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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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April 1979 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2025 



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Department of State 

huUetin 

Volume 79/ Number 2025 /April 1979 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy — 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



i 



C01^TE]\TS 



30TH ANNIVERSARY 
ORGANIZATION 

ii A Proclamation 
1 NATO— 30 Years After 
1 Statement by Secretary Vance 

THE PRESIDENT 

4 Remarks Before a National Foreign 

Policy Conference 
7 News Conference of February 27 



AFRICA 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals 

(Richard M. Moose) 
Letter of Credence (Mauritania) 
Horn of Africa (Richard M. Moose) 
Publications 

ARMS CONTROL 



OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 



11 

12 
13 



14 Preserving Freedom and Peace in a Nu- 

clear Age (Vice President Mandate) 

15 SALT Treaty (White House Statement) 

EAST ASIA 

17 FY 1980 Assistance Proposals 
(Richard C. Holbrooke) 

20 ASEAN-U.S, Business Council (De- 
partment Statement) 

22 Military Bases Agreement With the 
Philippines {Letter from President 
Carter) 

24 Security Assistance Report on Korea, 
1978 

26 Visit of Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak 

(Joint Press Statement) 

27 American and Japanese Interests in 

Southeast Asia (David D. Newsom) 

ECONOMICS 

30 America's Stake in the World Economy 

(Secretary Vance) 
32 Economic Report of the President 

(Message to the Congress) 

32 Waiver of Countervailing Duties (Mes- 

sage to the Congress) 

EUROPE 

33 FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the 

Eastern Mediterranean (Matthew 
Nimelz) 

34 I 1th Report on Cyprus (President 

Carter) 

36 FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Por- 

tugal and Spain (George S. Vest) 

37 Letter of Credence f/Vorway) 

37 Publications 

MIDDLE EAST 

38 FY 1980 Assistance Proposals (Morris 

Draper) 



38 Editor's Note 

39 Egyptian. Israeli, and U.S. Officials 

Meet at Camp David (President 
Carter) 

40 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin 

( White House Statement) 

41 North Yemen (Department Statement) 

41 Sixth Report on the Sinai Support Mis- 

sion (Message to the Congress) 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

42 FY 1980 Proposals (Lucy Wilson Ben- 

son) 

SOUTH ASIA 

48 Promoting Stability and Security (War- 

ren Christopher) 

49 U.S. Ambassador Killed in Afghanistan 

(President Carter, Secretary Vance) 

50 Assistance in Afghanistan (White 

House Statement) 

51 Letter of Credence ffa/tw/an) 

UNITED NATIONS 

52 Implementing Human Rights Standards 

(Edward M. Mezvinsky) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

56 FY 1980 Assistance Proposals (Viron 

P. Vaky) 

57 Pan American Day and Week. 1979 (A 

Proclamation) 

58 Letters of Credence (Guatemala. Hon- 

duras. Panama) 

59 Maritime Boundary Treaties (Message 

to the Senate) 

62 Panama Canal Treaty Legislation 
(President Carter. Warren Chris- 
topher, Ambler H. Moss, Jr.) 

65 U.S. and Panama Sign Two Agree- 
ments (Department Announcement) 

TREATIES 

67 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69 February 1979 

70 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



JiiL?4l'73 



30th A]\]\IVERSARY OF ]\ATO 



A Proelatnation 

Thirty years ago in Washington on April 4, 1949 the 
North Atlantic Treaty was signed. From that act grew 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, an 
alliance welded together by a common dedication to per- 
petuating democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law. 

For three decades, NATO has successfully deterred 
war and maintained stability in Western Europe and 
North America, thus securing the well-being and pros- 
perity of its fifteen member states: Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America. 

Though collective defense against possible aggression 
was the most urgent requirement at its founding, NATO 
has always been much more than just a military pact. 
The spontaneous political development of the Alliance 
demonstrates that true security is far more than a matter 
of weaponry and armed battalions. In the final analysis, 
true security flows from the freely-given support of the 
people and their willingness to participate in the defense 
of common ideals. 

Since NATO's inception, the international situation 
has evolved in many respects and NATO has adapted to 
these changes — militarily, politically, and econom- 
ically. Today the Alliance remains as relevant and cen- 
trally important to our security and way of life and to 
the independence of the United States as it was in 1949. 



Then as now, the firm support of Congress and the 
American people for NATO reflects their deep convic- 
tion that NATO is the cornerstone of United States 
foreign policy. 

As NATO moves forward into another decade of 
achievement, we look toward the future with confi- 
dence, aware that continuing Allied cooperation will 
provide the international stability and security upon 
which our ideals, our civilization, and our well-being 
depend. As NATO begins this new chapter in its distin- 
guished history, I am proud to rededicate the United 
States to the NATO objectives which have served the 
cause of peace so well. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby direct the attention 
of the Nation to this thirtieth anniversary of the signing 
of the North Atlantic Treaty; and I call upon the Gover- 
nors of the States, and upon the officers of local gov- 
ernments, to facilitate the suitable observance of this 
notable event throughout this anniversary year with par- 
ticular attention to April, the month which marks the 
historic signing ceremony. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this twenty-second day of March, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-nine, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the two 
hundred and third. 

Jimmy Carter 



No. 4648 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Mar. 26, 19791 



]\ATO— 30 YEARS AFTER 



Thirty years ago — April 4. 1949 — representatives of 12 
nations gathered in Washington, D.C.. to sign the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the cornerstone of NATO.^ 

At its founding. NATO' s immediate task was to con- 
struct an effective system of collective defense. The close 
harmony of allied i/t'H'5, however, insured thai NATO 
quickly became much more than a military alliance. From 
the beginning, it has been as much a political alliance, 
designed to promote wide cooperation in political, eco- 
nomic, and social fields as well as security. 

As NATO passes its 30th anniversary, its founders 
should he celebrated for their vision. So successful has 
NATO been in securing the peace and stability necessary 
\for the growth of the West' s economic and political in- 
stitutions, that the alliance too often is taken for 
granted — until a crisis reminds us how centrally important 
it is to our foreign policy. 

Today, NATO stands as the strongest defensive alliance 
in history, protecting some of the world' s most dynamic 
democratic political institutions and the greatest concen- 
tration of economic strength on the globe. 

In our open societies, we are so diligent in our exam- 
ination of the problems of the alliance, we tend to lose 
sight of the almost incomprehensible strength, size, and 
energy of the NATO nations. We are: 

• 570 million civilized people, living on 

• 8.6 million square miles of land, producing annually 

• $4 trillion ($4,000,000,000,000) worth of goods and 
services, and 

• $7,000 average GNP for each person: we are able to 
spend 

• $180 billion a year on our defense (an estimated $30 
billion more than the Warsaw Pact at current levels) and 
still have an estimated 

• $3.82 trillion ($3,820,000,000,000) left over for non- 
defense spending. 

Within this community. NATO's crucial function re- 
mains: the collective defense of Western Europe and North 
America. 

It is this central aspect of NATO which should he 
studied as we enter the fourth decade of the alliance, for 
our perceptions of the North Atlantic defenses weigh 
heavily as we consider other great events of this era: SALT 
11 and detente, Iran, the Middle East peace agreements, 
Africa, and our new relationship with China. NATO does 
not exist as a thing apart: it has always been shaped ac- 
cording to our perceptions of ourselves and the Communist 
forces in Eastern Europe. Those perceptions have changed 
over the years in some important Ways and so have our 
defense policies. The collective defense of 15 countries and 
half a billion people pose enormous practical problems. 



Through three decades, these policies have been 
hammered out under pressures of a variety of conflicting 
interests. 

From the start, NATO's central European strategy was 
based on holding the enemy as close to the East German 
boundary as possible — the concept of forward defense, as 
it eventually was labeled — under which the territory and 
people of Western Europe would receive maximum protec- 
tion. Obviously, such a strategy has meaning only if the 
defending forces have the strength to absorb the impact of 
an initial surprise attack without breaking. 



NATO'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY 

On April 4, the United States, along with the other 14 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ob- 
served the 30th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
That anniversary is a significant milestone in the West's 
history since World War II. 

For three decades the defensive purpose of the alliance 
has successfully preserved Europe and North America from 
the devastation of war. By securing peace, NATO has as- 
sured the stability under which the allies' democratic and 
economic institutions have strengthened and prospered. 

Over the years. NATO has proved resourceful in meet- 
ing new challenges. Its ability to deter aggression cannot 
be measured by numerical comparisons alone. Today, as 
the alliance enters a new decade, its strategy of forward 
defense and flexible response remains valid, as does its 
military capability to carry out that strategy. 

NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of our foreign 
policy. The commitment of the United States to the al- 
liance is unshakable. Our freedoms, our security, and our 
well-being are irrevocably tied by history, culture, and 
civilization to the destiny of our European allies with 
whom we share an unparalleled commonality of interests. 

The increasing interrelationship between our policies and 
interests and those of our allies has extended the scope of 
alliance consultation far beyond traditional military con- 
cerns to encompass political, economic, and social de- 
velopments in many parts of the globe. Today issues of 
deep interest to the alliance cut across a wide range of the 
geographical and functional concerns of our government, 
especially the Department of State. NATO's consultative 
mechanisms offer us an unrivaled forum for simultaneously 
reaching 14 nations whose support is important in achiev- 
ing U.S. policy objectives around the world. As President 
Carter has observed: "Our alliance has never been an end 
in itself. It is a way to promote stability and peace in 
Europe and, indeed, peace in the world at large." 

This 30th anniversary offers us all the occasion to cele- 
brate the success of the alliance. More importantly, it pre- 
sents us with an opportunity to reflect on how we can 
strengthen our contribution to NATO as it meets the chal- 
lenges of the coming decade. 

Cyrus R. Vance 



As the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons. NATO 
strategy was adjusted to take into account the possibility 
that any major aggression might involve the use of nuclear 
weapons at an early stage. This led. in turn, to the 
stockpiling in Europe after 1957 of tactical nuclear 
warheads for infantry and airborne weapons to strengthen 
NATO's defensive and deterrent capabilities. 

In the mid-1960's additional considerations had ap- 
peared, affecting NATO's strategic concepts. 

® Tensions between East and West were relaxed some- 
what. 

• Increased Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean 
posed a new threat on NATO's southern flank. 

• The ballistic missile became the principal means of 
delivering nuclear warheads. Hundreds of hardened 
launch sites on both sides, as well as nuclear-propelled 
ballistic missile submarines, made it possible for either 
side to receive a surprise nuclear attack and retaliate 
within a matter of minutes. Even the most destructive sur- 
prise attack could result in a reciprocal annihilation of an 
equally large proportion of the attacker' s own population 
and industry. Considering these developments. NATO 
Defense .Ministers met in December 1967 and adopted 
a more flexible strategic concept than that of massive 
retaliation. 

The new concept — called flexible response — while re- 
taining the principle of forward defense, was based on the 
requirement that a credible military response of all kinds is 
necessary, and this must be secured through a wide range 
of forces equipped with a well-balanced mix of conven- 
tional weapons and tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons. 

The flexible response is based on two principles: 

• Deterrence of attack through the possibility of escala- 
tion and 

• The capability to retaliate to an attack with direct de- 
fense at approximately the same level, while retaining the 
option to escalate. 

Keystone of the strategy is that an aggressor must be 
convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if 
necessary, yet he must be uncertain as to the timing or 
circumstances. While this policy involves, as before, the 



Department of State Bulletin 

possibility of escalation to nuclear war, it is based essen- 
tially upon controlling the progress of escalation of any 
conflict rather than planning to meet any attack with in- 
stant massive retaliation. 

In 1960 another important change was made. The 
problem, as some viewed it. was that the Soviets might be 
tempted to attack relatively lightly-defended, smaller 
countries on the flanks of NATO in a quick limited aggres- 
sion against purely national defending forces in the hope of 
facing the alliance with a fait accompli. This possibility in- 
creased the danger of war by miscalculation. 

NATO's solution was to form Allied Command Europe's 
Mobile Force, a brigade-size combat force made up of 
well-equipped land and air units from a variety of NATO 
countries. This multinational force would be immediately 
available for dispatch by air to any part of the alliance. 
Their rapid deployment, committing the combined armed 
forces of NATO, would insure against the mistaken notion 
that a Norway or a Greece or Turkey might stand alone in 
case of attack. 

Each change in defense policy has reflected an un- 
changed national policy on the part of all NA TO govern- 
ments: to secure our lands, deter aggression, stabilize 
Europe, and encourage peaceful solutions to outstanding 
problems. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says in his 
message to NATO: 

Over the years, NATO has proved resourceful in meeting new chal- 
lenges. Its ability to deter aggression cannot be measured by numerical 
comparisons alone. Today, as the alliance enters a new decade, its 
strategy of forward defense and llexible response remains valid, as 
does its military capability to carry out that strategy. 

There still are areas of obvious concern: major prob- 
lems to be solved in political, economic, and military 
spheres. However, looking back over the past 30 years and 
comparing the assets of the alliance then and now, the 
people of the North Atlantic community can take a large 
measure of satisfaction that the job has been well done. 



' Belgium. Canada. Denmark. France. Iceland. Italy. Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands. Norway. Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and the Federal Re- 
public of Germany in 1954. 



April 1979 



NATO-WARSAW PACT 
BALANCE SHEET 

Displays of comparative statistics can he misleading. • A comparison of economic strength shows an even 
For example, a comparison of U.S. and Soviet navies by greater disparity — NATO's combined gross national 
number of surface units shows one thing, but by tonnage a products is nearly three times as large as that of the War- 
different picture is presented. Another completely different saw Pact group, and NATO's per capita GNP is nearly 
picture can be seen when the ships of not the two countries twice as large. 

hut the two alliances are compared. The reason is simply • In total regular military manpower, although the 
that America' s European allies are more numerous, more Warsaw Pact has an estimated 8% advantage, the disposi- 
prosperous, and, generally, better armed than are the tion of those forces presents different kinds of problems 
Soviet allies. and advantages to each side. 

If we compare total NA TO figures with total Warsaw 



Pact figures, the popular image of Communist ' 'superior- 
ity" in various areas is brought into a more realistic 
perspective. For example: 

• The massive land area of the Soviet Union as shown 



Any attempt to achieve symmetrical, point-by-point 
comparisons of complex military and geopolitical data 
must be treated cautiously. What follow are rough ap- 
proximations to give the reader a sense of the current 
on most maps can create an impression that the combined order of magnitude of the two most powerful military al- 
land area of the Warsaw Pact countries is considerably liances, not a precise, detailed description. (Note: Where 
greater than that of NATO countries. In fact, there is very official military data are unavailable because of security 
little difference — about 5%. classification or other reasons, the data used are drawn 

• There are 54% more people in NATO countries than from The Military Balance, 1978, published privately by 

the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.) 





NATO 


WARSAW 
PACT 


LAND AREA (sq. mi.) 


8.6 
million 


9 million 


POPULATION 


570 
million 


370 million 


GROSS NATIONAL 
PRODUCT 


$4 trillion 


$1.4 trillion 


PER CAPITA GNP 


$7,000 


$3,000 


DEFENSE BUDGET 
Current Annual Rate 

'7f of GNP 


$180 billion 

4.5 


$150 billion 
11-14 



Heavy Antitank Weapons 

(Figures unavailable for 
publication, but NATO 
is believed to have 
significant superiority in 
numbers.) 



n.a. 



DIVISIONS— PEACETIME 
Central & Northern 
Regions 



29 



67 



%GNP AVAILABLE FOR 
NONDEFENSE 
SPENDING 



95 



86-89 



Southern Europe (NOTE: 
NATO divisions 
generally have about 
50% more combat 
personnel than Warsaw 
Pact divisions. They 
also incorporate more 
"tail," or support, 
units, giving them 
greater stamina in 
prolonged combat.) 



41 



33 



SEAPOWER 

Combat Surface Ships 
Submarines (all types) 



430 
249 



270 
207 



PERSONNEL, STANDING 4.8 
MILITARY FORCES million 



5.2 million 



CENTRAL EUROPE 
Ground Forces (Approx. 
figures include five 
French divisions not 



900,000 



900,000 



TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 






Central & Northern 






Regions 






Light bombers/fighters/ 


1,400 


1.600 


ground attack 






Short-range interceptors 


400 


2.000 


Southern Europe 






Light bombers/fighters/ 


450 


300 


ground attack 






Short-range interceptors 


275 


700 



under NATO command 
but affecting balance of 
forces in F.R.G.) 






THEATER NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 


7,000 


3,000 


STRATEGIC MISSILES 
STRATEGIC BOMBERS 
STRATEGIC WARHEADS 


2,200 

400 

10,000 


2,600 

150 

5,000 


Main Battle Tanks 


7,000 


20,000 





Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDE]\T: Remarks Before a 
]%ational Fipreign Policy Conference 



Remarks and questlon-and-answer 
session before a foreign policy confer- 
ence for editors and broadcasters held 
at the Department of State February 
22, 1979.' 

Before I take your questions this af- 
ternoon, I'd like to give you some of 
my own thoughts about the uses of 
American power in a changing and 
sometimes turbulent world. 

Recent events, particularly in Iran 
and Southeast Asia, have touched off a 
national debate about what America's 
role should be in dealing with turbu- 
lence and in trying to guide inevitable 
change. We've been going through de- 
bates like this ever since our first 
President served — George Washington, 
whose birthday this happens to be. 

Looking back over the last several 
years — particularly the last 2 years — 
I've been struck by the increasing 
complexity, however, of international 
affairs. I'm encouraged by what I judge 
to be a willingness on behalf of the 
American people to attempt to under- 
stand complex issues, not to over- 
simplify them, and to support policies 
and decisions that basically and openly 
address these complex issues responsi- 
bly and realistically. 

Of course, there has never been any 
change in America's determination or 
our willingness to maintain a strong 
military capability or to promote the 
economic health and vitality of our 
country or to deal with and enhance the 
political and moral strength of our na- 
tion. Those commitments have always 
been constant and unswerving. But we 
must also see issues that are complex 
very clearly. And we must devise in- 
telligent and thoughtful responses to 
them. 

Neither of the two events that have 
been so newsworthy the last few 
weeks — turmoil in Iran, the conflict in 
Southeast Asia — were of our own 
making. But both events place great 
demands on me as President and on our 
ability to define and to act upon the 
true interests of the American people. 
And there are likely to be many more 
events like this in the future. 

As the world becomes more com- 
plex, it's more important than ever 
before that we do not oversimplify 
events abroad. Bad analysis inevitably 
leads to bad policy. Instead, we need to 
be aware of the deep historical forces at 
work in other countries. We need to be 



well-informed. The revolution in Iran, 
for example, is a product of Iranian so- 
cial, political, economic, religious 
factors, all intertwined. To ignore these 
realities or fail to understand them 
would lead us into taking actions that 
might be ineffective or irrelevant or 
even dangerous. 

But in addition to understanding the 
complexity of individual nations, we 
must also understand how changes 
taking place in those nations can affect 
the future, both of that particular re- 
gion, the entire world, and especially 
my responsibility, the United States of 
America. 

We need to resist two temptations: to 
see all change as inevitably against the 
interests of the United States, as kind 
of a loss for us or a victory for them; or 
to imagine that what happens in a 
country like Iran will not have conse- 
quences for us and for other regions as 
well. We need to see what is happening 
not in terms of simplistic colors, black 
and white, but in more subtle shades; 
not as isolated events, but often as part 
of sweeping currents that have broad 
significance. 

At this moment there is turmoil or 
change in various countries from one 
end of the Indian Ocean to the other; 
some turmoil as in Indochina is the 
product of age-old enmities, inflamed 
by rivalries for influence by conflicting 
forces. Stability in some other coun- 
tries is being shaken by the processes 
of modernization, the search for na- 
tional significance, or the desire to ful- 
fill legitimate human hopes and human 
aspirations. 

For us in the United States, change 
itself is not the enemy. Our concern is 
twofold. We must work to dampen 
conflict, to maintain peace, and we 
must make clear that it's dangerous for 
outside powers to try to exploit for 
their own selfish benefits this inevita- 
ble turmoil. That kind of exploitation 
can damage not only the integrity and 
independence of the nations that hap- 
pen to be in a transition phase but also 
can damage the effort to build a more 
secure and a more peaceful world for 
us all. Let me repeat what I said at 
Georgia Tech earlier this week: "... 
in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, 
and elsewhere in the world, we will 
stand by our friends, we will honor our 
commitments, and we will protect the 
vital interests of the United States 



The United States continues to be the 
most powerful nation on Earth — 
militarily, economically, and politi- 
cally. And I'm committed to preserving 
and even enhancing that power, not for 
its own sake, but for the sake of the 
values and the ideals of our nation. We 
will make responsible use of that power 
where our interests are directly in- 
volved or where we can help to create 
conditions for peace and for the inde- 
pendent development of other nations 
and for the realization of the hopes of 
human beings who live there. 

We have forces in readiness, as you 
well know, which we will use if neces- 
sary. I hope that that need will never 
rise. I am proud that no member of the 
Armed Forces of our country has had to 
give his life in combat during my Ad- 
ministration. And I'm determined to do 
all in my power to keep this precious 
peace. But let there be no mistake, our 
will and our determination are firm; our 
commitment to protecting our vital 
interest is unshakable. We must, 
therefore, be very clear about where 
our true interests lie. 

In Iran, our interest is to see its 
people independent, able to develop, 
according to their own design, free 
from outside interference either by us 
or from any other power. 

In Southeast Asia, our interest is to 
promote peace and the withdrawal of 
outside forces and not to become em- 
broiled in the conflict among Asian 
Communist nations. And, in general, 
our interest is to promote the health and 
the development of individual 
societies, not to a pattern cut exactly 
like ours in the United States but tail- 
ored rather to the hopes and the needs 
and the desires of the peoples involved. 

To these ends we will broaden our 
cooperation with our friends in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, sup- 
porting their efforts to maintain na- 
tional stability and independence. 
We'll consult closely with Congress to 
determine the need for additional mili- 
tary aid in this troubled region of the 
Middle East, to be used where it can be 
most effective. And we have called and 
will call on our allies to help whenever 
they can or will, working in partnership 
with us. 

We are working hard for peace be- 
tween Israel and its neighbors and also 
in other troubled areas of the world. In 
the future, I feel sure that we will find 
demands on the United States to be in- 



April 197^ 

creasing and nul diminishing. We con- 
iiinie to hear the burdens ot iiiaintain- 
ini; a strong defense, of supporting ira- 
ilitional allies who depend upon u.s, and 
working to reduce the spread of con- 
ventional and nuclear weapons. 

But we also face a twilight world of 
change and sometimes of turmoil. We 
will increasingly be called upon to deal 
\u(h events that do not represent basic 
challenges to our security but still 
uhich require the responsible use of 
American influence and American 
power. 

We have the strength and the will to 
act where need be, and I'm confident 
that as a nation we have the wisdom to 
act wisely. 

That's my responsibility in brief 
terms, a responsibility which you share 
with me. 

Q. I'd like to know what we're 
j;()ing to do to insure the stability of 
small oil-producing states in the 
Middle East during this time of in- 
stability in that part of the world? 

A. I've just sent Secretary of De- 
tense Brown into that region, as you 
know, to meet with the leaders of four 
nations: .Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Egypt, 
and Israel. We have the top officials of 
Oman here consulting these last few 
days with Secretary Vance. And in the 
Emirates, in Bahrain, and other small 
countries we've assured them that our 
influence, our power as a nation, will 
be used to preserve the basic security 
of that region free from any outside 
political or military power. 

We are trying to bring them together 
in a spirit of peace and harmony and a 
recognition that their own national in- 
dependence ought to be preserved by 
them and also preserved by us. 

As I said in my brief remarlcs earlier, 
I am consulting with the Congress now, 
based on the reports that Harold Brown 
brought back, about how we might in- 
crease to some degree our military as- 
sistance efforts for those small coun- 
tries that feel insecure, so that through 
their own strength they might feel bet- 
ter able to withstand any internal and 
outside disturbances that are unwar- 
ranted. 

There are some nations that provide 
major stabilizing efforts. Egypt is a 
strong, powerful nation in the Arab 
world; Israel's strength is part of our 
own security. Iran, we hope and pray, 
in the future will still be a factor for 
stability in their region — in a different 
character, obviously, than it was under 
the Shah, but we hope will be inde- 
pendent and determined to maintain 
kind of a rock of stability in that re- 
gion, impervious to outside influence 
and attack. 



Working with individual nations, 
working collectively to reduce tensions 
among them and making sure they have 
adequate military capabilities, and 
using our own influence to prevent 
sOme major outside power from having 
an inordinate influence — those are 
some of the things that we can do. 

The last one, obviously, is to try to 
bring some peace between Israel and its 
own neighbors. I think if the Arab 
world, in a united way. working with 
us. perhaps with Israel in a peaceful 
pursuit, could face any outside disturb- 
ance rather than to focus their animos- 
ity, as it has been in the past, on Israel, 
it would certainly be a very stabilizing 
factor. 

We derive great benefit from free ac- 
cess to oil from that region. Some of 
our allies and friends in Europe and 
Japan rely much more heavily, and we 
are trying to get them to use their own 
influence to parallel ours in maintain- 
ing the independence of individual na- 
tions and the stability therein. 

There are a few instances in that re- 
gion where economic aid — either 
through direct grants, which are fairly 
rare, or through guaranteed loans on a 
multilateral basis or through interna- 
tional lending institutions — can also 
help. That's kind of a gamut of things 
that we explore and use with varying 
degrees of priority and emphasis. 

Q. Many observers of the Middle 
Eastern situation believe that the 
failure of Egypt and Israel to sign the 
Camp David agreements as originally 
conceived this fall, and, in fact, the 
subsequent delays in signing any 
agreement, are directly related to the 
lack of pressure by the United States 
not on Israel and Egypt, but on Jor- 
dan and Saudi Arabia to join the 
talks or at least to lend support to the 
negotiating process. Would you 
please comment on this? 

A. I think in a spirit of complete 
candor we have approached our limit 
on legitimate influence — perhaps even 
pressure in a proper way — on the 
countries in that entire region to sup- 
port the Camp David accords and to 
participate in future discussions. 

We have sent delegations to Jordan, 
to Saudi Arabia, even this past week, 
to encourage their tacit or public or ac- 
tive support of these accords. And I've 
used my own personal influence to a 
maximum degree within the bounds of 
propriety in the same pursuit. 

As you know, my own involvement 
in the Camp David negotiations has 
been substantial. There is no other 
single item that has addressed my at- 
tention as President on which I've 
spent more time, more effort, more 



study, more prayer than to bring peace 
between Israel and its neighbors. We 
believe the Camp David accords are a 
very firm and well-advised foundation 
on which to predicate, first of all, an 
agreement between Israel and Egypt, 
combined with a comprehensive set- 
tlement as part of the same procedure 
that relates to Israel and its neighbors. 
And whatever we can do — to use the 
word again — within the bounds of 
propriety, recognizing the independ- 
ence of other nations, we have done, 
are doing, and will do to bring about 
peace between Israel and its neighbors. 

Q. If the Soviet troops decide to 
help Vietnam in their struggle, how 
will this affect normalization and the 
Taiwan question, which is also being 
questioned as to its defenses? 

A. The normalization of relations 
between our country and the People's 
Republic of China is an accomplished 
fact. It will not be affected one way or 
the other by combat among the Asian 
Communist countries. We have used 
every bit of influence that we could 
with Vietnam, with China, with the 
Soviet Union to bring about a with- 
drawal of attacking forces whenever 
they've crossed an international border 
and to bring about an end to combat 
there. 

My hope is that this combat will 
rapidly be concluded. And even today 
we introduced to the United Nations a 
request for a complete analysis or de- 
bate of this question calling upon Viet- 
nam to withdraw their troops after they 
have invaded Kampuchea, and also 
calling upon China to withdraw its 
troops from Vietnam. 

But I would say that the recognition 
of the Peking government as the Gov- 
ernment of China is already an accom- 
plished fact and will not be abrogated 
nor will there be any interference with 
it. 

Q. Some columnists and commen- 
tators have come to regard the im- 
plementation of your foreign policy 
as a failure. They point specifically 
to the lack of a clear direction, a 
steady course. Aside from those 
areas covered in your opening re- 
marks, what do you think has 
created that perception? Do you 
think it's possible that you yourself 
may have contributed to that prob- 
lem? [Laughter] 

A. I think that this allegation is to be 
anticipated. It's not unexpected for us. 

There is a marshaling of public sup- 
port in almost every instance when a 
President takes forceful action at a time 
when our nation's security itself is 
endangered — obviously, in time of a 



war. When people feel that our nation's 
security is challenged, there's a patrio- 
tic response to a President in a time of 
forceful action. It's not quite so easy to 
marshal overwhelming, enthusiastic, 
dedicated support in a time when a 
President's been able to search out a 
path and maintain peace. But I hope 
that that will be my achievement 
throughout the rest of my term. 

In retrospect, I can't see that we 
should have done anything differently 
in the basic questions from what we 
have done. We have had some notable 
challenges. 

I think that on a worldwide basis 
we've increased our friendships sub- 
stantially with nations that are emerg- 
ing as leaders. We have greatly re- 
paired the dispirited nature and the rel- 
ative weakness of NATO. I think 
there's now a renewed commitment to 
the strength of our alliance there. 

Our relationships with Australia, 
New Zealand in the ANZUS agreement 
are very strong. For the first time in my 
lifetime, as a matter of fact, we now 
have better relationships with the three 
leading Asian countries than do the 
Soviet Union leaders; that is, India, 
Japan, and the People's Republic of 
China. 

We've injected ourselves, I think, in 
a well-advised way in trying to resolve 
disputes among nations that might 
erupt into a broader conflict. I have 
just covered the part of my effort in the 
Mideast. We've tried to bring peace to 
Cyprus. We've worked with the British 
trying to resolve the problems in 
Rhodesia, to give majority rule, a 
democratic government there, to end 
the racial discrimination that has 
existed. 

We've worked very closely with four 
other major allies — Canada, France, 
West Germany, Britain — to bring 
about majority rule and independence 
of Namibia. And in other areas of the 
world we've tried to add our influence 
whenever we could in a constructive 
way to insure stability, peace, and the 
realization of legitimate aspirations of 
people who are involved. 

And the fact that we haven't a crisis, 
that we haven't had to go to war, that 
we have been successful in maintaining 
peace, I think is an achievement. 

But it hasn't required, yet, and I 
hope never, a demonstration of courage 
on my part to call out the Armed 
Forces or to participate in an armed at- 
tack against other people. 

Q. Secretary of Defense Brown has 
just returned from the Middle East, 
and it's reported that Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat, concerned 
about the role of the Palestinians in 



Iran, is interested in becoming the 
region's policeman — which is how 
some newspapers are describing 
it — in return for heavy infusions of 
U.S. weapons. What's the likelihood 
for this? 

And, also, Sadat has said that he 
would not use the equipment in con- 
flict with Israel, but how can we be 
sure that if he's called upon by his 
Arab brothers to fight Israel that he 
wouldn't use it? 

A. I think Sadat has demonstrated in 
a very dramatic way, and also a con- 
sistent way in the last few years, his 
peaceful intentions toward Israel. His 
trip to Jerusalem, his participation, 
successfully, in the Camp David 
negotiations, I think, is proof of his 
good intentions toward having peaceful 
relations with Israel. 

As you probably know, Egypt is a 
very powerful element in the Arab 
world, economically; their population 
is very great; their military strength is 
great, compared to many other coun- 
tries. And I think they can be a legiti- 
mate stabilizing force. They now have 
five divisions or more on the eastern 
side of the Suez confronting Israel. 
Part of the Camp David accords, part 
of the negotiated points that have al- 
ready been concluded on the Sinai 
agreement would call for the with- 
drawal of these forces. They would 
perhaps never be used. But at least any 
entity that threatened to attack another 
country m the Mideast would be faced 
with the prospect that those Egyptian 
forces might very well be used to pre- 
serve the peace. I'm not predicting that 
this would happen, but the potential 
would be there for Egypt to help to 
protect relatively defenseless other 
Arab countries or to preserve peace in 
the Mideast. 

I don't want to try to comment on 
any nation being a policeman for the 
region nor for the world. I think that's 
a very serious mistake. 

There obviously have been requests 
made by many nations around the 
world for military or economic assist- 
ance that is in excess of what our na- 
tion could provide. That situation 
might apply to the request that Presi- 
dent Sadat has recently made. But he 
certainly wouldn't be unique in that re- 
spect. 

As you know, the two nations that 
receive the most aid from our country 
at this time, and for many years in the 
past, have been Israel and Egypt. And I 
think that the greatest single step we 
could take to preserving stability and 
peace in the Mideast, although it might 
be unpopular with some other Arab 
countries, would be a peace treaty be- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tween Israel and Egypt. That's our top 
priority, and we'll continue with that 
pursuit. 

Q. How strained is the relationship 
now between the United States and 
Russia because of the recent events in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Rhodesia, and 
Vietnam? And, two, how does that 
strain, if there is any, translate into 
how easily the Senate might accept a 
SALT agreement, if and when it gets 
there? 

A. I think it's inevitable for the 
foreseeable future that we will have 
competition with the Soviet Union for 
influence in nations which are either 
unaligned or which don't want to be 
completely under the domination of 
any other country. We have no desire 
to dominate another nation. But we 
would like to see each nation be inde- 
pendent, to be at peace, and to see the 
legitimate aspirations of those people 
be realized. 

There have been changes made in the 
last 15 years or less that affect both our 
countries. I think it is true that the re- 
gime in Afghanistan, a nation under 
Soviet influence, was replaced by a re- 
gime more closely aligned with the 
Soviet Union. Angola, it was com- 
pletely under the domination and influ- 
ence of the Soviet Union. And perhaps 
Cuba is now reaching out feelers or a 
hand of friendship to some of the 
Western nations. I think the same thing 
might apply to Mozambique, Tanzania. 

This, I think, is a normal evolution- 
ary process. In the past under Mrs. 
Gandhi, India was very closely aligned 
with the Soviet Union. Their relation- 
ships with our country were strained. I 
would say that under Prime Minister 
Desai, this has changed considerably. 
It wasn't too long ago that China and 
the Soviet Union were the closest ol 
political and military allies. Now China 
has normal relationships with us and 
is very sharply estranged from the 
Soviet Union. 

In the past, Egypt, the most powerful 
Arab nation, was an ally almost exclu- 
sively wtih the Soviet Union. Now it 
has an equally close friendship with us 
and is estranged from the Soviet 
Union. I think NATO in the past, iin- 
mediately following the Vietnam war, 
was weakened. 1 know that some of our 
great Members of Congress — Mike 
Mansfield — was calling for the with- 
drawal of all U.S. troops from Europe. 
Now I think there's been a revitaliza- 
tion of NATO, a strengthening of our 
alliance there which is very crucial to 
our own security. 

I think, in balance, the trends in the 
last number of years have not been ad- 
verse to our country. But it's easy to 



April 1979 

single out one or two individual places 
like Afghanistan where those trends 
'have been against our best interests. 
The point I'm trying to make is that the 
tluidity of this situation over a period 
of years is inevitable, and we can't 
freeze the world situation at any par- 
ticular time or any particular region or 
country where it might be temporarily 
-or historically to our advantage. 

And we cannot say to the Soviet 
Union: "Unless all Cuban troops are 
removed from Angola we will never 
sign a SALT agreement with you." 

Our negotiating of the SALT treaty 
has been in the best interest of the 
United States. It's in our be.st security 
interests. It lays a basis for enhanced 
prospects for peace. It gives us greater 
flexibility to use our conventional 
forces to carry out the purposes of our 
nation that 1 recently, last few minutes 
ago, described to you. 

1 think every potential altercation or 
difference or competition with the 
Soviet Union in a troubled region of 
the world — and. as I say, these are 
inevitable — would be greatly exacer- 
bated if we fail to conclude a SALT 
agreement or if we, on our own, refuse 
to negotiate with the Soviet Union to 
hring about a lessening of dependence 
upon nuclear weapons. 

1 consider the SALT treaty to be well 
negotiated in its present form, ap- 
proaching a conclusion, I hope, in the 
best interests of our country standing 
on its own. And we could not permit 
the Soviet Union to say to us: "Unless 
you withdraw all your troops from 
South Korea, unless you reduce your 
military strength in NATO, unless you 
^ever your relationships with Egypt, 
unless you permit us to come into the 
Mideast situation as a full negotiating 
partner, we will not sign a SALT 
agreement." We would consider that to 
be an absolutely unwarranted intrusion 
on the freedom of our country to make 
our own decisions based on what's best 
tor our people. 

And I think for us to claim that we 
can demand the same sort of restraint 
on the part of the Soviets as a prereq- 
uisite to the conclusion of a SALT 
agreement, that we consider it to be in 
our own best interest, is unwarranted 
and ill-advised and, obviously, unac- 
ceptable to them or in our own best 
interests. 

Obviously, we will have to cooperate 
\vith the Soviets whenever we can, to 
lessen tensions, to cooperate on trade, 
>o try to detect common purpose where 
*e can cooperate, to conclude agree- 
ments that might lessen tension and 
improve the possibility for peace. At 



IMews Conforonco oi 
February 27 (Excorpis) 



In my 2 years as President, I've 
spent more time and invested more of 
my own personal effort in the search 
for peace in the Middle East than on 
any other international problem. That 
investment of time and effort was and 
is appropriate because of the great im- 
portance of peace in that region to our 
own country and the vital importance 
of a peace agreement between Israel 
and Egypt to those two countries. 

Some progress was made in the talks 
at Camp David last week — 41/2 days of 
talks. 1 do not share the opinion that 
the proposals that we put forward were 
contrary to the Camp David agreements 
of last September or that they would 
make an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 
meaningless. 

Based upon the developments of last 
week and the recommendations of all 
the parties involved, I had hoped to be 
able to convene, without delay, negoti- 
ations at a level which would permit 
the early conclusion of a peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt, as a first 
step toward a wider settlement for the 
entire Middle East. 

I regret that such direct negotiations 
are not possible at this time. I'm con- 
cerned about the impact of this de- 
velopment upon the prospects for 
peace. However, it was the belief of all 
those at Camp David — Secretary 
Vance and all the negotiators from Is- 
rael and Egypt — that the conclusion of 
an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is an 
urgent necessity. I share that view 
completely. 

If we allow the prospects for peace 
that seemed so bright last September 
when we came back from Camp David 
to continue to dim and perhaps even to 
die, the future, at best, is unpredicta- 
ble. If we allow that hope to vanish, 
then the judgment of history and of our 
own children will of necessity, and 
rightly, condemn us for an absence of 
concerted effort. 



ences with the fullest confidence that 
we will continue to be successful. 

And I think those two ideas are not 
incompatible for a strong, secure, able, 
confident, enlightened nation like the 
United States. □ 



the 



same time, we will compete with 



ihe Soviet Union when we have differ 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 26, 1979. 

■For full text of the President's address on 
Feb. 20. see Bulletin of Mar. 1979. p. 21. 



For that reason. I spoke personally 
this afternoon with Prime Minister 
Begin and with President Sadat. I've 
invited Prime Minister Begin to join 
me as soon as possible for a frank dis- 
cussion of all the issues involved. I'm 
hopeful that these talks will lead to an 
early resumption of direct negotiations. 

Prime Minister Begin has accepted 
my invitation. He will be arriving here 
Thursday evening for discussions with 
me . 

I will then consider asking either 
Prime Minister Khalil or President 
Sadat to join in further discussions. I 
recognize that the public interest in this 
matter is intense. However. I have 
made it clear in the past that any pre- 
mature public discussions of these very 
sensitive issues serve no useful pur- 
pose. For that reason, I will have no 
further comments to make on the 
Mideast peace negotiations this after- 
noon, but I will be happy to answer any 
further questions on other matters of 
interest to the American public. 

Q. Well, I really think you should 
answer a couple of questions. One, 
are you saying that Camp David is 
back on track or you are trying to 
get it on? And also, were you led to 
believe by your own advisers or by 
the Israeli offlcials that Begin would 
come, or did you labor under some 
false assumption on your part? 

A. I won't have any other questions 
to answer on that subject. 1 think I've 
covered it adequately. And Prime 
Minister Begin is making a simultane- 
ous announcement in Israel, and I don't 
think it would be constructive for me to 
answer any questions further. 

Q. Does the escalating price of oil 
and gasoline, which is continuing — 
does that cause you to have any sec- 
ond thoughts now about your pre- 
diction of inflation for the year? 

A. Obviously, the unpredictable 
shortage of oil on the international 
market, caused by the Iranian disrup- 
tion of supply and other factors, has 
caused the price of energy to go up 
faster than we had anticipated. This 
adds inflationary pressures. The situa- 
tion with supplies and prices is serious; 
it's not critical. 

I have made proposals to the Con- 
gress for standby authority to take ac- 
tion, when necessary in the future, on a 
mandatory basis. Early next month we 
will present to the Congress, also for 



8 



their approval, matters that I can 
take — action that 1 can tai<c to deal 
with the temporary Iranian disruption. 

As you know, we had in 1973 about 
a 2'/2 million barrel-a-day shortage 
brought about by the embargo. We now 
have a shortage of about 2 million 
barrels per day. But I think it's accu- 
rate to say that our own country and the 
international consuming nations, in- 
cluding us, are much better organized 
to take care of these changes that have 
been taking place. Inflationary pres- 
sures do exceed what we had antici- 
pated. I think we are much better pre- 
pared to deal with them. 

Q. Some of your critics are saying 
that you are exhibiting weakness and 
impotency in your conduct of foreign 
affairs; that is, in your reaction to 
crises around the world. And al- 
though you argue that your policy is 
one of prudent restraint, is there not 
something to the idea that the per- 
ception itself adds to the problem of 
this country's interests, and, if so, is 
there anything you can do about it? 

A. Obviously, perceptions have 
some importance in political terms and 
also in diplomatic terms. There is no 
doubt in my mind that the United States 
is adequately protecting its own inter- 
ests, that we are adequately protecting 
the interests of our allies and friends as 
commitments bind us to do. We've had 
no complaints about them in this re- 
spect. And I think that an exercise of 
prudence in trying to contain our re- 
gional disputes and combat among 
other nations is in the best interest of 
our own country. 

We are a strong nation, the strongest 
on Earth — militarily, politically, eco- 
nomically. I'm committed to preserv- 
ing that strength of our nation, even 
enhancing it. And I think it would be 
completely improper for us, for in- 
stance, to inject ourselves in any active 
way into the combat that's presently 
taking place among Communist Asian 
nations, or to try to intrude in a com- 
pletely unwarranted fashion into the 
internal affairs, political affairs, of 
other nations. And I have no intention 
of making these foolish decisions and 
taking foolish action to the detriment of 
our nation's interest, just to assuage 
some who criticize me because we have 
not become actively involved in these 
kinds of circumstances. 

Q. Given all of that, when the 
United States was displeased with the 
action that the Soviets had taken in 
the Shcharanskiy case, we held up 
the sale of some oil-drilling equip- 
ment to the Soviets. Given the fact 
that we have condemned the Chinese 



Department of State Bulletin 



attack into Vietnam, why is it that 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal is 
now in China negotiating new trade 
agreements with the Chinese? 

A. That's a completely different cir- 
cumstance. We've not had any bilateral 
disharmony between ourselves and the 
Chinese. We are changing our Interest 
Offices into Embassies on the first of 
March, and 1 need a major representa- 
tive of our country to be there when 
that change is made. Our new Ambas- 
sador, Leonard Woodcock, has just re- 
cently been approved by the Senate — 
yesterday — and will not be able to ar- 
rive on time. 

We do not agree with many of the 
actions that the Soviets take in dealing 
with other countries. We've not let that 
disrupt our bilateral relationships with 
the Soviets. Our SALT talks, for in- 
stance, have never been interrupted nor 
delayed. And we have expressed our 
very firm disapproval to the Chinese 
about their crossing the Vietnamese 
border, and we have expressed our 
strong disapproval to the Soviets and to 
the Vietnamese for the Vietnamese 
crossing of the Cambodian border. 

But for us to terminate bilateral re- 
lationships because a major 
country — the Soviets, or the 
Chinese — do something contrary to our 
desires would certainly be counter- 
productive. And I think the trip to 
China to establish relationships with 
the Chinese for the future by Secretary 
Blumenthal is proper and was well- 
advised. 



Q. Recently Secretary [of Defense 
Harold] Brown was in the Middle 
East and met with the leaders of 
those countries, particularly Saudi 
Arabia. And you have expressed the 
need and the desire for the United 
States to strengthen the defensive 
perimeter of that part of the world to 
safeguard the flow of oil. There have 
been public reports that the Saudi 
Arabian Government has refused an 
offer by the United States for the 
stationing of U.S. troops. I can't 
vouch for that report, but could you 
tell us what your plans are for that 
area and what we would be willing to 
do to safeguard the world's oil sup- 

ply? 

A. We have no desire to open mili- 
tary bases in that area or to station 
American troops in Saudi Arabia. And 
this proposal has not been made. That 
part of the report was erroneous. 

However, we do want to strengthen 
the combined responsibility and capa- 
bility of our friends and allies who seek 
moderation and peace and stability, to 



preserve the integrity of that region. 
Secretary Brown visited Saudi Arabia. 
Jordan, Egypt, and Israel for this pur- 
pose, and his trip was very successful. 

It's important also for those nations 
and for others in that region to know 
that we have a real interest — a real na- 
tional interest — in the stability and 
peace of that region and, particularly, 
for the supply of oil, the routes through 
which the oil is delivered to ourselves 
and to our allies and friends throughout 
the world. 

But any sort of action that we take 
would be contributory to peace, would 
not encroach on the prerogatives of in- 
dividual nations. And we do not intend 
to become involved in the internal af- 
fairs of another country. We have no 
plans to establish military bases in that 
region. 



Q. Half a dozen OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] countries have announced, or 
are threatening to do so, some kind 
of oil price hike in the last couple of 
weeks. It gives the impression that 
the United States is at their mercy 
and that we are helpless. Are we? 

A. We have no control over prices 
that other nations establish for their 
products, including oil. This is a sub- 
ject that 1 have addressed as forcefully 
as possible, since April of 1977 when 
we presented to the Congress a com- 
prehensive energy proposal. Our best 
approach is to reduce exorbitant waste 
of oil and other energy products that 
presently exists in our country, to in- 
crease the production of oil and gas and 
other energy products within our na- 
tion, and to use our legitimate influ- 
ence when it can be exerted to 
minimize any increase in prices. But 
we cannot control other nations in this 
respect. 

I might say that we are much better 
able now, as a world-consuming com- 
munity, to deal with these increases 
than we were back in 1973 and 1974 
when the price was quadrupled over- 
night, without any warning, and before 
the consuming nations were working in 
harmony to provide reserves on hand, 
to increase exploration and production, 
which has since then occurred in the 
North Sea, in Mexico, obviously, in 
Alaska, and other places. 

But we have no control over it. We 
deplore it. We would like for them to 
hold down the prices as much as possi- 
ble. Our best response is to use energy 
in our own nation efficiently, to cut out 
waste, and to increase our own pro- 
duction. 

Q. In view of what you've just said 



April 1979 

about the energy situation, why are 
you uncertain about whether you will 
impose the new conservation meas- 
ures as soon as Congress gives you 
the authorization? It would seem that 
the country might be waiting for 
some sort of signal that things are 
really serious and that consumers 
must cut back. 

A. It the Iranian production is not 
restored, then we would face a halt- 
million-barrel-a-day shortage, more or 
less, possibly increasing later on to 
700,000 barrels a day. By the first of 
next month, in addition to the request 
to Congress that Fve just put forward, 
we will have measures outlined for 
taking this action when it is necessary. 
As a matter of fact, we don't want to 
have stringent restraints placed on our 
economy that might cause very severe 
disruptions, high unemployment, and 
very adverse reactions not only in our 
country but throughout the world. 

But with the standby authority, then 
1 would have the responsibility, as au- 
thorized by Congress, to take action 
based upon the severity of the need. 

We have, I think, a matter of judg- 
ment to be made in that respect. But to 
commit myself ahead of time to greatly 
constrain the American economy when 
it's not necessary would not be in the 
best interest of our country. 

Q. What is our government doing, 
if anything, to try and influence the 
new Iranian Government to increase 
production, keep prices down and, 
generally, how would you describe 
the relationship between our Gov- 
ernment and the Khomeini govern- 
ment? 

A. The Khomeini government has 
made it clear ever since it came into 
power, through our direct negotiations 
with Prime Minister Bazargan and our 
.Embassador and through their emis- 
saries who have even today talked to 
Secretary Vance, that they desire 
close-working friendly relationships 
with the United States. 

They have also announced that oil 
production in Iran will be increased and 
that very shortly exports will be re- 
commenced. And my own assessment is 
that they have strong intentions to carry 
out both these goals and that they are 
capable of doing so. 

Q. There is, or there appears to be 
starting, a public debate on the 
question: "Who lost Iran?" I noticed 
that former Secretary Kissinger was 
suggesting that your Administration 
should bear some responsibility; 
former Under Secretary of State 
George Ball suggested that the 
Nixon-Kissinger Administration did 



AFRICA: F\ 1980 Assistance 
Proposais 



by Richard M. Moose 

Statement before the Siihcommittee 
on Africa of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on February 14, 1979. 
Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to dis- 
cuss with you the security assistance 
programs which the President has pro- 
posed for sub-Saharan Africa in FY 
1980. 

It is my intention and that of the 
Bureau of African Affairs to consult 
fully and frankly with you on the entire 
range of issues confronting us on the 
African Continent. By studying and 
working together, we can contribute to a 
U.S. policy which protects and pro- 
motes our nation's interests. 



Our African policy is based on find- 
ing peaceful solutions to the numerous 
problems which today shape events in 
Africa. 

We have heard much about the 
Soviet and Cuban military adventures 
in Africa and seen figures on the mas- 
sive amounts of military equipment the 
Soviet Union has put into Africa. Our 
security assistance proposals do not 
attempt to match the Soviets ritTe-for- 
rifle, tank-for-tank. We believe our 
interests and those of Africa are better 
served by addressing the root causes of 
discontent. 

Our diplomatic initiatives in Namibia 
and Rhodesia are intended to support 
the attainment of majority rule and ra- 
cial justice in southern Africa. 

Our assistance is designed to meet 
the pressing needs of economic de- 



much to destabilize Iran with their 
billions in sophisticated military 
hardware. My question was, I sup- 
pose, do you agree with Ball? Who 
lost Iran, or was Iran ours to lose in 
the first place? 

A. It's obvious that Iran was not 
ours to lose in the first place. We don't 
own Iran, and we have never had any 
intention nor ability to control the 
internal affairs of Iran. 

For more than 2,000 years, the 
people in the Iran area, the Persians 
and others, have established their own 
government. They've had ups and 
downs, as have we. 1 think it's obvious 
that the present government in Iran, as 
1 just answered, would like to have 
good relationships with us. I don't 
know of anything we could have done 
to prevent the very complicated social 
and religious and political inter- 
relationships from occurring in Iran in 
the change of government. And we'll 
just have to make the best of the 
change. 

But, as 1 say, we cannot freeze the 
status quo in a country when it's 
very friendly to us. When the change is 
made by the people who live there, we 
do the best we can to protect American 
interests by forming new alliances, new 
friendships, new interrelationships, 
new trade relationships, new security 
relationships, perhaps, in the future, 
with the new government, and that's 
the best we can do. 

But to try to lay blame on someone 



in the United States for a new govern- 
ment having been established in Iran, 1 
think, is just a waste of time and avoids 
a basic issue that this was a decision to 
be made and which was made by the 
Iranian people themselves. 

Q. In view of the fact that we have 
some arrangement to support Israel 
in the event that they have oil short- 
ages, do you view Iran's lack of de- 
sire to supply oil to Israel as creating 
problems for us in terms of our sup- 
port for Israel in securing secondary 
sources? 

A. When the supply of Iranian oil to 
Israel was interrupted, I immediately 
notified Prime Minister Begin and the 
Israeli Government that we would 
honor our commitment to them. So far, 
the Israelis have been able to acquire 
oil from other sources in the Sinai and 
also on the world markets from differ- 
ent countries. 

We will honor that commitment. 1 
think that the total Israeli oil consump- 
tion is only about 1% of the consump- 
tion in the United States. Even if Israel 
should have to depend upon us for a 
substantial portion of its oil, we would 
supply that oil from our country or 
from sources in other nations without 
disruption of the American economy. 

□ 



For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 5. 1979, p. 364. 



10 



Department of State Bulletir 



velopment, provide shelter and food to 
the thousands of refugees escaping 
conflict in their homelands, and, in 
selected cases, help countries meet 
their legitimate self-defense needs. 

Our assistance programs to Africa 
are designed to bring various resources 
to bear on these unique needs. Total 
assistance proposed is about $600 mil- 
lion. This figure includes $322 million 
in development assistance, $100 mil- 
lion for security supporting assistance 
(SSA) for southern Africa, over $140 
million in PL-480 assistance (both title 
1 and II and our contribution to the 
World Food Program), $45.4 million in 
foreign military sales (FMS) credit, 
and $3.4 million for African participa- 
tion in the international military educa- 
tion and training (IMET) program, a 
modest real increase over levels appro- 
priated for FY 1979 ($496.3 million) 
when U.S. inflation rates are taken into 
account. 

Development Assistance 

Yesterday Goler Butcher [AID As- 
sistant Admininistrator for Africa] de- 
scribed to you the $322 million which 
we are proposing for development as- 
sistance in FY 1980. It would be used 
for agriculture and rural development, 
health and family planning, training, 
and special activities such as alterna- 
tive energy projects. Of the $322 mil- 
lion, $105 million is proposed for the 
eight countries participating in the 
Sahel Development Program, a unique 
coordination effort between donors and 
recipients. 

U.S. food aid to Africa under PL- 
480 has been increasing. Last year we 
programmed $57 million in title I con- 
cessional sales and $85 million in grant 
food aid to the needy. This year we 
plan to increase the title 1 program to 
$84 million, with approximately the 
same level proposed for FY 1980. A 
major concern is to secure a closer in- 
tegration between food aid and other 
forms of assistance in order to have the 
maximum impact on agricultural de- 
velopment. 

In addition to our bilateral assist- 
ance, the United States supports Afri- 
can economic development through our 
contributions to international develop- 
ment lending institutions such as the 
World Bank group and the African De- 
velopment Fund. 

The security assistance program 
which I am here today to support, to- 
gether with the development assistance 
proposals presented to you yesterday 
by Goler Butcher, represents the finan- 
cial underpinning of our African 
policy — an important earnest of our 
intentions. 



Security Supporting Assistance 

(SSA) 

The link between policy and re- 
sources is most vivid in southern 
Africa — between our efforts to achieve 
peaceful solutions to the problems of 
Namibia and Rhodesia and our pro- 
posal for SSA for southern Africa. For 
FY 1980 we are proposing $100 mil- 
lion in SSA for southern Africa. Al- 
though this is a considerably larger 
amount than we requested m FY 1979 
($45 million), it is basically a return to 
the level of FY 1978 when $100.7 mil- 
lion was obligated. 

The southern African region is im- 
portant to us for its resources, because 
of our support for the peoples" quest 
for self-rule, and for its political sig- 
nificance throughout Africa. Our own 
position in the future in that region will 
be determined by the positions we take 
today and how we relate to the people 
on the scene. They must know that we 
stand with them, are cognizant of their 
problems, and can be counted on to 
help. 

We learned after the war in Europe 
the importance of resources to back up 
our policy choices. Just as we see in 
the Middle East today how resources 
buttress our diplomacy; so too are they 
imperative to our southern African 
diplomacy. 

The majority-ruled states of southern 
Africa have serious and unique de- 
velopment problems. Six of the coun- 
tries are landlocked and suffer serious 
transportation bottlenecks. Lesotho, 
Botswana, and Malawi have been des- 
ignated as relatively least developed 
countries — although Botswana has re- 
cently been experiencing significant 
growth — and Mozambique has per 
capita income of only $170 (1976). 
Life expectancy is less than 45 years in 
all six countries. Literacy is especially 
low in Mozambique and Malawi. Per 
capita food production has been de- 
teriorating in Mozambique and Zam- 
bia. All six countries in the region are 
undergoing rapid population growth. 

I know that some of our proposals 
for security supporting assistance in 
southern Africa may raise some ques- 
tions so let me deal with them here and 
now. 

The largest chunk of our southern 
African program is earmarked for 
Zambia. We see in President Kaunda a 
force for peace and stability. Zambia is 
suffering very directly from the effects 
of the conflict in Rhodesia, and no one 
wants to see peace more than Kenneth 
Kaunda. He is a key to the peaceful 
solution. 

We disagree with those who think 
we should not be helping Mozambique. 



We do not believe that Mozambique 
can be characterized as being "in the 
Soviet camp." In our view its Presi- 
dent, Samora Machel, is a pragmatic 
leader who is interested in the de- 
velopment of his country. He is in- 
terested in opening his country to U.S. 
trade and investment, because hel 
knows that it is one way to help his 
people. When 1 last saw him, in early 
December, this was the subject which 
was uppermost in his mind. We have 
found that we can talk and work with 
President Machel about political prob- 
lems affecting the area. By refusing to 
help him and Mozambique, we are 
passing up an opportunity to enhance 
our influence and promote our inter- 
ests. 

The struggle for racial justice by the 
people and governments of southern 
Africa has been costly to the economy 
of this area. This program will provide 
the means of assisting the countries in 
the region which have suffered severe 
economic dislocations and hardships as 
a result of the struggle. 

This security assistance is consid- 
erably more developmental in orienta- 
tion than most such programs. Included 
in it is assistance for refugees and dis- 
placed persons. It will also help coun- 
tries of the region meet their transpor- 
tation as well as other developmental 
needs. 

For FY 1980 we seek $100 million in 
SSA, which is slightly less than the 
$105 million appropriated for the re- 
gion in FY 1978. In the coming fiscal 
year we wish to initiate a modest $3 
million agricultural assistance program 
for Mozambique. The largest element 
of the proposed program is $31 million 
for Zambia — equal to the amount ap- 
propriated in FY 1978. It will be used 
to ease that country's severe balance- 
of-payments position and allow the im- 
portation of critically needed agricul- 
tural inputs. Of this, $6 million is for 
diversification into agriculture and 
training. Other elements of the FY 
1980 program are basically extensions 
of existing programs in the fields of 
agriculture, rural development, educa- 
tion, alternative energy programs, and 
maintenance of refugees of the area. 

In coping with the exigencies of the 
southern African situation, this pro- 
gram will provide us with much needed 
flexibility not readily available in reg- 
ular development assistance projects. 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

Soviet and Cuban activities have in- 
duced some very real concerns in many 
African countries with regard to their 
security. In certain cases, there has 
been a concomitant requirement to 



April 1979 

meet legitimate defense needs, and our 
friends in Africa must be reassured that 
they can count on our support. Words 
alone are not always convincing. 
;| Our FY 1980 FMS proposals have 
been formulated in conformity with 
President Carter's May 19, 1977, di- 
rective on arms transfers and our 
human rights policy. This year's pro- 
gram for six countries totals $45.4 
million, $19.2 million more than last 
year. The doubling of the Kenyan pro- 
gram accounts for most of this in- 
crease. 

For Botswana, our only new FMS 
program, we are asking $500,000 FMS 
and $80,000 for the international mili- 
tary education and training (IMET) 
program. Why Botswana? A quick 
glance at the map of southern Africa 
should provide the answer. Bordering 
as it does on Rhodesia, Namibia, and 
South Africa. Botswana maintained no 
defense force at all until FY 1977. 
I Unfortunately the increase in fighting 
in Rhodesia forced it to establish one to 
prevent a spillover of the conflict from 
neighboring Rhodesia. Its government 
has played a constructive role in the 
pursuit of a peaceful resolution of that 
conflict and has resisted pressure to 
choose sides in it. 1 would also note 
that Botswana's moderate pro- Western 
government's record for respect for 
human rights is considered one of the 
best in Africa. 

Certainly our modest FMS program 
for the purchase of some trucks, jeeps, 
and tactical communication systems 
will not tip the scales, but it will indi- 
cate our support and recognition of 
Botswana's fidelity to principles that 
we share. 

The $2 million in FMS and $50,000 
in IMET for Cameroon is again in- 
tended to show our support and 
friendship for that moderate govern- 
ment. 

Our largest program in Africa is 
Kenya, for which we are asking $26 
million in FMS and $550,000 in IMET. 
Here we are looking at a stable pro- 
Western state which has consistently 
been supportive of our goals and ob- 
jectives in Africa, which finds itself 
nearly surrounded by neighbors which 
have been heavily armed by the Soviet 
Union, and two of which have at one 
time or another made claims on its ter- 
ritory . 

The Kenyan Government reluctantly 
concluded that its concentration of re- 
sources on economic development, 
while remarkably successful, has led to 
a degradation of its defense posture 
relative to its neighbors. It has now 
embarked on a program to modernize 
its defense establishment and achieve a 
credible defense deterrent. 

When then-Vice President and now 



President Moi was here last March, 
President Carter indicated that the 
United States would be sympathetic to 
Kenya's military needs. At President 
Moi's request, a U.S. military survey 
team was sent to Kenya last year, and 
the team's recommendations are re- 
flected in the FY 1980 FMS program 
proposal. 

Kenya would like to purchase 15 
helicopters equipped with antitank mis- 
siles and 17 commercially equipped 
helicopters. The total cost phased over 
3 years will be $44 million. 

1 would add, however, that defense 
cooperation with Kenya is not a one- 
way street. Mombassa is one of the few 
ports on the Indian Ocean littoral to 
welcome and provide facilities to the 
U.S. Navy. 

As this committee knows an historic 
and special relationship exists between 
the United States and Liberia. Liberia 
regards its security as part of that spe- 
cial relationship. It has depended ex- 
clusively on U.S. support for its defen- 
sive requirements. The port, airfield, 
and communications facilities extended 
to us by Liberia far exceed the value of 
our modest contributions to its defense. 

The very modest ($1.4 million FMS 
and $230,000 IMET) program will 
continue funding begun this year ($1.2 
million) of a much-needed force mod- 
ernization program. Basically it will be 
used to replace some rather obsolete 
equipment — radios, vehicles, and a 
Cessna aircraft. 

Sudan has become a force for mod- 
eration in the Horn of Africa. It has 
been supportive of the Camp David ac- 
cords and our efforts to promote peace 
in the Middle East. Through his current 
leadership of the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity, President Numeyri has been 
a positive force on the African Conti- 
nent. 

Our $5 million FMS request will 
cover only a very small portion of Su- 
dan's needs; a Saudi-financed commer- 
cial purchase program will address Su- 
dan's larger and immediate defense re- 
quirements. Our limited contribution 
frankly serves as the earnest of U.S. 
interest in Sudanese security and is 
valued by other interested parties such 
as the Saudis. Other Western allies 



Letter 
of Credence 

On February 26, 1979, President 
Carter accepted the credentials of Sidi 
Bouna Ould Sidi of Mauritania as his 
country's newly appointed Ambassador 
to the United States. D 



11 



such as the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Canada are also participating in the 
modernization of Sudan's military. 

Our program for Zaire will comple- 
ment those of our Belgian and French 
allies, whose commitment far exceeds 
our own. We are asking $10.5 million 
in FMS and $1 million in IMET. We 
regard Zaire as a key country in terms 
of its location, minerals, and potential; 
pro-Western in orientation, misman- 
aged, and a victim of two invasions in 
2 years, it presents a troublesome di- 
lemma. 

It represents a fundamental conflict 
of objectives — the quest for stability 
versus human rights and democratic 
principles. However, it is not an 
either/or situation. We are capable of 
nuance in our policy. Our programs are 
designed to enhance security and pro- 
vide incentives for the Zairian Gov- 
ernment to institute essential reforms. 

The FMS program at its proposed 
level will be used for follow-on logisti- 
cal support for the Zairian Air Force 
C-130 and Cessna aircraft and Navy 
patrol boats and some spare parts for 
U.S. provided vehicles and communi- 
cations equipment. 

In each of the six countries that I 
have just covered, we have IMET pro- 
grams. There are 10 additional coun- 
tries for a sub-Saharan total of $3.4 
million which is actually less than the 2 
previous years (FY 1978 — $3.6 mil- 
lion and FY 1979 — $3.5 million). 

For the most part these are very 
small programs, but they are, 
nevertheless, an important tool serving 
U.S. interests in Africa. The 16 coun- 
tries scheduled to be included in the FY 
1980 IMET are moderate in their policy 
orientation. Provision of even modest 
amounts of training is taken as a sign 
of U.S. interest and an indication of a 
willingness to help meet their security 
concerns. Furthermore, they are useful 
in providing access to a cadre of which 
has great influence on the political and 
economic development of their coun- 
tries. 

Through this U.S. training we have 
an opportunity to expose future and 
present leadership to values which we 
consider important, such as a respect 
for human rights. 

Before concluding, I wish to assure 
you that the human rights performance 
of the proposed recipient countries was 
carefully taken into account and are 
reflected in the level of program re- 
quests. □ 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



12 



If orii of Airica 



by Richard M. Moose 

Slatement before the Suhcommittee 
on Africa of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on February 28, 1979. 
Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to meet 
with you to discuss our security assist- 
ance programs and their relationship to 
events in the past year in the Horn of 
Africa and American policy in this im- 
portant area. 

Soviet and Cuban activities in the 
Horn of Africa have focused interna- 
tional attention on this area of the 
world over the past 18 months as never 
before. The political conflicts in the 
Horn which provided the Soviet Union 
and Cuba with the opportunity for in- 
tervention still continue unresolved, 
both in Eritrea and the Ogaden region 
of Ethiopia. The Cuban troop presence 
in Ethiopia remains. So does Soviet 
military support for Ethiopia. 

The choices which have confronted 
the United States in the Horn in the 
current political environment have been 
difficult and complex. Our policy ob- 
jectives of promoting peace and stabil- 
ity in the region have been complicated 
by the Soviet and Cuban presence, by 
deep-seated historical and ethnic rival- 
ries, as well as political changes which 
have brought new antagonisms with old 
friends, as in Ethiopia, or new oppor- 
tunities for those nations which were 
once less sympathetic to a U.S. role in 
the region, as in Somalia. 

The Horn of Africa is also a region 
whose developments have an effect not 
only upon African affairs but upon the 
Arab world as well. Three of the coun- 
tries of the Horn — Somalia, Djibouti, 
and Sudan — are members of the Arab 
League. Their security is a matter of 
concern for our Arab friends as well, 
who interpret American actions in the 
region in the light of their own security 
interests. 

For the purposes of our discussion 
today, I would like to focus our atten- 
tion on the five countries of Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and 
Kenya. Other countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, the Yemens, Egypt, or Tan- 
zania follow developments in the Horn 
closely, but the five core countries are 
the principals in the Horn, and it is to 
the actions and reactions between these 
countries that 1 want to concentrate in 
this review with you. 



Background to the Present Conflict 

In mid-1977, at a time when 
Ethiopia was in transition and a new 
revolutionary government had replaced 
the Haile Selassie regime, Somalia saw 
an opportunity for ending Ethiopian 
rule over the Somali peoples of the 
Ogaden. Insurgents of the Western 
Somali Liberation Front, supported by 
units from the Somali National Army, 
launched a campaign in the Ogaden re- 
gion of Ethiopia to "liberate" this area 
from what it called Ethiopian colo- 
nialism. 

At the same time, Eritrean rebels in 
the northernmost province of Ethiopia 
had succeeded in liberating most of this 
territory from Ethiopian domination. 
The Eritrean liberation movements, 
which include both Muslim and Chris- 
tian elements, had been waging an in- 
surgency for over a decade in their ef- 
forts to bring self-determination to the 
Eritrean people. The Eritrean 
separatists have been supported for 
years by neighboring Arab states in the 
region. 

In addition to these ethnic claims or 
disputes, there are also longstanding 
communal antagonisms between the 
populations of the Ethiopian highlands, 
which are predominantly Christian, and 
the Muslim people of the lowlands, 
both in Eritrea and in the Ogaden. 
Ethiopian fears of Arab encirclement 
and domination are of course 
longstanding. 

The demands of the Eritrean and 
Ogaden peoples for self-determination 
create a serious dilemma for the Or- 
ganization of African Unity (OAU) and 
others in their attempt to promote a 
peaceful resolution to these problems 
of conflict. One of the fundamental 
tenets of the OAU is the territorial in- 
tegrity of existing African states. 

As most of you know, tribal bound- 
aries in Africa seldom, if ever, coin- 
cide with national boundaries. Virtu- 
ally all African states, with the excep- 
tion of Somalia, include within their 
borders a great many ethnic or tribal 
groups. The granting of self- 
determination to various ethnic 
minorities because of their economic or 
ethnic grievances would require the 
rewriting of many African boundaries. 
Accordingly, African nations in the 
OAU have insisted upon the territorial 
integrity of existing African states over 
the rights of self-determination of those 
peoples with political or ethnic griev- 
ances like the Eritreans and Somalis. 



Department of State Bulletin 

There is little possibility that African 
states would support a political resolu- 
tion to the problems in the Ogaden or 
Eritrea unless the Ethiopian Govern- 
ment itself were willing to recognize 
that a problem exists and that a 
negotiated settlement is required. This, 
however, appears to be most unlikely 
under present circumstances. This 
conflict in the Horn continues today. 

In the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, 
Somalia continues its support for the 
Ogaden insurgents. The Ethiopian 
military government has been unable to 
end the guerrilla war, which continues 
at a low level. 

In Eritrea the Mengistu regime con- 
tinues its pursuit of a military solution 
to the Eritrean conflict. We have seen 
no evidence that the Eritreans have 
yielded in their demands for full mde- 
pendence or that the Mengistu regime 
is prepared to reduce its military ac- 
tions in favor of negotiations. 

We, nevertheless, continue to be- 
lieve that the problems in the Horn 
must be resolved peacefully if an en- 
during settlement is to be achieved. In 
our judgment the continuing Soviet and 
Cuban military presence tends to en- 
courage military solutions which can- 
not resolve in any final way the causes 
of the conflict. 



U.S. Goals 

This then is the political and military 
context in which the United States 
seeks to pursue its policy goals in the 
Horn of Africa. Those goals are: 

• To maintain cordial relations with 
all the countries in this area; 

• To assist within the limit of our re- 
sources in improving the well-being of 
the people in these countries; 

• To lend our support to the creation 
of an atmosphere that will eliminate the 
need for the large import of military 
weapons and that will encourage the 
pursuit by Ethiopia of a truly 
nonaligned foreign policy; 

• To support efforts aimed at finding 
political or negotiated solutions to the 
longstanding problems of the area, 
which we hope would remove opportu- 
nities for foreign intervention; and 

• To provide military assistance 
when it serves legitimate defensive 
purposes but to continue our policy of 
arms restraint in the Horn. We have not 
and we will not provide arms in situa- 
tions which fuel local conflicts. 

In Kenya we have been impressed at 
the strength of Kenyan political in- 
stitutions and how this facilitated the 
transition to new political leadership 
after the death of their great leader 
Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. 

We are working with Kenya to es- 



April 1979 

lablish a credible defensive military 
deterrent through the provision of a 
total of $44 million in foreign military 
sales (FMS) credits over a period of 3 
years for 32 helicopters (15 equipped 
with antitank missiles) to be used 
primarily as antitank weapons and in 
FY 1979, $400,000 for an international 
military education and training (IMET) 
program. We had earlier provided FMS 
credits for 12 F-5 airplanes. 

In Sudan President Nimeiri pledged 
Sudan's support for the Camp David 
accords and has consistently sustained 
Middle East peace efforts. Through his 
current leadership of the OAU, Presi- 
dent Nimeiri has been a positive force 
on the African Continent. 

The Sudan-U.S. Business Council, 
at meetings in Khartoum and last fall in 
Washington, have stimulated interest in 
private investment in Sudan and 
strengthened the ties between the busi- 
ness communities of our two countries. 
U.S. Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID) programs are ex- 
panding to help Sudan exploit more 
rapidly its immense agricultural poten- 
tial. 

We are sympathetic to Sudan's de- 
fensive concerns, but its larger and 
immediate defense requirements will be 
met by a Saudi-financed commercial 
purchase program. Our $5 million in 
FMS credits is being allocated by 
Sudan to the purchase of engineering 
equipment to allow the Sudanese army 
to participate in nation-building pro- 
grams. 

In Ethiopia the provisional military 
government has launched on a cam- 
paign to resolve its formidable eco- 
nomic problems. 

Discussion is well underway of our 
bilateral problems, such as compensa- 
tion for nationalized U.S. businesses 
and the settlement of issues involved in 
our past military program, which in- 
clude payments due us by Ethiopia as 
well as credits owed Ethiopia for 
military materiel we have not deliv- 
ered. 

The Soviet-Cuban presence remains 
in Ethiopia and may encourage 
Ethiopia to seek military, rather than 
negotiated, settlements of its problems. 

In Somalia regular troop units have 
withdrawn from the Ogaden, but the 
insurgency continues. 

We have initiated economic assist- 
ance programs which will total over 
$50 million when completed, as well as 
a PL-48U food assistance program in 
FY 1979 of over $11 million. 

We have opened a Defense Attache 
office in our Embassy and, after an in- 
terregnum of nearly 10 years, U.S. 
naval ships are again calling at Somali 
ports. We have remained firm in our 
resolve not to supply arms to Somalia 



because of its involvement in the con- 
tinuing high-level of violence in the 
Ogaden, but we are discussing with the 
Somalis other areas of mutual coopera- 
tion. 

Finally, in Djibouti we have opened 
a small Embassy headed by a Charge 
d'Affaires to establish working rela- 
tions with this new government. 

A modest U.S. AID program of $1 
million has been initiated, and U.S. 
naval ships continue, as in the past, to 
be welcomed at the port on a regular 
basis. 

As the foregoing outline suggests, 
difficult problems remain to be re- 
solved in the Horn of Africa. Soviet 
and Cuban influence remains signifi- 
cant in Ethiopia. Two of the most per- 
sistent conflicts — guerrilla operations 
in the countryside of Eritrea and the 
Ogaden — continue unabated despite 
the Ethiopian recapture of the major 
towns in both areas. Ethiopian-Somali 
hostilities remain active; relations be- 
tween Sudan and Ethiopia are also 
strained. Our relations with Ethiopia 
are plagued by suspicion and mistrust. 
Kenya continues to fear the Somali 
threat. 

We can report, however, that during 
the past year the human rights perform- 
ance in these five countries of the Horn 
has improved. There is still room for 
further improvement in nearly all of 
these countries, but it was a positive 
year, and this aspect of the situation 
has been reflected in our policy in part 
by the level of program requests. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



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14 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CO]\TROL: Preserving Freedom 
€tnd Peace in a ^uciear Age 



by Vice President Mondale 

Address before a conference cospon- 
sored by the Department of State, the 
Greater Minneapolis Chamber of 
Commerce, and a consortium of other 
Minnesota organizations in Min- 
neapolis on February 22. 1979. 

Today I want to talk with you about 
how our nation can preserve its free- 
dom, its beauty, and its peace in a nu- 
clear age. 

Our own Hubert Humphrey once said 
that: "In this world, disaster is but a 
step away. There is no margin for 
error." Returning to a dark age of un- 
restrained nuclear arms competition 
would reduce that margin. Allowing 
any nation to gain military advantage 
over the United States would be 
equally dangerous. 

We must not — and we will not — let 
either happen. This is the determina- 
tion of the Carter Administration. This 
is the view of the vast majority of the 
American people — who overwhelm- 
ingly support both an arms control 
agreement and a strong national de- 
fense. And I am confident that Con- 
gress shares this view as it prepares to 
consider both the strategic arms limita- 
tion treaty and our proposed defense 
programs. 

There are some Americans, how- 
ever, who fear that we are not strong 
enough as a nation to move ahead with 
SALT. That view — of the current 
military balance and of SALT — is 
wrong, and it can lead us in the wrong 
direction. It not only underestimates 
America's overwhelming nonmilitary 
advantages, it seriously misjudges both 
our relative military strength and the 
effect of a SALT agreement. 

Our military position today is secure, 
and we are taking steps to assure that it 
remains secure. And a sound SALT 
agreement will make us stronger as a 
nation because it will contribute to that 
security. 

Let me make that point again. The 
SALT agreement we hope to present to 
the American people is not a gift to the 
Soviets; it is an agreement which 
serves the security interests of our na- 
tion and of the world. It does not 
weaken us; it strengthens us. 

We have watched carefully the 
steady growth of Soviet military power 
in recent years. In some areas, the 
Soviets are ahead of us; in others, we 



are ahead of them. What matters for us 
is not whether the two forces are iden- 
tical, but whether they are in an overall 
balance — for that is the basis of secu- 
rity today. 

For example, the Soviets have al- 
ways had a larger land army. But we 
do not need to match them man-for- 
man because the strength of our more 
numerous allies. The Soviet Union has 
always had more tanks. But we have 
three times as many antitank weapons 
in Western Europe as there are Soviet 
tanks in Eastern Europe. 

The critical question is not whether 
we match the forces the Soviets have 
built to meet their own security needs 
but whether we meet U.S. and allied 
security needs. Without question, our 
forces meet those needs. 



U.S. Strategic Advantages 

To begin with, the United States has 
certain strategic advantages. 

• We have friendly neighbors on our 
borders. The Soviet Union has far 
longer and far more vulnerable borders. 

• We have only one major adver- 
sary. The Soviets face two. Fully 25% 
of its combat forces are deployed on 
the Soviet-Chinese border. 

• We have easy access to the sea. 
The Soviets are restricted by narrow 



We must continue to protect our own 
and our allies' interests. We are 
strengthening our forces in Europe. We 
are improving our ability to speed ad- 
ditional ground and air forces in the 
event of a crisis. And our European al- 
lies, who provide most of NATO's 
combat forces, are steadily improving 
their forces' readiness and effective- 
ness. 

But it is the awesome power of our 
nuclear weapons that 1 want to em- 
phasize this afternoon. 

Many of you here today remember 
the shuddering reality of our first 
atomic bomb. Today, the United States 
has over 20,000 nuclear weapons. 

• Each warhead on one of our 
Poseidon missiles is two times more 
destructive than the atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
One Poseidon submarine carries more 
than 140 warheads. Each Poseidon can 
deliver more destructive force than all 
the bombs — nuclear and convention- 
al — that were dropped during World 
War II. We have 31 of these Poseidon 
submarines. 

• More than half of our 1,000 Min- 
uteman missiles are equipped with 
multiple independently-targetable 
reentry vehicles (MIRV's) — which en- 
able one rocket to carry a number of 
warheads and thus strike at several 
different targets. Each of the Min- 



[SALT II] will establish equal limits on the number of missiles and 
bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons .... 



straits, by a long and icy winter, and 
by other natural barriers. 

Our military capabilities today are 
enormous and growing stronger. And 
our allies and friends significantly in- 
crease our overall strength. 

Nor are we standing still. Because of 
steady growth in Soviet defense 
spending and capabilities over the past 
decade — particularly in central 
Europe — we have had to reverse the 
pattern of shrinking American defense 
efforts. We and our allies committed 
ourselves last year to increasing indi- 
vidual defense expenditures. Tb^ de- 
fense budget President Carter sub- 
mitted to Congress last month reflects 
that commitment. 



uteman warheads carries eight times 
the force of the first atomic bomb. And 
soon we will double that destructive 
power. 

We have 348 heavy bombers which 
can carry 2,000 megatons of total 
power. Let me illustrate what that 
means. If every car of a train that ex- 
tended from Minneapolis to Winona 
were filled with TNT and blown up, 
that would be one megaton. 

1 cite these facts to give you a sense 
of the enormous scale — and the great 
diversity — of America's nuclear 
strength. 

The Soviets, of course, also have a 
large arsenal. But the factor that keeps 
us at peace is not simply what each of 



\piil 1979 



15 



lis has; it is whether there is any possi- 
bility that a nuclear attack on us or our 
allies would not mean massive destruc- 
tion for the Soviets. 

Let me take the worst case. It is pos- 
sible that, in the early to mid-1980"s. 
'he Soviets — with a surprise attack — 
(.cuild destroy most of our land-based 
missiles while keeping a large number 
(il their missiles in reserve. In doing 
SCI. they also must consider the grim 
jtossibility that we would have already 
launched our missiles before theirs ar- 
irived. The possibility, even theoretical, 
that our missiles would be vulnerable is 
somethmg we are working very hard to 
avoid. 

But even if our land-based missiles 
were vulnerable to a surprise attack, we 
could still totally destroy the Soviet 
I nion as a viable society with the rest 
ut our nuclear arsenal. No sane leader 
could expect to gain an advantage from 
launching such a suicidal attack. 

Modernization and Restructuring 

To assure that our strategic forces 
will be a convincing deterrent in the 
future, we are carrying out the most 
extensive modernization and restruc- 
turing of our nuclear forces in over a 
decade. 

First, we have put three-quarters of 
our strategic warheads in our largely 
invulnerable submarines and mobile 
bombers; three-quarters of the Soviet 
Union's warheads are on more vulnera- 
ble fixed land-based missiles. 

Second, we are adding to the 
capabilities of our strategic bombers. 
Our B-52 force is being equipped with 
long-range cruise missiles. That force 
eclipses Soviet air defense expendi- 
tures. These missiles will enable our 
B-52's to remain outside Soviet air 
defenses and still strike significant 
Soviet targets with extraordinary ac- 
curacy. 

Third, we are placing more power- 
ful, sophisticated missiles in our exist- 
ing submarines. We are about to launch 
our new. longer-range Trident subma- 
rine; and we are developing a still more 
powerful and accurate missile for these 
Trident submarines. 

Fourth, we are substantially im- 
proving our land-based missile force. 
Our Minuteman Ill's will be consid- 
erably more accurate. We are ac- 
celerating development of a new and 
much larger land-based missile called 
the M-X. And we are carefully 
analyzing the alternatives available for 
making our intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM's) less vulnerable. The 
SALT agreement now being considered 



will not constrain a single one of these 
alternatives. Indeed, it will help make 
these alternatives feasible and safe. 

We will continue to maintain a con- 
vincing deterrent with a nuclear 
weapons force. But in a world of nu- 
clear weapons, more is not necessarily 
better. We are not more secure today 
because we and the Soviets have tens 
of thousands of warheads rather than 
thousands. 

For the stark reality is that neither of 
us can win an all-out arms race. It is a 
futile search for a temporary advan- 
tage. We will match what they do, and 
they will do the same, in a spiral of 
ever-increasing risk and cost. 

Thus the power we share with the 
Soviet Union carries this imperative for 
our security: We must slow, and ulti- 
mately reverse, this dangerous and 
burdensome competition. That is an 
imperative recognized for nearly three 
decades. Every President since the be- 
ginning of the nuclear era — and both 
major political parties — have under- 
stood that security depends on both a 
sound defense and sound arms control. 

Background to SALT II 

Building on the efforts of Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower, President 
Kennedy concluded the first arms con- 
trol agreement with the Soviet Union in 
1963 — halting poisonous nuclear- 
weapons testing in the atmosphere. 



SALT Treaty 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 24, 1979' 

The President expects that a verifi- 
able agreement on strategic arms lim- 
itations which protects American 
strategic interests can be negotiated and 
will be ratified. 

The President's position is that this 
agreement will be submitted for Senate 
ratification as a treaty. If the Soviet 
Union, in the absence of a SALT 
treaty, were to engage in a significant 
arms buildup, the President would, of 
course, match it appropriately. By the 
same token, it is the President's inten- 
tion not to escalate the arms race un- 
ilaterally in the absence of a treaty, if 
comparable and verifiable restraint is 
shown by the Soviet Union. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 5, 1979. 



Later we reached agreements that ban- 
ned nuclear weapons from the ocean 
floor and from outer space. 

The 1968 Nuclear Nonprol iteration 
Treaty now binds more than 100 na- 
tions. It has not yet removed the spec- 
ter of nuclear proliferation, but it has 
advanced that objective significantly. 

Since first proposed by President 
Johnson, we have been engaged in 
broader Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks. During the Nixon Administra- 
tion, these negotiations severely re- 
stricted both sides from building new 
antiballistic missile systems. These 
systems would have cost billions of 
dollars and added new dangers to the 
arms race. 

Under President Nixon, SALT I 
placed the first limits on the number of 
strategic offensive missiles. It pre- 
vented the Soviets from continuing to 
increase the number of their missiles by 
several hundred each year. 

For the past 6 years, three Presidents 
of both parties have been negotiating 
the next step in arms control — the 
SALT II agreement. The negotiations 
have been intense. We have proceeded 
carefully and deliberately. And we are 
near agreement. 

What SALT II Will Accomplish 

Let me explain what this agreement 
will accomplish. 

First, it will establish equal limits 
on the number of missiles and bombers 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons 
to the other side. The first SALT 
agreement in 1972 froze the number of 
strategic missiles, leaving the Soviets 
with a numerical advantage which was 
then offset by U.S. technological 
superiority. The new agreement firmly 
establishes the principle of equal num- 
bers. 

Second, these limits will be lower 
and more encompassing than those in 
the first SALT agreement. The new 
overall limits would force the Soviets 
to eliminate over 250 strategic missiles 
and bombers. This is a 10% reduction 
and about 750 fewer than they are 
likely to have in the absence of SALT. 
On the other hand, because we are 
below the new limits, we would ac- 
tually be able, if we chose, to increase 
the overall number of our strategic 
weapons in operation. 

Third, the agreement will place 
lower limits on specific weapons, in- 
cluding those with more than a single 
warhead. 

Fourth, for the first time, we will 
curb the number of new systems and 



16 



begin to limit the race to make existing 
systems more deadly. Only one new 
ICBM will be permitted to each side. 
The number of warheads on a single 
missile would be limited. And there 
would be restraint on increasing the 
size of land-based missiles. 

What would be the major effect of 
this agreement on our security? Instead 
of an estimated 3,000 Soviet strategic 
weapons by 1985, there would be 
2,250. The strategic balance will be 
more stable and, therefore, safer. We 
will have greater confidence and cer- 
tainty in our own defense planning. 
And the defense programs that we and 
our allies need and have planned can 
proceed forward on schedule. 

Verification and Competition 

But how do we know the Soviets will 
not violate the agreement? The answer 
is — we can see for ourselves. 

We have powerful and varied sys- 
tems for observing the Soviets. Besides 
our photographic satellites, we have 
other highly sensitive and, therefore, 
highly classified means of verification. 
The large size and limited number of 
bases for intercontinental missiles, 
heavy bombers, and nuclear subma- 
rines eases our task. 

And the SALT agreement itself 
makes a major contribution. SALT II 
would forbid any interference which 
would impede our ability to verify 
compliance with the treaty. And for the 
first time the Soviets have agreed to 
regularly exchange precise data with us 
on each country's missiles. 

This is not a new and uncertain 
challenge. We have monitored Soviet 
compliance with SALT I. We know 
what we can see. And we know that we 
can detect any violation large enough 
to affect the strategic balance — and do 
so in time to respond effectively. 

Yet with all this, some critics 
suggest that we should not move ahead 
with SALT, even if it strengthens U.S. 
and allied security. They contend that 



Soviet actions elsewhere — in the Third 
World or on human rights — compel us 
to withhold approval of SALT II. This 
would be a profound mistake. 

As President Carter said two days 
ago, we " . . . cannot let the pressures 
of inevitable competition overwhelm 
possibilities for cooperation any more 
than [we can permit] cooperation to 
blind us to the realities of competition 
. . . ." And the President said this: 

It is precisely because we have fundamental 
differences with the Soviet Union that we are 
determined to bring this most dangerous di- 
mension of our military competition under 
control. ' 

We will continue to compete peace- 
fully with the Soviets. In this competi- 
tion, we hold many cards — not only 
our military aid but our economic ties. 



SALT II would forbid any inter- 
ference which would impede our 
ability to verify compliance with 
the treaty. 



our understanding of diversity, and, 
most of all, our support for the deter- 
mined sense of independence in 
emerging nations around the world. 

But as we compete, we must also 
cooperate to limit the most dangerous 
competition — nuclear weapons. This is 
in our calculated self-interest. SALT is 
not a reward for Soviet good behavior. 
It is a benefit for ourselves and for 
mankind. 

With or without SALT, competition 
with the Soviets in many areas will 
continue. We will respond to any 
Soviet behavior which adversely af- 
fects our interests. Without SALT, that 
competition becomes more dangerous, 
and the possibilities for cooperation are 
dimmed. 



Department of State Bulletin' 

We must recognize our overwhelm- 1 
ing strengths as a nation. We must see 
the future not as a threat but as an op- 
portunity to make our children's lives 
safer and more rewarding than our 
own. The emerging SALT agreement 
represents such an opportunity. 

Military competition today is carried 
out in highly technical terms. The de- 
bates on SALT will be very complex. 
Let us not, as we explore the tech- 
nicalities in all the detail they deserve, 
lose sight of these simple truths: A nu- 
clear war would destroy much — if not 
all — of what we love. We must do ev- 
erything in our power to see that it 
never happens. We prevent it today 
with a military defense strong enough 
to deter our potential adversaries. We 
will maintain that deterrence. 

But that alone will not make us se- 
cure. We must also, at long last, re- 
verse the dangerous race in nuclear 
weapons that each year increases nu- 
clear stockpiles and each year makes us 
less safe. That is what SALT is about. 

With the vision that set him apart 
from other men, Hubert Humphrey de- 
fined our present challenge over a dec- 
ade ago. He not only cared deeply, he 
thought deeply about the nature of 
America's security in a nuclear world. 

Nuclear power has placed into the hands of men 
the power to destroy all that man has created. 
Only responsive statesmen — who perceive that 
perseverence in the pursuit of peace is not 
cowardice but courage, that restraint in the use 
of force is not weakness but wisdom — can pre- 
vent international rivalries from leading to an 
incinerated world. 

Let us have Hubert's wisdom — and 
summon Hubert's courage — as we set 
the course which will help define our 
future for years to come. D 



' For the full text of the President's address 
at Georgia Tech on Feb. 20, 1979. see Bulle- 
tin of Mar. 1979. p. 21. 



\pril 1979 



17 



EAST ASIA: FY 1980 Assistunve Proposals 



by Richard C. Holbrooke 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 1, 
1979. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Sec- 
retary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 
fairs. ' 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to discuss our FY 1980 assistance pro- 
grams in East Asia and the Pacific. I 
think you will agree that profound 
changes have occurred on the face of 
Asia since the beginning of this Ad- 
ministration. At that time among our 
Asian friends there was a "crisis of 
confidence" in U.S. policy toward the 
region. We subsequently concentrated 
on overcoming that crisis and on put- 
ting into place long-term, sustainable 
policies that emphasize national self- 
reliance, supplemented by continued 
U.S. support, and no U.S. interference 
in the internal affairs of other coun- 
tries. 

By last March, thanks to the coordi- 
nated actions of the executive branch 
and Congress, we had largely suc- 
ceeded in overcoming the "crisis of 
confidence" by continuing our eco- 
nomic and security assistance programs 
at a modest but adequate level, by per- 
sonal contacts with many key Asian 
leaders, by a strong strategic presence 
in the area, and by a substantial in- 
crease in economic exchange between 
the United States and Asia. Thus, dur- 
ing the following year, the United 
States was able to concentrate primar- 
ily upon reinforcing the programs and 
policies already begun. At the same 
time, new problems arose in the secu- 
rity field, and persistent economic 
problems remained unresolved. 

Our basic policies remain sound, but 
in order to meet these challenges we 
will need to make a greater effort dur- 
ing the year ahead. 

This past year has been particularly 
eventful. Let me first cite the major 
positive events, from an American 
point of view, that have taken place. 

Positive Developments 

The United States has maintained its 
close ties with Japan, the cornerstone 
of our entire posture in Asia. Despite 
knotty economic problems, the funda- 
mental strength and depth of the re- 
lationship remain unimpaired. Our se- 
curity relationship continues stronger 



than ever, accompanied by a new 
awareness of defense matters among 
the Japanese Government and public 
and with an increased Japanese contri- 
bution to its own security goals and to 
the support of U.S. forces. 

Perhaps more dramatic, as we have 
already discussed, the United States 
embarked on a new era in our relations 
with the People's Republic of China 
with the formal establishment of full 
diplomatic relations; simultaneously 
our ties with Taiwan have been placed 
on a new basis which, although unoffi- 
cial, will be durable and mutually 
beneficial. 

We put behind us a period of major 
strain in our relationship with Korea. 
The withdrawal of our ground troops 
began; but further withdrawals are in 
abeyance until we complete our reas- 
sessment of North Korean military 
capabilities. South and North Korea 
have taken a first step to resume their 
long-interrupted dialogue. National 
elections were held, and prominent 
political prisoners were released. 

The Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) continued to mature 
as an economic and political grouping, 
and it expanded its relationships with 
the United States, Japan, and the Euro- 
pean Community. Its members also ad- 
vanced in mutual confidence and cohe- 
sion in the face of common challenges. 
The statements by ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers calling for withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Kampuchea and 
Vietnam and respect for territorial in- 
tegrity reflected this cohesion. 

We and the Philippine Government 
have agreed to an amendment of the 
32-year-old Military Bases Agreement 
that is more in keeping with Philippine 
sovereignty and at the same time per- 
mits continued and unhampered U.S. 
military operations at the facilities 
which we retain. This places on a firm 
footing the ability of our forces to op- 
erate effectively in the Pacific and In- 
dian Oceans, protecting vital sea lanes 
and ready to support our friends and 
allies. 

Close congressional consultation was 
vital in enabling the Adminstration to 
develop its position. Congressional 
contacts with the Government of the 
Philippines were important in bringing 
the negotiations to a successful conclu- 
sion. As President Marcos said on 
February 16: "If the United States of 
America will be remembered in history 



it will not be merely for its power, not 
only for its military might, but because 
of its noble objective to attain peace in 
the world." 

A number of Pacific island states 
have peacefully become independent. 
These new countries have been assisted 
in their emergence by the moral and 
material support of the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand, which to- 
gether continue to comprise one of the 
most durable and strongest treaty 
organizations — ANZUS — in the world. 

Negative Development 

The major new negative develop- 
ment in Asia was the boiling over into 
full-scale warfare of the long- 
simmering conflicts between Vietnam 
and Kampuchea [Cambodia], Vietnam 
and China. The interests of the United 
States are not immediately threatened, 
and we will not get directly involved in 
a conflict between Asian Communist 
nations. However, the continuation and 
possibly escalation of these conflicts 
between Communist states is poten- 
tially dangerous to the region. There- 
fore, we shall use whatever means are 
at our disposal to encourage restraint, 
bring an end to the fighting, and pre- 
vent a wider war. 

We are working with other nations 
bilaterally and at the United Nations to 
seek the immediate withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and 
Chinese forces from Vietnam. We 
continue to assert the important inter- 
national principles of territorial integ- 
rity and noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other nations. 

Together with the conflicts in In- 
dochina, there is the explosion of the 
refugee exodus from Vietnam, an 
exodus deliberately provoked by the 
policies of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam and one from which that gov- 
ernment derives material benefit at the 
expense of tens of thousands of suffer- 
ing people and of those Southeast 
Asian governments which continue 
their humanitarian policies of providing 
temporary asylum. 

We support the concept of a truly in- 
dependent and neutral Cambodia. The 
Kampuchean people clearly deserve at 
long last a genuinely representative 
government responsive to their aspira- 
tions. Neither Pol Pot nor the 
Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin re- 
gime fulfill these criteria. 



18 

Even though the fragility ot the 
equilibrium of which I spoke last year 
has become more apparent, the position 
of the United States in Asia remains a 
highly favorable one. The tensions and 
conflicts that do exist in Asia are es- 
sentially between Communist 
states — an "East-East" conflict — in 
which our efforts are directed at con- 
taining the effects. Our traditional 
friends in the region continue to move 
toward increased stability and prosper- 
ity but in the face of challenges both 
old and new. In our status as an Asian 
and Pacific power, we share in these 
challenges — challenges to peace and 
stability and to improvement of the 
human condition in Asia. 

The progress that we have made to- 
gether with those friends in the last 2 
years has positioned us jointly to meet 
these challenges confidently and effec- 
tively. For our part, therefore, while 
we must work even harder, we do not 
need at this time to undertake any 
dramatic or major departures from our 
current policy course in order to main- 
tain our favorable position in East 
Asia. We believe we are on the right 
course, and we should persevere. 

But in order to meet the challenges 
of today and the foreseeable future, we 
will have to apply on occasion in- 
creased resources — diplomatic, eco- 
nomic, and military, government and 
private. This will mean selective in- 
creases in security assistance and eco- 
nomic assistance. 

It will also mean increased attention 
to promotion of U.S. trade and invest- 
ment in Asia and recognition of the 
growing economic power of the 



region — power which has created both 
substantial opportunities and formida- 
ble problems for the United States. 

Indochina 

The United States is concerned over 
the increasing tensions in Asia that 
have resulted from the invasion and 
continuing occupation of Kampuchea 
by over 100,000 Vietnamese troops, 
and from the subsequent Chinese attack 
on Vietnam. 

We have no intention of taking sides 
among the parties to these conflicts, 
but we do wish to see an end to the 
present fighting, withdrawal of Viet- 
namese troops from Kampuchea and of 
Chinese troops from Vietnam, and a 
general reduction in the dangerous 
level of tensions that now prevails. 

Our position has been made clear to 
all of the parties concerned on numer- 
ous occasions, in public and private, 
over the past several months. Begin- 
ning in September, we expressed our 
concern to the Vietnamese and asked 
for clarification of their intentions in 
light of their troop buildup along the 
Kampuchean border. On November 1 
we sent a letter to the U.N. Security 
Council expressing concern over rising 
tensions between Vietnam and Kam- 
puchea, as well as the possibility of in- 
volving other countries, and asking that 
the Council consider how it might deal 
with this situation. Subsequently, we 
supported Security Council action on 
both the Vietnamese and the Chinese 
attacks. 

Our reasons for initially drawing 
U.N. attention to the growing tensions 



Department of State Bulletin 

in Indochina and later for supporting , 
Security Council actions calling for 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
the region were twofold. 

• We were concerned that the vol- 
atile nature of the conflicts posed a 
wider threat to regional peace. This in- 
deed was the case, and the Vietnamese 
attack on Cambodia was soon followed 
by the Chinese attack on Vietnam. 

• We were concerned over the tragic 
waste of limited resources, which 
would have been much better employed 
to meet the real needs of the Viet- 
namese and Cambodian peoples, rather 
than being used to support another 
round of cruel fighting. 

With the expansion of the fighting to 
the Vietnamese-Chinese border, 
squandered national resources and eco- 
nomic dislocation have become even 
greater. Even more important, how- 
ever, is the loss in human terms, as 
people die in disputes which we believe 
could, and should, be resolved through 
negotiation or mediation. 

Refugees 

Another tragic aspect of the predi- 
cament of Indochina is the situation 
which impels so many citizens of those 
countries to want to flee them. Since 
the Communist victories of spring 
1975. over 400.000 persons have fled 
to non-Communist countries from 
Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, exact- 
ing an incalculable toll in human suf- 
fering and misery and putting a heavy 
burden on the other countries of the re- 
gion that receive them. Thailand and 



Burma 



Thailand 

TOTAL 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM— EAST ASIA 

(millions of U.S. dollars) 



FY 1978 
MAP' FMSCR^ 



IMET 



FY 1979 
MAP FMSCR 



IMET 



FY 1980 REQUEST 
MAP FMSCR IMET 

— — .031 



8.0 
41.1 



29.5 



403.0 



1.050 



7.463 



30.0 



15.6 310.1 



0.8 

5.75 



25.0 



25.0 



342.0 



'MAP figures do not include supply operations. 
^FMS credits. 



0.9 



5.736 



SSA 



Indonesia 


15.0 


40.0 


3.064 


— 


32.0 


2.0 


— 


35.0 


2.0 


— 


Korea 


— 


275.0 


1.493 


— 


225.0 


1.8 


— 


225.0 


1.8 


— 


Malaysia 


— 


16.5 


0.596 


— 


7.5 


0.5 


— 


7.0 


0.305 


— 


Philippines 


18.1 


18.5 


0.704 


15.6 


15.6 


0.65 


25.0 


50.0 


0.7 


20.0 


Taiwan 


— 


23.5 


0.556 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 



20.0 



April 1979 

Malaysia have borne particularly heavy 
Uxids and have paid an economic and a 
political price for their humanitarian 
policies toward refugees; both coun- 
tries deserve our approbation and sup- 
port. 

''hat the outpouring of refugees con- 
iiiuies, in spite of the certain hardships 
and possible death that await them after 
they have left their homelands, is mute 
hut eloquent testimony to the condi- 
tions there. The Government of Viet- 
nam recently announced its intention to 
implement procedures that would allow 
Us citizens who wish to emigrate to do 
so in a more orderly and humane man- 
ner. We have no indications yet that 
there have been any practical results 
troin this announced intention. For the 
sake of the countries of first asylum, 
and for the sake of those people who 
wish to leave Vietnam, we earnestly 
hope that the Vietnamese Government 
will follow through. 

In keeping with our humanitarian 
tradition, we took the lead in the con- 
sultations on Indochina refugees called 
by the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees last December in an effort to 
emphasize the international nature of 
the problem and to bring forth a greater 
response from countries which have not 
matched the efforts of Australia. 
France. Canada, and the United States 
in providing permanent resettlement. 
We are somewhat encouraged by the 
response of other countries, but the 
task is immense. 

For our own part, we will continue 
in the American tradition of providing 
a haven for those tTeeing political re- 
pression; we have offered permanent re- 
settlement to over 200,000 Indochinese 
refugees since 1975. We will be con- 
sulting Congress on plans for the year 
ahead. We will make our program 
more efficient and responsive through 
the appointment of the distinguished 
Dick Clark, former Senator, as Ambas- 
sador at large, with the mission of in- 
tegrating and overseeing all refugee 
programs and interests of the U.S. 
Government. 

We have been very pleased by con- 
gressional participation in the Geneva 
consultations on refugees and sub- 
sequent working tours by congressional 
delegations to review first hand the 
refugee situation on Southeast Asia, 
including Vietnam itself. This can only 
lead to a better mutual understanding of 
the problem by the legislative and 
executive branches and an improved 
long-term refugee policy. 

Military Balance 

Although the main sources of actual 
and potential conflict are presently 



between the Communist states, our 
military posture in the region and the 
defensive capabilities of our friends 
and allies are of prime and continuing 
concern to us. 

Our military presence in Asia and the 
western Pacific remains strong, par- 
ticularly in view of qualitative factors 
and the continuous process of upgrad- 
ing of forces there. As an indication of 
our determination to maintain military 
sufficiency in the region, and an indi- 
cation of our flexibility in meeting 
changing strategic challenges, let me 
just catalogue some of our recent ac- 
tions. 

In the wake of the Vietnamese inva- 
sion of Kampuchea, we increased and 
made more responsive our security as- 
sistance to Thailand. We concluded 
mutually beneficial amendments to the 
Military Bases Agreement with the 
Philippines. We are undertaking qual- 
itative upgrading of air and naval 
forces in the Pacific. New organs for 
coordination of military planning in 
Japan and Korea make our combined 
efforts in those countries more effi- 
cient. 

In addition to our own forces in the 
region, those of our allies are also sig- 
nificant. Our treaty commitments to the 
mutual defense of Japan, South Korea, 
the Philippines, and Japan are unshake- 
able. Our treaty tie with Australia and 
New Zealand is one of the most basic 
and durable such relationships in his- 
tory. Our commitment under the Man- 
ila pact remains valid, as the President 
affirmed to Thailand's Prime Minister 
during his visit. We remain dedicated 
to the security and well-being of the 
people on Taiwan. 

We are keeping a careful eye on the 
development of Soviet forces in Asia. 
In addition to those along the border 
with China, which have grown by more 
than one-third in the last decade, the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet has also been 
strengthened. We also see this fleet 
ranging farther from its home ports for 
extended periods, including exercises 
in the Philippine Sea and the current 
deployments in the Gulf of Tonkin. 

While the Soviet Pacific Fleet is not 
a match for U.S. naval forces in the 
Pacific, such developments require our 
careful attention and underscore the 
need for Congress to appropriate the 
funds necessary to enable us to con- 
tinue to improve our own military 
forces and to contribute to the defense 
of our allies. 

Japan 

We have already discussed the 
dramatic new ties with China; in coun- 
terpoint to that stands our longstand- 



19 

ing, fundamental relationship with 
Japan. No relationship is more impor- 
tant, none more basic to U.S. interests. 
The U.S. alliance with Japan remains 
the keystone of our policy in Asia. It 
joins our two nations together in a dur- 
able, dynamic, and constructive re- 
lationship which is a vital element in 
the preservation of peace, security, and 
economic progress in the region. 

The alliance has enabled Japan to 
play an increasing economic and politi- 
cal role in the region and the world 
without having to develop strategic 
capabilities of its own. But Japan also 
contributes substantial resources to- 
ward its own defense — the Japanese 
defense budget for 1979 is projected at 
$10.5 billion, an impressive figure 
even though it is small as a percentage 
of Japan's large GNP (Japan ranks 
about eighth in the world in absolute 
size of defense budget). Much of this 
defense expenditure is being devoted to 
qualitative improvements in the self- 
defense forces, including the purchase 
of F-15 fighters and P-3C patrol air- 
craft. Japan's defense budget includes 
a substantial sum — around $700 
million — which will be contributed in 
1979 to the support of U.S. forces 
stationed there. 

I should also note a welcome degree 
of greater openness in discussing de- 
fense issues in Japan and a greater 
public appreciation of the security en- 
vironment in Asia and the role of the 
U.S. -Japan security relationship in that 
environment. 

While our overall relationship with 
Japan remains strong, there are clearly 
contentious problems in the economic 
field, especially those relating to Ja- 
pan's large global current account 
surplus and to market access. 

The Japanese trade surplus has been 
gradually declining in recent months. 
We welcome that. A continuation of 
the trend is of great importance. There 
have also been a certain number of 
steps forward in opening up market ac- 
cess in Japan, although less than we 
would hope. 

There is. of course, much more to be 
done by both sides, and this year will 
be a critical one in U.S. -Japanese eco- 
nomic relations. We will work cooper- 
atively with the Japanese to assure 
continuing progress. The importance of 
such progress transcends our bilateral 
relations and involves the health of the 
entire world trading system. 

Korea 

Our most immediate security con- 
cerns in Northeast Asia are focused on 
the Korean Peninsula. In the broader 
context, our relations with South Korea 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



are returning toward a more harmoni- 
ous state after a very difficult 2 years. I 
do not wish to suggest that the time of 
testing is entirely behind us. Yet the 
fundamental soundness of our relation- 
ship augurs well for the future. 

We have long been on record as 
favoring efforts to reduce tensions on 
the peninsula either through direct 
North-South talks or through meetings 
of all the nations directly concerned, 
including South Korea as a full partici- 
pant. South Korea has made, over the 
years, several proposals for direct talks 
and concrete forms of cooperation with 
the North, but the North has histori- 
cally been unwilling to participate. In 
January, however, the North publicly 
welcomed President Park's proposal for 
talks without preconditions, although 
the North tried to bend the proposal to 
its own conditions. 

As you know, the first contacts took 
place at Panmunjom on February 17, 
and since that date the North and South 
have also started discussions for the 
South's participation in the interna- 
tional table tennis championships in 
Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, 
in April. The second round of political 
contacts is set for next week. Although 
it is still far too early to tell whether 
the North will move beyond posturing 
to allow fruitful results, we are cau- 
tiously hopeful. 

In the meantime, neither we nor our 
South Korean allies can relax our vigi- 
lance against the possibility that the 
North will seek to reunify the peninsula 
by military means. The U.S. intelli- 
gence community is currently engaged 
in a reassessment of the data available 
on North Korean military strength and 
deployments. Because that analysis is 
still in progress, it would be premature 
to draw any definitive conclusions; 
however, it is already clear that we will 
significantly increase our estimates of 
some categories of North Korean 
strength. Certainly there is more there 
than is required for legitimate defen- 
sive purposes. 

We continue to believe that our pol- 
icy of gradually withdrawing American 
ground combat troops is reasonable and 
appropriate. It in no way diminishes 
the strength of our commitment to the 
security and well-being of South Korea 
as embodied in our mutual security 
treaty. However, as the President re- 
cently noted, further reductions will be 
held in abeyance until we can assess 
new developments, including the new 
intelligence data on North Korean 
strength, U.S. -China normalization, 
and the evolution of a North-South 
dialogue. 

Meanwhile, steps have been initiated 
to compensate for the reduction in 



Business Councii 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
FEB. 8, 1979' 

The Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States met February 8 with 
American business leaders active in 
Southeast Asia to establish the U.S. 
section of the ASEAN-U.S. Business 
Council. 

The council will be a joint under- 
taking between private business groups 
in the nations of Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It is 
similar in organization and purpose to 
Business Councils created jointly with 
the private sectors in Japan, the Euro- 
pean Communities, India, Egypt, and a 
dozen other countries. The council's 
main objectives are: (1) insure a high 
level of awareness of bilateral relations 
among businessmen, (2) serve as a 
forum to promote economic relation- 
ships, and (3) recommend ways to im- 
prove economic relations. 

The Department of State believes 
that formation of the ASEAN-U.S. 
Business Council is a timely and wel- 
come event which will contribute to 
and strengthen U.S. relations with 
ASEAN members. 

The first ASEAN-U.S. Business 
Conference is scheduled for July 22-24 
in Manila and will be cosponsored by 
the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States and its counterpart or- 
ganization. 



This joint endeavor is a tribute to the 
cooperation of the five nations — 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand — which com- 
prise ASEAN. This Association has 
created a stable, prosperous regional 
group of nations. It has emerged as one 
of the most attractive areas for interna- 
tional direct private investment in the 
developing world. 

ASEAN is one of the United States' 
most important trading partners, with a 
two-way volume of trade of over $12 
billion. The member countries have 
enjoyed substantial rates of economic 
growth in the 1970's based on govern- 
ment support for and reliance on pri- 
vate investment and foreign trade. 

The Department of State places high 
priority on maintaining U.S. competi- 
tiveness in Southeast Asia and con- 
tributing to its economic growth. We 
welcome expansion of two-way trade 
and private investment. The council 
will enhance U.S. business community 
awareness of the ample trade and in- 
vestment potential offered by the re- 
gion. The ASEAN-U.S. Business 
Council presents an excellent opportu- 
nity to work creatively toward these 
ends. □ 



' Made available to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



combat power. An additional squadron 
of U.S. F-4 aircraft has arrived in 
Korea, for example, and the Congress 
has approved the transfer of essential 
U.S. equipment to Korea as U.S. 
forces there are redeployed. The United 
States and R.O.K. forces have also in- 
augurated a Combined Forces Com- 
mand (CFC), which will improve the 
quality and flexibility of tactical plan- 
ning and enable the Korean forces to 
shoulder more of the responsibility for 
their own defense. 

Security Assistance Program 

Our security assistance is considered 
by the nations of East Asia to be of 
great material and psychological value. 
The overall objective of the FY 1980 
security assistance program which we 
are requesting for East Asia is to pro- 



vide access to the military wherewithal 
to cope with internal and external 
threats and to provide psychological 
reassurance of U.S. dedication to the 
goal of regional security and stability. 
As can be seen from the accompanying 
table, security assistance in East Asia 
has been declining in recent years. 
Especially in light of recent develop- 
ments in Indochina and Korea, it is 
evident that there is no room for any 
reductions. Leaving aside the major in- 
creases in the program for the Philip- 
pines resulting from the amendment to 
the base agreement the level of foreign 
military sales (FMS) credits has de- 
creased by 24% compared to FY 1978; 
the military assistance program (MAP) 
has been phased out except for the 
Philippines. The international military 
education and training (IMET) program 
has decreased by 23% in the same 



April 1979 

pciiod. Inflation and changes in ac- 
counting procedures have made real 
decreases much larger. 

Indeed, the evolving security situa- 
tion in Asia gives cause for concern 
over the levels of our security assist- 
ance program in the region. The Presi- 
dent spoke to this in his February 20 
speech at Georgia Tech [Atlanta] when 
he said that: "Many nations are 
troubled — even threatened — by the 
turmoil in Southeast Asia .... To stand 
by our friends and to help meet their 
security needs in these difficult times. I 
will consult with the Congress to de- 
termine what additional military assist- 
ance will be required."^ 

We continue to give special em- 
phasis to support of Korean security 
efforts in general and their 5-year force 
improvement plan in particular through 
FMS cash sales and FMS credits. For 
FY 1980 these credits amount to $225 
million. We will also provide the 
necessary grant training through the 
IMET program in the amount of $1.8 
million in FY 1980. This combination 
of FMS credits and IMET is, indeed, 
the bare minimum necessary to help 
compensate for the troop withdrawal 
and to support the Korean efforts to 
achieve greater self-sufficiency in the 
conduct of the defense of their country. 

For the first time since 1971. we are 
requesting a small amount of IMET 
funds ($31,000) for Burma, reflecting 
modest but growing U.S. -Burma coop- 
eration. 

I would like to point out also that 
these programs for East Asian countries 
have infinitesimal impact on Federal 
spending and even less on inflation, 
particularly the FMS financing program 
in which only 10% of the program 
amount is actually appropriated — for 
East Asia this would only be $34.2 
million in FY 1980. The foreign policy 
benefits in terms of regional stability 
and confidence in the United States far 
outweigh the costs in appropriated 
funds. This is particularly true of the 
IMET program, which gives us a 
unique opportunity to secure lasting 
contact and influence with military de- 
cisionmakers in friendly countries. 

As the President said in Atlanta. 
America's fundamental security re- 
sponsibilities include standing by our 
allies and our friends and supporting 
the national independence and integrity 
of other nations. In that spirit, I feel 
that it is essential, at the least, that the 
security assistance program I have out- 
lined be authorized and implemented. 



Philippine Bases 

The Governments of the United 
States and the Republic of the Philip- 



pines announced last December 31 that 
agreement had been reached on 
amendment of the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement. Consultations with Con- 
gress, and indeed congressional par- 
ticipation, were key elements in the 
process which led up to agreement on 
the future conditions of U.S. use of 
facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic 
Navy Base complex. While you are 
personally well aware of the history 
and outcome of the negotiations be- 
tween our two countries, let me set 
forth for the record some of the more 
prominent features. 

The final negotiations in a process 
that can be traced back to 1969 were 
carried out by representatives of the 
United States and the Philippines with 
the aim of implementing the principles 
in the joint statement issued by Presi- 
dent Marcos and Vice President Mon- 
dale during the latter's visit to Manila 
in May 1978. Those principles were: 

• The United States affirms that 
Philippine sovereignty extends over the 
bases; 

• Each base shall be under the com- 
mand of a Philippine base commander; 

• The United States shall be assured 
effective command and control over 
U.S. personnel, employees, equip- 
ment, material, the facilities authorized 
for their use within military bases, and 
unhampered military operations in- 
volving their own forces; and 

• There should be a thorough review 
of the agreement and amendments 
thereto every 5 years (the agreement 
continues in force through 1991). 

Due to the goodwill and persistence 
of the negotiators during the period 
June-December 1978, mutually ac- 
cepted terms for the amendments were 
worked out. I would pay particular 
tribute to the men on both sides who 
resolved in a few months issues which 
had, in some cases, been thorns of 
contention for years. 

Concerning compensation. President 
Carter has sent a letter to President 
Marcos promising that the Executive 
Branch will make its "best effort" 
over the next 5 fiscal years (1980-84) 
to obtain for the Philippines $50 mil- 
lion in grant military assistance, $250 
million in FMS credits, and $200 mil- 
lion in security supporting assistance 
(SSA). This was the approach 
suggested to us during congressional 
consultations as an alternative to the 
previous U.S. proposal of $1 billion in 
a treaty commitment. Members of this 
committee were closely consulted. In 
this first year, we are requesting $25 
million in grant military assistance, 
$50 million in FMS financing, and $20 
million in SSA. 



21 

The SSA program for the Philippines 
is new. Like existing SSA programs 
elsewhere in the world, it will be ad- 
ministered by the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID). It will sup- 
plement, not supplant, our on-going 
AID programs in the Philippines of de- 
velopment assistance and PL-480 
commodities. 

The SSA program in the Philippines 
will be implemented in the form of 
specific projects, and we will inform 
the Congress of the nature of those 
projects. Because the program is so 
new, the guidelines are still being de- 
veloped. We have identified three gen- 
eral types of projects which we believe 
correspond to the criteria of the con- 
gressional mandate and for which the 
administrative and support apparatus is 
already largely in place. 

One of these is the construction of 
typhoon-proof classrooms throughout 
the country. The Philippines has a seri- 
ous shortage of classrooms, and many 
existing ones, built years ago, need to 
be replaced. 

A second field is that of public 
health. We have in mind helping the 
Philippine Government to build and 
equip health centers in rural areas 
which would emphasize preventive 
health care, probably using paramedi- 
cal personnel. 

The third type of project would in- 
volve the improvement of social and 
economic conditions in Angeles and 
Olongapo cities, just outside the gates 
of our facilities at Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base, and in adjacent 
municipalities. AID has already con- 
ducted "shelter sector assessments" 
for both cities and has identified re- 
quirements for sites and services in 
those communities. And there is clear 
need for other types of developmental 
activity as well, such as reforestation, 
agricultural resettlement, flood control, 
land reclamation, vocational training, 
and social services. 

These are projects about which 
President Marcos has expressed per- 
sonal interest, and our desire to insti- 
tute programs to upgrade conditions in 
those communities is recorded in the 
diplomatic notes exchanged at Manila 
on January 7, 1979, and in an accom- 
panying letter from Secretary Vance to 
Foreign Minister Romulo. 

1 should like to explain why we 
chose to incorporate SSA — a program 
whose main focus is economic and so- 
cial development — in our security as- 
sitance "package" for the Philippines. 
You may be aware that the Philippine 
Government had long hoped for a mul- 
tiyear assistance commitment in con- 
junction with the amendment of the 
Military Bases Agreement. No such 



22 

commitment was possible, of course; 
the best we could and did otter was an 
undertaking by the President that the 
Administration would make its best 
effort, over a period of years, to seek 
authorization and appropriation for the 
Philippines of specified amounts of se- 
curity assistance, and we were influ- 
enced in choosing this approach by our 
consultations with a number of Mem- 
bers of Congress a year ago or more. 

In putting together our assistance 
package, we had to take into account 
the prospect that the military assistance 
program might be phased out in the 
near future and the fact that funding 
levels for traditional bilateral economic 
assistance programs have been declin- 
ing in recent years. We, therefore, 
conceived the SSA program for the 
Philippines in part as a substitute for 
those more traditional forms of assist- 
ance and as one that could reasonably 
be expected to last through the 5-year 
life of this assistance package. 

Another factor in our decision was 
that an SSA program is intrinsically 
more flexible than traditional develop- 
ment assistance programs. An SSA 
program can be developed relatively 
quickly, with less extensive bureaucra- 
tic preparation on the American side, 
and tailored to take advantage of an 
existing apparatus and to the needs of 
specific geographic areas. We made 
clear, in our consultations with the 
Congress a year ago, our intention to 
include an SSA program as part of our 
assistance package, and we received 
encouragement to do so from virtually 
everyone with whom we consulted. 

We intend to administer the SSA 
program in the Philippines with no in- 
crease in our ceiling on American per- 
sonnel permanently assigned to the 
AID mission in the Philippines, al- 
though we may need some temporary- 
duty help to get the program started. 
We will establish procedures to insure 
full accountability of the funds ex- 
pended under the program. Finally, we 
will insure that projects funded under 
the SSA program will be consistent 
with the congressional mandate for all 
foreign assistance programs, will com- 
plement our on-going development as- 
sistance programs in the Philippines, 
and will help to meet our long-term 
goal of aiding the poor people of that 
country. 

I expect you are aware that the 
Philippines declined an assistance 
package which the United States of- 
fered in 1976. It is difficult to make a 
clear comparison between the two of- 
fers. The 1979 package does not in- 
clude development assistance or PL- 
480 commodities, whereas the 1976 
offer did. In terms of international se- 



curity assistance, however, the two 
packages are equal in amount — $500 
million — although somewhat different 
in their internal composition. 

I would stress, liowever, that the 
1979 amendment contains a number of 
intangible features that were not en- 
visioned or not guaranteed in the 1976 
negotiations: full and visible recogni- 
tion of Philippine sovereignty; a very 
extensive reversion of land and water 
areas to the Philippines; provision of 
special operating rights for the United 
States in some of those reverted areas; 
and continued and unhampered opera- 
tional use by our forces of the facilities 
which we retain. 

1 believe that the security assistance 
program that we are proposing in con- 
nection with the amendment to the 
bases agreement is an appropriate 
acknowledgment of the long and 
friendly relationship which we have 
had with the Philippines, the durability 
of our defense relationship, and the 
importance of our facilities in the 
Philippines to the flexibility and eco- 
nomical operation of our forces in the 
western Pacific and contiguous areas 
such as the Indian Ocean. I strongly 
urge you to authorize the full amount 
so that this historic agreement can 
begin on a successful note. 

Economic Aspects 

Our economic relationships with the 
countries of Asia and the Pacific form 
the centerpiece of our role in the re- 
gion. The free-market economies of 
Asia constitute the most dynamic eco- 
nomic region in the world. Taken to- 
gether they are doubling real gross na- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tional product every 12 years, with 
some of the fastest achieving this 
doubling every 6 or 7 years. We con- 
duct about one-fourth of our foreign 
trade with East Asia — more than with 
all of Western Europe. U.S. exports to 
the world as a whole grew 19% during 
1978; our exports to East Asia in- 
creased 26%. Included among the 
goods that we receive from Asia in ex- 
change for our exports is about 10% of 
our petroleum imports, a fact that may 
become of increasing importance in the 
wake of recent events elsewhere in the 
world. 

The breadth of our economic re- 
lationships retTects the broad diversity 
of economic circumstances encom- 
passed by this vital region. I have al- 
ready referred to the fundamental im- 
portance of our economic relationship 
with Japan, and many have spoken of 
the challenges and potential benefits 
arising from the entry of China into the 
world economy. 

Our longstanding economic links 
with the developed economies of Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand are also an es- 
sential part of our close friendship with 
those staunch allies in the western 
Pacific. Our trade and investment with 
Taiwan and South Korea are at all-time 
highs. 

ASEAN 

One economic relationship which I 
would especially like to highlight is 
that with the Association of South East 
Asian Nations, which is continuing to 
emerge as a significant factor in the 
world political economy. At its incep- 
tion in 1967 and until a very few years 



MiUtary Bases Agreement 
Ifillt the Philippines 



LETTER TO 
PRESIDENT MARCOS, 
FEB. 16, 1979 

I extend my best wishes to you, President 
Marcos, and to the Philippine people on this 
important occasion marking the first step to- 
ward implementation of the January 7 amend- 
ment to the Military Bases Agreement. 

That amendment emphasized my Govern- 
ment's recognition of full Philippine 
sovereignty over the bases and your Govern- 
ment's willingness, in view of mutual benefits, 
to grant certain facilities for use by American 



armed forces. 

The Philippines and the United States pursue 
the common objectives of advancing world 
peace, regional stability and national independ- 
ence. We have stood together as comrades in 
arms in meeting the major challenges to peace 
in this century. 

It is my hope that the relations between our 
two nations will continue to be inspired by the 
spirit of harmony, understanding and mutual re- 
spect which characterized our recent negotia- 
tions and that our countries' historic ties will 
grow stronger with each passing year. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



April 1979 

ago, tew outside observers believed 
that ASEAN would be successful. Yet 
today the organization commands 
political and economic respect 
throughout the world. No longer do 
leaders of those nations speak simply 
as Thais, Filipinos, Indonesians, 
Malaysians or Singaporeans; they 
speak also as members of ASEAN. 

ASEAN has established relationships 
with Australia and New Zealand, with 
Japan, with the European Economic 
Community, with Canada, and with the 
United States. In August of last year 
Foreign and Economic Ministers from 
the ASEAN countries traveled halfway 
around the world for consultations with 
U.S. officials. They met with the 
President and Vice President, key 
members of Congress, and half of the 
Secretaries of Cabinet Departments, 
tangible evidence of the high-level at- 
tention being given by both sides to 
this growing relationship. The under- 
standings and commitments endorsed 
by that ministerial meeting established 
a broad framework for cooperation that 
is adding a regional dimension to our 
enduring bilateral ties with these old 
friends. 

The ASEAN region is economically 
important to the United States for its 
potential, as well as for present, re- 
lationships. These are among the most 
dynamic economies in the world. 
ASEAN total GNP in 1977 was nearly 
$100 billion. Average annual growth 
rates since 1968 have ranged from 6% 
to ]]%. The ASEAN economy sup- 
ports a total population of 245 
million — greater than that of South 
America — on a land area twice that of 
the European Economic Community. 
Average per capita GNP is over $350, 
ranging from $2,700 in Singapore to 
$240 in Indonesia, the world's fifth 
most populous nation. 

We are counting on American busi- 
ness to act energetically to realize the 
potential of ASEAN and especially to 
increase two-way trade both in terms of 
level and of U.S. market share. We 
must strive to expand our commercial 
relations in an area which is outward- 
looking and committed to close coop- 
eration with the Western countries. We 
in government will assist, as directed 
by the President's export expansion 
policy. Highly successful visits to the 
ASEAN countries last fall by the 
Chairman of the Export-Import Bank 
and an Overseas Private Investment 
Corp. investors mission helped spot- 
light the promising opportunity that 
awaits U.S. business. The inauguration 
of the U.S. section of the U.S. -ASEAN 
Business Council in Washington 2 
weeks ago is a hopeful sign. 



Trade and Adjustment Problems 

It is clear that 1979 will see the Ad- 
ministration engaged in extensive con- 
sultations with both the Asian countries 
and the Congress over problems of 
trade and adjustment, particularly as 
concern Japan and the advanced de- 
veloping countries of Asia. 

Congress will be faced with some of 
these problems when issues related to 
the multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTN) come before you. The coming 
year is a particularly critical year for 
the.se trade-related problems. While we 
have reached agreements with most in- 
dustrial nations, during this year we 
must still reach agreement with East 
Asian less developed countries on re- 
ductions in trade barriers through the 
MTN; we must present MTN legisla- 
tion before Congress; and we must deal 
with a protectionist sentiment that ap- 
pears stronger than at any time in re- 
cent memory. 

For all to realize the gains from 
trade, we must protect an open and lib- 
eral world trading order. This policy 
brings increased benefits and chal- 
lenges, and we must strengthen the 
ability of the United States to gain its 
full share of the benefits. 

To this end the President has em- 
barked the United States on a campaign 
to increase the competitiveness of U.S. 
exports and to enable us to maintain 
and expand our position in foreign 
markets. This campaign will be espe- 
cially important in Asia. For it to suc- 
ceed will take some adjustment of at- 
titude and management from both the 
U.S. Government and U.S. business. If 
either the United States or other coun- 
tries resist imports through overt or in- 
direct protectionist devices, then the 
system will not work to full advantage 
of all, and we will all be hard put to 
prevent protectionist retaliation. 

Economic Assistance 

The United States can take great 
pride in the role its economic assist- 
ance has played in supporting sound 
and equitable growth in the region. The 
more advanced of the developing 
economies have largely outgrown the 
need for bilateral development assist- 
ance, including two of the star 
graduates of U.S. aid programs — 
Korea and Taiwan. 

Our bilateral economic assistance is 
currently concentrated on a trio of the 
less advanced Southeast Asian 
market-economy nations — Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. In our 
FY 1980 program for these countries 
on which Administration officials will 



23 

testify in detail later, we are seeking a 
total of $124.4 million in development 
assistance (exclusive of $20 million in 
SSA for the Philippines) and $154.1 
million PL-480 food aid. 

Despite impressive achievements, 
Indonesia's development needs remain 
formidable. An estimated 60% of the 
population of 140 million live at a level 
that does not provide basic human 
needs. Underemployment and un- 
employment are as high as 30-40%. 
Our bilateral assistance focuses on as- 
sisting the Government of Indonesia's 
determined efforts to increase agricul- 
tural productivity; to improve incomes, 
employment opportunities, and living 
conditions in rural areas; to stem 
population growth; and to train criti- 
cally needed personnel. PL-480 con- 
tinues to meet critical food shortages 
and provides local currency for In- 
donesia's development budget. 

The emphasis in our bilateral aid 
programs in the Philippines and Thai- 
land is on helping to assure that the 
benefits of development are extended 
to the rural poor. We are assisting the 
Government of the Philippines, for 
example, in projects targeted on 
small-scale rice and corn farmers and 
programs to improve health services 
and nutrition in rural areas. Food 
through PL-480 will permit more 
maternal-child and student feeding 
programs and benefit thousands of 
malnourished Filipinos. 

We are giving special attention in 
Thailand to encouraging an integrated 
approach in programs to raise the in- 
comes and living standards of subsis- 
tence farmers, squatters, and hill 
tribes. This assistance gives tangible 
evidence of our support for the strong 
commitment the Government of Prime 
Minister Kriangsak has given to ex- 
panding rural development efforts. 

A request for $40 million for PL-480 
sales to Korea is linked to a previous 
commitment which we hope to com- 
plete in FY 1981. We are also engaged 
on a regional basis in modest develop- 
ment cooperation efforts with the South 
Pacific island countries and ASEAN. 

Conclusion 

Our military position is strong, and 
we have stable and progressive friends 
and allies in the region. The dark 
clouds in the Asian sky result from 
conflicts between the Communist states 
in the area — conflicts which have 
dangerous potential but which we 
are working to see do not expand to 
reach that potential. The economic 
picture is likewise generally bright, 
although there are dark spots and chal- 



24 



Security Assistance Report 
on Koreiif 1978 



Secretary Vance, on behalf of the 
President, transmitted the following 
report on January 15, 1979, to Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House 
of Representatives: John C. Stennis, 
Chairman of the Senate A rmed Services 
Committee: and Frank Church. Chair- 
man ad interim of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. 

INTRODUCTION 

This report is submitted in accord- 
ance witii Section 668 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. as amended. 

This is the third in a series of annual 
reports submitted under section 668; 
the information provided herein is sup- 
plemental to that provided in the two 
earlier reports. The 1976 report had a 
historical focus, describing the U.S. 
military role in Korea since 1945 and 
summarizing U.S. security assistance 
during that period. The 1977 report 
provided an account of President Car- 
ter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground 
combat forces from Korea, the consid- 
erations on which the decision was 
based, and an assessment of the impli- 
cations of the decision for the preser- 
vation of peace and stability in the 
Northeast Asia region and the con- 
tinued deterrence of North Korea ag- 
gression. 

The preface of this 1978 report pro- 
vides a brief overview of the current 
military situation on the Korean Penin- 
sula and the U.S. policies designed to 
assist the Republic of Korea in coun- 
tering the threat from the North. Part I 
reviews the progress made by Korea 
over the past year in modernizing its 
armed forces. Part II describes the role 
of the United States in mutual security 
efforts with the Republic of Korea, and 
part III reports on the progress of steps 
designed to implement the President's 



decision gradually to withdraw U.S. 
ground combat forces from the penin- 
sula in a way that will not be de- 
stabilizine. 



PREFACE 

The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) oc- 
cupies about half the land area of the 
peninsula and contains about two-thirds 
of the population. Over the past 15 
years, it has made impressive economic 
progress by pursuing a strategy of eco- 
nomic growth linked with the world 
trading community. During this period 
it has put comparatively little emphasis 
on the development of defense indus- 
tries, choosing instead to rely for the 
most part on the United States for de- 
fense materiel requirements, initially 
through grant military assistance and 
more recently through the foreign 
military sales (FMS) program. Of late 
the R.O.K. has turned its attention to 
the development, with U.S. assistance, 
of indigenous defense industries, and 
greater emphasis will be given to this 
effort in the future. 

In sharp contrast, the Communist re- 
gime in the North has concentrated its 
development efforts on heavy industry, 
with particular emphasis on military- 
related sectors. Under the cloak of 
secrecy and isolation which charac- 
terizes North Korean society, it has de- 
veloped and deployed a massive mili- 
tary capability for a nation of its size, 
including domestically produced tanks, 
armored vehicles, long-range self- 
propelled artillery, and a wide range of 
ships and submarines. North Korea 
continues to increase its offensive 
strength through, among other things, 
the production of modern weapons and 
the expansion of its military industry. 

The U.S. commitment to Korean se- 



Assistance Proposals (cont'd) 

lenges which will make the next year a 

crucial one in our relations with Asia. 

The past year has seen events of 
lasting historical significance that un- 
derscore the unalterable position of the 
United States as an Asian and Pacific 
power. I do not have to proclaim that 
fact of geopolitical life which is by 
now unmistakable to all. To maintain 
our favorable position in Asia will re- 
quire constant and imaginative policy 



formulation and management. In that 
regard I look forward to continued con- 
sultation and cooperation with the 
Congress, and particularly with this 
committee. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

''For full text, see Bulletin of Mar. 1979, 
p. 21. 



Department of State Bulletin|i 

curity and the U.S. and Korean com-! 
bined forces on the peninsula have pro-' 
vided an effective deterrent to North 
Korean attack. Further, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment has concluded, as noted in the 
1977 report, that the decision to with- 
draw U.S. ground combat forces, if 
carefully phased over a 4-5 year period 
and accompanied by appropriate meas- 
ures to strengthen and modernize 
R.O.K. forces, can be implemented 
without endangering the peace and sta- 
bility of the region. This conclusion 
remains valid. In close consultation 
with Congress, the R.O.K. and our 
other Asian allies, however, we will 
continually assess changes in the situa- 
tion, and our plans will be adjusted if 
developments so warrant. 

We must remain alert to changing 
circumstances. Intelligence analysis 
currently in progress has led to the 
conclusion that the North Koreans are 
substantially stronger than had been 
estimated earlier. Because the analysis 
is still in progress, it is premature to 
discuss details of the new estimates. 
When the new estimates are ready they 
will, of course, be factored into our 
on-going assessment of conditions on 
the peninsula. The extraordinary se- 
crecy of North Korean society has made 
it difficult to detect increases in the 
number of men under arms or their de- 
ployment. North Korea's precise mili- 
tary intentions are also extraordinarily 
difficult to ascertain on a timely basis. 
We can anticipate that North Korea 
will continue to develop and operate its 
defense establishment in a surreptitious 
way. 

Because the military threat from 
North Korea remains serious, and 
given Pyongyang's intransigent posture 
and rejection of repeated R.O.K. ini- 
tiatives to decrease tensions on the 
peninsula, the United States must con- 
tinue to assist the R.O.K. in its efforts 
to strengthen its own defense 
capabilities. Coupled with the direct 
U.S. commitment to defend the 
R.O.K., our assistance is designed to 
make clear to North Korea and others 
that any attack will meet with an im- 
mediate and strong response, that no 
armed attack can succeed, and that 
constructive, peaceful cooperation in 
the search for means of reducing ten- 
sions on the peninsula is the only 
fruitful approach to the Korean ques- 
tion. 



I. Progress Made by the R.O.K. 
to Modernize Its Forces 

The 5-year force improvement plan 
(FIP) initiated by President Park in 
mid- 1 975 is now more than half com- 



Apiil 1079 



25 



pleted. As of" September 1978 the Ko- 
ledP Government hud allocated funds 

, for about 65% of the $5 billion ear- 
marked for FIP. About a third of the 
124 projects involved have been com- 
pleted, and most of the remaining proj- 
ects are in active stages of development 
and/or acquisition. As a part of the 

IFIP, the R.O.K. is proceeding with a 
vigorous program to expand domestic 
defense production and to decrease re- 
liance on foreign sources of supply and 
ultimately to reduce the defense sec- 
iiHs demands on scarce foreign ex- 
change resources. The drive toward 
greater self-sufficiency is being pur- 

j sued, however, with the understanding 
and the assurance that the United States 
will continue to serve as a source for 
defense supplies and equipment, par- 
ticularly of major sophisticated 
weapons systems required to counter 
North Korea's unremitting efforts to 
strengthen its offensive capabilities still 
further. 

Between 1970 and 1978 Korean 
GNP grew at a compound annual rate 
of more than \07c in real terms, and the 
share of this expanding output devoted 
to defense rose over the same period 
from 4% to 6.5%. (In current prices 
defense spending increased from $300 
million in 1970 to $2.6 billion in 
1978.) In 1979 defense expenditures 
are expected to increase again in abso- 
lute terms, but the defense share of 
GNP is expected to be held to about 
6.2%. This reflects efforts by the gov- 
ernment to balance the budgetary re- 
quirements of the essential defense 
sector against those of other important 
programs, including industrial de- 
velopment, housing, education, and 
health. 

We continue to believe that the FIP 
is economically feasible and consistent 
with U.S. security objectives. The 
continuing high rate of growth of the 
Korean economy will enable the gov- 
ernment to support the local currency 
costs of the plan without diverting an 
unacceptably large share of resources 



from economic growth and social pro- 
grams, the critical importance of which 
we endorse. However, the R.O.K. may 
have difficulty in providing foreign ex- 
change in the quantities and at the 
times required to cover all the costs of 
needed major weapons systems, such 
as aircraft and improved antiarmor ca- 
pability. With this in mind, we have 
informed the Korean Government that 
we anticipate requesting from the Con- 
gress again in FY 1980 authorization 
for substantial foreign military sales 
credits. These credits will be an im- 
portant supplement to the far larger 
amount supplied directly by the 
R.O.K. U.S. plans to withdraw ground 
combat forces from the R.O.K. have 
given rise to some restructuring of the 
FIP and will be a critical element in the 
formulation of a second 5-year FIP for 
1981-86. 

In 1978 the R.O.K. placed new FMS 
orders for about $390 million worth of 
defense equipment, including the fol- 
lowing major items: AIM 7-E missiles, 
tank upgrade kits, precision guided 
munitions, and communications 
equipment for command and control 
networks. In addition, the R.O.K. pur- 
chased large quantities of spare parts 
and maintenance packages for equip- 
ment already in its inventory. Major 
equipment deliveries during the year 
included TOW antitank missiles, 
UH-H helicopters, an additional de- 
stroyer. Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles. 
F-4 and F-5 aircraft, and air-to-air 
missiles. The R.O.K. procured from 
U.S. forces in Korea two additional 
Nike-Hercules batteries. 

The program to develop and expand 
the defense industries sector has made 
impressive strides in the past year. A 
major achievement was the opening of 
an integrated facility for rebuilding 
older M-48 tanks, upgrading them to 
the M-48A3 and M-48A5 configura- 
tions. The R.O.K. Air Force's mainte- 
nance depot has increased its capacity 
and level of technical skill, and consid- 
erable gains have been made in the 



NATIONAL AND DEFENSE BUDGETS 

1970-79* 
{% OF GNP) 



70 



71 



72 



73 



74 



75 



76 



77 



78 



79 



National 
Defense 



17 

4 



17.3 
4.3 



18.2 
4.5 



13.3 
3.7 



15.6 
4.5 



19.5 
6.2 



18 
6.2 



18.6 
6.5 



18.5 
6.2 



*Data are the latest published by the R.O.K. Economic Planning Board. Differences 
from data presented in previous reports may be due to differences in totals being compared 
(e.g.. estimated, preliminary, or final GNP) and to the time at which the data base was 
selected (e.g., original budget submission, original budget plus supplemental, or actual 
expenditures). 



production of artillery and components 
to rehabilitate artillery already in the 
R.O.K. inventory. Production con- 
tinues of air defense weapons, light 
helicopters, infantry weapons, and 
naval patrol craft. 



II. Role of the U.S. 

in Mutual Security Efforts 

The central contribution of the 
United States to mutual security efforts 
in Korea lies in its treaty commitment 
to Korean security. This commitment is 
unaffected by the decision gradually to 
withdraw U.S. ground combat forces. 
The United States and Korea will con- 
tinue to work together to maintain a 
strong deterrent. U.S. forces will only 
be withdrawn in a way which does not 
reduce the overall combat capability, 
and important U.S. components — 
including Air Force, logistic, and in- 
telligence capability — will remain in 
Korea. 

In 1978 the United States also pro- 
vided support to Korean security ef- 
forts in the form of FMS cash sales. 
FMS credits amounting to $275 mil- 
lion, and a $1.5 million military edu- 
cation and training grant. This financial 
assistance has been in support of the 
FIP. and it is anticipated that the Ko- 
rean requirement for such assistance 
will extend through FY 1981 when the 
FIP is expected to be completed. 

The Congress acted in 1978 to au- 
thorize the transfer to R.O.K. forces of 
defense articles from withdrawing 
units. That authorization was essential 
to our ability to implement the with- 
drawal program in a way that is not de- 
stabilizing to the peninsula or the re- 
gion. The transfer of equipment will 
take place over the several years of the 
withdrawal process. The Congress also 
authorized provision of defense serv- 
ices, including training related to the 
transfer. 

Another major U.S. contribution to 
mutual security efforts in the next sev- 
eral years will be to support the transi- 
tion of the greater defense burden to 
Korean forces as U.S. ground combat 
forces are withdrawn from the R.O.K. 
It is essential that U.S. and Korean of- 
ficials at all levels work together to in- 
sure that the combination of R.O.K. 
forces and those remaining U.S. ele- 
ments retain at least the same combat 
capability as forces now in the R.O.K. 
To do this. Korean personnel must be 
trained, in some cases for extended 
periods, either in the United States or 
with U.S. or R.O.K. units in Korea, in 
sufficient time to take over U.S. 
weapons and equipment to be trans- 
ferred. 



26 



U.S. security assistance to Korea 
continues to emphasize the develop- 
ment of a modern resource manage- 
ment system, iceyed to Korean needs, 
embracing the fields of planning, pro- 
curement, logistics, education, and 
defense research. Particular emphasis 
has been placed on management infor- 
mation and quality assurance to facili- 
tate decisionmaking by R.O.K. defense 
officials at all levels and to aid in the 
development of the indigenous Korean 
defense effort along balanced, rational, 
and cost-effective lines. As the R.O.K. 
defense structure becomes more com- 
plex, such skills are essential both 
within the defense establishment and to 
insure smooth working relationships 
with the industrial sector. 



III. Actions to Implement 
the Withdrawal Program 

On April 21, 1978, the President an- 
nounced a modification of the with- 
drawal schedule described in the 1977 
report. The revision affected the first 
phase of the withdrawal schedule, in- 
volving 6,000 men, which is now 
scheduled to be implemented in 1978 
and 1979 rather than entirely in 1978. 
By the end of 1978, 3,400 men were 
withdrawn, including 850 from the 2nd 
Infantry Division. The remaining 2,600 
men involved in the first phase are 
scheduled to leave Korea in 1979. 
Their departure will involve transfer to 
Korean forces of equipment and 
weapons for one Honest John 
surface-to-surface missile battalion, 
three antitank companies, and one en- 
gineer battalion. The authorized com- 
bined U.S. force level in Korea by 
January 1, 1980, will be 36,000. 

The President's decision to stretch 
out the implementation of the first 
phase of the withdrawal recognized the 
importance of congressional approval 
of the equipment transfer package to 
the successful implementation of the 
withdrawal. Congress had not yet acted 
at the time of the President's an- 
nouncement but subsequently au- 
thorized the equipment transfer which 
will allow the withdrawal to proceed 
with confidence. The second and third 
increments will be carefully phased to 
maintain an undiminished combined 
U.S. -R.O.K. combat capability 
through the withdrawal period and will 
take account of the ability of R.O.K. 
forces to absorb the equipment being 
turned over to them. 

As previously planned, in November 
the 60 U.S. F-4 aircraft already 
stationed in Korea were augmented by 
the addition of 12 more F-4's. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Visit of Thai 
Prime Minister Kriangsak 



I 



Prime Minister Kriangsak Choma- 
nan of Thailand made an official visit 
to the United States February 4-16, 
1979. While in Washington (February 
4-8), he met with President Carter and 
other government officials. Following 
is the text of a joint press statement is- 
sued on February 7. ' 

At the invitation of the President of the United 
States of America and Mrs. Carter, the Prime 
Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand Kriangsak 
Chomanan and Madame Khunying Virat 
Chomanan are visiting the United States offi- 
cially during the period February 4 to February 
16, 1979. In addition to Washington, D.C., the 
Prime Minister and his party will also extend his 
official travel to New York City, Los Angeles, 
and Honolulu. 



The President's invitation to the Prime 
Minister was extended last May by Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale during his visit to Thailand and 
Southeast Asia. 



Purpose and Signiricance 

The President welcomed the Prime Minister 
recognizing particularly the long and close rela- 
tions between the United States and Thailand. 
The two countries have had diplomatic contact 
for nearly a century and a half and the fabric of 



U.S. and Thai relations has been particularly 
close for over 30 years. 

The visit enabled the two leaders to discuss 
directly recent events in Asia and Southeast Asia 
and the efforts of the two governments to pursue 
regional peace and stability. The President was 
able to hear first-hand views from one of the 
leaders of ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations], a dynamic organization recog- 
nized internationally as dedicated to peace, sta- 
bility, and economic growth in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN has the active support of the United 
States as well as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, the EEC [European Economic Commu- 
nity], and other nations. 

The Meetings 

The President reviewed the U.S. role as an 
Asian and Pacific power and noted recent de- 
velopments, including the normalization of U.S. 
relations with China and the new agreement on 
U.S. bases in the Philippines, which contribute 
constructively to the future of the region. 

The Prime Minister outlined his view of cur- 
rent developments in Indochina and the policies 
which the Thai Government is pursuing to sup- 
port a peaceful system of independent states in 
the region, a goal which the United States 
shares. He welcomed U.S. relations with China 
as a positive contribution. Both the Prime 
Minister and the President agreed on the impor- 
tance of an independent Cambodia to regional 
stability. 



Before the end of 1978, the United 
States and R.O.K. inaugurated the 
R.O.K. -U.S. Combined Forces Com- 
mand (CFC). The Commander in 
Chief, CFC, who is also CINC, United 
Nations Command/Commander U.S. 
Forces Korea, exercises operational 
control of R.O.K. and designated U.S. 
forces in defense of the republic. 
Strategic guidance and direction for the 
CFC is provided by the R.O.K. and 
U.S. national command and military 
authorities through the R.O.K. -U.S. 
Military Committee. The CFC repre- 
sents a significant action which is inte- 
gral to the implementation of the with- 
drawal program. 

We have continued to consult with 
the Korean Government on the military 
threat, the development of R.O.K. 
capabilities to meet the threat, and 
other developments affecting peace and 
stability in the region. In the past year, 
we have expanded joint military exer- 
cises and have provided, in consonance 
with U.S. laws and regulations, sup- 



port to South Korean industry in selec- 
ed areas of defense production. 

We intend, as the withdrawal pro- 
gram proceeds, to sustain an effective 
deterrent to war in Korea based on our 
firm and continuing defense commit- 
ment, assistance to R.O.K. efforts to- 
ward greater self-sufficiency, and with 
constant review of the withdrawal 
process and its effects. North Korea 
remains an intransigent and heavily 
armed adversary. The North continues 
to build up its military arsenal at a rate 
which clearly involves major sacrifices 
for the North Korean people. We will 
continue to support South Korean ef- 
forts to resume the moribund dialogue 
with Pyongyang as well as other initia- 
tives to reduce tensions on the penin- 
sula. But lacking any sign from the 
North that it is willing to revise its con- 
sistently hostile attitude toward the 
R.O.K., we will continue to assist the 
R.O.K. in deterring any efforts by 
Pyongyang to reunify the peninsula on 
its own terms. D 



April 1979 

The President slated that the United States 
supports the integrity of Thailand both in terms 
of the historic US-Thai friendship as well as our 
interest in Thailand as a stable, secure, and 
peaceful nation in Southeast Asia with an im- 
portant role in regional peace and cohesion. He 
confirmed the continuing validity of U.S. com- 
mitments in the Manila Pact. 

The Prime Minister stressed that Thailand's 
policies are based on self-reliance and independ- 
ence. Foreign economic and military assistance 
are important but must be complementary to 
Thailand's own policies and efforts. 

Within the context of an ongoing military as- 
sistance program, the United States will expedite 
items of military equipment already ordered by 
Thailand and has increased military credits 
(FMS) [foreign military sales] for FY 1979. The 
United States will consider sympathetically new 
Thai requests. The President also slated congres- 
sional authorization would be sought for the 
cost-free transfer to Thailand of $11.3 million of 
U.S. owned ammunition currently stored there. 

The two leaders noted the success of Thai- 
land's economic policies, its plan to continue 
rapid and equitable growth policies, and the 
dynamic aspects of the ASEAN region. The 
President was particularly impressed by the 
priority given to rural development during Thai- 
land's 1979 "Year of the Farmer" and con- 
firmed the continuing U.S. supplementary role 
in supporting the new Thai emphasis. 

The Prime Minister welcomed the continuing 
economic interests of the United States and other 
nations in Thailand and ASEAN, particularly 
American investment and other business ac- 
tivities. He noted the favorable business climate 
offered by Thailand to foreign commerce and in- 
vestment and discussed plans to improve the 
situation further. The President welcomed U.S. 
firms contributing to economic growth and trade 
with Thailand and hoped our business relations 
would expand as more American firms become 
aware of the opportunities in Thailand and the 
ASEAN region. 

The Prime Minister of Thailand stressed the 
serious burdens in providing temporary shelter 
and care to Indochinese refugees. He urged the 
international community to take additional steps 
to ease the problem. The President appreciated 
the humanitarian policies of Thailand, outlined 
his commitment to a long-range systematic U.S. 
program of resettlement, and reviewed the con- 

Prime Minister Kriangsak and President 
Carter. 



11 



Anierlean and Japanese interests 
in Southeast Asia 




by David D. Newsom 

Address before the International 
Study and Research Institute, Inc., in 
New York City on January II , 1979. 
Ambassador Newsom is Under Secre- 
tary for Political Affairs. 

1 wish to talk today about the U.S. 
and Japanese relationships with South- 
east Asia from the standpoint of those 
most directly concerned — the nations 
of Southeast Asia. Their perceptions of 
the respective roles and attitudes of the 
United States and Japan are important 
to the shaping of the basic relation- 
ships. 

At the beginning, let me address my 
remarks to the relationship and 
perspectives of the five members of 
ASEAN — the Association of South 
East Asian Nations [Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand]. The nations of In- 
dochina present different and complex 
elements bearing on this subject. I shall 
discuss them separately. 

The United States enjoys a basically 
favorable position in each of the five 
nations of ASEAN. While there have 
been differences with each in the past, 
these are largely minimized today. Our 
relationship with the Philippines is still 
marked by the vestigial feelings of a 
former colonial tie, but our coopera- 
tion remains close. Only last week we 
completed negotiations on the continu- 



tinuing U.S. efforts with other nations to do 
more. 

The President congratulated the Prime Minis- 
ter on current progress to combat narcotics pro- 
duction and trafficking in and through Thailand, 
particularly the creation of innovative crop sub- 
stitution programs. They agreed on the need for 
expanded cooperative efforts in this area of such 
importance to the United States and Thailand as 
well as other affected countries. 

Prime Minister Kriangsak invited President 
Carter to visit Thailand. The President expressed 
pleasure and said he would seek a mutually con- 
venient time. n 



' List of Thai officials accompanying the 
Prime Minister and U.S. officials who partici- 
pated in the meeting with the President omitted 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 12, 1979). For remarks made 
at the arrival ceremony on the South Lawn of the 
White House and an exchange of toasts at the 
state dinner on Feb. 6, see Weekly Compilation 
of Feb. 12, pp. 221 and 226 respectively. 



ation of our military bases in that 
country. 

Indonesia looks to us as a major 
trading partner. We take almost 40% of 
Indonesia's oil exports and are a major 
purchaser of their rubber, tin, and cof- 
fee. Indonesia is disappointed at the 
very slow process of our decision on 
taking their liquefied natural gas as 
another source of energy. 

Our links to Thailand have been 
close throughout the postwar years. We 
are looking forward to the visit of 
Prime Minister Kriangsak to Washing- 
ton next month. 

Singapore and Malaysia are close 
friends. Our business firms have found 
a climate that encourages mutually 
beneficial trade and investment. 

There are also problems. 

U.S-ASEAN Political 
and Military Issues 

On the political side, there is an 
ambivalence toward the United States. 
Consistent with their nonaligned pos- 
ture, the nations of ASEAN do not 
encourage a wider formal security role 
for the United States in the area. 
Malaysia is the primary formulator of 
the idea of a zone of peace, freedom, 
and neutrality in the region. While the 
Filipinos have agreed to the continua- 
tion of our base agreement, they have 
insisted strongly on a much greater as- 
sertion of Philippine sovereignty than 
in the past. 

During the 3'/2 years since the end of 
the Indochina conflict, these five 
countries have adjusted well to the re- 
duction of U.S. military forces in 
Southeast Asia and to their consequent 
need to become more self-reliant. Their 
increasingly close mutual cooperation 
within ASEAN — an economic and 
political but not a military 
organization — has significantly in- 
creased their strength and stability, 
both individually and collectively. 

While eschewing any military re- 
lationship between the United States 
and ASEAN, these nations clearly do 
not wish to see a weakening or with- 
drawal of an American presence, sym- 
bolized largely in the continued activity 
of our 7th Fleet in the waters of the 
region. They regard the intentions of 
the United States essentially as benign 
and have been concerned that, follow- 
ing the collapse in Vietnam, the United 
States would take a less active role in 



28 



Southeast Asia. To the extent that any 
major power needs to play a security 
role in the area, their preference is for 
the United States. 



U.S.-ASEAN 
Economic Issues 

The nations of the area also look to 
the United States as the second largest 
trading partner and second largest pres- 
ent and potential investor. They ex- 
press disappointment in the U.S. at- 
titude toward commodity agree- 
ments — including the common 
fund — which they see not only as 
stabilizing revenues but also as a strong 
hedge against inflation. They re- 
member that 4 years ago the un- 
stabilized price of sugar shot up to 600 
a pound. 

They also express disappointment 
that the private sector of the United 
States does not recognize the potential 
of this rapidly growing and largely pri- 
vate enterprise oriented region. Nor 
does it give sufficient weight to the 
current importance of these markets 
and the vital resources which the region 
has to offer. 

There is a general disappointment, 
too, that U.S. markets are not more 
available for many of the products of 
the ASEAN nations, particularly those 
of their new industries. Indonesia, in 
particular, has regretted that our Fed- 
eral energy authorities are not more 
positive on liquefied natural gas im- 
ports. The congressional ban against 
generalized preferences for countries 
that are members of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries also 
effectively excludes Indonesia from the 
benefits of the generalized preference 
provisions of our Trade Act. 

These economic issues are now 
being addressed in the U.S.-ASEAN 
dialogue. Opened with the U.S.- 
ASEAN economic consultation in 
Manila in September 1977, a highly 
successful second round of the dialogue 
was held in Washington August 3-4, 
conducted at the ministerial level. The 
August meeting involved participation 
by President Carter, Vice President 
Mondale, five U.S. Cabinet officers, 
and 14 ASEAN ministers. The meeting 
established a broad framework for 
growing cooperation between the 
United States and ASEAN, with par- 
ticular emphasis on expanding trade 
and business relations.' 

American business is welcome in the 
area. There is a general feeling that 
U.S. traders and investors have sought 
to respond to local sensitivities and to 
be imaginative and cooperative in 
bringing nationals of the countries into 



their enterprises. Many in Southeast 
Asia see U.S. business, however, as 
less competitive than others, both in 
terms of credit and in terms of price 
and availability. 

Japan-ASEAN Relations 

The ASEAN perception of the 
Japanese is more complicated. There is 
no doubt that, despite the lapse of three 
decades, there are still feelings toward 
the Japanese that date from World War 
II. 

They would not wish to see any 
other nation — including the United 
States — appear to approach Southeast 
Asia through Japan. The nations of the 
area wish to deal directly with key 
nations outside the region. 

They clearly do not wish to see 
Japan rearm and welcomed Prime 
Minister Fukuda's assurances in this 
regard in Manila in 1977. They quietly 
welcome the U.S. -Japan defense treaty 
which makes this unnecessary. 

But, while recognizing this, these 
nations generally feel there is no in- 
dustrialized nation other than Japan 
which can do as well in providing the 
machinery, the expertise, and the 
financing for their development. Still, 
it is clear, as in the case of Indonesian 
liquefied natural gas, that none of these 
countries wish to depend exclusively 
on Japan as the only market for any 
major commodity. They all hope the 
United States will become more rather 
than less competitive. They very badly 
need the United States to act as a bal- 
ance, a counterweight to excessive 
Japanese influence. 

Thus, Japan has nearly 25% of the 
market of the ASEAN states, compared 
to 14% for the United States. In 1977 
Japanese sales to ASEAN totaled $6.9 
billion compared to $3.9 billion from 
the United States. In 1977 the Euro- 
pean Economic Community nosed out 
the United States for the second spot; 
its share of the ASEAN market was 
14.6%. 

The visit of Japanese Prime Minister 
Tanaka to Bangkok and Jakarta in 1974 
was accompanied by riots in both of 
these cities against the Japanese. If one 
grants that, in the Indonesian case at 
least, there were local reasons for the 
riots which had nothing to do with the 
Japanese; the manifestations, 
nevertheless, demonstrated underlying 
feelings toward the Japanese presence. 

Since the Tanakea visit, Tokyo has 
sought to achieve a better understand- 
ing of the region and relate more effec- 
tively to national aspirations. There has 
been an increased tendency on the part 
of the Japanese in several of the coun- 



Department of State Bulletin i 

tries to seek joint ventures with nation- ; 
als of the country. 

Japan was the second entity, after 
the European Economic Community, 
with which the ASEAN nations opened 
an economic dialogue. 

Japan's new Prime Minister, 
Masayoshi Ohira, has already spoken 
of the importance to Japan of Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific and has promised 
to honor earlier Japanese commitments 
to double official development assist- 
ance during the next 3 years. During 
1977 about 60% of Japan's total over- 
seas development assistance was con- 
centrated on Asia — mainly the ASEAN 
countries. 

Japan in recent years has pledged 
substantial help to major projects with 
both political and economic signifi- 
cance in the ASEAN countries. One 
such is the giant Asahan project in 
Sumatra whicn will involve a substan- 
tial hydroelectric and alumina com- 
plex. Japan has committed $1 billion 
to the five ASEAN joint industrial 
projects. 

As with the United States, the na- 
tions of the area are unhappy with Ja- 
pan's failure to reduce trade barriers or 
to give preference to the import of cer- 
tain products of ASEAN nations. In 
October 1978, with 60% of its trade 
deficit with Japan, Thailand considered 
banning Japanese imports. 

Having sketched the way in which 
each nation is seen from the ASEAN 
area, let me say a few words on the 
interrelationship of the United States 
and Japan in the area. 



U.S. -Japan Interrelationship 

Japan and the United States have a 
shared interest in the peaceful de- 
velopment of the nations of the region 
as stable, prosperous, progressive, and 
independent nation states. 

We also share a major interest in in- 
suring that the area is not dominated by 
any outside powers. The security of 
transit routes and access to markets and 
resources is important to us both. The 
access to resources on a reasonable 
basis is vital to Japan. 

The reality of geography, the fact of 
commercial competition, and the influ- 
ence of history mean that these inter- 
ests are separately pursued. That, in no 
way, diminishes the basic common 
interests which underlie our relation- 
ship. 

Given Japan's resource dependency, 
it must naturally place the utmost 
priority on protection of markets and 
sea routes for its oil tankers, access to 
raw materials of the area, and opportu- 
nities for new investment. That Japan 



April 1979 

has nearly half of its overseas invest- 
ment in the Southeast Asia region is 
testimony to Japan's interest in and 
commitment to the region. 

U.S. interests are very similar to 
those of Japan. We seek closer cooper- 
ation with the nations and with 
Japanese interests in several areas, in- 
cluding increased investment, more 
effective economic assistance, energy 
resources, development, and more ex- 
changes in the scientific and cultural 
areas. 

We firmly believe that parallel ef- 
forts by the United States and Japan in 
Southeast Asia will contribute to the 
efforts by the countries of the area 
working toward their own development 
and an improvement in the condition of 
their peoples. 

I have been speaking of the Japanese 
and U.S. relationship to the nations of 
ASEAN. Here the general progress of 
these countries, their true independ- 
ence, and their concentration on their 
own development makes possible the 
kind of mutually beneficial cooperation 
we each seek. 

There are other areas where this is 
less possible. I refer to the Indochinese 
states. 

Indochina. Japan and the United 
States share common concerns over the 
current developments in these states. 
The continuation of conflict, the viola- 
tion of the territory of one state by 
another, the human rights deprivations 
in Kampuchea, and the clear roles of 
outside powers are matters which have 
implications for the peace and security 
of the whole region. 

Japan has, over the past years since 
the end of the Indochinese war, been 
able to exercise greater flexibility in its 
approach, particularly to Vietnam, than 
we. Japan, for example, has estab- 
lished diplomatic relations with Hanoi, 
and its businessmen have been demon- 
strating a keen interest in trade and 
development possibilities of all three 
states. 

We are. of course, restricted in what 
we can do. Talks last year improved 
prospects of normalization with Viet- 
nam, but, under present circumstances, 
we do not anticipate any movement on 
normalization. We had no dealings 
with the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, 
whose human rights policies we con- 
sistently condemned. There seems little 
prospect now for any U.S. relationship 
with Kampuchea in the immediate fu- 
ture. We do have, however, an Em- 
bassy in Laos with a small staff. 

Current events in Indochina have an 
immediate impact on the states of 
ASEAN in two ways. 



The aggressiveness of Vietnam, 
whatever may be the reasons or 
animosities in which the current con- 
flict is based, has raised the concerns 
of the ASEAN nations over the longer 
range ambitions of Hanoi. These con- 
cerns died down after the end of the 
Vietnam war and indications that 
Hanoi was turning its attention to its 
internal reconstruction. That now may 
seem less certain to the nations of 
ASEAN. The degree of concern will 
undoubtedly be reflected in their dis- 
cussions with us, as well as with the 
Japanese. 

Events in Indochina have also re- 
sulted in an unprecedented flow of ref- 
ugees southward to the nations of 
ASEAN. Confronted by numbers of 
refugees far beyond what they might 
have expected, these nations have 
turned to the United States, to Japan, 
and to others for help. Thailand and 
Malaysia are particularly affected. 

The United States has responded by 
taking substantial numbers of refugees 
and by making substantial contribu- 
tions to the funds of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
who is charged with their resettlement. 

Resettlement of Indochinese refugees 
presents a much more difficult problem 
for crowded Japan, but Japan is con- 
tributing financially to the work of the 
High Commissioner. After the United 
States. Japan is the second largest con- 
tributor to the UNHCR. 

The stability of these countries 
neighboring on Vietnam could well be 
affected if we cannot, through cooper- 
ation with many nations, find ways to 
relieve them of this tragic human bur- 
den. The nations of the area face the 
prospect that, conceivably, as many as 
a million persons could leave Vietnam 
and other Indochinese states in the 
course of the coming months. The in- 
ternational community has a serious 
obligation to find ways of dealing with 
such possibilities. 

People's Republic of China. In as- 
sessing the relations of Japan and the 
United States with Southeast Asia, one 
cannot fail to mention the People's Re- 
public of China. Its potential impact on 
this area and on the relationship of 
Japan and the United States to the re- 
gion can only be stated now in question 
form. 

China's need for capital and technol- 
ogy today are as great as those of the 
nations of Southeast Asia. Perhaps 
China, too, in the future will become a 
major element in the political and eco- 
nomic futures of the nations of the 
region. 

China will continue to follow closely 



29 

and to demonstrate an interest in the 
Chinese communities in each country, 
although the present regime in China 
has firmly supported the obligations of 
the overseas Chinese to the countries in 
which they reside. 

The availability of large amounts of 
Chinese oil for markets in the 
Pacific — including both the United 
States and Japan — could have an im- 
pact on Indonesian petroleum sales 
prospects. But this is not regarded as a 
serious problem in the foreseeable fu- 
ture. Chinese may also come to com- 
pete with ASEAN and/or Asians for 
export markets, perhaps in textiles, as 
well as in seeking sources of external 
financing. 

However, our general presumption is 
that the Chinese will continue to sup- 
port the active presence of both Japan 
and the United States in Southeast Asia 
and will also support ASEAN. They 
will be even more inclined to do so in 
view of our own recent decision to 
normalize relations. 

The picture that emerges, there- 
fore, is relatively simple. The five na- 
tions of ASEAN, moving with consid- 
erable success to enhance their de- 
velopment and their prosperity, look to 
the United States and Japan as signifi- 
cant partners in the process. They look 
quietly to the United States as an im- 
portant partner in their security. 

Japan and the United States recog- 
nize this and, in parallel ways — 
acknowledging natural nuances of 
interest — seek to respond. 

All share a concern over events in 
Indochina where continued warfare 
casts a shadow over hopes for a com- 
pletely peaceful Southeast Asia. 

With current limited influence on the 
policies of the Indochina states, both 
Japan and the United States can only 
hope that these nations will come to 
realize that their broad interests are not 
served by prolonged warfare, opening 
the possibilities for the interplay of 
outside powers as well as the post- 
ponement of any real improvement in 
the lives of their peoples. 

There are few areas in the world 
outside Southeast Asia where any two 
major countries recognize and carry 
forward parallel common interest to the 
same extent. Despite differences in the 
area of bilateral trade policies and fu- 
ture growth, here is an area where the 
United States and Japan find common 
ground. We believe it is in our interest 
and in the interest of the nations of the 
area that we continue to do so. D 



'For material on this ministerial meeting, see 
Bulletin of Sept. 1978, p. 19. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin i 



ECO]\OMICS: Americans Stake 
in the World Economy 



by Secretary Vance 

Remarks before the Council on 
Foreign Diplomats at the Department 
of State on February 27, 1979. ' 

The Executive Council on Foreign 
Diplomats has made an important con- 
tribution to our nation's relations 
throughout the world by translating an 
innovative idea into a valuable pro- 
gram. By assisting foreign diplomats to 
expand their American experience, you 
are enabling them to realize the rich- 
ness of our culture, the diversity of our 
people, and the workings of our de- 
mocracy. 

Our support for the council's pro- 
gram is strong and enthusiastic. I want 
personally to express my appreciation 
to all of you for this most important 
effort. 

I want to talk with you this afternoon 
about an issue of great importance to 
our future — America's stake in a 
healthy, outward-looking economy, 
one that is vigorously engaged in trade 
and investment abroad. 

The President has spoken in recent 
days of the challenges of leadership in 
a world undergoing rapid change. 
Much of this change is the product of 
forces with which our nation is quite 
familiar: the determination of people 
around the world to live better lives; 
their drive to participate in the basic 
decisions of their government; and the 
pushes and pulls that often accompany 
modernization. 

No nation — no matter how 
powerful — can always guarantee that 
change will work to its immediate ad- 
vantage. But our strengths as a 
nation — and our ability to thrive in a 
world of change — are unsurpassed. 

• Our military power is strong and 
flexible, and with reasoned increases in 
our defense programs and sound arms 
control measures, we will enhance our 
security. 

• Our position as the leader in the 
search for peaceful resolution of con- 
flict is unchallenged, and we are inten- 
sively engaged in efforts around the 
world to bring peace where there is 
now strife. 

• The way of life of our people, and 
what we believe in as a nation, con- 
tinue to have magnetic appeal around 
the world. 

The foundation on which all these 



rests is a vigorous and healthy national 
economy — one which continues to 
provide expanding opportunity for our 
people and continues to serve as an en- 
gine for creative change around the 
world. 

Increasingly, the health of our 
domestic economy depends upon the 
ability of our private sector to seize 
opportunities for expanding commer- 
cial activity in a healthy world econ- 
omy. 

• One out of every eight manufac- 
turing jobs in the United States depends 
on exports. For every one of those 
jobs, another one — in a supporting 
industry — is created. 

• Exports are one of the fastest 
growing sectors of our economy. In at 
least 42 States, export sales of man- 
ufactured goods grew faster between 
1972 and 1976 than domestic sales. 

• Every third acre of farmland in the 
United States produces for export. 

• Today, one out of every three 
dollars of U.S. corporate profits is de- 
rived from international activities. 

What I have described is the profile 
of a nation whose prosperity depends 
upon a growing world economy and a 
healthy trading and investment climate. 

Let me take a few moments to dis- 
cuss with you Administration programs 
which can help build a climate for sus- 
tained economic growth in the United 
States and abroad — our efforts to fight 
inflation, to promote U.S. exports, and 
to strengthen our economic assistance 
abroad. 

In discussing each, I particularly 
want to stress three basic points. 

First, strong and effective anti- 
inflation and export programs are es- 
sential not only to our domestic pros- 
perity but also to stable growth in the 
world economy which maximizes trade 
and investment opportunities. 

Second, our foreign assistance pro- 
grams serve not only to promote a more 
humane, stable, and equitable world, 
they also create new export markets 
and new sources of global growth. 

Third, while government plays an 
essential role in the advancement of our 
economic objectives — be they domes- 
tic or international — business coopera- 
tion is essential to fight inflation and to 
seize new export opportunities. 



Reducing Inflation , 

Reducing inflation is our top eco- 
nomic priority. It became clear by Oc- 
tober of last year that strong measures 
were necessary to prevent sustained 
inflation at an unacceptably high rate. 
Although the acceleration of inflation 
has not been a major cause of our trade 
deficit — continued high levels of oil 
imports and slow growth abroad have 
been largely responsible — our efforts 
to reduce that deficit and to maintain a 
strong dollar are unlikely to succeed 
unless we can bring inflation under 
control. 

Let me emphasize that the Adminis- 
tration's anti-inflation program does 
not envision putting the economy 
through the wringer of recession. 
Rather, it addresses the problem of in- 
flation through a comprehensive pack- 
age of mutually reinforcing measures 
designed to reduce the inflation rate by 
a percentage point or more this year, 
with further reductions in 1980 and be- 
yond. The tight budget submitted by 
the President — which actually proposes 
a net reduction in existing levels of 
Federal operations and personnel — and 
firm and careful monetary restraint by 
the Federal Reserve Board are impor- 
tant aspects of this program. 

If we tried to control inflation 
through fiscal and monetary policy 
alone, however, we would increase the 
risk of recession with little prospect for 
success in reducing inflation. Restraint 
on the part of labor and business is also 
necessary. Thus our anti-inflation pro- 
gram, as you know, includes a standard 
of 7% or less in annual increases in 
wage and fringe benefits and a standard 
limiting price increases this year to 
one-half of \% below the average rate 
in 1976 and 1977. 

I believe that this program is sensible 
and fair. The Administration is com- 
mitted to seeing that it works. The rec- 
ord of compliance with these guidelines 
so far has been encouraging. I would 
note that we may well have to ride out 
some bad news, such as the recent 
large increase in consumer and 
wholesale prices. But if we can avoid a 
major crop failure or a sharp increase 
in the price of imported oil, we should 
see moderation in the U.S. inflation 
rate this year. 



Promoting Exports 

A successful anti-inflation program 
will also help us to maintain the en- 
hanced competitiveness of our exports 
that has resulted from the depreciation 
of the dollar relative to the Japanese 
yen and the German mark. 



April 1979 

Strong export growth in the months 
and years ahead is essential to reducing 
our large trade deficits and maintaining 
confidence in the dollar. This will re- 
quire substantial and sustained effort 
both by business and government. 

The President has made clear the im- 
portance we attach to export stimula- 
tion by undertaking a series of actions 
to provide greater incentives for ex- 
ports and to reduce disincentives which 
now exist. 

On the incentive side, our national 
export program provides additional 
funds for Export-Import Bank financ- 
ing. It expands programs to help small 
businesses expand into overseas sales. 
The Departments of State and 
Commerce — despite overall net reduc- 
tions in budget and personnel — are ex- 
panding their programs for export pro- 
motion, with particular emphasis on 
small and medium-sized firms. 

In the area of disincentives, the na- 
tional export policy will reduce 
domestic barriers to exports by creating 
a more sensible regulatory environment 
and by clarifying some of the am- 
biguities associated with the enforce- 
ment of certain of our laws. More spe- 
cifically: 

• All agencies will weigh more 
carefully any adverse effect that major 
administrative and regulatory actions 
would have on exports; 

• The Department of State and other 
agencies will take export consequences 
fully into account when we consider 
the use of export controls for foreign 
policy purposes. We will give particu- 
lar attention to the availability of the 
product from other suppliers; and 

• Exporters will be given clearer 
guidelines on the full application of 
U.S. laws relating to foreign bribery, 
antitrust, and environmental matters. 

There will, of course, be times when 
essential security and foreign policy 
interests are overriding — when our 
military security, our interest in halting 
the spread of nuclear weapons and 
slowing the growth of increasingly 
dangerous conventional weapons, our 
effort to fight international terrorism 
and systematic violations of basic 
human rights will require export con- 
trols. These cases, however, should not 
obscure our broad and continuing ef- 
forts to pursue also our national interest 
in expanding exports. 

I want you to know that the State 
Department's Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs is at your service if 
you wish to pose questions about the 
implementation of our laws in this 
area. 

Complementing our domestic efforts 



to improve the competitiveness of our 
exports are our efforts in the multilat- 
eral trade negotiations to increase ex- 
port opportunities. We are now in the 
final stages of these negotiations. We 
expect to resolve the remaining out- 
standing issues by this spring. 

The objective of these negotiations is 
to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to 
trade and to strengthen the overall 
trading system by improving trading 
rules and by developing effective 
mechanisms for settling disputes. 

The nontariff agreements we are 
negotiating represent the first major 
international effort since the creation of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) to curb these trade- 
restricting practices. 

Let me just highlight two important 
pending agreements. First, a code on 
subsidies and countervailing duties 
would impose greater international dis- 
cipline over trade-distorting subsidies, 
define more clearly a country's right to 
take counter measures, and, we hope, 
prevent this contentious issue from 
disrupting relations between friendly 
governments in the future. Second, a 
code on government procurement 
would open up as much as $25 billion a 
year in foreign government markets 
now closed to U.S. exports. 

By reducing trade barriers and im- 
proving trading rules, these agreements 
will create a better environment for ex- 
panding international trade. 

Once the agreements are formally 
signed in Geneva, they will be pre- 
sented to the Congress for approval. 
With the support of the Congress, we 
can move toward a fairer and more 
open trading system and resist a retreat 
to dangerous and self-defeating protec- 
tionism. 



Strengthening Economic Assistance 

As we look at ways to improve the 
performance of our exports, we must 
recognize that the developing countries 
provide our fastest growing markets. 
Between the early 1970's and 1977, 
sales of U.S. goods to developing 
countries, including members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, increased by an average of 
22% per year compared to 15% for 
sales to developed countries. We are 
finding that the economic performance 
of the developing countries is an in- 
creasingly important factor in the 
health of our own economy and those 
of the other industrial countries. 

Our foreign assistance programs can 
make a modest but meaningful contri- 
bution to that economic performance. 
Furthermore, policies to increase pro- 



31 



ductive investment in developing 
countries not only increase our export 
opportunities but in many areas — such 
as food, energy, and raw materials — 
also reduce rising costs for these criti- 
cal commodities. 

I do not mean to suggest that the 
primary objective of our foreign assist- 
ance is export promotion. We seek to 
help nations achieve self-sustaining 
equitable growth, with particular em- 
phasis on meeting the basic needs of 
poor people. We are committed to 
helping developing countries to help 
themselves — to build their national 
capabilities for development. And we 
seek to integrate the developing coun- 
tries more fully and actively into the 
economc system. 

But we must also see our foreign as- 
sistance program not only as an in- 
vestment in the future of others but an 
investment in our own future as well. 

In each of the areas I have men- 
tioned, sound and responsible govern- 
ment policies are essential. But they 
are not sufficient by themselves. There 
must be a genuine partnership between 
the private and public sectors. 

Only with your help can we reverse 
the momentum of inflation. Govern- 
ment can help create the conditions for 
growing international commerce but 
only dynamic and aggressive busi- 
nesses can seek out and take advantage 
of export opportunities. Smaller and 
medium-sized firms, in particular, can 
take fuller advantage of important ex- 
port opportunities that now exist. And 
we need the support of national leaders 
like yourselves for progressive trade 
measures and sensible foreign assist- 
ance programs which will serve our 
national interests. 

With a strong and growing economy, 
with a firm commitment to maintain 
our military strength while we work for 
a more peaceful world, and with the 
vitality we derive from our free insti- 
tutions, I believe we can face the future 
not with fear but with confidence. D 



' Press release 49. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



Economic Report 
oi the President 



The following is an excerpt from the 
President' s annual message to the 
Congress of January 25, 1979, trans- 
mitting the "Economic Report of the 
President . . . Together With the An- 
nual Report of the Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers." ' 



Developments last year reminded us once 
again of the interdependence of our economy 
and those of other nations around the world. Our 
trading partners are looking at our ability to deal 
with our economic problems at home as an indi- 
cator of the strength and leadership they can 
expect from the United States. We will not dis- 
appoint them. 

Nineteen hundred and seventy-eight was a 
year of significant progress in the world econ- 
omy. Real output began to pick up in industrial 
countries other than the United States. Important 
initiatives in the international arena occurred in 
trade policy, in balance of payments adjustment, 
and in financial markets — all influenced by the 
cooperation shown at the Bonn Summit. 

Late 1978 and early 1979 will mark the cul- 
mination of the Tokyo round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. These historic 
negotiations — which began in 1975 and were 
intensified in 1977 — should lead to the first 
comprehensive overhaul of the rules of interna- 
tional trade since the 1960s. 

The need for a revamping of the trading sys- 
tem is clear. Our large foreign trade deficit 
stems in part from a loss of American vitality in 
world markets. But it has also resulted from the 
tariff and nontariff barriers of our trading 
partners. Over the coming years, under a final 
multilateral trade agreement, barriers at home 
and abroad will be reciprocally dismantled. 

During 1979 I will be working closely with 
the Congress to adopt the final multilateral trade 
agreement, along with implementing legislation, 
that will foster robust export growth and free and 
fair competition in world trade under rules that 
are both equitable and economically sensible. 
These measures will provide a framework for 
trade that will enhance our living standards in 
the decade to come. 

In recent years, the United States has had a 
serious balance of payments deficit. Our imports 
surged as we grew rapidly and drew heavily on 
imported oil. Our exports lagged because of 
slow economic growth abroad. These factors 
contributed to a trade deficit rising from about 
$10 billion in 1976 to an annual rate of almost 
$45 billion in early 1978. As a result of the 
sharp increase in our external deficit and the 
acceleration of inflation in the United States, the 
value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets 
fell substantially last year. 



We have taken important steps to correct the 
deficit; 

• In late 1978, Congress enacted the National 
Energy Act. the first comprehensive legislation 
for dealing with our energy problems. The effect 
will be to reduce our oil imports in 1985 by 2.5 
million barrels per day. 

• In 1978, I announced the first phase of a 
National Export Policy. By setting up a 
framework to increase support for exports and 
reduce disincentives to export, we can begin to 
increase our share of world commerce. Funda- 
mental improvement in our trade position is 
critical to a healthy dollar. 

• A strong and effective anti-intlation pro- 
gram has been put into place. An integral part of 
that program consists of monetary and fiscal 
policies that will moderate the rate of economic 
expansion. These actions will help reduce our 
large foreign trade deficit. 

These policies were beginning to bear fruit by 
the end of 1978. Exports today are growing more 
rapidly than the domestic economy. The mer- 
chandise trade deficit declined from a $38- 
billion annual rate in the first half of last year to 
about $32 billion in the latter half of the year. 
Narrowing of the deficit should continue and we 
foresee a marked improvement in the more com- 
prehensive current account measure. 

Nineteen hundred and seventy-eight was also 
a year of unusual instability in international fi- 
nancial markets. In the fall, movements in the 
exchange value of the dollar became very disor- 
derly, and its decline became clearly excessive. 

On November 1 . I announced a series of steps 
to restore order to the foreign exchange markets 
and to correct the excessive decline of the dollar. 
Up to $30 billion in foreign exchange resources 
were assembled by the United States, to be used 
in coordination with other countries utilizing 
their own resources, to protect the dollar's value 
in currency markets. Domestic interest rates 
were raised significantly to help reduce inflation 
and strengthen the dollar in exchange markets. 
And the United States underlined its commit- 
ment to deal with its inflation problem and 
strengthen its underlying economic position. 

These actions have improved the tone of the 
exchange markets and contributed to a rise in the 
value of the dollar. More importantly for the 
longer term, they are helping to create more 
stable conditions in the exchange markets, in 
which the value of the dollar can better reflect 
the fundamental strength of the U.S. economy. 

Progress also was made in 1978 in achieving 
closer economic cooperation among the leading 
industrial nations. I met in Bonn with the leaders 
of the six major industrial countries to discuss 
major economic problems facing us. Out of this 
came a concerted action program to restore 



greater balance and confidence in the interna- 
tional economy and in world financial markets. 
Together, we took the necessary steps to achieve 
those ends — the United States committed itself 
to combat inflation and reduce oil imports. Ger- 
many and Japan to mcrease growth and reduce 
trade surpluses, others to take measures on trade 
or inflation. Only through continued economic 
cooperation and sound policies can we attain the 
goal of full employment and price stability that 
is our ultimate objective. 



Jimmy Carter □ 



'For full text of the message, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 
29, 1979, p. 110. The 306-page report may be 
purchased for $3.50 from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. Remittance must ac- 
company order. 



Waiver of 

Countervailing 

Duties 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JAN. 15 » 

I am today transmitting to the Congress a 
proposal for legislation to extend until Sep- 
tember 30. 1979. the authority of the Secretary 
of the Treasury under Section 303(d) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 to waive the application of 
countervailing duties. The Secretary's author- 
ity to waive the imposition of countervailing 
duties expired on January 2. 1979. Expansion 
of this authority is essential to provide the 
Congress with time to consider the results of 
the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti- 
ations (MTN). Failure to extend this authority 
is likely to prevent the reaching of a conclusion 
to these negotiations and could set back our 
national economic interests. Accordingly, I 
urge that the Congress enact the necessary 
legislation at the earliest possible date. 

As stipulated by the Congress in the Trade 
Act of 1974. negotiation of a satisfactory code 
on subsidies and countervailing duties has been 
a primary U.S. objective in the Tokyo Round. 
We have sought an agreement to improve disci- 
pline on the use of subsidies which adversely 
affect trade. I am pleased to report that in 
recent weeks our negotiators have substantially 
concluded negotiations for a satisfactory 
subsidy/countervailing duty code which in- 
cludes: (1) new rules on the use of internal and 
export subsidies which substantially increase 
protection of United States agricultural and in- 
dustrial trading interests, and (2) more effec- 
tive provisions on notification, consultation 
and dispute settlement that will provide for 



April 1979 



EUROPE: F\ 1980 

Assistance Proposals for 

the Eastern Mediterranean 



hy Matthew Nimetz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on February 28. 1979. Mr. Nimetz is 
Counselor of the Department of State. ' 

1 am pleased to have this opportunity 
to discuss U.S. relations with the 
countries of the eastern Mediterranean 
region and to review the Administra- 
tion's security assistance proposals for 
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus for fiscal 
year 1980. 

The past year has seen a number of 
important developments in our bilateral 
relationships with the countries and 
within the region itself. Most of these 
developments have been positive, al- 
though the major problems of the area 
remain a considerable distance from 
solution. 

The goals of U.S. policy remain 
much as those stated by Secretary 
Vance when he appeared before the full 
committee almost a year ago: to 
strengthen our important bilateral re- 
lationships with Greece and Turkey; to 
strengthen NATO's southern flank; and 
to help in the search for a solution to 
the Cyprus problem. 

Since Congress authorized the Presi- 
dent to lift the arms embargo on Turkey 
we have sought to rebuild our relation- 
ships in the area and to help the parties 
confront the fundamental problems of 



the region. Recent developments in 
Iran and Afghanistan have created an 
area of instability to the east of the re- 
gion and made our tasks both more 
difficult and more urgent. These re- 
gional developments spotlight the im- 
portance of Greece and Turkey in the 
NATO alliance and give us an even 
greater incentive to help both countries 
in their efforts to maintain strong, 
vigorous, pro-Western democratic 
systems. 

In dealing with the region in the 
early post embargo period, we have 
sought to follow an evenhanded policy 
toward Greece and Turkey to improve 
our relationships with both important 
NATO allies. We have also actively 
sought, in the months since the lifting 
of the embargo, to facilitate a new 
round of intercommunal negotiations 
on Cyprus. Such a patient, steady, and 
forward-looking policy in the region 
will pay great dividends. 

The Administration recognizes that 
the International Security Assistance 
Act of 1978 contains an important 
statement of the principles which help 
guide U.S. policy in the eastern 
Mediterranean. In his letter transmit- 
ting the security assistance authoriza- 
tion bill for fiscal years 1980 and 1981 , 
Secretary Vance, on behalf of the 
President, has made the certification 
required by Section 620(C)(d) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, that requests for security as- 



timely resolution of disputes involving trade 
subsidies in international trade. 

My Special Representative for Trade Negoti- 
ations has informed me that negotiations on 
almost all MTN topics have been substantially 
concluded, and that those agreements meet 
basic U.S. objectives. However, final agree- 
ment is unlikely unless the waiver authority is 
extended for the period during which such 
agreements and their implementing legislation 
are being considered by the Congress under the 
procedures of the Trade Act of 1974. 

Under current authority, the imposition of 
countervailing duties may be waived in a spe- 
cific case only if, inter alia, "adequate steps 
have been taken to eliminate or substantially 
reduce the adverse effect" of the subsidy in 
question. This provision and the other lim- 
itations on the use of the waiver authority 



which are currently in the law would continue 
in effect if the waiver authority is extended. 
Thus, U.S. producers and workers will con- 
tinue to be protected from the adverse effects of 
subsidized competition. 

A successful conclusion to the MTN is es- 
sential to our national interest, as well as the 
continued growth of world trade. If the waiver 
authority is not extended, such a successful 
conclusion will be placed in serious jeopardy. 
Accordingly, I urge the Congress to act posi- 
tively upon this legislative proposal at the ear- 
liest possible date. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 22, 1979. 



33 



sistance for Greece and Turkey are 
consistent with the principles set forth 
in the act. A detailed explanation of the 
certification is set out in the country 
program documents, but I will address 
many of the same points in this state- 
ment. 

Turkey 

The lifting of the embargo by Presi- 
dent Carter on September 26, 1978, as 
authorized by the Congress, removed 
the primary impediment to improved 
U.S. -Turkish relations. On October 9, 
1978, the Government of Turkey au- 
thorized resumption of suspended U.S. 
activities at military installations in 
Turkey for a 1-year transitional period 
while a permanent agreement is 
negotiated. These negotiations formally 
commenced on January 18, 1979. I can 
inform the committee that our facilities 
in Turkey are now fully operational and 
that we and Turkish military authorities 
are cooperating well. 

As part of our effort to rebuild and 
broaden the bilateral relationship, we 
have had a number of useful exchanges 
with the Government of Turkey. Many 
of you will recall that President Carter 
and Prime Minister Ecevit had good 
discussions during the NATO summit 
last May. More recently, the visit to 
Ankara by Deputy Secretary Christ- 
opher on January 10-11, 1979, pro- 
vided an opportunity to review with 
Prime Minister Ecevit and other offi- 
cials the whole range of issues which 
concern Turkey and the United States. 
We initialed a treaty for the transfer of 
prisoners and agreed to begin negotia- 
tions on an extradition and judicial as- 
sistance agreement as well. 

The Government of Turkey reiterated 
its desire for a just and lasting settle- 
ment of the Cyprus problem. 

I would also note in passing that 
during the recent troubles in Iran, the 
Government of Turkey cooperated in 
facilitating evacuation of American 
citizens from Iran. With the agreement 
of the Turkish authorities, helicopters 
and C-130 aircraft were prepositioned 
at Incirlik Air Base in contingency 
preparations for emergency evacuation. 

The most important problem facing 
the Government of Turkey is its serious 
economic situation. Estimates place the 
current account deficit at over $1.7 
billion in 1978, and it may go as high 
as $2 billion in 1979. Inflation is run- 
ning at about 50%. Unemployment is 
estimated at 15-20%, and industry is 
only working at about half its capacity 
because Turkey cannot pay for needed 
raw material and component imports. 

As you know, this problem was dis- 
cussed at the Guadeloupe summit, and 



34 



as a result the Federal Republic of 
Germany has taken the lead to organize 
help for Turkey on an emergency basis. 
Several friendly countries have indi- 
cated a willingness to help. The United 
States is participating fully in this ef- 
fort. 

Our budget request for Turkey for fis- 
cal year 1980 is for $200 million in 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits 
and $2 million international military 
education and training (IMET) for a 
total military assistance program of 
$202 million. We are also requesting 
$98 million in economic supporting as- 
sistance to assist Turkey with its criti- 
cal balance-of-payments problem. 

The proposed 1980 military assist- 
ance program will help assist the Tur- 
kish forces to meet their NATO defense 
obligations. Turkey needs continued 
military assistance to conduct an or- 
derly program of force modernization 
and rationalization to meet its NATO 
defense commitments. There is also 
significant need for support equipment 
and replenishment of spare parts in- 
ventories, which have been seriously 
depleted in recent years. The $200 
million FMS financing program will 
also have a beneficial impact on the 
supportability of current equipment and 
will make a limited contribution to the 
program for force modernization. 

IMET is an extremely valuable pro- 
gram. In addition to providing needed 
training to Turkish personnel, it en- 
hances contacts and communication 
between Turkish and U.S. military per- 
sonnel. 

Another important result of such 
programs is the rebuilding of a con- 
structive dialouge between the officials 
responsible for foreign and defense 
policy questions in our two nations, 
This dialogue had all but stopped dur- 
ing the embargo period. Channels of 
communication are now being reopened 
and old habits of cooperation re- 
learned. The fruits of such dialogue 
will be a stronger NATO in which 
U.S., Turkish, and other allied forces 
play complementary roles and in which 
scarce resources are more wisely used. 

Because of the difficult economic 
circumstances which I mentioned, we 
believe it is extremely important for the 
United States, in conjunction with 
others, to support Turkey's efforts to 
strengthen its economy. Economic re- 
form measures are critical to the solu- 
tion of Turkey's problems and to assure 
that assistance is well used. We also 
believe continuing consultations with 
the International Monetary Fund are 
important. 

Our assistance, along with that from 
other nations as well as from private 
and international financial institutions, 
will help provide needed resources and 



Department of State Bulletin 



llih Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JAN. 29, 1979' 

In accordance with the provision.s of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following re- 
port on progress made during the past 60 days 
toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution 
of the Cyprus problem. 

During this reporting period, further inten- 
sive efforts have been made to bring the two 
Cypriot communities back to the negotiating 
table for serious and sustained talks under the 
auspices of Secretary General Waldheim. The 
substantive suggestions that the U.S., the U.K. 
and Canada made available to the two sides and 
to the United Nations on November 10 ap- 
peared to have stimulated the negotiating proc- 
ess and were recognized as constructive by sig- 
nificant (although not all) elements in Cyprus, 
Turkey and Greece. In the context of recent 
developments — especially the new atmosphere 
created by the lifting of the arms embargo on 
Turkey, the U.S.-Canadian-U,K. suggestions, 
the United Nations debates, and a growing in- 
ternational consensus for a negotiated 
settlement — Secretary General Waldheim sub- 
mitted to the two Cypriot parties a draft United 
Nations formula for the resumption of negotia- 
tions. As of the date of this report, it appeared 
that both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were 
seriously and sympathetically considering the 
Secretary General's proposal. 

The Government of Turkey has taken a con- 
structive attitude towards these efforts to bring 
about a resumption of the intercommunal nego- 
ations. Prime Minister Ecevit has publicly af- 
firmed that the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to 
return to the table, and he has indicated that 
they could accept the suggestions of November 
10 as an aid to negotiation if the Greek Cyp- 
riots were prepared to do likewise. During a 



meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Chris- 
topher in Ankara on January II, Mr. Ecevit em- 
phasized his strong interest in seeing a resump- 
tion of the intercommunal talks and expressed 
the hope that some way for doing this could 
soon be found. 

At the time of my last report, the United Na- 
tions Security Council was meeting at the re- 
quest of the Government of Cyprus to consider 
the Cyprus issue. On November 27. the Coun- 
cil adopted a resolution by consensus that 
called upon the two Cypriot parties to cooper- 
ate in the implementation of Security Council 
resolutions on Cyprus '"within a specific 
time-frame" and urged that intercommunal 
negotiations be resumed. The Secretary Gen- 
eral was asked to report on both these aspects 
by May 30, 1979. The United States fully sup- 
ports the goals of this resolution. 

This Administration warmly welcomes the 
initiatives that Secretary General Waldheim has 
taken and is continuing to take to bring about 
sustained and productive negotiations on Cyp- 
rus. We have been encouraged by recent de- 
velopments, and hope very much that a re- 
sumption of the talks will prove possible in the 
near future. The U.S.-Canadian-U.K. sugges- 
tions of November 10 have served a useful pur- 
pose in generating some of this forward move- 
ment and in stimulating fresh thinking on the 
substance of the problem, and it is our expec- 
tation that they will be actively considered in 
the negotiations. 

A copy of Secretary General Waldheim's 
comprehensive report of December I to the Se- 
curity Council on the United Nations operation 
in Cyprus is attached. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 5. 1979. 



impetus to support Turkey's stabiliza- 
tion efforts. While the proposed eco- 
nomic assistance is not dramatically 
large, especially when compared to 
Turkey's immediate balance-of- 
payments needs, we believe such sup- 
port will constitute an important further 
step in helping Turkey deal with its 
economic problems. 

We intend to provide our economic 
assistance on terms appropriate to Tur- 
key's present circumstances with a re- 
payment period of 20 years, including 
a 5-year grace period and an interest 
rate of 5%. 

The total FY 1980 U.S. assistance 
program is designed to support defense 
and economic measures by the Turkish 



Government which will strengthen 
NATO's southern flank and support 
democracy in a long-time ally. The 
maintenance of Turkey as a strong 
democratic NATO ally in the eastern 
Mediterranean is obviously important, 
not only in itself but also because an 
improved U.S. -Turkish relationship, as 
is developing in the post embargo 
period, can contribute over time to re- 
gional harmony and to other U.S. and 
Western interests. 

Greece 

In the past year, our relations with 
Greece continued to improve steadily. 
They are characterized by maturity and 



April 1979 

a continuing, positive dialogue. We 
support firmly Greek democracy and 
the strengthening of Greece's ties with 
the West. 

The most important bilateral consul- 
tations during the past year were those 
between the President and Prime 
Minister Karamanlis in May and more 
recently a visit by Deputy Secretary 
Christopher to Athens last October. 1 
accompanied the Deputy Secretary and 
participated in his discussions with 
Prime Minister Karamanlis and other 
Greek leaders. The Greek leaders ap- 
preciate our efforts to facilitate the re- 
turn of their forces to the integrated 
military structure of NATO. The Greek 
Government also welcomed and en- 
couraged our efforts to help achieve a 
just Cyprus settlement. 

We continue to have an ongoing and 
positive defense relationship with 
Greece. Our facilities in Greece con- 
tinue to operate with the full coopera- 
tion of the Greek authorities; 6th Fleet 
ships are making regular calls at Greek 
ports, and we have had an exchange of 
high-level military visits. 

We have also sought to broaden our 
relationship to include more collabora- 
tion in cultural affairs, scientific and 
technological exchanges, and expanded 
economic and commercial ties. Agree- 
ments have been signed between the 
National Science Foundation and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
their Greek counterpart agencies. At 
the request of the Government of 
Greece, we are now examining the pos- 
sibility of the negotiation of an agree- 
ment to coordinate and expand this 
type of cooperation. We believe this is 
especially important because while we 
have had a multiplicity of contacts and 
cooperation with Greece in many 
fields, public attention has tended to 
focus almost exclusively on political 
and security issues. 

The strength of Greece's commit- 
ment to democracy since 1974 and the 
strong economic growth it has enjoyed 
have given the country a new confi- 
dence in international relations. 
Greece's accession to the European 
Community will strengthen this process 
as will Greek reintegration into 
NATO's military structure. As a 
iTiember of the NATO alliance, we 
have been actively involved in ongoing 
efforts to arrange for the reintegration 
of Greek military forces into NATO on 
a basis satisfactory to Greece and the 
alliance. 

The security assistance program we 
are proposing for fiscal year 1980 
would provide $158 million in FMS 
credits and $1.8 million in IMET for a 
total military assistance program of 
$159.8 million. 



The proposed program will assist 
Greece in fulfilling its NATO obliga- 
tions and help provide for Greece's 
self-defense. The program also is a 
continuing indication of U.S. support 
for a democratic Greece. It has also 
been formulated with a view to 
strengthening the southeastern flank of 
NATO at a time of particular concern 
in that region. In sum, the program for 
Greece will be fully consistent with the 
principles of the International Security 
Act of 1978 and will make an impor- 
tant contribution to the defense posture 
of a key ally. 

Cyprus 

With respect to Cyprus, the principal 
focus of our policy continues to be the 
promotion of a just and enduring set- 
tlement that will enable all Cypriots to 
live in peace and security and in har- 
mony with one another. This objective 
was embodied in the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act, as amended by the Congress 
last year. 

In our view, the most effective 
means of achieving a mutually satis- 
factory Cyprus settlement is through 
direct negotiations between the two 
Cypriot communities under the aus- 
pices of the U.N. Secretary General; 
hence, the thrust of our efforts over the 
past year has been to promote progress 
by assisting the Secretary General in 
bringing about a resumption of these 
negotiations — which have been sus- 
pended since the spring of 1977 — on a 
sound and sustained basis. 

Unfortunately, I am unable at this 
time to report to you that the negotia- 
tions have resumed. The reasons for 
the continued impasse are complex; no 
one is totally blameless nor totally re- 
sponsible. I can report, however, that 
the United States has been actively in- 
volved, that there has been some 
movement in the right direction in re- 
cent months, and that our efforts are 
continuing. 

Last September I undertook an ex- 
ploratory mission to Cyprus in order to 
obtain a better picture of the attitudes 
of both sides. I met at some length with 
President Kyprianou, Foreign Minister 
Rolandis, and President of the House 
of Representatives Michaelides on the 
one side and with Turkish Cypriot 
leader Denktash and his associates on 
the other. I came away not only with a 
deeper understanding of their substan- 
tive positions on the issues but also 
with a renewed sense that both parties 
were prepared to resume their inter- 
rupted dialogue. 

For this to occur, we concluded that 
a suitable catalyst would be required. 
In October we had the opportunity to 



35 

explore the views of both sides further 
when President Kyprianou and His Ex- 
cellency Mr. Denktash visited the 
United States in connection with the 
U.N. General Assembly. President 
Carter met with President Kyprianou, 
and Secretary Vance met with both 
leaders. 

At the same time, Turkish Prime 
Minister Ecevit made clear his strong 
support for an early resumption of in- 
tercommunal negotiations and indi- 
cated he was prepared to assist in this 
direction. I might also note that in a 
speech before the U.N. General As- 
.sembly on October 3, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Okcun reconfirmed his gov- 
ernment's commitment to withdrawing 
all of its armed forces from Cyprus, 
except those mutually agreed upon by 
the parties concerned, in the context of 
a final settlement. 

Against this background, and in an 
effort to supply the missing catalyst, 
we worked with the British and Cana- 
dian Governments to prepare a series of 
substantive suggestions for com- 
promise formulations on the principal 
issues in dispute. These were submitted 
to both Cypriot parties and to the U.N. 
Secretariat on November 10. Our in- 
tention in taking this step was not, in 
fact, to prescribe a comprehensive so- 
lution to the Cyprus problem; rather, 
we asked that the Cypriot parties accept 
our suggestions as a basis from which 
direct negotiations could be conducted. 

These substantive suggestions of 
ours were — unfortunately, I believe 
— leaked to the press almost as soon as 
we had put them forward, which gave 
them excess publicity and reduced the 
scope for diplomatic activity. All the 
same, they attracted strong and diverse 
international support and were accepted 
for their constructive nature by 
significant — although not all — political 
elements in Cyprus. Greece, and Tur- 
key. Nevertheless it became evident 
before long that both Cypriot parties 
were reluctant to endorse them offi- 
cially. 

After an interval, the Greek Cypriots 
informed us that they could not at this 
time accept these suggestions as a basis 
for talks. Under these circumstances, 
and so as not to lose the favorable 
momentum that had developed. Secre- 
tary General Waldheim moved into the 
forefront of the effort to resume the 
intercommunal talks. After several 
meetings with Cypriot Foreign Minister 
Rolandis in mid-December, the U.N. 
Secretariat drew up a draft negotiating 
agenda, which made clear reference to 
our November 10 suggestions, and 
submitted this to both Cypriot parties 
for their comments. In response, the 
Turkish Cypriots presented on January 



36 



9 a counterdraft embodying their 
views, and on the following day the 
Greek Cypriots indicated that they ac- 
cepted the initial U.N. draft un- 
changed. 

For the past 6 weeks the U.N. Sec- 
retariat has been attempting to revise 
and update its original draft so as to 
achieve a mutually acceptable agenda. 
In our continuing contacts with both 
sides, we have urged them to maintain 
a flexible attitude and to respond posi- 
tively and imaginatively to the ongoing 
U.N. initiative. 

It would be premature for me at this 
stage to assess the prospects for suc- 
cess or failure of this effort to resume 
intercommunal talks on a sound and 
sustained basis. We will continue to 
exert our best efforts in support of the 
Secretary General. Both sides, we be- 
lieve, would welcome meaningful 
negotiations; both express unhappiness 
with the impasse. There is a general 
expectation in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean that a fresh round of talks will, 
indeed, begin soon. 

On the other hand, 1 would not want 
to underestimate the continuing broad 
differences between the two parties on 
matters of substance. The issues they 
face and the compromises they must 
make will be politically difficult and 
even painful for both sides. Neither has 
shown so far the degree of under- 
standing, flexibility, and openness to 
undertake the courageous compromises 
that will be needed to achieve an en- 
during solution. We continue to believe 
the results would be worth the risks. 
We also are convinced that time is of 
the essence; it is important that negoti- 
ations resume as soon as possible. The 
de facto division of Cyprus must not be 
allowed to solidify into permanence; 
and yet another opportunity must not 
be lost. 

The Administration is requesting $2 
million in FY 1980 security supporting 
assistance (SSA) funds as a U.S. con- 
tribution to the relief and rehabilitation 
of displaced persons in Cyprus. These 
funds would be made available to both 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities, as in the past, for specific 
projects in such fields as housing, 
health care, vocational education, and 
agricultural development. And as in 
past years, the disbursement would be 
effected through the intermediary of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees. Since the hostilities in 1974, the 
United States has contributed $102.5 
million for the relief of displaced per- 
sons. 

Symbolically, we believe that a con- 
tinuation of assistance to Cyprus' dis- 
placed persons will constitute tangible 
evidence of U.S. interest in Cyprus and 



Department of State Bulletin 



F\ 1980 Assistance Proposals 
for Portugal citiff Spain 



by George S. Vest 

Excerpted from a statement before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on March 1. 1979. Mr. Vest is 
Assistant Secretary for European 
Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to meet with you. In accord with your 
request, I will use this occasion to out- 
line the state of our relations with Por- 
tugal and Spain and to review the 
Administration's proposed security as- 
sistance programs for those nations for 
FY 1980. 

Many of the objectives for U.S. 
policy in these countries remain con- 
stant. Those goals include strengthen- 
ing our important bilateral relation- 
ships, bolstering the security of the 
area, and supporting the development 
of democracy. 

Portugal 

U.S. relations with Portugal have 
grown steadily stronger since Portugal 
established a democracy and ended its 
colonial wars in Africa. The United 
States applauds Portugal's fuller coop- 
eration with Western democracies and 
international affairs — as shown in 
Portugal's negotiations for entry into 
the European Economic Community, 
its emphasis on an active role in 
NATO, and assumption of a seat on the 
U.N. Security Council. 

During this last year, there have 
been several high-level bilateral con- 
sultations. President Carter met with 
President Eanes in May 1978; Secre- 



of our strong commitment to promoting 
a settlement on the island. As Secretary 
Vance noted in his testimony before 
the full committee last year, we are 
prepared at such time as a settlement is 
achieved to consider requesting from 
the Congress additional funds to assist 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities in making necessary eco- 
nomic, political, and social readjust- 
ments. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 



tary Vance met with former Foreign 
Minister Correia Gago in September; 
and Admiral Souto Cruz, Chief of the 
Portuguese military general staff, was 
received by high Administration offi- 
cials in August. 

Both the United States and Portugal 
have expressed their willingness to 
conclude negotiations on U.S. use of 
Lajes Air Base in the Azores. We ex- 
pect that agreement can be reached in 
the near future for renewal of U.S. 
base rights. 

In Portugal itself, the government is 
demonstrating a willingness to grapple 
with a wide range of thorny economic, 
political, and social issues. The reluc- 
tance of the democratic parties to force 
early national elections suggests that 
the present government stands a good 
chance of remaining in office until 
constitutionally mandated elections in 
1980. 

Portugal's major challenge now is its 
economy. Although the balance-of- 
payments deficit was reduced signifi- 
cantly in 1978, that improvement was 
not accompanied by a resurgence of the 
economy in general. Real growth in 
1978 was only about 2.7%; present 
production levels have fallen below 
those of early 1978. The inflation rate 
is about 22%, and the unemployment 
rate is approximately 13%. 

Serious as these economic problems 
are, the Portuguese Government is 
trying to address them. The govern- 
ment generally accepts the need to pur- 
sue the International Monetary Fund's 
stabilization program in order to reduce 
the nation's external deficit and estab- 
lish a sound basis for sustained eco- 
nomic development. The government 
has also announced its intention to pro- 
duce a medium-term plan. 

Overall U.S. policy interests in Por- 
tugal revolve around the consolidation 
of fledgling democratic institutions, 
promotion of economic recovery and 
growth, the continued professionaliza- 
tion of the armed forces, and provision 
of an increased role for them in NATO. 
These number among the major goals 
that the Portuguese have set for them- 
selves. We are pleased and encouraged 
by the progress the Portuguese are 
making in achieving them. Our pro- 
grams for military and economic assist- 
ance are intended primarily to support 
these coincident U.S. interests and 
Portuguese objectives. 

For FY 1980, we have proposed 



April 1979 



37 



funding lor several programs. The re- 
quests include: $50 million tor security 
supporting assistance (SSA), $40 mil- 
lion lor PL-480. $30 million for the 
military assistance program (MAP), 
and $2.2 million for international 
military education and traininsz 
(IMET). 

We did not request economic support 
funds for FY 1979. The $50 million 
SSA program for FY 1980 would sup- 
port Government of Portugal efforts to 
decrease its balance-of-payments defi- 
cit: to initiate programs to address the 
priority needs in agriculture, education, 
housing, and the export industries; and 
to develop further the economic infra- 
structure in the Azores. 

The PL-480 Title 1 program will be 
continued for FY 1980 to support Gov- 
ernment of Portugal efforts to increase 
farm productivity, provide production 
credit for small farmers and coopera- 
tives, and stimulate small agroindustry 
in rural areas. 

The MAP funds will enable the Gov- 
ernment of Portugal to secure addi- 
tional basic items for its NATO- 
designated brigade and its air support 
and to continue progress in the mod- 
ernization of the armed forces. 

The IMET program will provide for 
professional military education and 
some equipment-oriented training, 
mobile training teams, and training 
aids. 

Spain 

The United States enjoys a close re- 
lationship with Spain. Our cooperation 
with Spain spans political, cultural, 
and scientific areas, as well as military 
matters. It serves our mutual interest in 
promoting Western security and demo- 
cratic values. The framework for our 
relationship is provided by the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation (1976). 
Its successful implementation is a 
major goal of U.S. policy toward 
Spain. In addition to our efforts to 
maintain a strong bilateral relationship, 
we support Spanish integration with the 
rest of Western Europe and continuing 
Spanish efforts to consolidate democ- 
racy. 



Letter 
of Credence 



On March 1, 1979, Knut Hedemann 
presented his credentials to President 
Carter as the newly appointed Ambas- 
sador from Norway. D 



Spain has made tremendous progress 
in its transition to democracy over the 
past several years. A democratic con- 
stitution, approved by the major 
Spanish political parties and endorsed 
by national referendum last December, 
entered into force at year's end. New 
national elections are scheduled for 
today. March I, with local elections to 
follow next month. 

Whatever the composition of Spain's 
next government, it will continue to 
face demanding challenges. Spain has 
made significant progress in dealing 
with its economic difficulties, substan- 
tially lowering inflation from 26% in 
1977 to 17% in 1978, apparently re- 
gistering a surplus on its balance of 
payments after several years of large 
deficits and accumulating record 
foreign exchange reserves (about $10 
billion). But, further progress is needed 
and difficult economic problems await 
government action. 

In addition, brutal terrorist 
attacks — aimed at destabilizing the 
democratic process — continue, and is- 
sues of regional autonomy and basic 
governance and institutional arrange- 
ments will have to be addressed. 

Our support for Spain, as manifested 
by the Administration and the Congress 
and by our close bilateral relationship, 
is of assistance to the Spanish people 
and their representatives in their en- 
deavors to realize the democratic ideals 
which we share. The demonstrated 
wisdom, patience, and perseverance of 
the Spanish people in pursuit of these 
ideals gives us cause for optimism that 
their success will continue. 

U.S. assistance to Spain is intended 
to help support this continuing success. 
Our security assistance request for 
Spain for FY 1980 is consistent with 
the terms of the 1976 Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, which was 
endorsed by both Houses of Congress. 
The treaty stipulates that the United 
States shall provide to Spain, during 
each of the treaty's 5 years, $120 mil- 
lion in guaranteed FMS [foreign mili- 
tary sales] loans, $2 million in IMET, 
and $7 million in SSA, which provides 
for educational and cultural, scientific 
and technological exchanges. 

In addition, the United States is ob- 
ligated to furnish to Spain under the 
MAP program defense articles with a 
value of $75 million during the life of 
the treaty. The major portion of our 
remaining MAP commitment — $41 
million — is being provided to Spain in 
FY 1979 in order to minimize erosion 
of purchasing power by inflation and to 
maximize the benefits to Spain of this 
portion of our assistance. For FY 1980, 
we are requesting $3.8 million in MAP 
for supply operations and continuing 



procurement programs. Any remaining 
MAP obligations under the treaty will 
be fuiniled in FY 1981. 

The MAP, IMET, and FMS pro- 
grams for Spain provide military 
equipment and training to support and 
supplement the modernization and im- 
provement of Spain's equipment and to 
bring Spanish military capabilities 
closer to NATO standards. The types 
of equipment and training provided 
under the programs are consistent with 
the terms of the 1976 treaty. Likely 
Spanish purchases in FY 1980 under 
these programs include air-to-air mis- 
siles, communications equipment, 
spare parts, armored personnel carriers, 
and modern antitank weapons. 

The SSA funding under the treaty 
supports a wide range of educational, 
cultural, and scientific exchanges and 
projects, including projects for the 
Spanish educational system, cultural 
.seminars, research on water resources, 
land use, solar energy, and a number of 
other cooperative endeavors. 

The point of U.S. assistance in 
Spain, as elsewhere in southern 
Europe, is similar: We provide assist- 
ance for the sake of both our security 
and the security of the recipients. In so 
doing, we help strengthen the defense 
of the entire transatlantic community. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 



Publications 



GPO SALES 

Puhlicalions may be ordered by catalog or 
slock number from ihe Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is 
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any 
one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Pri<^s 
shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with 
Spain. TIAS 8725. 3 pp. 60^. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8725.) 

Express Mail Service. Agreement with Bel- 
gium. TIAS 8796. 3 pp. 60«. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8796.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland, modifying the agreement of July 
23, 1977. TIA8 8811. 2 pp. 50*. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8811.) □ 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST: F¥ 1980 
Assistance Proposais 



by Morris Draper 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on February 26, 1979. Mr. Draper is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to be here today in sup- 
port of the Administration's proposals 
for economic and military assistance 
programs involving four important 
countries in the Middle East. 

As stressed in earlier testimony to 
the subcommittee, the Middle East re- 
gion is in a period of increasingly rapid 
growth, change, and evolution. The 
dynamics in this situation hold many 
implications and lessons for the con- 
duct of our foreign policy. The United 
States must face the issue of how we 
intend to respond to the challenges 
posed by change. Will we as a nation 
view these trends and developments as 
unwelcome, full of potential crises and 
danger, and shirk opportunities to in- 
fluence events? Or will we view the 
period ahead as an opportunity to assist 
and encourage positive rather than 
negative trends and to help the nations 
involved emerge with increased stabil- 
ity and strength and with a lasting and 
consistent basis for solid cooperation 
with the United States? 

Our assistance programs have spe- 
cific goals and objectives in mind tai- 



lored to each country. The underlying 
goal common to all our programs and 
policies in all four countries, however, 
is to help nurture a basic relationship 
of mutual trust and confidence, to pro- 
mote trends and inclinations to look to 
the West, and to reinforce their com- 
mitments to find peace through negoti- 
ation and mediation rather than through 
conflict and confrontation. 

There are critical decisions to be 
made with regard to our various assist- 
ance programs in this important area of 
the world. The specific questions are: 

• Whether to work closely with the 
help of these assistance programs with 
states which have been friendly and 
cooperative, which value their associa- 
tion with us, and which have contrib- 
uted to the achievement of important 
policy goals of the United States; or 

• Whether to adopt in the process 
some negative measures which might 
be seen as either punitive or as a signal 
of disenchantment, thereby reducing 
our ability to influence future de- 
velopments in a rapidly changing and 
dynamic area. 

Three of the countries with programs 
we are addressing today — Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon — border Israel. A 
comprehensive settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict will not be possi- 
ble in the absence of full involvement 
by these three countries. We thus have 
strong interest in the directions their 



Editor's Note 

The White House announced on March 
5, 1979, that President Carter had ac- 
cepted invitations from Egyptian President 
.Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to 
visit Egypt and Israel to discuss the peace 
process, regional security, and bilateral is- 
sues. President Carter departed Wash- 
ington on March 7 and returned March 
14. 

Following a meeting with President 
Sadat at Cairo International Airport on 
March 13 en route from Tel Aviv to the 
United States President Carter an- 
nounced that the American proposals for 
resolving the remaining issues had been 
accepted by the two sides. 

On March 22 the White House an- 
nounced that President Sadat and Prime 



Minister Begin had accepted President 
Carter's invitation to sign the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel at the White 
House on March 26. 

For the convenience of our readers, all 
material relating to President Carter's trip 
and the treaty signing ceremony will be 
published as a "package" in the May 1979 
issue of the Bulletin including: 

• President Carter's addresses before 
the Egyptian and Israeli parliaments; 

• Remarks made on various occasions 
during his visit to Egypt and Israel; 

• Texts of the treaty, annexes, agreed 
minutes, and maps; 

• Remarks made by the three leaders at 
the treaty signing ceremony. 



policies will take over the period 
ahead. 

As for North Yemen, our policy — 
and thus our military and economic as- 
sistance programs — reflects our inter- 
est in enhancing stability in another 
important geographic area, close to the 
sealanes which carry petroleum 
supplies from the Persian Gulf. Our 
policy reflects our interest in the secu- 
rity and integrity of the Arabian Penin- 
sula as a whole and our desire to 
encourage cooperation among the mod- 
erate regimes of the peninsula, while 
assuring orderly economic and social 
development. 

Lebanon 

Our request for $32.5 million in 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits in 
FY 1980 would clo.se our planned $100 
million program aimed at helping to 
rebuild Lebanon's national army fol- 
lowing its disintegration in 1976 during 
the civil conflict there. This third 
tranche in FY 1980 would follow $25 
million in FMS credits in FY 1977, all 
of which have been used, plus $42.5 
million made available in FY 1979. 
This three-tranche approach was de- 
veloped after close consultations with 
Congress. 

It is particularly important that the 
United States, through congressional 
endorsement of these proposed pro- 
grams, demonstrate the depth of our 
commitment to the restoration of sta- 
bility in Lebanon. Our programs can 
impart momentum, not only for the 
crucial rebuilding of a new national 
army but also for the strengthening of 
other national institutions needed to 
enhance security for all of Lebanon's 
communities and to provide direction 
and leadership. 

The tensions and problems which 
befell Lebanon in 1978 seriously de- 
layed progress toward achievement of 
these objectives. But renewed efforts at 
progress in the last part of 1978 and at 
the moment deserve our support. Some 
Lebanese army elements have now 
been moved into the volatile southern 
Lebanese region to work closely with 
the U.N. peacekeeping force in carry- 
ing out the U.N. mandate to reestablish 
Lebanese governmental authority in 
that area. 

We are hopeful that more Lebanese 
army and security units can take over 
security duties in the capital, which has 
been the scene of many serious con- 
frontations between the Arab deterrent 
force and independent groups. 

The Lebanese Parliament currently is 
debating new legislation to reform the 
army structure in order to encourage, 
among other things, greater involve- 



April 1979 

merit by Muslim officers in the army 
command structure. This legislation 
should mark a major turning point in 
the Lebanese Government's effort to 
develop a true national consensus on 
the direction the new Lebanon will take 
in the future. 

We are also requesting for FY 1980 
the sum of $500,000 to provide train- 
ing in the United States for Lebanese 
officers. 

Members of the subcommittee may 
wonder why the Administration is not 
requesting economic assistance to deal 
with the humanitarian problems in 
Lebanon. 

The United States has already pro- 
vided more than $100 million in assist- 
ance since 1975. and all has been de- 
voted to meeting the most pressing 
human needs in the areas of medicine, 
public health, housing, and disaster re- 
lief. Some money is still in the 
pipeline, and some has been repro- 
grammed to meet special and urgent 
needs occasioned by the flight of dis- 
placed people from areas of fighting, 
most notably in southern Lebanon. We 
have made it clear, at the same time, 
that we are open-mined as regards new 
assistance, and we await with interest 
the Lebanese Government's presenta- 
tion of a comprehensive reconstruction 
plan, which we expect will be sub- 
mitted to various international donors 
and institutions. 



In our allocation of our resources, 
we at present attach priority to military 
credit assistance in the hope that it will 
contribute to the resolution of basic 
problems of insecurity and tension as 
Lebanon asserts greater authority. 
Progress in these areas could promote 
movement toward a final political con- 
sensus and economic reconstruction. 
Our basic policy toward Lebanon re- 
mains that of supporting the independ- 
ence, sovereignty, and territorial in- 
tegrity of Lebanon; its national unity; 
and the cohesion of its peoples. 

Jordan 

We are proposing for FY 1980 a sub- 
stantial program of economic and 
military assistance to Jordan. The total 
level of U.S. assistance for the coun- 
try, however, is somewhat lower than 
the levels of the past few years. The 
proposals consist of $30 million in 
grant military assistance, $70 million 
in FMS credits, $60 million in eco- 
nomic assistance, plus a specific allot- 
ment of $38 million for the Maqarin 
Dam. 

As Mr. Saunders [Harold H. Saun- 
ders, Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] made 
clear in his testimony to this subcom- 
mittee a few weeks ago, our proposed 
assistance programs for the Middle 
East are intended to advance movement 



Egyptian^ Israeli^ and U^S, 
Officials Meet at Camp David 



Delegations headed by Egyptian 
Prime Minister Mustafa Klialil. Israeli 
Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and 
Secretary Vance met at Camp David 
February 21-25. 1979. Following is a 
statement President Carter made on 
February 25. ' 

I have a statement to read, which has 
been drafted jointly by the Prime 
Minister of Egypt and the Foreign 
Minister of Israel, and it is expressed 
from my own point of view. 

During the past week, I, as Presi- 
dent, have kept in close touch with the 
negotiations at Camp David, and Sec- 
retary Vance, Prime Minister Khalil, 
and Foreign Minister Dayan have now 
given me a firsthand report on their 
talks. 

In light of the developments in the 
talks at Camp David this past week, we 
are discussing with the two govern- 
ments the possibility of moving these 



negotiations to the head-of-government 
level later this week. Prime Minister 
Begin would then represent Israel, and 
Prime Minister Khalil, who has been 
authorized by President Sadat to con- 
clude the negotiations on behalf of 
Egypt, would represent Egypt. 

I would be going to Camp David 
with Prime Minister Begin and Prime 
Minister Khalil, accompanied by Sec- 
retary Vance. Prime Minister Khalil is 
leaving this afternoon for Cairo for 
consultations. Foreign Minister Dayan 
is returning to Israel this evening to re- 
port to the Prime Minister and to the 
Cabinet. 

I am prepared to spare no effon in 
achieving the peace settlement foreseen 
in the Camp David accords reached last 
year. The other two partners in these 
negotiations share this determination. D 

'Made on the South Lawn of the White House 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Mar. 5, 1979). 



39 



toward a comprehensive settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they also 
go beyond this to aim at reinforcing 
and expanding the kind of relationship 
the United States wants with the people 
of the Middle East. Our goal is to build 
a relationship which will endure 
through political ups and downs, pro- 
viding the basis for lasting cooperation 
as we pursue our interests and they 
strengthen their national independence. 

Jordan — its leadership, its continued 
economic and social development, its 
stability, and its ability to defend 
itself — is of high importance to the 
United States. We have assisted Jordan 
in resolving what was considered at the 
beginning of our close association as 
almost insurmountable economic 
problems. Throughout our association 
with Jordan, moreover, many chal- 
lenges to the stability of the regime in 
Amman have been met, again with our 
help in some cases. Economic and so- 
cial advancement in Jordan constitute a 
major success story. We can now pre- 
dict that Jordan can become econom- 
ically self-reliant, a prospect that only 
a few years ago seemed an impossible 
dream. Jordanians have embraced 
American technology, concepts, and 
education with enthusiasm. 

With relatively few exceptions, Jor- 
dan has pursued a course of moderation 
and restraint through the years and has 
held in high value its relationship with 
the United States, even when Jordan's 
leaders were viciously attacked by 
others in the Arab world for their 
policies. We in turn appreciate the 
benefits our strong relationship with 
Jordan has brought the world, and we 
want to continue building on the firm 
foundation already established. 

Members of the subcommittee may 
wonder why we are proposing this sub- 
stantial program for Jordan when Jor- 
dan may be receiving a reported $1.25 
billion in annual subsidies as a result of 
decisions at the Baghdad summit last 
year. We believe we must bear in mind 
the lessons of the past, when foreign 
assistance contributors to Jordan post- 
poned, cut, or eliminated their prom- 
ised subsidies as a form of political 
pressure or intimidation, often in part 
because of Jordan's readiness to coop- 
erate with the United States in moder- 
ate policies. Our programs in those 
days allowed and encouraged Jordan to 
pursue an independent policy. We be- 
lieve the same considerations apply 
today, even in the highly unlikely event 
that all the subsidies promised at 
Baghdad materialize in a timely and 
regular way. 

It has been disappointing to some 
Members of Congress and to many 
other Americans that Jordan has elected 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



not to join the negotiations outlined in 
the Camp David frameworks. At the 
same time, Jordan remains fully com- 
mitted to a comprehensive settlement 
negotiated in accord with Security 
Council Resolution 242. While Jordan 
has been critical of the Camp David 
framework strategy for not setting forth 
in adequate clarity the final arrange- 
ments which would emerge at the end 
of the negotiating process, we are con- 
vinced that Jordan will remain funda- 
mentally open-minded, will observe the 
progress achieved and new avenues 
opened as negotiations proceed, and 
will be ready to seize opportunities 
which it finds promising. 

It is important to note in this con- 
nection that Jordan has made clear that 
it would pose no objections if Palesti- 
nians in the occupied territories de- 
cided to involve themselves more di- 
rectly in negotiations concerning the 
West Bank-Gaza and the Palestinian 
issue. 

It is in our interest to remain consist- 
ent, credible, and understanding in our 
relationship with this important country 
located in a turbulent region of the 
world. It is in our interest to demon- 
strate — not only in Jordan but in the 
wider Middle East region — that our 
friendships are consistent and that we 
are capable, as a government, of dis- 
tinguishing between our common inter- 
ests and goals and our short-run dis- 
agreements over how best to attain 
them. 

Syria 

We presented a request for $60 mil- 
lion in economic assistance for Syria, 
compared to $90 million in the last fis- 
cal year. Syria is a key country in the 
Middle East, with a capacity to influ- 
ence events far beyond its borders. Our 
assistance program in Syria has been 
welcomed by the Syrians. It is viewed 
as an earnest of our confidence in Syr- 
ian willingness to negotiate a com- 
prehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Syria's commitment to 
such a comprehensive peace, based on 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. remains an essential feature of its 
foreign policy. 

Members of this subcommittee are 
aware that Syria has been sharply criti- 
cal of President Sadat and his strategy 
in moving toward Middle East peace. 
Syrian leaders believe that President 
Sadat has split the Arab world and, in 
so doing, has lessened the possibilities 
that a just peace will be realized which 
satisfies all of the Arab world's con- 
cerns and interests, including those of 
the Palestinians. 

While we disagree with the Syrian 



VistI of israeU 
Printe Ifiinister Begin 



Prime Minister Memihern Begin of 
Israel made an official visit to the 
United States March 1-7, 1979. While 
in Washington March l^, he met with 
President Carter and other government 
officials. The following White House 
statement was issued on March 4 . ' 

Over the past 4 days, the President 
and the Prime Minister, together with 
their advisers, have had 8 hours of in- 
tensive conversations. In a friendly, 
straightforward manner the two sides 
discussed the strategic situation in the 
Middle East and. in great depth, all the 
unresolved issues in the negotiations. 

During the course of today's meet- 
ings. President Carter put forward 
suggestions designed to help resolve 
some of the outstanding differences 
between Egypt and Israel. Prime 
Minister Begin stated that he would 
seriously study these suggestions and 
consult with his colleagues. 

In the meantime. President Carter 
will be in touch with President Sadat to 
review the situation in light of the 
American-Israeli discussions over the 
past few days. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 12. 1979. 



assessment, we remain confident that 
the Syrians are sincere in their willing- 
ness to negotiate a comprehensive 
peace with Israel. Committed to the 
principle of a negotiated peace. Syria 
has refused to accept the harsh "rejec- 
tionist" position asserted by others in 
the Arab world, "rejecting" both a 
negotiated peace and peace of any kind 
with Israel. 

Almost equally important. Syrian 
actions and Syrian policies have a 
greater effect on the future destiny of 
Lebanon and on the direction of Pales- 
tinian behavior there than any other 
outside government. It is important, 
therefore, that the United States con- 
tinue to promote a growing relationship 
of trust and confidence with Syria to 
help encourage Syria in policies that 
will parallel our own with regard to 
Lebanon. The Syrian role in Lebanon is 
still indispensable in preventing an 
all-out renewal of civil conflict be- 
tween the various communities and 
groupings in that country. 

While we shared with the Congress 
serious disagreement with Syria over 



some actions during the series of con- 
frontations last year in the Beirut area, 
it remains a fact that cautious and pru- 
dent Syrian actions have — on more 
than one occasion in the last year — 
prevented an outbreak of wider hos- 
tilities in the area, e.g., during Israeli 
military movement into southern Leba- 
non last March, at a time when 30.000 
or more Syrian troops were carrying 
out their responsibilities only a short 
distance to the north. 

Our economic assistance program in 
Syria has been an important element of 
the expanding relationship between our 
two countries. The top Syrian lead- 
ership has sought an expanded relation- 
ship and has taken the initiative in 
many respects to see that it has grown. 
Just last week, our two governments 
signed the cultural agreement which the 
Syrians originally proposed. President 
Asad personally has directed that a 
major new program of postgraduate 
training for Syrian students be con- 
ducted in the United States. Partly 
under the auspices of our economic as- 
sistance program, educators, engineers, 
technicians, and scholars have been 
visiting the United States in increasing 
numbers. Our English language train- 
ing program has been enthusiastically 
received, and English training centers 
are springing up around the country as 
offspring of our model centers. Last 
year, a major delegation of the Ba'ath 
political party visited the United States 
for the first time in that party's history 
to meet with American politicians, 
primarily at the municipal, county, and 
state levels. 

Just as cultural, educational, and 
political relations have improved, the 
trends in Syrian trade and commerce 
have dramatically shown an increasing 
shift over the past few years to the 
West, including the United States. 
More and more Syrians are seeing that, 
in a period of evolution and transition 
in the Middle East, Syria need not look 
exclusively to a single source for un- 
derstanding or support as it seeks to 
pursue an independent policy. Al- 
though we cannot predict when the 
winds of change in the Middle East will 
be stilled or what political and eco- 
nomic shifts will result, we foresee 
major shifts taking place and wish to 
participate in shaping the direction of 
change. 

Our policy toward Syria and the pro- 
grams that are instruments of this pol- 
icy are aimed at the long view. We 
must keep disappointments or differ- 
ences in proper perspective lest they 
interfere with the progress that has 
been made in developing mutually 
beneficial ties since our resumption of 
diplomatic relations some 5 years ago. 



April 1979 



41 



We want a relationship with Syria 
which will encourage that key country 
to view us with a sense of confidence 
and to look to us as a source of tech- 
nology, education, and opportunity for 
its people. We want a relationship 
which continues to offer positive bene- 
fits to both countries on a broad range 
of interests, so that our views on issues 
of special concern to us can be ex- 
pressed within this context of shared 
interests. The assistance program con- 
tributes an important dimension to this 
type of relationship. 

Yemen 

Our overall policy toward North 
Yemen reflects our concern for the se- 
curity and integrity of the Arabian 
Peninsula and our desire to encourage 
cooperation among the moderate penin- 
sula states, to assure security and or- 
derly development of the region, and to 
develop a strong bilateral relationship 
with North Yemen. 



\cmen 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
FEB. 28, 1979' 

We have been concerned by the re- 
cent hostilities along the border be- 
tween North and South Yemen and the 
indications that forces from South 
Yemen have entered North Yemen's 
territory and occupied some positions 
in North Yemen. 

Our national interest in the security 
and national integrity in the Arabian 
Peninsula is clear. 

In response to requests by the Yemen 
Arab Republic Government [North 
Yemen], we will be accelerating the 
delivery of defensive arms previously 
agreed for that country. 

In addition, we have been working in 
cooperation with other governments in 
the Arabian Peninsula to relieve ten- 
sions and to strengthen elements of sta- 
bility in this long troubled part of the 
peninsula. 

In this connection, we support the 
Saudi Arabian appeal to end the fight- 
ing. It is in the interests of the interna- 
tional community that hostilities in this 
area cease, that occupying forces with- 
draw, and that all parties involved sup- 
port the principle of nonaggression. D 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



North Yemen, an extremely poor 
country, is still recovering politically 
and economically from the long civil 
war of the last decade. For much of the 
time since then, the Soviet Union has 
been North Yemen's principal source 
of assistance, including military 
equipment and training. Governments 
in North Yemen in recent years, how- 
ever, have been turning toward the 
West politically and economically and 
have shown a corresponding desire for 
Western defense assistance. 

I would like to stress that our re- 
lationship with North Yemen combines 
our concern for its development with a 
response to Yemeni security concerns. 
The Agency for International De- 
velopment has been involved in 
Yemen's development since the early 
I970's. Our program there is keyed to 
assisting the rural poor in better meet- 
ing their basic human needs through 
education, water projects, and nutri- 
tional care. We have an active and 
large Peace Corps program. 

U.S. companies are increasingly 
aware of the investment possibilities in 
North Yemen and are beginning to play 
a larger role in capital development 
projects that will lay the foundation for 
the development of industries neces- 
sary for the creation of a healthy econ- 
omy. 

Our military supply relationship, 
which began in 1974, is designed to as- 
sist North Yemen, in cooperation with 
Saudi Arabia, to meet the threat posed 
by the Marxist regime in the neighbor- 
ing People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY). The latter is well 
supplied with Soviet military equip- 
ment, qualitatively and quantitatively 
superior to that possessed by North 
Yemen. In the wake of events in North 
and South Yemen last summer — and 
the coup by pro-Marxist elements 
within the PDRY Government in 
Aden — both North Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia sense that the threat from South 
Yemen has intensified significantly; 
and they are deeply' concerned about 
the intimate relationship the Soviets 
have with the PDRY. 

We are in the process of delivering 
over $100 million in military 
equipment — howitzers, recoilless 
rifles. Vulcan antiaircraft guns. LAW 
antitank weapons, and vehicles — 
which have been financed by Saudi 
Arabia. Also, small U.S. military 
mobile training teams are assisting the 
Yemen Armed Forces to operate and 
maintain this equipment. We have also 
agreed to the transfer of four F-5B 
trainers from Saudi Arabia to North 
Yemen and transition training on those 
aircraft has begun. 

Further, in consultation and cooper- 



ation with both the governments of 
Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, we 
have agreed to seek congressional con- 
currence for additional equipment for 
the Yemen Armed Forces. This equip- 
ment includes 12 F-5E aircraft, 100 
M-1 13 armored personnel carriers, and 
64 M-60 tanks. 

Congressional informal notification 
on this program began on February 16. 
We believe that this equipment is im- 
portant to help North Yemen meet its 
legitimate defense requirements. It is a 
manifestation of U.S. and Saudi sup- 
port for the security and stability of 
North Yemen. In addition, two C-130 
transport aircraft will be transferred to 
North Yemen from Saudi Arabia. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Sixth Report 

on the Sinai 

Support Mission 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JAN. 18, 1979' 

I am pleased to transmit, as requested by 
section 4 of Public Law 94-1 10 of October 13, 
1975. the Sixth Report of the United States 
Sinai Support Mission, describing operations of 
the U.S. early warning system in the Sinai De- 
sert. The Mission's activities are an important 
part of the disengagement arrangements be- 
tween Egypt and Israel concluded in September 
1975. 

The cost of operating the Sinai Support Mis- 
sion during Fiscal Year 1978 was $11.7 mil- 
lion, about a half million dollars less than the 
amount appropriated. The estimated budget for 
Fiscal Year 1979 remains at $1 1.7 million. 

At the request of the Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East of the Committee 
on International Relations. House of Repre- 
sentatives, this report includes a brief review of 
the applicability of the United States early 
warning system concept to other areas of the 
Middle East. It concludes that the basic ap- 
proach to early warning employed in the Sinai 
could be successful elsewhere, provided the 
parties directly concerned want and are willing 
to support it. 

Talks now under way in Washington between 
Egypt and Israel are likely to result in substan- 
tial changes in the United States' role in the 
Sinai. I will consult closely with the Congress 
as these and subsequent talks proceed, in order 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE: F¥ 1980 Proposals 



by Lucy Wilson Benson 

Statement submitted to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on Feb- 
ruary 28, 1979. Mrs. Benson is Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, Sci- 
ence, and Technology.^ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to testify on the Administration's FY 
1980 requests for international security 
assistance. We are requesting an ap- 
propriation of $2,794 million to fi- 
nance programs totaling $4,236 mil- 
lion. 

Let me state at the outset that this is 
a lean, bare bones request in keeping 
with the President's policy of budget 
austerity. It is the minimum request 
consistent with our national security 
and the security of our allies and 
friends abroad. I will return to this 
point later. 

Developments in the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia have shown once 
again how the United States and 
friendly countries have shared concerns 
about security and defense. Interna- 
tional defense cooperation is as impor- 
tant as ever. 

The growing cost and complexity of 
modern defense equipment make it in- 
creasingly difficult for many allies and 
friends to meet all legitimate defense 
requirements by themselves. U.S. fi- 
nancial loans to help them acquire 
needed defense equipment and training 
involve modest sums but are of much 
significance. 

Similarly, the need for cooperation 
in reinforcing regional stability by ad- 
dressing social and economic problems 
in key countries has not lessened in 
importance, as the situation in the 
Middle East clearly demonstrates. 

In my testimony, I will review our 
arms transfer policy, briefly explain the 
general purposes of our security assist- 
ance programs, place the FY 1980 re- 



Sinai Report (cont'd) 

to insure that the peacekeeping efforts of the 
United States continue to advance the goal of 
perinanent peace in the Middle East. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 22, 1979. 



quests in an historical perspective, and 
describe regional and country programs 
and objectives. 

Arms Transfer Policy 

The President's arms transfer policy 
is almost 2 years old. It has been suc- 
cessful in both policy and procedural 
terms. 

We have met the twin objectives of: 
(1) achieving demonstrable qualitative 
and quantitative restraint in transfers to 
the developing world while continuing 
to meet the legitimate needs of our al- 
lies and friends and (2) developing a 
decisionmaking and management proc- 
ess that includes better forecasting and 
determination of priorities, thorough 
policy analysis of major sales cases, 
and more accurate bookkeeping. 

Let me briefly review the six qual- 
itative controls which are the heart of 
the policy. 

• The United States will not be the 
first supplier to introduce into a region 
newly developed advanced weapons 
which would create a new or signifi- 
cantly higher combat capability. 

• The United States will not sell 
such weapons until they are operation- 
ally deployed with U.S. forces. 

• The United States will not permit 
development of advanced weapons 
solely for export. 

• The United States will not permit 
coproduction by other countries of sig- 
nificant weapons, equipment, or major 
components. 

• The United States will not allow 
U.S. weapons or equipment to be 
transferred to third countries without 
U.S. Government consent. 

• The United States will not permit 
U.S. Embassy, military, or industrial 
representatives abroad to promote the 
sale of arms. 

Virtually all of the turnoffs or 
turndowns of sales as a result of the 
policy were based on these controls. 
However, because the policy explicitly 
provides for Presidential exception to 
the controls in extraordinary circum- 
stances or to offset quantitative or other 
disadvantages to friendly countries 
where there is a threat to a regional 
balance, the controls have proved suf- 
ficiently flexible to permit sales con- 
sidered important to our national secu- 
rity interests. 



There is a great preoccupation with 
the arms transfer ceiling. Some allege 
that the 8% reduction in FY 1978 was 
achieved only by creative bookkeeping. 
Others claim that the ceiling is an arbi- 
trary restraint, unrelated to U.S. na- 
tional interests, that has prevented sales 
that ought to have been made. 

In fact the ceiling is not a shibboleth 
but a tool to be used. It has been a val- 
uable management tool which supple- 
ments the more substantive qualitative 
controls. It forces the decisionmaking 
machinery to think and act in new 
ways, reflecting the shift in the burden 
of proof from the opposers to the pro- 
posers of an arms transfer. 

Moreover, by exempting NATO, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 
from the ceiling, ample attention was 
paid to security needs, and the Presi- 
dent provided the safety valve of an 
exception if circumstances warrant. 

Obviously the ceiling cannot be re- 
duced indefinitely in the absence of 
fundamental political changes or mul- 
tilateral cooperation. The President has 
stated that a key factor in the determi- 
nation of arms transfer levels for FY 
1980 will be the extent of cooperation 
we received from others. 

For FY 1978 the President set the 
ceiling at $8,551 billion — an 8% re- 
duction from the relevant arms sales 
total of the preceding year. The final 
year-end total of ceiling-related trans- 
fers was $8,538 billion. Thus there was 
a decline in sales of over three quarters 
of a billion dollars from 1977 to 1978 
adjusted for inflation. For the current 
fiscal year the President has established 
another 8% cut, which, when adjusted 
for inflation, provides for an FY 1979 
ceiling of $8.43 billion. 



General Purposes 
of Security Assistance 

Our military assistance, foreign 
military sales (EMS) financing, and 
international military education and 
training (IMET) programs directly sup- 
port an important objective — to help 
friendly nations maintain adequate 
military establishments for their self- 
defense, thus contributing to both 
mutual security and maintenance of re- 
gional balances. 

Our security supporting assistance 
(SSA) programs support the peaceful 
resolution of disputes by providing 



April 1979 

economic aid to nations in regions 
beset by serious conflict. They also 
promote the economic and political 
stability in selected countries and re- 
gions and support activities that further 
the national security interest of the 
United States. 

All of our security assistance pro- 
grams are designed to support our ef- 
forts to promote respect for human 
rights. 

Our security assistance programs are 
not acts of charity; they serve mutual 
interests. Although the several military 
and SSA programs differ in content, 
they all contribute to the overriding 
U.S. foreign policy and national secu- 
rity interest — to shape a more peaceful 
world. 

Unresolved conflicts in the Middle 
East, Southeast Asia, and southern 
Africa — to cite only a few — call for 
continuing efforts by the United 
States and others to support peaceful 
solutions. Security assistance programs 
reinforce U.S. political ties — many of 
longstanding and proven value — with 
key countries in these unsettled re- 
gions. In addition, our security assist- 
ance programs and mutual security 
arrangements — as with the Philippines, 
Spain, and Portugal — strengthen the 
global and regional security positions 
of the United States. Our steadfast sup- 
port of these allied and friendly nations 
has proven beneficial to them and to us 
and will continue to do so. 



Relationship to Human Rights 

The FY 1980 programs continue this 
Administration's emphasis on the pro- 
motion of respect for internationally 
recognized human rights. We weighed 
the human rights practices of each pro- 
posed recipient country at each step of 
a rigorous budget process. Our requests 
are consistent with the President's pol- 
icy guidance and all statutory require- 
ments concerning human rights prac- 
tices and security assistance. 



FY 1980 Program 

in Historical Perspective 

We are requesting an authorization 
i of appropriations of $2,794 million to 
finance a total FY 1980 security assist- 
ance program of $4,236 million. This 
program is composed of $2,063 million 
, in foreign military sales (FMS) 
j financing, $145 million in grant mili- 
! tary assistance program (MAP), $33 
i million in international military educa- 
! tion and training (IMET), and $1,995 
million in security supporting assist- 
ance (SSA). 

The proposed program accomplishes 



a great deal for less money than in re- 
cent years, when inflation is taken into 
account. Moreover, the sums requested 
are indicative of the long-term, con- 
tinuing transition away from grant pro- 
grams (MAP) and toward repayable 
loan financing (FMS). In current dol- 
lars, the total has increased from 
$1,407 million in FY 1964 to the 
$4,236 million proposed for FY 1980. 
Adjusted for inflation in constant 1980 
dollars, however, the increase over this 
period is marginal — from $3,895 mil- 
lion in FY 1964 to $4,236 million in 
FY 1980. 

This is so despite the dramatic in- 
crease in FMS financing and SSA pro- 
grams for Israel following the Yom 
Kippur war, and related increases to 
certain other Middle Eastern states, in- 
cluding Egypt. Israel received no se- 
curity assistance funding in 1964. Pro- 
grams have declined dramatically in all 
other regions over the last 15 years. 

As I mentioned earlier, there has 
also been a marked downward shift in 
grant MAP ($2.5 billion in FY 1964, 
measured in constant 1980 dollars, to 
$145 million m FY 1980) and a corre- 
sponding increase in FMS financing. 

Austerity 

Let me underscore, once again, the 
spartan nature of our requests. We have 
formulated our FY 1980 programs at 
the minimum level consistent with our 
objectives. To have proposed less 
would have incurred unacceptable 
risks. False economies make no sense. 

In sum while the overall FY 1980 
program total may appear slightly 
higher than for FY 1979 ($4,236 mil- 
lion vs. $4,133 in FY 1979), it is 
nearly $100 million lower when cor- 
rected for inflation. In constant dollars, 
FMS financing and SSA for FY 1980 
are each down by about 1% from last 
year's totals — which in turn were con- 
siderably lower than the previous year. 
Of the $2,794 million in the requested 
appropriations, $1,335 million is for 
Israel, while $751 million is for Egypt. 
Thus 74.6% of the entire security as- 
sistance appropriation is for these 
prime participants in the Camp David 
process. 



FMS Financing Program 

Under this program, we provide 
credits and loan repayment guarantees 
to enable eligible foreign governments 
to purchase defense articles and de- 
fense services. Begun 24 years ago, 
this program has consistently helped 
friendly countries to meet their justifi- 
able defense requirements. FMS 



43 

financing has made possible the 
gradual transition from grant aid to 
cash purchases. Most current FMS 
credit recipients were formerly MAP 
recipients. 

For FY 1980, we proposed a $2,063 
million program for 25 countries. Of 
that program, $1 billion is for Israel; 
other major recipients include Korea 
($225 million). Turkey ($200 million), 
Greece ($158 million), and Spain 
($120 million). To finance this pro- 
gram, we are requesting an appropria- 
tion of $656.3 million of which $550 
million is required for Israel — a $500 
million direct loan and $50 million to 
guarantee $500 million to be provided 
by the Federal Financing Bank (FEB). 
Only $106.3 million is requested to fi- 
nance $1,063 million in loans to 24 
other countries. 

It is useful to recall that, except in 
the case of the $500 million direct 
loan to Israel for which payment 
would be forgiven, every dollar ap- 
propriated supports a program 10 
times as large. Accordingly, every 
dollar appropriated for, or alterna- 
tively, every dollar cut from, the 
FFB-financed portion of the appro- 
priation has a magnified impact on the 
total program that can be financed. 
Moreover, none of the funds appro- 
priated to guarantee FEB loans will re- 
sult in U.S. budgetary expenditures 
unless there is a default in payments. 

This is a loan program, with money 
coming in as well as going out. For 
example in FY 1980 we will receive 
$1.2 billion in principal and interest 
from prior year loans. FMS financing 
is, over time, self-amortizing with no 
net cash apart from certain loans for 
Israel on which payment is waived. 

Military Assistance Program (MAP) 

Under MAP we provide defense ar- 
ticles and defense services to eligible 
foreign governments on a grant basis. 
As I have already indicated, the 
long-term trend in MAP is down. We 
are continuing to move from grant as- 
sistance to FMS financing or cash 
sales wherever justified. 

The proposed FY 1980 program to- 
tals $144.6 million compared to 
$210.4 million in FY 1979. We are 
requesting authorization and appro- 
priation of $110.2 million to finance 
FY 1980 programs for only four 
countries — Portugal ($30 million) Jor- 
dan ($30 million), the Philippines ($25 
million), and Spain ($3.8 million). 
Three of these programs — Portugal, 
the Philippines, and Spain — are for 
countries which permit U.S. access to 
and use of military and related 
facilities on theii; soil. In the case of 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Philippines and Spain, the program 
levels are tied directly to negotiated 
agreements. 

In addition to the $88.8 million re- 
quested for these four countries, the 
FY 1980 program includes $55.8 mil- 
lion for program management and de- 
livery of materiel funded from prior 
year programs. We expect reimburse- 
ments from foreign countries for $34 
million of the program management 
costs. Thus the net worldwide cost of 
MAP will be the $110 million re- 
quested. 

We are also asking Congress to in- 
crease the "ceiling" on the availabil- 
ity of current and prior year MAP ap- 
propriations in FY 1979 from 
$210,375,000 to $243,375,000. Rais- 
ing this "ceiling," which is contained 
in the Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, 
would not involve the appropriation of 
additional funds. However, it would 
allow us to obligate funds for certain 
prior year programs that were au- 
thorized by the Congress and for 
which funds were appropriated. We 
estimated that the ceiling precludes us 
from using $31.3 million in prior year 
funds. Among the countries affected 
are Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, 
Jordan, Portugal, Spain, Korea, and 
Thailand. 

We have important security interests 
in each of these countries. The latter 
have significant defense needs they 
expected to meet through such pre- 
viously funded programs. We urge the 
Congress to support this proposal, 
which will not require new or addi- 
tional funding. 

International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) 

Under IMET we provide grant 
military training in the United States, 
the Canal Zone, and certain U.S. 
facilities abroad to foreign military 
and civilian personnel. Similar training 
is also available on a cash (FMS) 
basis. Since 1950, we have trained 
almost 500,000 foreign nationals under 
various military training programs. 
These programs contribute to the 
military proficiency of allied and 
friendly countries and strengthen our 
communication with the current and 
future military leadership of those 
countries. 

A recently completed review of the 
current positions held by IMET/FMS 
trainees for the 5-year period FY 
1974-78 indicates that many trainees 
have achieved positions of prominence 
and influence in their respective coun- 
tries. In 47 countries for which infor- 
mation is reasonably complete, more 



than 1,100 former IMET students have 
achieved general or flag rank. Ap- 
proximately 1,000 former IMET stu- 
dents occupy high positions in the 
military or civilian sectors of their 
country. 

The latter positions include several 
heads of state or government. Cabinet 
ministers, members of Parliament, and 
ambassadors. The former include 
chiefs of the armed services or indi- 
vidual military services, commanders 
of major technical units, senior posi- 
tions in NATO, commandants of 
military academies and colleges, and 
senior military attaches. 

For FY 1980, we are requesting 
$32.9 million to train personnel from 
52 countries. This compares to an FY 
1979 program of $28.8 million for 
personnel from 38 countries. The 14 
additional countries include several 
(e.g., Turkey and Greece) where we 
think it is important to renew a mili- 



tary training relationship. Although the 
new programs are small in dollar 
amounts, we believe they serve im- 
portant U.S. interests. 

The FY 1980 request also includes a 
modest $800,000 for a pilot regional 
fund in Latin America to teach courses 
in two newly important fields — arms 
transfer restraint and peacekeeping op- 
erations. Such controls correspond to 
the initiatives of the Latin Americans 
themselves to promote hemispheric re- 
straint and to the continuing needs of 
the United Nations, the Organization 
of American States, and other interna- 
tional organizations for qualified 
peacekeeping contingents. 

Dollar-for-dollar, we think IMET is 
one of our best investments. The FY 
1980 request is already trim. We urge 
the Congress to support this small 
program which has clearly demon- 
strated its utility to U.S. security and 
political interests over the years. 



SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL 

On February 16,1979, the Department of 
State provided to various committees on the 
Hill the FY 1980 security assistance con- 
gressional presentation document. This 
document sets out in detail the Administra- 
tion's request for each category of security 
assistance for proposed recipient countries 
worldwide. We have already begun the con- 
gressional hearing process during which 
Administration witnesses testify on every 
aspect of our security assistance program. 

Throughout the formulation of the FY 
1980 program, we were conscious of the 
President's instruction that our security as- 
sistance programs reflect his policy of 
budget austerity and continue to be formu- 
lated and implemented in a manner that is 
fully supportive of his foreign policy and 
national security objectives. 

In terms of specific components of the FY 
1980 security assistance program, we are 
requesting: 

• Military Assistance Program (MAP): 

$1 10.2 million to finance a total program of 
$144.6 million to provide assistance to four 
countries — Spain, Portugal, Jordan, and the 
Philippines — and to pay for administrative 
costs and delivery of prior year programs. 
In FY 1979 the total MAP program is 
$210.4 million with assistance being pro- 
vided to five countries. 

• International Military Education and 
Training (IMET): $32.9 million which 
would provide training to personnel from 52 
countries, compared to an FY 1979 program 
of $28.8 million for 38 countries. Included 
in the request is a lump sum for the fixed 
costs of operating the three military training 
schools in the Canal Zone and a separate 



line item for a regional IMET program for 
Latin America. 

• Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
Financing: $656.3 million to finance a total 
FMS financing program of $2,063 million 
for 25 countries. Of this amount $1,000 
million is allocated to Israel. This compares 
to an FY 1979 appropriation of $654.5 mil- 
lion to finance a program totaling $1,973 
million for 26 countries. All of the financ- 
ing to be extended (except for a $500 mil- 
lion direct loan to Israel for which waiver of 
payment is requested) would be provided by 
the Federal Financing Bank with repayment 
guarantees issued by the Department of 
Defense. 

• Security Supporting Assistance 
(SSA): $1,995.1 million in economic as- 
sistance to promote political and economic 
stability in countries or regions important to 
our foreign policy or national security inter- 
ests. About 40% of the total SSA request is 
designated for Israel and about 45% for 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This compares to 
the FY 1979 SSA program which totals 
$1,912.4 million, with more than three- 
fourths of this amount being provided to 
these same four Middle East countries. 

Secretaries Vance and Brown testified 
before the House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee on February 5 on the entire FY 1980 
foreign assistance budget. Administration 
witnesses from State, Defense, and AID 
will appear before the appropriate authori- 
zation committees and appropriation sub- 
committees of both the House and Senate 
over the next 2 months in support of these 
requests. 



Press release 39. 



April 1979 

Security Supporting Assistance 

(SSA) 

SSA promotes economic or political 
stability in areas where the United 
States has special foreign policy secu- 
rity interests. Our economic assistance 
helps to avert major crises, to moder- 
ate the effects of past crises, and to 
help lay the foundation for peaceful 
evolution. 

Last year the Congress directed that 
SSA be redesignated as economic sup- 
port funds or peacekeeping operations, 
respectively. The authorization attrib- 
uted 98% of the funds to economic 
support and 2% to peacekeeping oper- 
ations. We carried out the directive of 
the Congress in FY 1979 and did not 
discover that it enhanced our manage- 
ment of security assistance or congres- 
sional oversight of the programs. We 
propose, therefore, to reintegrate these 
two funds into a single SSA authority 
and appropriation for FY 1980. Our 
reasons are these. 

• There is no apparent difference, 
whether conceptual or programmatic, 
between the two accounts. For exam- 
ple, in FY 1979 the SSA program for 
Spain was designated "peacekeeping 
operations" because it was related to 
the 1976 treaty that included provi- 
sions on base rights. Yet the $7 mil- 
lion program is for cultural and edu- 
cational exchange, together with coop- 
eration in science and technology. 
This appears to us more a supportive 
economic function than peacekeeping 
which is, in this instance, not rel- 
evant. Similarly, it appears undeniable 
that SSA programs for the confronta- 
tion states in the Middle East provide 
a contribution with a double 
purpose — the furtherance of peace and 
economic support, although last year 
SSA to these countries was catego- 
rized only as economic support. 

• What unites the "peacekeeping" 
and "economic support" accounts is 
the essential ingredient of security, 
both for the countries directly con- 
cerned and for the United States. The 
single SSA rubric seems the most ac- 
curate yet flexible description for such 
activities. It also permits ready com- 
parison with prior year programs so 
categorized. 

• The case of Portugal illustrates 
the difficulties posed by the bifurca- 
tion of SSA. Should a new base 
agreement be signed in the next few 
months, then presumably our SSA re- 
quest for Portugal in FY 1980 would, 
under the dual nomenclature, be re- 
classified from "economic support 
funds" to "peacekeeping operations." 
Since use of the two-category system 



would make no difference in the sums 
involved, nor presumably affect the 
recipient country in any way, there 
seems no need for the expense and 
complication of separate accounts. 

For FY 1980, we propose an SSA 
program of $1,995 million, which 
compares with a total economic sup- 
port funds/peacekeeping operations 
program of $1,921 million in FY 
1979. As in FY 1979, a high percent- 
age of the program — 85% — is allo- 
cated to Middle Eastern countries to 
support our continuing efforts to bring 
peace to this vital area. We are re- 
questing $785 million for Israel, $750 
million for Egypt, $60 million for Jor- 
dan. $38 million for the Maqarin 
Dam. $60 million for Syria, and $4 
million to fund two regional programs 
in the Middle East by voluntary agen- 
cies and for regional project develop- 
ment, respectively. 

For southern Africa, we are re- 
questing a regional fund of $100 mil- 
lion. For Turkey, we propose $98 
million and for refugee relief in Cyp- 
rus, $2 million. There are also two 
new SSA programs proposed for FY 
1980 for countries which permit U.S. 
use of mutual defense facilities — $50 
million for Portugal and $20 million 
for the Philippines. 

We are also requesting $7 million 
for educational and cultural exchange, 
scientific and technological programs 
in Spain, in accordance with the terms 
of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation; $12.1 million for a vol- 
untary U.S. contribution to the U.N. 
peacekeeping force in Cyprus; and $9 
million for the Sinai Support Mission. 

These country and regional eco- 
nomic SSA programs — administered 
by the Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID) — finance commodity 
imports and economic infrastructure 
projects and provide general budget 
support on a grant and loan basis. The 
projects are specifically directed to- 
ward meeting basic human needs in 
such fields as agriculture, health, 
family planning, and education. 

Regional Perspectives 

The proposed FY 1980 security as- 
sistance program is allocated on a re- 
gional basis as follows: Middle East 
and South Asia — 69%, Europe — 
16%, East Asia and the Pacific — 
9%, Africa — 5%, American Republics 
— 1%, and nonregional — 1%. 

Middle East and South Asia. Sec- 
urity assistance programs for Middle 
East recipients seek to create a climate 
of national self-confidence among re- 
cipient countries, encouraging them to 



45 



particip'ate positively in the peace 
process. 

There has been considerable prog- 
ress toward peace over the past year, 
most notably at the Camp David 
summit. Nonetheless, the effort re- 
mains delicate and uncertain. We 
strongly believe that our security as- 
sistance programs contribute to this 
process and to stability in the region 
not only because they assist in meeting 
necessary economic or security needs 
but also because they provide tangible 
evidence of U.S. concern for the 
well-being of all of the confrontation 
states and of our desire for a just 
settlement. 

U.S. security assistance to Israel 
has two basic purposes. First, it pro- 
vides Israel with the financial support 
required to maintain its own security 
and to defend itself successfully if at- 
tacked. Second, it is a concrete ex- 
pression of the historic U.S. commit- 
ment to Israel's essential security 
needs over the past 3 decades. 

In FY 1980 we propose to continue 
a $1 billion annual FMS financing 
program. Israel has borne a particu- 
larly heavy defense burden since 1973. 
The proposed assistance will help fi- 
nance the purchase of defense articles 
and services necessary to insure Is- 
rael's security against any combination 
of adversaries. As in the past several 
years, we are recommending that pay- 
ment on one-half of the total pro- 
gram — or $500 million — be waived. 

We are proposing $785 million in 
SSA, the same as in FY 1979. This 
assistance will provide Israel with the 
financial resources to adjust to eco- 
nomic pressures as the political- 
military situation evolves in the area. 
The provision of SSA will help Israel 
cope with mounting inflationary pres- 
sures and maintain a reasonable 
growth rate. 

The proposed FY 1980 SSA pro- 
gram of $750 million for Egypt is 
particuarly important as that country 
attempts to improve its economic situ- 
ation while participating actively in 
the search for a peaceful settlement. 
Moreover, traditional financial support 
for Egypt from Arab countries may 
become more uncertain in the future, 
depending on reactions to Egypt's 
negotiations with Israel. Strong op- 
position from certain "rejectionist" 
governments adamantly set against an 
Egypt-Israeli treaty increases the threat 
to Egypt's security. 

The SSA program is structured to 
demonstrate that President Sadat's 
objectives are complemented by 
realizable economic objectives. A high 
proportion of U.S. assistance is allo- 
cated to commodity import programs 



46 

and increased food aid. The balance is 
for development projects directed to- 
ward the long-term basic needs of the 
Egyptian people. 

In FY 1980 we are seeking $30 
million in MAP, $90 million in FMS. 
and $60 million in SSA for Jordan. 
These programs reflect our conviction 
that a moderate Jordan, secure in its 
relationship with the United States, is 
a stabilizing element in the Middle 
East. Our security assistance programs 
help Jordan to maintain a sense of 
confidence in its ability to defend it- 
.self against attack while strengthening 
its economy. The United States has 
been working with Jordan since 1968 
to develop a modern military force 
that balances its security requirements 
with manpower and economic re- 
sources. 

In FY 1980 we are seeking an SSA 
program of $60 million for Syria. This 
program helps in a major way to build 
mutual trust in our evolving bilateral 
relationship with Syria. It provides 
evidence of a sincere U.S. interest in 
improving the welfare of Syria's 
people. Our assistance also serves to 
strengthen habits of consultation and 
discussion with the United States and 
provides Syria with access to U.S. 
technology and management practices. 

Europe. Our security assistance 
programs in Europe, as in the past, are 
limited to Iberia and countries in the 
eastern Mediterranean area. 

The Administration has given special 
consideration to the assistance re- 
quirements of the three countries of the 
eastern Mediterranean — Greece, Tur- 
key and Cyprus. Greece and Turkey 
derive special importance from their 
strategic location on the southeastern 
flank of NATO. Cyprus continues to be 
of concern to us not only because of the 
refugees, but also because the unre- 
solved political situation has effects 
beyond the island itself. 

The request for Turkey of $200 mil- 
lion in FMS credits, $98 million in an 
SSA loan, and $2 million in IMET is 
designed to help the Turkish military 
forces improve their level of readiness 
to perform their NATO tasks, to assist 
the Government of Turkey as it seeks 
to deal with serious economic difficul- 
ties, and to provide for a renewal of the 
important training program for the Tur- 
kish Armed Forces. 

Turkey is faced at present with very 
difficult economic problems. It has a 
balance-of-payments gap of $1.5 bil- 
lion, an inflation rate in excess of 50%, 
and an unemployment rate of over 
20%. We believe it is important that 
Turkey's friends and allies work with 
the Turks in trying to help them over- 



come these difficulties. Our proposed 
SSA program is crucial to these efforts. 
We are also consulting with other 
donors, under the auspices of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, about what kind of 
assistance may be needed on a longer 
term basis to put the Turkish economy 
back on its feet. 

The requested program for 
Greece— $158 million in FMS and $2 
million in IMET — is designed to pro- 
vide a continuing indication of our 
support for a democratic Greece and 
our support for Greece's return to full 
participation in the NATO integrated 
military command structure. The as- 
sistance level for Greece reflects the 
importance of that country in the area 
and our close cooperation in defense 
matters. It will help the Greek military 
continue to play a major role in main- 
taining security in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 

Our assistance program for Cyprus 
demonstrates our continuing interest in 
a Cyprus solution. The need of the 
Greek Cypriot displaced persons has 
diminished with the almost complete 
recovery of the economy in the area 
controlled by the Government of Cyp- 
rus. Thus, we are requesting only $2 
million in SSA to supplement our pre- 
vious efforts to help the refugees 
achieve a more normal life pending the 
solution to the island's political prob- 
lems. 

Our FY 1980 security assistance re- 
quest for Spain is consistent with the 
terms of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation. The treaty stipulates 
that the United States shall provide to 
Spain, during each of the treaty's 5 
years, $120 million in guaranteed FMS 
loans and $2 million in IMET. In addi- 
tion, the United States is providing 
defense articles in the MAP program 
with a value of $75 million during the 
life of the treaty. 

The major portion of our remain- 
ing MAP commitment under the 
treaty — $41 million — is being pro- 
vided to Spain in FY 1979 in order to 
minimize erosion of purchasing power 
through inflation. For FY 1980 we are 
requesting $3.8 million in MAP. As I 
mentioned before, we are also provid- 
ing $7 million per year in SSA for edu- 
cational, cultural, scientific, and tech- 
nological exchanges. 

Priority interests served by our as- 
sistance programs in Portugal are con- 
solidation of Portuguese democracy, 
economic recovery and growth, and in- 
creasing the ability of the Portuguese 
military to play a greater NATO role. 
We have firm indications that the new 
Portuguese Government is prepared to 
conclude a new agreement relating to 



Department of State Bulletin 

continued U.S. use of military facilities 
in the Azores. We expect to resume 
negotiations shortly. To support these 
interests, we propose FY 1980 pro- 
grams of $50 million for SSA, $30 
million for MAP, and $2.2 million for 
IMET. 

Furthering Cooperative NATO 
Arms Projects. We are proposing 
three amendments to the Arms Export 
Control Act to strengthen the military 
effectiveness of NATO by facilitating 
rationalization, standardization and in- 
teroperability. Our NATO allies look to 
the United States for leadership in 
achieving these objectives, as set forth 
by President Carter at the May 1977 
London summit. As the pace of al- 
liance arms cooperation projects quick- 
ens, the need for this legislation be- 
comes more urgent. 

The bill would facilitate the transfer 
of U.S. Government-provided defense 
articles and services among NATO 
countries without affecting the re- 
quirement for prior U.S. consent to 
such transfers. Section 10 would permit 
the waiver, on a reciprocal basis, of 
charges for quality assurance, inspec- 
tion, and contract audit services with 
NATO members or in connection with 
the NATO infrastructure program. 
Section 1 1 would encourage NATO 
cooperative projects of a cost-sharing 
nature by permitting the reduction or 
waiver, on a reciprocal basis, of FMS 
charges for U.S. research, develop- 
ment, test, evaluation, and production 
costs as well as certain personnel costs. 

The proposed amendments are not a 
one-way street in favor of our NATO 
allies. Rather, the benefits are either at 
no-cost, reciprocal, or based on a 
burden-sharing agreement. By 
facilitating cooperative weapons de- 
velopment within NATO, the proposed 
legislation provides substantial benefits 
to the United States and to the military 
effectiveness of the alliance. We 
strongly urge favorable congressional 
action on these amendments. 

East Asia and the Pacific. In this 
region, our security assistance propos- 
als take into account three major recent 
developments; the recent amendment of 
our bases agreement with the Philip- 
pines, the continuing danger of military 
contlict on the Korean Peninsula, and 
the continuing Vietnamese military in- 
volvement in Kampuchea. 

The situation in Southeast Asia has 
become more tense, of course, because 
of the renewal of hostilities in In- 
dochina, both within Kampuchea and 
along the Vietnamese-Chinese border. 
The members of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations, and espe- 
cially Thailand, have renewed concerns 



April 1979 

about their security and the integrity of 
their frontiers. These friendly nations 
look to the United States for reaffirmed 
interest in helping them to meet their 
defense needs. 

The recent amendment to the 1947 
Military Bases Agreement with the 
Philippines, concluded after extensive 
consultations with the Congress, will 
permit continued use of Clark Air 
Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and other 
facilities on an equitable and politically 
sound basis well into the future. The 
new agreement reconfirms a mutual se- 
curity relationship which dates from 
the earliest days of Philippine inde- 
pendence and is critical to U.S. secu- 
rity interests. The levels and mix of as- 
sistance proposed for FY 1980 ($25 
million in MAP. $50 million in FMS, 
$700,000 in IMET. $20 million in 
SSA) are consistent with the terms of 
that agreement. 

South Korea continues to face a 
sizeable military threat from the North. 
The Koreans are paying the bulk of the 
costs of a major defense modernization 
program. We are requesting $225 mil- 
lion in FMS financing in FY 1980 to 
assist the Koreans in financing this 
program which is necessary for the 
maintenance of a viable defense pos- 
ture. Our assistance will also signal to 
the North Koreans that we remain con- 
cerned about and committed to the 
R.O.K.'s security. 

Vietnam's takeover of Kampuchea 
has caused considerable anxiety among 
Southeast Asian countries. Our pro- 
grams should help relieve those anx- 
ieties. We propose $25 million in FMS 
financing for Thailand. This will help 
the Thais acquire equipment to combat 
the ongoing insurgency in the northeast 
and to strengthen their forces against 
external attack. 

We also propose a $35 million FMS 
credit program to assist the Indone- 
sians to modernize their forces and a 
small $7 million FMS program for the 
Malaysians. Our security assistance 
programs in Southeast Asia also serve 
to reassure our friends in a vital, 
changing region of our continuing 
commitment to their security. 

The Administration's proposed 
international security assistance leg- 
islation provides authority for two ex- 
traordinary transfers of particular 
significance. 

First, we are seeking authority to 
waive payment from the Government 
of Thailand on the last increment of 
U.S. ammunition stored in Thailand 
and sold to Thailand in FY 1977; the 
amount to be waived is $11.3 million. 
President Carter told Prime Minister 
Kriangsak that he would request this 
authority to bolster Thailand's confi- 



dence in its defense capability and to 
ease its financial burden in view of the 
unstable conditions prevailing in 
Southeast Asia. 

Secondly, the Administration bill 
would authorize the transfer to the 
people on Taiwan during calendar 
year 1980 of Department of Defense 
war reserve materiel located on Taiwan 
as of January 1, 1979, and during 
calendar years 1979 and 1980 of U.S. 
rights in property other than war re- 
serve materiel located in Taiwan as of 
January 1. 1979. 

Because of the normalization of U.S. 
relations with the People's Republic of 
China and the resultant changes in our 
relationship with Taiwan, the United 
States must arrange for the disposition 
of this materiel and property. The bill 
would give the President discretionary 
authority to transfer U.S. rights which 
he deems appropriate under terms and 
conditions that he determines. 

Africa. Our security assistance pro- 
grams for Africa are small, moderate, 
and targeted on a few key countries. 
Our efforts in Africa have been devoted 
principally to economic development 
and other economic assistance rather 
than military assistance. For example, 
in FY 1980 we propose to double our 
SSA to certain states in southern Africa 
from $45 million in FY 1979 to $100 
million in FY 1980, while increasing 
FMS financing to Africa south of the 
Sahara from $26.2 million in FY 1979 
to only $45.9 million in FY 1980. 

The SSA program provides eco- 
nomic assistance to countries — 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozam- 
bique, Swaziland, and Zambia are pro- 
posed for FY 1980 — which have suf- 
fered severe economic dislocations and 
hardships as a result of their newly won 
independence and their commitment to 
the achievement of racial justice and 
majority rule in southern Africa. The 
program also helps assist refugees and 
displaced persons. All of these pro- 
grams directly or indirectly support our 
efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to 
the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia. 

In coping with the exigencies of the 
situation in southern Africa, the SSA 
program provides us with much needed 
flexibility not readily available under 
other assistance programs. For exam- 
ple, it now appears that the western 
five's proposals for a U.N. -supervised 
transition to independence in Namibia 
is going forward. The proposed SSA 
regional fund would allow us to con- 
tribute promptly to U.N. -coordinated 
assistance to Namibia. 

Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa 
south of the Sahara have sharpened 
concerns in many countries about their 



47 

security and defense requirements. If 
we are to continue to promote stability, 
our friends on the continent must know 
they can count on our support. We 
have responded to this situation with 
restraint and seek to avoid dealing with 
it primarily as an East-West issue. We 
propose only six FMS financing pro- 
grams for Africa south of the Sahara, 
the largest of which are Kenya ($26 
million). Zaire ($10.5 million), and 
Sudan ($5 million). 

We also propose in FY 1980 to enter 
into a small military supply relation- 
ship with Botswana in support of our 
search for peace in the southern Africa 
region. Botswana lacks defensive ca- 
pability to protect its democratic, mul- 
tiracial society from incursions by the 
adversaries in the Rhodesian conflict. 

We also propose to repeal Section 33 
of the Arms Export Control Act. This 
section places a $40 million ceiling on 
the total amount of military assistance 
and FMS financing which may be fur- 
nished to African countries in any year. 
Because the authorized and appro- 
priated programs for African countries 
have exceeded this ceiling in each of 
the past several years, the President has 
had to exercise his authority to waive 
the ceiling. Repeal of Section 33 would 
eliminate the need for such action, rec- 
ognizing the realities of our security 
assistance programs to Africa in recent 
years. 

American Republics. Latin 
America is the most lightly armed re- 
gion in the world, historically the most 
peaceful, and spends the least on mili- 
tary material. Currently, military 
spending in the region averages around 
3% of GNP. 

Our very limited FY 1980 FMS 
financing request — $30.1 million — is 
the smallest in history. It is designed to 
assist the eligible nations of the hemi- 
sphere to purchase minimum amounts 
of necessary equipment and services. 
No major equipment purchases are an- 
ticipated. Most purchases are expected 
to be for replacement of aging equip- 
ment, support and maintenance, or 
spares. 

We believe that the proposed Latin 
American programs are at the absolute 
minimum levels that will permit us to 
maintain traditional military links to 
the region through security assistance 
and training. We continue to believe 
that our military ties to the region are 
of importance, particularly because 15 
governments are either headed by or 
heavily influenced by the military. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, I return to my opening 
theme of austerity. We have carefully 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH A!$IA: Promoting StafnUty 
and Seeurity 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 7, 1979. Mr. Christopher is 
Deputy Secretary of State. ' 

Thank you for inviting me to be with 
you today. I welcome this opportunity 
to discuss with you the situation in 
South Asia; U.S. relations with the na- 
tions of that region; and steps that can 
be taken to promote South Asia's sta- 
bility, security, and prosperity. 

In addition 1 will, as you have re- 
quested, offer an assessment of India's 
role as a regional power and comment 
on the current state of U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations on the military balance in 
the Indian Ocean. 

I have just returned from a trip to 
India and Pakistan, where I met with 
Prime Minister Desai and President Zia 
and other senior officials in each coun- 
try. This was my second trip to the 
subcontinent since becoming Deputy 
Secretary. During my discussions with 
the leaders of both countries, I was 
struck by their desire for a stable, se- 
cure, and prosperous South Asia. They 
hope the future will bring better rela- 
tions among all the nations in the re- 
gion. They hope their efforts can be 
directed toward cooperation and de- 
velopment and not toward countering 
external threats. 

The memories of the past still weigh 
heavily on India and Pakistan, how- 
ever. Concern about each other's in- 



Security Assistance (Cont'd) 

examined the FY 1980 program re- 
quests. We cut programs where we 
thought they could be cut. We in- 
creased some programs and added a 
few new ones where we are firmly 
convinced it is in our interest to do so. 
The proposed FY 1980 security assist- 
ance programs reflect our judgment of 
what is required to advance and sustain 
important U.S. national interests 
abroad during a period of belt- 
tightening at home. We believe these 
programs merit your support. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



tentions remain. In the wake of events 
in nearby countries, they are also con- 
cerned, in different ways, about what 
external powers are doing, or might do. 
in the region. 

The nations of the region do not 
think of themselves only as part of the 
South Asian Subcontinent. Their links 
with the rest of the world are expand- 
ing. India and Pakistan export substan- 
tial quantities of goods and services to 
the Middle East oil states. Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh have been developing 
economic ties with nations in Europe 
and elsewhere in Asia. Events to their 
east and west affect the South Asian 
countries' perceptions of their security 
needs. In short, the nations of the sub- 
continent are becoming part of a larger 
region, expanding from the Arabian 
Peninsula in the west through Southeast 
Asia in the east. 

At the same time, our perception of 
the region also is changing. We cannot 
make "South Asia Policy" in a vac- 
uum. We must take into consideration 
the impact of events in other areas as 
well. 

The Past Year 

A new era in South Asia appeared on 
the horizon in 1977. There were a 
number of signs that the nations of the 
region were beginning to transcend 
histories of mutual suspicion and ten- 
sion. A "good neighbor policy" was in 
the offing. Indeed, when he testified 
before this committee one year ago, 
then Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
Adolph Dubs said: "I believe it would 
be no exaggeration to say that regional 
tensions are perhaps at their lowest 
level since 1947."^ 

In the months following Ambassador 
Dubs' testimony, the process of recon- 
cilation among the countries of South 
Asia continued. For example, India and 
Pakistan agreed to reopen their re- 
spective Consulates in Karachi and 
Bombay; and Prime Minister Desai had 
cordial talks with President Zia in 
Nairobi. The previous regime in Af- 
ghanistan was moving toward better 
relations with Pakistan and India, and 
Bangladesh had solved longstanding 
bilateral disputes. 

We welcomed these developments as 
indications that the nations of the re- 
gion were reducing tensions in order to 
devote increasing attention and re- 
sources to the core problems of eco- 



nomic development and human better- 
ment. 

Many of these healthy trends are 
continuing, but unfortunately, some of 
the momentum that was building for 
better relations among South Asia's 
nations began to dissipate. Indeed, 
Spike Dubs' tragic and senseless death 
reminds us of the dramatic changes that 
have altered the regional picture since 
he met with you a year ago.'^ 

There is now a real risk that 
deeply-rooted historical and psycho- 
logical forces will reemerge; that great 
power involvement and competition in 
the region will intensify; and that the 
attention of the governments of the area 
will focus again on dealing with per- 
ceived threats to their security instead 
of the internal development of their 
nations. 

What has happened in the region 
during the past year to create this situ- 
ation? 

Pakistan and others in the region are 
deeply concerned, as is the United 
States, by the appearance of a pro- 
Soviet government in Afghanistan and 
the accretion of Soviet influence there. 
Pakistan's primary concern, however, 
revolves not around the ideology of its 
neighbor but the revival of Afghan 
claims on Pakistan's border areas and 
the possibility of Afghan support of an 
irridentist movement in Pakistan's 
Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier 
provinces. 

India is particularly concerned about 
the instability in Iran. This reflects In- 
dia's substantial economic stake there, 
including 35% of its oil imports and the 
important market Iran has provided for 
Indian products and labor. 

For its part. Pakistan, like other Is- 
lamic nations, is waiting anxiously to 
see what kind of policies emanate from 
the new government in Tehran but 
hopes to preserve its past good rela- 
tions with Iran. 

Rapprochement between China and 
India has been set back by China's in- 
vasion of Vietnam, which occurred 
while Indian Foreign Minister Vaj- 
payee was in China. 

What can the United States and 
others do to respond to South Asia's 
needs and insure that the new era for 
South Asia that appeared on the hori- 
zon in 1977 still comes to pass? A sta- 
ble, secure, and prosperous South Asia 
requires that our efforts, and those of 
the nations of the region, focus on four 
areas; 



April 1979 

• Security for the nations of the re- 
gion from foreign exploitation of their 
internal difficulties or regional rival- 
ries; 

• Greater cooperation among the na- 
tions in the region; 

• Development and maintenance of 
responsive, representative political in- 
stitutions and respect for individual 
rights: and 

• Promotion of economic develop- 
ment, including especially increased 
employment and greater food produc- 
tion. 



Security From Foreign Exploitation 

The problems that face the nations of 
the region are primarily internal in na- 
ture, yet they lend themselves to 
exploitation by foreign sources. The 
nations of South Asia must be secure 
from external interference as they work 
out their problems. 

Within our overall policy regarding 
arms restraint in the region, we shall be 
responsive to their legitimate needs for 
defense. We believe such needs can be 
accommodated without interfering with 
the primary task of internal develop- 
ment and without contributing to an 
arms race in South Asia. Thus, we are 
prepared to sell military equipment to 
Pakistan and India on a nondis- 
criminatory basis and in a way that 
does not contribute to tension in the re- 
gion. We shall continue to follow a 
policy of restraint — in terms of quan- 
tity as well as sophistication — and 
hope that others will do likewise. 



Greater Intraregional Cooperation 

With respect to greater cooperation 
among the South Asian nations, we 
commend them for the progress they 
have already made. We hope that their 
efforts in this direction will intensify. 
Continuation of the process of recon- 
ciliation between Pakistan and India is 
of central importance. We look to both 
nations to nurture this process. We also 
believe that further moves toward rap- 
prochement between India and China, 
difficult as they might be. will contrib- 
ute to the stability and security of all 
nations in South Asia. 

In addition, we hope that Afghanis- 
tan will come to respect the Durand 
Line — the international border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan — as virtually 
every country of the world has already 
done. 

We will help where we can, and 
other nations may also be able to offer 
their assistance. But I must emphasize 
that the ultimate responsibility for suc- 
cess or failure lies with the nations of 
the region themselves. 



Political Development 
and Individual Rights 

As for political development and in- 
dividual rights, there are clear signs 
that the nations of South Asia are 
making progress in the development of 
responsive and representative political 
institutions. 

India's democratic traditions were 
restored following the Janata Party's 
sweeping victory in March 1977. The 
government, which commands a large 



49 

parliamentary majority, has moved ef- 
fectively to insure protection of human 
rights. 

Sri Lanka also has reaffirmed its 
commitment to a democratic political 
system and willingness to accommo- 
date various interests within a demo- 
cratic framework. 

The recent elections in Bangladesh 
signal the emergence of a more broadly 
based and popularly accepted govern- 
ment. 

In Nepal the government has 



MJ,S» Ambassador Killeci ttt Afghatustan 



Ambassador Adolph (Spike) Dubs 
was kidnapped in Kabul on February 
14, 1979. by terrorists and killed the 
same day during an attempt by Afghan 
police to free him from his captors. 
The following remarks by President 
Carter and Secretary Vance were made 
at Andrews Air Force Base ceremonies 
on February 18 when Ambassador 
Dubs' body was returned to the United 
States. ' 

President Carter 

This morning I would like to say to 
Mary Ann Dubs and to Lindsey. to the 
members of Spike Dubs' famiJy and his 
many friends that this is indeed a sad 
and painful moment for the United 
States of America. We've come here 
on this occasion to pay tribute to a 
good man. a courageous man. who 
served his country well and who gave 
his life for it. 

We've come here to express our 
outrage at the senseless terrorism 
among those who pay inadequate value 
to human life. And we condemn those 
who perpetrated and who participated 
in such a despicable act of violence. 

As President. I would like to pay 
honor, also, to the other men and 
women in the Foreign Service of our 
country, who serve with dedication and 
often great risk to their own lives so 
that all of us might enjoy a more 
peaceful existence in a world with bet- 
ter understanding, one for another. 

Mary Ann, Lindsey. we share with 
you your great loss. The grief of our 
nation can be expressed by me as 
President. And we also share with you 
a great pride in what your husband, 
what your father, did for our country. 
We are ready to help you in every way 
possible to share your loss. And I want 
you to know that our nation, in every 



sense of the word, shares this loss with 
you and your family. 

Secretary Vance 

Mary Ann. Lindsey. your loss and 
ours is a profound one. Spike deeply 
loved this country, his family, and his 
friends. He was one of our very best, a 
fine officer and a fine person. It is 
tragic that a man, whose whole life and 
career were dedicated to the cause of 
peace, was killed as a result of ter- 
rorism and violence. 

Events in Kabul and Tehran this 
week are terrible reminders that the 
diplomatic profession is dangerous as 
well as demanding. Courageous and 
selfless men of the Foreign Service like 
Spike Dubs have all too often in recent 
years sacrificed their lives for their 
country. We owe them a debt beyond 
price. 

I pledge to you that we will spare no 
effort to protect our diplomats over- 
seas, and we will fight terrorism with 
all of our resolve and our resources. 

As a symbol of my respect and re- 
gard for Ambassador Dubs and tribute 
to him from the Foreign Service to 
which he devoted his life. I have the 
sad honor to present to you. Mary Ann, 
in Spike's memory, the Secretary's 
Award, the highest award the State De- 
partment can give. 

As I present this award, I note with 
regret that for health reasons Spike's 
parents could not be here as we honor 
him. 

The citation reads: "To Adolph 
Dubs, for inspiring leadership, out- 
standing courage and devotion to duty 
for which he gave his life. Kabul, 
February 14, 1979." □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 26. 1979. 



50 

liberalized the political environment; 
we hope further efforts can be made 
there to permit ail political forces to 
operate within the system. 

The Bhutto case dominates the 
political landscape in Pakistan. The 
present situation there is tense. (Let me 
note here that when 1 was in Islamabad. 
I conveyed the sense of the House of 
Representatives urging that President 
Zia grant clemency to Mr. Bhutto as a 
humane gesture.) The martial law ad- 
ministration, headed by President Zia, 
has announced that national elections 
will be held later this year. These elec- 
tions should reduce political polariza- 
tion. We are confident that if Pakistan 
is permitted sufficient time to resolve 
its internal problems free from external 
threat, a government will evolve which 
will satisfy public expectations and as- 
sure all of a stake in the system. 

In Afghanistan, unfortunately, there 
has been a deterioration in human 
rights conditions — one of the major 
factors contributing to the sharp reduc- 
tion in our aid there. 

Economic Development 

With respect to economic develop- 
ment, the problems of South Asia are 
well known. But I was struck during 
my recent visit by the progress that has 
been made and by the reinforcement 
our bilateral assistance provides for 
that progress. Because of the funda- 
mental importance of advancement in 
this area, I would like to comment in 
some detail on the region's massive 
economic development effort and pro- 
vide a country-by-country assessment. 

With respect to the region as a 
whole, increased irrigation and im- 
proved management of water resources 
are central to the ability of South Asian 
nations to increase agricultural produc- 
tion to the levels that will be necessary 
in the years ahead. In this context, en- 
couraging progress is being made to- 
ward imaginative regional programs 
under which India. Bangladesh, and 
Nepal would pursue the joint develop- 
ment of their water resources. 

India is discussing with Nepal a hy- 
droelectric project that will involve 
production of power approximately 
equal to the total produced in India in 
the I960's, as well as major irrigation 
works. We encourage this concept and 
hope that future U.S. programs in 
South Asia can play a positive role in 
supporting such regional, multilaterally 
financed river development projects. 

India. India's economy has made 
important strides. In the early 1970's. 
it was characterized by inadequate food 
production, balance-of-payments pres- 
sures, and foreign exchange con- 



straints. The turnaround has been 
dramatic, with some genuine break- 
throughs. Four years of favorable mon- 
soon rains have brought India four rec- 
ord food-grain crops and a substantial 
reserve stock of food grains. As a re- 
sult, India's economy grew by over 7% 
in real terms in 1977-78 as compared 
with 2% growth in the preceding year. 
Economic growth is expected to be 
good but more moderate in 1978-79. 

But the bumper harvests are not sim- 
ply the result of plentiful rainfall. The 
farmers' dependence on the monsoon is 
lessening. Indeed, Indian agricul- 
ture — long recognized as an area of 
potential growth — is undergoing a 
technological revolution. 

There is evidence that important 
structural changes are occurring. About 
34% of India's cropped land was under 
irrigation in 1976. This total has been 
increasing at an annual rate of about 
8% for the last 2 years. Fertilizer con- 
sumption is rising rapidly, with annual 
increases in the past 2 years averaging 
22%. 

Additional positive factors are im- 
proved farmer access to high-yielding 
seeds, credit, research, extension 
services, storage, marketing, and elec- 
trification. India's new agricultural 
policy attempts to insure remunerative 
prices to farmers, promote employment 
in rural areas, and improve the condi- 
tions of small and marginal farmers. 



Assistattee in 
Afghanistan 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 22, 1979' 

The President has decided to se- 
verely reduce our development assist- 
ance program in Afghanistan below 
levels projected for the fiscal years 
1979 and 1980. The President has also 
decided to terminate a military training 
program that was in the planning 
stages. 

These decisions have been taken in 
the light of an ongoing review of our 
relations with Afghanistan and the 
policies with that government. Only 
small developmental assistance pro- 
grams that are already underway and 
that address the needs of the least 
privileged sectors of Afghan society 
will continue. □ 



'Read to news correspondents by White 
House Press Secretary Jody Powell (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Feb. 26, 1979) 



Department of State Bulletin 

The contribution of U.S. aid to this 
agricultural breakthrough has been sig- 
nificant. 

A substantial cushion against bad 
weather and poor crops is now in place. 
This favorable short-term situation 
frees India to devote its domestic sav- 
ings and the large amounts of financial 
assistance it receives from other coun- 
tries to easing its massive, long-term 
economic development problems — 
slow agricultural growth; rapidly in- 
creasing population, unemployment, 
and underemployment; and inadequate 
food, health care, housing, and educa- 
tion. I am pleased to say that our pro- 
gram is designed to help in these key 
areas. 

Pakistan. In Pakistan, the economic 
picture is mixed. There have been en- 
couraging developments, however, and 
the economy is recovering from the 
period of turmoil that led up to the es- 
tablishment of the present government 
in 1977. In an effort to liberalize the 
economy and restore investor confi- 
dence, the government has de- 
nationalized key industries and reduced 
government controls and direction 
where possible. 

Much remains to be done to 
strengthen and rationalize the econ- 
omy, and implementation of plans now 
under consideration will be an impor- 
tant step forward. These reforms can 
return Pakistan to the rapid growth it 
enjoyed in the 1960's. 

Pakistan is an agricultural country, 
and its best prospects for growth lay in 
that sector of the economy. While it 
has sustained production reverses in re- 
cent years, it is attempting to improve 
its agricultural practices. Fertilizer 
usage increased by approximately 
22% this past year and is projected to 
increase by an annual rate of 15% for 
the next few years. 

After nearly 2 decades of planning 
and construction, the Tarbela Dam, one 
of the world's largest, is becoming op- 
erational. It will provide regulated and 
assured Hows of water for irrigation 
that will be invaluable in the more arid 
portions of the Indus Valley. In addi- 
tion, a relatively recent design modifi- 
cation will permit the dam to generate 
60% of the electricity produced in the 
country. 

Pakistan's troubled wheat situation is 
showing signs of improvement. Paki- 
stan is in the final stages of importing 
2.3 million tons of wheat to cover a 
shortage that resulted from unexpected 
shortfalls in production and increases 
in demand. 

The production shortfall, after sev- 
eral years of moderate but steady pro- 
duction increases, can be attributed to 
wheat rust and a producer price that 



April 1979 

gave the farmer a less than satisfactory 
return tor growing wheat. The Pakistan 
Government has raised the producer 
price of wheat by 22% this year and 
introduced other measures to encourage 
production. An Agricultural Research 
Council — headed by one of Pakistan's 
ablest agriculturalists — has been estab- 
lished to provide the research support 
that will help the Pakistan Government 
provide better seed and cultivation ad- 
vice to its farmers. Fortunately. Paki- 
stan's wheal crop this year is expected 
to be excellent. 

Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, 4 years 
of good harvests and dramatic growth 
in the industrial and service sectors 
have strengthened the economy. How- 
ever, agriculture, the dominant sector 
of that economy, is largely dependent 
on the weather. While reduced food 
imports, increased food stocks, and 
growth of domestic food production are 
encouraging developments, a major 
flood, a cyclone, or a bad monsoon 
could seriously affect food production 
and confront Bangladesh with a disas- 
ter of major proportions. 

Bangladesh can substantially in- 
crease food production and insulate it- 
self from the shock of natural disasters. 
Our bilateral aid program supports ef- 
forts to realize this potential. Much 
remains to be done, and Bangladesh 
will need the assistance of the United 
States and other donors for some time 
to come. 

Increased use of fertilizer and high- 
yielding seeds, expansion of the irriga- 
tion system, and installation of a price 
support system have all contributed to 
increasing food production. The gov- 
ernment is working hard to expand the 
dry season harvests through the use of 
modern agricultural techniques. The 
realization of this potential growth will 
enable Bangladesh to reduce its re- 
liance on the monsoon and on imported 
food grains. 

In the industrial sector, the growth 
has been more dramatic than in ag- 
riculture, although it started from a 
very small base. The share of industrial 
production in Bangladesh's GDP in- 
creased by 45% over the last 4 years. 
While industrial production still ac- 
counts for less than 15% of GDP, in 
1977-78, for the first time, industrial 
output exceeded that of Bangladesh's 
last preindependence year (1969-70). 
The government has invited foreign in- 
vestment but, so far, it has not been 
successful in attracting it in significant 
amounts. 

j Sri Lanka. There have been impor- 
i tant positive economic developments in 
; Sri Lanka, with a government elected 
on a platform of economic reform de- 
signed to combat the sluggish growth 



and high unemployment that had 
characterized the nation's economy 
earlier in the 1970's. Central to the 
new economic policies of the Jayewar- 
dene government is the accelerated de- 
velopment of the massive Mahaweli ir- 
rigation scheme designed to increase 
employment and expand agricultural 
production. 

Our aid strategy in Sri Lanka sup- 
ports the government's efforts to ex- 
pand agricultural productivity and 
employment, to move toward food 
self-sufficiency, and to sustain the na- 
tion's considerable progress in meeting 
the basic needs of its people. 

In the last 18 months the government 
has devalued the currency, liberalized 
import and foreign exchange regula- 
tions, removed price controls, trimmed 
subsidies, and has undertaken a major 
program to create an export-oriented 
free trade zone attractive to the private 
sector, both domestic and foreign. 

These efforts, along with good 
weather and buoyant world prices for 
traditional exports, have begun to show 
encouraging results in terms of food 
and industrial production, investment, 
and employment. The economy grew 
an estimated 6% in real terms last year. 
This compares to a GDP growth of 
4.4% in 1977 and an annual growth of 
3% during the preceding 7 years. 
Today Sri Lanka's economy is stronger 
and better poised for growth than a 
year ago. 

Nepal. Nepal remains a very poor 
country, but there are some encourag- 
ing economic signs. The economy, 
helped by a good harvest, is expected 
to recover from the stagnation that has 
characterized it in recent years. 

The tremendous investment over the 
past 2 decades in infrastructure now 
permits the government to focus di- 
rectly on improving the lives of the 
people. Last year's trade and transit 
treaties with India and the reform of a 
complicated exchange system should 
stimulate economic growth. Foreign 
loans and grants can be expected to in- 
crease substantially. 

Nonetheless, Nepal's potential for 



Letter 
of Credence 



On February 26, 1979, Sultan 
Muhammad Khan presented his cre- 
dentials to President Carter as the 
newly appointed Ambassador from 
Pakistan. □ 



51 

economic development is limited; 
mountains and rivers represent the 
country's only important potential re- 
source. Convinced that a dramatic eco- 
nomic breakthrough can be made when 
the country begins to export substantial 
amounts of hydroelectric power, the 
Nepalese have taken the lead in calling 
for the development of the region's 
water resources. 

I have dealt at some length with the 
four areas on which we believe our ef- 
forts, and those of the nations of South 
Asia, should focus. But I want to em- 
phasize that progress in any one of the 
four areas will most likely be stalled 
unless accompanied by progress in 
each of the other areas. Enhanced se- 
curity, increased intraregional cooper- 
ation, more responsive political in- 
stitutions which respect individual 
rights, and greater economic develop- 
ment are mutually dependent, as well 
as mutually reinforcing, elements of a 
stable and prosperous future for South 
Asia. 

India's Role as a Regional Power 

By any measuring stick — GNP, 
population, military strength, industrial 
base — India is, by far, the largest 
power in the region. This is a basic and 
unalterable fact of life in South Asia. 
Our relations with India are good, and 
the tenor of this relationship has been 
set by the mutual respect and trust es- 
tablished between President Carter and 
Prime Minister Desai. 

We believe that our interests in the 
region are compatible and complimen- 
tary and that we can deal with the dif- 
ferences that do arise in a responsible 
and candid manner. To be sure, there 
are also elements of strain. Most nota- 
ble among them are — Indian concern, 
exacerbated by past experiences, about 
U.S. willingness to provide even a 
limited supply of arms to Pakistan and 
continuing differences over means of 
attaining nonproliferation objectives. 

Our nonproliferation policies con- 
tinue to be of the highest importance to 
us, and we have made them clear in our 
discussions over the last 2 years not 
only with India but with Pakistan as 
well. 

We take India and its views seri- 
ously, and our two governments are 
engaged in a wide range of consulta- 
tions on bilateral and multilateral 
issues — all in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect, trust, candor, and cooperation. 

Indian Ocean 

Let me turn to the question of U.S.- 
Soviet negotiations on the military bal- 
ance in the Indian Ocean. For reasons 
which have been widely discussed. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED I\ATIOI\S: f tMplettietilltijr 
Human Rights Standards 



by Edward M. Mezvinsky 

Statement in Committee III (Social, 
Humanitarian and Cultural) of the 
U. N. General Assembly on December 
7. Mr. Mezvinsky is U.S. Representa- 
tive to the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights.' 

In an earlier statement in this com- 
mittee, the U.S. delegation discussed 
various proposals for improving the 
human rights machinery and programs 
of the U.N. system. Today we wish to 
discuss the substance of the work of the 
U.N. human rights bodies and in par- 
ticular the work of the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Economic and 
Social Council. 

It is important for all of us to recog- 
nize the new task the world community 
has assumed. In the past, the U.N.'s 
work in the human rights field was 
largely devoted to codification of inter- 
national standards which were designed 
to elaborate on the principles laid down 
in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 30 years ago. But this vital 
work of codification has largely been 
completed. So it was natural and desir- 
able that the world community in- 
creasingly turn to the even more vital 
but more difficult work of implementa- 
tion. 

We should approach this task with 
both determination and humility. What 



is being attempted is, at the same time, 
both necessary and unprecedented. In- 
deed, until recently in history the very 
concept of international standards of 
human rights was unthinkable. A 
sovereign owned a territory and its 
people the way he possessed its grass 
and trees. If a piece of territory was 
given at last to a new sovereign, the 
people were expected, without com- 
plaint, to submit to the will of their 
new leader, however cruel. 

It was only in the aftermath of World 
War II that the international community 
began, in the kind of step that marks an 
advance in civilization, to recognize 
new standards of behavior applicable to 
states as well as people. 

As my government reviews the work 
of the United Nations in the human 
rights field, therefore, we are con- 
scious of the importance of the work 
being undertaken. We want to move 
ahead today: at the same time we must 
think about tomorrow. We want to lay 
the foundation stones as solidly as we 
can. 



Human Rights Treaties 

An important step in the implemen- 
tation process is the ratification by 
states of the international agreements 
on human rights. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Eco- 



South Asia (Cont'd) 

neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union wishes to see a large-scale in- 
crease in the other's military presence 
in the Indian Ocean area. 

Negotiations on an Indian Ocean 
arms limitations agreement were begun 
in 1977 and provided an area of at- 
tempted cooperation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
The negotiations were aimed at 
stabilizing the level of U.S. and Soviet 
military presence in the area. 

We held four rounds of discussions; 
the last meeting took place in February 
1978. However, at that time we ex- 
pressed our concern that the Soviet 
Union was supporting its political ac- 
tivities in the Horn of Africa by in- 
creasing the level of its naval forces in 
the Indian Ocean. We questioned if this 
was consistent with the objective of 
stabilization. The increased Soviet 



naval presence continued until later m 
1978 at which point it returned to ap- 
proximately routine levels. 

A future round of discussions has not 
been scheduled, and there are no cur- 
rent plans for resumption of negotia- 
tions, although this matter remains 
under consideration. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. 

^For full text of his statement on Mar. 16,. 
1978, see Bulletin of May 1978, p. 48. 

'Deputy Assistant Secretary Adolph (Spike) 
Dubs was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Af- 
ghanistan in July 1978. He was kidnapped in 
Kabul by terrorists on Feb. 14, 1979. and 
killed the same day during an attempt by Af- 
ghan police to free him from his captors. 



nomic. Social, and Cultural Rights 
were opened for signature on December 
19, 1966, and both covenants came 
into force in 1976 after the required 
number of states had ratified. Last year 
President Carter signed the two cove- 
nants in a ceremony here at the United 
Nations and subsequently submitted 
both documents to the U.S. Senate for 
ratification. The process of ratification 
has not yet been completed. 

However, what is even more impor- 
tant than an examination of the list of 
ratifications is for us to concentrate on 
whether states are striving to live ac- 
cording to the principles in those cov- 
enants, whether they have been ratified 
or not. Ratification of a document is of 
no value to the citizens of a state if 
they are still deprived of their basic 
rights. 

The citizens of the United States 
have a deep awareness of their found- 
ing principles, and after 200 years they 
continue to bind us together and to de- 
fine our national identity. A deep pop- 
ular commitment to justice — social as 
well as political — is the life blood of 
our system of government, encouraging 
all sectors of our population regularly 
to seek to redress new or old in- 
equalities. We have never claimed that 
our society is unblemished. Nor should 
we accept that any other society is un- 
blemished. No society ever will be. As 
old struggles are won, new struggles 
will arise. This is a basic law of social 
development. 

We believe the first honest step to- 
ward implementation of basic human 
rights principles would be for every 
government to acknowledge more of its 
imperfections and to announce its 
commitment to end or ameliorate them. 
What we can never allow is our collec- 
tive efforts to promote human rights to 
diminish because no country has yet 
reached the state of perfection outlined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 

Commission on Human Rights 

We must honestly face up to the fact 
that at times we appear to be falling 
into the trap of ignoring shocking vio- 
lations of human rights crying out for 
our attention. Thus, in spite of the fact 
that the international community has 
made a great deal of progress on paper 
in establishing norms and principles, 
there continue to exist today situations 



April 1979 

in a few areas which demand much 
more international attention than they 
have received. Precisely because we 
shall never forget the great suffering of 
peoples in the past, such as the 
tragedies that befell the Armenian and 
the Jewish peoples, we should now re- 
double our efforts on the most serious 
current cases. At its past session, the 
Commission on Human Rights ad- 
dressed the situations in several coun- 
tries and took concrete action to inquire 
into the situations in Uganda and Cam- 
bodia. 

It is relevant to the world's concern 
about the human rights situations in 
these latter countries, and our pos- 
sibilities for ameliorating worsening 
conditions there, that both are involved 
in military conflicts among neighbors, 
using arms provided by third powers. 
Both in Uganda and in Indochina, we 
condemn this role by outsiders, which 
shows their lack of concern about the 
improvement of human rights viola- 
tions within those countries. 

We have noted that the delegation of 
Uganda at this session of the General 
Assembly referred to cooperation by 
Uganda with the United Nations con- 
cerning the situation in their country. 
We hope that this approach will lead to 
useful results, and we look forward to 
further consideration of this subject at 
the coming session of the Commission. 

Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos 

No discussion of the state of human 
rights in today's world would be com- 
plete or even pertinent without a more 
detailed discussion of the serious 
human rights situation in the three 
countries of what was known as In- 
dochina. The increasing flow of refu- 
gees from those three countries points 
to drastic human rights abuses and is 
creating a serious source of interna- 
tional tension and conflict. 

Despite difficult terrain, high seas, 
and other threats to life posed by armed 
border guards and shore patrols, 
thousands of refugees are reaching 
other Southeast Asian states, each with 
his own personal report of oppression 
in his homeland. These reports are too 
consistent in detail to be dismissed. 
The world must heed them. 

The world's extraordinary concern 
about Kampuchea was prompted by 
repeated reports that whole categories 
of people — economic and ethnic 
groupings — have been systematically 
eliminated by the Kampuchean Gov- 
ernment. The practice of religion is 
banned; legal and political rights are 
nonexistent. The government officially 
discriminates between those who 
"joined" the revolution early and 



those who came under its control with 
the final days of the previous regime. 

Despite unspeakable accounts of 
human suffering as related to Kampu- 
chean refugees, there are still those 
who question the persuasive evidence 
of mass violations. 

Responding to world concern gener- 
ated by these abuses, delegates to the 
recent meetings of the human rights 
subcommission in Geneva had the op- 
portunity to review the massive evi- 
dence from many sources. The sub- 
commission was convinced, and rec- 
ommended for priority consideration, 
an analysis of the evidence to the next 
meeting of the Human Rights Commis- 
sion. But is this enough? 

During his general debate address, 
the Secretary of State for External Af- 
fairs of Canada called for an investiga- 
tion of the human rights situation in 
Kampuchea. My government has con- 
sistently supported the idea. 

We have also noted the greater will- 
ingness of Kampuchean leaders to 
allow foreign observers to visit their 
country. We urge that they also coop- 
erate with the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission. Because of both the 
human rights problems and the severe 
conflict in the area, we also urge that 
both Vietnam and Kampuchea allow a 
visit by Secretary General Waldheim to 
the area. 

In Vietnam, the human rights situa- 
tion is forcing tens of thousands of in- 
dividuals to flee. Harsh measures taken 
by the Vietnamese Government against 
whole categories of its citizenry and 
the forced settlement of thousands of 
Vietnamese to "new economic zones" 
appear to be principal reasons for the 
expanding exodus. We are also con- 
cerned that tens of thousands of those 
who did not immediately embrace the 
regime remain incarcerated without 
trial in "reeducation camps." 

We are also concerned about the 
situation in Laos where minority 
tribespeople are leaving as a direct re- 
sult of military pressures. Other Lao 
appear to be leaving for a broad range 
of reasons, most of which derive from 
that government's authoritarian rule 
and food shortages which derive from 
natural disasters and poor agricultural 
planning. 

The abuse of human rights in In- 
dochina constitutes a world concern, as 
undertaken to care for the scores of 
thousands of refugees who have in des- 
peration sought to build new lives 
abroad. This problem must be ad- 
dressed by this world body as a matter 
of the utmost urgency. 

In all these countries, it is clear with 
hindsight that they would have been 
better off not to hide their human rights 



53 



problems but to attempt to solve them 
in a manner consistent with the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 

Worldwide concern continues about 
the human rights situations in many 
other countries. The longer that these 
situations remain in darkness, the 
deeper the suspicions grow. We hope 
that countries about which substantial 
allegations have been raised will not 
make the mistakes we have seen but 
will think again about cooperating with 
officials of the United Nations and other 
international bodies so that the full 
facts — including those that reflect well 
on the country in question — may be 
brought to light. And more impor- 
tantly, we hope that, if there is truth to 
the allegations, these countries will 
take courses of action which can bring 
about respect for human dignity and 
legal process, as well as for the con- 
cerns of the international community. 
Above all, I hope that all of us will not 
be silent the next time. 

Chile 

The question of the protection of 
human rights in Chile will once again 
be considered under this item. This has 
been for my delegation, since the mat- 
ter was first raised in the General As- 
sembly in 1974, a matter of profound 
concern. The long history of close and 
harmonious relations between the 
peoples of Chile and the United States 
underlies our special interest in the 
human rights situation there. We have 
had deep and heartfelt sympathy for the 
trials which the Chilean people have 
undergone in recent years, and we have 
been particularly anxious to assure that 
actions taken by the General Assembly 
on this matter would be those which 
were best designed to influence in a 
positive way the course of events in 
that country so that basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms would be re- 
stored and fully respected. 

An event of special significance took 
place this year. The fact that the ad hoc 
working group of the Human Rights 
Commission was at last able to visit 
Chile was extremely gratifying to my 
government. While regretting that the 
cooperative spirit shown by the Gov- 
ernment of Chile in admitting the group 
could not have come about much 
sooner, we nevertheless welcome the 
fact that the visit did take place. 

We have read with particular interest 
the report of the ad hoc working group 
which has recently been issued because 
it is the only one which is based upon a 
firsthand observation of the scene in 
Chile. My government takes particular 
note of that paragraph in the report of 
the ad hoc working group to the effect 



54 

that the information received by the 
group while in Chile does not con- 
tradict the substance and conclusions 
which the group has previously sub- 
mitted to the General Assembly and to 
the Commission on Human Rights. The 
group also notes that persons of stature 
within Chile have told the group that 
the information in its earlier reports 
was accurate. 

We will be taking care to assure that 
the action we propose for the Assembly 
this year will be in view of the most 
recent developments, as reported by the 
ad hoc working group. Some of these 
developments have been encour- 
aging — the group reports that some 
improvements have taken place. At the 
same time, other developments have 
been discouraging — the group reports 
its conclusions that violations of 
human rights, often of a serious na- 
ture, continue to take place and that 
this situation should continue to be a 
matter of concern to the international 
community. My delegation agrees that 
the United Nations must continue to 
follow the human rights situation in 
Chile. 

We will be striving for actions which 
will most likely be effective in reach- 
ing, as soon as possible, the goal which 
we all seek — the full and complete res- 
toration of all human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms within that country. 

My final word on the subject of 
Chile must be to note our concern over 
the continuing problem of the disap- 
peared persons. There is too much an- 
guish and torment on the part of the 
relatives of these persons mixed up in 
this question for us to wash our hands 
of it. We must insist that the facts be 
clarified and that those who still remain 
in the dark about the fate of their rela- 
tives will finally know for sure what 
has happened. 

The problem of missing persons is 
not limited to Chile alone. The United 
States views the use of officially 
sanctioned political kidnappings to be 
one of the most serious governmental 
abuses confronting the international 
community. It requires prompt action 
by the United Nations to press for its 
end. 



Missing Persons 

Historically, the tragedy of missing 
persons resulted from the aftermath of 
war. In recent years, it has become a 
deliberate policy of certain govern- 
ments; a policy aimed at the silent 
elimination of opponents. As a result, 
thousands of persons have been de- 
tained by government security forces, 
tortured, and perhaps killed; yet their 
fate remains enclosed in governmental 
silence. 



Anyone who has talked with parents 
or children or wives of people who 
have disappeared knows the intense 
anguish and suffering they undergo and 
the destruction of spirit they endure. 
The individual stories are heartrending 
and tragic. 

• A young woman, her husband, and 
their infant son were dragged from 
their home by security forces. The 
child was found in an orphanage; the 
parents were never heard from again. 
The government denies all knowledge 
of their disappearance. 

• A peasant farmer was pushed into 
a waiting van by uniformed police. He 
did not return. The government denies 
all knowledge of the disappearance. 

• A physicist was dragged away 
from his home by plainclothes police 
forces. He was not heard from again. 
The government denies all knowledge 
of the disappearance. 

• A clergyman was abducted from 
his home by security forces, interro- 
gated, and tortured incessantly by his 
captors and then never heard from 
again. The government denies all 
knowledge of the disappearance. 

• A 14-year-old boy was picked up 
on his way from school and his father 
dragged from his home. Neither was 
heard from again. The government de- 
nies all knowledge of the disappear- 
ance. 

The victims range across the broad 
spectrum of society. They include stu- 
dents, workers, doctors, labor leaders, 
clergy, scientists, and journalists. They 
are the targets of both right-wing and 
left-wing authoritarian regimes who 
view them as a threat. Virtually all are 
tagged as "subversive" by govern- 
ments which have used that word so 
indiscriminately that it has lost all 
meaning. Some who disappear may be 
suspected of actual criminal acts of 
violence — which we all condemn — 
regardless of the political goal they 
pursue. 

Yet for all of these individuals, there 
is no trial, no court, no legal proce- 
dures to judge guilt or innocence. They 
disappear under administrative orders 
from a government, a military com- 
mand, a security subdivision. They 
disappear because security forces have 
been given nearly unlimited power to 
arrest, search, interrogate, torture, im- 
prison, and even execute without ac- 
countability. 

The Nobel Prize-winning non- 
governmental organization. Amnesty 
International, has termed this disturb- 
ing new tendency "political killings." 
Its International Executive Committee 
Chairman said; "It has become too 
complicated to arrive at someone's 
house with a warrant for arrest, take 



Department of State Bulletin' 

him away, investigate, bring him to ; 
trial, sentence, and imprison. It's so 
much easier for governments to send 
out their plainclothes agents to kidnap, 
torture, and shoot. This type of wan- 
tonly illegal repression. . . must 
be . . .exposed; and the response from 
those governments. . . that they have 
no responsibility or power to control 
the vigilante groups is not a satisfac- 
tory answer. The governments are re- 
sponsible." 

In confronting domestic violence or 
terrorism, governments have the au- 
thority to use legal means to restore 
public peace and order and protect the 
lives and safety of their citizens. When 
terrorists kidnap and kill defenseless 
victims, governments must seek to 
bring them to justice; but not by using 
the same methods of the terrorist. Even 
in such emergencies, there is no basis 
under domestic or international law for 
governments to engage in abductions, 
torture, or murder. Governments claim 
to be the custodians of law; yet when 
they engage in campaigns of terror, 
they undermine the rule of law as well 
as their own right to govern. 

International law, as set forth in the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Article 4), the Euro- 
pean Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms (Article 15), and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 
27) prohibits states, even in times of 
public emergency, from derogating 
from certain fundamental guarantees 
afforded the individual. Under no cir- 
cumstances can a state arbitrarily de- 
prive its citizens of their life or subject 
them to torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
Governments are responsible for the 
safety and protection of those detained. 
They also are responsible for rendering 
an accounting of the whereabouts and 
fate of those apprehended. 

The General Assembly in December 
1977 (Resolution 31/121) drew atten- 
tion to the "special dangers" to which 
persons detained "by reason of their 
political opinion or conviction" are 
often "exposed" as regards "the pro- 
tection of their human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms." A resolution 
adopted by consensus called upon 
member states to "safeguard" the 
human rights of this special category of 
prisoners. 

The twin principles of accountability 
and of humanitarian and legal access 
for persons deprived by any authority 
of their personal liberty are recognized 
in the Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims of 1949, the 
recently signed 1977 protocols to those 
conventions. Article 36 of the Vienna 
Consular Convention of 1963, Articles 



April 1979 

8-11 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, corresponding provi- 
sions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the draft 
body of principles for the protection of 
all persons under any form of detention 
or imprisonment, as adopted this fall 
by the U.N. Subcommission on Pre- 
vention of Discrimination and Protec- 
tion of Minorities. 

The Geneva conventions testify to 
what governments accept as treaty law, 
even in armed conflict, where states 
tend to preserve the greatest latitude for 
taking emergency measures as a matter 
of national self-preservation. They 
also reflect the understanding that sol- 
dier and civilian prisoners alike are en- 
titled to respect by the authorities for 
their right to life, to humane treat- 
ment, and judicial guarantees. 

At a very minimum, governments 
must be urged to issue statements re- 
flecting kidnappings or other excesses 
and insuring that those guilty of such 
practices will be punished in accord- 
ance with law. They must publish lists 
of those missing and provide death 
certificates for those known to be 
killed. They must consider ways to 
award compensation to families, to re- 
turn remains to relatives, and, most 
importantly, to establish a governmen- 
tal mechanism, together with the 
courts, to trace missing people and 
clarify their status for their relatives. 

A central characteristic of the 20th 
century profoundly distinguishing it 
from previous centuries is the recogni- 
tion that governments are obliged to 
protect the fundamental human rights, 
safety, and well-being of their citizens. 
No nation in the world today can hide 
politically-sanctioned abductions and 
murders, torture, or other gross viola- 
tions of human rights behind assertions 
of sovereignty. Where basic human 
rights are concerned, all governments 
are accountable not only to their own 
citizens but to the entire community of 
nations. Governments are committed to 
protect their citizens' right to liberty 
and security of person; their right to 
freedom from torture, to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; the 
right to fair public trials; and to free- 
dom from invasion of the home. 

At this General Assembly session, it 
is incumbent upon the world commu- 
nity to draw attention to the special 
dangers existing in those societies 
where substantial numbers of persons 
have disappeared and remain unac- 
counted for. 

In this modem era, 30 years after the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the world commu- 
nity must seek to make midnight ar- 
rests, summary executions, torture, 
disappearance, and failure to account 



for the missing alien to the experience 
of any nation. 

Let us take a first step by endorsing a 
resolution on missing persons, thereby 
generating support for long awaited 
action on this tragic, humanitarian 
problem. 

The 1503 Procedures 

We are encouraged with the dignity 
and wisdom with which the Human 
Rights Commission's subcommission 
has handled its mandate under 
ECOSOC Resolution 1503, which es- 
tablishes confidential procedures for 
examining allegations of violations of 
human rights. After several years of 
rather futile debate immediately fol- 
lowing the adoption of this resolution, 
this year the subcommission and the 
Human Rights Commission finally 
began to come to grips with the large 
number of allegations and acted on 10 
cases, as reported to the Economic and 
Social Council. 

It is only in taking seriously allega- 
tions about human rights violations in 
any nation, in all regions of the world, 
about any category of human rights, 
that the United Nations will be able to 
escape the accusation of following a 
double standard, blaming a few 
scapegoats instead of maintaining a 
balanced approach. We believe the 
Human Rights Commission demon- 
strated a new maturity this year in con- 
sidering seriously cases in nearly a 
dozen nations. We have great hopes 
that Resolution 1503 will be utilized 
even more in future years and that all 
nations will lose their fear of respond- 
ing to inquiries that may be addressed 
to it under this procedure. 

Struggle Against Torture 

In April 1977, before the Economic 
and Social Council, U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N. Andrew Young said that he 
believed that the United Nations should 
set priorities in its struggle for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in 
order to concentrate our resources and 
focus our attention. One of the three 
priorities he suggested was the struggle 
against torture, which he called "the 
leading edge of oppression" and which 
is surely an affront to the conscience of 
the international community. 

We are glad to note that the 
worldwide appeals from many 
groups — including the world religious 
communities and the growing concern 
of governments during the past 4 or 5 
years — have finally begun to show 
some progress and that apparently there 
are fewer cases of torture in the world 
today than there were even 2 or 3 years 
ago. 



55 

We are also alarmed by the use of 
modern science to engage in more 
sophisticated forms of torture, includ- 
ing the professional misuse of psy- 
chiatric wards to silence legitimate ex- 
pression of political opinions. 

We welcome the draft resolution 
sponsored by the Netherlands, India, 
and Sweden and express our commit- 
ment to a speedy conclusion of the 
drafting process of the treaty against 
torture. We cannot cease our concern 
nor our vigilance in this area. 

Freedom of Religion 

In a survey of the overall human 
rights record in the United Nations for 
the past year, there is one particular 
area which stands out for special 
notice. My government and my country 
attach deep importance to the right of 
everyone to freedom of thought, con- 
science, and religion. As stated in Ar- 
ticle 18 of the Universal Declaration, 
this right includes freedom to change 
one's religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with 
others and in public or in private, to 
manifest one's religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship, and obser- 
vance. 

We have already had occasion to 
discuss the very disappointing record 
so far achieved by the Commission on 
Human Rights in drafting a declaration 
on religious intolerance. Everyone in 
this room knows that my government is 
eager for the drafting exercise to go 
forward. But our concern is not be- 
cause we want to see another document 
added to the collection already pro- 
duced in the United Nations. It is be- 
cause we know that freedom of religion 
is a freedom that is widely denied in 
the world today. It is a freedom in 
which every country represented here 
should be interested, because this is the 
freedom which applies not just to reli- 
gions in a particular country or area of 
the world but to each of the many reli- 
gions which are practiced throughout 
the world. 

There are countries in the world 
today where Muslims are denied the 
practice of their religion, where Jews 
are discriminated against, where 
Christians are unable to worship freely. 
I urge all of you to pay greater atten- 
tion to this question and to join to- 
gether to resist those who would 
obstruct the efforts of this body to 
make into a reality throughout the 
world the words of Article IS of the 
Universal Declaration. 

I repeat, this is not a problem which 
should be the concern of just one or 
two countries or of one or two reli- 
gions. Everyone who professes a reli- 
gion, regardless of the particular be- 



56 

liets with which his religion may be 
identified, will benefit in direct meas- 
ure as this Organization can succeed in 
strengthening the observance of reli- 
gious freedom everywhere. 



Department of State Bulletin 



WE!$TERI\ HEMISPHERE: 

F\ 1980 Assistance Proposals 



Arrested or Detained Trade 
Unionists 

Last year the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 32/121 regarding 
the protection of the human rights of 
persons detained or imprisoned for 
their political opinions or convictions. 
This year that resolution is being spe- 
cifically applied to a certain category 
of persons — those arrested or detained 
on account of their trade union ac- 
tivities. My delegation strongly sup- 
ports this resolution. We firmly believe 
that at the heart of any healthy society 
lies a healthy trade union movement. 
History demonstrates that when human 
rights are violated and tyrannies used, 
the first to resist and the first to suffer 
is the trade union movement. 

In supporting the resolution, in 
document L.44, my delegation would 
like to note that it has been 30 years 
since the freedom to form and to join 
trade unions was proclaimed a basic 
human right in the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights and in the con- 
vention on freedom of association 
adopted that same year by the Interna- 
tional Labor Organization. We believe 
it is time for the United Nations to de- 
vote much more attention to this area. 

This resolution is directed to all 
member states. However, I would wish 
to note several specific examples. In 
South Africa, we have recently been 
encouraged by certain preliminary stir- 
rings toward the development of black 
trade unionism in that country. This 
resolution, if adopted, will serve notice 
that the United Nations and its member 
states will give special attention to the 
measure in which the Government of 
South Africa grants to its black citizens 
the right of association in trade unions 
of their own choosing. But here again 
we must avoid the double standard. 

We would also hope that this resolu- 
tion would be noted by the Govern- 
ments of Tunisia, Bangladesh, Argen- 
tina, Chile, and Uruguay — govern- 
ments to which the International Labor 
Organization has within the past year 
appealed for the release of trade 
unionists from imprisonment or deten- 
tion. 

We would hope that the resolution 
would also be noted by those Com- 
munist countries in which workers are 
beginning to insist on the exercise of 
their trade union rights. In China, Po- 
land, Romania, and the Soviet Union 
we have seen a small beginning. Some 



by Viron P. Vaky 



Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter- American Affairs of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on Feb- 
ruary 13, 1979. Mr. Vaky is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.^ 

I appreciate this opportunity to dis- 
cuss the Administration's proposed FY 
1980 foreign assistance program for 
Latin America. I will try to place this 
program in the context of our major 
interests and overall policy objectives. 

The importance of Latin America to 
the United States in economic terms is 
made obvious by the very large flow of 



goods, technology, and capital in both 
directions. Latin America is the source 
of one out of every six barrels of oil we 
import. U.S. investment in Latin 
America already exceeds $20 billion. 
Our exports to the area have tripled 
since 1967 to almost $20 billion annu- 
ally. We now sell more machinery,, 
consumer goods, and chemicals to 
Latin America than to the rest of the 
Third World combined. Three 
nations — Mexico, Brazil, and 
Venezuela — are among our top dozen 
trading partners. 

Less easily quantified, but no less 
important, are our political, 
psychological, and security interests in 
Latin America. To everyone's great 



workers have begun to speak out for 
their rights. Workers have gone on 
strike or attempted to form unions of 
their choosing, as guaranteed in the 
Universal Declaration. 

We believe this is an important test 
for the countries in question and for the 
international community. Such a cen- 
tral force in any community cannot 
forever be denied rights that are inter- 
nationally sanctioned and socially 
wise. 



Conclusion 

Finally, let me re-enforce what the 
United States has said on numerous oc- 
casions about the continuing impor- 
tance of economic and social rights. 

President Carter has said that the 
right to a job is a basic human right, 
and yet in my own country we have an 
unemployment problem. There is a 
massive problem in the world as a 
whole as millions flee the soil premat- 
urely to seek work they cannot find in 
the cities. The numbers of the im- 
poverished, the starving, the sick, the 
uneducated, the jobless — all over the 
world — are massive by any calculation. 
Ninety percent of the resources of the 
United Nations and its affiliated agen- 
cies are directed at this problem, and 
the bilateral assistance programs of my 
own and many other governments are 
aimed — in various ways — at making 
progress on this issue. 

The denial of life or health or 
schooling or employment is no less a 
denial of human rights because it re- 
sults from neglect or maldistribution of 
available resources or the lack of tech- 



nological skills to solve very real prac- 
tical problems. Our concern is for 
human beings whose rights are being 
denied, whatever the reason. 

We urge that the United Nations and 
its member countries continue their 
concerted efforts to address economic 
and social questions and to operate in- 
creasingly effective and efficient pro- 
grams that give even greater impact to 
limited resources that are available. We 
ask that these developed states that 
place special stress on economic and 
social rights now join with the rest of 
the developed countries in contributing 
their fair share to international efforts 
to solve these problems. We all can do 
more if we feel that everyone is work- 
ing together. The U.N. Charter deter- 
mined that a goal of this body is "to 
promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom." 
Let us work to that objective. 

I need not remind this group that this 
year we commemorate the 30th an- 
niversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. That and other legal 
documents prepared by this body chal- 
lenges us to put into practice the prin- 
ciples so carefully laid down by 
member governments. As worldwide 
concern for human rights, in all their 
forms, has grown over the past year, I 
urge that we seize this opportunity to 
make a quantum leap forward — to end 
human rights abuses and encourage 
member nations to foster new under- 
standing and concern for the rights of 
individuals everywhere. D 



'USUN press release 154. 



April 1979 



57 



;j(H)d fortune, our history of inter- 
American relations in recent years has 
hocn made up of movements of people 
laiher than of armies, of ideas rather 
than of threats. But the peaceful nature 
of our relations means only that Latin 
America is less in the headlines than. 
say, China, Iran, or the Soviet Union. 
It does not mean that we have no 
problems or that the problems are not 
important. 

While U.S. interests in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are strong 
and enduring, our relations with the 
nations of the region are undergoing a 
profound change. There is no better 
e\ idence of that than the budget re- 
t|ucsts you have before you now. They 
embody an apparent paradox: for de- 
spite the importance of Latin America 
to the United States and its direct im- 
pact on many basic U.S. interests, 
Latin America today receives less U.S. 
bilateral economic aid and military as- 
sistance than any other area in the de- 
\ eloping world. 

Today's programs are quite modest 
(Compared to» past U.S. assistance ef- 
forts. More importantly, they are ex- 
tremely modest in terms of the needs of 
the region. The $230 million economic 
I assistance program proposed for FY 
1980 is concentrated on a relatively 
lcv\ poorer countries — in the Carib- 
bean, Central America, and the 
Andes — and the proposed $38.7 mil- 
lion in security assistance, for exam- 
ple, would provide foreign military 
sales (FMS) credit for only six coun- 
tries. There is nothing in either cate- 
gory for the larger advanced develop- 
ing countries — Brazil, Mexico, Ven- 
ezuela, and Argentina. Indeed 70% of 
Latin America's people live in coun- 
tries not touched by our FY 1980 pro- 
posals. 

The modest bilateral economic pro- 
grams we are proposing are targeted at 
the worst aspects of poverty through a 
strategy of meeting basic human needs. 
They are a modest response to the 

■ pressing problems in the poorest coun- 
tries that blends development loans and 
technical cooperation. Our small mili- 
tary sales and training programs aim at 

■ the legitimate security needs of the re- 
gion and are carefully tailored to sup- 
port our political objectives, including 

' human rights. 

Secretary Vance noted in his state- 
ment before the full committee on 
February 5, that our strategy is one of 
affirmative involvement and support 

, for the independence and diversity of 
developing nations. This strategy is 
particularly important for our relations 
with Latin America. 

Relations in the hemisphere have 
changed. The Latins have widened 



their horizons while the United States 
is no longer such a dominant force. 
Military and equipment links now exist 
overwhelmingly with Europe — East 
and West — while we have slipped to 
fourth among all arms suppliers to the 
region; economic relationships — trade 
and investment — have been diversified 
toward Europe and Japan; while tradi- 
tional intellectual and cultural ties with 
Spain, France, and others have been 
strengthened. 

The significance of the North-South 
dialogue is that we are beginning to 
engage the countries of the developing 
world as active and effective partici- 
pants in the world economic system, 
ones increasingly well represented in 
its decisionmaking process. This link- 
age is important to us. Latin America's 
economic growth and that of the rest of 
the Third World has had an important 
and positive impact on growth rates in 
the industrialized world. 

These developments are basically 
healthy for everyone concerned. 
Strong, independent countries, operat- 
ing within and supported by a sound 
inter-American system and by a global 
economic and political framework, are 



our best assurance of peaceful, 
friendly, and economically sound 
neighbors in the hemisphere. 

Obviously, however, the new situa- 
tion requires careful definition of U.S. 
interests and objectives. In my experi- 
ence, U.S. assistance programs, in ad- 
dition to their own inherent reasons, 
are an integral part of the overall policy 
process. They provide major and direct 
support for key U.S. interests and ob- 
jectives which, in the hemisphere in 
their broadest terms, are: 

• To enhance Western Hemisphere 
security and create an environment in 
which the countries of the hemisphere 
will resort to peaceful means to settle 
disputes; to support regional arms re- 
straint efforts as a means to enhance 
security and stability in the area and 
free funds for development needs; 

• To prevent the proliferation of nu- 
clear weapons and weapons-making 
capabilities in the area; 

• To promote the increased observ- 
ance of all forms of human rights — 
individual rights, economic and social 
rights, and basic political rights; 

• To encourage economic growth 



Pan American Day 
and HVeek, 1979 



A Proclamation' 

Each year the peoples ot the Americas cele- 
brate our common origins and continuing 
mutual ties. To the people of the United States 
Pan American Day commemorates the impor- 
tance of mutual respect and cooperation which 
characterize the Inter-American system and its 
central institution, the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. 

No region of the world can boast a greater 
tradition of peace and tranquility among na- 
tions. No nations of the world have worked 
more consistently or harder to find solutions to 
the political and economic problems which they 
face in the world today. Our Organization of 
American States, the birth of which we will 
celebrate on April 14, has been and continues 
to be vital to this continuing effort. 

In the past year alone, the Organization of 
American States has made important contribu- 
tions to the welfare of the people of the hemi- 
sphere. It has helped to promote the cause of 
human rights and dignity in the Americas and 
to diffuse tensions in Central and South 
America. 

The United States, on Pan American Day 
1979. salutes the other nations of this hemi- 
sphere, and pledges its solidarity with them. 



and with the Organization of American States 
in the continuing efforts to achieve the vi- 
sionary democratic ideals of the founding 
heroes of our hemisphere. It is from these 
ideals that we derive our desire and our ability 
to cooperate for a common good and for the 
benefit of all our people. 

Now, Therefore, 1, Jimmy Carter, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, do hereby 
proclaim Saturday. April 14, 1979 as Pan 
American Day and the week beginning April 
15, 1979 as Pan American Week, and I call 
upon the Governors of the fifty States, the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, and appropriate officials of all other 
areas under the flag of the United States to 
issue similar Proclamations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set 
my hand this sixth day of March, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-nine, and of 
the Independence of the United States of 
America the two hundred and third. 

Jimmy Carter D 



•No. 4644 of Mar 6, 1979 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Mar. 12). 



58 

and development, with increased 
equity, and to strengthen U.S. eco- 
nomic relations with the area in trade, 
investment services, and technology 
transfer; and 

• To gain cooperation on many 
problems that directly affect daily life 
in the United States such as the nar- 
cotics trade, migration, and access to 
energy and raw materials. 

The basis of our programs lies in our 
own national interest. To the extent 
that we can help our poorer neighbors 
overcome the problems of poverty and 
live in greater security we can be more 
confident they will help us to deal with 
major problems of our own. 



Development Assistance 

The United States now has a small 
but vital program of bilateral economic 
assistance in Latin America. It is 
highly selective. Latin America is not a 
homogeneous region. The varying 
levels of development and domestic re- 
sources in the individual countries 
cover a wide spectrum. Our bilateral 
program concentrates on the smaller 
poorer countries and on rural poverty. 

This is not to say we are not also 
concerned with their larger neighbors 
or the broader aspects of economic de- 
velopment apart from rural poverty. 
We. of course, support the economic 
development of the entire region 
through our major participation in the 
international financial institutions, in- 
cluding the World Bank and the Inter- 
American Development Bank. 

Moreover, as these larger countries 
progress in their development, they no 
longer rely so heavily on concessional 
assistance from any source for resource 
transfers, but rather they participate in- 
creasingly as full-fledged members of 
the international economy. Thus, they 
look to us primarily to provide open 
markets for their trade and capital 
needs. Recently about 80% of the cap- 
ital inflow to Latin America has come 
from private, nongovernmental 
sources. In this connection, I might 
point out the importance to Latin 
America of timely, positive action by 
the Congress on such legislation as the 
extension of authority to waive our 
countervailing duties, ratification of 
the International Sugar Agreement and 
the results of the multilateral trade 
negotiations, and approval for the re- 
plenishment of the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank. 

There are other important aspects of 
our economic cooperation with the 
major part of Latin America where we 
do not have development assistance 
programs. These include our growing 



network of science and technology 
cooperation agreements and the recent 
initiative under the Agency for Inter- 
national Development's,. (AID) reim- 
bursable development programs. 

To return to the subject of this sec- 
tion of my testimony — the bilateral 
economic programs — I would like to 
make some general points. First, our 
bilateral development assistance re- 
quest in the region is a very modest 
one, totaling $230 million for FY 
1980. Fifty percent of our program re- 
sources will go to those countries with 
per capita incomes below $580 — Haiti. 
Bolivia. Honduras. El Salvador, 
Guyana, and the Associated States of 
the Caribbean. Even where we have 
programs in the so-called "middle in- 
come" Latin countries, our focus is on 
the very poorest sectors of these 
societies. In the middle-income coun- 
tries there are still large sectors — 
usually rural areas — where conditions 
of poverty are as severe as anywhere in 
the world. Thirty-seven percent — 
$86. 1 million — is for the nations of the 
Caribbean. 

We have been working intensively 
over the past 2 years to implement a 
regional strategy for the Caribbean. 
Last June, at our urging, the World 
Bank convened the first meeting of the 
Caribbean Group for Cooperation in 
Economic Development. This brought 
together the international financial in- 
stitutions, ourselves, and other donor 
countries and the recipient countries. 

The meeting agreed on establishing 
the Caribbean Development Facility 
(CDF) to meet the immediate and 
pressing needs in the area. With 
pledges at more than $115 million, this 
program is now being implemented. It 
has already become a key factor, and 
we are planning for a second meeting 
of the full group this year, as well as 
subgroups on particular countries. 
Another contribution to the CDF is a 
key part of our FY 1980 request, but 



Letters 
of Credence 



The following newly appointed Am- 
bassadors to the United States pre- 
sented their credentials to President 
Carter: Jose Antonio Bermudez Milla 
of Honduras on January II, 1979; 
Felipe Doroteo Monterroso Miranda of 
Guatemala on February 26; and Carlos 
Alfredo Lopez-Guevara of Panama on 
March I. D 



Department of State Bulletin 

we also want to support an increasing 
number of regional projects which will 
help to bring the countries of the area 
into additional cooperative arrange- 
ments as well as to improve living con- 
ditions for their poor. 

Bilateral programs also emphasize 
this sort of coordinated regional ap- 
proach to the common problems the 
Caribbean countries face. Further 
progress on regionalism and economic 
cooperation is made even more essen- 
tial by the difficult economic situations 
the newly independent states in the 
Caribbean will encounter. Their viabil- 
ity may well depend on cooperation. 

A key to continued progress in de- 
velopment even for the more advanced 
countries is maintaining the flow of 
modern technology and know-how to 
them. This transfer of technology 
issue, including the problem of adapt- 
ing technology to local needs, is one on 
which we are working in many ways. A 
new initiative we want to implement 
this year is the foundation for interna- 
tional technological cooperation. We 
expect it will be a useful tool in meet- 
ing a major need throughout the hemi- 
sphere. 

A problem area 1 want to commend 
to your attention is our inability to 
cooperate in meeting the critical 
short-range economic problems of 
countries whose cooperation we need 
to advance a wide range of U.S. inter- 
ests. In Latin America, some of these 
countries are now outside the range of 
our bilateral programs, but even for the 
rest our choices are severely restricted. 

In particular, we sometimes lack the 
flexibility and resources to share effec- 
tively in supporting even those friendly 
democratic countries in which we still 
have AID programs. I am referring to 
situations where short-term balance- 
of-payments crises force major reduc- 
tions in development programs and in 
some cases impinge on human rights 
conditions. Congressional directives 
requiring assistance to be in the form of 
projects and channeled to the poorest 
means long lead times and slow dis- 
bursement, when sometimes we need to 
make an impact immediately. 

Over the last decade, AID's re- 
sources have been gradually shifted 
away from Latin America to Asia, the 
Far East, and Africa. Comparing the 
development assistance authorization 
for Latin America in FY 1970 with our 
request for FY 1980, we see a decline 
from $418 million to $230 million. The 
region's share of total AID develop- 
ment assistance fell from 30% to 
15.6% over the same period. A 
dramatic effect of this decline is that in 
FY 1980 payments on principal and 
interest on previous AID loans to Latin 



April 1979 

America will total $205 million — an 
amount almost equal to new authoriza- 
tions. 

Although we understand the reasons 
for this decline — essentially the desire 
to concentrate on the world's poorest 
countries — it is also a cause for con- 
cern. Despite its favorable economic 
growth rate, Latin America has more 
people living in absolute poverty (less 
than $250 per year) today than it did a 
decade ago. There are perhaps 150 
million people, or 40-50%, of the still 
rapidly growing total population living 
in absolute poverty. 

Policy Objectives 

I have given you some general im- 
pressions of the significance of de- 
velopment assistance in Latin America 
and the conceptual context in which we 
work. I would attempt now to be 
somewhat more specific in identifying 
our policy objects. 

First is the broad question of 
strategy to maintain the momentum for 
continued economic development. U.S. 
bilateral economic and technical coop- 
eration in Latin America is not cur- 
rently designed as a resource transfer 
program. Its primary role is to transfer 
ideas and technical knowledge to build 
indigenous capacity in Latin and 
Caribbean countries to analyze and deal 
with poverty and newer global prob- 
lems. 

Second, in accordance with congres- 
sional directives, we are concentrating 
on seeing that our program addresses 
basic human needs of the poorest sec- 
tors in the recipient countries. Often 
this means rural health and agriculture 
programs. 

But we also face the growing global 
problems which threaten to impact on 
us all in a future that draws closer 
every day — environmental pollution, 
energy development and conservation, 
and population growth. These are a 
necessary complement to a basic 
human needs strategy. 

Third, we seek to maintain eco- 
nomic growth while spreading the 
benefits of growth more equitably. 
These are the economic rights we en- 
dorse and promote. 

Our human rights policy toward 
Latin America must be considered in 
the context of our global policy. We 
fully realize this policy has created 
strains and tensions in relations with 
some governments in Latin America as 
it has with governments in other areas. 
We regret that. We would like good 
relations with all, and we intend to 
continue our efforts to remove the ob- 



stacles to such relations. On the other 
hand, we are also determined to con- 
tinue our present human rights policy, 
tactfully, firmly, and, we hope, intelli- 
gently. 

I am sure 1 do not need to emphasize 
here how complex human rights issues 
can be. It would be absurd to attempt to 
calculate a precise debit and credit 
ledger of the results of our policy in 
Latin America. But it can be said that 
while there have been problems with 
some governments there has also been 
enthusiastic support for our policy from 
many important sectors of Latin 
American public opinion, including re- 
ligious leaders, intellectuals, the press, 
political parties, human rights groups, 
and labor unions. 

Our efforts have also had a salutary 
effect on the day-to-day application of 
human rights in many countries. 
Today, as compared with 2 years ago, 
in various countries there is less torture 
and murder, many political prisoners 
have been released, names of prisoners 



59 

have been published, there are fewer 
"disappeareds," states of seige have 
been lifted, the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission has been invited to 
visit many countries, and the American 
convention has been signed and 
ratified. 

In designing assistance programs we 
have paid special heed to the human 
rights factor. Bilateral aid has been se- 
verely restricted in several cases, but I 
would like to point to the positive pro- 
gram changes as well. 

Several countries, such as Peru, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia, are undergoing 
major political shifts that signal the 
return of popularly elected, constitu- 
tional governments. We are supporting 
this democratic trend through our AID 
programs. We have also tried to in- 
crease our bilateral assistance programs 
in a few countries with outstanding 
human rights records such as Costa 
Rica and the Dominican Republic. 

Ecuador is a unique case where we 
are proposing starting a new program 



Jftarititnc Boundary Treaties 



MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
JAN. 19' 

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent 
of the Senate to ratification, three treaties estab- 
lishing maritime boundaries; the Treaty on 
Maritime Boundaries between the United States 
of America and the United Mexican States, 
signed at Mexico City on May 4, 1978; the 
Maritime Boundary Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Ven- 
ezuela, signed at Caracas on March 28. 1978; 
and the Maritime Boundary Agreement between 
the United States of Amenca and the Republic of 
Cuba, signed at Washington. December 16, 
1977. 

These treaties are necessary to delimit the 
continental shelf and overlapping claims of 
jurisdiction resulting from the establishing of a 
200 nautical mile fishery conservation zone off 
the coasts of the United States in accordance 
with the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976, and the establishment of 200 nauti- 
cal mile zones by these neighboring countries. 

The treaty with Mexico establishes the 
maritime boundary between the United States 
and Mexico for the area between twelve and two 
hundred nautical miles off the coasts of the two 
countries in the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of 
Mexico. In this regard, it supplements the Treaty 
to resolve Pending Boundary Differences and 
Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as 
the International Boundary between the United 



States of America and the United Mexican 
States, signed at Mexico November 23. 1970, 
which establishes maritime boundaries out to 
twelve nautical miles off the respective coasts. 
The treaty with Venezuela establishes the 
maritime boundary between the two countries in 
the Caribbean Sea, between Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and Venezuela where the 
200 nautical mile zones overlap. The treaty with 
Cuba establishes the maritime boundary between 
the two countries in the Straits of Florida area 
and the eastern Gulf of Mexico where the 200 
nautical mile zones overlap. 

I believe that these treaties are in the United 
States interest. They are consistent with the 
United States interpretation of international law 
that maritime boundaries are to be established by 
agreement in accordance with equitable princi- 
ples in the light of relevant geographic circum- 
stances. They will facilitate law enforcement 
activities, and provide for certainty in resource 
development. 

I also transmit for the information of the Sen- 
ate the report of the Department of State with 
respect to each of these treaties. 

I recommend that the Senate give early con- 
sideration to these treaties and advice and con- 
sent to their ratification. 

Jimmy Carter D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Jan. 22. 1979. 



60 

in FY 1980 after several years without 
bilateral assistance. We are recom- 
mending $5 million of loans and grants 
focused on appropriate technology and 
training for small farmers. This will be 
tangible evidence of our support for the 
series of free elections already under- 
way for a new government in Ecuador. 
Of course 1 do not wish to imply that 
human rights violations have been 
eradicated in Latin America. But 
progress, encouraging progress, has 
been made in Latin America over the 
past 2 years. Once again, 1 do not wish 
to give the impression that the U.S. 
Government is solely or mainly respon- 
sible for that progress. The progress 
has been made by Latin Americans 
themselves, but we have made a con- 
tribution. 



Security Assistance 

I would also like to turn now to the 
security assistance side of our foreign 
assistance request. The amount we are 
asking for FY 1980— $38,734,000— is 
the smallest request for Latin America 
in the last decade. It is almost 30% less 
than we asked for last year, and it is 
less than half the amount we had in FY 
1978. A similar pattern is evident in 
our foreign military sales (FMS) cash 
and commercial arms sales to Latin 
America. The value of new contracts 
under both FMS cash and credit pro- 
grams reached a peak of $316 million 
in 1974 and declined to less than half 
that in 1976 and 1977. They recovered 
slightly m FY 1978 to $182 million. 
Commercial exports to Latin America 
licensed under the Arms Export Control 
Act peaked in 1976 at $162 million; in 
1978 they were less than one-fourth of 
that. 

In short, a very substantial change 
has taken place in the nature of our se- 
curity relationship with Latin America. 
The United States, until the mid-1960's 
the preeminent arms supplier to the re- 
gion, accounted in 1973-76 for only 
22% of total arms sales to Latin 
America. In 1977 and the first half of 
1978 we accounted for only 10%. We 
ranked behind West Germany, France, 
and the Soviet Union. Of the U.S. ma- 
teriel transferred, only about 25% rep- 
resented major end items, the balance 
being spare parts and support equip- 
ment. 

In part this was a natural and inevita- 
ble development. As European indus- 
try recovered from World War II and 
began aggressively to seek export mar- 
kets, and as Latin American 
nationalism and interest in avoiding 
over dependence on a single supplier 
grew, we would have seen in any event 
a decline in U.S. arms exports to the 



region. But much of the curtailment of 
our transfers in the last 2 years has 
been the result of the policy set by the 
Congress and the President. 

Sixteen countries received FMS 
credits in 1976-77, and 17 received 
international military education and 
training (IMET). In our proposal for 
FY 1980, only six will receive FMS 
credit and only 10 out of the 17 will 
receive IMET. Of the countries that 
have been wholly or partially dropped 
from the security assistance rolls, 
Argentina and Chile were, of course, 
excluded by legislative mandate. Four 
others — El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay — have signifi- 
cant unresolved human rights prob- 
lems, and both our implementation of 
the President's human rights policy and 
our interpretation of the provisions 
Congress has written into law required 
the elimination of security assistance to 
those countries. 

Haiti and Honduras have less serious 
human rights problems, but neither is a 
functioning democracy. For that rea- 
son, and in a year of general budget 
stringency, we have dropped our FMS 
credit financing there but retained 
small IMET programs. 

Reacting to the requirement for 
human rights reports, Brazil asked that 
it not be considered for any type of se- 
curity assistance, and that was also the 
reason for Guatemala's absence from 
the 1978 and 1979 programs. However, 
Guatemala requested, and we agreed to 
propose, IMET training in FY 1980. 

Costa Rica and Venezuela, both de- 
mocracies with outstanding human 
rights records, are no longer recipients 
of security assistance because they are 
able to meet their requirements through 
commercial and FMS cash channels to 
which they have full access. 

We have also carefully assessed both 
our government programs and each 
license we issue for commercial sales 
in light of the President's policy — 
which was last year also written into 
legislation — of arms transfer restraint. 
We believe it is not in the U.S. inter- 
est, nor in the interest of Latin 
America, to encourage the purchase of 
arms that are in excess of legitimate 
self-defense needs and that bear no re- 
lationship to the nature of the security 
threat faced by the recipient country. 
To do so only stimulates the purchase 
of additional arms by neighboring 
countries, with a resulting increase in 
international tension that causes con- 
cern to the entire hemisphere. 

Fortunately, most Latin American 
countries themselves have traditionally 
pursued a cautious and restrained pol- 
icy of arms acquisition, both because 
they have given priority to economic 



Department of State Bulletin' 

development and because they have, in | 
most cases, perceived a low external 
military threat. Latin America is the 
most lightly armed region in the world, 
historically the most peaceful, and it 
spends the least of any region on mili- 
tary materiel. About 2% of the regional 
GNP is devoted to defense, and some 
important countries spend less than 1% 
for that purpose. 

In addition, there has been increas- 
ing interest in Latin America during the 
last year in translating separate national 
policies of arms restraint into a 
region-wide understanding. Last June, 
the foreign ministers of the eight Latin 
American countries that had signed the 
1974 declaration of Ayacucho met here 
in Washington. They signed a state- 
ment reaffirming their countries' com- 
mitment to the declaration's goal of 
arms restraint, and they declared their 
intention "to explore, jointly with the 
other-Latin American countries, the 
possibilities of reaching an agreement 
for the limitation of conventional arms 
in Latin America." That exploration 
began at a meeting in Mexico City in 
August at which 20 governments were 
represented. 

There is expected to be a second 
conference this year, at which dele- 
gates will consider the specific propos- 
als presented at the Mexico City meet- 
ing. Among them are the establishment 
of a permanent mechanism through 
which the Latin American countries 
can consult on proposed arms pur- 
chases and the holding of a conference 
of all the principal arms suppliers to 
Latin America together with the pur- 
chasing countries. We do not expect a 
Latin American agreement on this 
complex and sensitive subject to be 
negotiated overnight — the United 
States has discovered that arms control 
negotiations are not easy or fast — but I 
think we can be pleased at the progress 
that has been made. The United States 
supports this Latin American initiative, 
and should the Latin American coun- 
tries decide to open negotiations with 
the arms suppliers on arms transfer re- 
straint, we are prepared to take an ac- 
tive part. 

I would be less than frank with this 
committee if I were to tell you that 
these policies — the defense of human 
rights, the self-restraint of arms trans- 
fers, the encouragement of restraint by 
others — had no costs for the United 
States. Of course they do. A reduction 
in our financing of arms purchases or 
the denial of an export license means 
the loss of a positive entry on the 
balance-of-payments ledger and the 
loss of a sale to an American company 
and to American workers. We have that 
very much in mind at every stage of the 



April 1979 

security assistance and license approval 
process. 

Bui our policies reflect our deeply 
held national beliefs about how we as a 
country ought to behave. Other coun- 
tries, even democratic ones, may re- 
gard the systematic suppression of 
human rights as no concern of theirs. 
We do not, and we have not since the 
foundation of this republic. Other 
countries, even democratic ones, may 
regard the sale of machine guns and 
tanks as indistinguishable from the sale 
of soap. We do not — even if it means, 
in some cases, the loss of the sale. 
These policies, as do most of our na- 
tional policies, carry costs. I believe 
they are worth paying, and I believe 
that view has support of the Congress. 



Principal Features 

I would now like to describe some of 
the principal features of the security as- 
sistance program we propose for FY 
1980. 

First, 1 want to direct your attention 
to an important new initiative in the 
training program. We are requesting 
$800,000 to cover the cost of new 
courses at U.S. military schools in 
arms restraint and international 
peacekeeping. Two of the courses — 
one for senior and one for middle-level 
officers — will teach the concept of 
arms control, primarily of restraint in 
the acquisition of conventional arms 
but also touching on nuclear prolifera- 
tion. The courses deal with the inter- 
relationship between arms procure- 
ment, national security, and regional 
stability and why arms restraint con- 
tributes to security and stability and an 
arms race does not. The problems of 
negotiating multilateral restraint 
agreements, including the need for 
confidence building measures, infor- 
mation exchange, and verification pro- 
visions, will be discus.sed. 

The other courses will deal with in- 
ternational truce observation and 
peacekeeping operations. The course 
for senior level officers will teach the 
history of such operations, their contri- 
bution to world peace, the growing 
need of the United Nations and the Or- 
ganization of American States (OAS) 
for properly trained and equipped per- 
sonnel, and the management and de- 
ployment of such units. The lower 
level courses will actually train partici- 
pants in working together in multina- 
tional, multilingual situations and help 
them work out solutions to the prob- 
lems of organization, communication, 
and logistics. 

This proposal would enable us to 
make a significant contribution in sup- 



port of U.N. peacekeeping functions to 
which we ourselves traditionally do not 
supply troop contingents. The Presi- 
dent's 1978 report to Congress on re- 
form and restructuring of the United 
Nations contained proposals for im- 
proving U.N. peacekeeping capabilities 
by encouraging the establishment of a 
U.N. peacekeeping reserve composed 
of national contingents trained in 
peacekeeping functions. The U.N. 
General Assembly adopted in De- 
cember 1978 a resolution cosponsored 
by the United States which invited all 
member states to consider the possibil- 
ity of training their personnel for U.N. 
peacekeeping operations and to con- 
sider supplying the Secretary General 
with information relating to standby 
capacities which could be made avail- 
able if required. 

Apart from the regional program, we 
are asking $4.4 million for fixed costs 
of the Canal Zone schools, the same 
amount requested in FY 1979 for that 
purpose. The total we are asking for 
individual country IMET programs is 
$3.2 million. That is 15% less than the 
President's request for Latin American 
country programs in FY 1979. In con- 
sequence, none of the individual coun- 
try requests exceeds the amount asked 
for in 1979, and most of them are re- 
duced. 

However, we found room for three 
countries not included last year: 
$60,000 each for the Bahamas and 
Barbados and $250,000 for Guatemala. 
I have already referred to Guatemala's 
request to reenter the IMET program 
this year. The training proposed for the 
Bahamas and Barbados reflects our 
concern that a great deal of important 
air and sea traffic passes through these 
islands and their territorial waters, but 
these countries lack sufficient trained 
government personnel in such essential 
activities as search and rescue and 
navigational safety. 

We are requesting authority to ex- 
tend FMS credits to only six countries: 
Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Re- 
public, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. 
No major new weapons systems will be 
financed; purchases will consist 
primarily of support and maintenance 
equipment, spare parts, and small 
amounts of ammunition. Several coun- 
tries are expected to be interested in 
patrol boats for antismuggling opera- 
tions, helicopters, trucks, and light ar- 
tillery. Where appropriate, we are en- 
couraging countries to use their credits 
increasingly for nonlethal equipment 
useful in civic action programs. For 
example, the entire FY 1979 credit for 
Bolivia will be used to purchase 
equipment for a military hospital which 
also serves the civilian population. 



61 

That, very sketchily, is our Latin 
American security assistance program 
for the coming year. As I said at the 
beginning, it is small, perhaps only 
one-half of 1% of all Latin American 
defense expenditures. But the impor- 
tance of this assistance far exceeds its 
size. It is a symbol of our interest in 
the security concerns of the Latin 
American nations. It is the tangible 
proof of our interest in working with 
them to meet their legitimate defense 
needs and to avoid excessive, de- 
stabilizing arms purchases. I ask your 
support for these objectives and for this 
program. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion let me try to sum up 
briefly the case for our assistance to 
Latin America. Because Latin America 
is close to us geographically, there are 
a great many interfaces between the 
United States and Latin America. Some 
are highly beneficial. Trade, invest- 
ment, banking, tourism, and cultural 
exchange come immediately to mind. 
Other relationships created by geo- 
graphic proximity are troublesome. Il- 
legal migration, narcotics trafficking, 
smuggling, pollution, and conflicts 
over fishing zones are obvious exam- 
ples. 

In addition, our proximity to Latin 
America gives increased significance 
for us to what happens there on such 
issues as nuclear nonprol iteration, con- 
ventional arms restraint, peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes, and last but not 
least improvement in human rights, in- 
cluding mitigation of the most trouble- 
some aspects of poverty and rapid 
population increase. 

At times our concern with these 
many interfaces has led us to articulate 
some kind of special relationship with 
Latin America. In this Administration 
we have consciously decided not to try 
to oversimplify these increasingly 
complex interrelationships in this way. 
The United States is a global power and 
has interests in all parts of the world. 
What we do in Latin America must be a 
consistent part of our global policies. 
Moreover, Latin America by itself has 
a growing global role. We welcome 
this growth and find that the countries 
of Latin America are increasingly ef- 
fective partners in global efforts for 
peace and improved living standards. 

While we cooperate more and more 
with the Latin American countries on 
the global stage, we must also 
strengthen our cooperation with them 
bilaterally and regionally, through the 
OAS and through support of coopera- 
tive subregional initiatives like those of 
the countries in the Caribbean group. 



62 



Panama Canal Treaty 
Legislation 



Following are President Carter's 
letters to the Congress of January 23. 
1979, transmitting a draft of proposed 
legislation to implement the Panama 
Canal Treaty and related agreements 
and statements before the Panama 
Canal Subcommittee of the House 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com- 
mittee by Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher on February 15 
and U.S. Ambassador to Panama Am- 
bler H. Moss, Jr., on February 26. 



DEPUTY SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER' 

1 am happy to meet with you today at 
the opening of this committee's hear- 
ings on legislation to implement the 
Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and re- 
lated agreements. Other witnesses from 
the State and Defense Departments, 
and other interested agencies, will 
comment on the legislation in detail, so 
I would like to step back and comment 



on the legislation from a more general 
perspective. 

We appreciate Chairman Murphy's 
[Congressman John M. Murphy of New 
York] cooperation in introducing the 
bill prepared by the Administration. 
We also welcome the opportunity to 
analyze the provisions of the bill he 
and you have separately introduced, as 
well as legislation introduced by Con- 
gressman [George V.] Hansen [of 
Idaho]. We particularly appreciate the 
committee's cooperation in scheduling 
these hearings early in this session of 
the 96th Congress. 

The implementing legislation will 
forge the major remaining link in the 
chain of events which, after 15 years, re- 
sulted in the two new treaties establish- 
ing arrangements for our future operation 
and defense of the Panama Canal, in 
cooperation with Panama. The legisla- 
tion will contribute directly to the se- 
curity, continuity, and efficiency of 
canal operations. It will provide a 
framework for effectively exercising 



Department of State Bulletin 

the substantial rights the United States 
obtained under the treaties. More 
broadly, such legislation, like the 
treaties, will contribute to the im- 
provement of our relations throughout 
the Western Hemisphere, helping to 
replace longstanding uncertainty and 
suspicion with a spirit of partnership 
and trust. 

It is true that the legislation is com- 
plex, raising technical issues of organi- 
zation and finances. But the legislation 
is nonetheless of great importance. Its 
passage is essential to the efficient and 
successful operation and defense of the 
canal under the Panama Canal Treaty 
of 1977. That treaty establishes the 
terms and conditions under which the 
United States will operate and defend 
the canal until the end of this century. 
The companion Treaty Concerning the 
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of 
the Panama Canal insures the canal's 
security both before and after the canal 
is transferred to Panama in the year 
2000. 

These treaties will come into force 
on October 1 of this year. They bind 
both countries under international law. 
The two countries have much to do to 
prepare for the changes which will 
occur on October 1 and thereafter. 

After that date, the United States 



Assistance Proposals (Cont'd) 

The fact that we have not articulated a 
catchy phrase to charactize our Latin 
relations does not mean we want to ne- 
glect these relationships. In fact, it is 
only by participating with our 
neighbors on matters of common con- 
cern that we can elicit the cooperation 
we need on narcotics, on migration, 
and in obtaining needed energy and raw 
materials. 

But the other side of the cooperation 
coin is that we must also be prepared to 
cooperate in areas of greatest impor- 
tance to our southern neighbors. Eco- 
nomic development is the highest 
priority objective of almost every one 
of these countries. They have made 
much progress but per capita GNP is 
still only one-seventh to one twenty- 
fifth of ours. The very education and 
awareness of possibilities that come 
with a little progress — the breaking of 
the traditional cycle of poverty — raise 
expectations and politically expressed 
demands for even more progress. 
Moreover, there is a general belief in 
Latin America that it is the technology 
and know-how available in the United 
States as well as capital from this and 
the global market that are the keys to 
the desired rapid development. 



As many of our southern neighbors 
have made more economic progress, 
their technicians and managers have 
become more competitive with ours in 
many fields. We therefore need to re- 
structure the relationships through 
which we cooperate with them. But we 
must not turn our back on their top 
priority — economic development — if 
we expect continued effective coopera- 
tion in those areas with direct and im- 
mediate impact on many Americans, 
such as narcotics, migration, and 
human rights. 

A second area in which Latin 
America has traditionally looked to the 
United States has been that of security. 
After World War II, we became the 
principal supplier of arms for their rel- 
atively modest military establishments. 
Tensions arising from arms restraint 
and human rights concerns have fun- 
damentally changed this relationship. 
Our interfaces are sufficiently broad 
and strong to enable us to manage these 
tensions. Over the long run, however, 
here also we must attain new and more 
appropriate forms of effective coopera- 
tion to enhance both the security of 
these friendly neighbors and our own 
security which would be much affected 
should hostile forces find increased 
hospitality to our south. 

The economic and security assist- 



ance requests you have before you are 
key to these two areas of economic and 
security cooperation. The economic as- 
sistance is a bare minimum to demon- 
strate our support for Latin America's 
number one objective; it already shows 
our efforts to stretch the available 
funding so that it will do as much as 
possible to assist the Latin countries in 
tapping what can be our largest contri- 
bution to their development — our 
know-how. Funding the IMET — the 
training that is now the most critical 
link in our military cooperation — is 
also at a minimal level, barely enough 
to sustain a basis for the communica- 
tion and cooperation that would be a 
vital necessity in a moment of crisis. 

As you consider these requests for 
authorizations, and as the debate on 
appropriations goes on, I hope you will 
keep in mind how important these 
minimum amounts are to provide the 
minimum basis for cooperation in this 
hemisphere — cooperation which car- 
ries direct benefits for every Ameri- 
can. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



April 1979 

will continue to operate and defend the 
canal. It will do so, however, not as 
virtual sovereign in the Canal Zone but 
rather as the partner in a cooperative 
enterprise with Panama. We will con- 
tinue to have the controlling voice, but 
Panama will also have a significant role 
to play. For both governments, the new 
situation will constitute an unprec- 
edented challenge. 

The way in which we exercise our 
rights and fulfill our obligations under 
the treaty will do much to help insure 
an efficient and secure Panama Canal. 
Thus, the legislation offers us an op- 
portunity to reaffirm and strengthen our 
basic objectives with relation to the 
canal. 

Planning for treaty implementation 
has gone forward on both sides in a 
spirit of sincerity and good will. 
Panamanian and U.S. officials, both 
civil and military, are working closely 
in approximately 30 separate bilateral 
working groups to plan for the adjust- 
ments which will occur under the 
treaty. We fully expect that the current 
atmosphere will be preserved and that 
we can look forward to a lasting new 
relationship with the Government and 
people of Panama. 

The new civilian government of 
President [Aristides] Royo has given 
treaty matters the highest priority. It 
has centralized its preparations for 
treaty implementation in a Panama 
Canal Authority. The Director of the 
new Authority is Gabriel Lewis 
Galindo. the former Ambassador to the 
United States, who was closely as- 
sociated with the negotiations leading 
to the treaty. The Panama Government 
has drawn heavily on many of its most 
qualified citizens to work on canal 
problems. 

Ancillary Agreements 

As required by the Panama Canal 
Treaty, three important ancillary 
agreements between our governments 
have recently been signed. 

• The first will relieve the United 
States from its current obligation to op- 
erate the air traffic control system in 
Panama and provides for a phased 
transfer of this function from the Fed- 
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) to 
the Government of Panama, over a 5- 
year period. 

• The second insures permanent 
U.S. use of a portion of Corozal 
Cemetery for the remains of American 
citizens. 

• The third will permit American 
citizens convicted of crimes in Panama, 
and Panamanians convicted in the 
United States, to serve their sentences 



63 



PRESIDENT'S LETTERS 
TO CONGRESS* 

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) 

I am pleased to forward herewith the text 
of proposed legislation to implement the 
Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and its Re- 
lated Agreements, I would appreciate its ur- 
gent consideration and timely passage by 
the Congress. 

Senate approval of the Canal Treaties last 
April, and the delivery of instruments of 
ratification m June, marked the beginning 
of a new and important phase in our rela- 
tions with the Republic of Panama and other 
nations of the Hemisphere. Under the 
Treaties, the United States will retain oper- 
ational control of the Canal and primary re- 
sponsibility for its defense until the end of 
this century. Panama will participate in the 
operation and defense of the Canal and will 
assume full responsibility for its operation 
when the Canal Treaty expires. Under a 
second treaty approved by the Senate the 
United States retains, permanently, the 
right to defend the Canal against any threat 
to its neutrality. 

The constitutional process of both coun- 
tries have now been completed, and the 
treaties will enter into effect on October I, 
1979. Under their terms, on that date the 
Canal Zone will cease to exist, the United 
States Government agencies known as the 
Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone 
Government will cease to operate within 
Panama, and general jurisdiction over the 
area as well as the performance of a number 
of important support functions will pass to 
Panama. Property transfers will become ef- 
fective in accordance with Treaty provi- 
sions. 

Under the Treaty, we will acquire exten- 
sive obligations and rights with respect to 
the Canal on October 1. We will not. how- 
ever, be in a position to exercise these 
rights in a manner which will fully protect 



our interests in the Canal unless legislative 
action is taken promptly. To assure a 
smooth transition and continued efficient 
Canal operation once the new Treaties come 
into force, the legislative framework — in 
which the agencies responsible for operat- 
ing and defending the Canal will be 
operating — must be established well in ad- 
vance so that they may make the necessary 
plans and preparations. 

Delay in adopting the legislation beyond 
May 31, 1979. could thus make conversion 
to the new system of Canal operation and 
defense less efficient and more costly. 
Moreover, uncertainty concerning the pro- 
posed legislative protection and benefits for 
Canal employees will increasingly affect 
employee morale and complicate the proc- 
ess of making necessary personnel adjust- 
ment. The consequent disruptive impact on 
the work force could reduce the efficiency 
of Canal operations and adversely affect the 
interests of U.S. shippers and consumers. 

Our stewardship of the Panama Canal has 
been one of the outstandingly successful un- 
dertakings of American history. 1 urge the 
Congress to consider this legislation as a 
step toward the completion of another 
chapter in that history — one in which we 
will join with Panama to keep the Canal 
open, efficient and secure. In doing so. I am 
confident that this Government will main- 
tain a system of management and a standard 
of performance of which all Americans can 
continue to be proud. 

Jimmy Carter 



*Text of identical letters addressed to 
Thomas P. O'Neill. Jr.. Speaker of the 
House, and Walter F. Mondale. President of 
the Senate; text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Jan. 29. 1979 
(also printed as House Doc. 96-39 of Jan. 
24 which includes draft of proposed legis- 
lation). 



in their own countries. This last agree- 
ment is similar to treaties we have with 
Mexico and Canada. 

Thus planning and preparation for 
treaty implementation are proceeding 
in an orderly and cooperative manner. 
For this important process to continue, 
implementing legislation should be 
enacted as expeditiously as possible. 
To a large degree, it is the legislation 
that will determine how the Treaty will 
work in practice. 

Proposed Legislation 

Let me briefly outline the legislation 
we have proposed. 

• It will establish, and provide for 



the operation of. the new entity which 
will manage and operate the canal until 
the year 2000 — the Panama Canal 
Commission. 

• It will establish a financial system 
to assure that the canal will continue to 
operate on a self-sustaining basis. 

• It will establish the basis for de- 
termining the level of tolls. 

• It will establish new conditions of 
employment, labor relations, and re- 
tirement for U.S. Government civilian 
employees in Panama, including those 
of the Defense Department. 

• It will establish a system of U.S. 
criminal jurisdiction for the 30-month 
transition period which begins on the 
effective date of the treaty. 

• It will make other aspects of the 



64 

existing body of U.S. legislation con- 
cerning the canal conform with the new 
treaty. 

Clearly, the legislation involves 
many matters of technical detail. But it 
also embodies some important deci- 
sions about the way in which the 
United States will carry out its treaty 
rights and responsibilities. In this re- 
gard, it is helpful to have three bills 
providing for treaty implementation 
— one, H.R. 1716, from the executive 
branch: another very similar bill, H.R. 
454. from Congressman Hansen; and 
the third. H.R. Ill, prepared by 
Chairman Murphy. The latter suggests 
certain alternative arrangements, pro- 
ceeding from the thorough study of the 
subject made under the direction of the 
chairman. 

In many respects the three bills are 
similar. But in others they differ, pos- 
ing issues which deserve full consid- 
eration. Other Administration 
witnesses will be prepared for exten- 
sive discussion of these issues. I can 
assure you that we will work construc- 
tively with your committee, and other 
concerned committees, to produce an 
effective statute. 

The Need for Prompt 
Legislative Action 

Let me now say a word about timing. 
Prompt passage of appropriate legisla- 
tion is critical. Sufficient lead time is 
required to plan and prepare for the 
new situation which will prevail after 
October 1 of this year. 

The authorities responsible for treaty 
implementation must have a clear un- 
derstanding, well in advance, of the 
legal framework in which the canal will 
be operating after that date. They must 
know what legal requirements will 
exist in order to prepare a budget, carry 
out personnel transfers and reductions, 
and transfer certain functions and ac- 
tivities to other U.S. Government 
agencies. 

In addition, the employees of the 
canal enterprise need and deserve ad- 
vance knowledge of the terms and con- 
ditions under which they may continue 
working, so that they may make ra- 
tional decisions about their futures and 
so that the canal enterprise may main- 
tain a competent and dedicated work 
force. 

In this connection, I would like to 
comment briefly on H.R. 1511, a sec- 
ond bill introduced by Congressman 
Hansen which would seek to preclude 
not only implementation of the treaty 
but even preparation for implementa- 
tion until the Congress has completed 
action on a bill to provide appropria- 
tions for these activities. Legislation of 



this nature would seem both unneces- 
sary and prejudicial to U.S. interests. 

To prohibit preparation for im- 
plementation would serve only to de- 
prive our canal operating authorities, 
our military forces, and our employees 
of the ability to insure a smooth and 
orderly transition when the treaties do 
enter into force. It is in our national 
interest that we plan and prepare as 
thoroughly as possible for the transition 
that will take place October 1, and 
early passage of the implementing 
legislation is a key element of this 
process. 

I would hope, therefore, that in both 
Houses of Congress the arrangements 
made to insure prompt treatment of this 
legislation will be observed. We hope 
that legislation can be passed by June 
1. Delay beyond that date would de- 
crease the efficiency and hence in- 
crease the cost of the conversion proc- 
ess. If delay were prolonged, it could 
have a serious adverse effect on mana- 
gerial efficiency, employee morale, 
and the operation of the canal itself. 

With the passage of Panama Canal 
Treaty implementing legislation, we 
will be in a position to begin a new 
chapter in the history of the canal. 
With the cooperation and support of 
this committee and the Congress, the 
U.S. Government can open that chapter 
with firm assurance that it will unfold 
to our own and the world's advantage. 



AMBASSADOR MOSS" 

I appreciate this opportunity to meet 
with you to discuss the proposed im- 
plementing legislation for the Panama 
Canal Treaty. 

In addition to its traditional diplo- 
matic and consular tasks, the American 
Embassy in Panama is actively en- 
gaged, in close coordination with the 
Governor of the Canal Zone [Harold R. 
Parfitt] and the Commander in Chief, 
Southern Command [Gen. Dennis P. 
McAuliffe] in planning for the im- 
plementation of the Panama Canal 
Treaty, which comes into effect on 
October 1, 1979. 

Previous executive branch witnesses 
have covered a number of aspects of 
the draft versions of implementing 
legislation under consideration by the 
committee. There are two aspects in 
particular I would like to address, 
which are of special concern to the 
Embassy. These are: 

• Our overall objective of building a 
partnership with Panama in the canal 
enterprise, designed to maintain a safe 
and efficient canal, and 

• The need to safeguard the interests 
of American citizens in the present 



Department of State Bulletin ' 

Canal Zone whose lives will be af- 
fected by the implementing legislation. 

First, I would like to make a few ob- 
servations to the subcommittee about 
the cooperation I have observed thus 
far between the United States and 
Panama. Although there is a great deal 
of work to be done between now and 
October I, and there are obviously a 
tremendous number of difficult deci- 
sions to be made by the United States 
and by Panama, individually as well as 
together, the cooperation between our 
government and the Panamanian Gov- 
ernment has been excellent. The 
treaties are a mutual obligation to 
which both sides are committed, and in 
that spirit the work done by both coun- 
tries' planners to date represents an 
honest effort to complete the arrange- 
ments called for under the treaty. 

We are fortunate in that many of the 
leaders of the Panamanian Government 
today were heavily involved in the 
treaty process over the last few years 
and are therefore extremely knowl- 
edgeable. President Aristides Royo, a 
young lawyer who became President of 
Panama last October 1 1 , was a chief 
treaty negotiator for Panama. He has 
shown a particular sensitivity toward 
the needs and concerns of the U.S. 
citizens who live in the Canal Zone and 
who work on the canal. President Royo 
has visited both Atlantic and Pacific 
sides of the Canal Zone where he has 
met with American and Panamanian 
citizens who work there. As a gesture 
of goodwill, he recorded a television 
message in English to the American 
residents of the Canal Zone which was 
broadcast on the local Armed Forces 
television stations. 

Ambassador Gabriel Lewis, a busi- 
nessman who was Panamanian Ambas- 
sador to Washington during the treaty 
ratification process, returned to the pri- 
vate sector shortly after approval of the 
treaties but now has come back to the 
Panamanian Government as Ambas- 
sador at Large and as the head of the 
Panama Canal Authority, the Panama- 
nian organization which has the re- 
sponsibility for all planning for treaty 
implementation. He has a strong team 
working with him in this effort, in- 
cluding three Cabinet ministers: two 
top military officers; and a number of 
economists, lawyers, and other advis- 
ers, many of whom have earned uni- 
versity and postgraduate degrees in the 
United States. Panama has sent as its 
new Ambassador-designate to the 
United States Carlos Lopez-Guevara, a 
distinguished international jurist who 
holds a law degree from Harvard. 

Numerous working subcommittees 
made up of representatives from our 
two countries have been working to- 



April 1979 

nether since mid- 1978 to plan for the 
inipieiiientation of the treaty in a wide 
range of subjects from operational 
transfers, such as the ports and rail- 
roads, to areas of employee and com- 
munity interests, including personnel, 
housing, social security, utilities, the 
environment, and the police and fire 
protection. Similar binational commit- 
tees have recently begun work in areas 
of concern to our Southern Command 
and the Panamanian National Guard. 

The goodwill and business-like at- 
titude which exists between our two 
countries is exemplified by the 
fact — as Deputy Secretary Christopher 
has already observed — that last month 
we signed three agreements with 
Panama which were called for under 
the new treaty relationship. We have 
thus dispatched those portions of work 
in a very timely manner. The first of 
these accords was a new civil aviation 
agreement, which provides for the 
phasing-over of our present air traffic 
control in Panama's air space to 
Panama over a 5-year period. During 
that time we will be training Panama- 
nian traffic controllers to begin replac- 
ing our personnel and also training 
Panamanian technicians in the use and 
maintenance of the equipment. The 
FAA agreement will represent a con- 
siderable cost savings to the United 
States. 

The second agreement provides for a 
permanent U.S. cemetery at the present 
Corozal Cemetery in the Canal Zone, 
over which our flag will fly and which 
will be administered by the American 
Battle Monuments Commission in the 
same way that our military cemeteries 
abroad are maintained. 

The third of these agreements is a 
prisoner exchange treaty — which will 
be submitted to the Senate for 
ratification — which provides that 
American citizens convicted of a crime 
in Panama can elect to serve their sen- 
tences in the United States and 
Panamanians convicted of a crime by a 
United States court can serve in their 
homeland. 

It is apparent that we are already be- 
ginning to realize the benefits of our 
new partnership with Panama in the 
military field. During the last 2 
months, conventional warfare exercises 
have been held by our 193d Infantry 
Brigade at the Rio Hato military base 
in cooperation with the Panamanian 
National Guard. This military area, 
large in size and ideal in terrain for 
such exercises, is deep into Panama's 
mterior and would not have been made 
available to us except under the new 
treaty relationship. 

On February 16, I accompanied 
President Royo on a visit to the U.S. 
Army School of the Americas. Presi- 



dent Royo. who was given full military 
honors upon his arrival, stated in a 
press conference at the school that he 
wished it to continue in operation alter 
the present 5-year agreement expires 
and encouraged the beginning of talks 
between the United States and Panama- 
nian representatives for that purpose. 
He has remarked to me that he is proud 
of the fact that there have been numer- 
ous Panamanian graduates of the 
school, and he hopes for greater 
Panamanian participation in it. 

Building a Partnership 

The foregoing remarks are back- 
ground observations leading me to the 
first point I wanted to make about the 
committee's consideration of imple- 
menting legislation. The new Panama 
Canal Treaty was designed to create a 
working partnership between the 
United States and Panama in the oper- 
ation and defense of the canal, so that 



65 

it would remain efficient and secure in 
the future. 

It is important that implementing 
legislation support the concept of 
partnership with Panama for two es- 
sential reasons. First, during the period 
of our stewardship of the canal opera- 
tion until the year 2000, there will be 
the continuous need for full coopera- 
tion between both governments in 
numerous respects, and the canal's op- 
eration will necessarily be affected by 
the degree to which it exists. The 
United States has a dual mission with 
regard to canal operation: to keep it 
functioning efficiently and securely, as 
it has in the past, but also to bring 
Panamanians into all levels of its man- 
agement so that they will be perfectly 
prepared to operate the canal after the 
year 2000. 

Although the treaty clearly puts the 
United States in control of the canal 
operation, that operation will function 
most efficiently if both sides regard it 



LLS. and Panatna 
Sign Two Agreements 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JAN. 12' 

The United States and Panama 
signed two agreements January 11, 
1979, called for in the Panama Canal 
Treaty and related documents. The 
first — a treaty on prisoner transfers — 
will make it possible, once ratified, for 
Americans arrested and convicted 
under Panamanian legal jurisdiction to 
request to serve their sentences in penal 
institutions in the United States. Under 
the treaty, Panamanians convicted of 
crimes in the United States will have 
the same right to petition their transfer 
to Panamanian institutions to serve 
their sentences. The treaty provides 
special protection for official Ameri- 
cans and their dependents working in 
Panama with the Panama Canal Com- 
mission, to be established October 1, 
1979, and the Department of Defense 
until the year 2000. According to the 
treaty, such official Americans and 
their dependents who might be sen- 
tenced under Panamanian legal juris- 
diction will be transferred to U.S. 
penal institutions automatically upon 
their request. This position will be in 
effect until the year 2000. 

All other Americans, such as 
tourists, businessmen, and unofficial 
residents, will be enabled to petition 
the American Embassy in Panama for 



their transfer to U.S. penal institutions. 
If both governments agree on the 
transfer, the prisoner will be sent to the 
United States. Panamanians convicted 
under U.S. law will be able to make 
similar requests to their Embassy in 
Washington. This provision will be 
effective for 5 years and is automati- 
cally renewable unless the U.S. Gov- 
ernment or the Government of Panama 
wishes to terminate it. The United 
States has similar treaties with Mexico, 
Bolivia, and Canada. 

The second agreement — concerning 
the Corozal Cemetery in the present 
Canal Zone, where many American 
citizens, military and civilian, are 
buried — provides that a portion of the 
cemetery will be permanently main- 
tained in the future by the American 
Battle Monuments Commission as a 
suitable resting place for deceased 
Americans. According to the agree- 
ment, Americans working for the 
Panama Canal Commission, military 
and civilian employees of the Depart- 
ment of Defense, and dependents of 
both groups and certain others will be 
allowed to be buried there until the 
year 2000. 

The same announcement was re- 
leased last night in Panama. D 



' Issued to the press by Department spokesman 
Hodding Carter III. 



66 

as a partnership. That will require an 
added ingredient in addition to simple 
compliance with the treaty's terms. 
That additional element is the willing- 
ness of both sides to approach the task 
in a spirit of collegiality. We see that 
spirit developing on the isthmus today, 
in the detailed work being accom- 
plished by technical experts of both 
countries, and implementing legislation 
can help promote that spirit by giving 
life to the new institutions which will 
take effect under the treaty. 

The principal new institution is the 
Panama Canal Commission itself. In 
my view, it is of great importance to 
follow the Administration's proposal 
that the Commission be constituted as a 
government corporation, subject, as is 
the present Company, to the continuing 
oversight by the Congress of its ac- 
tivities and budget. This form would 
best provide for a close working re- 
lationship between both countries in 
the manner contemplated by the 
treaties. A government corporation 
would not only assure continuity in the 
canal's operation, but it would also be 
instrumental in bringing Panama's 
minority representatives on the Board 
of Directors of the Commission into a 
genuine decisionmaking forum on pol- 
icy matters. In this way. over a period 
years. Panamanians would develop a 
tremendous expertise and appreciation 
for the extremely intricate problems of 
managing canal operations, because 
they would share in the process of 
making important managerial deci- 
sions. They would also share responsi- 
bility for them. 

In this respect, I would also like to 
point out that one of the principal con- 
cerns frequently expressed by Members 
of the Congress has been whether or 
not Panama would, after the year 2000. 
appreciate the need to provide for 
adequate maintenance and capital im- 
provement of the canal operation. I be- 
lieve that a corporate structure would 
best convey the concept that the canal 
be operated as a business, on a self- 
sustaining basis, and that proper provi- 
sions for maintenance be made in its 
financial structure. Indeed, since much 
of the business of the board of the gov- 
ernment corporation would involve ap- 
proval of canal maintenance programs, 
Panamanian members would be per- 
sonally involved and would share re- 
sponsibility for the upkeep of the 
canal. 

Anyone who is familiar with Panama 
knows that the country has a large 
number of highly qualified people in 
both technical and managerial areas, a 
great many of them with university de- 
grees from the United States. It is im- 



portant, however, that Panamanian per- 
sonnel be given the opportunity to 
work as closely as possible with their 
U.S. counterparts in all aspects of 
canal management so that the institu- 
tional knowledge that we have con- 
cerning the canal's operation be trans- 
mitted to them well in advance of the 
year 2000. 

Safeguarding the Interests 
of U.S. Citizens 

Both the Administration bill (H.R. 
1716) and the bill introduced by the 
chairman of the committee (H.R. Ill) 
contain numerous provisions relating to 
the employment and to the quality of 
life of the U.S. citizens who are pres- 
ently living in the Canal Zone. Gover- 
nor Parfitt has given extensive tes- 
timony on this subject to the Post 
Office and Civil Service Committee. I 
wish to associate myself with the Gov- 
ernor's testimony. During the 4 months 
since my appointment as Ambassador, 
I have had the opportunity to meet with 
numerous citizens organizations and 
labor unions in the Canal Zone and I 
can attest to the fact that our citizens 
living there, although the great major- 
ity of them did not favor the treaties, 
have a high esprit de corps, love their 
work on the canal, and wish to stay if 
the terms and conditions of their 
employment and the quality of life in 
their communities remain similar to 
those which they enjoy today. 

Many of them are apprehensive 
about the future, generally for two rea- 
sons. First, they want to be assured of 
Panama's goodwill and sensitivity to- 
ward their concerns. Our Embassy, 
along with the Panama Canal Company 
and the U.S. Southern Command, is 
very mindful of this concern as are the 
representatives of the Government of 
Panama. A second reason for their con- 
cern, however, is the notion that 
"Washington." by which they mean 
both the executive and legislative 
branches, may no longer care about 
them and may not provide for them in 
the ways promised in the treaties. In 
this respect, the provisions in both the 
Administration's and the chairman's 
bills are of critical importance. It is in 
the best interest of the continued effi- 
ciency of the canal that these loyal em- 
ployees and citizens be treated fairly, 
in recognition of the significant role 
they play today as well as the valuable 
contributions they have made in the 
past. 

I should also add that we are asking 
our employees to undertake an 
additional — and highly essential — 
mission: that of training Panamanians 



Department of State Bulletii 

to assume increasingly greater respon- 
sibility in the canal organization. ManjI 
Americans in the Canal Zone with 
whom I have spoken are very much 
aware of this extra requirement and re 
spond to the challenge with under 
standing and goodwill. We need theii 
continued support, and I feel it is in out 
highest national interest to enact the 
provisions made for the employees oi 
the canal enterprise which are con- 
tained in the Administration's proposed 
implementing legislation. 

in conclusion, let me say that I be- 
lieve there is every reason to be op- 
timistic about the success of our coop 
eration with Panama in treaty 
implementation. Our Panamanian 
counterparts have shown their desire 
for a spirit of partnership in our great 
common enterprise. A new government 
in Panama took office last October 
which is composed of young, energe 
tic. highly educated people who are 
determined to make their country an 
economic and social success. They 
have expressed a policy of vigorous 
stimulation of the private sector and 
have extended an open invitation to 
private foreign investment. 

An important part of their program is 
continued cooperation with the United 
States in every area. They have demon 
strated sensitivity to the concerns of the 
American citizens who live in the pres 
ent Canal Zone and have repeatedly 
stressed their desire for our citizens to 
remain in Panama after they retire. If 
we are able to implement both the spirit 
and letter of the treaties both with re 
spect to Panama and to our own em 
ployees, and if we can help maintain 
between both countries a true spirit of 
collegiality, we will assure that the 
Panama Canal will continue to provide 
its important service to our country and 
to world shipping. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC. 20402. 



\pril 1979 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

V\iation 

."onvention on the international recognition of 
lights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19. 
1948. Entered into force Sept 17, 1953. 
TIAS 2847. 

Adherences deposited: Madagascar, Jan. 9. 
1979; Seychelles, Jan. 16, 1979 

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
iTlAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14. 
1954. Entered into force Dec. 12. 1956. 
TIAS 3756. 

Ralification deposited: Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, June 27. 1978. 

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) 
of the convention on international civil avia- 
tion (TIAS 1591 ), Done at Montreal June 21 . 
1961 Entered into force July 17. 1962. TIAS 
5170. 

Rattficalion deposited: Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea. June 27. 1978. 

'ri'iocol relating to an amendment to the con- 
tention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591). Done at Rome Sept. 15. 1962. En- 
tered into force Sept. II. 1975. TIAS 8162. 
Ratification deposited: Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea. June 27, 1978. 

?onvention on offenses and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 

1969. TIAS 6768. 

Ratification deposited: People's Republic of 

the Congo. Nov. 13, 1978. 
Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, July 25, 
1978; Botswana. Jan. 16. 1979; People's 
Republic of China. Nov. 14. 1978;' The 
Gambia. Jan. 4. 1979; Grenada. Aug. 28. 
1978; Nepal. Jan. 15. 1979; Seychelles, 
Jan. 4, 1979. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft Done at The Hague Dec 16. 

1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 

Accession deposited: Togo, Feb. 9, 1979. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the con- 
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591). Done at New York Mar. 12. 1971. 
Entered into force Jan. 16. 1973. TIAS 7616. 
Ralification deposited: Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea. June 27, 1978. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the con- 
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591 ). Done at Vienna July 7. 1971 . Entered 
into force Dec. 19. 1974. TIAS 8092. 
Ratifications deposited: People's Republic 
of the Congo. Nov. 13. 1978; Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. June 27. 
1978; Tanzania. June 15. 1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23. 1971. Entered into force 
Jan. 26. 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Togo, Feb. 9, 1979. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the con- 
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 16. 1974.^ 



Ratifications deposited: Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. June 27. 
1978; Mall. July 27. 1978; Peru, July 19, 
1978; Tanzania, June 15, I97X. 
Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591). with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30. 1977.- 
Ratification deposited: Mexico. Mar. 2. 
1979. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the develop- 
ment, production, and stockpiling of bac- 
teriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and on their destruction. Done at Washing- 
ton, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. 
Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 
8062. 

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Mar. 15. 
1979; Honduras, Mar. 14. 1979. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations for 
preventing collisions at sea. 1972. with reg- 
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20. 1972. 
Entered into force July 15. 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Ratification deposited: Italy. Jan. 11, 1979. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international trans- 
port of goods under cover of TIR carnets, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov, 14, 
1975. Entered into force Mar. 20. 1978.^ 
Accession deposited: Portugal. Feb. 13, 
1979. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978.^ 

Accession deposited: Malawi, Oct. 5, 1978. 
Ralification deposited: Norway, Feb. 15. 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 
June 13. 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30. 
1977. TIAS 8765. 
Ratification deposited: Spain. Nov. 27. 

1978.-' 
Accessions deposited: Afghanistan. Bar- 
bados. Bhutan. Burundi. Jordan, Laos, 
and Seychelles. Dec. 13. 1978; Madagas- 
car. Jan. 12. 1979 

Fisheries 

Protocol amending the international convention 
for the high seas fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean of May 9. 1952. as amended 
(TIAS 2786. 5385). with agreed minutes and 
memoranda of understanding. Done at Tokyo 
Apr. 25. 1978. 

Ratifications exchanged: Feb. 15. 1979. 
Entered into force: Feb. 15, 1979. 

Health 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Con- 
stitution of the World Health Organization of 
July 22. 1946. as amended (TIAS 1808. 
4643. 8086. 8535). Adopted at Geneva May 
17. 1976.^ 

Acceptances deposited: Guatemala, Jan. 16. 
1979; Mexico. Feb. 23. 1979. 



67 



Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in 
civil or commercial matters. Opened for sig- 
nature at The Hague Mar. 18. 1970. Entered 
into force Oct. 7. 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Signature: Netherlands. Feb. 28, 1979. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva 
Mar. 6. 1958. Entered into force Mar. 17, 
1958. TIAS 4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Djibouti. Feb. 20, 
1979. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for 
the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 
1954, as amended (TIAS 4900. 6190. 8505). 
concerning the protection of the Great Bar- 
rier Reef. Adopted at London Oct. 12. 
1971.^ 

Acceptances deposited: German Democratic 
Republic. Jan. 25. 1979; Bahamas. Feb. 
16. 1979. 

Nuclear Free Zone 

Additional protocol II to the treaty of Feb. 14. 
1967. for the prohibition of nuclear weapons 
in Latin America. Done at Mexico Feb. 14. 
1967. Entered into force for the U.S. May 
12. 1971. TIAS 7137. 

Ratification deposited: USSR.. Jan. 8. 
1979 (with statement). 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington. London and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5. 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka. Mar. 5. 

1979. 
Succession deposited: Tuvalu. Jan. 19. 

1979. 

Postal 

Parcel post agreement, final protocol, and de- 
tailed regulations of the Postal Union of the 
Americas and Spain. Done at Lima Mar. 18. 
1976. Entered into force Oct. I. 1976. 
Ratification deposited: U.S.. Nov. 30. 
1978.^ 

Money order agreement and final protocol of 
the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. 
Done at Lima Mar. 18. 1976. Entered into 
force Oct. I. 1976. 

Ratification deposited: U.S.. Nov. 30. 
1978.^ 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, 
general regulations, regulations governing 
the International Office and the Transfer Of- 
fice, and convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Done at Lima Mar. 18, 
1976. Entered into force Oct. I. 1976. ex- 
cept for article 107. paragraph I of the gen- 
eral regulations which entered into force 
Mar. 18. 1976. 

Ratification deposited: U.S.. Nov. 30. 
1978. » 

Property, Industrial 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of June 
15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 
14, 1967. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1970; 
for the U.S. May 25. 1972. TIAS 7419. 



68 

Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization that ratification depos- 
ited: Sp'ain, Feb. 9, 1979. 
Nice agreenieni concerning the inlernational 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of June 
15. 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 
13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6. 1979.-' 
Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization thai ratification depos- 
ited: Spain, Feb. 9, 1979. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to chapter II of the international 

convention for the safety of life at sea, I960 

(TIAS 5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assem- 
bly at London Nov. 30, 1966.'^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention for 

the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). 

Adopted at London Oct. 25, 1967.^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention for 

the safety of life at sea, I960 (TIAS 5780). 

Adopted at London Nov. 26. 1968.^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12. 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention for 

the safety of life at sea, I960. Adopted at 

London Oct. 21. 1969.=^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention for 

the safety of life at sea. I960. Adopted at 

London Oct. 12. 1971. ^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979. 
Amendments to chapters II, III. IV. and V of 

the international convention for the safety of 

life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London Nov. 20, 1973.^ 

Acceptances deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979; 
Romania, Jan. 31, 1979. 
Amendment to chapter VI of the international 

convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. 

Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1973.^ 

Acceptance deposited: India, Jan. 12, 1979; 
Romania, Jan. 31, 1979; Singapore, Jan. 
9. 1979. 
International convention for the safety of life at 

sea, 1974, with anne.\. Done at London Nov. 

I. 1974.2 

Accessions deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 
Feb. 15. 1979; Bahamas. Feb. 16, 1979. 

Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the international maritime 
satellite organization (INMARSAT), with 
annex. Done at London Sept. 3. 1976. ^ 
Signature: U.S. (not subject to ratification). 
Feb. 15, 1979. 

Operating agreement on the international 
maritime satellite organization (INMAR- 
SAT), with annex Done at London Sept. 3, 
1976.2 

Signature: Communications Satellite Cor- 
poration (COMSAT), U.S., Jan. 10. 1979. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14. 
1975. Entered into force Sept. 15. 1976. 
TIAS 8480. 

Acceptance deposited: European Space 
Agency. Jan. 2, 1979. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement. 1977, with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered 
into force provisionally Jan. 1. 1978. 
Accession deposited: Austria, Feb. 8. 1979. 



Telecommunications 

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-1^.5 GHz (in region I), with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. En- 
tered into force Jan. I, 1979.'' 
Approvals deposited: Canada. Dec. 8. 1978; 

Ireland. Dec. 14. 1978; Korea. Dec. 7. 

1978; Netherlands. Dec. 28. I978;« 

Senegal. Dec. 6. 1978. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and schedule 
of whaling regulations. Done at Washington 
Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 
1948. TIAS 1849. 

Notification of withdrawal: Panama. Feb. 
12, 1979; effective June 30, 1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 1744). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered 
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to 
certain provisions; July I, 1978, with respect 
to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: El Salvador, Mar. 13, 

1979. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Mar. 6, 
1979. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done 
at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered Into 
force June 24, 1978. with respect to certain 
provisions; July I. 1978, with respect tO' 
other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Mar. 
6, 1979. 



BILATERAL 

Austria 

Air transport agreement. Signed at Vienna June 
23, 1966. Entered into force July 23, 1966 
TIAS 6066. 
Terminated: Mar. 9, 1979. 

Brazil 

Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 22, 
1976, as amended (TIAS 8738, 9175), relat- 
ing to trade in cotton textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Jan. 31 and Feb. 28. 1979. En- 
tered into force Feb. 28. 1979. 

Colombia 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
and technical cooperation in the earth sci- 
ences. Signed Dec. 12. 1978. and Jan. 30. 
1979. Entered into force Jan. 30, 1979. 

Memorandum of agreement relating to jet fuel 
prices. Signed at Bogota Feb. 22, 1979. En- 
tered into force Feb. 22, 1979; effective Jan. 
16, 1979. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Costa Rica during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and 15, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 15, 1979; effective Jan. I, 
1979. 



Department of State Bulletii 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Sept. 
28, 1977 (TIAS 8944). Signed at Santo 
Domingo Jan. 11, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. I 1. 1979. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from El Salvador during calendar 
year 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and 14, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 14, 1979; effective Jan. I, 
1979. 

France 

Agreement amending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of Jan. 15. 1976. (TIAS 8610) 
on the participation of France in the interna- 
tional phase of ocean drilling of the deep sea 
drilling project. Signed at Paris and Wash- 
ington Oct. 12 and 26. 1978. Entered into 
force Oct. 26, 1978. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement amending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding on the participation of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany in the international! 
phase of ocean drilling of the deep sea dril- 
ling project. Signed at Bonn-Bad Godesberg) 
and Washington Feb. 14 and 24, 1978. En- 
tered into force Feb. 24, 1978. 

International express mail/datapost agreement, 
with detailed regulations. Signed at Bonn 
and Washington Dec. 15, 1978. and Jan. 22, 
1979. Enters into force on a date mutually 
agreed upon by the administrations after it is 
signed by the authorized representatives of 
both administrations. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Accra Feb. 9, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 
9. 1979 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Guatemala during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and 12. 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 12, 1979; effective Jan. I, 
1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Haiti during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and Feb. 15, 1979. En- 
tered into force Feb. 15. 1979; effective Jan. 
I, 1979. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Honduras during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and 31, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 31, 1979; effective Jan. I, 
1979. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 8, 
1977. as amended (TIAS 8936). relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Hong Kong Feb. 2 and 13, 1979. Entered 
into force Feb. 13, 1979. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 



April 1979 

M), 1977. as amended (TIAS 9036). relating 
ii> Irade in cotton, wool, and manniade liher 
le\tiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Jan. 12 and 
Ich. 8, 1979. Entered int"o force Feb. X. 
1979. 

International Monetary Fund 

Agreement relating to provision of financing by 
the U.S. to the International Monetary Fund 
111 connection with the establishment of the 
.Supplementary Financing Facility. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Washington Jan. 5 
and 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 16. 
1979. 

Japan 

Agreement on educational exchange programs. 
.Signed at Tokyo Feb. 15. 1979, Enters into 
force on the date diplomatic notes are ex- 
changed indicating approval by each country 
in accordance with its Internal procedures. 

Understanding concerning the termination of 
the agreement of Jan. 1 1, 1958, as amended 
(TIAS .^982, 4635, 5422). for financing an 
educational exchange program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Tokyo Feb. 15, 1979. 
1 nters into force Feb. 15, 1979; effective 
upon entry into force of the agreement of 
Feb. 15. 1979, on educational exchange pro- 
grams. 

Jordan 

.^greement for sales of agricultural com- 
iiiodlties, relating to the agreement of Nov. 

27, 1974. (TIA'S 7995) with minutes of 
negotiation. Signed at Amman Jan. 17, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 17, 1979. 

Agreement amending the loan agreement for 
the potash plant project. Signed at Amman 
Jan. 25. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 25, 
1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
Imports from Mexico during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. 11 and 15.^1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 15. 1979; effective Jan. 1, 
1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2. 

1977. (TIAS 8952) as amended, relating to 
additional cooperative arrangements to curb 
the illegal traffic In narcotics. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Mexico Jan. 15, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 15, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 

28. 1948. and Aug. 30. 1949. as amended 
(TIAS 2086, 7360), establishing a U.S.- 
Mexican Commission on Cultural Coopera- 
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico and Tlatelolco Oct. 30. 1978. and 
Jan. 23. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 23. 
1979, 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 15. 

1978. as amended, relating to additional co- 
operative arrangements to curb the Illegal 
production and traffic in narcotics. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico Feb. 7, 

1979. Entered into force Feb. 7. 1979. 
Agreement for cooperation in the field of 

housing and urban development. Signed at 
Mexico Feb. 16, 1979. Entered into force 
Feb. 16, 1979. 
Agreement on cooperation to improve the man- 
agement of arid and semlarid lands and con- 
trol desertification. Signed at Mexico Feb. 
16, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 16, 1979. 



Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Feb. 26, 1979. Entered 
into force Feb, 26. 1979; effective May 1. 
1978, 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from New Zealand during calendar 
year 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. 11 and Feb. 9, 1979. En- 
tered into force Feb. 9, 1979; effective Jan. 

1, 1979. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Nicaragua during calendar year 
1979, Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. 11 and 16, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan, 16, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 
1979. 

Panama 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Panama during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. II and 17. 1979, Entered 
into force Jan, 17, 1979; effective Jan, 1, 
1979, 

Peru 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Apr. 26, 1978. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lima Feb. 
7. 1979. Entered into force Feb. 7, 1979. 

Poland 

Agreement amending the air transport agree- 
ment of July 19, 1972, as amended and ex- 
tended (TIAS 7535, 8469). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Warsaw Dec. 29, 1978, 
Jan. 15 and 30. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 
30, 1979, 

Turkey 

Implementing agreement regarding the consoli- 
dation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to the Agency for International De- 
velopment, with annexes. Signed at Ankara 
Dec. 5, 1978. Entered into force Dec. 7. 
1978. 

Tuvalu 

Treaty of friendship. Signed at Funafuti Feb. 7, 
1979. Enters Into force on the date of ex- 
change of Instruments of ratification. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement amending and extending the agree- 
ment of June 19, 1973. as extended (TIAS 
7651 . 9008), on cooperation in studies of the 
world ocean. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Moscow Dec. 15. 1979. Entered into force 
Dec, 15. 1979. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of Sept, 29, 1975, (TIAS 8591) 
on the participation by the United Kingdom 
in the international phase of ocean drilling 
and extension of the deep sea drilling proj- 
ect. Signed at Washington and London. Dec. 

2, 1977, and Jan. 31, 1978. Entered into 
force Jan. 31, 1978. 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Belize during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. 11 and 30, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 30. 1979; effective Jan. 1. 
1979. 



69 



Yugoslavia 

Agreement concerning trade in men's and boy's 
wool and mademade fiber suits. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Belgrade Oct. 26 and 
27, 1978, Enters into force after being ap- 
proved by competent authorities of the two 
parties. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Aug. 25. 1978. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa 
Dec. 27, 1978, and Jan. 3. 1979 Entered 
Into force Jan. 3, 1979. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to. guaran- 
teed, or Insured by the US. Government and 
Its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Wash- 
ington Feb. 7, 1979, Enters into force upon 
receipt by Zaire of written notice that U.S. 
laws and regulations covering debt re- 
scheduling have been complied with. D 



'With reservation. 

^Not in force. 

^Not iii force for the U.S. 

^With declarations. 

^Provisionally in force for the U,S,; deposit 
of ratification brought agreement into force 
definitively, 

'For the Kingdom In Europe and the Nether- 
lands Antilles. 



CHROI\OLOGY: 

February 1979 



Feb. 1 Yugoslavian President Tito 

visits Kuwait, Iraq. Syria, 
and Jordan Feb. 1-12, 

Feb, 4 Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak 

visits U,S. Feb, 4-16. 

Feb, 7 Col. Ben, Jadid Shadll elected 

President of Algeria, 

Feb. 8 State Department announces 

that U.S. is withdrawing Its 
military mission and all 
Peace Corps volunteers from 
Nicaragua, not considering 
new AID projects, and re- 
ducing the number of offi- 
cials in the U.S. Embassy in 
Nicaragua (press briefing), 

Feb. 9 Defense Secretary Brown visits 

Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Israel, 
and Egypt Feb, 9-18, 

Feb. 1 1 Iranian Prime Minister Bakh- 

tiar resigns. 

Feb. 12 Medhi Bazargan. designated by 

Ayatollah Khomeini to be 
Prime Minister of Iran, as- 
sumes office. 
Queen Elizabeth II visits 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and 
the United Arab Emirates 
Feb. 12-Mar, 2, 

Feb. 14 US, Ambassador to Af- 

ghanistan Adolph Dubs is 
abducted and killed in 
Kabul. 



70 



U.S. Embassy in Tehran is at- 
tacked and partially occupied 
by armed Iranians who are 
displaced by forces loyal lo 
Ayatollah Khomeini. After 
the incident the Embassy re- 
sumes operations. 
President Carter visits Mexico 
Feb. 14-16. 

Feb. 15 White House announces pro- 

posed reorganization of U.S. 
foreign assistance programs 
under one agency to be 
called the International De- 
velopment Cooperation Ad- 
ministration. 

Feb. 17 The P.R.C. invades Vietnam 

along much of their border. 

Feb. 18 North and South Korean offi- 

cials meet for the first time 
in 6 years in Panmunjom. 

Feb. 21 Delegations headed by Egyp- 

tian Prime Minister Khalil. 
Israeli Foreign Minister 
Dayan, and Secretary Vance 
participate in talks concern- 
ing peace in the Middle East 
at Camp David Feb. 21-25. 

Feb. 22 Caribbean island of St. Lucia 

gains its independence from 
the United Kingdom 
White House announces that 
U.S. economic aid to Af- 
ghanistan will be reduced. 

Feb. 23 U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 

Young urges a peaceful res- 
olution of the conflict in- 
volving the P.R.C, Viet- 
nam, and Cambodia (Secu- 
rity Council meeting). 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal 
visits the P.R.C. Feb. 23- 
Mar. 5. 

Feb. 26 Senate confirms the nomination 

of Leonard Woodcock to be 
the first U.S. Ambassador to 
the P.R.C. He is sworn in on 
Feb. 28. 

Feb. 28 Concerned by indications that 

South Yemen has invaded 
and occupied territory in 
North Yemen, the State De- 
partment announces that the 
U.S. will accelerate delivery 
of defensive arms previously 
agreed upon in response lo 
requests by North Yemen 
(press briefing). D 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



February 16-March 13 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

39 2/16 FY 1980 international secu- 
rity assistance program. 



*40 2/16 U.S. signs convention on the 

International Maritime 
Satellite Organization 
(INMARSAT), Feb. 15. 

*41 2/16 Shipping Coordinating Com- 

mittee (SCO, Subcom- 
mittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on fire protection. 
Mar. 1. 

*42 2/16 Advisory Committee on In- 

ternational Investment, 
Technology, and De- 
velopment, working group 
on UN/OECD investment 
undertakings. Mar. 9. 

♦43 2/16 sec. SOLAS, working group 
on radiocommunications. 
Mar. 15. 

*44 2/16 U.S.. Mexico agree to coop- 

erate to improve the man- 
agement of their arid and 
semiarid lands. 

*45 2/21 Advisory Commission to the 

U.S. national section of the 
International Commission 
for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas. Mar. 7. 

*46 2/22 State Department annual 

comprehensive review of 
advisory committees. 

*47 2/23 Advisory Committee on In- 

ternational Investment. 
Technology, and De- 
velopment, working group 
on Iransborder data Hows, 
Mar. 8. 

*48 2/26 U.S. Organization for the 

International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 5, 
Mar. 19. 
49 2/27 Vance: remarks before the 

Council on Foreign Diplo- 
mats. 

*50 2/27 Assistant Secretary Derian to 

travel to southern African 
countries, Feb. 23-Mar. 
16. 

*51 2/28 see, SOLAS, working group 

on subdivision, stability, 
and load lines. Mar. 20. 

*52 2/28 Leonard Woodcock sworn in 

as Ambassador to the 
P.R.C. (biographic data). 

*53 2/28 U.S.. India amend textile 

agreement. Jan. 12 and 
Feb. 8. 

*54 2/26 Robert H. Pelletreau. Jr., 
sworn in as Ambassador to 
Bahrain (biographic data). 

*55 2/28 Advisory Committee on Pri- 

vate International Law, 
study group on maritime 
law matters. Mar. 21 . 

•56 3/1 U.S., Haiti amend textile 

agreement, Dec. 28 and 
29. 

*57 3/2 Advisory Committee on 1979 

World Administrative 
Radio Conference, Mar. 
28. 

*58 3/6 U.S., Brazil amend textile 

agreement. Jan. 31 and 
Feb. 28. 

*59 3/7 Stephen W. Bosworth sworn 

in as Ambassador to 
Tunisia (biographic data). 



*61 


3/9 


•62 


3/9 


•63 


3/9 


•64 


3/9 


•65 


3/9 



Department of State Bulletit 

♦60 3/9 Deputy Defense Secretary .U 

Charles W. Duncan. Jr.. to 
address conference on U.S. 
security and the Soviet 
challenge. Atlanta. Mar. 
15. 
U.S.. Mexico sign textile 

agreement, Feb. 26. 
US.. Yugoslavia sign textile 
agreement. Oct. 26 and 27. 
U.S., Hong Kong amend 
textile agreement, Feb. 2 
and 13. 
U.S., Haiti amend textile 
agreement. Feb. 8 and 16. 
Former CIA Director William 
E. Colby to address con- 
ference on U.S. security 
and the Soviet challenge, 
Birmingham. Mar. 22. 

♦66 3/12 sec. Apr. 3. 

♦67 3/12 sec. SOLAS, working group 
on safety of fishing ves- 
sels. Apr. 4. 

♦68 3/12 see. SOLAS, working group 

on bulk chemicals. Apr. 5. 

•69 3/12 see. May 2. 

•70 3/12 U.S. Organization for the 

International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group 4. Apr. 6. 

♦71 3/12 CCITT. study group I, 

Apr. 5. 

*72 3/13 Fine Arts Committee. May 

24. D 



•Not printed in the Bulletin. 



IIVDEX 



APRIL 1979 
VOL. 79, NO. 2025 

Afghanistan 

Assistance in Afghanistan (White House state- 
ment) 50 

U.S. Ambassador Killed in Afghanistan (Car- 
ter, Vance) 49 

Africa 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Africa 
(Moose) 9 

Horn of Africa (Moose) 12 

Arms Control 

Preserving Freedom and Peace in a Nuclear 
Age (Mondale) 14 

Remarks Before a National Foreign Policy 
Conference (Carter) 4 

SALT Treaty (White House statement) 15 

Asia 

American and Japanese Interests in Southeast 
Asia (Newsom) 27 

ASEAN-U.S. Business Council (Department 
statement) 20 

Chronology: February 1979 69 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Remarks Before a National Foreign Policy 
Conference (Carter) 4 

Bangladesh. Promoting Stability and Security 
in South Asia (Christopher) 48 



Business. ASEAN-U.S. Business Council (De- 
partment statement) 20 

r^hina. President Carter's News Conference of 
February 27 (excerpts) 7 

Congress 

(Economic Report of the President (message to 

the Congress) 32 

1 1th Report on Cyprus (Carter) 34 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Africa 

(Moose) 9 

rY 1980 Assistance Proposals for East Asia 

(Holbrooke) 17 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Latin 

America and the Caribbean (Vaky) 56 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Portugal and 

, Spain (Vest) 36 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Eastern 

Mediterranean (Nimetz) 33 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Middle 

East (Draper) 38 

FY 1980 Security Assistance Proposals (Ben- 
son) 42 

Horn of Africa (Moose) 12 

Maritme Boundary Treaties (message to the 

Senate) 59 

Panama Canal Treaty Legislation (Carter. 

Christopher. Moss) 62 

Promoting Stability and Security in South Asia 

(Christopher) 48 

Security Assistance Report on Korea. 1978 ... .24 
Sixth Report on the Sinai Support Mission 

(message to the Congress) 41 

Waiver of Countervailing Duties (message to 

the Congress) 32 

Cuba. Maritime Boundary Treaties (message to 

the Senate) 59 

Cyprus 

1 1 th Report on Cyprus (Carter) 34 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Eastern 

Mediterranean (Nimetz) 33 

Department and Foreign Service 

Chronology: February 1979 69 

U.S. Ambassador Killed in Afghanistan (Car- 
ter. Vance) 49 

Developing Countries. America's Stake in the 

World Economy (Vance) 30 

Egypt 

Editor's Note 38 

Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. Officials Meet at 

Camp David (Carter) 39 

Energy. President Carter's News Conference 

of February 27 (excerpts) 7 

Europe. Chronology: February 1979 69 

Foreign Aid 

America's Stake in the World Economy 

(Vance) 30 

Assistance in Afghanistan (White House state- 
ment) 50 

Horn of Africa (Moose) 12 

Greece. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the 

Eastern Mediterranean (Nimetz) 33 

Guatemala. Letter of Credence (Monter- 

roso) 58 

Honduras. Letter of Credence (Bermudez) ... .58 
Human Rights. Implementing Human Rights 

Standards (Mezvinsky) 52 

India. Promoting Stability and Security in 

South Asia (Christopher) 48 

Israel 

Editor's Note 38 

Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. Officials Meet at 

Camp David (Carter) 39 

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (White 

House statement) 40 

Japan. American and Japanese Interests in 

Southeast Asia (Newsom) 27 

Jordan. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the 

Middle East (Draper) 38 



Korea 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Security Assistance Report on Korea. 1978 ... .24 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Chronology: February 1979 69 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Vaky) 56 

Pan American Day and Week. 1979 (proclama- 
tion) 57 

Lebanon. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for 
the Middle East (Draper) 38 

Mauritania. Letter of Credence (Sidi) II 

Mexico. Maritime Boundary Treaties (message 
to the Senate) 59 

Middle East 

Chronology: February 1979 69 

President Carter's News Conference of Feb- 
ruary 27 (excerpts) 7 

Remarks Before a National Foreign Policy 
Conference (Carter) 4 

Sixth Report on the Sinai Support Mission 
(message to the Congress) 41 

Monetary Affairs 

America's Stake in the World Economy 
(Vance) 30 

Economic Report of the President (message to 
the Congress) 32 

President Carter's News Conference of Feb- 
ruary 27 (excerpts) 7 

Nepal. Promoting Stability and Security in 
South Asia (Christopher) 48 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO — 30 Years After 1 

NATO's 30th Anniversary (Vance) 1 

30th Anniversary of NATO (proclamation) . .ii 

Norway. Letter of Credence (Hedemann) . .37 

Pakistan 

Letter of Credence (Khan) 51 

Promoting Stability and Security in South Asia 
(Christopher) 48 

Panama 

Letter of Credence (Lopez-Guevara) 58 

Panama Canal Treaty Legislation (Carter. 
Christopher, Moss) 62 

U.S. and Panama Sign Two Agreements (De- 
partment announcement) 65 

Philippines 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Military Bases Agreement With the Philippines 
( letter from President Carter) 22 

Portugal. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for 
Portugal and Spain (Vest) 36 

Presidential Documents 

Economic Report of the President 32 

Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. Officials Meet at 

Camp David 39 

1 1th Report on Cyprus 34 

Maritime Boundary Treaties 59 

Military Bases Agreement With the Philip- 
pines 22 

Panama Canal Treaty Legislation 62 

Pan American Day and Week, 1979 (proclama- 
tion) 57 

News Conference of February 27 (excerpts) . .7 
Remarks Before a National Foreign Policy 

Conference 4 

Sixth Report on the Sinai Support Mission . .41 
30th Anniversary of NATO (proclamation) . .ii 
U.S. Ambassador Killed in Afghanistan ... .49 

Waiver of Countervailing Duties 32 

Publications. GPO Sales 13.37 

Refugees. American and Japanese Interests in 

Southeast Asia (Newsom) 27 

Security Assistance 

Assistance in Afghanistan (White House state- 
ment) 50 



FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Africa 
(Moose) 9 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for East Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Vaky) 56 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Portugal and 
Spain (Vest) 36 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Nimetz) 33 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Middle 
East (Draper) 38 

FY 1980 Security Assistance Proposals (Ben- 
son) ^2 

Horn of Africa (Moose) 12 

North Yemen (Department statement) 41 

Security Assistance Report on Korea, 1978 ... .24 

Spain. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for Por- 
tugal and Spain (Vest) 36 

Sri Lanka. Promoting Stability and Security in 
South Asia (Christopher) 48 

Syria. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the 
Middle East (Draper) 38 

Terrorism. U.S. Ambassador Killed in Af- 
ghanistan (Carter, Vance) 49 

Thailand. Visit of Thai Prime Minister 
Kriangsak (joint press statement) 26 

Trade 

America's Stake in the World Economy 
(Vance) 30 

Economic Report of the President (message to 
the Congress) 32 

Waiver of Countervailing Duties (message to 
the Congress) 32 

Treaties 

Current Actions 67 

Maritime Boundary Treaties (message to the 
Senate) 59 

Military Bases Agreement With the Philippines 
(letter from President Carter) 22 

U.S. and Panama Sign Two Agreements (De- 
partment announcement) 65 

Turkey. FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the 
Eastern Mediterranean (Nimetz) 33 

United Nations 

Chronology: February 1979 69 

Implementing Human Rights Standards (Mez- 
vinsky) 52 

U.S.S.R. Preserving Freedom and Peace in a 
Nuclear Age (Mondale) H 

Venezuela. Maritime Boundary Treaties (mes- 
sage to the Senate) 59 

Yemen 

FY 1980 Assistance Proposals for the Middle 
East (Draper) 38 

North Yemen (Department statement) 41 

Name Index 

Benson, Lucy Wilson 42 

Bermudez Milla, Jose Antonio 58 

Carter, President ii, 4, 7. 22. 32. 

34, 39, 41, 49, 57, 59, 62 

Christopher, Warren 48, 62 

Draper, Morris 38 

Hedemann, Knut 37 

Holbrooke, Richard C 17 

Khan, Sultan Muhammad 51 

Lopez-Guevara, Carlos Alfredo 58 

Mezvinsky, Edward M 52 

Mondale, Vice President 14 

Monterroso Miranda, Felipe Doroteo 58 

Moose. Richard M 9, 12 

Moss, Ambler H 62 

Newsom, David D 27 

Nimetz, Matthew 33 

Sidi Bouna Ould Sidi II 

Vaky, Viron P 56 

Vance, Secretary I, 30, 49 

Vest, George S 36 



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Depart men t 
of State 



-m of state jm-m v ^ 

buUetin 



May 1979 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 79 / Nunnber 2026 








^ 



■.^^•:-^ 




^1-* 



Egyptian-Israeli Ff§ace Tre. 



Third World / 



SALT / 48 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 79 / Number 2026 / May 1979 



Cover Photo: 

President Sadat, President Carter, and 
Prime Minister Begin join hands in peace. 

(White House photo by Bill Fit2 Patnck) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CO]\TE]\TS 



EGYPT AND ISRAEL SIGN TREATY OF PEACE 

I Remarks by President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin 

1 Text of Joint Statement 

2 Israeli Cabinet Approves Proposals (President Carter) 

3 Egyptian Cabinet Approves Treaty {President Carter) 

3 Texts of Documents 

4 Israeli Knesset Approves Treaty (President Carter) 



THE PRESIDENT 

16 President Carter Visits Egypt and Israel 
( Menahem Begin, President Carter, 
Vice President Mandate, Yitzhak 
Navon, Anwar al-Sadal) 

21 Egypt — A Profile 

25 Israel — A Profile 

30 President Carter Interviewed for Israeli 

Television 

31 President Carter Interviewed for Egyp- 

tian Television 



THE SECRETARY 



33 



America's Commitment to Third World 
Development 

37 Question-and-Answer Session Follow- 
ing Seattle Address 

39 Interview on "Face the Nation" 

AFRICA 

42 U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Richard M. 
Moose) 

44 Zaire — A Profile 

45 Promoting Peace in Southern Rhodesia 

(Richard M. Moose) 

46 Southern Rhodesia (Department State- 

ment) 



MIDDLE EAST 

55 U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty (Harold Brown. Presi- 
dent Carter, Secretary Vance) 

60 U.S. and Israel Sign Memoranda of 

Agreement ( Moshe Dayan, Secre- 
tary Vance) 

61 Achievement of Peace in the Middle 

East and the Future Challenge 
(Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.) 

UNITED NATIONS 

64 Summaries of U.S. Statements in the 

U.N. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

66 Nicaragua (Department Spokesman's 
Response to a Question) 

TREATIES 

66 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69 March 1979 

70 PRESS RELEASES 



ARMS CONTROL 

48 SALT II and the National Defense 
(Harold Brown. Zbigniew Brzezinski) 



INDEX 



Boston Public Library 
Superintindcat of Document 



JUN 81P7P 



DEPOSITORY 




President Carter, seated between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, witnesses the Treaty 
of Peace Between Egypt and Israel. (Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, 
stands behind President Carter: and Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, stands to the right of Prime Minister Begin.) (Whue House phoio by Bill Fuz Patrick) 



EGYPT AJ\D ISRAEL SIGI\ TREATY OE PEACE 



At a ceremony on the North Lawn of the White House on March 26, 1979, 
President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed the Treaty of Peace Between 
'he Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel and the Agreed Minutes to 
Articles I. IV, V, and VI and Annexes I and III of the Treaty of Peace; the 
signing of these documents was witnessed by President Carter. 

At that ceremony. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin also signed a 
joint letter addressed to the President on the next stage in the negotiations. 

Following are remarks made by President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime 
Minister Begin after the signing of the documents: the Treaty of Peace, including 
three annexes and an appendix: the agreed minutes: and six letters. ' 



REMARKS AT 
SIGNING CEREMONY 2 



President Carter 

During the past 30 years, Israel and 
Egypt have waged war. But for the past 
16 months, these same two great na- 
tions have waged peace. Today we 
celebrate a victory — not of a bloody 
military campaign but of an inspiring 
peace campaign. Two leaders who will 
loom large in the history of nations — 
President Anwar al-Sadat and Prime 
Minister Menahem Begin — have con- 
ducted this campaign with all the cour- 
age, tenacity, brilliance, and inspira- 
tion of any generals who have ever led 
men and machines onto the field of 
battle. 

At the end of this campaign, the soil 
of the two lands is not drenched with 
young blood. The countrysides of both 
lands are free from the litter and the 
carnage of a wasteful war. Mothers in 
Egypt and Israel are not weeping today 
for their children fallen in senseless 
battle. The dedication and determina- 
tion of these two world statesmen have 
borne fruit. Peace has come to Israel 
and to Egypt. 

I honor these two leaders and their 
government officials who have ham- 
mered out this peace treaty which we 
have just signed. But most of all, I 
honor the people of these two lands 
whose yearning for peace kept alive the 
negotiations which today culminate in 
this glorious event. 

We have won at last the first step of 
peace, a first step on a long and dif- 
ficult road. We must not minimize the 
obstacles which still lie ahead. Differ- 
ences still separate the signatories to 
this treaty from one another, and also 
from some of their neighbors who fear 
what they have just done. To overcome 
these differences, to dispel these fears, 
we must rededicate ourselves to the 
goal of a broader peace with justice for 



all who have lived in a state of conflict 
in the Middle East. 

We have no illusions — we have 
hopes, dreams, and prayers, yes, but 
no illusions. 

There now remains the rest of the 
Arab world, whose support and whose 
cooperation in the peace process is 
needed and honestly sought. 1 am con- 
vinced that other Arab people need and 
want peace. But some of their leaders 
are not yet willing to honor these needs 
and desires for peace. We must now 
demonstrate the advantages of peace 
and expand its benefits to encompass 
all those who have suffered so much in 
the Middle East. 

Obviously, time and understanding 
will be necessary for people, hitherto 
enemies, to become neighbors in the 
best sense of the word. 

Just because a paper is signed, all 
the problems will not automatically go 
away. Future days will require the best 
from us to give reality to these lofty 
aspirations. 

Let those who would shatter peace, 
who would callously spill more blood, 
be aware that we three and all others 
who may join us will vigorously wage 
peace. 

So let history record that deep and 
ancient antagonism can be settled with- 
out bloodshed and without staggering 
waste of precious lives, without rapa- 
cious destruction of the land. 

It has been said, and I quote: "Peace 
has one thing in common with its 
enemy, with the fiend it battles, with 
war; peace is active, not passive; peace 
is doing, not waiting; peace is 
aggressive — attacking; peace plans its 
strategy and encircles the enemy; peace 
marshals its forces and storms the 
gates; peace gathers its weapons and 
pierces the defense; peace, like war, is 
waged." 

It is true that we cannot enforce trust 
and cooperation between nations, but 
we can use all our strength to see that 
nations do not again go to war. 



All our religious doctrines give us 
hope. In the Koran we read: "But if the 
enemy incline towards peace, do thou 
also incline towards peace, and trust in 
God; for He is the One that heareth and 
knoweth all things." 

And the prophet Isaiah said: "Na- 
tions shall beat their swords into plow- 
shares and their spears into pruning- 
hooks: nation shall not lift up sword 
against nation, neither shall they learn 
war any more." 

So let us now lay aside war. Let us 
now reward all the children of Abra- 
ham who hunger for a comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East. Let us now 
enjoy the adventure of becoming fully 
human, fully neighbors, even brothers 
and sisters. We pray God, we pray God 
together, that these dreams will come 
true. I believe they will. 

President Sadat 

This is certainly one of the happiest 
moments in my life. It is an historic 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 25, 1979* 

At the convening of the Camp David 
summit meeting we issued a communi- 
cation which stated in part: "Conscious 
of the grave issues which face us, we 
place our trust in the God of our fathers, 
from whom we seek wisdom and guid- 
ance .... We ask people of all faiths to 
pray with us that peace and justice may 
result from these deliberations." 

Our trust in God was well-placed. On 
Monday, a treaty of peace will be signed 
between Egypt and Israel within the 
framework of a comprehensive peace 
settlement in the area. We are grateful to 
the people around the world who joined 
us in prayer. We now ask people of all 
faiths to join again in a day of prayer 
and thanksgiving for what has been ac- 
complished and then ask God to guide 
our nations in the days ahead as we con- 
tinue to work for a comprehensive, just, 
and lasting peace. With God's help, we 
and generations to come will know peace 
between our peoples. To this end. we 
ask that Monday. March 26. be a day of 
prayer around the world. 



♦Issued by President Carter. President 
Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Apr. 2. 1979). 



turning point of great significance for 
all peace-loving nations. Those among 
us who are endowed with vision cannot 
fail to comprehend the dimensions of 
our sacred mission. The Egyptian 
people, with their heritage and unique 
awareness of history, have realized 
from the very beginning the meaning 
and value of this endeavor. 

In all the steps I took, I was not 
performing a personal mission. I was 
merely expressing the will of a nation. 
I'm proud of my people and of be- 
longing to them. 

Today a new dawn is emerging out 
of the darkness of the past. A new 
chapter is being opened in the history 
of coexistence among nations, one 
that's worthy of our spiritual values 
and civilization. Never before had men 
encountered such a complex dispute, 
which is highly charged with emotions. 
Never before did men need that much 
courage and imagination to confront a 
single challenge. Never before had any 



israeii Cabinet 
Approves Proposals 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 14, 1979 » 

I am extremely pleased that the Is- 
raeli Cabinet has approved the two re- 
maining proposals that I discussed with 
Prime Minister Begin on Monday in 
Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin has 
just called me with this good news. 
This means that all of the outstanding 
issues in the negotiations between 
Egypt and Israel have now been suc- 
cessfully resolved. 

At this historic moment, I want to 
congratulate the great leaders of both 
countries — President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin — for their leadership 
and the courage that they have consist- 
ently demonstrated. The peace which 
their peoples so clearly need and want 
is close to reality. I am proud that our 
country has been able to assist these 
two longtime adversaries along the path 
of reconciliation and toward future 
cooperation. We stand ready to help in 
the implementation of the peace treaty, 
in the negotiations that lie ahead on 
other issues of concern, and in working 
with these two friends to build a stable 
and peaceful Middle East. O 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 19, 1979. 



cause generated that much interest in 
all four corners of the globe. 

Men and women of good will have 
labored day and night to bring about 
this happy moment. Egyptians and Is- 
raelis alike pursued their sacred goal, 
undeterred by difficulties and compli- 
cations. Hundreds of dedicated indi- 
viduals on both sides have given 
generously of their thought and effort 
to translate the cherished dream into a 
living reality. 

But the man who performed the 
miracle was President Carter. Without 
any exaggeration, what he did consti- 
tutes one of the greatest achievements 
of our time. He devoted his skill, hard 
work, and, above all, his firm belief in 
the ultimate triumph of good against 
evil to insure the success of our mis- 
sion. 

To me he has been the best compan- 
ion and partner along the road to peace. 
With his deep sense of justice and 
genuine commitment to human rights, 
we were able to surmount the most dif- 
ficult obstacles. 

There came certain moments when 
hope was eroding and retreating in the 
face of crisis. However, President 
Carter remained unshaken in his confi- 
dence and determination. He is a man 
of faith and compassion. Before any- 
thing else, the signing of the peace 
treaty and the exchanged letter is a 
tribute to the spirit and ability of 
Jimmy Carter. 

Happily, he was armed with the 
blessing of God and the support of his 
people. For that we are grateful to each 
and every American who contributed in 
his own way to the success of our en- 
deavor. 

We are also heartened by the under- 
standing of hundreds of thousands of 
Israelis who remained unwavering in 
their commitment to peace. The con- 
tinuation of this spirit is vital to the 
coronation of our effort. We realize 
that difficult times lay ahead. The 
signing of these documents marks only 
the beginning of peace. But it is an in- 
dispensable start. Other steps remain to 
be taken without delay or procrastina- 
tion. Much will depend on the success 
of these steps. 

We are all committed to pursue our 
efforts until the fruits of the com- 
prehensive settlement we agreed upon 
are shared by all parties to the conflict. 

President Carter once said that the 
United States is committed without res- 
ervation to seeing the peace process 
through until all parties to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict are at peace. We value 
such a pledge from a leader who raised 
the banners of morality and ethics as a 
substitute for power politics and op- 
portunism. 






Department of State Bulletij 

The steps we took in the recent pai 
will serve Arab vital interests. The lib^ 
eration of Arab land and the reinstitu 
tion of Arab authority in the West Banl 
and Gaza would certainly enhance ou 
common strategic interests. 

While we take the initiative to pro 
tect these interests, we remain faithfu 
to our Arab commitment. To us, this i: 
a matter of destiny. Pursuing peace i; 
the only avenue which is compatibh 
with our culture and creed. 

Let there be no more wars o 
bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis 
Let there be no more wars or bloodshec 
between Arabs and Israelis. Let then 
be no more suffering or denial o 
rights. Let there be no more despair o 
loss of faith. Let no mother lament tht 
loss of her child. Let no young mat 
waste his life on a conflict from whict 
no one benefits. Let us work togethe 
until the day comes when they bea 
their swords into plowshares and thei 
spears into pruning-hooks. And Goc 
does call to the abode of peace. H( 
does guide whom he pleases to hi: 
way. 

[At this point, President Sadat spoke ii , 
Arabic. ] 

Prime Minister Begin 

I have come from the land of Israel 
the land of Zion and Jerusalem, an< 
here I am in humility and with pride ai 
a son of the Jewish people, as one o: 
the generation of the Holocaust and re 
demption. 

The ancient Jewish people gave th« 
world a vision of eternal peace, of uni 
versal disarmament, of abolishing th« 
teaching and the learning of war. 

Two prophets — Yishayahu Bei 
Amotz and Micah Hamorashti — having 
foreseen the spiritual unit of man undei ' 
God, with these words coming forth 
from Jerusalem, gave the nations of the 
world the following vision — expressed 
in identical terms — "And they shall 
beat their spears into pruninghooks: 
nation shall not lift up sword against 
nation, neither shall they learn war any 
more." 

Despite the tragedies and disap- 
pointments of the past, we must never 
foresake that vision, that human dream, 
that unshakable faith. 

Peace is the beauty of life. It is sun- 
shine. It is the smile of a child, the 
love of a mother, the joy of a father, 
the togetherness of a family. It is the 
advancement of man, the victory of a 
just cause, the triumph of truth. Peace 
is all of these and more, and more. 

These are words I uttered in Oslo, on 
December 10, 1978, while receiving 
the second half of the Nobel Peace 
Prize. The first half went, rightly so, to 
President Sadat. And I took the liberty 



ay 



1979 



1 repeat them here on this momentous, 
jistoric occasion. 

It is a great day in the annals of two 
ncient nations — Egypt and Israel — 
/hose sons met in battle five times in 
■ne generation, fighting and falling. 

Let us turn our hearts to our heroes 
nd pay tribute to their eternal mem- 
ry. It is thanks to them, to our fallen 
eroes, that we could have reached this 

ay- 

However, let us not forget that in an- 
ient times, our two nations met also in 
Uiance. Now we make peace, the cor- 
nerstone of cooperation and friendship. 

It is a great day in your life, Mr. 
''resident of the United States. You 
'ave worked so hard, so insistently, so 
onsistently to achieve this goal. And 
our labors and your devotion bore 
jod-blessed fruit. 

Our friend. President Sadat, said that 
ou are the unknown soldier of the 
leacemaking effort. I agree, but as 
'sual, with an amendment. [Laughter] 
\ soldier in the service of peace, you 
re. You are, Mr. President, even, 
urahile dictu, an intransigent fighter 
or peace. But Jimmy Carter, the 
'resident of the United States, is not 
ompletely unknown. [Laughter] And 
it is his efforts which will be re- 
lembered and recorded by generations 
•) come. 

It is, of course, a great day in your 
fe. Mr. President of the Arab Repub- 
c of Egypt. In the face of adversity 
nd hostility, you have demonstrated 
ne human value that can change 
istory — civil courage. 

A great field commander once said: 
Civil courage is sometimes more dif- 
icuit to show than military courage." 
'ou showed both, Mr. President. But 
ow it is time for all of us to show civil 
ourage in order to proclaim to our 
copies and to others: No more war, no 
lore bloodshed, no more bereavement. 
'eace unto you — sfialom, salaam 
orever. 

And it is the third greatest day in my 
ife. The first was May 14, 1948, when 
lur flag was hoisted. Our independence 
n our ancestors' land was proclaimed 
itter 1,878 years of dispersion, perse- 
ution, humiliation, and, ultimately 
>hysical destruction. 

We fought for our liberation alone, 
nd with God's help, we won the day. 
hat was spring. Such a spring we can 
i'e\er have again. 

The second day was when Jerusalem 
)ecame one city and our brave, perhaps 
nost hardened soldiers, the par- 
ichutists, embraced with tears and kiss- 
id the ancient stones of the remnants 
)f the wall destined to protect the cho- 
icn place of God's glory. Our hearts 
vept with them in remembrance. 



[In Hebrew] "Our feet shall stand 
within thy gates, O Jerusalem. 
Jerusalem is builded as a city that is 
compact together." 

This is the third day in my life. I 
have signed a Treaty of Peace with our 
great neighbor, with Egypt. The heart 
is full and overflowing. God gave me 
the strength to persevere, to survive the 
horrors of Nazism and of the Stalinite 
concentration camp and some other 
dangers, to endure, not to waver in nor 
flinch from my duty, to accept abuse 
from foreigners and, what is more 
painful, from my own people, and even 
from my close friends. This effort, too, 
bore some fruit. 

Therefore, it is the proper place and 
the appropriate time to bring back to 
memory the song and prayer of 
thanksgiving I learned as a child, in the 
home of father and mother that doesn't 
exist anymore because they were 
among the 6 million people — men, 
women, and children — who sanctified 
the Lord's name with the sacred blood 
which reddened the rivers of Europe 
from the Rhine to the Danube, from the 
Bug to the Volga, because — only 
because — they were born Jews, and 
because they didn't have a country of 
their own, and neither a valiant Jewish 
army to defend them, and because no- 
body, nobody came to their rescue, al- 
though they cried out, "Save us, save 
us" — de profundis, from the depths of 
the pits and agony. That is the Song of 
Degrees, written 2 millennia and 500 
years ago when our forefathers returned 
from their first exile to Jerusalem and 
Zion. 

[At this point. Prime Minister Begin spoke in 
Hebrew.] 

I will not translate. Every man, 
whether Jew or Christian or Moslem, 
can read it in his own language in the 
Book of the Books. It is just Psalm 
126. 



TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS 



TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN 

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT 

AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL 



The Government of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel; 

PREAMBLE 

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the es- 
tablishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting 
peace in the Middle East in accordance with Se- 
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 

Reaffirming their adherence to the 
"Framework for Peace in the Middle East 



Agreed at Camp David." dated September 17, 
1978; 

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as 
appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for 
peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also 
between Israel and each of its other Arab 
neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace 
with it on this basis; 

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war 
between them and to establish a peace in which 
every state in the area can live in security; 

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of 
Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important 
step in the search for comprehensive peace in the 
area and for the attainment of the settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects; 

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute 
to join the peace process with Israel guided by 
and based on the principles of the aforemen- 
tioned Framework; 

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations 
and cooperation between themselves in accord- 
ance with the United Nations Charter and the 



Egyptian Cahinet 
Approves Treaty 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 15, 1979' 

I am pleased that the Egyptian 
Cabinet now has approved the peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel and the 
related documents. The Cabinet has 
now given its support to President 
Sadat's imaginative leadership and de- 
cisive action in moving to end more 
than three decades of conflict with Is- 
rael. 

We look forward now to formal ac- 
tion on Sunday by the Israeli Cabinet, 
to be followed by the debate in the 
Knesset next week. 

The Egyptian action today, along 
with the preliminary action of the Is- 
raeli Cabinet yesterday on the out- 
standing issues, continued the 
momentum toward a quick conclusion 
of a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel. 

President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin continue to demonstrate their 
leadership and courage in building the 
cornerstone of peace in the Middle 
East. We will continue to assist Egypt 
and Israel to move their countries from 
war to peace, thereby releasing the re- 
sources that can bring a better life for 
their people. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 19, 1979. 



principles of international law governing inter- 
national relations in times of peace; 

Agree to the following provisions in the free 
exercise of their sovereignty, in order to imple- 
ment the "Framework for the Conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel": 

ARTICLE I 

1 . The state of war between the Parties will be 
terminated and peace will be established be- 
tween them upon the exchange of instruments of 
ratification of this Treaty. 

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces 
and civilians from the Sinai behind the interna- 
tional boundary between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol 
(Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of 
its full sovereignty over the Sinai. 

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal 
provided for in Annex I, the Parties will estab- 
lish normal and friendly relations, in accordance 
with Article III (3). 

ARTICLE II 

The permanent boundary between Egypt and 
Israel is the recognized international boundary 
between Egypt and the former mandated territory 
of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, 
without prejudice to the issue of the status of the 
Gaza Strip. The parties recognize this boundary 
as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial 
integrity of the other, including their territorial 
waters and airspace. 

ARTICLE III 

1. The Parties will apply between them the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law governing 
relations among states in times of peace. In par- 
ticular: 

a. They recognize and will respect each 
other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence; 

b. They recognize and will respect each 
other's right to live in peace within their secure 
and recognized boundaries; 

c. They will refrain from the threat or use of 
force, directly or indirectly, against each other 
and will settle all disputes between them by 
peaceful means. 

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or 
threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do 
not originate from and are not committed from 
within its territory, or by any forces subject to 
its control or by any other forces stationed on its 
territory, against the population, citizens or 
property of the other Party. Each Party also un- 
dertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
inciting, assisting or participating in acts or 
threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or 
violence against the other Party, anywhere, and 
undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such 
acts are brought to justice. 

3. The Parties agree that the normal relation- 
ship established between them will include full 
recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural 
relations, termination of economic boycotts and 



discriminatory barriers to the free movement of 
people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual 
enjoyment of citizens of the due process of law. 
The process by which they undertake to achieve 
such a relationship parallel to the implementa- 
tion of other provisions of this treaty is set out in 
the annexed protocol (Annex III). 

ARTICLE IV 

1. In order to provide maximum security for 
both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed 
security arrangements will be established in- 
cluding limited force zones in Egyptian and Is- 
raeli territory, and United Nations forces and ob- 
servers, described in detail as to nature and tim- 
ing in Annex I, and other security arrangements 
the Parties may agree upon. 

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of 
United Nations personnel in areas described in 
Annex I. The Parties agree not to request with- 
drawal of the United Nations personnel and that 
these personnel will not be removed unless such 
removal is approved by the Security Council of 
the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of 
the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties 
otherwise agree. 

3. A Joint Commission will be established to 
facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as 
provided for in Annex I. 



israeli Knesset 
Approves Treaty 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 21, 1979' 

The Israeli Knesset spoke with a 
voice heard around the world today — a 
voice for peace. We welcome this his- 
toric decision. The overwhelming vote 
in favor of the peace treaty between 
Israel and Egypt affirms the deep and 
long-felt desire of the people of Israel 
for peace with their neighbors. In tak- 
ing this action, Israel's democracy has 
lived up to its promise, providing a free 
and open discussion of all the issues, 
and then deciding in favor of peace. 

The bonds of shared values and 
common purpose between the United 
States and Israel are strong and endur- 
ing. The achievement of peace between 
Israel and Egypt will strengthen even 
more our relations with these two 
partners in peace and help move toward 
a stable, cooperative, and peaceful fu- 
ture for all the peoples of the Middle 
East. D 



'The Israeli Knesset approved the Treaty of 
Peace with Egypt by a vote of 95 to 18. Text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Mar. 26. 1979 



Department of State Bulletii 

! 

4. The security arrangements provided for | 

paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the r^ 

quest of either party be reviewed and amend 

by mutual agreement of the Parties. 

ARTICLE V 

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined fort 
coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of fre 
passage through the Suez Canal and its a[ 
proaches through the Gulf of Suez and th 
Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constat 
tinople Convention of 1888, applying to all m 
tions. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes 
well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined U 
or coming from Israel, shall be accorded not 
discriminatory treatment in all matters connecti 
with usage of the canal. 

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran ai 
the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterwaj 
open to all nations for unimpeded and noi 
suspendable freedom of navigation and ove 
flight. The Parties will respect each others' rigl 
to navigation and overflight for access to eith( 
country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gu 
of Aqaba. 



ARTICLE VI 

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not I 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights ai 
obligations of the Parties under the Charter 
the United Nations. 

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in goo 
faith their obligations under this Treaty, withoi 
regard to action or inaction of any other pari 
and independently of any instrument external I 
this Treaty. 

3. They further undertake to take all th 
necessary measures for the application in the 
relations of the provisions of the multilater; 
conventions to which they are parlies, includin 
the submission of appropriate notification to th 
Secretary General of the United Nations an 
other depositaries of such conventions. 

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into an 
obligation in conflict with this Treaty. 

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Na 
tions Charter, in the event of a conflict betwee 
the obligations of the Parties under the presen 
Treaty and any of their other obligations, th 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding an 
implemented. 



ARTICLE VII 

1. Disputes arising out of the application o 
interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved b; 
negotiations. 

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settlet 
by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliatioi 
or submitted to arbitration. 

ARTICLE VIII 

The Parties agree to establish a claims coni' 
mission for the mutual settlement of all financial 

claims. 

ARTICLE IX 



I . This Treaty shall enter into force upon ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 



4ay 1979 



2 This Treaty supersedes the Agreement be- 
wccn Egypt and Israel of September, 1975. 

_V All protocols, annexes, and maps attached 
o this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral 
lart hereof. 

4 The Treaty shall be communicated to the 
secretary General of the United Nations for reg- 
stralion in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 



Done at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of 
March, 1979, in triplicate in the English. 
"Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being 
equally authentic. In case of any divergence of 
interpretation, the English text shall prevail. 

For the Government of the 
\rjLb Republic of Egypt: 

\ .Sadat 

Fur the Government 
il Israel; 

M Begin 

V\ I messed By: 

IiMMY Carter 

Jimmy Carter, President 

[)f the United States of America 



ANNEX I 

PROTOCOL CONCERNING ISRAELI 

WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY 

ARRANGEMENTS 

Article I 
Concept of Withdrawal 

Israel will complete withdrawal of all its 
irmed forces and civilians from the Sinai not 
ater than three years from the date of exchange 
jf instruments of ratification of this Treaty. 
L To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, 
he implementation of phased withdrawal will be 
accompanied by the military measures and es- 
ahiishment of zones set out in this Annex and in 
Map I, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones." 
V The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accom- 
plished in two phases: 

a The interim withdrawal behind the line 
from east of El Arish to Ras Muhammed as de- 
lineated on Map 2 within nine months from the 
date of exchange of instruments of ratification of 
this Treaty. 

b The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind 
the international boundary not later than three 
years from the date of exchange of instruments 
ol ratification of this Treaty. 

4 \ Joint Commission will be formed im- 
miJiately after the exchange of instruments of 
raiilication of this Treaty in order to supervise 
and coordinate movements and schedules during 
the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and time- 
tahles as necessary within the limits established 
by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the 
Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the 



attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will 
be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai. 

Article II 
Determination of Final Line.s and Zones 

1. In order to provide maximum security for 
both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines 
and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be es- 
tablished and organized as follows: 

a. Zone A 

( 1 ) Zone A is bounded on the east by line A 
(red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and 
the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on 
Map 1 . 

(2) An Egyptian armed force of one 
mechanized infantry division and its military 
installations, and field fortifications, will be in 
this Zone. 

(3) The main elements of that division will 
consist of: 

(a) Three mechanized infantry brigades. 

(b) One armored brigade. 

(c) Seven field artillery battalions in- 
cluding up to 126 artillery pieces. 

(d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battal- 
ions including individual surface-to-air missiles 
and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and 
above. 

(e) Up to 230 tanks. 

(f) Up to 480 armored personnel ve- 
hicles of all types. 

(g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand 
personnel. 

b. Zone B 

(1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green 
line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the 
west, as shown on Map 1. 

(2) Egyptian border units of four battalions 
equipped with light weapons and wheeled ve- 
hicles will provide security and supplement the 
civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. 
The main elements of the four border battalions 
will consist of up to a total of four thousand 
personnel. 

(3) Land based, short range, low power, 
coastal warning points of the border patrol 
units may be established on the coast of this 
Zone. 

(4) There will be in Zone B field fortifica- 
tions and military installations for the four bor- 
der battalions. 

c. Zone C 

(1) Zone C is bounded by line B (green 
line) on the west and the international boundary 
and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on 
Map 1 . 

(2) Only United Nations forces and Egyp- 
tian civil police will be stationed in Zone C. 

(3) The Egyptian civil police armed with 
light weapons will perform normal police func- 
tions within this Zone. 

(4) The United Nations Force will be de- 
ployed within Zone C and perform its functions 
as defined in Article VI of this Annex. 

(5) The United Nations Force will be 



stationed mainly in camps located within the 
following stationing areas shown on Map 1, 
and will establish its precise locations after 
consultations with Egypt: 

(a) In that part of the area in the Sinai 
lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterra- 
nean Sea and adjacent to the international 
boundary. 

(b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area. 

d. Zone D 

(1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue 
line) on the east and the international boundary 
on the west, as shown on Map 1. 

(2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli 
limited force of four infantry battalions, their 



On April 10, 1979, the Egyptian 
People's Assembly ratified the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty by a vote 
of 328 to 15(1 abstention and 16 mem- 
bers were absent). 



military installations, and field fortifications, 
and United Nations observers. 

(3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not 
include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft mis- 
siles except individual surface-to-air missiles. 

(4) The main elements of the four Israeli 
infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 ar- 
mored personnel vehicles of all types and up to 
a total of four thousand personnel. 

2. Access across the international boundary 
shall only be permitted through entry check 
points designated by each Party and under its 
control. Such access shall be in accordance 
with laws and regulations of each country. 

3. Only those field fortifications, military in- 
stallations, forces, and weapons specifically 
permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones. 

Article III 
Aerial Military Regime 

1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance 
flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only 
over Zones A and D, respectively. 

2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt 
and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, 
respectively. 

3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft 
will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight 
such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The 
Egyptian border units may be equipped with 
unarmed helicopters to perform their functions 
in Zone B. 

4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped 
with unarmed police helicopters to perform 
normal police functions in Zone C. 

5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the 
Zones. 

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Treaty, only those military aerial activities 
specifically permitted by this Annex shall be 
allowed in the Zones and the airspace above 
their territorial waters. 



Department of State Bulleti: 



MAP 1 - International Boundary and the Lines of the Zones 




504093 3-79 (544089 

This is a representalion of the original map included in the treaty 



Mav 1979 



Article IV 
Naval Regime 

1 Igypi and Israel may base and operate naval 
ic^sels along the coasts of Zones A and D. re- 
spectively. 

2 Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, 
iiKi\ be stationed and operate in the territorial 
.\jicrs of Zone B to assist the border units in 

[performing their functions in this Zone. 

13. Egyptian civil police equipped with light 

{boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal 

police functions within the territorial waters of 
iZone C. 
'4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as 

derogating from the right of innocent passage 

of the naval vessels of either Party. 

5. Only civilian maritime ports and installa- 
tions may be built in the Zones. 

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Treaty, only those naval activities specifically 
permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the 
Zones and in their territorial waters. 

Article V 
Early Warning Systems 

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate 
early warning systems only in Zones A and D, 
respectively. 

Article VI 
United Nations Operations 

1. The Parties will request the United Nations 
to provide forces and observers to supervise the 
implementation of this Annex and employ their 
best efforts to prevent any violation of its 
terms. 

2. With respect to these United Nations forces 
and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree 
to request the following arrangements; 

a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance 
patrols, and observation posts along the inter- 
national boundary and line B, and within 
Zone C. 

b. Periodic verification of the implementa- 
tion of the provisions of this Annex will be 
carried out not less than twice a month unless 
otherwise agreed by the Parties. 

c. Additional verifications within 48 hours 
after the receipt of a request from either Party. 

d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation 
through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with 
Article V of the Treaty of Peace. 

3. The arrangements described in this article 
for each zone will be implemented in Zones A, 
B, and C by the United Nations Force and in 
Zone D by the United Nations Observers. 

4. United Nations verification teams shall be 
accompanied by liaison officers of the respec- 
tive Party. 

5. The United Nations Force and Observers 
will report their findings to both Parties. 

6. The United Nations Force and Observers 
operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of 
movement and other facilities necessary for the 
performance of their tasks. 

7. The United Nations Force and Observers are 



not empowered to authorize the crossing of the 

international boundary. 

X. The Parlies shall agree on the nations from 

which the United Nations Force and Observers 

will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations 

other than those which are Permanent Members 

of the United Nations Security Council. 

9. The Parties agree that the United Nations 

should make those command arrangements that 

will best assure the effective implementation of 

its responsibilities. 

Article VII 
Liaison System 

1 . Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a 
liaison system between the Parties will be es- 
tablished. This liaison system is intended to 
provide an effective method to assess progress 
in the implementation of obligations under the 
present Annex and to resolve any problem that 
may arise in the course of implementation, and 
refer other unresolved matters to the higher 
military authorities of the two countries re- 
spectively for consideration. It is also intended 
to prevent situations resulting from errors or 
misinterpretation on the part of either Parly. 

2. An Egyptian liaison office will be estab- 
lished in the city of El Arish and an Israeli 
liaison office will be established in the city of 
Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an 
officer of the respective country, and assisted 
by a number of officers. 

3. A direct telephone link between the two of- 
fices will be set up and also direct telephone 
lines with the United Nations command will be 
maintained by both offices. 

Article VIII 
Respect for War Memorials 

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good 
condition the War Memorials erected in the 
memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely 
those erected by Israel in the Sinai and those to 
be erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit 
access to such monuments. 

Article IX 
Interim Arrangements 

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and 
civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, 
and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and 
the United Nations prior to the final with- 
drawal, will be governed by the attached Ap- 
pendix and Maps 2 and 3. 

APPENDIX TO ANNEX I 

ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS IN 
THE SINAI 

ARTICLE I 

Principles of Withdrawal 

I. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and 
civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in 
two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. 



The description and timing of the withdrawal 
are included in this Appendix. The Joint Com- 
mission will develop and present to the Chief 
Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the 
Middle East the details of these phases not later 
than one month before the initiation of each 
phase of withdrawal. 

2. Both parties agree on the following princi- 
ples for the sequence of military movements. 

a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 
IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli 
armed forces complete withdrawal from the 
current J and M Lines established by the 
Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 
1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 
Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, 
all military arrangements existing under that 
Agreement will remain in effect, except those 
military arrangements otherwise provided for in 
this Appendix. 

b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw. United 
Nations forces will immediately enter the 
evacuated areas to establish interim and tem- 
porary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, 
respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a 
separation of forces. United Nations forces' 
deployment will precede the movement of any 
other personnel into these areas. 

c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli 
armed forces have evacuated any area located 
in Zone A. units of Egyptian armed forces shall 
deploy in accordance with the provisions of 
Article II of this Appendix. 

d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli 
armed forces have evacuated any area located 
in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall 
deploy in accordance with the provisions of 
Article II of this Appendix, and will function in 
accordance with the provisions of Article II of 
Annex I. 

e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated 
areas immediately after the United Nations 
forces to perform normal police functions. 

f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the 
Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions 
of Article II of this Appendix. 

g. Except those movements mentioned 
above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces 
and the activities covered in Annex I will be 
effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli 
armed forces have completed their withdrawal 
behind the interim withdrawal line. 

ARTICLE II 

Subphases of the Withdrawal 
to the Interim Withdrawal Line 

I. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal 
line will be accomplished in subphases as de- 
scribed in this Article and as shown on Map 3. 
Each subphase will be completed within the in- 
dicated number of months from the date of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this 
Treaty. 

a. First subphase: within two months, Israeli 
armed forces will withdraw from the area of El 
Arish, including the town of El Arish and its 
airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3. 



Department of State Bulletii 



MAP 2 - Lines and Zones Effective when Israeli Forces are on the 
El Arish - Ras Mohammad Line 




Part of Line "A" 
Interim Buffer Zone Line V 
El Arlsh - Ras Mohammad Line' 
International Boundary 

Part of Zone "B" 





_ Part of Zone 




Gu/fof\ 
Sucil 


A" 


■'T' 


Technical Installation 





Existing Line 


■E' 







Existing Line 


■J' 






Existing Line 


■M 




® 


Major Airfield 


in 


Sinai 




h- 






50 Kilometers 



50 Miles 



504094 3-79 (544089) 

This IS a represenlalion ot Ihe original map included in Ihe Ireaty 



,May 1979 



b. Second subphase: within three months, 
Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the 
area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and 
line A, shown as Area II on Map 3 

c. Third subphase: within five months, Is- 
raeli armed forces will withdraw from the areas 
east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on 
Map 3. 

d. Fourth subphase: within seven months, 
Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the 
area of El Tor-Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area 
IV on Map 3. 

e. Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Is- 
raeli armed forces will withdraw from the re- 
maining areas west of the interim withdrawal 
line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and 
the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, 
shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing 
Israeli withdrawal behind the interim with- 
drawal line. 

2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas 
evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows: 

a. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed 
forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 
Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone 
A lying within Area I, until the completion of 

I interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian 
armed forces as described in Article II of 
Annex 1 will be deployed in Zone A up to the 
limits of the interim buffer zone. 

b. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance 
with Article IV of Annex 1 will commence 
along the coasts of Areas II, 111, and IV, upon 
completion of the second, third, and fourth 

j subphases, respectively. 

I c. Of the Egyptian border units described in 
'Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the 
first subphase one battalion will be deployed in 
Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in 
Area II upon completion of the second sub- 
phase. A third battalion will be deployed in 
Area 111 upon completion of the third subphase. 
The second and third battalions mentioned 
above may also be deployed in any of the sub- 
sequently evacuated areas of the southern 
Sinai. 

3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of 
the 1975 Agreement will redeploy to enable the 
deployment of Egyptian forces described above 
upon the completion of the first subphase, but 
will otherwise continue to function in accord- 
ance with the provisions of that Agreement in 
the remainder of that zone until the completion 
of the interim withdrawal, as indicated in Arti- 
cle I of this Appendix. 

I 4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and 
east of the main road junction east of El Arish 

' to evacuate Israeli forces and equipment up to 
the completion of interim withdrawal. These 
convoys will proceed in daylight upon four 
hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and 
United Nations forces, will be escorted by 
United Nations forces, and will be in accord- 
ance with schedules coordinated by the Joint 
Commission. .An Egyptian liaison officer will 
accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted 



movement. The Joint Commission may approve 
other arrangements for convoys. 

ARTICLE III 
United Nations Forces 

1. The Parties shall request that United Nations 
forces be deployed as necessary to perform the 
functions described in this Appendix up to the 
time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. 
For that purpose, the Parties agree to the rede- 
ployment of the United Nations Emergency 
Force 

2. United Nations forces will supervise the im- 
plementation of this Appendix and will employ 
their best efforts to prevent any violation of its 
terms. 

3. When United Nations forces deploy in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of Articles I and 
II of this Appendix, they will perform the 
functions of verification in limited force zones 
in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and 
will establish check points, reconnaissance pa- 
trols, and observation posts in the temporary 
buffer zones described in Article II above. 
Other functions of the United Nations forces 
which concern the interim buffer zone are de- 
scribed in Article V of this Appendix. 

ARTICLE IV 
Joint Commission and Liaison 

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article 
IV of this Treaty will function from the date of 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this 
Treaty up to the date of completion of final Is- 
raeli withdrawal from the Sinai. 

2. The Joint Commission will be composed of 
representatives of each Party headed by senior 
officers. This Commission shall invite a repre- 
sentative of the United Nations when discus- 
sing subjects concerning the United Nations, or 
when either Party requests United Nations 
presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission 
will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Is- 
rael. 

3. The Joint Commission will supervise the 
implementation of the arrangements described 
in Annex 1 and this Appendix, To this end, and 
by agreement of both Parlies, it will: 

a. coordinate military movements described 
in this Appendix and supervise their im- 
plementation; 

b. address and seek to resolve any problem 
arising out of the implementation of Annex 1 
and this Appendix, and discuss any violations 
reported by the United Nations Force and Ob- 
servers and refer to the Governments of Egypt 
and Israel any unresolved problems; 

c. assist the United Nations Force and Ob- 
servers in the execution of their mandates, and 
deal with the timetables of the periodic verifi- 
cations when referred to it by the Parties as 
provided for in Annex 1 and in this Appendix; 

d. organize the demarcation of the interna- 
tional boundary and ail lines and zones de- 
scribed in Annex 1 and this Appendix; 

e. supervise the handing over of the main in- 



stallations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt; 

f. agree on necessary arrangements for find- 
ing and returning missing bodies of Egyptian 
and Israeli soldiers; 

g. organize the setting up and operation of 
entry check points along the El Arish — Ras 
Muhammed line in accordance with the provi- 
sions of Article 4 of Annex III; 

h. conduct its operations through the use of 
joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli 
representative and one Egyptian representative, 
provided from a standing Liaison Group, which 
will conduct activities as directed by the Joint 
Commission; 

i. provide liaison and coordination to the 
United Nations command implementing provi- 
sions of the Treaty, and, through the joint 
liaison teams, maintain local coordination and 
cooperation with the United Nations Force 
stationed in specific areas or United Nations 
Observers monitoring specific areas for any as- 
sistance as needed; 

j. discuss any other matters which the Parties 
by agreement may place before it. 

4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be 
held at least once a month. In the event that 
either Party or the Command of the United Na- 
tions Force requests a special meeting, it will 
be convened within 24 hours. 

5. The Joint Commission will meet in the 
buffer zone until the completion of the interim 
withdrawal and in El .Arish and Beer-Sheba al- 
ternately afterwards. The first meeting will be 
held not later than two weeks after the entry 
into force of this Treaty. 

ARTICLE V 

Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone 
and Its Activities 

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United 
Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyp- 
tian and Israeli elements, will be established 
west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal 
line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of 
Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the 
interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police 
equipped with light weapons will perform nor- 
mal police functions within this zone. 

2. The United Nations Force will operate check 
points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation 
posts within the interim buffer zone in order to 
ensure compliance with the terms of this Arti- 
cle. 

3. In accordance with arrangements agreed 
upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by 
the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will 
operate military technical installations at four 
specific locations shown on Map 2 and desig- 
nated as TI (map central coordinate 
57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 
59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 
59331527), and T4 (map central coordinate 
61 130979) under the following principles: 

a. The technical installations shall be 
manned by technical and administrative per- 
sonnel equipped with small arms required for 



10 



Department of State Bulletir 



MAP 3 - Sub-Phases of Withdrawal to the El Arish-Ras Mohammad Line 




504095 3-79 (544089 

This is a representation of the original map included in the treaty 



May 1979 



11 



their proleclion (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine 
guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and 
aninuinition), as follows: 

Tl — up to 150 personnel 

T2 and T3— up to 350 personnel 

T4 — up to 200 personnel. 

b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons out- 
side the sites, except officers who may carry 
personal weapons. 

c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and 
Israel will enter and conduct inspections within 

1 the perimeters of technical installations in the 
I buffer zone. The third party will conduct in- 
spections in a random manner at least once a 
month. The inspections will verify the nature of 
the operation of the installations and the 
weapons and personnel therein. The third party 
will immediately report to the Parties any di- 
I vergence from an installation's visual and 
I electronic surveillance or communications role. 

d. Supply of the installations, visits for tech- 
nical and administrative purposes, and re- 
placement of personnel and equipment situated 
in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the 
United Nations check points to the perimeter of 
the technical installations, after checking and 
being escorted by only the United Nations 
forces. 

e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into 
its technical installations items required for the 
proper functioning of the installations and per- 
sonnel. 

f. As determined by the Joint Commission, 
Israel will be permitted to: 

( 1 ) Maintain in its installations fire- 
fighting and general maintenance equipment as 
well as wheeled administrative vehicles and 
mobile engineering equipment necessary for the 
maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be 
unarmed. 

(2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, 
maintain roads, water lines, and communica- 
tions cables which serve the sites. At each of 
the three installation locations (Tl. T2 and T3. 
and T4), this maintenance may be performed 
with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and 
by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only 
necessary equipment, including heavy en- 
gineering equipment if needed. This mainte- 
nance may be performed three times a week, 
except for special problems, and only after 
giving the United Nations four hours notice. 
The teams will be escorted by the United Na- 
tions. 

g. Movement to and from the technical in- 
stallations will take place only during daylight 
hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical 
installations shall be as follows: 

(1)T1: through a United Nations check 
point, and via the road between Abu Aweigila 
and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road 



and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as 
shown on Map 2 

(2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations 
checkpoint and via the road constructed across 
the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on 
Map 2. 

(3) T2, T3. and T4: via helicopters flying 
within a corridor at the times, and according to 
a night profile, agreed to by the Joint Commis- 
sion. The helicopters will be checked by the 
United Nations Force at landing sites outside 
the perimeter of the installations. 

h. Israel will inform the United Nations 
Force at least one hour in advance of each in- 
tended movement to and from the installations. 

i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and 
wounded and summon medical experts and 
medical teams at any time after giving im- 
mediate notice to the United Nations Force. 

4. The details of the above principles and all 
other matters in this Article requiring coordi- 
nation by the Parties will be handled by the 
Joint Commission. 

5. These technical installations will be with- 
drawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the 
interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by 
the parties. 

ARTICLE VI 

Disposition of Installations 
and Military Barriers 

Disposition of installations and military bar- 
riers will be determined by the Parties in ac- 
cordance with the following guidelines: 

1 . Up to three weeks before Israeli with- 
drawal from any area, the Joint Commission 
will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and 
technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of 
all appropriate installations to agree upon con- 
dition of structures and articles which will be 
transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange 
for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that 
time, its plans for disposition of installations 
and articles within the installations. 

2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all 
agreed infrastructure, utilities, and installations 
intact, inter alia, airfield, roads, pumping sta- 
tions, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the 
information necessary for the maintenance and 
operation of these facilities. Egyptian technical 
teams will be permitted to observe and 
familiarize themselves with the operation of 
these facilities for a period of up to two weeks 
prior to transfer. 

3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military 
water points near El Arish and El Tor. Egyptian 
technical teams will assume control of those in- 
stallations and ancillary equipment in accord- 
ance with an orderly transfer process arranged 
beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt 
undertakes to continue to make available at all 
water supply points the normal quantity of 



currently available water up to the time Israel 
withdraws behind the international boundary, 
unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commis- 
sion. 

4, Israel will make its best effort to remove 
or destroy all military barriers, including ob- 
stacles and minefields, in the areas and adja- 
cent waters from which it withdraws, according 
to the following concept: 

a. Military barriers will be cleared first 
from areas near populations, roads, and major 
installations and utilities. 

b. For those obstacles and minefields 
which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to 
Israeli withdrawal. Israel will provide detailed 
maps to Egypt and the United Nations through 
the Joint Commission not later than 15 days 
before entry of United Nations forces into the 
affected areas. 

c. Egyptian military engineers will enter 
those areas after United Nations forces enter to 
conduct barrier clearance operations in accord- 
ance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior 
to implementation. 



ARTICLE VII 

Surveillance Activities 

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the 
withdrawal will be carried out as follows: 

a. Both Parties request the United States to 
continue airborne surveillance flights in ac- 
cordance with previous agreements until the 
completion of final Israeli withdrawal. 

b. Flight profiles will cover the Limited 
Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on 
forces and armaments, and to determine that 
Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the 
areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article 
II of this appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that 
these forces thereafter remain behind their 
lines. Special inspection flights may be flown 
at the request of either Party or of the United 
Nations. 

c. Only the main elements in the military or- 
ganizations of each Party, as described in 
Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported. 

2. Both Parties request the United States oper- 
ated Sinai Field Mission to continue its opera- 
tions in accordance with previous agreements 
until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from 
the area east of the Giddi and Mitia Passes. 
Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated. 



ARTICLE VIII 
Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty 

Egypt will resume the exercise of its full 
sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai 
upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Arti- 
cle 1 of this Treaty. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



ANNEX II - International Boundary 





Port SaSS?! 



Ai Qanfarah 



Mediterranean Sea 




E G Y P T 



Sinai . 
' Peninsula 



^ 



7 




\ 



Saint Catherine's 
Monastery 



International Boundary 



/Gulf 
/ of 

Aqaba SAUDI 
ARABIA 



50 Kilometers 



50 Miles 







Red Sea 



Stiarm ash 
Shaykti 

Ras Mohammad 



504096 3-79 (544089) 
This IS a represenution of the original map included in the treaty. 



4av 1979 



13 



j ANNEX III 

^PROTOCOL CONCERNING RELATIONS 
OF THE PARTIES 



Article 1 
Diplomatic and Consular Relations 

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and 
onsular relations and to exchange ambassadors 
ipon completion of the interim withdrawal. 



Article 2 
Economic and Trade Relations 

1. The Parties agree to remove all dis- 
iriminatory barriers to normal economic rela- 
ions and to terminate economic boycotts of 
ach other upon completion of the interim 
vithdrawal. 

2- As soon as possible, and not later than six 
nonths after the completion of the interim 
vithdrawal. the Parties will enter negotiations 
vilh a view to concluding an agreement on 
rade and commerce for the purpose of pro- 
noting beneficial economic relations. 

Article 3 
Cultural Relations 

1, The Parties agree to establish normal cul- 
ural relations following completion of the 
nterim withdrawal. 

2. They agree on the desirability of cultural 
■xchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as 
)ossible and not later than six months after 
:omplelion of the interim withdrawal, enter 
nto negotiations with a view to concluding a 
cultural agreement for this purpose. 

Article 4 
Freedom of Movement 

1. Upon completion of the interim with- 
drawal, each Party will permit the free move- 
■nent of the nationals and vehicles of the other 
into and within its territory according to the 
genera! rules applicable to nationals and ve- 
hicles of other states. Neither Party will impose 
discriminatory restrictions on the free movement 
of persons and vehicles from its territory to the 
territory of the other 

2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of re- 
ligious and historical significance will be pro- 
vided on a nondiscriminatory basis. 



Article 5 

Cooperation for Development and 

Good Neighborly Relations 

1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of inter- 
est in good neighborly relations and agree to 
consider means to promote such relations. 

2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting 
peace, stability and development in their re- 
gion. Each agrees to consider proposals the 
other may wish to make to this end. 



?. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual un- 
derstanding and tolerance and will, accord- 
ingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against 
each other. 

Article 6 
Transportation and Telecommunications 

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to 
each other the rights, privileges and obligations 
provided for by the aviation agreements to 
which they are both party, particularly by the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the 
International Air Services Transit Agreement, 
1944. 

2. Upon completion of the interim with- 
drawal any declaration of national emergency 
by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago 
Convention will not be applied to the other 
party on a discriminatory basis. 

3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left 
by Israel near EI Arish, Rafah, Ras El Nagb 
and Sharm el Sheikh shall be for civilian pur- 
poses only, including possible commercial use 
by all nations. 

4. As soon as possible and not later than six 
months after the completion of the interim 
withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negoti- 
ations for the purpose of concluding a civil avi- 
ation agreement. 

5. The Parties will reopen and maintain 
roads and railways between their countries and 
will consider further road and rail links. The 
Parties further agree that a highway will be 
constructed and maintained between Egypt, 
Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free 
and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and 
goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prej- 
udice to their sovereignty over that part of the 
highway which falls within their respective 
territory. 

6. Upon completion of the interim with- 
drawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data 
facsimile, wireless and cable communications 
and television relay services by cable, radio 
and satellite shall be established between the 
two Parties in accordance with all relevant in- 
ternational conventions and regulations. 

7. Upon completion of the interim with- 
drawal, each Party shall grant normal access to 
its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as 
well as vessels and cargoes destined for or 
coming from the other. Such access shall be 
granted on the same conditions generally appli- 
cable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be im- 
plemented upon the exchange of instruments of 
ratification of the aforementioned Treaty. 

Article 7 
Enjoyment of Human Rights 

The Parties affirm their commitment to re- 
spect and observe human rights and fundamen- 
tal freedoms for all, and they will promote 
these rights and freedoms in accordance with 
the United Nations Charter. 



Article 8 
Territorial Seas 

Without prejudice to the provisions of Arti- 
cle 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recog- 
nizes the right of the vessels of the other Party 
to innocent passage through its territorial sea in 
accordance with the rules of international law. 

AGREED MINUTES 

AGREED MINUTES 

TO ARTICLES I, IV, V AND VI 

AND ANNEXES I AND HI 

OF TREATY OF PEACE 

ARTICLE I 

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full 
sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in para- 
graph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to 
each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that 
area. 

ARTICLE IV 

It is agreed between the parties that the review 
provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken 
when requested by either party, commencing 
within three months of such a request, but that 
any amendment can be made only with the 
mutual agreement of both parties. 

ARTICLE V 

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 
V shall not be construed as limiting the first 
sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not 
to be construed as contravening the second sen- 
tence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads 
as follows: 

"The Parties will respect each other's right to 
navigation and overflight for access to either 
country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf 
of Aqaba." 

ARTICLE VI(2) 

The provisions of Article VI shall not be con- 
strued in contradiction to the provisions of the 
framework for peace in the Middle East agreed 
at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be con- 
strued as contravening the provisions of Article 
VI(2) of the treaty, which reads as follows: 

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith 
their obligations under this Treaty, without re- 
gard to action or inaction of any other Party and 
independently of any instrument external to this 
Treaty." 

ARTICLE VI(5) 

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no as- 
sertion that this Treaty prevails over other 
Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or 
agreements prevail over this Treaty. The 



14 



foregoing is not to be construed as contravening 
the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, 
which reads as follows: 

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations 
Charter, in the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Parties under the present 
Treaty and any of their other obligations, the 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and 
implemented." 

ANNEX I 

Article VI. Paragraph 8. of Annex I provides 
as follows: 

"The Parties shall agree on the nations from 
which the United Nations force and observers 
will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations 
other than those which are permanent members 
of the United Nations Security Council." 

The Parties have agreed as follows: 

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 
8, Article VI, of Annex 1, if no agreement is 
reached between the Parties, they will accept or 
support a U.S. proposal concerning the compos- 
ition of the United Nations force and obser- 
vers." 

ANNEX III 

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto 
provide for establishing normal economic rela- 
tions between the Parties. In accordance there- 
with, it is agreed that such relations will include 
normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Is- 
rael, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to 
make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for 
Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt 
and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids 
made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as 
apply to other bidders for such oil. 

For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: 

A. Sadat 

For the Government of 
Israel: 

M. Begin 

Witnessed by: 

Jimmy Carter 

Jimmy Carter, President 

of the United States of America 



LETTERS 



March 26, 1979 

Dear Mr. President: 

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have 
agreed as follows: 

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall 
that they concluded at Camp David and signed at 
the White House on September 17, 1978, the 
annexed documents entitled "A Framework for 



Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp 
David" and "Framework for the conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel " 

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive 
peace settlement in accordance with the above- 
mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will 
proceed with the implementation of those provi- 
sions relating to the West Bank and the Gaea 
Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations 
within a month after the exchange of the instru- 
ments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In ac- 
cordance with the "Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East," the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor- 
dan is invited to join the negotiations. The Dele- 
gations of Egypt and Jordan may include Pales- 
tinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or 
other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The pur- 
pose of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to 
the elections, on the modalities for establishing 
the elected self-governing authority (administra- 
tive council), define its powers and respon- 
sibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In 
the event Jordan decides not to take part in the 
negotiations, the negotiations will be held by 
Egypt and Israel. 

The two Governments agree to negotiate con- 
tinuously and in good faith to conclude these 
negotiations at the earliest possible date. They 
also agree that the objective of the negotiations 
is the establishment of the self-governing au- 
thority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to 
provide full autonomy to the inhabitants. 

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of 
completing the negotiations within one year so 
that elections will be held as expeditiously as 
possible after agreement has been reached be- 
tween the parties. The self-governing authority 
referred to in the "Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East" will be established and inaugu- 
rated within one month after it has been elected, 
at which time the transitional period of five 
years will begin. The Israeli military government 
and its civilian administration will be with- 
drawn, to be replaced by the self-governing au- 
thority, as specified in the "Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East." A withdrawal of Is- 
raeli armed forces will then take place and there 
will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli 
forces into specified security locations. 

This letter also confirms our understanding 
that the United States Government will partici- 
pate fully in all stages of negotiations. 
Sincerely yours. 

For the Government of 
Israel: 

M. Begin 
Menachem Begin 

For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: 

A. Sadat 

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat 

The President, 
The White House. 

[Note: President Carter, upon receipt of the 



Department of State Bulleti' 

I 
joint letter to him from President Sadat an, 
Prime Minister Begin, added to the America! 
and Israeli copies the notation: 

"I have been informed that the expressio 
"West Bank' is understood by the Government o 
Israel to mean 'Judea and Samaria'." 

This notation is in accordance with simila 
procedures established at Camp David.) 



March 26, 197< 

Dear Mr. President: 

In response to your request, 1 can confirn 
that, within one month after the completion o 
Israel's withdrawal to the interim line as pro 
vided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egyp 
and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambas 
sador to Israel and will receive a resident Israel 
ambassador in Egypt. 
Sincerely, 



The President, 
The White House. 



A. Sadai 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sada 



March 26, 1979 



Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

I have received a letter from President Sadai 
that, within one month after Israel completes it: 
withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as pro 
vided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypi 
and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambas 
sador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resi 
dent Israeli ambassador. 

I would be grateful if you will confirm thai 
this procedure will be agreeable to the Govern 
ment of Israel. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter 

His Excellency 
Menachem Begin 
Prime Minister of the 
State of Israel. 



March 26, 1979 

Dear Mr. President: 

I am pleased to be able to confirm that the 
Government of Israel is agreeable to the proce- 
dure set out in your letter of March 26, 1979 in 
which you state: 

"I have received a letter from President Sadat 
that, within one month after Israel completes its 
withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as pro- 
vided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambas- 



lay 1979 

ador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resi- 
lenl Israeli ambassador." 
Sincerely, 

M. Begin 
Menachem Begin 

The President. 
The White House. 



March 26, 1979 

)ear Mr. President: 

1 wish to confirm to you that subject to 
Jnited States Constitutional processes: 

In the event of an actual or threatened viola- 
ion of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and 
srael, the United States will, on request of one 
or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties 
vith respect thereto and will take such other 
iction as it may deem appropriate and helpful 
achieve compliance with the Treaty. 

The United States will conduct aerial 
nonitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant 
(0 Annex I of the Treaty. 

*• The United States believes the Treaty provi- 
i.ion for permanent stationing of United Nations 
lersonne! in the designated limited force zone 
:an and should be implemented by the United 
•Jations Security Council. The United States 
vill exert its utmost efforts to obtain the req- 
lisite action by the Security Council. If the Se- 
urity Council fails to establish and maintain 
he arrangements called for in the Treaty, the 
'resident will be prepared to take those steps 
lecessary to ensure the establishment and 
naintenance of an acceptable alternative multi- 
lational force. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter 

-lis Excellency 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, 
President of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt. 



March 26, 1979 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

I wish to confirm to you that subject to 
United States Constitutional processes: 

In the event of an actual or threatened viola- 
tion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and 
Egypt, the United States will, on request of one 
or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties 
with respect thereto and will take such other 
action as it may deem appropriate and helpful 
to achieve compliance with the Treaty. 

The United States will conduct aerial 
monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant 
to Annex I of the Treaty. 

The United States believes the Treaty provi- 
sion for permanent stationing of United Nations 
personnel in the designated limited force zone 
can and should be implemented by the United 
Nations Security Council. The United States 
will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the req- 



uisite action by the Security Council. If the Se- 
curity Council fails to establish and maintain 
the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the 
President will be prepared to take those steps 
necessary to ensure the establishment and 
maintenance of an acceptable alternative multi- 
national force. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter 



His Excellency 
Menachem Begin, 
Prime Minister of the 
State of Israel. 



D 



'The ceremony was attended by officials of 
the three governments and was broadcast live 
on radio and television. Earlier in the day 
President Carter held separate meetings with 
President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and, 
prior to the ceremony, the President and Mrs. 
Carter hosted a private luncheon for President 
and Mrs. Sadat and Prime Minister and Mrs. 
Begin at the White House. Following the cere- 
mony, the President met at the White House 
with Members of Congress to discuss U.S. aid 
and assistance to Egypt and Israel. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 2. 1979. Dinner 
toasts made at a state dinner on the South Lawn 
of the White House on Mar. 26 are printed in 
the same Weekly Compilation on p. 523. 



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Agreement with Kuwait, amending the 
agreement of January 18, 1976. TIAS 8905. 
2 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. S9, 10:8905.) 

Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. 
Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8973. 6 pp. 
70(«. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8973.) 

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exploded Ordnance. Agreement with Egypt, 
amending the arrangement of April 13 and 
25, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8989. 6 pp. 
700. (Cat, No. S9. 10:8989.) 

Highway Transportation. Agreement with 
Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8991. 15 pp. $1.10. 
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rael, amending the agreement of June 13, 
1950, as amended. TIAS 9002. 21 pp. $1.10. 
(Cat. No. $9.10:9002.) 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Eleventh proces-verbal extending the decla- 
ration of November 12, 1959, on provisional 
accession of Tunisia to the general agree- 
ment. TIAS 9011. 9 pp. 80C. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9011.) 

Technical Cooperation in Science and Tech- 
nology. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 
9019. 25 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 89.10:9019.) 

Agricultural Production and Economic De- 
velopment. Agreement with Syria. TIAS 
9022. 13 pp, 90(2, (Cat. No. 89.10:9022.) 

Economic Assistance — Loan. Agreement with 
Israel. TIAS 9028. 18 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 
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89.10:9097.) 



16 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE PREI$IDE]\T: Visit to Egypt and Israel 



j^ 



On March 7, 1979, President Carter departed the United States to meet with 
President Sadat in Egypt (March 8-10} and Prime Minister Begin in Israel 
(March 10-13). He met again with President Sadat at the Cairo International 
Airport on March 13 before returning to Washington on March 14.^ 



DEPARTURE REMARKS, 
WHITE HOUSE, MAR. 7, 1979^ 

Vice President Mondale 

You leave tonight, Mr. President, on 
perhaps the most important and dif- 
ficult mission of your Presidency. You 
seek a peace vital not only to the 
people of the Middle East but to the 
people of our own nation and to all 
mankind. 

There is no challenge more urgent 
than seeking that peace, for as the 
Bible tells us, it is the peacemakers 
who are blessed. And you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, Prime Minister Begin, and Presi- 
dent Sadat are three such peacemakers. 

Your efforts are even more than a 
pivotal moment in the history of the 
Middle East, for as a poet once put it: 
"Peace hath her victories no less re- 
nown'd than war." 

Each generation bears two funda- 
mental responsibilities to the next: One 
is to lay down our lives, if need be, for 
the things that we treasure; the other is 
to work ceaselessly so that our children 
will not be asked to make that sac- 
rifice. Both duties are sacred. Both re- 
quire courage. Both are filled with 
grave risks. 

There are statesmen whose tasks it is 
to go to the brink of war. For others, 
their courage is tested by the challenge 
to go to the brink for peace. In the end, 
the truest measure of our humanity is 
how we rise to the second challenge. 

Mr. President, tonight, as 6 months 
ago, you meet that demanding meas- 
ure. Please know that you have our 
love, our prayers. The prayers of all 
humanity are with you this evening as 
you search for that nobler victory, the 
victory of peace. 

President Carter 

Nothing could give me more encour- 
agement and a more gratifying sense 
than to have surround me here not only 
the Vice President but the distin- 
guished Members of Congress. 

I leave tonight on a new mission in 
the service of the oldest of human 
dreams — the dream of peace. And 



nowhere is this hope for peace more 
fervent, more alive than in the Middle 
East; nowhere is the path to its realiza- 
tion more difficult; nowhere might the 
price of failure be more terrible. 

Peace remains the goal of President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and of 
the great peoples of Egypt and of Is- 
rael. I know that they share my deter- 
mination that these long negotiations 
will bring fruit. 

The Middle East has suffered too 
much and too long from war and from 
the fear of war. Arabs and Israelis alike 
must now understand that bloodshed 
and deprivation and death can never 
settle their differences, can never be 
the path toward renewal and hope. 

For the first time in a generation, 
peace in the Middle East has come 
within reach. President Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem, his great and courageous re- 
ception by Prime Minister Begin, the 
reciprocal visit by the Prime Minister 



WHITE HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
MAR. 5, 1979* 

President Carter has accepted invita- 
tions from Prime Minister Begin and 
President Sadat and will depart Wash- 
ington on Wednesday afternoon for 
Egypt and Israel. 

The President will arrive in Egypt on 
Thursday afternoon for talks with Presi- 
dent Sadat. He will then fly to Israel on 
Saturday evening for talks with Prime 
Minister Begin. 

The talks will focus on the peace 
process, regional security, and bilateral 
issues. 

As he stated last Tuesday, the Presi- 
dent believes that we must not allow the 
prospects for peace which seemed so 
bright last September to continue to dim 
and perhaps to vanish. If we do, the 
judgment of history and of our children 
will rightly condemn us. 



*Read to news correspondents by 
White House Press Secretary Jody Pow- 
ell (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 12, 
1979). 



to Egypt — all opened the way towar 
possible progress. At Camp David, w^ 
then worked together for 13 days t( 
forge a political framework withi 
which their differences might be re 
solved. 

Our negotiations have been and an 
based on the idea that peace can onl 
be achieved when we meet the legiti 
mate needs of all those who are afi 
fected by the conflict. 

Real peace will not come with 
single treaty, important as it would be 
But a treaty between Egypt and Israe 
is an indispensable step toward th 
broader comprehensive peace that w 
all seek. 

Negotiation is a long and tedioui 
process — I know from personal experi 
ence. But there are times when makin; 
peace demands more courage thai 
making war. I believe that Presidei* 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin posi 
sess that special kind of courage ant 
that they possess, as well, the vision 
and the statesmanship to redeem tht 
great hope which they themselves hav* 
helped to create. 

So, it is with hope that I depart, hopi 
tempered by sober realism. As a frieno 
of Egypt and a friend of Israel, we will 
do our best to help them achieve th« 
peace that they have paid for in blooo 
many times over. 

In doing this, in seeking to lay the 
basis for a stable and a peaceful Middle 
East, we will also be serving our own 
deepest national interests and the inter 
ests of all the people of the world. 

I know that in this endeavor, I take 
with me the prayers and the good 
wishes of the American people. In the 
difficult work that lies ahead, I will 
draw strength and sustenance from 
those worldwide prayers and from your 
support. 



WELCOMING CEREMONY, 
CAIRO, MAR. 8, 1979^ 

President Sadat 

On behalf of 40 million Egyptians, I 
welcome you in the cradle of civiliza- 
tion. You are held here with the highest 
esteem, as one of the greatest states- 
men of our time. Your courage and 
wisdom are paralleled only by the 
strength of your commitment to moral- 
ity and justice. 

Never before has an American Presi- 






Any 1979 

lent been so firm in his devotion to the 
ause of world peace and the universal 
brotherhood of man. Never before has 
1 statesman with your awesome respon- 
.ibility devoted so much of his time 
md effort to the noble task of promot- 
ing peace and cooperation among na- 
ions. 

. This is an historic and courageous 
jiission. On your departure yesterday, 
^ou said that you were undertaking it 
vith hope and sober realism. We share 
/our hope and pray for the success of 
l^our endeavor. You will find the 
igyptian people firm in their dedica- 
ion to a just and comprehensive peace 
n the area. We are determined to en- 
ible our Palestinian brothers to realize 
heir national rights and regain their 
reedom . 

In the days ahead, we will be work- 
ng together to make these cherished 
lopes a living reality. We want to build 
I viable structure for peace that's based 
)n the rule of law and legitimacy. 

The reception you were accorded 
oday by our masses is a testimony of 
he affection they have for you and for 
:very American. Let us vow to cement 
he bonds of friendship and cooperation 
)etween our nations. 

May God Almighty guide our steps 
nd lighten our way and, God willing, 
ve shall overcome. 



'resident Carter 

Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians 
ined the streets this afternoon to ex- 
iress their deepest feelings — feelings 
lot of personal friendship or admira- 
ion for me, or even for their noble and 
leloved leader. President Sadat, but 
heir deepest feeling expressed hun- 
Ireds of times over was a genuine de- 
ire for peace. 

The greeting of peace has a special 
ind urgent meaning for all of us today. 

come to you, Mr. President, in the 
ier\ice of peace. You receive me in a 
pirit of peace. We meet to resume to- 
gether the sacred work of building 
)eace. 

It's an honor for me and my wife to 
)e reunited with you, Mr. President, 
md your wife and with our many other 
"riends with whom we've worked so 
liligently in recent months. 

It's a pleasure to be with you this 
ime in Cairo. We bring with us the re- 
ipect and the good wishes for President 
iadat and for the people of Egypt from 
he tens of millions of people who live 
n the United States of America. 

I've come to the Middle East to ad- 
vance the cause of peace between 
2uypt and Israel. A treaty between 
hese two great nations would be a be- 
ginning, not an end. It would bring us 



17 




President Carter waves to the crowd during his train trip to Alexandria with President Sadat. 
(While House photo by Karl Schumacher) 



much closer to the broader goal we 
seek — a real peace, a comprehensive 
peace, a peace that would reflect the 
legitimate needs of all those who have 
suffered so deeply during the last 30 
years of conflict, enmity, and war. 

It would also be the beginning of a 
new chapter in the long history of 
Egypt, one in which the energies of all 
Egyptians can at last be turned in full 
force to the human task of building a 
future of dignity and hope. 

I know from experience how deeply 
President Sadat wants that kind of fu- 
ture. In my many hours of conversation 
with him, I've learned to respect him 
as a man of great courage with a pas- 
sion for peace. He has spoken 
eloquently, but more importantly, he 
has acted boldly and decisively. 

In his electrifying trip to Jerusalem 
in November of 1977, President Sadat 
fully committed himself to the goal of a 
just and lasting pCace. That was also 
our goal at Camp David where Presi- 
dent Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and 
I agreed on a framework for a com- 
prehensive peace and on the outlines of 
a treaty between Egypt and Israel. And 
that remains the goal of the talks that 
will continue today. 

Our hope is to achieve an agreement 
which is honorable, just, and which 
provides security for each of the 
negotiating parties. But above all, our 
purpose is to achieve a peace that will 
last. 

If the promise of peace is to be fully 
realized for the people of Israel and 
Egypt, then others must be encouraged 
to join the process of resolving differ- 
ences through negotiations and ac- 
commodations. 

The United States will work with any 
and all parties who are committed to 
these principles of genuine peace and 
security. As the relations among us 
grow stronger, we can all work more 
effectively to bring stability to the 



Middle East region as a whole. 

President Sadat has written, and I 
quote: "No problem should ever be re- 
garded as insuperable." In recent 
months, we've overcome many prob- 
lems that once seemed insurmountable. 
I pray that, with God's help, we may 
remove the remaining obstacles to the 
conclusion of a peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel and continue the 
negotiations with great determination 
on other issues, in accordance with the 
Camp David agreements. 

The most important condition for 
success has already been met — the sin- 
cere conviction on both sides that peace 
is preferable to war, that differences 
can better be settled by the exercise of 
reason than by the spilling of blood. 

The people of Egypt have spilled 
much blood. And in the eyes of the 
women, in particular, on the streets and 
in the balconies in the last few minutes, 
we've seen a desire and a hunger and a 
prayer that their sons and their hus- 
bands would never again have to suffer 
in a cause of combat and war. 

President Sadat and I, in the car to- 
gether, repledged ourselves not to dis- 
appoint those here, in Israel, among the 
Palestinians, among the countries also 
presently in a state of war, who depend 
on us and others to bring the long un- 
realized but deeply desired state of 
peace to this region. 

Like you, Mr. President, I am dedi- 
cated to the cause of peace. Like you, 
Mr. President, I'm determined to 
persevere. Our common dedication, 
our common determination is rooted in 
the soil of common religious truth. 
Many signs said: "We believe in 
God." You and I, Mr. President, be- 
lieve in God. We believe in truth, that 
truth takes different forms. But its un- 
derlying message is the same — it's a 
message of love, of faith, and of peace. 

As we work together in the crucial 
discussions that are about to begin, let 



18 



1 o 

us pray God, in the words ot the Chris 
tian Gospel, "to guide our feet into the 
way of peace." 



Department of State Bulleti! 



INFORMAL EXCHANGE 
WITH AMERICAN TV 
CORRESPONDENTS (EXCERPTS), 
MAR. 9, 1979^ 



Q. How are the talks going? 

President Carter: I thinlc very well. 
We still have some problems, ob- 
viously. But President Sadat genuinely 
wants peace. So do I. So does Prime 
Minister Begin. We don't know yet 
what will happen until we get through 
with the talks. 

Q. Do you have a feeling that you 
can wrap up this end of it on the 
scheduled trip? 

Q. Will you be able to leave on 
schedule? 

President Carter: 1 dont know. 

Q. Maybe stay another day? 

President Carter: 1 don't know. 1 
really don't know. 

Q. At where you are at the mo- 
ment, would you think that you and 
Sadat will have an agreement by the 
time you leave? 

President Carter: That's hard to 
predict. Prime Minister Khalil and 
Secretary Vance are talking about lan- 
guage and specifics. President Sadat 
and I have always been basically in 
agreement on strategic matters. And 
that's the situation now. We'll get to- 
gether in Alexandria with the whole 
group to see what differences still re- 
main. 

Q. You said before you came out 
that you didn't think it would be 
easy. Is it any less difflcult now that 
you're here? 

President Carter: That's hard to 
judge. We obviously came on this trip 
without any assurance of success. But I 
know two things: One is that the people 
of Israel and Egypt want peace. That's 
obvious. And 1 believe that the leaders 
of Israel and Egypt want peace. 

Q. If it's possible that you may 
have to stay 1 more day, can we con- 
clude that the talks are not going as 
you thought they might? 

President Carter: I don't think 
that's easy to predict, because if they 
should go well or shouldn't go well, I 
day in my life wouldn't be very signifi- 
cant compared to the prospect of im- 
proving chances for peace. So, I don't 



believe that that would be a good 
measurement. 

Q. If you went 1 day later, would 
that foul things up on the Israeli 
side, with the arrangements that 
they've made? 

President Carter: No. I don't think 
there's any likelihood at all that 1 
would get to Israel a day later. 1 think 
what it will do is to take to Israel either 
an encouraging prospect or one that 
would require some substantial modifi- 
cations. And we really wouldn't know 
what the chances were until we got 
through with our discussions in Israel. 

Q. Are you in communication with 
the Israelis while you are here? 

President Carter: Only through the 
Ambassadors. But there's really noth- 
ing to report to the Israelis yet, because 
we're in the process of discussing the 
specific terms on which there is a dis- 
agreement still. And I think it'll be 
after our meetings in Alexandria this 
evening and tomorrow that we'll know 
how close we are together. Obviously, 
we'll go to Israel with some differences 
still remaining. And I'll do the best I 
can to resolve those differences. 

Q. Were you surprised by the 
Egyptian counterproposal? 

President Carter: No. We've had a 
very clear picture of the Egyptian posi- 
tion, both from the statements and at- 
titudes of Prime Minister Khalil in 
Camp David and, also, my own private 
conversations and communications 
with President Sadat. So there have not 
been any surprises. 

Q. How far apart do you presently 
regard the Israelis and Egyptians to 
be on the question of Palestinian au- 
tonomy? 

President Carter: The question of 
Palestinian autonomy will have to be 
resolved in the talks that would com- 
mence 1 month after the Israeli- 
Egyptian peace treaty. The Palestinian 
autonomy description is best sum- 
marized in the Camp David agree- 
ments, and both President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin have reconfirmed 
their commitment to me that all of the 
Camp David agreements will be carried 
out. And the details, obviously, will 
have to be worked out over a period of 
a year after the peace treaty is signed. 

Q. You expect it's possible that 
you may arrive in Israel 24 hours 
late? 

President Carter: No. I think we'll 
get to Israel on time. 

Q. Even though you are having 
more difficulties here than perhaps 
you'd imagined? 



President Carter: As I said, I have 
not been surprised after I got here. I'v^ 
not been disappointed nor pleasantlj 
surprised. It's about what we antic! 
pated. But my expectation is that we'll 
get to Israel on time. 



Q. Could you characterize tht 
talks for us so far? How do you thinl 
they've been doing? 

President Sadat: We had a 3-houi 
talk yesterday, very intensive talks 
think there is progress, for sure there is 
progress. And I think it is time now 
that we can say that the signing of the 
agreement is not so far at all. From mj 
side, as you know, I'm doing my best 
and I shall be doing my best. But in all 
candor, without the intensive effort bj 
President Carter and the Americar 
people and the Congress behind him 
we would have never reached this. Lc 
me hope that everything will be clear i 
this visit. 



(1 



Q. What is the greatest problem 
What is the biggest difficulty? 

President Sadat: I commented las 
night after the 3-hour talk with Presi 
dent Carter, Secretary Vance, anc 
[National Security Adviser] Brzez 
inski — and the [Egyptian] Vice Presi 
dent, and the Prime Minister was with 
me. Let me tell you this: We must ge 
rid of the distrust, because, unfortu 
nately, there are still some shades o 
distrust until this moment, and it is noi 
from the Egyptian side. We have 
dropped all complexes and everything 
through my visit to Jerusalem. It is i 
word here, a word, but I don't see anj 
difficulty in reaching an agreemen 
upon the main principal issues. 

And, as I told you, if it was not the 
effort and the perseverance of President 
Carter, we couldn't have achieved thisj 
And it is needed now in this precise 
moment to reach the final result. 

Q. On the basis of your discussionsi 
with President Carter and what you 
know from him of the Israeli posi 
tion, are you now ready to sign an 
agreement? 

President Sadat: I am ready to sign 
the agreement, yes. 

Q. There will be nothing more re 
quired for Egypt to do or for Israel 
to do before an agreement can be 
consummated? 

President Sadat: I can speak for 
myself, not for the Israelis. For myself, 
I am ready. 

Q. Without making any changes in 
the positions you held before Presi 
dent Carter came here? 

President Sadat: In the very frank 



Any 1979 

iisL'Ussions we had last night, I found 
,hat there is no obstacles in the way, 
because there is only a misunderstand- 
ng about the main issues. But apart 
"rom this — and this will be President 
larter's, I mean, goal to do — yes, I 
hink we are on the verge of an agree- 
Tient. 

Q. For example, are you now 
satisfied with the question of full 
Palestinian autonomy in the occupied 
ierritories? 

President Sadat: Let us always put 
;mphasis on the Camp David docu- 
Tients. This is a great achievement, and 
naybe you heard me before saying that 
let us try and defuse the explosive situ- 
ition. Camp David documents didn't 
defuse only the explosive situation but 
nas opened the way to a comprehensive 
Settlement. So, adhering to the Camp 
Oavid two documents, for sure we shall 
le reaching an agreement. 

Q. What is the main obstacle now? 
What is the main problem you still 
nust solve? 

President Sadat: I think — and it 
nay appear, I mean, ridiculous — some 
A'ords here or there, only some words 
lere or there. 

Q. Can that be resolved by tomor- 
row night, by Saturday night? 

President Sadat: Between me and 
^resident Carter, be sure of one thing: 
Whatever arises between me and Presi- 
ient Carter, we are identical, and we 
,hall continue to be identical. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, 
ALEXANDRIA, MAR. 9, 1979^ 

President Sadat 

. . . for the very noble cause of 
jeace. My people have welcomed 
President Carter yesterday and today. 
f^or me, I want to tell you how happy I 
im and how proud I am to have our 
dear friend and brother among us on 
Egyptian soil. All 1 can say is this: Let 
us raise our glass for a great President 
^of a great nation and to Mrs. Carter. 



evolutionary times, even revolutionary 
times, and one who's seen his own 
people suffer on many occasions trom 
combat and war. And when all others 
are too timid, too fearful — or whose 
horizons are too narrow, fear to 
act — that great leader acts and, there- 
fore, inspires others to join with him in 
a common, noble effort. 

President Anwar al-Sadat is such a 
man. He has aroused the admiration of 
the entire world. He has become a hero 
in many nations, and he deserves this 
esteem and admiration completely. 

I have never seen so many people as 
were along our route today from Cairo 
to Alexandria. And it was the most im- 
pressive political event that I have ever 



I 



resident Carter 

On a rare occasion in a person's life 
and on extremely rare occasions in the 
history of all humankind, there comes 
along a man or person with extremely 
great courage, a man who has the sen- 
sitivity to understand a complicated 
assue, who recognizes the deep feelings 
that exist because of historical 
animosities and hatreds, who has him- 
self suffered through tortuous political 



19 



witnessed — hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptian citizens, millions of Egyptian 
citizens. The number itself was impres- 
sive, but the most impressive aspect of 
this tremendous outpouring of emotion 
was their love and respect for their 
President and their obvious apprecia- 
tion for our common search for peace. 
I look upon President Sadat as a 
partner, sharing with him a common 
past, a common present, and a common 
future. But 1 also look upon him as a 
brother. The closeness with which he 
and I work and communicate, consult 
and plan and act is reassuring to me. 
And I can well understand, now that I 
know him better, how he could have 
made such a momentous decision to 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
ITINERARY 

Mar. 7 Departs Washington for Egypt. 
Mar X Arrives at Cairo International Air- 
port and is met by President 
Sadat. The two Presidents 
motorcade to Qubba Palace 
where the official welcoming 
ceremony takes place. 

Meets with President Sadat at 
Tahra Palace. 
Mar. 9 Travels by train with President 
Sadat to Alexandria. 

Meets with President Sadat at 
Mamoura Palace. 

Receives the Nile Collar award 
prior to the state dinner. 
Mar. 10 Returns to Cairo by plane. 

Addresses the People's Assembly. 

Hosts a luncheon for President 
Sadat at the Mena House in 
Giza. 

Meets with President Sadat at 
Mena House. Tours the 
Pyramids and the Sphinx with 
President Sadal. 

Departs from Cairo International 
Airport for Israel. 

Arrives at Ben Gurion Interna- 
tional Airport in Tel Aviv. The 
President and Prime Minister 
Begin motorcade to the entrance 
of the city of Jerusalem where, 
just inside the city limits, he 
participates in a wine and bread 
welcoming ceremony at the site 
of a monument to those who 
died in the 1948 Israeli war for 
independence. 

Attends a dinner at Prime Minister 
Begin's residence, following 
which the two leaders meet pri- 
vately. 
Mar. 1 1 Meets with President Navon at the 
latter's residence. 

With Prime Minister Begin, visits 



Yad Vashem. the memorial to 
Jews killed during World War 
II. At Yad Vashem, the Presi- 
dent visits the Hall of Names, 
which contains books listing the 
names of victims of the 
Holocaust, and then went to the 
Hall of Remembrance for a 
wreath-laying ceremony. 

With Prime Minister Begin, visits 
Mount Herzl, site of the ceme- 
tery where many Israeli war 
heroes and national leaders are 
buried. 

Meets with Prime Minister Begin 
at the latter's office. 

Attends state dinner in Chagall 
Hall at the Knesset, 
Mar. 12 Places a wreath at the Knesset 
Memorial, a sculpture with an 
eternal flame dedicated to sol- 
diers and civilians who gave 
their lives for Israel. 

Addresses the Knesset. 

Attends a luncheon with members 
of the foreign affairs committee 
of the Knesset. 

Visits the Shrine of the Book, a 
part of the Israel Museum, to 
view the Dead Sea Scrolls. 

Attends breakfast meeting with 
Prime Minister Begin and mem- 
bers of the Israeli Cabinet at the 
Prime Minister's residence. 
Mar. 13 Breakfasts with Prime Minister 
Begin at the King David Hotel, 
following which the two leaders 
meet privately (joined later by 
their advisers). 

Departs from Ben Gurion Interna- 
tional Airport for Cairo. 

Meets with President Sadat in the 
VIP Pavilion at Cairo Interna- 
tional Airport before continuing 
to the United States. 
Mar. 14 Arrives at Andrews Air Force 
Base. 



20 




President and Mrs. Carter with President and Mrs. Sadat at Mena House in Egypt. (Whue House 
photo by Karl Schumacher) 



slice through generations of hatred and, 
through a great expression of generos- 
ity, attempt to heal wounds. 

I also have a great admiration for the 
Egyptian people. Tomorrow I will 
speak to your parliamentary leaders and 
make a more substantive description of 
my hopes for the future. But tonight 1 
would say that I bring from 200 million 
Americans to 40 million Egyptians a 
heartfelt expression of the same kind of 
friendship and the same kind of mutual 
purpose that binds me with your Presi- 
dent. I said today, as we watched the 
adoring crowds shouting out their slo- 
gan of a pledge of their heart and soul 
for President Sadat, that I would cer- 
tainly hate to run against him for a 
public office in Egypt. But I would add 
very quickly, that I would also hate to 
run against him for a public office in 
the United States of America. 
[Laughter] I think it's accurate to say 
that he's perhaps, the most popular 
person in our own country. 

Tonight he and I share great hopes 
for the future. We recognize the dif- 
ficulties that we face. Some of the dis- 
trust, some of the difficulties in com- 
munication, some of the ancient 
animosities still exist. But we share 
common faith in two things: One is that 
the people of Israel and Egypt pray for 
peace, and the other one is that the 
leaders of Israel and Egypt pray for 
peace. 

This will be a first step only to a 
common peace for all the citizens of 
the Middle East and for the redressing 
of wrongs, for the realization of dreams 
and hopes. And I would like to offer a 
toast tonight to my friend, to a great 
and courageous leader who, himself. 



with the strength of his character, the 
nobility of his ideals and the 
purpose — which I share — is responsi- 
ble above all others for this kindling of 
new hope in the hearts of those that 
join with us in this common effort. 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
ADDRESS, EGYPTIAN PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY, MAR. 10, 1979 

I also come before you in the name 
of God, as a partner with my great and 
good friend, your President. Anwar 
al-Sadat, to address the Egyptian 
people through the Members of this 
People's Assembly of Egypt. 

My heart is full as I stand before you 
today. I feel admiration for the land of 
Egypt, and I feel a profound respect for 
the people of Egypt and for your 
leader. President Sadat, a man who has 
reached out his strong hand to alter the 
very course of history. 

And I also feel a deep sense of hope 
as I consider the future that will unfold 
before us if we have the will and the 
faith to bring peace. And we have that 
will and faith, and we will bring peace. 

As a boy, like other schoolchildren 
all over the world, I studied the civili- 
zation of Egypt. In the last few days, I 
have at last seen the legacy of that 
great civilization with my own eyes. 
As a citizen of a very young country, I 
can only marvel at the 7.000-year 
heritage of the Egyptian people whom 
you represent. 

For most of the last 500 years, Egypt 
suffered under foreign domination. But 
Egypt has again taken its place among 



Department of State BulletW 

I 
the world's independent countries and 
has led the resurgence among the Arab' 
people to a prominent place among the' 
nations of the world. I'm very proud of 
that great achievement on your part. 

Tragically, this generation of prog- 
ress has also been a generation of suf- 
fering. Again and again, the energies 
of the peoples of the Middle East have 
been drained by the conflicts among 
you — and especially by the violent 
confrontations between Arabs and Is- 
raelis. Four wars have taken their toll 
in blood and treasure, in uprooted 
families, and young lives cut short by 
death. 

Then, 16 months ago, one man, 
Anwar al-Sadat, rose up and said: 
"Enough of war." He rose up and 
said: "Enough of war. It is time fori 
peace." 

This extraordinary journey of Presi- 
dent Sadat to Jerusalem began the 
process which has brought me here 
today. Your President has demon- 
strated the power of human courage 
and human vision to create hope where 
there had been only despair. 

The negotiations begun by President 
Sadat's initiative have been long and 
arduous. It could not have been other- 
wise. The issues involved are complex, 
and they are tangled in a web of strong 
emotion. But among the people of 
Egypt and the people of Israel alike, 
the most powerful emotion is not hos- 
tility; it is not hatred; it is a will to 
peace. And more has been accom- 
plished in 1 year of talking than in 30l 
years of fighting. 

As the peace process has moved 
forward — sometimes smoothly, more 
often with pain and difficulty — the 
Government of Egypt has been repre- 
sented by able diplomats, fully attuned 
to Egypt's national interests and con- 
tinually mindful of Egypt's responsi- 
bilities to the rest of the Arab world. 

Last September, the course of 
negotiations took the President of 
Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel 
to Camp David, in the wooded moun- 
tains near the capital of the United 
States of America. 

Out of our dicussion there came two 
agreements: A framework within which 
peace between Israel and all its 
neighbors might be achieved and the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people realized — and also an outline 
for a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel, in the context of a comprehen- 
sive peace for the Middle East. 

Those agreements were rooted in 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 
which established the basic equation 
between an Arab commitment to peace 
and Israeli withdrawal in the context of 
security. The treaty which is now being 



May 1979 



21 



negotiated between Egypt and Israel 
retTects those principles. 

Since the two agreements were 
signed, we have been working to bring 
both of them to fruition. The United 
States has served as a mediator, work- 
ing to solve problems — not to press 
either party to accept provisions that 
are inconsistent with its basic interests. 

In these negotiations, a crucial ques- 
tion has involved the relationship be- 
tween an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and 
the broader peace envisioned and 
committed at Camp David. I believe 
that this body and the people of Egypt 
deserve to know my thinkmg on this 
I subject. 

When two nations conclude a treaty 
iwith one another, they have every right 
to expect that the terms of that treaty 
will be carried out faithfully and 
steadfastly. At the same time, there can 
be little doubt that the two agreements 
reached at Camp David — negotiated 
together and signed together — are re- 
lated and that a comprehensive peace 
remains a common objective. 

Just in recent days, both Prime 
Minister Begin in Washington and 
President Sadat here in Egypt have 
again pledged to carry out every com- 
mitment made at Camp David. 

Both leaders have reaffirmed that 
they do not want a separate peace be- 
tween their two nations. Therefore, our 
current efforts to complete the treaty 
negotiations represent not the end of a 
process but the beginning of one, for a 
treaty between Egypt and Israel is an 
indispensable part of a comprehensive 
peace. 

I pledge to you today that I also re- 
main personally committed to move on 
to negotiations concerning the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and other is- 
sues of concern to the Palestinians and 
also to future negotiations between Is- 
rael and all its neighbors. I feel a per- 
sonal obligation in this regard. 

Only the path of negotiation and ac- 
commodation can lead to the fulfill- 
ment of the hopes of the Palestinian 
people for peaceful self-expression. 
The negotiations proposed in the Camp 
David agreements will provide them 
with an opportunity to participate in the 
determination of their own future. We 
urge representative Palestinians to take 
part in these negotiations. 

We are ready to work with any who 
are willing to talk peace. Those who 
attack these efforts are opposing the 
only realistic prospect that can bring 
real peace to the Middle East. 

Let no one be deceived. The effect 
of their warlike slogans and their 
rhetoric is to make them in reality ad- 
vocates of the status quo, not change; 
advocates of war, not peace; advocates 



of further suffering, not of achieving 
the human dignity to which long- 
suffering people of this region are enti- 
tled. 

There is simply no workable alterna- 
tive to the course that your nation and 
my nation are now following together. 
The conclusion of a treaty between Is- 
rael and Egypt will enable your gov- 
ernment to mobilize its resources not 
for war but for the provision of a better 
life for every Egyptian. 

I know how deeply President Sadat 
is committed to that quest. And I be- 
lieve its achievement will ultimately be 
his greatest legacy to the people he 
serves so well. 

My government, for its part, the full 
power and influence of the United 
States of America, is ready to share 
that burden of that commitment with 
you. These gains which we envision 
will not come quickly or easily, but 
they will come. 

The conclusion of the peace treaty 
that we are discussing will strengthen 
cooperation between Egypt and the 



United States in other ways. I fully 
share and will support President 
Sadat's belief that stability must be 
maintained in this part of the world, 
even while constructive change is ac- 
tively encouraged. He and I recognize 
that the security of this vital region is 
being challenged. I applaud his deter- 
mination to meet that challenge, and 
my government will stand with him. 

Our policy is that each nation should 
have the ability to defend itself, so that 
it does not have to depend on external 
alliances for its own security. The 
United States does not seek a special 
position for itself. 

If we are successful in our efforts to 
conclude a comprehensive peace, it 
will be presented obviously — each 
element of it — to this body for ratifica- 
tion. 

It is in the nature of negotiation that 
no treaty can be ideal or perfect from 
either the Egyptian or the Israeli point 
of view. The question we've faced all 
along, however, is not whether the 
treaty we negotiate will meet all the 



EGYPT— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 386.000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than 
Calif.. Nev., and Ariz, combined). 

Capital: Cairo (pop. 8.4 million). 

Other Cities: Alexandria (2.5 million). Port 
Said. Suez, Ismailia. 

People 

Population: 40 million (1978 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: 2.7%. 

Ethnic Groups: Egyptian. Copt. Bedouin. 

Nubian. 
Religions: Sunni Muslim (90%). Christian. 
Languages: Arabic. English. French. 
Literacy: 40%. 
Life Expectancy: 54 yrs. 

Government 

Official Name: Arab Republic of Egypt. 

Type: Republic. 

Dale of Constitution: 1971. 

Independence: 1922. 

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of 
State). Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment). Legislative — Unicameral People's 
Assembly (350 elected members and 10 
appointed by the President). Judicial — 
Court of Cassation. State Council. 

Economy 

GDP: $12 billion (approx. FY 1977). 

Annual Growth Rate: 9%. 

Per Capita Income: $280. 

Agriculture: Land — 3%. Labor — 50%. 



Products — cotton, wheat, rice, corn. 

Industry: Labor — 12.7%. Products — textiles, 
processed foods, tobacco manufactures, 
chemicals, fertilizer, petroleum and pe- 
troleum products. 

Trade (1977): Exports — $2.1 billion: cotton, 
rice, petroleum, manufactured goods. 
Partners — U.S.S.R.. Eastern Europe, 
Italy. F.R.G.. India. Imports — $5.3 bil- 
lion: foodstuffs, capital goods. 
Partners— U.S. S.R.. F.R.G.. France, 
U.K.. Italy, U.S. 

Official Exchange Rate: 1 Egyptian pound = 
US$1.43. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N.. Arab League, Organization of African 
Unity. General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. 

Principal Officials 

Egypt: President — Anwar al-Sadat; Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister — Mustafa 
Khalil; Ambassador to U.S. — Ashraf 
Ghorbal. 

United States: Ambassador to Egypt — 
Herman F. Eilts. 



Taken from the Department of Stale's De- 
cember 1978 edition of the Background 
Notes on Egypt. Copies of the complete 
Note may be purchased for JOg from the 
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 
20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when or- 
dering 100 or more Notes mailed to the 
same address). 



22 



Department of State Bulletinn 



immediate desires of each of the two 
parties but whether it will protect the 
vital interests of both and further the 
cause of peace for all the states and all 
the peoples of this region. That is the 
basic purpose and the most difficult 
question which we are resolved to an- 
swer. 

Such a treaty, such an agreement, is 
within our grasp. Let us seize this op- 
portunity while we have it. 

We who are engaged in this great 
work, the work of peace, are of varied 
religious faiths. Some of us are Mus- 
lims; some are Jews; some are Chris- 
tians. The forms of our faith are differ- 
ent. We worship the same God. And 
the message of Providence has always 
been the same. 

I would like to quote the words of 
the Holy Koran: "If thine adversary in- 
cline towards peace, do thou also in- 
cline towards peace and trust in God, 
for he is the one that heareth and 
knoweth all things." 

Now I would like to quote from the 
words of the Old Testament: "Depart 
from evil and do good; seek peace, and 
pursue it." 

And now I would like to quote from 
the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the 
Mount: "Blessed are the peacemakers, 
for they shall be called the children of 
God." 

My friends, my brothers, let us com- 
plete the work before us. Let us find 
peace together. 



REMARKS FOLLOWING 
MEETING, GIZA, 
MAR. 10, 1979« 

President Carter 

President Sadat and I have a few 
words to say about this visit. First of 
all, on behalf of the American people 
and myself personally, 1 want to ex- 
press my deep thanks to President 
Sadat and to the people of Egypt for a 
welcome that has been exhilarating to 
me and which I will never forget. 

We have had hours of discussion 
about the issue of peace. It's obvious to 
me that the Egyptian people, from their 
tremendous outpouring of welcome to 
me and to President Sadat, genuinely 
want peace. 

It's equally obvious to me that Presi- 
dent Sadat and the people of Egypt and 
Israel are determined to carry out all 
the provisions, all the agreements made 
at Camp David, not only for peace 
between Israel and Egypt but for a full 
and comprehensive peace involving the 
realization of the rights of those who 
have suffered so long, and a step-by- 



step progression toward peace between 
Israel and all its neighbors. 

We have resolved some difficult is- 
sues here. Difficult issues still remain 
to be resolved. 

I will leave here this afternoon, 
going to Israel to meet with Prime 
Minister Begin and the officials of the 
Israeli Government. I'm hopeful that 
the differences which still remain can 
be resolved. 

President Sadat 

Let me seize this opportunity to ex- 
press really how happy my people and I 
were to receive President Carter, for 
whom we hold great esteem and great 
love, the man who has really, through 
his patience, perseverance, morale, and 
principles, has already achieved more 
than 59% of the whole problem, one of 
the most complicated problems in the 
whole world. 

We are happy to receive President 
Carter and Mrs. Carter, and we are 
happy also to ask them to convey to our 
friends, the American people, who 
supported my initiative whole- 
heartedly — we ask him to convey to 
them our gratitude. And in this precise 
moment, I prefer to say only that we 
had a very fruitful talk. Exactly as 
President Carter stated, we have over- 
come some of the difficulties. Some 
other issues are to be settled. 

And in the name of the Egyptian 
people, my name and my wife's name, 
we wish to President Carter and Mrs. 
Carter all the best wishes and fulfill- 
ment and achievement in his visit to 
Israel. 



WELCOMING CEREMONY, 
TEL AVIV, MAR. 10, 1979' 

President Navon 

In the name of the people of Israel, it 
is a great pleasure and privilege, to- 
gether with my wife, to greet you and 
the distinguished officials who have 
come with you with all our hearts in 
sincere friendship and profound ap- 
preciation. 

We cherish these feelings toward you 
personally and also as a representative 
of the leading nation in the free 
world — the great and noble democracy 
of the United States — which has done 
so much to deserve our admiration and 
gratitude. 

You come to us, Mr. President, on a 
unique mission for a goal which is dear 
to all of us and for which you have 
mustered all your energy, your dedica- 
tion, and your leadership, to put an end 



to hatred and hostility and to open a\ 
new page of peace in the troubled an- 
nals of the peoples of this area. 

At this moment we do not know asi 
yet what tidings you carry with youi 
from your visit to our great neighbor,. 
Egypt. Does the dove of peace, which' 
has emerged from the ark, carry am 
olive branch in its beak, or will it have: 
to wait some time longer until the wa- 
ters of the flood are abated from off thei 
Earth so that it can at last find a restingi 
place for its feet? 

You are not unaware, I'm sure, ofl 
the differences of opinion in our coun- 
try in the sphere of foreign policy and 
national security. Two sentiments,, 
however, are shared by all sections ofl 
our people — a sincere and ardent desirel 
for true peace and the profound con- 
viction that in order to achieve thati 
peace, Israel has made enormous sac- 
rifices above and beyond what mightl 
have been expected or demanded of it. 

These sacrifices, as you well know, 
take the form of very tangible: 
thing,s — withdrawal of our forces from 
strategic territories three times as large 
as the area of Israel, the evacuation of 
vitally important airfields and oil re- 
sources, the evacuation of flourishing 
villages. These concessions, once;, 
made, are irrevocable. In this situation,, 
it is easy to understand our desire to in- 
sure that the peace treaty we sign shall 
guarantee a true and permanent peace 
and shall not contain elements liable to 
endanger the peace and our security. 

During your visit here, you will meeti 
the people who feel at one and the 
same time deep concern and a greati 
hope. It is our prayer that your visiti 
will remove that concern and justify 
that hope. 

My dear President and Mrs. Carter, 
5 years ago you toured our country asi 
private citizens. Today Divine Provi- 
dence has brought you here on an his- 
toric mission. I hope it will not be long 
before you can come to Israel again and 
see that the seedlings of peace which 
you planted will have grown into 
sturdy trees bearing plentiful fruit on 
every hill and valley in Israel, in 
Egypt, and the entire area. 



President Carter 

As the elected leader and the repre- 
sentative of the people of the United 
States of America, I am indeed honored 
and pleased to set my foot on the soil 
of the free nation of Israel. 

I come to you as a fellow worker in 
the cause of peace. I know how much 
this cause means to the people of this 
land. No people in all history have 



May 1979 

suttered more from violence than the 
Jewish people. The State of Israel was 
born as a refuge from that violence. 
Yet, after four wars in three decades, 
every Israeli citizen still knows at first 
hand what it is to grieve for a fallen 
loved one or a friend. 

As I walked down the ranks of repre- 
sentatives of your military forces, cer- 
tainly among the finest fighting men on 
Earth, I said a silent prayer to God that 
none of these men nor their compatriots 
would ever again have to give their 
lives in war. 

As Prime Minister Begin has said 
many times, Israel truly wants peace. 
I Of that there can be no doubt. And I 
feel absolutely certain, after my ex- 
I perience of the past 3 days, that the 
people of Egypt fully share that desire 
for peace. 

During the last 3 days I have spent 
many hours discussing with President 
Sadat what could be the final details of 
a treaty of peace in the context of com- 
prehensive peace for the whole region. 
Prime Minister Begin and I will soon 
begin discussing the same details with 
the same end in mind — to seek in the 
present situation the means and the will 
to take this next crucial step toward a 
just and lasting peace for the Middle 
East. 

We have come a great distance 
together — perhaps a greater distance 
than many would have dreamed of. 
Under the strong and courageous lead- 
ership of Prime Minister Begin, the 
Government of Israel has been willing 
to make difficult decisions, as your 
President has just said, all along the 
way. 1 need not add that it would be a 
tragedy to turn away from the path of 
peace after having come so far. 

I have good reason to hope that the 
goal can now be reached. But, of 
course, the ultimate choice lies where 
those choices have always lain — with 
the chosen representatives of the 
people who have suffered directly from 
so many years of destruction and 
bloodshed. I look forward to complet- 
ing the urgent business at hand on this 
brief visit. 

I bring with me the best wishes of 
the American people and also the 
greetings of President Sadat, whom I 
left no longer than 1 hour ago, and the 
hopes for peace of the entire world. 

The task we are striving to accom- 
plish together demands more than rea- 
son, more even than will. It demands 
faith. For in a very real sense, the task 
of building peace is a sacred task. In 
the words of the Midrash; "'Peace is 
important, for God's name is Shalom." 
Let us have shalom. Let us make peace 
together. 



23 




President Carter prays at wreuih hmni; ceremony in the Hall of Renmnhiani 
Holocaust. (While House photo by Karl Schumacher) 



../ Ihc 



REMARKS FOLLOWING 
MEETING (EXCERPTS), 
JERUSALEM, MAR. 11, 1979" 

President Carter 

This morning and this afternoon I, 
the Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defense, National Security Adviser, 
and others, have met with the Defense 
Council of the Government of Israel 
and with the Prime Minister to discuss 
the issues that still remain to be re- 
solved between Israel and Egypt. 

It was a friendly meeting, a frank 
meeting, a thorough meeting. We have 
not yet reached a final agreement. Im- 
portant issues still remain to be re- 
solved. All of us are dedicated to con- 
tinue with our best efforts to reach suc- 
cess. 

Prime Minister Begin 

I subscribe to the statement made by 
the President. We had a long meeting 
with a break for luncheon. I can assure 
you, and my colleagues in the Cabinet 
say, it is one of the best they have ever 
eaten. And we are grateful to the Presi- 
dent and his advisers that they honored 
not only our meeting but also our 
luncheon downstairs. And then after 
the luncheon we continued our talks 
which were very serious; I suppose also 
very friendly, as the President said. 

Now, we decided to call a Cabinet of 
the full — excuse me, we decided to call 
a session of the full Cabinet for tonight 



at 10 o'clock. And tomorrow the Presi- 
dent will meet with our full Cabinet at 
8 o'clock in the morning. So, certain 
issues concerning the peace treaty be- 
tween us and Egypt will be clarified 
and decided upon by the Cabinet during 
the nocturnal session, so that we will 
be able tomorrow to give replies on 
those certain issues to the President. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, 
JERUSALEM, MAR. 11, 1979» 

President Navon 

It is my privilege to greet you in 
Jerusalem, the Eternal City of David. 

We have met here this evening to 
honor an illustrious statesman, his dis- 
tinguished and devoted wife, and his 
great country. 

The United States of America is 
great not only because of its scientific, 
technological, and military strength but 
also because of the profound human 
values that are deeply implanted in the 
hearts of its people. It is a beacon of 
hope for all those who walk in dark- 
ness. 

Greatness in a man or a nation is no 
easy thing. It takes supreme wisdom to 
refrain from exerting all the power at 
the disposal of the strong. To be leader 
of a nation which is responsible in 
large measure for the destiny of the en- 
tire world, a man needs profound faith 
and constant prayer. It is our profound 



24 

conviction, Mr. President, that you 
have within you that fountain of living 
waters from which you can draw a 
never-failing source of inner faith. 

By your side is your devoted 
helpmate, a loyal partner in your joys 
and .sorrow. In voting for her forever, 
if you will permit me a personal note, 
you have realized one of your favorite 
watchwords: "Why Not the Best?" 
[Laughter] 

In your life, my dear Rosalynn, you 
have also known the dark side of the 
Moon; hence your particular sensitivity 
toward those to whom fate has not been 
kind. Your heartfelt involvement in the 
welfare of the individual does not dis- 
tract your attention from the problems 
of the great world which is, in fact, 
composed of individuals. The Talmud 
has forbidden us to pronounce all the 
praises of any person in his presence. I 
will be content, therefore, to say no 
more than this: that all those who have 
met you have surrendered uncondition- 
ally to your sincerity, nobility, and 
warm personality. 

One thread runs through the entire 
history of our people. It is a long and 
epic story of the few against the many, 
a prolonged struggle to preserve our 
spiritual character and identity against 
powerful forces that threaten to destroy 
us. 

If it is not easy to be great, it is even 
harder to be small. We strive for two 
aims which, on the face of it, appear to 
be contradictory — to be equal but dif- 
ferent. We continue to cherish our na- 
tional aims, to gather in our scattered 
people from the four corners of the 
Earth, to solve our social and economic 
problems, to make the desert bloom, 
and, above all, to build a society 
founded on the spiritual heritage of our 
fathers and universal human values. 

We have worked hard to achieve 
these aims, even in times of stress and 
war. But we are profoundly convinced 
that only true peace will enable us to 
achieve these ideals. It is my smcere 
and earnest prayer that the efforts you 
have devoted here toward that end and 
the efforts devoted by the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Begin, and the govern- 
ment, will be crowned with success. 

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter, while 
it is irrelevant now, I read that both of 
you shook hands, while running for the 
governorship of Atlanta, you shook, in 
4 years, 600,000 hands. Yesterday we 
added a few more. Today we wanted to 
save you some, but the President went 
down and shook a few hands more, so I 
lost count of it. [Laughter] 

Anyhow, I can tell you those hands 
stretched to you, and those whom you 
did not shake are very friendly hands. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I will ask you 



all, please, to join me, to stand up and 
join with me in drinking a toast to our 
illustrious guests, the President of the 
United States and his honored lady, to 
the success of his noble mission, to the 
family, to Miss Lillian, to the 
friendship between our peoples, and to 
the progress and prosperity of the 
United States of America. 

Prime Minister Begin 

On behalf of the Government and the 
people of Israel, I welcome you to the 
eternal capital of the land of Israel, the 
indivisible Jerusalem. 

The saga of America is living in our 
hearts. What is the saga of America? 
Thirteen colonies, ruled by a great na- 
tion but by a foreign power, rising in 
revolt against a regular army, including 
mercenary troops, going through a 
horrible winter of suffering and depri- 
vation, fighting on, ultimately winning 
the day and receiving the surrender of 
General Cornwallis, proclaiming its in- 
dependence, explaining to the world 
why that separation took place. 

That Declaration of Independence 
written 13 years before the Declaration 
of Rights of Man and Citizen during 
the French Revolution — and I, a Jew, 
dare say, which reads as a chapter of 
the Bible — proclaiming those self- 
evident truths for which man, almost in 
every generation, has to rise and fight; 
giving a Constitution which is working 
for 200 years, and working well, which 
helps overcome every crisis in democ- 
racy; and then three times in 60 years 
saving all mankind from the dangers of 
militarism, from the peril of the most 
horrible tyranny ever known in the an- 
nals of mankind, and from Communist 
domination over the world — indeed 
saving thrice all mankind in a short 
period of 60 years. 

The saga of America, to which in 25 
years IVi million Jews emigrated, one 
of the greatest phenomenon of people's 
wanderings, 100,000 per year, for the 
shtetl, bring with them and transferring 
with them all the traditions of the 
shtetl, knowing no word of English, 
speaking their old language; and then 
giving birth to a new generation, to 
another generation; and then turning 
into the mightiest Jewish community in 
the history of our people since the days 
of Alexandria during the Second Tem- 
ple, and contributing so much to the 
civilization and culture and develop- 
ment of the United States, and helping 
so much the State of Israel. 

Since the famous words were written 
to America and about it — "give us the 
poor" — well, if not for that miracle of 
those 25 years, millions more of Jews 
would go the way you and I, Mr. 



Department of State Bulletin ; 

President, saw today when we visitedi 
Yad Vashem. i 

May I say, although it's a festive 
dinner, that when we both heard the 
children singing, [In Hebrew: "I be- 
lieve with a perfect faith in the coming 
of the Messiah, and though He tarry, I 
shall wait daily for His coming,"] and 
knowing that with this prayer, our 
fathers and mothers went into the gas 
chambers, I couldn't help all the time 
thinking these children and smaller 
ones were dragged to a wanton death. 
If I said this, I said everything. 

And this is the reason, why we, re- 
membering the saga of America, whoi 
helped to save a whole section of our 
people, is living in our hearts; why we 
love and respect your country, not be- 
cause of any interest, but from the 
heart; why we are your friend and your 
faithful ally; why we are grateful for 
your help; and why we help as much as 
we can your country. 

And this is also the reason why we 
want so much peace, with all our 
hearts, with all our souls; why we pray 
for it, why we yearn for it; why we 
made so great sacrifices for its sake; 
why this parliament gave an over- 
whelming support, with the sacrifices, 
to the completion of our labors toi 
achieve peace. 

We have to care for the security and 
the future of our people. This is our re- 
sponsibility. We shall carry it out 
under any circumstances. Never again 
should a foe, a bloodthirsty enemy, be 
capable of killing Jewish children. And 
we shall do whatever is humanly possi- 
ble to make their life secure, not only 
in this generation but for all genera- 
tions to come, in this land of our 
forefathers, to which, as of right, we 
came back. 

Therefore, we want a real peace 
treaty. It must be real. It cannot last a 
few months, or even a few years. It 
must last for generations, actually 
forever. Therefore, we must care of its 
wording, because it has to be clear that 
this is going to be a real peace, and 
with the peace must come security. 

Therefore, we cannot, and we shall 
not put under jeopardy and danger our 
civilian population. We shall defend it, 
under any circumstances, even with our 
lives, if necessary, as we have done. 
This is the problem. Some say to us: 
"What do you care? Even peace 
treaties are broken, can be broken." 
Respectfully, I would like to explain to 
the learned men who teach us this 
chapter in history that we, too, read 
some pages of history. 

For instance, I always remember 
since my boyhood the famous saying 
made by the German Ambassador to 
Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of 



May 1979 

Great Britain, on behalf of the German 
Chancellor. Bethmann Holiweg. when 
the German army swept through neutral 
Belgium, and so an international 
■agreement which lasted for 84 years 
(was trampled underfoot. And when 
Grey said: "If you don't evacuate Bel- 
gium, we shall go to war against you." 
That Ambassador, on behalf of his 
Chancellor. Bethmann Holiweg said: 
"But. Mr. Minister, are we going to go 
to war for a scrap of paper?" 

Those who say so pay a price for it. 
I A peace treaty is not a scrap of paper. 
A peace treaty is, as it must be, a seri- 
ous document. It should be carried out. 
j It can be broken by cynics, by 
[enemies of peace, by enemies of man- 
kind. But, of course, our nation, with 
I our experience, cannot be asked to sign 
iany document which would make 
j legitimate a breach of the peace treaty. 
; Therefore, we have problems. 

Yes, Mr. President, you, and may I 
say respectfully, I will tell our peoples 
the truth And therefore, here and now, 
its my duly to say that we have serious 
problems to solve until we can sign the 
peace treaty with Egypt — and we want 
so much to have this serious document 
signed. 

And today we dealt with the serious 
problems. We all work quite hard — you 
perhaps harder than anybody else — for 
the sake of peace. But we do work 
hard, and we shall go on during the 
night to deal with those difficult prob- 
lems. We only hope we shall be able to 
solve them. 

But there are serious issues and dif- 
ficult problems. This is what it is my 
duty to say at this juncture, at this mo- 
ment. Hopefully, we shall overcome 
the difficulties and be able to sign a 
peace treaty, a real peace treaty be- 
tween Egypt and Israel, as a first step 
toward a comprehensive settlement in 
the Middle East. 

We wouldn't like to have a separate 
peace treaty with Egypt and have an 
eastern-northern front, a combination 
of 6,500 tanks — excuse me, 5,600 
tanks — more than 6,000 heavy guns, 
more than a thousand fighting, first- 
line planes, et cetera; it's a great 
danger to us. But, of course, we cannot 
compel anybody to come to the table. 

We invited them. We are prepared at 
any moment to resume negotiations 
with them — with Syria, with Jordan, 
with Lebanon, with all our neighbors, 
\».ith all Arab states — if they wish. Of 
course, nobody can force them to 
come. In God's good time, they will, I 
believe, with all my heart, in God's 
yood time. Until then, of course, the 
peace treaty with Egypt is the first 
step, and it must be a real document. 
We are proud to have you with us, 



you and your gracious lady. We met 
many times in your great country, built 
on the saga of America, which is so 
dear to all of us. We meet here tonight 
in Jerusalem, in the Knesset, in the 
center of our democracy, this democ- 
racy which gives Israel the inherent 
stability which gives you a reliable and 
stable ally in the Middle East — and 
may I say the only democracy in the 
Middle East — and, therefore, the ally, 
the stable and reliable ally of the free 
world and of its leading power, the 
United States. 

Mr. President, you hold the greatest 
office in the world, the most difficult 
office. But I believe that you will go 
down in history with a higher title than 
even that of President of the United 



25 

States. And this higher title is servant 
of peace. 

In this spirit, ladies and gentlemen, 
may I raise my glass to our honored 
and dear guest, the President of the 
United States, and to Mrs. Carter, to 
the President of our Republic, Israel, 
and to Mrs. Navon, to peace and to the 
everlasting friendship between the 
United States of America and the State 
of Israel. 



President Carter 

I thank you, Mr. President, and Mr. 
Prime Minister, for your gracious and 
your kind and your wise words. For 
both Rosalynn and for me, 1 want to 
express to President Navon and Mrs. 



ISRAEL— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 7.993 sq. mi. (about the size of N.J.). 
Capital: Jerusalem (pop. 392.100). (Israel 

proclaimed Jerusalem its capital in 1950. 

The U.S.. like most other countries. 

maintains its Embassy in Tel Aviv.) 
Other Cities: Greater Tel Aviv (1.2 million). 

Haifa (534,000). 

People 

Population: 3.7 million. 

Annual Growth Rate: 2.2%. 

Ethnic Groups: Jewish (85%), Arab (15%). 

Religions: Judaism. Islam. Christianity. 

Druze. 
Languages: Hebrew, Arabic. English. 
Literacy: Jewish 90%, Arab 64%. 
Life Expectancy: 72 yrs. male. 75 yrs. 

female'. 

Government 

Official Name: State of Israel. 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. 

Date of Independence: May 14. 1948. 

Constitution: No written document. 

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of 
State), Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment). Legislative — unicameral Knesset 
(120 members). Judicial — Supreme Court. 

Political Parties: Likud (Herut. Liberals. 
La'am). Labor Alignment (Labor and 
Mapam). National Religious Party, and 
numerous smaller parties including a small 
Communist Party. 

Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 6 Districts. 

Economy 

GNP: $13 billion (1977). 
Annual Growth Rate: 1% (1977). 
Per Capita Income: $3,666 (1977). 
Annual Rate of Inflation: 40%. 



Agriculture: Labor — 5.8%. Products — citrus 
and other fruits, cotton, wheat, grains, 
vegetables, beef and dairy products, poul- 
try. 

Industry: Products — food processing, tex- 
tiles, metal products, electronics, chemical 
and petroleum refining, transport, 
diamonds. 

Trade (1977): Exports— $2 .94 billion: 
polished diamonds, citrus and other fruit, 
textiles, clothing, processed foods, fer- 
tilizer and chemical products. Imports — 
$4.65 billion: military equipment, rough 
diamonds, chemicals, machinery, iron and 
steel, cereals, textiles, vehicles, ships, air- 
craft. Partners— EEC, U.S.. U.K., Japan. 
Hong Kong. 

Official Exchange Rate: 16.5 IL = US$1.00 
(average for first half of 1978). 

Economic Aid Received: $13.8 billion (FY 
1949-78); of this $12.8 billion was from 
the U.S. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 27 others. 

Principal Officials 

Israel: President — Yitzhak Navon; Prime 
Minister — Menahem Begin; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs — Moshe Dayan; Ambas- 
sador to the U.S. — Ephraim Evron. 

United States: Ambassador to Israel — Samuel 
W. Lewis. 



Taken from the Department of Stale's revised 
edition of the Background Notes on Israel 
to be published in May 1979. Copies of the 
complete Note may he purchased for 70e 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when 
ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to the 
same address). 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



Navon appreciation for the personal 
hospitality they've shown us. 

We know that we are among friends 
within this room. Indeed, I have a 
sense that in many ways we are all one 
family. As in a family, the relation- 
ships between us are frank and some- 
times very lively. But also like family 
members, we recognize that the bonds 
between our nations and our people are 
more than just strong for now; they are 
both strong and permanent. 

We in the United States will stand by 
Israel, and we will never waiver in our 
admiration for you or in our support for 
you for a strong and secure and a free 
State of Israel. 

We realize that our own security is 
intimately tied with yours. There are 
bonds of blood between us, bonds of 
history, bonds of culture, bonds of re- 
ligious belief. Perhaps most important 
of all are the enduring values which we 
share, the values for which my nation 
was formed and exists, the values for 
which your nation was formed and 
exists — a belief in individual liberty, a 
common commitment to representative 
democracy, a common vision of human 
brotherhood, the conviction that there 
is no higher pursuit than that of peace 
with justice, not only among our own 
kin and our own kind but we share this 
commitment with like men and women 
throughout the world. 

We are now engaged together in a 
common effort, to achieve a real peace, 
a comprehensive peace, in the Middle 
East, a peace that would enable the 
people of Israel and all Middle Eastern 
people to live in security, to live in 
prosperity, and to develop to their full 
potential. 

We are now in sight of an important 
initial phase of that great objective. 
The events of the past 16 months, be- 
ginning with President Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem and Prime Minister Begin's 
immediate response, have engendered 
that great hope. More progress has 
been made in the last 16 months than in 
all previous three decades of 
bloodshed. 

I, myself, as President of the United 
States of America, have spent literally 
hundreds of hours in detailed negotia- 
tions trying to realize the peace which I 
have just described briefly. 

We are not looking for just a peace 
document signed by two nations 
grudgingly. We are looking for a 
document of peace signed in a spirit of 
mutual trust, mutual friendship, mutual 
commitment, mutual understanding, 
mutual realization of common purpose, 
that will open the avenue in the future 
to an easy interrelationship between 
neighbors either in a spirit of animosity 
and hatred and bloodshed or in a spirit 



of cooperation and good will and 
progress. 

We love Israel, but we are not jeal- 
ous. We want you to have many other 
friends. That's our common hope and 
our common prayer. There have been 
disappointments and frustrations, some 
still remain. But the progress that has 
been made would not have been possi- 
ble without Israel's great leader. Prime 
Minister Menahem Begin. 

He's a man of courage, of integrity, 
of utter and selfless dedication. He and 
his colleagues have been tough 
negotiators. They know what is at stake 
for Israel. And I know they want the 
best agreement for Israel. 

This concern is based on horrible 
historical fact, actions which we saw 
memorialized this morning, that 
brought horror to a world and which 
must not ever be forgotten. But in 
guiding the negotiations, the Prime 
Minister has never lost sight of his 
original vision, a strong, free, vibrant, 
Jewish people, living in Israel — which 
you are now — but also living in peace. 
And we've all seen abundant evidence 
that he possesses the political skills to 
translate this vision into reality. 

I am absolutley confident from my 
conversations within the last 3 or 4 
days with President Sadat and from my 
conversations with Prime Minister 
Begin that both are determined not to 
let this great opportunity for peace slip 
from our grasp. 

If we can resolve the few remaining 
differences — and I am still hopeful that 
we can — our meeting tonight will be 
just a prelude for an occasion of joyous 
celebration, the signing of the first 
peace treaty between Israel and an 
Arab nation. 

I ask all of you to join me in a toast 
to our gracious hosts. President and 
Mrs. Navon, to Israel's courageous 
leader and his wife. Prime Minister and 
Mrs. Begin, and to our common goal: 



President Carter with Prime Minister and Mrs. 
Begin. .(White House pholo by Karl Schumacher) 




the transformation of the Middle East 
into a land of peace. 

PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
ADDRESS, ISRAELI KNESSET, 
MAR. 12, 1979 

For the last 24 hours, I have been 
writing different versions of this 
speech. I have discarded the speech of 
despair; I have discarded the speech of 
glad tidings and celebration. I have de- 
cided to deliver the speech of concern 
and caution and hope. 

I'm honored to stand in this assem- 
bly of free men and women, which 
represents a great and an ancient 
people, a young and courageous na- J 
tion. ^ \ 

I bring with me the best wishes and 
the greetings of the people of the 
United States of America, who share 
with the people of Israel the love of 
liberty, of justice, and of peace. And 
I'm honored to be in Jerusalem, this 
holy city, described by Isaiah as a quiet 
habitation, in which for so many of the 
human race the cause of brotherhood 
and peace are enshrined. 

I am here in a cause of brotherhood 
and of peace. I've come to Cairo and 
also here to Jerusalem to try to enhance 
the bold, brave, and historic efforts of 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin and to demonstrate that the 
United States of America is as deter- 
mined as these two leaders are to create 
lasting peace and friendship between 
Egypt and Israel and to put an end to 
war and the threat of war throughout 
the Middle East. 

No people desire or deserve peace 
more then the Jewish people. None 
have wanted it so long. None have 
spoken of it more eloquently. None 
have suffered so much from the ab- 
sence of peace. Pogrom after pogrom, 
war after war, Israel has buried its sons 
and its daughters. 

Yesterday morning, at Yad Vashem, 
I grieved in the presence of terrible re- 
minders of the agony and the horror of 
the Holocaust. 

Modern Israel came into being in the 
wake of that historic crime, the enor- 
mity of which is almost beyond human 
comprehension. I know that Israel is 
committed and determined, above all, 
that nothing like it must ever, ever be 
permitted to happen again on Earth. 

Americans respect that determina- 
tion, and we fully share that determi- 
nation with you. And Americans rec- 
ognize that for Jews over the centuries, 
as for Israel since its independence, 
caution and wariness have been a prac- 
tical and a moral necessity for survival. 
And yet, in these past months, you've 



May 1979 

made enormous sacrifices, and you've 
taken great risks for peace. 

This sacred dedication to peace, born 
and fostered in Jerusalem and in Cairo, 
• has given to men and women 
everywhere renewed sense of hope that 
human reason, good will, and faith can 
succeed, can break down barriers be- 
tween peoples who, in our lifetimes, 
have only known war. 

As Prime Minister Begin said after 
the Camp David summit, the agree- 
ments reached there proved that any 
iproblem can be solved if there is 
some — and he repeated — just some 
I wisdom. Those are truthful and also 
j reassuring words. 1 know from my in- 
I tense, personal involvement in these 
I negotiations that President Sadat and 
i Prime Minister Begin have not wavered 
from their often-expressed commitment 
to peace. 

President Sadat told me in Cairo that 
he will let nothing stand in the way of 
our shared goal of finishing the treaty 
of peace between Israel and Egypt and 
(it making it a living testament of 
friendship between the two neighboring 
peoples. I believe him, and I know in 
my heart that Prime Minister Begin and 
the Government of Israel are no less 
fervently committed to the same noble 
objective. 

But we've not yet fully met our 
challenge. Despite our unflagging de- 
termination, despite the extraordinary 
progress of the past 6 months, we still 
fall short. It's now the somber respon- 
sibility of us all to exert our energies 
and our imaginations once again to 
contemplate the tragedy of failure and 
the legitimate exultation if we bring 
peace. 

In this effort, the support of the 
Members of the Knesset will obviously 
be crucial. Our vision must be as great 
as our goal. Wisdom and courage are 
required of us all, and so, too, are 
practicality and realism. We must not 
lose this moment. We must pray as if 
everything depended on God. and we 
must act as if everything depends on 
ourselves. 

What kind of peace do we seek? 
Spinoza said that peace is not an ab- 
sence of war; it is a virtue, a state of 
mind, a disposition for benevolence, 
for confidence, for justice. Americans 
share that vision and will stand beside 
Israel to be sure that that vision is ful- 
filled. 

In Egypt I saw vivid evidence of this 
deep longing for peace among the 
Egyptian people, millions of them. But 
like you, they worry about the uncer- 
tainties of that first crucial stage in the 
broad task of pounding Middle East 
swords into plowshares. Like you, they 
hope to banish forever the enmity that 



has existed between the neighbors, the 
permanent neighbors of Egypt and of 
Israel. Like you, they want this peace, 
and like you. they want it to be real and 
not just a sham peace. 

My friends, from my own experience 
as President of the United States, I un- 
derstand all too well that historic deci- 
sions are seldom easy, seldom without 
pain. Benjamin Franklin, who 
negotiated the treaty of peace between 
England and America after our own 
War of Independence, once said that he 
had never seen a peace made, even the 
most advantageous, that was not cen- 
sured as inadequate. 

Throughout the peace process, both 
Israel and Egypt have understood that 
no treaty can embody every aim of both 
nations. What a treaty can do — what it 
can do far better than the fragile status 
quo, and infinitely better than the in- 
sidious tensions that will build if our 
efforts are further stalled or fail — is to 
protect the vital interests of both Israel 
and Egypt and open up the possibility 
of peace for all the states and all the 
peoples of this troubled region. 

Doubts are the stuff of great deci- 
sions, but so are dreams. We are now 
at the very edge of turning Israel's eter- 
nal dream of peace into reality. I will 
not pretend that this reality will be free 
from further challenges. It will not. 
And better than most, the Jewish 
people know that life is seldom easy. 
But we must make this beginning. We 
must seize this precious opportunity. 

Fifty-seven years ago. the Congress 
of the United States of America com- 
mitted itself to a Jewish homeland. 
Twenty-six years later. President Harry 
Truman recognized the new State of 
Israel 1 1 minutes after your nation was 
born. Seven Presidents have believed 
and demonstrated that America's re- 
lationship with Israel is more than just 
a special relationship. It has been and it 
is a unique relationship. And it's a re- 
lationship which is indestructible be- 
cause it is rooted in the consciousness 
and the morals and the religion and the 
beliefs of the American people them- 
selves. 

Let me repeat what I said to Prime 
Minister Begin last year on the lawn of 
the White House, on the anniversary of 
the founding of the modern State of 
Israel. And I quote: "For 30 years we 
have stood at the side of the proud and 
independent nation of Israel. I can say 
without reservation, as President of the 
United States of America, that we will 
continue to do so not just for another 
30 years, but forever." 

We recognize the advantages to the 
United States of this partnership. You 
know that America deeply desires 
peace between Israel and Egypt and 



27 



that we will do everything we can to 
make peace possible. 

The people of the two nations are 
ready now for peace. The people of the 
two nations are ready now for peace. 
The leaders have not yet proven that we 
are also ready for peace, enough to 
take a chance. We must persevere. But 
with or without a peace treaty, the 
United States will always be at Israel's 
side. 

Meeting in this hall of liberty re- 
minds us that we are bound more than 
in any other way by instinctive com- 
mon ideals and common commitments 
and beliefs. This Knesset itself is a 
temple to the principle and the practice 
of open debate. Democracy is an es- 
sential element to the very nationhood 
of Israel, as it is to the United States. 

You've proven that democracy can 
be a stable form of government in a 
nation of great diversity and in a time 
and a place of danger and instability. 
But Israel and the United States were 
shaped by pioneers — my nation is also 
a nation of immigrants and 
refugees — by peoples gathered in both 
nations from many lands, by dreamers 
who, and I quote, "by the work of 
their hands and the sweat of their 
brows" transformed their dreams into 
the reality of nationhood. 

We share the heritage of the Bible, 
the worship of God, of individual free- 
dom, and we share a belief in coopera- 
tive endeavor, even in the face of ap- 
parently insurmountable obstacles. 

In nations around the world where 
governments deny these values, mil- 
lions look to us to uphold the right to 
freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, the right to emigrate, the right to 
express one's political views, the right 
to move from one place to another, the 
right for families to be reunited, the 
right to a decent standard of material 
life. 

These are the kinds of unbreakable 
ties that bind Israel and the United 
States together. These are the values 
that we offer to the whole world. Our 
mutual dedication to these ideals is an 
indispensable resource in our search for 
peace. 

The treaty between Egypt and Israel 
that we hope may be placed before you 
for approval promises to be the corner- 
stone of a comprehensive structure of 
peace for this entire region. 

We all recognize that this structure 
will be incomplete until the peace can 
be extended to include all the people 
who have been involved in the conflict. 
I know and I understand the concerns 
you feel as you consider the magnitude 
of the choices that will remain to be 
faced even after a peace treaty is con- 
cluded between Israel and Egypt. And 



28 



as the time for these choices ap- 
proaches, remember this pledge that I 
make to you again today: The United 
States will never support any agree- 
ment or any action that places Israel's 
security in jeopardy. 

We must proceed with due caution. I 
understand that. But we must proceed. 

As recently as 2 years ago, after all, 
these present steps that have already 
been taken seemed absolutely unthink- 
able. We know that confrontation mag- 
nifies differences. But the process of 
negotiation circumscribes differences, 
defines the differences, isolates them 
from the larger regions of common 
interests, and so makes the gaps which 
do exist more bridgeable. We've seen 
the proof of that in that last 16 months. 

At Camp David, Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat forged two 
frameworks for the building of that 
comprehensive peace. The genius of 
that accomplishment is that negotia- 
tions under these frameworks can go 
forward -independently of each other, 
without destroying the obvious re- 
lationship between them. 

They are designed to be mutually 
reinforcing, with the intrinsic flexibil- 
ity necessary to promote the com- 
prehensive peace that we all desire. 
Both will be fulfilled only when others 
of your Arab neighbors follow the vi- 
sionary example of President Sadat, 
when they put ancient animosities be- 
hind them and agree to negotiate, as 
you desire, as you've already done 
with President Sadat, an honorable so- 
lution to the differences between you. 

It's important that the door be kept 
open to all the parties to the conflict, 
including the Palestinians, with whom, 
above all, Israel shares a common 
interest in living in peace and living 
with mutual respect. 

Peace in the Middle East, always 
important to the security of the entire 
region, in recent weeks has become an 
even more urgent concern. 

Israel's security will rest not only on 
how the negotiations affect the situa- 
tion on your own borders but also on 
how it affects the forces of stability and 
moderation beyond your borders. 

I'm convinced that nothing can do 
more to create a hospitable atmosphere 
for those more distant forces in the 
long run than an equitable peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt. 

The risks of peace between you and 
your Egyptian neighbors are real. But 
America is ready to reduce any risks 
and to balance them within the bounds 
of our strength and our influence. 

I came to Israel representing the 
most powerful country on Earth. And I 
can assure you that the United States 
intends to use that power in the pursuit 



of a stable and a peaceful Middle East. 

We've been centrally involved in 
this region, and we will stay involved 
politically, economically, and militar- 
ily. We will stand by our friends. We 
are ready to place our strength at Is- 
rael's side when you want it to insure 
Israel's security and well-being. 

We know Israel's concern about 
many issues. We know your concern 
for an adequate oil supply. In the con- 
text of peace, we are ready to guaran- 
tee that supply. I've recommitted our 
nation publicly to this commitment, as 
you know, only in recent days in my 
own country. 

We know Israel's concern that the 
price of peace with Egypt will exacer- 
bate an already difficult economic situ- 
ation and make it more difficult to meet 
your country's essential security re- 
quirements. In the context of peace, we 
are prepared to see Israel's economic 
and military relationship with the 
United States take on new and strong 
and more meaningful dimensions, even 
than already exist. 

We will work not only to attain 
peace but to maintain peace, recogniz- 
ing that it's a permanent challenge of 
our time. 

We will rededicate ourselves to the 
ideals that our peoples share. These 
ideals are the course not only of our 
strength but of our self-respect as na- 
tions, as leaders, and as individuals. 

I'm here today to reaffirm that the 
United States will always recognize, 
appreciate, and honor the mutual ad- 
vantages of the strength and security of 
Israel. And I'm here to express my 
most heartfelt and passionate hope that 
we may work together successfully to 
make this peace. 

The Midrash tells us that, and I 
quote: "Peace is the wisp of straw that 
binds together the sheaf of blessings." 
But the wisp of straw, we know, is 
fragile and easily broken. 

Let us pray God to guide our hand. 
Millions of men, women, and children, 
in Israel and Egypt and beyond, in this 
generation and in generations to come, 
are relying on our skill and relying on 
our faith. 

In the words of a Sabbath prayer: 
"May He who causes peace to reign in 
the high heavens let peace descend on 
us, on all Israel, and on all the world." 



DEPARTURE CEREMONY 
TEL AVIV, MAR. 13, 1979^ 

President Carter 

As we depart for Cairo, and then for 
my own country, I want to express on 



Department of State Bulletin 

behalf of Rosalynn, my wife, myself, 
and all the American party, our{ 
gratitude to the Government and to the i 
people of Israel for your hospitality and 
for your kindness. 

I came here in the service of a cause 
which binds together, which unites Is- 
rael, Egypt, and the United States of 
America — the sacred cause of peace. 
We have talked and reasoned together 
in that cause for many hours during the 
past 3 days. We've talked as friends, 
and our conversations have been 
characterized by the frankness, the 
honesty, the mutual respect and con- 
cern that true friendship demands. 

In our discussions we've concen- 
trated on the differences that still exist 
between Egypt and Israel in the peace 
process, differences that are now very 
small compared to the much larger 
areas of agreement. 

Good progress has been made. There 
are fewer differences than when I first 
arrived, and those few differences 
which still remain have been substan- 
tially narrowed. 

Last night, there were further inten- 
sive discussions among members of the 
Israeli Cabinet and the U.S. delegation 
on the two or three most difficult is- 
sues. And this morning, building on 
those discussions. Prime Minister 
Begin and I were able to make sub- 
stantial additional progress. 

I will now fly to Cairo to review 
with President Sadat the discussions 
that we have had here and the progress 
which we have made together. 

As I depart, I want to repeat once 
again what I said in the Knesset yester- 
day. The friendship between America 
and Israel is more than strong. It is in- 
destructible. 

In the past 3 days I have been im- 
pressed deeply by the extraordinary 
story of faith and perseverence in the 
face of adversity, which is Israel. 

President Sadat, Prime Minister 
Begin, and I remain determined to 
exert every ounce of effort at our com- 
mand to bring the peace negotiations to 
a successful conclusion. We will not 
fail. 



Prime Minister Begin 

We take leave of you, Mr. President, 
on behalf of the Government and the 
people of Israel. On behalf of them, I 
wish to express our gratitude, my wife 
and myself, and all my colleagues in 
the Cabinet, that you honored us with 
your visit, you and your gracious lady, 
the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense, and your other advisers. 

Undoubtedly, those 3 days of your 
visit to Israel were 3 hectic days, and 



May 1979 

there were also 3 white nights, but they 
are memorable days. I believe they will 
be unforgettable. 

You came on the highest mission in 
humanity — for peace — and you have 
succeeded. We made real progress in 
the peacemaking process. Now, of 
course, it's the turn of Egypt to give its 
reply. 

Nobody can deny that we worked as 
expeditiously as humanly possible and, 
therefore, we worked day and night. 
And we are not tired, because of the 
elation in our hearts that we did a good 
job in the service of peace. 

May I say respectfully that you can 
leave this country with satisfaction, 
and we are happy that we could have 
helped you to the best of our ability. 
And when you embark on your journey 
and mission to Egypt, we wish you 
God-speed. 

And when you come back home, 
may I again ask you, tell the great 
American people that here is a free na- 
tion which loves and respects your 
great country, your people, and is 
grateful for their friendship and 
cherishes your personal friendship for 
Israel, which is a treasure in our time. 

Now we shall wish you all the suc- 
cess in Egypt, and we shall guard our 
friendship between America and Israel 
forever. 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
REMARKS, CAIRO, 
MAR. 13, 1979'» 

I have a statement to make which I 
consider to be extremely important. 

I have just given to President Sadat a 
full report on my discussions in Israel. 
During that visit the United States 
made proposals for resolving a number 
of outstanding issues, proposals which 
were accepted by Prime Minister Begin 
and his Cabinet. 

President Sadat has now accepted 
these proposals. Based on discussions 
in Egypt and Israel, I have also pre- 
sented U.S. proposals to President 
Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin for 
resolving the few remaining issues. 

Earlier today. Prime Minister Begin 
agreed to present these proposals to his 
Cabinet for consideration. This will be 
done at the earliest opportunity. 

President Sadat has carefully re- 
viewed all these remaining issues and 
has accepted these same proposals. I 
have just informed Prime Minister 
Begin by telephone of President 
Sadat's acceptance. 

I am convinced that now we have 
defined all of the main ingredients of a 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, 
which will be the cornerstone of a 



comprehensive peace settlement for the 



Middle East. 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY, 
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, 
MAR. 14, 1979 

Vice President Mondale 

Mr. President, 6 days ago you left 
for the Middle East in search of peace. 
You and Rosalynn took with you our 
love, our prayers, and the hopes of all 
humanity. You return tonight to a 
happy and a grateful nation, for you 
have drawn two ancient enemies to the 
brink of peace. 

We thank you tonight, not only for 
the breakthrough in the Middle East, 
but we thank you also for renewing our 
confidence in the deepest of American 
values. 

Where there were risks, you stood 
for hope. And where there were obsta- 
cles, you followed conscience. Where 
there were suspicions, you sought to 
build a lasting foundation of trust. It is 
the trust that you won from President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin that 
made these historic discussions possi- 
ble. And it is that same trust that made 
these talks a success. 

Mr. President, Rosalynn, welcome 
home to a proud and a hopeful nation. 

President Carter 

You are looking at a tired but a 
grateful man. [Laughter] 

All of us who made this journey ap- 
preciate the opportunity that we have 
had to render some service in the cause 
of peace. Now the journey is done and 
we are glad to be home, back in our 
own country, our beloved United States 
of America. 

It's good to see so many familiar and 
welcome faces, and I want to thank you 
for being out here in the middle of the 
night to greet us and to give us one of 
the best welcomes I have ever known. 
Thank you from the bottom of my 
heart. 

As you know, we did not go to 
Egypt and to Israel in order to confirm 
what was already a guaranteed result. 
We went there to use our influence and 
our good offices to help the leaders of 
those two great nations move deci- 
sively toward that peace that is so ar- 
dently desired by the people whom they 
serve. 

There were risks involved. They 
were pointed out to me by many 
people, political risks to me as Presi- 
dent, therefore, perhaps a risk even to 
the prestige of the United States. 

Fortunately, our work has had a 



29 

happy result. But I want to stress that 
the effort would have been worth 
making regardless of the outcome of 
this trip. Risk of failure should never 
deter us from a worthy goal. And no 
goal is higher than that of genuine 
peace. 

In war we offer our very lives as a 
matter of routine. And we must be no 
less daring, no less steadfast in the pur- 
suit of peace. 

For more than 30 years, the nations 
of Egypt and Israel, which have been 
and will be perpetual neighbors, have 
existed in a continual state of hostility. 
That hostility has exploded into combat 
four times. And each war has brought 
with it suffering and pain and the loss 
of life, renewed fear and hatred and 
great danger for that entire region and 
for the world far beyond. But in the 
last 16 months the way has finally been 
opened to peace. 

When I decided to make this trip, the 
peace negotiations, as you know, 
seemed to have reached a stalemate. 
After long hours of discussion in both 
Egypt and in Israel, proposals were 
made for resolving all the outstanding 
issues. All but two of these issues have 
been resolved with Prime Minister 
Begin and the Israeli Cabinet. 

Less than 3 hours from now the 
Prime Minister will present the re- 
maining proposals to the Israeli 
Cabinet for consideration. I have even 
left instructions to wake me up if the 
news is good — [laughter] — and I be- 
lieve it will be. As you also know. 
President Sadat has already accepted 
all of the proposals. 

Therefore, we have now defined the 
major components of a peace treaty 
between the largest and most powerful 
Arab country, Egypt, and its neighbor 
and former enemy, Israel. There may 
be sharp internal debates before this 
process is complete. But the treaty that 
emerges can be the cornerstone of a 
comprehensive settlement, one that can 
bless with peace all the people who 
have suffered from the long, enduring 
conflict in the Middle East. 

The leaders of Egypt and Israel are 
now daring to break the pattern of bit- 
terness and war. They are following the 
advice of the Biblical proverb: "When 
a man's way please the Lord, he 
maketh even his enemies to be at peace 
with Him." 

In choosing peace. President Sadat 
and the Prime Minister of Israel, Prime 
Minister Begin, are venturing into the 
unknown. But they know that the 
United States of America will be with 
them as they begin to make peace a 
living reality for their own people. 

I'm thankful that the friendships 
between their countries, both countries. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



intervietv for 
israeli Television 



The following is an interview Presi- 
dent Carter held with Dan Shilon of Is- 
raeli Television on March 22, 1979; it 
was taped for later broadcast in Is- 
rael. ' 



Q. Less than 2 weeks ago when you 
addressed the Israeli Knesset, you 
said, and I quote: "The people of the 
two nations are ready now for peace. 
The leaders have not yet proven that 
we are also ready for peace, enough 
to take a chance." 

After the leaders approved the 
peace treaty, it seems that the lead- 
ers are celebrating. The peoples are 
still a bit cautious about it. How can 
you explain it? 

A. Let me correct you, first of all. I 
didn't say the leaders of the two na- 
tions; I said we leaders. And I was re- 
ferring also to the adjacent 
countries — Syria and Jordan — where 1 
believe a substantial portion of the 
population are intensely desirous of 
peace and an end to hatred and ter- 
rorism and destruction and death. So, 
that's what 1 meant when I talked to the 
Knesset. 

I don't believe that the peace treaties 
can have their full, permanent, benefi- 
cial impact if they are just based on a 
relationship between or among leaders 
or documents, because Sadat, Begin, 
Carter will not be in office many years 
under the best of circumstances. And 
until we have a genuine interrelation- 
ship among the people of, say, Egypt 



and Israel, we can't have the full con- 
notation of the meaning of peace. We 
need students to move freely back and 
forth between the two countries, 
tourists, open borders, free use of the 
Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran. We 
need increased trade, mutual invest- 
ment, exchange of employees back and 
forth between the two countries, an 
opening up of trade between Israel and 
the United States, Egypt and the United 
States, and Western Europe, that hasn't 
been there before. 

As soon as the people of the two 
countries get to know each other, to 
trust each other, to like each other, to 
become mutually dependent on each 
other, to recognize their common fu- 
ture, common problems, common op- 
portunities, at that point, peace will be 
permanent and will be full. 

And I think that's the best way to 
demonstrate to the Palestinians, to the 
Jordanians, to the Syrians, and others 
the full advantages to them of emulat- 
ing what Egypt and Israel have already 
done. 

Q. But on the other hand, what 
are the risks to Israel and to Egypt, 
if there are any, by signing the peace 
treaty? 

A. I think the risks of not signing it 
are much greater than the risks of 
signing it. Obviously, there is going to 
be a period of time within which the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] and some of the Arab 
countries will threaten increased vio- 
lence or economic punishment, ter- 



President's Trip (Cont'd) 

and the United States will now grow 
even stronger when our own two 
friends are friends with one another. 

Through private messages and public 
statements, many messages sent from 
Air Force One on the trip back here 
from Egypt, I am urging all other world 
leaders to support what Egypt and Is- 
rael have done, for it offers hope to all 
who love peace everywhere in the 
world. 

My friends, let me thank you again 
for coming out to greet us. I believe 
that God has answered our prayers. D 



'Departure remarks on Mar. 7, 1979, from the 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Mar. 12; other material from the Weekly 
Compilation of Mar. 19. 

^Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House. 

^Made at Qubba Palace where President Carter 
stayed during his visit to Cairo. 

^Held on board the train from Cairo to 
Alexandria. 

^Made at Ras-al-Tin Palace. (Due to technical 
difficulties at the dinner, the White House Press 
Office was unable to provide a complete tran- 
script of President Sadat's toast.) 

'Held at Mena House, the hotel where the two 
Presidents held their meeting. 

'Made at Ben Gurion International Airport. 

"Made to reporters assembled outside the 
Prime Minister's office. 

'Made in Chagall Hall at the Knesset. 
'"Made at Cairo International Airport follow- 
ing a meeting with President Sadat. 



rorism, instability. I really believe that , 
that period is going to be relatively i 
brief. 

To compare the risks with the ad- 
vantages of signing the peace treaty; 
obviously, the advantages far outweigh 
the risks. 

There are some doubts about the fu- 
ture. This is kind of a new life, and 
both countries are going into the un- 
known with great predictions of prob- 
lems. I think the problems have been 
grossly exaggerated from the very be- 
ginning. And, of course, to the extent 
that we can use our influence in a^ 
beneficial way, the United States is not" 
only willing but eager to guarantee that 
the outcome of the peace negotiations 
will be fulfilled to their complete de- 
gree. 

And we can help to alleviate some of 
these concerns. And if problems do 
arise that we cannot presently antici- 
pate, we'll be full partners in trying to 
address those problems when they be- 
come evident. 

Q. Can you foresee realistically 
that Syria, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians — encouraged by Saudi 
Arabia — will cooperate with the con- 
tinuation of the peace process? 

A. 1 think this is a very good possi- 
bility in the future. But there's going to 
be a transition period when they try to 
posture and threaten and see if they can 
weaken the ties of friendship and peace 
between Israel and Egypt. 

I think they'll be unsuccessful in 
trying to destroy the peace process 
when it becomes evident that the ad- 
vantages of peace directly improve the 
quality of life of the Israelis and the 
Egyptians. In my opinion, the large 
number of Jordanians, who also pres- 
ently want peace, will become much 
more vocal, and perhaps King Hussein 
and the other Arab leaders will say: 
"Well, this is a good thing for me and 
my people as well." I think that could 
very well happen in the future. 

Q. During the past year, you men- 
tioned several times the right of the 
Palestinians to participate in their 
own determination of their own fu- 
ture. 

A. Yes. 

Q. This participation is now de- 
fined as self-rule or autonomy. Could 
the following steps, after establishing 
the self-rule, lead to an independent 
Palestinian state? 

A. We drafted this language — the 
Palestinians' right to participate in the 
determination of their own future — 
very carefully. It's been adopted by 



May 1979 



31 



both Israel and Egypt as a basis for the 
Camp David agreements. And. of 
course, that's incorporated within the 
peace treaties themselves. Also, the 
principles expressed in U.N. Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338 are part of the Camp 
David agreements and also this treaty. 

It's not up to the United States to de- 
cide the ultimate status of the West 
Bank or the Gaza area. This is the rea- 
son for the future negotiations, in 
which not only the Palestinians but also 
the Jordanians and the Egyptians will 
negotiate. 

I don't want to say what the ultimate 
status or who has sovereignty might be. 
The first step, to define what is — to use 
Prime Minister Begin's words — full 
autonomy will be difficult enough 
without my trying to decide here what 
decision might be reached 5 years in 
the future on the permanent status. 

Q. Can you define the exact 
American attitude these days toward 
the PLO? 

A. Our attitude these days is the 
same as it has been for a long time. 
The PLO has not been willing to rec- 
ognize the applicability of U.N. Res- 
olution 242, and the PLO has not been 
willing to accept the right of Israel to 
exist. Until the PLO is willing to do 
these things, we will not deal with the 
PLO. 

Q. Are you actually suggesting a 
defense treaty between Israel and the 
United States? 

A. No. We've never suggested this. 
But there will be a memorandum of 
understanding that will exist between 
Israel and the United States for the first 
time. It will be fairly far-reaching, and 
it's exactly what we want and exactly 
what Israel wants, as well. 

We've never had any sort of propos- 
als on either side that there be an actual 
defense treaty between our two coun- 
tries. I think Israel has always 
cherished the concept that they are 
perfectly able to defend themselves. 
And I think that's an accurate assess- 
ment. 

Q. It seems that accomplishing this 
goal was important to you person- 
ally, at least as important as to the 
parties involved. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Why was that? 

A. It's important to my country. We 
have a political, a philosophical, and a 
moral commitment to Israel — Israel's 
right to exist, to exist permanently, to 
exist securely, to exist in prosperity, 
and to exist in peace. And this is not a 
personal — this is not merely a 



intervieu^ for 
Egyptian Television 



The following is an interview Presi- 
dent Carter held with Adih Andrawes 
of Egyptian Television on March 22, 
1979: it was taped for later broadcast 
in Egypt. ' 

Q. You have committed the United 
States to be a full partner in the 
peace process until the Palestinian 
problem is settled, which is the core 
of the Middle East conflict. Would 
you care to tell us what are your im- 
mediate plans for the Palestinian 
people? 

A. The immediate plans are specified 
in the Camp David agreements and, 
also, in the terms of the peace treaty. 
They involve — to use part of the 
language — the right of the Palestinians 
to have a voice in the determination of 
their own future and to recognize the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians. 
This is encompassed in the mutual 
agreement, signed by Prime Minister 



personal — belief of mine, but it's a be- 
lief that accurately represents the 
overwhelming portion of the American 
people. 

Additionally, we have a strong 
friendship with Egypt. And obviously, 
it's to our own nation's advantage to 
have our two friends — who are perma- 
nent neighbors — be friends with each 
other. 

In addition to the personal commit- 
ment that I've had, I think I accurately 
represent what's best for my country 
and the aspirations which the people of 
my country have cherished for many 
years. 

Q. Finally, during the ups and 
downs of the negotiations, was there 
any moment in which you felt de- 
spair or thought of giving up your 
efforts? 

A. I despaired many times, but I 
never reached such a state of discour- 
agement that 1 thought about giving up. 
I was always determined to continue 
the peace process as long as I hold the 
office of President of the United States. 
And if there should evolve, in the fu- 
ture, problems, I'll be just as deter- 
mined to work for peace as I have been 
in the past. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 26. 1979. 



Begin, President Sadat, and myself: 
first of all — to use Prime Minister Be- 
gin's words — full autonomy for the 
Palestinians who live in the West Bank 
and Gaza areas; secondly, the termina- 
tion of the Israeli military government; 
third, the withdrawal of Israeli troops 
into specified security locations. 

I think the success of this effort will 
depend to a substantial degree on the 
willingness of the Palestinians and 
others to participate in the negotiations 
themselves. 

Obviously, President Sadat and I and 
Prime Minister Begin and our repre- 
sentatives can do a substantial amount 
for the Palestinians, even in their ab- 
sence. But the full realization of their 
expectations under these terms would 
obviously be dependent on how willing 
they are to participate themselves. 

Q. The Palestinian people feel they 
have been victims and evicted from 
their homes; the United States, as a 
superpower, should take the lead in 
inviting them and asking them to 
come and talk with the Administra- 
tion on their needs and their prob- 
lems and so on. Could this be envis- 
aged in the very near future? 

A. Yes. We would like to have di- 
rect relations with the Palestinians, and 
we will, as part of the negotiating 
process in the future. The Palestinians 
who live in Gaza and the West Bank 
will be invited and encouraged to par- 
ticipate in these discussions, the 
mayors of the cities and other repre- 
sentatives to be chosen by the 
Palestinians themselves. 

We have a problem with the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization]. 
The PLO has never yet been willing to 
accept the applicability of U.N. Res- 
olution 242, the basis for the Camp 
David agreements and, I think, a 
document that's been adopted by all of 
the Arab nations as a foundation for 
future progress. The PLO has never 
been willing to accept this document. 
Also, the PLO has never recognized 
Israel's right to exist. And as soon as 
the PLO itself, as an organization, is 
willing to accept these bases, then 
we'll immediately start working di- 
rectly with that organization as such. 

But in the meantime, the Palestinians 
who reside in the West Bank-Gaza 
area, the Palestinians who reside in 
Egypt and Jordan, and even others who 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



don't reside in either of these coun- 
tries, if they're mutually acceptable, 
will participate in the negotiations. 

Q. But wouldn't it be useful if you, 
as a superpower, took the first step 
and explained to the Palestinian 
people the necessity of accepting 
Resolution 242 and getting into the 
peace process? You have actually 
said before, and invited them to par- 
ticipate in the process, even accept- 
ing 242 with reservations. 

A. Yes, and I hope they will do that. 

We have not only sent representa- 
tives to meet with Palestinian leaders in 
the West Bank and Gaza areas — both 
from the Administration and the State 
Department and also, for instance, the 
Majority Leader of the Democratic 
Party in the U.S. Senate met with a 
representative group — but when I've 
met with President Asad of Syria and 
King Hussein of Jordan and with King 
Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd in Saudi 
Arabia, 1 have encouraged them to do 
everything they could, possibly, to in- 
volve the Palestinians in the peace 
process. 

As you know, there are threats 
made, and there are demonstrations of 
terrorism which tend to prevent the 
Palestinians who want to have peace 
and who want to have full autonomy 
from participating in these processes. 
And I think the threats of terrorism and 
the hatred that presently exists, the 
threat of war, the threat of economic 
boycotts and punishment against Egypt 
are certainly not conducive to realizing 
the hopes of the Palestinian people. 

There is no leader in the Mideast 
who has done more to open up an op- 
portunity for progress and the restora- 
tion of the rights of the Palestinians 
than President Sadat. If the other lead- 
ers in Jordan and Syria and Saudi 
Arabia would do half as much as Presi- 
dent Sadat has done, then these hopes 
that have been described in the agree- 
ments reached could be realized very 
quickly. 

Q. How do you see Prime Minister 
Begin's recent statements in the 



Knesset that Israel will not allow a 
Palestinian state or will not go back 
to the border of 1967? Are these 
useful at that ^me? 

A. I don't want to characterize either 
the statements made by Prime Minister 
Begin or Prime Minister Khalil, and so 
forth. You know, we're in the process 
now of completing the first step in a 
long process that will lead to a com- 
prehensive peace. These treaties, 
which have now been concluded after 
laborious negotiation, will just be a 
cornerstone, as President Sadat and I 
have said, for that comprehensive 
peace that we desire. 

We've specified a negotiating proc- 
ess. And the differences that presently 
exist between, say, Egypt and Israel on 
the definition of full autonomy are sub- 
stantial, substantial differences. But 
they're not nearly as wide as the differ- 
ences that existed before the Camp 
David agreements. 

It's inevitable that both nations, both 
negotiating parties, will express their 
own point of view in the strongest pos- 
sible terms originally. But after a 
while, as they get to understand one 
another and see the mutual advantages 
of agreement, I hope and expect that 
both positions will be moderated to 
some degree and an agreement can be 
reached. And we'll add our good of- 
fices as a negotiating partner. But I 
can't approve specifically what one 
leader or another says at the beginning. 
We'll be there to try to help them reach 
agreement. 

Q. Are you prepared to invest as 
much time and labor as you have 
with the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty on the second phase? 

A. I would hope that my personal 
involvement would be much less and 
that the negotiating teams could make 
substantial progress. 

Q. Do you think they can, without 
your personal intervention from time 
to time as you've — 

A. I believe so, because the terms of 
the agreement and the ultimate goal of 



the agreement have now been spelled 
out between myself and Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat. And this 
gives kind of a framework or a 
guideline for the negotiators in the fu- 
ture. We didn't have any such docu- 
ment, we didn't have any agreements 
to start with less than a year ago when 
we went to Camp David. And I think 
the results of what we've done now 
will make it much easier in the future 
for subordinates to negotiate than has 
been the case in the past. 

Q. Are the talks going to be in 
Washington? 

A. I would presume that the talks 
would be in the Middle East. I hope 
that 3 months from now, that Egypt 
will be the sovereign power over El 
Arish and will have control of this re- 
gion. And it could be that that beautiful 
seacoast town, as a part of Egypt, with 
no Israeli occupying forces, somewhere 
like that might be a good place to 
negotiate. J 

I never had a chance to visit El Arishi|| 
or Mt. Sinai and so forth, but I've told 
President Sadat that when it's under 
Egyptian control, I'd like to come back 
sometime. 

Q. Very good. You visited Egypt 
and you've seen the Egyptian people. 
What impression did you leave with? 

A. Perfect. I saw people who wen 
friendly toward me, who supportei 
their wonderful leader, Presiden 
Sadat, and who demonstrated to thei 
world that they genuinely want peace! 
and an end to hatred and war and deathil 
and destruction; a people who want ai 
better life in the future and who now 
have opened up an opportunity to 
benefit from a new relationship not 
only with Israel but with other nations 
in the world. 

I could not have been more pleased 
or favorably impressed than I was in 
my visit to Egypt. It was a great 
visit. n 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 26, 1979. 



May 1979 



33 



THE SECRETARY: Ameriea'^s Commitment to 

Third World Development 



Address before the Northwest Re- 
gional Conference on the Emerging 
International Order in Seattle. Wash- 
I ington, on March 30. 1979.^ 

These past weeks have been a time 
to deal with immediate diplomatic is- 
sues of extraordinary importance to our 
nation. Tonight I want to speak about 
an issue that may seem less immediate 
but is no less important: our approach 
to the economic future of the develop- 
' ing nations. 

Before turning to our strategy toward 
the North-South dialogue between the 
industrial and developing nations, let 
me first talk for a moment about why 
the development of Third World coun- 
tries matters to us. 

Its human dimension is clear. At 
least '/2-billion people regularly go 
hungry in a world of plenty. A half- 
billion is an abstract number, another 
statistic among many and. therefore, 
too easily dismissed. But when we 
pause to picture in our minds how 
much human suffering lies behind that 
single statistic, the scope of our moral 
challenge is evident. The continuation 
of that suffering is an affront to the 
conscience of men and women every- 
where. 

Americans have long recognized this 
challenge: We have generously shared 
our resources in times of tragedy and 
need abroad, from the great hunger in 
Ireland in 1847, to the Marshall plan 
and point 4 program 100 years later. 
We are determined today, despite 
budgetary stringency, to live up to that 
historic moral responsibility. 

Our humanitarian commitment is 
reinforced by the recognition that it 
also serves our national self-interest to 
assist the process of equitable growth 
within the developing nations. We need 
to help shape an international economic 
system which will support and stimu- 
late that growth. 

Here on this Pacific rim, you know 
well a fact that is true for our entire 
nation: that your prosperity and well- 
being depend on the increasing pros- 
perity and well-being of others 
throughout the world. 

Some 75% of the Northwest's wheat 
crop is sold on world markets. Fully 
one-third of western Washington's 
forest products economy is dependent 
on those markets, and that dependence 
is increasing. 

One dollar in eight in this State's 



economy comes directly from interna- 
tional trade. More than a quarter of a 
million jobs in Washington and Oregon 
alone depend on exports. 

Much of this trade, as you know, is 
with developing countries. Four of the 
State's 10 biggest export customers are 
developing countries. Seven of the 
State's biggest sources of imports — 
imports without which your economy 
could not function — are developing 
countries. 

These countries of the Third World 
are increasingly involved in our daily 
lives. We know how oil from these 
countries affects us. As a nation, we 
also get more than 50% of the tin, rub- 
ber, and manganese we need from less 
developed countries and substantial 
amounts of our tungsten and cobalt. 
We now export more to the developing 
countries, including the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, than 
to the Common Market, Japan, and the 
Communist countries combined- For 
example, almost one-half of our com- 
mercial aircraft sales abroad are to de- 
veloping nations. 

So, as we survey and address ques- 
tions of the evolving international eco- 
nomic order, we do not do so on some 
abstract basis. We do so as a matter of 



90% of this increase will be in de- 
veloping countries. And perhaps more 
troubling, this growth seems certain to 
be greatest in already hard-pressed 
urban centers. Imagine, if you can, 
what current projections would indi- 
cate: a Mexico City with 32 million 
people; a Sao Paulo with 26 million; 
Calcutta, Bombay, Rio de Janeiro, 
Seoul, Beijing, and Shanghai each with 
some 19 million in 20 years or so. 

We all recognize that the developing 
countries themselves bear the major 
burden for responding to these chal- 
lenges. The industrial countries, how- 
ever, can play a crucial role in assisting 
their efforts. Whether, and how, we 
help the developing nations in pursuing 
their development goals is one of the 
central issues of our time. 



U.S. Approach 

Our approach to development in the 
Third World is based on four funda- 
mental tenets. 

First, we are committed to support- 
ing strong and equitable growth in the 
developing nations, as a matter of our 
national interest as well as our national 
ideals. And we recognize that at times 



Our humanitarian commitment is reinforced by the recognition that it 
also serves our national self-interest to assist the process of equitable 
growth within the developing tuitions. 



economic self-interest and, for some 
sectors of our economy, of survival. 

The participation of the developing 
countries is also essential to solving 
pressing global problems that will 
shape the character of our future. Inef- 
ficient and wasteful use of the Earth's 
resources, pollution of the oceans and 
atmosphere, nuclear proliferation, un- 
checked arms competition, all of these 
involve the well-being and safety of the 
human race. None can be solved with- 
out the involvement of the developing 
nations. 

Most countries of the Third World 
have too little food and rapidly growing 
populations. We face the prospect of a 
population increase in the final quarter 
of this century which will equal the en- 
tire growth of world population from 
the birth of Christ to 1950. Roughly 



this requires facilitating adjustment in 
our own economy in ways which will 
support economic growth in the Third 
World. 

Second, we are committed to im- 
proving the international system in 
ways which will be mutually beneficial 
to all, which respond to the particular 
needs of the developing nations, and 
which accord them an appropriate 
voice in decisions that affect them. By 
the same token, we believe firmly that 
as nations develop and grow stronger, 
they incur increasing responsibility to 
contribute to, as well as gain from, the 
international economy. 

Third, despite the economic pres- 
sures we and other industrial nations 
now face, the United States remains 
committed to increasing transfers of re- 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



sources from the richer to the poorer 
nations. 

Let me emphasize, however, a 
fourth point. As we cooperate with de- 
veloping nations in seeking useful 
changes in the international system, 
and as we consider the level and nature 
of our resource flows, we must be clear 
about our priorities. Alterations in the 
international system and resource 
transfers among nations are not ends in 
themselves. They are a means to the 
compelling goal of development within 
nations. 

We cannot spend so much time and 
energy on our international discussions 
of the roadmap that we lose sight of our 
destination. The destination — the goal 
we share — is to find practical ways to 
have an appreciable impact on the lives 
of people around the world, and espe- 
cially on the lives of those for whom 
daily survival is an unanswered ques- 
tion. 

We envision an international eco- 
nomic system which is not rigidly di- 
vided into northern and southern blocs. 
We seek a global community which 
furthers the well-being of all countries, 
in which all recognize the respon- 
sibilities of each to the others, in which 
the richer help the poorer for the bene- 
fit of all, in which international delib- 
erations are focused as much on practi- 
cal ways of serving human needs as on 
levels of resource flows among nations, 
and in which every nation dedicates it- 
self to economic justice as well as eco- 
nomic growth. 

We can help build such a system in a 
number of ways; in our closer coopera- 
tion with the other industrial nations, 
constantly taking account of the effect 
on each other of our domestic deci- 
sions; in encouraging constructive in- 
volvement of Communist nations in 
the promotion of a healthy global eco- 
nomic system; in our positive partici- 
pation in the current North-South 
dialogue, and in our search for practi- 
cal programs that can best promote 
Third World development. 

North-South Negotiations 

Let me concentrate today on the 
negotiations that are taking place be- 
tween industrial and developing nations 
and the practical focus on development 
itself that we hope can be achieved. 

The distinction between industrial 
and developing nations, between North 
and South, is clearly eroding. The in- 
dustrial and agricultural performance of 
some of the developing nations now 
surpasses that of some of the industrial 
countries. But negotiations between 
North and South remain valuable. 
While we believe a broader global 



community is emerging in which rigid 
economic blocs no longer predominate, 
we understand the importance the de- 
veloping countries attach to the Group 
of 77. The developing nations can use 
their cohesion to bring greater clarity 
and purpose to our negotiations. 

We face an unusually large number 
of important international conferences 
in the coming 18 months. These meet- 
ings provide an extraordinary opportu- 
nity for progress on issues of impor- 
tance to developing nations — and to us 
all. 



We cannot spend so much time 
and energy on our international 
discussions of the roadmap that 
we lose sight of our destination. 



As we prepare for them, we must 
first recognize the progress that already 
has been made. Last week in Geneva, 
for example, agreement was reached on 
most of the basic elements of a com- 
mon fund to help finance international 
buffer stocks and other commodity de- 
velopment measures. This marks an 
important milestone in a process 
launched at the fourth U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development in 1976. 
Over the past IVz years of intensive 
negotiations, all participants moved 
from their original positions in search 
of common ground. The negotiations 
now move into a more technical phase 
leading to the drafting of articles of 
agreement, a process which could be 
concluded as early as the end of this 
year. 

In the past few years, industrial na- 
tions and international institutions have 
undertaken a number of other important 
measures of concrete benefit to the de- 
veloping countries. 

• Multilateral and bilateral aid flows 
have increased steadily in recent years. 
Agreements have recently been or will 
soon be concluded to enable the mul- 
tilateral development banks to increase 
significantly, in real terms, their lend- 
ing levels over the next 3 to 4 years. 

• Resources available through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
financing balance-of-payments dif- 
ficulties have been substantially 
increased — through liberalization of the 
IMF Compensatory Financing Facility; 
through the fourth IMF quota increase; 
and through the establishment of new 
IMF facilities including the trust fund 
and the $IO-billion Witteveen facility. 

• Consuming countries have agreed 
to the concept of shared responsibility 



with producing countries for financing 
buffer stocks to stabilize prices in j 
commodity markets. Agreements for 
coffee and tin were renegotiated; a new 
agreement for sugar has been reached; 
and negotiations on rubber and a new 
cocoa agreement are underway. Such 
agreements can have important anti- 
inflationary benefits for our own 
economy. 

• All Western industrial countries 
have implemented preferential tariff 
systems for developing countries. The 
multilateral trade negotiations will pro- 
vide new opportunities for all nations 
to increase their economic welfare. Just 
as consumers and producers will bene- 
fit in our own country, so they can gain 
in the developing world. 

• And donor countries have agreed 
to the concept of easing or eliminating 
the official debt burden of the poorest 
countries. 

The United States has played a 
leading role in many of these and other 
international initiatives and we have 
taken national measures to support 
them. 

• We have increased our foreign 
economic assistance from $3.7 billion 
in fiscal year 1975 to $7 billion in fis- 
cal year 1979. 

• In the commodities field, the 
United States is a member of the tin 
agreement, and we intend to make a 
contribution to the tin buffer stock. We 
are seeking Senate approval to join the 
sugar agreement, and we hope to con- 
clude new cocoa and rubber agreements 
in which we can participate. Last 
month we put forth ideas on a price 
stabilization agreement for copper. 

• We endorsed the concept of a 
common fund, and we worked toward 
that end with flexible new proposals 
on the major issues involved. 

• On trade, the United States has 
generally resisted protectionist pres- 
sures. We have a preferential tariff 
system for the developing countries 
which has assisted growth in their 
manufactured exports. 

• We now have legislation enabling 
us to waive interest payments on past 
development loans to the poorest 
countries and to allow principal to be 
paid into local currency accounts to be 
used for development purposes. 

• Almost all our development assist- 
ance to the poorest countries is now in 
grant form. 

• We have facilitated access to the 
technology that is in the public domain, 
and we have helped developing coun- 
tries draw upon our advanced 
technologies — using satellites, for 
example, to develop their natural re- 
sources and improve their internal 
communications. 



May 1979 

• The President is proposing the cre- 
ation of an international development 
cooperation administration which 
would consolidate or improve coor- 
dination among our bilateral and 
multilateral development assistance 
programs. 

In short, there has been real prog- 
ress. But far more remains to be done 
in concluding agreements to stabilize 
commodity markets, bringing the de- 
veloping nations more fully into the 
world trading system and implementing 
the new codes and tariff reductions of 
the multilateral trade negotiations, 
facilitating the adjustment of domestic 
economies to changing patterns of 
world trade, arriving at a common un- 
derstanding of the responsibilities of 
both governments and corporations to 
create a better environment for interna- 
tional investment and the flow of tech- 
nology, assuring adequate assistance to 
nations facing acute financial difficul- 
ties, strengthening the scientific and 
technological capabilities of developing 
countries, increasing aid flows to 
countries which need it most and can 
use it effectively, and finding ways to 
assure an appropriate role for develop- 
ing countries in international economic 
institutions. 

This is a heavy agenda. And these 
are difficult times in which to address 
it, since most of the industrial nations 
face difficult domestic economic chal- 
lenges. 

In a period of fiscal austerity, there 
is a danger, which we must frankly ad- 
dress, that negotiations between North 
and South could return to the rancor of 
earlier years. This will happen if each 
nation becomes so concerned with its 
own problems that it forgets the essen- 
tial reality of an interdependent age: 
that each nation can surmount its own 
difficulties only if it understands and 
helps resolve the difficulties of others 
as well. 

The industrial nations must maintain 
their commitment to the well-being of 
the developing nations. The developing 
nations must recognize that making 
demands which the industrial nations 
cannot meet will only produce interna- 
tional acrimony, not progress. And the 
oil-producing nations must recognize 
their special responsibilities for the 
health of the global economy and their 
fundamental stake in its continued 
vitality. 

A Practical Focus 

This brings me to a central point. 
Our progress in North-South 
negotiations — our progress toward a 
more equitable and healthy new inter- 
national economic order — will turn on 



our common ability to avoid endless 
debates on sterile texts and to focus in- 
stead on concrete development prob- 
lems which we can tackle together and 
which directly affect people's lives. 

Only by focusing on practical ways 
to meet human needs can we remain 
clear about our goals and clear in ex- 
plaining them to our peoples. I know 
that the American people will never be 
convinced that there is an inherent value 
only in resource flows among nations. 
They want to know, and have a right to 
know, how their taxes are being used to 
better the lives of people abroad. 

It is this practical — and human — 
focus which compels us to concentrate 
our aid on programs that directly im- 
prove the lives of poorer people 
abroad. We believe it is important that 
we concentrate our resources on pro- 
grams which most directly contribute 
not only to growth but also to equity in 
those countries which receive our aid. 

This approach is not only this Ad- 
ministration's policy. It has been ex- 
pressed by the Congress in the 1973 
Foreign Assistance Act and the Inter- 
national Development and Food Assist- 
ance Act of 1978. And it applies not 
only to our bilateral aid programs but 
also to those programs we support in 
the multilateral development institu- 
tions. 

Growth without equity can lead to a 
situation in which a growing economic 
pie is cut into ever more unequal 
pieces. Equity without growth can lead 
to a situation where a shrinking eco- 
nomic pie is cut into equal but ever 
smaller pieces. Neither situation can 
lead to long-term political or economic 



35 



• An ample supply of energy at rea- 
sonable prices is essential to economic 
advancement. It is also a key to our 
own prosperity. 

• Adequate food and good health are 
basic to human survival and productiv- 
ity. 

• And the ability of people and in- 
stitutions in the developing countries to 
obtain, develop, adapt, and apply tech- 
nology is critical to most development 
problems. 

Let me illustrate these priorities 
today by describing our current efforts 
and future plans in two areas — energy 
and food. In the coming months and in 
other forums such as the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Science and Technology for 
Development and the World Health As- 
sembly, we will be addressing the 
others as well. 



Energy 

No issue we face today more clearly 
demonstrates the interests we share 
with the people of the developing 
world than energy. The commuter 
buying gasoline in Seattle and the 
peasant farmer buying kerosene near 
Khartoum both face the harsh reality of 
rising world petroleum prices. Gov- 
ernments in the richest countries and 
those in the poorest must deal with the 
impact of higher energy costs and ris- 
ing energy demand on their national 
economies. 

Let me be frank. The worldwide 
energy situation, already serious, is 
likely to get worse before it gets better. 
For the foreseeable future, in the ab- 



. . . while we will continue to work with the developing countries in 
addressing the future of the international political and economic sys- 
tem, we intend increasingly to concentrate on specific development 
goals .... 



health. Both growth and equity are 
necessary. 

A practical focus also requires that 
we be clear about our priorities. Thus 
while we will continue to work with the 
developing countries in addressing the 
future of the international political and 
economic system, we intend increas- 
ingly to concentrate on specific de- 
velopment goals: energy, food, health, 
and increasing the capacity of the de- 
veloping countries to obtain and apply 
the knowledge and technology they 
need. 

There is good reason for seeking 
international emphasis on each of these 
areas: 



sence of substantial new efforts, 
worldwide growth in energy demand 
will continue to outpace worldwide 
growth in energy production. 

We must do what is necessary in our 
own country to restrain consumption 
and increase domestic production. But 
we cannot solve the energy problem by 
what we do here alone. It is a global 
challenge. 

Thus, we have a direct interest in 
helping developing countries devise 
their own effective energy policies — 
helping them identify their energy re- 
sources, determine their current and 
future energy demand, identify the 
technology they need, and obtain the 



36 



necessary financing. Let me tell you 
what we are already doing in each of 
these areas. 

We are now helping several de- 
veloping countries survey their national 
energy resources, define their future 
energy needs, and construct alternative 
energy strategies. 

With our strong support, the World 
Bank is significantly expanding its 
program to help developing countries 
finance further exploration and de- 
velopment of fossil fuels. The Bank 
envisages loans amounting to as much 
as $3 billion over the next 5 years. 

We are devoting substantial financial 
resources to research on renewable 
energy sources. In addition to private 
financing, the Department of Energy 
has budgeted over $600 million this 
year to study, develop, and demon- 
strate renewable energy technology. 
We have asked the Congress for more 
than $700 million for these efforts next 
year. These programs can lead to tech- 
nological developments that directly 
benefit the developing nations. 

The Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID) has requested $42 
million in FY 1980 for the actual appli- 
cation of renewable energy technol- 
ogies in developing countries. 

We have accelerated our training and 
technical assistance programs for 



conventional power projects. And the 
other development banks also are ac- 
tive in this area. 

But we must and will do more. 



• We will respond positively to ad- 
ditional requests from developing na- 
tions for help in evaluating their energy 
resources, needs, and strategies. 

• We will encourage the regional 
development banks to expand their 
energy programs and to consider new 
approaches to encourage further private 
capital flows into mineral and energy 
development in their regions. 

• President Carter and other heads of 
state at the Bonn economic summit last 
July pledged to increase assistance for 
harnessing the vast energy potential of 
the Sun, the wind, the oceans, and 
other renewable resources. We are now 
in the process of formulating a coordi- 
nated effort which will be discussed at 
the Tokyo summit in June. 

• With strong U.S. backing, the 
United Nations will hold a World 
Conference on New and Renewable 
Energy in 1981. We intend to play an 
active role in that effort. 

• We will increase our support for 
research, development, and training 
efforts of national and regional energy 
institutions in developing countries. 



We believe it is important that we concentrate our resources on pro- 
grams which most directly contribute not only to growth but also to 
equity in those countries which receive our aid. 



energy professionals and institutions in 
the developing countries. We have 
proposed a new institute for scientific 
and technological cooperation, which 
would become an important element of 
our foreign assistance program. Energy 
will be a major focus of the work of the 
institute as it both helps strengthen sci- 
entific and technological capacities in 
developing countries and also identifies 
domestic American research relevant to 
development abroad. 

And we are providing substantial 
direct and indirect financial assistance 
to help developing countries acquire 
the energy technology they need. The 
Export-Import Bank authorized ap- 
proximately $2 billion in energy- 
related loans and guarantees to de- 
veloping countries in fiscal year 1978. 
This has produced more than $3 billion 
in U.S. exports of energy equipment. 
The World Bank, to which we are the 
largest contributor, has already pro- 
vided about $10 billion for financing of 



We will encourage other nations to join 
us in this effort. 

• We will also work with other na- 
tions to determine whether it would be 
useful to supplement the work of such 
institutions. Together we will seek to 
identify gaps in current efforts, and 
ways to fill them, including the possi- 
ble establishment of new institutions. 
For example, international research 
centers — which enjoy support from de- 
veloped and developing countries, pri- 
vate organizations, and multilateral 
institutions — have played a major role 
in addressing developing country ag- 
ricultural problems. If, as a result of 
discussions with our colleagues in de- 
veloped and developing countries, 
there is agreement that this approach 
would be appropriate in the field of 
energy, the United States would sup- 
port such international energy centers. 

• We must assure that as new re- 
newable energy technology becomes 
relatively less expensive, adequate 



Department of State Bulletin 

financing is available for the develop- 
ing countries to acquire it. We will ask | 
the World Bank to undertake a thor- 
ough review of this question. 

These steps and others we will be 
discussing with developed and de- 
veloping countries in the months ahead 
can help assure that high energy costs 
do not undermine economic growth and 
a steadily improving way of life for 
those who live in the developing world. 

Our future economic well-being and 
theirs carries an inescapable impera- 
tive: We must work together to expand 
the availability of energy for developed^ 
and developing countries alike. There 
is no promise for any of us in an inten- 
sifying competition for limited energy 
supplies. 



Food 

Let me turn to a second development 
priority which we intend to focus on in 
the months ahead — the stark fact that 
one out of every five of our fellow 
human beings is sick or weak or hungry 
because he or she simply does not have 
enough to eat. 

In one respect, this is a question of 
the equity with which economic bene- 
fits are distributed. Millions are too 
poor to buy food, even when it is avail- 
able. As I have stressed, our overall 
development efforts must address this 
fundamental issue. 

But it is also clear that in many de- 
veloping countries, food production is 
not keeping pace with population 
growth. The long-range prospects point 
to even greater food deficits in de- 
veloping countries in the years ahead. 
Not only will we approach the limits of 
new land to cultivate, but soil erosion, 
desert encroachment, and simple over- 
use are robbing the world's historic 
breadbaskets of their productive capac- 
ity because of inadequate land and re- 
source management practices. 

The United States is already doing a 
great deal to increase the availability of 
food in the developing world. Roughly 
half of our bilateral economic de- 
velopment assistance — approximately 
$600 million this year — is devoted to 
agriculture and rural development. We 
provide roughly two-thirds of the 
world's concessionary food assistance. 
Our contribution this year will amount 
to $1.4 billion. And we have contrib- 
uted $200 million to the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development. 

But, as with energy, we must and 
will do more. Last September the 
President established a Commission on 
World Hunger. The commission will 
report this summer on concrete propos- 



May 1979 



37 



uls for additional efforts in dealing with 
the world food problem. 

In the meantime, we are moving 
ahead in several areas. We continue to 
believe that an effective International 
Wheat Agreement, with an expanded 
Food Aid Convention, would help 
stabilize world wheat prices and 
strengthen world food security. We are 
disappointed that after more than 2 
years of effort, a workable interna- 
tional arrangement could not be 
achieved at last month's negotiations. 
If prospects improve for reaching an 
accord, we are prepared to resume 
these negotiations. 

Under the existing Food Aid Con- 
vention, we are committed to providing 
a minimum of 1 .9 million tons of food 
assistance annually. We will more than 
double that minimum commitment, re- 
gardless of whether a new Food Aid 
Convention is successfully negotiated. 
And we are strongly encouraging other 
current and potential donors to do the 
same. 

To assure that our food aid commit- 
ments can be met even during periods 
of tight supply, we are seeking to es- 
tablish a special government-held 
wheat reserve which would add to food 
security for food-deficit countries. 

The agricultural research break- 
throughs of the past decade and a half 
have been of enormous benefit to the 
developing world — with improved 
plant strains, better animal breeds, and 
more efficient farming techniques. 
Much of this research has concentrated 
on cereal crops and cattle. While con- 
tinuing research in these areas, we 
must now devote greater attention to 
some of the traditional crops and ani- 
mals raised by poor farmers on margi- 
nal lands and to less widely grown 
crops that hold promise as new sources 
of food and income. These will be 
major agricultural priorities of the in- 
stitute for scientific and technological 
cooperation. Other government agen- 
cies will also increase their support for 
such research. 

We must also do more to prevent the 
tragic loss of 10-20% of the food 
which is produced each year in the de- 
veloping countries. More food is lost to 
rodents, insects, and spoilage in the 
developing world than all the food aid 
to the developing world combined. We 
are already a major contributor to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization's 
post-harvest loss fund, and both AID 
and the new institute will be devoting 
increasing resources to finding better 
ways to assure that what people toil to 
produce is available to sustain them. 

Finally, we intend to channel our 
food and development assistance in- 



Question'and-Anstver Session 
FoUowing Seattle Address 



Q. You spoke about energy. What 
about domestic conservation? 

A. Domestic conservation is a matter 
of the utmost importance and in 
dwelling upon energy and food, two of 
the items that are of special importance 
to me in my responsibility, I do not 
want in any way to lessen the impor- 
tance that should be attached to 
domestic conservation. 

Q. The present international in- 
stitutions in trade and flnance don't 
appear to be functioning very well 
for any group of countries now-a- 
days. Many developing countries are 
asking that developed, industrialized 
countries join them in building the 
foundations for a new Havana con- 
ference, one for the 1980's, which 
would restructure international 
commodity, trade, and financial af- 
fairs to reflect a change in structure 
not only of the industrialized nations. 



but the Socialist countries and de- 
veloping nations as well. 

This objective of the developing 
countries appears to be a centerpiece 
of the UNCTAD [U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development] agenda, 
the UNCTAD V meeting being one of 
the conferences of the next 18 months 
to which you referred. Could you 
give the U.S. position on this par- 
ticular UNCTAD V agenda item? 

A. The question was addressed to 
dealing with the structural changes 
which will be one of the subjects which 
will be coming up at the forthcoming 
UNCTAD conference. The question of 
structural change is, obviously, a 
question of great importance, and one 
which should be addressed and should 
be discussed fully in all of its aspects. 
However, as I tried to make clear to- 
night, I think that we should try and 



creasingly to countries which are 
seeking to adopt domestic policies 
which encourage their own food pro- 
duction and equitable distribution and 
promote better' use of water and land 
resources. We intend to participate ac- 
tively in the upcoming World Confer- 
ence on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development which will be addressing 
these essential questions. 

Conclusion 

Programs such as those I have men- 
tioned today are no cure-all. But they 
come to grips with the most pressing 
problems of the developing countries, 
and they will make a difference where 
it counts most — in the daily lives of 
people. They will insure that more 
people in the developing countries will 
have enough food to eat, that fewer 
children will die in infancy, that there 
is sufficient energy to power more irri- 
gation pumps and to bring more heat 
and light to distant villages. 

The resources we can bring to bear 
may seem small in comparison to the 
magnitude of the problems which must 
be solved. But let us remember that de- 
velopment is a long-term process. Our 
hopes for the coming decades are lifted 
by the fact that people are better off in 
most developing countries today than 
they were two decades ago. 



Life expectancy in the developing 
world in the past two decades has 
jumped from 42 to over 50, an increase 
which took the industrial nations a 
century to accomplish. Adult literacy 
in the developing world has jumped 
from one-third in 1950 to over one- 
half. In the past quarter of a century, 
per capita income in the developing 
countries grew on the average of al- 
most 3% a year. This is about 50% 
better than historical growth rates in 
Western nations during their indus- 
trialization. 

This is not cause to be sanguine; but 
it is reason to be confident that practi- 
cal progress can be made. But only if: 

• We and the other industrial coun- 
tries recognize that we share a common 
destiny with the developing world; 

• They, the developing nations, rec- 
ognize their responsibilities both within 
the international system and for equity 
as well as growth in their own 
societies; and 

• All of us, together, recognize the 
wisdom of a great man the world has 
now lost — Jean Monnet. "We must put 
our problems on one side of the table," 
Monnet said, "and all of us on the 
other." D 



Press release 88. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



concentrate on those matters where we 
can bring about practical results which 
will have an immediate or rapid effect 
upon improving the well-being and the 
lives of people in the developing coun- 
tries; and that is why I have stressed 
tonight the emphasis which the United 
States places on the particular items 
which I singled out. 

There are many other items which 
will be coming up at the UNCTAD 
conference which are of great impor- 
tance. One of those in which I have 
particular interest is that of the com- 
mon fund. The Minister [Manuel Perez 
Guerrero, former Minister of State for 
International Economic Affairs of Ven- 
ezuela] and I have talked about this and 
worked for it over the years. I am 
pleased to say that I think we have re- 
cently made real progress in arriving at 
an agreement on the framework for the 
common fund. This, I think, is in a 
sense, one of the structural changes 
that can and will make a substantial 
difference. 

So, in sum, to answer your question, 
I recognize the importance of address- 
ing the question of structural changes, 
but insofar as we are concerned, I 
would like to see us, in so doing, not 
lose sight of these specific items where 
I think we can have an immediate and 
practical effect. 

Q. You said in your speech that 
you wanted to make sure that dis- 
tribution of American foreign aid is 
more widespread than it has been in 
the past, that it benefit more of the 
population of each nation. How do 
you intend to do that without inter- 
fering with domestic governments? 

A. This is a difficult problem. We 
do not wish to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of the countries involved. How- 
ever, I think we can make it very clear 
to the countries involved that we be- 
lieve that it is important not only that 



the aid be received but that it be equi- 
tably distributed among the people of 
the country involved so that it really 
does reach the people who need it. 

This has been the structure of the 
program which has been developed by 
the Congress of the United States. Our 
Congress has said that our aid should 
go to the poor people of the countries 
of the world. That does not mean that it 
can go only to the poorest countries, 
because there are poor people in coun- 
tries which are at the median level or 
even some at the more advanced level. 
And we, therefore, should be careful 
that we see that it goes to poor people 
wherever they may be. 

Q. Forty miles away in Bangor, 
Washington, there is a Trident sub- 
marine base, and I was wondering 
how you reconcile the development of 
a new submarine, with broader and 
more powerful weapons than ever 
before, with your concerted efforts at 
reducing arms around the world. 

A. I'm very happy to answer that 
question. The question was, how do I 
reconcile the development of the Tri- 
dent submarine and the costs that are 
involved in the production of that new 
system with the efforts for arms con- 
trol. 

I think in order to have peace, that 
one has to have a combination of 
strength coupled with arms control. We 
are not going to reach the millennium 
overnight, and, therefore, we must de- 
velop the necessary forces to protect 
our nation — the values for which we 
stand — and those of our friends and al- 
lies. Yet, at the same time, we must 
work unceasingly to try and bring 
along, hand-in-hand with that, effec- 
tive arms control. And that is the rea- 
son we have been working so hard on 
so many arms control measures. 

I have spent more time, I can assure 
you, working to achieve a new SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 



agreement than on any other item, with 
the exception of seeking peace in the 
Middle East. I do it because I, my 
President, and our government believe 
that arms control, coupled with 
strength, is in the interest of our na- 
tion, is in the interest of peace in the 
world, and that we must persevere as 
long as we have to to bring about that 
result. 

Q. You talk about the importance 
of pledging additional aid to coun- 
tries as far as energy and food supply 
goes, but it seems to me that you 
don't stress the importance of 
educating the people of these under-- 
developed countries as to their ob- 
jectives and their problems that they 
need to overcome — and educating 
them insofar as showing them ways 
to enable them to be self-sufficient so 
they won't, in the future, have to de- 
pend on the powerful nations of the 
world. 

A. The question was why do I seem 
to stress such things as energy, food, 
and the like and not talk more about 
educating people so that they can play 
a more active and a fuller role in the 
developing of their institutions in their 
own life. 

This, in my judgment, is something 
for each of the countries to do for it- 
self. This is of vital importance, but it 
is individualistic and each country must 
develop in its own way. We should not 
be the ones to be dictating how this 
should be done. However, I think that 
if we can help by educational programs 
such as we have — by exchange fellow- 
ships and programs like that — that this 
is money very, very well spent and 
very important for us. So that by con- 
centrating on what I have concentrated 
on tonight, I, again, don't want to 
underestimate the importance of the 
matter which you raised. D 



Press release 88 A . 



May 1979 



39 



interview on 
''Face the iVarioti" 



Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
CBS's "Face the Nation" on March 
18. 1979. by George Herman. CBS 
News (moderator): Marvin Kalh. .CBS 
diplomatic correspondent: and Eleanor 
Clift, White House correspondent for 
Newsweek. ' 

Q. Yasir Arafat [Chairman, 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
Executive Committee] has been in 
Jordan and is going to Saudi Arabia 
trying to shift the balance one way. 
Our own mission, headed by [the 
President's national security adviser] 
Mr. Brzezinski and [Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Jones, 
has been in Saudi Arabia and is 
going to Jordan to shift the balance 
the other way. Who is winning? Have 
we won anything that we really need, 
for example, from Saudi Arabia in 
these talks? 

A. It's too early to say yet what will 
come out of the discussions that Pro- 
fessor Brzezinski and [Deputy Secre- 
tary of State] Warren Christopher and 
David Jones are having there. We've 
made it very clear to the Saudi Arabian 
Government and to our friends in the 
area that we consider the peace treaty 
to be the cornerstone of progress to- 
ward a comprehensive peace. I think 
they understand this very clearly. 
They're good and close friends, we 
share the same objective of a stable and 
moderate Middle Eastern region, and 
we will continue to work together to- 
ward that end. 

As to the specifics of what action 
they will or will not take on the treaty 
itself, we'll have to wait and see. 

Q. You say it is still too early to 
tell which way Saudi Arabia — which, 
I take it, is the principal concern of 
the U.S. policy at this moment — too 
early to tell which way they're going. 
But a front-page editorial in an in- 
fluential Saudi newspaper says the 
U.S. mission is doomed to failure. Do 
you take that lightly, or do you take 
it seriously? 

A. I would take it seriously. I do not 
think that they put those kind of state- 
ments in a government paper in less than 
a serious vein. On the other hand, I 
think that these issues are of such criti- 
cal importance that it will take time for 
them to reflect on what actions will or 
will not be taken as the facts unfold in 
the future. 



Q. This peace treaty, at least in 
the short term, seems to be produc- 
ing more turmoil than it is reducing. 
How do you reverse that tide? How 
can it be reversed? 

A. First let me say that the peace 
treaty, in my judgment, is a momen- 
tous step. For 30 years the countries of 
the region have been searching for 
peace. At long last, as a result of the 
mission of the President and of the far- 
sighted and courageous action of the 
leaders of these two countries, we now 
are on the threshold of signing a peace 
treaty. 

This could not have been possible, 
let me say, without the work of the 
President of the United States and 
without the presence of the United 
States, because it was absolutely es- 
sential that there be a trusted friend 
who could sit with the parties and, 
when they came to problems they could 
not resolve, come forward with 
suggestions that could bridge these 
gaps. 

Now this is not the end of the proc- 
ess; this is merely the beginning of the 
process. The process leads toward the 
end of a comprehensive peace treaty. 

The next step along the road toward 
a comprehensive peace treaty will be 
dealing with the questions of the West 
Bank and Gaza — the Palestinian is- 
sues, which are of fundamental impor- 
tance. Those issues, as they are de- 
bated and discussed in the negotiations, 
will be watched very carefully by the 
people in the area, both the Pales- 
tinians and the other nations. If prog- 
ress is made in those very difficult 
negotiations, I think the attitudes can 
begin to change. I think a momentum 
will take place that can begin to move 
this, because this, in my judgment, is 
the only road to peace. 

All the other alternatives at this time 
are really maintenance of the status 
quo. This has the objective of moving 
forward toward the ultimate end — a 
just and lasting peace. 

Q. Almost to bear that out, one of 
the principal actors — the leader of 
the PLO, Yasir Arafat — is quoted 
today as saying, in fact promising, an 
explosion in the Middle East if this 
treaty is signed. Do you yourself ex- 
pect violence in the Middle East if 
the treaty is signed? Has the State 
Department taken any precautionary 
measures so far? 



A. The answer is that we cannot rule 
out that there may be some violence 
after the signing of a peace treaty. We 
have taken the necessary precautions in 
light of this fact. 

Q. Do you yourself feel, or could 
you tell us — the obligatory kind of 
question at this point when you're in 
that kind of delicate negotiation — 
were there any secret understandings 
that will be popped on the Congress 
or the American people in another 
couple of weeks? 

A. The answer is, there were no se- 
cret understandings that will be popped 
on the Congress. 

Q. What about the American 
people? 

A. Nor the American people, I can 
assure you of that. 

Q. Let me go back and pick up 
that, I think, rather remarkable 
statement. When Marvin asked you 
about the possibility of violence, you 
said: "We have taken the necessary 
precautions. . . ." Can you enlarge 
on that a little bit? 

A. We have been in touch with our 
embassies in the area, indicating to 
them that they should take the neces- 
sary and normal kinds of actions that 
one would take in such a situation. 

Q. You were considering only vio- 
lence against American embassies? 

A. Yes. 

Q. The larger picture — if I may 
just pursue that for a second — is 
violence against Israel, violence 
against Egypt, violence against the 
person of President Sadat. 

A. 1 was not talking about those 
when I gave you the answer that I did. 

Q. In his speech before the Knes- 
set in Jerusalem, President Carter 
spoke of a new military dimension in 
the U.S. relationship with the Middle 
East. Can you explain what he meant 
by that? 

A. Yes. He was at that time talking 
about the need in the post-treaty sign- 
ing period to make sure that the re- 
quirements of Israel would be met in 
terms of the necessary defensive 
equipment. This is one of the matters 
that will be discussed with the repre- 
sentatives of both Israel and Egypt who 
are here at the present time. This has 
been raised with the Members of the 
Congress in the reports that the Presi- 
dent has already made. 

Q. I'd like to talk to you about a 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



statement made by the Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State [for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs], 
Mr. Crawford, before a congres- 
sional committee this past week. He 
was asked by Congressman Hamilton 
whether the United States would go 
to war in order to protect — and I 
wasn't quite sure here whether he 
meant — Saudi Arabia or the oil in 
Saudi Arabia. Would the United 
States go to war to protect either? 

A. We would deal with a situation 
which jeopardized the kinds of ele- 
ments that you are talking about when 
such a situation arose. And the Presi- 
dent would, of course, take such action 
as he and his advisers deemed appro- 
priate after full consultation with the 
Congress and within the constitutional 
processes. 

I must go further and say that I think 
it would be premature at this point to 
speculate about hypothetical situations 
which are not facing us now. 

I want to make one other point; I 
want to make it very clearly: There is 
no question that we have vital interests 
in this area. There is no question also 
that we have made it very clear, 
through a series of statements by Presi- 
dents over the years, that we consider 
the territorial integrity and the security 
of Saudi Arabia to be a matter of fun- 
damental importance to the United 
States. 

Q. So in other words, it's not 
based then on a specific piece of 
legislation or a treaty that has al- 
ready gone through Congress. When 
you assert a vital interest of the 
United States for Saudi Arabia, you 
are talking about a series of Presi- 
dential statements over the past 15, 
20 years perhaps. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. And what you are talking about 
then, too, is a vital interest in terms 
of the country? Or are you talking 
about oil which introduces a whole 
new definition of a vital interest? 

A. I am talking about stability in the 
region. This is a fundamentally impor- 
tant region, not only to the United 
States but to the world in general. And, 
of course, peace in the region is of 
fundamental importance to the people 
of the region. So I am talking about all 
of those when I answer your question. 

Q. There have been a number of 
reports — semiofficial, I think you 
would call them in the Middle 
East — that the United States will 
take a direct role in the negotiation 
between Israel and Egypt on the 
question of Palestinians and the pos- 



sibility of a Palestinian state however 
it works out. Is that true, and can 
you explain a little bit what kind of a 
role? 

A. The letter which will be signed at 
the same time that the peace treaty it- 
self is signed will have in it a statement 
that the United States will participate 
fully in the negotiations which will be 
taking place pursuant to the provisions 
of that letter. Those discussions are the 
discussions which deal with the ques- 
tion of the establishment of the self- 
governing authority in the West Bank 
and Gaza. So we will be — to use a 
phrase that has been used before — a 
full partner in the discussions which 
will be taking place, and this is at the 
request of Egypt and Israel. 

Q. Will the United States be in any 
sense safeguarding the interests of 
the Palestinian people in those talks? 

A. The interests of the Palestinian 
people are of fundamental importance, 
great importance, as the President has 
said and as I think all the parties recog- 
nize. Certainly that is one of the issues 
that has to be dealt with before you are 
going to get a final and comprehensive 
peace. 

Q. When are you going to get 
elections for the self-governing 
Palestinian authority? 

A. The basic agreement which is 
contained in the letter provides that 1 
month after the exchange of the docu- 
ments of ratification on the peace, 
negotiations will start, that the goal of 
the negotiations is to complete those 
negotiations within 1 year, and that as 
expeditiously as possible after those 
negotiations have been completed 
elections will be held. The purpose of 
those negotiations is to define what in 
the jargon we call the modalities of the 
election — how you set up the negotia- 
tions and the powers and respon- 
sibilities of the self-governing author- 
ity. 

Q. Since I'm not a diplomatic cor- 
respondent I can ask kind of a dumb 
question here. We see so many re- 
ports coming in about anti-American 
statements being made in various 
Muslim countries in the Middle East. 
The question occurs to me — not un- 
derstanding fully all these things — is 
the United States better off? Is our 
standing better or worse in the Mid- 
dle East as a result of negotiating this 
treaty? 

A. I think that our standing in the 
long run is clearly going to be better 
off. We are going through, I am sure, a 
difficult short-term period immediately 



after the signing of the treaty. But in 
the long run, 1 believe that people are 
going to recognize that this is the only 
road to peace. There is no other 
suggestion thai those who criticize the 
treaty are making. What they are 
suggesting is merely the maintenance 
of the status quo, which does not re- 
solve these problems but leaves them to 
fester. 

Q. In the short run, are things 
likely to get worse before they get 
better? 

A. I would think that we will proba- 
bly have some difficulties in the short 
run, yes. 

Q. Could you explain a little bit? 

A. 1 think there is going to be a good 
deal of criticism of the peace treaty. 
What particular actions will be taken 
remain to be seen. 1 don't want to try to 
guess at this point what the Baghdad 
group will do in terms of specific ac- 
tions, but I can expect that some action 
will come out of that. 

Q. Since it took the personal in- 
volvement of Jimmy Carter to pull 
this treaty off, what kind of prece- 
dent does that set? I mean, do you 
worry that no one around the world 
will want to settle a problem without 
a personal visit from the President? 

A. No. 1 believe that they will rec- 
ognize that this was an issue of 
paramount importance that had come to 
a point of stalemate, and, therefore, it 
was necessary that the President of the 
United States himself intervene to try 
and break that stalemate. 

It was such an important matter, and 
the time factor I think was 
important — that it be broken and 
broken when it was so that the de- 
terioration, which was taking place I 
think, would not continue. So I don't 
think it's going to establish the prece- 
dent that every problem has to be 
solved by President Carter. 

Q. You said a moment ago that 
some action will come out of the 
Baghdad group perhaps. You 
weren't predicting any, of course. 
But what about continuing Saudi 
economic support of Egypt? 

A. Again, I would have to say that 
that remains an open issue. I don't 
know the answer to that. 

Q. When you came back from the 
Middle East, you did see [Soviet] 
Ambassador Dobrynin at least twice, 
that were announced anyway. Have 
you now completed the basic 
framework for a new strategic arms 
agreement with the Russians? 



May 1979 



41 



A. No, we have not completed it. 
But we really are now at what I would 
call the bitter end. We're very close to 
completing it. 

Q. Have you discussed a summit 
between Presidents Carter and 
Brezhnev? 

A. The answer is yes. 

Q. Have you decided on a time and 
place as yet? 

A. Not yet. 

Q. You malte it sound as if the 
bitter end is not likely to be bitter. 

A. The bitter end is not used in the 
sense that the treaty which would come 
out of it would not be a satisfactory 
one. I believe that the treaty which will 
come out of it will be a sound treaty; it 
will be a treaty that protects and en- 
hances the security of the United States 
and of our allies. We would not sign 
any other kind of treaty. 

Q. Do the issues have to be re- 
solved at the summit level — those 
that still remain on a SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
agreement? 

A. There may be an issue that has to 
be discussed — 

Q. On the Backfire? 

A. I'm not going to get into detail. 

Q. How soon do you see a summit 
as a possibility? 

A. It all depends on what happens in 
the next several days. As I say. we're 
down to negotiating on one or two is- 
sues at this point, and if we can make 
progress on those, then I think we can 
move promptly onto scheduling a 
summit. 

Q. Politically do you think the 
President's breakthrough in the 
Middle East will make it any easier 
for him to win ratification of a SALT 
treaty in the Senate? 

A. I believe it will. I believe that an 
action which is as important and his- 
toric as that action is going to have a 
positive effect on the Hill. I think it 
will have a good and substantial effect 
on such issues as the ratification 
debate. 

Q. Beijing says it has taken all of 
its troops out of Vietnam; Vietnam 
says, Hanoi says, the Chinese have 
not taken all their troops out and 
fighting continues. What do we know 
about the situation? 

A. We know that there is a differ- 
ence of opinion as to whether they have 
completely withdrawn. I think it is 



quite clear that, except for some minor 
border areas, all of the Chinese troops 
are out. But I think there are still some 
debates on whether it is the border that 
the Chinese would urge or the border 
that the Vietnamese say is the proper 
border. But other than that, it is our 
best information that they are all now 
out. 

Now yesterday, as you know, the 
Vietnamese said that they would be 
prepared to sit down and enter into dis- 
cussions, starting I think on the 23d of 
March, on the resolution of the issues 
between themselves and China. I think 
that is an important step. 

Q. As I am told, in the reports that 
we receive over the wires here, Viet- 
nam continues its mobilization and 
movement of troops — some toward 
the border with China, some toward 
the border with Cambodia and Laos. 
What is going on? Do we know? 

A. I think they're putting themselves 
in the position where they will 
strengthen the regular forces that they 
have in the area. At the time of the in- 
cursion by the Chinese into Vietnam, 
there were only paramilitary type 
troops in that area, and now they are 
putting regular forces up along that 
area to flesh out what was there. 

Q. So you don't see anything 
ominous in it? 

A. No, I don't. 

Q. The U.S. position had been that 
the summit should take place in the 
United States. Is that a position ac- 
cepted now by the Soviet Union? 

A. That remains our view. We really 
have not had any 'serious discussion 
about that. They know very clearly we 
believe that should be the case. But we 
haven't gotten to the point of trying to 
set down the date. I believe the meet- 
ings will take place in the United 
States. 

Q. Given the Soviet paranoia 
about the Chinese, do you think you 
can convince the Russians that the 
United States is going to deal with 
them in an even-handed way when 
there is so much pressure from in- 
dustry and from the public to court 
the Chinese? 

A. 1 believe that we can. Let me say 
that I believe it is essential that we do 
deal in a balanced way with both the 
Soviet Union and the People's Repub- 
lic of China. We have said, for exam- 
ple, that insofar as arms are concerned, 
we will not sell arms to either; and we 
will not. That has been our policy, and 
our policy will remain that we will not 
do so. 



In addition to that, on other matters 
we will deal with them both in a bal- 
anced way. I think to do otherwise 
would give us a foreign policy that was 
skewed, and a skewed foreign policy in 
dealing with the two of them, I think, 
could have serious consequences. 

Q. Would the Administration be 
willing to withhold most-favored- 
nation status from the Chinese if you 
couldn't get the Congress to grant it 
to the Russians at the same time? 

A. On the question of most- 
favored-nation status, that is an issue 
which we are studying at this point. I 
hope it will be possible to find a way to 
give most-favored-nation status to both 
because I believe it is in our interest to 
trade with both of them. 

Q. Do you expect oil prices to go 
up? Do you see an end to these con- 
tinuing increases? 

A. It is clear that oil prices already 
have risen substantially because of the 
shortages which were brought about by 
the cutoff of Iranian oil. We indicated 
at the time, when the cutoff took place 
because of the Iranian situation, that 
we did not believe that the OPEC [Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] prices which were an- 
nounced were justified. We felt that 
they were too high and that they 
created a danger to the world 
economy — not only the industrialized 
countries but particularly the develop- 
ing countries as well. 

It is necessary that we take action on 
our own part, however, to see what we 
can do to cut back on our consumption. 
That's why I was very pleased to see 
the International Energy Agency taking 
the position the other day that all of 
us — the 20 countries — will cut back 
5%. I think it's terribly important that 
we do it, and that was a very positive 
step. I think that once the Iranian oil 
gets back on the market, you'll find the 
spot prices beginning to drop. 

Q. In the past, when we've had oil 
price troubles and oil supply trou- 
bles, we've always relied on the 
Saudi Arabians as our chief friends 
and allies in balancing things out. 
Considering the pressure that they're 
under now, can we rely on them 
anymore to keep oil production up to 
its extraordinarily high levels? 

A. I think you have to go back to the 
question of what are our mutual long- 
term interests. Our mutual long-term 
interests are for stability in the region. 
We share that view. I think we will 
have that very much in mind as we 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



AFRICA: U.S. Polivy 
Toieard Zaire 



hy Richard M. Moose 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on March 5, 1979. 
Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. ' 

1 welcome this opportunity to discuss 
with you the Administration's policy 
toward Zaire because I believe that 
there are some fundamental misun- 
derstandings about the objectives, 
content, and thrust of this policy, in- 
cluding our assistance programs. 

Zaire has a bad image in the Western 
press, among interested governments, 
in business circles, and in the halls of 
Congress. The critics see a corrupt and 
repressive regime which engages in 
serious human rights violations, has 
mismanaged the economy to the point 
where it is hopelessly in debt, and 
where the brunt of the crisis falls upon 
the Zairian poor and disadvantaged. 
More than that, critics believe that the 
Zairian regime is on the verge of col- 
lapse in the face of serious and growing 
threats from opposition forces. The 
critics ask why the United States 
should be identified with such a situa- 
tion or lend support to such a regime. 

Zaire's supporters maintain that the 
essential problem is economic and 
point out that some of the major 
foreign banks, businesses, and gov- 
ernments did not give good economic 
advice to Zaire when the copper prices 
were high. On the contrary, most 
foreigners were simply bent on secur- 
ing fat contracts and otherwise pushing 
Zaire into the very prestige projects 
which today are cited as examples of 
Zaire's misplaced priorities. The sup- 
porters of Zaire predict that the eco- 
nomic crisis can result in chaos with 



Interview (Cont'd) 

work together in the months ahead. 

Q. Does that mean we can rely on 
them to help us? 

A. I don't wnat to give you an iron- 
clad answer on that. I think it is cer- 
tainly a consideration, however, that 
we do share common values and ideas 
on many of these important and 
strategic issues. D 



'Press release 76. 



great damage to U.S. interests. They 
say that the way to assure stability and 
prosperity is to join in the current in- 
ternational efforts to put together an 
economic recovery package. Zaire's 
supporters ask why the United States is 
not doing more in this regard. 

How does this Administration look at 
the problem of Zaire, you ask? First of 
all, we do not believe that the stark op- 
tions presented by either the strong 
critics or the apologists — "principled 
disassociation" versus "strategic 
identification" — provide sound bases for 
American policy. On the one hand, 
there is no way for us to walk away 
from the problems of Zaire; our inter- 
ests will not permit it. On the other 
hand, we cannot restrict our vision to 
economic self-interest alone. Zaire's 
serious social and political problems 
and our humanitarian instincts do not 
allow such an approach. 

With these parameters in mind, we 
have tried to fashion a policy which 
takes into account the following; 

• First and foremost, U.S. interests 
over the long term; 

• Economic and political progress 
and stability in central Africa; 

• Humanitarian concerns; and 

• Perhaps most importantly, 
reform — since all else hinges upon it. 

In sum, the Administration's policy 
aims at addressing the very real prob- 
lems and opportunities which exist for 
us in Zaire. We believe our policy will 
stand the test of time and does not 
merely respond to today's political and 
economic conditions. 

U.S. Interests Over the Long Term 

Zaire's geopolitical and economic 
weight in African scales of power is 
significant. Zaire is the size of the 
United States east of the Mississippi 
and has boundaries and ethnic connec- 
tions with nine other nations. 

When Zaire is at peace, the region 
breathes easier. When Zaire's signifi- 
cant mineral reserves move to market 
under stable conditions, the world 
breathes easier. 

We must not forget that Zaire is the 
world's leading producer of both cobalt 
and industrial diamonds, the world's 
7th largest producer of copper, and the 
world's 13th ranked producer of cof- 
fee. A measure of this nation's latent 
importance is the fact that the Zaire 



river holds 13% of the world's hy- , 
droelectric potential. i 

A few short years ago, when copper 
prices were high, the American hotel, 
tire and battery factories, vehicle as- 
sembly plant, tlour mill, other U.S. 
investments — and the 1,500-mile 
high-tension line being built by an 
American company — were all consid- 
ered to be important and growing U.S. 
interests. They still are, although each 
is in difficulty as a result of the severe 
economic crisis that prevails in Zaire. 
Our policy and our actions are designed 
to improve economic conditions and 
thus protect and enhance U.S. business 
there. 

U.S. trade with Zaire, totaling more 
than $300 million last year in spite of 
economic difficulties, puts Zaire in 
third place among our black African 
trading partners. We ran a deficit last 
year with Zaire of more than $140 mil- 
lion, reflecting significant purchases by 
us of cobalt, zinc, and coffee. Histori- 
cally, U.S. exports have consisted of 
mining and construction machinery, 
passenger cars, aircraft, and locomo- 
tives, although more recently our ex- 
ports are mainly connected with our 
assistance programs — wheat, rice, and 
tobacco. We want to get back to a po- 
sition where we can export more than 
food to black Africa's fourth largest 
market. 

Zaire owes American private and of- 
ficial creditors more than $.5 billion as 
of now. The Export-Import Bank alone 
has lent more than $400 million. And it 
is clear that economic recovery in Zaire 
is the only way for us and other West- 
ern creditors to be repaid on time and 
m full. 

Not least, Zaire is pro-Western in its 
outlook and in the positions it takes in 
international arenas. We want to en- 
courage this support. 

Some might argue that the foregoing 
exposition is too self-centered. The fact 
is that our policy must be designed to 
serve a range of very real and very spe- 
cific interests. 

Economic and Political 
Stability and Progress 

Thus, we believe that Zaire is im- 
portant in its own right and important 
to us. Now let us look at recent de- 
velopments and trends to see how they 
impact on Zaire and on U.S. interests. 

By the early 1970's, Zaire had 
moved far beyond the chaos associated 
with the postindependence period. 
Political stability seemed assured. 
Copper prices were high and rising, 
and the economy was booming. 

In 1974, however, the bottom fell 
out of the copper prices and with it the 



May 1979 



43 



momentum of economic progress. 
Zaire soon found itself unable to pay 
the huge debts it had unwisely incurred 
during the good years, with the result 
that foreign suppliers and creditors cut 
off further credit. 

The lack of foreign exchange began 
to impact on local businesses, includ- 
ing American investment, which could 
no longer import the needed raw mate- 
rials to keep their plants operating at 
capacity. Unemployment, inflation, 
and black market activity increased 
sharply. As President Mobutu has so 
frequently pointed out, the causes and 
the effects of this vicious downturn in 
economic activity were exacerbated by 
economic mismanagement and corrup- 
tion. 

In the midst of Zaire's economic 
difficulties, and just as major interna- 
tional efforts were underway to address 
these problems, ex-Katangan gen- 
darmes struck across the border from 
Angola into Shaba Province in 1977. A 
year later the ex-gendarmes attacked 
again, this time capturing the center of 
Zaire's copper and cobalt producing 
facilities. 

In both instances, the invaders were 
repulsed and relative security reestab- 
lished through the intervention of 
foreign forces, mainly Moroccan, 
French, and Belgian. Each time the 
scenario for economic stabilization and 
recovery was set back. And on both 
occasions serious questions were raised 
as to the prospects for stability in 
Zaire. 

Clearly, U.S. policy must work to 
reestablish economic and political sta- 
bility and progress in this part of cen- 
tral Africa. Otherwise, the very basis 
and context for our interests and those 
of the West in general will continue to 
disintegrate. 

Humanitarian Concerns 

But beyond the question of our ma- 
terial interests, these economic and se- 
curity crises have had disastrous effects 
on the people of Zaire. 

• As a result of the two Shaba wars, as 
many as several hundred thousand 
Zairian refugees left Zaire for Angola 
and other bordering states. Over 
100,000 have returned under an am- 
nesty program. The consequent feeding 
and resettlement problems are enor- 
mous. 

• The urban and rural poor have 
borne the brunt of economic deteriora- 
tion, inflation, and corruption. It takes 
approximately 300 zaires to buy a 
monthly market basket of food for a 
poor family of five in Kinshasa. The 
head of that household, however, 
makes only 100-120 zaires. 



• Natural disasters, a cholera out- 
break in the Kivu region, and a drought 
followed by destructive heavy rains in 
Bas-Zaire have added to the number of 
sick and hungry. The current crop fail- 
ure in Bas-Zaire, for example, has re- 
sulted in famine conditions for over 
400,000 people and has seriously af- 
fected an additional 900,000 people in 
that region alone. 

• Severe malnutrition is widespread 
in Zaire with certain negative effects 
for the current and future generations 
of Zairians. The infant mortality rate is 
among the highest in the world. 

In view of these circumstances, we 
have built a substantial humanitarian 
element into our policy, and we believe 
we should continue to address the 
enormous suffering of the people of 
Zaire. 

Real and sustained improvement in 
the lot of the average Zairian, however, 
depends upon improvement in the 
economy as a whole. This is why our 
policy must go beyond short-term hu- 
manitarian assistance to attack longer 
range problems. 

Reform 

The solution to Zaire's problems ob- 
viously depends upon resources from 
abroad — military, economic, and hu- 
manitarian assistance programs. We 
and Zaire's other friends recognize this 
and have been engaged for some time 
in a major international effort aimed at 
economic stabilization and recovery 
and at improving the securi'y situation. 

All the donors realize, however, that 
for assistance programs to be effective, 
fundamental reforms must be under- 
taken. I would refer you to President 
Mobutu's speech of November 25, 
1977, for the most complete and 
scathing analysis of the ills that beset 
the Zairian society and economy. The 
necessary reforms that have been 
agreed upon fall into three categories: 
political and human rights, security, 
and economic. 

Political and Human Rights Re- 
forms. Since the middle of 1977, Zaire 
has been engaged in the process of 
liberalizing its political system, and we 
have seen what amounts to the begin- 
nings of a decentralization of authority 
and responsibility. 

Elections have been held at the 
levels of the urban zone, the legisla- 
ture, and the political bureau. The Of- 
fice of Prime Minister has been insti- 
tuted. The Legislative Council has 
shown encouraging signs of activity. 
Much remains to be done, however, to 
insure that these institutions work to 
their full potential. 



On the human rights front, I would 
refer the subcommittee to the report 
already submitted to the Congress. We 
can point to the general amnesty of last 
June whereunder more than 100,000 
refugees have returned to Zaire. In ad- 
dition, a number of prominent political 
prisoners have been released, including 
the former foreign minister. 

The other main reforms under the 
political and human rights category 
concern reconciliation with Shaba Pro- 
vince. The region has been returned to 
civilian rule, but there have been re- 
ports of mistreatment of returning refu- 
gees. Overall, progress on the Shaba 
front has not been very impressive. 

Security Reforms. Zaire and its 
friends also realized that in order to 
achieve real stability in the area, Zaire 
and Angola would have to reconcile 
their differences and work together to 
assure secure borders and peace in the 
region. Another requirement no less 
urgent is the reform of the Zairian 
Armed Forces. 

Presidents Mobutu and Neto have 
made remarkable progress toward re- 
solving the longstanding differences 
between their two countries. Military 
discipline, however, remains a real 
problem for the Zairian forces. Military 
pay systems have been revised, and the 
Belgian and French training missions 
have begun new programs. But it is 
still too early to say when Zairian 
forces will be able to replace the 
inter-African forces in Shaba. 

Economic Reforms. Lastly, con- 
cerning economic reforms, significant 
progress has been made, although the 
problem of corruption remains very 
serious. On the positive side, the Zair- 
ians can point to: 

• As of last August, an expatriate 
Principal Director of the Zairian Cen- 
tral Bank and a team of specialists pro- 
vided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); 

• Still other foreign experts soon to 
enter the Finance Ministry and Cus- 
toms Service; 

• A decree that prohibits a large 
number of prominent Zairians from en- 
gaging in foreign exchange transactions 
until they have paid past debts to the 
banking system; and 

• A high-level Zairian delegation 
which has been in Washington to con- 
tinue negotiations with the IMF on a 
new stabilization program. 

In summary, the Zairian Government 
itself has provided the framework for a 
comprehensive reform program. What 
is needed urgently now is effective im- 
plementation. Progress to date has been 
mixed. More has been accomplished 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



ZAIRE— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 905,063 sq. mi. (about the size of the 
U.S. east of the Mississippi River). 

Capital: Kinshasa (pop. 2.5 million. 1977). 

Other Cities: Kananga. Lubumbashi. 
Mbuji-Mayi, Kisangani, Bukavu (more 
than 200,000 in each). 




A tiantic 
Ocean 



People 

Population: 26.4 million (1977 est.). ' 

Annual Growth Rate: 3%. 

Density: 28 per sq. mi. 

Ethnic Groups: Bantu tribes (80%), over 
200 African tribal groups in all. 

Religions: Catholic and Protestant (50%), 
Kimbanguism, other syncretic sects, tra- 
ditional religions. 

Major Languages: French, Lingala, Kin- 
gwana, Kikongo. Tshiluba. 

Literacy: 20% (1976). 

Life Expectancy: 44 years. 



Government 

Official Name: Republic of Zaire. 

Type: Presidential, one-party. 

Independence: June 30, I960. 

Date of Constitution: June 24, 1967 
(amended Aug. 15, 1974; revised 1978). 

Branches: The Popular Movement of the 
Revolution (MPR) is the sole legal politi- 
cal institution; its organs include the 
Political Bureau, the Party Congress, the 
Executive Council (Council of Ministers), 
the 272-meniber Legislative Council 
(unicameral), and the Judicial Council. 
The President of the party is automati- 
cally President of Zaire. 

Suffrage: Compulsory over 18. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 8 Regions 
(Provinces) and one urban Region 
(Kinshasa). 

Economy 

GDP: $3.37 billion (1977, constant 1970 
prices). 

Annual Growth Rate: -0.7% (1977, con- 
stant 1970 prices). 

Per Capita Income: $127 (1977). 

Per Capita Growth Rate: -4% (1977). 

Agriculture: Land — 2% cultivated or pas- 
ture, 20% unused cropland. Labor — 
70-80%. Products — coffee, palm oil, 
rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa (cash crops); 
manioc, bananas, plantains, corn, rice, 
vegetables, fruits, sugar (food crops). 

Industry: Products — processed and unproc- 
essed minerals, consumer products, metal 
and chemical products, construction ma- 
terials, steel. 

Natural Resources: Copper, cobalt, zinc, 
industrial diamonds, manganese, tin, 
gold, columbium-tantalum, rare metals, 
bauxite, iron, coal, 13% of world hy- 
droelectric potential. 

Trade: Exports — %91\ million (1977 



f.o.b.): copper 40%. cobalt 11%, 
diamonds, gold, coffee 24%, palm oil. 
wood. Partners — Qe\%mm 18% (1977). 
U.S., F.R.G. Imports — %\.2i billion 
(1977 c.i.f): crude petroleum, petroleum 
products, chemicals, transport equip- 
ment, textiles, food. Partners — Belgium 
33% (1977), F.R.G. , U.S. 

Official Exchange Rate; 1 zaire = U.S. 
$.662. 

Economic Aid Received: Total — $260 mil- 
lion (1977). U.S. on/> — $48 million 
(1978), $36.65 million (1979 est.). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies. 
Organization of African Unity, Inter- 
governmental Council of Copper Export- 
ing Countries. African Development 
Bank, African countries associated with 
the EC, INTELSAT, International Coffee 
Organization, International Tin Council, 
Economic Community of the Great Lake 
Countries. 

Principal Government Officials 

Zaire: President and Commissioner of State 
for Defense — Mobutu Sese Seko; Prime 
Minister — Bo-Boliko Lokonga; Ambas- 
sador to U.S. — Kasongo Mutuale 

U.S.: Ambassador to Zaire — Walter L. 
Cutler 



Taken from the Department of Stale's June 
1978 edition of the Background Notes on 
Zaire with updated information provided 
where available. Copies of the complete 
Note may be purchased for 70(t from the 
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 (a 259c discount is allowed when or- 
dering 100 or more Notes mailed to the 
same address). 



overall in the past 9 months than most 
would have thought possible. How- 
ever, very serious problems remain, 
and much still has to be done. 



Assistance Programs 

Recognizing the severe impact of 
Zaire's difficulties on the disadvan- 
taged poor, we have consciously re- 
shaped the nature and emphasis of our 
assistance programs. We have shifted 
away from balance-of-payments sup- 
port in favor of project and humanitar- 
ian assistance which will have direct 
benefits for the people. We are stress- 
ing basic human needs: agriculture and 
related infrastructure necessary for 
food production and marketing, nutri- 
tion, health, and human resource 
development — together with assistance 



to special groups such as refugees and 
victims of natural disasters — and pro- 
vision of essential food and com- 
modities for local manufacture. 

Our agricultural projects are de- 
signed to lay the foundation for sub- 
stantial food production increases. In 
the interim, our PL-480 Title I pro- 
gram is having a significant impact on 
food availabilities by providing badly 
needed food resources without directly 
depressing local production. Other 
projects are directed at lowering the in- 
cidence and severity of malaria and 
measles and at the increased availabil- 
ity of locally produced tools for the 
small farmer. 

We are contributing up to $5 million 
through the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees to the resettlement of the 
refugees returning to Zaire under 



President Mobutu's amnesty and an ad- 
ditional $.5 million in PL-480 emer- 
gency Title II commodities. 

Based on the findings in 
November-December of last year of a 
joint Zairian-U.S. nutritional survey 
team that pointed to rising incidence 
and levels of malnutrition in Bas-Zaire, 
especially in the zones of Tshela and 
Lukula, we are now furnishing 
$625,000 in emergency aid for pur- 
chase and distribution of food and 
seed. We are attempting to provide this 
aid to the victims of famine through 
several voluntary organizations, in- 
cluding the Catholic Relief Service, 
International Rescue Committee, 
Caritas, League of Red Cross 
Societies, and the Church of Christ in 
Zaire. By utilizing these groups, we 
hope to determine whether an expanded 



May 1979 



45 



Promoting Peace in 
Southern Khodesia 



by Richard M. Moose 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 7, 
7979. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secre- 
tary for African Affairs.^ 

I wish to thank the committee for 
this opportunity to testify on an issue to 
which the Administration attaches con- 
siderable importance: how best to pro- 
mote peace, democratic government, 
and independence for Rhodesia. The 
committee has before it for considera- 
tion two specific proposals, one intro- 
duced by Senators McGovern and 
Hayakawa, the other by Senators 
Schweiker and DeConcini. Before 
commenting on these two proposals, I 
believe it might be useful for the com- 
mittee if I first attempt to place their 
consideration in a broader context by 
outlining what the Administration's 
efforts with respect to Rhodesia are de- 
signed to achieve. 

As you know, the United States has 
for over 2 years been engaged with the 
Government of Great Britain in a seri- 
ous effort to help resolve the issues that 
have led to the current tragic conflict in 
Rhodesia. We have done so out of a 
recognition that if a solution is not 
found that can command the support of 



the people of Rhodesia and of the in- 
ternational community, the inevitable 
result will be a long and bitter conflict 
in which many more people will suffer 
and which will have grave conse- 
quences for the whole of southern Af- 
rica. Already that conflict poses a seri- 
ous threat to the political and economic 
stability of states throughout the re- 
gion. The longer it continues, the 
greater will be the risk of involvement 
by outside powers whose interests con- 
flict with our own. And finally, a con- 
tinuing conflict could destroy the pros- 
pects for cooperation among the races 
in building a peaceful and prosperous 
future for an independent Zimbabwe 
and diminish the hopes for peaceful 
progress toward racial equality in 
South Africa. 

As is often the case, the outlines of 
the problem emerge much more clearly 
than the outlines of a solution. While 
the situation in Rhodesia is often per- 
ceived simplistically as a conflict be- 
tween two sides, the actual circum- 
stances are in fact much more complex. 

On the one hand, the patriotic front 
is in reality a tenuous alliance of the 
two externally based groups, [the Zim- 
babwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 
and the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU)] each of which 



PL-480 Title II program is feasible for 
Zaire in the present circumstances. 

Through our ongoing military assist- 
ance programs, we are emphasizing 
basics — communications, transporta- 
tion, and training — as opposed to 
costly and overly sophisticated pro- 
grams which Zaire cannot afford and 
which would offer little prospect of 
effective defense. We welcome the 
Belgian and French efforts to retrain 
Zairian units with a view toward re- 
placing the inter- African force in 
Shaba. 

In sum our programs are directly re- 
lated to our policy goals — protection of 
U.S. interests, economic and political 
stability and progress, and humanitar- 
ian concerns. Most importantly, each 
of our programs is tied to progress on 
reform. 



misunderstanding about the thrust of 
our policy and our programs. I have 
tried to be candid about the very seri- 
ous challenges that remain in the way 
of economic and political progress. I 
have tried as well to recognize the very 
important steps that Zaire has taken 
toward fundamental reforms. 

Our policy is to encourage and 
facilitate reform and recovery by link- 
ing our assistance to Zaire's progress in 
actually implementing changes. We 
believe our interests in that part of Af- 
rica warrant continuation of this policy 
so long as there is such progress. If 
there is not, then we should consider 
policy options other than those we are 
now pursuing. D 



Looking Ahead 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
I began this presentation by ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
suggesting that there might be some Washington, D.c. 20402. 



cherishes its own ambitions and pos- 
sesses its own army. Inside Rhodesia, 
the Salisbury parties have formed a co- 
alition which only thinly disguises the 
political rivalries among them. 

In addition to the two factions of the 
patriotic front and the Rhodesian secu- 
rity forces, the situation has been fur- 
ther complicated by the acquisition by 
Bishop Muzorewa [head of the United 
African National Council] and the Rev- 
erend Sithole [head of the African Na- 
tional Council/Sithole] of their own 
private armies, loyal only to them. 
Adding further to the potential for 
confusion and chaos is the fact that 
each of the parties and their armies are 
dependent to one degree or another 
upon the support of external parties. 

All of these factions lay claim to the 
leadership of the country. Each seems 
prepared to enforce its claim by a resort 
to armed force. If there is to be any 
hope of avoiding the violent confronta- 
tion that this situation portends, then it 
is clear that a way must be found to 
sort out these conflicting claims and 
ambitions through a peaceful process. 

The aim of the British and American 
Governments has been to help institute 
just such a process. We have become 
increasingly convinced that the key to 
averting a prolonged and debilitating 
struggle for power involving both 
blacks and whites is through impar- 
tially administered elections held under 
international supervision in which all 
political groups will be able to partici- 
pate equitably. We believe this is the 
only way of assuring that whatever 
government emerges will be able to 
command the support of the people of 
the country and of the international 
community. 

Both these elements are essential to 
Rhodesia's future peace and security. 
Any government that does not enjoy 
the broad support of the people of the 
country will be inherently unstable and 
vulnerable to challenge from both 
within and without. Only a demo- 
cratically elected government would 
have the broad support needed to resist 
factional opposition. Moreover, only a 
process that can command the accept- 
ance of the surrounding states and the 
international community can remove 
any and all pretext for outside inter- 
vention on behalf of one faction or 
another. 

Our experience in the Namibia 
negotiations has demonstrated that it is 
possible to gain the support of seem- 
ingly implacable enemies and of the 
international community for the princi- 
ple of free and fair elections under 
U.N. supervision which do not 
guarantee power to any particular fac- 
tion or party. While the results of this 



46 



negotiation are not yet completed and 
important issues remain to be resolved, 
the fundamental principle of impar- 
tially administered, U.N. -supervised 
elections has been accepted by South 
Africa and the Southwest Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO) as the 
basis for a settlement and has been 
strongly supported by the front-line 
states. 

What the British and American Gov- 
ernments are seeking from the parties 
to the Rhodesian conflict is their ac- 
ceptance of this very same principle. 

Elements of the Anglo-American 
Proposals 

The key to being able to conduct 
U . N . -supervised elections is the 
agreement of the parties to the conflict 
to a fair and impartial process. The 
Anglo-American proposals emerged 
out of the efforts of the British and 
American Governments to outline the 
basic conditions under which U.N.- 
supervised elections could be held. It 
might be helpful to review the essentia! 
elements of those proposals and the 
problems they were designed to con- 
front.^ 

• it was recognized that free elec- 
tions cannot be conducted in an atmos- 
phere of violence and intimidation. 
Therefore, the proposals placed special 
emphasis on the need for a negotiated 
cease-fire and on the introduction of a 
substantial U.N. presence to maintain 
and monitor it. 

• But in order to get a cease-fire, 
one must first have agreement on a fair 
political process. Therefore, it was 
recognized that the arrangements gov- 
erning the elections must be such that 
no faction could predominate and in 
which all parties could have confi- 
dence. Thus we and the British pro- 
posed a neutral transition administra- 
tion to govern the territory during the 
brief period leading up to the elections 
and a U.N. presence to insure the im- 
partiality of the elections process. 

• We recognized the critical impor- 
tance of finding a way to deal with the 
existence of no fewer than five separate 
military forces and to create a single 
army that would be loyal to the elected 
independence government. 

• It was accepted that all those in- 
volved would feel more secure about 
the outcome if there were agreement by 
the parties to the outlines of a demo- 
cratic constitution that would provide 
due protection for individual rights. 

The Anglo-American proposals con- 
stitute one approach — we believe a 
valid one — to the problem of how to 
create conditions essential to the hold- 



ing of free and fair elections. There 
may be others that are equally valid. 
But it seems to us that the essential 
feature of any settlement is the princi- 
ple of impartially administered, U.N.- 
supervised elections. Once that funda- 
mental principle is accepted by the 
parties, then it will be possible to con- 
duct productive negotiations on the 
specific arrangements to implement 
that goal. 

Status of the Negotiations 

When Secretaries Owen [U.K. 
Foreign Secretary David Owen] and 
Vance met with the leaders of the pa- 
triotic front in Dar es Salaam last 
April, they agreed to two of these basic 
provisions for free and fair elections: 
They accepted the idea of a U.N. pres- 
ence to maintain a cease-fire and 
monitor the elections, and they agreed 
to a neutral resident commissioner who 
would exercise control over law and 
order and defense during the transition 



Southern 
Rhodesia 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 21, 1979' 

The conflict in Rhodesia, which has 
brought widespread human suffering to 
that territory and to neighboring states, 
has been a matter of deep concern to 
the United States and to the interna- 
tional community. We, therefore, wish 
to endorse the appeal issued by the In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) on March 20 which calls upon 
all parties to the Rhodesian conflict to 
take immediate steps to end the prolif- 
eration of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians and to permit the 
ICRC to carry out its humanitarian 
work. 

In keeping with our commitment to 
the principles and provisions of the 
Geneva conventions, the United States 
wishes to associate itself to this appeal 
and to urge all concerned to do the 
same. We again urge the parties to the 
conflict to recognize the wisdom of 
compromise on an impartial settlement 
process leading to U.N. -supervised 
elections that can end the suffering of 
people who have already suffered for 
too long. D 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Hodding Carter III 



Department of State Bulletin,; 

period. They also agreed to attend an 
all-parties meeting where the details of 
a settlement agreement could be 
negotiated. At the same time, however, 
the patriotic front has insisted on other 
arrangements for the transition period 
that would have the effect of giving it a 
predominant political position. We and 
the British have made it clear that such 
arrangements are incompatible with the 
concept of an impartial transition proc- 
ess and, as such, could not have our 
support. 

I think it is important to note that in 
our frequent discussions with them, the 
front-line states have stated their clear 
preference for a settlement based on 
impartially administered, U.N.- 
supervised elections. They see this 
process as not only assuring an irrever- 
sible transition to majority rule but 
also — and just as important — as a 
means of averting a subsequent civil 
war in Rhodesia of the kind that was 
recently witnessed in Angola. 

On the other hand, it is fair to say 
that the preoccupation of the Salisbury 
parties — going back even before March 
3 of last year — with their own internal 
arrangements has been a significant ob- 
stacle to progress toward a more com- 
prehensive settlement that would 
involve all of the parties in U.N.- 
supervised elections. Not until Oc- 
tober, during the visit of the Salisbury 
Executive Council to Washington, did 
the internal parties finally agree to at- 
tend an all-parties meeting. Since then, 
our efforts to engage the parties in 
Salisbury in the kind of preliminary 
discussions that are essential to the 
success of an all-parties meeting have 
met with a persistent lack of interest. 
Meanwhile, the externally based guer- 
rilla groups have become more insistent 
in their demands for what would 
amount to a direct transfer of power to 
them. 

It was because of the obstacles en- 
countered on both sides that [U.K.] 
Prime Minister Callaghan's special 
emissary, Cledwyn Hughes, and U.S. 
Ambassador Stephen Low were forced 
to conclude following their tour of 
southern Africa last December that 
there was, for the moment, no realistic 
prospect of convening a successful 
all-parties meeting. 

There are increasing indications, 
however, that some of the leaders in 
Salisbury and their supporters have 
come to realize that the April 20 elec- 
tions cannot solve the fundamental 
problem of ending the conflict or of in- 
stalling a government that will be able 
to command the broad support of the 
people of Rhodesia and of the interna- 
tional community. Chief Chirau [head 
of the Zimbabwe United People's Or- 



May 1979 



47 



ganizationj, himself a signatory to the 
March 3 internal settlement agreement, 
IS among those in Salisbury who have 
been prepared to say publicly what 
many other Rhodesians, both black and 
white, feel privately: that a viable and 
lasting settlement will require further 
negotiations which involve all parties, 
including the patriotic front. 

The Internal Settlement 

The Administration has frequently 
been accused of having prejudged the 
internal settlement and of being funda- 
mentally opposed to the leaders in- 
I volved in it. Some have even alleged 
that the Administration's position is 
one of support for the patriotic front in 
its effort to impose its authority by 
force of arms. None of these accusa- 
tions bears any truth. 

The President will faithfully fulfill 
the requirement placed upon him by 
law to make a determination on the 
conduct of the scheduled April 20 
elections. In making that determination 
under the Case-Javits amendment to the 
1978 International Security Assistance 
Act, the President will take into ac- 
count all of the information available to 
him but will not be bound by the report 
of any particular body or group. 

In the final analysis, however, it is 
not what we in the U.S. Government, 
or in the U.S. Congress, or in any other 
outside body think of the internal set- 
tlement and its arrangements. What 
matters is whether those arrangements 
will in the first instance command the 
support of the people of Rhodesia. If 
they do not, then it would be accurate 
to say that these arrangements will not 
contribute to a solution of the Rhode- 
sian problem. 

In assessing whether the scheduled 
April elections are likely to provide a 
lasting solution to the Rhodesian prob- 
lem, it is important to take into account 
the conditions which are likely to pre- 
vail over the next 2 months. 

• The country is torn by war. The 
patriotic front will do everything it can 
to prevent the scheduled April 20 elec- 
tions from being held. The Rhodesian 
security forces may similarly resort to 
force to get voters to the polls. And 
there is every indication that the vari- 
ous leaders in Salisbury are prepared to 
use their own private armies to compel 
support for their candidates. 

• As matters now stand, large areas 
of the country are not under the effec- 
tive control of either side, and more 
than 85% of the country is governed 
under martial law. 

• In addition, the two wings of the 
patriotic front have been banned or- 



ganizations inside Rhodesia since Sep- 
tember of last year and many ZAPU 
and ZANU supporters have been placed 
in indefinite detention. Under these 
current restrictions, they have been 
prohibited from engaging in any or- 
ganized political activities and from 
publishing their views. 

• The scheduled elections will be 
held on the basis of a constitution 
which blacks representing 97% of the 
population have been given no oppor- 
tunity to approve and which gives what 
many would regard as a dispropor- 
tionate share of power and influence to 
the white minority. 

Given these circumstances, it is not 
unreasonable to question whether the 
government that emerges from the 
April 20 elections will be able to com- 
mand the support of either the people 
of Rhodesia or of the international 
community. If not, then we see every 
likelihood that the war will not only 
continue but escalate. The longer it 
continues, the greater will be the 
danger of a subsequent civil war which 
could very likely bring increased in- 
volvement by outside powers. The 
threat to the stability and independence 
of states throughout the region — such 
as Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi — 
will increase. And the prospects for 
peaceful change through negotiation 
and accommodation will diminish. 

This committee presently has before 
it for consideration two resolutions: 
one dealing with the issue of whether 
and under what circumstances the 
United States should continue to apply 
mandatory Security Council sanctions 
against Rhodesia; the other with the 
question of sending observers to the 
April elections. 

I would like to state frankly and 
without prejudice to the deliberations 
of the committee that one of the more 
unfortunate aspects of the debate on 
these two issues is that it has tended to 
obscure the perceptions of all of us as 
to the real issues and stakes involved in 
Rhodesia. I believe it is extremely im- 
portant that the committee consider 
whether its endorsement of either of 
these proposals would contribute to 
solving the fundamental problem of 
bringing a just and lasting settlement to 
Rhodesia. 

The Administration has decided that 
it will not send observers to the sched- 
uled April 20 elections because the in- 
volvement of the United States in an 
election process which is widely 
regarded — not only in Africa but by 
our friends around the world — as in- 
herently illegal and unrepresentative 
could seriously undermine the interna- 
tional standing and prestige of the 



United States. And it could seriously 
damage our ability to work with all the 
parties for a lasting solution to the 
Rhodesian conflict. 

One must also consider the likely 
consequence of encouraging the parties 
in Salisbury to persist in their present 
course in the expectation of receiving 
material and moral support from the 
United States and others which is most 
unlikely to be forthcoming. Certainly 
the Administration would oppose the 
direct or indirect involvement of the 
United States in the Rhodesian con- 
flict, and we strongly doubt that the 
American people would support such 
involvement. Under these circum- 
stances, the likely consequence of 
raising expectations of support in 
Salisbury would be to prolong the war 
and the suffering and to diminish the 
prospect for reaching a viable and 
lasting settlement. 

In this situation, the responsibilities 
of this Administration — indeed, I be- 
lieve, of any U.S. administration — are 
clear. We will not endorse the unrea- 
sonable claims and demands of any 
party to the conflict. We cannot sup- 
port the patriotic front in its insistence 
on arrangements that would assure it a 
dominant political position. Nor will 
we support the Salisbury parties in 
their efforts to institute arrangements 
which effectively exclude the equitable 
participation of recognized political 
groups. 

We must continue to hold out the 
prospect, dim though it might some- 
time seem, of a political solution that 
can provide a rational alternative to the 
violence and suffering. For that reason 
we will continue to work closely with 
the British to secure agreement of the 
parties to a settlement based on 
genuinely fair and impartially ad- 
ministered elections held under U.N. 
supervision. We will do so because we 
can see no other way of averting a 
wider and more tragic war or of bring- 
ing about a lasting solution to the 
Rhodesian problem. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 

^For text of proposals, see Bulletin of Oct. 
3, 1977, p. 424. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin, 



ARMIi^ COI^TROL: SALT Mi 

and the National Defense 



Following are addresses by National 
Security Adviser Zhigniew Brzezinski 
before the Chicago committee of the 
Council on Foreign Relations at the 
Art Institute of Chicago on April 4. 
1979. and by Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown before the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Foreign 
Policy Association in New York on 
AprifS. 

NATIONAL SECURITY 
ADVISER BRZEZINSKI* 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union are on the verge of an historic 
achievement: completion of a com- 
prehensive agreement on limiting 
strategic offensive nuclear forces. Our 
nation has been striving to achieve this 
goal since the SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] negotiations began 
nearly 10 years and three Administra- 
tions ago. Today, I want to talk with 
you about the importance of this SALT 
agreement in terms of our national se- 
curity and our relations with the Soviet 
Union. 

The signing of the SALT II agree- 
ment will engage us in a vigorous and, 
we hope, enlightening national debate 
leading to Senate ratification of the 
SALT II treaty. Equally important, this 
national dialogue should produce a 
fresh consensus for policies to insure 
our national security in the I980's. 
President Carter began this dialogue in 
his recent address at Georgia Tech.^ 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
will be discussing military and defense 
aspects of the treaty tomorrow in New 
York City. 

The .security of the United States can 
only be achieved through the full par- 
ticipation of our elected leaders and of 
the American people. As we all realize, 
the issues which challenged us in 
negotiating SALT II will not disappear 
once the agreement is signed and 
ratified. Protecting our strategic inter- 
ests and pursuing a constructive 
strategic relationship with the Soviet 
Union will remain on our national 
agenda as far into the future as we can 
see. As a result, our policies must be 
based on realism, patience, and wis- 
dom about the future. The American 
people must understand these policies. 
So must our allies. So must the leaders 
of the Soviet Union. 



SALT and U.S. Policy 
Toward the U.S.S.R. 

As President Carter has stated, 
U.S. -Soviet relations will continue to 
be a mixture of competition and coop- 
eration. Our policies must be designed 
to pursue both and to draw an effective 
balance between the two — seeking to 
broaden cooperation where we can but 
effectively meeting the challenge of the 
competition where we must. 

The Soviet Union is a military 
superpower that is now pressing for- 
ward to become a true global power. In 
some parts of the world, the Soviet 
Union challenges our security interests 
and those of our close friends and al- 
lies. 

In pursuing its goals, the Soviet 
Union relies primarily on its military 
power. This is its strength — strength 
which we match — but in many ways it 
is also the source for its weakness. By 
diverting massive resources from its 
civilian economy to build its military 
machine, the Soviet Union has 
weakened the strength of its society. 

In contrast, the United States enjoys 
many unique assets: our economic and 
technological dynamism; our thriving 
and stable society; our government 



military power to gain influence. This 
leads it to be both more assertive to- 
ward others and more fearful of its own 
position — a combination that poses 
deep challenges to our steadfastness 
and resolve. We are meeting these 
challenges today; we will continue to 
do so in the future. 

At the same time, the Soviet Union 
has gradually come to understand the 
risks of a competition that is so heavily 
influenced by military issues. It is a 
nation that directly suffered the full 
brunt of the worst conflict of modern 
times. With us, the Soviet Union has 
come to recognize that SALT can help 
contain the risks of nuclear holocaust 
which would flow from unrestrained 
competition in strategic arms. As a re- 
sult, SALT, in the context of pro- 
grammed U.S. strategic capabilities, 
can provide the needed strategic stabil- 
ity for progress in political relations 
between our two countries. 

Even with this SALT agreement, the 
competitive elements of our relations 
with the Soviet Union will remain. We 
will need a sustained and long-term 
effort to protect our interests and those 
of our friends. But this competition can 
be managed more safely and effectively 



[The SALT II treaty] unambiguously establishes that verification is a 
necessary component of arms control agreements in general and SALT 
II specifically. 



which can count on genuine public 
participation and support; our ability to 
count on allies who have joined with us 
in free association. 

The Soviet Union's ideological ap- 
peal has flagged at home and abroad. 
Its economic and political systems are 
models for none. Perhaps most remark- 
able is its political isolation, as it has 
discovered that it is difficult to trans- 
form raw military power into political 
gain. It has allies, clients, and proxies. 
But these are associations usually de- 
fined by Soviet might, not by mutual 
respect or self-interest. 

The limits on open and free Soviet 
political engagement with the commu- 
nity of nations — relationships which 
we enjoy in full measure — force the 
Soviet Union to concentrate on its 



if our two nations can and will contain 
the dangers of nuclear confrontation, 
through the agreed and reciprocal exer- 
cise of restraint. 

In pursuing mutual restraint through 
SALT, we are concerned not only 
about the Soviet Union of today but 
also about the Soviet Union of tomor- 
row. During the next several years, the 
Soviet leadership will change. We can- 
not predict the character of the new 
leaders or all the major aspects of fu- 
ture Soviet policy. But we can work 
now to insure that Soviet leaders of the 
present and the future will understand 
the policies and purposes of the United 
States — both our determination to 
protect our interests and those of our 
friends and allies and our desire to 
broaden detente and cooperation. 



May 1979 

When the next generation of Soviet 
leaders decides its policies toward 
strategic arms and toward the United 
States, we want them to face clear and 
agreed restraints on the competition in 
strategic arms. We want these to be the 
restraints of SALT II, not the milder 
restraints of the SALT 1 Interim 
Agreement. We want them to see con- 
vincing evidence that the United States 
recognizes its interests and will suc- 
cessfully defend them whatever the 
challenge. And we want them to know 
how they can join with us to further 
detente and cooperation. 

That is a vital objective of the new 
SALT agreement; helping to determine 
the way in which the Soviet Union will 
see future relations with the United 
States — setting limits now on its ac- 
tions in the strategic field and increas- 
ing the chances that limits on these 
arms can lead to more peaceful rela- 
tions. 

What is SALT? 

Our goals in SALT are the same as 
our goals in overall strategic policy: to 
promote greater stability, to reduce in- 
centives for either side to use nuclear 
force, to limit pressures to build up 
strategic arms, and to guarantee the se- 
curity of our national interests and 
those of our friends and allies. 

The SALT treaty of 1972 sharply 
limited deployment of antiballistic mis- 
sile systems on both sides. It averted a 
costly and dangerous antiballistic mis- 
sile (ABM) competition which neither 
side wanted but which both feared the 
other was about to initiate. We reached 
a comprehensive agreement with rela- 
tive ease because extensive ABM de- 
ployment had not yet begun, and 
neither side was confident that its ABM 
technology would be effective. 

The challenges involved in 
negotiating a comprehensive agreement 
on limiting strategic offensive arms 
have been far greater because both 
sides already have large deployments 
of these systems. Moreover, marked 
differences in the composition of 
Soviet and American offensive forces 
have made it extremely difficult to de- 
fine limitations that are both balanced 
and equitable. 

But we have persevered, and the ex- 
pected agreement will go far beyond 
the interim SALT agreement. It is 
much more comprehensive and better 
suited to America's strategic needs. Let 
me outline some of the major accom- 
plishments of the SALT II agreement. 

• For the first time, it sets equal 
ceilings on all major intercontinental 



strategic delivery systems, as well as 
important subcategories of MIRV'ed 
[multiple independently-targetable 
reentry vehicle] missiles. 

• It imposes an effective upper limit 
on the number of warheads that can be 
placed on each MIRVed ICBM [inter- 
continental ballistic missile]. This is 
critically important because it 
simplifies our future strategic planning 
and adds more certainty to our military 
projections. 

• The treaty limits each side to de- 
veloping and deploying one completely 
new ICBM before 1985. This provision 
will inhibit the qualitative expansion of 
the arms race, while still permitting us 
to develop an entirely new ICBM and a 
more secure basing mode for our ICBM 
force. This we need to do because im- 
provements in Soviet military capacity 
are increasing the threat to our Min- 
uteman ICBM's. The SALT treaty 
gives us the flexibility to solve this 
problem. 

SALT II goes beyond SALT I, in all 
these provisions, by setting equal ceil- 
ings for the categories of weapons it 
covers. This requirement reflects a key 
demand expressed by the Senate when 
SALT I was negotiated. This 
negotiated principle of equality will re- 
quire an actual reduction in the Soviet 
Union's intercontinental forces. They 
will have to eliminate more than 250 
systems, and the importance of this 
step should not be underestimated. It 
may well be the forerunner of more 
substantial and significant reductions 
by both sides. 

It is also important to recognize that 
the SALT II treaty runs only through 
1985. While our jong-term goal is a 
permanent treaty, the development of 
offensive weapons remains far too 
dynamic for us to make confident pre- 
dictions about the late 1980's and be- 
yond. But the SALT II treaty does 
markedly reduce our uncertainty about 
Soviet forces in the early 1980's — a 
period in which we must improve our 
own strategic forces, especially to 
allow them to survive in the face of 
potential Soviet attack. These neces- 
sary improvements on our part would 
be far more costly, and we would be 
far less confident about their success, if 
we were without the limits which 
SALT II will impose on Soviet forces. 

We have long recognized that SALT 
II would have little value if we could 
not be confident that its provisions 
were being followed by the Soviet 
Union. That is why verification was 
such an important issue in the negotia- 
tions. The treaty reflects our concerns. 
It unambiguously establishes that ver- 



49 

ification is a necessary component of 
arms control agreements in general and 
SALT II specifically. It establishes that 
national technical means of verifica- 
tion, such as satellite photography, are 
legitimate tools for insuring com- 
pliance. It prohibits both interference 
with these tools and deliberate con- 
cealment that could impede the collec- 
tion of necessary information. And the 
agreement mandates that both sides 
follow special procedures to make ver- 
ification easier. 

These important steps significantly re- 
duce the uncertainty about the threat 
each country faces. One of the major 
triggers of increased arms competition 
is uncertainty about what might exist. 
And the SALT II treaty takes a critical 
step toward reducing that uncertainty. 

It should also be underscored that the 
SALT II treaty allows us to proceed 
with the force improvements that we 
need within a structure of predictability 
and confidence. 

What SALT Is Not 

This is how the SALT II agreement 
will enhance our security and provide 
the basis for further limits on strategic 
arms in the future. But a sensible 
evaluation of the SALT II agreement 
also requires clear understanding of 
what it does not do, and what it cannot 
do. 

First, and most important, the SALT 
II treaty is not an agreement based on 
trust. It stands on its own merits based 
on common interest, expressed in hard 
bargaining and compromises. It pro- 
vides for adequate verification of es- 
sential provisions, it is backed up by 
strong U.S. capabilities to respond to 
both present and future military needs. 

Clearly, the SALT II treaty will also 
not signal the end of East- West compe- 
tition. Where our interests are 
threatened, we shall defend them. And 
where we can broaden detente and 
achieve new forms of cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, we shall seek to do 
so as well. 

SALT II is not the end of military 
competition with the Soviet Union, 
even in strategic arms. During the last 
two decades, the Soviet Union has ex- 
panded and modernized its armed 
forces in all areas. Its steadily growing 
defense budget consumes more than 
10% of Soviet GNP. As a result, we 
are confronted in many areas with 
military competition to which we must 
respond. 

The SALT II treaty will keep those 
requirements lower than they would 
otherwise be in one area — strategic 
arms — but it will not end them. The 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



most urgent problem we face is the 
growing vulnerability of our ICBM 
force. In addition, we must modernize 
and improve our theater nuclear and 
conventional forces. We can and shall 
do so, and nothing in the SALT II 
treaty prevents us from taking these 
necessary steps on our own and with 
our allies. 

No one should regard the SALT II 
treaty as a way to impose comprehen- 
sive constraints on everything that the 
Soviet Union does in its military and 
foreign policy, much less on what it 
does within its own society. In our own 
national debate about SALT, some ob- 
servers question whether we can sign 
an agreement when the Soviet Union 
continues to act against our interests in 
many areas abroad and fails to recog- 
nize basic human rights at home. They 
thus insist on linkage. 

Our position on linkage is clear. We 
believe that limitations on strategic 
arms are desirable in themselves. The 
quest for such limitations should not be 
held hostage either to other American 
or Soviet policies or to competition 
between us. We do not accept any link- 
age, for example, between closer 
U.S. -Chinese cooperation on a variety 
of issues and SALT, and we would 
strongly reject any Soviet effort to im- 
pose such a negative connection. 

By the same token, we cannot insist 
that the Soviet Union accommodate us 
in regard to matters of concern to us as 
a condition for an agreement with the 
United States on strategic limitations. 
To impose such a linkage would mean 
that no problem in the U.S. -Soviet re- 
lationship could be solved unless all 
major issues were resolved simultane- 
ously. This is not a prescription for 
policy but for paralysis. Accordingly, 
our task is to obtain a good SALT 
agreement and to meet as appropriate 
Soviet challenges where and when they 
arise. 

Criticisms and Rebuttals 

In the weeks ahead, the SALT II 
agreement will be subjected to search- 
ing discussion by the Senate and by the 
people of the United States. And that, 
in our democracy, is the way it should 
be. It is impossible to negotiate an 
agreement on anything that will please 
everyone. Critics of the SALT II treaty 
will raise a wide variety of objections. 
1 think it might help to clear the air if I 
tried to answer some of the more com- 
mon criticisms of this agreement. 

It will be maintained that the agree- 
ment does not go far enough, that the 
ceilings are too high, and that the lim- 
itations are too modest. Let me assure 
you that no one agrees more sincerely 



with this criticism than President Car- 
ter. Yet he recognizes — and we all 
need to — that the pursuit of the best 
cannot be permitted to stand in the way 
of achieving the good. The achieve- 
ments of the SALT II treaty are useful 
and real. They move the prospects for 
peace and stability far ahead of where 
they would be in the absence of this 
treaty. The road to achieving more am- 
bitious strategic arms control lies in 
approving this agreement and then 
moving ahead toward greater goals. 

There will be those who will argue 
that this agreement — despite the prin- 
ciple of equality on which its essential 
provisions are based — will impose a 



not symmetry of systems but a 
framework for equal security. 

Furthermore, much criticism of the 
SALT II treaty will focus on whether it 
can be adequately verified. We are 
fully confident that it can. We maintain 
a vast, sophisticated, and expensive 
array of means to detect and monitor 
what the Soviet Union is doing in its 
strategic programs. They are totally 
under our own control; in no way do 
they require us to simply trust Soviet 
good will. These means help us to 
overcome a major difference between 
our two countries — our open society 
versus their closed one. We are able to" 
monitor many aspects of the develop- 



We believe that limitations on strategic arms are desirable in them- 
selves. The quest for such limitations should not be held hostage either 
to other American or Soviet policies or to competition between us. 



degree of strategic inferiority on our 
nation. I believe these criticisms are 
unwarranted, alarmist, and I would like 
to explain why. 

• It will be said that the Soviet 
Union is permitted to have very heavy 
missiles, while ours are much lighter. 
Yet we have never had an interest in 
building heavier missiles ourselves, 
relying instead on our qualitative ad- 
vantages. And we have achieved in 
SALT II a truly important restriction on 
how the Soviets can exploit their heavy 
missiles by limiting the number of 
warheads each can carry. 

• It will be said that the agreement 
fails to cover the Backfire bomber, 
which could reach the United States. 
Yet. the agreement also does not con- 
strain our F-111 bombers based in 
Britain or other aircraft which could 
also be used against the Soviet Union. 

• It will he said that the agreement 
includes limits on cruise missiles which 
are more important to us than to the 
Soviet Union. Yet, we are permitted to 
mount a sizable force of air-launched 
cruise missiles without a limit on their 
range. And limits on sea-launched and 
land-launched cruise missiles will ex- 
pire well before we could deploy them. 

1 cite these examples — and there 
will be more — for a simple reason: We 
have gained or retained one or more 
advantages for ourselves for every one 
we have granted the Soviet Union. And 
where any Soviet capability truly pre- 
sents a military problem, we are free 
within the terms of the agreement to re- 
spond in appropriate ways to guarantee 
our security. This is what it means to 
have a good and equitable agreement; 



ment, testing, production, deploy- 
ment, training, and operation of Soviet 
strategic forces despite the closed na- 
ture of Soviet society and despite 
Soviet obsession with secrecy. 

To be sure, no means of verification 
can be absolutely perfect. Yet through 
our enormous efforts — harnessing the 
world's most advanced technology and 
the skills of many tens of thousands of 
our most highly trained people — we 
are confident that we can detect any 
significant violation of the SALT II 
agreement well before we would have 
to react militarily to such a violation. 
And the SALT II treaty will continue 
the Standing Consultative Commission 
in Geneva to which either we or the 
Soviets can refer any question of com- 
pliance with the treaty. 

While negotiating SALT II, it has 
been vitally important for us to protect 
the security and the interest of our 
NATO allies, as well as our own. We 
have consulted with our allies on SALT 
II at every step of the process with a 
thoroughness and intensity that has few 
precedents. 

We have assured our allies that their 
interests will be fully met by this 
treaty. The best evidence of the success 
of our continual efforts to work with 
our allies on SALT II can be seen in 
their response: strong support for this 
treaty by allied leaders, including pub- 
lic statements at Guadeloupe by Chan- 
cellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Cal- 
laghan, and President Giscard. 

We are also determined that the con- 
tinuing SALT process not divert our 
attention from the continuing challenge 
of Soviet military power or undermine 
our resolve to meet it. This resolve is 



May 1979 



51 



Linieluted to the merits of the proposed 
J agreement but rests instead on our own 
good sense and national will. 

With or without the SALT talks, 
with this agreement or any conceivable 
■ alternative, we would still face the 
tasks of judging the military challenge 
to the United States and our allies and 
of responding effectively to it. In any 
event, we would have to provide for 
the common defense in sober and 
realistic terms. And in any event we 
will do so. 

During the next several years, we 
will need to make a number of difficult 
choices about our force posture in sev- 
eral areas. We shall make these choices 
in the sober realization that the United 
States must have military strength suf- 
ficient to deter any attack on us or our 
allies to enable us to deal successfully 
with any attack and at any level — 
should an attack occur — and to defend 
our interests and those of our friends 
and allies around the world. 

The Future of SALT 

The SALT II agreement is a major 
step forward in strategic arms control. 
But it is only one step. In the future, it 
will be important for us to move 
promptly on a complex agenda of arms 
control issues, including significant re- 
ductions in strategic weapons, further 
qualitative limitations on weapons, and 
still further improvements in our ability 
to verify arms control agreements. And 
at every step of the way, we will work 
closely with our NATO allies, to insure 
that our efforts in SALT III will ad- 
vance their security as well as our own. 

We shall continue to press for more 
and better strategic arms control 
agreements. But we shall not hold our 
own needed defense programs hostage 
to the uncertain prospects of future 
arms control. Nor shall we hesitate to 
halt any defense program whose mili- 
tary requirements is effectively and 
safely removed by successful arms 
control agreements. 

Finally, as we judge the SALT II 
treaty, we must remember precisely 
what is being achieved. The SALT 
process is an effort unique in human 
history. Never before have two very 
different and powerful competing na- 
tions engaged in an effort to limit their 
freedom of action in matters vital to 
their own survival and that of mankind. 
Never before have two such nations 
recognized that greater security can 
come from mutual self-restraint in 
building their most destructive 
weapons rather than from continuing an 
unbridled competition. 

This mutual understanding is not 
based upon trust or upon ignoring our 



deep and continuing differences. 
Rather it is a recognition of the critical 
importance of reducing strategic un- 
certainties and the risks of nuclear 
crises and devastation. Our efforts in 
controlling nuclear weapons will con- 
tinue to be difficult, halting, and un- 
certain. It will require our patience, 
wisdom, and unparalleled efforts to 
make sound judgments. But I think you 
will agree that it is a noble effort to 
achieve goals that are vital to ourselves 
and to all mankind. 



SECRETARY BROWN ^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to speak with you about strategic arms 
limitations and the national defense. I 
am convinced — and I believe that the 
President and many of you agree — that 
the emerging SALT agreement with the 
Soviet Union will be the single most 
significant bilateral understanding 
reached by the two global superpowers 
during the 1970's. 

SALT has become part of the fabric 
of international relationships. It is an 
element of stability not only in military 
terms but in the worldwide political 
balance. Experience has shown that 
SALT alone cannot end the political 
competition between us and the Soviet 
Union, nor can it fulfill all our hopes 
for cooperation or all our needs for 
strategic security. But, as the Presi- 
dent's National Security Adviser 
suggested yesterday, it is necessary to 
the prudent management of both as- 
pects of our relationship. 

Because of the agreement's profound 
importance, it is essential that the pub- 
lic debate concerning its merits be not 
only thorough but also well informed. 
In speaking here today I hope to 
contribute to both of those essential 
qualities. 

Let me begin my discussion of SALT 
and the national defense by reporting to 
you on the status of the talks. Although 
we are very close to an agreement, 
there are at least two or three remaining 
major issues — especially those in- 
volving verification and limits on new 
missiles — of such importance that we 
must know that they have been re- 
solved satisfactorily before we can be 
confident a SALT II treaty can be 
achieved. Whether, and therefore 
when, agreement can be reached de- 
pends largely on the negotiation of 
these issues. The prospects, in my 
view, continue to be good. 

Under our system of government, of 
course, the final U.S. decision on 
whether or not a treaty will take effect 
will be made by the Senate. Thus, the 
formal debate over ratification will be 



conducted in the Senate and will not 
start until a treaty is signed and sub- 
mitted to that body. As a practical 
matter, however, the debate over SALT 
II has already begun and, in fact, has 
been underway for as long as or longer 
than the negotiations themselves. 
Moreover, the debate is a far-reaching 
one and has, properly, addressed our 
broader strategic policy objectives and 
programs as well as the provisions of 
the agreement itself. 

I believe the key question each of us 
must answer centers on the agreement 
itself: Will its approval make the 
United States more secure than lack, or 
rejection, of an agreement? But that 
question can be answered — and SALT 
can properly be evaluated — only in the 
context of U.S. strategic weapons 
policy and objectives, the state of the 
U.S. -Soviet balance now and as we ex- 
pect it in the future, and the programs 
that we have undertaken to implement 
our strategic policy. 



The Soviet Challenge 

Our national security derives from 
much more than our military strength. 
The military balance is only a part — 
but a vital part — of our total national 
security posture. There is no doubt that 
the Soviet military power today is 
much greater than it was in the I960's 
both in absolute terms and relative to 
our own. There has been a steady in- 
crease in Soviet military spending 
auring each of the past 15 years. Our 
current estimate is that it would cost us 
$40 billion more than we now spend 
each year on our own defense estab- 
lishment to support military forces and 
programs of the size and nature pur- 
sued by the Soviets. 

Today, the military balance between 
East and West is one of rough equiva- 
lence but with troubling trends ap- 
pearing in both strategic and tactical 
nuclear areas. It is not the current bal- 
ance but rather the momentum of 
Soviet strategic programs that is cause 
for concern. 

Despite Soviet military accom- 
plishments, the Soviet Union does not 
now enjoy a military advantage in nu- 
clear terms. It is not in a position to 
exploit its strategic weapons or embark 
on a course that may lead to the use of 
nuclear weapons without themselves 
encountering unacceptable risks. A 
strategic balance exists today because 
the deterrent forces on the two sides are 
essentially equivalent. Neither side 
could launch a first strike that would 
prevent the other side from responding 
with a retaliation of devastating pro- 
portions. Neither side can effectively 



52 



intimidate the other with its strategic 
forces. 

In the face of these circumstances of 
Soviet challenge and competition, we 
are pursuing, and need to continue, two 
complementary courses of action. 

• The first is to insure, within SALT 
constraints, that our strategic forces are 
capable of meeting our defense objec- 
tives despite the continued Soviet 
strategic buildup. The 1980 Defense 
budget and our 5 year defense program 
for 1980-84 are designed to do this. 

• The second is to seek, in a SALT 
II agreement, specific and verifiable 
provisions constraining Soviet strategic 
forces as part of the process of limiting 
further the strategic arms competition 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

U.S. Objectives 

Two concepts underlie U.S. strategic 
forces planning: deterrence and essen- 
tial equivalence. 

Deterrence of nuclear war is our 
most fundamental defense objective. A 
credible deterrent can be achieved only 
if we possess the military force neces- 
sary to persuade our enemies that, 
whatever the circumstances, if they 
start a course of action that could lead 
to war they will either: 

• Pay an unacceptable price to 
achieve their objective or 

• Be frustrated in their effort to 
achieve that objective. 

Our basic strategy requires us to be 
able to inflict such damage on a poten- 
tial adversary that regardless of the cir- 
cumstances the prospect of that damage 
will preclude his attack on the United 
States, our allies, or our vital interests. 
To achieve this we need, first of all, a 
survivable capability to devastate the 
industry and cities of the Soviet Union. 
Assured destruction capability — which 
is what I've just defined — is the bed- 
rock of nuclear deterrence. It is not, 
however, in my judgment, sufficient in 
itself as a strategic doctrine. Massive 
retaliation may not be appropriate, nor 
will its prospect always be sufficiently 
credible, to deter the full range of ac- 
tions we seek to prevent. 

We need capabilities convincingly 
able to do, and sure to carry out under 
any circumstances the Soviets consider 
realistic, whatever damage the Soviets 
consider will deter them. Put differ- 
ently, the perceptions of those whom 
we seek to deter can determine what is 
needed for deterrence in various cir- 
cumstances. For fully effective deter- 
rence, we need to be able to respond at 
the level appropriate to the type and 



scale of a Soviet attack. Fully effective 
deterrence requires forces of sufficient 
size and flexibility to attack selectively 
a range of military and other targets 
and to enable us to hold back a signifi- 
cant reserve. 

This ability to provide measured re- 
taliation in response to less-than-total 
attacks — and thus to prevent the 
Soviets from imagining that they can 
gain meaningful advantage at some 
level of nuclear conflict — is essential 
to credible deterrence. Moreover, 
whatever doubts one may have about 
whether a nuclear war could be kept 
limited — and I have severe ones — it 
would be the height of folly to put the 
United States in a position in which 
uncontrolled escalation would be the 
only course we could follow. 

By any reasonable standard, we have 
a credible deterrent today and will have 
one for the foreseeable future. We 
have, and will continue to have, sur- 
vivable forces capable of massive de- 
struction of Soviet cities and industrial 
potential, even after an all-out surprise 
attack. We also have — and will have 
increasingly in the coming years — both 
the forces and the targeting and 



Deterrence of nuclear war is our 
most fundamental defense objec- 
tive. 



employment policies that allow for 
selective use of nuclear force to re- 
spond to more limited provocations. 
The rapid Soviet buildup in strategic 
forces over the past decade, as com- 
pared to our own more modestly paced 
improvements in forces, should not 
obscure the basic power and credibility 
of our deterrent. 

Moreover, the problems we face — in 
particular the growing vulnerability of 
our fixed silo ICBM's — will not force 
us to choose between all-out attacks on 
cities, on the one hand, and surrender, 
on the other. Our capacity to make 
selective strikes at military and other 
targets, while maintaining reserve, is 
large now and will grow in the future, 
despite ICBM vulnerability. 

Essential equivalence, our second 
broad objective, is somewhat different 
from credible deterrence. It is one pos- 
sible criterion for such deterrence, par- 
ticularly if we want our nuclear forces 
to have an effect that goes beyond de- 
terrence of an all-out strategic surprise 
attack. The use of essential equivalence 
as an objective reflects the reality that 
nuclear forces — like other military 



Department of State Bulletin 

I 

forces — have a broader political role ,. 
not entirely determined by technical, ] 
static (force-counting), or even 
dynamic (war-gaming) calculations of 
military capability. 

As long as our relationship with the 
Soviet Union is more competitive than 
cooperative — and this is clearly the 
case in military terms — maintaining es- 
sential equivalence of strategic nuclear 
forces is necessary to prevent the 
Soviets from gaining political advan- 
tage from a real or perceived strategic 
imbalance. 

Essential equivalence thus demands^ 
that our forces not only be on a par 
with those of the Soviet Union but be 
seen to be so. We need not — we should 
not — imitate Soviet forces in an inevi- 
tably futile, immensely costly, and po- 
tentially very dangerous effort to match 
or exceed the Soviets in every conceiv- 
able index of strategic power. To say, 
however, we can tolerate some "gaps" 
that are offset by U.S. advantages by 
other measures is not to say we can tol- 
erate an overall imbalance whether per- 
ceived or real. 

Today, essential equivalence exists. 
While the Soviets have certain advan- 
tages, such as ICBM throw-weight and 
deliverable megatonnage, we now have 
offsetting advantages in numbers of 
warheads, accuracy, and antisubmarine 
warfare capability. Most importantly, 
while no one can assuredly predict the 
outcome of any nuclear exchange, 
neither we nor the Soviets would gain 
in any rational sense from such a 
conflict. 

It's worth considering, for a mo- 
ment, whether these objectives are am- 
bitious enough. 

• Ought we to be satisfied with 
equivalence and with preventing Soviet 
actions by deterrence? 

• Ought we instead to seek to exploit 
our resources and our technology to 
attain strategic superiority? 

In the first place, massive numerical 
superiority in strategic forces, even 
when we had it in the 1950's and 
1960's. proved to be no panacea for 
our military needs and still less for our 
diplomatic problems. We and our allies 
required strong conventional forces for 
our security. 

The potential futility of any quest for 
superiority derives, I believe, from the 
realities of nuclear weaponry and bilat- 
eral superpower relations. Modern 
nuclear-weapons technology is such 
that while equivalence is a realistic 
goal, superiority is not, providing that 
the other side is determined to prevent 
it. Each superpower can, by actions 
that are well within its technical and 
economic capability, prevent the other 



May 1979 



53 



from gaining an overall advantage, 
much less supremacy. 

The system is not self-equilibrating; 
neither equivalence nor even deterrence 
will be maintained automatically. 
Avoiding inferiority requires us to have 
the will and resolve to do the things 
that will enable us to maintain the 
strategic balance. For, if the Soviets 
ever were to achieve superiority, I am 
convinced they would make every ef- 
fort to exploit it politically and even 
militarily. I am confident that we will 
continue to show the will and resolve 
to prevent the Soviets from attaining 
superiority. But I think it would be 
equally wrong to suppose that the 
Soviets, challenged to a race for 
superiority, would passively yield such 
an advantage to us. 

In brief, equivalence and deterrence 
are at one and the same time our 
maximum feasible, and our minimum 
tolerable, objectives. And at present 
our forces meet those objectives. 

But if the present balance is adequate 
in terms of our objectives of deterrence 
and equivalence, we face challenges 
for the future that we can ignore only at 
great peril. If today we are in a satis- 
factory relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union, what of tomorrow; less rhetori- 
cally, what will the strategic balance be 
like during the planning horizons we 
can reasonably contemplate? 

Some trends are of real concern. The 
Soviets are rapidly catching up to us in 
a number of key areas where we have 
led in the past, especially in the areas 
of accuracy and reentry vehicle num- 
bers. Additionally, the improvements 
of the Soviets have made in long-range 
theater nuclear forces may be of great 
significance as the central balance be- 
comes more equal. Further, the grow- 
ing vulnerability of our land-based 
missile force in the early 1980's could, 
if not corrected, contribute to a per- 
ception of the U.S. strategic inferiority 
that would have severely adverse 
political, and could have potentially 
destabilizing military, consequences. 

In reviewing the challenges the 
Soviets are posing in the strategic area, 
we should remember that the United 
States has not been idle. In the past 10 
years, we have deployed more than 
1,000 MIRV'ed missiles, thereby in- 
creasing our missile warhead total 
nearly fourfold. SRAM (the short- 
range attack missile) has increased the 
capability of the B-52 force. Further, 
we have programs to improve each of 
the three elements of the U.S. triad of 
strategic forces. 

• This year we will begin to put new 
Trident C-4 missile in our submarine 
fleet. In addition, the first new Trident 



submarine will be on patrol in late 
1981, will be quieter — and thus less 
detectable acoustically — and will be 
capable of longer on-station times. We 
are also beginning work on a substan- 
tially improved Trident II submarine- 
launched missile. 

• Our cruise missile programs will 
greatly enhance the effectiveness of the 
bomber leg of the triad. B-52 aircraft 
capable of penetrating Soviet air de- 
fenses will continue to contribute to the 
viability of the manned bomber leg of 
the triad into the late I980's. We are 
working on bomber and cruise missile 
technology for the longer term. 

• We are improving the accuracy 
and yield of the Minuteman forces. We 
are pursuing and will choose from 
among a number of options for more 



as leader of the Atlantic alliance and 
the political damage that would be 
done to our status among allies and 
friends if the United States were seen 
to be neglecting, or even rejecting, 
strategic arms limitations. The SALT 
process itself is important to the further 
development of U.S. -Soviet and over- 
all East-West relations. SALT is the 
foundation for progress in establishing 
an enduring political relationship with 
the Soviets that reduces tensions and 
sets important visible boundaries to our 
ideological and political and military 
competition. 

The basic elements of the SALT II 
agreement are familiar to you. 

A treaty, to last until 1986, that 
will: 



[SALT II] enhances the stability of the deterrent and allows us the 
flexibility to embark on needed modernization of our strategic forces 
without triggering another expensive and potentially destabilizing arms 
race. 



survivable, mobile, basing of part of 
the ICBM force to deal with the vul- 
nerability problem. The M-X missile 
for this purpose is funded for en- 
gineering development in the fiscal 
year beginning this October. 

To summarize the current situation, 
despite Soviet military accom- 
plishments, neither the Soviet Union 
nor the United States has a clear mili- 
tary advantage, and we intend to keep 
it that way. Our programs are sufficient 
for the purpose if we receive the sup- 
port of Congress in providing the funds 
to carry them out. 



The Role of Arms Control 

Strategic arms control provides one 
important way in which we can limit 
the military challenges we face. It is, 
therefore, an integral part of our over- 
all efforts to meet our national security 
objectives. Thus, the SALT II agree- 
ments should be judged by the Con- 
gress and the American public first of 
all in terms of their contribution to our 
security and that of our allies. And it is 
in terms of this criterion that 1 will set 
forth the bulk of my evaluation of the 
agreement for you today. 

We should recognize, however, that 
in addition to the more specific military 
security issue, the merits of SALT and 
the SALT process must also be judged 
in a broader political context. That 
broader context has to do with our role 



• Set equal limits on strategic nu- 
clear vehicles; 

• Establish various sublimits on 
MIRV'ed systems (that is, ballistic 
missile systems carrying multiple 
warheads that can target more than one 
aim point) and heavy bombers carrying 
air-launched cruise missiles; 

• Limit each side to one new ICBM 
type with a maximum of 10 reentry 
vehicles; 

• Bar increases in number of reentry 
vehicles on existing ICBM's; and 

• Provide measures to permit unim- 
peded verification by national technical 
means. 



A protocol, to last about 3 years, 
that will: 

• Bar deployment of ground- 
launched and ship-launched cruise mis- 
siles with ranges greater than 600 km. 
during that period, while permitting 
unimpeded testing and development of 
such vehicles of any range; 

• Bar deployment of mobile ICBM's 
or air-to-surface ballistic missiles dur- 
ing that period; and 

• Permit the deployment of these 
systems after the protocol expires. 



The agreement also includes: 

• A statement of principles to guide 
SALT III and 

• An exchange of statements on the 
Soviet Backfire bomber. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



SALT II is, I firmly believe, a sig- 
nificant and most useful step in what 
we hope will be a continuing process. 

The 1972 SALT I agreement con- 
tributed greatly to stability. It did so by 
banning nationwide ABM defenses and 
by capping the buildup of strategic of- 
fensive arms through limiting missile 
launcher numbers to those existing or 
under construction in 1970. The Vla- 
divostok agreement of 1974 set equal 
aggregates of all strategic nuclear de- 
livery systems at 2,400 and set a sub- 
limit of MlRV'ed systems of 1,320. 

In 1977, at the beginning of this 
Administration, we attempted to 
achieve a comprehensive arms control 
agreement that would have been sub- 
stantially more restrictive than the Vla- 
divostok agreement — or the SALT II 
treaty — but a number of technological 
and political factors prevented success. 
We, therefore, took the dual track of 
trying to negotiate the largest possible 
reductions to the interim ceilings while 
making a serious attempt to limit qual- 
itative improvements in new systems. 
We have achieved real success in both 
areas. 

We have been able to negotiate re- 
ductions in the Vladivostok limits — 
to 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles and 1,200 MlRVed mis- 
siles — as well as to impose a new 
sublimit of 820 on land-based 
MIRVed ICBM's, the most de- 
stabilizing strategic force element. In 
addition, we have broken significant 
new ground in the qualitative area by 
limits on numbers of reentry vehicles 
on each type of ICBM (and sea- 
launched ballistic missile) and by al- 
lowing each side only one new type of 
ICBM. Taken together, these two 
tracks have resulted in a significant 
step forward in the arms control proc- 
ess. 

The prospect of continuing the proc- 
ess is a major intangible at stake in the 
debate. But the SALT II agreement 
need not be defended merely as a 
way station to SALT III and beyond. It 
can be fully and convincingly justified 
on its own merits. 

The simplest way is to observe that, 
without the SALT II agreement, the 
Soviet Union could have nearly one- 
third more strategic systems than with 
the agreement. And there would be 
corresponding effects on other meas- 
ures. For example, instead of the 2,250 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of 
the treaty, they could have 3.000. Nat- 
urally, we do not know what the 
Soviets would do in the absence of a 
treaty, but these higher strategic system 
levels are well within their capability. 
And the history of the nuclear era is 
strewn with the wreckage of confident 
U.S. predictions that the Soviets would 



at some point or another cease to add to 
force levels that were already, accord- 
ing to the U.S. predictors, as large as 
the Kremlin could possibly want. In my 
view, it is probable that without SALT 
II we would enter into an era of greater 
uncertainty, in both military and politi- 
cal terms, that would result in in- 
creased strategic forces on both sides 
as hedges against that uncertainty. 

Faced with such a Soviet buildup, 
the United States could and, I am con- 
fident would, respond. Given our de- 
termination to maintain essential 
equivalence, and the demonstrated 
Soviet willingness to avoid strategic 
inferiority even at great cost, the net 
result of such a numbers race would be 
greater strategic force levels at vastly 
greater expense and at substantial risk 
to stability. 

The United States does not have un- 
limited resources to spend on strategic 
weapons programs without signifi- 
cantly affecting other defense 
priorities — such as improvements in 
conventional forces — and other gov- 
ernment programs, such as those re- 
quired to combat inflation. But we do 
need to spend enough, and what is 
enough depends in part on the actions 
of our adversaries. 

SALT will not solve all our prob- 
lems. Even with SALT we will need, 
and we will be permitted, to expand 
our strategic nuclear efforts above their 
present levels. Those levels, inci- 
dentally, are about half, in constant dol- 
lar terms, what they were during the 
mid-1960"s. But SALT will mean 
greater stability and predictability in 
the strategic challenges we face, and so 
the balance could be maintained at a 
substantially lower level of destructive 
power. Furthermore, with SALT, it 
would be significantly less expensive 
(perhaps as much as $30 billion less 
expensive over the next decade) for the 
United States to maintain that balance 
than without a SALT II agreement. 

SALT II, while forestalling this 
pointless numbers race, will leave us 
the flexibility to carry out programs to 
deal with the challenges the treaty will 
not eliminate. We can develop, test, 
and deploy each of our planned 
programs — cruise missiles. Trident, 
M-X — in the fashion and on the 
schedule that we have planned. Apart 
from putting some distinguishing fea- 
tures on our air-launched cruise mis- 
siles and cruise missile carriers (to aid 
counting under SALT), we will not be 
forced by SALT II to alter our strategic 
programs, which we need to balance 
Soviet programs that are allowed in 
SALT II and that are, in large measure, 
already in place. 

In at least one important respect — 
Minuteman vulnerability — SALT II 



will make the solution of a problem 
easier than without an agreement, i 
SALT II will limit to well below pre- 
viously projected levels the number of 
Soviet MIRVed ICBM's, will freeze 
the number of warheads on existing 
ballistic missile launchers, and will 
limit the number of reentry vehicles 
allowed for new ICBM's. These re- 
strictions sharply reduce the signifi- 
cance of the Soviet throw-weight ad- 
vantage, which without limitation 
would, for example, enable them to 
deploy 20 or perhaps even 40 warheads 
on their largest ICBM's. 

The combination of limitations on 
missile launchers and numbers of 
warheads will ease somewhat the diffi- 
culty of maintaining the survivability 
of our land-based ICBM's. The de- 
ployment of a new mobile ICBM sys- 
tem, regardless of basing mode, will be 
more feasible because an upper bound 
will be placed on the number of 
warheads that can be targeted against 
the aim points represented by that de- 
ployment. SALT II becomes, then, an 
important element in insuring ICBM 
survivability. 

Equally important. SALT II will 
leave us free to pursue with our allies 
the important issues of modernization 
of NATO's tactical nuclear forces and 
to consider arms control initiatives in 
this area. 

SALT will serve U.S. interests. It 
enhances the stability of the deterrent 
and allows us the flexibility to embark 
on needed modernization of our 
strategic forces without triggering 
another expensive and potentially de- 
stabilizing arms race. I do not doubt 
our economic or technical ability to 
compete successfully with the Soviets 
in strategic weapons. I do question 
whether such an effort is the best use of 
our national — or even Defense — 
budget. And I do not believe that we 
would purchase increased security with 
that sort of effort. 

Under the treaty, we can maintain 
flexible and credible deterrence and as- 
sure essential equivalence. Without the 
treaty, we could also do these things, 
but it would be more costly and less 
certain. I see the treaty as a valuable 
method of meeting our strategic 
goals — as a major component in our 
strategy along with our weapons pro- 
grams. In my judgment, it is a very 
important component, although we 
must recognize that it will have to be 
accompanied by substantial U.S. de- 
fense programs — expanded ones in the 
strategic field. 

Verification 

Among the concerns expressed about 
the agreement one is undoubtedly in a 



May 1979 



55 



MIDDLE EA!$T: U.S. Support for the 
EgyptiaU'israeU Peace Treaty 



Statements by Secretary Vance and 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on April II. 1979.^ 



SECRETARY VANCE^ 

I appreciate the opportunity this 
morning to discuss with the committee 
obligations undertaken by the United 
States in connection with the Treaty of 
Peace Between Egypt and Israel signed 
on March 26 (see p. 1 ). 

Together with our Egyptian and Is- 
raeli colleagues, we have traveled a 
long and at times very difficult road 
during these last 16 months. That jour- 
ney, however, has been rewarded by 
the conclusion of an agreement which 
represents a watershed in the region. 
The Middle East has been changed for 
the better, and the world has moved a 
step closer to peace. 

Less than 6 years ago, the armies of 
Egypt and Israel met in the Sinai Des- 
ert in bloody conflict. It was the fourth 



time in less than three decades that 
those two nations had engaged in a de- 
structive and costly war. 

Soon, at a site near the battlegrounds 
of the past, these two nations will ex- 
change the instruments of peace. The 
era of bloodshed is over. A new era of 
peaceful cooperation can lie ahead. 

It should be noted that the process 
leading to this event did not begin with 
this Administration. The negotiations 
and agreements concluded in the wake 
of the 1973 war laid the groundwork 
for further progress — the disengage- 
ment agreement of January 1974 and 
the Sinai II agreement completed in 
September of 1975. 

The members of this committee are 
already familiar with the main provi- 
sions of the treaty. Let me simply note 
that the treaty applies the essential 
equation of Security Council Resolu- 
tion 242 to the Sinai Peninsula — Israeli 
withdrawal from territory occupied 
during the 1967 war and, on the part of 
Egypt, acknowledgment of Israeli 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and 



political independence, and Israel's 
right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized borders. The validity and 
value of Resolution 242 have been 
borne out by the success of the negoti- 
ations between Israel and Egypt. It 
continues to be the agreed basis for 
those remaining negotiations necessary 
to conclude a comprehensive peace in 
the Middle East. 

Assistance Package 

My particular purpose today is to 
concentrate on agreements reached 
which will require or could involve 
congressional action. Let me turn to the 
financial undertakings by the United 
States associated with the peace proc- 
ess. All of these undertakings were 
agreed subject to appropriate congres- 
sional action. 

In evaluating these requirements, it 
is essential to keep in mind the far 
greater potential cost of failing to make 
progress toward peace in the Middle 
East. Four wars in that region have cost 



class by itself: "Will it be verifiable?" 
Clearly the limits of an agreement with 
the U.S.SR. cannot be treated as self- 
enforcing. The United States must be 
able to verify with adequate confi- 
dence, by its own intelligence systems, 
the fact that the Soviets are complying 
with the agreement. 

The SALT II agreement will be ver- 
ified by national technical means, in- 
cluding photo reconnaissance satellites 
and other technical measures. These 
means enable us to monitor many as- 
pects of the development, testing, 
production, deployment, training, and 
operation of Soviet forces. Despite the 
closed nature of Soviet society, we are 
confident that no significant violation 
of the treaty could take place without 
the United States detecting it. Because 
of our vigorous deployment and 
research-and-development efforts, we 
would be able to respond with appro- 
priate actions before any serious ad- 
verse impact on the strategic balance 
could take place. 

Much has recently been written 
about the loss of the intelligence sites 
in Iran and how important these sites 
were to have been to SALT verifica- 
tion. Intelligence of the kind obtained 
from these sites is important to our as- 
sessment of Soviet strategic forces pro- 



grams, including some of the aspects 
limited by SALT II. We are examining 
alternative means of collection, and the 
question is not if we will reinstitute this 
capability, but how, where, and how 
quickly we can do it. This and other 
verification matters will of course be 
discussed at length during the ratifica- 
tion process. 

We are now well into a national de- 
bate, not only on the treaty but on our 
strategic policy and on the overall state 
of U.S. -Soviet relations. In the course 
of that debate, I would hope that those 
who consider themselves thoughtful 
proponents of military security and 
those who consider themselves 
thoughtful proponents of arms limita- 
tion, as well as those — among whom I 
number myself — who are concerned 
with both, can focus on the specific 
issue of whether our security, and with 
it the prospects of peace, will be better 
served with the treaty than without. 

The President of the United States 
and I think the answer is clear. A sound 
SALT agreement is in the interest of 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union despite the competition between 
our two systems that exists 
elsewhere — and indeed will continue 
with respect to strategic nuclear forces. 
SALT II will provide a firmer founda- 



tion for other measures to control the 
growth and proliferation of nuclear and 
conventional capabilities throughout 
the world. Indeed, if the Soviet Union 
will emphasize cooperation rather than 
competition, SALT II will allow a 
healthier state of U.S. -Soviet relations. 
All these considerations have led me 
to conclude that assuming the remain- 
ing issues can be resolved to our satis- 
faction, signature and ratification of 
SALT II are clearly in the national 
interest of the United States. In my 
own mind, I am satisfied with that con- 
clusion, but I acknowledge that reason- 
able people of good will and high pur- 
pose may come to a different judgment. 
I hope that the coming debate will 
strengthen our understanding, 
strengthen our resolve to sign and ap- 
prove the treaty, and in so doing lead 
to a strengthening of our national se- 
curity. Indeed, I am confident that will 
be the result, and that it will be a good 
one for all of us. D 



'Text from White House press release of 
Apr. 4, 1979. 

^For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 1979, 
p. 21. 

'Text from Department of Defense news re- 
lease No. 153-79 of Apr. 5, 1979. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



the U.S. taxpayers several tens of bil- 
lions of dollars in direct costs alone. 
The cost of peace is modest when com- 
pared with the cost of further war. 

I want to stress three general points 
about the aid package for Egypt and 
Israel we are seeking as an addition to 
the present basic programs for both 
countries. 

First, the proposed FY 1979 sup- 
plemental assistance is a coherent in- 
terrelated package which requires 
urgent congressional action It is a 
careful balance between foreign policy 
and budgetary requirements. 

Second, the funds requested are to 
be available to finance programs over a 
3-year period. 

Third, the impact on our budget is 
considerably lower than the overall 
amount of money that will be generated 
for the program. This is because our 
foreign military sales loans will be 
provided by the Federal Financing 
Bank, guaranteed by the U.S. Govern- 
ment. Accordingly, Congress is being 
asked to authorize and appropriate 
$1.47 billion over 3 years in order to 
finance programs with a total value of 
$4.8 billion. 

Secretary Brown will speak in 
greater detail about our military assist- 
ance requests. Let me make a few gen- 
eral observations about the package as 
a whole. 

• The bulk of the additional assist- 
ance for Israel and Egypt is to help 
them meet urgent security require- 
ments. This totals about $4.5 billion 
over 3 years — approximately $3 billion 
for Israel and $1.5 billion for Egypt. 
Of the amount for Israel, about $800 
million will be in the form of grant aid 
to help finance the construction of two 
airfields which will be moved from the 
Sinai to the Negev. This assistance will 
enable Israel to withdraw in the 3 years 
agreed under the treaty in a manner 
consistent with its security require- 
ments. The remaining sum for Israel 
and the entire military program for 
Egypt are in the form of foreign mili- 
tary sales financing, to be provided on 
favorable terms. 

• The military program for Israel 
will help defray the costs of withdraw- 
ing forces from the Sinai and relocating 
them in the Negev. The Government of 
Israel estimates that the direct costs of 
withdrawal will be between $4 and $5 
billion. This program will also enable 
Israel to continue modernizing its 
military establishment in light of con- 
tinuing security threats in the area. For 
Egypt the $1.5 billion military program 
will help Egypt to replace obsolete 
military equipment. 

• In addition to the security assist- 



ance 1 have outlined, we envision $300 
million more in economic assistance 
for Egypt over 3 years to help President 
Sadat address the real human needs of 
his people and so that peace can be 
translated into a better life for the 
people of that nation. 

We have also urged our friends and 
allies to contribute economic assistance 
in support of peace between Egypt and 
Israel. 

It is fair to ask why there should be 
such a price for peace. At the very 
least, why is the United States 

The cost of peace is modest when 
compared with the cost of further 
war. 



supplying additional military equip- 
ment to countries who have just con- 
cluded peace with one another? 

The answer to both those questions 
derives from the fact that in concluding 
this treaty, both Egypt and Israel are 
taking a step into the unknown. The 
unknown in an area as volatile as the 
Middle East carries its own risks. In 
order for both governments to lead 
their people through these uncharted 
waters, they must be confident that 
they can deal effectively with threats to 
their continued security. 

In addition, as President Carter said, 
both Egypt and Israel face immediate 
economic problems as they enter the 
post-treaty era. The financial cost to 
Israel of withdrawal from the Sinai will 
be substantial. For its part, the Egyp- 
tian Government has an urgent and 
critical need to demonstrate to its 
people the economic benefits of peace. 
We will work to accelerate implemen- 
tation of our current programs; the pro- 
posed additional assistance will provide 
funds to move quickly to meet these 
new requirements. 

Memorandum of Agreement 

I believe the benefits of peace to 
both parties are such that each will 
make every effort to assure that the 
treaty is implemented fully and in good 
faith. Nevertheless, we cannot expect 
that distrust built up over decades will 
dissipate overnight. The evolution of 
completely normal relations will be a 
gradual one. We, therefore, undertook 
to offer to the parties a buffer against 
potential and unforeseen problems in 
implementing their treaty by assuring 
them that we would remain a full part- 
ner in the implementation process just 
as we had been during the negotiating 
phase. 



The result is the memorandum of! 
agreement between the United States ' 
and Israel, about which 1 would like to 
make several comments [see p. 60]. The 
Government of Egypt declined our 
offer of a comparable agreement. 

First, the purpose of this memoran- 
dum is to define certain roles that the 
United States intends to play should 
questions arise concerning the im- 
plementation or interpretation of the 
treaty. 

There is no hidden purpose or hidden 
meaning to this memorandum. It can- 
not be construed as representing a 
mutual security pact with Israel even 
though its existence provides Israel 
with significant psychological reassur- 
ance as it enters into this new relation- 
ship with Egypt. The United States has 
agreed to consult with Israel if we are 
satisfied that the treaty has been vio- 
lated or that a violation is threatened. 
However, the determination of whether 
or not such a situation exists which 
might call for further action is left to 
the discretion of the United States. 
Similarly, what would constitute an 
appropriate action to take if such is 
deemed desirable is also left to the dis- 
cretion of the United States. 

Second, let me call your attention to 
the initial operative paragraph of the 
memorandum. The intent and effect of 
that paragraph are to make all of the 
commitments undertaken in the mem- 
orandum subject to our laws and con- 
stitutional processes. 

As a matter of course, we would en- 
vision prompt consultations with the 
Congress if and when the government 
perceived the need to become involved 
in resolving any significant problem 
under the memorandum. 

Third, let me call your attention to 
paragraph 8 of the memorandum which 
refers to assurances given Israel in 
connection with the Sinai II agreement 
in September of 1975. The sole pur- 
pose of this paragraph is to state that, 
with the exception of those prior assur- 
ances specifically enumerated in para- 
graph 8, existing assurances are not 
altered by the conclusion of the Treaty 
of Peace Between Egypt and Israel. 



Oil Supply Agreement 

In the context of the peace treaty, the 
United States has also revised and ex- 
tended the 5-year emergency oil supply 
commitment arising from Sinai II to a 
total of 15 years. As with the prior 
commitment, Israel would turn to the 
United States only if Israel could not 
make independent arrangements to 
meet its own domestic consumption re- 



May 1979 

iquirements through normal procedures. 
' Assured long-term oil supplies are 
crucial to Israel's security. Oil supply 
commitments were an integral part of 
the negotiating process. Viewed in that 
light, we believe this commitment by 
the United States is worth the small 
ootential added responsibility that may 
be assumed. 

Under the new agreement Israel will 
pay for any oil which might be pro- 
vided from the United States at rates 
comparable to world market prices at 
the time of transfer. Israel would reim- 
burse the United States for costs in- 
curred by us in providing oil from 
Iwhatever source. 

Our undertaking provides for conclu- 
Ision of a memorandum of agreement 
between the United States and Israel 
within 60 days after exchange of in- 
struments of ratification of the treaty. 
This memorandum will deal with the 
specific details of the arrangement. Is- 
raeli and U.S. negotiating delegations 
met here in Washington yesterday to 
begin that task. Once detailed agree- 
iment is reached, we will review it 
against existing legislative authority 
and promptly seek from the Congress 
any new authority necessary for its full 
implementation. 

I want to emphasize three points in 
connection with this oil supply ar- 
rangement. 

• Both sides recognize that this un- 
dertaking is a legal commitment on the 
United States, subject to the necessary 
legislative authority. 

• Relatively small amounts of 
American produced oil are likely to be 
involved. The Israelis have not had to 
call on our commitment since 1975, 
and we are confident they will do ev- 
erything possible to avoid that situation 
in the future. If Israel requested U.S. 
assistance, however, we would first 
help with the procurement of oil from 
abroad and turn to our own production 
only as a last resort. 

• Even should Israel at some point 
turn to us for its full oil requirements, 
it would require an amount equal to 
less than 1% of our consumption — 
hardly noticeable to us. 



Future of the Peace Process 

Let me say a few words about the 
future of the Middle East peace process 
and the U.S. role. The peace and sta- 
bility we seek can only be achieved ul- 
timately by making this treaty the cor- 
nerstone of peace between Israel and 
all its neighbors. For the United States, 
no less than for the parties in the region 
directly involved, continued progress 
toward such a comprehensive peace is 



essential. It is for this reason that we 
intend to remain a full partner in the 
negotiations. 

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty has ful- 
filled one of the two framework agree- 
ments worked out at Camp David.'' At 
that same time, the Governments of 
Egypt and Israel also committed them- 
selves to principles and procedures for 
a series of negotiations leading to 
peace between Israel and each of its 
Arab neighbors. The achievement of 
that peace depends on success in each 
negotiation, and each new negotiation 
builds on what has occurred. 

In addition to the Peace Treaty, 
Prime Minister Begin and President 
Sadat signed a second document on 
March 26. In a joint letter addressed to 
President Carter, they pledged to 
begin, within 1 month after the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification, 
negotiations to implement the process 
agreed upon at Camp David whose ul- 
timate objective, in the words of the 
Camp David framework agreement, is 
". . .the resolution of the Palestinian 
problem m all its aspects." 

That process will start with negotia- 
tions on the establishment of the self- 
governing authority in the West Bank 
and Gaza in order to provide full au- 
tonomy to the inhabitants. These 
negotiations will begin in the Middle 
East about 1 month from now with full 
American participation. The Egyp- 
tian-Israeli treaty has permitted us, for 



57 



ing those negotiations within 1 year so 
that elections will be held as expedi- 
tiously as possible after agreement 
between the parties has been reached. 
Their goal is to reach agreement on 
arrangements for electing a self- 
governing authority in the West Bank 
and Gaza and on the powers and re- 
sponsibilities of that body. 

Successful conclusion of the next 
phase of negotiations would thus bring 
into being a self-governing authority in 
the West Bank and Gaza for a 5-year 
transitional period during which 
negotiations will take place to deter- 
mine the final status of these areas. 
These negotiations provide a 
means — indeed the only practical 
means now available — by which 
Palestinians can participate in deter- 
mining their own future. They will be 
able to participate throughout the proc- 
ess, from the establishment of the 
self-governing authority to the final 
resolution of the status of the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

I also want to reiterate that in all fu- 
ture negotiations, as it has in the past, 
the United States will remain attentive 
to what we firmly believe is an essen- 
tial ingredient for long-term regional 
stability in the Middle East — the secu- 
rity of Israel. 

No one should underestimate the 
difficulty of the challenges that remain 
before a comprehensive peace in the 
Middle East becomes a reality. But 



The peace and stability we seek can only be achieved ultimately by 
making this treaty the cornerstone of peace between Israel and all its 
neighbors. 



the first time in more than three dec- 
ades of conflict, to turn attention to the 
practical solution of a central issue of 
that conflict — the Palestinian issue. 

It is evident that the issues involved 
in the Palestinian question are far too 
complex to be dealt with all at once. 
Because of this, we have long felt that 
the only realistic approach is to estab- 
lish a transitional period during which 
the decisions that need to be made can 
be dealt with in a logical sequence. 
That approach was agreed to by Egypt 
and Israel at Camp David, and they 
have invited other parties to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to support it and 
to join the negotiations. 

In their joint letter to President Car- 
ter accompanying the treaty. President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have 
agreed to negotiate continuously, and 
in good faith, with a goal of complet- 



those challenges must be met. And the 
United States must remain actively in- 
volved in the peace process because the 
alternatives pose far greater dangers to 
stability in the region, to the interests 
of the United States, and to world 
peace. 

We will continue this process re- 
gardless of the impediments we may 
face. We invite others involved in the 
conflict to join us and urge all nations 
concerned with peace to support our 
effort. We see no workable alternative 
to the process which is now moving 
ahead. The problems remaining are too 
complicated and too sensitive to be 
solved all at once. But with each prob- 
lem resolved, it becomes all the more 
possible to resolve the next — with each 
act of trust, the next act requiring even 
greater trust becomes more possible. In 
the end, the overall solution can 



58 

emerge, as we put in place the firm 
building blocks on which a comprehen- 
sive peace can stand. 

For the first time, in the Treaty of 
Peace Between Egypt and Israel, a 
practical beginning has been made to- 
ward a just and lasting peace in this 
troubled region, and a realistic oppor- 
tunity exists to complete the task. We 
are committed to help make this treaty 
the foundation for a wider and greater 
peace. In this endeavor, we solicit the 
counsel of this committee and of any 
party in the Middle East who will share 
with us our commitment to a com- 
prehensive peace. 



SECRETARY BROWN 

It is a privilege to appear before you 
today in support of President Carter's 
proposed legislation to strengthen Mid- 
dle East peace. 

I think that we as a nation should 
take considerable pride in the major 
role played by the United States in 
facilitating the signing of the Peace 
Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Cer- 
tainly, great credit is due to President 
Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and 
President Carter — and to my friend and 
colleague, the Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance. 

The treaty brings to an end 30 years 
of war that has cost Egypt and Israel so 
much in lives, in material substance, 
and in effort. The United States, also, 
has spent a great deal of money on this 
war. Now we propose to spend a 
smaller amount on peace. 

The treaty does more than serve the 
interests of Egypt and Israel; it is in- 
tended to be the cornerstone of a com- 
prehensive, just, long-term peace with 
resulting stability for the entire region. 
It is in the security interest of the 
United States that the region evolve 
into a peaceful and stable one. Our oil 
access, for example, would again be 
seriously threatened by regional con- 
flict; indeed, the only major oil inter- 
ruption we have experienced occurred 
in the context of the 1973 Middle East 
war. Resolution of the Arab-Israel 
conflict, which began with the Camp 
David accords and continues with this 
Peace Treaty, is a vital factor in the 
protection of American interests. 

The signing of the treaty is but the 
first step toward a durable peace be- 
tween the two states and the achieve- 
ment of a comprehensive settlement in 
this troubled part of the world. Further 
steps are needed. One factor in this 
equation is regional security. 

The United States seeks a region 
with strong friendly states, able to de- 
fend themselves from external aggres- 



sion. Strong states are best able to as- 
sure their territorial integrity without 
requiring direct U.S. involvement. 
Without this defensive ability, any 
state is much more vulnerable and 
subject to external, destabilizing influ- 
ences. This legislation, reflecting the 
President's agreement to continue to 
help Israel and to begin to help Egypt 
in the modernization of their armed 
forces, will make a vital contribution to 
the defense posture of both countries, 
and, hence, to peace in the entire re- 
gion. 

Let me briefly review the legislative 
package the Administration has pro- 
posed for congressional consideration. 
This assistance will be in the form of 
$800 million in grant aid for two Israeli 
airbases, $2.2 billion in foreign mili- 
tary sales (FMS) credits for Israel, $1.5 
billion in FMS credits for Egypt, and 
$300 million in economic aid for 
Egypt. The complete package will ex- 
tend some $1.1 billion of grants and 
$3.7 billion in loans to Israel and Egypt 
and will require an appropriation of 
$1.47 billion and a total program au- 
thorization of $4.8 billion. The budg- 
etary contribution of the United States 
to this Peace Treaty is thus $1.47 bil- 
lion, rather than the $4.8 billion in 
total assistance that has sometimes 
been taken to be the cost to the United 
States. 

I would now like to turn to the prin- 
cipal security issues involved. 

Israel 

Israel rightly needs to be certain of 
its security during and after withdrawal 
from the Sinai. This matter of security 
was an important element in the 
negotiations. The United States agrees 
that a continuing strong Israeli defense 
capability is essential. The legislation 
we are proposing, and the other agree- 
ments we have made, help to assure 
such a capability by facilitating the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces into new 
bases within the Negev and by con- 
tinuing the modernization of Israeli 
defense forces. 

Israel presently maintains a large 
portion of its active military force 
structure in the Sinai. In accordance 
with the Peace Treaty, within 3 years, 
"Israel will withdraw all its armed 
forces . . . behind the international 
boundary . . . and Egypt will resume 
the exercise of its full sovereignty over 
the Sinai." Relocation of Israeli forces 
now in the Sinai has implications for 
Israeli security in three specific areas: 
airbase requirements, ground forces re- 
deployments, and early-warning de- 
mands. 

Airbases. Israel now has four air- 



Department of State BuUetiii 

bases in the Sinai, two of which are) 
forward operating bases at Refidim andi 
Ophir, and two of which are maim 
operating bases at Etam and Etzion. 
Within 9 months, Israel must abandoni 
Refidim. and within 3 years, Israeli 
must give up the remaining three bases. 
The bases at Etam and Etzion are ofl 
prime concern because they normally; 
house all the Israeli squadrons de- 
ployed in the Sinai. Israel requires two 
new main operating bases to house the 
squadrons now at Etam and Etzion. 
These squadrons cannot be deployed to 
other bases without imposing unaccept- 
able risks to Israeli security through 
overcrowding. 

Construction of these facilities with- 
out U.S. assistance would be an ex- 
traordinary burden on Israel in two re- 
spects. First, it would strain Israel'si 
economy, which is already experienc- 
ing severe inflationary difficulties; and 
second, it would over-tax Israel's con- 
struction industry. In order to enable 
Israel to complete its withdrawal within 
the time allowed by the treaty, the 
President has agreed, subject to the ap- 
proval of Congress, to assist in the i 
construction of two airbases by pro-l 
viding funding and management assist-] 
ance. 

The two proposed bases will be lo- 
cated at Ovda and Matred, in the 
Negev. These sites are the most suita- 
ble in terms of terrain, location, avail- 
ability, and construction cost. The 
U.S. Air Force will be the project man- 
ager for this undertaking; the Corps ofl 
Engineers will be the construction 
agent. We will work in partnership 
with Israel; both parties will share re- 
sponsibility to assure the completion oP 
all construction necessary for initial 
operational capability prior to the date 
agreed for final relocation of Israeli 
forces into the Negev. 

The Defense Department's estimate 
of the cost of building the airbases in 
the time allowed is about $1 billion, in 
FY 1980 dollars (the midpoint of con- 
struction), exclusive of infrastructure 
costs for roads, utilities, and the like. 
We propose that this amount be drawn 
from the $3 billion total assistance 
package for Israel contained in the 
legislation. Of this amount, $800 mil- 
lion is proposed to be made available 
through grants of defense articles and 
services. Israel will fund all additional 
airbase construction costs, drawing on 
FMS credits as appropriate. 

The airbase requirement is a par- 
ticularly challenging endeavor for sev- 
eral reasons. First, as I mentioned, 
there is a definite time constraint. The 
Peace Treaty, in annex I, article I. re- I 
quires that: "Israel will complete with- I 
drawal of all its armed forces and 



4ay 1979 



59 



•ivilians from the Sinai not later than 
ihree years from the date of exchange 
)f instruments of ratification of this 
Treaty."" The newly built airbases in 
he Negev should be sufficiently com- 
pleted so that the Israeli Air Force can 
legin deploying to them fully 6 months 
irior to the abandonment of Etam and 
itzion in order to provide continuity of 
lir defense. 

Normally, construction of this nature 
vould take more than 5 years. Ac- 
celerating the pace means that the con- 
Itruction firms will have to work virtu- 
llly around the clock, 7 days a week, 
vluch new equipment will have to be 
icquired at the outset of the project in 
)rder to preclude costly and time con- 
suming breakdowns once construction 
|ias begun. The equipment must be able 
:o sustain long-term usage under con- 
.tant operating conditions. 

Ground Forces Relocation. In ad- 

lition to the airbase construction, there 
kre other costs which will be imposed 
)n Israel as a result of the withdrawal. 



One such cost involves the ground 
forces. Israel presently maintains two 
active armored divisions in the Sinai. 
These units, with their supporting 
infrastructure, will have to be displaced 
from their present Sinai locations to 
new facilities in Israel. This relocation 
will require significant construction. 

Supporting infrastructure will also be 
required — road networks, water and 
power lines, and landline communi- 
cations — for army and air force rede- 
ployments. 

Naval Forces Relocation. Israel will 
have to move its Sharm-el-Sheikh and 
Et Tur naval facilities to Elat and its 
Mediterranean Naval Facility at Dafna 
to Ashdod. 

Early Warning. The loss of the 
Sinai will reduce IsraeFs early-warning 
capability by forcing the closure of Is- 
raeli forward positioned early-warning 
sites. These sites provide important 
early-warning information, and new 
measures must be taken to insure, as a 
matter of prudence, Israel has high 



confidence in its early warning. This 
will require new construction and new 
procurement. 

We estimate that the total cost of 
these withdrawal actions will be be- 
tween $3 and $4 billion. This can only 
be a tentative estimate for considerable 
refinement remains to be done with re- 
spect to the withdrawal and relocation. 
We are helping support the additional 
costs by making available $2.2 billion 
in FMS credits. 

Military equipment Moderniza- 
tion. It is important that IsraeFs Armed 
Forces remain a modern, militarily ef- 
fective force. We are confident that, 
for the immediate future, Israel is fully 
able to defend itself against external 
attack. To insure that this is so over the 
longer run, however, modernization of 
Israel's Armed Forces must continue. 
Accordingly, the President has agreed 
to the sale of additional arms supplies 
for Israel to be purchased over the next 
several years. A classified list of this 
equipment has been provided to the 



LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, 
APR. 2, 1979* 

I am writing to you to urge your im- 
mediate attention to the authorizing legisla- 
tion and the 1979 supplemental appropria- 
tions request I will soon be transmitting to 
implement the Peace Treaty between Israel 
and Egypt. This supplemental request re- 
quires urgent enactment prior to the likely 
consideration of other pending supplemen- 
tals in order to avoid delays which could 
threaten timely implementation of the 
Treaty. 

The legislation to be transmitted will pro- 
vide $4.8 billion in special financial aid to 
the two countries over the next three years. 
This will he in addition to ongoing regular 
programs of military and economic assist- 
ance. Because much of the military financ- 
mg will take the form of guaranteed loans, 
requiring only fractional appropriations, 
budget authority for the assistance package 
will be $1.47 billion. Estimated budget 
outlays over the next four years will total 
$1.1 billion, with $350 million occurring in 
1979 and $315 million in 1980. 

Within the $4.8 billion total for special 
aid, I am proposing that $3 billion be made 
available to Israel in two components. 

• The first provides $800 million in 
grants to cover the direct costs of relocating 
two Israeli airbases now located on territory 
to be returned to Egypt. 

• The second provides $2.2 billion in 
foreign military sales credit financing to 
Israel. These funds will finance other Israeli 
relocation costs and some upgrading of 



force structure consistent with the new ter- 
ritorial arrangements. 

For Egypt, I am also proposing a two part 
aid package totalling $1.8 billion. 

• The larger component provides $1.5 
billion in military sales credit financing on 
the same terms offered to Israel. It will help 
Egypt maintain a modern well-equipped 
military force, and play a responsible role 
in promoting stability and moderation in the 
region. 

• In addition, I will propose to provide 
Egypt with $300 million of special eco- 
nomic aid loans under economic support 
fund authorities. These funds will help meet 
Egypt's large development needs and help 
satisfy the expectations of the Egyptian 
people for a better life. 

As you begin your consideration of these 
proposals, I urge you to give particular at- 
tention to three elements which I can per- 
sonally assure you are critical. 

• First, the proposed assistance is 
evenhanded. The financing package I will 
request reflects a careful assessment of the 
near-term burdens of the treaty balanced 
against the military and economic circum- 
stances of each country. Our future influence 
in the Middle East depends on the perception 
by all affected countries that we do not un- 
fairly support any one country. Alteration of 
the proposed amounts or terms of assistance 
to either Israel or Egypt could impair this 
perception. 

• Second, the amounts of aid proposed 
and the terms offered are the result of a 
careful balancing of foreign policy needs 



and fiscal policy constraints. Thus, while 
substantial U.S. assistance is required to as- 
sure successful implementation of the 
Treaty, I have made every effort to limit 
United States funding in light of our current 
budgetary constraints and my desire to 
avoid imposing any unnecessary burden on 
the U.S. taxpayer. 

• Third, the proposed United States as- 
sistance is a coherent, interrelated package 
which requires urgent congressional action. 
Piecemeal treatment would threaten both 
evenhandedness and the careful balance 
between foreign policy and budget require- 
ments. Delay in congressional action on the 
legislation could critically disrupt the care- 
fully negotiated timing for Treaty im- 
plementation. 



I regard this initiative as the most impor- 
tant foreign affairs proposal currently be- 
fore the Congress. I am sure I can count on 
your support for favorable and prompt con- 
gressional action. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



* Identical letters addressed to Frank 
Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee; Edmund S. Muskie. 
chairman of the Senate Budget Committee; 
Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Sen- 
ate Appropriations Committee; Clement J. 
Zablocki, chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee; Robert N. Giaimo, 
chairman of the House Budget Committee; 
and Jamie L. Whitten. chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Apr. 9, 1979). 



60 



committee, and proposed sales will be 
formally submitted to the Congress in 
the usual way, in accordance with the 
Arms Export Control Act. 

While modernization of Israel's 
Armed Forces is desirable and should 
continue, the peace with Egypt has en- 
abled Israel to make substantial reduc- 
tions in planned force expansion. As a 
result of the peace, Israel will have 
smaller forces than had been expected 
under its prior Matmon C force plan. 

We believe Israel's security can best 
be assured by Israel itself. This is why, 
from the point of view of U.S. national 
security, I recommend this legislation, 
which will facilitate a successful Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai, and also rec- 
ommend continuing American assist- 
ance in modernizing Israel's Armed 
Forces, so that Israel will remain in a 
satisfactory posture to defend itself. 

This policy of helping Israel help it- 
self does not absolve the United States 
from maintaining a watchful attitude 
toward the security of Israel. Indeed, 
the United States has agreed specif- 
ically, for example, in the improbable 
event that violations of the treaty 
occur, to " . . . take appropriate meas- 
ures to promote full observance of the 
Treaty of Peace." We do not expect 
that we would ever have to use U.S. 
military forces to insure treaty com- 
pliance. I do believe, nevertheless, that 
the United States must be continually 
concerned with the security of all 
friendly regional states, for vital 
American interests are at stake in the 
Middle East. 



Egypt 

The proposed legislation includes 
funds for both military and economic 
assistance to Egypt. The amount of 
money allotted for military assistance 
is larger than is allotted for economic 
assistance (though much less than the 
already existing rate of economic as- 
sistance). There is no doubt in my mind 
that a sound economy is at least as im- 
portant as a strong defense posture to 
the future of Egypt and to the stability 
of the region. Indeed, I place first 
priority on economic development, and 
I believe President Sadat and the Gov- 
ernment of Egypt do also. The future of 
Egypt will not turn primarily on the 
strength of its armed forces. 

Effective Egyptian Armed Forces are 
obviously necessary, however, to the 
defense of the country against agres- 
sion. Further, while we do not 
intend — nor, we believe, does Presi- 
dent Sadat intend — that Egypt will be- 
come a regional policeman, Egypt can 
play a positive role in helping other 
states in Africa and the Middle East. It 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. and israel Sign 
Mentoranda of Agreement 



The following two memoranda of 
agreement were signed by Secretary 
Vance and Israeli Foreign Minister 
Moshe Dayan on March 26, 1979 in 
Washington. D.C. 

The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 
1975, between the Governments of the United 
States and Israel, annexed hereto, remains in 
effect. A memorandum of agreement shall be 
agreed upon and concluded to provide an oil 
supply arrangement for a total of 15 years, in- 
cluding the 5 years provided in the September 
1, 1975, arrangement. 

The memorandum of agreement, including 
the commencement of this arrangement and 
pricing provisions, will be mutually agreed 
upon by the parties within sixty days following 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. 

It is the intention of the parties that prices 
paid by Israel for oil provided by the United 
States hereunder shall be comparable to world 
market prices current at the time of transfer, 
and that in any event the United States will be 
reimbursed by Israel for the costs incurred by 
the United States in providing oil to Israel 
hereunder. 



Experts provided for in the September 1, 
1975, arrangement will meet on request to dis- 
cuss matters arising under this relationship. 

The United States administration undertakes 
to seek promptly additional statutory authori- 
zation that may be necessary for full im- 
plementation of this arrangement. 

[M. Dayan] 

For the Government of Israel 

[Cyrus R. Vance] 

For the Government of the United States 



ANNEX 

Israel will make its own independent ar- 
rangements for oil supply to meet its require- 
ments through normal procedures. In the evenB 
Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, 
the United States Government, upon notifica- 
tion of this fact by the Government of Israel, 
will act as follows for five years, at the end oft 
which period either side can terminate this ar- 
rangement on one-year's notice. 

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its nor- 
mal requirements for domestic consumption is^ 
unavailable for purchase in circumstances 



is important, therefore, that the Egyp- 
tian Armed Forces have the appropriate 
military capability to carry out these 
tasks. 

Since expelling Soviet advisors in 
1972 and renouncing its bilateral treaty 
with Moscow in 1975, Egypt has been 
without substantive external assistance 
in meeting its legitimate defense needs. 
Last year President Carter proposed, 
and the Congress agreed, to the supply 
of F-5 aircraft to Egypt to help mod- 
ernize the air force. Now, in the con- 
text of peace between Egypt and Israel, 
the President proposes to provide addi- 
tional military assistance to Egypt. 

A classified listing of equipment ap- 
proved by the President has been pro- 
vided to the committee. As you will 
note, it includes additional aircraft, air 
defense equipment, armored personnel 
carriers, and frigates, among other 
things. This list is substantially smaller 
than what is required for full moderni- 
zation of Egypt's Armed Forces. It is, 
nevertheless, a very respectable begin- 
ning to the modernization process. 

Conclusion 

In summary, what we are recom- 
mending as part of this initiative for 



peace are programs of assistancei 
amounting to $1.47 billion in budget 
authority for Israel and Egypt, to help 
in the relocation of Israel's Armed 
Forces as they withdraw from the 
Sinai, and to help in the modernization| 
of the armed forces of both countries. I 
This assistance is militarily justified by J 
the circumstances. This legislative pro- ? 
posal is a substantial sum of money and 
a generous contribution to the peace. , 
But while peace is expensive, war is 
more expensive. 

This legislation will be, in my judg- 
ment and in the judgment of the Carter 
Administration, a major American 
contribution to peace in the Middle 
East, to the security of Egypt and Is- 
rael, and to the long-term stability of 
the region. I unequivocally recommend 
its approval by this committee and the 
Congress. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^ Press release 97. 

^For texts, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978, 
p. 7. 



.Wy 1979 



61 



Ahcre no quantitative restrictions exist on the 
ability of the United States to procure oil to 
■nect its normal requirements, the United Stales 
MAcrnmenl will promptly make oil available 
or purchase by Israel to meet all of the 
aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. 
If Israel is unable to secure the necessary 
neans to transport such oil to Israel, the United 
States Government will make every effort to 
fielp Israel secure the necessary means of trans- 
port. 

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its 
normal requirements for domestic consumption 
is unavailable for purchase in circumstances 
Where quantitative restrictions through em- 
bargo or otherwise also prevent the United 
States from procuring oil to meet its normal re- 
quirements, the United States Government will 
promptly make oil available for purchase by 
Jsrael in accordance with the International 
Energy Agency conservation and allocation 
formula, as applied by the United States Gov- 
ernment, in order to meet Israel's essential re- 
Iquirements. If Israel is unable to secure the 
(necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, 
the United States Government will make every 
!effort to help Israel secure the necessary means 
of transport. 

Israeli and United States experts will meet 
annually or more frequently at the request of 
leither party, to review Israel's continuing oil 
requirement. 



AcMevement of Peace 
and the Futare Chaiienge 



Recognizing the significance of the conclu- 
sion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and 
Egypt and considering the importance of full 
implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Is- 
rael's security interests and the contribution of 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the se- 
curity and development of Israel as well as its 
significance to peace and stability in the region 
and to the maintenance of international peace 
and security; and 

Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai 
imposes additional heavy security, military and 
economic burdens on Israel; 

The Governments of the United States of 
America and of the State of Israel, subject to 
their constitutional processes and applicable 
law, confirm as follows: 

1 , In the light of the role of the United States 
in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the par- 
ties' desire that the United States continue its 

.supportive efforts, the United States will take 
appropriate measures to promote full observ- 
ance of the Treaty of Peace. 

2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfac- 
tion of the United States that there has been a 
violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of 

! Peace, the United States will consult with the 
[parties with regard to measures to halt or pre- 
vent the violation, ensure observance of the 
Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful 
relations between the parties and promote peace 
in the region, and will take such remedial 
measures as it deems appropriate, which may 
include diplomatic, economic and military 
measures as described below. 



by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council in Pittsburgh on April 3, 1979. 
Mr. Atherton is Ambassador at Large 
with special responsibility for Middle 
East peace negotiations. 

A week ago a inagnificent feat of the 
human spirit was accomplished. The 
leaders of Egypt and Israel — enemies 
for 30 years — sat down together and 
signed a Treaty of Peace. At the same 
table on the White House lawn, they 
pledged to build on this achievement to 
meet the challenge of bringing peace to 
the Middle East. 

The problems and obstacles which 
Prime Minister Begin and President 
Sadat overcame were as intractable and 
complex as any in the history of 
statecraft. A legacy of bitterness and 
bloodshed separated their peoples; 
doubts, fears, and the open hostility of 
others stood in their way. But they had 
fortitude and vision. They remained 
true to their heritage, their peoples, and 
their own values. They persevered, and 
their monument is the documents they 
signed on March 26. 



Americans can take pride in the role 
their country played in this historic 
event. Both leaders have paid tribute to 
the key role of President Carter. With- 
out the courage, vision, and persistence 
of our President, this first practical step 
in 30 years toward peace in the Middle 
East would not have been possible. His 
deep involvement and firm leadership, 
supported by the patient and tenacious 
efforts of Secretary Vance, were es- 
sential to the final success of the 
negotiations. 

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty lays the 
foundation for true peace between Is- 
rael and the largest Arab state. It pro- 
vides for the security and integrity of 
the two nations. It opens new avenues 
for trade and communications; for eco- 
nomic, scientific, and social better- 
ment; and for the enhancement of 
learning and cultural exchange. The 
process of establishing normal relations 
will begin 9 months after the treaty has 
come into force — when Israel has with- 
drawn from three-fourths of the Sinai 
Peninsula — and will continue to de- 
velop as full withdrawal to the interna- 
tional border takes place within 3 
years. 



3. The United States will provide support it 
deems appropriate for proper actions taken by 
Israel in response to such demonstrated viola- 
tions of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a 
violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to 
threaten the security of Israel, including, inter 
alia, a blockade of Israel's use of international 
waterways, a violation of the provisions of the 
Treaty of Peace concerning limitation of forces 
or an armed attack against Israel, the United 
States will be prepared to consider, on an ur- 
gent basis, such measures as the strengthening 
of the United States presence in the area, the 
providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and 
the exercise of maritime rights in order to put 
an end to the violation. 

4. The United States will support the parties" 
rights to navigation and overflight for access to 
either country through and over the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the 
Treaty of Peace. 

5. The United States will oppose and. if 
necessary, vote against any action or resolution 
in the United Nations which in its judgment ad- 
versely affects the Treaty of Peace. 

6. Subject to Congressional authorization 
and appropriation, the United States will en- 
deavor to take into account and will endeavor 
to be responsive to military and economic as- 
sistance requirements of Israel. 



7. The United States will continue to impose 
restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any 
country which prohibit their unauthorized 
transfer to any third party. The United States 
will not supply or authorize transfer of such 
weapons for use in an armed attack against Is- 
rael, and will take steps to prevent such unau- 
thorized transfer. 

8. Existing agreements and assurances be- 
tween the United States and Israel are not ter- 
minated or altered by the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in 
articles 5. 6. 7. 8. II. 12. 15. and 16 of the 
Memorandum of Agreement between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and the Govern- 
ment of Israel (United States-Israeli Assur- 
ances) of September I. 1975. 

9. This Memorandum of Agreement sets 
forth the full understandings of the United 
States and Israel with regard to the subject 
matters covered between them hereby, and 
shall be carried out in accordance with its 
terms. 

[Cyrus R. Vance] 

For the Government of the United States of 

America 



[M. Dayan] 

For the Government of Israel 



D 



62 



This is a moment of immense im- 
portance for the Israeli and Egyptian 
peoples. It is of immense importance to 
others as well — not least to this nation. 

The United States has long been 
deeply concerned about the Middle 
East. Americans have longstanding 
friendships among the peoples there 
and deep and permanent moral com- 
mitments rooted in our own national 
values. We have labored for years to 
advance the cause of peace in that re- 
gion. Four Arab-Israeli wars have not 
only brought bloodshed and untold 
suffering to the peoples of the Middle 
East; they have also cost the United 
States and the rest of the world incal- 
culable billions. At several points the 
conflict has threatened world peace it- 
self. 

Therefore, all nations which truly 
care for peace and justice and progress 
should welcome the treaty. Its 
achievement against heavy odds is a 
demonstration to men and women 
everywhere that human reason, com- 
mon sense, goodwill, hard work, and 
faith can prevail. It demonstrates that 
even those who have been adversaries 
for generations can overcome enmity 
and make peace; it is a spark of hope in 
an uncertain world. 

For the Middle East, the Treaty of 
Peace between Egypt and Israel is a 
new reality and, I firmly believe, an 
irreversible reality. We must be under 
no illusion, however, that this is the 
end of the road. Peace has come to 
Egypt and Israel; it has not come to the 
other peoples of the Middle East. Until 
it does, the peoples of Egypt and Israel 
cannot realize the full benefits of the 
peace between them. The treaty just 
concluded is an essential corner- 
stone — but only the cornerstone — for 
comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East. Unless we build on it, the danger 
to our own national interests — and to 
the future of the people there — 
remains. The specter of tension and 
hostility in the volatile Middle East can 
only be finally removed when the com- 
prehensive peace foreseen last autumn 
by President Carter, President Sadat, 
and Prime Minister Begin at Camp 
David is achieved. 

For its part, the U.S. Government 
does not intend to relax its efforts. We 
intend to help consolidate the peace 
between Egypt and Israel and to move 
with them to the next stage of the 
negotiations. We have committed our- 
selves to help insure that what has been 
agreed to by both sides is scrupulously 
observed. But these assurances can 
only supplement the efforts of the par- 
ties themselves. The United States does 
not intend, nor has it ever intended, to 
play the role of policeman. 

Egypt and Israel signed their treaty 



in good faith and committed them- 
selves to work in good faith for peace 
with Israel's other neighbors. We are 
convinced they intend to carry out 
these commitments. 

Cost to the U.S. 

At this point, let me say a word 
about a matter of valid interest to the 
American people — the cost to the 
United States of this treaty. Four wars 
in the Middle East have cost the tax- 
payers several tens of billions of dol- 
lars in direct costs and billions more in 
inflation and loss of jobs. 

With the advent of Egyptian-Israeli 
peace, we want to help these two 
countries in their determination to im- 
prove the well-being of their peoples 
and to assure their security. It seems to 
us that the added aid we propose — 
primarily in loans — is small compared 
to the cost and dangers of another Mid- 
dle East war to the United States. 

In discussing the aid package for 
Egypt and Israel for which the Admin- 
istration will seek the approval of Con- 
gress, I want to stress two general 
points: (I) the program will stretch 
over 3 years and (2) the impact on our 
budget is considerably lower than the 
overall amount of money to be gener- 
ated for the program. This is because 
our foreign military sales program uses 
credit from private banks under loans 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government, so 
Congress does not have to appropriate 
money for the entire value of the pro- 
gram. Let me be specific. 

The bulk of the additional assistance 
we envisage for Israel and Egypt is to 
help them meet their urgent security 
requirements. It totals about $4.5 bil- 
lion over 3 years — approximately $3 
billion for Israel and $1.5 billion for 
Egypt. Of the amount for Israel, about 
$800 million will be in grant aid for the 
construction of two airfields which will 
be moved from the Sinai to the Negev, 
thereby enabling Israel to withdraw in 
the allotted 3 years in conditions of se- 
curity. The remaining sum for Israel, 
and the full amount for Egypt, are in 
the form of foreign military sales cred- 
its. 

Since Congress will need to appro- 
priate only 10% of the total amount to 
guarantee the credits, the actual budg- 
etary impact of the sum we contemplate 
will amount to only about $1.2 billion 
for the American taxpayer over 3 
years. 

The military program for Israel, be- 
sides helping defray the costs of with- 
drawal from the Sinai, will enable Is- 
rael to continue the modernization of 
its military establishment against con- 
tinuing security threats in the area. For 
Egypt the $1.5 billion military program 



I 

Department of State Bullet^ 

will help Egypt to replace equipment in 
its military establishment rendered obli 
solete by the Soviet embargo. 

In addition to the security assistance 
I have outlined, we envisage $300 miH 
lion more in economic assistance foi 
Egypt over the 3 years to help Presi< 
dent Sadat bring the rewards of peace 
to his people. 

We also plan to continue our curreni 
assistance programs to both countries 
These have been running at the level o) 
$1 .785 billion annually for military ano 
economic assistance to Israel and abou; 
$1 billion in economic aid annually tc 
Egypt. 

We shall also be urging our friends 
and allies to contribute their share o: 
economic assistance in support ol 
peace between Egypt and Israel. 

There is, I know, a gut reaction 
among many people: "Why should thi 
United States pay for peace in the Mid-1 
die East? Why doesn't peace save 
money?" 

The answer, 1 believe, is that in thi 
short run, risks are being taken by each 
side. We are contributing to th 
achievement of our longrun goals o 
stability and moderation in the Middl 
East. By strengthening the forces o 
moderation now against threats to the! 
well-being and security, we pave th 
way for reducing our burdens in th{ 
long run through reducing the risk o 
war. 

I repeat, the peace and stability we 
seek can only be achieved ultimate!; 
by making this treaty the cornerstone 
peace between Israel and all it 
neighbors. For the United States, no 
less than for the parties in the region 
directly involved, continued progress 
toward a comprehensive peace is es 
sential. As in the negotiations just con 
eluded, so in the negotiations just 
ahead, the United States intends to re 
main a full partner. 

Let me now discuss, first, why wei 
consider this full involvement is dic- 
tated by our national interests, and, 
second, how we foresee the next stage 
of the peace process developing. 

Reasons for U.S. Involvement 

The reasons for our involvement in 
this strategic area are clear. 

First, there are few areas in the 
world today where so many different 
and important American interests come 
together. Americans have come to rec- 
ognize the profound degree to which 
those interests are tied to peace in the 
region. Those interests include: 

• Our historic and moral commit- 
ment to the security of Israel; 

• The important and mutually bene- 
ficial economic and other relationships 
between the United States and Arab 



Mav 1979 



63 



nations of the Middle East, including 
'access to oil, and cooperation in main- 
:aining order in the global economy; 
: • Our humanitarian commitment to 
those people of the region — above all 
the homeless Palestinians — who cannot 
now look forward to the fully produc- 
'ive lives which are the human right of 
all peoples; and 

• Concern for the dangers which 
ersisting crisis in this region poses for 
global stability, for superpower con- 
frontation, and for the prosperity of the 
United States and its allies. 

Second, this is an area where fun- 
damental changes are taking place at a 
dramatic rate. The Middle East in- 
cludes some of the most resource-rich 
and rapidly modernizing nations of the 
world, as well as some of the poorest. 
We must, therefore, expect a period of 
instability. The recent upheaval in Iran 
is hut one reminder of how events in 
■one part of this region impact on the 
'other parts. 

Third, because of the importance 
and interrelatedness of all our interests, 
ithe only sensible American policy to- 
iward this area is one which permits us 
to pursue all of those interests at the 
same time in conditions of change. 

With these interests in mind, let me 
now turn to where we go next in the 
peace process. The Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty has fulfilled one of the two 
framework agreements worked out at 
Camp David.' At those historic meet- 
ings in the Maryland mountains, the 
Governments of Egypt and Israel com- 
mitted themselves to principles and 
procedures for a series of negotiations 
leading to peace between Israel and 
each of its Arab neighbors. The 
achievement of that peace depends on 
success in each negotiation, and each 
new negotiation builds on what has oc- 
curred. 

The Palestinian Question 

I said earlier that, in addition to the 
Peace Treaty. Prime Minister Begin 
and President Sadat signed a second 
document on March 26. In a joint letter 
addressed to President Carter, they 
pledged to begin almost immediately 
the process agreed upon at Camp David 
whose ultimate objective, in the words 
of the Camp David framework agree- 
ment is "... the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects." 
] That process is to start with negotia- 
jtions related to the West Bank and 
' Gaza — in other words, those parts of 
the former mandated territory of Pales- 
tine lying outside of the pre-1967 ar- 
■ mistice line boundaries of Israel — 
: territory which has been occupied by 
[Israel since the 1967 war. These 



negotiations will begin in the Middle 
East, with full American participation, 
within 1 month of the exchange of in- 
struments of ratification of the treaty, 
which will bring the Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty into force. We expect this to 
occur in the very near future. For the 
first time in more than three decades of 
conflict, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty has 
permitted us to turn our full attention to 
the practical solution of a central issue 
of that contlict — the Palestinian issue. 

It is evident that the issues involved 
in the Palestinian question are far too 
complex to be dealt with all at once. 
Because of this, we have long felt that 
the only realistic approach to their so- 
lution is to establish a transitional 
period during which decisionmaking 
institutions can evolve and in which the 
decisions that need to be made can be 
dealt with in a logical sequence. That 
approach was agreed to by Egypt and 
Israel at Camp David, and they have 
invited other parties to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to support it. In their letter to 
President Carter accompanying the 
treaty. President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin have agreed to 
negotiate in good faith, with a goal of 
completing those negotiations within 1 
year. Their goal is to reach agreement 
on arrangements for electing a self- 
governing authority for the West Bank 
and Gaza and on the powers and re- 
sponsibilities of that body. 

Let me briefly review what the Camp 
David framework calls for on the 
Palestinian issues. 

• A Palestinian self-governing au- 
thority will be established in the West 
Bank and Gaza for a 5-year transitional 
period, during which negotiations will 
take place to determine the final status 
of these areas. 

• At the start of the transitional 
period, the Israeli military government 
and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn and replaced by the self- 
governing authority freely elected by 
the inhabitants of these areas. An ini- 
tial withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces will take place, and those re- 
maining will be redeployed to specified 
security locations. 

• Elected Palestinian representatives 
and the Government of Jordan are in- 
vited to participate, along with Egypt 
and Israel, in negotiations based on all 
the provisions and principles of Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 242, the basis 
for all peace efforts in the Middle East 
since 1967. Thereby the Palestinians 
can participate, as they have every 
right to do, in determining their own 
future. They can participate in setting 
up their self-governing authority and in 
the subsequent negotiations to deter- 
mine the final status of the West Bank 



and Gaza, as well as in the negotiations 
for an Israel-Jordan peace treaty. The 
agreement on the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza will be submitted 
to a vote by the elected Palestinian 
representatives. These elected repre- 
sentatives will, by themselves, decide 
how they shall govern themselves after 
the 5-year transitional period, consist- 
ent with the terms of their agreement 
on the final status of the area. 

• Representatives of Palestinians not 
now living in the West Bank and Gaza, 
as mutually agreed, may join the 
negotiations on establishing the elected 
.self-governing authority in those areas. 
Throughout the 5-year transitional 
period, in all the negotiations, Palesti- 
nians in this area and outside it almost 
certainly will reflect each other's views 
and concerns. 

• Egypt and Israel have agreed to 
work with other interested parties to 
establish agreed procedures for a 
prompt, just, and permanent im- 
plementation of the resolution of the 
refugee problem. 

• Israel and Egypt have agreed that 
the solution from the negotiations must 
recognize the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and their just re- 
quirements, as well as provide for the 
security of Israel. 



Future Negotiations 

In future negotiations, as in the past, 
the United Stales will remain attentive 
to an important ingredient for long- 
term regional stability in the Middle 
East: the security of Israel. Seven 
American Presidents have believed and 
demonstrated that America's relation- 
ship with Israel is a unique relation- 
ship. It is a relationship which is inde- 
structible because it is rooted in the 
consciousness and the morals and the 
religion and the beliefs of the American 
people themselves. As President Carter 
has said [March 12, 1979]: "For 30 
years we have stood at the side of the 
proud and independent nation of Israel. 
I can say without reservation, as Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, 
that we will continue to do so not just 
for another 30 years, but 
forever. . . . The United States will 
never support any agreement or any 
action that places Israel's security in 
jeopardy." 

Israel as a sovereign state within the 
family of nations has the right to rec- 
ognition and acceptance by its 
neighbors. Beyond this the people of 
Israel, like people everywhere, have a 
deep-felt longing and inherent right to 
live in peace and security — a security 
which derives not only from our com- 
mitment and Israel's own strength and 



64 



Department of State Bulletii 



fortitude but from a peace based upon 
the growing cooperation and goodwill 
of its neighbors and from firm and 
lasting security agreements mutually 
arrived at and observed. 

No one should underestimate the 
difficulty of the remaining challenges 
in the Middle East. For all the reasons I 
have mentioned, the challenge must be 
met. Failure to do so poses sufficient 
dangers to world peace that your gov- 
ernment would be irresponsible were it 
not to remain actively involved in 
helping the parties meet the challenge. 

Only the resolution of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict in its broadest context 
can assure stability in the greater Mid- 
dle Eastern region. The process in- 
volved is mutually reinforcing: Without 
an Arab-Israeli settlement, stability in 
the Middle East will be difficult to 
achieve; that stability is impossible 
without settlement of the Palestinian 
issue; and until there is stability in the 
region at large, the concerns of both 
Arabs and Israelis for their security, 
independence, and territorial integrity 
cannot be completely allayed. 

Answer to the Critics 

As we go forward in this work, we 
are aware that there are those who do 
not support it, or who hesitate to do so 
openly. There are some who do not 
want peace and would even unravel the 
fabric of work already done. There are 
others who are committed to a peaceful 
settlement but who criticize the Camp 
David framework — the only approach 
in three decades that has begun to pro- 
duce results. There are those who de- 
mand that their concerns be addressed 
and their rights insured but who have 
refused so far to engage in the effort 
required to bring about the kind of fu- 
ture they want. 

To them we say: We are sensitive to 
your anxieties and your doubts. You 
fear that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will 
turn out to be a separate peace and that 
your legitimate interests will be for- 
gotten. We say to them: The documents 
signed and the solemn pledges made, 
including the pledge of the President of 
the United States, are proof that this 
fear is unfounded. A beginning has 
been made. The process continues. The 
critics provide no practical alternative. 
War is no solution. The solution lies in 
negotiations whose momentum toward 
peace will grow as concrete results are 
achieved. The results which seem im- 
possible today become realistic to- 
morrow as confidence in the peace 
process grows. The United States re- 
mains committed to achieving a com- 
prehensive peace, fair and just to all 
concerned. 

We will go on with this process re- 



U]\ITED ]\ATIO]\S: Summaries of 
11.S. Statements 



Dominica 

The United States supported the ap- 
plication of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica for membership in the United 
Nations. (Amb. Richard W. Petree in 
the Security Council on Dec. 6, 1978; 
USUN press release 153) It was ad- 
mitted as the 151st member of the 
United Nations on December 18, 1978. 

Human Rights 

The United States urged that the 
United Nations concentrate on im- 
proving its human rights machinery and 
programs. In an address before the as- 
sembled members of the United Na- 
tions on March 17, 1977, President 
Carter suggested that the U.N. Com- 
mission on Human Rights meet more 
often and move the entire human rights 
division back to central headquarters in 
New York. He also asked the United 
Nations to reconsider the proposal to 
create the post of a U.N. high commis- 
sioner of human rights. 

Accordingly, the United States con- 
tinued to press that the Human Rights 
Commission's overall analysis has a 



positive impact on improving the 
human rights mechanisms and thai 
there be a periodic reveiw of all U.N. 
activities in this respect. We also sup- 
ported initiatives concerning the crea- 
tion of autonomous human rights in- 
stitutions and regional human rights 
organizations. (Brady Tyson in Com- 
mittee III on Nov. 28, 1979; USUN 
press release 138) 

Mass Communications 

The United States welcomed the ex- : 
cellent report on major developments in 
mass communications during the last 
16 years which was submitted to theii 
U.N. Secretary General by the Directotl 
General of the U.N. Educational. Scii 
entific and Cultural Organizatiol 
(UNESCO). We also noted that the 
work of the 20th session of the UN-j 
ESCO general conference signified th| 
triumph of cooperation over confronta 
tion and laid the foundation for a mor 
equitable "new world information 
order." 

The U.S. general policy statement 
the conference (for text see BuLLETiii 
of February 1979, p. 50) proposed 



gardless of pressure or of the indiffer- 
ence of others. We invite others in- 
volved in the conflict to join us and 
urge all nations concerned with peace 
to support our effort. The full fruits of 
peace cannot be harvested unless its 
seed is sown widely and nurtured by 
all. We see no present alternative to the 
process begun at Camp David. The 
problems remaining are too compli- 
cated and too sensitive to be solved all 
at once. Most complicated of all is the 
unresolved problem of Jerusalem. But 
with each problem resolved, it becomes 
all the more possible to resolve the 
next — with each act of trust, the next 
act requiring even greater trust be- 
comes more possible. In the end, the 
overall solution will emerge, as we put 
in place the firm building blocks on 
which a comprehensive peace can 
stand. 

A framework for peace was estab- 
lished at Camp David and an 
Egyptian-Israeli treaty has now been 
concluded. This was the first indis- 
pensible step on the road to a just and 
lasting peace. The challenges ahead are 
formidable, and overcoming them will 
at times tax our patience and our for- 
titude. But, for the first time, a practi- 



cal beginning has been made toward 
peace in this troubled region, and a 
realistic opportunity exists to complete^ 
the task. 

We are determined to help make thisJ 
treaty the foundation for a wider andl 
greater peace. What we seek, in thei| 
words of Thomas Jefferson, is: "Equal ' 
and exact justice to all men, of what- 
ever state or persuasion, religious or 
political; peace, commerce, and honest 
friendship with all nations. ..." ^ 

Sixteen months ago. President Sadat I 
traversed in less than an hour the light I 
years separating Cairo and Jerusalem. ' 
By that symbolic act. he charted a new 
course that can make Jefferson's vision 
a reality for the peoples of the Middle 
East. Six months ago three men of 
vision — President Sadat. Prime 
Minister Begin, and President 
Carter — set out from Camp David on 
the long road to achieve that reality. 
One week ago those same three men 
reached the first major milestone on 
that journey. We are determined to stay 
on that road until, together, we reach 
its final and successful destination. □ 



'For texts of the Camp David frameworks 
and related material, see Bulletin of Oct. 
1978, p.l. 



May 1979 



65 



measures to further the free flow of 
information. 

• The United States pledged to de- 
velop a plan of cooperation and assist- 
ance in communications with develop- 
ing countries. 

• The United States announced that 
an AID-funded program using the 
facilities of INTELSAT would be ini- 
tiated to enable developing countries to 
disseminate information on health, 
education, and agriculture in remote 
rural areas. 

• The United States recommended 
consideration of a consultative role for 
appropriate international organizations 
for action upon requests for communi- 
cations assistance and mobilization of 
resources. 

We suggested that the Special Politi- 
cal Committee on Questions Relating 
to Information especially consider three 
I areas of activity: 

• Defining needs and aspirations of 
the world community in realistic terms; 

• Organizing procedures for pro- 
viding consultative services; and 

• Mobilizing resources. 

In conclusion the United States 
cautioned against radical and politically 
motivated prescriptions for structural 
changes. We cannot acquiesce in or be 
indifferent to concepts of a new world 
information order which imply linkage 
with ideas and proposals totally unac- 
ceptable to any society that constitu- 
tionally guarantees freedom of expres- 
sion against restriction by the state. To 
establish a more just and effective 
world order, all nations must pursue, 
without discarding their differences, 
the commonalities that exist in con- 
structive and practical approaches to 
the problems before them. (George A. 
Dalley in the Special Political Com- 
mittee on Questions Relating to Infor- 
mation on Dec. 4, 1978; USUN press 
release 149) 



Middle East 

The United States strongly opposed 
UNGA Resolution 33-71A. Its main 
point is a request that the Security 
Council, under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter, apply a mandatory arms 
embargo against only one nation in the 
Middle East — Israel. The United States 
believes that this would undermine the 
security of Israel, create a fundamental 
imbalance in the Middle East, and so 
contribute significantly to a dangerous 
destabilization in the region. Rather, 
the way to achieve stability in the Mid- 
dle East is for Israel and its Arab 
neighbors to resolve their differences 
through negotiations leading to a com- 



prehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. (Amb. Adrian S. Fisher 
on Nov. 27; USUN press release 139) 

The United States supported the Se- 
curity Council's renewal of the U.N. 
Disengagement Observer Force. (Amb. 
Richard W. Petree in the Security 
Council on Nov. 30, 1978; USUN 
press release 147) 

The United States expressed concern 
that little progress had been made in 
fulfilling the mandate of the U.N. 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 
Members of the Security Council, Is- 
rael, and other governments and or- 
ganizations having intTuence in the re- 
gion have responsibility for cooperat- 
ing with UNIFIL in order to insure that 
the relative stability in the UNIFIL area 
can be consolidated and that the au- 
thority of the Government of Lebanon 
is extended to southern Lebanon. UNI- 
FIL's operation must be extended in 
southern Lebanon and its freedom of 
movement assured. (Amb. James F. 
Leonard in the Security Council on 
Dec. 8, 1978; USUN press release 157) 

At the pledging conference for the 
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), the United States pledged 
$53 million for 1979. Of this amount 
$9.5 million is contingent upon receipt 
by UNRWA of matching contributions 
from members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. The 
United States noted that it has been the 
largest contributor to UNRWA since its 
establishment in 1949. (Betty-Jane 
Jones in the pledging conference for 
UNRWA on Dec. 7, 1978; USUN press 
release 159) 



Refugees 

At the pledging conference for the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees, the United States pledged $12.5 
million as its initial contribution toward 
the Refugees' 1979 general program 
and indicated its intention to seek ad- 
ditional funds during the 1979 opera- 
tional year. (William J. Stibravy, U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
pledging conference on Nov. 17, 1978; 
press release 123) 

South Asia 

The United States voted in favor of 
UNGA Resolution 33-65 on the estab- 
lishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in South Asia. We believe that an ef- 
fective nuclear-weapon-free zone that 
is developed and supported by states in 
the area can enhance the security of the 
parties and reinforce nonproliferation 
on a regional basis. (Amb. Adrian S. 
Fisher in Committee I on Nov. 29, 
1978; USUN press release 141) 



South Africa 

The United States cosponsored 
UNGA Resolution 33-42 to assure that 
students from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and 
South Africa are not denied the oppor- 
tunity to obtain training and education 
under the U.N. Educational and 
Training Program for Southern Africa. 
The United States urged a unanimous 
international commitment to the youth 
and future of southern Africa. (John 
Graham in Committee IV on Nov. 2, 
1978; USUN press release 129) 

World Assembly on the Elderly 

The U.S. Government believes the 
problems of older citizens are a con- 
cern for all nations. The rapid rise in 
numbers and proportions of older 
people characterized almost all de- 
veloped nations in this century. In de- 
veloping nations, the number of older 
people is expected to triple over the 
next 50 years. 

The United States presented a draft 
resolution (later adopted as A/RES/ 
33/52) which proposes convening a 
World Assembly on the Elderly in 
1982. Such an assembly would allow 
all nations to exchange knowledge and 
experience on current and projected 
measures to improve life for the el- 
derly. Also, the General Assembly is 
asked to consider observing an Inter- 
national Year of the Elderly. 

The U.S. Congress approved and 
President Carter signed a bill authoriz- 
ing the contribution of $1 million or 
25% of the cost (whichever is lower) to 
a world assembly. (Ruth Morgenthau in 
Committee III on Nov. 15, 1978; 
USUN press release 120) D 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTER]\ 
HEmiSPHERE: 

Nicaragua 



DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S 
RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, 
FEB. 8, 1979' 

A three-nation negotiating group, 
which has been trying since last Oc- 
tober to help the government and op- 
position forces in Nicaragua to reach a 
peaceful and democratic solution to 
that nation's political crisis, has sus- 
pended its mediation efforts. 

It is concluded that it cannot break 
the impasse between the opposition and 
the Nicaraguan Government caused by 
President Somoza's unwillingness to 
accept the essential elements of the 
mediators' most recent proposal. 

Following the events, strikes, and 
violence of last August and September 
in Nicaragua, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) on September 
23 noted the willingness of the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua to accept the 
mediation effort. In response, the 
United States, Guatemala, and the 
Dominican Republic offered their 
cooperation. This offer was accepted 
both by the Nicaraguan Government 
and the opposition coalition known as 
the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). 
That group began its work on Octo- 
ber 6. 

On December 20, it presented to 
both the governing National Liberal 
Party (PLN) and the FAO a carefully 
constructed proposal for a resolution of 
the political crisis through a national 
plebiscite. The plan was based upon 
the conditions and views which were 
presented both by the government and 
by the opposition. It included plans for 
international administration and super- 
vision of a plebiscite, along with other 
special conditions which the negotiat- 
ing group felt were essential to secure 
voter confidence in the fairness of the 
plebiscite process and without which 
agreement to hold such a plebiscite 
could not be achieved. 

The proposal was accepted by the 
FAO but not by the PLN, which sub- 
mitted a counterproposal. 

The three-nation group studied that 
counterproposal carefully but deemed it 
insufficient to have any prospect of 
being accepted by the opposition. 

On January 12, the group asked the 
PLN to reconsider its position. On 
January 17, the PLN reconfirmed its 



position and its opposition to the plan. 
The mediating group, therefore, con- 
cluded that the existing impasse could 
not be broken by further negotiations. 

The unwillingness of the Nicaraguan 
Government to accept the group's pro- 
posals, the resulting prospects for re- 
newed violence and polarization, and 
the human rights situation in 
Nicaragua, as reported by the Inter- 
American Commission on Human 
Rights, unavoidably affect the kind of 
relationship we can maintain with that 
government. It was with this back- 
ground that the U.S. Government reas- 
sessed its relationship with Nicaragua 
and concluded that in these circum- 
stances, it cannot continue to maintain 
the same level and kind of presence in 
Nicaragua as we have had in the past. 
Therefore, the United States will take 
the following steps in connection with 
its relationship with the Government of 
Nicaragua. 

First, the United States is with- 
drawing the U.S. military assistance 
group in Nicaragua, and it is terminat- 
ing our military assistance program 
which has, in fact, been suspended for 
some months. 

Second, with respect to economic 
assistance, those Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID) projects 
which are well-advanced will continue 
since they are aimed at the basic human 
needs of the poor, and termination of 
AID funding at this time — at this par- 
ticular advanced stage — would leave 
many elements only partially com- 
pleted. However, no new projects with 
the government will be considered 
under present conditions. At this point. 
AID does not intend to implement two 
loan projects signed in August 1978 on 
which work has not yet begun. There 
have been substantial changes in con- 
ditions affecting these projects since 
the loans were negotiated. 

Third, we are withdrawing all Peace 
Corps volunteers from Nicaragua. 

Fourth, we are also reducing the 
number of U.S. Government officials 
at our embassy in Managua. 

The United States wants to note 
again its willingness to resume the con- 
ciliation efforts should conditions and 
circumstances warrant. We hope that 
efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution 
to the political crisis can be resumed, 
and we urge all Nicaraguans to avoid 
the temptation to seek violent solutions 
to problems that are best resolved 
through a national consensus. 

We would deplore any outbreak of 
terrorism or violence emanating from 
whatever source, which besides the 
suffering and loss of human life it 



would cause would only complicate the ' 
task of finding a peaceful solution to 
Nicaragua's crisis. 

We call upon other governments in 
the region to avoid contributing to the 
continuation or spread of violence. We 
will continue to work closely with the 
OAS to the end that we can assist in 
promoting peace, democracy, and full 
respect for human rights in Nicaragua. 
This has been conveyed to the govern- 
ment in Nicaragua, and that is the cur- 
rent status and our intentions. D 



' The question was asked at the noon briefing 
and answered by Department spokesman Hod- 
ding Carter III. 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York 
June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 
1959, for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. HAS 
6997, 
Extended to: Isle of Man by the United 

Kingdom. Feb. 22, 1979; effective May 

23, 1979. 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the re- 
turn of astronauts, and the return of objects 
launched into outer space. Done at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow Apr. 22, 1968. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited: Peru, Mar. 21, 1979. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 

Ratification deposited: Ethiopia (with a res- 
ervation). Mar. 26, 1979. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia (with a res- 
ervation). Mar. 26, 1979. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Mar. 23, 
1979. 

Bills of Lading 

Protocol to amend the international convention 
for the unification of certain rules of law re- 
lating to bills of lading signed at Brussels 
Aug. 25, 1924 (TS 931). Done at Brussels 
Feb. 23, 1968. Entered into force June 23. 
1977.2 
Accession deposited: German Democratic 

Republic, Feb. 14, 1979. 
Signature: Netherlands, Feb. 5, 1979. 



Any 1979 

ollisions 

'onvcniion on the international regulations tor 
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with reg- 
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 85X7. 
Accessions deposited: Panama, Mar. 14, 
1979; Trinidad and Tohago, Feb. 15, 
1979; Yemen Arab Republic, Mar. 6, 
1979. 

'onlainers 

nternational convention for safe containers 
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 
2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6. 1977; for 
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037. 
Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Feb. 16. 

1979; Denmark, Mar. 2. I979;'' Yemen 

Arab Republic, Mar. 6, 1979. 

rounlerfeiting 

nternational convention and protocol for the 
suppression of counterfeiting currency. Done 
at Geneva Apr. 20, 1929. Entered into force 
Feb, 22, 1931.' 

Sotification of succession: Singapore, Feb. 
12, 1979. 

Cultural Relations 

'\greement on the importation of educational, 
scientific, and cultural materials, and pro- 
tocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. 
Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the 
U.S. Nov. 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. 
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, Mar. 15, 
1979. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov 4. 
1952; for the U.S. Nov 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates. 
Feb. 7, 1979. 

Protocol concerning the European Customs 
Union Study Group Done at Brussels Dec 
15. 1950. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1951; 
for the U.S. Nov. 5. 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates. 
Feb. 7, 1979. 

Defense 

Memorandum of understanding no. 3 concern- 
ing the execution of a joint test program for 
the Roland 11 weapons system, with annexes. 
Entered into force Dec. 12, 1978 
Signatures: U.S., Sept. 28, 1978; France, 
Nov. 15, 1978; Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Dec. 12, 1978. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 
1972. TIAS 7502. 

Accession deposited: Ethiopia, Mar. 22, 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 
1977. TIAS 8765. 

Accession deposited: Paraguay, Mar. 23, 
1979. 

Fisheries — North Pacific 

Protocol amending the international convention 
for the high seas fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, as amended 
(TIAS 2786, 5385), with agreed minutes and 



memoranda of understanding. Done at Tokyo 

Apr. 25, 1978. Entered into force Feb. 15, 

1979. 

Proclaimed by the President: Mar. 14, 1979. 

Gas 

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous, or other ga.ses, and 
of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done 
at Geneva June 17. 1925. Entered into force 
Feb. 8. 1928; for the U.S. Apr. 10, 1975. 
TIAS 8061. 

Accession deposited: Bhutan, June 12, 1978; 
effective Feb. 19. 1979. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.' 
Accession deposited: Gambia, Mar. 22. 
1979. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines. 1966. 

Done at London Apr. 5. 1966. Entered into 

force July 21. 1968. TIAS 6331. 

Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic. 
Mar. 6. 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention on 

load lines. 1966. Done at London Oct. 12. 

1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Panama. Mar. 14, 
1979. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva 
Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar 17. 
1958. TIAS 4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Yemen. Mar. 14. 
1979. 

Convention on facilitation of international 
maritime traffic, with annex. Done at Lon- 
don Apr. 9. 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5. 
1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TIAS 
6251. 

Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic. 
Mar. 6. 1979. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done 
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force 
Aug. 16, 1976.' 

Ratification deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 
Mar. 14, 1979. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of 
pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes, as 
amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. 
Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the 
U.S. Dec 8, 1961. TIAS 4900; 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic, Mar 6, 1979. 
Amendments to the international convention for 
the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 
1954, as amended (TIAS 4900. 6109). 
Adopted at London Oct 21. 1969. Entered 
into force Jan. 20. 1978. TIAS 8505. 
Acceptance deposited: Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic. Mar. 6, 1979. 
International convention on civil liability for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 
29. 1969. Entered into force June 19. 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Italy (with a declara- 
tion). Feb. 27. 1979. 
International convention relating to interven- 
tion on the high seas in cases of oil pollution 
casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Nov. 29. 1969. Entered into force May 6, 



67 



1975. TIAS 8068. 

Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic. 

Mar. 6, 1979. 
Ratification deposited: Italy. Feb. 27. 1979. 
International convention on the establishment 
of an international fund for compensation for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Dec. 
18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.' 
Accession deposited: Italy, Feb. 27, 1979. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. 
Done at Washington June 19. 1970. Entered 
into force Jan. 24. 1978. except for chapter 
II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 
1978.' TIAS 8733. 

Ratification deposited: Monaco, Mar. 22, 
1979. 

Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of 

pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols 

and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.' 

Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic. 

Mar. 6. 1979. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships. 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 
1978.' 

Signatures: France. Mar. 6. 1979;^ Sweden. 
Mar. I. 1979.-' 

Protocol relating to intervention on the high 
seas in cases of pollution by substances other 
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2. 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic. 
Mar. 6. 1979. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea. I960. Done at London June 17. 1960. 
Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 
5780. 

Acceptance deposited: Iraq, Feb. 27, 1979. 
International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 
1. 1974.' 
Accessions deposited: German Democratic 

Republic, Mar. 15, 1979; Yemen Arab 

Repubic, Mar. 6, 1979. 
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974. 
Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.' 
Accession deposited: Bahamas. Feb. 16. 

1979. 
Signatures: France, Jan. 26, 1979;' Federal 

Republic of Germany, Nov. 16, 1978;' 

Netherlands, Nov. 17, 1978;" Poland, Oct. 

16, 1978;'' Sweden, Mar. 1, 1979. •" 

Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the international maritime 
satellite orgainzation (INMARSAT), with 
annex. Done at London Sept 3, 1976.' 
Ratification deposited: Australia, Mar. 16, 
1979. 

Slavery 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of 
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30. 
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited: Djibouti, Mar. 21. 
1979. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial 



68 



bodies. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow Jan. 27. 1967. Entered into force 
Oct. 10, 1967. 

Ratification deposited: Peru. Mar. 1, 1979. 
Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14, 

1975. Entered into force Sept. 15. 1976. 
TIAS 8480. 

Accession deposited: Peru, Mar. 21, 1979. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at 
Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 

1976. TIAS 8572. 

Accession deposited: Nauru, Mar. 8, 1979. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, with annexes, 1969. Done at 
London June 23, 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Jan. 24, 

1979. 
Accessions deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 

Feb. 15, 1979; Yemen Arab Republic, 

Mar. 6, 1979. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and schedule 
of whaling regulations. Done at Washington 
Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 
1948. TIAS 1849. 

Notification of adherence: Seychelles, Mar. 
19, 1979. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
regulation of whaling of Dec. 2, 1946 (TIAS 
1849). Done at Washington Nov. 19, 1956. 
Entered into force May 4, 1959. (TIAS 
4228). 

Notification of adherence: Seychelles, Mar. 
19, 1979. 

Wills 

Convention providing a uniform law on the 
form of an international will, with annex. 
Done at Washington Oct. 26, 1973. Entered 
into force Feb. 9. 1978. ^ 
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, Apr. 3. 
1979. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Australia during calendar year 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Jan. 11 and Mar. 29, 1979. En- 
tered into force Mar. 29, 1979; effective Jan. 
I, 1979. 

Brazil 

Agreement extending the agreements of Apr. 
22, 1976. as amended (TIAS 8737, 8738). 
relating to trade in manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products and cotton textiles and 
textile products and amending the cotton 
textile agreement. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Mar. 27. 1979. Entered 
into force Mar. 27, 1979. 

Canada 

Protocol amending the convention of Aug. 16. 
1916. for the protection of migratory birds in 
Canada and the United Stales of America (39 
Stat. 1702). Signed at Ottawa Jan. 30, 1979. 
Enters into force on the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 



Department of State Bulletit 



Memorandum of understanding pertaining to 
coordination of cooperative research and de- 
velopment. Signed Feb. 1, 1979. Entered 
into force Feb. I, 1979. 

Agreement concerning fishing off the west 
coast of Canada, with annex. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Mar. 29, 
1979. Entered into force Mar. 29, 1979. 

Protocol amending the convention for the pres- 
ervation of the halibut fishery of the North- 
ern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 
2900). Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979. 
Enters into force on the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Treaty to submit to binding dispute settlement 
the delimitation of the maritime boundary in 
the Gulf of Maine area Signed at Washing- 
ton Mar. 29. 1979. Enters into force on the 
date of exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion of this treaty and the agreement on East 
Coast fishery resources. 

Special agreement to submit to a chamber of 
the International Court of Justice the delim- 
itation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf 
of Maine area. Signed at Washington Mar. 
29. 1979. Enters into force on the date of 
entry into force of the treaty to submit to 
binding dispute settlement the delimitation of 
the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine 
area. 

Agreement to submit to a court of arbitration 
the delimitation of the maritime boundary in 
the Gulf of Maine area. Signed at Washing- 
ton Mar. 29. 1979. Enters into force in ac- 
cordance with article II or III of the treaty to 
submit to binding dispute settlement the de- 
limitation of the maritime boundary in the 
Gulf of Maine area. 

Agreement on east coast fishery resources. 
Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979. Enters 
into force on the date instruments of ratifica- 
tion of this agreement and the treaty to sub- 
mit to binding dispute settlement the delim- 
itation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf 
of Maine area signed Mar. 29, 1979, are ex- 
changed. 

Egypt 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with annexes. Signed at Cairo Mar. 
20, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 20. 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Nov. 8, 1978. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Mar. 
20, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 20. 1979. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Memorandum of understanding on the partici- 
pation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
phase III of the deep sea drilling project. 
Signed at Bonn-Bad Godesberg July 18. 
1974. Entered into force July 18, 1974. 

Hong Kong 

International express mail agreement, with de- 
tailed regulations. Signed at Hong Kong and 
Washington Jan. 2 and Feb. 6, 1979. Entered 
into force Mar. 15. 1979; effective Feb. 1. 
1979. 

Iran 

Memorandum of understanding concerning re- 
visions of foreign military sales (FMS) let- 
ters of offer and acceptance in force between 
the U.S. and Iran. Signed at Tehran Feb. 3, 
1979. Entered into force Feb. 3. 1979. 

Israel 

Memorandum of agreement concerning assur- 



( 

ances. Signed at Washington Mar. 26. 1979, 
Entered into force Mar. 26. 1979. 
Memorandum of agreement concerning an oif 
supply arrangement, with annex. Signed at> 
Washington Mar. 26, 1979. Entered into 
force Mar. 26. 1979. 

Jamaica 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance 
in connection with matters relating to the 
Jamaica Nutrition Holdings Ltd.. its holding 
company. Stale Trading Corporation, and its 
associated companies. Signed at Washington 
Mar. 30, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 30 
1979. 

Japan 

Agreement in the field of liquid metal-cooled 
fast breeder reactors. Signed at Tokyo Jan.i 
31. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1979 

Jordan 

Loan agreement for a potash plant. Signed at 
Amman Aug. 28. 1978. Entered into force 
Aug. 28, 1978 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting oil 
authorizations to permit licensed amateuB 
radio operators of either country to operate 
their stations in the other country. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Amman Feb. 6 andi 
Mar. 11, 1979. Entered into force Mar. II 
1979. 

Korea 

Agreement relating to export of color televisioi 
receivers from the Republic of Korea, with 
annex. Effected by exchange of letters a 
Seoul and Washington Dec. 14, 1978, Jan 
2, and Mar. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Mar. 12. 1979; effective Dec. 14. 1978. 

Agreement amending the air transport agree 
ment of Apr. 24. 1957, as amended (TIAS' 
3807, 7083). with exchange of letters and* 
related note. Effected by exchange of notesi 
at Seoul Mar. 22. 1979. Entered into force! 
Mar. 22, 1979 

Liberia 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels 
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington! 
Oct. 27, 1978. and Jan. 15, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 15. 1979. 

Netherlands 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance 
in connection with matters relating to the 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. Signed at Wash- 
ington Mar. 21. 1979. Entered into force 
Mar. 21. 1979. 

New Zealand 

Agreement extending the agreement of Feb. 27, 
1974. (TIAS 7806) for scientific and tech- 
nological cooperation. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Wellington Feb. 27. 1979. En- 
tered into force Feb. 27. 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar, 
20, 1970, (TIAS 6857) concerning the ac- 
ceptance of certificates of airworthiness for 
imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Mar. 16 and 30. 1979. 
Entered into force Mar. 30. 1979. 

Romania 

Memorandum of understanding on scientific 
and technological cooperation, with annex. 
Signed at Bucharest Feb. 27. 1979. Entered 
into force Feb. 27. 1979. 



Vlay 1979 

>audi Arabia 

'roject agreement for lethnical cooperation in 

executive management development. Signed 

at Jidda Nov. 18. 1978. 

Entered into force: Mar. 4. 1979. 
^roject agreement tor technical cooperation in 

agricultural bank management and training, 

with annex. Signed at Jidda Nov. 18. 1978. 
. Entered into force: Mar. 5. 1979. 
'reject agreement for technical cooperation in 

transportation, with annex. Signed at Jidda 

Nov. 18. 1978. 

Entered into force: Mar. 5. 1979. 

Senegal 

Mr transport services agreement, with memo- 
randum of understanding Signed at Dakar 
Mar. 28, 1979. Entered into force provi- 
sionally. Mar. 28. 1979; definitively, upon 
an exchange of notes stating that the agree- 
ment has been approved in accordance with 
each contracting party's requirements. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 
:?, 1975. (TIAS 8107) with related letter. 
Signed at Colombo Feb. 22. 1979. Entered 
into force Feb. 22. 1979. 

'Sudan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Dec. 
24, 1977, (TIAS 9157) with agreed minutes. 
Signed at Khartoum Feb. 8, 1979. Enters 
into force upon U.S. Embassy receipt of 
notification of the completion of the con- 
stitutional procedures for ratification re- 
quired by applicable law of Sudan. 

Suriname 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance 
in connection with matters relating to the 
Reynolds Metals Company. Signed at Wash- 
ington Mar. 14, 1979. Entered into force 
Mar. 14, 1979. 

Taiwan 

Agreement relating to export of color television 
receivers from Taiwan, with annexes. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Washington 
Dec. 29, 1978. and Mar. 5, 1979. Entered 
into force Mar. 5, 1979; effective Dec. 29, 
1978. 

Tunisia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 7. 
1976 (TIAS 8506). Signed at Tunis Mar. 2, 
1979. Entered into force Mar. 2. 1979. 

U.S.S.R. 

Memorandum of understanding on continued 
participation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in the deep sea drilling project 
from Jan. I, 1979, through Sept. 30, 1980. 
Signed at Washington and Moscow Feb. 16 
and 21, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 21, 
1979; effective Jan. 1. 1979. 

United Kingdom 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation in the testing and development 
of antimisting kerosene and related equip- 
ment, with appendix. Signed at Washington 
and London June 1 and 14, 1978. Entered 
into force June 14, 1978. 

Third protocol further amending the convention 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 



taxes on income and capital gains, signed at 
London on Dec. .^1, 1975. Signed at London 
Mar. 15, 1979. Enters into force immediately 
after the expiration of .10 days following the 
date on which instruments of ratification are 
exchanged. 
Reciprocal fisheries agreement. Signed at Lon- 
don Mar. 27, 1979. Enters into force on the 
date of exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion. 

Zaire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran- 
teed, or insured by the U.S. Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Wash- 
ington Feb. 7, 1979. 
Entered into force: Apr. 4, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 24, 1977 
(TIAS 8813). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Kinshasa July 7, 1978. Entered into force 
July 7, 1978. D 



' Not in force. 
^ Not in force for the U.S. 
' Not applicable to Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. 

■■ Subject to ratification. 



CHROI^OLOGY: 

narch 1979 



Mar. 1 U.S. and P.R.C. exchange Ambas- 
sadors and establish Embassies in 
Beijing and Washington. DC. 
George M. Seignious II confirmed by 

the Senate to be ACDA Director. 
Israeli Prime Minister Begin visits the 

U.S. Mar. 1-8. 
Spain holds parliamentary elections, 
and Prime Minister Suarez's 
Democratic Center Union party 
wins 168 seats — 8 short of a 
majority. 

Mar. 2 Secretary Blumenthal and P.R.C. Fi- 
nance Minister Zhang initial 
agreement on settlement of finan- 
cial claims in Beijing. 

Mar. 3 President Carter meets with Canadian 
Prime Minister Trudeau in Wash- 
ington. DC. and affirms U.S. 
commitment to complete the Alas- 
kan oil pipeline. 
French President Giscard returns to 
France from visit to Mexico (Feb. 
28-Mar. 3). 

Mar. 4 Iran breaks diplomatic relations with 
South Africa. 

Mar. 5 Israeli Cabinet approves U.S. pro- 
posals for compromise in peace 
treaty negotiations. 
P.R.C. announces that it has begun 
withdrawing troops from Vietnam. 

Mar. 6 South Africa formally rejects a 
cease-fire proposal by U.N. Secre- 



69 

tary General Waldheim to help 
transition to majority rule in 
Namibia. 
North and South Yemen agree to 
Arab League's call for a cease-fire. 

Mar. 7 President Carter and Secretary Vance 
visit Egypt and Israel and return to 
Washington, D.C., on Mar. 14 (for 
details, see p. 16). 

Mar 9 U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin visits 
India Mar. 9-15. 

Mar. 12 Luis Herrera Campins sworn in as 
President of Venezuela. 

Mar. 13 President Sadat approves proposed 
peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel. 
Maurice Bishop assumes control of 
the Government of Grenada 
through a coup d'etat. 

Mar. 14 Israeli Cabinet accepts compromises 
in the proposed peace treaty be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. 

Mar 15 Gen. Joao Baptista de Oliveira 
Figueiredo sworn in as President of 
Brazil. 
Egyptian Cabinet approves draft 
peace treaty. 

Mar. 15 A U.S. delegation consisting of the 
Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs Brzezinski, 
Deputy Secretary of Stale Chris- 
topher, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Jones, and 
Chip Carter visit Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan Mar. 16-19. On Mar. 19 
they visit Egypt before leaving the 
Middle East. From Cairo Deputy 
Secretary Christopher travels to 
Rome, Bonn, Paris, London, and 
Brussels Mar. 19-22, and the rest 
of the delegation returns to the 
U.S. on Mar. 19. 

Mar. 16 Kano accord, signed by all factions to 
the civil war in Chad, concludes 
the Kano conference of Mar. 
10-16. It dissolves the former gov- 
ernment in Chad and calls for new 
government consisting of all fac- 
tions and creates a demilitarized 
zone around N'Djamena where 
fighting erupted on Feb, 12. 

Mar. 18 Parliamentary elections held in Fin- 
land Mar. 18-19. The governing 
center-left coalition loses some 
seats but maintains a majority in 
Parliament; the conservatives make 
significant gains. A new govern- 
ment will not be formed for several 
weeks. 

Mar. 19 Secretary Vance attends proximity 
talks on Namibia Mar. 19-20 in 
New York. 
8th session of the Law of the Sea 
Conference opens in Geneva for 6 
weeks. 

Mar. 20 International Committee of the Red 
Cross appeals to all parties to 
Southern Rhodesian conflict to take 
immediate steps to end increased 
indiscriminate violence against 



70 

civilians and to permit the ICRC to 
carry out its humanitarian work. 

Mar. 21 Vice President Mondale visits Brazil 
and Venezuela Mar. 21-24. 

Mar. 22 Israeli Parliament approves peace 
treaty with Egypt by vote of 95 to 
18 (Israeli time) 
U.K. Ambassador to the Netherlands 
Richard Sykes assassinated in The 
Hague. 

Mar. 23 Israeli Prime Minister Begin visits 
U.S. Mar. 23-29. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ap- 
proves export of 18.5 tons of 
slightly enriched uranium to India. 

Mar. 24 Egyptian President Sadat visits U.S. 
Mar. 24-29 and Germany Mar. 
29-30; returns to Egypt Mar. 30. 
Mahmoud Riad of Egypt resigns as 
Secretary General of the Arab 
League. 
U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko 
visits Syria Mar. 24-26. 

Mar. 25 Bomb explodes at U.S. Embassy in 
Damascus. Property damage is 
slight and no one is injured. 

Mar. 26 President Carter witnesses the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
signed by President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin in Washing- 
ton, DC. 

Mar. 27 OPEC decides to raise oil prices by 
9% on Apr. 1. 

Mar. 28 U.K. Prime Minister Callaghan's 
Labor government is defeated by a 
formal no-confidence vote of 3 1 1 
to 310 by the House of Commons. 
On Mar. 29 the Queen, acting on 
the advice of the Prime Minister, 
orders general elections for May 3. 
U.N. Security Council condemns 
South Africa for invasions of An- 
gola by a vote of 12 to (U.S., 
U.K., and France abstain). 
Jordan recalls its Ambassador to 
Egypt. 

Mar. 29 Egypt announces its intention to 
withdraw its diplomatic mission 
from Jordan. 
U.S. and Canada sign four agree- 
ments concerning fishing and ma- 
rine issues. 
Italian Prime Minister Andreotti 
presents a new coalition Cabinet to 
Parliament. 
Senate approves legislation estab- 
lishing informal relations with 
Taiwan by a vote of 85 to 4 and 
sends bill to President Carter to be 
signed. 

Mar. 30 Shah of Iran arrives in the Bahamas. 
North and South Yemen agree to 
unite their countries. 



Hie Verdet becomes Prime Minister 
of Romania. 

Iran holds a 2-day referendum in 
which Iranians vote approval of the 
proposal for the country to become 
an Islamic republic. 
Mar. 31 At an Arab League meeting in 
Baghdad, 18 Arab countries and 
the PLO declare a total economic 
boycott of Egypt, suspend Egypt's 
membership in the League, an- 
nounce withdrawal of their ambas- 
sadors to Egypt, and recommend 
complete cessation of diplomatic 
ties within a month. 

Italian Prime Minister Andreotti 
submits the resignation of his coal- 
ition government after the Senate 
defeats a confidence motion by a 
vote of 150 to 149. D 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



March 16April 12 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of Slate, 
Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Dale Subject 

•73 3/16 International Radio Consult- 
ative Committee (CCIR), 
study group 9, Apr. 10. 

•74 3/16 Statement on the death of 
Jean Monnet. 

t75 3/17 Vance: statement on 

Rhodesia. 
76 3/18 Vance: interview on CBS- 

TV's "Face the Nation." 

*77 3/20 Joan M. Clark sworn in as 
Ambassador to Malta 
(biographic data). 

*78 3/20 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and De- 
velopment, working group 
on UN/OECD investment 
undertakings, Apr. 17. 

•79 3/20 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO, Subcom- 
mittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on standards of 
training and walchkeeping, 
Apr. 18. 

•80 3/21 Conference on U.S. vital 

interests in the Middle 
East, Pittsburgh, Apr. 3. 

•81 3/26 U.S., Korea amend air trans- 
port agreement. Mar. 22. 

•82 3/29 Secretary Vance and Cana- 



•83 



88 



•89 



•90 



•96 

97 

•98 



•99 



3/29 



t84 


3/29 


•85 


3/29 


•86 

•87 


3/29 
3/29 



3/30 



88A 3/30 



3/29 



4/4 



•91 
•92 


4/4 
4/4 


•93 


4/4 


•94 


4/11 


•95 


4/11 



4/11 
4/11 

4/12 



4/12 



Department of State Bulleti 

dian Ambassador Towi 
sign four agreements. 

Loren E. Lawrence sworn in 
as Ambassador to Jamaica 
(biographic data). 

U.S. -Canadian consultations 
on Garrison diversion unit. 

sec, SOLAS, working group 
on the carriage of danger 
ous goods, Apr. 19. 

sec, May 1. 

International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), study 
group 1, Apr. 24. 

Vance: address at the 
Northwest regional confer- 
ence, Seattle, on Third 
World development. 

Vance: question-and-answet 
session following Seattle 
address. 

Vance: statement before thi 
Foreign Operations Sub 
committee of the Housi 
Appropriations Committee 
on foreign assistance. 

Richard Elliot Benedick 
sworn in as State Depart 
ment Coordinator of 
Population Affairs (biog- 
raphic data). 

CCIR, study group 7, May 2. 

sec, committee on oceani 
dumping. May 15. 

Vance: remarks on the 30thl 
anniversary of NATO. 

U.S., Brazil amend textili 
agreement. Mar. 27 

Advisory Committee on Pri 
vate International Law, 
subgroup on recognitioni 
and enforcement of foreign! 
judgments. May 9. 

U.S., Jamaica sign air trans 
port agreement. Apr. 4. 

Vance: statement before thei 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty. 

Paul C. Warnke, Special 
Consultant to the Secretary 
for SALT negotiations and 
arms control, to address 
conference on U.S. secu 
rity and the Soviet chal- 
lenge, Des Moines, Apr 
20. 

Paul C. Warnke to address 
conference on U.S. secu- 
rity and the Soviet chal- 
lenge, Albuquerque, Apr. 
25. D 



• Not printed in the Bulletin. 
t Held for a later issue. 



I]\DEX 



lAY 1979 

OL. 79, NO. 2026 

frica 

hronology: March 1979 69 

romoling Peace in Southern Rhodesia 

(Moose) 45 

outhern Rhodesia (Department statement) - .46 

,S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 

rms Control 

iterview on "Face the Nation" ( Vance) . . . .39 

uestion-and-Answer Session Following Seattle 

j Address ( Vance) 37 

ALT II and the National Defense (Brown, 

Brzezinski) 48 

sla. Chronology; March 1979 69 

usiness. U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 
hina. Interview on "Face the Nation"' 

(Vance) 39 

ommunications. Summaries of U.S. State- 
ments in the U.N 64 

ongress 

hronology: March 1979 69 

romoling Peace in Southern Rhodesia 

(Moose) 45 

S, Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 

S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 

Treaty (Brown. Carter, Vance) 55 

epartment and the Foreign Service. 

Chronology: March 1979 69 

eveloping Countries 

merica's Commitment to Third World De- 
velopment (Vance) 33 

uestion-and-Answer Session Following Seattle 

Address (Vance) 37 

conomics 

merica's Commitment to Third World De- 
velopment { Vance) 33 

uestion-and-Answer Session Following Seattle 
Address ( Vance) 37 

gypt 

chievement of Peace in the Middle East and the 

Future Challenge (Alherton) 61 

gypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace (Begin. 
Carter. Sadat, texts of documents and letters) 1 

gypt — A Profile 21 

gyptian Cabinet Approves Treaty (Carter) . . .3 
resident Carter Interviewed for Egyptian Tele- 
vision 31 

resident Carter Interviewed for Israeli Televi- 
sion 30 



President Carter Visits Egypt and Israel (Begin, 
Carter. Mondale, Navon. Sadat) 16 

U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty (Brown, Carter, Vance) 55 

Energy. America's Commitment to Third World 
Development (Vance) 33 

Europe. Chronology: March 1979 69 

Food. America's Commitment to Third World 
Development (Vance) 33 

Foreign Aid 

America's Commitment to Third World De- 
velopment (Vance) 33 

Nicaragua (Department spokesman's response to 
a question) 66 

Question-and-Answer Session Following Seattle 
Address (Vance) 37 

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 

U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty (Brown, Carter. Vance) 55 

Human Rights 

Summaries of U.S. Statements in the U.N. .64 

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 

Israel 

Achievement of Peace in the Middle East and the 
Future Challenge (Atherton) 61 

Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace (Begin, 
Carter, Sadat, texts of documents and letters) 1 

Israel — A Profile 25 

Israeli Cabinet Approves Proposals (Carter) . . .2 

Israeli Knesset Approves Treaty (Carter) 4 

President Carter Interviewed for Egyptian Tele- 
vision 31 

President Carter Interviewed for Israeli Televi- 
sion 30 

President Carter Visits Egypt and Israel (Begin, 
Carter. Mondale. Navon. Sadat) 16 

U.S. and Israel Sign Memoranda of Agreement 
(Dayan. Vance) 60 

U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty (Brown, Carter, Vance) 55 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Chronol- 
ogy: March 1979 69 

Middle East 

Chronology: March 1979 69 

Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace (Begin, 
Carter, Sadat, texts of documents and 
letters) 1 

Interview on "Face the Nation" (Vance) . . . .39 

President Carter Interviewed for Egyptian Tele- 
vision 31 

President Carter Interviewed for Israeli Televi- 
sion 30 

Summaries of U.S. Statements in the U.N. . .64 

Nicaragua. Nicaragua (Department spokesman's 
response to a question) 66 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. SALT II 
and the National Defense (Brown, 
Brzezinski) 48 

Petroleum 

Interview on "Face the Nation" (Vance) . . . .39 



U.S. and Israel Sign Memoranda of Agreement 

(Dayan, Vance) 60 

Population. America's Commitment to Third 

World Development (Vance) 33 

Presidential Documents 

Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace 1 

Egyptian Cabinet Approves Treaty 3 

Israeli Cabinet Approves Proposals 2 

Israeli Knesset Approves Treaty 4 

President Carter Interviewed for Egyptian Tele- 
vision 31 

President Carter Interviewed for Israeli Televi- 
sion 30 

President Carter Visits Egypt and Israel 16 

U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 

Treaty 55 

Southern Rhodesia 

Promoting Peace in Southern Rhodesia 

(Moose) 45 

Southern Rhodesia (Department statement) . 46 
Trade. U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) . .42 
Treaties 

Current Actions 66 

Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace (Begin. 

Carter, Sadat, texts of documents and letters) I 

U.S. Support for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 

Treaty (Brown, Carter, Vance) 55 

United Nations 

Chronology: March 1979 69 

Summaries of U.S. Statements in the U.N. .64 

U.S.S.R. 

Interview on "Face the Nation" (Vance) ... .39 

SALT II and the National Defense (Brown. 

Brzezinski) 48 

Vietnam. Interview on "Face the Nation" 

(Vance) 39 

Zaire 

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Moose) 42 

Zaire — A Profile 44 



Name Index 



Atherton, Alfred L., Jr . 61 

Begin, Menahem 1.16 

Brown. Harold 48.55 

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 48 

Carter, President 1,2.3,4,16,30,31,55 

Dayan, Moshe 60 

Mondale, Walter F 16 

Moose, Richard M 42,45 

Navon, Yitzhak 16 

Sadat, Anwar al- 1.16 

Vance. Secretary 33,37,39,55,60 



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D^partmpnt 
of State 



-m of state -^^ J ^ 

buUetin 



Jmw /»r» 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2027 




Df*partntf*nt of State 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2027 / June 1979 



Cover Photo: 

Thomas O. Enders 
President Carter 
Secretary Vance 
Julius L. Katz 
Andrew Young 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers" Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



COl^TENTS 



1 THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: COMPARISONS AND 
INTERRELATIONS (Thomas O. Enders) 

2 Canada— A Profile 

7 Maritime Boundary and Resource Agreements (Thomas R. Pickering) 

8 Garrison Diversion Unit 

9 Visit of Prime Minister Trudeau (Joint Communique) 

10 U.S. -Canada Atlantic Coast Fisheries and Boundary Agreements (Joint Statement) 



THE PRESIDENT 

11 SALT il— The Path of Security and 

Peace 
14 News Conference of April 30 

THE SECRETARY 

16 Meeting the Challenges of a Changing 
World 

AFRICA 

20 U.S. Policy and Africa (David D. 

Newsom) 

21 Letter of Credence (Z-ewf/ioj 

21 GPO Sales Publications 

22 Southern Rhodesia (Secretary Vance) 

ARMS CONTROL 

23 SALT II Treaty Concluded (Harold 

Brown, Secretary Vance) 

24 The Facts of SALT II (Leslie H. Gelh) 

DEPARTMENT 

25 Reorganization of Foreign Assistance 

Programs (White House Announce- 
ment) 

EAST ASIA 

26 Taiwan Relations Act (President Car- 

ter) 

ECONOMICS 

27 Major Elements of the Multilateral 

Trade Negotiations (Julius L. Katz) 

28 World Trade Week (President Carter. 

Secretary Vance) 

29 MTN Agreements (President Carter) 

30 Multilateral Trade Negotiations 

(Foreign Relations Outline) 

31 U.S. Export Policy (Richard N. 

Cooper) 
34 The Evolving International Monetary 
System (Anthony M. Solomon) 

EUROPE 

36 12th Report on Cyprus (Message to the 

Congress) 

MIDDLE EAST 

37 The Peace Treaty and Its Aftermath 

(Harold H. Saunders) 



38 Egypt and the ECWA (Department 

Statement) 

39 Yemen (William R. Crawford) 

OCEANS 

41 Law of the Sea Conference (Elliot L. 

Richardson) 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

42 President's Report on Science and 

Technology 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

45 Restraining Conventional Arms Trans- 

fers (Leslie H. Gelh) 

SOUTH ASIA 

46 India-U.S. Joint Commission Meet- 

ing (Joint Communique) 

UNITED NATIONS 

47 Serving American Foreign Policy Inter- 

ests (Andrew Young) 

51 FY 1980 Appropriations for Interna- 
tional Organizations and Conferences 
(Charles William Maynes) 

56 FY 1980 Appropriations for Voluntary 
Contributions and the OAS (Charles 
William Maynes) 

62 Southeast Asia (Richard Petree. An- 
drew Young) 

65 Namibia (Western Five Statements) 

TREATIES 

65 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

67 April 1979 i,).;; 1^:^.-,.,. 

PRESS RELEASES 

68 Department of State |||| - Q 'r~l 

69 U.S. U.N. *" 

PUBLICATIONS DEPOSITORY 

70 GPO Sales 

70 Congressional Documents 

INDEX 



Canada's Trade 

(Billion U.S. $) 



50 t— 



4 5 



40 — 



3 5 



30 



25 



20 



1 5 



1 



Total Exports 
Exports to U.S. 



Total Imports 

Imports from 

U.S. 4 5.3 



40.9 



38.138.0 



3 2.3 



2 4.8 




4 3.5 



1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197 



June 1979 



THE LWITED STATES AND CAI^ADA: 
COMPARISONS AND INTERRELATIONS 



by Thomas O. Enders 

Remarks at Stanford University on 
May 3. 1979. 

Clearly we've been doing something 
right these past couple ot years in 
Canada-U.S. relations. Two months 
ago Externa! Affairs Minister Jamieson 
said our relations "had seldom been 
better." Secretary of State Vance made 
the same comment shortly before. 
People all up and down the border find 
that we have come much closer to each 
other, work better together, and are 
having much success in solving our 
joint problems and taking advantage of 
our joint opportunities. 

You'll say, why not? After all, 
aren't Canada and the United States 
two of the most compatible societies in 
the world dedicated to the same vision 
of individual freedom, each built by 
immigrants from Europe, each blessed 
by those rarest endowments in the late 
20th century: space and resources? 

Sure, our political systems are 
structured quite differently, but our 
political values are almost the same. 
Sure, our individual interests are rarely 
identical, but there is almost always a 
substantial overlap. We trade more 
with each other, see more of each 
other, than any other peoples on Earth. 
We are the only two peoples to have a 
fully integrated common defense of our 
territories. We can be for each other 
models for social change, as Canada is 
now for the States in health insurance, 
and the United States may be for 
Canada in freedom of information. In 
practically every aspect of life we de- 
pend on each other more than other 
peoples. 

Yet we know that our interdepend- 
ence is not always free of stress. It 
comes out in Canadian fears that the 
United States will use its enormous 
weight to achieve a bargaining advan- 
tage. Or in U.S. concern that Canada 
will be able to assert that its smaller 
size exempts it from common obliga- 
tions in economics or defense. Or in 
charges of being taken for granted by 
the other country, as many Canadians 
felt up until recently and as Americans 
felt in the early 1970"s. Or in worries 
on both sides of the border that the 
burdens and benefits of common 
enterprises — pollution control, the auto 
pact, other trading arrangements, the 



seaway, the pipeline — will not be fairly 
shared between us. 

Quite clearly our interdependence 
can be enormously productive of 
wealth and progress. But I think it is 
the beginning of wisdom in our re- 
lationship to realize that increased 
interdependence can also bring tension 
between us. 

The "Special Relationship" 

The history of the "special relation- 
ship" makes the point. Both Canadians 
and Americans used that term to de- 
scribe their relationship from the Sec- 
ond World War until the early 1970's. 
No one ever defined the "special re- 
lationship" but its main features are 
well known: 

• The closest collaboration in inter- 
national affairs and defense (including 
the fully integrated North American Air 
Defense Command system); 

• Intensive two-way trade and in- 
vestment (the U.S. share of Canada's 
trade held steady at a high level — about 
70%— as has the U.S. share of all 
domestic and foreign investment in 
Canada — at about 40%); and 

• Access by Canada to exceptional 



economic arrangements the United 
States made available to no other 
country (exemption from oil import 
quotas, from capital export regulations, 
from buy-American rules on defense 
procurement). 

There can be no doubt about the 
great benefits each country drew from 
the special relationship. Canada's 
economy grew explosively during this 
period and became a more and more 
indispensable element in U.S. prosper- 
ity. The joint security arrangements 
helped keep the peace. Exchanges of 
people and ideas advanced enormously. 

Then the reaction set in. It came first 
in Canada, in the mid-l960"s, triggered 
by the Vietnam war. For the first time 
in more than a century, the great 
majority of Canadians found them- 
selves disagreeing fundamentally with 
what the United States was doing. And 
that disagreement sensitized Canadians 
astonishingly rapidly to how dependent 
they were on U.S. investment capital 
and U.S. media, which commanded the 
biggest audiences for radio, television, 
and news magazines. 

Within short order the Canadian 
Government moved to distance itself 
from U.S. foreign policy (in its open- 



U.S. AMBASSADOR 
TO CANADA 

Thomas O. Enders was born in Hartford. 
Connecticut, on November 28, 1931. He 
graduated first in his class with a B.A. de- 
gree in history and economics from Yale 
(1953), took a Doctor of University degree 
in colonial history from the University of 
Paris (1955). and received an M.A. degree 
in economics from Harvard (1957). 

Ambassador Enders entered the Foreign 
Service in 1958 and was assigned to the De- 
partment's Bureau of Intelligence and Re- 
search. In 1960 he was assigned to Stock- 
holm. He subsequently served in the Bureau 
of European Affairs, as Special Assistant to 
the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
and in 1968 became Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for International Monetary Affairs in 
the Bureau of Economic Affairs. 

He became Deputy Chief of Mission at 
the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade in 1969 and 
at Phnom Penh in January 1971; at the latter 
post, he served as Charge d'Affaires ad 
interim beginning in September 1973. Am- 




bassador Enders was Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs from July 
1974 until February 5. 1976. when he was 
sworn in as Ambassador to Canada. 



Department of State Bulleti 



CANADA— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 3.851,809 sq. mi. (second largest 

country in the world). 
Capital: Ottawa (pop. 693,288). 
Other Cities: Toronto (2.803 million), 

Montreal (2.802 million). Vancouver 

(1 .2 million). 

People 

Population: 23.6 million (1978). 

Annual Growth Rate: 1.3%. 

Density: 6.4 per sq. mi. (one of the lowest 

densities in the world). 
Religions: Roman Catholic (46%), United 

Church of Canada (18%), Anglican (12%). 
Languages: English, French. 
Literacy: 99%>. 
Life Expectancy: 69 yrs. (males), 76 yrs. 

(females). 

Government 

Type: Confederation with parliamentary de- 
mocracy. 

Date of Constitution: July I, 1867. 

Branches: Executive — Queen of England 
(Chief of State, represented by Governor 
General). Prime Minister (Head of Gov- 
ernment). Legislative — bicameral Parlia- 
ment (104-Member Senate. 282-Member 



House of Commons). Judicial — Supreme 
Court. 

Political Parties: Liberal. Progressive Con- 
servative, New Democratic, Social Credit. 

Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 10 Provinces, 2 
Territories. 

Economy 

GNP: $202 billion (1978). 

Annual Growth Rate: 3.4% (1978). 

Per Capita GNP: $7,032 (1978). 

Agriculture: Products — wheat, livestock and 
meat, feedgrains, oilseeds, dairy products, 
tobacco, fruits, vegetables. 

Industry: Products — motor vehicles and 
parts, fish and forest products, petroleum 
and natural gas, processed and unproc- 
essed minerals. 

Natural Resources: Metals and minerals, 
fish, forests, wildlife. 

Trade: Exports~S45.i billion (1978): motor 
vehicles and parts, lumber, wood pulp and 
newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, 
natural gas. crude petroleum, and wheal. 
Partners (1978)— U.S. (70.2%), EC 
(8.4%), Japan (5.9%), and Latin America 
(4.6%). Imports— S4i. 5 billion (1978): 
motor vehicles and parts, industrial 
machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals, 
and agricultural machinery. Partners 
(1978)— U.S. (70.5%), EC (7.3%), Japan 
(4,9%), and Latin America (4.6%). 



Official Exchange Rate: (floating) approx. 
C$.87 = U.S. $1.00 (May 1979). 

Economic Aid Extended: Total official and 
private resource flow (1976) — $2.4 bil- 
lion; official development assistance 
(1976)— $886 million. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N.. NATO. OECD. British Common- 
wealth. International Energy Agency 
(lEA). Agency For Cultural and Technical 
Cooperation. 

Principal Government 
Officials 

Canada: Prime Minister — Joe Clark; Secretary 
of State for External Affairs — Flora Mac- 
Donald; Ambassador to the U.S. — Peter 
Towe. 

United States: Ambassador to Canada — 
Thomas O. Enders. 



Taken from the Department of State's 
Background Note on Canada to be pub- 
lished in the summer of 1979. Copies of the 
complete Note may be purchased for 70i 
from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is al- 
lowed when ordering 100 or more Notes 
mailed to the same address). 



ing to China and radical Third World 
countries), downgrade its contribution 
to joint defense, screen incoming in- 
vestment, limit energy flows, and limit 
access by U.S. media. In 1972 Canada 
adopted a formal policy of diversifying 
its foreign relations so as to diminish 
its dependence on the United States 
(the so-called third option). 

American reaction against the special 
relationship came in the early 1970's. 
With the two countries pulling apart on 
so many issues, there no longer ap- 
peared to be a compelling case for ex- 
ceptional treatment of Canadian eco- 
nomic interests. So when the United 
States imposed an import surcharge in 
1971 as part of the effort to devalue the 
U.S. dollar. Canada received no 
exemption. Washington added insult to 
injury by misspecifying Japan as the 
United States" number one trading 
partner. An explosion of exasperation 
followed in Canada. 

This mutual pulling apart made the 
first half of the 1970's a turbulent 
period in U.S. -Canada relations, 
marked by accumulation of irritants, by 
distrust, and occasionally by bitterness. 

Yet in retrospect the adjustment was 
not only necessary but sound. Not only 



was the special relationship inherently 
unequal, and thus inappropriate to the 
conduct of mature relations between 
Canada and the United States, but its 
enormous success produced perceived 
levels of dependency intolerable to 
Canadians and ultimately to Ameri- 
cans. 

By mid-decade conditions were ripe 
to begin constructing again a 
forward-looking relationship. The 
Vietnam war was over. The seemingly 
automatic prosperity of the 1960"s and 
early 1970's — that gave each side the 
impression it could do without the 
other — was also gone. Each side's ad- 
justments to the relationship were in 
place, but it was already clear that their 
scope would be self-limiting. Canada 
had new formal links with the Euro- 
pean Community and Japan, but they 
were not even marginally a substitute 
for the economic connection with the 
States. And the challenge to Canadian 
unity gave both countries a new motive 
for making their relationship work 
well. 

It is against this background that 
President Carter and Prime Minister 
Trudeau set out to build Canada-U.S. 
cooperation anew. And the last 2 years 



have been remarkably rich in achieve- 
ment. Not only have the old irritants 
been largely bargained out — or at least 
neutralized — but there have been many 
major new successes: agreement to 
build the Alaska pipeline together, the 
biggest tariff reduction and trade reg- 
ulating deal we've ever reached, 
agreement on east coast fisheries and 
boundary arbitration, an innovative 
new accord on the Great Lakes 
cleanup, and revision of St. Lawrence 
Seaway toll structure. And we are 
working together on replacement of 
Canada's fighter planes. 

Let me see whether I can articulate 
some of the lessons implicit in this 
cycle and in the structure of our re- 
lationship. 

Basic Objectives 

and Mutual Confidence 

First, it is clear that some of the 
basic objectives of each society cannot 
be attained unless we attain them to- 
gether. We can't complete the Great 
Lakes cleanup nor begin to control 
two-way air pollution, nor stimulate 
productivity and fight inflation by 
freeing up trade, nor make our separate 



line 1979 



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Canadian Exports to U.S. by Category, 1971-77* 



CRUDE MATERIALS 



FABRICATED MATERIALS 



Crude Petroleum 


8.5% 


Natural Gas 


4.2% 


Iron Ore and 




Concentrates 


1.5% 


Asbestos 


0.5% 


Nonferrous Ore 




and Concentrates 


1.4% 


Other 


2.9% 



Forest Products 


17.4% 


Chemicals 


3.4% 


Coal and Petroleum 




Products 


2.0% 


Iron and Steel 




Products 


2.1% 


Nonferrous 




Metals and Alloys 


4.6% 


Other 


3.7% 




END PRODUCTS 



FOOD PRODUCTS 



Automobiles and 




Live Animals 


0.4% 


Parts 


27.1% 


Whiskey 


1.0% 


Industrial Machinery 


2.2% 


Fish and Fishery 




Aircraft and Pa-'ts 


1.4% 


Products 


1.3% 


Farm Machinery and 




Other 


1.7% 


Tractors 


1.7% 






Communication and 








Related Equipment 


0.9% 






Other 


8.3% 







'As percentage of total Canadian exports to U.S., average over 
period 1971-77. (Percentages for the segments in the main circle 
do not add to 100 because special transactions are excluded. This 
category includes items such as private donations of goods, settlers' 
effects, and imports for diplomats.) 

SOURCE: "Canada-United States Relations," Vol. II, Canadian Standing 
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 1978. 



Department of State Bulletit 

energy systems more efficient, nor tak6 
full advantage of the 200-mile eco- 
nomic zone offshore unless we do it td 
gether. 

Second, without an atmosphere of 
mutual confidence we will not be able 
to take advantage of these opportuni- 
ties. In the late 1960's, powerful 
voices on both sides of the border ar- 
gued that neither Canada nor the 
United States should put itself in thrall 
to the other by building a cross-Canada 
oil pipeline. In the suspicious ambiance 
of the time, these voices prevailed. The 
United States lost arguably the best 
option for moving Alaskan oil to deficit 
markets in the lower 48 States, and 
Canada lost a major source of employ 
ment and revenue. Now both countries' 
are seeking to patch together second 
and third best solutions to the same 
problem. 



Mutual Dependency 

Third, confidence depends in turn on 
respect for our mutual dependency. 
This means that we should consult be- 
fore we act, a commonplace observa- 
tion but only in the 1970's a common 
practice. That means we should try to 
use our consultation to accommodate, 
and this is only now coming. 

Less obviously, but no less impor- 
tantly, that means we shouldn't link 
unrelated issues. No doubt as a matter 
of practical politics, both the United 
States and the Canadian Cabinets are 
going to want to think twice before 
giving a concession if their interests on 
a range of other subjects are being 
clobbered. But formal links — say be- 
tween two environmental questions — 
can only violate the interests of the 
communities concerned. If frequently 
practised, linkage could bring the 
whole relationship to a halt. 



Cooperative Action 

Fourth, we should choose our targets 
for cooperative action with perspicac- 
ity, to be sure the benefits really out- 
weigh the cost of greater mutual de- 
pendency. 

There will always be thorough-going 
nationalists — on both sides of the 
border — to argue that any cooperative 
agreement involves more cost in lost 
independence than gain in other meas- 
ures of welfare. Most Canadians and 
most Americans disagree with that ar- 
gument, and with good reason. Without 
Canada-U.S. cooperative action, De- 
troit and Cleveland could never have 
persuaded the Congress to finance 
municipal waste treatment plants for 



1979 



hem. Without the seaway, the de- 
clopment of the Great Lakes economy 
Aduid have been much slower. Without 
lie auto pact, cars would be tar more 
'\pensive in Canada, and the U.S. in- 
luslry would be less efficient. For most 
)l us, the gains in these great projects 
^\\amp the cost. 

But the corresponding argument of 
.he thorough-going internationalists on 
-loth sides of the border — that whatever 
IS done together is ipso facto better — 
:.in also be wrong. 

There may not be very many, or in- 
iced any, industrial sectors beyond 
.lilt OS in which the payoff from 
rationalization induced by free trade is 
so great as to outweigh the inevitable 
iKL'uments between us on whether the 
benefits are being fairly shared. Even 
III the auto pact, which has generated 
an astounding real annual increase in 
tv\o-way trade of 22% for the last 14 
\ears, the constituency on both sides of 
the border remains thin, and periodic, 
abrasive controversies on sharing break 
out. 

Nor is it at all evident that a north- 
south free trade area — an idea that 
comes back occasionally in both 
countries — would yield enough eco- 
nomic benefit to justify the political 
costs. With the application of the re- 
sults of the most recent multilateral 
trade negotiations, U.S. tariffs on duti- 
able industrial imports from Canada 
will fall to an average 4%, with 80% of 
imports duty free. Canada's average 
tariff on imports from the United States 
will be 9%, with 65% coming in with- 
out duty. 

A free trade area would do away 
with these residual barriers. But it 
would cut across the vocation we both 
have to be worldwide traders. And it 
might seem to promise a reciprocal re- 
sponsibility for each other's well-being 
beyond what either country could 
realistically — or would — live up to. 

Similar care is required in the energy 
field. There is a lot we can do together 
to make our separate energy systems 
more efficient — joint oil storage, in- 
creased trade in electricity, cooperation 
in transporting Alaska oil into the U.S. 
Midwest, and use of surplus Canadian 
refinery capacity to meet U.S. 
shortfalls in gasoline. Augmented 
Canadian sales of gas and U.S. sales of 
coal are important to both countries. 
But proposals to create a "'North 
American energy market," which oc- 
casionally surface in the United States, 
are likely only to arouse American ex- 
pectations that cannot be met and stir 
up Canadian fears that are difficult to 
put to rest. After all, such proposals do 
not increase the availability of energy 



Canadian Imports from the U.S. by Category, 1971-77* 



FABRICATED MATERIALS 



FOOD PRODUCTS 

Grains 

Nuts, Fruits, and 

Vegetables 
Other 



0.2% 



CRUDE MATERIALS 



Coal 
Other 



Forest Products 
Fabric and Textile 

Materials 
Chemicals 
Petroleum and Coal 

Products 
Nonferrous Metals 

and Alloys 
Other 




2.0% 

1.4% 
5.2% 

0.6% 

1.4% 
6.7% 



END PRODUCTS ^^f^Oc/ucts — 32.3°'° 



Industrial Machinery 


10.0% 


Farm Machinery 




and Tractors 


3.9% 


Automobiles and 




Parts 


32.3% 


Aircraft and Parts 


2.1% 


Communications and 




Related Equipment 


2.5% 


Electronic 




Computers 


1.5% 


Other 


17.4% 



'As percentage of total Canadian exports to U.S., average over 
period 1971-77. (Percentages for the segments in the main circle 
do not add to 100 because special transactions are excluded. This 
category includes items such as private donations of goods, settlers' 
effects, and imports for diplomats.) 

SOURCE: "Canada-United States Relations," Vol. II, Canadian Standing 
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 1978. 



in North America, but they do set us to 
arguing over its distribution. 

Interdependence 

That leads me to a fifth reflection. 
Canada-U.S. relations will not work 
well if we feel that we are prisoners of 
our interdependence, not its masters. 

How can we retain control? There 
are a variety of means. One is to rec- 
ognize the need for such national 
safeguards as Canada's Foreign In- 
vestment Review Act (FIRA) and the 
United States' countervailing duty au- 
thorities. It was feared that FIRA might 
act as a barrier to new incoming in- 
vestment in Canada. But rather it has 
applied its mandate — to assure benefit 
to Canada in investment proposals. Its 
current approval rate of 90% is an indi- 
cation of the quality of proposals it re- 
ceives. I can understand how Canada, 
relying as heavily as it does on outside 
investment, feels the need for having 
such a mechanism to insure that its 
interests are identified and met. 

Similarly. I don't see how the United 
States could cut its tariff protection to- 
ward Canada, as low as it has. and not 
retain the means of protecting itself 
against unfair competition from sub- 
sidized imports. This is particularly 
true, given the widespread use of sub- 
sidies as an instrument of industrial 
policy in Canada. 

That doesn't mean that any national 
safeguard, however applied, should be 
acceptable. Clearly some can be cause 
for quarrel in themselves. The practice 
of random deletion of Canadian origin 
TV commercials broadcast by U.S. 
border stations — the manipulation of a 
signal originating in the United 
States — is a case that comes to mind. 
Others, such as FIRA and countervail- 
ing duties, could become highly con- 
tentious if applied unfairly or exces- 
sively. 

Where safeguards are needed, two 
procedures should be followed. 

• We should look for a solution to 
the problem that expands our ex- 
changes rather than cuts into them. For 
example, some Canadians have pro- 
posed a discriminatory tax on cinemas 
showing U.S. films as a means of fur- 
ther stimulating Canada's developing 
film industry and asserting Canada's 
cultural identity. But such a measure 



which could have led to a "film war," 
and Canada's industry cannot prosper 
without access to the American market. 
Thus the American Motion Picture As- 
sociation is promoting distribution of 
additional Canadian-made feature films 
in the United States as an alternative. 

• We should make the safeguards 
subject to agreed international disci- 
pline. That's what is now happening on 
countervailing duties and subsidies and 
has already happened through the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development with regard to na- 
tional treatment for investors once they 
are permitted to establish. 

But the most difficult of control 
problems are those involving adjust- 
ment of major deals between us. Clas- 
sically, our most important agreements 
have no reopener clause. But the world 
changes and interests change, and the 
dangers of rigidity have to be balanced 
off against the advantages of stability. 

Recently we've made some progress 
in this difficult, delicate area. Despite 
the fact that whole port systems were 
built on the basis of the original St. 
Lawrence toll structure, we were able 
to agree last year on modifying them, 
in order to cover rising costs. 

The provisions of the newly signed 
agreement on east coast fisheries and 
boundaries are innovative in this re- 
gard. The agreement is permanent, yet 
either party can ask for renegotiation of 
the catch split every 10 years. How- 
ever, the treaty puts an absolute limit 
on the cumulative change in percent- 
ages that can be negotiated. 

I'm not suggesting the reopener in 
the east coast treaty should be copied 
elsewhere; it's controversial itself. But 
proper allowance for change within an 
overall framework of stable bargains is 
clearly one area of unfinished business 
in the relationship. 

Style and Institutions 

My sixth and last point concerns 
style and institutions. 

The Constitutions of both countries 
give exclusive responsibility for the 
conduct of the relationship to the Fed- 
eral governments. Yet clearly not only 
are the Federal executives, the Parlia- 
ment, and the Congress involved but 
increasingly the Provinces and States. 



Department of State Bulletin 

as well as a mass of new actors — '■ 
environmental groups, labor unions,: 
businesses, and so forth. 

One implication is that we have to 
conduct our relations far more openly 
than before, using the media as ai 
means to inform and engage the players, 
on both sides. During the special re- 
lationship, an effort was made by offi- 
cials to vestpocket our affairs, and the 
concept was even formalized in the 
Merchant-Heeney principles for 
partnership of June 1965, which typi- 
cally appeared just as the reaction to 
the special relationship was about to set 
in. Such an attempt is not only impos- 
sible now, it would be damaging. 

Another implication is that diplo- 
macy must now include the Provinces 
and States. That does not mean that 
either Ottawa or Washington should 
attempt to contract business with the 
States or the Provinces; that would 
violate the Constitutions. But each 
capital can and is developing its liaison 
with other governments in its own 
country. And informal contacts be- 
tween the Provinces and the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Ottawa and the States and the 
Canadian Embassy in Washington can 
prevent misunderstanding and expedite 
our affairs. 

There is no way one can codify 
Canada-U.S. relations, and this is not 
an effort to do so. We are continuously 
evolving new procedures to meet new 
opportunities or problems. 

And no doubt we will have a new set 
of problems in the 1980's. Industrial 
development and technology are bound 
to be among them; perhaps they will be 
the central issues. Both societies are 
dissatisfied with the rate at which they 
are generating industrial innovation, 
and it is increasingly clear that for 
both, success or failure in energy will 
depend on technological change. Tech- 
nology may thus define quite new op- 
portunities for cooperation as well as 
new areas for rivalry. 

During the 1970's the United States 
learned a lot more not only about 
Canada but how it behaves in relating 
to Canada. I think Canada has had a 
similar experience. With that 
knowledge — and the sense that we've 
achieved something in the 
relationship — we should be exception- 
ally well placed to meet the challenges 
of the 1980's. n 



June 1979 



ilfarilitiii* Bouutitiry 
and Rfsourcv Agrecntents 



by Thomas R. Pickering 

Address before the Oceans Policy 
Forum in Washington. D.C., on April 
5, 1979. Mr. Pickering is .4ssistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 

On March 29, 1979. Secretary 
Vance and the Canadian Ambassador. 
Peter Towe, signed important maritime 
agreements relating to both the Pacific 
and Atlantic coasts. I would like to de- 
scribe those agreements briefly for 
you. review the background of their 
negotiation, and comment on the 
necessity for the arrangements encom- 
passed by them. 

The agreements relating to Pacific 
coast fisheries were contained in a 
protocol amending the Pacific halibut 
convention and in an exchange of dip- 
lomatic notes under which U.S. 
fishermen will be allowed to catch 
3.250 metric tons of groundfish off the 
coast of British Columbia in each of 
the next two 12-month periods. Under 
the amended halibut convention. Cana- 
dian fishermen will take 2 million 
pounds of halibut in the U.S. zone this 
year and 1 million pounds the follow- 
ing year. 

The west coast agreements, in es- 
sence, phase out reciprocal commercial 
fishing over a 2-year period but provide 
for continued joint management of the 
halibut resource in the bilateral Inter- 
national Pacific Halibut Commission. 
Reciprocal sport fishing in accordance 
with State and local laws and regula- 
tions is also provided for. 

Maritime Boundaries 

The maritime dispute in the Beaufort 
Sea and the disputed Pacific boundaries 
in the Dixon Entrance and Juan de Fuca 
areas have not been resolved. The area 
claimed by both sides in the Beaufort 
Sea, although large, is not of any pres- 
ent fisheries importance. The areas of 
overlapping claims in the Pacific are 
much smaller and of relatively little 
importance in fisheries terms. 

Also signed on March 29 was an 
east coast fisheries agreement and a 
treaty committing the two governments 
to resolve, by third-party means, the 
disputed maritime boundary in the Gulf 
of Maine area. Two related agreements 
were signed with the boundary settle- 
ment treaty. The first sets out in 



elaborate detail the method and proce- 
dures for submission of the delimita- 
tion of the maritime boundary in the 
Gulf of Maine area to a chamber of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The other agreement describes, in 
similar detail, arrangements for sub- 
mission of the issue to an ad hoc Court 
of Arbitration of agreed members 
should it prove impossible to proceed 
before a chamber of the ICJ. Our pre- 
ferred method of settling the boundary 
is by a chamber of the ICJ. In the ICJ 
process, although the special chamber 
would do the actual work, the award 
would be an award of the ICJ. This 
could be — if we are able to go the ICJ 
route — the first instance in which a 
case submitted to that Court's jurisdic- 
tion by the United States would be de- 
cided by the Court. 

Fisheries Resources 

Related to the boundary settlement 
treaty is the agreement between Canada 
and the United States on east coast 
fisheries resources which will enter 
into effect simultaneously with the 
boundary settlement treaty. The 
fisheries agreement will endure beyond 
the actual delimitation of the maritime 
boundary — a process which may itself 
require several years for completion. 

The boundary settlement treaty, with 
its two alternative agreements, like the 
west coast arrangements on halibut and 
groundfish. is not. as far as I am 
aware, controversial or opposed by 
concerned segments of our society or 
economy. The east coast fishery 
agreement on the other hand is 
controversial. 

Although I cannot here now re- 
capitulate the entire process which led 
to the signing of the fishery agreement, 
it is worthwhile to keep in mind the 
background against which we under- 
took the negotiations. 

Background to Negotiations 

Historically we lived in a world 
where national jurisdiction, in any 
form, did not extend beyond 3 miles. It 
was only in 1964 that the United States 
established a 9-mile contiguous 
fisheries zone, thereby extending U.S. 
jurisdiction (for fisheries purposes 
only) out to 12 miles. The 1958 Conti- 
nental Shelf convention, which we 
ratified in 1961. entered into force in 



June 1964. Even then, we did not ac- 
tually delimit shelf claims. We did, 
however, discuss shelf delimitation 
with our Canadian neighbors, and we 
discovered that we had differing opin- 
ions on our shelf boundaries. In 1970, 
we began negotiations, without any 
success, to resolve the shelf bound- 
aries, particularly the North Atlantic 
one since there was even then consid- 
erable interest in hydrocarbon explora- 
tion and exploitation on the Georges 
Bank. 

Throughout the early 1970"s pressure 
grew for extension of U.S. fisheries 
jurisdiction to 200 miles. Following 
passage of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976, we 
again tried to resolve by negotiation 
our maritime boundary differences with 
Canada. We have not yet succeeded, 
although the treaty signed last week 
provides for resolution of the dispute in 
the Gulf of Maine area. Of the four 
boundaries in dispute, it is the one that 
is most contentious, and it most affects 
exploitation and management of our 
two countries" fishery resources. The 
overlap in the two countries" claims is 
very large and encompasses extremely 
productive fishing grounds. 

Since passage of the Fishery Conser- 
vation and Management Act, it has be- 
come increasingly apparent that any 
logical or effective management of 
transboundary east coast fishery re- 
sources requires, as a sine qua non, 
agreement with Canada on who will 
manage each stock; what the shares of 
each country will be; and, to the extent 
that it is mutually beneficial, the 
amount and areas of any reciprocal 
fishing. Under the interim fisheries 
agreement we worked out for 1977. 
and also under a similar agreement for 
1978 which never was put into force, 
there were serious differences with the 
Canadians. A part of the problem re- 
lated to the rather special case of 
Pacific salmon fishing by Canadians 
off the Washington coast. More basic. 
however, on both coasts, was the dif- 
ference in management approaches and 
the resultant discord on management 
and sharing of transboundary stocks of 
fish. Canadian dissatisfaction with 
U.S. management of groundfish in the 
New England area was a primary cause 
of the collapse of the 1978 reciprocal 
and the cessation of reciprocal fishing. 

Even were there not a large disputed 
area of overlapping claims, the fact 
that several major fish stocks migrate 
back and forth across any conceivable 
boundary would preclude effective 
management of such stocks by either 
country acting independently. The 
overlap of claims also makes the divi- 
sion of catch extremely contentious. 



8 

The classic illustration of these man- 
agement and shares problems is what 
has happened with haddock and scal- 
lops during the past 2 years. 

Each side has formulated its own 
management regime for haddock (as 
well as cod and other species), Canada 
has repeatedly claimed that our regula- 
tions were not adequately conser- 
vationist. We have effectively raised 
the catch level on three occasions. In a 
thinly veiled "object lesson" Canada, 
in late 1978. allowed Canadian fisher- 



men to take very heavy harvests of 
haddock in the disputed area. 

In the case of scallops the United 
States has not yet implemented a man- 
agement plan, but U.S. efforts on 
Georges Bank scallops have increased 
remarkably in the past 2 years. Canada 
has become very alarmed both at the 
increased U.S. effort level and at the 
possible effect on the stocks. Similar 
problems and differences exist with re- 
gard to other species as well. 

Given this kind of situation, it is 



Garrison Diversion Unit 



On March 28, representatives of 
Canada and the United States met in 
Washington to discuss the recent de- 
velopments relating to the Garrison Di- 
version Unit — a multipurpose water 
project in the State of North Dakota. 

The meeting was requested by 
Canada to consult about the implica- 
tions for Canada of the Department of 
the Interior's recommendation to 
reauthorize the unit to include 96,300 
acres of irrigation. 

The revised Interior proposal, re- 
leased on March 7. would reduce the 
irrigation area to be covered by the 
project from 250.000 acres. The re- 
vised proposal will be reviewed by 
U.S. Government agencies in order to 
formulate an Administration position 
for presentation to the Congress. 

Canadian officials indicated that 
Canada remains concerned about the 
impact of the new plan. In particular 
they are concerned that the plan in- 
volves the transfer of water from the 
Missouri to the Hudson Bay drainage 
basin. In their view this would permit 
the introduction of new fish species, 
diseases, and parasites (foreign biota) 
into Manitoba waters, with detrimental 
effects on the multimillion dollar 
commercial, recreational, and native 
peoples fishery resource in Lake Man- 
itoba and Lake Winnipeg. They took 
the position that the plan should be 
modified to eliminate any transfers of 
water into the Hudson Bay drainage 
basin. 

They recalled that the International 
Joint Commission recommended in 
1977 that those parts of the project af- 
fecting Canada not be built until the 
problem of biota transfer had been 
satisfactorily resolved. They reminded 
the U.S. side of its commitment not to 
let a contract for the Lonetree Dam 



until consultations have been held on 
the report of the International Joint 
Commission. 

Canadian officials also noted that 
anything less than full implementation 
of the waterfowl mitigation plan, pro- 
posed in the revised plan, would lead 
to unacceptable waterfowl losses in 
Manitoba. They noted that the impact 
of the project on Manitoba in terms of 
flooding and water quality appeared to 
be substantially eliminated in the new 
plan, although there was insufficient 
information to predict all of the water 
quality implications. 

U.S. officials welcomed the detailed 
presentation of Canada's concerns. 
They also reiterated their previous as- 
surances to Canada that the United 
States would honor its obligations 
under the boundary waters treaty not to 
pollute to the injury of health or prop- 
erty in Canada and its past commitment 
that no construction potentially affect- 
ing Canada would be undertaken until 
it is clear that this obligation will be 
met. 

Both sides characterized the Wash- 
ington meeting as a useful step toward 
resolving questions surrounding the 
transboundary implications of the Gar- 
rison project. 

The United States undertook to give 
careful consideration to Canadian 
views and to the report of the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission and to take 
them into full account in the Adminis- 
tration's review of the Department of 
the Interior's revised plan. The Cana- 
dian side expressed its expectation that 
as a result of the meeting those portions 
of the revised plan that could affect 
Canada would he modified. D 



Press release 84 of Mar. 29. 1979 Ills! of pur 
licipants omitted I. 



Department of State Bulletin, 

clear that for the good of the fishery re- 
sources an agreement was necessary.; 
There is, in addition, a very real need' 
to maintain a friendly, although busi- 
nesslike, relationship with as close a 
neighbor as Canada. 

Neither the imperative of resource 
conservation and management nor of 
our bilateral relations would be justifi- 
cation for negotiating an unbalanced 
agreement, and I do not believe we 
have done so. The agreements we have 
reached will lead to the drawing of a 
boundary that will resolve the question 
of jurisdiction in the area including 
Georges Bank. 

They will also guarantee continua- 
tion of U.S. fisheries of long standing 
in the Canadian zone and the avoidance 
of economic disruption in those seg- 
ments of the industry which would, ab- 
sent an agreement, be closed out of the 
Canadian fishery. They will assure ra- 
tional management of the fish stocks 
with which we are mutually concerned. 
They will assure U.S. fishermen equit- 
able shares of those stocks. 

There are those who claim that cer- 
tain segments of the U.S. fishery in- 
dustry come off better in the agreement 
than other segments. Whether that is 
true, I leave to the analyses and judg- 
ments of others. What I am prepared to 
state unequivocally is that any such 
imbalance in advantages as may come 
about was not arrived at by design or 
intent. We simply sought the best over- 
all package of arrangements we could 
achieve. And I do not believe any seg- 
ment of the U.S. industry is worse off 
than it has been in recent years or than 
it would be without the agreement. 

The maritime boundary dispute and 
the attendant resource management and 
utilization problems faced us with a 
limited array of alternatives. Continua- 
tion of the status quo could only lead to 
a worsening of both the bilateral re- 
lationship and the conditions of the 
fishery resources. This leaves us effec- 
tively with only settlement by third- 
party means or negotiated solutions to 
resolve our problems. We have mixed 
these two alternatives in the east coast 
treaties that have been signed. Let me 
now describe briefly the substance of 
the fisheries agreement. 

East Coast Treaties 

The agreement divides fish stocks 
into three management categories: 
A — full joint management; B — 
management by the country of primary 
interest but in accordance with man- 
agement principles specified in the 
treaty; and C — management by one 
country or the other according to its 
own management standards. A few 



June 1979 



slocks do not tit neatly into the Ihiee- 
c;ilegory scheme and have been made 
subject to special arrangements. 

In the case of scallops, each side will 
sci the annual permissible commercial 
catch level on its side of 68° 30' W., 
and those catch levels will then be 
combined to form a total annual per- 
missible commercial catch. 

The annual permissible commercial 
catch for mackerel will be set jointly, 
but other regulations will be set by 
each side under category B. 

Lobster will be managed jointly in 
the disputed area only, until a boundary 
line is drawn. Each side will manage 
resources in its undisputed fishery zone 
under category C. 

In addition to management respon- 
sibilities, the agreement ahso assigns 
percentage shares of each stock, by 
area, to fishermen of the two countries. 
The statistical areas set up under the 
International Commission for Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries and continued under 
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Or- 
ganization are used for this purpose. 

Finally, the agreement specifies ac- 
cess for each country's fishermen to 
catch specified shares of some stocks in 
tlic other country's zone. In the case of 
C anadian redfish (ocean perch) and 
IS. loligo squid, both the shares as- 
signed to the other country's fishermen 
and the access for fishing them will 
terminate after 10 years. 

To carry out these rather complex 
aiiangements, a joint commission will 
be established with a cochairman and a 
panel of seven members from each 
side. The U.S. panel will have on it 
two Federal officials, three members 
selected by the New England Fishery 
Management Council from among its 
membership, and two similarly chosen 
by the Mid-Atlantic Council. The joint 
commission will meet as often as the 
two sides agree but at least once each 
year. If there are unresolved differ- 
ences between the two sides on the 
commission, the dispute will go first to 
the two cochairmen and, if not re- 
solved there, ultimately to a perma- 
nent, jointly selected arbitrator. 

The agreement is intended to provide 
a basis for long-term, optimal man- 
agement and utilization of the fishery 
resources so vital to both sides. There 
are provisions in the agreement for 
modifying not only the procedures of 
the joint commission itself but also the 
percentage shares and the management 
category to which any particular stock 
is assigned as well. In the case of 
changes in the shares, any reduction is 
limited to a maximum of 10% of the 
annual permissible commercial catch at 
the end of each 10-year period if the 
original share was more than 50%, or 



Visit of 
Printe Minister Trudeau 



Prime Minister Pierre Elliott 
Trudeau of Canada visited Washing- 
ton. D.C., on March 3, 1979. to meet 
with President Carter. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
MAR. 3, 1979' 



Energy 

During their discussion today over lunch at 
the White House, the Prime Minister and the 
President discussed the world energy situation 
and noted that increased energy self-reliance is 
a major objective of both their governments. 
They reaffirmed that enhanced bilateral coop- 
eration in the field of energy will serve the 
interests of both countries. They also agreed 
that maximizing the supplies of domestic 
energy available to each country was a common 
and shared objective. 

Recent international events have served to 
underline the vulnerability of the USA and 
Canada and other oil-consuming countries to 
oil supply and pricing disruptions. The Presi- 



dent and the Prime IVIinister endorsed the coor- 
dinated undertaking of March 2 by the member 
countries of the International Energy Agency to 
reduce demand for oil on the world market on 
an urgent basis in response to the current global 
supply situation. The Prime Minister noted that 
Canada is raising its oil production and that 
production in the first quarter of 1979 will be 
some 13 percent above the previous year, a 
portion of it being used to offset domestic 
shortfalls resulting from the Iranian situation. 
The United States plans to take appropriate ac- 
tion to increase its oil production to offset the 
world supply shortfall. 

The Prime Minister outlined to the President 
the progress already achieved in Canada toward 
construction of the Northern Gas Pipeline. The 
President affirmed his government's strong 
commitment to the completion of the line, 
which will bring .Maskan gas to the lower 48 
states and eventually Mackenzie Delta gas to 
Canadian markets. He noted that he is sending 
a reorganization plan to the Congress no later 
than April 1. establishing the Office of the 
Federal Pipeline Inspector. He also stated his 
determination to ensure that the U.S. regula- 



5% of the annual catch if the original 
share was less than 50%. An original 
entitlement share could not be cumula- 
tively reduced by more than one-third. 

The most frequent question regard- 
ing the agreement seems to be: "Why 
didn't we negotiate a fisheries agree- 
ment limited to 10 years or to some 
fixed period following the actual 
drawing of a boundary line?" The an- 
swer in the simplest terms is that it was 
not possible. During the course of the 
negotiations we, in fact, proposed such 
a 10-year limit and worked very hard 
for it. But Canada was unwilling to 
gamble everything on the outcome of 
the boundary. In fact, although some 
boundary outcomes could result in 
more favorable fishery shares for the 
United States than those agreed to, 
other conceivable outcomes could re- 
sult in much smaller shares overall. 
Moreover, as I stated earlier, the 
agreement does provide for some lim- 
ited upward or downward adjustments 
in shares after an initial 10-year period 
so that there is a bit more flexibility in 
these fishing arrangements that some 
would suggest. 

A similar question is: "Why didn't 
we just agree to arbitrate the boundary 
issue and not bother with a fishery 
agreement until we actually have a firm 
boundary?" The answer is, again, that 



Canada would not agree to submit the 
boundary to a third-party settlement 
process except in the context of an en- 
during fishery agreement. Moreover, 
the implications of this course of action 
from a conservation point of view 
might have been chaotic with attendant 
adverse consequences for the valuable 
fish stocks in question. 

Finally, we have at times heard the 
suggestion that we should use the eco- 
nomic leverage represented by the fact 
that the United States is Canada's prin- 
cipal market for fisheries products in 
order to achieve better entitlements for 
our own fishermen. We are opposed in 
principle to such an approach, because 
we do not believe it appropriate to link 
the issues of access to markets with the 
question of access to natural resources. 
This has wide policy significance for us 
in Canada and elsewhere in terms of 
energy and other important resource is- 
sues. Moreover, we do not believe that 
such a course would take into account 
the constraints and realities of a re- 
lationship between two countries that 
are each other's best customers in the 
trade arena. Thus, there was no viable 
method of resolving our differences ex- 
cept by mutually acceptable arrange- 
ments. We believe the arrangements we 
have made are fair and mutually bene- 
ficial to both ;iides. D 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



AiUiitiic Coast Fisheries 
CI tiff Botutdurtf Aifreemenis 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
FEB. 14, 1979' 

The Secretary ot State, the Honora- 
ble Cyrus Vance, and the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, the Honora- 
ble Don Jamieson. announced on Feb- 
ruary 14 the approval by the Govern- 
ments of the United States and Canada 
of the recommendations of Special 
Negotiators Lloyd N. Cutler and Mar- 
cel Cadieux for an Atlantic coast 
fisheries agreement and an agreement 
to resolve the boundary delimitation 
issue of the Gulf of Maine area by 
binding third-party procedures. 

The agreements reached will be set 
out in two separate but related treaties, 
one on fisheries and the other on third 
party resolution of the boundary de- 
limitation issue, which would enter 
into force simultaneously. Treaty texts 
should be ready for signature by the 
first of March. The treaties will then be 
subject to ratification in accordance 
with the domestic legal requirements of 
each country. Mr. Vance and Mr. 



Jamieson expressed their desire to have 
both treaties ratified as early as possi- 
ble. 

The fisheries agreement builds on 
the joint report of the special 
negotiators that was approved by the 
two governments in October 1977. A 
joint fisheries commission will be es- 
tablished to implement the agreement 
and to provide for cooperative man- 
agement of fish stocks of mutual inter- 
est. Dispute settlement mechanisms 
will be included as part of the institu- 
tional framework created by the agree- 
ment in order to resolve any differences 
that might arise in its interpretation or 
implementation. 

The fisheries agreement also con- 
tains detailed sharing, access, and 
management provisions for fish stocks 
of mutual interest on the Atlantic coast 
including the disputed area as well as 
areas in which each exercises undis- 
puted fisheries jurisdiction. These pro- 
visions include agreement on entitle- 
ment shares for the following major 
fish stocks in the Georges Bank area: 



Joint Communique (Cont'd) 

tory process on all aspects of the Northern Gas 
Pipeline proceeds as quickly as possible. 

The two leaders agreed to seek ways whereby 
any additional Canadian gas exports, should 
they be authorized, could facilitate timely con- 
struction of the entire Northern Gas Pipeline. 

In order to enhance the already close and 
timely cooperation in other bilateral energy 
areas, the two leaders agreed to establish a con- 
sultative mechanism at the sub-cabinet level 
which would function at least to the end of 
1979. This consultative mechanism is charged 
with: 

• Ensuring that decision-making processes in 
each country on the matter of a delivery system 
to transport Alaskan crude oil to the northern 
tier and other inland states proceed in a parallel 
and timely manner; 

• Developing options for decision by each 
government on a number of operational issues 
in bilateral energy relations, including oil 
supplies and oil exchanges, strategic petroleum 
storage, the utilization of surplus Canadian re- 
finery capacity, electricity exchanges, pos- 
sibilities for liquefied and synthetic natural gas 
exports to the U.S., and other energy-related 
tasks as may be appropriate. 

The President and Prime Minister will desig- 
nate promptly senior officials from their re- 
spective governments to serve on this consulta- 
tive mechanism. 



MTN 

The Prime Minister and the President ex- 
pressed satisfaction over progress achieved 
between them in the Multilateral Trade Negoti- 
ations. They agreed that timely completion of a 
balanced MTN agreement involving all the 
participants would make a notable contribution 
to reducing inflation and improving the pros- 
pects for sustained and balanced growth in the 
world economy. 

SALT 

The President and the Prime Minister dis- 
cussed prospects for the conclusion of a SALT 
II treaty with the Soviet Union and agreed thai 
such a treaty would be a significant step for- 
ward in the important task of restraining the 
nuclear arms race and of developing a more 
stable basis for maintaining world peace and 
security. The President acknowledged the 
Prime Minister's contribution to the nuclear 
arms control debate and expressed his appreci- 
ation for Canada's support for the U.S. pursuit 
of SALT II negotiations. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 12, 1979. Their ex- 
change of remarks made on the South Lawn of 
the White House upon the Prime Minister's de- 
parture is printed in the same Weekly Compi- 
lation on p. 379. 



7.^.35% (Canada), 26.65% (U.S.) for 
scallops; 17% (Canada). 83% (U.S.) 
for cod; 21% (Canada). 79% (U.S.) for 
haddock; and. after 6 years. 33.33% 
(Canada). 66.66% (U.S.) for herring. 
There are als