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April  1979 


he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  79  /  Number  2025 


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Department  of  State 

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Volume  79/  Number  2025  /April  1979 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

$18.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy — 

$1.40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 
Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


i 


C01^TE]\TS 


30TH   ANNIVERSARY 
ORGANIZATION 

ii     A  Proclamation 
1    NATO— 30  Years  After 
1    Statement  by  Secretary  Vance 

THE  PRESIDENT 

4  Remarks  Before  a  National  Foreign 

Policy  Conference 
7    News  Conference  of  February  27 


AFRICA 

FY     1980     Assistance     Proposals 

(Richard  M.  Moose) 
Letter  of  Credence  (Mauritania) 
Horn  of  Africa  (Richard  M.  Moose) 
Publications 

ARMS  CONTROL 


OF  THE  NORTH  ATLANTIC  TREATY 


11 

12 
13 


14  Preserving  Freedom  and  Peace  in  a  Nu- 

clear Age  (Vice  President  Mandate) 

15  SALT  Treaty  (White  House  Statement) 

EAST  ASIA 

17  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals 
(Richard  C.  Holbrooke) 

20  ASEAN-U.S,  Business  Council  (De- 
partment Statement) 

22  Military  Bases  Agreement  With  the 
Philippines  {Letter  from  President 
Carter) 

24  Security  Assistance  Report  on  Korea, 
1978 

26  Visit  of  Thai  Prime  Minister  Kriangsak 

(Joint  Press  Statement) 

27  American   and   Japanese   Interests   in 

Southeast  Asia  (David  D.  Newsom) 

ECONOMICS 

30   America's  Stake  in  the  World  Economy 

(Secretary  Vance) 
32   Economic  Report  of  the  President 

(Message  to  the  Congress) 

32  Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties  (Mes- 

sage to  the  Congress) 

EUROPE 

33  FY   1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the 

Eastern   Mediterranean   (Matthew 
Nimelz) 

34  I  1th   Report   on   Cyprus   (President 

Carter) 

36  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Por- 

tugal and  Spain  (George  S.  Vest) 

37  Letter  of  Credence  f/Vorway) 

37  Publications 

MIDDLE  EAST 

38  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  (Morris 

Draper) 


38  Editor's  Note 

39  Egyptian.   Israeli,   and  U.S.   Officials 

Meet   at   Camp   David   (President 
Carter) 

40  Visit  of  Israeli   Prime   Minister  Begin 

( White  House  Statement) 

41  North  Yemen  (Department  Statement) 

41  Sixth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mis- 

sion (Message  to  the  Congress) 

SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 

42  FY  1980  Proposals  (Lucy  Wilson  Ben- 

son) 

SOUTH  ASIA 

48  Promoting  Stability  and  Security  (War- 

ren Christopher) 

49  U.S.  Ambassador  Killed  in  Afghanistan 

(President  Carter,  Secretary  Vance) 

50  Assistance   in   Afghanistan   (White 

House  Statement) 

51  Letter  of  Credence  ffa/tw/an) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

52  Implementing  Human  Rights  Standards 

(Edward  M.  Mezvinsky) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

56  FY   1980  Assistance  Proposals  (Viron 

P.  Vaky) 

57  Pan  American  Day  and  Week.  1979  (A 

Proclamation) 

58  Letters  of  Credence  (Guatemala.  Hon- 

duras. Panama) 

59  Maritime  Boundary  Treaties  (Message 

to  the  Senate) 

62  Panama  Canal  Treaty  Legislation 
(President  Carter.  Warren  Chris- 
topher, Ambler  H.  Moss,  Jr.) 

65  U.S.  and  Panama  Sign  Two  Agree- 
ments (Department  Announcement) 

TREATIES 

67  Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69  February  1979 

70  PRESS  RELEASES 
INDEX 


JiiL?4l'73 


30th  A]\]\IVERSARY  OF  ]\ATO 


A  Proelatnation 

Thirty  years  ago  in  Washington  on  April  4,  1949  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  was  signed.  From  that  act  grew 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  or  NATO,  an 
alliance  welded  together  by  a  common  dedication  to  per- 
petuating democracy,  individual  liberty  and  the  rule  of 
law. 

For  three  decades,  NATO  has  successfully  deterred 
war  and  maintained  stability  in  Western  Europe  and 
North  America,  thus  securing  the  well-being  and  pros- 
perity of  its  fifteen  member  states:  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway,  Portugal,  Turkey,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  United  States  of  America. 

Though  collective  defense  against  possible  aggression 
was  the  most  urgent  requirement  at  its  founding,  NATO 
has  always  been  much  more  than  just  a  military  pact. 
The  spontaneous  political  development  of  the  Alliance 
demonstrates  that  true  security  is  far  more  than  a  matter 
of  weaponry  and  armed  battalions.  In  the  final  analysis, 
true  security  flows  from  the  freely-given  support  of  the 
people  and  their  willingness  to  participate  in  the  defense 
of  common  ideals. 

Since  NATO's  inception,  the  international  situation 
has  evolved  in  many  respects  and  NATO  has  adapted  to 
these  changes — militarily,  politically,  and  econom- 
ically. Today  the  Alliance  remains  as  relevant  and  cen- 
trally important  to  our  security  and  way  of  life  and  to 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  as  it  was  in  1949. 


Then  as  now,  the  firm  support  of  Congress  and  the 
American  people  for  NATO  reflects  their  deep  convic- 
tion that  NATO  is  the  cornerstone  of  United  States 
foreign  policy. 

As  NATO  moves  forward  into  another  decade  of 
achievement,  we  look  toward  the  future  with  confi- 
dence, aware  that  continuing  Allied  cooperation  will 
provide  the  international  stability  and  security  upon 
which  our  ideals,  our  civilization,  and  our  well-being 
depend.  As  NATO  begins  this  new  chapter  in  its  distin- 
guished history,  I  am  proud  to  rededicate  the  United 
States  to  the  NATO  objectives  which  have  served  the 
cause  of  peace  so  well. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Jimmy  Carter,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  direct  the  attention 
of  the  Nation  to  this  thirtieth  anniversary  of  the  signing 
of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty;  and  I  call  upon  the  Gover- 
nors of  the  States,  and  upon  the  officers  of  local  gov- 
ernments, to  facilitate  the  suitable  observance  of  this 
notable  event  throughout  this  anniversary  year  with  par- 
ticular attention  to  April,  the  month  which  marks  the 
historic  signing  ceremony. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  twenty-second  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-nine,  and  of  the  Inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  two 
hundred  and  third. 

Jimmy  Carter 


No.  4648  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Mar.  26,  19791 


]\ATO— 30  YEARS  AFTER 


Thirty  years  ago — April  4.  1949 — representatives  of  12 
nations  gathered  in  Washington,  D.C..  to  sign  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty,  the  cornerstone  of  NATO.^ 

At  its  founding.  NATO' s  immediate  task  was  to  con- 
struct an  effective  system  of  collective  defense.  The  close 
harmony  of  allied  i/t'H'5,  however,  insured  thai  NATO 
quickly  became  much  more  than  a  military  alliance.  From 
the  beginning,  it  has  been  as  much  a  political  alliance, 
designed  to  promote  wide  cooperation  in  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  social  fields  as  well  as  security. 

As  NATO  passes  its  30th  anniversary,  its  founders 
should  he  celebrated  for  their  vision.  So  successful  has 
NATO  been  in  securing  the  peace  and  stability  necessary 
\for  the  growth  of  the  West' s  economic  and  political  in- 
stitutions, that  the  alliance  too  often  is  taken  for 
granted — until  a  crisis  reminds  us  how  centrally  important 
it  is  to  our  foreign  policy. 

Today,  NATO  stands  as  the  strongest  defensive  alliance 
in  history,  protecting  some  of  the  world' s  most  dynamic 
democratic  political  institutions  and  the  greatest  concen- 
tration of  economic  strength  on  the  globe. 

In  our  open  societies,  we  are  so  diligent  in  our  exam- 
ination of  the  problems  of  the  alliance,  we  tend  to  lose 
sight  of  the  almost  incomprehensible  strength,  size,  and 
energy  of  the  NATO  nations.  We  are: 

•  570  million  civilized  people,  living  on 

•  8.6  million  square  miles  of  land,  producing  annually 

•  $4  trillion  ($4,000,000,000,000)  worth  of  goods  and 
services,  and 

•  $7,000  average  GNP  for  each  person:  we  are  able  to 
spend 

•  $180  billion  a  year  on  our  defense  (an  estimated  $30 
billion  more  than  the  Warsaw  Pact  at  current  levels)  and 
still  have  an  estimated 

•  $3.82  trillion  ($3,820,000,000,000)  left  over  for  non- 
defense  spending. 

Within  this  community.  NATO's  crucial  function  re- 
mains: the  collective  defense  of  Western  Europe  and  North 
America. 

It  is  this  central  aspect  of  NATO  which  should  he 
studied  as  we  enter  the  fourth  decade  of  the  alliance,  for 
our  perceptions  of  the  North  Atlantic  defenses  weigh 
heavily  as  we  consider  other  great  events  of  this  era:  SALT 
11  and  detente,  Iran,  the  Middle  East  peace  agreements, 
Africa,  and  our  new  relationship  with  China.  NATO  does 
not  exist  as  a  thing  apart:  it  has  always  been  shaped  ac- 
cording to  our  perceptions  of  ourselves  and  the  Communist 
forces  in  Eastern  Europe.  Those  perceptions  have  changed 
over  the  years  in  some  important  Ways  and  so  have  our 
defense  policies.  The  collective  defense  of  15  countries  and 
half  a  billion  people  pose  enormous  practical  problems. 


Through  three  decades,  these  policies  have  been 
hammered  out  under  pressures  of  a  variety  of  conflicting 
interests. 

From  the  start,  NATO's  central  European  strategy  was 
based  on  holding  the  enemy  as  close  to  the  East  German 
boundary  as  possible  — the  concept  of  forward  defense,  as 
it  eventually  was  labeled — under  which  the  territory  and 
people  of  Western  Europe  would  receive  maximum  protec- 
tion. Obviously,  such  a  strategy  has  meaning  only  if  the 
defending  forces  have  the  strength  to  absorb  the  impact  of 
an  initial  surprise  attack  without  breaking. 


NATO'S  30TH  ANNIVERSARY 

On  April  4,  the  United  States,  along  with  the  other  14 
members  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  ob- 
served the  30th  anniversary  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty. 
That  anniversary  is  a  significant  milestone  in  the  West's 
history  since  World  War  II. 

For  three  decades  the  defensive  purpose  of  the  alliance 
has  successfully  preserved  Europe  and  North  America  from 
the  devastation  of  war.  By  securing  peace,  NATO  has  as- 
sured the  stability  under  which  the  allies'  democratic  and 
economic  institutions  have  strengthened  and  prospered. 

Over  the  years.  NATO  has  proved  resourceful  in  meet- 
ing new  challenges.  Its  ability  to  deter  aggression  cannot 
be  measured  by  numerical  comparisons  alone.  Today,  as 
the  alliance  enters  a  new  decade,  its  strategy  of  forward 
defense  and  flexible  response  remains  valid,  as  does  its 
military  capability  to  carry  out  that  strategy. 

NATO  is  and  will  remain  the  cornerstone  of  our  foreign 
policy.  The  commitment  of  the  United  States  to  the  al- 
liance is  unshakable.  Our  freedoms,  our  security,  and  our 
well-being  are  irrevocably  tied  by  history,  culture,  and 
civilization  to  the  destiny  of  our  European  allies  with 
whom  we  share  an  unparalleled  commonality  of  interests. 

The  increasing  interrelationship  between  our  policies  and 
interests  and  those  of  our  allies  has  extended  the  scope  of 
alliance  consultation  far  beyond  traditional  military  con- 
cerns to  encompass  political,  economic,  and  social  de- 
velopments in  many  parts  of  the  globe.  Today  issues  of 
deep  interest  to  the  alliance  cut  across  a  wide  range  of  the 
geographical  and  functional  concerns  of  our  government, 
especially  the  Department  of  State.  NATO's  consultative 
mechanisms  offer  us  an  unrivaled  forum  for  simultaneously 
reaching  14  nations  whose  support  is  important  in  achiev- 
ing U.S.  policy  objectives  around  the  world.  As  President 
Carter  has  observed:  "Our  alliance  has  never  been  an  end 
in  itself.  It  is  a  way  to  promote  stability  and  peace  in 
Europe  and,  indeed,  peace  in  the  world  at  large." 

This  30th  anniversary  offers  us  all  the  occasion  to  cele- 
brate the  success  of  the  alliance.  More  importantly,  it  pre- 
sents us  with  an  opportunity  to  reflect  on  how  we  can 
strengthen  our  contribution  to  NATO  as  it  meets  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  coming  decade. 

Cyrus  R.  Vance 


As  the  Soviet  Union  acquired  nuclear  weapons.  NATO 
strategy  was  adjusted  to  take  into  account  the  possibility 
that  any  major  aggression  might  involve  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons  at  an  early  stage.  This  led.  in  turn,  to  the 
stockpiling  in  Europe  after  1957  of  tactical  nuclear 
warheads  for  infantry  and  airborne  weapons  to  strengthen 
NATO's  defensive  and  deterrent  capabilities. 

In  the  mid-1960's  additional  considerations  had  ap- 
peared, affecting  NATO's  strategic  concepts. 

®  Tensions  between  East  and  West  were  relaxed  some- 
what. 

•  Increased  Soviet  penetration  of  the  Mediterranean 
posed  a  new  threat  on  NATO's  southern  flank. 

•  The  ballistic  missile  became  the  principal  means  of 
delivering  nuclear  warheads.  Hundreds  of  hardened 
launch  sites  on  both  sides,  as  well  as  nuclear-propelled 
ballistic  missile  submarines,  made  it  possible  for  either 
side  to  receive  a  surprise  nuclear  attack  and  retaliate 
within  a  matter  of  minutes.  Even  the  most  destructive  sur- 
prise attack  could  result  in  a  reciprocal  annihilation  of  an 
equally  large  proportion  of  the  attacker' s  own  population 
and  industry.  Considering  these  developments.  NATO 
Defense  .Ministers  met  in  December  1967  and  adopted 
a  more  flexible  strategic  concept  than  that  of  massive 
retaliation. 

The  new  concept — called  flexible  response — while  re- 
taining the  principle  of  forward  defense,  was  based  on  the 
requirement  that  a  credible  military  response  of  all  kinds  is 
necessary,  and  this  must  be  secured  through  a  wide  range 
of  forces  equipped  with  a  well-balanced  mix  of  conven- 
tional weapons  and  tactical  and  strategic  nuclear 
weapons. 

The  flexible  response  is  based  on  two  principles: 

•  Deterrence  of  attack  through  the  possibility  of  escala- 
tion and 

•  The  capability  to  retaliate  to  an  attack  with  direct  de- 
fense at  approximately  the  same  level,  while  retaining  the 
option  to  escalate. 

Keystone  of  the  strategy  is  that  an  aggressor  must  be 
convinced  of  NATO's  readiness  to  use  nuclear  weapons  if 
necessary,  yet  he  must  be  uncertain  as  to  the  timing  or 
circumstances.   While  this  policy  involves,  as  before,  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

possibility  of  escalation  to  nuclear  war,  it  is  based  essen- 
tially upon  controlling  the  progress  of  escalation  of  any 
conflict  rather  than  planning  to  meet  any  attack  with  in- 
stant massive  retaliation. 

In  1960  another  important  change  was  made.  The 
problem,  as  some  viewed  it.  was  that  the  Soviets  might  be 
tempted  to  attack  relatively  lightly-defended,  smaller 
countries  on  the  flanks  of  NATO  in  a  quick  limited  aggres- 
sion against  purely  national  defending  forces  in  the  hope  of 
facing  the  alliance  with  a  fait  accompli.  This  possibility  in- 
creased the  danger  of  war  by  miscalculation. 

NATO's  solution  was  to  form  Allied  Command  Europe's 
Mobile  Force,  a  brigade-size  combat  force  made  up  of 
well-equipped  land  and  air  units  from  a  variety  of  NATO 
countries.  This  multinational  force  would  be  immediately 
available  for  dispatch  by  air  to  any  part  of  the  alliance. 
Their  rapid  deployment,  committing  the  combined  armed 
forces  of  NATO,  would  insure  against  the  mistaken  notion 
that  a  Norway  or  a  Greece  or  Turkey  might  stand  alone  in 
case  of  attack. 

Each  change  in  defense  policy  has  reflected  an  un- 
changed national  policy  on  the  part  of  all  NA  TO  govern- 
ments: to  secure  our  lands,  deter  aggression,  stabilize 
Europe,  and  encourage  peaceful  solutions  to  outstanding 
problems.  As  Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  Vance  says  in  his 
message  to  NATO: 

Over  the  years,  NATO  has  proved  resourceful  in  meeting  new  chal- 
lenges. Its  ability  to  deter  aggression  cannot  be  measured  by  numerical 
comparisons  alone.  Today,  as  the  alliance  enters  a  new  decade,  its 
strategy  of  forward  defense  and  llexible  response  remains  valid,  as 
does  its  military  capability  to  carry  out  that  strategy. 

There  still  are  areas  of  obvious  concern:  major  prob- 
lems to  be  solved  in  political,  economic,  and  military 
spheres.  However,  looking  back  over  the  past  30  years  and 
comparing  the  assets  of  the  alliance  then  and  now,  the 
people  of  the  North  Atlantic  community  can  take  a  large 
measure  of  satisfaction  that  the  job  has  been  well  done.  0 


'  Belgium.  Canada.  Denmark.  France.  Iceland.  Italy.  Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands.  Norway.  Portugal,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
United  States.  Greece  and  Turkey  joined  in  1952  and  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany  in  1954. 


April  1979 


NATO-WARSAW  PACT 
BALANCE  SHEET 

Displays  of  comparative  statistics  can  he  misleading.  •  A  comparison  of  economic  strength  shows  an  even 
For  example,  a  comparison  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  navies  by  greater  disparity  —  NATO's  combined  gross  national 
number  of  surface  units  shows  one  thing,  but  by  tonnage  a  products  is  nearly  three  times  as  large  as  that  of  the  War- 
different  picture  is  presented.  Another  completely  different  saw  Pact  group,  and  NATO's  per  capita  GNP  is  nearly 
picture  can  be  seen  when  the  ships  of  not  the  two  countries   twice  as  large. 

hut  the  two  alliances  are  compared.  The  reason  is  simply  •  In  total  regular  military  manpower,  although  the 
that  America' s  European  allies  are  more  numerous,  more  Warsaw  Pact  has  an  estimated  8%  advantage,  the  disposi- 
prosperous,  and,  generally,  better  armed  than  are  the  tion  of  those  forces  presents  different  kinds  of  problems 
Soviet  allies.  and  advantages  to  each  side. 

If  we  compare  total  NA  TO  figures  with  total  Warsaw 


Pact  figures,  the  popular  image  of  Communist  '  'superior- 
ity" in  various  areas  is  brought  into  a  more  realistic 
perspective.  For  example: 

•  The  massive  land  area  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  shown 


Any  attempt  to  achieve  symmetrical,  point-by-point 
comparisons  of  complex  military  and  geopolitical  data 
must  be  treated  cautiously.  What  follow  are  rough  ap- 
proximations to  give  the  reader  a  sense  of  the  current 
on  most  maps  can  create  an  impression  that  the  combined  order  of  magnitude  of  the  two  most  powerful  military  al- 
land  area  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries  is  considerably  liances,  not  a  precise,  detailed  description.  (Note:  Where 
greater  than  that  of  NATO  countries.  In  fact,  there  is  very  official  military  data  are  unavailable  because  of  security 
little  difference — about  5%.  classification  or  other  reasons,  the  data  used  are  drawn 

•  There  are  54%  more  people  in  NATO  countries  than  from  The  Military  Balance,   1978,  published  privately  by 

the  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  London.) 


NATO 

WARSAW 
PACT 

LAND  AREA  (sq.  mi.) 

8.6 
million 

9  million 

POPULATION 

570 
million 

370  million 

GROSS  NATIONAL 
PRODUCT 

$4  trillion 

$1.4  trillion 

PER  CAPITA  GNP 

$7,000 

$3,000 

DEFENSE  BUDGET 
Current  Annual  Rate 

'7f  of  GNP 

$180  billion 

4.5 

$150  billion 
11-14 

Heavy  Antitank  Weapons 

(Figures  unavailable  for 
publication,  but  NATO 
is  believed  to  have 
significant  superiority  in 
numbers.) 


n.a. 


DIVISIONS— PEACETIME 
Central  &  Northern 
Regions 


29 


67 


%GNP  AVAILABLE  FOR 
NONDEFENSE 
SPENDING 


95 


86-89 


Southern  Europe  (NOTE: 
NATO  divisions 
generally  have  about 
50%  more  combat 
personnel  than  Warsaw 
Pact  divisions.  They 
also  incorporate  more 
"tail,"  or  support, 
units,  giving  them 
greater  stamina  in 
prolonged  combat.) 


41 


33 


SEAPOWER 

Combat  Surface  Ships 
Submarines  (all  types) 


430 
249 


270 
207 


PERSONNEL,  STANDING      4.8 
MILITARY  FORCES  million 


5.2  million 


CENTRAL  EUROPE 
Ground  Forces  (Approx. 
figures  include  five 
French  divisions  not 


900,000 


900,000 


TACTICAL  AIRCRAFT 

Central  &  Northern 

Regions 

Light  bombers/fighters/ 

1,400 

1.600 

ground  attack 

Short-range  interceptors 

400 

2.000 

Southern  Europe 

Light  bombers/fighters/ 

450 

300 

ground  attack 

Short-range  interceptors 

275 

700 

under  NATO  command 
but  affecting  balance  of 
forces  in  F.R.G.) 

THEATER  NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 

7,000 

3,000 

STRATEGIC  MISSILES 
STRATEGIC  BOMBERS 
STRATEGIC  WARHEADS 

2,200 

400 

10,000 

2,600 

150 

5,000 

Main  Battle  Tanks 

7,000 

20,000 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDE]\T:       Remarks  Before  a 
]%ational  Fipreign  Policy  Conference 


Remarks  and  questlon-and-answer 
session  before  a  foreign  policy  confer- 
ence for  editors  and  broadcasters  held 
at  the  Department  of  State  February 
22,  1979.' 

Before  I  take  your  questions  this  af- 
ternoon, I'd  like  to  give  you  some  of 
my  own  thoughts  about  the  uses  of 
American  power  in  a  changing  and 
sometimes  turbulent  world. 

Recent  events,  particularly  in  Iran 
and  Southeast  Asia,  have  touched  off  a 
national  debate  about  what  America's 
role  should  be  in  dealing  with  turbu- 
lence and  in  trying  to  guide  inevitable 
change.  We've  been  going  through  de- 
bates like  this  ever  since  our  first 
President  served — George  Washington, 
whose  birthday  this  happens  to  be. 

Looking  back  over  the  last  several 
years — particularly  the  last  2  years — 
I've  been  struck  by  the  increasing 
complexity,  however,  of  international 
affairs.  I'm  encouraged  by  what  I  judge 
to  be  a  willingness  on  behalf  of  the 
American  people  to  attempt  to  under- 
stand complex  issues,  not  to  over- 
simplify them,  and  to  support  policies 
and  decisions  that  basically  and  openly 
address  these  complex  issues  responsi- 
bly and  realistically. 

Of  course,  there  has  never  been  any 
change  in  America's  determination  or 
our  willingness  to  maintain  a  strong 
military  capability  or  to  promote  the 
economic  health  and  vitality  of  our 
country  or  to  deal  with  and  enhance  the 
political  and  moral  strength  of  our  na- 
tion. Those  commitments  have  always 
been  constant  and  unswerving.  But  we 
must  also  see  issues  that  are  complex 
very  clearly.  And  we  must  devise  in- 
telligent and  thoughtful  responses  to 
them. 

Neither  of  the  two  events  that  have 
been  so  newsworthy  the  last  few 
weeks — turmoil  in  Iran,  the  conflict  in 
Southeast  Asia — were  of  our  own 
making.  But  both  events  place  great 
demands  on  me  as  President  and  on  our 
ability  to  define  and  to  act  upon  the 
true  interests  of  the  American  people. 
And  there  are  likely  to  be  many  more 
events  like  this  in  the  future. 

As  the  world  becomes  more  com- 
plex, it's  more  important  than  ever 
before  that  we  do  not  oversimplify 
events  abroad.  Bad  analysis  inevitably 
leads  to  bad  policy.  Instead,  we  need  to 
be  aware  of  the  deep  historical  forces  at 
work  in  other  countries.  We  need  to  be 


well-informed.  The  revolution  in  Iran, 
for  example,  is  a  product  of  Iranian  so- 
cial, political,  economic,  religious 
factors,  all  intertwined.  To  ignore  these 
realities  or  fail  to  understand  them 
would  lead  us  into  taking  actions  that 
might  be  ineffective  or  irrelevant  or 
even  dangerous. 

But  in  addition  to  understanding  the 
complexity  of  individual  nations,  we 
must  also  understand  how  changes 
taking  place  in  those  nations  can  affect 
the  future,  both  of  that  particular  re- 
gion, the  entire  world,  and  especially 
my  responsibility,  the  United  States  of 
America. 

We  need  to  resist  two  temptations:  to 
see  all  change  as  inevitably  against  the 
interests  of  the  United  States,  as  kind 
of  a  loss  for  us  or  a  victory  for  them;  or 
to  imagine  that  what  happens  in  a 
country  like  Iran  will  not  have  conse- 
quences for  us  and  for  other  regions  as 
well.  We  need  to  see  what  is  happening 
not  in  terms  of  simplistic  colors,  black 
and  white,  but  in  more  subtle  shades; 
not  as  isolated  events,  but  often  as  part 
of  sweeping  currents  that  have  broad 
significance. 

At  this  moment  there  is  turmoil  or 
change  in  various  countries  from  one 
end  of  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  other; 
some  turmoil  as  in  Indochina  is  the 
product  of  age-old  enmities,  inflamed 
by  rivalries  for  influence  by  conflicting 
forces.  Stability  in  some  other  coun- 
tries is  being  shaken  by  the  processes 
of  modernization,  the  search  for  na- 
tional significance,  or  the  desire  to  ful- 
fill legitimate  human  hopes  and  human 
aspirations. 

For  us  in  the  United  States,  change 
itself  is  not  the  enemy.  Our  concern  is 
twofold.  We  must  work  to  dampen 
conflict,  to  maintain  peace,  and  we 
must  make  clear  that  it's  dangerous  for 
outside  powers  to  try  to  exploit  for 
their  own  selfish  benefits  this  inevita- 
ble turmoil.  That  kind  of  exploitation 
can  damage  not  only  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  nations  that  hap- 
pen to  be  in  a  transition  phase  but  also 
can  damage  the  effort  to  build  a  more 
secure  and  a  more  peaceful  world  for 
us  all.  Let  me  repeat  what  I  said  at 
Georgia  Tech  earlier  this  week:  "... 
in  the  Middle  East,  in  Southeast  Asia, 
and  elsewhere  in  the  world,  we  will 
stand  by  our  friends,  we  will  honor  our 
commitments,  and  we  will  protect  the 
vital   interests  of  the   United  States 


The  United  States  continues  to  be  the 
most  powerful  nation  on  Earth  — 
militarily,  economically,  and  politi- 
cally. And  I'm  committed  to  preserving 
and  even  enhancing  that  power,  not  for 
its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  the 
values  and  the  ideals  of  our  nation.  We 
will  make  responsible  use  of  that  power 
where  our  interests  are  directly  in- 
volved or  where  we  can  help  to  create 
conditions  for  peace  and  for  the  inde- 
pendent development  of  other  nations 
and  for  the  realization  of  the  hopes  of 
human  beings  who  live  there. 

We  have  forces  in  readiness,  as  you 
well  know,  which  we  will  use  if  neces- 
sary. I  hope  that  that  need  will  never 
rise.  I  am  proud  that  no  member  of  the 
Armed  Forces  of  our  country  has  had  to 
give  his  life  in  combat  during  my  Ad- 
ministration. And  I'm  determined  to  do 
all  in  my  power  to  keep  this  precious 
peace.  But  let  there  be  no  mistake,  our 
will  and  our  determination  are  firm;  our 
commitment  to  protecting  our  vital 
interest  is  unshakable.  We  must, 
therefore,  be  very  clear  about  where 
our  true  interests  lie. 

In  Iran,  our  interest  is  to  see  its 
people  independent,  able  to  develop, 
according  to  their  own  design,  free 
from  outside  interference  either  by  us 
or  from  any  other  power. 

In  Southeast  Asia,  our  interest  is  to 
promote  peace  and  the  withdrawal  of 
outside  forces  and  not  to  become  em- 
broiled in  the  conflict  among  Asian 
Communist  nations.  And,  in  general, 
our  interest  is  to  promote  the  health  and 
the  development  of  individual 
societies,  not  to  a  pattern  cut  exactly 
like  ours  in  the  United  States  but  tail- 
ored rather  to  the  hopes  and  the  needs 
and  the  desires  of  the  peoples  involved. 

To  these  ends  we  will  broaden  our 
cooperation  with  our  friends  in  the 
Middle  East  and  Southeast  Asia,  sup- 
porting their  efforts  to  maintain  na- 
tional stability  and  independence. 
We'll  consult  closely  with  Congress  to 
determine  the  need  for  additional  mili- 
tary aid  in  this  troubled  region  of  the 
Middle  East,  to  be  used  where  it  can  be 
most  effective.  And  we  have  called  and 
will  call  on  our  allies  to  help  whenever 
they  can  or  will,  working  in  partnership 
with  us. 

We  are  working  hard  for  peace  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  neighbors  and  also 
in  other  troubled  areas  of  the  world.  In 
the  future,  I  feel  sure  that  we  will  find 
demands  on  the  United  States  to  be  in- 


April  197^ 

creasing  and  nul  diminishing.  We  con- 
iiinie  to  hear  the  burdens  ot  iiiaintain- 
ini;  a  strong  defense,  of  supporting  ira- 
ilitional  allies  who  depend  upon  u.s,  and 
working  to  reduce  the  spread  of  con- 
ventional and  nuclear  weapons. 

But  we  also  face  a  twilight  world  of 
change  and  sometimes  of  turmoil.  We 
will  increasingly  be  called  upon  to  deal 
\u(h  events  that  do  not  represent  basic 
challenges  to  our  security  but  still 
uhich  require  the  responsible  use  of 
American  influence  and  American 
power. 

We  have  the  strength  and  the  will  to 
act  where  need  be,  and  I'm  confident 
that  as  a  nation  we  have  the  wisdom  to 
act  wisely. 

That's  my  responsibility  in  brief 
terms,  a  responsibility  which  you  share 
with  me. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  know  what  we're 
j;()ing  to  do  to  insure  the  stability  of 
small  oil-producing  states  in  the 
Middle  East  during  this  time  of  in- 
stability in  that  part  of  the  world? 

A.  I've  just  sent  Secretary  of  De- 
tense  Brown  into  that  region,  as  you 
know,  to  meet  with  the  leaders  of  four 
nations:  .Saudi  Arabia.  Jordan,  Egypt, 
and  Israel.  We  have  the  top  officials  of 
Oman  here  consulting  these  last  few 
days  with  Secretary  Vance.  And  in  the 
Emirates,  in  Bahrain,  and  other  small 
countries  we've  assured  them  that  our 
influence,  our  power  as  a  nation,  will 
be  used  to  preserve  the  basic  security 
of  that  region  free  from  any  outside 
political  or  military  power. 

We  are  trying  to  bring  them  together 
in  a  spirit  of  peace  and  harmony  and  a 
recognition  that  their  own  national  in- 
dependence ought  to  be  preserved  by 
them  and  also  preserved  by  us. 

As  I  said  in  my  brief  remarlcs  earlier, 
I  am  consulting  with  the  Congress  now, 
based  on  the  reports  that  Harold  Brown 
brought  back,  about  how  we  might  in- 
crease to  some  degree  our  military  as- 
sistance efforts  for  those  small  coun- 
tries that  feel  insecure,  so  that  through 
their  own  strength  they  might  feel  bet- 
ter able  to  withstand  any  internal  and 
outside  disturbances  that  are  unwar- 
ranted. 

There  are  some  nations  that  provide 
major  stabilizing  efforts.  Egypt  is  a 
strong,  powerful  nation  in  the  Arab 
world;  Israel's  strength  is  part  of  our 
own  security.  Iran,  we  hope  and  pray, 
in  the  future  will  still  be  a  factor  for 
stability  in  their  region — in  a  different 
character,  obviously,  than  it  was  under 
the  Shah,  but  we  hope  will  be  inde- 
pendent and  determined  to  maintain 
kind  of  a  rock  of  stability  in  that  re- 
gion, impervious  to  outside  influence 
and  attack. 


Working  with  individual  nations, 
working  collectively  to  reduce  tensions 
among  them  and  making  sure  they  have 
adequate  military  capabilities,  and 
using  our  own  influence  to  prevent 
sOme  major  outside  power  from  having 
an  inordinate  influence  —  those  are 
some  of  the  things  that  we  can  do. 

The  last  one,  obviously,  is  to  try  to 
bring  some  peace  between  Israel  and  its 
own  neighbors.  I  think  if  the  Arab 
world,  in  a  united  way.  working  with 
us.  perhaps  with  Israel  in  a  peaceful 
pursuit,  could  face  any  outside  disturb- 
ance rather  than  to  focus  their  animos- 
ity, as  it  has  been  in  the  past,  on  Israel, 
it  would  certainly  be  a  very  stabilizing 
factor. 

We  derive  great  benefit  from  free  ac- 
cess to  oil  from  that  region.  Some  of 
our  allies  and  friends  in  Europe  and 
Japan  rely  much  more  heavily,  and  we 
are  trying  to  get  them  to  use  their  own 
influence  to  parallel  ours  in  maintain- 
ing the  independence  of  individual  na- 
tions and  the  stability  therein. 

There  are  a  few  instances  in  that  re- 
gion where  economic  aid  —  either 
through  direct  grants,  which  are  fairly 
rare,  or  through  guaranteed  loans  on  a 
multilateral  basis  or  through  interna- 
tional lending  institutions — can  also 
help.  That's  kind  of  a  gamut  of  things 
that  we  explore  and  use  with  varying 
degrees  of  priority  and  emphasis. 

Q.  Many  observers  of  the  Middle 
Eastern  situation  believe  that  the 
failure  of  Egypt  and  Israel  to  sign  the 
Camp  David  agreements  as  originally 
conceived  this  fall,  and,  in  fact,  the 
subsequent  delays  in  signing  any 
agreement,  are  directly  related  to  the 
lack  of  pressure  by  the  United  States 
not  on  Israel  and  Egypt,  but  on  Jor- 
dan and  Saudi  Arabia  to  join  the 
talks  or  at  least  to  lend  support  to  the 
negotiating  process.  Would  you 
please  comment  on  this? 

A.  I  think  in  a  spirit  of  complete 
candor  we  have  approached  our  limit 
on  legitimate  influence — perhaps  even 
pressure  in  a  proper  way — on  the 
countries  in  that  entire  region  to  sup- 
port the  Camp  David  accords  and  to 
participate  in  future  discussions. 

We  have  sent  delegations  to  Jordan, 
to  Saudi  Arabia,  even  this  past  week, 
to  encourage  their  tacit  or  public  or  ac- 
tive support  of  these  accords.  And  I've 
used  my  own  personal  influence  to  a 
maximum  degree  within  the  bounds  of 
propriety  in  the  same  pursuit. 

As  you  know,  my  own  involvement 
in  the  Camp  David  negotiations  has 
been  substantial.  There  is  no  other 
single  item  that  has  addressed  my  at- 
tention as  President  on  which  I've 
spent  more  time,   more  effort,  more 


study,  more  prayer  than  to  bring  peace 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors.  We 
believe  the  Camp  David  accords  are  a 
very  firm  and  well-advised  foundation 
on  which  to  predicate,  first  of  all,  an 
agreement  between  Israel  and  Egypt, 
combined  with  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement as  part  of  the  same  procedure 
that  relates  to  Israel  and  its  neighbors. 
And  whatever  we  can  do — to  use  the 
word  again  —  within  the  bounds  of 
propriety,  recognizing  the  independ- 
ence of  other  nations,  we  have  done, 
are  doing,  and  will  do  to  bring  about 
peace  between  Israel  and  its  neighbors. 

Q.  If  the  Soviet  troops  decide  to 
help  Vietnam  in  their  struggle,  how 
will  this  affect  normalization  and  the 
Taiwan  question,  which  is  also  being 
questioned  as  to  its  defenses? 

A.  The  normalization  of  relations 
between  our  country  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  is  an  accomplished 
fact.  It  will  not  be  affected  one  way  or 
the  other  by  combat  among  the  Asian 
Communist  countries.  We  have  used 
every  bit  of  influence  that  we  could 
with  Vietnam,  with  China,  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  bring  about  a  with- 
drawal of  attacking  forces  whenever 
they've  crossed  an  international  border 
and  to  bring  about  an  end  to  combat 
there. 

My  hope  is  that  this  combat  will 
rapidly  be  concluded.  And  even  today 
we  introduced  to  the  United  Nations  a 
request  for  a  complete  analysis  or  de- 
bate of  this  question  calling  upon  Viet- 
nam to  withdraw  their  troops  after  they 
have  invaded  Kampuchea,  and  also 
calling  upon  China  to  withdraw  its 
troops  from  Vietnam. 

But  I  would  say  that  the  recognition 
of  the  Peking  government  as  the  Gov- 
ernment of  China  is  already  an  accom- 
plished fact  and  will  not  be  abrogated 
nor  will  there  be  any  interference  with 
it. 

Q.  Some  columnists  and  commen- 
tators have  come  to  regard  the  im- 
plementation of  your  foreign  policy 
as  a  failure.  They  point  specifically 
to  the  lack  of  a  clear  direction,  a 
steady  course.  Aside  from  those 
areas  covered  in  your  opening  re- 
marks, what  do  you  think  has 
created  that  perception?  Do  you 
think  it's  possible  that  you  yourself 
may  have  contributed  to  that  prob- 
lem? [Laughter] 

A.  I  think  that  this  allegation  is  to  be 
anticipated.  It's  not  unexpected  for  us. 

There  is  a  marshaling  of  public  sup- 
port in  almost  every  instance  when  a 
President  takes  forceful  action  at  a  time 
when  our  nation's  security  itself  is 
endangered — obviously,  in  time  of  a 


war.  When  people  feel  that  our  nation's 
security  is  challenged,  there's  a  patrio- 
tic response  to  a  President  in  a  time  of 
forceful  action.  It's  not  quite  so  easy  to 
marshal  overwhelming,  enthusiastic, 
dedicated  support  in  a  time  when  a 
President's  been  able  to  search  out  a 
path  and  maintain  peace.  But  I  hope 
that  that  will  be  my  achievement 
throughout  the  rest  of  my  term. 

In  retrospect,  I  can't  see  that  we 
should  have  done  anything  differently 
in  the  basic  questions  from  what  we 
have  done.  We  have  had  some  notable 
challenges. 

I  think  that  on  a  worldwide  basis 
we've  increased  our  friendships  sub- 
stantially with  nations  that  are  emerg- 
ing as  leaders.  We  have  greatly  re- 
paired the  dispirited  nature  and  the  rel- 
ative weakness  of  NATO.  I  think 
there's  now  a  renewed  commitment  to 
the  strength  of  our  alliance  there. 

Our  relationships  with  Australia, 
New  Zealand  in  the  ANZUS  agreement 
are  very  strong.  For  the  first  time  in  my 
lifetime,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  now 
have  better  relationships  with  the  three 
leading  Asian  countries  than  do  the 
Soviet  Union  leaders;  that  is,  India, 
Japan,  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 

We've  injected  ourselves,  I  think,  in 
a  well-advised  way  in  trying  to  resolve 
disputes  among  nations  that  might 
erupt  into  a  broader  conflict.  I  have 
just  covered  the  part  of  my  effort  in  the 
Mideast.  We've  tried  to  bring  peace  to 
Cyprus.  We've  worked  with  the  British 
trying  to  resolve  the  problems  in 
Rhodesia,  to  give  majority  rule,  a 
democratic  government  there,  to  end 
the  racial  discrimination  that  has 
existed. 

We've  worked  very  closely  with  four 
other  major  allies — Canada,  France, 
West  Germany,  Britain  —  to  bring 
about  majority  rule  and  independence 
of  Namibia.  And  in  other  areas  of  the 
world  we've  tried  to  add  our  influence 
whenever  we  could  in  a  constructive 
way  to  insure  stability,  peace,  and  the 
realization  of  legitimate  aspirations  of 
people  who  are  involved. 

And  the  fact  that  we  haven't  a  crisis, 
that  we  haven't  had  to  go  to  war,  that 
we  have  been  successful  in  maintaining 
peace,  I  think  is  an  achievement. 

But  it  hasn't  required,  yet,  and  I 
hope  never,  a  demonstration  of  courage 
on  my  part  to  call  out  the  Armed 
Forces  or  to  participate  in  an  armed  at- 
tack against  other  people. 

Q.  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  has 
just  returned  from  the  Middle  East, 
and  it's  reported  that  Egyptian 
President  Anwar  Sadat,  concerned 
about  the  role  of  the  Palestinians  in 


Iran,  is  interested  in  becoming  the 
region's  policeman — which  is  how 
some  newspapers  are  describing 
it — in  return  for  heavy  infusions  of 
U.S.  weapons.  What's  the  likelihood 
for  this? 

And,  also,  Sadat  has  said  that  he 
would  not  use  the  equipment  in  con- 
flict with  Israel,  but  how  can  we  be 
sure  that  if  he's  called  upon  by  his 
Arab  brothers  to  fight  Israel  that  he 
wouldn't  use  it? 

A.  I  think  Sadat  has  demonstrated  in 
a  very  dramatic  way,  and  also  a  con- 
sistent way  in  the  last  few  years,  his 
peaceful  intentions  toward  Israel.  His 
trip  to  Jerusalem,  his  participation, 
successfully,  in  the  Camp  David 
negotiations,  I  think,  is  proof  of  his 
good  intentions  toward  having  peaceful 
relations  with  Israel. 

As  you  probably  know,  Egypt  is  a 
very  powerful  element  in  the  Arab 
world,  economically;  their  population 
is  very  great;  their  military  strength  is 
great,  compared  to  many  other  coun- 
tries. And  I  think  they  can  be  a  legiti- 
mate stabilizing  force.  They  now  have 
five  divisions  or  more  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  Suez  confronting  Israel. 
Part  of  the  Camp  David  accords,  part 
of  the  negotiated  points  that  have  al- 
ready been  concluded  on  the  Sinai 
agreement  would  call  for  the  with- 
drawal of  these  forces.  They  would 
perhaps  never  be  used.  But  at  least  any 
entity  that  threatened  to  attack  another 
country  m  the  Mideast  would  be  faced 
with  the  prospect  that  those  Egyptian 
forces  might  very  well  be  used  to  pre- 
serve the  peace.  I'm  not  predicting  that 
this  would  happen,  but  the  potential 
would  be  there  for  Egypt  to  help  to 
protect  relatively  defenseless  other 
Arab  countries  or  to  preserve  peace  in 
the  Mideast. 

I  don't  want  to  try  to  comment  on 
any  nation  being  a  policeman  for  the 
region  nor  for  the  world.  I  think  that's 
a  very  serious  mistake. 

There  obviously  have  been  requests 
made  by  many  nations  around  the 
world  for  military  or  economic  assist- 
ance that  is  in  excess  of  what  our  na- 
tion could  provide.  That  situation 
might  apply  to  the  request  that  Presi- 
dent Sadat  has  recently  made.  But  he 
certainly  wouldn't  be  unique  in  that  re- 
spect. 

As  you  know,  the  two  nations  that 
receive  the  most  aid  from  our  country 
at  this  time,  and  for  many  years  in  the 
past,  have  been  Israel  and  Egypt.  And  I 
think  that  the  greatest  single  step  we 
could  take  to  preserving  stability  and 
peace  in  the  Mideast,  although  it  might 
be  unpopular  with  some  other  Arab 
countries,  would  be  a  peace  treaty  be- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

tween  Israel  and  Egypt.  That's  our  top 
priority,  and  we'll  continue  with  that 
pursuit. 

Q.  How  strained  is  the  relationship 
now  between  the  United  States  and 
Russia  because  of  the  recent  events  in 
Afghanistan,  Iran,  Rhodesia,  and 
Vietnam?  And,  two,  how  does  that 
strain,  if  there  is  any,  translate  into 
how  easily  the  Senate  might  accept  a 
SALT  agreement,  if  and  when  it  gets 
there? 

A.  I  think  it's  inevitable  for  the 
foreseeable  future  that  we  will  have 
competition  with  the  Soviet  Union  for 
influence  in  nations  which  are  either 
unaligned  or  which  don't  want  to  be 
completely  under  the  domination  of 
any  other  country.  We  have  no  desire 
to  dominate  another  nation.  But  we 
would  like  to  see  each  nation  be  inde- 
pendent, to  be  at  peace,  and  to  see  the 
legitimate  aspirations  of  those  people 
be  realized. 

There  have  been  changes  made  in  the 
last  15  years  or  less  that  affect  both  our 
countries.  I  think  it  is  true  that  the  re- 
gime in  Afghanistan,  a  nation  under 
Soviet  influence,  was  replaced  by  a  re- 
gime more  closely  aligned  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  Angola,  it  was  com- 
pletely under  the  domination  and  influ- 
ence of  the  Soviet  Union.  And  perhaps 
Cuba  is  now  reaching  out  feelers  or  a 
hand  of  friendship  to  some  of  the 
Western  nations.  I  think  the  same  thing 
might  apply  to  Mozambique,  Tanzania. 

This,  I  think,  is  a  normal  evolution- 
ary process.  In  the  past  under  Mrs. 
Gandhi,  India  was  very  closely  aligned 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  Their  relation- 
ships with  our  country  were  strained.  I 
would  say  that  under  Prime  Minister 
Desai,  this  has  changed  considerably. 
It  wasn't  too  long  ago  that  China  and 
the  Soviet  Union  were  the  closest  ol 
political  and  military  allies.  Now  China 
has  normal  relationships  with  us  and 
is  very  sharply  estranged  from  the 
Soviet  Union. 

In  the  past,  Egypt,  the  most  powerful 
Arab  nation,  was  an  ally  almost  exclu- 
sively wtih  the  Soviet  Union.  Now  it 
has  an  equally  close  friendship  with  us 
and  is  estranged  from  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  think  NATO  in  the  past,  iin- 
mediately  following  the  Vietnam  war, 
was  weakened.  1  know  that  some  of  our 
great  Members  of  Congress — Mike 
Mansfield — was  calling  for  the  with- 
drawal of  all  U.S.  troops  from  Europe. 
Now  I  think  there's  been  a  revitaliza- 
tion  of  NATO,  a  strengthening  of  our 
alliance  there  which  is  very  crucial  to 
our  own  security. 

I  think,  in  balance,  the  trends  in  the 
last  number  of  years  have  not  been  ad- 
verse to  our  country.  But  it's  easy  to 


April  1979 

single  out  one  or  two  individual  places 
like  Afghanistan  where  those  trends 
'have  been  against  our  best  interests. 
The  point  I'm  trying  to  make  is  that  the 
tluidity  of  this  situation  over  a  period 
of  years  is  inevitable,  and  we  can't 
freeze  the  world  situation  at  any  par- 
ticular time  or  any  particular  region  or 
country  where  it  might  be  temporarily 
-or  historically  to  our  advantage. 

And  we  cannot  say  to  the  Soviet 
Union:  "Unless  all  Cuban  troops  are 
removed  from  Angola  we  will  never 
sign  a  SALT  agreement  with  you." 

Our  negotiating  of  the  SALT  treaty 
has  been  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
United  States.  It's  in  our  be.st  security 
interests.  It  lays  a  basis  for  enhanced 
prospects  for  peace.  It  gives  us  greater 
flexibility  to  use  our  conventional 
forces  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  our 
nation  that  1  recently,  last  few  minutes 
ago,  described  to  you. 

1  think  every  potential  altercation  or 
difference  or  competition  with  the 
Soviet  Union  in  a  troubled  region  of 
the  world — and.  as  I  say,  these  are 
inevitable — would  be  greatly  exacer- 
bated if  we  fail  to  conclude  a  SALT 
agreement  or  if  we,  on  our  own,  refuse 
to  negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union  to 
hring  about  a  lessening  of  dependence 
upon  nuclear  weapons. 

1  consider  the  SALT  treaty  to  be  well 
negotiated  in  its  present  form,  ap- 
proaching a  conclusion,  I  hope,  in  the 
best  interests  of  our  country  standing 
on  its  own.  And  we  could  not  permit 
the  Soviet  Union  to  say  to  us:  "Unless 
you  withdraw  all  your  troops  from 
South  Korea,  unless  you  reduce  your 
military  strength  in  NATO,  unless  you 
^ever  your  relationships  with  Egypt, 
unless  you  permit  us  to  come  into  the 
Mideast  situation  as  a  full  negotiating 
partner,  we  will  not  sign  a  SALT 
agreement."  We  would  consider  that  to 
be  an  absolutely  unwarranted  intrusion 
on  the  freedom  of  our  country  to  make 
our  own  decisions  based  on  what's  best 
tor  our  people. 

And  I  think  for  us  to  claim  that  we 
can  demand  the  same  sort  of  restraint 
on  the  part  of  the  Soviets  as  a  prereq- 
uisite to  the  conclusion  of  a  SALT 
agreement,  that  we  consider  it  to  be  in 
our  own  best  interest,  is  unwarranted 
and  ill-advised  and,  obviously,  unac- 
ceptable to  them  or  in  our  own  best 
interests. 

Obviously,  we  will  have  to  cooperate 
\vith  the  Soviets  whenever  we  can,  to 
lessen  tensions,  to  cooperate  on  trade, 
>o  try  to  detect  common  purpose  where 
*e  can  cooperate,  to  conclude  agree- 
ments that  might  lessen  tension  and 
improve  the  possibility  for  peace.    At 


IMews  Conforonco  oi 
February  27  (Excorpis) 


In  my  2  years  as  President,  I've 
spent  more  time  and  invested  more  of 
my  own  personal  effort  in  the  search 
for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  than  on 
any  other  international  problem.  That 
investment  of  time  and  effort  was  and 
is  appropriate  because  of  the  great  im- 
portance of  peace  in  that  region  to  our 
own  country  and  the  vital  importance 
of  a  peace  agreement  between  Israel 
and  Egypt  to  those  two  countries. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  the  talks 
at  Camp  David  last  week — 41/2  days  of 
talks.  1  do  not  share  the  opinion  that 
the  proposals  that  we  put  forward  were 
contrary  to  the  Camp  David  agreements 
of  last  September  or  that  they  would 
make  an  Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty 
meaningless. 

Based  upon  the  developments  of  last 
week  and  the  recommendations  of  all 
the  parties  involved,  I  had  hoped  to  be 
able  to  convene,  without  delay,  negoti- 
ations at  a  level  which  would  permit 
the  early  conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty 
between  Israel  and  Egypt,  as  a  first 
step  toward  a  wider  settlement  for  the 
entire  Middle  East. 

I  regret  that  such  direct  negotiations 
are  not  possible  at  this  time.  I'm  con- 
cerned about  the  impact  of  this  de- 
velopment upon  the  prospects  for 
peace.  However,  it  was  the  belief  of  all 
those  at  Camp  David  —  Secretary 
Vance  and  all  the  negotiators  from  Is- 
rael and  Egypt — that  the  conclusion  of 
an  Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty  is  an 
urgent  necessity.  I  share  that  view 
completely. 

If  we  allow  the  prospects  for  peace 
that  seemed  so  bright  last  September 
when  we  came  back  from  Camp  David 
to  continue  to  dim  and  perhaps  even  to 
die,  the  future,  at  best,  is  unpredicta- 
ble. If  we  allow  that  hope  to  vanish, 
then  the  judgment  of  history  and  of  our 
own  children  will  of  necessity,  and 
rightly,  condemn  us  for  an  absence  of 
concerted  effort. 


ences  with  the  fullest  confidence  that 
we  will  continue  to  be  successful. 

And  I  think  those  two  ideas  are  not 
incompatible  for  a  strong,  secure,  able, 
confident,  enlightened  nation  like  the 
United  States.  □ 


the 


same  time,  we  will  compete  with 


ihe  Soviet  Union  when  we  have  differ 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  26,  1979. 

■For  full  text  of  the  President's  address  on 
Feb.  20.  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  1979.  p.  21. 


For  that  reason.  I  spoke  personally 
this  afternoon  with  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  with  President  Sadat.  I've 
invited  Prime  Minister  Begin  to  join 
me  as  soon  as  possible  for  a  frank  dis- 
cussion of  all  the  issues  involved.  I'm 
hopeful  that  these  talks  will  lead  to  an 
early  resumption  of  direct  negotiations. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  has  accepted 
my  invitation.  He  will  be  arriving  here 
Thursday  evening  for  discussions  with 
me . 

I  will  then  consider  asking  either 
Prime  Minister  Khalil  or  President 
Sadat  to  join  in  further  discussions.  I 
recognize  that  the  public  interest  in  this 
matter  is  intense.  However.  I  have 
made  it  clear  in  the  past  that  any  pre- 
mature public  discussions  of  these  very 
sensitive  issues  serve  no  useful  pur- 
pose. For  that  reason,  I  will  have  no 
further  comments  to  make  on  the 
Mideast  peace  negotiations  this  after- 
noon, but  I  will  be  happy  to  answer  any 
further  questions  on  other  matters  of 
interest  to  the  American  public. 

Q.  Well,  I  really  think  you  should 
answer  a  couple  of  questions.  One, 
are  you  saying  that  Camp  David  is 
back  on  track  or  you  are  trying  to 
get  it  on?  And  also,  were  you  led  to 
believe  by  your  own  advisers  or  by 
the  Israeli  offlcials  that  Begin  would 
come,  or  did  you  labor  under  some 
false  assumption  on  your  part? 

A.  I  won't  have  any  other  questions 
to  answer  on  that  subject.  1  think  I've 
covered  it  adequately.  And  Prime 
Minister  Begin  is  making  a  simultane- 
ous announcement  in  Israel,  and  I  don't 
think  it  would  be  constructive  for  me  to 
answer  any  questions  further. 

Q.  Does  the  escalating  price  of  oil 
and  gasoline,  which  is  continuing — 
does  that  cause  you  to  have  any  sec- 
ond thoughts  now  about  your  pre- 
diction of  inflation  for  the  year? 

A.  Obviously,  the  unpredictable 
shortage  of  oil  on  the  international 
market,  caused  by  the  Iranian  disrup- 
tion of  supply  and  other  factors,  has 
caused  the  price  of  energy  to  go  up 
faster  than  we  had  anticipated.  This 
adds  inflationary  pressures.  The  situa- 
tion with  supplies  and  prices  is  serious; 
it's  not  critical. 

I  have  made  proposals  to  the  Con- 
gress for  standby  authority  to  take  ac- 
tion, when  necessary  in  the  future,  on  a 
mandatory  basis.  Early  next  month  we 
will  present  to  the  Congress,  also  for 


8 


their  approval,  matters  that  I  can 
take — action  that  1  can  tai<c  to  deal 
with  the  temporary  Iranian  disruption. 

As  you  know,  we  had  in  1973  about 
a  2'/2  million  barrel-a-day  shortage 
brought  about  by  the  embargo.  We  now 
have  a  shortage  of  about  2  million 
barrels  per  day.  But  I  think  it's  accu- 
rate to  say  that  our  own  country  and  the 
international  consuming  nations,  in- 
cluding us,  are  much  better  organized 
to  take  care  of  these  changes  that  have 
been  taking  place.  Inflationary  pres- 
sures do  exceed  what  we  had  antici- 
pated. I  think  we  are  much  better  pre- 
pared to  deal  with  them. 

Q.  Some  of  your  critics  are  saying 
that  you  are  exhibiting  weakness  and 
impotency  in  your  conduct  of  foreign 
affairs;  that  is,  in  your  reaction  to 
crises  around  the  world.  And  al- 
though you  argue  that  your  policy  is 
one  of  prudent  restraint,  is  there  not 
something  to  the  idea  that  the  per- 
ception itself  adds  to  the  problem  of 
this  country's  interests,  and,  if  so,  is 
there  anything  you  can  do  about  it? 

A.  Obviously,  perceptions  have 
some  importance  in  political  terms  and 
also  in  diplomatic  terms.  There  is  no 
doubt  in  my  mind  that  the  United  States 
is  adequately  protecting  its  own  inter- 
ests, that  we  are  adequately  protecting 
the  interests  of  our  allies  and  friends  as 
commitments  bind  us  to  do.  We've  had 
no  complaints  about  them  in  this  re- 
spect. And  I  think  that  an  exercise  of 
prudence  in  trying  to  contain  our  re- 
gional disputes  and  combat  among 
other  nations  is  in  the  best  interest  of 
our  own  country. 

We  are  a  strong  nation,  the  strongest 
on  Earth — militarily,  politically,  eco- 
nomically. I'm  committed  to  preserv- 
ing that  strength  of  our  nation,  even 
enhancing  it.  And  I  think  it  would  be 
completely  improper  for  us,  for  in- 
stance, to  inject  ourselves  in  any  active 
way  into  the  combat  that's  presently 
taking  place  among  Communist  Asian 
nations,  or  to  try  to  intrude  in  a  com- 
pletely unwarranted  fashion  into  the 
internal  affairs,  political  affairs,  of 
other  nations.  And  I  have  no  intention 
of  making  these  foolish  decisions  and 
taking  foolish  action  to  the  detriment  of 
our  nation's  interest,  just  to  assuage 
some  who  criticize  me  because  we  have 
not  become  actively  involved  in  these 
kinds  of  circumstances. 

Q.  Given  all  of  that,  when  the 
United  States  was  displeased  with  the 
action  that  the  Soviets  had  taken  in 
the  Shcharanskiy  case,  we  held  up 
the  sale  of  some  oil-drilling  equip- 
ment to  the  Soviets.  Given  the  fact 
that  we  have  condemned  the  Chinese 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


attack  into  Vietnam,  why  is  it  that 
Treasury  Secretary  Blumenthal  is 
now  in  China  negotiating  new  trade 
agreements  with  the  Chinese? 

A.  That's  a  completely  different  cir- 
cumstance. We've  not  had  any  bilateral 
disharmony  between  ourselves  and  the 
Chinese.  We  are  changing  our  Interest 
Offices  into  Embassies  on  the  first  of 
March,  and  1  need  a  major  representa- 
tive of  our  country  to  be  there  when 
that  change  is  made.  Our  new  Ambas- 
sador, Leonard  Woodcock,  has  just  re- 
cently been  approved  by  the  Senate — 
yesterday — and  will  not  be  able  to  ar- 
rive on  time. 

We  do  not  agree  with  many  of  the 
actions  that  the  Soviets  take  in  dealing 
with  other  countries.  We've  not  let  that 
disrupt  our  bilateral  relationships  with 
the  Soviets.  Our  SALT  talks,  for  in- 
stance, have  never  been  interrupted  nor 
delayed.  And  we  have  expressed  our 
very  firm  disapproval  to  the  Chinese 
about  their  crossing  the  Vietnamese 
border,  and  we  have  expressed  our 
strong  disapproval  to  the  Soviets  and  to 
the  Vietnamese  for  the  Vietnamese 
crossing  of  the  Cambodian  border. 

But  for  us  to  terminate  bilateral  re- 
lationships because  a  major 
country  —  the  Soviets,  or  the 
Chinese — do  something  contrary  to  our 
desires  would  certainly  be  counter- 
productive. And  I  think  the  trip  to 
China  to  establish  relationships  with 
the  Chinese  for  the  future  by  Secretary 
Blumenthal  is  proper  and  was  well- 
advised. 


Q.  Recently  Secretary  [of  Defense 
Harold]  Brown  was  in  the  Middle 
East  and  met  with  the  leaders  of 
those  countries,  particularly  Saudi 
Arabia.  And  you  have  expressed  the 
need  and  the  desire  for  the  United 
States  to  strengthen  the  defensive 
perimeter  of  that  part  of  the  world  to 
safeguard  the  flow  of  oil.  There  have 
been  public  reports  that  the  Saudi 
Arabian  Government  has  refused  an 
offer  by  the  United  States  for  the 
stationing  of  U.S.  troops.  I  can't 
vouch  for  that  report,  but  could  you 
tell  us  what  your  plans  are  for  that 
area  and  what  we  would  be  willing  to 
do  to  safeguard  the  world's  oil  sup- 

ply? 

A.  We  have  no  desire  to  open  mili- 
tary bases  in  that  area  or  to  station 
American  troops  in  Saudi  Arabia.  And 
this  proposal  has  not  been  made.  That 
part  of  the  report  was  erroneous. 

However,  we  do  want  to  strengthen 
the  combined  responsibility  and  capa- 
bility of  our  friends  and  allies  who  seek 
moderation  and  peace  and  stability,  to 


preserve  the  integrity  of  that  region. 
Secretary  Brown  visited  Saudi  Arabia. 
Jordan,  Egypt,  and  Israel  for  this  pur- 
pose, and  his  trip  was  very  successful. 

It's  important  also  for  those  nations 
and  for  others  in  that  region  to  know 
that  we  have  a  real  interest — a  real  na- 
tional interest — in  the  stability  and 
peace  of  that  region  and,  particularly, 
for  the  supply  of  oil,  the  routes  through 
which  the  oil  is  delivered  to  ourselves 
and  to  our  allies  and  friends  throughout 
the  world. 

But  any  sort  of  action  that  we  take 
would  be  contributory  to  peace,  would 
not  encroach  on  the  prerogatives  of  in- 
dividual nations.  And  we  do  not  intend 
to  become  involved  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  another  country.  We  have  no 
plans  to  establish  military  bases  in  that 
region. 


Q.  Half  a  dozen  OPEC  [Organiza- 
tion of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries] countries  have  announced,  or 
are  threatening  to  do  so,  some  kind 
of  oil  price  hike  in  the  last  couple  of 
weeks.  It  gives  the  impression  that 
the  United  States  is  at  their  mercy 
and  that  we  are  helpless.  Are  we? 

A.  We  have  no  control  over  prices 
that  other  nations  establish  for  their 
products,  including  oil.  This  is  a  sub- 
ject that  1  have  addressed  as  forcefully 
as  possible,  since  April  of  1977  when 
we  presented  to  the  Congress  a  com- 
prehensive energy  proposal.  Our  best 
approach  is  to  reduce  exorbitant  waste 
of  oil  and  other  energy  products  that 
presently  exists  in  our  country,  to  in- 
crease the  production  of  oil  and  gas  and 
other  energy  products  within  our  na- 
tion, and  to  use  our  legitimate  influ- 
ence when  it  can  be  exerted  to 
minimize  any  increase  in  prices.  But 
we  cannot  control  other  nations  in  this 
respect. 

I  might  say  that  we  are  much  better 
able  now,  as  a  world-consuming  com- 
munity, to  deal  with  these  increases 
than  we  were  back  in  1973  and  1974 
when  the  price  was  quadrupled  over- 
night, without  any  warning,  and  before 
the  consuming  nations  were  working  in 
harmony  to  provide  reserves  on  hand, 
to  increase  exploration  and  production, 
which  has  since  then  occurred  in  the 
North  Sea,  in  Mexico,  obviously,  in 
Alaska,  and  other  places. 

But  we  have  no  control  over  it.  We 
deplore  it.  We  would  like  for  them  to 
hold  down  the  prices  as  much  as  possi- 
ble. Our  best  response  is  to  use  energy 
in  our  own  nation  efficiently,  to  cut  out 
waste,  and  to  increase  our  own  pro- 
duction. 

Q.  In  view  of  what  you've  just  said 


April  1979 

about  the  energy  situation,  why  are 
you  uncertain  about  whether  you  will 
impose  the  new  conservation  meas- 
ures as  soon  as  Congress  gives  you 
the  authorization?  It  would  seem  that 
the  country  might  be  waiting  for 
some  sort  of  signal  that  things  are 
really  serious  and  that  consumers 
must  cut  back. 

A.  It  the  Iranian  production  is  not 
restored,  then  we  would  face  a  halt- 
million-barrel-a-day  shortage,  more  or 
less,  possibly  increasing  later  on  to 
700,000  barrels  a  day.  By  the  first  of 
next  month,  in  addition  to  the  request 
to  Congress  that  Fve  just  put  forward, 
we  will  have  measures  outlined  for 
taking  this  action  when  it  is  necessary. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  don't  want  to 
have  stringent  restraints  placed  on  our 
economy  that  might  cause  very  severe 
disruptions,  high  unemployment,  and 
very  adverse  reactions  not  only  in  our 
country  but  throughout  the  world. 

But  with  the  standby  authority,  then 
1  would  have  the  responsibility,  as  au- 
thorized by  Congress,  to  take  action 
based  upon  the  severity  of  the  need. 

We  have,  I  think,  a  matter  of  judg- 
ment to  be  made  in  that  respect.  But  to 
commit  myself  ahead  of  time  to  greatly 
constrain  the  American  economy  when 
it's  not  necessary  would  not  be  in  the 
best  interest  of  our  country. 

Q.  What  is  our  government  doing, 
if  anything,  to  try  and  influence  the 
new  Iranian  Government  to  increase 
production,  keep  prices  down  and, 
generally,  how  would  you  describe 
the  relationship  between  our  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Khomeini  govern- 
ment? 

A.  The  Khomeini  government  has 
made  it  clear  ever  since  it  came  into 
power,  through  our  direct  negotiations 
with  Prime  Minister  Bazargan  and  our 
.Embassador  and  through  their  emis- 
saries who  have  even  today  talked  to 
Secretary  Vance,  that  they  desire 
close-working  friendly  relationships 
with  the  United  States. 

They  have  also  announced  that  oil 
production  in  Iran  will  be  increased  and 
that  very  shortly  exports  will  be  re- 
commenced. And  my  own  assessment  is 
that  they  have  strong  intentions  to  carry 
out  both  these  goals  and  that  they  are 
capable  of  doing  so. 

Q.  There  is,  or  there  appears  to  be 
starting,  a  public  debate  on  the 
question:  "Who  lost  Iran?"  I  noticed 
that  former  Secretary  Kissinger  was 
suggesting  that  your  Administration 
should  bear  some  responsibility; 
former  Under  Secretary  of  State 
George  Ball  suggested  that  the 
Nixon-Kissinger  Administration  did 


AFRICA:        F\  1980  Assistance 
Proposais 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

Statement  before  the  Siihcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  February  14,  1979. 
Mr.  Moose  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs.  ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss with  you  the  security  assistance 
programs  which  the  President  has  pro- 
posed for  sub-Saharan  Africa  in  FY 
1980. 

It  is  my  intention  and  that  of  the 
Bureau  of  African  Affairs  to  consult 
fully  and  frankly  with  you  on  the  entire 
range  of  issues  confronting  us  on  the 
African  Continent.  By  studying  and 
working  together,  we  can  contribute  to  a 
U.S.  policy  which  protects  and  pro- 
motes our  nation's  interests. 


Our  African  policy  is  based  on  find- 
ing peaceful  solutions  to  the  numerous 
problems  which  today  shape  events  in 
Africa. 

We  have  heard  much  about  the 
Soviet  and  Cuban  military  adventures 
in  Africa  and  seen  figures  on  the  mas- 
sive amounts  of  military  equipment  the 
Soviet  Union  has  put  into  Africa.  Our 
security  assistance  proposals  do  not 
attempt  to  match  the  Soviets  ritTe-for- 
rifle,  tank-for-tank.  We  believe  our 
interests  and  those  of  Africa  are  better 
served  by  addressing  the  root  causes  of 
discontent. 

Our  diplomatic  initiatives  in  Namibia 
and  Rhodesia  are  intended  to  support 
the  attainment  of  majority  rule  and  ra- 
cial justice  in  southern  Africa. 

Our  assistance  is  designed  to  meet 
the   pressing  needs  of  economic  de- 


much  to  destabilize  Iran  with  their 
billions  in  sophisticated  military 
hardware.  My  question  was,  I  sup- 
pose, do  you  agree  with  Ball?  Who 
lost  Iran,  or  was  Iran  ours  to  lose  in 
the  first  place? 

A.  It's  obvious  that  Iran  was  not 
ours  to  lose  in  the  first  place.  We  don't 
own  Iran,  and  we  have  never  had  any 
intention  nor  ability  to  control  the 
internal  affairs  of  Iran. 

For  more  than  2,000  years,  the 
people  in  the  Iran  area,  the  Persians 
and  others,  have  established  their  own 
government.  They've  had  ups  and 
downs,  as  have  we.  1  think  it's  obvious 
that  the  present  government  in  Iran,  as 
1  just  answered,  would  like  to  have 
good  relationships  with  us.  I  don't 
know  of  anything  we  could  have  done 
to  prevent  the  very  complicated  social 
and  religious  and  political  inter- 
relationships from  occurring  in  Iran  in 
the  change  of  government.  And  we'll 
just  have  to  make  the  best  of  the 
change. 

But,  as  1  say,  we  cannot  freeze  the 
status  quo  in  a  country  when  it's 
very  friendly  to  us.  When  the  change  is 
made  by  the  people  who  live  there,  we 
do  the  best  we  can  to  protect  American 
interests  by  forming  new  alliances,  new 
friendships,  new  interrelationships, 
new  trade  relationships,  new  security 
relationships,  perhaps,  in  the  future, 
with  the  new  government,  and  that's 
the  best  we  can  do. 

But  to  try  to  lay  blame  on  someone 


in  the  United  States  for  a  new  govern- 
ment having  been  established  in  Iran,  1 
think,  is  just  a  waste  of  time  and  avoids 
a  basic  issue  that  this  was  a  decision  to 
be  made  and  which  was  made  by  the 
Iranian  people  themselves. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  we  have 
some  arrangement  to  support  Israel 
in  the  event  that  they  have  oil  short- 
ages, do  you  view  Iran's  lack  of  de- 
sire to  supply  oil  to  Israel  as  creating 
problems  for  us  in  terms  of  our  sup- 
port for  Israel  in  securing  secondary 
sources? 

A.  When  the  supply  of  Iranian  oil  to 
Israel  was  interrupted,  I  immediately 
notified  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  the 
Israeli  Government  that  we  would 
honor  our  commitment  to  them.  So  far, 
the  Israelis  have  been  able  to  acquire 
oil  from  other  sources  in  the  Sinai  and 
also  on  the  world  markets  from  differ- 
ent countries. 

We  will  honor  that  commitment.  1 
think  that  the  total  Israeli  oil  consump- 
tion is  only  about  1%  of  the  consump- 
tion in  the  United  States.  Even  if  Israel 
should  have  to  depend  upon  us  for  a 
substantial  portion  of  its  oil,  we  would 
supply  that  oil  from  our  country  or 
from  sources  in  other  nations  without 
disruption  of  the  American  economy. 

□ 


For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  5.  1979,  p.  364. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


velopment,  provide  shelter  and  food  to 
the  thousands  of  refugees  escaping 
conflict  in  their  homelands,  and,  in 
selected  cases,  help  countries  meet 
their  legitimate  self-defense  needs. 

Our  assistance  programs  to  Africa 
are  designed  to  bring  various  resources 
to  bear  on  these  unique  needs.  Total 
assistance  proposed  is  about  $600  mil- 
lion. This  figure  includes  $322  million 
in  development  assistance,  $100  mil- 
lion for  security  supporting  assistance 
(SSA)  for  southern  Africa,  over  $140 
million  in  PL-480  assistance  (both  title 
1  and  II  and  our  contribution  to  the 
World  Food  Program),  $45.4  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credit, 
and  $3.4  million  for  African  participa- 
tion in  the  international  military  educa- 
tion and  training  (IMET)  program,  a 
modest  real  increase  over  levels  appro- 
priated for  FY  1979  ($496.3  million) 
when  U.S.  inflation  rates  are  taken  into 
account. 

Development  Assistance 

Yesterday  Goler  Butcher  [AID  As- 
sistant Admininistrator  for  Africa]  de- 
scribed to  you  the  $322  million  which 
we  are  proposing  for  development  as- 
sistance in  FY  1980.  It  would  be  used 
for  agriculture  and  rural  development, 
health  and  family  planning,  training, 
and  special  activities  such  as  alterna- 
tive energy  projects.  Of  the  $322  mil- 
lion, $105  million  is  proposed  for  the 
eight  countries  participating  in  the 
Sahel  Development  Program,  a  unique 
coordination  effort  between  donors  and 
recipients. 

U.S.  food  aid  to  Africa  under  PL- 
480  has  been  increasing.  Last  year  we 
programmed  $57  million  in  title  I  con- 
cessional sales  and  $85  million  in  grant 
food  aid  to  the  needy.  This  year  we 
plan  to  increase  the  title  1  program  to 
$84  million,  with  approximately  the 
same  level  proposed  for  FY  1980.  A 
major  concern  is  to  secure  a  closer  in- 
tegration between  food  aid  and  other 
forms  of  assistance  in  order  to  have  the 
maximum  impact  on  agricultural  de- 
velopment. 

In  addition  to  our  bilateral  assist- 
ance, the  United  States  supports  Afri- 
can economic  development  through  our 
contributions  to  international  develop- 
ment lending  institutions  such  as  the 
World  Bank  group  and  the  African  De- 
velopment Fund. 

The  security  assistance  program 
which  I  am  here  today  to  support,  to- 
gether with  the  development  assistance 
proposals  presented  to  you  yesterday 
by  Goler  Butcher,  represents  the  finan- 
cial underpinning  of  our  African 
policy  —  an  important  earnest  of  our 
intentions. 


Security  Supporting  Assistance 

(SSA) 

The  link  between  policy  and  re- 
sources is  most  vivid  in  southern 
Africa  —  between  our  efforts  to  achieve 
peaceful  solutions  to  the  problems  of 
Namibia  and  Rhodesia  and  our  pro- 
posal for  SSA  for  southern  Africa.  For 
FY  1980  we  are  proposing  $100  mil- 
lion in  SSA  for  southern  Africa.  Al- 
though this  is  a  considerably  larger 
amount  than  we  requested  m  FY  1979 
($45  million),  it  is  basically  a  return  to 
the  level  of  FY  1978  when  $100.7  mil- 
lion was  obligated. 

The  southern  African  region  is  im- 
portant to  us  for  its  resources,  because 
of  our  support  for  the  peoples"  quest 
for  self-rule,  and  for  its  political  sig- 
nificance throughout  Africa.  Our  own 
position  in  the  future  in  that  region  will 
be  determined  by  the  positions  we  take 
today  and  how  we  relate  to  the  people 
on  the  scene.  They  must  know  that  we 
stand  with  them,  are  cognizant  of  their 
problems,  and  can  be  counted  on  to 
help. 

We  learned  after  the  war  in  Europe 
the  importance  of  resources  to  back  up 
our  policy  choices.  Just  as  we  see  in 
the  Middle  East  today  how  resources 
buttress  our  diplomacy;  so  too  are  they 
imperative  to  our  southern  African 
diplomacy. 

The  majority-ruled  states  of  southern 
Africa  have  serious  and  unique  de- 
velopment problems.  Six  of  the  coun- 
tries are  landlocked  and  suffer  serious 
transportation  bottlenecks.  Lesotho, 
Botswana,  and  Malawi  have  been  des- 
ignated as  relatively  least  developed 
countries — although  Botswana  has  re- 
cently been  experiencing  significant 
growth  —  and  Mozambique  has  per 
capita  income  of  only  $170  (1976). 
Life  expectancy  is  less  than  45  years  in 
all  six  countries.  Literacy  is  especially 
low  in  Mozambique  and  Malawi.  Per 
capita  food  production  has  been  de- 
teriorating in  Mozambique  and  Zam- 
bia. All  six  countries  in  the  region  are 
undergoing  rapid  population  growth. 

I  know  that  some  of  our  proposals 
for  security  supporting  assistance  in 
southern  Africa  may  raise  some  ques- 
tions so  let  me  deal  with  them  here  and 
now. 

The  largest  chunk  of  our  southern 
African  program  is  earmarked  for 
Zambia.  We  see  in  President  Kaunda  a 
force  for  peace  and  stability.  Zambia  is 
suffering  very  directly  from  the  effects 
of  the  conflict  in  Rhodesia,  and  no  one 
wants  to  see  peace  more  than  Kenneth 
Kaunda.  He  is  a  key  to  the  peaceful 
solution. 

We  disagree  with  those  who  think 
we  should  not  be  helping  Mozambique. 


We  do  not  believe  that  Mozambique 
can  be  characterized  as  being  "in  the 
Soviet  camp."  In  our  view  its  Presi- 
dent, Samora  Machel,  is  a  pragmatic 
leader  who  is  interested  in  the  de- 
velopment of  his  country.  He  is  in- 
terested in  opening  his  country  to  U.S. 
trade  and  investment,  because  hel 
knows  that  it  is  one  way  to  help  his 
people.  When  1  last  saw  him,  in  early 
December,  this  was  the  subject  which 
was  uppermost  in  his  mind.  We  have 
found  that  we  can  talk  and  work  with 
President  Machel  about  political  prob- 
lems affecting  the  area.  By  refusing  to 
help  him  and  Mozambique,  we  are 
passing  up  an  opportunity  to  enhance 
our  influence  and  promote  our  inter- 
ests. 

The  struggle  for  racial  justice  by  the 
people  and  governments  of  southern 
Africa  has  been  costly  to  the  economy 
of  this  area.  This  program  will  provide 
the  means  of  assisting  the  countries  in 
the  region  which  have  suffered  severe 
economic  dislocations  and  hardships  as 
a  result  of  the  struggle. 

This  security  assistance  is  consid- 
erably more  developmental  in  orienta- 
tion than  most  such  programs.  Included 
in  it  is  assistance  for  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons.  It  will  also  help  coun- 
tries of  the  region  meet  their  transpor- 
tation as  well  as  other  developmental 
needs. 

For  FY  1980  we  seek  $100  million  in 
SSA,  which  is  slightly  less  than  the 
$105  million  appropriated  for  the  re- 
gion in  FY  1978.  In  the  coming  fiscal 
year  we  wish  to  initiate  a  modest  $3 
million  agricultural  assistance  program 
for  Mozambique.  The  largest  element 
of  the  proposed  program  is  $31  million 
for  Zambia — equal  to  the  amount  ap- 
propriated in  FY  1978.  It  will  be  used 
to  ease  that  country's  severe  balance- 
of-payments  position  and  allow  the  im- 
portation of  critically  needed  agricul- 
tural inputs.  Of  this,  $6  million  is  for 
diversification  into  agriculture  and 
training.  Other  elements  of  the  FY 
1980  program  are  basically  extensions 
of  existing  programs  in  the  fields  of 
agriculture,  rural  development,  educa- 
tion, alternative  energy  programs,  and 
maintenance  of  refugees  of  the  area. 

In  coping  with  the  exigencies  of  the 
southern  African  situation,  this  pro- 
gram will  provide  us  with  much  needed 
flexibility  not  readily  available  in  reg- 
ular development  assistance  projects. 

Foreign  Military  Sales  (FMS) 

Soviet  and  Cuban  activities  have  in- 
duced some  very  real  concerns  in  many 
African  countries  with  regard  to  their 
security.  In  certain  cases,  there  has 
been  a  concomitant  requirement  to 


April  1979 

meet  legitimate  defense  needs,  and  our 
friends  in  Africa  must  be  reassured  that 
they  can  count  on  our  support.  Words 
alone  are  not  always  convincing. 
;|  Our  FY  1980  FMS  proposals  have 
been  formulated  in  conformity  with 
President  Carter's  May  19,  1977,  di- 
rective on  arms  transfers  and  our 
human  rights  policy.  This  year's  pro- 
gram for  six  countries  totals  $45.4 
million,  $19.2  million  more  than  last 
year.  The  doubling  of  the  Kenyan  pro- 
gram accounts  for  most  of  this  in- 
crease. 

For  Botswana,  our  only  new  FMS 
program,  we  are  asking  $500,000  FMS 
and  $80,000  for  the  international  mili- 
tary education  and  training  (IMET) 
program.  Why  Botswana?  A  quick 
glance  at  the  map  of  southern  Africa 
should  provide  the  answer.  Bordering 
as  it  does  on  Rhodesia,  Namibia,  and 
South  Africa.  Botswana  maintained  no 
defense  force  at  all  until  FY  1977. 
I  Unfortunately  the  increase  in  fighting 
in  Rhodesia  forced  it  to  establish  one  to 
prevent  a  spillover  of  the  conflict  from 
neighboring  Rhodesia.  Its  government 
has  played  a  constructive  role  in  the 
pursuit  of  a  peaceful  resolution  of  that 
conflict  and  has  resisted  pressure  to 
choose  sides  in  it.  1  would  also  note 
that  Botswana's  moderate  pro- Western 
government's  record  for  respect  for 
human  rights  is  considered  one  of  the 
best  in  Africa. 

Certainly  our  modest  FMS  program 
for  the  purchase  of  some  trucks,  jeeps, 
and  tactical  communication  systems 
will  not  tip  the  scales,  but  it  will  indi- 
cate our  support  and  recognition  of 
Botswana's  fidelity  to  principles  that 
we  share. 

The  $2  million  in  FMS  and  $50,000 
in  IMET  for  Cameroon  is  again  in- 
tended to  show  our  support  and 
friendship  for  that  moderate  govern- 
ment. 

Our  largest  program  in  Africa  is 
Kenya,  for  which  we  are  asking  $26 
million  in  FMS  and  $550,000  in  IMET. 
Here  we  are  looking  at  a  stable  pro- 
Western  state  which  has  consistently 
been  supportive  of  our  goals  and  ob- 
jectives in  Africa,  which  finds  itself 
nearly  surrounded  by  neighbors  which 
have  been  heavily  armed  by  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  two  of  which  have  at  one 
time  or  another  made  claims  on  its  ter- 
ritory . 

The  Kenyan  Government  reluctantly 
concluded  that  its  concentration  of  re- 
sources on  economic  development, 
while  remarkably  successful,  has  led  to 
a  degradation  of  its  defense  posture 
relative  to  its  neighbors.  It  has  now 
embarked  on  a  program  to  modernize 
its  defense  establishment  and  achieve  a 
credible  defense  deterrent. 

When  then-Vice  President  and  now 


President  Moi  was  here  last  March, 
President  Carter  indicated  that  the 
United  States  would  be  sympathetic  to 
Kenya's  military  needs.  At  President 
Moi's  request,  a  U.S.  military  survey 
team  was  sent  to  Kenya  last  year,  and 
the  team's  recommendations  are  re- 
flected in  the  FY  1980  FMS  program 
proposal. 

Kenya  would  like  to  purchase  15 
helicopters  equipped  with  antitank  mis- 
siles and  17  commercially  equipped 
helicopters.  The  total  cost  phased  over 
3  years  will  be  $44  million. 

1  would  add,  however,  that  defense 
cooperation  with  Kenya  is  not  a  one- 
way street.  Mombassa  is  one  of  the  few 
ports  on  the  Indian  Ocean  littoral  to 
welcome  and  provide  facilities  to  the 
U.S.  Navy. 

As  this  committee  knows  an  historic 
and  special  relationship  exists  between 
the  United  States  and  Liberia.  Liberia 
regards  its  security  as  part  of  that  spe- 
cial relationship.  It  has  depended  ex- 
clusively on  U.S.  support  for  its  defen- 
sive requirements.  The  port,  airfield, 
and  communications  facilities  extended 
to  us  by  Liberia  far  exceed  the  value  of 
our  modest  contributions  to  its  defense. 

The  very  modest  ($1.4  million  FMS 
and  $230,000  IMET)  program  will 
continue  funding  begun  this  year  ($1.2 
million)  of  a  much-needed  force  mod- 
ernization program.  Basically  it  will  be 
used  to  replace  some  rather  obsolete 
equipment — radios,  vehicles,  and  a 
Cessna  aircraft. 

Sudan  has  become  a  force  for  mod- 
eration in  the  Horn  of  Africa.  It  has 
been  supportive  of  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords and  our  efforts  to  promote  peace 
in  the  Middle  East.  Through  his  current 
leadership  of  the  Organization  of  Afri- 
can Unity,  President  Numeyri  has  been 
a  positive  force  on  the  African  Conti- 
nent. 

Our  $5  million  FMS  request  will 
cover  only  a  very  small  portion  of  Su- 
dan's needs;  a  Saudi-financed  commer- 
cial purchase  program  will  address  Su- 
dan's larger  and  immediate  defense  re- 
quirements. Our  limited  contribution 
frankly  serves  as  the  earnest  of  U.S. 
interest  in  Sudanese  security  and  is 
valued  by  other  interested  parties  such 
as   the   Saudis.   Other  Western  allies 


Letter 
of  Credence 

On  February  26,  1979,  President 
Carter  accepted  the  credentials  of  Sidi 
Bouna  Ould  Sidi  of  Mauritania  as  his 
country's  newly  appointed  Ambassador 
to  the  United  States.  D 


11 


such  as  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany, 
and  Canada  are  also  participating  in  the 
modernization  of  Sudan's  military. 

Our  program  for  Zaire  will  comple- 
ment those  of  our  Belgian  and  French 
allies,  whose  commitment  far  exceeds 
our  own.  We  are  asking  $10.5  million 
in  FMS  and  $1  million  in  IMET.  We 
regard  Zaire  as  a  key  country  in  terms 
of  its  location,  minerals,  and  potential; 
pro-Western  in  orientation,  misman- 
aged, and  a  victim  of  two  invasions  in 
2  years,  it  presents  a  troublesome  di- 
lemma. 

It  represents  a  fundamental  conflict 
of  objectives  —  the  quest  for  stability 
versus  human  rights  and  democratic 
principles.  However,  it  is  not  an 
either/or  situation.  We  are  capable  of 
nuance  in  our  policy.  Our  programs  are 
designed  to  enhance  security  and  pro- 
vide incentives  for  the  Zairian  Gov- 
ernment to  institute  essential  reforms. 

The  FMS  program  at  its  proposed 
level  will  be  used  for  follow-on  logisti- 
cal support  for  the  Zairian  Air  Force 
C-130  and  Cessna  aircraft  and  Navy 
patrol  boats  and  some  spare  parts  for 
U.S.  provided  vehicles  and  communi- 
cations equipment. 

In  each  of  the  six  countries  that  I 
have  just  covered,  we  have  IMET  pro- 
grams. There  are  10  additional  coun- 
tries for  a  sub-Saharan  total  of  $3.4 
million  which  is  actually  less  than  the  2 
previous  years  (FY  1978  —  $3.6  mil- 
lion and  FY  1979  — $3.5  million). 

For  the  most  part  these  are  very 
small  programs,  but  they  are, 
nevertheless,  an  important  tool  serving 
U.S.  interests  in  Africa.  The  16  coun- 
tries scheduled  to  be  included  in  the  FY 
1980  IMET  are  moderate  in  their  policy 
orientation.  Provision  of  even  modest 
amounts  of  training  is  taken  as  a  sign 
of  U.S.  interest  and  an  indication  of  a 
willingness  to  help  meet  their  security 
concerns.  Furthermore,  they  are  useful 
in  providing  access  to  a  cadre  of  which 
has  great  influence  on  the  political  and 
economic  development  of  their  coun- 
tries. 

Through  this  U.S.  training  we  have 
an  opportunity  to  expose  future  and 
present  leadership  to  values  which  we 
consider  important,  such  as  a  respect 
for  human  rights. 

Before  concluding,  I  wish  to  assure 
you  that  the  human  rights  performance 
of  the  proposed  recipient  countries  was 
carefully  taken  into  account  and  are 
reflected  in  the  level  of  program  re- 
quests. □ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


12 


If orii  of  Airica 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

Slatement  before  the  Suhcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  February  28,  1979. 
Mr.  Moose  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  to  discuss  our  security  assist- 
ance programs  and  their  relationship  to 
events  in  the  past  year  in  the  Horn  of 
Africa  and  American  policy  in  this  im- 
portant area. 

Soviet  and  Cuban  activities  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa  have  focused  interna- 
tional attention  on  this  area  of  the 
world  over  the  past  18  months  as  never 
before.  The  political  conflicts  in  the 
Horn  which  provided  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba  with  the  opportunity  for  in- 
tervention still  continue  unresolved, 
both  in  Eritrea  and  the  Ogaden  region 
of  Ethiopia.  The  Cuban  troop  presence 
in  Ethiopia  remains.  So  does  Soviet 
military  support  for  Ethiopia. 

The  choices  which  have  confronted 
the  United  States  in  the  Horn  in  the 
current  political  environment  have  been 
difficult  and  complex.  Our  policy  ob- 
jectives of  promoting  peace  and  stabil- 
ity in  the  region  have  been  complicated 
by  the  Soviet  and  Cuban  presence,  by 
deep-seated  historical  and  ethnic  rival- 
ries, as  well  as  political  changes  which 
have  brought  new  antagonisms  with  old 
friends,  as  in  Ethiopia,  or  new  oppor- 
tunities for  those  nations  which  were 
once  less  sympathetic  to  a  U.S.  role  in 
the  region,  as  in  Somalia. 

The  Horn  of  Africa  is  also  a  region 
whose  developments  have  an  effect  not 
only  upon  African  affairs  but  upon  the 
Arab  world  as  well.  Three  of  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Horn  —  Somalia,  Djibouti, 
and  Sudan  —  are  members  of  the  Arab 
League.  Their  security  is  a  matter  of 
concern  for  our  Arab  friends  as  well, 
who  interpret  American  actions  in  the 
region  in  the  light  of  their  own  security 
interests. 

For  the  purposes  of  our  discussion 
today,  I  would  like  to  focus  our  atten- 
tion on  the  five  countries  of  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Djibouti,  Somalia,  and 
Kenya.  Other  countries  such  as  Saudi 
Arabia,  the  Yemens,  Egypt,  or  Tan- 
zania follow  developments  in  the  Horn 
closely,  but  the  five  core  countries  are 
the  principals  in  the  Horn,  and  it  is  to 
the  actions  and  reactions  between  these 
countries  that  1  want  to  concentrate  in 
this  review  with  you. 


Background  to  the  Present  Conflict 

In  mid-1977,  at  a  time  when 
Ethiopia  was  in  transition  and  a  new 
revolutionary  government  had  replaced 
the  Haile  Selassie  regime,  Somalia  saw 
an  opportunity  for  ending  Ethiopian 
rule  over  the  Somali  peoples  of  the 
Ogaden.  Insurgents  of  the  Western 
Somali  Liberation  Front,  supported  by 
units  from  the  Somali  National  Army, 
launched  a  campaign  in  the  Ogaden  re- 
gion of  Ethiopia  to  "liberate"  this  area 
from  what  it  called  Ethiopian  colo- 
nialism. 

At  the  same  time,  Eritrean  rebels  in 
the  northernmost  province  of  Ethiopia 
had  succeeded  in  liberating  most  of  this 
territory  from  Ethiopian  domination. 
The  Eritrean  liberation  movements, 
which  include  both  Muslim  and  Chris- 
tian elements,  had  been  waging  an  in- 
surgency for  over  a  decade  in  their  ef- 
forts to  bring  self-determination  to  the 
Eritrean  people.  The  Eritrean 
separatists  have  been  supported  for 
years  by  neighboring  Arab  states  in  the 
region. 

In  addition  to  these  ethnic  claims  or 
disputes,  there  are  also  longstanding 
communal  antagonisms  between  the 
populations  of  the  Ethiopian  highlands, 
which  are  predominantly  Christian,  and 
the  Muslim  people  of  the  lowlands, 
both  in  Eritrea  and  in  the  Ogaden. 
Ethiopian  fears  of  Arab  encirclement 
and  domination  are  of  course 
longstanding. 

The  demands  of  the  Eritrean  and 
Ogaden  peoples  for  self-determination 
create  a  serious  dilemma  for  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity  (OAU)  and 
others  in  their  attempt  to  promote  a 
peaceful  resolution  to  these  problems 
of  conflict.  One  of  the  fundamental 
tenets  of  the  OAU  is  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  existing  African  states. 

As  most  of  you  know,  tribal  bound- 
aries in  Africa  seldom,  if  ever,  coin- 
cide with  national  boundaries.  Virtu- 
ally all  African  states,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Somalia,  include  within  their 
borders  a  great  many  ethnic  or  tribal 
groups.  The  granting  of  self- 
determination  to  various  ethnic 
minorities  because  of  their  economic  or 
ethnic  grievances  would  require  the 
rewriting  of  many  African  boundaries. 
Accordingly,  African  nations  in  the 
OAU  have  insisted  upon  the  territorial 
integrity  of  existing  African  states  over 
the  rights  of  self-determination  of  those 
peoples  with  political  or  ethnic  griev- 
ances like  the  Eritreans  and  Somalis. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

There  is  little  possibility  that  African 
states  would  support  a  political  resolu- 
tion to  the  problems  in  the  Ogaden  or 
Eritrea  unless  the  Ethiopian  Govern- 
ment itself  were  willing  to  recognize 
that  a  problem  exists  and  that  a 
negotiated  settlement  is  required.  This, 
however,  appears  to  be  most  unlikely 
under  present  circumstances.  This 
conflict  in  the  Horn  continues  today. 

In  the  Ogaden  region  of  Ethiopia, 
Somalia  continues  its  support  for  the 
Ogaden  insurgents.  The  Ethiopian 
military  government  has  been  unable  to 
end  the  guerrilla  war,  which  continues 
at  a  low  level. 

In  Eritrea  the  Mengistu  regime  con- 
tinues its  pursuit  of  a  military  solution 
to  the  Eritrean  conflict.  We  have  seen 
no  evidence  that  the  Eritreans  have 
yielded  in  their  demands  for  full  mde- 
pendence  or  that  the  Mengistu  regime 
is  prepared  to  reduce  its  military  ac- 
tions in  favor  of  negotiations. 

We,  nevertheless,  continue  to  be- 
lieve that  the  problems  in  the  Horn 
must  be  resolved  peacefully  if  an  en- 
during settlement  is  to  be  achieved.  In 
our  judgment  the  continuing  Soviet  and 
Cuban  military  presence  tends  to  en- 
courage military  solutions  which  can- 
not resolve  in  any  final  way  the  causes 
of  the  conflict. 


U.S.  Goals 

This  then  is  the  political  and  military 
context  in  which  the  United  States 
seeks  to  pursue  its  policy  goals  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa.  Those  goals  are: 

•  To  maintain  cordial  relations  with 
all  the  countries  in  this  area; 

•  To  assist  within  the  limit  of  our  re- 
sources in  improving  the  well-being  of 
the  people  in  these  countries; 

•  To  lend  our  support  to  the  creation 
of  an  atmosphere  that  will  eliminate  the 
need  for  the  large  import  of  military 
weapons  and  that  will  encourage  the 
pursuit  by  Ethiopia  of  a  truly 
nonaligned  foreign  policy; 

•  To  support  efforts  aimed  at  finding 
political  or  negotiated  solutions  to  the 
longstanding  problems  of  the  area, 
which  we  hope  would  remove  opportu- 
nities for  foreign  intervention;  and 

•  To  provide  military  assistance 
when  it  serves  legitimate  defensive 
purposes  but  to  continue  our  policy  of 
arms  restraint  in  the  Horn.  We  have  not 
and  we  will  not  provide  arms  in  situa- 
tions which  fuel  local  conflicts. 

In  Kenya  we  have  been  impressed  at 
the  strength  of  Kenyan  political  in- 
stitutions and  how  this  facilitated  the 
transition  to  new  political  leadership 
after  the  death  of  their  great  leader 
Mzee  Jomo  Kenyatta. 

We  are  working  with  Kenya  to  es- 


April  1979 

lablish  a  credible  defensive  military 
deterrent  through  the  provision  of  a 
total  of  $44  million  in  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  credits  over  a  period  of  3 
years  for  32  helicopters  (15  equipped 
with  antitank  missiles)  to  be  used 
primarily  as  antitank  weapons  and  in 
FY  1979,  $400,000  for  an  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET) 
program.  We  had  earlier  provided  FMS 
credits  for  12  F-5  airplanes. 

In  Sudan  President  Nimeiri  pledged 
Sudan's  support  for  the  Camp  David 
accords  and  has  consistently  sustained 
Middle  East  peace  efforts.  Through  his 
current  leadership  of  the  OAU,  Presi- 
dent Nimeiri  has  been  a  positive  force 
on  the  African  Continent. 

The  Sudan-U.S.  Business  Council, 
at  meetings  in  Khartoum  and  last  fall  in 
Washington,  have  stimulated  interest  in 
private  investment  in  Sudan  and 
strengthened  the  ties  between  the  busi- 
ness communities  of  our  two  countries. 
U.S.  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (AID)  programs  are  ex- 
panding to  help  Sudan  exploit  more 
rapidly  its  immense  agricultural  poten- 
tial. 

We  are  sympathetic  to  Sudan's  de- 
fensive concerns,  but  its  larger  and 
immediate  defense  requirements  will  be 
met  by  a  Saudi-financed  commercial 
purchase  program.  Our  $5  million  in 
FMS  credits  is  being  allocated  by 
Sudan  to  the  purchase  of  engineering 
equipment  to  allow  the  Sudanese  army 
to  participate  in  nation-building  pro- 
grams. 

In  Ethiopia  the  provisional  military 
government  has  launched  on  a  cam- 
paign to  resolve  its  formidable  eco- 
nomic problems. 

Discussion  is  well  underway  of  our 
bilateral  problems,  such  as  compensa- 
tion for  nationalized  U.S.  businesses 
and  the  settlement  of  issues  involved  in 
our  past  military  program,  which  in- 
clude payments  due  us  by  Ethiopia  as 
well  as  credits  owed  Ethiopia  for 
military  materiel  we  have  not  deliv- 
ered. 

The  Soviet-Cuban  presence  remains 
in  Ethiopia  and  may  encourage 
Ethiopia  to  seek  military,  rather  than 
negotiated,  settlements  of  its  problems. 

In  Somalia  regular  troop  units  have 
withdrawn  from  the  Ogaden,  but  the 
insurgency  continues. 

We  have  initiated  economic  assist- 
ance programs  which  will  total  over 
$50  million  when  completed,  as  well  as 
a  PL-48U  food  assistance  program  in 
FY  1979  of  over  $11  million. 

We  have  opened  a  Defense  Attache 
office  in  our  Embassy  and,  after  an  in- 
terregnum of  nearly  10  years,  U.S. 
naval  ships  are  again  calling  at  Somali 
ports.  We  have  remained  firm  in  our 
resolve  not  to  supply  arms  to  Somalia 


because  of  its  involvement  in  the  con- 
tinuing high-level  of  violence  in  the 
Ogaden,  but  we  are  discussing  with  the 
Somalis  other  areas  of  mutual  coopera- 
tion. 

Finally,  in  Djibouti  we  have  opened 
a  small  Embassy  headed  by  a  Charge 
d'Affaires  to  establish  working  rela- 
tions with  this  new  government. 

A  modest  U.S.  AID  program  of  $1 
million  has  been  initiated,  and  U.S. 
naval  ships  continue,  as  in  the  past,  to 
be  welcomed  at  the  port  on  a  regular 
basis. 

As  the  foregoing  outline  suggests, 
difficult  problems  remain  to  be  re- 
solved in  the  Horn  of  Africa.  Soviet 
and  Cuban  influence  remains  signifi- 
cant in  Ethiopia.  Two  of  the  most  per- 
sistent conflicts — guerrilla  operations 
in  the  countryside  of  Eritrea  and  the 
Ogaden — continue  unabated  despite 
the  Ethiopian  recapture  of  the  major 
towns  in  both  areas.  Ethiopian-Somali 
hostilities  remain  active;  relations  be- 
tween Sudan  and  Ethiopia  are  also 
strained.  Our  relations  with  Ethiopia 
are  plagued  by  suspicion  and  mistrust. 
Kenya  continues  to  fear  the  Somali 
threat. 

We  can  report,  however,  that  during 
the  past  year  the  human  rights  perform- 
ance in  these  five  countries  of  the  Horn 
has  improved.  There  is  still  room  for 
further  improvement  in  nearly  all  of 
these  countries,  but  it  was  a  positive 
year,  and  this  aspect  of  the  situation 
has  been  reflected  in  our  policy  in  part 
by  the  level  of  program  requests.        D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


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14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CO]\TROL:         Preserving  Freedom 
€tnd  Peace  in  a  ^uciear  Age 


by  Vice  President  Mondale 

Address  before  a  conference  cospon- 
sored  by  the  Department  of  State,  the 
Greater  Minneapolis  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  and  a  consortium  of  other 
Minnesota  organizations  in  Min- 
neapolis on  February  22.  1979. 

Today  I  want  to  talk  with  you  about 
how  our  nation  can  preserve  its  free- 
dom, its  beauty,  and  its  peace  in  a  nu- 
clear age. 

Our  own  Hubert  Humphrey  once  said 
that:  "In  this  world,  disaster  is  but  a 
step  away.  There  is  no  margin  for 
error."  Returning  to  a  dark  age  of  un- 
restrained nuclear  arms  competition 
would  reduce  that  margin.  Allowing 
any  nation  to  gain  military  advantage 
over  the  United  States  would  be 
equally  dangerous. 

We  must  not — and  we  will  not — let 
either  happen.  This  is  the  determina- 
tion of  the  Carter  Administration.  This 
is  the  view  of  the  vast  majority  of  the 
American  people — who  overwhelm- 
ingly support  both  an  arms  control 
agreement  and  a  strong  national  de- 
fense. And  I  am  confident  that  Con- 
gress shares  this  view  as  it  prepares  to 
consider  both  the  strategic  arms  limita- 
tion treaty  and  our  proposed  defense 
programs. 

There  are  some  Americans,  how- 
ever, who  fear  that  we  are  not  strong 
enough  as  a  nation  to  move  ahead  with 
SALT.  That  view  —  of  the  current 
military  balance  and  of  SALT — is 
wrong,  and  it  can  lead  us  in  the  wrong 
direction.  It  not  only  underestimates 
America's  overwhelming  nonmilitary 
advantages,  it  seriously  misjudges  both 
our  relative  military  strength  and  the 
effect  of  a  SALT  agreement. 

Our  military  position  today  is  secure, 
and  we  are  taking  steps  to  assure  that  it 
remains  secure.  And  a  sound  SALT 
agreement  will  make  us  stronger  as  a 
nation  because  it  will  contribute  to  that 
security. 

Let  me  make  that  point  again.  The 
SALT  agreement  we  hope  to  present  to 
the  American  people  is  not  a  gift  to  the 
Soviets;  it  is  an  agreement  which 
serves  the  security  interests  of  our  na- 
tion and  of  the  world.  It  does  not 
weaken  us;  it  strengthens  us. 

We  have  watched  carefully  the 
steady  growth  of  Soviet  military  power 
in  recent  years.  In  some  areas,  the 
Soviets  are  ahead  of  us;  in  others,  we 


are  ahead  of  them.  What  matters  for  us 
is  not  whether  the  two  forces  are  iden- 
tical, but  whether  they  are  in  an  overall 
balance — for  that  is  the  basis  of  secu- 
rity today. 

For  example,  the  Soviets  have  al- 
ways had  a  larger  land  army.  But  we 
do  not  need  to  match  them  man-for- 
man  because  the  strength  of  our  more 
numerous  allies.  The  Soviet  Union  has 
always  had  more  tanks.  But  we  have 
three  times  as  many  antitank  weapons 
in  Western  Europe  as  there  are  Soviet 
tanks  in  Eastern  Europe. 

The  critical  question  is  not  whether 
we  match  the  forces  the  Soviets  have 
built  to  meet  their  own  security  needs 
but  whether  we  meet  U.S.  and  allied 
security  needs.  Without  question,  our 
forces  meet  those  needs. 


U.S.  Strategic  Advantages 

To  begin  with,  the  United  States  has 
certain  strategic  advantages. 

•  We  have  friendly  neighbors  on  our 
borders.  The  Soviet  Union  has  far 
longer  and  far  more  vulnerable  borders. 

•  We  have  only  one  major  adver- 
sary. The  Soviets  face  two.  Fully  25% 
of  its  combat  forces  are  deployed  on 
the  Soviet-Chinese  border. 

•  We  have  easy  access  to  the  sea. 
The  Soviets  are  restricted  by  narrow 


We  must  continue  to  protect  our  own 
and  our  allies'  interests.  We  are 
strengthening  our  forces  in  Europe.  We 
are  improving  our  ability  to  speed  ad- 
ditional ground  and  air  forces  in  the 
event  of  a  crisis.  And  our  European  al- 
lies, who  provide  most  of  NATO's 
combat  forces,  are  steadily  improving 
their  forces'  readiness  and  effective- 
ness. 

But  it  is  the  awesome  power  of  our 
nuclear  weapons  that  1  want  to  em- 
phasize this  afternoon. 

Many  of  you  here  today  remember 
the  shuddering  reality  of  our  first 
atomic  bomb.  Today,  the  United  States 
has  over  20,000  nuclear  weapons. 

•  Each  warhead  on  one  of  our 
Poseidon  missiles  is  two  times  more 
destructive  than  the  atomic  bombs 
dropped  on  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki. 
One  Poseidon  submarine  carries  more 
than  140  warheads.  Each  Poseidon  can 
deliver  more  destructive  force  than  all 
the  bombs — nuclear  and  convention- 
al— that  were  dropped  during  World 
War  II.  We  have  31  of  these  Poseidon 
submarines. 

•  More  than  half  of  our  1,000  Min- 
uteman  missiles  are  equipped  with 
multiple  independently-targetable 
reentry  vehicles  (MIRV's) — which  en- 
able one  rocket  to  carry  a  number  of 
warheads  and  thus  strike  at  several 
different  targets.   Each  of  the   Min- 


[SALT  II]  will  establish  equal  limits  on  the  number  of  missiles  and 
bombers  capable  of  delivering  nuclear  weapons  .... 


straits,  by  a  long  and  icy  winter,  and 
by  other  natural  barriers. 

Our  military  capabilities  today  are 
enormous  and  growing  stronger.  And 
our  allies  and  friends  significantly  in- 
crease our  overall  strength. 

Nor  are  we  standing  still.  Because  of 
steady  growth  in  Soviet  defense 
spending  and  capabilities  over  the  past 
decade  —  particularly  in  central 
Europe — we  have  had  to  reverse  the 
pattern  of  shrinking  American  defense 
efforts.  We  and  our  allies  committed 
ourselves  last  year  to  increasing  indi- 
vidual defense  expenditures.  Tb^  de- 
fense budget  President  Carter  sub- 
mitted to  Congress  last  month  reflects 
that  commitment. 


uteman  warheads  carries  eight  times 
the  force  of  the  first  atomic  bomb.  And 
soon  we  will  double  that  destructive 
power. 

We  have  348  heavy  bombers  which 
can  carry  2,000  megatons  of  total 
power.  Let  me  illustrate  what  that 
means.  If  every  car  of  a  train  that  ex- 
tended from  Minneapolis  to  Winona 
were  filled  with  TNT  and  blown  up, 
that  would  be  one  megaton. 

1  cite  these  facts  to  give  you  a  sense 
of  the  enormous  scale — and  the  great 
diversity  —  of  America's  nuclear 
strength. 

The  Soviets,  of  course,  also  have  a 
large  arsenal.  But  the  factor  that  keeps 
us  at  peace  is  not  simply  what  each  of 


\piil  1979 


15 


lis  has;  it  is  whether  there  is  any  possi- 
bility that  a  nuclear  attack  on  us  or  our 
allies  would  not  mean  massive  destruc- 
tion for  the  Soviets. 

Let  me  take  the  worst  case.  It  is  pos- 
sible that,  in  the  early  to  mid-1980"s. 
'he  Soviets — with  a  surprise  attack — 
(.cuild  destroy  most  of  our  land-based 
missiles  while  keeping  a  large  number 
(il  their  missiles  in  reserve.  In  doing 
SCI.  they  also  must  consider  the  grim 
jtossibility  that  we  would  have  already 
launched  our  missiles  before  theirs  ar- 
irived.  The  possibility,  even  theoretical, 
that  our  missiles  would  be  vulnerable  is 
somethmg  we  are  working  very  hard  to 
avoid. 

But  even  if  our  land-based  missiles 
were  vulnerable  to  a  surprise  attack,  we 
could  still  totally  destroy  the  Soviet 
I  nion  as  a  viable  society  with  the  rest 
ut  our  nuclear  arsenal.  No  sane  leader 
could  expect  to  gain  an  advantage  from 
launching  such  a  suicidal  attack. 

Modernization  and  Restructuring 

To  assure  that  our  strategic  forces 
will  be  a  convincing  deterrent  in  the 
future,  we  are  carrying  out  the  most 
extensive  modernization  and  restruc- 
turing of  our  nuclear  forces  in  over  a 
decade. 

First,  we  have  put  three-quarters  of 
our  strategic  warheads  in  our  largely 
invulnerable  submarines  and  mobile 
bombers;  three-quarters  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  warheads  are  on  more  vulnera- 
ble fixed  land-based  missiles. 

Second,  we  are  adding  to  the 
capabilities  of  our  strategic  bombers. 
Our  B-52  force  is  being  equipped  with 
long-range  cruise  missiles.  That  force 
eclipses  Soviet  air  defense  expendi- 
tures. These  missiles  will  enable  our 
B-52's  to  remain  outside  Soviet  air 
defenses  and  still  strike  significant 
Soviet  targets  with  extraordinary  ac- 
curacy. 

Third,  we  are  placing  more  power- 
ful, sophisticated  missiles  in  our  exist- 
ing submarines.  We  are  about  to  launch 
our  new.  longer-range  Trident  subma- 
rine; and  we  are  developing  a  still  more 
powerful  and  accurate  missile  for  these 
Trident  submarines. 

Fourth,  we  are  substantially  im- 
proving our  land-based  missile  force. 
Our  Minuteman  Ill's  will  be  consid- 
erably more  accurate.  We  are  ac- 
celerating development  of  a  new  and 
much  larger  land-based  missile  called 
the  M-X.  And  we  are  carefully 
analyzing  the  alternatives  available  for 
making  our  intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles  (ICBM's)  less  vulnerable.  The 
SALT  agreement  now  being  considered 


will  not  constrain  a  single  one  of  these 
alternatives.  Indeed,  it  will  help  make 
these  alternatives  feasible  and  safe. 

We  will  continue  to  maintain  a  con- 
vincing deterrent  with  a  nuclear 
weapons  force.  But  in  a  world  of  nu- 
clear weapons,  more  is  not  necessarily 
better.  We  are  not  more  secure  today 
because  we  and  the  Soviets  have  tens 
of  thousands  of  warheads  rather  than 
thousands. 

For  the  stark  reality  is  that  neither  of 
us  can  win  an  all-out  arms  race.  It  is  a 
futile  search  for  a  temporary  advan- 
tage. We  will  match  what  they  do,  and 
they  will  do  the  same,  in  a  spiral  of 
ever-increasing  risk  and  cost. 

Thus  the  power  we  share  with  the 
Soviet  Union  carries  this  imperative  for 
our  security:  We  must  slow,  and  ulti- 
mately reverse,  this  dangerous  and 
burdensome  competition.  That  is  an 
imperative  recognized  for  nearly  three 
decades.  Every  President  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nuclear  era — and  both 
major  political  parties — have  under- 
stood that  security  depends  on  both  a 
sound  defense  and  sound  arms  control. 

Background  to  SALT  II 

Building  on  the  efforts  of  Presidents 
Truman  and  Eisenhower,  President 
Kennedy  concluded  the  first  arms  con- 
trol agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1963  —  halting  poisonous  nuclear- 
weapons  testing  in  the  atmosphere. 


SALT  Treaty 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  24,  1979' 

The  President  expects  that  a  verifi- 
able agreement  on  strategic  arms  lim- 
itations which  protects  American 
strategic  interests  can  be  negotiated  and 
will  be  ratified. 

The  President's  position  is  that  this 
agreement  will  be  submitted  for  Senate 
ratification  as  a  treaty.  If  the  Soviet 
Union,  in  the  absence  of  a  SALT 
treaty,  were  to  engage  in  a  significant 
arms  buildup,  the  President  would,  of 
course,  match  it  appropriately.  By  the 
same  token,  it  is  the  President's  inten- 
tion not  to  escalate  the  arms  race  un- 
ilaterally in  the  absence  of  a  treaty,  if 
comparable  and  verifiable  restraint  is 
shown  by  the  Soviet  Union.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  5,  1979. 


Later  we  reached  agreements  that  ban- 
ned nuclear  weapons  from  the  ocean 
floor  and  from  outer  space. 

The  1968  Nuclear  Nonprol iteration 
Treaty  now  binds  more  than  100  na- 
tions. It  has  not  yet  removed  the  spec- 
ter of  nuclear  proliferation,  but  it  has 
advanced  that  objective  significantly. 

Since  first  proposed  by  President 
Johnson,  we  have  been  engaged  in 
broader  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks.  During  the  Nixon  Administra- 
tion, these  negotiations  severely  re- 
stricted both  sides  from  building  new 
antiballistic  missile  systems.  These 
systems  would  have  cost  billions  of 
dollars  and  added  new  dangers  to  the 
arms  race. 

Under  President  Nixon,  SALT  I 
placed  the  first  limits  on  the  number  of 
strategic  offensive  missiles.  It  pre- 
vented the  Soviets  from  continuing  to 
increase  the  number  of  their  missiles  by 
several  hundred  each  year. 

For  the  past  6  years,  three  Presidents 
of  both  parties  have  been  negotiating 
the  next  step  in  arms  control  —  the 
SALT  II  agreement.  The  negotiations 
have  been  intense.  We  have  proceeded 
carefully  and  deliberately.  And  we  are 
near  agreement. 

What  SALT  II  Will  Accomplish 

Let  me  explain  what  this  agreement 
will  accomplish. 

First,  it  will  establish  equal  limits 
on  the  number  of  missiles  and  bombers 
capable  of  delivering  nuclear  weapons 
to  the  other  side.  The  first  SALT 
agreement  in  1972  froze  the  number  of 
strategic  missiles,  leaving  the  Soviets 
with  a  numerical  advantage  which  was 
then  offset  by  U.S.  technological 
superiority.  The  new  agreement  firmly 
establishes  the  principle  of  equal  num- 
bers. 

Second,  these  limits  will  be  lower 
and  more  encompassing  than  those  in 
the  first  SALT  agreement.  The  new 
overall  limits  would  force  the  Soviets 
to  eliminate  over  250  strategic  missiles 
and  bombers.  This  is  a  10%  reduction 
and  about  750  fewer  than  they  are 
likely  to  have  in  the  absence  of  SALT. 
On  the  other  hand,  because  we  are 
below  the  new  limits,  we  would  ac- 
tually be  able,  if  we  chose,  to  increase 
the  overall  number  of  our  strategic 
weapons  in  operation. 

Third,  the  agreement  will  place 
lower  limits  on  specific  weapons,  in- 
cluding those  with  more  than  a  single 
warhead. 

Fourth,  for  the  first  time,  we  will 
curb  the  number  of  new  systems  and 


16 


begin  to  limit  the  race  to  make  existing 
systems  more  deadly.  Only  one  new 
ICBM  will  be  permitted  to  each  side. 
The  number  of  warheads  on  a  single 
missile  would  be  limited.  And  there 
would  be  restraint  on  increasing  the 
size  of  land-based  missiles. 

What  would  be  the  major  effect  of 
this  agreement  on  our  security?  Instead 
of  an  estimated  3,000  Soviet  strategic 
weapons  by  1985,  there  would  be 
2,250.  The  strategic  balance  will  be 
more  stable  and,  therefore,  safer.  We 
will  have  greater  confidence  and  cer- 
tainty in  our  own  defense  planning. 
And  the  defense  programs  that  we  and 
our  allies  need  and  have  planned  can 
proceed  forward  on  schedule. 

Verification  and  Competition 

But  how  do  we  know  the  Soviets  will 
not  violate  the  agreement?  The  answer 
is — we  can  see  for  ourselves. 

We  have  powerful  and  varied  sys- 
tems for  observing  the  Soviets.  Besides 
our  photographic  satellites,  we  have 
other  highly  sensitive  and,  therefore, 
highly  classified  means  of  verification. 
The  large  size  and  limited  number  of 
bases  for  intercontinental  missiles, 
heavy  bombers,  and  nuclear  subma- 
rines eases  our  task. 

And  the  SALT  agreement  itself 
makes  a  major  contribution.  SALT  II 
would  forbid  any  interference  which 
would  impede  our  ability  to  verify 
compliance  with  the  treaty.  And  for  the 
first  time  the  Soviets  have  agreed  to 
regularly  exchange  precise  data  with  us 
on  each  country's  missiles. 

This  is  not  a  new  and  uncertain 
challenge.  We  have  monitored  Soviet 
compliance  with  SALT  I.  We  know 
what  we  can  see.  And  we  know  that  we 
can  detect  any  violation  large  enough 
to  affect  the  strategic  balance — and  do 
so  in  time  to  respond  effectively. 

Yet  with  all  this,  some  critics 
suggest  that  we  should  not  move  ahead 
with  SALT,  even  if  it  strengthens  U.S. 
and  allied  security.  They  contend  that 


Soviet  actions  elsewhere — in  the  Third 
World  or  on  human  rights — compel  us 
to  withhold  approval  of  SALT  II.  This 
would  be  a  profound  mistake. 

As  President  Carter  said  two  days 
ago,  we  "  .  .  .  cannot  let  the  pressures 
of  inevitable  competition  overwhelm 
possibilities  for  cooperation  any  more 
than  [we  can  permit]  cooperation  to 
blind  us  to  the  realities  of  competition 
.  .  .  ."  And  the  President  said  this: 

It  is  precisely  because  we  have  fundamental 
differences  with  the  Soviet  Union  that  we  are 
determined  to  bring  this  most  dangerous  di- 
mension of  our  military  competition  under 
control. ' 

We  will  continue  to  compete  peace- 
fully with  the  Soviets.  In  this  competi- 
tion, we  hold  many  cards — not  only 
our  military  aid  but  our  economic  ties. 


SALT  II  would  forbid  any  inter- 
ference which  would  impede  our 
ability  to  verify  compliance  with 
the  treaty. 


our  understanding  of  diversity,  and, 
most  of  all,  our  support  for  the  deter- 
mined sense  of  independence  in 
emerging  nations  around  the  world. 

But  as  we  compete,  we  must  also 
cooperate  to  limit  the  most  dangerous 
competition — nuclear  weapons.  This  is 
in  our  calculated  self-interest.  SALT  is 
not  a  reward  for  Soviet  good  behavior. 
It  is  a  benefit  for  ourselves  and  for 
mankind. 

With  or  without  SALT,  competition 
with  the  Soviets  in  many  areas  will 
continue.  We  will  respond  to  any 
Soviet  behavior  which  adversely  af- 
fects our  interests.  Without  SALT,  that 
competition  becomes  more  dangerous, 
and  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  are 
dimmed. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 

We  must  recognize  our  overwhelm- 1 
ing  strengths  as  a  nation.  We  must  see 
the  future  not  as  a  threat  but  as  an  op- 
portunity to  make  our  children's  lives 
safer  and  more  rewarding  than  our 
own.  The  emerging  SALT  agreement 
represents  such  an  opportunity. 

Military  competition  today  is  carried 
out  in  highly  technical  terms.  The  de- 
bates on  SALT  will  be  very  complex. 
Let  us  not,  as  we  explore  the  tech- 
nicalities in  all  the  detail  they  deserve, 
lose  sight  of  these  simple  truths:  A  nu- 
clear war  would  destroy  much — if  not 
all — of  what  we  love.  We  must  do  ev- 
erything in  our  power  to  see  that  it 
never  happens.  We  prevent  it  today 
with  a  military  defense  strong  enough 
to  deter  our  potential  adversaries.  We 
will  maintain  that  deterrence. 

But  that  alone  will  not  make  us  se- 
cure. We  must  also,  at  long  last,  re- 
verse the  dangerous  race  in  nuclear 
weapons  that  each  year  increases  nu- 
clear stockpiles  and  each  year  makes  us 
less  safe.  That  is  what  SALT  is  about. 

With  the  vision  that  set  him  apart 
from  other  men,  Hubert  Humphrey  de- 
fined our  present  challenge  over  a  dec- 
ade ago.  He  not  only  cared  deeply,  he 
thought  deeply  about  the  nature  of 
America's  security  in  a  nuclear  world. 

Nuclear  power  has  placed  into  the  hands  of  men 
the  power  to  destroy  all  that  man  has  created. 
Only  responsive  statesmen — who  perceive  that 
perseverence  in  the  pursuit  of  peace  is  not 
cowardice  but  courage,  that  restraint  in  the  use 
of  force  is  not  weakness  but  wisdom — can  pre- 
vent international  rivalries  from  leading  to  an 
incinerated  world. 

Let  us  have  Hubert's  wisdom — and 
summon  Hubert's  courage — as  we  set 
the  course  which  will  help  define  our 
future  for  years  to  come.  D 


'  For  the  full  text  of  the  President's  address 
at  Georgia  Tech  on  Feb.  20,  1979.  see  Bulle- 
tin of  Mar.   1979.  p.  21. 


\pril   1979 


17 


EAST  ASIA:         FY  1980  Assistunve  Proposals 


by  Richard  C.  Holbrooke 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  March  1, 
1979.  Mr.  Holbrooke  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Af- 
fairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  discuss  our  FY  1980  assistance  pro- 
grams in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  I 
think  you  will  agree  that  profound 
changes  have  occurred  on  the  face  of 
Asia  since  the  beginning  of  this  Ad- 
ministration. At  that  time  among  our 
Asian  friends  there  was  a  "crisis  of 
confidence"  in  U.S.  policy  toward  the 
region.  We  subsequently  concentrated 
on  overcoming  that  crisis  and  on  put- 
ting into  place  long-term,  sustainable 
policies  that  emphasize  national  self- 
reliance,  supplemented  by  continued 
U.S.  support,  and  no  U.S.  interference 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  coun- 
tries. 

By  last  March,  thanks  to  the  coordi- 
nated actions  of  the  executive  branch 
and  Congress,  we  had  largely  suc- 
ceeded in  overcoming  the  "crisis  of 
confidence"  by  continuing  our  eco- 
nomic and  security  assistance  programs 
at  a  modest  but  adequate  level,  by  per- 
sonal contacts  with  many  key  Asian 
leaders,  by  a  strong  strategic  presence 
in  the  area,  and  by  a  substantial  in- 
crease in  economic  exchange  between 
the  United  States  and  Asia.  Thus,  dur- 
ing the  following  year,  the  United 
States  was  able  to  concentrate  primar- 
ily upon  reinforcing  the  programs  and 
policies  already  begun.  At  the  same 
time,  new  problems  arose  in  the  secu- 
rity field,  and  persistent  economic 
problems  remained  unresolved. 

Our  basic  policies  remain  sound,  but 
in  order  to  meet  these  challenges  we 
will  need  to  make  a  greater  effort  dur- 
ing the  year  ahead. 

This  past  year  has  been  particularly 
eventful.  Let  me  first  cite  the  major 
positive  events,  from  an  American 
point  of  view,  that  have  taken  place. 

Positive  Developments 

The  United  States  has  maintained  its 
close  ties  with  Japan,  the  cornerstone 
of  our  entire  posture  in  Asia.  Despite 
knotty  economic  problems,  the  funda- 
mental strength  and  depth  of  the  re- 
lationship remain  unimpaired.  Our  se- 
curity relationship  continues  stronger 


than  ever,  accompanied  by  a  new 
awareness  of  defense  matters  among 
the  Japanese  Government  and  public 
and  with  an  increased  Japanese  contri- 
bution to  its  own  security  goals  and  to 
the  support  of  U.S.  forces. 

Perhaps  more  dramatic,  as  we  have 
already  discussed,  the  United  States 
embarked  on  a  new  era  in  our  relations 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
with  the  formal  establishment  of  full 
diplomatic  relations;  simultaneously 
our  ties  with  Taiwan  have  been  placed 
on  a  new  basis  which,  although  unoffi- 
cial, will  be  durable  and  mutually 
beneficial. 

We  put  behind  us  a  period  of  major 
strain  in  our  relationship  with  Korea. 
The  withdrawal  of  our  ground  troops 
began;  but  further  withdrawals  are  in 
abeyance  until  we  complete  our  reas- 
sessment of  North  Korean  military 
capabilities.  South  and  North  Korea 
have  taken  a  first  step  to  resume  their 
long-interrupted  dialogue.  National 
elections  were  held,  and  prominent 
political  prisoners  were  released. 

The  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  continued  to  mature 
as  an  economic  and  political  grouping, 
and  it  expanded  its  relationships  with 
the  United  States,  Japan,  and  the  Euro- 
pean Community.  Its  members  also  ad- 
vanced in  mutual  confidence  and  cohe- 
sion in  the  face  of  common  challenges. 
The  statements  by  ASEAN  Foreign 
Ministers  calling  for  withdrawal  of 
foreign  troops  from  Kampuchea  and 
Vietnam  and  respect  for  territorial  in- 
tegrity reflected  this  cohesion. 

We  and  the  Philippine  Government 
have  agreed  to  an  amendment  of  the 
32-year-old  Military  Bases  Agreement 
that  is  more  in  keeping  with  Philippine 
sovereignty  and  at  the  same  time  per- 
mits continued  and  unhampered  U.S. 
military  operations  at  the  facilities 
which  we  retain.  This  places  on  a  firm 
footing  the  ability  of  our  forces  to  op- 
erate effectively  in  the  Pacific  and  In- 
dian Oceans,  protecting  vital  sea  lanes 
and  ready  to  support  our  friends  and 
allies. 

Close  congressional  consultation  was 
vital  in  enabling  the  Adminstration  to 
develop  its  position.  Congressional 
contacts  with  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  were  important  in  bringing 
the  negotiations  to  a  successful  conclu- 
sion. As  President  Marcos  said  on 
February  16:  "If  the  United  States  of 
America  will  be  remembered  in  history 


it  will  not  be  merely  for  its  power,  not 
only  for  its  military  might,  but  because 
of  its  noble  objective  to  attain  peace  in 
the  world." 

A  number  of  Pacific  island  states 
have  peacefully  become  independent. 
These  new  countries  have  been  assisted 
in  their  emergence  by  the  moral  and 
material  support  of  the  United  States, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand,  which  to- 
gether continue  to  comprise  one  of  the 
most  durable  and  strongest  treaty 
organizations — ANZUS — in  the  world. 

Negative  Development 

The  major  new  negative  develop- 
ment in  Asia  was  the  boiling  over  into 
full-scale  warfare  of  the  long- 
simmering  conflicts  between  Vietnam 
and  Kampuchea  [Cambodia],  Vietnam 
and  China.  The  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  not  immediately  threatened, 
and  we  will  not  get  directly  involved  in 
a  conflict  between  Asian  Communist 
nations.  However,  the  continuation  and 
possibly  escalation  of  these  conflicts 
between  Communist  states  is  poten- 
tially dangerous  to  the  region.  There- 
fore, we  shall  use  whatever  means  are 
at  our  disposal  to  encourage  restraint, 
bring  an  end  to  the  fighting,  and  pre- 
vent a  wider  war. 

We  are  working  with  other  nations 
bilaterally  and  at  the  United  Nations  to 
seek  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
Vietnamese  forces  from  Cambodia  and 
Chinese  forces  from  Vietnam.  We 
continue  to  assert  the  important  inter- 
national principles  of  territorial  integ- 
rity and  noninterference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  nations. 

Together  with  the  conflicts  in  In- 
dochina, there  is  the  explosion  of  the 
refugee  exodus  from  Vietnam,  an 
exodus  deliberately  provoked  by  the 
policies  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of 
Vietnam  and  one  from  which  that  gov- 
ernment derives  material  benefit  at  the 
expense  of  tens  of  thousands  of  suffer- 
ing people  and  of  those  Southeast 
Asian  governments  which  continue 
their  humanitarian  policies  of  providing 
temporary  asylum. 

We  support  the  concept  of  a  truly  in- 
dependent and  neutral  Cambodia.  The 
Kampuchean  people  clearly  deserve  at 
long  last  a  genuinely  representative 
government  responsive  to  their  aspira- 
tions. Neither  Pol  Pot  nor  the 
Vietnamese-installed  Heng  Samrin  re- 
gime fulfill  these  criteria. 


18 

Even  though  the  fragility  ot  the 
equilibrium  of  which  I  spoke  last  year 
has  become  more  apparent,  the  position 
of  the  United  States  in  Asia  remains  a 
highly  favorable  one.  The  tensions  and 
conflicts  that  do  exist  in  Asia  are  es- 
sentially between  Communist 
states — an  "East-East"  conflict — in 
which  our  efforts  are  directed  at  con- 
taining the  effects.  Our  traditional 
friends  in  the  region  continue  to  move 
toward  increased  stability  and  prosper- 
ity but  in  the  face  of  challenges  both 
old  and  new.  In  our  status  as  an  Asian 
and  Pacific  power,  we  share  in  these 
challenges — challenges  to  peace  and 
stability  and  to  improvement  of  the 
human  condition  in  Asia. 

The  progress  that  we  have  made  to- 
gether with  those  friends  in  the  last  2 
years  has  positioned  us  jointly  to  meet 
these  challenges  confidently  and  effec- 
tively. For  our  part,  therefore,  while 
we  must  work  even  harder,  we  do  not 
need  at  this  time  to  undertake  any 
dramatic  or  major  departures  from  our 
current  policy  course  in  order  to  main- 
tain our  favorable  position  in  East 
Asia.  We  believe  we  are  on  the  right 
course,  and  we  should  persevere. 

But  in  order  to  meet  the  challenges 
of  today  and  the  foreseeable  future,  we 
will  have  to  apply  on  occasion  in- 
creased resources — diplomatic,  eco- 
nomic, and  military,  government  and 
private.  This  will  mean  selective  in- 
creases in  security  assistance  and  eco- 
nomic assistance. 

It  will  also  mean  increased  attention 
to  promotion  of  U.S.  trade  and  invest- 
ment in  Asia  and  recognition  of  the 
growing  economic   power  of  the 


region — power  which  has  created  both 
substantial  opportunities  and  formida- 
ble problems  for  the  United  States. 

Indochina 

The  United  States  is  concerned  over 
the  increasing  tensions  in  Asia  that 
have  resulted  from  the  invasion  and 
continuing  occupation  of  Kampuchea 
by  over  100,000  Vietnamese  troops, 
and  from  the  subsequent  Chinese  attack 
on  Vietnam. 

We  have  no  intention  of  taking  sides 
among  the  parties  to  these  conflicts, 
but  we  do  wish  to  see  an  end  to  the 
present  fighting,  withdrawal  of  Viet- 
namese troops  from  Kampuchea  and  of 
Chinese  troops  from  Vietnam,  and  a 
general  reduction  in  the  dangerous 
level  of  tensions  that  now  prevails. 

Our  position  has  been  made  clear  to 
all  of  the  parties  concerned  on  numer- 
ous occasions,  in  public  and  private, 
over  the  past  several  months.  Begin- 
ning in  September,  we  expressed  our 
concern  to  the  Vietnamese  and  asked 
for  clarification  of  their  intentions  in 
light  of  their  troop  buildup  along  the 
Kampuchean  border.  On  November  1 
we  sent  a  letter  to  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  expressing  concern  over  rising 
tensions  between  Vietnam  and  Kam- 
puchea, as  well  as  the  possibility  of  in- 
volving other  countries,  and  asking  that 
the  Council  consider  how  it  might  deal 
with  this  situation.  Subsequently,  we 
supported  Security  Council  action  on 
both  the  Vietnamese  and  the  Chinese 
attacks. 

Our  reasons  for  initially  drawing 
U.N.  attention  to  the  growing  tensions 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

in   Indochina  and   later  for  supporting  , 
Security  Council   actions  calling  for 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
the  region  were  twofold. 

•  We  were  concerned  that  the  vol- 
atile nature  of  the  conflicts  posed  a 
wider  threat  to  regional  peace.  This  in- 
deed was  the  case,  and  the  Vietnamese 
attack  on  Cambodia  was  soon  followed 
by  the  Chinese  attack  on  Vietnam. 

•  We  were  concerned  over  the  tragic 
waste  of  limited  resources,  which 
would  have  been  much  better  employed 
to  meet  the  real  needs  of  the  Viet- 
namese and  Cambodian  peoples,  rather 
than  being  used  to  support  another 
round  of  cruel  fighting. 

With  the  expansion  of  the  fighting  to 
the  Vietnamese-Chinese  border, 
squandered  national  resources  and  eco- 
nomic dislocation  have  become  even 
greater.  Even  more  important,  how- 
ever, is  the  loss  in  human  terms,  as 
people  die  in  disputes  which  we  believe 
could,  and  should,  be  resolved  through 
negotiation  or  mediation. 

Refugees 

Another  tragic  aspect  of  the  predi- 
cament of  Indochina  is  the  situation 
which  impels  so  many  citizens  of  those 
countries  to  want  to  flee  them.  Since 
the  Communist  victories  of  spring 
1975.  over  400.000  persons  have  fled 
to  non-Communist  countries  from 
Laos,  Vietnam,  and  Cambodia,  exact- 
ing an  incalculable  toll  in  human  suf- 
fering and  misery  and  putting  a  heavy 
burden  on  the  other  countries  of  the  re- 
gion that  receive  them.  Thailand  and 


Burma 


Thailand 

TOTAL 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM— EAST  ASIA 

(millions  of  U.S.  dollars) 


FY  1978 
MAP'     FMSCR^ 


IMET 


FY  1979 
MAP      FMSCR 


IMET 


FY  1980  REQUEST 
MAP      FMSCR  IMET 

—  —  .031 


8.0 
41.1 


29.5 


403.0 


1.050 


7.463 


30.0 


15.6  310.1 


0.8 

5.75 


25.0 


25.0 


342.0 


'MAP  figures  do  not  include  supply  operations. 
^FMS  credits. 


0.9 


5.736 


SSA 


Indonesia 

15.0 

40.0 

3.064 

— 

32.0 

2.0 

— 

35.0 

2.0 

— 

Korea 

— 

275.0 

1.493 

— 

225.0 

1.8 

— 

225.0 

1.8 

— 

Malaysia 

— 

16.5 

0.596 

— 

7.5 

0.5 

— 

7.0 

0.305 

— 

Philippines 

18.1 

18.5 

0.704 

15.6 

15.6 

0.65 

25.0 

50.0 

0.7 

20.0 

Taiwan 

— 

23.5 

0.556 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

20.0 


April  1979 

Malaysia  have  borne  particularly  heavy 
Uxids  and  have  paid  an  economic  and  a 
political  price  for  their  humanitarian 
policies  toward  refugees;  both  coun- 
tries deserve  our  approbation  and  sup- 
port. 

''hat  the  outpouring  of  refugees  con- 
iiiuies,  in  spite  of  the  certain  hardships 
and  possible  death  that  await  them  after 
they  have  left  their  homelands,  is  mute 
hut  eloquent  testimony  to  the  condi- 
tions there.  The  Government  of  Viet- 
nam recently  announced  its  intention  to 
implement  procedures  that  would  allow 
Us  citizens  who  wish  to  emigrate  to  do 
so  in  a  more  orderly  and  humane  man- 
ner. We  have  no  indications  yet  that 
there  have  been  any  practical  results 
troin  this  announced  intention.  For  the 
sake  of  the  countries  of  first  asylum, 
and  for  the  sake  of  those  people  who 
wish  to  leave  Vietnam,  we  earnestly 
hope  that  the  Vietnamese  Government 
will  follow  through. 

In  keeping  with  our  humanitarian 
tradition,  we  took  the  lead  in  the  con- 
sultations on  Indochina  refugees  called 
by  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  last  December  in  an  effort  to 
emphasize  the  international  nature  of 
the  problem  and  to  bring  forth  a  greater 
response  from  countries  which  have  not 
matched  the  efforts  of  Australia. 
France.  Canada,  and  the  United  States 
in  providing  permanent  resettlement. 
We  are  somewhat  encouraged  by  the 
response  of  other  countries,  but  the 
task  is  immense. 

For  our  own  part,  we  will  continue 
in  the  American  tradition  of  providing 
a  haven  for  those  tTeeing  political  re- 
pression; we  have  offered  permanent  re- 
settlement to  over  200,000  Indochinese 
refugees  since  1975.  We  will  be  con- 
sulting Congress  on  plans  for  the  year 
ahead.  We  will  make  our  program 
more  efficient  and  responsive  through 
the  appointment  of  the  distinguished 
Dick  Clark,  former  Senator,  as  Ambas- 
sador at  large,  with  the  mission  of  in- 
tegrating and  overseeing  all  refugee 
programs  and  interests  of  the  U.S. 
Government. 

We  have  been  very  pleased  by  con- 
gressional participation  in  the  Geneva 
consultations  on  refugees  and  sub- 
sequent working  tours  by  congressional 
delegations  to  review  first  hand  the 
refugee  situation  on  Southeast  Asia, 
including  Vietnam  itself.  This  can  only 
lead  to  a  better  mutual  understanding  of 
the  problem  by  the  legislative  and 
executive  branches  and  an  improved 
long-term  refugee  policy. 

Military  Balance 

Although  the  main  sources  of  actual 
and   potential   conflict  are   presently 


between  the  Communist  states,  our 
military  posture  in  the  region  and  the 
defensive  capabilities  of  our  friends 
and  allies  are  of  prime  and  continuing 
concern  to  us. 

Our  military  presence  in  Asia  and  the 
western  Pacific  remains  strong,  par- 
ticularly in  view  of  qualitative  factors 
and  the  continuous  process  of  upgrad- 
ing of  forces  there.  As  an  indication  of 
our  determination  to  maintain  military 
sufficiency  in  the  region,  and  an  indi- 
cation of  our  flexibility  in  meeting 
changing  strategic  challenges,  let  me 
just  catalogue  some  of  our  recent  ac- 
tions. 

In  the  wake  of  the  Vietnamese  inva- 
sion of  Kampuchea,  we  increased  and 
made  more  responsive  our  security  as- 
sistance to  Thailand.  We  concluded 
mutually  beneficial  amendments  to  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines.  We  are  undertaking  qual- 
itative upgrading  of  air  and  naval 
forces  in  the  Pacific.  New  organs  for 
coordination  of  military  planning  in 
Japan  and  Korea  make  our  combined 
efforts  in  those  countries  more  effi- 
cient. 

In  addition  to  our  own  forces  in  the 
region,  those  of  our  allies  are  also  sig- 
nificant. Our  treaty  commitments  to  the 
mutual  defense  of  Japan,  South  Korea, 
the  Philippines,  and  Japan  are  unshake- 
able.  Our  treaty  tie  with  Australia  and 
New  Zealand  is  one  of  the  most  basic 
and  durable  such  relationships  in  his- 
tory. Our  commitment  under  the  Man- 
ila pact  remains  valid,  as  the  President 
affirmed  to  Thailand's  Prime  Minister 
during  his  visit.  We  remain  dedicated 
to  the  security  and  well-being  of  the 
people  on  Taiwan. 

We  are  keeping  a  careful  eye  on  the 
development  of  Soviet  forces  in  Asia. 
In  addition  to  those  along  the  border 
with  China,  which  have  grown  by  more 
than  one-third  in  the  last  decade,  the 
Soviet  Pacific  Fleet  has  also  been 
strengthened.  We  also  see  this  fleet 
ranging  farther  from  its  home  ports  for 
extended  periods,  including  exercises 
in  the  Philippine  Sea  and  the  current 
deployments  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin. 

While  the  Soviet  Pacific  Fleet  is  not 
a  match  for  U.S.  naval  forces  in  the 
Pacific,  such  developments  require  our 
careful  attention  and  underscore  the 
need  for  Congress  to  appropriate  the 
funds  necessary  to  enable  us  to  con- 
tinue to  improve  our  own  military 
forces  and  to  contribute  to  the  defense 
of  our  allies. 

Japan 

We  have  already  discussed  the 
dramatic  new  ties  with  China;  in  coun- 
terpoint to  that  stands  our  longstand- 


19 

ing,  fundamental  relationship  with 
Japan.  No  relationship  is  more  impor- 
tant, none  more  basic  to  U.S.  interests. 
The  U.S.  alliance  with  Japan  remains 
the  keystone  of  our  policy  in  Asia.  It 
joins  our  two  nations  together  in  a  dur- 
able, dynamic,  and  constructive  re- 
lationship which  is  a  vital  element  in 
the  preservation  of  peace,  security,  and 
economic  progress  in  the  region. 

The  alliance  has  enabled  Japan  to 
play  an  increasing  economic  and  politi- 
cal role  in  the  region  and  the  world 
without  having  to  develop  strategic 
capabilities  of  its  own.  But  Japan  also 
contributes  substantial  resources  to- 
ward its  own  defense — the  Japanese 
defense  budget  for  1979  is  projected  at 
$10.5  billion,  an  impressive  figure 
even  though  it  is  small  as  a  percentage 
of  Japan's  large  GNP  (Japan  ranks 
about  eighth  in  the  world  in  absolute 
size  of  defense  budget).  Much  of  this 
defense  expenditure  is  being  devoted  to 
qualitative  improvements  in  the  self- 
defense  forces,  including  the  purchase 
of  F-15  fighters  and  P-3C  patrol  air- 
craft. Japan's  defense  budget  includes 
a  substantial  sum  —  around  $700 
million — which  will  be  contributed  in 
1979  to  the  support  of  U.S.  forces 
stationed  there. 

I  should  also  note  a  welcome  degree 
of  greater  openness  in  discussing  de- 
fense issues  in  Japan  and  a  greater 
public  appreciation  of  the  security  en- 
vironment in  Asia  and  the  role  of  the 
U.S. -Japan  security  relationship  in  that 
environment. 

While  our  overall  relationship  with 
Japan  remains  strong,  there  are  clearly 
contentious  problems  in  the  economic 
field,  especially  those  relating  to  Ja- 
pan's large  global  current  account 
surplus  and  to  market  access. 

The  Japanese  trade  surplus  has  been 
gradually  declining  in  recent  months. 
We  welcome  that.  A  continuation  of 
the  trend  is  of  great  importance.  There 
have  also  been  a  certain  number  of 
steps  forward  in  opening  up  market  ac- 
cess in  Japan,  although  less  than  we 
would  hope. 

There  is.  of  course,  much  more  to  be 
done  by  both  sides,  and  this  year  will 
be  a  critical  one  in  U.S. -Japanese  eco- 
nomic relations.  We  will  work  cooper- 
atively with  the  Japanese  to  assure 
continuing  progress.  The  importance  of 
such  progress  transcends  our  bilateral 
relations  and  involves  the  health  of  the 
entire  world  trading  system. 

Korea 

Our  most  immediate  security  con- 
cerns in  Northeast  Asia  are  focused  on 
the  Korean  Peninsula.  In  the  broader 
context,  our  relations  with  South  Korea 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


are  returning  toward  a  more  harmoni- 
ous state  after  a  very  difficult  2  years.  I 
do  not  wish  to  suggest  that  the  time  of 
testing  is  entirely  behind  us.  Yet  the 
fundamental  soundness  of  our  relation- 
ship augurs  well  for  the  future. 

We  have  long  been  on  record  as 
favoring  efforts  to  reduce  tensions  on 
the  peninsula  either  through  direct 
North-South  talks  or  through  meetings 
of  all  the  nations  directly  concerned, 
including  South  Korea  as  a  full  partici- 
pant. South  Korea  has  made,  over  the 
years,  several  proposals  for  direct  talks 
and  concrete  forms  of  cooperation  with 
the  North,  but  the  North  has  histori- 
cally been  unwilling  to  participate.  In 
January,  however,  the  North  publicly 
welcomed  President  Park's  proposal  for 
talks  without  preconditions,  although 
the  North  tried  to  bend  the  proposal  to 
its  own  conditions. 

As  you  know,  the  first  contacts  took 
place  at  Panmunjom  on  February  17, 
and  since  that  date  the  North  and  South 
have  also  started  discussions  for  the 
South's  participation  in  the  interna- 
tional table  tennis  championships  in 
Pyongyang,  the  North  Korean  capital, 
in  April.  The  second  round  of  political 
contacts  is  set  for  next  week.  Although 
it  is  still  far  too  early  to  tell  whether 
the  North  will  move  beyond  posturing 
to  allow  fruitful  results,  we  are  cau- 
tiously hopeful. 

In  the  meantime,  neither  we  nor  our 
South  Korean  allies  can  relax  our  vigi- 
lance against  the  possibility  that  the 
North  will  seek  to  reunify  the  peninsula 
by  military  means.  The  U.S.  intelli- 
gence community  is  currently  engaged 
in  a  reassessment  of  the  data  available 
on  North  Korean  military  strength  and 
deployments.  Because  that  analysis  is 
still  in  progress,  it  would  be  premature 
to  draw  any  definitive  conclusions; 
however,  it  is  already  clear  that  we  will 
significantly  increase  our  estimates  of 
some  categories  of  North  Korean 
strength.  Certainly  there  is  more  there 
than  is  required  for  legitimate  defen- 
sive purposes. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  our  pol- 
icy of  gradually  withdrawing  American 
ground  combat  troops  is  reasonable  and 
appropriate.  It  in  no  way  diminishes 
the  strength  of  our  commitment  to  the 
security  and  well-being  of  South  Korea 
as  embodied  in  our  mutual  security 
treaty.  However,  as  the  President  re- 
cently noted,  further  reductions  will  be 
held  in  abeyance  until  we  can  assess 
new  developments,  including  the  new 
intelligence  data  on  North  Korean 
strength,  U.S. -China  normalization, 
and  the  evolution  of  a  North-South 
dialogue. 

Meanwhile,  steps  have  been  initiated 
to  compensate   for  the  reduction   in 


Business  Councii 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  8,  1979' 

The  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the 
United  States  met  February  8  with 
American  business  leaders  active  in 
Southeast  Asia  to  establish  the  U.S. 
section  of  the  ASEAN-U.S.  Business 
Council. 

The  council  will  be  a  joint  under- 
taking between  private  business  groups 
in  the  nations  of  Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  and  the 
U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce.  It  is 
similar  in  organization  and  purpose  to 
Business  Councils  created  jointly  with 
the  private  sectors  in  Japan,  the  Euro- 
pean Communities,  India,  Egypt,  and  a 
dozen  other  countries.  The  council's 
main  objectives  are:  (1)  insure  a  high 
level  of  awareness  of  bilateral  relations 
among  businessmen,  (2)  serve  as  a 
forum  to  promote  economic  relation- 
ships, and  (3)  recommend  ways  to  im- 
prove economic  relations. 

The  Department  of  State  believes 
that  formation  of  the  ASEAN-U.S. 
Business  Council  is  a  timely  and  wel- 
come event  which  will  contribute  to 
and  strengthen  U.S.  relations  with 
ASEAN  members. 

The  first  ASEAN-U.S.  Business 
Conference  is  scheduled  for  July  22-24 
in  Manila  and  will  be  cosponsored  by 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the 
United  States  and  its  counterpart  or- 
ganization. 


This  joint  endeavor  is  a  tribute  to  the 
cooperation  of  the  five  nations  — 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Singapore,  and  Thailand — which  com- 
prise ASEAN.  This  Association  has 
created  a  stable,  prosperous  regional 
group  of  nations.  It  has  emerged  as  one 
of  the  most  attractive  areas  for  interna- 
tional direct  private  investment  in  the 
developing  world. 

ASEAN  is  one  of  the  United  States' 
most  important  trading  partners,  with  a 
two-way  volume  of  trade  of  over  $12 
billion.  The  member  countries  have 
enjoyed  substantial  rates  of  economic 
growth  in  the  1970's  based  on  govern- 
ment support  for  and  reliance  on  pri- 
vate investment  and  foreign  trade. 

The  Department  of  State  places  high 
priority  on  maintaining  U.S.  competi- 
tiveness in  Southeast  Asia  and  con- 
tributing to  its  economic  growth.  We 
welcome  expansion  of  two-way  trade 
and  private  investment.  The  council 
will  enhance  U.S.  business  community 
awareness  of  the  ample  trade  and  in- 
vestment potential  offered  by  the  re- 
gion. The  ASEAN-U.S.  Business 
Council  presents  an  excellent  opportu- 
nity to  work  creatively  toward  these 
ends.  □ 


'  Made  available  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


combat  power.  An  additional  squadron 
of  U.S.  F-4  aircraft  has  arrived  in 
Korea,  for  example,  and  the  Congress 
has  approved  the  transfer  of  essential 
U.S.  equipment  to  Korea  as  U.S. 
forces  there  are  redeployed.  The  United 
States  and  R.O.K.  forces  have  also  in- 
augurated a  Combined  Forces  Com- 
mand (CFC),  which  will  improve  the 
quality  and  flexibility  of  tactical  plan- 
ning and  enable  the  Korean  forces  to 
shoulder  more  of  the  responsibility  for 
their  own  defense. 

Security  Assistance  Program 

Our  security  assistance  is  considered 
by  the  nations  of  East  Asia  to  be  of 
great  material  and  psychological  value. 
The  overall  objective  of  the  FY  1980 
security  assistance  program  which  we 
are  requesting  for  East  Asia  is  to  pro- 


vide access  to  the  military  wherewithal 
to  cope  with  internal  and  external 
threats  and  to  provide  psychological 
reassurance  of  U.S.  dedication  to  the 
goal  of  regional  security  and  stability. 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  accompanying 
table,  security  assistance  in  East  Asia 
has  been  declining  in  recent  years. 
Especially  in  light  of  recent  develop- 
ments in  Indochina  and  Korea,  it  is 
evident  that  there  is  no  room  for  any 
reductions.  Leaving  aside  the  major  in- 
creases in  the  program  for  the  Philip- 
pines resulting  from  the  amendment  to 
the  base  agreement  the  level  of  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  credits  has  de- 
creased by  24%  compared  to  FY  1978; 
the  military  assistance  program  (MAP) 
has  been  phased  out  except  for  the 
Philippines.  The  international  military 
education  and  training  (IMET)  program 
has  decreased  by  23%  in  the  same 


April  1979 

pciiod.  Inflation  and  changes  in  ac- 
counting procedures  have  made  real 
decreases  much  larger. 

Indeed,  the  evolving  security  situa- 
tion in  Asia  gives  cause  for  concern 
over  the  levels  of  our  security  assist- 
ance program  in  the  region.  The  Presi- 
dent spoke  to  this  in  his  February  20 
speech  at  Georgia  Tech  [Atlanta]  when 
he  said  that:  "Many  nations  are 
troubled  —  even  threatened  —  by  the 
turmoil  in  Southeast  Asia  ....  To  stand 
by  our  friends  and  to  help  meet  their 
security  needs  in  these  difficult  times.  I 
will  consult  with  the  Congress  to  de- 
termine what  additional  military  assist- 
ance will  be  required."^ 

We  continue  to  give  special  em- 
phasis to  support  of  Korean  security 
efforts  in  general  and  their  5-year  force 
improvement  plan  in  particular  through 
FMS  cash  sales  and  FMS  credits.  For 
FY  1980  these  credits  amount  to  $225 
million.  We  will  also  provide  the 
necessary  grant  training  through  the 
IMET  program  in  the  amount  of  $1.8 
million  in  FY  1980.  This  combination 
of  FMS  credits  and  IMET  is,  indeed, 
the  bare  minimum  necessary  to  help 
compensate  for  the  troop  withdrawal 
and  to  support  the  Korean  efforts  to 
achieve  greater  self-sufficiency  in  the 
conduct  of  the  defense  of  their  country. 

For  the  first  time  since  1971.  we  are 
requesting  a  small  amount  of  IMET 
funds  ($31,000)  for  Burma,  reflecting 
modest  but  growing  U.S. -Burma  coop- 
eration. 

I  would  like  to  point  out  also  that 
these  programs  for  East  Asian  countries 
have  infinitesimal  impact  on  Federal 
spending  and  even  less  on  inflation, 
particularly  the  FMS  financing  program 
in  which  only  10%  of  the  program 
amount  is  actually  appropriated — for 
East  Asia  this  would  only  be  $34.2 
million  in  FY  1980.  The  foreign  policy 
benefits  in  terms  of  regional  stability 
and  confidence  in  the  United  States  far 
outweigh  the  costs  in  appropriated 
funds.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
IMET  program,  which  gives  us  a 
unique  opportunity  to  secure  lasting 
contact  and  influence  with  military  de- 
cisionmakers in  friendly  countries. 

As  the  President  said  in  Atlanta. 
America's  fundamental  security  re- 
sponsibilities include  standing  by  our 
allies  and  our  friends  and  supporting 
the  national  independence  and  integrity 
of  other  nations.  In  that  spirit,  I  feel 
that  it  is  essential,  at  the  least,  that  the 
security  assistance  program  I  have  out- 
lined be  authorized  and  implemented. 


Philippine  Bases 

The  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  the  Philip- 


pines announced  last  December  31  that 
agreement  had  been  reached  on 
amendment  of  the  1947  Military  Bases 
Agreement.  Consultations  with  Con- 
gress, and  indeed  congressional  par- 
ticipation, were  key  elements  in  the 
process  which  led  up  to  agreement  on 
the  future  conditions  of  U.S.  use  of 
facilities  at  Clark  Air  Base  and  Subic 
Navy  Base  complex.  While  you  are 
personally  well  aware  of  the  history 
and  outcome  of  the  negotiations  be- 
tween our  two  countries,  let  me  set 
forth  for  the  record  some  of  the  more 
prominent  features. 

The  final  negotiations  in  a  process 
that  can  be  traced  back  to  1969  were 
carried  out  by  representatives  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Philippines  with 
the  aim  of  implementing  the  principles 
in  the  joint  statement  issued  by  Presi- 
dent Marcos  and  Vice  President  Mon- 
dale  during  the  latter's  visit  to  Manila 
in  May  1978.  Those  principles  were: 

•  The  United  States  affirms  that 
Philippine  sovereignty  extends  over  the 
bases; 

•  Each  base  shall  be  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  Philippine  base  commander; 

•  The  United  States  shall  be  assured 
effective  command  and  control  over 
U.S.  personnel,  employees,  equip- 
ment, material,  the  facilities  authorized 
for  their  use  within  military  bases,  and 
unhampered  military  operations  in- 
volving their  own  forces;  and 

•  There  should  be  a  thorough  review 
of  the  agreement  and  amendments 
thereto  every  5  years  (the  agreement 
continues  in  force  through  1991). 

Due  to  the  goodwill  and  persistence 
of  the  negotiators  during  the  period 
June-December  1978,  mutually  ac- 
cepted terms  for  the  amendments  were 
worked  out.  I  would  pay  particular 
tribute  to  the  men  on  both  sides  who 
resolved  in  a  few  months  issues  which 
had,  in  some  cases,  been  thorns  of 
contention  for  years. 

Concerning  compensation.  President 
Carter  has  sent  a  letter  to  President 
Marcos  promising  that  the  Executive 
Branch  will  make  its  "best  effort" 
over  the  next  5  fiscal  years  (1980-84) 
to  obtain  for  the  Philippines  $50  mil- 
lion in  grant  military  assistance,  $250 
million  in  FMS  credits,  and  $200  mil- 
lion in  security  supporting  assistance 
(SSA).  This  was  the  approach 
suggested  to  us  during  congressional 
consultations  as  an  alternative  to  the 
previous  U.S.  proposal  of  $1  billion  in 
a  treaty  commitment.  Members  of  this 
committee  were  closely  consulted.  In 
this  first  year,  we  are  requesting  $25 
million  in  grant  military  assistance, 
$50  million  in  FMS  financing,  and  $20 
million  in  SSA. 


21 

The  SSA  program  for  the  Philippines 
is  new.  Like  existing  SSA  programs 
elsewhere  in  the  world,  it  will  be  ad- 
ministered by  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID).  It  will  sup- 
plement, not  supplant,  our  on-going 
AID  programs  in  the  Philippines  of  de- 
velopment assistance  and  PL-480 
commodities. 

The  SSA  program  in  the  Philippines 
will  be  implemented  in  the  form  of 
specific  projects,  and  we  will  inform 
the  Congress  of  the  nature  of  those 
projects.  Because  the  program  is  so 
new,  the  guidelines  are  still  being  de- 
veloped. We  have  identified  three  gen- 
eral types  of  projects  which  we  believe 
correspond  to  the  criteria  of  the  con- 
gressional mandate  and  for  which  the 
administrative  and  support  apparatus  is 
already  largely  in  place. 

One  of  these  is  the  construction  of 
typhoon-proof  classrooms  throughout 
the  country.  The  Philippines  has  a  seri- 
ous shortage  of  classrooms,  and  many 
existing  ones,  built  years  ago,  need  to 
be  replaced. 

A  second  field  is  that  of  public 
health.  We  have  in  mind  helping  the 
Philippine  Government  to  build  and 
equip  health  centers  in  rural  areas 
which  would  emphasize  preventive 
health  care,  probably  using  paramedi- 
cal personnel. 

The  third  type  of  project  would  in- 
volve the  improvement  of  social  and 
economic  conditions  in  Angeles  and 
Olongapo  cities,  just  outside  the  gates 
of  our  facilities  at  Clark  Air  Base  and 
Subic  Naval  Base,  and  in  adjacent 
municipalities.  AID  has  already  con- 
ducted "shelter  sector  assessments" 
for  both  cities  and  has  identified  re- 
quirements for  sites  and  services  in 
those  communities.  And  there  is  clear 
need  for  other  types  of  developmental 
activity  as  well,  such  as  reforestation, 
agricultural  resettlement,  flood  control, 
land  reclamation,  vocational  training, 
and  social  services. 

These  are  projects  about  which 
President  Marcos  has  expressed  per- 
sonal interest,  and  our  desire  to  insti- 
tute programs  to  upgrade  conditions  in 
those  communities  is  recorded  in  the 
diplomatic  notes  exchanged  at  Manila 
on  January  7,  1979,  and  in  an  accom- 
panying letter  from  Secretary  Vance  to 
Foreign  Minister  Romulo. 

1  should  like  to  explain  why  we 
chose  to  incorporate  SSA — a  program 
whose  main  focus  is  economic  and  so- 
cial development — in  our  security  as- 
sitance  "package"  for  the  Philippines. 
You  may  be  aware  that  the  Philippine 
Government  had  long  hoped  for  a  mul- 
tiyear  assistance  commitment  in  con- 
junction with  the  amendment  of  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement.   No  such 


22 

commitment  was  possible,  of  course; 
the  best  we  could  and  did  otter  was  an 
undertaking  by  the  President  that  the 
Administration  would  make  its  best 
effort,  over  a  period  of  years,  to  seek 
authorization  and  appropriation  for  the 
Philippines  of  specified  amounts  of  se- 
curity assistance,  and  we  were  influ- 
enced in  choosing  this  approach  by  our 
consultations  with  a  number  of  Mem- 
bers of  Congress  a  year  ago  or  more. 

In  putting  together  our  assistance 
package,  we  had  to  take  into  account 
the  prospect  that  the  military  assistance 
program  might  be  phased  out  in  the 
near  future  and  the  fact  that  funding 
levels  for  traditional  bilateral  economic 
assistance  programs  have  been  declin- 
ing in  recent  years.  We,  therefore, 
conceived  the  SSA  program  for  the 
Philippines  in  part  as  a  substitute  for 
those  more  traditional  forms  of  assist- 
ance and  as  one  that  could  reasonably 
be  expected  to  last  through  the  5-year 
life  of  this  assistance  package. 

Another  factor  in  our  decision  was 
that  an  SSA  program  is  intrinsically 
more  flexible  than  traditional  develop- 
ment assistance  programs.  An  SSA 
program  can  be  developed  relatively 
quickly,  with  less  extensive  bureaucra- 
tic preparation  on  the  American  side, 
and  tailored  to  take  advantage  of  an 
existing  apparatus  and  to  the  needs  of 
specific  geographic  areas.  We  made 
clear,  in  our  consultations  with  the 
Congress  a  year  ago,  our  intention  to 
include  an  SSA  program  as  part  of  our 
assistance  package,  and  we  received 
encouragement  to  do  so  from  virtually 
everyone  with  whom  we  consulted. 

We  intend  to  administer  the  SSA 
program  in  the  Philippines  with  no  in- 
crease in  our  ceiling  on  American  per- 
sonnel permanently  assigned  to  the 
AID  mission  in  the  Philippines,  al- 
though we  may  need  some  temporary- 
duty  help  to  get  the  program  started. 
We  will  establish  procedures  to  insure 
full  accountability  of  the  funds  ex- 
pended under  the  program.  Finally,  we 
will  insure  that  projects  funded  under 
the  SSA  program  will  be  consistent 
with  the  congressional  mandate  for  all 
foreign  assistance  programs,  will  com- 
plement our  on-going  development  as- 
sistance programs  in  the  Philippines, 
and  will  help  to  meet  our  long-term 
goal  of  aiding  the  poor  people  of  that 
country. 

I  expect  you  are  aware  that  the 
Philippines  declined  an  assistance 
package  which  the  United  States  of- 
fered in  1976.  It  is  difficult  to  make  a 
clear  comparison  between  the  two  of- 
fers. The  1979  package  does  not  in- 
clude development  assistance  or  PL- 
480  commodities,  whereas  the  1976 
offer  did.  In  terms  of  international  se- 


curity assistance,  however,  the  two 
packages  are  equal  in  amount — $500 
million — although  somewhat  different 
in  their  internal  composition. 

I  would  stress,  liowever,  that  the 
1979  amendment  contains  a  number  of 
intangible  features  that  were  not  en- 
visioned or  not  guaranteed  in  the  1976 
negotiations:  full  and  visible  recogni- 
tion of  Philippine  sovereignty;  a  very 
extensive  reversion  of  land  and  water 
areas  to  the  Philippines;  provision  of 
special  operating  rights  for  the  United 
States  in  some  of  those  reverted  areas; 
and  continued  and  unhampered  opera- 
tional use  by  our  forces  of  the  facilities 
which  we  retain. 

1  believe  that  the  security  assistance 
program  that  we  are  proposing  in  con- 
nection with  the  amendment  to  the 
bases  agreement  is  an  appropriate 
acknowledgment  of  the  long  and 
friendly  relationship  which  we  have 
had  with  the  Philippines,  the  durability 
of  our  defense  relationship,  and  the 
importance  of  our  facilities  in  the 
Philippines  to  the  flexibility  and  eco- 
nomical operation  of  our  forces  in  the 
western  Pacific  and  contiguous  areas 
such  as  the  Indian  Ocean.  I  strongly 
urge  you  to  authorize  the  full  amount 
so  that  this  historic  agreement  can 
begin  on  a  successful  note. 

Economic  Aspects 

Our  economic  relationships  with  the 
countries  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific  form 
the  centerpiece  of  our  role  in  the  re- 
gion. The  free-market  economies  of 
Asia  constitute  the  most  dynamic  eco- 
nomic region  in  the  world.  Taken  to- 
gether they  are  doubling  real  gross  na- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

tional  product  every  12  years,  with 
some  of  the  fastest  achieving  this 
doubling  every  6  or  7  years.  We  con- 
duct about  one-fourth  of  our  foreign 
trade  with  East  Asia — more  than  with 
all  of  Western  Europe.  U.S.  exports  to 
the  world  as  a  whole  grew  19%  during 
1978;  our  exports  to  East  Asia  in- 
creased 26%.  Included  among  the 
goods  that  we  receive  from  Asia  in  ex- 
change for  our  exports  is  about  10%  of 
our  petroleum  imports,  a  fact  that  may 
become  of  increasing  importance  in  the 
wake  of  recent  events  elsewhere  in  the 
world. 

The  breadth  of  our  economic  re- 
lationships retTects  the  broad  diversity 
of  economic  circumstances  encom- 
passed by  this  vital  region.  I  have  al- 
ready referred  to  the  fundamental  im- 
portance of  our  economic  relationship 
with  Japan,  and  many  have  spoken  of 
the  challenges  and  potential  benefits 
arising  from  the  entry  of  China  into  the 
world  economy. 

Our  longstanding  economic  links 
with  the  developed  economies  of  Aus- 
tralia and  New  Zealand  are  also  an  es- 
sential part  of  our  close  friendship  with 
those  staunch  allies  in  the  western 
Pacific.  Our  trade  and  investment  with 
Taiwan  and  South  Korea  are  at  all-time 
highs. 

ASEAN 

One  economic  relationship  which  I 
would  especially  like  to  highlight  is 
that  with  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations,  which  is  continuing  to 
emerge  as  a  significant  factor  in  the 
world  political  economy.  At  its  incep- 
tion in  1967  and  until  a  very  few  years 


MiUtary  Bases  Agreement 
Ifillt  the  Philippines 


LETTER  TO 
PRESIDENT  MARCOS, 
FEB.  16,  1979 

I  extend  my  best  wishes  to  you,  President 
Marcos,  and  to  the  Philippine  people  on  this 
important  occasion  marking  the  first  step  to- 
ward implementation  of  the  January  7  amend- 
ment to  the  Military  Bases  Agreement. 

That  amendment  emphasized  my  Govern- 
ment's recognition  of  full  Philippine 
sovereignty  over  the  bases  and  your  Govern- 
ment's willingness,  in  view  of  mutual  benefits, 
to  grant  certain  facilities  for  use  by  American 


armed  forces. 

The  Philippines  and  the  United  States  pursue 
the  common  objectives  of  advancing  world 
peace,  regional  stability  and  national  independ- 
ence. We  have  stood  together  as  comrades  in 
arms  in  meeting  the  major  challenges  to  peace 
in  this  century. 

It  is  my  hope  that  the  relations  between  our 
two  nations  will  continue  to  be  inspired  by  the 
spirit  of  harmony,  understanding  and  mutual  re- 
spect which  characterized  our  recent  negotia- 
tions and  that  our  countries'  historic  ties  will 
grow  stronger  with  each  passing  year. 

Jimmy  Carter  □ 


April  1979 

ago,  tew  outside  observers  believed 
that  ASEAN  would  be  successful.  Yet 
today  the  organization  commands 
political  and  economic  respect 
throughout  the  world.  No  longer  do 
leaders  of  those  nations  speak  simply 
as  Thais,  Filipinos,  Indonesians, 
Malaysians  or  Singaporeans;  they 
speak  also  as  members  of  ASEAN. 

ASEAN  has  established  relationships 
with  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  with 
Japan,  with  the  European  Economic 
Community,  with  Canada,  and  with  the 
United  States.  In  August  of  last  year 
Foreign  and  Economic  Ministers  from 
the  ASEAN  countries  traveled  halfway 
around  the  world  for  consultations  with 
U.S.  officials.  They  met  with  the 
President  and  Vice  President,  key 
members  of  Congress,  and  half  of  the 
Secretaries  of  Cabinet  Departments, 
tangible  evidence  of  the  high-level  at- 
tention being  given  by  both  sides  to 
this  growing  relationship.  The  under- 
standings and  commitments  endorsed 
by  that  ministerial  meeting  established 
a  broad  framework  for  cooperation  that 
is  adding  a  regional  dimension  to  our 
enduring  bilateral  ties  with  these  old 
friends. 

The  ASEAN  region  is  economically 
important  to  the  United  States  for  its 
potential,  as  well  as  for  present,  re- 
lationships. These  are  among  the  most 
dynamic  economies  in  the  world. 
ASEAN  total  GNP  in  1977  was  nearly 
$100  billion.  Average  annual  growth 
rates  since  1968  have  ranged  from  6% 
to  ]]%.  The  ASEAN  economy  sup- 
ports a  total  population  of  245 
million — greater  than  that  of  South 
America — on  a  land  area  twice  that  of 
the  European  Economic  Community. 
Average  per  capita  GNP  is  over  $350, 
ranging  from  $2,700  in  Singapore  to 
$240  in  Indonesia,  the  world's  fifth 
most  populous  nation. 

We  are  counting  on  American  busi- 
ness to  act  energetically  to  realize  the 
potential  of  ASEAN  and  especially  to 
increase  two-way  trade  both  in  terms  of 
level  and  of  U.S.  market  share.  We 
must  strive  to  expand  our  commercial 
relations  in  an  area  which  is  outward- 
looking  and  committed  to  close  coop- 
eration with  the  Western  countries.  We 
in  government  will  assist,  as  directed 
by  the  President's  export  expansion 
policy.  Highly  successful  visits  to  the 
ASEAN  countries  last  fall  by  the 
Chairman  of  the  Export-Import  Bank 
and  an  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corp.  investors  mission  helped  spot- 
light the  promising  opportunity  that 
awaits  U.S.  business.  The  inauguration 
of  the  U.S.  section  of  the  U.S. -ASEAN 
Business  Council  in  Washington  2 
weeks  ago  is  a  hopeful  sign. 


Trade  and  Adjustment  Problems 

It  is  clear  that  1979  will  see  the  Ad- 
ministration engaged  in  extensive  con- 
sultations with  both  the  Asian  countries 
and  the  Congress  over  problems  of 
trade  and  adjustment,  particularly  as 
concern  Japan  and  the  advanced  de- 
veloping countries  of  Asia. 

Congress  will  be  faced  with  some  of 
these  problems  when  issues  related  to 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
(MTN)  come  before  you.  The  coming 
year  is  a  particularly  critical  year  for 
the.se  trade-related  problems.  While  we 
have  reached  agreements  with  most  in- 
dustrial nations,  during  this  year  we 
must  still  reach  agreement  with  East 
Asian  less  developed  countries  on  re- 
ductions in  trade  barriers  through  the 
MTN;  we  must  present  MTN  legisla- 
tion before  Congress;  and  we  must  deal 
with  a  protectionist  sentiment  that  ap- 
pears stronger  than  at  any  time  in  re- 
cent memory. 

For  all  to  realize  the  gains  from 
trade,  we  must  protect  an  open  and  lib- 
eral world  trading  order.  This  policy 
brings  increased  benefits  and  chal- 
lenges, and  we  must  strengthen  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  gain  its 
full  share  of  the  benefits. 

To  this  end  the  President  has  em- 
barked the  United  States  on  a  campaign 
to  increase  the  competitiveness  of  U.S. 
exports  and  to  enable  us  to  maintain 
and  expand  our  position  in  foreign 
markets.  This  campaign  will  be  espe- 
cially important  in  Asia.  For  it  to  suc- 
ceed will  take  some  adjustment  of  at- 
titude and  management  from  both  the 
U.S.  Government  and  U.S.  business.  If 
either  the  United  States  or  other  coun- 
tries resist  imports  through  overt  or  in- 
direct protectionist  devices,  then  the 
system  will  not  work  to  full  advantage 
of  all,  and  we  will  all  be  hard  put  to 
prevent  protectionist  retaliation. 

Economic  Assistance 

The  United  States  can  take  great 
pride  in  the  role  its  economic  assist- 
ance has  played  in  supporting  sound 
and  equitable  growth  in  the  region.  The 
more  advanced  of  the  developing 
economies  have  largely  outgrown  the 
need  for  bilateral  development  assist- 
ance, including  two  of  the  star 
graduates  of  U.S.  aid  programs  — 
Korea  and  Taiwan. 

Our  bilateral  economic  assistance  is 
currently  concentrated  on  a  trio  of  the 
less  advanced  Southeast  Asian 
market-economy  nations — Indonesia, 
the  Philippines,  and  Thailand.  In  our 
FY  1980  program  for  these  countries 
on  which  Administration  officials  will 


23 

testify  in  detail  later,  we  are  seeking  a 
total  of  $124.4  million  in  development 
assistance  (exclusive  of  $20  million  in 
SSA  for  the  Philippines)  and  $154.1 
million  PL-480  food  aid. 

Despite  impressive  achievements, 
Indonesia's  development  needs  remain 
formidable.  An  estimated  60%  of  the 
population  of  140  million  live  at  a  level 
that  does  not  provide  basic  human 
needs.  Underemployment  and  un- 
employment are  as  high  as  30-40%. 
Our  bilateral  assistance  focuses  on  as- 
sisting the  Government  of  Indonesia's 
determined  efforts  to  increase  agricul- 
tural productivity;  to  improve  incomes, 
employment  opportunities,  and  living 
conditions  in  rural  areas;  to  stem 
population  growth;  and  to  train  criti- 
cally needed  personnel.  PL-480  con- 
tinues to  meet  critical  food  shortages 
and  provides  local  currency  for  In- 
donesia's development  budget. 

The  emphasis  in  our  bilateral  aid 
programs  in  the  Philippines  and  Thai- 
land is  on  helping  to  assure  that  the 
benefits  of  development  are  extended 
to  the  rural  poor.  We  are  assisting  the 
Government  of  the  Philippines,  for 
example,  in  projects  targeted  on 
small-scale  rice  and  corn  farmers  and 
programs  to  improve  health  services 
and  nutrition  in  rural  areas.  Food 
through  PL-480  will  permit  more 
maternal-child  and  student  feeding 
programs  and  benefit  thousands  of 
malnourished  Filipinos. 

We  are  giving  special  attention  in 
Thailand  to  encouraging  an  integrated 
approach  in  programs  to  raise  the  in- 
comes and  living  standards  of  subsis- 
tence farmers,  squatters,  and  hill 
tribes.  This  assistance  gives  tangible 
evidence  of  our  support  for  the  strong 
commitment  the  Government  of  Prime 
Minister  Kriangsak  has  given  to  ex- 
panding rural  development  efforts. 

A  request  for  $40  million  for  PL-480 
sales  to  Korea  is  linked  to  a  previous 
commitment  which  we  hope  to  com- 
plete in  FY  1981.  We  are  also  engaged 
on  a  regional  basis  in  modest  develop- 
ment cooperation  efforts  with  the  South 
Pacific  island  countries  and  ASEAN. 

Conclusion 

Our  military  position  is  strong,  and 
we  have  stable  and  progressive  friends 
and  allies  in  the  region.  The  dark 
clouds  in  the  Asian  sky  result  from 
conflicts  between  the  Communist  states 
in  the  area — conflicts  which  have 
dangerous  potential  but  which  we 
are  working  to  see  do  not  expand  to 
reach  that  potential.  The  economic 
picture  is  likewise  generally  bright, 
although  there  are  dark  spots  and  chal- 


24 


Security  Assistance  Report 
on  Koreiif  1978 


Secretary  Vance,  on  behalf  of  the 
President,  transmitted  the  following 
report  on  January  15,  1979,  to  Thomas 
P.  O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives:  John  C.  Stennis, 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  A  rmed  Services 
Committee:  and  Frank  Church.  Chair- 
man ad  interim  of  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee. 

INTRODUCTION 

This  report  is  submitted  in  accord- 
ance witii  Section  668  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  of  1961.  as  amended. 

This  is  the  third  in  a  series  of  annual 
reports  submitted  under  section  668; 
the  information  provided  herein  is  sup- 
plemental to  that  provided  in  the  two 
earlier  reports.  The  1976  report  had  a 
historical  focus,  describing  the  U.S. 
military  role  in  Korea  since  1945  and 
summarizing  U.S.  security  assistance 
during  that  period.  The  1977  report 
provided  an  account  of  President  Car- 
ter's decision  to  withdraw  U.S.  ground 
combat  forces  from  Korea,  the  consid- 
erations on  which  the  decision  was 
based,  and  an  assessment  of  the  impli- 
cations of  the  decision  for  the  preser- 
vation of  peace  and  stability  in  the 
Northeast  Asia  region  and  the  con- 
tinued deterrence  of  North  Korea  ag- 
gression. 

The  preface  of  this  1978  report  pro- 
vides a  brief  overview  of  the  current 
military  situation  on  the  Korean  Penin- 
sula and  the  U.S.  policies  designed  to 
assist  the  Republic  of  Korea  in  coun- 
tering the  threat  from  the  North.  Part  I 
reviews  the  progress  made  by  Korea 
over  the  past  year  in  modernizing  its 
armed  forces.  Part  II  describes  the  role 
of  the  United  States  in  mutual  security 
efforts  with  the  Republic  of  Korea,  and 
part  III  reports  on  the  progress  of  steps 
designed  to  implement  the  President's 


decision  gradually  to  withdraw  U.S. 
ground  combat  forces  from  the  penin- 
sula in  a  way  that  will  not  be  de- 
stabilizine. 


PREFACE 

The  Republic  of  Korea  (R.O.K.)  oc- 
cupies about  half  the  land  area  of  the 
peninsula  and  contains  about  two-thirds 
of  the  population.  Over  the  past  15 
years,  it  has  made  impressive  economic 
progress  by  pursuing  a  strategy  of  eco- 
nomic growth  linked  with  the  world 
trading  community.  During  this  period 
it  has  put  comparatively  little  emphasis 
on  the  development  of  defense  indus- 
tries, choosing  instead  to  rely  for  the 
most  part  on  the  United  States  for  de- 
fense materiel  requirements,  initially 
through  grant  military  assistance  and 
more  recently  through  the  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  program.  Of  late 
the  R.O.K.  has  turned  its  attention  to 
the  development,  with  U.S.  assistance, 
of  indigenous  defense  industries,  and 
greater  emphasis  will  be  given  to  this 
effort  in  the  future. 

In  sharp  contrast,  the  Communist  re- 
gime in  the  North  has  concentrated  its 
development  efforts  on  heavy  industry, 
with  particular  emphasis  on  military- 
related  sectors.  Under  the  cloak  of 
secrecy  and  isolation  which  charac- 
terizes North  Korean  society,  it  has  de- 
veloped and  deployed  a  massive  mili- 
tary capability  for  a  nation  of  its  size, 
including  domestically  produced  tanks, 
armored  vehicles,  long-range  self- 
propelled  artillery,  and  a  wide  range  of 
ships  and  submarines.  North  Korea 
continues  to  increase  its  offensive 
strength  through,  among  other  things, 
the  production  of  modern  weapons  and 
the  expansion  of  its  military  industry. 

The  U.S.  commitment  to  Korean  se- 


Assistance  Proposals  (cont'd) 

lenges  which  will  make  the  next  year  a 

crucial  one  in  our  relations  with  Asia. 

The  past  year  has  seen  events  of 
lasting  historical  significance  that  un- 
derscore the  unalterable  position  of  the 
United  States  as  an  Asian  and  Pacific 
power.  I  do  not  have  to  proclaim  that 
fact  of  geopolitical  life  which  is  by 
now  unmistakable  to  all.  To  maintain 
our  favorable  position  in  Asia  will  re- 
quire constant  and  imaginative  policy 


formulation  and  management.  In  that 
regard  I  look  forward  to  continued  con- 
sultation and  cooperation  with  the 
Congress,  and  particularly  with  this 
committee.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

''For  full  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  1979, 
p.  21. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin|i 

curity  and  the  U.S.  and  Korean  com-! 
bined  forces  on  the  peninsula  have  pro-' 
vided  an  effective  deterrent  to  North 
Korean  attack.  Further,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment has  concluded,  as  noted  in  the 
1977  report,  that  the  decision  to  with- 
draw U.S.  ground  combat  forces,  if 
carefully  phased  over  a  4-5  year  period 
and  accompanied  by  appropriate  meas- 
ures to  strengthen  and  modernize 
R.O.K.  forces,  can  be  implemented 
without  endangering  the  peace  and  sta- 
bility of  the  region.  This  conclusion 
remains  valid.  In  close  consultation 
with  Congress,  the  R.O.K.  and  our 
other  Asian  allies,  however,  we  will 
continually  assess  changes  in  the  situa- 
tion, and  our  plans  will  be  adjusted  if 
developments  so  warrant. 

We  must  remain  alert  to  changing 
circumstances.  Intelligence  analysis 
currently  in  progress  has  led  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  North  Koreans  are 
substantially  stronger  than  had  been 
estimated  earlier.  Because  the  analysis 
is  still  in  progress,  it  is  premature  to 
discuss  details  of  the  new  estimates. 
When  the  new  estimates  are  ready  they 
will,  of  course,  be  factored  into  our 
on-going  assessment  of  conditions  on 
the  peninsula.  The  extraordinary  se- 
crecy of  North  Korean  society  has  made 
it  difficult  to  detect  increases  in  the 
number  of  men  under  arms  or  their  de- 
ployment. North  Korea's  precise  mili- 
tary intentions  are  also  extraordinarily 
difficult  to  ascertain  on  a  timely  basis. 
We  can  anticipate  that  North  Korea 
will  continue  to  develop  and  operate  its 
defense  establishment  in  a  surreptitious 
way. 

Because  the  military  threat  from 
North  Korea  remains  serious,  and 
given  Pyongyang's  intransigent  posture 
and  rejection  of  repeated  R.O.K.  ini- 
tiatives to  decrease  tensions  on  the 
peninsula,  the  United  States  must  con- 
tinue to  assist  the  R.O.K.  in  its  efforts 
to  strengthen  its  own  defense 
capabilities.  Coupled  with  the  direct 
U.S.  commitment  to  defend  the 
R.O.K.,  our  assistance  is  designed  to 
make  clear  to  North  Korea  and  others 
that  any  attack  will  meet  with  an  im- 
mediate and  strong  response,  that  no 
armed  attack  can  succeed,  and  that 
constructive,  peaceful  cooperation  in 
the  search  for  means  of  reducing  ten- 
sions on  the  peninsula  is  the  only 
fruitful  approach  to  the  Korean  ques- 
tion. 


I.  Progress  Made  by  the  R.O.K. 
to  Modernize  Its  Forces 

The  5-year  force  improvement  plan 
(FIP)  initiated  by  President  Park  in 
mid- 1 975  is  now  more  than  half  com- 


Apiil   1079 


25 


pleted.  As  of"  September  1978  the  Ko- 
ledP  Government  hud  allocated  funds 

,  for  about  65%  of  the  $5  billion  ear- 
marked for  FIP.  About  a  third  of  the 
124  projects  involved  have  been  com- 
pleted, and  most  of  the  remaining  proj- 
ects are  in  active  stages  of  development 
and/or  acquisition.    As  a  part  of  the 

IFIP,  the  R.O.K.  is  proceeding  with  a 
vigorous  program  to  expand  domestic 
defense  production  and  to  decrease  re- 
liance on  foreign  sources  of  supply  and 
ultimately  to  reduce  the  defense  sec- 
iiHs  demands  on  scarce  foreign  ex- 
change resources.  The  drive  toward 
greater  self-sufficiency   is  being  pur- 

j  sued,  however,  with  the  understanding 
and  the  assurance  that  the  United  States 
will  continue  to  serve  as  a  source  for 
defense  supplies  and  equipment,  par- 
ticularly of  major  sophisticated 
weapons  systems  required  to  counter 
North  Korea's  unremitting  efforts  to 
strengthen  its  offensive  capabilities  still 
further. 

Between  1970  and  1978  Korean 
GNP  grew  at  a  compound  annual  rate 
of  more  than  \07c  in  real  terms,  and  the 
share  of  this  expanding  output  devoted 
to  defense  rose  over  the  same  period 
from  4%  to  6.5%.  (In  current  prices 
defense  spending  increased  from  $300 
million  in  1970  to  $2.6  billion  in 
1978.)  In  1979  defense  expenditures 
are  expected  to  increase  again  in  abso- 
lute terms,  but  the  defense  share  of 
GNP  is  expected  to  be  held  to  about 
6.2%.  This  reflects  efforts  by  the  gov- 
ernment to  balance  the  budgetary  re- 
quirements of  the  essential  defense 
sector  against  those  of  other  important 
programs,  including  industrial  de- 
velopment, housing,  education,  and 
health. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  the  FIP 
is  economically  feasible  and  consistent 
with  U.S.  security  objectives.  The 
continuing  high  rate  of  growth  of  the 
Korean  economy  will  enable  the  gov- 
ernment to  support  the  local  currency 
costs  of  the  plan  without  diverting  an 
unacceptably  large  share  of  resources 


from  economic  growth  and  social  pro- 
grams, the  critical  importance  of  which 
we  endorse.  However,  the  R.O.K.  may 
have  difficulty  in  providing  foreign  ex- 
change in  the  quantities  and  at  the 
times  required  to  cover  all  the  costs  of 
needed  major  weapons  systems,  such 
as  aircraft  and  improved  antiarmor  ca- 
pability. With  this  in  mind,  we  have 
informed  the  Korean  Government  that 
we  anticipate  requesting  from  the  Con- 
gress again  in  FY  1980  authorization 
for  substantial  foreign  military  sales 
credits.  These  credits  will  be  an  im- 
portant supplement  to  the  far  larger 
amount  supplied  directly  by  the 
R.O.K.  U.S.  plans  to  withdraw  ground 
combat  forces  from  the  R.O.K.  have 
given  rise  to  some  restructuring  of  the 
FIP  and  will  be  a  critical  element  in  the 
formulation  of  a  second  5-year  FIP  for 
1981-86. 

In  1978  the  R.O.K.  placed  new  FMS 
orders  for  about  $390  million  worth  of 
defense  equipment,  including  the  fol- 
lowing major  items:  AIM  7-E  missiles, 
tank  upgrade  kits,  precision  guided 
munitions,  and  communications 
equipment  for  command  and  control 
networks.  In  addition,  the  R.O.K.  pur- 
chased large  quantities  of  spare  parts 
and  maintenance  packages  for  equip- 
ment already  in  its  inventory.  Major 
equipment  deliveries  during  the  year 
included  TOW  antitank  missiles, 
UH-H  helicopters,  an  additional  de- 
stroyer. Harpoon  ship-to-ship  missiles. 
F-4  and  F-5  aircraft,  and  air-to-air 
missiles.  The  R.O.K.  procured  from 
U.S.  forces  in  Korea  two  additional 
Nike-Hercules  batteries. 

The  program  to  develop  and  expand 
the  defense  industries  sector  has  made 
impressive  strides  in  the  past  year.  A 
major  achievement  was  the  opening  of 
an  integrated  facility  for  rebuilding 
older  M-48  tanks,  upgrading  them  to 
the  M-48A3  and  M-48A5  configura- 
tions. The  R.O.K.  Air  Force's  mainte- 
nance depot  has  increased  its  capacity 
and  level  of  technical  skill,  and  consid- 
erable gains  have  been  made  in  the 


NATIONAL  AND  DEFENSE  BUDGETS 

1970-79* 
{%  OF  GNP) 


70 


71 


72 


73 


74 


75 


76 


77 


78 


79 


National 
Defense 


17 

4 


17.3 
4.3 


18.2 
4.5 


13.3 
3.7 


15.6 
4.5 


19.5 
6.2 


18 
6.2 


18.6 
6.5 


18.5 
6.2 


*Data  are  the  latest  published  by  the  R.O.K.  Economic  Planning  Board.  Differences 
from  data  presented  in  previous  reports  may  be  due  to  differences  in  totals  being  compared 
(e.g..  estimated,  preliminary,  or  final  GNP)  and  to  the  time  at  which  the  data  base  was 
selected  (e.g.,  original  budget  submission,  original  budget  plus  supplemental,  or  actual 
expenditures). 


production  of  artillery  and  components 
to  rehabilitate  artillery  already  in  the 
R.O.K.  inventory.  Production  con- 
tinues of  air  defense  weapons,  light 
helicopters,  infantry  weapons,  and 
naval  patrol  craft. 


II.  Role  of  the  U.S. 

in  Mutual  Security  Efforts 

The  central  contribution  of  the 
United  States  to  mutual  security  efforts 
in  Korea  lies  in  its  treaty  commitment 
to  Korean  security.  This  commitment  is 
unaffected  by  the  decision  gradually  to 
withdraw  U.S.  ground  combat  forces. 
The  United  States  and  Korea  will  con- 
tinue to  work  together  to  maintain  a 
strong  deterrent.  U.S.  forces  will  only 
be  withdrawn  in  a  way  which  does  not 
reduce  the  overall  combat  capability, 
and  important  U.S.  components  — 
including  Air  Force,  logistic,  and  in- 
telligence capability — will  remain  in 
Korea. 

In  1978  the  United  States  also  pro- 
vided support  to  Korean  security  ef- 
forts in  the  form  of  FMS  cash  sales. 
FMS  credits  amounting  to  $275  mil- 
lion, and  a  $1.5  million  military  edu- 
cation and  training  grant.  This  financial 
assistance  has  been  in  support  of  the 
FIP.  and  it  is  anticipated  that  the  Ko- 
rean requirement  for  such  assistance 
will  extend  through  FY  1981  when  the 
FIP  is  expected  to  be  completed. 

The  Congress  acted  in  1978  to  au- 
thorize the  transfer  to  R.O.K.  forces  of 
defense  articles  from  withdrawing 
units.  That  authorization  was  essential 
to  our  ability  to  implement  the  with- 
drawal program  in  a  way  that  is  not  de- 
stabilizing to  the  peninsula  or  the  re- 
gion. The  transfer  of  equipment  will 
take  place  over  the  several  years  of  the 
withdrawal  process.  The  Congress  also 
authorized  provision  of  defense  serv- 
ices, including  training  related  to  the 
transfer. 

Another  major  U.S.  contribution  to 
mutual  security  efforts  in  the  next  sev- 
eral years  will  be  to  support  the  transi- 
tion of  the  greater  defense  burden  to 
Korean  forces  as  U.S.  ground  combat 
forces  are  withdrawn  from  the  R.O.K. 
It  is  essential  that  U.S.  and  Korean  of- 
ficials at  all  levels  work  together  to  in- 
sure that  the  combination  of  R.O.K. 
forces  and  those  remaining  U.S.  ele- 
ments retain  at  least  the  same  combat 
capability  as  forces  now  in  the  R.O.K. 
To  do  this.  Korean  personnel  must  be 
trained,  in  some  cases  for  extended 
periods,  either  in  the  United  States  or 
with  U.S.  or  R.O.K.  units  in  Korea,  in 
sufficient  time  to  take  over  U.S. 
weapons  and  equipment  to  be  trans- 
ferred. 


26 


U.S.  security  assistance  to  Korea 
continues  to  emphasize  the  develop- 
ment of  a  modern  resource  manage- 
ment system,  iceyed  to  Korean  needs, 
embracing  the  fields  of  planning,  pro- 
curement, logistics,  education,  and 
defense  research.  Particular  emphasis 
has  been  placed  on  management  infor- 
mation and  quality  assurance  to  facili- 
tate decisionmaking  by  R.O.K.  defense 
officials  at  all  levels  and  to  aid  in  the 
development  of  the  indigenous  Korean 
defense  effort  along  balanced,  rational, 
and  cost-effective  lines.  As  the  R.O.K. 
defense  structure  becomes  more  com- 
plex, such  skills  are  essential  both 
within  the  defense  establishment  and  to 
insure  smooth  working  relationships 
with  the  industrial  sector. 


III.  Actions  to  Implement 
the  Withdrawal  Program 

On  April  21,  1978,  the  President  an- 
nounced a  modification  of  the  with- 
drawal schedule  described  in  the  1977 
report.  The  revision  affected  the  first 
phase  of  the  withdrawal  schedule,  in- 
volving 6,000  men,  which  is  now 
scheduled  to  be  implemented  in  1978 
and  1979  rather  than  entirely  in  1978. 
By  the  end  of  1978,  3,400  men  were 
withdrawn,  including  850  from  the  2nd 
Infantry  Division.  The  remaining  2,600 
men  involved  in  the  first  phase  are 
scheduled  to  leave  Korea  in  1979. 
Their  departure  will  involve  transfer  to 
Korean  forces  of  equipment  and 
weapons  for  one  Honest  John 
surface-to-surface  missile  battalion, 
three  antitank  companies,  and  one  en- 
gineer battalion.  The  authorized  com- 
bined U.S.  force  level  in  Korea  by 
January  1,  1980,  will  be  36,000. 

The  President's  decision  to  stretch 
out  the  implementation  of  the  first 
phase  of  the  withdrawal  recognized  the 
importance  of  congressional  approval 
of  the  equipment  transfer  package  to 
the  successful  implementation  of  the 
withdrawal.  Congress  had  not  yet  acted 
at  the  time  of  the  President's  an- 
nouncement but  subsequently  au- 
thorized the  equipment  transfer  which 
will  allow  the  withdrawal  to  proceed 
with  confidence.  The  second  and  third 
increments  will  be  carefully  phased  to 
maintain  an  undiminished  combined 
U.S. -R.O.K.  combat  capability 
through  the  withdrawal  period  and  will 
take  account  of  the  ability  of  R.O.K. 
forces  to  absorb  the  equipment  being 
turned  over  to  them. 

As  previously  planned,  in  November 
the  60  U.S.  F-4  aircraft  already 
stationed  in  Korea  were  augmented  by 
the  addition  of  12  more  F-4's. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Visit  of  Thai 
Prime  Minister  Kriangsak 


I 


Prime  Minister  Kriangsak  Choma- 
nan  of  Thailand  made  an  official  visit 
to  the  United  States  February  4-16, 
1979.  While  in  Washington  (February 
4-8),  he  met  with  President  Carter  and 
other  government  officials.  Following 
is  the  text  of  a  joint  press  statement  is- 
sued on  February  7. ' 

At  the  invitation  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Mrs.  Carter,  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  Kingdom  of  Thailand  Kriangsak 
Chomanan  and  Madame  Khunying  Virat 
Chomanan  are  visiting  the  United  States  offi- 
cially during  the  period  February  4  to  February 
16,  1979.  In  addition  to  Washington,  D.C.,  the 
Prime  Minister  and  his  party  will  also  extend  his 
official  travel  to  New  York  City,  Los  Angeles, 
and  Honolulu. 


The  President's  invitation  to  the  Prime 
Minister  was  extended  last  May  by  Vice  Presi- 
dent Mondale  during  his  visit  to  Thailand  and 
Southeast  Asia. 


Purpose  and  Signiricance 

The  President  welcomed  the  Prime  Minister 
recognizing  particularly  the  long  and  close  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Thailand. 
The  two  countries  have  had  diplomatic  contact 
for  nearly  a  century  and  a  half  and  the  fabric  of 


U.S.   and  Thai  relations  has  been  particularly 
close  for  over  30  years. 

The  visit  enabled  the  two  leaders  to  discuss 
directly  recent  events  in  Asia  and  Southeast  Asia 
and  the  efforts  of  the  two  governments  to  pursue 
regional  peace  and  stability.  The  President  was 
able  to  hear  first-hand  views  from  one  of  the 
leaders  of  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations],  a  dynamic  organization  recog- 
nized internationally  as  dedicated  to  peace,  sta- 
bility, and  economic  growth  in  Southeast  Asia. 
ASEAN  has  the  active  support  of  the  United 
States  as  well  as  Japan,  Australia,  New  Zealand, 
Canada,  the  EEC  [European  Economic  Commu- 
nity], and  other  nations. 

The  Meetings 

The  President  reviewed  the  U.S.  role  as  an 
Asian  and  Pacific  power  and  noted  recent  de- 
velopments, including  the  normalization  of  U.S. 
relations  with  China  and  the  new  agreement  on 
U.S.  bases  in  the  Philippines,  which  contribute 
constructively  to  the  future  of  the  region. 

The  Prime  Minister  outlined  his  view  of  cur- 
rent developments  in  Indochina  and  the  policies 
which  the  Thai  Government  is  pursuing  to  sup- 
port a  peaceful  system  of  independent  states  in 
the  region,  a  goal  which  the  United  States 
shares.  He  welcomed  U.S.  relations  with  China 
as  a  positive  contribution.  Both  the  Prime 
Minister  and  the  President  agreed  on  the  impor- 
tance of  an  independent  Cambodia  to  regional 
stability. 


Before  the  end  of  1978,  the  United 
States  and  R.O.K.  inaugurated  the 
R.O.K. -U.S.  Combined  Forces  Com- 
mand (CFC).  The  Commander  in 
Chief,  CFC,  who  is  also  CINC,  United 
Nations  Command/Commander  U.S. 
Forces  Korea,  exercises  operational 
control  of  R.O.K.  and  designated  U.S. 
forces  in  defense  of  the  republic. 
Strategic  guidance  and  direction  for  the 
CFC  is  provided  by  the  R.O.K.  and 
U.S.  national  command  and  military 
authorities  through  the  R.O.K. -U.S. 
Military  Committee.  The  CFC  repre- 
sents a  significant  action  which  is  inte- 
gral to  the  implementation  of  the  with- 
drawal program. 

We  have  continued  to  consult  with 
the  Korean  Government  on  the  military 
threat,  the  development  of  R.O.K. 
capabilities  to  meet  the  threat,  and 
other  developments  affecting  peace  and 
stability  in  the  region.  In  the  past  year, 
we  have  expanded  joint  military  exer- 
cises and  have  provided,  in  consonance 
with  U.S.  laws  and  regulations,  sup- 


port to  South  Korean  industry  in  selec- 
ed  areas  of  defense  production. 

We  intend,  as  the  withdrawal  pro- 
gram proceeds,  to  sustain  an  effective 
deterrent  to  war  in  Korea  based  on  our 
firm  and  continuing  defense  commit- 
ment, assistance  to  R.O.K.  efforts  to- 
ward greater  self-sufficiency,  and  with 
constant  review  of  the  withdrawal 
process  and  its  effects.  North  Korea 
remains  an  intransigent  and  heavily 
armed  adversary.  The  North  continues 
to  build  up  its  military  arsenal  at  a  rate 
which  clearly  involves  major  sacrifices 
for  the  North  Korean  people.  We  will 
continue  to  support  South  Korean  ef- 
forts to  resume  the  moribund  dialogue 
with  Pyongyang  as  well  as  other  initia- 
tives to  reduce  tensions  on  the  penin- 
sula. But  lacking  any  sign  from  the 
North  that  it  is  willing  to  revise  its  con- 
sistently hostile  attitude  toward  the 
R.O.K.,  we  will  continue  to  assist  the 
R.O.K.  in  deterring  any  efforts  by 
Pyongyang  to  reunify  the  peninsula  on 
its  own  terms.  D 


April  1979 

The  President  slated  that  the  United  States 
supports  the  integrity  of  Thailand  both  in  terms 
of  the  historic  US-Thai  friendship  as  well  as  our 
interest  in  Thailand  as  a  stable,  secure,  and 
peaceful  nation  in  Southeast  Asia  with  an  im- 
portant role  in  regional  peace  and  cohesion.  He 
confirmed  the  continuing  validity  of  U.S.  com- 
mitments in  the  Manila  Pact. 

The  Prime   Minister  stressed  that  Thailand's 
policies  are  based  on  self-reliance  and  independ- 
ence. Foreign  economic  and  military  assistance 
are  important  but  must  be  complementary  to 
Thailand's  own  policies  and  efforts. 

Within  the  context  of  an  ongoing  military  as- 
sistance program,  the  United  States  will  expedite 
items  of  military  equipment  already  ordered  by 
Thailand  and  has  increased  military  credits 
(FMS)  [foreign  military  sales]  for  FY  1979.  The 
United  States  will  consider  sympathetically  new 
Thai  requests.  The  President  also  slated  congres- 
sional authorization  would  be  sought  for  the 
cost-free  transfer  to  Thailand  of  $11.3  million  of 
U.S.  owned  ammunition  currently  stored  there. 

The  two  leaders  noted  the  success  of  Thai- 
land's economic  policies,  its  plan  to  continue 
rapid  and  equitable  growth  policies,  and  the 
dynamic  aspects  of  the  ASEAN  region.  The 
President  was  particularly  impressed  by  the 
priority  given  to  rural  development  during  Thai- 
land's 1979  "Year  of  the  Farmer"  and  con- 
firmed the  continuing  U.S.  supplementary  role 
in  supporting  the  new  Thai  emphasis. 

The  Prime  Minister  welcomed  the  continuing 
economic  interests  of  the  United  States  and  other 
nations  in  Thailand  and  ASEAN,  particularly 
American  investment  and  other  business  ac- 
tivities. He  noted  the  favorable  business  climate 
offered  by  Thailand  to  foreign  commerce  and  in- 
vestment and  discussed  plans  to  improve  the 
situation  further.  The  President  welcomed  U.S. 
firms  contributing  to  economic  growth  and  trade 
with  Thailand  and  hoped  our  business  relations 
would  expand  as  more  American  firms  become 
aware  of  the  opportunities  in  Thailand  and  the 
ASEAN  region. 

The  Prime  Minister  of  Thailand  stressed  the 
serious  burdens  in  providing  temporary  shelter 
and  care  to  Indochinese  refugees.  He  urged  the 
international  community  to  take  additional  steps 
to  ease  the  problem.  The  President  appreciated 
the  humanitarian  policies  of  Thailand,  outlined 
his  commitment  to  a  long-range  systematic  U.S. 
program  of  resettlement,  and  reviewed  the  con- 

Prime   Minister  Kriangsak  and  President 
Carter. 


11 


Anierlean  and  Japanese  interests 
in  Southeast  Asia 


by  David  D.  Newsom 

Address  before  the  International 
Study  and  Research  Institute,  Inc.,  in 
New  York  City  on  January  II ,  1979. 
Ambassador  Newsom  is  Under  Secre- 
tary for  Political  Affairs. 

1  wish  to  talk  today  about  the  U.S. 
and  Japanese  relationships  with  South- 
east Asia  from  the  standpoint  of  those 
most  directly  concerned — the  nations 
of  Southeast  Asia.  Their  perceptions  of 
the  respective  roles  and  attitudes  of  the 
United  States  and  Japan  are  important 
to  the  shaping  of  the  basic  relation- 
ships. 

At  the  beginning,  let  me  address  my 
remarks  to  the  relationship  and 
perspectives  of  the  five  members  of 
ASEAN — the  Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations  [Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore, 
and  Thailand].  The  nations  of  In- 
dochina present  different  and  complex 
elements  bearing  on  this  subject.  I  shall 
discuss  them  separately. 

The  United  States  enjoys  a  basically 
favorable  position  in  each  of  the  five 
nations  of  ASEAN.  While  there  have 
been  differences  with  each  in  the  past, 
these  are  largely  minimized  today.  Our 
relationship  with  the  Philippines  is  still 
marked  by  the  vestigial  feelings  of  a 
former  colonial  tie,  but  our  coopera- 
tion remains  close.  Only  last  week  we 
completed  negotiations  on  the  continu- 


tinuing  U.S.  efforts  with  other  nations  to  do 
more. 

The  President  congratulated  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter on  current  progress  to  combat  narcotics  pro- 
duction and  trafficking  in  and  through  Thailand, 
particularly  the  creation  of  innovative  crop  sub- 
stitution programs.  They  agreed  on  the  need  for 
expanded  cooperative  efforts  in  this  area  of  such 
importance  to  the  United  States  and  Thailand  as 
well  as  other  affected  countries. 

Prime  Minister  Kriangsak  invited  President 
Carter  to  visit  Thailand.  The  President  expressed 
pleasure  and  said  he  would  seek  a  mutually  con- 
venient time.  n 


'  List  of  Thai  officials  accompanying  the 
Prime  Minister  and  U.S.  officials  who  partici- 
pated in  the  meeting  with  the  President  omitted 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  12,  1979).  For  remarks  made 
at  the  arrival  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the 
White  House  and  an  exchange  of  toasts  at  the 
state  dinner  on  Feb.  6,  see  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Feb.  12,  pp.  221  and  226  respectively. 


ation  of  our  military  bases  in  that 
country. 

Indonesia  looks  to  us  as  a  major 
trading  partner.  We  take  almost  40%  of 
Indonesia's  oil  exports  and  are  a  major 
purchaser  of  their  rubber,  tin,  and  cof- 
fee. Indonesia  is  disappointed  at  the 
very  slow  process  of  our  decision  on 
taking  their  liquefied  natural  gas  as 
another  source  of  energy. 

Our  links  to  Thailand  have  been 
close  throughout  the  postwar  years.  We 
are  looking  forward  to  the  visit  of 
Prime  Minister  Kriangsak  to  Washing- 
ton next  month. 

Singapore  and  Malaysia  are  close 
friends.  Our  business  firms  have  found 
a  climate  that  encourages  mutually 
beneficial  trade  and  investment. 

There  are  also  problems. 

U.S-ASEAN  Political 
and  Military  Issues 

On  the  political  side,  there  is  an 
ambivalence  toward  the  United  States. 
Consistent  with  their  nonaligned  pos- 
ture, the  nations  of  ASEAN  do  not 
encourage  a  wider  formal  security  role 
for  the  United  States  in  the  area. 
Malaysia  is  the  primary  formulator  of 
the  idea  of  a  zone  of  peace,  freedom, 
and  neutrality  in  the  region.  While  the 
Filipinos  have  agreed  to  the  continua- 
tion of  our  base  agreement,  they  have 
insisted  strongly  on  a  much  greater  as- 
sertion of  Philippine  sovereignty  than 
in  the  past. 

During  the  3'/2  years  since  the  end  of 
the  Indochina  conflict,  these  five 
countries  have  adjusted  well  to  the  re- 
duction of  U.S.  military  forces  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  to  their  consequent 
need  to  become  more  self-reliant.  Their 
increasingly  close  mutual  cooperation 
within  ASEAN — an  economic  and 
political  but  not  a  military 
organization — has  significantly  in- 
creased their  strength  and  stability, 
both  individually  and  collectively. 

While  eschewing  any  military  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States 
and  ASEAN,  these  nations  clearly  do 
not  wish  to  see  a  weakening  or  with- 
drawal of  an  American  presence,  sym- 
bolized largely  in  the  continued  activity 
of  our  7th  Fleet  in  the  waters  of  the 
region.  They  regard  the  intentions  of 
the  United  States  essentially  as  benign 
and  have  been  concerned  that,  follow- 
ing the  collapse  in  Vietnam,  the  United 
States  would  take  a  less  active  role  in 


28 


Southeast  Asia.  To  the  extent  that  any 
major  power  needs  to  play  a  security 
role  in  the  area,  their  preference  is  for 
the  United  States. 


U.S.-ASEAN 
Economic  Issues 

The  nations  of  the  area  also  look  to 
the  United  States  as  the  second  largest 
trading  partner  and  second  largest  pres- 
ent and  potential  investor.  They  ex- 
press disappointment  in  the  U.S.  at- 
titude toward  commodity  agree- 
ments—  including  the  common 
fund — which  they  see  not  only  as 
stabilizing  revenues  but  also  as  a  strong 
hedge  against  inflation.  They  re- 
member that  4  years  ago  the  un- 
stabilized  price  of  sugar  shot  up  to  600 
a  pound. 

They  also  express  disappointment 
that  the  private  sector  of  the  United 
States  does  not  recognize  the  potential 
of  this  rapidly  growing  and  largely  pri- 
vate enterprise  oriented  region.  Nor 
does  it  give  sufficient  weight  to  the 
current  importance  of  these  markets 
and  the  vital  resources  which  the  region 
has  to  offer. 

There  is  a  general  disappointment, 
too,  that  U.S.  markets  are  not  more 
available  for  many  of  the  products  of 
the  ASEAN  nations,  particularly  those 
of  their  new  industries.  Indonesia,  in 
particular,  has  regretted  that  our  Fed- 
eral energy  authorities  are  not  more 
positive  on  liquefied  natural  gas  im- 
ports. The  congressional  ban  against 
generalized  preferences  for  countries 
that  are  members  of  the  Organization 
of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  also 
effectively  excludes  Indonesia  from  the 
benefits  of  the  generalized  preference 
provisions  of  our  Trade  Act. 

These  economic  issues  are  now 
being  addressed  in  the  U.S.-ASEAN 
dialogue.  Opened  with  the  U.S.- 
ASEAN  economic  consultation  in 
Manila  in  September  1977,  a  highly 
successful  second  round  of  the  dialogue 
was  held  in  Washington  August  3-4, 
conducted  at  the  ministerial  level.  The 
August  meeting  involved  participation 
by  President  Carter,  Vice  President 
Mondale,  five  U.S.  Cabinet  officers, 
and  14  ASEAN  ministers.  The  meeting 
established  a  broad  framework  for 
growing  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  ASEAN,  with  par- 
ticular emphasis  on  expanding  trade 
and  business  relations.' 

American  business  is  welcome  in  the 
area.  There  is  a  general  feeling  that 
U.S.  traders  and  investors  have  sought 
to  respond  to  local  sensitivities  and  to 
be  imaginative  and  cooperative  in 
bringing  nationals  of  the  countries  into 


their  enterprises.  Many  in  Southeast 
Asia  see  U.S.  business,  however,  as 
less  competitive  than  others,  both  in 
terms  of  credit  and  in  terms  of  price 
and  availability. 

Japan-ASEAN  Relations 

The  ASEAN  perception  of  the 
Japanese  is  more  complicated.  There  is 
no  doubt  that,  despite  the  lapse  of  three 
decades,  there  are  still  feelings  toward 
the  Japanese  that  date  from  World  War 
II. 

They  would  not  wish  to  see  any 
other  nation — including  the  United 
States — appear  to  approach  Southeast 
Asia  through  Japan.  The  nations  of  the 
area  wish  to  deal  directly  with  key 
nations  outside  the  region. 

They  clearly  do  not  wish  to  see 
Japan  rearm  and  welcomed  Prime 
Minister  Fukuda's  assurances  in  this 
regard  in  Manila  in  1977.  They  quietly 
welcome  the  U.S. -Japan  defense  treaty 
which  makes  this  unnecessary. 

But,  while  recognizing  this,  these 
nations  generally  feel  there  is  no  in- 
dustrialized nation  other  than  Japan 
which  can  do  as  well  in  providing  the 
machinery,  the  expertise,  and  the 
financing  for  their  development.  Still, 
it  is  clear,  as  in  the  case  of  Indonesian 
liquefied  natural  gas,  that  none  of  these 
countries  wish  to  depend  exclusively 
on  Japan  as  the  only  market  for  any 
major  commodity.  They  all  hope  the 
United  States  will  become  more  rather 
than  less  competitive.  They  very  badly 
need  the  United  States  to  act  as  a  bal- 
ance, a  counterweight  to  excessive 
Japanese  influence. 

Thus,  Japan  has  nearly  25%  of  the 
market  of  the  ASEAN  states,  compared 
to  14%  for  the  United  States.  In  1977 
Japanese  sales  to  ASEAN  totaled  $6.9 
billion  compared  to  $3.9  billion  from 
the  United  States.  In  1977  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community  nosed  out 
the  United  States  for  the  second  spot; 
its  share  of  the  ASEAN  market  was 
14.6%. 

The  visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Tanaka  to  Bangkok  and  Jakarta  in  1974 
was  accompanied  by  riots  in  both  of 
these  cities  against  the  Japanese.  If  one 
grants  that,  in  the  Indonesian  case  at 
least,  there  were  local  reasons  for  the 
riots  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Japanese;  the  manifestations, 
nevertheless,  demonstrated  underlying 
feelings  toward  the  Japanese  presence. 

Since  the  Tanakea  visit,  Tokyo  has 
sought  to  achieve  a  better  understand- 
ing of  the  region  and  relate  more  effec- 
tively to  national  aspirations.  There  has 
been  an  increased  tendency  on  the  part 
of  the  Japanese  in  several  of  the  coun- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  i 

tries  to  seek  joint  ventures  with  nation-  ; 
als  of  the  country. 

Japan  was  the  second  entity,  after 
the  European  Economic  Community, 
with  which  the  ASEAN  nations  opened 
an  economic  dialogue. 

Japan's  new  Prime  Minister, 
Masayoshi  Ohira,  has  already  spoken 
of  the  importance  to  Japan  of  Southeast 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  and  has  promised 
to  honor  earlier  Japanese  commitments 
to  double  official  development  assist- 
ance during  the  next  3  years.  During 
1977  about  60%  of  Japan's  total  over- 
seas development  assistance  was  con- 
centrated on  Asia — mainly  the  ASEAN 
countries. 

Japan  in  recent  years  has  pledged 
substantial  help  to  major  projects  with 
both  political  and  economic  signifi- 
cance in  the  ASEAN  countries.  One 
such  is  the  giant  Asahan  project  in 
Sumatra  whicn  will  involve  a  substan- 
tial hydroelectric  and  alumina  com- 
plex. Japan  has  committed  $1  billion 
to  the  five  ASEAN  joint  industrial 
projects. 

As  with  the  United  States,  the  na- 
tions of  the  area  are  unhappy  with  Ja- 
pan's failure  to  reduce  trade  barriers  or 
to  give  preference  to  the  import  of  cer- 
tain products  of  ASEAN  nations.  In 
October  1978,  with  60%  of  its  trade 
deficit  with  Japan,  Thailand  considered 
banning  Japanese  imports. 

Having  sketched  the  way  in  which 
each  nation  is  seen  from  the  ASEAN 
area,  let  me  say  a  few  words  on  the 
interrelationship  of  the  United  States 
and  Japan  in  the  area. 


U.S. -Japan  Interrelationship 

Japan  and  the  United  States  have  a 
shared  interest  in  the  peaceful  de- 
velopment of  the  nations  of  the  region 
as  stable,  prosperous,  progressive,  and 
independent  nation  states. 

We  also  share  a  major  interest  in  in- 
suring that  the  area  is  not  dominated  by 
any  outside  powers.  The  security  of 
transit  routes  and  access  to  markets  and 
resources  is  important  to  us  both.  The 
access  to  resources  on  a  reasonable 
basis  is  vital  to  Japan. 

The  reality  of  geography,  the  fact  of 
commercial  competition,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  history  mean  that  these  inter- 
ests are  separately  pursued.  That,  in  no 
way,  diminishes  the  basic  common 
interests  which  underlie  our  relation- 
ship. 

Given  Japan's  resource  dependency, 
it  must  naturally  place  the  utmost 
priority  on  protection  of  markets  and 
sea  routes  for  its  oil  tankers,  access  to 
raw  materials  of  the  area,  and  opportu- 
nities for  new  investment.  That  Japan 


April  1979 

has  nearly  half  of  its  overseas  invest- 
ment in  the  Southeast  Asia  region  is 
testimony  to  Japan's  interest  in  and 
commitment  to  the  region. 

U.S.  interests  are  very  similar  to 
those  of  Japan.  We  seek  closer  cooper- 
ation with  the  nations  and  with 
Japanese  interests  in  several  areas,  in- 
cluding increased  investment,  more 
effective  economic  assistance,  energy 
resources,  development,  and  more  ex- 
changes in  the  scientific  and  cultural 
areas. 

We  firmly  believe  that  parallel  ef- 
forts by  the  United  States  and  Japan  in 
Southeast  Asia  will  contribute  to  the 
efforts  by  the  countries  of  the  area 
working  toward  their  own  development 
and  an  improvement  in  the  condition  of 
their  peoples. 

I  have  been  speaking  of  the  Japanese 
and  U.S.  relationship  to  the  nations  of 
ASEAN.  Here  the  general  progress  of 
these  countries,  their  true  independ- 
ence, and  their  concentration  on  their 
own  development  makes  possible  the 
kind  of  mutually  beneficial  cooperation 
we  each  seek. 

There  are  other  areas  where  this  is 
less  possible.  I  refer  to  the  Indochinese 
states. 

Indochina.  Japan  and  the  United 
States  share  common  concerns  over  the 
current  developments  in  these  states. 
The  continuation  of  conflict,  the  viola- 
tion of  the  territory  of  one  state  by 
another,  the  human  rights  deprivations 
in  Kampuchea,  and  the  clear  roles  of 
outside  powers  are  matters  which  have 
implications  for  the  peace  and  security 
of  the  whole  region. 

Japan  has,  over  the  past  years  since 
the  end  of  the  Indochinese  war,  been 
able  to  exercise  greater  flexibility  in  its 
approach,  particularly  to  Vietnam,  than 
we.  Japan,  for  example,  has  estab- 
lished diplomatic  relations  with  Hanoi, 
and  its  businessmen  have  been  demon- 
strating a  keen  interest  in  trade  and 
development  possibilities  of  all  three 
states. 

We  are.  of  course,  restricted  in  what 
we  can  do.  Talks  last  year  improved 
prospects  of  normalization  with  Viet- 
nam, but,  under  present  circumstances, 
we  do  not  anticipate  any  movement  on 
normalization.  We  had  no  dealings 
with  the  Pol  Pot  regime  in  Kampuchea, 
whose  human  rights  policies  we  con- 
sistently condemned.  There  seems  little 
prospect  now  for  any  U.S.  relationship 
with  Kampuchea  in  the  immediate  fu- 
ture. We  do  have,  however,  an  Em- 
bassy in  Laos  with  a  small  staff. 

Current  events  in  Indochina  have  an 
immediate  impact  on  the  states  of 
ASEAN  in  two  ways. 


The  aggressiveness  of  Vietnam, 
whatever  may  be  the  reasons  or 
animosities  in  which  the  current  con- 
flict is  based,  has  raised  the  concerns 
of  the  ASEAN  nations  over  the  longer 
range  ambitions  of  Hanoi.  These  con- 
cerns died  down  after  the  end  of  the 
Vietnam  war  and  indications  that 
Hanoi  was  turning  its  attention  to  its 
internal  reconstruction.  That  now  may 
seem  less  certain  to  the  nations  of 
ASEAN.  The  degree  of  concern  will 
undoubtedly  be  reflected  in  their  dis- 
cussions with  us,  as  well  as  with  the 
Japanese. 

Events  in  Indochina  have  also  re- 
sulted in  an  unprecedented  flow  of  ref- 
ugees southward  to  the  nations  of 
ASEAN.  Confronted  by  numbers  of 
refugees  far  beyond  what  they  might 
have  expected,  these  nations  have 
turned  to  the  United  States,  to  Japan, 
and  to  others  for  help.  Thailand  and 
Malaysia  are  particularly  affected. 

The  United  States  has  responded  by 
taking  substantial  numbers  of  refugees 
and  by  making  substantial  contribu- 
tions to  the  funds  of  the  U.N.  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR), 
who  is  charged  with  their  resettlement. 

Resettlement  of  Indochinese  refugees 
presents  a  much  more  difficult  problem 
for  crowded  Japan,  but  Japan  is  con- 
tributing financially  to  the  work  of  the 
High  Commissioner.  After  the  United 
States.  Japan  is  the  second  largest  con- 
tributor to  the  UNHCR. 

The  stability  of  these  countries 
neighboring  on  Vietnam  could  well  be 
affected  if  we  cannot,  through  cooper- 
ation with  many  nations,  find  ways  to 
relieve  them  of  this  tragic  human  bur- 
den. The  nations  of  the  area  face  the 
prospect  that,  conceivably,  as  many  as 
a  million  persons  could  leave  Vietnam 
and  other  Indochinese  states  in  the 
course  of  the  coming  months.  The  in- 
ternational community  has  a  serious 
obligation  to  find  ways  of  dealing  with 
such  possibilities. 

People's  Republic  of  China.  In  as- 
sessing the  relations  of  Japan  and  the 
United  States  with  Southeast  Asia,  one 
cannot  fail  to  mention  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  Its  potential  impact  on 
this  area  and  on  the  relationship  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States  to  the  re- 
gion can  only  be  stated  now  in  question 
form. 

China's  need  for  capital  and  technol- 
ogy today  are  as  great  as  those  of  the 
nations  of  Southeast  Asia.  Perhaps 
China,  too,  in  the  future  will  become  a 
major  element  in  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic futures  of  the  nations  of  the 
region. 

China  will  continue  to  follow  closely 


29 

and  to  demonstrate  an  interest  in  the 
Chinese  communities  in  each  country, 
although  the  present  regime  in  China 
has  firmly  supported  the  obligations  of 
the  overseas  Chinese  to  the  countries  in 
which  they  reside. 

The  availability  of  large  amounts  of 
Chinese  oil  for  markets  in  the 
Pacific — including  both  the  United 
States  and  Japan — could  have  an  im- 
pact on  Indonesian  petroleum  sales 
prospects.  But  this  is  not  regarded  as  a 
serious  problem  in  the  foreseeable  fu- 
ture. Chinese  may  also  come  to  com- 
pete with  ASEAN  and/or  Asians  for 
export  markets,  perhaps  in  textiles,  as 
well  as  in  seeking  sources  of  external 
financing. 

However,  our  general  presumption  is 
that  the  Chinese  will  continue  to  sup- 
port the  active  presence  of  both  Japan 
and  the  United  States  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  will  also  support  ASEAN.  They 
will  be  even  more  inclined  to  do  so  in 
view  of  our  own  recent  decision  to 
normalize  relations. 

The  picture  that  emerges,  there- 
fore, is  relatively  simple.  The  five  na- 
tions of  ASEAN,  moving  with  consid- 
erable success  to  enhance  their  de- 
velopment and  their  prosperity,  look  to 
the  United  States  and  Japan  as  signifi- 
cant partners  in  the  process.  They  look 
quietly  to  the  United  States  as  an  im- 
portant partner  in  their  security. 

Japan  and  the  United  States  recog- 
nize this  and,  in  parallel  ways — 
acknowledging  natural  nuances  of 
interest — seek  to  respond. 

All  share  a  concern  over  events  in 
Indochina  where  continued  warfare 
casts  a  shadow  over  hopes  for  a  com- 
pletely peaceful  Southeast  Asia. 

With  current  limited  influence  on  the 
policies  of  the  Indochina  states,  both 
Japan  and  the  United  States  can  only 
hope  that  these  nations  will  come  to 
realize  that  their  broad  interests  are  not 
served  by  prolonged  warfare,  opening 
the  possibilities  for  the  interplay  of 
outside  powers  as  well  as  the  post- 
ponement of  any  real  improvement  in 
the  lives  of  their  peoples. 

There  are  few  areas  in  the  world 
outside  Southeast  Asia  where  any  two 
major  countries  recognize  and  carry 
forward  parallel  common  interest  to  the 
same  extent.  Despite  differences  in  the 
area  of  bilateral  trade  policies  and  fu- 
ture growth,  here  is  an  area  where  the 
United  States  and  Japan  find  common 
ground.  We  believe  it  is  in  our  interest 
and  in  the  interest  of  the  nations  of  the 
area  that  we  continue  to  do  so.  D 


'For  material  on  this  ministerial  meeting,  see 
Bulletin  of  Sept.  1978,  p.  19. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  i 


ECO]\OMICS:  Americans  Stake 
in  the  World  Economy 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Remarks  before  the  Council  on 
Foreign  Diplomats  at  the  Department 
of  State  on  February  27,  1979. ' 

The  Executive  Council  on  Foreign 
Diplomats  has  made  an  important  con- 
tribution to  our  nation's  relations 
throughout  the  world  by  translating  an 
innovative  idea  into  a  valuable  pro- 
gram. By  assisting  foreign  diplomats  to 
expand  their  American  experience,  you 
are  enabling  them  to  realize  the  rich- 
ness of  our  culture,  the  diversity  of  our 
people,  and  the  workings  of  our  de- 
mocracy. 

Our  support  for  the  council's  pro- 
gram is  strong  and  enthusiastic.  I  want 
personally  to  express  my  appreciation 
to  all  of  you  for  this  most  important 
effort. 

I  want  to  talk  with  you  this  afternoon 
about  an  issue  of  great  importance  to 
our  future  —  America's  stake  in  a 
healthy,  outward-looking  economy, 
one  that  is  vigorously  engaged  in  trade 
and  investment  abroad. 

The  President  has  spoken  in  recent 
days  of  the  challenges  of  leadership  in 
a  world  undergoing  rapid  change. 
Much  of  this  change  is  the  product  of 
forces  with  which  our  nation  is  quite 
familiar:  the  determination  of  people 
around  the  world  to  live  better  lives; 
their  drive  to  participate  in  the  basic 
decisions  of  their  government;  and  the 
pushes  and  pulls  that  often  accompany 
modernization. 

No  nation — no  matter  how 
powerful — can  always  guarantee  that 
change  will  work  to  its  immediate  ad- 
vantage. But  our  strengths  as  a 
nation — and  our  ability  to  thrive  in  a 
world  of  change — are  unsurpassed. 

•  Our  military  power  is  strong  and 
flexible,  and  with  reasoned  increases  in 
our  defense  programs  and  sound  arms 
control  measures,  we  will  enhance  our 
security. 

•  Our  position  as  the  leader  in  the 
search  for  peaceful  resolution  of  con- 
flict is  unchallenged,  and  we  are  inten- 
sively engaged  in  efforts  around  the 
world  to  bring  peace  where  there  is 
now  strife. 

•  The  way  of  life  of  our  people,  and 
what  we  believe  in  as  a  nation,  con- 
tinue to  have  magnetic  appeal  around 
the  world. 

The  foundation  on  which  all  these 


rests  is  a  vigorous  and  healthy  national 
economy — one  which  continues  to 
provide  expanding  opportunity  for  our 
people  and  continues  to  serve  as  an  en- 
gine for  creative  change  around  the 
world. 

Increasingly,  the  health  of  our 
domestic  economy  depends  upon  the 
ability  of  our  private  sector  to  seize 
opportunities  for  expanding  commer- 
cial activity  in  a  healthy  world  econ- 
omy. 

•  One  out  of  every  eight  manufac- 
turing jobs  in  the  United  States  depends 
on  exports.  For  every  one  of  those 
jobs,  another  one — in  a  supporting 
industry — is  created. 

•  Exports  are  one  of  the  fastest 
growing  sectors  of  our  economy.  In  at 
least  42  States,  export  sales  of  man- 
ufactured goods  grew  faster  between 
1972  and  1976  than  domestic  sales. 

•  Every  third  acre  of  farmland  in  the 
United  States  produces  for  export. 

•  Today,  one  out  of  every  three 
dollars  of  U.S.  corporate  profits  is  de- 
rived from  international  activities. 

What  I  have  described  is  the  profile 
of  a  nation  whose  prosperity  depends 
upon  a  growing  world  economy  and  a 
healthy  trading  and  investment  climate. 

Let  me  take  a  few  moments  to  dis- 
cuss with  you  Administration  programs 
which  can  help  build  a  climate  for  sus- 
tained economic  growth  in  the  United 
States  and  abroad — our  efforts  to  fight 
inflation,  to  promote  U.S.  exports,  and 
to  strengthen  our  economic  assistance 
abroad. 

In  discussing  each,  I  particularly 
want  to  stress  three  basic  points. 

First,  strong  and  effective  anti- 
inflation  and  export  programs  are  es- 
sential not  only  to  our  domestic  pros- 
perity but  also  to  stable  growth  in  the 
world  economy  which  maximizes  trade 
and  investment  opportunities. 

Second,  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams serve  not  only  to  promote  a  more 
humane,  stable,  and  equitable  world, 
they  also  create  new  export  markets 
and  new  sources  of  global  growth. 

Third,  while  government  plays  an 
essential  role  in  the  advancement  of  our 
economic  objectives — be  they  domes- 
tic or  international — business  coopera- 
tion is  essential  to  fight  inflation  and  to 
seize  new  export  opportunities. 


Reducing  Inflation  , 

Reducing  inflation  is  our  top  eco- 
nomic priority.  It  became  clear  by  Oc- 
tober of  last  year  that  strong  measures 
were  necessary  to  prevent  sustained 
inflation  at  an  unacceptably  high  rate. 
Although  the  acceleration  of  inflation 
has  not  been  a  major  cause  of  our  trade 
deficit — continued  high  levels  of  oil 
imports  and  slow  growth  abroad  have 
been  largely  responsible — our  efforts 
to  reduce  that  deficit  and  to  maintain  a 
strong  dollar  are  unlikely  to  succeed 
unless  we  can  bring  inflation  under 
control. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  Adminis- 
tration's anti-inflation  program  does 
not  envision  putting  the  economy 
through  the  wringer  of  recession. 
Rather,  it  addresses  the  problem  of  in- 
flation through  a  comprehensive  pack- 
age of  mutually  reinforcing  measures 
designed  to  reduce  the  inflation  rate  by 
a  percentage  point  or  more  this  year, 
with  further  reductions  in  1980  and  be- 
yond. The  tight  budget  submitted  by 
the  President — which  actually  proposes 
a  net  reduction  in  existing  levels  of 
Federal  operations  and  personnel — and 
firm  and  careful  monetary  restraint  by 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  are  impor- 
tant aspects  of  this  program. 

If  we  tried  to  control  inflation 
through  fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
alone,  however,  we  would  increase  the 
risk  of  recession  with  little  prospect  for 
success  in  reducing  inflation.  Restraint 
on  the  part  of  labor  and  business  is  also 
necessary.  Thus  our  anti-inflation  pro- 
gram, as  you  know,  includes  a  standard 
of  7%  or  less  in  annual  increases  in 
wage  and  fringe  benefits  and  a  standard 
limiting  price  increases  this  year  to 
one-half  of  \%  below  the  average  rate 
in  1976  and  1977. 

I  believe  that  this  program  is  sensible 
and  fair.  The  Administration  is  com- 
mitted to  seeing  that  it  works.  The  rec- 
ord of  compliance  with  these  guidelines 
so  far  has  been  encouraging.  I  would 
note  that  we  may  well  have  to  ride  out 
some  bad  news,  such  as  the  recent 
large  increase  in  consumer  and 
wholesale  prices.  But  if  we  can  avoid  a 
major  crop  failure  or  a  sharp  increase 
in  the  price  of  imported  oil,  we  should 
see  moderation  in  the  U.S.  inflation 
rate  this  year. 


Promoting  Exports 

A  successful  anti-inflation  program 
will  also  help  us  to  maintain  the  en- 
hanced competitiveness  of  our  exports 
that  has  resulted  from  the  depreciation 
of  the  dollar  relative  to  the  Japanese 
yen  and  the  German  mark. 


April  1979 

Strong  export  growth  in  the  months 
and  years  ahead  is  essential  to  reducing 
our  large  trade  deficits  and  maintaining 
confidence  in  the  dollar.  This  will  re- 
quire substantial  and  sustained  effort 
both  by  business  and  government. 

The  President  has  made  clear  the  im- 
portance we  attach  to  export  stimula- 
tion by  undertaking  a  series  of  actions 
to  provide  greater  incentives  for  ex- 
ports and  to  reduce  disincentives  which 
now  exist. 

On  the  incentive  side,  our  national 
export  program  provides  additional 
funds  for  Export-Import  Bank  financ- 
ing. It  expands  programs  to  help  small 
businesses  expand  into  overseas  sales. 
The  Departments  of  State  and 
Commerce — despite  overall  net  reduc- 
tions in  budget  and  personnel — are  ex- 
panding their  programs  for  export  pro- 
motion, with  particular  emphasis  on 
small  and  medium-sized  firms. 

In  the  area  of  disincentives,  the  na- 
tional export  policy  will  reduce 
domestic  barriers  to  exports  by  creating 
a  more  sensible  regulatory  environment 
and  by  clarifying  some  of  the  am- 
biguities associated  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  certain  of  our  laws.  More  spe- 
cifically: 

•  All  agencies  will  weigh  more 
carefully  any  adverse  effect  that  major 
administrative  and  regulatory  actions 
would  have  on  exports; 

•  The  Department  of  State  and  other 
agencies  will  take  export  consequences 
fully  into  account  when  we  consider 
the  use  of  export  controls  for  foreign 
policy  purposes.  We  will  give  particu- 
lar attention  to  the  availability  of  the 
product  from  other  suppliers;  and 

•  Exporters  will  be  given  clearer 
guidelines  on  the  full  application  of 
U.S.  laws  relating  to  foreign  bribery, 
antitrust,  and  environmental  matters. 

There  will,  of  course,  be  times  when 
essential  security  and  foreign  policy 
interests  are  overriding — when  our 
military  security,  our  interest  in  halting 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
slowing  the  growth  of  increasingly 
dangerous  conventional  weapons,  our 
effort  to  fight  international  terrorism 
and  systematic  violations  of  basic 
human  rights  will  require  export  con- 
trols. These  cases,  however,  should  not 
obscure  our  broad  and  continuing  ef- 
forts to  pursue  also  our  national  interest 
in  expanding  exports. 

I  want  you  to  know  that  the  State 
Department's  Bureau  of  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs  is  at  your  service  if 
you  wish  to  pose  questions  about  the 
implementation  of  our  laws  in  this 
area. 

Complementing  our  domestic  efforts 


to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  our 
exports  are  our  efforts  in  the  multilat- 
eral trade  negotiations  to  increase  ex- 
port opportunities.  We  are  now  in  the 
final  stages  of  these  negotiations.  We 
expect  to  resolve  the  remaining  out- 
standing issues  by  this  spring. 

The  objective  of  these  negotiations  is 
to  reduce  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  to 
trade  and  to  strengthen  the  overall 
trading  system  by  improving  trading 
rules  and  by  developing  effective 
mechanisms  for  settling  disputes. 

The  nontariff  agreements  we  are 
negotiating  represent  the  first  major 
international  effort  since  the  creation  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  to  curb  these  trade- 
restricting  practices. 

Let  me  just  highlight  two  important 
pending  agreements.  First,  a  code  on 
subsidies  and  countervailing  duties 
would  impose  greater  international  dis- 
cipline over  trade-distorting  subsidies, 
define  more  clearly  a  country's  right  to 
take  counter  measures,  and,  we  hope, 
prevent  this  contentious  issue  from 
disrupting  relations  between  friendly 
governments  in  the  future.  Second,  a 
code  on  government  procurement 
would  open  up  as  much  as  $25  billion  a 
year  in  foreign  government  markets 
now  closed  to  U.S.  exports. 

By  reducing  trade  barriers  and  im- 
proving trading  rules,  these  agreements 
will  create  a  better  environment  for  ex- 
panding international  trade. 

Once  the  agreements  are  formally 
signed  in  Geneva,  they  will  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Congress  for  approval. 
With  the  support  of  the  Congress,  we 
can  move  toward  a  fairer  and  more 
open  trading  system  and  resist  a  retreat 
to  dangerous  and  self-defeating  protec- 
tionism. 


Strengthening  Economic  Assistance 

As  we  look  at  ways  to  improve  the 
performance  of  our  exports,  we  must 
recognize  that  the  developing  countries 
provide  our  fastest  growing  markets. 
Between  the  early  1970's  and  1977, 
sales  of  U.S.  goods  to  developing 
countries,  including  members  of  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries,  increased  by  an  average  of 
22%  per  year  compared  to  15%  for 
sales  to  developed  countries.  We  are 
finding  that  the  economic  performance 
of  the  developing  countries  is  an  in- 
creasingly important  factor  in  the 
health  of  our  own  economy  and  those 
of  the  other  industrial  countries. 

Our  foreign  assistance  programs  can 
make  a  modest  but  meaningful  contri- 
bution to  that  economic  performance. 
Furthermore,  policies  to  increase  pro- 


31 


ductive  investment  in  developing 
countries  not  only  increase  our  export 
opportunities  but  in  many  areas — such 
as  food,  energy,  and  raw  materials — 
also  reduce  rising  costs  for  these  criti- 
cal commodities. 

I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the 
primary  objective  of  our  foreign  assist- 
ance is  export  promotion.  We  seek  to 
help  nations  achieve  self-sustaining 
equitable  growth,  with  particular  em- 
phasis on  meeting  the  basic  needs  of 
poor  people.  We  are  committed  to 
helping  developing  countries  to  help 
themselves  —  to  build  their  national 
capabilities  for  development.  And  we 
seek  to  integrate  the  developing  coun- 
tries more  fully  and  actively  into  the 
economc  system. 

But  we  must  also  see  our  foreign  as- 
sistance program  not  only  as  an  in- 
vestment in  the  future  of  others  but  an 
investment  in  our  own  future  as  well. 

In  each  of  the  areas  I  have  men- 
tioned, sound  and  responsible  govern- 
ment policies  are  essential.  But  they 
are  not  sufficient  by  themselves.  There 
must  be  a  genuine  partnership  between 
the  private  and  public  sectors. 

Only  with  your  help  can  we  reverse 
the  momentum  of  inflation.  Govern- 
ment can  help  create  the  conditions  for 
growing  international  commerce  but 
only  dynamic  and  aggressive  busi- 
nesses can  seek  out  and  take  advantage 
of  export  opportunities.  Smaller  and 
medium-sized  firms,  in  particular,  can 
take  fuller  advantage  of  important  ex- 
port opportunities  that  now  exist.  And 
we  need  the  support  of  national  leaders 
like  yourselves  for  progressive  trade 
measures  and  sensible  foreign  assist- 
ance programs  which  will  serve  our 
national  interests. 

With  a  strong  and  growing  economy, 
with  a  firm  commitment  to  maintain 
our  military  strength  while  we  work  for 
a  more  peaceful  world,  and  with  the 
vitality  we  derive  from  our  free  insti- 
tutions, I  believe  we  can  face  the  future 
not  with  fear  but  with  confidence.      D 


'  Press  release  49. 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Economic  Report 
oi  the  President 


The  following  is  an  excerpt  from  the 
President' s  annual  message  to  the 
Congress  of  January  25,  1979,  trans- 
mitting the  "Economic  Report  of  the 
President  .  .  .  Together  With  the  An- 
nual Report  of  the  Council  of  Eco- 
nomic Advisers."  ' 


Developments  last  year  reminded  us  once 
again  of  the  interdependence  of  our  economy 
and  those  of  other  nations  around  the  world.  Our 
trading  partners  are  looking  at  our  ability  to  deal 
with  our  economic  problems  at  home  as  an  indi- 
cator of  the  strength  and  leadership  they  can 
expect  from  the  United  States.  We  will  not  dis- 
appoint them. 

Nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-eight  was  a 
year  of  significant  progress  in  the  world  econ- 
omy. Real  output  began  to  pick  up  in  industrial 
countries  other  than  the  United  States.  Important 
initiatives  in  the  international  arena  occurred  in 
trade  policy,  in  balance  of  payments  adjustment, 
and  in  financial  markets — all  influenced  by  the 
cooperation  shown  at  the  Bonn  Summit. 

Late  1978  and  early  1979  will  mark  the  cul- 
mination of  the  Tokyo  round  of  Multilateral 
Trade  Negotiations.  These  historic 
negotiations — which  began  in  1975  and  were 
intensified  in  1977 — should  lead  to  the  first 
comprehensive  overhaul  of  the  rules  of  interna- 
tional trade  since  the  1960s. 

The  need  for  a  revamping  of  the  trading  sys- 
tem is  clear.  Our  large  foreign  trade  deficit 
stems  in  part  from  a  loss  of  American  vitality  in 
world  markets.  But  it  has  also  resulted  from  the 
tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  of  our  trading 
partners.  Over  the  coming  years,  under  a  final 
multilateral  trade  agreement,  barriers  at  home 
and  abroad  will  be  reciprocally  dismantled. 

During  1979  I  will  be  working  closely  with 
the  Congress  to  adopt  the  final  multilateral  trade 
agreement,  along  with  implementing  legislation, 
that  will  foster  robust  export  growth  and  free  and 
fair  competition  in  world  trade  under  rules  that 
are  both  equitable  and  economically  sensible. 
These  measures  will  provide  a  framework  for 
trade  that  will  enhance  our  living  standards  in 
the  decade  to  come. 

In  recent  years,  the  United  States  has  had  a 
serious  balance  of  payments  deficit.  Our  imports 
surged  as  we  grew  rapidly  and  drew  heavily  on 
imported  oil.  Our  exports  lagged  because  of 
slow  economic  growth  abroad.  These  factors 
contributed  to  a  trade  deficit  rising  from  about 
$10  billion  in  1976  to  an  annual  rate  of  almost 
$45  billion  in  early  1978.  As  a  result  of  the 
sharp  increase  in  our  external  deficit  and  the 
acceleration  of  inflation  in  the  United  States,  the 
value  of  the  dollar  in  foreign  exchange  markets 
fell  substantially  last  year. 


We  have  taken  important  steps  to  correct  the 
deficit; 

•  In  late  1978,  Congress  enacted  the  National 
Energy  Act.  the  first  comprehensive  legislation 
for  dealing  with  our  energy  problems.  The  effect 
will  be  to  reduce  our  oil  imports  in  1985  by  2.5 
million  barrels  per  day. 

•  In  1978,  I  announced  the  first  phase  of  a 
National  Export  Policy.  By  setting  up  a 
framework  to  increase  support  for  exports  and 
reduce  disincentives  to  export,  we  can  begin  to 
increase  our  share  of  world  commerce.  Funda- 
mental improvement  in  our  trade  position  is 
critical  to  a  healthy  dollar. 

•  A  strong  and  effective  anti-intlation  pro- 
gram has  been  put  into  place.  An  integral  part  of 
that  program  consists  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  that  will  moderate  the  rate  of  economic 
expansion.  These  actions  will  help  reduce  our 
large  foreign  trade  deficit. 

These  policies  were  beginning  to  bear  fruit  by 
the  end  of  1978.  Exports  today  are  growing  more 
rapidly  than  the  domestic  economy.  The  mer- 
chandise trade  deficit  declined  from  a  $38- 
billion  annual  rate  in  the  first  half  of  last  year  to 
about  $32  billion  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year. 
Narrowing  of  the  deficit  should  continue  and  we 
foresee  a  marked  improvement  in  the  more  com- 
prehensive current  account  measure. 

Nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-eight  was  also 
a  year  of  unusual  instability  in  international  fi- 
nancial markets.  In  the  fall,  movements  in  the 
exchange  value  of  the  dollar  became  very  disor- 
derly, and  its  decline  became  clearly  excessive. 

On  November  1 .  I  announced  a  series  of  steps 
to  restore  order  to  the  foreign  exchange  markets 
and  to  correct  the  excessive  decline  of  the  dollar. 
Up  to  $30  billion  in  foreign  exchange  resources 
were  assembled  by  the  United  States,  to  be  used 
in  coordination  with  other  countries  utilizing 
their  own  resources,  to  protect  the  dollar's  value 
in  currency  markets.  Domestic  interest  rates 
were  raised  significantly  to  help  reduce  inflation 
and  strengthen  the  dollar  in  exchange  markets. 
And  the  United  States  underlined  its  commit- 
ment to  deal  with  its  inflation  problem  and 
strengthen  its  underlying  economic  position. 

These  actions  have  improved  the  tone  of  the 
exchange  markets  and  contributed  to  a  rise  in  the 
value  of  the  dollar.  More  importantly  for  the 
longer  term,  they  are  helping  to  create  more 
stable  conditions  in  the  exchange  markets,  in 
which  the  value  of  the  dollar  can  better  reflect 
the  fundamental  strength  of  the  U.S.  economy. 

Progress  also  was  made  in  1978  in  achieving 
closer  economic  cooperation  among  the  leading 
industrial  nations.  I  met  in  Bonn  with  the  leaders 
of  the  six  major  industrial  countries  to  discuss 
major  economic  problems  facing  us.  Out  of  this 
came   a   concerted   action    program   to   restore 


greater  balance  and  confidence  in  the  interna- 
tional economy  and  in  world  financial  markets. 
Together,  we  took  the  necessary  steps  to  achieve 
those  ends — the  United  States  committed  itself 
to  combat  inflation  and  reduce  oil  imports.  Ger- 
many and  Japan  to  mcrease  growth  and  reduce 
trade  surpluses,  others  to  take  measures  on  trade 
or  inflation.  Only  through  continued  economic 
cooperation  and  sound  policies  can  we  attain  the 
goal  of  full  employment  and  price  stability  that 
is  our  ultimate  objective. 


Jimmy  Carter  □ 


'For  full  text  of  the  message,  see  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Jan. 
29,  1979,  p.  110.  The  306-page  report  may  be 
purchased  for  $3.50  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC.  20402.  Remittance  must  ac- 
company order. 


Waiver  of 

Countervailing 

Duties 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JAN.  15 » 

I  am  today  transmitting  to  the  Congress  a 
proposal  for  legislation  to  extend  until  Sep- 
tember 30.  1979.  the  authority  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  under  Section  303(d)  of  the 
Tariff  Act  of  1930  to  waive  the  application  of 
countervailing  duties.  The  Secretary's  author- 
ity to  waive  the  imposition  of  countervailing 
duties  expired  on  January  2.  1979.  Expansion 
of  this  authority  is  essential  to  provide  the 
Congress  with  time  to  consider  the  results  of 
the  Tokyo  Round  of  Multilateral  Trade  Negoti- 
ations (MTN).  Failure  to  extend  this  authority 
is  likely  to  prevent  the  reaching  of  a  conclusion 
to  these  negotiations  and  could  set  back  our 
national  economic  interests.  Accordingly,  I 
urge  that  the  Congress  enact  the  necessary 
legislation  at  the  earliest  possible  date. 

As  stipulated  by  the  Congress  in  the  Trade 
Act  of  1974.  negotiation  of  a  satisfactory  code 
on  subsidies  and  countervailing  duties  has  been 
a  primary  U.S.  objective  in  the  Tokyo  Round. 
We  have  sought  an  agreement  to  improve  disci- 
pline on  the  use  of  subsidies  which  adversely 
affect  trade.  I  am  pleased  to  report  that  in 
recent  weeks  our  negotiators  have  substantially 
concluded  negotiations  for  a  satisfactory 
subsidy/countervailing  duty  code  which  in- 
cludes: (1)  new  rules  on  the  use  of  internal  and 
export  subsidies  which  substantially  increase 
protection  of  United  States  agricultural  and  in- 
dustrial trading  interests,  and  (2)  more  effec- 
tive provisions  on  notification,  consultation 
and  dispute   settlement   that   will   provide   for 


April  1979 


EUROPE:  F\  1980 

Assistance  Proposals  for 

the  Eastern  Mediterranean 


hy  Matthew  Nimetz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  February  28.  1979.  Mr.  Nimetz  is 
Counselor  of  the  Department  of  State. ' 

1  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  discuss  U.S.  relations  with  the 
countries  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
region  and  to  review  the  Administra- 
tion's security  assistance  proposals  for 
Greece,  Turkey,  and  Cyprus  for  fiscal 
year  1980. 

The  past  year  has  seen  a  number  of 
important  developments  in  our  bilateral 
relationships  with  the  countries  and 
within  the  region  itself.  Most  of  these 
developments  have  been  positive,  al- 
though the  major  problems  of  the  area 
remain  a  considerable  distance  from 
solution. 

The  goals  of  U.S.  policy  remain 
much  as  those  stated  by  Secretary 
Vance  when  he  appeared  before  the  full 
committee  almost  a  year  ago:  to 
strengthen  our  important  bilateral  re- 
lationships with  Greece  and  Turkey;  to 
strengthen  NATO's  southern  flank;  and 
to  help  in  the  search  for  a  solution  to 
the  Cyprus  problem. 

Since  Congress  authorized  the  Presi- 
dent to  lift  the  arms  embargo  on  Turkey 
we  have  sought  to  rebuild  our  relation- 
ships in  the  area  and  to  help  the  parties 
confront  the  fundamental  problems  of 


the  region.  Recent  developments  in 
Iran  and  Afghanistan  have  created  an 
area  of  instability  to  the  east  of  the  re- 
gion and  made  our  tasks  both  more 
difficult  and  more  urgent.  These  re- 
gional developments  spotlight  the  im- 
portance of  Greece  and  Turkey  in  the 
NATO  alliance  and  give  us  an  even 
greater  incentive  to  help  both  countries 
in  their  efforts  to  maintain  strong, 
vigorous,  pro-Western  democratic 
systems. 

In  dealing  with  the  region  in  the 
early  post  embargo  period,  we  have 
sought  to  follow  an  evenhanded  policy 
toward  Greece  and  Turkey  to  improve 
our  relationships  with  both  important 
NATO  allies.  We  have  also  actively 
sought,  in  the  months  since  the  lifting 
of  the  embargo,  to  facilitate  a  new 
round  of  intercommunal  negotiations 
on  Cyprus.  Such  a  patient,  steady,  and 
forward-looking  policy  in  the  region 
will  pay  great  dividends. 

The  Administration  recognizes  that 
the  International  Security  Assistance 
Act  of  1978  contains  an  important 
statement  of  the  principles  which  help 
guide  U.S.  policy  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  In  his  letter  transmit- 
ting the  security  assistance  authoriza- 
tion bill  for  fiscal  years  1980  and  1981 , 
Secretary  Vance,  on  behalf  of  the 
President,  has  made  the  certification 
required  by  Section  620(C)(d)  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  that  requests  for  security  as- 


timely  resolution  of  disputes  involving  trade 
subsidies  in  international  trade. 

My  Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negoti- 
ations has  informed  me  that  negotiations  on 
almost  all  MTN  topics  have  been  substantially 
concluded,  and  that  those  agreements  meet 
basic  U.S.  objectives.  However,  final  agree- 
ment is  unlikely  unless  the  waiver  authority  is 
extended  for  the  period  during  which  such 
agreements  and  their  implementing  legislation 
are  being  considered  by  the  Congress  under  the 
procedures  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974. 

Under  current  authority,  the  imposition  of 
countervailing  duties  may  be  waived  in  a  spe- 
cific case  only  if,  inter  alia,  "adequate  steps 
have  been  taken  to  eliminate  or  substantially 
reduce  the  adverse  effect"  of  the  subsidy  in 
question.  This  provision  and  the  other  lim- 
itations  on   the   use   of  the   waiver   authority 


which  are  currently  in  the  law  would  continue 
in  effect  if  the  waiver  authority  is  extended. 
Thus,  U.S.  producers  and  workers  will  con- 
tinue to  be  protected  from  the  adverse  effects  of 
subsidized  competition. 

A  successful  conclusion  to  the  MTN  is  es- 
sential to  our  national  interest,  as  well  as  the 
continued  growth  of  world  trade.  If  the  waiver 
authority  is  not  extended,  such  a  successful 
conclusion  will  be  placed  in  serious  jeopardy. 
Accordingly,  I  urge  the  Congress  to  act  posi- 
tively upon  this  legislative  proposal  at  the  ear- 
liest possible  date. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text   from   Weekly   Compilation   of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Jan.  22,  1979. 


33 


sistance  for  Greece  and  Turkey  are 
consistent  with  the  principles  set  forth 
in  the  act.  A  detailed  explanation  of  the 
certification  is  set  out  in  the  country 
program  documents,  but  I  will  address 
many  of  the  same  points  in  this  state- 
ment. 

Turkey 

The  lifting  of  the  embargo  by  Presi- 
dent Carter  on  September  26,  1978,  as 
authorized  by  the  Congress,  removed 
the  primary  impediment  to  improved 
U.S. -Turkish  relations.  On  October  9, 
1978,  the  Government  of  Turkey  au- 
thorized resumption  of  suspended  U.S. 
activities  at  military  installations  in 
Turkey  for  a  1-year  transitional  period 
while  a  permanent  agreement  is 
negotiated.  These  negotiations  formally 
commenced  on  January  18,  1979.  I  can 
inform  the  committee  that  our  facilities 
in  Turkey  are  now  fully  operational  and 
that  we  and  Turkish  military  authorities 
are  cooperating  well. 

As  part  of  our  effort  to  rebuild  and 
broaden  the  bilateral  relationship,  we 
have  had  a  number  of  useful  exchanges 
with  the  Government  of  Turkey.  Many 
of  you  will  recall  that  President  Carter 
and  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  had  good 
discussions  during  the  NATO  summit 
last  May.  More  recently,  the  visit  to 
Ankara  by  Deputy  Secretary  Christ- 
opher on  January  10-11,  1979,  pro- 
vided an  opportunity  to  review  with 
Prime  Minister  Ecevit  and  other  offi- 
cials the  whole  range  of  issues  which 
concern  Turkey  and  the  United  States. 
We  initialed  a  treaty  for  the  transfer  of 
prisoners  and  agreed  to  begin  negotia- 
tions on  an  extradition  and  judicial  as- 
sistance agreement  as  well. 

The  Government  of  Turkey  reiterated 
its  desire  for  a  just  and  lasting  settle- 
ment of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

I  would  also  note  in  passing  that 
during  the  recent  troubles  in  Iran,  the 
Government  of  Turkey  cooperated  in 
facilitating  evacuation  of  American 
citizens  from  Iran.  With  the  agreement 
of  the  Turkish  authorities,  helicopters 
and  C-130  aircraft  were  prepositioned 
at  Incirlik  Air  Base  in  contingency 
preparations  for  emergency  evacuation. 

The  most  important  problem  facing 
the  Government  of  Turkey  is  its  serious 
economic  situation.  Estimates  place  the 
current  account  deficit  at  over  $1.7 
billion  in  1978,  and  it  may  go  as  high 
as  $2  billion  in  1979.  Inflation  is  run- 
ning at  about  50%.  Unemployment  is 
estimated  at  15-20%,  and  industry  is 
only  working  at  about  half  its  capacity 
because  Turkey  cannot  pay  for  needed 
raw  material  and  component  imports. 

As  you  know,  this  problem  was  dis- 
cussed at  the  Guadeloupe  summit,  and 


34 


as  a  result  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  has  taken  the  lead  to  organize 
help  for  Turkey  on  an  emergency  basis. 
Several  friendly  countries  have  indi- 
cated a  willingness  to  help.  The  United 
States  is  participating  fully  in  this  ef- 
fort. 

Our  budget  request  for  Turkey  for  fis- 
cal year  1980  is  for  $200  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits 
and  $2  million  international  military 
education  and  training  (IMET)  for  a 
total  military  assistance  program  of 
$202  million.  We  are  also  requesting 
$98  million  in  economic  supporting  as- 
sistance to  assist  Turkey  with  its  criti- 
cal balance-of-payments  problem. 

The  proposed  1980  military  assist- 
ance program  will  help  assist  the  Tur- 
kish forces  to  meet  their  NATO  defense 
obligations.  Turkey  needs  continued 
military  assistance  to  conduct  an  or- 
derly program  of  force  modernization 
and  rationalization  to  meet  its  NATO 
defense  commitments.  There  is  also 
significant  need  for  support  equipment 
and  replenishment  of  spare  parts  in- 
ventories, which  have  been  seriously 
depleted  in  recent  years.  The  $200 
million  FMS  financing  program  will 
also  have  a  beneficial  impact  on  the 
supportability  of  current  equipment  and 
will  make  a  limited  contribution  to  the 
program  for  force  modernization. 

IMET  is  an  extremely  valuable  pro- 
gram. In  addition  to  providing  needed 
training  to  Turkish  personnel,  it  en- 
hances contacts  and  communication 
between  Turkish  and  U.S.  military  per- 
sonnel. 

Another  important  result  of  such 
programs  is  the  rebuilding  of  a  con- 
structive dialouge  between  the  officials 
responsible  for  foreign  and  defense 
policy  questions  in  our  two  nations, 
This  dialogue  had  all  but  stopped  dur- 
ing the  embargo  period.  Channels  of 
communication  are  now  being  reopened 
and  old  habits  of  cooperation  re- 
learned.  The  fruits  of  such  dialogue 
will  be  a  stronger  NATO  in  which 
U.S.,  Turkish,  and  other  allied  forces 
play  complementary  roles  and  in  which 
scarce  resources  are  more  wisely  used. 

Because  of  the  difficult  economic 
circumstances  which  I  mentioned,  we 
believe  it  is  extremely  important  for  the 
United  States,  in  conjunction  with 
others,  to  support  Turkey's  efforts  to 
strengthen  its  economy.  Economic  re- 
form measures  are  critical  to  the  solu- 
tion of  Turkey's  problems  and  to  assure 
that  assistance  is  well  used.  We  also 
believe  continuing  consultations  with 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  are 
important. 

Our  assistance,  along  with  that  from 
other  nations  as  well  as  from  private 
and  international  financial  institutions, 
will  help  provide  needed  resources  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


llih  Report 
on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JAN.  29,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  the  provision.s  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following  re- 
port on  progress  made  during  the  past  60  days 
toward  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated  solution 
of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

During  this  reporting  period,  further  inten- 
sive efforts  have  been  made  to  bring  the  two 
Cypriot  communities  back  to  the  negotiating 
table  for  serious  and  sustained  talks  under  the 
auspices  of  Secretary  General  Waldheim.  The 
substantive  suggestions  that  the  U.S.,  the  U.K. 
and  Canada  made  available  to  the  two  sides  and 
to  the  United  Nations  on  November  10  ap- 
peared to  have  stimulated  the  negotiating  proc- 
ess and  were  recognized  as  constructive  by  sig- 
nificant (although  not  all)  elements  in  Cyprus, 
Turkey  and  Greece.  In  the  context  of  recent 
developments — especially  the  new  atmosphere 
created  by  the  lifting  of  the  arms  embargo  on 
Turkey,  the  U.S.-Canadian-U,K.  suggestions, 
the  United  Nations  debates,  and  a  growing  in- 
ternational consensus  for  a  negotiated 
settlement — Secretary  General  Waldheim  sub- 
mitted to  the  two  Cypriot  parties  a  draft  United 
Nations  formula  for  the  resumption  of  negotia- 
tions. As  of  the  date  of  this  report,  it  appeared 
that  both  the  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots  were 
seriously  and  sympathetically  considering  the 
Secretary  General's  proposal. 

The  Government  of  Turkey  has  taken  a  con- 
structive attitude  towards  these  efforts  to  bring 
about  a  resumption  of  the  intercommunal  nego- 
ations.  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  has  publicly  af- 
firmed that  the  Turkish  Cypriots  are  prepared  to 
return  to  the  table,  and  he  has  indicated  that 
they  could  accept  the  suggestions  of  November 
10  as  an  aid  to  negotiation  if  the  Greek  Cyp- 
riots were  prepared  to  do  likewise.   During  a 


meeting  with  Deputy  Secretary  of  State  Chris- 
topher in  Ankara  on  January  II,  Mr.  Ecevit  em- 
phasized his  strong  interest  in  seeing  a  resump- 
tion of  the  intercommunal  talks  and  expressed 
the  hope  that  some  way  for  doing  this  could 
soon  be  found. 

At  the  time  of  my  last  report,  the  United  Na- 
tions Security  Council  was  meeting  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  Government  of  Cyprus  to  consider 
the  Cyprus  issue.  On  November  27.  the  Coun- 
cil adopted  a  resolution  by  consensus  that 
called  upon  the  two  Cypriot  parties  to  cooper- 
ate in  the  implementation  of  Security  Council 
resolutions  on  Cyprus  '"within  a  specific 
time-frame"  and  urged  that  intercommunal 
negotiations  be  resumed.  The  Secretary  Gen- 
eral was  asked  to  report  on  both  these  aspects 
by  May  30,  1979.  The  United  States  fully  sup- 
ports the  goals  of  this  resolution. 

This  Administration  warmly  welcomes  the 
initiatives  that  Secretary  General  Waldheim  has 
taken  and  is  continuing  to  take  to  bring  about 
sustained  and  productive  negotiations  on  Cyp- 
rus. We  have  been  encouraged  by  recent  de- 
velopments, and  hope  very  much  that  a  re- 
sumption of  the  talks  will  prove  possible  in  the 
near  future.  The  U.S.-Canadian-U.K.  sugges- 
tions of  November  10  have  served  a  useful  pur- 
pose in  generating  some  of  this  forward  move- 
ment and  in  stimulating  fresh  thinking  on  the 
substance  of  the  problem,  and  it  is  our  expec- 
tation that  they  will  be  actively  considered  in 
the  negotiations. 

A  copy  of  Secretary  General  Waldheim's 
comprehensive  report  of  December  I  to  the  Se- 
curity Council  on  the  United  Nations  operation 
in  Cyprus  is  attached. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  5.  1979. 


impetus  to  support  Turkey's  stabiliza- 
tion efforts.  While  the  proposed  eco- 
nomic assistance  is  not  dramatically 
large,  especially  when  compared  to 
Turkey's  immediate  balance-of- 
payments  needs,  we  believe  such  sup- 
port will  constitute  an  important  further 
step  in  helping  Turkey  deal  with  its 
economic  problems. 

We  intend  to  provide  our  economic 
assistance  on  terms  appropriate  to  Tur- 
key's present  circumstances  with  a  re- 
payment period  of  20  years,  including 
a  5-year  grace  period  and  an  interest 
rate  of  5%. 

The  total  FY  1980  U.S.  assistance 
program  is  designed  to  support  defense 
and  economic  measures  by  the  Turkish 


Government  which  will  strengthen 
NATO's  southern  flank  and  support 
democracy  in  a  long-time  ally.  The 
maintenance  of  Turkey  as  a  strong 
democratic  NATO  ally  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  is  obviously  important, 
not  only  in  itself  but  also  because  an 
improved  U.S. -Turkish  relationship,  as 
is  developing  in  the  post  embargo 
period,  can  contribute  over  time  to  re- 
gional harmony  and  to  other  U.S.  and 
Western  interests. 

Greece 

In  the  past  year,  our  relations  with 
Greece  continued  to  improve  steadily. 
They  are  characterized  by  maturity  and 


April  1979 

a  continuing,  positive  dialogue.  We 
support  firmly  Greek  democracy  and 
the  strengthening  of  Greece's  ties  with 
the  West. 

The  most  important  bilateral  consul- 
tations during  the  past  year  were  those 
between  the  President  and  Prime 
Minister  Karamanlis  in  May  and  more 
recently  a  visit  by  Deputy  Secretary 
Christopher  to  Athens  last  October.  1 
accompanied  the  Deputy  Secretary  and 
participated  in  his  discussions  with 
Prime  Minister  Karamanlis  and  other 
Greek  leaders.  The  Greek  leaders  ap- 
preciate our  efforts  to  facilitate  the  re- 
turn of  their  forces  to  the  integrated 
military  structure  of  NATO.  The  Greek 
Government  also  welcomed  and  en- 
couraged our  efforts  to  help  achieve  a 
just  Cyprus  settlement. 

We  continue  to  have  an  ongoing  and 
positive  defense  relationship  with 
Greece.  Our  facilities  in  Greece  con- 
tinue to  operate  with  the  full  coopera- 
tion of  the  Greek  authorities;  6th  Fleet 
ships  are  making  regular  calls  at  Greek 
ports,  and  we  have  had  an  exchange  of 
high-level  military  visits. 

We  have  also  sought  to  broaden  our 
relationship  to  include  more  collabora- 
tion in  cultural  affairs,  scientific  and 
technological  exchanges,  and  expanded 
economic  and  commercial  ties.  Agree- 
ments have  been  signed  between  the 
National  Science  Foundation  and  the 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  and 
their  Greek  counterpart  agencies.  At 
the  request  of  the  Government  of 
Greece,  we  are  now  examining  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  negotiation  of  an  agree- 
ment to  coordinate  and  expand  this 
type  of  cooperation.  We  believe  this  is 
especially  important  because  while  we 
have  had  a  multiplicity  of  contacts  and 
cooperation  with  Greece  in  many 
fields,  public  attention  has  tended  to 
focus  almost  exclusively  on  political 
and  security  issues. 

The  strength  of  Greece's  commit- 
ment to  democracy  since  1974  and  the 
strong  economic  growth  it  has  enjoyed 
have  given  the  country  a  new  confi- 
dence in  international  relations. 
Greece's  accession  to  the  European 
Community  will  strengthen  this  process 
as  will  Greek  reintegration  into 
NATO's  military  structure.  As  a 
iTiember  of  the  NATO  alliance,  we 
have  been  actively  involved  in  ongoing 
efforts  to  arrange  for  the  reintegration 
of  Greek  military  forces  into  NATO  on 
a  basis  satisfactory  to  Greece  and  the 
alliance. 

The  security  assistance  program  we 
are  proposing  for  fiscal  year  1980 
would  provide  $158  million  in  FMS 
credits  and  $1.8  million  in  IMET  for  a 
total  military  assistance  program  of 
$159.8  million. 


The  proposed  program  will  assist 
Greece  in  fulfilling  its  NATO  obliga- 
tions and  help  provide  for  Greece's 
self-defense.  The  program  also  is  a 
continuing  indication  of  U.S.  support 
for  a  democratic  Greece.  It  has  also 
been  formulated  with  a  view  to 
strengthening  the  southeastern  flank  of 
NATO  at  a  time  of  particular  concern 
in  that  region.  In  sum,  the  program  for 
Greece  will  be  fully  consistent  with  the 
principles  of  the  International  Security 
Act  of  1978  and  will  make  an  impor- 
tant contribution  to  the  defense  posture 
of  a  key  ally. 

Cyprus 

With  respect  to  Cyprus,  the  principal 
focus  of  our  policy  continues  to  be  the 
promotion  of  a  just  and  enduring  set- 
tlement that  will  enable  all  Cypriots  to 
live  in  peace  and  security  and  in  har- 
mony with  one  another.  This  objective 
was  embodied  in  the  Foreign  Assist- 
ance Act,  as  amended  by  the  Congress 
last  year. 

In  our  view,  the  most  effective 
means  of  achieving  a  mutually  satis- 
factory Cyprus  settlement  is  through 
direct  negotiations  between  the  two 
Cypriot  communities  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  U.N.  Secretary  General; 
hence,  the  thrust  of  our  efforts  over  the 
past  year  has  been  to  promote  progress 
by  assisting  the  Secretary  General  in 
bringing  about  a  resumption  of  these 
negotiations — which  have  been  sus- 
pended since  the  spring  of  1977 — on  a 
sound  and  sustained  basis. 

Unfortunately,  I  am  unable  at  this 
time  to  report  to  you  that  the  negotia- 
tions have  resumed.  The  reasons  for 
the  continued  impasse  are  complex;  no 
one  is  totally  blameless  nor  totally  re- 
sponsible. I  can  report,  however,  that 
the  United  States  has  been  actively  in- 
volved, that  there  has  been  some 
movement  in  the  right  direction  in  re- 
cent months,  and  that  our  efforts  are 
continuing. 

Last  September  I  undertook  an  ex- 
ploratory mission  to  Cyprus  in  order  to 
obtain  a  better  picture  of  the  attitudes 
of  both  sides.  I  met  at  some  length  with 
President  Kyprianou,  Foreign  Minister 
Rolandis,  and  President  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  Michaelides  on  the 
one  side  and  with  Turkish  Cypriot 
leader  Denktash  and  his  associates  on 
the  other.  I  came  away  not  only  with  a 
deeper  understanding  of  their  substan- 
tive positions  on  the  issues  but  also 
with  a  renewed  sense  that  both  parties 
were  prepared  to  resume  their  inter- 
rupted dialogue. 

For  this  to  occur,  we  concluded  that 
a  suitable  catalyst  would  be  required. 
In  October  we  had  the  opportunity  to 


35 

explore  the  views  of  both  sides  further 
when  President  Kyprianou  and  His  Ex- 
cellency Mr.  Denktash  visited  the 
United  States  in  connection  with  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly.  President 
Carter  met  with  President  Kyprianou, 
and  Secretary  Vance  met  with  both 
leaders. 

At  the  same  time,  Turkish  Prime 
Minister  Ecevit  made  clear  his  strong 
support  for  an  early  resumption  of  in- 
tercommunal  negotiations  and  indi- 
cated he  was  prepared  to  assist  in  this 
direction.  I  might  also  note  that  in  a 
speech  before  the  U.N.  General  As- 
.sembly  on  October  3,  Turkish  Foreign 
Minister  Okcun  reconfirmed  his  gov- 
ernment's commitment  to  withdrawing 
all  of  its  armed  forces  from  Cyprus, 
except  those  mutually  agreed  upon  by 
the  parties  concerned,  in  the  context  of 
a  final  settlement. 

Against  this  background,  and  in  an 
effort  to  supply  the  missing  catalyst, 
we  worked  with  the  British  and  Cana- 
dian Governments  to  prepare  a  series  of 
substantive  suggestions  for  com- 
promise formulations  on  the  principal 
issues  in  dispute.  These  were  submitted 
to  both  Cypriot  parties  and  to  the  U.N. 
Secretariat  on  November  10.  Our  in- 
tention in  taking  this  step  was  not,  in 
fact,  to  prescribe  a  comprehensive  so- 
lution to  the  Cyprus  problem;  rather, 
we  asked  that  the  Cypriot  parties  accept 
our  suggestions  as  a  basis  from  which 
direct  negotiations  could  be  conducted. 

These  substantive  suggestions  of 
ours  were — unfortunately,  I  believe 
— leaked  to  the  press  almost  as  soon  as 
we  had  put  them  forward,  which  gave 
them  excess  publicity  and  reduced  the 
scope  for  diplomatic  activity.  All  the 
same,  they  attracted  strong  and  diverse 
international  support  and  were  accepted 
for  their  constructive  nature  by 
significant — although  not  all — political 
elements  in  Cyprus.  Greece,  and  Tur- 
key. Nevertheless  it  became  evident 
before  long  that  both  Cypriot  parties 
were  reluctant  to  endorse  them  offi- 
cially. 

After  an  interval,  the  Greek  Cypriots 
informed  us  that  they  could  not  at  this 
time  accept  these  suggestions  as  a  basis 
for  talks.  Under  these  circumstances, 
and  so  as  not  to  lose  the  favorable 
momentum  that  had  developed.  Secre- 
tary General  Waldheim  moved  into  the 
forefront  of  the  effort  to  resume  the 
intercommunal  talks.  After  several 
meetings  with  Cypriot  Foreign  Minister 
Rolandis  in  mid-December,  the  U.N. 
Secretariat  drew  up  a  draft  negotiating 
agenda,  which  made  clear  reference  to 
our  November  10  suggestions,  and 
submitted  this  to  both  Cypriot  parties 
for  their  comments.  In  response,  the 
Turkish  Cypriots  presented  on  January 


36 


9  a  counterdraft  embodying  their 
views,  and  on  the  following  day  the 
Greek  Cypriots  indicated  that  they  ac- 
cepted the  initial  U.N.  draft  un- 
changed. 

For  the  past  6  weeks  the  U.N.  Sec- 
retariat has  been  attempting  to  revise 
and  update  its  original  draft  so  as  to 
achieve  a  mutually  acceptable  agenda. 
In  our  continuing  contacts  with  both 
sides,  we  have  urged  them  to  maintain 
a  flexible  attitude  and  to  respond  posi- 
tively and  imaginatively  to  the  ongoing 
U.N.  initiative. 

It  would  be  premature  for  me  at  this 
stage  to  assess  the  prospects  for  suc- 
cess or  failure  of  this  effort  to  resume 
intercommunal  talks  on  a  sound  and 
sustained  basis.  We  will  continue  to 
exert  our  best  efforts  in  support  of  the 
Secretary  General.  Both  sides,  we  be- 
lieve, would  welcome  meaningful 
negotiations;  both  express  unhappiness 
with  the  impasse.  There  is  a  general 
expectation  in  the  eastern  Mediterra- 
nean that  a  fresh  round  of  talks  will, 
indeed,  begin  soon. 

On  the  other  hand,  1  would  not  want 
to  underestimate  the  continuing  broad 
differences  between  the  two  parties  on 
matters  of  substance.  The  issues  they 
face  and  the  compromises  they  must 
make  will  be  politically  difficult  and 
even  painful  for  both  sides.  Neither  has 
shown  so  far  the  degree  of  under- 
standing, flexibility,  and  openness  to 
undertake  the  courageous  compromises 
that  will  be  needed  to  achieve  an  en- 
during solution.  We  continue  to  believe 
the  results  would  be  worth  the  risks. 
We  also  are  convinced  that  time  is  of 
the  essence;  it  is  important  that  negoti- 
ations resume  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
de  facto  division  of  Cyprus  must  not  be 
allowed  to  solidify  into  permanence; 
and  yet  another  opportunity  must  not 
be  lost. 

The  Administration  is  requesting  $2 
million  in  FY  1980  security  supporting 
assistance  (SSA)  funds  as  a  U.S.  con- 
tribution to  the  relief  and  rehabilitation 
of  displaced  persons  in  Cyprus.  These 
funds  would  be  made  available  to  both 
the  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriot  com- 
munities, as  in  the  past,  for  specific 
projects  in  such  fields  as  housing, 
health  care,  vocational  education,  and 
agricultural  development.  And  as  in 
past  years,  the  disbursement  would  be 
effected  through  the  intermediary  of 
the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees. Since  the  hostilities  in  1974,  the 
United  States  has  contributed  $102.5 
million  for  the  relief  of  displaced  per- 
sons. 

Symbolically,  we  believe  that  a  con- 
tinuation of  assistance  to  Cyprus'  dis- 
placed persons  will  constitute  tangible 
evidence  of  U.S.  interest  in  Cyprus  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


F\  1980  Assistance  Proposals 
for  Portugal  citiff  Spain 


by  George  S.  Vest 

Excerpted  from  a  statement  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee on  March  1.  1979.  Mr.  Vest  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  European 
Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  meet  with  you.  In  accord  with  your 
request,  I  will  use  this  occasion  to  out- 
line the  state  of  our  relations  with  Por- 
tugal and  Spain  and  to  review  the 
Administration's  proposed  security  as- 
sistance programs  for  those  nations  for 
FY  1980. 

Many  of  the  objectives  for  U.S. 
policy  in  these  countries  remain  con- 
stant. Those  goals  include  strengthen- 
ing our  important  bilateral  relation- 
ships, bolstering  the  security  of  the 
area,  and  supporting  the  development 
of  democracy. 

Portugal 

U.S.  relations  with  Portugal  have 
grown  steadily  stronger  since  Portugal 
established  a  democracy  and  ended  its 
colonial  wars  in  Africa.  The  United 
States  applauds  Portugal's  fuller  coop- 
eration with  Western  democracies  and 
international  affairs  —  as  shown  in 
Portugal's  negotiations  for  entry  into 
the  European  Economic  Community, 
its  emphasis  on  an  active  role  in 
NATO,  and  assumption  of  a  seat  on  the 
U.N.  Security  Council. 

During  this  last  year,  there  have 
been  several  high-level  bilateral  con- 
sultations. President  Carter  met  with 
President  Eanes  in  May    1978;  Secre- 


of  our  strong  commitment  to  promoting 
a  settlement  on  the  island.  As  Secretary 
Vance  noted  in  his  testimony  before 
the  full  committee  last  year,  we  are 
prepared  at  such  time  as  a  settlement  is 
achieved  to  consider  requesting  from 
the  Congress  additional  funds  to  assist 
both  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriot  com- 
munities in  making  necessary  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  social  readjust- 
ments. D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


tary  Vance  met  with  former  Foreign 
Minister  Correia  Gago  in  September; 
and  Admiral  Souto  Cruz,  Chief  of  the 
Portuguese  military  general  staff,  was 
received  by  high  Administration  offi- 
cials in  August. 

Both  the  United  States  and  Portugal 
have  expressed  their  willingness  to 
conclude  negotiations  on  U.S.  use  of 
Lajes  Air  Base  in  the  Azores.  We  ex- 
pect that  agreement  can  be  reached  in 
the  near  future  for  renewal  of  U.S. 
base  rights. 

In  Portugal  itself,  the  government  is 
demonstrating  a  willingness  to  grapple 
with  a  wide  range  of  thorny  economic, 
political,  and  social  issues.  The  reluc- 
tance of  the  democratic  parties  to  force 
early  national  elections  suggests  that 
the  present  government  stands  a  good 
chance  of  remaining  in  office  until 
constitutionally  mandated  elections  in 
1980. 

Portugal's  major  challenge  now  is  its 
economy.  Although  the  balance-of- 
payments  deficit  was  reduced  signifi- 
cantly in  1978,  that  improvement  was 
not  accompanied  by  a  resurgence  of  the 
economy  in  general.  Real  growth  in 
1978  was  only  about  2.7%;  present 
production  levels  have  fallen  below 
those  of  early  1978.  The  inflation  rate 
is  about  22%,  and  the  unemployment 
rate  is  approximately  13%. 

Serious  as  these  economic  problems 
are,  the  Portuguese  Government  is 
trying  to  address  them.  The  govern- 
ment generally  accepts  the  need  to  pur- 
sue the  International  Monetary  Fund's 
stabilization  program  in  order  to  reduce 
the  nation's  external  deficit  and  estab- 
lish a  sound  basis  for  sustained  eco- 
nomic development.  The  government 
has  also  announced  its  intention  to  pro- 
duce a  medium-term  plan. 

Overall  U.S.  policy  interests  in  Por- 
tugal revolve  around  the  consolidation 
of  fledgling  democratic  institutions, 
promotion  of  economic  recovery  and 
growth,  the  continued  professionaliza- 
tion  of  the  armed  forces,  and  provision 
of  an  increased  role  for  them  in  NATO. 
These  number  among  the  major  goals 
that  the  Portuguese  have  set  for  them- 
selves. We  are  pleased  and  encouraged 
by  the  progress  the  Portuguese  are 
making  in  achieving  them.  Our  pro- 
grams for  military  and  economic  assist- 
ance are  intended  primarily  to  support 
these  coincident  U.S.  interests  and 
Portuguese  objectives. 

For  FY    1980,   we  have  proposed 


April  1979 


37 


funding  lor  several  programs.  The  re- 
quests include:  $50  million  tor  security 
supporting  assistance  (SSA),  $40  mil- 
lion lor  PL-480.  $30  million  for  the 
military  assistance  program  (MAP), 
and  $2.2  million  for  international 
military  education  and  traininsz 
(IMET). 

We  did  not  request  economic  support 
funds  for  FY  1979.  The  $50  million 
SSA  program  for  FY  1980  would  sup- 
port Government  of  Portugal  efforts  to 
decrease  its  balance-of-payments  defi- 
cit: to  initiate  programs  to  address  the 
priority  needs  in  agriculture,  education, 
housing,  and  the  export  industries;  and 
to  develop  further  the  economic  infra- 
structure in  the  Azores. 

The  PL-480  Title  1  program  will  be 
continued  for  FY  1980  to  support  Gov- 
ernment of  Portugal  efforts  to  increase 
farm  productivity,  provide  production 
credit  for  small  farmers  and  coopera- 
tives, and  stimulate  small  agroindustry 
in  rural  areas. 

The  MAP  funds  will  enable  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Portugal  to  secure  addi- 
tional basic  items  for  its  NATO- 
designated  brigade  and  its  air  support 
and  to  continue  progress  in  the  mod- 
ernization of  the  armed  forces. 

The  IMET  program  will  provide  for 
professional  military  education  and 
some  equipment-oriented  training, 
mobile  training  teams,  and  training 
aids. 

Spain 

The  United  States  enjoys  a  close  re- 
lationship with  Spain.  Our  cooperation 
with  Spain  spans  political,  cultural, 
and  scientific  areas,  as  well  as  military 
matters.  It  serves  our  mutual  interest  in 
promoting  Western  security  and  demo- 
cratic values.  The  framework  for  our 
relationship  is  provided  by  the  Treaty 
of  Friendship  and  Cooperation  (1976). 
Its  successful  implementation  is  a 
major  goal  of  U.S.  policy  toward 
Spain.  In  addition  to  our  efforts  to 
maintain  a  strong  bilateral  relationship, 
we  support  Spanish  integration  with  the 
rest  of  Western  Europe  and  continuing 
Spanish  efforts  to  consolidate  democ- 
racy. 


Letter 
of  Credence 


On  March  1,  1979,  Knut  Hedemann 
presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Carter  as  the  newly  appointed  Ambas- 
sador from  Norway.  D 


Spain  has  made  tremendous  progress 
in  its  transition  to  democracy  over  the 
past  several  years.  A  democratic  con- 
stitution, approved  by  the  major 
Spanish  political  parties  and  endorsed 
by  national  referendum  last  December, 
entered  into  force  at  year's  end.  New 
national  elections  are  scheduled  for 
today.  March  I,  with  local  elections  to 
follow  next  month. 

Whatever  the  composition  of  Spain's 
next  government,  it  will  continue  to 
face  demanding  challenges.  Spain  has 
made  significant  progress  in  dealing 
with  its  economic  difficulties,  substan- 
tially lowering  inflation  from  26%  in 
1977  to  17%  in  1978,  apparently  re- 
gistering a  surplus  on  its  balance  of 
payments  after  several  years  of  large 
deficits  and  accumulating  record 
foreign  exchange  reserves  (about  $10 
billion).  But,  further  progress  is  needed 
and  difficult  economic  problems  await 
government  action. 

In  addition,  brutal  terrorist 
attacks — aimed  at  destabilizing  the 
democratic  process — continue,  and  is- 
sues of  regional  autonomy  and  basic 
governance  and  institutional  arrange- 
ments will  have  to  be  addressed. 

Our  support  for  Spain,  as  manifested 
by  the  Administration  and  the  Congress 
and  by  our  close  bilateral  relationship, 
is  of  assistance  to  the  Spanish  people 
and  their  representatives  in  their  en- 
deavors to  realize  the  democratic  ideals 
which  we  share.  The  demonstrated 
wisdom,  patience,  and  perseverance  of 
the  Spanish  people  in  pursuit  of  these 
ideals  gives  us  cause  for  optimism  that 
their  success  will  continue. 

U.S.  assistance  to  Spain  is  intended 
to  help  support  this  continuing  success. 
Our  security  assistance  request  for 
Spain  for  FY  1980  is  consistent  with 
the  terms  of  the  1976  Treaty  of 
Friendship  and  Cooperation,  which  was 
endorsed  by  both  Houses  of  Congress. 
The  treaty  stipulates  that  the  United 
States  shall  provide  to  Spain,  during 
each  of  the  treaty's  5  years,  $120  mil- 
lion in  guaranteed  FMS  [foreign  mili- 
tary sales]  loans,  $2  million  in  IMET, 
and  $7  million  in  SSA,  which  provides 
for  educational  and  cultural,  scientific 
and  technological  exchanges. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  is  ob- 
ligated to  furnish  to  Spain  under  the 
MAP  program  defense  articles  with  a 
value  of  $75  million  during  the  life  of 
the  treaty.  The  major  portion  of  our 
remaining  MAP  commitment  —  $41 
million — is  being  provided  to  Spain  in 
FY  1979  in  order  to  minimize  erosion 
of  purchasing  power  by  inflation  and  to 
maximize  the  benefits  to  Spain  of  this 
portion  of  our  assistance.  For  FY  1980, 
we  are  requesting  $3.8  million  in  MAP 
for  supply  operations  and  continuing 


procurement  programs.  Any  remaining 
MAP  obligations  under  the  treaty  will 
be  fuiniled  in  FY  1981. 

The  MAP,  IMET,  and  FMS  pro- 
grams for  Spain  provide  military 
equipment  and  training  to  support  and 
supplement  the  modernization  and  im- 
provement of  Spain's  equipment  and  to 
bring  Spanish  military  capabilities 
closer  to  NATO  standards.  The  types 
of  equipment  and  training  provided 
under  the  programs  are  consistent  with 
the  terms  of  the  1976  treaty.  Likely 
Spanish  purchases  in  FY  1980  under 
these  programs  include  air-to-air  mis- 
siles, communications  equipment, 
spare  parts,  armored  personnel  carriers, 
and  modern  antitank  weapons. 

The  SSA  funding  under  the  treaty 
supports  a  wide  range  of  educational, 
cultural,  and  scientific  exchanges  and 
projects,  including  projects  for  the 
Spanish  educational  system,  cultural 
.seminars,  research  on  water  resources, 
land  use,  solar  energy,  and  a  number  of 
other  cooperative  endeavors. 

The  point  of  U.S.  assistance  in 
Spain,  as  elsewhere  in  southern 
Europe,  is  similar:  We  provide  assist- 
ance for  the  sake  of  both  our  security 
and  the  security  of  the  recipients.  In  so 
doing,  we  help  strengthen  the  defense 
of  the  entire  transatlantic  community.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


Publications 


GPO  SALES 

Puhlicalions  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
slock  number  from  ihe  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Pri<^s 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Criminal  Investigations.  Agreement  with 
Spain.  TIAS  8725.  3  pp.  60^.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8725.) 

Express  Mail  Service.  Agreement  with  Bel- 
gium. TIAS  8796.  3  pp.  60«.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8796.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  North- 
ern Ireland,  modifying  the  agreement  of  July 
23,  1977.  TIA8  8811.  2  pp.  50*.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8811.)  □ 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST:        F¥  1980 
Assistance  Proposais 


by  Morris  Draper 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  February  26,  1979.  Mr.  Draper  is 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  in  sup- 
port of  the  Administration's  proposals 
for  economic  and  military  assistance 
programs  involving  four  important 
countries  in  the  Middle  East. 

As  stressed  in  earlier  testimony  to 
the  subcommittee,  the  Middle  East  re- 
gion is  in  a  period  of  increasingly  rapid 
growth,  change,  and  evolution.  The 
dynamics  in  this  situation  hold  many 
implications  and  lessons  for  the  con- 
duct of  our  foreign  policy.  The  United 
States  must  face  the  issue  of  how  we 
intend  to  respond  to  the  challenges 
posed  by  change.  Will  we  as  a  nation 
view  these  trends  and  developments  as 
unwelcome,  full  of  potential  crises  and 
danger,  and  shirk  opportunities  to  in- 
fluence events?  Or  will  we  view  the 
period  ahead  as  an  opportunity  to  assist 
and  encourage  positive  rather  than 
negative  trends  and  to  help  the  nations 
involved  emerge  with  increased  stabil- 
ity and  strength  and  with  a  lasting  and 
consistent  basis  for  solid  cooperation 
with  the  United  States? 

Our  assistance  programs  have  spe- 
cific goals  and  objectives  in  mind  tai- 


lored to  each  country.  The  underlying 
goal  common  to  all  our  programs  and 
policies  in  all  four  countries,  however, 
is  to  help  nurture  a  basic  relationship 
of  mutual  trust  and  confidence,  to  pro- 
mote trends  and  inclinations  to  look  to 
the  West,  and  to  reinforce  their  com- 
mitments to  find  peace  through  negoti- 
ation and  mediation  rather  than  through 
conflict  and  confrontation. 

There  are  critical  decisions  to  be 
made  with  regard  to  our  various  assist- 
ance programs  in  this  important  area  of 
the  world.  The  specific  questions  are: 

•  Whether  to  work  closely  with  the 
help  of  these  assistance  programs  with 
states  which  have  been  friendly  and 
cooperative,  which  value  their  associa- 
tion with  us,  and  which  have  contrib- 
uted to  the  achievement  of  important 
policy  goals  of  the  United  States;  or 

•  Whether  to  adopt  in  the  process 
some  negative  measures  which  might 
be  seen  as  either  punitive  or  as  a  signal 
of  disenchantment,  thereby  reducing 
our  ability  to  influence  future  de- 
velopments in  a  rapidly  changing  and 
dynamic  area. 

Three  of  the  countries  with  programs 
we  are  addressing  today — Jordan, 
Syria,  and  Lebanon — border  Israel.  A 
comprehensive  settlement  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  will  not  be  possi- 
ble in  the  absence  of  full  involvement 
by  these  three  countries.  We  thus  have 
strong  interest  in  the  directions  their 


Editor's  Note 

The  White  House  announced  on  March 
5,  1979,  that  President  Carter  had  ac- 
cepted invitations  from  Egyptian  President 
.Sadat  and  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin  to 
visit  Egypt  and  Israel  to  discuss  the  peace 
process,  regional  security,  and  bilateral  is- 
sues. President  Carter  departed  Wash- 
ington on  March  7  and  returned  March 
14. 

Following  a  meeting  with  President 
Sadat  at  Cairo  International  Airport  on 
March  13  en  route  from  Tel  Aviv  to  the 
United  States  President  Carter  an- 
nounced that  the  American  proposals  for 
resolving  the  remaining  issues  had  been 
accepted  by  the  two  sides. 

On  March  22  the  White  House  an- 
nounced that  President  Sadat  and  Prime 


Minister  Begin  had  accepted  President 
Carter's  invitation  to  sign  the  peace  treaty 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  at  the  White 
House  on  March  26. 

For  the  convenience  of  our  readers,  all 
material  relating  to  President  Carter's  trip 
and  the  treaty  signing  ceremony  will  be 
published  as  a  "package"  in  the  May  1979 
issue  of  the  Bulletin  including: 

•  President  Carter's  addresses  before 
the  Egyptian  and  Israeli  parliaments; 

•  Remarks  made  on  various  occasions 
during  his  visit  to  Egypt  and  Israel; 

•  Texts  of  the  treaty,  annexes,  agreed 
minutes,  and  maps; 

•  Remarks  made  by  the  three  leaders  at 
the  treaty  signing  ceremony. 


policies   will   take   over  the   period 
ahead. 

As  for  North  Yemen,  our  policy — 
and  thus  our  military  and  economic  as- 
sistance programs — reflects  our  inter- 
est in  enhancing  stability  in  another 
important  geographic  area,  close  to  the 
sealanes  which  carry  petroleum 
supplies  from  the  Persian  Gulf.  Our 
policy  reflects  our  interest  in  the  secu- 
rity and  integrity  of  the  Arabian  Penin- 
sula as  a  whole  and  our  desire  to 
encourage  cooperation  among  the  mod- 
erate regimes  of  the  peninsula,  while 
assuring  orderly  economic  and  social 
development. 

Lebanon 

Our  request  for  $32.5  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits  in 
FY  1980  would  clo.se  our  planned  $100 
million  program  aimed  at  helping  to 
rebuild  Lebanon's  national  army  fol- 
lowing its  disintegration  in  1976  during 
the  civil  conflict  there.  This  third 
tranche  in  FY  1980  would  follow  $25 
million  in  FMS  credits  in  FY  1977,  all 
of  which  have  been  used,  plus  $42.5 
million  made  available  in  FY  1979. 
This  three-tranche  approach  was  de- 
veloped after  close  consultations  with 
Congress. 

It  is  particularly  important  that  the 
United  States,  through  congressional 
endorsement  of  these  proposed  pro- 
grams, demonstrate  the  depth  of  our 
commitment  to  the  restoration  of  sta- 
bility in  Lebanon.  Our  programs  can 
impart  momentum,  not  only  for  the 
crucial  rebuilding  of  a  new  national 
army  but  also  for  the  strengthening  of 
other  national  institutions  needed  to 
enhance  security  for  all  of  Lebanon's 
communities  and  to  provide  direction 
and  leadership. 

The  tensions  and  problems  which 
befell  Lebanon  in  1978  seriously  de- 
layed progress  toward  achievement  of 
these  objectives.  But  renewed  efforts  at 
progress  in  the  last  part  of  1978  and  at 
the  moment  deserve  our  support.  Some 
Lebanese  army  elements  have  now 
been  moved  into  the  volatile  southern 
Lebanese  region  to  work  closely  with 
the  U.N.  peacekeeping  force  in  carry- 
ing out  the  U.N.  mandate  to  reestablish 
Lebanese  governmental  authority  in 
that  area. 

We  are  hopeful  that  more  Lebanese 
army  and  security  units  can  take  over 
security  duties  in  the  capital,  which  has 
been  the  scene  of  many  serious  con- 
frontations between  the  Arab  deterrent 
force  and  independent  groups. 

The  Lebanese  Parliament  currently  is 
debating  new  legislation  to  reform  the 
army  structure  in  order  to  encourage, 
among  other  things,  greater  involve- 


April  1979 

merit  by  Muslim  officers  in  the  army 
command  structure.  This  legislation 
should  mark  a  major  turning  point  in 
the  Lebanese  Government's  effort  to 
develop  a  true  national  consensus  on 
the  direction  the  new  Lebanon  will  take 
in  the  future. 

We  are  also  requesting  for  FY  1980 
the  sum  of  $500,000  to  provide  train- 
ing in  the  United  States  for  Lebanese 
officers. 

Members  of  the  subcommittee  may 
wonder  why  the  Administration  is  not 
requesting  economic  assistance  to  deal 
with  the  humanitarian  problems  in 
Lebanon. 

The  United  States  has  already  pro- 
vided more  than  $100  million  in  assist- 
ance since  1975.  and  all  has  been  de- 
voted to  meeting  the  most  pressing 
human  needs  in  the  areas  of  medicine, 
public  health,  housing,  and  disaster  re- 
lief. Some  money  is  still  in  the 
pipeline,  and  some  has  been  repro- 
grammed  to  meet  special  and  urgent 
needs  occasioned  by  the  flight  of  dis- 
placed people  from  areas  of  fighting, 
most  notably  in  southern  Lebanon.  We 
have  made  it  clear,  at  the  same  time, 
that  we  are  open-mined  as  regards  new 
assistance,  and  we  await  with  interest 
the  Lebanese  Government's  presenta- 
tion of  a  comprehensive  reconstruction 
plan,  which  we  expect  will  be  sub- 
mitted to  various  international  donors 
and  institutions. 


In  our  allocation  of  our  resources, 
we  at  present  attach  priority  to  military 
credit  assistance  in  the  hope  that  it  will 
contribute  to  the  resolution  of  basic 
problems  of  insecurity  and  tension  as 
Lebanon  asserts  greater  authority. 
Progress  in  these  areas  could  promote 
movement  toward  a  final  political  con- 
sensus and  economic  reconstruction. 
Our  basic  policy  toward  Lebanon  re- 
mains that  of  supporting  the  independ- 
ence, sovereignty,  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  Lebanon;  its  national  unity; 
and  the  cohesion  of  its  peoples. 

Jordan 

We  are  proposing  for  FY  1980  a  sub- 
stantial program  of  economic  and 
military  assistance  to  Jordan.  The  total 
level  of  U.S.  assistance  for  the  coun- 
try, however,  is  somewhat  lower  than 
the  levels  of  the  past  few  years.  The 
proposals  consist  of  $30  million  in 
grant  military  assistance,  $70  million 
in  FMS  credits,  $60  million  in  eco- 
nomic assistance,  plus  a  specific  allot- 
ment of  $38  million  for  the  Maqarin 
Dam. 

As  Mr.  Saunders  [Harold  H.  Saun- 
ders, Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs]  made 
clear  in  his  testimony  to  this  subcom- 
mittee a  few  weeks  ago,  our  proposed 
assistance  programs  for  the  Middle 
East  are  intended  to  advance  movement 


Egyptian^  Israeli^  and  U^S, 
Officials  Meet  at  Camp  David 


Delegations  headed  by  Egyptian 
Prime  Minister  Mustafa  Klialil.  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  Moshe  Dayan,  and 
Secretary  Vance  met  at  Camp  David 
February  21-25.  1979.  Following  is  a 
statement  President  Carter  made  on 
February  25. ' 

I  have  a  statement  to  read,  which  has 
been  drafted  jointly  by  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Egypt  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Israel,  and  it  is  expressed 
from  my  own  point  of  view. 

During  the  past  week,  I,  as  Presi- 
dent, have  kept  in  close  touch  with  the 
negotiations  at  Camp  David,  and  Sec- 
retary Vance,  Prime  Minister  Khalil, 
and  Foreign  Minister  Dayan  have  now 
given  me  a  firsthand  report  on  their 
talks. 

In  light  of  the  developments  in  the 
talks  at  Camp  David  this  past  week,  we 
are  discussing  with  the  two  govern- 
ments the  possibility  of  moving  these 


negotiations  to  the  head-of-government 
level  later  this  week.  Prime  Minister 
Begin  would  then  represent  Israel,  and 
Prime  Minister  Khalil,  who  has  been 
authorized  by  President  Sadat  to  con- 
clude the  negotiations  on  behalf  of 
Egypt,  would  represent  Egypt. 

I  would  be  going  to  Camp  David 
with  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  Prime 
Minister  Khalil,  accompanied  by  Sec- 
retary Vance.  Prime  Minister  Khalil  is 
leaving  this  afternoon  for  Cairo  for 
consultations.  Foreign  Minister  Dayan 
is  returning  to  Israel  this  evening  to  re- 
port to  the  Prime  Minister  and  to  the 
Cabinet. 

I  am  prepared  to  spare  no  effon  in 
achieving  the  peace  settlement  foreseen 
in  the  Camp  David  accords  reached  last 
year.  The  other  two  partners  in  these 
negotiations  share  this  determination.  D 

'Made  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White  House 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  5,  1979). 


39 


toward  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  but  they  also 
go  beyond  this  to  aim  at  reinforcing 
and  expanding  the  kind  of  relationship 
the  United  States  wants  with  the  people 
of  the  Middle  East.  Our  goal  is  to  build 
a  relationship  which  will  endure 
through  political  ups  and  downs,  pro- 
viding the  basis  for  lasting  cooperation 
as  we  pursue  our  interests  and  they 
strengthen  their  national  independence. 

Jordan — its  leadership,  its  continued 
economic  and  social  development,  its 
stability,  and  its  ability  to  defend 
itself — is  of  high  importance  to  the 
United  States.  We  have  assisted  Jordan 
in  resolving  what  was  considered  at  the 
beginning  of  our  close  association  as 
almost  insurmountable  economic 
problems.  Throughout  our  association 
with  Jordan,  moreover,  many  chal- 
lenges to  the  stability  of  the  regime  in 
Amman  have  been  met,  again  with  our 
help  in  some  cases.  Economic  and  so- 
cial advancement  in  Jordan  constitute  a 
major  success  story.  We  can  now  pre- 
dict that  Jordan  can  become  econom- 
ically self-reliant,  a  prospect  that  only 
a  few  years  ago  seemed  an  impossible 
dream.  Jordanians  have  embraced 
American  technology,  concepts,  and 
education  with  enthusiasm. 

With  relatively  few  exceptions,  Jor- 
dan has  pursued  a  course  of  moderation 
and  restraint  through  the  years  and  has 
held  in  high  value  its  relationship  with 
the  United  States,  even  when  Jordan's 
leaders  were  viciously  attacked  by 
others  in  the  Arab  world  for  their 
policies.  We  in  turn  appreciate  the 
benefits  our  strong  relationship  with 
Jordan  has  brought  the  world,  and  we 
want  to  continue  building  on  the  firm 
foundation  already  established. 

Members  of  the  subcommittee  may 
wonder  why  we  are  proposing  this  sub- 
stantial program  for  Jordan  when  Jor- 
dan may  be  receiving  a  reported  $1.25 
billion  in  annual  subsidies  as  a  result  of 
decisions  at  the  Baghdad  summit  last 
year.  We  believe  we  must  bear  in  mind 
the  lessons  of  the  past,  when  foreign 
assistance  contributors  to  Jordan  post- 
poned, cut,  or  eliminated  their  prom- 
ised subsidies  as  a  form  of  political 
pressure  or  intimidation,  often  in  part 
because  of  Jordan's  readiness  to  coop- 
erate with  the  United  States  in  moder- 
ate policies.  Our  programs  in  those 
days  allowed  and  encouraged  Jordan  to 
pursue  an  independent  policy.  We  be- 
lieve the  same  considerations  apply 
today,  even  in  the  highly  unlikely  event 
that  all  the  subsidies  promised  at 
Baghdad  materialize  in  a  timely  and 
regular  way. 

It  has  been  disappointing  to  some 
Members  of  Congress  and  to  many 
other  Americans  that  Jordan  has  elected 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


not  to  join  the  negotiations  outlined  in 
the  Camp  David  frameworks.  At  the 
same  time,  Jordan  remains  fully  com- 
mitted to  a  comprehensive  settlement 
negotiated  in  accord  with  Security 
Council  Resolution  242.  While  Jordan 
has  been  critical  of  the  Camp  David 
framework  strategy  for  not  setting  forth 
in  adequate  clarity  the  final  arrange- 
ments which  would  emerge  at  the  end 
of  the  negotiating  process,  we  are  con- 
vinced that  Jordan  will  remain  funda- 
mentally open-minded,  will  observe  the 
progress  achieved  and  new  avenues 
opened  as  negotiations  proceed,  and 
will  be  ready  to  seize  opportunities 
which  it  finds  promising. 

It  is  important  to  note  in  this  con- 
nection that  Jordan  has  made  clear  that 
it  would  pose  no  objections  if  Palesti- 
nians in  the  occupied  territories  de- 
cided to  involve  themselves  more  di- 
rectly in  negotiations  concerning  the 
West  Bank-Gaza  and  the  Palestinian 
issue. 

It  is  in  our  interest  to  remain  consist- 
ent, credible,  and  understanding  in  our 
relationship  with  this  important  country 
located  in  a  turbulent  region  of  the 
world.  It  is  in  our  interest  to  demon- 
strate— not  only  in  Jordan  but  in  the 
wider  Middle  East  region — that  our 
friendships  are  consistent  and  that  we 
are  capable,  as  a  government,  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  our  common  inter- 
ests and  goals  and  our  short-run  dis- 
agreements over  how  best  to  attain 
them. 

Syria 

We  presented  a  request  for  $60  mil- 
lion in  economic  assistance  for  Syria, 
compared  to  $90  million  in  the  last  fis- 
cal year.  Syria  is  a  key  country  in  the 
Middle  East,  with  a  capacity  to  influ- 
ence events  far  beyond  its  borders.  Our 
assistance  program  in  Syria  has  been 
welcomed  by  the  Syrians.  It  is  viewed 
as  an  earnest  of  our  confidence  in  Syr- 
ian willingness  to  negotiate  a  com- 
prehensive settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict.  Syria's  commitment  to 
such  a  comprehensive  peace,  based  on 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338.  remains  an  essential  feature  of  its 
foreign  policy. 

Members  of  this  subcommittee  are 
aware  that  Syria  has  been  sharply  criti- 
cal of  President  Sadat  and  his  strategy 
in  moving  toward  Middle  East  peace. 
Syrian  leaders  believe  that  President 
Sadat  has  split  the  Arab  world  and,  in 
so  doing,  has  lessened  the  possibilities 
that  a  just  peace  will  be  realized  which 
satisfies  all  of  the  Arab  world's  con- 
cerns and  interests,  including  those  of 
the  Palestinians. 

While  we  disagree  with  the  Syrian 


VistI  of  israeU 
Printe  Ifiinister  Begin 


Prime  Minister  Memihern  Begin  of 
Israel  made  an  official  visit  to  the 
United  States  March  1-7,  1979.  While 
in  Washington  March  l^,  he  met  with 
President  Carter  and  other  government 
officials.  The  following  White  House 
statement  was  issued  on  March  4 . ' 

Over  the  past  4  days,  the  President 
and  the  Prime  Minister,  together  with 
their  advisers,  have  had  8  hours  of  in- 
tensive conversations.  In  a  friendly, 
straightforward  manner  the  two  sides 
discussed  the  strategic  situation  in  the 
Middle  East  and.  in  great  depth,  all  the 
unresolved  issues  in  the  negotiations. 

During  the  course  of  today's  meet- 
ings. President  Carter  put  forward 
suggestions  designed  to  help  resolve 
some  of  the  outstanding  differences 
between  Egypt  and  Israel.  Prime 
Minister  Begin  stated  that  he  would 
seriously  study  these  suggestions  and 
consult  with  his  colleagues. 

In  the  meantime.  President  Carter 
will  be  in  touch  with  President  Sadat  to 
review  the  situation  in  light  of  the 
American-Israeli  discussions  over  the 
past  few  days.  □ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  12.  1979. 


assessment,  we  remain  confident  that 
the  Syrians  are  sincere  in  their  willing- 
ness to  negotiate  a  comprehensive 
peace  with  Israel.  Committed  to  the 
principle  of  a  negotiated  peace.  Syria 
has  refused  to  accept  the  harsh  "rejec- 
tionist"  position  asserted  by  others  in 
the  Arab  world,  "rejecting"  both  a 
negotiated  peace  and  peace  of  any  kind 
with  Israel. 

Almost  equally  important.  Syrian 
actions  and  Syrian  policies  have  a 
greater  effect  on  the  future  destiny  of 
Lebanon  and  on  the  direction  of  Pales- 
tinian behavior  there  than  any  other 
outside  government.  It  is  important, 
therefore,  that  the  United  States  con- 
tinue to  promote  a  growing  relationship 
of  trust  and  confidence  with  Syria  to 
help  encourage  Syria  in  policies  that 
will  parallel  our  own  with  regard  to 
Lebanon.  The  Syrian  role  in  Lebanon  is 
still  indispensable  in  preventing  an 
all-out  renewal  of  civil  conflict  be- 
tween the  various  communities  and 
groupings  in  that  country. 

While  we  shared  with  the  Congress 
serious  disagreement  with  Syria  over 


some  actions  during  the  series  of  con- 
frontations last  year  in  the  Beirut  area, 
it  remains  a  fact  that  cautious  and  pru- 
dent Syrian  actions  have — on  more 
than  one  occasion  in  the  last  year — 
prevented  an  outbreak  of  wider  hos- 
tilities in  the  area,  e.g.,  during  Israeli 
military  movement  into  southern  Leba- 
non last  March,  at  a  time  when  30.000 
or  more  Syrian  troops  were  carrying 
out  their  responsibilities  only  a  short 
distance  to  the  north. 

Our  economic  assistance  program  in 
Syria  has  been  an  important  element  of 
the  expanding  relationship  between  our 
two  countries.  The  top  Syrian  lead- 
ership has  sought  an  expanded  relation- 
ship and  has  taken  the  initiative  in 
many  respects  to  see  that  it  has  grown. 
Just  last  week,  our  two  governments 
signed  the  cultural  agreement  which  the 
Syrians  originally  proposed.  President 
Asad  personally  has  directed  that  a 
major  new  program  of  postgraduate 
training  for  Syrian  students  be  con- 
ducted in  the  United  States.  Partly 
under  the  auspices  of  our  economic  as- 
sistance program,  educators,  engineers, 
technicians,  and  scholars  have  been 
visiting  the  United  States  in  increasing 
numbers.  Our  English  language  train- 
ing program  has  been  enthusiastically 
received,  and  English  training  centers 
are  springing  up  around  the  country  as 
offspring  of  our  model  centers.  Last 
year,  a  major  delegation  of  the  Ba'ath 
political  party  visited  the  United  States 
for  the  first  time  in  that  party's  history 
to  meet  with  American  politicians, 
primarily  at  the  municipal,  county,  and 
state  levels. 

Just  as  cultural,  educational,  and 
political  relations  have  improved,  the 
trends  in  Syrian  trade  and  commerce 
have  dramatically  shown  an  increasing 
shift  over  the  past  few  years  to  the 
West,  including  the  United  States. 
More  and  more  Syrians  are  seeing  that, 
in  a  period  of  evolution  and  transition 
in  the  Middle  East,  Syria  need  not  look 
exclusively  to  a  single  source  for  un- 
derstanding or  support  as  it  seeks  to 
pursue  an  independent  policy.  Al- 
though we  cannot  predict  when  the 
winds  of  change  in  the  Middle  East  will 
be  stilled  or  what  political  and  eco- 
nomic shifts  will  result,  we  foresee 
major  shifts  taking  place  and  wish  to 
participate  in  shaping  the  direction  of 
change. 

Our  policy  toward  Syria  and  the  pro- 
grams that  are  instruments  of  this  pol- 
icy are  aimed  at  the  long  view.  We 
must  keep  disappointments  or  differ- 
ences in  proper  perspective  lest  they 
interfere  with  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  in  developing  mutually 
beneficial  ties  since  our  resumption  of 
diplomatic  relations  some  5  years  ago. 


April  1979 


41 


We  want  a  relationship  with  Syria 
which  will  encourage  that  key  country 
to  view  us  with  a  sense  of  confidence 
and  to  look  to  us  as  a  source  of  tech- 
nology, education,  and  opportunity  for 
its  people.  We  want  a  relationship 
which  continues  to  offer  positive  bene- 
fits to  both  countries  on  a  broad  range 
of  interests,  so  that  our  views  on  issues 
of  special  concern  to  us  can  be  ex- 
pressed within  this  context  of  shared 
interests.  The  assistance  program  con- 
tributes an  important  dimension  to  this 
type  of  relationship. 

Yemen 

Our  overall  policy  toward  North 
Yemen  reflects  our  concern  for  the  se- 
curity and  integrity  of  the  Arabian 
Peninsula  and  our  desire  to  encourage 
cooperation  among  the  moderate  penin- 
sula states,  to  assure  security  and  or- 
derly development  of  the  region,  and  to 
develop  a  strong  bilateral  relationship 
with  North  Yemen. 


\cmen 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  28,  1979' 

We  have  been  concerned  by  the  re- 
cent hostilities  along  the  border  be- 
tween North  and  South  Yemen  and  the 
indications  that  forces  from  South 
Yemen  have  entered  North  Yemen's 
territory  and  occupied  some  positions 
in  North  Yemen. 

Our  national  interest  in  the  security 
and  national  integrity  in  the  Arabian 
Peninsula  is  clear. 

In  response  to  requests  by  the  Yemen 
Arab  Republic  Government  [North 
Yemen],  we  will  be  accelerating  the 
delivery  of  defensive  arms  previously 
agreed  for  that  country. 

In  addition,  we  have  been  working  in 
cooperation  with  other  governments  in 
the  Arabian  Peninsula  to  relieve  ten- 
sions and  to  strengthen  elements  of  sta- 
bility in  this  long  troubled  part  of  the 
peninsula. 

In  this  connection,  we  support  the 
Saudi  Arabian  appeal  to  end  the  fight- 
ing. It  is  in  the  interests  of  the  interna- 
tional community  that  hostilities  in  this 
area  cease,  that  occupying  forces  with- 
draw, and  that  all  parties  involved  sup- 
port the  principle  of  nonaggression.    D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


North  Yemen,  an  extremely  poor 
country,  is  still  recovering  politically 
and  economically  from  the  long  civil 
war  of  the  last  decade.  For  much  of  the 
time  since  then,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
been  North  Yemen's  principal  source 
of  assistance,  including  military 
equipment  and  training.  Governments 
in  North  Yemen  in  recent  years,  how- 
ever, have  been  turning  toward  the 
West  politically  and  economically  and 
have  shown  a  corresponding  desire  for 
Western  defense  assistance. 

I  would  like  to  stress  that  our  re- 
lationship with  North  Yemen  combines 
our  concern  for  its  development  with  a 
response  to  Yemeni  security  concerns. 
The  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment has  been  involved  in 
Yemen's  development  since  the  early 
I970's.  Our  program  there  is  keyed  to 
assisting  the  rural  poor  in  better  meet- 
ing their  basic  human  needs  through 
education,  water  projects,  and  nutri- 
tional care.  We  have  an  active  and 
large  Peace  Corps  program. 

U.S.  companies  are  increasingly 
aware  of  the  investment  possibilities  in 
North  Yemen  and  are  beginning  to  play 
a  larger  role  in  capital  development 
projects  that  will  lay  the  foundation  for 
the  development  of  industries  neces- 
sary for  the  creation  of  a  healthy  econ- 
omy. 

Our  military  supply  relationship, 
which  began  in  1974,  is  designed  to  as- 
sist North  Yemen,  in  cooperation  with 
Saudi  Arabia,  to  meet  the  threat  posed 
by  the  Marxist  regime  in  the  neighbor- 
ing People's  Democratic  Republic  of 
Yemen  (PDRY).  The  latter  is  well 
supplied  with  Soviet  military  equip- 
ment, qualitatively  and  quantitatively 
superior  to  that  possessed  by  North 
Yemen.  In  the  wake  of  events  in  North 
and  South  Yemen  last  summer — and 
the  coup  by  pro-Marxist  elements 
within  the  PDRY  Government  in 
Aden — both  North  Yemen  and  Saudi 
Arabia  sense  that  the  threat  from  South 
Yemen  has  intensified  significantly; 
and  they  are  deeply'  concerned  about 
the  intimate  relationship  the  Soviets 
have  with  the  PDRY. 

We  are  in  the  process  of  delivering 
over  $100  million  in  military 
equipment  —  howitzers,  recoilless 
rifles.  Vulcan  antiaircraft  guns.  LAW 
antitank  weapons,  and  vehicles  — 
which  have  been  financed  by  Saudi 
Arabia.  Also,  small  U.S.  military 
mobile  training  teams  are  assisting  the 
Yemen  Armed  Forces  to  operate  and 
maintain  this  equipment.  We  have  also 
agreed  to  the  transfer  of  four  F-5B 
trainers  from  Saudi  Arabia  to  North 
Yemen  and  transition  training  on  those 
aircraft  has  begun. 

Further,  in  consultation  and  cooper- 


ation with  both  the  governments  of 
Saudi  Arabia  and  North  Yemen,  we 
have  agreed  to  seek  congressional  con- 
currence for  additional  equipment  for 
the  Yemen  Armed  Forces.  This  equip- 
ment includes  12  F-5E  aircraft,  100 
M-1  13  armored  personnel  carriers,  and 
64  M-60  tanks. 

Congressional  informal  notification 
on  this  program  began  on  February  16. 
We  believe  that  this  equipment  is  im- 
portant to  help  North  Yemen  meet  its 
legitimate  defense  requirements.  It  is  a 
manifestation  of  U.S.  and  Saudi  sup- 
port for  the  security  and  stability  of 
North  Yemen.  In  addition,  two  C-130 
transport  aircraft  will  be  transferred  to 
North  Yemen  from  Saudi  Arabia.        D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Sixth  Report 

on  the  Sinai 

Support  Mission 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JAN.  18,  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit,  as  requested  by 
section  4  of  Public  Law  94-1 10  of  October  13, 
1975.  the  Sixth  Report  of  the  United  States 
Sinai  Support  Mission,  describing  operations  of 
the  U.S.  early  warning  system  in  the  Sinai  De- 
sert. The  Mission's  activities  are  an  important 
part  of  the  disengagement  arrangements  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel  concluded  in  September 
1975. 

The  cost  of  operating  the  Sinai  Support  Mis- 
sion during  Fiscal  Year  1978  was  $11.7  mil- 
lion, about  a  half  million  dollars  less  than  the 
amount  appropriated.  The  estimated  budget  for 
Fiscal  Year  1979  remains  at  $1  1.7  million. 

At  the  request  of  the  Subcommittee  on 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the  Committee 
on  International  Relations.  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, this  report  includes  a  brief  review  of 
the  applicability  of  the  United  States  early 
warning  system  concept  to  other  areas  of  the 
Middle  East.  It  concludes  that  the  basic  ap- 
proach to  early  warning  employed  in  the  Sinai 
could  be  successful  elsewhere,  provided  the 
parties  directly  concerned  want  and  are  willing 
to  support  it. 

Talks  now  under  way  in  Washington  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  are  likely  to  result  in  substan- 
tial changes  in  the  United  States'  role  in  the 
Sinai.  I  will  consult  closely  with  the  Congress 
as  these  and  subsequent  talks  proceed,  in  order 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE:  F¥  1980  Proposals 


by  Lucy  Wilson  Benson 

Statement  submitted  to  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  Feb- 
ruary 28,  1979.  Mrs.  Benson  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Security  Assistance,  Sci- 
ence, and  Technology.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  testify  on  the  Administration's  FY 
1980  requests  for  international  security 
assistance.  We  are  requesting  an  ap- 
propriation of  $2,794  million  to  fi- 
nance programs  totaling  $4,236  mil- 
lion. 

Let  me  state  at  the  outset  that  this  is 
a  lean,  bare  bones  request  in  keeping 
with  the  President's  policy  of  budget 
austerity.  It  is  the  minimum  request 
consistent  with  our  national  security 
and  the  security  of  our  allies  and 
friends  abroad.  I  will  return  to  this 
point  later. 

Developments  in  the  Middle  East 
and  Southeast  Asia  have  shown  once 
again  how  the  United  States  and 
friendly  countries  have  shared  concerns 
about  security  and  defense.  Interna- 
tional defense  cooperation  is  as  impor- 
tant as  ever. 

The  growing  cost  and  complexity  of 
modern  defense  equipment  make  it  in- 
creasingly difficult  for  many  allies  and 
friends  to  meet  all  legitimate  defense 
requirements  by  themselves.  U.S.  fi- 
nancial loans  to  help  them  acquire 
needed  defense  equipment  and  training 
involve  modest  sums  but  are  of  much 
significance. 

Similarly,  the  need  for  cooperation 
in  reinforcing  regional  stability  by  ad- 
dressing social  and  economic  problems 
in  key  countries  has  not  lessened  in 
importance,  as  the  situation  in  the 
Middle  East  clearly  demonstrates. 

In  my  testimony,  I  will  review  our 
arms  transfer  policy,  briefly  explain  the 
general  purposes  of  our  security  assist- 
ance programs,  place  the  FY  1980  re- 


Sinai  Report  (cont'd) 

to  insure  that  the  peacekeeping  efforts  of  the 
United  States  continue  to  advance  the  goal  of 
perinanent  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Jan.  22,  1979. 


quests  in  an  historical  perspective,  and 
describe  regional  and  country  programs 
and  objectives. 

Arms  Transfer  Policy 

The  President's  arms  transfer  policy 
is  almost  2  years  old.  It  has  been  suc- 
cessful in  both  policy  and  procedural 
terms. 

We  have  met  the  twin  objectives  of: 
(1)  achieving  demonstrable  qualitative 
and  quantitative  restraint  in  transfers  to 
the  developing  world  while  continuing 
to  meet  the  legitimate  needs  of  our  al- 
lies and  friends  and  (2)  developing  a 
decisionmaking  and  management  proc- 
ess that  includes  better  forecasting  and 
determination  of  priorities,  thorough 
policy  analysis  of  major  sales  cases, 
and  more  accurate  bookkeeping. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  six  qual- 
itative controls  which  are  the  heart  of 
the  policy. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  be  the 
first  supplier  to  introduce  into  a  region 
newly  developed  advanced  weapons 
which  would  create  a  new  or  signifi- 
cantly higher  combat  capability. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  sell 
such  weapons  until  they  are  operation- 
ally deployed  with  U.S.  forces. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  permit 
development  of  advanced  weapons 
solely  for  export. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  permit 
coproduction  by  other  countries  of  sig- 
nificant weapons,  equipment,  or  major 
components. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  allow 
U.S.  weapons  or  equipment  to  be 
transferred  to  third  countries  without 
U.S.  Government  consent. 

•  The  United  States  will  not  permit 
U.S.  Embassy,  military,  or  industrial 
representatives  abroad  to  promote  the 
sale  of  arms. 

Virtually  all  of  the  turnoffs  or 
turndowns  of  sales  as  a  result  of  the 
policy  were  based  on  these  controls. 
However,  because  the  policy  explicitly 
provides  for  Presidential  exception  to 
the  controls  in  extraordinary  circum- 
stances or  to  offset  quantitative  or  other 
disadvantages  to  friendly  countries 
where  there  is  a  threat  to  a  regional 
balance,  the  controls  have  proved  suf- 
ficiently flexible  to  permit  sales  con- 
sidered important  to  our  national  secu- 
rity interests. 


There  is  a  great  preoccupation  with 
the  arms  transfer  ceiling.  Some  allege 
that  the  8%  reduction  in  FY  1978  was 
achieved  only  by  creative  bookkeeping. 
Others  claim  that  the  ceiling  is  an  arbi- 
trary restraint,  unrelated  to  U.S.  na- 
tional interests,  that  has  prevented  sales 
that  ought  to  have  been  made. 

In  fact  the  ceiling  is  not  a  shibboleth 
but  a  tool  to  be  used.  It  has  been  a  val- 
uable management  tool  which  supple- 
ments the  more  substantive  qualitative 
controls.  It  forces  the  decisionmaking 
machinery  to  think  and  act  in  new 
ways,  reflecting  the  shift  in  the  burden 
of  proof  from  the  opposers  to  the  pro- 
posers of  an  arms  transfer. 

Moreover,  by  exempting  NATO, 
Japan,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand 
from  the  ceiling,  ample  attention  was 
paid  to  security  needs,  and  the  Presi- 
dent provided  the  safety  valve  of  an 
exception  if  circumstances  warrant. 

Obviously  the  ceiling  cannot  be  re- 
duced indefinitely  in  the  absence  of 
fundamental  political  changes  or  mul- 
tilateral cooperation.  The  President  has 
stated  that  a  key  factor  in  the  determi- 
nation of  arms  transfer  levels  for  FY 
1980  will  be  the  extent  of  cooperation 
we  received  from  others. 

For  FY  1978  the  President  set  the 
ceiling  at  $8,551  billion  — an  8%  re- 
duction from  the  relevant  arms  sales 
total  of  the  preceding  year.  The  final 
year-end  total  of  ceiling-related  trans- 
fers was  $8,538  billion.  Thus  there  was 
a  decline  in  sales  of  over  three  quarters 
of  a  billion  dollars  from  1977  to  1978 
adjusted  for  inflation.  For  the  current 
fiscal  year  the  President  has  established 
another  8%  cut,  which,  when  adjusted 
for  inflation,  provides  for  an  FY  1979 
ceiling  of  $8.43  billion. 


General  Purposes 
of  Security  Assistance 

Our  military  assistance,  foreign 
military  sales  (EMS)  financing,  and 
international  military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  programs  directly  sup- 
port an  important  objective  —  to  help 
friendly  nations  maintain  adequate 
military  establishments  for  their  self- 
defense,  thus  contributing  to  both 
mutual  security  and  maintenance  of  re- 
gional balances. 

Our  security  supporting  assistance 
(SSA)  programs  support  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes  by  providing 


April  1979 

economic  aid  to  nations  in  regions 
beset  by  serious  conflict.  They  also 
promote  the  economic  and  political 
stability  in  selected  countries  and  re- 
gions and  support  activities  that  further 
the  national  security  interest  of  the 
United  States. 

All  of  our  security  assistance  pro- 
grams are  designed  to  support  our  ef- 
forts to  promote  respect  for  human 
rights. 

Our  security  assistance  programs  are 
not  acts  of  charity;  they  serve  mutual 
interests.  Although  the  several  military 
and  SSA  programs  differ  in  content, 
they  all  contribute  to  the  overriding 
U.S.  foreign  policy  and  national  secu- 
rity interest  —  to  shape  a  more  peaceful 
world. 

Unresolved  conflicts  in  the  Middle 
East,  Southeast  Asia,  and  southern 
Africa  —  to  cite  only  a  few  —  call  for 
continuing  efforts  by  the  United 
States  and  others  to  support  peaceful 
solutions.  Security  assistance  programs 
reinforce  U.S.  political  ties — many  of 
longstanding  and  proven  value  —  with 
key  countries  in  these  unsettled  re- 
gions. In  addition,  our  security  assist- 
ance programs  and  mutual  security 
arrangements  —  as  with  the  Philippines, 
Spain,  and  Portugal  —  strengthen  the 
global  and  regional  security  positions 
of  the  United  States.  Our  steadfast  sup- 
port of  these  allied  and  friendly  nations 
has  proven  beneficial  to  them  and  to  us 
and  will  continue  to  do  so. 


Relationship  to  Human  Rights 

The  FY  1980  programs  continue  this 
Administration's  emphasis  on  the  pro- 
motion of  respect  for  internationally 
recognized  human  rights.  We  weighed 
the  human  rights  practices  of  each  pro- 
posed recipient  country  at  each  step  of 
a  rigorous  budget  process.  Our  requests 
are  consistent  with  the  President's  pol- 
icy guidance  and  all  statutory  require- 
ments concerning  human  rights  prac- 
tices and  security  assistance. 


FY  1980  Program 

in  Historical  Perspective 

We  are  requesting  an  authorization 
i   of  appropriations  of  $2,794  million  to 
finance  a  total  FY  1980  security  assist- 
ance program  of  $4,236  million.  This 
program  is  composed  of  $2,063  million 
,   in   foreign   military    sales    (FMS) 
j   financing,  $145  million  in  grant  mili- 
!   tary   assistance   program   (MAP),   $33 
i   million  in  international  military  educa- 
!   tion  and  training  (IMET),  and  $1,995 
million   in   security  supporting  assist- 
ance (SSA). 

The  proposed  program  accomplishes 


a  great  deal  for  less  money  than  in  re- 
cent years,  when  inflation  is  taken  into 
account.  Moreover,  the  sums  requested 
are  indicative  of  the  long-term,  con- 
tinuing transition  away  from  grant  pro- 
grams (MAP)  and  toward  repayable 
loan  financing  (FMS).  In  current  dol- 
lars, the  total  has  increased  from 
$1,407  million  in  FY  1964  to  the 
$4,236  million  proposed  for  FY  1980. 
Adjusted  for  inflation  in  constant  1980 
dollars,  however,  the  increase  over  this 
period  is  marginal  —  from  $3,895  mil- 
lion in  FY  1964  to  $4,236  million  in 
FY  1980. 

This  is  so  despite  the  dramatic  in- 
crease in  FMS  financing  and  SSA  pro- 
grams for  Israel  following  the  Yom 
Kippur  war,  and  related  increases  to 
certain  other  Middle  Eastern  states,  in- 
cluding Egypt.  Israel  received  no  se- 
curity assistance  funding  in  1964.  Pro- 
grams have  declined  dramatically  in  all 
other  regions  over  the  last  15  years. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  there  has 
also  been  a  marked  downward  shift  in 
grant  MAP  ($2.5  billion  in  FY  1964, 
measured  in  constant  1980  dollars,  to 
$145  million  m  FY  1980)  and  a  corre- 
sponding increase  in  FMS  financing. 

Austerity 

Let  me  underscore,  once  again,  the 
spartan  nature  of  our  requests.  We  have 
formulated  our  FY  1980  programs  at 
the  minimum  level  consistent  with  our 
objectives.  To  have  proposed  less 
would  have  incurred  unacceptable 
risks.  False  economies  make  no  sense. 

In  sum  while  the  overall  FY  1980 
program  total  may  appear  slightly 
higher  than  for  FY  1979  ($4,236  mil- 
lion vs.  $4,133  in  FY  1979),  it  is 
nearly  $100  million  lower  when  cor- 
rected for  inflation.  In  constant  dollars, 
FMS  financing  and  SSA  for  FY  1980 
are  each  down  by  about  1%  from  last 
year's  totals  —  which  in  turn  were  con- 
siderably lower  than  the  previous  year. 
Of  the  $2,794  million  in  the  requested 
appropriations,  $1,335  million  is  for 
Israel,  while  $751  million  is  for  Egypt. 
Thus  74.6%  of  the  entire  security  as- 
sistance appropriation  is  for  these 
prime  participants  in  the  Camp  David 
process. 


FMS  Financing  Program 

Under  this  program,  we  provide 
credits  and  loan  repayment  guarantees 
to  enable  eligible  foreign  governments 
to  purchase  defense  articles  and  de- 
fense services.  Begun  24  years  ago, 
this  program  has  consistently  helped 
friendly  countries  to  meet  their  justifi- 
able defense  requirements.   FMS 


43 

financing  has  made  possible  the 
gradual  transition  from  grant  aid  to 
cash  purchases.  Most  current  FMS 
credit  recipients  were  formerly  MAP 
recipients. 

For  FY  1980,  we  proposed  a  $2,063 
million  program  for  25  countries.  Of 
that  program,  $1  billion  is  for  Israel; 
other  major  recipients  include  Korea 
($225  million).  Turkey  ($200  million), 
Greece  ($158  million),  and  Spain 
($120  million).  To  finance  this  pro- 
gram, we  are  requesting  an  appropria- 
tion of  $656.3  million  of  which  $550 
million  is  required  for  Israel  —  a  $500 
million  direct  loan  and  $50  million  to 
guarantee  $500  million  to  be  provided 
by  the  Federal  Financing  Bank  (FEB). 
Only  $106.3  million  is  requested  to  fi- 
nance $1,063  million  in  loans  to  24 
other  countries. 

It  is  useful  to  recall  that,  except  in 
the  case  of  the  $500  million  direct 
loan  to  Israel  for  which  payment 
would  be  forgiven,  every  dollar  ap- 
propriated supports  a  program  10 
times  as  large.  Accordingly,  every 
dollar  appropriated  for,  or  alterna- 
tively, every  dollar  cut  from,  the 
FFB-financed  portion  of  the  appro- 
priation has  a  magnified  impact  on  the 
total  program  that  can  be  financed. 
Moreover,  none  of  the  funds  appro- 
priated to  guarantee  FEB  loans  will  re- 
sult in  U.S.  budgetary  expenditures 
unless  there  is  a  default  in  payments. 

This  is  a  loan  program,  with  money 
coming  in  as  well  as  going  out.  For 
example  in  FY  1980  we  will  receive 
$1.2  billion  in  principal  and  interest 
from  prior  year  loans.  FMS  financing 
is,  over  time,  self-amortizing  with  no 
net  cash  apart  from  certain  loans  for 
Israel  on  which  payment  is  waived. 

Military  Assistance  Program  (MAP) 

Under  MAP  we  provide  defense  ar- 
ticles and  defense  services  to  eligible 
foreign  governments  on  a  grant  basis. 
As  I  have  already  indicated,  the 
long-term  trend  in  MAP  is  down.  We 
are  continuing  to  move  from  grant  as- 
sistance to  FMS  financing  or  cash 
sales  wherever  justified. 

The  proposed  FY  1980  program  to- 
tals $144.6  million  compared  to 
$210.4  million  in  FY  1979.  We  are 
requesting  authorization  and  appro- 
priation of  $110.2  million  to  finance 
FY  1980  programs  for  only  four 
countries — Portugal  ($30  million)  Jor- 
dan ($30  million),  the  Philippines  ($25 
million),  and  Spain  ($3.8  million). 
Three  of  these  programs  —  Portugal, 
the  Philippines,  and  Spain  —  are  for 
countries  which  permit  U.S.  access  to 
and  use  of  military  and  related 
facilities  on  theii;  soil.  In  the  case  of 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  Philippines  and  Spain,  the  program 
levels  are  tied  directly  to  negotiated 
agreements. 

In  addition  to  the  $88.8  million  re- 
quested for  these  four  countries,  the 
FY  1980  program  includes  $55.8  mil- 
lion for  program  management  and  de- 
livery of  materiel  funded  from  prior 
year  programs.  We  expect  reimburse- 
ments from  foreign  countries  for  $34 
million  of  the  program  management 
costs.  Thus  the  net  worldwide  cost  of 
MAP  will  be  the  $110  million  re- 
quested. 

We  are  also  asking  Congress  to  in- 
crease the  "ceiling"  on  the  availabil- 
ity of  current  and  prior  year  MAP  ap- 
propriations in  FY  1979  from 
$210,375,000  to  $243,375,000.  Rais- 
ing this  "ceiling,"  which  is  contained 
in  the  Foreign  Assistance  and  Related 
Programs  Appropriations  Act  of  1978, 
would  not  involve  the  appropriation  of 
additional  funds.  However,  it  would 
allow  us  to  obligate  funds  for  certain 
prior  year  programs  that  were  au- 
thorized by  the  Congress  and  for 
which  funds  were  appropriated.  We 
estimated  that  the  ceiling  precludes  us 
from  using  $31.3  million  in  prior  year 
funds.  Among  the  countries  affected 
are  Turkey,  Greece,  the  Philippines, 
Jordan,  Portugal,  Spain,  Korea,  and 
Thailand. 

We  have  important  security  interests 
in  each  of  these  countries.  The  latter 
have  significant  defense  needs  they 
expected  to  meet  through  such  pre- 
viously funded  programs.  We  urge  the 
Congress  to  support  this  proposal, 
which  will  not  require  new  or  addi- 
tional funding. 

International  Military  Education 
and  Training  (IMET) 

Under  IMET  we  provide  grant 
military  training  in  the  United  States, 
the  Canal  Zone,  and  certain  U.S. 
facilities  abroad  to  foreign  military 
and  civilian  personnel.  Similar  training 
is  also  available  on  a  cash  (FMS) 
basis.  Since  1950,  we  have  trained 
almost  500,000  foreign  nationals  under 
various  military  training  programs. 
These  programs  contribute  to  the 
military  proficiency  of  allied  and 
friendly  countries  and  strengthen  our 
communication  with  the  current  and 
future  military  leadership  of  those 
countries. 

A  recently  completed  review  of  the 
current  positions  held  by  IMET/FMS 
trainees  for  the  5-year  period  FY 
1974-78  indicates  that  many  trainees 
have  achieved  positions  of  prominence 
and  influence  in  their  respective  coun- 
tries. In  47  countries  for  which  infor- 
mation is  reasonably  complete,  more 


than  1,100  former  IMET  students  have 
achieved  general  or  flag  rank.  Ap- 
proximately 1,000  former  IMET  stu- 
dents occupy  high  positions  in  the 
military  or  civilian  sectors  of  their 
country. 

The  latter  positions  include  several 
heads  of  state  or  government.  Cabinet 
ministers,  members  of  Parliament,  and 
ambassadors.  The  former  include 
chiefs  of  the  armed  services  or  indi- 
vidual military  services,  commanders 
of  major  technical  units,  senior  posi- 
tions in  NATO,  commandants  of 
military  academies  and  colleges,  and 
senior  military  attaches. 

For  FY  1980,  we  are  requesting 
$32.9  million  to  train  personnel  from 
52  countries.  This  compares  to  an  FY 
1979  program  of  $28.8  million  for 
personnel  from  38  countries.  The  14 
additional  countries  include  several 
(e.g.,  Turkey  and  Greece)  where  we 
think  it  is  important  to  renew  a  mili- 


tary training  relationship.  Although  the 
new  programs  are  small  in  dollar 
amounts,  we  believe  they  serve  im- 
portant U.S.  interests. 

The  FY  1980  request  also  includes  a 
modest  $800,000  for  a  pilot  regional 
fund  in  Latin  America  to  teach  courses 
in  two  newly  important  fields — arms 
transfer  restraint  and  peacekeeping  op- 
erations. Such  controls  correspond  to 
the  initiatives  of  the  Latin  Americans 
themselves  to  promote  hemispheric  re- 
straint and  to  the  continuing  needs  of 
the  United  Nations,  the  Organization 
of  American  States,  and  other  interna- 
tional organizations  for  qualified 
peacekeeping  contingents. 

Dollar-for-dollar,  we  think  IMET  is 
one  of  our  best  investments.  The  FY 
1980  request  is  already  trim.  We  urge 
the  Congress  to  support  this  small 
program  which  has  clearly  demon- 
strated its  utility  to  U.S.  security  and 
political  interests  over  the  years. 


SUMMARY  OF  PROPOSAL 

On  February  16,1979,  the  Department  of 
State  provided  to  various  committees  on  the 
Hill  the  FY  1980  security  assistance  con- 
gressional presentation  document.  This 
document  sets  out  in  detail  the  Administra- 
tion's request  for  each  category  of  security 
assistance  for  proposed  recipient  countries 
worldwide.  We  have  already  begun  the  con- 
gressional hearing  process  during  which 
Administration  witnesses  testify  on  every 
aspect  of  our  security  assistance  program. 

Throughout  the  formulation  of  the  FY 
1980  program,  we  were  conscious  of  the 
President's  instruction  that  our  security  as- 
sistance programs  reflect  his  policy  of 
budget  austerity  and  continue  to  be  formu- 
lated and  implemented  in  a  manner  that  is 
fully  supportive  of  his  foreign  policy  and 
national  security  objectives. 

In  terms  of  specific  components  of  the  FY 
1980  security  assistance  program,  we  are 
requesting: 

•  Military  Assistance  Program  (MAP): 

$1  10.2  million  to  finance  a  total  program  of 
$144.6  million  to  provide  assistance  to  four 
countries  —  Spain,  Portugal,  Jordan,  and  the 
Philippines  —  and  to  pay  for  administrative 
costs  and  delivery  of  prior  year  programs. 
In  FY  1979  the  total  MAP  program  is 
$210.4  million  with  assistance  being  pro- 
vided to  five  countries. 

•  International  Military  Education  and 
Training  (IMET):  $32.9  million  which 
would  provide  training  to  personnel  from  52 
countries,  compared  to  an  FY  1979  program 
of  $28.8  million  for  38  countries.  Included 
in  the  request  is  a  lump  sum  for  the  fixed 
costs  of  operating  the  three  military  training 
schools  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  a  separate 


line  item  for  a  regional  IMET  program  for 
Latin  America. 

•  Foreign  Military  Sales  (FMS) 
Financing:  $656.3  million  to  finance  a  total 
FMS  financing  program  of  $2,063  million 
for  25  countries.  Of  this  amount  $1,000 
million  is  allocated  to  Israel.  This  compares 
to  an  FY  1979  appropriation  of  $654.5  mil- 
lion to  finance  a  program  totaling  $1,973 
million  for  26  countries.  All  of  the  financ- 
ing to  be  extended  (except  for  a  $500  mil- 
lion direct  loan  to  Israel  for  which  waiver  of 
payment  is  requested)  would  be  provided  by 
the  Federal  Financing  Bank  with  repayment 
guarantees  issued  by  the  Department  of 
Defense. 

•  Security  Supporting  Assistance 
(SSA):  $1,995.1  million  in  economic  as- 
sistance to  promote  political  and  economic 
stability  in  countries  or  regions  important  to 
our  foreign  policy  or  national  security  inter- 
ests. About  40%  of  the  total  SSA  request  is 
designated  for  Israel  and  about  45%  for 
Egypt,  Jordan,  and  Syria.  This  compares  to 
the  FY  1979  SSA  program  which  totals 
$1,912.4  million,  with  more  than  three- 
fourths  of  this  amount  being  provided  to 
these  same  four  Middle  East  countries. 

Secretaries  Vance  and  Brown  testified 
before  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee on  February  5  on  the  entire  FY  1980 
foreign  assistance  budget.  Administration 
witnesses  from  State,  Defense,  and  AID 
will  appear  before  the  appropriate  authori- 
zation committees  and  appropriation  sub- 
committees of  both  the  House  and  Senate 
over  the  next  2  months  in  support  of  these 
requests. 


Press  release  39. 


April  1979 

Security  Supporting  Assistance 

(SSA) 

SSA  promotes  economic  or  political 
stability  in  areas  where  the  United 
States  has  special  foreign  policy  secu- 
rity interests.  Our  economic  assistance 
helps  to  avert  major  crises,  to  moder- 
ate the  effects  of  past  crises,  and  to 
help  lay  the  foundation  for  peaceful 
evolution. 

Last  year  the  Congress  directed  that 
SSA  be  redesignated  as  economic  sup- 
port funds  or  peacekeeping  operations, 
respectively.  The  authorization  attrib- 
uted 98%  of  the  funds  to  economic 
support  and  2%  to  peacekeeping  oper- 
ations. We  carried  out  the  directive  of 
the  Congress  in  FY  1979  and  did  not 
discover  that  it  enhanced  our  manage- 
ment of  security  assistance  or  congres- 
sional oversight  of  the  programs.  We 
propose,  therefore,  to  reintegrate  these 
two  funds  into  a  single  SSA  authority 
and  appropriation  for  FY  1980.  Our 
reasons  are  these. 

•  There  is  no  apparent  difference, 
whether  conceptual  or  programmatic, 
between  the  two  accounts.  For  exam- 
ple, in  FY  1979  the  SSA  program  for 
Spain  was  designated  "peacekeeping 
operations"  because  it  was  related  to 
the  1976  treaty  that  included  provi- 
sions on  base  rights.  Yet  the  $7  mil- 
lion program  is  for  cultural  and  edu- 
cational exchange,  together  with  coop- 
eration in  science  and  technology. 
This  appears  to  us  more  a  supportive 
economic  function  than  peacekeeping 
which  is,  in  this  instance,  not  rel- 
evant. Similarly,  it  appears  undeniable 
that  SSA  programs  for  the  confronta- 
tion states  in  the  Middle  East  provide 
a  contribution  with  a  double 
purpose — the  furtherance  of  peace  and 
economic  support,  although  last  year 
SSA  to  these  countries  was  catego- 
rized only  as  economic  support. 

•  What  unites  the  "peacekeeping" 
and  "economic  support"  accounts  is 
the  essential  ingredient  of  security, 
both  for  the  countries  directly  con- 
cerned and  for  the  United  States.  The 
single  SSA  rubric  seems  the  most  ac- 
curate yet  flexible  description  for  such 
activities.  It  also  permits  ready  com- 
parison with  prior  year  programs  so 
categorized. 

•  The  case  of  Portugal  illustrates 
the  difficulties  posed  by  the  bifurca- 
tion of  SSA.  Should  a  new  base 
agreement  be  signed  in  the  next  few 
months,  then  presumably  our  SSA  re- 
quest for  Portugal  in  FY  1980  would, 
under  the  dual  nomenclature,  be  re- 
classified from  "economic  support 
funds"  to  "peacekeeping  operations." 
Since  use  of  the  two-category  system 


would  make  no  difference  in  the  sums 
involved,  nor  presumably  affect  the 
recipient  country  in  any  way,  there 
seems  no  need  for  the  expense  and 
complication  of  separate  accounts. 

For  FY  1980,  we  propose  an  SSA 
program  of  $1,995  million,  which 
compares  with  a  total  economic  sup- 
port funds/peacekeeping  operations 
program  of  $1,921  million  in  FY 
1979.  As  in  FY  1979,  a  high  percent- 
age of  the  program  —  85%  —  is  allo- 
cated to  Middle  Eastern  countries  to 
support  our  continuing  efforts  to  bring 
peace  to  this  vital  area.  We  are  re- 
questing $785  million  for  Israel,  $750 
million  for  Egypt,  $60  million  for  Jor- 
dan. $38  million  for  the  Maqarin 
Dam.  $60  million  for  Syria,  and  $4 
million  to  fund  two  regional  programs 
in  the  Middle  East  by  voluntary  agen- 
cies and  for  regional  project  develop- 
ment, respectively. 

For  southern  Africa,  we  are  re- 
questing a  regional  fund  of  $100  mil- 
lion. For  Turkey,  we  propose  $98 
million  and  for  refugee  relief  in  Cyp- 
rus, $2  million.  There  are  also  two 
new  SSA  programs  proposed  for  FY 
1980  for  countries  which  permit  U.S. 
use  of  mutual  defense  facilities  —  $50 
million  for  Portugal  and  $20  million 
for  the  Philippines. 

We  are  also  requesting  $7  million 
for  educational  and  cultural  exchange, 
scientific  and  technological  programs 
in  Spain,  in  accordance  with  the  terms 
of  the  1976  Treaty  of  Friendship  and 
Cooperation;  $12.1  million  for  a  vol- 
untary U.S.  contribution  to  the  U.N. 
peacekeeping  force  in  Cyprus;  and  $9 
million  for  the  Sinai  Support  Mission. 

These  country  and  regional  eco- 
nomic SSA  programs  —  administered 
by  the  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (AID) — finance  commodity 
imports  and  economic  infrastructure 
projects  and  provide  general  budget 
support  on  a  grant  and  loan  basis.  The 
projects  are  specifically  directed  to- 
ward meeting  basic  human  needs  in 
such  fields  as  agriculture,  health, 
family  planning,  and  education. 

Regional  Perspectives 

The  proposed  FY  1980  security  as- 
sistance program  is  allocated  on  a  re- 
gional basis  as  follows:  Middle  East 
and  South  Asia  —  69%,  Europe  — 
16%,  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  — 
9%,  Africa — 5%,  American  Republics 
—  1%,  and  nonregional — 1%. 

Middle  East  and  South  Asia.  Sec- 
urity assistance  programs  for  Middle 
East  recipients  seek  to  create  a  climate 
of  national  self-confidence  among  re- 
cipient countries,  encouraging  them  to 


45 


particip'ate  positively  in  the  peace 
process. 

There  has  been  considerable  prog- 
ress toward  peace  over  the  past  year, 
most  notably  at  the  Camp  David 
summit.  Nonetheless,  the  effort  re- 
mains delicate  and  uncertain.  We 
strongly  believe  that  our  security  as- 
sistance programs  contribute  to  this 
process  and  to  stability  in  the  region 
not  only  because  they  assist  in  meeting 
necessary  economic  or  security  needs 
but  also  because  they  provide  tangible 
evidence  of  U.S.  concern  for  the 
well-being  of  all  of  the  confrontation 
states  and  of  our  desire  for  a  just 
settlement. 

U.S.  security  assistance  to  Israel 
has  two  basic  purposes.  First,  it  pro- 
vides Israel  with  the  financial  support 
required  to  maintain  its  own  security 
and  to  defend  itself  successfully  if  at- 
tacked. Second,  it  is  a  concrete  ex- 
pression of  the  historic  U.S.  commit- 
ment to  Israel's  essential  security 
needs  over  the  past  3  decades. 

In  FY  1980  we  propose  to  continue 
a  $1  billion  annual  FMS  financing 
program.  Israel  has  borne  a  particu- 
larly heavy  defense  burden  since  1973. 
The  proposed  assistance  will  help  fi- 
nance the  purchase  of  defense  articles 
and  services  necessary  to  insure  Is- 
rael's security  against  any  combination 
of  adversaries.  As  in  the  past  several 
years,  we  are  recommending  that  pay- 
ment on  one-half  of  the  total  pro- 
gram—  or  $500  million — be  waived. 

We  are  proposing  $785  million  in 
SSA,  the  same  as  in  FY  1979.  This 
assistance  will  provide  Israel  with  the 
financial  resources  to  adjust  to  eco- 
nomic pressures  as  the  political- 
military  situation  evolves  in  the  area. 
The  provision  of  SSA  will  help  Israel 
cope  with  mounting  inflationary  pres- 
sures and  maintain  a  reasonable 
growth  rate. 

The  proposed  FY  1980  SSA  pro- 
gram of  $750  million  for  Egypt  is 
particuarly  important  as  that  country 
attempts  to  improve  its  economic  situ- 
ation while  participating  actively  in 
the  search  for  a  peaceful  settlement. 
Moreover,  traditional  financial  support 
for  Egypt  from  Arab  countries  may 
become  more  uncertain  in  the  future, 
depending  on  reactions  to  Egypt's 
negotiations  with  Israel.  Strong  op- 
position from  certain  "rejectionist" 
governments  adamantly  set  against  an 
Egypt-Israeli  treaty  increases  the  threat 
to  Egypt's  security. 

The  SSA  program  is  structured  to 
demonstrate  that  President  Sadat's 
objectives  are  complemented  by 
realizable  economic  objectives.  A  high 
proportion  of  U.S.  assistance  is  allo- 
cated to  commodity  import  programs 


46 

and  increased  food  aid.  The  balance  is 
for  development  projects  directed  to- 
ward the  long-term  basic  needs  of  the 
Egyptian  people. 

In  FY  1980  we  are  seeking  $30 
million  in  MAP,  $90  million  in  FMS. 
and  $60  million  in  SSA  for  Jordan. 
These  programs  reflect  our  conviction 
that  a  moderate  Jordan,  secure  in  its 
relationship  with  the  United  States,  is 
a  stabilizing  element  in  the  Middle 
East.  Our  security  assistance  programs 
help  Jordan  to  maintain  a  sense  of 
confidence  in  its  ability  to  defend  it- 
.self  against  attack  while  strengthening 
its  economy.  The  United  States  has 
been  working  with  Jordan  since  1968 
to  develop  a  modern  military  force 
that  balances  its  security  requirements 
with  manpower  and  economic  re- 
sources. 

In  FY  1980  we  are  seeking  an  SSA 
program  of  $60  million  for  Syria.  This 
program  helps  in  a  major  way  to  build 
mutual  trust  in  our  evolving  bilateral 
relationship  with  Syria.  It  provides 
evidence  of  a  sincere  U.S.  interest  in 
improving  the  welfare  of  Syria's 
people.  Our  assistance  also  serves  to 
strengthen  habits  of  consultation  and 
discussion  with  the  United  States  and 
provides  Syria  with  access  to  U.S. 
technology  and  management  practices. 

Europe.  Our  security  assistance 
programs  in  Europe,  as  in  the  past,  are 
limited  to  Iberia  and  countries  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean  area. 

The  Administration  has  given  special 
consideration  to  the  assistance  re- 
quirements of  the  three  countries  of  the 
eastern  Mediterranean — Greece,  Tur- 
key and  Cyprus.  Greece  and  Turkey 
derive  special  importance  from  their 
strategic  location  on  the  southeastern 
flank  of  NATO.  Cyprus  continues  to  be 
of  concern  to  us  not  only  because  of  the 
refugees,  but  also  because  the  unre- 
solved political  situation  has  effects 
beyond  the  island  itself. 

The  request  for  Turkey  of  $200  mil- 
lion in  FMS  credits,  $98  million  in  an 
SSA  loan,  and  $2  million  in  IMET  is 
designed  to  help  the  Turkish  military 
forces  improve  their  level  of  readiness 
to  perform  their  NATO  tasks,  to  assist 
the  Government  of  Turkey  as  it  seeks 
to  deal  with  serious  economic  difficul- 
ties, and  to  provide  for  a  renewal  of  the 
important  training  program  for  the  Tur- 
kish Armed  Forces. 

Turkey  is  faced  at  present  with  very 
difficult  economic  problems.  It  has  a 
balance-of-payments  gap  of  $1.5  bil- 
lion, an  inflation  rate  in  excess  of  50%, 
and  an  unemployment  rate  of  over 
20%.  We  believe  it  is  important  that 
Turkey's  friends  and  allies  work  with 
the  Turks  in  trying  to  help  them  over- 


come these  difficulties.  Our  proposed 
SSA  program  is  crucial  to  these  efforts. 
We  are  also  consulting  with  other 
donors,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development,  about  what  kind  of 
assistance  may  be  needed  on  a  longer 
term  basis  to  put  the  Turkish  economy 
back  on  its  feet. 

The  requested  program  for 
Greece— $158  million  in  FMS  and  $2 
million  in  IMET — is  designed  to  pro- 
vide a  continuing  indication  of  our 
support  for  a  democratic  Greece  and 
our  support  for  Greece's  return  to  full 
participation  in  the  NATO  integrated 
military  command  structure.  The  as- 
sistance level  for  Greece  reflects  the 
importance  of  that  country  in  the  area 
and  our  close  cooperation  in  defense 
matters.  It  will  help  the  Greek  military 
continue  to  play  a  major  role  in  main- 
taining security  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean. 

Our  assistance  program  for  Cyprus 
demonstrates  our  continuing  interest  in 
a  Cyprus  solution.  The  need  of  the 
Greek  Cypriot  displaced  persons  has 
diminished  with  the  almost  complete 
recovery  of  the  economy  in  the  area 
controlled  by  the  Government  of  Cyp- 
rus. Thus,  we  are  requesting  only  $2 
million  in  SSA  to  supplement  our  pre- 
vious efforts  to  help  the  refugees 
achieve  a  more  normal  life  pending  the 
solution  to  the  island's  political  prob- 
lems. 

Our  FY  1980  security  assistance  re- 
quest for  Spain  is  consistent  with  the 
terms  of  the  1976  Treaty  of  Friendship 
and  Cooperation.  The  treaty  stipulates 
that  the  United  States  shall  provide  to 
Spain,  during  each  of  the  treaty's  5 
years,  $120  million  in  guaranteed  FMS 
loans  and  $2  million  in  IMET.  In  addi- 
tion, the  United  States  is  providing 
defense  articles  in  the  MAP  program 
with  a  value  of  $75  million  during  the 
life  of  the  treaty. 

The  major  portion  of  our  remain- 
ing MAP  commitment  under  the 
treaty  —  $41  million  —  is  being  pro- 
vided to  Spain  in  FY  1979  in  order  to 
minimize  erosion  of  purchasing  power 
through  inflation.  For  FY  1980  we  are 
requesting  $3.8  million  in  MAP.  As  I 
mentioned  before,  we  are  also  provid- 
ing $7  million  per  year  in  SSA  for  edu- 
cational, cultural,  scientific,  and  tech- 
nological exchanges. 

Priority  interests  served  by  our  as- 
sistance programs  in  Portugal  are  con- 
solidation of  Portuguese  democracy, 
economic  recovery  and  growth,  and  in- 
creasing the  ability  of  the  Portuguese 
military  to  play  a  greater  NATO  role. 
We  have  firm  indications  that  the  new 
Portuguese  Government  is  prepared  to 
conclude  a  new  agreement  relating  to 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

continued  U.S.  use  of  military  facilities 
in  the  Azores.  We  expect  to  resume 
negotiations  shortly.  To  support  these 
interests,  we  propose  FY  1980  pro- 
grams of  $50  million  for  SSA,  $30 
million  for  MAP,  and  $2.2  million  for 
IMET. 

Furthering  Cooperative  NATO 
Arms  Projects.  We  are  proposing 
three  amendments  to  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Act  to  strengthen  the  military 
effectiveness  of  NATO  by  facilitating 
rationalization,  standardization  and  in- 
teroperability. Our  NATO  allies  look  to 
the  United  States  for  leadership  in 
achieving  these  objectives,  as  set  forth 
by  President  Carter  at  the  May  1977 
London  summit.  As  the  pace  of  al- 
liance arms  cooperation  projects  quick- 
ens, the  need  for  this  legislation  be- 
comes more  urgent. 

The  bill  would  facilitate  the  transfer 
of  U.S.  Government-provided  defense 
articles  and  services  among  NATO 
countries  without  affecting  the  re- 
quirement for  prior  U.S.  consent  to 
such  transfers.  Section  10  would  permit 
the  waiver,  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  of 
charges  for  quality  assurance,  inspec- 
tion, and  contract  audit  services  with 
NATO  members  or  in  connection  with 
the  NATO  infrastructure  program. 
Section  1 1  would  encourage  NATO 
cooperative  projects  of  a  cost-sharing 
nature  by  permitting  the  reduction  or 
waiver,  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  of  FMS 
charges  for  U.S.  research,  develop- 
ment, test,  evaluation,  and  production 
costs  as  well  as  certain  personnel  costs. 

The  proposed  amendments  are  not  a 
one-way  street  in  favor  of  our  NATO 
allies.  Rather,  the  benefits  are  either  at 
no-cost,  reciprocal,  or  based  on  a 
burden-sharing  agreement.  By 
facilitating  cooperative  weapons  de- 
velopment within  NATO,  the  proposed 
legislation  provides  substantial  benefits 
to  the  United  States  and  to  the  military 
effectiveness  of  the  alliance.  We 
strongly  urge  favorable  congressional 
action  on  these  amendments. 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  In  this 
region,  our  security  assistance  propos- 
als take  into  account  three  major  recent 
developments;  the  recent  amendment  of 
our  bases  agreement  with  the  Philip- 
pines, the  continuing  danger  of  military 
contlict  on  the  Korean  Peninsula,  and 
the  continuing  Vietnamese  military  in- 
volvement in  Kampuchea. 

The  situation  in  Southeast  Asia  has 
become  more  tense,  of  course,  because 
of  the  renewal  of  hostilities  in  In- 
dochina, both  within  Kampuchea  and 
along  the  Vietnamese-Chinese  border. 
The  members  of  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations,  and  espe- 
cially Thailand,  have  renewed  concerns 


April  1979 

about  their  security  and  the  integrity  of 
their  frontiers.  These  friendly  nations 
look  to  the  United  States  for  reaffirmed 
interest  in  helping  them  to  meet  their 
defense  needs. 

The  recent  amendment  to  the  1947 
Military  Bases  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines,  concluded  after  extensive 
consultations  with  the  Congress,  will 
permit  continued  use  of  Clark  Air 
Base,  Subic  Bay  Naval  Base,  and  other 
facilities  on  an  equitable  and  politically 
sound  basis  well  into  the  future.  The 
new  agreement  reconfirms  a  mutual  se- 
curity relationship  which  dates  from 
the  earliest  days  of  Philippine  inde- 
pendence and  is  critical  to  U.S.  secu- 
rity interests.  The  levels  and  mix  of  as- 
sistance proposed  for  FY  1980  ($25 
million  in  MAP.  $50  million  in  FMS, 
$700,000  in  IMET.  $20  million  in 
SSA)  are  consistent  with  the  terms  of 
that  agreement. 

South  Korea  continues  to  face  a 
sizeable  military  threat  from  the  North. 
The  Koreans  are  paying  the  bulk  of  the 
costs  of  a  major  defense  modernization 
program.  We  are  requesting  $225  mil- 
lion in  FMS  financing  in  FY  1980  to 
assist  the  Koreans  in  financing  this 
program  which  is  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  viable  defense  pos- 
ture. Our  assistance  will  also  signal  to 
the  North  Koreans  that  we  remain  con- 
cerned about  and  committed  to  the 
R.O.K.'s  security. 

Vietnam's  takeover  of  Kampuchea 
has  caused  considerable  anxiety  among 
Southeast  Asian  countries.  Our  pro- 
grams should  help  relieve  those  anx- 
ieties. We  propose  $25  million  in  FMS 
financing  for  Thailand.  This  will  help 
the  Thais  acquire  equipment  to  combat 
the  ongoing  insurgency  in  the  northeast 
and  to  strengthen  their  forces  against 
external  attack. 

We  also  propose  a  $35  million  FMS 
credit  program  to  assist  the  Indone- 
sians to  modernize  their  forces  and  a 
small  $7  million  FMS  program  for  the 
Malaysians.  Our  security  assistance 
programs  in  Southeast  Asia  also  serve 
to  reassure  our  friends  in  a  vital, 
changing  region  of  our  continuing 
commitment  to  their  security. 

The  Administration's  proposed 
international  security  assistance  leg- 
islation provides  authority  for  two  ex- 
traordinary transfers  of  particular 
significance. 

First,  we  are  seeking  authority  to 
waive  payment  from  the  Government 
of  Thailand  on  the  last  increment  of 
U.S.  ammunition  stored  in  Thailand 
and  sold  to  Thailand  in  FY  1977;  the 
amount  to  be  waived  is  $11.3  million. 
President  Carter  told  Prime  Minister 
Kriangsak  that  he  would  request  this 
authority  to  bolster  Thailand's  confi- 


dence in  its  defense  capability  and  to 
ease  its  financial  burden  in  view  of  the 
unstable  conditions  prevailing  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

Secondly,  the  Administration  bill 
would  authorize  the  transfer  to  the 
people  on  Taiwan  during  calendar 
year  1980  of  Department  of  Defense 
war  reserve  materiel  located  on  Taiwan 
as  of  January  1,  1979,  and  during 
calendar  years  1979  and  1980  of  U.S. 
rights  in  property  other  than  war  re- 
serve materiel  located  in  Taiwan  as  of 
January  1.  1979. 

Because  of  the  normalization  of  U.S. 
relations  with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  the  resultant  changes  in  our 
relationship  with  Taiwan,  the  United 
States  must  arrange  for  the  disposition 
of  this  materiel  and  property.  The  bill 
would  give  the  President  discretionary 
authority  to  transfer  U.S.  rights  which 
he  deems  appropriate  under  terms  and 
conditions  that  he  determines. 

Africa.  Our  security  assistance  pro- 
grams for  Africa  are  small,  moderate, 
and  targeted  on  a  few  key  countries. 
Our  efforts  in  Africa  have  been  devoted 
principally  to  economic  development 
and  other  economic  assistance  rather 
than  military  assistance.  For  example, 
in  FY  1980  we  propose  to  double  our 
SSA  to  certain  states  in  southern  Africa 
from  $45  million  in  FY  1979  to  $100 
million  in  FY  1980,  while  increasing 
FMS  financing  to  Africa  south  of  the 
Sahara  from  $26.2  million  in  FY  1979 
to  only  $45.9  million  in  FY  1980. 

The  SSA  program  provides  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  countries  — 
Botswana,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mozam- 
bique, Swaziland,  and  Zambia  are  pro- 
posed for  FY  1980 — which  have  suf- 
fered severe  economic  dislocations  and 
hardships  as  a  result  of  their  newly  won 
independence  and  their  commitment  to 
the  achievement  of  racial  justice  and 
majority  rule  in  southern  Africa.  The 
program  also  helps  assist  refugees  and 
displaced  persons.  All  of  these  pro- 
grams directly  or  indirectly  support  our 
efforts  to  achieve  peaceful  solutions  to 
the  problems  of  Namibia  and  Rhodesia. 

In  coping  with  the  exigencies  of  the 
situation  in  southern  Africa,  the  SSA 
program  provides  us  with  much  needed 
flexibility  not  readily  available  under 
other  assistance  programs.  For  exam- 
ple, it  now  appears  that  the  western 
five's  proposals  for  a  U.N. -supervised 
transition  to  independence  in  Namibia 
is  going  forward.  The  proposed  SSA 
regional  fund  would  allow  us  to  con- 
tribute promptly  to  U.N. -coordinated 
assistance  to  Namibia. 

Soviet  and  Cuban  activities  in  Africa 
south  of  the  Sahara  have  sharpened 
concerns  in  many  countries  about  their 


47 

security  and  defense  requirements.  If 
we  are  to  continue  to  promote  stability, 
our  friends  on  the  continent  must  know 
they  can  count  on  our  support.  We 
have  responded  to  this  situation  with 
restraint  and  seek  to  avoid  dealing  with 
it  primarily  as  an  East-West  issue.  We 
propose  only  six  FMS  financing  pro- 
grams for  Africa  south  of  the  Sahara, 
the  largest  of  which  are  Kenya  ($26 
million).  Zaire  ($10.5  million),  and 
Sudan  ($5  million). 

We  also  propose  in  FY  1980  to  enter 
into  a  small  military  supply  relation- 
ship with  Botswana  in  support  of  our 
search  for  peace  in  the  southern  Africa 
region.  Botswana  lacks  defensive  ca- 
pability to  protect  its  democratic,  mul- 
tiracial society  from  incursions  by  the 
adversaries  in  the  Rhodesian  conflict. 

We  also  propose  to  repeal  Section  33 
of  the  Arms  Export  Control  Act.  This 
section  places  a  $40  million  ceiling  on 
the  total  amount  of  military  assistance 
and  FMS  financing  which  may  be  fur- 
nished to  African  countries  in  any  year. 
Because  the  authorized  and  appro- 
priated programs  for  African  countries 
have  exceeded  this  ceiling  in  each  of 
the  past  several  years,  the  President  has 
had  to  exercise  his  authority  to  waive 
the  ceiling.  Repeal  of  Section  33  would 
eliminate  the  need  for  such  action,  rec- 
ognizing the  realities  of  our  security 
assistance  programs  to  Africa  in  recent 
years. 

American  Republics.  Latin 
America  is  the  most  lightly  armed  re- 
gion in  the  world,  historically  the  most 
peaceful,  and  spends  the  least  on  mili- 
tary material.  Currently,  military 
spending  in  the  region  averages  around 
3%  of  GNP. 

Our  very  limited  FY  1980  FMS 
financing  request — $30.1  million  —  is 
the  smallest  in  history.  It  is  designed  to 
assist  the  eligible  nations  of  the  hemi- 
sphere to  purchase  minimum  amounts 
of  necessary  equipment  and  services. 
No  major  equipment  purchases  are  an- 
ticipated. Most  purchases  are  expected 
to  be  for  replacement  of  aging  equip- 
ment, support  and  maintenance,  or 
spares. 

We  believe  that  the  proposed  Latin 
American  programs  are  at  the  absolute 
minimum  levels  that  will  permit  us  to 
maintain  traditional  military  links  to 
the  region  through  security  assistance 
and  training.  We  continue  to  believe 
that  our  military  ties  to  the  region  are 
of  importance,  particularly  because  15 
governments  are  either  headed  by  or 
heavily  influenced  by  the  military. 

Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  I  return  to  my  opening 
theme  of  austerity.  We  have  carefully 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SOUTH  A!$IA:  Promoting  StafnUty 
and  Seeurity 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  7,  1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State. ' 

Thank  you  for  inviting  me  to  be  with 
you  today.  I  welcome  this  opportunity 
to  discuss  with  you  the  situation  in 
South  Asia;  U.S.  relations  with  the  na- 
tions of  that  region;  and  steps  that  can 
be  taken  to  promote  South  Asia's  sta- 
bility, security,  and  prosperity. 

In  addition  1  will,  as  you  have  re- 
quested, offer  an  assessment  of  India's 
role  as  a  regional  power  and  comment 
on  the  current  state  of  U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations  on  the  military  balance  in 
the  Indian  Ocean. 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  trip  to 
India  and  Pakistan,  where  I  met  with 
Prime  Minister  Desai  and  President  Zia 
and  other  senior  officials  in  each  coun- 
try. This  was  my  second  trip  to  the 
subcontinent  since  becoming  Deputy 
Secretary.  During  my  discussions  with 
the  leaders  of  both  countries,  I  was 
struck  by  their  desire  for  a  stable,  se- 
cure, and  prosperous  South  Asia.  They 
hope  the  future  will  bring  better  rela- 
tions among  all  the  nations  in  the  re- 
gion. They  hope  their  efforts  can  be 
directed  toward  cooperation  and  de- 
velopment and  not  toward  countering 
external  threats. 

The  memories  of  the  past  still  weigh 
heavily  on  India  and  Pakistan,  how- 
ever.  Concern  about  each  other's  in- 


Security  Assistance  (Cont'd) 

examined  the  FY  1980  program  re- 
quests. We  cut  programs  where  we 
thought  they  could  be  cut.  We  in- 
creased some  programs  and  added  a 
few  new  ones  where  we  are  firmly 
convinced  it  is  in  our  interest  to  do  so. 
The  proposed  FY  1980  security  assist- 
ance programs  reflect  our  judgment  of 
what  is  required  to  advance  and  sustain 
important  U.S.  national  interests 
abroad  during  a  period  of  belt- 
tightening  at  home.  We  believe  these 
programs  merit  your  support.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


tentions  remain.  In  the  wake  of  events 
in  nearby  countries,  they  are  also  con- 
cerned, in  different  ways,  about  what 
external  powers  are  doing,  or  might  do. 
in  the  region. 

The  nations  of  the  region  do  not 
think  of  themselves  only  as  part  of  the 
South  Asian  Subcontinent.  Their  links 
with  the  rest  of  the  world  are  expand- 
ing. India  and  Pakistan  export  substan- 
tial quantities  of  goods  and  services  to 
the  Middle  East  oil  states.  Sri  Lanka 
and  Bangladesh  have  been  developing 
economic  ties  with  nations  in  Europe 
and  elsewhere  in  Asia.  Events  to  their 
east  and  west  affect  the  South  Asian 
countries'  perceptions  of  their  security 
needs.  In  short,  the  nations  of  the  sub- 
continent are  becoming  part  of  a  larger 
region,  expanding  from  the  Arabian 
Peninsula  in  the  west  through  Southeast 
Asia  in  the  east. 

At  the  same  time,  our  perception  of 
the  region  also  is  changing.  We  cannot 
make  "South  Asia  Policy"  in  a  vac- 
uum. We  must  take  into  consideration 
the  impact  of  events  in  other  areas  as 
well. 

The  Past  Year 

A  new  era  in  South  Asia  appeared  on 
the  horizon  in  1977.  There  were  a 
number  of  signs  that  the  nations  of  the 
region  were  beginning  to  transcend 
histories  of  mutual  suspicion  and  ten- 
sion. A  "good  neighbor  policy"  was  in 
the  offing.  Indeed,  when  he  testified 
before  this  committee  one  year  ago, 
then  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs 
Adolph  Dubs  said:  "I  believe  it  would 
be  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  regional 
tensions  are  perhaps  at  their  lowest 
level  since  1947."^ 

In  the  months  following  Ambassador 
Dubs'  testimony,  the  process  of  recon- 
cilation  among  the  countries  of  South 
Asia  continued.  For  example,  India  and 
Pakistan  agreed  to  reopen  their  re- 
spective Consulates  in  Karachi  and 
Bombay;  and  Prime  Minister  Desai  had 
cordial  talks  with  President  Zia  in 
Nairobi.  The  previous  regime  in  Af- 
ghanistan was  moving  toward  better 
relations  with  Pakistan  and  India,  and 
Bangladesh  had  solved  longstanding 
bilateral  disputes. 

We  welcomed  these  developments  as 
indications  that  the  nations  of  the  re- 
gion were  reducing  tensions  in  order  to 
devote  increasing  attention  and  re- 
sources to  the  core  problems  of  eco- 


nomic development  and  human  better- 
ment. 

Many  of  these  healthy  trends  are 
continuing,  but  unfortunately,  some  of 
the  momentum  that  was  building  for 
better  relations  among  South  Asia's 
nations  began  to  dissipate.  Indeed, 
Spike  Dubs'  tragic  and  senseless  death 
reminds  us  of  the  dramatic  changes  that 
have  altered  the  regional  picture  since 
he  met  with  you  a  year  ago.'^ 

There  is  now  a  real  risk  that 
deeply-rooted  historical  and  psycho- 
logical forces  will  reemerge;  that  great 
power  involvement  and  competition  in 
the  region  will  intensify;  and  that  the 
attention  of  the  governments  of  the  area 
will  focus  again  on  dealing  with  per- 
ceived threats  to  their  security  instead 
of  the  internal  development  of  their 
nations. 

What  has  happened  in  the  region 
during  the  past  year  to  create  this  situ- 
ation? 

Pakistan  and  others  in  the  region  are 
deeply  concerned,  as  is  the  United 
States,  by  the  appearance  of  a  pro- 
Soviet  government  in  Afghanistan  and 
the  accretion  of  Soviet  influence  there. 
Pakistan's  primary  concern,  however, 
revolves  not  around  the  ideology  of  its 
neighbor  but  the  revival  of  Afghan 
claims  on  Pakistan's  border  areas  and 
the  possibility  of  Afghan  support  of  an 
irridentist  movement  in  Pakistan's 
Baluchistan  and  Northwest  Frontier 
provinces. 

India  is  particularly  concerned  about 
the  instability  in  Iran.  This  reflects  In- 
dia's substantial  economic  stake  there, 
including  35%  of  its  oil  imports  and  the 
important  market  Iran  has  provided  for 
Indian  products  and  labor. 

For  its  part.  Pakistan,  like  other  Is- 
lamic nations,  is  waiting  anxiously  to 
see  what  kind  of  policies  emanate  from 
the  new  government  in  Tehran  but 
hopes  to  preserve  its  past  good  rela- 
tions with  Iran. 

Rapprochement  between  China  and 
India  has  been  set  back  by  China's  in- 
vasion of  Vietnam,  which  occurred 
while  Indian  Foreign  Minister  Vaj- 
payee was  in  China. 

What  can  the  United  States  and 
others  do  to  respond  to  South  Asia's 
needs  and  insure  that  the  new  era  for 
South  Asia  that  appeared  on  the  hori- 
zon in  1977  still  comes  to  pass?  A  sta- 
ble, secure,  and  prosperous  South  Asia 
requires  that  our  efforts,  and  those  of 
the  nations  of  the  region,  focus  on  four 
areas; 


April  1979 

•  Security  for  the  nations  of  the  re- 
gion from  foreign  exploitation  of  their 
internal  difficulties  or  regional  rival- 
ries; 

•  Greater  cooperation  among  the  na- 
tions in  the  region; 

•  Development  and  maintenance  of 
responsive,  representative  political  in- 
stitutions and  respect  for  individual 
rights:  and 

•  Promotion  of  economic  develop- 
ment, including  especially  increased 
employment  and  greater  food  produc- 
tion. 


Security  From  Foreign  Exploitation 

The  problems  that  face  the  nations  of 
the  region  are  primarily  internal  in  na- 
ture, yet  they  lend  themselves  to 
exploitation  by  foreign  sources.  The 
nations  of  South  Asia  must  be  secure 
from  external  interference  as  they  work 
out  their  problems. 

Within  our  overall  policy  regarding 
arms  restraint  in  the  region,  we  shall  be 
responsive  to  their  legitimate  needs  for 
defense.  We  believe  such  needs  can  be 
accommodated  without  interfering  with 
the  primary  task  of  internal  develop- 
ment and  without  contributing  to  an 
arms  race  in  South  Asia.  Thus,  we  are 
prepared  to  sell  military  equipment  to 
Pakistan  and  India  on  a  nondis- 
criminatory basis  and  in  a  way  that 
does  not  contribute  to  tension  in  the  re- 
gion. We  shall  continue  to  follow  a 
policy  of  restraint — in  terms  of  quan- 
tity as  well  as  sophistication — and 
hope  that  others  will  do  likewise. 


Greater  Intraregional  Cooperation 

With  respect  to  greater  cooperation 
among  the  South  Asian  nations,  we 
commend  them  for  the  progress  they 
have  already  made.  We  hope  that  their 
efforts  in  this  direction  will  intensify. 
Continuation  of  the  process  of  recon- 
ciliation between  Pakistan  and  India  is 
of  central  importance.  We  look  to  both 
nations  to  nurture  this  process.  We  also 
believe  that  further  moves  toward  rap- 
prochement between  India  and  China, 
difficult  as  they  might  be.  will  contrib- 
ute to  the  stability  and  security  of  all 
nations  in  South  Asia. 

In  addition,  we  hope  that  Afghanis- 
tan will  come  to  respect  the  Durand 
Line — the  international  border  between 
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan — as  virtually 
every  country  of  the  world  has  already 
done. 

We  will  help  where  we  can,  and 
other  nations  may  also  be  able  to  offer 
their  assistance.  But  I  must  emphasize 
that  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  suc- 
cess or  failure  lies  with  the  nations  of 
the  region  themselves. 


Political  Development 
and  Individual  Rights 

As  for  political  development  and  in- 
dividual rights,  there  are  clear  signs 
that  the  nations  of  South  Asia  are 
making  progress  in  the  development  of 
responsive  and  representative  political 
institutions. 

India's  democratic  traditions  were 
restored  following  the  Janata  Party's 
sweeping  victory  in  March  1977.  The 
government,  which  commands  a  large 


49 

parliamentary  majority,  has  moved  ef- 
fectively to  insure  protection  of  human 
rights. 

Sri  Lanka  also  has  reaffirmed  its 
commitment  to  a  democratic  political 
system  and  willingness  to  accommo- 
date various  interests  within  a  demo- 
cratic framework. 

The  recent  elections  in  Bangladesh 
signal  the  emergence  of  a  more  broadly 
based  and  popularly  accepted  govern- 
ment. 

In    Nepal    the   government    has 


MJ,S»  Ambassador  Killeci  ttt  Afghatustan 


Ambassador  Adolph  (Spike)  Dubs 
was  kidnapped  in  Kabul  on  February 
14,  1979.  by  terrorists  and  killed  the 
same  day  during  an  attempt  by  Afghan 
police  to  free  him  from  his  captors. 
The  following  remarks  by  President 
Carter  and  Secretary  Vance  were  made 
at  Andrews  Air  Force  Base  ceremonies 
on  February  18  when  Ambassador 
Dubs'  body  was  returned  to  the  United 
States. ' 

President  Carter 

This  morning  I  would  like  to  say  to 
Mary  Ann  Dubs  and  to  Lindsey.  to  the 
members  of  Spike  Dubs'  famiJy  and  his 
many  friends  that  this  is  indeed  a  sad 
and  painful  moment  for  the  United 
States  of  America.  We've  come  here 
on  this  occasion  to  pay  tribute  to  a 
good  man.  a  courageous  man.  who 
served  his  country  well  and  who  gave 
his  life  for  it. 

We've  come  here  to  express  our 
outrage  at  the  senseless  terrorism 
among  those  who  pay  inadequate  value 
to  human  life.  And  we  condemn  those 
who  perpetrated  and  who  participated 
in  such  a  despicable  act  of  violence. 

As  President.  I  would  like  to  pay 
honor,  also,  to  the  other  men  and 
women  in  the  Foreign  Service  of  our 
country,  who  serve  with  dedication  and 
often  great  risk  to  their  own  lives  so 
that  all  of  us  might  enjoy  a  more 
peaceful  existence  in  a  world  with  bet- 
ter understanding,  one  for  another. 

Mary  Ann,  Lindsey.  we  share  with 
you  your  great  loss.  The  grief  of  our 
nation  can  be  expressed  by  me  as 
President.  And  we  also  share  with  you 
a  great  pride  in  what  your  husband, 
what  your  father,  did  for  our  country. 
We  are  ready  to  help  you  in  every  way 
possible  to  share  your  loss.  And  I  want 
you  to  know  that  our  nation,  in  every 


sense  of  the  word,  shares  this  loss  with 
you  and  your  family. 

Secretary  Vance 

Mary  Ann.  Lindsey.  your  loss  and 
ours  is  a  profound  one.  Spike  deeply 
loved  this  country,  his  family,  and  his 
friends.  He  was  one  of  our  very  best,  a 
fine  officer  and  a  fine  person.  It  is 
tragic  that  a  man,  whose  whole  life  and 
career  were  dedicated  to  the  cause  of 
peace,  was  killed  as  a  result  of  ter- 
rorism and  violence. 

Events  in  Kabul  and  Tehran  this 
week  are  terrible  reminders  that  the 
diplomatic  profession  is  dangerous  as 
well  as  demanding.  Courageous  and 
selfless  men  of  the  Foreign  Service  like 
Spike  Dubs  have  all  too  often  in  recent 
years  sacrificed  their  lives  for  their 
country.  We  owe  them  a  debt  beyond 
price. 

I  pledge  to  you  that  we  will  spare  no 
effort  to  protect  our  diplomats  over- 
seas, and  we  will  fight  terrorism  with 
all  of  our  resolve  and  our  resources. 

As  a  symbol  of  my  respect  and  re- 
gard for  Ambassador  Dubs  and  tribute 
to  him  from  the  Foreign  Service  to 
which  he  devoted  his  life.  I  have  the 
sad  honor  to  present  to  you.  Mary  Ann, 
in  Spike's  memory,  the  Secretary's 
Award,  the  highest  award  the  State  De- 
partment can  give. 

As  I  present  this  award,  I  note  with 
regret  that  for  health  reasons  Spike's 
parents  could  not  be  here  as  we  honor 
him. 

The  citation  reads:  "To  Adolph 
Dubs,  for  inspiring  leadership,  out- 
standing courage  and  devotion  to  duty 
for  which  he  gave  his  life.  Kabul, 
February  14,  1979."  □ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  26.  1979. 


50 

liberalized  the  political  environment; 
we  hope  further  efforts  can  be  made 
there  to  permit  ail  political  forces  to 
operate  within  the  system. 

The  Bhutto  case  dominates  the 
political  landscape  in  Pakistan.  The 
present  situation  there  is  tense.  (Let  me 
note  here  that  when  1  was  in  Islamabad. 
I  conveyed  the  sense  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  urging  that  President 
Zia  grant  clemency  to  Mr.  Bhutto  as  a 
humane  gesture.)  The  martial  law  ad- 
ministration, headed  by  President  Zia, 
has  announced  that  national  elections 
will  be  held  later  this  year.  These  elec- 
tions should  reduce  political  polariza- 
tion. We  are  confident  that  if  Pakistan 
is  permitted  sufficient  time  to  resolve 
its  internal  problems  free  from  external 
threat,  a  government  will  evolve  which 
will  satisfy  public  expectations  and  as- 
sure all  of  a  stake  in  the  system. 

In  Afghanistan,  unfortunately,  there 
has  been  a  deterioration  in  human 
rights  conditions — one  of  the  major 
factors  contributing  to  the  sharp  reduc- 
tion in  our  aid  there. 

Economic  Development 

With  respect  to  economic  develop- 
ment, the  problems  of  South  Asia  are 
well  known.  But  I  was  struck  during 
my  recent  visit  by  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  and  by  the  reinforcement 
our  bilateral  assistance  provides  for 
that  progress.  Because  of  the  funda- 
mental importance  of  advancement  in 
this  area,  I  would  like  to  comment  in 
some  detail  on  the  region's  massive 
economic  development  effort  and  pro- 
vide a  country-by-country  assessment. 

With  respect  to  the  region  as  a 
whole,  increased  irrigation  and  im- 
proved management  of  water  resources 
are  central  to  the  ability  of  South  Asian 
nations  to  increase  agricultural  produc- 
tion to  the  levels  that  will  be  necessary 
in  the  years  ahead.  In  this  context,  en- 
couraging progress  is  being  made  to- 
ward imaginative  regional  programs 
under  which  India.  Bangladesh,  and 
Nepal  would  pursue  the  joint  develop- 
ment of  their  water  resources. 

India  is  discussing  with  Nepal  a  hy- 
droelectric project  that  will  involve 
production  of  power  approximately 
equal  to  the  total  produced  in  India  in 
the  I960's,  as  well  as  major  irrigation 
works.  We  encourage  this  concept  and 
hope  that  future  U.S.  programs  in 
South  Asia  can  play  a  positive  role  in 
supporting  such  regional,  multilaterally 
financed  river  development  projects. 

India.  India's  economy  has  made 
important  strides.  In  the  early  1970's. 
it  was  characterized  by  inadequate  food 
production,  balance-of-payments  pres- 
sures,  and   foreign  exchange  con- 


straints. The  turnaround  has  been 
dramatic,  with  some  genuine  break- 
throughs. Four  years  of  favorable  mon- 
soon rains  have  brought  India  four  rec- 
ord food-grain  crops  and  a  substantial 
reserve  stock  of  food  grains.  As  a  re- 
sult, India's  economy  grew  by  over  7% 
in  real  terms  in  1977-78  as  compared 
with  2%  growth  in  the  preceding  year. 
Economic  growth  is  expected  to  be 
good  but  more  moderate  in  1978-79. 

But  the  bumper  harvests  are  not  sim- 
ply the  result  of  plentiful  rainfall.  The 
farmers'  dependence  on  the  monsoon  is 
lessening.  Indeed,  Indian  agricul- 
ture—  long  recognized  as  an  area  of 
potential  growth  —  is  undergoing  a 
technological  revolution. 

There  is  evidence  that  important 
structural  changes  are  occurring.  About 
34%  of  India's  cropped  land  was  under 
irrigation  in  1976.  This  total  has  been 
increasing  at  an  annual  rate  of  about 
8%  for  the  last  2  years.  Fertilizer  con- 
sumption is  rising  rapidly,  with  annual 
increases  in  the  past  2  years  averaging 
22%. 

Additional  positive  factors  are  im- 
proved farmer  access  to  high-yielding 
seeds,  credit,  research,  extension 
services,  storage,  marketing,  and  elec- 
trification. India's  new  agricultural 
policy  attempts  to  insure  remunerative 
prices  to  farmers,  promote  employment 
in  rural  areas,  and  improve  the  condi- 
tions of  small  and  marginal   farmers. 


Assistattee  in 
Afghanistan 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  22,  1979' 

The  President  has  decided  to  se- 
verely reduce  our  development  assist- 
ance program  in  Afghanistan  below 
levels  projected  for  the  fiscal  years 
1979  and  1980.  The  President  has  also 
decided  to  terminate  a  military  training 
program  that  was  in  the  planning 
stages. 

These  decisions  have  been  taken  in 
the  light  of  an  ongoing  review  of  our 
relations  with  Afghanistan  and  the 
policies  with  that  government.  Only 
small  developmental  assistance  pro- 
grams that  are  already  underway  and 
that  address  the  needs  of  the  least 
privileged  sectors  of  Afghan  society 
will  continue.  □ 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  White 
House  Press  Secretary  Jody  Powell  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Feb.  26,  1979) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

The  contribution  of  U.S.  aid  to  this 
agricultural  breakthrough  has  been  sig- 
nificant. 

A  substantial  cushion  against  bad 
weather  and  poor  crops  is  now  in  place. 
This  favorable  short-term  situation 
frees  India  to  devote  its  domestic  sav- 
ings and  the  large  amounts  of  financial 
assistance  it  receives  from  other  coun- 
tries to  easing  its  massive,  long-term 
economic  development  problems  — 
slow  agricultural  growth;  rapidly  in- 
creasing population,  unemployment, 
and  underemployment;  and  inadequate 
food,  health  care,  housing,  and  educa- 
tion. I  am  pleased  to  say  that  our  pro- 
gram is  designed  to  help  in  these  key 
areas. 

Pakistan.  In  Pakistan,  the  economic 
picture  is  mixed.  There  have  been  en- 
couraging developments,  however,  and 
the  economy  is  recovering  from  the 
period  of  turmoil  that  led  up  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  present  government 
in  1977.  In  an  effort  to  liberalize  the 
economy  and  restore  investor  confi- 
dence, the  government  has  de- 
nationalized key  industries  and  reduced 
government  controls  and  direction 
where  possible. 

Much  remains  to  be  done  to 
strengthen  and  rationalize  the  econ- 
omy, and  implementation  of  plans  now 
under  consideration  will  be  an  impor- 
tant step  forward.  These  reforms  can 
return  Pakistan  to  the  rapid  growth  it 
enjoyed  in  the  1960's. 

Pakistan  is  an  agricultural  country, 
and  its  best  prospects  for  growth  lay  in 
that  sector  of  the  economy.  While  it 
has  sustained  production  reverses  in  re- 
cent years,  it  is  attempting  to  improve 
its  agricultural  practices.  Fertilizer 
usage  increased  by  approximately 
22%  this  past  year  and  is  projected  to 
increase  by  an  annual  rate  of  15%  for 
the  next  few  years. 

After  nearly  2  decades  of  planning 
and  construction,  the  Tarbela  Dam,  one 
of  the  world's  largest,  is  becoming  op- 
erational. It  will  provide  regulated  and 
assured  Hows  of  water  for  irrigation 
that  will  be  invaluable  in  the  more  arid 
portions  of  the  Indus  Valley.  In  addi- 
tion, a  relatively  recent  design  modifi- 
cation will  permit  the  dam  to  generate 
60%  of  the  electricity  produced  in  the 
country. 

Pakistan's  troubled  wheat  situation  is 
showing  signs  of  improvement.  Paki- 
stan is  in  the  final  stages  of  importing 
2.3  million  tons  of  wheat  to  cover  a 
shortage  that  resulted  from  unexpected 
shortfalls  in  production  and  increases 
in  demand. 

The  production  shortfall,  after  sev- 
eral years  of  moderate  but  steady  pro- 
duction increases,  can  be  attributed  to 
wheat  rust  and  a  producer  price  that 


April  1979 

gave  the  farmer  a  less  than  satisfactory 
return  tor  growing  wheat.  The  Pakistan 
Government  has  raised  the  producer 
price  of  wheat  by  22%  this  year  and 
introduced  other  measures  to  encourage 
production.  An  Agricultural  Research 
Council — headed  by  one  of  Pakistan's 
ablest  agriculturalists — has  been  estab- 
lished to  provide  the  research  support 
that  will  help  the  Pakistan  Government 
provide  better  seed  and  cultivation  ad- 
vice to  its  farmers.  Fortunately.  Paki- 
stan's wheal  crop  this  year  is  expected 
to  be  excellent. 

Bangladesh.  In  Bangladesh,  4  years 
of  good  harvests  and  dramatic  growth 
in  the  industrial  and  service  sectors 
have  strengthened  the  economy.  How- 
ever, agriculture,  the  dominant  sector 
of  that  economy,  is  largely  dependent 
on  the  weather.  While  reduced  food 
imports,  increased  food  stocks,  and 
growth  of  domestic  food  production  are 
encouraging  developments,  a  major 
flood,  a  cyclone,  or  a  bad  monsoon 
could  seriously  affect  food  production 
and  confront  Bangladesh  with  a  disas- 
ter of  major  proportions. 

Bangladesh  can  substantially  in- 
crease food  production  and  insulate  it- 
self from  the  shock  of  natural  disasters. 
Our  bilateral  aid  program  supports  ef- 
forts to  realize  this  potential.  Much 
remains  to  be  done,  and  Bangladesh 
will  need  the  assistance  of  the  United 
States  and  other  donors  for  some  time 
to  come. 

Increased  use  of  fertilizer  and  high- 
yielding  seeds,  expansion  of  the  irriga- 
tion system,  and  installation  of  a  price 
support  system  have  all  contributed  to 
increasing  food  production.  The  gov- 
ernment is  working  hard  to  expand  the 
dry  season  harvests  through  the  use  of 
modern  agricultural  techniques.  The 
realization  of  this  potential  growth  will 
enable  Bangladesh  to  reduce  its  re- 
liance on  the  monsoon  and  on  imported 
food  grains. 

In  the  industrial  sector,  the  growth 
has  been  more  dramatic  than  in  ag- 
riculture, although  it  started  from  a 
very  small  base.  The  share  of  industrial 
production  in  Bangladesh's  GDP  in- 
creased by  45%  over  the  last  4  years. 
While  industrial  production  still  ac- 
counts for  less  than  15%  of  GDP,  in 
1977-78,  for  the  first  time,  industrial 
output  exceeded  that  of  Bangladesh's 
last  preindependence  year  (1969-70). 
The  government  has  invited  foreign  in- 
vestment but,  so  far,  it  has  not  been 
successful  in  attracting  it  in  significant 
amounts. 

j      Sri  Lanka.  There  have  been  impor- 
i  tant  positive  economic  developments  in 
;  Sri  Lanka,  with  a  government  elected 
on  a  platform  of  economic  reform  de- 
signed to  combat  the  sluggish  growth 


and  high  unemployment  that  had 
characterized  the  nation's  economy 
earlier  in  the  1970's.  Central  to  the 
new  economic  policies  of  the  Jayewar- 
dene  government  is  the  accelerated  de- 
velopment of  the  massive  Mahaweli  ir- 
rigation scheme  designed  to  increase 
employment  and  expand  agricultural 
production. 

Our  aid  strategy  in  Sri  Lanka  sup- 
ports the  government's  efforts  to  ex- 
pand agricultural  productivity  and 
employment,  to  move  toward  food 
self-sufficiency,  and  to  sustain  the  na- 
tion's considerable  progress  in  meeting 
the  basic  needs  of  its  people. 

In  the  last  18  months  the  government 
has  devalued  the  currency,  liberalized 
import  and  foreign  exchange  regula- 
tions, removed  price  controls,  trimmed 
subsidies,  and  has  undertaken  a  major 
program  to  create  an  export-oriented 
free  trade  zone  attractive  to  the  private 
sector,  both  domestic  and  foreign. 

These  efforts,  along  with  good 
weather  and  buoyant  world  prices  for 
traditional  exports,  have  begun  to  show 
encouraging  results  in  terms  of  food 
and  industrial  production,  investment, 
and  employment.  The  economy  grew 
an  estimated  6%  in  real  terms  last  year. 
This  compares  to  a  GDP  growth  of 
4.4%  in  1977  and  an  annual  growth  of 
3%  during  the  preceding  7  years. 
Today  Sri  Lanka's  economy  is  stronger 
and  better  poised  for  growth  than  a 
year  ago. 

Nepal.  Nepal  remains  a  very  poor 
country,  but  there  are  some  encourag- 
ing economic  signs.  The  economy, 
helped  by  a  good  harvest,  is  expected 
to  recover  from  the  stagnation  that  has 
characterized  it  in  recent  years. 

The  tremendous  investment  over  the 
past  2  decades  in  infrastructure  now 
permits  the  government  to  focus  di- 
rectly on  improving  the  lives  of  the 
people.  Last  year's  trade  and  transit 
treaties  with  India  and  the  reform  of  a 
complicated  exchange  system  should 
stimulate  economic  growth.  Foreign 
loans  and  grants  can  be  expected  to  in- 
crease substantially. 

Nonetheless,  Nepal's  potential  for 


Letter 
of  Credence 


On  February  26,  1979,  Sultan 
Muhammad  Khan  presented  his  cre- 
dentials to  President  Carter  as  the 
newly  appointed  Ambassador  from 
Pakistan.  □ 


51 

economic  development  is  limited; 
mountains  and  rivers  represent  the 
country's  only  important  potential  re- 
source. Convinced  that  a  dramatic  eco- 
nomic breakthrough  can  be  made  when 
the  country  begins  to  export  substantial 
amounts  of  hydroelectric  power,  the 
Nepalese  have  taken  the  lead  in  calling 
for  the  development  of  the  region's 
water  resources. 

I  have  dealt  at  some  length  with  the 
four  areas  on  which  we  believe  our  ef- 
forts, and  those  of  the  nations  of  South 
Asia,  should  focus.  But  I  want  to  em- 
phasize that  progress  in  any  one  of  the 
four  areas  will  most  likely  be  stalled 
unless  accompanied  by  progress  in 
each  of  the  other  areas.  Enhanced  se- 
curity, increased  intraregional  cooper- 
ation, more  responsive  political  in- 
stitutions which  respect  individual 
rights,  and  greater  economic  develop- 
ment are  mutually  dependent,  as  well 
as  mutually  reinforcing,  elements  of  a 
stable  and  prosperous  future  for  South 
Asia. 

India's  Role  as  a  Regional  Power 

By  any  measuring  stick  —  GNP, 
population,  military  strength,  industrial 
base  —  India  is,  by  far,  the  largest 
power  in  the  region.  This  is  a  basic  and 
unalterable  fact  of  life  in  South  Asia. 
Our  relations  with  India  are  good,  and 
the  tenor  of  this  relationship  has  been 
set  by  the  mutual  respect  and  trust  es- 
tablished between  President  Carter  and 
Prime  Minister  Desai. 

We  believe  that  our  interests  in  the 
region  are  compatible  and  complimen- 
tary and  that  we  can  deal  with  the  dif- 
ferences that  do  arise  in  a  responsible 
and  candid  manner.  To  be  sure,  there 
are  also  elements  of  strain.  Most  nota- 
ble among  them  are — Indian  concern, 
exacerbated  by  past  experiences,  about 
U.S.  willingness  to  provide  even  a 
limited  supply  of  arms  to  Pakistan  and 
continuing  differences  over  means  of 
attaining  nonproliferation  objectives. 

Our  nonproliferation  policies  con- 
tinue to  be  of  the  highest  importance  to 
us,  and  we  have  made  them  clear  in  our 
discussions  over  the  last  2  years  not 
only  with  India  but  with  Pakistan  as 
well. 

We  take  India  and  its  views  seri- 
ously, and  our  two  governments  are 
engaged  in  a  wide  range  of  consulta- 
tions on  bilateral  and  multilateral 
issues — all  in  an  atmosphere  of  mutual 
respect,  trust,  candor,  and  cooperation. 

Indian  Ocean 

Let  me  turn  to  the  question  of  U.S.- 
Soviet negotiations  on  the  military  bal- 
ance in  the  Indian  Ocean.  For  reasons 
which  have  been  widely  discussed. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


UNITED  I\ATIOI\S:        f tMplettietilltijr 
Human  Rights  Standards 


by  Edward  M.  Mezvinsky 

Statement  in  Committee  III  (Social, 
Humanitarian  and  Cultural)  of  the 
U.  N.  General  Assembly  on  December 
7.  Mr.  Mezvinsky  is  U.S.  Representa- 
tive to  the  U.N.  Commission  on 
Human  Rights.' 

In  an  earlier  statement  in  this  com- 
mittee, the  U.S.  delegation  discussed 
various  proposals  for  improving  the 
human  rights  machinery  and  programs 
of  the  U.N.  system.  Today  we  wish  to 
discuss  the  substance  of  the  work  of  the 
U.N.  human  rights  bodies  and  in  par- 
ticular the  work  of  the  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  and  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council. 

It  is  important  for  all  of  us  to  recog- 
nize the  new  task  the  world  community 
has  assumed.  In  the  past,  the  U.N.'s 
work  in  the  human  rights  field  was 
largely  devoted  to  codification  of  inter- 
national standards  which  were  designed 
to  elaborate  on  the  principles  laid  down 
in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  30  years  ago.  But  this  vital 
work  of  codification  has  largely  been 
completed.  So  it  was  natural  and  desir- 
able that  the  world  community  in- 
creasingly turn  to  the  even  more  vital 
but  more  difficult  work  of  implementa- 
tion. 

We  should  approach  this  task  with 
both  determination  and  humility.  What 


is  being  attempted  is,  at  the  same  time, 
both  necessary  and  unprecedented.  In- 
deed, until  recently  in  history  the  very 
concept  of  international  standards  of 
human  rights  was  unthinkable.  A 
sovereign  owned  a  territory  and  its 
people  the  way  he  possessed  its  grass 
and  trees.  If  a  piece  of  territory  was 
given  at  last  to  a  new  sovereign,  the 
people  were  expected,  without  com- 
plaint, to  submit  to  the  will  of  their 
new  leader,  however  cruel. 

It  was  only  in  the  aftermath  of  World 
War  II  that  the  international  community 
began,  in  the  kind  of  step  that  marks  an 
advance  in  civilization,  to  recognize 
new  standards  of  behavior  applicable  to 
states  as  well  as  people. 

As  my  government  reviews  the  work 
of  the  United  Nations  in  the  human 
rights  field,  therefore,  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  importance  of  the  work 
being  undertaken.  We  want  to  move 
ahead  today:  at  the  same  time  we  must 
think  about  tomorrow.  We  want  to  lay 
the  foundation  stones  as  solidly  as  we 
can. 


Human  Rights  Treaties 

An  important  step  in  the  implemen- 
tation process  is  the  ratification  by 
states  of  the  international  agreements 
on  human  rights.  The  International 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights 
and  the  International  Covenant  on  Eco- 


South  Asia  (Cont'd) 

neither  the  United  States  nor  the  Soviet 
Union  wishes  to  see  a  large-scale  in- 
crease in  the  other's  military  presence 
in  the  Indian  Ocean  area. 

Negotiations  on  an  Indian  Ocean 
arms  limitations  agreement  were  begun 
in  1977  and  provided  an  area  of  at- 
tempted cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  negotiations  were  aimed  at 
stabilizing  the  level  of  U.S.  and  Soviet 
military  presence  in  the  area. 

We  held  four  rounds  of  discussions; 
the  last  meeting  took  place  in  February 
1978.  However,  at  that  time  we  ex- 
pressed our  concern  that  the  Soviet 
Union  was  supporting  its  political  ac- 
tivities in  the  Horn  of  Africa  by  in- 
creasing the  level  of  its  naval  forces  in 
the  Indian  Ocean.  We  questioned  if  this 
was  consistent  with  the  objective  of 
stabilization.  The  increased  Soviet 


naval  presence  continued  until  later  m 
1978  at  which  point  it  returned  to  ap- 
proximately routine  levels. 

A  future  round  of  discussions  has  not 
been  scheduled,  and  there  are  no  cur- 
rent plans  for  resumption  of  negotia- 
tions, although  this  matter  remains 
under  consideration.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC.  20402. 

^For  full  text  of  his  statement  on  Mar.  16,. 
1978,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1978,  p.  48. 

'Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Adolph  (Spike) 
Dubs  was  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Af- 
ghanistan in  July  1978.  He  was  kidnapped  in 
Kabul  by  terrorists  on  Feb.  14,  1979.  and 
killed  the  same  day  during  an  attempt  by  Af- 
ghan police  to  free  him  from  his  captors. 


nomic.  Social,  and  Cultural  Rights 
were  opened  for  signature  on  December 
19,  1966,  and  both  covenants  came 
into  force  in  1976  after  the  required 
number  of  states  had  ratified.  Last  year 
President  Carter  signed  the  two  cove- 
nants in  a  ceremony  here  at  the  United 
Nations  and  subsequently  submitted 
both  documents  to  the  U.S.  Senate  for 
ratification.  The  process  of  ratification 
has  not  yet  been  completed. 

However,  what  is  even  more  impor- 
tant than  an  examination  of  the  list  of 
ratifications  is  for  us  to  concentrate  on 
whether  states  are  striving  to  live  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  in  those  cov- 
enants, whether  they  have  been  ratified 
or  not.  Ratification  of  a  document  is  of 
no  value  to  the  citizens  of  a  state  if 
they  are  still  deprived  of  their  basic 
rights. 

The  citizens  of  the  United  States 
have  a  deep  awareness  of  their  found- 
ing principles,  and  after  200  years  they 
continue  to  bind  us  together  and  to  de- 
fine our  national  identity.  A  deep  pop- 
ular commitment  to  justice — social  as 
well  as  political — is  the  life  blood  of 
our  system  of  government,  encouraging 
all  sectors  of  our  population  regularly 
to  seek  to  redress  new  or  old  in- 
equalities. We  have  never  claimed  that 
our  society  is  unblemished.  Nor  should 
we  accept  that  any  other  society  is  un- 
blemished. No  society  ever  will  be.  As 
old  struggles  are  won,  new  struggles 
will  arise.  This  is  a  basic  law  of  social 
development. 

We  believe  the  first  honest  step  to- 
ward implementation  of  basic  human 
rights  principles  would  be  for  every 
government  to  acknowledge  more  of  its 
imperfections  and  to  announce  its 
commitment  to  end  or  ameliorate  them. 
What  we  can  never  allow  is  our  collec- 
tive efforts  to  promote  human  rights  to 
diminish  because  no  country  has  yet 
reached  the  state  of  perfection  outlined 
in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights. 

Commission  on  Human  Rights 

We  must  honestly  face  up  to  the  fact 
that  at  times  we  appear  to  be  falling 
into  the  trap  of  ignoring  shocking  vio- 
lations of  human  rights  crying  out  for 
our  attention.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  international  community  has 
made  a  great  deal  of  progress  on  paper 
in  establishing  norms  and  principles, 
there  continue  to  exist  today  situations 


April  1979 

in  a  few  areas  which  demand  much 
more  international  attention  than  they 
have  received.  Precisely  because  we 
shall  never  forget  the  great  suffering  of 
peoples  in  the  past,  such  as  the 
tragedies  that  befell  the  Armenian  and 
the  Jewish  peoples,  we  should  now  re- 
double our  efforts  on  the  most  serious 
current  cases.  At  its  past  session,  the 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  ad- 
dressed the  situations  in  several  coun- 
tries and  took  concrete  action  to  inquire 
into  the  situations  in  Uganda  and  Cam- 
bodia. 

It  is  relevant  to  the  world's  concern 
about  the  human  rights  situations  in 
these  latter  countries,  and  our  pos- 
sibilities for  ameliorating  worsening 
conditions  there,  that  both  are  involved 
in  military  conflicts  among  neighbors, 
using  arms  provided  by  third  powers. 
Both  in  Uganda  and  in  Indochina,  we 
condemn  this  role  by  outsiders,  which 
shows  their  lack  of  concern  about  the 
improvement  of  human  rights  viola- 
tions within  those  countries. 

We  have  noted  that  the  delegation  of 
Uganda  at  this  session  of  the  General 
Assembly  referred  to  cooperation  by 
Uganda  with  the  United  Nations  con- 
cerning the  situation  in  their  country. 
We  hope  that  this  approach  will  lead  to 
useful  results,  and  we  look  forward  to 
further  consideration  of  this  subject  at 
the  coming  session  of  the  Commission. 

Vietnam,  Kampuchea,  and  Laos 

No  discussion  of  the  state  of  human 
rights  in  today's  world  would  be  com- 
plete or  even  pertinent  without  a  more 
detailed  discussion  of  the  serious 
human  rights  situation  in  the  three 
countries  of  what  was  known  as  In- 
dochina. The  increasing  flow  of  refu- 
gees from  those  three  countries  points 
to  drastic  human  rights  abuses  and  is 
creating  a  serious  source  of  interna- 
tional tension  and  conflict. 

Despite  difficult  terrain,  high  seas, 
and  other  threats  to  life  posed  by  armed 
border  guards  and  shore  patrols, 
thousands  of  refugees  are  reaching 
other  Southeast  Asian  states,  each  with 
his  own  personal  report  of  oppression 
in  his  homeland.  These  reports  are  too 
consistent  in  detail  to  be  dismissed. 
The  world  must  heed  them. 

The  world's  extraordinary  concern 
about  Kampuchea  was  prompted  by 
repeated  reports  that  whole  categories 
of  people — economic  and  ethnic 
groupings — have  been  systematically 
eliminated  by  the  Kampuchean  Gov- 
ernment. The  practice  of  religion  is 
banned;  legal  and  political  rights  are 
nonexistent.  The  government  officially 
discriminates  between  those  who 
"joined"  the  revolution  early  and 


those  who  came  under  its  control  with 
the  final  days  of  the  previous  regime. 

Despite  unspeakable  accounts  of 
human  suffering  as  related  to  Kampu- 
chean refugees,  there  are  still  those 
who  question  the  persuasive  evidence 
of  mass  violations. 

Responding  to  world  concern  gener- 
ated by  these  abuses,  delegates  to  the 
recent  meetings  of  the  human  rights 
subcommission  in  Geneva  had  the  op- 
portunity to  review  the  massive  evi- 
dence from  many  sources.  The  sub- 
commission  was  convinced,  and  rec- 
ommended for  priority  consideration, 
an  analysis  of  the  evidence  to  the  next 
meeting  of  the  Human  Rights  Commis- 
sion. But  is  this  enough? 

During  his  general  debate  address, 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  External  Af- 
fairs of  Canada  called  for  an  investiga- 
tion of  the  human  rights  situation  in 
Kampuchea.  My  government  has  con- 
sistently supported  the  idea. 

We  have  also  noted  the  greater  will- 
ingness of  Kampuchean  leaders  to 
allow  foreign  observers  to  visit  their 
country.  We  urge  that  they  also  coop- 
erate with  the  U.N.  Human  Rights 
Commission.  Because  of  both  the 
human  rights  problems  and  the  severe 
conflict  in  the  area,  we  also  urge  that 
both  Vietnam  and  Kampuchea  allow  a 
visit  by  Secretary  General  Waldheim  to 
the  area. 

In  Vietnam,  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion is  forcing  tens  of  thousands  of  in- 
dividuals to  flee.  Harsh  measures  taken 
by  the  Vietnamese  Government  against 
whole  categories  of  its  citizenry  and 
the  forced  settlement  of  thousands  of 
Vietnamese  to  "new  economic  zones" 
appear  to  be  principal  reasons  for  the 
expanding  exodus.  We  are  also  con- 
cerned that  tens  of  thousands  of  those 
who  did  not  immediately  embrace  the 
regime  remain  incarcerated  without 
trial  in  "reeducation  camps." 

We  are  also  concerned  about  the 
situation  in  Laos  where  minority 
tribespeople  are  leaving  as  a  direct  re- 
sult of  military  pressures.  Other  Lao 
appear  to  be  leaving  for  a  broad  range 
of  reasons,  most  of  which  derive  from 
that  government's  authoritarian  rule 
and  food  shortages  which  derive  from 
natural  disasters  and  poor  agricultural 
planning. 

The  abuse  of  human  rights  in  In- 
dochina constitutes  a  world  concern,  as 
undertaken  to  care  for  the  scores  of 
thousands  of  refugees  who  have  in  des- 
peration sought  to  build  new  lives 
abroad.  This  problem  must  be  ad- 
dressed by  this  world  body  as  a  matter 
of  the  utmost  urgency. 

In  all  these  countries,  it  is  clear  with 
hindsight  that  they  would  have  been 
better  off  not  to  hide  their  human  rights 


53 


problems  but  to  attempt  to  solve  them 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

Worldwide  concern  continues  about 
the  human  rights  situations  in  many 
other  countries.  The  longer  that  these 
situations  remain  in  darkness,  the 
deeper  the  suspicions  grow.  We  hope 
that  countries  about  which  substantial 
allegations  have  been  raised  will  not 
make  the  mistakes  we  have  seen  but 
will  think  again  about  cooperating  with 
officials  of  the  United  Nations  and  other 
international  bodies  so  that  the  full 
facts — including  those  that  reflect  well 
on  the  country  in  question — may  be 
brought  to  light.  And  more  impor- 
tantly, we  hope  that,  if  there  is  truth  to 
the  allegations,  these  countries  will 
take  courses  of  action  which  can  bring 
about  respect  for  human  dignity  and 
legal  process,  as  well  as  for  the  con- 
cerns of  the  international  community. 
Above  all,  I  hope  that  all  of  us  will  not 
be  silent  the  next  time. 

Chile 

The  question  of  the  protection  of 
human  rights  in  Chile  will  once  again 
be  considered  under  this  item.  This  has 
been  for  my  delegation,  since  the  mat- 
ter was  first  raised  in  the  General  As- 
sembly in  1974,  a  matter  of  profound 
concern.  The  long  history  of  close  and 
harmonious  relations  between  the 
peoples  of  Chile  and  the  United  States 
underlies  our  special  interest  in  the 
human  rights  situation  there.  We  have 
had  deep  and  heartfelt  sympathy  for  the 
trials  which  the  Chilean  people  have 
undergone  in  recent  years,  and  we  have 
been  particularly  anxious  to  assure  that 
actions  taken  by  the  General  Assembly 
on  this  matter  would  be  those  which 
were  best  designed  to  influence  in  a 
positive  way  the  course  of  events  in 
that  country  so  that  basic  human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms  would  be  re- 
stored and  fully  respected. 

An  event  of  special  significance  took 
place  this  year.  The  fact  that  the  ad  hoc 
working  group  of  the  Human  Rights 
Commission  was  at  last  able  to  visit 
Chile  was  extremely  gratifying  to  my 
government.  While  regretting  that  the 
cooperative  spirit  shown  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Chile  in  admitting  the  group 
could  not  have  come  about  much 
sooner,  we  nevertheless  welcome  the 
fact  that  the  visit  did  take  place. 

We  have  read  with  particular  interest 
the  report  of  the  ad  hoc  working  group 
which  has  recently  been  issued  because 
it  is  the  only  one  which  is  based  upon  a 
firsthand  observation  of  the  scene  in 
Chile.  My  government  takes  particular 
note  of  that  paragraph  in  the  report  of 
the  ad  hoc  working  group  to  the  effect 


54 

that  the  information  received  by  the 
group  while  in  Chile  does  not  con- 
tradict the  substance  and  conclusions 
which  the  group  has  previously  sub- 
mitted to  the  General  Assembly  and  to 
the  Commission  on  Human  Rights.  The 
group  also  notes  that  persons  of  stature 
within  Chile  have  told  the  group  that 
the  information  in  its  earlier  reports 
was  accurate. 

We  will  be  taking  care  to  assure  that 
the  action  we  propose  for  the  Assembly 
this  year  will  be  in  view  of  the  most 
recent  developments,  as  reported  by  the 
ad  hoc  working  group.  Some  of  these 
developments  have  been  encour- 
aging—  the  group  reports  that  some 
improvements  have  taken  place.  At  the 
same  time,  other  developments  have 
been  discouraging — the  group  reports 
its  conclusions  that  violations  of 
human  rights,  often  of  a  serious  na- 
ture, continue  to  take  place  and  that 
this  situation  should  continue  to  be  a 
matter  of  concern  to  the  international 
community.  My  delegation  agrees  that 
the  United  Nations  must  continue  to 
follow  the  human  rights  situation  in 
Chile. 

We  will  be  striving  for  actions  which 
will  most  likely  be  effective  in  reach- 
ing, as  soon  as  possible,  the  goal  which 
we  all  seek — the  full  and  complete  res- 
toration of  all  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms  within  that  country. 

My  final  word  on  the  subject  of 
Chile  must  be  to  note  our  concern  over 
the  continuing  problem  of  the  disap- 
peared persons.  There  is  too  much  an- 
guish and  torment  on  the  part  of  the 
relatives  of  these  persons  mixed  up  in 
this  question  for  us  to  wash  our  hands 
of  it.  We  must  insist  that  the  facts  be 
clarified  and  that  those  who  still  remain 
in  the  dark  about  the  fate  of  their  rela- 
tives will  finally  know  for  sure  what 
has  happened. 

The  problem  of  missing  persons  is 
not  limited  to  Chile  alone.  The  United 
States  views  the  use  of  officially 
sanctioned  political  kidnappings  to  be 
one  of  the  most  serious  governmental 
abuses  confronting  the  international 
community.  It  requires  prompt  action 
by  the  United  Nations  to  press  for  its 
end. 


Missing  Persons 

Historically,  the  tragedy  of  missing 
persons  resulted  from  the  aftermath  of 
war.  In  recent  years,  it  has  become  a 
deliberate  policy  of  certain  govern- 
ments; a  policy  aimed  at  the  silent 
elimination  of  opponents.  As  a  result, 
thousands  of  persons  have  been  de- 
tained by  government  security  forces, 
tortured,  and  perhaps  killed;  yet  their 
fate  remains  enclosed  in  governmental 
silence. 


Anyone  who  has  talked  with  parents 
or  children  or  wives  of  people  who 
have  disappeared  knows  the  intense 
anguish  and  suffering  they  undergo  and 
the  destruction  of  spirit  they  endure. 
The  individual  stories  are  heartrending 
and  tragic. 

•  A  young  woman,  her  husband,  and 
their  infant  son  were  dragged  from 
their  home  by  security  forces.  The 
child  was  found  in  an  orphanage;  the 
parents  were  never  heard  from  again. 
The  government  denies  all  knowledge 
of  their  disappearance. 

•  A  peasant  farmer  was  pushed  into 
a  waiting  van  by  uniformed  police.  He 
did  not  return.  The  government  denies 
all  knowledge  of  the  disappearance. 

•  A  physicist  was  dragged  away 
from  his  home  by  plainclothes  police 
forces.  He  was  not  heard  from  again. 
The  government  denies  all  knowledge 
of  the  disappearance. 

•  A  clergyman  was  abducted  from 
his  home  by  security  forces,  interro- 
gated, and  tortured  incessantly  by  his 
captors  and  then  never  heard  from 
again.  The  government  denies  all 
knowledge  of  the  disappearance. 

•  A  14-year-old  boy  was  picked  up 
on  his  way  from  school  and  his  father 
dragged  from  his  home.  Neither  was 
heard  from  again.  The  government  de- 
nies all  knowledge  of  the  disappear- 
ance. 

The  victims  range  across  the  broad 
spectrum  of  society.  They  include  stu- 
dents, workers,  doctors,  labor  leaders, 
clergy,  scientists,  and  journalists.  They 
are  the  targets  of  both  right-wing  and 
left-wing  authoritarian  regimes  who 
view  them  as  a  threat.  Virtually  all  are 
tagged  as  "subversive"  by  govern- 
ments which  have  used  that  word  so 
indiscriminately  that  it  has  lost  all 
meaning.  Some  who  disappear  may  be 
suspected  of  actual  criminal  acts  of 
violence — which  we  all  condemn — 
regardless  of  the  political  goal  they 
pursue. 

Yet  for  all  of  these  individuals,  there 
is  no  trial,  no  court,  no  legal  proce- 
dures to  judge  guilt  or  innocence.  They 
disappear  under  administrative  orders 
from  a  government,  a  military  com- 
mand, a  security  subdivision.  They 
disappear  because  security  forces  have 
been  given  nearly  unlimited  power  to 
arrest,  search,  interrogate,  torture,  im- 
prison, and  even  execute  without  ac- 
countability. 

The  Nobel  Prize-winning  non- 
governmental organization.  Amnesty 
International,  has  termed  this  disturb- 
ing new  tendency  "political  killings." 
Its  International  Executive  Committee 
Chairman  said;  "It  has  become  too 
complicated  to  arrive  at  someone's 
house  with  a  warrant  for  arrest,  take 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 

him  away,  investigate,  bring  him  to  ; 
trial,  sentence,  and  imprison.  It's  so 
much  easier  for  governments  to  send 
out  their  plainclothes  agents  to  kidnap, 
torture,  and  shoot.  This  type  of  wan- 
tonly illegal  repression.  .  .  must 
be  .  .  .exposed;  and  the  response  from 
those  governments.  .  .  that  they  have 
no  responsibility  or  power  to  control 
the  vigilante  groups  is  not  a  satisfac- 
tory answer.  The  governments  are  re- 
sponsible." 

In  confronting  domestic  violence  or 
terrorism,  governments  have  the  au- 
thority to  use  legal  means  to  restore 
public  peace  and  order  and  protect  the 
lives  and  safety  of  their  citizens.  When 
terrorists  kidnap  and  kill  defenseless 
victims,  governments  must  seek  to 
bring  them  to  justice;  but  not  by  using 
the  same  methods  of  the  terrorist.  Even 
in  such  emergencies,  there  is  no  basis 
under  domestic  or  international  law  for 
governments  to  engage  in  abductions, 
torture,  or  murder.  Governments  claim 
to  be  the  custodians  of  law;  yet  when 
they  engage  in  campaigns  of  terror, 
they  undermine  the  rule  of  law  as  well 
as  their  own  right  to  govern. 

International  law,  as  set  forth  in  the 
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights  (Article  4),  the  Euro- 
pean Convention  for  the  Protection  of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Free- 
doms (Article  15),  and  the  American 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (Article 
27)  prohibits  states,  even  in  times  of 
public  emergency,  from  derogating 
from  certain  fundamental  guarantees 
afforded  the  individual.  Under  no  cir- 
cumstances can  a  state  arbitrarily  de- 
prive its  citizens  of  their  life  or  subject 
them  to  torture  or  cruel,  inhuman,  or 
degrading  treatment  or  punishment. 
Governments  are  responsible  for  the 
safety  and  protection  of  those  detained. 
They  also  are  responsible  for  rendering 
an  accounting  of  the  whereabouts  and 
fate  of  those  apprehended. 

The  General  Assembly  in  December 
1977  (Resolution  31/121)  drew  atten- 
tion to  the  "special  dangers"  to  which 
persons  detained  "by  reason  of  their 
political  opinion  or  conviction"  are 
often  "exposed"  as  regards  "the  pro- 
tection of  their  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms."  A  resolution 
adopted  by  consensus  called  upon 
member  states  to  "safeguard"  the 
human  rights  of  this  special  category  of 
prisoners. 

The  twin  principles  of  accountability 
and  of  humanitarian  and  legal  access 
for  persons  deprived  by  any  authority 
of  their  personal  liberty  are  recognized 
in  the  Geneva  Conventions  for  the 
Protection  of  War  Victims  of  1949,  the 
recently  signed  1977  protocols  to  those 
conventions.  Article  36  of  the  Vienna 
Consular  Convention  of  1963,  Articles 


April  1979 

8-11  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  corresponding  provi- 
sions of  the  International  Covenant  on 
Civil  and  Political  Rights,  and  the  draft 
body  of  principles  for  the  protection  of 
all  persons  under  any  form  of  detention 
or  imprisonment,  as  adopted  this  fall 
by  the  U.N.  Subcommission  on  Pre- 
vention of  Discrimination  and  Protec- 
tion of  Minorities. 

The  Geneva  conventions  testify  to 
what  governments  accept  as  treaty  law, 
even  in  armed  conflict,  where  states 
tend  to  preserve  the  greatest  latitude  for 
taking  emergency  measures  as  a  matter 
of  national  self-preservation.  They 
also  reflect  the  understanding  that  sol- 
dier and  civilian  prisoners  alike  are  en- 
titled to  respect  by  the  authorities  for 
their  right  to  life,  to  humane  treat- 
ment, and  judicial  guarantees. 

At  a  very  minimum,  governments 
must  be  urged  to  issue  statements  re- 
flecting kidnappings  or  other  excesses 
and  insuring  that  those  guilty  of  such 
practices  will  be  punished  in  accord- 
ance with  law.  They  must  publish  lists 
of  those  missing  and  provide  death 
certificates  for  those  known  to  be 
killed.  They  must  consider  ways  to 
award  compensation  to  families,  to  re- 
turn remains  to  relatives,  and,  most 
importantly,  to  establish  a  governmen- 
tal mechanism,  together  with  the 
courts,  to  trace  missing  people  and 
clarify  their  status  for  their  relatives. 

A  central  characteristic  of  the  20th 
century  profoundly  distinguishing  it 
from  previous  centuries  is  the  recogni- 
tion that  governments  are  obliged  to 
protect  the  fundamental  human  rights, 
safety,  and  well-being  of  their  citizens. 
No  nation  in  the  world  today  can  hide 
politically-sanctioned  abductions  and 
murders,  torture,  or  other  gross  viola- 
tions of  human  rights  behind  assertions 
of  sovereignty.  Where  basic  human 
rights  are  concerned,  all  governments 
are  accountable  not  only  to  their  own 
citizens  but  to  the  entire  community  of 
nations.  Governments  are  committed  to 
protect  their  citizens'  right  to  liberty 
and  security  of  person;  their  right  to 
freedom  from  torture,  to  freedom  from 
arbitrary  arrest  or  imprisonment;  the 
right  to  fair  public  trials;  and  to  free- 
dom from  invasion  of  the  home. 

At  this  General  Assembly  session,  it 
is  incumbent  upon  the  world  commu- 
nity to  draw  attention  to  the  special 
dangers  existing  in  those  societies 
where  substantial  numbers  of  persons 
have  disappeared  and  remain  unac- 
counted for. 

In  this  modem  era,  30  years  after  the 
adoption  of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights,  the  world  commu- 
nity must  seek  to  make  midnight  ar- 
rests, summary  executions,  torture, 
disappearance,  and  failure  to  account 


for  the  missing  alien  to  the  experience 
of  any  nation. 

Let  us  take  a  first  step  by  endorsing  a 
resolution  on  missing  persons,  thereby 
generating  support  for  long  awaited 
action  on  this  tragic,  humanitarian 
problem. 

The  1503  Procedures 

We  are  encouraged  with  the  dignity 
and  wisdom  with  which  the  Human 
Rights  Commission's  subcommission 
has  handled  its  mandate  under 
ECOSOC  Resolution  1503,  which  es- 
tablishes confidential  procedures  for 
examining  allegations  of  violations  of 
human  rights.  After  several  years  of 
rather  futile  debate  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  adoption  of  this  resolution, 
this  year  the  subcommission  and  the 
Human  Rights  Commission  finally 
began  to  come  to  grips  with  the  large 
number  of  allegations  and  acted  on  10 
cases,  as  reported  to  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council. 

It  is  only  in  taking  seriously  allega- 
tions about  human  rights  violations  in 
any  nation,  in  all  regions  of  the  world, 
about  any  category  of  human  rights, 
that  the  United  Nations  will  be  able  to 
escape  the  accusation  of  following  a 
double  standard,  blaming  a  few 
scapegoats  instead  of  maintaining  a 
balanced  approach.  We  believe  the 
Human  Rights  Commission  demon- 
strated a  new  maturity  this  year  in  con- 
sidering seriously  cases  in  nearly  a 
dozen  nations.  We  have  great  hopes 
that  Resolution  1503  will  be  utilized 
even  more  in  future  years  and  that  all 
nations  will  lose  their  fear  of  respond- 
ing to  inquiries  that  may  be  addressed 
to  it  under  this  procedure. 

Struggle  Against  Torture 

In  April  1977,  before  the  Economic 
and  Social  Council,  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  the  U.N.  Andrew  Young  said  that  he 
believed  that  the  United  Nations  should 
set  priorities  in  its  struggle  for  human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  in 
order  to  concentrate  our  resources  and 
focus  our  attention.  One  of  the  three 
priorities  he  suggested  was  the  struggle 
against  torture,  which  he  called  "the 
leading  edge  of  oppression"  and  which 
is  surely  an  affront  to  the  conscience  of 
the  international  community. 

We  are  glad  to  note  that  the 
worldwide  appeals  from  many 
groups — including  the  world  religious 
communities  and  the  growing  concern 
of  governments  during  the  past  4  or  5 
years — have  finally  begun  to  show 
some  progress  and  that  apparently  there 
are  fewer  cases  of  torture  in  the  world 
today  than  there  were  even  2  or  3  years 
ago. 


55 

We  are  also  alarmed  by  the  use  of 
modern  science  to  engage  in  more 
sophisticated  forms  of  torture,  includ- 
ing the  professional  misuse  of  psy- 
chiatric wards  to  silence  legitimate  ex- 
pression of  political  opinions. 

We  welcome  the  draft  resolution 
sponsored  by  the  Netherlands,  India, 
and  Sweden  and  express  our  commit- 
ment to  a  speedy  conclusion  of  the 
drafting  process  of  the  treaty  against 
torture.  We  cannot  cease  our  concern 
nor  our  vigilance  in  this  area. 

Freedom  of  Religion 

In  a  survey  of  the  overall  human 
rights  record  in  the  United  Nations  for 
the  past  year,  there  is  one  particular 
area  which  stands  out  for  special 
notice.  My  government  and  my  country 
attach  deep  importance  to  the  right  of 
everyone  to  freedom  of  thought,  con- 
science, and  religion.  As  stated  in  Ar- 
ticle 18  of  the  Universal  Declaration, 
this  right  includes  freedom  to  change 
one's  religion  or  belief  and  freedom, 
either  alone  or  in  community  with 
others  and  in  public  or  in  private,  to 
manifest  one's  religion  or  belief  in 
teaching,  practice,  worship,  and  obser- 
vance. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to 
discuss  the  very  disappointing  record 
so  far  achieved  by  the  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  in  drafting  a  declaration 
on  religious  intolerance.  Everyone  in 
this  room  knows  that  my  government  is 
eager  for  the  drafting  exercise  to  go 
forward.  But  our  concern  is  not  be- 
cause we  want  to  see  another  document 
added  to  the  collection  already  pro- 
duced in  the  United  Nations.  It  is  be- 
cause we  know  that  freedom  of  religion 
is  a  freedom  that  is  widely  denied  in 
the  world  today.  It  is  a  freedom  in 
which  every  country  represented  here 
should  be  interested,  because  this  is  the 
freedom  which  applies  not  just  to  reli- 
gions in  a  particular  country  or  area  of 
the  world  but  to  each  of  the  many  reli- 
gions which  are  practiced  throughout 
the  world. 

There  are  countries  in  the  world 
today  where  Muslims  are  denied  the 
practice  of  their  religion,  where  Jews 
are  discriminated  against,  where 
Christians  are  unable  to  worship  freely. 
I  urge  all  of  you  to  pay  greater  atten- 
tion to  this  question  and  to  join  to- 
gether to  resist  those  who  would 
obstruct  the  efforts  of  this  body  to 
make  into  a  reality  throughout  the 
world  the  words  of  Article  IS  of  the 
Universal  Declaration. 

I  repeat,  this  is  not  a  problem  which 
should  be  the  concern  of  just  one  or 
two  countries  or  of  one  or  two  reli- 
gions. Everyone  who  professes  a  reli- 
gion, regardless  of  the  particular  be- 


56 

liets  with  which  his  religion  may  be 
identified,  will  benefit  in  direct  meas- 
ure as  this  Organization  can  succeed  in 
strengthening  the  observance  of  reli- 
gious freedom  everywhere. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WE!$TERI\  HEMISPHERE: 

F\  1980  Assistance  Proposals 


Arrested  or  Detained  Trade 
Unionists 

Last  year  the  General  Assembly 
adopted  Resolution  32/121  regarding 
the  protection  of  the  human  rights  of 
persons  detained  or  imprisoned  for 
their  political  opinions  or  convictions. 
This  year  that  resolution  is  being  spe- 
cifically applied  to  a  certain  category 
of  persons — those  arrested  or  detained 
on  account  of  their  trade  union  ac- 
tivities. My  delegation  strongly  sup- 
ports this  resolution.  We  firmly  believe 
that  at  the  heart  of  any  healthy  society 
lies  a  healthy  trade  union  movement. 
History  demonstrates  that  when  human 
rights  are  violated  and  tyrannies  used, 
the  first  to  resist  and  the  first  to  suffer 
is  the  trade  union  movement. 

In  supporting  the  resolution,  in 
document  L.44,  my  delegation  would 
like  to  note  that  it  has  been  30  years 
since  the  freedom  to  form  and  to  join 
trade  unions  was  proclaimed  a  basic 
human  right  in  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights  and  in  the  con- 
vention on  freedom  of  association 
adopted  that  same  year  by  the  Interna- 
tional Labor  Organization.  We  believe 
it  is  time  for  the  United  Nations  to  de- 
vote much  more  attention  to  this  area. 

This  resolution  is  directed  to  all 
member  states.  However,  I  would  wish 
to  note  several  specific  examples.  In 
South  Africa,  we  have  recently  been 
encouraged  by  certain  preliminary  stir- 
rings toward  the  development  of  black 
trade  unionism  in  that  country.  This 
resolution,  if  adopted,  will  serve  notice 
that  the  United  Nations  and  its  member 
states  will  give  special  attention  to  the 
measure  in  which  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  grants  to  its  black  citizens 
the  right  of  association  in  trade  unions 
of  their  own  choosing.  But  here  again 
we  must  avoid  the  double  standard. 

We  would  also  hope  that  this  resolu- 
tion would  be  noted  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  Tunisia,  Bangladesh,  Argen- 
tina, Chile,  and  Uruguay — govern- 
ments to  which  the  International  Labor 
Organization  has  within  the  past  year 
appealed  for  the  release  of  trade 
unionists  from  imprisonment  or  deten- 
tion. 

We  would  hope  that  the  resolution 
would  also  be  noted  by  those  Com- 
munist countries  in  which  workers  are 
beginning  to  insist  on  the  exercise  of 
their  trade  union  rights.  In  China,  Po- 
land, Romania,  and  the  Soviet  Union 
we  have  seen  a  small  beginning.  Some 


by  Viron  P.  Vaky 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Inter- American  Affairs  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1979.  Mr.  Vaky  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss the  Administration's  proposed  FY 
1980  foreign  assistance  program  for 
Latin  America.  I  will  try  to  place  this 
program  in  the  context  of  our  major 
interests  and  overall  policy  objectives. 

The  importance  of  Latin  America  to 
the  United  States  in  economic  terms  is 
made  obvious  by  the  very  large  flow  of 


goods,  technology,  and  capital  in  both 
directions.  Latin  America  is  the  source 
of  one  out  of  every  six  barrels  of  oil  we 
import.  U.S.  investment  in  Latin 
America  already  exceeds  $20  billion. 
Our  exports  to  the  area  have  tripled 
since  1967  to  almost  $20  billion  annu- 
ally. We  now  sell  more  machinery,, 
consumer  goods,  and  chemicals  to 
Latin  America  than  to  the  rest  of  the 
Third  World  combined.  Three 
nations  —  Mexico,  Brazil,  and 
Venezuela — are  among  our  top  dozen 
trading  partners. 

Less  easily  quantified,  but  no  less 
important,  are  our  political, 
psychological,  and  security  interests  in 
Latin  America.  To  everyone's  great 


workers  have  begun  to  speak  out  for 
their  rights.  Workers  have  gone  on 
strike  or  attempted  to  form  unions  of 
their  choosing,  as  guaranteed  in  the 
Universal  Declaration. 

We  believe  this  is  an  important  test 
for  the  countries  in  question  and  for  the 
international  community.  Such  a  cen- 
tral force  in  any  community  cannot 
forever  be  denied  rights  that  are  inter- 
nationally sanctioned  and  socially 
wise. 


Conclusion 

Finally,  let  me  re-enforce  what  the 
United  States  has  said  on  numerous  oc- 
casions about  the  continuing  impor- 
tance of  economic  and  social  rights. 

President  Carter  has  said  that  the 
right  to  a  job  is  a  basic  human  right, 
and  yet  in  my  own  country  we  have  an 
unemployment  problem.  There  is  a 
massive  problem  in  the  world  as  a 
whole  as  millions  flee  the  soil  premat- 
urely to  seek  work  they  cannot  find  in 
the  cities.  The  numbers  of  the  im- 
poverished, the  starving,  the  sick,  the 
uneducated,  the  jobless — all  over  the 
world — are  massive  by  any  calculation. 
Ninety  percent  of  the  resources  of  the 
United  Nations  and  its  affiliated  agen- 
cies are  directed  at  this  problem,  and 
the  bilateral  assistance  programs  of  my 
own  and  many  other  governments  are 
aimed — in  various  ways — at  making 
progress  on  this  issue. 

The  denial  of  life  or  health  or 
schooling  or  employment  is  no  less  a 
denial  of  human  rights  because  it  re- 
sults from  neglect  or  maldistribution  of 
available  resources  or  the  lack  of  tech- 


nological skills  to  solve  very  real  prac- 
tical problems.  Our  concern  is  for 
human  beings  whose  rights  are  being 
denied,  whatever  the  reason. 

We  urge  that  the  United  Nations  and 
its  member  countries  continue  their 
concerted  efforts  to  address  economic 
and  social  questions  and  to  operate  in- 
creasingly effective  and  efficient  pro- 
grams that  give  even  greater  impact  to 
limited  resources  that  are  available.  We 
ask  that  these  developed  states  that 
place  special  stress  on  economic  and 
social  rights  now  join  with  the  rest  of 
the  developed  countries  in  contributing 
their  fair  share  to  international  efforts 
to  solve  these  problems.  We  all  can  do 
more  if  we  feel  that  everyone  is  work- 
ing together.  The  U.N.  Charter  deter- 
mined that  a  goal  of  this  body  is  "to 
promote  social  progress  and  better 
standards  of  life  in  larger  freedom." 
Let  us  work  to  that  objective. 

I  need  not  remind  this  group  that  this 
year  we  commemorate  the  30th  an- 
niversary of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  That  and  other  legal 
documents  prepared  by  this  body  chal- 
lenges us  to  put  into  practice  the  prin- 
ciples so  carefully  laid  down  by 
member  governments.  As  worldwide 
concern  for  human  rights,  in  all  their 
forms,  has  grown  over  the  past  year,  I 
urge  that  we  seize  this  opportunity  to 
make  a  quantum  leap  forward — to  end 
human  rights  abuses  and  encourage 
member  nations  to  foster  new  under- 
standing and  concern  for  the  rights  of 
individuals  everywhere.  D 


'USUN  press  release  154. 


April  1979 


57 


;j(H)d  fortune,  our  history  of  inter- 
American  relations  in  recent  years  has 
hocn  made  up  of  movements  of  people 
laiher  than  of  armies,  of  ideas  rather 
than  of  threats.  But  the  peaceful  nature 
of  our  relations  means  only  that  Latin 
America  is  less  in  the  headlines  than. 
say,  China,  Iran,  or  the  Soviet  Union. 
It  does  not  mean  that  we  have  no 
problems  or  that  the  problems  are  not 
important. 

While  U.S.  interests  in  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  are  strong 
and  enduring,  our  relations  with  the 
nations  of  the  region  are  undergoing  a 
profound  change.  There  is  no  better 
e\  idence  of  that  than  the  budget  re- 
t|ucsts  you  have  before  you  now.  They 
embody  an  apparent  paradox:  for  de- 
spite the  importance  of  Latin  America 
to  the  United  States  and  its  direct  im- 
pact on  many  basic  U.S.  interests, 
Latin  America  today  receives  less  U.S. 
bilateral  economic  aid  and  military  as- 
sistance than  any  other  area  in  the  de- 
\ eloping  world. 

Today's  programs  are  quite  modest 
(Compared  to»  past  U.S.  assistance  ef- 
forts. More  importantly,  they  are  ex- 
tremely modest  in  terms  of  the  needs  of 
the  region.  The  $230  million  economic 
I  assistance  program  proposed  for  FY 
1980  is  concentrated  on  a  relatively 
lcv\  poorer  countries  —  in  the  Carib- 
bean, Central  America,  and  the 
Andes — and  the  proposed  $38.7  mil- 
lion in  security  assistance,  for  exam- 
ple, would  provide  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  credit  for  only  six  coun- 
tries. There  is  nothing  in  either  cate- 
gory for  the  larger  advanced  develop- 
ing countries  —  Brazil,  Mexico,  Ven- 
ezuela, and  Argentina.  Indeed  70%  of 
Latin  America's  people  live  in  coun- 
tries not  touched  by  our  FY  1980  pro- 
posals. 

The  modest  bilateral  economic  pro- 
grams we  are  proposing  are  targeted  at 
the  worst  aspects  of  poverty  through  a 
strategy  of  meeting  basic  human  needs. 
They  are  a  modest  response  to  the 

■  pressing  problems  in  the  poorest  coun- 
tries that  blends  development  loans  and 
technical  cooperation.  Our  small  mili- 
tary sales  and  training  programs  aim  at 

■  the  legitimate  security  needs  of  the  re- 
gion and  are  carefully  tailored  to  sup- 
port our  political  objectives,  including 

'  human  rights. 

Secretary  Vance  noted  in  his  state- 
ment before  the  full  committee  on 
February  5,  that  our  strategy  is  one  of 
affirmative  involvement  and  support 

,  for  the  independence  and  diversity  of 
developing  nations.  This  strategy  is 
particularly  important  for  our  relations 
with  Latin  America. 

Relations  in  the  hemisphere  have 
changed.  The  Latins  have  widened 


their  horizons  while  the  United  States 
is  no  longer  such  a  dominant  force. 
Military  and  equipment  links  now  exist 
overwhelmingly  with  Europe  —  East 
and  West  —  while  we  have  slipped  to 
fourth  among  all  arms  suppliers  to  the 
region;  economic  relationships — trade 
and  investment  —  have  been  diversified 
toward  Europe  and  Japan;  while  tradi- 
tional intellectual  and  cultural  ties  with 
Spain,  France,  and  others  have  been 
strengthened. 

The  significance  of  the  North-South 
dialogue  is  that  we  are  beginning  to 
engage  the  countries  of  the  developing 
world  as  active  and  effective  partici- 
pants in  the  world  economic  system, 
ones  increasingly  well  represented  in 
its  decisionmaking  process.  This  link- 
age is  important  to  us.  Latin  America's 
economic  growth  and  that  of  the  rest  of 
the  Third  World  has  had  an  important 
and  positive  impact  on  growth  rates  in 
the  industrialized  world. 

These  developments  are  basically 
healthy  for  everyone  concerned. 
Strong,  independent  countries,  operat- 
ing within  and  supported  by  a  sound 
inter-American  system  and  by  a  global 
economic  and  political  framework,  are 


our  best  assurance  of  peaceful, 
friendly,  and  economically  sound 
neighbors  in  the  hemisphere. 

Obviously,  however,  the  new  situa- 
tion requires  careful  definition  of  U.S. 
interests  and  objectives.  In  my  experi- 
ence, U.S.  assistance  programs,  in  ad- 
dition to  their  own  inherent  reasons, 
are  an  integral  part  of  the  overall  policy 
process.  They  provide  major  and  direct 
support  for  key  U.S.  interests  and  ob- 
jectives which,  in  the  hemisphere  in 
their  broadest  terms,  are: 

•  To  enhance  Western  Hemisphere 
security  and  create  an  environment  in 
which  the  countries  of  the  hemisphere 
will  resort  to  peaceful  means  to  settle 
disputes;  to  support  regional  arms  re- 
straint efforts  as  a  means  to  enhance 
security  and  stability  in  the  area  and 
free  funds  for  development  needs; 

•  To  prevent  the  proliferation  of  nu- 
clear weapons  and  weapons-making 
capabilities  in  the  area; 

•  To  promote  the  increased  observ- 
ance of  all  forms  of  human  rights — 
individual  rights,  economic  and  social 
rights,  and  basic  political  rights; 

•  To  encourage  economic  growth 


Pan  American  Day 
and  HVeek,  1979 


A  Proclamation' 

Each  year  the  peoples  ot  the  Americas  cele- 
brate our  common  origins  and  continuing 
mutual  ties.  To  the  people  of  the  United  States 
Pan  American  Day  commemorates  the  impor- 
tance of  mutual  respect  and  cooperation  which 
characterize  the  Inter-American  system  and  its 
central  institution,  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States. 

No  region  of  the  world  can  boast  a  greater 
tradition  of  peace  and  tranquility  among  na- 
tions. No  nations  of  the  world  have  worked 
more  consistently  or  harder  to  find  solutions  to 
the  political  and  economic  problems  which  they 
face  in  the  world  today.  Our  Organization  of 
American  States,  the  birth  of  which  we  will 
celebrate  on  April  14,  has  been  and  continues 
to  be  vital  to  this  continuing  effort. 

In  the  past  year  alone,  the  Organization  of 
American  States  has  made  important  contribu- 
tions to  the  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  hemi- 
sphere. It  has  helped  to  promote  the  cause  of 
human  rights  and  dignity  in  the  Americas  and 
to  diffuse  tensions  in  Central  and  South 
America. 

The  United  States,  on  Pan  American  Day 
1979.  salutes  the  other  nations  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  pledges  its  solidarity  with  them. 


and  with  the  Organization  of  American  States 
in  the  continuing  efforts  to  achieve  the  vi- 
sionary democratic  ideals  of  the  founding 
heroes  of  our  hemisphere.  It  is  from  these 
ideals  that  we  derive  our  desire  and  our  ability 
to  cooperate  for  a  common  good  and  for  the 
benefit  of  all  our  people. 

Now,  Therefore,  1,  Jimmy  Carter,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  do  hereby 
proclaim  Saturday.  April  14,  1979  as  Pan 
American  Day  and  the  week  beginning  April 
15,  1979  as  Pan  American  Week,  and  I  call 
upon  the  Governors  of  the  fifty  States,  the 
Governor  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto 
Rico,  and  appropriate  officials  of  all  other 
areas  under  the  flag  of  the  United  States  to 
issue  similar  Proclamations. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set 
my  hand  this  sixth  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of 
our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-nine,  and  of 
the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  and  third. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


•No.  4644  of  Mar  6,  1979  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Mar.   12). 


58 

and  development,  with  increased 
equity,  and  to  strengthen  U.S.  eco- 
nomic relations  with  the  area  in  trade, 
investment  services,  and  technology 
transfer;  and 

•  To  gain  cooperation  on  many 
problems  that  directly  affect  daily  life 
in  the  United  States  such  as  the  nar- 
cotics trade,  migration,  and  access  to 
energy  and  raw  materials. 

The  basis  of  our  programs  lies  in  our 
own  national  interest.  To  the  extent 
that  we  can  help  our  poorer  neighbors 
overcome  the  problems  of  poverty  and 
live  in  greater  security  we  can  be  more 
confident  they  will  help  us  to  deal  with 
major  problems  of  our  own. 


Development  Assistance 

The  United  States  now  has  a  small 
but  vital  program  of  bilateral  economic 
assistance  in  Latin  America.  It  is 
highly  selective.  Latin  America  is  not  a 
homogeneous  region.  The  varying 
levels  of  development  and  domestic  re- 
sources in  the  individual  countries 
cover  a  wide  spectrum.  Our  bilateral 
program  concentrates  on  the  smaller 
poorer  countries  and  on  rural  poverty. 

This  is  not  to  say  we  are  not  also 
concerned  with  their  larger  neighbors 
or  the  broader  aspects  of  economic  de- 
velopment apart  from  rural  poverty. 
We.  of  course,  support  the  economic 
development  of  the  entire  region 
through  our  major  participation  in  the 
international  financial  institutions,  in- 
cluding the  World  Bank  and  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank. 

Moreover,  as  these  larger  countries 
progress  in  their  development,  they  no 
longer  rely  so  heavily  on  concessional 
assistance  from  any  source  for  resource 
transfers,  but  rather  they  participate  in- 
creasingly as  full-fledged  members  of 
the  international  economy.  Thus,  they 
look  to  us  primarily  to  provide  open 
markets  for  their  trade  and  capital 
needs.  Recently  about  80%  of  the  cap- 
ital inflow  to  Latin  America  has  come 
from  private,  nongovernmental 
sources.  In  this  connection,  I  might 
point  out  the  importance  to  Latin 
America  of  timely,  positive  action  by 
the  Congress  on  such  legislation  as  the 
extension  of  authority  to  waive  our 
countervailing  duties,  ratification  of 
the  International  Sugar  Agreement  and 
the  results  of  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations,  and  approval  for  the  re- 
plenishment of  the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank. 

There  are  other  important  aspects  of 
our  economic  cooperation  with  the 
major  part  of  Latin  America  where  we 
do  not  have  development  assistance 
programs.   These  include  our  growing 


network  of  science  and  technology 
cooperation  agreements  and  the  recent 
initiative  under  the  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development's,. (AID)  reim- 
bursable development  programs. 

To  return  to  the  subject  of  this  sec- 
tion of  my  testimony  —  the  bilateral 
economic  programs  —  I  would  like  to 
make  some  general  points.  First,  our 
bilateral  development  assistance  re- 
quest in  the  region  is  a  very  modest 
one,  totaling  $230  million  for  FY 
1980.  Fifty  percent  of  our  program  re- 
sources will  go  to  those  countries  with 
per  capita  incomes  below  $580 — Haiti. 
Bolivia.  Honduras.  El  Salvador, 
Guyana,  and  the  Associated  States  of 
the  Caribbean.  Even  where  we  have 
programs  in  the  so-called  "middle  in- 
come" Latin  countries,  our  focus  is  on 
the  very  poorest  sectors  of  these 
societies.  In  the  middle-income  coun- 
tries there  are  still  large  sectors  — 
usually  rural  areas  —  where  conditions 
of  poverty  are  as  severe  as  anywhere  in 
the  world.  Thirty-seven  percent  — 
$86. 1  million  —  is  for  the  nations  of  the 
Caribbean. 

We  have  been  working  intensively 
over  the  past  2  years  to  implement  a 
regional  strategy  for  the  Caribbean. 
Last  June,  at  our  urging,  the  World 
Bank  convened  the  first  meeting  of  the 
Caribbean  Group  for  Cooperation  in 
Economic  Development.  This  brought 
together  the  international  financial  in- 
stitutions, ourselves,  and  other  donor 
countries  and  the  recipient  countries. 

The  meeting  agreed  on  establishing 
the  Caribbean  Development  Facility 
(CDF)  to  meet  the  immediate  and 
pressing  needs  in  the  area.  With 
pledges  at  more  than  $115  million,  this 
program  is  now  being  implemented.  It 
has  already  become  a  key  factor,  and 
we  are  planning  for  a  second  meeting 
of  the  full  group  this  year,  as  well  as 
subgroups  on  particular  countries. 
Another  contribution  to  the  CDF  is  a 
key  part  of  our  FY   1980  request,  but 


Letters 
of  Credence 


The  following  newly  appointed  Am- 
bassadors to  the  United  States  pre- 
sented their  credentials  to  President 
Carter:  Jose  Antonio  Bermudez  Milla 
of  Honduras  on  January  II,  1979; 
Felipe  Doroteo  Monterroso  Miranda  of 
Guatemala  on  February  26;  and  Carlos 
Alfredo  Lopez-Guevara  of  Panama  on 
March  I.  D 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

we  also  want  to  support  an  increasing 
number  of  regional  projects  which  will 
help  to  bring  the  countries  of  the  area 
into  additional  cooperative  arrange- 
ments as  well  as  to  improve  living  con- 
ditions for  their  poor. 

Bilateral  programs  also  emphasize 
this  sort  of  coordinated  regional  ap- 
proach to  the  common  problems  the 
Caribbean  countries  face.  Further 
progress  on  regionalism  and  economic 
cooperation  is  made  even  more  essen- 
tial by  the  difficult  economic  situations 
the  newly  independent  states  in  the 
Caribbean  will  encounter.  Their  viabil- 
ity may  well  depend  on  cooperation. 

A  key  to  continued  progress  in  de- 
velopment even  for  the  more  advanced 
countries  is  maintaining  the  flow  of 
modern  technology  and  know-how  to 
them.  This  transfer  of  technology 
issue,  including  the  problem  of  adapt- 
ing technology  to  local  needs,  is  one  on 
which  we  are  working  in  many  ways.  A 
new  initiative  we  want  to  implement 
this  year  is  the  foundation  for  interna- 
tional technological  cooperation.  We 
expect  it  will  be  a  useful  tool  in  meet- 
ing a  major  need  throughout  the  hemi- 
sphere. 

A  problem  area  1  want  to  commend 
to  your  attention  is  our  inability  to 
cooperate  in  meeting  the  critical 
short-range  economic  problems  of 
countries  whose  cooperation  we  need 
to  advance  a  wide  range  of  U.S.  inter- 
ests. In  Latin  America,  some  of  these 
countries  are  now  outside  the  range  of 
our  bilateral  programs,  but  even  for  the 
rest  our  choices  are  severely  restricted. 

In  particular,  we  sometimes  lack  the 
flexibility  and  resources  to  share  effec- 
tively in  supporting  even  those  friendly 
democratic  countries  in  which  we  still 
have  AID  programs.  I  am  referring  to 
situations  where  short-term  balance- 
of-payments  crises  force  major  reduc- 
tions in  development  programs  and  in 
some  cases  impinge  on  human  rights 
conditions.  Congressional  directives 
requiring  assistance  to  be  in  the  form  of 
projects  and  channeled  to  the  poorest 
means  long  lead  times  and  slow  dis- 
bursement, when  sometimes  we  need  to 
make  an  impact  immediately. 

Over  the  last  decade,  AID's  re- 
sources have  been  gradually  shifted 
away  from  Latin  America  to  Asia,  the 
Far  East,  and  Africa.  Comparing  the 
development  assistance  authorization 
for  Latin  America  in  FY  1970  with  our 
request  for  FY  1980,  we  see  a  decline 
from  $418  million  to  $230  million.  The 
region's  share  of  total  AID  develop- 
ment assistance  fell  from  30%  to 
15.6%  over  the  same  period.  A 
dramatic  effect  of  this  decline  is  that  in 
FY  1980  payments  on  principal  and 
interest  on  previous  AID  loans  to  Latin 


April  1979 

America  will  total  $205  million  —  an 
amount  almost  equal  to  new  authoriza- 
tions. 

Although  we  understand  the  reasons 
for  this  decline  —  essentially  the  desire 
to  concentrate  on  the  world's  poorest 
countries  —  it  is  also  a  cause  for  con- 
cern. Despite  its  favorable  economic 
growth  rate,  Latin  America  has  more 
people  living  in  absolute  poverty  (less 
than  $250  per  year)  today  than  it  did  a 
decade  ago.  There  are  perhaps  150 
million  people,  or  40-50%,  of  the  still 
rapidly  growing  total  population  living 
in  absolute  poverty. 

Policy  Objectives 

I  have  given  you  some  general  im- 
pressions of  the  significance  of  de- 
velopment assistance  in  Latin  America 
and  the  conceptual  context  in  which  we 
work.  I  would  attempt  now  to  be 
somewhat  more  specific  in  identifying 
our  policy  objects. 

First  is  the  broad  question  of 
strategy  to  maintain  the  momentum  for 
continued  economic  development.  U.S. 
bilateral  economic  and  technical  coop- 
eration in  Latin  America  is  not  cur- 
rently designed  as  a  resource  transfer 
program.  Its  primary  role  is  to  transfer 
ideas  and  technical  knowledge  to  build 
indigenous  capacity  in  Latin  and 
Caribbean  countries  to  analyze  and  deal 
with  poverty  and  newer  global  prob- 
lems. 

Second,  in  accordance  with  congres- 
sional directives,  we  are  concentrating 
on  seeing  that  our  program  addresses 
basic  human  needs  of  the  poorest  sec- 
tors in  the  recipient  countries.  Often 
this  means  rural  health  and  agriculture 
programs. 

But  we  also  face  the  growing  global 
problems  which  threaten  to  impact  on 
us  all  in  a  future  that  draws  closer 
every  day  —  environmental  pollution, 
energy  development  and  conservation, 
and  population  growth.  These  are  a 
necessary  complement  to  a  basic 
human  needs  strategy. 

Third,  we  seek  to  maintain  eco- 
nomic growth  while  spreading  the 
benefits  of  growth  more  equitably. 
These  are  the  economic  rights  we  en- 
dorse and  promote. 

Our  human  rights  policy  toward 
Latin  America  must  be  considered  in 
the  context  of  our  global  policy.  We 
fully  realize  this  policy  has  created 
strains  and  tensions  in  relations  with 
some  governments  in  Latin  America  as 
it  has  with  governments  in  other  areas. 
We  regret  that.  We  would  like  good 
relations  with  all,  and  we  intend  to 
continue  our  efforts  to  remove  the  ob- 


stacles to  such  relations.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  are  also  determined  to  con- 
tinue our  present  human  rights  policy, 
tactfully,  firmly,  and,  we  hope,  intelli- 
gently. 

I  am  sure  1  do  not  need  to  emphasize 
here  how  complex  human  rights  issues 
can  be.  It  would  be  absurd  to  attempt  to 
calculate  a  precise  debit  and  credit 
ledger  of  the  results  of  our  policy  in 
Latin  America.  But  it  can  be  said  that 
while  there  have  been  problems  with 
some  governments  there  has  also  been 
enthusiastic  support  for  our  policy  from 
many  important  sectors  of  Latin 
American  public  opinion,  including  re- 
ligious leaders,  intellectuals,  the  press, 
political  parties,  human  rights  groups, 
and  labor  unions. 

Our  efforts  have  also  had  a  salutary 
effect  on  the  day-to-day  application  of 
human  rights  in  many  countries. 
Today,  as  compared  with  2  years  ago, 
in  various  countries  there  is  less  torture 
and  murder,  many  political  prisoners 
have  been  released,  names  of  prisoners 


59 

have  been  published,  there  are  fewer 
"disappeareds,"  states  of  seige  have 
been  lifted,  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  has  been  invited  to 
visit  many  countries,  and  the  American 
convention  has  been  signed  and 
ratified. 

In  designing  assistance  programs  we 
have  paid  special  heed  to  the  human 
rights  factor.  Bilateral  aid  has  been  se- 
verely restricted  in  several  cases,  but  I 
would  like  to  point  to  the  positive  pro- 
gram changes  as  well. 

Several  countries,  such  as  Peru, 
Ecuador,  and  Bolivia,  are  undergoing 
major  political  shifts  that  signal  the 
return  of  popularly  elected,  constitu- 
tional governments.  We  are  supporting 
this  democratic  trend  through  our  AID 
programs.  We  have  also  tried  to  in- 
crease our  bilateral  assistance  programs 
in  a  few  countries  with  outstanding 
human  rights  records  such  as  Costa 
Rica  and  the  Dominican  Republic. 

Ecuador  is  a  unique  case  where  we 
are  proposing  starting  a  new  program 


Jftarititnc  Boundary  Treaties 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  SENATE, 
JAN.  19' 

I  transmit  herewith,  for  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  three  treaties  estab- 
lishing maritime  boundaries;  the  Treaty  on 
Maritime  Boundaries  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  United  Mexican  States, 
signed  at  Mexico  City  on  May  4,  1978;  the 
Maritime  Boundary  Treaty  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  Ven- 
ezuela, signed  at  Caracas  on  March  28.  1978; 
and  the  Maritime  Boundary  Agreement  between 
the  United  States  of  Amenca  and  the  Republic  of 
Cuba,  signed  at  Washington.  December  16, 
1977. 

These  treaties  are  necessary  to  delimit  the 
continental  shelf  and  overlapping  claims  of 
jurisdiction  resulting  from  the  establishing  of  a 
200  nautical  mile  fishery  conservation  zone  off 
the  coasts  of  the  United  States  in  accordance 
with  the  Fishery  Conservation  and  Management 
Act  of  1976,  and  the  establishment  of  200  nauti- 
cal mile  zones  by  these  neighboring  countries. 

The  treaty  with  Mexico  establishes  the 
maritime  boundary  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  for  the  area  between  twelve  and  two 
hundred  nautical  miles  off  the  coasts  of  the  two 
countries  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  Gulf  of 
Mexico.  In  this  regard,  it  supplements  the  Treaty 
to  resolve  Pending  Boundary  Differences  and 
Maintain  the  Rio  Grande  and  Colorado  River  as 
the  International  Boundary  between  the  United 


States  of  America  and  the  United  Mexican 
States,  signed  at  Mexico  November  23.  1970, 
which  establishes  maritime  boundaries  out  to 
twelve  nautical  miles  off  the  respective  coasts. 
The  treaty  with  Venezuela  establishes  the 
maritime  boundary  between  the  two  countries  in 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  between  Puerto  Rico  and  the 
U.S.  Virgin  Islands  and  Venezuela  where  the 
200  nautical  mile  zones  overlap.  The  treaty  with 
Cuba  establishes  the  maritime  boundary  between 
the  two  countries  in  the  Straits  of  Florida  area 
and  the  eastern  Gulf  of  Mexico  where  the  200 
nautical  mile  zones  overlap. 

I  believe  that  these  treaties  are  in  the  United 
States  interest.  They  are  consistent  with  the 
United  States  interpretation  of  international  law 
that  maritime  boundaries  are  to  be  established  by 
agreement  in  accordance  with  equitable  princi- 
ples in  the  light  of  relevant  geographic  circum- 
stances. They  will  facilitate  law  enforcement 
activities,  and  provide  for  certainty  in  resource 
development. 

I  also  transmit  for  the  information  of  the  Sen- 
ate the  report  of  the  Department  of  State  with 
respect  to  each  of  these  treaties. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early  con- 
sideration to  these  treaties  and  advice  and  con- 
sent to  their  ratification. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Jan.  22.  1979. 


60 

in  FY  1980  after  several  years  without 
bilateral  assistance.  We  are  recom- 
mending $5  million  of  loans  and  grants 
focused  on  appropriate  technology  and 
training  for  small  farmers.  This  will  be 
tangible  evidence  of  our  support  for  the 
series  of  free  elections  already  under- 
way for  a  new  government  in  Ecuador. 
Of  course  1  do  not  wish  to  imply  that 
human  rights  violations  have  been 
eradicated  in  Latin  America.  But 
progress,  encouraging  progress,  has 
been  made  in  Latin  America  over  the 
past  2  years.  Once  again,  1  do  not  wish 
to  give  the  impression  that  the  U.S. 
Government  is  solely  or  mainly  respon- 
sible for  that  progress.  The  progress 
has  been  made  by  Latin  Americans 
themselves,  but  we  have  made  a  con- 
tribution. 


Security  Assistance 

I  would  also  like  to  turn  now  to  the 
security  assistance  side  of  our  foreign 
assistance  request.  The  amount  we  are 
asking  for  FY  1980— $38,734,000— is 
the  smallest  request  for  Latin  America 
in  the  last  decade.  It  is  almost  30%  less 
than  we  asked  for  last  year,  and  it  is 
less  than  half  the  amount  we  had  in  FY 
1978.  A  similar  pattern  is  evident  in 
our  foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  cash 
and  commercial  arms  sales  to  Latin 
America.  The  value  of  new  contracts 
under  both  FMS  cash  and  credit  pro- 
grams reached  a  peak  of  $316  million 
in  1974  and  declined  to  less  than  half 
that  in  1976  and  1977.  They  recovered 
slightly  m  FY  1978  to  $182  million. 
Commercial  exports  to  Latin  America 
licensed  under  the  Arms  Export  Control 
Act  peaked  in  1976  at  $162  million;  in 
1978  they  were  less  than  one-fourth  of 
that. 

In  short,  a  very  substantial  change 
has  taken  place  in  the  nature  of  our  se- 
curity relationship  with  Latin  America. 
The  United  States,  until  the  mid-1960's 
the  preeminent  arms  supplier  to  the  re- 
gion, accounted  in  1973-76  for  only 
22%  of  total  arms  sales  to  Latin 
America.  In  1977  and  the  first  half  of 
1978  we  accounted  for  only  10%.  We 
ranked  behind  West  Germany,  France, 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  Of  the  U.S.  ma- 
teriel transferred,  only  about  25%  rep- 
resented major  end  items,  the  balance 
being  spare  parts  and  support  equip- 
ment. 

In  part  this  was  a  natural  and  inevita- 
ble development.  As  European  indus- 
try recovered  from  World  War  II  and 
began  aggressively  to  seek  export  mar- 
kets, and  as  Latin  American 
nationalism  and  interest  in  avoiding 
over  dependence  on  a  single  supplier 
grew,  we  would  have  seen  in  any  event 
a  decline  in  U.S.  arms  exports  to  the 


region.  But  much  of  the  curtailment  of 
our  transfers  in  the  last  2  years  has 
been  the  result  of  the  policy  set  by  the 
Congress  and  the  President. 

Sixteen  countries  received  FMS 
credits  in  1976-77,  and  17  received 
international  military  education  and 
training  (IMET).  In  our  proposal  for 
FY  1980,  only  six  will  receive  FMS 
credit  and  only  10  out  of  the  17  will 
receive  IMET.  Of  the  countries  that 
have  been  wholly  or  partially  dropped 
from  the  security  assistance  rolls, 
Argentina  and  Chile  were,  of  course, 
excluded  by  legislative  mandate.  Four 
others  —  El  Salvador,  Nicaragua, 
Paraguay,  and  Uruguay  —  have  signifi- 
cant unresolved  human  rights  prob- 
lems, and  both  our  implementation  of 
the  President's  human  rights  policy  and 
our  interpretation  of  the  provisions 
Congress  has  written  into  law  required 
the  elimination  of  security  assistance  to 
those  countries. 

Haiti  and  Honduras  have  less  serious 
human  rights  problems,  but  neither  is  a 
functioning  democracy.  For  that  rea- 
son, and  in  a  year  of  general  budget 
stringency,  we  have  dropped  our  FMS 
credit  financing  there  but  retained 
small  IMET  programs. 

Reacting  to  the  requirement  for 
human  rights  reports,  Brazil  asked  that 
it  not  be  considered  for  any  type  of  se- 
curity assistance,  and  that  was  also  the 
reason  for  Guatemala's  absence  from 
the  1978  and  1979  programs.  However, 
Guatemala  requested,  and  we  agreed  to 
propose,  IMET  training  in  FY  1980. 

Costa  Rica  and  Venezuela,  both  de- 
mocracies with  outstanding  human 
rights  records,  are  no  longer  recipients 
of  security  assistance  because  they  are 
able  to  meet  their  requirements  through 
commercial  and  FMS  cash  channels  to 
which  they  have  full  access. 

We  have  also  carefully  assessed  both 
our  government  programs  and  each 
license  we  issue  for  commercial  sales 
in  light  of  the  President's  policy  — 
which  was  last  year  also  written  into 
legislation — of  arms  transfer  restraint. 
We  believe  it  is  not  in  the  U.S.  inter- 
est, nor  in  the  interest  of  Latin 
America,  to  encourage  the  purchase  of 
arms  that  are  in  excess  of  legitimate 
self-defense  needs  and  that  bear  no  re- 
lationship to  the  nature  of  the  security 
threat  faced  by  the  recipient  country. 
To  do  so  only  stimulates  the  purchase 
of  additional  arms  by  neighboring 
countries,  with  a  resulting  increase  in 
international  tension  that  causes  con- 
cern to  the  entire  hemisphere. 

Fortunately,  most  Latin  American 
countries  themselves  have  traditionally 
pursued  a  cautious  and  restrained  pol- 
icy of  arms  acquisition,  both  because 
they  have  given  priority  to  economic 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 

development  and  because  they  have,  in  | 
most  cases,  perceived  a  low  external 
military  threat.  Latin  America  is  the 
most  lightly  armed  region  in  the  world, 
historically  the  most  peaceful,  and  it 
spends  the  least  of  any  region  on  mili- 
tary materiel.  About  2%  of  the  regional 
GNP  is  devoted  to  defense,  and  some 
important  countries  spend  less  than  1% 
for  that  purpose. 

In  addition,  there  has  been  increas- 
ing interest  in  Latin  America  during  the 
last  year  in  translating  separate  national 
policies  of  arms  restraint  into  a 
region-wide  understanding.  Last  June, 
the  foreign  ministers  of  the  eight  Latin 
American  countries  that  had  signed  the 
1974  declaration  of  Ayacucho  met  here 
in  Washington.  They  signed  a  state- 
ment reaffirming  their  countries'  com- 
mitment to  the  declaration's  goal  of 
arms  restraint,  and  they  declared  their 
intention  "to  explore,  jointly  with  the 
other-Latin  American  countries,  the 
possibilities  of  reaching  an  agreement 
for  the  limitation  of  conventional  arms 
in  Latin  America."  That  exploration 
began  at  a  meeting  in  Mexico  City  in 
August  at  which  20  governments  were 
represented. 

There  is  expected  to  be  a  second 
conference  this  year,  at  which  dele- 
gates will  consider  the  specific  propos- 
als presented  at  the  Mexico  City  meet- 
ing. Among  them  are  the  establishment 
of  a  permanent  mechanism  through 
which  the  Latin  American  countries 
can  consult  on  proposed  arms  pur- 
chases and  the  holding  of  a  conference 
of  all  the  principal  arms  suppliers  to 
Latin  America  together  with  the  pur- 
chasing countries.  We  do  not  expect  a 
Latin  American  agreement  on  this 
complex  and  sensitive  subject  to  be 
negotiated  overnight  —  the  United 
States  has  discovered  that  arms  control 
negotiations  are  not  easy  or  fast  —  but  I 
think  we  can  be  pleased  at  the  progress 
that  has  been  made.  The  United  States 
supports  this  Latin  American  initiative, 
and  should  the  Latin  American  coun- 
tries decide  to  open  negotiations  with 
the  arms  suppliers  on  arms  transfer  re- 
straint, we  are  prepared  to  take  an  ac- 
tive part. 

I  would  be  less  than  frank  with  this 
committee  if  I  were  to  tell  you  that 
these  policies — the  defense  of  human 
rights,  the  self-restraint  of  arms  trans- 
fers, the  encouragement  of  restraint  by 
others  —  had  no  costs  for  the  United 
States.  Of  course  they  do.  A  reduction 
in  our  financing  of  arms  purchases  or 
the  denial  of  an  export  license  means 
the  loss  of  a  positive  entry  on  the 
balance-of-payments  ledger  and  the 
loss  of  a  sale  to  an  American  company 
and  to  American  workers.  We  have  that 
very  much  in  mind  at  every  stage  of  the 


April  1979 

security  assistance  and  license  approval 
process. 

Bui  our  policies  reflect  our  deeply 
held  national  beliefs  about  how  we  as  a 
country  ought  to  behave.  Other  coun- 
tries, even  democratic  ones,  may  re- 
gard the  systematic  suppression  of 
human  rights  as  no  concern  of  theirs. 
We  do  not,  and  we  have  not  since  the 
foundation  of  this  republic.  Other 
countries,  even  democratic  ones,  may 
regard  the  sale  of  machine  guns  and 
tanks  as  indistinguishable  from  the  sale 
of  soap.  We  do  not — even  if  it  means, 
in  some  cases,  the  loss  of  the  sale. 
These  policies,  as  do  most  of  our  na- 
tional policies,  carry  costs.  I  believe 
they  are  worth  paying,  and  I  believe 
that  view  has  support  of  the  Congress. 


Principal  Features 

I  would  now  like  to  describe  some  of 
the  principal  features  of  the  security  as- 
sistance program  we  propose  for  FY 
1980. 

First,  1  want  to  direct  your  attention 
to  an  important  new  initiative  in  the 
training  program.  We  are  requesting 
$800,000  to  cover  the  cost  of  new 
courses  at  U.S.  military  schools  in 
arms  restraint  and  international 
peacekeeping.  Two  of  the  courses  — 
one  for  senior  and  one  for  middle-level 
officers  —  will  teach  the  concept  of 
arms  control,  primarily  of  restraint  in 
the  acquisition  of  conventional  arms 
but  also  touching  on  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion. The  courses  deal  with  the  inter- 
relationship between  arms  procure- 
ment, national  security,  and  regional 
stability  and  why  arms  restraint  con- 
tributes to  security  and  stability  and  an 
arms  race  does  not.  The  problems  of 
negotiating  multilateral  restraint 
agreements,  including  the  need  for 
confidence  building  measures,  infor- 
mation exchange,  and  verification  pro- 
visions, will  be  discus.sed. 

The  other  courses  will  deal  with  in- 
ternational truce  observation  and 
peacekeeping  operations.  The  course 
for  senior  level  officers  will  teach  the 
history  of  such  operations,  their  contri- 
bution to  world  peace,  the  growing 
need  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  (OAS) 
for  properly  trained  and  equipped  per- 
sonnel, and  the  management  and  de- 
ployment of  such  units.  The  lower 
level  courses  will  actually  train  partici- 
pants in  working  together  in  multina- 
tional, multilingual  situations  and  help 
them  work  out  solutions  to  the  prob- 
lems of  organization,  communication, 
and  logistics. 

This  proposal  would  enable  us  to 
make  a  significant  contribution  in  sup- 


port of  U.N.  peacekeeping  functions  to 
which  we  ourselves  traditionally  do  not 
supply  troop  contingents.  The  Presi- 
dent's 1978  report  to  Congress  on  re- 
form and  restructuring  of  the  United 
Nations  contained  proposals  for  im- 
proving U.N.  peacekeeping  capabilities 
by  encouraging  the  establishment  of  a 
U.N.  peacekeeping  reserve  composed 
of  national  contingents  trained  in 
peacekeeping  functions.  The  U.N. 
General  Assembly  adopted  in  De- 
cember 1978  a  resolution  cosponsored 
by  the  United  States  which  invited  all 
member  states  to  consider  the  possibil- 
ity of  training  their  personnel  for  U.N. 
peacekeeping  operations  and  to  con- 
sider supplying  the  Secretary  General 
with  information  relating  to  standby 
capacities  which  could  be  made  avail- 
able if  required. 

Apart  from  the  regional  program,  we 
are  asking  $4.4  million  for  fixed  costs 
of  the  Canal  Zone  schools,  the  same 
amount  requested  in  FY  1979  for  that 
purpose.  The  total  we  are  asking  for 
individual  country  IMET  programs  is 
$3.2  million.  That  is  15%  less  than  the 
President's  request  for  Latin  American 
country  programs  in  FY  1979.  In  con- 
sequence, none  of  the  individual  coun- 
try requests  exceeds  the  amount  asked 
for  in  1979,  and  most  of  them  are  re- 
duced. 

However,  we  found  room  for  three 
countries  not  included  last  year: 
$60,000  each  for  the  Bahamas  and 
Barbados  and  $250,000  for  Guatemala. 
I  have  already  referred  to  Guatemala's 
request  to  reenter  the  IMET  program 
this  year.  The  training  proposed  for  the 
Bahamas  and  Barbados  reflects  our 
concern  that  a  great  deal  of  important 
air  and  sea  traffic  passes  through  these 
islands  and  their  territorial  waters,  but 
these  countries  lack  sufficient  trained 
government  personnel  in  such  essential 
activities  as  search  and  rescue  and 
navigational  safety. 

We  are  requesting  authority  to  ex- 
tend FMS  credits  to  only  six  countries: 
Bolivia,  Colombia,  the  Dominican  Re- 
public, Ecuador,  Panama,  and  Peru. 
No  major  new  weapons  systems  will  be 
financed;  purchases  will  consist 
primarily  of  support  and  maintenance 
equipment,  spare  parts,  and  small 
amounts  of  ammunition.  Several  coun- 
tries are  expected  to  be  interested  in 
patrol  boats  for  antismuggling  opera- 
tions, helicopters,  trucks,  and  light  ar- 
tillery. Where  appropriate,  we  are  en- 
couraging countries  to  use  their  credits 
increasingly  for  nonlethal  equipment 
useful  in  civic  action  programs.  For 
example,  the  entire  FY  1979  credit  for 
Bolivia  will  be  used  to  purchase 
equipment  for  a  military  hospital  which 
also  serves  the  civilian  population. 


61 

That,  very  sketchily,  is  our  Latin 
American  security  assistance  program 
for  the  coming  year.  As  I  said  at  the 
beginning,  it  is  small,  perhaps  only 
one-half  of  1%  of  all  Latin  American 
defense  expenditures.  But  the  impor- 
tance of  this  assistance  far  exceeds  its 
size.  It  is  a  symbol  of  our  interest  in 
the  security  concerns  of  the  Latin 
American  nations.  It  is  the  tangible 
proof  of  our  interest  in  working  with 
them  to  meet  their  legitimate  defense 
needs  and  to  avoid  excessive,  de- 
stabilizing arms  purchases.  I  ask  your 
support  for  these  objectives  and  for  this 
program. 

Conclusion 

In  conclusion  let  me  try  to  sum  up 
briefly  the  case  for  our  assistance  to 
Latin  America.  Because  Latin  America 
is  close  to  us  geographically,  there  are 
a  great  many  interfaces  between  the 
United  States  and  Latin  America.  Some 
are  highly  beneficial.  Trade,  invest- 
ment, banking,  tourism,  and  cultural 
exchange  come  immediately  to  mind. 
Other  relationships  created  by  geo- 
graphic proximity  are  troublesome.  Il- 
legal migration,  narcotics  trafficking, 
smuggling,  pollution,  and  conflicts 
over  fishing  zones  are  obvious  exam- 
ples. 

In  addition,  our  proximity  to  Latin 
America  gives  increased  significance 
for  us  to  what  happens  there  on  such 
issues  as  nuclear  nonprol iteration,  con- 
ventional arms  restraint,  peaceful  set- 
tlement of  disputes,  and  last  but  not 
least  improvement  in  human  rights,  in- 
cluding mitigation  of  the  most  trouble- 
some aspects  of  poverty  and  rapid 
population  increase. 

At  times  our  concern  with  these 
many  interfaces  has  led  us  to  articulate 
some  kind  of  special  relationship  with 
Latin  America.  In  this  Administration 
we  have  consciously  decided  not  to  try 
to  oversimplify  these  increasingly 
complex  interrelationships  in  this  way. 
The  United  States  is  a  global  power  and 
has  interests  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
What  we  do  in  Latin  America  must  be  a 
consistent  part  of  our  global  policies. 
Moreover,  Latin  America  by  itself  has 
a  growing  global  role.  We  welcome 
this  growth  and  find  that  the  countries 
of  Latin  America  are  increasingly  ef- 
fective partners  in  global  efforts  for 
peace  and  improved  living  standards. 

While  we  cooperate  more  and  more 
with  the  Latin  American  countries  on 
the  global  stage,  we  must  also 
strengthen  our  cooperation  with  them 
bilaterally  and  regionally,  through  the 
OAS  and  through  support  of  coopera- 
tive subregional  initiatives  like  those  of 
the  countries  in  the  Caribbean  group. 


62 


Panama  Canal  Treaty 
Legislation 


Following  are  President  Carter's 
letters  to  the  Congress  of  January  23. 
1979,  transmitting  a  draft  of  proposed 
legislation  to  implement  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty  and  related  agreements 
and  statements  before  the  Panama 
Canal  Subcommittee  of  the  House 
Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries  Com- 
mittee by  Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
Warren  Christopher  on  February  15 
and  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Panama  Am- 
bler H.  Moss,  Jr.,  on  February  26. 


DEPUTY  SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER' 

1  am  happy  to  meet  with  you  today  at 
the  opening  of  this  committee's  hear- 
ings on  legislation  to  implement  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  of  1977  and  re- 
lated agreements.  Other  witnesses  from 
the  State  and  Defense  Departments, 
and  other  interested  agencies,  will 
comment  on  the  legislation  in  detail,  so 
I  would  like  to  step  back  and  comment 


on  the  legislation  from  a  more  general 
perspective. 

We  appreciate  Chairman  Murphy's 
[Congressman  John  M.  Murphy  of  New 
York]  cooperation  in  introducing  the 
bill  prepared  by  the  Administration. 
We  also  welcome  the  opportunity  to 
analyze  the  provisions  of  the  bill  he 
and  you  have  separately  introduced,  as 
well  as  legislation  introduced  by  Con- 
gressman [George  V.]  Hansen  [of 
Idaho].  We  particularly  appreciate  the 
committee's  cooperation  in  scheduling 
these  hearings  early  in  this  session  of 
the  96th  Congress. 

The  implementing  legislation  will 
forge  the  major  remaining  link  in  the 
chain  of  events  which,  after  15  years,  re- 
sulted in  the  two  new  treaties  establish- 
ing arrangements  for  our  future  operation 
and  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal,  in 
cooperation  with  Panama.  The  legisla- 
tion will  contribute  directly  to  the  se- 
curity, continuity,  and  efficiency  of 
canal  operations.  It  will  provide  a 
framework  for  effectively   exercising 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

the  substantial  rights  the  United  States 
obtained  under  the  treaties.  More 
broadly,  such  legislation,  like  the 
treaties,  will  contribute  to  the  im- 
provement of  our  relations  throughout 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  helping  to 
replace  longstanding  uncertainty  and 
suspicion  with  a  spirit  of  partnership 
and  trust. 

It  is  true  that  the  legislation  is  com- 
plex, raising  technical  issues  of  organi- 
zation and  finances.  But  the  legislation 
is  nonetheless  of  great  importance.  Its 
passage  is  essential  to  the  efficient  and 
successful  operation  and  defense  of  the 
canal  under  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty 
of  1977.  That  treaty  establishes  the 
terms  and  conditions  under  which  the 
United  States  will  operate  and  defend 
the  canal  until  the  end  of  this  century. 
The  companion  Treaty  Concerning  the 
Permanent  Neutrality  and  Operation  of 
the  Panama  Canal  insures  the  canal's 
security  both  before  and  after  the  canal 
is  transferred  to  Panama  in  the  year 
2000. 

These  treaties  will  come  into  force 
on  October  1  of  this  year.  They  bind 
both  countries  under  international  law. 
The  two  countries  have  much  to  do  to 
prepare  for  the  changes  which  will 
occur  on  October  1  and  thereafter. 

After  that  date,  the  United  States 


Assistance  Proposals  (Cont'd) 

The  fact  that  we  have  not  articulated  a 
catchy  phrase  to  charactize  our  Latin 
relations  does  not  mean  we  want  to  ne- 
glect these  relationships.  In  fact,  it  is 
only  by  participating  with  our 
neighbors  on  matters  of  common  con- 
cern that  we  can  elicit  the  cooperation 
we  need  on  narcotics,  on  migration, 
and  in  obtaining  needed  energy  and  raw 
materials. 

But  the  other  side  of  the  cooperation 
coin  is  that  we  must  also  be  prepared  to 
cooperate  in  areas  of  greatest  impor- 
tance to  our  southern  neighbors.  Eco- 
nomic development  is  the  highest 
priority  objective  of  almost  every  one 
of  these  countries.  They  have  made 
much  progress  but  per  capita  GNP  is 
still  only  one-seventh  to  one  twenty- 
fifth  of  ours.  The  very  education  and 
awareness  of  possibilities  that  come 
with  a  little  progress — the  breaking  of 
the  traditional  cycle  of  poverty — raise 
expectations  and  politically  expressed 
demands  for  even  more  progress. 
Moreover,  there  is  a  general  belief  in 
Latin  America  that  it  is  the  technology 
and  know-how  available  in  the  United 
States  as  well  as  capital  from  this  and 
the  global  market  that  are  the  keys  to 
the  desired  rapid  development. 


As  many  of  our  southern  neighbors 
have  made  more  economic  progress, 
their  technicians  and  managers  have 
become  more  competitive  with  ours  in 
many  fields.  We  therefore  need  to  re- 
structure the  relationships  through 
which  we  cooperate  with  them.  But  we 
must  not  turn  our  back  on  their  top 
priority  —  economic  development  —  if 
we  expect  continued  effective  coopera- 
tion in  those  areas  with  direct  and  im- 
mediate impact  on  many  Americans, 
such  as  narcotics,  migration,  and 
human  rights. 

A  second  area  in  which  Latin 
America  has  traditionally  looked  to  the 
United  States  has  been  that  of  security. 
After  World  War  II,  we  became  the 
principal  supplier  of  arms  for  their  rel- 
atively modest  military  establishments. 
Tensions  arising  from  arms  restraint 
and  human  rights  concerns  have  fun- 
damentally changed  this  relationship. 
Our  interfaces  are  sufficiently  broad 
and  strong  to  enable  us  to  manage  these 
tensions.  Over  the  long  run,  however, 
here  also  we  must  attain  new  and  more 
appropriate  forms  of  effective  coopera- 
tion to  enhance  both  the  security  of 
these  friendly  neighbors  and  our  own 
security  which  would  be  much  affected 
should  hostile  forces  find  increased 
hospitality  to  our  south. 

The  economic  and  security  assist- 


ance requests  you  have  before  you  are 
key  to  these  two  areas  of  economic  and 
security  cooperation.  The  economic  as- 
sistance is  a  bare  minimum  to  demon- 
strate our  support  for  Latin  America's 
number  one  objective;  it  already  shows 
our  efforts  to  stretch  the  available 
funding  so  that  it  will  do  as  much  as 
possible  to  assist  the  Latin  countries  in 
tapping  what  can  be  our  largest  contri- 
bution to  their  development  —  our 
know-how.  Funding  the  IMET — the 
training  that  is  now  the  most  critical 
link  in  our  military  cooperation  —  is 
also  at  a  minimal  level,  barely  enough 
to  sustain  a  basis  for  the  communica- 
tion and  cooperation  that  would  be  a 
vital  necessity  in  a  moment  of  crisis. 

As  you  consider  these  requests  for 
authorizations,  and  as  the  debate  on 
appropriations  goes  on,  I  hope  you  will 
keep  in  mind  how  important  these 
minimum  amounts  are  to  provide  the 
minimum  basis  for  cooperation  in  this 
hemisphere  —  cooperation  which  car- 
ries direct  benefits  for  every  Ameri- 
can. D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


April  1979 

will  continue  to  operate  and  defend  the 
canal.  It  will  do  so,  however,  not  as 
virtual  sovereign  in  the  Canal  Zone  but 
rather  as  the  partner  in  a  cooperative 
enterprise  with  Panama.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  have  the  controlling  voice,  but 
Panama  will  also  have  a  significant  role 
to  play.  For  both  governments,  the  new 
situation  will  constitute  an  unprec- 
edented challenge. 

The  way  in  which  we  exercise  our 
rights  and  fulfill  our  obligations  under 
the  treaty  will  do  much  to  help  insure 
an  efficient  and  secure  Panama  Canal. 
Thus,  the  legislation  offers  us  an  op- 
portunity to  reaffirm  and  strengthen  our 
basic  objectives  with  relation  to  the 
canal. 

Planning  for  treaty  implementation 
has  gone  forward  on  both  sides  in  a 
spirit  of  sincerity  and  good  will. 
Panamanian  and  U.S.  officials,  both 
civil  and  military,  are  working  closely 
in  approximately  30  separate  bilateral 
working  groups  to  plan  for  the  adjust- 
ments which  will  occur  under  the 
treaty.  We  fully  expect  that  the  current 
atmosphere  will  be  preserved  and  that 
we  can  look  forward  to  a  lasting  new 
relationship  with  the  Government  and 
people  of  Panama. 

The  new  civilian  government  of 
President  [Aristides]  Royo  has  given 
treaty  matters  the  highest  priority.  It 
has  centralized  its  preparations  for 
treaty  implementation  in  a  Panama 
Canal  Authority.  The  Director  of  the 
new  Authority  is  Gabriel  Lewis 
Galindo.  the  former  Ambassador  to  the 
United  States,  who  was  closely  as- 
sociated with  the  negotiations  leading 
to  the  treaty.  The  Panama  Government 
has  drawn  heavily  on  many  of  its  most 
qualified  citizens  to  work  on  canal 
problems. 

Ancillary  Agreements 

As  required  by  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty,  three  important  ancillary 
agreements  between  our  governments 
have  recently  been  signed. 

•  The  first  will  relieve  the  United 
States  from  its  current  obligation  to  op- 
erate the  air  traffic  control  system  in 
Panama  and  provides  for  a  phased 
transfer  of  this  function  from  the  Fed- 
eral Aviation  Administration  (FAA)  to 
the  Government  of  Panama,  over  a  5- 
year  period. 

•  The  second  insures  permanent 
U.S.  use  of  a  portion  of  Corozal 
Cemetery  for  the  remains  of  American 
citizens. 

•  The  third  will  permit  American 
citizens  convicted  of  crimes  in  Panama, 
and  Panamanians  convicted  in  the 
United  States,  to  serve  their  sentences 


63 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTERS 
TO  CONGRESS* 

Dear  Mr.  Speaker:  (Dear  Mr.  President:) 

I  am  pleased  to  forward  herewith  the  text 
of  proposed  legislation  to  implement  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  of  1977  and  its  Re- 
lated Agreements,  I  would  appreciate  its  ur- 
gent consideration  and  timely  passage  by 
the  Congress. 

Senate  approval  of  the  Canal  Treaties  last 
April,  and  the  delivery  of  instruments  of 
ratification  m  June,  marked  the  beginning 
of  a  new  and  important  phase  in  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  other 
nations  of  the  Hemisphere.  Under  the 
Treaties,  the  United  States  will  retain  oper- 
ational control  of  the  Canal  and  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  its  defense  until  the  end  of 
this  century.  Panama  will  participate  in  the 
operation  and  defense  of  the  Canal  and  will 
assume  full  responsibility  for  its  operation 
when  the  Canal  Treaty  expires.  Under  a 
second  treaty  approved  by  the  Senate  the 
United  States  retains,  permanently,  the 
right  to  defend  the  Canal  against  any  threat 
to  its  neutrality. 

The  constitutional  process  of  both  coun- 
tries have  now  been  completed,  and  the 
treaties  will  enter  into  effect  on  October  I, 
1979.  Under  their  terms,  on  that  date  the 
Canal  Zone  will  cease  to  exist,  the  United 
States  Government  agencies  known  as  the 
Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  Canal  Zone 
Government  will  cease  to  operate  within 
Panama,  and  general  jurisdiction  over  the 
area  as  well  as  the  performance  of  a  number 
of  important  support  functions  will  pass  to 
Panama.  Property  transfers  will  become  ef- 
fective in  accordance  with  Treaty  provi- 
sions. 

Under  the  Treaty,  we  will  acquire  exten- 
sive obligations  and  rights  with  respect  to 
the  Canal  on  October  1.  We  will  not.  how- 
ever, be  in  a  position  to  exercise  these 
rights  in  a  manner  which  will  fully  protect 


our  interests  in  the  Canal  unless  legislative 
action  is  taken  promptly.  To  assure  a 
smooth  transition  and  continued  efficient 
Canal  operation  once  the  new  Treaties  come 
into  force,  the  legislative  framework  —  in 
which  the  agencies  responsible  for  operat- 
ing and  defending  the  Canal  will  be 
operating  —  must  be  established  well  in  ad- 
vance so  that  they  may  make  the  necessary 
plans  and  preparations. 

Delay  in  adopting  the  legislation  beyond 
May  31,  1979.  could  thus  make  conversion 
to  the  new  system  of  Canal  operation  and 
defense  less  efficient  and  more  costly. 
Moreover,  uncertainty  concerning  the  pro- 
posed legislative  protection  and  benefits  for 
Canal  employees  will  increasingly  affect 
employee  morale  and  complicate  the  proc- 
ess of  making  necessary  personnel  adjust- 
ment. The  consequent  disruptive  impact  on 
the  work  force  could  reduce  the  efficiency 
of  Canal  operations  and  adversely  affect  the 
interests  of  U.S.  shippers  and  consumers. 

Our  stewardship  of  the  Panama  Canal  has 
been  one  of  the  outstandingly  successful  un- 
dertakings of  American  history.  1  urge  the 
Congress  to  consider  this  legislation  as  a 
step  toward  the  completion  of  another 
chapter  in  that  history  —  one  in  which  we 
will  join  with  Panama  to  keep  the  Canal 
open,  efficient  and  secure.  In  doing  so.  I  am 
confident  that  this  Government  will  main- 
tain a  system  of  management  and  a  standard 
of  performance  of  which  all  Americans  can 
continue  to  be  proud. 

Jimmy  Carter 


*Text  of  identical  letters  addressed  to 
Thomas  P.  O'Neill.  Jr..  Speaker  of  the 
House,  and  Walter  F.  Mondale.  President  of 
the  Senate;  text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  29.  1979 
(also  printed  as  House  Doc.  96-39  of  Jan. 
24  which  includes  draft  of  proposed  legis- 
lation). 


in  their  own  countries.  This  last  agree- 
ment is  similar  to  treaties  we  have  with 
Mexico  and  Canada. 

Thus  planning  and  preparation  for 
treaty  implementation  are  proceeding 
in  an  orderly  and  cooperative  manner. 
For  this  important  process  to  continue, 
implementing  legislation  should  be 
enacted  as  expeditiously  as  possible. 
To  a  large  degree,  it  is  the  legislation 
that  will  determine  how  the  Treaty  will 
work  in  practice. 

Proposed  Legislation 

Let  me  briefly  outline  the  legislation 
we  have  proposed. 

•  It  will  establish,  and  provide  for 


the  operation  of.  the  new  entity  which 
will  manage  and  operate  the  canal  until 
the  year  2000 — the  Panama  Canal 
Commission. 

•  It  will  establish  a  financial  system 
to  assure  that  the  canal  will  continue  to 
operate  on  a  self-sustaining  basis. 

•  It  will  establish  the  basis  for  de- 
termining the  level  of  tolls. 

•  It  will  establish  new  conditions  of 
employment,  labor  relations,  and  re- 
tirement for  U.S.  Government  civilian 
employees  in  Panama,  including  those 
of  the  Defense  Department. 

•  It  will  establish  a  system  of  U.S. 
criminal  jurisdiction  for  the  30-month 
transition  period  which  begins  on  the 
effective  date  of  the  treaty. 

•  It  will  make  other  aspects  of  the 


64 

existing  body  of  U.S.  legislation  con- 
cerning the  canal  conform  with  the  new 
treaty. 

Clearly,  the  legislation  involves 
many  matters  of  technical  detail.  But  it 
also  embodies  some  important  deci- 
sions about  the  way  in  which  the 
United  States  will  carry  out  its  treaty 
rights  and  responsibilities.  In  this  re- 
gard, it  is  helpful  to  have  three  bills 
providing  for  treaty  implementation 
—  one,  H.R.  1716,  from  the  executive 
branch:  another  very  similar  bill,  H.R. 
454.  from  Congressman  Hansen;  and 
the  third.  H.R.  Ill,  prepared  by 
Chairman  Murphy.  The  latter  suggests 
certain  alternative  arrangements,  pro- 
ceeding from  the  thorough  study  of  the 
subject  made  under  the  direction  of  the 
chairman. 

In  many  respects  the  three  bills  are 
similar.  But  in  others  they  differ,  pos- 
ing issues  which  deserve  full  consid- 
eration. Other  Administration 
witnesses  will  be  prepared  for  exten- 
sive discussion  of  these  issues.  I  can 
assure  you  that  we  will  work  construc- 
tively with  your  committee,  and  other 
concerned  committees,  to  produce  an 
effective  statute. 

The  Need  for  Prompt 
Legislative  Action 

Let  me  now  say  a  word  about  timing. 
Prompt  passage  of  appropriate  legisla- 
tion is  critical.  Sufficient  lead  time  is 
required  to  plan  and  prepare  for  the 
new  situation  which  will  prevail  after 
October  1  of  this  year. 

The  authorities  responsible  for  treaty 
implementation  must  have  a  clear  un- 
derstanding, well  in  advance,  of  the 
legal  framework  in  which  the  canal  will 
be  operating  after  that  date.  They  must 
know  what  legal  requirements  will 
exist  in  order  to  prepare  a  budget,  carry 
out  personnel  transfers  and  reductions, 
and  transfer  certain  functions  and  ac- 
tivities to  other  U.S.  Government 
agencies. 

In  addition,  the  employees  of  the 
canal  enterprise  need  and  deserve  ad- 
vance knowledge  of  the  terms  and  con- 
ditions under  which  they  may  continue 
working,  so  that  they  may  make  ra- 
tional decisions  about  their  futures  and 
so  that  the  canal  enterprise  may  main- 
tain a  competent  and  dedicated  work 
force. 

In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to 
comment  briefly  on  H.R.  1511,  a  sec- 
ond bill  introduced  by  Congressman 
Hansen  which  would  seek  to  preclude 
not  only  implementation  of  the  treaty 
but  even  preparation  for  implementa- 
tion until  the  Congress  has  completed 
action  on  a  bill  to  provide  appropria- 
tions for  these  activities.  Legislation  of 


this  nature  would  seem  both  unneces- 
sary and  prejudicial  to  U.S.  interests. 

To  prohibit  preparation  for  im- 
plementation would  serve  only  to  de- 
prive our  canal  operating  authorities, 
our  military  forces,  and  our  employees 
of  the  ability  to  insure  a  smooth  and 
orderly  transition  when  the  treaties  do 
enter  into  force.  It  is  in  our  national 
interest  that  we  plan  and  prepare  as 
thoroughly  as  possible  for  the  transition 
that  will  take  place  October  1,  and 
early  passage  of  the  implementing 
legislation  is  a  key  element  of  this 
process. 

I  would  hope,  therefore,  that  in  both 
Houses  of  Congress  the  arrangements 
made  to  insure  prompt  treatment  of  this 
legislation  will  be  observed.  We  hope 
that  legislation  can  be  passed  by  June 
1.  Delay  beyond  that  date  would  de- 
crease the  efficiency  and  hence  in- 
crease the  cost  of  the  conversion  proc- 
ess. If  delay  were  prolonged,  it  could 
have  a  serious  adverse  effect  on  mana- 
gerial efficiency,  employee  morale, 
and  the  operation  of  the  canal  itself. 

With  the  passage  of  Panama  Canal 
Treaty  implementing  legislation,  we 
will  be  in  a  position  to  begin  a  new 
chapter  in  the  history  of  the  canal. 
With  the  cooperation  and  support  of 
this  committee  and  the  Congress,  the 
U.S.  Government  can  open  that  chapter 
with  firm  assurance  that  it  will  unfold 
to  our  own  and  the  world's  advantage. 


AMBASSADOR  MOSS" 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  to  discuss  the  proposed  im- 
plementing legislation  for  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty. 

In  addition  to  its  traditional  diplo- 
matic and  consular  tasks,  the  American 
Embassy  in  Panama  is  actively  en- 
gaged, in  close  coordination  with  the 
Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  [Harold  R. 
Parfitt]  and  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Southern  Command  [Gen.  Dennis  P. 
McAuliffe]  in  planning  for  the  im- 
plementation of  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty,  which  comes  into  effect  on 
October  1,  1979. 

Previous  executive  branch  witnesses 
have  covered  a  number  of  aspects  of 
the  draft  versions  of  implementing 
legislation  under  consideration  by  the 
committee.  There  are  two  aspects  in 
particular  I  would  like  to  address, 
which  are  of  special  concern  to  the 
Embassy.  These  are: 

•  Our  overall  objective  of  building  a 
partnership  with  Panama  in  the  canal 
enterprise,  designed  to  maintain  a  safe 
and  efficient  canal,  and 

•  The  need  to  safeguard  the  interests 
of  American  citizens  in  the  present 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  ' 

Canal  Zone  whose   lives  will   be  af- 
fected by  the  implementing  legislation. 

First,  I  would  like  to  make  a  few  ob- 
servations to  the  subcommittee  about 
the  cooperation  I  have  observed  thus 
far  between  the  United  States  and 
Panama.  Although  there  is  a  great  deal 
of  work  to  be  done  between  now  and 
October  I,  and  there  are  obviously  a 
tremendous  number  of  difficult  deci- 
sions to  be  made  by  the  United  States 
and  by  Panama,  individually  as  well  as 
together,  the  cooperation  between  our 
government  and  the  Panamanian  Gov- 
ernment has  been  excellent.  The 
treaties  are  a  mutual  obligation  to 
which  both  sides  are  committed,  and  in 
that  spirit  the  work  done  by  both  coun- 
tries' planners  to  date  represents  an 
honest  effort  to  complete  the  arrange- 
ments called  for  under  the  treaty. 

We  are  fortunate  in  that  many  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Panamanian  Government 
today  were  heavily  involved  in  the 
treaty  process  over  the  last  few  years 
and  are  therefore  extremely  knowl- 
edgeable. President  Aristides  Royo,  a 
young  lawyer  who  became  President  of 
Panama  last  October  1 1 ,  was  a  chief 
treaty  negotiator  for  Panama.  He  has 
shown  a  particular  sensitivity  toward 
the  needs  and  concerns  of  the  U.S. 
citizens  who  live  in  the  Canal  Zone  and 
who  work  on  the  canal.  President  Royo 
has  visited  both  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
sides  of  the  Canal  Zone  where  he  has 
met  with  American  and  Panamanian 
citizens  who  work  there.  As  a  gesture 
of  goodwill,  he  recorded  a  television 
message  in  English  to  the  American 
residents  of  the  Canal  Zone  which  was 
broadcast  on  the  local  Armed  Forces 
television  stations. 

Ambassador  Gabriel  Lewis,  a  busi- 
nessman who  was  Panamanian  Ambas- 
sador to  Washington  during  the  treaty 
ratification  process,  returned  to  the  pri- 
vate sector  shortly  after  approval  of  the 
treaties  but  now  has  come  back  to  the 
Panamanian  Government  as  Ambas- 
sador at  Large  and  as  the  head  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Authority,  the  Panama- 
nian organization  which  has  the  re- 
sponsibility for  all  planning  for  treaty 
implementation.  He  has  a  strong  team 
working  with  him  in  this  effort,  in- 
cluding three  Cabinet  ministers:  two 
top  military  officers;  and  a  number  of 
economists,  lawyers,  and  other  advis- 
ers, many  of  whom  have  earned  uni- 
versity and  postgraduate  degrees  in  the 
United  States.  Panama  has  sent  as  its 
new  Ambassador-designate  to  the 
United  States  Carlos  Lopez-Guevara,  a 
distinguished  international  jurist  who 
holds  a  law  degree  from  Harvard. 

Numerous  working  subcommittees 
made  up  of  representatives  from  our 
two  countries  have  been  working  to- 


April  1979 

nether  since  mid- 1978  to  plan  for  the 
inipieiiientation  of  the  treaty  in  a  wide 
range  of  subjects  from  operational 
transfers,  such  as  the  ports  and  rail- 
roads, to  areas  of  employee  and  com- 
munity interests,  including  personnel, 
housing,  social  security,  utilities,  the 
environment,  and  the  police  and  fire 
protection.  Similar  binational  commit- 
tees have  recently  begun  work  in  areas 
of  concern  to  our  Southern  Command 
and  the  Panamanian  National  Guard. 

The  goodwill  and  business-like  at- 
titude which  exists  between  our  two 
countries  is  exemplified  by  the 
fact — as  Deputy  Secretary  Christopher 
has  already  observed  —  that  last  month 
we  signed  three  agreements  with 
Panama  which  were  called  for  under 
the  new  treaty  relationship.  We  have 
thus  dispatched  those  portions  of  work 
in  a  very  timely  manner.  The  first  of 
these  accords  was  a  new  civil  aviation 
agreement,  which  provides  for  the 
phasing-over  of  our  present  air  traffic 
control  in  Panama's  air  space  to 
Panama  over  a  5-year  period.  During 
that  time  we  will  be  training  Panama- 
nian traffic  controllers  to  begin  replac- 
ing our  personnel  and  also  training 
Panamanian  technicians  in  the  use  and 
maintenance  of  the  equipment.  The 
FAA  agreement  will  represent  a  con- 
siderable cost  savings  to  the  United 
States. 

The  second  agreement  provides  for  a 
permanent  U.S.  cemetery  at  the  present 
Corozal  Cemetery  in  the  Canal  Zone, 
over  which  our  flag  will  fly  and  which 
will  be  administered  by  the  American 
Battle  Monuments  Commission  in  the 
same  way  that  our  military  cemeteries 
abroad  are  maintained. 

The  third  of  these  agreements  is  a 
prisoner  exchange  treaty  —  which  will 
be  submitted  to  the  Senate  for 
ratification  —  which  provides  that 
American  citizens  convicted  of  a  crime 
in  Panama  can  elect  to  serve  their  sen- 
tences in  the  United  States  and 
Panamanians  convicted  of  a  crime  by  a 
United  States  court  can  serve  in  their 
homeland. 

It  is  apparent  that  we  are  already  be- 
ginning to  realize  the  benefits  of  our 
new  partnership  with  Panama  in  the 
military  field.  During  the  last  2 
months,  conventional  warfare  exercises 
have  been  held  by  our  193d  Infantry 
Brigade  at  the  Rio  Hato  military  base 
in  cooperation  with  the  Panamanian 
National  Guard.  This  military  area, 
large  in  size  and  ideal  in  terrain  for 
such  exercises,  is  deep  into  Panama's 
mterior  and  would  not  have  been  made 
available  to  us  except  under  the  new 
treaty  relationship. 

On  February  16,  I  accompanied 
President  Royo  on  a  visit  to  the  U.S. 
Army  School  of  the  Americas.  Presi- 


dent Royo.  who  was  given  full  military 
honors  upon  his  arrival,  stated  in  a 
press  conference  at  the  school  that  he 
wished  it  to  continue  in  operation  alter 
the  present  5-year  agreement  expires 
and  encouraged  the  beginning  of  talks 
between  the  United  States  and  Panama- 
nian representatives  for  that  purpose. 
He  has  remarked  to  me  that  he  is  proud 
of  the  fact  that  there  have  been  numer- 
ous Panamanian  graduates  of  the 
school,  and  he  hopes  for  greater 
Panamanian  participation  in  it. 

Building  a  Partnership 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  back- 
ground observations  leading  me  to  the 
first  point  I  wanted  to  make  about  the 
committee's  consideration  of  imple- 
menting legislation.  The  new  Panama 
Canal  Treaty  was  designed  to  create  a 
working  partnership  between  the 
United  States  and  Panama  in  the  oper- 
ation and  defense  of  the  canal,  so  that 


65 

it  would  remain  efficient  and  secure  in 
the  future. 

It  is  important  that  implementing 
legislation  support  the  concept  of 
partnership  with  Panama  for  two  es- 
sential reasons.  First,  during  the  period 
of  our  stewardship  of  the  canal  opera- 
tion until  the  year  2000,  there  will  be 
the  continuous  need  for  full  coopera- 
tion between  both  governments  in 
numerous  respects,  and  the  canal's  op- 
eration will  necessarily  be  affected  by 
the  degree  to  which  it  exists.  The 
United  States  has  a  dual  mission  with 
regard  to  canal  operation:  to  keep  it 
functioning  efficiently  and  securely,  as 
it  has  in  the  past,  but  also  to  bring 
Panamanians  into  all  levels  of  its  man- 
agement so  that  they  will  be  perfectly 
prepared  to  operate  the  canal  after  the 
year  2000. 

Although  the  treaty  clearly  puts  the 
United  States  in  control  of  the  canal 
operation,  that  operation  will  function 
most  efficiently  if  both  sides  regard  it 


LLS.  and  Panatna 
Sign  Two  Agreements 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JAN.  12' 

The  United  States  and  Panama 
signed  two  agreements  January  11, 
1979,  called  for  in  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty  and  related  documents.  The 
first — a  treaty  on  prisoner  transfers — 
will  make  it  possible,  once  ratified,  for 
Americans  arrested  and  convicted 
under  Panamanian  legal  jurisdiction  to 
request  to  serve  their  sentences  in  penal 
institutions  in  the  United  States.  Under 
the  treaty,  Panamanians  convicted  of 
crimes  in  the  United  States  will  have 
the  same  right  to  petition  their  transfer 
to  Panamanian  institutions  to  serve 
their  sentences.  The  treaty  provides 
special  protection  for  official  Ameri- 
cans and  their  dependents  working  in 
Panama  with  the  Panama  Canal  Com- 
mission, to  be  established  October  1, 
1979,  and  the  Department  of  Defense 
until  the  year  2000.  According  to  the 
treaty,  such  official  Americans  and 
their  dependents  who  might  be  sen- 
tenced under  Panamanian  legal  juris- 
diction will  be  transferred  to  U.S. 
penal  institutions  automatically  upon 
their  request.  This  position  will  be  in 
effect  until  the  year  2000. 

All  other  Americans,  such  as 
tourists,  businessmen,  and  unofficial 
residents,  will  be  enabled  to  petition 
the  American  Embassy  in  Panama  for 


their  transfer  to  U.S.  penal  institutions. 
If  both  governments  agree  on  the 
transfer,  the  prisoner  will  be  sent  to  the 
United  States.  Panamanians  convicted 
under  U.S.  law  will  be  able  to  make 
similar  requests  to  their  Embassy  in 
Washington.  This  provision  will  be 
effective  for  5  years  and  is  automati- 
cally renewable  unless  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment or  the  Government  of  Panama 
wishes  to  terminate  it.  The  United 
States  has  similar  treaties  with  Mexico, 
Bolivia,  and  Canada. 

The  second  agreement — concerning 
the  Corozal  Cemetery  in  the  present 
Canal  Zone,  where  many  American 
citizens,  military  and  civilian,  are 
buried  —  provides  that  a  portion  of  the 
cemetery  will  be  permanently  main- 
tained in  the  future  by  the  American 
Battle  Monuments  Commission  as  a 
suitable  resting  place  for  deceased 
Americans.  According  to  the  agree- 
ment, Americans  working  for  the 
Panama  Canal  Commission,  military 
and  civilian  employees  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  and  dependents  of 
both  groups  and  certain  others  will  be 
allowed  to  be  buried  there  until  the 
year  2000. 

The  same  announcement  was  re- 
leased last  night  in  Panama.  D 


'  Issued  to  the  press  by  Department  spokesman 
Hodding  Carter  III. 


66 

as  a  partnership.  That  will  require  an 
added  ingredient  in  addition  to  simple 
compliance  with  the  treaty's  terms. 
That  additional  element  is  the  willing- 
ness of  both  sides  to  approach  the  task 
in  a  spirit  of  collegiality.  We  see  that 
spirit  developing  on  the  isthmus  today, 
in  the  detailed  work  being  accom- 
plished by  technical  experts  of  both 
countries,  and  implementing  legislation 
can  help  promote  that  spirit  by  giving 
life  to  the  new  institutions  which  will 
take  effect  under  the  treaty. 

The  principal  new  institution  is  the 
Panama  Canal  Commission  itself.  In 
my  view,  it  is  of  great  importance  to 
follow  the  Administration's  proposal 
that  the  Commission  be  constituted  as  a 
government  corporation,  subject,  as  is 
the  present  Company,  to  the  continuing 
oversight  by  the  Congress  of  its  ac- 
tivities and  budget.  This  form  would 
best  provide  for  a  close  working  re- 
lationship between  both  countries  in 
the  manner  contemplated  by  the 
treaties.  A  government  corporation 
would  not  only  assure  continuity  in  the 
canal's  operation,  but  it  would  also  be 
instrumental  in  bringing  Panama's 
minority  representatives  on  the  Board 
of  Directors  of  the  Commission  into  a 
genuine  decisionmaking  forum  on  pol- 
icy matters.  In  this  way.  over  a  period 
years.  Panamanians  would  develop  a 
tremendous  expertise  and  appreciation 
for  the  extremely  intricate  problems  of 
managing  canal  operations,  because 
they  would  share  in  the  process  of 
making  important  managerial  deci- 
sions. They  would  also  share  responsi- 
bility for  them. 

In  this  respect,  I  would  also  like  to 
point  out  that  one  of  the  principal  con- 
cerns frequently  expressed  by  Members 
of  the  Congress  has  been  whether  or 
not  Panama  would,  after  the  year  2000. 
appreciate  the  need  to  provide  for 
adequate  maintenance  and  capital  im- 
provement of  the  canal  operation.  I  be- 
lieve that  a  corporate  structure  would 
best  convey  the  concept  that  the  canal 
be  operated  as  a  business,  on  a  self- 
sustaining  basis,  and  that  proper  provi- 
sions for  maintenance  be  made  in  its 
financial  structure.  Indeed,  since  much 
of  the  business  of  the  board  of  the  gov- 
ernment corporation  would  involve  ap- 
proval of  canal  maintenance  programs, 
Panamanian  members  would  be  per- 
sonally involved  and  would  share  re- 
sponsibility for  the  upkeep  of  the 
canal. 

Anyone  who  is  familiar  with  Panama 
knows  that  the  country  has  a  large 
number  of  highly  qualified  people  in 
both  technical  and  managerial  areas,  a 
great  many  of  them  with  university  de- 
grees from  the  United  States.  It  is  im- 


portant, however,  that  Panamanian  per- 
sonnel be  given  the  opportunity  to 
work  as  closely  as  possible  with  their 
U.S.  counterparts  in  all  aspects  of 
canal  management  so  that  the  institu- 
tional knowledge  that  we  have  con- 
cerning the  canal's  operation  be  trans- 
mitted to  them  well  in  advance  of  the 
year  2000. 

Safeguarding  the  Interests 
of  U.S.  Citizens 

Both  the  Administration  bill  (H.R. 
1716)  and  the  bill  introduced  by  the 
chairman  of  the  committee  (H.R.  Ill) 
contain  numerous  provisions  relating  to 
the  employment  and  to  the  quality  of 
life  of  the  U.S.  citizens  who  are  pres- 
ently living  in  the  Canal  Zone.  Gover- 
nor Parfitt  has  given  extensive  tes- 
timony on  this  subject  to  the  Post 
Office  and  Civil  Service  Committee.  I 
wish  to  associate  myself  with  the  Gov- 
ernor's testimony.  During  the  4  months 
since  my  appointment  as  Ambassador, 
I  have  had  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
numerous  citizens  organizations  and 
labor  unions  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  I 
can  attest  to  the  fact  that  our  citizens 
living  there,  although  the  great  major- 
ity of  them  did  not  favor  the  treaties, 
have  a  high  esprit  de  corps,  love  their 
work  on  the  canal,  and  wish  to  stay  if 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  their 
employment  and  the  quality  of  life  in 
their  communities  remain  similar  to 
those  which  they  enjoy  today. 

Many  of  them  are  apprehensive 
about  the  future,  generally  for  two  rea- 
sons. First,  they  want  to  be  assured  of 
Panama's  goodwill  and  sensitivity  to- 
ward their  concerns.  Our  Embassy, 
along  with  the  Panama  Canal  Company 
and  the  U.S.  Southern  Command,  is 
very  mindful  of  this  concern  as  are  the 
representatives  of  the  Government  of 
Panama.  A  second  reason  for  their  con- 
cern, however,  is  the  notion  that 
"Washington."  by  which  they  mean 
both  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches,  may  no  longer  care  about 
them  and  may  not  provide  for  them  in 
the  ways  promised  in  the  treaties.  In 
this  respect,  the  provisions  in  both  the 
Administration's  and  the  chairman's 
bills  are  of  critical  importance.  It  is  in 
the  best  interest  of  the  continued  effi- 
ciency of  the  canal  that  these  loyal  em- 
ployees and  citizens  be  treated  fairly, 
in  recognition  of  the  significant  role 
they  play  today  as  well  as  the  valuable 
contributions  they  have  made  in  the 
past. 

I  should  also  add  that  we  are  asking 
our  employees  to  undertake  an 
additional  —  and  highly  essential  — 
mission:  that  of  training  Panamanians 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

to  assume  increasingly  greater  respon- 
sibility in  the  canal  organization.  ManjI 
Americans  in  the  Canal  Zone  with 
whom  I  have  spoken  are  very  much 
aware  of  this  extra  requirement  and  re 
spond  to  the  challenge  with  under 
standing  and  goodwill.  We  need  theii 
continued  support,  and  I  feel  it  is  in  out 
highest  national  interest  to  enact  the 
provisions  made  for  the  employees  oi 
the  canal  enterprise  which  are  con- 
tained in  the  Administration's  proposed 
implementing  legislation. 

in  conclusion,  let  me  say  that  I  be- 
lieve there  is  every  reason  to  be  op- 
timistic about  the  success  of  our  coop 
eration  with  Panama  in  treaty 
implementation.  Our  Panamanian 
counterparts  have  shown  their  desire 
for  a  spirit  of  partnership  in  our  great 
common  enterprise.  A  new  government 
in  Panama  took  office  last  October 
which  is  composed  of  young,  energe 
tic.  highly  educated  people  who  are 
determined  to  make  their  country  an 
economic  and  social  success.  They 
have  expressed  a  policy  of  vigorous 
stimulation  of  the  private  sector  and 
have  extended  an  open  invitation  to 
private  foreign  investment. 

An  important  part  of  their  program  is 
continued  cooperation  with  the  United 
States  in  every  area.  They  have  demon 
strated  sensitivity  to  the  concerns  of  the 
American  citizens  who  live  in  the  pres 
ent  Canal  Zone  and  have  repeatedly 
stressed  their  desire  for  our  citizens  to 
remain  in  Panama  after  they  retire.  If 
we  are  able  to  implement  both  the  spirit 
and  letter  of  the  treaties  both  with  re 
spect  to  Panama  and  to  our  own  em 
ployees,  and  if  we  can  help  maintain 
between  both  countries  a  true  spirit  of 
collegiality,  we  will  assure  that  the 
Panama  Canal  will  continue  to  provide 
its  important  service  to  our  country  and 
to  world  shipping.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
DC.  20402. 


\pril  1979 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

V\iation 

."onvention  on  the  international  recognition  of 
lights  in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19. 
1948.  Entered  into  force  Sept  17,  1953. 
TIAS  2847. 

Adherences  deposited:  Madagascar,  Jan.   9. 
1979;  Seychelles,  Jan.   16,  1979 

Protocol  relating  to  certain  amendments  to  the 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
iTlAS  1591).  Done  at  Montreal  June  14. 
1954.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  12.  1956. 
TIAS  3756. 

Ralification  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  June  27.  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  amendment  of  article  50(a) 
of  the  convention  on  international  civil  avia- 
tion (TIAS  1591 ),  Done  at  Montreal  June  21 . 
1961  Entered  into  force  July  17.  1962.  TIAS 
5170. 

Rattficalion  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea.  June  27.  1978. 

'ri'iocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  con- 
tention on  international  civil  aviation  (TIAS 
1591).  Done  at  Rome  Sept.  15.  1962.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  II.  1975.  TIAS  8162. 
Ratification  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea.  June  27,  1978. 

?onvention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts 
committed  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Sept.    14,    1963.   Entered   into  force  Dec.  4, 

1969.  TIAS  6768. 

Ratification  deposited:  People's  Republic  of 

the  Congo.  Nov.   13,  1978. 
Accessions  deposited:   Bangladesh,  July  25, 
1978;  Botswana.  Jan.    16.    1979;  People's 
Republic  of  China.   Nov.    14.    1978;'   The 
Gambia.  Jan.  4.  1979;  Grenada.  Aug.  28. 
1978;  Nepal.  Jan.    15.   1979;  Seychelles, 
Jan.  4,  1979. 
Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft    Done  at  The  Hague  Dec    16. 

1970.  Entered   into  force  Oct.    14,    1971. 
TIAS  7192. 

Accession  deposited:  Togo,  Feb.  9,  1979. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation  (TIAS 
1591).  Done  at  New  York  Mar.  12.  1971. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  16.  1973.  TIAS  7616. 
Ralification  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea.  June  27,  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation  (TIAS 
1591 ).  Done  at  Vienna  July  7.  1971 .  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  19.  1974.  TIAS  8092. 
Ratifications  deposited:    People's   Republic 
of  the  Congo.  Nov.  13.  1978;  Democratic 
People's   Republic  of  Korea.  June   27. 
1978;  Tanzania.  June  15.  1978. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23.  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26.  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  Feb.  9,  1979. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation  (TIAS 
1591).  Done  at  Montreal  Oct.  16.  1974.^ 


Ratifications  deposited:    Democratic 
People's  Republic  of  Korea.  June   27. 
1978;  Mall.  July  27.   1978;  Peru,  July   19, 
1978;  Tanzania,  June  15,  I97X. 
Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,    1944)  (TIAS   1591).  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30.  1977.- 
Ratification  deposited:   Mexico.   Mar.    2. 
1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1975.  TIAS 
8062. 

Ratifications  deposited:   Belgium,   Mar.    15. 
1979;  Honduras,  Mar.  14.  1979. 

Collisions 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for 
preventing  collisions  at  sea.  1972.  with  reg- 
ulations. Done  at  London  Oct.  20.  1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15.  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy.  Jan.   11,  1979. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  trans- 
port of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov,  14, 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20.  1978.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Portugal.  Feb.  13, 
1979. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978.^ 

Accession  deposited:  Malawi,  Oct.  5,  1978. 
Ralification  deposited:    Norway,   Feb.    15. 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
June   13.   1976.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  30. 
1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Ratification  deposited:    Spain.   Nov.    27. 

1978.-' 
Accessions  deposited:   Afghanistan.    Bar- 
bados.  Bhutan.   Burundi.  Jordan,  Laos, 
and  Seychelles.  Dec.   13.  1978;  Madagas- 
car. Jan.  12.  1979 

Fisheries 

Protocol  amending  the  international  convention 
for  the  high  seas  fisheries  of  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean  of  May  9.  1952.  as  amended 
(TIAS  2786.  5385).  with  agreed  minutes  and 
memoranda  of  understanding.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Apr.  25.  1978. 

Ratifications  exchanged:  Feb.   15.  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Feb.  15,  1979. 

Health 

Amendments  to  Articles  24  and  25  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  World  Health  Organization  of 
July  22.  1946.  as  amended  (TIAS  1808. 
4643.  8086.  8535).  Adopted  at  Geneva  May 
17.  1976.^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  Guatemala,  Jan.  16. 
1979;  Mexico.  Feb.  23.  1979. 


67 


Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad  in 
civil  or  commercial  matters.  Opened  for  sig- 
nature at  The  Hague  Mar.   18.   1970.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  7.  1972.  TIAS  7444. 
Signature:  Netherlands.  Feb.  28,  1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva 
Mar.  6.  1958.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  17, 
1958.  TIAS  4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Djibouti.  Feb.  20, 
1979. 

Oil  Pollution 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil, 
1954,  as  amended  (TIAS  4900.  6190.  8505). 
concerning  the  protection  of  the  Great  Bar- 
rier Reef.  Adopted  at  London  Oct.  12. 
1971.^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  German  Democratic 
Republic.  Jan.  25.  1979;  Bahamas.  Feb. 
16.  1979. 

Nuclear  Free  Zone 

Additional  protocol  II  to  the  treaty  of  Feb.  14. 
1967.  for  the  prohibition  of  nuclear  weapons 
in  Latin  America.  Done  at  Mexico  Feb.  14. 
1967.  Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S.  May 
12.  1971.  TIAS  7137. 

Ratification  deposited:  USSR..  Jan.  8. 
1979  (with  statement). 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington.  London  and 
Moscow  July   1,    1968.   Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5.  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Ratification  deposited:   Sri   Lanka.   Mar.   5. 

1979. 
Succession  deposited:   Tuvalu.   Jan.    19. 

1979. 

Postal 

Parcel  post  agreement,  final  protocol,  and  de- 
tailed regulations  of  the  Postal  Union  of  the 
Americas  and  Spain.  Done  at  Lima  Mar.  18. 
1976.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  I.  1976. 
Ratification  deposited:  U.S..  Nov.  30. 
1978.^ 

Money  order  agreement  and  final  protocol  of 
the  Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain. 
Done  at  Lima  Mar.  18.  1976.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  I.  1976. 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S..  Nov.  30. 
1978.^ 

Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain, 
general  regulations,  regulations  governing 
the  International  Office  and  the  Transfer  Of- 
fice, and  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lima  Mar.  18, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  I.  1976.  ex- 
cept for  article  107.  paragraph  I  of  the  gen- 
eral regulations  which  entered  into  force 
Mar.   18.  1976. 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S..  Nov.  30. 
1978. » 

Property,  Industrial 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15,  1957,  as  revised  at  Stockholm  on  July 
14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  18,  1970; 
for  the  U.S.  May  25.  1972.  TIAS  7419. 


68 

Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  ratification  depos- 
ited: Sp'ain,  Feb.  9,   1979. 
Nice   agreenieni   concerning   the   inlernational 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15.   1957,  as  revised.  Done  at  Geneva  May 
13,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  6.  1979.-' 
Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  thai  ratification  depos- 
ited: Spain,  Feb.  9,  1979. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendments  to  chapter  II  of  the  international 

convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  I960 

(TIAS  5780).  Adopted  by  the  IMCO  Assem- 
bly at  London  Nov.  30,  1966.'^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.  12,  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 

the  safety  of  life  at  sea,   1960  (TIAS  5780). 

Adopted  at  London  Oct.  25,  1967.^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.  12,  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 

the  safety  of  life  at  sea,   I960  (TIAS  5780). 

Adopted  at  London  Nov.  26.  1968.^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.  12.  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 

the  safety  of  life  at  sea,   I960.   Adopted  at 

London  Oct.  21.  1969.=^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.   12,  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 

the  safety  of  life  at  sea.   I960.   Adopted  at 

London  Oct.  12.  1971. ^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.  12,  1979. 
Amendments  to  chapters  II,  III.  IV.  and  V  of 

the  international  convention  for  the  safety  of 

life  at  sea,   1960  (TIAS  5780).   Adopted  at 

London  Nov.  20,  1973.^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  India,  Jan.  12,  1979; 
Romania,  Jan.  31,  1979. 
Amendment  to  chapter  VI  of  the  international 

convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960. 

Adopted  at  London  Nov.  20,  1973.^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  India,  Jan.   12,  1979; 
Romania,  Jan.   31,    1979;  Singapore,  Jan. 
9.  1979. 
International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 

sea,  1974,  with  anne.\.  Done  at  London  Nov. 

I.  1974.2 

Accessions  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Feb.  15.  1979;  Bahamas.  Feb.  16,  1979. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention  on  the   international   maritime 
satellite  organization   (INMARSAT),   with 
annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3.  1976. ^ 
Signature:  U.S.  (not  subject  to  ratification). 
Feb.  15,  1979. 

Operating  agreement  on  the  international 
maritime  satellite  organization  (INMAR- 
SAT), with  annex  Done  at  London  Sept.  3, 
1976.2 

Signature:    Communications   Satellite   Cor- 
poration (COMSAT),  U.S.,  Jan.  10.  1979. 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  Jan.  14. 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15.  1976. 
TIAS  8480. 

Acceptance  deposited:    European   Space 
Agency.  Jan.  2,  1979. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement.    1977,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Jan.   1.  1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Austria,  Feb.  8.  1979. 


Telecommunications 

Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  for  the  planning  of  the 
broadcasting-satellite  service  in  frequency 
bands  11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  regions  2  and  3) 
and  11.7-1^.5  GHz  (in  region  I),  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  I,  1979.'' 
Approvals  deposited:  Canada.  Dec.  8.  1978; 

Ireland.  Dec.    14.    1978;  Korea.  Dec.   7. 

1978;   Netherlands.    Dec.    28.    I978;« 

Senegal.  Dec.  6.  1978. 

Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  and  schedule 
of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at  Washington 
Dec.  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  10, 
1948.  TIAS  1849. 

Notification  of  withdrawal:    Panama.   Feb. 
12,  1979;  effective  June  30,  1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  1744). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to 
certain  provisions;  July  I,  1978,  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Mar.    13, 

1979. 
Ratification  deposited:  Luxembourg,  Mar.  6, 
1979. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done 
at  Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered  Into 
force  June  24,  1978.  with  respect  to  certain 
provisions;  July  I.  1978,  with  respect  tO' 
other  provisions. 

Ratification  deposited:    Luxembourg,    Mar. 
6,  1979. 


BILATERAL 

Austria 

Air  transport  agreement.  Signed  at  Vienna  June 
23,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  23,  1966 
TIAS  6066. 
Terminated:  Mar.  9,  1979. 

Brazil 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Apr.  22, 
1976,  as  amended  (TIAS  8738,  9175),  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  cotton  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Jan.  31  and  Feb.  28.  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  28.  1979. 

Colombia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  scientific 
and  technical  cooperation  in  the  earth  sci- 
ences. Signed  Dec.  12.  1978.  and  Jan.  30. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  30,  1979. 

Memorandum  of  agreement  relating  to  jet  fuel 
prices.  Signed  at  Bogota  Feb.  22,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  22,  1979;  effective  Jan. 
16,  1979. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Costa  Rica  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  15,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  15,  1979;  effective  Jan.  I, 
1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Sept. 
28,  1977  (TIAS  8944).  Signed  at  Santo 
Domingo  Jan.  11,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.   I  1.  1979. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  El  Salvador  during  calendar 
year  1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  14,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  14,  1979;  effective  Jan.  I, 
1979. 

France 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  Jan.  15.  1976.  (TIAS  8610) 
on  the  participation  of  France  in  the  interna- 
tional phase  of  ocean  drilling  of  the  deep  sea 
drilling  project.  Signed  at  Paris  and  Wash- 
ington Oct.  12  and  26.  1978.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  26,  1978. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding on  the  participation  of  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany  in  the  international! 
phase  of  ocean  drilling  of  the  deep  sea  dril- 
ling project.  Signed  at  Bonn-Bad  Godesberg) 
and  Washington  Feb.  14  and  24,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  24,  1978. 

International  express  mail/datapost  agreement, 
with  detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Bonn 
and  Washington  Dec.  15,  1978.  and  Jan.  22, 
1979.  Enters  into  force  on  a  date  mutually 
agreed  upon  by  the  administrations  after  it  is 
signed  by  the  authorized  representatives  of 
both  administrations. 

Ghana 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 
Accra  Feb.  9,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb. 
9.  1979 

Guatemala 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Guatemala  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  12.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  12,  1979;  effective  Jan.  I, 
1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Haiti  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  Feb.  15,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  15.  1979;  effective  Jan. 
I,  1979. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Honduras  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  31,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  31,  1979;  effective  Jan.  I, 
1979. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  8, 
1977.  as  amended  (TIAS  8936).  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Hong  Kong  Feb.  2  and  13,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  13,  1979. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 


April  1979 

M),  1977.  as  amended  (TIAS  9036).  relating 
ii>  Irade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manniade  liher 
le\tiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Jan.  12  and 
Ich.  8,  1979.  Entered  int"o  force  Feb.  X. 
1979. 

International  Monetary  Fund 

Agreement  relating  to  provision  of  financing  by 
the  U.S.  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
111  connection  with  the  establishment  of  the 
.Supplementary  Financing  Facility.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  Jan.  5 
and  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  16. 
1979. 

Japan 

Agreement  on  educational  exchange  programs. 
.Signed  at  Tokyo  Feb.  15.  1979,  Enters  into 
force  on  the  date  diplomatic  notes  are  ex- 
changed indicating  approval  by  each  country 
in  accordance  with  its  Internal  procedures. 

Understanding  concerning  the  termination  of 
the  agreement  of  Jan.  1  1,  1958,  as  amended 
(TIAS  .^982,  4635,  5422).  for  financing  an 
educational  exchange  program.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  Feb.  15,  1979. 
1  nters  into  force  Feb.  15,  1979;  effective 
upon  entry  into  force  of  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  15.  1979,  on  educational  exchange  pro- 
grams. 

Jordan 

.^greement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
iiiodlties,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Nov. 

27,  1974.  (TIA'S  7995)  with  minutes  of 
negotiation.  Signed  at  Amman  Jan.  17,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  17,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  loan  agreement  for 
the  potash  plant  project.  Signed  at  Amman 
Jan.  25.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  25, 
1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
Imports  from  Mexico  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  11  and  15.^1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  15.  1979;  effective  Jan.  1, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June  2. 

1977.  (TIAS  8952)  as  amended,  relating  to 
additional  cooperative  arrangements  to  curb 
the  illegal  traffic  In  narcotics.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  Jan.  15,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  15,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 

28.  1948.  and  Aug.  30.  1949.  as  amended 
(TIAS  2086,  7360),  establishing  a  U.S.- 
Mexican Commission  on  Cultural  Coopera- 
tion. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  Oct.  30.  1978.  and 
Jan.  23.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  23. 
1979, 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  15. 

1978.  as  amended,  relating  to  additional  co- 
operative arrangements  to  curb  the  Illegal 
production  and  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  Feb.   7, 

1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  7.  1979. 
Agreement  for  cooperation   in  the   field  of 

housing  and  urban  development.  Signed  at 
Mexico  Feb.  16,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  16,  1979. 
Agreement  on  cooperation  to  improve  the  man- 
agement of  arid  and  semlarid  lands  and  con- 
trol desertification.  Signed  at  Mexico  Feb. 
16,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  16,  1979. 


Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Feb.  26,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb,  26.  1979;  effective  May  1. 
1978, 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  New  Zealand  during  calendar 
year  1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  11  and  Feb.  9,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  9,  1979;  effective  Jan. 

1,  1979. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Nicaragua  during  calendar  year 
1979,  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  11  and  16,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan,  16,  1979;  effective  Jan.  1, 
1979. 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Panama  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  II  and  17.  1979,  Entered 
into  force  Jan,  17,  1979;  effective  Jan,  1, 
1979, 

Peru 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Apr.  26,  1978. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Lima  Feb. 
7.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  7,  1979. 

Poland 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  July  19,  1972,  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended (TIAS  7535,  8469).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Warsaw  Dec.  29,  1978, 
Jan.  15  and  30.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
30,  1979, 

Turkey 

Implementing  agreement  regarding  the  consoli- 
dation and  rescheduling  of  certain  debts 
owed  to  the  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Ankara 
Dec.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7. 
1978. 

Tuvalu 

Treaty  of  friendship.  Signed  at  Funafuti  Feb.  7, 
1979.  Enters  Into  force  on  the  date  of  ex- 
change of  Instruments  of  ratification. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  June  19,  1973.  as  extended  (TIAS 
7651 .  9008),  on  cooperation  in  studies  of  the 
world  ocean.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Moscow  Dec.  15.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Dec,  15.  1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  Sept,  29,  1975,  (TIAS  8591) 
on  the  participation  by  the  United  Kingdom 
in  the  international  phase  of  ocean  drilling 
and  extension  of  the  deep  sea  drilling  proj- 
ect. Signed  at  Washington  and  London.  Dec. 

2,  1977,  and  Jan.   31,    1978.   Entered  into 
force  Jan.  31,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Belize  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  11  and  30,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  30.  1979;  effective  Jan.  1. 
1979. 


69 


Yugoslavia 

Agreement  concerning  trade  in  men's  and  boy's 
wool  and  mademade  fiber  suits.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Belgrade  Oct.  26  and 
27,  1978,  Enters  into  force  after  being  ap- 
proved by  competent  authorities  of  the  two 
parties. 

Zaire 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug.  25.  1978. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kinshasa 
Dec.  27,  1978,  and  Jan.  3.  1979  Entered 
Into  force  Jan.  3,  1979. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  certain  debts  owed  to.  guaran- 
teed, or  Insured  by  the  US.  Government  and 
Its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Feb.  7,  1979,  Enters  into  force  upon 
receipt  by  Zaire  of  written  notice  that  U.S. 
laws  and  regulations  covering  debt  re- 
scheduling have  been  complied  with.  D 


'With  reservation. 

^Not  in  force. 

^Not  iii  force  for  the  U.S. 

^With  declarations. 

^Provisionally  in  force  for  the  U,S,;  deposit 
of  ratification  brought  agreement  into  force 
definitively, 

'For  the  Kingdom  In  Europe  and  the  Nether- 
lands Antilles. 


CHROI\OLOGY: 

February  1979 


Feb.  1  Yugoslavian  President  Tito 

visits  Kuwait,  Iraq.  Syria, 
and  Jordan  Feb.  1-12, 

Feb,  4  Thai  Prime  Minister  Kriangsak 

visits  U,S.  Feb,  4-16. 

Feb,  7  Col.  Ben,  Jadid  Shadll  elected 

President  of  Algeria, 

Feb.  8  State   Department   announces 

that  U.S.  is  withdrawing  Its 
military  mission  and  all 
Peace  Corps  volunteers  from 
Nicaragua,  not  considering 
new  AID  projects,  and  re- 
ducing the  number  of  offi- 
cials in  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Nicaragua  (press  briefing), 

Feb.  9  Defense  Secretary  Brown  visits 

Saudi  Arabia.  Jordan,  Israel, 
and  Egypt  Feb,  9-18, 

Feb.  1 1  Iranian  Prime  Minister  Bakh- 

tiar  resigns. 

Feb.  12  Medhi  Bazargan.  designated  by 

Ayatollah  Khomeini  to  be 
Prime  Minister  of  Iran,  as- 
sumes office. 
Queen  Elizabeth  II  visits 
Kuwait,  Bahrain,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Qatar,  Oman,  and 
the  United  Arab  Emirates 
Feb.  12-Mar,  2, 

Feb.  14  US,    Ambassador   to    Af- 

ghanistan Adolph  Dubs  is 
abducted  and  killed  in 
Kabul. 


70 


U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran  is  at- 
tacked and  partially  occupied 
by  armed  Iranians  who  are 
displaced  by  forces  loyal  lo 
Ayatollah  Khomeini.  After 
the  incident  the  Embassy  re- 
sumes operations. 
President  Carter  visits  Mexico 
Feb.  14-16. 

Feb.  15  White   House   announces   pro- 

posed reorganization  of  U.S. 
foreign  assistance  programs 
under  one  agency  to  be 
called  the  International  De- 
velopment Cooperation  Ad- 
ministration. 

Feb.  17  The   P.R.C.    invades   Vietnam 

along  much  of  their  border. 

Feb.  18  North  and  South  Korean  offi- 

cials meet  for  the  first  time 
in  6  years  in  Panmunjom. 

Feb.  21  Delegations  headed  by  Egyp- 

tian Prime  Minister  Khalil. 
Israeli  Foreign  Minister 
Dayan,  and  Secretary  Vance 
participate  in  talks  concern- 
ing peace  in  the  Middle  East 
at  Camp  David  Feb.  21-25. 

Feb.  22  Caribbean   island  of  St.   Lucia 

gains  its  independence  from 
the  United  Kingdom 
White  House  announces  that 
U.S.  economic  aid  to  Af- 
ghanistan will  be  reduced. 

Feb.  23  U.S.   Ambassador  to  the  U.N. 

Young  urges  a  peaceful  res- 
olution of  the  conflict  in- 
volving the  P.R.C,  Viet- 
nam, and  Cambodia  (Secu- 
rity Council  meeting). 
Treasury  Secretary  Blumenthal 
visits  the  P.R.C.  Feb.  23- 
Mar.  5. 

Feb.  26  Senate  confirms  the  nomination 

of  Leonard  Woodcock  to  be 
the  first  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
the  P.R.C.  He  is  sworn  in  on 
Feb.  28. 

Feb.  28  Concerned  by   indications  that 

South  Yemen  has  invaded 
and  occupied  territory  in 
North  Yemen,  the  State  De- 
partment announces  that  the 
U.S.  will  accelerate  delivery 
of  defensive  arms  previously 
agreed  upon  in  response  lo 
requests  by  North  Yemen 
(press  briefing).  D 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


February  16-March  13 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

39         2/16         FY   1980  international  secu- 
rity assistance  program. 


*40         2/16  U.S.  signs  convention  on  the 

International  Maritime 
Satellite  Organization 
(INMARSAT),  Feb.  15. 

*41  2/16         Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 

mittee (SCO,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  fire  protection. 
Mar.   1. 

*42         2/16  Advisory  Committee  on   In- 

ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, working  group 
on  UN/OECD  investment 
undertakings.  Mar.  9. 

♦43  2/16  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radiocommunications. 
Mar.   15. 

*44  2/16  U.S..  Mexico  agree  to  coop- 

erate to  improve  the  man- 
agement of  their  arid  and 
semiarid  lands. 

*45  2/21  Advisory  Commission  to  the 

U.S.  national  section  of  the 
International  Commission 
for  the  Conservation  of 
Atlantic  Tunas.  Mar.  7. 

*46         2/22  State   Department   annual 

comprehensive  review  of 
advisory  committees. 

*47         2/23  Advisory  Committee  on  In- 

ternational Investment. 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, working  group 
on  Iransborder  data  Hows, 
Mar.  8. 

*48         2/26  U.S.   Organization  for  the 

International   Radio  Con- 
sultative      Committee 
(CCIR),   study   group   5, 
Mar.  19. 
49         2/27  Vance:   remarks  before  the 

Council  on  Foreign  Diplo- 
mats. 

*50  2/27  Assistant  Secretary  Derian  to 

travel  to  southern  African 
countries,  Feb.  23-Mar. 
16. 

*51  2/28  see,  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  subdivision,  stability, 
and  load  lines.  Mar.  20. 

*52         2/28  Leonard  Woodcock  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  the 
P.R.C.  (biographic  data). 

*53  2/28  U.S..    India   amend   textile 

agreement.  Jan.  12  and 
Feb.  8. 

*54  2/26  Robert  H.  Pelletreau.  Jr., 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Bahrain  (biographic  data). 

*55         2/28  Advisory  Committee  on  Pri- 

vate International  Law, 
study  group  on  maritime 
law  matters.  Mar.  21 . 

•56  3/1  U.S.,   Haiti   amend   textile 

agreement,  Dec.  28  and 
29. 

*57  3/2  Advisory  Committee  on  1979 

World  Administrative 
Radio  Conference,  Mar. 
28. 

*58  3/6  U.S.,   Brazil   amend  textile 

agreement.  Jan.  31  and 
Feb.  28. 

*59  3/7  Stephen  W.  Bosworth  sworn 

in  as  Ambassador  to 
Tunisia  (biographic  data). 


*61 

3/9 

•62 

3/9 

•63 

3/9 

•64 

3/9 

•65 

3/9 

Department  of  State  Bulletit 

♦60  3/9  Deputy    Defense   Secretary  .U 

Charles  W.  Duncan.  Jr..  to 
address  conference  on  U.S. 
security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge.  Atlanta.  Mar. 
15. 
U.S..   Mexico  sign  textile 

agreement,  Feb.  26. 
US..  Yugoslavia  sign  textile 
agreement.  Oct.  26  and  27. 
U.S.,  Hong  Kong  amend 
textile  agreement,  Feb.  2 
and  13. 
U.S.,  Haiti  amend  textile 
agreement.  Feb.  8  and  16. 
Former  CIA  Director  William 
E.  Colby  to  address  con- 
ference on  U.S.  security 
and  the  Soviet  challenge, 
Birmingham.  Mar.  22. 

♦66         3/12  sec.  Apr.  3. 

♦67  3/12  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  safety  of  fishing  ves- 
sels. Apr.  4. 

♦68         3/12  see.  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  bulk  chemicals.  Apr.  5. 

•69         3/12  see.  May  2. 

•70         3/12  U.S.   Organization  for  the 

International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  4.  Apr.  6. 

♦71  3/12         CCITT.    study    group    I, 

Apr.  5. 

*72         3/13  Fine  Arts  Committee.   May 

24.  D 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


IIVDEX 


APRIL  1979 
VOL.  79,  NO.  2025 

Afghanistan 

Assistance  in  Afghanistan  (White  House  state- 
ment)     50 

U.S.  Ambassador  Killed  in  Afghanistan  (Car- 
ter, Vance)   49 

Africa 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Africa 
(Moose)  9 

Horn  of  Africa  (Moose)   12 

Arms  Control 

Preserving  Freedom  and  Peace  in  a  Nuclear 
Age  (Mondale) 14 

Remarks  Before  a  National  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  (Carter) 4 

SALT  Treaty  (White  House  statement) 15 

Asia 

American  and  Japanese  Interests  in  Southeast 
Asia  (Newsom) 27 

ASEAN-U.S.  Business  Council  (Department 
statement)   20 

Chronology:  February  1979 69 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  East  Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Remarks  Before  a  National  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  (Carter) 4 

Bangladesh.  Promoting  Stability  and  Security 
in  South  Asia  (Christopher) 48 


Business.   ASEAN-U.S.   Business  Council  (De- 
partment statement) 20 

r^hina.  President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
February  27  (excerpts)   7 

Congress 

(Economic  Report  of  the  President  (message  to 

the  Congress) 32 

1 1th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Carter) 34 

FY    1980   Assistance   Proposals   for   Africa 

(Moose)   9 

rY    1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  East  Asia 

(Holbrooke) 17 

FY    1980   Assistance   Proposals  for  Latin 

America  and  the  Caribbean  (Vaky)   56 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Portugal  and 

,    Spain  (Vest)   36 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the  Eastern 

Mediterranean  (Nimetz)  33 

FY   1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the  Middle 

East  (Draper) 38 

FY   1980  Security  Assistance  Proposals  (Ben- 
son)   42 

Horn  of  Africa  (Moose)  12 

Maritme  Boundary  Treaties  (message  to  the 

Senate) 59 

Panama  Canal  Treaty   Legislation   (Carter. 

Christopher.  Moss)   62 

Promoting  Stability  and  Security  in  South  Asia 

(Christopher) 48 

Security  Assistance  Report  on  Korea.  1978  ...  .24 
Sixth   Report  on  the  Sinai   Support  Mission 

(message  to  the  Congress)  41 

Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties  (message  to 

the  Congress)   32 

Cuba.  Maritime  Boundary  Treaties  (message  to 

the  Senate) 59 

Cyprus 

1 1  th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Carter) 34 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the  Eastern 

Mediterranean  (Nimetz)  33 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Chronology:  February  1979 69 

U.S.  Ambassador  Killed  in  Afghanistan  (Car- 
ter. Vance)    49 

Developing  Countries.  America's  Stake  in  the 

World  Economy  (Vance)   30 

Egypt 

Editor's  Note 38 

Egyptian,  Israeli,  and  U.S.   Officials  Meet  at 

Camp  David  (Carter) 39 

Energy.   President  Carter's  News  Conference 

of  February  27  (excerpts) 7 

Europe.  Chronology:  February  1979 69 

Foreign  Aid 

America's  Stake   in  the   World  Economy 

(Vance)   30 

Assistance  in  Afghanistan  (White  House  state- 
ment)     50 

Horn  of  Africa  (Moose)   12 

Greece.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the 

Eastern  Mediterranean  (Nimetz) 33 

Guatemala.   Letter  of  Credence   (Monter- 

roso) 58 

Honduras.  Letter  of  Credence  (Bermudez)  ...  .58 
Human   Rights.   Implementing  Human  Rights 

Standards  (Mezvinsky) 52 

India.   Promoting  Stability  and  Security  in 

South  Asia  (Christopher)   48 

Israel 

Editor's  Note 38 

Egyptian,  Israeli,  and  U.S.  Officials  Meet  at 

Camp  David  (Carter) 39 

Visit  of  Israeli   Prime  Minister  Begin  (White 

House  statement)  40 

Japan.   American  and  Japanese  Interests  in 

Southeast  Asia  (Newsom)  27 

Jordan.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the 

Middle  East  (Draper) 38 


Korea 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  East  Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Security  Assistance  Report  on  Korea.  1978  ...  .24 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Chronology:  February  1979 69 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Vaky)   56 

Pan  American  Day  and  Week.  1979  (proclama- 
tion)    57 

Lebanon.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for 
the  Middle  East  (Draper)  38 

Mauritania.  Letter  of  Credence  (Sidi) II 

Mexico.  Maritime  Boundary  Treaties  (message 
to  the  Senate)  59 

Middle  East 

Chronology:  February  1979 69 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  Feb- 
ruary 27  (excerpts) 7 

Remarks  Before  a  National  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  (Carter) 4 

Sixth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
(message  to  the  Congress)  41 

Monetary  Affairs 

America's  Stake  in  the  World  Economy 
(Vance)    30 

Economic  Report  of  the  President  (message  to 
the  Congress)   32 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  Feb- 
ruary 27  (excerpts) 7 

Nepal.  Promoting  Stability  and  Security  in 
South  Asia  (Christopher)   48 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

NATO  — 30  Years  After 1 

NATO's  30th  Anniversary  (Vance)  1 

30th  Anniversary  of  NATO  (proclamation)   .  .ii 

Norway.  Letter  of  Credence  (Hedemann)    .  .37 

Pakistan 

Letter  of  Credence  (Khan) 51 

Promoting  Stability  and  Security  in  South  Asia 
(Christopher) 48 

Panama 

Letter  of  Credence  (Lopez-Guevara) 58 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Legislation  (Carter. 
Christopher,  Moss)    62 

U.S.  and  Panama  Sign  Two  Agreements  (De- 
partment announcement) 65 

Philippines 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  East  Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

Military  Bases  Agreement  With  the  Philippines 
( letter  from  President  Carter) 22 

Portugal.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for 
Portugal  and  Spain  (Vest)   36 

Presidential  Documents 

Economic  Report  of  the  President   32 

Egyptian,  Israeli,  and  U.S.  Officials  Meet  at 

Camp  David    39 

1 1th  Report  on  Cyprus  34 

Maritime  Boundary  Treaties   59 

Military  Bases  Agreement  With  the  Philip- 
pines   22 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Legislation 62 

Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1979  (proclama- 
tion)    57 

News  Conference  of  February  27  (excerpts)  .  .7 
Remarks  Before  a   National   Foreign  Policy 

Conference 4 

Sixth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission  .  .41 
30th  Anniversary  of  NATO  (proclamation)  .  .ii 
U.S.  Ambassador  Killed  in  Afghanistan  ...  .49 

Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties   32 

Publications.  GPO  Sales   13.37 

Refugees.   American  and  Japanese  Interests  in 

Southeast  Asia  (Newsom) 27 

Security  Assistance 

Assistance  in  Afghanistan  (White  House  state- 
ment)    50 


FY    1980  Assistance   Proposals  for  Africa 
(Moose)   9 

FY    1980   Assistance   Proposals   for  East   Asia 
(Holbrooke) 17 

FY    1980    Assistance    Proposals   for   Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Vaky)   56 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Portugal  and 
Spain  (Vest)   36 

FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  (Nimetz)   33 

FY   1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the  Middle 
East  (Draper) 38 

FY   1980  Security  Assistance  Proposals  (Ben- 
son)   ^2 

Horn  of  Africa  (Moose)  12 

North  Yemen  (Department  statement)  41 

Security  Assistance  Report  on  Korea,  1978  ...  .24 

Spain.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  Por- 
tugal and  Spain  (Vest)    36 

Sri  Lanka.  Promoting  Stability  and  Security  in 
South  Asia  (Christopher)  48 

Syria.   FY   1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the 
Middle  East  (Draper) 38 

Terrorism.   U.S.   Ambassador  Killed  in  Af- 
ghanistan (Carter,  Vance)   49 

Thailand.    Visit   of  Thai   Prime   Minister 
Kriangsak  (joint  press  statement) 26 

Trade 

America's  Stake   in   the   World   Economy 
(Vance)   30 

Economic  Report  of  the  President  (message  to 
the  Congress)   32 

Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties  (message  to 
the  Congress)   32 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   67 

Maritime  Boundary  Treaties  (message  to  the 
Senate) 59 

Military  Bases  Agreement  With  the  Philippines 
(letter  from  President  Carter) 22 

U.S.  and  Panama  Sign  Two  Agreements  (De- 
partment announcement) 65 

Turkey.  FY  1980  Assistance  Proposals  for  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  (Nimetz) 33 

United  Nations 

Chronology:  February  1979 69 

Implementing  Human  Rights  Standards  (Mez- 
vinsky)   52 

U.S.S.R.   Preserving  Freedom  and  Peace  in  a 
Nuclear  Age  (Mondale) H 

Venezuela.   Maritime  Boundary  Treaties  (mes- 
sage to  the  Senate)  59 

Yemen 

FY    1980  Assistance   Proposals  for  the  Middle 
East  (Draper) 38 

North  Yemen  (Department  statement) 41 

Name  Index 

Benson,  Lucy  Wilson 42 

Bermudez  Milla,  Jose  Antonio 58 

Carter,  President ii,  4,  7.  22.  32. 

34,  39,  41,  49,  57,  59,  62 

Christopher,  Warren   48,  62 

Draper,  Morris 38 

Hedemann,  Knut 37 

Holbrooke,  Richard  C 17 

Khan,  Sultan  Muhammad   51 

Lopez-Guevara,  Carlos  Alfredo  58 

Mezvinsky,  Edward  M 52 

Mondale,  Vice  President 14 

Monterroso  Miranda,  Felipe  Doroteo 58 

Moose.  Richard  M 9,  12 

Moss,  Ambler  H 62 

Newsom,  David  D 27 

Nimetz,  Matthew    33 

Sidi  Bouna  Ould  Sidi II 

Vaky,  Viron  P 56 

Vance,  Secretary I,  30,  49 

Vest,  George  S 36 


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Depart  men  t 
of  State 


-m  of  state  jm-m  v   ^ 

buUetin 


May  1979 


he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  79  /  Nunnber  2026 


^ 


■.^^•:-^ 


^1-* 


Egyptian-Israeli  Ff§ace  Tre. 


Third  World  / 


SALT  /  48 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  79  /  Number  2026  /  May  1979 


Cover  Photo: 

President  Sadat,  President  Carter,  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin  join  hands  in  peace. 

(White  House  photo  by  Bill  Fit2  Patnck) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
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foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
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The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
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The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CO]\TE]\TS 


EGYPT  AND  ISRAEL  SIGN  TREATY  OF  PEACE 

I   Remarks  by  President  Carter,  President  Sadat,  and  Prime  Minister  Begin 

1  Text  of  Joint  Statement 

2  Israeli  Cabinet  Approves  Proposals  (President  Carter) 

3  Egyptian  Cabinet  Approves  Treaty  {President  Carter) 

3  Texts  of  Documents 

4  Israeli  Knesset  Approves  Treaty  (President  Carter) 


THE  PRESIDENT 

16  President  Carter  Visits  Egypt  and  Israel 
( Menahem  Begin,  President  Carter, 
Vice  President  Mandate,  Yitzhak 
Navon,  Anwar  al-Sadal) 

21    Egypt  —  A  Profile 

25    Israel  — A  Profile 

30  President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Israeli 

Television 

31  President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Egyp- 

tian Television 


THE  SECRETARY 


33 


America's  Commitment  to  Third  World 
Development 

37  Question-and-Answer  Session  Follow- 
ing Seattle  Address 

39    Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 

AFRICA 

42  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Richard  M. 
Moose) 

44  Zaire  —  A  Profile 

45  Promoting  Peace  in  Southern  Rhodesia 

(Richard  M.  Moose) 

46  Southern  Rhodesia  (Department  State- 

ment) 


MIDDLE  EAST 

55  U.S.  Support  for  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace  Treaty  (Harold  Brown.  Presi- 
dent Carter,  Secretary  Vance) 

60  U.S.   and   Israel   Sign   Memoranda  of 

Agreement    ( Moshe   Dayan,   Secre- 
tary Vance) 

61  Achievement   of  Peace   in   the   Middle 

East   and    the   Future   Challenge 
(Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

64   Summaries  of  U.S.    Statements  in  the 

U.N. 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

66  Nicaragua  (Department  Spokesman's 
Response  to  a  Question) 

TREATIES 

66   Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69  March  1979 

70  PRESS  RELEASES 


ARMS  CONTROL 

48  SALT  II  and  the  National   Defense 
(Harold  Brown.  Zbigniew  Brzezinski) 


INDEX 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superintindcat  of  Document 


JUN     81P7P 


DEPOSITORY 


President  Carter,  seated  between  President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin,  witnesses  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  Between  Egypt  and  Israel.  (Herbert  Hansell,  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Department  of  State, 
stands  behind  President  Carter:  and  Meir  Rosenne,  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Israeli  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  stands  to  the  right  of  Prime  Minister  Begin.)  (Whue  House  phoio  by  Bill  Fuz  Patrick) 


EGYPT  AJ\D  ISRAEL  SIGI\  TREATY  OE  PEACE 


At  a  ceremony  on  the  North  Lawn  of  the  White  House  on  March  26,  1979, 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  signed  the  Treaty  of  Peace  Between 
'he  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  and  the  State  of  Israel  and  the  Agreed  Minutes  to 
Articles  I.  IV,  V,  and  VI  and  Annexes  I  and  III  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace;  the 
signing  of  these  documents  was  witnessed  by  President  Carter. 

At  that  ceremony.  President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  also  signed  a 
joint  letter  addressed  to  the  President  on  the  next  stage  in  the  negotiations. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  President  Carter,  President  Sadat,  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  after  the  signing  of  the  documents:  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  including 
three  annexes  and  an  appendix:  the  agreed  minutes:  and  six  letters. ' 


REMARKS  AT 
SIGNING  CEREMONY  2 


President  Carter 

During  the  past  30  years,  Israel  and 
Egypt  have  waged  war.  But  for  the  past 
16  months,  these  same  two  great  na- 
tions have  waged  peace.  Today  we 
celebrate  a  victory — not  of  a  bloody 
military  campaign  but  of  an  inspiring 
peace  campaign.  Two  leaders  who  will 
loom  large  in  the  history  of  nations — 
President  Anwar  al-Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Menahem  Begin — have  con- 
ducted this  campaign  with  all  the  cour- 
age, tenacity,  brilliance,  and  inspira- 
tion of  any  generals  who  have  ever  led 
men  and  machines  onto  the  field  of 
battle. 

At  the  end  of  this  campaign,  the  soil 
of  the  two  lands  is  not  drenched  with 
young  blood.  The  countrysides  of  both 
lands  are  free  from  the  litter  and  the 
carnage  of  a  wasteful  war.  Mothers  in 
Egypt  and  Israel  are  not  weeping  today 
for  their  children  fallen  in  senseless 
battle.  The  dedication  and  determina- 
tion of  these  two  world  statesmen  have 
borne  fruit.  Peace  has  come  to  Israel 
and  to  Egypt. 

I  honor  these  two  leaders  and  their 
government  officials  who  have  ham- 
mered out  this  peace  treaty  which  we 
have  just  signed.  But  most  of  all,  I 
honor  the  people  of  these  two  lands 
whose  yearning  for  peace  kept  alive  the 
negotiations  which  today  culminate  in 
this  glorious  event. 

We  have  won  at  last  the  first  step  of 
peace,  a  first  step  on  a  long  and  dif- 
ficult road.  We  must  not  minimize  the 
obstacles  which  still  lie  ahead.  Differ- 
ences still  separate  the  signatories  to 
this  treaty  from  one  another,  and  also 
from  some  of  their  neighbors  who  fear 
what  they  have  just  done.  To  overcome 
these  differences,  to  dispel  these  fears, 
we  must  rededicate  ourselves  to  the 
goal  of  a  broader  peace  with  justice  for 


all  who  have  lived  in  a  state  of  conflict 
in  the  Middle  East. 

We  have  no  illusions — we  have 
hopes,  dreams,  and  prayers,  yes,  but 
no  illusions. 

There  now  remains  the  rest  of  the 
Arab  world,  whose  support  and  whose 
cooperation  in  the  peace  process  is 
needed  and  honestly  sought.  1  am  con- 
vinced that  other  Arab  people  need  and 
want  peace.  But  some  of  their  leaders 
are  not  yet  willing  to  honor  these  needs 
and  desires  for  peace.  We  must  now 
demonstrate  the  advantages  of  peace 
and  expand  its  benefits  to  encompass 
all  those  who  have  suffered  so  much  in 
the  Middle  East. 

Obviously,  time  and  understanding 
will  be  necessary  for  people,  hitherto 
enemies,  to  become  neighbors  in  the 
best  sense  of  the  word. 

Just  because  a  paper  is  signed,  all 
the  problems  will  not  automatically  go 
away.  Future  days  will  require  the  best 
from  us  to  give  reality  to  these  lofty 
aspirations. 

Let  those  who  would  shatter  peace, 
who  would  callously  spill  more  blood, 
be  aware  that  we  three  and  all  others 
who  may  join  us  will  vigorously  wage 
peace. 

So  let  history  record  that  deep  and 
ancient  antagonism  can  be  settled  with- 
out bloodshed  and  without  staggering 
waste  of  precious  lives,  without  rapa- 
cious destruction  of  the  land. 

It  has  been  said,  and  I  quote:  "Peace 
has  one  thing  in  common  with  its 
enemy,  with  the  fiend  it  battles,  with 
war;  peace  is  active,  not  passive;  peace 
is  doing,  not  waiting;  peace  is 
aggressive — attacking;  peace  plans  its 
strategy  and  encircles  the  enemy;  peace 
marshals  its  forces  and  storms  the 
gates;  peace  gathers  its  weapons  and 
pierces  the  defense;  peace,  like  war,  is 
waged." 

It  is  true  that  we  cannot  enforce  trust 
and  cooperation  between  nations,  but 
we  can  use  all  our  strength  to  see  that 
nations  do  not  again  go  to  war. 


All  our  religious  doctrines  give  us 
hope.  In  the  Koran  we  read:  "But  if  the 
enemy  incline  towards  peace,  do  thou 
also  incline  towards  peace,  and  trust  in 
God;  for  He  is  the  One  that  heareth  and 
knoweth  all  things." 

And  the  prophet  Isaiah  said:  "Na- 
tions shall  beat  their  swords  into  plow- 
shares and  their  spears  into  pruning- 
hooks:  nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword 
against  nation,  neither  shall  they  learn 
war  any  more." 

So  let  us  now  lay  aside  war.  Let  us 
now  reward  all  the  children  of  Abra- 
ham who  hunger  for  a  comprehensive 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Let  us  now 
enjoy  the  adventure  of  becoming  fully 
human,  fully  neighbors,  even  brothers 
and  sisters.  We  pray  God,  we  pray  God 
together,  that  these  dreams  will  come 
true.  I  believe  they  will. 

President  Sadat 

This  is  certainly  one  of  the  happiest 
moments  in  my  life.  It  is  an  historic 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  25,  1979* 

At  the  convening  of  the  Camp  David 
summit  meeting  we  issued  a  communi- 
cation which  stated  in  part:  "Conscious 
of  the  grave  issues  which  face  us,  we 
place  our  trust  in  the  God  of  our  fathers, 
from  whom  we  seek  wisdom  and  guid- 
ance ....  We  ask  people  of  all  faiths  to 
pray  with  us  that  peace  and  justice  may 
result  from  these  deliberations." 

Our  trust  in  God  was  well-placed.  On 
Monday,  a  treaty  of  peace  will  be  signed 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  within  the 
framework  of  a  comprehensive  peace 
settlement  in  the  area.  We  are  grateful  to 
the  people  around  the  world  who  joined 
us  in  prayer.  We  now  ask  people  of  all 
faiths  to  join  again  in  a  day  of  prayer 
and  thanksgiving  for  what  has  been  ac- 
complished and  then  ask  God  to  guide 
our  nations  in  the  days  ahead  as  we  con- 
tinue to  work  for  a  comprehensive,  just, 
and  lasting  peace.  With  God's  help,  we 
and  generations  to  come  will  know  peace 
between  our  peoples.  To  this  end.  we 
ask  that  Monday.  March  26.  be  a  day  of 
prayer  around  the  world. 


♦Issued  by  President  Carter.  President 
Sadat,  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  2.  1979). 


turning  point  of  great  significance  for 
all  peace-loving  nations.  Those  among 
us  who  are  endowed  with  vision  cannot 
fail  to  comprehend  the  dimensions  of 
our  sacred  mission.  The  Egyptian 
people,  with  their  heritage  and  unique 
awareness  of  history,  have  realized 
from  the  very  beginning  the  meaning 
and  value  of  this  endeavor. 

In  all  the  steps  I  took,  I  was  not 
performing  a  personal  mission.  I  was 
merely  expressing  the  will  of  a  nation. 
I'm  proud  of  my  people  and  of  be- 
longing to  them. 

Today  a  new  dawn  is  emerging  out 
of  the  darkness  of  the  past.  A  new 
chapter  is  being  opened  in  the  history 
of  coexistence  among  nations,  one 
that's  worthy  of  our  spiritual  values 
and  civilization.  Never  before  had  men 
encountered  such  a  complex  dispute, 
which  is  highly  charged  with  emotions. 
Never  before  did  men  need  that  much 
courage  and  imagination  to  confront  a 
single  challenge.  Never  before  had  any 


israeii  Cabinet 
Approves  Proposals 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  14,  1979 » 

I  am  extremely  pleased  that  the  Is- 
raeli Cabinet  has  approved  the  two  re- 
maining proposals  that  I  discussed  with 
Prime  Minister  Begin  on  Monday  in 
Jerusalem.  Prime  Minister  Begin  has 
just  called  me  with  this  good  news. 
This  means  that  all  of  the  outstanding 
issues  in  the  negotiations  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  have  now  been  suc- 
cessfully resolved. 

At  this  historic  moment,  I  want  to 
congratulate  the  great  leaders  of  both 
countries — President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin — for  their  leadership 
and  the  courage  that  they  have  consist- 
ently demonstrated.  The  peace  which 
their  peoples  so  clearly  need  and  want 
is  close  to  reality.  I  am  proud  that  our 
country  has  been  able  to  assist  these 
two  longtime  adversaries  along  the  path 
of  reconciliation  and  toward  future 
cooperation.  We  stand  ready  to  help  in 
the  implementation  of  the  peace  treaty, 
in  the  negotiations  that  lie  ahead  on 
other  issues  of  concern,  and  in  working 
with  these  two  friends  to  build  a  stable 
and  peaceful  Middle  East.  O 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  19,  1979. 


cause  generated  that  much  interest  in 
all  four  corners  of  the  globe. 

Men  and  women  of  good  will  have 
labored  day  and  night  to  bring  about 
this  happy  moment.  Egyptians  and  Is- 
raelis alike  pursued  their  sacred  goal, 
undeterred  by  difficulties  and  compli- 
cations. Hundreds  of  dedicated  indi- 
viduals on  both  sides  have  given 
generously  of  their  thought  and  effort 
to  translate  the  cherished  dream  into  a 
living  reality. 

But  the  man  who  performed  the 
miracle  was  President  Carter.  Without 
any  exaggeration,  what  he  did  consti- 
tutes one  of  the  greatest  achievements 
of  our  time.  He  devoted  his  skill,  hard 
work,  and,  above  all,  his  firm  belief  in 
the  ultimate  triumph  of  good  against 
evil  to  insure  the  success  of  our  mis- 
sion. 

To  me  he  has  been  the  best  compan- 
ion and  partner  along  the  road  to  peace. 
With  his  deep  sense  of  justice  and 
genuine  commitment  to  human  rights, 
we  were  able  to  surmount  the  most  dif- 
ficult obstacles. 

There  came  certain  moments  when 
hope  was  eroding  and  retreating  in  the 
face  of  crisis.  However,  President 
Carter  remained  unshaken  in  his  confi- 
dence and  determination.  He  is  a  man 
of  faith  and  compassion.  Before  any- 
thing else,  the  signing  of  the  peace 
treaty  and  the  exchanged  letter  is  a 
tribute  to  the  spirit  and  ability  of 
Jimmy  Carter. 

Happily,  he  was  armed  with  the 
blessing  of  God  and  the  support  of  his 
people.  For  that  we  are  grateful  to  each 
and  every  American  who  contributed  in 
his  own  way  to  the  success  of  our  en- 
deavor. 

We  are  also  heartened  by  the  under- 
standing of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Israelis  who  remained  unwavering  in 
their  commitment  to  peace.  The  con- 
tinuation of  this  spirit  is  vital  to  the 
coronation  of  our  effort.  We  realize 
that  difficult  times  lay  ahead.  The 
signing  of  these  documents  marks  only 
the  beginning  of  peace.  But  it  is  an  in- 
dispensable start.  Other  steps  remain  to 
be  taken  without  delay  or  procrastina- 
tion. Much  will  depend  on  the  success 
of  these  steps. 

We  are  all  committed  to  pursue  our 
efforts  until  the  fruits  of  the  com- 
prehensive settlement  we  agreed  upon 
are  shared  by  all  parties  to  the  conflict. 

President  Carter  once  said  that  the 
United  States  is  committed  without  res- 
ervation to  seeing  the  peace  process 
through  until  all  parties  to  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  are  at  peace.  We  value 
such  a  pledge  from  a  leader  who  raised 
the  banners  of  morality  and  ethics  as  a 
substitute  for  power  politics  and  op- 
portunism. 


Department  of  State  Bulletij 

The  steps  we  took  in  the  recent  pai 
will  serve  Arab  vital  interests.  The  lib^ 
eration  of  Arab  land  and  the  reinstitu 
tion  of  Arab  authority  in  the  West  Banl 
and  Gaza  would  certainly  enhance  ou 
common  strategic  interests. 

While  we  take  the  initiative  to  pro 
tect  these  interests,  we  remain  faithfu 
to  our  Arab  commitment.  To  us,  this  i: 
a  matter  of  destiny.  Pursuing  peace  i; 
the  only  avenue  which  is  compatibh 
with  our  culture  and  creed. 

Let  there  be  no  more  wars  o 
bloodshed  between  Arabs  and  Israelis 
Let  there  be  no  more  wars  or  bloodshec 
between  Arabs  and  Israelis.  Let  then 
be  no  more  suffering  or  denial  o 
rights.  Let  there  be  no  more  despair  o 
loss  of  faith.  Let  no  mother  lament  tht 
loss  of  her  child.  Let  no  young  mat 
waste  his  life  on  a  conflict  from  whict 
no  one  benefits.  Let  us  work  togethe 
until  the  day  comes  when  they  bea 
their  swords  into  plowshares  and  thei 
spears  into  pruning-hooks.  And  Goc 
does  call  to  the  abode  of  peace.  H( 
does  guide  whom  he  pleases  to  hi: 
way. 

[At  this  point,    President  Sadat  spoke  ii  , 
Arabic.  ] 

Prime  Minister  Begin 

I  have  come  from  the  land  of  Israel 
the  land  of  Zion  and  Jerusalem,  an< 
here  I  am  in  humility  and  with  pride  ai 
a  son  of  the  Jewish  people,  as  one  o: 
the  generation  of  the  Holocaust  and  re 
demption. 

The  ancient  Jewish  people  gave  th« 
world  a  vision  of  eternal  peace,  of  uni 
versal  disarmament,  of  abolishing  th« 
teaching  and  the  learning  of  war. 

Two  prophets  —  Yishayahu  Bei 
Amotz  and  Micah  Hamorashti — having 
foreseen  the  spiritual  unit  of  man  undei ' 
God,  with  these  words  coming  forth 
from  Jerusalem,  gave  the  nations  of  the 
world  the  following  vision — expressed 
in  identical  terms — "And  they  shall 
beat  their  spears  into  pruninghooks: 
nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword  against 
nation,  neither  shall  they  learn  war  any 
more." 

Despite  the  tragedies  and  disap- 
pointments of  the  past,  we  must  never 
foresake  that  vision,  that  human  dream, 
that  unshakable  faith. 

Peace  is  the  beauty  of  life.  It  is  sun- 
shine. It  is  the  smile  of  a  child,  the 
love  of  a  mother,  the  joy  of  a  father, 
the  togetherness  of  a  family.  It  is  the 
advancement  of  man,  the  victory  of  a 
just  cause,  the  triumph  of  truth.  Peace 
is  all  of  these  and  more,  and  more. 

These  are  words  I  uttered  in  Oslo,  on 
December  10,  1978,  while  receiving 
the  second  half  of  the  Nobel  Peace 
Prize.  The  first  half  went,  rightly  so,  to 
President  Sadat.  And  I  took  the  liberty 


ay 


1979 


1  repeat  them  here  on  this  momentous, 
jistoric  occasion. 

It  is  a  great  day  in  the  annals  of  two 
ncient  nations — Egypt  and  Israel  — 
/hose  sons  met  in  battle  five  times  in 
■ne  generation,  fighting  and  falling. 

Let  us  turn  our  hearts  to  our  heroes 
nd  pay  tribute  to  their  eternal  mem- 
ry.  It  is  thanks  to  them,  to  our  fallen 
eroes,  that  we  could  have  reached  this 

ay- 

However,  let  us  not  forget  that  in  an- 
ient times,  our  two  nations  met  also  in 
Uiance.  Now  we  make  peace,  the  cor- 
nerstone of  cooperation  and  friendship. 

It  is  a  great  day  in  your  life,  Mr. 
''resident  of  the  United  States.  You 
'ave  worked  so  hard,  so  insistently,  so 
onsistently  to  achieve  this  goal.  And 
our  labors  and  your  devotion  bore 
jod-blessed  fruit. 

Our  friend.  President  Sadat,  said  that 
ou  are  the  unknown  soldier  of  the 
leacemaking  effort.  I  agree,  but  as 
'sual,  with  an  amendment.  [Laughter] 
\  soldier  in  the  service  of  peace,  you 
re.  You  are,  Mr.  President,  even, 
urahile  dictu,  an  intransigent  fighter 
or  peace.  But  Jimmy  Carter,  the 
'resident  of  the  United  States,  is  not 
ompletely  unknown.  [Laughter]  And 
0  it  is  his  efforts  which  will  be  re- 
lembered  and  recorded  by  generations 
•)  come. 

It  is,  of  course,  a  great  day  in  your 
fe.  Mr.  President  of  the  Arab  Repub- 
c  of  Egypt.  In  the  face  of  adversity 
nd  hostility,  you  have  demonstrated 
ne  human  value  that  can  change 
istory  —  civil  courage. 

A  great  field  commander  once  said: 
Civil  courage  is  sometimes  more  dif- 
icuit  to  show  than  military  courage." 
'ou  showed  both,  Mr.  President.  But 
ow  it  is  time  for  all  of  us  to  show  civil 
ourage  in  order  to  proclaim  to  our 
copies  and  to  others:  No  more  war,  no 
lore  bloodshed,  no  more  bereavement. 
'eace  unto  you — sfialom,  salaam 
orever. 

And  it  is  the  third  greatest  day  in  my 
ife.  The  first  was  May  14,  1948,  when 
lur  flag  was  hoisted.  Our  independence 
n  our  ancestors'  land  was  proclaimed 
itter  1,878  years  of  dispersion,  perse- 
ution,  humiliation,  and,  ultimately 
>hysical  destruction. 

We  fought  for  our  liberation  alone, 
nd  with  God's  help,  we  won  the  day. 
hat  was  spring.  Such  a  spring  we  can 
i'e\er  have  again. 

The  second  day  was  when  Jerusalem 
)ecame  one  city  and  our  brave,  perhaps 
nost  hardened  soldiers,  the  par- 
ichutists,  embraced  with  tears  and  kiss- 
id  the  ancient  stones  of  the  remnants 
)f  the  wall  destined  to  protect  the  cho- 
icn  place  of  God's  glory.  Our  hearts 
vept  with  them  in  remembrance. 


[In  Hebrew]  "Our  feet  shall  stand 
within  thy  gates,  O  Jerusalem. 
Jerusalem  is  builded  as  a  city  that  is 
compact  together." 

This  is  the  third  day  in  my  life.  I 
have  signed  a  Treaty  of  Peace  with  our 
great  neighbor,  with  Egypt.  The  heart 
is  full  and  overflowing.  God  gave  me 
the  strength  to  persevere,  to  survive  the 
horrors  of  Nazism  and  of  the  Stalinite 
concentration  camp  and  some  other 
dangers,  to  endure,  not  to  waver  in  nor 
flinch  from  my  duty,  to  accept  abuse 
from  foreigners  and,  what  is  more 
painful,  from  my  own  people,  and  even 
from  my  close  friends.  This  effort,  too, 
bore  some  fruit. 

Therefore,  it  is  the  proper  place  and 
the  appropriate  time  to  bring  back  to 
memory  the  song  and  prayer  of 
thanksgiving  I  learned  as  a  child,  in  the 
home  of  father  and  mother  that  doesn't 
exist  anymore  because  they  were 
among  the  6  million  people  —  men, 
women,  and  children  —  who  sanctified 
the  Lord's  name  with  the  sacred  blood 
which  reddened  the  rivers  of  Europe 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Danube,  from  the 
Bug  to  the  Volga,  because  —  only 
because  —  they  were  born  Jews,  and 
because  they  didn't  have  a  country  of 
their  own,  and  neither  a  valiant  Jewish 
army  to  defend  them,  and  because  no- 
body, nobody  came  to  their  rescue,  al- 
though they  cried  out,  "Save  us,  save 
us" — de  profundis,  from  the  depths  of 
the  pits  and  agony.  That  is  the  Song  of 
Degrees,  written  2  millennia  and  500 
years  ago  when  our  forefathers  returned 
from  their  first  exile  to  Jerusalem  and 
Zion. 

[At  this  point.  Prime  Minister  Begin  spoke  in 
Hebrew.] 

I  will  not  translate.  Every  man, 
whether  Jew  or  Christian  or  Moslem, 
can  read  it  in  his  own  language  in  the 
Book  of  the  Books.  It  is  just  Psalm 
126. 


TEXTS  OF  DOCUMENTS 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  BETWEEN 

THE  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EGYPT 

AND  THE  STATE  OF  ISRAEL 


The  Government  of  the  Arab  Republic  of 
Egypt  and  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Israel; 

PREAMBLE 

Convinced  of  the  urgent  necessity  of  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  just,  comprehensive  and  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  in  accordance  with  Se- 
curity Council  Resolutions  242  and  338; 

Reaffirming  their  adherence  to  the 
"Framework  for  Peace   in  the  Middle  East 


Agreed  at  Camp  David."  dated  September  17, 
1978; 

Noting  that  the  aforementioned  Framework  as 
appropriate  is  intended  to  constitute  a  basis  for 
peace  not  only  between  Egypt  and  Israel  but  also 
between  Israel  and  each  of  its  other  Arab 
neighbors  which  is  prepared  to  negotiate  peace 
with  it  on  this  basis; 

Desiring  to  bring  to  an  end  the  state  of  war 
between  them  and  to  establish  a  peace  in  which 
every  state  in  the  area  can  live  in  security; 

Convinced  that  the  conclusion  of  a  Treaty  of 
Peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  an  important 
step  in  the  search  for  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
area  and  for  the  attainment  of  the  settlement  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  in  all  its  aspects; 

Inviting  the  other  Arab  parties  to  this  dispute 
to  join  the  peace  process  with  Israel  guided  by 
and  based  on  the  principles  of  the  aforemen- 
tioned Framework; 

Desiring  as  well  to  develop  friendly  relations 
and  cooperation  between  themselves  in  accord- 
ance with  the  United  Nations  Charter  and  the 


Egyptian  Cahinet 
Approves  Treaty 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  15,  1979' 

I  am  pleased  that  the  Egyptian 
Cabinet  now  has  approved  the  peace 
treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel  and  the 
related  documents.  The  Cabinet  has 
now  given  its  support  to  President 
Sadat's  imaginative  leadership  and  de- 
cisive action  in  moving  to  end  more 
than  three  decades  of  conflict  with  Is- 
rael. 

We  look  forward  now  to  formal  ac- 
tion on  Sunday  by  the  Israeli  Cabinet, 
to  be  followed  by  the  debate  in  the 
Knesset  next  week. 

The  Egyptian  action  today,  along 
with  the  preliminary  action  of  the  Is- 
raeli Cabinet  yesterday  on  the  out- 
standing issues,  continued  the 
momentum  toward  a  quick  conclusion 
of  a  peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel. 

President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  continue  to  demonstrate  their 
leadership  and  courage  in  building  the 
cornerstone  of  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  will  continue  to  assist  Egypt 
and  Israel  to  move  their  countries  from 
war  to  peace,  thereby  releasing  the  re- 
sources that  can  bring  a  better  life  for 
their  people.  □ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  19,  1979. 


principles  of  international  law  governing  inter- 
national relations  in  times  of  peace; 

Agree  to  the  following  provisions  in  the  free 
exercise  of  their  sovereignty,  in  order  to  imple- 
ment the  "Framework  for  the  Conclusion  of  a 
Peace  Treaty  Between  Egypt  and  Israel": 

ARTICLE  I 

1 .  The  state  of  war  between  the  Parties  will  be 
terminated  and  peace  will  be  established  be- 
tween them  upon  the  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  this  Treaty. 

2.  Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed  forces 
and  civilians  from  the  Sinai  behind  the  interna- 
tional boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated 
Palestine,  as  provided  in  the  annexed  protocol 
(Annex  I),  and  Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of 
its  full  sovereignty  over  the  Sinai. 

3.  Upon  completion  of  the  interim  withdrawal 
provided  for  in  Annex  I,  the  Parties  will  estab- 
lish normal  and  friendly  relations,  in  accordance 
with  Article  III  (3). 

ARTICLE  II 

The  permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  is  the  recognized  international  boundary 
between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated  territory 
of  Palestine,  as  shown  on  the  map  at  Annex  II, 
without  prejudice  to  the  issue  of  the  status  of  the 
Gaza  Strip.  The  parties  recognize  this  boundary 
as  inviolable.  Each  will  respect  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  other,  including  their  territorial 
waters  and  airspace. 

ARTICLE  III 

1.  The  Parties  will  apply  between  them  the 
provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
and  the  principles  of  international  law  governing 
relations  among  states  in  times  of  peace.  In  par- 
ticular: 

a.  They  recognize  and  will  respect  each 
other's  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence; 

b.  They  recognize  and  will  respect  each 
other's  right  to  live  in  peace  within  their  secure 
and  recognized  boundaries; 

c.  They  will  refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force,  directly  or  indirectly,  against  each  other 
and  will  settle  all  disputes  between  them  by 
peaceful  means. 

2.  Each  Party  undertakes  to  ensure  that  acts  or 
threats  of  belligerency,  hostility,  or  violence  do 
not  originate  from  and  are  not  committed  from 
within  its  territory,  or  by  any  forces  subject  to 
its  control  or  by  any  other  forces  stationed  on  its 
territory,  against  the  population,  citizens  or 
property  of  the  other  Party.  Each  Party  also  un- 
dertakes to  refrain  from  organizing,  instigating, 
inciting,  assisting  or  participating  in  acts  or 
threats  of  belligerency,  hostility,  subversion  or 
violence  against  the  other  Party,  anywhere,  and 
undertakes  to  ensure  that  perpetrators  of  such 
acts  are  brought  to  justice. 

3.  The  Parties  agree  that  the  normal  relation- 
ship established  between  them  will  include  full 
recognition,  diplomatic,  economic  and  cultural 
relations,  termination  of  economic  boycotts  and 


discriminatory  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of 
people  and  goods,  and  will  guarantee  the  mutual 
enjoyment  of  citizens  of  the  due  process  of  law. 
The  process  by  which  they  undertake  to  achieve 
such  a  relationship  parallel  to  the  implementa- 
tion of  other  provisions  of  this  treaty  is  set  out  in 
the  annexed  protocol  (Annex  III). 

ARTICLE  IV 

1.  In  order  to  provide  maximum  security  for 
both  Parties  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity,  agreed 
security  arrangements  will  be  established  in- 
cluding limited  force  zones  in  Egyptian  and  Is- 
raeli territory,  and  United  Nations  forces  and  ob- 
servers, described  in  detail  as  to  nature  and  tim- 
ing in  Annex  I,  and  other  security  arrangements 
the  Parties  may  agree  upon. 

2.  The  Parties  agree  to  the  stationing  of 
United  Nations  personnel  in  areas  described  in 
Annex  I.  The  Parties  agree  not  to  request  with- 
drawal of  the  United  Nations  personnel  and  that 
these  personnel  will  not  be  removed  unless  such 
removal  is  approved  by  the  Security  Council  of 
the  United  Nations,  with  the  affirmative  vote  of 
the  five  Permanent  Members,  unless  the  Parties 
otherwise  agree. 

3.  A  Joint  Commission  will  be  established  to 
facilitate  the  implementation  of  the  Treaty,  as 
provided  for  in  Annex  I. 


israeli  Knesset 
Approves  Treaty 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  21,  1979' 

The  Israeli  Knesset  spoke  with  a 
voice  heard  around  the  world  today  —  a 
voice  for  peace.  We  welcome  this  his- 
toric decision.  The  overwhelming  vote 
in  favor  of  the  peace  treaty  between 
Israel  and  Egypt  affirms  the  deep  and 
long-felt  desire  of  the  people  of  Israel 
for  peace  with  their  neighbors.  In  tak- 
ing this  action,  Israel's  democracy  has 
lived  up  to  its  promise,  providing  a  free 
and  open  discussion  of  all  the  issues, 
and  then  deciding  in  favor  of  peace. 

The  bonds  of  shared  values  and 
common  purpose  between  the  United 
States  and  Israel  are  strong  and  endur- 
ing. The  achievement  of  peace  between 
Israel  and  Egypt  will  strengthen  even 
more  our  relations  with  these  two 
partners  in  peace  and  help  move  toward 
a  stable,  cooperative,  and  peaceful  fu- 
ture for  all  the  peoples  of  the  Middle 
East.  D 


'The  Israeli  Knesset  approved  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  with  Egypt  by  a  vote  of  95  to  18.  Text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Mar.  26.  1979 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

! 

4.  The  security  arrangements  provided  for  | 

paragraphs  1  and  2  of  this  Article  may  at  the  r^ 

quest  of  either  party  be  reviewed  and  amend 

by  mutual  agreement  of  the  Parties. 

ARTICLE  V 

1.  Ships  of  Israel,  and  cargoes  destined  fort 
coming  from  Israel,  shall  enjoy  the  right  of  fre 
passage  through  the  Suez  Canal  and  its  a[ 
proaches  through  the  Gulf  of  Suez  and  th 
Mediterranean  Sea  on  the  basis  of  the  Constat 
tinople  Convention  of  1888,  applying  to  all  m 
tions.  Israeli  nationals,  vessels  and  cargoes 
well  as  persons,  vessels  and  cargoes  destined  U 
or  coming  from  Israel,  shall  be  accorded  not 
discriminatory  treatment  in  all  matters  connecti 
with  usage  of  the  canal. 

2.  The  Parties  consider  the  Strait  of  Tiran  ai 
the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  to  be  international  waterwaj 
open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and  noi 
suspendable  freedom  of  navigation  and  ove 
flight.  The  Parties  will  respect  each  others'  rigl 
to  navigation  and  overflight  for  access  to  eith( 
country  through  the  Strait  of  Tiran  and  the  Gu 
of  Aqaba. 


ARTICLE  VI 

1.  This  Treaty  does  not  affect  and  shall  not  I 
interpreted  as  affecting  in  any  way  the  rights  ai 
obligations  of  the  Parties  under  the  Charter 
the  United  Nations. 

2.  The  Parties  undertake  to  fulfill  in  goo 
faith  their  obligations  under  this  Treaty,  withoi 
regard  to  action  or  inaction  of  any  other  pari 
and  independently  of  any  instrument  external  I 
this  Treaty. 

3.  They  further  undertake  to  take  all  th 
necessary  measures  for  the  application  in  the 
relations  of  the  provisions  of  the  multilater; 
conventions  to  which  they  are  parlies,  includin 
the  submission  of  appropriate  notification  to  th 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations  an 
other  depositaries  of  such  conventions. 

4.  The  Parties  undertake  not  to  enter  into  an 
obligation  in  conflict  with  this  Treaty. 

5.  Subject  to  Article  103  of  the  United  Na 
tions  Charter,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  betwee 
the  obligations  of  the  Parties  under  the  presen 
Treaty  and  any  of  their  other  obligations,  th 
obligations  under  this  Treaty  will  be  binding  an 
implemented. 


ARTICLE  VII 

1.  Disputes  arising  out  of  the  application  o 
interpretation  of  this  Treaty  shall  be  resolved  b; 
negotiations. 

2.  Any  such  disputes  which  cannot  be  settlet 
by  negotiations  shall  be  resolved  by  conciliatioi 
or  submitted  to  arbitration. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  Parties  agree  to  establish  a  claims  coni' 
mission  for  the  mutual  settlement  of  all  financial 

claims. 

ARTICLE  IX 


I .  This  Treaty  shall  enter  into  force  upon  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification. 


4ay  1979 


2  This  Treaty  supersedes  the  Agreement  be- 
wccn  Egypt  and  Israel  of  September,  1975. 

_V  All  protocols,  annexes,  and  maps  attached 
o  this  Treaty  shall  be  regarded  as  an  integral 
lart  hereof. 

4  The  Treaty  shall  be  communicated  to  the 
secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations  for  reg- 
stralion  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article  102  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 


Done  at  Washington,  D.C.  this  26th  day  of 
March,  1979,  in  triplicate  in  the  English. 
"Arabic,  and  Hebrew  languages,  each  text  being 
equally  authentic.  In  case  of  any  divergence  of 
interpretation,  the  English  text  shall  prevail. 

For  the  Government  of  the 
\rjLb  Republic  of  Egypt: 

\    .Sadat 

Fur  the  Government 
il  Israel; 

M    Begin 

V\  I  messed  By: 

IiMMY  Carter 

Jimmy  Carter,  President 

[)f  the  United  States  of  America 


ANNEX  I 

PROTOCOL  CONCERNING  ISRAELI 

WITHDRAWAL   AND   SECURITY 

ARRANGEMENTS 

Article  I 
Concept  of  Withdrawal 

Israel  will  complete  withdrawal  of  all  its 
irmed  forces  and  civilians  from  the  Sinai  not 
ater  than  three  years  from  the  date  of  exchange 
jf  instruments  of  ratification  of  this  Treaty. 
L  To  ensure  the  mutual  security  of  the  Parties, 
he  implementation  of  phased  withdrawal  will  be 
accompanied  by  the  military  measures  and  es- 
ahiishment  of  zones  set  out  in  this  Annex  and  in 
Map  I,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the  Zones." 
V  The  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  will  be  accom- 
plished in  two  phases: 

a  The  interim  withdrawal  behind  the  line 
from  east  of  El  Arish  to  Ras  Muhammed  as  de- 
lineated on  Map  2  within  nine  months  from  the 
date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of 
this  Treaty. 

b  The  final  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  behind 
the  international  boundary  not  later  than  three 
years  from  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments 
ol  ratification  of  this  Treaty. 

4  \  Joint  Commission  will  be  formed  im- 
miJiately  after  the  exchange  of  instruments  of 
raiilication  of  this  Treaty  in  order  to  supervise 
and  coordinate  movements  and  schedules  during 
the  withdrawal,  and  to  adjust  plans  and  time- 
tahles  as  necessary  within  the  limits  established 
by  paragraph  3,  above.  Details  relating  to  the 
Joint  Commission  are  set  out  in  Article  IV  of  the 


attached  Appendix.  The  Joint  Commission  will 
be  dissolved  upon  completion  of  final  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  the  Sinai. 

Article  II 
Determination  of  Final  Line.s  and  Zones 

1.  In  order  to  provide  maximum  security  for 
both  Parties  after  the  final  withdrawal,  the  lines 
and  the  Zones  delineated  on  Map  1  are  to  be  es- 
tablished and  organized  as  follows: 

a.  Zone  A 

( 1 )  Zone  A  is  bounded  on  the  east  by  line  A 
(red  line)  and  on  the  west  by  the  Suez  Canal  and 
the  east  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Suez,  as  shown  on 
Map  1 . 

(2)  An  Egyptian  armed  force  of  one 
mechanized  infantry  division  and  its  military 
installations,  and  field  fortifications,  will  be  in 
this  Zone. 

(3)  The  main  elements  of  that  division  will 
consist  of: 

(a)  Three  mechanized  infantry  brigades. 

(b)  One  armored  brigade. 

(c)  Seven  field  artillery  battalions  in- 
cluding up  to  126  artillery  pieces. 

(d)  Seven  anti-aircraft  artillery  battal- 
ions including  individual  surface-to-air  missiles 
and  up  to  126  anti-aircraft  guns  of  37  mm  and 
above. 

(e)  Up  to  230  tanks. 

(f)  Up  to  480  armored  personnel  ve- 
hicles of  all  types. 

(g)  Up  to  a  total  of  twenty-two  thousand 
personnel. 

b.  Zone  B 

(1)  Zone  B  is  bounded  by  line  B  (green 
line)  on  the  east  and  by  line  A  (red  line)  on  the 
west,  as  shown  on  Map  1. 

(2)  Egyptian  border  units  of  four  battalions 
equipped  with  light  weapons  and  wheeled  ve- 
hicles will  provide  security  and  supplement  the 
civil  police  in  maintaining  order  in  Zone  B. 
The  main  elements  of  the  four  border  battalions 
will  consist  of  up  to  a  total  of  four  thousand 
personnel. 

(3)  Land  based,  short  range,  low  power, 
coastal  warning  points  of  the  border  patrol 
units  may  be  established  on  the  coast  of  this 
Zone. 

(4)  There  will  be  in  Zone  B  field  fortifica- 
tions and  military  installations  for  the  four  bor- 
der battalions. 

c.  Zone  C 

(1)  Zone  C  is  bounded  by  line  B  (green 
line)  on  the  west  and  the  international  boundary 
and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  on  the  east,  as  shown  on 
Map  1 . 

(2)  Only  United  Nations  forces  and  Egyp- 
tian civil  police  will  be  stationed  in  Zone  C. 

(3)  The  Egyptian  civil  police  armed  with 
light  weapons  will  perform  normal  police  func- 
tions within  this  Zone. 

(4)  The  United  Nations  Force  will  be  de- 
ployed within  Zone  C  and  perform  its  functions 
as  defined  in  Article  VI  of  this  Annex. 

(5)  The  United  Nations  Force  will   be 


stationed  mainly  in  camps  located  within  the 
following  stationing  areas  shown  on  Map  1, 
and  will  establish  its  precise  locations  after 
consultations  with  Egypt: 

(a)  In  that  part  of  the  area  in  the  Sinai 
lying  within  about  20  Km.  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean Sea  and  adjacent  to  the  international 
boundary. 

(b)  In  the  Sharm  el  Sheikh  area. 

d.  Zone  D 

(1)  Zone  D  is  bounded  by  line  D  (blue 
line)  on  the  east  and  the  international  boundary 
on  the  west,  as  shown  on  Map  1. 

(2)  In  this  Zone  there  will  be  an  Israeli 
limited  force  of  four  infantry  battalions,  their 


On  April  10,  1979,  the  Egyptian 
People's  Assembly  ratified  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  by  a  vote 
of  328  to  15(1  abstention  and  16  mem- 
bers were  absent). 


military  installations,  and  field  fortifications, 
and  United  Nations  observers. 

(3)  The  Israeli  forces  in  Zone  D  will  not 
include  tanks,  artillery  and  anti-aircraft  mis- 
siles except  individual  surface-to-air  missiles. 

(4)  The  main  elements  of  the  four  Israeli 
infantry  battalions  will  consist  of  up  to  180  ar- 
mored personnel  vehicles  of  all  types  and  up  to 
a  total  of  four  thousand  personnel. 

2.  Access  across  the  international  boundary 
shall  only  be  permitted  through  entry  check 
points  designated  by  each  Party  and  under  its 
control.  Such  access  shall  be  in  accordance 
with  laws  and  regulations  of  each  country. 

3.  Only  those  field  fortifications,  military  in- 
stallations, forces,  and  weapons  specifically 
permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be  in  the  Zones. 

Article  III 
Aerial  Military  Regime 

1.  Flights  of  combat  aircraft  and  reconnaissance 
flights  of  Egypt  and  Israel  shall  take  place  only 
over  Zones  A  and  D,  respectively. 

2.  Only  unarmed,  non-combat  aircraft  of  Egypt 
and  Israel  will  be  stationed  in  Zones  A  and  D, 
respectively. 

3.  Only  Egyptian  unarmed  transport  aircraft 
will  take  off  and  land  in  Zone  B  and  up  to  eight 
such  aircraft  may  be  maintained  in  Zone  B.  The 
Egyptian  border  units  may  be  equipped  with 
unarmed  helicopters  to  perform  their  functions 
in  Zone  B. 

4.  The  Egyptian  civil  police  may  be  equipped 
with  unarmed  police  helicopters  to  perform 
normal  police  functions  in  Zone  C. 

5.  Only  civilian  airfields  may  be  built  in  the 
Zones. 

6.  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty,  only  those  military  aerial  activities 
specifically  permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be 
allowed  in  the  Zones  and  the  airspace  above 
their  territorial  waters. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti: 


MAP  1  -  International  Boundary  and  the  Lines  of  the  Zones 


504093  3-79  (544089 

This  is  a  representalion  of  the  original  map  included  in  the  treaty 


Mav  1979 


Article  IV 
Naval  Regime 

1  Igypi  and  Israel  may  base  and  operate  naval 
ic^sels  along  the  coasts  of  Zones  A  and  D.  re- 
spectively. 

2  Egyptian  coast  guard  boats,  lightly  armed, 
iiKi\  be  stationed  and  operate  in  the  territorial 
.\jicrs  of  Zone  B  to  assist  the  border  units  in 

[performing  their  functions  in  this  Zone. 

13.  Egyptian  civil   police  equipped  with   light 

{boats,   lightly   armed,   shall   perform  normal 

police  functions  within  the  territorial  waters  of 
iZone  C. 
'4.  Nothing  in  this  Annex  shall  be  considered  as 

derogating  from  the  right  of  innocent  passage 

of  the  naval  vessels  of  either  Party. 

5.  Only  civilian  maritime  ports  and  installa- 
tions may  be  built  in  the  Zones. 

6.  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty,  only  those  naval  activities  specifically 
permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be  allowed  in  the 
Zones  and  in  their  territorial  waters. 

Article  V 
Early  Warning  Systems 

Egypt  and  Israel  may  establish  and  operate 
early  warning  systems  only  in  Zones  A  and  D, 
respectively. 

Article  VI 
United  Nations  Operations 

1.  The  Parties  will  request  the  United  Nations 
to  provide  forces  and  observers  to  supervise  the 
implementation  of  this  Annex  and  employ  their 
best  efforts  to  prevent  any  violation  of  its 
terms. 

2.  With  respect  to  these  United  Nations  forces 
and  observers,  as  appropriate,  the  Parties  agree 
to  request  the  following  arrangements; 

a.  Operation  of  check  points,  reconnaissance 
patrols,  and  observation  posts  along  the  inter- 
national boundary  and  line  B,  and  within 
Zone  C. 

b.  Periodic  verification  of  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  provisions  of  this  Annex  will  be 
carried  out  not  less  than  twice  a  month  unless 
otherwise  agreed  by  the  Parties. 

c.  Additional  verifications  within  48  hours 
after  the  receipt  of  a  request  from  either  Party. 

d.  Ensuring  the  freedom  of  navigation 
through  the  Strait  of  Tiran  in  accordance  with 
Article  V  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

3.  The  arrangements  described  in  this  article 
for  each  zone  will  be  implemented  in  Zones  A, 
B,  and  C  by  the  United  Nations  Force  and  in 
Zone  D  by  the  United  Nations  Observers. 

4.  United  Nations  verification  teams  shall  be 
accompanied  by  liaison  officers  of  the  respec- 
tive Party. 

5.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers 
will  report  their  findings  to  both  Parties. 

6.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers 
operating  in  the  Zones  will  enjoy  freedom  of 
movement  and  other  facilities  necessary  for  the 
performance  of  their  tasks. 

7.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers  are 


not  empowered  to  authorize  the  crossing  of  the 

international  boundary. 

X.  The  Parlies  shall  agree  on  the  nations  from 

which  the  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers 

will  be  drawn.  They  will  be  drawn  from  nations 

other  than  those  which  are  Permanent  Members 

of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council. 

9.  The  Parties  agree  that  the  United  Nations 

should  make  those  command  arrangements  that 

will  best  assure  the  effective  implementation  of 

its  responsibilities. 

Article  VII 
Liaison  System 

1 .  Upon  dissolution  of  the  Joint  Commission,  a 
liaison  system  between  the  Parties  will  be  es- 
tablished. This  liaison  system  is  intended  to 
provide  an  effective  method  to  assess  progress 
in  the  implementation  of  obligations  under  the 
present  Annex  and  to  resolve  any  problem  that 
may  arise  in  the  course  of  implementation,  and 
refer  other  unresolved  matters  to  the  higher 
military  authorities  of  the  two  countries  re- 
spectively for  consideration.  It  is  also  intended 
to  prevent  situations  resulting  from  errors  or 
misinterpretation  on  the  part  of  either  Parly. 

2.  An  Egyptian  liaison  office  will  be  estab- 
lished in  the  city  of  El  Arish  and  an  Israeli 
liaison  office  will  be  established  in  the  city  of 
Beer-Sheba.  Each  office  will  be  headed  by  an 
officer  of  the  respective  country,  and  assisted 
by  a  number  of  officers. 

3.  A  direct  telephone  link  between  the  two  of- 
fices will  be  set  up  and  also  direct  telephone 
lines  with  the  United  Nations  command  will  be 
maintained  by  both  offices. 

Article  VIII 
Respect  for  War  Memorials 

Each  Party  undertakes  to  preserve  in  good 
condition  the  War  Memorials  erected  in  the 
memory  of  soldiers  of  the  other  Party,  namely 
those  erected  by  Israel  in  the  Sinai  and  those  to 
be  erected  by  Egypt  in  Israel,  and  shall  permit 
access  to  such  monuments. 

Article  IX 
Interim  Arrangements 

The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  and 
civilians  behind  the  interim  withdrawal  line, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  forces  of  the  Parties  and 
the  United  Nations  prior  to  the  final  with- 
drawal, will  be  governed  by  the  attached  Ap- 
pendix and  Maps  2  and  3. 

APPENDIX  TO  ANNEX  I 

ORGANIZATION  OF   MOVEMENTS   IN 
THE  SINAI 

ARTICLE  I 

Principles  of  Withdrawal 

I.  The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  and 
civilians  from  the  Sinai  will  be  accomplished  in 
two  phases  as  described  in  Article  I  of  Annex  I. 


The  description  and  timing  of  the  withdrawal 
are  included  in  this  Appendix.  The  Joint  Com- 
mission will  develop  and  present  to  the  Chief 
Coordinator  of  the  United  Nations  forces  in  the 
Middle  East  the  details  of  these  phases  not  later 
than  one  month  before  the  initiation  of  each 
phase  of  withdrawal. 

2.  Both  parties  agree  on  the  following  princi- 
ples for  the  sequence  of  military  movements. 

a.  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article 
IX,  paragraph  2,  of  this  Treaty,  until  Israeli 
armed  forces  complete  withdrawal  from  the 
current  J  and  M  Lines  established  by  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Agreement  of  September 
1975,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  1975 
Agreement,  up  to  the  interim  withdrawal  line, 
all  military  arrangements  existing  under  that 
Agreement  will  remain  in  effect,  except  those 
military  arrangements  otherwise  provided  for  in 
this  Appendix. 

b.  As  Israeli  armed  forces  withdraw.  United 
Nations  forces  will  immediately  enter  the 
evacuated  areas  to  establish  interim  and  tem- 
porary buffer  zones  as  shown  on  Maps  2  and  3, 
respectively,  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  a 
separation  of  forces.  United  Nations  forces' 
deployment  will  precede  the  movement  of  any 
other  personnel  into  these  areas. 

c.  Within  a  period  of  seven  days  after  Israeli 
armed  forces  have  evacuated  any  area  located 
in  Zone  A.  units  of  Egyptian  armed  forces  shall 
deploy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article  II  of  this  Appendix. 

d.  Within  a  period  of  seven  days  after  Israeli 
armed  forces  have  evacuated  any  area  located 
in  Zones  A  or  B,  Egyptian  border  units  shall 
deploy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article  II  of  this  Appendix,  and  will  function  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  II  of 
Annex  I. 

e.  Egyptian  civil  police  will  enter  evacuated 
areas  immediately  after  the  United  Nations 
forces  to  perform  normal  police  functions. 

f.  Egyptian  naval  units  shall  deploy  in  the 
Gulf  of  Suez  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  Article  II  of  this  Appendix. 

g.  Except  those  movements  mentioned 
above,  deployments  of  Egyptian  armed  forces 
and  the  activities  covered  in  Annex  I  will  be 
effected  in  the  evacuated  areas  when  Israeli 
armed  forces  have  completed  their  withdrawal 
behind  the  interim  withdrawal  line. 

ARTICLE  II 

Subphases  of  the  Withdrawal 
to  the  Interim  Withdrawal  Line 

I.  The  withdrawal  to  the  interim  withdrawal 
line  will  be  accomplished  in  subphases  as  de- 
scribed in  this  Article  and  as  shown  on  Map  3. 
Each  subphase  will  be  completed  within  the  in- 
dicated number  of  months  from  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of  this 
Treaty. 

a.  First  subphase:  within  two  months,  Israeli 
armed  forces  will  withdraw  from  the  area  of  El 
Arish,  including  the  town  of  El  Arish  and  its 
airfield,  shown  as  Area  I  on  Map  3. 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


MAP  2  -  Lines  and  Zones  Effective  when  Israeli  Forces  are  on  the 
El  Arish  -  Ras  Mohammad  Line 


Part  of  Line  "A" 
Interim  Buffer  Zone  Line   V 
El  Arlsh  -  Ras  Mohammad  Line' 
International  Boundary 

Part  of  Zone  "B" 


_   Part  of  Zone 

Gu/fof\ 
Sucil 

A" 

■'T' 

Technical  Installation 



Existing   Line 

■E' 



Existing   Line 

■J' 

Existing   Line 

■M 

® 

Major  Airfield 

in 

Sinai 

0 

h- 

50  Kilometers 

50  Miles 


504094  3-79  (544089) 

This  IS  a  represenlalion  ot  Ihe  original  map  included  in  Ihe  Ireaty 


,May  1979 


b.  Second  subphase:  within  three  months, 
Israeli  armed  forces  will  withdraw  from  the 
area  between  line  M  of  the  1975  Agreement  and 
line  A,  shown  as  Area  II  on  Map  3 

c.  Third  subphase:  within  five  months,  Is- 
raeli armed  forces  will  withdraw  from  the  areas 
east  and  south  of  Area  II,  shown  as  Area  III  on 
Map  3. 

d.  Fourth  subphase:  within  seven  months, 
Israeli  armed  forces  will  withdraw  from  the 
area  of  El  Tor-Ras  El  Kenisa,  shown  as  Area 
IV  on  Map  3. 

e.  Fifth  subphase:  Within  nine  months,  Is- 
raeli armed  forces  will  withdraw  from  the  re- 
maining areas  west  of  the  interim  withdrawal 
line,  including  the  areas  of  Santa  Katrina  and 
the  areas  east  of  the  Giddi  and  Mitla  passes, 
shown  as  Area  V  on  Map  3,  thereby  completing 
Israeli  withdrawal  behind  the  interim  with- 
drawal line. 

2.  Egyptian  forces  will  deploy  in  the  areas 
evacuated  by  Israeli  armed  forces  as  follows: 

a.  Up  to  one-third  of  the  Egyptian  armed 
forces  in  the  Sinai  in  accordance  with  the  1975 
Agreement  will  deploy  in  the  portions  of  Zone 
A  lying  within  Area  I,  until  the  completion  of 

I  interim  withdrawal.  Thereafter,  Egyptian 
armed  forces  as  described  in  Article  II  of 
Annex  1  will  be  deployed  in  Zone  A  up  to  the 
limits  of  the  interim  buffer  zone. 

b.  The  Egyptian  naval  activity  in  accordance 
with  Article  IV  of  Annex  1  will  commence 
along  the  coasts  of  Areas  II,  111,  and  IV,  upon 
completion  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth 

j  subphases,  respectively. 

I  c.  Of  the  Egyptian  border  units  described  in 
'Article  II  of  Annex  I,  upon  completion  of  the 
first  subphase  one  battalion  will  be  deployed  in 
Area  I.  A  second  battalion  will  be  deployed  in 
Area  II  upon  completion  of  the  second  sub- 
phase.  A  third  battalion  will  be  deployed  in 
Area  111  upon  completion  of  the  third  subphase. 
The  second  and  third  battalions  mentioned 
above  may  also  be  deployed  in  any  of  the  sub- 
sequently evacuated  areas  of  the  southern 
Sinai. 

3.  United  Nations  forces  in  Buffer  Zone  I  of 
the  1975  Agreement  will  redeploy  to  enable  the 
deployment  of  Egyptian  forces  described  above 
upon  the  completion  of  the  first  subphase,  but 
will  otherwise  continue  to  function  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  that  Agreement  in 
the  remainder  of  that  zone  until  the  completion 
of  the  interim  withdrawal,  as  indicated  in  Arti- 
cle I  of  this  Appendix. 

I  4.  Israeli  convoys  may  use  the  roads  south  and 
east  of  the  main  road  junction  east  of  El  Arish 

'  to  evacuate  Israeli  forces  and  equipment  up  to 
the  completion  of  interim  withdrawal.  These 
convoys  will  proceed  in  daylight  upon  four 
hours  notice  to  the  Egyptian  liaison  group  and 
United  Nations  forces,  will  be  escorted  by 
United  Nations  forces,  and  will  be  in  accord- 
ance with  schedules  coordinated  by  the  Joint 
Commission.  .An  Egyptian  liaison  officer  will 
accompany  convoys  to  assure   uninterrupted 


movement.  The  Joint  Commission  may  approve 
other  arrangements  for  convoys. 

ARTICLE  III 
United  Nations  Forces 

1.  The  Parties  shall  request  that  United  Nations 
forces  be  deployed  as  necessary  to  perform  the 
functions  described  in  this  Appendix  up  to  the 
time  of  completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal. 
For  that  purpose,  the  Parties  agree  to  the  rede- 
ployment of  the  United  Nations  Emergency 
Force 

2.  United  Nations  forces  will  supervise  the  im- 
plementation of  this  Appendix  and  will  employ 
their  best  efforts  to  prevent  any  violation  of  its 
terms. 

3.  When  United  Nations  forces  deploy  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  Articles  I  and 
II  of  this  Appendix,  they  will  perform  the 
functions  of  verification  in  limited  force  zones 
in  accordance  with  Article  VI  of  Annex  I,  and 
will  establish  check  points,  reconnaissance  pa- 
trols, and  observation  posts  in  the  temporary 
buffer  zones  described  in  Article  II  above. 
Other  functions  of  the  United  Nations  forces 
which  concern  the  interim  buffer  zone  are  de- 
scribed in  Article  V  of  this  Appendix. 

ARTICLE  IV 
Joint  Commission  and  Liaison 

1.  The  Joint  Commission  referred  to  in  Article 
IV  of  this  Treaty  will  function  from  the  date  of 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of  this 
Treaty  up  to  the  date  of  completion  of  final  Is- 
raeli withdrawal  from  the  Sinai. 

2.  The  Joint  Commission  will  be  composed  of 
representatives  of  each  Party  headed  by  senior 
officers.  This  Commission  shall  invite  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  Nations  when  discus- 
sing subjects  concerning  the  United  Nations,  or 
when  either  Party  requests  United  Nations 
presence.  Decisions  of  the  Joint  Commission 
will  be  reached  by  agreement  of  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael. 

3.  The  Joint  Commission  will  supervise  the 
implementation  of  the  arrangements  described 
in  Annex  1  and  this  Appendix,  To  this  end,  and 
by  agreement  of  both  Parlies,  it  will: 

a.  coordinate  military  movements  described 
in  this  Appendix  and  supervise  their  im- 
plementation; 

b.  address  and  seek  to  resolve  any  problem 
arising  out  of  the  implementation  of  Annex  1 
and  this  Appendix,  and  discuss  any  violations 
reported  by  the  United  Nations  Force  and  Ob- 
servers and  refer  to  the  Governments  of  Egypt 
and  Israel  any  unresolved  problems; 

c.  assist  the  United  Nations  Force  and  Ob- 
servers in  the  execution  of  their  mandates,  and 
deal  with  the  timetables  of  the  periodic  verifi- 
cations when  referred  to  it  by  the  Parties  as 
provided  for  in  Annex  1  and  in  this  Appendix; 

d.  organize  the  demarcation  of  the  interna- 
tional boundary  and  ail  lines  and  zones  de- 
scribed in  Annex  1  and  this  Appendix; 

e.  supervise  the  handing  over  of  the  main  in- 


stallations in  the  Sinai  from  Israel  to  Egypt; 

f.  agree  on  necessary  arrangements  for  find- 
ing and  returning  missing  bodies  of  Egyptian 
and  Israeli  soldiers; 

g.  organize  the  setting  up  and  operation  of 
entry  check  points  along  the  El  Arish — Ras 
Muhammed  line  in  accordance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  Article  4  of  Annex  III; 

h.  conduct  its  operations  through  the  use  of 
joint  liaison  teams  consisting  of  one  Israeli 
representative  and  one  Egyptian  representative, 
provided  from  a  standing  Liaison  Group,  which 
will  conduct  activities  as  directed  by  the  Joint 
Commission; 

i.  provide  liaison  and  coordination  to  the 
United  Nations  command  implementing  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty,  and,  through  the  joint 
liaison  teams,  maintain  local  coordination  and 
cooperation  with  the  United  Nations  Force 
stationed  in  specific  areas  or  United  Nations 
Observers  monitoring  specific  areas  for  any  as- 
sistance as  needed; 

j.  discuss  any  other  matters  which  the  Parties 
by  agreement  may  place  before  it. 

4.  Meetings  of  the  Joint  Commission  shall  be 
held  at  least  once  a  month.  In  the  event  that 
either  Party  or  the  Command  of  the  United  Na- 
tions Force  requests  a  special  meeting,  it  will 
be  convened  within  24  hours. 

5.  The  Joint  Commission  will  meet  in  the 
buffer  zone  until  the  completion  of  the  interim 
withdrawal  and  in  El  .Arish  and  Beer-Sheba  al- 
ternately afterwards.  The  first  meeting  will  be 
held  not  later  than  two  weeks  after  the  entry 
into  force  of  this  Treaty. 

ARTICLE  V 

Definition  of  the  Interim  Buffer  Zone 
and  Its  Activities 

1.  An  interim  buffer  zone,  by  which  the  United 
Nations  Force  will  effect  a  separation  of  Egyp- 
tian and  Israeli  elements,  will  be  established 
west  of  and  adjacent  to  the  interim  withdrawal 
line  as  shown  on  Map  2  after  implementation  of 
Israeli  withdrawal  and  deployment  behind  the 
interim  withdrawal  line.  Egyptian  civil  police 
equipped  with  light  weapons  will  perform  nor- 
mal police  functions  within  this  zone. 

2.  The  United  Nations  Force  will  operate  check 
points,  reconnaissance  patrols,  and  observation 
posts  within  the  interim  buffer  zone  in  order  to 
ensure  compliance  with  the  terms  of  this  Arti- 
cle. 

3.  In  accordance  with  arrangements  agreed 
upon  by  both  Parties  and  to  be  coordinated  by 
the  Joint  Commission,  Israeli  personnel  will 
operate  military  technical  installations  at  four 
specific  locations  shown  on  Map  2  and  desig- 
nated as  TI  (map  central  coordinate 
57163940),  T2  (map  central  coordinate 
59351541),  T3  (map  central  coordinate 
59331527),  and  T4  (map  central  coordinate 
61  130979)  under  the  following  principles: 

a.  The  technical  installations  shall  be 
manned  by  technical  and  administrative  per- 
sonnel equipped  with  small  arms  required  for 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


MAP  3  -  Sub-Phases  of  Withdrawal  to  the  El  Arish-Ras  Mohammad  Line 


504095  3-79  (544089 

This  is  a  representation  of  the  original  map  included  in  the  treaty 


May  1979 


11 


their  proleclion  (revolvers,  rifles,  sub-machine 
guns,  light  machine  guns,  hand  grenades,  and 
aninuinition),  as  follows: 

Tl — up  to  150  personnel 

T2  and  T3— up  to  350  personnel 

T4 — up  to  200  personnel. 

b.  Israeli  personnel  will  not  carry  weapons  out- 
side the  sites,  except  officers  who  may  carry 
personal  weapons. 

c.  Only  a  third  party  agreed  to  by  Egypt  and 
Israel  will  enter  and  conduct  inspections  within 

1  the  perimeters  of  technical  installations  in  the 
I  buffer  zone.   The  third  party  will  conduct  in- 
spections in  a  random  manner  at  least  once  a 
month.  The  inspections  will  verify  the  nature  of 
the  operation   of  the   installations  and  the 
weapons  and  personnel  therein.  The  third  party 
will  immediately  report  to  the  Parties  any  di- 
I  vergence  from  an   installation's  visual   and 
I  electronic  surveillance  or  communications  role. 

d.  Supply  of  the  installations,  visits  for  tech- 
nical and  administrative  purposes,  and  re- 
placement of  personnel  and  equipment  situated 
in  the  sites,  may  occur  uninterruptedly  from  the 
United  Nations  check  points  to  the  perimeter  of 
the  technical  installations,  after  checking  and 
being  escorted  by  only  the  United  Nations 
forces. 

e.  Israel  will  be  permitted  to  introduce  into 
its  technical  installations  items  required  for  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  installations  and  per- 
sonnel. 

f.  As  determined  by  the  Joint  Commission, 
Israel  will  be  permitted  to: 

(  1  )  Maintain  in  its  installations  fire- 
fighting  and  general  maintenance  equipment  as 
well  as  wheeled  administrative  vehicles  and 
mobile  engineering  equipment  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  sites.  All  vehicles  shall  be 
unarmed. 

(2)  Within  the  sites  and  in  the  buffer  zone, 
maintain  roads,  water  lines,  and  communica- 
tions cables  which  serve  the  sites.  At  each  of 
the  three  installation  locations  (Tl.  T2  and  T3. 
and  T4),  this  maintenance  may  be  performed 
with  up  to  two  unarmed  wheeled  vehicles  and 
by  up  to  twelve  unarmed  personnel  with  only 
necessary  equipment,  including  heavy  en- 
gineering equipment  if  needed.  This  mainte- 
nance may  be  performed  three  times  a  week, 
except  for  special  problems,  and  only  after 
giving  the  United  Nations  four  hours  notice. 
The  teams  will  be  escorted  by  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

g.  Movement  to  and  from  the  technical  in- 
stallations will  take  place  only  during  daylight 
hours.  Access  to,  and  exit  from,  the  technical 
installations  shall  be  as  follows: 

(1)T1:  through  a  United  Nations  check 
point,  and  via  the  road  between  Abu  Aweigila 
and  the  intersection  of  the  Abu  Aweigila  road 


and  the  Gebel  Libni  road  (at  Km.  161),  as 
shown  on  Map  2 

(2)  T2  and  T3:  through  a  United  Nations 
checkpoint  and  via  the  road  constructed  across 
the  buffer  zone  to  Gebel  Katrina,  as  shown  on 
Map  2. 

(3)  T2,  T3.  and  T4:  via  helicopters  flying 
within  a  corridor  at  the  times,  and  according  to 
a  night  profile,  agreed  to  by  the  Joint  Commis- 
sion. The  helicopters  will  be  checked  by  the 
United  Nations  Force  at  landing  sites  outside 
the  perimeter  of  the  installations. 

h.  Israel  will  inform  the  United  Nations 
Force  at  least  one  hour  in  advance  of  each  in- 
tended movement  to  and  from  the  installations. 

i.  Israel  shall  be  entitled  to  evacuate  sick  and 
wounded  and  summon  medical  experts  and 
medical  teams  at  any  time  after  giving  im- 
mediate notice  to  the  United  Nations  Force. 

4.  The  details  of  the  above  principles  and  all 
other  matters  in  this  Article  requiring  coordi- 
nation by  the  Parties  will  be  handled  by  the 
Joint  Commission. 

5.  These  technical  installations  will  be  with- 
drawn when  Israeli  forces  withdraw  from  the 
interim  withdrawal  line,  or  at  a  time  agreed  by 
the  parties. 

ARTICLE  VI 

Disposition  of  Installations 
and  Military  Barriers 

Disposition  of  installations  and  military  bar- 
riers will  be  determined  by  the  Parties  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  following  guidelines: 

1 .  Up  to  three  weeks  before  Israeli  with- 
drawal from  any  area,  the  Joint  Commission 
will  arrange  for  Israeli  and  Egyptian  liaison  and 
technical  teams  to  conduct  a  joint  inspection  of 
all  appropriate  installations  to  agree  upon  con- 
dition of  structures  and  articles  which  will  be 
transferred  to  Egyptian  control  and  to  arrange 
for  such  transfer.  Israel  will  declare,  at  that 
time,  its  plans  for  disposition  of  installations 
and  articles  within  the  installations. 

2.  Israel  undertakes  to  transfer  to  Egypt  all 
agreed  infrastructure,  utilities,  and  installations 
intact,  inter  alia,  airfield,  roads,  pumping  sta- 
tions, and  ports.  Israel  will  present  to  Egypt  the 
information  necessary  for  the  maintenance  and 
operation  of  these  facilities.  Egyptian  technical 
teams  will  be  permitted  to  observe  and 
familiarize  themselves  with  the  operation  of 
these  facilities  for  a  period  of  up  to  two  weeks 
prior  to  transfer. 

3.  When  Israel  relinquishes  Israeli  military 
water  points  near  El  Arish  and  El  Tor.  Egyptian 
technical  teams  will  assume  control  of  those  in- 
stallations and  ancillary  equipment  in  accord- 
ance with  an  orderly  transfer  process  arranged 
beforehand  by  the  Joint  Commission.  Egypt 
undertakes  to  continue  to  make  available  at  all 
water  supply   points  the  normal  quantity  of 


currently  available  water  up  to  the  time  Israel 
withdraws  behind  the  international  boundary, 
unless  otherwise  agreed  in  the  Joint  Commis- 
sion. 

4,  Israel  will  make  its  best  effort  to  remove 
or  destroy  all  military  barriers,  including  ob- 
stacles and  minefields,  in  the  areas  and  adja- 
cent waters  from  which  it  withdraws,  according 
to  the  following  concept: 

a.  Military  barriers  will  be  cleared  first 
from  areas  near  populations,  roads,  and  major 
installations  and  utilities. 

b.  For  those  obstacles  and  minefields 
which  cannot  be  removed  or  destroyed  prior  to 
Israeli  withdrawal.  Israel  will  provide  detailed 
maps  to  Egypt  and  the  United  Nations  through 
the  Joint  Commission  not  later  than  15  days 
before  entry  of  United  Nations  forces  into  the 
affected  areas. 

c.  Egyptian  military  engineers  will  enter 
those  areas  after  United  Nations  forces  enter  to 
conduct  barrier  clearance  operations  in  accord- 
ance with  Egyptian  plans  to  be  submitted  prior 
to  implementation. 


ARTICLE  VII 

Surveillance  Activities 

1.  Aerial  surveillance  activities  during  the 
withdrawal  will  be  carried  out  as  follows: 

a.  Both  Parties  request  the  United  States  to 
continue  airborne  surveillance  flights  in  ac- 
cordance with  previous  agreements  until  the 
completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal. 

b.  Flight  profiles  will  cover  the  Limited 
Forces  Zones  to  monitor  the  limitations  on 
forces  and  armaments,  and  to  determine  that 
Israeli  armed  forces  have  withdrawn  from  the 
areas  described  in  Article  II  of  Annex  I,  Article 
II  of  this  appendix,  and  Maps  2  and  3,  and  that 
these  forces  thereafter  remain  behind  their 
lines.  Special  inspection  flights  may  be  flown 
at  the  request  of  either  Party  or  of  the  United 
Nations. 

c.  Only  the  main  elements  in  the  military  or- 
ganizations of  each  Party,  as  described  in 
Annex  I  and  in  this  Appendix,  will  be  reported. 

2.  Both  Parties  request  the  United  States  oper- 
ated Sinai  Field  Mission  to  continue  its  opera- 
tions in  accordance  with  previous  agreements 
until  completion  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
the  area  east  of  the  Giddi  and  Mitia  Passes. 
Thereafter,  the  Mission  will  be  terminated. 


ARTICLE  VIII 
Exercise  of  Egyptian  Sovereignty 

Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of  its  full 
sovereignty  over  evacuated  parts  of  the  Sinai 
upon  Israeli  withdrawal  as  provided  for  in  Arti- 
cle 1  of  this  Treaty. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ANNEX  II  -  International  Boundary 


Port  SaSS?! 


Ai  Qanfarah 


Mediterranean  Sea 


E    G  Y    P  T 


Sinai  . 
'    Peninsula 


^ 


7 


\ 


Saint  Catherine's 
Monastery 


International  Boundary 


/Gulf 
/     of 

Aqaba       SAUDI 
ARABIA 


50  Kilometers 


50  Miles 


Red  Sea 


Stiarm  ash 
Shaykti 

Ras  Mohammad 


504096  3-79  (544089) 
This  IS  a  represenution  of  the  original  map  included  in  the  treaty. 


4av  1979 


13 


j  ANNEX  III 

^PROTOCOL  CONCERNING  RELATIONS 
OF  THE  PARTIES 


Article  1 
Diplomatic  and  Consular  Relations 

The  Parties  agree  to  establish  diplomatic  and 
onsular  relations  and  to  exchange  ambassadors 
ipon  completion  of  the  interim  withdrawal. 


Article  2 
Economic  and  Trade  Relations 

1.  The  Parties  agree  to  remove  all  dis- 
iriminatory  barriers  to  normal  economic  rela- 
ions  and  to  terminate  economic  boycotts  of 
ach  other  upon  completion  of  the  interim 
vithdrawal. 

2-  As  soon  as  possible,  and  not  later  than  six 
nonths  after  the  completion  of  the  interim 
vithdrawal.  the  Parties  will  enter  negotiations 
vilh  a  view  to  concluding  an  agreement  on 
rade  and  commerce  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
noting  beneficial  economic  relations. 

Article  3 
Cultural  Relations 

1,  The  Parties  agree  to  establish  normal  cul- 
ural  relations  following  completion  of  the 
nterim  withdrawal. 

2.  They  agree  on  the  desirability  of  cultural 
■xchanges  in  all  fields,  and  shall,  as  soon  as 
)ossible  and  not  later  than  six  months  after 
:omplelion  of  the  interim  withdrawal,  enter 
nto  negotiations  with  a  view  to  concluding  a 
cultural  agreement  for  this  purpose. 

Article  4 
Freedom  of  Movement 

1.  Upon  completion  of  the  interim  with- 
drawal, each  Party  will  permit  the  free  move- 
■nent  of  the  nationals  and  vehicles  of  the  other 
into  and  within  its  territory  according  to  the 
genera!  rules  applicable  to  nationals  and  ve- 
hicles of  other  states.  Neither  Party  will  impose 
discriminatory  restrictions  on  the  free  movement 
of  persons  and  vehicles  from  its  territory  to  the 
territory  of  the  other 

2.  Mutual  unimpeded  access  to  places  of  re- 
ligious and  historical  significance  will  be  pro- 
vided on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis. 


Article  5 

Cooperation  for  Development  and 

Good  Neighborly  Relations 

1.  The  Parties  recognize  a  mutuality  of  inter- 
est in  good  neighborly  relations  and  agree  to 
consider  means  to  promote  such  relations. 

2.  The  Parties  will  cooperate  in  promoting 
peace,  stability  and  development  in  their  re- 
gion. Each  agrees  to  consider  proposals  the 
other  may  wish  to  make  to  this  end. 


?.  The  Parties  shall  seek  to  foster  mutual  un- 
derstanding and  tolerance  and  will,  accord- 
ingly, abstain  from  hostile  propaganda  against 
each  other. 

Article  6 
Transportation  and  Telecommunications 

1.  The  Parties  recognize  as  applicable  to 
each  other  the  rights,  privileges  and  obligations 
provided  for  by  the  aviation  agreements  to 
which  they  are  both  party,  particularly  by  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation, 
1944  ("The  Chicago  Convention")  and  the 
International  Air  Services  Transit  Agreement, 
1944. 

2.  Upon  completion  of  the  interim  with- 
drawal any  declaration  of  national  emergency 
by  a  party  under  Article  89  of  the  Chicago 
Convention  will  not  be  applied  to  the  other 
party  on  a  discriminatory  basis. 

3.  Egypt  agrees  that  the  use  of  airfields  left 
by  Israel  near  EI  Arish,  Rafah,  Ras  El  Nagb 
and  Sharm  el  Sheikh  shall  be  for  civilian  pur- 
poses only,  including  possible  commercial  use 
by  all  nations. 

4.  As  soon  as  possible  and  not  later  than  six 
months  after  the  completion  of  the  interim 
withdrawal,  the  Parties  shall  enter  into  negoti- 
ations for  the  purpose  of  concluding  a  civil  avi- 
ation agreement. 

5.  The  Parties  will  reopen  and  maintain 
roads  and  railways  between  their  countries  and 
will  consider  further  road  and  rail  links.  The 
Parties  further  agree  that  a  highway  will  be 
constructed  and  maintained  between  Egypt, 
Israel  and  Jordan  near  Eilat  with  guaranteed  free 
and  peaceful  passage  of  persons,  vehicles  and 
goods  between  Egypt  and  Jordan,  without  prej- 
udice to  their  sovereignty  over  that  part  of  the 
highway  which  falls  within  their  respective 
territory. 

6.  Upon  completion  of  the  interim  with- 
drawal, normal  postal,  telephone,  telex,  data 
facsimile,  wireless  and  cable  communications 
and  television  relay  services  by  cable,  radio 
and  satellite  shall  be  established  between  the 
two  Parties  in  accordance  with  all  relevant  in- 
ternational conventions  and  regulations. 

7.  Upon  completion  of  the  interim  with- 
drawal, each  Party  shall  grant  normal  access  to 
its  ports  for  vessels  and  cargoes  of  the  other,  as 
well  as  vessels  and  cargoes  destined  for  or 
coming  from  the  other.  Such  access  shall  be 
granted  on  the  same  conditions  generally  appli- 
cable to  vessels  and  cargoes  of  other  nations. 
Article  5  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  will  be  im- 
plemented upon  the  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  the  aforementioned  Treaty. 

Article  7 
Enjoyment  of  Human  Rights 

The  Parties  affirm  their  commitment  to  re- 
spect and  observe  human  rights  and  fundamen- 
tal freedoms  for  all,  and  they  will  promote 
these  rights  and  freedoms  in  accordance  with 
the  United  Nations  Charter. 


Article  8 
Territorial  Seas 

Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  Arti- 
cle 5  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  each  Party  recog- 
nizes the  right  of  the  vessels  of  the  other  Party 
to  innocent  passage  through  its  territorial  sea  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  of  international  law. 

AGREED  MINUTES 

AGREED  MINUTES 

TO  ARTICLES  I,  IV,  V  AND  VI 

AND  ANNEXES  I  AND  HI 

OF  TREATY  OF  PEACE 

ARTICLE  I 

Egypt's  resumption  of  the  exercise  of  full 
sovereignty  over  the  Sinai  provided  for  in  para- 
graph 2  of  Article  I  shall  occur  with  regard  to 
each  area  upon  Israel's  withdrawal  from  that 
area. 

ARTICLE  IV 

It  is  agreed  between  the  parties  that  the  review 
provided  for  in  Article  IV(4)  will  be  undertaken 
when  requested  by  either  party,  commencing 
within  three  months  of  such  a  request,  but  that 
any  amendment  can  be  made  only  with  the 
mutual  agreement  of  both  parties. 

ARTICLE  V 

The  second  sentence  of  paragraph  2  of  Article 
V  shall  not  be  construed  as  limiting  the  first 
sentence  of  that  paragraph.  The  foregoing  is  not 
to  be  construed  as  contravening  the  second  sen- 
tence of  paragraph  2  of  Article  V,  which  reads 
as  follows: 

"The  Parties  will  respect  each  other's  right  to 
navigation  and  overflight  for  access  to  either 
country  through  the  Strait  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf 
of  Aqaba." 

ARTICLE  VI(2) 

The  provisions  of  Article  VI  shall  not  be  con- 
strued in  contradiction  to  the  provisions  of  the 
framework  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  agreed 
at  Camp  David.  The  foregoing  is  not  to  be  con- 
strued as  contravening  the  provisions  of  Article 
VI(2)  of  the  treaty,  which  reads  as  follows: 

"The  Parties  undertake  to  fulfill  in  good  faith 
their  obligations  under  this  Treaty,  without  re- 
gard to  action  or  inaction  of  any  other  Party  and 
independently  of  any  instrument  external  to  this 
Treaty." 

ARTICLE  VI(5) 

It  is  agreed  by  the  Parties  that  there  is  no  as- 
sertion that  this  Treaty  prevails  over  other 
Treaties  or  agreements  or  that  other  Treaties  or 
agreements  prevail  over  this  Treaty.   The 


14 


foregoing  is  not  to  be  construed  as  contravening 
the  provisions  of  Article  VI(5)  of  the  Treaty, 
which  reads  as  follows: 

"Subject  to  Article  103  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the 
obligations  of  the  Parties  under  the  present 
Treaty  and  any  of  their  other  obligations,  the 
obligations  under  this  Treaty  will  be  binding  and 
implemented." 

ANNEX  I 

Article  VI.  Paragraph  8.  of  Annex  I  provides 
as  follows: 

"The  Parties  shall  agree  on  the  nations  from 
which  the  United  Nations  force  and  observers 
will  be  drawn.  They  will  be  drawn  from  nations 
other  than  those  which  are  permanent  members 
of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council." 

The  Parties  have  agreed  as  follows: 

"With  respect  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
8,  Article  VI,  of  Annex  1,  if  no  agreement  is 
reached  between  the  Parties,  they  will  accept  or 
support  a  U.S.  proposal  concerning  the  compos- 
ition of  the  United  Nations  force  and  obser- 
vers." 

ANNEX  III 

The  Treaty  of  Peace  and  Annex  III  thereto 
provide  for  establishing  normal  economic  rela- 
tions between  the  Parties.  In  accordance  there- 
with, it  is  agreed  that  such  relations  will  include 
normal  commercial  sales  of  oil  by  Egypt  to  Is- 
rael, and  that  Israel  shall  be  fully  entitled  to 
make  bids  for  Egyptian-origin  oil  not  needed  for 
Egyptian  domestic  oil  consumption,  and  Egypt 
and  its  oil  concessionaires  will  entertain  bids 
made  by  Israel,  on  the  same  basis  and  terms  as 
apply  to  other  bidders  for  such  oil. 

For  the  Government  of  the 
Arab  Republic  of  Egypt: 

A.  Sadat 

For  the  Government  of 
Israel: 

M.  Begin 

Witnessed  by: 

Jimmy  Carter 

Jimmy  Carter,  President 

of  the  United  States  of  America 


LETTERS 


March  26,  1979 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

This  letter  confirms  that  Egypt  and  Israel  have 
agreed  as  follows: 

The  Governments  of  Egypt  and  Israel  recall 
that  they  concluded  at  Camp  David  and  signed  at 
the  White  House  on  September  17,  1978,  the 
annexed  documents  entitled  "A  Framework  for 


Peace  in  the  Middle  East  Agreed  at  Camp 
David"  and  "Framework  for  the  conclusion  of  a 
Peace  Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel  " 

For  the  purpose  of  achieving  a  comprehensive 
peace  settlement  in  accordance  with  the  above- 
mentioned  Frameworks,  Egypt  and  Israel  will 
proceed  with  the  implementation  of  those  provi- 
sions relating  to  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaea 
Strip.  They  have  agreed  to  start  negotiations 
within  a  month  after  the  exchange  of  the  instru- 
ments of  ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  In  ac- 
cordance with  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East,"  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jor- 
dan is  invited  to  join  the  negotiations.  The  Dele- 
gations of  Egypt  and  Jordan  may  include  Pales- 
tinians from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  or 
other  Palestinians  as  mutually  agreed.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  negotiation  shall  be  to  agree,  prior  to 
the  elections,  on  the  modalities  for  establishing 
the  elected  self-governing  authority  (administra- 
tive council),  define  its  powers  and  respon- 
sibilities, and  agree  upon  other  related  issues.  In 
the  event  Jordan  decides  not  to  take  part  in  the 
negotiations,  the  negotiations  will  be  held  by 
Egypt  and  Israel. 

The  two  Governments  agree  to  negotiate  con- 
tinuously and  in  good  faith  to  conclude  these 
negotiations  at  the  earliest  possible  date.  They 
also  agree  that  the  objective  of  the  negotiations 
is  the  establishment  of  the  self-governing  au- 
thority in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  in  order  to 
provide  full  autonomy  to  the  inhabitants. 

Egypt  and  Israel  set  for  themselves  the  goal  of 
completing  the  negotiations  within  one  year  so 
that  elections  will  be  held  as  expeditiously  as 
possible  after  agreement  has  been  reached  be- 
tween the  parties.  The  self-governing  authority 
referred  to  in  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East"  will  be  established  and  inaugu- 
rated within  one  month  after  it  has  been  elected, 
at  which  time  the  transitional  period  of  five 
years  will  begin.  The  Israeli  military  government 
and  its  civilian  administration  will  be  with- 
drawn, to  be  replaced  by  the  self-governing  au- 
thority, as  specified  in  the  "Framework  for 
Peace  in  the  Middle  East."  A  withdrawal  of  Is- 
raeli armed  forces  will  then  take  place  and  there 
will  be  a  redeployment  of  the  remaining  Israeli 
forces  into  specified  security  locations. 

This  letter  also  confirms  our  understanding 
that  the  United  States  Government  will  partici- 
pate fully  in  all  stages  of  negotiations. 
Sincerely  yours. 

For  the  Government  of 
Israel: 

M.  Begin 
Menachem  Begin 

For  the  Government  of  the 
Arab  Republic  of  Egypt: 

A.  Sadat 

Mohamed  Anwar  El-Sadat 

The  President, 
The  White  House. 

[Note:   President  Carter,  upon  receipt  of  the 


Department  of  State  Bulleti' 

I 
joint  letter  to  him  from  President  Sadat  an, 
Prime  Minister  Begin,  added  to  the  America! 
and  Israeli  copies  the  notation: 

"I  have  been  informed  that  the  expressio 
"West  Bank'  is  understood  by  the  Government  o 
Israel  to  mean  'Judea  and  Samaria'." 

This  notation  is  in  accordance  with  simila 
procedures  established  at  Camp  David.) 


March  26,  197< 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

In  response  to  your  request,  1  can  confirn 
that,  within  one  month  after  the  completion  o 
Israel's  withdrawal  to  the  interim  line  as  pro 
vided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egyp 
and  Israel,  Egypt  will  send  a  resident  ambas 
sador  to  Israel  and  will  receive  a  resident  Israel 
ambassador  in  Egypt. 
Sincerely, 


The  President, 
The  White  House. 


A.  Sadai 
Mohamed  Anwar  El-Sada 


March  26,  1979 


Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 

I  have  received  a  letter  from  President  Sadai 
that,  within  one  month  after  Israel  completes  it: 
withdrawal  to  the  interim  line  in  Sinai,  as  pro 
vided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypi 
and  Israel,  Egypt  will  send  a  resident  ambas 
sador  to  Israel  and  will  receive  in  Egypt  a  resi 
dent  Israeli  ambassador. 

I  would  be  grateful  if  you  will  confirm  thai 
this  procedure  will  be  agreeable  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  Israel. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 
Jimmy  Carter 

His  Excellency 
Menachem  Begin 
Prime  Minister  of  the 
State  of  Israel. 


March  26,  1979 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  confirm  that  the 
Government  of  Israel  is  agreeable  to  the  proce- 
dure set  out  in  your  letter  of  March  26,  1979  in 
which  you  state: 

"I  have  received  a  letter  from  President  Sadat 
that,  within  one  month  after  Israel  completes  its 
withdrawal  to  the  interim  line  in  Sinai,  as  pro- 
vided for  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt 
and  Israel,  Egypt  will  send  a  resident  ambas- 


lay  1979 

ador  to  Israel  and  will  receive  in  Egypt  a  resi- 
lenl  Israeli  ambassador." 
Sincerely, 

M.  Begin 
Menachem  Begin 

The  President. 
The  White  House. 


March  26,  1979 

)ear  Mr.  President: 

1  wish  to  confirm  to  you  that  subject  to 
Jnited  States  Constitutional  processes: 

In  the  event  of  an  actual  or  threatened  viola- 
ion  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and 
srael,  the  United  States  will,  on  request  of  one 
or  both  of  the  Parties,  consult  with  the  Parties 
vith  respect  thereto  and  will  take  such  other 
iction  as  it  may  deem  appropriate  and  helpful 
0  achieve  compliance  with  the  Treaty. 

The  United  States  will  conduct  aerial 
nonitoring  as  requested  by  the  Parties  pursuant 
(0  Annex  I  of  the  Treaty. 

*•  The  United  States  believes  the  Treaty  provi- 
i.ion  for  permanent  stationing  of  United  Nations 
lersonne!  in  the  designated  limited  force  zone 
:an  and  should  be  implemented  by  the  United 
•Jations  Security  Council.  The  United  States 
vill  exert  its  utmost  efforts  to  obtain  the  req- 
lisite  action  by  the  Security  Council.  If  the  Se- 
urity  Council  fails  to  establish  and  maintain 
he  arrangements  called  for  in  the  Treaty,  the 
'resident  will  be  prepared  to  take  those  steps 
lecessary  to  ensure  the  establishment  and 
naintenance  of  an  acceptable  alternative  multi- 
lational  force. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 
Jimmy  Carter 

-lis  Excellency 
Mohamed  Anwar  El-Sadat, 
President  of  the  Arab 
Republic  of  Egypt. 


March  26,  1979 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 

I  wish  to  confirm  to  you  that  subject  to 
United  States  Constitutional  processes: 

In  the  event  of  an  actual  or  threatened  viola- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Israel  and 
Egypt,  the  United  States  will,  on  request  of  one 
or  both  of  the  Parties,  consult  with  the  Parties 
with  respect  thereto  and  will  take  such  other 
action  as  it  may  deem  appropriate  and  helpful 
to  achieve  compliance  with  the  Treaty. 

The  United  States  will  conduct  aerial 
monitoring  as  requested  by  the  Parties  pursuant 
to  Annex  I  of  the  Treaty. 

The  United  States  believes  the  Treaty  provi- 
sion for  permanent  stationing  of  United  Nations 
personnel  in  the  designated  limited  force  zone 
can  and  should  be  implemented  by  the  United 
Nations  Security  Council.  The  United  States 
will  exert  its  utmost  efforts  to  obtain  the  req- 


uisite action  by  the  Security  Council.  If  the  Se- 
curity Council  fails  to  establish  and  maintain 
the  arrangements  called  for  in  the  Treaty,  the 
President  will  be  prepared  to  take  those  steps 
necessary  to  ensure  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  an  acceptable  alternative  multi- 
national force. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 
Jimmy  Carter 


His  Excellency 
Menachem  Begin, 
Prime  Minister  of  the 
State  of  Israel. 


D 


'The  ceremony  was  attended  by  officials  of 
the  three  governments  and  was  broadcast  live 
on  radio  and  television.  Earlier  in  the  day 
President  Carter  held  separate  meetings  with 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin,  and, 
prior  to  the  ceremony,  the  President  and  Mrs. 
Carter  hosted  a  private  luncheon  for  President 
and  Mrs.  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  and  Mrs. 
Begin  at  the  White  House.  Following  the  cere- 
mony, the  President  met  at  the  White  House 
with  Members  of  Congress  to  discuss  U.S.  aid 
and  assistance  to  Egypt  and  Israel. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  2.  1979.  Dinner 
toasts  made  at  a  state  dinner  on  the  South  Lawn 
of  the  White  House  on  Mar.  26  are  printed  in 
the  same  Weekly  Compilation  on  p.  523. 


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Atomic  Energy — Technical  Information  Ex- 
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Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Is- 
rael, amending  the  agreement  of  June  13, 
1950,  as  amended.  TIAS  9002.  21  pp.  $1.10. 
(Cat.  No.  $9.10:9002.) 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Eleventh  proces-verbal  extending  the  decla- 
ration of  November  12,  1959,  on  provisional 
accession  of  Tunisia  to  the  general  agree- 
ment. TIAS  9011.  9  pp.  80C.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:9011.) 

Technical  Cooperation  in  Science  and  Tech- 
nology. Agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia.  TIAS 
9019.  25  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9019.) 

Agricultural  Production  and  Economic  De- 
velopment. Agreement  with  Syria.  TIAS 
9022.  13  pp,  90(2,  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9022.) 

Economic  Assistance — Loan.  Agreement  with 
Israel.  TIAS  9028.  18  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9028.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Egypt.  TIAS  9040.  18  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9040.) 

Solar  Energy.  Agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia. 
TIAS  9077.  7  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9077.) 

Economic  Assistance — Cash  Grant.  Agree- 
ment with  Israel.  TIAS  9095.  4  pp.  70(Z. 
(Cat.  No,  89.10:9095.) 

Economic  Assistance — Loan.  Agreement  with 
Israel.  TIAS  9097.  18  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9097.) 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  PREI$IDE]\T:         Visit  to  Egypt  and  Israel 


j^ 


On  March  7,  1979,  President  Carter  departed  the  United  States  to  meet  with 
President  Sadat  in  Egypt  (March  8-10}  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  in  Israel 
(March  10-13).  He  met  again  with  President  Sadat  at  the  Cairo  International 
Airport  on  March  13  before  returning  to  Washington  on  March  14.^ 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS, 
WHITE  HOUSE,  MAR.  7,  1979^ 

Vice  President  Mondale 

You  leave  tonight,  Mr.  President,  on 
perhaps  the  most  important  and  dif- 
ficult mission  of  your  Presidency.  You 
seek  a  peace  vital  not  only  to  the 
people  of  the  Middle  East  but  to  the 
people  of  our  own  nation  and  to  all 
mankind. 

There  is  no  challenge  more  urgent 
than  seeking  that  peace,  for  as  the 
Bible  tells  us,  it  is  the  peacemakers 
who  are  blessed.  And  you,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, Prime  Minister  Begin,  and  Presi- 
dent Sadat  are  three  such  peacemakers. 

Your  efforts  are  even  more  than  a 
pivotal  moment  in  the  history  of  the 
Middle  East,  for  as  a  poet  once  put  it: 
"Peace  hath  her  victories  no  less  re- 
nown'd  than  war." 

Each  generation  bears  two  funda- 
mental responsibilities  to  the  next:  One 
is  to  lay  down  our  lives,  if  need  be,  for 
the  things  that  we  treasure;  the  other  is 
to  work  ceaselessly  so  that  our  children 
will  not  be  asked  to  make  that  sac- 
rifice. Both  duties  are  sacred.  Both  re- 
quire courage.  Both  are  filled  with 
grave  risks. 

There  are  statesmen  whose  tasks  it  is 
to  go  to  the  brink  of  war.  For  others, 
their  courage  is  tested  by  the  challenge 
to  go  to  the  brink  for  peace.  In  the  end, 
the  truest  measure  of  our  humanity  is 
how  we  rise  to  the  second  challenge. 

Mr.  President,  tonight,  as  6  months 
ago,  you  meet  that  demanding  meas- 
ure. Please  know  that  you  have  our 
love,  our  prayers.  The  prayers  of  all 
humanity  are  with  you  this  evening  as 
you  search  for  that  nobler  victory,  the 
victory  of  peace. 

President  Carter 

Nothing  could  give  me  more  encour- 
agement and  a  more  gratifying  sense 
than  to  have  surround  me  here  not  only 
the  Vice  President  but  the  distin- 
guished Members  of  Congress. 

I  leave  tonight  on  a  new  mission  in 
the  service  of  the  oldest  of  human 
dreams  —  the  dream  of  peace.   And 


nowhere  is  this  hope  for  peace  more 
fervent,  more  alive  than  in  the  Middle 
East;  nowhere  is  the  path  to  its  realiza- 
tion more  difficult;  nowhere  might  the 
price  of  failure  be  more  terrible. 

Peace  remains  the  goal  of  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  of 
the  great  peoples  of  Egypt  and  of  Is- 
rael. I  know  that  they  share  my  deter- 
mination that  these  long  negotiations 
will  bring  fruit. 

The  Middle  East  has  suffered  too 
much  and  too  long  from  war  and  from 
the  fear  of  war.  Arabs  and  Israelis  alike 
must  now  understand  that  bloodshed 
and  deprivation  and  death  can  never 
settle  their  differences,  can  never  be 
the  path  toward  renewal  and  hope. 

For  the  first  time  in  a  generation, 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  has  come 
within  reach.  President  Sadat's  visit  to 
Jerusalem,  his  great  and  courageous  re- 
ception by  Prime  Minister  Begin,  the 
reciprocal  visit  by  the  Prime  Minister 


WHITE  HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
MAR.  5,  1979* 

President  Carter  has  accepted  invita- 
tions from  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
President  Sadat  and  will  depart  Wash- 
ington on  Wednesday  afternoon  for 
Egypt  and  Israel. 

The  President  will  arrive  in  Egypt  on 
Thursday  afternoon  for  talks  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat.  He  will  then  fly  to  Israel  on 
Saturday  evening  for  talks  with  Prime 
Minister  Begin. 

The  talks  will  focus  on  the  peace 
process,  regional  security,  and  bilateral 
issues. 

As  he  stated  last  Tuesday,  the  Presi- 
dent believes  that  we  must  not  allow  the 
prospects  for  peace  which  seemed  so 
bright  last  September  to  continue  to  dim 
and  perhaps  to  vanish.  If  we  do,  the 
judgment  of  history  and  of  our  children 
will  rightly  condemn  us. 


*Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
White  House  Press  Secretary  Jody  Pow- 
ell (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  12, 
1979). 


to  Egypt  —  all  opened  the  way  towar 
possible  progress.  At  Camp  David,  w^ 
then  worked  together  for  13  days  t( 
forge  a  political  framework  withi 
which  their  differences  might  be  re 
solved. 

Our  negotiations  have  been  and  an 
based  on  the  idea  that  peace  can  onl 
be  achieved  when  we  meet  the  legiti 
mate  needs  of  all  those  who  are  afi 
fected  by  the  conflict. 

Real  peace  will  not  come  with 
single  treaty,  important  as  it  would  be 
But  a  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israe 
is  an  indispensable  step  toward  th 
broader  comprehensive  peace  that  w 
all  seek. 

Negotiation  is  a  long  and  tedioui 
process — I  know  from  personal  experi 
ence.  But  there  are  times  when  makin; 
peace  demands  more  courage  thai 
making  war.  I  believe  that  Presidei* 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  posi 
sess  that  special  kind  of  courage  ant 
that  they  possess,  as  well,  the  vision 
and  the  statesmanship  to  redeem  tht 
great  hope  which  they  themselves  hav* 
helped  to  create. 

So,  it  is  with  hope  that  I  depart,  hopi 
tempered  by  sober  realism.  As  a  frieno 
of  Egypt  and  a  friend  of  Israel,  we  will 
do  our  best  to  help  them  achieve  th« 
peace  that  they  have  paid  for  in  blooo 
many  times  over. 

In  doing  this,  in  seeking  to  lay  the 
basis  for  a  stable  and  a  peaceful  Middle 
East,  we  will  also  be  serving  our  own 
deepest  national  interests  and  the  inter 
ests  of  all  the  people  of  the  world. 

I  know  that  in  this  endeavor,  I  take 
with  me  the  prayers  and  the  good 
wishes  of  the  American  people.  In  the 
difficult  work  that  lies  ahead,  I  will 
draw  strength  and  sustenance  from 
those  worldwide  prayers  and  from  your 
support. 


WELCOMING  CEREMONY, 
CAIRO,  MAR.  8,  1979^ 

President  Sadat 

On  behalf  of  40  million  Egyptians,  I 
welcome  you  in  the  cradle  of  civiliza- 
tion. You  are  held  here  with  the  highest 
esteem,  as  one  of  the  greatest  states- 
men of  our  time.  Your  courage  and 
wisdom  are  paralleled  only  by  the 
strength  of  your  commitment  to  moral- 
ity and  justice. 

Never  before  has  an  American  Presi- 


Any  1979 

lent  been  so  firm  in  his  devotion  to  the 
ause  of  world  peace  and  the  universal 
brotherhood  of  man.  Never  before  has 
1  statesman  with  your  awesome  respon- 
.ibility  devoted  so  much  of  his  time 
md  effort  to  the  noble  task  of  promot- 
ing peace  and  cooperation  among  na- 
ions. 

.  This  is  an  historic  and  courageous 
jiission.  On  your  departure  yesterday, 
^ou  said  that  you  were  undertaking  it 
vith  hope  and  sober  realism.  We  share 
/our  hope  and  pray  for  the  success  of 
l^our  endeavor.  You  will  find  the 
igyptian  people  firm  in  their  dedica- 
ion  to  a  just  and  comprehensive  peace 
n  the  area.  We  are  determined  to  en- 
ible  our  Palestinian  brothers  to  realize 
heir  national  rights  and  regain  their 
reedom . 

In  the  days  ahead,  we  will  be  work- 
ng  together  to  make  these  cherished 
lopes  a  living  reality.  We  want  to  build 
I  viable  structure  for  peace  that's  based 
)n  the  rule  of  law  and  legitimacy. 

The  reception  you  were  accorded 
oday  by  our  masses  is  a  testimony  of 
he  affection  they  have  for  you  and  for 
:very  American.  Let  us  vow  to  cement 
he  bonds  of  friendship  and  cooperation 
)etween  our  nations. 

May  God  Almighty  guide  our  steps 
nd  lighten  our  way  and,  God  willing, 
ve  shall  overcome. 


'resident  Carter 

Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Egyptians 
ined  the  streets  this  afternoon  to  ex- 
iress  their  deepest  feelings — feelings 
lot  of  personal  friendship  or  admira- 
ion  for  me,  or  even  for  their  noble  and 
leloved  leader.  President  Sadat,  but 
heir  deepest  feeling  expressed  hun- 
Ireds  of  times  over  was  a  genuine  de- 
ire  for  peace. 

The  greeting  of  peace  has  a  special 
ind  urgent  meaning  for  all  of  us  today. 

come  to  you,  Mr.  President,  in  the 
ier\ice  of  peace.  You  receive  me  in  a 
pirit  of  peace.  We  meet  to  resume  to- 
gether the  sacred  work  of  building 
)eace. 

It's  an  honor  for  me  and  my  wife  to 
)e  reunited  with  you,  Mr.  President, 
md  your  wife  and  with  our  many  other 
"riends  with  whom  we've  worked  so 
liligently  in  recent  months. 

It's  a  pleasure  to  be  with  you  this 
ime  in  Cairo.  We  bring  with  us  the  re- 
ipect  and  the  good  wishes  for  President 
iadat  and  for  the  people  of  Egypt  from 
he  tens  of  millions  of  people  who  live 
n  the  United  States  of  America. 

I've  come  to  the  Middle  East  to  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  peace  between 
2uypt  and  Israel.  A  treaty  between 
hese  two  great  nations  would  be  a  be- 
ginning, not  an  end.  It  would  bring  us 


17 


President  Carter  waves  to  the  crowd  during  his  train  trip  to  Alexandria  with  President  Sadat. 
(While  House  photo  by  Karl  Schumacher) 


much  closer  to  the  broader  goal  we 
seek  —  a  real  peace,  a  comprehensive 
peace,  a  peace  that  would  reflect  the 
legitimate  needs  of  all  those  who  have 
suffered  so  deeply  during  the  last  30 
years  of  conflict,  enmity,  and  war. 

It  would  also  be  the  beginning  of  a 
new  chapter  in  the  long  history  of 
Egypt,  one  in  which  the  energies  of  all 
Egyptians  can  at  last  be  turned  in  full 
force  to  the  human  task  of  building  a 
future  of  dignity  and  hope. 

I  know  from  experience  how  deeply 
President  Sadat  wants  that  kind  of  fu- 
ture. In  my  many  hours  of  conversation 
with  him,  I've  learned  to  respect  him 
as  a  man  of  great  courage  with  a  pas- 
sion for  peace.  He  has  spoken 
eloquently,  but  more  importantly,  he 
has  acted  boldly  and  decisively. 

In  his  electrifying  trip  to  Jerusalem 
in  November  of  1977,  President  Sadat 
fully  committed  himself  to  the  goal  of  a 
just  and  lasting  pCace.  That  was  also 
our  goal  at  Camp  David  where  Presi- 
dent Sadat,  Prime  Minister  Begin,  and 
I  agreed  on  a  framework  for  a  com- 
prehensive peace  and  on  the  outlines  of 
a  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  And 
that  remains  the  goal  of  the  talks  that 
will  continue  today. 

Our  hope  is  to  achieve  an  agreement 
which  is  honorable,  just,  and  which 
provides  security  for  each  of  the 
negotiating  parties.  But  above  all,  our 
purpose  is  to  achieve  a  peace  that  will 
last. 

If  the  promise  of  peace  is  to  be  fully 
realized  for  the  people  of  Israel  and 
Egypt,  then  others  must  be  encouraged 
to  join  the  process  of  resolving  differ- 
ences through  negotiations  and  ac- 
commodations. 

The  United  States  will  work  with  any 
and  all  parties  who  are  committed  to 
these  principles  of  genuine  peace  and 
security.  As  the  relations  among  us 
grow  stronger,  we  can  all  work  more 
effectively  to  bring  stability  to  the 


Middle  East  region  as  a  whole. 

President  Sadat  has  written,  and  I 
quote:  "No  problem  should  ever  be  re- 
garded as  insuperable."  In  recent 
months,  we've  overcome  many  prob- 
lems that  once  seemed  insurmountable. 
I  pray  that,  with  God's  help,  we  may 
remove  the  remaining  obstacles  to  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  and  continue  the 
negotiations  with  great  determination 
on  other  issues,  in  accordance  with  the 
Camp  David  agreements. 

The  most  important  condition  for 
success  has  already  been  met — the  sin- 
cere conviction  on  both  sides  that  peace 
is  preferable  to  war,  that  differences 
can  better  be  settled  by  the  exercise  of 
reason  than  by  the  spilling  of  blood. 

The  people  of  Egypt  have  spilled 
much  blood.  And  in  the  eyes  of  the 
women,  in  particular,  on  the  streets  and 
in  the  balconies  in  the  last  few  minutes, 
we've  seen  a  desire  and  a  hunger  and  a 
prayer  that  their  sons  and  their  hus- 
bands would  never  again  have  to  suffer 
in  a  cause  of  combat  and  war. 

President  Sadat  and  I,  in  the  car  to- 
gether, repledged  ourselves  not  to  dis- 
appoint those  here,  in  Israel,  among  the 
Palestinians,  among  the  countries  also 
presently  in  a  state  of  war,  who  depend 
on  us  and  others  to  bring  the  long  un- 
realized but  deeply  desired  state  of 
peace  to  this  region. 

Like  you,  Mr.  President,  I  am  dedi- 
cated to  the  cause  of  peace.  Like  you, 
Mr.  President,  I'm  determined  to 
persevere.  Our  common  dedication, 
our  common  determination  is  rooted  in 
the  soil  of  common  religious  truth. 
Many  signs  said:  "We  believe  in 
God."  You  and  I,  Mr.  President,  be- 
lieve in  God.  We  believe  in  truth,  that 
truth  takes  different  forms.  But  its  un- 
derlying message  is  the  same — it's  a 
message  of  love,  of  faith,  and  of  peace. 

As  we  work  together  in  the  crucial 
discussions  that  are  about  to  begin,  let 


18 


1  o 

us  pray  God,  in  the  words  ot  the  Chris 
tian  Gospel,  "to  guide  our  feet  into  the 
way  of  peace." 


Department  of  State  Bulleti! 


INFORMAL  EXCHANGE 
WITH  AMERICAN  TV 
CORRESPONDENTS  (EXCERPTS), 
MAR.  9,  1979^ 


Q.  How  are  the  talks  going? 

President  Carter:  I  thinlc  very  well. 
We  still  have  some  problems,  ob- 
viously. But  President  Sadat  genuinely 
wants  peace.  So  do  I.  So  does  Prime 
Minister  Begin.  We  don't  know  yet 
what  will  happen  until  we  get  through 
with  the  talks. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  feeling  that  you 
can  wrap  up  this  end  of  it  on  the 
scheduled  trip? 

Q.  Will  you  be  able  to  leave  on 
schedule? 

President  Carter:  1  dont  know. 

Q.  Maybe  stay  another  day? 

President  Carter:  1  don't  know.  1 
really  don't  know. 

Q.  At  where  you  are  at  the  mo- 
ment, would  you  think  that  you  and 
Sadat  will  have  an  agreement  by  the 
time  you  leave? 

President  Carter:  That's  hard  to 
predict.  Prime  Minister  Khalil  and 
Secretary  Vance  are  talking  about  lan- 
guage and  specifics.  President  Sadat 
and  I  have  always  been  basically  in 
agreement  on  strategic  matters.  And 
that's  the  situation  now.  We'll  get  to- 
gether in  Alexandria  with  the  whole 
group  to  see  what  differences  still  re- 
main. 

Q.  You  said  before  you  came  out 
that  you  didn't  think  it  would  be 
easy.  Is  it  any  less  difflcult  now  that 
you're  here? 

President  Carter:  That's  hard  to 
judge.  We  obviously  came  on  this  trip 
without  any  assurance  of  success.  But  I 
know  two  things:  One  is  that  the  people 
of  Israel  and  Egypt  want  peace.  That's 
obvious.  And  1  believe  that  the  leaders 
of  Israel  and  Egypt  want  peace. 

Q.  If  it's  possible  that  you  may 
have  to  stay  1  more  day,  can  we  con- 
clude that  the  talks  are  not  going  as 
you  thought  they  might? 

President  Carter:  I  don't  think 
that's  easy  to  predict,  because  if  they 
should  go  well  or  shouldn't  go  well,  I 
day  in  my  life  wouldn't  be  very  signifi- 
cant compared  to  the  prospect  of  im- 
proving chances  for  peace.  So,  I  don't 


believe   that   that   would   be   a  good 
measurement. 

Q.  If  you  went  1  day  later,  would 
that  foul  things  up  on  the  Israeli 
side,  with  the  arrangements  that 
they've  made? 

President  Carter:  No.  I  don't  think 
there's  any  likelihood  at  all  that  1 
would  get  to  Israel  a  day  later.  1  think 
what  it  will  do  is  to  take  to  Israel  either 
an  encouraging  prospect  or  one  that 
would  require  some  substantial  modifi- 
cations. And  we  really  wouldn't  know 
what  the  chances  were  until  we  got 
through  with  our  discussions  in  Israel. 

Q.  Are  you  in  communication  with 
the  Israelis  while  you  are  here? 

President  Carter:  Only  through  the 
Ambassadors.  But  there's  really  noth- 
ing to  report  to  the  Israelis  yet,  because 
we're  in  the  process  of  discussing  the 
specific  terms  on  which  there  is  a  dis- 
agreement still.  And  I  think  it'll  be 
after  our  meetings  in  Alexandria  this 
evening  and  tomorrow  that  we'll  know 
how  close  we  are  together.  Obviously, 
we'll  go  to  Israel  with  some  differences 
still  remaining.  And  I'll  do  the  best  I 
can  to  resolve  those  differences. 

Q.  Were  you  surprised  by  the 
Egyptian  counterproposal? 

President  Carter:  No.  We've  had  a 
very  clear  picture  of  the  Egyptian  posi- 
tion, both  from  the  statements  and  at- 
titudes of  Prime  Minister  Khalil  in 
Camp  David  and,  also,  my  own  private 
conversations  and  communications 
with  President  Sadat.  So  there  have  not 
been  any  surprises. 

Q.  How  far  apart  do  you  presently 
regard  the  Israelis  and  Egyptians  to 
be  on  the  question  of  Palestinian  au- 
tonomy? 

President  Carter:  The  question  of 
Palestinian  autonomy  will  have  to  be 
resolved  in  the  talks  that  would  com- 
mence 1  month  after  the  Israeli- 
Egyptian  peace  treaty.  The  Palestinian 
autonomy  description  is  best  sum- 
marized in  the  Camp  David  agree- 
ments, and  both  President  Sadat  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin  have  reconfirmed 
their  commitment  to  me  that  all  of  the 
Camp  David  agreements  will  be  carried 
out.  And  the  details,  obviously,  will 
have  to  be  worked  out  over  a  period  of 
a  year  after  the  peace  treaty  is  signed. 

Q.  You  expect  it's  possible  that 
you  may  arrive  in  Israel  24  hours 
late? 

President  Carter:  No.  I  think  we'll 
get  to  Israel  on  time. 

Q.  Even  though  you  are  having 
more  difficulties  here  than  perhaps 
you'd  imagined? 


President  Carter:  As  I  said,  I  have 
not  been  surprised  after  I  got  here.  I'v^ 
not  been  disappointed  nor  pleasantlj 
surprised.  It's  about  what  we  antic! 
pated.  But  my  expectation  is  that  we'll 
get  to  Israel  on  time. 


Q.  Could  you  characterize  tht 
talks  for  us  so  far?  How  do  you  thinl 
they've  been  doing? 

President  Sadat:  We  had  a  3-houi 
talk  yesterday,  very  intensive  talks 
think  there  is  progress,  for  sure  there  is 
progress.  And  I  think  it  is  time  now 
that  we  can  say  that  the  signing  of  the 
agreement  is  not  so  far  at  all.  From  mj 
side,  as  you  know,  I'm  doing  my  best 
and  I  shall  be  doing  my  best.  But  in  all 
candor,  without  the  intensive  effort  bj 
President  Carter  and  the  Americar 
people  and  the  Congress  behind  him 
we  would  have  never  reached  this.  Lc 
me  hope  that  everything  will  be  clear  i 
this  visit. 


(1 


Q.  What  is  the  greatest  problem 
What  is  the  biggest  difficulty? 

President  Sadat:  I  commented  las 
night  after  the  3-hour  talk  with  Presi 
dent  Carter,  Secretary  Vance,  anc 
[National  Security  Adviser]  Brzez 
inski — and  the  [Egyptian]  Vice  Presi 
dent,  and  the  Prime  Minister  was  with 
me.  Let  me  tell  you  this:  We  must  ge 
rid  of  the  distrust,  because,  unfortu 
nately,  there  are  still  some  shades  o 
distrust  until  this  moment,  and  it  is  noi 
from  the  Egyptian  side.  We  have 
dropped  all  complexes  and  everything 
through  my  visit  to  Jerusalem.  It  is  i 
word  here,  a  word,  but  I  don't  see  anj 
difficulty  in  reaching  an  agreemen 
upon  the  main  principal  issues. 

And,  as  I  told  you,  if  it  was  not  the 
effort  and  the  perseverance  of  President 
Carter,  we  couldn't  have  achieved  thisj 
And  it  is  needed  now  in  this  precise 
moment  to  reach  the  final  result. 

Q.  On  the  basis  of  your  discussionsi 
with  President  Carter  and  what  you 
know  from  him  of  the  Israeli  posi 
tion,  are  you  now  ready  to  sign  an 
agreement? 

President  Sadat:  I  am  ready  to  sign 
the  agreement,  yes. 

Q.  There  will  be  nothing  more  re 
quired  for  Egypt  to  do  or  for  Israel 
to  do  before  an  agreement  can  be 
consummated? 

President  Sadat:  I  can  speak  for 
myself,  not  for  the  Israelis.  For  myself, 
I  am  ready. 

Q.  Without  making  any  changes  in 
the  positions  you  held  before  Presi 
dent  Carter  came  here? 

President  Sadat:  In  the  very  frank 


Any  1979 

iisL'Ussions  we  had  last  night,  I  found 
,hat  there  is  no  obstacles  in  the  way, 
because  there  is  only  a  misunderstand- 
ng  about  the  main  issues.  But  apart 
"rom  this — and  this  will  be  President 
larter's,  I  mean,  goal  to  do — yes,  I 
hink  we  are  on  the  verge  of  an  agree- 
Tient. 

Q.  For  example,  are  you  now 
satisfied  with  the  question  of  full 
Palestinian  autonomy  in  the  occupied 
ierritories? 

President  Sadat:  Let  us  always  put 
;mphasis  on  the  Camp  David  docu- 
Tients.  This  is  a  great  achievement,  and 
naybe  you  heard  me  before  saying  that 
let  us  try  and  defuse  the  explosive  situ- 
ition.  Camp  David  documents  didn't 
defuse  only  the  explosive  situation  but 
nas  opened  the  way  to  a  comprehensive 
Settlement.  So,  adhering  to  the  Camp 
Oavid  two  documents,  for  sure  we  shall 
le  reaching  an  agreement. 

Q.  What  is  the  main  obstacle  now? 
What  is  the  main  problem  you  still 
nust  solve? 

President  Sadat:  I  think — and  it 
nay  appear,  I  mean,  ridiculous — some 
A'ords  here  or  there,  only  some  words 
lere  or  there. 

Q.  Can  that  be  resolved  by  tomor- 
row night,  by  Saturday  night? 

President  Sadat:  Between  me  and 
^resident  Carter,  be  sure  of  one  thing: 
Whatever  arises  between  me  and  Presi- 
ient  Carter,  we  are  identical,  and  we 
,hall  continue  to  be  identical. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS, 
ALEXANDRIA,  MAR.  9,  1979^ 

President  Sadat 

.  .  .  for  the  very  noble  cause  of 
jeace.  My  people  have  welcomed 
President  Carter  yesterday  and  today. 
f^or  me,  I  want  to  tell  you  how  happy  I 
im  and  how  proud  I  am  to  have  our 
dear  friend  and  brother  among  us  on 
Egyptian  soil.  All  1  can  say  is  this:  Let 
us  raise  our  glass  for  a  great  President 
^of  a  great  nation  and  to  Mrs.  Carter. 


evolutionary  times,  even  revolutionary 
times,  and  one  who's  seen  his  own 
people  suffer  on  many  occasions  trom 
combat  and  war.  And  when  all  others 
are  too  timid,  too  fearful  —  or  whose 
horizons  are  too  narrow,  fear  to 
act — that  great  leader  acts  and,  there- 
fore, inspires  others  to  join  with  him  in 
a  common,  noble  effort. 

President  Anwar  al-Sadat  is  such  a 
man.  He  has  aroused  the  admiration  of 
the  entire  world.  He  has  become  a  hero 
in  many  nations,  and  he  deserves  this 
esteem  and  admiration  completely. 

I  have  never  seen  so  many  people  as 
were  along  our  route  today  from  Cairo 
to  Alexandria.  And  it  was  the  most  im- 
pressive political  event  that  I  have  ever 


I 


resident  Carter 

On  a  rare  occasion  in  a  person's  life 
and  on  extremely  rare  occasions  in  the 
history  of  all  humankind,  there  comes 
along  a  man  or  person  with  extremely 
great  courage,  a  man  who  has  the  sen- 
sitivity to  understand  a  complicated 
assue,  who  recognizes  the  deep  feelings 
that  exist  because  of  historical 
animosities  and  hatreds,  who  has  him- 
self suffered  through  tortuous  political 


19 


witnessed  —  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Egyptian  citizens,  millions  of  Egyptian 
citizens.  The  number  itself  was  impres- 
sive, but  the  most  impressive  aspect  of 
this  tremendous  outpouring  of  emotion 
was  their  love  and  respect  for  their 
President  and  their  obvious  apprecia- 
tion for  our  common  search  for  peace. 
I  look  upon  President  Sadat  as  a 
partner,  sharing  with  him  a  common 
past,  a  common  present,  and  a  common 
future.  But  1  also  look  upon  him  as  a 
brother.  The  closeness  with  which  he 
and  I  work  and  communicate,  consult 
and  plan  and  act  is  reassuring  to  me. 
And  I  can  well  understand,  now  that  I 
know  him  better,  how  he  could  have 
made  such  a  momentous  decision  to 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
ITINERARY 

Mar.  7  Departs  Washington  for  Egypt. 
Mar  X  Arrives  at  Cairo  International  Air- 
port and  is  met  by  President 
Sadat.  The  two  Presidents 
motorcade  to  Qubba  Palace 
where  the  official  welcoming 
ceremony  takes  place. 

Meets  with   President  Sadat  at 
Tahra  Palace. 
Mar.     9     Travels   by   train   with   President 
Sadat  to  Alexandria. 

Meets  with  President  Sadat  at 
Mamoura  Palace. 

Receives   the   Nile   Collar   award 
prior  to  the  state  dinner. 
Mar.  10     Returns  to  Cairo  by  plane. 

Addresses  the  People's  Assembly. 

Hosts  a  luncheon  for  President 
Sadat  at  the  Mena  House  in 
Giza. 

Meets  with  President  Sadat  at 
Mena  House.  Tours  the 
Pyramids  and  the  Sphinx  with 
President  Sadal. 

Departs  from  Cairo  International 
Airport  for  Israel. 

Arrives  at  Ben  Gurion  Interna- 
tional Airport  in  Tel  Aviv.  The 
President  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  motorcade  to  the  entrance 
of  the  city  of  Jerusalem  where, 
just  inside  the  city  limits,  he 
participates  in  a  wine  and  bread 
welcoming  ceremony  at  the  site 
of  a  monument  to  those  who 
died  in  the  1948  Israeli  war  for 
independence. 

Attends  a  dinner  at  Prime  Minister 
Begin's  residence,  following 
which  the  two  leaders  meet  pri- 
vately. 
Mar.  1  1  Meets  with  President  Navon  at  the 
latter's  residence. 

With  Prime  Minister  Begin,  visits 


Yad  Vashem.  the  memorial  to 
Jews  killed  during  World  War 
II.  At  Yad  Vashem,  the  Presi- 
dent visits  the  Hall  of  Names, 
which  contains  books  listing  the 
names  of  victims  of  the 
Holocaust,  and  then  went  to  the 
Hall  of  Remembrance  for  a 
wreath-laying  ceremony. 

With  Prime  Minister  Begin,  visits 
Mount  Herzl,  site  of  the  ceme- 
tery where  many  Israeli  war 
heroes  and  national  leaders  are 
buried. 

Meets  with  Prime  Minister  Begin 
at  the  latter's  office. 

Attends  state  dinner  in  Chagall 
Hall  at  the  Knesset, 
Mar.  12  Places  a  wreath  at  the  Knesset 
Memorial,  a  sculpture  with  an 
eternal  flame  dedicated  to  sol- 
diers and  civilians  who  gave 
their  lives  for  Israel. 

Addresses  the  Knesset. 

Attends  a  luncheon  with  members 
of  the  foreign  affairs  committee 
of  the  Knesset. 

Visits  the  Shrine  of  the  Book,  a 
part  of  the  Israel  Museum,  to 
view  the  Dead  Sea  Scrolls. 

Attends  breakfast  meeting  with 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  mem- 
bers of  the  Israeli  Cabinet  at  the 
Prime  Minister's  residence. 
Mar.  13  Breakfasts  with  Prime  Minister 
Begin  at  the  King  David  Hotel, 
following  which  the  two  leaders 
meet  privately  (joined  later  by 
their  advisers). 

Departs  from  Ben  Gurion  Interna- 
tional Airport  for  Cairo. 

Meets  with  President  Sadat  in  the 
VIP  Pavilion  at  Cairo  Interna- 
tional Airport  before  continuing 
to  the  United  States. 
Mar.  14  Arrives  at  Andrews  Air  Force 
Base. 


20 


President  and  Mrs.  Carter  with  President  and  Mrs.  Sadat  at  Mena  House  in  Egypt.  (Whue  House 
photo  by  Karl  Schumacher) 


slice  through  generations  of  hatred  and, 
through  a  great  expression  of  generos- 
ity, attempt  to  heal  wounds. 

I  also  have  a  great  admiration  for  the 
Egyptian  people.  Tomorrow  I  will 
speak  to  your  parliamentary  leaders  and 
make  a  more  substantive  description  of 
my  hopes  for  the  future.  But  tonight  1 
would  say  that  I  bring  from  200  million 
Americans  to  40  million  Egyptians  a 
heartfelt  expression  of  the  same  kind  of 
friendship  and  the  same  kind  of  mutual 
purpose  that  binds  me  with  your  Presi- 
dent. I  said  today,  as  we  watched  the 
adoring  crowds  shouting  out  their  slo- 
gan of  a  pledge  of  their  heart  and  soul 
for  President  Sadat,  that  I  would  cer- 
tainly hate  to  run  against  him  for  a 
public  office  in  Egypt.  But  I  would  add 
very  quickly,  that  I  would  also  hate  to 
run  against  him  for  a  public  office  in 
the  United  States  of  America. 
[Laughter]  I  think  it's  accurate  to  say 
that  he's  perhaps,  the  most  popular 
person  in  our  own  country. 

Tonight  he  and  I  share  great  hopes 
for  the  future.  We  recognize  the  dif- 
ficulties that  we  face.  Some  of  the  dis- 
trust, some  of  the  difficulties  in  com- 
munication, some  of  the  ancient 
animosities  still  exist.  But  we  share 
common  faith  in  two  things:  One  is  that 
the  people  of  Israel  and  Egypt  pray  for 
peace,  and  the  other  one  is  that  the 
leaders  of  Israel  and  Egypt  pray  for 
peace. 

This  will  be  a  first  step  only  to  a 
common  peace  for  all  the  citizens  of 
the  Middle  East  and  for  the  redressing 
of  wrongs,  for  the  realization  of  dreams 
and  hopes.  And  I  would  like  to  offer  a 
toast  tonight  to  my  friend,  to  a  great 
and  courageous  leader  who,  himself. 


with  the  strength  of  his  character,  the 
nobility  of  his  ideals  and  the 
purpose  —  which  I  share  —  is  responsi- 
ble above  all  others  for  this  kindling  of 
new  hope  in  the  hearts  of  those  that 
join  with  us  in  this  common  effort. 


PRESIDENT     CARTER'S 
ADDRESS,  EGYPTIAN  PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY,  MAR.  10,  1979 

I  also  come  before  you  in  the  name 
of  God,  as  a  partner  with  my  great  and 
good  friend,  your  President.  Anwar 
al-Sadat,  to  address  the  Egyptian 
people  through  the  Members  of  this 
People's  Assembly  of  Egypt. 

My  heart  is  full  as  I  stand  before  you 
today.  I  feel  admiration  for  the  land  of 
Egypt,  and  I  feel  a  profound  respect  for 
the  people  of  Egypt  and  for  your 
leader.  President  Sadat,  a  man  who  has 
reached  out  his  strong  hand  to  alter  the 
very  course  of  history. 

And  I  also  feel  a  deep  sense  of  hope 
as  I  consider  the  future  that  will  unfold 
before  us  if  we  have  the  will  and  the 
faith  to  bring  peace.  And  we  have  that 
will  and  faith,  and  we  will  bring  peace. 

As  a  boy,  like  other  schoolchildren 
all  over  the  world,  I  studied  the  civili- 
zation of  Egypt.  In  the  last  few  days,  I 
have  at  last  seen  the  legacy  of  that 
great  civilization  with  my  own  eyes. 
As  a  citizen  of  a  very  young  country,  I 
can  only  marvel  at  the  7.000-year 
heritage  of  the  Egyptian  people  whom 
you  represent. 

For  most  of  the  last  500  years,  Egypt 
suffered  under  foreign  domination.  But 
Egypt  has  again  taken  its  place  among 


Department  of  State  BulletW 

I 
the  world's  independent  countries  and 
has  led  the  resurgence  among  the  Arab' 
people  to  a  prominent  place  among  the' 
nations  of  the  world.  I'm  very  proud  of 
that  great  achievement  on  your  part. 

Tragically,  this  generation  of  prog- 
ress has  also  been  a  generation  of  suf- 
fering. Again  and  again,  the  energies 
of  the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East  have 
been  drained  by  the  conflicts  among 
you  —  and  especially  by  the  violent 
confrontations  between  Arabs  and  Is- 
raelis. Four  wars  have  taken  their  toll 
in  blood  and  treasure,  in  uprooted 
families,  and  young  lives  cut  short  by 
death. 

Then,  16  months  ago,  one  man, 
Anwar  al-Sadat,  rose  up  and  said: 
"Enough  of  war."  He  rose  up  and 
said:  "Enough  of  war.  It  is  time  fori 
peace." 

This  extraordinary  journey  of  Presi- 
dent Sadat  to  Jerusalem  began  the 
process  which  has  brought  me  here 
today.  Your  President  has  demon- 
strated the  power  of  human  courage 
and  human  vision  to  create  hope  where 
there  had  been  only  despair. 

The  negotiations  begun  by  President 
Sadat's  initiative  have  been  long  and 
arduous.  It  could  not  have  been  other- 
wise. The  issues  involved  are  complex, 
and  they  are  tangled  in  a  web  of  strong 
emotion.  But  among  the  people  of 
Egypt  and  the  people  of  Israel  alike, 
the  most  powerful  emotion  is  not  hos- 
tility; it  is  not  hatred;  it  is  a  will  to 
peace.  And  more  has  been  accom- 
plished in  1  year  of  talking  than  in  30l 
years  of  fighting. 

As  the  peace  process  has  moved 
forward — sometimes  smoothly,  more 
often  with  pain  and  difficulty — the 
Government  of  Egypt  has  been  repre- 
sented by  able  diplomats,  fully  attuned 
to  Egypt's  national  interests  and  con- 
tinually mindful  of  Egypt's  responsi- 
bilities to  the  rest  of  the  Arab  world. 

Last  September,  the  course  of 
negotiations  took  the  President  of 
Egypt  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Israel 
to  Camp  David,  in  the  wooded  moun- 
tains near  the  capital  of  the  United 
States  of  America. 

Out  of  our  dicussion  there  came  two 
agreements:  A  framework  within  which 
peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
neighbors  might  be  achieved  and  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  realized — and  also  an  outline 
for  a  peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel,  in  the  context  of  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  for  the  Middle  East. 

Those  agreements  were  rooted  in 
U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  242, 
which  established  the  basic  equation 
between  an  Arab  commitment  to  peace 
and  Israeli  withdrawal  in  the  context  of 
security.  The  treaty  which  is  now  being 


May  1979 


21 


negotiated   between   Egypt   and   Israel 
retTects  those  principles. 

Since  the  two  agreements  were 
signed,  we  have  been  working  to  bring 
both  of  them  to  fruition.  The  United 
States  has  served  as  a  mediator,  work- 
ing to  solve  problems — not  to  press 
either  party  to  accept  provisions  that 
are  inconsistent  with  its  basic  interests. 

In  these  negotiations,  a  crucial  ques- 
tion has  involved  the  relationship  be- 
tween an  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  and 
the  broader  peace  envisioned  and 
committed  at  Camp  David.  I  believe 
that  this  body  and  the  people  of  Egypt 
deserve  to  know  my  thinkmg  on  this 
I  subject. 

When  two  nations  conclude  a  treaty 
iwith  one  another,  they  have  every  right 
to  expect  that  the  terms  of  that  treaty 
will  be  carried  out  faithfully  and 
steadfastly.  At  the  same  time,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the  two  agreements 
reached  at  Camp  David — negotiated 
together  and  signed  together — are  re- 
lated and  that  a  comprehensive  peace 
remains  a  common  objective. 

Just  in  recent  days,  both  Prime 
Minister  Begin  in  Washington  and 
President  Sadat  here  in  Egypt  have 
again  pledged  to  carry  out  every  com- 
mitment made  at  Camp  David. 

Both  leaders  have  reaffirmed  that 
they  do  not  want  a  separate  peace  be- 
tween their  two  nations.  Therefore,  our 
current  efforts  to  complete  the  treaty 
negotiations  represent  not  the  end  of  a 
process  but  the  beginning  of  one,  for  a 
treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  an 
indispensable  part  of  a  comprehensive 
peace. 

I  pledge  to  you  today  that  I  also  re- 
main personally  committed  to  move  on 
to  negotiations  concerning  the  West 
Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  and  other  is- 
sues of  concern  to  the  Palestinians  and 
also  to  future  negotiations  between  Is- 
rael and  all  its  neighbors.  I  feel  a  per- 
sonal obligation  in  this  regard. 

Only  the  path  of  negotiation  and  ac- 
commodation can  lead  to  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  hopes  of  the  Palestinian 
people  for  peaceful  self-expression. 
The  negotiations  proposed  in  the  Camp 
David  agreements  will  provide  them 
with  an  opportunity  to  participate  in  the 
determination  of  their  own  future.  We 
urge  representative  Palestinians  to  take 
part  in  these  negotiations. 

We  are  ready  to  work  with  any  who 
are  willing  to  talk  peace.  Those  who 
attack  these  efforts  are  opposing  the 
only  realistic  prospect  that  can  bring 
real  peace  to  the  Middle  East. 

Let  no  one  be  deceived.  The  effect 
of  their  warlike  slogans  and  their 
rhetoric  is  to  make  them  in  reality  ad- 
vocates of  the  status  quo,  not  change; 
advocates  of  war,  not  peace;  advocates 


of  further  suffering,  not  of  achieving 
the  human  dignity  to  which  long- 
suffering  people  of  this  region  are  enti- 
tled. 

There  is  simply  no  workable  alterna- 
tive to  the  course  that  your  nation  and 
my  nation  are  now  following  together. 
The  conclusion  of  a  treaty  between  Is- 
rael and  Egypt  will  enable  your  gov- 
ernment to  mobilize  its  resources  not 
for  war  but  for  the  provision  of  a  better 
life  for  every  Egyptian. 

I  know  how  deeply  President  Sadat 
is  committed  to  that  quest.  And  I  be- 
lieve its  achievement  will  ultimately  be 
his  greatest  legacy  to  the  people  he 
serves  so  well. 

My  government,  for  its  part,  the  full 
power  and  influence  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  is  ready  to  share 
that  burden  of  that  commitment  with 
you.  These  gains  which  we  envision 
will  not  come  quickly  or  easily,  but 
they  will  come. 

The  conclusion  of  the  peace  treaty 
that  we  are  discussing  will  strengthen 
cooperation  between  Egypt  and  the 


United  States  in  other  ways.  I  fully 
share  and  will  support  President 
Sadat's  belief  that  stability  must  be 
maintained  in  this  part  of  the  world, 
even  while  constructive  change  is  ac- 
tively encouraged.  He  and  I  recognize 
that  the  security  of  this  vital  region  is 
being  challenged.  I  applaud  his  deter- 
mination to  meet  that  challenge,  and 
my  government  will  stand  with  him. 

Our  policy  is  that  each  nation  should 
have  the  ability  to  defend  itself,  so  that 
it  does  not  have  to  depend  on  external 
alliances  for  its  own  security.  The 
United  States  does  not  seek  a  special 
position  for  itself. 

If  we  are  successful  in  our  efforts  to 
conclude  a  comprehensive  peace,  it 
will  be  presented  obviously — each 
element  of  it — to  this  body  for  ratifica- 
tion. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  negotiation  that 
no  treaty  can  be  ideal  or  perfect  from 
either  the  Egyptian  or  the  Israeli  point 
of  view.  The  question  we've  faced  all 
along,  however,  is  not  whether  the 
treaty  we  negotiate  will  meet  all  the 


EGYPT— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  386.000  sq.  mi.  (slightly  larger  than 
Calif..  Nev.,  and  Ariz,  combined). 

Capital:  Cairo  (pop.  8.4  million). 

Other  Cities:  Alexandria  (2.5  million).  Port 
Said.  Suez,  Ismailia. 

People 

Population:  40  million  (1978  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  2.7%. 

Ethnic  Groups:   Egyptian.   Copt.   Bedouin. 

Nubian. 
Religions:  Sunni  Muslim  (90%).  Christian. 
Languages:  Arabic.  English.  French. 
Literacy:  40%. 
Life  Expectancy:  54  yrs. 

Government 

Official  Name:  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt. 

Type:  Republic. 

Dale  of  Constitution:  1971. 

Independence:  1922. 

Branches:  Executive — President  (Chief  of 
State).  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Govern- 
ment). Legislative — Unicameral  People's 
Assembly  (350  elected  members  and  10 
appointed  by  the  President).  Judicial — 
Court  of  Cassation.  State  Council. 

Economy 

GDP:  $12  billion  (approx.  FY  1977). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  9%. 

Per  Capita  Income:  $280. 

Agriculture:  Land — 3%.   Labor  —  50%. 


Products — cotton,  wheat,  rice,  corn. 

Industry:  Labor — 12.7%.  Products — textiles, 
processed  foods,  tobacco  manufactures, 
chemicals,  fertilizer,  petroleum  and  pe- 
troleum products. 

Trade  (1977):  Exports — $2.1  billion:  cotton, 
rice,  petroleum,  manufactured  goods. 
Partners — U.S.S.R..  Eastern  Europe, 
Italy.  F.R.G..  India.  Imports — $5.3  bil- 
lion: foodstuffs,  capital  goods. 
Partners— U.S. S.R..  F.R.G..  France, 
U.K..  Italy,  U.S. 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  1  Egyptian  pound  = 
US$1.43. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N..  Arab  League,  Organization  of  African 
Unity.  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade. 

Principal  Officials 

Egypt:  President — Anwar  al-Sadat;  Prime 
Minister  and  Foreign  Minister — Mustafa 
Khalil;  Ambassador  to  U.S. — Ashraf 
Ghorbal. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Egypt — 
Herman  F.  Eilts. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  Stale's  De- 
cember 1978  edition  of  the  Background 
Notes  on  Egypt.  Copies  of  the  complete 
Note  may  be  purchased  for  JOg  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington.  D.C. 
20402  (a  25%  discount  is  allowed  when  or- 
dering 100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the 
same  address). 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletinn 


immediate  desires  of  each  of  the  two 
parties  but  whether  it  will  protect  the 
vital  interests  of  both  and  further  the 
cause  of  peace  for  all  the  states  and  all 
the  peoples  of  this  region.  That  is  the 
basic  purpose  and  the  most  difficult 
question  which  we  are  resolved  to  an- 
swer. 

Such  a  treaty,  such  an  agreement,  is 
within  our  grasp.  Let  us  seize  this  op- 
portunity while  we  have  it. 

We  who  are  engaged  in  this  great 
work,  the  work  of  peace,  are  of  varied 
religious  faiths.  Some  of  us  are  Mus- 
lims; some  are  Jews;  some  are  Chris- 
tians. The  forms  of  our  faith  are  differ- 
ent. We  worship  the  same  God.  And 
the  message  of  Providence  has  always 
been  the  same. 

I  would  like  to  quote  the  words  of 
the  Holy  Koran:  "If  thine  adversary  in- 
cline towards  peace,  do  thou  also  in- 
cline towards  peace  and  trust  in  God, 
for  he  is  the  one  that  heareth  and 
knoweth  all  things." 

Now  I  would  like  to  quote  from  the 
words  of  the  Old  Testament:  "Depart 
from  evil  and  do  good;  seek  peace,  and 
pursue  it." 

And  now  I  would  like  to  quote  from 
the  words  of  Jesus  in  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount:  "Blessed  are  the  peacemakers, 
for  they  shall  be  called  the  children  of 
God." 

My  friends,  my  brothers,  let  us  com- 
plete the  work  before  us.  Let  us  find 
peace  together. 


REMARKS  FOLLOWING 
MEETING,  GIZA, 
MAR.  10,  1979« 

President  Carter 

President  Sadat  and  I  have  a  few 
words  to  say  about  this  visit.  First  of 
all,  on  behalf  of  the  American  people 
and  myself  personally,  1  want  to  ex- 
press my  deep  thanks  to  President 
Sadat  and  to  the  people  of  Egypt  for  a 
welcome  that  has  been  exhilarating  to 
me  and  which  I  will  never  forget. 

We  have  had  hours  of  discussion 
about  the  issue  of  peace.  It's  obvious  to 
me  that  the  Egyptian  people,  from  their 
tremendous  outpouring  of  welcome  to 
me  and  to  President  Sadat,  genuinely 
want  peace. 

It's  equally  obvious  to  me  that  Presi- 
dent Sadat  and  the  people  of  Egypt  and 
Israel  are  determined  to  carry  out  all 
the  provisions,  all  the  agreements  made 
at  Camp  David,  not  only  for  peace 
between  Israel  and  Egypt  but  for  a  full 
and  comprehensive  peace  involving  the 
realization  of  the  rights  of  those  who 
have  suffered  so  long,  and  a  step-by- 


step  progression  toward  peace  between 
Israel  and  all  its  neighbors. 

We  have  resolved  some  difficult  is- 
sues here.  Difficult  issues  still  remain 
to  be  resolved. 

I  will  leave  here  this  afternoon, 
going  to  Israel  to  meet  with  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  the  officials  of  the 
Israeli  Government.  I'm  hopeful  that 
the  differences  which  still  remain  can 
be  resolved. 

President  Sadat 

Let  me  seize  this  opportunity  to  ex- 
press really  how  happy  my  people  and  I 
were  to  receive  President  Carter,  for 
whom  we  hold  great  esteem  and  great 
love,  the  man  who  has  really,  through 
his  patience,  perseverance,  morale,  and 
principles,  has  already  achieved  more 
than  59%  of  the  whole  problem,  one  of 
the  most  complicated  problems  in  the 
whole  world. 

We  are  happy  to  receive  President 
Carter  and  Mrs.  Carter,  and  we  are 
happy  also  to  ask  them  to  convey  to  our 
friends,  the  American  people,  who 
supported  my  initiative  whole- 
heartedly— we  ask  him  to  convey  to 
them  our  gratitude.  And  in  this  precise 
moment,  I  prefer  to  say  only  that  we 
had  a  very  fruitful  talk.  Exactly  as 
President  Carter  stated,  we  have  over- 
come some  of  the  difficulties.  Some 
other  issues  are  to  be  settled. 

And  in  the  name  of  the  Egyptian 
people,  my  name  and  my  wife's  name, 
we  wish  to  President  Carter  and  Mrs. 
Carter  all  the  best  wishes  and  fulfill- 
ment and  achievement  in  his  visit  to 
Israel. 


WELCOMING  CEREMONY, 
TEL  AVIV,  MAR.  10,  1979' 

President  Navon 

In  the  name  of  the  people  of  Israel,  it 
is  a  great  pleasure  and  privilege,  to- 
gether with  my  wife,  to  greet  you  and 
the  distinguished  officials  who  have 
come  with  you  with  all  our  hearts  in 
sincere  friendship  and  profound  ap- 
preciation. 

We  cherish  these  feelings  toward  you 
personally  and  also  as  a  representative 
of  the  leading  nation  in  the  free 
world — the  great  and  noble  democracy 
of  the  United  States — which  has  done 
so  much  to  deserve  our  admiration  and 
gratitude. 

You  come  to  us,  Mr.  President,  on  a 
unique  mission  for  a  goal  which  is  dear 
to  all  of  us  and  for  which  you  have 
mustered  all  your  energy,  your  dedica- 
tion, and  your  leadership,  to  put  an  end 


to  hatred  and  hostility  and  to  open  a\ 
new  page  of  peace  in  the  troubled  an- 
nals of  the  peoples  of  this  area. 

At  this  moment  we  do  not  know  asi 
yet  what  tidings  you  carry  with  youi 
from  your  visit  to  our  great  neighbor,. 
Egypt.  Does  the  dove  of  peace,  which' 
has  emerged  from  the  ark,  carry  am 
olive  branch  in  its  beak,  or  will  it  have: 
to  wait  some  time  longer  until  the  wa- 
ters of  the  flood  are  abated  from  off  thei 
Earth  so  that  it  can  at  last  find  a  restingi 
place  for  its  feet? 

You  are  not  unaware,  I'm  sure,  ofl 
the  differences  of  opinion  in  our  coun- 
try in  the  sphere  of  foreign  policy  and 
national  security.  Two  sentiments,, 
however,  are  shared  by  all  sections  ofl 
our  people — a  sincere  and  ardent  desirel 
for  true  peace  and  the  profound  con- 
viction that  in  order  to  achieve  thati 
peace,  Israel  has  made  enormous  sac- 
rifices above  and  beyond  what  mightl 
have  been  expected  or  demanded  of  it. 

These  sacrifices,  as  you  well  know, 
take  the  form  of  very  tangible: 
thing,s — withdrawal  of  our  forces  from 
strategic  territories  three  times  as  large 
as  the  area  of  Israel,  the  evacuation  of 
vitally  important  airfields  and  oil  re- 
sources, the  evacuation  of  flourishing 
villages.  These  concessions,  once;, 
made,  are  irrevocable.  In  this  situation,, 
it  is  easy  to  understand  our  desire  to  in- 
sure that  the  peace  treaty  we  sign  shall 
guarantee  a  true  and  permanent  peace 
and  shall  not  contain  elements  liable  to 
endanger  the  peace  and  our  security. 

During  your  visit  here,  you  will  meeti 
the  people  who  feel  at  one  and  the 
same  time  deep  concern  and  a  greati 
hope.  It  is  our  prayer  that  your  visiti 
will  remove  that  concern  and  justify 
that  hope. 

My  dear  President  and  Mrs.  Carter, 
5  years  ago  you  toured  our  country  asi 
private  citizens.  Today  Divine  Provi- 
dence has  brought  you  here  on  an  his- 
toric mission.  I  hope  it  will  not  be  long 
before  you  can  come  to  Israel  again  and 
see  that  the  seedlings  of  peace  which 
you  planted  will  have  grown  into 
sturdy  trees  bearing  plentiful  fruit  on 
every  hill  and  valley  in  Israel,  in 
Egypt,  and  the  entire  area. 


President  Carter 

As  the  elected  leader  and  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  I  am  indeed  honored 
and  pleased  to  set  my  foot  on  the  soil 
of  the  free  nation  of  Israel. 

I  come  to  you  as  a  fellow  worker  in 
the  cause  of  peace.  I  know  how  much 
this  cause  means  to  the  people  of  this 
land.    No  people  in  all   history  have 


May  1979 

suttered  more  from  violence  than  the 
Jewish  people.  The  State  of  Israel  was 
born  as  a  refuge  from  that  violence. 
Yet,  after  four  wars  in  three  decades, 
every  Israeli  citizen  still  knows  at  first 
hand  what  it  is  to  grieve  for  a  fallen 
loved  one  or  a  friend. 

As  I  walked  down  the  ranks  of  repre- 
sentatives of  your  military  forces,  cer- 
tainly among  the  finest  fighting  men  on 
Earth,  I  said  a  silent  prayer  to  God  that 
none  of  these  men  nor  their  compatriots 
would  ever  again  have  to  give  their 
lives  in  war. 

As  Prime  Minister  Begin  has  said 
many  times,  Israel  truly  wants  peace. 
I  Of  that  there  can  be  no  doubt.  And  I 
feel  absolutely  certain,  after  my  ex- 
I  perience  of  the  past  3  days,  that  the 
people  of  Egypt  fully  share  that  desire 
for  peace. 

During  the  last  3  days  I  have  spent 
many  hours  discussing  with  President 
Sadat  what  could  be  the  final  details  of 
a  treaty  of  peace  in  the  context  of  com- 
prehensive peace  for  the  whole  region. 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  I  will  soon 
begin  discussing  the  same  details  with 
the  same  end  in  mind — to  seek  in  the 
present  situation  the  means  and  the  will 
to  take  this  next  crucial  step  toward  a 
just  and  lasting  peace  for  the  Middle 
East. 

We  have  come  a  great  distance 
together — perhaps  a  greater  distance 
than  many  would  have  dreamed  of. 
Under  the  strong  and  courageous  lead- 
ership of  Prime  Minister  Begin,  the 
Government  of  Israel  has  been  willing 
to  make  difficult  decisions,  as  your 
President  has  just  said,  all  along  the 
way.  1  need  not  add  that  it  would  be  a 
tragedy  to  turn  away  from  the  path  of 
peace  after  having  come  so  far. 

I  have  good  reason  to  hope  that  the 
goal  can  now  be  reached.  But,  of 
course,  the  ultimate  choice  lies  where 
those  choices  have  always  lain — with 
the  chosen  representatives  of  the 
people  who  have  suffered  directly  from 
so  many  years  of  destruction  and 
bloodshed.  I  look  forward  to  complet- 
ing the  urgent  business  at  hand  on  this 
brief  visit. 

I  bring  with  me  the  best  wishes  of 
the  American  people  and  also  the 
greetings  of  President  Sadat,  whom  I 
left  no  longer  than  1  hour  ago,  and  the 
hopes  for  peace  of  the  entire  world. 

The  task  we  are  striving  to  accom- 
plish together  demands  more  than  rea- 
son, more  even  than  will.  It  demands 
faith.  For  in  a  very  real  sense,  the  task 
of  building  peace  is  a  sacred  task.  In 
the  words  of  the  Midrash;  "'Peace  is 
important,  for  God's  name  is  Shalom." 
Let  us  have  shalom.  Let  us  make  peace 
together. 


23 


President  Carter  prays  at  wreuih  hmni;  ceremony  in  the  Hall  of  Renmnhiani 
Holocaust.   (While  House  photo  by  Karl  Schumacher) 


../  Ihc 


REMARKS  FOLLOWING 
MEETING  (EXCERPTS), 
JERUSALEM,  MAR.  11,  1979" 

President  Carter 

This  morning  and  this  afternoon  I, 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Secretary  of 
Defense,  National  Security  Adviser, 
and  others,  have  met  with  the  Defense 
Council  of  the  Government  of  Israel 
and  with  the  Prime  Minister  to  discuss 
the  issues  that  still  remain  to  be  re- 
solved between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

It  was  a  friendly  meeting,  a  frank 
meeting,  a  thorough  meeting.  We  have 
not  yet  reached  a  final  agreement.  Im- 
portant issues  still  remain  to  be  re- 
solved. All  of  us  are  dedicated  to  con- 
tinue with  our  best  efforts  to  reach  suc- 
cess. 

Prime  Minister  Begin 

I  subscribe  to  the  statement  made  by 
the  President.  We  had  a  long  meeting 
with  a  break  for  luncheon.  I  can  assure 
you,  and  my  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet 
say,  it  is  one  of  the  best  they  have  ever 
eaten.  And  we  are  grateful  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  advisers  that  they  honored 
not  only  our  meeting  but  also  our 
luncheon  downstairs.  And  then  after 
the  luncheon  we  continued  our  talks 
which  were  very  serious;  I  suppose  also 
very  friendly,  as  the  President  said. 

Now,  we  decided  to  call  a  Cabinet  of 
the  full — excuse  me,  we  decided  to  call 
a  session  of  the  full  Cabinet  for  tonight 


at  10  o'clock.  And  tomorrow  the  Presi- 
dent will  meet  with  our  full  Cabinet  at 
8  o'clock  in  the  morning.  So,  certain 
issues  concerning  the  peace  treaty  be- 
tween us  and  Egypt  will  be  clarified 
and  decided  upon  by  the  Cabinet  during 
the  nocturnal  session,  so  that  we  will 
be  able  tomorrow  to  give  replies  on 
those  certain  issues  to  the  President. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS, 
JERUSALEM,  MAR.  11,  1979» 

President  Navon 

It  is  my  privilege  to  greet  you  in 
Jerusalem,  the  Eternal  City  of  David. 

We  have  met  here  this  evening  to 
honor  an  illustrious  statesman,  his  dis- 
tinguished and  devoted  wife,  and  his 
great  country. 

The  United  States  of  America  is 
great  not  only  because  of  its  scientific, 
technological,  and  military  strength  but 
also  because  of  the  profound  human 
values  that  are  deeply  implanted  in  the 
hearts  of  its  people.  It  is  a  beacon  of 
hope  for  all  those  who  walk  in  dark- 
ness. 

Greatness  in  a  man  or  a  nation  is  no 
easy  thing.  It  takes  supreme  wisdom  to 
refrain  from  exerting  all  the  power  at 
the  disposal  of  the  strong.  To  be  leader 
of  a  nation  which  is  responsible  in 
large  measure  for  the  destiny  of  the  en- 
tire world,  a  man  needs  profound  faith 
and  constant  prayer.  It  is  our  profound 


24 

conviction,  Mr.  President,  that  you 
have  within  you  that  fountain  of  living 
waters  from  which  you  can  draw  a 
never-failing  source  of  inner  faith. 

By  your  side  is  your  devoted 
helpmate,  a  loyal  partner  in  your  joys 
and  .sorrow.  In  voting  for  her  forever, 
if  you  will  permit  me  a  personal  note, 
you  have  realized  one  of  your  favorite 
watchwords:  "Why  Not  the  Best?" 
[Laughter] 

In  your  life,  my  dear  Rosalynn,  you 
have  also  known  the  dark  side  of  the 
Moon;  hence  your  particular  sensitivity 
toward  those  to  whom  fate  has  not  been 
kind.  Your  heartfelt  involvement  in  the 
welfare  of  the  individual  does  not  dis- 
tract your  attention  from  the  problems 
of  the  great  world  which  is,  in  fact, 
composed  of  individuals.  The  Talmud 
has  forbidden  us  to  pronounce  all  the 
praises  of  any  person  in  his  presence.  I 
will  be  content,  therefore,  to  say  no 
more  than  this:  that  all  those  who  have 
met  you  have  surrendered  uncondition- 
ally to  your  sincerity,  nobility,  and 
warm  personality. 

One  thread  runs  through  the  entire 
history  of  our  people.  It  is  a  long  and 
epic  story  of  the  few  against  the  many, 
a  prolonged  struggle  to  preserve  our 
spiritual  character  and  identity  against 
powerful  forces  that  threaten  to  destroy 
us. 

If  it  is  not  easy  to  be  great,  it  is  even 
harder  to  be  small.  We  strive  for  two 
aims  which,  on  the  face  of  it,  appear  to 
be  contradictory — to  be  equal  but  dif- 
ferent. We  continue  to  cherish  our  na- 
tional aims,  to  gather  in  our  scattered 
people  from  the  four  corners  of  the 
Earth,  to  solve  our  social  and  economic 
problems,  to  make  the  desert  bloom, 
and,  above  all,  to  build  a  society 
founded  on  the  spiritual  heritage  of  our 
fathers  and  universal  human  values. 

We  have  worked  hard  to  achieve 
these  aims,  even  in  times  of  stress  and 
war.  But  we  are  profoundly  convinced 
that  only  true  peace  will  enable  us  to 
achieve  these  ideals.  It  is  my  smcere 
and  earnest  prayer  that  the  efforts  you 
have  devoted  here  toward  that  end  and 
the  efforts  devoted  by  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Begin,  and  the  govern- 
ment, will  be  crowned  with  success. 

Mr.  President  and  Mrs.  Carter,  while 
it  is  irrelevant  now,  I  read  that  both  of 
you  shook  hands,  while  running  for  the 
governorship  of  Atlanta,  you  shook,  in 
4  years,  600,000  hands.  Yesterday  we 
added  a  few  more.  Today  we  wanted  to 
save  you  some,  but  the  President  went 
down  and  shook  a  few  hands  more,  so  I 
lost  count  of  it.  [Laughter] 

Anyhow,  I  can  tell  you  those  hands 
stretched  to  you,  and  those  whom  you 
did  not  shake  are  very  friendly  hands. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  will  ask  you 


all,  please,  to  join  me,  to  stand  up  and 
join  with  me  in  drinking  a  toast  to  our 
illustrious  guests,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  his  honored  lady,  to 
the  success  of  his  noble  mission,  to  the 
family,  to  Miss  Lillian,  to  the 
friendship  between  our  peoples,  and  to 
the  progress  and  prosperity  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Prime  Minister  Begin 

On  behalf  of  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  Israel,  I  welcome  you  to  the 
eternal  capital  of  the  land  of  Israel,  the 
indivisible  Jerusalem. 

The  saga  of  America  is  living  in  our 
hearts.  What  is  the  saga  of  America? 
Thirteen  colonies,  ruled  by  a  great  na- 
tion but  by  a  foreign  power,  rising  in 
revolt  against  a  regular  army,  including 
mercenary  troops,  going  through  a 
horrible  winter  of  suffering  and  depri- 
vation, fighting  on,  ultimately  winning 
the  day  and  receiving  the  surrender  of 
General  Cornwallis,  proclaiming  its  in- 
dependence, explaining  to  the  world 
why  that  separation  took  place. 

That  Declaration  of  Independence 
written  13  years  before  the  Declaration 
of  Rights  of  Man  and  Citizen  during 
the  French  Revolution — and  I,  a  Jew, 
dare  say,  which  reads  as  a  chapter  of 
the  Bible — proclaiming  those  self- 
evident  truths  for  which  man,  almost  in 
every  generation,  has  to  rise  and  fight; 
giving  a  Constitution  which  is  working 
for  200  years,  and  working  well,  which 
helps  overcome  every  crisis  in  democ- 
racy; and  then  three  times  in  60  years 
saving  all  mankind  from  the  dangers  of 
militarism,  from  the  peril  of  the  most 
horrible  tyranny  ever  known  in  the  an- 
nals of  mankind,  and  from  Communist 
domination  over  the  world — indeed 
saving  thrice  all  mankind  in  a  short 
period  of  60  years. 

The  saga  of  America,  to  which  in  25 
years  IVi  million  Jews  emigrated,  one 
of  the  greatest  phenomenon  of  people's 
wanderings,  100,000  per  year,  for  the 
shtetl,  bring  with  them  and  transferring 
with  them  all  the  traditions  of  the 
shtetl,  knowing  no  word  of  English, 
speaking  their  old  language;  and  then 
giving  birth  to  a  new  generation,  to 
another  generation;  and  then  turning 
into  the  mightiest  Jewish  community  in 
the  history  of  our  people  since  the  days 
of  Alexandria  during  the  Second  Tem- 
ple, and  contributing  so  much  to  the 
civilization  and  culture  and  develop- 
ment of  the  United  States,  and  helping 
so  much  the  State  of  Israel. 

Since  the  famous  words  were  written 
to  America  and  about  it — "give  us  the 
poor" — well,  if  not  for  that  miracle  of 
those  25  years,  millions  more  of  Jews 
would  go  the  way   you   and   I,   Mr. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin ; 

President,  saw  today  when  we  visitedi 
Yad  Vashem.  i 

May  I  say,  although  it's  a  festive 
dinner,  that  when  we  both  heard  the 
children  singing,  [In  Hebrew:  "I  be- 
lieve with  a  perfect  faith  in  the  coming 
of  the  Messiah,  and  though  He  tarry,  I 
shall  wait  daily  for  His  coming,"]  and 
knowing  that  with  this  prayer,  our 
fathers  and  mothers  went  into  the  gas 
chambers,  I  couldn't  help  all  the  time 
thinking  these  children  and  smaller 
ones  were  dragged  to  a  wanton  death. 
If  I  said  this,  I  said  everything. 

And  this  is  the  reason,  why  we,  re- 
membering the  saga  of  America,  whoi 
helped  to  save  a  whole  section  of  our 
people,  is  living  in  our  hearts;  why  we 
love  and  respect  your  country,  not  be- 
cause of  any  interest,  but  from  the 
heart;  why  we  are  your  friend  and  your 
faithful  ally;  why  we  are  grateful  for 
your  help;  and  why  we  help  as  much  as 
we  can  your  country. 

And  this  is  also  the  reason  why  we 
want  so  much  peace,  with  all  our 
hearts,  with  all  our  souls;  why  we  pray 
for  it,  why  we  yearn  for  it;  why  we 
made  so  great  sacrifices  for  its  sake; 
why  this  parliament  gave  an  over- 
whelming support,  with  the  sacrifices, 
to  the  completion  of  our  labors  toi 
achieve  peace. 

We  have  to  care  for  the  security  and 
the  future  of  our  people.  This  is  our  re- 
sponsibility. We  shall  carry  it  out 
under  any  circumstances.  Never  again 
should  a  foe,  a  bloodthirsty  enemy,  be 
capable  of  killing  Jewish  children.  And 
we  shall  do  whatever  is  humanly  possi- 
ble to  make  their  life  secure,  not  only 
in  this  generation  but  for  all  genera- 
tions to  come,  in  this  land  of  our 
forefathers,  to  which,  as  of  right,  we 
came  back. 

Therefore,  we  want  a  real  peace 
treaty.  It  must  be  real.  It  cannot  last  a 
few  months,  or  even  a  few  years.  It 
must  last  for  generations,  actually 
forever.  Therefore,  we  must  care  of  its 
wording,  because  it  has  to  be  clear  that 
this  is  going  to  be  a  real  peace,  and 
with  the  peace  must  come  security. 

Therefore,  we  cannot,  and  we  shall 
not  put  under  jeopardy  and  danger  our 
civilian  population.  We  shall  defend  it, 
under  any  circumstances,  even  with  our 
lives,  if  necessary,  as  we  have  done. 
This  is  the  problem.  Some  say  to  us: 
"What  do  you  care?  Even  peace 
treaties  are  broken,  can  be  broken." 
Respectfully,  I  would  like  to  explain  to 
the  learned  men  who  teach  us  this 
chapter  in  history  that  we,  too,  read 
some  pages  of  history. 

For  instance,  I  always  remember 
since  my  boyhood  the  famous  saying 
made  by  the  German  Ambassador  to 
Edward  Grey,  the  Foreign  Minister  of 


May  1979 

Great  Britain,  on  behalf  of  the  German 
Chancellor.  Bethmann  Holiweg.  when 
the  German  army  swept  through  neutral 
Belgium,  and  so  an  international 
■agreement  which  lasted  for  84  years 
(was  trampled  underfoot.  And  when 
Grey  said:  "If  you  don't  evacuate  Bel- 
gium, we  shall  go  to  war  against  you." 
That  Ambassador,  on  behalf  of  his 
Chancellor.  Bethmann  Holiweg  said: 
"But.  Mr.  Minister,  are  we  going  to  go 
to  war  for  a  scrap  of  paper?" 

Those  who  say  so  pay  a  price  for  it. 
I A  peace  treaty  is  not  a  scrap  of  paper. 
A  peace  treaty  is,  as  it  must  be,  a  seri- 
ous document.  It  should  be  carried  out. 
j      It  can   be   broken   by   cynics,   by 
[enemies  of  peace,  by  enemies  of  man- 
kind. But,  of  course,  our  nation,  with 
I  our  experience,  cannot  be  asked  to  sign 
iany  document  which   would  make 
j  legitimate  a  breach  of  the  peace  treaty. 
; Therefore,  we  have  problems. 

Yes,  Mr.  President,  you,  and  may  I 
say  respectfully,  I  will  tell  our  peoples 
the  truth  And  therefore,  here  and  now, 
its  my  duly  to  say  that  we  have  serious 
problems  to  solve  until  we  can  sign  the 
peace  treaty  with  Egypt — and  we  want 
so  much  to  have  this  serious  document 
signed. 

And  today  we  dealt  with  the  serious 
problems.  We  all  work  quite  hard — you 
perhaps  harder  than  anybody  else — for 
the  sake  of  peace.  But  we  do  work 
hard,  and  we  shall  go  on  during  the 
night  to  deal  with  those  difficult  prob- 
lems. We  only  hope  we  shall  be  able  to 
solve  them. 

But  there  are  serious  issues  and  dif- 
ficult problems.  This  is  what  it  is  my 
duty  to  say  at  this  juncture,  at  this  mo- 
ment. Hopefully,  we  shall  overcome 
the  difficulties  and  be  able  to  sign  a 
peace  treaty,  a  real  peace  treaty  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel,  as  a  first  step 
toward  a  comprehensive  settlement  in 
the  Middle  East. 

We  wouldn't  like  to  have  a  separate 
peace  treaty  with  Egypt  and  have  an 
eastern-northern  front,  a  combination 
of  6,500  tanks — excuse  me,  5,600 
tanks — more  than  6,000  heavy  guns, 
more  than  a  thousand  fighting,  first- 
line  planes,  et  cetera;  it's  a  great 
danger  to  us.  But,  of  course,  we  cannot 
compel  anybody  to  come  to  the  table. 

We  invited  them.  We  are  prepared  at 
any  moment  to  resume  negotiations 
with  them — with  Syria,  with  Jordan, 
with  Lebanon,  with  all  our  neighbors, 
\».ith  all  Arab  states — if  they  wish.  Of 
course,  nobody  can  force  them  to 
come.  In  God's  good  time,  they  will,  I 
believe,  with  all  my  heart,  in  God's 
yood  time.  Until  then,  of  course,  the 
peace  treaty  with  Egypt  is  the  first 
step,  and  it  must  be  a  real  document. 
We  are  proud  to  have  you  with  us, 


you  and  your  gracious  lady.  We  met 
many  times  in  your  great  country,  built 
on  the  saga  of  America,  which  is  so 
dear  to  all  of  us.  We  meet  here  tonight 
in  Jerusalem,  in  the  Knesset,  in  the 
center  of  our  democracy,  this  democ- 
racy which  gives  Israel  the  inherent 
stability  which  gives  you  a  reliable  and 
stable  ally  in  the  Middle  East — and 
may  I  say  the  only  democracy  in  the 
Middle  East — and,  therefore,  the  ally, 
the  stable  and  reliable  ally  of  the  free 
world  and  of  its  leading  power,  the 
United  States. 

Mr.  President,  you  hold  the  greatest 
office  in  the  world,  the  most  difficult 
office.  But  I  believe  that  you  will  go 
down  in  history  with  a  higher  title  than 
even  that  of  President  of  the  United 


25 

States.  And  this  higher  title  is  servant 
of  peace. 

In  this  spirit,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
may  I  raise  my  glass  to  our  honored 
and  dear  guest,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  Mrs.  Carter,  to 
the  President  of  our  Republic,  Israel, 
and  to  Mrs.  Navon,  to  peace  and  to  the 
everlasting  friendship  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  State 
of  Israel. 


President  Carter 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  President,  and  Mr. 
Prime  Minister,  for  your  gracious  and 
your  kind  and  your  wise  words.  For 
both  Rosalynn  and  for  me,  1  want  to 
express  to  President  Navon  and  Mrs. 


ISRAEL— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  7.993  sq.  mi.  (about  the  size  of  N.J.). 
Capital:  Jerusalem  (pop.   392.100).   (Israel 

proclaimed  Jerusalem  its  capital  in   1950. 

The  U.S..   like  most  other  countries. 

maintains  its  Embassy  in  Tel  Aviv.) 
Other  Cities:  Greater  Tel  Aviv  (1.2  million). 

Haifa  (534,000). 

People 

Population:  3.7  million. 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  2.2%. 

Ethnic  Groups:  Jewish  (85%),  Arab  (15%). 

Religions:   Judaism.    Islam.   Christianity. 

Druze. 
Languages:  Hebrew,  Arabic.  English. 
Literacy:  Jewish  90%,  Arab  64%. 
Life  Expectancy:   72  yrs.   male.   75  yrs. 

female'. 

Government 

Official  Name:  State  of  Israel. 

Type:  Parliamentary  democracy. 

Date  of  Independence:  May  14.  1948. 

Constitution:  No  written  document. 

Branches:  Executive — President  (Chief  of 
State),  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Govern- 
ment). Legislative — unicameral  Knesset 
(120  members).  Judicial — Supreme  Court. 

Political  Parties:  Likud  (Herut.  Liberals. 
La'am).  Labor  Alignment  (Labor  and 
Mapam).  National  Religious  Party,  and 
numerous  smaller  parties  including  a  small 
Communist  Party. 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  6  Districts. 

Economy 

GNP:  $13  billion  (1977). 
Annual  Growth  Rate:  1%  (1977). 
Per  Capita  Income:  $3,666  (1977). 
Annual  Rate  of  Inflation:  40%. 


Agriculture:  Labor — 5.8%.  Products — citrus 
and  other  fruits,  cotton,  wheat,  grains, 
vegetables,  beef  and  dairy  products,  poul- 
try. 

Industry:  Products — food  processing,  tex- 
tiles, metal  products,  electronics,  chemical 
and  petroleum  refining,  transport, 
diamonds. 

Trade  (1977):  Exports— $2 .94  billion: 
polished  diamonds,  citrus  and  other  fruit, 
textiles,  clothing,  processed  foods,  fer- 
tilizer and  chemical  products.  Imports — 
$4.65  billion:  military  equipment,  rough 
diamonds,  chemicals,  machinery,  iron  and 
steel,  cereals,  textiles,  vehicles,  ships,  air- 
craft. Partners— EEC,  U.S..  U.K.,  Japan. 
Hong  Kong. 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  16.5  IL  =  US$1.00 
(average  for  first  half  of  1978). 

Economic  Aid  Received:  $13.8  billion  (FY 
1949-78);  of  this  $12.8  billion  was  from 
the  U.S. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  27  others. 

Principal  Officials 

Israel:  President — Yitzhak  Navon;  Prime 
Minister — Menahem  Begin;  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs — Moshe  Dayan;  Ambas- 
sador to  the  U.S. — Ephraim  Evron. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Israel — Samuel 
W.  Lewis. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  Stale's  revised 
edition  of  the  Background  Notes  on  Israel 
to  be  published  in  May  1979.  Copies  of  the 
complete  Note  may  he  purchased  for  70e 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  allowed  when 
ordering  100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the 
same  address). 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Navon  appreciation  for  the  personal 
hospitality  they've  shown  us. 

We  know  that  we  are  among  friends 
within  this  room.  Indeed,  I  have  a 
sense  that  in  many  ways  we  are  all  one 
family.  As  in  a  family,  the  relation- 
ships between  us  are  frank  and  some- 
times very  lively.  But  also  like  family 
members,  we  recognize  that  the  bonds 
between  our  nations  and  our  people  are 
more  than  just  strong  for  now;  they  are 
both  strong  and  permanent. 

We  in  the  United  States  will  stand  by 
Israel,  and  we  will  never  waiver  in  our 
admiration  for  you  or  in  our  support  for 
you  for  a  strong  and  secure  and  a  free 
State  of  Israel. 

We  realize  that  our  own  security  is 
intimately  tied  with  yours.  There  are 
bonds  of  blood  between  us,  bonds  of 
history,  bonds  of  culture,  bonds  of  re- 
ligious belief.  Perhaps  most  important 
of  all  are  the  enduring  values  which  we 
share,  the  values  for  which  my  nation 
was  formed  and  exists,  the  values  for 
which  your  nation  was  formed  and 
exists — a  belief  in  individual  liberty,  a 
common  commitment  to  representative 
democracy,  a  common  vision  of  human 
brotherhood,  the  conviction  that  there 
is  no  higher  pursuit  than  that  of  peace 
with  justice,  not  only  among  our  own 
kin  and  our  own  kind  but  we  share  this 
commitment  with  like  men  and  women 
throughout  the  world. 

We  are  now  engaged  together  in  a 
common  effort,  to  achieve  a  real  peace, 
a  comprehensive  peace,  in  the  Middle 
East,  a  peace  that  would  enable  the 
people  of  Israel  and  all  Middle  Eastern 
people  to  live  in  security,  to  live  in 
prosperity,  and  to  develop  to  their  full 
potential. 

We  are  now  in  sight  of  an  important 
initial  phase  of  that  great  objective. 
The  events  of  the  past  16  months,  be- 
ginning with  President  Sadat's  visit  to 
Jerusalem  and  Prime  Minister  Begin's 
immediate  response,  have  engendered 
that  great  hope.  More  progress  has 
been  made  in  the  last  16  months  than  in 
all  previous  three  decades  of 
bloodshed. 

I,  myself,  as  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  have  spent  literally 
hundreds  of  hours  in  detailed  negotia- 
tions trying  to  realize  the  peace  which  I 
have  just  described  briefly. 

We  are  not  looking  for  just  a  peace 
document  signed  by  two  nations 
grudgingly.  We  are  looking  for  a 
document  of  peace  signed  in  a  spirit  of 
mutual  trust,  mutual  friendship,  mutual 
commitment,  mutual  understanding, 
mutual  realization  of  common  purpose, 
that  will  open  the  avenue  in  the  future 
to  an  easy  interrelationship  between 
neighbors  either  in  a  spirit  of  animosity 
and  hatred  and  bloodshed  or  in  a  spirit 


of  cooperation  and  good  will  and 
progress. 

We  love  Israel,  but  we  are  not  jeal- 
ous. We  want  you  to  have  many  other 
friends.  That's  our  common  hope  and 
our  common  prayer.  There  have  been 
disappointments  and  frustrations,  some 
still  remain.  But  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  would  not  have  been  possi- 
ble without  Israel's  great  leader.  Prime 
Minister  Menahem  Begin. 

He's  a  man  of  courage,  of  integrity, 
of  utter  and  selfless  dedication.  He  and 
his  colleagues  have  been  tough 
negotiators.  They  know  what  is  at  stake 
for  Israel.  And  I  know  they  want  the 
best  agreement  for  Israel. 

This  concern  is  based  on  horrible 
historical  fact,  actions  which  we  saw 
memorialized  this  morning,  that 
brought  horror  to  a  world  and  which 
must  not  ever  be  forgotten.  But  in 
guiding  the  negotiations,  the  Prime 
Minister  has  never  lost  sight  of  his 
original  vision,  a  strong,  free,  vibrant, 
Jewish  people,  living  in  Israel — which 
you  are  now — but  also  living  in  peace. 
And  we've  all  seen  abundant  evidence 
that  he  possesses  the  political  skills  to 
translate  this  vision  into  reality. 

I  am  absolutley  confident  from  my 
conversations  within  the  last  3  or  4 
days  with  President  Sadat  and  from  my 
conversations  with  Prime  Minister 
Begin  that  both  are  determined  not  to 
let  this  great  opportunity  for  peace  slip 
from  our  grasp. 

If  we  can  resolve  the  few  remaining 
differences — and  I  am  still  hopeful  that 
we  can — our  meeting  tonight  will  be 
just  a  prelude  for  an  occasion  of  joyous 
celebration,  the  signing  of  the  first 
peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  an 
Arab  nation. 

I  ask  all  of  you  to  join  me  in  a  toast 
to  our  gracious  hosts.  President  and 
Mrs.  Navon,  to  Israel's  courageous 
leader  and  his  wife.  Prime  Minister  and 
Mrs.  Begin,  and  to  our  common  goal: 


President  Carter  with  Prime  Minister  and  Mrs. 
Begin.  .(White  House  pholo  by  Karl  Schumacher) 


the  transformation  of  the  Middle  East 
into  a  land  of  peace. 

PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
ADDRESS,  ISRAELI  KNESSET, 
MAR.  12,  1979 

For  the  last  24  hours,  I  have  been 
writing  different  versions  of  this 
speech.  I  have  discarded  the  speech  of 
despair;  I  have  discarded  the  speech  of 
glad  tidings  and  celebration.  I  have  de- 
cided to  deliver  the  speech  of  concern 
and  caution  and  hope. 

I'm  honored  to  stand  in  this  assem- 
bly of  free  men  and  women,  which 
represents  a  great  and  an  ancient 
people,  a  young  and  courageous  na-  J 
tion.  ^  \ 

I  bring  with  me  the  best  wishes  and 
the  greetings  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  who  share 
with  the  people  of  Israel  the  love  of 
liberty,  of  justice,  and  of  peace.  And 
I'm  honored  to  be  in  Jerusalem,  this 
holy  city,  described  by  Isaiah  as  a  quiet 
habitation,  in  which  for  so  many  of  the 
human  race  the  cause  of  brotherhood 
and  peace  are  enshrined. 

I  am  here  in  a  cause  of  brotherhood 
and  of  peace.  I've  come  to  Cairo  and 
also  here  to  Jerusalem  to  try  to  enhance 
the  bold,  brave,  and  historic  efforts  of 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  to  demonstrate  that  the 
United  States  of  America  is  as  deter- 
mined as  these  two  leaders  are  to  create 
lasting  peace  and  friendship  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  and  to  put  an  end  to 
war  and  the  threat  of  war  throughout 
the  Middle  East. 

No  people  desire  or  deserve  peace 
more  then  the  Jewish  people.  None 
have  wanted  it  so  long.  None  have 
spoken  of  it  more  eloquently.  None 
have  suffered  so  much  from  the  ab- 
sence of  peace.  Pogrom  after  pogrom, 
war  after  war,  Israel  has  buried  its  sons 
and  its  daughters. 

Yesterday  morning,  at  Yad  Vashem, 
I  grieved  in  the  presence  of  terrible  re- 
minders of  the  agony  and  the  horror  of 
the  Holocaust. 

Modern  Israel  came  into  being  in  the 
wake  of  that  historic  crime,  the  enor- 
mity of  which  is  almost  beyond  human 
comprehension.  I  know  that  Israel  is 
committed  and  determined,  above  all, 
that  nothing  like  it  must  ever,  ever  be 
permitted  to  happen  again  on  Earth. 

Americans  respect  that  determina- 
tion, and  we  fully  share  that  determi- 
nation with  you.  And  Americans  rec- 
ognize that  for  Jews  over  the  centuries, 
as  for  Israel  since  its  independence, 
caution  and  wariness  have  been  a  prac- 
tical and  a  moral  necessity  for  survival. 
And  yet,  in  these  past  months,  you've 


May  1979 

made  enormous  sacrifices,  and  you've 
taken  great  risks  for  peace. 

This  sacred  dedication  to  peace,  born 
and  fostered  in  Jerusalem  and  in  Cairo, 
•  has  given  to  men  and  women 
everywhere  renewed  sense  of  hope  that 
human  reason,  good  will,  and  faith  can 
succeed,  can  break  down  barriers  be- 
tween peoples  who,  in  our  lifetimes, 
have  only  known  war. 

As  Prime  Minister  Begin  said  after 
the  Camp  David   summit,   the  agree- 
ments reached  there  proved  that  any 
iproblem   can   be   solved    if  there    is 
some — and  he  repeated — just  some 
I  wisdom.   Those  are  truthful   and  also 
j  reassuring  words.  1  know  from  my  in- 
I  tense,   personal   involvement  in  these 
I  negotiations  that  President  Sadat  and 
i  Prime  Minister  Begin  have  not  wavered 
from  their  often-expressed  commitment 
to  peace. 

President  Sadat  told  me  in  Cairo  that 
he  will  let  nothing  stand  in  the  way  of 
our  shared  goal  of  finishing  the  treaty 
of  peace  between  Israel  and  Egypt  and 
(it  making  it  a  living  testament  of 
friendship  between  the  two  neighboring 
peoples.  I  believe  him,  and  I  know  in 
my  heart  that  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
the  Government  of  Israel  are  no  less 
fervently  committed  to  the  same  noble 
objective. 

But  we've  not  yet  fully  met  our 
challenge.  Despite  our  unflagging  de- 
termination, despite  the  extraordinary 
progress  of  the  past  6  months,  we  still 
fall  short.  It's  now  the  somber  respon- 
sibility of  us  all  to  exert  our  energies 
and  our  imaginations  once  again  to 
contemplate  the  tragedy  of  failure  and 
the  legitimate  exultation  if  we  bring 
peace. 

In  this  effort,  the  support  of  the 
Members  of  the  Knesset  will  obviously 
be  crucial.  Our  vision  must  be  as  great 
as  our  goal.  Wisdom  and  courage  are 
required  of  us  all,  and  so,  too,  are 
practicality  and  realism.  We  must  not 
lose  this  moment.  We  must  pray  as  if 
everything  depended  on  God.  and  we 
must  act  as  if  everything  depends  on 
ourselves. 

What  kind  of  peace  do  we  seek? 
Spinoza  said  that  peace  is  not  an  ab- 
sence of  war;  it  is  a  virtue,  a  state  of 
mind,  a  disposition  for  benevolence, 
for  confidence,  for  justice.  Americans 
share  that  vision  and  will  stand  beside 
Israel  to  be  sure  that  that  vision  is  ful- 
filled. 

In  Egypt  I  saw  vivid  evidence  of  this 
deep  longing  for  peace  among  the 
Egyptian  people,  millions  of  them.  But 
like  you,  they  worry  about  the  uncer- 
tainties of  that  first  crucial  stage  in  the 
broad  task  of  pounding  Middle  East 
swords  into  plowshares.  Like  you,  they 
hope  to  banish  forever  the  enmity  that 


has  existed  between  the  neighbors,  the 
permanent  neighbors  of  Egypt  and  of 
Israel.  Like  you,  they  want  this  peace, 
and  like  you.  they  want  it  to  be  real  and 
not  just  a  sham  peace. 

My  friends,  from  my  own  experience 
as  President  of  the  United  States,  I  un- 
derstand all  too  well  that  historic  deci- 
sions are  seldom  easy,  seldom  without 
pain.  Benjamin  Franklin,  who 
negotiated  the  treaty  of  peace  between 
England  and  America  after  our  own 
War  of  Independence,  once  said  that  he 
had  never  seen  a  peace  made,  even  the 
most  advantageous,  that  was  not  cen- 
sured as  inadequate. 

Throughout  the  peace  process,  both 
Israel  and  Egypt  have  understood  that 
no  treaty  can  embody  every  aim  of  both 
nations.  What  a  treaty  can  do — what  it 
can  do  far  better  than  the  fragile  status 
quo,  and  infinitely  better  than  the  in- 
sidious tensions  that  will  build  if  our 
efforts  are  further  stalled  or  fail — is  to 
protect  the  vital  interests  of  both  Israel 
and  Egypt  and  open  up  the  possibility 
of  peace  for  all  the  states  and  all  the 
peoples  of  this  troubled  region. 

Doubts  are  the  stuff  of  great  deci- 
sions, but  so  are  dreams.  We  are  now 
at  the  very  edge  of  turning  Israel's  eter- 
nal dream  of  peace  into  reality.  I  will 
not  pretend  that  this  reality  will  be  free 
from  further  challenges.  It  will  not. 
And  better  than  most,  the  Jewish 
people  know  that  life  is  seldom  easy. 
But  we  must  make  this  beginning.  We 
must  seize  this  precious  opportunity. 

Fifty-seven  years  ago.  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  of  America  com- 
mitted itself  to  a  Jewish  homeland. 
Twenty-six  years  later.  President  Harry 
Truman  recognized  the  new  State  of 
Israel  1 1  minutes  after  your  nation  was 
born.  Seven  Presidents  have  believed 
and  demonstrated  that  America's  re- 
lationship with  Israel  is  more  than  just 
a  special  relationship.  It  has  been  and  it 
is  a  unique  relationship.  And  it's  a  re- 
lationship which  is  indestructible  be- 
cause it  is  rooted  in  the  consciousness 
and  the  morals  and  the  religion  and  the 
beliefs  of  the  American  people  them- 
selves. 

Let  me  repeat  what  I  said  to  Prime 
Minister  Begin  last  year  on  the  lawn  of 
the  White  House,  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  founding  of  the  modern  State  of 
Israel.  And  I  quote:  "For  30  years  we 
have  stood  at  the  side  of  the  proud  and 
independent  nation  of  Israel.  I  can  say 
without  reservation,  as  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  that  we  will 
continue  to  do  so  not  just  for  another 
30  years,  but  forever." 

We  recognize  the  advantages  to  the 
United  States  of  this  partnership.  You 
know  that  America  deeply  desires 
peace  between  Israel  and  Egypt  and 


27 


that  we  will  do  everything  we  can  to 
make  peace  possible. 

The  people  of  the  two  nations  are 
ready  now  for  peace.  The  people  of  the 
two  nations  are  ready  now  for  peace. 
The  leaders  have  not  yet  proven  that  we 
are  also  ready  for  peace,  enough  to 
take  a  chance.  We  must  persevere.  But 
with  or  without  a  peace  treaty,  the 
United  States  will  always  be  at  Israel's 
side. 

Meeting  in  this  hall  of  liberty  re- 
minds us  that  we  are  bound  more  than 
in  any  other  way  by  instinctive  com- 
mon ideals  and  common  commitments 
and  beliefs.  This  Knesset  itself  is  a 
temple  to  the  principle  and  the  practice 
of  open  debate.  Democracy  is  an  es- 
sential element  to  the  very  nationhood 
of  Israel,  as  it  is  to  the  United  States. 

You've  proven  that  democracy  can 
be  a  stable  form  of  government  in  a 
nation  of  great  diversity  and  in  a  time 
and  a  place  of  danger  and  instability. 
But  Israel  and  the  United  States  were 
shaped  by  pioneers — my  nation  is  also 
a  nation  of  immigrants  and 
refugees — by  peoples  gathered  in  both 
nations  from  many  lands,  by  dreamers 
who,  and  I  quote,  "by  the  work  of 
their  hands  and  the  sweat  of  their 
brows"  transformed  their  dreams  into 
the  reality  of  nationhood. 

We  share  the  heritage  of  the  Bible, 
the  worship  of  God,  of  individual  free- 
dom, and  we  share  a  belief  in  coopera- 
tive endeavor,  even  in  the  face  of  ap- 
parently insurmountable  obstacles. 

In  nations  around  the  world  where 
governments  deny  these  values,  mil- 
lions look  to  us  to  uphold  the  right  to 
freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  the 
press,  the  right  to  emigrate,  the  right  to 
express  one's  political  views,  the  right 
to  move  from  one  place  to  another,  the 
right  for  families  to  be  reunited,  the 
right  to  a  decent  standard  of  material 
life. 

These  are  the  kinds  of  unbreakable 
ties  that  bind  Israel  and  the  United 
States  together.  These  are  the  values 
that  we  offer  to  the  whole  world.  Our 
mutual  dedication  to  these  ideals  is  an 
indispensable  resource  in  our  search  for 
peace. 

The  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
that  we  hope  may  be  placed  before  you 
for  approval  promises  to  be  the  corner- 
stone of  a  comprehensive  structure  of 
peace  for  this  entire  region. 

We  all  recognize  that  this  structure 
will  be  incomplete  until  the  peace  can 
be  extended  to  include  all  the  people 
who  have  been  involved  in  the  conflict. 
I  know  and  I  understand  the  concerns 
you  feel  as  you  consider  the  magnitude 
of  the  choices  that  will  remain  to  be 
faced  even  after  a  peace  treaty  is  con- 
cluded between  Israel  and  Egypt.  And 


28 


as  the  time  for  these  choices  ap- 
proaches, remember  this  pledge  that  I 
make  to  you  again  today:  The  United 
States  will  never  support  any  agree- 
ment or  any  action  that  places  Israel's 
security  in  jeopardy. 

We  must  proceed  with  due  caution.  I 
understand  that.  But  we  must  proceed. 

As  recently  as  2  years  ago,  after  all, 
these  present  steps  that  have  already 
been  taken  seemed  absolutely  unthink- 
able. We  know  that  confrontation  mag- 
nifies differences.  But  the  process  of 
negotiation  circumscribes  differences, 
defines  the  differences,  isolates  them 
from  the  larger  regions  of  common 
interests,  and  so  makes  the  gaps  which 
do  exist  more  bridgeable.  We've  seen 
the  proof  of  that  in  that  last  16  months. 

At  Camp  David,  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat  forged  two 
frameworks  for  the  building  of  that 
comprehensive  peace.  The  genius  of 
that  accomplishment  is  that  negotia- 
tions under  these  frameworks  can  go 
forward -independently  of  each  other, 
without  destroying  the  obvious  re- 
lationship between  them. 

They  are  designed  to  be  mutually 
reinforcing,  with  the  intrinsic  flexibil- 
ity necessary  to  promote  the  com- 
prehensive peace  that  we  all  desire. 
Both  will  be  fulfilled  only  when  others 
of  your  Arab  neighbors  follow  the  vi- 
sionary example  of  President  Sadat, 
when  they  put  ancient  animosities  be- 
hind them  and  agree  to  negotiate,  as 
you  desire,  as  you've  already  done 
with  President  Sadat,  an  honorable  so- 
lution to  the  differences  between  you. 

It's  important  that  the  door  be  kept 
open  to  all  the  parties  to  the  conflict, 
including  the  Palestinians,  with  whom, 
above  all,  Israel  shares  a  common 
interest  in  living  in  peace  and  living 
with  mutual  respect. 

Peace  in  the  Middle  East,  always 
important  to  the  security  of  the  entire 
region,  in  recent  weeks  has  become  an 
even  more  urgent  concern. 

Israel's  security  will  rest  not  only  on 
how  the  negotiations  affect  the  situa- 
tion on  your  own  borders  but  also  on 
how  it  affects  the  forces  of  stability  and 
moderation  beyond  your  borders. 

I'm  convinced  that  nothing  can  do 
more  to  create  a  hospitable  atmosphere 
for  those  more  distant  forces  in  the 
long  run  than  an  equitable  peace  treaty 
between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

The  risks  of  peace  between  you  and 
your  Egyptian  neighbors  are  real.  But 
America  is  ready  to  reduce  any  risks 
and  to  balance  them  within  the  bounds 
of  our  strength  and  our  influence. 

I  came  to  Israel  representing  the 
most  powerful  country  on  Earth.  And  I 
can  assure  you  that  the  United  States 
intends  to  use  that  power  in  the  pursuit 


of  a  stable  and  a  peaceful  Middle  East. 

We've  been  centrally  involved  in 
this  region,  and  we  will  stay  involved 
politically,  economically,  and  militar- 
ily. We  will  stand  by  our  friends.  We 
are  ready  to  place  our  strength  at  Is- 
rael's side  when  you  want  it  to  insure 
Israel's  security  and  well-being. 

We  know  Israel's  concern  about 
many  issues.  We  know  your  concern 
for  an  adequate  oil  supply.  In  the  con- 
text of  peace,  we  are  ready  to  guaran- 
tee that  supply.  I've  recommitted  our 
nation  publicly  to  this  commitment,  as 
you  know,  only  in  recent  days  in  my 
own  country. 

We  know  Israel's  concern  that  the 
price  of  peace  with  Egypt  will  exacer- 
bate an  already  difficult  economic  situ- 
ation and  make  it  more  difficult  to  meet 
your  country's  essential  security  re- 
quirements. In  the  context  of  peace,  we 
are  prepared  to  see  Israel's  economic 
and  military  relationship  with  the 
United  States  take  on  new  and  strong 
and  more  meaningful  dimensions,  even 
than  already  exist. 

We  will  work  not  only  to  attain 
peace  but  to  maintain  peace,  recogniz- 
ing that  it's  a  permanent  challenge  of 
our  time. 

We  will  rededicate  ourselves  to  the 
ideals  that  our  peoples  share.  These 
ideals  are  the  course  not  only  of  our 
strength  but  of  our  self-respect  as  na- 
tions, as  leaders,  and  as  individuals. 

I'm  here  today  to  reaffirm  that  the 
United  States  will  always  recognize, 
appreciate,  and  honor  the  mutual  ad- 
vantages of  the  strength  and  security  of 
Israel.  And  I'm  here  to  express  my 
most  heartfelt  and  passionate  hope  that 
we  may  work  together  successfully  to 
make  this  peace. 

The  Midrash  tells  us  that,  and  I 
quote:  "Peace  is  the  wisp  of  straw  that 
binds  together  the  sheaf  of  blessings." 
But  the  wisp  of  straw,  we  know,  is 
fragile  and  easily  broken. 

Let  us  pray  God  to  guide  our  hand. 
Millions  of  men,  women,  and  children, 
in  Israel  and  Egypt  and  beyond,  in  this 
generation  and  in  generations  to  come, 
are  relying  on  our  skill  and  relying  on 
our  faith. 

In  the  words  of  a  Sabbath  prayer: 
"May  He  who  causes  peace  to  reign  in 
the  high  heavens  let  peace  descend  on 
us,  on  all  Israel,  and  on  all  the  world." 


DEPARTURE  CEREMONY 
TEL  AVIV,  MAR.  13,  1979^ 

President  Carter 

As  we  depart  for  Cairo,  and  then  for 
my  own  country,  I  want  to  express  on 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

behalf  of  Rosalynn,  my  wife,  myself, 
and   all    the   American   party,   our{ 
gratitude  to  the  Government  and  to  the  i 
people  of  Israel  for  your  hospitality  and 
for  your  kindness. 

I  came  here  in  the  service  of  a  cause 
which  binds  together,  which  unites  Is- 
rael, Egypt,  and  the  United  States  of 
America — the  sacred  cause  of  peace. 
We  have  talked  and  reasoned  together 
in  that  cause  for  many  hours  during  the 
past  3  days.  We've  talked  as  friends, 
and  our  conversations  have  been 
characterized  by  the  frankness,  the 
honesty,  the  mutual  respect  and  con- 
cern that  true  friendship  demands. 

In  our  discussions  we've  concen- 
trated on  the  differences  that  still  exist 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  peace 
process,  differences  that  are  now  very 
small  compared  to  the  much  larger 
areas  of  agreement. 

Good  progress  has  been  made.  There 
are  fewer  differences  than  when  I  first 
arrived,  and  those  few  differences 
which  still  remain  have  been  substan- 
tially narrowed. 

Last  night,  there  were  further  inten- 
sive discussions  among  members  of  the 
Israeli  Cabinet  and  the  U.S.  delegation 
on  the  two  or  three  most  difficult  is- 
sues. And  this  morning,  building  on 
those  discussions.  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  I  were  able  to  make  sub- 
stantial additional  progress. 

I  will  now  fly  to  Cairo  to  review 
with  President  Sadat  the  discussions 
that  we  have  had  here  and  the  progress 
which  we  have  made  together. 

As  I  depart,  I  want  to  repeat  once 
again  what  I  said  in  the  Knesset  yester- 
day. The  friendship  between  America 
and  Israel  is  more  than  strong.  It  is  in- 
destructible. 

In  the  past  3  days  I  have  been  im- 
pressed deeply  by  the  extraordinary 
story  of  faith  and  perseverence  in  the 
face  of  adversity,  which  is  Israel. 

President  Sadat,  Prime  Minister 
Begin,  and  I  remain  determined  to 
exert  every  ounce  of  effort  at  our  com- 
mand to  bring  the  peace  negotiations  to 
a  successful  conclusion.  We  will  not 
fail. 


Prime  Minister  Begin 

We  take  leave  of  you,  Mr.  President, 
on  behalf  of  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  Israel.  On  behalf  of  them,  I 
wish  to  express  our  gratitude,  my  wife 
and  myself,  and  all  my  colleagues  in 
the  Cabinet,  that  you  honored  us  with 
your  visit,  you  and  your  gracious  lady, 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  Secretary  of 
Defense,  and  your  other  advisers. 

Undoubtedly,  those  3  days  of  your 
visit  to  Israel  were  3  hectic  days,  and 


May  1979 

there  were  also  3  white  nights,  but  they 
are  memorable  days.  I  believe  they  will 
be  unforgettable. 

You  came  on  the  highest  mission  in 
humanity — for  peace — and  you  have 
succeeded.  We  made  real  progress  in 
the  peacemaking  process.  Now,  of 
course,  it's  the  turn  of  Egypt  to  give  its 
reply. 

Nobody  can  deny  that  we  worked  as 
expeditiously  as  humanly  possible  and, 
therefore,  we  worked  day  and  night. 
And  we  are  not  tired,  because  of  the 
elation  in  our  hearts  that  we  did  a  good 
job  in  the  service  of  peace. 

May  I  say  respectfully  that  you  can 
leave  this  country  with  satisfaction, 
and  we  are  happy  that  we  could  have 
helped  you  to  the  best  of  our  ability. 
And  when  you  embark  on  your  journey 
and  mission  to  Egypt,  we  wish  you 
God-speed. 

And  when  you  come  back  home, 
may  I  again  ask  you,  tell  the  great 
American  people  that  here  is  a  free  na- 
tion which  loves  and  respects  your 
great  country,  your  people,  and  is 
grateful  for  their  friendship  and 
cherishes  your  personal  friendship  for 
Israel,  which  is  a  treasure  in  our  time. 

Now  we  shall  wish  you  all  the  suc- 
cess in  Egypt,  and  we  shall  guard  our 
friendship  between  America  and  Israel 
forever. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
REMARKS,  CAIRO, 
MAR.  13,  1979'» 

I  have  a  statement  to  make  which  I 
consider  to  be  extremely  important. 

I  have  just  given  to  President  Sadat  a 
full  report  on  my  discussions  in  Israel. 
During  that  visit  the  United  States 
made  proposals  for  resolving  a  number 
of  outstanding  issues,  proposals  which 
were  accepted  by  Prime  Minister  Begin 
and  his  Cabinet. 

President  Sadat  has  now  accepted 
these  proposals.  Based  on  discussions 
in  Egypt  and  Israel,  I  have  also  pre- 
sented U.S.  proposals  to  President 
Sadat  and  to  Prime  Minister  Begin  for 
resolving  the  few  remaining  issues. 

Earlier  today.  Prime  Minister  Begin 
agreed  to  present  these  proposals  to  his 
Cabinet  for  consideration.  This  will  be 
done  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 

President  Sadat  has  carefully  re- 
viewed all  these  remaining  issues  and 
has  accepted  these  same  proposals.  I 
have  just  informed  Prime  Minister 
Begin  by  telephone  of  President 
Sadat's  acceptance. 

I  am  convinced  that  now  we  have 
defined  all  of  the  main  ingredients  of  a 
peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel, 
which  will  be  the  cornerstone  of  a 


comprehensive  peace  settlement  for  the 


Middle  East. 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
ANDREWS  AIR  FORCE  BASE, 
MAR.  14,  1979 

Vice  President  Mondale 

Mr.  President,  6  days  ago  you  left 
for  the  Middle  East  in  search  of  peace. 
You  and  Rosalynn  took  with  you  our 
love,  our  prayers,  and  the  hopes  of  all 
humanity.  You  return  tonight  to  a 
happy  and  a  grateful  nation,  for  you 
have  drawn  two  ancient  enemies  to  the 
brink  of  peace. 

We  thank  you  tonight,  not  only  for 
the  breakthrough  in  the  Middle  East, 
but  we  thank  you  also  for  renewing  our 
confidence  in  the  deepest  of  American 
values. 

Where  there  were  risks,  you  stood 
for  hope.  And  where  there  were  obsta- 
cles, you  followed  conscience.  Where 
there  were  suspicions,  you  sought  to 
build  a  lasting  foundation  of  trust.  It  is 
the  trust  that  you  won  from  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  that 
made  these  historic  discussions  possi- 
ble. And  it  is  that  same  trust  that  made 
these  talks  a  success. 

Mr.  President,  Rosalynn,  welcome 
home  to  a  proud  and  a  hopeful  nation. 

President  Carter 

You  are  looking  at  a  tired  but  a 
grateful  man.  [Laughter] 

All  of  us  who  made  this  journey  ap- 
preciate the  opportunity  that  we  have 
had  to  render  some  service  in  the  cause 
of  peace.  Now  the  journey  is  done  and 
we  are  glad  to  be  home,  back  in  our 
own  country,  our  beloved  United  States 
of  America. 

It's  good  to  see  so  many  familiar  and 
welcome  faces,  and  I  want  to  thank  you 
for  being  out  here  in  the  middle  of  the 
night  to  greet  us  and  to  give  us  one  of 
the  best  welcomes  I  have  ever  known. 
Thank  you  from  the  bottom  of  my 
heart. 

As  you  know,  we  did  not  go  to 
Egypt  and  to  Israel  in  order  to  confirm 
what  was  already  a  guaranteed  result. 
We  went  there  to  use  our  influence  and 
our  good  offices  to  help  the  leaders  of 
those  two  great  nations  move  deci- 
sively toward  that  peace  that  is  so  ar- 
dently desired  by  the  people  whom  they 
serve. 

There  were  risks  involved.  They 
were  pointed  out  to  me  by  many 
people,  political  risks  to  me  as  Presi- 
dent, therefore,  perhaps  a  risk  even  to 
the  prestige  of  the  United  States. 

Fortunately,  our  work  has  had  a 


29 

happy  result.  But  I  want  to  stress  that 
the  effort  would  have  been  worth 
making  regardless  of  the  outcome  of 
this  trip.  Risk  of  failure  should  never 
deter  us  from  a  worthy  goal.  And  no 
goal  is  higher  than  that  of  genuine 
peace. 

In  war  we  offer  our  very  lives  as  a 
matter  of  routine.  And  we  must  be  no 
less  daring,  no  less  steadfast  in  the  pur- 
suit of  peace. 

For  more  than  30  years,  the  nations 
of  Egypt  and  Israel,  which  have  been 
and  will  be  perpetual  neighbors,  have 
existed  in  a  continual  state  of  hostility. 
That  hostility  has  exploded  into  combat 
four  times.  And  each  war  has  brought 
with  it  suffering  and  pain  and  the  loss 
of  life,  renewed  fear  and  hatred  and 
great  danger  for  that  entire  region  and 
for  the  world  far  beyond.  But  in  the 
last  16  months  the  way  has  finally  been 
opened  to  peace. 

When  I  decided  to  make  this  trip,  the 
peace  negotiations,  as  you  know, 
seemed  to  have  reached  a  stalemate. 
After  long  hours  of  discussion  in  both 
Egypt  and  in  Israel,  proposals  were 
made  for  resolving  all  the  outstanding 
issues.  All  but  two  of  these  issues  have 
been  resolved  with  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  the  Israeli  Cabinet. 

Less  than  3  hours  from  now  the 
Prime  Minister  will  present  the  re- 
maining proposals  to  the  Israeli 
Cabinet  for  consideration.  I  have  even 
left  instructions  to  wake  me  up  if  the 
news  is  good — [laughter] — and  I  be- 
lieve it  will  be.  As  you  also  know. 
President  Sadat  has  already  accepted 
all  of  the  proposals. 

Therefore,  we  have  now  defined  the 
major  components  of  a  peace  treaty 
between  the  largest  and  most  powerful 
Arab  country,  Egypt,  and  its  neighbor 
and  former  enemy,  Israel.  There  may 
be  sharp  internal  debates  before  this 
process  is  complete.  But  the  treaty  that 
emerges  can  be  the  cornerstone  of  a 
comprehensive  settlement,  one  that  can 
bless  with  peace  all  the  people  who 
have  suffered  from  the  long,  enduring 
conflict  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  leaders  of  Egypt  and  Israel  are 
now  daring  to  break  the  pattern  of  bit- 
terness and  war.  They  are  following  the 
advice  of  the  Biblical  proverb:  "When 
a  man's  way  please  the  Lord,  he 
maketh  even  his  enemies  to  be  at  peace 
with  Him." 

In  choosing  peace.  President  Sadat 
and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Israel,  Prime 
Minister  Begin,  are  venturing  into  the 
unknown.  But  they  know  that  the 
United  States  of  America  will  be  with 
them  as  they  begin  to  make  peace  a 
living  reality  for  their  own  people. 

I'm  thankful  that  the  friendships 
between  their  countries,  both  countries. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  ' 


intervietv  for 
israeli  Television 


The  following  is  an  interview  Presi- 
dent Carter  held  with  Dan  Shilon  of  Is- 
raeli Television  on  March  22,  1979;  it 
was  taped  for  later  broadcast  in  Is- 
rael. ' 


Q.  Less  than  2  weeks  ago  when  you 
addressed  the  Israeli  Knesset,  you 
said,  and  I  quote:  "The  people  of  the 
two  nations  are  ready  now  for  peace. 
The  leaders  have  not  yet  proven  that 
we  are  also  ready  for  peace,  enough 
to  take  a  chance." 

After  the  leaders  approved  the 
peace  treaty,  it  seems  that  the  lead- 
ers are  celebrating.  The  peoples  are 
still  a  bit  cautious  about  it.  How  can 
you  explain  it? 

A.  Let  me  correct  you,  first  of  all.  I 
didn't  say  the  leaders  of  the  two  na- 
tions; I  said  we  leaders.  And  I  was  re- 
ferring also  to  the  adjacent 
countries — Syria  and  Jordan — where  1 
believe  a  substantial  portion  of  the 
population  are  intensely  desirous  of 
peace  and  an  end  to  hatred  and  ter- 
rorism and  destruction  and  death.  So, 
that's  what  1  meant  when  I  talked  to  the 
Knesset. 

I  don't  believe  that  the  peace  treaties 
can  have  their  full,  permanent,  benefi- 
cial impact  if  they  are  just  based  on  a 
relationship  between  or  among  leaders 
or  documents,  because  Sadat,  Begin, 
Carter  will  not  be  in  office  many  years 
under  the  best  of  circumstances.  And 
until  we  have  a  genuine  interrelation- 
ship among  the  people  of,  say,  Egypt 


and  Israel,  we  can't  have  the  full  con- 
notation of  the  meaning  of  peace.  We 
need  students  to  move  freely  back  and 
forth  between  the  two  countries, 
tourists,  open  borders,  free  use  of  the 
Suez  Canal,  the  Strait  of  Tiran.  We 
need  increased  trade,  mutual  invest- 
ment, exchange  of  employees  back  and 
forth  between  the  two  countries,  an 
opening  up  of  trade  between  Israel  and 
the  United  States,  Egypt  and  the  United 
States,  and  Western  Europe,  that  hasn't 
been  there  before. 

As  soon  as  the  people  of  the  two 
countries  get  to  know  each  other,  to 
trust  each  other,  to  like  each  other,  to 
become  mutually  dependent  on  each 
other,  to  recognize  their  common  fu- 
ture, common  problems,  common  op- 
portunities, at  that  point,  peace  will  be 
permanent  and  will  be  full. 

And  I  think  that's  the  best  way  to 
demonstrate  to  the  Palestinians,  to  the 
Jordanians,  to  the  Syrians,  and  others 
the  full  advantages  to  them  of  emulat- 
ing what  Egypt  and  Israel  have  already 
done. 

Q.  But  on  the  other  hand,  what 
are  the  risks  to  Israel  and  to  Egypt, 
if  there  are  any,  by  signing  the  peace 
treaty? 

A.  I  think  the  risks  of  not  signing  it 
are  much  greater  than  the  risks  of 
signing  it.  Obviously,  there  is  going  to 
be  a  period  of  time  within  which  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization] and  some  of  the  Arab 
countries  will  threaten  increased  vio- 
lence or  economic  punishment,  ter- 


President's  Trip  (Cont'd) 

and  the  United  States  will  now  grow 
even  stronger  when  our  own  two 
friends  are  friends  with  one  another. 

Through  private  messages  and  public 
statements,  many  messages  sent  from 
Air  Force  One  on  the  trip  back  here 
from  Egypt,  I  am  urging  all  other  world 
leaders  to  support  what  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael have  done,  for  it  offers  hope  to  all 
who  love  peace  everywhere  in  the 
world. 

My  friends,  let  me  thank  you  again 
for  coming  out  to  greet  us.  I  believe 
that  God  has  answered  our  prayers.    D 


'Departure  remarks  on  Mar.  7,  1979,  from  the 


Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Mar.  12;  other  material  from  the  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Mar.  19. 

^Made  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House. 

^Made  at  Qubba  Palace  where  President  Carter 
stayed  during  his  visit  to  Cairo. 

^Held  on  board  the  train  from  Cairo  to 
Alexandria. 

^Made  at  Ras-al-Tin  Palace.  (Due  to  technical 
difficulties  at  the  dinner,  the  White  House  Press 
Office  was  unable  to  provide  a  complete  tran- 
script of  President  Sadat's  toast.) 

'Held  at  Mena  House,  the  hotel  where  the  two 
Presidents  held  their  meeting. 

'Made  at  Ben  Gurion  International  Airport. 

"Made  to  reporters  assembled  outside  the 
Prime  Minister's  office. 

'Made  in  Chagall  Hall  at  the  Knesset. 
'"Made  at  Cairo  International  Airport  follow- 
ing a  meeting  with  President  Sadat. 


rorism,  instability.  I  really  believe  that  , 
that  period  is  going  to  be  relatively  i 
brief. 

To  compare  the  risks  with  the  ad- 
vantages of  signing  the  peace  treaty; 
obviously,  the  advantages  far  outweigh 
the  risks. 

There  are  some  doubts  about  the  fu- 
ture. This  is  kind  of  a  new  life,  and 
both  countries  are  going  into  the  un- 
known with  great  predictions  of  prob- 
lems. I  think  the  problems  have  been 
grossly  exaggerated  from  the  very  be- 
ginning. And,  of  course,  to  the  extent 
that  we  can  use  our  influence  in  a^ 
beneficial  way,  the  United  States  is  not" 
only  willing  but  eager  to  guarantee  that 
the  outcome  of  the  peace  negotiations 
will  be  fulfilled  to  their  complete  de- 
gree. 

And  we  can  help  to  alleviate  some  of 
these  concerns.  And  if  problems  do 
arise  that  we  cannot  presently  antici- 
pate, we'll  be  full  partners  in  trying  to 
address  those  problems  when  they  be- 
come evident. 

Q.  Can  you  foresee  realistically 
that  Syria,  Jordan,  and  the 
Palestinians — encouraged  by  Saudi 
Arabia — will  cooperate  with  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  peace  process? 

A.  1  think  this  is  a  very  good  possi- 
bility in  the  future.  But  there's  going  to 
be  a  transition  period  when  they  try  to 
posture  and  threaten  and  see  if  they  can 
weaken  the  ties  of  friendship  and  peace 
between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

I  think  they'll  be  unsuccessful  in 
trying  to  destroy  the  peace  process 
when  it  becomes  evident  that  the  ad- 
vantages of  peace  directly  improve  the 
quality  of  life  of  the  Israelis  and  the 
Egyptians.  In  my  opinion,  the  large 
number  of  Jordanians,  who  also  pres- 
ently want  peace,  will  become  much 
more  vocal,  and  perhaps  King  Hussein 
and  the  other  Arab  leaders  will  say: 
"Well,  this  is  a  good  thing  for  me  and 
my  people  as  well."  I  think  that  could 
very  well  happen  in  the  future. 

Q.  During  the  past  year,  you  men- 
tioned several  times  the  right  of  the 
Palestinians  to  participate  in  their 
own  determination  of  their  own  fu- 
ture. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  This  participation  is  now  de- 
fined as  self-rule  or  autonomy.  Could 
the  following  steps,  after  establishing 
the  self-rule,  lead  to  an  independent 
Palestinian  state? 

A.  We  drafted  this  language  —  the 
Palestinians'  right  to  participate  in  the 
determination  of  their  own  future — 
very  carefully.   It's  been  adopted  by 


May  1979 


31 


both  Israel  and  Egypt  as  a  basis  for  the 
Camp  David  agreements.  And.  of 
course,  that's  incorporated  within  the 
peace  treaties  themselves.  Also,  the 
principles  expressed  in  U.N.  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338  are  part  of  the  Camp 
David  agreements  and  also  this  treaty. 

It's  not  up  to  the  United  States  to  de- 
cide the  ultimate  status  of  the  West 
Bank  or  the  Gaza  area.  This  is  the  rea- 
son for  the  future  negotiations,  in 
which  not  only  the  Palestinians  but  also 
the  Jordanians  and  the  Egyptians  will 
negotiate. 

I  don't  want  to  say  what  the  ultimate 
status  or  who  has  sovereignty  might  be. 
The  first  step,  to  define  what  is — to  use 
Prime  Minister  Begin's  words — full 
autonomy  will  be  difficult  enough 
without  my  trying  to  decide  here  what 
decision  might  be  reached  5  years  in 
the  future  on  the  permanent  status. 

Q.  Can  you  define  the  exact 
American  attitude  these  days  toward 
the  PLO? 

A.  Our  attitude  these  days  is  the 
same  as  it  has  been  for  a  long  time. 
The  PLO  has  not  been  willing  to  rec- 
ognize the  applicability  of  U.N.  Res- 
olution 242,  and  the  PLO  has  not  been 
willing  to  accept  the  right  of  Israel  to 
exist.  Until  the  PLO  is  willing  to  do 
these  things,  we  will  not  deal  with  the 
PLO. 

Q.  Are  you  actually  suggesting  a 
defense  treaty  between  Israel  and  the 
United  States? 

A.  No.  We've  never  suggested  this. 
But  there  will  be  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  that  will  exist  between 
Israel  and  the  United  States  for  the  first 
time.  It  will  be  fairly  far-reaching,  and 
it's  exactly  what  we  want  and  exactly 
what  Israel  wants,  as  well. 

We've  never  had  any  sort  of  propos- 
als on  either  side  that  there  be  an  actual 
defense  treaty  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. I  think  Israel  has  always 
cherished  the  concept  that  they  are 
perfectly  able  to  defend  themselves. 
And  I  think  that's  an  accurate  assess- 
ment. 

Q.  It  seems  that  accomplishing  this 
goal  was  important  to  you  person- 
ally, at  least  as  important  as  to  the 
parties  involved. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Why  was  that? 

A.  It's  important  to  my  country.  We 
have  a  political,  a  philosophical,  and  a 
moral  commitment  to  Israel — Israel's 
right  to  exist,  to  exist  permanently,  to 
exist  securely,  to  exist  in  prosperity, 
and  to  exist  in  peace.  And  this  is  not  a 
personal  —  this    is    not    merely    a 


intervieu^  for 
Egyptian  Television 


The  following  is  an  interview  Presi- 
dent Carter  held  with  Adih  Andrawes 
of  Egyptian  Television  on  March  22, 
1979:  it  was  taped  for  later  broadcast 
in  Egypt. ' 

Q.  You  have  committed  the  United 
States  to  be  a  full  partner  in  the 
peace  process  until  the  Palestinian 
problem  is  settled,  which  is  the  core 
of  the  Middle  East  conflict.  Would 
you  care  to  tell  us  what  are  your  im- 
mediate plans  for  the  Palestinian 
people? 

A.  The  immediate  plans  are  specified 
in  the  Camp  David  agreements  and, 
also,  in  the  terms  of  the  peace  treaty. 
They  involve — to  use  part  of  the 
language — the  right  of  the  Palestinians 
to  have  a  voice  in  the  determination  of 
their  own  future  and  to  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinians. 
This  is  encompassed  in  the  mutual 
agreement,   signed  by  Prime   Minister 


personal — belief  of  mine,  but  it's  a  be- 
lief that  accurately  represents  the 
overwhelming  portion  of  the  American 
people. 

Additionally,  we  have  a  strong 
friendship  with  Egypt.  And  obviously, 
it's  to  our  own  nation's  advantage  to 
have  our  two  friends — who  are  perma- 
nent neighbors — be  friends  with  each 
other. 

In  addition  to  the  personal  commit- 
ment that  I've  had,  I  think  I  accurately 
represent  what's  best  for  my  country 
and  the  aspirations  which  the  people  of 
my  country  have  cherished  for  many 
years. 

Q.  Finally,  during  the  ups  and 
downs  of  the  negotiations,  was  there 
any  moment  in  which  you  felt  de- 
spair or  thought  of  giving  up  your 
efforts? 

A.  I  despaired  many  times,  but  I 
never  reached  such  a  state  of  discour- 
agement that  1  thought  about  giving  up. 
I  was  always  determined  to  continue 
the  peace  process  as  long  as  I  hold  the 
office  of  President  of  the  United  States. 
And  if  there  should  evolve,  in  the  fu- 
ture, problems,  I'll  be  just  as  deter- 
mined to  work  for  peace  as  I  have  been 
in  the  past.  D 


'Text    from    Weekly    Compilation    of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  26.  1979. 


Begin,  President  Sadat,  and  myself: 
first  of  all — to  use  Prime  Minister  Be- 
gin's words — full  autonomy  for  the 
Palestinians  who  live  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  areas;  secondly,  the  termina- 
tion of  the  Israeli  military  government; 
third,  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  troops 
into  specified  security  locations. 

I  think  the  success  of  this  effort  will 
depend  to  a  substantial  degree  on  the 
willingness  of  the  Palestinians  and 
others  to  participate  in  the  negotiations 
themselves. 

Obviously,  President  Sadat  and  I  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  our  repre- 
sentatives can  do  a  substantial  amount 
for  the  Palestinians,  even  in  their  ab- 
sence. But  the  full  realization  of  their 
expectations  under  these  terms  would 
obviously  be  dependent  on  how  willing 
they  are  to  participate  themselves. 

Q.  The  Palestinian  people  feel  they 
have  been  victims  and  evicted  from 
their  homes;  the  United  States,  as  a 
superpower,  should  take  the  lead  in 
inviting  them  and  asking  them  to 
come  and  talk  with  the  Administra- 
tion on  their  needs  and  their  prob- 
lems and  so  on.  Could  this  be  envis- 
aged in  the  very  near  future? 

A.  Yes.  We  would  like  to  have  di- 
rect relations  with  the  Palestinians,  and 
we  will,  as  part  of  the  negotiating 
process  in  the  future.  The  Palestinians 
who  live  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank 
will  be  invited  and  encouraged  to  par- 
ticipate in  these  discussions,  the 
mayors  of  the  cities  and  other  repre- 
sentatives to  be  chosen  by  the 
Palestinians  themselves. 

We  have  a  problem  with  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization]. 
The  PLO  has  never  yet  been  willing  to 
accept  the  applicability  of  U.N.  Res- 
olution 242,  the  basis  for  the  Camp 
David  agreements  and,  I  think,  a 
document  that's  been  adopted  by  all  of 
the  Arab  nations  as  a  foundation  for 
future  progress.  The  PLO  has  never 
been  willing  to  accept  this  document. 
Also,  the  PLO  has  never  recognized 
Israel's  right  to  exist.  And  as  soon  as 
the  PLO  itself,  as  an  organization,  is 
willing  to  accept  these  bases,  then 
we'll  immediately  start  working  di- 
rectly with  that  organization  as  such. 

But  in  the  meantime,  the  Palestinians 
who  reside  in  the  West  Bank-Gaza 
area,  the  Palestinians  who  reside  in 
Egypt  and  Jordan,  and  even  others  who 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


don't  reside  in  either  of  these  coun- 
tries, if  they're  mutually  acceptable, 
will  participate  in  the  negotiations. 

Q.  But  wouldn't  it  be  useful  if  you, 
as  a  superpower,  took  the  first  step 
and  explained  to  the  Palestinian 
people  the  necessity  of  accepting 
Resolution  242  and  getting  into  the 
peace  process?  You  have  actually 
said  before,  and  invited  them  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  process,  even  accept- 
ing 242  with  reservations. 

A.  Yes,  and  I  hope  they  will  do  that. 

We  have  not  only  sent  representa- 
tives to  meet  with  Palestinian  leaders  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  areas — both 
from  the  Administration  and  the  State 
Department  and  also,  for  instance,  the 
Majority  Leader  of  the  Democratic 
Party  in  the  U.S.  Senate  met  with  a 
representative  group — but  when  I've 
met  with  President  Asad  of  Syria  and 
King  Hussein  of  Jordan  and  with  King 
Khalid  and  Crown  Prince  Fahd  in  Saudi 
Arabia,  1  have  encouraged  them  to  do 
everything  they  could,  possibly,  to  in- 
volve the  Palestinians  in  the  peace 
process. 

As  you  know,  there  are  threats 
made,  and  there  are  demonstrations  of 
terrorism  which  tend  to  prevent  the 
Palestinians  who  want  to  have  peace 
and  who  want  to  have  full  autonomy 
from  participating  in  these  processes. 
And  I  think  the  threats  of  terrorism  and 
the  hatred  that  presently  exists,  the 
threat  of  war,  the  threat  of  economic 
boycotts  and  punishment  against  Egypt 
are  certainly  not  conducive  to  realizing 
the  hopes  of  the  Palestinian  people. 

There  is  no  leader  in  the  Mideast 
who  has  done  more  to  open  up  an  op- 
portunity for  progress  and  the  restora- 
tion of  the  rights  of  the  Palestinians 
than  President  Sadat.  If  the  other  lead- 
ers in  Jordan  and  Syria  and  Saudi 
Arabia  would  do  half  as  much  as  Presi- 
dent Sadat  has  done,  then  these  hopes 
that  have  been  described  in  the  agree- 
ments reached  could  be  realized  very 
quickly. 

Q.  How  do  you  see  Prime  Minister 
Begin's  recent  statements  in  the 


Knesset  that  Israel  will  not  allow  a 
Palestinian  state  or  will  not  go  back 
to  the  border  of  1967?  Are  these 
useful  at  that  ^me? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  characterize  either 
the  statements  made  by  Prime  Minister 
Begin  or  Prime  Minister  Khalil,  and  so 
forth.  You  know,  we're  in  the  process 
now  of  completing  the  first  step  in  a 
long  process  that  will  lead  to  a  com- 
prehensive peace.  These  treaties, 
which  have  now  been  concluded  after 
laborious  negotiation,  will  just  be  a 
cornerstone,  as  President  Sadat  and  I 
have  said,  for  that  comprehensive 
peace  that  we  desire. 

We've  specified  a  negotiating  proc- 
ess. And  the  differences  that  presently 
exist  between,  say,  Egypt  and  Israel  on 
the  definition  of  full  autonomy  are  sub- 
stantial, substantial  differences.  But 
they're  not  nearly  as  wide  as  the  differ- 
ences that  existed  before  the  Camp 
David  agreements. 

It's  inevitable  that  both  nations,  both 
negotiating  parties,  will  express  their 
own  point  of  view  in  the  strongest  pos- 
sible terms  originally.  But  after  a 
while,  as  they  get  to  understand  one 
another  and  see  the  mutual  advantages 
of  agreement,  I  hope  and  expect  that 
both  positions  will  be  moderated  to 
some  degree  and  an  agreement  can  be 
reached.  And  we'll  add  our  good  of- 
fices as  a  negotiating  partner.  But  I 
can't  approve  specifically  what  one 
leader  or  another  says  at  the  beginning. 
We'll  be  there  to  try  to  help  them  reach 
agreement. 

Q.  Are  you  prepared  to  invest  as 
much  time  and  labor  as  you  have 
with  the  Egyptian-Israeli  peace 
treaty  on  the  second  phase? 

A.  I  would  hope  that  my  personal 
involvement  would  be  much  less  and 
that  the  negotiating  teams  could  make 
substantial  progress. 

Q.  Do  you  think  they  can,  without 
your  personal  intervention  from  time 
to  time  as  you've — 

A.  I  believe  so,  because  the  terms  of 
the  agreement  and  the  ultimate  goal  of 


the  agreement  have  now  been  spelled 
out  between  myself  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat.  And  this 
gives  kind  of  a  framework  or  a 
guideline  for  the  negotiators  in  the  fu- 
ture. We  didn't  have  any  such  docu- 
ment, we  didn't  have  any  agreements 
to  start  with  less  than  a  year  ago  when 
we  went  to  Camp  David.  And  I  think 
the  results  of  what  we've  done  now 
will  make  it  much  easier  in  the  future 
for  subordinates  to  negotiate  than  has 
been  the  case  in  the  past. 

Q.  Are  the  talks  going  to  be  in 
Washington? 

A.  I  would  presume  that  the  talks 
would  be  in  the  Middle  East.  I  hope 
that  3  months  from  now,  that  Egypt 
will  be  the  sovereign  power  over  El 
Arish  and  will  have  control  of  this  re- 
gion. And  it  could  be  that  that  beautiful 
seacoast  town,  as  a  part  of  Egypt,  with 
no  Israeli  occupying  forces,  somewhere 
like  that  might  be  a  good  place  to 
negotiate.  J 

I  never  had  a  chance  to  visit  El  Arishi|| 
or  Mt.  Sinai  and  so  forth,  but  I've  told 
President  Sadat  that  when  it's  under 
Egyptian  control,  I'd  like  to  come  back 
sometime. 

Q.  Very  good.  You  visited  Egypt 
and  you've  seen  the  Egyptian  people. 
What  impression  did  you  leave  with? 

A.  Perfect.  I  saw  people  who  wen 
friendly  toward  me,  who  supportei 
their  wonderful  leader,  Presiden 
Sadat,  and  who  demonstrated  to  thei 
world  that  they  genuinely  want  peace! 
and  an  end  to  hatred  and  war  and  deathil 
and  destruction;  a  people  who  want  ai 
better  life  in  the  future  and  who  now 
have  opened  up  an  opportunity  to 
benefit  from  a  new  relationship  not 
only  with  Israel  but  with  other  nations 
in  the  world. 

I  could  not  have  been  more  pleased 
or  favorably  impressed  than  I  was  in 
my  visit  to  Egypt.  It  was  a  great 
visit.  n 


'Text    from    Weekly    Compilation    of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  26,  1979. 


May  1979 


33 


THE  SECRETARY:        Ameriea'^s  Commitment  to 

Third  World  Development 


Address  before  the   Northwest  Re- 
gional Conference  on  the  Emerging 
International  Order  in  Seattle.    Wash- 
I  ington,  on  March  30.  1979.^ 

These  past  weeks  have  been  a  time 
to  deal  with  immediate  diplomatic  is- 
sues of  extraordinary  importance  to  our 
nation.  Tonight  I  want  to  speak  about 
an  issue  that  may  seem  less  immediate 
but  is  no  less  important:  our  approach 
to  the  economic  future  of  the  develop- 
'  ing  nations. 

Before  turning  to  our  strategy  toward 
the  North-South  dialogue  between  the 
industrial  and  developing  nations,  let 
me  first  talk  for  a  moment  about  why 
the  development  of  Third  World  coun- 
tries matters  to  us. 

Its  human  dimension  is  clear.  At 
least  '/2-billion  people  regularly  go 
hungry  in  a  world  of  plenty.  A  half- 
billion  is  an  abstract  number,  another 
statistic  among  many  and.  therefore, 
too  easily  dismissed.  But  when  we 
pause  to  picture  in  our  minds  how 
much  human  suffering  lies  behind  that 
single  statistic,  the  scope  of  our  moral 
challenge  is  evident.  The  continuation 
of  that  suffering  is  an  affront  to  the 
conscience  of  men  and  women  every- 
where. 

Americans  have  long  recognized  this 
challenge:  We  have  generously  shared 
our  resources  in  times  of  tragedy  and 
need  abroad,  from  the  great  hunger  in 
Ireland  in  1847,  to  the  Marshall  plan 
and  point  4  program  100  years  later. 
We  are  determined  today,  despite 
budgetary  stringency,  to  live  up  to  that 
historic  moral  responsibility. 

Our  humanitarian  commitment  is 
reinforced  by  the  recognition  that  it 
also  serves  our  national  self-interest  to 
assist  the  process  of  equitable  growth 
within  the  developing  nations.  We  need 
to  help  shape  an  international  economic 
system  which  will  support  and  stimu- 
late that  growth. 

Here  on  this  Pacific  rim,  you  know 
well  a  fact  that  is  true  for  our  entire 
nation:  that  your  prosperity  and  well- 
being  depend  on  the  increasing  pros- 
perity and  well-being  of  others 
throughout  the  world. 

Some  75%  of  the  Northwest's  wheat 
crop  is  sold  on  world  markets.  Fully 
one-third  of  western  Washington's 
forest  products  economy  is  dependent 
on  those  markets,  and  that  dependence 
is  increasing. 

One  dollar  in  eight  in  this  State's 


economy  comes  directly  from  interna- 
tional trade.  More  than  a  quarter  of  a 
million  jobs  in  Washington  and  Oregon 
alone  depend  on  exports. 

Much  of  this  trade,  as  you  know,  is 
with  developing  countries.  Four  of  the 
State's  10  biggest  export  customers  are 
developing  countries.  Seven  of  the 
State's  biggest  sources  of  imports — 
imports  without  which  your  economy 
could  not  function — are  developing 
countries. 

These  countries  of  the  Third  World 
are  increasingly  involved  in  our  daily 
lives.  We  know  how  oil  from  these 
countries  affects  us.  As  a  nation,  we 
also  get  more  than  50%  of  the  tin,  rub- 
ber, and  manganese  we  need  from  less 
developed  countries  and  substantial 
amounts  of  our  tungsten  and  cobalt. 
We  now  export  more  to  the  developing 
countries,  including  the  Organization 
of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries,  than 
to  the  Common  Market,  Japan,  and  the 
Communist  countries  combined-  For 
example,  almost  one-half  of  our  com- 
mercial aircraft  sales  abroad  are  to  de- 
veloping nations. 

So,  as  we  survey  and  address  ques- 
tions of  the  evolving  international  eco- 
nomic order,  we  do  not  do  so  on  some 
abstract  basis.  We  do  so  as  a  matter  of 


90%  of  this  increase  will  be  in  de- 
veloping countries.  And  perhaps  more 
troubling,  this  growth  seems  certain  to 
be  greatest  in  already  hard-pressed 
urban  centers.  Imagine,  if  you  can, 
what  current  projections  would  indi- 
cate: a  Mexico  City  with  32  million 
people;  a  Sao  Paulo  with  26  million; 
Calcutta,  Bombay,  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
Seoul,  Beijing,  and  Shanghai  each  with 
some  19  million  in  20  years  or  so. 

We  all  recognize  that  the  developing 
countries  themselves  bear  the  major 
burden  for  responding  to  these  chal- 
lenges. The  industrial  countries,  how- 
ever, can  play  a  crucial  role  in  assisting 
their  efforts.  Whether,  and  how,  we 
help  the  developing  nations  in  pursuing 
their  development  goals  is  one  of  the 
central  issues  of  our  time. 


U.S.  Approach 

Our  approach  to  development  in  the 
Third  World  is  based  on  four  funda- 
mental tenets. 

First,  we  are  committed  to  support- 
ing strong  and  equitable  growth  in  the 
developing  nations,  as  a  matter  of  our 
national  interest  as  well  as  our  national 
ideals.  And  we  recognize  that  at  times 


Our  humanitarian  commitment  is  reinforced  by  the  recognition  that  it 
also  serves  our  national  self-interest  to  assist  the  process  of  equitable 
growth  within  the  developing  tuitions. 


economic  self-interest  and,  for  some 
sectors  of  our  economy,  of  survival. 

The  participation  of  the  developing 
countries  is  also  essential  to  solving 
pressing  global  problems  that  will 
shape  the  character  of  our  future.  Inef- 
ficient and  wasteful  use  of  the  Earth's 
resources,  pollution  of  the  oceans  and 
atmosphere,  nuclear  proliferation,  un- 
checked arms  competition,  all  of  these 
involve  the  well-being  and  safety  of  the 
human  race.  None  can  be  solved  with- 
out the  involvement  of  the  developing 
nations. 

Most  countries  of  the  Third  World 
have  too  little  food  and  rapidly  growing 
populations.  We  face  the  prospect  of  a 
population  increase  in  the  final  quarter 
of  this  century  which  will  equal  the  en- 
tire growth  of  world  population  from 
the  birth  of  Christ  to   1950.  Roughly 


this  requires  facilitating  adjustment  in 
our  own  economy  in  ways  which  will 
support  economic  growth  in  the  Third 
World. 

Second,  we  are  committed  to  im- 
proving the  international  system  in 
ways  which  will  be  mutually  beneficial 
to  all,  which  respond  to  the  particular 
needs  of  the  developing  nations,  and 
which  accord  them  an  appropriate 
voice  in  decisions  that  affect  them.  By 
the  same  token,  we  believe  firmly  that 
as  nations  develop  and  grow  stronger, 
they  incur  increasing  responsibility  to 
contribute  to,  as  well  as  gain  from,  the 
international  economy. 

Third,  despite  the  economic  pres- 
sures we  and  other  industrial  nations 
now  face,  the  United  States  remains 
committed  to  increasing  transfers  of  re- 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


sources  from  the  richer  to  the  poorer 
nations. 

Let  me  emphasize,  however,  a 
fourth  point.  As  we  cooperate  with  de- 
veloping nations  in  seeking  useful 
changes  in  the  international  system, 
and  as  we  consider  the  level  and  nature 
of  our  resource  flows,  we  must  be  clear 
about  our  priorities.  Alterations  in  the 
international  system  and  resource 
transfers  among  nations  are  not  ends  in 
themselves.  They  are  a  means  to  the 
compelling  goal  of  development  within 
nations. 

We  cannot  spend  so  much  time  and 
energy  on  our  international  discussions 
of  the  roadmap  that  we  lose  sight  of  our 
destination.  The  destination — the  goal 
we  share — is  to  find  practical  ways  to 
have  an  appreciable  impact  on  the  lives 
of  people  around  the  world,  and  espe- 
cially on  the  lives  of  those  for  whom 
daily  survival  is  an  unanswered  ques- 
tion. 

We  envision  an  international  eco- 
nomic system  which  is  not  rigidly  di- 
vided into  northern  and  southern  blocs. 
We  seek  a  global  community  which 
furthers  the  well-being  of  all  countries, 
in  which  all  recognize  the  respon- 
sibilities of  each  to  the  others,  in  which 
the  richer  help  the  poorer  for  the  bene- 
fit of  all,  in  which  international  delib- 
erations are  focused  as  much  on  practi- 
cal ways  of  serving  human  needs  as  on 
levels  of  resource  flows  among  nations, 
and  in  which  every  nation  dedicates  it- 
self to  economic  justice  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic growth. 

We  can  help  build  such  a  system  in  a 
number  of  ways;  in  our  closer  coopera- 
tion with  the  other  industrial  nations, 
constantly  taking  account  of  the  effect 
on  each  other  of  our  domestic  deci- 
sions; in  encouraging  constructive  in- 
volvement of  Communist  nations  in 
the  promotion  of  a  healthy  global  eco- 
nomic system;  in  our  positive  partici- 
pation in  the  current  North-South 
dialogue,  and  in  our  search  for  practi- 
cal programs  that  can  best  promote 
Third  World  development. 

North-South  Negotiations 

Let  me  concentrate  today  on  the 
negotiations  that  are  taking  place  be- 
tween industrial  and  developing  nations 
and  the  practical  focus  on  development 
itself  that  we  hope  can  be  achieved. 

The  distinction  between  industrial 
and  developing  nations,  between  North 
and  South,  is  clearly  eroding.  The  in- 
dustrial and  agricultural  performance  of 
some  of  the  developing  nations  now 
surpasses  that  of  some  of  the  industrial 
countries.  But  negotiations  between 
North  and  South  remain  valuable. 
While  we  believe  a  broader  global 


community  is  emerging  in  which  rigid 
economic  blocs  no  longer  predominate, 
we  understand  the  importance  the  de- 
veloping countries  attach  to  the  Group 
of  77.  The  developing  nations  can  use 
their  cohesion  to  bring  greater  clarity 
and  purpose  to  our  negotiations. 

We  face  an  unusually  large  number 
of  important  international  conferences 
in  the  coming  18  months.  These  meet- 
ings provide  an  extraordinary  opportu- 
nity for  progress  on  issues  of  impor- 
tance to  developing  nations — and  to  us 
all. 


We  cannot  spend  so  much  time 
and  energy  on  our  international 
discussions  of  the  roadmap  that 
we  lose  sight  of  our  destination. 


As  we  prepare  for  them,  we  must 
first  recognize  the  progress  that  already 
has  been  made.  Last  week  in  Geneva, 
for  example,  agreement  was  reached  on 
most  of  the  basic  elements  of  a  com- 
mon fund  to  help  finance  international 
buffer  stocks  and  other  commodity  de- 
velopment measures.  This  marks  an 
important  milestone  in  a  process 
launched  at  the  fourth  U.N.  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development  in  1976. 
Over  the  past  IVz  years  of  intensive 
negotiations,  all  participants  moved 
from  their  original  positions  in  search 
of  common  ground.  The  negotiations 
now  move  into  a  more  technical  phase 
leading  to  the  drafting  of  articles  of 
agreement,  a  process  which  could  be 
concluded  as  early  as  the  end  of  this 
year. 

In  the  past  few  years,  industrial  na- 
tions and  international  institutions  have 
undertaken  a  number  of  other  important 
measures  of  concrete  benefit  to  the  de- 
veloping countries. 

•  Multilateral  and  bilateral  aid  flows 
have  increased  steadily  in  recent  years. 
Agreements  have  recently  been  or  will 
soon  be  concluded  to  enable  the  mul- 
tilateral development  banks  to  increase 
significantly,  in  real  terms,  their  lend- 
ing levels  over  the  next  3  to  4  years. 

•  Resources  available  through  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  for 
financing  balance-of-payments  dif- 
ficulties have  been  substantially 
increased — through  liberalization  of  the 
IMF  Compensatory  Financing  Facility; 
through  the  fourth  IMF  quota  increase; 
and  through  the  establishment  of  new 
IMF  facilities  including  the  trust  fund 
and  the  $IO-billion  Witteveen  facility. 

•  Consuming  countries  have  agreed 
to  the  concept  of  shared  responsibility 


with  producing  countries  for  financing 
buffer  stocks  to  stabilize  prices  in  j 
commodity  markets.  Agreements  for 
coffee  and  tin  were  renegotiated;  a  new 
agreement  for  sugar  has  been  reached; 
and  negotiations  on  rubber  and  a  new 
cocoa  agreement  are  underway.  Such 
agreements  can  have  important  anti- 
inflationary  benefits  for  our  own 
economy. 

•  All  Western  industrial  countries 
have  implemented  preferential  tariff 
systems  for  developing  countries.  The 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  will  pro- 
vide new  opportunities  for  all  nations 
to  increase  their  economic  welfare.  Just 
as  consumers  and  producers  will  bene- 
fit in  our  own  country,  so  they  can  gain 
in  the  developing  world. 

•  And  donor  countries  have  agreed 
to  the  concept  of  easing  or  eliminating 
the  official  debt  burden  of  the  poorest 
countries. 

The  United  States  has  played  a 
leading  role  in  many  of  these  and  other 
international  initiatives  and  we  have 
taken  national  measures  to  support 
them. 

•  We  have  increased  our  foreign 
economic  assistance  from  $3.7  billion 
in  fiscal  year  1975  to  $7  billion  in  fis- 
cal year  1979. 

•  In  the  commodities  field,  the 
United  States  is  a  member  of  the  tin 
agreement,  and  we  intend  to  make  a 
contribution  to  the  tin  buffer  stock.  We 
are  seeking  Senate  approval  to  join  the 
sugar  agreement,  and  we  hope  to  con- 
clude new  cocoa  and  rubber  agreements 
in  which  we  can  participate.  Last 
month  we  put  forth  ideas  on  a  price 
stabilization  agreement  for  copper. 

•  We  endorsed  the  concept  of  a 
common  fund,  and  we  worked  toward 
that  end  with  flexible  new  proposals 
on  the  major  issues  involved. 

•  On  trade,  the  United  States  has 
generally  resisted  protectionist  pres- 
sures. We  have  a  preferential  tariff 
system  for  the  developing  countries 
which  has  assisted  growth  in  their 
manufactured  exports. 

•  We  now  have  legislation  enabling 
us  to  waive  interest  payments  on  past 
development  loans  to  the  poorest 
countries  and  to  allow  principal  to  be 
paid  into  local  currency  accounts  to  be 
used  for  development  purposes. 

•  Almost  all  our  development  assist- 
ance to  the  poorest  countries  is  now  in 
grant  form. 

•  We  have  facilitated  access  to  the 
technology  that  is  in  the  public  domain, 
and  we  have  helped  developing  coun- 
tries draw  upon  our  advanced 
technologies — using  satellites,  for 
example,  to  develop  their  natural  re- 
sources and  improve  their  internal 
communications. 


May  1979 

•  The  President  is  proposing  the  cre- 
ation of  an  international  development 
cooperation  administration  which 
would  consolidate  or  improve  coor- 
dination among  our  bilateral  and 
multilateral  development  assistance 
programs. 

In  short,  there  has  been  real  prog- 
ress. But  far  more  remains  to  be  done 
in  concluding  agreements  to  stabilize 
commodity  markets,  bringing  the  de- 
veloping nations  more  fully  into  the 
world  trading  system  and  implementing 
the  new  codes  and  tariff  reductions  of 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations, 
facilitating  the  adjustment  of  domestic 
economies  to  changing  patterns  of 
world  trade,  arriving  at  a  common  un- 
derstanding of  the  responsibilities  of 
both  governments  and  corporations  to 
create  a  better  environment  for  interna- 
tional investment  and  the  flow  of  tech- 
nology, assuring  adequate  assistance  to 
nations  facing  acute  financial  difficul- 
ties, strengthening  the  scientific  and 
technological  capabilities  of  developing 
countries,  increasing  aid  flows  to 
countries  which  need  it  most  and  can 
use  it  effectively,  and  finding  ways  to 
assure  an  appropriate  role  for  develop- 
ing countries  in  international  economic 
institutions. 

This  is  a  heavy  agenda.  And  these 
are  difficult  times  in  which  to  address 
it,  since  most  of  the  industrial  nations 
face  difficult  domestic  economic  chal- 
lenges. 

In  a  period  of  fiscal  austerity,  there 
is  a  danger,  which  we  must  frankly  ad- 
dress, that  negotiations  between  North 
and  South  could  return  to  the  rancor  of 
earlier  years.  This  will  happen  if  each 
nation  becomes  so  concerned  with  its 
own  problems  that  it  forgets  the  essen- 
tial reality  of  an  interdependent  age: 
that  each  nation  can  surmount  its  own 
difficulties  only  if  it  understands  and 
helps  resolve  the  difficulties  of  others 
as  well. 

The  industrial  nations  must  maintain 
their  commitment  to  the  well-being  of 
the  developing  nations.  The  developing 
nations  must  recognize  that  making 
demands  which  the  industrial  nations 
cannot  meet  will  only  produce  interna- 
tional acrimony,  not  progress.  And  the 
oil-producing  nations  must  recognize 
their  special  responsibilities  for  the 
health  of  the  global  economy  and  their 
fundamental  stake  in  its  continued 
vitality. 

A  Practical  Focus 

This  brings  me  to  a  central  point. 
Our  progress  in  North-South 
negotiations — our  progress  toward  a 
more  equitable  and  healthy  new  inter- 
national economic  order — will  turn  on 


our  common  ability  to  avoid  endless 
debates  on  sterile  texts  and  to  focus  in- 
stead on  concrete  development  prob- 
lems which  we  can  tackle  together  and 
which  directly  affect  people's  lives. 

Only  by  focusing  on  practical  ways 
to  meet  human  needs  can  we  remain 
clear  about  our  goals  and  clear  in  ex- 
plaining them  to  our  peoples.  I  know 
that  the  American  people  will  never  be 
convinced  that  there  is  an  inherent  value 
only  in  resource  flows  among  nations. 
They  want  to  know,  and  have  a  right  to 
know,  how  their  taxes  are  being  used  to 
better  the  lives  of  people  abroad. 

It  is  this  practical — and  human — 
focus  which  compels  us  to  concentrate 
our  aid  on  programs  that  directly  im- 
prove the  lives  of  poorer  people 
abroad.  We  believe  it  is  important  that 
we  concentrate  our  resources  on  pro- 
grams which  most  directly  contribute 
not  only  to  growth  but  also  to  equity  in 
those  countries  which  receive  our  aid. 

This  approach  is  not  only  this  Ad- 
ministration's policy.  It  has  been  ex- 
pressed by  the  Congress  in  the  1973 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  and  the  Inter- 
national Development  and  Food  Assist- 
ance Act  of  1978.  And  it  applies  not 
only  to  our  bilateral  aid  programs  but 
also  to  those  programs  we  support  in 
the  multilateral  development  institu- 
tions. 

Growth  without  equity  can  lead  to  a 
situation  in  which  a  growing  economic 
pie  is  cut  into  ever  more  unequal 
pieces.  Equity  without  growth  can  lead 
to  a  situation  where  a  shrinking  eco- 
nomic pie  is  cut  into  equal  but  ever 
smaller  pieces.  Neither  situation  can 
lead  to  long-term  political  or  economic 


35 


•  An  ample  supply  of  energy  at  rea- 
sonable prices  is  essential  to  economic 
advancement.  It  is  also  a  key  to  our 
own  prosperity. 

•  Adequate  food  and  good  health  are 
basic  to  human  survival  and  productiv- 
ity. 

•  And  the  ability  of  people  and  in- 
stitutions in  the  developing  countries  to 
obtain,  develop,  adapt,  and  apply  tech- 
nology is  critical  to  most  development 
problems. 

Let  me  illustrate  these  priorities 
today  by  describing  our  current  efforts 
and  future  plans  in  two  areas — energy 
and  food.  In  the  coming  months  and  in 
other  forums  such  as  the  U.N.  Confer- 
ence on  Science  and  Technology  for 
Development  and  the  World  Health  As- 
sembly, we  will  be  addressing  the 
others  as  well. 


Energy 

No  issue  we  face  today  more  clearly 
demonstrates  the  interests  we  share 
with  the  people  of  the  developing 
world  than  energy.  The  commuter 
buying  gasoline  in  Seattle  and  the 
peasant  farmer  buying  kerosene  near 
Khartoum  both  face  the  harsh  reality  of 
rising  world  petroleum  prices.  Gov- 
ernments in  the  richest  countries  and 
those  in  the  poorest  must  deal  with  the 
impact  of  higher  energy  costs  and  ris- 
ing energy  demand  on  their  national 
economies. 

Let  me  be  frank.  The  worldwide 
energy  situation,  already  serious,  is 
likely  to  get  worse  before  it  gets  better. 
For  the  foreseeable  future,  in  the  ab- 


.  .  .  while  we  will  continue  to  work  with  the  developing  countries  in 
addressing  the  future  of  the  international  political  and  economic  sys- 
tem, we  intend  increasingly  to  concentrate  on  specific  development 
goals  .... 


health.  Both  growth  and  equity  are 
necessary. 

A  practical  focus  also  requires  that 
we  be  clear  about  our  priorities.  Thus 
while  we  will  continue  to  work  with  the 
developing  countries  in  addressing  the 
future  of  the  international  political  and 
economic  system,  we  intend  increas- 
ingly to  concentrate  on  specific  de- 
velopment goals:  energy,  food,  health, 
and  increasing  the  capacity  of  the  de- 
veloping countries  to  obtain  and  apply 
the  knowledge  and  technology  they 
need. 

There  is  good  reason  for  seeking 
international  emphasis  on  each  of  these 
areas: 


sence  of  substantial  new  efforts, 
worldwide  growth  in  energy  demand 
will  continue  to  outpace  worldwide 
growth  in  energy  production. 

We  must  do  what  is  necessary  in  our 
own  country  to  restrain  consumption 
and  increase  domestic  production.  But 
we  cannot  solve  the  energy  problem  by 
what  we  do  here  alone.  It  is  a  global 
challenge. 

Thus,  we  have  a  direct  interest  in 
helping  developing  countries  devise 
their  own  effective  energy  policies — 
helping  them  identify  their  energy  re- 
sources, determine  their  current  and 
future  energy  demand,  identify  the 
technology  they  need,  and  obtain  the 


36 


necessary  financing.  Let  me  tell  you 
what  we  are  already  doing  in  each  of 
these  areas. 

We  are  now  helping  several  de- 
veloping countries  survey  their  national 
energy  resources,  define  their  future 
energy  needs,  and  construct  alternative 
energy  strategies. 

With  our  strong  support,  the  World 
Bank  is  significantly  expanding  its 
program  to  help  developing  countries 
finance  further  exploration  and  de- 
velopment of  fossil  fuels.  The  Bank 
envisages  loans  amounting  to  as  much 
as  $3  billion  over  the  next  5  years. 

We  are  devoting  substantial  financial 
resources  to  research  on  renewable 
energy  sources.  In  addition  to  private 
financing,  the  Department  of  Energy 
has  budgeted  over  $600  million  this 
year  to  study,  develop,  and  demon- 
strate renewable  energy  technology. 
We  have  asked  the  Congress  for  more 
than  $700  million  for  these  efforts  next 
year.  These  programs  can  lead  to  tech- 
nological developments  that  directly 
benefit  the  developing  nations. 

The  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (AID)  has  requested  $42 
million  in  FY  1980  for  the  actual  appli- 
cation of  renewable  energy  technol- 
ogies in  developing  countries. 

We  have  accelerated  our  training  and 
technical    assistance    programs    for 


conventional  power  projects.  And  the 
other  development  banks  also  are  ac- 
tive in  this  area. 

But  we  must  and  will  do  more. 


•  We  will  respond  positively  to  ad- 
ditional requests  from  developing  na- 
tions for  help  in  evaluating  their  energy 
resources,  needs,  and  strategies. 

•  We  will  encourage  the  regional 
development  banks  to  expand  their 
energy  programs  and  to  consider  new 
approaches  to  encourage  further  private 
capital  flows  into  mineral  and  energy 
development  in  their  regions. 

•  President  Carter  and  other  heads  of 
state  at  the  Bonn  economic  summit  last 
July  pledged  to  increase  assistance  for 
harnessing  the  vast  energy  potential  of 
the  Sun,  the  wind,  the  oceans,  and 
other  renewable  resources.  We  are  now 
in  the  process  of  formulating  a  coordi- 
nated effort  which  will  be  discussed  at 
the  Tokyo  summit  in  June. 

•  With  strong  U.S.  backing,  the 
United  Nations  will  hold  a  World 
Conference  on  New  and  Renewable 
Energy  in  1981.  We  intend  to  play  an 
active  role  in  that  effort. 

•  We  will  increase  our  support  for 
research,  development,  and  training 
efforts  of  national  and  regional  energy 
institutions  in  developing  countries. 


We  believe  it  is  important  that  we  concentrate  our  resources  on  pro- 
grams which  most  directly  contribute  not  only  to  growth  but  also  to 
equity  in  those  countries  which  receive  our  aid. 


energy  professionals  and  institutions  in 
the  developing  countries.  We  have 
proposed  a  new  institute  for  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation,  which 
would  become  an  important  element  of 
our  foreign  assistance  program.  Energy 
will  be  a  major  focus  of  the  work  of  the 
institute  as  it  both  helps  strengthen  sci- 
entific and  technological  capacities  in 
developing  countries  and  also  identifies 
domestic  American  research  relevant  to 
development  abroad. 

And  we  are  providing  substantial 
direct  and  indirect  financial  assistance 
to  help  developing  countries  acquire 
the  energy  technology  they  need.  The 
Export-Import  Bank  authorized  ap- 
proximately $2  billion  in  energy- 
related  loans  and  guarantees  to  de- 
veloping countries  in  fiscal  year  1978. 
This  has  produced  more  than  $3  billion 
in  U.S.  exports  of  energy  equipment. 
The  World  Bank,  to  which  we  are  the 
largest  contributor,  has  already  pro- 
vided about  $10  billion  for  financing  of 


We  will  encourage  other  nations  to  join 
us  in  this  effort. 

•  We  will  also  work  with  other  na- 
tions to  determine  whether  it  would  be 
useful  to  supplement  the  work  of  such 
institutions.  Together  we  will  seek  to 
identify  gaps  in  current  efforts,  and 
ways  to  fill  them,  including  the  possi- 
ble establishment  of  new  institutions. 
For  example,  international  research 
centers — which  enjoy  support  from  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries,  pri- 
vate organizations,  and  multilateral 
institutions — have  played  a  major  role 
in  addressing  developing  country  ag- 
ricultural problems.  If,  as  a  result  of 
discussions  with  our  colleagues  in  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries, 
there  is  agreement  that  this  approach 
would  be  appropriate  in  the  field  of 
energy,  the  United  States  would  sup- 
port such  international  energy  centers. 

•  We  must  assure  that  as  new  re- 
newable energy  technology  becomes 
relatively  less  expensive,   adequate 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

financing  is  available  for  the  develop- 
ing countries  to  acquire  it.  We  will  ask   | 
the  World  Bank  to  undertake  a  thor- 
ough review  of  this  question. 

These  steps  and  others  we  will  be 
discussing  with  developed  and  de- 
veloping countries  in  the  months  ahead 
can  help  assure  that  high  energy  costs 
do  not  undermine  economic  growth  and 
a  steadily  improving  way  of  life  for 
those  who  live  in  the  developing  world. 

Our  future  economic  well-being  and 
theirs  carries  an  inescapable  impera- 
tive: We  must  work  together  to  expand 
the  availability  of  energy  for  developed^ 
and  developing  countries  alike.  There 
is  no  promise  for  any  of  us  in  an  inten- 
sifying competition  for  limited  energy 
supplies. 


Food 

Let  me  turn  to  a  second  development 
priority  which  we  intend  to  focus  on  in 
the  months  ahead — the  stark  fact  that 
one  out  of  every  five  of  our  fellow 
human  beings  is  sick  or  weak  or  hungry 
because  he  or  she  simply  does  not  have 
enough  to  eat. 

In  one  respect,  this  is  a  question  of 
the  equity  with  which  economic  bene- 
fits are  distributed.  Millions  are  too 
poor  to  buy  food,  even  when  it  is  avail- 
able. As  I  have  stressed,  our  overall 
development  efforts  must  address  this 
fundamental  issue. 

But  it  is  also  clear  that  in  many  de- 
veloping countries,  food  production  is 
not  keeping  pace  with  population 
growth.  The  long-range  prospects  point 
to  even  greater  food  deficits  in  de- 
veloping countries  in  the  years  ahead. 
Not  only  will  we  approach  the  limits  of 
new  land  to  cultivate,  but  soil  erosion, 
desert  encroachment,  and  simple  over- 
use are  robbing  the  world's  historic 
breadbaskets  of  their  productive  capac- 
ity because  of  inadequate  land  and  re- 
source management  practices. 

The  United  States  is  already  doing  a 
great  deal  to  increase  the  availability  of 
food  in  the  developing  world.  Roughly 
half  of  our  bilateral  economic  de- 
velopment assistance — approximately 
$600  million  this  year — is  devoted  to 
agriculture  and  rural  development.  We 
provide  roughly  two-thirds  of  the 
world's  concessionary  food  assistance. 
Our  contribution  this  year  will  amount 
to  $1.4  billion.  And  we  have  contrib- 
uted $200  million  to  the  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development. 

But,  as  with  energy,  we  must  and 
will  do  more.  Last  September  the 
President  established  a  Commission  on 
World  Hunger.  The  commission  will 
report  this  summer  on  concrete  propos- 


May  1979 


37 


uls  for  additional  efforts  in  dealing  with 
the  world  food  problem. 

In  the  meantime,  we  are  moving 
ahead  in  several  areas.  We  continue  to 
believe  that  an  effective  International 
Wheat  Agreement,  with  an  expanded 
Food  Aid  Convention,  would  help 
stabilize  world  wheat  prices  and 
strengthen  world  food  security.  We  are 
disappointed  that  after  more  than  2 
years  of  effort,  a  workable  interna- 
tional arrangement  could  not  be 
achieved  at  last  month's  negotiations. 
If  prospects  improve  for  reaching  an 
accord,  we  are  prepared  to  resume 
these  negotiations. 

Under  the  existing  Food  Aid  Con- 
vention, we  are  committed  to  providing 
a  minimum  of  1 .9  million  tons  of  food 
assistance  annually.  We  will  more  than 
double  that  minimum  commitment,  re- 
gardless of  whether  a  new  Food  Aid 
Convention  is  successfully  negotiated. 
And  we  are  strongly  encouraging  other 
current  and  potential  donors  to  do  the 
same. 

To  assure  that  our  food  aid  commit- 
ments can  be  met  even  during  periods 
of  tight  supply,  we  are  seeking  to  es- 
tablish a  special  government-held 
wheat  reserve  which  would  add  to  food 
security  for  food-deficit  countries. 

The  agricultural  research  break- 
throughs of  the  past  decade  and  a  half 
have  been  of  enormous  benefit  to  the 
developing  world — with  improved 
plant  strains,  better  animal  breeds,  and 
more  efficient  farming  techniques. 
Much  of  this  research  has  concentrated 
on  cereal  crops  and  cattle.  While  con- 
tinuing research  in  these  areas,  we 
must  now  devote  greater  attention  to 
some  of  the  traditional  crops  and  ani- 
mals raised  by  poor  farmers  on  margi- 
nal lands  and  to  less  widely  grown 
crops  that  hold  promise  as  new  sources 
of  food  and  income.  These  will  be 
major  agricultural  priorities  of  the  in- 
stitute for  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation.  Other  government  agen- 
cies will  also  increase  their  support  for 
such  research. 

We  must  also  do  more  to  prevent  the 
tragic  loss  of  10-20%  of  the  food 
which  is  produced  each  year  in  the  de- 
veloping countries.  More  food  is  lost  to 
rodents,  insects,  and  spoilage  in  the 
developing  world  than  all  the  food  aid 
to  the  developing  world  combined.  We 
are  already  a  major  contributor  to  the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization's 
post-harvest  loss  fund,  and  both  AID 
and  the  new  institute  will  be  devoting 
increasing  resources  to  finding  better 
ways  to  assure  that  what  people  toil  to 
produce  is  available  to  sustain  them. 

Finally,  we  intend  to  channel  our 
food  and  development  assistance  in- 


Question'and-Anstver  Session 
FoUowing  Seattle  Address 


Q.  You  spoke  about  energy.  What 
about  domestic  conservation? 

A.  Domestic  conservation  is  a  matter 
of  the  utmost  importance  and  in 
dwelling  upon  energy  and  food,  two  of 
the  items  that  are  of  special  importance 
to  me  in  my  responsibility,  I  do  not 
want  in  any  way  to  lessen  the  impor- 
tance that  should  be  attached  to 
domestic  conservation. 

Q.  The  present  international  in- 
stitutions in  trade  and  flnance  don't 
appear  to  be  functioning  very  well 
for  any  group  of  countries  now-a- 
days.  Many  developing  countries  are 
asking  that  developed,  industrialized 
countries  join  them  in  building  the 
foundations  for  a  new  Havana  con- 
ference, one  for  the  1980's,  which 
would  restructure  international 
commodity,  trade,  and  financial  af- 
fairs to  reflect  a  change  in  structure 
not  only  of  the  industrialized  nations. 


but  the  Socialist  countries  and  de- 
veloping nations  as  well. 

This  objective  of  the  developing 
countries  appears  to  be  a  centerpiece 
of  the  UNCTAD  [U.N.  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development]  agenda, 
the  UNCTAD  V  meeting  being  one  of 
the  conferences  of  the  next  18  months 
to  which  you  referred.  Could  you 
give  the  U.S.  position  on  this  par- 
ticular UNCTAD  V  agenda  item? 

A.  The  question  was  addressed  to 
dealing  with  the  structural  changes 
which  will  be  one  of  the  subjects  which 
will  be  coming  up  at  the  forthcoming 
UNCTAD  conference.  The  question  of 
structural  change  is,  obviously,  a 
question  of  great  importance,  and  one 
which  should  be  addressed  and  should 
be  discussed  fully  in  all  of  its  aspects. 
However,  as  I  tried  to  make  clear  to- 
night, I  think  that  we  should  try  and 


creasingly  to  countries  which  are 
seeking  to  adopt  domestic  policies 
which  encourage  their  own  food  pro- 
duction and  equitable  distribution  and 
promote  better'  use  of  water  and  land 
resources.  We  intend  to  participate  ac- 
tively in  the  upcoming  World  Confer- 
ence on  Agrarian  Reform  and  Rural 
Development  which  will  be  addressing 
these  essential  questions. 

Conclusion 

Programs  such  as  those  I  have  men- 
tioned today  are  no  cure-all.  But  they 
come  to  grips  with  the  most  pressing 
problems  of  the  developing  countries, 
and  they  will  make  a  difference  where 
it  counts  most — in  the  daily  lives  of 
people.  They  will  insure  that  more 
people  in  the  developing  countries  will 
have  enough  food  to  eat,  that  fewer 
children  will  die  in  infancy,  that  there 
is  sufficient  energy  to  power  more  irri- 
gation pumps  and  to  bring  more  heat 
and  light  to  distant  villages. 

The  resources  we  can  bring  to  bear 
may  seem  small  in  comparison  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  problems  which  must 
be  solved.  But  let  us  remember  that  de- 
velopment is  a  long-term  process.  Our 
hopes  for  the  coming  decades  are  lifted 
by  the  fact  that  people  are  better  off  in 
most  developing  countries  today  than 
they  were  two  decades  ago. 


Life  expectancy  in  the  developing 
world  in  the  past  two  decades  has 
jumped  from  42  to  over  50,  an  increase 
which  took  the  industrial  nations  a 
century  to  accomplish.  Adult  literacy 
in  the  developing  world  has  jumped 
from  one-third  in  1950  to  over  one- 
half.  In  the  past  quarter  of  a  century, 
per  capita  income  in  the  developing 
countries  grew  on  the  average  of  al- 
most 3%  a  year.  This  is  about  50% 
better  than  historical  growth  rates  in 
Western  nations  during  their  indus- 
trialization. 

This  is  not  cause  to  be  sanguine;  but 
it  is  reason  to  be  confident  that  practi- 
cal progress  can  be  made.  But  only  if: 

•  We  and  the  other  industrial  coun- 
tries recognize  that  we  share  a  common 
destiny  with  the  developing  world; 

•  They,  the  developing  nations,  rec- 
ognize their  responsibilities  both  within 
the  international  system  and  for  equity 
as  well  as  growth  in  their  own 
societies;  and 

•  All  of  us,  together,  recognize  the 
wisdom  of  a  great  man  the  world  has 
now  lost — Jean  Monnet.  "We  must  put 
our  problems  on  one  side  of  the  table," 
Monnet  said,  "and  all  of  us  on  the 
other."  D 


Press  release  88. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


concentrate  on  those  matters  where  we 
can  bring  about  practical  results  which 
will  have  an  immediate  or  rapid  effect 
upon  improving  the  well-being  and  the 
lives  of  people  in  the  developing  coun- 
tries; and  that  is  why  I  have  stressed 
tonight  the  emphasis  which  the  United 
States  places  on  the  particular  items 
which  I  singled  out. 

There  are  many  other  items  which 
will  be  coming  up  at  the  UNCTAD 
conference  which  are  of  great  impor- 
tance. One  of  those  in  which  I  have 
particular  interest  is  that  of  the  com- 
mon fund.  The  Minister  [Manuel  Perez 
Guerrero,  former  Minister  of  State  for 
International  Economic  Affairs  of  Ven- 
ezuela] and  I  have  talked  about  this  and 
worked  for  it  over  the  years.  I  am 
pleased  to  say  that  I  think  we  have  re- 
cently made  real  progress  in  arriving  at 
an  agreement  on  the  framework  for  the 
common  fund.  This,  I  think,  is  in  a 
sense,  one  of  the  structural  changes 
that  can  and  will  make  a  substantial 
difference. 

So,  in  sum,  to  answer  your  question, 
I  recognize  the  importance  of  address- 
ing the  question  of  structural  changes, 
but  insofar  as  we  are  concerned,  I 
would  like  to  see  us,  in  so  doing,  not 
lose  sight  of  these  specific  items  where 
I  think  we  can  have  an  immediate  and 
practical  effect. 

Q.  You  said  in  your  speech  that 
you  wanted  to  make  sure  that  dis- 
tribution of  American  foreign  aid  is 
more  widespread  than  it  has  been  in 
the  past,  that  it  benefit  more  of  the 
population  of  each  nation.  How  do 
you  intend  to  do  that  without  inter- 
fering with  domestic  governments? 

A.  This  is  a  difficult  problem.  We 
do  not  wish  to  interfere  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  the  countries  involved.  How- 
ever, I  think  we  can  make  it  very  clear 
to  the  countries  involved  that  we  be- 
lieve that  it  is  important  not  only  that 


the  aid  be  received  but  that  it  be  equi- 
tably distributed  among  the  people  of 
the  country  involved  so  that  it  really 
does  reach  the  people  who  need  it. 

This  has  been  the  structure  of  the 
program  which  has  been  developed  by 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Our 
Congress  has  said  that  our  aid  should 
go  to  the  poor  people  of  the  countries 
of  the  world.  That  does  not  mean  that  it 
can  go  only  to  the  poorest  countries, 
because  there  are  poor  people  in  coun- 
tries which  are  at  the  median  level  or 
even  some  at  the  more  advanced  level. 
And  we,  therefore,  should  be  careful 
that  we  see  that  it  goes  to  poor  people 
wherever  they  may  be. 

Q.  Forty  miles  away  in  Bangor, 
Washington,  there  is  a  Trident  sub- 
marine base,  and  I  was  wondering 
how  you  reconcile  the  development  of 
a  new  submarine,  with  broader  and 
more  powerful  weapons  than  ever 
before,  with  your  concerted  efforts  at 
reducing  arms  around  the  world. 

A.  I'm  very  happy  to  answer  that 
question.  The  question  was,  how  do  I 
reconcile  the  development  of  the  Tri- 
dent submarine  and  the  costs  that  are 
involved  in  the  production  of  that  new 
system  with  the  efforts  for  arms  con- 
trol. 

I  think  in  order  to  have  peace,  that 
one  has  to  have  a  combination  of 
strength  coupled  with  arms  control.  We 
are  not  going  to  reach  the  millennium 
overnight,  and,  therefore,  we  must  de- 
velop the  necessary  forces  to  protect 
our  nation — the  values  for  which  we 
stand — and  those  of  our  friends  and  al- 
lies. Yet,  at  the  same  time,  we  must 
work  unceasingly  to  try  and  bring 
along,  hand-in-hand  with  that,  effec- 
tive arms  control.  And  that  is  the  rea- 
son we  have  been  working  so  hard  on 
so  many  arms  control  measures. 

I  have  spent  more  time,  I  can  assure 
you,  working  to  achieve  a  new  SALT 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 


agreement  than  on  any  other  item,  with 
the  exception  of  seeking  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  I  do  it  because  I,  my 
President,  and  our  government  believe 
that  arms  control,  coupled  with 
strength,  is  in  the  interest  of  our  na- 
tion, is  in  the  interest  of  peace  in  the 
world,  and  that  we  must  persevere  as 
long  as  we  have  to  to  bring  about  that 
result. 

Q.  You  talk  about  the  importance 
of  pledging  additional  aid  to  coun- 
tries as  far  as  energy  and  food  supply 
goes,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  you 
don't  stress  the  importance  of 
educating  the  people  of  these  under-- 
developed  countries  as  to  their  ob- 
jectives and  their  problems  that  they 
need  to  overcome — and  educating 
them  insofar  as  showing  them  ways 
to  enable  them  to  be  self-sufficient  so 
they  won't,  in  the  future,  have  to  de- 
pend on  the  powerful  nations  of  the 
world. 

A.  The  question  was  why  do  I  seem 
to  stress  such  things  as  energy,  food, 
and  the  like  and  not  talk  more  about 
educating  people  so  that  they  can  play 
a  more  active  and  a  fuller  role  in  the 
developing  of  their  institutions  in  their 
own  life. 

This,  in  my  judgment,  is  something 
for  each  of  the  countries  to  do  for  it- 
self. This  is  of  vital  importance,  but  it 
is  individualistic  and  each  country  must 
develop  in  its  own  way.  We  should  not 
be  the  ones  to  be  dictating  how  this 
should  be  done.  However,  I  think  that 
if  we  can  help  by  educational  programs 
such  as  we  have — by  exchange  fellow- 
ships and  programs  like  that — that  this 
is  money  very,  very  well  spent  and 
very  important  for  us.  So  that  by  con- 
centrating on  what  I  have  concentrated 
on  tonight,  I,  again,  don't  want  to 
underestimate  the  importance  of  the 
matter  which  you  raised.  D 


Press  release  88 A . 


May  1979 


39 


interview  on 
''Face  the  iVarioti" 


Secretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
CBS's  "Face  the  Nation"  on  March 
18.  1979.  by  George  Herman.  CBS 
News  (moderator):  Marvin  Kalh.  .CBS 
diplomatic  correspondent:  and  Eleanor 
Clift,  White  House  correspondent  for 
Newsweek. ' 

Q.  Yasir  Arafat  [Chairman, 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
Executive  Committee]  has  been  in 
Jordan  and  is  going  to  Saudi  Arabia 
trying  to  shift  the  balance  one  way. 
Our  own  mission,  headed  by  [the 
President's  national  security  adviser] 
Mr.  Brzezinski  and  [Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff]  General  Jones, 
has  been  in  Saudi  Arabia  and  is 
going  to  Jordan  to  shift  the  balance 
the  other  way.  Who  is  winning?  Have 
we  won  anything  that  we  really  need, 
for  example,  from  Saudi  Arabia  in 
these  talks? 

A.  It's  too  early  to  say  yet  what  will 
come  out  of  the  discussions  that  Pro- 
fessor Brzezinski  and  [Deputy  Secre- 
tary of  State]  Warren  Christopher  and 
David  Jones  are  having  there.  We've 
made  it  very  clear  to  the  Saudi  Arabian 
Government  and  to  our  friends  in  the 
area  that  we  consider  the  peace  treaty 
to  be  the  cornerstone  of  progress  to- 
ward a  comprehensive  peace.  I  think 
they  understand  this  very  clearly. 
They're  good  and  close  friends,  we 
share  the  same  objective  of  a  stable  and 
moderate  Middle  Eastern  region,  and 
we  will  continue  to  work  together  to- 
ward that  end. 

As  to  the  specifics  of  what  action 
they  will  or  will  not  take  on  the  treaty 
itself,  we'll  have  to  wait  and  see. 

Q.  You  say  it  is  still  too  early  to 
tell  which  way  Saudi  Arabia — which, 
I  take  it,  is  the  principal  concern  of 
the  U.S.  policy  at  this  moment — too 
early  to  tell  which  way  they're  going. 
But  a  front-page  editorial  in  an  in- 
fluential Saudi  newspaper  says  the 
U.S.  mission  is  doomed  to  failure.  Do 
you  take  that  lightly,  or  do  you  take 
it  seriously? 

A.  I  would  take  it  seriously.  I  do  not 
think  that  they  put  those  kind  of  state- 
ments in  a  government  paper  in  less  than 
a  serious  vein.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
think  that  these  issues  are  of  such  criti- 
cal importance  that  it  will  take  time  for 
them  to  reflect  on  what  actions  will  or 
will  not  be  taken  as  the  facts  unfold  in 
the  future. 


Q.  This  peace  treaty,  at  least  in 
the  short  term,  seems  to  be  produc- 
ing more  turmoil  than  it  is  reducing. 
How  do  you  reverse  that  tide?  How 
can  it  be  reversed? 

A.  First  let  me  say  that  the  peace 
treaty,  in  my  judgment,  is  a  momen- 
tous step.  For  30  years  the  countries  of 
the  region  have  been  searching  for 
peace.  At  long  last,  as  a  result  of  the 
mission  of  the  President  and  of  the  far- 
sighted  and  courageous  action  of  the 
leaders  of  these  two  countries,  we  now 
are  on  the  threshold  of  signing  a  peace 
treaty. 

This  could  not  have  been  possible, 
let  me  say,  without  the  work  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  and 
without  the  presence  of  the  United 
States,  because  it  was  absolutely  es- 
sential that  there  be  a  trusted  friend 
who  could  sit  with  the  parties  and, 
when  they  came  to  problems  they  could 
not  resolve,  come  forward  with 
suggestions  that  could  bridge  these 
gaps. 

Now  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  proc- 
ess; this  is  merely  the  beginning  of  the 
process.  The  process  leads  toward  the 
end  of  a  comprehensive  peace  treaty. 

The  next  step  along  the  road  toward 
a  comprehensive  peace  treaty  will  be 
dealing  with  the  questions  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza — the  Palestinian  is- 
sues, which  are  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance. Those  issues,  as  they  are  de- 
bated and  discussed  in  the  negotiations, 
will  be  watched  very  carefully  by  the 
people  in  the  area,  both  the  Pales- 
tinians and  the  other  nations.  If  prog- 
ress is  made  in  those  very  difficult 
negotiations,  I  think  the  attitudes  can 
begin  to  change.  I  think  a  momentum 
will  take  place  that  can  begin  to  move 
this,  because  this,  in  my  judgment,  is 
the  only  road  to  peace. 

All  the  other  alternatives  at  this  time 
are  really  maintenance  of  the  status 
quo.  This  has  the  objective  of  moving 
forward  toward  the  ultimate  end — a 
just  and  lasting  peace. 

Q.  Almost  to  bear  that  out,  one  of 
the  principal  actors — the  leader  of 
the  PLO,  Yasir  Arafat — is  quoted 
today  as  saying,  in  fact  promising,  an 
explosion  in  the  Middle  East  if  this 
treaty  is  signed.  Do  you  yourself  ex- 
pect violence  in  the  Middle  East  if 
the  treaty  is  signed?  Has  the  State 
Department  taken  any  precautionary 
measures  so  far? 


A.  The  answer  is  that  we  cannot  rule 
out  that  there  may  be  some  violence 
after  the  signing  of  a  peace  treaty.  We 
have  taken  the  necessary  precautions  in 
light  of  this  fact. 

Q.  Do  you  yourself  feel,  or  could 
you  tell  us — the  obligatory  kind  of 
question  at  this  point  when  you're  in 
that  kind  of  delicate  negotiation — 
were  there  any  secret  understandings 
that  will  be  popped  on  the  Congress 
or  the  American  people  in  another 
couple  of  weeks? 

A.  The  answer  is,  there  were  no  se- 
cret understandings  that  will  be  popped 
on  the  Congress. 

Q.  What  about  the  American 
people? 

A.  Nor  the  American  people,  I  can 
assure  you  of  that. 

Q.  Let  me  go  back  and  pick  up 
that,  I  think,  rather  remarkable 
statement.  When  Marvin  asked  you 
about  the  possibility  of  violence,  you 
said:  "We  have  taken  the  necessary 
precautions.  .  .  ."  Can  you  enlarge 
on  that  a  little  bit? 

A.  We  have  been  in  touch  with  our 
embassies  in  the  area,  indicating  to 
them  that  they  should  take  the  neces- 
sary and  normal  kinds  of  actions  that 
one  would  take  in  such  a  situation. 

Q.  You  were  considering  only  vio- 
lence against  American  embassies? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  The  larger  picture — if  I  may 
just  pursue  that  for  a  second — is 
violence  against  Israel,  violence 
against  Egypt,  violence  against  the 
person  of  President  Sadat. 

A.  1  was  not  talking  about  those 
when  I  gave  you  the  answer  that  I  did. 

Q.  In  his  speech  before  the  Knes- 
set in  Jerusalem,  President  Carter 
spoke  of  a  new  military  dimension  in 
the  U.S.  relationship  with  the  Middle 
East.  Can  you  explain  what  he  meant 
by  that? 

A.  Yes.  He  was  at  that  time  talking 
about  the  need  in  the  post-treaty  sign- 
ing period  to  make  sure  that  the  re- 
quirements of  Israel  would  be  met  in 
terms  of  the  necessary  defensive 
equipment.  This  is  one  of  the  matters 
that  will  be  discussed  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  both  Israel  and  Egypt  who 
are  here  at  the  present  time.  This  has 
been  raised  with  the  Members  of  the 
Congress  in  the  reports  that  the  Presi- 
dent has  already  made. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  talk  to  you  about  a 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


statement  made  by  the  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State  [for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs], 
Mr.  Crawford,  before  a  congres- 
sional committee  this  past  week.  He 
was  asked  by  Congressman  Hamilton 
whether  the  United  States  would  go 
to  war  in  order  to  protect — and  I 
wasn't  quite  sure  here  whether  he 
meant — Saudi  Arabia  or  the  oil  in 
Saudi  Arabia.  Would  the  United 
States  go  to  war  to  protect  either? 

A.  We  would  deal  with  a  situation 
which  jeopardized  the  kinds  of  ele- 
ments that  you  are  talking  about  when 
such  a  situation  arose.  And  the  Presi- 
dent would,  of  course,  take  such  action 
as  he  and  his  advisers  deemed  appro- 
priate after  full  consultation  with  the 
Congress  and  within  the  constitutional 
processes. 

I  must  go  further  and  say  that  I  think 
it  would  be  premature  at  this  point  to 
speculate  about  hypothetical  situations 
which  are  not  facing  us  now. 

I  want  to  make  one  other  point;  I 
want  to  make  it  very  clearly:  There  is 
no  question  that  we  have  vital  interests 
in  this  area.  There  is  no  question  also 
that  we  have  made  it  very  clear, 
through  a  series  of  statements  by  Presi- 
dents over  the  years,  that  we  consider 
the  territorial  integrity  and  the  security 
of  Saudi  Arabia  to  be  a  matter  of  fun- 
damental importance  to  the  United 
States. 

Q.  So  in  other  words,  it's  not 
based  then  on  a  specific  piece  of 
legislation  or  a  treaty  that  has  al- 
ready gone  through  Congress.  When 
you  assert  a  vital  interest  of  the 
United  States  for  Saudi  Arabia,  you 
are  talking  about  a  series  of  Presi- 
dential statements  over  the  past  15, 
20  years  perhaps.  Is  that  correct? 

A.  That  is  correct. 

Q.  And  what  you  are  talking  about 
then,  too,  is  a  vital  interest  in  terms 
of  the  country?  Or  are  you  talking 
about  oil  which  introduces  a  whole 
new  definition  of  a  vital  interest? 

A.  I  am  talking  about  stability  in  the 
region.  This  is  a  fundamentally  impor- 
tant region,  not  only  to  the  United 
States  but  to  the  world  in  general.  And, 
of  course,  peace  in  the  region  is  of 
fundamental  importance  to  the  people 
of  the  region.  So  I  am  talking  about  all 
of  those  when  I  answer  your  question. 

Q.  There  have  been  a  number  of 
reports — semiofficial,  I  think  you 
would  call  them  in  the  Middle 
East  — that  the  United  States  will 
take  a  direct  role  in  the  negotiation 
between  Israel  and  Egypt  on  the 
question  of  Palestinians  and  the  pos- 


sibility of  a  Palestinian  state  however 
it  works  out.  Is  that  true,  and  can 
you  explain  a  little  bit  what  kind  of  a 
role? 

A.  The  letter  which  will  be  signed  at 
the  same  time  that  the  peace  treaty  it- 
self is  signed  will  have  in  it  a  statement 
that  the  United  States  will  participate 
fully  in  the  negotiations  which  will  be 
taking  place  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  that  letter.  Those  discussions  are  the 
discussions  which  deal  with  the  ques- 
tion of  the  establishment  of  the  self- 
governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  So  we  will  be  —  to  use  a 
phrase  that  has  been  used  before  —  a 
full  partner  in  the  discussions  which 
will  be  taking  place,  and  this  is  at  the 
request  of  Egypt  and  Israel. 

Q.  Will  the  United  States  be  in  any 
sense  safeguarding  the  interests  of 
the  Palestinian  people  in  those  talks? 

A.  The  interests  of  the  Palestinian 
people  are  of  fundamental  importance, 
great  importance,  as  the  President  has 
said  and  as  I  think  all  the  parties  recog- 
nize. Certainly  that  is  one  of  the  issues 
that  has  to  be  dealt  with  before  you  are 
going  to  get  a  final  and  comprehensive 
peace. 

Q.  When  are  you  going  to  get 
elections  for  the  self-governing 
Palestinian  authority? 

A.  The  basic  agreement  which  is 
contained  in  the  letter  provides  that  1 
month  after  the  exchange  of  the  docu- 
ments of  ratification  on  the  peace, 
negotiations  will  start,  that  the  goal  of 
the  negotiations  is  to  complete  those 
negotiations  within  1  year,  and  that  as 
expeditiously  as  possible  after  those 
negotiations  have  been  completed 
elections  will  be  held.  The  purpose  of 
those  negotiations  is  to  define  what  in 
the  jargon  we  call  the  modalities  of  the 
election  —  how  you  set  up  the  negotia- 
tions and  the  powers  and  respon- 
sibilities of  the  self-governing  author- 
ity. 

Q.  Since  I'm  not  a  diplomatic  cor- 
respondent I  can  ask  kind  of  a  dumb 
question  here.  We  see  so  many  re- 
ports coming  in  about  anti-American 
statements  being  made  in  various 
Muslim  countries  in  the  Middle  East. 
The  question  occurs  to  me — not  un- 
derstanding fully  all  these  things — is 
the  United  States  better  off?  Is  our 
standing  better  or  worse  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  as  a  result  of  negotiating  this 
treaty? 

A.  I  think  that  our  standing  in  the 
long  run  is  clearly  going  to  be  better 
off.  We  are  going  through,  I  am  sure,  a 
difficult  short-term  period  immediately 


after  the  signing  of  the  treaty.  But  in 
the  long  run,  1  believe  that  people  are 
going  to  recognize  that  this  is  the  only 
road  to  peace.  There  is  no  other 
suggestion  thai  those  who  criticize  the 
treaty  are  making.  What  they  are 
suggesting  is  merely  the  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo,  which  does  not  re- 
solve these  problems  but  leaves  them  to 
fester. 

Q.  In  the  short  run,  are  things 
likely  to  get  worse  before  they  get 
better? 

A.  I  would  think  that  we  will  proba- 
bly have  some  difficulties  in  the  short 
run,  yes. 

Q.  Could  you  explain  a  little  bit? 

A.  1  think  there  is  going  to  be  a  good 
deal  of  criticism  of  the  peace  treaty. 
What  particular  actions  will  be  taken 
remain  to  be  seen.  1  don't  want  to  try  to 
guess  at  this  point  what  the  Baghdad 
group  will  do  in  terms  of  specific  ac- 
tions, but  I  can  expect  that  some  action 
will  come  out  of  that. 

Q.  Since  it  took  the  personal  in- 
volvement of  Jimmy  Carter  to  pull 
this  treaty  off,  what  kind  of  prece- 
dent does  that  set?  I  mean,  do  you 
worry  that  no  one  around  the  world 
will  want  to  settle  a  problem  without 
a  personal  visit  from  the  President? 

A.  No.  1  believe  that  they  will  rec- 
ognize that  this  was  an  issue  of 
paramount  importance  that  had  come  to 
a  point  of  stalemate,  and,  therefore,  it 
was  necessary  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  himself  intervene  to  try 
and  break  that  stalemate. 

It  was  such  an  important  matter,  and 
the  time  factor  I  think  was 
important  —  that  it  be  broken  and 
broken  when  it  was  so  that  the  de- 
terioration, which  was  taking  place  I 
think,  would  not  continue.  So  I  don't 
think  it's  going  to  establish  the  prece- 
dent that  every  problem  has  to  be 
solved  by  President  Carter. 

Q.  You  said  a  moment  ago  that 
some  action  will  come  out  of  the 
Baghdad  group  perhaps.  You 
weren't  predicting  any,  of  course. 
But  what  about  continuing  Saudi 
economic  support  of  Egypt? 

A.  Again,  I  would  have  to  say  that 
that  remains  an  open  issue.  I  don't 
know  the  answer  to  that. 

Q.  When  you  came  back  from  the 
Middle  East,  you  did  see  [Soviet] 
Ambassador  Dobrynin  at  least  twice, 
that  were  announced  anyway.  Have 
you  now  completed  the  basic 
framework  for  a  new  strategic  arms 
agreement  with  the  Russians? 


May  1979 


41 


A.  No,  we  have  not  completed  it. 
But  we  really  are  now  at  what  I  would 
call  the  bitter  end.  We're  very  close  to 
completing  it. 

Q.  Have  you  discussed  a  summit 
between  Presidents  Carter  and 
Brezhnev? 

A.  The  answer  is  yes. 

Q.  Have  you  decided  on  a  time  and 
place  as  yet? 

A.  Not  yet. 

Q.  You  malte  it  sound  as  if  the 
bitter  end  is  not  likely  to  be  bitter. 

A.  The  bitter  end  is  not  used  in  the 
sense  that  the  treaty  which  would  come 
out  of  it  would  not  be  a  satisfactory 
one.  I  believe  that  the  treaty  which  will 
come  out  of  it  will  be  a  sound  treaty;  it 
will  be  a  treaty  that  protects  and  en- 
hances the  security  of  the  United  States 
and  of  our  allies.  We  would  not  sign 
any  other  kind  of  treaty. 

Q.  Do  the  issues  have  to  be  re- 
solved at  the  summit  level  —  those 
that  still  remain  on  a  SALT 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
agreement? 

A.  There  may  be  an  issue  that  has  to 
be  discussed  — 

Q.  On  the  Backfire? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  get  into  detail. 

Q.  How  soon  do  you  see  a  summit 
as  a  possibility? 

A.  It  all  depends  on  what  happens  in 
the  next  several  days.  As  I  say.  we're 
down  to  negotiating  on  one  or  two  is- 
sues at  this  point,  and  if  we  can  make 
progress  on  those,  then  I  think  we  can 
move  promptly  onto  scheduling  a 
summit. 

Q.  Politically  do  you  think  the 
President's  breakthrough  in  the 
Middle  East  will  make  it  any  easier 
for  him  to  win  ratification  of  a  SALT 
treaty  in  the  Senate? 

A.  I  believe  it  will.  I  believe  that  an 
action  which  is  as  important  and  his- 
toric as  that  action  is  going  to  have  a 
positive  effect  on  the  Hill.  I  think  it 
will  have  a  good  and  substantial  effect 
on  such  issues  as  the  ratification 
debate. 

Q.  Beijing  says  it  has  taken  all  of 
its  troops  out  of  Vietnam;  Vietnam 
says,  Hanoi  says,  the  Chinese  have 
not  taken  all  their  troops  out  and 
fighting  continues.  What  do  we  know 
about  the  situation? 

A.  We  know  that  there  is  a  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  whether  they  have 
completely  withdrawn.   I  think  it  is 


quite  clear  that,  except  for  some  minor 
border  areas,  all  of  the  Chinese  troops 
are  out.  But  I  think  there  are  still  some 
debates  on  whether  it  is  the  border  that 
the  Chinese  would  urge  or  the  border 
that  the  Vietnamese  say  is  the  proper 
border.  But  other  than  that,  it  is  our 
best  information  that  they  are  all  now 
out. 

Now  yesterday,  as  you  know,  the 
Vietnamese  said  that  they  would  be 
prepared  to  sit  down  and  enter  into  dis- 
cussions, starting  I  think  on  the  23d  of 
March,  on  the  resolution  of  the  issues 
between  themselves  and  China.  I  think 
that  is  an  important  step. 

Q.  As  I  am  told,  in  the  reports  that 
we  receive  over  the  wires  here,  Viet- 
nam continues  its  mobilization  and 
movement  of  troops — some  toward 
the  border  with  China,  some  toward 
the  border  with  Cambodia  and  Laos. 
What  is  going  on?  Do  we  know? 

A.  I  think  they're  putting  themselves 
in  the  position  where  they  will 
strengthen  the  regular  forces  that  they 
have  in  the  area.  At  the  time  of  the  in- 
cursion by  the  Chinese  into  Vietnam, 
there  were  only  paramilitary  type 
troops  in  that  area,  and  now  they  are 
putting  regular  forces  up  along  that 
area  to  flesh  out  what  was  there. 

Q.  So  you  don't  see  anything 
ominous  in  it? 

A.  No,  I  don't. 

Q.  The  U.S.  position  had  been  that 
the  summit  should  take  place  in  the 
United  States.  Is  that  a  position  ac- 
cepted now  by  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  That  remains  our  view.  We  really 
have  not  had  any  'serious  discussion 
about  that.  They  know  very  clearly  we 
believe  that  should  be  the  case.  But  we 
haven't  gotten  to  the  point  of  trying  to 
set  down  the  date.  I  believe  the  meet- 
ings will  take  place  in  the  United 
States. 

Q.  Given  the  Soviet  paranoia 
about  the  Chinese,  do  you  think  you 
can  convince  the  Russians  that  the 
United  States  is  going  to  deal  with 
them  in  an  even-handed  way  when 
there  is  so  much  pressure  from  in- 
dustry and  from  the  public  to  court 
the  Chinese? 

A.  1  believe  that  we  can.  Let  me  say 
that  I  believe  it  is  essential  that  we  do 
deal  in  a  balanced  way  with  both  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China.  We  have  said,  for  exam- 
ple, that  insofar  as  arms  are  concerned, 
we  will  not  sell  arms  to  either;  and  we 
will  not.  That  has  been  our  policy,  and 
our  policy  will  remain  that  we  will  not 
do  so. 


In  addition  to  that,  on  other  matters 
we  will  deal  with  them  both  in  a  bal- 
anced way.  I  think  to  do  otherwise 
would  give  us  a  foreign  policy  that  was 
skewed,  and  a  skewed  foreign  policy  in 
dealing  with  the  two  of  them,  I  think, 
could  have  serious  consequences. 

Q.  Would  the  Administration  be 
willing  to  withhold  most-favored- 
nation  status  from  the  Chinese  if  you 
couldn't  get  the  Congress  to  grant  it 
to  the  Russians  at  the  same  time? 

A.  On  the  question  of  most- 
favored-nation  status,  that  is  an  issue 
which  we  are  studying  at  this  point.  I 
hope  it  will  be  possible  to  find  a  way  to 
give  most-favored-nation  status  to  both 
because  I  believe  it  is  in  our  interest  to 
trade  with  both  of  them. 

Q.  Do  you  expect  oil  prices  to  go 
up?  Do  you  see  an  end  to  these  con- 
tinuing increases? 

A.  It  is  clear  that  oil  prices  already 
have  risen  substantially  because  of  the 
shortages  which  were  brought  about  by 
the  cutoff  of  Iranian  oil.  We  indicated 
at  the  time,  when  the  cutoff  took  place 
because  of  the  Iranian  situation,  that 
we  did  not  believe  that  the  OPEC  [Or- 
ganization of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries]  prices  which  were  an- 
nounced were  justified.  We  felt  that 
they  were  too  high  and  that  they 
created  a  danger  to  the  world 
economy  —  not  only  the  industrialized 
countries  but  particularly  the  develop- 
ing countries  as  well. 

It  is  necessary  that  we  take  action  on 
our  own  part,  however,  to  see  what  we 
can  do  to  cut  back  on  our  consumption. 
That's  why  I  was  very  pleased  to  see 
the  International  Energy  Agency  taking 
the  position  the  other  day  that  all  of 
us  —  the  20  countries  —  will  cut  back 
5%.  I  think  it's  terribly  important  that 
we  do  it,  and  that  was  a  very  positive 
step.  I  think  that  once  the  Iranian  oil 
gets  back  on  the  market,  you'll  find  the 
spot  prices  beginning  to  drop. 

Q.  In  the  past,  when  we've  had  oil 
price  troubles  and  oil  supply  trou- 
bles, we've  always  relied  on  the 
Saudi  Arabians  as  our  chief  friends 
and  allies  in  balancing  things  out. 
Considering  the  pressure  that  they're 
under  now,  can  we  rely  on  them 
anymore  to  keep  oil  production  up  to 
its  extraordinarily  high  levels? 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  go  back  to  the 
question  of  what  are  our  mutual  long- 
term  interests.  Our  mutual  long-term 
interests  are  for  stability  in  the  region. 
We  share  that  view.  I  think  we  will 
have  that  very  much  in  mind  as  we 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA:         U.S.  Polivy 
Toieard  Zaire 


hy  Richard  M.  Moose 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  March  5,  1979. 
Mr.  Moose  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs. ' 

1  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  the  Administration's  policy 
toward  Zaire  because  I  believe  that 
there  are  some  fundamental  misun- 
derstandings about  the  objectives, 
content,  and  thrust  of  this  policy,  in- 
cluding our  assistance  programs. 

Zaire  has  a  bad  image  in  the  Western 
press,  among  interested  governments, 
in  business  circles,  and  in  the  halls  of 
Congress.  The  critics  see  a  corrupt  and 
repressive  regime  which  engages  in 
serious  human  rights  violations,  has 
mismanaged  the  economy  to  the  point 
where  it  is  hopelessly  in  debt,  and 
where  the  brunt  of  the  crisis  falls  upon 
the  Zairian  poor  and  disadvantaged. 
More  than  that,  critics  believe  that  the 
Zairian  regime  is  on  the  verge  of  col- 
lapse in  the  face  of  serious  and  growing 
threats  from  opposition  forces.  The 
critics  ask  why  the  United  States 
should  be  identified  with  such  a  situa- 
tion or  lend  support  to  such  a  regime. 

Zaire's  supporters  maintain  that  the 
essential  problem  is  economic  and 
point  out  that  some  of  the  major 
foreign  banks,  businesses,  and  gov- 
ernments did  not  give  good  economic 
advice  to  Zaire  when  the  copper  prices 
were  high.  On  the  contrary,  most 
foreigners  were  simply  bent  on  secur- 
ing fat  contracts  and  otherwise  pushing 
Zaire  into  the  very  prestige  projects 
which  today  are  cited  as  examples  of 
Zaire's  misplaced  priorities.  The  sup- 
porters of  Zaire  predict  that  the  eco- 
nomic crisis  can  result  in  chaos  with 


Interview  (Cont'd) 

work  together  in  the  months  ahead. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  we  can  rely  on 
them  to  help  us? 

A.  I  don't  wnat  to  give  you  an  iron- 
clad answer  on  that.  I  think  it  is  cer- 
tainly a  consideration,  however,  that 
we  do  share  common  values  and  ideas 
on  many  of  these  important  and 
strategic  issues.  D 


'Press  release  76. 


great  damage  to  U.S.  interests.  They 
say  that  the  way  to  assure  stability  and 
prosperity  is  to  join  in  the  current  in- 
ternational efforts  to  put  together  an 
economic  recovery  package.  Zaire's 
supporters  ask  why  the  United  States  is 
not  doing  more  in  this  regard. 

How  does  this  Administration  look  at 
the  problem  of  Zaire,  you  ask?  First  of 
all,  we  do  not  believe  that  the  stark  op- 
tions presented  by  either  the  strong 
critics  or  the  apologists — "principled 
disassociation"  versus  "strategic 
identification" — provide  sound  bases  for 
American  policy.  On  the  one  hand, 
there  is  no  way  for  us  to  walk  away 
from  the  problems  of  Zaire;  our  inter- 
ests will  not  permit  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  cannot  restrict  our  vision  to 
economic  self-interest  alone.  Zaire's 
serious  social  and  political  problems 
and  our  humanitarian  instincts  do  not 
allow  such  an  approach. 

With  these  parameters  in  mind,  we 
have  tried  to  fashion  a  policy  which 
takes  into  account  the  following; 

•  First  and  foremost,  U.S.  interests 
over  the  long  term; 

•  Economic  and  political  progress 
and  stability  in  central  Africa; 

•  Humanitarian  concerns;  and 

•  Perhaps  most  importantly, 
reform — since  all  else  hinges  upon  it. 

In  sum,  the  Administration's  policy 
aims  at  addressing  the  very  real  prob- 
lems and  opportunities  which  exist  for 
us  in  Zaire.  We  believe  our  policy  will 
stand  the  test  of  time  and  does  not 
merely  respond  to  today's  political  and 
economic  conditions. 

U.S.  Interests  Over  the  Long  Term 

Zaire's  geopolitical  and  economic 
weight  in  African  scales  of  power  is 
significant.  Zaire  is  the  size  of  the 
United  States  east  of  the  Mississippi 
and  has  boundaries  and  ethnic  connec- 
tions with  nine  other  nations. 

When  Zaire  is  at  peace,  the  region 
breathes  easier.  When  Zaire's  signifi- 
cant mineral  reserves  move  to  market 
under  stable  conditions,  the  world 
breathes  easier. 

We  must  not  forget  that  Zaire  is  the 
world's  leading  producer  of  both  cobalt 
and  industrial  diamonds,  the  world's 
7th  largest  producer  of  copper,  and  the 
world's  13th  ranked  producer  of  cof- 
fee. A  measure  of  this  nation's  latent 
importance   is  the  fact  that  the  Zaire 


river  holds    13%  of  the  world's  hy-    , 
droelectric  potential.  i 

A  few  short  years  ago,  when  copper 
prices  were  high,  the  American  hotel, 
tire  and  battery  factories,  vehicle  as- 
sembly plant,  tlour  mill,  other  U.S. 
investments  —  and  the  1,500-mile 
high-tension  line  being  built  by  an 
American  company — were  all  consid- 
ered to  be  important  and  growing  U.S. 
interests.  They  still  are,  although  each 
is  in  difficulty  as  a  result  of  the  severe 
economic  crisis  that  prevails  in  Zaire. 
Our  policy  and  our  actions  are  designed 
to  improve  economic  conditions  and 
thus  protect  and  enhance  U.S.  business 
there. 

U.S.  trade  with  Zaire,  totaling  more 
than  $300  million  last  year  in  spite  of 
economic  difficulties,  puts  Zaire  in 
third  place  among  our  black  African 
trading  partners.  We  ran  a  deficit  last 
year  with  Zaire  of  more  than  $140  mil- 
lion, reflecting  significant  purchases  by 
us  of  cobalt,  zinc,  and  coffee.  Histori- 
cally, U.S.  exports  have  consisted  of 
mining  and  construction  machinery, 
passenger  cars,  aircraft,  and  locomo- 
tives, although  more  recently  our  ex- 
ports are  mainly  connected  with  our 
assistance  programs — wheat,  rice,  and 
tobacco.  We  want  to  get  back  to  a  po- 
sition where  we  can  export  more  than 
food  to  black  Africa's  fourth  largest 
market. 

Zaire  owes  American  private  and  of- 
ficial creditors  more  than  $.5  billion  as 
of  now.  The  Export-Import  Bank  alone 
has  lent  more  than  $400  million.  And  it 
is  clear  that  economic  recovery  in  Zaire 
is  the  only  way  for  us  and  other  West- 
ern creditors  to  be  repaid  on  time  and 
m  full. 

Not  least,  Zaire  is  pro-Western  in  its 
outlook  and  in  the  positions  it  takes  in 
international  arenas.  We  want  to  en- 
courage this  support. 

Some  might  argue  that  the  foregoing 
exposition  is  too  self-centered.  The  fact 
is  that  our  policy  must  be  designed  to 
serve  a  range  of  very  real  and  very  spe- 
cific interests. 

Economic  and  Political 
Stability  and  Progress 

Thus,  we  believe  that  Zaire  is  im- 
portant in  its  own  right  and  important 
to  us.  Now  let  us  look  at  recent  de- 
velopments and  trends  to  see  how  they 
impact  on  Zaire  and  on  U.S.  interests. 

By  the  early  1970's,  Zaire  had 
moved  far  beyond  the  chaos  associated 
with  the  postindependence  period. 
Political  stability  seemed  assured. 
Copper  prices  were  high  and  rising, 
and  the  economy  was  booming. 

In  1974,  however,  the  bottom  fell 
out  of  the  copper  prices  and  with  it  the 


May  1979 


43 


momentum  of  economic  progress. 
Zaire  soon  found  itself  unable  to  pay 
the  huge  debts  it  had  unwisely  incurred 
during  the  good  years,  with  the  result 
that  foreign  suppliers  and  creditors  cut 
off  further  credit. 

The  lack  of  foreign  exchange  began 
to  impact  on  local  businesses,  includ- 
ing American  investment,  which  could 
no  longer  import  the  needed  raw  mate- 
rials to  keep  their  plants  operating  at 
capacity.  Unemployment,  inflation, 
and  black  market  activity  increased 
sharply.  As  President  Mobutu  has  so 
frequently  pointed  out,  the  causes  and 
the  effects  of  this  vicious  downturn  in 
economic  activity  were  exacerbated  by 
economic  mismanagement  and  corrup- 
tion. 

In  the  midst  of  Zaire's  economic 
difficulties,  and  just  as  major  interna- 
tional efforts  were  underway  to  address 
these  problems,  ex-Katangan  gen- 
darmes struck  across  the  border  from 
Angola  into  Shaba  Province  in  1977.  A 
year  later  the  ex-gendarmes  attacked 
again,  this  time  capturing  the  center  of 
Zaire's  copper  and  cobalt  producing 
facilities. 

In  both  instances,  the  invaders  were 
repulsed  and  relative  security  reestab- 
lished through  the  intervention  of 
foreign  forces,  mainly  Moroccan, 
French,  and  Belgian.  Each  time  the 
scenario  for  economic  stabilization  and 
recovery  was  set  back.  And  on  both 
occasions  serious  questions  were  raised 
as  to  the  prospects  for  stability  in 
Zaire. 

Clearly,  U.S.  policy  must  work  to 
reestablish  economic  and  political  sta- 
bility and  progress  in  this  part  of  cen- 
tral Africa.  Otherwise,  the  very  basis 
and  context  for  our  interests  and  those 
of  the  West  in  general  will  continue  to 
disintegrate. 

Humanitarian  Concerns 

But  beyond  the  question  of  our  ma- 
terial interests,  these  economic  and  se- 
curity crises  have  had  disastrous  effects 
on  the  people  of  Zaire. 

•  As  a  result  of  the  two  Shaba  wars,  as 
many  as  several  hundred  thousand 
Zairian  refugees  left  Zaire  for  Angola 
and  other  bordering  states.  Over 
100,000  have  returned  under  an  am- 
nesty program.  The  consequent  feeding 
and  resettlement  problems  are  enor- 
mous. 

•  The  urban  and  rural  poor  have 
borne  the  brunt  of  economic  deteriora- 
tion, inflation,  and  corruption.  It  takes 
approximately  300  zaires  to  buy  a 
monthly  market  basket  of  food  for  a 
poor  family  of  five  in  Kinshasa.  The 
head  of  that  household,  however, 
makes  only  100-120  zaires. 


•  Natural  disasters,  a  cholera  out- 
break in  the  Kivu  region,  and  a  drought 
followed  by  destructive  heavy  rains  in 
Bas-Zaire  have  added  to  the  number  of 
sick  and  hungry.  The  current  crop  fail- 
ure in  Bas-Zaire,  for  example,  has  re- 
sulted in  famine  conditions  for  over 
400,000  people  and  has  seriously  af- 
fected an  additional  900,000  people  in 
that  region  alone. 

•  Severe  malnutrition  is  widespread 
in  Zaire  with  certain  negative  effects 
for  the  current  and  future  generations 
of  Zairians.  The  infant  mortality  rate  is 
among  the  highest  in  the  world. 

In  view  of  these  circumstances,  we 
have  built  a  substantial  humanitarian 
element  into  our  policy,  and  we  believe 
we  should  continue  to  address  the 
enormous  suffering  of  the  people  of 
Zaire. 

Real  and  sustained  improvement  in 
the  lot  of  the  average  Zairian,  however, 
depends  upon  improvement  in  the 
economy  as  a  whole.  This  is  why  our 
policy  must  go  beyond  short-term  hu- 
manitarian assistance  to  attack  longer 
range  problems. 

Reform 

The  solution  to  Zaire's  problems  ob- 
viously depends  upon  resources  from 
abroad  —  military,  economic,  and  hu- 
manitarian assistance  programs.  We 
and  Zaire's  other  friends  recognize  this 
and  have  been  engaged  for  some  time 
in  a  major  international  effort  aimed  at 
economic  stabilization  and  recovery 
and  at  improving  the  securi'y  situation. 

All  the  donors  realize,  however,  that 
for  assistance  programs  to  be  effective, 
fundamental  reforms  must  be  under- 
taken. I  would  refer  you  to  President 
Mobutu's  speech  of  November  25, 
1977,  for  the  most  complete  and 
scathing  analysis  of  the  ills  that  beset 
the  Zairian  society  and  economy.  The 
necessary  reforms  that  have  been 
agreed  upon  fall  into  three  categories: 
political  and  human  rights,  security, 
and  economic. 

Political  and  Human  Rights  Re- 
forms. Since  the  middle  of  1977,  Zaire 
has  been  engaged  in  the  process  of 
liberalizing  its  political  system,  and  we 
have  seen  what  amounts  to  the  begin- 
nings of  a  decentralization  of  authority 
and  responsibility. 

Elections  have  been  held  at  the 
levels  of  the  urban  zone,  the  legisla- 
ture, and  the  political  bureau.  The  Of- 
fice of  Prime  Minister  has  been  insti- 
tuted. The  Legislative  Council  has 
shown  encouraging  signs  of  activity. 
Much  remains  to  be  done,  however,  to 
insure  that  these  institutions  work  to 
their  full  potential. 


On  the  human  rights  front,  I  would 
refer  the  subcommittee  to  the  report 
already  submitted  to  the  Congress.  We 
can  point  to  the  general  amnesty  of  last 
June  whereunder  more  than  100,000 
refugees  have  returned  to  Zaire.  In  ad- 
dition, a  number  of  prominent  political 
prisoners  have  been  released,  including 
the  former  foreign  minister. 

The  other  main  reforms  under  the 
political  and  human  rights  category 
concern  reconciliation  with  Shaba  Pro- 
vince. The  region  has  been  returned  to 
civilian  rule,  but  there  have  been  re- 
ports of  mistreatment  of  returning  refu- 
gees. Overall,  progress  on  the  Shaba 
front  has  not  been  very  impressive. 

Security  Reforms.  Zaire  and  its 
friends  also  realized  that  in  order  to 
achieve  real  stability  in  the  area,  Zaire 
and  Angola  would  have  to  reconcile 
their  differences  and  work  together  to 
assure  secure  borders  and  peace  in  the 
region.  Another  requirement  no  less 
urgent  is  the  reform  of  the  Zairian 
Armed  Forces. 

Presidents  Mobutu  and  Neto  have 
made  remarkable  progress  toward  re- 
solving the  longstanding  differences 
between  their  two  countries.  Military 
discipline,  however,  remains  a  real 
problem  for  the  Zairian  forces.  Military 
pay  systems  have  been  revised,  and  the 
Belgian  and  French  training  missions 
have  begun  new  programs.  But  it  is 
still  too  early  to  say  when  Zairian 
forces  will  be  able  to  replace  the 
inter-African  forces  in  Shaba. 

Economic  Reforms.  Lastly,  con- 
cerning economic  reforms,  significant 
progress  has  been  made,  although  the 
problem  of  corruption  remains  very 
serious.  On  the  positive  side,  the  Zair- 
ians can  point  to: 

•  As  of  last  August,  an  expatriate 
Principal  Director  of  the  Zairian  Cen- 
tral Bank  and  a  team  of  specialists  pro- 
vided by  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF); 

•  Still  other  foreign  experts  soon  to 
enter  the  Finance  Ministry  and  Cus- 
toms Service; 

•  A  decree  that  prohibits  a  large 
number  of  prominent  Zairians  from  en- 
gaging in  foreign  exchange  transactions 
until  they  have  paid  past  debts  to  the 
banking  system;  and 

•  A  high-level  Zairian  delegation 
which  has  been  in  Washington  to  con- 
tinue negotiations  with  the  IMF  on  a 
new  stabilization  program. 

In  summary,  the  Zairian  Government 
itself  has  provided  the  framework  for  a 
comprehensive  reform  program.  What 
is  needed  urgently  now  is  effective  im- 
plementation. Progress  to  date  has  been 
mixed.   More  has  been  accomplished 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ZAIRE— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  905,063  sq.  mi.  (about  the  size  of  the 
U.S.  east  of  the  Mississippi  River). 

Capital:  Kinshasa  (pop.  2.5  million.  1977). 

Other  Cities:  Kananga.  Lubumbashi. 
Mbuji-Mayi,  Kisangani,  Bukavu  (more 
than  200,000  in  each). 


A  tiantic 
Ocean 


People 

Population:  26.4  million  (1977  est.).  ' 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  3%. 

Density:  28  per  sq.  mi. 

Ethnic  Groups:  Bantu  tribes  (80%),  over 
200  African  tribal  groups  in  all. 

Religions:  Catholic  and  Protestant  (50%), 
Kimbanguism,  other  syncretic  sects,  tra- 
ditional religions. 

Major  Languages:  French,  Lingala,  Kin- 
gwana,  Kikongo.  Tshiluba. 

Literacy:  20%  (1976). 

Life  Expectancy:  44  years. 


Government 

Official  Name:  Republic  of  Zaire. 

Type:  Presidential,  one-party. 

Independence:  June  30,  I960. 

Date  of  Constitution:  June  24,  1967 
(amended  Aug.  15,  1974;  revised  1978). 

Branches:  The  Popular  Movement  of  the 
Revolution  (MPR)  is  the  sole  legal  politi- 
cal institution;  its  organs  include  the 
Political  Bureau,  the  Party  Congress,  the 
Executive  Council  (Council  of  Ministers), 
the  272-meniber  Legislative  Council 
(unicameral),  and  the  Judicial  Council. 
The  President  of  the  party  is  automati- 
cally President  of  Zaire. 

Suffrage:  Compulsory  over  18. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  8  Regions 
(Provinces)  and  one  urban  Region 
(Kinshasa). 

Economy 

GDP:  $3.37  billion  (1977,  constant  1970 
prices). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  -0.7%  (1977,  con- 
stant 1970  prices). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $127  (1977). 

Per  Capita  Growth  Rate:  -4%  (1977). 

Agriculture:  Land — 2%  cultivated  or  pas- 
ture, 20%  unused  cropland.  Labor  — 
70-80%.  Products  —  coffee,  palm  oil, 
rubber,  tea,  cotton,  cocoa  (cash  crops); 
manioc,  bananas,  plantains,  corn,  rice, 
vegetables,  fruits,  sugar  (food  crops). 

Industry:  Products  —  processed  and  unproc- 
essed minerals,  consumer  products,  metal 
and  chemical  products,  construction  ma- 
terials, steel. 

Natural  Resources:  Copper,  cobalt,  zinc, 
industrial  diamonds,  manganese,  tin, 
gold,  columbium-tantalum,  rare  metals, 
bauxite,  iron,  coal,  13%  of  world  hy- 
droelectric potential. 

Trade:    Exports  — %91\    million   (1977 


f.o.b.):  copper  40%.  cobalt  11%, 
diamonds,  gold,  coffee  24%,  palm  oil. 
wood.  Partners  — Qe\%mm  18%  (1977). 
U.S.,  F.R.G.  Imports  — %\.2i  billion 
(1977  c.i.f):  crude  petroleum,  petroleum 
products,  chemicals,  transport  equip- 
ment, textiles,  food.  Partners  —  Belgium 
33%  (1977),  F.R.G. ,  U.S. 

Official  Exchange  Rate;  1  zaire  =  U.S. 
$.662. 

Economic  Aid  Received:  Total — $260  mil- 
lion (1977).  U.S.  on/>  — $48  million 
(1978),  $36.65  million  (1979  est.). 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  most  of  its  specialized  agencies. 
Organization  of  African  Unity,  Inter- 
governmental Council  of  Copper  Export- 
ing Countries.  African  Development 
Bank,  African  countries  associated  with 
the  EC,  INTELSAT,  International  Coffee 
Organization,  International  Tin  Council, 
Economic  Community  of  the  Great  Lake 
Countries. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Zaire:  President  and  Commissioner  of  State 
for  Defense  —  Mobutu  Sese  Seko;  Prime 
Minister  —  Bo-Boliko  Lokonga;  Ambas- 
sador to  U.S.  —  Kasongo  Mutuale 

U.S.:  Ambassador  to  Zaire  —  Walter  L. 
Cutler 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  Stale's  June 
1978  edition  of  the  Background  Notes  on 
Zaire  with  updated  information  provided 
where  available.  Copies  of  the  complete 
Note  may  be  purchased  for  70(t  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402  (a  259c  discount  is  allowed  when  or- 
dering 100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the 
same  address). 


overall  in  the  past  9  months  than  most 
would  have  thought  possible.  How- 
ever, very  serious  problems  remain, 
and  much  still  has  to  be  done. 


Assistance  Programs 

Recognizing  the  severe  impact  of 
Zaire's  difficulties  on  the  disadvan- 
taged poor,  we  have  consciously  re- 
shaped the  nature  and  emphasis  of  our 
assistance  programs.  We  have  shifted 
away  from  balance-of-payments  sup- 
port in  favor  of  project  and  humanitar- 
ian assistance  which  will  have  direct 
benefits  for  the  people.  We  are  stress- 
ing basic  human  needs:  agriculture  and 
related  infrastructure  necessary  for 
food  production  and  marketing,  nutri- 
tion, health,  and  human  resource 
development — together  with  assistance 


to  special  groups  such  as  refugees  and 
victims  of  natural  disasters — and  pro- 
vision of  essential  food  and  com- 
modities for  local  manufacture. 

Our  agricultural  projects  are  de- 
signed to  lay  the  foundation  for  sub- 
stantial food  production  increases.  In 
the  interim,  our  PL-480  Title  I  pro- 
gram is  having  a  significant  impact  on 
food  availabilities  by  providing  badly 
needed  food  resources  without  directly 
depressing  local  production.  Other 
projects  are  directed  at  lowering  the  in- 
cidence and  severity  of  malaria  and 
measles  and  at  the  increased  availabil- 
ity of  locally  produced  tools  for  the 
small  farmer. 

We  are  contributing  up  to  $5  million 
through  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees  to  the  resettlement  of  the 
refugees  returning  to  Zaire  under 


President  Mobutu's  amnesty  and  an  ad- 
ditional $.5  million  in  PL-480  emer- 
gency Title  II  commodities. 

Based  on  the  findings  in 
November-December  of  last  year  of  a 
joint  Zairian-U.S.  nutritional  survey 
team  that  pointed  to  rising  incidence 
and  levels  of  malnutrition  in  Bas-Zaire, 
especially  in  the  zones  of  Tshela  and 
Lukula,  we  are  now  furnishing 
$625,000  in  emergency  aid  for  pur- 
chase and  distribution  of  food  and 
seed.  We  are  attempting  to  provide  this 
aid  to  the  victims  of  famine  through 
several  voluntary  organizations,  in- 
cluding the  Catholic  Relief  Service, 
International  Rescue  Committee, 
Caritas,  League  of  Red  Cross 
Societies,  and  the  Church  of  Christ  in 
Zaire.  By  utilizing  these  groups,  we 
hope  to  determine  whether  an  expanded 


May  1979 


45 


Promoting  Peace  in 
Southern  Khodesia 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  March  7, 
7979.  Mr.  Moose  is  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  African  Affairs.^ 

I  wish  to  thank  the  committee  for 
this  opportunity  to  testify  on  an  issue  to 
which  the  Administration  attaches  con- 
siderable importance:  how  best  to  pro- 
mote peace,  democratic  government, 
and  independence  for  Rhodesia.  The 
committee  has  before  it  for  considera- 
tion two  specific  proposals,  one  intro- 
duced by  Senators  McGovern  and 
Hayakawa,  the  other  by  Senators 
Schweiker  and  DeConcini.  Before 
commenting  on  these  two  proposals,  I 
believe  it  might  be  useful  for  the  com- 
mittee if  I  first  attempt  to  place  their 
consideration  in  a  broader  context  by 
outlining  what  the  Administration's 
efforts  with  respect  to  Rhodesia  are  de- 
signed to  achieve. 

As  you  know,  the  United  States  has 
for  over  2  years  been  engaged  with  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain  in  a  seri- 
ous effort  to  help  resolve  the  issues  that 
have  led  to  the  current  tragic  conflict  in 
Rhodesia.  We  have  done  so  out  of  a 
recognition  that  if  a  solution  is  not 
found  that  can  command  the  support  of 


the  people  of  Rhodesia  and  of  the  in- 
ternational community,  the  inevitable 
result  will  be  a  long  and  bitter  conflict 
in  which  many  more  people  will  suffer 
and  which  will  have  grave  conse- 
quences for  the  whole  of  southern  Af- 
rica. Already  that  conflict  poses  a  seri- 
ous threat  to  the  political  and  economic 
stability  of  states  throughout  the  re- 
gion. The  longer  it  continues,  the 
greater  will  be  the  risk  of  involvement 
by  outside  powers  whose  interests  con- 
flict with  our  own.  And  finally,  a  con- 
tinuing conflict  could  destroy  the  pros- 
pects for  cooperation  among  the  races 
in  building  a  peaceful  and  prosperous 
future  for  an  independent  Zimbabwe 
and  diminish  the  hopes  for  peaceful 
progress  toward  racial  equality  in 
South  Africa. 

As  is  often  the  case,  the  outlines  of 
the  problem  emerge  much  more  clearly 
than  the  outlines  of  a  solution.  While 
the  situation  in  Rhodesia  is  often  per- 
ceived simplistically  as  a  conflict  be- 
tween two  sides,  the  actual  circum- 
stances are  in  fact  much  more  complex. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  patriotic  front 
is  in  reality  a  tenuous  alliance  of  the 
two  externally  based  groups,  [the  Zim- 
babwe African  People's  Union  (ZAPU) 
and  the  Zimbabwe  African  National 
Union    (ZANU)]    each    of    which 


PL-480  Title  II  program  is  feasible  for 
Zaire  in  the  present  circumstances. 

Through  our  ongoing  military  assist- 
ance programs,  we  are  emphasizing 
basics — communications,  transporta- 
tion, and  training  —  as  opposed  to 
costly  and  overly  sophisticated  pro- 
grams which  Zaire  cannot  afford  and 
which  would  offer  little  prospect  of 
effective  defense.  We  welcome  the 
Belgian  and  French  efforts  to  retrain 
Zairian  units  with  a  view  toward  re- 
placing the  inter- African  force  in 
Shaba. 

In  sum  our  programs  are  directly  re- 
lated to  our  policy  goals — protection  of 
U.S.  interests,  economic  and  political 
stability  and  progress,  and  humanitar- 
ian concerns.  Most  importantly,  each 
of  our  programs  is  tied  to  progress  on 
reform. 


misunderstanding  about  the  thrust  of 
our  policy  and  our  programs.  I  have 
tried  to  be  candid  about  the  very  seri- 
ous challenges  that  remain  in  the  way 
of  economic  and  political  progress.  I 
have  tried  as  well  to  recognize  the  very 
important  steps  that  Zaire  has  taken 
toward  fundamental  reforms. 

Our  policy  is  to  encourage  and 
facilitate  reform  and  recovery  by  link- 
ing our  assistance  to  Zaire's  progress  in 
actually  implementing  changes.  We 
believe  our  interests  in  that  part  of  Af- 
rica warrant  continuation  of  this  policy 
so  long  as  there  is  such  progress.  If 
there  is  not,  then  we  should  consider 
policy  options  other  than  those  we  are 
now  pursuing.  D 


Looking  Ahead 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
I     began     this     presentation     by     ments,   U.S.   Government   Printing  Office, 
suggesting  that  there  might  be  some     Washington,  D.c.  20402. 


cherishes  its  own  ambitions  and  pos- 
sesses its  own  army.  Inside  Rhodesia, 
the  Salisbury  parties  have  formed  a  co- 
alition which  only  thinly  disguises  the 
political  rivalries  among  them. 

In  addition  to  the  two  factions  of  the 
patriotic  front  and  the  Rhodesian  secu- 
rity forces,  the  situation  has  been  fur- 
ther complicated  by  the  acquisition  by 
Bishop  Muzorewa  [head  of  the  United 
African  National  Council]  and  the  Rev- 
erend Sithole  [head  of  the  African  Na- 
tional Council/Sithole]  of  their  own 
private  armies,  loyal  only  to  them. 
Adding  further  to  the  potential  for 
confusion  and  chaos  is  the  fact  that 
each  of  the  parties  and  their  armies  are 
dependent  to  one  degree  or  another 
upon  the  support  of  external  parties. 

All  of  these  factions  lay  claim  to  the 
leadership  of  the  country.  Each  seems 
prepared  to  enforce  its  claim  by  a  resort 
to  armed  force.  If  there  is  to  be  any 
hope  of  avoiding  the  violent  confronta- 
tion that  this  situation  portends,  then  it 
is  clear  that  a  way  must  be  found  to 
sort  out  these  conflicting  claims  and 
ambitions  through  a  peaceful  process. 

The  aim  of  the  British  and  American 
Governments  has  been  to  help  institute 
just  such  a  process.  We  have  become 
increasingly  convinced  that  the  key  to 
averting  a  prolonged  and  debilitating 
struggle  for  power  involving  both 
blacks  and  whites  is  through  impar- 
tially administered  elections  held  under 
international  supervision  in  which  all 
political  groups  will  be  able  to  partici- 
pate equitably.  We  believe  this  is  the 
only  way  of  assuring  that  whatever 
government  emerges  will  be  able  to 
command  the  support  of  the  people  of 
the  country  and  of  the  international 
community. 

Both  these  elements  are  essential  to 
Rhodesia's  future  peace  and  security. 
Any  government  that  does  not  enjoy 
the  broad  support  of  the  people  of  the 
country  will  be  inherently  unstable  and 
vulnerable  to  challenge  from  both 
within  and  without.  Only  a  demo- 
cratically elected  government  would 
have  the  broad  support  needed  to  resist 
factional  opposition.  Moreover,  only  a 
process  that  can  command  the  accept- 
ance of  the  surrounding  states  and  the 
international  community  can  remove 
any  and  all  pretext  for  outside  inter- 
vention on  behalf  of  one  faction  or 
another. 

Our  experience  in  the  Namibia 
negotiations  has  demonstrated  that  it  is 
possible  to  gain  the  support  of  seem- 
ingly implacable  enemies  and  of  the 
international  community  for  the  princi- 
ple of  free  and  fair  elections  under 
U.N.  supervision  which  do  not 
guarantee  power  to  any  particular  fac- 
tion or  party.  While  the  results  of  this 


46 


negotiation  are  not  yet  completed  and 
important  issues  remain  to  be  resolved, 
the  fundamental  principle  of  impar- 
tially administered,  U.N. -supervised 
elections  has  been  accepted  by  South 
Africa  and  the  Southwest  Africa 
People's  Organization  (SWAPO)  as  the 
basis  for  a  settlement  and  has  been 
strongly  supported  by  the  front-line 
states. 

What  the  British  and  American  Gov- 
ernments are  seeking  from  the  parties 
to  the  Rhodesian  conflict  is  their  ac- 
ceptance of  this  very  same  principle. 

Elements  of  the  Anglo-American 
Proposals 

The  key  to  being  able  to  conduct 
U . N . -supervised  elections  is  the 
agreement  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict 
to  a  fair  and  impartial  process.  The 
Anglo-American  proposals  emerged 
out  of  the  efforts  of  the  British  and 
American  Governments  to  outline  the 
basic  conditions  under  which  U.N.- 
supervised  elections  could  be  held.  It 
might  be  helpful  to  review  the  essentia! 
elements  of  those  proposals  and  the 
problems  they  were  designed  to  con- 
front.^ 

•  it  was  recognized  that  free  elec- 
tions cannot  be  conducted  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  violence  and  intimidation. 
Therefore,  the  proposals  placed  special 
emphasis  on  the  need  for  a  negotiated 
cease-fire  and  on  the  introduction  of  a 
substantial  U.N.  presence  to  maintain 
and  monitor  it. 

•  But  in  order  to  get  a  cease-fire, 
one  must  first  have  agreement  on  a  fair 
political  process.  Therefore,  it  was 
recognized  that  the  arrangements  gov- 
erning the  elections  must  be  such  that 
no  faction  could  predominate  and  in 
which  all  parties  could  have  confi- 
dence. Thus  we  and  the  British  pro- 
posed a  neutral  transition  administra- 
tion to  govern  the  territory  during  the 
brief  period  leading  up  to  the  elections 
and  a  U.N.  presence  to  insure  the  im- 
partiality of  the  elections  process. 

•  We  recognized  the  critical  impor- 
tance of  finding  a  way  to  deal  with  the 
existence  of  no  fewer  than  five  separate 
military  forces  and  to  create  a  single 
army  that  would  be  loyal  to  the  elected 
independence  government. 

•  It  was  accepted  that  all  those  in- 
volved would  feel  more  secure  about 
the  outcome  if  there  were  agreement  by 
the  parties  to  the  outlines  of  a  demo- 
cratic constitution  that  would  provide 
due  protection  for  individual  rights. 

The  Anglo-American  proposals  con- 
stitute one  approach — we  believe  a 
valid  one — to  the  problem  of  how  to 
create  conditions  essential  to  the  hold- 


ing of  free  and  fair  elections.  There 
may  be  others  that  are  equally  valid. 
But  it  seems  to  us  that  the  essential 
feature  of  any  settlement  is  the  princi- 
ple of  impartially  administered,  U.N.- 
supervised  elections.  Once  that  funda- 
mental principle  is  accepted  by  the 
parties,  then  it  will  be  possible  to  con- 
duct productive  negotiations  on  the 
specific  arrangements  to  implement 
that  goal. 

Status  of  the  Negotiations 

When  Secretaries  Owen  [U.K. 
Foreign  Secretary  David  Owen]  and 
Vance  met  with  the  leaders  of  the  pa- 
triotic front  in  Dar  es  Salaam  last 
April,  they  agreed  to  two  of  these  basic 
provisions  for  free  and  fair  elections: 
They  accepted  the  idea  of  a  U.N.  pres- 
ence to  maintain  a  cease-fire  and 
monitor  the  elections,  and  they  agreed 
to  a  neutral  resident  commissioner  who 
would  exercise  control  over  law  and 
order  and  defense  during  the  transition 


Southern 
Rhodesia 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  21,  1979' 

The  conflict  in  Rhodesia,  which  has 
brought  widespread  human  suffering  to 
that  territory  and  to  neighboring  states, 
has  been  a  matter  of  deep  concern  to 
the  United  States  and  to  the  interna- 
tional community.  We,  therefore,  wish 
to  endorse  the  appeal  issued  by  the  In- 
ternational Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC)  on  March  20  which  calls  upon 
all  parties  to  the  Rhodesian  conflict  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  end  the  prolif- 
eration of  indiscriminate  violence 
against  civilians  and  to  permit  the 
ICRC  to  carry  out  its  humanitarian 
work. 

In  keeping  with  our  commitment  to 
the  principles  and  provisions  of  the 
Geneva  conventions,  the  United  States 
wishes  to  associate  itself  to  this  appeal 
and  to  urge  all  concerned  to  do  the 
same.  We  again  urge  the  parties  to  the 
conflict  to  recognize  the  wisdom  of 
compromise  on  an  impartial  settlement 
process  leading  to  U.N. -supervised 
elections  that  can  end  the  suffering  of 
people  who  have  already  suffered  for 
too  long.  D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III 


Department  of  State  Bulletin,; 

period.  They  also  agreed  to  attend  an 
all-parties  meeting  where  the  details  of 
a  settlement  agreement  could  be 
negotiated.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
the  patriotic  front  has  insisted  on  other 
arrangements  for  the  transition  period 
that  would  have  the  effect  of  giving  it  a 
predominant  political  position.  We  and 
the  British  have  made  it  clear  that  such 
arrangements  are  incompatible  with  the 
concept  of  an  impartial  transition  proc- 
ess and,  as  such,  could  not  have  our 
support. 

I  think  it  is  important  to  note  that  in 
our  frequent  discussions  with  them,  the 
front-line  states  have  stated  their  clear 
preference  for  a  settlement  based  on 
impartially  administered,  U.N.- 
supervised  elections.  They  see  this 
process  as  not  only  assuring  an  irrever- 
sible transition  to  majority  rule  but 
also  —  and  just  as  important  —  as  a 
means  of  averting  a  subsequent  civil 
war  in  Rhodesia  of  the  kind  that  was 
recently  witnessed  in  Angola. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  the  preoccupation  of  the  Salisbury 
parties — going  back  even  before  March 
3  of  last  year — with  their  own  internal 
arrangements  has  been  a  significant  ob- 
stacle to  progress  toward  a  more  com- 
prehensive settlement  that  would 
involve  all  of  the  parties  in  U.N.- 
supervised  elections.  Not  until  Oc- 
tober, during  the  visit  of  the  Salisbury 
Executive  Council  to  Washington,  did 
the  internal  parties  finally  agree  to  at- 
tend an  all-parties  meeting.  Since  then, 
our  efforts  to  engage  the  parties  in 
Salisbury  in  the  kind  of  preliminary 
discussions  that  are  essential  to  the 
success  of  an  all-parties  meeting  have 
met  with  a  persistent  lack  of  interest. 
Meanwhile,  the  externally  based  guer- 
rilla groups  have  become  more  insistent 
in  their  demands  for  what  would 
amount  to  a  direct  transfer  of  power  to 
them. 

It  was  because  of  the  obstacles  en- 
countered on  both  sides  that  [U.K.] 
Prime  Minister  Callaghan's  special 
emissary,  Cledwyn  Hughes,  and  U.S. 
Ambassador  Stephen  Low  were  forced 
to  conclude  following  their  tour  of 
southern  Africa  last  December  that 
there  was,  for  the  moment,  no  realistic 
prospect  of  convening  a  successful 
all-parties  meeting. 

There  are  increasing  indications, 
however,  that  some  of  the  leaders  in 
Salisbury  and  their  supporters  have 
come  to  realize  that  the  April  20  elec- 
tions cannot  solve  the  fundamental 
problem  of  ending  the  conflict  or  of  in- 
stalling a  government  that  will  be  able 
to  command  the  broad  support  of  the 
people  of  Rhodesia  and  of  the  interna- 
tional community.  Chief  Chirau  [head 
of  the  Zimbabwe  United  People's  Or- 


May  1979 


47 


ganizationj,  himself  a  signatory  to  the 
March  3  internal  settlement  agreement, 
IS  among  those  in  Salisbury  who  have 
been  prepared  to  say  publicly  what 
many  other  Rhodesians,  both  black  and 
white,  feel  privately:  that  a  viable  and 
lasting  settlement  will  require  further 
negotiations  which  involve  all  parties, 
including  the  patriotic  front. 

The  Internal  Settlement 

The  Administration  has  frequently 
been  accused  of  having  prejudged  the 
internal  settlement  and  of  being  funda- 
mentally opposed  to  the  leaders  in- 
I  volved  in  it.  Some  have  even  alleged 
that  the  Administration's  position  is 
one  of  support  for  the  patriotic  front  in 
its  effort  to  impose  its  authority  by 
force  of  arms.  None  of  these  accusa- 
tions bears  any  truth. 

The  President  will  faithfully  fulfill 
the  requirement  placed  upon  him  by 
law  to  make  a  determination  on  the 
conduct  of  the  scheduled  April  20 
elections.  In  making  that  determination 
under  the  Case-Javits  amendment  to  the 
1978  International  Security  Assistance 
Act,  the  President  will  take  into  ac- 
count all  of  the  information  available  to 
him  but  will  not  be  bound  by  the  report 
of  any  particular  body  or  group. 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  it  is 
not  what  we  in  the  U.S.  Government, 
or  in  the  U.S.  Congress,  or  in  any  other 
outside  body  think  of  the  internal  set- 
tlement and  its  arrangements.  What 
matters  is  whether  those  arrangements 
will  in  the  first  instance  command  the 
support  of  the  people  of  Rhodesia.  If 
they  do  not,  then  it  would  be  accurate 
to  say  that  these  arrangements  will  not 
contribute  to  a  solution  of  the  Rhode- 
sian  problem. 

In  assessing  whether  the  scheduled 
April  elections  are  likely  to  provide  a 
lasting  solution  to  the  Rhodesian  prob- 
lem, it  is  important  to  take  into  account 
the  conditions  which  are  likely  to  pre- 
vail over  the  next  2  months. 

•  The  country  is  torn  by  war.  The 
patriotic  front  will  do  everything  it  can 
to  prevent  the  scheduled  April  20  elec- 
tions from  being  held.  The  Rhodesian 
security  forces  may  similarly  resort  to 
force  to  get  voters  to  the  polls.  And 
there  is  every  indication  that  the  vari- 
ous leaders  in  Salisbury  are  prepared  to 
use  their  own  private  armies  to  compel 
support  for  their  candidates. 

•  As  matters  now  stand,  large  areas 
of  the  country  are  not  under  the  effec- 
tive control  of  either  side,  and  more 
than  85%  of  the  country  is  governed 
under  martial  law. 

•  In  addition,  the  two  wings  of  the 
patriotic  front  have   been  banned  or- 


ganizations inside  Rhodesia  since  Sep- 
tember of  last  year  and  many  ZAPU 
and  ZANU  supporters  have  been  placed 
in  indefinite  detention.  Under  these 
current  restrictions,  they  have  been 
prohibited  from  engaging  in  any  or- 
ganized political  activities  and  from 
publishing  their  views. 

•  The  scheduled  elections  will  be 
held  on  the  basis  of  a  constitution 
which  blacks  representing  97%  of  the 
population  have  been  given  no  oppor- 
tunity to  approve  and  which  gives  what 
many  would  regard  as  a  dispropor- 
tionate share  of  power  and  influence  to 
the  white  minority. 

Given  these  circumstances,  it  is  not 
unreasonable  to  question  whether  the 
government  that  emerges  from  the 
April  20  elections  will  be  able  to  com- 
mand the  support  of  either  the  people 
of  Rhodesia  or  of  the  international 
community.  If  not,  then  we  see  every 
likelihood  that  the  war  will  not  only 
continue  but  escalate.  The  longer  it 
continues,  the  greater  will  be  the 
danger  of  a  subsequent  civil  war  which 
could  very  likely  bring  increased  in- 
volvement by  outside  powers.  The 
threat  to  the  stability  and  independence 
of  states  throughout  the  region  —  such 
as  Botswana,  Zambia,  and  Malawi  — 
will  increase.  And  the  prospects  for 
peaceful  change  through  negotiation 
and  accommodation  will  diminish. 

This  committee  presently  has  before 
it  for  consideration  two  resolutions: 
one  dealing  with  the  issue  of  whether 
and  under  what  circumstances  the 
United  States  should  continue  to  apply 
mandatory  Security  Council  sanctions 
against  Rhodesia;  the  other  with  the 
question  of  sending  observers  to  the 
April  elections. 

I  would  like  to  state  frankly  and 
without  prejudice  to  the  deliberations 
of  the  committee  that  one  of  the  more 
unfortunate  aspects  of  the  debate  on 
these  two  issues  is  that  it  has  tended  to 
obscure  the  perceptions  of  all  of  us  as 
to  the  real  issues  and  stakes  involved  in 
Rhodesia.  I  believe  it  is  extremely  im- 
portant that  the  committee  consider 
whether  its  endorsement  of  either  of 
these  proposals  would  contribute  to 
solving  the  fundamental  problem  of 
bringing  a  just  and  lasting  settlement  to 
Rhodesia. 

The  Administration  has  decided  that 
it  will  not  send  observers  to  the  sched- 
uled April  20  elections  because  the  in- 
volvement of  the  United  States  in  an 
election  process  which  is  widely 
regarded  —  not  only  in  Africa  but  by 
our  friends  around  the  world — as  in- 
herently illegal  and  unrepresentative 
could  seriously  undermine  the  interna- 
tional standing  and  prestige  of  the 


United  States.  And  it  could  seriously 
damage  our  ability  to  work  with  all  the 
parties  for  a  lasting  solution  to  the 
Rhodesian  conflict. 

One  must  also  consider  the  likely 
consequence  of  encouraging  the  parties 
in  Salisbury  to  persist  in  their  present 
course  in  the  expectation  of  receiving 
material  and  moral  support  from  the 
United  States  and  others  which  is  most 
unlikely  to  be  forthcoming.  Certainly 
the  Administration  would  oppose  the 
direct  or  indirect  involvement  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Rhodesian  con- 
flict, and  we  strongly  doubt  that  the 
American  people  would  support  such 
involvement.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, the  likely  consequence  of 
raising  expectations  of  support  in 
Salisbury  would  be  to  prolong  the  war 
and  the  suffering  and  to  diminish  the 
prospect  for  reaching  a  viable  and 
lasting  settlement. 

In  this  situation,  the  responsibilities 
of  this  Administration  —  indeed,  I  be- 
lieve, of  any  U.S.  administration — are 
clear.  We  will  not  endorse  the  unrea- 
sonable claims  and  demands  of  any 
party  to  the  conflict.  We  cannot  sup- 
port the  patriotic  front  in  its  insistence 
on  arrangements  that  would  assure  it  a 
dominant  political  position.  Nor  will 
we  support  the  Salisbury  parties  in 
their  efforts  to  institute  arrangements 
which  effectively  exclude  the  equitable 
participation  of  recognized  political 
groups. 

We  must  continue  to  hold  out  the 
prospect,  dim  though  it  might  some- 
time seem,  of  a  political  solution  that 
can  provide  a  rational  alternative  to  the 
violence  and  suffering.  For  that  reason 
we  will  continue  to  work  closely  with 
the  British  to  secure  agreement  of  the 
parties  to  a  settlement  based  on 
genuinely  fair  and  impartially  ad- 
ministered elections  held  under  U.N. 
supervision.  We  will  do  so  because  we 
can  see  no  other  way  of  averting  a 
wider  and  more  tragic  war  or  of  bring- 
ing about  a  lasting  solution  to  the 
Rhodesian  problem.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 

^For  text  of  proposals,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct. 
3,  1977,  p.  424. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin, 


ARMIi^  COI^TROL:        SALT  Mi 

and  the  National  Defense 


Following  are  addresses  by  National 
Security  Adviser  Zhigniew  Brzezinski 
before  the  Chicago  committee  of  the 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations  at  the 
Art  Institute  of  Chicago  on  April  4. 
1979.  and  by  Secretary  of  Defense 
Harold  Brown  before  the  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations  and  the  Foreign 
Policy  Association  in  New  York  on 
AprifS. 

NATIONAL  SECURITY 
ADVISER  BRZEZINSKI* 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  on  the  verge  of  an  historic 
achievement:  completion  of  a  com- 
prehensive agreement  on  limiting 
strategic  offensive  nuclear  forces.  Our 
nation  has  been  striving  to  achieve  this 
goal  since  the  SALT  [Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks]  negotiations  began 
nearly  10  years  and  three  Administra- 
tions ago.  Today,  I  want  to  talk  with 
you  about  the  importance  of  this  SALT 
agreement  in  terms  of  our  national  se- 
curity and  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

The  signing  of  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment will  engage  us  in  a  vigorous  and, 
we  hope,  enlightening  national  debate 
leading  to  Senate  ratification  of  the 
SALT  II  treaty.  Equally  important,  this 
national  dialogue  should  produce  a 
fresh  consensus  for  policies  to  insure 
our  national  security  in  the  I980's. 
President  Carter  began  this  dialogue  in 
his  recent  address  at  Georgia  Tech.^ 
Secretary  of  Defense  Harold  Brown 
will  be  discussing  military  and  defense 
aspects  of  the  treaty  tomorrow  in  New 
York  City. 

The  .security  of  the  United  States  can 
only  be  achieved  through  the  full  par- 
ticipation of  our  elected  leaders  and  of 
the  American  people.  As  we  all  realize, 
the  issues  which  challenged  us  in 
negotiating  SALT  II  will  not  disappear 
once  the  agreement  is  signed  and 
ratified.  Protecting  our  strategic  inter- 
ests and  pursuing  a  constructive 
strategic  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  will  remain  on  our  national 
agenda  as  far  into  the  future  as  we  can 
see.  As  a  result,  our  policies  must  be 
based  on  realism,  patience,  and  wis- 
dom about  the  future.  The  American 
people  must  understand  these  policies. 
So  must  our  allies.  So  must  the  leaders 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 


SALT  and  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  the  U.S.S.R. 

As  President  Carter  has  stated, 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  will  continue  to 
be  a  mixture  of  competition  and  coop- 
eration. Our  policies  must  be  designed 
to  pursue  both  and  to  draw  an  effective 
balance  between  the  two  —  seeking  to 
broaden  cooperation  where  we  can  but 
effectively  meeting  the  challenge  of  the 
competition  where  we  must. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  military 
superpower  that  is  now  pressing  for- 
ward to  become  a  true  global  power.  In 
some  parts  of  the  world,  the  Soviet 
Union  challenges  our  security  interests 
and  those  of  our  close  friends  and  al- 
lies. 

In  pursuing  its  goals,  the  Soviet 
Union  relies  primarily  on  its  military 
power.  This  is  its  strength  —  strength 
which  we  match — but  in  many  ways  it 
is  also  the  source  for  its  weakness.  By 
diverting  massive  resources  from  its 
civilian  economy  to  build  its  military 
machine,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
weakened  the  strength  of  its  society. 

In  contrast,  the  United  States  enjoys 
many  unique  assets:  our  economic  and 
technological  dynamism;  our  thriving 
and  stable  society;  our  government 


military  power  to  gain  influence.  This 
leads  it  to  be  both  more  assertive  to- 
ward others  and  more  fearful  of  its  own 
position  —  a  combination  that  poses 
deep  challenges  to  our  steadfastness 
and  resolve.  We  are  meeting  these 
challenges  today;  we  will  continue  to 
do  so  in  the  future. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  gradually  come  to  understand  the 
risks  of  a  competition  that  is  so  heavily 
influenced  by  military  issues.  It  is  a 
nation  that  directly  suffered  the  full 
brunt  of  the  worst  conflict  of  modern 
times.  With  us,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
come  to  recognize  that  SALT  can  help 
contain  the  risks  of  nuclear  holocaust 
which  would  flow  from  unrestrained 
competition  in  strategic  arms.  As  a  re- 
sult, SALT,  in  the  context  of  pro- 
grammed U.S.  strategic  capabilities, 
can  provide  the  needed  strategic  stabil- 
ity for  progress  in  political  relations 
between  our  two  countries. 

Even  with  this  SALT  agreement,  the 
competitive  elements  of  our  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  will  remain.  We 
will  need  a  sustained  and  long-term 
effort  to  protect  our  interests  and  those 
of  our  friends.  But  this  competition  can 
be  managed  more  safely  and  effectively 


[The  SALT  II  treaty]  unambiguously  establishes  that  verification  is  a 
necessary  component  of  arms  control  agreements  in  general  and  SALT 
II  specifically. 


which  can  count  on  genuine  public 
participation  and  support;  our  ability  to 
count  on  allies  who  have  joined  with  us 
in  free  association. 

The  Soviet  Union's  ideological  ap- 
peal has  flagged  at  home  and  abroad. 
Its  economic  and  political  systems  are 
models  for  none.  Perhaps  most  remark- 
able is  its  political  isolation,  as  it  has 
discovered  that  it  is  difficult  to  trans- 
form raw  military  power  into  political 
gain.  It  has  allies,  clients,  and  proxies. 
But  these  are  associations  usually  de- 
fined by  Soviet  might,  not  by  mutual 
respect  or  self-interest. 

The  limits  on  open  and  free  Soviet 
political  engagement  with  the  commu- 
nity of  nations  —  relationships  which 
we  enjoy  in  full  measure  —  force  the 
Soviet  Union  to  concentrate  on  its 


if  our  two  nations  can  and  will  contain 
the  dangers  of  nuclear  confrontation, 
through  the  agreed  and  reciprocal  exer- 
cise of  restraint. 

In  pursuing  mutual  restraint  through 
SALT,  we  are  concerned  not  only 
about  the  Soviet  Union  of  today  but 
also  about  the  Soviet  Union  of  tomor- 
row. During  the  next  several  years,  the 
Soviet  leadership  will  change.  We  can- 
not predict  the  character  of  the  new 
leaders  or  all  the  major  aspects  of  fu- 
ture Soviet  policy.  But  we  can  work 
now  to  insure  that  Soviet  leaders  of  the 
present  and  the  future  will  understand 
the  policies  and  purposes  of  the  United 
States  —  both  our  determination  to 
protect  our  interests  and  those  of  our 
friends  and  allies  and  our  desire  to 
broaden  detente  and  cooperation. 


May  1979 

When  the  next  generation  of  Soviet 
leaders  decides  its  policies  toward 
strategic  arms  and  toward  the  United 
States,  we  want  them  to  face  clear  and 
agreed  restraints  on  the  competition  in 
strategic  arms.  We  want  these  to  be  the 
restraints  of  SALT  II,  not  the  milder 
restraints  of  the  SALT  1  Interim 
Agreement.  We  want  them  to  see  con- 
vincing evidence  that  the  United  States 
recognizes  its  interests  and  will  suc- 
cessfully defend  them  whatever  the 
challenge.  And  we  want  them  to  know 
how  they  can  join  with  us  to  further 
detente  and  cooperation. 

That  is  a  vital  objective  of  the  new 
SALT  agreement;  helping  to  determine 
the  way  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  will 
see  future  relations  with  the  United 
States  —  setting  limits  now  on  its  ac- 
tions in  the  strategic  field  and  increas- 
ing the  chances  that  limits  on  these 
arms  can  lead  to  more  peaceful  rela- 
tions. 

What  is  SALT? 

Our  goals  in  SALT  are  the  same  as 
our  goals  in  overall  strategic  policy:  to 
promote  greater  stability,  to  reduce  in- 
centives for  either  side  to  use  nuclear 
force,  to  limit  pressures  to  build  up 
strategic  arms,  and  to  guarantee  the  se- 
curity of  our  national  interests  and 
those  of  our  friends  and  allies. 

The  SALT  treaty  of  1972  sharply 
limited  deployment  of  antiballistic  mis- 
sile systems  on  both  sides.  It  averted  a 
costly  and  dangerous  antiballistic  mis- 
sile (ABM)  competition  which  neither 
side  wanted  but  which  both  feared  the 
other  was  about  to  initiate.  We  reached 
a  comprehensive  agreement  with  rela- 
tive ease  because  extensive  ABM  de- 
ployment had  not  yet  begun,  and 
neither  side  was  confident  that  its  ABM 
technology  would  be  effective. 

The  challenges  involved  in 
negotiating  a  comprehensive  agreement 
on  limiting  strategic  offensive  arms 
have  been  far  greater  because  both 
sides  already  have  large  deployments 
of  these  systems.  Moreover,  marked 
differences  in  the  composition  of 
Soviet  and  American  offensive  forces 
have  made  it  extremely  difficult  to  de- 
fine limitations  that  are  both  balanced 
and  equitable. 

But  we  have  persevered,  and  the  ex- 
pected agreement  will  go  far  beyond 
the  interim  SALT  agreement.  It  is 
much  more  comprehensive  and  better 
suited  to  America's  strategic  needs.  Let 
me  outline  some  of  the  major  accom- 
plishments of  the  SALT  II  agreement. 

•  For  the  first  time,  it  sets  equal 
ceilings  on  all  major  intercontinental 


strategic  delivery  systems,  as  well  as 
important  subcategories  of  MIRV'ed 
[multiple  independently-targetable 
reentry  vehicle]  missiles. 

•  It  imposes  an  effective  upper  limit 
on  the  number  of  warheads  that  can  be 
placed  on  each  MIRVed  ICBM  [inter- 
continental ballistic  missile].  This  is 
critically  important  because  it 
simplifies  our  future  strategic  planning 
and  adds  more  certainty  to  our  military 
projections. 

•  The  treaty  limits  each  side  to  de- 
veloping and  deploying  one  completely 
new  ICBM  before  1985.  This  provision 
will  inhibit  the  qualitative  expansion  of 
the  arms  race,  while  still  permitting  us 
to  develop  an  entirely  new  ICBM  and  a 
more  secure  basing  mode  for  our  ICBM 
force.  This  we  need  to  do  because  im- 
provements in  Soviet  military  capacity 
are  increasing  the  threat  to  our  Min- 
uteman  ICBM's.  The  SALT  treaty 
gives  us  the  flexibility  to  solve  this 
problem. 

SALT  II  goes  beyond  SALT  I,  in  all 
these  provisions,  by  setting  equal  ceil- 
ings for  the  categories  of  weapons  it 
covers.  This  requirement  reflects  a  key 
demand  expressed  by  the  Senate  when 
SALT  I  was  negotiated.  This 
negotiated  principle  of  equality  will  re- 
quire an  actual  reduction  in  the  Soviet 
Union's  intercontinental  forces.  They 
will  have  to  eliminate  more  than  250 
systems,  and  the  importance  of  this 
step  should  not  be  underestimated.  It 
may  well  be  the  forerunner  of  more 
substantial  and  significant  reductions 
by  both  sides. 

It  is  also  important  to  recognize  that 
the  SALT  II  treaty  runs  only  through 
1985.  While  our  jong-term  goal  is  a 
permanent  treaty,  the  development  of 
offensive  weapons  remains  far  too 
dynamic  for  us  to  make  confident  pre- 
dictions about  the  late  1980's  and  be- 
yond. But  the  SALT  II  treaty  does 
markedly  reduce  our  uncertainty  about 
Soviet  forces  in  the  early  1980's  —  a 
period  in  which  we  must  improve  our 
own  strategic  forces,  especially  to 
allow  them  to  survive  in  the  face  of 
potential  Soviet  attack.  These  neces- 
sary improvements  on  our  part  would 
be  far  more  costly,  and  we  would  be 
far  less  confident  about  their  success,  if 
we  were  without  the  limits  which 
SALT  II  will  impose  on  Soviet  forces. 

We  have  long  recognized  that  SALT 
II  would  have  little  value  if  we  could 
not  be  confident  that  its  provisions 
were  being  followed  by  the  Soviet 
Union.  That  is  why  verification  was 
such  an  important  issue  in  the  negotia- 
tions. The  treaty  reflects  our  concerns. 
It  unambiguously  establishes  that  ver- 


49 

ification  is  a  necessary  component  of 
arms  control  agreements  in  general  and 
SALT  II  specifically.  It  establishes  that 
national  technical  means  of  verifica- 
tion, such  as  satellite  photography,  are 
legitimate  tools  for  insuring  com- 
pliance. It  prohibits  both  interference 
with  these  tools  and  deliberate  con- 
cealment that  could  impede  the  collec- 
tion of  necessary  information.  And  the 
agreement  mandates  that  both  sides 
follow  special  procedures  to  make  ver- 
ification easier. 

These  important  steps  significantly  re- 
duce the  uncertainty  about  the  threat 
each  country  faces.  One  of  the  major 
triggers  of  increased  arms  competition 
is  uncertainty  about  what  might  exist. 
And  the  SALT  II  treaty  takes  a  critical 
step  toward  reducing  that  uncertainty. 

It  should  also  be  underscored  that  the 
SALT  II  treaty  allows  us  to  proceed 
with  the  force  improvements  that  we 
need  within  a  structure  of  predictability 
and  confidence. 

What  SALT  Is  Not 

This  is  how  the  SALT  II  agreement 
will  enhance  our  security  and  provide 
the  basis  for  further  limits  on  strategic 
arms  in  the  future.  But  a  sensible 
evaluation  of  the  SALT  II  agreement 
also  requires  clear  understanding  of 
what  it  does  not  do,  and  what  it  cannot 
do. 

First,  and  most  important,  the  SALT 
II  treaty  is  not  an  agreement  based  on 
trust.  It  stands  on  its  own  merits  based 
on  common  interest,  expressed  in  hard 
bargaining  and  compromises.  It  pro- 
vides for  adequate  verification  of  es- 
sential provisions,  it  is  backed  up  by 
strong  U.S.  capabilities  to  respond  to 
both  present  and  future  military  needs. 

Clearly,  the  SALT  II  treaty  will  also 
not  signal  the  end  of  East- West  compe- 
tition. Where  our  interests  are 
threatened,  we  shall  defend  them.  And 
where  we  can  broaden  detente  and 
achieve  new  forms  of  cooperation  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  we  shall  seek  to  do 
so  as  well. 

SALT  II  is  not  the  end  of  military 
competition  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
even  in  strategic  arms.  During  the  last 
two  decades,  the  Soviet  Union  has  ex- 
panded and  modernized  its  armed 
forces  in  all  areas.  Its  steadily  growing 
defense  budget  consumes  more  than 
10%  of  Soviet  GNP.  As  a  result,  we 
are  confronted  in  many  areas  with 
military  competition  to  which  we  must 
respond. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  will  keep  those 
requirements  lower  than  they  would 
otherwise  be  in  one  area — strategic 
arms  —  but  it  will  not  end  them.  The 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


most  urgent  problem  we  face  is  the 
growing  vulnerability  of  our  ICBM 
force.  In  addition,  we  must  modernize 
and  improve  our  theater  nuclear  and 
conventional  forces.  We  can  and  shall 
do  so,  and  nothing  in  the  SALT  II 
treaty  prevents  us  from  taking  these 
necessary  steps  on  our  own  and  with 
our  allies. 

No  one  should  regard  the  SALT  II 
treaty  as  a  way  to  impose  comprehen- 
sive constraints  on  everything  that  the 
Soviet  Union  does  in  its  military  and 
foreign  policy,  much  less  on  what  it 
does  within  its  own  society.  In  our  own 
national  debate  about  SALT,  some  ob- 
servers question  whether  we  can  sign 
an  agreement  when  the  Soviet  Union 
continues  to  act  against  our  interests  in 
many  areas  abroad  and  fails  to  recog- 
nize basic  human  rights  at  home.  They 
thus  insist  on  linkage. 

Our  position  on  linkage  is  clear.  We 
believe  that  limitations  on  strategic 
arms  are  desirable  in  themselves.  The 
quest  for  such  limitations  should  not  be 
held  hostage  either  to  other  American 
or  Soviet  policies  or  to  competition 
between  us.  We  do  not  accept  any  link- 
age, for  example,  between  closer 
U.S. -Chinese  cooperation  on  a  variety 
of  issues  and  SALT,  and  we  would 
strongly  reject  any  Soviet  effort  to  im- 
pose such  a  negative  connection. 

By  the  same  token,  we  cannot  insist 
that  the  Soviet  Union  accommodate  us 
in  regard  to  matters  of  concern  to  us  as 
a  condition  for  an  agreement  with  the 
United  States  on  strategic  limitations. 
To  impose  such  a  linkage  would  mean 
that  no  problem  in  the  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lationship could  be  solved  unless  all 
major  issues  were  resolved  simultane- 
ously. This  is  not  a  prescription  for 
policy  but  for  paralysis.  Accordingly, 
our  task  is  to  obtain  a  good  SALT 
agreement  and  to  meet  as  appropriate 
Soviet  challenges  where  and  when  they 
arise. 

Criticisms  and  Rebuttals 

In  the  weeks  ahead,  the  SALT  II 
agreement  will  be  subjected  to  search- 
ing discussion  by  the  Senate  and  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  And  that, 
in  our  democracy,  is  the  way  it  should 
be.  It  is  impossible  to  negotiate  an 
agreement  on  anything  that  will  please 
everyone.  Critics  of  the  SALT  II  treaty 
will  raise  a  wide  variety  of  objections. 
1  think  it  might  help  to  clear  the  air  if  I 
tried  to  answer  some  of  the  more  com- 
mon criticisms  of  this  agreement. 

It  will  be  maintained  that  the  agree- 
ment does  not  go  far  enough,  that  the 
ceilings  are  too  high,  and  that  the  lim- 
itations are  too  modest.  Let  me  assure 
you  that  no  one  agrees  more  sincerely 


with  this  criticism  than  President  Car- 
ter. Yet  he  recognizes  —  and  we  all 
need  to — that  the  pursuit  of  the  best 
cannot  be  permitted  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  achieving  the  good.  The  achieve- 
ments of  the  SALT  II  treaty  are  useful 
and  real.  They  move  the  prospects  for 
peace  and  stability  far  ahead  of  where 
they  would  be  in  the  absence  of  this 
treaty.  The  road  to  achieving  more  am- 
bitious strategic  arms  control  lies  in 
approving  this  agreement  and  then 
moving  ahead  toward  greater  goals. 

There  will  be  those  who  will  argue 
that  this  agreement  —  despite  the  prin- 
ciple of  equality  on  which  its  essential 
provisions  are  based  —  will   impose   a 


not    symmetry    of   systems    but    a 
framework  for  equal  security. 

Furthermore,  much  criticism  of  the 
SALT  II  treaty  will  focus  on  whether  it 
can  be  adequately  verified.  We  are 
fully  confident  that  it  can.  We  maintain 
a  vast,  sophisticated,  and  expensive 
array  of  means  to  detect  and  monitor 
what  the  Soviet  Union  is  doing  in  its 
strategic  programs.  They  are  totally 
under  our  own  control;  in  no  way  do 
they  require  us  to  simply  trust  Soviet 
good  will.  These  means  help  us  to 
overcome  a  major  difference  between 
our  two  countries  —  our  open  society 
versus  their  closed  one.  We  are  able  to" 
monitor  many  aspects  of  the  develop- 


We  believe  that  limitations  on  strategic  arms  are  desirable  in  them- 
selves. The  quest  for  such  limitations  should  not  be  held  hostage  either 
to  other  American  or  Soviet  policies  or  to  competition  between  us. 


degree  of  strategic  inferiority  on  our 
nation.  I  believe  these  criticisms  are 
unwarranted,  alarmist,  and  I  would  like 
to  explain  why. 

•  It  will  be  said  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  permitted  to  have  very  heavy 
missiles,  while  ours  are  much  lighter. 
Yet  we  have  never  had  an  interest  in 
building  heavier  missiles  ourselves, 
relying  instead  on  our  qualitative  ad- 
vantages. And  we  have  achieved  in 
SALT  II  a  truly  important  restriction  on 
how  the  Soviets  can  exploit  their  heavy 
missiles  by  limiting  the  number  of 
warheads  each  can  carry. 

•  It  will  be  said  that  the  agreement 
fails  to  cover  the  Backfire  bomber, 
which  could  reach  the  United  States. 
Yet.  the  agreement  also  does  not  con- 
strain our  F-111  bombers  based  in 
Britain  or  other  aircraft  which  could 
also  be  used  against  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  It  will  he  said  that  the  agreement 
includes  limits  on  cruise  missiles  which 
are  more  important  to  us  than  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  Yet,  we  are  permitted  to 
mount  a  sizable  force  of  air-launched 
cruise  missiles  without  a  limit  on  their 
range.  And  limits  on  sea-launched  and 
land-launched  cruise  missiles  will  ex- 
pire well  before  we  could  deploy  them. 

1  cite  these  examples  —  and  there 
will  be  more  —  for  a  simple  reason:  We 
have  gained  or  retained  one  or  more 
advantages  for  ourselves  for  every  one 
we  have  granted  the  Soviet  Union.  And 
where  any  Soviet  capability  truly  pre- 
sents a  military  problem,  we  are  free 
within  the  terms  of  the  agreement  to  re- 
spond in  appropriate  ways  to  guarantee 
our  security.  This  is  what  it  means  to 
have  a  good  and  equitable  agreement; 


ment,  testing,  production,  deploy- 
ment, training,  and  operation  of  Soviet 
strategic  forces  despite  the  closed  na- 
ture of  Soviet  society  and  despite 
Soviet  obsession  with  secrecy. 

To  be  sure,  no  means  of  verification 
can  be  absolutely  perfect.  Yet  through 
our  enormous  efforts  —  harnessing  the 
world's  most  advanced  technology  and 
the  skills  of  many  tens  of  thousands  of 
our  most  highly  trained  people  —  we 
are  confident  that  we  can  detect  any 
significant  violation  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement  well  before  we  would  have 
to  react  militarily  to  such  a  violation. 
And  the  SALT  II  treaty  will  continue 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commission 
in  Geneva  to  which  either  we  or  the 
Soviets  can  refer  any  question  of  com- 
pliance with  the  treaty. 

While  negotiating  SALT  II,  it  has 
been  vitally  important  for  us  to  protect 
the  security  and  the  interest  of  our 
NATO  allies,  as  well  as  our  own.  We 
have  consulted  with  our  allies  on  SALT 
II  at  every  step  of  the  process  with  a 
thoroughness  and  intensity  that  has  few 
precedents. 

We  have  assured  our  allies  that  their 
interests  will  be  fully  met  by  this 
treaty.  The  best  evidence  of  the  success 
of  our  continual  efforts  to  work  with 
our  allies  on  SALT  II  can  be  seen  in 
their  response:  strong  support  for  this 
treaty  by  allied  leaders,  including  pub- 
lic statements  at  Guadeloupe  by  Chan- 
cellor Schmidt,  Prime  Minister  Cal- 
laghan,  and  President  Giscard. 

We  are  also  determined  that  the  con- 
tinuing SALT  process  not  divert  our 
attention  from  the  continuing  challenge 
of  Soviet  military  power  or  undermine 
our  resolve  to  meet  it.  This  resolve  is 


May  1979 


51 


Linieluted  to  the  merits  of  the  proposed 
J  agreement  but  rests  instead  on  our  own 
good  sense  and  national  will. 

With  or  without  the  SALT  talks, 
with  this  agreement  or  any  conceivable 
■  alternative,  we  would  still  face  the 
tasks  of  judging  the  military  challenge 
to  the  United  States  and  our  allies  and 
of  responding  effectively  to  it.  In  any 
event,  we  would  have  to  provide  for 
the  common  defense  in  sober  and 
realistic  terms.  And  in  any  event  we 
will  do  so. 

During  the  next  several  years,  we 
will  need  to  make  a  number  of  difficult 
choices  about  our  force  posture  in  sev- 
eral areas.  We  shall  make  these  choices 
in  the  sober  realization  that  the  United 
States  must  have  military  strength  suf- 
ficient to  deter  any  attack  on  us  or  our 
allies  to  enable  us  to  deal  successfully 
with  any  attack  and  at  any  level  — 
should  an  attack  occur — and  to  defend 
our  interests  and  those  of  our  friends 
and  allies  around  the  world. 

The  Future  of  SALT 

The  SALT  II  agreement  is  a  major 
step  forward  in  strategic  arms  control. 
But  it  is  only  one  step.  In  the  future,  it 
will  be  important  for  us  to  move 
promptly  on  a  complex  agenda  of  arms 
control  issues,  including  significant  re- 
ductions in  strategic  weapons,  further 
qualitative  limitations  on  weapons,  and 
still  further  improvements  in  our  ability 
to  verify  arms  control  agreements.  And 
at  every  step  of  the  way,  we  will  work 
closely  with  our  NATO  allies,  to  insure 
that  our  efforts  in  SALT  III  will  ad- 
vance their  security  as  well  as  our  own. 

We  shall  continue  to  press  for  more 
and  better  strategic  arms  control 
agreements.  But  we  shall  not  hold  our 
own  needed  defense  programs  hostage 
to  the  uncertain  prospects  of  future 
arms  control.  Nor  shall  we  hesitate  to 
halt  any  defense  program  whose  mili- 
tary requirements  is  effectively  and 
safely  removed  by  successful  arms 
control  agreements. 

Finally,  as  we  judge  the  SALT  II 
treaty,  we  must  remember  precisely 
what  is  being  achieved.  The  SALT 
process  is  an  effort  unique  in  human 
history.  Never  before  have  two  very 
different  and  powerful  competing  na- 
tions engaged  in  an  effort  to  limit  their 
freedom  of  action  in  matters  vital  to 
their  own  survival  and  that  of  mankind. 
Never  before  have  two  such  nations 
recognized  that  greater  security  can 
come  from  mutual  self-restraint  in 
building  their  most  destructive 
weapons  rather  than  from  continuing  an 
unbridled  competition. 

This  mutual  understanding  is  not 
based  upon  trust  or  upon  ignoring  our 


deep  and  continuing  differences. 
Rather  it  is  a  recognition  of  the  critical 
importance  of  reducing  strategic  un- 
certainties and  the  risks  of  nuclear 
crises  and  devastation.  Our  efforts  in 
controlling  nuclear  weapons  will  con- 
tinue to  be  difficult,  halting,  and  un- 
certain. It  will  require  our  patience, 
wisdom,  and  unparalleled  efforts  to 
make  sound  judgments.  But  I  think  you 
will  agree  that  it  is  a  noble  effort  to 
achieve  goals  that  are  vital  to  ourselves 
and  to  all  mankind. 


SECRETARY  BROWN  ^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  speak  with  you  about  strategic  arms 
limitations  and  the  national  defense.  I 
am  convinced — and  I  believe  that  the 
President  and  many  of  you  agree — that 
the  emerging  SALT  agreement  with  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  the  single  most 
significant  bilateral  understanding 
reached  by  the  two  global  superpowers 
during  the  1970's. 

SALT  has  become  part  of  the  fabric 
of  international  relationships.  It  is  an 
element  of  stability  not  only  in  military 
terms  but  in  the  worldwide  political 
balance.  Experience  has  shown  that 
SALT  alone  cannot  end  the  political 
competition  between  us  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  nor  can  it  fulfill  all  our  hopes 
for  cooperation  or  all  our  needs  for 
strategic  security.  But,  as  the  Presi- 
dent's National  Security  Adviser 
suggested  yesterday,  it  is  necessary  to 
the  prudent  management  of  both  as- 
pects of  our  relationship. 

Because  of  the  agreement's  profound 
importance,  it  is  essential  that  the  pub- 
lic debate  concerning  its  merits  be  not 
only  thorough  but  also  well  informed. 
In  speaking  here  today  I  hope  to 
contribute  to  both  of  those  essential 
qualities. 

Let  me  begin  my  discussion  of  SALT 
and  the  national  defense  by  reporting  to 
you  on  the  status  of  the  talks.  Although 
we  are  very  close  to  an  agreement, 
there  are  at  least  two  or  three  remaining 
major  issues  —  especially  those  in- 
volving verification  and  limits  on  new 
missiles — of  such  importance  that  we 
must  know  that  they  have  been  re- 
solved satisfactorily  before  we  can  be 
confident  a  SALT  II  treaty  can  be 
achieved.  Whether,  and  therefore 
when,  agreement  can  be  reached  de- 
pends largely  on  the  negotiation  of 
these  issues.  The  prospects,  in  my 
view,  continue  to  be  good. 

Under  our  system  of  government,  of 
course,  the  final  U.S.  decision  on 
whether  or  not  a  treaty  will  take  effect 
will  be  made  by  the  Senate.  Thus,  the 
formal  debate  over  ratification  will  be 


conducted  in  the  Senate  and  will  not 
start  until  a  treaty  is  signed  and  sub- 
mitted to  that  body.  As  a  practical 
matter,  however,  the  debate  over  SALT 
II  has  already  begun  and,  in  fact,  has 
been  underway  for  as  long  as  or  longer 
than  the  negotiations  themselves. 
Moreover,  the  debate  is  a  far-reaching 
one  and  has,  properly,  addressed  our 
broader  strategic  policy  objectives  and 
programs  as  well  as  the  provisions  of 
the  agreement  itself. 

I  believe  the  key  question  each  of  us 
must  answer  centers  on  the  agreement 
itself:  Will  its  approval  make  the 
United  States  more  secure  than  lack,  or 
rejection,  of  an  agreement?  But  that 
question  can  be  answered — and  SALT 
can  properly  be  evaluated — only  in  the 
context  of  U.S.  strategic  weapons 
policy  and  objectives,  the  state  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  balance  now  and  as  we  ex- 
pect it  in  the  future,  and  the  programs 
that  we  have  undertaken  to  implement 
our  strategic  policy. 


The  Soviet  Challenge 

Our  national  security  derives  from 
much  more  than  our  military  strength. 
The  military  balance  is  only  a  part — 
but  a  vital  part — of  our  total  national 
security  posture.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
the  Soviet  military  power  today  is 
much  greater  than  it  was  in  the  I960's 
both  in  absolute  terms  and  relative  to 
our  own.  There  has  been  a  steady  in- 
crease in  Soviet  military  spending 
auring  each  of  the  past  15  years.  Our 
current  estimate  is  that  it  would  cost  us 
$40  billion  more  than  we  now  spend 
each  year  on  our  own  defense  estab- 
lishment to  support  military  forces  and 
programs  of  the  size  and  nature  pur- 
sued by  the  Soviets. 

Today,  the  military  balance  between 
East  and  West  is  one  of  rough  equiva- 
lence but  with  troubling  trends  ap- 
pearing in  both  strategic  and  tactical 
nuclear  areas.  It  is  not  the  current  bal- 
ance but  rather  the  momentum  of 
Soviet  strategic  programs  that  is  cause 
for  concern. 

Despite  Soviet  military  accom- 
plishments, the  Soviet  Union  does  not 
now  enjoy  a  military  advantage  in  nu- 
clear terms.  It  is  not  in  a  position  to 
exploit  its  strategic  weapons  or  embark 
on  a  course  that  may  lead  to  the  use  of 
nuclear  weapons  without  themselves 
encountering  unacceptable  risks.  A 
strategic  balance  exists  today  because 
the  deterrent  forces  on  the  two  sides  are 
essentially  equivalent.  Neither  side 
could  launch  a  first  strike  that  would 
prevent  the  other  side  from  responding 
with  a  retaliation  of  devastating  pro- 
portions. Neither  side  can  effectively 


52 


intimidate  the  other  with  its  strategic 
forces. 

In  the  face  of  these  circumstances  of 
Soviet  challenge  and  competition,  we 
are  pursuing,  and  need  to  continue,  two 
complementary  courses  of  action. 

•  The  first  is  to  insure,  within  SALT 
constraints,  that  our  strategic  forces  are 
capable  of  meeting  our  defense  objec- 
tives despite  the  continued  Soviet 
strategic  buildup.  The  1980  Defense 
budget  and  our  5  year  defense  program 
for  1980-84  are  designed  to  do  this. 

•  The  second  is  to  seek,  in  a  SALT 
II  agreement,  specific  and  verifiable 
provisions  constraining  Soviet  strategic 
forces  as  part  of  the  process  of  limiting 
further  the  strategic  arms  competition 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union. 

U.S.  Objectives 

Two  concepts  underlie  U.S.  strategic 
forces  planning:  deterrence  and  essen- 
tial equivalence. 

Deterrence  of  nuclear  war  is  our 
most  fundamental  defense  objective.  A 
credible  deterrent  can  be  achieved  only 
if  we  possess  the  military  force  neces- 
sary to  persuade  our  enemies  that, 
whatever  the  circumstances,  if  they 
start  a  course  of  action  that  could  lead 
to  war  they  will  either: 

•  Pay  an  unacceptable  price  to 
achieve  their  objective  or 

•  Be  frustrated  in  their  effort  to 
achieve  that  objective. 

Our  basic  strategy  requires  us  to  be 
able  to  inflict  such  damage  on  a  poten- 
tial adversary  that  regardless  of  the  cir- 
cumstances the  prospect  of  that  damage 
will  preclude  his  attack  on  the  United 
States,  our  allies,  or  our  vital  interests. 
To  achieve  this  we  need,  first  of  all,  a 
survivable  capability  to  devastate  the 
industry  and  cities  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Assured  destruction  capability — which 
is  what  I've  just  defined — is  the  bed- 
rock of  nuclear  deterrence.  It  is  not, 
however,  in  my  judgment,  sufficient  in 
itself  as  a  strategic  doctrine.  Massive 
retaliation  may  not  be  appropriate,  nor 
will  its  prospect  always  be  sufficiently 
credible,  to  deter  the  full  range  of  ac- 
tions we  seek  to  prevent. 

We  need  capabilities  convincingly 
able  to  do,  and  sure  to  carry  out  under 
any  circumstances  the  Soviets  consider 
realistic,  whatever  damage  the  Soviets 
consider  will  deter  them.  Put  differ- 
ently, the  perceptions  of  those  whom 
we  seek  to  deter  can  determine  what  is 
needed  for  deterrence  in  various  cir- 
cumstances. For  fully  effective  deter- 
rence, we  need  to  be  able  to  respond  at 
the  level  appropriate  to  the  type  and 


scale  of  a  Soviet  attack.  Fully  effective 
deterrence  requires  forces  of  sufficient 
size  and  flexibility  to  attack  selectively 
a  range  of  military  and  other  targets 
and  to  enable  us  to  hold  back  a  signifi- 
cant reserve. 

This  ability  to  provide  measured  re- 
taliation in  response  to  less-than-total 
attacks  —  and  thus  to  prevent  the 
Soviets  from  imagining  that  they  can 
gain  meaningful  advantage  at  some 
level  of  nuclear  conflict — is  essential 
to  credible  deterrence.  Moreover, 
whatever  doubts  one  may  have  about 
whether  a  nuclear  war  could  be  kept 
limited — and  I  have  severe  ones — it 
would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  put  the 
United  States  in  a  position  in  which 
uncontrolled  escalation  would  be  the 
only  course  we  could  follow. 

By  any  reasonable  standard,  we  have 
a  credible  deterrent  today  and  will  have 
one  for  the  foreseeable  future.  We 
have,  and  will  continue  to  have,  sur- 
vivable forces  capable  of  massive  de- 
struction of  Soviet  cities  and  industrial 
potential,  even  after  an  all-out  surprise 
attack.  We  also  have — and  will  have 
increasingly  in  the  coming  years — both 
the   forces   and   the   targeting  and 


Deterrence  of  nuclear  war  is  our 
most  fundamental  defense  objec- 
tive. 


employment  policies  that  allow  for 
selective  use  of  nuclear  force  to  re- 
spond to  more  limited  provocations. 
The  rapid  Soviet  buildup  in  strategic 
forces  over  the  past  decade,  as  com- 
pared to  our  own  more  modestly  paced 
improvements  in  forces,  should  not 
obscure  the  basic  power  and  credibility 
of  our  deterrent. 

Moreover,  the  problems  we  face — in 
particular  the  growing  vulnerability  of 
our  fixed  silo  ICBM's — will  not  force 
us  to  choose  between  all-out  attacks  on 
cities,  on  the  one  hand,  and  surrender, 
on  the  other.  Our  capacity  to  make 
selective  strikes  at  military  and  other 
targets,  while  maintaining  reserve,  is 
large  now  and  will  grow  in  the  future, 
despite  ICBM  vulnerability. 

Essential  equivalence,  our  second 
broad  objective,  is  somewhat  different 
from  credible  deterrence.  It  is  one  pos- 
sible criterion  for  such  deterrence,  par- 
ticularly if  we  want  our  nuclear  forces 
to  have  an  effect  that  goes  beyond  de- 
terrence of  an  all-out  strategic  surprise 
attack.  The  use  of  essential  equivalence 
as  an  objective  reflects  the  reality  that 
nuclear  forces — like  other  military 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

I 

forces — have  a  broader  political  role  ,. 
not  entirely  determined  by  technical,   ] 
static   (force-counting),   or  even 
dynamic  (war-gaming)  calculations  of 
military  capability. 

As  long  as  our  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  is  more  competitive  than 
cooperative — and  this  is  clearly  the 
case  in  military  terms — maintaining  es- 
sential equivalence  of  strategic  nuclear 
forces  is  necessary  to  prevent  the 
Soviets  from  gaining  political  advan- 
tage from  a  real  or  perceived  strategic 
imbalance. 

Essential  equivalence  thus  demands^ 
that  our  forces  not  only  be  on  a  par 
with  those  of  the  Soviet  Union  but  be 
seen  to  be  so.  We  need  not — we  should 
not — imitate  Soviet  forces  in  an  inevi- 
tably futile,  immensely  costly,  and  po- 
tentially very  dangerous  effort  to  match 
or  exceed  the  Soviets  in  every  conceiv- 
able index  of  strategic  power.  To  say, 
however,  we  can  tolerate  some  "gaps" 
that  are  offset  by  U.S.  advantages  by 
other  measures  is  not  to  say  we  can  tol- 
erate an  overall  imbalance  whether  per- 
ceived or  real. 

Today,  essential  equivalence  exists. 
While  the  Soviets  have  certain  advan- 
tages, such  as  ICBM  throw-weight  and 
deliverable  megatonnage,  we  now  have 
offsetting  advantages  in  numbers  of 
warheads,  accuracy,  and  antisubmarine 
warfare  capability.  Most  importantly, 
while  no  one  can  assuredly  predict  the 
outcome  of  any  nuclear  exchange, 
neither  we  nor  the  Soviets  would  gain 
in  any  rational  sense  from  such  a 
conflict. 

It's  worth  considering,  for  a  mo- 
ment, whether  these  objectives  are  am- 
bitious enough. 

•  Ought  we  to  be  satisfied  with 
equivalence  and  with  preventing  Soviet 
actions  by  deterrence? 

•  Ought  we  instead  to  seek  to  exploit 
our  resources  and  our  technology  to 
attain  strategic  superiority? 

In  the  first  place,  massive  numerical 
superiority  in  strategic  forces,  even 
when  we  had  it  in  the  1950's  and 
1960's.  proved  to  be  no  panacea  for 
our  military  needs  and  still  less  for  our 
diplomatic  problems.  We  and  our  allies 
required  strong  conventional  forces  for 
our  security. 

The  potential  futility  of  any  quest  for 
superiority  derives,  I  believe,  from  the 
realities  of  nuclear  weaponry  and  bilat- 
eral superpower  relations.  Modern 
nuclear-weapons  technology  is  such 
that  while  equivalence  is  a  realistic 
goal,  superiority  is  not,  providing  that 
the  other  side  is  determined  to  prevent 
it.  Each  superpower  can,  by  actions 
that  are  well  within  its  technical  and 
economic  capability,  prevent  the  other 


May  1979 


53 


from  gaining  an  overall  advantage, 
much  less  supremacy. 

The  system  is  not  self-equilibrating; 
neither  equivalence  nor  even  deterrence 
will  be  maintained  automatically. 
Avoiding  inferiority  requires  us  to  have 
the  will  and  resolve  to  do  the  things 
that  will  enable  us  to  maintain  the 
strategic  balance.  For,  if  the  Soviets 
ever  were  to  achieve  superiority,  I  am 
convinced  they  would  make  every  ef- 
fort to  exploit  it  politically  and  even 
militarily.  I  am  confident  that  we  will 
continue  to  show  the  will  and  resolve 
to  prevent  the  Soviets  from  attaining 
superiority.  But  I  think  it  would  be 
equally  wrong  to  suppose  that  the 
Soviets,  challenged  to  a  race  for 
superiority,  would  passively  yield  such 
an  advantage  to  us. 

In  brief,  equivalence  and  deterrence 
are  at  one  and  the  same  time  our 
maximum  feasible,  and  our  minimum 
tolerable,  objectives.  And  at  present 
our  forces  meet  those  objectives. 

But  if  the  present  balance  is  adequate 
in  terms  of  our  objectives  of  deterrence 
and  equivalence,  we  face  challenges 
for  the  future  that  we  can  ignore  only  at 
great  peril.  If  today  we  are  in  a  satis- 
factory relationship  vis-a-vis  the  Soviet 
Union,  what  of  tomorrow;  less  rhetori- 
cally, what  will  the  strategic  balance  be 
like  during  the  planning  horizons  we 
can  reasonably  contemplate? 

Some  trends  are  of  real  concern.  The 
Soviets  are  rapidly  catching  up  to  us  in 
a  number  of  key  areas  where  we  have 
led  in  the  past,  especially  in  the  areas 
of  accuracy  and  reentry  vehicle  num- 
bers. Additionally,  the  improvements 
of  the  Soviets  have  made  in  long-range 
theater  nuclear  forces  may  be  of  great 
significance  as  the  central  balance  be- 
comes more  equal.  Further,  the  grow- 
ing vulnerability  of  our  land-based 
missile  force  in  the  early  1980's  could, 
if  not  corrected,  contribute  to  a  per- 
ception of  the  U.S.  strategic  inferiority 
that  would  have  severely  adverse 
political,  and  could  have  potentially 
destabilizing  military,  consequences. 

In  reviewing  the  challenges  the 
Soviets  are  posing  in  the  strategic  area, 
we  should  remember  that  the  United 
States  has  not  been  idle.  In  the  past  10 
years,  we  have  deployed  more  than 
1,000  MIRV'ed  missiles,  thereby  in- 
creasing our  missile  warhead  total 
nearly  fourfold.  SRAM  (the  short- 
range  attack  missile)  has  increased  the 
capability  of  the  B-52  force.  Further, 
we  have  programs  to  improve  each  of 
the  three  elements  of  the  U.S.  triad  of 
strategic  forces. 

•  This  year  we  will  begin  to  put  new 
Trident  C-4  missile  in  our  submarine 
fleet.  In  addition,  the  first  new  Trident 


submarine  will  be  on  patrol  in  late 
1981,  will  be  quieter — and  thus  less 
detectable  acoustically — and  will  be 
capable  of  longer  on-station  times.  We 
are  also  beginning  work  on  a  substan- 
tially improved  Trident  II  submarine- 
launched  missile. 

•  Our  cruise  missile  programs  will 
greatly  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the 
bomber  leg  of  the  triad.  B-52  aircraft 
capable  of  penetrating  Soviet  air  de- 
fenses will  continue  to  contribute  to  the 
viability  of  the  manned  bomber  leg  of 
the  triad  into  the  late  I980's.  We  are 
working  on  bomber  and  cruise  missile 
technology  for  the  longer  term. 

•  We  are  improving  the  accuracy 
and  yield  of  the  Minuteman  forces.  We 
are  pursuing  and  will  choose  from 
among  a  number  of  options  for  more 


as  leader  of  the  Atlantic  alliance  and 
the  political  damage  that  would  be 
done  to  our  status  among  allies  and 
friends  if  the  United  States  were  seen 
to  be  neglecting,  or  even  rejecting, 
strategic  arms  limitations.  The  SALT 
process  itself  is  important  to  the  further 
development  of  U.S. -Soviet  and  over- 
all East-West  relations.  SALT  is  the 
foundation  for  progress  in  establishing 
an  enduring  political  relationship  with 
the  Soviets  that  reduces  tensions  and 
sets  important  visible  boundaries  to  our 
ideological  and  political  and  military 
competition. 

The  basic  elements  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement  are  familiar  to  you. 

A  treaty,  to  last  until   1986,  that 
will: 


[SALT  II]  enhances  the  stability  of  the  deterrent  and  allows  us  the 
flexibility  to  embark  on  needed  modernization  of  our  strategic  forces 
without  triggering  another  expensive  and  potentially  destabilizing  arms 
race. 


survivable,  mobile,  basing  of  part  of 
the  ICBM  force  to  deal  with  the  vul- 
nerability problem.  The  M-X  missile 
for  this  purpose  is  funded  for  en- 
gineering development  in  the  fiscal 
year  beginning  this  October. 

To  summarize  the  current  situation, 
despite  Soviet  military  accom- 
plishments, neither  the  Soviet  Union 
nor  the  United  States  has  a  clear  mili- 
tary advantage,  and  we  intend  to  keep 
it  that  way.  Our  programs  are  sufficient 
for  the  purpose  if  we  receive  the  sup- 
port of  Congress  in  providing  the  funds 
to  carry  them  out. 


The  Role  of  Arms  Control 

Strategic  arms  control  provides  one 
important  way  in  which  we  can  limit 
the  military  challenges  we  face.  It  is, 
therefore,  an  integral  part  of  our  over- 
all efforts  to  meet  our  national  security 
objectives.  Thus,  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ments should  be  judged  by  the  Con- 
gress and  the  American  public  first  of 
all  in  terms  of  their  contribution  to  our 
security  and  that  of  our  allies.  And  it  is 
in  terms  of  this  criterion  that  1  will  set 
forth  the  bulk  of  my  evaluation  of  the 
agreement  for  you  today. 

We  should  recognize,  however,  that 
in  addition  to  the  more  specific  military 
security  issue,  the  merits  of  SALT  and 
the  SALT  process  must  also  be  judged 
in  a  broader  political  context.  That 
broader  context  has  to  do  with  our  role 


•  Set  equal  limits  on  strategic  nu- 
clear vehicles; 

•  Establish  various  sublimits  on 
MIRV'ed  systems  (that  is,  ballistic 
missile  systems  carrying  multiple 
warheads  that  can  target  more  than  one 
aim  point)  and  heavy  bombers  carrying 
air-launched  cruise  missiles; 

•  Limit  each  side  to  one  new  ICBM 
type  with  a  maximum  of  10  reentry 
vehicles; 

•  Bar  increases  in  number  of  reentry 
vehicles  on  existing  ICBM's;  and 

•  Provide  measures  to  permit  unim- 
peded verification  by  national  technical 
means. 


A  protocol,  to  last  about  3  years, 
that  will: 

•  Bar  deployment  of  ground- 
launched  and  ship-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles with  ranges  greater  than  600  km. 
during  that  period,  while  permitting 
unimpeded  testing  and  development  of 
such  vehicles  of  any  range; 

•  Bar  deployment  of  mobile  ICBM's 
or  air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles  dur- 
ing that  period;  and 

•  Permit  the  deployment  of  these 
systems  after  the  protocol  expires. 


The  agreement  also  includes: 

•  A  statement  of  principles  to  guide 
SALT  III  and 

•  An  exchange  of  statements  on  the 
Soviet  Backfire  bomber. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SALT  II  is,  I  firmly  believe,  a  sig- 
nificant and  most  useful  step  in  what 
we  hope  will  be  a  continuing  process. 

The  1972  SALT  I  agreement  con- 
tributed greatly  to  stability.  It  did  so  by 
banning  nationwide  ABM  defenses  and 
by  capping  the  buildup  of  strategic  of- 
fensive arms  through  limiting  missile 
launcher  numbers  to  those  existing  or 
under  construction  in  1970.  The  Vla- 
divostok agreement  of  1974  set  equal 
aggregates  of  all  strategic  nuclear  de- 
livery systems  at  2,400  and  set  a  sub- 
limit of  MlRV'ed  systems  of  1,320. 

In  1977,  at  the  beginning  of  this 
Administration,  we  attempted  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  arms  control 
agreement  that  would  have  been  sub- 
stantially more  restrictive  than  the  Vla- 
divostok agreement — or  the  SALT  II 
treaty — but  a  number  of  technological 
and  political  factors  prevented  success. 
We,  therefore,  took  the  dual  track  of 
trying  to  negotiate  the  largest  possible 
reductions  to  the  interim  ceilings  while 
making  a  serious  attempt  to  limit  qual- 
itative improvements  in  new  systems. 
We  have  achieved  real  success  in  both 
areas. 

We  have  been  able  to  negotiate  re- 
ductions in  the  Vladivostok  limits  — 
to  2,250  strategic  nuclear  delivery 
vehicles  and  1,200  MlRVed  mis- 
siles—  as  well  as  to  impose  a  new 
sublimit  of  820  on  land-based 
MIRVed  ICBM's,  the  most  de- 
stabilizing strategic  force  element.  In 
addition,  we  have  broken  significant 
new  ground  in  the  qualitative  area  by 
limits  on  numbers  of  reentry  vehicles 
on  each  type  of  ICBM  (and  sea- 
launched  ballistic  missile)  and  by  al- 
lowing each  side  only  one  new  type  of 
ICBM.  Taken  together,  these  two 
tracks  have  resulted  in  a  significant 
step  forward  in  the  arms  control  proc- 
ess. 

The  prospect  of  continuing  the  proc- 
ess is  a  major  intangible  at  stake  in  the 
debate.  But  the  SALT  II  agreement 
need  not  be  defended  merely  as  a 
way  station  to  SALT  III  and  beyond.  It 
can  be  fully  and  convincingly  justified 
on  its  own  merits. 

The  simplest  way  is  to  observe  that, 
without  the  SALT  II  agreement,  the 
Soviet  Union  could  have  nearly  one- 
third  more  strategic  systems  than  with 
the  agreement.  And  there  would  be 
corresponding  effects  on  other  meas- 
ures. For  example,  instead  of  the  2,250 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  of 
the  treaty,  they  could  have  3.000.  Nat- 
urally, we  do  not  know  what  the 
Soviets  would  do  in  the  absence  of  a 
treaty,  but  these  higher  strategic  system 
levels  are  well  within  their  capability. 
And  the  history  of  the  nuclear  era  is 
strewn  with  the  wreckage  of  confident 
U.S.  predictions  that  the  Soviets  would 


at  some  point  or  another  cease  to  add  to 
force  levels  that  were  already,  accord- 
ing to  the  U.S.  predictors,  as  large  as 
the  Kremlin  could  possibly  want.  In  my 
view,  it  is  probable  that  without  SALT 
II  we  would  enter  into  an  era  of  greater 
uncertainty,  in  both  military  and  politi- 
cal terms,  that  would  result  in  in- 
creased strategic  forces  on  both  sides 
as  hedges  against  that  uncertainty. 

Faced  with  such  a  Soviet  buildup, 
the  United  States  could  and,  I  am  con- 
fident would,  respond.  Given  our  de- 
termination to  maintain  essential 
equivalence,  and  the  demonstrated 
Soviet  willingness  to  avoid  strategic 
inferiority  even  at  great  cost,  the  net 
result  of  such  a  numbers  race  would  be 
greater  strategic  force  levels  at  vastly 
greater  expense  and  at  substantial  risk 
to  stability. 

The  United  States  does  not  have  un- 
limited resources  to  spend  on  strategic 
weapons  programs  without  signifi- 
cantly affecting  other  defense 
priorities — such  as  improvements  in 
conventional  forces — and  other  gov- 
ernment programs,  such  as  those  re- 
quired to  combat  inflation.  But  we  do 
need  to  spend  enough,  and  what  is 
enough  depends  in  part  on  the  actions 
of  our  adversaries. 

SALT  will  not  solve  all  our  prob- 
lems. Even  with  SALT  we  will  need, 
and  we  will  be  permitted,  to  expand 
our  strategic  nuclear  efforts  above  their 
present  levels.  Those  levels,  inci- 
dentally, are  about  half,  in  constant  dol- 
lar terms,  what  they  were  during  the 
mid-1960"s.  But  SALT  will  mean 
greater  stability  and  predictability  in 
the  strategic  challenges  we  face,  and  so 
the  balance  could  be  maintained  at  a 
substantially  lower  level  of  destructive 
power.  Furthermore,  with  SALT,  it 
would  be  significantly  less  expensive 
(perhaps  as  much  as  $30  billion  less 
expensive  over  the  next  decade)  for  the 
United  States  to  maintain  that  balance 
than  without  a  SALT  II  agreement. 

SALT  II,  while  forestalling  this 
pointless  numbers  race,  will  leave  us 
the  flexibility  to  carry  out  programs  to 
deal  with  the  challenges  the  treaty  will 
not  eliminate.  We  can  develop,  test, 
and  deploy  each  of  our  planned 
programs — cruise  missiles.  Trident, 
M-X  —  in  the  fashion  and  on  the 
schedule  that  we  have  planned.  Apart 
from  putting  some  distinguishing  fea- 
tures on  our  air-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles and  cruise  missile  carriers  (to  aid 
counting  under  SALT),  we  will  not  be 
forced  by  SALT  II  to  alter  our  strategic 
programs,  which  we  need  to  balance 
Soviet  programs  that  are  allowed  in 
SALT  II  and  that  are,  in  large  measure, 
already  in  place. 

In  at  least  one  important  respect — 
Minuteman   vulnerability  —  SALT   II 


will  make  the  solution  of  a  problem 
easier  than  without  an  agreement,  i 
SALT  II  will  limit  to  well  below  pre- 
viously projected  levels  the  number  of 
Soviet  MIRVed  ICBM's,  will  freeze 
the  number  of  warheads  on  existing 
ballistic  missile  launchers,  and  will 
limit  the  number  of  reentry  vehicles 
allowed  for  new  ICBM's.  These  re- 
strictions sharply  reduce  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  Soviet  throw-weight  ad- 
vantage, which  without  limitation 
would,  for  example,  enable  them  to 
deploy  20  or  perhaps  even  40  warheads 
on  their  largest  ICBM's. 

The  combination  of  limitations  on 
missile  launchers  and  numbers  of 
warheads  will  ease  somewhat  the  diffi- 
culty of  maintaining  the  survivability 
of  our  land-based  ICBM's.  The  de- 
ployment of  a  new  mobile  ICBM  sys- 
tem, regardless  of  basing  mode,  will  be 
more  feasible  because  an  upper  bound 
will  be  placed  on  the  number  of 
warheads  that  can  be  targeted  against 
the  aim  points  represented  by  that  de- 
ployment. SALT  II  becomes,  then,  an 
important  element  in  insuring  ICBM 
survivability. 

Equally  important.  SALT  II  will 
leave  us  free  to  pursue  with  our  allies 
the  important  issues  of  modernization 
of  NATO's  tactical  nuclear  forces  and 
to  consider  arms  control  initiatives  in 
this  area. 

SALT  will  serve  U.S.  interests.  It 
enhances  the  stability  of  the  deterrent 
and  allows  us  the  flexibility  to  embark 
on  needed  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces  without  triggering 
another  expensive  and  potentially  de- 
stabilizing arms  race.  I  do  not  doubt 
our  economic  or  technical  ability  to 
compete  successfully  with  the  Soviets 
in  strategic  weapons.  I  do  question 
whether  such  an  effort  is  the  best  use  of 
our  national  —  or  even  Defense  — 
budget.  And  I  do  not  believe  that  we 
would  purchase  increased  security  with 
that  sort  of  effort. 

Under  the  treaty,  we  can  maintain 
flexible  and  credible  deterrence  and  as- 
sure essential  equivalence.  Without  the 
treaty,  we  could  also  do  these  things, 
but  it  would  be  more  costly  and  less 
certain.  I  see  the  treaty  as  a  valuable 
method  of  meeting  our  strategic 
goals — as  a  major  component  in  our 
strategy  along  with  our  weapons  pro- 
grams. In  my  judgment,  it  is  a  very 
important  component,  although  we 
must  recognize  that  it  will  have  to  be 
accompanied  by  substantial  U.S.  de- 
fense programs — expanded  ones  in  the 
strategic  field. 

Verification 

Among  the  concerns  expressed  about 
the  agreement  one  is  undoubtedly  in  a 


May  1979 


55 


MIDDLE  EA!$T:         U.S.  Support  for  the 
EgyptiaU'israeU  Peace  Treaty 


Statements  by  Secretary  Vance  and 
Secretary  of  Defense  Harold  Brown 
Before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  on  April  II.  1979.^ 


SECRETARY  VANCE^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  this 
morning  to  discuss  with  the  committee 
obligations  undertaken  by  the  United 
States  in  connection  with  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  Between  Egypt  and  Israel  signed 
on  March  26  (see  p.  1 ). 

Together  with  our  Egyptian  and  Is- 
raeli colleagues,  we  have  traveled  a 
long  and  at  times  very  difficult  road 
during  these  last  16  months.  That  jour- 
ney, however,  has  been  rewarded  by 
the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  which 
represents  a  watershed  in  the  region. 
The  Middle  East  has  been  changed  for 
the  better,  and  the  world  has  moved  a 
step  closer  to  peace. 

Less  than  6  years  ago,  the  armies  of 
Egypt  and  Israel  met  in  the  Sinai  Des- 
ert in  bloody  conflict.  It  was  the  fourth 


time  in  less  than  three  decades  that 
those  two  nations  had  engaged  in  a  de- 
structive and  costly  war. 

Soon,  at  a  site  near  the  battlegrounds 
of  the  past,  these  two  nations  will  ex- 
change the  instruments  of  peace.  The 
era  of  bloodshed  is  over.  A  new  era  of 
peaceful  cooperation  can  lie  ahead. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  process 
leading  to  this  event  did  not  begin  with 
this  Administration.  The  negotiations 
and  agreements  concluded  in  the  wake 
of  the  1973  war  laid  the  groundwork 
for  further  progress  —  the  disengage- 
ment agreement  of  January  1974  and 
the  Sinai  II  agreement  completed  in 
September  of  1975. 

The  members  of  this  committee  are 
already  familiar  with  the  main  provi- 
sions of  the  treaty.  Let  me  simply  note 
that  the  treaty  applies  the  essential 
equation  of  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 242  to  the  Sinai  Peninsula — Israeli 
withdrawal  from  territory  occupied 
during  the  1967  war  and,  on  the  part  of 
Egypt,  acknowledgment  of  Israeli 
sovereignty,   territorial   integrity  and 


political  independence,  and  Israel's 
right  to  live  in  peace  within  secure  and 
recognized  borders.  The  validity  and 
value  of  Resolution  242  have  been 
borne  out  by  the  success  of  the  negoti- 
ations between  Israel  and  Egypt.  It 
continues  to  be  the  agreed  basis  for 
those  remaining  negotiations  necessary 
to  conclude  a  comprehensive  peace  in 
the  Middle  East. 

Assistance  Package 

My  particular  purpose  today  is  to 
concentrate  on  agreements  reached 
which  will  require  or  could  involve 
congressional  action.  Let  me  turn  to  the 
financial  undertakings  by  the  United 
States  associated  with  the  peace  proc- 
ess. All  of  these  undertakings  were 
agreed  subject  to  appropriate  congres- 
sional action. 

In  evaluating  these  requirements,  it 
is  essential  to  keep  in  mind  the  far 
greater  potential  cost  of  failing  to  make 
progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  Four  wars  in  that  region  have  cost 


class  by  itself:  "Will  it  be  verifiable?" 
Clearly  the  limits  of  an  agreement  with 
the  U.S.SR.  cannot  be  treated  as  self- 
enforcing.  The  United  States  must  be 
able  to  verify  with  adequate  confi- 
dence, by  its  own  intelligence  systems, 
the  fact  that  the  Soviets  are  complying 
with  the  agreement. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  will  be  ver- 
ified by  national  technical  means,  in- 
cluding photo  reconnaissance  satellites 
and  other  technical  measures.  These 
means  enable  us  to  monitor  many  as- 
pects of  the  development,  testing, 
production,  deployment,  training,  and 
operation  of  Soviet  forces.  Despite  the 
closed  nature  of  Soviet  society,  we  are 
confident  that  no  significant  violation 
of  the  treaty  could  take  place  without 
the  United  States  detecting  it.  Because 
of  our  vigorous  deployment  and 
research-and-development  efforts,  we 
would  be  able  to  respond  with  appro- 
priate actions  before  any  serious  ad- 
verse impact  on  the  strategic  balance 
could  take  place. 

Much  has  recently  been  written 
about  the  loss  of  the  intelligence  sites 
in  Iran  and  how  important  these  sites 
were  to  have  been  to  SALT  verifica- 
tion. Intelligence  of  the  kind  obtained 
from  these  sites  is  important  to  our  as- 
sessment of  Soviet  strategic  forces  pro- 


grams, including  some  of  the  aspects 
limited  by  SALT  II.  We  are  examining 
alternative  means  of  collection,  and  the 
question  is  not  if  we  will  reinstitute  this 
capability,  but  how,  where,  and  how 
quickly  we  can  do  it.  This  and  other 
verification  matters  will  of  course  be 
discussed  at  length  during  the  ratifica- 
tion process. 

We  are  now  well  into  a  national  de- 
bate, not  only  on  the  treaty  but  on  our 
strategic  policy  and  on  the  overall  state 
of  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  In  the  course 
of  that  debate,  I  would  hope  that  those 
who  consider  themselves  thoughtful 
proponents  of  military  security  and 
those  who  consider  themselves 
thoughtful  proponents  of  arms  limita- 
tion, as  well  as  those — among  whom  I 
number  myself — who  are  concerned 
with  both,  can  focus  on  the  specific 
issue  of  whether  our  security,  and  with 
it  the  prospects  of  peace,  will  be  better 
served  with  the  treaty  than  without. 

The  President  of  the  United  States 
and  I  think  the  answer  is  clear.  A  sound 
SALT  agreement  is  in  the  interest  of 
both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  despite  the  competition  between 
our  two  systems  that  exists 
elsewhere — and  indeed  will  continue 
with  respect  to  strategic  nuclear  forces. 
SALT  II  will  provide  a  firmer  founda- 


tion for  other  measures  to  control  the 
growth  and  proliferation  of  nuclear  and 
conventional  capabilities  throughout 
the  world.  Indeed,  if  the  Soviet  Union 
will  emphasize  cooperation  rather  than 
competition,  SALT  II  will  allow  a 
healthier  state  of  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 
All  these  considerations  have  led  me 
to  conclude  that  assuming  the  remain- 
ing issues  can  be  resolved  to  our  satis- 
faction, signature  and  ratification  of 
SALT  II  are  clearly  in  the  national 
interest  of  the  United  States.  In  my 
own  mind,  I  am  satisfied  with  that  con- 
clusion, but  I  acknowledge  that  reason- 
able people  of  good  will  and  high  pur- 
pose may  come  to  a  different  judgment. 
I  hope  that  the  coming  debate  will 
strengthen  our  understanding, 
strengthen  our  resolve  to  sign  and  ap- 
prove the  treaty,  and  in  so  doing  lead 
to  a  strengthening  of  our  national  se- 
curity. Indeed,  I  am  confident  that  will 
be  the  result,  and  that  it  will  be  a  good 
one  for  all  of  us.  D 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release  of 
Apr.  4,  1979. 

^For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  1979, 
p.  21. 

'Text  from  Department  of  Defense  news  re- 
lease No.  153-79  of  Apr.  5,  1979. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  U.S.  taxpayers  several  tens  of  bil- 
lions of  dollars  in  direct  costs  alone. 
The  cost  of  peace  is  modest  when  com- 
pared with  the  cost  of  further  war. 

I  want  to  stress  three  general  points 
about  the  aid  package  for  Egypt  and 
Israel  we  are  seeking  as  an  addition  to 
the  present  basic  programs  for  both 
countries. 

First,  the  proposed  FY  1979  sup- 
plemental assistance  is  a  coherent  in- 
terrelated package  which  requires 
urgent  congressional  action  It  is  a 
careful  balance  between  foreign  policy 
and  budgetary  requirements. 

Second,  the  funds  requested  are  to 
be  available  to  finance  programs  over  a 
3-year  period. 

Third,  the  impact  on  our  budget  is 
considerably  lower  than  the  overall 
amount  of  money  that  will  be  generated 
for  the  program.  This  is  because  our 
foreign  military  sales  loans  will  be 
provided  by  the  Federal  Financing 
Bank,  guaranteed  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment. Accordingly,  Congress  is  being 
asked  to  authorize  and  appropriate 
$1.47  billion  over  3  years  in  order  to 
finance  programs  with  a  total  value  of 
$4.8  billion. 

Secretary  Brown  will  speak  in 
greater  detail  about  our  military  assist- 
ance requests.  Let  me  make  a  few  gen- 
eral observations  about  the  package  as 
a  whole. 

•  The  bulk  of  the  additional  assist- 
ance for  Israel  and  Egypt  is  to  help 
them  meet  urgent  security  require- 
ments. This  totals  about  $4.5  billion 
over  3  years  —  approximately  $3  billion 
for  Israel  and  $1.5  billion  for  Egypt. 
Of  the  amount  for  Israel,  about  $800 
million  will  be  in  the  form  of  grant  aid 
to  help  finance  the  construction  of  two 
airfields  which  will  be  moved  from  the 
Sinai  to  the  Negev.  This  assistance  will 
enable  Israel  to  withdraw  in  the  3  years 
agreed  under  the  treaty  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  its  security  require- 
ments. The  remaining  sum  for  Israel 
and  the  entire  military  program  for 
Egypt  are  in  the  form  of  foreign  mili- 
tary sales  financing,  to  be  provided  on 
favorable  terms. 

•  The  military  program  for  Israel 
will  help  defray  the  costs  of  withdraw- 
ing forces  from  the  Sinai  and  relocating 
them  in  the  Negev.  The  Government  of 
Israel  estimates  that  the  direct  costs  of 
withdrawal  will  be  between  $4  and  $5 
billion.  This  program  will  also  enable 
Israel  to  continue  modernizing  its 
military  establishment  in  light  of  con- 
tinuing security  threats  in  the  area.  For 
Egypt  the  $1.5  billion  military  program 
will  help  Egypt  to  replace  obsolete 
military  equipment. 

•  In  addition  to  the  security  assist- 


ance 1  have  outlined,  we  envision  $300 
million  more  in  economic  assistance 
for  Egypt  over  3  years  to  help  President 
Sadat  address  the  real  human  needs  of 
his  people  and  so  that  peace  can  be 
translated  into  a  better  life  for  the 
people  of  that  nation. 

We  have  also  urged  our  friends  and 
allies  to  contribute  economic  assistance 
in  support  of  peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel. 

It  is  fair  to  ask  why  there  should  be 
such  a  price  for  peace.  At  the  very 
least,    why    is    the    United    States 

The  cost  of  peace  is  modest  when 
compared  with  the  cost  of  further 
war. 


supplying  additional  military  equip- 
ment to  countries  who  have  just  con- 
cluded peace  with  one  another? 

The  answer  to  both  those  questions 
derives  from  the  fact  that  in  concluding 
this  treaty,  both  Egypt  and  Israel  are 
taking  a  step  into  the  unknown.  The 
unknown  in  an  area  as  volatile  as  the 
Middle  East  carries  its  own  risks.  In 
order  for  both  governments  to  lead 
their  people  through  these  uncharted 
waters,  they  must  be  confident  that 
they  can  deal  effectively  with  threats  to 
their  continued  security. 

In  addition,  as  President  Carter  said, 
both  Egypt  and  Israel  face  immediate 
economic  problems  as  they  enter  the 
post-treaty  era.  The  financial  cost  to 
Israel  of  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  will 
be  substantial.  For  its  part,  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  has  an  urgent  and 
critical  need  to  demonstrate  to  its 
people  the  economic  benefits  of  peace. 
We  will  work  to  accelerate  implemen- 
tation of  our  current  programs;  the  pro- 
posed additional  assistance  will  provide 
funds  to  move  quickly  to  meet  these 
new  requirements. 

Memorandum  of  Agreement 

I  believe  the  benefits  of  peace  to 
both  parties  are  such  that  each  will 
make  every  effort  to  assure  that  the 
treaty  is  implemented  fully  and  in  good 
faith.  Nevertheless,  we  cannot  expect 
that  distrust  built  up  over  decades  will 
dissipate  overnight.  The  evolution  of 
completely  normal  relations  will  be  a 
gradual  one.  We,  therefore,  undertook 
to  offer  to  the  parties  a  buffer  against 
potential  and  unforeseen  problems  in 
implementing  their  treaty  by  assuring 
them  that  we  would  remain  a  full  part- 
ner in  the  implementation  process  just 
as  we  had  been  during  the  negotiating 
phase. 


The  result  is  the  memorandum  of! 
agreement  between  the  United   States  ' 
and  Israel,  about  which  1  would  like  to 
make  several  comments  [see  p.  60].  The 
Government  of  Egypt  declined   our 
offer  of  a  comparable  agreement. 

First,  the  purpose  of  this  memoran- 
dum is  to  define  certain  roles  that  the 
United  States  intends  to  play  should 
questions  arise  concerning  the  im- 
plementation or  interpretation  of  the 
treaty. 

There  is  no  hidden  purpose  or  hidden 
meaning  to  this  memorandum.  It  can- 
not be  construed  as  representing  a 
mutual  security  pact  with  Israel  even 
though  its  existence  provides  Israel 
with  significant  psychological  reassur- 
ance as  it  enters  into  this  new  relation- 
ship with  Egypt.  The  United  States  has 
agreed  to  consult  with  Israel  if  we  are 
satisfied  that  the  treaty  has  been  vio- 
lated or  that  a  violation  is  threatened. 
However,  the  determination  of  whether 
or  not  such  a  situation  exists  which 
might  call  for  further  action  is  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  United  States. 
Similarly,  what  would  constitute  an 
appropriate  action  to  take  if  such  is 
deemed  desirable  is  also  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  United  States. 

Second,  let  me  call  your  attention  to 
the  initial  operative  paragraph  of  the 
memorandum.  The  intent  and  effect  of 
that  paragraph  are  to  make  all  of  the 
commitments  undertaken  in  the  mem- 
orandum subject  to  our  laws  and  con- 
stitutional processes. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  we  would  en- 
vision prompt  consultations  with  the 
Congress  if  and  when  the  government 
perceived  the  need  to  become  involved 
in  resolving  any  significant  problem 
under  the  memorandum. 

Third,  let  me  call  your  attention  to 
paragraph  8  of  the  memorandum  which 
refers  to  assurances  given  Israel  in 
connection  with  the  Sinai  II  agreement 
in  September  of  1975.  The  sole  pur- 
pose of  this  paragraph  is  to  state  that, 
with  the  exception  of  those  prior  assur- 
ances specifically  enumerated  in  para- 
graph 8,  existing  assurances  are  not 
altered  by  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  Between  Egypt  and  Israel. 


Oil  Supply  Agreement 

In  the  context  of  the  peace  treaty,  the 
United  States  has  also  revised  and  ex- 
tended the  5-year  emergency  oil  supply 
commitment  arising  from  Sinai  II  to  a 
total  of  15  years.  As  with  the  prior 
commitment,  Israel  would  turn  to  the 
United  States  only  if  Israel  could  not 
make  independent  arrangements  to 
meet  its  own  domestic  consumption  re- 


May  1979 

iquirements  through  normal  procedures. 
'  Assured  long-term  oil  supplies  are 
crucial  to  Israel's  security.  Oil  supply 
commitments  were  an  integral  part  of 
the  negotiating  process.  Viewed  in  that 
light,  we  believe  this  commitment  by 
the  United  States  is  worth  the  small 
ootential  added  responsibility  that  may 
be  assumed. 

Under  the  new  agreement  Israel  will 
pay  for  any  oil  which  might  be  pro- 
vided from  the  United  States  at  rates 
comparable  to  world  market  prices  at 
the  time  of  transfer.  Israel  would  reim- 
burse the  United  States  for  costs  in- 
curred by  us  in  providing  oil  from 
Iwhatever  source. 

Our  undertaking  provides  for  conclu- 
Ision  of  a  memorandum  of  agreement 
between  the  United  States  and  Israel 
within  60  days  after  exchange  of  in- 
struments of  ratification  of  the  treaty. 
This  memorandum  will  deal  with  the 
specific  details  of  the  arrangement.  Is- 
raeli and  U.S.  negotiating  delegations 
met  here  in  Washington  yesterday  to 
begin  that  task.  Once  detailed  agree- 
iment  is  reached,  we  will  review  it 
against  existing  legislative  authority 
and  promptly  seek  from  the  Congress 
any  new  authority  necessary  for  its  full 
implementation. 

I  want  to  emphasize  three  points  in 
connection  with  this  oil  supply  ar- 
rangement. 

•  Both  sides  recognize  that  this  un- 
dertaking is  a  legal  commitment  on  the 
United  States,  subject  to  the  necessary 
legislative  authority. 

•  Relatively  small  amounts  of 
American  produced  oil  are  likely  to  be 
involved.  The  Israelis  have  not  had  to 
call  on  our  commitment  since  1975, 
and  we  are  confident  they  will  do  ev- 
erything possible  to  avoid  that  situation 
in  the  future.  If  Israel  requested  U.S. 
assistance,  however,  we  would  first 
help  with  the  procurement  of  oil  from 
abroad  and  turn  to  our  own  production 
only  as  a  last  resort. 

•  Even  should  Israel  at  some  point 
turn  to  us  for  its  full  oil  requirements, 
it  would  require  an  amount  equal  to 
less  than  1%  of  our  consumption  — 
hardly  noticeable  to  us. 


Future  of  the  Peace  Process 

Let  me  say  a  few  words  about  the 
future  of  the  Middle  East  peace  process 
and  the  U.S.  role.  The  peace  and  sta- 
bility we  seek  can  only  be  achieved  ul- 
timately by  making  this  treaty  the  cor- 
nerstone of  peace  between  Israel  and 
all  its  neighbors.  For  the  United  States, 
no  less  than  for  the  parties  in  the  region 
directly  involved,  continued  progress 
toward  such  a  comprehensive  peace  is 


essential.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we 
intend  to  remain  a  full  partner  in  the 
negotiations. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  has  ful- 
filled one  of  the  two  framework  agree- 
ments worked  out  at  Camp  David.''  At 
that  same  time,  the  Governments  of 
Egypt  and  Israel  also  committed  them- 
selves to  principles  and  procedures  for 
a  series  of  negotiations  leading  to 
peace  between  Israel  and  each  of  its 
Arab  neighbors.  The  achievement  of 
that  peace  depends  on  success  in  each 
negotiation,  and  each  new  negotiation 
builds  on  what  has  occurred. 

In  addition  to  the  Peace  Treaty, 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  President 
Sadat  signed  a  second  document  on 
March  26.  In  a  joint  letter  addressed  to 
President  Carter,  they  pledged  to 
begin,  within  1  month  after  the  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification, 
negotiations  to  implement  the  process 
agreed  upon  at  Camp  David  whose  ul- 
timate objective,  in  the  words  of  the 
Camp  David  framework  agreement,  is 
".  .  .the  resolution  of  the  Palestinian 
problem  m  all  its  aspects." 

That  process  will  start  with  negotia- 
tions on  the  establishment  of  the  self- 
governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  in  order  to  provide  full  au- 
tonomy to  the  inhabitants.  These 
negotiations  will  begin  in  the  Middle 
East  about  1  month  from  now  with  full 
American  participation.  The  Egyp- 
tian-Israeli treaty  has  permitted  us,  for 


57 


ing  those  negotiations  within  1  year  so 
that  elections  will  be  held  as  expedi- 
tiously as  possible  after  agreement 
between  the  parties  has  been  reached. 
Their  goal  is  to  reach  agreement  on 
arrangements  for  electing  a  self- 
governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  and  on  the  powers  and  re- 
sponsibilities of  that  body. 

Successful  conclusion  of  the  next 
phase  of  negotiations  would  thus  bring 
into  being  a  self-governing  authority  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  for  a  5-year 
transitional  period  during  which 
negotiations  will  take  place  to  deter- 
mine the  final  status  of  these  areas. 
These  negotiations  provide  a 
means — indeed  the  only  practical 
means  now  available  —  by  which 
Palestinians  can  participate  in  deter- 
mining their  own  future.  They  will  be 
able  to  participate  throughout  the  proc- 
ess, from  the  establishment  of  the 
self-governing  authority  to  the  final 
resolution  of  the  status  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 

I  also  want  to  reiterate  that  in  all  fu- 
ture negotiations,  as  it  has  in  the  past, 
the  United  States  will  remain  attentive 
to  what  we  firmly  believe  is  an  essen- 
tial ingredient  for  long-term  regional 
stability  in  the  Middle  East — the  secu- 
rity of  Israel. 

No  one  should  underestimate  the 
difficulty  of  the  challenges  that  remain 
before  a  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  becomes  a  reality.   But 


The  peace  and  stability  we  seek  can  only  be  achieved  ultimately  by 
making  this  treaty  the  cornerstone  of  peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
neighbors. 


the  first  time  in  more  than  three  dec- 
ades of  conflict,  to  turn  attention  to  the 
practical  solution  of  a  central  issue  of 
that  conflict — the  Palestinian  issue. 

It  is  evident  that  the  issues  involved 
in  the  Palestinian  question  are  far  too 
complex  to  be  dealt  with  all  at  once. 
Because  of  this,  we  have  long  felt  that 
the  only  realistic  approach  is  to  estab- 
lish a  transitional  period  during  which 
the  decisions  that  need  to  be  made  can 
be  dealt  with  in  a  logical  sequence. 
That  approach  was  agreed  to  by  Egypt 
and  Israel  at  Camp  David,  and  they 
have  invited  other  parties  to  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  to  support  it  and 
to  join  the  negotiations. 

In  their  joint  letter  to  President  Car- 
ter accompanying  the  treaty.  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  have 
agreed  to  negotiate  continuously,  and 
in  good  faith,  with  a  goal  of  complet- 


those  challenges  must  be  met.  And  the 
United  States  must  remain  actively  in- 
volved in  the  peace  process  because  the 
alternatives  pose  far  greater  dangers  to 
stability  in  the  region,  to  the  interests 
of  the  United  States,  and  to  world 
peace. 

We  will  continue  this  process  re- 
gardless of  the  impediments  we  may 
face.  We  invite  others  involved  in  the 
conflict  to  join  us  and  urge  all  nations 
concerned  with  peace  to  support  our 
effort.  We  see  no  workable  alternative 
to  the  process  which  is  now  moving 
ahead.  The  problems  remaining  are  too 
complicated  and  too  sensitive  to  be 
solved  all  at  once.  But  with  each  prob- 
lem resolved,  it  becomes  all  the  more 
possible  to  resolve  the  next — with  each 
act  of  trust,  the  next  act  requiring  even 
greater  trust  becomes  more  possible.  In 
the  end,   the  overall  solution  can 


58 

emerge,  as  we  put  in  place  the  firm 
building  blocks  on  which  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  can  stand. 

For  the  first  time,  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  Between  Egypt  and  Israel,  a 
practical  beginning  has  been  made  to- 
ward a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  this 
troubled  region,  and  a  realistic  oppor- 
tunity exists  to  complete  the  task.  We 
are  committed  to  help  make  this  treaty 
the  foundation  for  a  wider  and  greater 
peace.  In  this  endeavor,  we  solicit  the 
counsel  of  this  committee  and  of  any 
party  in  the  Middle  East  who  will  share 
with  us  our  commitment  to  a  com- 
prehensive peace. 


SECRETARY  BROWN 

It  is  a  privilege  to  appear  before  you 
today  in  support  of  President  Carter's 
proposed  legislation  to  strengthen  Mid- 
dle East  peace. 

I  think  that  we  as  a  nation  should 
take  considerable  pride  in  the  major 
role  played  by  the  United  States  in 
facilitating  the  signing  of  the  Peace 
Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  Cer- 
tainly, great  credit  is  due  to  President 
Sadat,  Prime  Minister  Begin,  and 
President  Carter — and  to  my  friend  and 
colleague,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Cyrus  Vance. 

The  treaty  brings  to  an  end  30  years 
of  war  that  has  cost  Egypt  and  Israel  so 
much  in  lives,  in  material  substance, 
and  in  effort.  The  United  States,  also, 
has  spent  a  great  deal  of  money  on  this 
war.  Now  we  propose  to  spend  a 
smaller  amount  on  peace. 

The  treaty  does  more  than  serve  the 
interests  of  Egypt  and  Israel;  it  is  in- 
tended to  be  the  cornerstone  of  a  com- 
prehensive, just,  long-term  peace  with 
resulting  stability  for  the  entire  region. 
It  is  in  the  security  interest  of  the 
United  States  that  the  region  evolve 
into  a  peaceful  and  stable  one.  Our  oil 
access,  for  example,  would  again  be 
seriously  threatened  by  regional  con- 
flict; indeed,  the  only  major  oil  inter- 
ruption we  have  experienced  occurred 
in  the  context  of  the  1973  Middle  East 
war.  Resolution  of  the  Arab-Israel 
conflict,  which  began  with  the  Camp 
David  accords  and  continues  with  this 
Peace  Treaty,  is  a  vital  factor  in  the 
protection  of  American  interests. 

The  signing  of  the  treaty  is  but  the 
first  step  toward  a  durable  peace  be- 
tween the  two  states  and  the  achieve- 
ment of  a  comprehensive  settlement  in 
this  troubled  part  of  the  world.  Further 
steps  are  needed.  One  factor  in  this 
equation  is  regional  security. 

The  United  States  seeks  a  region 
with  strong  friendly  states,  able  to  de- 
fend themselves  from  external  aggres- 


sion. Strong  states  are  best  able  to  as- 
sure their  territorial  integrity  without 
requiring  direct  U.S.  involvement. 
Without  this  defensive  ability,  any 
state  is  much  more  vulnerable  and 
subject  to  external,  destabilizing  influ- 
ences. This  legislation,  reflecting  the 
President's  agreement  to  continue  to 
help  Israel  and  to  begin  to  help  Egypt 
in  the  modernization  of  their  armed 
forces,  will  make  a  vital  contribution  to 
the  defense  posture  of  both  countries, 
and,  hence,  to  peace  in  the  entire  re- 
gion. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  legislative 
package  the  Administration  has  pro- 
posed for  congressional  consideration. 
This  assistance  will  be  in  the  form  of 
$800  million  in  grant  aid  for  two  Israeli 
airbases,  $2.2  billion  in  foreign  mili- 
tary sales  (FMS)  credits  for  Israel,  $1.5 
billion  in  FMS  credits  for  Egypt,  and 
$300  million  in  economic  aid  for 
Egypt.  The  complete  package  will  ex- 
tend some  $1.1  billion  of  grants  and 
$3.7  billion  in  loans  to  Israel  and  Egypt 
and  will  require  an  appropriation  of 
$1.47  billion  and  a  total  program  au- 
thorization of  $4.8  billion.  The  budg- 
etary contribution  of  the  United  States 
to  this  Peace  Treaty  is  thus  $1.47  bil- 
lion, rather  than  the  $4.8  billion  in 
total  assistance  that  has  sometimes 
been  taken  to  be  the  cost  to  the  United 
States. 

I  would  now  like  to  turn  to  the  prin- 
cipal security  issues  involved. 

Israel 

Israel  rightly  needs  to  be  certain  of 
its  security  during  and  after  withdrawal 
from  the  Sinai.  This  matter  of  security 
was  an  important  element  in  the 
negotiations.  The  United  States  agrees 
that  a  continuing  strong  Israeli  defense 
capability  is  essential.  The  legislation 
we  are  proposing,  and  the  other  agree- 
ments we  have  made,  help  to  assure 
such  a  capability  by  facilitating  the 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  into  new 
bases  within  the  Negev  and  by  con- 
tinuing the  modernization  of  Israeli 
defense  forces. 

Israel  presently  maintains  a  large 
portion  of  its  active  military  force 
structure  in  the  Sinai.  In  accordance 
with  the  Peace  Treaty,  within  3  years, 
"Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed 
forces  .  .  .  behind  the  international 
boundary  .  .  .  and  Egypt  will  resume 
the  exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty  over 
the  Sinai."  Relocation  of  Israeli  forces 
now  in  the  Sinai  has  implications  for 
Israeli  security  in  three  specific  areas: 
airbase  requirements,  ground  forces  re- 
deployments, and  early-warning  de- 
mands. 

Airbases.  Israel  now  has  four  air- 


Department  of  State  BuUetiii 

bases  in  the  Sinai,  two  of  which  are) 
forward  operating  bases  at  Refidim  andi 
Ophir,  and  two  of  which  are  maim 
operating  bases  at  Etam  and  Etzion. 
Within  9  months,  Israel  must  abandoni 
Refidim.  and  within  3  years,  Israeli 
must  give  up  the  remaining  three  bases. 
The  bases  at  Etam  and  Etzion  are  ofl 
prime  concern  because  they  normally; 
house  all  the  Israeli  squadrons  de- 
ployed in  the  Sinai.  Israel  requires  two 
new  main  operating  bases  to  house  the 
squadrons  now  at  Etam  and  Etzion. 
These  squadrons  cannot  be  deployed  to 
other  bases  without  imposing  unaccept- 
able risks  to  Israeli  security  through 
overcrowding. 

Construction  of  these  facilities  with- 
out U.S.  assistance  would  be  an  ex- 
traordinary burden  on  Israel  in  two  re- 
spects.  First,  it  would  strain  Israel'si 
economy,  which  is  already  experienc- 
ing severe  inflationary  difficulties;  and 
second,  it  would  over-tax  Israel's  con- 
struction industry.    In  order  to  enable 
Israel  to  complete  its  withdrawal  within 
the  time  allowed  by  the  treaty,  the 
President  has  agreed,  subject  to  the  ap- 
proval of  Congress,  to  assist  in  the  i 
construction  of  two  airbases  by  pro-l 
viding  funding  and  management  assist-] 
ance. 

The  two  proposed  bases  will  be  lo- 
cated at  Ovda  and  Matred,  in  the 
Negev.  These  sites  are  the  most  suita- 
ble in  terms  of  terrain,  location,  avail- 
ability, and  construction  cost.  The 
U.S.  Air  Force  will  be  the  project  man- 
ager for  this  undertaking;  the  Corps  ofl 
Engineers  will  be  the  construction 
agent.  We  will  work  in  partnership 
with  Israel;  both  parties  will  share  re- 
sponsibility to  assure  the  completion  oP 
all  construction  necessary  for  initial 
operational  capability  prior  to  the  date 
agreed  for  final  relocation  of  Israeli 
forces  into  the  Negev. 

The  Defense  Department's  estimate 
of  the  cost  of  building  the  airbases  in 
the  time  allowed  is  about  $1  billion,  in 
FY  1980  dollars  (the  midpoint  of  con- 
struction), exclusive  of  infrastructure 
costs  for  roads,  utilities,  and  the  like. 
We  propose  that  this  amount  be  drawn 
from  the  $3  billion  total  assistance 
package  for  Israel  contained  in  the 
legislation.  Of  this  amount,  $800  mil- 
lion is  proposed  to  be  made  available 
through  grants  of  defense  articles  and 
services.  Israel  will  fund  all  additional 
airbase  construction  costs,  drawing  on 
FMS  credits  as  appropriate. 

The  airbase  requirement  is  a  par- 
ticularly challenging  endeavor  for  sev- 
eral reasons.  First,  as  I  mentioned, 
there  is  a  definite  time  constraint.  The 
Peace  Treaty,  in  annex  I,  article  I.  re-  I 
quires  that:  "Israel  will  complete  with-  I 
drawal  of  all  its  armed  forces  and 


4ay  1979 


59 


•ivilians  from  the  Sinai  not  later  than 
ihree  years  from  the  date  of  exchange 
)f  instruments  of  ratification  of  this 
Treaty.""  The  newly  built  airbases  in 
he  Negev  should  be  sufficiently  com- 
pleted so  that  the  Israeli  Air  Force  can 
legin  deploying  to  them  fully  6  months 
irior  to  the  abandonment  of  Etam  and 
itzion  in  order  to  provide  continuity  of 
lir  defense. 

Normally,  construction  of  this  nature 
vould  take  more  than  5  years.  Ac- 
celerating the  pace  means  that  the  con- 
Itruction  firms  will  have  to  work  virtu- 
llly  around  the  clock,  7  days  a  week, 
vluch  new  equipment  will  have  to  be 
icquired  at  the  outset  of  the  project  in 
)rder  to  preclude  costly  and  time  con- 
suming breakdowns  once  construction 
|ias  begun.  The  equipment  must  be  able 
:o  sustain  long-term  usage  under  con- 
.tant  operating  conditions. 

Ground  Forces  Relocation.  In  ad- 

lition  to  the  airbase  construction,  there 
kre  other  costs  which  will  be  imposed 
)n  Israel  as  a  result  of  the  withdrawal. 


One  such  cost  involves  the  ground 
forces.  Israel  presently  maintains  two 
active  armored  divisions  in  the  Sinai. 
These  units,  with  their  supporting 
infrastructure,  will  have  to  be  displaced 
from  their  present  Sinai  locations  to 
new  facilities  in  Israel.  This  relocation 
will  require  significant  construction. 

Supporting  infrastructure  will  also  be 
required — road  networks,  water  and 
power  lines,  and  landline  communi- 
cations— for  army  and  air  force  rede- 
ployments. 

Naval  Forces  Relocation.  Israel  will 
have  to  move  its  Sharm-el-Sheikh  and 
Et  Tur  naval  facilities  to  Elat  and  its 
Mediterranean  Naval  Facility  at  Dafna 
to  Ashdod. 

Early  Warning.  The  loss  of  the 
Sinai  will  reduce  IsraeFs  early-warning 
capability  by  forcing  the  closure  of  Is- 
raeli forward  positioned  early-warning 
sites.  These  sites  provide  important 
early-warning  information,  and  new 
measures  must  be  taken  to  insure,  as  a 
matter  of  prudence,  Israel  has  high 


confidence  in  its  early  warning.  This 
will  require  new  construction  and  new 
procurement. 

We  estimate  that  the  total  cost  of 
these  withdrawal  actions  will  be  be- 
tween $3  and  $4  billion.  This  can  only 
be  a  tentative  estimate  for  considerable 
refinement  remains  to  be  done  with  re- 
spect to  the  withdrawal  and  relocation. 
We  are  helping  support  the  additional 
costs  by  making  available  $2.2  billion 
in  FMS  credits. 

Military  equipment  Moderniza- 
tion. It  is  important  that  IsraeFs  Armed 
Forces  remain  a  modern,  militarily  ef- 
fective force.  We  are  confident  that, 
for  the  immediate  future,  Israel  is  fully 
able  to  defend  itself  against  external 
attack.  To  insure  that  this  is  so  over  the 
longer  run,  however,  modernization  of 
Israel's  Armed  Forces  must  continue. 
Accordingly,  the  President  has  agreed 
to  the  sale  of  additional  arms  supplies 
for  Israel  to  be  purchased  over  the  next 
several  years.  A  classified  list  of  this 
equipment  has  been  provided  to  the 


LETTER  TO  CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE  CHAIRMEN, 
APR.  2,  1979* 

I  am  writing  to  you  to  urge  your  im- 
mediate attention  to  the  authorizing  legisla- 
tion and  the  1979  supplemental  appropria- 
tions request  I  will  soon  be  transmitting  to 
implement  the  Peace  Treaty  between  Israel 
and  Egypt.  This  supplemental  request  re- 
quires urgent  enactment  prior  to  the  likely 
consideration  of  other  pending  supplemen- 
tals  in  order  to  avoid  delays  which  could 
threaten  timely  implementation  of  the 
Treaty. 

The  legislation  to  be  transmitted  will  pro- 
vide $4.8  billion  in  special  financial  aid  to 
the  two  countries  over  the  next  three  years. 
This  will  he  in  addition  to  ongoing  regular 
programs  of  military  and  economic  assist- 
ance. Because  much  of  the  military  financ- 
mg  will  take  the  form  of  guaranteed  loans, 
requiring  only  fractional  appropriations, 
budget  authority  for  the  assistance  package 
will  be  $1.47  billion.  Estimated  budget 
outlays  over  the  next  four  years  will  total 
$1.1  billion,  with  $350  million  occurring  in 
1979  and  $315  million  in  1980. 

Within  the  $4.8  billion  total  for  special 
aid,  I  am  proposing  that  $3  billion  be  made 
available  to  Israel  in  two  components. 

•  The  first  provides  $800  million  in 
grants  to  cover  the  direct  costs  of  relocating 
two  Israeli  airbases  now  located  on  territory 
to  be  returned  to  Egypt. 

•  The  second  provides  $2.2  billion  in 
foreign  military  sales  credit  financing  to 
Israel.  These  funds  will  finance  other  Israeli 
relocation  costs  and  some  upgrading  of 


force  structure  consistent  with  the  new  ter- 
ritorial arrangements. 

For  Egypt,  I  am  also  proposing  a  two  part 
aid  package  totalling  $1.8  billion. 

•  The  larger  component  provides  $1.5 
billion  in  military  sales  credit  financing  on 
the  same  terms  offered  to  Israel.  It  will  help 
Egypt  maintain  a  modern  well-equipped 
military  force,  and  play  a  responsible  role 
in  promoting  stability  and  moderation  in  the 
region. 

•  In  addition,  I  will  propose  to  provide 
Egypt  with  $300  million  of  special  eco- 
nomic aid  loans  under  economic  support 
fund  authorities.  These  funds  will  help  meet 
Egypt's  large  development  needs  and  help 
satisfy  the  expectations  of  the  Egyptian 
people  for  a  better  life. 

As  you  begin  your  consideration  of  these 
proposals,  I  urge  you  to  give  particular  at- 
tention to  three  elements  which  I  can  per- 
sonally assure  you  are  critical. 

•  First,  the  proposed  assistance  is 
evenhanded.  The  financing  package  I  will 
request  reflects  a  careful  assessment  of  the 
near-term  burdens  of  the  treaty  balanced 
against  the  military  and  economic  circum- 
stances of  each  country.  Our  future  influence 
in  the  Middle  East  depends  on  the  perception 
by  all  affected  countries  that  we  do  not  un- 
fairly support  any  one  country.  Alteration  of 
the  proposed  amounts  or  terms  of  assistance 
to  either  Israel  or  Egypt  could  impair  this 
perception. 

•  Second,  the  amounts  of  aid  proposed 
and  the  terms  offered  are  the  result  of  a 
careful  balancing  of  foreign  policy  needs 


and  fiscal  policy  constraints.  Thus,  while 
substantial  U.S.  assistance  is  required  to  as- 
sure successful  implementation  of  the 
Treaty,  I  have  made  every  effort  to  limit 
United  States  funding  in  light  of  our  current 
budgetary  constraints  and  my  desire  to 
avoid  imposing  any  unnecessary  burden  on 
the  U.S.  taxpayer. 

•  Third,  the  proposed  United  States  as- 
sistance is  a  coherent,  interrelated  package 
which  requires  urgent  congressional  action. 
Piecemeal  treatment  would  threaten  both 
evenhandedness  and  the  careful  balance 
between  foreign  policy  and  budget  require- 
ments. Delay  in  congressional  action  on  the 
legislation  could  critically  disrupt  the  care- 
fully negotiated  timing  for  Treaty  im- 
plementation. 


I  regard  this  initiative  as  the  most  impor- 
tant foreign  affairs  proposal  currently  be- 
fore the  Congress.  I  am  sure  I  can  count  on 
your  support  for  favorable  and  prompt  con- 
gressional action. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 


*  Identical  letters  addressed  to  Frank 
Church,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee;  Edmund  S.  Muskie. 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Budget  Committee; 
Warren  G.  Magnuson,  chairman  of  the  Sen- 
ate Appropriations  Committee;  Clement  J. 
Zablocki,  chairman  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee;  Robert  N.  Giaimo, 
chairman  of  the  House  Budget  Committee; 
and  Jamie  L.  Whitten.  chairman  of  the 
House  Appropriations  Committee  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Apr.  9,  1979). 


60 


committee,  and  proposed  sales  will  be 
formally  submitted  to  the  Congress  in 
the  usual  way,  in  accordance  with  the 
Arms  Export  Control  Act. 

While  modernization  of  Israel's 
Armed  Forces  is  desirable  and  should 
continue,  the  peace  with  Egypt  has  en- 
abled Israel  to  make  substantial  reduc- 
tions in  planned  force  expansion.  As  a 
result  of  the  peace,  Israel  will  have 
smaller  forces  than  had  been  expected 
under  its  prior  Matmon  C  force  plan. 

We  believe  Israel's  security  can  best 
be  assured  by  Israel  itself.  This  is  why, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  U.S.  national 
security,  I  recommend  this  legislation, 
which  will  facilitate  a  successful  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  Sinai,  and  also  rec- 
ommend continuing  American  assist- 
ance in  modernizing  Israel's  Armed 
Forces,  so  that  Israel  will  remain  in  a 
satisfactory  posture  to  defend  itself. 

This  policy  of  helping  Israel  help  it- 
self does  not  absolve  the  United  States 
from  maintaining  a  watchful  attitude 
toward  the  security  of  Israel.  Indeed, 
the  United  States  has  agreed  specif- 
ically, for  example,  in  the  improbable 
event  that  violations  of  the  treaty 
occur,  to  "  .  .  .  take  appropriate  meas- 
ures to  promote  full  observance  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace."  We  do  not  expect 
that  we  would  ever  have  to  use  U.S. 
military  forces  to  insure  treaty  com- 
pliance. I  do  believe,  nevertheless,  that 
the  United  States  must  be  continually 
concerned  with  the  security  of  all 
friendly  regional  states,  for  vital 
American  interests  are  at  stake  in  the 
Middle  East. 


Egypt 

The  proposed  legislation  includes 
funds  for  both  military  and  economic 
assistance  to  Egypt.  The  amount  of 
money  allotted  for  military  assistance 
is  larger  than  is  allotted  for  economic 
assistance  (though  much  less  than  the 
already  existing  rate  of  economic  as- 
sistance). There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind 
that  a  sound  economy  is  at  least  as  im- 
portant as  a  strong  defense  posture  to 
the  future  of  Egypt  and  to  the  stability 
of  the  region.  Indeed,  I  place  first 
priority  on  economic  development,  and 
I  believe  President  Sadat  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Egypt  do  also.  The  future  of 
Egypt  will  not  turn  primarily  on  the 
strength  of  its  armed  forces. 

Effective  Egyptian  Armed  Forces  are 
obviously  necessary,  however,  to  the 
defense  of  the  country  against  agres- 
sion. Further,  while  we  do  not 
intend — nor,  we  believe,  does  Presi- 
dent Sadat  intend — that  Egypt  will  be- 
come a  regional  policeman,  Egypt  can 
play  a  positive  role  in  helping  other 
states  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East.  It 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  and  israel  Sign 
Mentoranda  of  Agreement 


The  following  two  memoranda  of 
agreement  were  signed  by  Secretary 
Vance  and  Israeli  Foreign  Minister 
Moshe  Dayan  on  March  26,  1979  in 
Washington.  D.C. 

The  oil  supply  arrangement  of  September  1, 
1975,  between  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Israel,  annexed  hereto,  remains  in 
effect.  A  memorandum  of  agreement  shall  be 
agreed  upon  and  concluded  to  provide  an  oil 
supply  arrangement  for  a  total  of  15  years,  in- 
cluding the  5  years  provided  in  the  September 
1,  1975,  arrangement. 

The  memorandum  of  agreement,  including 
the  commencement  of  this  arrangement  and 
pricing  provisions,  will  be  mutually  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties  within  sixty  days  following 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel. 

It  is  the  intention  of  the  parties  that  prices 
paid  by  Israel  for  oil  provided  by  the  United 
States  hereunder  shall  be  comparable  to  world 
market  prices  current  at  the  time  of  transfer, 
and  that  in  any  event  the  United  States  will  be 
reimbursed  by  Israel  for  the  costs  incurred  by 
the  United  States  in  providing  oil  to  Israel 
hereunder. 


Experts  provided  for  in  the  September  1, 
1975,  arrangement  will  meet  on  request  to  dis- 
cuss matters  arising  under  this  relationship. 

The  United  States  administration  undertakes 
to  seek  promptly  additional  statutory  authori- 
zation that  may  be  necessary  for  full  im- 
plementation of  this  arrangement. 

[M.  Dayan] 

For  the  Government  of  Israel 

[Cyrus  R.  Vance] 

For  the  Government  of  the  United  States 


ANNEX 

Israel  will  make  its  own  independent  ar- 
rangements for  oil  supply  to  meet  its  require- 
ments through  normal  procedures.  In  the  evenB 
Israel  is  unable  to  secure  its  needs  in  this  way, 
the  United  States  Government,  upon  notifica- 
tion of  this  fact  by  the  Government  of  Israel, 
will  act  as  follows  for  five  years,  at  the  end  oft 
which  period  either  side  can  terminate  this  ar- 
rangement on  one-year's  notice. 

(a)  If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  meet  all  its  nor- 
mal requirements  for  domestic  consumption  is^ 
unavailable  for  purchase   in  circumstances 


is  important,  therefore,  that  the  Egyp- 
tian Armed  Forces  have  the  appropriate 
military  capability  to  carry  out  these 
tasks. 

Since  expelling  Soviet  advisors  in 
1972  and  renouncing  its  bilateral  treaty 
with  Moscow  in  1975,  Egypt  has  been 
without  substantive  external  assistance 
in  meeting  its  legitimate  defense  needs. 
Last  year  President  Carter  proposed, 
and  the  Congress  agreed,  to  the  supply 
of  F-5  aircraft  to  Egypt  to  help  mod- 
ernize the  air  force.  Now,  in  the  con- 
text of  peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel, 
the  President  proposes  to  provide  addi- 
tional military  assistance  to  Egypt. 

A  classified  listing  of  equipment  ap- 
proved by  the  President  has  been  pro- 
vided to  the  committee.  As  you  will 
note,  it  includes  additional  aircraft,  air 
defense  equipment,  armored  personnel 
carriers,  and  frigates,  among  other 
things.  This  list  is  substantially  smaller 
than  what  is  required  for  full  moderni- 
zation of  Egypt's  Armed  Forces.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  a  very  respectable  begin- 
ning to  the  modernization  process. 

Conclusion 

In  summary,  what  we  are  recom- 
mending as  part  of  this  initiative  for 


peace  are  programs  of  assistancei 
amounting  to  $1.47  billion  in  budget 
authority  for  Israel  and  Egypt,  to  help 
in  the  relocation  of  Israel's  Armed 
Forces  as  they  withdraw  from  the 
Sinai,  and  to  help  in  the  modernization| 
of  the  armed  forces  of  both  countries.  I 
This  assistance  is  militarily  justified  by  J 
the  circumstances.  This  legislative  pro-  ? 
posal  is  a  substantial  sum  of  money  and 
a  generous  contribution  to  the  peace.  , 
But  while  peace  is  expensive,  war  is 
more  expensive. 

This  legislation  will  be,  in  my  judg- 
ment and  in  the  judgment  of  the  Carter 
Administration,  a  major  American 
contribution  to  peace  in  the  Middle 
East,  to  the  security  of  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael, and  to  the  long-term  stability  of 
the  region.  I  unequivocally  recommend 
its  approval  by  this  committee  and  the 
Congress.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^  Press  release  97. 

^For  texts,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  1978, 
p.  7. 


.Wy  1979 


61 


Ahcre  no  quantitative  restrictions  exist  on  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  procure  oil  to 
■nect  its  normal  requirements,  the  United  Stales 
MAcrnmenl  will  promptly  make  oil  available 
or  purchase  by  Israel  to  meet  all  of  the 
aforementioned  normal  requirements  of  Israel. 
If  Israel  is  unable  to  secure  the  necessary 
neans  to  transport  such  oil  to  Israel,  the  United 
States  Government  will  make  every  effort  to 
fielp  Israel  secure  the  necessary  means  of  trans- 
port. 

(b)  If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  meet  all  of  its 
normal  requirements  for  domestic  consumption 
is  unavailable  for  purchase  in  circumstances 
Where  quantitative  restrictions  through  em- 
bargo or  otherwise  also  prevent  the  United 
States  from  procuring  oil  to  meet  its  normal  re- 
quirements, the  United  States  Government  will 
promptly  make  oil  available  for  purchase  by 
Jsrael  in  accordance  with  the  International 
Energy  Agency  conservation  and  allocation 
formula,  as  applied  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment, in  order  to  meet  Israel's  essential  re- 
Iquirements.  If  Israel  is  unable  to  secure  the 
(necessary  means  to  transport  such  oil  to  Israel, 
the  United  States  Government  will  make  every 
!effort  to  help  Israel  secure  the  necessary  means 
of  transport. 

Israeli  and  United  States  experts  will  meet 
annually  or  more  frequently  at  the  request  of 
leither  party,  to  review  Israel's  continuing  oil 
requirement. 


AcMevement  of  Peace 
and  the  Futare  Chaiienge 


Recognizing  the  significance  of  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Israel  and 
Egypt  and  considering  the  importance  of  full 
implementation  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  to  Is- 
rael's security  interests  and  the  contribution  of 
the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  to  the  se- 
curity and  development  of  Israel  as  well  as  its 
significance  to  peace  and  stability  in  the  region 
and  to  the  maintenance  of  international  peace 
and  security;  and 

Recognizing  that  the  withdrawal  from  Sinai 
imposes  additional  heavy  security,  military  and 
economic  burdens  on  Israel; 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  of  the  State  of  Israel,  subject  to 
their  constitutional  processes  and  applicable 
law,  confirm  as  follows: 

1 ,  In  the  light  of  the  role  of  the  United  States 
in  achieving  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  par- 
ties' desire  that  the  United  States  continue  its 

.supportive  efforts,  the  United  States  will  take 
appropriate  measures  to  promote  full  observ- 
ance of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

2.  Should  it  be  demonstrated  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  United  States  that  there  has  been  a 
violation  or  threat  of  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 

!  Peace,  the  United  States  will  consult  with  the 
[parties  with  regard  to  measures  to  halt  or  pre- 
vent the  violation,  ensure  observance  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace,  enhance  friendly  and  peaceful 
relations  between  the  parties  and  promote  peace 
in  the  region,  and  will  take  such  remedial 
measures  as  it  deems  appropriate,  which  may 
include  diplomatic,  economic  and  military 
measures  as  described  below. 


by  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr. 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  in  Pittsburgh  on  April  3,  1979. 
Mr.  Atherton  is  Ambassador  at  Large 
with  special  responsibility  for  Middle 
East  peace  negotiations. 

A  week  ago  a  inagnificent  feat  of  the 
human  spirit  was  accomplished.  The 
leaders  of  Egypt  and  Israel — enemies 
for  30  years — sat  down  together  and 
signed  a  Treaty  of  Peace.  At  the  same 
table  on  the  White  House  lawn,  they 
pledged  to  build  on  this  achievement  to 
meet  the  challenge  of  bringing  peace  to 
the  Middle  East. 

The  problems  and  obstacles  which 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  President 
Sadat  overcame  were  as  intractable  and 
complex  as  any  in  the  history  of 
statecraft.  A  legacy  of  bitterness  and 
bloodshed  separated  their  peoples; 
doubts,  fears,  and  the  open  hostility  of 
others  stood  in  their  way.  But  they  had 
fortitude  and  vision.  They  remained 
true  to  their  heritage,  their  peoples,  and 
their  own  values.  They  persevered,  and 
their  monument  is  the  documents  they 
signed  on  March  26. 


Americans  can  take  pride  in  the  role 
their  country  played  in  this  historic 
event.  Both  leaders  have  paid  tribute  to 
the  key  role  of  President  Carter.  With- 
out the  courage,  vision,  and  persistence 
of  our  President,  this  first  practical  step 
in  30  years  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  would  not  have  been  possible.  His 
deep  involvement  and  firm  leadership, 
supported  by  the  patient  and  tenacious 
efforts  of  Secretary  Vance,  were  es- 
sential to  the  final  success  of  the 
negotiations. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  lays  the 
foundation  for  true  peace  between  Is- 
rael and  the  largest  Arab  state.  It  pro- 
vides for  the  security  and  integrity  of 
the  two  nations.  It  opens  new  avenues 
for  trade  and  communications;  for  eco- 
nomic, scientific,  and  social  better- 
ment; and  for  the  enhancement  of 
learning  and  cultural  exchange.  The 
process  of  establishing  normal  relations 
will  begin  9  months  after  the  treaty  has 
come  into  force — when  Israel  has  with- 
drawn from  three-fourths  of  the  Sinai 
Peninsula — and  will  continue  to  de- 
velop as  full  withdrawal  to  the  interna- 
tional border  takes  place  within  3 
years. 


3.  The  United  States  will  provide  support  it 
deems  appropriate  for  proper  actions  taken  by 
Israel  in  response  to  such  demonstrated  viola- 
tions of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  In  particular,  if  a 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  is  deemed  to 
threaten  the  security  of  Israel,  including,  inter 
alia,  a  blockade  of  Israel's  use  of  international 
waterways,  a  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  concerning  limitation  of  forces 
or  an  armed  attack  against  Israel,  the  United 
States  will  be  prepared  to  consider,  on  an  ur- 
gent basis,  such  measures  as  the  strengthening 
of  the  United  States  presence  in  the  area,  the 
providing  of  emergency  supplies  to  Israel,  and 
the  exercise  of  maritime  rights  in  order  to  put 
an  end  to  the  violation. 

4.  The  United  States  will  support  the  parties" 
rights  to  navigation  and  overflight  for  access  to 
either  country  through  and  over  the  Strait  of 
Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  pursuant  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace. 

5.  The  United  States  will  oppose  and.  if 
necessary,  vote  against  any  action  or  resolution 
in  the  United  Nations  which  in  its  judgment  ad- 
versely affects  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

6.  Subject  to  Congressional  authorization 
and  appropriation,  the  United  States  will  en- 
deavor to  take  into  account  and  will  endeavor 
to  be  responsive  to  military  and  economic  as- 
sistance requirements  of  Israel. 


7.  The  United  States  will  continue  to  impose 
restrictions  on  weapons  supplied  by  it  to  any 
country  which  prohibit  their  unauthorized 
transfer  to  any  third  party.  The  United  States 
will  not  supply  or  authorize  transfer  of  such 
weapons  for  use  in  an  armed  attack  against  Is- 
rael, and  will  take  steps  to  prevent  such  unau- 
thorized transfer. 

8.  Existing  agreements  and  assurances  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Israel  are  not  ter- 
minated or  altered  by  the  conclusion  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace,  except  for  those  contained  in 
articles  5.  6.  7.  8.  II.  12.  15.  and  16  of  the 
Memorandum  of  Agreement  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  (United  States-Israeli  Assur- 
ances) of  September  I.  1975. 

9.  This  Memorandum  of  Agreement  sets 
forth  the  full  understandings  of  the  United 
States  and  Israel  with  regard  to  the  subject 
matters  covered  between  them  hereby,  and 
shall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  its 
terms. 

[Cyrus  R.  Vance] 

For  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 

America 


[M.  Dayan] 

For  the  Government  of  Israel 


D 


62 


This  is  a  moment  of  immense  im- 
portance for  the  Israeli  and  Egyptian 
peoples.  It  is  of  immense  importance  to 
others  as  well — not  least  to  this  nation. 

The  United  States  has  long  been 
deeply  concerned  about  the  Middle 
East.  Americans  have  longstanding 
friendships  among  the  peoples  there 
and  deep  and  permanent  moral  com- 
mitments rooted  in  our  own  national 
values.  We  have  labored  for  years  to 
advance  the  cause  of  peace  in  that  re- 
gion. Four  Arab-Israeli  wars  have  not 
only  brought  bloodshed  and  untold 
suffering  to  the  peoples  of  the  Middle 
East;  they  have  also  cost  the  United 
States  and  the  rest  of  the  world  incal- 
culable billions.  At  several  points  the 
conflict  has  threatened  world  peace  it- 
self. 

Therefore,  all  nations  which  truly 
care  for  peace  and  justice  and  progress 
should  welcome  the  treaty.  Its 
achievement  against  heavy  odds  is  a 
demonstration  to  men  and  women 
everywhere  that  human  reason,  com- 
mon sense,  goodwill,  hard  work,  and 
faith  can  prevail.  It  demonstrates  that 
even  those  who  have  been  adversaries 
for  generations  can  overcome  enmity 
and  make  peace;  it  is  a  spark  of  hope  in 
an  uncertain  world. 

For  the  Middle  East,  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  a 
new  reality  and,  I  firmly  believe,  an 
irreversible  reality.  We  must  be  under 
no  illusion,  however,  that  this  is  the 
end  of  the  road.  Peace  has  come  to 
Egypt  and  Israel;  it  has  not  come  to  the 
other  peoples  of  the  Middle  East.  Until 
it  does,  the  peoples  of  Egypt  and  Israel 
cannot  realize  the  full  benefits  of  the 
peace  between  them.  The  treaty  just 
concluded  is  an  essential  corner- 
stone—  but  only  the  cornerstone  —  for 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  Unless  we  build  on  it,  the  danger 
to  our  own  national  interests — and  to 
the  future  of  the  people  there  — 
remains.  The  specter  of  tension  and 
hostility  in  the  volatile  Middle  East  can 
only  be  finally  removed  when  the  com- 
prehensive peace  foreseen  last  autumn 
by  President  Carter,  President  Sadat, 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin  at  Camp 
David  is  achieved. 

For  its  part,  the  U.S.  Government 
does  not  intend  to  relax  its  efforts.  We 
intend  to  help  consolidate  the  peace 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  and  to  move 
with  them  to  the  next  stage  of  the 
negotiations.  We  have  committed  our- 
selves to  help  insure  that  what  has  been 
agreed  to  by  both  sides  is  scrupulously 
observed.  But  these  assurances  can 
only  supplement  the  efforts  of  the  par- 
ties themselves.  The  United  States  does 
not  intend,  nor  has  it  ever  intended,  to 
play  the  role  of  policeman. 

Egypt  and  Israel  signed  their  treaty 


in  good  faith  and  committed  them- 
selves to  work  in  good  faith  for  peace 
with  Israel's  other  neighbors.  We  are 
convinced  they  intend  to  carry  out 
these  commitments. 

Cost  to  the  U.S. 

At  this  point,  let  me  say  a  word 
about  a  matter  of  valid  interest  to  the 
American  people — the  cost  to  the 
United  States  of  this  treaty.  Four  wars 
in  the  Middle  East  have  cost  the  tax- 
payers several  tens  of  billions  of  dol- 
lars in  direct  costs  and  billions  more  in 
inflation  and  loss  of  jobs. 

With  the  advent  of  Egyptian-Israeli 
peace,  we  want  to  help  these  two 
countries  in  their  determination  to  im- 
prove the  well-being  of  their  peoples 
and  to  assure  their  security.  It  seems  to 
us  that  the  added  aid  we  propose — 
primarily  in  loans — is  small  compared 
to  the  cost  and  dangers  of  another  Mid- 
dle East  war  to  the  United  States. 

In  discussing  the  aid  package  for 
Egypt  and  Israel  for  which  the  Admin- 
istration will  seek  the  approval  of  Con- 
gress, I  want  to  stress  two  general 
points:  (I)  the  program  will  stretch 
over  3  years  and  (2)  the  impact  on  our 
budget  is  considerably  lower  than  the 
overall  amount  of  money  to  be  gener- 
ated for  the  program.  This  is  because 
our  foreign  military  sales  program  uses 
credit  from  private  banks  under  loans 
guaranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government,  so 
Congress  does  not  have  to  appropriate 
money  for  the  entire  value  of  the  pro- 
gram. Let  me  be  specific. 

The  bulk  of  the  additional  assistance 
we  envisage  for  Israel  and  Egypt  is  to 
help  them  meet  their  urgent  security 
requirements.  It  totals  about  $4.5  bil- 
lion over  3  years — approximately  $3 
billion  for  Israel  and  $1.5  billion  for 
Egypt.  Of  the  amount  for  Israel,  about 
$800  million  will  be  in  grant  aid  for  the 
construction  of  two  airfields  which  will 
be  moved  from  the  Sinai  to  the  Negev, 
thereby  enabling  Israel  to  withdraw  in 
the  allotted  3  years  in  conditions  of  se- 
curity. The  remaining  sum  for  Israel, 
and  the  full  amount  for  Egypt,  are  in 
the  form  of  foreign  military  sales  cred- 
its. 

Since  Congress  will  need  to  appro- 
priate only  10%  of  the  total  amount  to 
guarantee  the  credits,  the  actual  budg- 
etary impact  of  the  sum  we  contemplate 
will  amount  to  only  about  $1.2  billion 
for  the  American  taxpayer  over  3 
years. 

The  military  program  for  Israel,  be- 
sides helping  defray  the  costs  of  with- 
drawal from  the  Sinai,  will  enable  Is- 
rael to  continue  the  modernization  of 
its  military  establishment  against  con- 
tinuing security  threats  in  the  area.  For 
Egypt  the  $1.5  billion  military  program 


I 

Department  of  State  Bullet^ 

will  help  Egypt  to  replace  equipment  in 
its  military  establishment  rendered  obli 
solete  by  the  Soviet  embargo. 

In  addition  to  the  security  assistance 
I  have  outlined,  we  envisage  $300  miH 
lion  more  in  economic  assistance  foi 
Egypt  over  the  3  years  to  help  Presi< 
dent  Sadat  bring  the  rewards  of  peace 
to  his  people. 

We  also  plan  to  continue  our  curreni 
assistance  programs  to  both  countries 
These  have  been  running  at  the  level  o) 
$1 .785  billion  annually  for  military  ano 
economic  assistance  to  Israel  and  abou; 
$1  billion  in  economic  aid  annually  tc 
Egypt. 

We  shall  also  be  urging  our  friends 
and  allies  to  contribute  their  share  o: 
economic  assistance  in  support  ol 
peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 

There  is,  I  know,  a  gut  reaction 
among  many  people:  "Why  should  thi 
United  States  pay  for  peace  in  the  Mid-1 
die  East?  Why  doesn't  peace  save 
money?" 

The  answer,  1  believe,  is  that  in  thi 
short  run,  risks  are  being  taken  by  each 
side.  We  are  contributing  to  th 
achievement  of  our  longrun  goals  o 
stability  and  moderation  in  the  Middl 
East.  By  strengthening  the  forces  o 
moderation  now  against  threats  to  the! 
well-being  and  security,  we  pave  th 
way  for  reducing  our  burdens  in  th{ 
long  run  through  reducing  the  risk  o 
war. 

I  repeat,  the  peace  and  stability  we 
seek  can  only  be  achieved  ultimate!; 
by  making  this  treaty  the  cornerstone 
peace  between  Israel  and  all  it 
neighbors.  For  the  United  States,  no 
less  than  for  the  parties  in  the  region 
directly  involved,  continued  progress 
toward  a  comprehensive  peace  is  es 
sential.  As  in  the  negotiations  just  con 
eluded,  so  in  the  negotiations  just 
ahead,  the  United  States  intends  to  re 
main  a  full  partner. 

Let  me  now  discuss,  first,  why  wei 
consider  this  full  involvement  is  dic- 
tated by  our  national  interests,  and, 
second,  how  we  foresee  the  next  stage 
of  the  peace  process  developing. 

Reasons  for  U.S.  Involvement 

The  reasons  for  our  involvement  in 
this  strategic  area  are  clear. 

First,  there  are  few  areas  in  the 
world  today  where  so  many  different 
and  important  American  interests  come 
together.  Americans  have  come  to  rec- 
ognize the  profound  degree  to  which 
those  interests  are  tied  to  peace  in  the 
region.  Those  interests  include: 

•  Our  historic  and  moral  commit- 
ment to  the  security  of  Israel; 

•  The  important  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial economic  and  other  relationships 
between  the  United  States  and  Arab 


Mav  1979 


63 


nations  of  the  Middle  East,  including 
'access  to  oil,  and  cooperation  in  main- 
:aining  order  in  the  global  economy; 
:  •  Our  humanitarian  commitment  to 
those  people  of  the  region — above  all 
the  homeless  Palestinians — who  cannot 
now  look  forward  to  the  fully  produc- 
'ive  lives  which  are  the  human  right  of 
all  peoples;  and 

•  Concern   for  the  dangers   which 
ersisting  crisis  in  this  region  poses  for 
global   stability,   for  superpower  con- 
frontation, and  for  the  prosperity  of  the 
United  States  and  its  allies. 

Second,  this  is  an  area  where  fun- 
damental changes  are  taking  place  at  a 
dramatic  rate.  The  Middle  East  in- 
cludes some  of  the  most  resource-rich 
and  rapidly  modernizing  nations  of  the 
world,  as  well  as  some  of  the  poorest. 
We  must,  therefore,  expect  a  period  of 
instability.  The  recent  upheaval  in  Iran 
is  hut  one  reminder  of  how  events  in 
■one  part  of  this  region  impact  on  the 
'other  parts. 

Third,  because  of  the  importance 
and  interrelatedness  of  all  our  interests, 
ithe  only  sensible  American  policy  to- 
iward  this  area  is  one  which  permits  us 
to  pursue  all  of  those  interests  at  the 
same  time  in  conditions  of  change. 

With  these  interests  in  mind,  let  me 
now  turn  to  where  we  go  next  in  the 
peace  process.  The  Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty  has  fulfilled  one  of  the  two 
framework  agreements  worked  out  at 
Camp  David.'  At  those  historic  meet- 
ings in  the  Maryland  mountains,  the 
Governments  of  Egypt  and  Israel  com- 
mitted themselves  to  principles  and 
procedures  for  a  series  of  negotiations 
leading  to  peace  between  Israel  and 
each  of  its  Arab  neighbors.  The 
achievement  of  that  peace  depends  on 
success  in  each  negotiation,  and  each 
new  negotiation  builds  on  what  has  oc- 
curred. 

The  Palestinian  Question 

I  said  earlier  that,  in  addition  to  the 
Peace  Treaty.   Prime   Minister  Begin 
and  President  Sadat  signed  a  second 
document  on  March  26.  In  a  joint  letter 
addressed  to  President  Carter,  they 
pledged  to  begin  almost  immediately 
the  process  agreed  upon  at  Camp  David 
whose  ultimate  objective,  in  the  words 
of  the  Camp  David  framework  agree- 
ment is   "...  the  resolution  of  the 
Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  aspects." 
]      That  process  is  to  start  with  negotia- 
jtions  related  to  the  West  Bank  and 
'  Gaza — in  other  words,   those  parts  of 
the  former  mandated  territory  of  Pales- 
tine lying  outside  of  the  pre-1967  ar- 
■  mistice  line  boundaries  of  Israel — 
:  territory  which  has  been  occupied  by 
[Israel  since  the    1967  war.   These 


negotiations  will  begin  in  the  Middle 
East,  with  full  American  participation, 
within  1  month  of  the  exchange  of  in- 
struments of  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
which  will  bring  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty  into  force.  We  expect  this  to 
occur  in  the  very  near  future.  For  the 
first  time  in  more  than  three  decades  of 
conflict,  the  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  has 
permitted  us  to  turn  our  full  attention  to 
the  practical  solution  of  a  central  issue 
of  that  contlict — the  Palestinian  issue. 

It  is  evident  that  the  issues  involved 
in  the  Palestinian  question  are  far  too 
complex  to  be  dealt  with  all  at  once. 
Because  of  this,  we  have  long  felt  that 
the  only  realistic  approach  to  their  so- 
lution is  to  establish  a  transitional 
period  during  which  decisionmaking 
institutions  can  evolve  and  in  which  the 
decisions  that  need  to  be  made  can  be 
dealt  with  in  a  logical  sequence.  That 
approach  was  agreed  to  by  Egypt  and 
Israel  at  Camp  David,  and  they  have 
invited  other  parties  to  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  to  support  it.  In  their  letter  to 
President  Carter  accompanying  the 
treaty.  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  have  agreed  to 
negotiate  in  good  faith,  with  a  goal  of 
completing  those  negotiations  within  1 
year.  Their  goal  is  to  reach  agreement 
on  arrangements  for  electing  a  self- 
governing  authority  for  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  and  on  the  powers  and  re- 
sponsibilities of  that  body. 

Let  me  briefly  review  what  the  Camp 
David  framework  calls  for  on  the 
Palestinian  issues. 

•  A  Palestinian  self-governing  au- 
thority will  be  established  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  for  a  5-year  transitional 
period,  during  which  negotiations  will 
take  place  to  determine  the  final  status 
of  these  areas. 

•  At  the  start  of  the  transitional 
period,  the  Israeli  military  government 
and  its  civilian  administration  will  be 
withdrawn  and  replaced  by  the  self- 
governing  authority  freely  elected  by 
the  inhabitants  of  these  areas.  An  ini- 
tial withdrawal  of  Israeli  military 
forces  will  take  place,  and  those  re- 
maining will  be  redeployed  to  specified 
security  locations. 

•  Elected  Palestinian  representatives 
and  the  Government  of  Jordan  are  in- 
vited to  participate,  along  with  Egypt 
and  Israel,  in  negotiations  based  on  all 
the  provisions  and  principles  of  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolution  242,  the  basis 
for  all  peace  efforts  in  the  Middle  East 
since  1967.  Thereby  the  Palestinians 
can  participate,  as  they  have  every 
right  to  do,  in  determining  their  own 
future.  They  can  participate  in  setting 
up  their  self-governing  authority  and  in 
the  subsequent  negotiations  to  deter- 
mine the  final  status  of  the  West  Bank 


and  Gaza,  as  well  as  in  the  negotiations 
for  an  Israel-Jordan  peace  treaty.  The 
agreement  on  the  final  status  of  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  will  be  submitted 
to  a  vote  by  the  elected  Palestinian 
representatives.  These  elected  repre- 
sentatives will,  by  themselves,  decide 
how  they  shall  govern  themselves  after 
the  5-year  transitional  period,  consist- 
ent with  the  terms  of  their  agreement 
on  the  final  status  of  the  area. 

•  Representatives  of  Palestinians  not 
now  living  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza, 
as  mutually  agreed,  may  join  the 
negotiations  on  establishing  the  elected 
.self-governing  authority  in  those  areas. 
Throughout  the  5-year  transitional 
period,  in  all  the  negotiations,  Palesti- 
nians in  this  area  and  outside  it  almost 
certainly  will  reflect  each  other's  views 
and  concerns. 

•  Egypt  and  Israel  have  agreed  to 
work  with  other  interested  parties  to 
establish  agreed  procedures  for  a 
prompt,  just,  and  permanent  im- 
plementation of  the  resolution  of  the 
refugee  problem. 

•  Israel  and  Egypt  have  agreed  that 
the  solution  from  the  negotiations  must 
recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and  their  just  re- 
quirements, as  well  as  provide  for  the 
security  of  Israel. 


Future  Negotiations 

In  future  negotiations,  as  in  the  past, 
the  United  Stales  will  remain  attentive 
to  an  important  ingredient  for  long- 
term  regional  stability  in  the  Middle 
East:  the  security  of  Israel.  Seven 
American  Presidents  have  believed  and 
demonstrated  that  America's  relation- 
ship with  Israel  is  a  unique  relation- 
ship. It  is  a  relationship  which  is  inde- 
structible because  it  is  rooted  in  the 
consciousness  and  the  morals  and  the 
religion  and  the  beliefs  of  the  American 
people  themselves.  As  President  Carter 
has  said  [March  12,  1979]:  "For  30 
years  we  have  stood  at  the  side  of  the 
proud  and  independent  nation  of  Israel. 
I  can  say  without  reservation,  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America, 
that  we  will  continue  to  do  so  not  just 
for  another  30  years,  but 
forever.  .  .  .  The  United  States  will 
never  support  any  agreement  or  any 
action  that  places  Israel's  security  in 
jeopardy." 

Israel  as  a  sovereign  state  within  the 
family  of  nations  has  the  right  to  rec- 
ognition and  acceptance  by  its 
neighbors.  Beyond  this  the  people  of 
Israel,  like  people  everywhere,  have  a 
deep-felt  longing  and  inherent  right  to 
live  in  peace  and  security  —  a  security 
which  derives  not  only  from  our  com- 
mitment and  Israel's  own  strength  and 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


fortitude  but  from  a  peace  based  upon 
the  growing  cooperation  and  goodwill 
of  its  neighbors  and  from  firm  and 
lasting  security  agreements  mutually 
arrived  at  and  observed. 

No  one  should  underestimate  the 
difficulty  of  the  remaining  challenges 
in  the  Middle  East.  For  all  the  reasons  I 
have  mentioned,  the  challenge  must  be 
met.  Failure  to  do  so  poses  sufficient 
dangers  to  world  peace  that  your  gov- 
ernment would  be  irresponsible  were  it 
not  to  remain  actively  involved  in 
helping  the  parties  meet  the  challenge. 

Only  the  resolution  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  in  its  broadest  context 
can  assure  stability  in  the  greater  Mid- 
dle Eastern  region.  The  process  in- 
volved is  mutually  reinforcing:  Without 
an  Arab-Israeli  settlement,  stability  in 
the  Middle  East  will  be  difficult  to 
achieve;  that  stability  is  impossible 
without  settlement  of  the  Palestinian 
issue;  and  until  there  is  stability  in  the 
region  at  large,  the  concerns  of  both 
Arabs  and  Israelis  for  their  security, 
independence,  and  territorial  integrity 
cannot  be  completely  allayed. 

Answer  to  the  Critics 

As  we  go  forward  in  this  work,  we 
are  aware  that  there  are  those  who  do 
not  support  it,  or  who  hesitate  to  do  so 
openly.  There  are  some  who  do  not 
want  peace  and  would  even  unravel  the 
fabric  of  work  already  done.  There  are 
others  who  are  committed  to  a  peaceful 
settlement  but  who  criticize  the  Camp 
David  framework  —  the  only  approach 
in  three  decades  that  has  begun  to  pro- 
duce results.  There  are  those  who  de- 
mand that  their  concerns  be  addressed 
and  their  rights  insured  but  who  have 
refused  so  far  to  engage  in  the  effort 
required  to  bring  about  the  kind  of  fu- 
ture they  want. 

To  them  we  say:  We  are  sensitive  to 
your  anxieties  and  your  doubts.  You 
fear  that  the  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  will 
turn  out  to  be  a  separate  peace  and  that 
your  legitimate  interests  will  be  for- 
gotten. We  say  to  them:  The  documents 
signed  and  the  solemn  pledges  made, 
including  the  pledge  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  are  proof  that  this 
fear  is  unfounded.  A  beginning  has 
been  made.  The  process  continues.  The 
critics  provide  no  practical  alternative. 
War  is  no  solution.  The  solution  lies  in 
negotiations  whose  momentum  toward 
peace  will  grow  as  concrete  results  are 
achieved.  The  results  which  seem  im- 
possible today  become  realistic  to- 
morrow as  confidence  in  the  peace 
process  grows.  The  United  States  re- 
mains committed  to  achieving  a  com- 
prehensive peace,  fair  and  just  to  all 
concerned. 

We  will  go  on  with  this  process  re- 


U]\ITED  ]\ATIO]\S:        Summaries  of 
11.S.  Statements 


Dominica 

The  United  States  supported  the  ap- 
plication of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Dominica  for  membership  in  the  United 
Nations.  (Amb.  Richard  W.  Petree  in 
the  Security  Council  on  Dec.  6,  1978; 
USUN  press  release  153)  It  was  ad- 
mitted as  the  151st  member  of  the 
United  Nations  on  December  18,  1978. 

Human  Rights 

The  United  States  urged  that  the 
United  Nations  concentrate  on  im- 
proving its  human  rights  machinery  and 
programs.  In  an  address  before  the  as- 
sembled members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions on  March  17,  1977,  President 
Carter  suggested  that  the  U.N.  Com- 
mission on  Human  Rights  meet  more 
often  and  move  the  entire  human  rights 
division  back  to  central  headquarters  in 
New  York.  He  also  asked  the  United 
Nations  to  reconsider  the  proposal  to 
create  the  post  of  a  U.N.  high  commis- 
sioner of  human  rights. 

Accordingly,  the  United  States  con- 
tinued to  press  that  the  Human  Rights 
Commission's  overall  analysis  has  a 


positive  impact  on  improving  the 
human  rights  mechanisms  and  thai 
there  be  a  periodic  reveiw  of  all  U.N. 
activities  in  this  respect.  We  also  sup- 
ported initiatives  concerning  the  crea- 
tion of  autonomous  human  rights  in- 
stitutions and  regional  human  rights 
organizations.  (Brady  Tyson  in  Com- 
mittee III  on  Nov.  28,  1979;  USUN 
press  release  138) 

Mass  Communications 

The  United  States  welcomed  the  ex-  : 
cellent  report  on  major  developments  in 
mass  communications  during  the  last 
16  years  which  was  submitted  to  theii 
U.N.  Secretary  General  by  the  Directotl 
General  of  the  U.N.  Educational.  Scii 
entific  and  Cultural  Organizatiol 
(UNESCO).  We  also  noted  that  the 
work  of  the  20th  session  of  the  UN-j 
ESCO  general  conference  signified  th| 
triumph  of  cooperation  over  confronta 
tion  and  laid  the  foundation  for  a  mor 
equitable  "new  world  information 
order." 

The  U.S.  general  policy  statement 
the  conference  (for  text  see  BuLLETiii 
of  February    1979,   p.   50)  proposed 


gardless  of  pressure  or  of  the  indiffer- 
ence of  others.  We  invite  others  in- 
volved in  the  conflict  to  join  us  and 
urge  all  nations  concerned  with  peace 
to  support  our  effort.  The  full  fruits  of 
peace  cannot  be  harvested  unless  its 
seed  is  sown  widely  and  nurtured  by 
all.  We  see  no  present  alternative  to  the 
process  begun  at  Camp  David.  The 
problems  remaining  are  too  compli- 
cated and  too  sensitive  to  be  solved  all 
at  once.  Most  complicated  of  all  is  the 
unresolved  problem  of  Jerusalem.  But 
with  each  problem  resolved,  it  becomes 
all  the  more  possible  to  resolve  the 
next  —  with  each  act  of  trust,  the  next 
act  requiring  even  greater  trust  be- 
comes more  possible.  In  the  end,  the 
overall  solution  will  emerge,  as  we  put 
in  place  the  firm  building  blocks  on 
which  a  comprehensive  peace  can 
stand. 

A  framework  for  peace  was  estab- 
lished at  Camp  David  and  an 
Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  has  now  been 
concluded.  This  was  the  first  indis- 
pensible  step  on  the  road  to  a  just  and 
lasting  peace.  The  challenges  ahead  are 
formidable,  and  overcoming  them  will 
at  times  tax  our  patience  and  our  for- 
titude. But,  for  the  first  time,  a  practi- 


cal beginning  has  been  made  toward 
peace  in  this  troubled  region,  and  a 
realistic  opportunity  exists  to  complete^ 
the  task. 

We  are  determined  to  help  make  thisJ 
treaty  the  foundation  for  a  wider  andl 
greater  peace.  What  we  seek,  in  thei| 
words  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  is:  "Equal  ' 
and  exact  justice  to  all  men,  of  what- 
ever state  or  persuasion,   religious  or 
political;  peace,  commerce,  and  honest 
friendship  with  all  nations.  ..."  ^ 

Sixteen  months  ago.  President  Sadat  I 
traversed  in  less  than  an  hour  the  light  I 
years  separating  Cairo  and  Jerusalem.  ' 
By  that  symbolic  act.  he  charted  a  new 
course  that  can  make  Jefferson's  vision 
a  reality  for  the  peoples  of  the  Middle 
East.  Six  months  ago  three  men  of 
vision  —  President  Sadat.  Prime 
Minister  Begin,  and  President 
Carter — set  out  from  Camp  David  on 
the  long  road  to  achieve  that  reality. 
One  week  ago  those  same  three  men 
reached  the  first  major  milestone  on 
that  journey.  We  are  determined  to  stay 
on  that  road  until,  together,  we  reach 
its  final  and  successful  destination.     □ 


'For  texts  of  the  Camp  David  frameworks 
and  related  material,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct. 
1978,  p.l. 


May  1979 


65 


measures  to  further  the   free   flow  of 
information. 

•  The  United  States  pledged  to  de- 
velop a  plan  of  cooperation  and  assist- 
ance in  communications  with  develop- 
ing countries. 

•  The  United  States  announced  that 
an  AID-funded  program  using  the 
facilities  of  INTELSAT  would  be  ini- 
tiated to  enable  developing  countries  to 
disseminate  information  on  health, 
education,  and  agriculture  in  remote 
rural  areas. 

•  The  United  States  recommended 
consideration  of  a  consultative  role  for 
appropriate  international  organizations 
for  action  upon  requests  for  communi- 
cations assistance  and  mobilization  of 
resources. 

We  suggested  that  the  Special  Politi- 
cal Committee  on  Questions  Relating 
to  Information  especially  consider  three 
I  areas  of  activity: 

•  Defining  needs  and  aspirations  of 
the  world  community  in  realistic  terms; 

•  Organizing  procedures  for  pro- 
viding consultative  services;  and 

•  Mobilizing  resources. 

In  conclusion  the  United  States 
cautioned  against  radical  and  politically 
motivated  prescriptions  for  structural 
changes.  We  cannot  acquiesce  in  or  be 
indifferent  to  concepts  of  a  new  world 
information  order  which  imply  linkage 
with  ideas  and  proposals  totally  unac- 
ceptable to  any  society  that  constitu- 
tionally guarantees  freedom  of  expres- 
sion against  restriction  by  the  state.  To 
establish  a  more  just  and  effective 
world  order,  all  nations  must  pursue, 
without  discarding  their  differences, 
the  commonalities  that  exist  in  con- 
structive and  practical  approaches  to 
the  problems  before  them.  (George  A. 
Dalley  in  the  Special  Political  Com- 
mittee on  Questions  Relating  to  Infor- 
mation on  Dec.  4,  1978;  USUN  press 
release  149) 


Middle  East 

The  United  States  strongly  opposed 
UNGA  Resolution  33-71A.  Its  main 
point  is  a  request  that  the  Security 
Council,  under  Chapter  VII  of  the 
U.N.  Charter,  apply  a  mandatory  arms 
embargo  against  only  one  nation  in  the 
Middle  East — Israel.  The  United  States 
believes  that  this  would  undermine  the 
security  of  Israel,  create  a  fundamental 
imbalance  in  the  Middle  East,  and  so 
contribute  significantly  to  a  dangerous 
destabilization  in  the  region.  Rather, 
the  way  to  achieve  stability  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  is  for  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors  to  resolve  their  differences 
through  negotiations  leading  to  a  com- 


prehensive settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  dispute.  (Amb.  Adrian  S.  Fisher 
on  Nov.  27;  USUN  press  release  139) 

The  United  States  supported  the  Se- 
curity Council's  renewal  of  the  U.N. 
Disengagement  Observer  Force.  (Amb. 
Richard  W.  Petree  in  the  Security 
Council  on  Nov.  30,  1978;  USUN 
press  release  147) 

The  United  States  expressed  concern 
that  little  progress  had  been  made  in 
fulfilling  the  mandate  of  the  U.N. 
Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL). 
Members  of  the  Security  Council,  Is- 
rael, and  other  governments  and  or- 
ganizations having  intTuence  in  the  re- 
gion have  responsibility  for  cooperat- 
ing with  UNIFIL  in  order  to  insure  that 
the  relative  stability  in  the  UNIFIL  area 
can  be  consolidated  and  that  the  au- 
thority of  the  Government  of  Lebanon 
is  extended  to  southern  Lebanon.  UNI- 
FIL's  operation  must  be  extended  in 
southern  Lebanon  and  its  freedom  of 
movement  assured.  (Amb.  James  F. 
Leonard  in  the  Security  Council  on 
Dec.  8,  1978;  USUN  press  release  157) 

At  the  pledging  conference  for  the 
U.N.  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for 
Palestine  Refugees  in  the  Near  East 
(UNRWA),  the  United  States  pledged 
$53  million  for  1979.  Of  this  amount 
$9.5  million  is  contingent  upon  receipt 
by  UNRWA  of  matching  contributions 
from  members  of  the  Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries.  The 
United  States  noted  that  it  has  been  the 
largest  contributor  to  UNRWA  since  its 
establishment  in  1949.  (Betty-Jane 
Jones  in  the  pledging  conference  for 
UNRWA  on  Dec.  7,  1978;  USUN  press 
release  159) 


Refugees 

At  the  pledging  conference  for  the 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees, the  United  States  pledged  $12.5 
million  as  its  initial  contribution  toward 
the  Refugees'  1979  general  program 
and  indicated  its  intention  to  seek  ad- 
ditional funds  during  the  1979  opera- 
tional year.  (William  J.  Stibravy,  U.N. 
High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
pledging  conference  on  Nov.  17,  1978; 
press  release  123) 

South  Asia 

The  United  States  voted  in  favor  of 
UNGA  Resolution  33-65  on  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  nuclear-weapon-free  zone 
in  South  Asia.  We  believe  that  an  ef- 
fective nuclear-weapon-free  zone  that 
is  developed  and  supported  by  states  in 
the  area  can  enhance  the  security  of  the 
parties  and  reinforce  nonproliferation 
on  a  regional  basis.  (Amb.  Adrian  S. 
Fisher  in  Committee  I  on  Nov.  29, 
1978;  USUN  press  release  141) 


South  Africa 

The  United  States  cosponsored 
UNGA  Resolution  33-42  to  assure  that 
students  from  Zimbabwe,  Namibia,  and 
South  Africa  are  not  denied  the  oppor- 
tunity to  obtain  training  and  education 
under  the  U.N.  Educational  and 
Training  Program  for  Southern  Africa. 
The  United  States  urged  a  unanimous 
international  commitment  to  the  youth 
and  future  of  southern  Africa.  (John 
Graham  in  Committee  IV  on  Nov.  2, 
1978;  USUN  press  release  129) 

World  Assembly  on  the  Elderly 

The  U.S.  Government  believes  the 
problems  of  older  citizens  are  a  con- 
cern for  all  nations.  The  rapid  rise  in 
numbers  and  proportions  of  older 
people  characterized  almost  all  de- 
veloped nations  in  this  century.  In  de- 
veloping nations,  the  number  of  older 
people  is  expected  to  triple  over  the 
next  50  years. 

The  United  States  presented  a  draft 
resolution  (later  adopted  as  A/RES/ 
33/52)  which  proposes  convening  a 
World  Assembly  on  the  Elderly  in 
1982.  Such  an  assembly  would  allow 
all  nations  to  exchange  knowledge  and 
experience  on  current  and  projected 
measures  to  improve  life  for  the  el- 
derly. Also,  the  General  Assembly  is 
asked  to  consider  observing  an  Inter- 
national Year  of  the  Elderly. 

The  U.S.  Congress  approved  and 
President  Carter  signed  a  bill  authoriz- 
ing the  contribution  of  $1  million  or 
25%  of  the  cost  (whichever  is  lower)  to 
a  world  assembly.  (Ruth  Morgenthau  in 
Committee  III  on  Nov.  15,  1978; 
USUN  press  release  120)  D 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WESTER]\ 
HEmiSPHERE: 

Nicaragua 


DEPARTMENT  SPOKESMAN'S 
RESPONSE  TO  A  QUESTION, 
FEB.  8,  1979' 

A  three-nation  negotiating  group, 
which  has  been  trying  since  last  Oc- 
tober to  help  the  government  and  op- 
position forces  in  Nicaragua  to  reach  a 
peaceful  and  democratic  solution  to 
that  nation's  political  crisis,  has  sus- 
pended its  mediation  efforts. 

It  is  concluded  that  it  cannot  break 
the  impasse  between  the  opposition  and 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  caused  by 
President  Somoza's  unwillingness  to 
accept  the  essential  elements  of  the 
mediators'  most  recent  proposal. 

Following  the  events,  strikes,  and 
violence  of  last  August  and  September 
in  Nicaragua,  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  on  September 
23  noted  the  willingness  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Nicaragua  to  accept  the 
mediation  effort.  In  response,  the 
United  States,  Guatemala,  and  the 
Dominican  Republic  offered  their 
cooperation.  This  offer  was  accepted 
both  by  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
and  the  opposition  coalition  known  as 
the  Broad  Opposition  Front  (FAO). 
That  group  began  its  work  on  Octo- 
ber 6. 

On  December  20,  it  presented  to 
both  the  governing  National  Liberal 
Party  (PLN)  and  the  FAO  a  carefully 
constructed  proposal  for  a  resolution  of 
the  political  crisis  through  a  national 
plebiscite.  The  plan  was  based  upon 
the  conditions  and  views  which  were 
presented  both  by  the  government  and 
by  the  opposition.  It  included  plans  for 
international  administration  and  super- 
vision of  a  plebiscite,  along  with  other 
special  conditions  which  the  negotiat- 
ing group  felt  were  essential  to  secure 
voter  confidence  in  the  fairness  of  the 
plebiscite  process  and  without  which 
agreement  to  hold  such  a  plebiscite 
could  not  be  achieved. 

The  proposal  was  accepted  by  the 
FAO  but  not  by  the  PLN,  which  sub- 
mitted a  counterproposal. 

The  three-nation  group  studied  that 
counterproposal  carefully  but  deemed  it 
insufficient  to  have  any  prospect  of 
being  accepted  by  the  opposition. 

On  January  12,  the  group  asked  the 
PLN  to  reconsider  its  position.  On 
January   17,  the  PLN  reconfirmed  its 


position  and  its  opposition  to  the  plan. 
The  mediating  group,  therefore,  con- 
cluded that  the  existing  impasse  could 
not  be  broken  by  further  negotiations. 

The  unwillingness  of  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  to  accept  the  group's  pro- 
posals, the  resulting  prospects  for  re- 
newed violence  and  polarization,  and 
the  human  rights  situation  in 
Nicaragua,  as  reported  by  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human 
Rights,  unavoidably  affect  the  kind  of 
relationship  we  can  maintain  with  that 
government.  It  was  with  this  back- 
ground that  the  U.S.  Government  reas- 
sessed its  relationship  with  Nicaragua 
and  concluded  that  in  these  circum- 
stances, it  cannot  continue  to  maintain 
the  same  level  and  kind  of  presence  in 
Nicaragua  as  we  have  had  in  the  past. 
Therefore,  the  United  States  will  take 
the  following  steps  in  connection  with 
its  relationship  with  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua. 

First,  the  United  States  is  with- 
drawing the  U.S.  military  assistance 
group  in  Nicaragua,  and  it  is  terminat- 
ing our  military  assistance  program 
which  has,  in  fact,  been  suspended  for 
some  months. 

Second,  with  respect  to  economic 
assistance,  those  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID)  projects 
which  are  well-advanced  will  continue 
since  they  are  aimed  at  the  basic  human 
needs  of  the  poor,  and  termination  of 
AID  funding  at  this  time — at  this  par- 
ticular advanced  stage — would  leave 
many  elements  only  partially  com- 
pleted. However,  no  new  projects  with 
the  government  will  be  considered 
under  present  conditions.  At  this  point. 
AID  does  not  intend  to  implement  two 
loan  projects  signed  in  August  1978  on 
which  work  has  not  yet  begun.  There 
have  been  substantial  changes  in  con- 
ditions affecting  these  projects  since 
the  loans  were  negotiated. 

Third,  we  are  withdrawing  all  Peace 
Corps  volunteers  from  Nicaragua. 

Fourth,  we  are  also  reducing  the 
number  of  U.S.  Government  officials 
at  our  embassy  in  Managua. 

The  United  States  wants  to  note 
again  its  willingness  to  resume  the  con- 
ciliation efforts  should  conditions  and 
circumstances  warrant.  We  hope  that 
efforts  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  solution 
to  the  political  crisis  can  be  resumed, 
and  we  urge  all  Nicaraguans  to  avoid 
the  temptation  to  seek  violent  solutions 
to  problems  that  are  best  resolved 
through  a  national  consensus. 

We  would  deplore  any  outbreak  of 
terrorism  or  violence  emanating  from 
whatever  source,  which  besides  the 
suffering  and  loss  of  human  life  it 


would  cause  would  only  complicate  the  ' 
task  of  finding  a  peaceful  solution  to 
Nicaragua's  crisis. 

We  call  upon  other  governments  in 
the  region  to  avoid  contributing  to  the 
continuation  or  spread  of  violence.  We 
will  continue  to  work  closely  with  the 
OAS  to  the  end  that  we  can  assist  in 
promoting  peace,  democracy,  and  full 
respect  for  human  rights  in  Nicaragua. 
This  has  been  conveyed  to  the  govern- 
ment in  Nicaragua,  and  that  is  the  cur- 
rent status  and  our  intentions.  D 


'  The  question  was  asked  at  the  noon  briefing 
and  answered  by  Department  spokesman  Hod- 
ding  Carter  III. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforcement 
of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New  York 
June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1959,  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970.  HAS 
6997, 
Extended  to:   Isle  of  Man  by  the   United 

Kingdom.   Feb.   22,    1979;  effective  May 

23,  1979. 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  re- 
turn of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  Wash- 
ington, London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  22,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited:  Peru,  Mar.  21,  1979. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec.  16, 
1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14.  1971. 
TIAS  7192. 

Ratification  deposited:  Ethiopia  (with  a  res- 
ervation). Mar.  26,  1979. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Ratification  deposited:  Ethiopia  (with  a  res- 
ervation). Mar.  26,   1979. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,  1944)  (TIAS  1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30,  1977.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Seychelles,  Mar.  23, 
1979. 

Bills  of  Lading 

Protocol  to  amend  the  international  convention 
for  the  unification  of  certain  rules  of  law  re- 
lating to  bills  of  lading  signed  at  Brussels 
Aug.  25,  1924  (TS  931).  Done  at  Brussels 
Feb.  23,  1968.  Entered  into  force  June  23. 
1977.2 
Accession  deposited:   German   Democratic 

Republic,  Feb.  14,  1979. 
Signature:  Netherlands,  Feb.  5,  1979. 


Any  1979 

ollisions 

'onvcniion  on  the  international  regulations  tor 
preventing  collisions  at  sea,   1972,  with  reg- 
ulations.   Done   at   London  Oct.    20,    1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  85X7. 
Accessions  deposited:    Panama,    Mar.    14, 
1979;   Trinidad   and   Tohago,   Feb.    15, 
1979;   Yemen    Arab   Republic,    Mar.   6, 
1979. 

'onlainers 

nternational   convention   for   safe   containers 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec. 
2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6.  1977;  for 
the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979.  TIAS  9037. 
Accessions  deposited:    Bahamas,    Feb.    16. 

1979;  Denmark,   Mar.   2.    I979;''  Yemen 

Arab  Republic,  Mar.  6,  1979. 

rounlerfeiting 

nternational  convention  and  protocol  for  the 
suppression  of  counterfeiting  currency.  Done 
at  Geneva  Apr.  20,  1929.  Entered  into  force 
Feb,  22,  1931.' 

Sotification  of  succession:   Singapore,   Feb. 
12,  1979. 

Cultural  Relations 

'\greement  on  the  importation  of  educational, 
scientific,  and  cultural  materials,  and  pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Lake  Success  Nov.  22,  1950. 
Entered  into  force  May  21,  1952;  for  the 
U.S.  Nov.  2,  1966.  TIAS  6129. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Hungary,  Mar.  15, 
1979. 

Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Coopera- 
tion Council,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  force  Nov  4. 
1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov  5,  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  United  Arab  Emirates. 
Feb.  7,  1979. 

Protocol   concerning   the   European  Customs 
Union  Study  Group    Done  at  Brussels  Dec 
15.  1950.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  30,  1951; 
for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5.  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  United  Arab  Emirates. 
Feb.  7,  1979. 

Defense 

Memorandum  of  understanding  no.  3  concern- 
ing the  execution  of  a  joint  test  program  for 
the  Roland  11  weapons  system,  with  annexes. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  12,  1978 
Signatures:  U.S.,  Sept.  28,  1978;  France, 
Nov.  15,  1978;  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Dec.  12,  1978. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 
1972.  TIAS  7502. 

Accession   deposited:    Ethiopia,    Mar.    22, 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  30, 
1977.  TIAS  8765. 

Accession  deposited:    Paraguay,   Mar.    23, 
1979. 

Fisheries — North  Pacific 

Protocol  amending  the  international  convention 
for  the  high  seas  fisheries  of  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean  of  May  9,  1952,  as  amended 
(TIAS  2786,  5385),  with  agreed  minutes  and 


memoranda  of  understanding.  Done  at  Tokyo 

Apr.  25,   1978.  Entered  into  force  Feb.    15, 

1979. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Mar.  14,  1979. 

Gas 

Protocol  for  the  prohibition  of  the  use  in  war  of 
asphyxiating,  poisonous,  or  other  ga.ses,  and 
of  bacteriological  methods  of  warfare.  Done 
at  Geneva  June  17.  1925.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  8.  1928;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  10,  1975. 
TIAS  8061. 

Accession  deposited:  Bhutan,  June  12,  1978; 
effective  Feb.   19.  1979. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil   and  political 
rights     Done   at   New   York   Dec.    16.    1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.' 
Accession   deposited:    Gambia,   Mar.    22. 
1979. 

Load  Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines.    1966. 

Done  at  London  Apr.  5.   1966.  Entered  into 

force  July  21.  1968.  TIAS  6331. 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 
Mar.  6.  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  on 

load   lines.    1966.    Done  at  London  Oct.    12. 

1971.' 

Acceptance  deposited:    Panama.   Mar.    14, 
1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva 
Mar.  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Mar  17. 
1958.  TIAS  4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Yemen.   Mar.    14. 
1979. 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international 
maritime  traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don Apr.  9.  1965.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  5. 
1967;  for  the  U.S.  May  16,  1967.  TIAS 
6251. 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 
Mar.  6.  1979. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 
at  Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  16,  1976.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Mar.   14,  1979. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  for  the  prevention  of 
pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  with  annexes,  as 
amended.   Done  at  London  May   12,    1954. 
Entered  into  force  July  26,    1958;  for  the 
U.S.  Dec    8,  1961.  TIAS  4900;  6109. 
Acceptance  deposited:   Yemen  Arab  Repub- 
lic, Mar  6,  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil, 
1954,   as  amended  (TIAS  4900.   6109). 
Adopted  at  London  Oct    21.   1969.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  20.  1978.  TIAS  8505. 
Acceptance  deposited:   Yemen  Arab  Repub- 
lic. Mar.  6,  1979. 
International  convention  on  civil   liability  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels  Nov. 
29.  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19.  1975.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy  (with  a  declara- 
tion). Feb.  27.  1979. 
International  convention  relating  to  interven- 
tion on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollution 
casualties,   with   annex.   Done  at  Brussels 
Nov.   29.   1969.   Entered  into  force  May  6, 


67 


1975.  TIAS  8068. 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 

Mar.  6,  1979. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy.  Feb.  27.  1979. 
International  convention  on  the  establishment 
of  an  international  fund  for  compensation  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels  Dec. 
18,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16,  1978.' 
Accession  deposited:  Italy,  Feb.  27,  1979. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19.  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24.  1978.  except  for  chapter 
II.  Chapter  II  entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 
1978.'  TIAS  8733. 

Ratification  deposited:    Monaco,   Mar.    22, 
1979. 

Pollution 

International  convention  for  the  prevention  of 

pollution  from  ships,   1973,  with  protocols 

and  annexes.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973.' 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 

Mar.  6.  1979. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships.  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 
1978.' 

Signatures:  France.  Mar.  6.  1979;^  Sweden. 
Mar.  I.  1979.-' 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 
seas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  substances  other 
than  oil.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2.  1973.' 
Accession  deposited:  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 
Mar.  6.  1979. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea.  I960.  Done  at  London  June  17.  1960. 
Entered  into  force  May  26,  1965.  TIAS 
5780. 

Acceptance  deposited:   Iraq,   Feb.   27,    1979. 
International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov. 
1.  1974.' 
Accessions  deposited:   German  Democratic 

Republic,   Mar.    15,    1979;  Yemen  Arab 

Repubic,  Mar.  6,  1979. 
Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974. 
Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978.' 
Accession  deposited:   Bahamas.   Feb.    16. 

1979. 
Signatures:  France,  Jan.  26,   1979;'  Federal 

Republic  of  Germany,   Nov.    16,    1978;' 

Netherlands,  Nov.  17,  1978;"  Poland,  Oct. 

16,  1978;''  Sweden,  Mar.  1,  1979. •" 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention  on   the   international   maritime 
satellite   orgainzation   (INMARSAT),   with 
annex.  Done  at  London  Sept    3,  1976.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Australia,   Mar.    16, 
1979. 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and 
practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30. 
1957;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Accession  deposited:  Djibouti,  Mar.  21. 
1979. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of 
states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer 
space,  including  the  Moon  and  other  celestial 


68 


bodies.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  Jan.  27.  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.   10,  1967. 

Ratification  deposited:  Peru.  Mar.   1,  1979. 
Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  Jan.   14, 

1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15.  1976. 
TIAS  8480. 

Accession  deposited:  Peru,  Mar.  21,  1979. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention, 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  7, 

1976.  TIAS  8572. 

Accession  deposited:  Nauru,  Mar.  8,  1979. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage   measure- 
ment of  ships,  with  annexes,  1969.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.' 
Acceptance  deposited:    Argentina,   Jan.    24, 

1979. 
Accessions  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 

Feb.    15,    1979;   Yemen   Arab  Republic, 

Mar.  6,  1979. 

Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  and  schedule 
of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at  Washington 
Dec.  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  10, 
1948.  TIAS  1849. 

Notification  of  adherence:  Seychelles,  Mar. 
19,  1979. 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
regulation  of  whaling  of  Dec.  2,  1946  (TIAS 
1849).  Done  at  Washington  Nov.  19,  1956. 
Entered  into  force  May  4,  1959.  (TIAS 
4228). 

Notification  of  adherence:  Seychelles,  Mar. 
19,  1979. 

Wills 

Convention  providing  a  uniform  law  on  the 
form  of  an  international  will,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Washington  Oct.  26,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  9.  1978. ^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Ecuador,  Apr.  3. 
1979. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat 
imports  from  Australia  during  calendar  year 
1979.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Jan.  11  and  Mar.  29,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Mar.  29,  1979;  effective  Jan. 
I,  1979. 

Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  agreements  of  Apr. 
22,  1976.  as  amended  (TIAS  8737,  8738). 
relating  to  trade  in  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products  and  cotton  textiles  and 
textile  products  and  amending  the  cotton 
textile  agreement.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Mar.  27.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  27,  1979. 

Canada 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  of  Aug.  16. 
1916.  for  the  protection  of  migratory  birds  in 
Canada  and  the  United  Stales  of  America  (39 
Stat.  1702).  Signed  at  Ottawa  Jan.  30,  1979. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification. 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


Memorandum  of  understanding  pertaining  to 
coordination  of  cooperative  research  and  de- 
velopment. Signed  Feb.  1,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  I,  1979. 

Agreement  concerning  fishing  off  the  west 
coast  of  Canada,  with  annex.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Mar.  29, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  29,  1979. 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  halibut  fishery  of  the  North- 
ern Pacific  Ocean  and  Bering  Sea  (TIAS 
2900).  Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  29,  1979. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification. 

Treaty  to  submit  to  binding  dispute  settlement 
the  delimitation  of  the  maritime  boundary  in 
the  Gulf  of  Maine  area  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton Mar.  29.  1979.  Enters  into  force  on  the 
date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion of  this  treaty  and  the  agreement  on  East 
Coast  fishery  resources. 

Special  agreement  to  submit  to  a  chamber  of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  the  delim- 
itation of  the  maritime  boundary  in  the  Gulf 
of  Maine  area.  Signed  at  Washington  Mar. 
29.  1979.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of 
entry  into  force  of  the  treaty  to  submit  to 
binding  dispute  settlement  the  delimitation  of 
the  maritime  boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine 
area. 

Agreement  to  submit  to  a  court  of  arbitration 
the  delimitation  of  the  maritime  boundary  in 
the  Gulf  of  Maine  area.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton Mar.  29.  1979.  Enters  into  force  in  ac- 
cordance with  article  II  or  III  of  the  treaty  to 
submit  to  binding  dispute  settlement  the  de- 
limitation of  the  maritime  boundary  in  the 
Gulf  of  Maine  area. 

Agreement  on  east  coast  fishery  resources. 
Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  29,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion of  this  agreement  and  the  treaty  to  sub- 
mit to  binding  dispute  settlement  the  delim- 
itation of  the  maritime  boundary  in  the  Gulf 
of  Maine  area  signed  Mar.  29,  1979,  are  ex- 
changed. 

Egypt 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Cairo  Mar. 
20,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20.  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Nov.  8,  1978. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Cairo  Mar. 
20,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20.  1979. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  partici- 
pation of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in 
phase  III  of  the  deep  sea  drilling  project. 
Signed  at  Bonn-Bad  Godesberg  July  18. 
1974.  Entered  into  force  July  18,  1974. 

Hong  Kong 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with  de- 
tailed regulations.  Signed  at  Hong  Kong  and 
Washington  Jan.  2  and  Feb.  6,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  15.  1979;  effective  Feb.  1. 
1979. 

Iran 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  re- 
visions of  foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  let- 
ters of  offer  and  acceptance  in  force  between 
the  U.S.  and  Iran.  Signed  at  Tehran  Feb.  3, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  3.  1979. 

Israel 

Memorandum  of  agreement  concerning  assur- 


( 

ances.  Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  26.  1979, 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  26.  1979. 
Memorandum  of  agreement  concerning  an  oif 
supply  arrangement,  with  annex.  Signed  at> 
Washington  Mar.  26,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  26.  1979. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance 
in  connection  with  matters  relating  to  the 
Jamaica  Nutrition  Holdings  Ltd..  its  holding 
company.  Stale  Trading  Corporation,  and  its 
associated  companies.  Signed  at  Washington 
Mar.  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  30 
1979. 

Japan 

Agreement  in  the  field  of  liquid  metal-cooled 
fast  breeder  reactors.  Signed  at  Tokyo  Jan.i 
31.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  31,  1979 

Jordan 

Loan  agreement  for  a  potash  plant.  Signed  at 
Amman  Aug.  28.  1978.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  28,  1978 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting  oil 
authorizations  to  permit  licensed  amateuB 
radio  operators  of  either  country  to  operate 
their  stations  in  the  other  country.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Amman  Feb.  6  andi 
Mar.  11,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  II 
1979. 

Korea 

Agreement  relating  to  export  of  color  televisioi 
receivers  from  the  Republic  of  Korea,  with 
annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  a 
Seoul  and  Washington  Dec.  14,  1978,  Jan 
2,  and  Mar.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  12.  1979;  effective  Dec.  14.  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agree 
ment  of  Apr.  24.  1957,  as  amended  (TIAS' 
3807,  7083).  with  exchange  of  letters  and* 
related  note.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notesi 
at  Seoul  Mar.  22.  1979.  Entered  into  force! 
Mar.  22,  1979 

Liberia 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over  vessels 
utilizing  the  Louisiana  offshore  oil  port.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington! 
Oct.  27,   1978.  and  Jan.   15,   1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  15.  1979. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance 
in  connection  with  matters  relating  to  the 
McDonnell  Douglas  Corp.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Mar.  21.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  21.  1979. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Feb.  27, 
1974.  (TIAS  7806)  for  scientific  and  tech- 
nological cooperation.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Wellington  Feb.  27.  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Feb.  27.  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar, 
20,  1970,  (TIAS  6857)  concerning  the  ac- 
ceptance of  certificates  of  airworthiness  for 
imported  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Mar.  16  and  30.  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  30.  1979. 

Romania 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Bucharest  Feb.  27.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  27.  1979. 


Vlay  1979 

>audi  Arabia 

'roject  agreement  for  lethnical  cooperation  in 

executive  management  development.   Signed 

at  Jidda  Nov.   18.   1978. 

Entered  into  force:  Mar.  4.  1979. 
^roject  agreement  tor  technical  cooperation  in 

agricultural  bank  management  and  training, 

with  annex.  Signed  at  Jidda  Nov.   18.  1978. 
.    Entered  into  force:  Mar.  5.  1979. 
'reject  agreement  for  technical  cooperation  in 

transportation,   with   annex.    Signed  at  Jidda 

Nov.   18.   1978. 

Entered  into  force:  Mar.  5.  1979. 

Senegal 

Mr  transport  services  agreement,  with  memo- 
randum of  understanding  Signed  at  Dakar 
Mar.  28,  1979.  Entered  into  force  provi- 
sionally. Mar.  28.  1979;  definitively,  upon 
an  exchange  of  notes  stating  that  the  agree- 
ment has  been  approved  in  accordance  with 
each  contracting  party's  requirements. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar. 
:?,  1975.  (TIAS  8107)  with  related  letter. 
Signed  at  Colombo  Feb.  22.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  22.  1979. 

'Sudan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
24,  1977,  (TIAS  9157)  with  agreed  minutes. 
Signed  at  Khartoum  Feb.  8,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  upon  U.S.  Embassy  receipt  of 
notification  of  the  completion  of  the  con- 
stitutional procedures  for  ratification  re- 
quired by  applicable  law  of  Sudan. 

Suriname 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance 
in  connection  with  matters  relating  to  the 
Reynolds  Metals  Company.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Mar.  14,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.   14,  1979. 

Taiwan 

Agreement  relating  to  export  of  color  television 
receivers  from  Taiwan,  with  annexes.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
Dec.  29,  1978.  and  Mar.  5,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  5,  1979;  effective  Dec.  29, 
1978. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7. 
1976  (TIAS  8506).  Signed  at  Tunis  Mar.  2, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  2.  1979. 

U.S.S.R. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  continued 
participation  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  in  the  deep  sea  drilling  project 
from  Jan.  I,  1979,  through  Sept.  30,  1980. 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Moscow  Feb.  16 
and  21,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  21, 
1979;  effective  Jan.  1.  1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperation  in  the  testing  and  development 
of  antimisting  kerosene  and  related  equip- 
ment, with  appendix.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  London  June  1  and  14,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  14,  1978. 

Third  protocol  further  amending  the  convention 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 


taxes  on  income  and  capital  gains,  signed  at 
London  on  Dec.  .^1,  1975.  Signed  at  London 
Mar.  15,  1979.  Enters  into  force  immediately 
after  the  expiration  of  .10  days  following  the 
date  on  which  instruments  of  ratification  are 
exchanged. 
Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement.  Signed  at  Lon- 
don Mar.  27,  1979.  Enters  into  force  on  the 
date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

Zaire 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed, or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government  and 
its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Feb.  7,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Apr.  4,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  May  24,  1977 
(TIAS  8813).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Kinshasa  July  7,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
July  7,  1978.  D 


'  Not  in  force. 
^  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
'  Not  applicable  to  Greenland  and  the  Faroe 
Islands. 

■■  Subject  to  ratification. 


CHROI^OLOGY: 

narch  1979 


Mar.     1    U.S.   and  P.R.C.   exchange  Ambas- 
sadors  and  establish   Embassies   in 
Beijing  and  Washington.  DC. 
George  M.  Seignious  II  confirmed  by 

the  Senate  to  be  ACDA  Director. 
Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin  visits  the 

U.S.  Mar.  1-8. 
Spain  holds  parliamentary  elections, 
and  Prime  Minister  Suarez's 
Democratic  Center  Union  party 
wins  168  seats  —  8  short  of  a 
majority. 

Mar.  2  Secretary  Blumenthal  and  P.R.C.  Fi- 
nance Minister  Zhang  initial 
agreement  on  settlement  of  finan- 
cial claims  in  Beijing. 

Mar.  3  President  Carter  meets  with  Canadian 
Prime  Minister  Trudeau  in  Wash- 
ington. DC.  and  affirms  U.S. 
commitment  to  complete  the  Alas- 
kan oil  pipeline. 
French  President  Giscard  returns  to 
France  from  visit  to  Mexico  (Feb. 
28-Mar.  3). 

Mar.  4  Iran  breaks  diplomatic  relations  with 
South  Africa. 

Mar.    5    Israeli  Cabinet  approves  U.S.   pro- 
posals for  compromise  in  peace 
treaty  negotiations. 
P.R.C.   announces  that  it  has  begun 
withdrawing  troops  from  Vietnam. 

Mar.  6  South  Africa  formally  rejects  a 
cease-fire  proposal  by  U.N.  Secre- 


69 

tary  General   Waldheim  to  help 
transition   to    majority    rule    in 
Namibia. 
North   and   South   Yemen   agree  to 
Arab  League's  call  for  a  cease-fire. 

Mar.  7  President  Carter  and  Secretary  Vance 
visit  Egypt  and  Israel  and  return  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  on  Mar.  14  (for 
details,  see  p.  16). 

Mar  9  U.S.S.R.  Premier  Kosygin  visits 
India  Mar.  9-15. 

Mar.  12  Luis  Herrera  Campins  sworn  in  as 
President  of  Venezuela. 

Mar.  13  President  Sadat  approves  proposed 
peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel. 
Maurice  Bishop  assumes  control  of 
the  Government  of  Grenada 
through  a  coup  d'etat. 

Mar.  14  Israeli  Cabinet  accepts  compromises 
in  the  proposed  peace  treaty  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel. 

Mar    15    Gen.   Joao   Baptista   de  Oliveira 
Figueiredo  sworn  in  as  President  of 
Brazil. 
Egyptian  Cabinet   approves  draft 
peace  treaty. 

Mar.  15  A  U.S.  delegation  consisting  of  the 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs  Brzezinski, 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Stale  Chris- 
topher, Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  Gen.  Jones,  and 
Chip  Carter  visit  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Jordan  Mar.  16-19.  On  Mar.  19 
they  visit  Egypt  before  leaving  the 
Middle  East.  From  Cairo  Deputy 
Secretary  Christopher  travels  to 
Rome,  Bonn,  Paris,  London,  and 
Brussels  Mar.  19-22,  and  the  rest 
of  the  delegation  returns  to  the 
U.S.  on  Mar.  19. 

Mar.  16  Kano  accord,  signed  by  all  factions  to 
the  civil  war  in  Chad,  concludes 
the  Kano  conference  of  Mar. 
10-16.  It  dissolves  the  former  gov- 
ernment in  Chad  and  calls  for  new 
government  consisting  of  all  fac- 
tions and  creates  a  demilitarized 
zone  around  N'Djamena  where 
fighting  erupted  on  Feb,  12. 

Mar.  18  Parliamentary  elections  held  in  Fin- 
land Mar.  18-19.  The  governing 
center-left  coalition  loses  some 
seats  but  maintains  a  majority  in 
Parliament;  the  conservatives  make 
significant  gains.  A  new  govern- 
ment will  not  be  formed  for  several 
weeks. 

Mar.  19  Secretary  Vance  attends  proximity 
talks  on  Namibia  Mar.  19-20  in 
New  York. 
8th  session  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  opens  in  Geneva  for  6 
weeks. 

Mar.  20  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  appeals  to  all  parties  to 
Southern  Rhodesian  conflict  to  take 
immediate  steps  to  end  increased 
indiscriminate  violence  against 


70 

civilians  and  to  permit  the  ICRC  to 
carry  out  its  humanitarian  work. 

Mar.  21  Vice  President  Mondale  visits  Brazil 
and  Venezuela  Mar.  21-24. 

Mar.  22  Israeli  Parliament  approves  peace 
treaty  with  Egypt  by  vote  of  95  to 
18  (Israeli  time) 
U.K.  Ambassador  to  the  Netherlands 
Richard  Sykes  assassinated  in  The 
Hague. 

Mar.  23    Israeli  Prime  Minister  Begin  visits 
U.S.  Mar.  23-29. 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  ap- 
proves export   of   18.5   tons  of 
slightly  enriched  uranium  to  India. 

Mar.  24  Egyptian  President  Sadat  visits  U.S. 
Mar.  24-29  and  Germany  Mar. 
29-30;  returns  to  Egypt  Mar.  30. 
Mahmoud  Riad  of  Egypt  resigns  as 
Secretary  General  of  the  Arab 
League. 
U.S.S.R.  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
visits  Syria  Mar.  24-26. 

Mar.  25  Bomb  explodes  at  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Damascus.  Property  damage  is 
slight  and  no  one  is  injured. 

Mar.  26  President  Carter  witnesses  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty 
signed  by  President  Sadat  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin  in  Washing- 
ton, DC. 

Mar.  27  OPEC  decides  to  raise  oil  prices  by 
9%  on  Apr.  1. 

Mar.  28  U.K.  Prime  Minister  Callaghan's 
Labor  government  is  defeated  by  a 
formal  no-confidence  vote  of  3 1 1 
to  310  by  the  House  of  Commons. 
On  Mar.  29  the  Queen,  acting  on 
the  advice  of  the  Prime  Minister, 
orders  general  elections  for  May  3. 
U.N.  Security  Council  condemns 
South  Africa  for  invasions  of  An- 
gola by  a  vote  of  12  to  0  (U.S., 
U.K.,  and  France  abstain). 
Jordan  recalls  its  Ambassador  to 
Egypt. 

Mar.  29    Egypt  announces  its  intention  to 
withdraw  its  diplomatic  mission 
from  Jordan. 
U.S.   and  Canada  sign  four  agree- 
ments concerning  fishing  and  ma- 
rine issues. 
Italian   Prime   Minister   Andreotti 
presents  a  new  coalition  Cabinet  to 
Parliament. 
Senate  approves  legislation  estab- 
lishing informal  relations  with 
Taiwan  by  a  vote  of  85  to  4  and 
sends  bill  to  President  Carter  to  be 
signed. 

Mar.  30    Shah  of  Iran  arrives  in  the  Bahamas. 
North  and  South  Yemen  agree  to 
unite  their  countries. 


Hie  Verdet  becomes  Prime  Minister 
of  Romania. 

Iran  holds  a  2-day  referendum  in 
which  Iranians  vote  approval  of  the 
proposal  for  the  country  to  become 
an  Islamic  republic. 
Mar.  31  At  an  Arab  League  meeting  in 
Baghdad,  18  Arab  countries  and 
the  PLO  declare  a  total  economic 
boycott  of  Egypt,  suspend  Egypt's 
membership  in  the  League,  an- 
nounce withdrawal  of  their  ambas- 
sadors to  Egypt,  and  recommend 
complete  cessation  of  diplomatic 
ties  within  a  month. 

Italian  Prime  Minister  Andreotti 
submits  the  resignation  of  his  coal- 
ition government  after  the  Senate 
defeats  a  confidence  motion  by  a 
vote  of  150  to  149.  D 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


March  16April  12 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  Slate, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

•73  3/16  International  Radio  Consult- 
ative Committee  (CCIR), 
study  group  9,  Apr.  10. 

•74  3/16  Statement  on  the  death  of 
Jean  Monnet. 

t75         3/17  Vance:       statement       on 

Rhodesia. 
76         3/18  Vance:   interview  on  CBS- 

TV's  "Face  the  Nation." 

*77  3/20  Joan  M.  Clark  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Malta 
(biographic  data). 

*78  3/20  Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, working  group 
on  UN/OECD  investment 
undertakings,  Apr.  17. 

•79  3/20  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  standards  of 
training  and  walchkeeping, 
Apr.  18. 

•80         3/21  Conference  on  U.S.   vital 

interests  in  the   Middle 
East,  Pittsburgh,  Apr.  3. 

•81  3/26  U.S.,  Korea  amend  air  trans- 
port agreement.  Mar.  22. 

•82         3/29         Secretary  Vance  and  Cana- 


•83 


88 


•89 


•90 


•96 

97 

•98 


•99 


3/29 


t84 

3/29 

•85 

3/29 

•86 

•87 

3/29 
3/29 

3/30 


88A      3/30 


3/29 


4/4 


•91 
•92 

4/4 
4/4 

•93 

4/4 

•94 

4/11 

•95 

4/11 

4/11 
4/11 

4/12 


4/12 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

dian   Ambassador  Towi 
sign  four  agreements. 

Loren  E.  Lawrence  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Jamaica 
(biographic  data). 

U.S. -Canadian  consultations 
on  Garrison  diversion  unit. 

sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  the  carriage  of  danger 
ous  goods,  Apr.  19. 

sec,  May  1. 

International  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT),  study 
group  1,  Apr.  24. 

Vance:  address  at  the 
Northwest  regional  confer- 
ence, Seattle,  on  Third 
World  development. 

Vance:  question-and-answet 
session  following  Seattle 
address. 

Vance:  statement  before  thi 
Foreign  Operations  Sub 
committee  of  the   Housi 
Appropriations  Committee 
on  foreign  assistance. 

Richard  Elliot  Benedick 
sworn  in  as  State  Depart 
ment  Coordinator  of 
Population  Affairs  (biog- 
raphic data). 

CCIR,  study  group  7,  May  2. 

sec,  committee  on  oceani 
dumping.  May  15. 

Vance:  remarks  on  the  30thl 
anniversary  of  NATO. 

U.S.,  Brazil  amend  textili 
agreement.  Mar.  27 

Advisory  Committee  on  Pri 
vate  International  Law, 
subgroup  on  recognitioni 
and  enforcement  of  foreign! 
judgments.  May  9. 

U.S.,  Jamaica  sign  air  trans 
port  agreement.  Apr.  4. 

Vance:  statement  before  thei 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty. 

Paul  C.  Warnke,  Special 
Consultant  to  the  Secretary 
for  SALT  negotiations  and 
arms  control,  to  address 
conference  on  U.S.  secu 
rity  and  the  Soviet  chal- 
lenge, Des  Moines,  Apr 
20. 

Paul  C.  Warnke  to  address 
conference  on  U.S.  secu- 
rity and  the  Soviet  chal- 
lenge, Albuquerque,  Apr. 
25.  D 


•  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
t  Held  for  a  later  issue. 


I]\DEX 


lAY  1979 

OL.  79,  NO.  2026 

frica 

hronology:  March  1979 69 

romoling   Peace   in   Southern   Rhodesia 

(Moose)    45 

outhern  Rhodesia  (Department  statement)    -  .46 

,S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose)   42 

rms  Control 

iterview  on  "Face  the  Nation"  ( Vance)  .  .  .  .39 

uestion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Seattle 

j  Address  ( Vance) 37 

ALT   II   and   the   National   Defense   (Brown, 

Brzezinski) 48 

sla.  Chronology;  March  1979   69 

usiness.  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose)  42 
hina.    Interview   on    "Face   the    Nation"' 

(Vance) 39 

ommunications.   Summaries  of  U.S.   State- 
ments in  the  U.N 64 

ongress 

hronology:  March  1979 69 

romoling   Peace    in   Southern   Rhodesia 

(Moose)   45 

S,  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose)   42 

S.    Support   for   the   Egyptian-Israeli    Peace 

Treaty  (Brown.  Carter,  Vance) 55 

epartment   and   the   Foreign   Service. 

Chronology:  March  1979 69 

eveloping  Countries 

merica's  Commitment   to  Third  World   De- 
velopment (Vance) 33 

uestion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Seattle 

Address  (Vance) 37 

conomics 

merica's  Commitment   to  Third  World  De- 
velopment { Vance) 33 

uestion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Seattle 
Address  ( Vance) 37 

gypt 

chievement  of  Peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  the 

Future  Challenge  (Alherton) 61 

gypt  and  Israel  Sign  Treaty  of  Peace  (Begin. 
Carter.  Sadat,  texts  of  documents  and  letters)  1 

gypt  —  A  Profile 21 

gyptian  Cabinet  Approves  Treaty  (Carter)  .  .  .3 
resident  Carter  Interviewed  for  Egyptian  Tele- 
vision     31 

resident  Carter  Interviewed  for  Israeli  Televi- 
sion   30 


President  Carter  Visits  Egypt  and  Israel  (Begin, 
Carter.  Mondale,  Navon.  Sadat) 16 

U.S.  Support  for  the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty  (Brown,  Carter,  Vance) 55 

Energy.  America's  Commitment  to  Third  World 
Development  (Vance) 33 

Europe.  Chronology:  March  1979 69 

Food.  America's  Commitment  to  Third  World 
Development  (Vance) 33 

Foreign  Aid 

America's  Commitment  to  Third  World  De- 
velopment (Vance) 33 

Nicaragua  (Department  spokesman's  response  to 
a  question) 66 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Seattle 
Address  (Vance) 37 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose)   42 

U.S.  Support  for  the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty  (Brown,  Carter.  Vance) 55 

Human  Rights 

Summaries  of  U.S.  Statements  in  the  U.N.     .64 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose) 42 

Israel 

Achievement  of  Peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  the 
Future  Challenge  (Atherton) 61 

Egypt  and  Israel  Sign  Treaty  of  Peace  (Begin, 
Carter,  Sadat,  texts  of  documents  and  letters)  1 

Israel  — A  Profile   25 

Israeli  Cabinet  Approves  Proposals  (Carter)  .  .  .2 

Israeli  Knesset  Approves  Treaty  (Carter)    4 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Egyptian  Tele- 
vision     31 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Israeli  Televi- 
sion   30 

President  Carter  Visits  Egypt  and  Israel  (Begin, 
Carter.  Mondale.  Navon.  Sadat) 16 

U.S.  and  Israel  Sign  Memoranda  of  Agreement 
(Dayan.  Vance) 60 

U.S.  Support  for  the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty  (Brown,  Carter,  Vance) 55 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Chronol- 
ogy: March  1979 69 

Middle  East 

Chronology:  March  1979 69 

Egypt  and  Israel  Sign  Treaty  of  Peace  (Begin, 
Carter,  Sadat,  texts  of  documents  and 
letters) 1 

Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation"  (Vance)  .  .  .  .39 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Egyptian  Tele- 
vision    31 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Israeli  Televi- 
sion   30 

Summaries  of  U.S.  Statements  in  the  U.N.   .  .64 

Nicaragua.  Nicaragua  (Department  spokesman's 
response  to  a  question) 66 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  SALT  II 
and  the  National  Defense  (Brown, 
Brzezinski) 48 

Petroleum 

Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation"  (Vance)  .  .  .  .39 


U.S.  and  Israel  Sign  Memoranda  of  Agreement 

(Dayan,  Vance) 60 

Population.    America's  Commitment   to  Third 

World  Development  (Vance) 33 

Presidential  Documents 

Egypt  and  Israel  Sign  Treaty  of  Peace 1 

Egyptian  Cabinet  Approves  Treaty 3 

Israeli  Cabinet  Approves  Proposals   2 

Israeli  Knesset  Approves  Treaty 4 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Egyptian  Tele- 
vision    31 

President  Carter  Interviewed  for  Israeli  Televi- 
sion   30 

President  Carter  Visits  Egypt  and  Israel 16 

U.S.    Support   for  the   Egyptian-Israeli    Peace 

Treaty 55 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Promoting    Peace    in    Southern    Rhodesia 

(Moose)    45 

Southern  Rhodesia  (Department  statement)  .  46 
Trade.  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose)  .  .42 
Treaties 

Current  Actions 66 

Egypt  and   Israel  Sign  Treaty  of  Peace  (Begin. 

Carter,  Sadat,  texts  of  documents  and  letters)  I 

U.S.    Support   for   the   Egyptian-Israeli    Peace 

Treaty  (Brown,  Carter,  Vance) 55 

United  Nations 

Chronology:  March  1979 69 

Summaries  of  U.S.  Statements  in  the  U.N.      .64 

U.S.S.R. 

Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation"  (Vance)  ...  .39 

SALT  II   and  the  National  Defense  (Brown. 

Brzezinski) 48 

Vietnam.    Interview   on    "Face   the   Nation" 

(Vance) 39 

Zaire 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Zaire  (Moose) 42 

Zaire  —  A  Profile 44 


Name  Index 


Atherton,  Alfred  L.,  Jr  . 61 

Begin,  Menahem 1.16 

Brown.  Harold   48.55 

Brzezinski.  Zbigniew    48 

Carter,  President   1,2.3,4,16,30,31,55 

Dayan,  Moshe 60 

Mondale,  Walter  F 16 

Moose,  Richard  M 42,45 

Navon,  Yitzhak    16 

Sadat,  Anwar  al- 1.16 

Vance.  Secretary   33,37,39,55,60 


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Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


D^partmpnt 
of  State 


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he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  79  /  Number  2027 


Df*partntf*nt  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  79  /  Number  2027  /  June  1979 


Cover  Photo: 

Thomas  O.  Enders 
President  Carter 
Secretary  Vance 
Julius  L.  Katz 
Andrew  Young 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers"  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

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Single  copy— 

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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 
Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 
Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


COl^TENTS 


1  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA:  COMPARISONS  AND 
INTERRELATIONS  (Thomas  O.  Enders) 

2  Canada— A  Profile 

7  Maritime  Boundary  and  Resource  Agreements  (Thomas  R.  Pickering) 

8  Garrison  Diversion  Unit 

9  Visit  of  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  (Joint  Communique) 

10  U.S. -Canada  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  and  Boundary  Agreements  (Joint  Statement) 


THE  PRESIDENT 

11    SALT  il— The   Path  of  Security   and 

Peace 
14   News  Conference  of  April  30 

THE  SECRETARY 

16   Meeting  the  Challenges  of  a  Changing 
World 

AFRICA 

20  U.S.    Policy   and   Africa   (David  D. 

Newsom) 

21  Letter  of  Credence  (Z-ewf/ioj 

21  GPO  Sales  Publications 

22  Southern  Rhodesia  (Secretary  Vance) 

ARMS  CONTROL 

23  SALT   II  Treaty   Concluded  (Harold 

Brown,  Secretary  Vance) 

24  The  Facts  of  SALT  II  (Leslie  H.  Gelh) 

DEPARTMENT 

25  Reorganization  of  Foreign  Assistance 

Programs   (White  House  Announce- 
ment) 

EAST  ASIA 

26  Taiwan  Relations  Act  (President  Car- 

ter) 

ECONOMICS 

27  Major  Elements  of  the  Multilateral 

Trade  Negotiations  (Julius  L.  Katz) 

28  World  Trade  Week  (President  Carter. 

Secretary  Vance) 

29  MTN  Agreements  (President  Carter) 

30  Multilateral   Trade   Negotiations 

(Foreign  Relations  Outline) 

31  U.S.    Export   Policy    (Richard   N. 

Cooper) 
34   The   Evolving   International   Monetary 
System  (Anthony  M.  Solomon) 

EUROPE 

36  12th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  to  the 

Congress) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

37  The  Peace  Treaty  and  Its  Aftermath 

(Harold  H.  Saunders) 


38  Egypt   and   the   ECWA    (Department 

Statement) 

39  Yemen  (William  R.  Crawford) 

OCEANS 

41  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  (Elliot  L. 

Richardson) 

SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 

42  President's   Report   on   Science   and 

Technology 

SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 

45  Restraining  Conventional  Arms  Trans- 

fers (Leslie  H.  Gelh) 

SOUTH  ASIA 

46  India-U.S.   Joint  Commission   Meet- 

ing (Joint  Communique) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

47  Serving  American  Foreign  Policy  Inter- 

ests (Andrew  Young) 

51  FY  1980  Appropriations  for  Interna- 
tional Organizations  and  Conferences 
(Charles  William  Maynes) 

56  FY  1980  Appropriations  for  Voluntary 
Contributions  and  the  OAS  (Charles 
William  Maynes) 

62  Southeast  Asia  (Richard  Petree.  An- 
drew Young) 

65    Namibia  (Western  Five  Statements) 

TREATIES 

65   Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

67  April  1979  i,).;;  1^:^.-,.,. 

PRESS  RELEASES 

68  Department  of  State         ||||     -  Q  'r~l 

69  U.S. U.N.  *" 

PUBLICATIONS      DEPOSITORY 

70  GPO  Sales 

70  Congressional  Documents 

INDEX 


Canada's  Trade 

(Billion  U.S.  $) 


50  t— 


4  5 


40   — 


3  5 


30 


25 


20 


1  5 


1  0 


Total  Exports 
Exports  to  U.S. 


Total  Imports 

Imports  from 

U.S.  4  5.3 


40.9 


38.138.0 


3  2.3 


2  4.8 


4  3.5 


1973      1974      1975      1976      1977      197 


June  1979 


THE  LWITED  STATES  AND  CAI^ADA: 
COMPARISONS  AND  INTERRELATIONS 


by  Thomas  O.  Enders 

Remarks  at  Stanford  University  on 
May  3.  1979. 

Clearly  we've  been  doing  something 
right  these  past  couple  ot  years  in 
Canada-U.S.  relations.  Two  months 
ago  Externa!  Affairs  Minister  Jamieson 
said  our  relations  "had  seldom  been 
better."  Secretary  of  State  Vance  made 
the  same  comment  shortly  before. 
People  all  up  and  down  the  border  find 
that  we  have  come  much  closer  to  each 
other,  work  better  together,  and  are 
having  much  success  in  solving  our 
joint  problems  and  taking  advantage  of 
our  joint  opportunities. 

You'll  say,  why  not?  After  all, 
aren't  Canada  and  the  United  States 
two  of  the  most  compatible  societies  in 
the  world  dedicated  to  the  same  vision 
of  individual  freedom,  each  built  by 
immigrants  from  Europe,  each  blessed 
by  those  rarest  endowments  in  the  late 
20th  century:  space  and  resources? 

Sure,  our  political  systems  are 
structured  quite  differently,  but  our 
political  values  are  almost  the  same. 
Sure,  our  individual  interests  are  rarely 
identical,  but  there  is  almost  always  a 
substantial  overlap.  We  trade  more 
with  each  other,  see  more  of  each 
other,  than  any  other  peoples  on  Earth. 
We  are  the  only  two  peoples  to  have  a 
fully  integrated  common  defense  of  our 
territories.  We  can  be  for  each  other 
models  for  social  change,  as  Canada  is 
now  for  the  States  in  health  insurance, 
and  the  United  States  may  be  for 
Canada  in  freedom  of  information.  In 
practically  every  aspect  of  life  we  de- 
pend on  each  other  more  than  other 
peoples. 

Yet  we  know  that  our  interdepend- 
ence is  not  always  free  of  stress.  It 
comes  out  in  Canadian  fears  that  the 
United  States  will  use  its  enormous 
weight  to  achieve  a  bargaining  advan- 
tage. Or  in  U.S.  concern  that  Canada 
will  be  able  to  assert  that  its  smaller 
size  exempts  it  from  common  obliga- 
tions in  economics  or  defense.  Or  in 
charges  of  being  taken  for  granted  by 
the  other  country,  as  many  Canadians 
felt  up  until  recently  and  as  Americans 
felt  in  the  early  1970"s.  Or  in  worries 
on  both  sides  of  the  border  that  the 
burdens  and  benefits  of  common 
enterprises — pollution  control,  the  auto 
pact,  other  trading  arrangements,  the 


seaway,  the  pipeline — will  not  be  fairly 
shared  between  us. 

Quite  clearly  our  interdependence 
can  be  enormously  productive  of 
wealth  and  progress.  But  I  think  it  is 
the  beginning  of  wisdom  in  our  re- 
lationship to  realize  that  increased 
interdependence  can  also  bring  tension 
between  us. 

The  "Special  Relationship" 

The  history  of  the  "special  relation- 
ship" makes  the  point.  Both  Canadians 
and  Americans  used  that  term  to  de- 
scribe their  relationship  from  the  Sec- 
ond World  War  until  the  early  1970's. 
No  one  ever  defined  the  "special  re- 
lationship" but  its  main  features  are 
well  known: 

•  The  closest  collaboration  in  inter- 
national affairs  and  defense  (including 
the  fully  integrated  North  American  Air 
Defense  Command  system); 

•  Intensive  two-way  trade  and  in- 
vestment (the  U.S.  share  of  Canada's 
trade  held  steady  at  a  high  level — about 
70%— as  has  the  U.S.  share  of  all 
domestic  and  foreign  investment  in 
Canada — at  about  40%);  and 

•  Access  by  Canada  to  exceptional 


economic  arrangements  the  United 
States  made  available  to  no  other 
country  (exemption  from  oil  import 
quotas,  from  capital  export  regulations, 
from  buy-American  rules  on  defense 
procurement). 

There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the 
great  benefits  each  country  drew  from 
the  special  relationship.  Canada's 
economy  grew  explosively  during  this 
period  and  became  a  more  and  more 
indispensable  element  in  U.S.  prosper- 
ity. The  joint  security  arrangements 
helped  keep  the  peace.  Exchanges  of 
people  and  ideas  advanced  enormously. 

Then  the  reaction  set  in.  It  came  first 
in  Canada,  in  the  mid-l960"s,  triggered 
by  the  Vietnam  war.  For  the  first  time 
in  more  than  a  century,  the  great 
majority  of  Canadians  found  them- 
selves disagreeing  fundamentally  with 
what  the  United  States  was  doing.  And 
that  disagreement  sensitized  Canadians 
astonishingly  rapidly  to  how  dependent 
they  were  on  U.S.  investment  capital 
and  U.S.  media,  which  commanded  the 
biggest  audiences  for  radio,  television, 
and  news  magazines. 

Within  short  order  the  Canadian 
Government  moved  to  distance  itself 
from  U.S.  foreign  policy  (in  its  open- 


U.S.  AMBASSADOR 
TO  CANADA 

Thomas  O.  Enders  was  born  in  Hartford. 
Connecticut,  on  November  28,  1931.  He 
graduated  first  in  his  class  with  a  B.A.  de- 
gree in  history  and  economics  from  Yale 
(1953),  took  a  Doctor  of  University  degree 
in  colonial  history  from  the  University  of 
Paris  (1955).  and  received  an  M.A.  degree 
in  economics  from  Harvard  (1957). 

Ambassador  Enders  entered  the  Foreign 
Service  in  1958  and  was  assigned  to  the  De- 
partment's Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Re- 
search. In  1960  he  was  assigned  to  Stock- 
holm. He  subsequently  served  in  the  Bureau 
of  European  Affairs,  as  Special  Assistant  to 
the  Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs, 
and  in  1968  became  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  International  Monetary  Affairs  in 
the  Bureau  of  Economic  Affairs. 

He  became  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  at 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Belgrade  in  1969  and 
at  Phnom  Penh  in  January  1971;  at  the  latter 
post,  he  served  as  Charge  d'Affaires  ad 
interim  beginning  in  September  1973.  Am- 


bassador Enders  was  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Economic  and  Business  Affairs  from  July 
1974  until  February  5.  1976.  when  he  was 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to  Canada. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


CANADA— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:    3.851,809   sq.    mi.    (second   largest 

country  in  the  world). 
Capital:  Ottawa  (pop.  693,288). 
Other  Cities:   Toronto  (2.803   million), 

Montreal   (2.802   million).    Vancouver 

(1 .2  million). 

People 

Population:  23.6  million  (1978). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  1.3%. 

Density:  6.4  per  sq.  mi.  (one  of  the  lowest 

densities  in  the  world). 
Religions:   Roman  Catholic  (46%),   United 

Church  of  Canada  (18%),  Anglican  (12%). 
Languages:  English,  French. 
Literacy:  99%>. 
Life  Expectancy:  69  yrs.   (males),  76  yrs. 

(females). 

Government 

Type:  Confederation  with  parliamentary  de- 
mocracy. 

Date  of  Constitution:  July  I,  1867. 

Branches:  Executive — Queen  of  England 
(Chief  of  State,  represented  by  Governor 
General).  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Gov- 
ernment). Legislative — bicameral  Parlia- 
ment  (104-Member  Senate.   282-Member 


House  of  Commons).  Judicial — Supreme 
Court. 

Political  Parties:  Liberal.  Progressive  Con- 
servative, New  Democratic,  Social  Credit. 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  10  Provinces,  2 
Territories. 

Economy 

GNP:  $202  billion  (1978). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  3.4%  (1978). 

Per  Capita  GNP:  $7,032  (1978). 

Agriculture:  Products — wheat,  livestock  and 
meat,  feedgrains,  oilseeds,  dairy  products, 
tobacco,  fruits,  vegetables. 

Industry:  Products — motor  vehicles  and 
parts,  fish  and  forest  products,  petroleum 
and  natural  gas,  processed  and  unproc- 
essed minerals. 

Natural  Resources:  Metals  and  minerals, 
fish,  forests,  wildlife. 

Trade:  Exports~S45.i  billion  (1978):  motor 
vehicles  and  parts,  lumber,  wood  pulp  and 
newsprint,  crude  and  fabricated  metals, 
natural  gas.  crude  petroleum,  and  wheal. 
Partners  (1978)— U.S.  (70.2%),  EC 
(8.4%),  Japan  (5.9%),  and  Latin  America 
(4.6%).  Imports— S4i. 5  billion  (1978): 
motor  vehicles  and  parts,  industrial 
machinery,  crude  petroleum,  chemicals, 
and  agricultural  machinery.  Partners 
(1978)— U.S.  (70.5%),  EC  (7.3%),  Japan 
(4,9%),  and  Latin  America  (4.6%). 


Official  Exchange  Rate:  (floating)  approx. 
C$.87  =  U.S.  $1.00  (May  1979). 

Economic  Aid  Extended:  Total  official  and 
private  resource  flow  (1976) — $2.4  bil- 
lion; official  development  assistance 
(1976)— $886  million. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N..  NATO.  OECD.  British  Common- 
wealth. International  Energy  Agency 
(lEA).  Agency  For  Cultural  and  Technical 
Cooperation. 

Principal  Government 
Officials 

Canada:  Prime  Minister — Joe  Clark;  Secretary 
of  State  for  External  Affairs — Flora  Mac- 
Donald;  Ambassador  to  the  U.S. — Peter 
Towe. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Canada — 
Thomas  O.  Enders. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's 
Background  Note  on  Canada  to  be  pub- 
lished in  the  summer  of  1979.  Copies  of  the 
complete  Note  may  be  purchased  for  70i 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  al- 
lowed when  ordering  100  or  more  Notes 
mailed  to  the  same  address). 


ing  to  China  and  radical  Third  World 
countries),  downgrade  its  contribution 
to  joint  defense,  screen  incoming  in- 
vestment, limit  energy  flows,  and  limit 
access  by  U.S.  media.  In  1972  Canada 
adopted  a  formal  policy  of  diversifying 
its  foreign  relations  so  as  to  diminish 
its  dependence  on  the  United  States 
(the  so-called  third  option). 

American  reaction  against  the  special 
relationship  came  in  the  early  1970's. 
With  the  two  countries  pulling  apart  on 
so  many  issues,  there  no  longer  ap- 
peared to  be  a  compelling  case  for  ex- 
ceptional treatment  of  Canadian  eco- 
nomic interests.  So  when  the  United 
States  imposed  an  import  surcharge  in 
1971  as  part  of  the  effort  to  devalue  the 
U.S.  dollar.  Canada  received  no 
exemption.  Washington  added  insult  to 
injury  by  misspecifying  Japan  as  the 
United  States"  number  one  trading 
partner.  An  explosion  of  exasperation 
followed  in  Canada. 

This  mutual  pulling  apart  made  the 
first  half  of  the  1970's  a  turbulent 
period  in  U.S. -Canada  relations, 
marked  by  accumulation  of  irritants,  by 
distrust,  and  occasionally  by  bitterness. 

Yet  in  retrospect  the  adjustment  was 
not  only  necessary  but  sound.  Not  only 


was  the  special  relationship  inherently 
unequal,  and  thus  inappropriate  to  the 
conduct  of  mature  relations  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States,  but  its 
enormous  success  produced  perceived 
levels  of  dependency  intolerable  to 
Canadians  and  ultimately  to  Ameri- 
cans. 

By  mid-decade  conditions  were  ripe 
to  begin  constructing  again  a 
forward-looking  relationship.  The 
Vietnam  war  was  over.  The  seemingly 
automatic  prosperity  of  the  1960"s  and 
early  1970's — that  gave  each  side  the 
impression  it  could  do  without  the 
other — was  also  gone.  Each  side's  ad- 
justments to  the  relationship  were  in 
place,  but  it  was  already  clear  that  their 
scope  would  be  self-limiting.  Canada 
had  new  formal  links  with  the  Euro- 
pean Community  and  Japan,  but  they 
were  not  even  marginally  a  substitute 
for  the  economic  connection  with  the 
States.  And  the  challenge  to  Canadian 
unity  gave  both  countries  a  new  motive 
for  making  their  relationship  work 
well. 

It  is  against  this  background  that 
President  Carter  and  Prime  Minister 
Trudeau  set  out  to  build  Canada-U.S. 
cooperation  anew.  And  the  last  2  years 


have  been  remarkably  rich  in  achieve- 
ment. Not  only  have  the  old  irritants 
been  largely  bargained  out — or  at  least 
neutralized — but  there  have  been  many 
major  new  successes:  agreement  to 
build  the  Alaska  pipeline  together,  the 
biggest  tariff  reduction  and  trade  reg- 
ulating deal  we've  ever  reached, 
agreement  on  east  coast  fisheries  and 
boundary  arbitration,  an  innovative 
new  accord  on  the  Great  Lakes 
cleanup,  and  revision  of  St.  Lawrence 
Seaway  toll  structure.  And  we  are 
working  together  on  replacement  of 
Canada's  fighter  planes. 

Let  me  see  whether  I  can  articulate 
some  of  the  lessons  implicit  in  this 
cycle  and  in  the  structure  of  our  re- 
lationship. 

Basic  Objectives 

and  Mutual  Confidence 

First,  it  is  clear  that  some  of  the 
basic  objectives  of  each  society  cannot 
be  attained  unless  we  attain  them  to- 
gether. We  can't  complete  the  Great 
Lakes  cleanup  nor  begin  to  control 
two-way  air  pollution,  nor  stimulate 
productivity  and  fight  inflation  by 
freeing  up  trade,  nor  make  our  separate 


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Canadian  Exports  to  U.S.  by  Category,  1971-77* 


CRUDE  MATERIALS 


FABRICATED  MATERIALS 


Crude  Petroleum 

8.5% 

Natural  Gas 

4.2% 

Iron  Ore  and 

Concentrates 

1.5% 

Asbestos 

0.5% 

Nonferrous  Ore 

and  Concentrates 

1.4% 

Other 

2.9% 

Forest  Products 

17.4% 

Chemicals 

3.4% 

Coal  and  Petroleum 

Products 

2.0% 

Iron  and  Steel 

Products 

2.1% 

Nonferrous 

Metals  and  Alloys 

4.6% 

Other 

3.7% 

END  PRODUCTS 


FOOD  PRODUCTS 


Automobiles  and 

Live  Animals 

0.4% 

Parts 

27.1% 

Whiskey 

1.0% 

Industrial  Machinery 

2.2% 

Fish  and  Fishery 

Aircraft  and  Pa-'ts 

1.4% 

Products 

1.3% 

Farm  Machinery  and 

Other 

1.7% 

Tractors 

1.7% 

Communication  and 

Related  Equipment 

0.9% 

Other 

8.3% 

'As  percentage  of  total  Canadian  exports  to  U.S.,  average  over 
period  1971-77.  (Percentages  for  the  segments  in  the  main  circle 
do  not  add  to  100  because  special  transactions  are  excluded.  This 
category  includes  items  such  as  private  donations  of  goods,  settlers' 
effects,  and  imports  for  diplomats.) 

SOURCE:  "Canada-United  States  Relations,"  Vol.  II,  Canadian  Standing 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  June  1978. 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 

energy  systems  more  efficient,  nor  tak6 
full  advantage  of  the  200-mile  eco- 
nomic zone  offshore  unless  we  do  it  td 
gether. 

Second,  without  an  atmosphere  of 
mutual  confidence  we  will  not  be  able 
to  take  advantage  of  these  opportuni- 
ties. In  the  late  1960's,  powerful 
voices  on  both  sides  of  the  border  ar- 
gued that  neither  Canada  nor  the 
United  States  should  put  itself  in  thrall 
to  the  other  by  building  a  cross-Canada 
oil  pipeline.  In  the  suspicious  ambiance 
of  the  time,  these  voices  prevailed.  The 
United  States  lost  arguably  the  best 
option  for  moving  Alaskan  oil  to  deficit 
markets  in  the  lower  48  States,  and 
Canada  lost  a  major  source  of  employ 
ment  and  revenue.  Now  both  countries' 
are  seeking  to  patch  together  second 
and  third  best  solutions  to  the  same 
problem. 


Mutual  Dependency 

Third,  confidence  depends  in  turn  on 
respect  for  our  mutual  dependency. 
This  means  that  we  should  consult  be- 
fore we  act,  a  commonplace  observa- 
tion but  only  in  the  1970's  a  common 
practice.  That  means  we  should  try  to 
use  our  consultation  to  accommodate, 
and  this  is  only  now  coming. 

Less  obviously,  but  no  less  impor- 
tantly, that  means  we  shouldn't  link 
unrelated  issues.  No  doubt  as  a  matter 
of  practical  politics,  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Canadian  Cabinets  are 
going  to  want  to  think  twice  before 
giving  a  concession  if  their  interests  on 
a  range  of  other  subjects  are  being 
clobbered.  But  formal  links — say  be- 
tween two  environmental  questions — 
can  only  violate  the  interests  of  the 
communities  concerned.  If  frequently 
practised,  linkage  could  bring  the 
whole  relationship  to  a  halt. 


Cooperative  Action 

Fourth,  we  should  choose  our  targets 
for  cooperative  action  with  perspicac- 
ity, to  be  sure  the  benefits  really  out- 
weigh the  cost  of  greater  mutual  de- 
pendency. 

There  will  always  be  thorough-going 
nationalists — on  both  sides  of  the 
border — to  argue  that  any  cooperative 
agreement  involves  more  cost  in  lost 
independence  than  gain  in  other  meas- 
ures of  welfare.  Most  Canadians  and 
most  Americans  disagree  with  that  ar- 
gument, and  with  good  reason.  Without 
Canada-U.S.  cooperative  action,  De- 
troit and  Cleveland  could  never  have 
persuaded  the  Congress  to  finance 
municipal  waste  treatment  plants  for 


1979 


hem.  Without  the  seaway,  the  de- 
clopment  of  the  Great  Lakes  economy 
Aduid  have  been  much  slower.  Without 
lie  auto  pact,  cars  would  be  tar  more 
'\pensive  in  Canada,  and  the  U.S.  in- 
luslry  would  be  less  efficient.  For  most 
)l  us,  the  gains  in  these  great  projects 
^\\amp  the  cost. 

But  the  corresponding  argument  of 
.he  thorough-going  internationalists  on 
-loth  sides  of  the  border — that  whatever 
IS  done  together  is  ipso  facto  better — 
:.in  also  be  wrong. 

There  may  not  be  very  many,  or  in- 
iced  any,  industrial  sectors  beyond 
.lilt OS  in  which  the  payoff  from 
rationalization  induced  by  free  trade  is 
so  great  as  to  outweigh  the  inevitable 
iKL'uments  between  us  on  whether  the 
benefits  are  being  fairly  shared.  Even 
III  the  auto  pact,  which  has  generated 
an  astounding  real  annual  increase  in 
tv\o-way  trade  of  22%  for  the  last  14 
\ears,  the  constituency  on  both  sides  of 
the  border  remains  thin,  and  periodic, 
abrasive  controversies  on  sharing  break 
out. 

Nor  is  it  at  all  evident  that  a  north- 
south  free  trade  area — an  idea  that 
comes  back  occasionally  in  both 
countries — would  yield  enough  eco- 
nomic benefit  to  justify  the  political 
costs.  With  the  application  of  the  re- 
sults of  the  most  recent  multilateral 
trade  negotiations,  U.S.  tariffs  on  duti- 
able industrial  imports  from  Canada 
will  fall  to  an  average  4%,  with  80%  of 
imports  duty  free.  Canada's  average 
tariff  on  imports  from  the  United  States 
will  be  9%,  with  65%  coming  in  with- 
out duty. 

A  free  trade  area  would  do  away 
with  these  residual  barriers.  But  it 
would  cut  across  the  vocation  we  both 
have  to  be  worldwide  traders.  And  it 
might  seem  to  promise  a  reciprocal  re- 
sponsibility for  each  other's  well-being 
beyond  what  either  country  could 
realistically —  or  would — live  up  to. 

Similar  care  is  required  in  the  energy 
field.  There  is  a  lot  we  can  do  together 
to  make  our  separate  energy  systems 
more  efficient — joint  oil  storage,  in- 
creased trade  in  electricity,  cooperation 
in  transporting  Alaska  oil  into  the  U.S. 
Midwest,  and  use  of  surplus  Canadian 
refinery  capacity  to  meet  U.S. 
shortfalls  in  gasoline.  Augmented 
Canadian  sales  of  gas  and  U.S.  sales  of 
coal  are  important  to  both  countries. 
But  proposals  to  create  a  "'North 
American  energy  market,"  which  oc- 
casionally surface  in  the  United  States, 
are  likely  only  to  arouse  American  ex- 
pectations that  cannot  be  met  and  stir 
up  Canadian  fears  that  are  difficult  to 
put  to  rest.  After  all,  such  proposals  do 
not  increase  the  availability  of  energy 


Canadian  Imports  from  the  U.S.  by  Category,  1971-77* 


FABRICATED  MATERIALS 


FOOD  PRODUCTS 

Grains 

Nuts,  Fruits,  and 

Vegetables 
Other 


0.2% 


CRUDE  MATERIALS 


Coal 
Other 


Forest  Products 
Fabric  and  Textile 

Materials 
Chemicals 
Petroleum  and  Coal 

Products 
Nonferrous  Metals 

and  Alloys 
Other 


2.0% 

1.4% 
5.2% 

0.6% 

1.4% 
6.7% 


END  PRODUCTS  ^^f^Oc/ucts  — 32.3°'° 


Industrial  Machinery 

10.0% 

Farm  Machinery 

and  Tractors 

3.9% 

Automobiles  and 

Parts 

32.3% 

Aircraft  and  Parts 

2.1% 

Communications  and 

Related  Equipment 

2.5% 

Electronic 

Computers 

1.5% 

Other 

17.4% 

'As  percentage  of  total  Canadian  exports  to  U.S.,  average  over 
period  1971-77.  (Percentages  for  the  segments  in  the  main  circle 
do  not  add  to  100  because  special  transactions  are  excluded.  This 
category  includes  items  such  as  private  donations  of  goods,  settlers' 
effects,  and  imports  for  diplomats.) 

SOURCE:  "Canada-United  States  Relations,"  Vol.  II,  Canadian  Standing 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  June  1978. 


in  North  America,  but  they  do  set  us  to 
arguing  over  its  distribution. 

Interdependence 

That  leads  me  to  a  fifth  reflection. 
Canada-U.S.  relations  will  not  work 
well  if  we  feel  that  we  are  prisoners  of 
our  interdependence,  not  its  masters. 

How  can  we  retain  control?  There 
are  a  variety  of  means.  One  is  to  rec- 
ognize the  need  for  such  national 
safeguards  as  Canada's  Foreign  In- 
vestment Review  Act  (FIRA)  and  the 
United  States'  countervailing  duty  au- 
thorities. It  was  feared  that  FIRA  might 
act  as  a  barrier  to  new  incoming  in- 
vestment in  Canada.  But  rather  it  has 
applied  its  mandate — to  assure  benefit 
to  Canada  in  investment  proposals.  Its 
current  approval  rate  of  90%  is  an  indi- 
cation of  the  quality  of  proposals  it  re- 
ceives. I  can  understand  how  Canada, 
relying  as  heavily  as  it  does  on  outside 
investment,  feels  the  need  for  having 
such  a  mechanism  to  insure  that  its 
interests  are  identified  and  met. 

Similarly.  I  don't  see  how  the  United 
States  could  cut  its  tariff  protection  to- 
ward Canada,  as  low  as  it  has.  and  not 
retain  the  means  of  protecting  itself 
against  unfair  competition  from  sub- 
sidized imports.  This  is  particularly 
true,  given  the  widespread  use  of  sub- 
sidies as  an  instrument  of  industrial 
policy  in  Canada. 

That  doesn't  mean  that  any  national 
safeguard,  however  applied,  should  be 
acceptable.  Clearly  some  can  be  cause 
for  quarrel  in  themselves.  The  practice 
of  random  deletion  of  Canadian  origin 
TV  commercials  broadcast  by  U.S. 
border  stations — the  manipulation  of  a 
signal  originating  in  the  United 
States — is  a  case  that  comes  to  mind. 
Others,  such  as  FIRA  and  countervail- 
ing duties,  could  become  highly  con- 
tentious if  applied  unfairly  or  exces- 
sively. 

Where  safeguards  are  needed,  two 
procedures  should  be  followed. 

•  We  should  look  for  a  solution  to 
the  problem  that  expands  our  ex- 
changes rather  than  cuts  into  them.  For 
example,  some  Canadians  have  pro- 
posed a  discriminatory  tax  on  cinemas 
showing  U.S.  films  as  a  means  of  fur- 
ther stimulating  Canada's  developing 
film  industry  and  asserting  Canada's 
cultural   identity.    But  such  a  measure 


which  could  have  led  to  a  "film  war," 
and  Canada's  industry  cannot  prosper 
without  access  to  the  American  market. 
Thus  the  American  Motion  Picture  As- 
sociation is  promoting  distribution  of 
additional  Canadian-made  feature  films 
in  the  United  States  as  an  alternative. 

•  We  should  make  the  safeguards 
subject  to  agreed  international  disci- 
pline. That's  what  is  now  happening  on 
countervailing  duties  and  subsidies  and 
has  already  happened  through  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  with  regard  to  na- 
tional treatment  for  investors  once  they 
are  permitted  to  establish. 

But  the  most  difficult  of  control 
problems  are  those  involving  adjust- 
ment of  major  deals  between  us.  Clas- 
sically, our  most  important  agreements 
have  no  reopener  clause.  But  the  world 
changes  and  interests  change,  and  the 
dangers  of  rigidity  have  to  be  balanced 
off  against  the  advantages  of  stability. 

Recently  we've  made  some  progress 
in  this  difficult,  delicate  area.  Despite 
the  fact  that  whole  port  systems  were 
built  on  the  basis  of  the  original  St. 
Lawrence  toll  structure,  we  were  able 
to  agree  last  year  on  modifying  them, 
in  order  to  cover  rising  costs. 

The  provisions  of  the  newly  signed 
agreement  on  east  coast  fisheries  and 
boundaries  are  innovative  in  this  re- 
gard. The  agreement  is  permanent,  yet 
either  party  can  ask  for  renegotiation  of 
the  catch  split  every  10  years.  How- 
ever, the  treaty  puts  an  absolute  limit 
on  the  cumulative  change  in  percent- 
ages that  can  be  negotiated. 

I'm  not  suggesting  the  reopener  in 
the  east  coast  treaty  should  be  copied 
elsewhere;  it's  controversial  itself.  But 
proper  allowance  for  change  within  an 
overall  framework  of  stable  bargains  is 
clearly  one  area  of  unfinished  business 
in  the  relationship. 

Style  and  Institutions 

My  sixth  and  last  point  concerns 
style  and  institutions. 

The  Constitutions  of  both  countries 
give  exclusive  responsibility  for  the 
conduct  of  the  relationship  to  the  Fed- 
eral governments.  Yet  clearly  not  only 
are  the  Federal  executives,  the  Parlia- 
ment, and  the  Congress  involved  but 
increasingly  the  Provinces  and  States. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

as  well  as  a  mass  of  new  actors — '■ 
environmental  groups,  labor  unions,: 
businesses,  and  so  forth. 

One  implication  is  that  we  have  to 
conduct  our  relations  far  more  openly 
than  before,  using  the  media  as  ai 
means  to  inform  and  engage  the  players, 
on  both  sides.  During  the  special  re- 
lationship, an  effort  was  made  by  offi- 
cials to  vestpocket  our  affairs,  and  the 
concept  was  even  formalized  in  the 
Merchant-Heeney  principles  for 
partnership  of  June  1965,  which  typi- 
cally appeared  just  as  the  reaction  to 
the  special  relationship  was  about  to  set 
in.  Such  an  attempt  is  not  only  impos- 
sible now,  it  would  be  damaging. 

Another  implication  is  that  diplo- 
macy must  now  include  the  Provinces 
and  States.  That  does  not  mean  that 
either  Ottawa  or  Washington  should 
attempt  to  contract  business  with  the 
States  or  the  Provinces;  that  would 
violate  the  Constitutions.  But  each 
capital  can  and  is  developing  its  liaison 
with  other  governments  in  its  own 
country.  And  informal  contacts  be- 
tween the  Provinces  and  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Ottawa  and  the  States  and  the 
Canadian  Embassy  in  Washington  can 
prevent  misunderstanding  and  expedite 
our  affairs. 

There  is  no  way  one  can  codify 
Canada-U.S.  relations,  and  this  is  not 
an  effort  to  do  so.  We  are  continuously 
evolving  new  procedures  to  meet  new 
opportunities  or  problems. 

And  no  doubt  we  will  have  a  new  set 
of  problems  in  the  1980's.  Industrial 
development  and  technology  are  bound 
to  be  among  them;  perhaps  they  will  be 
the  central  issues.  Both  societies  are 
dissatisfied  with  the  rate  at  which  they 
are  generating  industrial  innovation, 
and  it  is  increasingly  clear  that  for 
both,  success  or  failure  in  energy  will 
depend  on  technological  change.  Tech- 
nology may  thus  define  quite  new  op- 
portunities for  cooperation  as  well  as 
new  areas  for  rivalry. 

During  the  1970's  the  United  States 
learned  a  lot  more  not  only  about 
Canada  but  how  it  behaves  in  relating 
to  Canada.  I  think  Canada  has  had  a 
similar  experience.  With  that 
knowledge — and  the  sense  that  we've 
achieved  something  in  the 
relationship — we  should  be  exception- 
ally well  placed  to  meet  the  challenges 
of  the  1980's.  n 


June  1979 


ilfarilitiii*  Bouutitiry 
and  Rfsourcv  Agrecntents 


by  Thomas  R.  Pickering 

Address  before  the  Oceans  Policy 
Forum  in  Washington.  D.C.,  on  April 
5,  1979.  Mr.  Pickering  is  .4ssistant 
Secretary  for  Oceans  and  International 
Environmental  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

On  March  29,  1979.  Secretary 
Vance  and  the  Canadian  Ambassador. 
Peter  Towe,  signed  important  maritime 
agreements  relating  to  both  the  Pacific 
and  Atlantic  coasts.  I  would  like  to  de- 
scribe those  agreements  briefly  for 
you.  review  the  background  of  their 
negotiation,  and  comment  on  the 
necessity  for  the  arrangements  encom- 
passed by  them. 

The  agreements  relating  to  Pacific 
coast  fisheries  were  contained  in  a 
protocol  amending  the  Pacific  halibut 
convention  and  in  an  exchange  of  dip- 
lomatic notes  under  which  U.S. 
fishermen  will  be  allowed  to  catch 
3.250  metric  tons  of  groundfish  off  the 
coast  of  British  Columbia  in  each  of 
the  next  two  12-month  periods.  Under 
the  amended  halibut  convention.  Cana- 
dian fishermen  will  take  2  million 
pounds  of  halibut  in  the  U.S.  zone  this 
year  and  1  million  pounds  the  follow- 
ing year. 

The  west  coast  agreements,  in  es- 
sence, phase  out  reciprocal  commercial 
fishing  over  a  2-year  period  but  provide 
for  continued  joint  management  of  the 
halibut  resource  in  the  bilateral  Inter- 
national Pacific  Halibut  Commission. 
Reciprocal  sport  fishing  in  accordance 
with  State  and  local  laws  and  regula- 
tions is  also  provided  for. 

Maritime  Boundaries 

The  maritime  dispute  in  the  Beaufort 
Sea  and  the  disputed  Pacific  boundaries 
in  the  Dixon  Entrance  and  Juan  de  Fuca 
areas  have  not  been  resolved.  The  area 
claimed  by  both  sides  in  the  Beaufort 
Sea,  although  large,  is  not  of  any  pres- 
ent fisheries  importance.  The  areas  of 
overlapping  claims  in  the  Pacific  are 
much  smaller  and  of  relatively  little 
importance  in  fisheries  terms. 

Also  signed  on  March  29  was  an 
east  coast  fisheries  agreement  and  a 
treaty  committing  the  two  governments 
to  resolve,  by  third-party  means,  the 
disputed  maritime  boundary  in  the  Gulf 
of  Maine  area.  Two  related  agreements 
were  signed  with  the  boundary  settle- 
ment treaty.   The  first   sets  out  in 


elaborate  detail  the  method  and  proce- 
dures for  submission  of  the  delimita- 
tion of  the  maritime  boundary  in  the 
Gulf  of  Maine  area  to  a  chamber  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ). 
The  other  agreement  describes,  in 
similar  detail,  arrangements  for  sub- 
mission of  the  issue  to  an  ad  hoc  Court 
of  Arbitration  of  agreed  members 
should  it  prove  impossible  to  proceed 
before  a  chamber  of  the  ICJ.  Our  pre- 
ferred method  of  settling  the  boundary 
is  by  a  chamber  of  the  ICJ.  In  the  ICJ 
process,  although  the  special  chamber 
would  do  the  actual  work,  the  award 
would  be  an  award  of  the  ICJ.  This 
could  be — if  we  are  able  to  go  the  ICJ 
route — the  first  instance  in  which  a 
case  submitted  to  that  Court's  jurisdic- 
tion by  the  United  States  would  be  de- 
cided by  the  Court. 

Fisheries  Resources 

Related  to  the  boundary  settlement 
treaty  is  the  agreement  between  Canada 
and  the  United  States  on  east  coast 
fisheries  resources  which  will  enter 
into  effect  simultaneously  with  the 
boundary  settlement  treaty.  The 
fisheries  agreement  will  endure  beyond 
the  actual  delimitation  of  the  maritime 
boundary — a  process  which  may  itself 
require  several  years  for  completion. 

The  boundary  settlement  treaty,  with 
its  two  alternative  agreements,  like  the 
west  coast  arrangements  on  halibut  and 
groundfish.  is  not.  as  far  as  I  am 
aware,  controversial  or  opposed  by 
concerned  segments  of  our  society  or 
economy.  The  east  coast  fishery 
agreement  on  the  other  hand  is 
controversial. 

Although  I  cannot  here  now  re- 
capitulate the  entire  process  which  led 
to  the  signing  of  the  fishery  agreement, 
it  is  worthwhile  to  keep  in  mind  the 
background  against  which  we  under- 
took the  negotiations. 

Background  to  Negotiations 

Historically  we  lived  in  a  world 
where  national  jurisdiction,  in  any 
form,  did  not  extend  beyond  3  miles.  It 
was  only  in  1964  that  the  United  States 
established  a  9-mile  contiguous 
fisheries  zone,  thereby  extending  U.S. 
jurisdiction  (for  fisheries  purposes 
only)  out  to  12  miles.  The  1958  Conti- 
nental Shelf  convention,  which  we 
ratified  in   1961.  entered  into  force  in 


June  1964.  Even  then,  we  did  not  ac- 
tually delimit  shelf  claims.  We  did, 
however,  discuss  shelf  delimitation 
with  our  Canadian  neighbors,  and  we 
discovered  that  we  had  differing  opin- 
ions on  our  shelf  boundaries.  In  1970, 
we  began  negotiations,  without  any 
success,  to  resolve  the  shelf  bound- 
aries, particularly  the  North  Atlantic 
one  since  there  was  even  then  consid- 
erable interest  in  hydrocarbon  explora- 
tion and  exploitation  on  the  Georges 
Bank. 

Throughout  the  early  1970"s  pressure 
grew  for  extension  of  U.S.  fisheries 
jurisdiction  to  200  miles.  Following 
passage  of  the  Fishery  Conservation 
and  Management  Act  of  1976,  we 
again  tried  to  resolve  by  negotiation 
our  maritime  boundary  differences  with 
Canada.  We  have  not  yet  succeeded, 
although  the  treaty  signed  last  week 
provides  for  resolution  of  the  dispute  in 
the  Gulf  of  Maine  area.  Of  the  four 
boundaries  in  dispute,  it  is  the  one  that 
is  most  contentious,  and  it  most  affects 
exploitation  and  management  of  our 
two  countries"  fishery  resources.  The 
overlap  in  the  two  countries"  claims  is 
very  large  and  encompasses  extremely 
productive  fishing  grounds. 

Since  passage  of  the  Fishery  Conser- 
vation and  Management  Act,  it  has  be- 
come increasingly  apparent  that  any 
logical  or  effective  management  of 
transboundary  east  coast  fishery  re- 
sources requires,  as  a  sine  qua  non, 
agreement  with  Canada  on  who  will 
manage  each  stock;  what  the  shares  of 
each  country  will  be;  and,  to  the  extent 
that  it  is  mutually  beneficial,  the 
amount  and  areas  of  any  reciprocal 
fishing.  Under  the  interim  fisheries 
agreement  we  worked  out  for  1977. 
and  also  under  a  similar  agreement  for 
1978  which  never  was  put  into  force, 
there  were  serious  differences  with  the 
Canadians.  A  part  of  the  problem  re- 
lated to  the  rather  special  case  of 
Pacific  salmon  fishing  by  Canadians 
off  the  Washington  coast.  More  basic. 
however,  on  both  coasts,  was  the  dif- 
ference in  management  approaches  and 
the  resultant  discord  on  management 
and  sharing  of  transboundary  stocks  of 
fish.  Canadian  dissatisfaction  with 
U.S.  management  of  groundfish  in  the 
New  England  area  was  a  primary  cause 
of  the  collapse  of  the  1978  reciprocal 
and  the  cessation  of  reciprocal  fishing. 

Even  were  there  not  a  large  disputed 
area  of  overlapping  claims,  the  fact 
that  several  major  fish  stocks  migrate 
back  and  forth  across  any  conceivable 
boundary  would  preclude  effective 
management  of  such  stocks  by  either 
country  acting  independently.  The 
overlap  of  claims  also  makes  the  divi- 
sion of  catch  extremely  contentious. 


8 

The  classic  illustration  of  these  man- 
agement and  shares  problems  is  what 
has  happened  with  haddock  and  scal- 
lops during  the  past  2  years. 

Each  side  has  formulated  its  own 
management  regime  for  haddock  (as 
well  as  cod  and  other  species),  Canada 
has  repeatedly  claimed  that  our  regula- 
tions were  not  adequately  conser- 
vationist. We  have  effectively  raised 
the  catch  level  on  three  occasions.  In  a 
thinly  veiled  "object  lesson"  Canada, 
in  late  1978.  allowed  Canadian  fisher- 


men to  take  very  heavy  harvests  of 
haddock  in  the  disputed  area. 

In  the  case  of  scallops  the  United 
States  has  not  yet  implemented  a  man- 
agement plan,  but  U.S.  efforts  on 
Georges  Bank  scallops  have  increased 
remarkably  in  the  past  2  years.  Canada 
has  become  very  alarmed  both  at  the 
increased  U.S.  effort  level  and  at  the 
possible  effect  on  the  stocks.  Similar 
problems  and  differences  exist  with  re- 
gard to  other  species  as  well. 

Given  this   kind  of  situation,   it   is 


Garrison  Diversion  Unit 


On  March  28,  representatives  of 
Canada  and  the  United  States  met  in 
Washington  to  discuss  the  recent  de- 
velopments relating  to  the  Garrison  Di- 
version Unit — a  multipurpose  water 
project  in  the  State  of  North  Dakota. 

The  meeting  was  requested  by 
Canada  to  consult  about  the  implica- 
tions for  Canada  of  the  Department  of 
the  Interior's  recommendation  to 
reauthorize  the  unit  to  include  96,300 
acres  of  irrigation. 

The  revised  Interior  proposal,  re- 
leased on  March  7.  would  reduce  the 
irrigation  area  to  be  covered  by  the 
project  from  250.000  acres.  The  re- 
vised proposal  will  be  reviewed  by 
U.S.  Government  agencies  in  order  to 
formulate  an  Administration  position 
for  presentation  to  the  Congress. 

Canadian  officials  indicated  that 
Canada  remains  concerned  about  the 
impact  of  the  new  plan.  In  particular 
they  are  concerned  that  the  plan  in- 
volves the  transfer  of  water  from  the 
Missouri  to  the  Hudson  Bay  drainage 
basin.  In  their  view  this  would  permit 
the  introduction  of  new  fish  species, 
diseases,  and  parasites  (foreign  biota) 
into  Manitoba  waters,  with  detrimental 
effects  on  the  multimillion  dollar 
commercial,  recreational,  and  native 
peoples  fishery  resource  in  Lake  Man- 
itoba and  Lake  Winnipeg.  They  took 
the  position  that  the  plan  should  be 
modified  to  eliminate  any  transfers  of 
water  into  the  Hudson  Bay  drainage 
basin. 

They  recalled  that  the  International 
Joint  Commission  recommended  in 
1977  that  those  parts  of  the  project  af- 
fecting Canada  not  be  built  until  the 
problem  of  biota  transfer  had  been 
satisfactorily  resolved.  They  reminded 
the  U.S.  side  of  its  commitment  not  to 
let  a  contract   for  the  Lonetree   Dam 


until  consultations  have  been  held  on 
the  report  of  the  International  Joint 
Commission. 

Canadian  officials  also  noted  that 
anything  less  than  full  implementation 
of  the  waterfowl  mitigation  plan,  pro- 
posed in  the  revised  plan,  would  lead 
to  unacceptable  waterfowl  losses  in 
Manitoba.  They  noted  that  the  impact 
of  the  project  on  Manitoba  in  terms  of 
flooding  and  water  quality  appeared  to 
be  substantially  eliminated  in  the  new 
plan,  although  there  was  insufficient 
information  to  predict  all  of  the  water 
quality  implications. 

U.S.  officials  welcomed  the  detailed 
presentation  of  Canada's  concerns. 
They  also  reiterated  their  previous  as- 
surances to  Canada  that  the  United 
States  would  honor  its  obligations 
under  the  boundary  waters  treaty  not  to 
pollute  to  the  injury  of  health  or  prop- 
erty in  Canada  and  its  past  commitment 
that  no  construction  potentially  affect- 
ing Canada  would  be  undertaken  until 
it  is  clear  that  this  obligation  will  be 
met. 

Both  sides  characterized  the  Wash- 
ington meeting  as  a  useful  step  toward 
resolving  questions  surrounding  the 
transboundary  implications  of  the  Gar- 
rison project. 

The  United  States  undertook  to  give 
careful  consideration  to  Canadian 
views  and  to  the  report  of  the  Interna- 
tional Joint  Commission  and  to  take 
them  into  full  account  in  the  Adminis- 
tration's review  of  the  Department  of 
the  Interior's  revised  plan.  The  Cana- 
dian side  expressed  its  expectation  that 
as  a  result  of  the  meeting  those  portions 
of  the  revised  plan  that  could  affect 
Canada  would  he  modified.  D 


Press  release  84  of  Mar.  29.  1979  Ills!  of  pur 
licipants  omitted  I. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin, 

clear  that  for  the  good  of  the  fishery  re- 
sources an  agreement  was  necessary.; 
There  is,  in  addition,  a  very  real  need' 
to  maintain  a  friendly,  although  busi- 
nesslike, relationship  with  as  close  a 
neighbor  as  Canada. 

Neither  the  imperative  of  resource 
conservation  and  management  nor  of 
our  bilateral  relations  would  be  justifi- 
cation for  negotiating  an  unbalanced 
agreement,  and  I  do  not  believe  we 
have  done  so.  The  agreements  we  have 
reached  will  lead  to  the  drawing  of  a 
boundary  that  will  resolve  the  question 
of  jurisdiction  in  the  area  including 
Georges  Bank. 

They  will  also  guarantee  continua- 
tion of  U.S.  fisheries  of  long  standing 
in  the  Canadian  zone  and  the  avoidance 
of  economic  disruption  in  those  seg- 
ments of  the  industry  which  would,  ab- 
sent an  agreement,  be  closed  out  of  the 
Canadian  fishery.  They  will  assure  ra- 
tional management  of  the  fish  stocks 
with  which  we  are  mutually  concerned. 
They  will  assure  U.S.  fishermen  equit- 
able shares  of  those  stocks. 

There  are  those  who  claim  that  cer- 
tain segments  of  the  U.S.  fishery  in- 
dustry come  off  better  in  the  agreement 
than  other  segments.  Whether  that  is 
true,  I  leave  to  the  analyses  and  judg- 
ments of  others.  What  I  am  prepared  to 
state  unequivocally  is  that  any  such 
imbalance  in  advantages  as  may  come 
about  was  not  arrived  at  by  design  or 
intent.  We  simply  sought  the  best  over- 
all package  of  arrangements  we  could 
achieve.  And  I  do  not  believe  any  seg- 
ment of  the  U.S.  industry  is  worse  off 
than  it  has  been  in  recent  years  or  than 
it  would  be  without  the  agreement. 

The  maritime  boundary  dispute  and 
the  attendant  resource  management  and 
utilization  problems  faced  us  with  a 
limited  array  of  alternatives.  Continua- 
tion of  the  status  quo  could  only  lead  to 
a  worsening  of  both  the  bilateral  re- 
lationship and  the  conditions  of  the 
fishery  resources.  This  leaves  us  effec- 
tively with  only  settlement  by  third- 
party  means  or  negotiated  solutions  to 
resolve  our  problems.  We  have  mixed 
these  two  alternatives  in  the  east  coast 
treaties  that  have  been  signed.  Let  me 
now  describe  briefly  the  substance  of 
the  fisheries  agreement. 

East  Coast  Treaties 

The  agreement  divides  fish  stocks 
into  three  management  categories: 
A  —  full  joint  management;  B  — 
management  by  the  country  of  primary 
interest  but  in  accordance  with  man- 
agement principles  specified  in  the 
treaty;  and  C — management  by  one 
country  or  the  other  according  to  its 
own   management   standards.   A   few 


June  1979 


slocks  do  not  tit  neatly  into  the  Ihiee- 
c;ilegory  scheme  and  have  been  made 
subject  to  special  arrangements. 

In  the  case  of  scallops,  each  side  will 
sci  the  annual  permissible  commercial 
catch  level  on  its  side  of  68°  30'  W., 
and  those  catch  levels  will  then  be 
combined  to  form  a  total  annual  per- 
missible commercial  catch. 

The  annual  permissible  commercial 
catch  for  mackerel  will  be  set  jointly, 
but  other  regulations  will  be  set  by 
each  side  under  category  B. 

Lobster  will  be  managed  jointly  in 
the  disputed  area  only,  until  a  boundary 
line  is  drawn.  Each  side  will  manage 
resources  in  its  undisputed  fishery  zone 
under  category  C. 

In  addition  to  management  respon- 
sibilities, the  agreement  ahso  assigns 
percentage  shares  of  each  stock,  by 
area,  to  fishermen  of  the  two  countries. 
The  statistical  areas  set  up  under  the 
International  Commission  for  Northwest 
Atlantic  Fisheries  and  continued  under 
the  Northwest  Atlantic  Fisheries  Or- 
ganization are  used  for  this  purpose. 

Finally,  the  agreement  specifies  ac- 
cess for  each  country's  fishermen  to 
catch  specified  shares  of  some  stocks  in 
tlic  other  country's  zone.  In  the  case  of 
C  anadian  redfish  (ocean  perch)  and 
IS.  loligo  squid,  both  the  shares  as- 
signed to  the  other  country's  fishermen 
and  the  access  for  fishing  them  will 
terminate  after  10  years. 

To  carry  out  these  rather  complex 
aiiangements,  a  joint  commission  will 
be  established  with  a  cochairman  and  a 
panel  of  seven  members  from  each 
side.  The  U.S.  panel  will  have  on  it 
two  Federal  officials,  three  members 
selected  by  the  New  England  Fishery 
Management  Council  from  among  its 
membership,  and  two  similarly  chosen 
by  the  Mid-Atlantic  Council.  The  joint 
commission  will  meet  as  often  as  the 
two  sides  agree  but  at  least  once  each 
year.  If  there  are  unresolved  differ- 
ences between  the  two  sides  on  the 
commission,  the  dispute  will  go  first  to 
the  two  cochairmen  and,  if  not  re- 
solved there,  ultimately  to  a  perma- 
nent, jointly  selected  arbitrator. 

The  agreement  is  intended  to  provide 
a  basis  for  long-term,  optimal  man- 
agement and  utilization  of  the  fishery 
resources  so  vital  to  both  sides.  There 
are  provisions  in  the  agreement  for 
modifying  not  only  the  procedures  of 
the  joint  commission  itself  but  also  the 
percentage  shares  and  the  management 
category  to  which  any  particular  stock 
is  assigned  as  well.  In  the  case  of 
changes  in  the  shares,  any  reduction  is 
limited  to  a  maximum  of  10%  of  the 
annual  permissible  commercial  catch  at 
the  end  of  each  10-year  period  if  the 
original  share  was  more  than  50%,  or 


Visit  of 
Printe  Minister  Trudeau 


Prime  Minister  Pierre  Elliott 
Trudeau  of  Canada  visited  Washing- 
ton. D.C.,  on  March  3,  1979.  to  meet 
with  President  Carter. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
MAR.  3,  1979' 


Energy 

During  their  discussion  today  over  lunch  at 
the  White  House,  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
President  discussed  the  world  energy  situation 
and  noted  that  increased  energy  self-reliance  is 
a  major  objective  of  both  their  governments. 
They  reaffirmed  that  enhanced  bilateral  coop- 
eration in  the  field  of  energy  will  serve  the 
interests  of  both  countries.  They  also  agreed 
that  maximizing  the  supplies  of  domestic 
energy  available  to  each  country  was  a  common 
and  shared  objective. 

Recent  international  events  have  served  to 
underline  the  vulnerability  of  the  USA  and 
Canada  and  other  oil-consuming  countries  to 
oil  supply  and  pricing  disruptions.   The  Presi- 


dent and  the  Prime  IVIinister  endorsed  the  coor- 
dinated undertaking  of  March  2  by  the  member 
countries  of  the  International  Energy  Agency  to 
reduce  demand  for  oil  on  the  world  market  on 
an  urgent  basis  in  response  to  the  current  global 
supply  situation.  The  Prime  Minister  noted  that 
Canada  is  raising  its  oil  production  and  that 
production  in  the  first  quarter  of  1979  will  be 
some  13  percent  above  the  previous  year,  a 
portion  of  it  being  used  to  offset  domestic 
shortfalls  resulting  from  the  Iranian  situation. 
The  United  States  plans  to  take  appropriate  ac- 
tion to  increase  its  oil  production  to  offset  the 
world  supply  shortfall. 

The  Prime  Minister  outlined  to  the  President 
the  progress  already  achieved  in  Canada  toward 
construction  of  the  Northern  Gas  Pipeline.  The 
President  affirmed  his  government's  strong 
commitment  to  the  completion  of  the  line, 
which  will  bring  .Maskan  gas  to  the  lower  48 
states  and  eventually  Mackenzie  Delta  gas  to 
Canadian  markets.  He  noted  that  he  is  sending 
a  reorganization  plan  to  the  Congress  no  later 
than  April  1.  establishing  the  Office  of  the 
Federal  Pipeline  Inspector.  He  also  stated  his 
determination  to  ensure  that  the  U.S.  regula- 


5%  of  the  annual  catch  if  the  original 
share  was  less  than  50%.  An  original 
entitlement  share  could  not  be  cumula- 
tively reduced  by  more  than  one-third. 

The  most  frequent  question  regard- 
ing the  agreement  seems  to  be:  "Why 
didn't  we  negotiate  a  fisheries  agree- 
ment limited  to  10  years  or  to  some 
fixed  period  following  the  actual 
drawing  of  a  boundary  line?"  The  an- 
swer in  the  simplest  terms  is  that  it  was 
not  possible.  During  the  course  of  the 
negotiations  we,  in  fact,  proposed  such 
a  10-year  limit  and  worked  very  hard 
for  it.  But  Canada  was  unwilling  to 
gamble  everything  on  the  outcome  of 
the  boundary.  In  fact,  although  some 
boundary  outcomes  could  result  in 
more  favorable  fishery  shares  for  the 
United  States  than  those  agreed  to, 
other  conceivable  outcomes  could  re- 
sult in  much  smaller  shares  overall. 
Moreover,  as  I  stated  earlier,  the 
agreement  does  provide  for  some  lim- 
ited upward  or  downward  adjustments 
in  shares  after  an  initial  10-year  period 
so  that  there  is  a  bit  more  flexibility  in 
these  fishing  arrangements  that  some 
would  suggest. 

A  similar  question  is:  "Why  didn't 
we  just  agree  to  arbitrate  the  boundary 
issue  and  not  bother  with  a  fishery 
agreement  until  we  actually  have  a  firm 
boundary?"  The  answer  is,  again,  that 


Canada  would  not  agree  to  submit  the 
boundary  to  a  third-party  settlement 
process  except  in  the  context  of  an  en- 
during fishery  agreement.  Moreover, 
the  implications  of  this  course  of  action 
from  a  conservation  point  of  view 
might  have  been  chaotic  with  attendant 
adverse  consequences  for  the  valuable 
fish  stocks  in  question. 

Finally,  we  have  at  times  heard  the 
suggestion  that  we  should  use  the  eco- 
nomic leverage  represented  by  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  is  Canada's  prin- 
cipal market  for  fisheries  products  in 
order  to  achieve  better  entitlements  for 
our  own  fishermen.  We  are  opposed  in 
principle  to  such  an  approach,  because 
we  do  not  believe  it  appropriate  to  link 
the  issues  of  access  to  markets  with  the 
question  of  access  to  natural  resources. 
This  has  wide  policy  significance  for  us 
in  Canada  and  elsewhere  in  terms  of 
energy  and  other  important  resource  is- 
sues. Moreover,  we  do  not  believe  that 
such  a  course  would  take  into  account 
the  constraints  and  realities  of  a  re- 
lationship between  two  countries  that 
are  each  other's  best  customers  in  the 
trade  arena.  Thus,  there  was  no  viable 
method  of  resolving  our  differences  ex- 
cept by  mutually  acceptable  arrange- 
ments. We  believe  the  arrangements  we 
have  made  are  fair  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial to  both  ;iides.  D 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AiUiitiic  Coast  Fisheries 
CI  tiff  Botutdurtf  Aifreemenis 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  14,  1979' 

The  Secretary  ot  State,  the  Honora- 
ble Cyrus  Vance,  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  External  Affairs,  the  Honora- 
ble Don  Jamieson.  announced  on  Feb- 
ruary 14  the  approval  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  United  States  and  Canada 
of  the  recommendations  of  Special 
Negotiators  Lloyd  N.  Cutler  and  Mar- 
cel Cadieux  for  an  Atlantic  coast 
fisheries  agreement  and  an  agreement 
to  resolve  the  boundary  delimitation 
issue  of  the  Gulf  of  Maine  area  by 
binding  third-party  procedures. 

The  agreements  reached  will  be  set 
out  in  two  separate  but  related  treaties, 
one  on  fisheries  and  the  other  on  third 
party  resolution  of  the  boundary  de- 
limitation issue,  which  would  enter 
into  force  simultaneously.  Treaty  texts 
should  be  ready  for  signature  by  the 
first  of  March.  The  treaties  will  then  be 
subject  to  ratification  in  accordance 
with  the  domestic  legal  requirements  of 
each   country.    Mr.    Vance   and    Mr. 


Jamieson  expressed  their  desire  to  have 
both  treaties  ratified  as  early  as  possi- 
ble. 

The  fisheries  agreement  builds  on 
the  joint  report  of  the  special 
negotiators  that  was  approved  by  the 
two  governments  in  October  1977.  A 
joint  fisheries  commission  will  be  es- 
tablished to  implement  the  agreement 
and  to  provide  for  cooperative  man- 
agement of  fish  stocks  of  mutual  inter- 
est. Dispute  settlement  mechanisms 
will  be  included  as  part  of  the  institu- 
tional framework  created  by  the  agree- 
ment in  order  to  resolve  any  differences 
that  might  arise  in  its  interpretation  or 
implementation. 

The  fisheries  agreement  also  con- 
tains detailed  sharing,  access,  and 
management  provisions  for  fish  stocks 
of  mutual  interest  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
including  the  disputed  area  as  well  as 
areas  in  which  each  exercises  undis- 
puted fisheries  jurisdiction.  These  pro- 
visions include  agreement  on  entitle- 
ment shares  for  the  following  major 
fish  stocks  in  the  Georges  Bank  area: 


Joint  Communique  (Cont'd) 

tory  process  on  all  aspects  of  the  Northern  Gas 
Pipeline  proceeds  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  two  leaders  agreed  to  seek  ways  whereby 
any  additional  Canadian  gas  exports,  should 
they  be  authorized,  could  facilitate  timely  con- 
struction of  the  entire  Northern  Gas  Pipeline. 

In  order  to  enhance  the  already  close  and 
timely  cooperation  in  other  bilateral  energy 
areas,  the  two  leaders  agreed  to  establish  a  con- 
sultative mechanism  at  the  sub-cabinet  level 
which  would  function  at  least  to  the  end  of 
1979.  This  consultative  mechanism  is  charged 
with: 

•  Ensuring  that  decision-making  processes  in 
each  country  on  the  matter  of  a  delivery  system 
to  transport  Alaskan  crude  oil  to  the  northern 
tier  and  other  inland  states  proceed  in  a  parallel 
and  timely  manner; 

•  Developing  options  for  decision  by  each 
government  on  a  number  of  operational  issues 
in  bilateral  energy  relations,  including  oil 
supplies  and  oil  exchanges,  strategic  petroleum 
storage,  the  utilization  of  surplus  Canadian  re- 
finery capacity,  electricity  exchanges,  pos- 
sibilities for  liquefied  and  synthetic  natural  gas 
exports  to  the  U.S.,  and  other  energy-related 
tasks  as  may  be  appropriate. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister  will  desig- 
nate promptly  senior  officials  from  their  re- 
spective governments  to  serve  on  this  consulta- 
tive mechanism. 


MTN 

The  Prime  Minister  and  the  President  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  over  progress  achieved 
between  them  in  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negoti- 
ations. They  agreed  that  timely  completion  of  a 
balanced  MTN  agreement  involving  all  the 
participants  would  make  a  notable  contribution 
to  reducing  inflation  and  improving  the  pros- 
pects for  sustained  and  balanced  growth  in  the 
world  economy. 

SALT 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  dis- 
cussed prospects  for  the  conclusion  of  a  SALT 
II  treaty  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  agreed  thai 
such  a  treaty  would  be  a  significant  step  for- 
ward in  the  important  task  of  restraining  the 
nuclear  arms  race  and  of  developing  a  more 
stable  basis  for  maintaining  world  peace  and 
security.  The  President  acknowledged  the 
Prime  Minister's  contribution  to  the  nuclear 
arms  control  debate  and  expressed  his  appreci- 
ation for  Canada's  support  for  the  U.S.  pursuit 
of  SALT  II  negotiations.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  12,  1979.  Their  ex- 
change of  remarks  made  on  the  South  Lawn  of 
the  White  House  upon  the  Prime  Minister's  de- 
parture is  printed  in  the  same  Weekly  Compi- 
lation on  p.  379. 


7.^.35%  (Canada),  26.65%  (U.S.)  for 
scallops;  17%  (Canada).  83%  (U.S.) 
for  cod;  21%  (Canada).  79%  (U.S.)  for 
haddock;  and.  after  6  years.  33.33% 
(Canada).  66.66%  (U.S.)  for  herring. 
There  are  also  provisions  for  allocating 
to  U.S.  and  Canadian  fishermen  shares 
of  cod,  haddock,  pollock,  and  certain 
other  stocks  off  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  In  addition,  for  the  first  10 
years  of  the  agreement,  U.S.  fishermen 
will  be  permitted  to  fish  for  agreed  en- 
titlement shares  of  the  total  allowable 
catch  of  redfish  off  Nova  Scotia,  and 
Canadian  fishermen  will  be  granted  re- 
ciprocal privileges  to  catch  loligo  squid 
off  the  United  States. 

The  fisheries  agreement  will  be  per- 
manent, but  the  shares  will  be  subject 
to  review  every  10  years,  at  which  time 
either  side  may  request  changes  in  the 
shares  set  out  in  the  agreement  in  light 
of  the  boundary  delimitation  and  other 
relevant  factors.  Should  the  two  parties 
not  be  able  to  agree  on  changes,  the 
binding  dispute  settlement  machinery 
can  be  invoked,  but  the  agreement 
protects  the  interests  of  both  parties  by 
limiting  the  extent  of  the  changes 
which  can  be  made  under  this  proce- 
dure. 

With  regard  to  the  resolution  of  the 
boundary  delimitation  in  the  Gulf  of 
Maine  area,  the  two  governments  have 
agreed  to  submit  this  issue  to  binding 
third-party  settlement.  While  basic 
principles  concerning  this  submission 
have  been  agreed  upon,  some  ques- 
tions, such  as  the  forum  and  proceilures 
to  be  used,  remain  to  be  settled  in  de- 
tail. The  two  governments  expect  to  re- 
solve these  issues  promptly  so  that  the 
two  treaties  can  be  concluded  at  an 
early  date. 

If,  for  any  reason,  the  boundary 
issue  is  not  submitted  within  2  years 
after  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
fisheries  treaty  to  a  binding  third-party 
dispute  settlement  procedure  consti- 
tuted in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  boundary  delimitation  treaty,  either 
party  may  terminate  the  fisheries  treaty 
upon  6  months"  notice  to  the  other 
party. 

Mr.  Vance  and  Mr.  Jamieson  wel- 
comed these  agreements  on  Atlantic 
coast  issues  as  a  positive  development 
which  would  strengthen  the  close  and 
harmonious  relationship  between  the 
two  countries.  They  expressed  the  hope 
that  these  agreements  would  provide 
momentum  for  the  continuation  of 
negotiations  directed  toward  the  res- 
olution of  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  coast 
issues  in  an  equally  amicable  fash- 
ion. D 


'  Press  release  37. 


June  1979 


11 


THE  PRESIDE]\T:        SALT  11— 

The  Path  of  Security  atul  Peace 


Address  hefore  the  American  News- 
paper Publishers  Association  in  New 
York  City  on  April  25,  1979. ' 

I  want,  first  of  all,  to  commend  and 
endorse  the  theme  of  this  convention: 
the  defense  of  the  first  amendment  of 
our  Constitution  and  the  freedom  of  the 
press.  Liberty  of  expression  is  our  most 
important  civil  right,  and  freedom  of 
the  press  is  its  most  important  bulwark. 
We  can  never  afford  to  grow  compla- 
cent about  the  first  amendment.  On  the 
contrary,  you  and  I  and  others  must 
actively  protect  it  always. 

The  American  press  has  grown 
enormously  since  the  nation's  early 
days — not  only  in  its  size  and  breadth 
but  in  its  concepts  of  its  own  duties  and 
its  own  responsibilities.  The  highest  of 
these  duties  is  to  inform  the  public  on 
the  important  issues  of  the  day.  And  no 
issue  is  more  important  than  the  one  I 
want  to  discuss  with  you  today  in  a  sol- 
emn and  somber  and  sincere  way — the 
control  of  nuclear  arms. 

Each  generation  of  Americans  faces 
a  choice  that  defines  our  national 
character,  a  choice  that  is  also  impor- 
tant for  what  it  says  about  our  own  na- 
tion's outlook  toward  the  world.  In  the 
coming  months,  we  will  almost  cer- 
tainly be  faced  with  such  a  choice: 
whether  to  accept  or  to  reject  a  new 
strategic  arms  limitation  treaty.  The 
decision  we  make  will  profoundly  af- 
fect our  lives — and  the  lives  of  people 
all  over  the  world — for  years  to  come. 

We  face  this  choice  from  a  position 
of  strength — as  the  strongest  nation  on 
Earth — economically,  militarily,  and 
politically. 

Our  alliances  are  firm  and  reliable. 
Our  military  forces  are  strong  and 
ready.  Our  economic  power  is  un- 
matched. Along  with  other  industrial 
democracies  which  are  our  friends,  we 
lead  the  way  in  technological  innova- 
tion. Our  combined  economies  are 
more  than  three  times  as  productive  as 
those  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  all  its  al- 
lies. Our  political  institutions  are  based 
on  human  freedom.  Our  open  system 
encourages  individual  initiative  and 
creativity  —  and  that,  in  turn, 
strengthens  our  entire  society.  Our  val- 
ues and  our  democratic  way  of  life 
have  a  magnetic  appeal  for  people  all 
over  the  world  which  a  materialistic 
and  a  totalitarian  philosophy  can  never 
hope  to  challenge  or  to  rival. 


For  all  these  reasons,  we  have  a 
capacity  for  leadership  in  the  world 
that  surpasses  that  of  any  other  nation. 

That  leadership  imposes  many  re- 
sponsibilities on  us,  on  me  as  Presi- 
dent, and  on  you,  other  leaders  who 
shape  opinion  and  the  character  of  our 
country.  But  our  noblest  duty  is  to  use 
our  strength  to  serve  our  highest  inter- 
est: the  building  of  a  secure,  stable, 
and  a  peaceful  world.  We  perform  that 
duty  in  the  spirit  proclaimed  by  John  F. 
Kennedy  in  1963,  the  year  he  died: 
"Confident  and  unafraid."  he  said, 
"we  labor  on — not  toward  a  strategy  of 
annihilation  but  toward  a  strategy  of 
peace." 

In  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  possibility  of  mutual  an- 
nihilation makes  a  strategy  of  peace  the 
only  rational  choice  for  both  sides.  Be- 
cause our  values  are  so  different,  it  is 
clear  that  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  in  compe- 
tition as  far  ahead  as  we  can  imagine  or 
see. 

Yet  we  have  a  common  interest  in 
survival,  and  we  share  a  common  rec- 
ognition that  our  survival  depends,  in  a 
real   sense,   on  each  other.   The   very 


Why  We  Need  a  SALT  Treaty 

We  need  it  because  it  will  contribute 
to  a  more  peaceful  world — and  to  our 
own  national  security. 

Today,  we  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
with  sharply  different  world  outlooks 
and  interests,  both  have  the  ominous 
destructive  power  literally  to  destroy 
each  other  as  a  functioning  society, 
killing  tens  of  millions  of  people  in  the 
process.  And  common  sense  tells  us — 
as  it  tells  the  Soviet  Union — that  we 
must  work  to  make  our  competition 
less  dangerous,  less  burdensome,  and 
less  likely  to  bring  the  ultimate  horror 
of  nuclear  war.  Indeed,  the  entire 
world  has  a  vital  interest  in  whether  or 
not  we  control  the  strategic  arms  race. 

We  have  consulted  closely  with  our 
allies,  who  count  on  us  not  only  to 
maintain  strong  military  forces  to  offset 
Soviet  military  power  but  also,  and 
equally  important,  to  manage  success- 
fully a  stable  East-West  relationship. 
SALT  is  at  the  heart  of  both  these  cru- 
cial efforts.  That  is  why  the  leaders  of 
France,  Great  Britain,  Germany, 
Canada,  and  other  nations  have  voiced 
their  full  support  for  the  emerging 
treaty. 


We  need  \a  SALT  treaty]  because  it  will  contribute  to  a  more 
peaceful  world — and  to  our  own  national  security. 


competition  between  us  makes  it  im- 
perative that  we  bring  under  control  its 
most  dangerous  aspect — the  nuclear 
arms  race.  That  is  why  the  Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks  (SALT)  are  so 
very  important.  This  effort  by  two 
great  nations  to  limit  vital  security 
forces  is  unique  in  human  history. 
None  have  ever  done  this  before. 

As  Congress  and  the  American 
people  consider  the  SALT  treaty  which 
is  now  nearly  complete,  the  debate  will 
center  around  four  basic  questions: 
Why  do  we  need  SALT?  How  is  the 
treaty  related  to  our  overall  defense 
strategy?  Can  Soviet  compliance  be 
verified?  How  does  the  treaty  relate  to 
Soviet  activities  which  challenge  us 
and  challenge  our  interests? 

Let  me  address  each  question  in  turn. 
First,  why  do  we  need  a  strategic  arms 
limitation  treaty? 


Some  nations  which  have  so  far  held 
back  from  building  their  own  nuclear 
weapons — and  at  least  a  dozen  other 
nations  on  Earth  now  have  that 
capability — will  be  strongly  influenced 
in  their  decision  by  whether  the  two 
nuclear  superpowers  will  restrain  our 
weapons.  Rejection  of  the  new 
strategic  arms  limitation  treaty  would 
seriously  undermine  the  effort  to  con- 
trol proliferation  of  these  deadly 
weapons.  And  nothing,  nothing,  would 
more  surely  damage  our  other  critical 
efforts  in  arms  control — from  a  ban  on 
all  nuclear  testing  to  the  prevention  of 
dangerous  satellite  warfare  in  space; 
from  equalizing  NATO  and  Warsaw 
Pact  forces  to  restraining  the  spread  of 
sophisticated  conventional  weapons  on 
Earth. 

Every  President  since  the  dawn  of 
the  nuclear  age  has  pursued  the  effort 


12 

to  bring  nuclear  arms  under  control. 
And  this  must  he  a  continuing  process. 

President  Kennedy,  building  on  the 
efforts  of  Presidents  Truman  and 
Eisenhower,  signed  the  first  agreement 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  1963  to  stop 
the  poisonous  testing  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives in  the  atmosphere. 

Five  years  later,  under  President 
Johnson,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  joined  other  nations 
throughout  the  world  in  signing  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty,  an  important 
step  in  preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
explosives  to  other  nations. 

In  1972,  under  President  Nixon,  the 
SALT  I  agreement  placed  the  first 
agreed  limit  on  the  number  of  offensive 
weapons,  and  the  Antiballistic  Missile 
Treaty,  the  ABM  Treaty,  made  an  en- 
during contribution  to  our  own  secu- 
rity. 

President  Ford  continued  the  negoti- 
ations at  Helsinki  and  at  Vladivostok. 
Each  negotiation  builds  on  the  accom- 
plishments of  the  last.  Each  agreement 
provides  a  foundation  for  further 
progress  toward  a  more  stable  nuclear 
relationship. 

Three  Presidents  have  now  spent 
more  than  8  years  negotiating  the  next 
step  in  this  process — SALT  IL  We 
have  all  negotiated  carefully  and  delib- 
erately. Every  step  of  the  way.  we  have 
worked  with  our  military  leaders  and 
other  experts,  and  we  have  sought  the 
advice  and  counsel  of  the  Members  of 
Congress. 

An  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
American  people  recognize  the  need 
for  SALT  11.  Our  people  want,  and  our 
people  expect,  continued  step-by-step 
progress  toward  bringing  nuclear 
weapons  under  control. 

Americans  will  support  a  reasoned 
increase  in  our  defense  effort,  but  we 
do  not  want  a  wholly  unnecessary  re- 
turn to  the  cold  war  and  an  all-out  arms 
race  with  its  vastly  greater  risks  and 
costs.  Through  strength,  we  want 
world  peace. 

Let  me  turn  to  the  second  question. 
How  is  SALT  11  related  to  our  overall 
defense  strategy? 


SALT  II  and  Defense  Strategy 

The  strategic  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  today  are 
essentially  equivalent.  They  have 
larger  and  more  numerous  land-based 
missiles.  We  have  a  larger  number  of 
warheads  and,  as  you  know,  significant 
technological  and  geographical  advan- 
tages. 

Each  side  has  the  will  and  the  means 
to  prevent  the  other  from  achieving 
superiority.  Neither  side  is  in  a  position 


to  exploit  its  nuclear  weapons  for 
political  purposes  nor  to  use  strategic 
weapons  without  facing  almost  certain 
suicide. 

What  causes  us  concern  is  not  the 
current  balance  but  the  momentum  of 
the  Soviet  strategic  buildup.  Over  the 
past  decade,  the  Soviets  have  steadily 
increased  their  real  defense  spending, 
year-by-year,  while  our  own  defense 
spending  over  that  decade  has  had  a  net 
decrease. 

In  areas  not  limited  by  SALT  I,  they 
have  launched  ambitious  programs  to 
strengthen  their  strategic  forces.  At 
some  future  point,  the  Soviet  Union 
could  achieve  a  strategic  advantage — 
unless  we  alter  these  trends.  That  is 
exactly  what  1  want  to  do — with  the 
support  of  the  American  people  and  the 
bipartisan  support  of  Congress. 

We  must  move  on  two  fronts  at  the 
same  time. 


The  .  .  .  agreement  will  slow 
the  growth  of  Soviet  arms  and 
limit  the  strategic  competi- 
tion .... 


First,  within  mutually  accepted  lim- 
its, we  must  modernize  our  own 
strategic  forces.  Along  with  the 
strengthening  of  NATO,  that  is  a  cen- 
tral purpose  of  the  increased  Defense 
budget  that  I  have  submitted  to 
Congress — improvements  which  are 
necessary  even  in  a  time  of  fiscal  re- 
straint. 

And  second,  we  must  place  more 
stringent  limits  on  the  arms  race  than 
are  presently  imposed  by  SALT  I.  That 
is  the  purpose  of  the  SALT  11  treaty. 

The  Defense  budget  I  have  submitted 
will  insure  that  our  nuclear  force  con- 
tinues to  be  essentially  equivalent  to 
that  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  year  we  have  begun  to  equip 
our  submarines  with  new,  more  pow- 
erful and  longer  range  Trident  I  mis- 
siles. Next  year,  the  first  of  our  new 
even  more  secure  Trident  submarines 
will  be  going  to  sea,  and  we  are  work- 
ing on  a  more  powerful  and  accurate 
Trident  II  missile  for  these  submarines. 

Our  cruise  missile  program  will 
greatly  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  our 
long-range  bomber  force.  These  mis- 
siles will  be  able  to  penetrate  any  air 
defense  system  which  the  Soviet  Union 
could  build  in  the  foreseeable  future. 

We  are  substantially  improving  the 
accuracy  and  the  power  of  our  land- 
based  Minuteman  missiles.  But  in  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

coming  decade,  missiles  of  this  type 
based  in  fixed  silos  will  become  in- 
creasingly vulnerable  to  surprise  at- 
tack. The  Soviets  have  three-quarters 
of  their  warheads  in  such  fixed-based 
missiles,  compared  to  only  one-quarter 
of  ours.  Nevertheless,  this  is  a  very 
serious  problem,  and  we  must  deal  with 
it  effectively  and  sensibly. 

The  Defense  Department  now  has 
under  consideration  a  number  of  op- 
tions for  responding  to  this  problem, 
including  making  some  of  our  own  in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missiles 
(ICBM's)  mobile.  I  might  add — and 
this  is  very  important — that  the  options 
which  we  are  evaluating  would  be  far 
more  costly,  and  we  would  have  far 
less  confidence  of  their  effectiveness, 
in  the  absence  of  SALT  II  limits.  For 
without  these  limits  on  the  number  of 
Soviet  warheads,  the  Soviet  Union 
could  counter  any  effort  we  made  sim- 
ply by  greatly  increasing  the  number  of 
warheads  on  their  missiles. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  SALT  II 
agreement  preserves  adequate  flexibil- 
ity for  the  United  States  in  this  impor- 
tant area. 

Our  strategic  forces  must  be  able  to 
survive  any  attack  and  to  counterattack 
military  and  civilian  targets  in  the  ag- 
gressor nation.  And  the  aggressor  na- 
tion must  know  that  we  have  the  ability 
and  the  will  to  exercise  this  option  if 
they  should  attack  us.  We  have  had  this 
capacity — which  isthe  essence  of 
deterrence — in  the  past;  we  have  it 
today;  and  SALT  11,  plus  the  defense 
programs  that  I  have  described,  will  in- 
sure that  we  have  it  for  the  future. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  will  slow 
the  growth  of  Soviet  arms  and  limit  the 
strategic  competition,  and  by  helping 
to  define  future  threats  that  we  might 
face,  SALT  II  will  make  our  defense 
planning  much  more  effective. 

Under  the  agreement,  the  two  sides 
will  be  limited  to  equal  numbers  of 
strategic  launchers  for  the  first  time, 
ending  the  substantial  Soviet  numerical 
advantage  which  was  permitted  in  the 
currently  effective  SALT  I  treaty. 

To  reach  these  new  and  lower  levels, 
the  Soviets  will  have  to  reduce  their 
overall  number  of  strategic  delivery 
systems  by  10%  —  more  than  250 
Soviet  missile  launchers  or  bombers 
will  have  to  be  dismantled.  Naturally, 
the  Soviets  will  choose  to  phase  out 
their  older  systems,  but  these  systems 
are  still  formidable. 

The  missiles,  for  instance,  to  be  torn 
down  are  comparable  in  age  and 
payload  to  our  Minuteman  II  missiles 
and  to  our  Polaris  missiles  presently 
deployed.  Under  the  agreement,  they 
will  not  be  permitted  to  replace  these 
dismantled  systems  with  modern  ones. 


luiic  1979 


13 


Olii"  own  operational  forces  have  been 
kept  somewhat  below  the  permitted 
ceiling.  Thus,  under  the  agreement,  we 
could  increase  our  force  level,  if  neces- 
sary. 

SALT  II  will  also  impose  the  first 
limited  but  important  restraints  on  the 
ijce  to  build  new  systems  and  to  im- 
prove existing  ones — the  so-called 
qualitative  arms  race. 

In  short,  SALT  II  places  serious 
lunits  on  what  the  Soviets  might  do  in 
the  absence  of  such  an  agreement.  For 
example,  without  SALT  II,  the  Soviet 
I'nion  could  build  up  to  some  3,000 
strategic  systems  by  1985.  With  SALT 
II.  we  will  both  be  limited  to  2,250 
such  weapons. 

This  new  arms  control  agreement 
uill,  obviously,  serve  our  national 
luierest.  It  will  reduce  the  dangerous 
lc\els  of  strategic  arms  and  restrain  the 
development  of  future  weapons.  It  will 
help  to  maintain  our  relative  strength 
compared  to  the  Soviets.  It  will  avert  a 
costly,  risky,  and  pointless  buildup  of 
jmissile  launchers  and  bombers — at  the 
end  of  which  both  sides  would  be  even 
less  secure. 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  third  of  the 
four  questions.  How  can  we  know 
vvhen  the  Soviets  are  living  up  to  their 
obligations  under  this  SALT  agree- 
ment? 

Verification 

No  objective,  no  objective,  has 
commanded  more  energy  and  attention 
in  our  negotiations.  We  have  insisted 
that  the  SALT  II  agreement  be  made 
verifiable.  We  are  confident  that  no 
significant  violation  of  the  treaty  could 
take  place  without  the  United  States 
detecting  it. 

Our  confidence  in  the  verifiability  of 
the  agreement  derives  from  the  size  and 
the  nature  of  activities  we  must  monitor 
and  the  many  effective  and  sophisti- 
cated intelligence  collection  systems 
which  we  in  America  possess. 

For  example,  nuclear  submarines 
take  several  years  to  construct  and  as- 
semble. Missile  silos  and  their  suppor- 
tive equipment  are  quite  large  and  visi- 
ble. Intercontinental  bombers  are  built 
at  a  few  plants,  and  they  need  major 
airfields.  Our  photoreconnaissance 
satellites  survey  the  entire  Soviet 
Union  on  a  regular  basis,  and  they  give 
us  high  confidence  that  we  will  be  able 
to  count  accurately  the  numbers  of  all 
these  systems. 

But  our  independent  verification 
capabilities  are  not  limits  only  to  ob- 
serving these  large-scale  activities.  We 
can  determine  not  only  how  many  sys- 
tems there  are  but  what  they  can  do. 
Our  photographic  satellites  and  other 


systems  enable  us  to  follow  technolog- 
ical developments  in  Soviet  strategic 
forces  with  great  accuracy.  There  is  no 
question  that  any  cheating  which  might 
affect  our  national  security  would  be 
discovered  in  time  for  us  to  respond 
fully. 

For  many  years  we  have  monitored 
Soviet  strategic  forces  and  Soviet  com- 
pliance with  the  SALT  agreements  with 
a  high  degree  of  confidence.  The  over- 
all capability  remains.  It  was  certainly 
not  lost  with  our  observation  stations  in 


SALT  II  and  Overall 
Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R. 

Because  SALT  II  will  make  the 
world  safer  and  our  own  nation  more 
secure,  it  is  in  our  national  interest  to 
control  nuclear  weapons  even  as  we 
compete  with  the  Soviets  elsewhere  in 
the  world.  A  SALT  II  agreement  in  no 
way  limits  our  ability  to  promote  our 
interests  or  to  answer  Soviet  threats  to 
those  interests. 

We  will  continue  to  support  the  in- 


Our  confidence  in  the  verifiability  of  the  agreement  derives  fi-om  the 
size  and  the  nature  of  activities  we  must  monitor  and  the  many  effective 
and  sophisticated  intelligence  collection  systems  which  we  .  .  .  pos- 
sess. 


Iran,  which  was  only  one  of  many  in- 
telligence sources  that  we  use  to  follow 
Soviet  strategic  activities.  We  are  con- 
cerned with  that  loss,  but  we  must  keep 
it  in  perspective. 

This  monitoring  capability  relates 
principally  to  the  portion  of  the  new 
agreement  dealing  with  the  moderniza- 
tion limits  on  ICBM's  and  to  only  a 
portion  of  such  modernization  re- 
straints. 

The  sensitive  intelligence  techniques 
obviously  cannot  be  disclosed  in  pub- 
lic, but  the  bottom  line  is  that  if  there 
is  an  effort  to  cheat  on  the  SALT 
agreement — including  the  limits  on 
modernizing  ICBM's — we  will  detect 
it.  and  we  will  do  so  in  time  fully  to 
protect  our  security. 

We  must  also  keep  in  mind  that  quite 
apart  from  SALT  limits,  our  security  is 
affected  by  the  extent  of  our  informa- 
tion about  Soviet  strategic  forces.  With 
this  SALT  II  treaty,  that  vital  informa- 
tion will  be  much  more  accessible  to 
us. 

The  agreement  specifically  forbids, 
for  the  first  time,  interference  with  the 
systems  used  for  monitoring  com- 
pliance and  prohibits  any  deliberate 
concealment  that  would  impede  verifi- 
cation. Any  concealment  activity 
would  itself  be  detectable,  and  a  viola- 
tion of  this  part  of  the  agreement  would 
be  so  serious  as  to  give  us  grounds  to 
cancel  the  treaty  itself. 

As  I  have  said  many  times,  the 
stakes  are  too  high  to  rely  on  trust,  or 
even  on  the  Soviets  rational  inclination 
to  act  in  their  own  best  interest.  The 
treaty  must — and  the  treaty  will — be 
verifiable  from  the  first  day  it  is 
signed. 

And,  finally,  how  does  SALT  II  fit 
into  the  context  of  our  overall  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union? 


dependence  of  Third  World  nations 
which  struggle  to  stay  free.  We  will 
continue  to  promote  the  peaceful  res- 
olution of  local  and  regional  disputes 
and  to  oppose  efforts  by  any  others  to 
inflame  these  disputes  with  outside 
force.  And  we  will  continue  to  work 
for  human  rights. 

It  is  a  delusion  to  believe  that  rejec- 
tion of  a  SALT  treaty  would  somehow 
induce  the  Soviet  Union  to  exercise 
new  restraints  in  troubled  areas. 

The  actual  effect  of  rejecting  such  a 
treaty  might  be  precisely  the  opposite. 
The  most  intransigent  and  hostile  ele- 
ments of  a  Soviet  political  power 
structure  would  certainly  be  encour- 
aged and  strengthened  by  our  rejection 
of  a  SALT  agreement.  The  Soviets 
might  very  well  feel  that  they  then  have 
little  to  lose  by  creating  new  interna- 
tional tensions. 

A  rejection  of  SALT  II  would  have 
significance  far  beyond  the  fate  of  a 
single  treaty.  It  would  mean  a  radical 
turning  away  from  America's  longtime 
policy  of  seeking  world  peace. 

We  would  no  longer  be  identified  as 
the  peace  loving  nation.  It  would  turn 
us  away  from  the  control  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  from  the  easing  of  ten- 
sions between  Americans  and  the 
Soviet  people  under  the  system  of  in- 
ternational law  based  on  mutual  inter- 
ests. 

The  rejection  of  SALT  II  would  re- 
sult in  a  more  perilous  world.  As  I  said 
at  Georgia  Tech  on  February  20: 

Each  crisis,  eacli  confrontation,  each  point  of 
friction — as  serious  as  it  may  be  in  its  own 
right — will  take  on  an  added  measure  of  sig- 
nificance and  an  added  dimension  of  danger  for 
it  would  occur  in  an  atmosphere  of  unbridled 
strategic  competition  and  deteriorating  strategic 
stability.  It  is  precisely  because  we  have  fun- 
damental differences  with  the  Soviet  Union  that 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


we  are  determined  to  bring  this  most  dangerous 
dimension  of  our  military  competition  under 
control. 

For  these  reasons,  we  will  not  try  to 
impose  binding  linkage  between  Soviet 
behavior  and  SALT,  and  we  will  not 
accept  any  Soviet  attempts  to  link 
SALT  with  aspects  of  our  own  foreign 
policy  of  which  they  may  disapprove. 

Again,  SALT  II  is  not  a  favor  we  are 
doing  for  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  an 
agreement  carefully  negotiated  in  the 
national  security  interests  of  the  United 
States  of  America. 

I  put  these  issues  to  you  today  be- 
cause they  need  discussion  and  debate, 
and  because  the  voices  of  the  American 
people  must  be  heard. 

In  the  months  ahead,  we  will  do  all 
in  our  power  to  e.xplain  the  treaty 
clearly  and  fully  to  the  American 
people.  I  know  that  Members  of  Con- 
gress from  both  parties  will  join  in  this 
effort  to  insure  an  informed  public  de- 
bate. And  you,  more  than  any  other 
group  I  can  imagine  in  the  United 
States,  share  this  responsibility  with 
me  and  with  the  Congress. 

During  this  debate,  it  is  important 
that  we  exercise  care.  We  will  be 
sharing  with  the  Congress  some  of  our 
most  sensitive  defense  and  intelligence 
secrets.  And  the  leaders  in  Congress 
must  insure  that  these  secrets  will  be 
guarded  so  that  the  debate  itself  will 
not  undermine  our  own  security. 

As  the  national  discussion  takes 
place,  let  us  be  clear  about  what  the  is- 
sues are  and  are  not. 

Americans  are  committed  to  main- 
taining a  strong  defense.  That  is  not  the 
issue. 

We  will  continue  to  compete — and 
compete  effectively — with  the  Soviet 
Union.  That  is  not  the  issue. 

The  issue  is  whether  we  will  move 
ahead  with  strategic  arms  control  or  re- 
sume a  relentless  nuclear  weapons 
competition.  That  is  the  choice  we 
face — between  an  imperfect  world  with 
a  SALT  agreement  or  an  imperfect  and 
more  dangerous  world  without  a  SALT 
agreement. 

With  SALT  II,  we  will  have: 

•  The  foundation  for  further  controls 
on  nuclear  and  conventional  arms; 

•  Far  greater  certainty  in  our  defense 
planning  and  in  the  knowledge  of  the 
threats  that  we  might  face; 

•  Flexibility  to  meet  our  own  de- 
fense needs; 

•  Our  own  self-respect  and  the 
earned  respect  of  the  world  for  a 
United  States  demonstrably  committed 
to  the  works  of  peace;  and 


iVetrs  Conference  of 
April  30  (Excerpts) 


Q.  What  are  the  prospects  right 
now  for  an  early  extension  of  most- 
favored-nation  trading  status  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  China? 

A.  I  personally  favor  the  extension 
of  the  most-favored-nation  treatment  to 
both  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  if  it 
can  be  done  in  compliance  with  exist- 
ing law.  I  think  it's  good  for  us,  for  our 
country,  to  be  able  to  export  more 
goods,  to  provide  more  jobs  for  our 
own  people,  and  to  improve  the  re- 
lationships between  ourselves  and 
foreign  countries,  including  the  Soviet 
Union  and  China,  brought  about  by  in- 
creased economic  interchange  or  trade. 

So  when  the  time  comes  that  I  think 
these  requirements  can  be  met,  I  would 
personally  favor  the  extension  of 
most-favored-nation  to  these  two 
countries. 

Q.  Might  that  time  come  soon? 

A.  I  hope  so,  yes. 

Q.  Can  you  provide  any  more  en- 
lightenment on  our  ability  to  verify 
SALT  and  are  those  within  the  Ad- 
ministration who  say  this  ability  is, 


say,  from  1  to  4  years  away;  are  they 
wrong? 

A.  The  Secretary  of  Defense  made  a 
statement  concerning  1  year.  That  was 
applying  to  specifically  how  rapidly  we 
could  overcome  the  setback  resulting 
from  the  loss  of  our  Iranian  monitoring 
stations.  But  in  the  same  brief  state- 
ment, he  replied  to  a  news  questiori, 
that  as  soon  as  the  SALT  treaty  is  ef- 
fective, when  it's  signed  and  ratified, 
we  would  be  able  to  verify  the  treaty 
adequately. 

There's  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
this  is  the  case.  I  would  not  sign  nor 
present  to  the  Congress  or  to  the 
American  people  any  treaty  which  in 
my  opinion  could  not  be  adequately 
verified  from  the  first  day  it's  effec- 
tive. Many  of  the  concerns  that  we 
have  relate  to  very  complicated  ques- 
tions. For  instance,  we  can't  guarantee 
that  every  time  a  test  missile  is 
launched  by  the  Soviet  Union  that 
every  aspect  of  the  flight  can  be  com- 
pletely comprehended  by  us. 

There  are  limits  on  what  we  can  do. 
But  as  the  Secretary  of  Defense  has 
testified  publicly,  in  order  for  the 
Soviets  to  develop  any  kind  of  signifi- 


•  Reductions  in  Soviet  strategic 
forces. 

Without  SALT,  the  Soviets  will  be 
unconstrained  and  capable  of — and 
probably  committed  to — an  enormous 
further  buildup. 

Without  SALT,  there  would  have  to 
be  a  much  sharper  rise  in  our  own  de- 
fense spending,  at  the  expense  of  other 
necessary  programs  for  our  people. 

Without  SALT,  we  would  end  up 
with  thousands  more  strategic  nuclear 
warheads  on  both  sides,  with  far 
greater  costs — and  far  less  security — 
for  our  citizens. 

Without  SALT,  we  would  see  im- 
proved relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
replaced  by  heightened  tensions. 

Without  SALT,  the  long  slow  proc- 
ess of  arms  control — so  central  to 
building  a  safer  world — would  be  dealt 
a  crippling,  and  perhaps  a  fatal,  blow. 

Without  SALT,  the  world  would  be 
forced  to  conclude  that  America  had 
chosen  confrontation  rather  than  coop- 
eration and  peace.  This  is  an  inescapa- 
ble choice  we  face.  For  the  fact  is  that 


the  alternative  to  this  treaty  is  not  some 
perfect  agreement  drafted  unilaterally 
by  the  United  States  in  which  we  gain 
everything  and  the  Soviets  gain  noth- 
ing. The  alternative  now,  and  in  the 
foreseeable  future,  is  no  agreement  at 
all. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  United  States 
has  a  moral  and  a  political  will  to  con- 
trol the  relentless  technology  which 
could  constantly  devise  new  and  more 
destructive  weapons  to  kill  human  be- 
ings. We  need  not  drift  into  a  dark 
nightmare  of  unrestrained  arms  compe- 
tition. We  Americans  have  the  wisdom 
to  know  that  our  security  depends  on 
more  than  just  maintaining  our  unsur- 
passed defense  forces.  Our  security  and 
that  of  our  allies  also  depend  on  the 
strength  of  ideas  and  ideals  and  on 
arms  control  measures  that  can 
stabilize  and  finally  reverse  a  danger- 
ous and  a  wasteful  arms  race  which 
neither  side  can  win.  This  is  the  path  of 
wisdom.  This  is  the  path  of  peace.     D 

'Text  from  Weekly  compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  30,  1979. 


June  1979 


15 


cant  new  missile,  they  would  have  to 
have  like  20-50  test  launchings.  And 
during  that  process,  it  is  a  very  high 
likelihood  that  we  ourselves  would  be 
able  to  detect  any  violation  of  the 
SALT  treaty. 

There's  another  factor  that  must  be 
considered.  If  the  only  purpose  of  the 

,  Soviet  Union  in  the  long,  tedious 
negotiations  of  a  SALT  treaty  is  to 
have  a  document  that  they  can  violate 
and  that's  their  only  purpose  in  exist- 
ence, is  to  violate  the  SALT  treaty,  it 
would  make  our  problem  much  worse. 
But  there  is  an  element  of  rationality 
and  stability  because  the  Soviets  know 
that  if  we  ever  detect  any  violation  of 
the  SALT  agreement,  that  that  would 
be  a  basis  on  which  to  reject  the  treaty 
in  its  entirety;  there  would  be  a  possi- 

■  ble  termination  of  the  good  relation- 
ships between  our  country  and  the 
Siiviet  Union  on  which  detente  is 
based,  and  it  might  very  well  escalate 
into  a  nuclear  confrontation. 

So  the  consequences  would  be  very 
severe,  and  that  is  an  additional  con- 
straint imposed  upon  the  Soviet  Union 
and  on  us  that  strengthens  my  state- 
ment that  we  can  verify.  But  absent 
that  very  important  factor,  we  can  still 
verify  to  our  complete  satisfaction  the 
SALT  agreement  through  various 
means  that  we  have  available  to  us. 

Q.  You've  been  quoted  by  histo- 
rian James  MacGregor  Burns  as 
saying  that  even  if  the  SALT  treaty  is 
rejected  by  the  Senate,  that  you 
would  abide  by  its  terms.  I  would 
like  to  know  how  far  you  would  go  in 
this.  Would  you,  for  instance,  abide 
by  the  limitations  on  the  range  of 
land-  and  sea-based  cruise  missiles, 
and  more  generally,  don't  you  think 
abiding  by  a  treaty  that's  been  re- 
jected by  the  Senate  would  amount  to 
thwarting  the  will  of  the  public? 

A.  I  have  no  inclination  to  minimize 
the  importance  of  the  constitutional 
processes  whereby  treaties  are 
negotiated  by  the  Executive  and 
ratified  or  rejected  by  the  Senate. 

My  belief  is  that  the  treaty  will  be 
sound  enough  when  it's  completely 
scrutinized  by  the  public  and  the  Senate 
that  it  will  be  ratified.  If,  because  of 
some  factor  that  I  cannot  anticipate,  the 
treaty  is  not  ratified,  then  I  would  do 
all  I  could,  monitoring  very  closely 
Soviet  activities  to  comply  with  the 
basic  agreements  reached. 

It  would  certainly  not  be  proper  for 
me  if  the  treaty  were  not  ratified  to 
immediately  launch  our  country  into  a 
massive  nuclear  arms  race.  And  the 
constraints  placed  on  me  and  the  Soviet 
Union,   monitored  very  carefully   by 


each  other,  would  be  a  basis  on  which 
to  constrain  ourselves  and  to  avoid 
such  a  nuclear  confrontation  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  treaty.  But  I  still  believe  that 
we  will  have  the  treaty. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  how  the  list  was 
arrived  at  concerning  which  Soviet 
dissidents  would  be  released  in  ex- 
change for  the  two  Soviet  spies?' 
And  in  view  of  this  exchange,  you're 
now  hopeful  of  gaining  the  release  of 
other  Soviet  religious  and  political 
dissidents  such  as  Mr.  Shcharanskiy? 

A.  We've  not  forgotten  any  human 
rights  activist  in  the  Soviet  Union  who 
is  being  punished  or  imprisoned.  The 
recent  exchange  was  the  result  of  long 
and  tedious  and  detailed  negotiations 
extending,  I  would  say,  at  least  over  a 
6-month  period.  The  final  agreement 
was  approved  personally  by  me  and,  I 
presume,  by  President  Brezhnev.  The 
identity  of  the  human  rights  activists 
who  came  here  from  the  Soviet  Union 
was  one  that  was  the  subject  of  detailed 
negotiation  where  the  Soviets  would 
put  forward  names,  and  we  would  as- 
sess those  names  and  repeatedly  reject 
them  because  we  did  not  think  they 
were  adequate. 

In  my  final  judgment  reached  just  a 
week  or  so  ago,  I  felt  that  the  list  of 
names  was  a  fair  exchange  and,  there- 
fore, approved  them.  And  I  cannot  tell 
you  any  more  detail  than  that  about  the 
negotiations. 

Q.  Have  you  considered  taking 
your  SALT  case  to  the  public  next 
year  to  try  to  get  a  Senate  that  would 
approve  the  treaty? 

A.  No,  I  have  every  intention  to 
conclude  the  SALT  negotiations  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment.  No  one  has 
ever  seriously  considered,  in  my  Ad- 
ministration, to  my  knowledge,  any 
slightest  delay  in  concluding  the  SALT 
treaty  for  political  purposes  or  for  any 
other  purpose.  And  my  understanding 
is  that  if  the  SALT  treaty  can  be  con- 
cluded fairly  early,  that  it  will  be  con- 
sidered as  a  very  top  priority  by  the 
Senate,  and  the  action  by  the  Senate 
will  be  concluded  this  year. 

Q.  On  Capitol  Hill  today,  a 
number  of  Republican  Senators  who 
say  that  they  are  uncommitted  on 
SALT  II  were  critical  of  Admiral 
Turner,  the  Director  of  [the  Central] 
Intelligence  [Agency].  They  claim 
that  he  has  been  making  speeches 
around  the  country  in  support  of  the 
treaty,  and  they  feel  that  he  should 
not  get  involved  in  what  may  become 
a  partisan  issue.  What  is  your  under- 
standing of  Admiral  Turner's  role? 


Is  he  an  advocate  of  SALT  II?  And  if 
so,  is  this  at  your  direction? 

A.  No.  I've  never  asked  him  to  make 
any  such  speech.  I  think,  as  is  the  case 
with  almost  every  major  official  in  the 
Federal  Government — in  the  executive 
branch,  at  least — they  are  called  upon 
to  make  speeches  on  matters  of  great 
moment  and  importance  to  the  people. 

Even  in  the  case  of  the  CIA  Director 
responsible  for  intelligence,  he's  not 
confined  just  to  expressing  an  opinion 
on  collection  techniques,  most  of 
which  are  highly  secret  in  any  case.  I 
don't  know  what  comments  Admiral 
Turner  has  made.  I  happen  to  know 
that  he's  basically  in  favor  of  the  SALT 
treaty. 

Q.  The  Israeli  Cabinet  has  re- 
cently approved  two  new  settlements 
on  the  West  Bank.  In  light  of  the 
enormous  cost  to  the  United  States  of 
implementing  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace  Treaty,  isn't  it  reasonable  to 
expect  the  Israelis  to  cease  from  set- 
tlement policy  which  violates  inter- 
national law,  and  secondly,  why 
should  the  American  people  pay  for 
policies  of  the  Israelis  that  under- 
mine the  peace  process  and  run 
counter  to  American  foreign  policy? 

A.  The  position  of  the  United  States 
historically  has  been  consistent  and  my 
own  position  on  settlements  in  the 
West  Bank-Gaza  area  and  on  the  Golan 
Heights,  and  in  the  Sinai  have — my  po- 
sition has  been  consistent.  The  Israeli 
Government  knows  perfectly  well, 
after  hours  of  discussion  on  this  issue, 
what  my  position  is. 

We  do  consider  the  creation  of  Is- 
raeli settlements  in  these  areas  as  being 
inconsistent  with  international  law, 
and,  as  I've  said  many  times,  they  are 
an  obstacle  to  peace.  Knowing  that,  the 
Israeli  Government  still  on  occasion 
authorizes  new  settlements. 

They  interpret  the  law  differently 
from  myself.  I  hope  that  the  Israeli 
Government  will  severely  restrain  any 
inclination,  either  approved  by  the 
Knesset  or  done  without  legal  sanction, 
in  establishing  new  settlements.  But 
there  is  a  limit  to  what  we  can  do  to 
impose  our  will  on  a  sovereign  nation. 

Q.  The  Administration  position  on 
the  Rhodesian  election  has  been, 
until  now,  that  you  are  assessing  the 
situation.  Can  you  tell  us,  though, 
however,  whether  you  personally  are 
inclined  to  lifting  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia,  recognizing  the  new  gov- 
ernment there  and  if  you  do  do  that, 
what  impact  do  you  think  that  will 
have  on  your  Africa  policy?  Won't  it 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletirv 


THE  SECRETARY:        IfieeUng  the  Chattenges 

of  a  Chuttgiwtg  World 


Address  before  the  American  As- 
sociation of  Community  and  Junior 
Colleges  in  Chicago  on  May  J ,  1979. ' 

From  the  first  days  of  our  nation, 
Americans  have  held  a  staunch  op- 
timism about  the  future.  We  have  been 
a  self-confident  people,  certain  about 
our  ability  to  shape  our  destiny.  And 
we  are  a  people  who  have  not  only 
adapted  well  to  change,  we  have 
thrived  on  it. 

We  are  now  living  in  a  period  of 
history  marked  by  deep  and  rapid 
change.  Tonight,  I  want  to  talk  about 
change  and  how  America  can  use  its 
extraordinary  strength  to  meet  the 
challenges  of  a  changing  world. 

America's  optimism  has  been  jarred 
in  recent  years — by  a  bitter  war,  by 
domestic  divisions  that  tested  our 
democratic  institutions  and  left  many 
of  our  people  skeptical  about  govern- 
ment, by  the  sudden  awareness  that  our 
economic  life  at  home  can  be  shaped 
by  actions  abroad,  and  by  the  realiza- 
tion that  there  are  events  which  affect 
us  but  which  we  can  only  partly  influ- 
ence. 

There  is  much  that  we  can  and  have 
learned  from  these  experiences.  But 
fear  of  the  future  is  not  one  of  them. 

Let  me  share  with  you  frankly  my 
concern  that  the  distorted  proposition 


being  advanced  by  some  that  America 
is  in  a  period  of  decline  in  the  world  is 
not  only  wrong  as  a  matter  of  fact  but 
dangerous  as  a  basis  for  policy. 

For  we  would  imperil  our  future  if 
we  lost  confidence  in  ourselves  and  in 
our  strength  and  retreated  from  ener- 
getic leadership  in  the  world.  And  we 
would  imperil  our  future,  as  well,  if  we 
reacted  in  frustration  and  used  our 
power  to  resist  change  in  the  world  or 
employed  our  military  power  when  it 
would  do  more  harm  than  good. 

The  realization  that  we  are  not  om- 
nipotent should  not  make  us  fear  we 
have  lost  our  power  or  the  will  to  use 
it.  If  we  appreciate  the  extraordinary 
strengths  we  have,  if  we  understand  the 
nature  of  the  changes  taking  place  in 
the  world,  and  if  we  act  effectively  to 
use  our  different  kinds  of  power  to 
shape  different  kinds  of  change,  we 
have  every  reason  to  be  confident  about 
our  future. 


America's  Strengths 

We  must  begin  with  a  clear  under- 
standing of  our  own  strengths  as  a  na- 
tion. 

America's  military  strength  today  is 
formidable.  I  know  of  no  responsible 
military  official  who  would  exchange 


News  Conference  (Cont'd) 


cause  you  severe  troubles  for  what 
you've  been  trying  to  do  on  that  con- 
tinent? 

A.  I  am  constrained  by  the  law  to 
wait  until  after  the  new  government  is 
established  before  I  make  a  decision  on 
whether  or  not  the  recent  elections  have 
been  adequate  in  my  judgment  to  lift 
the  sanctions.  And  we  are  now  going 
through  a  very  careful  process  of  as- 
sessing the  conduct  of  the  elections 
themselves  and  also  the  consequences 
of  the  election. 

I'm  not  going  to  comment  any  fur- 
ther on  it  than  that,  but  I  will  say  that 
we  have  not  varied  our  position  that  the 
government  of  Rhodesia  ought  to  be 
established  through  democratic  princi- 
ples, the  election  should  be  held  with 
all  parties  willing  to  vote  or  run  for  of- 
fice being  permitted  to  do  so,  and  that 
this  should  be  based  on  one-person, 
one-vote  principle. 


We  have  worked  in  consonance  with 
most  other  Western  nations  all  so  far  as 
I  know  and  closely  with  the  British 
who  have  a  legal  responsibility  for 
Rhodesia.  We  have  kept  the  United 
Nations  informed,  and  I  think  that  our 
positon  is  a  proper  one.  But  after  the 
new  government  is  installed  in  office, 
at  that  time  I  will  make  a  judgment 
under  the  Case-Javits  amendment  and 
decide  whether  or  not  I  think  the  elec- 
tions were  enough  progress  toward 
those  principles  that  I've  just  described 
to  warrant  the  lifting  of  sanctions.  I 
cannot  make  that  judgment  at  this 
time.  D 


For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  7,  1979,  p.  747 . 

'On  Apr.  27,  1979,  the  U.S.S.R.  released 
five  Soviet  dissidents  from  prison  (Aleksandr 
Ginzburg,  Eduard  Kuznetsov,  Mark  Dymshits, 
Valentin  Moroz,  and  Georgi  Vins)  and  flew 
them  to  New  York  in  exchange  for  two  con- 
victed Soviet  spies  in  the  United  States  (Valdik 
Enger  and  Rudolph  Chernyayev). 


our  strategic  position  for  that  of  any 
other  nation. 

•  We  have  friendly  neighbors  on  our 
borders. 

•  We  have  strong  and  reliable  secu- 
rity relationships.  Together,  these  al- 
lies more  than  double  our  overall  mili- 
tary strength. 

•  We  have  easy  access  to  the  sea, 
which  enables  us  to  have  diversified 
strategic  forces  and  the  ready  capacity 
to  project  our  power. 

Our  economy,  and  those  of  our  al- 
lies, are  more  than  three  times  as  pro- 
ductive as  those  of  the  Soviets  and  their 
allies. 

The  industrial  democracies  continue 
to  lead  the  way  in  technological  inno- 
vation and  in  harnessing  that  technol- 
ogy to  serve  mankind. 

And  the  way  of  life  of  our  people 
and  what  we  stand  for  as  a  nation  con- 
tinue to  have  magnetic  appeal  around 
the  world. 

Because  we  and  our  allies  are  the 
engines  of  creative  change  in  almost 
every  field,  because  of  the  vitality  of 
our  political  institutions  and  the 
strength  of  our  military  forces,  we  have  | 
a  capacity  for  leadership — and  an  abil-  I 
ity  to  thrive  in  a  world  of  change — that 
is  unsurpassed. 

The  issue  is  not  whether  we  are 
strong.  We  are.  The  challenge  is  to  use 
these  unquestioned  strengths  appro- 
priately and  effectively  to  advance  our 
interests  in  a  world  undergoing  differ- 
ent kinds  of  change. 

What  are  these  changes,  and  how 
can  we  use  our  strength  effectively? 


Stable  Strategic  Equivalence 

The  first  element  of  change  is  the 
evolution  from  an  earlier  period  of 
American  strategic  supremacy  to  an  era 
of  stable  strategic  equivalence. 

We  should  harbor  no  illusion  that  we 
could  return  to  the  earlier  era.  Neither 
side  will  permit  the  other  to  hold  an 
exploitable  strategic  advantage.  Each 
side  has  the  financial  and  technical  re- 
sources to  keep  pace  with  the  other. 
With  the  stakes  so  high,  we  know  that 
both  of  us  will  do  whatever  is  neces- 
sary to  keep  from  falling  behind.  That 
is  why  essentia!  equivalence  has  be- 
come the  only  realistic  strategy  in  to- 
day's nuclear  world. 

This  rough  balance  can  also  serve  the 
cause  of  stability — even  if  some  find  it 


June  1979 


17 


unsettling  compared  with  our  earlier 
supremacy.  It  is  this  essential  equiva- 
lence in  strategic  arms  which  allows  us 
lo  move  ahead  on  arms  limitation.  For 
it  one  side  were  tar  ahead,  it  would 
teel  no  special  urgency  about  arms 
control,  and  the  side  that  was  behind 
would  refuse  to  negotiate  from  a  posi- 
tion of  weakness.  Only  when  both  sides 
perceive  a  balance,  as  is  now  the  case, 
can  we  hope  for  real  arms  control 
progress. 

Our  response  to  this  broad  change  in 
the  security  environment  has  several 
elements. 

We  will  assure  that  essential 
equivalence  in  nuclear  arms  is  main- 
tained. We  will  not  be  overtaken  by  the 
momentum  of  Soviet  military  pro- 
grams. 

We  have  undertaken  a  far-reaching 
modernization  of  our  strategic  forces. 
We  are  improving  each  leg  of  our 
strategic  triad — with  cruise  missiles  for 
our  B-52  bombers,  with  a  new  Trident 
I  missile  for  existing  submarines  and 
the  development  of  a  new  Trident  sub- 
marine and  Trident  11  missile,  and  with 
development  funding  for  the  M-X  mis- 
sile. And  we  are  examining,  in  a  timely 
fashion,  the  options  for  offsetting  the 
probable  future  threat  to  the  land-based 
portion  of  our  missile  force. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  equally 
determined  to  enhance  our  security  by 
applying  mutual  limits  to  nuclear  arms. 
We  are  at  the  threshold  of  a  SALT  II 
treaty.  It  is  a  critical  step  in  the  process 
of  bringing  strategic  weapons  under 
sensible  control.  As  its  terms  become 
known  and  debated,  I  am  confident  that 
the  Senate  will  agree  that  it  will  en- 
hance our  national  security  and  that  of 
our  allies.  Its  rejection  would  lead  to 
an  intensification  of  the  nuclear  arms 
race.  The  risk  of  nuclear  war  would  in- 
crease. The  costs  to  our  taxpayers 
would  rise  sharply.  It  would  heighten 
tensions  with  the  Soviets,  trouble  our 
allies,  and  deal  a  crippling  blow  to  fu- 
ture arms  control  prospects. 

The  American  people,  and  our  allies, 
understand  the  importance  of  decreas- 
ing tensions  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
seeking  common  ground  where  our 
interests  may  converge. 

While  we  address  strategic  issues, 
we  must  also  be  especially  sensitive  to 
the  importance  of  maintaining  a  bal- 
ance of  conventional  forces.  At  the 
NATO  summit  last  summer,  we  and 
our  allies  committed  ourselves  to  real 
increases  of  3%  in  defense  expendi- 
tures and  to  modernize  and  upgrade 
NATO  forces.  Last  year's  repeal  of  the 
arms  embargo  against  Turkey  was  an 
important  step  to  help  bolster  NATO's 
southern  Hank. 

In  Europe  and  elsewhere,  we  are 


committed  to  maintain  strong  conven- 
tional forces.  And  no  one  should  doubt 
that  we  will  use  those  forces  if  our  vital 
interests  or  those  of  our  allies  are 
threatened. 

In  these  ways,  we  will  maintain,  and 
strengthen,  our  security  in  an  age  of  es- 
sential equivalence  by  meeting  the  new 
problems  it  presents  and  by  seizing  the 
new  arms  control  opportunities  it  af- 
fords. 

Glowing  Risks 

of  Regional  Conflicts 

A  second  change  is  the  reality  that 
the  risks  posed  by  regional  conflicts 
have  grown.    Many  of  these  conflicts 


institutions  that  provide  a  framework 
tor  easing  tensions.  When  we  believe  it 
will  contribute  to  regional  stability,  we 
will  assist  nations  threatened  by  exter- 
nal force  to  strengthen  their  ability  to 
defend  themselves. 

In  all  cases,  we  will  oppose  attempts 
by  others  to  transform  local  disputes 
into  international  tests  of  will.  Every 
nation  has  a  responsibility  to  recognize 
that  there  is  greater  safety  in  healing, 
rather  than  fueling,  local  conflicts. 

Changes  Within  Nations 

A  third  kind  of  change  we  must  ad- 
dress is  change  within  nations. 

As  a  result  of  mass  communications. 


.  .  .  the  distorted  proposition  being  advanced  by  some  that  America  is 
in  a  period  of  decline  in  the  world  is  not  only  wrong  as  a  matter  of  fact 
but  dangerous  as  a  basis  for  policy. 


are  long  standing.  They  have  roots 
deep  in  history,  in  geography,  in  reli- 
gious and  ethnic  differences. 

But  as  more  nations  acquire  more 
sophisticated  arms,  regional  conflicts 
become  more  dangerous.  They  pose  a 
constant  threat  of  wider  confrontation. 
As  a  result,  the  United  States  must  be 
more  active  in  working  to  help  settle 
these  disputes  peacefully. 

The  fact  is  that  no  nation  is  more  in- 
tensively engaged  in  the  continuing 
effort  to  dampen  the  tlames  of  conflict 
around  the  world  than  the  United 
States. 

No  other  nation  could  have  played 
the  role  that  the  United  States  has 
played  in  helping  Israel  and  Egypt 
achieve  an  historic  peace  treaty.  And 
we  will  continue  to  remain  actively  in- 
volved in  the  effort  to  achieve  a  com- 
prehensive peace — a  peace  in  which 
Israel,  the  neighboring  Arab  states,  and 
the  Palestinian  people  can  live  with  se- 
curity and  with  dignity. 

In  southern  Africa,  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean,  in  Southeast  Asia,  and 
elsewhere  in  the  world,  we  are  using 
the  influence  we  have  for  peace.  Prog- 
ress does  not  come  easily  or  quickly. 
There  will  be  setbacks,  for  the  path  to 
peace  is  often  more  difficult  than  the 
road  to  war.  But  with  persistence  and 
steadiness,  we  can  help  provide  the 
parties  to  conflict  with  an  alternative  to 
violence — if  they  choose  to  take  it. 

In  some  cases,  these  efforts  will  in- 
volve working  with  other  interested 
nations  as  a  catalyst  for  bringing  the 
parties  together.  In  other  situations,  we 
will  support  international  and  regional 


better  education,  urbanization,  and 
growing  expectations  for  a  better  life, 
there  is  a  new  tide  in  many  Third 
World  nations,  as  more  and  more 
people  demand  a  fuller  share  in  their 
government  and  their  economy.  These 
demands  can  place  extraordinary  pres- 
sures on  economic,  social,  and  political 
institutions. 

This  ferment  can  at  times  cause  the 
kind  of  turmoil  that  adversely  affects 
our  interests,  at  least  in  the  short  run. 
But  rather  than  reacting  in  opposition 
to  such  change,  or  assuming  that  it 
necessarily  works  against  us,  let  us 
look  at  two  central  questions:  Is  this 
kind  of  change  generally  in  the  interest 
of  our  nation?  And  what  are  the  best 
instruments  through  which  we  can  help 
others  meet  popular  aspirations  in  an 
orderly  and  peaceful  fashion? 

The  answer  to  the  first  question,  in 
my  judgment,  is  that  the  growing  de- 
mand of  individuals  around  the  world 
for  the  fulfillment  of  their  political,  so- 
cial, and  economic  rights  is  generally 
in  our  interest.  These  aspirations  are 
producing  new  or  strengthened  demo- 
cratic institutions  in  many  nations 
throughout  the  world.  And  America 
can  flourish  best  in  a  world  where  free- 
dom nourishes. 

Should  we  not  gain  confidence  from 
this  expansion  of  democracy,  which  is 
taking  place  not  because  we  force  it  but 
because  of  its  inherent  appeal? 

And  what  is  that  inherent  appeal? 
Surely  it  lies  in  the  enhanced  opportu- 
nity that  democracy  provides  for  the 
realization  of  fundamental  human 
rights — the  rights  to  political  and  reli- 


li 


gious  expression,  to  political  partici- 
pation, and  to  economic  justice. 

These  values  are  remarkably  attuned 
to  the  demands  of  change.  The  change 
which  confronts  many  nations  — 
particularly  the  less  developed 
nations — challenges  cultures,  ways  of 
living  and  communicating,  notions  of 
individual  and  national  autonomy.  The 
great  strength  of  democratic  processes 
is  their  flexibility  and  resilience.  They 
allow  accommodation  and  compromise. 
By  giving  all  groups  a  voice  in  the  de- 
cisions which  affect  their  lives,  demo- 
cratic societies  are  far  better  able  to 
shape  a  peaceful  and  stable  balance 
between  tradition  and  progress. 

Internal  change  in  other  countries 
will  sometimes  be  turbulent  and  dif- 
ficult. At  times,  it  may  run  in  repres- 
sive directions.  But  we  must  not  let  our 
concerns  about  the  crosscurrents  blind 
us  to  the  tide  running  in  favor  of  free- 
dom. 

In  seeking  to  help  others  meet  the 
legitimate  demands  of  their  peoples, 
what  are  the  best  instruments  at  hand? 

Let  me  state  first  that  the  use  of 
military  force  is  not,  and  should  not  be, 
a  desirable  American  policy  response 
to  the  internal  politics  of  other  nations. 
We  believe  we  have  the  right  to  shape 
our  destiny;  we  must  respect  that  right 
in  others.  We  must  clearly  understand 
the  distinction  between  our  readiness  to 
act  forcefully  when  the  vital  interests 
of  our  nation,  our  allies,  and  our 
friends  are  threatened  and  our  recogni- 
tion that  our  military  forces  cannot 
provide  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the 
purely  internal  problems  of  other  na- 
tions. 

In  helping  other  nations  cope  with 
such  internal  change,  our  challenge  is 
to  help  them  develop  their  own  institu- 
tions, strengthen  their  own  economies, 
and  foster  the  ties  between  government 
and  people. 

To  do  so.  we  must  continue  to  pro- 
vide them  with  increasing  levels  of  de- 
velopment assistance.  We  must  main- 
tain human  rights  policies  which  work 
in  practical  ways  to  advance  freedom. 
And  we  must  accept  the  fact  that  other 
societies  will  manage  change  and  build 
new  institutions  in  patterns  that  may  be 
different  from  our  own. 

Third  World  nations  will  fiercely 
defend  their  independence.  They  will 
reject  efforts  by  outsiders  to  impose 
their  institutions.  We  should  welcome 
this  spirit.  For  our  national  interest  is 
not  in  their  becoming  like  us;  it  is  that 
they  be  free  of  domination  by  others. 

This  strategy  of  affirmative  involve- 
ment and  support  for  the  independence 
and  the  diversity  of  developing  nations 
serves  us  well.    It  capitalizes  on  the 


West's  inherent  strengths.  And  it  im- 
proves our  ties  to  developing  countries 
in  a  context  which  does  not  force  them 
to  make  an  explicit  choice  between 
East  and  West. 

The  test  of  our  will  in  dealing  with 
domestic  change  abroad  will  come  not 
in  how  we  use  our  military  might  but  in 
whether  we  are  willing  to  put  our  re- 
sources behind  our  words — and  to 
make  them  work  effectively. 

An  Increasingly  Pluralistic  World 

A  fourth  kind  of  change  that  we  are 
seeing  is  in  the  international  system  it- 
self. Building  on  our  experience  as  a 
pluralistic  nation,  we  must  learn  to  deal 
effectively  with  an  increasingly 
pluralistic  world. 

Since  the  early  1960"s,  we  have  seen 
the  emergence  of  dozens  of  new  na- 
tions, each  with  its  distinctive  identity, 
each  fiercely  intent  on  fulfilling  its  na- 
tional aspirations. 

We  have  seen  the  development  of 
new   powers   in   the   world,    nations 


.  .  .  essential  equivalence  has  be- 
come the  only  realistic  strategy  in 
today's  nuclear  world. 


which  play  an  increasingly  important 
role  in  international  economic  and 
political  life. 

And  we  have  come  to  recognize  that 
many  of  the  challenges  we  face  are 
genuinely  global  in  scope.  Halting  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  managing 
the  world's  resources  sensibly  and 
fairly,  preserving  an  environment  that 
can  sustain  us — these  problems  do  not 
derive  from  any  single  nation  nor  can 
any  single  nation,  working  alone,  re- 
solve them. 

A  world  where  many  must  partici- 
pate in  designing  the  future  rather  than 
a  few,  where  progress  often  requires 
cooperative  effort,  demands  more — not 
less — American  leadership.  It  requires 
us  to  exercise  that  leadership  crea- 
tively, to  inspire  others  to  work  with  us 
toward  goals  we  share  but  cannot 
achieve  separately.  It  calls  for  a  new 
kind  of  diplomacy. 

We  must  practice,  wherever  possi- 
ble, an  inclusive  form  of  diplomacy, 
working  together  with  others  to  achieve 
common  goals.  Such  multilateral  ef- 
forts are  time  consuming  and  complex. 
But  they  can  often  be  more  productive 
than  working  alone. 

The  core  around  which  these  broader 
efforts  must  be  built  is  a  strong  and 
solid  relationship  with  our  traditional 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

allies.    We  have  worked   hard   in  this    i 
Administration   to   strengthen   that 
partnership,  and  we  have  done  so. 

Working  together  with  our  allies  we 
are  able,  on  an  increasing  number  of 
issues,  to  engage  others  in  collective 
efforts  to  resolve  some  of  the  more  in- 
tractable problems  we  face.  Let  me  cite 
just  one  example — our  effort  to  find  a 
more  proliferation-resistant  nuclear 
fuel  cycle. 

At  our  initiative,  44  nations  have 
come  together  to  search  for  ways — both 
technical  and  institutional — to  enable 
nations  to  pursue  peaceful  nuclear 
energy  without  adding  to  the  danger  of  _ 
nuclear  weapons  proliferation.  There  is 
no  "American"  answer  to  the  threat  of 
nuclear  weapons  proliferation;  there  is 
only  an  international  answer,  and  we 
are  working  with  others  to  find  it. 

We  are  strengthening  our  ties  with 
those  developing  nations  which  exert 
increasing  economic  and  political  in- 
fluence. We  have  worked  to  bring  these 
and  other  developing  nations  more 
fully  and  fairly  into  the  decisionmaking 
of  international  institutions  which  af- 
fect their  life  and  ours.  For  enduring 
solutions  to  problems  we  face  in  com- 
mon can  be  found  only  if  all  who  have 
a  stake  also  have  a  role  and  recognize 
their  responsibilities  as  well  as  their 
rights  in  the  world  community. 

To  work  effectively  in  a  changing 
international  system  we  must  be  pre- 
pared to  work  with  nations  whose 
ideologies  are  different  from  our  own. 
By  establishing  full  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  for  example,  we  are  now  in  a 
better  position  to  deal  directly  and 
forthrightly  with  a  government  that 
represents  one-fourth  of  the  world's 
people. 

We  have  embarked  on  a  deliberate 
effort  to  enhance  the  role  of  the  United 
Nations  and  regional  institutions  such 
as  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations,  and  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity.  These  institutions  often 
can  provide  the  most  effective  setting 
for  resolving  international  disputes  and 
for  broadening  the  realm  of  interna- 
tional cooperation. 

To  secure  the  cooperation  of  other 
nations,  we  must  deal  with  them  on  a 
basis  of  mutual  respect  and  independ- 
ence. Our  achievement  of  a  new 
Panama  Canal  treaty,  which  secures 
our  use  of  the  canal  for  coming  gener- 
ations, has  demonstrated  that  fair 
dealing  with  other  nations,  whatever 
their  size,  can  serve  our  interests  as 
well  as  theirs.  Our  relations  throughout 
this  hemisphere  have  benefited  as  a  re- 
sult. 


June  1979 


19 


A  Changing  World  Economy 

Let  me  turn  finally  to  the  change  we 
are  seeing  in  the  international 
economy — the  growing  stake  every  na- 
tion has  in  economic  decisions  made 
beyond  its  borders. 

America's  strength  rests  on  the  vi- 
tality of  America's  economy.  Our 
economy  continues  to  provide  expand- 
ing opportunity  for  our  people  and 
continues  to  fuel  growth  around  the 
world.  We  must  also  recognize  the 
other  side  of  this  coin — the  health  of 
other  economies  around  the  world  in- 
creasingly affects  the  health  of  our 
economy. 

Our  exports  provide  Americans  with 
jobs — in  fact,  one  out  of  every  eight 
jobs  in  the  manufacturing  sector — and 
income  for  our  firms  and  farmers. 
Every  third  acre  of  our  farmland  pro- 
duces for  export.  Imports  from  abroad 
provide  us  with  essential  raw  materials, 
they  afford  our  consumers  greater 
choice,  and  they  dampen  our  inflation. 

This  growing  economic  interdepend- 
ence requires  that  our  government  work 
with  others  to  help  create  international 
conditions  in  which  all  nations  can 
thrive.  We  cannot  seek  to  build  our 
own  economic  future  at  the  expense  of 
others,  nor  will  we  allow  others  to  com- 
pete unfairly.  For  a  new  era  of  eco- 
nomic nationalism  could  have  tragic 
consequences,  just  as  it  did  during  the 
protectionist  warfare  of  the  1930"s. 

We  are  deeply  involved  in  working 
with  other  nations  to  meet  the  chal- 
lenges of  a  changing  world  economic 
order. 

We  have  been  successful  in 
strengthening  economic  cooperation 
among  the  industrial  nations.  We  have 
instituted  regular  economic  summits  to 
coordinate  our  economic  policies  so 
that  they  reinforce  rather  than   under- 


mine one  another.  And  there  has  been 
far  closer  collaboration  among  our 
monetary  authorities  in  restoring  order 
to  foreign  exchange  markets. 

We  have  initialed  an  important  new 
multilateral  trade  agreement  that  will 
establish  fair  trading  rules  for  the  next 
decade.  It  will  have  a  direct  and  posi- 
tive impact  on  our  economy. 

We  have  agreed  with  the  other  in- 
dustrialized members  of  the  Interna- 
tional Energy  Agency  to  cut  back  our 
collective  demand  for  oil  by  2  million 
barrels  a  day.  To  fulfill  this  commit- 
ment— and  to  reduce  our  own  costly 
and  dangerous  dependence  on  oil 
imports — the  President  has  initiated  a 
sensible  program  for  achieving  greater 
domestic  conservation  and  production. 
For  we  must  begin  to  deal  urgently 
with  a  markedly  changed  global  energy 
environment. 


path  we  will  follow  in  a  new  era.  In 
unsettled  times,  each  of  us  has  a  re- 
sponsibility to  be  clear  about  how  we 
would  deal  with  the  world  as  we  find 
it. 

Most  Americans  now  recognize  that 
we  alone  cannot  dictate  events.  This 
recognition  is  not  a  sign  of  America's 
decline;  it  is  a  sign  of  growing  Ameri- 
can maturity  in  a  complex  world. 

We  are  stronger  today  because  we 
recognize  the  realities  of  our  times. 
This  recognition,  together  with  an 
equally  clear  understanding  that  we 
remain  the  most  powerful  of  nations, 
should  make  every  American  as 
staunchly  optimistic  about  our  nation's 
future  as  we  have  always  been. 

There  can  be  no  going  back  to  a  time 
when  we  thought  there  could  be 
American  solutions  to  every  problem. 
We  must  go  forward  into  a  new  era  of 


There  can  be  no  going  back  to  a  time  when  we  thought  there  could 
be  American  solutions  to  every  problem.  We  must  go  forward  into  a 
new  era  of  mature  American  leadership  .  .  . 


We  recognize  that  a  well-managed 
foreign  assistance  program  contributes 
to  the  economic  performance  of  the  de- 
veloping countries.  Their  growth  has 
become  an  increasingly  important  fac- 
tor in  the  health  of  our  own  economy. 
Aiding  that  development  is  not  only  an 
investment  in  the  future  of  others,  it  is 
an  investment  in  our  own  future  as 
well. 


The  Path  We  Will  Follow 

In  the  foreign  policy  choices  we  are 
now   making,   we  are  determining  the 


mature  American  leadership — based  on 
strength,  not  belligerence;  on  steadi- 
ness, not  impulse;  on  confidence,  not 
fear. 

We  have  every  reason  to  be  confi- 
dent. For  200  years,  we  have  prospered 
by  welcoming  change  and  working 
with  it,  not  by  resisting  it.  We  have 
understood,  at  home  and  abroad,  that 
stability  is  not  the  status  quo.  It  comes 
through  human  progress.  We  will  con- 
tinue in  this  American  tradition.  D 


'Press  release  1  16. 


20 


AFRICA:        UJS.  Poiiey 
and  Africa 


hy  David  D.  Newsom 

Address  at  the  George  Washington 
University  Institute  for  Sino-Soviet 
Studies  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
March  14,  1979.  Ambassador  Newsom 
is  Under  Secretary  for  Political  Af- 
fairs. 

I  was,  initially,  much  relieved  when 
I  saw  the  topic  assigned  to  me  at  this 
conference:  "U.S.  Policy  and  Af- 
rica." This  meant  that  I  could  relate 
Africa  to  our  broader  policy  consid- 
erations and  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  dis- 
cussing U.S.  policy  in  Africa. 

The  more  I  thought  about  this,  the 
more  1  realized  I  was  wrong.  To  talk 
about  how  Africa  relates  to  broader 
U.S.  policies  is  to  address  the  very 
basic  issues  which  have  been  at  the 
heart  of  20  years  of  debate  on  African 
policy. 

How  does  Africa  relate  to  our 
broader  policy  objectives?  Are  we  in- 
terested in  the  continent  primarily  for 
its  resources?  Is  the  continent  relevant 
to  us  only  as  one  more  theater  in  the 
contlict  between  East  and  West?  Is  Af- 
rica primarily  important  to  us  because 
its  racial  conflicts  echo  the  emotions 
and  injustices  of  our  own  civil  rights 
problems?  Is  it  the  deep  and  often 
tragic  human  problems  which  catch  our 
sympathy  and  drive  our  policies? 

One  day  in  the  early  1960's,  G. 
Mennen  Williams,  then  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  African  Affairs,  came  back 
from  a  congressional  hearing  and  called 
his  staff  together. 

"I  have  just  had  a  very  rough  time," 
he  said,  "answering  a  question  from 
the  committee  on  the  strategic  impor- 
tance of  Africa.  I  want  a  study  done  on 
this  subject." 

A  professor  of  political  science,  who 
specialized  in  geopolitical  issues,  was 
called  in  to  do  such  a  study.  After  sev- 
eral weeks  of  diligent  academic  labor, 
he  produced  a  paper.  The  first  line  of 
the  paper  read:  "Africa  has  no  strategic 
importance  for  the  United  States." 

Fifteen  years  ago  there  were  many 
who  felt  that  Africa  was  peripheral  to 
our  basic  global  interests.  Africa  had 
no  "priority."  There  are  fewer  who 
feel  that  way  today. 

Africa  has  a  priority  today.  Its  issues 
are  on  the  front  page,  but  it  is  not  only 
its  strategic  interest  to  us  which  puts  it 
there. 

The  fact  is  that,  in  American  terms, 


each  one  of  the  elements  I  mentioned 
has  been  important  in  justifying  Afri- 
can policy,  in  obtaining  resources  for 
that  policy,  and  in  relating  such 
policies  to  wider  U.S.  interests. 

Africa's  Priorities 

Black  Africa's  priorities  are  very 
clear:  an  end  to  racial  discrimination, 
the  maintenance  of  territorial  integrity, 
an  end  to  colonization,  and  progress  in 
economic  development. 

Africans  often  speak  of  each  in  ex- 
treme terms.  We  do  not  need  to  con- 
clude that  they  want  the  extreme  option 
in  each  case. 

Let  me  pause  a  moment  to  speak 
frankly  about  the  first  African  priority: 
an  end  to  racial  discrimination.  It  is 
often  pointed  out  that  the  African  is  in- 
consistent in  his  approach  to  this  issue: 
that  democracy  does  not  prevail  in 
many  African  countries;  that  blacks 
often  dominate  other  blacks;  and  that 
many  are  not  prepared  to  give  to  their 
own  people  the  rights  they  demand  for 
those  in  other  countries. 

Africans  may  well  acknowledge  the 
correctness  of  some  of  these  criticisms. 
To  them,  however,  these  are  aspects  of 
their  internal  political  develop- 
ment—  matters  they  consider  to  be  es- 
sentially African.  Time  and  again  we 
have  seen  indications  of  the  African 
reluctance  to  be  critical  of  the  internal 
policies  of  other  Africans.  They  put 
into  a  different  category  the  funda- 
mental question  of  ending  white 
minority  domination  and  privilege  on 
the  African  Continent. 

One  case  that  has  been  central  to  de- 
bates on  U.S.  African  policy  over  the 
past  two  decades  has  been  our  attitude 
toward  the  white-ruled  states  and,  in 
particular.  South  Africa.  Many  in  this 
country  have  recognized  the  significant 
geographic  position  of  South  Africa 
and  the  major  economic  strength  of  that 
country.  Hopes  have  frequently  been 
expressed  in  this  debate  that  South  Af- 
rica and  the  black  African  states  could 
cooperate  for  their  mutual  benefit. 

There  has  also  been  strong  interest  in 
Rhodesia  and  the  hope  that  black  and 
white  there  can  find  a  basis  for  living 
and  working  together.  Central  to  the 
debate  is  the  question  of  whether  an 
internal  settlement  can  endure  without 
a  satisfactory  resolution  of  the  conflict 
which  now  engulfs  that  country.  Here, 
again,  the  acceptance  by  Rhodesia's 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

black  African  neighbors  becomes  criti- 
cal to  a  longer  range  solution. 

The  fact  is  that  U.S.  policies  have 
not  been  successful  in  relating  to  Af- 
rica itself  or  to  our  wider  interests  un- 
less consideration  was  also  given  to 
black  African  priorities  and  sen- 
sitivities. To  do  so  is  not  to  reject  the 
justice  of  the  claim  of  the  white  Afri- 
can that  his  rights  and  his  contributions 
be  respected;  it  is  to  recognize  that  Af- 
rica is  overwhelmingly  and  consciously 
black  and  that  no  solution  to  its  prob- 
lems will  survive  which  does  not  rec- 
ognize this  reality. 

Successes  and  Failures 

The  successes  we  have  had  in  Afri- 
can policy  have  been  those  in  which  we 
recognized  not  only  our  wider  interests 
but  the  concerns  of  the  African  nations 
as  well.  Our  failures  have  been  in  cases 
where  we  did  not  fully  recognize  those 
concerns. 

In  the  first  major  crisis  we  faced  in 
modern  Africa — the  Congo  —  we  jus- 
tified our  support  for  the  U.N.  action  to 
a  large  extent  on  keeping  the  Soviets 
from  gaining  a  foothold  in  the  center  of 
Africa.  We  won  the  support  of  other 
Africans  because  we  were  supporting 
the  principle  of  the  territorial  integrity 
of  an  African  state. 

Later  in  Nigeria,  the  equivocal  na- 
ture of  our  attitude  toward  Biafra 
created  difficulties  for  us  with  Africa's 
largest  country  precisely  because  we 
did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  this 
same  principle.  Only  recently  have  we 
been  able  to  improve  our  relations  with 
Nigeria. 

Our  earlier  efforts  to  bring  about  an 
outcome  of  events  in  Angola  satisfac- 
tory to  our  wider  concerns  encountered 
the  strong  African  resentment  of  the 
appearance  of  our  being  on  the  same 
side  as  South  Africa. 

Our  frustrations  over  the  events  in 
the  Horn  of  Africa  were  due  in  part  to 
the  fact  that  the  Soviets  were,  in  Afri- 
can eyes  by  helping  Ethiopia,  support- 
ing the  principle  of  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  African  nations. 

In  the  middle  1960's  we  agonized 
over  the  Tanzania-Zambia  railway 
which  the  Chinese  were  building  be- 
tween Lusaka  and  Dar  es  Salaam.  We 
sought  to  find  alternatives  to  it,  but  we 
were  not  prepared  to  provide  resources 
to  do  it  ourselves.  The  Africans  ac- 
cepted the  Chinese  offer  because  they 
saw  it  as  a  boon  to  their  economic  de- 
velopment and  as  a  means  to  lessen 
their  dependence  on  the  white-ruled 
areas  of  Africa. 

Taiwan  kept  itself  in  the  United  Na- 
tions for  many  years  through  the  sup- 
port of  a  strong  bloc  of  African  na- 


June  1979 


21 


tions.  That  bloc  was  built  and  nurtured 
by  an  astute,  imaginative  recognition 
oi  the  need  and  desire  of  these  nations 
tor  simple  and  appropriate  aids  to  eco- 
nomic development. 

Our  position  today  in  that  belt  of 
African  nations  which  lies  at  the  edge 
ot  the  Sahara  is  strong  because  we  were 
among  the  first  to  recognize  the  deep 
tragedy  of  drought  and  to  mobilize 
others  to  join  with  us  in  remedial  aid. 

Throughout  these  two  decades  of  as- 
sociation with  Africa,  we  have  been 
successful  in  blocking  opportunities  for 
our  adversaries  where  we  have  matched 
our  concerns  with  those  of  the  majority 
of  African  states.  We  have  been  less 
successful  where  these  were  in  con- 
tlict. 

We  have  at  times  tended  to  place 
non-African  labels  on  Africans  and  on 
their  countries  which  have  been  only 
superficially  appropriate.  Let  us  take 
an  African  who  is  brought  up  in  a  mis- 
sionary school  and  educated  to  greater 
expectations.  As  he  seeks  a  greater  de- 
gree of  expression  and  dignity,  he  en- 
counters colonial  or  white  power  and  is 
jailed.  He  comes  out  of  jail,  still  hop- 
ing for  a  reasonable  solution  to  his 
problem.  As  the  opportunities  for  such 
a  solution  recede,  he  becomes  increas- 
ingly frustrated.  Others  offer  him  arms 
and  a  militant  philosophy.  Is  he  a 
Communist  of  the  European  or  Asian 
variety?  Is  he  a  terrorist  of  the  Middle 
East  variety?  Or  is  he,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, someone  whom  we  must  ultimately 
accept  if  we  are  to  see  a  solution  to  his 
nation's  problems?  I  am  not  sure  we 
yet  have  a  clear  answer. 

In  the  early  1970's  there  was  a 
meeting  on  the  7th  floor  of  the  State 
Department  among  representatives  of 
the  African  Bureau,  the  Bureau  of 
European  Affairs,  and  the  Bureau  of 
International  Organization  Affairs.  The 
Assistant  Secretaries  for  Africa  and 
International  Organization  were  mak- 
ing a  strong  plea  that  the  policy  be  re- 
laxed against  any  contact  with  the  lead- 
ers of  the  liberation  movements  in  the 
Portuguese  territories.  Their  plea  was 
rejected  on  the  grounds  that  Portugal's 
relations  with  us  were  too  important, 
that  Portugal  was  not  likely  to  relin- 
quish its  colonies  in  any  foreseeable 
future,  and,  finally,  that  we  would  be 
"dealing  with  terrorists." 

Today  those  men  who  were  so 
starkly  characterized  in  that  meeting 
are  leading  African  countries  important 
to  us  and  to  a  satisfactory  solution  to 
some  of  Africa's  gravest  problems. 

In  the  debates  on  African  policies  of 
the  1960's  and  early  1970's,  a  stark 
picture  of  the  future  was  sometimes 
drawn  —  an  Armageddon  approach.  In 
this  stark  picture,  the  final  hard  prob- 


lems of  southern  Africa  led  to  a  war  es- 
sentially between  races  in  which  our 
Communist  adversaries  were  pitted  on 
the  side  of  black  Africans,  and  we  were 
on  the  side  of  the  white  regimes.  It  was 
the  conclusion  of  those  debates  I  at- 
tended that  that  outcome  should,  by 
every  possible  means,  be  avoided.  We 
have  not  reached  that  "worst  case."  It 
is  important  that  we  do  not. 

In  assessing  where  we  are  today  in 
relation  to  the  Soviets  and  the  Chinese 
in  Africa,  as  you  are  doing  at  this  con- 
ference, it  is  important  that  we  keep  the 
continent  in  perspective. 

We,  as  Americans,  tend  to  be  doom- 
sayers.  We  seem  so  often  to  feel  the 
other  side  is  "winning." 

The  Chinese,  despite  their  major  ef- 
fort in  Africa  in  the  1960's,  are  of  rel- 
atively minor  importance  today. 

The  Soviet's  position  has,  over  the 
years,  been  reduced  —  in  Ghana,  in 
Guinea,  in  the  Sudan,  in  Somalia,  in 
Egypt  to  name  the  most  significant 
cases.  Today  they  are  strong  in  the 
former  Portuguese  colonies  and  in 
Ethiopia  but  in  few  other  states.  Most 
black  states  of  southern  Africa  continue 
to  avoid  options  that  would  place  them 
totally  in  the  Soviet  debt.  The  Soviet 
gains  have  come  only  in  those  areas 
where,  because  we  have  failed  to  do 
so,  they  have  benefitted  from  identity 
with  African  objectives.  We  should  not 
consider  that  the  red  paint  is  spreading 
on  the  continent  of  Africa. 

The  states  of  black  Africa  still  look 
to  us  as  the  primary  peacemaker.  They 
still  find  in  us  ideals  they  would  like  to 
apply  to  their  societies.  They  still  find 
in  the  Western  nations  as  a  whole  their 
primary  markets,  capital  sources,  and 
assistance  for  development. 

U.S.  Objectives 

Africa,  which  was  in  many  ways  in 
prior  years  peripheral  to  American 
global  policy,  has  come  on  the  center 
stage  today.  Our  objectives  remain 
clear. 

•  We  want  to  minimize  the  opportu- 
nities and  gains  of  our  global  adver- 
saries. 

•  We  want  continued  access  to  the 
resources,  the  transport  routes,  the 


Letter 
of  Credence 

On  March  30,  1979,  Timothy  T. 
Thahane  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Carter  as  the  newly  appointed 
Ambassador  from  Lesotho.  D 


peoples  and  governments  of  Africa. 

•  We  want  an  American  contribution 
to  the  solution  of  its  greatest  problems 
which  is  consistent  with  our  own  his- 
tory and  our  own  principles. 

•  We  want  a  solution  which 
minimizes  for  all  races  the  tragic  con- 
sequences of  the  current  confrontation. 

It  seems  temptingly  simple  at  times 
to  ally  ourselves  with  those  to  whom 
we  relate  most  easily  who  profess  to  be 
our  friends  and  to  support  our  global 
objectives.  To  do  so  in  Africa  might 
well  leave  us  isolated  from  the  greater 
part  of  that  continent  and  its  peoples 
without,  at  the  same  time,  achieving 
our  wider  objectives. 

To  achieve  our  global  policy  objec- 
tives as  they  apply  to  Africa  requires 
not  only  that  we  pursue  them  as  we  see 
them  but  that  we  include,  as  well,  a 
full  recognition  of  the  priorities  as  they 
are  seen  by  the  majority  of  Africa's  in- 
dependent nations.  To  fail  to  do  so  is  to 
reject  the  experience  of  two  decades  of 
close  and  active  relationships  with  Af- 
rica and  to  run  the  risk  of  giving  our 
adversaries  opportunities  which  should 
be  ours.  □ 


Ptthiications 


GPO  SALES 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Criminal  Investigations.  AgreemenI  with  Su- 
dan. TIAS  8723.  6  pp.  60?.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8723.) 

Senegal  River  Basin  Survey  and  Mapping. 

Agreement  with  the  Organization  Pour  La 
Mise  En  Valeur  Du  Fleuve  Senegal.  TIAS 
8779.   16  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8779.) 

Drought  Assistance  in  Arusha  Region. 

Agreement  with  Tanzania.  TIAS  8786.  13 
pp.  80^.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8786.) 

Technical  Cooperation — Studies  Concerning 
the  Capital  Territory.  Agreement  with 
Nigeria.  TIAS  8809.  13  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8809.) 

Plant  Protection — Quelea  Bird  Research. 

Agreement  with  Sudan  TIAS  8814.  7  pp. 
70^.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8814.) 


Continued  on  p.  22 


22 


Southern  Rhodesia 


SECRETARY  VANCE'S 
STATEMENT,  MAR.  17,  1979' 

I  have  today  a  statement  on 
Rhodesia  —  about  the  situation  there 
and  the  stakes  involved  and  about  the 
position  of  the  American  and  British 
Governments  on  the  best  solution  to  a 
deepening  tragedy. 

The  conflict  in  Rhodesia  continues  to 
grow  and  to  widen  —  some  1,000 
people  are  losing  their  lives  every 
month.  Both  sides  must  share  responsi- 
bility for  these  human  losses,  whether 
in  daily  combat  or  through  the  shooting 
down  of  civilian  aircraft  or  in  the  raids 
on  camps  beyond  Rhodesia's  borders. 

Each  party  also  holds  in  its  hands  the 
decisions  that  can  bring  peace,  major- 
ity rule,  the  protection  of  individual 
rights,  and  internationally  recognized 
independence. 

The  alternative  to  this  peace  is 
greater  bloodshed  and  destruction,  the 
polarization  and  weakened  economic 
potential  of  the  Zimbabwe  that  some 
day  gains  independence,  and  a  growing 
threat  to  the  well-being  of  neighboring 
states.  As  the  conflict  grows,  there  is 
also  a  growing  opportunity  for  Soviet 
and  Cuban  involvement  and  influence. 

Our  efforts  in  support  of  a  peaceful, 
just  solution  strengthen  our  ties 
throughout  Africa,  further  our  funda- 
mental values  of  human  rights  and  ra- 
cial equality,  deny  opportunities  for 
intervention  by  foreign  forces,  and 
promote  stability  in  southern  Africa. 

Our  own  nation  thus  has  a  tangible 
interest  —  in  political  and  moral 
terms  —  in  helping  resolve  this  conflict. 
The  parties  themselves  have  a  far 
greater  stake  in  such  a  peace.  Yet  each 
still  insists  on  a  predominance  the  other 
will  not  allow.  It  remains  our  view  that 
the  American  Government  should 
not  —  and  will  not — throw  its  support 
to  either  side;  to  do  so  would  destroy 
our  ability  to  work  now,  or  later,  for  an 
impartial  solution.  And  it  could  commit 
us  to  further  support  for  whichever  side 
we  endorsed. 

We  have  refused  to  support  the  de- 
mands of  the  external  forces  for  pre- 
dominance during  the  period  leading  up 
to  pre-independence  elections.  ZAPU 
and  ZANU  [Zimbabwe  African 
People's  Union  and  Zimbabwe  African 
National  Union]  have  large  popular 
followings  within  the  country  and  in 
Africa;  a  lasting  settlement  must  in- 
clude them.  But  to  assure  real  peace 


and  stability,  they  and  other  parties 
must  be  willing  to  compete  on  an  equal 
basis  in  an  impartial  election  for  a  gov- 
ernment reflecting  the  will  of  the 
people. 

We  have  also  opposed  the  lifting  of 
international  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia.  Such  an  action  would  re- 
verse an  American  policy  of  more  than 
a  decade  and  thus  support  the  Salisbury 
parties.  It  would  encourage  the  illusion 
that  now  or  later,  further  American  aid 
might  be  forthcoming,  since  the  lifting 
of  sanctions  could  not  in  itself  reverse 
the  deteriorating  military  situation  the 
Salisbury  parties  face.  It  would  en- 
courage Salisbury's  insistence  on  its 
own  plan  for  the  future  of  Rhodesia,  a 
plan  we  do  not  believe  can  succeed. 
And  it  would  weaken  our  own  position 
in  the  area. 

There  are,  however,  elements  in  the 
situation  on  which  progress  might  still 
be  built. 

•  The  Salisbury  parties  have  reached 
agreements  which  accept  the  principles 
of  multiracial  government  and  elec- 
tions. 

•  The  external  forces  have  accepted 
the  principles  of  elections,  nonracial 
government,  and  U.N.  peacekeeping. 

•  While  a  Namibian  settlement  has 
not  yet  been  reached,  we  remain  re- 
solved to  try  to  achieve  a  solution  on 
the  basis  of  acceptance  by  all  parties  of 
the  principle  of  internationally  super- 
vised elections. 

We  therefore  believe  that  both  sides 
should  take  a  first  and  significant  step: 
to  accept  the  principle  of  U.N.- 
supervised  elections  in  Rhodesia  and  to 
agree  to  negotiate  the  conditions  for 
holding  such  elections.  The  proposals 
we  and  the  British  have  previously  put 
forward  convey  our  view  of  such  a 
process.  But  we  recognize  that  elec- 
tions arrangements  must  be  negotiated 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  parties  them- 
selves. The  crucial  point  is  the  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  of  internationally 
supervised  elections  as  the  only  way  to 
avoid  protracted  and  damaging  war. 
We  would  prefer  that  negotiations 
begin  prior  to  the  April  20  elections. 
Failing  that,  we  would  hope  that  the 
principle  of  U.N. -supervised  elec- 
tions would  be  accepted  by  all  the  par- 
ties before  April  20. 

With  regard  to  the  lifting  of  sanc- 
tions pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Case-Javits  amendment,  the  President 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

will  faithfully  make  the  required  de-  i 
termination  about  the  nature  of  the 
elections  within  Rhodesia  now  sched-  , 
uled  for  April  20,  taking  into  account 
all  of  the  information  available  to  him. 
The  Administration  will  not  be  sending 
its  own  observers  to  these  elections, 
since  to  do  so  could  be  to  imply  official 
recognition  of  elections  we  do  not  be- 
lieve can  provide  a  solution  to  the  con- 
flict. The  question  of  congressionally 
sponsored  observers  is  a  matter  for  the 
Congress  to  decide.  We  would,  of 
course,  be  prepared  to  send  official  ob- 
servers to  U.N. -supervised  elections 
following  negotiations  if  asked  to  do 
so. 

And  let  me  state  clearly  that  the  U.S. 
Government  would  support  the  lifting 
of  sanctions  against  Rhodesia  when  an 
agreed-upon  and  irrevocable  transition 
process  leading  to  U.N. -supervised 
elections  has  begun. 

We  do  not  pretend  that  a  solution  to 
the  Rhodesian  problem  will  be  simple 
or  that  the  outlook  is  encouraging.  But 
it  is  not  yet  too  late,  if  all  will  see  the 
wisdom  of  compromise  on  an  impartial 
process  that  can  end  the  suffering  of 
people  who  have  suffered  already  for 
far  too  long.  □ 


'Press  Release  75. 


Publications 


GPO  Sales  (Cont'd) 

Social  Security.  Agreement  with  Kenya.  TIAS 
8847.  6  pp.  70(Z.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8847.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Guinea.  TIAS  8864.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8864.) 

Program  To  Assist  Sahel  Rural   Population. 

Agreement   with   Chad.   TIAS   8871.   49  pp. 
$1.80   (Cat.  No.  59.10:8871.) 

Food  Production.  Agreement  with  the  Mutual 
Aid  and  Loan  Guaranty  Fund  of  the  Council 
of  the  Entente  Slates.  TIAS  8773.  59  pp. 
$1.80.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8773.) 

Improvement  of  Agricultural  Officers 
Training.  Agreement  with  Mali  TIAS  8940. 
31  pp.  $1.40.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8940.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 
Nigeria.  TIAS  8999.  14  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8999.) 

Agricultural  Production  Capacity  and 
Training.  Agreement  with  Guinea.  TIAS 
9091.  63  pp.  $2.00.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9091.) 

Increased   Cereal   Crops.   Agreement  with  ] 
Mali.  TIAS  9093.  29  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9093.)  D 


June  1979 


23 


ARMS  €0]\TROL: 
SALT  n  Treaty  Concluded 


The  following  announcement  wus 
made  at  the  White  House  by  Secretarv 
['ance  and  Secretary  of  Defense 
Harold  Brown  on  May  9.  1979. 

SKCRETARY  VANCE' 

Ambassador  Dobrynin  and  1  have 
concluded  our  negotiations  on  SALT. 
Both  governments  have  now  instructed 
their  respective  delegations  at  Geneva 
to  incorporate  into  the  joint  draft  treaty 
the  agreements  reached  in  negotiations 
between  Ambassador  Dobrynin  and 
myself  and  to  complete  negotiations  on 
the  few  remaining  secondary  items 
which  have  not  yet  been  resolved. 

Details  concerning  the  time  and 
place  of  a  summit  meeting  will  be  an- 
nounced in  the  very  near  future. 

Let  me  make  a  few  comments  about 
the  significance  of  these  negotiations. 
With  this  treaty,  we  will  take  an  essen- 
tial step  toward  a  safer  America  and  a 
safer  world.  Our  overriding  purpose  in 
these  negotiations  has  been  to 
strengthen  our  nation's  security  and 
that  of  our  allies  through  practical  and 
verifiable  restraints  on  the  nuclear  arms 
race.  Today  we  are  on  the  threshold  of 
signing  a  strategic  arms  agreement  that 
achieves  our  purpose. 

The  treaty  will  enhance  the  security 
of  the  United  States  and  our  allies.  It 
will  restrain  the  nuclear  arms  race.  It 
will  lessen  the  likelihood  of  nuclear 
war.  The  treaty  will  serve  these  essen- 
tial interests  of  the  American  people  in 
several  concrete  ways.  It  will  establish 
equal  ceilings  on  the  strategic  forces  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States. 
It  will  begin  the  process  of  actually  re- 
ducing the  level  of  nuclear  weapons, 
and  it  will  limit  not  only  the  quantita- 
tive but  also  the  qualitative  race  in  nu- 
clear arms. 

As  a  result,  this  treaty  will  limit  the 
strategic  challenges  we  would  other- 
wise have  to  meet.  It  will  hold  down 
the  expense  we  would  have  to  bear  to 
meet  those  challenges.  And  it  will 
avoid  much  of  the  uncertainty  about 
Soviet  arms  that  would  otherwise  pre- 
vail. 

This  treaty  will  not  only  mark  the 
end  of  one  negotiation,  it  will  open  the 
way  for  another.  When  it  is  ratified  by 
the  Senate,  it  will  become  the  cor- 
nerstone for  still  further  limits  in  re- 
ductions in  SALT  III. 

The  national  debate  which  we  now 
commence  is  not  only  about  this  treaty. 


We  are  still  considering  as  well  the  in- 
escapable realities  of  a  nuclear 
world — the  necessity  to  our  security  of 
a  strong  defense  and  the  grave  danger 
to  our  security  of  an  unlimited  race  in 
nuclear  arms,  for  our  security  today 
lies  in  maintaining  a  stable  strategic 
balance  between  two  nations  with  awe- 
some power. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  will  make  a  sub- 
stantial contribution  to  that  stability. 
We  have  demonstrated  through  the 
SALT  process  that  even  as  we  compete 
in  some  areas,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  can  and  must  cooper- 
ate to  lessen  the  dangers  of  war.  In  this 
way.  the  treaty  can  serve  to  open  the 
path  to  a  more  constructive  and  peace- 
ful relationship  between  us. 

This  treaty  is  a  message  of  hope  for 
us  and  for  all  the  people  of  the  world. 


SECRETARY  BROWN  ^ 

The  highest  single  priority  in  our  na- 
tional defense  must  go  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  strategic  nuclear  balance.  I 
want  to  say  a  few  words  about  how  the 
SALT  II  agreement  will  help  us  to  meet 
that  need. 

The  outlines  of  the  agreement  are 
well-known.  But  let  me  repeat  for  you 
some  of  the  main  features. 

There  will  be  a  limit  on  the  number 
of  strategic  launchers.  Each  side  can 
have  2,250.  With  SALT,  the  Soviets 
will  have  to  make  some  reductions. 
Without  SALT,  the  Soviets  could,  by 
continuing  at  their  present  rates  of  de- 
ployment of  new  systems,  have  a  third 
more  than  this  by  1985. 

There  will  also  be  sublimits  on  the 
numbers  of  launchers  for  missiles  with 
independently  targetable  multiple 
warheads,  that  is,  MIRV's.  With  the 
SALT  II  agreement,  the  Soviet  launch- 
ers will  be  limited  to  820  for  MIRV'ed 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles,  the 
most  threatening  part  of  their  force. 
This  is  fewer  than  we  believe  they 
planned.  Without  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment, they  could  have  many  more  than 
that  by  1985. 

In  addition,  there  will  be  limits  on 
the  introduction  of  new  intercontinental 
ballistic  systems  and  on  the  number  of 
warheads  they  can  carry.  With  a  SALT 
II  agreement,  the  Soviets  can  have,  for 
example.  10  warheads  on  their  largest 
missile.  Without  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment, they  could  have  20.  perhaps  40. 


Finally,  there  will  be  a  ban  on  inter- 
fering with  national  technical  means  of 
verification,  and  there  will  be  other 
provisions  to  make  verification  easier. 

We  now  have  highly  capable 
monitoring  systems  in  place.  They  will 
be  bolstered  by  measures  we  are  taking 
to  replace  expeditiously  the  capability 
lost  in  the  Iranian  stations. 

We  will  be  able  to  detect  any  Soviet 
violation  in  ample  time  to  protect  our 
military  security.  With  a  SALT  II 
agreement,  we  will  be  able  to  verify 
the  agreement  from  the  outset.  Without 
the  SALT  II  agreement,  we  could  be 
faced  with  concealment,  countermeas- 
ures.  and  so-called  cheating  of  all 
sorts,  because  without  SALT,  all  of 
these  actions  would  be  permitted. 

Even  with  SALT,  we  will  need  to 
expand  our  defense  efforts,  including 
specifically  our  efforts  devoted  to 
strategic  nuclear  forces.  We  are  doing 
so  under  the  program  now  before  the 
Congress,  because  SALT  won't  solve 
all  of  our  strategic  problems.  However, 
SALT  will  contribute  significantly  to 
our  security. 

With  the  SALT  II  agreement,  we 
will  be  able  to  avoid  the  pressures  and 
uncertainties  of  an  unbounded  numbers 
race  in  strategic  forces.  The  United 
States  could  and  would  engage  in  such 
competition  if  we  had  to.  But  the  result 
would  be  simply  more  systems,  higher 
costs,  and  greater  risks  with  no  more 
security,  still  less  a  situation  of  U.S. 
superiority. 

SALT  II  will  ease  some  of  our  other 
problems.  For  example,  the  limit  on 
warhead  numbers  will  make  more  sur- 
vivable  the  mobile  missiles  whose  de- 
ployment we're  considering  as  an  an- 
swer to  the  growing  vulnerability  of 
our  Minuteman  ICBM's  [interconti- 
nental ballistic  missiles]. 

SALT  II  will  not  prevent  us  from 
doing  what  may  be  needed  in  areas 
where  the  Soviet  challenge  is  not  lim- 
ited. For  example,  we  will  be  able  to 
work  with  our  allies  on  both  force 
modernization  and  on  arms  control  in 
response  to  the  problems  posed  by  the 
Soviet  buildup  of  theater  nuclear 
forces. 

SALT  II  will  provide  a  firmer  foun- 
dation for  other  measures  to  control  the 
growth  and  spread  of  nuclear  and  con- 
ventional arms.  It  will  permit  continu- 
ation of  the  process  of  limiting  the 
superpowers  strategic  forces,  leading, 
we  hope,  to  substantial  cutbacks  in 
those  arsenals. 

In  sum,  SALT  will  help  us  maintain 
flexible  and  credible  deterrence,  sta- 
bility, and  essential  equivalence.  With- 
out the  treaty,  we  could  also  do  these 
things,  but  it  would  be  more  costly  and 
less  certain.  None  of  the  challenges  we 


24 


The  Facts  of  SALT  ii 


by  Leslie  H.  Gelb 

Excerpted  from  an  address  before 
the  San  Diego  World  Affairs  Council 
on  January  30,  1979.  Mr.  Gelb  is  Di- 
rector of  the  Bureau  of  Politico- 
Military  Affairs. 

There  are  three  things  you  should  not 
expect  from  SALT. 

First,  SALT  will  not  reduce  current 
defense  expenditures.  It  will  enable  us 
to  spend  less  than  we  would  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  agreement.  With  a  SALT 
agreement,  expenditures  on  strategic 
nuclear  forces  are  likely  to  rise  from  20 
to  40%  in  the  coming  years;  without 
SALT,  the  same  expenditures  would 
rise  50  to  60  %. 

Second,  SALT  is  not  going  to  pro- 
pel the  United  States  out  in  front  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  strategic  arms  race 
nor  is  it  going  to  allow  the  Russians  to 
gain  advantage  over  us.  It  will  allow  us 
to  maintain  nuclear  parity. 

Third,  SALT  will  not  bring  on  the 
millennium  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 
SALT  will  be  a  way  to  moderate  and 
stabilize  these  difficult  relations,  a  kind 
of  safety  net  for  what  will  otherwise  be 
a  substantially  competitive  relation- 
ship. 

Let  me  now  expand  on  what  we  can 
expect  from  SALT. 

What  Is  In  The  Agreement 

First,  the  SALT  II  agreement  pro- 
vides for  an  equal  ceiling  on  strategic 


Salt  Announcement  (Cont'd) 

face  would  be  less  without  the  treaty, 
and  some  would  be  considerably 
greater.  All  the  increases  we  plan  in 
our  defense  efforts  with  SALT  would 
still  be  needed  without  it.  But  many 
more  would  be  needed  as  well. 

I  see  the  treaty  as  a  valuable  method 
of  helping,  along  with  our  own  moder- 
ately increased  programs,  to  meet  our 
nation's  strategic  needs,  and,  if  the 
Soviet  Union  will  emphasize  coopera- 
tion rather  than  competition,  SALT 
will  also  allow  a  healthier  state  of 
U.S. -Soviet  relations.  •  D 


'Press  release  127  of  May  10,  1979. 
^Text  from  White  House  press  release  of 
May  9. 


delivery  vehicles.  Each  side  will  be 
allowed  2,250  delivery  vehicles  —  that 
is,  long-range  bombers,  land-based 
ballistic  missiles  of  intercontinental 
range  (ICBM's),  and  ballistic  missiles 
fired  by  submarines  (SLBM's).  This 
equal  ceiling  will  correct  a  major 
problem  we  had  with  SALT  I,  namely, 
perceptions. 

Under  SALT  I,  the  Soviet  Union  was 
allowed  over  2,300  missiles,  the 
United  States  just  a  little  over  1,700. 
SALT  I  thus  created  a  "perception"  of 
Soviet  superiority,  even  though  the 
superiority  was  not  real. 

SALT  II  wipes  that  away.  It  forces 
the  Soviets  to  destroy  some  250  exist- 
ing missiles  and/or  long-range  bomb- 
ers. Because  the  United  States  has  only 
slightly  over  2,000  delivery  vehicles  at 
this  time,  we  could  build  up  to  the 
2,250  ceiling,  if  we  so  choose. 

SALT  II  will  also  place  limits  on  the 
number  of  warheads.  The  2,250  limit 
refers  only  to  the  platforms  and  launch- 
ers on  which  warheads  are  placed.  The 
United  States  now  has  almost  10,000 
nuclear  warheads  on  the  launchers  lim- 
ited by  SALT.  The  Soviet  Union  has 
nearly  5.000.  Within  the  SALT  II  lim- 
its on  warheads,  we  will  still  be  ahead 
of  the  Soviets  in  the  number  of 
warheads  by  the  end  of  the  period  cov- 
ered by  this  agreement — 1985  —  but 
the  comparative  totals  will  be  closer. 

The  destructive  capability  of  a  single 
Poseidon  submarine  illustrates  the  di- 
mensions of  nuclear  power,  the  signifi- 
cance of  numbers  of  warheads.  Each 
Poseidon  submarine  can  hit  up  to  160 
separate  targets  with  individual 
warheads.  Each  of  these  warheads  has 
almost  three  times  the  destructive 
power  of  the  bomb  dropped  on 
Hiroshima. 

The  second  point  about  SALT  II  is 
that  for  the  first  time  there  will  be 
qualitative  controls  on  technology,  on 
modernization.  Part  of  these  qualitative 
limits  are  the  warhead  limits  mentioned 
above.  There  are  specific  limits  on  the 
number  of  warheads  that  can  be  placed 
on  all  SLBM's,  on  existing  ICBM's. 
and  on  the  one  new  type  of  ICBM  each 
side  will  be  permitted  until  1985. 

That  limitation  to  only  one  new  type 
of  ICBM  is,  itself,  a  most  significant 
qualitative  control.  To  insure  that  it  has 
real  meaning,  the  modernization  of 
existing  ICBM's  will  be  limited  so  that 
neither  side  can  circumvent  the  limita- 
tion to  one  new  ICBM.  There  will  also 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

be  other  qualitative  limitations  which 
are  designed  to  slow  the  strategic  com-; 
petition.  \ 

Third,  we  believe  we  can  adequately 
verify  this  agreement  by  our  photo- 
reconnaissance  satellites  and  through  i 
other  national  technical  means.  Thus, 
the  agreement  does  not  depend  on  be- 
lieving the  Russians  but  on  our  own 
capability  to  see  and  estimate  that  they 
are  complying  with  the  agreement. 

That  doesn't  mean  that  we  can  verify 
each  of  the  many  provisions  of  the 
agreement  with  the  same  degree  of 
confidence.  We  cannot.  Most  of  the 
provisions  can  be  verified  with  good  or 
high  confidence.  In  the  case  of  a  few 
provisions,  the  confidence  is  less. 
However,  we  believe  that  we  can  deal 
with  these  particular  provisions,  even 
in  a  "worst  case"  where  the  Russians 
cheated. 

On  balance,  we  feel  that  verification 
is  adequate  and  that  we  can  deal  effec- 
tively with  the  consequences  of  viola- 
tion. 

Under  the  SALT  I  and  antiballistic 
missile  (ABM)  agreements,  it  is  fair  to 
say  that  the  Soviets  pushed  the  in- 
terpretation of  many  of  the  provisions 
to  the  limit.  But  on  every  single 
occasion  —  and  I  underline  every  — 
where  we  drew  Soviet  attention  to  a 
compliance  issue,  they  ended  up  in 
compliance  with  the  agreement.  Either 
we  cleared  up  a  misunderstanding  or 
they  changed  their  practices. 

Fourth,  SALT  II  allows  us  to  con- 
tinue our  patterns  of  military  coopera- 
tion with  our  allies,  particularly  our 
NATO  allies.  This  point  should  be 
stressed,  because  one  of  the  most  seri- 
ous pieces  of  misinformation  about 
SALT  is  that  the  agreement  will  some- 
how prevent  us  from  continuing  to  help 
our  allies  develop  their  forces.  This  is 
simply  nonsense.  As  Secretary  [of  De- 
fense Harold  H.]  Brown  and  senior 
military  officers  have  testified  to  Con- 
gress, this  agreement  does  not  hamper 
our  ability  to  continue  those  patterns  of 
cooperation,  including  helping  our  al- 
lies modernize  their  forces. 

Finally,  the  agreement  allows  the 
United  States  to  go  forward  with  every 
single  strategic  nuclear  program  now 
on  our  drawing  boards — every  one  of 
them.  The  SALT  agreement  does  not 
slow  down  our  plans  to  develop  the 
cruise  missile.  It  does  not  in  any  way 
impair  our  ability  to  move  forward  with 
new  programs  for  SLBM's — Trident  I 
and  Trident  II  —  with  the  new  Trident 
submarine,  or  the  new  M-X  land-based 
missile.  Our  military  options  are  open. 
All  this  being  said  about  the  terms  of 
the  agreement,  what  does  it  add  up  to 
in  arms  control  value?  What  is  being 
controlled?  The  honest  answer  is  that 


June  1979 


25 


the  agreement  has  us  taking  a  step  to- 
ward control,  toward  limitation,  rather 
than  just  accepting  unrestrained  com- 
petition and  all  that  that  entails.  This  is 
not  an  insignificant  statement — it  is  a 
major  statement. 

In  politics,  people  often  scoff  at 
moving  on  the  margins,  moving  a  little 
here,  moving  a  little  there.  It's  not 
enough;  it  doesn't  amount  to  a  hill  of 
beans,  so  some  say.  Why  are  we  pay- 
ing such  a  high  price  for  so  little?  One 
really  has  to  understand  what  arms 
control  is  all  about  to  understand  why 
this  agreement  is  so  important.  Arms 
control  is.  in  its  essence,  a 
confidence-building  exercise. 

What  if  we  didn't  have  SALT  11? 
Even  with  the  agreement,  we  will  do 
what  is  necessary  to  compete  with  the 
Soviets.  No  responsible  political  leader 
would  choose  otherwise.  That  is  not 
the  issue.  The  issue  is  that,  if  we  both 
decided  to  increase  our  spending  sub- 
stantially on  strategic  forces,  we 
would  end  up  with  a  lot  more  bucks 
having  been  spent  and  no  more  secu- 
rity. In  the  nuclear  age  absolute  secu- 
rity is  no  longer  in  the  cards.  Part  of 
our  growing  up  and  learning  to  live 
with  this  situation  is  understanding  that 
fact. 

The  Treaty  and  the  U.S. -Soviet 
Strategic  Balance 

How  then  does  this  agreement  fit 
into  the  general  Soviet-American  nu- 
clear balance?  The  first  point  is  that  we 
are  strong,  that  we  are  not  getting 
weaker,  that  we  are  getting  stronger. 
We  have  underway  the  nuclear  pro- 
grams that  I  have  mentioned  and 
others,  as  well  as  programs  to  mod- 
ernize our  conventional  forces.  We  are 
not  sitting  on  our  laurels  and  taking 
chances  with  our  security.  I  am  very 
discouraged,  as  I  have  gone  around  the 
country,  to  hear  so  many  American 
political  leaders  bad-mouthing  our 
military  strength,  portraying  the 
Soviets  as  10  feet  tall  and  the  United 
States  as  a  midget.  The  danger  is  that 
the  Soviets  and  others  might  believe 
this  and  act  on  it,  even  though  it  is  not 
true. 

Let  me  now  address  a  subject  that 
has  gained  considerable  attention  and 
that  will  continue  to  be  discussed 
throughout  the  SALT  debate.  It  is 
called  "ICBM  vulnerability,"  and  it 
lies  at  the  heart  of  judgments  being 
made  about  the  future  of  the  strategic 
balance. 

As  missiles  become  more  accurate, 
they  have  more  capability  to  destroy 
other  missiles  which  are  still  in  silos 
waiting  to  be  launched.  So  a  situation 
is  evolving  where  our  ICBM  force — 


the  Minuteman  force  —  will  in  the  early 
1980's  become  vulnerable  in  theory  to 
a  Soviet  first-strike.  This  is  of  concern 
to  many  people  both  inside  and  outside 
the  Administration.  If  we  keep  the 
problem  in  perspective,  we  realize  that 
we  cannot  be  relaxed  about  it,  but 
neither  do  we  have  to  panic  or  react 
hastily  with  quick  fixes  and  short-term 
solutions. 

Based  on  our  projections  of  what  the 
Soviet  force  will  be  capable  of  in  the 
early  1980's  we  now  estimate  that  they 


will  have  the  theoretical  capability  to 
destroy  up  to  90%  of  our  1 ,000  Min- 
uteman missiles  in  a  surprise  first- 
strike.  But  this  is  a  "worst  case" 
scenario  and  one  which  I  believe  the 
Soviets  could  never  count  upon  in 
making  their  strategic  plans.  Let  me 
outline  some  of  the  assumptions  they 
would  have  to  make  to  act  upon  this 
situation  of  ICBM  vulnerability. 

•  The  Soviets  would  have  to  assume 
optimum  performance  by  their  missile 


DEPARTMEIVr:      Reorganization 
of  Foreign  Assistance  Progran^s 


WHITE  HOUSE 

ANNOUNCEMENT, 
FEB.  15,  1979' 

The  White  House  announced  on 
February  15  that  President  Carter  will 
propose  to  the  Congress  a  far-reaching 
reorganization  of  U.S.  foreign  assist- 
ance programs,  the  first  such  restruc- 
turing since  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID)  was 
established  in  1961.  It  is  designed  to 
improve  the  cost-effectiveness  of  U.S. 
assistance  to  developing  nations. 

The  reorganization  would  consoli- 
date policy  direction  of  development 
agencies  and  responsibilities  in  a  new 
International  Development  Cooperation 
Administration  (IDCA).  The  IDCA 
Administrator  would  report  both  to  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
would  serve  as  the  principal  develop- 
ment adviser  to  each.  The  new  admin- 
istration would  be  a  small  agency 
charged  with  coordinating,  providing 
policy  guidance,  and  evaluating  the  de- 
velopment activities  of: 

•  The  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment, which  administers  the  U.S. 
bilateral  foreign  assistance  program; 

•  The  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation  (OPIC),  which  insures  and 
guarantees  U.S.  private  investments  in 
developing  countries;  and 

•  The  proposed  new  Institute  for 
Technological  Cooperation,  which  will 
support  research  and  technological  in- 
novation to  reduce  obstacles  to  eco- 
nomic development. 

The  agency  will  also  have  the  fol- 
lowing responsibilities: 

•  To  insure  that  development  goals 
are  considered  in  executive  branch  de- 
cisionmaking on  trade,  technology,  and 
other  economic  policy  issues  affecting 
the  less  developed  nations; 


•  To  participate  in  the  selection  of 
U.S.  Executive  Directors  of  multilat- 
eral development  banks  (World  Bank, 
Inter-American  Development  Bank, 
Asian  Development  Bank,  and  African 
Development  Fund)  and  advise  these 
Executive  Directors  on  proposed  proj- 
ects and  programs;  and 

•  To  assume  lead  responsibility  for 
U.S.  budget  support  for  policy  advice 
to  those  international  organizations  and 
programs  whose  purpose  is  primarily 
developmental  (U.N.  Development 
Program;  UNICEF;  Organization  of 
American  States  technical  assistance 
funds;  U.N.  Capital  Development 
Fund;  U.N.  Educational  and  Training 
Program  for  Southern  Africa;  U.N./ 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
(FAO)  World  Food  Program?  FAO  Post 
Harvest  Funds;  and  U.N.  Disaster  Re- 
lief Organization). 

The  purpose  of  this  reorganization  is 
to  manage  more  effectively  U.S.  de- 
velopment activities  by  making  a  single 
U.S.  official  responsible  for  formulat- 
ing overall  development  policy  and  for 
overseeing  the  numerous  programs  in- 
tended to  implement  that  policy. 

The  reorganization  was  decided  upon 
by  the  President  after  considerable  con- 
sultation with  interested  Members  of 
Congress,  and  is  consistent  with  the 
objectives  of  a  bill  submitted  last  year 
by  the  late  Senator  Hubert  H. 
Humphrey. 

The  reorganization  will  be  im- 
plemented through  a  combination  of 
reorganization  plan  (to  be  submitted  to 
Congress  in  accordance  with  the  reor- 
ganization authority  enacted  in  1977), 
legislation,  executive  order,  and  ad- 
ministrative action.  These  steps  will 
begin  during  the  next  several  weeks.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  19.  1979. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


force  in  a  first-strike,  including  com- 
plete surprise.  But  no  one  has  ever 
planned,  coordinated,  and  launched 
such  an  attack.  The  imponderables  are 
numerous  and  enormous.  The  effects  of 
"fratricide,"  for  example,  where  in- 
coming missiles  destroy  each  other,  are 
and  will  remain  big  question  marks. 

•  They  would  have  to  assume  we 
would  leave  our  ICBM's  in  the  silos 
and  let  them  be  destroyed;  that  is,  that 
we  would  not  launch  these  ICBM's 
even  though  we  knew  a  Soviet  attack 
was  under  way.  But  they  would  be 
taking  great  risks  to  make  such  an  as- 
sumption. And  if  we  launch  under  at- 
tack, their  missiles  would  blow  up 
empty  silos.  The  exchange  would  crip- 
ple the  Soviet  strategic  forces  and 
would  still  leave  the  United  States  with 
its  submarines  and  bombers  relatively 
untouched  (and  these  remaining  forces 


represent  between  two-thirds  to 
three-fourths  of  our  nuclear  strike 
force).  But  that's  not  all. 

•  The  Soviets  would  have  to  assume 
that  we  would  be  so  paralyzed  by  their 
strike  that  we  would  not  respond  with 
our  remaining  ICBM's  and  all  of  our 
submarines  and  bombers  against  Soviet 
cities  for  fear  of  inviting  Soviet  attack 
against  U.S.  cities.  But  if  the  Soviets 
struck  to  destroy  all  of  our  ICBM's 
somewhere  between  8  and  20  million 
Americans  would  be  killed  virtually 
right  away.  The  Soviets  would  be  fools 
to  launch  an  attack  on  the  assumption 
that  we  would  not  strike  back.  I  said 
they  are  not  supermen;  they  are  not 
fools  either. 

What  I  am  saying  is  that  the  real- 
world  danger  will  be  much  less  than 
what  the  doomsayers  are   predicting. 


EAST  ASIA:        Tahvan 
Relntions  Act 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT 
APR.  10,  1979' 

I  am  today  signing  into  law  H.R. 
2479,  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act.  This 
legislation  will  enable  the  American 
people  and  the  people  on  Taiwan  to 
maintain  commercial,  cultural,  and 
other  relations  without  official  gov- 
ernment representation  and  without 
diplomatic  relations. 

The  act  contains  all  of  the  authority 
that  1  requested  in  order  to  enable  us  to 
maintain  such  unofficial  relations  with 
the  people  on  Taiwan.  It  authorizes  the 
American  Institute  in  Taiwan,  a  non- 
governmental entity  incorporated  under 
the  laws  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to 
conduct  these  relations.  Similarly,  the 
people  on  Taiwan  will  conduct  rela- 
tions through  a  nongovernmental 
organization — the  Coordination  Coun- 
cil for  North  American  Affairs. 

The  act  is  consistent  with  the  under- 
standings we  reached  in  normalizing 
relations  with  the  Government  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  It  reflects 
our  recognition  of  that  government  as 
the  sole  legal  government  of  China. 
Having  normalized  relations  with 
China  in  the  spirit  of  the  Shanghai 
communique,  I  look  forward  in  the 
coming  years  to  a  deepening  and 
broadening  of  U.S. -China   relations 


which  will  contribute  to  the  welfare  of 
our  two  peoples  and  to  peace  in  the 
world. 

I  wish  to  express  my  appreciation  to 
the  Congress  for  the  speed  and  dili- 
gence with  which  it  has  acted.  I  believe 
a  different  treatment  of  the  issue  of 
diplomatic  properties  belonging  to 
China  would  have  been  preferable,  and 
my  action  today  is  without  prejudice  to 
any  subsequent  adjudication  of  the 
legal  status  of  these  properties.  In  most 
respects,  however,  the  Congress  and 
the  executive  branch  have  cooperated 
effectively  in  this  matter. 

In  a  number  of  sections  of  this 
legislation,  the  Congress  has  wisely 
granted  discretion  to  the  President.  In 
all  instances,  1  will  exercise  that  dis- 
cretion in  a  manner  consistent  with  our 
interest,  in  the  well-being  of  the  people 
on  Taiwan,  and  with  the  understand- 
ings we  reached  on  the  normalization 
of  relations  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China,  as  expressed  in  our  joint 
communique  of  December  15,  1978, 
on  establishment  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. D 


'Made  on  signing  H.R.  2479  inio  law.  As 
enacted.  H.R.  2479  is  Public  Law  96-8.  ap- 
proved Apr.  10,  1979  (text  from  Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  16). 


This  danger  to  our  ICBM  force,  how- 
ever, has  not  yet  arrived,  and  since  we 
see  it  coming  we  are  working  to  correct 
it. 

One  of  the  main  options  being  con- 
sidered to  solve  this  problem  —  the 
mobile  land-based  missile  —  would  not 
be  feasible  without  SALT.  SALT 
didn't  create  the  problem  of  Min- 
uteman  vulnerability.  The  problem  re- 
sults from  the  increasing  accuracy  and 
destructive  power  of  new  Soviet  mis- 
siles. But,  paradoxically,  only  SALT 
can  make  the  land-based  mobile  missile 
idea  a  viable  one,  because  it  limits  the 
number  of  warheads  that  can  be  placed 
on  ICBM's.  Without  SALT,  the 
Soviets  could  just  keep  putting  more 
warheads  on  their  missiles  every  time 
we  build  a  new  hole  in  the  ground  to 
hide  our  missiles. 

In  sum,  SALT  does  not  hurt  the 
strategic  balance  and  U.S.  long-term 
security;  it  enhances  it.  This  Adminis- 
tration is  working,  as  its  predecessors 
have  worked,  to  keep  the  United  States 
secure.  The  weapons  programs  planned 
or  underway  will  do  just  that  through 
the  period  of  SALT  II  and  beyond.  We 
can  do  the  job  without  SALT,  but  we 
can  do  the  job  much  better  with  SALT. 


SALT  and  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

Even  if  we  have  a  sense  of  confi- 
dence about  future  security,  about 
measures  we  are  taking  to  deal  with  it, 
how  does  SALT  affect  the  broader 
picture  of  U.S. -Soviet  relations?  There 
are  two  general  concerns.  One  is:  Why 
do  we  want  to  have  an  agreement  like 
this  with  the  Russians  when  they  are 
acting  as  they  are  in  Africa  or  Iran  or 
Indochina?  Why  don't  we  withhold 
SALT  until  they  behave  themselves  in 
these  other  parts  of  the  world?  The 
other  concern  is:  Isn't  SALT  funda- 
mentally dangerous  to  the  American 
body  politic  and  isn't  it  somehow  going 
to  lull  the  American  people  into  a  false 
sense  of  security  and  make  them  think  , 
there  is  peace  when  there  really  isn't? 

The  question  is  whether  we  should 
tell  the  Soviets  that  we  won't  move 
forward  on  SALT  unless  they  cease  and 
desist  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  or  Iran  or 
Indochina  or  elsewhere.  To  begin  with 
we  are  not  negotiating  SALT  as  a  favor 
to  the  Russians,  a  favor  we  will  with- 
draw if  they  are  not  "nice  guys" 
elsewhere.  We  are  signing  the  SALT 
agreement  because  it  is  in  our  interest 
to  do  so;  it  makes  strategic  sense.  The 
Soviet  Union  is  in  SALT  for  the  same 
reasons.  If  we  seek  to  tie  the  fate  of 
SALT,  and  all  that  hinges  on  it,  to  the 
achievement  of  some  benchmark  in 


June  1979 


27 


I'. S. -Soviet  relations,  or  to  Soviet  ac- 
ceptance of  our  interests  in  other  parts 
ot  the  world,  it  will  not  solve  these 
other  problems  and  we  will  not  have 
SALT  either.  The  Soviets  will  pursue 
their  interests,  attempting  to  gain  influ- 
ence elsewhere  in  the  world,  and  so 
will  we.  SALT  does  not  mean  the  com- 
petition is  over  everywhere,  just  that 
the  strategic  competition,  because  of 
mutual  interests,  will  be  limited  to 
some  degree. 

By  the  same  token,  going  ahead  with 
SALT  does  not  mean  we  are  caving  in 
to  the  Soviets  elsewhere  either.  We  can 
bring  our  resources  to  bear  on  Soviet 
behavior  in  the  Third  World.  We  do 
that,  but  it  is  not  easy — just  as  it  is  not 
easy  for  the  Soviets  simply  to  accept 
our  stepping  in  where  they  have  had 
difficulties  or  failed  such  as  in  Egypt, 
the  Arab-Israel  negotiations,  Indonesia, 
Sudan,  and  elsewhere. 

The  other  concern  is  that  SALT  is 
somehow  putting  the  American  people 
to  sleep,  leading  them  to  think  that 
"detente"  solves  all  our  problems  and 
that  the  Soviets  are  our  trusted  friends. 
The  policy  of  this  Administration  — 
and  previous  ones  as  well  —  is  to  de- 
velop some  elements  of  cooperation 
even  as  we  compete  with  the  Soviets. 
It's  a  mixed,  complicated,  and  even  in- 
consistent relationship,  but  that's  life. 
It's  the  kind  of  thing  people  accept  as 
normal  in  dealing  with  other  people.  A 
mature  relationship,  even  with  an  ad- 
versary, necessitates  building  some 
bridges  of  restraint  and  moderation  at 
the  same  time  as  we  compete  and 
challenge.  It's  hard  to  get  some  critics 
to  accept  this  in  foreign  policy,  even 
though  it  is  readily  accepted  in  their 
private  lives  and  business  relationships. 
As  I  move  around  the  country.  I  am 
concerned,  from  what  I  hear,  that  the 
critics  are  creating  a  climate  where 
there  is  less  and  less  willingness  to  tol- 
erate this  type  of  commonsense,  mixed 
relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  the  late  1970's  there  is  less  toler- 
ance for  complexities.  I  am  concerned 
that  this  kind  of  attitude  is  affecting 
how  we  come  to  terms  with  something 
like  SALT,  which  I  think  lies  at  the 
very  heart  of  a  sensible,  but  complex, 
foreign  policy.  What  is  required  here  is 
a  steadiness,  a  sense  of  balance,  an 
awareness  of  risks  and  opportunities, 
and  a  maturity.  In  the  end.  what  we  are 
trying  to  do  .  what  we  are  trying  to  per- 
suade you  to  believe,  is  that  SALT  is  a 
part  of  a  process,  part  of  a  hard-nosed, 
pragmatic,  American  way  of  attempt- 
ing to  deal  with  our  security.  SALT  is 
not  a  substitute  for  a  strong  national 
defense.  It  is,  in  our  judgment,  a 
necessary  supplement  to  it.  D 


ECOIVOMICS:    19tajor  Elements 

of  the  iff ullilaleral  Trade 

IVegotiutions 


by  Julius  L .  Katz 


Address  before   the   League   of 
Women   Voters  conference  in  Racine. 
Wisconsin,  on  April  5.  1979.  Mr.  Katz 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for   Economic 
and  Business  Affairs. ' 

Within  the  next  several  weeks  5 
years  of  multilateral  trade  nego- 
tiations —  known  as  the  Tokyo 
Round — will  conclude  in  Geneva.  To  a 
remarkable  degree  our  achievements 
have  matched  our  objectives.  It  is  par- 
ticularly remarkable  when  one  consid- 
ers that  these  negotiations  were  con- 
ducted during  a  period  of  worldwide 
economic  recession  and  economic  ad- 
justment to  higher  energy  costs. 

Not  surprisingly,  we  did  not  meet  all 
of  our  objectives.  And.  as  in  all  negoti- 
ations, we  had  to  offer  to  receive. 
Some  of  the  results  are  tangible  and 
immediate.  Many  are  less  tangible  and 
will  depend  on  the  successful  and  ef- 
fective implementation  of  the  agree- 
ments. 

This  trade  negotiation — to  a  greater 
extent  than  any  of  the  six  prior 
negotiations — set  out  to  bring  greater 
discipline  over  government  interven- 
tion as  it  affects  the  flow  of  goods 
across  borders.  If  we  start  with  the 
premise  that  our  government  is  rela- 
tively less  inclined  to  intervention  in 
the  economy,  then  this  greater  disci- 
pline in  the  world  trading  system  re- 
dounds to  the  benefit  of  our  exports 
and  our  economy. 

Through  a  series  of  agreements 
dealing  with  the  nontariff  measures 
governments  employed  to  interfere 
with  trade,  we  have  set  the  stage  for  a 
major  reform  of  the  world  trading  sys- 
tem. These  nontariff  measures  include 
subsidies,  quotas,  customs  valuation, 
and  discriminatory  government 
procurement — practices  that  govern- 
ments have  increasingly  used  to  sup- 
port and  protect  domestic  industries 
from  import  competition  or  to  increase 
shares  of  world  trade.  With  the  general 
reduction  of  tariffs  in  previous  rounds, 
these  nontariff  measures  have  become 
relatively  more  important  in  their  im- 
pact on  international  trade. 


Results  of  the  Negotiations 

What  more  specifically  are  the  re- 
sults of  these  negotiations?  Let  me 
briefly  discuss  some  of  the  main  ele- 
ments. 

Although  present  average  tariffs  are 
well  below  the  levels  of  the  1930's  and 
1940's  and  are  thus  less  of  a  trade 
barrier  than  in  the  past,  tariffs  remain 
the  central  element  of  trade  negotia- 
tions. We  and  our  major  trading 
partners — including  the  Europeans, 
Japan,  and  Canada — have  agreed  to  av- 
erage tariff  cuts  of  about  30%.  This  is 
only  slightly  less  than  the  35%  reduc- 
tion that  was  agreed  in  1967  during  the 
Kennedy  Round  of  Trade  negotiations. 
Tariff  cuts  obtained  in  several  areas  of 
special  interest  to  U.S.  exporters  are 
paper,  electronic  products,  and  heavy 
industrial  equipment.  When  these  tariff 
cuts  are  in  place,  the  average  tariff  of 
the  United  States,  the  European  Com- 
munity, and  Japan  will  be  between  6% 
and  7%.  In  addition,  we  are  trying  to 
reach  bilateral  tariff  agreements  with 
15-20  developing  countries  which  are 
important  trading  countries. 

In  this  round  of  negotiations,  more 
has  been  achieved  in  the  agricultural 
sector  than  in  any  previous  round.  We 
have  obtained  increased  access  for 
U.S.  agriculture  to  the  markets  of 
Europe,  Japan,  and  other  countries  for 
a  number  of  important  U.S.  agricul- 
tural products — including  poultry,  rice, 
almonds,  tobacco,  beef,  and  citrus.  A 
new  framework  for  consultations 
among  the  main  agricultural  exporters 
will  assist  us  in  dealing  with  foreign 
agricultural  policies  that  affect  our  ex- 
ports. We  also  have  an  instrument  to 
deal  with  the  problem  of  foreign  sub- 
sidies that  displace  American  agricul- 
tural exports  in  traditional  third- 
country  markets. 

Of  all  the  nontariff  codes,  the  one 
on  subsidies  perhaps  ranks  as  the  most 
important.  No  other  issue  has  been 
more  contentious  recently  in  our  trad- 
ing relations,  and  none  so  clearly  re- 
flects the  direct  intervention  of  gov- 
ernments in  trade.  The  agreement  we 
have  reached  will  prohibit  export  sub- 
sidies on  industrial  products.  If  this 
agreement  is  breached  countries  can 


28 

take  countervailing  action.  It  also  pro- 
vides that  where  certain  domestic 
subsidies — such  as  those  to  assist  re- 
gional development — have  trade  effects 
which  cause  injury  to  other  nations, 
their  effects  can  be  offset  by  counter- 
vailing action. 

Governments  often  give  preferences 
to  domestic  industries  when  making 
purchases  for  the  government's  own 
use.  Sometimes  they  completely 
exclude  foreign  bidders.  The  agreement 
we  have  reached  on  government  pro- 
curement takes  a  major  step  toward 
opening  the  growing  public  sector  to  all 
bidders  and  removing  domestic  prefer- 
ences. It  is  estimated  that  as  much  as 
$25  billion  in  foreign  government  pur- 
chases will  be  newly  opened  to  bids  by 
U.S.  firms. 

Countries  have  legitimate  reasons  to 
require  that  imports  meet  certain  per- 
formance and  quality  standards  to  pro- 
tect, for  instance,  the  health  and  safety 
of  their  consumers.  The  agreement  on 
standards  provides  that  these  legiti- 
mate standards  not  be  used  or  ad- 
ministered so  as  to  be  trade  barriers  and 
will  give  foreign  industries  access  to 
domestic  standard  setting  bodies. 

One  way  of  increasing  the  costs  of 
imported  goods  is  to  use  arbitrary  or 
fictitious  means  of  valuing  them  for  the 
purpose  of  setting  the  import  duty.  The 


agreement  we  have  reached  on  customs 
valuation  establishes  the  transaction 
value  of  a  product  as  the  principal 
means  of  determining  the  value  of  the 
product  for  the  assessment  of  customs 
duties.  This  will  replace  many  different 
systems  that  are  currently  used  by  dif- 
ferent countries,  even  within  the  same 
country.  Thus,  importers  will  now 
know  with  greater  certainty  the  duty 
they  will  be  required  to  pay.  Countries 
will  not  be  able  to  use  their  method  of 
valuation  as  additional  protection  for 
the  industries. 

A  special  sectoral  agreement  is 
nearing  completion  on  civilian  air- 
craft. Tariffs  on  aircraft  and  parts  will 
be  reduced  to  zero  in  signatory  coun- 
tries, which  also  agree  to  place  re- 
straints on  government  subsidization 
for  the  production  and  marketing  of 
aircraft  and  on  the  "buy  national" 
practices  which  occur  in  this  sector.  As 
the  world's  most  efficient  producer  of 
aircraft,  and  the  biggest  exporter,  this 
agreement  should  be  of  special  benefit 
to  the  United  States. 


Major  Trading  Problems 

This  negotiation  enabled  us  to  ad- 
dress major  problems  with  a  number  of 
our  trading  partners,   such  as  Japan, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Europe,  Canada,  and  the  developing  i 
countries.  Our  problems  were  perhaps 
greatest,  and  certainly  the  most  visible, 
with  Japan,  given  our  trade  deficit  with 
Japan  of  $12  billion  in  1978.  We  ob- 
tained an  average  tariff  cut  of  about 
35%  from  the  Japanese.  We  also  ob- 
tained increased  access  to  the  Japanese 
market  for  high-quality  U.S.  beef  and 
U.S.  citrus  products,  goals  we  have 
been  pursuing  for  years. 

And  Japanese  acceptance  of  the 
codes  of  nontariff  measures  should 
bring  about  some  major  changes  in 
Japanese  practices — for  example,  in 
setting  product  standards — that  have 
frustrated  U.S.  exporters  for  many" 
years.  In  government  procurement 
Japan  has  kept  its  market  closed,  espe- 
cially for  high-technology  goods  such 
as  telecommunications  equipment.  We 
have  made  it  clear  that  Japan  must  open 
these  markets  to  imports  if  it  is  to 
benefit  from  the  MTN  [multilateral 
trade  negotiations]  code  in  our  market. 

With  the  European  Community,  we 
obtained  an  average  tariff  cut  of  around 
34%.  Agriculture  is  one  area  where  we 
have  had  difficult  disputes  with  the 
Community  in  the  past.  Although  the 
MTN  will  not  end  our  differences,  we 
have  at  least  obtained  tacit  recognition 
by  the  Community  that  their  agricul- 
tural  subsidies   may  cause  the   United 


WORLD  TRADE  WEEK, 
A  PROCLAMATION, 
APR.  6,  1971* 

A  .strong  position  in  world  trade  i.s  one  of 
the  foundations  of  the  American  economy. 
By  expanding  our  trade,  we  enlarge  the  op- 
portunities for  U.S.  companies  to  prosper 
under  our  free  enterprise  system  and  for  U.S. 
workers  to  find  employment  throughout  the 
American  industrial  complex. 

Trade  also  joins  us  with  other  nations  of 
the  world  in  a  partnership  of  peace  and  trust 
that  advances  the  well-being  of  people 
everywhere.  It  encourages  the  internalional 
exchange  of  ideas,  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence, and  assists  in  developing  fuller  and 
more  fruitful  use  of  the  world's  resources. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  dedicated  to 
policies  that  promote  freer,  wider  trade  and 
that  avoid  the  destructive  consequences  of 
protectionism.  We  believe  our  economy  is 
best  protected,  and  our  citizens  better  served, 
when  barriers  to  trade  between  nations  are 
lowered  rather  than  raised. 

We  are  the  world's  largest  trading  nation. 
Yet  compared  to  many  of  our  trading 
partners,  we  export  less  of  our  rich  and  var- 
ied production  than  we  should. 

World  Trade  Week  gives  us  the  opportu- 


nity to  pledge  ourselves  to  exporting  as  a  na- 
tional priority  and  renew  our  determination 
to  succeed  in  the  world  marketplace. 

Now,  Therefore,  1,  Jimmy  Carter, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  do 
hereby  proclaim  the  week  beginning  May  20, 
1979,  as  World  Trade  Week,  and  I  request 
all  Federal.  State  and  local  officials  to  coop- 
erate in  the  observance  of  that  week. 

1  urge  business,  labor,  agricultural,  educa- 
tional, professional  and  civic  groups,  and  all 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  observe 
World  Trade  Week  with  gatherings,  discus- 
sions, exhibits,  ceremonies  and  other  appro- 
priate activities  that  promote  awareness  of 
the  importance  of  world  trade  to  our  econ- 
omy and  our  relations  with  other  nations. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set 
my  hand  this  sixth  day  of  April,  in  the  year 
of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-nine, 
and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States 
of  America  the  two  hundred  and  third. 

Jimmy  Carter 


SECRETARY  VANCE'S 
STATEMENT,  APR.  24,  1979 

World  Trade  Week  this  year  is  especially 
timely.  After  6  years  of  painstaking  negotia- 


tions, we  and  the  other  major  trading  nations 
have  just  concluded  a  series  of  agreements 
which  represent  the  most  important  steps  to 
encourage  world  trade  in  more  than  a  gener- 
ation. 

Over  time,  the  so-called  Tokyo  Round 
agreements  will  mean  freer  and  fairer  world 
trade,  with  more  production  and  more  jobs, 
lower  prices,  and  less  inflation  for  all.  And 
as  the  world's  largest  trader,  our  country 
stands  to  gain  more  than  any  other  from  the 
new,  fairer  trading  rules. 

Legislation  to  give  effect  to  these  historic 
agreements  is  now  before  our  Congress, 
which  played  an  important  role  in  launching 
and  helping  to  carry  forward  the  negotia- 
tions. As  consumers  and  as  producers,  all 
Americans  have  an  important  stake  in  in- 
creased foreign  trade.  I  hope  as  many  of 
them  as  possible  will  use  the  opportunities 
which  World  Trade  Week  presents  to  inform 
themselves  on  these  agreements  and  their  im- 
plications and  to  convey  their  views  about 
them  soon  to  their  representatives  in  the 
Congress. 


*No.  4654  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  9,  1979. 


lurie  1979 


29 


Slates  to  lose  exports  in  traditional 
IS.  markets.  They  have  also  agreed  to 
a  consultative  mechanism  in  agriculture 
In  help  avoid  problems  before  they  de- 
\elop. 

We  have  had  a  particular  problem 
with  the  Canadian  system  of  customs 
valuation,  which  artificially  increased 
the  value  of  imports  for  duty  assess- 
ment purposes.  The  Canadian  agree- 
ment to  join  the  customs  valuation  code 
should  be  of  considerable  benefit  to 
U.S.  exporters,  in  addition,  Canada 
has  agreed  to  moderate  the  impact  of 
the  "made-in-Canada"  tariff — a  law 
that  raised  the  duty  on  any  product 
manufactured  north  of  the  border  and 
kept  American  exporters  in  doubt. 

Developing  countries  have  not  as  a 
general  rule  accepted  all  the  obligations 
of  the  world  trading  system.  Many  are 
not  GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  members,  and  even 
those  who  are  GATT  members  often 
have  extensive  exceptions  from  the 
normal  rules.  This  is  in  recognition,  of 
course,  of  their  development  status. 
But  as  they  advance  to  higher  levels  of 
industrialization  and  take  advantage  of 
the  relative  openness  of  our  market,  we 
expect  them  to  assume  an  increasingly 
higher  level  of  obligation.  The  Tokyo 
Round  has  served  to  advance  this  ob- 
jective by  bringing  developing  coun- 
tries more  into  the  mainstream  of  the 
world  trading  system.  For  example, 
several  developing  countries  will  join 
the  GATT  as  a  result  of  these  negotia- 
tions, and  about  20  of  the  more  de- 
veloped of  the  developing  countries 
have  made  tariff  reductions,  something 
they  have  not  done  in  previous  rounds. 
We  also  expect  that  the  more  advanced 
less  developed  countries  (LDC's)  will 
sign  a  number  of  the  codes.  Since 
LDC's  are  increasingly  important  mar- 
kets for  U.S.  goods,  these  results  are 
clearly  in  our  interest. 

In  a  number  of  sectors  we  reached 
agreements  which,  while  less  trade 
liberalizing  than  other  areas,  neverthe- 
less will  benefit  American  exporters 
and  consumers  while  at  the  same  time 
provide  adequate  protection  for  Ameri- 
can producers.  For  example,  among  the 
highest  U.S.  tariffs  have  been  those  on 
textile  and  apparel  products.  In  this 
negotiation,  we  have  made  an  impor- 
tant reduction  in  these  high  tariffs, 
which  will  benefit  the  U.S.  consumer. 

However,  at  the  same  time,  the 
President,  recognizing  the  sensitivity 
and  importance  of  the  domestic  textile 
industry,  especially  as  a  major 
employer  of  U.S.  workers,  said  that  the 
Administration  would  act  to  guard 
against  disruptive  and  injurious  import 
surges  to  insure  that  this  industry 
would   not  be   damaged.    This   is   an 


example  of  a  pragmatic  policy  designed 
to  meet  the  challenges  of  the 
I980's — lowering  tariffs  to  benefit 
consumers,  while  taking  parallel  ac- 
tions to  insure  that  an  important 
American  industry  and  American  jobs 
are  protected. 

1  might  also  mention  cheese,  a  prod- 
uct of  great  interest  to  many  people 
here  in  Wisconsin.  Our  trading 
partners — such  as  the  European  Com- 
munity. Scandinavia,  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand — insisted  on  obtaining 
increased  access  to  the  U.S.  market  for 
their  cheese  in  return  for  their  making 
concessions  important  to  the  United 
States.  In  order  to  deal  with  this  prob- 
lem, we  have  agreed  to  modestly  ex- 
pand access  to  our  market  for  cheese. 
But  at  the  same  time,  we  recognize  the 
importance  of  the  U.S.  cheese  industry 
to  the  United  States,  and  so  we  will 
maintain  most  cheeses  under  absolute 
quotas  to  insure  that  no  damage  is  done 
to  the  U.S.  industry.  We  have  also 
made  sure  that  imports  will  not  enter 
the  United  States  under  U.S.  support 
prices.  Thus  the  consumer  will  gain 
some  benefits  by  having  a  wider  range 
of  choice  for  cheese,  while  the  industry 
maintains  some  protection.  And  in  re- 
turn the  United  States  obtained  some 
important  benefits  from  our  trading 
partners. 

We  faced  a  similar  problem  regard- 
ing the  American  selling  price  (ASP),  a 
practice  long  objected  to  by  our  trading 
partners.  This  is  a  system  of  customs 
valuation  under  which  certain 
products  —  chiefly  benzenoid  chem- 
icals— are  valued  according  to  their 
price  in  the  United  States,  which  was 
generally  significantly  higher  than  the 
price  of  the  import.  In  effect,  this  al- 
lowed American  firms  to  determine  the 
duty  for  their  import  competition.  We 
have  agreed  to  abandon  the  ASP  sys- 
tem of  valuation  in  the  context  of  the 
customs  valuation  code  and  also  to  ob- 
tain additional  concessions  from  our 
trading  partners. 

At  the  same  time,  we  did  not  want  to 
cause  hardship  to  the  U.S.  chemical 
industry  by  simply  removing  the  sys- 
tem all  at  once.  Therefore,  we  decided 
to  translate  the  ASP  system  into  its 
equivalent  tariff  protection  before 
making  any  tariff  cuts.  For  example, 
assume  there  was  a  chemical  subject  to 
ASP  that  had  a  10%  duty  on  which  we 
agreed  to  make  a  307c  tariff  cut — the 
average  cut.  This  cut  would  not  be 
made  from  the  10%  base  tariff  rate. 
Rather,  the  U.S.  International  Trade 
Commission  was  asked  to  translate  the 
effect  of  the  ASP  valuation  for  this 
chemical  into  tariff  terms.  If  the  Com- 
mission discovered  that  ASP  had  an 
additional  protection  effect  of  10%,  we 


lfMT]% 

Agreements 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  12,  1979' 

The  United  States  today  has  entered 
into  international  agreements  that  will 
bring  a  new  order  to  the  world  trading 
system. 

Trade  negotiators  representing  41 
nations,  accounting  for  more  than  90% 
of  world  trade,  have  agreed  in  Geneva 
on  the  final,  substantive  results  of  the 
Tokyo  Round  of  international  trade 
talks.  These  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions (MTN),  the  seventh  round  since 
World  War  II,  are  the  most  comprehen- 
sive and  far  reaching  since  establish- 
ment of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  in  1947.  For 
the  first  time,  agreements,  or  "codes," 
have  been  concluded  on  a  broad  range 
of  "nontariff" '  obstacles  to  trade. 
Phased  tariff  reductions  averaging 
about  33%  were  also  approved. 

The  agreements,  when  approved  by 
Congress,  will  establish  new  trading 
rules  that  will  increase  the  opportuni- 
ties of  all  nations,  rich  and  poor,  to  ex- 
change their  goods  under  equitable 
conditions.  Through  such  fair  and  open 
trade,  we  strengthen  peace  and  trust  in 
the  world  and  make  more  efficient  use 
of  the  world's  human  and  material  re- 
sources. 

The  agreements  steer  us  away  from 
destructive  protectionism  and  into  a 
path  of  greater  export  opportunities, 
with  the  prospects  of  new  jobs,  im- 
proved productivity,  and  increased  in- 
dustrial and  agricultural  production. 
The  new  opportunities  that  are  thus  de- 
veloped will  be  realized  through  vigor- 
ous efforts  by  government,  industry, 
and  agriculture  to  promote  exports. 

The  trade  agreements  that  we  have 
signed  are  the  product  of  years  of 
work,  during  which  time  American 
negotiators  have  been  advised  and  as- 
sisted by  concerned  Members  of  Con- 
gress and  by  hundreds  of  men  and 
women  from  the  private  sector. 

I  wish  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
reemphasize  this  Administration's 
commitment  to  the  national  export 
policy  that  stimulates  our  export  trade. 
I  also  wish  to  commend  all  those  in  the 
United  States  and  abroad  whose  labors 
resulted  in  the  new  international  trade 
agreements.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  16.  1979. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


will  begin  our  tariff  cut  from  a  tariff 
level  of  20%  (10%  normal  duty  plus 
10%  ASP).  Thus,  a  30%  cut  on  this 
item  would  reduce  the  protection  from 
20%.  to  14%,  not  from  10%r  to  1% . 

These  cases  illustrate  the  sort  of 
problems  we  faced  in  many  sectors. 
We  sought  results  which  would  bring 
forth  concessions  valuable  to  our  ex- 
porters, benefit  the  U.S.  consumers, 
and  at  the  same  time  minimize  any  po- 
tential harm  to  U.S.  producers.  It  is  to 
the  great  credit  of  Ambassador  Strauss 
[Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations]  and  his  team  of 
negotiators  that  we  succeeded  in  high 
degree  in  meeting  these  objectives. 

These  then,  are  the  broad  outlines  of 
the  agreements  that  will  result  from  the 
MTN.  But  will  the  MTN  package 
benefit  the  United  States,  and  if  so, 
how?  These  are  questions  that  must  be 
asked — and  answered — especially  since 
the  Congress  will  be  deciding  this 
summer  whether  or  not  to  approve  the 
MTN  package. 

U.S.  Benefits 

I  believe  that  there  are  five  principal 
benefits  to  the  United  States  of  the 
MTN  agreements,  which  argue  com- 
pellingly  for  their  approval  by  the  Con- 
gress. 

The  first  benefit  is  that  the  MTN 
agreements  will  increase  U.S.  exports. 
This  is  extremely  important  in  view  of 
the  U.S.  balance-of-payment  deficit, 
recent  sluggish  productivity  gains,  and 
the  need  to  sustain  a  high  rate  of 
employment.  I  have  cited  a  number  of 
examples  of  the  package  that  will  pro- 
vide opportunity  for  increased 
exports — the  industrial  tariff  cuts,  the 
agricultural  agreements,  the  govern- 
ment procurement  code,  and  the  air- 
craft agreement.  The  MTN  package 
will  particularly  promote  increased  ex- 
ports to  the  developing  countries — an 
increasingly  important  market  for  U.S. 
goods.  I  am  confident  that  American 
firms  can  and  will  aggressively  take 
advantage  of  the  new  export  opportu- 
nities available  to  them. 

A  second  benefit  from  the  MTN 
package  is  that  it  will  help  fight  infla- 
tion. Naturally,  in  order  to  obtain  tariff 
cuts  overseas,  the  United  States  also 
had  to  agree  to  cut  its  tariffs  recipro- 
cally. These  tariff  cuts  will  make  a 
wider  range  of  goods  available  to 
American  consumers  at  lower  prices 
and  thus  help  in  our  anti-inflation  ef- 
fort. The  staging  of  these  reductions 
over  a  period  of  8  years  will  greatly 
ease  any  short-term  problems  of  ad- 
justment by  U.S.  firms.  In  the  longer 
term  they  will  tend  to  make  U.S.  firms 
more  efficient  and  better  able  to 


JftuitUaterai  Trade 
J^cgotiations 


Foreign  Relations  Outline^ 

The  Tokyo  Round  of  the  Geneva- 
based  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
(MTN)  concluded  April  12,  1979,  in 
Geneva  with  the  initialing  of  the 
negotiated  documents.  This  was  the 
seventh  negotiating  session  held  under 
the  auspices  of  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  Previous 
rounds  dealt  mainly  with  tariff  reduc- 
tions; this  one  also  focused  on  nontariff 
measures  that  distort  international 
trade. 

As  tariffs  were  progressively  re- 
duced, many  nations  relied  more  heav- 
ily on  nontariff  measures  to  restrict  im- 
ports. These  protectionist  measures 
contribute  to  international  tension, 
which  the  Tokyo  Round  seeks  to  dif- 
fuse by  establishing  new  ground  rules 
for  the  world  trading  system. 


U.S.  Benefits 

During  the  past  10  years,  U.S.  ex- 
ports have  more  than  quadrupled,  to 
$143  billion  in  1978.  We  export  about 
16%  of  everything  we  grow,  manufac- 
ture, or  mine,  and  some  4.3  million 
American  jobs  depend  on  U.S.  exports. 


Thus,  the  United  States  has  a  critical 
stake  in  the  MTN's  successful  out- 
come. As  President  Carter  said  in  his 
State  of  the  Union  message  to  the  Con- 
gress on  January  25,  the  proposed  trade 
agreements  will: 

•  Lead  to  increased  opportunities  for 
U.S.  exports; 

•  Insure  that  import  competition  is 
fair;  and 

•  Result  in  lower  prices,  increased 
competition,  and  greater  prosperity  for 
the  American  people. 

The  nontariff  codes  will  not  take  ef- 
fect until  Congress  approves  them  and 
enacts  implementing  legislation. 

Subsidies 

Extensive  use  of  subsidies  by  our 
trading  partners  tends  to  increase  U.S. 
imports  and  displace  our  exports  and  is 
a  constant  irritant  to  our  trade  relations. 
This  code  will  prohibit  export  subsidies 
on  nonprimary  products,  increase  the 
discipline  on  the  use  of  domestic  sub- 
sidies, and  set  up  rules  for  countries  to 
take  countermeasures  against  sub- 
sidized products  that  adversely  affect 
their  trade. 


compete — thus  further  helping  hold 
down  prices. 

A  third  benefit  is  that  the  several 
nontariff  measure  codes  will  lessen 
government  intervention  in  the  world 
trading  system.  Rules  and  limits  to 
government  intervention  will  be 
strengthened.  Since  U.S.  Government 
intervention  in  the  trading  system  is 
generally  much  less  than  that  of  other 
governments,  this  must  be  a  net-plus 
for  the  United  States  and  its  exporters. 
In  short,  these  agreements  will  make 
the  trading  system  more  open — and  in 
such  a  system  it  is  the  best  product  at 
the  lowest  cost  which  is  purchased. 

The  fourth  benefit  is  both  political 
and  economic.  The  MTN  demonstrates 
the  continued  commitment  of  the 
world's  major  trading  nations  to 
liberalized  trade  and  their  rejection  of 
protectionism.  This  is  extremely  im- 
portant to  a  major  trading  nation  such 
as  ours,  for  it  means  that  our  exporters 
will  have  expanded  access  to  foreign 
markets.  In  addition,  we  have  put  in 
place  a  better  means  to  resolve  disputes 
and  thus  enable  countries  to  resolve 


political  conflict  caused  by  trade  con- 
flicts. 

Finally,  there  is  a  longer  term  bene- 
fit. The  MTN  results  will  increase  the 
efficiency  of  the  world  trading  system. 
This  is  a  major  step  in  the  adjustment 
of  the  world's  economies  to  the  new 
realities  of  the  I980's.  The  next  decade 
will  see  increasing  participation  by  the 
developing  countries  in  the  trading 
system  both  as  suppliers  and  purchasers 
of  goods.  It  is  important  that  the  rules 
of  the  world  trading  system  apply  to  an 
appropriate  degree  to  these  countries. 
Key  developing  countries  have  ac- 
cepted the  concept  of  graduation  and, 
as  they  develop,  will  accept  more  of 
the  obligations  of  the  trading  system, 
thus  making  it  more  efficient. 

The  issue  of  efficiency  and  adjust- 
ment may  become  one  of  the  major 
economic  issues  in  the  last  quarter  of 
the  20th  century.  The  MTN  package  is 
a  major  step  down  this  road  and  thus  is 
an  important  step  in  making  the  world  a 
better  place  for  all  of  us.  D 


'  Introductory  paragraph  omitted. 


June  1979 


31 


Technical  Barriers  to  Trade 
(Standards) 

This  code  is  designed  to  prevent 
standards  and  technical  regulations 
from  becoming  impediments  to  inter- 
national trade.  Concern  over  health, 
safety,  and  the  environment  has  led  to 
new  product  standards  that  have  caused 
numerous  trade  disputes.  The  code  will 
allow  affected  parties  to  participate  in 
the  standards-making  process  and  pro- 
vide nondiscriminatory  access  for 
foreign  products  to  national  and  re- 
gional certification  systems. 

Customs  Valuation 

This  code  attempts  to  provide  a 
standard  method  of  determining  the 
duties  collectible  on  an  import,  thereby 
protecting  an  exporter  from  arbitrary 
increases  in  assessed  duties.  Ordinar- 
ily, duties  will  now  be  assessed  on  an 
import's  transaction  value.  If  this  is  not 
,  appropriate,  other  methods  of  valuation 
are  provided. 

Government  Procurement 

Until  now.  governments  have  been 
allowed  to  discriminate  in  favor  of 
domestic  suppliers  for  items  purchased 
for  government  use.  Under  this  code, 
an  estimated  $25  billion  in  foreign 
government  procurement  will  be  open 
to  bids  from  U.S.  firms.  Since  our  pro- 
curement system  is  already  far  less  re- 
strictive than  that  of  most  countries,  we 
will  clearly  benefit  from  this  code. 

Licensing 

This  code  will  reduce  the  effect  of 
U.S.  exports  of  unnecessary  or  unduly 
complicated  import  licensing  require- 
ments. 

Aircraft 

This  agreement,  which  is  still  not 
complete,  would  eliminate  tariffs  and 
reduce  nontariff  barriers  on  many  air- 
craft products.  The  United  States  is  the 
world's  major  supplier  of  civil  aircraft 
and  parts,  and  we  should  benefit 
greatly  from  this  agreement. 

Agriculture 

The  United  States  is  vitally  in- 
terested in  the  successful  negotiation  of 
an  agricultural  package.  As  the  world's 
largest  exporter  of  agricultural  prod- 
ucts, the  United  States  seeks  long- 
term,  stable,  sustainable  export  growth 
through  expanded  trade  opportunities 
and  orderly  conditions  in  international 
markets,  particularly  in  periods  of 
surplus  or  shortfall.  Consequently,  we 


U.S.  Export  Pollen 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Banking;.  Housing  and  Urban 
Affairs  on  March  6,  1979.  Mr.  Cooper 
is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Af- 
fairs. ' 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here  today  to 
testify  on  U.S.  export  policy.  I  ap- 
preciate the  thoughtful  questions  in 
your  letter  of  invitation.  I  will  do  my 
best  to  answer  them,  at  least  in  general 
terms,  in  my  opening  remarks.  We  can 
deal  with  them  in  more  detail — if  you 
wish — in  our  subsequent  discussion. 

In  response  to  two  of  the  questions,  I 
have  attached  to  my  statement  a  sum- 
mary of  restrictions  on  U.S.  exports 
which  have  been  adopted  to  further  our 
foreign  policy,  with  an  indication  as  to 
which  of  these  are  also  observed  by 
foreign  governments. 

Before  discussing  export  controls 
specifically,  let  me  begin  by  em- 
phasizing the  great  importance  we  at- 


tach to  positive  and  effective  national 
export  policies.  A  basic  element  in 
these  policies  is  the  Export  Adminis- 
tration Act,  which  must  soon  be  re- 
newed. The  act  wisely  emphasizes  our 
national  commitment  to  encouraging 
exports.  This  will  always  be  an  impor- 
tant policy  objective.  I  urge  the  com- 
mittee in  reviewing  the  act  to  bear  in 
mind  that  in  1979  and  the  years  ahead 
the  need  to  increase  our  exports  will  be 
especially  acute. 

Our  economic  situation  has  changed 
dramatically  since  the  early  postwar 
years.  At  that  time  we  took  our  favora- 
ble export  position  for  granted.  Now 
we  are  experiencing  large  trade  deficits 
which  adversely  affect  both  our 
domestic  economy  and  our  foreign  re- 
lations. We  must  find  effective  meas- 
ures to  improve  our  export  perform- 
ance. 

The  strength  of  our  economy  is 
highly  dependent  on  international 
trade.  Our  country  is  large,  and  our 
productive   activities   are  diversified. 


have  helped  create  a  framework  for  in- 
ternational agricultural  trade,  including 
agreements  on  meat  and  dairy  prod- 
ucts. The  United  States  has  succeeded 
in  reducing  tariff  barriers  on  many  ag- 
ricultural items  of  great  export  interest 
to  us. 

GATT  Reform 

Several  procedural  changes  in  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  have  been  negotiated. 
An  "enabling  clause"  permits  some 
special  and  differential  treatment  for 
the  de\eloping  countries.  This  agree- 
ment also  recognizes  that  as  these 
countries  advance  economically,  they 
must  accept  more  obligations  and  fewer 
exceptions  under  the  trade  rules.  Pro- 
cedures concerning  measures  countries 
can  take  for  balance-of-payments  rea- 
sons, and  measures  by  developing 
countries  to  protect  infant  industries, 
were  improved.  GATT's  dispute- 
settlement  procedures  were 
strengthened,  and  agreement  was 
reached  to  negotiate  improved  rules  on 
use  of  export  controls. 

Industrial  Tariffs 

We  have  reached  satisfactory  agree- 
ments with  Japan,   the  European  Eco- 


nomic Community,  Canada,  some 
smaller  countries  belonging  to  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development,  and  about  20  de- 
veloping countries.  Discussions  con- 
tinue with  some  developing  countries. 
Our  tariff  cuts  will  equal  33%  on  a 
trade-weighted  basis.  In  return,  we 
have  received  many  concessions, 
including  tariff  reductions  on  items  of 
high  priority  interest  to  U.S.  industry 
and  agriculture,  which  should  stimulate 
U.S.  exports. 


Safeguards 

Negotiations  have  not  been  com- 
pleted on  a  safeguards  code  that  would 
require  countries  to  observe  certain  in- 
ternational trading  rules  and  would 
subject  them  to  international  discipline 
when  they  temporarily  limit  imports 
that  seriously  injure  domestic  indus- 
tries. These  negotiations  are  continu- 
ing, n 


'  Taken  from  the  Department  of  State  publica- 
tion in  the  GIST  series,  released  m  April  1979. 
This  outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  reference 
aid  on  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not  intended 
as  a  comprehensive  U.S.  foreign  policy  state- 
ment. 


32 


But  we  are  not  independent  econom- 
ically. We  need  to  emphasize  this  sim- 
ple truth.  Americans  do  not  sufficiently 
appreciate  that  we  live  in  an  econom- 
ically interdependent  world. 

An  estimated  one  out  of  eight 
American  manufacturing  jobs  now  de- 
pends on  export  markets.  Fully  one- 
third  of  all  our  agricultural  production 
is  sold  abroad.  Exports  mean  more  than 
jobs  and  higher  income  at  home.  They 
also  pay  for  those  materials,  like  oil, 
which  we  have  to  buy  from  other 
countries.  Our  ability  to  export  must 
keep  pace  with  our  increasing  depend- 
ence on  imported  raw  materials  and 
foreign  manufactures. 

A  strong  position  in  international 
trade  requires  vigorous  and  highly 
competitive  export  industries.  We  must 
develop  more  of  them  to  close  the 
balance-of-payments  gap.  With  these 
industries  will  come  new  jobs,  higher 
productivity,  and  the  technological  in- 
novation that  our  country  will  need  in 
the  1980's. 

Our  export  performance  affects  vital 
U.S.  foreign  policy  interests  as  well. 
America's  strength  is  not  measured 
only  by  our  military  might;  a  vigorous 
economy,  which  produces  goods  that 
can  compete  effectively  in  markets  at 
home  and  abroad,  is  essential  to  main- 
taining U.S.  leadership  in  the  world.  It 
is  the  foundation  of  our  military 
strength,  our  diplomacy,  and  our  inher- 
ent appeal  as  a  nation. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  steadily  grow- 
ing trade  deficit  and  a  weakened 
currency — which  are  in  part  due  to 
poor  export  performance — can  eventu- 
ally lead  to  an  erosion  of  our  interna- 
tional political  standing  and  influence. 
For  example,  the  effect  on  our  relations 
with  European  nations,  Japan,  and 
some  oil-exporting  nations  was  evident 
last  year  when  the  dollar  plummeted  in 
foreign  exchange  markets.  Thus  a 
stronger  export  performance,  which 
among  other  things  will  bolster  the 
dollar,  is  fundamentally  important  to 
an  effective  foreign  policy. 

Export  Promotion 

Success  in  the  international  export 
market  does  not  come  through  occa- 
sional bursts  of  energy.  A  sustained 
effort  is  necessary,  requiring  invest- 
ment of  time,  manpower,  and  market 
research. 

A  large  part  of  the  burden  for  im- 
proving American  export  performance 
falls  upon  the  private  sector,  but  the 
government  can  help  in  a  variety  of 
ways.  Among  them  is  providing  credit 
support  and  minimizing  regulatory  in- 
tervention. Our  most  effective  interna- 
tional competitors,   notably  the  highly 


industrialized  Western  European  coun- 
tries and  Japan,  have  consistently  and 
actively  supported  their  export  sectors 
and  minimized  government  restrictions 
for  many  years.  The  President's  na- 
tional export  policy  announced  last 
September  represents  our  commitment 
to  make  the  same  sustained  effort. 

One  of  the  most  effective  means  by 
which  our  government  can  promote  ex- 
ports is  to  provide  official  export  credit 
support  to  permit  U.S.  firms  to  com- 
pete effectively.  We  are  seeking  to  in- 
crease the  Export-Import  Bank's  FY 
1980  program  level  above  the  level  of 
FY  1979  to  allow  it  to  support  a  greater 
volume  of  exports,  and  Eximbank  is 
seeking  more  aggressively  within  the 
limits  of  its  resources  to  provide  sup- 
port in  individual  transactions  on  terms 
competitive  with  those  offered  by  the 
official  export  credit  agencies  of  our 
competitors. 

Another  measure  we  can  take  is  to 
seek  the  removal  or  reduction  of 
foreign  barriers  to  our  exports.  We  are 
now  at  the  end  of  a  major  multilateral 
undertaking  which  has  achieved  that 
objective.  As  a  result  of  the  mutilateral 
trade  negotiations  in  Geneva  now 
nearing  completion,  our  businessmen 
will  have  expanded  opportunities  for 
increasing  their  exports. 

Equally  important,  they  will  be  able 
to  do  so  in  the  framework  of  fairer  in- 
ternational trading  rules.  Trade  dis- 
putes should  be  less  frequent  and  more 
easily  resolved.  A  code  on  subsidies 
and  countervailing  duties  would  impose 
greater  international  discipline  over 
trade-distorting  subsidies  and  define 
more  clearly  a  country's  right  to  take 
countermeasures.  A  code  on  govern- 
ment procurement  could  open  up  as 
much  as  $25  billion  a  year  in  foreign 
government  markets  now  closed  to 
U.S.  exports. 

Congress  will  shortly  be  reviewing 
the  results  of  these  negotiations.  When 
you  review  the  agreements,  I  believe 
you  will  conclude  that  they  serve  our 
national  interests.  Their  approval  by 
the  Congress  will  be  a  major  step  for- 
ward in  fulfilling  our  national  need  to 
export. 

The  Administration  thus  is  moving 
forcefully  to  enhance  the  opportunities 
for  American  products  in  foreign  mar- 
kets. In  the  area  of  disincentives,  the 
national  export  policy  will  reduce 
domestic  barriers  to  exports  by  creating 
a  more  sensible  regulatory  environment 
and  by  clarifying  some  of  the  am- 
biguities associated  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  certain  of  our  laws.  More  spe- 
cifically: 

•  All  agencies  will  weigh  more 
carefully  any  adverse  effect  that  major 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 

administrative   and   regulatory   actions  ' 
would  have  on  exports  and 

•  The  Department  of  State  and  other 
agencies  will  take  export  consequences 
fully  into  account  when  we  consider 
the  use  of  export  controls  for  foreign 
policy  purposes.  We  will  give  particu- 
lar attention  to  the  availability  of  the 
product  from  other  suppliers. 


Export  Controls 

It  must  be  recognized,  however,  that 
at  times  our  desire  to  promote  exports 
will  be  overridden  by  other  foreign^ 
policy  concerns.  There  are  circum- 
stances under  which  our  overall  na- 
tional interest  will  be  served  by  export 
controls.  Exports  subject  to  validated 
license  requirements,  however,  are 
only  a  small  percentage  of  our  total  ex- 
ports. 

The  clearest  instance  is  in  the  area  of 
national  security,  where  we  must  con- 
tinue to  restrict,  in  cooperation  with 
our  allies,  the  export  of  equipment  and 
the  transfer  of  critical  technology 
which  would  contribute  significantly  to 
the  military  capabilities  of  potential 
adversaries.  We  are  now  negotiating  an 
updated  list  of  goods  and  technology  to 
be  controlled  in  our  respective  coun- 
tries, to  eliminate  those  products  which 
no  longer  have  a  significant  security 
impact. 

The  principal  countries  to  which 
these  security  controls  apply  are  the 
Soviet  Union  and  China.  We  have  and 
will  continue  to  apply  security  controls 
on  exports  to  these  two  countries  in  a 
balanced  manner.  It  would  not  serve 
our  political  interests  to  give  the  ap- 
pearance of  being  less  stringent  with 
one  country  than  with  the  other. 

In  making  judgments  as  to  which 
items  of  equipment  and  technology  are 
critical  to  our  security,  we  will  keep  in 
mind  that  exports  are  essential  to  the 
strength  of  our  economy  and  that  a 
strong  economy  is  a  critical  element  of 
our  security.  Our  competitors  in  West- 
ern Europe  and  Japan,  with  their 
greater  experience  of  dependence  upon 
exports  to  sustain  economic  growth, 
understand  this  point  well  and  have  al- 
ready taken  the  largest  shares  of  indus- 
trial import  markets  in  Communist 
countries.  Our  firms  lag  behind.  If  they 
can  start  to  make  greater  gains,  the  new 
trading  relationships  should  add  to  the 
stability  of  our  political  relations. 

Export  controls  are  also  of  impor- 
tance to  our  efforts  against  nuclear 
proliferation,  international  terrorism, 
systematic  violations  of  human  rights, 
and  regional  military  conflicts.  The 
Administration  has  clearly  articulated 
its  commitment  to  these  goals  and  has 


1979 


33 


;jiven  high  priority  to  their  iinpiemen- 
lation.  The  Congress  has  been  gener- 
ally supportive  of  these  efforts. 

As  in  the  case  of  security  controls, 
however,  we  are  following  the  Presi- 
dent's directive  of  September  26,  1978, 
lo  insure,  in  those  instances  where 
controls  are  invoked,  that  the  foreign 
policy  gain  will  outweigh  any  commer- 
cial loss. 

The  Department  of  State  considers  a 
number  of  factors  in  its  recommenda- 
tions on  the  application  of  controls:  the 
importance  of  our  foreign  policy  inter- 
est; the  relationship  between  the  export 
in  question  and  the  conduct  we  are 
trying  to  influence;  and  the  likelihood 
that  denial  of  an  export  license  in  a 
particular  instance  will  be  an  effective 
means  of  achieving  our  purpose. 

In  making  recommendations  on  the 
denial  of  export  licenses  the  State  De- 
partment does  assess  the  availability  of 
the  product  from  other  sources  and 
weighs  whether  or  not  this  will  negate 
the  effects  of  denial.  However,  it  is 
important  that  the  President  and  his 
principal  foreign  policy  adviser  be  free 
to  recommend  denial  of  an  export 
license  in  those  cases  where  there  are 
compelling  foreign  policy  reasons,  for 
example,  when  we  find  it  imperative  to 
disassociate  the  United  States  from 
some  activity  which  we  find  particu- 
larly abhorrent.  We  will  not  sell 
equipment  to  police  and  military  en- 
tities in  South  Africa,  though  we  know 
that  such  equipment  may  be  supplied 
by  others.  There  may  also  be  instances 
where  denial  is  essential  to  advance  our 
nuclear  nonproliferation  objectives. 

In  a  few  instances,  authority  granted 
under  the  Export  Administration  Act 
has  been  used  to  limit  the  export  of 
products  which  were  in  short  supply 
and  deemed  vital  to  our  domestic  eco- 
nomic well-being.  The  imposition  of 
export  restrictions  in  response  to  a 
temporary  shortage  can  dispropor- 
tionately damage  long-term  export 
markets  and  even  political  relations 
with  purchasing  countries.  We  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  avoiding  wher- 
ever possible  such  short-term  export 
restraints  and  maintaining  the  U.S. 
reputation  as  a  reliable  supplier.  Even 
in  the  vital  area  of  energy  policy,  we 
must  take  particular  care  that  our 
legislative  restrictions  on  exports  of  oil 
do  not  interfere  with  the  long-term 
need  for  adequate  and  efficient  supplies 
for  countries  with  which  we  have  espe- 
cially close  political,  economic,  and 
security  ties. 

With  regard  to  the  antiboycott  provi- 
sion of  the  Export  Administration  Act, 
we  cannot  agree  to  having  our  com- 
panies become  the  tool  of  other  gov- 
ernments' trade  boycotts  against  a  third 


party.    We   are   not   proposing   any 
changes  in  this  portion  of  the  act. 

Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  let  me  say  that  while 
export  controls  are  an  important 
foreign  policy  tool,  I  believe  that  many 
people  have  a  somewhat  exaggerated 
impression  of  the  extent  to  which  these 
controls  really  hamper  the  U.S.  export 
performance.  For  those  few  cases  re- 
quiring validated  licenses,  less  than  \9c 
are  denied,  and  we  are  striving  to  re- 
duce procedural  delays  that  may  dis- 
courage potential  exporters. 

This  Administration  fully  recognizes 


the  growing  importance  of  exports  to 
our  nation's  economic  well-being  and 
overall  world  standing.  The  State  De- 
partment is  joining  with  the  Depart- 
ments of  Commerce,  Defense,  and 
Energy  in  a  further  effort  to  eliminate 
those  product  restrictions  which  no 
longer  serve  our  security  and  other 
foreign  policy  interests;  to  streamline 
the  processing  of  license  applications; 
and  to  help  individual  businesses  more 
clearly  understand  our  export  control 
policies. 

The  Department  of  State  is  com- 
mitted to  increasing  its  support  for  ex- 
port promotion  with  particular  em- 
phasis  on   small   and   medium-sized 


SUMMARY  OF  CURRENT 
U.S.  EXPORT  CONTROLS 
FOR  FOREIGN  POLICY 
PURPOSES 

The  following  controls  have  been  adopted 
by  the  United  States.  The  positions  of  the 
governments  of  our  major  foreign  compet- 
itors toward  these  controls  are  also  indi- 
cated. 

a.  Virtually  total  embargoes  of  exports 
(and  imports)  from  the  United  States  to 
North  Korea,  Vietnam,  Kampuchea,  and 
Cuba  continue  because,  in  the  judgment  of 
the  Administration,  the  political  conditions 
for  normalizing  trade  relations  with  those 
countries  have  not  yet  been  achieved.  Unre- 
solved differences  with  these  countries  in- 
clude: their  military  activities,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment and  private  claims,  and  our  terms 
for  diplomatic  recognition.  The  embargoes 
constitute  a  peaceful  means  available  to  the 
United  Slates  to  support  our  foreign  policy 
interests  in  these  countries.  Our  allies  and 
major  foreign  competitors  do  not  observe 
these  embargoes. 

b.  Virtually  total  embargo  of  exports  to 
Rhodesia  and  prohibition  of  arms  sales  to 
South  Africa  are  in  place  in  compliance 
with  U.N.  resolutions  and  are  thus  au- 
thorized by  the  U.N.  Participation  Act. 
Other  members  of  the  United  Nations  par- 
ticipate in  these  sanctions. 

The  President  directed  the  prohibition  of 
all  exports  to  the  police  and  military  entities 
in  South  Africa  to  disassociate  the  United 
States  from  the  repressive  practices  of  those 
organizations.  A  few  other  items  are  con- 
trolled for  export  to  other  South  African 
Government  organizations  administering 
apartheid  activities.  The  export  of  aircraft 
to  South  Africa  is  conditioned  upon  assur- 
ances of  peaceful  use.  Our  major  foreign 
competitors  do  not  apply  these  controls. 

c.  All  U.S.  trade  with  Uganda  is  prohib- 
ited because  of  human  rights  violations, 
pursuant  to  Public  Law  95-435.  It  is  too 
early  to  judge  whether  this  legislated  em- 
bargo  will   significantly   advance   U.S. 


foreign  policy.   Major  foreign  competitors 
have  not  joined  us  in  this  embargo. 

d.  The  export  of  munitions,  crime  control 
and  detection  equipment,  and  a  few  other 
items  to  a  few  consignees  in  a  few  countries 
whose  governments  are  seriously  violating 
human  rights  or  are  aiding  and  abetting  in- 
ternational terrorism  is  restricted. 

Our  allies  are  in  basic  sympathy  with  our 
human  rights  policy  and  antiterrorism  goals. 
While  most  do  not  generally  deny  commer- 
cial exports  for  purely  human  rights  rea- 
sons, they  may  take  such  matters  into  con- 
sideration when  reviewing  exports  which 
are  subject  to  control  for  other  reasons, 
such  as  an  incipient  or  ongoing  conflict  in 
the  country  of  destination. 

e.  The  President  decided  to  require  vali- 
dated licenses  for  the  export  of  petroleum 
equipment  and  to  deny  a  license  for  a  com- 
puter for  TASS  to  the  U.S.S.R.  for  foreign 
policy  reasons.  Our  allies  and  major  foreign 
competitors  do  not  apply  these  controls. 

f.  The  export  of  munitions  is  controlled  in 
furtherance  of  the  policy  of  restraint  on 
arms  sales.  A  few  items  on  the  Commerce 
Department  list  are  controlled  in  the  interest 
of  regional  stability. 

Most  other  governments  control  exports 
of  arms.  International  negotiations  are 
underway  on  conventional  arms  transfers. 

g.  The  export  of  items  judged  to  have  the 
potential  to  contribute  significantly  to  nu- 
clear proliferation  is  controlled.  We  and 
other  members  of  the  London  Suppliers 
Group  condition  the  export  of  an  agreed  list 
of  nuclear-related  items  on  safeguards  un- 
dertaken by  the  importer. 

h.  The  Federal  Insecticide,  Fungicide  and 
Rodenticide  Act,  the  Toxic  Substances 
Control  Act,  and  the  Consumer  Products 
Safety  Act  require  some  restrictions  on  the 
export  of  hazardous  substances. 

Other  governments  do  not  impose  legal 
restrictions  on  the  export  of  hazardous  sub- 
stances. We  are  encouraging  the  exchange 
of  information  with  our  trading  partners  in 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development. 


34 


The  Evolving  International 
Monetary  System 


by  Anthony  M.  Solomon 

Address  at  the  Royal  Institute  of  In- 
ternational Affairs  in  London  on 
January  12,  1979.  Mr.  Solomon  is 
Under  Secretary  for  Monetary  Affairs 
of  the  U.S.  Treasury  Department.' 

Much  of  the  past  year  was  charac- 
terized by  major  international  monetary 
unrest.  Continuing  large  payments  im- 
balances among  the  industrial  countries 
were  accompanied  by  serious  exchange 
market  disorders  which  ultimately  re- 
quired forceful  and  internationally 
coordinated  counteraction.  These  dis- 
turbances have  given  rise  to  a  wide- 
spread feeling  that  our  monetary 
mechanisms  are  not  working  as  well  as 
they  should.  Various  ideas  for  change 
have  been  advanced. 

The  year  also  saw  major  modifica- 
tion of  the  formal  structure  of  the 
monetary  system,  with  implementation 
of  amended  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  Articles  of  Agreement  and 
the  move  toward  new  monetary  ar- 
rangements within  the  European  Com- 
munity (EC).  The  new  IMF  provisions, 
and  the  Community's  efforts  to  develop 
closer  monetary  cooperation  and 
greater  economic  stability,  offer  sub- 
stantial promise  for  a  more  smoothly 
operating  international  monetary  sys- 
tem in  the  future. 

Today  I  would  like  to  discuss  these 
developments  and  suggest  some  impli- 
cations for  the  future  evolution  of  the 
system.   My  starting  point   is  an  ap- 


Export  Policy  (Cont'd) 

firms.  I  have  recently  sent  a  message  to 
our  ambassadors  throughout  the  world 
stressing  the  need  to  promote  U.S.  ex- 
ports. 

As  you  review  the  Export  Adminis- 
tration Act  and  other  related  matters 
within  your  jurisdiction,  I  urge  that  this 
committee  be  mindful  of  the  impor- 
tance of  expanding  U.S.  exports  for 
our  economy  while  at  the  same  time 
preserving  our  ability  to  pursue  other 
fundamental  foreign  policy  interests.  D 


'The  complele  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


preciation  that  the  international  eco- 
nomic imbalances  and  tensions  of 
today  stem  in  large  part  from  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  post-World  War  II 
decision — a  brilliant  and  far-reaching 
decision — to  work  toward  creation  of 
an  open  and  liberal  system  of  interna- 
tional trade  and  payments.  Catalyzed 
by  progressive  trade  liberalization  and 
lubricated  by  international  capital 
flows,  the  postwar  global  economy 
brought  rapid  and  sustained  increases 
in  the  wealth  and  living  standards  of 
the  industrialized  countries  and  prog- 
ress in  the  developing  countries.  A 
further  result  of  movement  toward  an 
open  system  of  trade  and  capital  was  an 
increasing  and  unprecedented  degree  of 
international  economic  interdepend- 
ence, particularly  among  the  industrial 
countries,  whose  industrial  and  ag- 
ricultural structures  are  now  heavily 
dependent  on  sources  and  markets 
abroad.  And  this  increasingly  compli- 
cates management  of  the  system. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  I960's  and 
during  the  1970"s,  the  great  postwar 
record  of  growth,  employment,  and 
prosperity  ran  into  trouble.  We  are  all 
too  familiar  with  the  acceleration  of 
inflation  as  the  United  States  escalated 
and  poured  more  resources  into  the 
Vietnam  war;  with  the  shocks  to  the 
system  associated  with  the  multilateral 
exchange  rate  realignments  of  the  early 
1970"s;  with  the  simultaneous  boom  in 
the  industrial  countries  feeding  rapid 
increases  in  commodity  prices 
worldwide;  with  the  oil  embargo  and 
massive  increases  in  oil  prices  of 
1973-74;  and  with  the  severe  world  re- 
cession of  1974-75. 

We  have  been  living  for  much  of  this 
decade  not  only  with  destructively  high 
levels  of  inflation  worldwide  but  with 
sharply  divergent  rates  of  inflation  and 
real  growth  among  the  industrial  coun- 
tries. Because  of  the  major  reduction  of 
trade  barriers  and  the  greater  ease  with 
which  capital  can  move  across  interna- 
tional boundaries,  differences  among 
the  industrial  countries  in  growth  and 
inflation  can  now  have  not  only  a  much 
larger  potential  effect  but  also  a  much 
more  immediate  effect  on  the  direction 
and  magnitude  of  trade  and  financial 
flows  and  on  the  exchange  markets. 

Our  greatly  increased  interdepend- 
ence has  brought  all  of  us  greater 
wealth  and  a  higher  standard  of  living 
than  would  have  been  possible  other- 
wise.  But  these  gains  have  not  been 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

without  some  cost.  We  have  had  to  pay   ( 
a  price — we  are  all  far  more  vulnerable 
now  than  in  the  past  to  developments   ; 
abroad  and  to  the  operations  of  the  in- 
ternational economic  system. 

The  developments  of  1978  pointed 
up  this  vulnerability  with  great  clarity 
and  posed  challenges  in  two  closely 
related  but  distinguishable  areas.  First, 
we  should  consider  whether  changes  in 
our  existing  monetary  arrangements  are 
practical  and  desirable.  Second,  and 
more  fundamentally,  we  must  develop 
better  ways  of  bringing  our  economic 
policies  and  perfortnance  into  greater 
harmony  in  an  effort  to  reduce  or  avoid 
the  internationally  disruptive  impacts- 
of  sharp  divergences  in  domestic  eco- 
nomic performance. 

The  international  monetary  system, 
and  the  exchange  market  in  particular, 
is  a  principal  focal  point  for  the  pres- 
sures arising  from  our  interdependent 
world  economy.  Understandably,  in- 
ternational monetary  arrangements 
have  also  become  a  focal  point  for  pro- 
posals to  alleviate  those  pressures. 
Some  have  proposed  that  targets  or 
zones  for  exchange  rates  be  established 
and  pursued  by  monetary  authorities. 
Others  have  proposed  limitations  on 
international  capital  flows  as  a  means 
of  attaining  greater  monetary  and  ex- 
change rate  stability.  Still  others  see 
the  major  role  of  the  dollar  in  interna- 
tional reserves  as  a  principal  source  of 
international  monetary  difficulty  and 
have  suggested  that  steps  be  taken  to 
reduce  the  reserve  role  of  the  dollar. 
Let  me  comment  on  these  three  sepa- 
rate but  not  necessarily  independent 
questions. 

Exchange  Market  Developments 

Exchange  market  developments  over 
the  past  year  or  so  have  unquestionably 
posed  serious  problems.  We  have  seen 
that  when  there  is  uncertainty  about  the 
validity  of  basic  economic  policies  of 
major  countries,  the  exchange  markets, 
left  to  themselves,  can  generate  a 
psychological  atmosphere  in  which 
rates  may  be  carried  beyond  what  can 
be  justified  by  any  objective  standard. 
But  does  that  fact — and  I  believe  it  is 
widely  accepted  as  a  fact — mean  that 
the  world  now  can  or  should  move  to  a 
much  more  highly  structured  set  of  ar- 
rangements for  exchange  market  inter- 
vention? 

In  the  case  of  the  United  States,  the 
decline  of  the  dollar  under  disturbed 
and  disorderly  conditions  last  fall 
threatened  to  undermine  our  anti- 
inflation  efforts  and  to  damage  the  cli- 
mate for  sustained  investment  and 
growth  in  the  United  States  and  abroad. 
Our  action  on   November    1 — jointly 


June  1979 


35 


with  Germ  u  n  y  ,  J  a  pan.  a  n  d 
Switzerland — to  embark  on  a  major 
program  ol  coordinated  intervention 
was  specifically  a  response  to  what  was 
and  had  been  happening  in  the  ex- 
change markets.  But  in  order  to  be  suc- 
cessful, that  response  had  to  fit  into  a 
broader  context — a  context  composed 
of  comprehensive  U.S  policy  measures 
to  correct  its  domestic  economic  prob- 
lems and  clear  prospects  for  a  very 
strong  improvement  in  the  U.S.  exter- 
nal position  between  1978  and  1979. 

The  United  States  is  now  acting 
t'orcefully  to  deal  with  its  inflation 
problem.  Fiscal  policy  has  turned  deci- 
sively toward  restraint.  As  will  be  al- 
firmed  in  the  next  few  days,  the  Presi- 
dent is  lightening  even  further  in  the 
FY  1980  budget,  with  a  deficit  of  under 
$30  billion  or  barely  more  than  \'7(  of 
GNP.  which  compares  with  deficits 
currently  averaging  about  4.5%  of  GNP 
in  the  other  major  industrial  countries. 
Monetary  policy  is  complementing  fis- 
cal restraint,  as  evidenced  by  a  further 
pronounced  rise  in  interest  rates  and 
welcome  slowdown  in  growth  of  the 
principal  monetary  aggregates.  And 
these  measures  of  demand  restraint  are 
being  supplemented  importantly  by 
wage  and  price  standards,  which  are 
gaining  a  broad  measure  of  support  and 
compliance  on  the  part  of  the  American 
people. 

We  anticipate  a  very  sharp  improve- 
ment in  the  U.S.  current  account  posi- 
tion between  1978  and  1979.  It  will 
reflect  the  combined  consequences  of  a 
number  of  factors,  including  our 
rapidly  improving  export  performance, 
implementation  of  our  energy  program 
and  slower  growth  in  the  United  States 
coupled  with  faster  growth  abroad. 
Even  with  the  recently  announced  oil 
price  increase,  we  expect  the  deficit  to 
be  reduced  very  substantially  in  1979. 

We  recognize  that  our  inflation 
problem  is  destructive  to  our  domestic 
performance  and  objectives  as  well  as 
to  our  external  position.  That  problem 
did  not  arise  overnight,  and  it  cannot 
be  solved  easily  or  painlessly.  But 
overcoming  it  is  the  policy  of  the  U.S. 
Government,  and  the  President  is  de- 
termined to  persevere  and  to  succeed. 

International  Capital  Markets 

We  were  encouraged  by  the  initial 
response  to  the  November  1  program, 
and  we  are  encouraged  by  the  better 
balance  in  the  markets  that  has 
emerged  lately.  We  believe  that  pro- 
gram will  provide  a  framework  of 
greater  stability  and  order,  in  which  the 
markets  can  react  positively  to  the 
strengthening  of  the  underlying  U.S. 
position.   In  implementing  the  interna- 


tional aspects  of  the  program,  we  have 
greatly  intensified  and  deepened  our 
consultations  on  exchange  market  pol- 
icy and  operations  with  the  other  coun- 
ties involved.  This  process  has  been  ot 
great  value  to  us  in  analyzing  and  as- 
sessing exchange  market  develop- 
ments, and  we  look  toward  a  continua- 
tion of  the  close  consultations  and 
cooperation  that  have  been  engendered 
by  this  effort. 

But  important  as  that  cooperative 
initiative  was,  we  knew  that  our  inter- 
vention efforts  could  succeed  only  if 
underlying  conditions  were  moving  in 
our  favor,  and  if  we  had  the  policies  in 
place  to  assure  they  would  continue  to 
move  in  our  favor.  Our  judgment  was 
that  a  bandwagon  effect  was  depressing 
the  dollar  excessively,  well  out  of  line 
with  fundamental  economic  factors  and 
without  regard  to  the  fact  that  policies 
were  in  place  to  bring  about  a  basic 
improvement  in  our  position.  Timing 
was  essential,  and  I  do  not  believe  the 
intervention  program  would  have  been 
warranted  or  successful  if  those  pre- 
conditions had  not  been  met. 

In  short,  large-scale  intervention  can 
be  useful  and  effective  under  circum- 
stances of  serious  disorder,  when  the 
basic  requirements  for  greater  stability 
have  been  met.  But  it  would  be  a  mis- 
take to  interpret  the  November  1  pro- 
gram as  a  departure  from  a  policy  of 
permitting  exchange  rates  to  reflect 
fundamental  factors  in  different 
economies — rates  were  not  reflecting 
such  factors.  The  November  1  initiative 
does  not  imply  that  such  intervention 
can  succeed  in  holding  exchange  rates 
against  fundamental  trends  or  that  ef- 
forts to  do  so  would  be  desirable. 
Rather,  the  experience  of  the  past  sev- 
eral months  reinforces  our  view  that 
appropriate  economic  and  financial 
policies  must  be  in  place  if  there  is  to 
be  meaningful  and  lasting  stability  in 
exchange  markets.  And  I  believe  that  is 
a  view  that  is  fully  appreciated  and,  in- 
deed, frequently  expressed  by  partici- 
pants in  the  exchange  markets  them- 
selves. 

Second,  the  potential  for  very  large 
international  capital  flows,  with  their 
important  implications  for  exchange 
rate  movements,  has  led  some  to  feel 
that  greater  official  control  over  capital 
flows  could  provide  a  useful  technique 
of  exchange  market  stabilization.  Our 
own  experience  in  the  United  States 
with  capital  controls  in  the  1960's  and 
early  I970's  does  not  provide  any  as- 
surance that  controls  would  offer  a 
feasible  approach.  Moreover,  it  seems 
to  me  to  be  an  approach  that  removes  a 
critical  element  of  the  foundation  of 
our  open  and  interdependent  global 
system,  and  that  could  erode  the  tangi- 


ble economic  gains  that  have  been 
achieved  over  the  past  decade.  Finally, 
it  is  an  approach  that  assumes  capital 
flows  should  not  be  permitted  to  influ- 
ence exchange  rates — that  only  the 
movement  of  real  goods  and  services 
should  affect  rates.  I  have  great  diffi- 
culty in  accepting  this  idea. 

I  do  feel  that  steps  can  be  taken  to 
expand  and  improve  information  about 
world  money  markets,  and  perhaps  to 
strengthen  official  influence  over  those 
markets.  Consideration  can  usefully  be 
given  to  whether  steps  might  be  taken 
to  bring  banks  operating  in  the 
Euromarkets  more  completely  and 
explicitly  under  the  regulations  and 
supervision  of  national  banking  au- 
thorities. There  is,  I  know,  a  feeling  on 
the  part  of  some  that  the  Euromarket  is 
unanchored  and  unregulated.  This  is  a 
considerable  exaggeration.  For  exam- 
ple, branches  of  U.S.  banks  operating 
abroad — a  substantial  component  of  the 
Eurocurrency  market — are  subject  to 
U.S.  reporting  requirements  and  bank 
examination  procedures  as  are  domestic 
operations  of  U.S.  banks.  Moreover, 
the  Bank  of  International  Settlements  is 
currently  working  to  expand  and  im- 
prove its  reporting  arrangements  and 
data  collection  in  an  effort  to  provide  a 
basis  for  more  complete  understanding 
of  the  Euromarkets.  But  there  may  well 
be  further  steps  that  could  be  taken  to 
strengthen  bank  supervision  and  miti- 
gate the  impression  that  the  market  has 
explosive  potential. 

International  Reserve  System 

Finally,  there  is  a  view  that  the  re- 
serve role  of  the  dollar,  and  the  very 
large  volume  of  foreign  official  hold- 
ings of  dollars,  constitute  an  important 
source  of  instability  in  the  international 
monetary  system.  This  view  has  led  to 
various  proposals^ — for  funding  or  con- 
solidating dollar  balances,  for  an  in- 
creasing role  in  the  system  for  the  SDR 
[special  drawing  rights],  and  possibly 
for  a  European  currency  unit  or  for 
greater  use  in  reserves  of  other  national 
currencies  such  as  the  Deutsche  mark 
and  Japanese  yen. 

I  personally  have  some  doubts  that 
the  existence  of  foreign-held  dollar 
balances  —  official  or  private  — 
represents  the  major  part  of  the  prob- 
lems and  instability  which  have  af- 
fected the  dollar.  Certainly  sudden 
changes  in  the  level  of  these  balances 
can  and  at  times  do  add  to  pressures  in 
the  exchange  markets,  but  there  is 
ample  scope  for  capital  movements  and 
exchange  market  pressures  quite  inde- 
pendent of  the  existing  stock  of  foreign 
balances.  While  moves  toward  funding 
or  consolidation   of  foreign   official 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


dollar  balances  might  have  some  posi- 
tive impact,  it  seems  to  me  that  they 
are  not  the  root  cause  of  exchange  mar- 
ket disorder  or  dollar  instability. 

Let  me  make  clear  that  the  United 
States  has  no  interest  in  artificially  per- 
petuating a  particular  international  role 
for  the  dollar.  The  dollar's  present  role 
is  itself  the  product  of  an  evolutionary 
process.  We  would  expect  the  dollar's 
role  to  continue  to  evolve  with  eco- 
nomic and  financial  developments  in 
the  world  economy,  and  a  relative  re- 
duction in  that  role  in  the  future  could 
be  a  natural  consequence. 

At  this  juncture,  it  is  difficult  to  pre- 
dict just  what  evolutionary  changes 
may  take  place  in  the  years  ahead, 
though  we  can  foresee  certain  pos- 
sibilities. Certainly  we  would  expect 
the  SDR  to  take  on  a  growing  role  in 
the  system.  The  world  has  recently 
taken  important  steps  to  increase  the 
role  of  this  internationally  created  asset 
by  widening  the  scope  of  operations  in 
which  it  can  be  used,  by  strengthening 
its  financial  characteristics,  and  by  the 
decision  to  resume  allocations  of  SDR 
after  a  period  of  7  years  in  which  no 
allocations  were  made.  We  in  the 
United  States  have  great  hope  for  the 
progress  of  the  SDR.  As  experience 
with  the  asset  accumulates,  as  alloca- 


tions continue  over  a  period  of  time, 
and  as  the  usability  of  the  instrument 
increases,  we  believe  it  will  fulfill  the 
promise  which  its  creators  foresaw  and 
play  an  increasingly  more  valuable 
role. 

Another  possibility  is  that  certain 
national  currencies  will  play  an  in- 
creasing role.  Indeed  an  expansion  of 
the  reserve  roles  of  the  Deutsche  mark 
and  Japanese  yen  has  occurred  over  the 
past  decade  in  both  absolute  and  rela- 
tive terms.  I  would  note  that  the  au- 
thorities of  other  countries  have  gener- 
ally tended  to  discourage  use  of  their 
currencies  as  reserves,  largely  because 
of  concern  about  the  implications  for 
domestic  money  supply  and  a  fear  that 
domestic  financial  management  will  be 
made  more  difficult.  Whether  such  at- 
titudes persist  will  presumably  have  an 
important  bearing  on  future  develop- 
ments, as  will  questions  of  size  and  ac- 
cessibility of  nondollar  capital  markets. 

A  new  possibility  for  international 
monetary  evolution  is  posed  by  the 
EC's  current  efforts  in  the  international 
monetary  area.  At  least  in  the  initial 
phase,  the  focus  of  these  efforts  is 
principally  on  arrangements  for  inter- 
vention and  settlement  among  par- 
ticipating EC  countries.  However, 
there  is  the  possibility  that  in  time  a 


EUROPE:       12th  Report 
on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  23,  1979' 


In  accordance  wilh  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following  re- 
port on  the  progress  made  during  the  past  sixty 
days  toward  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated  so- 
lution of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

During  the  past  two  months,  as  1  outlined  in 
my  report  of  January  29,  the  United  Nations 
has  persisted  in  its  active  efforts,  to  bring  about 
a  resumption  of  the  Cyprus  intercommunal 
negotiations  on  a  sound  and  effective  basis. 
The  focus  of  this  effort  is  to  develop  a  mean- 
ingful agenda  acceptable  to  both  Cypnot  par- 
ties. The  Secretary  General's  Special  Repre- 
sentative in  Cyprus  has  held  frequent  consulta- 
tions wilh  both  sides  in  Nicosia,  eliciting  their 
reactions  to  each  other's  comments  on  the  pres- 
ent draft  agenda  and  seeking  their  acceptance 
of  compromise  suggestions.  These  consulta- 
tions are  continuing  on  an  intensive  basis. 
Meanwhile,  some  consideration  has  also  been 
given  to  the  possibility  of  direct  consultations 
involving   representatives  of  the  two  Cypriol 


communities  and  the  Secretary  General  this 
spring. 

■While  we  believe  that  both  sides  would  wel- 
come meaningful  talks,  we  should  not  underes- 
timate the  magnitude  of  the  differences  be- 
tween them  on  matters  of  substance.  The  com- 
promises that  must  be  made  if  an  enduring  set- 
tlement is  to  be  achieved  will  be  politically 
difficult  for  both  sides. 

The  Department  of  State  has  remained  in 
close  and  frequent  contact  with  the  United  Na- 
tions Secretariat  and  with  the  parties  con- 
cerned. We  have  urged  both  parlies  to  show 
P.-xibility  and  to  respond  constructively  and 
imaginatively  to  the  ongoing  United  Nations 
initiative.  We  will  continue  to  make  every  ef- 
fort to  help  bring  about  a  productive  resump- 
tion of  negotiations. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter  □ 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill.  Jr..  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, and  Frank  Church,  chairman  of  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Mar.  26.  1979). 


European  currency  unit  may  develop  as 
a  reserve  instrument  of  broader  interest 
and  use. 

We  are  prepared  to  consider  with  an 
open  mind  these  and  possibly  other 
ideas  for  evolution  of  the  reserve  sys- 
tem. Such  ideas  may  offer  potential  for 
a  reduction  in  the  relative  role  of  the 
dollar,  and  that  prospect  is  not  in  itself 
troublesome  to  the  United  States.  We 
do  not  live  in  a  static  world,  and  we 
must  adjust  to  changing  circumstances. 
We  will  not  resist  change  but  rather 
will  be  concerned  to  insure  that  any 
change  be  an  improvement  and  that  it 
be  accomplished  smoothly  and  in  a 
manner  which  strengthens  our  open 
international  trade  and  payments  sys- 
tem. 

The  Basic  Problem 

In  each  of  these  aspects  of  our  inter- 
national monetary  arrangeinents — the 
exchange  rate  system,  the  international 
capital  markets,  the  reserve  system — 
the  United  States  is  fully  prepared  to 
cooperate  with  others  to  consider  where 
improvements  might  be  possible.  But  I 
do  not  believe  that  possible  action  in 
any  of  these  areas — or  indeed  in  all  of 
them — will  solve  the  fundamental 
problems  facing  the  system.  As  1  see  it, 
the  basic  problem  is  a  different  one: 
How  to  coordinate  better  the  eco- 
nomic performance  of  the  major  coun- 
tries, to  reduce  inflation  rates  and  in- 
flation differentials,  and  to  manage 
domestic  growth  rates  so  as  to  bring 
about  a  better  balance  in  global  eco- 
nomic relations. 

This  is  not  a  short-run  problem  but  a 
continuing  one.  There  is  no  magic, 
overnight  solution,  and  the  task  of  in- 
ternational policy  coordination  ulti- 
mately can  raise  highly  sensitive  issues 
of  national  sovereignty.  Nonetheless,  I 
believe  it  is  the  real  task  we  have  to 
address,  if  we  are  serious  about  main- 
taining our  open  system  and  about 
achieving  greater  stability  in  interna- 
tional economic  relations. 

We  do  not  lack  institutional  opportu- 
nities for  pushing  ahead  with  this  ef- 
fort. The  industrial  countries  meet  reg- 
ularly in  various  bodies  of  the  Organi- 
zation for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  and  heads  of  state  have 
inet  with  increasing  frequency  to  dis- 
cuss common  economic  problems. 
Most  recently,  the  IMF,  in  its  new  Ar- 
ticles of  Agreement,  has  been  given 
potentially  important  powers  of  sur- 
veillance over  the  operations  of  the  in- 
ternational monetary  system  and  the 
balance-of-payments  adjustment  proc- 
ess. 

The  basic  problem  facing  the  system 
is  recognized  clearly  in  the  new  IMF 


June  1979 


37 


provisions  on  surveillance,  which 
stress  that  the  attainment  of  exchange 
market  stability  depends  on  develop- 
ment of  underlying  economic  and  fi- 
nancial stability  in  member  countries. 
These  provisions  equip  the  IMF  with 
major  potential  to  address  the  problems 
of  policy  coordination  with  a  view  to 
achieving  a  more  sustainable  pattern  of 
payments  positions  among  its  member 
nations  and  a  more  smoothly  function- 
ing international  monetary  system.  The 
IMF's  focus  encompasses  not  only  ex- 
change rate  policy,  narrowly  defined, 
but  also  domestic  economic  policies  as 
they  affect  the  balance-of-payments 
adjustment  process.  The  IMF  has  en- 
hanced capability  to  advise  not  only 
countries  in  balance-of-payments  dif- 
ficulty but  also  countries  in  surplus,  on 
the  international  implications  of  their 
policies,  and  on  approaches  they  might 
appropriately  follow  to  correct  their 
payments  imbalances — a  symmetry  of 
approach  we  believe  is  essential  to  an 
effectively  functioning  system. 

Progress  in  implementing  the  IMF's 
new  surveillance  role  has  been  cautious 
and  deliberate.  This  is  understandable, 
given  the  very  short  time  these  powers 
have  existed.  But  we  believe  the  time 
has  come  for  the  IMF  to  move  more 
vigorously  to  fulfill  its  potential  in  this 
area,  and  we  intend  to  support  it  in  that 
effort.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  Fund's 
new  provisions  afford  the  international 
community  a  framework  for  policy 
coordination  that  can  be  made  effec- 
tive. The  potential  is  there.  The  ques- 
tion is  whether  governments  will 
permit — indeed,  help — that  potential  to 
develop.  If  they  are  willing,  the  pros- 
pects for  sustained  monetary  stability 
and  maintenance  of  our  open  interde- 
pendent system  are  good. 

We  need,  in  effect,  a  new  atti- 
tude—  a  recognition  that  if  nations 
want  the  benefits  of  an  interdependent 
world  with  freedom  of  trade  and  pay- 
ments, they  must  be  prepared  to  give 
up  some  of  the  freedom  they  have  en- 
joyed to  manage  their  domestic 
economies  without  full  consideration  of 
the  international  environment.  As  part 
of  an  interdependent  world  economy, 
each  country  must  accept  greater  re- 
sponsibilities to  exercise  its  economic 
management  to  coordinate  better  its 
policies  and  performance  with  those  of 
other  countries.  Whatever  the  institu- 
tional arrangements,  unless  nations  are 
prepared  to  accept  these  responsibilities 
of  interdependence,  they  cannot  expect 
to  continue  to  receive  its  full  benefits. 

The  potential  role  of  the  emerging 
European  monetary  arrangements 
should  be  viewed  against  broader 
evolution  of  the  system.  The  European 
effort  is  inspired  fundamentally  by  an 


MIDDLE  EAST:       TIte  Peace 
Treaty  and  its  Aftermath 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House 
Appropriations  Committee  on  May  H, 
1979.  Mr.  Saunders  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs. ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  re- 
view with  you  the  Treaty  of  Peace  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel  and  to  examine 
what  the  practical  consequences  of  this 
treaty  will  be  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States. 

I  know  that  you  will  have  specific 
questions  on  the  details  of  the  treaty, 
on  the  proposed  U.S.  assistance  to  the 
parties,  and  on  our  plans  for  the  West 
Bank-Gaza  and  Palestinian  negotia- 
tions. I  welcome  the  chance  to  address 
whatever  interests  you  may  have.  First, 
however,  let  me  briefly  set  forth  our 
overall  view  of  the  situation  regarding 
the  treaty  and  its  aftermath. 

I  am  sure  that  you  share  the  belief 
that  the  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
is  a  milestone  on  the  road  toward  a 
complete  and  just  settlement  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict. 

The  treaty  offers  Egypt  and  Israel  a 
true  peace;  it  provides  for  the  security 
and  integrity  of  the  two  nations;  it 
opens  new  avenues  for  trade  and  com- 
munication between  them  and  for  en- 


hanced scientific,  educational,  and 
cultural  exchange. 

For  Israel,  the  treaty  is  a  major  step 
forward  in  achieving  the  dream  of  the 
Jewish  people  to  live  peacefully  and 
normally  within  secure  and  recognized 
borders  in  their  modern  state. 

For  Egypt  and  other  Arabs,  the  treaty 
and  associated  documents  restore 
Egyptian  sovereignty  throughout  the 
Sinai,  and  it  can  begin  a  political  proc- 
ess which  will  advance  significantly 
other  legitimate  Arab  objectives  while 
assuring  Israel's  security  and  right  to 
live  in  peace  with  its  neighbors. 

The  signing  of  this  treaty  and  its  as- 
sociated documents  are,  therefore,  an 
event  of  immense  importance  for  the 
Israeli  and  Arab  peoples.  But  we  must 
keep  in  mind  that  it  is  of  immense  im- 
portance to  us  as  well. 

For  30  years  we  have  sought  to  en- 
courage Middle  East  peace,  and  the 
core  elements  behind  our  approach  bear 
repeating; 

•  We  operate  from  an  unshakeable 
commitment  to  the  security  of  Israel. 
For  reasons  of  history,  of  interest,  and 
of  ideals,  this  element  of  our  policy  is 
immutable. 

•  We  are  also  determined  to  have 
friendly  and  mutually  beneficial  rela- 
tions with  the  Arab  nations  and 
peoples.  We  are  profoundly  important 


objective  of  ultimate  political  and  eco- 
nomic unification,  an  objective  that  is 
unlikely  to  be  adopted  on  a  global  basis 
for  many  years  to  come.  Against  the 
background  of  that  objective,  the  EC  is 
making  an  ambitious  and  laudable 
move  to  make  progress  in  many  of  the 
areas  I  have  touched  on  today.  Most  im- 
portantly, participating  EC  nations  are 
attempting  to  achieve  meaningful  eco- 
nomic policy  coordination,  in  an  effort 
to  reduce  imbalances  within  the  Com- 
munity and  create  conditions  for 
greater  exchange  market  stability. 

The  EC's  efforts  on  a  regional  level 
can  make  a  major  contribution  toward 
progress  in  the  broader  global  effort  to 
manage  international  economic  inter- 
dependence, and  we  offer  the  EC  every 
encouragement  in  attaining  its  objec- 
tives. We  have  asked  only  that  Europe 
bear  in  mind  the  interests  of  nonmem- 
bers  and  of  the  broader  system,  par- 
ticularly the  critical  need  to  develop  the 


role  of  the  IMF  in  the  system.  We  have 
been  assured  that  this  will  be  the  case. 
In  conclusion,  I  feel  that  the  de- 
velopments of  the  past  year  point 
clearly  to  the  need  for  improvement  in 
our  international  economic  arrange- 
ments. We  can  and  will  consider  with 
others  whether  improvements  are  pos- 
sible and  desirable  in  the  more 
mechanical  aspects  of  those  arrange- 
ments. But  improvements  in  our 
monetary  mechanisms  cannot  solve  the 
more  fundamental  problem  facing  the 
system,  the  need  for  governments  to 
improve  their  international  economic 
policy  coordination  out  of  recognition 
of  their  own  self-interest  in  preserving 
our  interdependent  system.  We  believe 
this  must  be  the  focal  point  of  our  ef- 
forts and  offers  the  only  real  prospect 
of  lasting  stability.  D 


'  Text  from  Treasury   Department  news  re- 
lease. 


38 


to  each  other,  and  many  of  our  tTiost 
critical  interests  are  in  common. 

•  We  remain  committed  to  a  just 
solution  for  those  people  in  the 
region — especially  the  Palestinians — 
who  remain  displaced  and  unable  to 
enjoy  all  the  rights  essential  to  human 
dignity.  Our  commitment  here  is  prac- 
tical as  well  as  humane,  for  in  the  face 
of  grinding  despair  and  a  sense  of 
grievance,  a  genuine  and  comprehen- 
sive peace  will  be  hard  to  achieve. 

•  We  see  comprehensive  peace  in 
the  Middle  East  as  an  imperative  world 
objective.  We  know  that  each  crisis  in 
that  region  has  the  potential  to  threaten 
world  prosperity  and  world  peace.  The 
issues  dividing  Arabs  and  Israelis  may 


Egypt  and 
the  ECWA 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAY  1,  1979' 

The  United  States  deeply  regrets  the 
decision  of  the  Economic  Commission 
for  Western  Asia  (ECWA),  which  is  a 
subgroup  in  the  United  Nations,  to  rec- 
ommend the  suspension  of  Egypt's 
membership  from  the  Commission. 
Moves  to  expel  countries  from  organi- 
zations in  which  they  have  every  right 
to  belong  damage  not  only  the  organi- 
zation but  the  people  who  depend  on 
them  for  services. 

The  United  States  will  strongly  op- 
pose this  decision  when  it  comes  before 
the  U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC). 

ECWA  is  one  of  the  U.N.'s  five  re- 
gional economic  commissions.  Its 
membership  is  confined  entirely  to 
what  we  loosely  consider  Middle  East- 
ern states  plus  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO).  And  since  it  was 
formed  in  1973,  Israel,  as  the  other 
logical  member,  has  been  excluded — 
something  which  we  have  protested 
regularly  against  and  as  we  had  pro- 
tested in  1977  at  the  time  that  the  PLO 
was  included  as  a  full  member. 

The  decision  that  has  been  taken  by 
this  regional  Commission  has  to  be 
taken  up  by  ECOSOC  and  voted  on.  In 
the  meantime,  Egypt  maintains  its  seat 
in  the  Commission  after  the  vote  and 
will  do  so  until  ECOSOC  takes  up  the 
recommendation  that  Egypt  be 
expelled.  D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by   Depart- 
ment spokesmen  Hodding  Carter  III 


be  regional  in  scope,  but  they  are  truly 
global  in  effect. 

•  Even  in  purely  economic  terms,  it 
is  clear  that  the  cost  to  the  United 
States  of  peace  is  surely  less  than  a 
continuation  of  the  state  of  war.  The 
cost  to  the  United  States  alone  of  re- 
placing Israel's  battlefield  losses  from 
the  1973  war  was  higher  than  the  budg- 
etary impact  of  the  package  the  Ad- 
ministration is  now  proposing,  while 
the  price  we  have  paid  in  inflation,  un- 
employment, and  other  adverse  eco- 
nomic developments  attributable  at 
least  in  part  to  Middle  East  instability 
would  add  billions  more  to  this  total. 


Assistance  for  Israel  and  Egypt 

Let  me  now  turn  to  some  of  the  de- 
tails of  the  assistance  package  which  is 
presently  before  the  Congress. 

In  discussing  the  aid  package  for  Is- 
rael and  Egypt,  1  want  to  stress  two 
general  points.  (I)  The  impact  on  our 
budget  is  considerably  less  than  the 
total  amount  of  money  to  be  generated 
for  the  program  because  the  use  of 
U.S.  guaranteed  loans  from  private 
banks  obviates  the  need  for  Congress  to 
appropriate  money  for  the  entire  value 
of  the  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
credits  program,  and  (2)  the  terms  of 
our  additional  assistance  will  not  im- 
pose an  unmanageable  new  debt  burden 
on  either  Israel  or  Egypt. 

The  bulk  of  the  additional  assistance 
we  envisage  for  Israel  and  Egypt  is  to 
help  them  meet  their  urgent  security 
requirements.  The  military  program  for 
Israel,  besides  helping  the  costly  with- 
drawal from  the  Sinai,  will  enable  Is- 
rael to  continue  the  modernization  of 
its  military  establishment  against  con- 
tinuing security  threats  in  the  area. 

The  $1.5  billion  military  program  for 
Egypt  will  help  it  to  replace  equipment 
in  its  military  establishment  rendered 
obsolete  by  the  Soviet  embargo. 

The  total  military  package  comes  to 
$45  billion  over  3  years  —  ap- 
proximately $3  billion  for  Israel  and 
$1 .5  billion  for  Egypt. 

Of  the  amount  for  Israel,  $800  mil- 
lion will  be  in  grant  aid  money.  This 
sum  would  allow  Israel  to  construct 
two  airfields  in  the  Negev  to  replace 
those  being  given  up  in  the  Sinai;  this 
is  essential  to  enable  Israel  to  withdraw 
in  the  allotted  3  years  in  conditions  of 
security. 

The  remaining  sum  for  Israel,  and 
the  full  amount  for  Egypt,  are  in  the 
form  of  FMS  credits. 

In  addition  to  the  security  assistance 
I  have  outlined,  we  are  seeking  an  ad- 
ditional $300  million  in  economic  as- 
sistance for  Egypt  over  the  3  years  to 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 

help  President  Sadat  bring  the  benefits  ' 
of  peace  to  his  people. 

Since  Congress  will  need  to  appro-  i 
priate  only  10'7f  of  the  total  amount  to 
guarantee  the  FMS  credit  portion  of  the 
assistance  package,  the  actual  budg- 
etary impact  of  the  $4.5  billion  we 
contemplate  for  military  programs  will 
amount  to  only  $1.14  billion  in  appro- 
priations. The  total  $4.8  billion  secu- 
rity and  economic  program  will  require 
$1.47  billion  in  appropriations. 

This  assistance  is  in  addition  to  our 
current  assistance  programs  to  both 
countries,  which  involve  $1 .785  billion 
for  military  and  economic  assistance  to 
Israel  and  almost  $1  billion  in  eco- 
nomic aid  to  Egypt. 

In  addition  I  would  also  like  to  stress 
that  we  have  already  begun  to  urge  our 
friends  and  allies  to  contribute  mean- 
ingfully to  the  reinforcement  of  peace. 
We  hope  that  trade,  investment,  and 
economic  assistance  flows  to  those  who 
have  taken  this  courageous  step  toward 
peace  will  expand.  The  World  Bank 
has  a  role  to  play  also.  This  is  a  matter 
we  will  pursue  vigorously.  The  entire 
world  will  benefit  from  Middle  East 
peace. 

Ability  to  Repay  Loans 

Questions  have  been  asked  whether 
Israel,  in  particular,  will  be  able  to  live 
with  the  added  debt  burdens.  We  be- 
lieve that  both  Egypt  and  Israel  will  be 
able  to  do  so.  The  ratio  of  debt  service 
to  export  earnings  in  Israel  has  de- 
clined from  a  high  of  over  28%  in  1975 
to  23%  or  24%  in  1978. 

We  anticipate  this  favorable  trend 
will  continue  for  several  years,  even 
with  the  added  burdens  of  the  new 
debts.  Egypt's  foreign  exchange  situa- 
tion is  improving,  and  its  foreign  debt 
situation  is  being  managed  satisfacto- 
rily. 

Legislation  on  Assistance 

Congressional  action  on  additional 
assistance  is  vital  to  the  continued  im- 
plementation of  the  Peace  Treaty  be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt.  The  $1.47  bil- 
lion supplemental  appropriation  we  are 
asking  for  in  FY  1979  is  the  best  way 
to  accomplish  this  from  all  perspec- 
tives. 

It  provides  the  total  cost  of  U.S. 
support  of  the  Peace  Treaty  in  a  com- 
prehensive package  which  can  be  dealt 
with  in  an  integrated  fashion;  this  ob- 
viates the  need  for  piecemeal  requests 
which  might  tend  to  grow  in  cost  to  the 
American  taxpayer  if  they  were  to  be 
stretched  out  over  time.  It  provides 
money  needed  to  construct  the  new  Is- 
raeli airbases  rapidly  so  that  the  with- 


June  1979 


39 


drawal  can  be  completed  within  the 
stipulated  3  years.  It  also  provides  both 
Israel  and  Egypt  in  one  decisive  step 
with  the  assurance  that  they  will  re- 
ceive not  all  that  they  would  have 
wished  but  a  substantial  contribution  of 
the  funds  needed  to  implement  the 
Peace  Treaty,  to  satisfy  some  pressing 
security  concerns,  and  to  show  the 
peoples  concerned  the  benefits  of 
peace. 

Toward  a  Comprehensive  Settlement 

The  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  is  a  reality  which  is  now 
ratified  and  firmly  in  place.  There  is, 
however,  a  long  way  to  go  before  a 
comprehensive  settlement,  which  can 
be  the  only  guarantee  of  Middle  East 
peace,  is  achieved. 

At  Camp  David,  a  framework  for 
negotiations  toward  a  comprehensive 
settlement  of  all  outstanding  issues  in 
the  Arab-Israel  dispute,  including  the 
key  Palestinian  issue,  was  agreed  to.  In 
the  final  days  of  negotiations  for  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  treaty,  both  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  re- 
newed their  commitment  to  the  under- 
takings made  at  Camp  David.  Both 
leaders  reaffirmed  that  they  will  con- 
tinue beyond  the  peace  between  their 
two  nations  toward  a  comprehensive 
peace. 

Also  of  crucial  importance  is  Presi- 
dent Carter's  promise,  made  before  the 
Egyptian  People's  Assembly  March  10: 

I  pledge  to  you  today  that  1  also  remain  per- 
sonally committed  to  move  on  to  negotiations 
concerning  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip 
and  other  issues  of  concern  to  the  Palestinians 
and  also  to  future  negotiations  between  Israel 
and  all  its  neighbors.  I  feel  a  personal  obligation 
in  this  regard. 

The  President's  nomination  of  Am- 
bassador Robert  Strauss  to  lead  the 
U.S.  side  in  the  negotiations  to  estab- 
lish the  self-governing  authority  in  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  is  a  tangible  reaf- 
firmation of  that  commitment.  His 
nomination  only  underscores  our  in- 
tention to  pursue  the  effort  for  peace 
vigorously  and  with  the  same  determi- 
nation that  has  brought  us  to  the  peace 
between  Egypt  and  Israel. 

It  is  our  profound  hope  that  those 
who  are  directly  concerned  but  still 
uninvolved  will  be  persuaded  to  join 
this  process  and  that  all  nations  that 
care  for  peace  will  lend  their  support  to 
this  treaty  and  to  the  continuing  effort 
ahead. 

If  progress  is  made  on  the  West 
Bank-Gaza  and  basic  Palestinian  is- 
sues, Arab  doubts  about  the 
Egyptian-Israel  treaty  should  begin  to 
subside.  We  will  continue  in  our  efforts 


Yemen 


by  H'illiam  R.  Crawford 

Statement  before  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  March  12,  1979. 
Ambassador  Crawford  was  acting  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs  on  the  day  of  this 
testimony. ' 

For  over  30  years,  we  have  recog- 
nized the  strategic  importance  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  to  the  United  States  and  to 
our  allies  and  have  had  a  deep  interest 
in  and  commitment  to  the  security  and 
stability  of  Saudi  Arabia.  Saudi 
Arabia's  security  is  directly  affected  by 
the  situation  in  neighboring  North 
Yemen  [Yemen  Arab  Republic — 
Y.A.R.]  which  supplies  perhaps  a  mil- 
lion members  of  the  Saudi  work  force. 

For  some  years  we  have  been  work- 
ing with  Saudi  Arabia  to  improve  the 
stability  of  south  Arabia  by  fostering  a 
strong  central  government  in  North 
Yemen,  which  has  been  subject  to 
political  pressure  from  the  Soviet- 
supplied  Marxist  regime  in  South 
Yemen  [People's  Democratic  Republic 
of  Yemen— P.D.R.Y.]  We,  the  Saudis, 
and  other  peninsula  countries  agree 
with  the  Government  of  the  Yemen 
Arab  Republic  that  the  long-term  solu- 
tion  to   nation   building   is   through 


steady  economic  development  and  so- 
cial progress. 

The  focus  of  our  initial  assistance  to 
the  Y.A.R.,  therefore,  was  economic 
aid,  designed  to  serve  as  a  catalyst  for 
much  more  bountiful  assistance  from 
Arab  neighbors.  Since  the  restoration 
of  relations  in  1972,  we  have  supplied 
over  $75  million  in  development  assist- 
ance and  PL  480  to  the  Y.A.R.,  while 
Saudi  Arabia  and  other  peninsula  states 
have  supplied  over  $1  billion  in  aid. 

We  recognized  by  the  rniddle  of  this 
decade,  however,  that  economic  aid 
was  not  the  sole  answer  to  the  pressing 
problem  of  stability  in  North  Yemen. 
As  Soviet  supply  of  military  equipment 
dwindled  in  the  north  and  intensified  in 
the  south,  a  serious  imbalance  in  the 
military  capabilities  between  the  two 
states  developed.  Today,  we  estimate 
there  are  800-1,000  Soviets  in  South 
Yemen;  perhaps  half  of  them  military. 
There  are  500-700  Cuban  advisers,  half 
of  them  military. 

The  United  States  in  1976  agreed  to 
its  first  sale  of  military  equipment  to 
North  Yemen — some  $140  million  in 
essentially  infantry  equipment  financed 
by  Saudi  Arabia — and  began  training 
members  of  the  Yemen  Armed  Forces 
under  our  international  military  educa- 
tion and  training  (IMET)  program.  In 
the   spring  of   1978,   after  informing 


to  persuade  Arab  leaders  that  the  treaty 
represents  the  beginning  of  a  new, 
realistic  way  to  proceed  and  that  op- 
position to  it  will  surely  damage  the 
prospects  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  United  States — and  the  President 
personally — is  determined  to  see  that 
Israel's  security  is  assured,  to  demon- 
strate that  the  next  negotiations  can 
produce  results  that  will  respect  the 
legitimate  rights  and  just  requirements 
of  the  Palestinian  people,  and  to  see 
that  the  essential  elements  of  Resolu- 
tion 242  are  applied. 

President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  have  agreed  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith,  with  a  goal  of  completing  those 
negotiations  within  1  year,  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  the  modalities  for  hold- 
ing elections  to  a  self-governing  au- 
thority for  the  inhabitants  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  and  on  the  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  that  body.  These 
negotiations  are  to  begin  at  the  end  of 
this  month. 

The  framework  for  peace  established 


at  Camp  David  and  the  achievement  of 
the  Egypt-Israel  treaty  are  parts  of  a 
process  that  have  not  been  concluded. 
They  provide  the  indispensable  foun- 
dation and  the  first  effective  step  on  the 
road  to  a  just  and  lasting  peace.  The 
challenges  ahead  are  formidable,  and 
overcoming  them  may,  at  times,  tax 
our  patience  and  our  fortitude.  But,  for 
the  first  time,  a  concrete  beginning  has 
been  made  toward  peace  in  this  trou- 
bled region,  and  a  real  opportunity 
exists  to  complete  the  task. 

Our  intention  is  to  help  make  this 
treaty  the  foundation  for  a  wider  and 
greater  peace  that  all  the  Middle  East 
may  join  and  all  the  world  support.  We 
are  determined  to  remain  steady  on  this 
course  and  to  turn  our  intentions  into  a 
reality.  American  interests  require  it.D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Congress  of  our  intent,  we  agreed  to  a 
Saudi  transfer  of  four  F-5B  trainer  air- 
craft to  North  Yemen  in  anticipation  of 
developing  an  F-5  squadron  as  the 
Y.A.R.  Air  Force. 

Last  June  the  President  of  North 
Yemen  was  assassinated.  A  majority  of 
the  Arab  League  found  South  Yemen  to 
be  responsible  for  this  extraordinary  act 
of  international  terrorism.  Two  days 
later,  the  more  pro-Soviet  faction 
within  the  Adeni  regime  ousted  and 
killed  the  P.D.R.Y.  head  of  state  in  a 
coup.  From  this  point  the  concern  of 
both  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Y.A.R.  over 
the  threat  South  Yemen  posed  greatly 
intensified. 

Because  of  our  own  concern  over  the 
stability  of  the  region,  and  after  inten- 
sive consultations  with  the  Saudis  and 
the  Y.A.R.,  we  thought  it  wise  to  ac- 
celerate deliveries  of  equipment  agreed 
to  in  1976 — some  of  it  by  aircraft — and 
to  provide  some  military  training  teams 
to  facilitate  the  introduction  of  this 
equipment  into  the  Y.A.R.  Armed 
Forces. 

In  September  1978,  after  intensive 
top-level  review  of  urgent  Y.A.R.  and 
Saudi  requests,  we  determined  to  notify 
Congress  of  our  willingness  to  supply 
approximately  $400  million  in  addi- 
tional military  equipment,  includinii  12 
F-5E,  64  M-60  tanks,  and  100  armored 
personnel  carriers.  The  notifications  to 
Congress  were  held  until  after  the  re- 
cess and  submitted  in  February  of  this 
year. 

The  current  fighting,  which  began 
February  23,  is  more  serious  than  past 
incidents.  It  is  clearly  a  carefully 
planned,  coordinated,  and  amply  sup- 
ported campaign  with  the  apparent  in- 
tention of  seizing  and  occupying  North 
Yeineni  territory  and  destabilizing  the 
North  Yemen  Government. 

The  timing  of  the  attack  may  have 
been  related  to  South  Yemen's  desire 
to  exploit  its  current  superiority  in 
equipment  before  our  announced  mili- 
tary assistance  reaches  and  is  integrated 
into  the  North  Yemen  Armed  Forces. 

We  have  been  in  close  consultations 
with  the  Saudis  and  the  North  Yemenis 
since  the  fighting  began  and  have  con- 
tinued to  urge  that  diplomatic  means, 
primarily  in  an  Arab  context,  be 
employed  to  end  the  fighting,  arrange 
the  withdrawal  of  South  Yemeni  forces 
from  Y.A.R.  territory,  and  promote  a 
relaxation  of  tensions  between  the  two 
states. 

We  are  encouraged  that  both  Saudi 
Arabia  and  other  Arab  states  supportive 
of  North  Yemen  are  emphasizing  dip- 
lomatic means  to  deal  with  this  prob- 
lem. North  Yemen  has  informed  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions of  the  attack  indicating  it  is  the 
object  of  aggression  and   is  acting  in 


legitimate  self-defense  under  Article  51 
ol^he  U.N.  Charter. 

On  February  28,  in  a  statement  read 
by  the  Department's  spokesman,  we 
indicated  our  concern  about  the  situa- 
tion and  our  support  for  the  principle  of 
nonaggression.' 

We  cannot  confirm  various  reports 
that  foreigners,  including  Cubans  and 
Ethiopians,  are  assisting  South  Yemen 
forces  within  North  Yemen's  territory, 
but  it  is  clear  that  Soviet  and  Cuban 
logistic  support  and  advice  have  been 
an  important  factor  in  the  P.D.R.Y.'s 
military  successes. 

We  have  expressed  our  concern 
about  the  situation  to  the  Soviets,  urg- 
ing the  need  for  restraint  on  both  par- 
ties to  the  fighting.  We  have  also  made 
clear  that  we  consider  the  security  and 
stability  of  the  Arabian  Peninsula  to  be 
in  the  vital  interest  of  the  United  States 
and  are  prepared  to  take  appropriate 
actions  to  help  defend  those  interests. 

The  Iraqis,  Syrians,  and  Jordanians 
arranged  a  cease-fire  on  March  3  but  it 
did  not  hold.  On  March  6  the  Arab 
League  Council  of  Ministers  called  for 
an  immediate  cease-fire  and  a  with- 
drawal of  forces  within  10  days.  The 
March  6  cease-fire  was  not  observed 
immediately,  but  the  fighting  has 
abated  somewhat. 

In  the  meantime  the  P.D.R.Y.  had 
made  substantial  inroads  into  the 
Y.A.R.,   seizing  several   towns  of  re- 


NORTH  YEMEN— A  PROFILE 

Area:  75,000  sq.  mi.  (about  the  size  of 

Neb.). 
Capital:  Sana. 

Population:  6.5  million  (1978). 
Govt.  Type:  Republic. 
Independence:  1918. 
GNP:  $1.7  billion  (1976). 
Per  Capita  GNP:  $250-469  (1977). 
Exports:  $11.9  million  (1977). 
Imports:  $1  billion  (1977). 
U.S.   Economic  Aid   (1959-78):   $90.4 

million. 
U.S.  Ambassador:  George  M.  Lane. 

SOUTH  YEMEN— A  PROFILE 

Area:  1 12,000  sq.  mi.  (about  the  size  of 
Wis.  and  Mich.). 

Capital:  Aden. 

Population:  1.8  million  (1979  est.). 

Govt.  Type:  Socialist  republic. 

Independence:    Nov.  30.  1967. 

GNP:  $490  million  (1976  e.st.). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $290  (1976  est). 

Exports:  $177  million  (1976). 

Imports:  $451  million  (1976). 

U.S.  Economic  Aid:  None. 

U.S.  Ambassador:  No  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. 


gional  political  importance  and  ' 
threatening  to  cut  the  road  linking  the  i 
two  principal  cities  in  the  country.  The 
worsening  military  situation  and  the 
uncertainty  that  a  cease-fire  could  be 
established  required  firm,  appropriate 
U.S.  responses  to  meet  an  emergency 
affecting  the  U.S.  national  interest. 

We  thought  it  prudent  to  further  ac- 
celerate deliveries  of  previously  ap- 
proved equipment  by  immediate  airlift 
to  North  Yemen. 

Under  provisions  of  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Act,  the  President  has  certified 
that  an  emergency  exists  which  re- 
quires waiver  of  the  congressional  re- 
view period  for  those  items  of  equip- 
ment which  were  already  before  Con- 
gress on  an  informal  notification  basis. 

We  have  additionally  approved  new 
requests  for  appropriate  amounts  of 
TOW  antitank  weapons,  M-79  grenade 
launchers,  155  mm  howitzers.  Dragon 
antitank  weapons,  and  support  equip- 
ment and  ammunition  for  the  Y.A.R. 
The  value  of  these  additional  items 
falls  below  the  levels  specified  for 
notification  under  Section  36(b)  of  the 
Arms  Export  Control  Act. 

Finally,  we  have  received  requests 
from  Jordan  and  Saudi  Arabia  for 
transfer  to  Y.A.R.  of  certain  U.S.  ori- 
gin equipment  in  their  inventories.  We 
will  notify  the  Congress  of  our  inten- 
tion to  waive  the  waiting  period  for 
these  section  3(d)  transfers. 

As  the  President  has  indicated  to 
Members  of  Congress,  we  informed  the 
Saudis  of  our  willingness  to  deploy  a 
.squadron  of  F-15's  and  two  airborne 
warning  and  control  system  (AWACS) 
aircraft  to  Saudi  Arabia  to  bolster  the 
security  of  Saudi  airspace.  The  Saudis 
indicated  an  immediate  need  for  the 
AWACS,  which  are  now  in  country. 
The  President  also  ordered  a  carrier 
task  force — headed  by  the  U.S.S. 
Constellation — from  the  7th  Fleet  into 
the  western  Indian  Ocean  to  demon- 
strate our  concern  for  the  security  of 
the  Arabian  Peninsula. 

These  responses  indicate  the  serious- 
ness with  which  we  view  this  situation 
and  our  determination  to  meet  the 
legitimate  defense  needs  of  moderate 
governments  in  this  strategically  vital 
part  of  the  world.  Our  military  re- 
sponses to  the  situation  are  designed  to 
reinforce  the  prospect  for  cessation  of 
hostilities,  withdrawal  from  occupied 
territories,  and  an  end  to  violence  in 
this  long  troubled  and  strategic  part  of 
the  Arabian  Peninsula.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^For  text  see  Bun  etin  of  Apr.  1979.  p.  41. 


me  1979 


41 


OCEAJVS:        Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference 


by  Elliot  L.  Richardson 

Statement  released  to  the  press  in 
Washington.  DC.  on  April  27.  1979. 
Ambassador  at  Large  Richardson  is 
Special  Representative  of  the  President 
for  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference. ' 

The  nations  of  the  world  are  consid- 
erably closer  today  to  a  Law  of  the  Sea 
treaty  than  they  were  6  weeks  ago. 
While  the  Geneva  phase  of  the  eighth 
session  fell  short  of  its  stated  goal,  its 
negotiations  resulted  in  solid,  en- 
couraging progress.  Clear  and  emphatic 
testimony  to  this  is  the  appearance  of  a 
revised  negotiating  text.  This  text  con- 
tains many  improvements,  but  it  also 
contains  a  number  of  unresolved  is- 
sues. By  definition,  it  represents  prog- 
ress toward  a  substantially  improved 
prospect  of  consensus. 

The  conference  can  take  great  pride 
in  its  landmark  agreement  obligating 
all  nations  of  the  world  to  protect  and 
preserve  the  marine  environment.  A 
Law  of  the  Sea  treaty  containing  these 
new  articles  on  the  environment  would 
represent  one  of  the  most  significant 
accomplishments  in  the  history  of  in- 
ternational environmental  law.  The 
conference  has  at  last  successfully 
negotiated  a  compromise  giving  land- 
locked and  geographically  disadvan- 
taged states  access  to  the  surplus  fish 
stocks  in  the  exclusive  economic  zones 
of  the  coastal  states  in  their  region. 
This  was  one  of  the  seven  hard-core  is- 
sues identified  by  the  conference  last 
year.  Its  resolution  stands  as  a  major 
achievement  of  the  conference. 

Another  principal  concern  of  the 
United  States — the  conduct  of  marine 
scientific  research  on  the  shelf  beyond 
200  miles  —  has  not  yet  been  resolved 
to  our  satisfaction.  We  seek  a  regime 
more  congenial  to  freedom  of  inquiry. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  third  com- 
mittee has  completed  its  work  except 
for  marine  scientific  research.  This 
subject  is  being  kept  open  for  further 
negotiation  in  a  special  effort  to  bring 
opposing   points  of  view  closer  to- 


gether. We  intend  to  continue  to  press 
our  case  vigorously. 

Our  concern  about  scientific  research 
seriously  qualifies  our  reaction  to  the 
new  texts  on  the  outer  limit  of  the 
Continental  Shelf.  In  and  of  them- 
selves, these  texts  set  the  stage  for  a 
major  breakthrough.  But  this  will  not 
occur  until  the  scientific  research 
problem  is  resolved. 

A  revision  of  the  article  on  marine 
mammals  is  not  part  of  the  revised  text, 
but  a  growing  number  of  countries  ex- 
pressed their  support  for  U.S.  efforts  to 
strengthen  conservation  and  protection 
of  these  unique  creatures.  We  view  this 
as  a  satisfying  and  desirable  develop- 
ment. 

Negotiations  on  seabeds  issues 
yielded  considerable  movement.  In 
more  than  20  significant  provisions, 
improvements  have  been  made. 
Perhaps  five  have  been  made  worse. 
For  the  first  time  we  have  an  appro- 
priate structure  to  provide  reasonable 
assurance  of  access  to  seabed  minerals. 
Qualification  standards  for  applicants 
are  limited  to  financial  and  technical 
competence  and  performance  under 
prior  contracts.  All  plans  of  work  pro- 
posed by  all  qualified  applicants  are 
required  to  be  approved,  except  as  lim- 
ited by  the  production  ceiling.  These 
are  major  accomplishments,  but  they 
also  make  doubly  clear  the  critical  im- 
portance of  having  a  production  limita- 
tion that  will  not  prevent  the  develop- 
ment of  this  new  industry.  On  that 
subject,  much  work  remains  to  be 
done. 

I  do  not  want  to  imply  that  we  had 
nothing  but  success.  In  fact,  many  is- 
sues proved  impossible  to  solve  during 
this  session,  and  it  is  far  from  clear  that 
they  can  be  solved  during  the  next. 

Among  these  is  one  authorizing  the 
International  Seabed  Resource  Author- 
ity to  share  the  financial  benefits  of 
mining  with  peoples  who  have  not  yet 
attained  independence.  In  our  view, 
this  would  place  on  the  Authority  a 
political  burden  that  could  well  be  too 
much  for  it  to  survive. 


Transfer  of  technology  continues  to 
be  a  subject  we  have  not  yet  fully  re- 
solved. 

We  believe  further  work  needs  to  be 
done  on  the  question  of  contractor 
selection  when  production  limitation 
forces  such  selection.  An  absolute 
priority  for  the  Enterprise  over  other 
applicants  in  the  competition  under  the 
production  ceiling,  as  in  the  new  text, 
would  bring  into  jeopardy  the  whole 
system  of  production  limitation. 

There  was  some  limited  progress  on 
the  financial  terms  of  contracts,  but  the 
total  financial  burden  remains  too  high 
to  permit  this  lledgling  industry  to  sur- 
vive. 

One  regrettable  development  con- 
cerns the  financing  of  the  Enterprise. 
Adequate,  even  generous,  provision 
has  been  made  for  the  financing  of  the 
Authority's  operating  arm.  The  capital 
for  its  first  mining  operation  would  be 
provided  by  means  of  loans  guaranteed 
by  governments  with  up  to  one-third  of 
the  total  to  be  paid  in  refundable  capi- 
tal to  the  extent  needed  to  secure 
adequate  Enterprise  funding.  The  new 
text  proposes  to  increase  the  paid-in 
refundable  capital  to  one-half  of  the 
capital  requirements  of  the  Enterprise 
and  to  eliminate  the  provision  that  it 
only  be  drawn  as  needed.  This  is  a  bur- 
den on  member  states  which  is  quite 
unnecessary.  We  have  seen  no  indica- 
tion that  the  states  represented  in  this 
conference  would  be  willing  to  accept 
it. 

Turning  to  the  decisionmaking 
structure  of  the  Authority,  there  was 
movement  on  the  composition  of  the 
council,  but  the  number  of  members 
and  the  voting  procedures  remain  unre- 
solved. From  the  U.S.  point  of  view, 
this  is  a  pivotal  issue  certain  to  be  the 
focus  of  conference  energy  when  the 
eighth  session  resumes  negotiations  in 
New  York  this  summer. 

Summing  up.  I  believe  it  is  fair  to 
say  that  these  6  weeks  have  ended  on  a 
note  of  solid  accomplishment.  If  it  dis- 
appointed our  highest  hopes,  the  con- 
ference certainly  met  our  most  realistic 
expectations.  Our  chances  of  going  all 
the  way  to  a  treaty  look  better  than  ever 
before.  D 


'  Press  release  113. 


42 


SCIE]\CE  AJ^D  TECHNOLOGY: 

Report  from  the  President 


In  a  message  to  the  Congress  on 
March  27.  1979.  President  Carter  de- 
scribed the  Administration' s  policy 
perspective  on  science  and  technology, 
highlighted  some  of  the  most  important 
initiatives  undertaken  in  this  area,  and 
outlined  the  potential  effects  of  science 
and  technology  for  the  coming  decade 
and  beyond.  Following  is  an  excerpt 
from  that  message.' 


SCIENCE.  TECHNOLOGY 
AND  INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 

Science  and  technology  is  increas- 
ingly international  in  its  scope  and  sig- 
nificance. This  international  dimension 
affects  the  planning  and  conduct  of  our 
research  and  development  activities. 
Such  activities,  whether  carried  out  by 
us  or  by  others,  serve  to  increase  the 
fundamental  stock  of  human  knowl- 
edge. They  can  also  foster  commercial 
relationships,  impact  on  the  quality  of 
life  in  all  countries,  and  affect  the 
global  environment.  Both  our  domestic 
planning  and  our  foreign  policy  must 
reflect  an  understanding  of  this  wide- 
ranging  impact  of  science  and  technol- 
ogy. 

Much  ot  the  existing  international 
cooperation  in  science  and  technology 
takes  place  in  academic  or  commercial 
channels.  There  is,  however,  a  growing 
role  for  governmental  cooperation  as 
other  nations  make  new  commitments 
to  scientific  and  technological  growth. 
If  used  wisely  these  future  opportuni- 
ties for  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation  can  support  our  foreign 
policy  objectives. 

Several  themes  have  shaped  my  Ad- 
ministration's policy  in  this  area.  We 
are: 

•  Pursuing  new  international  initia- 
tives that  advance  our  own  research 
and  development  objectives; 

•  Developing  and  strengthening  sci- 
entific exchanges  that  bridge  political, 
ideological,  and  cultural  divisions  be- 
tween countries; 

•  Formulating  programs  and  institu- 
tions that  help  developing  countries  use 
science  and  technology;  and 

•  Cooperating  with  other  nations  to 
manage  technologies  with  global  im- 
pact. 


Pursuing  New  International 
Initiatives 

United  States  scientific  and  techno- 
logical objectives  are  advanced  by 
cooperating  with  other  nations.  For 
example,  we  work  together  with  many 
nations  on  large  scale  scientific  pro- 
grams; joint  funding  of  expensive  re- 
search, development,  and  demonstra- 
tion projects;  and  efforts  to  alleviate 
common  problems. 

Two  decades  ago,  the  International 
Geophysical  Year  set  a  pattern  for  in- 
ternational cooperation  on  large-scale 
scientific  problems.  This  model  has 
been  extended  to  most  fields  of  sci- 
ence. Today  the  world's  weather  is 
studied  jointly  by  nations  through  the 
Global  Atmospheric  Research  Project. 
With  the  European  Space  Organization 
we  are  planning  a  space  mission  to 
examine  polar  regions  of  the  sun. 
These  programs  are  yielding  new 
knowledge  about  our  solar  system  and 
our  earth's  natural  processes.  They  are 
providing  important  practical  divi- 
dends. 

As  the  cost  of  large-scale  research 
programs  and  research  facilities  rises, 
all  countries  find  the  financial  support 
increasingly  burdensome.  We  must  join 
together  to  support  the  most  expensive 
and  significant  projects.  We  are  discus- 
sing with  other  nations  a  program  to 
drill  deeply  into  the  offshore  continen- 
tal margins  between  the  continental 
shelves  and  ocean  basins.  This  program 
would  provide  new  knowledge  of  the 
sea  floor  and  help  us  assess  the  mar- 
gins' potential  for  resources.  Other 
large-scale  scientific  programs  that 
could  be  pursued  jointly  include  the 
next  generation  of  high  energy  physics 
accelerators,  telescopes,  and  fusion 
energy  research  facilities. 

Through  the  International  Energy 
Agency  we  are  cooperating  on 
energy-related  research  and  develop- 
ment. At  the  economic  summit  in  Bonn 
in  1978,  and  more  recently  in  Wash- 
ington, I  discussed  the  importance  of 
intensifying  joint  energy  research  and 
development  with  the  President  of  the 
European  Economic  Community. 
Similarly,  in  my  discussions  with  the 
Prime  Minister  of  Japan  we  agreed  to 
increase  cooperation  in  large-scale 
projects,  particularly  nuclear  fusion 
and  synthetic  fuel  production  from 
coal.  These  agreements  will  help  both 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

nations  achieve  new  energy  sources 
— faster  and  at  lower  cost  than  if  the 
research  were  pursued  independently.      ' 

Environmental  problems  caused  by 
industrialization  are  another  area  ap- 
propriate for  cooperation.  During  my 
Administration  we  have  started  efforts 
with  other  nations  to  deal  with  prob- 
lems of  transboundary  air  pollution. 
Canadian  and  American  scientists,  for 
example,  are  working  jointly  to  al- 
leviate damage  from  acid  rain  caused 
by  the  long-range  pollutants  across  our 
common  border. 

During  my  visit  this  February  with 
Mexico's  President  Jose  Lopez  Por- 
tillo,  we  agreed  to  intensify  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation  to  al- 
leviate problems  of  mutual  concern. 
We  will  explore  ways  to  cooperate  on 
research  for  developing  the  vast  arid 
lands  on  both  sides  of  our  border.  This 
will  include  research  on  new  crops 
suitable  for  these  lands  and  research  on 
effective  use  of  scarce  water  resources. 
We  also  will  exchange  information  and 
begin  joint  work  on  housing  and  urban 
planning  for  cities  close  to  our  common 
border. 


Developing  Scientific  Exchanges 
That  Bridge  Differences  Between 
Countries 

Most  nations  value  scientific  and 
technological  cooperation  with  the 
United  States.  We  can  use  this  fact  to 
build  bridges  with  countries  where  of- 
ficial relationships  have  been  absent  or 
strained.  Our  scientific  and  health  ex- 
changes with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  European  countries,  beginning 
after  World  War  II,  can  be  viewed  in 
this  light.  These  exchanges  are  now 
mature  and  extensive. 

Our  scientific  exchanges  with  the 
Soviet  Union  are  of  special  signifi- 
cance. At  the  sixth  meeting  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  Joint  Commission  on  Sci- 
ence and  Technology  in  Moscow  in 
February  1979,  we  agreed  to  add  new 
cooperative  areas  of  interest  to  both 
sides.  I  expect  to  see  continuing  im- 
provement in  the  quality  of  our  ex- 
changes with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  also 
expect  these  programs  to  support  and 
remain  compatible  with  our  overall 
political  relationship. 

The  normalization  of  our  relations 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China  is  a 
major  event  in  American  foreign  pol- 
icy. Since  the  signing  of  the  Shanghai 
Communique  of  1972,  scientific  and 
technological  relationships  have  played 
a  critical  role  in  building  the  relation- 
ship. In  order  to  accelerate  this  proc- 
ess, my  Science  and  Technology  Ad- 
viser led  a  delegation  of  senior  gov- 
ernment scientists  to  China  in  July  of 


June  1979 

1978.  This  delegation  was  followed  by 
visits  of  the  Secretaries  of  Energy  and 
Agriculture.  Chinese  delegations  sub- 
sequently visited  the  United  States  to 
discuss  educational  exchanges  and 
space  technology  programs. 

These  missions  led  to  the  science  and 
technology  agreement  that  I  signed 
with  Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping 
during  his  recent  visit  to  the  United 
States.  The  agreement  covers  programs 
of  interest  to  both  countries,  including 
development  of  a  satellite  communica- 
tions system  that  will  provide  China 
with  the  means  for  nationwide  televi- 
sion and  telephone  service.  The  agree- 
ment provides  for  exchange  of  scholars 
and  students,  exchange  of  plant  mate- 
rials for  genetic  research  on  crops,  and 
cooperation  in  high-energy  physics  and 
other  areas.  The  agreement  enhances 
opportunities  for  U.S.  industry  partici- 
pation in  China's  modernization  ef- 
forts. Our  new  relationship  provides  a 
sound  beginning  for  increased  technical 
social  ties  between  our  countries. 

Helping  Developing  Countries  Use 
Science  and  Technology 

The  United  States  has  an  opportunity 
and  responsibility  to  share  scientific 
knowledge  and  appropriate  technolog- 
ical skills  with  the  developing  world. 
Our  purpose  is  to  assist  other  countries 
in  developing  technology  for  their  own 
needs.  We  must  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose both  for  humanitarian  reasons  and 
because  overcoming  the  problems  of 
poverty,  overpopulation,  and  scarcity 
of  food  and  natural  resources,  will 
promote  a  stable  world,  enhancing  our 
own  security  and  well-being. 

Recognizing  these  facts,  I  have  sub- 
mitted legislation  to  create  an  Institute 
for  Scientific  and  Technological  Coop- 
eration, which  will  be  charged  with 
helping  developing  countries  improve 
their  scientific  and  technological 
capacity.  Working  with  the  Agency  for 
International  Development,  the  Insti- 
tute will  expand  the  use  of  science  and 
technology  to  o\ercome  obstacles  to 
development. 

The  Institute  will  help  individual  de- 
veloping countries  choose  and  develop 
technologies  that  suit  their  own  needs. 
At  the  same  time,  it  will  enable  them  to 
contribute  to  the  solution  of  problems 
that  affect  developed  as  well  as  de- 
veloping nations.  For  example,  the  In- 
stitute will  work  with  developing 
countries  on  multiple  crop  farming 
systems  for  areas  not  suited  to  continu- 
ous cropping  of  food  grain,  technol- 
ogies for  clean  water  and  sewage  in 
rural  areas  where  most  of  the  poor  live, 
modern  information  systems,  preven- 
tion and  cure  of  tropical  diseases,  and 


appropriate  energy  systems.  The  Insti- 
tute also  will  establish  means  for  de- 
veloping countries  to  draw  on  United 
States  government  agencies,  univer- 
sities, and  institutes,  as  well  as  private 
industry.  In  this  way  the  Institute  will 
enhance  coordination  of  the  interna- 
tional activities  of  our  government 
agencies. 

An  important  dimension  of  the  In- 
stitute is  its  mandate  to  work  with  the 
more  advanced  countries  of  the  de- 
veloping world,  the  "middle  tier"  na- 
tions. These  countries  have  the  infra- 
structure and  science  and  technology 
capacity  to  become  true  partners  with 
us  in  addressing  regional  and  interna- 
tional problems  and  needs  of  the  poor 
majority. 

The  Institute  will  call  on  industry, 
labor,  and  private  voluntary  organiza- 
tions for  development  and  management 
skills  and  improvement  of  the  health 
and  safety  levels  of  modernizing 
societies.  Already  twenty-five  percent 
of  our  current  exports  go  to  non-OPEC 
[Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries]  third  world  nations.  Our 
trade  in  manufactured  goods  will  ex- 
pand as  developing  countries  become 
better  able  to  purchase  and  use  our 
products. 

Finally,  we  plan  to  take  an  active 
role  in  the  United  Nations  Conference 
on  Science  and  Technology  for  De- 
velopment next  summer.  Father  Theo- 
dore Hesburgh,  President  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Notre  Dame,  will  lead  our 
delegation  to  the  Conference.  I  view 
this  Conference  as  an  opportunity  for 
discussing  technology-related  issues  of 
concern  lo  developing  countries  and 
reaching  agreement  on  common  objec- 
tives. 

Cooperating  With  Other  Nations  to 
Manage  Technologies  with  Global 
Impact 

Much  of  modern  technology  requires 
global  cooperation  and  management. 
The  telecommunications  network  and 
activities  of  international  organizations 
like  the  World  Meteorological  Organi- 
zation, the  International  Civilian  Avia- 
tion Organization,  and  the  World 
Health  Organization  are  noteworthy 
examples.  The  monitoring  activities 
organized  through  the  United  Nations 
Environmental  Program  is  a  more  re- 
cent example.  Among  other  activities, 
we  are  working  with  other  nations  to 
update  electromagnetic  spectrum  allo- 
cation, strengthen  international  con- 
trols on  nuclear  materials,  and  develop 
a  regime  for  rapidly  expanding  trans- 
national data  tlows.  International  coop- 
eration in  the  management  of  technol- 
ogy for  the  mutual  benefit  of  all  nations 


43 

will  become  even  more  important  in  the 
coming  decades. 

I  call  the  attention  of  Congress  to 
two  international  discussions  of  great 
importance,  one  dealing  with  nuclear 
fuel  cycle  evaluation  and  the  other  with 
allocation  of  radio  frequencies.  The 
Congress  knows  of  my  concern  over  a 
spreading  nuclear  weapons  capability 
as  more  countries  meet  their  energy 
needs  with  nuclear  power.  Our  own  re- 
search and  development  programs  have 
been  reoriented  toward  developing 
technologies  more  resistant  to  misuse. 
At  our  suggestion,  over  forty  countries 
have  convened  in  the  International  Nu- 
clear Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  to  consider 
how  we  can  minimize  risks.  I  am 
hopeful  that  new  institutional  controls 
and  technological  approaches  will 
emerge  from  these  deliberations. 

The  electromagnetic  spectrum — 
including  the  radio  frequencies — is  one 
of  the  reusable  natural  resources  avail- 
able to  mankind.  We  are  at  a  point  in 
history  where  increasing  worldwide 
demands  for  these  frequencies  are 
being  made;  demands  that  exceed  the 
availability  of  the  resource.  All  na- 
tions, large  or  small,  have  rights  of 
equitable  access  as  signatories  to  the 
International  Telecommunications 
Convention.  It  is  only  through  interna- 
tional cooperation  and  planning  that 
these  rights  can  be  guaranteed.  The 
1979  Worldwide  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  will  review  the  allocation 
of  radio  frequencies  for  communica- 
tions and  other  purposes.  Results  of 
this  conference  will  guide  the  use  of 
communications  and  electronic  equip- 
ment and  the  pattern  of  domestic  and 
international  communications  systems 
for  the  next  several  decades. 


NATIONAL  SECURITY 

Our  national  security  depends  in 
large  measure  on  our  technological  ca- 
pability. Our  future  security  will  de- 
pend in  part  on  our  ability  to  deploy 
new  weapons  systems  that  embody 
more  advanced  technology.  Our  poten- 
tial adversaries  are  investing  heavily  in 
military  personnel,  equipment,  and 
technology.  Accordingly,  we  must  look 
to  our  research  and  development  pro- 
grams to  enable  us  to  maintain  a  mod- 
ern and  responsive  defense  capability. 

In  the  context  of  this  message  on  sci- 
ence and  technology,  I  wish  to  em- 
phasize several  facets  of  their  relation- 
ship to  national  security.  We  must  en- 
sure that  we  are: 

•  Maintaining  technological  lead- 
ership in  weapons  systems; 

•  Utilizing  technology  to  reduce 


44 

costs  in  an  era  of  expensive  defense 
systems; 

•  Building  our  defense  research  base 
to  provide  for  our  national  security  in 
the  future; 

•  Preventing  export  of  technological 
products  and  processes  with  military 
applications  that  would  erode  our  se- 
curity; and 

•  Utilizing  advanced  technological 
capability  in  the  pursuit  of  arms  limita- 
tion agreements. 

Maintaining  Technological 
Leadership  in  Weapons  Systems 

Our  military  investments  in  new 
technology  over  the  years  have  con- 
tributed immeasurably  to  our  security. 
Now,  as  other  nations  are  becoming 
more  proficient  in  science  and  technol- 
ogy, we  must  make  certain  that  our 
own  capabilities  remain  at  the  frontier 
of  knowledge.  We  must  be  spared  the 
shock  of  major  technological  surprises. 
It  is  absolutely  essential  for  us  to  re- 
main second  to  none  in  the  develop- 
ment and  production  of  new  weapons. 

We  are  moving  ahead  with  major  de- 
velopment programs  to  increase  our 
military  capabilities.  In  the  strategic 
area,  programs  are  underway  to 
strengthen  each  element  of  the  triad — 
air.  land,  and  sea — in  order  to  preserve 
our  deterrent  capabilities.  Examples  are 
the  M-X  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
sile, cruise  missiles,  and  the  Trident 
submarine  and  missile  system.  We  are 
also  pursuing  the  development  of  more 
survivable  and  reliable  strategic  warn- 
ing and  command  control  systems. 

In  order  to  improve  our  capability  to 
fight  a  conventional  war,  we  are  de- 
veloping and  procuring  new  genera- 
tions of  aircraft,  ground  vehicles,  and 
munitions.  The  F-I5,  F-16.  F-I8, 
and  A-IO  aircraft,  the  XM-I  tank,  and 
the  Patriot  air  defense  missile  are 
examples. 

Utilizing  Technology  to  Reduce  Costs 

Science  and  technology — properly 
applied — can  increase  efficiency, 
thereby  reducing  acquisition  costs  and 
improving  the  effectiveness  of 
weapons.  Science  and  technology  en- 
able us  to  develop  new  materials  and 
components  at  lower  costs.  They  can 
give  our  weapons  greater  reliability  and 
efficiency,  thereby  reducing  personnel 
needs.  And  they  improve  our  man- 
ufacturing productivity.   Cooperation 


with  our  allies  also  will  help  reduce 
costs  without  sacrificing  our  moderni- 
zation programs.  Standardization  and 
common  operational  capability  among 
NATO  allies  are  important  objectives. 

In  the  procurement  of  weapons,  we 
are  emphasizing  competition  between 
potential  suppliers  to  help  keep  costs 
down.  And  we  have  adopted  new  man- 
agement techniques  to  ensure  that 
economies  are  not  overlooked.  We  also 
are  analyzing  carefully  the  best  mix  of 
systems  needed  to  meet  anticipated 
contingencies.  We  have  concluded  that 
future  shipbuilding  efforts  should  con- 
centrate on  larger  numbers  of  small 
ships,  with  enhanced  mobility  and 
firepower.  Similarly,  we  are  building  a 
new,  comparatively  low-cost  tactical 
airplane,  the  A-10,  that  emphasizes 
mobility  and  munitions  designed  for 
engagement  of  enemy  tank  forces. 
With  imagination  and  effort,  these 
various  approaches  will  enable  us  to 
maintain  technological  superiority  at 
acceptable  cost. 

Building  Our  Defense  Research  Base 

The  development  cycle  from  pro- 
posal of  a  new  concept  to  a  deployed 
weapons  system  can  take  a  decade  or 
more.  The  length  of  time  for  dividends 
from  investments  in  basic  research  is 
even  longer.  Moreover,  research  and 
development  are  inexpensive  compared 
to  the  acquisition  cost  of  weapons  sys- 
tems. The  proper  strategy,  therefore,  is 
to  expand  our  options  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  acquisition  process 
through  research,  and  then  be  very 
selective  at  the  costly  engineering,  de- 
velopment, and  production  stage. 

For  these  reasons,  our  science  and 
technology  base  related  to  national  se- 
curity must  be  the  best  in  the  world. 
Thus,  I  am  deeply  concerned  over  the 
declining  support  for  research  and 
technology  in  the  defense  budgets  that 
occurred  in  the  early  part  of  this  dec- 
ade. My  budgets  for  Fiscal  Year  1979 
and  1980  reverse  that  trend  and 
strengthen  our  technology  base.  The 
two  year  average  growth  in  the  tech- 
nology base  will  be  about  14  percent, 
including  an  increase  in  basic  research 
of  about  20  percent. 

The  Department  of  Defense  also  is 
taking  steps  to  strengthen  its  relation- 
ship with  universities  in  order  to  use 
the  research  and  development  resources 
of  the  academic  community  more  ef- 
fectively. Defense  support  of  university 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 

research  will  have  increased  more  than  ' 
20  percent  between  Fiscal  Years  1978  i 
and  1980. 


Preventing  Export  That  Erodes  Our 
Technological  Superiority 

Within  the  framework  of  national  se- 
curity, export  controls  on  technology 
are  important  to  ensure  that  our  tech- 
nological advantage  is  not  com- 
promised. A  comprehensive  study  of 
the  implications  of  international  tech- 
nology transfer  was  undertaken  early  in 
my  Administration.  I  am  persuaded 
that  the  export  control  process  must , 
seek  to  balance  the  conflicting  goals  of 
trade  promotion,  selected  trade  restric- 
tion based  on  national  security  consid- 
erations, and  furthering  our  foreign 
policy  objectives.  Decisions  in  specific 
export  licensing  cases  must  be  made  on 
their  merits  by  considering  these  three 
goals.  In  particular  we  are  taking  steps 
to  refine  and  expedite  the  government's 
decisionmaking  processes.  I  must  em- 
phasize, however,  that  while  sound  ex- 
port controls  are  important,  only  a 
strong  research  and  development  pro- 
gram, as  I  have  proposed,  ensures  our 
technological  leadership  in  defense. 

Utilizing  Advanced  Technological 
Capability  for  Arms  Control 

National  security  is  enhanced  by 
prudent  arms  control,  as  well  as  new 
weapons  systems.  To  this  end  I  have 
pursued  a  new  Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Treaty  with  the  Soviet  Union,  a 
comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban  treaty, 
and  other  arms  control  measures.  As 
these  agreements  enter  into  force,  our 
choices  in  weapons  development  must 
meet  our  own  needs,  while  giving  our 
adversaries  the  incentive  to  participate 
seriously  in  negotiations.  Successful 
arms  control  depends  on  science  and 
technology  to  provide  adequate  techni- 
cal means  of  verification.  Our  current 
national  capability  to  verify  arms 
agreements  is  excellent.  It  includes  ob- 
servation satellites  and  extensive 
capabilities  for  seismographic  detection 
and  interpretation.  We  must  continue  to 
pursue  scientific  and  technological  ad- 
vances to  maintain  these  capabilities. 


Jimmy  Carter  D 


'  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  2,  1979.  p.  529. 


line  1979 


45 


SECURITY  ASSISTAIVCE: 

Restrainnng  ConventU^nal 

Arms  Transfers 


by  Leslie  H .  Gelh 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Security  and  Scientific 
Affairs  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee.  Mr.  Gelb  is  Director  of  the 
Bureau  of  Politico- Military  Affairs. ' 

In  mid- 1977,  the  President  directed 
us  to  make  a  major  effort  to  develop 
multilateral  cooperation  in  the  restraint 
of  conventional  arms  transfers.  We 
pursued  this  on  three  basic  fronts;  with 
the  Soviets,  with  recipients,  and  with 
the  major  European  suppliers.  Today  I 
would  like  to  give  you  a  status  report 
on  where  we  are  and  where  we  hope  to 
go. 

Arms  transfers  are  an  important  in- 
strument of  U.S.  foreign  and  national 
security  policy.  We  make  arms  trans- 
fers on  a  substantial  scale.  At  the  same 
time,  we  have  begun  to  exercise  self- 
restraint.  We  have  taken  modest  steps 
to  cut  back  sales  to  the  developing 
countries,  both  qualitatively  and  quan- 
titatively. The  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  go  further  if  international  con- 
ditions will  allow.  Unfortunately,  the 
situation  is  not  propitious  at  this  time 
with  the  Soviets,  with  recipients,  or 
with  our  allies. 

We  have  been  discussing  various  re- 
straint possibilities  with  the  Soviets  for 
over  a  year.  In  general,  we  have  moved 
along  at  a  reasonable  pace  and  have 
had  some  serious  exchanges.  We  have 
discussed  political/legal  and  military/ 
technical  criteria  which  would  govern 
arms  transfers  globally,  and  we  have 
discussed  certain  regions.  However,  we 
did  not  make  much  headway  during  the 
last  round  of  talks  in  Mexico  City  in 
December. 

The  restraint  picture  with  regard  to 
recipients  is  mixed.  Some  countries  are 
interested  in  exploring  restraint  pos- 
sibilities, while  others  have  yet  to 
come  to  grips  with  the  issue.  Still 
others  are  fearful  that  the  Soviets  might 
use  our  bilateral  talks  as  a  vehicle  for 
making  U.S.  arms  transfers  more  dif- 
ficult. A  number  are  skeptical  that  re- 
straint can  work  but  are  willing  to 
examine  the  issue  in  various  interna- 
tional organizations  and  fora  such  as 
the  United  Nations.  In  general,  we 
have  found  that  most  recipient  coun- 
tries do  not  have  the  array  of  expertise 
necessary  to  develop  a  concerted  policy 


initiative  on  conventional   arms   re- 
straint. 

In  all  candor  I  must  say  that  the  en- 
thusiasm for  restraint  among  our  West- 
ern European  allies — the  major  Euro- 
pean suppliers  —  is  restrained.  The  al- 
lies are  basically  skeptical  about  the 
possibility  of  achieving  multilateral  re- 


straint. They  are  waiting  to  see  what 
progress  we  are  able  to  make  with  the 
Soviets.  At  the  same  time,  we  are 
monitoring  to  see  if  they  or  other 
suppliers  are  taking  advantage  of  our 
policy  of  restraint.  There  may  be  some 
signs  of  this.  How  these  circumstances 
will  or  should  affect  future  U.S.  unilat- 
eral cuts  remains  to  be  seen. 

Where  do  we  go  from  here?  We  shall 
try  to  continue  all  of  these  efforts  to- 
ward multilateral  restraint  in  spite  of 
the  mixed  results  we  have  achieved  so 
far.  However,  it  is  clear  that,  while 
some  basis  for  multilateral  restraint  has 
been  developed  over  the  past  year,  tan- 
gible results  will  require  lime.  There- 


MR.  GELB'S  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  3,  1978  (EXCERPTS)* 

Our  strategy  to  ohtain  multilateral  coop- 
eration is  based  on  the  need  to  move  for- 
ward in  tandem  on  three  fronts:  with  the 
Soviets  and  their  allies,  with  major  West 
European  suppliers,  and  with  recipients. 

We  talked  first  to  our  allies,  the  major 
European  suppliers.  They  said  that  restraint 
could  pose  serious  problems  for  them,  not 
the  least  of  which  would  be  the  future  of 
their  own  defense  industries.  Moreover, 
they  rightfully  said  that  before  they  could 
consider  restraint  seriously,  we  would  have 
to  be  sure  that  the  Soviets  were  willing  to 
cooperate  in  this  enterprise. 

So  we  took  our  case  to  the  Soviets,  Our 
first  meeting  with  them  was  in  December 
1977.  By  the  end  of  the  second  meeting,  in 
May,  they  had  moved  from  a  totally  nega- 
tive position  on  restraint  to  agreement  with 
us  that  unrestrained  arms  transfers  are  a 
serious  problem,  that  the  problem  is  urgent, 
and  that  it  has  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  concrete 
way.  They  also  agreed  to  meet  with  us  on  a 
regularly  scheduled  basis. 

In  our  third  bilateral  meeting  last  July, 
we  developed  a  framework  for  approaching 
restraint,  a  framework  for  subjecting  arms 
transfers  to  arms  control  considerations.  We 
also  agreed  to  explore  some  concrete  steps 
that  might  be  taken  in  the  near  term. 

At  the  same  lime  that  we  have  been  talk- 
ing with  the  Soviets,  the  international  cli- 
mate for  restraint  has  been  improving 
through  the  recognition  by  recipients  that 
restraint  could  serve  their  interests.  The 
Final  Document  of  the  U.N,  Special  Session 
on  Disarmament  called  for  consultations 
".  .  .  among  major  arms  suppliers  and  re- 
cipient countries  on  the  limitation  of  all 
types  of  international  transfer  of  conven- 
tional weapons."  This  is  the  first  time  that 
there  has  been  an  international  blessing  for 
the  concept  of  restraint. 

Immediately  after  the  special  session,  the 
Latin   American  countries  began   talking 


among  themselves  about  the  possibilities  of 
developing  a  restraint  regime  for  that  re- 
gion. If  this  could  be  achieved  in  one  re- 
gion, it  might  stimulate  other  regions  to 
seek  a  similar  approach.  We  strongly  sup- 
port such  regional  restraint  initiatives. 

This  is,  in  general,  where  we  stand  as  we 
approach  our  fourth  session  with  the 
Soviets,  sometime  in  December,  While  the 
Soviets  seem  to  be  negotiating  seriously,  we 
do  not  yet  know  whether  they  will  accept 
actual  restraint  in  arms  transfers.  We  do 
know,  however,  that  they  have  gone  far 
enough  with  us  that  they  must  have  made 
some  calculations  about  what  is  in  it  for 
them. 

We  can  only  speculate  about  these  calcu- 
lations, but  it  could  be  that  the  Soviets 
realize  that  arms  transfers  beyond  a  certain 
point  can  complicate  and  can  cause  serious 
problems  in  their  relations  with  the  United 
Stales,  They  may  recognize  that  they,  like 
us.  have  had  some  bad  experiences  as  a 
supplier — Egypt.  Indonesia.  Somalia  —  that 
they  have  not  always  achieved  what  they 
hoped  for  politically  through  arms  transfers, 
and  that  their  arms  have  been  used  in  ways 
that  were  not  intended.  They  may  also  cal- 
culate that,  in  the  absence  of  some  basis  for 
international  restraint,  the  United  States  has 
a  far  greater  capability  than  the  Soviet 
Union  to  increase  arms  transfers.  And  fi- 
nally, as  in  any  arms  control  negotiation, 
they  are  probably  looking  for  ways  to  cause 
difficulties  between  us  and  our  allies  and 
friends.  We  continue  to  talk  to  these  allies 
and  friends  about  our  restraint  policy,  our 
discussions  with  the  Soviets,  and  about 
ways  that  we  might  work  together. 


*  Excerpted  from  a  statement  before  the 
Special  Panel  on  Conventional  Arms 
Transfers  and  the  Indian  Ocean  of  the 
House  Armed  Services  Committee.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, DC.  20402. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SOUTH  ASIA:       tndia'U.S. 
Joint  Conttnission  Meeting 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE 
APR.  24,  1979' 

The  fourth  session  of  the  India-United  States 
Joint  Commission  was  held  in  Washington  on 
April  24,  1979. 

The  Indian  Delegation  was  led  by  Mr.  Atal 
Bihari  Vajpayee,  Minister  of  External  Affairs. 
The  United  States  Delegation  was  led  by  Cyrus 
R    Vance,  Secretary  of  State. 

Recognizing  that  both  Governments  welcome 
collaborative  efforts  in  the  agricultural  field 
and  have  already  initiated  agricultural  pro- 
grams within  the  Joint  Commission  framework, 
the  Joint  Commission  directed  that  a  fourth 
Subcommission — the  Agricultural  Subcommis- 
sion  —  be  established  in  the  year  ahead.  The 
Joint  Commission  feels  that  the  establishment 
of  an  Agricultural  Subcommission  will  help  in 
promoting  joint  agricultural  activities  between 
the  two  countries. 

The  Joint  Commission  heard,  discussed,  and 
approved  reports  of  its  three  Subcommis- 
sions  —  Economic  and  Commercial,  Education 
and  Culture,  and  Science  and  Technology  —  all 
of  which  met  in  1978-79. 

Economic  and  Commercial 

Noting  that  the  joint  discussions  of  bilateral 
trade,  investment,  and  international  economic 
issues  which  have  taken  place  have  contributed 
to  the  understanding  of  the  respective  posi- 


tions, the  Joint  Commission  endorsed  the  Sub- 
commission's  plan  to  continue  its  wide  ranging 
dialogue.  The  Joint  Commission  reviewed  the 
activities  of  the  Subcommission's  Agricultural 
Inputs  and  Associated  Technology  Working 
Group  and  commended  the  Group's  initiative  in 
expanding  its  scope  to  include  broader  ag- 
ricultural economic  policy  issues  in  its  discus- 
sions. The  Joint  Commission  noted  that  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  Working  Group  would  provide 
effective  support  to  the  work  of  the  new  Ag- 
ricultural Subcommission. 

The  Joint  Commission  welcomed  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Subcommission's  Industrial 
Technology  Working  Group  and  endorsed  the 
Group's  agreement  on  guidelines  for  ongoing 
cooperation  in  this  vital  field. 

The  Joint  Commission  reviewed  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  India-U.S.  Business  Council, 
which  has  served  as  a  valuable  adviser.  The 
Joint  Commission  noted  the  continuing  value  of 
the  frank  and  open  discussions  of  trade  and  in- 
vestment issues  of  mutual  concern  which  busi- 
ness and  industrial  leaders  of  both  countries 
have  conducted  within  the  Council.  The  Joint 
Commission  commended  and  endorsed  the 
Council's  project  on  Indo-U.S.  Commercial 
Cooperation  in  Third  Countries. 

Education  and  Culture 

The  Joint  Commission  reviewed  the  pro- 
grams and  activities  of  the  Subcommission  on 


Arms  Transfers  (Cont'd) 

fore,  we  should  be  thinking  about  a 
longer  term  perspective.  Taking  the 
longer  term  perspective  might  include 
the  following. 

•  A  regularized  exchange  of  views 
with  the  Soviets.  If  formal  negotiations 
do  not  prove  fruitful,  this  should  not 
mean  the  end  of  bilateral  discussions 
on  the  subject.  The  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lationship has  been  troubled  by  the 
problem  of  competitive  arms  transfers 
in  the  past  and  will  continue  to  be  so  in 
the  future.  There  is  too  much  at  stake. 
A  regular  exchange  of  views  would  be 
useful  if  only  to  reduce  the  risks  of 
miscalculation  and  misinformation. 

•  A  broader  program  of  spadework 
with  recipients.  This  would  involve 
discussing  their  security  problems  and 
defense  requirements,  as  well  as  so- 
liciting more  methodically  their  views 
on  cooperative  restraint  measures  and 
the  possibilities  for  developing  regional 


efforts.  We  have  to  find  some  way  to 
mesh  their  security  needs  with  their  de- 
sire to  devote  more  resources  to  eco- 
nomic development. 

•  A  new  look  at  the  opportunities  for 
progress  in  international  institutions. 
The  Program  of  Action  of  the  U.N. 
Special  Session  on  Disarmament  called 
for  discussions  between  suppliers  and 
recipients  on  arms  transfer  restraint. 
Many  good  ideas  that  have  been  ad- 
vanced in  the  past  deserve  reexamina- 
tion in  light  of  today's  circumstances. 
For  example,  we  might  reexamine  the 
idea  of  a  U.N.  arms  transfer  registry  or 
other  confidence-building  measures; 
we  might  take  a  new  look  at  how  the 
issue  could  be  dealt  with  in  an  upcom- 
ing U.N.  study  of  regional  disarma- 
ment, n 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Education  and  Culture  and  received  a  report  on     I 
the  Subcommission's  March   1979  meeting  in     ; 
New  Delhi.  The  Commission  commended  the      1 
Subcommission  for  its  success  in  promoting  the 
expansion  of  Indo-U.S.  cooperation  in  the  cul- 
tural and  educational  spheres  and  approved  the 
Subcommission's  plans  for  future  activities. 

The  Joint  Commission  noted  the  success  of 
the  exhibition  on  American  technology  which 
opened  in  India  in  January  1978  and  expressed 
keen  interest  in  plans  lor  an  exhibition  of  In- 
dian classical  art  in  the  United  States.  The  Joint 
Commission  endorsed  the  suggestions  for  fu- 
ture exchange  of  exhibitions  on  items  of  inter- 
est to  both  sides  which  were  formulated  during 
the  last  meeting  of  the  Indo-U.S.  Subcommis- 
sion on  Education  and  Culture  in  New  Delhi  in 
March  1979. 

The  Joint  Commission  endorsed  the  suc- 
cessful expansion  of  the  Subcommission's  fel- 
lowship program  and  considered  it  as  an  im- 
portant link  which  binds  the  academic  com- 
munities of  India  and  the  United  States.  It  also 
commended  the  Subcommission's  initiative  in 
establishing  a  visitorship  program  and  in  or- 
ganizing two  academic  seminars  in  1978.  The 
Commission  approved  the  subjects  for  future 
seminars. 

The  Joint  Commission  reviewed  the  work  of 
the  Subcommission's  Joint  Committee  on  Film 
and  Broadcasting,  noting  that  productive  work- 
shops and  exchange  visits  of  media  personnel 
have  taken  place.  The  Commission  noted  with 
satisfaction  that  five  Indian  films  are  being 
shown  on  American  public  television  in  1979 
and  that  a  package  of  sophisticated  television 
documentaries  from  the  United  States  has  been 
presented  to  the  Film  and  Television  Institute 
in  Pune,  India.  The  Commission  endorsed 
plans  for  an  Indian  Film  Festival  which  would 
bring  some  twenty  Indian  films  to  several 
American  cities. 

The  Joint  Commission  agreed  with  the  gen- 
eral recommendation  of  the  Subcommission 
that  a  periodic  review  of  Indo-U.S.  cooperation 
in  the  field  of  educational  exchanges  should  be 
undertaken  with  a  view  to  assess  its  long-term 
impact  and  to  draw  up  plans  for  these  ex- 
changes on  practical  and  useful  lines  for  the 
future.  The  Commission  also  endorsed  the 
suggestion  that  possibilities  for  closer  coopera- 
tion between  the  Subcommission  on  Education 
and  Culture  and  the  Subcommission  on  Science 
and  Technology  should  be  explored. 

Science  and  Technology 

The  Joint  Commission  confirmed  the  con- 
tinuing interest  of  both  countries  in  intensify- 
ing their  cooperation  in  scientific  and  techno- 
logical research  and  received  a  report  of  the 
fourth  meeting  of  the  Subcommission  on  Sci- 
ence and  Technology  which  took  place  in  New 
Delhi  in  November  1978.  It  noted  with  satis- 
faction activities  already  underway  in  agreed 
priority  areas  and  approved  the  Subcommis- 
sion's suggestions  for  newer  areas  of  collab- 
oration within  the  field  of  agricultural  sciences, 
energy,  material  sciences  and  electronics,  nat- 


June  1979 


47 


UNITED  IVATIONS:        herring 
American  Foreign  Poiicy  Interests 


by  Andrew  Young 

Siihmitted  to  the  Subcommittee  on 
State.  Justice,  Commerce,  the 
Judiciary,  and  Related  Agencies  of  the 
Senate  Appropriations  Committee  on 
April  2.  1979.  Ambassador  Young  is 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. ' 


These  important  hearings  deal  not 
only  with  the  United  Nations  but  with 
our  entire  foreign  policy.  For  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  United  Nations  and 
our  ability  to  pursue  our  interests 
through  the  U.N.  are  greatly  inlTuenced 
by  the  perceptions  we  have  of  our- 
selves as  a  nation  and  the  perceptions 
we  have  of  the  United  Nations  as  a 
forum  of  multilateral  diplomacy. 

The  United  Nations  serves  American 
foreign  policy  interests  well  in  part  be- 
cause of  the  Organization's  intrinsic 
values.  But  to  a  greater  extent,  our  de- 
gree of  success  really  depends  on  the 
strength  of  the  vision  we  impart  to  our 
policy  and  the  weight  we  ascribe  to  the 


ural  resources,  medical  and  health  sciences, 
and  institutional  exchange. 

The  Joint  Commission  noted  with  satisfac- 
tion the  grant  agreement  signed  by  the  U.S.  and 
Indian  Governments  in  August  1978  under 
which  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment will  provide  $2  million  to  fund  Suh- 
commission  and  other  projects  that  stress  oper- 
ational research  on  projects  of  potential  benefit 
to  the  Indian  rural  population. 

The  Joint  Commission  endorsed  the  Sub- 
commission's  plans  to  establish  approval 
guidelines  and  procedures  and  urged  the  Sub- 
commission  to  redouble  its  efforts  to  reach 
agreement  on  other  concrete  projects  in  priority 
areas. 

The  Joint  Commission  endorsed  the  work  in 
the  agricultural  research  area  carried  out  under 
Subcommission  auspices  and  noted  that  these 
activities  would  provide  a  useful  base  for  the 
work  of  the  new  Agricultural  Subcommission. 

The  Co-Chairmen  agreed  that  the  work  of  the 
Joint  Commission  and  its  subcommissions  has 
widened  the  area  of  understanding  and  facili- 
tated progress  on  a  wide  range  of  specific  is- 
sues in  the  bilateral  relationship.  They  con- 
firmed that  it  was  the  intent  of  both  govern- 
ments to  continue  to  expand  the  scope  of  the 
Joint  Commission  through  annual  meetings, 
joint  projects,  and  individual  exchanges  under 
its  sponsorship.  D 


'Press  release  108. 


United  Nations  in  the  management  of 
our  global  responsibilities. 

In  retrospect,  the  era  of  San  Fran- 
cisco and  Bretton  Woods  was  one  of 
grand  designs  as  well  as  grand  illu- 
sions. Thirty  some  years  ago,  we  had. 
in  concert  with  other  governments, 
pledged  ourselves  to  banish  forever  the 
scourge  of  war  and  set  out  to  reappraise 
the  political,  economic,  and  moral 
principles  operative  in  international 
relations. 

In  doing  so,  we  perhaps  attributed 
greater  promise  to  the  United  Nations 
than  it  could  ever  possibly  fulfill.  But 
we  were,  at  that  time,  also  a  nation  un- 
paralleled in  our  achievements,  un- 
challenged in  our  power,  and  unbridled 
in  our  idealism.  We  did  not,  then,  look 
at  the  United  Nations  as  "our"  instru- 
ment of  global  diplomacy  but  as  every 
nation's  joint  enterprise  of  peace. 

Today  the  world  is  very  different 
from  that  of  1945.  In  30  some  years, 
the  U.N.'s  agenda  has  doubled,  its 
membership  tripled,  its  budget  has 
grown  tenfold.  It  has  not  only  ex- 
panded international  institutions  it  had 
inherited  from  the  League  of  Nations 
but  spawned  new  specialized  agencies, 
financial  institutions,  and  international 
commitments. 

In  the  early  1950's  and  1960's,  the 
cold  war  and  the  rapid  process  of  de- 
colonization changed  perceptions  of  the 
United  Nations.  The  United  Nations 
seemed  an  important  terrain  of  contest 
between  East  and  West  in  which  newly 
independent  countries  appeared  as  a 
coveted  prize  in  the  fluctuating  power 
struggle,  pawns  in  the  rivalry  of  the 
cold  war. 

Since  the  mid-1960's,  however, 
changes  have  occurred.  "Pawns"  grew 
into  major  figures  on  the  world 
chessboard  with  moves  of  their  own 
and  strategies  independent  of  the  game 
of  traditional  power  players.  The  entire 
nature  of  world  and  U.S.  politics 
shifted.  The  United  Nations  no  longer 
was  "our"  instrument.  And  in  the 
interval,  our  perception  of  ourself  as  a 
nation  with  global  responsibilities  also 
underwent  drastic  alteration.  While  still 
remaining  in  the  absolute  sense  the 
major  military,  economic,  and  political 
power  in  the  world,  our  relative 
strength  has  diminished  in  comparison, 
not  only  to  the  Soviet  Union  but  to  our 
Western  partners  and  to  a  significant 
number  of  Third  World  countries  as 
well. 


In  part,  this  relative  change  in  our 
power  represented  a  major  success  of 
postwar  U.S.  diplomacy  which  at- 
tempted to  assist  others  to  get  back  on 
their  feet.  This  development  then  was 
healthy.  The  toll  of  Vietnam,  the 
energy  crisis,  and  our  own  economic 
difficulties  have  naturally  raised 
legitimate  concerns  about  the  extent  of 
our  foreign  commitments  and  the  limits 
of  our  power;  the  corresponding  situa- 
tion raised  serious  questions  about  the 
utility  of  the  United  Nations  for  us, 
forcing  a  reassessment  of  our  attitude 
and  approach  to  the  United  Nations  and 
of  the  United  Nations  itself. 

It  has  been  hard  for  some  to  accept 
that  the  United  Nations  can  no  longer 
be  the  instrument  of  Pax  Americana. 
Instead  of  trying  to  effectively  cope 
with  a  new  constellation  of  power 
within  the  United  Nations,  they  remain 
startled  that  we  do  not  command  au- 
tomatic majorities  and  bewildered  that 
our  good  intentions  and  designs  are 
not  always  taken  at  face  value.  They 
became  angry  rather  than  seriously  re- 
formulating our  policies  and  ap- 
proaches to  the  United  Nations.  And 
these  reactions  put  us  right  in  the  cen- 
ter of  the  minefield. 

Conflicting  Sentiments 
About  tlie  U.N. 

The  last  few  years  have  witnessed  a 
curious  coexistence  of  conflicting 
emotions  and  sentiments  about  the 
United  Nations  in  the  American  public 
and  policymakers. 

Were  we  not,  deep  down  in  our  col- 
lective psyche,  convinced  of  the  world 
body's  importance,  we  would  not  have 
been  so  concerned  over  events  at  the 
United  Nations  but  would,  instead, 
have  articulated  clearly  and  forcefully 
why  the  United  Nations  was  unimpor- 
tant. But  many  have  not  chosen  this 
difficult  road  but  have  preferred  to 
dismiss  the  United  Nations  as  unim- 
portant yet  paradoxically  have  felt  it 
necessary  to  defy  it. 

There  is,  I  concede,  something 
romantic  in  standing  against  the  tide 
and  standing  up  for  what  is  perceived 
to  be  right. 

I  do  think,  however,  that  some  of 
our  impatience  with  the  United  Nations 
told  more  about  us  than  reflected  what 
occurred  in  the  United  Nations  itself. 

Such  an  attitude,  I  submit,  was  not 
warranted  by  events  in  the  United  Na- 


48 

lions  but  was  an  understandable  out- 
ward manifestation  of  our  own  doubts 
about  ourselves,  particularly  after 
Vietnam.  We  have  provided  close  to 
$100  billion  in  foreign  aid  to  a  war- 
devastated  Europe  and  to  the  emerging 
countries  and,  expecting  gratitude,  we 
only  received — or  we  thought  we 
received — blame.  We  have  been  the 
largest  contributor  to  the  U.N.  budget 
but  thought  our  influence  dispropor- 
tionate to  our  investment.  Our  road  to 
Vietnam  led  to  an  overwhelming  na- 
tional self-doubt  about  both  our  morals 
and  our  strength. 

In  sum,  we  have  conducted  a  foreign 
policy  that  exhausted  our  energies  and 
our  patience.  In  the  United  Nations,  we 
were  on  the  defensive  not  because  we 
were  attacked  but  because  for  some 
time  we  were  without  a  purpose.  Hav- 
ing thus  cornered  ourselves,  we  lashed 
out  indiscriminately  at  our  foes  as  well 
as  at  those  whom  we  thought  were  our 
antagonists. 

Today  we  know,  in  retrospect,  that 
we  felt  misunderstood  in  the  United 
Nations  because  we  misunderstood  the 
United  Nations  and  the  mood  of  its 
members.  We  have  depicted  the  United 
Nations  to  our  own  public  in  con- 
tradictory terms,  describing  it  as  im- 
potent, where  nothing  would  ever  hap- 
pen but  where  anti-Americanism  and 
anti-Israel  and  antidemocratic  senti- 
ments prevailed.  So  preoccupied  were 
we  with  our  own  hurt  that  we  failed  to 
perceive  and  transmit  to  our  public  an 
image  of  the  United  Nations  as  an  im- 
perfect place  but  still  the  only  place 
where  nations  talked  instead  of  fought 


nizing  the  influence  we  have,  that  in 
matters  of  importance  we  still  com- 
mand enormous  support  and  influence 
that  our  ideas  and  initiatives  are  wel- 
comed and  our  leadership  is  expected. 
No,  we  did  not  turn  the  tide  back  in  our 
favor — we  have  matured  to  see  that  it 
has  never  been  against  us. 

In  the  past  2  years,  I  have  had  the 
privilege  of  serving  as  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador to  the  United  Nations,  and  my 
experiences  do  not  lead  me  to  prefer 
confrontation  to  cooperation  or  to  con- 
clude that  railing  against  the  body  is  a 
substitute  for  policy  or  produces  any 
effective  results. 

In  the  last  two  General  Assembly 
sessions,  we  have  worked  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  much  greater  cooperation  be- 
cause our  perceptions  of  the  United 
Nations  and  of  ourselves  are  more 
positive  and  more  constructive.  And 
that  makes  our  work  easier  and  infi- 
nitely more  challenging. 

It  is  easier  because  from  the  outset 
this  Administration  has  placed  the 
United  Nations  in  the  center  of  our 
multilateral  efforts  and  has  proceeded 
to  pursue  foreign  policy  objectives  by 
taking  advantage  of  the  opportunities 
the  United  Nations  places  at  our  dis- 
posal. 

•  Our  efforts  for  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes  in  southern  Africa — 
specifically  in  Namibia — have  still  not 
been  consummated,  but  the  promise  of 
peaceful  change  would  not  even  be 
possible  without  the  active  participa- 
tion of  the  United  Nations,  and  the 
peaceful    transition   could    not   be 


.  .  .  we  failed  to  perceive  and  transmit  to  our  public  an  image  of  the 
United  Nations  as  an  imperfect  place  but  still  the  only  place  where 
nations  talked  instead  of  fought  .... 


with  each  other.  And  we  have  failed  to 
understand  the  newly  emerging  coun- 
tries which  wrestle  with  their  own 
sense  of  nationhood  and  must  yet  find 
their  proper  role  in  international  af- 
fairs. Most  tragically,  we  have  failed  to 
grasp  that  our  influence  did  not  wane; 
that  we  draw  on  a  remarkably  deep  res- 
ervoir of  goodwill  and  friendship. 

Changing  Attitudes 
Toward  the  U.N. 

Since  those  days,  the  mood  in  our 
country  has  changed  and  with  it  have 
changed  our  policies  and  attitude  to- 
ward the  United  Nations.  We  are  no 
longer  on  the  defensive — without  fall- 
ing into  an  equally  erroneous  posture  of 
the  offensive.   Instead,   we  are  recog- 


planned   without   the   tool   of  U.N. 
peacekeeping. 

•  Without  the  rapport  we  have  es- 
tablished in  the  United  Nations  with  the 
front-line  states,  we  would  not  be  able 
to  maintain  the  lines  of  communication 
which  would  permit  the  international 
community  to  play  a  constructive  role 
in  the  resolution  of  the  Rhodesian 
question  if  the  parties  to  the  dispute 
were  ever  willing  to  embrace  this  pos- 
sibility. 

•  The  preconditions  for  the  present 
dramatic  prospects  for  a  Middle  East 
peace  were  also  laid  down  by  collective 
efforts  in  the  United  Nations,  provid- 
ing, through  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338,  the  framework  for 
the  Camp  David  negotiations.  And,  in 
a  very  important  way,  these  conditions 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

could  not  have  existed  without  the  de- 
ployment of  U.N.  peacekeeping  forces 
in  the  Golan  Heights,  in  Sinai,  and  in 
.st)uthern  Lebanon. 

•  Arms  control  negotiations  gener- 
ally received  a  strong  impetus  from  the 
U.N.'s  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment focusing  worldwide  attention  on 
the  urgent  need  for  arms  control — both 
nuclear  and  conventional. 

It  is  not,  however,  the  crises  the 
United  Nations  helped  solve  or  the 
conflicts  it  tempered  but  the  crises  it 
prevented  and  the  causes  of  conflicts  it 
addressed  which  mark  the  U.N.'s 
progress.  The  U.N.  record  in  matters 
of  global  security  is  not  spotless.  It  has 
failed  to  act  or  get  involved  in  a 
number  of  international  conflicts — 
from  Uganda  to  the  Somali-Ethiopian 
war. 

But  it  should  also  be  noted  that  its 
purview  of  what  constitutes  global  se- 
curity has  also  expanded.  What  used  to 
be  the  soft  issues  in  the  affairs  of  inter- 
national organizations — the  elaboration 
of  codes,  the  setting  of  standards  in 
economic,  social,  cultural,  and  scien- 
tific fields — have  come  to  represent  not 
only  the  major  load  of  the  U.N.'s  work 
but  also  perhaps  its  second  important 
contribution  after  peacekeeping  to  the 
reduction  of  international  tensions. 
Thus,  in  addition  to  military  and  politi- 
cal affairs,  its  global  security  concerns 
now  encompass  economic  security 
questions  as  well. 

The  world  today  is  facing  critical 
shortages  on  many  fronts.  We  live 
under  the  constant  threat  of  an  energy 
crisis,  the  exhaustion  of  our  nonrenew- 
able resources,  and  the  despoliation  of 
our  environment.  These  are  problems 
that  no  nation,  large  or  small,  can  face 
and  confront  alone.  No  government  can 
adequately  address  its  national  security 
needs  while  disregarding  the  interde- 
pendence among  national  economies. 

Since  this  interdependence  contains 
the  conditions  of  mutual  vulnerability, 
the  threats  of  global  depression  and 
economic  stagnation  are  a  principal 
concern  of  the  ongoing  U.N. -sponsored 
North-South  dialogue. 

Collective  Action  on 
Economic  Issues 

There  are  hardly  any  major  issues  on 
the  global  agenda  that  the  United  Na- 
tions has  not  pioneered  in  legitimizing 
as  a  major  concern  and  in  encouraging 
collective  action  for  their  resolution. 
From  the  Stockholm  U.N.  Conference 
on  the  Environment  in  1972  to  the  forth- 
coming Conference  on  Science  and 
Technology  for  Development  in  August 
of  this  year,   the  United  Nations  has 


June  1979 


49 


phiyed  or  will  soon  play  an  indispensa- 
ble role  in  tackling  problems  of  hunger 
and  food  production,  population,  the 
human  habitat,  trade,  renewable  energy 
sources,  and  a  host  of  other  issues. 

The  United  Nations  is  also  a  major 
actor  in  assisting  the  Third  World 
countries  in  their  development  efforts. 
We  should,  however,  not  view  these 
efforts  simply  and  simplistically  as  yet 
another  means  of  taxing  the  affluent 
countries  for  the  benefit  of  the  poor 
ones.  The  growth  of  the  economies  of 
the  developing  countries  is  vital  to  the 
U.S.  economy  in  terms  of  trade  and  in- 
vestment. 

In  terms  of  trade.  U.S.  exports  to 
developing  countries  are  far  greater  in 
volume  and  value  than  to  Europe, 
Japan,  and  the  Communist  bloc  nations 
combined.  Investment  and  trade  op- 
portunities afforded  to  American  busi- 
ness through  our  contributions  to  U.N. 
programs  and  specialized  agencies  far 
exceed  the  normal  returns  comparable 
business  transactions  would  provide. 
For  example,  investment  opportunities 
generated  by  the  U.N.  Development 
Program  (UNDP)  between  1959  and 
1977  were  estimated  at  close  to  $30 
billion.  Important  as  the  UNDP  and  the 
specialized  agencies  may  be  for  de- 
veloping areas,  the  United  States  and 
other  developed  countries  are  also  di- 
rect beneficiaries  of  their  work.  The 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA),  for  example,  provides  techni- 
cal assistance  and  inspections  that 
promote  nuclear  safety  and  inhibit  the 
proliferation  of  weapons  technology. 

Reappraising  the  Role 
of  the  Individual 

We  delude  ourselves,  however,  if  we 
think  that  any  of  the  global  economic, 
military,  and  political  security  prob- 
lems could  find  just  and  permanent 
resolution  without  a  fundamental  reap- 
praisal of  the  role  of  the  individual  as  a 
subject  of  international  law  and  his 
concomitant  rights.  What  began  30 
years  ago  with  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights  as  a  statement  of 
intent  is  slowly  evolving  into  a  global 
compact,  a  set  of  rules — conventions 
and  covenants — that  proscribes  and 
prescribes  the  behavior  of  governments 
toward  their  own  citizens. 

Human  rights  is  not  an  isolated, 
separate  branch  of  international  affairs 
or  of  our  foreign  policy.  It  permeates 
all  fields  of  international  activity.  It  is 
an  integral  part  of  development.  As  we 
labor  toward  disarmament,  we  think 
not  only  of  the  security  of  nations  but 
of  the  peace  of  peoples.  As  we 
negotiate  issues  of  trade,  investment, 
and  technology  transfer  we  deal   with 


global  economics  but  in  a  way  as  it 
people  mattered. 

Since  the  35th  session  of  the  U.N. 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  has  just 
concluded  less  than  a  week  ago,  let  me 
focus  on  its  work  as  perhaps  both  typi- 
cal and  current  of  the  U.N.'s  work  in 
areas  of  what  I  call  "soft  issues." 

The  United  Nations  is  an  appropriate 
place  and  perhaps  a  litmus  test  for  this 
Administration's  human  rights  em- 
phasis. This  U.N.  Commission  did  not, 
by  extensive  debate  or  the  stroke  of  the 


though  It  is  by  no  means  untainted  by 
political  considerations,  there  is  public 
discussion  and  condemnation  of  other 
countries,  such  as  Cambodia  and 
Equatorial  Guinea,  and — through  the 
confidential  procedures  it  has 
adopted — the  United  Nations  reviews 
human  rights  violations  in  a  broad 
range  of  countries,  from  Uganda  to 
Uruguay,  from  Burma  to  Ethiopia. 

Of  course,  members  of  this  Commis- 
sion bicker  and  argue  about  means  and 
ends,   but  that  is  no  reason  for  us  to 


We  cannot  reform  the  United  Nations  by  wreaking  havoc  with  its 
system  or  participating  in  an  emotional  campaign  on  how  badly  it 
functions. 


pen,  end  violations  of  human  rights. 
But  It  did  prove  that  the  defense  of 
human  rights  is  not  the  sole  and  soli- 
tary concern  of  the  United  States  or  of 
the  Western  democracies  alone,  but  it 
is  beginning  to  become — slowly  but 
perceptibly — an  important  issue  for  a 
growing  number  of  governments,  even 
affecting  their  bilateral  relationships. 

The  work  of  this  Commission  is  liv- 
ing proof  of  how  far  we  have  already 
come  and  how  important  a  role  has 
been  assumed  by  the  United  Nations  in 
the  promotion  and  protection  of  human 
rights.  This  Commission  has  codified  a 
body  of  international  human  rights  laws 
that  set  standards  of  governmental  be- 
havior toward  citizens.  These  include 
conventions  on  genocide;  civil  and 
political,  economic,  and  social  rights; 
refugees  and  women's  rights;  and  racial 
discrimination.  The  Commission  is 
currently  working  on  instruments  to 
prevent  torture  and  to  protect  the  rights 
of  the  child  and  the  freedom  of  reli- 
gion. These  instruments,  while  not 
self-enforcing,  do  provide  means  for 
individuals  and  groups  to  hold  their 
governments  accountable.  Beyond  the 
setting  of  standards,  this  Commission 
is  involved  in  the  difficult  task  of 
seeking  their  implementation. 

Thus,  this  Commission  is  much  more 
than  a  sideshow,  off  the  big  stage  of 
global  diplomacy.  It  has  become  an 
important  forum  of  public  opinion, 
representing  concrete  hope  for  the 
many  victims  of  repression  who  have 
no  other  recourse  than  the  international 
community.  Were  it  not.  over  50.000 
people  would  not  every  year  contact 
this  Commission  on  matters  relating  to 
the  violation  of  human  rights. 

There  was  a  time  when  this  Commis- 
sion could  only  deal  with  human  rights 
violations  in  southern  Africa.  Israeli- 
occupied  territories,  and  Chile.  Today, 


condemn  this  U.N.  Commission  or 
lecture  other  U.N.  members  about  their 
shortcomings  or  slow  pace.  It  should 
be  understood  that  most  U.N.  member 
states  are  new  nations  struggling  to 
create  the  institutions  which  we  take 
for  granted.  Rather  than  chastise  these 
states,  we  should  encourage  them. 

Of  course,  there  is  hypocrisy  and 
double  standard.  Some  governments 
which  do  not  practice  all  the  demo- 
cratic principles  are  often  condemned 
by  those  very  governments  which  do 
not  practice  democratic  principles  at 
all.  And  certainly  it  does  not  provide 
sufficient  evidence  to  dismiss  what  we 
have  accomplished  there  or  predict  that 
nothing  will  ever  be  accomplished. 

The  United  Nations  is  not  a  collec- 
tive manifestation  of  homogenous 
peoples.  It  is  a  mosaic  of  many  images, 
true  as  well  as  erroneous.  The  richness 
of  the  respective  cultural  traditions, 
political  institutions,  and  legal 
philosophies  of  its  member  states 
makes  them  express  subtle  differences 
and  differentiate  in  emphasis. 

No.  they  do  not  all  think  like  we  do, 
nor  are  all  interests  the  same  or  even 
complementary.  But  before  we  take  the 
road  to  criticize  others,  we  should 
rather  see  what  we  can  ourselves  do.  In 
the  area  of  human  rights,  for  example, 
it  is  we,  among  all  the  significant 
countries,  who  have  not  yet  ratified  the 
three  most  important  international  in- 
struments for  the  protection  of  human 
rights.  We,  the  country  that  need  not 
take  second  place  in  our  reverence  for 
these  rights,  have  not  seen  the  urgency 
to  ratify  the  genocide  convention,  the 
social  and  economic  or  the  political  and 
civil  covenants. 

If  there  are  a  lot  of  things  wrong 
with  the  United  Nations,  at  least  some 
of  them  are  our  own  fault.  By  not 
ratifying  these  treaties  we  have  ham- 


50 

pered  our  own  efforts,  since  we  are  not 
entitled  to  participate  in  the  imple- 
menting U.N.  bodies  these  covenants 
have  established.  Yes.  there  are  many 
things  wrong  with  the  United  Nations, 
with  the  way  it  worivs,  or  rather  fails  to 
work. 

Reforming  and  Restructuring 
the  U.N.  System 

The  President's  proposals  a  year  ago 
on  the  reform  and  restructuring  of  the 
U.N.  system  is  one  of  the  constructive 
steps  we  are  taking  to  make  this  Or- 
ganization more  effective  and  more  re- 
sponsive to  global  needs. 

The  U.N.  reform  proposals  we  have 
made  were  not  motivated  by  a  reason- 
ing that  preoccupies  itself  with  what  is 
wrong  with  the  United  Nations.  We  are 
trying  to  improve  the  workings  of  this 
international  Organization  because  of 
what  is  right  with  it.  because  we  would 
like  to  see  it  function  better. 

Reforms  proposed,  however,  are  not 
reforms  accomplished.  We  have  intro- 
duced or  discussed  with  other  member 
states  several  major  reform  ideas  in  the 
past  year.  The  most  desirable  and 
feasible  among  them  fall  in  the  cate- 
gory of  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes, 
particularly  as  they  relate  to  the  effec- 
tive functioning  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil. We  have  proposed,  and  have 
gained  the  support  of  the  majority  of 
the  permanent  members  of  the  Council, 
that  the  Council  be  seized  more  reg- 
ularly and  routinely  with  issues  and 
events  that  might  prove  to  be  a  threat  to 
international  peace  and  security.  We 
have  proposed  more  frequent,  informal 
meetings  among  the  members  and  one 
meeting  at  least  each  year  at  the  foreign 
minister  level.  These  proposals  have 
not  been  institutionalized.  But  in  actual 
fact,  the  Security  Council  has  been 
meeting  with  increasing  frequency  on  a 
broad  range  of  issues.  For  example, 
over  the  past  several  weeks,  the  Coun- 
cil has  held  extended  discussions  about 
the  situation  in  Southeast  Asia, 
Namibia,  South  Africa's  raids  into  An- 
gola. Rhodesia,  and  the  Israeli  settle- 
ments in  occupied  Arab  territories. 

Equally  significant  is  our  proposal  to 
strengthen  the  U.N.'s  peacekeeping 
capabilities  by  exploring  the  possibility 


of  states  earmarking  troop  contingents 
trained  in  peacekeeping  functions  and 
improving  training  in  peacekeeping. 

We  have  been  participating  in  the 
Special  Committee  on  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  and  on  Strengthen- 
ing the  Role  of  the  Organization  where 
several  proposals  are  being  discussed 
to  improve  the  workings  of  the  United 
Nations.  There  have  been  some  signifi- 
cant steps  taken  to  improve  the  United 
Nation's  performance  and  coordination 
in  the  social  and  economic  sectors  by 
the  creation  of  the  post  and  appoint- 
ment of  a  Director  General  for  De- 
velopment and  Economic  Cooperation. 

In  the  area  of  human  rights,  the 
Commission  is  continuing  to  seek 
workable  means  of  keeping  our  pro- 
posal for  a  high  commissioner  viable 
and  is  promoting  continuing  improve- 
ments in  the  functioning  of  the  U.N. 
human  rights  sector. 

The  reform  process  is  a  slow  proc- 
ess. It  is  not  simply  a  question  of  the 
influence  we  can  and  should  exert.  It  is 
also  the  manner  and  style  through 
which  these  reforms  take  shape  and  are 


It  has  been  hard  for  some  to 
accept  that  the  United  Nations 
can  no  longer  be  the  instrument  of 
Pax  Americana. 


adopted.  Our  analyses  have  shown,  and 
the  President  pointed  out  last  year,  that 
neither  U.S.  nor  U.N.  interests  would 
be  served  by  drastic  reforms  through 
charter  amendments.  Most  of  the  re- 
forms proposals  should  not  be  repre- 
sented as  major  watersheds  in  the 
U.N.'s  steady  improvement  requiring 
drastic  and  dramatic  changes.  Our 
strategy  is  based  on  a  careful  progress 
through  practice,  application,  and 
precedent.  Although  we  have  given 
extensive  publicity  to  our  U.N.  reform 
package  and  have  consulted  in  capitals 
and  with  delegations  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, we  believe  pressure  and  haste 
would  defeat  our  objectives. 

We  cannot  reform  the  United  Na- 
tions by  wreaking  havoc  with  its  sys- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

tem  or  participating  in  an  emotional  t 
campaign  on  how  badly  it  functions. 
Reforms  will  not  spring  from  dissatis-  i 
faction   but   from   constructive   ap- 
proaches. 

Dissatisfaction  only  caters  to  ignor- 
ance about  global  affairs.  We  must 
combat  that  in  both  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches  of  our  government. 
I  am  saddened  but  not  surprised  that 
anti-U.N.  sentiments  can  find  receptive 
audiences  in  our  country.  A  recent 
study  by  the  U.N.  Educational,  Scien- 
tific and  Cultural  Organization,  and 
verified  by  a  1977  Gallup  poll,  ranked 
U.S.  students  near  the  bottom,  com- 
pared to  their  counterparts  in  other 
countries,  in  comprehension  of  foreign 
cultures  and  affairs. 

To  reverse  this,  I  believe,  you  in  the 
Congress  and  we  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment should  be  much  more  forceful  and 
articulate  about  the  U.N.'s  importance 
to  the  American  public.  The  support  of 
this  Congress  for  the  United  Nations 
and  this  Administration's  constructive 
approach  to  the  United  Nations  is  a 
matter  of  public  record.  But  in  addition 
to  funding  support — without  which  the 
United  Nations  is  crippled — we  need 
your  leadership  to  help  the  public  un- 
derstand that  our  interests  are  interwo- 
ven with  those  of  the  United  Nations; 
to  help  to  be  more  informed  about  the 
states  that  constitute  the  international 
community,  their  aspirations,  and 
needs;  and  to  seek  in  this  interdepen- 
dent world  a  steady  strengthening  of 
this  institution. 

It  is  time  to  begin  to  comprehend 
how  much  the  United  Nations  is  doing 
for  the  United  States  in  economic, 
political,  and  security  matters.  Its  very 
existence  is  tempering  influence  on  big- 
power  confrontation  and  a  bridge  be- 
tween the  industrialized  countries  and 
the  Third  World.  We  neither  want  nor 
can  afford  to  conduct  a  foreign  policy 
oblivious  to  the  United  Nations  or  ap- 
proach it  as  if  it  were  yet  another  field 
of  conflict  instead  of  resolution.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


June  1979 


51 


F¥  1980  Appropriations 

11    for  international  Organizations 
and  Conferences 


by  Charles  William  Maynes 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  Feb- 
ruary 14.  1979.  Mr.  Maynes  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  International  Organi- 
zation Affairs. ' 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
!]pear  before  this  committee  in  support 
lot'  the  President's  request  for 
$502,945,000  to  meet  the  costs  of  U.S. 
participation  in  international  organiza- 
tions and  conferences  in  FY  1980.  This 
amount  would  be  distributed  to  four 
appropriations  in  the  following  way: 

•  $41 1 ,552,000  to  enable  the  United 
States  to  fund   its  share  of  assessed 

,  contributions  to  the  United  Nations.  9 
U.N.  specialized  agencies,  and  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency;  6 
inter-American  and  5  regional  organi- 
zations; and  22  other  international 
bodies; 

•  $70,000,000  to  meet  our  share  of 
the  cost  of  three  U.N.  peacekeeping 
forces  in  the  Middle  East; 

•  $14,193,000  to  cover  the  costs  of 
maintaining  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations  and  seven  other  perma- 
nent missions  to  major  international 
organizations,  as  well  as  the  cost  of 
congressional  participation  in  four  in- 
terparliamentary groups;  and 

•  $7,200,000  to  coordinate  and  sup- 
port U.S.  participation  in  multilateral 
intergovernmental  conferences  and 
provisional  membership  in  certain  or- 
ganizations. 

U.N.  Events  of  the  Past  Year 

I  would  like  to  recount  some  of  the 
major  activities  and  events  in  the  U.N. 
system  over  the  past  year. 

It  is  a  complex  institution.  Fre- 
quently much  of  its  constructive  work 
is  overlooked  by  the  public  in  this 
country,  while  primary  attention  is 
given  to  a  few  selected  votes  or  events 
that  have  negative  impact  on  our 
populace.  Even  the  negative  issues 
often  get  distorted,  and  the  truth  never 
quite  gets  a  chance  to  catch  up. 

Some  now  argue,  for  example,  that 
the  United  Nations  is  impotent  in  the 
field  of  collective  security  and  that  its 
advocates  are  trying  to  disguise  this 
failure  by  giving  increased  attention  to 


subjects  like  the  environment  or  eco- 
nomic development.  It  is  true  that  the 
United  Nations  is  not  the  complete  in- 
strument of  collective  security  that  the 
U.S.  Government,  and  certainly  this 
Administration,  would  like  to  see  it  be- 
come. But  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
U.N.'s  usefulness  in  this  field  is  di- 
minishing. The  recent  record  demon- 
strates that  precisely  the  opposite  is 
true,  that  in  the  past  few  years  the 
U.N.  system  has  shown  new  vitality  in 
the  area  of  peace  and  security. 

•  In  the  late  I950"s,  there  was  de- 
creasing use  of  the  Security  Council 
due  to  cold  war  rivalries.  In  1959,  the 
Council  met  only  five  times.  But  in  the 
last  3  years  it  has  met  238  times,  an 
average  of  79  times  a  year. 

•  The  past  2  years  have  seen  the  Se- 
curity Council  directly  and  deeply  en- 
gaged in  seeking  peaceful  resolution  of 
major  problems  for  international  peace 
and  security  in  the  Middle  East,  Cy- 
prus, southern  Africa,  and,  most  re- 
cently. Southeast  Asia.  Currently  about 
13,000  troops  from  two  dozen  coun- 
tries are  .serving  in  the  peacekeeping 
forces  established  by  the  Council. 

•  In  the  fall  of  1978,  the  Council  re- 
newed the  mandates  of  the  U.N.'s  vital 
peacekeeping  force  in  Cyprus  and  the 
two  other  forces  in  the  Middle  East. 

•  In  March  1978,  the  Security 
Council,  acting  on  a  U.S.  initiative, 
created  UNIFIl  [the  U.N.  Interim 
Force  in  Lebanon],  a  new  peacekeeping 
force  in  Lebanon. 

•  In  September,  the  Council  adopted 
the  Secretary  General's  plan  for  a 
peaceful  path  to  decolonization  in 
Namibia — a  plan  worked  out  through 
the  intensive  efforts  of  the  United 
States  and  the  other  four  Western 
members  of  the  Council. 

•  In  October,  the  Council,  by  a 
unanimous  15-0  vote,  adopted  a  res- 
olution establishing  a  cease-fire  in 
Beirut. 

•  And  in  January  of  this  year,  the 
Council  took  up  the  Vietnamese  inva- 
sion of  Cambodia. 

We  believe  that  the  net  results  of  the 
work  of  the  United  Nations  and  its 
system  of  specialized  agencies  and 
programs  —  even  taking  into  account 
some  issues  that  do  not  go  our 
way  —  remain  overwhelmingly  in  U.S. 
interests.  The  United  Nations,  there- 


fore, fully  deserves  the  support  — 
moral,  financial,  and  political — of  this 
country.  I  hope  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  will  work  together  con- 
structively to  enhance  the  growing 
value  to  the  United  States  of  an  effec- 
tive international  body  that  can  deal 
with  global  issues  and  support  our  ef- 
forts to  achieve  reforms  in  the  U.N. 
system  that  will  make  it  more  effective. 

Effective  U.S.  Initiatives 

Let  me  just  elaborate  on  some  of  the 
areas  where  the  pursuit  of  U.S.  initia- 
tives in  the  U.N.  system  has  been 
highly  effective. 

In  southern  Africa,  we  are  im- 
mensely pleased  that  2  long  years  of 
intense  negotiation  through  the  United 
Nations  appear  finally  to  be  culminat- 
ing in  a  peaceful  resolution  of  conflict 
in  Namibia.  The  talks  between  the 
United  Nations  and  South  Africa  ap- 
pear to  have  gone  well.  We  are  rapidly 
moving  to  a  stage  where  actual  im- 
plementation of  the  U.N.  plan  can 
begin,  and  a  U.N.  Transition  Assist- 
ance Group  (UNTAG)  will  be  put  in 
place  to  insure  the  independence  of 
Namibia  through  U.N. -supervised 
elections.  The  training  of  future  civil 
servants  under  U.N.  auspices  is  already 
well  underway.  We  are  very  hopeful 
that  the  chief  lesson  of  a  settle- 
ment—  that  peaceful  resolution  of 
longstanding  conflict  is  possible  — 
could  carry  over  to  Rhodesia,  to  South 
Africa's  internal  racial  difficulties,  and 
to  similar  problems  in  other  parts  of  the 
globe. 

In  the  Middle  East,  just  within  the 
last  year,  the  United  States  proposed, 
sponsored,  and  led  the  Security  Coun- 
cil effort  to  create  the  U.N.  Interim 
Force  in  Lebanon.  Our  successful  ef- 
fort to  have  the  Security  Council  call 
for  a  cease-fire  in  Beirut,  where  vio- 
lence had  reached  alarming  propor- 
tions, brought  a  pause  of  peace  to  that 
city.  There  are  few  better  illustrations 
of  the  way  that  multilateral  policy  can 
complement  bilateral  foreign  policy 
than  these  Security  Council  actions. 

Meanwhile,  the  peace  we  have  pur- 
sued in  the  Middle  East — at  Camp 
David  and  then  through  more  detailed 
negotiations  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  —  has  been  maintained  by  three 
U.N.  peacekeeping  forces  and 
negotiated  on  the  basis  of  two  Security 
Council  resolutions.  The  Foreign 
Minister  of  Israel,  whose  country  is 
often  the  target  of  debate  and  par- 
liamentary maneuver  in  the  United  Na- 
tions, acknowledged  to  the  General  As- 
sembly last  fall  the  "constructive  role" 
that  U.N.  forces  have  played  in  the 
various  agreed  arrangements  in  that  re- 
gion. 


52 

On  disarmament,  the  United  Na- 
tions last  May  and  June  conducted  the 
,  largest  single  multilateral  arms  control 
meeting  ever  held.  We  were  pleased 
with  the  steps  triggered  by  the 
session  —  including  French  and 
Chinese  participation,  action  on  nega- 
tive security  assurances,  and  Soviet 
adherence  to  protocol  II  of  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco,  which  prohibits  nuclear 
weapons  in  Latin  America.  The  foi- 
lowup  in  the  General  Assembly  was 
also  constructive.  One  of  the  two  im- 
portant new  disarmament  committees 
established  by  the  special  session  has 
just  begun  to  work,  and  the  other  will 
meet  in  May.  The  committees  are  indi- 
cations of  international  acceptance  of 
the  concept  that  disarmament  and  nu- 
clear nonproliferation  are  among  those 
pressing  global  problems  that  must  be 
addressed  in  a  multilateral  context. 

On  international  economic  issues, 
the  General  Assembly  has  approved  a 
resolution  on  a  new  international  de- 
velopment strategy  for  the  next  decade 
which  reflects  many  of  our  views  as 
well  as  those  of  developing  nations. 
Guidelines  for  handling  the  burden  of 
debt  on  the  least  developed  countries 
have  been  agreed  upon  by  expert 
working  groups.  There  is  solid  progress 
toward  agreements  on  individual  com- 
modities. A  working  group  of  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council  is  now 
drafting  a  convention  on  illicit  pay- 
ments by  foreign  corporations,  which 
should  complement  the  work  of  the 
Congress  in  the  Foreign  Corrupt  Prac- 
tices Act  of  1978. 

The  General  Assembly  has  ap- 
proved, with  our  strong  support,  a 
1981  U.N.  conference  on  new  and  re- 
newable sources  of  energy  —  an  im- 
portant step  in  boosting  our  own  and 
other  nations'  programs  to  develop  new 
energy  sources.  And,  as  a  followup  to 
the  Helsinki  accords,  the  U.N.'s  Eco- 
nomic Commission  for  Europe  —  which 
includes  both  East  and  West  European 
nations  and  the  United  States  —  has 
made  good  progress  toward  coopera- 
tion on  important  environmental  issues, 
and  this  serves  as  an  important  example 
of  East-West  cooperation  under  the 
aegis  of  the  United  Nations. 

On  human  rights,  we  have  used  the 
occasion  of  the  30th  anniversary  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
to  signal  the  need  for  a  recommitment 
by  all  nations  to  that  document's  prin- 
ciples and  goals.  And  increasingly 
there  is  evidence  of  more  objective 
judgments  on  human  rights  issues,  in 
contrast  to  employment  of  the  double 
standard  that  in  past  years  clearly  hin- 
dered progress.  Similarly,  international 
efforts  to  include  women  in  the 
mainstream  of  society  are  being  fur- 


thered by  the  World  Plan  of  Action  de- 
veloped under  the  U.N.'s  Decade  for 
Women. 

Finally,  on  refugees,  we  were  able 
to  persuade  the  United  Nations  to  con- 
duct a  special  meeting  in  Geneva  to  re- 
view the  tragic  plight  of  the  "boat 
people"  in  Southeast  Asia  and  to  con- 
sider a  plan  of  action  by  all  concerned 
nations. 

Disharmony  in  the  U.N.  System 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  I  would  not 
pretend  that  these  diplomatic  successes 
tell  the  whole  story,  or  that  everything 
in  the  U.N.  system  operates  the  way 
that  we  would  have  it.  There  are,  for 
example,  continuing  efforts  to  bestow 
legitimacy  on  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization  which  we  consider  inap- 
propriate. Last  fall  there  was  a  General 
Assembly  resolution  calling  for  an 
arms  embargo  on  Israel  —  but  that  has 
no  substantive  effect  because  such  an 
embargo  can  be  made  legally  binding 
only  by  the  Security  Council,  where  we 
enjoy  a  veto.  There  are  continuing  at- 
tempts, by  the  Cubans  in  particular,  to 
have  the  General  Assembly  become  in- 
volved in  the  affairs  of  Puerto  Rico  — 
but  our  strong  diplomatic  efforts  have 
thus  far  succeeded  in  preventing  this. 

Developments  such  as  these,  I  know, 
are  annoying  to  many  Members  of 
Congress,  to  the  public,  and  to  us  in 
the  Administration.  But  our  task  in  as- 
sessing the  work  of  the  United  Nations 
is  to  consider  the  overall  trends,  and 
the  Administration  submits  that  they 
are  positive.  Even  if  we  focus  only  on 
the  work  of  the  various  U.N. 
peacekeeping  forces  in  limiting  the 
outbreak  of  violence  and  war,  we 
would  argue  that  the  United  Nations 
has  paid  for  itself  many  times  over. 

Much  of  the  disharmony  that  we  see 
in  the  U.N.  system  takes  place  at  the 
annual  general  conferences  of  organi- 
zations. Meanwhile,  the  day-to-day  op- 
erations of  the  U.N.  agencies  continue 
in  such  vital  efforts  as  the  elimination 
of  contagious  disease,  protection  of  the 
environment,  increasing  air  safety, 
dealing  with  population  growth,  and 
many  other  global  issues.  The  annual 
meetings  themselves  give  us  the  op- 
portunity to  deal  with  intense  resent- 
ments and  misunderstandings  and  to 
explain  our  policies.  Secretary  Vance's 
speech  to  the  last  General  Assembly, 
for  example,  devoted  almost  half  of  its 
length  to  an  explanation  of  U.S. 
policies  and  intentions  in  the  interna- 
tional economy  and  largely  served  to 
pave  the  way  for  some  of  the  produc- 
tive results  I  have  described. 

As  President  Carter  said  in  a  recent 
report,  the  occasions  when  U.N.  events 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

do  not  go  our  way  "".  .  .  should  not 
make  us  withdraw  our  support,  for  the 
UN  reflects  the  reality  of  the  world  in 
which  we  must  live.  We  should,  in- 
stead, feel  challenged  to  develop 
imaginative  and  thoughtful  new  ap- 
proaches in  our  diplomacy  so  as  to  ad- 
vance our  interests,  and  to  play  a  con- 
structive role  in  the  world  community. 
In  particular,  we  need  to  continue 
demonstrating  our  faith  in  the  basic 
purposes  of  an  organization  whose 
strength  and  effectiveness  are  essential 
to  us  and  to  the  world." 

Constructive  Work  in  UNESCO 

Since  the  Congress  has  long  held 
special  interest  in  the  work  of  the  U.N. 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization  (UNESCO),  let  me  re- 
view quickly  some  of  the  developments 
in  the  biennial  conference  held  in  Paris 
last  fall. 

Probably  the  most  discussed  issue  in 
the  entire  U.N.  system  during  the  past 
year  came  to  a  highly  constructive  con- 
clusion in  the  Paris  meeting.  I  refer,  of 
course,  to  the  long-debated  declaration 
on  the  mass  media.  Given  the  original 
Soviet  sponsorship  of  this  initiative  in 
1970  and  its  implications  for  state  con- 
trol of  the  media,  it  certainly  was  not 
unexpected  that  America's  journalists, 
lawyers,  government  leaders,  and  other 
defenders  of  freedom  of  the  press 
should  be  highly  vocal  on  this  topic.  In 
the  early  stages,  there  were  even 
suggestions  that  the  United  States 
ought  to  get  out  of  UNESCO,  once 
again  stop  U.S.  contributions,  or  sim- 
ply refuse  to  join  in  this  decision. 

But  the  outcome  of  this  debate 
proves  the  validity  of  maintaining  a 
strong  and  effective  U.S.  presence  in 
an  institution  that  is  dealing  with  a 
topic  that  touches  fundamental  political 
values  of  this  country.  This  was  not  a 
"politicized"  debate  in  the  sense  that 
political  questions  sometimes  are  in- 
jected into  substantive  discussions 
where  they  are  largely  irrelevant  to  the 
cause  at  hand. 

The  mass  media  issue  may  have  been 
an  unfortunate  topic  for  UNESCO,  but 
it  was  not  an  irrelevant  one.  Under  its 
constitution,  UNESCO  deals  with  some 
highly  politicized  subjects.  The  con- 
stitution gives  it  the  authority  to  rec- 
ommend international  agreements  in 
the  mass  communication  field,  and  it 
was  wholly  in  this  country's  interests 
to  get  heavily  involved  in  the  debate,  to 
vigorously  present  our  point  of  view,  to 
help  the  participants  define  the  com- 
mon ground  in  their  positions,  and  to 
take  steps  to  meet  the  legitimate  con- 
cerns that  many  nations  have  about  the 
mass  media.  Backing  out  would  simply 


June  1979 


53 


have  ceded   the   issue   to  those  who 
would  damage  our  interests. 

The  text  that  emerged  —  with  this 
country  joining  in  the  consensus  — 
represented  a  remartcable  turnaround 
from  the  earlier  versions  of  the  decla- 
ration. It  not  only  removed  those 
clauses  calling  for  state  control  of  the 
media  but  added  others  guaranteeing 
freedom  of  information  as  an  essential 
element  of  human  rights  and  the  right 
of  journalists  to  report  the  news  freely. 
The  general  reaction  of  the  U.S.  media 
community  has  been  that  the  U.S.  ef- 
forts were  responsible  for  a  notable 
success  in  the  face  of  extremely  un- 
favorable circumstances. 

In  the  process  of  this  long  debate,  I 
believe  we  ourselves  were  able  to  ac- 
quire a  greater  understanding  of  the 
concerns  that  developing  nations  have 
about  the  present  imbalance  of  com- 
munications resources  in  the  world  and 
about  the  needs  of  developing  nations 
for  assistance  in  augmenting  their  own 
communications  capabilities.  This  was 
not  simply  a  debate  orchestrated  by 
those  opposed  to  American  media 
interests.  The  developing  countries 
have  considerable  and  legitimate  con- 
cerns of  their  own.  They  worry  that 
media  reports  from  outside  tend  to  pro- 
vide too  little  information  which  can 
help  struggling  nations  with  develop- 
mental problems.  And  they  worry  that 
media  reporting  to  the  outside  world 
from  inside  developing  nations  tends  to 
concentate  on  the  natural  disasters,  the 
intrigues,  and  the  poverty. 

This  is  a  view  that  is  sometimes  ex- 
cessively ethnocentric,  but  it  is  a  view 
that  we  should  understand.  Before  the 
Associated  Press  began  to  dispatch 
news  about  the  United  States  to  other 
countries,  according  to  an  AP  official, 
"Reuters  decided  what  news  was  to  be 
sent  from  America.  It  told  the  world 
about  the  Indians  on  the  war  path  in  the 
West,  lynchings  in  the  South  and 
bizarre  crimes  in  the  North."  It  was 
not  until  the  AP  became  active  in 
sending  news  abroad  —  until  we  had 
our  own  news  source  —  that  we  became 
more  relaxed  about  foreign  press 
coverage  of  the  United  States. 

Certainly,  part  of  the  reason  for  the 
effective  resolution  of  the  UNESCO 
media  issue  this  autumn  was  the 
forthcoming  attitude  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  —  with  the  considerable  as- 
sistance of  American  media 
representatives — offering  programs  for 
the  training  of  journalists  in  developing 
nations,  cooperation  in  supplying 
needed  media  equipment,  and  an  ini- 
tiative through  the  facilities  of  INTEL- 
SAT, and  with  the  cooperation  of  the 
Agency  for  International  Development, 
to  help  developing  nations  disseminate 


valuable  information  to  people  in  re- 
mote areas  of  the  country. 

Overall,  I  think  the  American  people 
can  be  proud  of  the  constructive  man- 
ner in  which  this  issue  was  handled  by 
its  representatives.  Undoubtedly,  the 
cooperation  of  the  Congress  in  enabling 
us  to  eliminate  our  financial  arrearages 
with  UNESCO  helped  to  strengthen  our 
influence  at  this  crucial  time,  while 
your  advice  and  encouragement  of 
more  effective  coordination  of  interna- 
tional communications  policy  within 
the  government  contributed  to  the  suc- 
cess of  our  effort. 

This  will  not,  of  course,  mean  the 
end  of  communications  issues.  U.S. 
credibility  will  now  depend  very  much 
on  our  ability  to  carry  through  on  the 
Paris  initiatives.  There  will  continue  to 
be  efforts  to  define  a  "new  world  in- 
formation order,"  in  various  parts  of 
the  U.N.  system.  There  will  be,  in  the 
fall  of  this  year,  a  3-month  World  Ad- 
ministrative Radio  Conference,  at 
which  the  world's  radio  frequencies 
and  satellite  parking  spaces — including 
our  own  —  will  be  reallocated.  And 
there  will  be  continuing  concern  about 
direct  broadcast  satellites,  transborder 
data  flow,  and  other  issues  that  result 
from  the  tremendous  recent  advances 
in  communications  technology.  It 
clearly  is  in  U.S.  interests  to  have 
strong  representations  in  the  forums 
where  these  issues  arise,  and  we  fully 
intend  to  do  so. 

There  were  other  aspects  of  the  re- 
cent UNESCO  general  conference 
which  were  less  satisfactory  to  us. 
Conference  treatment  of  Middle  East 
issues,  for  example,  provided  mixed  re- 
sults. On  the  unfavorable  side  of  the 
ledger,  the  general  conference  again 
adopted  resolutions  critical  of  Israel  for 
its  archaeological  excavations  in 
Jerusalem  and  for  its  administration  of 
education  in  the  occupied  territories. 
On  both  issues  the  United  States  led  the 
opposition. 

In  a  more  happy  contrast,  the  confer- 
ence also  adopted  —  by  a  consensus 
that  we  were  pleased  to  join  —  an  au- 
thoritative Declaration  on  Race  and 
Racial  Prejudice,  a  U.N.  document 
which  clearly  and  forcefully  condemns 
racism  and  which,  for  the  first  time 
since  1975,  avoids  in  a  U.N.  document 
any  linkage  —  even  an  indirect  one  —  to 
the  infamous  Zionism-racism  equation 
of  1975.  Although  there  were  indica- 
tions that  some  Arab  states  might  seek 
once  again  to  tie  the  two  concepts, 
strong  U.S.  expressions  of  concern,  to- 
gether with  the  desire  of  U.N.  members 
for  a  consensus  document  on  racism, 
prevented  this  from  occurring.  The  re- 
sult is  the  most  authoritative  statement 
which  the  international  community  has 


ever  adopted  on  race,  with  no  mention 
of  the  Zionism-racism  issue. 

Pressing  Forward  on 
Management  Issues 

The  continued  interest  of  the  Con- 
gress in  making  the  U.N.  system  oper- 
ate more  efficiently  and  effectively 
coincides  with  the  overall  efforts  of  the 
Administration. 

One  issue  of  special  concern  is  the 
growth  of  the  budgets  in  the  United 
Nations  and  the  specialized  agencies. 
The  U.S.  Government's  efforts  to 
economize  its  own  internal  operations 
cannot  be  translated  literally  into  an 
international  organization  that  has  rep- 
resentatives of  many  cultures  and 
unique  systems  of  operations. 
Nevertheless,  our  training  at  home 
proves  to  be  of  eminent  value  as  we 
seek  to  question  the  validity  of  U.N. 
programs  that  continue  year  after  year 
or  to  implement  evaluation  mechanisms 
that  can  document  the  value  or  lack  of 
value  of  specific  activities  or  to  avoid 
overestimations  of  the  impact  of  infla- 
tion when  new  budget  proposals  are 
being  formulated.  We  are  doing  these 
things  not  just  at  the  United  Nations  in 
New  York  but  in  all  of  the  specialized 
agencies  and  programs  and  in  discus- 
sions with  other  member  governments. 

The  United  States  has  clearly  been  in 
the  forefront  of  those  U.N.  members 
concerned  about  budget  and  manage- 
ment issues — even  to  the  extent  that 
some  nations  have  questioned  our 
commitment  to  the  organizations  con- 
cerned. The  British,  customary  allies 
on  U.N.  issues,  this  year  publicly 
asked  whether  we  were  not  expecting 
miracles  of  economy  in  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem. Nevertheless,  we  continue  to  be- 
lieve these  issues  to  be  matters  of  sig- 
nificant importance.  This  year  we 
voted  against  a  major  U.N.  budget  re- 
quest for  the  first  time  in  our 
history  —  because  of  opposition  to  pro- 
gram additions  in  the  second  year  of  a 
biennial  budget,  to  attempts  to  make 
the  United  Nations  fully  immune  to  the 
effects  of  inflation  and  currency  fluctu- 
ation, and  to  a  few  specific  activities 
that  we  found  objectionable.  In  the 
vote  we  were  joined  by  14  other  coun- 
tries, including  France,  Belgium. 
Luxembourg.  Italy,  Israel,  and  the 
Soviet  bloc.  Indeed,  those  who  did  not 
vote  in  favor  of  the  budget  this  year  ac- 
counted for  approximately  80%  of  the 
assessed  contributions  to  the  U.N. 
budget. 

I  think  our  efforts  are  being  felt.  We 
have  reason  to  believe  that  senior  Sec- 


54 

retariat  officials  will  now  exercise 
much  greater  efforts  to  control  budget 
expenditures  in  the  coming  period.  The 
point  is  clearly  being  made  to  the  U.N. 
Secretariat,  and  to  the  smaller  nations 
which  contribute  little,  that  the  major 
donors  cannot  tolerate  liberal  ap- 
proaches to  spending. 

On  personnel  questions,  we  have 
seen  some  impressive  new  approaches 
by  the  International  Civil  Service 
Commission  over  the  past  year.  The 
salary  levels  of  the  bulk  of  U.N.  em- 
ployees are  now  in  acceptable  relation- 
ship to  those  of  U.S.  Government  em- 
ployees. And  at  U.S.  insistence,  the 
Commission  has  been  instructed  by  the 
General  Assembly  to  work  toward  the 
establishment  of  grade  equivalencies 
with  U.S.  employees  at  the  most  senior 
executive  levels. 

There  remains  considerable  room  for 
improvement  on  all  of  these  manage- 
ment issues.  Nevertheless,  the  Con- 
gress may  be  assured  that  its  concerns 
are  being  well  represented  throughout 
the  U.N.  system. 

Meeting  Financial  Obligations 

Finally,  let  me  turn  to  the  amend- 
ment regarding  technical  assistance  in 
the  U.N.  system  that  was  inserted  by 
the  Congress  last  fall  in  the  State  De- 
partment's appropriation  act  for  FY 
1979.  Not  only  did  that  amendment 
delete  $27.7  million  from  the  Presi- 
dent's budget  request  but,  more  im- 
portantly, it  specified  that  no  part  of 
the  funds  appropriated  to  pay  our  as- 
sessed contributions  to  the  United  Na- 
tions and  its  specialized  agencies  could 
be  made  available  to  fund  technical  as- 
sistance activities  carried  out  by  these 
agencies. 

Upon  signing  the  bill.  President 
Carter  simultaneously  issued  a  state- 
ment indicating  his  strong  opposition  to 
these  two  provisions  and  that  he  would 
".  .  .  recommend  promptly  to  the 
Congress  the  restoration  of  funds  for 
this  appropriation  and  the  elimination 
of  the  language  which  jeopardizes  our 
ability  to  support  these  international 
organizations.  ..."  The  President's 
budget  for  FY  1980  requests  removal 
of  the  specific  prohibition  against  using 
U.S.  assessed  contributions  for  U.N. 
technical  assistance  activities  and  res- 
toration of  the  $27.7  million  that  was 
disallowed. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  reasons  for 
the  Administration's  concern.  The  reg- 


ular assessed  budgets  of  the  United 
Nations  and  its  specialized  agencies 
and  the  share  to  be  paid  by  each 
member  state  (its  assessment)  is  deter- 
mined by  the  governing  bodies  of  those 
organizations  according  to  their  re- 
spective constitutional  provisions.  Each 
country,  therefore,  is  obligated  to  pay 
what  it  has  been  assessed  according  to 
the  treaty  under  which  it  assumed 
membership  in  a  particular  U.N. 
agency.  Failure  to  pay  these  assess- 
ments places  the  member  state  in  vio- 
lation of  those  obligations  which  are 
legally  binding  on  it. 

Furthermore,  a  member  of  state 
which  offers  to  contribute  its  assessed 
share  but  places  restrictions  on  the  use 
of  its  contribution  violates  its  obliga- 
tion of  membership.  Not  only  are  such 
conditional  contributions  constitution- 
ally unacceptable  to  the  U.N.  agencies 
but  there  are  practical  reasons  why 
placing  conditions  on  contributions 
cannot  work.  The  funds  provided 
through  assessments  by  a  particular 
member  state  are  commingled  with  the 
contributions  of  others  and  lose  their 
national  identity.  Consequently,  the 
U.N.  agencies  have  no  way  of  guaran- 
teeing that  the  contributions  of  a  par- 
ticular country  are  not  used  for  a  spe- 
cific purpose.  If  they  attempted  to  do 
so,  not  only  would  U.N.  finances  be- 
come chaotic  but  the  ability  of  the 
agencies  to  carry  out  programs  ap- 
proved by  the  membership  would  be 
badly  crippled.  The  financial  viability 
of  the  individual  U.N.  agencies — and 
possibly  the  future  of  the  U.N.  system 
itself — would  be  seriously  challenged 
if  not  destroyed. 

If  the  Administration  is  compelled  to 
obtain  the  assurances  required  by  the 
current  legislation  that  none  of  our  as- 
sessed contributions  will  be  used  by  the 
U.N.  agencies  for  technical  assistance 
activities,  then  the  United  States  will 
be  unable  to  make  any  assessed  contri- 
butions to  the  U.N.  system  this 
year — to  date  we  have  not  made  any 
payments  to  the  U.N.  and  the  10  spe- 
cialized agencies  in  which  we  maintain 
membership. 

This  will  result  in  a  significant 
shortfall  of  funds  for  the  U.N.  agencies 
since  we  are  the  major  contributor  to 
most  of  the  agencies.  Such  a  shortage 
of  funds  will  have  a  serious  adverse 
impact  on  the  work  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  preserve  international  peace 
and  security  and  to  develop  greater  in- 
ternational cooperation  in  the  economic 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

and  social  areas.  In  the  specialized  ' 
agencies  such  vital  programs  as  de-  ! 
veloping  nuclear  safeguards  in  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
improving  weather  surveillance  and 
prediction  in  the  World  Meteorological 
Organization,  eradicating  and  control- 
ling contagious  diseases  in  the  World 
Health  Organization,  to  name  but  a 
few,  will  be  seriously  damaged. 

Also  damaged  will  be  an  important 
process  for  developing  greater  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  which  we  have 
played  a  major  role  over  the  past  three 
decades.  The  loss  of  American  influ-"" 
ence  both  in  the  U.N.  system  and  in 
our  bilateral  relationships — especially 
the  developing  states  of  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia — is  likely  to  be  sig- 
nificant. As  a  country  which  has  cham- 
pioned the  rule  of  law  and,  through  its 
actions,  has  set  an  example  for  other 
states  to  follow,  the  United  States  will 
appear  to  be  untrue  to  its  own  ideals  if 
we  cannot  honor  our  legal  obligations. 

In  short,  the  legislation  enacted  last 
year — if  it  is  allowed  to  stand — 
threatens  to  have  serious  negative  im- 
plications for  our  national  well-being, 
for  U.S.  foreign  relations,  and  for  the 
world  community.  We  believe  that  new 
corrective  legislation  is  needed  ur- 
gently before  we  experience  the  full 
impact  of  that  action  in  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem. 


Funding  U.N.  Technical  Assistance 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  specific 
problem  of  funding  U.N.  technical  as- 
sistance activities.  Concern  has  been 
voiced  by  some  Members  of  Congress 
that  the  technical  assistance  work  of 
the  United  Nations  ought  to  be  funded 
entirely  through  voluntary,  rather  than 
assessed,  contributions  levied  on  the 
total  membership.  Apparently  this  con- 
cern was  partially  responsible  for 
enactment  of  the  unacceptable  legisla- 
tion passed  last  year. 

The  most  up-to-date  data  available 
show  that  the  U.N.  system  spent  nearly 
$663  million  in  1977  on  technical  as- 
sistance activities — or  27%  of  the  total 
funds  available  to  the  agencies  that 
year.  However,  of  the  amount  spent  for 
technical  assistance,  about  81%  was 
obtained  through  voluntary  contribu- 
tions and  only  19%  from  assessed 
budgets.  Furthermore,  of  the  $2.4  bil- 
lion total  funds  available  in  1977  to  the 
U.N.   agencies,   technical  assistance 


June  1979 


55 


funded  in  assessed  budgets  accounted 
tor  only  5.1%. 

Looked  at  another  way,  for  the 
United  Nations  and  the  10  specialized 
agencies  to  which  the  United  States 
belongs,  the  combined  assessed  budg- 
ets in  1979  are  estimated  to  be  $1.2 
billion;  of  that  amount,  only  $151 
million — or  12.9% — is  expected  to  be 
allocated  for  technical  assistance  ac- 
tivities. If  we  exclude  the  World  Health 
Organization  (WHO)  which  according 
to  its  constitution  and  30  years  of  prac- 
tice has  used  its  regular  assessed 
budget  to  fund  its  important  worldwide 
health  programs,  the  picture  in  1979 
changes  dramatically,  i.e..  of  the  esti- 
mated $970  million  total  regular  budg- 
ets for  the  other  10  U.N.  agencies, 
only  $34.5  million  is  planned  to  be 
used  for  technical  assistance  work  —  or 
3.6%  of  the  total. 

Although  the  technical  assistance 
work  of  the  U.N.  system  funded 
through  assessments  is  small — and 
many  would  argue  that  larger  rather 
than  smaller  amounts  should  be  de- 
voted to  these  activities,  given  the 
needs  and  the  demonstrated  capabilities 
of  the  U.N.  agencies — there  is  no 
doubt  that  it  has  been  overwhelmingly 
consistent  with  U.S.  interests. 

The  United  States  has  supported  the 
technical  assistance  efforts  of  the  U.N. 
system  because  these  activities: 

•  Have  an  impressive  multiplier  ef- 
fect through  facilitating  large-scale 
development  efforts  managed  and  fi- 
nanced by  other  international  institu- 
tions and/or  private  investments; 

•  Perform  a  catalytic  role  and  pro- 
vide technical  expertise  for  initiating 
activities  which  otherwise  may  not  be 
undertaken; 

•  Possess  a  unique  capability  for 
stimulating  recipient  developing  coun- 
tries to  improve  their  internal  planning, 
management,  and  related  capabilities 
necessary  to  maximize  benefits  avail- 
able from  their  own  resources  and  other 
external  assistance; 

•  Provide  global  benefits  in  fields 
such  as  nuclear  safeguards,  weather 
forecasting,  air  navigation  safety,  and 
the  fight  against  communicable  dis- 
eases; and 

•  Complement  our  bilateral  efforts. 

Technical  assistance  provided  by  the 
U.N.  system  also  helps  to  establish 
within  the  recipient  countries  an  envi- 
ronment of  reduced  political  tensions, 
growing  economic  prosperity  to  be 


shared  by  all,  and  improved  social 
conditions,  in  particular,  it  promotes 
increased  respect  for  the  political  and 
economic  rights  of  the  individual  and 
other  conditions  which  enhance  human 
rights. 

Strong  U.S.  support  for  U.N.  system 
technical  assistance  indicates  our  ea- 
gerness to  participate  as  a  full  partner 
in  the  evolving  multilateral  economic 
and  social  infrastructure  and  encour- 
ages fuller  participation  and  increased 
support  from  all  members  of  the  world 
community  especially  other  donor  na- 
tions. It  also  demonstrates  our  respon- 
siveness to  the  legitimate  needs  of  de- 
veloping countries — thereby  helping  to 
improve  North-South  relations  —  and 
serves  to  strengthen  the  important  lead- 
ership role  of  the  United  States 
throughout  the  U.N.  system  and  the 
world  community. 

In  supporting  technical  assistance 
activities  conducted  by  the  agencies  of 
the  U.N.  system,  the  United  States 
seeks  to  promote  coherence,  coordina- 
tion, and  effective  management  in  the 
implementation  of  these  activities,  both 
individually  and  as  a  whole.  This  is  of 
special  concern  to  the  United  States 
given  the  decentralized  character  of  the 
U.N.  system,  the  maintenance  of  which 
reflects  and  complements  the  pluralism 
of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and  our  own  na- 
tional interests.  A  major  U.S.  concern, 
however,  is  to  assure  that  a  proper  re- 
lationship exists  between  those  U.N. 
agency  activities  funded  by  obligatory 
assessments  levied  on  all  member 
states  and  those  funded  by  voluntary 
contributions,  the  level  of  which  is 
fully  discretionary  for  the  donor  coun- 
tries. 

The  central  theme  of  U.S.  policy 
continues  to  be  that  of  seeking  to 
strengthen  the  U.N.  Development  Pro- 
gram (UNDP)  as  the  primary  source  of 
funding  and  overall  coordination  for 
technical  assistance  activities  con- 
ducted by  each  of  the  U.N.  system 
agencies  and  programs.  Through 
strengthening  the  capability  of  the 
UNDP  to  promote  the  necessary  coher- 
ence, coordination,  and  effective  man- 
agement that  we  seek,  we  believe  that 
the  interests  of  individual  countries  and 
the  world  community  will  be  enhanced. 
In  support  of  this  emphasis  on  the  cen- 
tral role  of  the  UNDP,  the  United 
States  will  continue  to: 

•  Press  in  each  U.N.  agency  to  keep 
existing  assessed  funded  technical  as- 
sistance to  a  minimum  consistent  with 
overall  U.S.  policy  objectives; 


•  Seek  to  avoid  the  introduction  of 
new  programs  unless  the  need  is  ex- 
traordinary and  can  be  fully  justified; 
and 

•  Transfer,  wherever  appropriate, 
funding  and  policy  responsibility  for 
such  programs  to  other  agencies  — 
especially  the  UNDP — utilizing  vol- 
untary contributions. 

We  will  make  every  effort  to  insure 
that  the  U.N.  agencies  and  other 
member  governments  clearly  under- 
stand that  the  longstanding  U.S.  sup- 
port for  these  organizations  could  be 
seriously  impaired  if  the  repeated  ex- 
pressions of  concern  by  us,  the  major 
U.N.  contributor,  are  ignored. 

In  supporting  the  central  role  for  the 
UNDP,  our  policy  must  take  into  ac- 
count the  fact  that  some  of  the  U.N. 
agency  charters,  accepted  by  the 
United  States  in  joining  the  organiza- 
tions, provide  for  the  furnishing  of 
some  kinds  of  technical  assistance  out 
of  assessed  budget  funds.  While  the 
United  States  can  oppose  assessments 
levied  on  it  for  technical  assistance  ac- 
tivities by  a  U.N.  agency,  these  as- 
sessments must  be  respected  as  legal 
obligations  of  membership  once  deci- 
sions have  been  taken  in  the  agencies 
in  accordance  with  the  appropriate 
statutory  instruments.  We  fully  recog- 
nize, however,  that  it  was  never  in- 
tended for  these  provisions  to  serve  as 
a  device  for  the  majority  to  employ  in 
making  significant  resource  transfers 
through  the  U.N.  system  from  the  de- 
veloped to  the  developing  countries.  To 
the  extent  this  takes  place,  a  major 
constitutional  crisis  would  ensue,  and 
the  United  States  might  be  forced  to  re- 
consider its  participation  in  the  institu- 
tions in  question. 

In  dealing  with  this  issue,  we  recog- 
nize that  universal  funding  and 
burden-sharing  for  U.N.  system  techni- 
cal assistance  activities  are  appropriate 
in  those  instances  where  benefits  serve 
a  common  interest.  Examples  of  in- 
stances where  this  is  true  are  WHO's 
programs  for  the  control  and  eradica- 
tion of  diseases  and  efforts  by  other 
U.N.  agencies  to  advance  global  norms 
(e.g.,  developing  internationally  ac- 
ceptable criteria  for  foodstuffs  involved 
in  international  trade). 

Finally,  our  policy  is  to  support  as- 
sessed funding  of  technical  assistance 
in  individual  U.N.  agencies  in  those  in- 
stances where  important  goals  are  bet- 
ter served  this  way  than  through  the 
UNDP.  For  example,  UNDP  proce- 
dures often  will  not  allow  for  meeting 
short-term  emergency  needs  on  a 
timely  basis,  and  the  United  States 
sometimes  finds  that  the  UNDP  country 
programming  system  does  not  suffi- 


56 


F¥  1980  Appropriations  for 
Voluntary  Contributions  and  the  OAS 


by  Charles  William  IVIaynes 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House 
Appropriations  Committee  on  March 
7,  1979.  Mr.  Maynes  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  International  Organization 
Affairs. ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  testify 
in  support  of  President  Carter's  request 
for  $277.2  million  for  voluntary  con- 
tributions to  the  United  Nations  and  to 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS). 

The  United  Nations  has  been  and 
remains  a  critical  arena  for  U.S.  inter- 
ests. But  we  are  not  alone.  Never  be- 
fore in  world  history  have  so  many  na- 
tions faced   such   a   significant  chal- 


lenge: to  secure  peace  and  prosperity 
not  only  for  ourselves  but  for  future 
generations  as  well.  We  must  turn  this 
challenge  into  a  manageable  task. 

For  too  long  some  have  perceived 
the  United  Nations  as  primarily  a  stage 
for  intermittent  hostile  competition 
among  nation  states.  It  is  not  surpris- 
ing, therefore,  that  these  people  tend  to 
see  the  United  Nations  and  its  activities 
as  posing  threats  to  the  United  States 
rather  than  providing  opportunities.  In 
fact,  it  offers  us  far  more  of  the  latter 
than  commonly  accepted. 

In  the  United  Nations,  it  is  true  that 
a  handful  of  pathologically  anti- 
American  governments  engage  in  pub- 
lic posturing  against  us.  But  they  are 
not  characteristic  of  this  great  collec- 
tive of  nations.  Their  actions  should  be 


International  Organizations  (Cont'd) 

ciently  accommodate  priority  needs 
identified  by  this  country  in  particular 
program  sectors  (e.g.,  primary  health 
care). 

I  think  the  crucial  issue  here  is 
whether  or  not  the  United  States  will 
honor  the  legal  obligations  which  we 
accepted  in  joining  the  United  Nations 
and  its  specialized  agencies.  There  are 
occasions  when  we  oppose  specific  ac- 
tivities promoted  by  others,  but  we  are 
required  to  contribute  our  assessed 
share.  Others  oppose  activities  which 
the  U.S.  promotes  and  supports,  but  we 
insist  that  they  contribute  funds 
nevertheless  in  order  to  fulfill  their  ob- 
ligations of  membership. 

Sometimes  we  prevail  in  our  view, 
and  sometimes  we  do  not.  That  is  the 
nature  of  a  representative  organization 
composed  of  150  sovereign  member 
states.  This  is  not  significantly  differ- 
ent from  our  own  budget  process,  since 
funds  approved  by  the  Congress  are  the 
result  of  compromise  among  competing 
interests.  The  United  States,  along  with 
a  number  of  other  major  contributors, 
voted  against  appropriations  for  the 
United  Nations  at  the  recently  con- 
cluded U.N.  General  Assembly;  how- 
ever, the  majority  prevailed  and  the  re- 
quest was  approved.  As  a  responsible 
member,  the  United  States  has  an  obli- 
gation to  pay  its  assessment. 

The  U.N.  agencies  operate  on  the 
basis  of  political  balance.  Inevitably, 
there  is  a  certain  give-and-take  in  the 


system.  Our  decision  to  join  these  or- 
ganizations and  to  accept  the  con- 
sequent treaty  obligations  —  including 
the  obligation  to  pay  our  assess- 
ments—  was  made  in  full  confidence 
that  we  would  gain  a  clear  net  balance 
of  benefits.  We  accepted  membership 
in  the  U.N.  agencies  knowing  that  we 
would  not  be  able  to  control  all  the  ac- 
tivities they  undertake,  as  no  single 
nation  can  or  should.  But  any  fair 
evaluation  of  the  enormous  benefits  we 
enjoy  through  our  membership — from 
peacekeeping  to  the  setting  of  stand- 
ards for  air  navigation  safety  or  en- 
vironmental protection  —  would  con- 
firm that  it  remains  in  our  interest  to 
"play  by  the  rules"  that  we  helped  es- 
tablish. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  we  ask  the 
Congress  to  remove  from  the  legisla- 
tion enacted  last  year  the  prohibition 
against  the  use  of  funds  appropriated 
for  U.N.  technical  assistance  activities 
and  to  act  favorably  on  the  supple- 
mental appropriation  requested  to  per- 
mit full  funding  of  our  U.N.  system  as- 
sessments. This  country,  if  it  is  to  re- 
main a  leader  in  the  international  com- 
munity and  a  major  actor  in  the  U.N. 
system,  must  respect  the  rule  of  law 
and  honor  its  international  legal  obli- 
gations. D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

taken  into  account  in  our  policy  vis-a-  i 
vis  those  countries,  but  it  should  not 
provoke  public  posturing  on  our  part 
about  the  merits  of  the  United  Nations 
itself. 

Certainly  some  of  the  rhetoric  in  the 
United  Nations  is  not  to  our  taste;  a 
few  resolutions  have  been  against  our 
interests.  But  the  advantages  to  the 
United  States  of  the  United  Nations  far 
outweigh  its  periodic  irritations. 

For  a  mature  American  foreign  pol- 
icy: 

•  What  threat  is  there  in  providing 
technical  assistance  through  the  U.N. 
Development  Program  (UNDP)  to 
countries  in  need?  Should  we  not  focus 
on  the  investment  opportunities  created 
for  the  governments  themselves  and 
outside  investors? 

•  What  threat  lies  in  efforts  to  meet 
humanitarian  and  developmental  needs 
through  UNICEF  and  the  U.N.  Relief 
and  Works  Agency  (UNRWA)?  Should 
we  not  concentrate  on  the  lives  im- 
proved and  enriched? 

•  What  threat  lies  in  international 
scientific  cooperation  through  the  U.N. 
Environment  Program  (UNEP)  or  in 
advancing  nuclear  safeguards  through 
the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)?  Should  we  not  con- 
sider the  costs  of  not  having  these  pro- 
grams? 

•  What  is  so  threatening  about  the 
education  and  training  that  the  United 
Nations  provides  for  people  denied 
such  opportunities  in  their  own  ter- 
ritories? Should  we  not  imagine  how 
countries  like  Namibia  will  be  gov- 
erned in  the  absence  of  this  prepara- 
tion? 

The  threat  lies  not  in  the  United  Na- 
tions but  in  ourselves  if  we  are  hood- 
winked by  new  peddlers  of  old  fears. 
The  real  danger  facing  our  world  lurks 
behind  propositions  which  make  a  vir- 
tue out  of  unconcern  for  our  fellow 
men,  which  are  blind  to  our  nation's 
true  self-interest,  and  which  would 
make  Americans  believe  that  we  need 
the  United  Nations  less  when  we  need 
it  more. 

True,  we  were  the  founders  and 
moving  spirit  of  the  United  Nations. 
True,  we  have  been  its  major  funder 
and  leading  member.  But  that  reflects 
the  intelligence  of  our  policies  as  inuch 
as  the  generosity  of  our  nation. 

Today,  the  United  Nations  is  the 
forum  for  major  diplomatic  initiatives 
by  many  countries.  It  has  become  a 
major  force  for  tempering  periodic  out- 
bursts of  violence  among  nations.  And 
it  has  become  more  than  just  the  last 
resort  for  peace — it  has  also  become  a 
pioneer  organization  in  creating  global 


June  1979 


57 


conditions  for  permanent  peace  and 
stable  economic  order. 

The  voluntary  contributions  we  offer 
to  this  international  organization — 
ycnerous  as  they  may  be — are  not  a  tax 
oil  our  charity  nor  a  real  burden  on  our 
economy.  The  sum  of  $277  million  is 
no  more  than  $1.10  for  each  American. 
a  very  small  per  capita  expenditure 
with  a  major  return.  It  will  not  in  itself 
buy  political  good  will,  but  it  is  an  in- 
vestment in  peace  and  prosperity.  And 
Irum  it  we  will  also  obtain  direct  and 
important  economic,  technical,  and  so- 
cial benefits. 

Thus,  the  United  Nations  devotes 
these  voluntary  contributions  to: 

•  Confront  the  deterioration  of  the 
pli\  sical  environment  of  this  Earth; 

•  Monitor  and  give  technical  guid- 
ance for  nuclear  facilities  worldwide; 

•  Improve  the  basic  economic  secu- 
rity for  children,  mothers,  and  refu- 
gees; 

•  Mobilize  and  employ  skilled  plan- 
ners, managers,  and  technicians  in  the 
ikneloping  countries; 

•  Act  against  food  shortages  and 
gram  waste; 

•  Gather  information  and  impart 
knowledge  about  the  impact  of  weather 
and  climate  on  people's  lives  and  farm- 
ers" crops; 

•  Prevent  the  outbreak  and  the 
spread  of  infectuous  disease;  and 

•  Improve  the  status  of  and  opportu- 
nities for  women  in  the  developed  and 
developing  countries  alike. 

1  mention  these  constructive  actions 
only  for  illustration,  not  as  an  all- 
iiiclusive  list.  But  when  Americans 
travel  by  air  and  land  safely,  we  wish 
more  would  think  about  this  investment 
in  the  U.N.'s  International  Civil  Avia- 
tion Organization  (ICAO).  If  Ameri- 
cans are  not  stricken  with  food 
poisoning,  we  hope  some  will  recall 
the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organiza- 
tion's (FAO)  Codex  Alimentarius 
Commission  that  sets  health  and  safety 
standards  for  the  fish  we  consume.  I 
could  continue  to  elaborate  on  how 
U.N.  programs  and  agencies  touch  our 
daily  lives.  In  an  increasingly  interde- 
pendent and  complex  world,  multilat- 
eral technical  and  scientific  cooperation 
promoted  by  all  the  U.N.  agencies  and 
programs  is  not  a  luxury;  it  is  a  neces- 
sity. 

I  submit  that  each  one  of  us  has 
something  to  benefit  from  our  support 
to  this  worldwide  Organization.  Permit 
me,  however,  to  discuss  briefly  why 
our  continued  policy  and  financial  sup- 
port to  international  organizations  and 
programs  is  essential  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  major  U.S.  policy  objectives. 

First,  these  voluntary  contributions 


enhance  U.S.  leadership  in  shaping  the 
direction  and  growth  of  the  rapidly 
evolving  nature  of  global  economic  and 
political  cooperation. 

Second,  our  voluntary  contributions 
will  strengthen — as  they  already 
have — the  U.N.'s  capacity  to  confront 
effectively  global  economic,  human- 
itarian, and  environmental  problems. 

Third,  the  investment  of  American 
tax  dollars  through  these  voluntary 
contributions  returns  specific  benefits 
to  the  United  States. 

And  fourth,  only  through  an  active 
and  positive  participation  in  these  pro- 
grams can  we  play  a  role  in  assuring 
that  voluntary  contributions  are  well 
spent  and  the  programs  effectively 
managed. 

Strengthening  U.S.  Leadership 

In  an  editorial  the  day  after  Ambas- 
sador Dubs'  tragic  death  [in  Afghani- 
stan] and  the  attack  on  our  Embassy  in 
Tehran,  the  New  York  Times  used  a 
telling  phrase — "the  unavoidable  obli- 
gations of  leadership."  The  American 
people  and  the  Congress  want  the 
United  States  to  continue  as  the  leading 
nation  in  this  difficult  and  complex 
world. 

The  strength  of  our  global  position  is 
expressed  in  several  ways.  Our  prestige 
as  a  democratic  republic,  our  military 
power,  and  our  economic  vitality  are 
key  elements.  But  since  World  War  II 
our  consistent  initiative  in  urging  that 
nations  act  together  to  solve  common 
problems  has  been  a  principal  course  of 
action  in  demonstrating  our  leadership. 

Since  its  founding  the  United  Na- 
tions has  grown  to  reflect  all  of  the 
problems,  conflicts,  and  complexities 
of  the  world.  New  factors  in  interna- 
tional affairs  make  our  voluntary 
contributions  critically  important, 
especially  since  political  and  security 
considerations  are  closely  linked  to 
economic  issues.  The  United  Nations 
today  is  the  main  forum  for  the  North- 
South  dialogue.  The  interdependence 
of  the  economies  of  North  and  South 
contains  the  seeds  of  promise  for  a 
more  prosperous  world  as  well  as  the 
specter  of  increased  global  tensions. 
The  United  Nations  will  have  a  crucial 
role  in  determining  the  outcome. 

Much  will  depend  on  our  leadership 
to  turn  this  promise  into  reality  and 
defuse  the  confrontation  that  is  fueled 
by  the  growing  disparities  in  global 
living  standards. 

In  the  long  run  the  pressing  problems 
of  food,  energy,  and  population  in  the 
less  developed  countries,  if  not  con- 
fronted decisively,  will  inevitably  en- 
tail serious  security  risks  to  all  and 
rising  costs  to  the  industrialized  coun- 


tries. Efforts  to  improve  North-South 
relations  require  the  United  States  to 
demonstrate  our  responsiveness  to  the 
legitimate  needs  of  the  developing 
countries.  They  are  turning  increas- 
ingly to  international  agencies  to  assist 
them  in  improving  the  lot  of  their 
people. 

The  question  is  not  simply  one  of 
preventive  action.  It  is  through  our 
leadership  in  the  United  Nations  that 
we  have  again  and  again  demonstrated 
the  possibility  of  progressive  and  con- 
structive steps. 

The  leading  example  now  is 
Namibia.  After  long  and  extremely 
difficult  negotiations,  it  appears  that  a 
peaceful  transfer  of  power  to  majority 
rule  can  be  achieved.  The  United  Na- 
tions provided  the  channel  for  that  ef- 
fort and  will  provide,  in  the  next  sev- 
eral weeks,  the  human  skills  needed  to 
get  an  independent  Namibia  started. 
Some  will  be  funded  from  programs  in 
this  request,  especially  the  UNDP. 

Similarly,  the  United  Nations  is  now 
providing  a  forum  and  a  channel  for 
action  to  moderate  and  stabilize  politi- 
cal conflicts  in  Cyprus,  southern  Leba- 
non, and  in  Indochina. 

The  U.N.  system  also  provides  a 
means  to  negotiate  within  the  interna- 
tional community  major  economic  is- 
sues which  would  be  simply  unman- 
ageable bilaterally  and  which  are  of 
vital  concern  to  the  United  States. 
These  include  trade,  international 
monetary  reform,  technology  transfer, 
and  a  new  but  crucial  subject — energy. 

Dealing  with  Global  Problems  and 
Challenges 

More  specifically,  it  is  through  the 
United  Nations  and  through  the  OAS 
that  we  have  obtained  the  cooperation 
of  other  nations  to  deal  with  problems 
having  global  impact.  By  sponsoring 
these  multilateral  initiatives,  the  United 
States  led  the  way  for: 

•  Developing  nations  to  have  skilled 
and  specialized  manpower,  which  they 
need  and  which  the  UNDP  provides; 

•  Southern  Africans  to  be  trained  for 
constructive  roles  in  their  newly  inde- 
pendent countries,  which  several  pro- 
grams in  this  request  provide; 

•  Women  to  achieve  a  rightful  and 
useful  place  in  their  societies,  which 
the  Decade  for  Women  promotes; 

•  Effective  cooperation  among  the 
Latin  American  countries,  which  the 
OAS  programs  provide; 

•  Permanent  improvement  in  the 
health  and  welfare  of  women  and  chil- 
dren, which  UNICEF  furthers;  and 

•  International  cooperation  in  the 
fields  of  meteorology  and  nuclear  tech- 
nology, which  the  World  Meteorological 


58 

Organization   (WMO)  and   the   IAEA 
underpin. 

In  an  era  of  growing  scarcity  of  re- 
sources for  the  developing  countries, 
technical  cooperation  has  become  a 
highly  cost-effective  way  to  stimulate 
the  global  economy.  Multilateral  tech- 
nical assistance  programs  draw  on  a 
pool  of  international  knowledge,  skills, 
and  language  proficiency  that  no  single 
country  can  provide;  allocate  assistance 
primarily  on  the  basis  of  developmental, 
not  political,  criteria;  influence  recip- 
ient countries  to  pursue  sound  de- 
velopment policies  and  practices;  and 
set  international  standards  for  technical 
assistance  projects. 

Moreover,  multilateral  technical  as- 
sistance serves  as  a  channel  for  vital 
preinvestment  work  for  capital  projects 
of  the  international  financial  institu- 
tions and  the  private  sector.  U.S.  pri- 
vate firms  then  participate  significantly 
in  the  followup  investment  opportuni- 
ties that  UNDP  generates — estimated  at 
some  $28.8  billion  between  1959  and 
1977.  UNDP  technical  advisers  help 
identify  existing,  unused,  and  untapped 
resources.  They  have  been  credited 
with  uncovering  some  $20  billion 
worth  of  mineral  deposits.  Using  indig- 
enous technology,  UNDP  speeds  the 
building  of  roads,  rural  power  systems, 
communications,  and  other  facilities. 
This  improved  infrastructure  increases 
the  capacity  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries to  help  each  other  and  to  contrib- 
ute their  share  in  solving  global  food 
shortages  and  in  developing  renewable 
energy  sources. 

We  cannot  expect  the  international 
community  to  continue  to  act  together 
on  problems  we  want  resolved  if  we  do 
not  pay  our  fair  share  of  the  multilat- 
eral actions  we  initiated  to  deal  with 
them.  We  led  in  founding  the  UNDP, 
UNICEF,  the  IAEA,  and  most  of  the 
other  programs  in  this  request.  We 
continue  to  have  strong  influence  over 
their  policies.  Americans  now  head 
UNDP,  UNICEF,  and  UNRWA,  the 
programs  with  the  greatest  resources. 

But  our  leadership  in  these  pro- 
grams, in  the  United  Nations  and  OAS, 
and  in  the  international  community  will 
be  weakened  if  we  do  not  sustain  our 
strong  support  for  each  of  these  pro- 
grams. 

Benefits  to  the  U.S. 

American  tax  dollars  contributed  to 
these  programs  return  substantial 
benefits  to  U.S.  interests.  In  fact,  it  is 
not  inappropriate  to  think  of  them  as  an 
investment  with  specific  dividends  for 
the  United  States. 

The  most  important  benefit  is  that 


these  programs  support  our  foreign 
policies,  especially  toward  the  de- 
veloping world. 

Through  UNDP,  UNICEF,  and  the 
IAEA,  the  OAS  programs — indeed, 
through  each  of  these  programs — 
elements  of  basic  long-term  American 
policy  are  applied  in  every  recipient 
country. 

•  UNDP  promotes  rational  allocation 
of  scarce  managerial  and  technical  re- 
sources, development  of  private  enter- 
prise and  investment  as  sources  of 
employment,  and  widespread  applica- 
tion of  light  capital  technology  at  the 
grassroots  level. 

•  UNRWA  provides  basic  and  voca- 
tional education  to  Palestinian  youths 
so  they  can  get  jobs  instead  of  turning 
to  despair  and  violence. 

•  UNICEF  attacks  malnutrition 
which  reduces  the  potential  of  millions 
of  children  to  work  productively  when 
they  become  adults. 

•  IAEA  provides  technical  assist- 
ance and  inspections  that  promote  nu- 
clear safety  and  inhibit  proliferation  of 
weapons  technology. 

Thus  these  programs  benefit  the 
United  States  by  supporting  our  own 
objectives. 

But  a  unique  benefit  of  multilateral 
action  is  that  we  do  not  pay  the  whole 
bill.  By  mobilizing  the  financial  and 
human  resources  of  the  entire  interna- 
tional community,  these  programs  are 
highly  cost  effective.  For  every  dollar 
we  contribute  to  UNDP  and  to  UN- 
ICEF, other  nations  contribute  four. 
Our  sustained  strong  support  for  each 
program  has  a  multiplier  effect  by  en- 
couraging other  major  donor  nations  to 
increase  their  contributions.  This  effect 
has  been  demonstrated  dramatically  in 
such  major  programs  as  UNDP  and 
UNRWA. 

These  programs  also  benefit  the 
United  States  by  promoting  interna- 
tional economic  stability  and  the  ex- 
pansion of  market  and  investment  op- 
portunities for  American  firms. 

As  the  development  of  countries  in 
Africa,  Asia,  and  South  America  pro- 
ceeds, new  markets  will  be  opened  for 
the  export  of  American  goods.  Ameri- 
can high  technology  services  will  be 
required  to  operate  and  maintain  more 
complex  economies  and  societies, 
especially  if  significant  American  input 
is  involved  in  their  early  development. 
Raw  materials  required  by  American 
industry  will  continue  to  be  available 
and  possibly  at  reduced  cost.  New  op- 
portunities for  the  investment  of 
American  capital  will  arise.  And  bar- 
riers to  free  international  trade  will  be 
reduced. 

UNDP  especially  improves  U.S. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

economic  opportunities  by  strengthen-' 
ing  developing  economies  in  the  long) 
term  and  by  identifying  specific  in-i 
vestment  opportunities  in  developing 
countries,  many  of  which  are  taken  up 
by  American  firms. 

Finally,  these  programs  benefit  the 
U.S.  economy  by  purchasing  signifi- 
cant amounts  of  American  goods  and! 
services.  We  contributed  $115  million 
to  UNDP  in  1977,  but  UNDP  spenti 
over  $100  million  in  the  United  States. 
In  1976  alone  UNDP  generated  $l.4i 
billion  worth  of  investments  in  natural 
resource  projects,  of  which  $256  mil- 
lion was  the  share  of  American  private 
firms. 

We  contributed  $30  million  to  UN- 
ICEF in  1978,  but  UNICEF  spent 
$48.4  million  in  the  United  States  that 
year.  Moreover  many  of  these  pro- 
grams are  headquartered  in  New  York. 
The  United  Nations  and  its  specialized 
agencies  spend  over  $450  million  an- 
nually in  that  city. 

Thus  it  is  true  that  we  join  with  other 
nations  in  contributing  to  these  pro- 
grams because  they  benefit  people  who 
need  assistance.  Through  them,  we 
pursue  traditional  American  human-  jj 
itarian  goals. 

The  reality,  however,  is  that  meeting 
humanitarian  concerns  serves  our  nar- 
row as  well  as  our  broad  self-interest. 
In  fact,  multilateral  technical  coopera- 
tion is  no  longer  simply  a  resource 
transfer  from  the  rich  nations  for  the  ex- 
clusive benefit  of  the  poor.  In  an  inter- 
dependent world — where  prosperity  in 
the  developed  countries  is  closely 
linked  to  steady  growth  and  moderni- 
zation in  the  developing  areas — these 
voluntary  contributions  should  not  be 
seen  as  ""give-aways"  but  as  long- 
range  investments  with  definite  returns 
for  the  United  States. 


Assuring  Effectiveness  and  Efficiency 

We  share  with  the  Congress  the 
strong  view  that  multilateral  assistance 
programs  must  be  efficiently  managed 
and  effective  in  achieving  their  objec- 
tives. We  want  to  assure  that  our  con- 
tributions are  well  spent. 

In  the  last  2  years,  we  have  inten- 
sified our  regular  consultations  with  the 
chief  executives  and  staff  of  all  U.N. 
programs  concerning  their  planning, 
administration,  budgets,  and  opera- 
tions. 

Moreover,  we  have  urged  in  the 
governing  bodies  of  these  organizations 
managerial  and  fiscal  reforms  aimed  at 
cutting  overhead  costs  and  maximizing 
the  share  of  total  budgets  devoted  to 
delivery  of  assistance.  These  efforts 
have  had  concrete  results,  especially  in 
UNDP. 


jiiiic  1979 


59 


With  respect  to  our  own  evaluation 
capability,  we  have  revised  and  in- 
creased the  frequency  of  periodic  re- 
ports on  U.N.  programs  from  Foreign 
.Service  posts.  We  have  also  completed 
two  comprehensive  field  evaluations  of 
IN.  programs  in  Kenya  and  Thailand. 
W  c  plan  similar  missions  to 
Bangladesh  and  other  major  recipients 
ol  U.N.  assistance.  We  will  be  pleased 
to  provide  the  Congress  with  the  results 
(if  our  evaluation  efforts  so  far. 

The  U.N.'s  own  evaluation 
mechanism — the  system-wide  Joint  In- 
spection Unit — is  increasingly  effec- 
tive, pinpointing  problem  spots  and 
possible  areas  of  overlap  among  agen- 
cies. 

On  personnel  questions,  we  have  seen 
some  impressive  new  approaches  by 
the  International  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission over  the  past  year.  The  salary 
levels  of  the  bulk  of  U.N.  employees 
are  no  longer  unreasonably  higher  than 
those  of  U.S.  Government  employees. 
And  at  U.S.  insistence  the  General 
Assembly  has  asked  the  International 
Civil  Service  Commission  to  study  the 
salaries  at  the  most  senior  executive 
levels  and  to  submit  a  report  to  the  next 
General  Assembly. 

While  we  continue  to  pursue  these 
and  other  management  issues,  recog- 
nizing that  much  yet  remains  to  be 
done,  the  Congress  may  be  assured  that 
its  concerns  in  this  area  are  being  rep- 
resented strongly  throughout  the  U.N. 
system. 

A  Minimum  Request 

Our  total  request  this  year  is  $5  mil- 
lion less  than  last  year  and  only  I'^k 
above  the  fiscal  year  1979  total  appro- 
priation of  $260  million.  The  percent- 
age increases  for  two  major 
programs  — UNDP  and  UNICEF  — 
are  less  than  last  year;  most  other  major 
programs  are  unchanged  or  increased 
only  slightly;  and  two  smaller  but  im- 
portant programs  —  UNEP  and  the 
Decade  for  Women  —  have  been  de- 
creased. Moreover,  we  have  included  no 
new  programs  and  dropped  one  pro- 
gram funded  last  year  pending  a  review 
of  the  first  year's  results.  There  are 
good  reasons  now  for  new  initiatives  in 
multilateral  cooperation,  especially  in 
areas  of  strong  interest  to  the  United 
States  such  as  renewable  energy,  nutri- 
tion in  developing  countries,  and  a 
program  to  place  more  young  Ameri- 
cans in  the  U.N.  system.  We  consid- 
ered requesting  funding  for  such  pro- 
grams, but  they  were  deleted  in  view  of 
the  need  for  budgetary  restraint. 

In  our  view,  this  total  request  and 
the  individual  funding  levels  represent 
the  minimal  levels  consistent  with  our 


national  interests.  Any  less  would  sig- 
nificantly damage  our  interests  and  the 
effectiveness  of  these  programs. 


Meeting  Financial  Obligations 

Before  we  discuss  the  individual 
program  funding  requests,  let  me  return 
to  the  theme  at  the  beginning  of  this 
statement:  that  of  the  perceived  threats 
and  the  opportunities  for  the  United 
States  that  exist  in  the  United  Nations. 

Today  I  would  emphasize  the  very 
strong  concern  of  the  executive  branch 
about  meeting  our  assessed  contribu- 
tions to  the  United  Nations  and  its  spe- 
cialized agencies.  Legislation  passed 
last  year  deleted  $27.7  million  from  the 
President's  budget  request  and  imposed 
a  condition  on  the  remainder  of  the 
U.S.  contribution  that  none  of  the 
funds  could  be  used  for  technical  as- 
sistance. Since  regular  budget  funds 
are  commingled  in  one  account,  the 
U.N.  agencies  cannot  guarantee  that 
one  country's  funds  are  not  used  for 
any  specific  purpose.  The  effect  of  last 
year's  legislation,  therefore,  is  to  cut 
off  all  U.S.  funds  for  the  United  Na- 
tions and  for  its  10  specialized  agen- 
cies. So  far  in  1979,  we  have  made  no 
regular  budget  payments  to  these  agen- 
cies. 

We  cannot  do  so  until  the  legislation 
is  changed.  As  you  know,  the  Admin- 
istration has  introduced  legislation  that 
would  restore  the  $27.7  million  and 
delete  the  prohibitory  language.  We 
hope  that  the  Congress  will  act 
promptly.  That  action  is  essential  to 
minimize  the  damage  to  the  U.N. 
agencies  and  to  maintain  U.S.  lead- 
ership in  these  organizations. 

I  recognize  that  this  new  legislation 
falls  under  a  different  appropriation 
than  the  one  under  review  here  today. 
But  the  voluntary  contributions,  which 
are  the  concern  of  this  subcommittee, 
will  be  of  little  value  if  the  United 
States  cannot  make  its  assessed  contri- 
butions to  the  U.N.  agencies.  Specif- 
ically: 

•  There  will  be  adverse  impact  on 
the  U.N.'s  work  to  preserve  interna- 
tional peace  and  security; 

•  There  will  be  damage  to  its  efforts 
to  develop  greater  international  cooper- 
ation in  economic  and  social  areas; 

•  There  will  be  serious  harm  to  the 
efforts  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion (WHO)  to  control  contagious  dis- 
ease and  to  FAO  programs  to  combat 
plant  and  animal  disease  and  to  in- 
crease the  quantity  and  nutritional 
value  of  food  produced  in  developing 
countries; 

•  The  loss  of  U.S.  leadership  in  the 
development  assistance   field  —  which 


has  persuaded  many  other  nations  to 
contribute  to  U.N.  agencies  and  to  de- 
velopment programs  —  will  seriously 
undermine  efforts  we  have  pursued  for 
30  years; 

•  There  will  also  be  a  tremendous 
loss  of  American  influence  within  these 
organizations — particularly  among  the 
developing  nations  of  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia  which  are  important 
to  us;  and 

•  Our  efforts  to  champion  the  rule  of 
law  —  to  encourage  all  nations  to 
adhere  to  legal  principles  —  will  be  un- 
dermined by  our  own  disregard  of  the 
legal  obligations  we  have  accepted. 

In  short,  the  current  legislation  has 
tragic  implications  not  just  for  the 
U.N.  system  but  for  all  aspects  of  our 
foreign  relations. 

We  agree  with  the  Congress  on  the 
general  principle  that  most  U.N.  sys- 
tem funds  for  technical  assistance 
should  be  provided  from  voluntary 
contributions.  We  support  the 
strengthening  of  the  UNDP  as  the  pri- 
mary channel  for  these  funds  and  the 
central  coordinator  of  U.N.  technical 
assistance  activity.  However,  the  con- 
stitutions of  many  of  the  U.N.  agencies 
specifically  provide  for  technical  as- 
sistance in  assessed  budgets. 
Moreover,  because  these  programs 
generally  meet  global  objectives  that 
we  strongly  support  or  fill  gaps  for 
which  UNDP  was  not  intended,  the 
United  States  has  consistently  sup- 
ported the  technical  assistance  pro- 
grams of  these  agencies — including 
control  of  disease,  greater  air  safety, 
and  stronger  nuclear  safeguards.  These 
efforts  are  in  our  interest.  And  so. 
while  we  seek  to  limit  growth  of  these 
assessed  budget  activities,  we  believe 
there  is  a  persuasive  case  to  be  made 
for  a  continuation  of  a  certain  amount 
of  technical  assistance  in  the  regular 
budgets. 

Our  most  immediate  concern,  how- 
ever, is  the  damage  being  done  now  to 
the  U.N.  system  by  our  failure  to  pay 
our  dues.  We  respectfully  request  the 
support  of  the  subcommittee  in  en- 
abling us  to  meet  our  obligations  when 
the  remedial  legislation  comes  up  for 
consideration. 

Development  and  Technical 
Assistance 

For  the  U.N.  Development  Pro- 
gram (UNDP)  we  request  $140  mil- 
lion. Since  1977  UNDP  has  emerged 
from  a  severe  financial  crisis,  has  come 
under  the  direction  of  a  strong  ad- 
ministrator, and  has  grown  into  an  ef- 
fective technical  assistance  program 
with  genuine  global   impact  on  the 


60 

progress  made  by  developing  countries. 
As  I  noted  above,  the  Congress  and  the 
executive  branch  share  the  objective  of 
making  the  UNDP  the  central  coor- 
dinating agency  tor  technical  assistance 
in  the  U.N.  development  system.  But 
the  United  States  cannot  achieve  that 
objective  unless  we  increase  our  annual 
contribution  at  a  rate  which  meets 
UNDP's  agreed  target  for  total  resource 
requirements  and  which  maintains  our 
percentage  share  of  total  contributions 
from  governments. 

At  the  1976  UNDP  Governing  Coun- 
cil, the  United  States  joined  in  a  con- 
sensus that  a  14%  annual  increase  in 
total  financial  resources  would  be  re- 
quired to  carry  out  UNDP's  goal  of  de- 
livering $2.5  billion  in  technical  assist- 
ance during  the  1977-81  planning 
cycle.  That  annual  resource  target  al- 
lows roughly  7%  for  inflation  and  7% 
for  real  program  growth. 

From  fiscal  year  1977  to  1978,  our 
contribution  increased  15%  from  $100 
million  to  $115  million.  For  fiscal  year 
1979  the  Congress  approved  a  9%  in- 
crease to  $126  million.  This  year  we 
request  an  11  %  increase.  Many  other 
nations  have  boosted  their  contribu- 
tions much  more  than  14%.  Last  fall, 
at  the  pledging  conference  for  1979,  96 
governments  made  commitments  to- 
taling $682  million,  about  a  15%  in- 
crease over  the  1978  total. 

For  the  first  3  years  of  UNDP's 
planning  cycle,  the  United  States  is 
below  the  14%  target.  Meanwhile  our 
share  of  total  contributions  from  all 
governments  has  declined  from  35%  in 
1970  to  the  present  18%.  Our  percent- 
age share  in  1970  was  too  high,  but  we 
should  not  let  our  current  level  fall 
further.  We  should  do  more  in  the 
future. 

1  want  to  stress  again  the  substantial 
benefits  we  derive  from  our  support  for 
UNDP.  Our  national  economic  inter- 
ests are  served  by  UNDP's  global  con- 
tribution to  a  growing,  dynamic  world 
economy  with  high  levels  of  trade  and 
investment  opportunities  and  increasing 
availability  of  vital  natural  resources. 

In  1977  U.S.  firms  earned  $13.9 
million  from  UNDP  in  equipment  sales 
and  subcontracts  (27%  of  the  total). 
Since  1959  these  earnings  have  totaled 
$209  million.  Over  15,000  expert  as- 
signments have  been  filled  by  U.S. 
citizens.  In  1977  alone.  699  American 
nationals  were  employed  as  UNDP 
field  experts. 

The  United  States  is  actively  in- 
volved in  determining  UNDP  strategy, 
thereby  helping  to  promote  U.S.  de- 
velopment goals.  In  recognition  of  the 
importance  the  United  States  and  others 
attach  to  directing  more  assistance  to- 
ward  basic   human   needs,   UNDP  is 


shifting  its  efforts  more  toward  de- 
velopment technology  fitted  to  the  spe- 
cific needs  of  poor  people  in  individual 
developing  economies.  During  the 
1977-81  cycle,  nearly  66%  of  UNDP 
assistance  will  go  to  countries  with  less 
than  $300  per  capita  GNP. 

Moreover,  UNDP's  Administrator, 
Bradford  Morse,  is  an  American.  There 
are  other  Americans  in  UNDP's  top 
echelons.  The  United  States  is  a  key 
member  of  UNDP's  Governing  Coun- 
cil, and  has  always  been  a  leader  in 
policy  decisions  by  that  body. 

Let  me  cite  a  few  examples  of  UNDP 
work  which  supports  U.S.  economic 
and  developmental  objectives; 

In  Bolivia,  a  UNDP  groundwater 
project  near  Cochabamba  has  resulted 
in  wells  that  now  help  supply  potable 
water  to  the  city  and  have  nearly  dou- 
bled the  growing  season  for  nearby 
farmers. 

In  the  Sudan.  UNDP  and  FAO  have 
established  an  Institute  for  Agricultural 
Technicians  in  an  almost  inaccessable 
area,  which  for  many  years  was  torn  by 
civil  war.  The  institute  now  has  200 
students  enrolled  and  expects  to  turn 
out  100  new  technicians  annually. 

In  Botswana,  UNDP,  along  with  the 
U.N.  Industrial  Development  Organi- 
zation (UNIDO),  Norway,  Sweden, 
and  the  U.S.  Peace  Corps,  is  creating 
opportunities  for  small-scale  industries 
and  increased  employment  by  provid- 
ing credit,  training,  and  workshop 
space  for  grassroots  entrepreneurs. 

On  a  larger  scale,  UNDP  preinvest- 
ment  and  feasibility  studies  in  Sri 
Lanka  laid  the  foundation  for  a  major 
World  Bank  financed  development 
scheme  which  eventually  will  irrigate 
900,000  acres,  build  11  hydroelectric 
stations,  and  create  up  to  1  million 
jobs. 

Multiply  these  examples  by  the  scale 
of  UNDP's  current  total  program  and 
you  can  see  why  the  organization  has 
global  impact.  In  June  1978.  UNDP 
had  underway  in  150  countries  and  ter- 
ritories 3,800  technical  assistance 
projects  employing  7,000  trained  ex- 
perts and  valued  at  over  $3.7  billion. 

The  projects  1  have  described  point 
up  another  UNDP  function  that  is  of 
vital  importance  to  progress  in  the 
global  development  effort — field  coor- 
dination. Almost  every  UNDP  project 
involves  close  collaboration  among  the 
host  government  and  bilateral  and  mul- 
tilateral donors.  Moreover,  through  its 
country  programming  and  5-year  plan- 
ning procedures,  UNDP  works  with 
governments  to  minimize  duplication 
and  waste  in  the  allocation  of  scarce 
development  assistance  resources. 

In  the  present  U.N.  restructuring 
exercises,  a  major  objective  had  been 


Department  of  State  Bulletin. 

the  designation  of  a  single  U.N.  offi-' 
cial  in  each  recipient  developing  coun-: 
try  to  coordinate  all  U.N.  efforts.  We 
have   urged   successfully   that,   almost 
without  exception,  that  official  should 
be  the  UNDP  resident  representative. 

To  support  our  policy  on  multilateral 
technical  assistance,  to  sustain  UNDP's 
5-year  target,  and  to  maintain  our  lead- 
ership on  this  key  organization,  the 
$140  million  contribution  we  propose 
this  year  is  essential. 

Our  continued  support  for  the  U.N. 
Capital  Development  Fund  (UNCDF) 
reflects  the  concern  both  of  the  Con- 
gress and  of  the  Administration  that 
multilateral  programs  actively  promote 
light  capital  technology  and  grass  roots 
enterprise  in  developing  countries. 

UNCDF.  which  is  administered  by 
UNDP,  provides  small  amounts  of 
capital  to  entrepreneurs  in  the  poorest 
countries.  It  responds  to  the  need  for 
small-scale  projects  directly  beneficial 
to  rural  and  disadvantaged  urban 
people. 

So  far.  projects  have  been  identified 
with  a  total  value  of  $52  million. 
Examples  include:  $1.9  million  for 
small-scale  irrigation  works  in  Nepal; 
$130,000  for  irrigation  pump  mainte- 
nance workshops  in  Nepal,  and 
$800,000  for  grain  storage  in  the 
Sudan. 

This  year  we  are  requesting  funding 
for  three  African  programs.  Each  sup- 
ports U.S.  political,  developmental, 
and  humanitarian  objectives  in  south- 
ern Africa. 

First,  the  $500,000  contribution  to 
the  U.N.  Institute  for  Namibia  in 
Lusaka,  Zambia,  will  help  provide 
practical  training  for  young  Namibians 
to  become  middle-level  civil  servants 
in  Namibia  when  it  becomes  independ- 
ent. About  250  young  Namibians  now 
attend.  This  institution's  work  is  vital 
in  view  of  the  near  term  prospect  for  a 
U.N.  supervised  transition  from  South 
African  control  to  majority  rule. 
Nothing  will  be  more  crucial  to 
Namibia's  success  than  the  capability 
of  Namibians  themselves  to  manage 
their  own  affairs. 

I  should  add  that  in  response  to  the 
specific  concern  of  the  Congress.  Sec- 
retary Vance  has  determined  that  no 
U.S.  funds  contributed  to  this  institute 
are  used  to  support  the  military  or 
paramilitary  activities  of  the  South 
West  Africa  People's  Organization 
(SWAPO). 

Second,  the  $1  million  contribution 
to  the  U.N.  Education  and  Training 
Program  for  Southern  Africa  (UN- 
ETPSA)  will  provide  scholarships  for 
young  blacks  denied  secondary  and 
college  education  opportunities  in  their 
own   minority-ruled   territories.    In 


June  1979 


61 


1977-78  over  1.500  African  students 
received  assistance  from  the  program 
lor  education  in  many  countries,  in- 
cludinii  the  United  States. 

Third,  we  request  $400,000  tor  con- 
tributions for  the  U.N.  Trust  Fund  for 
Southern  Africa  which  helps  defend  in- 
dividual victims  of  discrimination  and 
harassment  in  southern  Africa. 

We  identify  these  programs  as  de- 
sclopmental  because  it  is  clear  that 
southern  Africa  cannot  make  real  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress  so  long  as 
the  majority  are  denied  basic  rights, 
especially  to  educational  and  voca- 
tional training  and  the  opportunity  to 
earn  a  living. 

We  propose  $17.5  million  for  the 
lour  cooperative  development  funds  of 
ilic  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS).  These  programs,  comparable  to 
those  of  the  United  Nations,  backstop 
our  efforts  to  promote  U.S.  interests  in 
ihis  regional  political  organization.  The 
OAS  is  uniquely  suited  to  provide  a 
torum  for  peacekeeping  in  the  region 
and  the  promotion  of  human  rights  in- 
cluding, as  in  these  programs,  im- 
proved opportunities  for  human  de- 
\clopment. 

The  U.S.  contribution  to  these  pro- 
Lirams  is  a  reflection  to  the  other  OAS 
members  of  the  continuing  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  the  inter-American  system 
and  the  ideal  of  collective  hemispheric 
action  for  development.  For  over  a 
decade  the  United  States  has  contrib- 
uted 66%  of  the  funds  for  these  funds; 
in  1980  our  contribution  would  ac- 
count for  less  than  55'^.  The  effective- 
ness of  these  funds  has  also  triggered 
voluntary  contribution  from  various 
nonmember  countries,  such  as  Canada. 
Spain.  Japan,  and  Israel.  This  reduc- 
tion in  our  percentage  is  consistent 
with  the  interest  and  concern  of  the 
Congress  and  is  actively  encouraged  by 
our  representatives  in  the  OAS.  Let 
me.  however,  urge  that,  while  we  pur- 
sue a  relative  decline  in  the  U.S.  share, 
we  avoid  a  reduction  in  the  absolute 
level  of  U.S.  support  which  would 
raise  questions  about  our  commitment 
to  the  OAS  and  handicap  our  efforts  to 
reduce  the  U.S.  share  of  the  regular 
OAS  budget. 

The  proposed  contribution  of  $1 
million  to  the  U.N.  Decade  for 
Women  continues  our  strong  support 
for  multilateral  action  programs  aimed 
at  improving  permanently  the  status  of 
women,  especially  in  developing 
countries.  The  poorest  countries  cannot 
progress  unless  the  skills  and  energies 
of  their  women  are  utilized  fully  in  the 
developmental  process.  The  decade 
works  toward  that  goal. 

The  $2  million  contribution  to  the 
World  Food  Program  (WFP)  will 


provide  cash  for  administration  of  one 
t)f  the  largest  and  most  effective  mul- 
tilateral food  assistance  and  develop- 
ment programs  in  the  world.  This  con- 
tribution is  small  in  terms  of  WFP's 
total  expenditure,  but  it  is  an  essential 
part  of  our  total  support  for  emergency 
food  and  aid  activities  which  reach 
nearly  every  developing  country.  WFP 
delivers  annually  $300-400  million  in 
food  assistance  to  developing  countries 
and  about  $60  million  in  emergency  aid 
to  disaster  victims.  About  three-fourths 
of  WFP  resources  goes  to  least  de- 
veloped countries. 

We  request  $600,000  for  contribu- 
tion to  the  development  program  of  the 
Central  Treaty  Organization 
(CENTO).  Despite  uncertainties  in  the 
region,  the  United  States  continues  to 
support  CENTO.  Moreover,  we  believe 
that  our  contribution  to  this  relatively 
small  program  has  definite  political  and 
developmental  merit,  especially  since  it 
funds  continuing  participation  by 
American  experts  in  cooperative  re- 
gional development  activities  involving 
Turkey.  Iran,  and  Pakistan. 

Humanitarian  Needs 

We  request  $36  million  for  UN- 
ICEF,  a  20%  increase  over  the  fiscal 
year  1979  contribution  of  $30  million. 
This  is  20%  of  the  $158  million  ex- 
pected from  all  governments. 

UNICEF  deals  directly  and  effec- 
tively with  one  of  the  most  profound 
problems  of  human  existence — the  lack 
of  hope  for  the  900  million  persons  on 
Earth  who  do  not  have  minimum  nutri- 
tional, health,  educational,  and  social 
services.  More  specifically,  malnutri- 
tion affects  one-quarter  of  the  world's 
children  and  blights  their  future  as  pro- 
ductive adults.  Some  10  million  chil- 
dren under  age  5  suffer  severe  malnu- 
trition because  they  weigh  less  than 
half  their  normal  weight  with  resulting 
permanent  damage  to  the  individuals 
concerned. 

Except  in  countries  such  as  Cam- 
bodia, where  U.N.  representatives  have 
been  unwelcome.  UNICEF  has  a  posi- 
tive impact  in  every  developing  coun- 
try. Recent  UNICEF  projects  include 
establishment  of  78  new  health  centers 
in  The  Gambia,  training  in  nutrition  for 
some  2.500  women  in  Lesotho,  and 
provision  of  safe  drinking  water  to 
85.000  people  in  the  Yemen. 

No  multilateral  program  so  closely 
supports  American  ideals  and  de- 
velopmental objectives  as  UNICEF.  In 
this  International  Year  of  the  Child,  no 
assistance  expenditure  will  return  more 
in  the  long  term  than  this  $36  million 
contribution. 

We  again  request  $52  million  for  the 


U.N.   Relief  and   Works   Agency 

(UNRWA).  This  program  continues  to 
have  a  significant  role  in  providing 
humanitarian  relief  to  Palestinian  refu- 
gees of  past  wars  in  the  Middle  East 
and  maintaining  stability  in  that  region 
which  is  crucial  to  the  success  of  the 
current  peace  effort. 

In  our  view.  UNRWA's  most  im- 
portant function  is  to  provide  education 
to  320.000  Palestinian  primary  and 
secondary  school  children,  to  4,500 
vocational  and  technical  students,  and 
to  over  300  college  students. 

These  educational  programs  provide 
hope  of  jobs  and  a  decent  living  stand- 
ard for  literally  thousands  of  young 
Palestinians.  Without  UNRWA.  their 
alternative  would  be  ignorance,  vio- 
lence, and  probably  a  role  in  increasing 
instability  in  the  region.  Cutbacks  in 
UNRWA's  services  would  pose  serious 
political  risks. 

The  organization  continues  to  face  a 
serious  financial  crisis.  As  its  inajor 
contributor,  we  are  responding  to  the 
strong  concern  of  the  Congress  that 
other  nations,  especially  the  members 
of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum  Ex- 
porting Countries  (OPEC),  contribute 
more  to  UNRWA.  We  have  approached 
every  OPEC  capital.  The  effort  is 
showing  results.  In  calendar  year  1978, 
the  OPEC  countries  contributed  a  total 
of  $8.3  million  to  UNRWA.  including 
a  Saudi  Arabian  special  contribution  of 
$5  million. 

We  propose  $250,000  for  the  U.N. 
Disaster  Relief  Organization 
(UNDRO).  UNDRO  monitors  disasters 
worldwide,  especially  in  developing 
countries.  It  coordinates  bilateral  and 
multilateral  relief  efforts,  reducing 
wasteful  duplication.  Finally  it  pro- 
vides specialized  technical  assistance  to 
disaster  prone  countries,  helping  them 
anticipate  and  reduce  damage  from  dis- 
asters. 


International  Scientific  Cooperation 

Our  proposed  $2.3  million  contribu- 
tion to  the  voluntary  assistance  pro- 
gram of  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
ganization (WMO)  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption that  our  weather  forecasts 
cannot  be  made  more  reliable  without 
international  cooperation  in  collecting 
global  meteorological  data.  WMO: 

•  Facilitates  the  establishment  of  a 
worldwide  weather  observation  net- 
work; 

•  Promotes  the  quick  exchange  of 
weather  information  and  standardiza- 
tion of  meteorological  observations; 
and 

•  Promotes  research  and  training  in 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin, 


meteorology,  especially  in  developing 
countries. 

For  a  very  small  total  outlay,  WMO 
has  more  than  doubled  the  weather  data 
available  to  this  country,  a  benefit  to 
American  commerce  and  agriculture  far 
outweighing  our  contributions. 

FY  1980  funding  of  $8  million  is  re- 
quested for  a  U.S.  voluntary  contribu- 
tion to  the  U.N.  Environment  Pro- 
gram (UNEP).  The  reduction  from  this 
year's  $10  million  contribution  does 
not  mean  a  lessening  in  U.S.  concern 
for  international  environmental  cooper- 
ation, nor  does  it  suggest  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  UNEP  or  its  management. 
It  represents  instead  the  current  ex- 
treme budgetary  constraints  on  our 
total  request  and  our  desire  to  be  re- 
sponsive to  congressional  concerns 
about  the  share  of  U.S.  contribution  to 
U.N.  organizations. 

A  major  benefit  of  this  program  is 
the  encouragement  of  international  en- 
vironmental standards.  These  standards 
reduce  competitive  economic  handicaps 
faced  by  American  business  as  a  result 
of  tight  U.S.  environmental  controls. 

In  addition,  through  UNEP  efforts, 
the  developing  world  is  increasing  ef- 
forts to  conserve  its  natural  resource 
base  and  is  starting  to  build  environ- 
mental safeguards  into  new  develop- 
ment projects. 

The  proposed  funding  level  is  the 
minimum  essential  contribution;  any- 
thing less  will  signal  seriously  reduced 
U.S.  environmental  interest,  influence 
other  donors  to  reconsider  their  support 
for  UNEP,  and  cause  curtailment  of 
important  parts  of  the  environment 
program. 

For  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA),  we  request 
$12.5  million.  The  IAEA  safeguards 
program  assures  the  world  community 
and  the  United  States  that  nuclear  ma- 
terials and  facilities  under  the  program 
are  not  used  to  further  any  military 
purpose.  Thus,  IAEA  activities  are  a 
key  element  in  U.S.  nonproliferation 
policy. 

Concerning  the  Agency's  technical 
assistance  program,  over  50%  of  the 
equipment  and  supplies  come  from  the 
United  States,  while  U.S.  scientists 
benefit  from  the  exchange  of  scientific 
and  technical  information  which  IAEA 
promotes. 

Finally,  IAEA's  work  in  nuclear 
safety  and  environmental  protection 
plays  a  major  role  in  assuring  the  safe 
development  of  nuclear  power. 

The  $12.5  million  requested  for  FY 
1980  is  only  $500,000  more  than  ap- 
propriated for  FY  1979.  This  will  per- 
mit a  modest  increase  in  technical  as- 
sistance for  countries  party  to  the  Non- 


Southeast  Asia 


Statements  made  in  the  Security 
Council  by  Andrew  Young,  U.S.  Am- 
bassador to  the  United  Nations,  and 
Richard  Petree,  U.S.  Alternate  Repre- 
sentative to  the  United  Nations  for 
Special  Political  Affairs. 


AMBASSADOR  YOUNG, 
Feb.  23,  1979' 

The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
charges  the  Security  Council  with  pri- 
mary responsibility  for  the  maintenance 
of  international  peace  and  security.  My 
government  has  joined  in  the  call  for 
this  Council  to  meet  because  serious 
breaches  of  peace  have  occurred  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  because  the  threat 
of  broader  conflict  looms  in  that  area. 
We  firmly  believe  that  in  such  circum- 
stances the  Council  must  exercise  its 
responsibilities. 


That  the  situation  is  dangerous  can- 
not be  denied.  If  we  cut  through  the 
rhetoric,  propaganda,  charges,  and 
countercharges  of  those  involved,  we 
are  left  with  simple  but  ominous  facts: 
Over  100,000  Vietnamese  troops  re- 
main engaged  in  heavy  fighting  on  the 
territory  of  Cambodia  despite  all  efforts 
of  the  international  community  to  bring 
an  end  to  the  conflict. 

As  foreseen  by  many  of  us,  this  situ- 
ation has  led  to  greatly  increased  ten- 
sions throughout  the  region.  And  now 
we  find  thousands  of  Chinese  troops 
engaged  in  military  action  on  the  terri- 
tory of  Vietnam.  The  blood  of  soldiers 
and  innocent  civilians  is  being  shed  on 
all  sides.  These  actions  have  wide  and 
dangerous  implications  for  the  peace  of 
Asia. 

Only  a  few  weeks  ago,  this  body  was 
called  together  to  hear  a  complaint 
about  the   Vietnamese  attack  on  Kam- 


proliferation  Treaty  and  the  provisions 
of  low  enriched  uranium  fuel  for  re- 
search reactors,  both  U.S.  initiatives 
announced  at  the  U.N.  Special  Session 
on  Disarmament. 

For  the  World  Heritage  Trust 
Fund,  our  request  is  for  $640,000, 
which  will  cover  contributions  for  2 
years.  This  contribution  is  based  on  our 
annual  assessment  to  UNESCO.  No 
contribution  was  made  in  FY  1978  as  a 
result  of  certain  legislative  restrictions. 
The  Trust  Fund  reflects  international 
concern  for  the  preservation  of  natural 
and  historic  sites  throughout  the  world 
for  future  generations. 

Finally,  we  are  requesting  $500,000 
for  the  U.N.  Institute  for  Training 
and  Research  (UNITAR).  Through  its 
training  programs  for  officials  par- 
ticipating in  U.N.  activities  and  its 
publications  on  major  international  is- 
sues, UNITAR  supports  belter  per- 
formance by  multilateral  organizations 
and  the  nonideological  treatment  of  is- 
sues in  the  U.N.  system. 

Summation 

World  events  are  challenging  Ameri- 
can leadership  and  influence.  Current 
trends  —  political,  economic,  and 
sociological — are  focused  in  the  United 
Nations  and,  for  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, in  the  OAS  as  well. 


The  American  people,  and,  I  am 
sure,  the  Congress  want  this  country  to 
meet  the  challenge  and  protect  our  na- 
tional interest  in  every  forum. 

A  slackening  of  our  resolve  in  sup- 
porting actions  to  deal  with  specific 
global  problems  can  only  harm  our 
interests  and  lessen  our  international 
leadership  position.  If  our  economic 
and  political  power  is  to  be  expressed 
in  the  international  community,  we 
must  sustain  our  strong  support  for 
these  and  other  multilateral  programs. 
Their  activities  benefit  U.S.  interests. 
Through  multilateral  burden-sharing, 
they  reduce  the  cost  to  the  American 
taxpayer  of  dealing  with  global  prob- 
lems that  directly  and  indirectly  affect 
our  nation  and  the  lives  of  our  citizens. 
In  part  because  of  our  continued  pres- 
sure, these  programs  are  making  strides 
in  improving  their  efficiency  and  ef- 
fectiveness. 

We  believe  the  contributions  in  this 
request  constitute  one  of  this  nation's 
"unavoidable  obligations  of  lead- 
ership." I  urge  that  you  and  your  col- 
leagues give  favorable  consideration  to 
our  request.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


iLinc  1979 


63 


piicheu.  Thirteen  members  of  the 
Council  expressed  the  will  of  the  inter- 
national community  that  foreign  forces 
should  he  withdrawn  from  Kampuchea 
and  that  further  efforts  were  needed  to 
reduce  the  tensions  in  the  area  to  pre- 
\cnt  a  still  broader  conflict.  A  veto 
prevented  the  Council  from  acting. 
Today  we  see  the  results  of  the  more 
prctfound  failure — the  failure  of  those 
involved  to  heed  the  call  of  the  over- 
u helming  majority  of  the  Council. 

Fhe  United  States  has  done  every- 
thing possible  to  head  off  the  dangers 
posed  by  the  conflict.  We  have  spoken 
out  publicly  and  expressed  our  con- 
cerns directly  to  the  Vietnamese. 
Soviet,  and  Chinese  Governments 
about  the  dangers  of  continued, 
perhaps  expanded,  fighting. 

In  our  earlier  deliberations.  I  pointed 
out  that  the  Vietnamese  invasion  of 
Kampuchea  brought  into  play  a  number 
of  provisions  of  the  U.N.  Charter,  in- 
cluding the  tbilowing: 

•  One  state  must  not  use  force 
.ii:amst  the  territory  of  another; 

•  A  state  must  not  interfere  in  the 
aftairs  of  another  state;  and 

•  If  there  is  a  dispute  between  states, 
it  must  be  settled  peacefully. 

These  provisions  apply  to  the  present 
attack  by  China  on  Vietnam  just  as 
they  apply  to  the  earlier  invasion  of 
Kampuchea  by  Vietnam.  The  new 
conflict,  coming  so  soon  after  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  this  Council 
expressed  its  strong  views  on  the  Viet- 
namese invasion,  is  a  further  serious 
blow  to  the  proposition  that  member 
states  are  bound  by  their  participation 
in  this  Organization  to  live  up  to  the 
precepts  of  its  charter. 

We  are  aware  that  there  have  been 
incidents  along  the  frontier  between 
Vietnam  and  China  and  that  the  two 
countries  have  been  in  serious  dis- 
agreement for  some  time.  But  this  in  no 
way  gives  China  the  right  to  attack 
Vietnam,  any  more  than  Vietnam's 
dispute  with  Kampuchea  gave  Vietnam 
the  right  to  overrun  that  country.  In 
both  cases  the  obligation  of  China  and 
Vietnam  was  to  involve  the 
mechanisms  for  peaceful  settlement 
provided  by  the  U.N.  Charter. 

My  government's  position,  as  the 
signs  of  pending  conflict  began  to  mul- 
tiply, has  been  to  urge  restraint  and  the 
peaceful  resolutitm  of  outstanding  is- 
sues. This  position  applies  also  to  the 
conflict  between  China  and  Vietnam. 
We  have  stated  firmly  that  we  will  not 
take  sides  in  these  conflicts.  We  seek 
peace  and  a  stable  system  of  indepen- 
dent states  in  Southeast  Asia.  We  want 
to  see  an  end  to  the  present  fighting,  an 
end  to  the  threats  to  regional  peace. 


and  above  all,  an  end  to  the  suffering 
of  innocent  people  in  the  region. 

In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to 
restate  our  concern  for  the  human 
rights  of  all  the  peoples  of  Indochina,  a 
people  who  have  suffered  both  from 
outside  military  action  and  froin  re- 
pression from  within.  Concerning 
Kampuchea,  the  U.S.  position  remains 
that  the  country  should  be  one  which  is 
truly  independent  and  neutral  with  a 
freely  chosen  government  which  repre- 
sents the  will  of  the  Kampuchean 
people  and  respects  their  human  rights. 

It  is  the  view  of  my  government  that 
this  Council,  backed  by  the  fundamen- 
tal principles  of  the  U.N.  Charter  to 
which  all  members  of  this  Organization 
are  committed,  can  and  should  express 
the  sense  of  concern  of  the  interna- 
tional community  with  regard  to  the 
violations  of  peace  that  have  occurred. 
It  can  encourage  the  parties  to  move 
the  dispute  to  the  negotiating  table,  and 
it  can  help  persuade  the  parties  that 
military  action  is  not  a  solution  to 
existing  problems. 

What  action  should  this  Council 
therefore  take?  In  our  view,  the  Coun- 
cil should  call  for  the  following  meas- 
ures: 

•  An  immediate  cease-fire  between 
forces  in  conflict; 

•  A  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  the  territories  of  Vietnam  and 
Cambodia; 

•  A  commitment  by  all  parties  to 
settle  their  differences  by  peaceful 
means  and  the  beginning  of  practical 
diplomatic  processes  to  this  end;  and 

•  International  efforts  to  assist  the 
parties  in  reaching  a  more  lasting  res- 
olution to  their  dispute,  perhaps  under 
the  auspices  of  the  Secretary  General. 
In  this  connection,  the  United  States 
welcomes  the  Secretary  General's  offer 
to  make  his  good  offices  available.  We 
believe  that  during  our  discussions,  the 
Council  should  explore  this  and  other 
possible  efforts  which  might  lead  to  an 
end  to  the  conflict. 

We  urge  the  Council,  as  well  as 
member  states  not  on  the  Council,  to 
give  serious  consideration  to  ways  in 
which  the  international  community  can 
assist.  We  urge  the  parties  directly  in- 
volved to  act  with  restraint  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  of  the 
charter.  We  urge  all  others  to  exercise 
similar  restraint  in  order  to  insure  that 
passions  are  not  further  inflamed  and 
the  conflict  not  further  broadened.  We 
fervently  hope,  and  believe,  that  this 
Council  can  play  a  key  role  in  the  so- 
lution to  this  serious  situation,  so  that 
there  can  be  an  end  to  the  fighting  and 
suffering  that  have  plagued  the  region 
of  Southeast  Asia  for  far  too  long. 


AMBASSADOR  YOUNG, 
FEB.  27,  1979- 

In  response  to  soine  of  the  comments 
made  in  this  forum,  I  would  like  to  re- 
view very  briefly  the  U.S.  position, 
starting  with  our  November  I  letter  to 
the  Security  Council,  drawing  the 
Council's  attention  to  the  buildup  of 
forces  on  the  Vietnamese-Kampuchean 
frontier. 

Prior  to  and  following  this  letter,  my 
government  publicly  and  privately 
expressed  its  concern  that  the  tensions 
appeared  likely  to  explode  into  full- 
scale  conflict  unless  something  were 
done  to  defuse  the  situation.  We  urged 
efforts  directly  between  the  parties  in- 
volved. We  suggested  recourse  to  the 
United  Nations  —  an  organization 
created  for  precisely  this  purpose.  We 
urged  restraint  on  all  parties. 

After  the  Vietnamese  attack  on 
Kampuchea,  it  appeared  probable  that 
the  fears  we  had  earlier  expressed  con- 
cerning further  escalation  would  prove 
to  be  correct.  We  immediately  con- 
tacted the  governments  directly  con- 
cerned, urging  an  end  to  the  Viet- 
namese attack  and  calling  for  others  not 
to  become  involved.  My  presentation 
here  on  January  13  warned  of  the  dan- 
gers of  wider  war  and  urged  restraint 
on  all  parties. 

On  February  9.  my  government  is- 
sued a  statement  which  said  in  part: 
"We  do  not  want  to  see  any  escalation, 
and  we  are  seriously  concerned  that  the 
continued  combat  between  Kampu- 
cheans  and  Vietnamese  can  lead  to  an 
extended  conflict."  The  statement  con- 
cluded; "We  would  be  seriously  con- 
cerned over  a  Chinese  attack  on  Viet- 
nam. We  remain  seriously  concerned 
over  the  continued  Vietnamese  attack 
on  Kampuchea." 

On  February  17.  as  the  Chinese  at- 
tack began,  my  government  appealed 
for  a  Chinese  withdrawal  from  Vietnam 
while  reiterating  its  call  for  a  Viet- 
namese withdrawal  from  Kampuchea. 
In  my  own  statement  last  Friday,  I  re- 
stated that  there  must  be  restraint  on 
the  part  of  those  involved  and  those 
who  could  potentially  become  involved 
in  this  conflict.  I  urged  that  the  Council 
consider  actions  to  slow  down  the 
military  activities  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  to  substitute  negotiation  and  medi- 
ation for  tensions  and  threats  to  peace 
and  security  there. 

I  have  reviewed  this  record  because 
some  here  have  stated  that  the  visit  of 
Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping  to  the 
United  States  served  to  provide  U.S. 
"consent  if  not  encouragement"  for 
the  Chinese  attack. 

This  is  wholly  false.  And  we 
strongly   resent   such   an  assertion. 


64 


President  Carter  made  clear  directly  to 
the  Chinese  Vice  Premier  our  opposi- 
tion to  any  Chinese  military  action. 
When  our  efforts  to  prevent  the  attack 
failed,  we  immediately  spoke  out 
against  it,  and  we  began  to  ask  for  this 
meeting  of  the  Security  Council.  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  Blumenthal  has 
reiterated  our  opposition  to  Chinese 
actions  publicly  in  Beijing. 

The  attack  on  Kampuchean  territory 
heightened  the  tensions  in  the  region, 
leading  to  the  Chinese  attack  on  Viet- 
nam. As  long  as  those  troops  remain  in 
Kampuchea,  violating  the  principles  of 
the  U.N.  Charter  and  the  will  of  the 
international  community,  tensions  will 
remain  high. 

We  believe  that  Vietnamese  forces 
should  withdraw  from  Kampuchea.  We 
also  believe  that  Chinese  forces  should 
withdraw  from  Vietnam  since  their 
presence  further  increases  tensions  in 
the  region  and  the  risk  of  escalation.  In 
both  cases  territorial  integrity  has  been 
violated  and  foreign  military  forces  are 
in  the  territory  of  another  country. 
Both  steps  are  vital  to  the  restoration  of 
peace  in  the  area.  All  parties  involved 
are  bound  to  adhere  to  their  obligations 
under  the  charter  without  any  linkage 
and  without  any  qualification. 

AMBASSADOR  PETREE, 
MAR.  16,  1979' 

It  has  now  been  over  2  months  since 
Vietnam  invaded  Kampuchea  and  sev- 
eral weeks  since  China  invaded  Viet- 
nam. Those  of  us  who  warned  that  the 
Vietnamese  invasion  contained  in  it  the 
seeds  of  wider  conflict  can  take  no 
satisfaction  in  seeing  our  prediction 
come  true.  For  the  fact  is  that  this 
Council  has  a  clearly  defined  responsi- 
bility for  the  maintenance  of  interna- 
tional peace  and  security,  yet  the  at- 
titudes of  key  member  states  have 
caused  it  to  hestitate  in  meeting  its  ob- 
ligations. 

No  one  can  deny  that  the  situation  in 
Southeast  Asia  is  more  dangerous 
today  than  it  was  2  months  ago. 

•  China  has  announced  its  with- 
drawal from  Vietnamese  territory,  and 
Vietnam  has  stated  publicly  that  it 
would  be  willing  to  negotiate  with 
China  upon  its  withdrawal.  But.  the 
withdrawal  has  proceeded  slowly,  and 
the  qualifications  each  country  has  at- 
tached to  its  statement  raise  the  pros- 
pect that  hostilities  will  not,  in  fact, 
end. 

•  The  continued  Vietnamese  occu- 
pation of  Kampuchea  and  the  fighting 
in  that  country  affect  the  security  and 
stability  of  the  region  and  cause  need- 


less loss  of  human  life.  Aside  from  the 
direct  combat,  there  are  well- 
substantiated  reports  that  the  Pol  Pot 
forces  have  retaliated  brutally  against 
elements  of  the  population  they  believe 
to  have  collaborated  with  the  Viet- 
namese. An  end  to  this  fighting  and 
bloodshed  seems  nowhere  in  sight. 

•  The  members  of  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN), 
near  neighbors  to  the  conflict,  have  is- 
sued two  significant  declarations  re- 
lated to  the  successive  invasions  of 
Kampuchea  and  Vietnam.  These  state- 
ments express  concern  about  possible 
escalation  and  widening  of  the  conflict, 
reiterate  support  for  the  principles  of 
the  U.N.  Charter  and  international  law 
and  urge  an  end  to  hostilities  and  a 
withdrawal  of  all  forces  from  foreign 
territory.  They  reflect  the  unease  that 
has  spread  throughout  the  region  be- 
cause of  the  resort  to  military  force  to 
resolve  disputes. 

•  As  a  result  of  the  war  in  Cam- 
bodia, serious  incidents  have  occurred 
on  Kampuchea's  border  with  Thailand. 
Thailand's  border  has  been  crossed  on 
several  occasions  by  forces  in  conflict. 
Whether  inadvertent  or  not.  these  are 
further  demonstrations  of  the  difficulty 
of  limiting  the  present  conflict  to  the 
parties  directly  involved. 

•  In  the  meantime,  Laos  has  ex- 
pressed its  concern  about  alleged 
Chinese  intentions  and  actions  on  its 
border.  Its  charges  have  been  supported 
by  the  Soviet  Union  and  Vietnam. 
China  has  denied  these  charges  in 
strong  terms.  We  cannot  merely  dis- 
miss these  exchanges  as  meaningless 
rhetoric,  for  in  the  past  few  months,  we 
have  had  ample  demonstration  of  how 
threatening  words  can  be  translated 
into  military  action. 

The  Council  has  had  extensive  delib- 
erations. We  have  consulted  closely 
among  ourselves  and  with  other  con- 
cerned nations  on  ways  to  promote  ac- 
commodation between  the  parties  in 
conflict.  Clearly,  there  is  broad  agree- 
ment that  the  situation  is  perilous  and 
that  its  solution  lies  in  bringing  about  a 
cease-fire,  a  withdrawal  of  forces  from 
foreign  territory,  and  a  diplomatic 
process  to  allow  the  parties  to  compose 
their  differences  peacefully  and  in  a 
manner  which  will  lead  to  a  mutual  re- 
spect for  existing  borders.  But  this 
broad  agreement  has  not  found  expres- 
sion in  concrete  steps  by  the  parties  to 
the  conflict  or  by  the  Council. 

My  government  deeply  regrets  that 
the  Soviet  Union  has,  for  the  second 
time  in  just  over  a  month,  vetoed  a  res- 
olution supported  by  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  this  Council  and,  it  is  clear. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

by  international  opinion.  These  meas- 
ures would  have  been  instrumental  in' 
helping  to  restore  peace  and  security  to 
an  area  of  the  world  which  has  suffered 
from  armed  conflict  tor  so  long.  In  any 
case,  the  fact  that  the  resolution  pro- 
posed by  Indochina's  immediate 
neighbors  and  supported  by  so  many 
governments  has  been  defeated  does 
not  bring  an  end  to  the  matter.  Active 
armed  hostilities  continue,  and  an  end 
to  the  threat  of  a  widened  conflict  is 
not  in  sight.  We  must,  therefore,  con- 
tinue to  seek  ways  to  deal  with  the 
breach  of  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity, as  we  are  bound  to  do  by  the  U.N.^ 
Charter. 

My  government  has  stated  on 
numerous  occasions  that  it  is  prepared 
to  give  strong  diplomatic  support  to 
effective  measures  to  end  the  conflict 
in  Southeast  Asia  and  to  bring  stability 
and  peace  to  the  region.  Along  with 
others,  we  have  welcomed  the  Secre- 
tary General's  offer  to  make  his  good 
offices  available  to  the  parties.  China 
and  Vietnam  having  declared  their 
willingness  to  negotiate  their  differ- 
ences. We  believe  that  such  third-party 
assistance  may  well  be  an  effective 
means  of  translating  these  stated  inten- 
tions into  reality. 

We  also  encourage  those  who  have 
been  considering  the  proposal  for  an 
international  conference  on  Kampuchea 
to  elaborate  their  views.  How,  for 
example,  might  a  conference  act  to  in- 
sure the  independence,  territorial  in- 
tegrity, and  neutrality  of  Kampuchea 
and  the  security  of  its  neighbors?  How 
could  such  a  conference  assist  in  as- 
suring the  human  rights  of  Kam- 
puchea's long-suffering  people?  How 
could  it  contribute  to  the  stability  of  the 
region  as  a  whole?  What  role  should 
our  Organization  play  in  such  a  confer- 
ence to  promote  a  successful  outcome? 

We  must  break  the  impasse  in  our 
deliberations.  The  clear  requirement 
that  we  make  every  effort  to  protect 
international  peace  and  security  has 
been  obfuscated.  We  must  exhibit  more 
concern  for  the  soldiers  dying  on  the 
field  of  battle  and  for  the  thousands  of 
innocent  civilians  being  rendered 
homeless,  maimed,  and  killed  by  a 
conflict  they  did  not  create.  This  alone 
should  impel  us  toward  action. 

My  government  urges  that  the  Coun- 
cil keep  under  active  consideration  the 
"situation  in  Southeast  Asia"  and 
continue  consideration  of  measures 
which  would  help  in  the  restoration  of 
peace,  the  withdrawal  of  forces  on 
foreign  territory,  and  the  formation  of  a 
representative  government  in  Kam- 
puchea which  would  respect  the  rights 
of  its  peoples. 


June  1979 


65 


In  this  regard  we  again  welcome 
ScLretary  General  Waldheim's  oiler  to 
Lisc  his  "good  offices"'  toward  a  res- 
olution of  the  conflict.  We  urge  that  the 
parties  directly  concerned  respond 
positively  and  without  delay  to  the 
Secretary  General. 

Let  us  as  a  first  step  inject  into  the 
conflict  the  mechanisms  of  this  Organi- 
zation that  are  readily  available  to  us. 
Alternatively,  we  can  form  a  Security 
Council  committee  or  dispatch  a  spe- 
cial mission  to  the  area.  We  can  set  in 
motion  practical  measures  toward  con- 
\ening  an  international  conference. 

.Ml  such  proposals  offer  the  means  to 
inicct  restraint  into  the  present  conflict 
and  to  begin  the  long  process  of  politi- 
cal accommodation  and  peaceful  set- 
tlement. We,  therefore,  appeal  to  the 
members  of  this  Council,  to  the  parties 
ui  conflict,  and  to  the  affected  nations 
of  the  region  to  intensify  their  efforts  to 
find  a  way  to  terminate  the  hostilities 
and  to  achieve  peace  and  stability  in 
Southeast  Asia.  D 


'  USUN  press  release  13. 
-USUN  press  release  15. 
^USUN  press  release  29  of  Mar.  17,  1979. 


]%aniihia 


The  following  statements  were  issued 
on  behalf  of  the  Governments  of 
Canada,  France,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  United  States. 

MAR.  3,  1979' 

Our  five  governments  have  over  the 
past  2  years  pursued  a  policy  of  talking 
regularly  with  all  of  the  Namibian 
political  parties  and  church  groups  and, 
if  requested,  will  continue  to  do  so. 

The  South  African  Government  has 
brought  to  our  attention  that  the  so- 
called  "constituent  assembly""  in 
Namibia  has  invited  our  five  ambas- 
sadors in  Cape  Town  to  meet  with  that 
body  in  Windhoek  to  explain  the  Sec- 
retary General's  February  26th  report 
on  Namibia. 

On  November  13,  1978,  in  the  Se- 
curity Council,  our  five  governments 
made  clear  our  position  on  the  unilat- 
eral elections  held  in  December  1978: 
"We  do  not  accept  the  validity  of  those 
elections,  and  we  would  co.sider  those 


elections  null  and  void.  We  do  not  con- 
sider them  as  having  any  significance. 
We  will  not  accord  any  recognition  to 
the  outcome."" 

Accordingly,  our  five  governments 
do  not  recognize  the  "constituent  as- 
sembly"" and  will  not  acknowledge  or 
accept  any  invitation  from  it.  As  in  the 
past  we  will  not  meet  with  the  "con- 
stituent assembly""  or  with  any  indi- 
viduals as  representatives  of  that  body. 

Our  governments  support  the  Feb- 
ruary 26th  report  of  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral to  the  Security  Council  on 
Namibia.  We  believe  that  it  represents 
a  fair  and  reasonable  implementation  of 
Security  Council  Resolution  435. 


MAR.  12.  19792 

The  Governments  of  Canada, 
France,  and  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
United  States  reject  categorically  the 
accusations  of  bad  faith  levelled 
against  them  by  the  South  African 
Government.  These  accusations  are 
unfounded  and  highly  damaging  to  the 
current  settlement  effort  on  Namibia. 
The  five  governments  believe  that  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  435  can  and 
must  be  implemented.  They  intend  to 
press  forward  with  their  efforts  to 
achieve  this. 


MAR.  12,  1979^ 

In  recent  days  it  has  become  appar- 
ent that  a  number  of  concerns  of  the 
parties  involved  in  the  Namibia  settle- 
ment effort  must  be  resolved  before  the 
United  Nations  can  arrive  in  Namibia. 
Our  governments  believe  it  important 
that  these  concerns  be  resolved  quickly 
so  that  the  cease-fire  and  the  transi- 
tional period  can  begin  and  so  that  the 
extensive  progress  which  has  been 
made  toward  a  settlement  will  not  be 
lost. 

Our  five  foreign  ministers  have, 
therefore,  extended  invitations  to  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  South  Africa,  the 
President  of  the  South  West  Africa 
People"s  Organization  (SWAPO),  and 
the  foreign  ministers  of  the  front-line 
states  and  Nigeria  to  come  to  New 
York  for  proximity  talks  on  March  19 
and  20.  U.N.  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim  has  advised  us  that  he  will  also  be 
available  for  consultations.  D 


'USUN  press  release  16. 
^USUN  press  release  24. 
^USUN  press  release  25. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Inter-American  convenlion  on  international 
commercial  arbitration.  Done  at  Panama  City 
Jan.  30,  1975.  Entered  into  Force  June  16. 
1976.' 

Ralification  deposited:    Honduras,   Mar.   22, 
1979. 

Aviation 

Amendments  to  Article  V  of  the  1956  agree- 
ments on  the  joint  financing  of  certain  air 
navigation  services  in  Greenland  and  the 
Faroe  Islands  and  in  Iceland  (TIAS  4049, 
4048).  Adopted  by  the  ICAO  Council  at 
Montreal  Mar.  7,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  7.  1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton. London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10.  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1975.  TIAS 
8062. 

Ratification  deposited:    Belgium,    Mar.    15. 
1979. 

Collisions 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for 
preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972.  with  reg- 
ulations. Done  at  London  Oct.  20.  1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Accession  deposited:  Jamaica.  Mar.  30, 
1979. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.  Done 
at  Vienna  Apr.  24.  1963.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  19,  1967;  for  the  United  States  Dec. 
24.  1969.  TIAS  6820. 

Ratification  deposited:    Benin.    Apr.    27, 
1979. 

Cultural  Property 

Statutes  of  the  International  Centre  for  the 
Study  of  the  Preservation  and  Restoration  of 
Cultural  Property.  Done  at  New  Delhi 
Nov. -Dec.  1956.  as  amended  at  Rome  Apr. 
24,  1963,  and  Apr.  14-17,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  May  10,  1958;  for  the  U.S.  Jan. 
20.  1971.  TIAS  7038. 
Accession  deposited:  Somalia,  Mar.  2,  1979. 

Energy 

Implementing  agreement  for  a  program  of  re- 
search and  development  on  energy  conserva- 
tion through  energy  storage,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Paris  Sept.  22,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  22,  1978;  for  the  United  States 
Feb.  21.  1979. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
June  13,   1976.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  30, 
1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  Apr.  26.  1979. 


66 


Fisheries 

Convention  tor  the  establishment  of  an  Inter- 
American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission.  Done 
at  Washington  May  31,  1949.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  3.  1950.  TIAS  2044. 
Notice  oj  denunciation:  Costa  Rica,  effective 
May  8.  1979. 

Human  Rights 

International   covenant   on   civil   and   political 
rights.    Done   at   New   York   Dec.    16.    1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23.  1976.' 
Accession  deposited:  India.  Apr.   10.   1979. 

International   covenant   on  economic,    social, 
and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York  Dec. 
16.  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3,  1976.' 
Accession  deposited:  India.  Apr.   10,  1979. 

Law,  Private  International 

Statute  of  the  International  Institute  for  the 
Unification  of  Private  Law.  Done  at  Rome 
Mar.  15,  1940.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  21. 
1940;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  13.  1964.  TIAS 
5743. 
Accession  deposited:  Poland,  Jan.   1.  1979 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  on 
load  lines,  1966,  relating  to  amendments  to 
the  convention.  Done  at  London  Nov.  12, 
1975. ' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Panama,  Mar.  14, 
1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.   6. 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization.  Done  at 
London  Nov.  14.  1975." 
Acceptances  deposited:   Jamaica.   Apr.   9. 
1979;   Suriname.   Apr.    11,    1979;   Malta, 
Tanzania.  Apr.  23.  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.   6. 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization.  Done  at 
London  Nov.  17.  1977. ^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  Jamaica.  Apr.  9. 
1979;  Ethiopia.  Suriname.  Apr.  II.  1979; 
Malta.  Tanzania,  Apr.  23,  1979. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.   Done 

at  Vienna  Feb.  21.  1971.  Entered  into  force 

Aug.   16.  1976.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Libya,  Apr.  24.  1979; 
PortugaL  Apr.  20.  1979. 
Protocol   amending   the   single   convention   on 

narcotic  drugs.   1961    (TIAS  6298).   Done  at 

Geneva  Mar.   25.    1972.   Entered  into  force 

Aug.  8.  1975.  TIAS  8118. 

Accession  deposited:  Portugal.  Apr.  20. 
1979. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19.  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24.  1978;  except  for  Chapter 
II.  Chapter  II  entered  into  force  Mar.  29. 
1978.'  TIAS  8733. 

Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands.  Apr. 
10.  1979. 
Strasbourg  agreement  concerning  the  interna- 
tional patent  classification.  Done  at  Stras- 
bourg Mar.  24.  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oct. 
7.  1975.  TIAS  8140. 

Notification  from  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  that  ratification 
deposited:  Italy,  Mar.  30.  1979.^ 


Postal 

Money  order  agreement   and   final   protocol  of 
the  Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain. 
Done  at  Lima  Mar.    18.   1976.   Entered  into 
force  Oct.   1.  1976.  TIAS  9206. 
Ratification  deposited:    Argentina.   Feb.   9. 

1979. 
Parcel  post  agreement,  final  protocol,  and  de- 
tailed regulations  of  the  Postal  Union  of  the 
Americas  and  Spain.  Done  at  Lima  Mar.  18. 
1976.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  I.  1976  TIAS 
9206. 
Ratification  deposited:    Argentina.   Feb.   9. 

1979. 
Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain, 
genera!  regulations,  regulations  governing 
the  International  Office  and  the  Transfer  Of- 
fice, and  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lima  Mar.  18. 
1976.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1.  1976.  TIAS 
9206. 
Ratification  deposited:    Argentina,   Feb.   9, 

1979. 

Property,  Industrial 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15.  1957.  as  revised.  Done  at  Geneva  May 
13.  1977.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  6.  1979." 
Notification  from   the    World  Intellectual 

Property  Organization   that  ratification 

deposited:  U.K.  Apr.  3.   1979. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea.  1974.  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov. 
1.  1974." 

Ratification  deposited:  Germany,  Federal 
Republic,  Mar.  26,  1979.^ 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention   on  the   international   maritime 
satellite  organization   (INMARSAT),   with 
annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3.  1976." 
Acceptances  deposited:   Byelorussian  Soviet 
Socialist     Republic.      Ukrainian     Soviet 
Socialist  Republic.  Mar.   29.   1979;  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics.   Mar.    13. 
1979. 
Operating    agreement   on   the    international 
maritime   satellite   organization   (INMAR- 
SAT), with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3, 
1976." 

Signatures:  V/O  Morsvyazsputnik, 
Byelorussian,  and  Ukrainian  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics.  Mar.  29.  1979;  The 
Post  Office.  United  Kingdom,  Mar.  20. 
1979. 

Shipping 

United  Nations  convention  on  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea.   1978.  Done  at  Hamburg  Mar. 
31.  1978." 
Signatures:  Austria.  Apr.  30;  Hungary,  Apr. 

23;  Zaire.  Apr.  18.  1979. 
Ratification  deposited:    Egypt,   Apr.    23. 

1979. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  conventions 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1.  1975;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  7, 
1976.  TIAS  8572. 

Ratifications  deposited:  People's  Republic  of 
the  Congo.  Feb.  2.  1979;  Peru.  Feb.  8. 
1979;  Uganda.  Feb.  21.  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 

! 
Accession  deposited:    Nauru.    Mar.    8.    1979 
(with  reservation).  ■ 

I 

Trade 

Arrangement  regarding  international  trade  in  i 
textiles,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec. 
20.  1973.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  I.  1974, 
except  for  Article  2.  paragraphs  2.  3.  and  4 
which  entered  into  force  Apr.  1.  1974.  TIAS 
7840. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Dominican  Republic.   T 
Mar.  14.  1979. 
Protocol   extending  the  arrangement   regarding 
international   trade   in  textiles  of  Dec.   20. 
1973.   Done  at  Geneva  Dec.    14,   1977.   En- 
tered into  force  Jan.   1.  1978.  TIAS  8939. 
Acceptances  deposited:    El   Salvador.   Mar. 
21.    1979;    Malaysia.    Feb.    19.    1979; 
Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Feb.  28.  1979. 
Second  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration 
on   the   provisional   accession  of  the   Philip- 
pines to  the  GATT.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  1  1 , 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  24.  1978.  TIAS 
9010. 

Notifications  of  acceptance  deposited:  Aus- 
tria. Mar.  23.  1979;  Brazil.  Feb.  9.  1979. 
Eleventh  proces-verbal  extending  the  declara 
tion  on  the  provisional  accession  of  Tunisia 
to  the  GATT  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  II. 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  22.  1977;  for 
the  U.S.  Jan.  II.  1978. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Brazil.  Feb.  9.  1979. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties,  with 
annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969." 
Accession   deposited:    Austria,    Apr.    30. 
1979. 

UNESCO 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.   Educational.   Scien- 
tific  and   Cultural   Organization.    Done   at 
London   Nov.    16.    1945.    Entered   into   force 
Nov.  4.  1946.  TIAS  1580. 
Signatures:   Cape   Verde.   Feb.    15.    1978, 
Dominica.  Nov.  20.  1978;  Swaziland.  Jan 
25.  1978;  U.N.  Council  for  Namibia.  Nov. 
2,  1978. 
Acceptances  deposited:    Cape    Verde.    Nov 
14,  1977;  Dominica.  Jan.  9.  1979;  Swazi- 
land.  Jan.    25.    1978;   U.N.   Council   for 
Namibia.  Nov.  2.  1978. 

United  Nations 

Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  Statute  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  Signed  at  San 
Francisco  June  26.  1945.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  24.  1945.  TS  993. 

Admitted  to  membership:    Dominica.    Dec. 
18.  1978. 

Weights  and  Measures 

Convention  establishing  an  International  Or- 
ganization of  Legal  Metrology.  Done  at  Paris 
Oct.  12.  1955.  and  amended  Jan.  1968.  En- 
tered into  force  May  28.  1958;  for  the  U.S. 
Oct.  22.  1972.  TIAS  7533.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  Mar.  5.  1979. 

Whaling 

Amendments  to  the  schedule  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  regulation  of  whaling, 
1946.  Adopted  at  Tokyo  Dec.  19-20,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  6,  1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat   trade  convention  (part  of  the   interna- 


June  1979 

luinal  wheat  agreement),  1971.  Done  al 
VVashlnglon  Apr.  26,  197X.  Entered  into  force 
June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  certain  provi- 
sions, and  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to  other 
provisions. 

Ratification  ilerosiled:  U.K.  May  3,  1979. ■''' 
Accessions  deposited:  Nigeria.  May  4,  1979; 
Tunisia.  Apr.  18.  1979. 
I'ldlocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
uheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
lional  wheat  agreement).  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washmgton  Apr.  25.  1979.  Enters 
mto  force  June  23.  1979.  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions  and  July  I.  1979.  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 

Signatures:  Japan,  Apr.  2^.    1979;  Iraq.  Apr. 
30,    1979;   Mauritius,   May   3,    1979;   Paki- 
stan, May  8,  1979;  Austria.  Brazil.  Finland. 
South  Africa.   May   11.    1979;  Cuba  (with 
declarations).    Egypt.    Kenya.   Switzerland. 
May  14.  1979. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application  depos- 
ited: Cuba.  May  14.  1979. 
Protocol   modilying  and   further  extending  the 
liHid  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at 
Washington  Apr.  25.   1979.  Enters  into  force 
.lime  23.   1979.  with  respect  to  certain  provi- 
sions and  July   1.   1979.  with  respect  to  other 
provisions. 

Sifinatiires:    Finland.    May    11.    1979;  Japan 
(with  a  reservation).  Apr.   25.    1979;  Swit 
/eriand.  May  14.  1979, 

World  Health  Organization 

Amendments  to  Articles  34  and  55  of  the  Con- 
stitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization  of 
.Inly  22,  1946.  as  amended.  Done  at  Geneva 
May  22.  1973.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  3. 
l^il.  TIAS  8534. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Upper  Volta.  Mar.  20, 
1979. 

Amendment  to  Article  74  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  World  Health  Organization,  as  amended. 
Done  at  Geneva  May  18.  1978. ^ 
Acceptances  deposited:  Niger,  Apr.  18,  1979; 
Singapore.  Apr.  17.  1979. 

BILATERAL 

Canada 

.Agreement  governing  the  operation  of  pilotage 
on  the  Great  Lakes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ottawa  Aug.  23,  1978.  and  Mar.  29. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  29,  1979;  ef- 
fective Jan.  18.  1977. 

Agreement  governing  the  operation  of  pilotage 
on  the  Great  Lakes  and  St.  Lawrence  Seaway, 
with  memorandum  of  arrangeinents.  as 
amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  July  6,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
July  6.  1970.  TIAS  6901. 
Terminated:  Mar,  29,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  construction,  opera- 
tion, and  maintenance  of  a  Loran-C  station  in 
British  Columbia.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ottawa  Mar.  19  and  29,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Mar.  29,  1979. 

Arrangement  concerning  an  observer  scheme  tor 
the  spring  1979  bowhead  whaling  season  in 
Alaska.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ot- 
tawa Apr.  3  and  4,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  4,  1979. 

Egypt 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  29, 
1978,  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in 
connection  with  matters  relating  to  the  Wes- 


67 


tinghouse  Electric  Corporation  to  include  the 
BeaJay  Products  Corporation  and  its  sub- 
sidiaries and  affiliates.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Washington  Mar.  19  and  Apr.  17, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Apr.   17,  1979. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Agreement  regarding  operation  of  the  radio  in- 
stallation al  Erching,  with  confidential  mem- 
orandum of  understanding.  Signed  al  Bonn 
Jan.  22  and  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
26,  1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar.  22 
and  23,  1976.  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  8268.  9084).  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Port-au-Prince  Feb.  8  and  16.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.   16.  1979. 

Honduras 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
with  annexes  and  minutes.  Signed  at 
Tegucigalpa  Feb.  27.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  27.  1979. 

India 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  India  amend- 
ing the  agreement  of  Dec.  30,  1977.  as 
amended  (TIAS  9036)  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  May  7  and  8.  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  May  8,  1979. 

indone.sia 

Agreement  concerning  the  furnishing  of  launch- 
ing and  associated  services  for  Palapa-B 
spacecraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Apr.  1  1.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.   IK  1979. 

Israel 

Agreement  concerning  construction  of  airbase 
facilities.  Signed  al  Tel  Aviv  Apr.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  6.  1979. 

Agreement  concerning  funding  of  airbase  con- 
struction. Signed  at  Tel  Aviv  Apr.  6,  1979, 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  6,  1979. 

Memorandum  of  agreement  concerning  the  prin- 
ciples governing  mutual  cooperation  in  re- 
search and  development,  scientist  and  en- 
gineer exchange,  and  procurement  and  logistic 
support  of  selected  defense  equipment,  wilh 
annexes  and  attachment.  Signed  Mar.  19, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.   19.  1979. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug.  2.  1978 
(TIAS  9188).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kingston  Mar.  7  and  29.  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  29,  1979. 

Protocol  amending  the  air  transport  agreement  of 
Oct  2.  1969  (TIAS  6770).  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  al  Kingston  Apr.  4.  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Apr.  4.  1979. 

Japan 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  the  field  of  energy 
research   and  development.    Signed   al   Wash- 
ington July   15.   1974.  Entered  into  force  July 
15.  1974.  TIAS  7905. 
Terminated:  May  2.  1979. 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  research  and  de 
velopmeni  in  energy  and  related  fields,  with 
exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington  May 


2.  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  2.  1979. 


Portugal 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  the 
principles  governing  mutual  cooperation  in  the 
research,  development,  produciion.  procure- 
ment, and  logistic  support  of  defense  equip- 
ment. Signed  at  Lisbon  and  Washington  Dec. 
18.  1978,  and  Mar.  28.  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  28.  1979. 

Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  marine 
cargo  insurance.  Signed  at  London  Apr.  5. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  5.  1979. 

'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

"Not  in  force. 

■''With  declaration. 

^Applicable  to  West  Berlin. 

■■'With  a  statement. 

"Applicable  to  Saint  Vincent.  The  Bailiwick 
of  Guernsey.  The  Isle  of  Man.  Belize,  Ber- 
muda, British  Virgin  Islands.  Gibraltar.  Gilbert 
Islands,  Hong  Kong.  Montserrat.  Saint  Helena 
and  Dependencies. 


CHROMOLOGY: 
April  1979 


Apr.     1     OPEC  raises  oil  prices  by  9%. 

Israeli  Cabinet  ratifies  Peace  Treaty 
with  Egypt  without  dissent  (1 
abstention). 

Apr.     2    Israeli   Prime   Minister   Begin   pays  a 
state  visit  to  Egypt  April  2-3. 
Jordan  breaks  diplomatic  relations  wilh 

Egypt;  Egypt  reciprocates. 
Bomb  explodes  in  U.S.   Embassy  in 
Beirut.    Property   damage   is  slight, 
and  no  one  is  injured. 
Italian   President   Pertini   dissolves  the 
Parliament. 

Apr.  3  Wilfried  Martens  is  sworn  in  as  Prime 
Minister  of  Belgium. 

Apr.     4    30th  anniversary  of  NATO. 

Former  Pakistani  Prime  Minister 
Bhutto  IS  executed  in  Pakistan. 

Apr.  5  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  Sonoda  vis- 
its U.S.  Apr.  5-11. 

Apr.  6  U.S.  ends  military  and  economic  aid  to 
Pakistan. 
President  Mohamed  Saleck  of 
Mauritania  creates  the  new  position 
of  Prime  Minister  to  be  held  by  Ll. 
Col.  Bouceif. 

Apr.  7  Former  Iranian  Prime  Minister  Hoveyda 
is  executed  in  Iran. 
Egypt  announces  the  recall  of  its  Am- 
bassadors to  Bahrain,  Kuwait. 
Morocco.  Qatar.  Saudi  Arabia. 
Tunisia,  and  the  United  Arab  Emi- 
rates 

Apr.    9    U.K.  Parliament  is  dissolved. 

Panamanian  President  Aristides  Royo 
visits  U.S.  Apr.  9-11. 

Apr.  10  Egyptian  People's  Assembly  ratifies 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  by  a 
vote  of  328  to  15  (1  abstention  and 
16  members  were  absent). 

Apr.  1  1  An  invading  force  of  Tanzanians  and 
exiled  Ugandans  captures  Kampala. 
Uganda.   Ugandan  exiles  announce 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  formation  of  a  provisional  gov- 
ernment headed  by  Yusutu  K.  Lule, 
chairman  of  the  new  Uganda  Libera- 
tion Front. 
Vice  President  Mondale  visits  Iceland 
(Apr.  11-13).  Norway  (Apr. 
13-18),  Denmark  (Apr.  18-19), 
Sweden  (Apr.  19-20),  Finland  (Apr. 
20-21).  and  the  Netherlands  (Apr. 
21-22),  and  returns  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  Apr.  22. 

Apr.  12  U.S.  and  other  representatives  of  the 
world's  major  trading  nations  initial 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
agreements  in  Geneva. 
South  African  Prime  Minister  Botha 
orders  three  U.S.  Embassy  personnel 
expelled  from  the  country  for  what 
he  terms  the  use  of  the  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador's plane  for  aerial  espionage. 

Apr.  13  Yusufu  K.  Lule  is  sworn  in  as  Presi- 
dent of  Uganda. 
U.S.  Stale  Department  requests  that 
the  South  African  air  attache  and  the 
defense  and  military  attache  leave 
U.S.  in  1  week. 

Apr.  14    31st  anniversary  of  the  OAS. 

Apr.  15  Egypt  is  suspended  from  membership 
in  the  Arab  Fund  for  Economic  and 
Social  Development. 

Apr.  16  The  Organization  of  Arab  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries  and  the  Arab 
Bank  for  African  Development  sus- 
pend Egypt's  membership. 

Apr.  17  Southern  Rhodesians  vote  for  a  new 
administration  Apr.  10  and  Apr. 
17-21.  Bishop  Muzorewa's  United 
African  National  Council  wins  con- 
trol of  51  seats  in  the  projected  100- 
seal  Parliament.  Bishop  Muzorewa 
is  expected  to  become  the  country's 
first  black  Prime  Minister. 

Apr.  18  P.R.C.  and  Vietnam  begin  first  round 
of  talks  in  Hanoi  after  their  recent 
border  dispute.  Further  rounds  are 
also  held  in  Hanoi  Apr.  26  and  May 
4,  12.  and  18.  More  discussions  are 
projected  to  be  held  in  Beijing. 
Arab  Monetary  Fund  votes  to  suspend 
Egypt  from  its  membership. 

Apr.  19  Egypt  holds  a  nationwide  referendum 
in  which  voters  overwhelmingly  ap- 
prove the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty  and  President  Sadat's  pro- 
posal to  dissolve  the  People's  As- 
sembly and  conduct  new  elections. 

Apr.  21  Egyptian  President  Sadat  dissolves  the 
People's  Assembly  and  orders  new 
elections  for  June  7. 

Apr.  22  Arab  Labor  Organization  suspends 
Egypt's  membership. 
Thailand  holds  elections  for  301  Mem- 
bers of  Parliament  and  so  restores 
representative  government  after  the 
1976  military  coup.  Prime  Minister 
Kriangsak  is  expected  to  remain  in 
office. 
U.N.  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
visits  Malaysia,  Vietnam.  P.R.C, 
North  and  South  Korea,  Japan, 
Philippines,  Indonesia,  Singapore. 
Thailand.  U.S.S.R..  Cyprus,  and 
Italy  Apr.  22-May  22, 

Apr.  23    Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait  break  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Egypt;  Egypt 
reciprocates. 
Third  round  of  discussions  begin  be- 


tween U.S.   and  USSR,   on  an- 
tisatellite  systems  in  Vienna. 

Apr.  24  Mauritania  breaks  relations  with 
Egypt;  Egypt  reciprocates. 

Apr.  25  Egypt  and  Israel  exchange  ratification 
documents  of  the  Peace  Treaty  in  the 
U.N.  buffer  zone  in  the  Sinai. 
Qatar,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  and 
the  Yemen  Arab  Republic  sever 
diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt; 
Egypt  reciprocates. 

Apr.  26    French   President  Giscard   visits  Mos- 
cow Apr.  26-28. 
Lebanon  and  Bahrain  break  diplomatic 
relations  with  Egypt;  Egypt  recipro- 
cates. 

Apr.  27  U.S.S.R.  releases  five  Soviet  dissi- 
dents from  prison  (Aleksandr 
Ginzburg.  Eduard  Kuznetsov.  Mark 
Dymshits.  Valentin  Moroz.  and 
Georgi  Vins)  and  flies  them  to  New 
York  in  exchange  for  two  convicted 
Soviet  spies  in  the  U.S.  (Valdik 
Enger  and  Rudolph  Chernyayev). 
Messrs.  Dymshits  and  Kuznetsov 
then  fly  to  Israel  Apr.  30. 
Morocco  and  Tunisia  break  relations 
with  Egypt;  Egypt  reciprocates. 

Apr.  29  Ecuador  holds  a  presidential  election 
which  is  won  by  Jaime  Roldos 
Aguilera. 

Apr.  30    Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira  visits 
U.S.  Apr.  30-May  6. 
Israeli  freighter  Ashclod  passes  through 

the  Suez  Canal. 
Egypt  breaks  diplomatic  relations  with 
Iran.  D 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


April  16-May  15 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C,  20520. 

Subject 

Overseas  Schools  Advisory 
Council,  June  14. 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO,  May  10. 

sec,  national  committee  for 
the  prevention  of  marine 
pollution.  June  5. 

Frances  Joseph  Meehan 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Czechoslovakia  (bio- 
graphic data). 

Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law. 

Transportation  and  interment 
of  remaining  bodies  of 
Jonestown  deceased. 

Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Investment. 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, working  group 
on  Iransborder  data  flows. 
May  25. 

sec.  subcommittee  on  safety 
of  life  at  sea  (SOLAS), 
working        group        on 


No. 

Date 

100 

4/16 

101 

4/16 

102 

4/16 

*I03 

tl04 
*105 

•106 


4/17 

4/17 
4/20 

4/20 


*I07        4/20 


radiocommunications.  May 
17. 
108        4/24  India-U.S.  Joint  Commissioi* 

communique. 

*109        4/25  sec,  SOLAS,  working  groupj 

on  ship  design  and  equip-i 
ment.  May  17. 

*IIO        4/26  Vance:  statement  before  the 

Subcommittee  on  Foreigni 
Operations  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions on  FY  1980  foreigni 
assistance. 

*  I  1 1         4/26  Conference  for  young  politi- 

cal leaders.  May  17-18. 

*II2        4/27  Advisory  Committee  on  In- 

ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, working  group  onl 
accounting  standards.  Junet 
20. 

113        4/27  Richardson:   press  confer- 

ence. Geneva. 

*I14        4/30  U.S.  hosts  North  Pacific  Fur. 

Seal  Commission.  Apr. 
9-13. 

*115         5/1  Program  for  the  official  visia 

of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Ohira.  Apr.  30-May  6. 
116         5/1  Vance:   address  before  the^| 

American  Association  of 
Community  and  Junior 
Colleges.  Chicago. 

*I17         5/2  U.S..  Japan  agreement  on 

cooperation  in  research  and 
development  in  energy  and 
related  fields. 

*II8  5/3  Advisory   Committee  on   law 

of  the  sea.  closed  meeting. 
May  18;  open  meeting. 
May  21. 

*I19  5/3  Vance:   remarks   upon   un- 

veiling memorial  plaque> 
honoring  Adolph  Dubs. 

*120  5/4  William   L.   Swing  sworn   in 

as  Ambassador  to  the 
Congo  (biographic  data). 

*12l  5/4  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  standards  of  training 
and  watchkeeping. 

•122         5/4  U.S.   Organization  for  the 

International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT). 
study  group  4.  May  3  I . 

•123  5/4  Second  annual  conference  on 

the  American  international 
traveler.  May  9-10. 

•124  5/8  Vance:   statement  before   the 

House    Foreign    Affairs   | 
Committee   on   the   Egypt- 
Israel  Peace  Treaty. 

•125        5/10         US,   Organization  for  the/ 
International    Radio   Con- 
sultative      Committee 
(CCIR).   study  group  5, 
June  19. 

•126        5/10         Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational   Intellectual 
Property.  May  29. 
127         5/10  Vance:   remarks   on   SALT, 

May  9. 

•128        5/11  Ocean   Affairs   Advisory 

Committee.  Antarctic  sec- 
tion, closed  meeting.  June 
18;  open  meeting,  June  19. 

tl29         5/14  Vance.   Brown:   interview  on 


line  1979 


69 


"Meel  the  Press."  May 
13. 

•130         5/15  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  subdivision,  stability, 
and  load  lines.  June  6. 

*131         5/15  US.    Organization   for  the 

International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee,  study 
group  6.  June  22.  San 
Diego. 

+  132         5/15  Newsom:   address   before   the 

Pacific  Basin  Economic 
Council.  Los  Angeles.      D 

t  To  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 
*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


1/.S.I/.JV. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office.  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations.  799  LInited  Nations  Plaza. 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Dale  .Subject 

*I20  11/16  Morgenthau:  World  Assem- 
bly on  the  Elderly,  Com- 
mittee in,  Nov.  15. 

*I21  11/17  Hoyt:  explanation  of  vote  on 
southern  Africa.  Commit- 
tee III.  Nov.  16. 

*122  11/20  Rosenstock:  hostages.  Com- 
mittee VL 

*123  11/17  Stibravy:  UNHCR  pledging 
conference 

'*124  11/20  Horbal:  U.N.  Decade  for 
Women.  Committee  ML 

*125  11/20  Young  (Mrs.  Andrew):  Dr. 
Margaret  Mead. 

*126        11/21  Cunningham:    medium-term 

plan  for  1980-83.  Com- 
mittee V. 

*127  11/21  Kettlewell:  East  Timor. 
Committee  IV,  Nov.  20. 

128  11/22         Pearson:  arms  control.  Com- 

mittee 1. 

129  11/22         Graham:   U.N.   educational 

and  training  program  for 
southern  Africa,  Commit- 
tee IV,  Nov.  21. 

•130       11/22         Graham:  Southern  Rhodesia, 
Committee  IV. 
131        11/22         Leonard:  apartheid,  UNGA. 

*132  [No  press  release  was  issued 

with  this  number.] 

*133  11/24  Letter  from  Theodore  R. 
Mann,  Chairman  of  the 
Conference  of  Presidents 
of  Major  American  Jewish 
Organizations  to  Ambas- 
sador Young. 

*134  11/27  Jones:  U.S.  territories. 
Committee  IV. 

*135  11/24  Stibravy:  UNCSTD,  Com- 
mittee II. 

*I36  11/29  Saddler:  U.N.  staff  pension 
system.  Committee  V. 

*137  11/28  Ribicoff:  narcotics.  Com- 
mittee III. 

*138  11/28  Tyson:  human  rights  commis- 
sioner. Committee  III. 

*I39        11/28         Fisher:  weapons  in  the  Mid- 


144 

11/30 

*145 

11/30 

♦146 

1 1  /30 

*I47 

11/30 

•148 

12/1 

•149 

I2,'4 

die  East.   Committee   I, 
Nov.  27. 
140        11/28         Slahl:    Israeli   practices   and 
the    occupied   Arab   ter- 
ritories.  Special  Political 
Committee,  Nov.  27 
•141        11/29         Fisher:        South        Asian 
nuclear-weapon-free  zone. 
Committee  1. 
142         11/30         Hechinger:    peacekeeping. 
Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 
•143        11/30         Mezvinsky;   elimination   of 
religious    intolerance. 
Committee  III,  Nov.  29. 

Ribicoff:  Palestine.  UNGA. 

Tyson:  human  rights  ac- 
tivities. Committee  lU. 

Cardwell:  social  develop- 
ment. Committee  III. 

Petree:  UNDOF.  Security 
Council. 

Stahl:  cooperation  between 
U.N.  and  OAU.  UNGA. 

Dalley:    mass   communica- 
tions.  Special   Political 
Committee. 
150         12/4  McHenry:   Namibia,  Security 

Council. 
*I51  12/6  Petree:  Middle  East,  UNGA. 

•152         12/6  Leonard:    attack    against 

senior  member  of  Egyptian 
mission  to  the  U.N. 
•153         12/6  Petree:       admission       of 

Dominica,   Security  Coun- 
cil. 
154        12/7  Mezvinsky:   report   of  the 

Economic    and    Social 
Council,  Committee  III. 

Young:  Palestine,  UNGA. 

Shelton:  Nicaragua,  Com- 
mittee I. 

Leonard:  UNIFIL.  Security 
Council. 

Stahl:  information.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

U.S.  announces  pledge  to 
UNRWA  for  1979. 

Stahl:  decolonization, 
UNGA,  Dec.  13. 

Young:  30th  anniversary  of 
the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  UNGA. 

Saddler:  personnel.  Commit- 
tee V.  Dec.   14. 

Petree:  Nicaragua,  UNGA. 

Petree:  admission  of 
Dominica,  UNGA. 

Stahl:  assistance  to  Palestin- 
ian people,  UNGA. 

Saddler:  supplemental  budget 

appropriations   for   bien- 

nium  1978-79,  Committee 

V,  Dec.  20. 

*1  1/13  Young:  Kampuchea,  Security 

Council. 
•2  1/19  Young:   UNIFIL,   Security 

Council. 
•3  1/23  Hormats:        North-South 

dialogue.  Committee  of  the 
Whole. 
*4  1/23  Riemer:  restructuring.  Com- 

mittee II 
•5  1/26  Saddler:  budget.  Committee 

V. 
•6  1/29  Wells:  UNCSTD,  plenary. 


'7 

1/30 

8 

1/31 

9 

2/6 

10 

2/12 

155 

12/7 

•156 

12/8 

•157 

12/8 

•158 

12/8 

•159 

12/13 

•160 

12/14 

161 

12/14 

♦162        12/15 


163 

12/15 

164 

12/18 

165 

12/20 

166 

12/21 

*20 


*21 


*22 


•23 


24 


25 


•26 


•27 


2/14 


•12 

2/15 

13 

2/23 

•14 

2/27 

15 

2/27 

16 

.3/3 

•17 

3/5 

•18 

3/8 

•19 

3/8 

3/9 


3/9 


3/9 


3/9 


3/12 


3/12 


3/13 


3/15 


•28 

3/16 

29 

3/17 

•30 

3/20 

•31 

.3/21 

•32 

3/21 

•33 

3/22 

•34 

3/28 

•35 

4/3 

Wilkowski:  UNCSTD,  ple- 
nary. 

Green:  population.  Popula- 
tion Commission. 

Stibravy:  UNCSTD,  plenary. 

Cooks:  Marshall  Islands, 
Trusteeship  Council. 

Frutkin;  U.S.  space  pro- 
grams. Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer 
Space. 

Cooks:  Micronesia,  Trustee- 
ship Council. 

Young:  Southeast  Asia,  Se- 
curity Council. 

Morgenthau:  social  develop- 
ment. Commission  on  So- 
cial Development  in  the 
U.N.  System. 

Young:  Southeast  Asia,  Se- 
curity Council. 

Statement  by  Western  five 
members  of  the  Security 
Council:  Namibia, 

Young:  Rhodesia,  Security 
Council. 

Young:  Rhodesia,  Security 
Council. 

Moose:  Rhodesia,  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee, Mar.  7. 

Morgenthau:  children,  the 
disabled,  and  the  elderly. 
Commission  for  Social  De- 
velopment, Feb.  22. 

Morgenthau:  UNRISD,  rural 
development,  and  food 
corps.  Commission  for  So- 
cial Development. 

Turem:  crime  prevention  and 
control.  Commission  for 
Social  Development. 

Turem:  social  progress. 
Commission  for  Social  De- 
velopment. 

Statement  by  Western  five 
members  of  the  Security 
Council:  Namibia. 

Statement  by  Western  five 
members  of  the  Security 
Council:  Namibia. 

Statement  by  Western  five 
members  of  the  Security 
Council:  proximity  talks  on 
Namibia. 

Bond:  U.S.  space  program. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space,  Mar. 
14. 

Press  information  on  prox- 
imity talks  on  Namibia. 

Petree:  Southeast  Asia,  Se- 
curity Council,  Mar.   16. 

Wells:  food  and  agriculture. 
Committee  of  the  Whole. 

Quainton:  international  ter- 
rorism. Ad  Hoc  Committee 
on  International  Terrorism. 

Young:  presentation  of  U.S. 
payment  to  UNDP. 

Leonard:  settlements  in  the 
occupied  territories.  Secu- 
rity Council. 

Petree:  Angolan  complaint. 
Security  Council. 

Hormats:    international    de- 


70 


•36 


4/13 


velopmeni   strategy.    Pre- 
paratory Committee. 
Wells:   drugs.   Social   Com- 
mittee. D 


*  Not  printed  in  the  Bui  ietin. 


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with  the  Hague  Conference  on  Private  Inter- 


national Law.  TIAS  8890.  3  pp    70«;.   (Cat 
No.  S9. 10:8890.) 
International   Wheat   Agreement,    1971  — 
Modification   and   Extension   of  Wheat 
Trade  Convention  and  Food  Aid  Conven- 
tion.  Agreement   with   other  governments. 
TIAS   8902.   95   pp.    $2.20.    (Cat.    No. 
S9, 10:8902  ) 
Second  Amendment  of  Articles  of  Agreement 
of   the    International    Monetary    Fund. 
Agreement   with   other   governments.    TIAS 
8937.  80  pp.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8937.) 
International  Trade  In  Textiles.  Protocol  with 
other    governments.    TIAS    8939      17    pp. 
$1.10.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8939.) 
Narcotic  Drugs — Prohibition  of  Poppy  Culti- 
vation.   TIAS    8950.    2    pp.    600.    (Cat.    No. 
S9. 10:8950.) 
Food   and   Agriculture   Organization  — 
Amendments  to  the  Constitution.  Adopted 
at  the  Nineteenth  Session  of  the  FAO  Con- 
ference. Rome,  November  I2-December  1. 
1977.    TIAS   8982.    6   pp.    700.    (Cat.    No. 
S9. 10:8982.) 
Whaling — Amendments  to  the  Schedule  to 
the  International   Whaling  Convention   of 
1946,  adopted  at  the  special  meeting  of  the 
International  Whaling  Commission.  TIAS 
8983.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8983.) 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural   Organization  —  Amendments  to 
Article  V  of  the  Constitution,  adopted  by 
the  General  Conference  of  the   United  Na- 
tions Educational,   Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization   at  the  Nineteenth  Session. 
TIAS    9017.     3    pp.     700.     (Cat.     No. 
59.10:9017.) 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural   Organization — Amendments  to 
Articles  IV.  V  and  VIII  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, adopted  by  the  General  Conference  of 
the   United   Nations   Educational.   Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization  at  the  Seventeenth 
Session.   TIAS  9016.   5   pp.   700.   (Cat.   No. 
S9. 10:90 16.) 
Safe  Containers— Geneva   1972.  TIAS  9037. 

123  pp.  $2.75.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9037.) 
Atomic   Energy — Gas-Cooled   Reactor  Con- 
cepts and  Technology.  Agreement  with  other 
governments,   amending   the   agreement   of 
February   II,   1977  with  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany.   TIAS  9047.    10  pp.   800.   (Cat. 
No.  S9. 10:9047.) 
Sale  of  Excess  Property.  Agreement  with  the 
United   Nations.   TIAS   9086.    II    pp.   900. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9086.) 
Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer  Under 
Title  II.  Agreement  with  the  United  Nations 
Children's  Fund.   TIAS  9100.   3  pp.   700. 
(Cat.  No.  $9.10:9100.) 
Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer  Under 
Title  II.  Agreement  with  the  United  Nation's 
Children's  Fund.   TIAS  9101.   3  pp.   700. 
(Cat.  No.  $9.10:9101.) 
Helicopter   Pilot  Training.   Agreement   with 
other  governments.   TIAS  9128.   6  pp.   700. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9128.) 
International     Poplar     Commission  — 
Amendments  to  the  Convention.   Adopted 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

at  the  Third  Special  Session  of  the  Interna 
tional  Poplar  Commission,  Rome,  November 
15,  1977.  TIAS  91.'!0.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
$9.10:9130.) 
Study  of  Compensation  Systems.  Memoran- 
dum of  understanding  with  other  govern- 
ments. TIAS  9138.  8  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9138.) 


Congressional 
Doeuntents 


Progress  in  Cyprus  Negotiations    Communica- 
tion from  the  President  transmitting  a  report 
on  efforts  to  resolve  the  Cyprus  dispute.  H. 
Doc.  No.  96-5.  Jan.  15,  1979.  15  pp. 
Trade  Agreements  Reached  in  the  Tokyo  Round 
of  Multilateral   Trade   Negotiations.   Com- 
munication  from  the   President  transmitting 
notice  of  several  trade  agreements.  H.  Doc. 
No.  96-33.  Jan.  15.  1979.  38  pp. 
Agreement   on   the   International   Carriage  of 
Perishable   Foodstuffs   and  on   the   Special 
Equipment  To  Be   Used   for  Such  Carriage. 
Message  from  the  President  transmitting  the 
agreement.  8.  E.\.  B.  Jan.  23,  1979.  48'pp. 
Protocol  of  1978  Relating  to  the  International 
Convention  for  the  Prevention  of  Pollution 
From  Ships.   With   Annexes  and  Protocols. 
Message  from  the  President  transmitting  the 
protocol.  8.  Ex.  C,  Jan.  23.  1979.  24  pp. 
Protocol  of  1978  Relating  to  the  International 
Convention   for  the   Safety   of  Life   at   Sea, 
1974.   Message  from  the  President  transmit- 
ting the  protocol.  $.  Ex.  D    Jan.  23.   1979. 
22  pp. 
Three   Treaties   Establishing   Maritime   Bound- 
aries Between  the  United  States  and  Mexico, 
Venezuela   and   Cuba.    Message   from   the 
President  transmitting  three  treaties.  S.  Ex. 
F,  G,  and  H.  Jan.  23,   1979.   16  pp. 
State  of  the  Union.   Message  from  the  Presi- 
dent. H.  Doc.  No.  96-1.  Jan.  23.  1979. 
Implementation  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  of 
1977.    Communication   from   the   President 
transmitting  a  draft  of  proposed  legislation. 
H.  Doc.  No.  96-39.  Jan.  24.  1979.^92  pp. 
State  of  the  Union  Supplement.  Message  from 
the  President.  H.  Doc.  No.  96-44.  Jan.  25, 
1979.  47  pp. 
Relations  With  Taiwan.   Message  from  the 
President   transmitting   a   draft   of  proposed 
legislation.    H.    Doc.    No.   96-45.   Jan.    29, 
1979.  9  pp. 
Funds  for  Study  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy.  Report 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions.  8.   Repl.   No.  96-6.   Feb.   21,    1979. 
4  pp. 
Taiwan   Enabling   Act.    Report   of  the  Senate 
Cominittee  on   Foreign   Relations.    8.    Rept. 
No.  96-7.  Mar.   1.  1979. 
United  States-Taiwan  Relations  Act    Report  of 
the  House  Committtee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  H. 
Rept.  No.  96-26.  Mar.  3.  1979.  27  pp. 
International   Development.   Message  from  the 
President   transmitting   a  report   on  steps   he 
has  taken  and  proposes  to  take  to  strengthen 
the  coordination  of  U.S.   economic  policies 
allecting  developing  countries.  H.  Doc.   No. 
96-70.  Mar.  8,  1979.  2  pp. 


II\DEX 


INE  1979 
,()L.  79,  NO. 


2027 


Vfrica 

rhronology:  April  1979   67 

.oulhern  Rhodesia  (  Vance)    22 

IS.  Policy  and  Africa  (Newsom)   20 

^rms  Control 

^he  Facts  of  SALT  II  (Gelb) 24 

.Iccling  the  Challenges  of  a  Changing  World 

I  Vance)    16 

'riMdenl  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 

M)  (excerpts) 14 

(cslraining   Conventional    Arms   Transfers 

(Cielb) 45 

;,\LT   II— The   Path  of  Security  and  Peace 

(Carter) 11 

,  \1  T  II  Treaty  Concluded  (Brown,  Vance)    23 
>  iMl   of  Prime   Minister  Trudeau   (joint  com- 

j    munique)   9 

\sia.  Chronology:  April  1979 67 

'amhodia.  Southeast  Asia  (Petree.  Young)    62 
anada 

'aiuida — A  Profile 2 

i.irnson  Diversion  Unit  8 

vljiiiime  Boundary  and  Resource  Agreements 

I  Pickering) 7 

S     Canada   Atlantic   Coast   Fisheries   and 

Boundary  Agreements  (joint  statement)    .    10 

lie   Llnited   States   and  Canada;   Comparisons 

and  Interrelations  (Enders) 1 

.  iMl   of  Prime   Minister  Trudeau   (joint   com- 
munique    9 

hina 

iiHitheast  Asia  (Petree,  Young)    62 

.iman  Relations  Act  (Carter) 26 

(iinmunications.  FY  1980  Appropriations  for 
International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

I  Maynes)   51 

undress 
I  he  Fgyptian-lsraeli  Peace  Treaty  and  Its  Af- 

icrmath  (Saunders) 37 

Y     1980  Appropriations  for  International  Or- 
ganizations and  Conferences  (Maynes)  .  .  51 
->■   1980  Appropriations  for  Voluntary  Contri- 
butions and  the  OAS  (Maynes) 56 

'resident's  Report  on  Science  and  Technology 

levcerpt) 42 

■ie^lraining   Conventional    Arms   Transfers 

((ielb)  .    ' 45 

Twelfth   Report   on   Cyprus   (message   to   the 

Congress) 36 

United   Nations:    Serving   American   Foreign 

Policy  Interests  (Young) 47 

I'  S    Export  Policy  (Cooper) 31 

Vcinen  (Crawford) 39 

Cyprus.  Twelfth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

;     the  Congress)   36 

jDepartment  and  Foreign  Service.   Reorgani- 
zation  of   Foreign   Assistance    Programs 

(White  House  announcement)   25 

Developing  Countries.   Meeting  the  Chal- 
lenges of  a  Changing  World  ( Vance)  ....    16 
Economics 
The   Evolving   International    Monetary   System 

(Solomon)  34 

FY    1980  Appropriations  for  International  Or- 


ganizations and  Conterences  (Maynes)  ..  51 
Major   Elements   of   the    Multilateral    Trade 

Negotiations  (Katz) 27 

Meeting  the  Challenges  of  a  Changing  World 

(Vance)    16 

U.S.  Export  Policy  (Cooper) 31 

World  Trade  Week  (Carter,  Vance) 28 

Egypt 

Egypt  and  the  ECWA  (Department  state- 
ment)      38 

The  Peace  Treaty  and  Its  Aftermath  (Saun- 
ders)     37 

Energy 

President's  Report  on  Science  and  Technology 
(excerpt) 42 

Visit  of  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  (joint  com- 
munique)        9 

Environment 

Garrison  Diverson  Unit 8 

President's  Report  on  Science  and  Technology 
(excerpt) 42 

Europe.  Chronology:  April  1979 67 

Fisheries 

Maritime  Boundary  and  Resource  Agreements 
(Pickering) 7 

U.S. -Canada  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  and 
Boundary  Agreements  (joint  statement)    .    10 

Government  Organization. Reorganization  of 
Foreign  Assistance  Programs  (White  House 
announcement  I   25 

Human  Rights 

FY  1980  Appropriations  for  International  Or- 
ganizations and  Conferences  (Maynes)  .  .   51 

FY  1980  Appropriations  for  Voluntary  Contri- 
butions and  the  OAS  (Maynes) 56 

India.  India-U.S.  Joint  Commission  Meeting 
(joint  communique) 46 

Israel.  The  Peace  Treaty  and  Its  Aftermath 
(Saunders) 37 

Laos.  Southeast  Asia  (Petree,  Young) 62 

Latin  American  and  the  Caribbean.  Chronol- 
ogy: April   1979    67 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 
(Richardson)  41 

Lesotho.  Letter  of  Credence  (Thahane)       .21 

Middle  East 

Chronology:  April  1979   67 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 
30  (excerpts) 14 

Military  Affairs.  President's  Report  on  Sci- 
ence and  Technology  (excerpt) 42 

Monetary  Affairs.  The  Evolving  International 
Monetary  System  (Solomon) 34 

Namibia.  Namibia  (Western  five  state- 
ments)     64 

Nuclear  Policy.  President's  Report  on  Science 
and  Technology  (excerpt) 42 

Oceans.  President's  Report  on  Science  and 
Technology  (excerpt) 42 

Presidential  Documents 

MTN  Agreements 29 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 
30  (excerpts) 14 

President's  Report  on  Science  and  Technology 
(excerpt) 42 

SALT  II— The  Path  of  Security  and  Peace  .    I  1 

Taiwan  Relations  Act   26 

Twelfth  Report  on  Cyprus  36 

World  Trade  Week 28 

Publications 

Congressional  Documents    70 

GPO  Sales 21,  22,  70 

Science  and  Technology 

FY  1980  Appropriations  for  International  Or- 
ganizations and  Conferences  (Maynes)   ..   51 


President's  Report  on  Science  and  Technology 
(excerpt ) 42 

Security  Assistance 

Restraining  Conventional  Arms  Transfers 
(Gelb) 45 

Yemen  (Crawford) 39 

Southern  Rhodesia 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 
30  (excerpts) 14 

Southern  Rhodesia  (Vance,  Department  state- 
ment)       22 

Thailand.  Southeast  Asia  (Petree,  Young).   62 

Trade 

Chronology:  April  1979   67 

The  Evolving  International  Monetary  System 
(Solomon)   34 

Major  Elements  of  the  Multilateral  Trade 
Negotiations  (Katz) 27 

MTN  Agreenienis  (Carter) 29 

Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  (foreign  rela- 
tions outline) 30 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 
30  (excerpts) 14 

U.S.  Export  Policy  (Cooper) 31 

Visit  of  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  (joint  com- 
munique)       9 

World  Trade  Week  (Carter,  Vance) 28 

Treaties 

Current  Actions    65 

Maritime  Boundary  and  Resource  Agreements 
(Pickering) 7 

MTN  Agreements  (Carter) 29 

U.S. -Canada  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  and 
Boundary  Agreements  (joint  statement)    .    10 

U.S.S.R. 

The  Facts  of  SALT  U  (Gelb) 24 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  April 
30  (excerpts) 14 

Restraining  Conventional  Arms  Transfers 
(Gelb) 45 

SALT  II  — The  Path  of  Security  and  Peace 
(Carter! 11 

SALT  II  Treaty  Concluded  (Brown,  Vance)    23 

Southeast  Asia  (Petree,  Young)    62 

United  Nations 

FY  1980  Appropriations  for  International  Or- 
ganizations and  Conferences  (Maynes)  .  .   51 

FY  1980  Appropriations  for  Voluntary  Contri- 
butions and  the  OAS  (Maynes) 56 

Namibia  (Western  five  statements) 64 

Southeast  Asia  (Petree,  Young)   62 

United  Nations:  Serving  American  Foreign 
Policy  Interests  (Young) 47 

Vietnam.  Southeast  Asia  (Petree,  Young)  .   62 

Yemen.  Yemen  (Crawford) 39 

Name  Index 

Brown.  Harold   23 

Carter,  President  .  .    11,14,  26,  28,  29,  36.  42 

Cooper,  Richard  N 31 

Crawford,  William  R 39 

Enders,  Thomas  O 1 

Gelb,  Leslie  H 24,  45 

Katz,  Julius  L 27 

Maynes.  Charles  William   51 ,  56 

Newsom,  David  D 20 

Petree,  Richard 62 

Pickering,  Thomas  R 7 

Richardson,  Elliot  L   41 

Saunders,  Harold  H 37 

Solomon,  Anthony  M   34 

Thahane,  Timothy  T   21 

Vance,  Secretary   16,  22,  23,  28 

Young.  Andrew 47.  62 


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