating with them more fully on 
" global concerns. We shall con- 
h to pursue a genuine settlement in 
8 Middle East while expanding our 



relationship with the moderate Arab 
countries. 

• We shall increase our efforts to 
develop constructive and cooperative 
solutions to emerging global issues. 
Above all, we need to head off any 
drift toward nuclear proliferation. 

• We shall seek to sustain domestic 
support for our policies by rooting 
them clearly in our moral values. We 
believe that our devotion to human 
rights is responsive to man's yearning 
everywhere for greater social justice. 

This is an ambitious agenda. We 
shoulder the responsibilities it imposes 
on us willingly. But obviously we 
cannot shoulder them alone. Success 
will require greater cooperation, above 
all with our closest friends. 

Centrality of U.S. -Japan Relations 

Japan is clearly such a close friend. 
We have been impelled toward a spe- 
cial relationship with Japan by the 
force of history and by strategic and 
economic imperatives. The members 
of this Society have long recognized 
the basic proposition I wish to affirm 
this evening: Close partnership be- 
tween the United States and Japan is a 
vital foundation for successful pursuit 
of America's wider objectives in the 
world. If relations between America 
and Japan are strong, we benefit and 



the world benefits; when we run into 
difficulties, we suffer and others suffer 
with us. 

Our alliance not only protects the 
security of Japan and America; it has 
also become a central element in the 
equilibrium in the Pacific, which all 
the major powers share a stake in 
preserving. 

Japan is our largest overseas trading 
partner; trade between us exceeded 
$29 billion in 1977. Economic cooper- 
ation confers benefits on each of us; it 
also sustains the prosperity of the 
Pacific basin and the stability of the 
international trade and payments sys- 
tem. 

Effective responses to pressing 
global issues — whether the develop- 
ment of alternative sources of energy, 
expanding food production, assuring 
equitable access to the riches of the 
ocean area, or stemming nuclear 
proliferation — demand active collab- 
oration between us. 

In short, we are mutually depend- 
ent. No relationship in our foreign 
policy is more important. None de- 
mands more careful nourishment. 

While cooperation between the 
United States and Japan is indispensa- 
ble, it is not automatically assured. 
Managing our relationship has become 
more challenging as our links have 
grown more numerous and more com- 



Zbigniew Brzezinski was born on March 
28, 1928, in Warsaw, Poland. He came to 
North America in 1938 and to the United 
States in 1953. In 1958 he became a natu- 
ralized U.S. citizen. He received a B.A 
(1948) and an MA. (1950) from McGill 
University. He received a Ph.D. from Har- 
vard University (1953) where he then 
taught and researched (1953-60) He was 
associate professor (1960-62), Herbert 
Lehman professor of government (1962- 
77), and director of the Research Institute 
on International Change (1961-77) — 
formerly the Research Institute on Com- 
munist Affairs — at Columbia University. 

Among his other activities, Dr. 
Brzezinski served as a member of the Pol- 
icy Planning Council of the Department of 
State from 1966 to 1968. He was director 
of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 
1976 and traveled extensively on its behalf 

Dr. Brzezinski became Assistant to the 




President for National Security Affa 
January 20, 1977. 



plex and as each nation's policies have 
come to have a more direct impact on 
the welfare of the other's people. 
Moreover, most of the problems we 
face are bigger than both of us — they 
are not susceptible to bilateral resolu- 
tion, and they arise most frequently in 
multilateral forums. 

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, 
that our relations have not been en- 
tirely free of difficulties. Over the last 
year, for example, our approaches to 
nuclear reprocessing diverged to some 
extent, and we experienced a large 
trade imbalance. 

In each case we consulted closely. 
We devised arrangements for manag- 
ing these problems which reflected 
both our respective concerns and the 
broader interests of the international 
community. We demonstrated that the 
test of effective ties between societies 
as dynamic as ours and economies as 
competitive as ours is not the absence 
of problems but the spirit in which we 
confront them and the competence 
with which we resolve them. 



Current Challenge 

Our interests and Japan's require 
that we broaden and deepen our ties, 
adapting our relationship to an era in 
which our policies have a global im- 
pact. This imposes on each of us an 
obligation to take each other's inter- 
ests and perspectives carefully into ac- 
count on a wider and wider range of 
issues. 

Japan's extraordinary economic 
growth has challenged it to define a 
wider vision of its role in the world — 
in Asia and beyond. Japanese deci- 
sions, which once would have been 
considered domestic in character, now 
impinge directly on the interests of 
distant nations. Japan's capacity to 
promote global economic develop- 
ment, to aid its neighbors, to promote 
a constructive North-South dialogue, 
to encourage the reconciliation of 
former rivals, and to provide for its 
own defense have grown. So have the 
expectations of Japan on the part of. 
the international community. A com- 
mitment of Japan's political and eco- 
nomic capabilities to the achievement 
of major global goals is essential to a 
strong U.S. -Japanese relationship. 

In recent years the United States has 
placed its relationship with Japan 
primarily in a setting of collaboration 
among the advanced democratic coun- 
tries. This is entirely appropriate. It is 
important that we remember, however, 
that while Japan is an industrial 
power, it is also an Asian nation, 
acutely interested in the continuity of 
America's role in the Pacific. Uncer- 



tainties about our Asian intentions 
have inevitably arisen in the wake of 
our disengagement from Indochina and 
our planned ground force withdrawal 
from Korea. A strong American role 
in the Pacific remains essential for the 
protection of our own strategic inter- 
ests. It is also an important factor in 
our relationship with Japan. We must 
adjust our relationship to accommodate 
these concerns. 



TEN LARGEST 


U.S. TRADING PARTNERS (1977) 


(millions 


of dollars) 




Total 


Country 


Exports and Imports 


Canada 


55,507.7 


Japan 


29,424.0 


West Germany 


13,340.8 


United Kingdom 


10,490.5 


Saudi Arabia 


9.932.7 


Mexico 


9.495.1 


Venezuela 


7,247.1 


Nigeria 


7,049.9 


France 


6,577.0 


Netherlands 


6,281.4 



il 



Broadening Cooperation 

In the economic field, the world has 
had to accommodate to Japan's grow- 
ing strength, even as Japan has been 
adapting its own policies to shoulder 
the responsibilities which strength 
confers. 

Neither we nor the Japanese have 
adjusted policies quickly enough in 



Department of State Bl 

recent years to avoid major dif 
ties. Consequently our economic 
tions have been marked over the 
year by a growing Japanese cui 
account surplus, sharp imbalanc 
our bilateral trade, a huge 
balance-of-payments deficit, and 
rency disorders. These structural ] 
lems arise particularly out oi 
dramatic growth in U.S. oil im 
in recent years and from Jap 
transition to an era of lower 
nomic growth. They have gl 
consequences. 

Only through concerted action r. 
the advanced industrial democr. 
can we deal effectively with our 
mon problems. We will all go for 
together to lower trade barriers 
succumb together to protection 
That is why we must assure a 
tinued expansion in world t 
through the successful conclusio 
the multilateral trade negotiat 
(MTN) in Geneva this summer. 
United States has taken the lea< 
presenting a forthcoming tariff 
which we expect other sti 
economies to match. 

The United States and Japan 
bear special responsibilities for ac 
which will not only reduce barriel 
trade through a fair and balanced 1 
agreement but also promote contl 
economic recovery, check disor 
exchange rate movements, encoi 
energy conservation and the dev* 
ment of alternative sources, anc 
crease the transfer of resource 
promote growth in the economic 
the developing nations. We cannc 
ford to pursue beggar-thy-neig 
policies, export our domestic prob 






Visit of Japanese 
Prime Minister Fukuda 



Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of 
Japan made an official visit to Wash- 
ington May 1-3 to meet with President 
Carter and other government officials. 
The two leaders last met in May 1977 
at the economic summit conference in 
London. 

In their discussions on May 3, the 
President and the Prime Minister ex- 
changed views on global economic is- 
sues in preparation for the Bonn sum- 
mit in July 1978, including economic 
growth, inflation, balance of pay- 
ments, monetary policy, energy, trade, 
and aid flows. 

The two leaders consulted on ele- 



ments of their respective policie 
Asia, stressing the importance of 
U.S. -Japan relationship and touc 
upon the Korean Peninsula, Ch 
and Southeast Asia. In the latter I 
nection the Japanese Government I 
nounced its intention to increasel 
contribution to the U.N. High Cl 
missioner for Refugees by $10 mill 
in support of Indochina refugees I 
well as its willingness to accept uifl 
certain conditions refugees for perl 
nent residence in Japan. 

The President and the Prime Mil 
ter also agreed to expand coopera'l 
in science and technology. 



□ 



978 



ers, or look for scapegoats. We 
a mutual responsibility to deal 
the fundamentals of these 

ems. 

e United States must take deci- 

iction in several areas: 

The implementation of an effec- 

:nergy program is the most impor- 

step. We must substantially re- 

our oil imports if we are to 

:e our current-accounts deficit, 

lish pressures on the dollar, and 

lize international money markets. 

e Administration presented an 

y bill to the Congress more than 

ar ago. We need action, and if 

;ress does not act, then the execu- 

branch must. While the United 

s has the largest problem in this 

ct, the question of how to take 

action to conserve and develop 

tative sources of energy must en- 

the efforts of all advanced na- 

as well — and particularly those 

lapan which experience extraordi- 

dependence on external sources 

pply. 

^We must bring inflation under 

^ol not only for domestic reasons 

1 lso to bolster our competitiveness 

.1 ernational trade. 

• We must devote more effort to 

jromotion of American exports. In 

sionths to come the Administration 

I look not only for ways to en- 

lage exports but to reduce or 

ii nate current governmental prac- 

.1 which reduce our competitiveness 

ic discourage our business commu- 

t from searching out overseas 

i ets. 

I ese adjustments are required not 

■ to underpin our economic posi- 
| in the world but to enhance the 

■ lity and growth of the interna- 

I I economy and thus fortify our 
lomic ties with Japan. Japan must 
I: comparable structural adjust- 
I s for it has become too large an 
sdomy to rely on export-led growth. 
'ie Japanese Government recog- 
1; the need for such adjustments 
ii has begun actions designed to 
i.'ve sharp reductions in its current 
xunts surplus in 1978; an economic 
fc'th rate of 7% this fiscal year; an 
IK agreement assuring the U.S. of 
lirocal and roughly equivalent ac- 
li to the Japanese market; and ex- 
iled long-term capital flows to the 
a loping countries. These measures 
ij essential to the vitality of the 

d economy as well as the con- 
id health of our bilateral relations, 
must be decisive in action and 
snt in awaiting the results. 

one looks beyond current eco- 
ic problems, there is a remarkable 



U.S. AMBASSADOR 
TO JAPAN 

Michael Joseph Mansfield of Missoula, 
Montana, was born on March 16, 1903, in 
New York City. He served in the U.S. 
Navy (1918-19). the U.S. Army (1919— 
20), and the U.S. Marines (1920-22); he 
worked as a miner and mining engineer in 
Butte, Montana (1922-31). He received an 
A B (1933) and an MA. (1934) from the 
University of Montana where he was then a 
professor of history and political science 
(1933-42). 

In 1943 Ambassador Mansfield was 
elected to Congress and served until 1952 
when he was elected to the Senate He was 
a U.S. Senator until 1977 and was Senate 
Majority Leader from 1961 to 1977, the 
longest tenure in U.S. Senate history. He 
was a member of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, the Appropriations Committee, 
the Policy Committee, and the Steering 
Committee. 

Ambassador Mansfield was a Presiden- 
tial representative in China in 1944 He 
was a US. delegate to the IX Inter- 
American Conference in 1948 and attended 




the 6th U.N. General Assembly in Paris 
(1951-52). He was a U.S. delegate to the 
Southeast Asian Conference in Manila in 
1954. In 1958 he attended the 13th U.N. 
General Assembly Ambassador Mansfield 
has traveled on Presidential assignment to 
West Berlin, Southeast Asia, and Vietnam 
(1962) and to Europe and Southeast Asia 
(1965 and 1969); he visited the People's 
Republic of China in 1972 at the invitation 
of Premier Chou En-lai. 

He was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan in May 1977. 



consonance of view between the 
United States and Japan on virtually 
all major international issues. We in- 
tend to sustain this confluence in our 
approaches toward the major Com- 
munist powers, toward Asian issues, 
toward the North-South dialogue, and 
toward major international negotia- 
tions. We look for Japan to play a 
more active political role in dealing 
with such matters. It is neither neces- 
sary nor possible to preserve identical 
policies on such issues, but the de- 
velopment of compatible approaches to 
common problems should be an objec- 
tive for us both. 



America's Role in Asia 

Close cooperation between us is 
especially important in Asia. There 
have been recurrent suggestions that 
the United States is withdrawing from 
Asia. These suggestions are untrue. 
The United States will maintain a 
strong and diversified military pres- 
ence and an active diplomacy in the 
Asian-Pacific region to support our 
growing economic and political stakes 
in the area. 

• Above all, we shall sustain the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Se- 
curity with Japan. For Japan this treaty 
offers strategic protection and firm 
moorings for its diplomacy. For the 
United States, alliance with a Japan 



steadily improving its self-defense 
capabilities provides the anchor for 
our position in East Asia and extends 
the reach of our strategic and political 
influence in the Pacific. Beyond these 
reciprocal benefits, our alliance con- 
tributes to the stability of Northeast 
Asia and the Pacific, and it threatens 
no one. 

• We will manage ground combat 
force withdrawals from Korea in a 
prudent fashion and help build up 
South Korea's capabilities in order to 
assure that there is no weakening of its 
defenses. 

• We shall preserve the strength of 
the 7th Fleet and our air units in 
the Pacific while improving them 
qualitatively. 

• We shall strengthen our ties with 
our traditional allies in Australia and 
New Zealand. 

• We shall seek to assure our con- 
tinued access to military facilities in 
the Philippines through arrangements 
which take full account of Philippine 
sovereignty over the bases. 

• We shall deepen our bilateral re- 
lations with the non-Communist states 
of Southeast Asia and encourage the 
growing cohesion of the Association 
of South East Asian Nations. And we 
shall persevere in our measured efforts 
to develop constructive relationships 
with Indochina. 

• In recent years Asian nations 
have come to depend more heavily 



upon U.S. trade and investment as a 
result of our strong and steady growth 
and the comparatively greater access 
Asian producers of manufactured 
goods enjoy in our market. We expect 
that to continue. 

• The American-Chinese relation- 
ship is a central element of our global 
policy. We shall endeavor to expand 
our relations with the People's Repub- 
lic of China. It is important that we 
make progress in normalizing relations 
with China, and we shall consult with 
the Chinese on major international 
matters that are of importance to us 
both. 

The steady implementation of these 
policies is required by our own inter- 
ests and should converge with 
Japanese interests 

Our defense cooperation, specif- 
ically, is excellent. Japan is 
strengthening its air and naval de- 
fenses. Cooperation between our uni- 
formed services is growing. Base is- 
sues arise less frequently and are re- 
solved amicably. Last fall Japan 
agreed to help with some of the ex- 
penses associated with our military 
presence. 

We look for these trends to evolve 
further, even as Japan continues to 
remind the world that security cannot 
be achieved through military strength 
alone. Through such measures as 
Prime Minister Fukuda's trip to South- 
cast Asia last summer, Japan has un- 
dertaken to expand its role in Asian 
development, speed the development 
of a strong regional grouping in 
Southeast Asia, and discourage the 
emergence of polarization between two 
antagonistic blocs in that area. These 
are constructive steps, and we wel- 
come their vigorous implementation. 

In the weeks ahead, there will be 
visible evidence of our resolve to in- 
tensify America's diplomatic efforts in 
Asia. 

Vice President Mondale will depart 
April 29 for Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific. He will visit the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Aus- 
tralia, and New Zealand on a mission 
which we consider of great impor- 
tance. Important changes are taking 
place in that region. The Vice Presi- 
dent will be assessing the force and 
direction of those changes in order to 
offer recommendations on how we can 
continue to play a constructive role 
commensurate with our significant 
stake in the prosperity and security of 
that area. 

On May 3 Prime Minister Fukuda 
will visit Washington for consultations 
with President Carter. We welcome 
this chance to harmonize our ap- 



proaches to key issues in advance of 
the Bonn summit in July. The two 
leaders know and respect each other; I 
know personally that they work well 
together. 

On May 18 I will embark on a trip 
to Northeast Asia. In Peking I will 
discuss global issues of parallel con- 
cern with Chinese leaders. Sub- 
sequently I will visit Tokyo and Seoul 
to hold consultations with the leaders 
of Japan and the Republic of Korea. 

Conclusion 

The relationship that has developed 
between the United States and Japan is 
uniquely significant. Despite differ- 
ences in our national situation and 
national styles, we have fashioned ties 
that are rooted in shared interests and 
common values — our commitment to 



Department of State Bt 

democratic procedures, civil ri 
the market system, a free press, 
open societies. 

The attributes of the Japa 
people and nation are formidable, 
people and a nation, we have cor 
respect, admire, and often learn 
Japan — even as we compete. Th 
the essence of our interdepend 
which has been built carefully 
trust, vitality, and common purpos 

Looking back at what we 1 
created over the past 30 years, we 
assert with confidence that we 
established a permanent partnersh 
value not only to ourselves but to 
entire world community. We 
work to assure its durability. 



Address before the Japan Society in ,Ven 
on Apr. 27, 197S (lex! from White House 
release of Apr, 27). 



JAPAN— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 147.470 sq mi. (slightly smaller 
than Calif). 

Capital: Tokyo (pop. I 1 .6 million). 

Other Cities: Osaka (2.8 million). 
Yokohama (2.6 million). Nagoya (2 mil- 
lion), Kyoto (1.4 million). 

People 

Population: 1 13 million i 147(1). 
Annual Growth Rale 1'. 
Density: 778 per sq mi. 
Religions: Shintoism. Buddhism 
Language: Japanese- 
Literacy: 99'. 

Life Expectancy: 72 > rs (males, 77 yrs. 
(females) 

Government 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. 

Date of Constitution: May 3, 1947. 

Branches: Executive — Prime Minister 
(Head of Government) Legislative — 
bicameral Diet of House of Represent.! 
tives (511 seats) and House of Council- 
lors i 252 sens) Judicial — Civil law sys- 
tem with Anglo-American influence 

Political Parlies. Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP). Japan Socialist Party (JSP). 
Democratic Socialist Party ( D S P ) , 
Komeito (Clean Government Part\). 
Japan Communist Party (JCP). New Lib- 
eral Club(NLC). 

Suffrage: Universal over 20. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 47 Prefec- 
tures. 

Economy 

GNP: $584 billion (1977). 
Annual Growth Rate 6 !9S I 1976). 
Per Capita GNP: $5,000 ( 1977) 
Agriculture: Products — rice, vegetables, 
fruits, milk. meat, natural silk. 



Industry: Products — machinery and equi 
menl. metals and metal products, te 
tiles, autos, chemicals, electrical ai 
electronic equipment. 

Natural Resources: Negligible mineral 
sources, fish. 

Trade: Exports — $80.5 billion (197' 
machinery and equipment, metals a 
metal products, textiles. Partners — U. 
(24.5%). EC (10.9%), Southeast Asp 
(31.5s"r). Communist countries (69 
Imports— $70.8 billion (1977): fos 
fuels, metal ore, raw material- 
foodstuffs, machinery and equipmei 
Partners— U.S. (17.5%), EC (5.9SI 
Southeast Asia (49.9'r). Communi 
countries (4 7', ' i 

Official Exchange Rate: ifloating) appro I 
225 yen=US$1.00 (May 1978). 

Economic Aid Extended: Total official ai 
private resource flow (1976) — $4 
lion; official development assistan 
(1976)— $1.1 billion 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies. IC 
GATT.OECD. IEA. 

Principal Government Officials 

Japan: Prime Minister — Takeo Fukud; 

Minister of Foreign Affairs — Sun 

Sonada; Ambassador to the U.S.- 

Fumihiko Togo 
United States: Ambassador Michael J 

Mansfield. 



Taken from the Department of Stale' 
January 1978 edition of the B\< KGROUN 
Notes on Japan Copies of the comple 
Note may he purchased for 5()<t from th,. 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. I"" 
eminent Printing Office. Washington, DC I 
20402 fa 2591 discount is allowed wkeA 
ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to the 
same address I 



11978 



Japan in the llorlcf Economy 



ibert D. Hormats 

United States and Japan are the 
I's two largest market economies, 
GNP's of $1.8 trillion and $584 
n, respectively, in 1977. Japan is 
econd largest trading partner of 
Inited States (after Canada). Last 
our two-way trade came to $29 
n. 

I addition. Japan is the largest ex- 
market for many Asian countries, 
senting 40% of the exports of 
esia, about 30% of the exports of 
talia and Thailand, and 20% of 
■xports of Korea, Malaysia, and 
e hilippines. Japan's growth, there- 

■ helps to stimulate U.S. exports 

■ ly and through its positive effect 
■per economies. 

1; economic development of Japan 
rt' last 30 years has been dramatic. 
|J')52 Japan's per capita GNP of 
18 put it in the ranks of middle- 
I developing countries. Its per 
ipi GNP of over $5,000 in 1977 

■ it close to the top among indus- 
a ed democracies. 

J>an's rapid growth, and the struc- 
N of Japan's economy which de- 
:Ii ed along with that growth, may 
«i hadow future developments in 
b economies. Over the past several 
a economic consultations with the 
piese have focused on our joint 
B s to manage the adjustments to 

■ i's increasing economic weight 
hn the framework of the liberal 
a- and payments system set up 
Wt the General Agreement on 
U f s and Trade (GATT) and the 

■ national Monetary Fund (IMF). 
I: look at the increasingly strong 
B th in the economies and exports 
Niore advanced developing coun- 
ie such as Korea. Brazil, Mexico, 
ic Taiwan and observe also the rapid 
lis in comparative advantage 
xght about by rapid communica- 
I and transportation, we may ex- 
it that these and similar countries 
I increasingly pose adjustment 
llems for the United States as 
» as Japan and for the world econ- 
I as a whole. We and the other 
■strialized democracies will have 
live increasing thought to this 
meet. 

rhaps our experience with the de- 
Ibment and growth of Japan will be 
Buctive. 



Role of Exports 

Japan is a country which has indus- 
trialized with virtually no resource 
base. It imports all of the crude oil, 
iron ore, cotton, wool, bauxite, and 
gum rubber it uses; nearly all of its 
copper and roughly 75% of its coal. 
This nearly total dependence on im- 
ported raw materials means that Ja- 
pan's prosperity depends heavily on 
international trade. It accounts in large 
measure for Japan's strong concerns 
about exports and the importance 
placed on them by Japanese society. 
Japan has a natural trade deficit in raw 
materials and trade-related services. It 
seeks a surplus in trade in manufac- 
tured goods to balance these. 

Yet, as in the U.S. economy, the 
share of trade in the Japanese economy 
is surprisingly low. Over the 1953-72 
period, Japanese exports were 11.3% 
of GNP, and imports were 10.2% of 
GNP, compared to 21.2% and 20.9% 
for the European members of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). In 1976, 
Japanese exports were still only 14% 
of GNP and imports only 12%. 

Increased exports have accompanied 
Japanese growth and have contributed 
significantly to it, but they have not 
been the key factor. Japanese growth 
and industrial policies in the postwar 
period have focused mainly on stimu- 
lation of domestic economic expan- 
sion; strong export performance pro- 
ceeded in parallel with this effort. 

Japan has had to husband its limited 
resources carefully, for its growth de- 
pends on making the most efficient use 
of its labor, capital, and land. To 
create economic growth from a very 
small capital stock after World War II, 
the Japanese Government encouraged 
debt financing, through the Bank of 
Japan, to promote investment. The 
focus has been on a few key 
industries — especially chemicals, steel, 
shipbuilding, and autos. Tax policy 
encouraged saving and investment and 
gave incentives for industries' expan- 
sion. Import competition, at least to 
the mid-1960's, was very tightly con- 
trolled by protective barriers. Those 
firms that could expand rapidly en- 
joyed the greatest benefits by borrow- 
ing heavily and by taking advantage of 
tax breaks, such as accelerated depre- 
ciation on new equipment. Firms that 



could export as well as supply the 
domestic market expanded especially 
rapidly, received substantial tax bene- 
fits, and enjoyed significant economies 
of scale. They could undersell smaller 
competitors without sacrificing return 
on capital and so expand further at the 
expense of smaller companies. 

These carefully designed govern- 
ment programs of growth incentives 
have been enormously successful in 
expanding the economy. They have 
stimulated a flow of resources from a 
huge pool of savings (about 35% of 
GNP) into high-growth industries, 
with the greatest benefits going to the 
most price-competitive, largest- volume 
firms. The growth of Japan's domestic 
economy has led the export sector. 

Exports are, however, an important 
factor in Japanese growth. They have 
served to maintain economic activity 
in times of slack domestic demand. 
Because of their high-fixed costs — 
particularly levels of debt and 
"lifetime employment" policies — 
Japanese firms place a premium on 
maintaining high levels of output. 
Many have also invested a great deal 
of time, effort, and managerial talent 
in developing and servicing their 
foreign markets, encouraged in part by 
the persistent undervaluation of the 
yen in the 1960's. When domestic 
demand drops during recession, 
Japanese producers understandably 
turn to export markets to maintain use 
of capacity. 

The largest gains in Japanese shares 
of foreign markets have coincided 
with, or followed immediately after, 
domestic recessions. The ability of 
Japanese industry to turn rapidly to 
production for export when domestic 
demand falls has helped Japan to shor- 
ten downturns in the business cycle 
and sustain high rates of growth. 

Why have Japanese growth and ex- 
port policies created such extreme ten- 
sions among the industrialized coun- 
tries when other countries, including 
Western Europe and the United States, 
have also experienced a rapid growth 
in exports over the past 30 years? 
Major reasons are the phenomenal 
growth in the Japanese economy com- 
pared to other economies and the con- 
centration of Japanese exports in a 
relatively few product areas. 

Part of the answer also lies in the 
composition of Japan's trade in man- 
ufactured goods. In North America 
and in Western Europe, a large part of 
the growth in exports in manufactures 
since the mid-1950's has been in in- 
termediate goods. There has been a 
clear trend toward increased spe- 
cialization, a trend accelerated by the 
formation and expansion of the Euro- 



Department of State Bu, 



pean Economic Community and by 
close economic links between the 
United States and Canada. Over half 
of world trade in manufactures con- 
sists of shipments of intermediate in- 
puts, and over half of the growth of 
trade in manufactures (1955-73) has 
occurred within North America and 
within Western Europe rather than 
among continents. For countries in 
these geographic regions, exports of 
manufactures include a high percent- 
age of foreign inputs. Thus a country's 
imports may actually include a sub- 
stantial amount of intermediate goods 
which it had earlier exported. 

Japan, however, is not part of an 
integrated, geographic trading area and 
for a time was significantly insulated 
from intermediate products from other 
areas by trade barriers. Except for its 
dependence on raw materials, most of 
its economy is, therefore, self- 
contained. Its main trading partners 
are the diverse countries of the Pacific 
rim, the United States, and the coun- 
tries of Southeast Asia. Because of its 
geographic position and its trade pol- 
icy, Japan did not participate as fully 
as others in the process of interna- 
tional specialization in manufacturing 
which occurred in the 1950's and 
1960's. Its imports of manufactures 
are unusually low — about 20% of total 
imports with little growth — so that its 
exports of manufactures contain a very 
high proportion of domestic value 
added. And manufactures are over 
90% of Japanese exports. 

In other words, despite the rela- 
tively low ratio of export to GNP, an 
unusually large part of the value of 
Japanese export production is domes- 
tic. The lack of Japanese participation 
in trade in intermediate manufactured 
goods, and the difficulty in penetrating 
the Japanese market encountered by 
intermediate or final products, has re- 
duced the benefits that other indus- 
trialized countries receive from 
Japanese growth. 

Trade Barriers 

Trade barriers contributed in a 
major way to the low share of man- 
ufactures in Japan's imports. And 
while Japan has, in the 1970's, em- 
barked on a constructive and sus- 
tained path toward reducing these, the 
legacy of the 1950's and 1960's has 
had an impact on the structure of 
Japanese industry. 

In the 1950's, as the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) moved to spur development of 
key sectors such as petrochemicals, 
automobiles, electronics, and heavy 
machinery, the Japanese Government 



Japan's Exports and Imports by Destination and Origin (1977) 



(in millions of dollars and percent) 



Total 100 % 
U.S. 

EC 

EFTA 

Asia 

Latin 
America 

Africa 

Oceania 

Communist 
Countries 

Canada 

Other 



80.495 



ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ 70-809 '// ////////////////. 



Tzzzzzzzzzz za 12,396 



] 19,717 



* 



EZZZ24A9S 

bi. 



8.736 



[2,373 
,051 



7ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ2ZZZ352E?ZZk 



I 6,292 
V/A 3.065 



1 6,643 



\/A 2,128 ' 

I 1 3,047 

W/?//\ 6.213 



1 4,910 

zzzn,3i9 



SI, 708 
3 2,881 

F 11,714 
233 



I I I l I I I I I L 



percent 



10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 



Exports 

Import.; \7?////. 



E 



Note: Imports on cif basis. 

Source: Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics (Japan) 



imposed quotas to block imports of 
competing products. These quotas 
were extremely restrictive; for exam- 
ple, virtually no foreign cars entered 
japan from the early 1950's to the 
late 1960's. 

This high degree of protection also 
inhibited Japanese access to foreign 
markets. Although Japan joined the 
GATT in 1955, many countries (in- 
cluding the United Kingdom, France, 
and Austria) contended that Japanese 
quotas prevented establishment of re- 
ciprocal most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment and refused (under article 
XXXV) to assume GATT obligations 
toward Japan. Nevertheless, because 
Japan accounted for only a small 
share of world trade (3.2% in 1960), 
Japanese protection did not create 
major problems for the world trading 
system. 

Gradual liberalization of Japan's 
import regime, and full acceptance of 
Japan as an MFN trading partner, 



came in the 1960's. In 1962, 
items were still under Japanese q 
restriction. This fell to 229 in 1' 
to 122 by 1970, and stands at 
today. Many other industrialized 
tions, it must be noted, have rou 
the same number of quotas. 

Removal of quotas, however, 
posed other trade barriers. In 
1950's, tariffs were quite high 
the neighborhood of 15% on ca|i 
goods and 24% on consumer good! 
nominal terms. And because Jai 
maintained tariffs on goods at I 
vanced stages of production that \m 
sharply higher than tariffs on I 
materials, the effective rate of t;a 
protection was much higher than U 
nominal rate. 

The Kennedy Round produce > 
noticeable liberalization of Japarto 
tariff barriers, lowering nominal r* 
to about 9.5% on capital goods ami 
about 12% on consumer goods, \1 
the estimated rate of effective pro* 



1978 



falling from 22% to 13% on 

al goods and from 35% to 14% 

onsumer goods. Unilateral tariff 

:tions of 20% in October 1972 

er reduced applied tariffs to an 

ge of about 8% on industrial 

rts, although these applied rates 

not bound internationally under 

iATT. And high protective tariffs 

tin on some key items, e.g., 

on computers and 22.5% on 

heral equipment. 

J>anese tariffs on industrial goods 

Si central issue in the multilateral 

n negotiations (MTN), where our 

■live, as stated in the Strauss- 

-slba joint statement [of January 

'■], is to achieve comparable aver- 

eevels of bound tariffs at the end 

le negotiations. We will also 

c|. on nontariff barriers and other 

lpdiments to trade. Major reduc- 

>H by Japan in this exercise would 

! Jill another step in improving the 

tlj ce between manufactured goods 

id aw materials in Japanese imports 

c mprove the climate for Japanese 

;p-ts as well. 

5 uctural barriers to imports also 
>q difficulties for importers. Struc- 
xi problems include the complex 
ic fragmented Japanese distribution 
■sm. Japan relies for distribution 
f )ods on an extraordinarily large 
.iner of very small retail outlets — 
ipi has about twice as many retail 

s per 1 ,000 of population as does 
leJnited States. The chain of dis- 
ittion, from the importer to the 
:t ler, involves many links, and 
j( s passing through the chain must 
: narked up at every stage. An 
n] rted good which arrives at the 
M;r with a price advantage over 
ijnese domestic production may 
« this advantage through these suc- 
■ ive mark-ups, although some 
ipese firms also suffer from the 
il: distribution difficulties. 
Jjanese consumers also appear to 
iv- domestically made goods. This 
a is probably a question of taste, a 
"clem which can be overcome by 
i'ul market research by potential 
[Jrters and adaptation of produc- 
t to meet the needs of the Japanese 
B:et. Clearly, American producers 
b want to export to Japan must 
t^i the same efforts to accommo- 
M Japanese tastes as Japanese ex- 
Sirs do in accommodating Ameri- 
Wastes. 

■culture 

iriculture is the most inefficient 

1 highly protected sector of Japan's 
Momy. Despite very high prices, 
C average fanner's productivity in 



Japan is only about one-fifth that of 
the average worker in manufacturing. 
Farm income is correspondingly low. 
Despite protection, however, we 
should not forget that Japan is a 
large, growing, and reliable consumer 
of U.S. agricultural products — it's 
our best agricultural customer. 

The barriers to agricultural trade 
with Japan flow directly from the 
social and political situation of its 
farmers. Farm population in Japan, 
which was still 27% of the total in 
1960, has fallen to about 10% in 
1976. The remaining farmers tend to 
be older persons with little interest, 
or ability, in nanfarm employment. 
They constitute an important political 
bloc, largely supportive of the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
Perhaps 80% of LDP members of the 
Japanese Diet come from districts 
with substantial members of farm 
voters, and a very sizable block of 
LDP Diet members is totally opposed 
to any liberalization of agricultural 
trade. 

In addition, Japan feels a sense of 
insecurity about access to food 
supplies, a concern heightened by talk 
of "agripower" and by the short- 
lived U.S. embargo on soybean ex- 
ports in 1973. As a result, Japanese 
self-sufficiency in agriculture remains 
high — about 72% overall — with sharp 
declines in the past 20 years only in 
wheat, barley, and soybeans. 

The Ministry of Agriculture gets 
10-12% of the national budget, and 
outlays for farm price supports — 
principally for rice — are extremely 
high. 

The import quotas still maintained 
by Japan are virtually all on agricul- 
tural products. Among the most acute 
problems for U.S. exports are the 
quotas on beef — which sells for about 
$17 per pound in Tokyo — and citrus 
products. Japanese tobacco imports 
are heavily restricted by state-trading 
practices. State trading also affects 
rice, wheat, barley, and rye; many 
dairy products; salt; and alcohol. The 
United States is also affected by 
Japanese restrictions on meat, poul- 
try, dairy products, and a variety of 
fruits and vegetables. These problems 
are under discussion bilaterally and in 
the MTN. 



Shifting Comparative Advantage 

But while some sectors of Japan's 
economy are protected and ineffi- 
cient, many others are extremely 
dynamic. Consistent with its desire to 
make the most efficient use of its 
resources, Japan has been quick to 
take advantage of shifts in compara- 



tive advantage between it and certain 
developing countries. One prominent 
economist has called this phenomenon 
the "dynamic international division 
of labor. " 

In the 1930's Japan began compet- 
ing internationally with the United 
Kingdom in textiles. It moved into a 
wide range of other light industrial 
exports during the 1950's. In the 
1960's it shifted into increasingly 
sophisticated and technologically ad- 
vanced areas. 

These shifts have taken place not 
only because there is demand from 
advanced markets such as the United 
States for high-technology products 
but also because there is increased 
export competition in less sophisti- 
cated product areas from the middle- 
level developing countries such as 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Sing- 
apore. And in 1977, total exports 
from these four countries were almost 
half of total exports from Japan. 

These countries have moved into 
three different geographical markets 
formerly occupied almost exclusively 
by Japanese products: 

• Markets in the developing coun- 
tries themselves; 

• Markets in Japan; and 

• Markets in developed countries 
such as the United States. 

For example, Japan's exports of 
TV receivers to Asian markets in 
Southeast Asia dropped by 46% be- 
tween 1970 and 1976, while Japan's 
imports of TV receivers from the four 
countries mentioned above almost 
doubled. 

Similarly, Japan's share of the 
U.S. textile and apparel imports 
dropped from about 25% to around 
10% between 1970 and 1976, while 
the four Asian countries mentioned 
increased their share from about 25% 
to over 40%. Drops in Japanese mar- 
ket shares and increases in the other 
Asian countries' market shares also 
occurred in many other product 
categories, including clothing, 
plywood, footwear, radios, and tele- 
vision sets. 

With Japanese industries increas- 
ingly feeling the pressure of Asian 
competition, there is increasing incen- 
tive for them to move into higher 
value-added industries. There are 
some demands for protection in Ja- 
pan, but imposing new restrictions on 
imports does not seem to be the sort 
of policy the Japanese Government is 
interested in pursuing. 

Rather, the Japanese Government is 
moving toward speeding the process 
of adjustment of Japanese industries 
to the new competititon, moving 



8 



Department of State Bui 



workers out of less competitive, low- 
technology industries into more com- 
petitive, high-technology areas. 
Japanese leaders are recognizing that 
the structural changes in the other 
Asian countries are quite rapid, with 
entirely new products being exported 
from these countries during a period 
of only a few short years. In addition 
to industry-specific adjustment pro- 
grams to relieve pressures on 
structurally depressed industries, the 
Japanese Government's attainment of 
its growth target will assist Japanese 
industries in their shift from lower- 
technology to higher-technology 
areas. 

Post-1973 Events 

The 1973 oil embargo, followed by 
the quadrupling of oil prices, led to 
the recession that has contributed 
heavily to today's situation. 



In 1971 and 1972, Japan experi- 
enced an extraordinary surge in ex- 
ports, a large balance-of-payments 
surplus, and a huge increase in hold- 
ings of foreign exchange. Official re- 
serves, which stood at $4.8 billion at 
the end of 1970, rose to $14.1 billion 
by the end of 1971 and to almost $17 
billion by the end of 1972. This rise 
occurred despite the 17% yen revalua- 
tion of December 1971 from a rela- 
tively constant postwar rate of 360 to 
the dollar to roughly 315. These de- 
velopments led to strong international 
criticism of Japanese policies and to 
pressure on Japan to liberalize im- 
port barriers — a situation not unlike 
today's. 

It was in this atmosphere that Japan 
reduced industrial tariffs unilaterally 
by 20% in October 1972, floated the 
yen (which rose to roughly 271), and 
hosted the meeting of ministers that 
inaugurated the Tokyo Round of 



multilateral trade negotiation! 
September 1973. 

The October 1973 oil crisis hi 
these trends. Japan experienced 
mendous inflationary pressure a 
drop in the yen against the dc 
Domestic policies, including j 
controls and restrictive fiscal 
monetary policies, were introduct 
curb demand, and GNP fell in 
terms. The yen weakened to 300. 

These measures took some tirr 
take hold. Inflation in consi 
prices approached a peak of 45' 
the spring of 1974. The Japanese 
ance of payments shifted into di 
($4.7 billion on current accour 
1974). The next stage of the Japa 
response was characterized by ef 
to let the price system reflect 
increase in energy and other comi 
ity prices. Direct price controls 
eliminated by the end of 1974. 
products, power, and other de 



71,944 



Japan's Exports and Imports by Principal Commodity (Jan.-Nov. 1977) 

(in millions of dollars and percent) 

Exports 

Total 100 % 

Motor Vehicles 

Iron and Steel 

Ships 

Textiles 

Chemicals 



10,223 
9,484 



7,577 



Scientific and 
Optical Equipment 

Radios 
Other 



D 
□ 



4,138 
841 



2,268 
2,204 



32,209 



I I I I I I I 1 I I 
percent 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 



Note: Imports on cif basis. 

Source: Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics (Japan) 



Imports 

Total 100% 

Crude Oil 

Foodstuffs 

Machinery 

Logs and 
Lumber 

Coal 

Chemicals 

Iron Ore 

Petroleum 
Products 

Textile Raw 
Materials 

Soybeans 



v//////////^y/jm 



'///\ 4,365 
^ 3,483 
^ 3,260 



2,735 



2j 2,338 



r 



2,033 



1,844 



977 



V////////A ^.683 



_LJ I I I 



percent 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 



978 



A, increased in price by 30-50%. 
lit monetary and fiscal policies 
led hold down the rate of inflation 
|fri2 this period. 

R, 1975 the atmosphere of crisis 
■lifted. Inflation was held to 10%, 
•jven-dollar rate settled in the 
fls, the current-account deficit was 
I zero. GNP held steady in real 
Es, and oii imports fell slightly, 
bvertheless, recovery was slow, 
fistrial production did not return to 
lb levels until mid-1976. Un- 
■loyment continued to rise. And as 
{happened in the past, slow 
lestic growth inspired an increase 
leports as manufacturers attempted 
Maintain production levels. In 1976 
an again had a current-account 
llus of $3.7 billion; this rose to 
■billion in 1977. 

rtJlus in Perspective 

■ie present period of current- 
junt surplus, as just noted, is not 
Ifirst which the Japanese have ex- 
I;nced. Japan entered a period of 
lained trade surpluses in 1965 and 
furrent-account surpluses in 1968, 
Irell as 1971. It should be instruc- 
I to look at the causes of the 
llus trend and the policies the 
ijnese Government developed then 
> djust to the surplus before we 
I at the present situation. 
J 1961 Japan had a current ac- 
;|it deficit of almost $1 billion. By 
9 it had a surplus of $5.8 billion. 
I ng this 10-year period, Japan's 

■ irts increased from $4.1 billion to 
16 billion, while imports increased 
ii $4.7 billion to $15.8 billion. A 
stnt study analyzed the causes of 
i< ncreases. 

|)ur factors, not including the con- 
I: of the undervalued yen, were 
kipally responsible for the $19.5 
ion increase in Japanese merchan- 
1 exports during 1961-71. 

I Growth in world GNP and in 
■id trade accounted for $9 billion 
§4%) of the increase. 

■ Japanese export prices rising 
Ie slowly than those of other in- 
lurialized countries accounted for 
Ii billion ( 12.4%) of the increase. 

i Shifts in Japan's comparative ad- 
ILage and development of new ex- 
Kj products accounted for $6.8 bil- 
|| (35%) of the increase. 
Benefits from lower tariffs (fol- 
ing implementation of the Ken- 
s' Round cuts) accounted for $1.3 
Bon (6.2%) of the total increase. 

»n the import side, four similar 
dors explain most of the increase in 
Bchandise imports from $4.7 bil- 



lion in 1961 to $15.8 billion in 1971. 

• Growth in Japanese GNP (con- 
sumption, investment, etc.) accounted 
for $9.0 billion (81.1%). 

• Changes in import prices ac- 
counted for $1 billion (9%), 

• Shifts in the structure of Japanese 
manufacturing accounted for $0.8 bil- 
lion (7.2%). 

• Japanese commercial policy (re- 
duction of tariffs, etc.) accounted for 
$0.3 billion (2.7%). 

Simple lessons can be learned from 
these facts. First, Japanese growth is 
by far the most important determinant 
of its import levels. Second, growth 
abroad is the most significant factor 
in increased Japanese exports. Third, 
product innovation is a major feature 
of Japanese export expansion. 

Japan's surplus remained large in 
1971. In June of that year, the 
Japanese Government announced its 
eight point plan to avoid yen revalua- 
tion. The plan included the following 
measures: 

1) Reduction of quantitative import 
restraints; 

2) Promotion of capital exports; 

3) Tariff cuts; 

4) Increase of government expendi- 
tures; 

5) Creation and enlargement of a 
generalized system of preferences to 
promote imports of manufactures 
from less developed countries; 

6) Reduction of nontariff barriers; 

7) Promotion of foreign aid; and 

8) Arrangements for orderly mar- 
keting of exports. 

In addition to product-specific 
measures to stimulate imports and re- 
strain exports, relaxation of restric- 
tions on capital outflows resulted in 
an increase in net long-term capital 
outflows from $155 million in 1969 
to $4.5 billion in 1972. 

These policies were not successful 
at curbing the pressure for yen re- 
valuation. The Japanese revalued the 
yen by 16.88% against the dollar as 
part of the Smithsonian Agreement on 
December 18, 1971, and agreed to let 
the yen float in early 1973. These 
policy measures contributed to elimi- 
nation of the surplus in 1973, and the 
oil-price increase brought about a 
$4.7 billion deficit in 1974. 

Japan subsequently returned to a 
current-account surplus of $3.7 bil- 
lion in 1976 and $11 billion in 1977. 
This dramatic rise had several causes. 

• Japanese firms cut their prices on 
exports, maintaining or improving 
their competitive positions overseas 
(export prices fell in yen in 1975, 



rose in 1976, and then dropped 
sharply in 1977 returning to 1975 
levels). 

• Energy and raw-material conser- 
vation helped slow imports and made 
production more efficient (Japanese 
oil imports have been nearly constant 
in volume since 1974). 

• Growth in Japan's export mar- 
kets, especially in the United States, 
increased demand for Japanese goods. 

In the past, when the Japanese 
surplus provoked international tension 
(as in 1969, 1971, and 1972), the 
Japanese tended to limit their re- 
sponse solely to the field of foreign 
economic policy. For example, the 
1971 plan to avoid yen revaluation 
included no measures, other than a 
small increase in government expendi- 
ture, that were directed at changing 
the structure of Japan's internal 
economy. 

Now, however, it appears that the 
Japanese leadership has come to rec- 
ognize that the Japanese surplus is to 
a large degree — and for a number of 
reasons pointed to earlier — a product 
of the structure of the Japanese econ- 
omy. The leadership also understands 
that the surplus is a problem which 
seriously affects other nations and the 
international economic system be- 
cause it adds to the burden on other 
oil-importing countries which already 
must finance the surplus of the mem- 
bers of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries. And Japan has 
seen that its surplus has important 
repercussions for currency markets. 

Because the problems, as noted 
above, are largely structural, the 
Japanese Government has few tools at 
its command to create a rapid turn- 
around in the situation. Japan is not, 
as some would suggest, a planned 
economy where directions can be 
dramatically altered by government 
fiat. 



What Can Reasonably Be Done? 

To understand the genuine policy 
dilemma which the Japanese Govern- 
ment faces, one has to understand the 
conflicting effects of yen apprecia- 
tion. The immediate effect of yen 
appreciation is to increase Japan's 
trade surplus. This is so because trade 
volumes are initially affected very lit- 
tle by the change in exchange values. 
Imports into Japan cost less, but it 
takes time to increase their volume. 
Exports from Japan cost more, but it 
takes time before orders and ship- 
ments fall off. Until trade volumes 
are substantially affected, the statisti- 
cal result is a larger trade surplus 



10 



after than before yen appreciation. 
Moreover, the increase in the trade 
surplus is larger if the trade values 
are expressed in dollars than if they 
are expressed in yen. 

Over time, yen appreciation will 
make imports into Japan more attrac- 
tive and will make Japanese exports 
more expensive on world markets. 
This should work to increase import 
volumes and reduce export volumes. 
But the full effect of any given ap- 
preciation of the yen may take up to 2 
years to fully work itself out. 

Another factor contributing to the 
delay is the effect of yen appreciation 
on profits and investment. As noted 
above, exports are only about 14% of 
Japanese GNP. But they account for 
roughly one-third of sales in the man- 
ufacturing sector and for over one- 
half in certain industries. Manufactur- 
ing firms in Japan have high fixed 
costs. They are highly leveraged, 
operating with 70-80% debt capital. 
And as a result of Japanese "lifetime 
employment" policies, wage bills are 
relatively inflexible. Although an in- 
crease in the yen's value can help a 
firm by lowering the yen cost of raw 
materials and energy, it can also 
cause a harmful, or even fatal, drop 
in cash flow by squeezing the profits 
of those who must shave prices in 
order to export or compete with 
imports. 

This situation has provoked a major 
shakeout in Japanese industry. Busi- 
ness failures have climbed steadily 
since the oil crisis — from 14,000 in 
1974 to almost 19,000 in 1977, an 
historically high level. Employment 
in manufacturing has fallen 9% since 
1973. Reductions in exports would 
accelerate these trends. 

On the import side, the main de- 
terminant of demand is domestic 
growth. Because 80% of Japanese 
imports are raw materials and 
semimanufactures, imports respond 
more dramatically to changes in 
domestic income than to changes in 
price. The appreciation of the yen 
lowers the price of imports, but it 
also inhibits domestic growth by re- 
straining business profits and invest- 
ment in internationally tradable 
goods. 

As yen appreciation begins to take 
hold in the export sector, businesses 
experiencing lower sales and profits 
will trim investment and inventory 
accumulation. Industrial production, 
employment, and personal income 
slip, and thus GNP growth and import 
demand are reduced. And because of 
the nature of the Japanese distribution 
system, price reductions on imports 



Department of State Bui 



U.S. Trade With Japan 

(in millions of dollars) 

LJ Export 
YA Import 



•: 



00 
co 

00 

cm" 



ID 

o 

V, 






to 
rv 
to 

oo oS" 
f-t 
oo 
CO 



w rr-x 



v, 



'A 



Z 



21 



CO 



s 

in 



1 



OOr 

in 



r 



J 



A 



00 
ID 
00 

1 



« 









1972 



1973 



1974 



1975 



1976 



1977 



Note: Imports on F.A.S. basis 

Source: Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade 



may not be passed through to 
consumers. 

The net effect of the sharp appreci- 
ation of the yen on import demand 
has been positive, but it is not so 
great as the swing in the value of the 
yen would initially lead one to 
expect. 

Under these circumstances, it is 
clear that strong domestic demand, to 
draw in imports and to ease the pres- 
sure on manufacturers to export, is 
the most effective remedy in the short 
term to reduce Japan's current- 
account surplus. In the longer term, 
elimination of the Japanese current- 
account surplus will also require 
structural changes in the Japanese 
economy. Some of these changes 
involve trade policy — including elimi- 
nation of barriers to import compe- 
tition in the Japanese market, espe- 
cially for manufactured goods. More 
importantly, Japanese firms should see 



it in their interest to participate r 
fully in trade in intermediate g< 
which in turn will increase the shai 
manufactured components in Japa 
imports. And, of course, firm 
other countries wishing to expot 
Japan must make a determined el 
to identify and take advantage of 
port opportunities. 

Until all of this is done, Japan 
contribute to the adjustment pro< 
and to global economic health by 
nificantly increasing its aid to po 
countries, and it has pledged to m 
in this direction. 

What Can Be Expected? 

The Japanese current-acco 
surplus will not quickly disapp' 
The conditions for its eliminatl 
include: 

• Sustained strong growth 



' 



1978 



11 



gestic demand in the Japanese 
«omy; 

^Improvement in the competitive 
jprtunities for imports in the 
ttnese market and a willingness on 
aiart of exporters to exploit those 
iprtunities; 

• Reduction in the level of protec- 
y. afforded to Japanese agriculture; 
c 

fA shift in the structure of 
.pnese manufacturing toward use of 
rgher percentage of imported in- 
jt] at various stages in the produc- 
jiprocess. 

Te present situation is unstable, 
peciation of the yen works to ex- 
ii imports and slow exports but 
0| slowly than desired and with 
liful effects on some sectors of the 
ipnese economy. The Japanese 
irlus creates pressures for protec- 
31 in other countries; if govern- 
ed succumb to these pressures, 
ei will feed inflation, weakening 



their currencies and hindering pros- 
pects for growth and structural change 
in Japan. Our present course, which 
relies on positive Japanese action 
rather than import restrictions and 
which looks for structural changes 
rather than a quick fix, is the correct 
one. 

Following intensive consultations 
between Japanese and U.S. Govern- 
ment officials in the last quarter of 
1977, the Japanese Minister for Ex- 
ternal Economic Affairs, Mr. 
Nobuhiko Ushiba and Ambassador 
Strauss [Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations Robert S. Strauss] 
announced policies designed to reduce 
the surplus substantially during 1978. 

In addition to product-specific 
measures dealing with certain prod- 
ucts such as beef, citrus, and forest 
products, the Japanese Government 
reiterated its real growth target of 7% 
for Japan fiscal year 1978; announced 
that domestic economic growth, yen 
appreciation, and efforts to improve 



the access of foreign goods to the 
Japanese domestic market would sub- 
stantially reduce Japan's current- 
account surplus in 1978; and stated 
that additional steps to reduce it fur- 
ther would be taken in 1979 with the 
ultimate goal being equilibrium in the 
current account. 

We recognize the difficulties that 
the Japanese Government faces in try- 
ing to achieve that goal, but we also 
recognize the importance of its mak- 
ing every effort to do so. 

In our talks with the Government of 
Japan, we have tried to maintain a 
spirit of cooperation. Our economies 
are too closely linked for either side 
to benefit from a confrontation. We 
are pleased that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment has recognized that the 
growth of its domestic economy is a 
matter of international interest and 
concern. 

In a broader perspective, we and 
Japan share an interest in progress 
and cooperation in the Pacific area. 



Major Products in U.S.-Japan Trade (1977) 

(in millions of dollars and percent) 
U.S. Exports 



Total 100% 

Nonelectrical 
Machinery 

Feedgrains 

Logs and 
Lumber 

Soybeans 

Coal 

Agricultural 
Raw Material 

Chemicals 

Consumer 
Goods 

Other 



percent 



10,522 



1,124 
1,061 



945 

938 
899 

861 



606 
591 



3,497 



U.S. Imports 
Total 100% 



V////////////M&0M 



' V////////////////fib ** 



Parts and Engines 

Machinery 

Iron and 
Steel Products 



Y/////////A *™ 



V////////A *-™ 



Radio. TV. Phonos V///////A 2|418 
and Appliances V////////\ 



Other Consumer 
Goods 

Other 



V/////////A ^ 



L_l I I I I LJ 

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 



percent 



10 15 20 25 30 35 



No;e: Imports on F.A.S. basis 

Source: Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade 



12 



THE PRESIDENT: Mews 
Conference of April 25 (Excerpts) 



Q. Where do you stand now on 
the possibility of imposing, by 
Executive order or administrative 
action, oil import fees, and how 
soon might you act? I understand a 
couple of your advisers are suggest- 
ing a May 1 deadline. 

A. No one has suggested a deadline 
that early. As a matter of fact, we 
have just finished the fourth major 
element of a five-part comprehensive 
fuel or energy program with natural 
gas deregulation. And now this is 
being recommended to the complete 
conference committee. 

The next step is the crude oil 
equalization tax, which will be ad- 
dressed by the Finance Committee in 
the Senate and the Ways and Means 
Committee in the House — 
representatives of them in a conference 
committee. I've talked to the chairmen 
of both those committees about the 
crude oil equalization tax, the fifth 
element of our major proposals. 

It's too early, I think, to consider 
administrative action. I still hope and 
expect that the Congress will act and 
will complete the fifth element of our 
energy plan and present the entire 



package as it should be to the Con- 
gress in one body. 

Q. President Brezhnev has offered 
to not build the neutron bomb if you 
agree or the United States agrees to 
do likewise. Is that the word you're 
looking for to halt the program? 

A. No. The Soviets know and Pres- 
ident Brezhnev knows that the neutron 
weapon is designed to be used against 
massive and perhaps overwhelming 
tank forces in the Western and Eastern 
European area. 

The Soviets, over a period of years, 
have greatly built up their tank forces 
and others, stronger than have the 
NATO allies. The neutron weapons 
are designed to equalize that inequal- 
ity, along with many other steps that 
our country is now taking. 

The Soviets have no use for a neu- 
tron weapon, so the offer by Brezhnev 
to refrain from building the neutron 
weapons has no significance in the 
European theater, and he knows this. 

We are strengthening NATO in 
other ways. Ourselves, our NATO al- 
lies, will meet here in Washington the 
last of May with a recommitment, 
which is already well in progress, for 
a long-range strengthening of NATO 
in all its aspects. 



The interdependence of the Pacific 
nations has not been as clearly recog- 
nized as, for instance, that which 
exists among the nations of Europe. 
Yet, as we have seen, trade has 
boomed of late without benefit of a 
common market or free-trade area. In 
part this is because the economies of 
the region are largely complementary, 
in part because of the drop in the cost 
of shipping, and in part because these 
countries have provided a favorable 
climate for investment and export- 
oriented production. 

These nations can benefit from 
closer cooperation in trade, com- 
modities, food and agriculture, 
energy, investment, and development 
assistance. More intensive consulta- 
tion among these nations — 
particularly the OECD countries of 
the area and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations — appears to 
be a logical outgrowth of these 
relationships. 



Beyond this we and Japan collabo- 
rate closely in the OECD, the eco- 
nomic summit framework, financial 
fora, and various North-South discus- 
sions to deal with multilateral issues 
of common concern. As vital cogs in 
the world economy, the United States 
and Japan together play an indispens- 
able role in the orderly evolution of 
the world economy. We benefit from 
our economic relationship far more 
than we are harmed by occasional 
difficulties. □ 



Statement before the Subt ommittee on Interna- 
tional Economic Polic) and Trade of the House 
Committee on Intel national Relations on Apr. 
4. 1978. The complete transcript of the hear 
ings will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington, DC. 20402. Mr. Hormats is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. 



Department of State Bu> 

But this statement by Brezhnev 
cerning the neutron weapon has 
significance at all. 

Q. Are you going to heed the i 
of the congressional leadership 
your own party and delay the for 
submission of the package salt 
warplanes to the Congress or bi 
it up in any way? 



A. I've not been asked by the 1 
ership in the Congress to delay. 1 1 
had one Senator who came to sea 
about holding off on this propc 
Secretary Vance and I have bee: 
close communication, both with 
another and with leaders in the ( 
gress, for a number of weeks cone 
ing the arms sales package that wi 
presented to the Congress very sho 
This package will be presented ir 
dividual component parts to the < 
gress. It's the only legal way to do 

The Congress will act on tb 
major sales proposals individual! 
Israel, to Egypt, and to Saudi Ar; 
Each one is important. Each one t 
pletes a commitment that has 
made by either me, or, even in 
case of the Saudis and Israel, 
predecessors for these sales. 

I look upon them as a package, 
if the Congress should accept a po 
and reject another, then my intent 
withdraw the sales proposal altoge 
But the Congress will not receive 
act on these proposals as a pack 
They have to act, according to 
law, on individual items. 

These proposals are in the nati> 
interest. I think it's important to 
country to meet our commitments, 
one that's perhaps the most contrc 
sial is the sale of F-15's to the S 
Arabians. This was a' promise that 
made to the Saudi Arabians in 
tember of 1975, to let them ha' 
choice of F-16's or F-15's. They ' 
these weapons for defensive purpos 

I recommitted this nation to pro 
these planes both last year and a 
this year. And my deep belief is i 
since in the Middle East our pre< 
nent consideration is the long-r; 
and permanent security and peac< 
ness for the people of Israel, thi 
treat the moderate Arabs with fair 
and with friendship and to streng 
their commitment to us in return i 
the best interests of our own cou 
and of Israel. 

We are negotiating or discus; 
these matters with the Congress, 
there will be no delay of the s 
proposal beyond the point where it 
be completed by the time the Cong 
goes into recess — maybe 2 or 3 d 
no longer than that. 






1978 

Do you think it proper or do 

think it right for the foreign 

ster of another government to 

fere in the legislative processes 

is government? I'm talking par- 

arly about your Middle East 

package here, legislation which 

ijve said is in the best interest of 

■{United States. Do vou think it's 

:t? 

m I have made my decision about 
farms sales package after very care- 
I consideration, a close study of 
lions and opinions expressed by 
■predecessors in the White House, 
i'ul consultation with the State De- 
unent and our Defense Department, 
Imilitary leaders, and I made my 
Immendation to the Congress — I 
I make it shortly — on what I con- 
I to be in the best interests of our 
I nation with a well-balanced and 
Idly attitude toward our allies and 
Bds in the Middle East. 
I each one of these instances, the 
I sales proposals were made as a 
It of request by the governments 
lived. And I think that's the basis 
I'hich the decision should be made, 
liy making the request to the Con- 
|.. by Congress considering my re- 
|t for approval of the sales on the 
a interests of our country as judged 
II ie and the Congress. 



i. Just to follow up on the Middle 
4 thing, I would like to pursue it 
i! a little bit more maybe from a 
ii|itly different angle. The Israeli 
• ign Minister, Mr. Dayan, has 

■ ested that Israel might be will- 
:!(o give up its own fighter planes 
lour package if the sales were 
toped to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
jpw, in the light of your own pro- 
a;d interest in cutting back on 
ii ign arms sales, would you con- 
|r withdrawing the entire pack- 
i to prevent a new escalation of 
larms race in the Middle East? 

I. No, I would not. As I said 
ler, the process through which we 
I arms — and this sales proposal 
lid be completed 5 years in the 
Ire by, I think the last deliveries 

■ Id be 1983 — is initiated by a re- 
I >t from governments, foreign gov- 
I lents, that we permit the sale of 
1 5 to them. As I said earlier, we 
f imitted ourselves to help Saudi 

bia with arms sales to protect 
I iselves in September of 1975. 

t the same time, approximately, in 
| fall of 1975, our government 
(imitted to help Israel with their 
iwsal by making arms sales avail- 



able to them. Obviously, if any nation 
withdrew its request for arms sales, 
that would change the entire proce- 
dure. 

I have never heard of Foreign 
Minister Dayan 's statement that they 
did not need the weapons or would 
withdraw their request for weapons 
until today. Mr. Dayan is on the way 
to our country. He will be meeting 
shortly with the Secretary of State and 
others, and I think only after very 
close consultations with them can we 
determine whether or not Israel desires 
to go ahead with the arms sales com- 
mitment that I've made to them. 

But I do not intend to withdraw the 
arms sales proposals after they are 
submitted to the Congress, and I do 
not intend to delay. 

Q. If Mr. Dayan did in fact tell 
you that Israel would withdraw its 
request, would you then be willing 
to pull back the whole package? 

A. I can't imagine that happening, 
and I would rather not answer a 
hypothetical question of that kind. 

Q. You mentioned that Mr. Dayan 
is coming. I just wonder, sir, do you 
have any reason at all to feel op- 
timistic that the negotiations be- 
tween Israel and Egypt can somehow 
be brought off dead center? I know 
Mr. Antherton's [Alfred L. Ather- 
ton, Jr., Ambassador at Large with 
special responsibility for Middle 
East peace negotiations] been in 
Cairo, and you've had consultations. 
What is the outlook now? 

A. Yes, I have reason to be optimis- 
tic, but I can't predict success any 
time soon. This has been going on for 
30 years. 

I think compared to a year ago, for 
instance, remarkable progress has been 
made. After the visit of President 
Sadat to Jerusalem, there was a re- 
markable sense of excessive hope or 
euphoria that swept the world, that 
peace was imminent. Since then, I've 
met extensively with President Sadat 
and with Prime Minister Begin and 
also with the foreign ministers of the 
two countries involved. And there's 
still hope that we can move toward a 
peaceful settlement. 

I think if there were not hope, that 
Foreign Minister Dayan would not be 
coming to Washington to meet with 
our own officials to explore further 
avenues for progress. 

As you know, since Prime Minister 
Begin was here, Ezer Weizman, who 
is the Defense Minister of Israel, has 
been to Egypt twice to meet with 
President Sadat. So, discussions 



13 

are going on and explorations are 
continuing. 

And I am firmly convinced that both 
the Israelis and the Egyptians want 
peace. They both are concerned about 
the terms of peace. After years of 
hatred and even active combat, there's 
still an element of distrust about the 
future intentions of each other. 

But I am hopeful that we can con- 
tinue to make progress. My commit- 
ment is deep and irreversible. As long 
as I'm in the White House as Presi- 
dent, I will continue to pursue, with- 
out any slacking of my interests or 
commitment, the avenue toward peace. 

And I anticipate that now and in the 
future there will be temporary periods 
of discouragement and withdrawal of 
the negotiating parties. So, I think 
every evidence that I have both pub- 
licly and privately known is that both 
sides want peace and the progress to- 
ward peace is steady. 



Q. Your spokesmen have said that 
there will be written assurances 
from Saudi Arabia and Egypt that 
they will not use the warplanes 
against Israel in any future conflict. 
And further, various Administration 
spokesmen have pointed out that the 
Saudi Arabian Government will be 
dependent on the United States for 
technical support for these planes, 
and this support could always be cut 
off in the event that a future conflict 
would start and that the Saudis de- 
sired to use the weapons against Is- 
rael. Is it your understanding that 
both types of assurances will be in 
effect? 

A. We would not sell the planes to 
the Saudi Arabians if we thought that 
the desire was to use them against 
Israel. I'm completely convinced that 
the Saudis want their airplanes to be 
used to protect their own country. 

The Saudis have informed officials 
in our government that they do not 
desire to deploy them at Tabuk, which 
is the airfield nearest to Israel, and I 
know for a fact that the configuration 
of the weapons on the F— 15 that the 
Saudis have offered is primarily a de- 
fensive configuration. And for those 
reasons I feel sure that the problems 
that you described are adequately ad- 
dressed in the proposals that I've made 
to the Congress and in the statements 
that the Saudis have already made. 

□ 



For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 1 , 1978. p. 775. D 



14 



Department of State Bu 



THE SECRETARY: 

Foreign Assistance and U.S. Pollen 









Today I want to discuss with you a 
subject about which I care deeply be- 
cause of its importance to our nation. I 
speak of foreign assistance. 

Over the years the League of 
Women Voters has endeavored to ex- 
plain and support our foreign assist- 
ance programs. You have done this as 
an essential part of your nonpartisan 
program of public education. Your 
interest in and knowledge of foreign 
assistance has been a key element in 
making people aware of what their 
government is trying to achieve with 
these programs. 

The United States has a profound 
stake in its relationships with the na- 
tions and peoples in developing coun- 
tries. Our response to their problems, 
needs, and aspirations tests not only 
the quality of our leadership in the 
world but our commitment to eco- 
nomic and social justice. 

Let me begin our discussion by pos- 
ing three questions. First, why do we 
have foreign aid programs? Second, 
what are these programs designed to 
accomplish? Third, do they work? 

During the past 15 months as the 
Carter Administration fashioned aid 
budgets, reorganized aid programs, 
and discussed aid issues with Con- 
gress, we have thought with great care 
about these three questions. Today, in 
discussing our conclusions, I want to 
return to the basic elements of our aid 
programs. 



Why Foreign Aid 

Our foreign policy flows from what 
we are as a people — our history, our 
culture, our values, and our beliefs. 
One reason this nation has a foreign 
aid program is that we believe we 
have a humanitarian and moral obliga- 
tion to help alleviate poverty and pro- 
mote more equitable economic growth 
in the developing world. 

We cannot be indifferent when half 
a billion people are hungry and mal- 
nourished, when 700 million adults are 
illiterate, and when one and a half 
billion people do not have minimal 
health care. As free people who have 
achieved one of the highest standards 
of living in the world, we cannot fail 
to respond to such staggering statistics 
and the individual lives they encom- 
pass. We can be proud that we are a 
people who believe in the development 
of human potential. 



The answer to the question of why 
we have foreign aid programs also 
goes beyond our system of values and 
our concern for the less fortunate. 
Foreign aid is clearly in our national 
economic and political interest. 

The success or failure of developing 
countries to grow more food, develop 
new energy supplies, sell their raw 
materials and products, curb their 



. . . when we are discussing aid 
levels ... we are talking about 
whether or not we can fund prac- 
tical projects that make a differ- 
ence to people in need. 



birthrates, and defend themselves 
against aggression will matter to 
Americans. 

Our economic health and our secu- 
rity are more closely tied today than 
ever before to the economic well-being 
and security of the developing world. 
Progress there means more jobs and 
more prosperity for the United States. 

• The non-oil-producing developing 
countries are a major market for 
American goods, taking a quarter of 
our total exports last year. About the 
same share of our total exports goes to 
Europe and the Communist countries 
combined. 

• Products from less developed 
countries — including raw materials 
such as tin, copper, bauxite, and 
lead — accounted for nearly a quarter 
of our total imports last year. 

• Our nation gained more than $7 
billion from our direct private invest- 
ment in the developing world in 1975. 
And in 1976 developing countries ab- 
sorbed nearly $11 billion of our direct 
foreign investment. 

• In the export of our agricultural 
abundance last year, developing coun- 
tries purchased half of our exports of 
cotton, 65% of our wheat, and nearly 
70% of our rice. 

• Our economy benefits substan- 
tially as aid dollars are spent here to 
buy commodities and services. For 
example, for every dollar we have 
paid into such organizations as the 



World Bank and the regional 
velopment banks for Latin Amen 
Asia, and Africa, about $2 has 1 
spent in the U.S. economy. 

The economic growth of the 
veloping world is taking place prin 
ily as a result of massive effort; 
the leaders and peoples of the 
veloping nations. For many, the i 
critical international factors in 
growth and development are 
policies toward trade, investm 
commodities, and technology, 
economic aid, as well as that 
vided by other developed natiu 
also makes a crucial contributio 
their well-being. For s< 
countries — particularly the 1 
income nations — it is the princ 
source of foreign exchange and t 
nical assistance. But for many otl 
it serves as an essential complei 
to other components of their 
velopment strategy. 

In addition to America's econ( 
involvement in the developing w< 
our political interests are strongly 
gaged as well. Developing coun 
are often key participants in the c 
for peace. Regional stability 
peace in the Middle East, sout 
Africa, and elsewhere canno 
achieved without the cooperatioi 
developing nations. Achieving p 
ress on the global issues which 
rectly affect peace — arms restr 
and nonproliferation — depend 
large measure on strengthening pc 
cal ties between the industrialized l 
developing worlds. 

Our ties to developing countries e 
essential in many other areas w 1 
affect our national security: in dep^ 
ing our armed forces and in maintt- 
ing access to straits, ports, and a> 
tion facilities. 

But the peace and stability we J 
in the world cannot be obtained so 
through the maintenance of a str 
defense in concert with others, 
social unrest which breeds con* 
can best be prevented if econol; 
growth and an equitable distribu » 
of resources are realized. As Pi 
John XXIII so eloquently stated: I 
a world of constant want there is* 
peace . . . . " 

Foreign Assistance Programs 

In view of the stakes involved, I 
foreign aid goals must be matched H 



fc 1978 

M performance. The Carter Admin- 
lition is asking the Congress to 
ujorize and appropriate $8.4 billion 
fiour economic, food, security as- 
Ance programs, and contributions 
>jhe international financial institu- 
te this fiscal year. About 16% of 
M sum represents government 
■rantees and will not result in ac- 

■ spending. We are requesting 
lie sums because we believe that 

■ ign aid can and does work. We 
eeve it can have a direct impact on 
ciomic growth and the maintenance 
ifeace. 

et me give you a summary of 
i i we are trying to do. 

irst, in the area of bilateral eco- 
■iic assistance, we are trying to 
ermine the most effective way to 
■binel this aid to stimulate economic 
;rwth and alleviate poverty. In 
flng so we are implementing a 
U:egy which targets our resources 
tlctly on the needs of the poor. 
|j ed the "basic human needs" ap- 
■ach, this development strategy 
o:s to help people meet such basic 

■ Is as nutrition, shelter, education, 
in health care. It is not an interna- 
kal welfare program. It is, instead, 
in approach to development which 
I s the poor a chance to improve 

■ r standard of living by their own 
!f rts. 

Farmers need good quality seed if 
b are going to escape subsistence 
tg culture and grow enough food for 
h r families and to sell at the market 
s ell. Our aid program in Tanzania, 

instance, is helping that govern- 
ni t establish a seed multiplication 
ir ect to provide improved seed for 
h main crops grown there. The im- 

■ on the lives of Tanzanian farm- 
er should be large. 

1 In vast sections of West Africa, 
Male cannot live in potentially fer- 
U agricultural areas because of a 
Bible disease — river blindness. We 
hi helping to finance efforts to sup- 
m;s this affliction. Some success 
it been achieved. Small farmers are 
ilady beginning to resettle in areas 
•rich had been virtually abandoned. 

Education is critical to human 
fcelopment. In numerous poor coun- 
ts, our aid goes to training people 
■jural and urban areas in basic skills 
^ch permit them to earn a better 
Kng. Education takes place in many 
W's besides the schoolroom. It can 
Carried by low powered local radio 
■grams, such as one we fund in 
jitemala, or by direct broadcast 
■:llite TV, as in an experiment we 
*sted in India. 
iecond, the programs of the World 



Bank and the regional development 
banks through which we channel a 
significant amount of our foreign aid 
range from large, capital intensive 
programs, such as dams and roads, to 
smaller scale programs designed to 
directly improve the lives of the poor. 
These institutions can mobilize and 
coordinate large amounts of capital 
for development. And they can build 
consensus between aid donors and re- 
cipients on development goals. In 
performing these roles, they well 
serve U.S. interests. The work of 
these institutions is varied. 

• In Buenaventura, Colombia — one 
of the poorest cities in the 
hemisphere — the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank is trying to relocate 
slum dwellers and provide the city 
with safe drinking water to reduce 
disease. 

• In the West African country of 
Benin, the African Development Fund 
is improving rural health services by 
constructing dispensaries in remote 
areas and training people to run them. 

• In Burma, an Asian Development 
Bank loan will increase fish produc- 
tion for domestic consumption, thus 
raising the low protein intake of the 
population. 



15 

about whether or not we can fund 
practical projects that make a differ- 
ence to people in need. 

There is another important aspect 
of our foreign aid program which I 
would like to mention very briefly — 
our security assistance programs. 

These programs have three impor- 
tant objectives. First, they are de- 
signed to assist our friends and allies 
to provide for their legitimate defense 
needs. Second, these programs sup- 
port our strategic and political objec- 
tives of reducing tensions and promot- 
ing stability in areas of potential con- 
frontation and conflict. Third, they 
provide economic assistance to coun- 
tries which are experiencing political 
and economic stresses and where 
U.S. security interests are involved. 
The vast majority of our security as- 
sistance aid goes to support our peace 
efforts in the Middle East and in 
southern Africa. In providing assist- 
ance to such nations, we help them 
meet the economic strains imposed by 
tensions in their regions. 

Does Foreign Aid Work? 

Do all these programs work? 
There is a popular myth that 
foreign assistance often does not pro- 



. . . we have approved aid programs when they would directly benefit 
the poor since we recognize that people have economic as well as 
political rights. 



Third, we support the development 
programs of the United Nations, 
which finance technical assistance to 
poor countries and provide direct hu- 
manitarian assistance to children, ref- 
ugees, and other groups in need of 
particular relief. 

• In India, the U.N. Children's 
Fund is working to restore and im- 
prove potable water resources in the 
areas hardest hit by the November 
1977 cyclone and tidal wave. 

• In Central America, experts from 
the U.N. Development Program are 
working in four countries to develop 
energy from underground volcanic 
steam. 

I could go on and on, citing proj- 
ects in various countries aimed at 
specific problems and particular 
groups. The point is that when we are 
discussing aid levels, we must re- 
member we are not talking about 
abstract statistics: we are talking 



duce results. The record shows 
otherwise. 

It is impossible to separate foreign 
assistance from other factors that pro- 
duce development. But foreign assist- 
ance has been central in some meas- 
ure to the following achievements. 

• Between 1950 and 1975 the de- 
veloping countries grew more rapidly 
than either they or the developed 
countries had grown in any time 
period in the past. 

• Substantial increases in life ex- 
pectancy are taking place in many 
developing countries. 

• The number of children in pri- 
mary schools in the developing world 
has trebled since 1950, and the 
number of secondary students has in- 
creased sixfold during the same 
period. 

• The battle against communicable 
disease has produced significant re- 
sults. Smallpox is now confined to a 



16 

small area of Africa, and the numbers 
of people suffering from Malaria has 
been reduced by 80-90% in the past 
three decades. 

• The yields of rice and wheat in 
Asia are estimated to be substantially 
higher today because of the introduc- 
tion of high-yielding varieties. More 
than a billion dollars worth of grain 
each year is ascribed to the new seed. 

Beyond these successes, the record 
reveals countless instances in which 
projects funded by foreign assistance 
have improved the lives of people in 
fundamental ways. 

• When a village has clean water, 
its children are no longer made sick 
from the water they drink. 

• When couples have access to 
family planning services, there are 
fewer mouths to feed. 

• When a clinic is constructed, 
modern medicine enters lives for the 
first time. 

• And when a job program begins, 
the unemployed can find work and 
have incomes. 

Progress has been made. But more 
has to be done. Over the last 15 
months the Carter Administration has 
made a substantial effort to further 
improve the management and effec- 
tiveness of all of our programs. 

Let me report to you on some of 
the steps we have already taken or 
will soon implement to achieve this 
objective. 

One of the key problems with 
foreign assistance over the years has 
been a lack of adequate coordination 



Department of State Bui; 



The Carter Administration announced 
its support of the basic purposes of 
this bill. Although the Congress will 
probably not consider this legislation 
in the current session, the Administra- 
tion is moving to put into place a new 
interagency coordinating mechanism 
which we believe will go a long way 
toward having the executive branch 
better coordinate its diverse develop- 
ment efforts. 

The Agency for International De- 
velopment has been reorganized under 
the leadership of Governor John Gil- 
ligan. More authority is being dele- 
gated to our AID missions abroad. 
Tighter controls are now imposed on 
financial and operational procedures. 
In addition, AID has eliminated some 
complex and cumbersome procedures 
which have slowed our ability to de- 
sign and implement projects. 

The United States has encouraged 
the multilateral banks to better take 
into account the lessons of the 
past — both successes and failures. 
The Administration has also shared 
congressional concerns about high 
salary levels of bank employees. We 
want the banks to look especially 
hard at more effective ways to reach 
poor people directly, as well as to 
operate in the most cost effective 
ways. 

In our security programs we have 
tightened management controls and 
have instituted an interagency com- 
mittee to provide coordinated recom- 
mendations to me and the President 
on all aspects of our arms transfer 
and security assistance programs. 

Finally, because we recognize that 



Helping the children of Pakistan have adequate diets does not mean 
that we need neglect the children of Cincinnati, Boston, or Los 
Angeles. Helping the farmers of Mali grow more food does not mean 
we need to abandon the farmers of Texas, Illinois, or Colorado . . . 
Both foreign aid and adequate domestic expenditures are essential to 
the national interest. 



improve the management and deliv 
of our foreign assistance progra 
Accountability to the Congress anc 
the public is an essential element 
our approach. 



iti 



between our bilateral programs and 
our activities in the international fi- 
nancial institutions. Responsibility for 
these various programs is spread 
throughout several Cabinet Depart- 
ments and agencies. 

Shortly before his death, Senator 
Hubert Humphrey introduced legisla- 
tion which called for a sweeping 
reorganization of the government's 
foreign aid programs designed to 
meet these defects in coordination. 



science and technology offer many 
opportunities for expanding the de- 
velopment process. President Carter 
has proposed the creation of a new 
U.S. foundation on technological col- 
laboration. This foundation will sup- 
port the application of our research to 
development problems. And it will 
improve the access of the developing 
countries to American science and 
technology. 

We will continue to seek ways to 



: 



Other Key Issues 

There are several other impon 
questions relating, to our foreign 
sistance programs which I would 
to discuss. 

First, there is a growing belief 
we are both giving more aid anc 
the same time losing control c 
where it goes. Let me put this is 
in perspective. 

Clearly, we are not shoulderin 
disproportionate burden of global 
flows. While in absolute terms 
U.S. aid program is larger than 
of any other nation, as a percent 
of GNP we rank in the bottom 259i 
all non-Communist country donors. 

Concerning control, we are \ 
active in attempting to steer multi 
eral assistance in directions we tb 
best for our nation and for glc 
development. We have often b 
successful in encouraging the type 
projects consistent with our des 
policies. We will be working clo: 
with Congress to develop procedi 
which permit the United States 
express its views about multilat 
lending policies as effectively as \ 
sible. But in doing so, we must 
ognize the damage that would be d 
if the international character of tr 
institutions were lost. 

Second, our foreign assistance f 
grams must be consistent with 
determination to improve the coi 
tions of political, economic, and c 
rights worldwide. Over the past > 
we have reviewed all of our aid p 
grams for their impact on hun 
rights. In some cases we have 
duced assistance to governments w 
consistent records of repression, 
have also increased aid to others w 
good or improving human rig 
policies. 

We face a dilemma when apply 
human rights considerations 
foreign assistance. We do not want 
support governments which cons 
ently violate human rights. On 
other hand, we do not wish to dc 
our assistance to poor people w 
happen to live under repressive 
gimes. We must resolve this dilem 
on a case-by-case basis. In gener 
we have approved aid programs wr 
they would directly benefit the pi 
since we recognize that people hi 
economic as well as political rights. ! 



■1978 

Bird, there is the question of 
m countries should receive our 
(The President has decided that 
Concessional assistance programs 
Id focus primarily but not exclu- 
Mv on the poorest countries. In the 
I advanced developing countries 

10 not want to substitute our own 
■jrt for the assistance those gov- 
■ents should be giving. On the 
I hand, we cannot be indifferent 
le plight of people who are no 
Spoor because they live in middle 
kne countries and who need our 
I We are resolving this problem 
■sisting that our efforts to mount 
Jams in middle income develop- 
liations be matched by efforts of 
Most country. 

f urth, it is sometimes argued that 
■:annot afford to spend large 
lints of money to help solve prob- 
I abroad when we have many 
ling domestic needs. But I firmly 
Ive that it would be a serious 

■ ke to try to trade off interna- 
aal obligations for domestic 
lities. Both need to be addressed, 
le health of our nation is increas- 
g dependent on the world econ- 
I If we neglect international prog- 

■ we undermine the welfare of our 
I society. As a nation we have a 

■ r concern with improving the 
I of poor people. I do not believe 
Is a credible commitment if made 

11 domestically. And as a percent- 
jJDf the Federal budget for 1979, 

■ economic assistance is only 
H7c. Adding our security assist- 
K programs does not increase this 
Be substantially. 

Mi can afford to increase foreign 
d xpenditures at a reasonable rate, 
n; must. At the same time, we can 
Id to increase our domestic educa- 
Ibudget, expand programs for the 
Irly, and fund other critical 
l^stic programs as we are now do- 
I Helping the children of Pakistan 
adequate diets does not mean 
I we need neglect the children of 
|innati, Boston, or Los Angeles, 
ling the farmers of Mali grow 
1: food does not mean we need to 
■don the farmers of Texas, Il- 
ls, or Colorado. And helping the 
lins of the Middle East remain at 
le does not mean that we cannot 
1 meet the needs of our cities. We 
liot have a choice. Both foreign 
land adequate domestic expendi- 
Is are essential to the national 
Best. 

pnator Humphrey raised a funda- 
Ital issue about foreign aid. He 
I: "The question we must decide 
H/hether or not the conditions of 



social and economic injustice — 
poverty, illiteracy, and disease — are a 
real threat to our security. I think 
they are and they require the same 
commitment of policy, will, and re- 
sources as does our conventional na- 
tional defense."' 

As someone charged with helping 
to protect the national security, I 
agree with Senator Humphrey's as- 
sessment of the role of foreign aid in 
the scheme of our national priorities. 
I agree with his approach to the tasks 
of alleviating poverty and working for 
peace. 



17 



He believed in harnessing the 
energy and creativity of the American 
people to solve problems which have 
plagued the world for centuries. I 
share his faith in our abilities. I share 
his optimism that we can do the job. 

I ask that you help us inform the 
American people why foreign aid is 
essential to the nation's economic 
health, political interests, and preser- 
vation of its humanitarian tradition. □ 



Address before the national convention of the 
League of Women Voters in Cincinnati on 
May 1 , 1978 (press release 195 of May 1). 



Question~and'Answer Session 
Following Cincinnati Address 



Q. Would you please give your 
assessment of the prospects for 
peace in the Middle East in light of 
the most recent meetings there? 

A. You certainly started me off 
with the hardest of all questions. At 
the current point, the situation in the 
Middle East is, I would say, in a 
stalemate. That does not mean that it 
is impossible to make progress. I be- 
lieve very deeply that it is possible to 
make progress. It is in the interests of 
each of the nations in the Middle East 
to see that this is done. It is in our 
national interests. It is in the interests 
of the world that a just and lasting 
peace be brought to the Middle East. 

There are basically three fundamen- 
tal issues involved. First, the need for 
a real peace, a true peace, in which 
we will have not only the end of a 
state of war but normal relations be- 
tween the nations of all the countries 
of that region will be restored. 

Secondly, it is necessary to solve 
the problem of withdrawal from ter- 
ritories occupied in the 1967 war, 
while at the same time protecting the 
security of the State of Israel. 

Thirdly, it is essential that the 
Palestinian question be resolved in all 
of its aspects. 

These are all very difficult prob- 
lems. Their roots are deep. They have 
been problems which the countries of 
that region have been wrestling with 
for a long time. But I think some 
progress has been made. If one looks 
back a year ago, it wasn't even possi- 
ble to conceive that people would start 
talking to each other about how to sit 
down together and solve these ques- 
tions. Now, at least, we have some of 
the nations talking to each other. 



Insofar as the United States is con- 
cerned, the United States has a deep 
interest in seeing this problem re- 
solved. And we have and will continue 
to put this at the top of our agenda in 
terms of problems in the foreign pol- 
icy field where we must try to help. 

I think that the parties on both sides 
do have confidence and trust in the 
United States. I think we can act as a 
catalyst in bringing the parties together. 
Sometimes our role must be one of, in 
effect, carrying messages between the 
two. And other times, when the 
dialogue becomes stalemated, then I 
think it is incumbent upon us to come 
forward with our own suggestions and 
initiatives, to try and regain the 
momentum of the peace process. 

That is the course we have followed 
during the last year and a few months. 
That is the course we will continue to 
follow in the year ahead, and I think 
that is the policy that the people in the 
area wish to follow. 

Q. I know that there has been 
Federal assistance to the Vietnamese 
refugees in the past. Do you have 
more assistance financially coming 
to the boat people of this area? 

A. Yes. This is one of the problems 
which cries out for help and for ac- 
tion. Recently, the President approved 
a major step on our part to increase 
the amount of help that we can give 
for the refugees in this area, and par- 
ticularly the boat people. This is a 
program which will be funded over a 
period of 2 years. And I think by the 
leadership we will be able to give with 
the funding which we will be receiving 
that we will be able to help stimulate 
others to work with us to take care of 
this tremendous humanitarian problem. 



18 

It is a vastly difficult, complicated 
one. We are working with many other 
nations around the world, with the 
United Nations, and others. And it is a 
problem which will remain very im- 
portant to us and which we are going 
to devote our full efforts to. 

Q. There has been much in the 
news in regard to the exportation of 
nuclear technologies to the develop- 
ing nations. In view of the fact that 
this has been declared Energy Con- 
servation Week and because May 3d 
has been declared Sun Day, could 
you give us some insights into what 
is being exported from this country 
in terms of the decentralized systems 
of volume mass, solar technology, 
wind technology, and others, for the 
less developed countries? 

A. Yes. We have cooperative 
agreements with a number of the de- 
veloping countries where we are work- 
ing together to share our technology 
and our know-how in the kinds of 
areas that you are talking about. 

Some of those countries have a 
great deal to contribute to us, and we 
are learning from them. And, there- 
fore, I feel it is through these kinds of 
cooperative efforts that we can make 
the most progress. Whether it be the 
use of wind, whether it be solar 
energy products which require greater 
funding capabilities — in that kind of a 
situation, we are working with the 
countries often which have resources 
to put into it, such as countries like 
Saudi Arabia and others who have 
both knowledge and funding to help 
on it. But with others, we have to be 
the ones who provide the basic fund- 
ing and technology. 

And this is an area in which I think we 
must increase our efforts, because it is 
essential that in the future we must find 
other forms of energy which will be able 
to take the place as our petroleum re- 
sources continue to dwindle. The nuclear 
resources with the problems that they 
present can never find or provide the 
total solution to the problem. So we must 
be looking at all of these other kinds of 
energy-producing resources if we are 
going to cope with the energy problems 
of the world. 

Q. There have been several 
statements the past few days, and I 
was wondering whether the Carter 
Administration is going to withdraw 
their plans for planes to Israel if the 
U.S. Congress does not go along 
with the planes for Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt? 

A. Let me try and answer this very 
clearly. 

Under the law, we are required to 



send up each one of the proposals — 
the proposals for aircraft to Israel, the 
proposals for transfer of aircraft to 
Egypt, and the proposals for the trans- 
fer of aircraft to Saudi Arabia — 
separately to the Congress. Each one 
of those will be examined in hearings 
separately by the Congress, and the 
Congress will vote separately on each 
one of them. 

However, the President, in exercis- 
ing his responsibility, must take into 
account the importance of each one of 
these specific proposals and the mutu- 
ally reinforcing nature of these various 
proposals. Therefore, the ultimate de- 
cision to be made by the President can 
only be made after he has seen what 
the Congress does with respect to each 
of these various elements of the pro- 
posals which are being sent forward. I 
will be very frank in saying I believe 
each one of these to be essential. 

We did not arrive lightly at the 
proposals which were sent forward. 
Each one of the countries has pressing 
needs. They came and sent to us what 
they consider to be their requirements. 
We examined each of these require- 
ments to determine whether or not we 
believe they were justifiable from a 
military standpoint. We concluded that 
they were. 

We also took a look to see very 
carefully whether or not, if we went 
forward with these proposals, it would 
upset the basic military balance in the 
Middle East. We concluded that it 
would not. 

Finally, let me say that we have a 
deep and unshakable commitment to 
Israel to meet its security needs. We 
will carry out that commitment. 

Secondly, with respect to Saudi 
Arabia, a commitment was made in 1975 
to provide them with aircraft. We. in this 
Administration, reaffirmed that commit- 
ment. I think it is essential that we 
should go forward with it. 

With respect to Egypt, which is one 
of the principal parties in the peace 
negotiations, they have needs, not be- 
cause of the relationships between 
themselves and Israel but because of 
other military needs, because of the 
situations which exist on their western 
and southern borders. 

I believe, as I said earlier, that these 
are all mutually reinforceable and that 
it would be a tragedy if the Congress 
did not vote affirmatively on each one 
of these proposals. I think it would be 
very harmful to our national interests. 

Q. In referring directly to your 
speech, I was a little confused. On 
the one hand, we have the altruistic 
desire to help and the moral obliga- 
tion bears that out, and on the other 



Department of State Bui 

hand you pointed out how m 
money we make off this. 

Later on, you talked about 
forming. One of the big criticism 
something like AID has been 
the money is given or lent, as 
example, perhaps, for building u || 
cedures with the provision t ji 
perhaps the lumber be bought fi j 
the United States when there m \f 
be a local supply. Would you c . 
ment on that? 

A. I think that there are two asp 
to it. I think we do have a very sti 
and deep moral obligation to help 
poor of the world. That is why 
programs are addressed to the need 
the poor. On the other hand, it 
reality, it is a fact, that this is als- 
benefit to the United States. We 01 
to recognize it is a benefit. 

Too often people criticize these 
grams because they will not accepl 
fact that it is morally right to do thi: 

Even if they reject that, they 01 
to think about the other side of it 
also good for the United States 
well, from the standpoint of the e 
omy of the United States. 

With respect to the kinds of 
straints which I think you were n 
ring to, some of those restraints 
imposed by congressional stat 
which require that the goods which 
to be provided and the services 
are being provided have to be prov 
from the United States. These are 1 
that one has to deal with. So t 
may seem to be contradictions. 

I think these contradictions 
really reconcilable. I think they 
important facts that people ough 
know when they are considering 
questions of foreign assistance and 
importance of foreign assistance t< 
and to the people of the world. 

Q. I happen to be the mothei 
a 17-year-old daughter. When 
was born in 1961, there were 
proximately 3 billion people in 
world. Last year, on her birth 
in April, there were 4 billion pa 
in the world. This year, there 
about 4.3 billion people in 
world. In 22 short years, they 
estimating 7 billion people. W 
does our State Department 
about this? How do we cope v 
this? [Laughter.] 

A. Let me say the State Dep 
ment does have something to 
about it. [Laughter.] 

There is no question but that 
population problem is one of the n 
severe problems facing the world 
day, and one of the principal thn 
of the aid program has been in t 
population field. 



1978 

viously this is a service that 
be made available that cannot be 
d and should not be forced on 
s. But it is one of the principal 
ts of the aid program and has 
Jfor the last several years. 

I If I heard you correctly, you 
rd that $8.5 "billion will be re- 
sted for foreign aid. Was that in 
I or 1979? 

I That is in '79. 

( Approximately, do you know 
lit percentage of that will be 
a able for foreign countries to 
ii'hase arms from the United 
as in that year? 

I As I recall it, the $8.5 billion 
« not include the military assist- 
I and that figure I do not have 
aable to me. If you are talking 
m: the mutual assistance programs, 
bieve it is somewhere around $2 

■ n. That is my best estimate. But 
nvould be over and above the kind 
^instance that I was talking about. 

( I would like to know what we 

mlo as individuals or as a nation 

s >p the holocaust in Cambodia? 

id I am afraid to say that I don't 
n a good answer to that. The situa- 
Dihere is, indeed, a tragic one. We 
n no contact at all with the Cam- 
Ktns. We have tried to establish 
I contact so as to find out at least 
b is going on there. We have been 
lile to do this. 

^iat knowledge we have, we have 
iji in from others. I think that what 
u :an do is to focus world attention 
jitiis situation and hope that the 
It of world opinion may change 
edtuation there. But in terms of 
I we actually can do other than 
ocing with others in the world 
Mis, such as the United Nations 
M other international fora, there is 
ijy nothing practically that I can 
lest that we can do. 

i It seems that the League and 
H government had the same prob- 
n a credibility gap — we concern- 

■ equal rights and that it isn't 
Dig to harm our families; and 

0, as the government, that 
nign assistance isn't all in vain. 

the government planning any 
j-ific programs to educate our 
«>le at the grassroots level that 
i hould continue this aid? 

1. They certainly are, and I really 
Hint it when I said that I hoped that 
I all will help in getting this in- 
itiation across to the people. 

■am going to speak out on this in 
■pus parts around the country. A 



number of people in the State De- 
partment are going to fora in cities 
and towns all across the country to 
talk about this and to answer ques- 
tions. Without that we are simply not 
going to achieve our objective. And 
without getting the kind of support at 
the grassroots that we need, we are 
not going to get the kind of support 
that we have to have in the Congress. 
We are then going to fail in carrying 
out what I think are the fundamental 
obligations that we have. 

Q. When John F. Kennedy was 
running for the Presidency, he said 
there were only 10 people working 
on disarmament in our government. 
He felt there should be 100. How 
many people today are working on 
disarmament in the government? 

A. We have got well over 100. We 
have, I would say, several hundred 
people working on disarmament now. 
This is a subject on which I spend a 
great deal of my time, working to- 
gether with people in the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency and 
with people within my own Depart- 
ment directly. 

As you know, the State Department 
gives policy guidance to the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, 
and we are very fortunate to have 
Paul Warnke heading up that agency. 
I think he is doing a superb job, and 
we in the State Department are going 
to do all we can to work with him and 
give him the support that he needs. 

We are also getting support from 
people in the Defense Department. 
That may seem strange for some of 
you here, but there are many there 
who care deeply about arms control 
as well because, particularly in the 
strategic field, I think everybody 
realizes that a nuclear exchange can 
result only in a holocaust and be of 
benefit to no one. 

We have got to find ways to begin 
to not only cap but to reduce the arms 
spiral, and that is why we are putting 
so much emphasis on trying to make 
progress in achieving an agreement in 
the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks— the so-called SALT II talks— 
that are going on. 

It is my deep belief that we will 
reach an agreement with the Soviet 
Union. I don't want to try and give 
you any specific date. I don't think 
that we ought to negotiate against any 
fixed given time deadline. But I am 
convinced the SALT agreement which 
will be achieved will enhance or 
maintain our security and that of our 
allies. I believe it is very much in our 
national interests and that we should 
put all of our weight behind it. 



19 



Q. You have discussed the im- 
portance of population control in 
underdeveloped countries. What is 
your response to a television report 
last week that millions of foreign 
aid dollars were wasted by sending 
to many of those countries, against 
their specific requests to decrease 
the supply, more contraceptives 
than they can possibly distribute 
and use for the next few years? 
[Laughter.] 

A. Let me say, first, I am not 
familiar with that report, but it could 
well be. [Laughter.] 

I am not trying to say in any way 
that what we do is perfect — that the 
aid programs are without fault. 

Obviously, we all make mistakes. 
[Laughter.] I think we are getting on 
top of some of these problems. 
[Laughter.] I better go to the next 
question. [Applause.] 

Q. I traveled last year in 
Morocco, and I have a feeling that 
very often we are giving things 
away to people that are really not 
prepared to handle them yet, as 
happened on the previous question. 
[Laughter.] I was driving with a 
retired representative of our gov- 
ernment from Rabat, and there 
were miles and miles of aqueducts 
along the way, and this man said: 
"Here are your American dollars. 
You have paid for all this clean 
water." And I saw two children 
getting pails of water, and I 
thought: "Well I will sleep tonight; 
they won't have some dreadful 
disease." 

Half a mile down, I saw two men 
voiding in the same trough of 
water. And I think perhaps we are 
giving people things in our big 
giveaway that they are not ready to 
accept or handle. 

A. What we have tried to do is to 
get down to the more basic kind of 
things. The big projects we are trying 
to turn over in terms of what they call 
in the jargon the infrastructure kind 
of projects to the world institutions 
like the World Bank and the interna- 
tional financial institutions. And we 
are really trying to get down to things 
like helping on agriculture with sim- 
ple kinds of tools, to help on 
rudimentary kinds of health care 
which can be helpful, to help in edu- 
cation, and the kind of things that we 
can handle and, I think, that they can 
handle too. This really is a focus of 
the programs these days. □ 



Press release 195 A of May 1. 1978. 



20 



Remarks to the Press 
Following Cincinnati Address 



Q. [Inaudible]. 

A. We are exploring the various 
possibilities that it might be possible 
to get momentum going again in the 
peace talks. Both of us will be reflect- 
ing on the exchange of views and will 
be in touch with each other as we will 
with the Egyptians. 

Q. You said in the Q and A on 
Friday that the talks in the Middle 
East are now at a stalemate. 

A. They have been. 

Q. Can you elaborate on that? 

A. There has been a lack of conver- 
sation directly between the Egyptians 
and the Israelis for a period of weeks 
now, and as a result of that I think it 
is necessary to find some way to get 
the momentum going again so that we 
can get the talks off dead center. That 
is why we're in consultation with each 
other to see what we can do to move 
forward, and I'm hopeful that we can 
achieve that. 

Q. Do you think that this is the 
time for the United States to step in 
to try and pry the talks? 

A. Yes. I think that this is a time 
we can be helpful in prying the talks. 
That has been our feeling in the past. 
If the parties can make progress talk- 
ing to each other, fine. That's the way 
one should. If our help is needed, we 
will give it a stimulus. And we're glad 
to do that. 

Q. In your prepared remarks I 
noticed that you deleted reference to 
Governor Kelly. 

A. I didn't delete reference to any- 
thing. I was just trying to save time 
because the thing was too long, and I 
thought they would go to sleep if I 
read the whole thing. You know I 



stand by everything that is in the writ- 
ten text. 

Q. How much of a strain on the 
Mideast situation has Mr. Begin's 
objections to the arms proposals 
been? 

A. On the arms proposals, I don't 
know how to say it any clearer than 
I've said it on many occasions; that I 
believe that it is very much in the 
interests of the search for peace that 
all of these proposals be approved. I 
also believe that it is very important 
from the standpoint of engendering 
confidence in all of the three countries 
involved that we go forward and meet 
commitments which we have made to 
them. I think that it is possible, 
through these various proposals, to 
meet the basic military need of these 
countries and at the same time stimu- 
late the peace process because I think 
people are going to be willing to take 
the risks that one has to take when you 
are negotiating peace if they feel se- 
cure that they can meet their prob- 
lems, their security problems. 

Q. You don't feel that is a 
contradiction — arms for peace? 

A. No, I do not. 

Q. Can you elaborate on that 
point? 

A. Sure. There are certain 
minimum requirements that a country 
has to deal with in terms of their 
security. Now, if you can keep the 
basic balance in the region so that is 
not changed, if you can then stimulate 
that confidence which will give them 
the willingness to take an extra risk 
for peace, then I think clearly there is 
no contradiction but, in fact, a little 
reinforcement. 






Department of State Bu 

Yemen, I understand the C 
munists have been heavily suppl 
that country. Do you see the suj 
ing of Saudi Arabia with the F- 
as a movement to balance or c 
terbalance the Soviet action? O 
you see it as trying to retain fri 
ship? Or do you see it as tryin 
prevent a country which faces o 
instabilities in the area from tur 
to other hostile suppliers of arms 

A. First of all, I think the 11 
threat that the Saudis fear is n 
threat from Israel; their concerns 
basically the dangers that they 
from their Arab neighbors — to 
north, especially Iraq; the cone 
that they have in the south. They 
had three border incursions from S 
Yemen in the past. This is a matti 
concern to them. They have a cot 
which is vast. It is the equivalet 
the land area from the Atlantic tc 
Mississippi. They have very 
people to man their aircraft. Tl 
fore, it is important that they hav< 
kind of an aircraft system that 
give them the defense capability wl 
does not require vast number! 
people. And the F— 15 is exactly 
kind of airplane. 

It is obviously a very impoi 
country because it is one of the le< 
of the moderate group in the M 
East. And I think that it is in 
interests and in the interests of 
Middle East that we should help 
friends who are moderates in that 
That is going to help in the p 
process. If you look down the i 
what kind of world would we all 
to see at the end of 5-10 years 
now? We would like to see a w 
peace where Israel could be li 
within secure and recognized bo 
aries, where the other moderate 
tions again also would be livin, 
peace, and secure. And I think 
kind of steps that we are talking a 
here would lead us to that end — w>( 
lead the way. 



Q. Speaking of balance, in South Pressrelease 195 B of May 1, 1978. 



1978 



Visit to Africa, 
the United Kingdom, and the I .ALS.lt. 



ecretary Vance visited Africa, the 
ted Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. 
il 13-23. He and British Foreign 
retary David Owen were in Dar es 
■mm, Tanzania (April 13-16), to 
t with Robert Mugabe (Secretary 
Krai, Zimbabwe African National 
ion — ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo 
esident. Zimbabwe African 
jple's Union — ZAPU) Secretary 
ice met also with Tanzanian Presi- 
t Nyerere. The two Secretaries met 
h government officials in Pretoria, 
tth Africa (April 16-17), and 
Salisbury , Southern Rhodesia 
ml 17). 

ecretary Vance then headed the 
>. delegation to the Central Treaty 
ionization (CENTO) ministerial 
?ting in London (April 18-19) and 
ted Moscow (April 19-23). 
ollowing are the texts of state- 
its made on various occasions dur- 
the trip, the joint statement and 
imunique issued in Dar es Salaam 
( Moscow, and Secretary Vance's 
ss briefing at the White House on 
HI 24.' 



INT STATEMENT, 
lR ES SALAAM, APR. 



15 s 



The Malta II conference between the 
riotic Front and the British and 
lerican Governments was held in 
r es Salaam on April 14-15, 1978. 
parties expressed appreciation to 
:sident Nyerere and the Tanzanian 
vernment for the kind hospitality. 
The British and the United States 
egation were led by Dr. David 
Iven, the British Foreign Secretary, 
\d Mr. Cyrus Vance, the United 
Idtes Secretary of State, while the 
Itriotic Front delegation was led by 
lesidents Robert Mugabe and Joshua 
Icomo. General Prem Chand rep- 
lanting the Secretary General of the 
iiited Nations also attended. 
■ Representatives of Angola, Bots- 
Btna, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania 
d Zambia were present as observers. 
The conference, whose purpose was 
] discuss military and related matters 
Rising from the Anglo-American pro- 
jisals, was held in an atmosphere of 
jndour and seriousness. 3 
(The United States and British Sec- 
taries of State reaffirmed their sup- 
Jirt for the Anglo-American propos- 
]s. In the course of the discussions, 



the leaders of the Patriotic Front put 
forward a number of proposals aimed 
at reaching a settlement within the 
principles of the Anglo-American pro- 
posals. For their part the U.S. and 
British Secretaries of State took note 
of these proposals they regarded as 
fundamental changes in the Anglo- 
American plan which would have to 
be negotiated. Progress was made and 
there was broad agreement in some 
important areas. 

It was agreed that a further confer- 
ence be held as soon as possible. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
PRETORIA, APR. 16 4 

Secretary Vance: The two subjects 
which we discussed this evening with 
the Foreign Minister were Namibia 
and Rhodesia. I would like to say a 
few words about the first and then Dr. 
Owen will speak to the second. 

We had a full discussion of the 
Namibian question. We pointed out 
the importance which we addressed to 
the resolution of this problem and to 
the finding of an international solution 
of the problem. We also stressed the 
fact that we believe that we must not 
only initiate the action but follow 
through and make sure that it has 
a successful conclusion. We are in 
it to stay, to see that it works out 
satisfactorily. 



Mr. Botha raised a number of ques- 
tions. We took note of those matters. 
We are but two of the Foreign Minis- 
ters in the five, and we must, of 
course, discuss those with our col- 
leagues and we plan to do so. 

Foreign Secretary Owen: On 

Rhodesia. I think that when I was first 
in South Africa last April, at that time 
we discussed both Rhodesia and 
Namibia, and I don't think that since 
that time in April I have been under 
any doubt that the South African Gov- 
ernment does want an internationally 
acceptable solution, if it's possible, 
for both Namibia and for Rhodesia. I 
believe this is extremely important, 
and I think it's in the interests of 
everybody in southern Africa. 

The problem we face now over 
Rhodesia is that we have made some 
progress but that we have still got a 
situation in which there is armed con- 
flict. We have got a situation in which 
two of the nationalist leaders are not 
involved outside, and the armed con- 
flict is continuing, and we feel that it 
is an extremely important responsibil- 
ity for us to continue to work on the 
Anglo-American plan; to try and bring 
about a peaceful settlement. 

We don't underestimate the difficul- 
ties, but all we ask everyone — and I 
think this particularly applies to South 
Africans, because it is in your inter- 
ests to have, I think, a stable country 
on your borders. But we should try to 
continue the path of negotiations, and 
these are the issues we discussed with 
Foreign Minister Botha. 

All we can ask is that people should 
encourage the process of negotiation 
and work toward a settlement that can 



Secretary Vance in Dar es Salaam with Robert Mugabe (left). Secretary General of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union, and Zambian Foreign Minister Sitake Mwale (center). 







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22 

be internationally acceptable in a free 
and fair election and a transfer to 
independence in 1978. 

I know that some people say: 
"Well, what's the point of going on 
talking?" The point of going on talk- 
ing is that if we allow the armed 
conflict to just continue, I think we 
could get into a very bitter struggle. If 
we cease to pursue the Anglo- 
American plan, I think that the people 
will give up talking about a negotiated 
peaceful settlement. They would then 
just fight it out, and with that there is 
a very severe risk of internationalizing 
the situation. 

Other countries have been asked to 
come in in support, and we could find 
that southern Africa would be a center 
of conflict, as we've seen in other 
parts of Africa in recent months. So 
we believe very strongly that despite 
the obstacles, it is necessary for us to 
continue to try to bring all the sides 
together and bring them around a 
negotiating table and get them to rec- 
oncile their difficulties and have a 
negotiated settlement. 

So we will work, over the coming 
weeks and months, for a conference of 
all the parties to try and resolve this 
issue, and we put these issues to 
Foreign Minister Botha, and he will 
decide his response. I gather he is 
talking to you later. I don't intend to 
anticipate this, but he understands the 
problem, and I hope that you under- 
stand what we are trying to achieve. 
It's not going to be easy. 

Q. What was Mr. Botha's initial 
reaction to your request that he 
support or endorse the call for an 
all-parties conference in Rhodesia? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: We're 
not asking him to come out and en- 
dorse all this, but I think that the 
South African Government has, in the 
past, seen the merit in trying to bring 
all the parties together, and I hope 
he'll see the merit in doing this at this 
present moment in time. It's up to him 
how he expresses it, how he uses his 
influence, and how he expresses it to 
the South African Government. 

Q. Are you saying now that you 
are hoping that South Africa will 
use whatever influence it has in 
Salisbury to make sure that the 
internal people there are willing to 
continue talking? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I think 
that's a question up to them. It's not 
for me to tell them how to conduct 
their affairs. They are in touch with 
the situation, and they must decide it. 

They've often made it clear that 
they will not interfere in the affairs of 



Rhodesia. That's up to them how they 
use their influence or what they decide 
to do, but I do believe it's in South 
Africa's interests. 

Q. To try and understand 
better — then is it correct you didn't 
suggest a particular course of action 
to South Africa today? Just gener- 
ally, you restated really what you've 
always said: that you want them to 
use their influence, or is there some 
new twist to it that escapes us? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: There's 
no new twist. We discussed these 
problems frankly and in considerable 
detail as we've been doing over quite 
some time. I mean, we came back, we 
discussed this in September. We've 
had further contact all through the last 
few months when we've been dis- 
agreeing on some other things. We 
still continue to work in a way keeping 
each other closely in touch. 

Q. Have they not used their influ- 
ence or have they not used it enough 
or are you suggesting a specific 
course of action that you can't dis- 
cuss with us? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I have 
long taken the view that other gov- 
ernments don't usually like you to tell 
them how to conduct their own foreign 
policy. 

Secretary Vance: I would endorse 
what Dr. Owen has said. 

Q, What is it that the United 
States would particularly like to see 
South Africa do? 

Secretary Vance: We would hope, 
all of us working together, that we 
find a solution to both the Namibian 
problem and the Rhodesian. As Dr. 
Owen pointed out in connection with 
the Rhodesian problem, we feel that a 
solution — an internationally approved 
and acceptable solution — of the Nami- 
bian problem would clearly be in the 
interests of South Africa was well as 
the people of the region and the world 
in general. 

Q. Could I follow that up please 
by asking if the questions that were 
raised by Foreign Minister Botha 
represented any fundamental new is- 
sues raised in the Namibian discus- 
sions? 

Secretary Vance: They raised is- 
sues which are important issues as 
seen by South Africa, and they relate 
to matters which are covered in the 
proposal of the five. 

Q. Would they conceivably have 
required some renegotiation of the 
proposals? 



Department of State Bulk 

Secretary Vance: I think that al 
should go into at this point, because 
I said, we must merely take them 
take note of them now and take tht 
back to our colleagues, that they « 
important issues. 

Q. Would it be fair to paraphra 
your impression of the South Afi 
can answer on that that their answ 
is inconclusive? 

Secretary Vance: I think that th 
ought to speak for themselves on th; 
I know that Foreign Minister Botha 
going to be here in a little while 
speak to you, and I really don't th\' 
that I ought to speak for him. 

Q. But you are not able to 
away with any firm indicatiii 
whether they have not accepted 
proposal put forward by the fi 
Western powers? 

Secretary Vance: It is my imprt 
sion that they have not accepted 
proposals of the five Western powers 

Q. On Namibia, you have se 
both Mr. Botha and Mr. Nujor 
[Sam Nujoma, President of the Sou 
West Africa People's Organu 
tion— SWAPO] in the same 12 hou 
Is it your sense that they are nt 
coming closer together on the basis 
the revised Western proposals? 

Secretary Vance: I think real 
again, that they have to speak 
themselves on this thing as to h> 
they stand with respect to our prop 
als. It is not for me to speak for the 
and I'm sure as far as Mr. Botha 
concerned that he will speak to t 
issue as far as Namibia is concernt 
and I would be surprised if W 
Nujoma didn't express his views. 

Q. What would happen if the i 
curity Council or the General 
sembly of the United Nations rejei 
the proposals, doesn't appro 
them? What will happen then? 

Secretary Vance: That's an assi 
tion that I certainly am not prepared 
accept. They have not been discuss 
by the Security Council. They will 
discussed in the future by the Secur 
Council, and I hope that the Secur 
Council will endorse them. 

Q. I sense that neither you n 
Dr. Owen want to address you 
selves to the question of the degr 
of pressure that you asked Sou 
Africa to put on Rhodesia. Ther 
fore, I'd like to put the question 
you this way. Were you satisf 
with Mr. Botha's response? 



Secretary Vance: 1 feel that 






e 1978 

cussions were important discus- 
ns. They were candid discussions, 
1 I think it was useful to have had 
discussions. 



23 



i 



Q. You will be seeing Mr. Smith 
Smith, Prime Minister of the 
ite regime in Rhodesia] tomor- 
w. Will what you were told yes- 
day by Mr. Nkomo and Mr. 
igabe make your date with Mr. 
Siith any more difficult than it 
?>uld have been? 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think 
it They have indicated that they are 
p pared to attend the meeting of all 
I parties. As Dr. Owen has said, we 

i'|l that if progress is going to be 
tide on the Rhodesian question, it is 
eential that all of the parties sit 
dAn together and discuss the differ- 
a|:es which remain. 

\s we have indicated on many oc- 
c ions, we believe that the Anglo- 
^Terican proposals provide a 
fimework for a solution which should 

h acceptable not only to the parties 

M internationally acceptable, which 

3'ery important. 

J. Mr. Nkomo was quoted out of 
Isaka today as saying that at the 
meting that you've just concluded in 

I r, the patriotic front made conces- 
s ns on the question of U.N. forces 
td resident commissioner power, 

I I that Britian and the United 
Jites failed to meet them halfway, 
i led to make any concessions on 

Kir side. Therefore, everything was 
ling given by the patriotic front and 
1 thing given by you. 
Is it your concept or is it Dr. 
(ven's concept that you were there 
i order to compromise or to change 
te Anglo-American plan that, 
terefore, this sort of question 
c ises? 

Secretary Vance: The Anglo- 
/nerican proposals were put forward, 
ley were amplified and modified 
aer the discussions which followed 
c in Malta. We have always said that 
I are prepared to discuss with the 
grties, because they must ultimately 
tike the decision, any aspects which 
t:y feel must be raised in connection 

th it. 

Q. Over the past few days some 
I the newly sworn black ministers 
'j Salisbury have restated their will- 
Igness to see Mr. Nkomo and Mr. 
jugabe take places on the Executive 
Ouncil in the framework of the 
(ternal settlement. In light of what 
iu heard in Dar from the patriotic 
lont leaders, what is your evalua- 




British Foreign Secretary Owen, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Young, and Secretary Vance 
(from left to right) confer in Pretoria with South Africa's Foreign Minister Botha (far right). 



tion of the obstacles or likelihood of 
that kind of a compromise solution? 

Secretary Vance: I think the first 
step is to get everybody to sit down 
together so that they can discuss their 
varying views with respect to these 
problems, and I think they've got to 
speak for themselves rather than my 
speaking for them. 



REMARKS TO THE PRESS, 
SALISBURY, APR. 17 5 

Foreign Secretary Owen: As you 

know we've had some hours of de- 
tailed discussion, both this morning 
and this afternoon, and the atmos- 
phere has been a good atmosphere. 
The expression of views has been 
clear on both sides. 

As you know, we put to the meet- 
ing that we thought there should be 
roundtable talks at which all the par- 
ties could come, without precondi- 
tion, to try and see if we could build 
on the areas of agreement that already 
exist, to widen the areas of agree- 
ment, and hopefully to work toward 
an agreed cease-fire, fair and free 
elections to be conducted this year, 
and a granting of independence to 
Zimbabwe recognized by the United 
Nations and the whole international 
community. We put that proposition 
to them. 

I think they understand the reasons 
why we think it's in the interests of 
the people of Rhodesia and all the 
citizens who live in Zimbabwe that 



such talks should take place. I think 
they understand our fears that could 
come if this opportunity of continuing 
the negotiations was to be missed. 
We are under no illusions about the 
difficulty that would be faced. They 
have agreed to take this away and 
give serious, detailed, and mature 
thought to the proposition that we put 
to them. That's what we asked them 
to do. We didn't come here asking 
them to make a snap decision; we 
recognize that they will want to con- 
sult amongst themselves, and they 
have agreed to do so. 

Secretary Vance: I have very little 
to add to that except to say that I 
have found the discussions today to 
have been very helpful, and I am glad 
that we have had the opportunity to 
exchange ideas and views in a good 
atmosphere. We shall continue to work 
to give all the help we can in trying 
to find a peaceful solution to the 
problem in Rhodesia. 

Q. Considering that the date of 
independence is now only about 8 
months away, have you issued any 
kind of time limit to the decision 
you are hoping they will make? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: The an- 
swer is no, we recognize that they 
will want to talk about it, that maybe 
that, between, we will have to have 
further discussions in order to try and 
narrow the areas so that people 
[inaudible] with agreements as far as 
we can on the way to talks will be 
held, where they'll be held, and the 



24 



Department of State Bulle 



time and the place, so that we've not 
put them under any tight threshold. 
They're going to go ahead and carry 
on their proposals, but we believe 
that no party should give up the 
negotiating process. 

Q. In Dar es Salaam, Mr. 
Mugabe said that he wanted to see 
a one-party Marxist state in Zim- 
babwe. Do you have any comment? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I do have a 
comment about that. He did not say 
that to me. If he had said that. I 
would have rejected it completely. 

Q. Since no quick agreement has 
been reached to call a Rhodesian 
conference, I wonder, as you wind 
up your mission to Africa, what you 
see developing ahead? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say I 

think it has been a useful trip. I think 
progress has been made during the 
trip; the road ahead is a very difficult 
one and, as David has said, none of 
us underestimate those difficulties. 
But I am very glad we came and will 
continue to work at it. 

Q. After the Lagos meeting it 
was announced that the plan was to 
have the Dar meeting and then on 
the 25th and 26th of April the all- 
parties conference. Would you ex- 
plain what has happened since 
Lagos that you have not arrived at 
that 25th (of) April date? 

Secretary Vance: The Rhodesians 
have indicated to us that they wished 
to take time to reflect seriously upon 
our proposals. I think that that is a 
fair and proper suggestion on their 
part. and. therefore, I think we must 
proceed and will proceed along those 
lines. 

Q. What is your impression of 
the interim government, as you 
have now been in touch with it? In- 
deed, this is the first visit by a Sec- 
retary of State to Rhodesia. What is 
your impression of Rhodesia? 

Secretary Vance: I think it's a 
lovely country. 

Q. Do you think the interim gov- 
ernment is functioning? 

Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen 
in Salisbury 



IIF 




Secretary Vance: I was very glad 
to have the opportunity to meet with 
them. This is the first time that I 
have, and as I said I found my talks 
very useful today. 



CENTO OPENING SESSION, 
LONDON, APR. 19 6 

This ministerial meeting reaffirms 
the commitment of CENTO members 
to enduring and important common 
interests. As in the past, the United 
States remains committed to the cen- 
tral objective of CENTO — protecting 
the independence and territorial integ- 
rity of member states. My country 
remains committed as well to working 
with each of you on a number of crit- 
ical issues which are of special inter- 
est to CENTO members because they 
have a direct or indirect impact on the 
stability and security of the CENTO 
region. 

U.S. Defense Policies 

The United States has recently 
completed a major review of its na- 
tional defense strategy. The guiding 
principles which emerged from this 
study were first stated a month ago 
when President Carter spoke at Wake 
Forest University. They are worth re- 
stating today. President Carter said: 

We will match, together with our allies and 
friends, any threatening power through a com- 
bination of military forces, political efforts, 
and economic programs. We will not allow 
any other nation to gain military superiority 
over us. 

We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet 
Union and other nations in reducing areas of 
tension. We do not desire to intervene militar- 
ily in the internal domestic affairs of other 
countries nor to aggravate regional conflicts 
And we shall oppose intervention by others 

While assuring our own military 
capabilities, we shall seek security through 
dependable, verifiable arms control agree- 
ments wherever possible. 

We shall use our great economic, technolog- 
ical, and diplomatic advantages to defend our 
interests and to promote American values 

This statement of American policy 
indicates more than our concern for 
our own military strength; it indicates 
our readiness to act in concert with 
others to achieve a more peaceful and 
more stable world. This is why my 
country's association with CENTO is 
(it fundamental importance to us. 

While we maintain our military 
strength, we are also working for 
peace in a number of areas. These 
problems remain as challenges which 
must be addressed directly and in 



common. The fact that they are on oi 
agenda this year, at last, indicat* 
their complexity and suggests the di 
ficulty we will face in achieving the 
resolution. But in each case, the stakt' 
are so high that we cannot fail to c 
all we can to help the parties to di 
putes to find just resolutions. 

Middle East 

A just and lasting peace in the Mill 
die East remains today of crucial in 
portance to the United States and to tr 
world. The past year has brought son- 
progress. Working with the parties, w 
have been able to move from gener; 
concepts to a precise identification ( 
areas of concern on which agreemei 
must be reached. We have witnessed 
narrowing of the gap, and with the hi ' 
toric visit of President Sadat t 
Jerusalem we have seen the initiatio 
of direct contacts between Egypt arc 
Israel. We strongly support these con 
tacts, and we will continue to encoui 
age and assist the parties to resolvi 
their outstanding problems together. 

We continue to believe that thre 
basic issues must be addressed if 
lasting settlement is to be achievec 
These are: 

• True peace, based on normal reh 
tions among the parties; 

• Withdrawal by Israel on all front 
from territories occupied in 1967 an* 
agreement by all parties on secure an 
recognized borders in accordance wit. 
U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338; and 

• A just resolution of the Palestin 
ian problem in all its aspects. Th* 
resolution must recognize the legiti 
mate rights of the Palestinian peopl 
and enable the Palestinians to partici 
pate in the determination of their owi 
future. 

These are complex and difficul 
questions. The progress made on thl 
first has, unfortunately, not bee 
matched in the other two areas 
Nevertheless, the United States re* 
mains committed to a continuation o 
the peace process. Statesmanship am 
perserverance will yield compro 
mise — and compromise will open th< 
door to a resolution of the conflict 
One thing is clear: If the process o 
peace remains deadlocked, the inevita 
ble regression toward conflict will bi 
difficult to halt — with the most pro 
found consequences for us all 

The United States will continue n 
assist and encourage the parties to re 
solve their differences. We are unwill 
ing to let slip an historic opportunifj 
to achieve a just and lasting peace 
when it may be within our grasp. 



IH7S 



■> 



a 



other area of great concern to all 
s Africa. We are deeply con- 

d that the Soviet Union and Cuba 
inwilling to recognize the funda- 
al principle often stated by Afri- 
nations that they can solve their 

problems without the use of ex- 
I force. 

e presence of large numbers of 
n combat forces and Soviet per- 
il in the Horn of Africa does not 
ote stability, 
e United States strongly supports 

rritorial integrity of all states in 
region, including particularly 
opia, Djibouti. Somalia, and 
a. 
seek the withdrawal of all 

n forces from Ethiopia and a 
;~ful resolution of the Eritrean dis- 

It is clear to us that if the Eri- 

issue is determined through the 
of force by foreign troops, 
lshed and suffering will increase, 
nduring solution will be found, 
ensions in the region will only be 
itened. 

iw that Somali forces have with- 
n from the Ogaden and the ter- 
ial integrity of Ethiopia is not 
atened, there is no legitimate 
nale for the maintenance of exter- 
ombat forces in that country. We 
continue to consult actively with 
as to ways we can work together 
duce tensions in the Horn, in sup- 
of the efforts of the Organization 
frican Unity, 
southern Africa, my country has 

working closely with the United 
dom. nations of the region, and 
Irs to help bring about a prompt 

■ fair transition to independence and 
lority rule without further 
It jshed in Rhodesia and Namibia. 
l»reign Secretary Owen and I have 
H completed talks on the Rhodesian 
r< lem with the patriotic front and 
leparties in Salisbury. We are con- 
iled that we must keep the negotia- 
I door open. Otherwise the parties 
I have no alternative to escalating 
llict with the danger of increasing 
lide involvement. The front-line 
Is and Nigeria have worked closely 
■i us. 

Ibelieve our recent trip to Africa 
'J well worthwhile. The patriotic 
It did not accept all the Anglo- 
|:rican proposals. They did agree to 
Hid further talks at which all parties 
lid be represented. There was also 
N progress on issues that are central 
lissuring free and fair elections; 
He was general agreement on U.N. 
Movement in peacekeeping and ob- 

■ ing elections; and, contingent on 



agreement on other issues, they ac- 
cepted the executive authority of a 
neutral resident commissioner in the 
areas of defense and internal security. 

Our talks in Salisbury and Pretoria 
were at least as positive as we had 
hoped. South Africa appears to under- 
stand the importance of achieving an 
early, internationally acceptable set- 
tlement which will bring peace. And 
while the Salisbury parties had said 
before our visit that they would reject 
an all-parties meeting, they are now 
willing to give it serious considera- 
tion. At least some realize that if they 
close the door to negotiations, they 
will further hurt their standing in the 
international community and will find 
it difficult to achieve the cease-fire 
that is so important to the holding of 
free and fair elections. 

Our primary aim is to achieve a set- 
tlement among all the parties that will 
end the conflict. We remain committed 
to the Anglo-American proposals as a 
workable basis for a settlement. We 
also will continue to try to bring the 
parties together in roundtable talks. 

In our talks on the Namibian ques- 
tion with the South Africans, there 
was recognition of the importance of a 
settlement which would have interna- 
tional acceptance. The South Africans 
have requested clarification of several 
of the proposals of the contact group. 
Foreign Secretary Owen and I agreed 
to discuss these matters with our col- 
leagues in the contact group and to 
make a prompt reply so that both 
South Africa and SWAPO may re- 
spond soon to the contact group's pro- 
posals. A fair settlement in Namibia 
would do more than protect the people 
of that territory; it would also help to 
establish a sense of progress in south- 
ern Africa that would assist our efforts 
in Rhodesia. 

Eastern Mediterranean 

With respect to another important 
regional issue — that of Cyprus — my 
country remains fully committed to 
helping the parties and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations in the 
search for a solution that will permit 
the two Cypriot communities to live 
peacefully together within one inde- 
pendent and sovereign nation. We are 
committed to this goal because a di- 
vided Cyprus will continue to be an 
impediment to good relations between 
two important friends and allies — 
Turkey and Greece. 

The United States views both Tur- 
key and Greece as essential to the col- 
lective self-defense of the free world. 
The United States pledges its deter- 
mined efforts to strengthening its ties 



25 

in this vital region which is so crucial 
to the long-term interests of CENTO, 
and of NATO as well. 



Persian Gulf 

We remain deeply interested, too, in 
the security of the Persian Gulf region. 
The cardinal importance of this region 
is underscored by the world's increas- 
ing reliance on its energy resources 
and by the growing role which the 
Persian Gulf states have to play in 
supporting the stability and prosperity 
of other areas. The United States 
places great importance on its relation- 
ship with Iran — a CENTO partner — 
and with Saudi Arabia and the other 
gulf states. 

Iran, buttressed by steadily growing 
economic and defensive strength, re- 
mains of fundamental importance as a 
strategic partner within the CENTO 
framework. Iran is playing a most val- 
uable role in promoting regional prog- 
ress and security. 

Pakistan, too, can contribute much 
to the stability of the region. We have 
noted its significant role in normaliz- 
ing relations among the countries of 
the South Asian subcontinent. 



Economic Progress 

While the swift resolution of dis- 
putes necessarily can demand the 
most urgent of our diplomatic efforts, 
we recognize that the peace and sta- 
bility we seek will ultimately elude us 
unless we are willing to join with 
others in promoting global economic 
progress. 

We have indicated our willingness 
to work with others to increase capital 
flows to the developing world; to 
build a fairer and more open system 
of world trade; to work to moderate 
disruptive movements in commodity 
prices; to cooperate on energy con- 
servation and development; and to 
strengthen the technological 
capabilities of developing nations. 
We are pursuing each of these 
policies through bilateral and mul- 
tilateral channels. 

We believe that policies which 
promise economic equity are strongly 
linked to the prospects for protecting 
political human rights more fully. My 
country will continue to work with 
others who believe that common secu- 
rity, though dependent upon a strong 
defense, must be founded as well on 
the far-sighted pursuit of economic 
and political justice. 

The world is changing. Diplomacy 
becomes more complex. The agenda 
of issues expands. Increasingly, no 
nation acting alone can resolve its 



26 




problems. In such a world, the close 
relations and cooperation among the 
nations represented in this room be- 
comes all the more important. Our secu- 
rity depends not only on our mutual trust 
and military strength but also on our abil- 
ity to work together in addressing the 
problems that affect us all. 

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
MOSCOW, APR. 22 8 

US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
visited Moscow from April 20-22. 
He was received by CC CPSU USSR 
Supreme Soviet L.I. Brezhnev and had 
several meetings with A. A. Gromyko, 
Member of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union Presidium and USSR Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 

An exchange of views took place 
on major issues of US-Soviet rela- 
tions and also on certain international 
problems of mutual interest to the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 

In the course of the negotiations 
particular attention was devoted to the 
development and implementation of 
further measures aimed at the preven- 
tion of nuclear war and the limitation 
of armaments. 

In this connection there were useful 
and thorough discussions regarding 
the preparation of a new agreement 
for the limitation of offensive 
strategic weapons. As a result there 
was a narrowing of the parties' posi- 
tions on some of the remaining unre- 
solved issues. 

Both sides expressed the intention 
to work intensively to conclude an 
agreement on the limitation of offen- 
sive strategic arms at the earliest pos- 
sible time. Other arms limitation 
negotiations were also discussed, and 
both sides agreed, in particular, to 
continue, jointly with Great Britain, 
to work toward the most rapid con- 
clusion of an agreement on a full and 
comprehensive ban on nuclear 
weapons testing. 

Both sides emphasized the great 
importance they attach to achieving 



Sipa Press from Black Slar 

progress in negotiations on the mutual 
reduction of forces and armaments in 
Central Europe. 

During the discussion of arms lim- 
itation issues, the parties also ex- 
changed views on the forthcoming 
UN General Assembly Special Ses- 
sion on Disarmament. 

It was agreed to continue discus- 
sion of the questions dealt with in 
Moscow. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 
MOSCOW, APR. 23 9 

First, I would like to express my 
appreciation to President Brezhnev 
and to Foreign Minister Gromyko for 
their warm hospitality and for the 
friendly and constructive spirit which 
they have brought to our meetings. 

I would in particular, as a Foreign 
Minister, like to add a personal word 
of respect for Minister Gromyko. As 
a thoroughly professional practitioner 
of the diplomatic trade, he has few 
peers in the modern world. He repre- 
sents his country's interest with great 
skill, high intelligence, and a spirit 
tempered in decades of experience. 

Our meetings here have been useful 
and constructive. The structure of 
peace that we all desire, if it is to be 
enduring, must be built brick-by-brick 
with workmanlike and realistic steps. 
We have made some progress during 
these meetings toward a SALT 
agreement, and we hope to carry 
these efforts forward in subsequent 
meetings. There is no more important 
task before the nations of the world 
than this critical effort to bring a 
sense of sanity into the regulation of 
the military competition, especially in 
regard to strategic weapons. 

We have also made some progress, 
I believe, in moving toward a better 
understanding of the problems in- 
volved in the bilateral relations be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the 
United States. We are realistic about 
these problems, and we know that 
they will not be dispelled by declara- 



Department of State Buf 

In Moscow Secretary Vance and U.S. Am 
sador Malcolm Toon (right) meet with Pr 
dent Brezhnev. Foreign Minister Grant) 
ami Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Dobr 
(across table from left to right). 



tions but will continue to require pi 
tical measures and continuous eff> 
It is our intention to work at th 
problems with determination, rec 
nizing that the relations between 
Soviet Union and the United Stz 
are a central factor in world pe 
and stability. 

PRESS BRIEFING, 
WHITE HOUSE, APR. 24 10 



: 



I just reported to the President 
my trip to Africa and to the So* 
Union and to Western Europe. 

In southern Africa David Owen 
I first went to Rhodesia, as 
know, and met with the patrit 
front. During our talks with the 
triotic front, we made some prog 
on a couple of key issues — nam 
the powers of the resident comn 
sioner with respect to internal secu 
and defense. They are two key arc 
and it was agreed with the patrii 
front, as proposed in the Ang 
American plan, that he sho 
have — he, the resident commissi 
er — exclusive power in these areas. 

The patriotic front also agreed v 
the principle of the United Nati 
supervising the cease-fire and suj 
vising the police during the transit 
period. 

The patriotic front also agreed v 
respect to an all-parties confere 
and said that they would attend 
all-parties conference. 

There were differences of views 
other matters, such as the govern 
council and what the power-shar 
within a governing council should 
and the functions of the gove 
ing council in terms of legislat 
authority. 

We went from there down to So 
Africa. We discussed with the So 
Africans both the Rhodesian situat 
and the Namibian problem. T 
Foreign Minister of South Afr 
asked for certain clarifications on 
proposal of the five Western powe 
the so-called contact group. As ) 
know, that group has put those p 
posals into the U.N. Security Coun 
now and debate is starting in t 
General Assembly tomorrow 
Namibia. 

The clarifications asked for by t 
Foreign Minister of South Africa, a 
also clarifications asked by IV 






fil 1978 

|>ma on behalf of SWAPO, will be 
jjained in the statement which is 
flg made by Mr. Jamieson, the 
lign Minister of Canada. He will 
Speaking on behalf of all of the 
^tomorrow at the United Nations. 
1, the Soviet Union, I think as you 

(■enow, I indicated that I believe 
talks there were useful. I believe 
iwe made some progress. There is 
g;at deal of hard work ahead, and 

.Agreed that both sides would in- 
nfy their efforts to try and com- 
f the work which has to be done 
eure an agreement could be 
•led. 

(. How long do you think it will 
>efore you are able to get an 
;iement? 

j I honestly don't know. I would 
siuessing if I tried to say. There 
e;ome difficult issues that remain, 
mow long it is going to take — 

( Are they the issues that were 
hays there almost from the 
ejnning? 

•)l Some of them are. 

t For some time now, since this 
Ministration has been in office, 
■ Soviets have argued — 
a icularly in the SALT talks — 
ki all the goodwill which they 
e anded and the give in SALT 
a to come from the American 
Id. Did you see any moderation of 
W view, that the Americans must 
c le ones who do all the giving? 

. I think it is interesting in the 
iament that was issued by President 
or hnev at the close, after our meet- 

j He indicated that both sides 
a to work together to achieve an 
glement. 

'■. You said that is interesting. 
Hi you consider it significant? Do 
o consider the Soviets will not be 
K e flexible? 

. I think it is significant that it 
pi ifically stated this was something 
li both sides had to work at. 

. Pardon my ignorance, but is 
>ident Brezhnev coming to the 
i ted Nations for the disarma- 
ii'.t — for the meeting? 

II . He didn't indicate that he was, 
n the last that I had heard several 
Ijks ago is that probably the delega- 
i*l would be handled by the Foreign 
djister. 

». You say you don't know; you 
»iild be guessing. This year for 
> ^T, though? 



A. Yes, it could be this year. 

Q. Could be. In other words, it 
might not be? 

A. I am not going to predict the 
date. 

Q. The President has predicted a 
date often. 

A. I am not going to predict today. 

Q. Can you tell us where you did 
make progress generally? 

A. I have said very clearly in Mos- 
cow and I hav.e said since leaving 
Moscow that I am not going to go 
into the underlying details. All I am 
going to say is that some progress 
was made. Let me tell you the reason 
for it. 

In negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, the mark of the seriousness of 
the negotiation is the confidentiality 
of the negotiations. If one gets into 
the detail in public discussion of mat- 
ters still under negotiation, it is re- 
garded by them as a propaganda exer- 
cise rather than a serious negotiation. 
I do not want to do anything to 
jeopardize serious negotiations that 
are going on between us. Therefore, I 
am going to stick to what I have said, 
which is in general that the talks were 
useful and that we made some 
progress. 

Q. Would you say that the at- 
titude about public discussion is 
somewhat of a shift in the view of 
this Administration from last year? 

A. Yes, it certainly is insofar as I 
was concerned in my first trip to 
Moscow. I spoke frequently on the is- 
sues. A year later I am convinced that 
the way we handled it this time in 
Moscow is the preferable way. 

Q. You are saying in effect that 
the President can no longer discuss 
foreign policy openly as he talked 
about during the campaign? 

A. I am not saying that at all. I am 
saying in a particular negotiation like 
the SALT negotiation, that where you 
are dealing with very complicated and 
technical matters on many issues, to 
talk about matters which are still 
under negotiation is liable to give 
misleading information, and at the 
same time it also has the problem that 
I referred to earlier. 

Q. Does that extend to no more 
discussion of human rights and the 
Horn of Africa? 

A. Of course not. 

Q. When do you expect to hear 



27 

from the internal government in 
Rhodesia as to whether they will go 
to a conference? 

A. I would expect we will proba- 
bly hear from them in the next couple 
of weeks would be my guess. I don't 
know for sure, but they said they 
were going to take the proposals and 
give them serious consideration. They 
said it would be — I think the word 
was irresponsible not to give them 
serious consideration, and they would 
be back in touch with us. □ 



'Other press releases relating to Secretary 
Vance's trip are Nos. 163 of Apr. 13; 165 of 
Apr. 14; 166 and 167 of Apr. 15; 168 and 169 
of Apr. 16; 179 and 181 of Apr. 20; and 184 
of Apr. 24. 

-"Pressrelease 170 of Apr. 17, 1978. 

'For text of the proposals, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 3. 1977, p. 424. 

"Press release 171 of Apr. 17. 1978. 

5 Made following their meeting with the 
Rhodesian transitional government (press re- 
lease 174 of Apr. 17, 1978). 

""Opening paragraphs omitted. 

'For full text of President Carter's address 
on Mar. 17. 1978, see Bulletin of Apr. 1978, 
p. 17. 

"Press release 182 of Apr. 22. 1978. (list 
of U.S. and Soviet participants in the meetings 
omitted). 

"Press release 183 of Apr. 24. 1978 (ex- 
change of remarks with the press omitted). 

'"Press release 187 of Apr. 24, 1978. 



Interview) on 
"Face the Nation" 



Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
the CBS television and radio program 
"Face the Nation" on April 30 by 
George Herman, CBS News corre- 
spondent; Marvin Kalb, CBS News 
diplomatic correspondent; and Murrey 
Murder, Washington Post senior dip- 
lomatic correspondent. 

Q. President Carter said about 
the sale of airplanes to Israel, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia: "I look 
upon them as a package, and if 
Congress should accept a portion 
and reject another, then my intent is 
to withdraw the sales proposal al- 
together." I wonder, listening to 
some Administration statements 
since, has the President done an 
about-face on this as a package? 

A. What the President has made 



28 

very clear is that each one of these 
must be separate, put before the Con- 
gress separately, considered separately 
by the Congress. That is the law, and 
that is the way that it will be done. 
However, in exercising his responsibil- 
ity, the President must look at the ac- 
tion taken on each one of these sepa- 
rate actions before he makes his ulti- 
mate determination. 

Q. In your first answer, you sort 
of explained what the President had 
said. But I'm not sure I've gotten 
the whole thing yet, because another 
part of the President's quotation 
from the news conference was: "If 
Congress should accept a portion 
and reject another, then my intent is 
to withdraw the sales package al- 
together." Is that still operative? 

A. Yes. He's got to exercise his 
judgment as he sees the action taken 
on each one of the elements of this 
package. These separate elements are 
reinforcing. 

Let me say a word by way of back- 
ground on this. We believe that 
they're an important part of the search 
for peace in the Middle East. They're 
important because they fill the needs, 
the requirements of each one of these 
countries. Yet, at the same time, they 
give confidence to each one of these 
countries that we are going to fulfill 
our commitments to them and fill their 
needs when they have legitimate 
needs. 

Now, this is important to the peace 
process. Why is it important to the 
peace process: 1 It's important not only 
that they should have the elements 
which they need for their defense, but 
it's also important they they should 
have confidence in the United States. 
If we are going to play an effective 
role in the peace process, then we 
must have the confidence of each of 
the parties. We are committed to the 
defense of Israel, to its security. This 
is an unshakable commitment. 

Insofar as Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
are concerned, each of them has an im- 
portant role to play in the peace proc- 
ess. The Egyptians are an essential 
element in the discussions which arc- 
taking place. The Saudi Arabians are a 
moderate force, a moderate force for 
peace. And, therefore, it's important 
that all of them have confidence in us 
and that we will help them in what they 
need and in their well-being. 

Q. This arms sales issue has taken 
on implications clearly beyond the 
normal factor of weaponry. Can you 
tell us what in your judgment would 
be the damage done to overall U.S. 
policy if some measure of weaponry 



is not provided for Saudi Arabia? 

A. Saudi Arabia, as I indicated, is a 
force for moderation in the Middle 
East. It is also an extremely important 
country in terms of the part which it is 
playing in the economy of the world. 
Obviously it is one of the leaders in 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries]. And, thus, it is 
a very important country from many, 
many standpoints. 

Saudi Arabia is also a long and 
close friend of the United States. We 
have made a commitment, starting in 
1975 and reaffirmed in this Adminis- 
tration, to meet their needs in this re- 
gard. We have carefully examined 
their request for 60 F— 15 aircraft. We 
have, after that examination, con- 
cluded that this is a valid need to meet 
their defense requirements. If we were 
now not to go forward with that. I think 
we would seriously jeopardize our re- 
lationship not only with Saudi Arabia 
but with the moderate countries in the 
area as well. 

Q. I just want to not misun- 
derstand something. Earlier on you 
used the term again "mutually rein- 
forcing," which was the language 
that you used at the very beginning 
at that news conference with Defense 
Secretary Brown. And then you fol- 
lowed that news conference state- 
ment up by talking about a package. 
I know that you are now stressing 
the individual nature of the consid- 
eration of Congress, but it is in your 
mind — the Administration — still a 
package. 

A. In the view of the Administra- 
tion, they are — each of them — self- 
reinforcing. And without each one of 
them being acted upon positively, I 
think it's going to produce a result 
which will be damaging to the peace 
process and damaging to our relation- 
ships with each one of these countries. 

Therefore, I believe very strongly 
that the Congress should act positively 
on each one of those. 

Q. To what extent has Adminis- 
tration policy in the Middle East be- 
come hostage — you talked a great 
deal about Saudi Arabia and its 
importance — become hostage really 
to oil — Saudi Arabia being a terrific 
and principal supplier of oil? 

A. Obviously oil is a very impor- 
tant commodity, not only for the 
United States but for the world, for 
Western Europe, for our friends and 
allies all over the world, for the poor 
nations as well as the developed coun- 
tries. And no one should try and belit- 
tle the importance of oil. 






Department of State Bu-f 

But that's not the sole factor. T 
are other factors involved. And the 
factor here that I see is reinforcing 
peace process. And I stress that S 
Arabia, as a moderate, as a supp< 
of the search for peace that is goin 
now — on now between Israel 
Egypt — is a very important elem 
And therefore, that must not be 
counted. It must be underlined. 

Q. Feeling the way you do al 
the importance of the arms sale 
Egypt and to Saudi Arabia as m I 
ally reinforcing and so forth, w<| 
you recommend to the Presideni 
withdraw the package in what<J 
form — this is the question that I 
trying to get at — if one or the ot | 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia, is tur 
down by Congress? Would 
recommend to the Presideni 
withdraw? 

A. I think I've made it very cj 
that I consider each one of these 
ments to be essential. 

Q. You've had a series of t | 
with Israeli Foreign Minister M< 
Dayan, and Israeli Prime Mini I 
Menahem Begin is coming on Nit 
day. Have you made any spei I 
headway on any issue in the Mi 1 
East, in the Arab-Israeli confl 
that gives you any further re: I 
for believing that the impasse I 
we have experienced on the A I 
Israeli negotiations can be o I 
come? Anything specific? 

A. No, I cannot give you anyt I 
specific coming out of the discuss w 
which I had with Minister Di I 
which gives me the basis for sa iff 
that there has been a breakthroi I 
that I see new light at the end of I 
road. We did have 1 a good exchi I 
of views. I think the meeting I 
useful. I asked a number of quest I 
of the Foreign Minister, for who I 
have great respect, as you know. I 
is going to discuss those questil 
with his Prime Minister and, I assuij 
with other members of the Cabi l\ 
And we shall see what comes f I 
that. 

Let me say I have not given 1 
hope with respect to the possibilit;! 
making peace in the Middle Has I 
believe it can be done, because I I 
lieve that it's in the interests of all 
the countries in the area that that v 
done. And, therefore, we're goinjd 
persevere, and I believe that they II 
persevere as well. 

Q. Is the Egyptian Forein 
Minister coming here soon? 

A. No, not at this point. There I 
no plans for him to come. 



ne 1978 

Q. On another related issue here, 
iere are a number of members of 
it- Administration who have been 
loted as saying that this Adminis- 
lation cannot succeed in its Middle 
tst policy unless the so-called Is- 
lel lobby is broken. To what ex- 
nt does that sentiment govern the 
|plicy? 

A. I don't like to use words like 

Irael lobby or anything like that. I 

ink that individuals are going to 

|ake up their own minds on this. 

Ihese are very serious, very impor- 

ni issues. And those issues are 

ping to be weighed individually by 

dividual Americans, and they're 

ping to make up their own mind on 

lese. 

i Q. You went to the Soviet Union 
ist week at a time when Soviet 
ader Leonid Brezhnev was se- 
;rely criticizing the United States 
Ir vacillation and uncertainty in its 
uclear arms control policy. Were 
>u able to convince him otherwise? 

A. I think that words speak for 
lemselves. As you'll recall, after our 
Iks President Brezhnev indicated 
at he believed that some progress 
id been made. He indicated further 
at the task of completing the re- 
aining items was a task which lay in 
e hands of both of us, not just in 
e hands of one. Previously, he had 
ferred to the fact that, in effect, it 
as up to the United States to move. 
<e said after our discussions that it 
as up to both of us to see whether 
e couldn't take the necessary steps 
i close the gaps on the remaining is- 
les. And I think that speaks for itself. 

Q. Can you give us any specifics 
t all, about the degree of move- 
lent you made which will enable 

iae Administration to overcome the 
uite fierce opposition it has in 

i ongress on a SALT treaty? 

| A. You've touched a very sensitive 
Ibint with me. As you know, I feel 
I pry deeply that where one is engaged 
li sensitive negotiations on a very 

omplicated matter like the SALT 
negotiations — that's the Strategic 
Brms Limitation Talks — that it is 

rong to talk publicly about the de- 
liils of that negotiation while the 
legotiation is ongoing. 
J Let me further say that insofar as 
lie Soviets are concerned, they con- 

ider it a mark of seriousness if you 
;eep the talks confidential while they 

re still in the discussion stage. And 
|f it immediately becomes public and 
pu go into the details, they regard 
mat as a propaganda exercise. So 



that's another factor I think one has 
to take into consideration. 

Q. I recognize the problem that 
the Administration has. At the same 
time, the Carter Administration did 
take office pledging a considerable 
degree of openness. And frankly, 
from your own standpoint, from 
your own ability to develop a con- 
sensus to support your policy, how 
does the Administration intend, 
while this process is underway, to 
marshal! the consensus that is 
necessary to overcome the very 
strong opposition of those who are 
opposed to any SALT treaty? 

A. It's a very good question, and 
let me answer it. I think we're going 
to have to talk in general terms. I 
think we're going to talk about what 
our objectives are in SALT. What are 
they? First, we want an agreement 
which is a sound agreement. We feel 
under no time deadline. We will 
negotiate until we have a sound 
agreement. 

What do I mean by a sound agree- 
ment? I mean one which will maintain 
or enhance our security and that of 
our allies as well. 

Now I think that if we can get such 
an agreement, then obviously we will 
take an action in our national interest. 
And I think when the time comes 
when we have completed our negotia- 
tions, then we can lay out very 
clearly all the elements and show how 
these do enhance not only our secu- 
rity but those of our allies. 

Q. Do you believe that as a result 
of your trip to Moscow and the 
forthcoming talks that you will have 
in May with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko in New York that a sum- 
mit meeting between Presidents 
Brezhnev and Carter is now likely? 

A. I don't want to use the word 
"likely. " I think it's possible. 

Q. When? 

A. I don't want to make any 
guesses on that. 

Q. Are you looking toward some- 
thing this summer, which seems to 
be what one hears in the State De- 
partment? 

A. I think it would be unwise for 
me to speculate or guess on some- 
thing like that. 

Q. Is a summit meeting impor- 
tant or even critical at this point 
in resolving the differences that 
remain? 

A. I think, first, we've got to see 
if we can't resolve the remaining dif- 



29 

ferences in the Geneva talks — that's 
between our two delegations there — 
or between the Foreign Minister and 
myself and then see whether anything 
remains which has to be resolved at a 
summit. 

Q. Let me ask you a question 
which may sound like a change of 
subject but actually isn't. Is there 
going to be Sino-Soviet, Chinese 
and Russian talks? Is there going to 
be a series of moves toward a rap- 
prochement between the Soviet 
Union and China? 

A. They are having discussions, I 
believe, on the questions relating to 
the border disputes on the Amur 
River. 

My own analysis is that at this time 
that the relationships between the two 
will remain about the same as they 
are at the present time. Those are cor- 
rect relationships. However, they are 
not warm relationships, to say the 
least. And I would anticipate that 
they would continue at about that 
level and tone. 

Q. President Carter had said a 
few weeks before you went to Mos- 
cow that the projection of Soviet 
power into Africa was a very omi- 
nous trend. Your predecessor, Henry 
Kissinger, said recently: "Another 
move of the kind we have seen in 
Angola and Ethi