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Department 



-m of state -m-^ J ^ 

bulletin 



|3 Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 80 / Number 2037 



AFRICA / .1 ^^ 



April 1980 



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Jons / 47 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2037 / April 1980 



Cover : 

Mangbetu woman, Zaire 

( Museum of African Art, 
Eliot Elisofon Archives ) 

Secretary Vance 
Victor Palmieri 
President Carter 
David D. Newsom 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairt 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



i 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printi 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ' ' 

Price: |l 

12 issues plus annual index— J 

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Single copy- $1.40 (domestic) $1.80 « 



CONTENTS 



Feature 



Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States- 
Background Notes on African Countries 



-Part 2 



h Secretary 

2 Afghanistan: America's Course 
5 Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Chicago Address 

\1ca 

7 $787 Million Request for 
Economic and Security 
Assistance (Goler T. Butcher. 
Richard M. Mooxe) 

9 U.S. Aid to Refugees in Somalia 

I $5 Million Pledged for Rhodesian 

Refugees 

S{ Africa's Refugees (Frank E. 
Loy) 

•I Political and Economic Interests 
in Africa (Douglas J. Betniet, 
Jr.. Donald F.' McHoiry) 

'0 Southern Rhodesia Holds 

Elections (Secretari/ Vance, 
Department Statement) 

:£ t Asia 

II Refugee Coordinator Reports on 

Situation in Thailand (Victor 

Palmieri) 
13, Contributions for Khmer Relief 
Ki Thai-Kampuchea Border 

Situation (Department 

Statement) 
18 Kampuchean Relief Disrupted 

(White House Statement) 
!8 Publications 



44 CSCE and East-West Relations 

(Matthew Nimetz) 

45 Italian Prime Minister Visits 

U.S. (Joint Press Statement) 

46 U.S. Withdraws From Summer 

Olympics (White House 
Statement) 



Middle East 



47 



47 



47 
48 



51 



Relations With Islamic Nations 

(President Carter) 
U.N. Commission of Inquiry 

Established (White House 

Statement) 
Iran Chronology, February 1980 
Progress in the Middle East 

Peace Negotiations (Sol M. 

Linitwitz) 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 

1981 Program (Morris 

Draper) 



Pacific 

53 ANZUS Council Meets (D.J. 
Killeu. Andrew Peacock, 
Briati Talboijs, Secretary 
Vance, Joint Communique) 

58 Australian Prime Minister's 

Visits (President Carter, J. 
Malcolm Fra.'ter. White House 
Press Secretary's Stateinent) 

59 U.S. -Kiribati Sign Friendship 

Treaty (Message to the 
Senate) 



65 Background on U.S. Reentry 

Into ILO (Foreign Relations 
Outline) 

66 U.S. Policy on Apartheid 

(William Dunfey) 

68 U.S. Contributions to the 

UNHCR (Esther 
Coopers))! ith) 

69 Secretariat Formed for Women's 

Conference 

70 New and Renewable Energy 

Sources — 1981 Conference 
(Harry M . Montgomery, Jr.) 



Western l-lemisphere 



70 



FY 1981 Foreign Assistance 
Program (John A. Bushnell) 



Treaties 

76 Current Actions 

Chronology 

78 February 1980 

Press Releases 

78 Department of State 

Index 



:iope 



Secretary Visits Europe 
IOC Rejects U.S. Proposal on 

Summer Olympics (White 

House Statenioit) 
European Parliament 

President's Visit (White 

House Statemoit) 
Security Assistance for Greece, 

Turkey, Relations With 

Cyprus (H. Allen Holmes) 
17th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 
Spanish Prime Minister Meets 

With President Carter (White 

House Stateme)/t) 



South Asia 

60 U.S. Military Presence in the 

Indian Ocean Area (David D. 
iWeu'so)n) 

61 South Asia — Old Problems, New 

Challenges (Jane Coon) 

62 Assistance for Afghan Refugees 

(White House Announcement) 



United Nations 



63 



65 



Security Council Vote on Israeli 
Settlements (President 
Carter, Donald F. McHenry, 
Department Statemoit, Text of 
Resolution ) 

U.S. To Rejoin ILO (President 
Carter) 



DEPOSITORY 



FEATURE 




Clockivide from top: 

Abidjan, Ivory Coast 

Rubber tire plant, Tanzania dCA phoio 

by Richard Saundi-rs) 

Mosque, Niger (AID phot.>) 

Fulani woman (Museum of African 
Art. Eliot Elisofon Archives) 




itub-Saharan Africa and the 
Inited States — Part 2 



Feature 



77/ (s is the second of a two-part 
:ciisKion paper, compiled by forrner 
'ibassndor G. Edward Clark. Part 1. 
icli iras printed in the March 1980 
ue of the Department of State Bulle- 
I, focused on the geography, history, 
'people of Africa and their culture, 
d economic and political conditions, 
rt 2 examines the role the United 
ites has played i)i postcolonial Af- 
an development. 



lericans once thought of Africa as 
"dark Continent" — mysterious, 
cnown, and remote. Without colonial 
?rests or responsibilities, the United 
tes knew little of Africa and was 
tent to permit European powers to 
'ern and exploit. The United States 
, however, share in exploitation 
ough the slave trade. In the 19th 
I early 20th centuries, U.S. involve- 
nt began to increase slowly and more 
;itively through the activities of mis- 
aaries, explorers, and commercial 
'Ups. Slavery and related problems 
;an to be eliminated in the United 
■tes through the passage of interdic- 
(1 laws by the 1780s, the Civil War, 
1 passage of the 14th and 24th 
endments. World War II changed 
ny American perceptions and began 
shift U.S. priorities and policies. Af- 
i, the "sleeping giant," was begin- 
g to wake, bringing the realization 
i the United States, along with the 
t of the world, soon would have to 
e account of its potential power and 
own goals and ambitions. 
Having played a major role in 
ifting provisions of the U.N. Char- 
, which provided the philosophical 
56 for the end of colonialism, the 
ited States from that point onward 
> taken stands which reflect common 
erests and has endeavored to insure 
it the emerging countries are ac- 
•ded the opportunities which the 
ited States had in its postindepen- 
ice vears. 



IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA 
TO THE UNITED STATES 

While U.S. -Africa relations today are 
strongly influenced by humanitarian 
considerations, Africa is also important 
to the United States for the following 
pragmatic reasons. 

• Africa has political clout. In addi- 
tion to its own bloc of 45 (50 with North 
Africa) African nations, in concert with 
other nations of the Third World, con- 
stitute two-thirds of U.N. membership. 
They play an important, often decisive, 
role in most international fora, includ- 
ing U.N. specialized agencies and 
political-economic agreements of great 
importance to the United States, such 
as one now being negotiated on the law 
of the sea. 

• Africa, as indicated earlier, is 
rich in increasingly important natural 
resources — oil, copper, bauxite, 
uranium, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. 
Its largely unharnessed rivers can pro- 
vide hydroelectric power to increase 
industry and agricultural irrigation. 

• The potential exists for greatly 
increased trade and economic coopera- 
tion. While the United States needs to 
buy African raw materials, Africa re- 
quires capital investment, new technol- 
ogy, and markets for a wider range of 
other products. 

• The continent is strategically lo- 
cated; many countries possess safe 
ports, good airfields, and controlling po- 
sitions in relation to major waterways, 
air corridors, and disputed territories. 

• Continuing liberation struggles, 
political instability within countries, 
and friction between countries make 
portions of Africa a potential arena for 
large-power confrontation. 

• North-South issues, highlighting 
the poverty of most Third World coun- 
tries, if not resolved, could create in- 
creasing envy, hostility, and resent- 



ment toward the United States and 
other industrialized nations. 

• Africa assumes particular signifi- 
cance for Americans of African descent, 
who are increasingly concerned about 
many of the problems of the continent. 



U.S. POLICY 

Elements of U.S. foreign policy in- 
volving Africa have shifted from time to 
time, depending on various Administra- 
tions, changing congressional attitudes, 
and shifting circumstances on the con- 
tinent itself. To a degree, flexibility is 
desirable in order that U.S. actions can 
be responsive to changing conditions. 
Resulting moves, however, must not be 
merely reactive but must be integrated 
with long-term, worldwide goals. 
Somewhere between the inevitable 
variables and the need for consistency, 
there has emerged in the past two dec- 
ades a broad outline of U.S. policy 
toward Africa, which contains the fol- 
lowing ingredients. 

Preservation of the independence of 
African states 

Forces of African nationalism are 
vital components of African political, 
social, and economic development. 

Strong African states act as a bul- 
wark against outside intervention. 

An interrelationship exists be- 
tween political stability and economic 
development. 

Pursuit of peaceful solutions 
to African conflicts 

Armed conflict has a negative ef- 
fect on the nation-building process. 

Resort to arms drains funds from 
the development process and sets back 



Information in this article is intended to provide background for study and 
discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, 
except where the material is specifically described as such. The article sum- 
marizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of 
which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of im- 
portant issues in U.S. foreign policy. All material in this article is in the public 
domain except where copyright is indicated. 



Feature 



achievement of the goals of economic 
development. 

Armed conflict acts as an invitation 
to continued and heightened foreign 
intervention. 

Ending racial injustice 
in southern Africa 

Africa is united on the need for 
transition to majority rule; most na- 
tions favor a peaceful transition 
process. 

U.S. interests — including trade, 
access to minerals, strategic concerns, 
continued political influence — are best 
served by a peaceful transition to 
majority rule in Africa. 

Avoiding an East-West conflict 
in Africa 

East-West conflict would neu- 
tralize other U.S. goals for Africa. 

Africans themselves do not wish to 
become embroiled in such conflicts nor 
to allow their continent to be used by 
superpowers for their own purposes. 

True nonalignment by African na- 
tions is compatible with U.S. interests. 

Support for Africa's legitimate 
defense needs 

The United States is not willing to 
enter an arms race in Africa. However, 
recognizing that certain African nations 
have legitimate defense needs, the 
United States has limited military as- 
sistance programs, including training, 
in certain countries. 

Promoting respect for human rights 

U.S. concern with this issue is not 
confined to Africa. 

The United States believes that 
such respect is fundamental to the suc- 
cess of political and economic develop- 
ment. 

Promoting U.S. trade, aid, and in- 
vestment 

Most African leaders see develop- 
ment as absolute top priority. 

The Western world is best able to 
respond to this urgent need. 

A sustained U.S. response is 
needed. 

The United States needs African 
resources. 

Adherence to the foregoing princi- 
ples has contributed to African 
achievement of some of its most impor- 




Freighter African Comet in New York harbor dCA phuto) 



tant goals and a steady improvement in 
U.S. -African relations. Secretary 
Vance has credited this improvement 
to: 

Our willingness to work with African 
nations in a spirit of cooperation and 
understanding; 

Our active support for majority rule 
and racial equality in southern Africa; 

Our serious efforts to deal with the 
many economic issues which are part of the 
North-South dialogue and which directly 
affect the lives of Africans; and 

Our genuine interest in African prob- 
lems on their own terms, and not only in 
the context of East-West relations. 

Illustrative of American support 
are: the roles which the United States 
has played in conflict resolution efforts 
in southern Africa, the Horn, and 
Shaba Province of Zaire; support of Af- 
rican regional organizations (i.e., OAU) 
in their effort to deal with political and 
developmental problems; U.S. stands 
against dictatorial regimes in the former 
Central African Empire, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Uganda; increasing levels 
of U.S. assistance, bilateral and mul- 
tilateral; responsiveness to emergency 
needs, such as the Sahel drought and 
refugee problems; and efforts to pro- 
mote investment and trade through the 
Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, and special 
missions. 



POLICY ISSUES 

African countries are making pro^rt' 
on many fronts, but they still face .-^i i- 
ous problems and occasionally suffer 
setbacks in their efforts to achieve i 
tional goals. In offering economic, 
political, and sometimes moral su])]h :, 
the United States shares many of th 
aspirations and concerns of African - 
tions, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 

The question of decolonializatii)i 
following years of strife in Zimbabw 
and Namibia, has been a volatile oiu 
Closely related, and to a degree in- 
volving these countries, is the issue 
human rights, most systematically v ■ 
lated by the apartheid structure of 
South Africa but abused elsewhere ( 
the continent as well. Efforts to re- 
juvenate national unity and institute 
reforms needed to satisy post- 
independence dreams of constitu- 
tional democracy and economic pidK 
ress can be observed in Zaire and 
Nigeria. Equally pressing developnu- 
tal needs are being tackled, for exan, 
pie, in the Sahel on a regional basis a! 
in Nigeria, which is able to use its pv 
troleum and mineral wealth. The pri 
ence of Soviet, Cuban, and other (d 
munist troops and technicians in the 
Horn and other parts of Africa presei.s 
strategy concerns, not only for the P- 
ricans but for the West. 

Zimbabwe 

Zimbabwe has been the focus of iiite 
national attention for many years an 
the scene of an expanding guerrilla w 



Department of State Bull 



I 



Feature 



ce the early 1970s. A British colony 
ee 1890, it is populated by about 
;0,000 whites and 7 million blacks. Its 
ling white settlers instituted a 
Iciopolitical system that severely lim- 
d black rights. In November 1965, 
inie Minister Ian Smith announced a 
nilateral declaration of independ- 
ce" from the United Kingdom. The 
N. Security Council, with U.S. sup- 
rt, imposed economic sanctions on 
lodesia in 1966 and 1968 in an attempt 
force the Smith regime to end its il- 
al rebellion and take steps toward 
ijority rule. 

In the early 1960s, Rhodesian 
tionalists formed two rival groups, 

Zimbabwe African National Union 
\NU) and the Zimbabwe African 
ople's Union (ZAPU), which advo- 
ed majority rule. They ultimately 
•ned to guerrilla warfare from bases 
neighboring countries. Eventually a 
se ZAPU-ZANU alliance, known as 
■ Patriotic Front, was formed. Inside 
odesia, other nationalist groups, in- 
ding Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United 
•lean National Council (UANC), 
re formed. 

On March 3, 1978, the Smith re- 
le and three black nationalists, in- 
ding Bishop Muzorewa. signed the 
isbury agreement, which provided 
qualified majority rule under which 
ites would retain considerable 
ver. The external nationalists de- 
inced the settlement and did not par- 
pate in it. After elections in April 
9, Bishop Muzorewa was installed as 

first black Prime Minister of "Zim- 
)we Rhodesia." Following the elec- 
1 of Prime Minister Margaret 
itcher's Conservative government in 
y 1979, the British undertook a new 
iative which culminated in the Lan- 
ter House settlement signed De- 
iber 21, 1979, by all the interested 
ties and the British. 

The parties agreed on: 

• A new, democratic constitution 
t will institute majority rule while 
itecting minority rights; 

• A short transition period during 
ich Rhodesia would return to legality 
ler an all-powerful British Governor; 

• British-supervised elections; and 

• A cease-fire. 

The transition period, which saw a 
lining level of violence, climaxed in 



ull city well provides security for Tim- 
ttu, Mali (above right); the dry well 
lis disaster in the Sahel (below right) 

photos) 




Feature 



February with Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe's ZANU party winning a 
majority of 57 seats in the House of As- 
sembly. Subsequently, Mr. Mugabe 
took a number of steps which fostered a 
climate of reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
The date for Zimbabwe's independence 
is April 18, 1980. 

The United States has fully sup- 
ported the British throughout the Lan- 
caster House negotiations and thereaf- 
ter. The United States urged the vari- 
ous Rhodesian parties to make the 
necessary compromises that were even- 
tually required for a final settlement. 
The United States assisted in the 
British airlift to Salisbury of material 
used to monitor the cease-fu'e. Also, the 
United States has pledged $5 million to 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees for use in the effort to repatriate 
an estimated 200,000 Rhodesian refu- 
gees. In the near term, the United 
States has indicated willingness to 
cooperate in a multidonor regional 
transportation and economic develop- 
ment program for the region that will 
include Zimbabwe and its neighbors. 

Namibia 

Following World War I, South Africa 
was given a League of Nations mandate 
to administer the former German col- 
ony of South West Africa until it was 
ready to become independent. After 
World War II South Africa refused to 
place Namibia under U.N. trusteeship 
and instead continued to subject the 
black majority of its 900,000 residents 
to South African law, including apart- 
heid and racial discrimination. In 1966 
the U.N. General Assembly revoked 
South Africa's mandate and in 1971 the 
International Court of Justice stated in 
an advisory opinion that South Africa 
was obligated to withdraw its adminis- 
trator from Namibia immediately. 

Through the 1975 Turnhalle con- 
ference of representatives (acceptable 
to South Africa) from most elements of 
the territory's population. South Africa 
sought to engineer a unilateral internal 
settlement based on a weak federation 
of ethnic states. Since this plan was in- 
ternationally unacceptable, the then 
five Western members of the U.N. Se- 
curity Council, including the United 
States, began a unique cooperative ef- 
fort in 1977 to find a way to implement 
Security Council Resolution 385, passed 
unanimously the previous year with the 
intent of insuring free and fair elections 
in Namibia under U.N. supervision and 
control. 



The Western Five plan, endorsed 
by the Security Council, calls for the 
creation of a U.N. Transitional Assist- 
ance Group (UNTAG) with military and 
civilian components and withdrawal of 
South African forces before independ- 
ence. South Africa accepted the plan 
but raised problems concerning its im- 
plementation and proceeded with its 
own election of a "constituent assem- 
bly" (later "national assembly") in De- 
cember 1978. 

The Western Five have continued 
in their efforts, however, and despite 
the election have slowly gained more 
South African acceptance of the Secre- 
tary General's proposal for implement- 
ing the plan. Recent acceptance by 
South Africa of the concept of a de- 
militarized zone between Angola and 
Namibia to help monitor adherence to 
the plan is taken as a hopeful indication 
of the republic's willingness to cooper- 
ate with the United Nations. Settle- 
ment efforts accelerated in early 1980 
with the dispatch of a U.N. technical 
team to southern Africa. Near settle- 
ment of the Zimbabwe problem may 
also have a positive effect on South Af- 
rica's attitude. 

However, a transitional period 
leading to elections could be tense and 
fraught with further controversy, both 
in the delicate relations between South 
Africa and the United Nations and 
among the various aspirants to political 
power. Failure of the present initiative 
would probably increase the bloodshed 
and the involvement of outside powers. 
Success here, on the other hand, espe- 
cially coupled with success in Zim- 
babwe, could point the way toward 
amelioration of the most intransigent of 
southern Africa's problems — apartheid 
in South Africa itself. 

Apartheid 

From the establishment of a Consulate 
in Cape Town in 1799, through the era 
of British colonies and independent 
Boer republics, the Union of South Af- 
rica and finally the Republic of South 
Africa, the United States has main- 
tained official relations with the various 
governing entities. Rich in resources 
and strategically located. South Africa 
has been an important trading partner 
and wartime ally. However, during the 
past several decades, and particularly 
since the Sharpesville riots of 1960, 
U.S. -South African relations have been 
adversely affected by the republic's ra- 
cial policies, generically known as 
"apartheid" or "separate development." 



Rigidly codified and often brutally er 
forced, apartheid laws offend concept 
of racial justice and human rights hel 
not only by the United States but alt 
by the independent nations of sub- 
Saharan Africa as embodied in the U 
versal Declaration of Human Rights. N 

In order to demonstrate oppositi)! 
to apartheid and support for nonvioUM 
evolution toward racial justice, the \{ 
United States has imposed restraint; 
on its relations with South Africa. 
Among these are an embargo on arm 
sales, police weapons, and equipment 14 
and a ban on U.S. naval ship visits til 
South Africa. In the commercial fiek I 
the United States prohibits direct ||j 
Export-Import Bank loans to finance 
U.S. sales and limits trade promotio ; 
activities. ' 

The United States, like the rest \' 
the international community, has re-' 
fused to recognize South Africa's be-ij 
stowal of so-called "independence" u] rl 
the Transkei and other homelands, i^ 
homelands policy — which purports t ■' 
define all black South Africans as cit 
zens of one of the homelands — is a f 
damental element of the apartheid 
strategy. The United States has nev 
provided economic or developmental 
assistance to South Africa. 

The United States has endeavor 
to use its influence to encourage 
peaceful evolution through maintena 
of contact with leaders of all racial 
groups, through encouragement of p 
vate American firms to improve pay 
and working conditions of their blacli 
employees, and through support of co: 
structive measures in the United Na 
tions and other international bodies 
However, the effect of U.S. efforts ; 
indeed those of other countries and th 
United Nations has been limited. 

There are indications that eleme 
of the present government in South A 
rica, recognizing that their system a 
presently constituted is not viable, n' 
be willing to make minor modificatio 
in the government's racial policies. 
Near settlement in Zimbabwe and 
progress regarding Namibia have en 
couraged exponents of change withir 
the South African ruling establishme 
However, minor concessions regardi 
"petty apartheid" fall far short of ba 
demands of the black majority of citi 
zens and their international support* 
for demonstrable progress toward th 
ultimate goal of full participation of 
races in the political, economic, and 
cial affairs of the country. The intens 
of black demands and expectations ii 
increasing, along with heightened rai 



Department of State Bul!^ 



larization and growing militancy. 
is issue is the major political concern 
all of black Africa. 
The fundamental dilemma facing 

United States and other concerned 
servers is how to promote racial jus- 
e without e.xternal involvement and 
ilence, while simultaneously main- 
ning effective relations with the gov- 
iment and maintaining credibility 
:h the black leadership. Another im- 

tant policy objective is securing 
jth Africa's cooperation with U.S. 
1 international nuclear nonprolifera- 
n goals. 

rn of Africa 

e Horn of Africa, which includes 
dan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and 
fiya, occupies a strategically impor- 
(t location on the Red Sea and Indian 
pan close to volatile areas of the 
idle East. The region has become a 
ject of U.S. concern because deep- 
ted historic and ethnic rivalries have 
ipted in recent years into open con- 
t. The situation has been exacer- 
ed by the involvement of Soviet and 
pan forces, the latter now numbering 
iBstimated 15,000 troops. Two sec- 
I are particularly worrisome. 

Eritrean liberation forces, includ- 
both Moslem and Christian ele- 
its, have been waging an insurgency 
over 16 years in an effort to bring 
-determination to the Eritrean 
pie. Supported by Arab states, the 
irgents had succeeded by mid-1977 
iberating most of Eritrea from 
liopian domination. Since then, 
'iopia has endeavored to reassert its 
trol with only limited success de- 
e massive Soviet military 
istance. 

Following the replacement of Em- 
or Haile Selassie by a new revolu- 
lary Ethiopian government, Somalia 
nmenced an effort to end Ethiopian 
|e over the Somali people of the Oga- 
1 region in mid-1977. Regular Somali 
itary units were withdrawn in 1978, 
. fighting within the territory has 
itinued. 

The United States remains deeply 
icerned about the overall future of 

region, and recent developments 
^e produced a curious reversal of 
lerican relations with the countries 
;he Horn. Relations have improved 
h Somalia, which a few years ago 
3 pro-Soviet. They have deteriorated 
h Ethiopia, once a close ally and now 
reasingly involved with Cuba and 



1980 



The Horn of Africa 



Sudan 




Tanzania 



3628 2-80 STATE(RGE) 



Russia, with which it has a close mili- 
tary relationship. The United States, in 
fact, has suspended developmental as- 
sistance and preferential trade treat- 
ment for Ethiopia (although continuing 
humanitarian assistance) because of the 
expropriation without compensation of 
U.S. property. 

Consistent with general policy, the 
United States endeavors to support 
moves toward negotiated, peaceful set- 
tlement of problems in the Horn. 
Faced, however, with Soviet-Cuban en- 
couragement of military actions and 
with the growing threats to security in 
broad northwest portions of the Indian 
Ocean, the United States is increas- 
ingly willing to consider requests for 
assistance in efforts to maintain secu- 
rity in the region. 

Zaire 

Just after the Congo obtained inde- 
pendence from Belgium in 1960, the 
army mutinied, political authority 
broke down, and the Governor of 
Katanga (now Shaba) declared his pro- 
vince an independent country. Now 
called Zaire, the republic has been in- 
volved in turmoil, internal and exter- 
nal, political and economic, ever since. 
Katanga was reintegrated in 1963, but 
rebellions occurred in Kwilu and Kivu 
Provinces in 1964-65 and former 
Katangans invaded Zaire from 
neighboring Angola, first with insur- 
gent white mercenaries in 1967 and 
then on their own in 1977 and again in 
1978. Political instability in Zaire can 
have repercussions well beyond its na- 
tional boundaries due to its size, its 



Feature 



mineral wealth, and the fact that it 
borders on nine other states. 

Zaire has rich deposits of copper, 
cobalt, and diamonds; an extraordinary 
hydroelectric potential; navigable riv- 
ers; and much good agricultural land. 
Unfortunately, the economy has suf- 
fered severely from political instability, 
mismanagement, and corruption in high 
places. International debts are now far 
too large, and Zaire, with the help of 
the IMF, Belgium, France, the United 
States, and others, is trying to fight its 
way out of its economic morass. 

Many critics blame Zaire's eco- 
nomic plight on President Mobutu's au- 
thoritarian style of government. The 
United States has strongly encouraged 
current Zairian attempts to work with 
the IMF to reorganize the country's fi- 
nancial sector and to live with the fiscal 
constraints of the Fund's economic 
stabilization program. The United 
States has also urged President Mobutu 
to halt human rights abuses and adopt 
changes in the political structure of the 
country that would allow for stability 
and improve the prospect for a peaceful 
transfer of authority at such time as 
government leadership passes to 
others. 

U.S. assistance is designed to as- 
sist the needy people of Zaire as di- 
rectly as possible and to reinforce eco- 
nomic and political reform. Some re- 
form measures have been implemented 
and others announced. How well these 
will work in the long run remains to be 
seen, but there has been a start toward 
reestablishment of economic health and 
toward healing of some of the human, 
regional, and ethnic wounds that have 
plagued Zaire since its independence. 

Sahel 

The Sahel (meaning "desert's edge"), 
drought-stricken in the early 1970s and 
today suffering from continuing deser- 
tification, provides an encouraging 
example of donor countries and interna- 
tional organizations working together 
with affected countries in a coordinated 
effort to meet emergency and long- 
range development needs on a regional 
basis. The region includes those coun- 
tries which lie along the southern edge 
of the Sahara Desert — Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, Upper 
Volta, The Gambia, plus the islands of 
Cape Verde. 

The Sahel is populated by 30 mil- 
lion persons, whose livelihood depends 
largely on livestock and agriculture. 
Rainfall is scarce and erratic. In times 



Feature 



of drought rural and nomadic people 
lose their crops, pasture land, and, con- 
sequently, their herds. The immediate 
effects can be starvation and death for 
thousands. Equally serious, as fodder 
disappears, herdsmen must forage 
farther southward, thus desolating new 
belts of land. 

It was a cyclical drought which 
caused the major disaster in 1968-73, 
resulting in immense economic losses; 
the disruption of the precarious balance 
among man, animals, and environ- 
ment; and starvation. With the United 
States among the leaders, many coun- 
tries, international bodies, and private 
organizations mounted relief efforts 
which reduced the human tragedy but 
did not reach the underlying problems. 
Initially, assistance was offered largely 
on bilateral terms to countries affected, 
and they themselves attempted rela- 
tively little regional coordination. 

Out of the crisis in the early 1970s 
came two positive developments. Prior 
to that time, the Sahelian states, even 
though sharing the same ecological con- 
ditions, shaped their development plans 
in isolation from each other and indi- 
vidually sought assistance to finance 
them as well as emergency require- 
ments. Donors also failed to coordinate 
with each other. 

The drought, however, illustrated 
dramatically the regionally of the 
Sahelian ecological disaster and em- 
phasized the need for regional planning 
and solutions. Thus these countries 
formed the Permanent Inter-State 
Committee on Drought Control in the 
Sahel (CILSS) to devise a Sahel de- 
velopment program, through which 
today they work together in a regional 
framework while international donors 
pool resources, avoiding competition 
and duplication. The program is focused 
on rural populations and the deprived in 
small urban areas. Decisions regarding 
project selection are made jointly by 
recipients and donors. 

The United States has often taken 
the lead and is a major participant in 
both emergency and long-range Sahe- 
lian problems. U.S. help to the Sahel is 
based on a mix of humanitarianism and 
on an honest desire to help these coun- 
tries make economic progress (all, ex- 
cept one, are classified by the United 
Nations as economically "least de- 
veloped"). U.S. contributions for the 
past 4 years are: 1976— $39.5 mil- 
lion, 1977— $45.9 million, 1978— $80.1 
million, and 1979— $77.3 million (all ex- 
clusive of food aid). This is the largest 
U.S. aid program in Africa. 



Major West African Oilfields 



Lagos 

)-Novo 



Guff of Guinea 



awthorne Mal^hn 



ATLANTIC 



• 


Oilfield 




Oil pipeline 


■^ 


Oil export terminal 





200 Miles 





200 Kilometers 



Fernando Pol — ' 

EOUATORIAL 
/ GUINEA 
/ S Principe 

SAO TOM f 
E PRlNCIfT 

h Sao Tome 
^Sdo Tom e 




J 



W 



3632 2-80STATE(RGEI 



Department of State Bullei 



Feature 



.1 merits special attention, not as 
ntious issue, but because of its 
position in Africa and its impor- 
n the United States, 
seen from previous references, 
I has had a turbulent history 
iLc iiecoming independent in 1960 — 
eatened disintegration of the origi- 
federation, three coups placing a 
ies of military governments in 
ver, and the Biafran secession at- 
ipt in 1967. For most of this period 
country was beset by severe eco- 
nic problems, corruption, misman- 
■ment, and political wrangling. How- 
■r, the great increase in oil income 
■ing the mid-1970s and the return in 
orderly manner to civilian govern- 
nt (under a federal system much like 
t of the United States) in late 1979 
■e dramatically improved the pros- 
ts and status of this major country. 
Nigeria's population numbered at 
most recent count 79.8 million per- 
3, with estimates going over 80 mil- 
. Nigeria has a GDP of $42.7 billion 
1 a rising per capita figure of $522. 
eria plays a powerful role in the 
ted Nations, other international 
ies, and African councils. It 
ingly supports regional economic 
aeration, helps coordinate African 
itions on many issues (such as apar- 
d), and helps mediate African dis- 
?s. 

The United States is the major 
•ign market for Nigeria's -crude oil. 
eria ranks second only to Saudi 
bia as the most important supplier 
etroleum to the United States 
ch buys over 1 million barrels a day 
he highly desirable, light, low sul- 
r "sweet crude." With Nigeria's oil 
1th, it is no longer necessary for the 
.. Agency for International De- 
ipment (AID) to assist it with major 
eloi-nnent grants or loans, but 
eria does seek from the U.S. mana- 
al and technical expertise to help 
;e efficient use of its resources, 
■ign investment, and transfer of 
mology. 

Probably as many as 20,000 Nige- 
is were studying in the United 
tes in 1979. American private in- 
jtment, exceeding $335 million (book 
le — net private direct investment 
if 1977), is welcomed by Nigeria as a 
rce of managerial talent and train- 

Despite its impressive economic 
gress and political strides, this vast 
complex country still faces prob- 



lems. Even with its oil profits (over $10 
billion annually and steadily increasing) 
the Federal Government of Nigei'ia is 
saddled with debts from previous re- 
gimes and demands for improvement in 
education, health, and other sectors of 
its infrastructure. The average Nige- 
rian is clamoring for a greater share of 
the counti'y's new-found wealth. Re- 
newed challenges to the solidarity of 
the country are coming from minority 
groups and once-prominent political 
figures. Controversy, perhaps normal, 
is developing between newly elected 
President Shagari and the equally new 
bicameral Federal Legislature. 

Many other African nations are 
watching with interest Nigeria's bold 
experiment in democracy and economic 
development. So, indeed, is the United 
States, which not only relies on Nige- 
rian resources but looks to it as a 
strong, responsible voice in world 
councils. 

Human Rights 

With attention focused for so long on 
human rights violations in southern Af- 
rica, much of the world and Africans 
themselves paid relatively little atten- 
tion to flagrant excesses in various 
other parts of the continent. Serious 
problems did develop in a number of 
newly independent sub-Saharan coun- 
tries. The United States has shai'ed in- 
ternational concern over resulting vio- 
lations of human rights but is now en- 
couraged by evidence that many Afri- 
can states are taking steps to restore 
and protect the rights of their citizens. 
As mentioned earlier, a number of des- 
pots have fallen, several countries have 
returned to civilian rule, and others 
have strengthened their commitment to 
the rule of law. 

The OAU has passed a resolution 
calling for the drafting of a charter on 
human rights in Africa. The United Na- 
tions is studying the feasibility of 
creating an African human rights re- 
gional commission. Seminars and con- 
ferences on human rights matters have 
been held in Dar es Salaam, Butare, 
Dakar, Freetown, Cape Town, Khar- 
toum, Kinshasa, and Lubumbashi. 

Where human rights problems con- 
tinue to exist, the United States seeks 
to induce improvements through the 
following means: 

• Government-to-government 
communications; 

• Meetings with opposition political 
figures, exiled victims of human rights 



abuses, human rights advocates, 
lawyers, journalists, and a wide cross 
section of citizens; 

• Reexamination of U.S. assistance 
relationships; 

• Exercising votes in multinational 
development banks; 

• Support of human rights pro- 
grams in international organizations; 
and 

• Distancing the U.S. Government 
from abusive practices. 

Communism 

Communism, as espoused and sup- 
ported by foreign Communist powers, 
has been a disruptive and often de- 
structive force in sub-Saharan Africa 
for the past two decades. Initially the 
philosophy had an ideological appeal for 
the leaders of newly independent 
states, many of whom adopted Socialist 
forms of government. Later, however, 
various Communist powers — notably 
the U.S.S.R., China, and recently 
Cuba — began to exploit these fertile 
philosophical grounds, lingering an- 
ticolonialism, continuing racial dis- 
crimination, and intractable economic 
problems with escalating offers of ad- 
vice, military assistance, involvement, 
and, in a few instances, domination. 

Today, Communist influence, 
exerted through the presence of mili- 
tary personnel and economic techni- 
cians, threatens the future of several 
countries and the stability of various 
regions. U.S. interests are jeopai-dized, 
and concern is growing that Africa 
might become the stage for big power 
confrontation. 

At the same time it should be noted 
that most African states are deter- 
mined to maintain their hard-earned in- 
dependence, believing, as several Afri- 
can leaders have remarked, "Having rid 
ourselves of one form of colonialism, we 
do not intend to subject ourselves to 
another." While making gains in some 
countries (Angola, Ethiopia) the 
Soviets in particular have lost ground 
in others (Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, 
Somalia, Uganda, and Equatorial 
Guinea). 

According to the most reliable es- 
timates, there were over 41,000 Com- 
munist military personnel in sub- 
Saharan Africa in 1978. Of these, the 
largest numbers were 35,500 Cubans in 
Angola and Ethiopia and 3,815 from the 



Feature 



Soviet Union and East Germany 
primarily in seven countries. 

Communist country technical ex- 
perts were estimated at 37,225, of 
whom 18,615 were Cuban, 10,970 
Chinese, and 7,640 from the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, most of 
whom are more widely dispersed 
throughout the continent than military 
personnel. 

In the face of Communist initia- 
tives, the United States has continued 
to build relationships which appear to 
serve overall the best interests of both 
the African nations and the West. The 
thrust of this genera! approach (cited 
earlier) is to promote: 

• Resolution of those African 
problems which threaten the peace and 
provide opportunities for Communist 
e.xploitation; 

• Constructive participation of Af- 
rican nations in international fora; and 

• Peaceful economic development 
of these nations. 



ECONOMIC REL.4TI0NS 

The United States endeavors to help 
African countries in their sometimes 
successful and sometimes frustrated 
efforts to deal with their difficult eco- 
nomic problems. In doing so, American 
motives are a mi.x of altruism and 
pragmatism. In either case they reflect 
a high degree of interdependence be- 
tween Africa and America. U.S. actions 
are based on the following consid- 
erations. 

• Americans have a genuine hu- 
manitarian interest in helping African 
countries meet the basic needs of their 
people — proper nutrition, good health, 
availability of proper water, and the 
ability to achieve a decent standard of 
living. 

• Achievement of African prosper- 
ity is important because the United 
States relies increasingly on the de- 
veloping world as a market for its 
exports. 

• The United States needs African 
minerals and raw materials. 

• A good economic relationship 
with Africa can provide the foundation 
for a good political relationship. It is 
important that the United States iden- 
tify with the basic development aspira- 
tions of Africans. 



Communist Military Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978' 



Country 

Angola 

Equatorial Guinea 

Ethiopia 

Guinea 

Guinea-Bissau 

Mali 

Mozambique 

Other 

TOTAL 





U.S.S.R. 






and 






Eastern 




TOTAL 


Europe^ 


Cuba^ 


20,300 


1,300 


19,000 


290 


40 


150 


17,900 


1,400 


16,500 


330 


100 


200 


205 


65 


140 


195 


180 


— 


1,130 


230 


800 


1,330 


500 


485 



41,680 



3,815 



37,275 



15 
100 
345 

590 



'Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978^ Rounded to the 
nearest 5. 

^Mainly Soviets. Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans. 
^Includes troops. 



Communist Economic Technicians in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978' 







U.S.S.R. 










and 










Eastern 






Country 


TOTAL 


Europe^ 


Cuba 


China 


Angola 


9,910 


1.400 


8,500 


10 


Ethiopia 


1,400 


650 


500 


250 


Gabon 


75 


10 


— 


65 


Gambia 


75 


— 


— 


75 


Ghana 


175 


95 


— 


80 


Guinea 


1.035 


700 


35 


300 


Guinea-Bissau 


405 


265 


85 


55 


Kenya 


30 


25 


— 


5 


Liberia 


210 


10 


— 


200 


Madagascar 


200 


— 


— 


200 


Mali 


1,025 


475 


— 


550 


Mauritius 


15 


— 


— 


15 


Mozambique 


1,270 


750 


400 


120 


Niger 


160 


10 


— 


150 


Nigeria 


1,750 


1,625 


— 


125 


Rwanda 


60 


10 


— 


50 


Sao Tome and Principe 


260 


20 


140 


100 


Senegal 


500 


100 


— 


400 


Sierra Leone 


310 


10 


— 


300 


Somalia 


3,050 


50 


— 


3,000 


Sudan 


775 


125 


— 


650 


Tanzania 


1,365 


165 


200 


1,000 


Zambia 


5,645 


125 


20 


5,500 


Others 


7,525 


1.020 


1.090 


5,415 



TOTAL 



37,225 



7,640 



18,615 



10,970 



'Number of persons present for a penod of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to 

nearest 5. 

^More than half are Soviets; nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans. 



Department of State Bulle'r 



Feature 



The United States endeavors to 
'Ip Africans achieve national and re- 
onal Koals, while at the same time 
i-\ iiiir U.S. interests, through 
(inomie assistance, trade, and 
vestment. 

IreiKn Assistance 

■ e iflatively small (about 10'7f of total 
cnoi- assistance through bilateral and 
riltiiateral channels) development role 
(the United States in Africa through 
t> 1970s has been helpful when com- 
lieil with the cooperative efforts of 
t' cciuntries involved. For example: 

• Efforts in institution building 
1 .e helped African governments to 
f )aii(l their capacity to absorb both 
•: rate and concessional resource 

A~ These institutions include re- 
i-ih centers, universities, veterinary 
; odls, secondary and vocational in- 
•- utions, agriculture credit banks, 

• Infant mortality and longevity 

.- ti.stics have been improved by Afri- 
c countries when assisted by AID- 
1 meed hospitals, inoculation and 
i nunization programs, rural health 
a e systems, and health training. 

• Essential capital infrastructure 

f jects of African countries have been 
a ;mented by roads, bridges, schools, 

I rketing centers, ports, and railways 
tit with U.S. aid. 

• Grain exports have been aug- 

H nted and national nutrition improved 
ii several countries through the co- 
rative development and dissemina- 
t 1 of new hybrid cereals. 

• The quality of livestock has been 

II ;i'a(ied, often in joint projects. 

Increasing emphasis in U.S. assist- 
a e has been directed in recent years 
a illeviating the most critical needs of 
tl most poor. To this end, bilateral 
.■* 1 programs are designed to concen- 
:e even more than in the past on 
ise persistently serious problems: 

• Declining per capita food 
P. duction; 

• Shortage of employment oppor- 
iues relative to rapidly growing 

■ 'Illations; 

• Lack of access to health and 
el' basic services; 

• Shortage of skilled manpower 
' training opportunities; and 

• Desertification of the land and 
I'tage of energy. 

While many of the foregoing needs 
c be met on a national basis, other 
' hleins require regional cooperation 
effective resolution. In some cases 



multicountry approaches are the most 
cost effective allocation of scarce re- 
sources, such as through the Concerted 
Action for Development in Africa. AID, 
therefore, is increasingly attempting to 
address critical problems, such as those 
of the Sahel and southern and eastern 
Africa, through regional programs. 

There are other special programs, 
some of which involve AID but in other 
instances extend beyond or outside the 
agency. These include: 

• Refugee assistance — Africa has 
an estimated 4 million refugees, the 
largest number in the world. There are 
475,000 refugees in camps in Somalia as 
of January 1, 1980, with a possible 
700,000 more being outside camps. 
There are also large numbers of refu- 
gees of other nationalities in southern 
Africa, in or near Zaire, and elsewhere. 
In addition to giving refugee assistance 
to host governments, the United States 
has made major contributions to pro- 
grams administered by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 

• The Peace Corps has 2,000 volun- 
teers in Africa performing a wide vari- 
ety of humanitarian and developmental 
services on a unique person-to-person 
basis. 

• Under circumstances when 
legitimate self-defense is the criterion, 
the United States has provided limited 
military assistance to a few countries. 
For FY 1980 the United States is con- 
sidering providing $45.5 million in 
foreign military sales credits and $3.4 
million for participation in the U.S. in- 
ternational military education and 
training program. 

• From the accompanying table, it 
will be noted that U.S. economic assist- 
ance to Africa has been steadily rising, 
at rates averaging more than 20% per 
year. Bilateral assistance, not including 
military assistance or Peace Corps 
funding, will total over $600 million for 
1980 and a projected $768 million for 
1981. This does not include U.S. contri- 
butions through multilateral channels, 
which in 1978 totaled an estimated $305 
million. 

Trade and Investment 

In 1978, sub-Saharan Africa accounted 
for a mere 3.7'7f of world trade, the 
same proportion as in 1969. U.S. trade 
with sub-Saharan Africa remains small, 
accounting in 1978 for only 2.3% of our 
exports and, with Nigerian oil, 5.4% of 
our imports. 



Direct foreign investment is also 
small and stagnating. U.S. net direct 
investment in sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa) amounts to 
about $1.8 billion (mainly in oil and 
mineral extraction), which represents 
less than 5% of U.S. investments in 
South America. 

Manufacturing activities are mini- 
mal, constituting only 9% of all ex- 
ports, compared to the 43% average for 
other developing regions. 

Unfortunately barriers inhibiting 
expansion of trade and investment exist 
on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, 
these include inadequate infrastruc- 
ture, lack of economic diversification, 
shortage of economic institutions and 
expertise, deficient government in- 
vestment policies, and frequent inci- 
dences of political instability. On the 
part of the United States, there is in- 
sufficient understanding among U.S. 
firms concerning opportunities and 
ways of doing business in Africa, as 
well as difficulties in competing suc- 
cessfully with Europeans and Asians in 
the African marketplace. Nevertheless, 
expansion of U.S. trade and investment 
involving sub-Saharan Africa is in the 
interest of both African countries and 
the United States for the following 
reasons. 

• As intimated earlier, during the 
1980s the United States will become 
even more dependent on Africa's natu- 
ral resources. While large known re- 
serves have been mentioned earlier, 
many regions, which have not yet been 
explored, hold promise of additional 
mineral and petroleum wealth. 

• The U.S. trade deficit with sub- 
Saharan Africa, primarily due to oil im- 



U.S. TVade With Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1978 

($ millions) 



Ibtal Sub-Saharan trade 
of which: 

South Africa 
Nigeria 

U.S. total worldwide 
trade 

% of U.S. total world- 
wide trade 



Exports Imports 

3,371 9,965 

1,080 2,346 

985 4,977 

143,660 183,136 

2.3 5.4 



SOURCE; International Monetary Fund, 
Direction of Trade 



ril 1980 



Feature 



ports from Nigeria, was over $6.5 bil- 
lion in 1978. 

• Economic progress in Africa will 
lead to expanded markets for U.S. 
products. 

• Given the limitations on aid re- 
source flows, the private sector holds 
the potential for providing the goods, 
technology, and capital necessary for 
economic progress. 

Opportunities and hopeful signs, 
however, do e.xist for increasing U.S. 
commercial activities in the longer 
term. There is growing awareness in 
Africa of the need for workable eco- 
nomic policies, including the I'ole of 
foreign investment. These involve and, 
in some cases, rely on U.S. investment. 
Governments are seeking to improve 
their investment climate. There are re- 
newed efforts to promote regional eco- 
nomic cooperation. Total Western aid, 
while still too little to meet Africa's 
basic needs, offers direct opportunities 
to U.S. firms for sale of capital goods, 
supplies, and specialized services. 

Industrialized countries have 
begun to respond to developing coun- 
tries' demands for special trade and 
financing benefits. The U.S. gen- 
eralized system of preferences, 
various commodity pricing arrange- 
ments, expanded IMF help, and the 
Lome II Convention can lead to higher 
and more stable export earnings and 
therefore enhance African countries' 
ability to pay for needed imports. U.S. 
Government financing institutions, such 
as the Eximbank and Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, are attempt- 
ing to do more in Africa. Additional 
funding for the African Development 
Bank and Fund and any major increase 
in the oil-producing countries' aid to Af- 
rica through OPEC or the Arab De- 
velopment Bank will open more pos- 
sibilities for U.S. trade and investment. 

Additional effort, however, will be 
necessary to take advantage of the 
foregoing and other opportunities to 
promote further trade and investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa. There needs to 
be close cooperation between the U.S. 
Government and private sector. African 
governments can also take additional 
measures to create a favorable envi- 
ronment for enhanced foreign trade and 
investment ties. 



3182 



83 


87 


^^8* 


87 


105« 


105« 


53 


1003 


1405 


15 


14 


12 


486 


624 


768 


(10) 


(22) 


(23) 



U.S. Economic Aid to Africa 

($ millions) 



BILATERAL AID' 
Development Assistance 

P.L.-480 (food aid) 

Title I (concessional 

sales) 
Title II (grants) 

Economic Support Fund 

Refugees 

TOTAL 

% Increase 

MULTILATERAL AID' 

International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 

US, share 

International 
Development 
Association 

US, share 

African Development 
Fund 

US share 

TOTAL 

Total U.S. share 



'The United States also provides assistance m the form of loans from the quasi-commercial 
U.S. Export-Import Bank totaling $157 million in 1977 and $551 million in 1978 (1979-81 
figures not available). 

^"Best guess" assuming passage of FY 1980 appropriation at current conference levels. 

^"Best guess" assuming FY 1980 appropriation. Of this 60 is for southern Afnca, 40 for 
Sudan. 

"Congressional presentation level for FY 1981 . 

^Congressional presentation level for FY 1981 of which 90 for southern Africa. 50 for Sudan. 

«For Title II, FY 1981 level is estimate based on FY 1980. 

'Figures from Treasury Department. Imputed U.S. share Is roughly 25% for IBRD, ranges 
from 37% (1977) to 30% (1979) for International Development Association and from 8% to 
9% for African Development Fund. 

'Based on averaging planning figure for FY 1979-83. 

'Estimates for calendar years. 

'"Assumes U.S. share is 30%. 



583 


7888 


7888 


139 


197 


1978 


619 


7948 


7948 


188 


238'" 


238" 


228'' 


2803 


NA 


21'° 


25'° 


NA 


1,430 


1,862 


NA 


348 


460 


NA 



10 



Feature 



)N( I,USION 

uc all U.S. -Africa policy goals are 
r simultaneously attainable or easily 
: iifxed, in the 1980s the United 
t ite.-; will have to make some difficult 
oices. for e.xample: 

In endeavoring to help bring about 
S-ind development of African states, 
\11 the United States be willing to step 
I diamatically economic assistance? 
I'W liest can such assistance be used? 

What are legitimate defense needs 
( .African states; where is the line be- 
teeii self-defense and partnership in 
ier|i(iwer maneuvering? 

What are the best ways to avoid 
1 st-West conflict in Africa — more 
i)nomic assistance, investment, trade 
^ h the independent countries? 

Is there a point where the idea of 
( itlift avoidance may have to be sub- 
( linated to stop the exertion of politi- 
( control through increased military 
istance and advisers or even naked 
' ei\ ention in a strategic area? 

How can we minimize the opportu- 
; ies and gains of our global adver- 
- ies without interfering in the inter- 
r affairs of independent states? 

In an effort to end racial injustice 
i southern Africa, is the United States 
c ng all it can? What strategy is most 
1 ?ly to promote our objectives in that 
t ubled region? How? 

Ill encouraging respect for human 
I hts elsewhere in Africa, can the 
1 ited States do more in certain coun- 
t ?s where they are still being violated 
( lire or Ethiopia)? Is the U.S. house 
^ 11 enough in order to give credibility 
t U.S. demarches? 

How can the United States better 
f )mote trade and investment to the 
r tual advantage of itself and African 
c intries? 

Has the United States done its fair 
■ lie in responding to calls for human- 
1 rian assistance — for drought victims, 
t political refugees? 



( i<ii X of the complete discussion paper, 
' h-Saharan Africa and the United States, 

■ (/ /). piirvhaxed for $-.50 from the 
. pn-nilciKlciit nf'DociiiiU'lits, U.S. Gov- 
'iiiriil I'rniliiifi Office. Washington, D.C. 
iij III ,',;'■; ili.'o-nioit (.s allowed when or- 
'■niij mil (,r iiiiirc dif!cussion papers 
Silcd to Ike same address). ■ 



Background Notes 
on African Countries 

BackgroHtid Notes — a unique series of 
short, authoritative pamphlets on the 
countries of the world — are written by 
officers in the Department of State's 
geographical bureaus and edited and 
published by the Editorial Division of 
the Office of Public Communication, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 

The 47 Background Notes on each 
country of sub-Saharan Africa includes 
information on the people, land, his- 
tory, government, political conditions, 
economy, foreign relations, and U.S. 
policy. Included also are a profile, brief 
travel notes, maps, a list of principal 
government officials, and a reading list. 

Background Notes may be pur- 
chased for 75C each from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 (orders of 100 or more copies of 
the same Notes mailed to the same ad- 
dress are sold at a 25% discount). Re- 
mittances, payable to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, in the form of a 
check or money order must accompany 
orders. ■ 




hi 1980 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



Afghanistan: America's Course 



bif Secret arif Vance 

Addresf; befove the Council of 
Foreign Relatione in Chicago on March 
■i, 1980. » 

The Chicago Council on Foreign Rela- 
tions has a proud tradition as a forum 
where major world issues can be explored 
and discussed. For nearly 60 years, this 
organization has been a center of 
thought, education, and reasoned debate 
on America's course in the world. 

I want to speak with you today about 
that course. For as much as at any time 
in recent years, it is essential that our 
people be clear about our nation's goals 
and about the actions we are prepared to 
take in their pursuit. 

As long as Americans remain in cap- 
tivity in Iran, their safe release is up- 
permost in all our minds. The situation is 
now at a delicate and difficult stage. It 
would not be proper for me to comment 
on that situation in detail today. 

Let me simply say that our objective 
is to bring the present crisis to an early 
end. We expect the work of the U.N. 
commission of inquiry to contribute to 
that objective. Our hostages must be re- 
leased and safely returned to the United 
States. At the same time, we hope for an 
independent and secure Iran and have no 
desire to interfere in its internal affairs. 

Today, I want to speak with you 
about another serious challenge we face: 
Soviet aggression against Afghanistan 
and the actions we have taken in re- 
sponse. Specifically, I want to discuss the 
purposes that underlie our actions and 
how they relate to the long-term goals of 
American foreign policy. 

Let me begin by underscoring what 
is at stake. 

Because of our commitment to the 
principles of national independence, ter- 
ritorial integrity, and human rights, we 
cannot turn our backs when national 
boundaries are violated, when the inde- 
pendence of another nation is destroyed, 
when the popular will is suppressed 
through brute military force. 

What is at stake fir.st in Afghanistan 
is the freedom of a nation and of a people. 

We are concerned as well with the 
broader threat that Soviet actions pose to 
the region of southwest Asia and the Per- 
sian Gulf. We now depend upon this area 
of the world for roughly 2.">'7f of our an- 



nual imports of oil. Our allies and 
others — developing nations as well as 
industrial — are even more dependent on 
oil from this region. Approximately two- 
thirds of Western Europe's oil imports 
and three-fourths of Japan's come from 
the Persian Gulf. And we must remember 
that our own economic health is inti- 
mately tied to theirs. 

Our stake in the region, however, 
goes beyond oil, beyond economics. 

Peace and stability in the region are 
critical to the future of our friends there. 
The strength and skill we show in sup- 
porting their independence will demon- 
strate to them and to others the con- 
stancy of our purpose. This is important 
to the character of our alliances, to our 
ties to friendly nations in every region of 
the world, and to the future of our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. 

So it is entirely accurate to say that 
the vital interests of the United States — 
in fact, of much of the world — are in- 
volved in this region. An attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Per- 
sian Gulf region would be an assault on 
these vital interests. As the President 
has said: It ". . . will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military 
force." 

Not even the most penetrating anal- 
ysis can determine with certainty Soviet 
intentions in the region — whether their 
motives in Afghanistan are limited or 
part of a larger strategy. The fact is that 
tens of thousands of Soviet troops are in 
Afghanistan. The fact is that Soviet ac- 
tions have created a potential threat to 
the security of nations in the region and 
to the world's free access to vital re- 
sources and shipping routes. 

To respond firmly to the potential 
threat is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply 
to be prudent. In such a situation, our 
own people, our allies — and the leaders of 
the Soviet Union — must understand not 
only what the United States is doing in 
this crisis, but why. 

A few days ago, I went to Europe at 
the President's request to consult with a 
number of our allies about the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan. We discussed our 
common interests and our common re- 
sponsibilities. I explained how America's 



actions support five key objectives. 
Today I want to outline them briefly fi n 
you and for the larger audience beyotid 
this room. 

U.S. Objectives 

Our first purpose is to impose a heavy 
price for this aggression^because of nu 
abhorrence of what is being done to the 
Afghan people and to help deter similar 
actions elsewhere. The Soviet leadershi 
must understand that the international 
reaction to aggression wall be swift and 
firm. 

The steps we have taken — on giain 
on technology, on the Olympics, on 
fisheries, and in other areas — convey m 
determination in the clearest terms. 
These measures do not stand alone. Fur 
the Soviets are facing staunch, broadly 
based Afghan resistance. And they havi 
been condemned by the overwhelming 
majority of nations in the world. 

The measures we have taken invoh 
sacrifice — for our farmers and our busi- 
nessmen, our athletes, our scientists — 
indeed, for all of us. But the American 
people are prepared to make sacrifices f 
the peace we cherish. 

The steps we have taken are also di 
signed to move us toward our second 
goal: the withdrawal of all Soviet militai 
forces from Afghanistan. 

Let me affirm today that the sanc- 
tions we have undertaken in response ti 
the Soviet invasion will remain in force 
until all Soviet troops are withdrawn 
from Afghanistan. Let me be equally 
clear that when those actions cease — 
when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn 
from Afghanistan — our intention is to 
remove the sanctions we have imposed 
since the invasion of that nation. 

To encourage that withdrawal, we 
are also ready, as the President has said 
to support efforts by the international 
community to restore a neutral, 
nonaligned Afghan Government that 
would be responsive to the wishes of the 
Afghan people. With the prompt with- 
drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanis- 
tan, the United States would be willing 
join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a 
guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutral- 
ity and of noninterference in its internal 



12 



Department of State BuHel 



The Secretary 



fairs. Such a political settlement would 
lit an end to brutality and bloodshed in 
fghanistan. It would threaten the inter- 
Its of no nation; it would serve the 
terests of all. 

I^ut let me be frank. There are no 
;ns at this time of a Soviet withdrawal, 
anything, current signs point to the 
,intraiT, tht- Soviet buildup continues, 
;d jicrmanent facilities are being con- 
•ucti'd. 

This makes our third objective all the 
iiT important. While imposing penal- 
s fi If aggression for as long as neces- 
T, It is deeply in the interests of the 
lit I'll States and our allies to manage 
i,-;t-West relations in ways that pre- 
Vf their essential framework. 

( )ur relations with the Soviet Union 
ve been and will be essentially compet- 
,e. Our fundamental values differ Our 
ercsts frecjuently diverge. We will 
imiite our interests and our values, and 
will oppose aggression. But our corn- 
it ion must be bounded by restraint 
1 by sensitivity to each other's vital 
. ercsts. For such a relationship be- 
1 een the two superpowers is central to 
^1 ice. 

We seek no return of the cold war, of 
' indiscriminate confrontation of earlier 
,iii les. 

I We will continue to pursue our na- 
I nal interests in balanced and verifiable 
lis control agreements — in the SALT 
icess, on conventional and theater nu- 
I ar forces in Europe, on banning tests 
jfi nuclear weapons, and in other areas. 
; ecifically, the offer to negotiate an 
ftnient on limiting theater nuclear 
Its in Europe remains on the table. 
1' Soviet Union should pursue it with 

( )ur nation has benefited from the 
lis control agreements we have 
iit\ rd. In 1963, we halted poisonous 
cirar weapons tests in the atmosphere. 
e SALT I Interim Agreement froze the 
mher of offensive strategic missiles 
len the Soviets were building up in this 
.^a and we were not. The Antiballistic 
ssile Treaty headed off a potentially 

i'^tly and destabilizing arms race in 
i-se defensive weapons. 

The SALT II Treaty we have negoti- 
?d also serves America's security inter- 

t ;s. It would restrain Soviet strategic 
^grams through 1985. It would limit the 
uri' threats we will face and thus make 

1 r own defense planning more certain, 
would preserve our ability to monitor 



SALT II is not a carrot. It is not a 
stick. It stands on its own merits as an 
integi'al part of our national security pol- 
icy. It is especially important during a 
time of increased tension between the 
two superpowers. 

We remain deeply committed to 
ratification of the treaty. It is not in our 
interest to forego its security advantages. 
Nor is it in our interest, during a period 
of heightened tensions, to dismantle the 
framework of East- West relations that 
has been built over more than two 
decades. 

To help preserve this framework, 
and because we adhere to international 
law, we are not abrogating formal agree- 
ments with the Soviet Union. 

We are pursuing preparations for the 
next review Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, to be held this 
year in Madrid. We will continue our pol- 
icy of building stronger relations with the 
nations of Eastern Europe. And we re- 
main prepared to build a more stable rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union when cir- 
cumstances permit. 

Our fourth objective is to work with 
the nations of southwest Asia and with 
others to strengthen the security, stabil- 
ity, and independence of the region. 

We firmly believe that the nations of 
the region should control their own des- 
tinies. Most emphatically, we believe that 
the resources of the region belong to its 
nations and peoples. Their independence 
poses no threat to us. The threat would 
lie in the loss of their independence. 

We are strengthening our ability to 
respond swiftly and effectively if our vital 
interests are assaulted. We have in- 
creased our naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. We have held positive discussions 



independence and enhance their political 
and economic stability. It means that we 
will continue to work with others toward 
peaceful resolutions of the tensions be- 
tween nations in the region — most impor- 
tantly, between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. And it means that we will 
work to improve our relations with na- 
tions throughout the area, wherever 
there is a basis of shared interests. The 
LInited States welcomes the growing vi- 
tality of the Islamic world and sees in it a 
creative contribution to a world based on 
diversity and self-reliance. 

Our fifth goal must be to draw from 
these events a renewed commitment to 
building the basic military and economic 
strength of America. 

Our nation has initiated the most 
comprehensive modernization of our de- 
fense forces in over a decade. We will 
proceed e.xpeditiously with the programs 
underway — to modernize each leg of our 
strategic forces, to implement NATO's 
decision last December on our theater 
nuclear weapons in Europe, and to up- 
grade our conventional forces. 

Afghanistan brings the importance of 
those long-term defense investments into 
sharp focus, and it gives new focus to the 
need to increase our military mobility. 

These programs will require in- 
creased defense budgets this year and for 
the foreseeable future. We must be clear 
in our determination to meet the re- 
quirements of safety and security for our 
nation and our allies. 

Events in southwest Asia must also 
strengthen our determination to forestall 
a future energy disaster. For, quite sim- 
ply, that is what we could face. 

We should need no reminder of the 
costs and risks of our energy dependence. 



. . . the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet inva- 
sion will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from 
Afghanistan. 



viet strategic developments. And it 
mid permit our own modernization ef- 
ts to proceed. 



with nations in the area on U.S. access to 
air and naval facilities. 

Our own military preparedness, 
however, is only one element of our strat- 
egy in the region. Creating a framework 
for security cooperation in the region 
must, of its essence, be a cooperative 
undertaking. 

This means that we will work with 
the nations of the region to help 
strengthen their ability to defend their 



It fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. 
It drains our balance of payments. It in- 
creases our vulnerability. 

The message is clear. Energy policy 
is central to our foreign policy. We cannot, 
over the long run, be independent, 
strong, and free and at the same time 
remain heavily dependent on foreign en- 
ergy. 

We have made some progress in the 
past few years. Our overall oil consump- 
tion was down in 1979. So was gasoline 



pril 1980 



13 



The Secretary 



consumption. Under the President's lead- 
ership, we have taken important steps 
toward greater energy security. But, as 
the President has said, far more needs to 
be done. Gaining control over our energy 
future is an essential part of a prudent 
response to recent events in southwest 
Asia. 

National Interests 

Each of these objectives — to gain the 
withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Af- 
ghanistan, to deter further Soviet ag- 
gression, to manage sensibly U.S. -Soviet 



factories, and our farms; it is rooted in 
the determination and good sense of our 
people when they are united in a common 
purpose. For the shape of our future de- 
pends on our will and our wisdom: the 
will to respond to aggression with re- 
newed national strength and the wisdom 
to find, in our response to immediate 
crisis, a new national unity behind our 
foreign policy for the future. 

That leads me to my final point. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
has had a definite impact on our foreign 
policy — on U.S. -Soviet relations and the 
common agenda with our allies. But it 



Energy policy is central to our foreign policy. We cannot . . . be inde- 
pendent, strong, and free and at the same time remain heavily depend- 
ent on foreign energy. 



relations in a period of heightened ten- 
sions, to help strengthen the nations in 
the region, and to build America's 
strength — each serves the interests not 
only of America but of all nations which 
have a stake in world peace and stability. 
And they involve the efforts of others as 
well as ourselves. 

As we move ahead together, our al- 
hes need to know that the United States 
will remain strong. And we will. 

They need to know that we are 
committed to the common defense. We 
are, and we will remain so. 

They need to know, at the same 
time, that the United States, for its part, 
would welcome a more stable relationship 
with the Soviet Union. And we would. 

We are not asking our allies to dis- 
mantle the framework of East- West rela- 
tions. We do ask that they take measures 
designed to bring about the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to 
deter the Soviets from new adventures 
that will produce new crises. 

Detente cannot be divorced from de- 
terrence. To oppose aggression now is to 
promote peace in the future — to foster 
the conditions for progress in East- West 
relations. To assume that we can obtain 
the benefits of detente while ignoring the 
need for deterrence would be short- 
sighted and dangerous. I am convinced 
that we will not do so. 

As we work with other nations, we 
also seek the understanding and support 
of the American people behind the objec- 
tives I have described. 

America's strength lies not only in 
our weapons and our laboratories, our 



should not — it will not — turn us away 
from the fundamental goals our nation 
has been pursuing in the world. They re- 
main deeply in our national interest. 

• It is in our national interest to lend 
America's full support to the negotiation 
of peaceful solutions to regional tensions. 

Festering regional disputes fuel local 
arms races that drain resources from 
pressing human needs. They present op- 
portunities for foreign intervention and 
exploitation. And they can erupt into 
open conflicts that bring the threat of 
wider wars. Precisely because the world 
has become a more dangerous place in re- 
cent months, we will continue to work to 
defuse its dangers. 

• It is in our national interest to con- 
tinue to strengthen our traditional al- 
liances, to open new relationships — as we 
have with China — and to stay on course 
in building cooperative relations with the 
developing world. 

The best way to thwart Soviet inter- 
ference in the Third World is to pursue 
our own affirmative policy there, one that 
addresses the real interests we share in 
the freedom of developing nations — 
freedom from the dominance of outside 
powers, from the bitterness of racial in- 
justice, from the waste of regional con- 
flict, from the burdens of poverty. 

That strategy does not mean that we 
should hide our differences with develop- 
ing countries. But we can work together 
most effectively on issues of critical im- 
portance to us when they know we share 
their goals of political independence and 
economic justice. 



This approach builds on our 
strengths, for it is most often to thi' Wi 
that these nations first turn for assist- 
ance in meeting their economic and sec 
rity concerns. And this approach is uo - 
ing. There are serious trouble spots. B 
the fact is that our relations with most 
the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America are stronger today than thf\' 
have been in years. 

• And finally, it is not only in our • 
tional character but deeply in our nati( il 
interest to translate our dedication to 
freedom into practical support for hum 
liberty in other nations. 

Nations that respect the rights of 
their citizens, that are open to the e\ 
pression and accommodation of conflict .' 
views and interests, are in a stronger 
position to maintain their national bala e 
and their national independence. 

We are well aware that seething 
frustrations can explode into radicalisn 
and violence which imperil America's 
interests. But it remains true that mor 
often today, change is taking place pea 
fully, and it is leading toward human 
freedom. 

It is in our interest to be part of th 
tide. And it is in our interest to defend 
human rights when they are threatene 

Indeed, a central issue raised for f 
the world by Soviet actions in Afghani: 
tan is one of human rights: the right to 
determine one's own government: the 
right to religious liberty; the right to li 
in peace. 

We will continue to strive not to in 
pose our own institutions but to help 
others give expression in their own u a 
to the irrepressible human right to l>c 
free. 

Ultimately, the purpose and the 
measure of our foreign policy are its im 
pact on the lives of our people and othe . 

For over 200 years the United Sta 5 
has been on the side of freedom and pn ■ 
ress. While we have known the world i i 
dangerous place, requiring our strengtl 
and our vigilance, we have also known 
that it need not be a hostile one. As th< 
human condition is improved, as peoplf 
everywhere find better and more secui 
lives, the world becomes a safer place I ■ 
America. 

It is this belief that has marked th 
American character throughout the lift f 
our Republic. It remains our faith 
today. 



'Press release 52 of March 4, 19Ki). 



14 



Department of State Bullei 



t 

y|uestion-and-Answer Session 
following Chicago Address 



The Secretary 



J. "^ ou referred to your discussions 
ith French President Giscard d'Es- 
ains and German Chancellor Helmut 
■chmidt, who later, after the invasion 
f Afshanistan, issued a strong 
tatement bolstering alliance unity, 
ievertheless, many analysts have 
, ommented on the frictions within 
he alliance in recent months. How 
nified are our European allies be- 
ind you on policy in the Middle East 
nd southwest Asia? 

A. First, let me say that what we 
re talking about is a set of commnn 
hjfctives, a set of common goals. 

The principal purpose of my trip 
as to discuss with the leaders of the 
lUi- nations which I visited both our 

, ssessment of the threat we faced and 

, 1 18 short-term and the long-term goals 
s we saw them. In addition to that, we 
leii discussed the question of what ae- 
ons should be taken to achieve those 
hjt'ctives. 

Insofar as the assessment of the 
ireat was concerned and both the 

' hort-term and long-term goals, I found 
lat there was a great degree of 
imilarity — that we were, indeed, on 
le same track. When it came to the 
uestion of specific actions, there were 

, ifferences of views on some of the 
ems. I think that is to be understood 
-it is understandable to me. We will be 
ontinuing our consultations as we work 
Dgether to implement these common 
oals and objectives, and we will be 
eeking to find both common actions 
, nd parallel actions which will lead to 
he achievement of the common goals. 

I believe, contrary to much of what 
ne hears from time to time, that there 
5 unity among us. 

Q. A number of the questions, 
iredictably, deal with different as- 
lects of the situation in Iran and Af- 

: hanistan. A number complain about 
t'hy our allies allegedly haven't pro- 
ided us with more support; a number 
isk about the Olympics. Will we, in 

V^ct, go through with the boycott? 
low comparable is the current situa- 
ion to the Olympics in Nazi Germany 
n 19.36? Are we hurting our athletes 
ind ourselves more than we're hurt- 
ng the Soviets? 



A. Let me start with the latter and 
then you will have to remind me of 
what each of the others is. [Laughter] 

Insofar as the Olympics is con- 
cerned, we have taken our decision on 
the Olympics, and we have said that we 
would not participate in Olympics which 
were being held in the capital of a na- 
tion which is invading another nation. 
That decision has been taken; that is 
our decision. That is the decision that 
we will follow. 

Q. Among the critics of the Ad- 
ministration's strong response to the 
Afghan invasion have been Ronald 
Reagan and George Kennan. Kennan 
noted that from a geopolitical point 
of view, there is merit to the view 
which allegedly has been stated by 
Mr. Reagan, that it would make more 
sense to take a strong action against 
Cuba, 90 miles from our shores, than 
to seek to influence Soviet behavior 
.5,000 miles away in a country located 
on the Soviet border. What is your 
response? 

A. My response is that the sugges- 
tion by Mr. Kennan is very difficult for 
me to understand. To suggest that we 
should blockade Cuba at this point, 
with all the dangers that that would 
carry with it — and we have memories of 
that back in 1962 — does not, in my 
judgment, make sense at this time. 

I think it is very clear that there is 
a danger to our vital national interests 
and to those of our allies posed by the 
action which has been taken in Af- 
ghanistan by the Soviets in sending 
tens of thousands of troops into that 
country, is not only violating all the 
precepts of the U.N. Charter, interna- 
tional law but also the human rights of 
the people of that country, and at the 
same time, posing a threat to the sur- 
rounding countries; and as I indicated 
earlier, a potential threat also to the 
vital interests which we all have in the 
flow of oil from that important region. 

Therefore, it seems to me that is 
where we should concentrate our atten- 
tion; and that view is shared by our 
allies. 

Q. A number of questions from 
the audience follow up on your point 



about the need for a strong defense. 
People are concerned, specifically, 
about the problems with the volunteer 
military. Will the proposals for draft 
registration of young men and au- 
thority to register young women lead 
to conscription? .And do you have 
views on what should be the limits on 
women in terms of service in combat 
units? 

A. On the question of conscription 
of draft, I have very strong personal 
views. I've held them for a long while. 
They often don't agree with other 
people's views. 

I think it was a mistake to do away 
with the draft and go to a volunteer 
army. I believe not only should there be 
a draft, but I believe there should be 
universal service and that everyone 
should have to serve their government. 
I do not believe that that service neces- 
sarily has to be military service, but 
they should give at least 1 year to some 
kind of service to their country. 

Q. There is a question referring 
to the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations survey a year ago when the 
majority of the respondents expressed 
great concern about the declining po- 
sition of the United States in the 
world. When asked for the principal 
reason for this decline, the greatest 
number of respondents attributed the 
decline to the diminishing value of 
the U.S. dollar, not to growing Soviet 
military power. The question is, what 
has the Carter Administration done, 
or is it doing, to arrest the decline of 
the dollar? 

A. One of the main things which 
the Administration must do in connec- 
tion with the problem of the dollar is to 
take the necessary steps on the energy 
front, which I talked about. That is a 
key element of the actions which we 
must take there because that has a very 
major impact on what happens to the 
value of the dollar. 

In addition to that, obviously, we 
must take steps here at home to curb 
inflation, and that, I think, is obviously 
the key domestic item at this point and 
the one to which this Administration 
and the Congress must address their 
attention now and in the months ahead. 



April 1980 



15 



The Secretary 



Q. There are a number of ques- 
tions about different aspects of 
energy problems and our interna- 
tional relationships dealing there- 
with. What are the chances that the 
International Knergy Agency (lEA) 
may be made, in the reasonably near 
future, into an effective consumers' 
cartel or consumers' alliance to op- 
pose the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries'? 

A. My judgment is that the Inter- 
national Energy Agency will continue 
to operate generally as it is at the pres- 
ent time, and that is that it will serve 
as a body which can be called into ac- 
tion at such time as prices rise above 
the trigger point, when it will then be- 
come necessary for them — namely the 
20 nations that participate in the 
lEA — to share the burden which is 
being thrust upon them. I believe it will 
adhei'e to that form rather than taking 
a different form. 

Q. Many are concerned about the 
effects of the grain embargo on food 
producers and processors. The Lon- 
don Economist has argued that U.S. 
farmers or taxpayers are more likely 
to be hurt, possibly, than the Soviet 
Union. What are the economic conse- 
quences in the United States and how 
much are we hurting the Soviet Gov- 
ernment through this embargo'? 

A. On the latter question, I think 
that the grain embargo on 17 million 
tons that will not be shipped by the 
United States is having an effect and 
will have an effect on the Soviet Union. 
I believe it will also have an effect on 
some of the countries which are de- 
pendent upon the Soviet Union in this 
area, so that I think that the grain em- 
bargo, in its combined action and effect, 
will be meaningful. 



It is an action which requires sac- 
rifice, but, as I have said, others are 
going to have to sacrifice and are sac- 
rificing. This is necessary if we are 
going to take the steps to demonstrate 
our firmness and our resolve in light of 
the situation which faces us, which is, 
indeed, a critical situation. 

Q. The Vietnamese have been 
creating a good deal of havoc in Kam- 
puchea and elsewhere in the region. 
There is also the poignant question 
covered in a New York Times Maga- 
zine article yesterday on children of 
American servicemen who were left 
behind in Vietnam. How likely is it 
that we will be establishing diplomat- 
ic relations with Vietnam in the near 
future, diplomatic relations of some 
kind'? And how ominous is it that the 
Vietnamese Army will continue to 
make significant gains in that region'? 

A. I think that it is unlikely that 
we will be establishing relations with 
Vietnam in the near future. At the out- 
set of the Carter Administration, we 
indicated that we would be prepared to 
move in that direction should there be 
reciprocity on the other side. 

First, we were met with demands 
from the Vietnamese for "reparations," 
as they called them. We said, under no 
circumstances would that be done, and 
that was a block which remained in the 
way of any progress until they with- 
drew that. At about the time they 
withdrew it, however, they embarked 
upon the program of pushing out into 
the sea tens of thousands of refugees — 
the "boat people." At the same time 
that they were doing this, they were 
preparing themselves for the invasion 
of Kampuchea. 

We told them at that time that as 
long as these two actions on their part 



continued that we could not make piof 
ress on normalization. There has beer 
some progress made in the area uf tin 
boat people; there has been a 
moratorium for a period of time on th 
boat people being pushed out of Viet- 
nam. But insofar as Kampuchea is cor 
cerned, Vietnamese troops remain in 
Kampuchea and have not been with- 
drawn and, therefore, this remains ar 
obstacle. 

In the long run, we would like to 
normalize relationships, but we have 
deal with these pressing issues, and 
these kinds of issues must be removei 
before we can come to that point. 

Q. In the view of some, there is 
greater threat to world stability pos( 
by the instability that might result 
Eastern Europe through the death ( 
President Tito. Is the Soviet Union 
likely to exploit any crisis situation 
that might develop after Tito's deat! 
and seek to reverse the world balani 
of power'? 

A. The leadership in Yugoslavia 
able, strong, resolved; and we have 
confidence that in a post-Tito period, 
they can lead their nation with streng 
and wisdom. 

Insofar as we are concerned, we 
fully support their staunch position 
with respect to the importance of the 
independence, their sovereignty, and 
their territorial integrity. 

Insofar as our own relations are 
concerned, our relations with Yugci- 
slavia are good — indeed, I think they 
are deep and strong. I do not believe 
that in the post-Tito period that thrr 
is danger to Yugoslavia. It is a good, 
strong leadership, and they will be ab 
to lead their country well and wi.sely. 



Press release 52A of Mar. 4, 1980. 



16 



Department of State Bullet 



AFRICA 



$787 Million Request for 
iconomic and Security Assistance 



Statements by Goler T. Butcher, 
istant Administrator for Africa of 
AficHcy for International Develop- 
■li (Alb), and Richard M. Moose, 
ixtant Secretary for African Af- 
■s. before the Subcommittee on Af- 
I if the House Foreign Affairs 
iniiittee on February 7, 1980. '^ 



IRS. BUTCHER 

welcome the opportunity to appear 
efore this committee to discuss AID's 
:oiiomic assistance program for Af- 
ca. I acknowledge with appreciation 
le support of this committee for our 
rogram in Africa. 

For FY 1981 the Africa Bureau is 
'questing a total of $533.1 million; this 
icludes $140 million in economic sup- 
jrt funds ($90 million for southern Af- 
ca and $50 million for Sudan). 

This compares with recent AID 
vels for Africa of $219 million in FY 
)77 (which included $54 million in se- 
irity supporting assistance); $329.7 
illion in FY 1978 (which included 
110.7 million in security supporting 
5sistance); $317.2 million in FY 1979 
vhich included $53 million for eco- 
jmic support funds, and $15 million for 
frican refugees); and a planned FY 
)80 program of $455.7 million (includ- 
g $118 million for economic support 
inds). 

In addition in FY 1981 we are 
anning PL 480 programs totaling $205 
illion. This compares with $169 mil- 
an in FY 1979 and $142 million in FY 
)78. Title III programs have been 
arted in Sudan and are being de- 
jloped for Senegal in FY 1980 and 
omalia in FY 1981. We will be pre- 
aring food for development programs 

I other countries either through title 

II or title II of section 206 during the 
3ar. 

While our AID levels for Africa 
ave been increasing steadily in recent 
ears, inflation both in the United 
tates and Africa, and the addition of 
ew country programs have offset much 
f the apparent increase in resources 
j)r the Africa program. Relative to the 
|3vere problems Africa faces in the 
'980s, available development resources 
re e.xtremely limited. 

Africa's development problems, 
ften due to factors beyond the control 
f national states, are complex and in 
iiany cases worsening. These prob- 

(ipril 1980 



lems, however, can be solved. The 
sub-Saharan portion of the continent 
has the potential for self-sustaining 
economic development and for an im- 
portant economic role in the interna- 
tional community. Its markets and 
exports may now be modest in global 
terms, but in the coming two decades 
Africa's contribution can be significant 
and critical to a rapidly growing world 
demand for vital minerals — for oil as 
well as for raw materials and food 
supplies — in addition to providing in- 
vestment opportunities and new 
markets. 

Untapped Potential 

I would like to discuss further the sig- 
nificance of Africa's untapped potential. 

With world food shortages pro- 
jected to reach near 100 million tons by 
1995, Africa possesses sufficient under- 
utilized land and water resources to 
feed its growing population and eventu- 
ally to be a net exporter of food. In 
many areas only 10% of the arable land 
is under cultivation and major irriga- 
tion resources go undeveloped. 

In an increasingly energy deficient 
world, the greatest undeveloped hy- 
droenergy capacity is in Africa. Today 
80% of the population's energy needs 
are satisfied by wood burning, a factor 
which contributes significantly to 
desertification. Over time, combination 
efforts in reforestation, hydropower, 
and coal development can reduce the 
heavy economic vulnerability Africa 
faces from current reliance on cutting 
forests and costly imported energy and 
could release surplus energy for world 
consumption. 

In the past, illiteracy and unusually 
difficult health conditions have limited 
the full utilization of Africa's significant 
human resources. Today, literacy is ex- 
panding significantly, and health condi- 
tions are improving. The peoples of Af- 
rica have developed great skill in locally 
adapted agricultural techniques. If 
supplemented by outside technology, 
productivity can be considerably 
enlarged. 

Sub-Sahara Africa is, minerally 
speaking, the most unexplored of the 
world's accessible regions. There are 
known mineral resources yet to be 
exploited. There is great promise of 
new mineral wealth. The United States 
will become increasingly dependent on 
regular supplies of Africa's petroleum 
and is already.importing other strategic 



minerals, such as vanadium, chrome, 
manganese, and uranium. The growing 
interdependence between Africa and 
the United States is only beginning to 
be felt. 

The Third World, specifically Af- 
rica, was the fastest growing market 
for U.S. exports in the 1970s. We now 
sell more goods to the developing world 
than we do to Europe and Japan. One 
out of nine industrial jobs in the United 
States today is due to exports to the 
Third World. These trends, mutually 
beneficial to both Africa and the United 
States, can show continuous growth 
only if economic stagnation can be 
avoided and minimum acceptable levels 
of development progress sustained. 

Key Problems 

There are, however, serious and often 
alarming problems which, in aggregate, 
could severely inhibit Africa's potential 
for economic growth and social 
progress. 

We have highlighted, in the Africa 
overview of the congressional presenta- 
tion, the most serious of these trends 
and their implications. In this regard, 
we believe that we must take the 
necessary steps in succeeding years; 
first, to concentrate our efforts in the 
five most serious problem areas; sec- 
ond, to encourage much greater intra- 
African development cooperation; and 
third, to redouble our collaboration ef- 
forts with other Western and OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] donors and international or- 
ganizations. 

Regarding the key problems, we 
will in FY 1981 begin more systemati- 
cally to harmonize resources from all 
the development assistance accounts, 
economic support funds, and PL 480 to 
have a greater impact on five core con- 
straints in Africa. 

The highest priority will be given 
to reversing the sub-Sahara's declining 
per capita food productivity. While 
overall food production has increased, it 
has fallen behind population growth. 
We will be working with international 
groups and other donors in coming 
months to reevaluate past strategies 
and, where appropriate, to propose new 
directions. We have highlighted in the 
overview some of the important actions 
that must be taken. 

An employment strategy must be 
developed to create critically needed 



17 



Africa 



jobs for rapidly growing populations. 
The modern sector labor force in Africa 
is enlarging by more than 9% annually, 
whereas jobs are increasing by less 
than 1%. Aside from job formation in 
rural sectors, we must increasingly en- 
courage the U.S. private sector to 
assist. 

We will work to substantially ex- 
pand the public access of poor popula- 
tions to improved health and family 
planning, basic agricultural services, 
safer water, sanitation, and improved 
rural transportation systems. These are 
imperative if progress is to be made in 
social and economic development. 

We will seek broader methods of 
attacking the key absorptive capacity 
constraints in Africa, the shortage of 
skilled and trained human resources. 
Broader participation in the benefits of 
development will be sought through 
nonformal and agricultural education, 
vocational training, and professional- 
level training and greater participation 
of women in development. 

We will increase support for 
energy programs — including afforesta- 
tion, renewable energy technologies, 
and soil conservation — to begin to ad- 
dress the twin and interrelated prob- 
lems of energy shortage and desertifi- 
cation. Fifty-two percent of Africa's 
land area today is desert or subject to 
desertification, far greater than any 
other developing region. 

Even with our most efficient con- 
cent.*ation on these core constraints, we 
are seeking more and more to facilitate 
new forms of intraregional development 
cooperation between African states. 
Since 1970 trade between African states 
has declined from 18% of all trade to 
12%. At a recent colloquium on trade 
and investment opportunities in Africa, 
U.S. companies identified the 
phenomenon of small national markets 
in Africa as a major disincentive to 
U.S. private investment. Many of Af- 
rica's difficulties today stem from the 
colonial fragmentation of the continent. 

Today, increasingly, there is rec- 
ognition by donors and Africans of the 
need to institutionalize African subre- 
gional cooperation, resolve common 
problems, exploit common resources — 
such as river basins — engage in selec- 
tive market integration, and participate 
in joint projects that address national 
priorities. We will increase our support 
to African efforts in economic and de- 
velopment cooperation. 

For instance, in southern Africa 
the five front-line states are working 
together on a plan for a systematic 



process of cooperation, starting in 
transportation and later moving to 
other areas in agricultural research, 
food production, livestock diseases, and 
technical training. They have indicated 
their desire that Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Malawi, and eventually independent 
Zimbabwe and Namibia join in this im- 
portant precedent. These fledgling 
steps initiated by the front-line states 
in pluralistic approaches to economic 
cooperation merit the strongest sup- 
port. 

In FY 1981, we are proposing new 
regional programs in transportation 
and technical education to support the 
southern African initiatives. These new 
regional programs will also provide us 
the means, if appropriate, to respond to 
assistance requirements of a new 
elected government in Zimbabwe 
within the framework of the priority 
regional development concerns. 

We will continue to support similar 
region-specific forms of collaboration in 
the Lake Kivu crescent, among the 
Economic Community of West African 
States, and in East Africa. 

As I turn to the issue of project 
evaluation and program impact, I would 
like to recall the development situation 
which confronted most African nations 
at independence. 

Development Situation 
in the 1960s and 1970s 

There were very few institutions of 
higher learning, virtually no agricul- 
tural research institutions working on 
food crops, and extremely limited major 
infrastructure and health care services. 
Disease was widespread, illiteracy per- 
vasive, and the departure of colonial 
technicians left services and facilities 
unfunctioning in many countries, as few 
if any Africans had been prepared for 
higher level positions. These were be- 
ginnings not faced in most other de- 
veloping regions. 

In the 1960s, U.S. assistance to Af- 
rica was very limited and represented 
between 3% and 4% of total worldwide 
U.S. aid. 

The primary objective of U.S. eco- 
nomic assistance in Africa through the 
1960s and early 1970s was to help de- 
velop the manpower, limited infrastruc- 
ture, and institutional bases for short- 
term national integration and eventual 
efforts of macroeconomic development. 
Progress toward achieving these objec- 
tives is indicated by the following ac- 
complishments. 



In Nigeria AID financed contract 
teams from a dozen U.S. universities 
cooperated with Nigeria to expand 
facilities to reshape the Nigerian educ; 
tion system. Teacher-training institu- 
tions were expanded or created. Com- 
prehensive secondary schools were 
developed at Ayetoro and Port Har- 
court offering, for the first time ever i 
Nigeria, vocational and commercial 
courses. A technical college was de- 
veloped at Ibadan. Several faculties o 
agriculture were developed, as well as 
school of veterinary medicine. Consid- 
erable effort was devoted to establish 
ing and training the faculty for the 
University of Nigeria — now with ap- 
proximately 7,000 students. 

Vocational training institutions 
were established in Togo, Guinea, 
Zaire, Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, ar 
Niger by 1965. 

By the early 1970s, AID had sup- 
ported the establishment or expansioi 
of the faculties of eight higher educa- 
tion and 26 subprofessional institutioi 
in Africa (including teacher-training i 
stitutions). In the period 1960-70, AI 
assisted in building institutions — 
including 15,000 classrooms housing 
800,000 students — in which agiiculture, 
education, and veterinary medicine <\i 
grees have been granted to 3,000 stu- 
dents and certificates awarded to 
another 14,000 during the period and in 
which in-service training had been pr 
vided to more than 100,000 teachers 
and training in U.S. or third-country 
institutions of higher education was 
provided to 14,000 participants. 

One hundred million people in We 
and central Africa have been vaccinate 
against smallpox. The disease was 
eliminated from the area. (Later, witl 
U.S. assistance, the World Health Or 
ganization eliminated smallpox from 
Ethiopia and Somalia and, with the sui 
cessful conclusion of these campaigns, 
eliminated it entirely from the face of 
the Earth.) 

Twenty million children in West 
and central Africa have been protecte 
from measles. 

More than 5 million people in 
Ethiopia were protected from malaria 
and new farm lands were opened in 
areas earlier affected by malaria. 

In infrastructure in the decade of 
the 1960s, the Volta hydroelectric proj- 
ect and related projects added 500, 00( 
kilowatts of electric power generation 
and added considerably to (Ghana's in- 
dustrial potential. 

Throughout Africa road systems 
were extended by 8,500 miles. AID 



16 



Department of State Bullet 



Africa 



uirticipated with other donors in con- 
tiikting the Trans-Cameroon Railway 
\lii( h has contributed substantially to 
'amt'i-oon's impressive growth rates. 
The programs started in the mid- 
97(is in response to the new directions 
iiHiKJate, the Sahelian drought, and the 
oiK-ern over the plight of the southern 
African states are still too new to de- 
ermine the full magnitude of their im- 
lact. There has already been a discern- 
ble increase in food production in the 
Sahel. 

'.S. Programs 

iID together with numerous other 
onoi's has been deeply involved in this 
ffort. In addition assistance to agricul- 
ure research has increased with the 
reation, in Africa, of the International 
nstitute for Tropical Agriculture and 
he International Livestock Center for 
kfrica. Applied research in cereal 
rops — rice, maize (corn), sorghum, and 
lillet — has been expanded. Seed mul- 
iplication programs are being sup- 
orted in every region of the continent. 

In Kenya AID assisted in nearly 
ripling the numbers of Agriculture Fi- 
ance Corporation loans made to small 
irmers in the period 1971-79 (from 
0,000 to 30,000). In addition AID con- 
ributed significantly to the successful 
esearch efforts leading to the introduc- 
ion and widespread utilization by small 
irmers of Kenyan hybrid maize which 
icreased small-holder production by as 
luch as 25% per hectare. 

In Tanzania AID has assisted in in- 
titutionalizing the capability to train 
laternal child health aides to staff 
,600 rural dispensaries and 184 rural 
ealth centers throughout Tanzania. It 
5 estimated that 70-80% of women of 
hildbearing age are attending mater- 
al child health clinics staffed by these 
rained aides. 

Overall literacy rates in Africa 
ave risen rapidly and health programs 
lave been steadily lowering infant mor- 
ality and adult morbidity. 

But our expectations of impact and 
access should be evaluated with an 
listdrical perspective. Our general as- 
istance policies of the 1960s and even 
•arly 1970s held that the former colo- 
nial powers were primarily responsible 
or assisting Africa's development, 
tloreover, policies were accepted that 
•oncentrated U.S. assistance to Africa 
n only 10 of the now more than 46 



countries. AID had virtually no bilat- 
eral programs in Francophone and 
southern Africa until the 1970s. 

New U.S. Initiatives 

The program for which we are re- 
questing your support recognizes the 
role of AID as a catalytic though minor 
donor in Africa. In terms of overall as- 
sistance flows to Africa, AID will pro- 
vide in FY 1981 approximately 8%. We 
believe, however, that our programs 
fall into the areas of the most critical 

U.S. Aid to Refugees 
in Somalia 

Two cargo planes carrying 166,000 
pounds of medical supplies arrived in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, on January 23, 
1980. These shipments, worth about 
$313,000, are the first deliveries of 
nonfood aid for relief of refugees in 
Somalia. The U.S. Government has 
pledged $2.5 million in nonfood aid to 
meet refugee needs as determined by 
the Government of Somalia and the 
U.N. High Commission for Refugees. 
Future shipments, which will be coor- 
dinated by the Office of Foreign Disas- 
ter Assistance, will include blankets, 
tents, cloth, used clothing, and kitchen 
utensils. 

While the problem of refugees in 
the Horn of Africa is severe, it has re- 
ceived little publicity. There are more 
than 475,000 refugees in camps in 
Somalia, and there may be as many as 
700,000 living outside the camps. A re- 
cent U.N. study estimates the number 
in camps will reach 600,000 by the end 
of this year. That could mean over a 
million refugees in a country whose 
normal population is estimated at 4 
million. Most of the refugees are 
nomads or subsistence farmers fleeing 
the fighting in Ethiopia. Their plight 
has been aggravated by poor "short 
rains" this past autumn. 

In addition to nonfood aid, the 
United States, through Food for Peace, 
is providing 13,400 metric tons of vari- 
ous food commodities worth about $3.7 
million. These shipments should begin 
arriving in February. Requests for ad- 
ditional assistance are under considera- 
tion by the U.S. Government. 



Press release 18 of Jan. 23, 1980. 



priorities and where the United States 
has special capabilities. Our assistance, 
hopefully, can be the linchpin in ren- 
dering other donor assistance more ef- 
fective. In this regard, we are par- 
ticipating in several new initiatives. 

In December 1979 the concerted 
action program for Africa was an- 
nounced. Through this process of con- 
certation with the five major Western 
donors, in close collaboration with Afri- 
cans, more concentrated resources can 
be brought to bear in major programs 
of a regional nature that might not get 
underway in a normal bilateral project 
approach. 

In June of this year we will meet 
with other Development Assistance 
Committee donors, six OPEC nations, 
and with Africans to consider some key 
problem strategies in food production, 
energy, transportation, and employ- 
ment. We will present to the OPEC 
funding sources a number of projects 
for cofinancing. We believe that 
mechanisms can be found to assist the 
OPEC funds in designing projects so 
that OPEC's low rates of disbursement 
to Africa can be consistent with their 
pledges. 

In southern Africa, the southern 
African development analysis, sent to 
Congress in April 1979, was completed 
in close cooperation with Africans and 
other donors. As a result there are sev- 
eral projects that will be undertaken as 
multidonor programs. The major effort 
will be in transport rehabilitation, the 
critical short-term problem of the area. 

Later this year we will be en- 
couraging the organization of a "coming 
together" of donors and African states 
to completely reevaluate our collective 
approaches to food production, to see 
where and how the currently declining 
per capita food productivity trends can 
be reversed. No other economic prob- 
lem in Africa has higher priority. 

In Africa today we find a continent 
with the capability of sustaining its 
socioeconomic growth and contributing 
to U.S. and global needs. In Africa 
today we find a continent with the re- 
sources and markets increasingly 
needed by the United States and other 
Western countries. But this potential is 
shadowed by the fact that Africa today 
lies squarely in the path of the food, 
energy, and ecological crises projected 
for the world as a whole later in this 
century. Moreover, the indivisible link 
between U.S. political and economic 
interests and African development is 
now a demonstrable fact. 

We must, therefore, redouble our 
efforts to participate with Africa in the 



aril 1980 



19 



Africa 



fullest realization of the continent's 
human and economic potential. The FY 
1981 budget before you is an important 
first step in the initiation of such a pol- 
icy for the 1980s and 1990s. 



MR. MOOSE 

It is a pleasure to appear again before 
this committee which has done so much 
to promote an effective and enlightened 
policy toward Africa. 

Recent events, especially in 
Rhodesia, offer convincing evidence 
that the basic direction of this Adminis- 
tration's policy toward Africa is sensi- 
ble and sound. We are under no illusion 
that there are many problems that re- 
main, both in southern Africa and 
elsewhere on the continent; however, 
we are convinced that in the long run, 
our national interest and the interests 
of African states are best served by our 
continued contributions to the growth 
of strong, economically viable nations in 
Africa. 

Our efforts, therefore, will con- 
tinue to be directed toward that end 
through our development assistance, 
through the economic support fund, 
through our security assistance, and 
through our contributions to interna- 
tional development lending institutions. 

Aid alone, however, is not suffi- 
cient: There is an equal if not greater 
need for more U.S. trade and invest- 
ment. Far more than is the case on 
other continents, Africa's economic 
strength will depend on transnational, 
regional cooperation. We hope to use 
our resources to encourage regional 
economic cooperation as well as de- 
velopment on a national basis. 

At the moment, our diplomacy has 
the following major goals: 

• To help consolidate the historic 
breakthrough achieved at Lancaster 
House; 

• To carry forward our negotia- 
tions toward an internationally accept- 
able transition to majority rule in 
Namibia; 

• To continue to promote the con- 
cept of human rights in Africa and, 
most specifically, in South Africa; this, 
of course, includes our efforts to assist 
refugees throughout Africa; and 

• To assure that key African states 
remain willing to support us in our ef- 
forts to protect and promote a peaceful 
international political order. 

Our economic and security assist- 
ance programs in Africa provide tangi- 



ble resources without which policy must 
remain rhetoric. The proposed total for 
FY 1981 is $787 million. This includes 
$393 million in development assistance, 
$140 million in economic support funds, 
over $205 million in PL 480 food aid (in- 
cluding titles, I, II, and III and our 
contribution to the World Food Pro- 
gram but not emergency feeding pro- 
grams), and over $49 million in military 
aid — $45.5 in foreign military sales 
(FMS) credits, and $3.7 for the interna- 
tional military educational and training 
(IMET) program. 

Mrs. Butcher has described for you 
the objectives that we hope to achieve 
with $393 million in development as- 
sistance. I shall concentrate my re- 
marks on our proposals for economic 
support funds, FMS, and IMET for FY 
1981. 

Economic Support Funds 

Our economic support funds will pro- 
vide the underpinning for our policy in 
two critical areas — the Sudan and 
southern Africa. For the Sudan the 
proposed level of $50 million is the same 
as that requested for FY 1980. For 
southern Africa we are requesting $90 
million, an increase of $22 million over 
what we hope will be appropriated for 
FY 1980. 

In the Sudan, President Nimeiri 
has been supportive of the search for 
peace in the Middle East and of our ac- 
tions on both the Iranian and Afghan 
crises. He has demonstrated an equally 
courageous commitment to develop- 
ment in spite of the fact that the initial 
measures required, such as price 
stabilization, have e.xposed him to 
domestic political risk. Our $50 million 
in economic support fund assistance, 
which takes the form of financing com- 
modity imports vital to development, 
will help the Sudan overcome one major 
development constraint — a severe and 
continuing balance-of-payments short- 
age. It is designed to complement and 
support our project and PL 480 assist- 
ance (including a title III food for de- 
velopment program) and to support the 
economic reforms suggested by the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. 

The remaining $90 million in eco- 
nomic support funds will be devoted to 
development in southern Africa. As you 
are all aware, the next few months may 
determine whether or not we are, in 
fact, entering a new era in this region. 
We currently face the twin challenges 
of fragile independence for Zimbabwe 
and economic reconstruction in the re- 
gion. As you all know, residual hos- 



tilities and suspicions continue to 
threaten the momentum toward peace 
Our support, both economic and politi- 
cal, will continue to be required even 
more in the future than it has been in 
the past. 

The economic support fund pro- 
gram for southern Africa will support 
the peace in several ways. 

• It will provide an immediate re- 
sponse to humanitarian needs gener- 
ated by conflict and resettlement. 

• It will stimulate development b 
easing immediate balance-of-paymeiit 
constraints and facilitating the impm-ti 
tion of essential commodities. 

• It will foster an integrated, re- 
gional approach to rehabilitating and 
extending regional transportation link 
upon which sustained development in 
this area must depend. 

In short, our aid will both respon^ 
to and reinforce the basic desire for 
economic progress, which can be 
achieved once peace and stability com 
to the region. 

Three countries will be the direct 
bilateral recipients of southern Africa 
economic support funds. In Zambia th 
money will be used for programs ainn 
primarily at financing imports of com 
modities required for increasing food 
production and covering foreign ex- 
change shortfalls. In Mozambique our 
assistance will support improved farn 
production and enhanced food distribi 
tion and storage capacity. In Botswai 
we will continue to support transport; 
tion, food production, and rural de- 
velopment projects. 

We realize that aid to Mozambiciu 
is controversial. There are continuiiijz 
signs that despite its Marxist ideology 
the Mozambican regime is attempting 
to build a sound basis for economic 
progress and wants expanded econom 
contact with us. We believe that U.S. 
aid will encourage such pragmatism ar 
enable Mozambique — which provides 
vital transport links between the sea 
and South Africa and four other state 
in the region — to play the constructiv 
role that it muxt play in order to sup- 
port the economic consequences of iht 
peace. I should add that Mozambique 
made a significant contribution to the 
success of the negotiations at Lancasti 
House, particularly in their final 
stages, and since then the Governmeri 
of Mozambique has cooperated with 
[British Governor] Lord Soames' ad- 
ministration in Salisbury. 

As you can see, our economic sup 
port fund aid to southern Africa is de 
velopmental in its orientation. 



20 



Department of State Bullet 



Africa 



In addition to the bilateral pro- 
ams I have just described, we are 
opiising a regional program aimed at 
rengthening efforts toward closer 
lonomic coordination by the countries 
. southern Africa. Improvement of the 
ansport system, as well as manpower 
•aining, are high priority sectors to 
lich we intend to contribute. Beyond 
is, however, the economic support 
nd program is intended to support an 
. plicitly political scenario — the 
aceful reintegration of southern Af- 
•a. It also provides us with the flexi- 
lity that we need to deal with the un- 
pected. This brings me to my final 
bject, Zimbabwe. 

At the time of the Lancaster House 
iks, the United States indicated that, 
bject to congressional approval, it 
mid be prepared to cooperate in a 
dtidonor effort to assist in the ag- 
■ultural and economic development of 
. independent Zimbabwe within the 
imework of a wider development con- 
3t for southern Africa as a whole. 
ir planning in this effort is at a very 
eliminary stage. The regional ac- 
■ ities I have just mentioned would 

■ ovide solid benefits for Zimbabwe. 
illowing discussions with the new 

: vernment, expected to be formed in 
. irch, we will be in a better position to 
I icuss in specific terms the needs of 
■' s new nation and our assistance al- 
•natives. 

Finally, let me mention the pro- 
sed worldwide special requirements 
id (if ,$50 million that the Administra- 
n is proposing for FY 1981. It is de- 
;ne(i to enable the President to re- 
inii quickly to unforeseen situations 
such as economic problems resulting 
im |)olitical upheavals, balance-of- 
;yments crises, or natural disasters — 
" :urring between budgetary cycles. 
' hile we cannot predict now to what 
es such a fund will be put in Africa 

■ ring FY 1981, I am sure the commit- 
? can appreciate how welcome such a 
ad would have been to us for use in 

"untries such as Uganda and Equato- 
■:il Guinea in FY 1980 and how impor- 

rtt it could be during the next fiscal 

lar. 

MS and IMET 

Bt me begin my testimony on our pro- 
ised security assistance programs for 
^ 1981 by explaining briefly how we 

'termine which countries should be 
oposed for an FMS program and the 

'Intext in which our African programs 

•I'erate. 



A number of factors are weighed 
and balanced before we determine that 
the security of the United States and 
world peace would be promoted 
through our entering into an FMS re- 
lationship with a given country, 
whether it be in Africa or elsewhere. 
These factors include, but are not lim- 
ited to: 

• Our political and economic re- 
lationship with that country; 

• The nature of the threat posed to 
its security; 

• The nature of its defense supply 
relationships with other nations; 

• A possible desire to facilitate 
U.S. access to a country's military 
facilities; and 

• The priority of the country 
within the region and on a worldwide 
basis. 

In the International Security As- 
sistance Act of 1979 (Section 18, PL 
96-92), the Congress expressed its 
opinion that the problems of sub- 
Saharan Africa are primarily those of 
economic development, that U.S. policy 
should assist in limiting military con- 
flict in that region, and that the Presi- 
dent should exercise restraint in selling 
or providing financing for defense arti- 
cles and services to that continent. 

To date, we have pursued a policy 
of arms restraint in Africa, and we have 
not wished to become involved in an 
arms race on that continent. We have 
done so despite the massive transfers of 
arms by Soviet bloc nations to Africa 
since 1975. While we continue to be- 
lieve that it is in our — and Africa's — 
long-term interests to direct our pri- 
mary efforts to fulfilling the basic eco- 
nomic and developmental needs of Afri- 
can nations, we realize that events 
elsewhere in the world, especially to 
the northeast of Africa, are having an 
impact upon the African Continent it- 
self. We cannot ignore those events nor 
can we turn a deaf ear to requests from 
friendly African nations for the up- 
grading and/or expansion of their mili- 
tary establishments. 

For FY 1981, we are proposing an 
FMS program totaling $45.5 million and 
IMET programs totaling $3.7 million. 

In the time remaining, I would like 
to review briefly with you our major 
country programs. Before I do so, how- 
ever, let me say a brief word about our 
IMET programs. For FY 1981, we are 
proposing IMET grants for 20 African 
nations. The value of these programs 
cannot be measured in dollar terms. 



Through IMET, we are able each year 
to bring to U.S. military schools African 
officers who often return to their coun- 
tries to play leadership roles. The edu- 
cation they receive, the friendships 
they make, the impressions of the 
United States with which they return, 
all contribute to making this program 
one of our least costly but nevertheless 
most important. 

For FY 1981, we are proposing an 
FMS program of $30 million and an 
IMET program of $746,000 for the 
Sudan. 

As you are well aware, the Sudan, 
under the leadership of President 
Nimeiri, has played and continues to 
play a crucial role in inter-African af- 
fairs and as a bridge between Africa 
and the Middle East. President 
Nimeiri's support for the Camp David 
accords is a matter of record. Domesti- 
cally, the Government of the Sudan has 
followed a policy of political reconcilia- 
tion, an ambitious economic develop- 
ment program coupled with economic 
reforms and efforts to assist with a 
growing refugee population numbering 
over 350,000 persons. 



$5 Million Pledged 
for Rhodesian 
Refugees 



On January 23 the Department of State 
notified the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) that in response to 
its appeal of January 14, the United 
States would pledge a total of $5 million 
to that organization for use in the re- 
patriation of the more than 200,000 
Rhodesian refugees. The UNHCR, 
which is coordinating the refugee re- 
patriation effort in cooperation with 
other international organizations, in- 
cluding the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, expects to begin this 
operation later this month. 

The return of refugees to Rhodesia 
was an integral part of the Lancaster 
House agreement on a settlement of the 
Rhodesian conflict. The United States 
fully supports the complete and suc- 
cessful implementation of that accord. 
It is our hope that our support of the 
return of refugees and their reestab- 
lishment in their nation will contribute 
to the ongoing process of reconciliation 
and peaceful change in Zimbabwe. 



Unnumbered press release. 



oril 1980 



21 



Africa 



We believe strongly that it is in our 
national interest to support the Gov- 
ernment of Sudan. Sudan is expected to 
use the FMS funds to finance a military 
modernization program. The Govern- 
ment of Sudan may wish to purchase 
engineering and air defense equipment 
and other equipment, such as armored 
vehicles and artillery for self-defense. 

The proposed IMET program, 
which would provide some 50 officers 
with professional/technical training in 
U.S. military schools in FY 1981, com- 
plements the acquisition of U.S. 
weapons and provides training in the 
essentials of modern military manage- 
ment. 

The stability and economic 
strength of Zaire are important to the 
United States and our Western allies. 
We cannot agree with those who would 
have us wash our hands of Zaire's 
problems. To do so, we believe, would 
not be in our national interest. Instead, 
our policy begins with the premise that 
Zaire's strategic location, as well as its 
deposits of strategic minerals, renders 
that country's welfare important to us. 
Zaire's economic problems remain 
acute, as do its problems related to 
political participation and military ac- 
countability. Our position is that, to- 
gether with our allies and the interna- 
tional financial institutions, we shall 
continue to assist Zaire's efforts to cor- 
rect these problems as long as sus- 
tained progress is also made by the 
Government of Zaire in these same 
areas. 

Our security assistance program 
for Zaire has already proven valuable in 
both Shaba invasions, when U.S.- 
provided spare parts, petroleum prod- 
ucts, rations, medical supplies, and 
C-130s were of considerable assistance 
to the Zairian Armed Forces. We con- 
tinue to be receptive to the Govern- 
ment of Zaire's request for modest se- 
curity assistance and, in cooperation 
with our allies, expect that this assist- 
ance will contribute to the creation of a 
more disciplined and mobile armed 
forces. For FY 1981 we are proposing 
FMS financing of $8 million, which we 
expect the Government of Zaire to use 
for the maintenance and support of 
previously supplied C-130 and Cessna 
aircraft, as well as U.S. -origin trans- 
port communications equipment. Zaire 
may also request financing to purchase 
ammunition and basic transport and 
communications equipment for those 
brigades currently being trained by the 
French and Belgians. 

Our proposed $897,000 in IMET for 
Zaire includes command and staff 



college-level courses plus a broad pro- 
gram in basic and advanced military 
operations, logistics, and maintenance. 

We are proposing a $1 million FMS 
program and a $50,000 IMET pro- 
gram for Cameroon. For a nation 
which has played a lead role in interna- 
tional fora as a moderate, and one 
which has made considerable progress 
in economic development, our modest se- 
curity assistance is designed to help 
strengthen Cameroon's defense 
capabilities and help diversify its 
sources for defense purchases. We ex- 
pect Cameroon to request use of these 
proposed funds to purchase jeeps, 
trucks, communications equipment, and 
spare parts. The proposed IMET pro- 
gram would provide training for four or 
five officers in engineering, logistics, 
and communications courses. 

We are proposing a $1.2 million 
FMS program and a $249,000 IMET 
program for Liberia, whose small 
Armed Forces depend almost entirely on 
U.S. assistance for equipment and mili- 
tary training. For one of our oldest and 
closest friends in Africa, U.S. support 
is designed to contribute to the modern- 
ization of Liberia's Armed Forces. Our 
proposal is, indeed, a modest one. 
Liberia has supported the United 
States in many ways: through its mod- 
erate positions in international fora, 
through the responsible leadership 
exercised by President Tolbert at home 
and in the Organization of African 
Unity, and through the important 
communications facilities we maintain 
in Liberia. We expect the Liberian 
Government to request FMS training to 
purchase support vehicles, field and 
engineering equipment, and mortar and 
small arms ammunition. Some of these 
credits may also be used for military 
housing construction. The IMET pro- 
gram would provide training for offi- 
cers in operations, maintenance, and 
supply courses in the United States or 
one military training team to train a 
unit of personnel in Liberia. 

The $500,000 proposal FMS and the 
$30,000 IMET program are designed to 
improve Botswana's ability to defend 
its neutrality and control its borders. 
The small defense force Botswana 
formed in 1977 for border patrols re- 
quires additional vehicles and equip- 
ment. A small but well-equipped border 
defense force can be important in help- 
ing secure Botswana's territory from 
those who would use it for infiltration 
purposes. 

For FY 1981, we are proposing 
new FMS programs in four countries — 



Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and Gabon. ^ 
are modest programs, and their total 
value is $4.8 million. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee hi 
will be available from the Superintendent 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 



Africa's Refugee: 



by Frank E. Loy 

Statement before the SubcouiDiitt 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affni 
Committee on February 13, 1980. An 
bassador Loy is Deputy U.S. Coor- 
dinator for Refugee Affairs.^ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
discuss assistance for African refuget 
As you are well aware, refugee prob- 
lems are of an immense magnitude in 
Africa. Yet they are often over- 
shadowed by developments in other 
parts of the world. In the past, this 
subcommittee has played a key role i 
focusing attention on African refugee 
problems, as well as in generating co 
gressional support for increased U.S. 
contributions for both bilateral and 
multilateral refugee assistance. I lool 
forward to working with you to makt 
sure that the United States does all i 
can do to strengthen international rel 
efforts in Africa. 

This hearing is particularly timel 
because just 2 days ago Karl Beck, tl 
officer responsible for Africa in the 
State Department's Office of Refuget 
Programs, returned from a 2-week tr 
to the Horn of Africa to assess currei 
needs and the adequacy of existing in 
ternational relief programs and con- 
tingency planning. 

This hearing is also timely becau; 
recent developments in southern Afri 
and the Horn have forced the interna 
tional community to reassess the nee( 
for outside refugee assistance in Afric 
On January 14, 1980, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 
issued a special appeal for Zimbabwe: 
repatriation. In the next few days, w 
expect the U.N. Secretary General tc 
issue a sizable appeal for assistance t^ 
Somalia. 

To date, the Administration has 
requested a total of $95 million in fod 
and nonfood aid for African refugees f 
FY 1980. The nonfood items are valuf 
at $49.85 million. Of this, we already 



22 



Department of State Bullei 



Africa 



lavf contributed $16.9 million to the 
•e.trular African program of the 
'XHCR. This figure represents one- 
hird of the UNHCR's announced 1980 
')udget for Africa of $50.3 million. 

The urgency we attach to African 
•efugee needs is reflected in the fact 
hat we already have contributed all of 
lur one-third contributions this early in 
he year. At the same time, we have 
■ommitted $5 million of section 533 eco- 
lomic support funds to the UNHCR's 
'lippeal for Zimbabwean repatriation 
ind have received assurance that our $5 
nillion, together with the amounts con- 
ributed by other donors, will insure 
de()uate funding for the current phase 
f that operation. 

Meanwhile, we are aware that due 
the situations in Somalia and 
Isewhere in Africa, the UNHCR at 
iresent is undertaking a substantial re- 
ision of his African budget, and we al- 
eady have begun the contingency 
' lanning necessary to enable us to at- 
?mpt to respond to the UNHCR's in- 
reased requests. 

In 1980 we will also provide $5 mil- 
on to the International Committee of 
he Red Cross (ICRC) for its African 
^ rograms. And we will support a com- 
' ination of bilateral and multilateral 
t rograms aimed at care and mainte- 
' ance, infrastructure development, and 

ducation and training to the value of 
': 19.85 million. 

> In addition, our 1980 Food for 
eace contributions for food aid to Afri- 
an refugees will total $22 million, at 
tie current Food for Peace budget 
i ?vel. Food for Peace's pending sup- 
li lementa! request would provide an ad- 
itional $22 million in title II foods for 
•■ tfrican refugee-related programs. 

For 1981 the State Department is 
equesting $54 million for nonfood aid 
3r African refugees. This includes $35 
lillion for the UNHCR, $7 million for 
he ICRC, and $12 million for direct 
! ilateral assistance. Since these figures 
nriginally were compiled last summer, 
■ re have received information about in- 
t reased needs that makes it apparent 

hat additional funding will be re- 
' uested by the international agencies 
i oncerned. In addition to nonfood aid, 
(he Administration will be requesting 
« ubstantial amounts for food aid. 

At this time, I will turn to an analy- 
is of the African refugee problem as 
/e see it. 
i 



AFRICAN REFUGEES 



Country 


Number 


Principal Country 




of Asylum 


of Refugees 


of Origin 


Comments 


Algeria, 


9,100 


Western Sahara 


Access not allowed to deter- 


Moroeco, 






mine accurate numbers. 


Tunisia 








Angola 


61,000 


Namibia 
Zaire 




Botswana 


20,300 


South Africa 


Repatriation to Southern 






Namibia 


Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) should 






Zimbabwe 


end substantial problem. 






Lesotho 




Burundi 


50,000 


Rwanda 


Self-settled, some for as long as 
20 years. 


Cameroon 


30,000 


Equatorial Guinea 


Political refugees becoming 
economic refugees. 


Djibouti 


20,000 


Ethiopia (mostly 


Urban refugee problem special; 






Eritreans) 


govt, encouraging resettle- 
ment in third country. 


Ethiopia 


10,900' 


Sudan 
Somalia 




Gabon 


60,000 


Equatorial Guinea 


Refugee status being with- 
drawn Mar. 1, 1980. 


Kenya 


6,500 


Uganda 
Ethiopia 


Numbers decreasing. 


Lesotho 


250 


South Africa 




Mozambique 


120,000 


Zimbabwe 


Repatriation should end prob- 
lem. 


Nigeria 


370 


Equatorial Guinea 


Political refugees becoming 
economic refugees. 


Rwanda 


8,500 


Burundi 

Uganda 


Fairly well integrated. 


Somalia 


500,000^ 


Ethiopia 


22 camps; great, long-term aid 
needed. 


Sudan 


330,000 


Ethiopia 
Uganda 
Zaire 


Additional assistance required. 


Swaziland 


3,700 


South Africa 
Mozambique 




Uganda 


112,400 


Rwanda 
Zaire 




Tanzania 


160,000 


Rwanda 
Burundi 
Uganda 


Many long-term; self-settled. 


Zaire 


653,000 


Angola 
Rwanda 
Burundi 




Zambia 


80,000 


Zimbabwe 


Severe problem should be ob- 






Angola 


viated by repatriation to 






South Africa 


Southern Rhodesia (Zim- 



babwe). 



'Does not include displaced persons, estimated to be as many as 1 million. 
2 Does not include 500,000-700.000 refugees outside camps. 



I((\pril 1980 



23 



Africa 



Overview 

The continent of Africa, which has a 
majority of the world's least developed 
countries, also has the greatest number 
of refugees. There are estimates of up 
to 4 million refugees and displaced per- 
sons in Africa. The UNHCR estimated 
that there were 2.24 million refugees in 
Africa in December 1979, of which up- 
wards of 1.7 million are in need of 
substantial assistance. 

The discrepancies in estimates are 
due to a variety of factors, including 
differences in the definition of refugee 
status, political and economic incentives 
felt by various African governments to 
inflate or deflate figures reported, and 
the large number of African refugees 
who are "self-settling"; that is, who 
cross borders with livestock and other 
possessions to resettle among related 
ethnic groups in neighboring countries 
of first asylum, outside of organized 
refugee resettlement programs. 

The exact numbers of refugees are 
less important than the impact of their 
rapid growth in recent years on host 
countries, many of which are engaged 
in struggles to assure the survival of 
their own peoples. 

A significant aspect of the refugee 
problem in Africa is the extent to which 
the African nations share their scarce 
resources with refugees seeking asylum 
within the borders. In the past 2 
weeks, we have surveyed U.S. embas- 
sies in Africa in an attempt to quantify 
the burden which African countries 
shoulder in caring for refugees. The al- 
most universal response was that, al- 
though impossible to quantify, the 
refugee assistance given by African 
countries, in the conte.xt of their limited 
resources, is substantial and generous. 
In almost every instance, refugees re- 
ceive land and access to whatever 
health and education facilities are avail- 
able. Often, as well, refugees in Africa 
are given food, clothing, and shelter by 
the people and governments of their 
countries of asylum. Mr. Beck tells me, 
for example, that in Somalia, the gov- 
ernment has deployed 1,500 of its own 
personnel to care for the refugees and 
that the relief effort has nearly de- 
pleted the Somali Government's own 
stocks of food and medicines. 

The African governments and 
people extend this hospitality despite 



the negative effect which this generos- 
ity has on their own development pro- 
grams. It is incumbent on donors, such 
as the United States, to take this fact 
into consideration when providing de- 
velopment assistance. African countries 
seriously affected by refugee problems. 



natural catastrophes, discourage refu- 
gees from returning to their homelands 

Unfortunately, we cannot be op- 
timistic about prospects for declining 
numbers of refugees in 1980 and 19.^1. 
In fact, we can expect major increases 
for the foreseeable future in areas 



ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN REFUGEES 



U.S. Government 

(millions $) 
UNHCR Budget 

(millions $) 
U.S. Contribution to UNHCR 

(millions $) 



1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


$31.8 


$60.2 


$93.91 


54^ 


27 


45 


60 2 


105- 


6 


16 


203 


35- 



'Contingent on approval of the PL 480 supplemental request pending in the Congress. 

^Estimate. 

^What is expected to be appropriated. 

^Requested in the 1981 budget. 



such as those in the Horn and in south- 
ern Africa, should not only receive di- 
rect refugee assistance but should be 
given special development assistance as 
well. 

The magnitude of the refugee 
problem in Africa is awesome, not be- 
cause of the sheer numbers alone but 
also because of the potential for politi- 
cal and economic havoc which the 
problem poses. Four of the six coun- 
tries which are hosts to refugees in ex- 
cess of 100,000 are numbered among 
the 25 least developed nations in the 
world. Also, civil strife and systematic 
oppression, which are the principal 
causes of refugee outflows, in turn 
heighten tensions among neighboring 
countries and reduce opportunities for 
political and economic cooperation that 
could improve the lives of all the people 
in any given region. 

In addition to the factors that gen- 
erate refugee problems in Africa like 
civil strife and oppression, several 
other factors contribute to the size of 
refugee populations and the duration of 
refugee problems in Africa. 

• African governments have tradi- 
tionally been hospitable to refugees 
from neighboring countries and have 
been reluctant to adopt a policy of 
forced repatriation. 

• In many parts of Africa, people 
move with relative ease across national 
boundaries, yet remain among people of 
similar ethnic origin. 

• Generalized poverty, often 
exacerbated by droughts and other 



24 



where there are already large refugee 
populations. In the Horn of Africa, for 
instance, we do not anticipate the kind 
of political accommodation between tho 
Ethiopian Government and the insur- 
gents that would permit the return to 
Ethiopia of the million or so refugees 
who have fled to the Sudan, Djibouti, 
and Somalia. The scope of the refugee 
problem in this area will probably re- 
main massive for a long time to come. 

Somalia 

In Somalia alone, refugees have been 
arriving in the camps at the rate of 
1,700 a day during the last 3 months. 
The current camp population of about 
500,000 could easily reach 1.1 million b; 
the end of this year. And in addition t( 
this camp population, another 
500,000-700,000 refugees are report- 
edly subsisting outside camps in a 
fragile economy and ecology. 

Consequently, there is a good pes 
sibility that the Somali host-country na 
tionals themselves will require assist- 
ance, especially in light of indications 
from the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation early warning system that near- 
drought conditions may devastate both 
the spring and fall crops this year. 

In response to its growing refugee 
problem, the Somali Government issuei 
a worldwide appeal for $71 million in 
October 1979. The U.S. Government 
has already agreed to provide food aid 
valued at $13.6 million and nonfood 
items valued at $3.8 million, including 



Department of State Bulleti'f 



Africa 



hi|il>iiig costs. The nonfood items in- 
luili' drugs and medical supplies, 
(iincstic utensils, clothing, blankets, 
cuts, and tarpaulins, which are being 
laiisported to Somalia now by air and 
ea. 

Ill light of recent increases in the 
iomali refugee populations, the U.N. 
elief agencies have reassessed the 
eeds for outside assistance in Somalia, 
■ecretary General Waldheim is ex- 
acted to issue an appeal this week for 
120 million in emergency assistance 
nd an additional amount for long-term 
evelnpment support. 

In anticipation of the U.N. appeal 
)r the World Food Program, the 
.gi-ncy for International Develop- 
lent's (AID) Food for Peace office has 
icluded $15 million in additional food 
ncluding freight) for Somalia in a 1980 
jpplemental request. Unless this re- 
uest is acted upon by the Congress in 
timely fashion, however, it will not be 
3ssihle to deliver the food early 
lough to avoid certain starvation. In 
Idition, we will be seeking to repro- 
ram funds for the UNHCR's programs 
I Somalia which, together with the 
i.8 million that we have already com- 
itti'd, would bring our contribution 
inu'diately to the one-third level at 
hich we traditionally have supported 
'fugee assistance in Africa. However, 
3cause of the critical nature of the 
^ed in Somalia, we would continue to 
;sess the situation in order to deter- 
line if further support should be given. 

ambabwe 

■s the subcommittee is aware, the di- 
ensions of the Zimbabwe refugee 
"oblem will only become clear in the 
eeks and months ahead. The agree- 
ents reached at Lancaster House con- 
'rning Zimbabwe-Rhodesia provide, 
til- (ilia, for the repatriation of Zim- 
ibwean refugees, estimated to 
imher as many as 250,000. The first 
nase of the repatriation effort is to be 
)mpleted by February 22, in anticipa- 
on of the national elections February 
7-29. The balance of the refugees, 
any of whom are children — including 
udents whose education ought not be 
isrupted — will have been repatriated 
,_V July-August. Last month UNHCR 
"lounted a $22 million appeal to fund 
|ie repatriation effort — $14 million for 
le first phase and $8 million for the 
"cond. The U.S. Government has con- 
•ibuted $5 million to this fund. We 



eiipril 1980 



hope the Zimbabwe repatriation pro- 
gram will be followed by development 
programs proposed by the new majority 
government for implementation in 1981. 

General Trends 

Following these comments about geo- 
graphic areas, let me make some gen- 
eral observations about refugee prob- 
lems throughout Africa. First, we see 
the following trends: There is a wide- 
spread and deep interest in education 
among all Africans, including refugees; 
refugees face ever-increasing difficulty 
in seeking access to agricultural land; 
and consequently, a growing number of 
refugees are creating new problems in 
urban areas. The possible implications 
of these trends, if they continue, would 
seem to be: 

• Higher costs in refugee pro- 
grams; 

• The desire for greater control of 
refugees and their camps by host 
governments; 

• Possible backlash among the citi- 
zens of host countries and, therefore, 
greater reluctance to accept massive 
numbers of refugees by their govern- 
ments; and 

• A need for more research and 
training to assist in the greater Af- 
ricanization of refugee programs and 
activities. 

Second, refugee problems are not a 
new phenomenon in Africa, nor are 
they apt to be resolved soon. Some ref- 
ugees in Africa today have been outside 
their countries of origin for more than 
15 years. It would be unrealistic to ex- 
pect that the many intricate political 
differences that have uprooted these 
people could be settled in the near fu- 
ture. Despite the plan to return some 
250,000 refugees to Zimbabwe, we are 
not sure that refugee problems in 
southern Africa will be entirely solved. 

Third, we believe that the U.S. 
Government, as the largest single sup- 
porter of international refugee assist- 
ance, has a responsibility to encourage 
international relief agencies to broaden 
their view of refugee problems in Africa 
to include both emergency relief and 
the longer term support necessary to 
help refugees become self-sufficient in 
the countries where they are now lo- 
cated. In the past, multilateral aid has 
been too little and too temporary in 
nature to deal with the magnitude of 
the problem. As a result, the interna- 
tional community has probably ex- 



pended more in continued food and 
other subsistence relief than would 
have been necessary to insure that the 
refugees could take care of themselves. 

Recently, the governments of 
Somalia and Sudan have expressed 
their intention to request additional as- 
sistance for development programs spe- 
cifically aimed at the permanent set- 
tlement and economic and social inte- 
gration of refugees within their coun- 
tries. These requests present our 
government with unusual opportunities 
to assist in effecting the long-term solu- 
tions, which in many instances will be 
the only answer to the refugee prob- 
lem. I am assured by the African 
Bureau of AID that they will accord 
high priority to such requests. 

Fourth, the practical needs in Af- 
rica are thus quite different from refu- 
gee assistance in other areas of the 
world, such as Southeast Asia where 
the primary goal is to provide care and 
maintenance to refugees while they are 
awaiting offers of permanent resettle- 
ment elsewhere. We need to be realistic 
about the quantity and kind of assist- 
ance needed to meet the circumstances 
in each area. And at the same time, we 
need to be sensitive to wishes of host- 
country governments that refugees not 
be perceived as having a better stand- 
ard of living and having greater oppor- 
tunities than the indigenous inhabit- 
ants. 

Finally, there is growing recogni- 
tion of the need for durable solutions in 
Africa. The current refugee assistance 
plans of both Somalia and Sudan, the 
two countries with the largest numbers 
of refugees, have called for assistance 
for permanent settlement programs. 

In closing, I wish to assure you 
that we are well aware of the feeling of 
many people in Africa, in our country, 
and elsewhere that too little assistance 
has been offered African refugees. We 
are in the process of reassessing Afri- 
can needs for outside assistance, and 
we welcome your thoughts on ways to 
strengthen our contributions to this 
critical humanitarian problem. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



25 



Africa 



Political and Economic Interests 
in Africa 



Addressee hij DougJas J. Bennet, 
Jr., Adii'iliisfratdr of the Agency for 
Infcrnatio>ial Developmoit (AID), and 
Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador 
to the United Nations, on Deceynber 13. 
1979, in Detroit before a regional 
foreign policy conference on Africa 
cosponsored by the Department of State 
and the Economic Club of Detroit; 
more than 35 other organizations in the 
Detroit area — representing bu.sine.'is, 
organized labor, and educational, 
ethnic, civic, and professional 
groups — also cooperated in the con- 
ference program. 



MR. BENNET 

We are about to enter the last two dec- 
ades of the 20th century. Looking back, 
the last two decades have been tumul- 
tuous ones for sub-Sahara Africa. 

Today there are 46 independent 
states; in 1955 there were only two. In 
the past two decades political, social, 
cultural, and economic changes of 
enormous magnitude have swept across 
the continent. Change came so fast that 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. 
policymakers found forces racing ahead 
of their ability to adjust to the unfold- 
ing of African nationalism and the 
breakdown of colonial empires. Al- 
though Africa had emerged as an im- 
portant global factor in the early 1970s, 
U.S. policy still tended to view Africa 
as weak and economically and politi- 
cally unimportant. U.S. -Africa trade 
was minute, and our economic assist- 
ance to Africa decidedly token — only 
6% of our worldwide totals. U.S. policy 
held that Africans should find their own 
answers to worsening problems. 

Since 1976 a more active and sensi- 
tive U.S. -Africa policy has emerged. In 
contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s 
when policy was largely a series of 
reactions to events, today we see the 
United States taking a positive and ac- 
tivist role in searching for peaceful so- 
lutions to conflicts that persist in sev- 
eral corners of Africa. Relations with 
most African states have improved 
markedly. U.S. economic assistance to 
Africa had risen to $443 million in FY 
1979, a doubling of 1975 levels. This 
still represents only 9% of our total 
worldwide assistance. However, our 
fastest growing economic aid program 
today is in Africa. 



As our own policy has been matur- 
ing, we have seen a maturing of African 
nationalism which permits closer coop- 
eration. In the immediate postcolonial 
period, it was natural for African lead- 
ers to concentrate on the politics of in- 
dependence, and we were sometimes 
viewed as adversaries-by-association 
with excolonial masters. 

Now, however, African leaders 
must turn time and more attention to 
economic and social development. Their 
people are pressing hard for results. 
We are able to provide some of that 
help, and most African governments 
are becoming more e.xpert as well at 
tapping foreign private investment in 
ways compatible with their own natural 
development goals. 

Today African leaders are com- 
mitted to economic and social develop- 
ment, to gaining political and economic 
equality among the nations of the 
world, to limiting, where possible, 
foreign or outside meddling in African 
affairs, and to ending once and for all 
minority rule where it stubbornly re- 
sists inevitable change. The United 



. . At costs more to move a bushel 
of grain 700 miles into the interior 
of any African country than it does 
to ship it 7,000 miles from New 
Orleans. 



States today supports those goals. 
Moreover, we realize that the 
long-term success of U.S. -African pol- 
icy depends on the not-too-distant 
realization of African development as- 
pirations. This is where we confront the 
most difficult challenge to the United 
States' Africa policy of the 1980s and 
1990s. Just when U.S. policy has 
caught up with Africa's vision of itself, 
serious and unmet development needs 
and economic deterioration portend 
new crises and instability. 

Challenges Facing Africa 

In 1978, the average per capita GNP 
growth for all non-oil-producing African 
states was near zero. There are indica- 
tions that the situation in 1979 is worse. 
Africa is projected to fall much farther 
behind the rest of the developing world 
during the next 10 years. 



Consider these trends, their pot en 
tial aggregate impact on Africa, and thi 
challenge they present for U.S. policy 
in the near future. 

First, per capita food production ii 
Africa is now declining by 1.4% annu- 
ally. During the period 1960-79, there 
has been no significant shift from Af- 
rica's highly vulnerable and predomi- 
nantly subsistence agriculture. Aver- 
age per hectare production in Africa 
lags far behind other developing re- 
gions. The increased production that 
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s came 
through expanding the area under cul- 
tivation rather than through increased 
yield. International research groups 
now estimate a food grain deficit in Af 
rica of 23 million tons in 1990. Nigeria 
alone will then have to import as mucl 
grain as India. Even assuming suffi- 
cient world supplies, balance-of- 
pa.vments trends suggest that most Af- 
rican nations will have insufficient 
foreign exchange to finance the food 
imports they require. 

Second, desertification, deforestat 
tion, and erosion are threatening the 
essential agriculture resource base of 
the majority of the continent's coun- 
tries. LANDSAT satellite photos shov« 
that 52% of Africa's land is now deser- 
or subject to serious desertification. 
The capacity to produce food and mee" 
basic human needs could be perma- 
nently and irreversibly damaged if thii 
land degradation continues. 

Third, population and urbanizatio' 
growth rates, at 2.65% and 9.5% re- 
spectively, are the highest in the worlc 
We can anticipate accelerating move- 
ments of migrant workers and refugee 
that will further aggravate food short- 
ages and unemployment, possibly 
leading to serious social conflict. 

Fourth, despite substantial prog- 
ress in eradicating selected communi- 
cable diseases, the majority of Africa's 
population still has no access to basic 
health services. The presence of some 
debilitating disease in most of the Afr 
can adult population is a predominant 
factor in the low productivity of labor. 
Life expectancy averages 45 years in 
Africa compared with 53 years in the 
developing world overall and 72 yearS' 
in the United States. 

Fifth, the World Bank forecasts a 
real per capita growth of less than 1% 
in Africa during the 1980s. 

Sixth, accelerating rates of infla- 
tion and deteriorating terms of trade, 
fueled largely by recent energy price 



26 



Department of State Bullet* 



Africa 



iinTcases, will further undermine Af- 
■ica's fragile economies. An estimated 
lelit service burden in 1990 of 27.6% of 
■N]ii)rt earnings, more than any other 
xiMiuraphic region, will seriously reduce 
Africa's capacity to import food and 
■eciuii-ed capital resources. 

Seventh, transportation systems 
\rv poor, developed largely for extrac- 
ivo industries with little regard for 
ntei-nal needs and domestic popula- 
ions. Africa ranks last of all the conti- 
u'lits in transport systems. The limited 
•apacity that does exist is so expensive 
hat it discourages investment and 
•aises prices. For instance, it costs 
iioi-e to move a bushel of grain 700 
niles into the interior of any African 
■ountry than it does to ship it 7,000 
niles from New Orleans. 

In summary, for 70% of the African 
ountries, per capita growth was luiver 
luring the 1970s than in the previous 
lecarle. This group was, in other 
vdi'ds, undeveluping. Unless reversed, 
hv trends I have cited could turn to- 
lay's development plans into nothing 
nore than tomorrow's short-term, 
risis-oriented relief programs. 

mportance of Development 
o U.S. Interests 

Vith such serious economic problems in 
i.frica, not to mention here at home, 
>ne might legitimately ask: Is there 
anything we can do to help, even if we 
lant to? Is Africa's development really 
hat important to U.S. interests? The 
inswers are clearly yes, for several 
easons. 

First, with ever-increasing global 
nterdependence during the 1980s and 
990s, the United States will become 
onsiderably more dependent on reg- 
dar, dependable supplies of Africa's 
latural resources. The region, the most 
inexplored of the continents, holds 
rreat promise of mineral and petroleum 
vealth. Today more than 25% of our 
mported petroleum comes from sub- 
Sahara Africa, five times what we used 
II import from Iran. 

Several of the poorest African 
'•ountries are only now discovering or 
beginning to develop important depos- 
its of the strategic minerals uranium, 
naiiganese, vanadium, cobalt, chrome, 
Itanium, and bauxite. These are essen- 
jial to us for the production of high- 
■j^rade metals for jet engines, for air- 
craft, and for defense and nuclear 
■nergy uses, and the earnings they rep- 
■esent are just as essential to the fu- 
ure prosperity of Africa. 



Second, despite the discouraging 
economic and environmental trends, 
Africa, with untapped major river ba- 
sins and extensive land, does have the 
physical potential to produce surplus 
food grains late in this century, when 
global deficiencies are projected to 
reach new records. Africa has the po- 
tential for increasing annual production 
of food grains by 16 million tons from 
rain-fed agriculture and 9 million from 
irrigated land. This would represent a 
47% increase over the approximately 55 
million tons of cereal produced in 1979. 
In addition, from another energy 
standpoint, most of the world's unde- 
veloped hydroelectric power is in 
Africa. 

Third, we are seeing today impor- 
tant and encouraging political transi- 
tions in Africa. Nigeria and Ghana have 
recently moved from military to civilian 
rule. Upper Volta and Mali are moving 
in similar directions. A peaceful settle- 
ment in Zimbabwe may now be a real- 
ity. These transitions are encouraging 
to all who believe more strength lies in 
democracy than in totalitarianism. 
These changes should mean more 
human rights and more human energies 
liberated for the task of development. 
They also make it all the more impera- 
tive that the African people see some 
tangible benefits of development prog- 
ress. 

Fourth, we should not forget that 
it was the rapidly rising U.S. exports to 
the developing world that played a key 
role in pulling the U.S. economy out of 
the 1973 recession. Africa is potentially 
a very important part of that market, 
depending on the continent's growth 
and capacity to import. 

Moreover, with one-third of the in- 
dependent nations of the world being 
African, and all of them voting mem- 
bers of the United Nations, Africa 
plays a major role in the ongoing 
North-South dialogue that is vital to 
our future welfare as well as to 
Africa's. 

But clear interests do not consti- 
tute a policy. A policy expressed in ma- 
terial terms is narrow, short-sighted, 
and too much like the colonialism and 
paternalism that held Africa back for 
years. 

A U.S. -Africa policy for the 1980s 
and 1990s must offer much more. It 
must start out with a shared hope for 
the future of the continent which is 
painfully far behind the rest of the 
world in unlocking its enormous human 
and physical potential. It must con- 



cretely support African aspirations in 
the drive for racial justice and economic 
and social development. An affirmative 
U.S. -Africa policy for the 1980s and 
1990s must state with clarity that we, 
the most developed of the world's na- 
tions, will not allow Africa's alarming 
economic and environmental decline to 
continue, because it portends a loss of 
human potential and political instability 
that are contrary to both U.S. and Af- 
rican interests. 

Our country has the wealth and the 
know-how in both its public and private 
sectors to help Africa move forward. 



Today more than 259( of our im- 
ported petroleum comes from 
sub-Sahara Africa, five times 
what we used to import from Iran. 



We know it, the Africans know it, and 
the world knows it. 

Some say African development will 
take many decades, because they are so 
far behind. I say we no longer have the 
luxury of such patience. As we look 
back at the turn of the century, the test 
of the realism and effectiveness of our 
Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s will 
certainly be whether we had the capac- 
ity to craft, in full partnership with Af- 
rica and with other donors, comprehen- 
sive solutions that will reverse the de- 
cline in Africa's development progress. 

With this in mind, what new initia- 
tives can be undertaken? Ideas will 
emerge from your deliberations here 
today particularly in the individual 
workshops on "African Economic Pros- 
pects" and on "U.S. Strategic Interest 
and Africa's International Role." We 
look forward to studying the results of 
your deliberations. 

There are some important areas in 
which African nations can help them- 
selves substantially. 

There is room in some countries for 
cautious decentralization and greater 
local initiative in the development proc- 
ess. A strong central authority may 
have been necessary in the first stage 
of nationbuilding but can become a dead 
end if a few ministries attempt to 
manage all aspects of the development 
process. The greatest single develop- 
ment resource in any country is the lib- 
erated energies of its people. 

One factor that is particularly im- 
portant in liberating these energies is 
seeing that farmers receive economic 
prices for their labor. We frequently 
see farm prices held down artificially in 



April 1980 



27 



Africa 



an understandable but frankly self- 
defeating effort to protect consumer 
prices, particularly in politically vol- 
atile cities. The result is less food 
grown and sold, less income for farmers 
to reinvest, stronger incentives for 
urban migration, and mounting costs 
for food imports. The transition to a 
policy which pays farmers an incentive 
price for their product is always pain- 
ful, but it's essential. We are prepared 
to work through these complex issues 
in close partnership with the African 
countries and in some cases help ease 
the way by judicious use of PL 480 
food. 

U.S. Initiatives 

For our part, we in AID, along 
with our colleagues in the State De- 
partment, are undertaking the follow- 
ing initiatives designed to integrate a 
more comprehensive U.S. development 
effort into our overall Africa policy. 

First, the establishment of the In- 
ternational Development Cooperation 



take advantage of the tariff concessions 
that are, in theory, allowed under these 
trade policy vehicles. From this we will 
see where and how U.S. trade policy 
can and should have greater benefits 
for African development. 

Third, we will work in concert with 
other Western donors and interna- 
tional organizations to design more 
comprehensive problem-solving pro- 
grams rather than piecemeal projects. 
The major programs needed in food 
production, environmental reclamation, 
energy, infrastructure, etc., can often, 
by their nature, be undertaken only as 
multidonor programs. Following on the 
Sahel e.xperience, we will be consider- 
ing more significant multidonor pro- 
grams in the Lake Kivu area and in the 
southern African region. We will be 
meeting with OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] donors 
to identify ways and means for in- 
terested OPEC agencies to play a 
larger development role in Africa. In 
addition, we will be taking various 



. . . U.S. -Africa policy . . . must state with clarity that we, the most de- 
veloped of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming eco- 
nomic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss 
of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both 
U.S. and African interests. 



Agency (IDCA) presents a new oppor- 
tunity for the United States to relate 
more coherently all of this country's 
various development instruments to 
Africa's most .serious problems. These 
include development grants, food aid 
(PL 480), technical assistance, non- 
governmental and voluntary organiza- 
tions, Peace Corps, Export-Import 
Bank, trade policy, and private sector 
investment. We are acutely aware of 
the indispensable role private invest- 
ment must play in Africa — in the crea- 
tion of jobs, in overall growth, and in 
establishing a revenue base so that 
"basic human needs" is an affordable 
policy and not merely an empty passing 
slogan. Concessional funding must not 
only be increased but used creatively to 
expand the continent's absorptive 
capacity for private sector investment, 
both foreign and domestic. 

Second, we are studying the U.S. 
general schedule of preferences and re- 
cently completed multilateral trade 
agreements to determine why most Af- 
rican countries have been unable to 



steps to reinforce Western donor col- 
laboration in Africa. 

Fourth, also following our Sahel 
experience, we will encourage more 
intra- African cooperation in the various 
subregions. Many of Africa's difficulties 
today stem from the fragmentation that 
occurred in the "divide-and-conquer" 
policies of the old colonial empires. 
Today all the Western donors and many 
of the African states recognize the 
political and economic payoffs of in- 
stitutionalizing African subregional 
cooperation to resolve common prob- 
lems, exploit common resources, such 
as river basins, and enter into selective 
kinds of market integration. Despite 
the unfortunate demise of the East Af- 
rican Community, the new Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), southern African efforts at 
economic cooperation, and other new 
efforts deserve our active support. 
Dormant or ineffective African regional 
organizations can be animated with new 
mandates, programs, and resources. 



The economic progress of Africa 
may well depend on how effectively 
many small and fragmented African 
states can work together. The United 
States can have a catalytic impact on 
what may become an important new en 
of African cooperation. 

Fifth, the question of increased fi- 
nancial resources is an essential part o 
any set of new initiatives. We hope to 
see at least some increases in our con- 
cessional aid levels for Africa in FY 
1981 and beyond. 

The United States will seek con- 
gressional authority to join the Afriear 
Development Bankin FY 1981. For tht 
first time, the African Development 
Bank is being opened to nonregional 
capital, and the bank's significance wil 
take on renewed importance in the dif 
ficult times ahead. The United States 
will propose in FY 1981 a capital inpul 
of $360 million representing 17% of th 
bank's nonregional capital. The Unitec 
States would then be the largest singl 
nonregional member. 

These are but a few of the initia- 
tives this Administration will be under 
taking to support U.S. policy interest: 
and African development. 

All of this will require the suppor 
and determination of the American 
people. I believe all Americans now 
fully understand that we are not alone 
on this planet. We are fully aware 
today of our interdependence with 
other people whose attitudes toward 
the United States can have a very di- 
rect bearing on our own well-being. W 
may wish it were not so, but we know 
is so. 

We have shown in recent weeks 
that we are capable of deliberateness, 
and forceful moderation, even when 
unconscionably provoked. In recent 
years, we have found our voice again a 
advocates of the human rights to whic 
all people aspire. We have wealth and 
power. And I believe we do have the 
capacity and boldness to translate thes 
assets into a program that will, indeec 
make a difference to Africa. 



AMBASSADOR Mt HENRY' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity t 
talk to you today about U.S. -Africa 
policy. My topic, however, is somethin 
of a misnomer. For the United States 
has an "Africa policy" only in the sami 
sense that is has a "European policy" o 
an "Asia policy." Most of our policies ii 
Africa, as elsewhere in the world, are 
bilateral; they pertain to our relations 



28 



Department of State Bullet: 



with each of the 52 individual independ- 
ent African countries. 

But certain concerns cut across na- 
tional boundaries. Africans share com- 
mon aspirations. They are working to 
resolve common problems, many of 
which can be met only by cooperative 
and regional effort. 

For three decades, the dominant 
concern of Africa has been its 
emergence from colonialism. The 
United States played a major role in 
drafting the provisions of the U.N. 
Charter that provided the philosophical 
base for the end of colonialism. During 
the decades since, American interest 
in Africa has waxed and waned. 

• We had not been a colonial 
power. 

• We carried on little trade with 
the black African states. 

• We looked to those countries 
A'hich had been colonial powers to play 
;he major role in developments follow- 
ng independence. 

Too often, what passed for policy 
vas a series of responses to particular 

' ncidents and disorders that punctuated 

' hose years. 

Today, the long struggle to end 
■olonialism and racial discrimination in 
\frica is drawing to a close. I do not 
Tiean to suggest that Africa has put 

, his period entirely behind it. In South- 
>rn Rhodesia and Namibia, the right of 
he people to determine their own fu- 
ure and to govern themselves has re- 
nained elusive. And in South Africa, 
he full political participation of all its 
itizens remains but a distant dream, 
iut even in these last outposts, there 
las been jirogress. 

The complex negotiations aimed at 
I settlement in Southern Rhodesia have 
learly reached their conclusion. De- 
.pite initial skepticism, only a few dif- 
ferences regarding the cease-fire re- 
nain. So optimistic is the United King- 
lorn that the British Government has 

„ aken the first steps in the transition 

. )rocess. A British Governor arrived in 
louthern Rhodesia earlier this week. 
)ther steps in the transition process 
eading to elections are underway. It is 
inimaginable that the remaining differ- 
'Hces on the cease-fire can be allowed 
stand in the way of an agreement. 
Illearly, the interests of the parties in 

M. reaching agreement outweigh the dif- 

, 'erences that continue to exist. 
What happens in Southern 
Ihodesia may very much affect the 
lossibility of a peaceful settlement in 
"Namibia. There, the United States, 

,,it>panada, France, West Germany, and 



^(\pril 1980 



the United Kingdom have been engaged 
for over 2 years in frustrating negotia- 
tions with South Africa in the hope of 
reaching an accord that will permit 
Namibia to gain its independence with- 
out further bloodshed. A reasonable 
basis for settlement has been proposed 



Africa 



ance, the outlook for growth and de- 
velopment is indeed grim. 

But even in southern Africa, where 
the political problems of Rhodesia, 
Namibia, and South Africa continue to 
receive priority attention, plans are al- 
ready in motion to confront the serious 



None of the nine non-African nations invited to participate in last 
summer's Southern African Development Conference was an Eastern 
European state. But we were there, along with most of the countries of 
Western Europe. 



and enjoys wide support. However, 
South Africa has objected to two impor- 
tant aspects of implementation. Our 
hope is that the remaining differences 
can be overcome through technical dis- 
cussions during the next few weeks so 
that the bloodshed can end and the 
people of Namibia can get on with the 
process of governing themselves. 

So while the elimination of the last 
vestiges of colonialism and racial dis- 
crimination remain a high priority, Af- 
rica has reached an important transi- 
tion point. Its nations can increasingly 
focus their attention on other issues — 
issues that have important long-term 
consequences for life and for the quality 
of life. 

Human Concerns 

Not surprisingly, economic de- 
velopment and modernization head the 
list of these concerns. As Doug Bennet 
pointed out so graphically in his re- 
marks this morning, economic condi- 
tions, particularly in sub-Saharan Af- 
rica, have reached crisis proportions. 

• Food production is declining 
while the population increases. 

• Inflation and trade deficits soar 
as the cost of energy rises and the price 
of the industrial goods Africa must im- 
port follows suit. 

• Transportation and communica- 
tions systems remain inadequate. An 
African foreign minister seeking to 
travel from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam 
finds himself having first to go to 
Europe. 

• And while the world focuses its 
attention on the enormous refugee 
problems in Southeast Asia, Africa has 
painfully and quietly borne the burden 
of an even larger and more permanent 
displacement of people. 

Without inter- African cooperation 
and without large-scale world assist- 



developmental problems that exist. At 
the Southern Africa Development 
Conference, which was held last July, 
the "front-line" states of southern 
Africa — looking forward to the early 
independence of their neighbors in 
Southern Rhodesia and Namibia — laid 
the groundwork for cooperation on a 
regional development scheme. Eco- 
nomic development was also a principal 
topic at last summer's meeting of the 
Commonwealth countries in Zambia. 

African states are active propo- 
nents of readjustments in the world's 
economic, financial, and trading sys- 
tems. Along with other developing 
countries, they seek to replace or adapt 
the economic systems that were de- 
veloped before they came into being, so 
that what they call the "new interna- 
tional economic order" will take into ac- 
count the unique problems they face in 
a world dominated by developed 
nations. 

While economic concerns are 
pressing, they are not the only impor- 
tant questions with which the new Afri- 
can nations are coping. In Africa, as 
elsewhere, human rights issues have 
assumed a new importance. In the last 
year, the tragic and brutal regimes of 
Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Mascias have 
been driven from power. The need for 
collective condemnation of evils like 
those practiced by these despots has 
resulted in the adoption of a draft out- 
line for the creation of a human rights 
commission. 

Many African nations are acquiring 
a measure of political stability unheard 
of just 15 years ago. The Governments 
of Upper Volta, Mali, Ghana, and 
Nigeria recently reverted from military 
to civilian control after democratic elec- 
tions. Nigeria, Africa's most populous 
country, patterned its new constitution 
after our own. In Kenya, the predic- 
tions that chaos would result after the 
death of Jomo Kenyatta have not been 



29 



Africa 



fulfilled. Instead power was transferred 
smoothly from one civilian leader to 
another in accordance with that coun- 
try's constitutional processes. 

Africa's political, economic, and so- 
cial evolution is far from complete. The 
rapid pace at which change takes place 
today only complicates the evolutionary 
process. Modern communications ex- 
pose every stumble along the way to 
world scrutiny. And we, who must ad- 
just rapidly to change in our own lives, 
may, therefore, be holding the new na- 
tions of Africa to unrealistic standards. 

The development of nation states is 
a slow and difficult process. It took cen- 
turies, not mere decades, for the na- 
tions of modern Europe to grow from 
their tribal beginnings to highly de- 
veloped states. Our own country grew 
to maturity slowly and painfully. And 
along the way, the developed countries 
of today experienced most of the 
travails that Africa has recently 
faced — colonialism, revolution, ethnic 
and racial conflict, civil war, economic 
upheaval, natural disasters. 

When judged against the standard 
of our own progress, we must recognize 
that the new nations of Africa have 
taken substantial strides toward na- 
tional maturity in a very brief period. 

This does not mean that more can- 
not be done. Africa can learn from the 
mistakes we made as we developed and 
industrialized, particularly the short- 
sightedness that caused us to deplete 
our resources with insufficient thought 
for conservation or the short- 
sightedness that caused us to foul our 
air and water with little concern for 
pollution. Above all, Africa must resist 
the temptation to view issues myopic- 
ally and to endow any one principle, 
such as noninterference, with such im- 
portance that it cancels out concern for 
other principles, such as respect for 
human and political rights. 

Transition in U.S. Policy 

Just as Africa has come to a transition 
point, so the United States has reached 
a transition point in its policy toward 
Africa. Under President Carter, Africa 
is no longer what I called in 1975 the 
"unchallenged occupant of the bottom 
rung of American foreign policy 
priorities." Today, America attaches a 
new importance to Africa — partly in re- 
sponse to Africa's changing concerns 
and partly in response to our own. 

Our increasing economic interde- 
pendence with the black African states 
underscores the importance of a viable 
and independent Africa to American 



30 



U 



interests. We are becoming more de- 
pendent on African resources and more 
aware of Africa's potential as a trading 
partner. Without regard to differences 
in economic systems, Africa is turning 
to us and to our traditional allies for the 
development assistance it so desper- 
ately needs. 

I believe that Africans realize that 
the Communist countries to which some 
of them have turned for arms are not 
equipped to make a major contribution 
to African economic development. None 
of the nine non-African nations invited 
to participate in last summer's South- 
ern African Development Conference 
was an Eastern European state. But we 
were there, along with most of the 
countries of Western Europe. 

So development, the wave of the 
future in Africa, is a wave that the 
United States is uniquely qualified to 
ride. If we are willing to supply more 
and better development assistance to 
Africa, and to couple it with a commit- 
ment for additional investment and 
two-way trade by the private sector, 
Africa's increasing preoccupation with 
economic concerns can be a cornerstone 
on which to build a mutually beneficial 
long-term relationship with African na- 
tions. 

It would be naive to imply that the 
involvement of the Soviet Union and 
some of its allies as suppliers of arms 
and troops to selected revolutionary 
movements and governments has not 
affected our view of Africa. So has Af- 
rica's proximity to the Middle East. 

In the end, however, America's Af- 
rica policy cannot be based on the fal- 
lacy that Africa's importance to us 
stems from its position on East- West 
issues. Neither can it be based on a de- 
sire to protect the existence of re- 
sources or to acquire lucrative markets 
for American goods. 

Instead, the United States should 
base its relations with Africa on our de- 
sire to promote and facilitate the same 
opportunity for African nations that our 
own country was given two centuries 
ago — the chance to develop themselves 
politically, the chance to develop them- 
selves economically and socially, and to 
do so without outside interference so 
that they can run their own affairs and 
take their rightful places in the commu- 
nity of nations. 

Even judged by traditional stand- 
ards, American interests are well 
served by an Africa policy that respects 
and responds to Africa's legitimate de- 
sire to develop with international as- 
sistance, but without outside interfer- 
ence. If our interest is anticommunism. 



a policy of assistance without outside 
interference offers a better chance of 
preventing Communist gains in Africa, 
because it is geared to alleviate the in- 
tolerable conditions in which com- 
munism thrives best. If our interest is 
economic, a policy of assistance without 
interference is the only way we can cul- 
tivate the African resource base and 
uncover potential markets without im- 
posing an unacceptable form of eco- 
nomic dependence on newly independ- 
ent nations. 

But most important, a policy of as- 
sistance without interference will send 
a signal to Africa and the rest of the 
developing world that the United 
States supports dynamic, positive 
change in congruence with the goals of 
the developing countries, not simply 
our own. 

Africa stands on the threshold of 
new and tremendous challenges. 
America stands on the threshold of a 
new and promising relationship with 
Africa. We must now make a renewed 
commitment to work with Africa for out 
mutual benefit. It will take time; it wiU 
take patience; and it will take joint ef- 
forts to bear fruit. But by working to- 
gether, I am confident that we can sue 
ceed. 



'USUN press release 145. ■ 

Southern 
Rhodesia 
Holds Elections 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
FEB. 27. 1980' 

Today marks the beginning of a 3-day 
electoral period in Rhodesia. This step 
together with the elections February 
14, means that for the first time all tht 
people of Rhodesia will have had a 
genuine opportunity to choose their 
leaders in an open election. The proc- 
ess, set in motion by the Lancaster 
House settlement, has accomplished a 
great deal. All the parties involved arc 
to be commended. 

In spite of the difficulties of the 
transitional period, a cease-fire was es 
tablished and violence reduced. For th« 
first time in years, the leaders of all thi 
parties were present in Rhodesia and 



Department of State Bulleti' 



EAST ASIA 



have been engaged in the electoi-al 
campaign over the past weeks. 

The holding of this election is a re- 
markable achievement, indeed. As we 
have stated previously, we are confi- 
dent that the British are determined to 
1 conduct these elections as fairly as pos- 
sible. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT 
MAR. 2, 19802 

The British Government and the other 
parties to the Lancaster House agree- 
ment are to be congratulated on the 
successful completion of elections 
throughout Rhodesia. For the first time 
in the history of the territory, elections 
open to all parties have been held under 
an agreed, democratic constitution. 

According to the interim report of 
the Commonwealth observer group, 
which recognized the difficulties under 
which the election was conducted, the 
election was "free and fair to the ex- 
:ent that it provided an adequate and 
acceptable means of determining the 
wishes of the people in a democratic 
manner." This corresponds with our 
3wn assessment that the results of the 
election will reflect the will of the 
people of Zimbabwe. 

We urge the forces on all sides to 
?xercise restraint during this historic 
noment. Any attempt to abort the 
political process would be condemned 
iy the world community. We, there- 
ore, urge the parties to the process in 
Zimbabwe, and all nations, to respect 
ind support the electoral outcome. 

We look forward to the successful 
mplementation of independence for 
Zimbabwe and to working with the new 
government. We shall continue to assist 
n the return and resettlement of refu- 
gees. In keeping with our pledge at 
Liancaster House, we also intend to as- 
sist the people of Zimbabwe as they re- 
)uild their nation after years of conflict. 



Refugee Coordinator Reports 
on Situation in Tiiailand 



' Read to news correspondents by De- 
)artment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 

^ Issued to news correspondents by 
department spokesman Hodding Carter 
:il; also issued as USUN press release 18 
)f Mar. 3, 1980. ■ 



Following are two news confer- 
ences by Ambassador Victor Palmieri, 
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 
in Bangkok u» January 18, 1980, and 
at the Department of State on Janu- 
ary 2S. 



JAN. 18, 1980 

As you may know, it was only 2 weeks 
ago that my appointment by President 
Carter as U.S. Refugee Coordinator 
and Ambassador at Large was con- 
firmed by the Senate. My purpose in 
coming immediately to Thailand was to 
make a first-hand assessment of relief 
operations here, to meet with officials 
of the Royal Thai Government and in- 
ternational agencies, and to review the 
U.S. refugee program. 

I have had very productive discus- 
sions with the Prime Minister and a wide 
range of Thai, U.S., and international 
organization officials. I have also in- 
spected a number of the refugee camps, 
including Loei and Nong Khai in the 
north and Sa Kaeo, Khao I Dang, and 
the large concentrations on the border. 

What I have seen during the past 
several days has reinforced my impres- 
sions of the magnitude of the problem 
and the generous scope of Thailand's 
humanitarian response. I have been as- 
sured by the Thai Government that 
Thailand will continue to do what it can 
to assist the unfortunate peoples from 
Indochina in their plight. 

For our part, the United States 
will continue to give Thailand the 
strongest possible support in all re- 
spects. The President, Mrs. Carter, 
and Members of Congress are dedicated 
to this effort, and I look forward to 
strengthening our efforts in my position 
as refugee coordinator. 

Throughout my visit, I have been 
enormously impressed by the dedica- 
tion and hard work by Thai, interna- 
tional, and voluntary organizations per- 
sonnel. Their efforts are crucial and will 
continue to receive strong support from 
the American Government and people. 
Considerable progress has clearly 
been made on the resettlement side for 
Hmong, Lao, Vietnamese, and earlier 
Khmer refugees. I am pleased to note 
that the accelerated U.S. acceptance 
rate has measurably reduced the num- 
bers of these refugees. I can only hope 
that the Governments of Vietnam and 



i^pril 1980 



Laos will ameliorate those practices 
which compel their citizens to flee. 

The major problem facing Thailand 
and the international community is, of 
course, the very large numbers of 
Khmer now in Thailand or awaiting an 
uncertain fate on the border. In recent 
weeks, there have been significant im- 
provements in the facilities for dis- 
placed Khmer in Sa Kaeo and Khao I 
Dang. Fighting among Khmer border 
leadership groups, however, is a dis- 
turbing development and has pushed 
thousands more Khmer to move to 
Khao I Dang. Thus that site requires 
rapid expansion to remain minimally 
adequate. I am hopeful that the situa- 
tion can be stabilized and that Khmer 
I'efugees who want to can remain on the 
border, free from the threat of attack 
and sustained by the international relief 
effort. With all the problems they face, 
it is tragic that displaced Khmer are 
fighting each other. In the interim, we 
will do our best to help Thai and inter- 
national authorities solve pressing 
problems, such as water shortages now 
and possible flooding in the rainy sea- 
son. 

With respect to the situation inside 
Kampuchea, we remain deeply con- 
cerned over the continuing privation of 
the Khmer population. Further delay in 
the distribution of relief supplies do- 
nated by the world community is inex- 
cusable. Ample supplies of food and 
trucks are now available within Kam- 
puchea. The failure to make any signifi- 
cant progress in distribution raises fun- 
damental questions about the priorities 
of the Heng Samrin authorities and 
their Vietnamese and other supporters. 
Against this background, the interna- 
tional effort to feed Khmer civilians on 
the border will continue to play a vital 
role in sustaining the population of 
western Kampuchea. 

In sum, a strong framework for 
Thai and international cooperation has 
been developed and substantial prog- 
ress has been made in recent weeks. 
But the tragedy of Kampuchea and the 
Khmer people remains. 

Q. What did the Thai Prime 
Minister ask your government to do 
for the refugees in Thailand? 

A. The Prime Minister was assured 
of continuing U.S. support for the relief 
effort in Thailand, not only in terms of 
our contributions to the international 



31 



East Asia 



community but also in terms of the 
commitment which President Carter 
has made for continuing resettlement of 
refugees from Thailand. We assured 
the Prime Minister that we remain 
deeply committed to those objectives 
which President Carter has announced 
and that we stand ready to support this 
government in what must be one of the 
great humanitarian efforts of any na- 
tion. 

Q. Is it true that you promised 
Prime Minister Kriangsak that the 
United States will increase the intake 
of refugees from Thailand to 10,000 
per month? 

A. It is true that we confirmed to 
the Prime Minister the commitment 
that was made some time ago as fol- 
lows: that we will continue direct reset- 
tlement of refugees from Thailand to 
the United States at the rate of 7,500 
per month, and in addition, we will be 
seeking to move another 2,500 to the 
refugee processing center to be opened 
at the end of January in the Philippines. 

Q. What long-term problems do 
you think Thailand will face with the 
continued presence of Khmer people 
within its boundaries? Do you see 
another Palestinian-type situation 
existing in Thailand in the future? 

A. I can't foretell the future; I'm 
sure that's not a surprise to you. But 
what I can do is tell you that Thai and 
U.S. objectives are precisely the 
same — to see that the Khmer refugees 
attain their desire to be able to return 
to their homeland. It is significant that 
the bulk of the movement of the Khmer 
refugees has been to the border, where 
they remain under conditions that are 
very difficult, obviously in the hope of 
returning to their homeland. It remains 
to be seen what the future will bring. 
The objective of most people when they 
are forced to leave their homeland is to 
return to their homeland, and I believe 
that is true for the Khmer people who 
are now on the border or in the camps 
close to the border. I am hopeful that 
that is exactly the result that we can 
obtain for them in the future. 

Q. Will the refugees who do not 
want to return to their homeland be 
considered for resettlement in the 
United States at this time or in the 
near future? 

A. We have made a very strong 
commitment to share with Thailand the 
burden of the refugee problem. That 
commitment has involved doubling the 



resettlement of refugees from Thailand 
to the United States— from 7,000 to 
14,000, including, of course, refugees 
from all of Indochina. This doubling in- 
volves roughly 7,500 from Thailand 
going directly to the United States and 
another 2,500 to the refugee processing 
center. The processing is now at a point 
where we can meet those commitments. 
Thousands of refugees who are qual- 
ified, in terms of the criteria used for 
resettlement, are now awaiting transit. 
The question of new arrivals in Thai- 
land is really not one that we can con- 
front in this ne.xt phase. 

We have obligations to this gov- 
ernment and to the refugees, who have 
been here awaiting resettlement for a 
long time, to see to it that they are 
treated fairly. That is to say, that we 
have a principle of first in, first out. 
Later, we will be in a position to de- 
termine whether newly arrived refu- 
gees who do not want to return home 
will be processed for resettlement. I'm 
sure that there will be some in the cat- 
egory that you suggest. But that is not 
a category that we can reach right now 
with as many Hmong and Lao as well as 
Vietnamese that the United States is 
accepting after long stays in the camps. 

Q. Does that mean that the pro- 
gram is to resettle everyone from the 
old camps who is qualified or who 
wants to go before you think about 
turning to the new Khmer? 

A. No. It means that we will do our 
best to balance our obligations and to 
meet some tests of fairness. At some 
point there will be people among the 
new arrivals who, for reasons of family 
unification or prior association with the 
U.S. Government, will have to be con- 
sidered. I can't give you a categorical 
answer to a problem that has as many 
human priorities as this one. We will 
continue to do our best to deal with 
these kinds of issues in a way that is 
seen as fair and sensible, and I hope 
that we can deliver on that. Up to now 
I think we have. 

Q. In your talks with all the 
people concerned with the situation 
on the Kampuchean border, were you 
able to obtain any guarantee from 
those who control the hundreds of 
thousands of Khmer in the border 
camps that the humanitarian aid will 
be carried freely for those people and 
free of charge for those people in the 
border camps and further inside west- 
ern Kampuchea? 



A. The question is, who is in con- 
trol of these border camps or concen- 
trations? They really are not camps in a 
literal sense. They are large concentra- 
tions of refugees who have gathered nr 
the border because they are being ffd 
through the efforts of the Thai Gov- 
ernment, the international agencies, 
and the American Embassy in 
Bangkok. They are surviving. 

The issue for us is really a simple 
issue: How can we get the most food tc 
the most people? The border situaticm 
is very complicated and changes from 
day to day. The situation involves 
communal arrangements in internal nr- 
ganizational structures which are pecu- 
liar to the Khmer groups that are 
there. 

I don't have any guarantees excep 
this: The Thai Government has ex- 
pressed great concern about stabilizing 
the situation on the border. The inter- 
national agencies have made it clear 
that they will continue to provide the 
people on the border with food. Our 
objective will remain feeding as many 
people as possible, in effect flooding 
that zone with food so as much of it as 
possible gets into Kampuchea. One of 
the amazing things to me was to under 
stand that a great deal of the food thai 
is reaching the border is being taken 
into the Kampuchean countryside by 
bicycles, other conveyances, and on 
people's backs. This food is playing a 
major role in sustaining the populaticir 
of western Kampuchea. With that in 
mind, I haven't sought guarantees be- 
cause there's nobody to give them. 

Q. The U.S. Government has 
made much of the fact that the food i 
not being properly distributed inside 
Kampuchea. What specific sources 
lead you or the government to believ 
that aid is not being properly distrib 
uted by the Heng Samrin and possibi; 
Vietnamese authorities in Kam- 
puchea? 

A. I have spent the last two days 
touring some of the camps and one of 
the things that we did was to interview 
people in the camps. Some of those in- 
terviews were arranged in advance an 
for others I just moved through the 
camps and talked to people, asking 
them about conditions inside Kam- 
puchea. I was seeking, of course, recer 
arrivals to the extent possible. 

I was overcome by the stories of 
what is going on inside the country in 
terms of the plight of people who are 
traveling under conditions of very grea 
danger and great privation, often in ex 



32 



Department of State Bulleti 



East Asia 



traordinarily weak condition, to reach 
the border. So I have a personal sense 
that there is no effective food distribu- 
tion to a large part of the Khmer 
population. 

Secondly, we have a great deal of 
evidence now from the international or- 
ganizations, which are exhibiting in- 
creasing concern and impatience, that 
the bulk of the relief supplies that have 
been brought into Kampuchea are still 
in warehouses or at the harbor. There 
isn't really any substantial argument 
about that. It is true that some supplies 
have been distributed, mainly Russian 
corn. Our impression is that that corn 
has not reached significant portions of 
the population and, more importantly, 
that the supplies sent into Phnom Penh 
and to the harbor have remained in 
warehouses. The international officials 
have confirmed that. 

Q. International aid officials who 
have been in Kampuchea say thai the 
Vietnamese or the authorities in 
Kampuchea are doing the best they 
can, and logistical problems are to 
blame. Some statements from Wash- 
ington imply that there's a willful 
obstruction of such distribution by 
the authorities in Kampuchea. On 
what does the U.S. Government base 
that assertion? 

A. My role in this matter has one 
objective — to see that the maximum 
number of people are fed. All I know is 
that the officials confirmed to me that 
the bulk of the relief supplies remain in 
the warehouses. I don't have to know 
much more than that. I'm not even in- 
terested in the difference between in- 
competence and deliberate nondistribu- 
tion. All I'm interested in is the result, 
and the result is great suffering. I will 
bring every effort I can to bear on that 
situation. 

There has now been a period of 
several months for the Phnom Penh au- 
thorities to invite people to take on the 
logistical job, if they cannot accomplish 
it themselves. It's perfectly clear that if 
they cannot accomplish it, there are 
many people, willing, ready, and able, 
to distribute it for them. There are 
people ready, willing, and able to carry 
the supplies on their backs, so it isn't 
even a question of gasoline. Let's not 
worry about fine distinctions; the fact is 
that the food is not being distributed. I, 
for one, will not join the debate about 
whether it's delivered or not. It's in the 
warehouses. That's the significant fact, 
especially for people who are starving. 



Q. When you say you will bring 
every effort you possibly can, every 
pressure to bear to relieve this situa- 
tion, what exactly do you mean? 

A. I'm talking about every effort I 
can bring to bear. Let's see what this 
might be. First of all, the United States 
is a major contributor to the interna- 
tional effort. I hope to use every influ- 
ence I can to see that our contributions 
result in food that reaches the people. 
If at some point I decide, and my gov- 
ernment agrees, that people are not re- 
ceiving the benefit of the contributions, 
then I may well suggest changes in dis- 
tribution practices. 

I might add that I'm not the first to 
suggest this. The operations director of 



the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Mr. Hocke, has said that he 
would give the authorities in Phnom 
Penh until January 15 to get their act 
together. I do not intend to be a long 
way behind Mr. Hocke, to the extent I 
have anything to do with the matter. 
And remember our relief operations 
there, as elsewhere, are not direct. 
They are channeled through the inter- 
national agencies. I hope that we can be 
effective in getting food to people, not 
getting food to warehouses. I think 
there are probably other things that 
• can be done. I think that we will use all 
the ingenuity and energy we can bring 
to bear to achieve the result that we 
are seeking, namely the relief of 
hunger. 



Contributions for Khmer Relief 
(asof Feb. 22, 1980) 













Donor 




ICRC 


UNHCR 


UNICEF 


WFP 


Totals 


Australia 


$ 286,3001 


$ 550,781 


$ 876,200 


$ 917,000 


$ 2,630,281 


Belgium 




251,724 






251,724 


Canada 


1,282,000 




1,289,900 




2,571,900 


Cyprus 




1,000 






1,000 


Denmark 


470,000 


375,940 






845,940 


Finland 


52,600 




52,600 




105,200 


France 


1,000,000 








1,000,000 


Germany, West 


555,600 


5,177,203 


1,555,500 




7,288,300 


Greece 




5,000 






5,000 


Iceland 


1,500 




1,500 




3,000 


Ireland 






106,900 




106,900 


Israel 




55,000 






55,000 


Italy 




120,482 




400,000 


520,482 


Japan 


2,272,700 


10,000,000 


316,500 


500,000 


13,089,200 


Lebanon 




4,644 






4,644 


Liechtenstein 


500,000 




500,000 




1,000,000 


Luxembourg 


24,600 








24,600 


Malaysia 




5,000 






5,000 


Netherlands 


75,000 


1,288,660 


375,000 


800,000 


2,538,660 


New Zealand 


50,300 




50,200 




100,500 


Norway 


200,000 


804,198 


400,000 


1,944,000 


3,348,198 


Philippines 




5,000 






5,000 


Qatar 




10,000 






10,000 


Singapore 




5,000 






5,000 


Sweden 


1,176,500 




1,176,500 


2,429,500 


4,782,500 


Switzerland 


1,093,800 


156,250 


768,700 


855,700 


2,874,450 


Taiwan 


5,333, 333^ 








5,333,333 


U.K. 








1,600,000 


1,600,000 


U.S. 


5,999,400 


15,095,000 


11,492,600 


30,357,600 


62,944,600^ 


Totals 


$20,373,633 


$33,910,882 


$18,962,100 


$39,803,800 


$113,050,415 



1 Includes $10,000 equivalent of a donation of 30 tons of rice. 

^Represents dollar equivalent of a donation of 16,000 tons of rice. 

^The remaining $2,680,000 of the total amount disbursed by the United States have 
been contributions in kind, airlift costs, and grants to various smaller voluntary agencies 
and organizations. 

Note- On Feb. 21, 1980, the American National Red Cross donated $500,000 to the ICRC; 
the total ANRC contribution to ICRC currently is $1.5 million. 
Source: Kampuchea Working Group, Department of State. 



April 1980 



33 



East Asia 



Q. You have mentioned the bi- 
cycle brigade two or three times and 
the people who are willing to carry 
the aid — mainly the food — deep inside 
Kampuchea. As a result of your talks, 
then, has agreement been reached 
with the international agencies and 
others concerned that the effort to get 
food to the people on the border and 
to those who could carry it into Kam- 
puchea will be stepped up consid- 
erably? 

A. That is a very ambitious goal. In 
little more than 3 months, the interna- 
tional agencies and the world commu- 
nity have succeeded in mounting an 
operation which is bringing food to 
something like a million Khmer. That is 
a remarkable effort. It is remarkable in 
a number of ways. There is still a war 
going on in Kampuchea, and whether or 
not aid can be stepped up may not be as 
important as the question of whether it 
can be maintained, whether we can 
keep those shipments going to the bor- 
der, whether distribution can be made 
to the people there in sufficient 
amounts so that supplies can continue 
to be carried inside the country. 

Maybe it can be stepped up, but my 
sense at the moment is that the priority 
is to stabilize the situation on the bor- 
der, to keep the shipments going, to 
start focusing on some other problems 
that have to be solved to maintain the 
flow of food. For instance, one of those 
problems is the water supply. There is 
no more pressing problem now in the 
relief effort than the question of water 
supply. The food is now flowing in tre- 
mendous volume, and the organizations 
are competent to handle it. They are 
succeeding. The food management and 
distribution problems are being solved 
in a major way. The problem that is not 
being solved is the water supply, which 
is getting more difficult every day, 
which demands major attention, and 
which is now being given attention by 
the international agencies. 

Q. Late last year in New York 
there was an international pledging 
session to aid the refugees in Kam- 
puchea. Soon after that there was 
some suggestion that some countries 
weren't delivering on those pledges. 
Could you give us an idea what the 
situation is now? Is there adequate 
international funding to keep this ef- 
fort going for the foreseeable future? 

A. This situation is complicated be- 
cause of the way in which many of the 
pledges were made. There are about 30 
pledging nations. Many of them have 
pledged contributions in kind. This aid 



is now flowing in from all over the 
world. One of the major tasks that faces 
Sir Robert Jackson, the U.N. Secretary 
General's special representative for 
coordinating the relief effort in Thai- 
land, will be to match the pledges with 
the contributions to date and to assess 
the need for the balance of the planning 
period. I would say, however, that to 
my knowledge the pledges are being 
kept. The agencies are spending more 
money than was planned, but the 
pledges are being kept. One of Sir 
Robert Jackson's goals will be to con- 
vene a donor conference in the near fu- 
ture to take a new look at the funding 
situation. But the response to this has 
been solid and responsible from the 
great majority of the pledging nations. 

Q. You've referred several times 
to stabilizing the border, which, to 
put it at its kindest, is chaotic right 
now. What can be done to bring sta- 
bility to the border, and what role 
will the United States be playing in 
any such effort? 

A. The United States is not a direct 
player, as you know. The direct players 
consist of the Thai Government, the in- 
ternational organizations, and the vol- 
untary agencies. We are represented 
through our Embassy, of course, in 
support of the Thai Government and as 
a major donor to the relief effort and in 
other ways. But ultimately the question 
of stability on the borders is beyond the 
control of the players I've mentioned. 
It will depend on whether the Khmer 
community, which is concentrated in 
such great numbers there, can settle 
the differences among the factional 
leaderships in a way that permits the 
international organizations to operate. 
That's not something that anyone that 
is operating in Thailand can do very 
much about. My hope will be that the 
Khmer leadership on the border will 
see the need to concert its activities 
and to make some sense in keeping a 
stable environment. 

Q. Three months ago. Thai Gov- 
ernment policy was to try to move 
people away from the border to camps 
inside Thailand where there would 
not be this security problem. Two 
weeks ago the Thai announced that 
they would no longer encourage 
people to leave the border. Given the 
events of the last few days, do you 
think it is possible to guarantee an 
acceptable level of security if those 
people remain on the border? 

A. Security for the refugees? I 
don't think it's possible to talk about 



security guarantees when you have ref- 
ugees from a country in which hos- 
tilities are being conducted. The reason 
you have refugees is because you have 
insecurity. We are going to continue to 
have deep concerns about the issue of 
security for the Khmer people, who 
cannot be organized by anybody in 
Thailand. That responsibility lies 
elsewhere. We're going to be doing our 
best, through the Thai Government ami 
through the voluntary agencies, to feefl 
people and to keep people alive in the 
hope that the conditions that have 
caused them such suffering and that 
have caused them to leave their homes 
will somehow, someday, soon I hope, 
change so that they can return. That's 
our objective. 



JAN. 23, 1980 

I spent two weeks in Southeast Asia, 
about half of it in Thailand and the 
other half in Malaysia and the Philip- 
pines, essentially asking two or three 
questions: What have we accomplished 
with respect to the Kampuchean relief 
effort? What are the prospects for that 
effort in Thailand and within Kam- 
puchea? What is happening in relation 
to our resettlement program in coun- 
tries of first asylum throughout South- 
east Asia? 

I also had the opportunity to talk 
about funding problems with govern- 
ments there and about other issues 
connected with this tragic, massive, 
and increasingly difficult situation. 

Let me summarize just very 
quickly what I bring home with me by 
way of conclusions. First, famine has 
been checked tempoi'arily within Kam- 
puchea. It has been checked for the 
most part by the massive feeding oper- 
ations which have been organized on 
the border by international agencies — 
principally the U.N. agencies, by vol- 
untary organizations, and, I might also 
add, by the efforts of the American 
Embassy in Bangkok, which may have 
sounded the earliest alarm about famine 
in Kampuchea. 

We can say that the famine has 
been checked in the west by the efforts 
of the border-feeding operation, which 
has penetrated into Kampuchea to an 
amazing distance. We have reports 
from both travelers within Kampuchea 
and from debriefings of refugees who 
arrived at the border that food from the 
border is penetrating 200-300 kilome- 
ters inside Kampuchea by the bicycle 
brigade and by the bull carts. That has 
been a major effort; it's been a suc- 
cessful effort. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



East Asia 



Secondly, the famine has been 
emporarily checked by the fact that 
he recent harvest has come in, and the 
luthorities have, in the main, appar- 
ently allowed people to keep that har- 
dest. And I think you have to give 
;redit to the international 
)rganizations — the International Com- 
Tiittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
UN ICE F— which are operating the re- 
ief program within Kampuchea, for 
iffecting the psychology of the au- 
;horities in Phnom Penh— allowing dis- 
.ributions of Russian corn, allowing 
/illagers and farmers to keep that re- 
.■ent harvest, which was a very short 
larvest. 

Now the question: What's ahead? 
\nd that answer, I think, is quite grim. 
: think we are facing again the threat of 
I renewed famine in Kampuchea. We 
ire very seriously concerned as to how 
he population can be sustained be- 
ween March — when this current short 
larvest will be consumed entirely — and 
"Jovember-December, when the next 
nain crops will be harvested. 

There will be a short harvest on 
imall irrigated acreage in the spring 
md in the early fall, but there is going 
be a huge deficit. We are going to 
lave a massive famine again in Kam- 
luchea if we are not able to step up the 
elief effort very substantially in the 
le.xt 60-90 days. 

According to the international or- 
ganizations, there is now some hope 
or improvement of distribution within 
Campuchea. In particular, after persis- 
ent refusal UNICEF has recently re- 
eived agreement from Hanoi to allow 
t to charter barges for food shipments 
ip the Mekong. They have received ap- 
)roval for flights to provincial airports 
)y chartered Laotian aircraft operating 
lUt of Phnom Penh. And the pos- 
.ibilities of an airlift to outlying regions 
ind barging operations — particularly 
ifter the dry season — give us some 
lope. At least, they give the interna- 
ional organizations hope that the 
cejam that has been blocking distribu- 
ion within Kampuchea may be Ihaw- 
ng, if not breaking up. 

The processing of refugees for the 
•esettlement program is in good shape. 
The third country resettlement is 
vorking and working well. Many coun- 
tries are cooperating. And the refugee 
processing center in Bataan, Philip- 
pines, which will be a major help in that 
l^ystem, is well under way and will be 
''eceiving refugees from countries of 
"irst asylum this week. 



Q. Can you tell us something 
more about the distribution of food 
within Kampuchea that has been ar- 
riving at Kompong Som and at Phnom 
Penh? How has this food been dis- 
tributed in recent weeks, or has it been 
distributed? 

A. In the last 2-3 weeks, UNICEF 
officials advised that some improve- 
ments in the situation have occurred, 
namely the ones I've mentioned — the 
approvals from Hanoi for barge char- 
ters up the Mekong, the approvals for 
the flights of Laotian aircraft into pro- 
vincial capitals out of Phnom Penh. 

They also report that there is a 
steady improvement in the movement 
of supplies out of Kompong Som to 
Phnom Penh. We hope these supplies 
then get to the provinces and to the 
Khmer, although I want to state that 
under the conditions that obtain within 
the country, neither the international 
officials nor we have any way to 
monitor distribution. We are continuing 
to ask that those organizations fulfill 
the requirements of our law and that 
we get reports which verify distribu- 
tion. 

I want to say again that they have 
indicated there are improvements that 
they deem important. They also have 
emphasized to me what I've already 
told you— that the famine has been 
temporarily checked. Again in saying 
that, I want to make it very clear that 
we do not have information covering 
important sectors of the country— the 
northeast; the southwest where the Pol 
Pot forces hold up in the Cardarnom 
Mountains, particularly pockets in the 
hills and outlying regions in the north; 
and in institutions where children, the 
sick, the aged, and marginal groups 
have undoubtedly been bypassed with 
food supplies and are still undoubtedly 
suffering. 

So when I say the famine is tem- 
porarily checked, it's based on the re- 
ports that I've indicated but also on an 
important proviso that there are large 
areas of the country we haven't seen. 
We are reasonably certain that there 
are still large groups suffering and cer- 
tain also that famine is coming unless 
these relief efforts can be stepped up in 
the months ahead. 

Q. The problem of supplies piling 
up in warehouses in Phnom Penh — is 
that a political problem; is that a 
logistical problem; is it a problem 
that they just don't have enough 
know-how to achieve that or track it 
or whatever? 

A. That is not a distinction one can 
easily make between political and logis- 



Thai-Kampuchea 
Border Situation 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JAN. 2t), 1980' 

The United States is concerned about 
recent Vietnamese military reconnais- 
sance operations along the Thai- 
Kampuchean border, increasingly harsh 
Vietnamese propaganda attacking bor- 
der area relief operations, and recent 
intelligence reports which point to pos- 
sible Vietnamese military attacks on 
refugee concentrations along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. 

Vietnamese military activity in this 
area poses a potential threat to the se- 
curity of Thailand. Any expansion of 
this military activity would constitute a 
threat to the peace, security, and sta- 
bility of the entire region. 

We welcome the strong expressions 
of concern already issued by Japan, the 
European Community, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada about the safety 
of the noncombatants on the border. 
Utmost care must be taken to assure 
that these people can return to their 
homes in Kampuchea. 

We urge that all concerned gov- 
ernments continue to support efforts of 
international organizations, both at the 
border and in Kampuchea. 

We also call upon the Governments 
of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which 
supports Vietnam's military activity in 
Kampuchea, to refrain from any action 
that would threaten Thailand's security 
and integrity or endanger the well- 
being and safety of the noncombatants 
in the refugee concentrations along the 
border. More broadly, we urge them to 
seek a peaceful solution there, entailing 
the end of hostilities, withdrawal of all 
foreign troops, and creation of a 
genuinely independent and representa- 
tive Khmer government at peace with 
all its neighbors. 



'Made available to news corre- 
spondents by Department spokesman Hod- 
ding Carter III. ■ 



'\pril 1980 



35 



East Asia 



tical problems, especially when 
operating from outside the country. 

The private voluntary organiza- 
tions, U.N. agencies and the ICRC 
operating in Phnom Penh feel strongly 
that the problems are what they would 
call "structural;" that is, the lack of 
administrative competence, the lack of 
communications, the lack of transporta- 
tion, the lack of roads, and so forth. 

Other observers feel that the 
problems go beyond that; that if it's 
possible to supply 200,000 Vietnamese 
troops, it ought to be possible to supply 
food to people. And those observers 
would ask why it has not been possible 
to move some of the more than 40,000 
tons that have been delivered into the 
country before this date. 

Again, the answer has been that 
supplies have been moved out of Kom- 
pong Som and out of Phnom Penh, but 
those supplies were there before the in- 
ternational relief effort supplies ar- 
rived; that the Phnom Penh authorities 
were pursuing the principle of "first in 
time, first in right," and so they dis- 
tributed Russian corn rather than the 
UNICEF and ICRC .supplies. There 
are, in short, a lot of e.xplanations. 

Another explanation is that, in 
fact, the U.N. supplies delivered 
through ICRC and UNICEF have made 
a major impact on the total hoarding 
psychology of a government that lacked 
any strategic reserve for the period to 
come. It has been obvious for a long 
time that the coming months would be 
the worst period of all because the ag- 
ricultural production system is shat- 
tered. There are no substantial pros- 
pects for recovery in agricultural pro- 
duction before 1981. The last crop was 
perhaps 10-15% of normal. And so 
some have argued that the supplies de- 
livered by international agencies have 
constituted a kind of strategic reserve 
for the lean times ahead. 

Whatever the facts, the supplies 
haven't been distributed up to now. 
There is now evidence that some 
supplies are being moved out of Kom- 
pong Som and out of Phnom Penh. We 
hope, and the international agencies 
believe, that those supplies are reach- 
ing people and that increasing amounts 
will move out of this blockage in the 
weeks ahead. 

Q. From your 2-week trip, which 
of these different explanations do you 
subscrihe to? I mean what is your im- 
pression as to why the delays? 

A. I would find it easy to subscribe 
to the theory that the delays are caused 
by different factors at different times. 



It would seem to me that there has 
been a clear lack of logistical compe- 
tence, a clear lack of administrative 
structure, and a clear lack of determi- 
nation to get the food to the people. 

Q. How many international refu- 
gee relief workers are now in Kam- 
puchea, and what is the status of the 
hundreds of trucks that have now 
been provided by various sides? And is 
the distribution going beyond the 
Phnom Penh area — is it now, in any 
sense, fanning out from Phnom Penh 
to the rest of the country? 

A. Let me remind you that I did 
not go into Kampuchea; that I have 
sought to give you a balanced view of 
the situation as it was reported to me 
by UNICEF officials with whom we 
met in Bangkok, who had come from 
Phnom Penh, and by other officials and 
travelers — including refugees — who 
have been recently in Kampuchea. I do 
not speak from personal observation 
within the country. 

There are about five or six UN- 
ICEF officials operating in Phnom 
Penh. They have no opportunity, with 
that small a complement, to monitor 
movements out of Phnom Penh. They 
are doing their best to get the goods 
from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, 
where the basic transportation system 
of the country is centered. 

Routes 5 and 6 around the Tonle 
Sap, the Great Lake, originate at that 
point, so there are very few officials 
there. 

I might add a point concerning the 
threat of renewed famine as against the 
temporary improvements that we've 
been able to make through these relief 
efforts. One of the things that has not 
happened, and which represents a 
clear, political issue rather than a logis- 
tical issue, is the improvement in the 
medical situation. There has been no 
willingness to allow international medi- 
cal assistance, with some very limited 
exceptions. That is a matter, I think, of 
great and increasing concern. 

Q. Do they have the adequate 
trucks now to distribute the food, and 
are they allowing distribution outside 
of the Phnom Penh area? 

A. I'm advised by the UNICEF of- 
ficials that there are now 400-500 
trucks within the country; however, not 
all of them are operational because 
there is a very limited training program 
underway for drivers. There are 50 
trucks a day moving supplies from 
Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, which 
carry about 250 tons. A lot of those 



trucks are not yet in service along the 
principal supply routes from the major 
harbor to the major distribution points. 

There are 800 tons a week going by 
train, as of most recent information, 
from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. 
That would mean, according to UN- 
ICEF, that they have improved their 
capacity to move goods out of Kompong 
Som — we're talking about relief goods 
now, both the joint ICRC/UNICEF 
program and the voluntary agencies. 
They think they have the capacity now 
for about 11,000 tons per month. 

The target is 30,000 tons per montl 
moving into the country to meet the 
food needs of the Kampuchean popula- 
tion. The Phnom Penh port itself has a 
substantially greater relief capacity 
right now — about 20,000 tons per 
month. If they can keep those supplies 
moving and we can sustain the progran 
of moving them into the country, they 
will gradually develop the capacity to 
make the logistical connections that an 
necessary to reach the people. 

Q. I'm perplexed by several thing 
here. Last October, when Father 
Hesburgh [Theodore M. Hesburgh, 
chairman of a White House meeting 
on refugees] put together a group to 
make an appeal and Dick Clark [Am- 
bassador Palmieri's predecessor] was 
providing him with some of the data 
that he was using, we were told that i 
large proportion of the people who 
were still surviving in Kampuchea 
were going to die within the next few 
months unless the relief effort could 
get up to that level of 30,000 tons a 
month. 

Now you seem to be suggestinK 
that it has not gotten up to that level, 
and yet you talk about a famine beinj! 
temporarily checked in Kampuchea. 
You also talk about the inability to 
get to some areas to really be sure of 
what is happening. You talk about 
the inability of the five or six UN- 
ICEF people in Phnom Penh to knov 
exactly where the food is going once 
they've put it in the warehouses in 
Phnom Penh. 

Were the worst fears of last Oc- 
tober exaggerated, or is our hope now 
that not too many people are dying is 
exaggerated? There seems to be some 
inconsistency here in the picture 
we've been given in the past and the 
picture you're painting today, and I 
don't understand it. 

A. It's not hard to understand. The 
thing that would be hard to understant 
is if it would be perfectly consistent. 
The information is itself difficult to ob- 



36 



Department of State Bulletr 



East Asia 



tain and difficult to verify. There are no 
statistics; there are no communications 
to speak of within this country. 

What we do know is that as of Sep- 
tember, we had the prospects of a vir- 
tual holocaust within Kampuchea. As of 
January, some 4 months later, it is pos- 
sible to say that there have been, un- 
doubtedly, thousands and thousands of 
deaths by malnutrition and starvation 
during the past year within that coun- 
try. On the other hand, the relief ef- 
forts I've mentioned have come up to 
speed particularly in the border opera- 
tion. I think we can say that that bor- 
der operation may have saved a million 
Khmer lives in the past several months, 
not only by directly feeding several 
hundred thousand people in the border 
concentrations and in the Khmer hold- 
ing centers but also by providing food 
that was taken into western Kam- 
puchea. So both things are true. There 
has been great suffering; there remains 
great malnutrition. 

I hope I have not misled you by 
saying the famine conditions were tem- 
porarily checked. There remains very 
serious malnutrition. There undoubt- 
edly remain pockets — and they may be 
very substantial — of people in outlying 
regions who are still starving. 

When I say the famine has been 
temporarily checked, I am giving you 
the characterization of experts in UN- 
ICEF and ICRC, and Sir Robert 
Jackson, the new U.N. coordinator, 
who have used those terms. 

I don't think that the information 
was at all exaggerated that you got a 
few months ago. I think that I'm not 
exaggerating now when I tell you what 
I have said about the threat of a new 
famine, and I'm not sure I see the in- 
consistency. This was, in fact, one of 
the fastest buildups of an international 
relief effort, comprising not only food 
on the borders but water trucked in — 
one of the biggest water supply opera- 
tions that has ever been mounted. In- 
deed it's been so big, it has about 
ruined the roads in that part of the area 
of Thailand. 

In medicine, we now have several 
hundred medical people on the Thai 
border. This medical operation has 
played the major role in changing that 
picture. What I'm trying to say is that 
by checking it, we have not removed 
the problem. 

Q. Nobody knows for sure, but 
there are estimates that the popula- 
tion of Kampuchea is only 3 million. 
If you are feeding 1 million on the 



border and planned distribution 
within the country has only met one- 
third of its goal and, therefore, 
reaching another 1 million people, 
two-thirds of the population are being 
reached. Do the remaining 1 million 
constitute the pockets you're talking 
about? 

A. I think you're going to have 
trouble making the numbers add be- 
cause we have trouble making the num- 
bers add. For one thing, as I men- 
tioned, there have been shipments of 
Russian grains which have been dis- 
tributed. Undoubtedly those shipments 
have played a role. 

For another reason, there has been 
the recent November-December har- 
vest which, while it won't last another 
month, has played an important role in 
checking the famine. 

Another thing that goes to the 
question, and that is perhaps the grim- 
mest consideration, is that those people 
who were strong enough to get to the 
border or who had friends or family 
who were strong enough to get to the 
border and get back to them have had a 
higher survival rate than other people 
within western Kampuchea. 

We really don't know how many 
people have died there, so when I say 
the famine is temporarily checked, I 
certainly am not commenting on the 
mortality rate of the last few months 
from malnutrition within Kampuchea. I 
hope that's clear, that there could have 
been and undoubtedly was a very real 
human tragedy expressed in terms of 
lives lost. It may be that that tragedy 
still continues, just in terms of the 
permanent damage that's been done by 
malnutrition, to a whole generation of 
Khmer. 

Q. About 6 weeks or 2 months 
ago, officials here were suggesting 
that some of this food might be going 
to the wrong people, that we had no 
way of knowing whether it was going 
to the Vietnamese Army. Do you have 
a better grip on that subject now? Is 
this still the fear of the Administra- 
tion here? 

A. Again, my sense would be that 
it would be strange if some part of it 
were not going in the wrong direction, 
because there is such a substantial ef- 
fort being made to move food to the 
border in order to get that food moving 
into the country. 

On the other hand, the interna- 
tional organizations assure us — and we 
have made the concern very plain to 
them — that they have no evidence of 



deliberate diversion. On the other 
hand, they would say just what I have 
said, that in the real world, there may 
well be diversions. There may also be 
limitations to what they have the abil- 
ity to inspect. I told you that they don't 
have any monitoring facilities. But I 
conclude from the information given by 
the international authorities that the 
food that is going into this relief pro- 
gram and, in the main, is reaching the 
people for whom it is intended. I want 
to be very clear on that, because I think 
that is what has checked the famine. 

Q. Is there any sign of any 
movement by Hanoi toward allowing 
the controlled departure of people as 
seemed to have been agreed in Geneva 
last July? 

A. There have been continuing 
conversations on that point. I myself 
met with the Vietnamese charge d'af- 
faires in Bangkok, along with U.S. Am- 
bassador Abramowitz. We asked again 
for the response that we need to con- 
tinue the discussions. That response 
consists of the information concerning 
the relationship of the people on their 
list to either our government through 
past employment or to relatives in the 
United States. With that information, 
we have offered to use their list and to 
proceed on the basis indicated earlier, 
namely, to interview people at the air- 
port in Ho Chi Minh Ville and to take 
them out and to make the program 
work. The charge listened with cour- 
tesy and interest, and we await the re- 
sponse of his government with interest. 

Q. How long do you think it 
would be before these refugee camps 
are ever emptied, if ever possible, and 
do you think the flow of refugees into 
the United States will be speeded up? 

A. The answer to the second ques- 
tion is that the process is being speeded 
up, particularly with respect to those 
people who have been there longest. 
We have, I think, made a very impor- 
tant improvement in the processing in 
Thailand. We will be taking well over 
7,000 people a month out of Thailand. 
The whole worldwide resettlement ef- 
fort now, from a processing standpoint, 
is in high gear. It takes time to put a 
management system in place, but this 
one is now in place; it is now working 
both in respect of the operation of the 
camps, the transit processing, and, 
hopefully, the processing centers where 
we will be working on bringing orienta- 
tion programs to the refugees before 
they depart for third countries. 



April 1980 



37 



East Asia 



On the first question, which is the 
$64 question or in this case a somewhat 
larger figure, the obvious answer is 
that we don't know when conditions in 
Indochina will return to a point at 
which people will no longer have the 
motivation to flee. 

It is clear that that motivation is, 
in part, related to political repression, 
in part to military activity, and in 
part — and particularly in 
Kampuchea — to hunger. If you could 
tell me when those conditions will 
change, I can tell you when people will 
want to stay home. ■ 



Kampuchean 
Relief Disrupted 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 6, 1979' 

Starvation still threatens millions of 
Cambodian lives, despite a massive in- 
ternational relief effort. This sad real- 
ity is due to no failure of global con- 
cern. The international community has 
offered the means and has the will to 
allay the suffering of the Cambodian 
people. 

Growing quantities of food and 
medical supplies are now reaching that 
country, but too often the relief cannot 
get through to those in need; instead, 
the flow of aid is deliberately blocked 
and obstructed by the Vietnamese and 
Heng Samrin authorities. Their Soviet 
allies have not brought any discernible 
influence to bear to alleviate the situa- 
tion, while supporting Vietnam heavily. 

• Relief supplies are piling up in 
Phnom Penh and other points of initial 
delivery because local and Vietnamese 
authorities continually change or delay 
agreed arrangements for distribution. 

• Ta.xes and tariffs are collected on 
the delivery of relief supplies — in ef- 
fect, imposing a surcharge on human 
survival. 

• We continue to receive reports 
that relief supplies are diverted or 
stockpiled for the use of military forces 
and that what distribution does take 
place is skewed to favor officials and 
supporters of the Heng Samrin regime. 

• There is even interference with 
the attempts of the Kampuchean people 
to feed themselves. F'or example, refu- 
gees have reported the mining of rice 
fields to prevent a harvest. 



In the face of widespread human 
anguish, this delay and diversion of 
humanitarian efforts is unconscionable. 

As many as 2 million Cambodians 
may have died under the brutal Pol Pot 
regime. Now, in the wake of a Viet- 
namese invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia, the long-suffering people of 
that country face a new wave of oppres- 
sion, hunger, and disease. 

To counter this mounting tragedy, 
we call upon responsible leaders in both 
Hanoi and Moscow to recognize and act 
upon the compelling humanitarian re- 
quirements of the Cambodian people — 
which they thus far have not done. We 
call on them to cooperate fully with the 
international community in opening all 
routes for supplies to enter 
Cambodia — which they thus far have 
not done. We call on them to take the 
steps necessary to speed the distribu- 
tion of humanitarian aid to starving 
people throughout all parts of that 
country — which they thus far have not 
done. We call on them not to feed the 
flames of war, but use aircraft and air- 
fields to ferry food to feed the people of 
Kampuchea. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 10, 1979. 



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38 



EUROPE 



Secretary Visits Europe 



Secretary Vance departed Wash- 
I'vgfo)! 0)1 Febntarij 19, 1980, for visits 
oBotin (February 19-20), Rome 
Fihriiary 20-21), Paris (February 
7 I. mid London (February 21-22); he 
■I'tiiiiicd to Washington on February 
'J. Fill I owing is the text of the news 
■iiiifirence he and Gertnan Foreign 
lliiii^ter Hans-Dietrich Genscher held 
II Biiiin on February 20.^ 

"oreign Minister Genscher. We had, 

est t' 1-day and today, talks lasting for 
several hours. We had a substantive 
liscussion of the world situation, we 
lave arrived at a common analysis, and 
we were in agreement on the need for 
in overall Western concept. And I be- 
ieve that the visit of the Secretary of 
5tate not only to Bonn but also to 
tome, to Paris, and to London is of 
ery great importance. 

We welcome this effort undertaken 
y the American Administration to con- 
ult with its European allies and, as you 
now, there has been a very intensive 
irocess of consultations over the last 
2w weeks. These talks will be con- 
inued when the Chancellor goes to 
Vashington in 2 weeks. 

I am convinced that the Secretary 
f State will leave the Federal Republic 
f Germany certain and convinced that 
he Federal Republic will meet its obli- 
ations within the framework of the 
Western community and that we will 
ontribute to the objective of 
afeguarding the balance both 
iternationally — worldwide — as well 
s here in in Europe. The objective is, 
Lirthermore, to implement the resolu- 
ions adopted by the United Nations as 
egards Afghanistan. The objective is 
Iso that all possibilities for talks and 
ontacts should be used and exploited 
do all we can in order to avoid escala- 
ion, but rather to make a political solu- 
ion of the pending problems possible, 
nd to continue in this way the process 
f a realistic policy of detente. 

Secretary Vance. I first want to 
xpress my deep thanks to Foreign 
linister Genscher and to the Chancel- 
ir for spending many hours during my 
tay here in the discussion of the vari- 
us topics which Minister Genscher has 
eferred to. The discussions were ex- 
remely helpful to me. 

As Foreign Minister Genscher indi- 
ated, our analysis of the situation is 
ommon. And we had a chance to dis- 



cuss in depth the steps to be taken 
within the Western community in 
dealing with the difficult problems that 
face us. 

I might say a particular word about 
our discussion at lunch today with 
Chancellor Schmidt. During those dis- 
cussions we discussed in great depth 
substantive issues relating to not only 
the current situation but the long-term 
objectives. We did not devote our time 
to the tactical short-term problems; 
those have been covered, along with 
substantive matters, in my discussions 
with Foreign Minister Genscher and his 
colleagues. But it was extremely useful 
to have the chance to have an in-depth 
discussion of both the short- and the 
long-term substantive issues which I 
shall convey back to my President in 
preparation for the meetings which he 
will be having in the near future with 
Chancellor Schmidt. 

Q. A lack of information and con- 
sultation on the part of the United 
States has been often deplored here in 
Europe. Has this matter been on your 
agenda, and is the U.S. Administra- 
tion willing to improve in the near fu- 
ture the process of informing the 
Western allies? 

Secretary Vance. The answer is 
yes, of course, we are willing to im- 
prove the methods of consultation. It is 
absolutely essential that we have the 
fullest consultation between ourselves 
and our allies and friends. We have 
talked about possible ways of improv- 
ing the exchanges between us which I 
hope will prove fruitful. I believe that 
they will. It is crucial in times like 
these that we do have both a 
mechanism and a means for full and 
complete discussion at any time. 

Q. Hodding Carter [State Depart- 
ment spokesman] told us this morning 
that the State Department had estab- 
lished two lists of countries support- 
ing, or seeming to support, the U.S. 
boycott initiative on the Olympics. 
Twenty-five countries would make 
this position clear, 25 others would 
express private support. West Ger- 
many, Mr. Carter said, was not on 
either list. Were you able to gain any 
support during your visit here? 

Secretary Vance. The question of 
the Olympics is a question which must 
be determined by each government 



after full consultations among not only 
its government officials but also with 
the members of its national Olympic 
committee and after discussion within 
its domestic public. That is an issue for 
each country to decide for itself, and I 
am sure that that process will be fol- 
lowed in this country. 

Q. [Inaudible; concerned Olympic 
boycott.] 

Secretary Vance. We made our po- 
sition very clear on this issue. We said 
that we would not attend the Olympics 
in the capital of any invading country. 
The Soviet Union has invaded Af- 
ghanistan; its troops remain in Af- 
ghanistan; we have suggested that the 
Olympics should be transferred or an 
alternate site found or that they be can- 
celed. And we have said if this is not 
done that we will not attend. 

Q. You said there was agreement 
on "the need for" a Western overall 
concept. When will you reach an 
agreement on the Western concept? 

Foreign Minister Genscher. I 



IOC Rejects 
U.S. Proposal 
on Summer 
Olympics 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 12, 1980' 

We regret the decision of the Interna- 
tional Olympic Committee (IOC) to 
conduct the 1980 Summer Olympic 
Games in Moscow, and rejecting the 
proposal of the U.S. Olympic Commit- 
tee to transfer, postpone, or cancel the 
games. 

Under these circumstances neither 
the President, the Congress, nor the 
American people can support the send- 
ing of the U.S. team to Moscow this 
summer. The President urges the U.S. 
Olympic Committee to reach a prompt 
decision against sending its team to the 
games. The United States is working 
with a number of other like-minded 
governments to take similar action and 
to consider the practicability of con- 
ducting other international games for 
the teams which do not go to Moscow. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. 



Xpril 1980 



39 



Europe 



think I should say that we discussed es- 
sential elements of this Western overall 
concept and that we reached full 
agreement on these essential elements 
of such an overall concept. I think we 
should take very seriously what the 
Secretary of State said about the sub- 
stance of the talks he had with the Fed- 
eral Chancellor because the Chancellor 
gave a very detailed, thorough, and 
in-depth analysis of the situation— po- 
tential consequences flowing from this 
situation — and he also explained in de- 
tail his views as to how the present 
situation could be overcome. 

So I think an exchange of the kind 
we had today which produced agree- 
ment on the assessment of individual 
elements is necessary as the basis for 
such a substantive concept, and, 
therefore, it is no wonder that we 
reached agreement on these essential 
elements today insofar as such agree- 
ment hadn't existed already earlier. 

Secretary Vance. Let me simply 
add to that that I want to underscore 
what Herr Genscher has said. It was 
extremely important to have this in- 
depth discussion of those short-term 
and long-range substantive matters. 
And as Herr Genscher has said, there 
was agreement; and we are proceeding 
along the same track. 

Q. Did you discuss the plan of the 
international guaranty for a neutral 
Afghanistan? 

Secretary Vance. We have dis- 
cussed the communique which was is- 
sued yesterday at the end of the [Euro- 
pean Communities Foreign Ministers'] 
conference in Rome and the conclusions 
which were set forth in that com- 
munique. Let me say that we are in 
general agreement with the statements 
reflected in that communique. 

Q. 1 Inaudible; concerned U.S. 
policy to "punish" the Soviet Union 
for the invasion of Afghanistan.] 

Secretary Vance. What we have 
said on that is that as long as Soviet 
troops remain in Afghanistan that they 
mu.st pay a cost which flows from the 
fact of this blatant invasion of a 
neighboring country. And at the same 
time they must realize that such action 
is unacceptable to the world commu- 
nity, as is reflected by the vote in the 
United Nations, which was over- 
whelming. 

Q. Can you tell us what contribu- 
tion West Germany will make to the 
implementation of this overall re- 
sponse policy".' 



Foreign Minister Genscher. I 

think it is well-known that the Govern- 
ment of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, within the framework of the al- 
liance, faces its most essential task in 
helping to safeguard the balance here in 
the central district of the central area 
of the alliance. Another very important 
role of the Federal Republic is to con- 
tribute to a solution of the very difficult 
economic and financial problems beset- 
ting our ally Turkey. We are, fur- 
thermore, interested in making a con- 
tribution to improving relations and 
deepening cooperation with the gulf 
states and also to make a contribution 
to the economic development of Paki- 
stan. These, I think, are essential con- 
tributions on the part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to this overall 
concept. 



'Press release 41 of Feb. 21, 1980. ■ 

European 
Parliament 
President's Visit 

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JAN. 29, 1980' 

The President met with European 
Parliament President Simone Veil 
January 29, 1980. Madame Veil, who 
presides over the first directly elected 
European Parliament, is heading a 

Madame Veil and President Carter 



23-member delegation to the United 
States. 

Madame Veil discussed the evolu- 
tion of the European Parliament (EP) 
and the enlarged prospects it enjoys for 
becoming a significant social and politi- 
cal force in Europe now that its mem- 
bers are elected by universal suffrage. 
She pointed to the recent EP resolution 
on Iran in support of international ef- 
forts to secure the release of American 
hostages in Tehran who continue to be 
held in defiance of all accepted norms of 
international law. In addition, she dis- 
cussed the recent EP resolution which 
condemned Soviet aggression in Af- 
ghanistan and which urged EP membei 
countries to reconsider the sending of 
their national teams to compete in the 
Moscow Olympics. 

The President stressed his admira- 
tion for the strength and vigor with 
which the European Parliament is ad- 
dressing major issues of the day, and ht 
reiterated U.S. interest in maintaining 
close contacts with this evolving in- 
stitution. In that connection, the Presi 
dent and Madame Veil agreed on the 
desirability of intensifying transatlantic 
cooperation in the fields of trade and 
energy, a development which would ac 
cord with the Parliament's growing 
interest in international affairs. 

Madame Veil expressed her per- 
sonal appreciation for the forcefulness 
of the President's State of the Union 
message and felt that a great number o 
Europeans felt as she did. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. 







40 



Department of State Bulletii 



Europe 



Security Assistance for Greece, 
Turkey, Relations With Cyprus 



bif //. Allen Holmes 

Statt'uient before the Subcovimittee 
'til Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
Fehniury 13. 1980. Mr. Holmes is Dep- 
litfi A.'^sistant Secretary for European 

[ am pleased to be here today to discuss 
lur relations with the countries of the 
nistern Mediterranean and the Admin- 
strat ion's security assistance proposals 
'or Greece and Turkey for FY 1981. At 
he outset, I should explain that, this 
ear, the Administration's proposal for 
unds for Cyprus' displaced persons will 
)e submitted separately from the secu- 
■ity assistance package. It, more ap- 
)ropriately, will be part of the budget 
equest for refugee programs. 

The basic policy goals of the United 
itates in the eastern Mediterranean 
emain constant. We seek to strengthen 
pur important bilateral relations with 
Jreece and Turkey, to strengthen 
■lATO's vital southern flank, and to 
acilitate the search for a solution to the 
yyprus problem. 

Events in Iran and Afghanistan, 
dded to the unresolved problems in 
he Middle East, have opened to ques- 
ion some earlier assumptions about 
loviet behavior, thus deepening the al- 
eady considerable instability in the 
; rea bordering on the eastern Mediter- 
anean region. International tensions 
ave increased. These developments 
nderline the importance of fostering 
lose, cooperative relations with Greece 
nd Turkey and the necessity of helping 
hem to maintain viable, pro-Western 
emocratic systems. They lend great 
rgency to our efforts to assist these 
ritically situated allies in acquiring the 
lateriel and training needed to dis- 
harge effectively their NATO respon- 
ibilities. 

In formulating our security assist- 
lue proposals, we have been guided by 
,he .statement of principles contained in 
lection 620C(b) of the Foreign Assist- 
,nce Act of 1961. The formal certifica- 
ion to this effect, required by section 
20C(d) of that act, will accompany the 
administration's FY 1981 legislative 
roposal. Detailed explanations of the 
frtification are contained in the coun- 
ty pi'ogram documents, and I will at- 
■mpt to highlight some of the main 
oiiits in this statement. 



Turkey 

As a result of partial elections on Oc- 
tober 15, a new Turkish Government, 
led by Suleyman Demirel, took office in 
November. It is the first minority gov- 
ernment in the history of the Turkish 
Republic, depending on parliamentary 
votes from parties which have no seals 
in the Cabinet. This government faces 
severe problems at home. The economy 
is in disarray; terrorism takes a daily 
toll of lives, including the brutal slaying 
of four Americans in December; and the 
harshest winter in 30 years makes all 
other problems even more acute. The 
Turkish Government is moving vigor- 
ously to combat these problems. Our 
support in the defense and economic 
fields will help it in this task, as well as 
serve basic U.S. interests. 

The past year has seen a continua- 
tion of the steady improvement in our 
bilateral relationship. We have made 
significant progress in our defense 
negotiations. Secretary Vance and his 
Turkish colleague. Foreign Minister 
Erkmen, agreed in December on an in- 
tensified effort to complete these 
negotiations expeditiously. In talks 
held in Ankara in early January, Under 
Secretary-designate [for Security As- 
sistance, Science, and Technology Mat- 
thew] Nimetz reached agreement on the 
core documents of a new relationship of 
defense and economic cooperation. 

Initialed on January 10, these 
documents are the foundation agree- 
ment and supplementary agreements on 
defense support, defense industrial 
cooperation, and installations. In order 
to facilitate the conclusion of the 
negotiations and the continued func- 
tioning of U.S. -utilized facilities, Tur- 
kish authorities extended until Feb- 
ruary 22 the interim measures under 
which we conduct our various opera- 
tions at Turkish installations. Both 
sides are now striving to complete the 
remaining parts of the agreement by 
February 22. 

This new agreement contains no 
specific U.S. pledge of funding but 
rather a best-efforts commitment that 
we shall seek to help meet Turkish 
needs in the security and economic 
fields. Our FY 1981 assistance request 
for Turkey is in line with both the mag- 
nitude of these needs and the spirit of 
the recently initialed agreement. We 



are mindful of strong congressional 
interests in these negotiations, and we 
are arranging to brief the relevant 
committees in detail on what has been 
accomplished to date. 

On the international plane, the 
Turkish Government has been helpful 
to us with respect to the critical prob- 
lems in southwest Asia. It has con- 
demned forcefully the taking of Ameri- 
can hostages and the violation of our 
Embassy in Tehran. It fully shares our 
grave concern ovei- Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan. Within NATO, Turkey 
has given strong support in meeting 
that challenge. 

Cyprus continues to affect our 
bilateral relationship with Turkey. The 
Turkish Government has frequently af- 
firmed its desire to reach a just and 
lasting settlement on the island through 
the intercommunal talks. We hope that 
U.N. Secretary General Waldheim will 
soon succeed in bringing the two com- 
munities back to the negotiating table. 
We believe that Turkey will support his 
efforts toward that end. 

On the bilateral plane, the U.S. 
Senate completed action last year on 
two consular treaties — the prisoner 
transfer treaty and the agreement on 
extradition and judicial assistance. 
Shortly after taking office, the new 
Turkish Government submitted both 
treaties to its Parliament for ratifica- 
tion. They are now in committee. 

On January 24 the Turkish Gov- 
ernment announced a sweeping pro- 
gram of measures which amount to a 
radical reorientation of the Turkish 
economy. It devalued the Turkish lira 
by 48%; ceased subsidizing most state 
economic enterprises, thus raising the 
price of many basic goods; encouraged 
foreign investment and private sector 
activity; and made the state economic 
enterprises subject to market forces. 
Independent financial experts and 
friendly governments have long advo- 
cated reforms of this kind and mag- 
nitude. Initial foreign reaction has been 
overwhelmingly positive. Success of the 
program will depend on a large inflow 
of external resources to finance essen- 
tial imports in the next few months. 
The United States will do its part, as in 
1979. We are delighted that the Federal 
Republic of Germany has again under- 
taken to put together an international 
consortium for this purpose. Chancellor 
Schmidt has appointed Finance Minis- 
ter Matthoefer to lead this effort. 

Our FY 1981 request for Turkey 
addresses these realities. We propose a 
total security assistance program of 
$452 million, of which $250 million is 



Xpril 1980 



41 



Europe 



foreign military sales (FMS) financing 
and $2 million is international military 
education and training (IMET). We also 
seek $200 million in economic support 
fund assistance to help Turkey with its 
critical balance-of-payments problems. 

The $250 niillion"FMS financing 
program will have a beneficial impact 
on Turkey's ability to maintain equip- 
ment now in its inventory. It will also 
make a limited contribution to Turkey's 
program for reaching its NATO- 
approved goals of force modernization. 
Other allies, particularly the Federal 
Republic of Germany, are also making 
bilateral efforts to enhance Turkish 
defense capabilities. Turkey has, how- 
ever, a massive need for support 
equipment and spare pai'ts. 

IMET is an e.xtremely valuable 
program. It provides needed training, 
and it enhances contacts and communi- 
cation between Turkish and American 
military personnel. This dialogue is es- 
sential in light of the disruption which 
occurred during the embargo period. 
Now, both sides are relearning old 
habits of cooperation. As a result, we 
are working toward a stronger NATO 
in which U.S. and Turkish forces play 
complementary roles and make more 
effective use of scarce resources. 

Turkey's critical economic situation 
makes it vital for the United States and 
other friendly nations to support the 
January 24 economic reforms. Our as- 
sistance will provide some of the re- 
sources which Turkey needs to sustain 
this program and, over time, to regain 
its economic health. Realistically, this 
process will take much longer than a 
year. Our economic support fund pro- 
posal is not dramatically large, but it 
builds significantly on our FY 1980 as- 
sistance. More importantly, it gives 
Turkey further assurance of our undi- 
minished political support for the suc- 
cess of its economic stabilization pro- 
gram. We would plan to provide this 
$200 million in economic support fund 
assistance on terms which reflect Tur- 
key's stringent financial circumstances. 
Last year the Administration agreed 
with the congressional initiative to pro- 
vide $75 million of the $198 million eco- 
nomic support fund as a grant. 

The assistance measures which I 
have cited will help to strengthen a val- 
ued friend and ally. They, therefore, 
are intrinsically important to major 
U.S. and Western security interests. 
They will enhance the Turkish- 
American bilateral relationship and 
Turkey's ability to play a useful role in 
the alliance. 



42 



Greece 

During the past year, our relations with 
Greece have deepened and matured as 
that increasingly developed country has 
more firmly established itself as an im- 
portant member of the democratic 
West. Under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Karamanlis, Greece will be en- 
tering the European Communities (EC) 
on January 1, 1981. The treaty of acces- 
sion now being ratified by member 
states was signed in Athens on May 28 
in the presence of major European 
leaders, including the President of 
France and the Prime Ministers of 
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ire- 
land. President Carter sent a message 
to Prime Minister Karamanlis warmly 
welcoming this demonstration of 
Greece's economic vitality and demo- 
cratic strength and congratulating him 
on his wisdom and leadership in bring- 
ing Greece into the EC. 

The Government of Greece recently 
proposed the establishment of a perma- 
nent home for the Summer Olympic 
Games in Greece. It has offered to the 



International Olympic Committee a site 
near ancient Olympia for this purpose. 
We consider this a worthwhile initia- 
tive, particularly in the present circum- 
stances, and are prepared to support it 
in any way that would be helpful. 

We continue to have an on-going 
and positive defense relationship with 
Greece. The facilities we utilize there 
operate with the full cooperation of 
Greek authorities. Sixth fleet ships 
make regular calls in Greek ports. 

Greece is seeking to reintegrate its 
armed forces into the NATO military 
command structure, from which it 
withdrew in 1974. The Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, Gen. [Bernard M.] 
Rogers, has assumed the alliance man- 
date to develop military arrangements 
satisfactory to Greece and the alliance 
for this purpose. As a member of 
NATO, we strongly support these ef- 
forts and have urged all parties to work 
with General Rogers. We will continue 
to do so. 

The security assistance program 
we are proposing for Greece for FY 
1981 would provide $180 million in FMS 



1 7th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JAN. 24, 1980' 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 
days toward the conclusion of a negotiated 
solution of the Cyprus problem, plus a copy 
of Secretary General Waldheim's com- 
prehensive report to the Security Council 
on the United Nations operation in Cyprus 
for the period of June 1 through November 
30. 1979. 

Since my last report on Cyprus, dated 
November 21 [28|, 1979, the intercommunal 
talks have regrettably remained recessed. 
Now that the United Nations General As- 
sembly and Security Council have con- 
cluded their periodic reviews of the Cyprus 
question, I am hopeful that all parties will 
again focus their primary attention on re- 
suming the intercommunal negotiations. 
Secretary General Waldheim, in his De- 
cember 1, 1979, report on Cyprus, under- 
took to pursue his efforts to reconvene the 
talks as early as possible in the new year. I 
am encouraged to note that the Secretary 
General's representatives on Cyprus have 
begun consultations with both parties in an 
attempt to find common ground upon which 
the negotiations might resume. The United 
States will continue to support fully the 
Secretary General and his staff in their ef- 
forts to achieve an early resumption of 
serious negotiations. 



On December 14, 1979, the Security 
Council unanimously passed a resolution 
extending the mandate on the UN Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to 
June 15, 1980. I am pleased that the other 
members of the Security Council share our 
view that UNFICYP isessential to the 
maintenance of a calm atmosphere condu- 
cive to the reconvening of the intercom- 
munal talks. 

The Cyprus dispute has been on the in- 
ternational agenda for decades. The his- 
torical complexity of this issue indicates 
that perseverance, patience, and political 
courage are required on both sides if a just 
and lasting settlement is to be achieved. 
We are committed to the vigorous pursuit 
of all promising avenues that might lead to 
that settlement, and will continue to con- 
sult closely with all parties to the Cyprus 
dispute, the United Nations, our European 
allies, and other nations legitimately con- 
cerned with bringing peace to this troubled 
island. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter ■ 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P. O'Neill. Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 
1980). 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



inancing and $1.5 million IMET, for a 
otal of $181.5 million. 

The proposed program will assist 
ireece in fulfilling its NATO obliga- 
ions and help provide for Greece's 
elf-defense. The program also is a con- 
inuing indication of U.S. support for a 
lemocratic Greece. It has been formu- 
-ated with a view to maintaining the 
Inilitary balance among the countries of 
he region and to strengthening the 
outhern flank of NATO at a time of 
'articular concern. In sum, the pro- 
ram for Greece will be fully consistent 
vith the principles set forth in Section 
20C(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
f 1961, as amended, and will make an 
Tiportant contribution to the defense 
osture of a key ally. 



;yprus 

i^ith respect to Cyprus, we continue to 
elieve that the most effective way to 
chieve a permanent and mutually 
atisfactory settlement is through di- 
ect negotiations between the two par- 
nies on the island. 

Secretary General Waldheim suc- 
eeded in bringing the two sides to- 
ether in June, 1979, but the talks were 
ecessed when the parties were unable 
D agree on an agenda. Since then, the 
ecretary General and his staff have 
forked tirelessly to find common 
round on which the two sides might 
eturn to the negotiating table. The 
Inited States has consistently sup- 
orted the Secretary General and will 
ontinue to do so, for we believe that 
is efforts carry the most promise for 
esumption of the intercommunal talks. 

At the same time, we continue to 
onsult closely with all parties to the 
ispute, our European allies, and other 
tates which have a legitimate role to 
lay and which share our common goal. 
;ast fall. Secretary Vance had com- 
rehensive discussions with Cypriot 
'resident Kyprianou in New York 
uring the U.N. General Assembly, 
"ypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis has 
ust completed a visit to Washington 
/here he discussed the Cyprus problem 
yith the Secretary, Deputy Secretary 
/hristopher, and Unaer Secretary- 
esignate Nimetz. 

The long history of the Cyprus 
iroblem demonstrates that peaceful 
irogress has never been easy. We be- 
ieve, however, that a solution is 



achievable, and we remain committed 
to finding a solution that will bring 
peace to this troubled island. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from tne Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Spanish Prime 
iViinister 
Meets With 
President Carter 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JAN. 14, 1980' 



The President met today with Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suarez of Spain. The 
two leaders had a working lunch in the 
Cabinet Room, with senior officials of 
both governments participating. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister noted with satisfaction the 
close relations between their two coun- 
tries and discussed a number of inter- 
national issues which are of particular 
concern to both. These included the 
crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the 
situation in the Middle East, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and U.S.- 
Spanish cooperation in Western secu- 
rity matters. 

The President, in congratulating 
the Prime Minister for his vigorous 
leadership in the evolution of Spanish 
democracy, e.xpressed his appreciation 



and that of the entire American people 
for Spain's support on behalf of the in- 
ternational effort to secure release of 
American hostages held by Iran in de- 
fiance of universally accepted standards 
of decency and law. The President and 
the Prime Minister agreed that the 
principle of the rule of law, vital to the 
whole world community, is at stake in 
this crisis. The President and the Prime 
Minister further agreed that they 
would use every effort to convince the 
Iranian authorities to release, un- 
harmed, all the hostages. 

The two leaders exchanged views 
on the Soviet armed invasion and occu- 
pancy of Afghanistan. They agreed that 
this Soviet action, in flagrant violation 
of the U.N. Charter, constitutes a most 
serious threat to international peace. In 
condemning Soviet aggression, the 
President and the Prime Minister 
agreed on the need to strengthen West- 
ern solidarity, as expressed in concrete 
measures, to impress upon the Soviet 
Union the consequences of its conduct. 

During their discussion concerning 
other areas of interest to both govern- 
ments, the President expressed admi- 
ration for the Prime Minister's insights 
based on Spanish contacts and histori- 
cal experience in the Middle East, Af- 
rica, and Latin America. The President 
welcomed the constructive suggestions 
which the Prime Minister made re- 
garding these parts of the world and 
agreed that it would be useful to inten- 
sify U.S. -Spanish consultations on ways 
in which both countries could work for 
peace and stability there. ■ 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980. 



Prime Minister Suarez and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schu 




\pril 1980 



43 



Europe 



CSCE and East-West Relations 



by Matthew Simetz 

Statement before the U.S. congren- 
aional Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe on Janunrt/ 2i, 
1980. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor of the 
Department of State, Under Secretary- 
designate for Security Assistance, 
Science, and Technology.^ 

Thank you for the opportunity to ap- 
pear before the CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
Commission to exchange views on the 
Helsinki Final Act andthe CSCE proc- 
ess and to I'eport to you on our prepara- 
tions for the CSCE review meeting in 
Madrid. We appreciate the creative role 
of Chairman Fascell and the members 
of the commission, and we value the 
close working relationship with your 
staff. We will benefit increasingly from 
this collaboration as (jur Madrid prep- 
arations intensify. 

As we meet, the world has entered 
on a dangerous and unpredictable 
|)eriod. Soviet aggression in Afghanis- 
tan has called into (|Uestion fundamen- 
tal principles of international 
conduct — principles upon which 
East-West stability has rested since 
W(jrld War II and which are fundamen- 
tal to the Helsinki agreement. Indeed, 
the first basket of the Final Act is a vir- 
tual catalogue of principles violated by 
the Soviet invasion: 

• Principle one: sovereign e(|uality 
iif nations: 

• Principle two: refraining from the 
threat or use of force: 

• Principle three: inviolability of 
frcjntiers: 

• Principle f(iur: territorial integ- 
rity of states: 

• Principle six: nonintervention in 
internal affairs; 

• Principle eight: e(iual rights and 
self-determination of peoples. 

Afghanistan is not a party to the 
Helsinki agreement, but we must ask 
ourselves whether the Soviet Union, 
which feels free to violate such basic 
principles of conduct in Afghanistan, is 
not undercutting the basic norms of in- 
ternational conduct, embodied in the 
U.N. Charter, in a manner that 
threatens the peace and security (jf all 
regions of the world, including Europe. 

Moreover, the human rights situa- 
tion in the Soviet Union continues to 
give cause for concern. We had hoped 



44 



that the year leading up to the Madrid 
meeting would produce movement to 
resolve long-standing cases of human 
rights spokesmen and prisoners of con- 
science. There have been a few positive 
developments. For example, Jewish 
emigration from the Soviet Union 
reached high levels last year, although 
the numbers of applicants for emigra- 
tion and of refusals also increased. 
Howevei-. there are indications that the 
number of .Jews allowed to emigrate 
may now be decreasing, and we will 
i-ontinue to monitor this situation 
closely in coming months. 

Lately has come word of the de- 
pl(jrable action of Soviet authorities re- 
garding Dr. Andrei Sakharov. whose 
enormous contribution to science and to 
the cause of human rights is celebrated 
around the world. The fate of this 
Nobel Prize winner must be a cause of 
deepest concern to all free men and 
women. It is ironic that the Soviets 
should choose to take this harsh and 
unjustifiable action on the eve of the 
CSCE Scientific Foi-um in Hamburg, 
which has as its fundamental g(]al the 
encouragement of scientific incjuiry and 
cooperation. 

This latest act of official repression 
adds to a list of i-ecent incidents which 
was already depressingly long. Three 
important figures in the Soviet 
Union — a human rights activist, 
Tatyana Velikanova; a Russian Or- 
thodox priest. Father Gleb Yakunin: 
and a Baltic nationalist, Antanas 
Terleckas — were arrested on the same 
day at the beginning of November. In 
December, Victor Nikipelov, a human 
rights activist wh(( had been particu- 
larly concerned with Soviet psychiatric 
practices, was arrested. 

Two Ukrainian human rights fig- 
ures, Yuri Litvin and Oles Bernik. 
were taken into custody and (|uickly 
sentenced to substantial terms in prison 
and labor camps for "anti-Soviet prop- 
aganda." We are concerned for the fate 
of Igor Guberman, editor of an unoffi- 
cial journal of the situation of Jews in 
the Soviet Union, who was arrested in 
September. It is also deeply troubling 
that figures in the Soviet Helsinki 
monitors group — men like Orlov, 
Shcharanski, Rudenko, Petkus, 
Gajaukas — remain in prison, where 
some of them have been for many 
years. In Czechoslovakia, members of 
Charter 77— Dienstbier, Benda, Havel, 
and others — have also been imprisoned. 

Given this discouraging record, one 



must assess why it is in our interest tn 
persevere in CSCE. We have made this 
assessment and conclude that there are 
important ways in which CSCE con- 
tinues to serve our interests and the 
interests of human rights. 

For one, it has set a standard by 
which the actions of all participating 
states will henceforth be judged. We 
should not underestimate the impor- 
tance of this fact. CSCE has made the 
human rights practices of our fellow- 
signatories an object of legitimate con- 
cern and protest, heightening our 
awareness of our obligation to speak 
out and insuring that abuses of funda- 
mental human rights will no longer go 
unremarked and unchallenged. We can 
hope that the steady pressure of world 
opinion, focused by CSCE on repres- 
sive practices, will gradually affect the 
actions of governments — first in margi 
nal cases but eventually perhaps in 
more fundamental ways. 

We should also be aware that 
CSCE has helped to break down, how- 
ever slightly, the bloc-tct-bloc config- 
uration of European politics which for 
years prevented us from establishing 
lines of communication to many coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe. The Final Aei 
is an agreement betw een 35 sovereign 
states, without regard to political or 
military alignment. It has become a 
palpable and growing element in Euro- 
pean politics, one which promotes dis- 
cussion over confrontation and provides 
new opportunities for the countries of 
Eastern Europe to establish, albeit ten- 
tatively, their separate identities as in- 
depenclent nations. We are encouraged 
by signs that the Eastern Europeans 
value their CSCE relationship w ith us 
and by the progress which has been 
made — in Hungary, Romania. Bulgaria 
and the German Democratic Republic 
(G.D.R.), for example— in resolving fam- 
ily reunification and emigration issues. 
By helping put our relations with thest 
countries on a more normal basis, 
CSCE is perhaps a harbinger of the fu- 
ture Europe we all hope to build. 

CSCE has other benefits. It repre- 
sents a definitive recognition of the fact 
that the United States plays a central 
role in the future of Europe and pro- 
vides us w ith a forum which includes all 
the European states (except Albania), 
the United States, and Canada, where 
we can meet to discuss political, eco- 
nomic, and humanitarian issues of 
common concern. In the area of secu- 
rity, for example. CSCE has estab- 
lished a means of creating a regime of 
confidence-building measures which has 



Department of State Bulletir 



Europe 



he Idiig-tfi-m pcitential fur enhancing 
\arning time of surprise attack and 
lelping t(i stabilize the security situa- 
ion in Europe. In the area iif economic 
|ind environmental cooperation, the 
"reat y on Trans-boundary Air Pollution 
ijjiied last November is a good example 
f an agreement made possible by the 
xistence of CSCE and the Helsinki 
)rocess. We hope in the future to use 
his process to help us find systematic 
olutions to issues like family reunifica- 
ion which are of central concern to us. 

Finally, CSCE serves to remind 
he free nations of the West of the prin- 
iples and values which bind them to- 
:ether and, in the end. are the source 
if their collective strength. 

As we look forward to the Madrid 
neeting, we are ccmscious that the at- 
nosphere of East-West relations has 
leen gravely damaged by recent 
vents. Nevertheless, the goals we 
lave set for ourselves remain valid: 

• To encourage substantive prog- 
less in human rights performance by 
eastern countries befoi-e, during, and 
iter the Madrid meeting: 

• To insure a thorcjugh review of 
implementation, especially of the hu- 
(nanitarian and human rights elements 

n the Final Act: 

• To promote U.S. security and 
conomic goals; 

• To maintain a balance among the 
larious baskets of CSCE and to insure 
Ihat all subjects receive full attention 
md e.xposure. 

We are. however, realistic. What is 
(ossible at Madrid w ill depend to a 
hrge extent on actions taken by others. 
\o insure a useful and productive 
heeting at Madrid, we need action to 
(esolve outstanding human rights cases 
Ike those of the Helsinki monitors and 
'harter 77 and an end to Soviet aggres- 
ion in Afghanistan. For our part, we 
.■ill continue to insist on a thorough re- 
liew of impU'mentaticjn. not only at 
lladrid but in our consultations with 
ither signatories prior to Madrid. 

In conclusion. I would like to men- 
ion briefly how we plan to continue our 
ireparations in coming months. We 
'Ian to continue the series of bilateral 
'SCE consultations we have had with 
.^astern European countries and with 
he neutral and nonaligned. Members of 
he commission's staff will participate 
n these meetings as they have in past 
onsultations. We plan an extensive 
eries of meetings in Washington and 
round the country with interested 
:roups to discuss Madrid preparations. 



We hope to reach as many people as we 
can, and we intend to take their com- 
ments seriously. We will continue our 
multilateral con.sultations in NATO and 
our cooperation with the commission 
and its staff. Our purpose is to develop 
not only an effective policy but one 
which reflects the legitimate concerns 
and the long-term goals of the Ameri- 
can people. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Italian Prime 
Minister Visits U.S. 



Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga 
of Italy made an official visit to the 
United States January 23-26, 1980. 
While in Washhigton (January 23-25), 
he met with President Carter and other 
government officials. Following is the 
joint press statement issued on 
January 25.^ 

At President Carter's invitation, the 
President of the Council of Ministers of 
Italy, Francesco Cossiga, paid an offi- 



cial visit to Washington January 24-25. 
The Italian Prime Minister is also vis- 
iting the United States in his capacity 
as President of the Council of Ministers 
of the European Community for the 
current 6-month term. The President 
offered a dinner at the White House in 
honor of Prime Minister Cossiga and 
had two meetings with him. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister reviewed the exceptionally 
close relations between the two coun- 
tries and stressed the solidarity exist- 
ing between them; they also discussed a 
number of major international issues of 
common concern. These included the 
crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the re- 
lations between East and West, the 
situation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, the continuing efforts by 
both the United States and Italy to 
strengthen the Atlantic alliance, the in- 
ternational economic situation, the de- 
velopment of the European Economic 
Community — of which Italy holds at 
the moment the presidency — and a 
broad range of bilateral activities de- 
signed to intensify U.S. -Italian cooper- 
ation in all fields. 

The President expressed his ap- 
preciation and that of the entire Ameri- 
can people for Italy's assistance and 
support in connection with the inter- 
national effort to secure the release of 
the American hostages held by Iran in 



Prime Minister Cossiga and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz Pa 




vpril 1980 



45 



Europe 



defiance of the universally accepted 
standards of international law. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister agreed that the principle of 
civilized behavior and rule of law is at 
stake. They believe that the continued 
detention, bent on blackmail, of Ameri- 
can diplomatic personnel puts Iran in 
conflict not merely with the United 
States but with the entire world com- 
munity. The President and the Prime 
Minister further agreed that all the 
hostages must be released unharmed. 
To this effect, they concur in the need 
for all appropriate means to convince 
the Iranian authorities to end the illegal 
captivity of U.S. citizens. 

The two leaders discussed the 
Soviet invasion and occupation of Af- 
ghanistan and agreed that this unac- 
ceptable violation of the sovereignty 
and independence of a previously 
nonaligned state, of international law, 
and of the U.N. Charter constitutes a 
grave threat to the peace not only of a 
vital region but of the entire world. 
They noted the international recogni- 
tion of this threat — as expressed by a 
very large number of countries, in- 
cluding all the European Community 
states — in the U.N. General Assembly 
vote overwhelmingly condemning the 
Soviet action in Afghanistan. The two 
leaders firmly reiterated their demand 
that all Soviet troops be withdrawn 
from Afghanistan. The President and 
the Prime Minister e.xpressed their de- 
termination to pursue, with like-minded 
nations, a series of coordinated actions 
to make very clear to the Soviet Union 
that it will not be allowed to commit 
such aggression with impunity. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister reviewed the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East and 
agreed to press forward on the Camp 
David accords and on the search for a 
comprehensive settlement, recognizing 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and independence of each country of the 
area and their rights to live within es- 
tablished and secure borders and taking 
into account the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister also discussed Atlantic secu- 
rity issues and expressed their satisfac- 
tion with the recent NATO decision to 
modernize the alliance's long-range 
theatre nuclear forces, in conjunction 
with the offer to Warsaw Pact countries 
to negotiate a balanced reduction of 
such weapons. They noted and they 
agreed that efforts to control and verify 
strategic nuclear weapons in the inter- 
est of world peace should not be aban- 
doned. 



46 



The President and the Prime 
Minister also reviewed the difficulties 
of the present economic situation and 
agreed to cooperate closely in the ef- 
forts to reach common solutions to cope 
with them. They discussed the plans for 
the Venice economic summit, which 
Italy will host in June, with particular 
emphasis on pursuing effective policies 
on macroeconomics, energy, trade and 
monetary questions, as well as new ini- 
tiatives for developing the North-South 
dialogue to which both sides attribute 
great importance. 

In emphasizing his solidarity with 
the Prime Minister and with the Italian 
people in the fight against terrorism, 
the President expressed admiration for 
the Prime Minister's leadership and his 
commitment to democratic tradition. 
He further expressed his appreciation 
for the efforts made by the Italian Gov- 
ernment to cope with the difficult eco- 
nomic situation, in order to achieve a 
greater stability and solve the most 
pressing problem of our time, the 
shortage of energy, and assure the 
necessai-y rate of economic growth. 

To further the close bilateral re- 
lationship between the United States 
and Italy and enhance democratic ties 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the two 



leaders agreed to intensify cooperation 
in a variety of fields. Concrete steps in 
support of such cooperation will enc(]m- 
pass the visit of a high-level investment 
mission to Italy for the purpose of ex- 
panding American investment in south- 
ern Italy; increased bilateral collaboi'a- 
tion in the fields of energy research and 
development; a comprehensive progi'am 
in agriculture which will help make „ 
Italy more self-sufficient in meat pro- 
duction and enlarge U.S. feed grain ex- 
ports; expanded cultural and educa- 
tional exchange activity between Italy 
and the United States, including in- 
structional television for the reciprocal 
teaching of each country's language; 
and the prevention of drug abuse. 
The President told the Prime 
Minister he looked forward with par- 
ticular pleasure to the visit he will be 
making to Rome in June and the con- 
tinuation of his bilateral talks with the 
Italian leadership directly preceding 
the Venice economic summit. ■ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980, 
which also carries the texts of President 
Carter's and Prime Minister Cossiga's re- 
marks made at the welcoming ceremony oi 
Jan. 24 and their dinner toasts that even- 
ing. 



U.S. Withdraws 
From Summer 
Olympics 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 20, 1980' 

On January 20, the President wrote to 
President Kane of the U.S. Olympic 
Committee to urge the committee to 
propose to the International Olympic 
Committee that the 1980 summer 
games in Moscow be transferred, post- 
poned, or cancelled if Soviet forces 
were not fully withdrawn from Af- 
ghanistan within a month. ^ The Presi- 
dent also urged that if these proposals 
were not adopted, the U.S. Committee 
should not send a team to the Moscow 
games. This position has been over- 
whelmingly supported by the U.S. 
Congress and the American people. 

On February 12, the International 
Olympic Committee announced it would 
adhere to its plans to conduct the 
games in Moscow. On February 14, 
President Kane of the U.S. Olympic 
Committee issued a statement saying 
the U.S. Olympic Committee would, of 



course, accept any decision the Presi- 
dent makes as to whether a team shoulc 
be sent to Moscow. 

A month has now expired, and 
Soviet forces have not even begun to 
withdraw from Afghanistan. The Presi 
dent has, therefore, advised the U.S. 
Olympic Committee that his decision 
remains unchanged and that we should 
not send a team to Moscow. The Presi- 
dent thanked the committee for its ear 
nest and patriotic efforts to present the 
case for transferring, postponing, or 
canceling the games and asked it to 
take prompt action to formalize its ac- 
ceptance of his decision. 

The U.S. Olympic Committee de- 
pends for its funds on the generosity o 
American citizens and American busi- 
ness. Even though no U.S. team is sent 
to Moscow, the committee carries on 
many other important and worthwhile 
activities to support athletic excellence 
in this country. The President urges ali 
American citizens to continue their fi 
nancial and moral support of the com- 
mittee. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980. 

^For text of the letter, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 1980, p. 50. ■ 



MIDDLE EAST 



^' 



elations With Islamic Nations 



ly President Carter 

Stafoiioit made at the beginning of 
is )neeti)ig in the White House with 
epreseiitatives qffaculties in Islamic 
tudies from Washington, D.C., area 
'.niversities on Fehruarij 7, 1980 J 

!"he history of Islam is very long eom- 
lared to that of the United States. 
slam is celebrating the first year of its 
5th century. As an independent na- 
ion, we have only just entered our 
hird. But from the beginning, the 
Jnited States has enjoyed close and 
alued ties with the Muslim world. 

A Muslim state, Morocco, was the 
irst to recognize our independence. 
>ur kaleidoscopic population includes a 
igorous Islamic community. Many 
cholars from the Muslim world pursue 
heir studies here. Centers for Islamic 
nd Middle Eastern studies — many of 
'hich you represent — have grown up 
n universities all over America. 

I have been struck, personally and 
n my experience as President, by the 
luman and moral values which Amei'i- 
lans as a people share with Islam. We 
Ihare, first and foremost, a deep faith 
a the one Supreme Being. We are all 
ommanded by Him to faith, compas- 
ion, and justice. We have a common 
espect and reverence for law. Despite 
he strains of the modern age, we con- 
inue to place special importance on the 
imily and the home. And we share a 
elit'f that hospitality is a virtue and 
hat the host, whether a nation or an 
idividual, should behave with 
enerosity and honor toward guests. 

On the basis of both values and 
iterests, the natural relationship be- 
ween Islam and the United States is 
ne of friendship. I affirm that 
riendship, both as a reality and as a 
toal — just as I totally reject any at- 
lempt to make moral and spiritual be- 
iefs a barrier to understanding, rather 
han the bridge they can and should be. 

I am determined to strengthen, not 
veaken, the longstanding and valued 
•ends of friendship and cooperation be- 
ween the United States and many 
■rluslim nations. We will lend our sup- 
lort to any nation working for peace 
ind justice and to resist external domi- 
latiiin. We will continue our efforts to 
lelp resolve peaceably — and with 
ustice — the international disputes, in- 
luding the Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
iffect the Muslim world. 



It is with profound revulsion that 
the world now witnesses the rejection 
of these principles of understanding and 
respect on the part of the Soviet Union. 
Today, in a Muslim country, Russian 
troops are making war against a people 
whose dedication to independence is as 
fierce as their faith. 

In a time of grave danger and up- 
heaval, I want to reaffirm what I said a 
few weeks ago: We have the deepest 
respect and reverence for Islam and all 
who share the faith of Islam. 

Of course there is indignation 
among Americans today over events in 
one Islamic country. I share that indig- 
nation. But I can assure you that this 
just anger will not be twisted into a 
false resentment against Islam or its 
faithful. I say that with confidence, be- 
cause a respect for religious faith is so 
deeply ingrained in the character of the 
American people. 

We continue to seek the closest 
possible political, economic, and cul- 
tural ties with the Islamic nations and 
with Muslims throughout the world. 
That has not changed, and it will not 
change. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980. 



U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry Established 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 20, 1980' 

Secretary General Waldheim has an- 
nounced the establishment of a commis- 
sion of inquiry to go to Iran to hear 
Iran's grievances and to allow an early 
solution of the crisis between Iran and 
the United States. He has stated that 
the commission will speak with each of 
our people. 

Both the United States and Iran 
have concun-ed in the establishment of 
the commission, as proposed by the 
Secretary General, in mutually accept- 
able, official responses to him. 

In concurring, the United States 
has taken note of the Secretary Gen- 
eral's statement that the commission 
will undertake a factfinding mission. It 
will not be a tribunal. The United 
States understands that the commission 



will hear the grievances of both sides 
and will report to the Secretary Gen- 
eral. 

The American people are deeply 
aggrieved that Iran, after guaranteeing 
the protection of our people, has taken 
them hostage and held them in intoler- 
able conditions for 108 days. The 
United States has no desire to interfere 
in the internal affairs of Iran, but it 
does insist on the prompt return of the 
53 Americans now illegally held in 
Tehran. 

The United States has also made 
clear its position that the meeting of 
the commission with our people must be 
consistent with international law and 
that the hostages must, under no cir- 
cumstances, be subjected to interroga- 
tion. It is vital, however, for the com- 
mission to determine that they are all 
present and to assess their condition. 

We hope that the commission will, 
as the Secretary General has said, 
achieve an early resolution of the crisis 
between our two countries, which re- 
quires the release of the hostages. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980. 



Iran Chronology, 
February 1980 



February 2 

Iranian militants, fearing a political 
compromise between Iran and the U.S. to 
secure release of the hostages, call for mass 
demonstrations of solidarity. 

February 3 

Militants cancel march to prevent it 
from coinciding with the unofficial inau- 
gural speech to be given by President-elect 
Bani-Sadr. 

Bani-Sadr is interview-ed on ABC-TV 
"Issues and Answers." 

February 4 

Khomeini formally installs Bani-Sadr 
as first President of the Iranian Republic. 

Khomeini, for the first time, condemns 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 
and pledges "unconditional support" for 
Moslem insurgents. 

February 6 

U.S. delays imposing formal economic 
sanctions against Iran to avoid upsetting 
possible chances for settling the crisis. 

Panama's Foreign Minister, Carlos 
Ozones, states that the deposed Shah could 
not leave Panama. Other officials say that 
the Shah will not be extradited. 

The Revolutionary Council announces 
that the first round of parliamentary elec- 



Xpril 1980 



47 



Middle East 



tions are to be held March 7 and that the 
new 270-member assembly will convene on 
April 1. 

February 8 

Khomeini confirms designation of 
Bani-Sadr as chairman of the Revolu- 
tionary Council. 

Archbishop Capucei and Monsignor 
Nolan visit some of the hostages. 

February 9 

Militants claim they have a mandate 
from Khomeini to continue holding hos- 
tages. 

February 10 

A group of 49 Americans, invited by 
the militants and led by Norman Fouer, a 
professor at the University of Kansas, 
meets with militants for 4 hours but is not 
allowed to see the hostages. 

February 11 

On the first anniversary of Iran's Is- 
lamic revolution, Khomeini urges all op- 
pressed peoples to rise and fight for their 
rights against superpowers, but also 
suggests possible future relations with the 
U.S. 

Bani-Sadr announces a formula for re- 
lease of hostages which calls for the U.S. to 
admit the "crimes" it had committed in 
Iran, recognize Iran's "right to obtain the 
e.xtradition" of the deposed Shah, and re- 
solve "never again to interfere" in Iran's 
affairs. 

February 12 

Ghotbzadeh suggests the organization 
of a commission of inquiry into the abuses 
of the Shah's regime would help resolve the 
hostage issue. 

February 13 

Bani-Sadr announces that Khomeini 
approves secret plan for release of the hos- 
tages. 

President Carter approves of an inter- 
national commission of inquiry into Iran's 
grievances. 

February 14 

Bani-Sadr states that hostages could 
be freed within 48 hours if President Car- 
ter agrees to conditions approved by Kho- 
meini. 

Secretary General Waldheim begins 
draft guidelines for a U.N. commission that 
would hear Iran's grievances and obtain 
release of the hostages. 

February 15 

In New York, a Federal judge orders 
all briefs to be filed in lawsuits against Iran 
be sealed because of the sensitive situation 
e.xisting to gain release of the hostages. 

Alireza Nobari, head of Iran's central 
bank, declares that to gain release of the 
hostages, the U.S. should release Iranian 
assets now officially frozen. 



Progress in the Middle East 
Peace Negotiations 



by Sol M. Linowitz 

Address before the Foreign Policy 
Association in New York on January 
17. 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is 
Personal Representatire of the Presi- 
dent for the Middle East Peace Negoti- 
ations. 

Tiiday I want to speak to you candidly 
and with unalloyed realism about a 
truly critical subject: the Middle East 
peace negotiations — their objectives, 
their progress to date, and their pros- 
pects for the future. 

Over the years, the world has 
needed no reminder that the Middle 
East is an area of uncertainty and in- 
stability. Yet in recent days the remind- 
ers have been multiplying. Events 
have conspired to underscore once 
again how volatile — and how vital — 
that region of the world is. 

The unlawful detention of Ameri- 
can hostages in Tehran, the revolu- 
tionary turmoil and instability of Iran, 
the naked aggression of the Soviets into 



Afghanistan — all these explosive 
bursts of crisis dramatically absorb oui 
attention. These events pose a threat ti 
the independence and capability of 
moderate governments throughout 
southwest Asia and the Middle East. 
We are asking these governments to- 
gether with our European allies to joir 
us in a major effort to prevent furthci- 
Soviet encroachment and to guarantee 
regional security. 

But this strategy cannot be fully 
effective if it fails to address one of th( 
main causes of instability in the region 
— the Arab-Israeli problem. Recent 
developments thus make progress to- 
ward resolution of this conflict an ob- 
jective of even more crucial important 
to peace and stability and to U.S. intei 
est in this vital area. They make it eve 
more urgent that the current negntia- 
tions between Egypt and Israel succcc 
and that the United States uSe its goi 
offices constructively and vigorously t 
help them succeed. 'To do so is both ii 
the highest interest of the United 



February 17 

The five members of the inquiry com- 
mission announced by Secretary General 
Waldheim are: Adib Daoudy of Syria, a 
political adviser to President Hafez al- 
Assad; Louis-Edmond Pettiti of France, a 
judge on the European Court of Human 
Rights; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria's 
envoy to the U.N.; Andres Aguilar 
Mawdsley, Venezuela's former Ambassador 
to the U.S.; and Harry W. Jayewardene, a 
lawyer from Sri Lanka who is active in civil 
rights causes. 

February 18 

Bani-Sadr orally approves inquiry 
commission but does not give a firm com- 
mitment on the timing of the release of the 
hostages. He later sends a formal message 
to Secretary General Waldheim accepting 
the commission. 

February 20 

At Iran's request, U.N. inquiry com- 
mission delays trip from Geneva to Tehran 
for 3 days. 

Khomeini issues statement giving his 
support for the militants holding the hos- 
tages and their demand for the Shah's re- 
turn. 

February 21 

U.N. inquiry commission uses its 3-day 
delay in Geneva to gather information on 



conditions in Iran during the deposed 
Shah's reign. 



February 23 

Commission arrives in Tehran, but 
Khomeini issues a statement saying that 
the fate of the hostages should be decidedl 
by the new parliament to be elected in 
March/April. 

February 24 

Militants endorse Khomeini's state- 
ment. 

February 26 

Revolutionary Council announces that 
some U.S. reporters, banned since mid- 
January, may be permitted to enter the 
country. 

February 27 

Secretary of the Revolutionary Coun- 
cil, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, offi- 
cially forecasts that the parliament which 
to be elected will not be ready to discuss . 
the hostage issue until 4 weeks after it con 
venes. 

February 28 

Visit to hostages by commission is sti 
undecided. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletr. 



Middle East 



Statts and in the interest of world 
)eace. 

Prospects for the Future 

am here as a negotiator, and nego- 
iators are by nature optimists. 
The business of a negotiator, after all. 
s to try to fashion workable solutions 
rem the most unpromising of raw ma- 
erials. But I am also a realist, and it is 
IS an optimistic realist or a realistic op- 
imist that I want to put my basic 
hesis before you: It is my deep convic- 
idii that the prospects for achieving 
leaic between the Arabs and the 
sruflis — a just, durable, and com- 
irehensive peace — are better today 
han they have been at any time in the 
)ast 30 years. 

That is a dramatic statement, and I 
, I'ant to suggest to you the reasons why 
j believe it is so. 

'■"irst. For the first time in history Is- 
ael and the strongest of its Arab 
eighbors, Egypt, have pledged them- 
elves to peace and have entered into a 
■inding treaty solemnly committing 
hemselves to that objective. 

iecond. That historic pledge of peace, 
,hich rightly brought the Nobel Peace 
'rize to President Sadat and Prime 
linister Begin, is holding; it is work- 
ig; it is bearing tangible fruits that 
ramatize, for all parties in the region, 
he benefits of peaceful negotiation. 

Most importantly, both Egypt and 
srael are living up to their agree- 
lents. Both nations have demonstrated 
heir determination to adhere to their 
ommitments. Thus Israel has turned 
ver to Egypt on schedule not only the 
najor portion of the Sinai but als(( the 
Uma oilfields, in spite of the immense 
lifficulties that the loss of this oil — at 
oday's prices — has posed for the Is- 
aeli economy. By the same token, 
■Igypt has proceeded diligently to nor- 
nalize its relations with Israel, despite 
he fact that these steps have led to 
mnitive political and economic actions 
)y a number of other Arab nations. 
This normalization process will be 
lighlighted by an e.xchange of ambas- 
iiad(]rs less than 6 weeks from now. 

In addition, this dramatic progress 
rn their relations has been accompanied 
py what President Carter has described 
us "an extraordinary change in at- 
itude" by Israelis and Egyptians alike. 
The growing respect and understanding 
5etw een President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin — which I have witnes- 



sed firsthand — reflect the steadily 
evolving attitudes of their two peoples. 

Third. Israel and Egypt, through a 
framework agreement reached at Camp 
David, have pledged themselves to a 
broader peace — a comprehensive peace 
among all parties in the region. I have 
detected no wavering on the part of 
either leader in that commitment. Both 
know that progress toward that goal is 
essential if their dreams for their na- 
tions and peoples are to be fulfilled. 

Fourth. The Camp David summit was 
not a one-shot achievement; rather it 
launched an ongoing process — and the 
e.xisting momentum of that process is 
itself a major contribution to peace. 
The Camp David accords recognized 
that no comprehensive peace is possible 
unless both Israel's security concerns 
and the Palestinians' legitimate political 
requirements are satisfied. The present 
negotiation process is realistically de- 
signed to reconcile both sets of con- 
cerns. The process will necessarily be 
slow and difficult; it will be strewn with 
obstacles and setbacks. But the over- 
riding fact is that the process is realis- 
tic and that it can succeed. 

Fifth. The United States, at the re- 
quest of both Israel and Egypt, is in- 
volved as a full partner in the negotia- 
tions. As Camp David demonstrated, 
the United States can contribute in a 
major way to the peace process — not 
by imposing its will — but by acting as 
a catalyst, by helping the parties over- 
come difficult issues, and by assisting 
the parties to maintain the momentum 
toward peace. The role of the United 
States is not to force solutions or pre- 
scribe answers. Nor do we envisage our 
role as that of policeman of the region. 
But within the framework agreed to by 
Israel and Egypt, the United States is 
committed ar/d determined, more than 
ever, to work with the parties and to 
help them in their negotiations. 

On this matter of U.S. involvement 
in the present peace process, I would 
like to interject one observation: As I 
look back tf) the decision of President 
Carter to take the initiative at Camp 
David, and as I see today the positive 
results that have flowed from that ini- 
tiative, I am struck by the comparison 
between our nation's major contribu- 
tion to Middle East stability and the re- 
cent actions of the Soviet Union in the 
Middle East, and what those actions 
tell us about the Soviet interest in sta- 
bility in that part of the world. For me, 



the actions of the two great powers 
stand now in particularly sharp and 
vivid contrast — and the contrast makes 
me deeply proud of my country. 

Objectives 

I recognize, of course, that even a mul- 
titude of reasons to be hopeful is no 
substitute for concrete plans and 
specific actions. So let me briefly re- 
view with you the objectives of the 
peace process launched at Camp David, 
and where we now stand. 

It was. in my judgment, the genius 
of the principal negotiators at Camp 
David to understand that other efforts 
to achieve comprehensive peace had 
failed by grasping for too much, too 
soon. In fact, the issues in the Middle 
East are so complex, the emotions so 
deep, and the contending parties so 
numerous that the problems have al- 
ways defied shortcuts or one-step solu- 
tions. 

The wisdom of Camp David was to 
recognize this fact: to recognize that 
the best hope for peace lay in a phased 
process — one in which agreements at- 
tainable at one stage become building 
blocks for subsequent progress on more 
difficult issues. And thus, by abandon- 
ing the (|uest ft)r comprehensive "break- 
throughs," Camp David, parado.xically. 
became a dramatic breakthrough; by 
deciding to pursue peace in relatively 
modest steps, the parties at Camp 
David took a giant step. 

This does not mean that the objec- 
tives they set forth at Camp David 
were modest ones, far from it. 

• The first goal was to establish an 
atmosphere of trust and confidence — an 
atmosphere that would not only make 
relations more friendly and fruitful be- 
tween Israel and Egypt, but one that 
would also impress other parties in the 
region with the possibilities of peace. 

• The second objective was to put 
in place, after the achievement of peace 
between Israel and Egypt, a function- 
ing self-governing process for the Pal- 
estinian people in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The intention here was. and is. to 
demonstrate, in a transitional period, 
that full autonomy for the Palestinians 
and security for Israel are compatible 
and to pave the way for later negotia- 
tions to determine a final status for the 
West Bank and Gaza. 

• The third goal was. and is. the 
most ambitious: to build a comprehen- 
sive peace settlement in the region — 
the "just, durable, and comprehensive" 



^prll 1980 



49 



Middle East 



peace that has attracted, and eluded, so 
many people for so many years. 

As I emphasized earlier, it is not 
my place as the President's personal 
representative, nor is it the role of the 
United States, to dictate how those 
objectives shall be pursued. But it does 
seem to me appropriate to observe that 
achieving those goals will require cer- 
tain essential acts and attitudes. 

To begin with, we regard it as es- 
sential that Israel's security be strictly 
insured, f(]r if terrorism should flare up 
during the transitional period, as the 
fledgling self-governing authority for 
the Palestinians gets underway, the 
whole future of the peace process could 
be jeopardized in the conflagration. 



tions on two aspects of such transitional 
arrangements: the machinery for 
electing a self-governing authority for 
the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza and the powers and respon- 
sibilities to be exerci-sed by such an au- 
thcjrity. 

At present we are making efforts 
on both fronts. But predictably, much 
more has been accomplished in reaching 
agreement on the machinery than on 
the difficult second (|Uestion — the pow- 
ers and responsibilities to be e.xercised 
by the self-governing authority. 

Let me underscore one point about 
this: No one has ever defined "full au- 
tonomy" in circumstances like these 
and that is what we are trying to do. 



// is my deep conviction that the prospects for achieving peace between 
the Arabs and the Israelis . . . are better today than they have been at 
any time in the past 30 years. 



Second, and of equal importance, it 
is essential that the self-governing au- 
thority have real substance; and that it 
have an opportunity to build authentic 
democratic leadership. 

Third. I think it is essential to 
build cooperative relationships between 
the self-governing authority and Israel 
and with .Jordan if that nation will join 
the peace process. 

And finally. I believe it important 
that all of us resist the temptation to 
make premature judgments or predic- 
tions about an eventual final settle- 
ment. Our immediate objective is to set 
u|) transitional mechanisms: let us do 
that, putting first things first, and 
dealing with today's problems today. 
After such transitional arrangements 
have been implemented, the parties will 
be in the best position to work together 
to achieve comprehensive peace. 

For the fundamental point is that 
the present negotiatiims are not de- 
signed to achieve agreement on the 
final status of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Rather. Israel and Egypt, with the 
United States as a partner, are seeking 
agreement on a Tj-year transitional ar- 
rangement to replace the present Is- 
raeli military government and its civil- 
ian administration on the West Bank 
and Gaza. 

Current Status 

Where do these negotiations stand at 
present? The accords call for negotia- 



50 



The talks since late May, therefore, 
have necessarily gone through a series 
of exploratory exercises. The day-in 
and day-out work is meticulous and ar- 
duous: but this is the very essence of 
negotiations. Now we are beginning to 
grapple with arrangements for full au- 
tonomy and a new way of life for the in- 
habitants of these areas. 

Someone once said that there is no 
problem, no matter how complicated, 
which, when looked at in the right way, 
does not become more complicated. In 
these negotiations, we are now trying 
to look at immensely complicated prob- 
lems in the right way. The difficulties 
are, as Secretary Vance once observed, 
like "trying to untie a knot from the 
inside." But as I found on my trip sev- 
eral weeks ago to Cairo and Jerusalem, 
there is a readiness on both sides to ac- 
cept the fact that negotiations must re- 
sult in the creation of a self-governing 
authority that is both credible and via- 
ble. And this, in turn, means that the 
transitional government must be em- 
powered to exercise real authority over 
the lives of the West Bank and Gaza in- 
habitants. 

So both parties are focusing (m the 
powers and responsibilities which 
should be transmitted to the transi- 
tional authority and on how to insure 
that they will provide both full au- 
tonon y for the Palestinians on the 
West Bank and Gaza and security for 
Israel. This means we must focus atten- 
tion on the powers and responsibilities 
to be conveyed to the Palestinians and 



try to find answers to such complex 
problems as what to do about security 
about arrangements with respect to 
lands, including settlements: about ar- 
rangements regarding water rights; 
and about the status of East Jerusalem' 
Arabs. 

These are enormously difficult 
problems. But we must view them in 
the light of the progress already made 
remembering that a little more than a 
year ago there were many who believed 
that peace between Egypt and Israel 
was also impossible. 

A serious problem of concern to 
both Egypt and Israel is the continued 
refusal of the Palestinian Arabs and of 
most Arab nations to join in the peace 
process. Admittedly, the absence of the 
Palestinians from the peace table — as 
well as the absence of Jordan — is both 
a disappointment and an obstacle. 
However, it should not be considered 
insuperable at this time. Real progress 
can be made by the present partici- 
pants. The most important thing is to 
devote our maximum energies to mak- 
ing concrete progress in these talks. B\ 
so doing we can show those who have 
not yet participated that it is in their 
interest to join the process. 

Ultimately, for the achievement ol 
the peace we seek, we will need the 
participation of other key parties. But 
if there is sufficient progress by the 
current participants, that very prog- 
ress can persuade the other parties tha^ 
peace is in their interest. 

Next week I will be going back to 
the Middle Ea.st. On that trip^ I plan ti 
meet with the heads of government of 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, as 
well as with President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin. I am no prophet, par- 
ticularly when it comes to a region so 
filled with uncertainties. But I do ap- 
proach the journey with the conviction 
that the facts as I know them and the 
progress thus far made justify an at- 
titude of guarded optimism. 

For I believe that if we continue on 
our course, with the commitment and 
determination of the parties, we may 
yet find our way: and it may yet be that 
the Middle East, where man first 
dreamed his dream of peace, can show 
the world — even at an anguished time 
such as this cme — how to resolve issues 
and conflicts that have been smoldering 
for centuries. And how right and fitting 
it would be that this region of the 
world, which is the cradle of civiliza- 
tion, should be the one which teaches 
man the great lesson he has not yet 
learned: How to beat swords into plow 
shares and learn war no more. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



ebanon, Jordan, and Syria — 
=Y 1981 Programs 



y Morris Draper 

Stateiiiciit befon- the Si(hcom)inttee 
■I Europe and the Middle Eaf^f of the 
ouse Foreign Affairs Couimittee on 
•ebraary 12, 1980. Mr. Draper is Dep- 
fy Assistant Secretary for Near 
lastern and Sonth Asian Affairs.'^ 

ast year, when we discussed programs 
ir these three countries, I I'emarked 
lat the region was experiencing a 
jriod of rapid growth, change, and 
/olution. In the year since then, the 
intinuing revolution in Iran, fighting 
southern Lebanon, the Soviet inva- 
on of Afghanistan, and shifts and 
•alignments of forces in the region 
ive posed new challenges to the con- 
ict of our foreign policy. 

The three countries with the pro- 
•ams we are addressing today — Jor- 
m, Syria, and Lebanon — border Is- 
lel. A comprehensive settlement of 
le Arab-Israeli conflict will not be 
)ssible without the involvement of 
ese three countries. The directions 
eir policies will take over the period 
lead will be of great interest to the 
nited States. 

These countries are geographically 
ose but are dissimilar in character, in 
)vernment, in their political forces, 
rid in the individual relationships we 
ive with them. Our assistance pro- 
•ams take into account their diversity 
'. well as our major policy interests. 

Underlying the specific objectives 
ich country program addresses is a 
)al common to all three. This is to help 
aintain mutual trust and confidence, 
strengthen their wishes for associa- 
jn with the West, to demonstrate our 
instancy and purposefulness in sup- 
trt of their independence, and to 
'inforce their commitments to find 
;ace through negotiation and media- 
an rather than through confrontation 
id conflict. 

The programs we have proposed 
^r fiscal year 1981 reflect in both mag- 
tude and focus our best judgment of 
jw our interests can be protected and 
ivanced at a time of greater demands 
pon our limited financial resources. 
he programs are critically important 
5sets in our capacity to influence new 
j 'ends and developments not only 
ithin these three countries but in a 
ider arena. 



LEBANON 

The program we are proposing for 
Lebanon this year reflects our deep be- 
lief that the United States must con- 
tinue to give visible and tangible sup- 
port for President [Ilyas] Sarkis' efforts 
to reconstruct his divided country and 
to develop strong national institutions. 
We are seeking .$20 million in foreign 
military sales credits, .$500,000 for mili- 
tary training, and $7 million in eco- 
nomic support funds. 

Military Assistance 

New outbursts of fighting in southern 
Lebanon yesterday and today demon- 
strate graphically the need to realize 
President Sarkis' hope to e.xtend his 
government's authority throughout the 
country, stage by stage. An indispen- 
sable element in this effort is the re- 
building of the Lebanese armed forces, 
and this has been a centerpiece of our 
overall strategy in Lebanon for 3 years. 

In 1977, Secretary Vance an- 
nounced a 3-year, $100 million foreign 
military sales credit program to assist 
in recreating a united national army. 
The first tranche of $25 million, funded 
in FY 1977, permitted the purchase of 
basic weapons and equipment to equip 
two defense battalions, which have be- 
come the nucleus of what is a conces- 
sionally balanced security force. Fur- 
ther tranches of $42.5 million in FY 
1979 and of $32.5 million in FY 1980 
will close the original program an- 
nounced in 1977 and have placed, in the 
pipeline, the bulk of the light 
mechanized infantry and support 
equipment necessary to reestablish a 
four-brigade core ground force. 

In addition, from 1977 to the end of 
1979, well over 100 Lebanese officers 
received military, professional, and 
management training in U.S. service 
schools. Credits for the Lebanese Army 
international military education and 
training program amounted to $40,000 
in FY 1977, $550,000 in FY 1979, and 
$500,000 in FY 1980. 

Good progress has been made. The 
new Lebanese Army has remained in- 
tact and effective despite periodic out- 
breaks of fighting. In the past year, 
army units have been deployed into 
both the southeastern suburbs of Beirut 
— replacing Syrian units there — and 
into areas of south Lebanon, where 



they work with U.N. peacekeeping 
forces. 

And, most significantly, in terms of 
President Sarkis' goal of achieving a 
genuine national consensus, the 
Lebanese Parliament last spring passed 
an armed forces reorganization law de- 
signed to reinforce the concept of con- 
cessional balance and to meet objec- 
tions from Muslims that the Lebanese 
Army was tilted concessionally. In 
coming months, the Lebanese Army 
may be deployed in additional areas, 
possibly including the cities of Tyre and 
Nabatiyyah in the south. 

The Lebanese Army now enjoys 
growing popular support. It is under- 
taking more responsibilities. Its morale 
is good, and its recruitment and train- 
ing programs are proceeding well. U.S. 
assistance has helped make this possi- 
ble. 

Economic Assistance 

President Sarkis' recovery program is 
a balanced mix of security and economic 
measures. We have been helping the 
Lebanese in economic and relief areas 
since 1975, at the height of the civil 
conflict. Some $115 million in economic 
assistance has been provided during 
this period, of which approximately $55 
million has been for emergency disaster 
relief. 

We are requesting $7 million in 
economic support funds for FY 1981 
which will assist small and highly visi- 
ble projects for agriculture, vocational 
training, housing repair, social welfare, 
and potable water. Our geographic con- 
centration will be in south Lebanon 
which has suffered greatly in the past 2 
years and will be supportive of the ex- 
tension of Lebanese governmental au- 
thority, as mandated by the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council resolution which also 
formed the peacekeeping force for that 
region. 

We did not seek economic support 
funds for Lebanon in the past 2 years. 
Now that the earlier pipeline is begin- 
ning to empty, we want it to resume 
this next fiscal year at a modest but 
politically very important level and use 
it where relatively small contributions 
will have the broadest result and ease 
pressing needs. Our successful village 
resettlement activity in southern Leba- 
non is a good model for what we seek to 
achieve. 

Our military and economic assist- 
ance programs for Lebanon show the 
Lebanese and their neighbors in the 
Middle East that we attach great im- 
portance to movement toward a broad 



April 1980 



51 



Middle East 



political consensus, social and economic 
reconstruction, and the strengthening 
of democratic and representative in- 
stitutions. All our actions focus on 
achieving stability and security for the 
Lebanese. We support the independ- 
ence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and national unity of Lebanon and the 
cohesion of its peoples. 



JORDAN 

We are proposing a substantial pro- 
gram of security and economic assist- 
ance for Jordan in FY 198L This con- 
sists of $50 million in foreign military 
sales credits and almost $1.1 million for 
military training. Confirming our inten- 
tion announced some 3 years ago, we 
have phased out grant military assist- 
ance. In the economic field, we intend 
to concentrate our efforts exclusively 
on the Maqarin Dam project, which is 
critical to Jordan's future economic 
and social health. We are seeking $50 
million in economic support funding for 
this purpose. 



Jordanian Contributions 

While substantial, the overall size 
of our programs reflects a continued 
downward trend, which was also evi- 
dent last year. While Jordan's needs for 
outside help will remain large in scope, 
the country is prospering and the proj- 
ects begun in past years with American 
assistance are making important con- 
tributions to future progress. 

Jordan remains highly important to 
the United States. Its leadership, its 
stability, its continued social and eco- 
nomic development, and its ability to 
defend itself and resist outside direc- 
tion have been integral elements of our 
broad policy interests in Jordan and in 
the region for decades. Our programs 
will build on a relationship which pro- 
vides for broad U.S. -Jordanian cooper- 
ation in many fields as we pursue our 
own interests and as Jordan strength- 
ens its national independence. 

While both the United States and 
Jordan want to sustain the mutually 
beneficial and friendly cooperation they 
have developed over the years, we do 
not disguise our differences over the 
Middle East peace process. We bear in 
mind, however, that Jordan remains 
dedicated to achieving a comprehensive 
peace on the basis of Security Council 
Resolution 242. It will, we are sure, 
remain openminded and will seize op- 
portunities which may later beckon. 



King Hussein has also argued with 
Arab leaders that they should move 
from a totally negative posture re- 
garding the Camp David process to the 
development of a positive and pragmat- 
ic alternative strategy. While no such 
reasonable alternative has yet been de- 
veloped, by King Hussein or others, we 
believe that Hussein's basic advice 
warrants more interest among the re- 
gion's leaders than the blind and in- 
flexible opposition we hear elsewhere. 

Security and Stability 

A word about Jordan's interests in and 
concerns over security and stability in 
the broader Middle East region and 
southwest Asia may be useful. Jordan 
has been helpful over the years to its 
friends in the Gulf states. Over 1,800 of 
Jordan's best officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers are training security 
personnel and are providing advice in 
the peninsula states. More than 7,000 
men from these states have passed 
through Jordanian training programs 
since 1970. 

Jordan sent troops to help Oman 
resist outside attacks and has trained 
military personnel in North Yemen. 
Jordanian help has been responsible, 
discreet, and effective, and — 
indirectly — has thus served broader 
U.S. policy goals. 

Our military assistance programs 
will contribute to the careful, phased 
modernization of Jordan's armed forces. 
Our military training programs will 
reinforce the orientation of Jordan's 
military establishment toward the 
West. Our economic assistance program 
will be an indispensable element in the 
construction and development of the 
Maqarin Dam project, designed to har- 
ness and exploit effectively the last 
major uncontrolled source of water in 
the lower Jordan River basin. In a 
water-scarce region, which suffered a 
major drought this year, it is impera- 
tive that this project be started soon. 

We have examined the mix of our 
agreements, our disagreements, and 
our interests in and with Jordan. We 
have renewed our conviction that it is 
in our fundamental interest to remain 
credible and understanding to this im- 
portant country. The basic message — 
that we are capable of working with our 
friends even when we have disagree- 
ment and that we have a long-term vi- 
sion of the achievement of basic goals 
common to both our countries — is one 
that we want understood far beyond 



Jordan. Only on such a basis can \vr 
strengthen our structure of cooperati( 
which can overcome the challenge uf 
tomorrow. 



SYRIA 

The program of economic assistance \ 
are proposing for Syria reflects an ap 
preciation of our long-term regional 
interests and the desirability of a ma- 
ture and constructive relationship wit 
this important Arab country. It alsn 
takes into account a situation that is 
different from that I have just dis- 
cussed in respect to Jordan. 

Economic and Military Support 

We are seeking for FY 1981 economic 
support funding of $5 million. This re 
quest is significantly below the levels 
approved in most of the fiscal years v 
have had a program in Syria. There ai 
reasons for this decrease. On a techn 
cal level, it is difficult to justify furtht 
large requests for the Syrian prograi 
while substantial funds from previou,- 
fiscal years remain in the pipeline. V\ 
are continuing our joint efforts to r<- 
solve cooperatively the difficulties 
which have prevented the early use < 
these funds for the development and 
welfare of Syria and its people. 

Members of this subcommittee m 
wonder why we are proposing any pr 
gram at all this year when Syria has 
been so sharply critical of the United 
States and the Camp David approach 
the Middle East negotiations. While v 
do not accept the criticisms made by 
Syria — or those offered by other 
states — we are prepared to believe 
that they are meant sincerely. We ha\ 
made fully clear to Syria that we inter 
to proceed with the process on which 
we have embarked, believing that it i 
the only path that has been suggestec 
that promises steady progress toward 
just and lasting settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. We have also 
made clear, at the same time, that wt 
want Syria to keep the door ajar so th 
it can pass through it and rejoin the 
peace negotiations at a later time, an 
possibly under conditions that would 
appear more promising to Syrian |)oli 
interests. 

Syria is an important state, with 
vital strategic location, whose cooper: 
tion will be essential if lasting stabilit 
in the Arab-Israeli scene is to be 
achieved. Syria has influence going fa 
beyond its borders. It has close re- 
lationships with many governments 



52 



Department of State Bullet 



PACIFIC 



.vhich have sprung from revolutions, 
Including; that in Tehran. Syria is a key 
Tieniber of the nonaligned movement. 

Syria has more influence on the fu- 
ure destiny of Lebanon and on the di- 
•ection of Palestinian policies there 
hail any other government. The Syrian 
iiilitary presence in Lebanon has been 
1 major ingredient in preserving the 
measy stability that has been estab- 
ished there, and Syrian behavior 
here — on the whole — has been pru- 
lent and cautious, thus reducing the 
■isk of wider conflict in the area. 

^lultural Agreement 

"'inally, we have wanted to carry out 
he understandings reached when we 
igned a cultural agreement with Syria 
n 1978. Our proposed program for FY 
981 will preserve our interesting and 
nutually beneficial people-to-people ex- 
I hange efforts and U.S. training under- 
I akings. Together with the support 
irovided by the U.S. International 
'Communication Agency, our proposed 
irogram will train 83 Syrian partici- 
)ants. Since 1975 a total of 310 Syrian 
)rofessionals in the fields of agricul- 
ure, rural development, health, educa- 
ion, nutrition, and human resources 
lave received training in the United 
states. 

Shifts in attitudes and unforeseen 
■vents occur with astonishing rapidity 
n the Middle East. It is essential that 
he United States retain and exercise 
neans of influencing trends and rein- 
orcing cooperative relationships which 
•neourage nations to pursue independ- 
ent policies, as free as possible of nega- 
ive outside influences. We also want to 
how our interest in Syrian citizens and 
n their aspirations for a better life in a 
nore peaceful world. Our modest pro- 
n"am for Syria is intended as a major 
ontribution toward achievement of 
hese policy goals and toward the rein- 
orcement of the underlying good will 
yhich has been part of our relationship 
"or many years. 



ANZUS Council Meets 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ngs will be published by the committee and 
vill be available from the Superintendent 
if Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
)ffice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



The 29th meeting of the ANZUS 
(Australia, Neiv Zealand, United 
States pact) Council was held in 
Washington, D.C, February 26-27, 
1980. Following are a joint news con- 
ference held on February 27 by Secre- 
tary Vance, Australian Foreign 
Minister Andrew Peacock and Minister 
for Defense D.J. Killen. and New 
Zealand Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Brian Talboys and 
the te.rt of the joint communique issued 
February 27. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 

FEB. 27, 19801 

Secretary Vance. Let me just say a 
few words at the outset, if I might, 
please. This 29th meeting of the 
ANZUS Council has been, in my judg- 
ment, one of the most productive in the 
long history of our alliance. It was, as 
you know, a special meeting. 

Under our customary schedule, we 
would have met this summer in Wel- 
lington. However, the new interna- 
tional situation in the wake of the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan lent greater 
urgency to our annual ANZUS consul- 
tations. We are particularly grateful to 
New Zealand for agreeing to a change 
in time and place. 

We have found ourselves in close 
agreement on the importance of demon- 
strating to the Soviet Union that it 
cannot profit from such blatant viola- 
tions of international law. We agreed 
that the response to this new challenge 
should be firm and contain a combina- 
tion of political, economic, and security 
measures. These we discussed in detail. 

As was the case last year in Can- 
berra, we also had a very useful discus- 
sion on the situation in Southeast Asia, 
the South Pacific, and other matters of 
concern to the alliance. 

Again, may I thank my good 
friends and colleagues, Brian Talboys, 
Andrew Peacock, and Jim Killen for 
their participation in this most impor- 
tant meeting. 

Foreign Minister Talboys. This 
has been a very valuable meeting of the 
ANZUS Council. It certainly has been, 
by far, the most valuable meeting that I 
have attended, and I want to place on 
the record, I'm sure, our admiration for 
the way in which the Secretary of State 
has led the discussion and has provided 
an opportunity in a very free and open 



way to discuss the development at- 
titudes, the development of policies 
that can be followed. 

We in New Zealand have been part 
of ANZUS since its inception. We have, 
through the years, played our part 
within the limit of our capacities, and 
we will certainly continue to do that. 

Foreign Minister Peacock. I 

would like to endorse what has been 
said. I also regard this as the most sig- 
nificant ANZUS Council meeting I have 
attended. Together with Brian, I think 
it's our fifth — we came in as Foreign 
Ministers at about the same time. They 
are unique meetings. They are extraor- 
dinarily valuable in the manner in 
which one can coordinate approaches to 
global and regional situations. 

We happen to be meeting on this 
occasion at a most significant time fol- 
lowing the invasion by the Soviet Union 
of Afghanistan. We've been able to in- 
dicate, through the communique, the 
areas covered. I think it is widely rec- 
ognized that we do not see events oc- 
curring there in a simple return to the 
cold war. The requirements of interna- 
tional security today are far more com- 
plex than that, and the complexities 
must be discussed openly. And the sort 
of Council meeting we have provides a 
forum for just that. I was glad to par- 
ticipate and I speak on behalf of Jim 
Killen as well. 

Q. On page 9 of your com- 
munique, with reference to the sub- 
ject of Iran, you use the words "the 
hostages speedy release." It seems to 
be anything but speedy, and I wonder 
if you could define that word, what 
your expectations are. 

Secretary Vance. It has been 100- 
plus days since the hostages were 
seized and held in Tehran. We have 
been, since that time, engaged in dis- 
cussions through various intermediaries 
with the Government of Iran seeking 
the earliest possible release of the 
hostages. 

We have left no stone unturned in 
trying to bring this about at the earliest 
possible moment, nfortunately, we 
have not been able to do so yet. We 
have, however, I think, taken a step 
forward with the commission which has 
gone to Tehran. They are engaged at 
this point in the performance of the 
duties set forth under their terms of 
reference which have been described by 
the Secretary General. Their mission is 



^pril 1980 



53 



Pacific 



two-foki: to hear the grievances of the 
Iranians and also to binng about a 
speedy release of the hostages, and 
thus end the crisis. 

I cannot tell you when that is going 
to be, but all of us in the international 
community will continue to do every- 
thing we can to bring that about at the 
earliest possible date. 

Q. On pages 3 and 4 of the com- 
munique, you talk about enhancing 
the effectiveness of the military 
activities in the Indian Ocean and ad- 
ditional measures for military coop- 
eration. Specifically, would either 
Australia or New Zealand give access 
to further military facilities for the 
United States? Would either of them 
be prepared to join the U.S. idea of a 
rapid deployment force? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. We 

are prepared to look at any of those 
matters. We've held preliminary con- 
sultations with the United States and 
other interested countries, or particu- 
larly the United States and New Zea- 
land, on this matter. 

The military activities by the 
ANZUS partners in the Indian Ocean of 
the kind that we've discussed are dis- 
tinct from the traditional activities in 
the Pacific and in defense of their met- 
ropolitan territories. They, therefore, 
represent an extension of effort to cope 
with Soviet pressure and threats to se- 
curity affecting an area that is strategi- 
cally vital because of its oil resources. 

The discussions will continue about 
the nature of further operational plan- 
ning in response to the crisis, and that 
is well underway. The additional 
measures for military cooperation, 
therefore, in essence, are still being 
explored. 

Q. In other words then, would 
Australia, with its carrier task force 
which is mentioned here, be willing to 
take part in a standing increase in the 
level of forces in the Indian Ocean, 
together with the United States? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. This is 
what we are discussing, and it is on the 
assumption that it will be on the basis 
of an increased role. 

Q. Can you quantify that? 

Defense Minister Killen. Not at 

the moment. A political decision has 
been taken to enhance the role; but to 
express it in mathematical form or 
quantify it, as you suggest, no, that is a 
matter for determination or advice by 
the military representatives who will 
be meeting tomorrow, and of course, 
that will be ongoing. 



54 



Q. There have been certain elipti- 
cal signals in the past few days — both 
from President Brezhnev and from 
President Carter — that both the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
are at least prepared to try to resolve 
the issue in Afghanistan. I wonder if 
you would try to put it in less elipti- 
cal language for us. What is the 
United States prepared to do? What 
do you perceive the Soviet Union as 
being ready to do? 

Secretary Vance. I think that the 
President really made it quite clear 
what we are prepared to do. The Presi- 
dent has indicated that if there is a 
withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Af- 
ghanistan and the establishment of a 
nonaligned and neutral Afghanistan, 
acceptable to the Afghan people, that 
under those circumstances, we would 
be prepared to enter into others in the 
region in the guaranteeing of the 
nonalignment and neutrality of that 
state. 

Q. Your perceptions are of what 
you think the Soviets are prepared to 
do. It's possible to interpret President 
Brezhnev's speech as also being some- 
thing of an olive branch. Do you see it 
that way? 

Secretary Vance. I think it is hard 
to interpret exactly what is being said. 
I think it would be fruitless for me to 
speculate at this point. I think it is im- 
portant to know what we are prepared 
to do at this point and to convey that 
very clearly to the Soviets, as we have 
done by what we have stated publicly. 

Q. There is a reference in the com- 
munique to the tensions along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. You say 
that ". . . the Council viewed with 
particular concern the possibility that 
the hostilities could spill over into 
Thailand." 

Could you describe for us today, 
in view of the fact that several weeks 
ago the State Department was saying 
that a Vietnamese attack into the 
refugee areas in Thailand appeared 
imminent, what the nature of that 
threat is today? Does it still appear 
imminent? 

Secretary Vance. The concern 
which we have had — which is shared by 
many others — is that the Vietnamese 
troops would cross over the border and 
engage in conflict with those who are in 
the region immediately around the bor- 
der where the refugee camps are lo- 
cated, as well as a number of refugees 
who are moving back and forth across 
the border. 



Such an incursion across the bordei 
could lead to a confrontation between 
Thai troops and the Vietnamese troops 
who would be coming across the border 
This would, obviously, present a very 
dangerous situation — one which all of 
us hope very much can and will be pre- 
vented. 

That is the concern which we were 
referring to — or I was referring to — ir 
what I have said before and what is 
mentioned here in the communique. 

Q. Is there anything imminent 
about such a threat? 

Secretary Vance. With the large 
numbers of troops that exist on the 
Kampuchean border, obviously, that 
presents a continuing danger which re- 
mains as long as they are there. You 
know our position. It is that the Viet- 
namese troops should be withdrawn 
from Kampuchea. 

Q. Since the issuance of the Sec- 
retary General's statement on the 
mandate for the commission, which 
you pointed out had a two-fold pur- 
pose, the Iranian authorities have 
publicly, at least, denied that it had 
more than the purpose of hearing 
their grievances. And, secondly, sine 
then there have been statements by 
Iranian authorities, including the 
Ayatollah. suggesting that if the hos 
tages are released — and it's just an 
"iT' — it would not be any time befon 
April, and now today it's suggested 
May. 

The American people I think 
would like to know: Is this a misun- 
derstanding by the United Nations 
and the United States of the role of 
the commission? Has there been any 
change in Iran? Or where do we stand 
on this? 



Secretary Vance. Let me say that 
the understanding of the United Na- 
tions and ourselves has been clearly set 
forth by the Secretary General. He was 
asked what the mandate was after a 
question had been raised as to the na- 
ture of the mandate, and he confirmed 
it was as he had originally stated it 

Sometimes there are very difficult 
and delphic statements that come out o 
Tehran. Indeed, that happens very fre 
quently, and it's often very difficult to 
tell what is being said, particularly in 
light of the fact that often statements 
are made and then retracted very 
quickly thereafter. 

Q. In the communique you talk 
about the Olympics. Could both of 
you address the specific cities in you 



Department of State Bullett 



Pacific 



ountries which mig-ht be involved in 
he Olympics — when, which games 
light be played, and whether you 
ave the facilities to handle them? 

Foreign Minister Talboys. In New 
ealand there is no suggestion that 
lere should be games in New Zealand. 
Aiat is being done at the present time 
that consitleration is being given by a 
umber of people to alternative 
tes — maybe in North America, and 
anada perhaps, in other parts of the 
orld — and as soon as those sites are 
entified, I have no doubt that they 
ill be announced. 

Q. But you are definitely ruling 
ut any games in Auckland or other 
arts of your country. 

Foreign Minister Talboys. Tiiere 
as been no such suggestion made. 

Foreign Minister Peacock. We've 
?ld preliminary consultations with the 
nited States and with other countries 
)out the transferring of the games 
om Moscow and there were further 
scussions. 

Transfer of the Olympics to 
lother site would, in our view, repre- 
nt politically the most effective way 
■ registering with the Soviets the in- 
nsity of international disapproval of 
ieir invasion of Afghanistan. 

I would confirm with you that one 
ty of Australia, Melbourne, is one of 
ie cities that is being considered, 
lOUgh for climatic and other reasons it 
ould be lower on the list. 

Q. What activities, and is that the 
aly city under consideration? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. We 

:ld the Olympics in 1956 so there are 
linner facilities available. 

Q. You're saying it could be any 
the activities then in any of the 
imes? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. I'm 

lying nothing more than what I just 
dd. 

Q. In view of the role played by 
le United States and New Zealand, 
Bth in first precipitating and then 
jndemning the African Olympic 
aycott of 1976, as well as the appar- 
it dissatisfaction by African leaders 
ith what they consider lukewarm 
ipport from the United States and in 
articular with your other colleagues 
5 well on issues relating to southern 
frica — particularly Rhodesia — do 
Du feel or can you say that the 
nited States actually has the moral 
uthoritv to ask Third World coun- 



tries to boycott the Olympics in 1980 
when the West is outraged? 

Secretary Vance. I would draw a 
distinction between a dipute over 
whether a particular team could par- 
ticipate and the question of whether or 
not it is proper for a nation to host the 
Olympic Games when it is involved in a 
naked and brutal invasion of another 
country. Under Olympic tradition and 
law itself, that is contrary to the tradi- 
tions of the Olympics, and it goes back 
to the very beginning of the Olympics. 
So I think there's a clear distinction be- 
tween the two. 

Q. But what do you say to the Af- 
ricans who don't see it that way and 
who felt that they — 

Secretary Vance. They'll have to 
make their own decisions. 

Q. You consulted very closely 
with Secretary General Waldheim be- 
fore those terms of reference were is- 
sued. Why, if the Iranians were in 
agreement that there was some link- 
age between the commission and the 
release of the hostages, was it not 
spelled out in those terms of refer- 
ence? And if they weren't in agree- 
ment, why did you make the conces- 
sion allowing the commission to be 
formed when you had said previously 
you wouldn't do that unless there was 
some linkage to the release of the 
hostages? 

Secretary Vance. I think the terms 
of reference and the understanding 
with respect to those terms of reference 
were clear, remain clear, and I think 
they have been correctly reflected by 
what the Secretary General has said. 

Q. You earlier seemed to allow 
the possibility that Australia would 
participate in the U.S. rapid deploy- 
ment forces. Could you please spell 
that out? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. I sim- 
ply said that we have the whole 
totality — and the Defense Minister is 
here so he should really answer it — but 
this question of operational planning 
and response to any crisis is well under- 
way. 

I said I think that additional meas- 
ures for military cooperation are being 
explored. That means if you are having 
an examination, you would look at all 
the options. 

Q. You say on page 4 [of the com- 
munique] that: "Council members 
reiterated the importance of preven- 
ting the . . . spread of nuclear 



weapons . . . ." What have you ob- 
tained from the United States by way 
of guarantees that if Pakistan is 
given a further supply of U.S. arms, it 
will prevent or will not be accom- 
panied by the continued development 
of Pakistani nuclear weapons? What 
have we done to get guarantees from 
the new military regime in South 
Korea that our uranium being sold to 
South Korea will not be sold, continued 
for nuclear weapons, as distinct from 
the previous piece of paper signed by 
the previous regime? And what have 
we done to find out who exploded a 
nuclear weapon inside of South Af- 
rica, and what have we done to con- 
demn it? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. I wish 
we had 6 hours [laughter]. 

In regard to the first question, the 
communique speaks for itself. It says 
there that we "reiterated the impor- 
tance of preventing the further spread 
of nuclear weapons, and expressed con- 
cern that development and spread of 
the capability to acquire nuclear 
weapons would further harm security 
and international stability." 

Now that statement is not made in 
raoio. It applies globally. And you can 
apply it wherever you will. 

In regard to your second 
question — which I think related to 
South Korea — so far as the export of 
uranium is concerned, you are well 
aware that Australia will not export 
uranium other than on terms of a 
government-to-government agreement 
entered into under stringent 
safeguards that we have laid down. In- 
deed, the safeguards that are written 
into the agreement are probably more 
stringent, if I may say so, than any 
other country in the world. And the 
basis is to insure that the yellow cake 
so sold and transferred to the 
country — to the purchaser — is not to be 
used for military purposes. So that an- 
swers the South Korean Army. 

So far as South Africa is 
concerned — or, indeed, anybody else 
who explodes weapons — I've indicated 
clearly in Australia our opposition to 
nuclear testing. 

Q. Can you give us any idea if 
there is anything more concrete than 
the public statements currently com- 
ing from Washington and Moscow on 
this whole issue of the neutralization 
of Afghanistan? Are talks at any pre- 
liminary stage between the United 
States and the Soviet Union? Are the 



Ipril 1980 



55 



Pacific 



Common Market countries that raised 
this issue with you when you were in 
Europe a few days ag:o; are they doing 
anything? 

In other words, is there some- 
thing more than simply what's said 
publicly actually going on right now? 

Secretary Vance. There are cur- 
rently no talks between the United 
Stales and the Soviet Union on this 
issue. The matter was raised and dis- 
cussed between me and the ministers of 
the four countries which I visited. In- 
deed, at the time that I was in Europe 
the subject was discussed in the meet- 
ing of the Nine, which was held in 
Rome, and they issued a statement on 
that. 

Following the issuance of that 
statement, I was asked my views with 
respect to the statement which they 
had issued, and I stated that I was in 
general agreement with the substance 
of what was being said by the Nine in 
that statement. 

Q. Do you think your Olympic 
committees will go along with the 
boycott, and do you have an assess- 
ment of how many Olympic commit- 
tees will go along? 

Foreign Minister Talboys. As far 

as New Zealand is concerned, I can tell 
you this: What the government has 
stated is that the government would 
welcome a change in venue. 

I read a report this morning of a 
statement made by Mr. Lance Cross on 
his return from a meeting of the IOC 
[Intel-national Olympic Committee). I 
think here in the United States, in 
which he said, as I recall the statement, 
something to the effect that if a number 
of other countries indicate that they 
would attend alternative games or not 
attend Moscow, then he thought it very 
likely that the New Zealand teams 
would not attend either. 

Foreign Minister Peacock. Yes. 
So far as Australia is concerned, I think 
our opposition is clearly known and 
nothing further has developed since I 
left Australia, to the best of my knowl- 
edge, and that is that the Australian 
Government is strongly in favor of a 
boycott. It's indicated this to the Olym- 
pic Federation. It is in the process of 
consulting with that federation, and it, 
therefore, hopes the federation will ac- 
cept its view. 

Q. Could I ask you if as a result 
of this meeting we'll see any change 
in New Zealand's quite significant 
trading links with the Soviet Union? 



56 



Foreign Mininster Talboys. When 
you talk of New Zealand's quite signifi- 
cant trading links with the Soviet 
Union, I think that what one needs to 
bear in mind is the point that has been 
made on many occasions — both by a 
Prime Minister, by myself, and by 
other ministers — that what New Zea- 
land seeks is an opportunity to sell live- 
stock products in markets around the 
world. 

We have, as a result of policies 
pursued in Europe, in Japan, in the 
United States, had to diversify our 
markets — sort of seek markets in other 
parts of the world. Some of those mar- 
kets we have found in the Soviet Union. 
What we've been talking about is nor- 
mal or traditional trade, and it will con- 
tinue. 

Q. Your communique talks about 
a Soviet threat with the countries 
that produce oil. Do you detect any 
specific Soviet threat to those coun- 
tries or to the sea lanes by which that 
oil is carried out of there? 

Secretary Vance. The presence of 
tens of thousands of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan presents a potential threat 
which is quite obvious. Those troops 
previously were not in that area. They 
now are in a position which puts them 
some 300 miles closer to the sea lanes 
and immediately adjacent to Iran which 
has oil fields, as you well know, so that 
the mere fact of their presence presents 
a threat that was not present before the 
invasion. 

Q. Was there any di.scussion or 
decision on the possibility of U.S. 
warships using Fremantle as a navy 
base in the Indian Ocean? 

Foreign Minister Peacock. We 

previously indicated that Cockburn 
Sound in that area is available. We're in 
discussion with the United States on 
that issue, as indicated earlier. 

Defense Minister Killen. They are 
using it and have used it for some time. 
There will be units of the U.S. Navy in 
Cockburn Sound in connection with an 
exercise now in the Sandgroper in 
another couple of days. 

Foreign Minister Peacock. It's 
referred to in the communique — 
Sandgroper. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB. 27, 1980 

The 29th Meeting of the ANZUS Council 
was held in Wa.shington on the 26th and 
27th of February, 1980. The Honorable 
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the 
United States; the Right Honorable Brian 
Talboys, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister of New Zealand; the Hon 
orable Andrew Peacock, Foreign Minister 
of Australia; and the Honorable D. J. Kil- 
len, Minister of Defence of Australia, rep- 
resented their respective governments. 

In opening the meeting, the Secretary 
of State emphasized its particular impor- 
tance in view of the new international siti 
ation stemming from the Soviet invasion c 
Afghanistan. He and the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence of Australia 
expressed their great appreciation for Ne\ 
Zealand's willingness to advance the date 
and change the venue of the meeting. 

The Council members agreed that the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a 
nonaligned country, was a blatant violatio 
of international law and of the Charter of 
the United Nations. The Council noted tha» 
this action had been condemned by an 
overwhelming majority of the members o) 
the General Assembly and by more than c 
Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in Is- 
lamabad. 

The treaty partners further agreed 
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
challenged the independence of all states. 
The Soviet action calls for appropriate 
political responses according to national 
interests and capacities, as well as for de 
fence preparedness. The Council recog- 
nized that individual nations could contril 
ute in different ways to promoting a stab 
international order and to strengthening 
the political environment against threats t 
national independence. It recognized that 
firm support by the international commu- 
nity for the sovereignty and independenci 
of small countries, especially developing 
countries, must be accompanied by intern; 
tional cooperation in the economic field tc 
which all members of the United Nations 
should make a fair contribution, in order t 
strengthen the economies of developing 
countries and to establish a more effectiv 
and more equitable international economi 
order. 

The use or threat offeree by the USS 
against countries vital to the flow of pe- 
troleum to the East and West could, the 
Council agreed, endanger the independem 
and economic viabiHty of many nations, 
both developed and developing. In the dii 
cussion of recent events in Afghanistan, 
emphasis was placed on the importance of 
strong, consistent, and enduring stand in 
opposition to the use of force in extendini 
Soviet or other influence over sovereign 
governments. The Council members agree 
on the importance of convincing the USSl 
that it cannot profit in the long run from 
such actions. They further agreed that th 
complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces 
from Afghanistan and the restoration of « 



Pacific 



•uly nonaligned, neutral government in 
fghanistan responsive to the wishes of the 
fghan people were necessary for the secu- 
ty and peace of the region. 

The American Council member out- 
jned the economic measures which the 
nited States has taken vis-a-vis the 
3viet Union in the wake of the invasion of 
fghanistan. He expressed appreciation for 
ttions already taken by the other treaty 
irtners in their relations with the USSR, 
he Council members agreed on the de- 
rability of close consultation on these 
atters. 

In view of the failure of the Soviet 
nion to withdraw its troops from Af- 
lanistan. the Council agreed that it would 
)t be appropriate for the Summer Olym- 
cs to be held in Moscow. It considered 
at the Olympics should be transferred to 
lother site or sites and noted proposals 
at, if necessary, alternative competitions 
ould be arranged in the latter half of 1980 
which all world-class athletes would be 
vited to participate. The Council agreed 
at there would be close and continuing 
nsultations among the three governments 
this question. 
The Council also discussed the com- 
sition and level of forces in the Indian 
ean that would be appropriate to demon- 
•ate allied support for security of the 
ea and determination to deter further 
viet adventurism. It agreed to explore 
ly the possibilities for enhancing the ef- 
:tiveness of the treaty partners' military 
tivities in the Indian Ocean, without 
ejudicing the fulfillment of their respec- 
e responsibilities in the Treaty area. The 
uncil reviewed United States plans for 
military presence in the Indian Ocean 
d the Arabian Sea. These included en- 
nced maritime surveillance and anti- 
omarine patrolling, increased military 
lining and assistance to various countries 
the region, and arrangements for secure 
■ess into the Indian Ocean for alliance 
'ces. The Council noted that later in the 
ar Australia will deploy a carrier task 
jup in the Indian Ocean led by the air- 
ift carrier HMAS MELBOURNE. Naval 
1 air- support will be given by New Zea- 
iil as resources permit. 

The Council took note of the decision to 
(icatf greater resources to defense an- 
untcd by the Prime Minister of Australia 
bruary 19. They further noted that con- 
Itatinns on joint cooperation at both op- 
itiunal and policy levels take on a new 
t'eiu y in the uncertain strategic pros- 
it s resulting from the present Southwest 
iaii ( risis, that operational planning in 
-pmise to the crisis is well under way, 
il that additional measures for military 
ipfiation are being explored. 

Ciiuncil members reiterated the impor- 
ice (if preventing the further spread of 
clear weapons, and expressed concern 
at development and spread of the capa- 
ity t(i acquire nuclear weapons would 
•thcr harm security and international 
ibility. 

The American Council member in- 
•med his colleagues that, despite the ad- 



verse political climate engendered by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, effective 
mutual constraints on strategic nuclear 
weapons remain of great importance in en- 
suring world peace and security. For this 
reason, the US administration remains 
firmly committed to ratification of the 
SALT II Agreement and to the general 
principle of seeking effective and verifiable 
arms control agreements as a matter of na- 
tional interest and policy. The Australian 
and New Zealand members welcomed a 
continued emphasis by the United States 
on arms control and disarmament measures 
that enhance security, including the Com- 
prehensive Test Ban' Treaty (CTB). In this 
regard, the Council acknowledged that the 
current military and political climate is not 
conducive to resumption of US-Soviet talks 
on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. 

The Council members considered the 
tensions along the borders of Indochina re- 
sulting from the invasion of Kampuchea by 
Vietnamese forces sustained by Soviet 
support. They expressed their strong con- 
cern over the danger to peace and stability 
arising from the present crisis and their 
desire to see the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Kampuchea. 

The ANZUS partners strongly en- 
dorsed efforts of Southeast Asian countries 
to bring about the restoration of peace and 
security in their region. They reaffirmed 
their support for the UNGA resolution, 
sponsored by the members of the Associa- 
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
which called for the Kampuchean people to 
be able to choose democratically their own 
government, without outside interference, 
subversion or coercion. 

With regard to tensions along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border, the Council 
viewed the particular concern the possibil- 
ity that the hostilities could spill over into 
Thailand. The Council called on Viet Nam 
to respect Thailand's territorial integrity 
and to avoid actions which would endanger 
the civilian Khmer concentrations along the 
border, or risk escalation of the fighting or 
confrontation with Thai military units. The 
Council stressed the great importance it 
placed on Thailand's security and territo- 
rial integrity, and noted the continued rel- 
evance of the Manila Pact. 

Noting the great suffering inflicted on 
the Kampuchean people, the Council mem- 
bers strongly emphasized the necessity for 
continuing relief efforts within Kampuchea 
and along the border of Kampuchea and 
Thailand. They also underscored the re- 
quirement for international efforts to deal 
with the problems of refugees, hunger, and 
disease until displaced Khmer can return to 
their homes and they called upon the au- 
thorities in Kampuchea to cooperate with 
the international relief program. 

The problem created for many of the 
countries of Southeast Asia as a result of 
the persisting refugee exodus from Viet 
Nam was reviewed by the Council. The 
members noted the continuing importance 
of the humane policies of first asylum of 



countries in the region. They expressed 
gratification at the very large number of 
refugees resettled outside Southeast Asia 
during the past year, which has relieved 
pressures on first asylum countries of the 
region. The opening of the Bataan Refugee 
Processing Center (RPC) and the prospec- 
tive opening of the Galang RPC were also 
viewed as significant additions to the abil- 
ity of the region to cope with the refugee 
problem, as was the decision by China to 
take an active part in refugee resettlement. 
Members agreed on the need for continuing 
world-wide participation in refugee reset- 
tlement and support for the UNHCR [U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees] In- 
dochina program. They called upon Viet 
Nam to refrain from creating internal con- 
ditions that motivate its people to attempt 
to escape. Recognizing that several 
thousand Vietnamese flee their homeland 
each month despite all handicaps, members 
reaffirmed support for the principle of re- 
sponsibility of flag states for refugees res- 
cued at sea. In those instances, where flag 
states did not accept this responsibility, 
members supported other means to assist 
the refugees such as through the Sea Res- 
cue Resettlement Reserve of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

In addition to the tragic plight of In- 
dochinese and Khmer refugees, the Council 
members took particular note of the many 
thousands now fleeing the occupation by 
Soviet forces of Afghanistan. The Council 
urged that all independent governments 
contribute monetarily or in kind to the in- 
ternational and humanitarian effort, coor- 
dinated by the United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees, to maintain the 
Afghan refugees until they can return 
safely to their homeland. The Council noted 
with appreciation the efforts of the Paki- 
stan Government to receive and care for 
the Afghan refugees. 

Welcoming the accession of Kiribati to 
independence since the last Council meet- 
ing, the Council reaffirmed the importance 
it attaches to the peaceful progress of the 
South Pacific. 

The Council welcomed the expression 
of concern by South Pacific governments in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan. The Council reaffirmed the 
commitment of the ANZUS partners to 
cooperate with the South Pacific states in 
support of a common interest in a secure 
and peaceful environment in which the 
South Pacific countries can most effectively 
pursue their national policies. It welcomed 
the continued development of regional 
cooperation among the Pacific Islands. 

The Ministers took note of progress 
made towards self-determination in the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and 
welcomed the increased participation of the 
Micronesian governments in regional or- 
ganizations. 

The Council noted the increased impor- 
tance of its members reducing their de- 
pendence on imported fuels in the light of 
recent events in South West Asia. They 
recognized that recent dramatic increases 
in the price of oil will also have a disruptive 



pril 1980 



57 



Pacific 



effect on the economies of both developed 
and developing countries and may cause 
serious strains in the international financial 
system. The respective delegations ac- 
cordingly agreed that there is a serious 
need to pursue strong measures to reduce 
oil imports, bringing prices for domestic 
crude oil to world levels, and substantially 
greater efforts to use and develop alterna- 
tive energy sources. They noted the degree 
of cooperation that had already been 
achieved within the International Energy 
Agency on these issues. It also considered 
the effect on the economies of the develop- 
ing countries of the dramatic increases in 
the price of petroleum and agreed to con- 
tinue to provide development assistance 
and to consult these countries in an effort 
to overcome this effect. 

In reviewing the situation in Iran, the 
Council agreed that the seizure and holding 
of American personnel as hostages is a 
blatant violation of international law, dip- 
lomatic norms, and human rights. The Aus- 
tralian and New Zealand representatives 
reaffirmed their sympathy and support for 
the United States and the American hos- 
tages. The members of the Council em- 
phasizefi the importance of the hostages 
speedy release. 

In addition to the special problems 
arising from the crisis in Southwest Asia, 
Council members reviewed the conduct of 
the alliance since the 28th Council meeting 
and expressed themselves satisfied with 
the continued high degree of cooperation 
and consultation. They took note of the 
regular program of exchanges, exercises, 
and visits carried out by the armed services 
of the three allies and the contribution 
these have made to the readiness of the 
members to support one another in periods 
of military danger or natural disaster. In 
this regard, they were particularly 
gratified that a second exercise in the 
Sandgroper series will be carried out in the 
Indian Ocean off of Western Australia later 
this year. Satisfaction was also expressed 
with the success of the other exercises car- 
ried on over the past eight months in the 
various series established under the al- 
liance. 

The Council members concluded by 
agreeing that the 30th Meeting of the Coun- 
cil will be held in Wellington in 1981 at a 
date to be decided. 



' Press release 45. 



Australian Prime 
iViinister's Visits 



Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser 
of Australia visited Washington, D.C., 
January SO-Febniarij 1, 1979, for 
meetings with President Carter and 
other government officials. He returned 
again on Fehruarg 7-8 to discuss with 
President Carter conversations he had 
held with European leaders. Following 
are a statement by White House press 
secretary Jody Powell on January 31 
and the President's and Prime Minis- 
ter's remarks to reporters on Feb- 
ruary 7. 



WHITE HOUSE PRESS 
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
JAN. 31. 1980' 

The President and the Prime Minister's 
discussion focused primarily upon the 
dangerous situation that has arisen as a 
result of Soviet aggression in Afghani- 
stan, its potential impact on other coun- 
tries in southwest Asia, and the impli- 
cations that it has for independent gov- 
ernments everywhere, whether large 
or small. There will be further discus- 
Prime Minister Fraser and President 

Carter iWhitt- Huu.^ie photo by Karl Schumacher) 




sions at the official level as a result (if 
the subjects covered by the two lead- 
ers. 

I might say that the discussions 
ranged over a fairly wide area, includ- 
ing the Third World, obviously the In- 
dian Ocean and southwest Asia, the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] nations, energy — thost 
were the primary areas. I think I can 
say — as Prime Minister Fraser, I be- 
lieve, has already indicated — that the 
United States and Australia have a 
very similar view of the gravity of the 
situation in southwest Asia and of the 
steps which need to be taken to deal 
with it. 

The President told the Prime 
Minister at the beginning of the meet- 
ing that it was — this is a quote — 
"reassuring to have friends like you in 
time of trial and testing." The Presi- 
dent also complimented the Prime 
Minister upon the role of Australia in 
helping to bring about the Lancaster 
House discussions which resulted in th 
agreements in Rhodesia. 



REMARKS TO REPORTERS, 
FEB. 7, 19802 



President Carter 

We're delighted to welcome back to tl 
White House Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser of Australia, who came here a 
few days ago to consult very closely 
with me on matters of common intere 
to our two countries, but particularly 
the late developing events centered 
around the Soviet invasion of Afghani 
Stan. 

Following his visit here, Prime 
Minister Fraser went to London to 
meet with the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom — Great Britain — the 
went to meet with the Chancellor of 
Germany, and then the President of 
France. Following those visits, the 
leaders of the European countries 
suggested that because his meetings 
were so fruitful with them that he 
might stop by to see me again to give 
me a report on the consultations in 
Europe. I'm deeply grateful that Prirr 
Minister Fraser has been willing to d( 
this. His report has, indeed, been 
helpful. 

We are grateful also to Australia 
because of their courageous stand as &> 
ally of ours in condemning the invasio 
that threatens the peace in southwest 
Asia and the Persian Gulf region; the 
fact that as a major exporter of grain. 
Australia immediately announced that 



58 



Department of State BulletiJ 



Pacific 



ley would not replace the grain being 
ithheld hy our country from the 
jviet Union. And I'm also very pleased 

the close military, economic, and 
i)litical alliance that exists among Aus- 
lalia. New Zealand, and the United 
:;ates. 

There was a meeting of foreign 
inisters scheduled in this alliance in 
ily. At the suggestion of Prime Minis- 
r Fraser, we have decided to move 
at meeting up until the last week in 
?bruary so that we can expedite the 
mmon discussions among us about the 
;uation in the Indian Ocean and the 
Lgions bordering that sea. 

We have had a thorough discussion 
iQUt the Olympics and what might be 
■ne concerning the Olympics if the 
iviets do not quickly withdraw all 
eir forces from Afghanistan, and 
■ime Minister Fraser has taken the 
id in this discussion and consultation 

well. It's with a great deal of pleas- 
e that I welcome him back here, and 
; 1 like to ask him as an honored guest 

make a few comments to you. 

j'ime Minister Fraser 

lank you very much, Mr. President. I 
l.lue very greatly, indeed, the discus- 
ms that we had a few days ago and 
50 today. I had said at the outset of 
is round of discussions that I have 
dertaken that it's important for the 
velopment of Australia's own policy 
the future to know as well as possible 
e mind of the President of the United 
ates, the policies of this country, and 
50 of principal countries in Europe. 

We have no presumptuous view of 
e influence of 14 million Australians, 
t we are determined to play what 
rt we can in a cause that is important 
r free peoples, wherever they may 
. We're glad, indeed, and thankful 
at the United States has responded in 
cent days, that the President made 
d delivered the statement he did in 
e State of the Union message, which 
ould surely give clear warnings to the 
iviets about any further moves be- 
nd Afghanistan, and the clear need 
at there clearly is to bring greater 
assurance to the world by removing 
rees from Afghanistan. 

There are times when all of us in 
dependent nations have necessarily to 
'pend on the United States for the 
nd of world in which we live. This is 
e world's greatest free power, the 
rongest country in the world. And in 
Ties of danger, in times of 
vasion — as there have been, the 



Soviets in Afghanistan — it is the United 
States that must set a lead. And the 
United States has done what is neces- 
sary in the preservation, as Australia 
believes, of world peace. And because 
we strongly believe that what the 
President has done is right, because we 
strongly believe that what the Presi- 
dent has done is necessary, Australia 
has moved to support — in what ways 
we can — the actions of the United 
States, and we will continue to do so in 
a cause which is of such great impor- 
tance for us all. 

The United States has also taken a 
lead over the matter of the Olympics. 
And I was shown some days ago that 
small document that has been handed 
out by Soviet activists in Moscow giv- 
ing their view of what the Olympics 
mean and how they're going to exploit 
it amongst their own people. The 
Soviets themselves have made it per- 
fectly plain that they regard the Olym- 
pic Games being held in Moscow as a 
great social and political event, not at 
that moment speaking about a great 
sporting event which is what it was 
meant to be. And they've also made it 
perfectly plain, in their own writings 
and documents, that they would regard 
the rewarding of the games to Moscow 
as a mark of approval of Soviet foreign 
policy. 

Now, against the background of 
their own statements and against the 
background of their invasion of Af- 
ghanistan, how can free peoples' repre- 
sentatives go to Moscow and, no matter 
what they themselves might say, allow 
the Soviets to say of them that their 
presence there is a mark of approval of 
Soviet foreign policy? Because that's 
plainly in the current circumstances 
what "the Soviet Union would in fact be 
saying. 

Mr. President, I welcome very 
much the discussions that we've been 
able to have; they've been extraordi- 
narily useful to me. They have given me 
much, if it was needed, much greater 
confidence that the United States, to- 
gether with allies in Europe, is deter- 
mined to do what must be done to pre- 
serve all those things which the people 
of the United States and the people of 
Australia hold most dear. 



U.S.-Kiribati Sign 
Friendship Treaty 



MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
JAN. 24, 1980' 

I transmit herewith, for advice and consent 
of the Senate, the Treaty of Friendship be- 
tween the United States of America and 
the Republic of Kiribati. The primary pur- 
pose of the Treaty is to settle on terms ac- 
ceptable to both governments the conflict- 
ing claims to 14 islands in Kiribati (for- 
merly the Gilbert Islands) in the South 
Pacific Ocean, and to establish a regime of 
cooperation, particularly regarding secu- 
rity arrangements and fisheries. The re- 
port of the Department of State is enclosed 
for the information of the Senate. 

The Treaty and Agreed Minute meet 
the practical interests of both countries and 
will satisfy the desire of the Kiribati people 
that their sovereignty over 14 of the is- 
lands in their country be unencumbered by 
a conflicting claim of the United States. 

The Treaty will protect United States 
interests by assuring non-discriminatory 
future access to Kiribati fishing grounds 
which supply fi.sh to the canneries of 
American Samoa. The Treaty also pro- 
motes the interest of American Samoa by 
encouraging joint ventures using the 
facilities constructed by the United States 
on Canton Island.' As well, any military use 
of the islands by third parties is to be a 
subject of consultations with the United 
States, and third parties may not use 
United States-built facilities without 
United States agreement. 

The Treaty will further United States 
foreign policy and security interests in 
promoting peace, security and development 
of the region. I recommend that the Senate 
give early consideration to the Treaty and 
give its advice and consent to ratification. 

Jimmy Carter 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Feb. 11, 1980. ■ 



)ril 1980 



59 



SOUTH ASIA 



U.S. Military Presence 
in the Indian Ocean Area 



fti/ Darid I), .\ewsom 

Statenu'iit before the Subcommittee 
Oil Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Connnittee on Februari/ 7, 1980. Am- 
bassador Neu'som is Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs. ' 

It is a pleasure to provide you this brief 
overview of the political background to 
our military presence in the Indian 
Ocean area. 

As the President said in his State 
of the Union message [January 21, 
1980]: "Events in Iran and Afghanistan 
have dramatized for us the critical im- 
portance for American security and 
prosperity of the area running from the 
Middle East through the Persian Gulf 
to South Asia. This region provides 
two-thirds of the world's oil exports, 
supplying most of the energy needs of 
our allies in Europe and Japan. It has 
been a scene of almost constant conflict 
between nations, and of serious internal 
instability within many countries. And 
now one of its nations has been invaded 
by the Soviet Union." 

The United States has, for more 
than three decades, had a modest mili- 
tary presence in the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf area. In recent years this 
has been symbolized primarily by the 
ships of the Middle East force presence 
in the Persian Gulf and naval visits 
throughout the Indian Ocean area. 

Our need for improved communica- 
tions and logistic capabilities in the area 
as a whole was recognized a number of 
years ago with the decision, in coopera- 
tion with the British, to begin con- 
structing an austere facility on Diego 
Garcia in 1972, which we subsequently 
e.xpanded with congressional approval 
to a naval support facility in 1976. The 
revolution in Iran and the general con- 
cern over our citizens in the area and 
over the security of the region gener- 
ally have led us to increase that pres- 
ence over the last year by regular and 
extended Navy task forces, including 
carriers. Two such task forces are cur- 
rently in the Indian Ocean. 

The events in Afghanistan further 
reinforce the need for forces upon 
which we can call to protect our inter- 
ests and to come to the assistance of 
friendly countries, if we have need to 
do so. The tensions and uncertainties in 



60 



this region clearly call for U.S. capabil- 
ity and flexibility to make such deploy- 
ments and to sustain them effectively. 

This raises force and budgetary 
implications which are best addressed 
by the representatives of the Depart- 
ment of Defense but whose importance 
we would firmly support. 

Our friends in the area are gener- 
ally receptive to the presence of U.S. 
forces in the region as a whole. The 
question of the location of these forces, 
the establishment of bases, and the use 
of facilities on their territories, how- 
ever, is politically sensitive. The public 
posture of most countries in the area is 
to prefer a neutral Indian Ocean with- 
out the presence of either U.S. or 
Soviet forces. Most nations, however, 
recognize the realities of the current 
world scene, and if Soviet forces are 
present in increased numbers and a 
more threatening posture, as they are, 
there is a clear desire for the presence 
of a U.S. capability as well. 

While there is an awareness both in 
and outside the region of Soviet 
facilities in the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (Aden) and 
Ethiopia, these tend to get less atten- 
tion politically than our own more mod- 
est installations, in part because of the 
very natural and necessary public dis- 
cussions of our plans and requirements. 
Thus, however inaccurately, Diego 
Garcia is more of a political symbol in 
some countries than Aden. 

Opposition to the presence of 
foreign forces, bases, and facilities in 
this area comes from a variety of 
sources. There is a strong influence in 
the Indian Ocean area of nonalignment, 
epitomized by the participation of vir- 
tually every nation around the Indian 
Ocean in the nonaligned movement. 

In all countries there are images 
and political cliches about past co- 
lonialization and intervention which 
come to the fore when a Western coun- 
try talks of securing facilities or estab- 
lishing bases. 

To some extent we tend to bring 
this on ourselves by speaking of inter- 
vention at times as if these lands and 
the resources of this area were ours. 
They belong to independent sovereign 
countries which feel that the first re- 
sponsibility for their defense lies with 
them. They want our help and our 
presence but in the context of their own 
sovereignty. 



Throughout the Arab portions of 
this area, there are all of the senti- 
ments, emotions, and political tensions 
which grow out of the Arab-Israeli dis 
pute and the presence of large number 
of Palestinian people. Inevitably coop- 
eration of any sort with the United 
States risks political opposition in this 
context. 

The events in Afghanistan have 
changed this picture, although the un 
derlying reservations remain. There i; 
a greater concern about Soviet inten- 
tions which undoubtedly makes our 
quest for support facilities easier. We 
still cannot ignore, however, the polit 
cal realities which lie below the surface 
Nor can we ignore the economic and so 
cial pressures and ferment which leadl 
to political instability and to vul- 
nerabilities in many of the countries o 
the region to outside pressures. Our 
economic and security assistance pro- 
grams directed at the region are thus 
an indispensable component of a 
strategy of building stability and 
strengthening the ability of the coun- 
tries of the region to defend themselvf! 
and insure their security against out- 
side intervention or internal 
subversion. 

As the committee is aware, we ai' 
discussing cooperation and facilities 
with several countries in the area. 
These requests are based on the realit' 
that we cannot keep a permanent flee 
presence in the area without access t( 
shore facilities to aid in resupply and 
reconnaissance. We believe that we 
shall be able to obtain useful coopera- 
tive arrangements in the area. 

We are aware of the interest of th 
committee also in the possible use of 
facilities in the Sinai. In our present 
planning for support of the Indian 
Ocean presence and in the absence of 
the completion of the arrangements fo 
peace in the area, we have not made 
final conclusions about the desirabilitj 
or feasibility of facilities in this region 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ar 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



South Asia 



>outh Asia — Old Problems, 
lew Challenges 



I Jane Coon 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
I Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
ouse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
■'bruarii 11. 1980. Ms. Coon is Deputy 
ssistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
fid South Asian Affairs. ' 

am pleased to have this opportunity to 
)pear before your subcommittee to 
scuss with you the complex diplo- 
atic, political, and security situation 
South Asia today. Never before has 
mth Asia seemed more important, nor 
e challenges to our interests more 
al and direct. Old problems remain, 
it new developments require us to re- 
amine our policies in a fresh and 
eative fashion. 

As we begin to adjust to the new 
uation created by the Soviet invasion 
Afghanistan, it is even more impor- 
nt than ever that the Congress and 
e Administration share their respec- 
'e assessments and consult closely on 
propriate and effective ways to pur- 
e long-term U.S. interests in the re- 
m. 

You have described some of the 
parent paradoxes in the policy 
oices facing us in South Asia. It is 
ecisely because there are no obvious 
! swers that we are here today. You 
I d your committee have an interest 
d the experience of many years 
anding in the region. With the exten- 
^e travel of you and many of your 
lleagues in Asia, you bring to these 
oblems both the insight of direct ex- 
rience and the perspective of a legis- 
;or. I hope that together we can bring 
:o sharper focus the issues before us, 
cognizing that our choices will not be 

sy- 

S. Security Interests — 
16 Soviet Impact 

A-ould like to begin by talking about 
r Security interests in South Asia and 
\v we analyze them in light of recent 
vt'liipments. Inevitably, the Soviet 
jVf into Afghanistan affects the man- 
r in which we address other aspects 
our policies. I would then like to 
)\v on to some of the other issues you 
ve raised — nuclear nonproliferation, 
nventional arms transfers, and 
iman rights — and relate these to the 
curity interests which are the princi- 
,1 theme of my statement. 



The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
has dramatically changed the security 
situation in South Asia and southwest 
Asia. In responding to this challenge, 
we are proceeding along several paral- 
lel tracks. 

• You are all aware of the steps we 
have taken in our bilateral relations 
with the Soviet Union to make sure the 
Soviets pay a high cost for what they 
have done. 

• Internationally, we have sup- 
ported the strong condemnation passed 
by the U.N. General Assembly, and we 
note that the Islamic conference has 
taken even stronger exception to the 
Soviet action. 

• We are working on appropriate 
followup actions in international 
forums, including support for an appro- 
priate resolution in the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission. 

• We are strengthening our de- 
fense capabilities in southwest Asia and 
the Indian Ocean. 

• We have made available over $11 
million in cash and kind for the relief of 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, whose 
plight you know better than most 
people. 

• Finally, we are encouraging what 
we hope will be an effective regional re- 
sponse to the Soviet invasion. This in- 
cludes efforts to strengthen Pakistan's 
ability and will to defend itself. It also 
involves keeping in touch with the Gov- 
ernment of India and supporting the 
efforts India is making to encourage 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

U.S.-Pakistani Cooperation 

The country most directly affected, of 
course, is Pakistan. In the period since 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we 
have been able to work on parallel lines 
with the Pakistan Government in 
shaping an effective political response 
both internationally and regionally. 

The 2 days of intensive discussions 
in Islamabad earlier this month built on 
our earlier talks with Pakistan's 
Foreign Affairs Adviser, Agha Shahi, 
in Washington and produced a large 
measure of agreement on the nature of 
the threat and of the security relation- 
ship we seek to build between our two 
nations. The personal participation of 
President Zia throughout the discus- 
sions in Islamabad indicates, in our 
view, the importance which he attaches 



to the regional threat and to U.S.- 
Pakistani cooperation in meeting that 
threat. 

During these talks, we again 
strongly reiterated our commitment to 
the 1959 agreement which addresses 
the threat of Soviet or Soviet-directed 
aggression against Pakistan. The 
President's forthright statement of 
vital U.S. interests in the region — in 
his State of the Union address — 
seemed to have had a salutary effect in 
helping to remove doubts about the 
strength and durability of this commit- 
ment. 

We stated our willingness to ask 
the Congress to affirm this commitment 
explicitly when we seek legislation to 
permit resumption of assistance. The 
Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with 
this outcome and will not pursue their 
earlier request to turn it into a treaty. 

We were unable to reach a similar 
degree of agreement on our proposed 
levels of assistance. We described our 
intention to propose to the Congress a 
package which would authorize $100 
million of economic support funds and a 
like amount of foreign military sales 
credits for each of the fiscal years 1980 
and 1981. We described our efforts to 
encourage other traditional donors to 
increase their levels of assistance sub- 
stantially and indicated that we viewed 
our contribution as part of a broad mul- 
tilateral effort. 

The Pakistanis asked that we defer 
presenting any legislation which would 
specify amounts of aid until we had a 
better assessment of Pakistan's overall 
economic and military needs and until 
we had a fuller appreciation of the in- 
creased assistance which might be 
forthcoming from all quarters to meet 
these needs. We agreed to this request, 
while making clear that our offer of as- 
sistance continued to stand. We also 
explained in some detail the degree to 
which this delay complicates our ability 
to get a supplemental appropriation for 
Pakistan in the current fiscal year. 

In the immediate period ahead, 
both we and the Pakistanis intend to 
continue discussions with those gov- 
ernments to which we are looking to 
provide additional assistance. Our dis- 
cussions in Riyadh suggest that Saudi 
Arabia is keenly aware of the impor- 
tance of strengthening Pakistan. We 
will stay in close touch with the Paki- 
stan Government as multilateral con- 
sultations proceed. 

In the meantime, our military team 
has had detailed discussions in Pakistan 
in an effort to determine the scope of 
Pakistan's existing military deficiencies 
and to identify specific types of equip- 
ment which the United States might 



)nl 1980 



61 



South Asia 



provide to strengthen Pakistan's defen- 
sive capabilities on the western fron- 
tier. We will be in touch with other po- 
tential equipment suppliers and sources 
of financing in an effort to collaborate 
with them and the Pakistanis on an 
overall effective response. 

We are prepared to process certain 
cash military sales even in the absence 
of agreement on our assistance levels, 
though obviously, Pakistan's ability to 
pay for much new equipment will be se- 
verely constrained under present 
circumstances. 

We hope and trust that our eco- 
nomic support and that of other donors 
will make it easier for the Pakistan 
Government to take measures to en- 
courage internal stability. We are con- 
fident that a U.S. military sales re- 



lationship will help Pakistan improve 
its ability to defend itself against the 
increased threat from the northwest. 

India 

Our contacts with Mrs. [Indira] Gan- 
dhi's new government in India have 
also been significant. 

As you know, former Secretary of 
Defense Clark Clifford was in New 
Delhi January 30-31 as the President's 
special emissary. We believe that his 
mission was successful in registering 
U.S. desires to maintain good relations 
and close consultative ties with the new 
Indian Government. 

The President's decision to send a 
senior adviser of Secretary Clifford's 
stature obviously gratified Mrs. Gandhi 



Assistance for Afghan Refugees 



WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JAN. 31, 1980 > 

President Carter announced on January 
31, 1980, that the United States is 
making a new pledge of $5.3 million for 
immediate assistance to the growing 
number of Afghan refugees fleeing into 
Pakistan because of Soviet aggression 
in Afghanistan. This latest U.S. contri- 
bution consists of $5 million in emer- 
gency refugee funds for the Afghan 
relief program of the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
$300,000 in grant aid for voluntary 
agency efforts. 

The $5 million contribution to the 
UNHCR will include an immediate cash 
contribution of $3 million, plus the 
shipment of $2 million more in relief 
supplies. As a first step the United 
States is shipping more than 40,000 
heavy blankets to Pakistan. The cost, 
including airfreight, is more than 
$500,000. 

This new U.S. pledge is in response 
to the worldwide appeal issued by the 
UNHCR for a total of $55 million ($25 
million in food and $30 million in cash) 
to help care for a projected refugee 
population of 500,000 over the next 
year — a number which may well in- 
crease as more Afghan people flee their 
occupied land. 

The United States has already 
made an initial contribution to the 
UNHCR, through the U.N. World 
Food Program, of more than 17,000 
metric tons of food commodities, 
largely wheat, valued at $6.1 million. In 
addition, the United States will allocate 



a minimum of $10 million from the 
pending supplemental appropriation for 
PL 480 (Food for Peace), on which the 
President hopes the Congress will 
shortly complete action. 

Together, these will provide more 
than $16 million for more than 50,000 
tons of food, including wheat, vegetable 
oil, and dried milk. With today's new 
pledge, the U.S. contribution will total 
more than $21 million, nearly 40^^ of 
the U.N. appeal. 

We are considering still other hu- 
manitarian steps we can take to help 
UNHCR and the Government of Paki- 
stan care for these unfortunate Afghan 
people who have been forced to flee 
their homes and now suffer from cold 
and hunger because of the brutal Soviet 
invasion and occupation of their home- 
land. More help is needed, and we call 
on all other humanitarian-minded coun- 
tries to join this effort. 

The President's Coordinator for 
Refugee Affairs, Victor H. Palmieri, 
also announced today that he is sending 
his deputy, Frank E. Loy, and two staff 
members of a factfinding mission to 
Pakistan for a firsthand look at relief 
operations. Dr. Marie Griffin of the 
Center for Disease Control will accom- 
pany them to survey the medical needs 
of the refugees. Loy and his delegation 
will report their findings to President 
Carter and Secretary of State Vance on 
their return in 2 weeks. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. 



and her colleagues, and the talks he 
held were frank, amicable, and in our 
view highly beneficial. 

Mr. Clifford was forthright in jne 
senting U.S. positions on the Soviet in 
vasion and our response to it. He miuh 
it clear to the Indians that the United 
States was interested in their concei'ti; 
and opinions and that as the largest 
power in the region, they had an impor 
tant role in dealing with the new 
situation. 

He reiterated our belief that the 
efforts we have undertaken to help 
Pakistan meet the challenge on its 
northwest frontier should not adversel 
affect either our relations with India o 
Indo-Pakistan ties. 

He expressed our hope that India 
and Pakistan could evolve a regional 
approach to the fundamentally change 
situation which the whole region now 
faces, and stated that what we do to 
strengthen Pakistan's security should 
not impede such an approach. He wel- 
comed the decision of the Indians and 
Pa.kistanis to hold high-level talks, 
which took place a few days later. 

We came away from the Clifford 
talks convinced that while the Indians 
are dubious about our military supply 
relationship with Pakistan, they are 
quite concerned by the Soviet invasior 
They share our desire that the Soviets 
pull out of Afghanistan. They find de 
velopments in Afghanistan a matter ol 
concern both for their own sake and 
also because, in the Indian view, the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan could 
lead to big-power confrontation in the 
South Asian region. 

We hope that continuing a frank 
dialogue with India can lessen the 
danger that our differences in approac 
could adversely influence Indo-U.S. 
relations. Our offer to be more recep- 
tive to Indian interest in purchases of 
U.S. military equipment to meet their 
legitimate security requirements re- 
flects the importance we attach to In- 
dia's role and to Indo-U.S. relations 
under present circumstances. 

Against this background, we will 
also pursue our other interests in the 
region which include nuclear nonprolif 
eration, human rights, narcotics, and 
the discouragement of regional arms 
races. I believe that our security objec- 
tives and these other interests can be 
mutually supportive and that we must 
seek to achieve all of our goals. 

Nuclear Proliferation 

The problem of nuclear proliferation 
causes us intense concern. If and whei 
we reach an understanding with the 
Pakistan Government about a U.S. aio 



62 



UNITED NATIONS 



elationship, we expect to propose to 
he Congress legislation which would 
iuspend the strictures of our nonprolif- 
ration legislation — the Symington and 
;ienn amendments — because of the im- 
leratives of our security interests. 

We have made it clear to the Paki- 
tan Government that this does not 
lepresent any lessening of concern on 
ur part. We have plainly told them our 
iew that a nuclear explosion in the 
resent unsettled international envi- 
onment in South Asia would be even 
lore dangerous and unwise than be- 
)re. We have stated what we consider 
) be a fact — that a Pakistani nuclear 
3St would drastically alter our re- 
itionship and put at serious risk our 
irther cooperation. 

We intend to continue to pursje 
lis matter with the Pakistan Govern- 
lent since we believe that concerns for 
akistani security and regional stability 
innot be separated from the question 
:" nuclear restraint within the region. 

Both the nuclear question and our 
respective military supply relationship 
"6 intimately bound up with our desire 
) avoid sparking an arms race, espe- 
ally one between developing countries 
hich need to spend their scarce re- 
mrces on pressing development prob- 
ms. Our military supply policy toward 
, akistan will emphasize improving 
; akistan's ability to defend its western 
ontier with Afghanistan and will not 
3 directed against India. 

•uman Rights 

ur interest in human rights, too, is 
osely bound up with our support for 
le region. We are convinced that 
juitable economic development which 
icompasses all regions of Pakistan and 
18 creation of representative political 
stitutions can make an important con- 
■ibution to the stability of the country, 
rur recently released human rights re- 
prt has highlighted some of the prac- 
Ces we are concerned about. We have 
ade our views known to the Pakistan 
overnment and hope that we will be 
pie to establish an aid relationship 
hich will help Pakistan to move in this 
irection. 

farcotics 

1 closing, let me say a brief word 
iQUt narcotics. We are deeply con- 
3med about the influx of narcotic sub- 
dances from southwest Asia into the 
uropean and U.S. markets. We are 



Security Council Vote 
on Israeli Settlements 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 465' 

The Security Coiuictl, 

Taking note of the reports of the 
Commission of the Security Council estab- 
lished by Resolution 446 (1979) to examine 
the situation relating to settlements in the 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, in- 
cluding Jerusalem, contained in documents 
S/13450 and Corr. 1 and S/13679, 

Taking note also of letters from the 
Permanent Representative of Jordan 
(S/13801) and the Permanent Representa- 
tive of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic 
Group (S/13802), 

Strongly deploring the refusal by Is- 
rael to cooperate with the Commission and 
regretting its formal rejection of Resolu- 
tions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979), 

Affirming once more that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protec- 
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 
August 1949 is applicable to the Arab ter- 
ritories occupied by Israel since 1967, in- 
cluding Jerusalem, 

Deploring the decision of the Govern- 
ment of Israel to officially support Israeli 
settlement in the Palestinian and other 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, 

Deeply concerned over the practices of 
the Israeli authorities in implementing this 
settlement policy in the occupied ter- 
ritories, including Jerusalem, and its con- 
sequences on the local Arab and Palestinian 
population, 

Taking into account the need to con- 
sider measures for the impartial protection 
of private and public land and property, 
and water resources. 

Bearing in mind the specific status of 
Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for 
protection and preservation of the unique 
spiritual and religious dimension of the 
holy places in the city, 

Drawing attention to the grave conse- 
quences which the settlement policy is 
bound to have on any attempt to reach a 



encouraged by Pakistan's recent ban on 
opium production in the settled and 
merged areas of the Northwe-st Fron- 
tier Province and by the apparent re- 
duction in this year's crop. Realisti- 
cally, this problem is likely to be with 
us for some time, however, and we will 
continue to work closely with the Paki- 
stan Government on enforcement and 
other aspects of narcotics control. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



comprehensive, just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East, 

Recalling pertinent Security Council 
resolutions, specifically Resolutions 237 
(1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 
1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 
15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 
September 1971, as well as the consensus 
statement made by the President of the Se- 
curity Council on 11 November 1976, 

Having invited Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, 
Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), in the oc- 
cupied territory, to supply it with informa- 
tion pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional 
procedure, 

1. Commends the work done by the 
Commission in preparing the report con- 
tained in document S/13679; 

2. Accepts the conclusions and recom- 
mendations contained in the above- 
mentioned report of the Commission; 

3. Calls upon all Parties, particularly 
the Government of Israel, to cooperate 
with the Commission; 

'4. Strongly deplores the decision of Is- 
rael to prohibit the free travel of Mayor 
Fahd Qawasmeh in order to appear before 
the Security Council, and requests Israel to 
permit his free travel to the United Na- 
tions Headquarters for that purpose; 

5. Determines that all measures taken 
by Israel to change the physical character, 
demographic composition, institutional 
structure or status of the Palestinian and 
other Arab territories occupied since 1967, 
including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, 
have no legal validity and that Israel's pol- 
icy and practices of settling parts of its 
population and new immigrants in those 
territories constitute a flagrant violation of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War and also constitute a serious 
obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 

6. Strongly deplores the continuation 
and persistence of Israel in pursuing those 
policies and practices and calls upon the 
Government and people of Israel to rescind 
those measures, to dismantle the e.xisting 
settlements and in particular to cease, on 
an urgent basis, the establishment, con- 
struction and planning of settlements in the 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, in- 
cluding Jerusalem; 

7. Calls upon all States not to provide 
Israel with any assistance to be used spe- 
cifically in connection with settlements in 
the occupied territories; 

8. Requests the Commission to con- 
tinue to examine the situation relating to 
settlements in the Arab territories oc- 
cupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to 
investigate the reported serious depletion 
of natural re.sources, with a view to ensur- 
ing the protection of those important natu- 
ral resources of the territories under occu- 
pation, and to keep under close scrutiny the 
implementation of the present resolution; 



63 



United Nations 



9. Requests the Commission to repoi t 
to the Security Council before 1 September 
1980, and decides to convene at the earliest 
possible date thereafter in order to con- 
sider the report and the full implementa- 
tion of the present resolution. 



AMBASSADOR McHENRY, 
MAR. 1, 19802 

As always, the Middle East is subject 
to many trends and influences, some of 
them contradictory in nature. In the 
view of the United States, one of the 
positive trends in the area is the cur- 
rent series of negotiations for a com- 
prehensive settlement which resulted 
from the historic breakthrough at Camp 
David a year and a half ago. A Peace 
Treaty has been signed, and large areas 
of occupied Arab territory have been 
evacuated by Israel. The parties have 
taken concrete steps in the cause of 
peace, even in the face of issues which 
touch their most vital national interests 
and on which there are, particularly in 
Israel, sharp but honest differences of 
view. 

As significant as these develop- 
ments are, we recognize that there can 
be no comprehensive peace in the Mid- 
dle East until the Palestinian problem 
in all of its aspects is resolved. The on- 
going negotiations on the West Bank 
and Gaza are admittedly difficult and 
even if successful will constitute only a 
first step. But progress is being made, 
and for the first time in 30 years, the 
core issues are being addressed seri- 
ously and with determination. 

Everyone recognizes that the 
problem of Israeli settlements is one of 
the issues that must be dealt with. The 
position of the United States on the 
question of settlements is clear and is 
consistent. In particular, the United 
States has had the occasion to state its 
views both publicly and privately con- 
cerning the situation in Hebron. 

We regard settlements in the oc- 
cupied territories as illegal under inter- 
national law, and we consider them to 
be an obstacle to the successful outcome 
to the current negotiations which are 
aimed at a comprehensive, just, and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. 

We have supported the resolution 
before us. We have done so despite our 
reservations with regard to certain of 
the provisions of the resolution, which 
we consider to be recommendatory in 
character. We believe that the report of 
the settlements commission is generally 
fair-minded and objective, but we have 
a que.stion concerning the commi.ssion's 
recommendation in paragraph 54 of its 



64 



report as to the best means to deal with 
the settlements in the occupied ter- 
ritories. I should also add that we do 
not read the reference in operative 
paragraph 5 of the resolution to 
changes in the institutional structure of 
the occupied territories as in any way 
prejudicing the outcome of the au- 
tonomy negotiations. 

The basic framework for all our 
efforts, including the Camp David ac- 
cords, is Resolution 242 which calls for 
negotiations to resolve the many and 
difficult aspects of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Such negotiations are cur- 
rently underway. 

One of the issues which the 
negotiators will have to address is the 
matter of e.xisting settlements. There 
are a number of factors of a practical 
character that make impractical the call 
in operative paragraph 6 of the resolu- 
tion for the dismantling of existing set- 
tlements. Some projects are not so eas- 
ily dismantled; moreover, whatever the 
future status of the occupied ter- 
ritories, there will be a need for hous- 
ing, and there will be a need for related 
infrastructure for the inhabitants. 

My delegation is pleased that the 
Council has spoken unanimously on this 
important issue. At the same time, we 
believe we must all recognize that the 
solution to the problem lies ultimately 
in a negotiating process. For our part, 
we are committed to the negotiations in 
which we are currently engaged as a 
full partner, and we are determined 
that they shall bring a comprehensive 
peace closer to reality. In the final 
analysis, all of us here will be judged by 
the contribution which we make to this 
objective. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. .3, 19803 

There were some questions raised over 
the weekend about our vote in the Se- 
curity Council on Saturday. I want, 
therefore, to make the following points. 
There is no change in our basic policy 
on settlements or on Jerusalem. Our 
policy has been consistently stated over 
a number of months and remains un- 
changed. Our support for Israeli secu- 
rity and well-being also remains firm 
and unwavering. 

This is a fundamental element in 
American foreign policy. We remain to- 
tally committed to the success of the 
negotiations under the Camp David 
frameworks. We believe they will pro- 
vide the proper context for dealing with 



issues such as the Israeli settlements i 
occupied territory. 

As we said yesterday and as Am- 
bassador McHenry made clear in the 
Security Council, the United States is 
opposed to the inclusion of the phrase 
"dismantling of existing settlements" i 
the Security Council resolution which 
was passed on Saturday. 

The issue of existing settlements i 
occupied territory will be dealt with ii 
the negotiations now underway. We d 
not consider the call in this forum — i.e. 
in the Security Council — in that resoh 
tion for dismantling them to be either 
proper or practical. 

As we have said, we believe all th 
outstanding issues should be dealt wit 
through negotiation, and we are fully 
committed to the success of the curren 
negotiations. 

Finally, to repeat again what we 
have said before, we have made clear 
our opposition to any effort to change 
or amend U.N. Resolution 242 in any 
way. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 3, 1980^ 

I want to make it clear that the vote 
the United States in the Security Cou 
cil of the United Nations does not 
represent a change in our position re- 
garding the Israeli settlements in the 
occupied areas nor regarding the stati 
of Jerusalem. 

While our opposition to the estab 
lishment of the Israeli settlements is 
longstanding and well-known, we mac 
strenuous efforts to eliminate the lan- 
guage with reference to the dismantlir 
of settlements in the resolution. This 
call for dismantling was neither prope 
nor practical. We believe that the fu- 
ture disposition of existing settlement 
must be determined during the currer 
autonomy negotiations. 

As to Jerusalem, we strongly be 
lieve that Jerusalem should be undi- 
vided with free access to the holy placi 
for all faiths and that its status shoulc 
be determined in the negotiations for 
comprehensive peace settlement. 

The U.S. vote in the United Na- 
tions was approved with the under- 
standing that all references to 
Jerusalem would be deleted. The failui 
to communicate this clearly resulted i 
a vote in favor of the resolution rathe 
than abstention. 

I want to reiterate in the most un 
equivocal of terms that in the autonom 
negotiations and in other fora, the 
United States will neither support noi 



Department of State Buileti 



United Nations 



(cept any position that might jeopar- 
ize Israel's vital security interests, 
ur commitment to Israel's security 
id well-being remains unqualified and 

lishakable. 



'Adopted unanimously on Mar, 1, 1980. 

^USUN press release 16 of Mar. 1, 
•80. 

^Read to news correspondents by act- 
? Department spokesman Tom Reston. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
■esidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1980. ■ 



I.S. to Rejoin ILO 



RESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
^.B. 13, 1980' 

!0 years ago I directed that the 
lited States withdraw from member- 
p in the International Labor Organi- 
ion (ILO), a specialized agency of 
'. United Nations, because it had 
ayed too far from its fundamental 
nciples and purposes. In particular, 
r withdrawal was an expression of 
r growing concern over a number of 
•nds that weakened the ability of the 
10 to carry out its basic mission. 
'. ose trends included the erosion of the 
; epcndence of employer and worker 
; e^^ates attending ILO conferences, 
1 ' relative immunity of certain coun- 
j es from criticism for violating work- 
j ;' human rights, the growing disre- 
-d within the ILO of the principles of 
s process, and the introduction of ex- 
neous political issues into ILO 
Dates. 

At the time of our withdrawal, I 
ted that we remained ready to re- 
•n to the ILO whenever that organi- 
ion demonstrated respect for its 
)per principles and procedures. It 
s my hope that other countries would 
ne to realize that the ILO and other 
N. agencies can only be effective if 
y are not used for political prop- 
anda purposes. 

Since then, a majority of ILO 
mbers — governments, workers, and 
fployers — have successfully joined 
Jether to return the ILO to its origi- 
i purposes. Through their efforts, 
ps have been taken to strengthen 
3 independence of employer and 
irker delegates, undertake investiga- 
■ns of human rights violations in a 
mber of countries, including the 
viet Union, reinforce the principle of 
e process, and generally reduce the 
'el of politicization in the ILO. 



I have decided, therefore, that the 
United States should now rejoin the 
ILO and work with other members to 
insure that the true potential of this or- 
ganization is realized. This decision has 
the support of American trade union 
and employer organizations — the 
AFL-CIO and the U.S. Council of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. 

As a member of the ILO, and with 
the support of other countries, the 
United States will seek to insure that 
the ILO continues to serve the inter- 
ests of the world's working men and 
women by promoting more and better 
jobs while protecting their human 
rights and dignity. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. 



Background on U.S. 
Reentry into ILO 

Foreign Relations Outline ' 

The International Labor Organization 
(ILO), created in 1919 as part of the 
League of Nations, was established to 
set international labor standards, im- 
prove working conditions, create em- 
ployment, and promote human rights. 
In 1946 it became the first U.N. spe- 
cialized agency. 

Unique among international or- 
ganizations, it operates on a tripartite 
principle. Representatives of workers, 
employers, and government all partici- 
pate on an equal basis. It is now com- 
posed of 141 member states. 

U.S. Withdrawal 

In November 1977, the United States 
withdrew from membership in the ILO 
for several reasons, including the ero- 
sion of the tripartite principle, the 
ILO's selective concern for human 
rights, its growing disregard for due 
process, and the increasing politiciza- 
tion of the organization. At that time, 
President Carter said that: "The 
United States remains ready to return 
whenever the ILO is again true to its 
proper principles and procedures." 

Decision to Rejoin 

Following the withdrawal, the Presi- 
dent established a Cabinet-level com- 
mittee to monitor developments and 



advise him on ILO matters. Reflecting 
the ILO's tripartite structure, AFL- 
CIO, U.S. Council of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Gov- 
ernment representatives all had an 
equal voice on the committee. In early 
February 1980, the committee recom- 
mended unanimously to the President 
that the United States rejoin the ILO. 
The President accepted this recommen- 
dation, and the United States rejoined 
the organization on February 18. 

Progress at the ILO 

Although the ILO has not fully resolved 
all the issues that led to U.S. with- 
drawal, it has made significant progress 
on each. 

Tripartism. The ILO has passed 
several resolutions strengthening its 
tripartite decisionmaking system. For 
example, a new ILO general conference 
secret ballot procedure, vigorously re- 
sisted by the U.S.S.R., permits 
employer and worker delegates to vote 
their consciences on sensitive issues 
without fear of government recrimina- 
tion. 

Human Rights. The ILO is apply- 
ing its human rights machinery to 
Eastern Europe. In November 1978, 
the ILO governing body censured 
Czechoslovakia for illegally firing dissi- 
dents from their jobs, and it is cur- 
rently examining worker complaints 
against the U.S.S.R. and Poland for 
violating trade union rights. 

Due Process. In 1978 the general 
conference defeated an Arab resolution 
seeking to extend a 1974 resolution that 
condemned Israel without any investi- 
gation of the facts. A new mechanism to 
eliminate resolutions representing such 
violations of due process was 
negotiated by Western and Third World 
governments. 

Politicization. ILO meetings have 
been far less politicized, and there has 
been a major turnaround on Middle 
East issues. When Arab representa- 
tives walked out during the speech of 
the Egyptian Labor Minister in the 
1979 conference, only Communist dele- 
gates joined the walkout. The ILO also 
sent two missions to investigate work- 
ing conditions of Palestinians in the 
Israeli-occupied territories. The mis- 
sion reports were well balanced and ac- 
cepted by both Arabs and Israelis at 
the 1978 and 1979 general conferences. 
As a result, no political resolutions 
were offered on this subject. 



65 



United Nations 



Effect of U.S. Withdrawal 

U.S. withdrawal from the ILO appar- 
ently contributed to the progress that 
has been achieved. Western countries 
played a more active role in pressing 
for reforms. A majority of ILO mem- 
bers successfully resisted efforts to 
subvert due process and constitutional 
procedures. Equally important, the 
U.S.S.R. generally was unable to 
capitalize on the U.S. absence. 

Benefits of Membership 

Although withdrawal may have pro- 
moted reforms, continuing to remain 
outside the ILO would not have yielded 
additional benefits to the United 
States. Those ILO members which 
worked to achieve the gains that were 
made would have felt disillusioned if 
the United States had failed to return. 
Moreover, while the Western group has 
become more cohesive and effective, 
there remains a clear need for the kind 
of presence that only we can provide. 
This is especially true on human rights 
issues. By rejoining now, we can re- 
sume our seat on the governing body 
before the June 1980 annual conference. 
Specifically, membership in the ILO 
offers the United States: 

• The opportunity to participate in 
and influence the formation of interna- 
tional labor standards, which directly 
affect labor codes in developing coun- 
tries; 

• The opportunity to participate in 
and influence voluntary agreements 
such as codes of conduct for multina- 
tional enterprises, the ILO version of 
which is regarded by U.S. labor and 
business as the most constructive yet 
developed; 

• A framework in which the U.S. 
labor movement and business commu- 
nity can be in contact with their coun- 
terpart organizations throughout the 
world; 

• Influence over ILO execution of 
U.N. Development Program projects, 
totaling about $40 million in 1980; 

• An important forum in which the 
United States can carry on discussions 
with the Third World; 

• Participation in the U.N. sys- 
tem's most effective mechanism for 
promoting the human rights of workers; 
and 

• Participation in the ILO's studies 
of development, which pioneered the 
basic human needs approach to de- 
velopment and directly influenced 
World Bank and Agency for Interna- 
tional Development programs. 



Membership Costs 

Our contribution to the ILO will be 
about $25 million in 1980. Administra- 
tive support costs of U.S. participation 
could amount to an additional $500,000. 



' Taken from the Department of State 
publication in the GIST series, released 
Feb. 1980. This outline is designed to be a 
quick reference aid on U.S. foreign rela- 
tions. It is not intended as a comprehensive 
U.S. foreign policy statement.* 



U.S. Policy on 
Apartheid 



by William Dunfey 

Statement in the U.N. General 
Assembly on Novembers, 1979. Mr. 
Dunfey is U.S. Alternate Representa- 
tive to the 34th U.N. General Assem- 
bly. 1 

My Government shares the total and 
inalterable opposition of this body to 
the institutionalized system of racism 
called apartheid. We are committed to 
affirmative policies which promote 
genuine social and political change in 
South Africa. We believe that economic 
forces are particularly important in an 
effort to effect the kinds of changes in 
South Africa we all desire. In the last 
several days, other speakers have in- 
troduced reports of a possible nuclear 
event into this debate. Because these 
comments are based on information 
which originated with my government, 
I shall address this issue briefly. 

As the members of this Assembly 
are aware, my government has had an 
indication of the possibility of a low- 
yield nuclear explosion in the area of 
the Indian Ocean and the South Atlan- 
tic, although we do not have cor- 
roborating evidence. It is important to 
understand that we cannot confirm that 
a nuclear explosion took place nor, ob- 
viously, can we say at this time who 
was responsible. We are continuing to 
investigate this matter. Earlier in this 
session, a distinguished delegate called 
upon the Assembly to address this 
issue, not in panic, but with facts. We 
could not agree more. 

My government has made clear 
that a fundamental objective of our na- 
tional policy is to halt the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. We have joined 
others in expressing concern that South 



Africa's nuclear facilities could be usee 
to develop a nuclear explosives capa- 
bility. The U.S. Nonproliferation Act of 
1978 provides, as a minimum conditior 
for the licensing of nuclear exports to 
any country after March 1980, that it 
have all its nuclear activities under in- 
ternational safeguards. As a practical 
matter, however, the United States 
ceased exports of nuclear materials or 
equipment to South Africa 4 years agt 
My government calls on South Af 
rica and all other countries which are 
not parties to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, to adhere to that treaty and t 
act promptly to place all their peacefu 
nuclear activities under international 
safeguards. 

U.S. Approach 

In recent years the U.S. Government 
has taken a number of actions to undei 
score our opposition to the apartheid 
system in South Africa. Following the 
death of Steve Biko, the United Statel 
supported a mandatory arms embargo 
in the Security Council. In addition, tl 
United States has unilaterally impose! 
a ban on all exports of whatever natu 
to the South Africa military and polic 

On October 4, 1979, speaking be- 
fore ambassadors and ministers com- 
prising the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in New York, Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance reaffirmed that 
unless a system of government evolve 
there in which all South Africans can 
participate equitably, our relations wi 
South Africa would inevitably deterio- 
rate. 

The United States opposes the ra 
cially motivated bannings and deten- 
tions in South Africa. We oppose the 
pass laws and other such forms of soci: 
discrimination. We oppose the policy 
separate development under which 
black South Africans are systematical! 
being denied citizenship in their own 
country and instead are being 
documented as nationals of so-called i 
dependent homelands. We oppose the 
current lack of equal opportunity for a 
races regarding employment, job pro- 
motion, and education. We oppose the 
lack of opportunity for full political pai 
ticipation by all the citizens of South 
Africa, regardless of race or color. 

We do note, however, that there 
have been some signs of a more flexibl 
attitude on the part of white South A; 
ricans over the last year and that the 
present South African Government ha 
taken steps to eliminate some aspects 
discrimination in the economic area. 
These have included steps to eliminat 



66 



Department of State Bullel^ 



United Nations 



,)St categories of legal job reserva- 
ms, recognize trade union rights for 
^cks, and lift some restrictions on the 
erations of black businesses. 

Unfortunately, most of these steps 
ve been hedged with qualifications 
it could seriously dilute their impact, 
is too soon to say that they have, in 
■t, led to real, specific changes, and 
reiterate our position that any 
mges that leave the basic framework 
apartheid intact are by definition in- 
?quate. Apartheid is also based on 
ictices as well as laws — practices 
quently sanctioned by the South Af- 
an Government. 

onomic Focus 

e presence of U.S. corporations in 
ith Africa has become an important 
itical issue in the United States and 
)cus of the more general debate on 
5. policy toward South Africa. Our 
free of economic involvement repre- 
its potential leverage for social and 
itical change. Since 1973, we have 
;ed U.S. firms operating in South 
•ica to institute, maintain, and e.x- 
id enlightened employment practices 
their black employees, including 
)rovements in wages, working condi- 
is, fringe benefits, and opportunities 
i advancement, as well as dealing 
I h legitimate representatives of black 
irkers, including black unions.- 
: Students on many U.S. campuses 
j 'e focused their efforts on college 
I university investments in U.S. cor- 
ations doing business with South 
•ica. Many institutions have been 
ler pressure to divest themselves of 
stock of companies doing business 
h, or in. South Africa, and about a 
ien have done so. At this time, many 
ege and university boards are urg- 
corporations in which they own 
ek to work for social change in South 
ica. For now, we believe the latter 
iative is a valid means to confront 
apartheid system realistically, but 
are monitoring closely the progress 
mch initiatives. If their effects prove 
ther significant nor rapid enough to 

tisfy our commitment to end apar- 
id, we will consider other ways to 
ng about change. 

e "Sullivan Principles" 

e of the more successful of the intia- 
es to bring international pressure to 
ir on South Africa has been that un- 
•taken in the United States by the 
verend Leon H. Sullivan. His action 
aunching a set of principles for fair 



employment practices by U.S. com- 
panies doing business in South Africa 
and in subsequently established re- 
porting and monitoring procedures has 
set the pace for corporate conduct and 
procedures in South Africa. 

There are now 135 U.S. companies 
which have signed the "Sullivan princi- 
ples." These companies represent 75% 
of the work forces on the payrolls of 
U.S. corporations doing business in 
South Africa. The Sullivan initiative 
springs from the private corporate 
world. It brings together U.S. com- 
panies voluntarily to pursue a common 
objective based, realistically, on their 
growing awareness that an investment 
in an apartheid environment is not in 
their interest. 

Following the lead of the Sullivan 
principles, 13 similar codes of conduct 
have emerged from other nations with 
corporations doing business with South 
Africa. Also, this year, 10 of the largest 
South African corporations, employing 
more than one-half million black work- 
ers in mining and other labor intensive 
areas, have agreed to implement the 
principles. 

The third report on the progress of 
U.S. companies doing business in South 
Africa in implementing the Sullivan 
principles was issued October 18. While 
the report indicated that the principles 
had become an important force for so- 
cial change in South Africa, it is clear 
that the companies should not be satis- 
fied with the current progress and need 
to push their effort significantly fur- 
ther. 

Commitment to 
Combat Apartheid 

There are many groups in the United 
States today calling for stronger meas- 
ures to combat apartheid in South 
Africa — in the private sector, in 
churches, on university campuses, and 
in Congress. And indeed, my govern- 
ment's objective remains fundamental, 
not peripheral or token change. In this 
context we recognize, as do their spon- 
sors, that the existing principles and 
procedures concerning corporate con- 
duct in South Africa need to be applied 
so as to insure their relevance to this 
objective. 

They should address additional sig- 
nificant "problems of labor and social 
conditions in South Africa, including, 
for example, migratory labor, minimum 
wage, and influx control. They should 
examine the continuing role of banks 



and lending institutions. This would re- 
quire effective monitoring systems for 
activities of all foreign firms. In this 
regard, it is important that fair em- 
ployment principles and procedures be 
supported by all those who trade with 
and invest in South Africa. 

While we believe that corporate 
principles for fair employment practices 
in South Africa can have a cumulative 
effect on South African labor policies 
and practices, we also recognize that 
they can affect the structure of the 
basic apartheid system itself only in 
combination with an unrelenting com- 
mitment from the world community 
that apartheid must end. And apartheid 
will end only when the people and the 
South African Government, motivated 
both from within and without, accept 
the inevitability of change. In the final 
analysis, it is those persons in influen- 
tial positions in South Africa, particu- 
larly those who now dominate its eco- 
nomic life, who must catalyze and pro- 
mote the fundamental changes for 
which the majority of the population 
yearns — and to which my government 
remains firmly committed. 



'USUN press release 115. 



hi 1980 



67 



United Nations 



U.S. Contributions to the UNHCR 



by Ksther Coopersmith 

Stnteiiiciit i)> ConiDiittee III (So- 
cial, Hinimintarian. and Cultural) of 
the U.N. General Assembly on 
November U and in the ad hoc Com- 
mittee for the Announcement ofVol- 
untari/ Contributions to the 1980 Pro- 
gramme of the UNHCR on November 
16. 1979. Ms. Coopersmith is U.S. 
Representative to the -Uth U.N. Gen- 
eral Assemblj/. 



NOV. 14, 1979' 

Ever since the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
was created in 1951, it has had to deal 
with the humanitarian problem of dis- 
placed peoples throughout the world. 
During and immediately following the 
Second World War, we witnessed the 
flood of refugees from war-torn 
Europe. The High Commissioner then 
faced the challenge of finding asylum 
for these tens of thousands of homeless 
people. It would be nice to say that the 
problem has been solved. But, as we 
meet here today, we find that once 
again the world confronts a refugee 
problem of monumental proportion. 

We have all pondered the stagger- 
ing figures on refugees, but numbers 
alone do not reveal the extent of human 
suffering which these people are ex- 
periencing. Our eyes have been focused 
on the human tragedy in Indochina. 
First, there were the boat people from 
Vietnam, and at this very moment, it is 
the famine-striken people of Kam- 
puchea who are fleeing across the bor- 
der into Thailand. 

We have all been deeply moved and 
saddened by the human suffering that 
engulfs these people. Finding the 
means to help them poses a difficult 
task for the High Commissioner and the 
international community. 

Having heard the report of the 
High Commissioner, I know I speak the 
sentiments of all countries in acknowl- 
edging his heroic response and the ex- 
traordinary work of his colleagues. We 
know he wants to do more, and we 
know that more has to be done. 

May I take this opportunity to ex- 
press my government's appreciation 
and gratitude to the Government and 
people of Thailand for their compas- 
sionate and generous response to the 



68 



refugees who have streamed across 
their border seeking not only sanctuary 
but the most basic needs of staying 
alive. 

U.S. Support to Kampuchea 

Reflecting the personal concern of our 
President and the American people, 
Mrs. Rosalyn Carter visited the areas 
in Thailand where thousands of Kam- 
puchean refugees are seeking shelter in 
overcrowded, unsanitary, and 
humiliating conditions. She found this 
experience to be emotionally wrench- 
ing, and one which she will never 
forget. We had hoped Mrs. Carter 
could have come to New York to ad- 
dress Committee III, but unfortunately 
circumstances did not allow her to do 
so. She has met with High Commis- 
sioner [Poull Hartling and discussed 
her observations with Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim. She will continue to 
give support and encouragement to the 
voluntary groups in our country which 
have already demonstrated their pro- 
found concern and which have been in- 
volved in this crisis since its very 
beginning. 

My government has already au- 
thorized the High Commissioner to 
make immediate use of $4 million for 
Kampuchean refugees from our contri- 
bution to the UNHCR. We will im- 
mediately transport mobile equipment 
to provide water to refugee holding 
camps as well as send communication 
equipment in order to improve the 
coordination between the refugee 
camps and the support agencies in 
Bangkok. Moreover, the President has 
directed the Peace Corps to accelerate 
its support of the UNHCR programs. 

African Refugees 

While we acknowledge the tragic cir- 
cumstances of the people of Kampuchea 
and the continuing plight of those flee- 
ing Vietnam and Laos, we must 
not — we cannot — allow these tragedies 
to divert our attention from Africa 
where most of the world's refugees are 
now concentrated. Approximately 4 
million people have been uprooted in 
that continent, and the High Commis- 
sioner in his report, as well as by his 
attendance at the Arusha conference 
last May, has made it clear that his of- 
fice gives the highest priority to the 
African refugee problems. We must 
support the High Commissioner in this 



commitment. The United States will 
certainly do so. The United States ha 
set for itself a goal of providing one- 
third of the costs of the High Commis 
sioner's general program requirement 
in Africa as an expression of its 
concern. 

International Contributions 

The UNHCR's role is essential to the 
well-being of the millions of refugees 
throughout the world. That role needl 
to be enhanced and additional resourc 
made available in order for the High 
Commissioner to meet this immense 
problem which affects us all. We mua 
do more than merely provide substam 
ard camps in which refugees are bare 
able to eke out an existence. For ovei 
the long term, refugees must be helpi 
to regain productive and self-sufficiew 
lives as quickly as possible. 

An undue burden of coping with 
problems caused by the influx of refii' 
gees has fallen to developing countric 
and it is these countries which will r( 
quire additional resources if the refug 
programs of the High Commissioner i 
to succeed. But the High Commission 
cannot accomplish a task of such maiB 
nitude alone. Therefore, we call upoi 
the specialized agencies of the Unitei 
Nations to give high priority to a.ssis 
ing those developing countries with 
large numbers of refugees. 

My government believes that tht 
work of the High Commissioner is the 
responsibility of all nations. As Am- 
bassador (Deputy Permanent Repre- 
sentative, Per] Aasen of Norway not 
yesterday only 87 countries have con 
tributed to the general program for 
1978. We do hope all countries will co 
tribute and get involved with the \m> 
of the High Commissioner. 

Conclusion 

This is a most critical period for the 
UNHCR. The tasks before it are un- 
precedented, and its response must 
transcend traditional approaches to t 
problem. History shall look to these 
days and those immediately ahead to 
judge the wisdom, the imagination, ai 
the innovation we apply to the refug( 
crises of today. 

For our part, let me state clearlj 
that my government — and in fact all t 
American people — will continue to re 
spond to this humanitarian problem. 
Our commitment, which we hope is 
shared by all present in this room, is 



Department of State Bulla; 



United Nations 



und in the preamble of the U.N. 
larter — ". . . to reaffirm faith in fun- 
imental human rights, in the dignity 
Id worth of the human person. . . ." 



)V. IB, 1979' 

IS. Pledge 

1 behalf of the U.S. Government, I 
1 pleased to announce our intention to 
'dge $48,350,000 as an initial contri- 
tion to the UNHCR 1980 general 
Dgram. A pledge letter in that 
lount will be forwarded to you pend- 
'^ final action on our 1980 appropria- 
n which is now pending in Congress. 
We plan to provide the $48,350,000 
•dge for the following purposes: 

• $30 million, to the ongoing 
■JHCR program for the care and 
intenance of Indochinese refugees 

the first 9 months of 1980; 

• $16.9 million as a contribution 
vard the UNHCR's general program 

African refugees; and 

• $1,450,000 toward UNHCR's 
leral program requirements in other 
vas. 

With regard to UNHCR's special 
i orations, we are pleased to announce 
I increase of the U.S. contribution to 
I ' High Commissioner's program of 
I )port for Khmer refugees in Thailand 
a total of $15 million. With this 
dge, U.S. commitments in support of 

• High Commissioner's program 

!ds for the care and maintenance of 
ugees in countries of first asylum 
al $63,350,000. 
We have the capability to increase 

• support of UNHCR programs in 
iO as further needs and special pro- 
ims are identified. The United States 
ns to contribute up to one-third of 

■ High Commissioner's general pro- 
im needs in Africa, 30% of the pro- 
im in Southeast Asia, and an appro- 
ate share in meeting other UNHCR 
)gram needs, taking into account, as 
the past, the level of support by 
ler member governments. We are 
;ouraged by the response other gov- 
iments have made this year to some 
the most urgent program needs and 

confident that they will continue to 
a us in providing strong support to 

overall program in 1980. 

ecial Programs 

'ould like to mention two special pro- 
ims which the UNHCR has in proc- 
h. The first concern is refugee proc- 



essing centers in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Both these governments, 
to their great credit, have now reached 
agreement with the High Commissioner 
to construct processing centers to 
which refugees, now in countries of 
first asylum, can go after they have 
been accepted for resettlement and 
while they await movement to their 
destinations. We plan to support 30% of 
the cost of these centers and have al- 
ready provided adequate funds for ini- 
tiation of construction. 

The second program I would like to 
mention is the idea, still in its develop- 
mental stage, of a fund to promote dur- 
able solutions for refugees. The Oc- 
tober meeting of the UNHCR's execu- 
tive committee named a working group 
to develop this concept further. We do 
not see this fund as a large new de- 
velopment bank but as a focus for de- 
vising and planning — in collaboration 
with development banks and specialized 
agencies — projects which will be useful 
to governments and people who are 
taking the important and humanitarian 
step of absorbing or, in some cases, 
reabsorbing refugees into their 
societies and economies. We sincerely 
hope such a concept can be developed 
and, if it is, will support it fully so that 
the fund will have a capability of not 
only devising appropriate projects but 
assisting the movement and reception 
of refugees going to new locations. 

These two new programs can, in 
our view, give the UNHCR substan- 
tially added capabilities in providing 
protection, care, and resettlement of 
the growing numbers of refugees. We 
are prepared to give strong support for 
these programs and the overall ac- 
tivities of the UNHCR. 



' USUN Press release 120. 

2USUN Press release 123 of Nov. 19, 



1979. 



Secretariat Formed 
for Women's 
Conference 



The U.S. Department of State, 
expressing its commitment to the U.N. 
Decade for Women, established the 
U.S. Secretariat for the World Confer- 
ence of the U.N. Decade for Women, 
1980 on November 26, 1979. Earlier in 
the year, the Department inaugurated 
U.S. preparatory efforts for the world 
conference with a day-long meeting on 
September 12 attended by more than 
800 American women. The early estab- 
lishment of the U.S. Secretariat, a full 
7 months before the world conference, 
will enable in-depth U.S. preparation 
for the middecade reappraisal. 

The U.S. Secretariat will direct 
and coordinate U.S. preparations for 
the world conference which will be held 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14-30, 
1980. The conference has two major 
purposes. 

First, conferees will assess 
worldwide progress toward achieving 
the goals outlined in the resolutions 
adopted at the 1975 International 
Women's Year Conference in Mexico 
City, including the World Plan of 
Action. 

Second, participants will formulate 
specific action-oriented programs for 
regional development in the second half 
of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980- 
1985. 

The conference will focus on three 
subthemes of education, health, and 
employment, as well as other substan- 
tive topics including the effects of 
apartheid on women and the special 
plight of women as refugees. 

The U.S. Secretariat will work in 
conjunction with various government 
agencies and departments in the prep- 
aration of U.S. position papers. The 
Secretariat, through extensive public 
outreach, will seek to obtain opinions 
and suggestions from American women 
on all aspects of the Copenhagen 
conference. 

Vivian Lowery Derryck is the di- 
rector of the U.S. Secretariat. Maureen 
Whalen is the deputy director. 

Correspondence for the Secretariat 
may be addressed to: U.S. Secretariat 
for the World Conference on the UN 
Decade for Women, 1980, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Press release 9 of Jan. 15, 1980. 



ril 1980 



69 



United Nations 



New and Renewable Energy 
Sources~1981 Conference 



by Harry M. Montgomery, Jr. 

Statement in Cohiniittee II (Eco- 
nomic and Financial) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on November 21, 
1979. Mr. Montgomery is the U.S. 
Representative on that committee.^ 

The global energy problem affects all of 
us. Effective and cooperative actions by 
all nations — producer and consumer, 
developed and developing — are re- 
quired to insure a smooth and orderly 
transition from primary reliance on oil 
and gas to increased use of other forms 
of energy to meet the world's needs. 
The accelerated development and im- 
plementation of new and renewable 
forms of energy can make an important 
contribution to this process. 

The U.S. Government attaches 
great significance to the Conference on 
New and Renewable Energy that will 
be held in 1981. Secretary of State 
Vance empha.sized, at both the 33d and 
34th sessions of the U.N. General As- 
sembly, our strong support for this 
conference. The Senate, in its resolu- 
tion of April 10, 1979, reaffirmed the 
high priority my country accords to this 
meeting. We welcome the proposal that 
it should be held in Nairobi. This is 
especially fitting, given the particular 
importance to developing countries of 
the issues to be dealt with by the con- 
ference. 

The United States is already e.x- 
panding its programs to develop these 
new energy technologies with a view 
both to our needs and to those of de- 
veloping countries. 

Energy Programs 

Our Department of Energy (DOE) al- 
ready has a substantial program to de- 
velop and apply various new and re- 
newable technologies. For our fiscal 
year 1980, its budget includes almost 
$800 million in direct funding. Now, re- 
sponding to President Carter's program 
to assure our nation's energy needs, the 
Congress is considering a much en- 
larged program for development of al- 
ternate sources of energy — notably 
synthetic fuels and solar energy — 
which will make available tested tech- 
nologies benefiting the world commu- 
nity. 

Our Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID), which provides bilat- 



70 



eral assistance to developing countries, 
has established programs which will 
provide: 

• Training and support for national 
energy institutions; 

• Analysis of developing countries' 
energy needs, uses, and resources; and 

• Support for experimental pro- 
grams and projects to determine the 
applicability of selected new and re- 
newable energy technologies. 

Also, the DOE manages a program 
of comprehensive energy assessments 
in collaboration with developing coun- 
tries and is involved in other coopera- 
tive energy activities in 11 developing 
countries. 

Conference Objectives 

Multilateral efforts also will be required 
to meet these global needs. We believe 
the U.N. Conference on New and Re- 
newable Energy can accomplish a 
number of valuable objectives. 

• First of all, it will demonstrate, 
concretely, the mutual interest of the 
developed and developing countries in 
cooperating in the development of new 
sources and improved methods of using 
energy. 

• In recognition of the seriousness 
of the global energy situation and the 
need to conserve conventional fuels, the 
conference will highlight the urgency of 
bringing alternatives to oil and natural 
gas into use as rapidly as posssible. 

• The conference can review the 
state-of-the-art of various technologies, 
produce an inventory of research in 
progress and planning, highlight areas 
in which further research is needed, 
evaluate the demonstration projects, 
and assess the economic viability of 
available technologies. 

• It can commit all developed and 
developing countries to making alterna- 
tive energy development a priority field 
of cooperation and investment, with 
special attention to meeting the needs 
of developing countries in the context 
of accelerating their overall develop- 
ment. 

• The conference can seek to agree 
on a realistic goal for the global use of 
new and renewable sources by the year 
2000 and evaluate the role that such 
sources can play in rural, industrial, 
and other applications. 



• Finally, it could draw up a plan f ]1 
action for intensified and coordinatdl 
efforts at the national, regional, and in 
ternational levels. 

Conference Preparations 

A successful conference requires 
prompt and effective preparations. Wf 
must move with despatch to insure thai 
the conference takes place in August 
1981 — as proposed in the draft 
resolution — only 20 months from now. 
Its subject matter is too important to 
permit the date to slip. And if the con 
ference is to be successful, it will re- 
quire major efforts in the intervening 
period by the Secretariat, by the vari^ 
ous agencies of the U.N. system, and 
by member states. 

We are pleased that the first 
meetings of the technical panels are 
underway, with much credit due to tht 
intensive work of the Center on Natu 
ral Resources, Energy, and Transpor- 
tation. We agree with others that the 
ECOSOC [Economic and Social Counci 
Committee on Natural Resources 
should be designated as the conference 
preparatory committee. To perform 
this role, it would, of course, have to b 
open to universal membership. 

Many U.N. agencies and other 
multilateral organizations are current 
engaged in relevant energy activities. 
We agree with the distinguished Seen 
tary General [Mohamed Habib Gherat 
of the conference that greater coordini 
tion will serve the interest of all. The 
energy conference coordinating com- 
mittee and task force, created by the 
Director General [Kenneth Dadzie], ar 
steps in the right direction. In additior 
strengthened interagency machinery, 
including further analysis by the Com 
mittee for Program Coordination of th 
Energy Programs of the U.N. system 
would be useful. 

We regret that the conference 
budget submission for 1980-81 has not 
been prepared in time for careful re- 
view before this debate. We will reviev 
this document carefully. 

We have much work ahead to pro 
duce the type of conference that will 
meet the expectations of all of us and 
thus contribute to solving the global 
energy problem. The United States wdl 
participate actively and constructively 
in the conference and in its prepara 
tions. We will do our part to make it a 
success. 



'USUN press release 127. 



Department of State Bulleti 



ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Y 1 981 Foreign Assistance Program 



John A. Bushnell 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
\lnter-American Affairs of the House 
\"eign Affairs Comrnitee on February 
\'980. Mr. Bushnell is Deputy As- 
lant Secretary for Inter- American 
\airs.'^ 

; past year has been one of substan- 
change in Latin America. We wel- 
le most of the changes. We are 
[llenged ourselves to adjust our as- 
ance programs, both economic and 
iirity, to the changes in the area. 
Some changes have been traumatic 
caused great suffering, as in 
aragua and the process even now 
ig on in El Salvador. Others have 
n less drastic although not less pas- 
late, as in the return to democracy 
Ecuador, the evolution of democracy 
t he Dominican Republic and St. 
i ia through peaceful change rather 
1 revolution, and the steady move- 
1 it of Peru toward free and open 
Itions. The Andean Pact gained new 
i nentum and moved toward warmer 
; tions with us. Significant improve- 
I its in human rights were made in 
I ly countries. The island states in the 
I ibbean continued to cut their colo- 
j ties and are beginning to stand on 
j r own feet — a few of them not too 
i idily. 

The rise in oil prices has been 
( eficial to several hemisphere coun- 
's; to most, particularly the smaller 
: itries of Central America and the 
'I ibbean, it has been a severe blow. 
i of these changes require new 
^spectives and a U.S. response suited 
{he new reality. 



ILTILATERAL ECONOMIC 
iilSTANCE 

. vou are aware, the absolute amount 
fiilitary and bilateral development 
stance for Latin America as a whole 
lined over the decade of the 1970s, 
major thrust of our economic as- 
ance in Latin America and the 
ibbean is now multilateral. And we 
e moved away from close relation- 
His with countries where the military 
nI the reins of power and have made 
(e progress toward a return to 
•'locratie government. 

Some of the dimensions of our 
S^ iged role are less immediately evi- 
t. First, bilateral and multilateral 



assistance are not perfect substitutes 
one for the other. Secondly, the de- 
clines in our assistance have come about 
for several reasons, among them budg- 
etary constraints, competing demands 
for limited resources, and a change in 
worldwide assistance policy to concen- 
trate on the poorest countries. 

These changes do not, however, 
signal any diminution in the importance 
of our relationship with Latin America. 
We have over 330 million neighbors 
south of our border, many of whom are 
desperately poor. The combined 
economies of the entire region pro- 
duced some $460 billion in gross na- 
tional product in 1978. In the same 
year, we produced over $2 trillion 
worth. It is easy to see why the coun- 
tries of Latin America expect us to 
provide significant help in their de- 
velopment, either through direct as- 
sistance or by special consideration in 
trade matters. For them, the test of 
our interest is our willingness to help 
with their most pressing problems — 
economic development and security. 

U.S. Interests 

Our own interests in the countries of 
Latin America are strong. They are our 
closest neighbors. They are also impor- 
tant trading partners and friends which 
share many of our views about peace 
and stability in the world. They voted 
unanimously in the OAS [Organization 
of American States] to condemn the 
taking of hostages in Iran, and 25 coun- 
tries in the region voted for the resolu- 
tion condemning Soviet forces in Af- 
ghanistan. Increasingly, we need the 
cooperation of our southern neighbors 
to solve some of our own problems — 
such as drugs, illegal migration, and ac- 
cess to energy and raw materials. 

Finally, we have reason for concern 
because their economies are not yet 
robust enough to provide a decent 
livelihood — and sometimes even 
sustenance — to all their people. A 
number of countries are in a crucial 
state of political change. We have a 
large stake in this change process. If 
these transitions preserve democracy, 
national independence, and pluralism — 
principles we believe are necessary for 
the development of a political system 
truly responsive to the needs of the 
people — the outcome will be govern- 
ments that we can work with smoothly 



and effectively on the whole range of 
mutual problems. 

Given the magnitude and impor- 
tance of our interests in the region, the 
programs we are proposing are modest. 
Our total request for development as- 
sistance, security assistance, and PL 
480 programs totals $450 million. This 
is but a fraction of our worldwide total 
of nearly $8 billion. Our development 
assistance in 1981 would be equal to 
only one-half of 1% of the combined 
output of the receiving countries. More 
than half of our proposed program for 
Latin America and the Caribbean — 
$275 million, of which only $111 million 
is in the form of grants — -is for de- 
velopment assistance through AID 
[Agency for International Development]. 
Security assistance totals $91 million: 
$63 million for military sales credits and 
training — less than 2% of our 
worldwide military programs — and $28 
million for economic support, compared 
with $2 billion for other areas. 

Latin America is an area with 
countries at various levels of develop- 
ment. Let me differentiate this eco- 
nomic geography. The countries which 
receive our development assistance 
through AID have less than 20% of the 
region's population. They produce only 
11% of its output. In South America, 
the four countries with which we have 
development assistance programs make 
up only 14%' of the population of the 
continent and produce barely 7% of 
continental gross national product. 

The point to underline here is that 
the largest countries with the largest 
populations and the largest economies 
— Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ven- 
ezuela, and to a lesser degree Chile and 
Colombia — look to the international fi- 
nancial institutions for development as- 
sistance and to the private sector for 
the bulk of their financing needs. It is 
only through the international financial 
institutions and our private sector that 
we help in their special development 
needs. There are still enormous unde- 
veloped areas in these countries with 
large numbers of very poor and even 
hungry people. But the immense 
financing needs of these countries must 
be satisfied in the private financial 
markets. A single syndicated loan in 
Colombia — for $600 million, or Brazil, 
for $1.5 billion — exceeds international 
financial institutions' lending in that 
country by many times and dwarfs our 
entire assistance program for the hemi- 
sphere. 



71 



Western Hemisphere 



These relatively more developed 
countries play an ever growing role in 
the affairs of the region and in world 
affairs. Moreover, the AID reflows — 
principal and interest — from these 
countries where we no longer have as- 
sistance programs will amount to $130 
million in FY 1981. This is more than 
enough to pay for the $111 million in 
grant assistance we intend to provide to 
their smaller neighbors. Furthermore, 
a large share of their imports come 
from the United States, and we are an 
immensely important market for them. 
They look to us to be responsive to 
their needs in keeping our markets ac- 
cessible to their goods and thus permit 
a reasonable rate of growth for their 
economies. For every dollar they earn 
in our market, they spend a dollar here. 
Thus, growing trade increases effi- 
ciency and well-being in both countries. 

Let me turn now to the areas and 
countries where we still do have 
programs. 



South America 

The economies of Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru — plus Paraguay and Colombia 
where our economic aid is small — are 
beginning to gain some economic 
strength which enables them to utilize 
to varying degrees the private financial 
markets. Their long-term outlook is 
generally positive; we expect their eco- 
nomic policies will enhance their de- 
velopment and strengthen their 
economies while addressing the very 
real problems they still face. The de- 
velopment assistance programs we 
have worked out with them are care- 
fully crafted to reach and benefit the 
poor and to assist in institution build- 
ing. The security assistance programs 
we are asking you to approve for these 
important South American countries 
are largely symbolic, but they will 
strengthen existing bonds of friendship. 
It would be seriously misleading to 
suggest that such small programs will 
enable us to exercise significant influ- 
ence on the direction or nature of Latin 
American military expenditures or mili- 
tary planning. 

Some disbursements continue from 
earlier programs in countries where we 
have withdrawn our development and 
military assistance, either by request 
or because of problems with the current 
governments. There are, for example, 
still $7.8 million in AID loans to be dis- 
bursed in Colombia and $4.5 million for 
Chile, although no new loans have been 
signed since 1976. But these older pro- 
grams are coming to an end; they do not 
reflect our current priorities. 

In sum, the focus of our commit- 

72 



ment in South America today is to 
reach the poor and build institutions 
through training, planning assistance, 
and expert advise and to remain in 
touch with their military establish- 
ments. These purposes are narrow and 
the size of our programs small com- 
pared to each country's output, as is 
appropriate under the changed circum- 
stances in South America. 

Central America and 
the Caribbean 

The situations we face today are radi- 
cally different. President Carter stated 
to the Congress last November in his 
request for a major supplemental ap- 
propriation that: 

Many of our neighbors in Central 
America and the Caribbean are in crises 
marked by economic problems, terrorism, 
and popular frustration. The resolution of 
these problems in ways that will preserve 
the independence and security of these 
countries, while expanding democracy and 
supporting human rights, is very much in 
the interest of the United States. 

The perception of deepening crisis and 
the assessment that we have a major 
interest in helping is, if anything, 
stronger today than it was 3 months 
ago. The Administration is giving ur- 
gent attention to Central America and 
the Caribbean and is seeking to use all 
the resources at our disposal to the 
maximum. But it is clear that the 
problems of the area are long term and 
that resources that might have been 
adequate in other circumstances are in- 
adequate today. 

In the Caribbean, the 12 small is- 
land states — of which nine have become 
independent since 1960 — face enormous 
problems with very limited resources. 
Their economies cannot provide 
adequate growth and improve the 
livelihoods of their people under the 
impact of oil price rises and other ex- 
ternal shocks. Our development assist- 
ance, while only 1% of their combined 
GNPs, can have a noticeable impact in a 
few important sectors. In addition, the 
rapid reduction in the British role in 
the Caribbean requires us to open the 
door to cooperative security relation- 
ships with them. Our security assist- 
ance proposals, principally for military 
training, are modest. But they can have 
a significant impact in providing secu- 
rity for development. To do otherwise 
is to leave the field to Cuba, which is 
aggressively expanding its influence 
with its smaller Caribbean neighbors. 

We place considerable emphasis on 
regional programs in the Caribbean be- 
cause we believe regional cooperation is 
the best and quickest way to deal with 



their problems. We are concerned th: 
in the absence of efficient regional in 
stitutions, the sense of futility of the 
poor and unemployed spawned by ec( 
nomic stagnation could turn into a 
breeding ground for radicalism. We 
must be prompt to respond to the nei 
to grow and develop into healthy, inc 
pendent, and pluralistic societies. 

In Central America, even more 
fundamental changes are taking plac« 
Economic distortions — the foremost ( 
which has been an exaggerated conce 
tration of wealth and political power 
too few hands — have bred inequities 
that have festered over a long period 
Adverse international economic condl 
tions now severely aggravate these e- 
demic tensions. We are concerned th 
without resolution of the severest of 
the economic problems, the processes 
change could in some cases produce 
traumas and slip into anarchy. 

The assistance we plan to repro- 
gram for Central America in 1980, th| 
funds we seek in the supplemental, a| 
the appropriations we seek for 1981 al 
in part a response to a lessening of rc 
pression. But increased assistance is 
needed to forestall the possibility th£ 
over the longer term events will lead 
governments unrepresentative of the 
broad majority of the population and 
controlled by well-trained and disci- 
plined groups unashamedly hostile to 
the United States. Whether in the er 
these groups are of the right or the le 
will matter little to the peoples whos 
aspirations they would frustrate. 

With regard to security assistam 
it is important that we act now to im 
prove the capability of moderate gov 
emments to defend themselves and 
sustain evolutionary and peaceful pro 
ress. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Ho 
duras will receive the largest increase 
in FMS [foreign military sales] credit 
and IMET [international military edu 
cation and training] — albeit not large 
absolute terms. 



HUMAN RIGHTS 

As you know, there are several impoi 
tant countries where we have reduce' 
or stopped completely our support be 
cause of their performance in human 
rights. But the tide has turned. 

Last year was one of substantial 
progress on both pergonal and politic! 
rights in Latin America. There was ai 
marked overall decline in cases of violl 
tions of the integrity of the person, 
even in countries where abuses have 
been most serious. Fewer disappear- 
ances occurred in Argentina. Cases o 



Western Hemisphere 



olonged arbitrary detention were 
wn in Chile. The Uruguayan armed 
-ces adopted apparently effective 
ernal measures to stop the use of 
rture. Cuba released about 3,900 
litical prisoners. 

The institutionalization of human 
'hts in the inter-American system 
ntinued apace with the establishment 
the Human Rights Court and a land- 
irk visit to Argentina by the Inter- 
nerican Commission on Human 
ghts. These improvements were 
iven by a series of changes within 
tin America itself although influ- 
ced by U.S. policies. 

The regionvdde trend from military 
civilian governments enhanced re- 
3ct for human rights. In 1979 
uador and Bolivia installed civilian 
vernments; Peru elected an assembly 
lich adopted a new Constitution; 
azil maintained a steady course of 
eralization; and the freely elected 
vernment in the Dominican Republic 
isolidated its position. 

Indigenous human rights organiza- 
ns grew in strength and boldness, 
illenging government policies in 
gentina, Chile, El Salvador, 
raguay, and Nicaragua. 

Acrimonious OAS debates on 
man rights gave way to general 
reement on principles and institu- 
ns. The ninth General Assembly of 
i OAS approved resolutions urging 
brms in Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
ile and emphasized the need to deal 
th the problem of disappearances, 
e Inter-American Human Rights 
urt came into being under the San 
5e Pact, and the Inter-American 
iman Rights Commission enhanced 
role. 



^VELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 

t me now address more specifically 
3 proposed development assistance 
Dgram for Latin America. The acting 
D Assistant Administrator will dis- 
5S the program with you in greater 
tail in a few days. 

The broad strategy is, of course, to 
dntain the momentum for continued 
>nomic development. We seek to 
dntain economic growth while 
reading the benefits of growth more 
uitably. U.S. bilateral economic and 
hnieal cooperation in Latin America 
not currently designed primarily as a 
source transfer program. Our pri- 
iry roles are to transfer ideas and 
hnieal knowledge to build indigenous 
pacity — primarily through creating 
d strengthening institutions and to 
al with newer global problems. 



In accordance with congressional 
directives, we concentrate our program 
on addressing the basic human needs of 
the poorest sectors in the recipient 
countries. Often this means rural health 
and agriculture programs. But we also 
face the growing global problems which 
increasingly impact on us all — 
environmental pollution, energy de- 
velopment and conservation, and 
population growth. These are a neces- 
sary complement to a basic human 
needs strategy. 

Turning to our specific requests, 
the total development and economic 
support assistance of $303 million re- 
quested for the region is modest. The 
poorest countries — Haiti, Honduras, 
Bolivia, Guyana, and El Salvador, with 
per capita incomes of less than $625 — 
would receive $80 million, including $32 
million of our grant assistance. Where 
we have programs in the so-called 
middle-income Latin countries, our 
focus is on the poorest people in these 
countries. As you are well aware, the 
poor bear the burden that lagging 
growth and economic stagnation pro- 
duce. Even in the best of times, the 
economies of these countries are not yet 
robust enough to employ fully their 
human resources. 

Assistance to Nicaragua will re- 
main large in FY 1981, but a significant 
shift is planned in the type of assist- 
ance. For FY 1980, in our supplemental 
request, we have asked for $75 million 
of quick disbursing economic support 
funds. Fast disbursing support funds 
are needed quickly to help overcome 
the crises resulting from exhausted 
foreign exchange resources, damaged 
or destroyed inventories, late or lost 
agricultural plantings, and lack of 
credit. Development assistance levels 
for FY 1980 are minimal; for until the 
immediate problems are resolved, few 
new development projects can be put in 
place. 

We are continuing with several de- 
velopment projects for which funds 
were committed in FY 1978 and earlier 
years. By FY 1981 we expect the worst 
of the economic crises will be over, and 
it will be time to begin new develop- 
ment assistance projects. Thus, 
Nicaragua again becomes a major re- 
cipient of AID development assistance 
in FY 1981. However, there will still be 
short-term problems in the balance of 
payments which will require help. Our 
economic support fund request for $25 
million is intended to address both the 
balance-of-payments problem and the 
needs of the private sector for credit. 
By FY 1982, we expect to be able to re- 



turn to a normal program of develop- 
ment assistance without economic sup- 
port funding. 

To complement official aid efforts 
and help meet the challenge we face in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, we 
are working with a number of voluntary 
organizations, such as the American In- 
stitute for Free Labor Development. 
This organization can respond quickly 
and flexibly to new situations. The 
labor movements it reinforces are gen- 
erally a key element of pluralistic de- 
mocracy and an important political as 
well as economic force. We want to help 
and encourage them to do more and 
have requested $8 million for FY 1981. 
Because of constraints and in- 
flexibilities inherent in any 
government-to-government program , 
there is much that private organiza- 
tions can do that the United States 
cannot. 

Respect for human rights is central 
to our policy in Latin America. Our 
proposed increased assistance levels in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are linked 
to their present progress on human 
rights. A modest increase in our level of 
assistance would acknowledge the dem- 
onstrated support and respect for 
human rights in these countries where 
we have made clear our strong support 
of the return to the democratic process. 
Moreover, the fledgling democratic 
governments need our support to help 
relieve the strong pressures for social 
development which the return to de- 
mocracy promises, but which the 
economies of these countries are unable 
to support adequately. 

We have tried to maintain the 
momentum of assistance to regional 
programs. We are convinced that re- 
gional and subregional cooperation and 
interdependence can be the key to ac- 
celerating development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Regional 
cooperation not only can achieve 
economies of scale but helps tear away 
the sometimes fierce suspicions and 
fear which isolation can cultivate. 

The Latins themselves are coming 
to realize the benefits that can accrue 
from working in tandem rather than 
competitively or defensively. We have 
urged the development of institutions 
which foster these linkages, and we are 
pleased to see the growing strength of 
the concept of regional cooperation on a 
wide variety of issues. 

We hope to have $34 million for the 
Caribbean regional program. Nowhere 
is the building of regional institutions 
and cooperation more important than in 
the ministates of the Caribbean. Our 
program for Central America at $3.7 



73 



Western Hemisphere 



million and the Andean region — only 
slightly less — are very modest indeed 
but, nevertheless, are important as an 
incentive to the development of re- 
gional projects. 

Let me conclude my comments on 
economic assistance by noting how im- 
portant it is for us to have a means to 
respond quickly to unexpected political 
changes, such as in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. The contingency economic 
support fund which the President has 
requested is just such an instrument 
which embodies primarily through its 
disbursement characteristics the fle.xi- 
bility we need to meet situations of 
rapid change. The size of the worldwide 
fund is small considering that it will 
probably have to be spread among sev- 
eral countries. But such funding can be 
made invaluable as visible demonstra- 
tion of our support in countries where 
the changing situation is such that 
quick and effective economic support 
from the United States is critical to 
achieving outcomes in our national 
interests. 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

Our request for FMS and IMET of 
$63.7 million is the largest we have 
sought for Latin America in 3 years. 
Although that represents a 65% in- 
crease over the amount originally re- 
quested for Latin America in the 1980 
budget, it is close to the average of the 
programs Congress approved for 1977 
and 1978. It is still substantially below 
the Latin American programs of earlier 
years. Moreover, since most of the pro- 
gram is for FMS credits, which require 
appropriations for only 10% of the total 
amount, the actual request for appro- 
priations is small — only $14.6 million. 

This increased request does not re- 
flect a general increase in assistance to 
the region. On the contrary, the pro- 
grams we are asking that you approve 
for important South American countries 
are shrinking to levels that are largely 
symbolic. In 1979, 1980, and 1981 we 
will offer FMS loans of between $3 and 
$6 million to Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru, and between $10 and $12 million 
to Colombia. Such loans to Peru, for 
example, represent less than one-half of 
1% of its total military budget. 

A squadron of 18 F-5E fighters— 
the aircraft we have made available to 
major Latin American countries in lieu 
of our more advanced planes — costs ap- 
proximately $75 million, exclusive of 
spare parts and training. A squadron of 
Mirages or Soviet SU-22s costs sub- 
stantially more, but credit from the 



74 



U.S.S.R. or France is often available 
with concessional interest rates and re- 
payment periods. 

Obviously, a U.S. loan of $4 mil- 
lion, offered not on concessional terms 
but at 11.4% interest, with 5-8 years to 
repay, neither provides major assist- 
ance to friendly governments nor offers 
any alternative to major purchases 
from suppliers who offer concessional 
credit. 

Our FMS sales, both cash and 
credit, to all Latin America have de- 
clined from a high of $212 million in 
1974 to $81 million in 1978 and $33.2 
million in 1979. FMS sales to South 
America, excluding the two countries 
where sales are prohibited by law, 
dropped from $120 million in 1974 to 
$30 million in 1979. That represents 
less than 3% of total South American 
arms purchases from outside the area. 

There are, of course, a number of 
reasons for this decline. In a few cases, 
we have denied the sale of major 
weapons systems in accordance with 
our policies on conventional arms re- 
straint. We have also deliberately cur- 
tailed our sales to some countries where 
major human rights violations have oc- 
curred. In particular, we have avoided 
a close military relationship with coun- 
tries where the military has over- 
thrown civilian regimes and is making 
little or no progress toward a return to 
democratic government. Pursuant to 
that policy, we terminated all military 
and most economic assistance to Bolivia 
last year when a military officer over- 
threw the elected President of that 
country. 

Fortunately, that intervention was 
quickly terminated by the people and 
the armed forces of Bolivia themselves, 
and we were able to resume assistance. 
Where military governments have 
made firm plans for elections and have 
prepared to return their countries to 
civilian control, where human rights 
situations have shown decided im- 
provement, we have sought to respond 
by modest increases in our security 
assistance. 

I began by noting that the Admin- 
istration is seeking increased security 
assistance in FY 1981 in Latin America. 
Given the essential stability of our 
South American programs, it will be 
evident to you that most of the increase 
is being sought for Central America and 
the Caribbean. In his message to the 
Congress last November on the sup- 
plemental request. President Carter 
said that we would be reprograming 
$5 to $10 million in FMS credits and 
IMET funds for the Caribbean and 
similar amounts for such programs in 
Central America. 



We are considering reallocating 
about $14 million in FMS credits and 
$500,000 in IMET to the Central 
American and Caribbean countries, 
within the worldwide levels which we 
hope will be approved by the confer 
ence committee on the FY 1980 apprc 
priation bill. As you know, those leve 
are austere. FMS credits for the rest i 
Latin America in 1980 are being cut 1: 
$9.5 million below the President's re- 
quest in order to fund, in part, the 
necessary increases in the Caribbean 
and Central America. IMET funds foi 
the rest of Latin America are being c 
by more than 20%. 

It is time now to establish 
these new programs in the regular ar 
nual budget process, responding to tl 
new and critical circumstances in our 
southern neighbors. Permit me to tou 
briefly on each of the countries when 
we are proposing new or substantial! 
increased security assistance in 1980 
and 1981. 

The Caribbean 

Our largest program in the Caribbea; 
has traditionally been in the Dominic 
Republic. In the past, however, it ha 
averaged only a half million dollars a 
year in FMS credits and a similar 
amount in IMET. Yet the Dominican |( 
Republic has the fifth largest popula- 
tion and the fifth largest military for 
among all Latin American FMS recip 
ients. Its population and armed force 
are almost the same size as those of |i( 
Bolivia, which is receiving $4 to $6 rr 
lion a year in FMS credits. Moreover, 
now has a lengthening record of free 
elections, civilian government, and r< 
spect for human rights. Its military 
equipment suffered extensive damagi 
from hurricanes last year. We are coi 
sidering $3.8 million in FMS credits i 
FY 1980 and are requesting $3 millio 
in 1981. 

We began a small IMET progran 
in Barbados in 1979, continued it in 

1980, and propose a modest $84,000 f 

1981. Training has so far been limitec 
to the members of Barbados' new coa 
guard, but the government is in- 
terested in expanding training to the 
Barbados regiment. In response to a 
request from Barbados, President Ca 
ter determined the country to be FM 
eligible last June, and we are preparii 
to offer a $1 million credit in FY 1980 
purchase a small patrol plane and oth 
equipment for the coast guard. 

We are requesting authority for 
$5 million FMS program in 1981 to fi- 
nance the purchase of communication 
and navigational equipment for the 



Department of State Bullei 



Western Hemisphere 



ist guard and perhaps transport and 
ler equipment for the Barbados 
^iment. These expenditures will 
engthen the security not of Barbados 
ne but of the entire eastern Carib- 
in area. 

We are initiating very small — 
000— IMET programs in FY 1980 
h three other eastern Caribbean 
tes — St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and 
minica — and we propose to continue 
se at appro.ximately the same level 
1981. All three countries have dis- 
sed cooperation with Barbados and 
h other in coastal and maritime pa- 
ls, and our training would be in this 
I. 

We also propose to offer IMET of 
to $25,000 each to Guyana and 
laica. Their defense relationship 
, until recently, been largely with 
United Kingdom. We believe it is 
lortant to open the door to a cooper- 
e relationship with the United 
tes in military training. We do not 
it the primary alternative to the 
ted Kingdom to be Cuba. 

itral America 

)art, the assistance we are repro- 
ming for Central America in 1980 
the appropriations we seek for 1981 
act improvements in the Central 
erican human rights situation. We 
Dended assistance to Nicaragua, in 
-S. The bitter and bloody civil war in 
; country has since ended; a gov- 
nent with evident wide popular 
port has been established; and the 
lan rights situation, although still 
ed, has improved greatly. 
A small amount of IMET funding, 
100, was used by the new govern- 
it in FY 1979, and small FMS cash 
chases have been made. We are con- 
ring $3 million in FMS credits and 
ut $250,000 in IMET for Nicaragua 
980. 

El Salvador. Assistance was ter- 
ated at the request of the military 
ernment in 1977 because of its con- 
1 over our human rights reports, 
overthrow of that government by a 
lian-military junta which was clearly 
■e representative, committed to 
locratic government, and deter- 
ed to improve respect for human 
its was followed by urgent requests 
nonlethal equipment for the armed 
es and training in its use. 
The junta has now been reconsti- 
\d with the participation of the 
istian Democrats. That government 
not yet completed its evaluation of 
security assistance requirements. In 
er to be in position to respond 



rapidly to possible requests, we have 
tentatively allocated $4.5 million in 
FMS credits and $350,000 in IMET for 
El Salvador in 1980. 

Honduras. Preparations continue 
for national elections in April, and 
there is every indication that there, as 
in Peru, the military junta will peace- 
fully turn over power to an elected 
civilian president. In response to the 
Honduran Government's growing con- 
cerns over its ability to defend its terri- 
tory against covert penetration and agi- 
tation, we are considering $3 million in 
FMS credits and about $350,000 in 
IMET in 1980. 

In FY 1981, we are seeking $5 mil- 
lion in credits, $500,000 in training for 
each of these three countries, and a 
similar amount to assist Panama in 
preparing itself to participate in the 
joint defense of the canal. The emphasis 
in all four countries will be on nonlethal 
equipment. Transportation and com- 
munications are the priority needs: 
jeeps, heavy-duty support vehicles, 
radios, helicopters, aircraft engines and 
spare parts, transport aircraft, and 
coastal patrol boats. 

International Military and 
Education Training Program 

In discussing individual countries, I 
have referred several times to the in- 
ternational military education and 
training program. In dollars it appears 
to be a small program. However, in my 
opinion, it is our most important secu- 
rity assistance program in Latin 
America. As our role as a supplier of 
military hardware has declined, the 
program has become our most signifi- 
cant channel of contact with the mili- 
tary in many countries. For many Latin 
American military, these courses pro- 
vide the only exposure they will ever 
receive to American strategic concepts 
and American values. It is our only in- 
strument to encourage the development 
of professional military officers, proud 
of their technical military skills and 
conscious of their nation's external se- 
curity requirements. Without strong 
professional training, too many become 
politically oriented officers, seeing their 
role as governing, instead of defending, 
their countries. 

It is sometimes implied that an end 
to U.S. training and contact with Latin 
American military officers would some- 
how reduce the number of military 
governments in Latin America. That 
proposition seems to me highly ques- 
tionable. Latin American officers are 
going to be trained, many of them in 
other countries, whether we offer 



training or not. Those officers trained 
by our military, in our schools, are 
given a strong professional orientation 
and are exposed to our concept of the 
proper role of the military. I hope that 
as you examine the budget requests, 
you will give particular consideration to 
the value of these inexpensive but valu- 
able training programs. 

There is one issue related to IMET 
that I would like to bring to the com- 
mittee's attention. We are, of course, 
always interested in encouraging aid 
recipients to move from grant aid to 
self-financed purchases of needed 
training. Several Latin American coun- 
tries are now reaching a stage where 
they can afford to purchase some or 
even all their military training. 

We would like them to continue to 
seek their external training require- 
ments from the United States, to main- 
tain the close relationship among the 
hemisphere's military forces which con- 
tributes to our mutual security. But the 
Latin American countries are well 
aware of the fact — and have repeatedly 
drawn our attention to it — that training 
in U.S. military schools purchased 
through FMS cash sales is extremely 
expensive. It is noticeably more expen- 
sive than the same training provided 
through the grant IMET program. 

For example, to put an army officer 
through the command and general staff 
course at the School of the Americas in 
Panama costs a country $3,318 when 
that sum is charged against his coun- 
try's IMET allocation. If Venezuela or 
any of the other eligible Latin Ameri- 
can countries should seek to pay cash 
for that same course, they would be 
charged $38,598 — 11 times as much. 
The jet engine mechanic's course at the 
Panama schools costs only $199 under 
the IMET program; if purchased under 
FMS, it would cost $2,940. 

Of course, one reason why the 
charge for IMET courses conducted in 
Panama is less than that for the same 
courses conducted in the United States 
or under FMS is that the fixed costs of 
the Panama schools are a separate line 
item, not charged to individual coun- 
tries. But the schools are not filled to 
capacity. With no addition to fixed 
costs, additional personnel could be 
trained under FMS cash if the charges 
were set at a more reasonable level. I 
invite your attention to this problem 
because it would be desirable to make 
U.S. military training more competitive 
and more attractive to countries that 
pay for it with their own funds. 

I might add that this comparison of 
costs which I have just made also illus- 
trates the immense importance and 



75 



TREATIES 



value of our U.S. military schools in 
Panama. We would have to appropriate 
substantially larger amounts of IMET if 
all of our Latin American training pro- 
grams had to be conducted in the 
United States. The Panama Canal 
treaties provide for the continued oper- 
ation of the School of the Americas until 
1984. We will need to plan carefully, 
and to consult closely with you, about 
their future after that time. 

In sum, the programs we are pro- 
posing in both economic and security 
assistance are modest. They are de- 
signed to respond with limited re- 
sources to the changing situation in 
Latin America. They will contribute 
significantly to improving the lot of the 
poor. They are useful instruments in 
support of U.S. policy objectives. In 
Central America our programs are of 
potentially great importance given the 
tremendous changes taking place there. 
I hope you will be able to support these 
lean program proposals fully. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the fur- 
therance of principles and objectives of the 
Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at 
London Oct. 7, 1977 at the 9th Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting.' 
Notification of approval: Japan, Jan. 28, 
1980. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations 

for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with 

regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 

Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 

8587. 

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, Nov. 13, 

1979. 

Accessions deposited: China, Jan. 7, 1980; 

Peru, Jan. 9, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; 

Thailand, Aug. 6, 1979; Uruguay, Aug. 15, 

1979. 

Consular 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into 
force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 

Ratification deposi ted: Norway, Feb. 13, 
1980^ 



76 



Optional protocol to the Vienna convention 
on consular relations concerning the com- 
pulsory settlement of disputes. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force 
Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 

Ratification deposited: Norway, Feb. 13, 
1980. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as re- 
vised, with two protocols annexed thereto. 
Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into 
force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Dec. 7, 
1979. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR car- 
nets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 
14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978. ^ 
Accession deposited: Romania, Feb. 14, 
1980. 

Defense 

Memorandum of understanding for the co- 
operative support of the 76/62 OTO Melara 
Compact Gun (OMCG), with annexes. Open 
for signature Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into 
force Oct. 24, 1978; for the U.S. July 17, 
1979. 

Signatures: Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Turkey, U.S. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done 
at Geneva Mav 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. 
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 12, 
1980. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International 

Fund for Agricultural Development. Done 

at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force 

for the U.S. Nov. 30, 1977. 

Accession deposited: Dominica, Jan. 29, 

1980. 

Fisheries 

Convention on future multilateral coopera- 
tion in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. 
Done at Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1979.* 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, Jan. 4, 1980. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international conven- 
tion on load lines, 1966, relating to amend- 
ments to the convention. Adopted at Lon- 
don Nov. 12, 1975.' 

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Jan. 10, 
1980. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental 

Maritime Consultative Organization. Done 

at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force 

Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 

Acceptance deposited : Dominica, Dec. 18, 

1979. 



Amendment of article VII of the conven- 
tion on facilitation of international 
maritime traffic, 1965. Done at London 
Nov. 19, 1973.' 

Acceptances deposited: Brazil, July 6, 
1978; Argentina, Jan. 29. 1980. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological 

Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 1 

1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 

TIAS 2052. 

Accession deposited : Dominica, Feb. 21, 

1980. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 

Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered ir 

force Aug. 16, 1976. * 

Accession deposited: Morocco, Feb. 11, 

1980. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclea 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into 
force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Ratification deposited: Barbados, Feb. 2 
1980. 

Succession deposited: St. Lucia, Dec. 28 
1979. 

Pollution 

Convention on long-range transboundarj 
air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 

1979. Enters into force on the 90th day 
after the date of deposit of the 24th inst 
ment of ratification, acceptance, approv: 
or succession. 

Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germs 
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Po- 
land, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia, Nov. 
13, 1979; Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet | 
Socialist Republic, Denmark, European 
Economic Community, Greece, Holy See 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Romania 
San Marino, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Nov. 14, 1979. 

Property — Industrial — Classification 

Nice agreement concerning the interna- 
tional classification of goods and service: 
for the purposes of the registration of 
marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done 
Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into forc< 
Feb. 6, 1979.2 
Ratification deposited: France, Jan. 18 

1980. ■• 

Refugees - 

Protocol relating to the status of refugei 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entere 
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Yemen (Sana), Jan 
18, 1980. 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the safety of life at 



Department of State Buile 



Treaties 



1974. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. » 
ification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, 1979. 



vention on international liability for 
age caused by space objects. Done at 
ihington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 
!. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for 
U.S. Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
issions deposited: Syria, Feb. 6, 1980; 
idad and Tobago, Feb. 8, 1980. 



rnational sugar agreement, 1977, with 
xes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En- 
d into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; 
litively Jan. 2, 1980. 
laimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980. 
fication deposited: Brazil, Feb. 5, 



icommunications 

rnational telecommunication conven- 
with annexes and protocols. Done at 
ga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. En- 
i into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. 
7, 1976. TIAS 8572. 
Fication deposited: Benin, Nov. 13, 

ial revision of the radio regulations 
eva, 1959), as revised, relating to the 
nautical mobile (R) service, with an- 
s and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 
, except for the frequency allotment 
for the aeronautical mobile (R) service 
h shall come into force on Feb. 1, 



•oval deposited: Hungary, Nov. 15, 



orism 

•national convention against the taking 
stages. Adopted at New York Dee. 19, 
1 

atures: Canada, Feb. 18, 1980; Liberia, 
30, 1980; Panama, Jan. 24, 1980. 

aage Measurement 

national convention on tonnage meas- 
iient of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done 
Ondon June 23, 1969.' 
iptance deposited: Korea, Jan. 18, 



ie 

Dcol for the accession of Colombia to 
Jeneral Agreement on Tariffs and 
e (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva Nov. 
979. Enters into force on the 30th day 
wing the day upon which it shall have 
signed by Colombia. 

DO 

ititution of the U.N. Industrial De- 
Dment Organization, with annexes. 
3ted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
atures: Afghanistan, Feb. 13, 1980; 
;ladesh, Jan. 2, 1980; Bolivia, Burundi, 
25, 1980; Gabon, Jan. 8, 1980; Hon- 
s, Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Jan. 30, 1980; 
iwi, Feb. 12, 1980; Syria, Feb. 1, 1980. 



Approval deposited : China, Feb. 14, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited : Philippines, Jan. 7, 
1980; Yugoslavia, Feb. 8, 1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further expanding 
the wheat trade convention (part of the in- 
ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. 
Entered into force June 23, 1979, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited : Austria, Feb. 27, 
1980. 



BILATERAL 

China 

Agreement on trade relations. Signed at 

Beijing July 7, 1979. 

Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1980. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 8944), with memoran- 
dum of understanding. Signed at Santo 
Domingo Jan. 3, 1980. Entered into force 
Jan. 3, 1980. 

Finland 

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 

11, 1976. 

Instruments of ratification exchanged: 

Feb. 11, 1980. 

Enters into force: May 11, 1980. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Administrative agreement relating to addi- 
tion of an educational program under para- 
graph 4, article 71, of the Supplementary 
Agreement of Aug. 3, 1959 (TIAS 5351). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn 
Nov. 23 and Dec. 28, 1979. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1980. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 8, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8936, 
9291, 9611), relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and tex- 
tile products. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Hong Kong Jan. 28 and Feb. 6, 
1980. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1980; ef- 
fective Jan. 1, 1980. 

Indonesia 

Arrangement relating to a visa system for 
exports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
apparel manufactured in Indonesia. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Jakarta 
Oct. 1 and 15, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 
15, 1979. 

Jamaica 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 
8, 1977 (TIAS 8824). Signed at Kingston 
Feb. 8, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 8, 
1980. 

Japan 

Treaty on extradition, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978. 



Instruments of ratification exchanged: 

Feb. 25, 1980. 

Entered into force: Mar. 26, 1980. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for 
sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 

1979. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul Jan. 25, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 

25, 1980. 

Mexico 

Treaty on extradition, with appendix. 
Signed at Mexico May 4, 1978. Entered into 
force Jan. 25, 1980. 
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980. 

Minute 260 of the International Boundary 
and Water Commission amending and ex- 
tending minute 240, as amended and ex- 
tended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to 
emergency deliveries of Colorado River 
waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El 
Paso Aug. 11, 1979. Enters into force upon 
approval of the two governments. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 26, 1979 (TIAS 9419) relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington Sept. 11 and Nov. 
20, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1979. 

Agreement on cooperation in cases of natu- 
ral disasters. Signed at Mexico Jan. 15, 

1980. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 
15, 1980; definitively, when each party 
shall inform the other by way of diplomatic 
note of the completion of the necessary 
legal requirements in its country for entry 
into force, and such notification is received 
by the second party. 

Agreement establishing a U.S. -Mexico 
committee for assistance in cases of disas- 
ter, as amended by exchange of notes at 
Mexico Mar. 28, 1972. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington May 3, 1968. 
TIAS 6481, 7308. 
Terminated: Jan. 15, 1980. 

Agreements amending the agreement of 
Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 
9436), concerning frequency modulation 
broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
Sept. 5, 1979, and Jan. 23, 1980. Entered 
into force Jan. 23, 1980. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement relating to privileges and im- 
munities for U.S. military personnel in 
Nicaragua for the purpose of furnishing as- 
sistance in connection with flooding. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Managua 
Dec. 17 and 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Dec. 18, 1979. 

Peru 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 

26, 1978 (TIAS 9604), with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Lima Feb. 14, 
1980. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1980. 



77 



CHRONOLOGY 



PRESS RELEASES 



Turkey 

Agreement concerning assistance to Tur- 
key in stabilizing its economy. Signed at 
Ankara Jan. 28, 1980. Entered into force 
Jan. 28, 1980. 



• Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 
' With declaration. 

* Applicable to the territory of the 
French Republic, including Overseas De- 
partments and Territories. ■ 



February 1980 



Events pertaining to Iran can be found 
on page 47. 

February 4 

French Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, is 
attacked by demonstrators. 

February 7 

U.S. further reduces its personnel at 
the Embassy in Libya and continues sus- 
pension of normal Embassy operations as a 
security precaution following mob attack on 
the French mission. 

February 9 

Ambassador McHenry begins 2-week 
visit to the Middle East and North Africa. 

February 12 

State Department announces that if Is- 
rael establishes a settlement in the city of 
Hebron, it could have a damaging effect on 
the peace process and cause serious conse- 
quences for the autonomy negotiations. 

February 13 

President Carter holds news confer- 
ence. During the conference he calls for a 
February 20 deadline for Soviets to with- 
draw troops from Afghanistan or the U.S. 
will not participate in the Summer Olym- 
pics. 

February 14 

U.N. Human Rights Commission 
adopts a resolution condemning Soviet in- 
tervention in Afghanistan. The resolution 
was approved by a vote of 27 to 8, with 6 
abstentions. 

U.S. Olympic Committee accepts 
President Carter's decision that a U.S. 
team not participate in the Moscow Olym- 
pics. 

February 15 

Spanish King Juan Carlos and Queen 
Sofia on a private visit to the U.S. make a 
courtesy call on President Carter. 

February 17 

Canada holds parliamentary elections. 

February 18 

Former Canadian Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau wins in Canada's elections. 



Israeli Embassy officially opens in 
Cairo. 

U.S. formally resumes membership in 
the International Labor Organization. 

February 19 

Secretary Vance departs for Bonn for 
meetings with Foreign Minister Genscher 
of West Germany and other European allies 
Feb. 19-22 on coordinating policies in re- 
sponse to the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan. 

Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi 
visits the U.S. Feb. 19-22. 

February 20 

State Department announces the fol- 
lowing countries supporting the Moscow 
Olympics boycott: Great Britain, Luxem- 
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Ber- 
muda, Chile, Haiti, Australia, Fiji, Japan, 
New Guinea, New Zealand, Malaysia, 
China, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Sudan, 
Zaire, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Canada, Paraguay, Papua New 
Guinea, and Israel. 

February 21 

Egypt officially opens embassy in Tel 
Aviv. 

February 22 

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk arrives in 
Washington for private talks with U.S. 
officials. 

February 26 

Israel and Egypt formally exchange 
ambassadors. 

Twenty-ninth ANZUS Council meeting 
is held in Washington Feb. 26-27. 

February 27 

Leftist guerrillas invade Dominican 
Republic Embassy in Bogota, Colombia 
seizing 45 diplomats, including U.S. Am- 
bassador Diego C. Asencio. 

Rhodesia begins second phase of par- 
liamentary elections. ■ 



Department of State 



February 4-29 

Press releases may be obtained from 
the Office of Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*26 2/4 U.S., Pakistan amend 

textile agreement, Nov. 
30, 1979 and Jan. 17, 
1980. 

*27 2/4 U.S., Mexico amend tex- 

tile agreement, Sept. 11 
and Nov. 20, 1979. 

*28 214 Secretary of State's Ad- 

visory Committee on 
Private International 
Law, Feb. 29. 



30 2/4 
*31 2/5 
32 2/5 



Fifth annual U.S.-Centi , 
American Conference ' 
Trade and Investment! '. 
New Orleans, Feb. 
27-29. 

Vance: statement befori 
the Senate Appropria 
tions Committee, Feb. 

Vance: statement on 
"Egypt Today" sym- 
posium. 

Vance: statement befori 
the House Foreign All 
fairs Committee. j 

U.S. Organization for ti 
International Telegra 
and Telephone Consul 
tative Committee 
(CCITT), study grouf 
A, Feb. 28. 

Vance: statement befori 
Senate Appropriation 
Committee, Feb. 7. 

Ronald I. Spiers is ap- 
pointed Director of 
Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (biog- 
raphic data). 

Vance: statement befon 
the International Olyi 
pic Committee, Lake I 
Placid, Feb. 9. 1 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee (SCO, Su 
committee on Safety ■ 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on fire 
protection, Feb. 25. 

sec, SOLAS, working 
group on standards ol 
training and watch- 
keeping, Feb. 27. I 

Itinerary of Kenyan B 
President Daniel T. ^ 
arap Moi's visit to the 
U.S. Feb. 19-22. 

Vance: statement follow 
ing meeting with Itali 
Foreign Minister Ruf 
fini, Rome, Feb. 20. 

Vance, Genscher: news 
conference, Bonn, Fel 
20. 

sec, SOLAS, working 
group on bulk chemi- 
cals, Mar. 13. 

U.S., Finland air trans- 
port agreement. 

U.S., Hong Kong ameni 
textile agreement, Jai 
28 and Feb. 6. 

Vance, Peacock, Talboy 
news conference fol- 
lowing ANZUS Counc 
meeting. 

U.S. -Canada consultatic •■ 
on U.S. fuel conversic 
proposals. 

Assistant Secretary Der 
ian to travel to South 
Asia and Hong Kong, 
Mar. 2-28. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tTo be printed in a later issue. 



♦34 2/7 
*35 2/8 



36 2/11 



*37 2/11 



*38 2/11 



*39 2/19 



*40 2/21 



•43 2/25 
•44 2/25 



t46 2/29 



78 



Department of State BulleM 



IDEX 



>RIL 1980 

IL. 80, NO. 2037 



^hanistan 

:hanistan: America's Course (Vance) 12 

distance for Afghan Refugees (White 

louse announcement) 62 

i;stion-and-Answer Session Following 
hicago Address (Vance) 15 

ations With Islamic Nations (Carter) 47 

ith Asia— Old Problems, New Chal- 

■nges (Coon) 61 

ica 

ica's Refugees (Loy) 22 

itical and Economic Interests in Africa 

?ennet, McHenry) 26 

7 Million Request for Economic and Se- 
irity Assistance for Africa (Butcher, 

loose) 17 

)-Saharan Africa and the United 

tates— Part 2 1 

.. Aid to Refugees in Somalia 19 

ns Control. Afghanistan: America's 

ourse (Vance) 12 

i. U.S. Military Presence in the Indian 

cean Area (Newsom) 60 

tralia 

, ZUS Council Meets (Killen, Peacock, 
alboys, Vance, joint communique) .. 53 

, tralian Prime Minister's Visits (Carter, 
raser. White House press secretary) 58 
igress 

. ica's Refugees (Loy) 22 

;3E and East-West Relations 
Jimetz) 44 

, in America— FY 1981 Foreign Assist- 
ice Program (Bushnell) 70 

I anon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 1981 Pro- 
•am (Draper) 51 

luritv Assistance for Greece, Turkey, 
elations With Cyprus (Holmes) 41 

'1 Million Request for Economic and Se- 
irity Assistance for Africa (Butcher, 
oose) 17 

'i Report on Cyprus (message to the 

ongress) 42 

th Asia— Old Problems, New Chal- 
nges (Coon) 61 

li. -Kiribati Sign Friendship Treaty 
nessage to the Senate) 59 

I . Military Presence in the Indian Ocean 
rea (Newsom) 60 

! irus 

liurity Assistance for Greece, Turkey, 
elations With Cyprus (Holmes) 41 

'i Report on (jyprus (message to the 
ongress) 42 

imomics. Political and Economic Inter- 
5ts in Africa (Bennet, McHenry) .... 26 

i^rgy 

I hanistan: America's Course (Vance) 12 

iv and Renewable Energy Sources — 1981 
onference (Montgomery) 70 

I'Stion-and-Answer Session Following 
hicago Address (Vance) 15 

i^'ope 

?CE and East-West Relations 
"^imetz) 44 

iropean Parliament President's Visit 
'A^hite House statement) 40 

!''retary Visits Europe (Genscher, 

_ ance) 39 

'i-eiRn Aid 

.'in America— FY 1981 Foreign Assist- 

nce Program (Bushnell) 70 

)anon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 1981 Pro- 
ram ( Draper) 51 

"7 Million Request for Economic and Se- 
aritv Assistance for Africa (Butcher, 
loose) 17 



U.S. Aid to Refugees in Somalia 19 

Greece. Security Assistance for Greece, 
Turkey, Relations With Cyprus 
(Holme's) 41 

Human Rights. CSCE and East-West Re- 
lations (Nimetz) 44 

Iran 

Iran Chronology, February 1980 47 

U.N. Commission of Inquiry Established 
(White House statement) 47 

Israel. Security Council Vote on Israeli 
Settlements (Carter, McHenry, Depart- 
ment statement, te.xt of resolution) .. 63 

Italy. Italian Prime Minister Visits U.S. 
(joint press statement) 45 

Jordan. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 
1981 Program (Draper) 51 

Kampuchea 

Contributions for Khmer Relief 33 

Kampuchean Relief Disrupted (White 
House statement) 38 

Refugee Coordinator Reports on Situation 
in Thailand (Palmieri) 31 

Thai-Kampuchea Border Situation (De- 
partment statement) 35 

Kiribati. U.S. -Kiribati Sign Friendship 
Treaty (message to the Senate) 59 

Labor 

Background on U.S. Reentry Into ILO 
(foreign relations outline) 65 

U.S. To Rejoin ILO (Carter) 65 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin 
America — FY 1981 Foreign Assistance 
Program (Bushnell) 70 

Lebanon. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 
1981 Program (Draper) 51 

Middle East 

Progress in the Middle East Peace Negoti- 
ations (Linowitz) 48 

Relations With Islamic Nations (Carter) 47 

Military Affairs. U.S. Military Presence in 
the Indian Ocean Area (Newsom) .... 60 

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meets 
(Killen, Peacock. Talboys, Vance, joint 
communique) 53 

Pakistan 

Assistance for Afghan Refugees (White 
House announcement) 62 

South Asia— Old Problems, New Chal- 
lenges (Coon) 61 

Presidential Documents 

Australian Prime Minister's Visits 58 

Relations With Islamic Nations 47 

17th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 42 

U.S. -Kiribati Sign Friendship Treaty 
(message to the Senate) 59 

U.S. To Rejoin ILO 65 

Publications 

Background Notes on African Countries 11 

GPO Sales 38 

Refugees 

Africa's Refugees (Loy) 22 

Assistance for Afghan Refugees (White 
House announcement) 62 

Contributions for Khmer Relief 33 

$5 Million Pledged for Rhodesian Refu- 

ci 
gees -^ 

Kampuchean Relief Disrupted (White 
House statement) 38 

Refugee Coordinator Reports on Situation 
in 'Thailand (Palmieri) 31 

U.S. Aid to Refugees in Somalia 19 

U.S. Contributions to the UNHCR 
(Coopersmith) 68 

Security Assistance 

Latin America— FY 1981 Foreign Assist- 
ance Program (Bushnell) 70 

Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria— FY 1981 Pro- 
gram ( Draper) 51 

Security Assistance for Greece, Turkey, 
Relations With Cyprus (Holmes) 41 



$787 Million Request for Economic and Se- 
curity Assistance for Africa (Butcher, 
Moose) 17 

South Asia — Old Problems, New Chal- 
lenges (Coon) 61 

South Africa. U.S. Policy on Apartheid 
(Dunfey) '. 66 

Southern Rhodesia 

$5 Million Pledged for Rhodesian Refu- 
gees 21 

Southern Rhodesia Holds Elections (Vance, 
Department statement) 30 

Spain. Spanish Prime Minister Meets With 
President Carter (White House state- 
ment) 43 

Syria. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria — FY 
1981 Program (Draper) 51 

Thailand 

Refugee Coordinator Reports on Situation 
in Thailand (Palmieri) 31 

Thai-Kampuchea Border Situation (De- 
partment statement) 35 

Treaties. Current Actions 76 

Turkey. Security Assistance for Greece, 
Turkey, Relations With Cyprus 
(Holme's) 41 

U.S.S.R. 

Afghanistan: America's Course (Vance). 12 

IOC Rejects U.S. Proposal on Summer 
Olympics (White House statement) . . 39 

Secretary Visits Europe (Genscher, 
Vance) 39 

U.S. Withdraws From Summer Olympics 
(White House statement) 46 

United Nations 

New and Renewable Energy Sources — 1981 
Conference (Montgomery) 70 

Secretariat Formed for Women's Confer- 
ence 69 

Security Council Vote on Israeli Settle- 
ments (Carter, McHenry, Department 
statement, te.xt of resolution) 63 

U.N. Commission of Inquiry Established 
(White House statement) 47 

U.S. Contributions to the UNHCR 
(Coopersmith) 68 

U.S. Policy on Apartheid (Dunfey) 66 

U.S. To R'ejoin ILO (Carter) 65 

Vietnam. Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Chicago Address (Vance) . . 15 

Yugoslavia. Ouestion-and-Answer Session 
Following Chicago Address (Vance) . . 15 



Name Index 

Bennet, Douglas J. , Jr 26 

Bushnell, John A 70 

Butcher, Goler T 17 

Carter, President ... 42, 47, 58, 59, 63, 65 

Coon. Jane 61 

Coopersmith, Esther 68 

Draper, Morris 51 

Dunfey, William 66 

Eraser, J. Malcolm 58 

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 39 

Holmes, H. Allen 41 

Killen, D.J 53 

Linowitz, Sol M 48 

Loy, Frank E 22 

McHenry, Donald F 26, 63 

Montgomery, Harry M., Jr 70 

Moose, Richard M 17 

Newsom, David D 60 

Nimetz, Matthew 44 

Palmieri, Victor 31 

Peacock, Andrew 53 

Talboys, Brian 53 

Vance, Secretary 12, 15, 30, 39, 53 



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Department 



V of State -m-^ J ^ 

buUetin 



eOfficial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 80 / Number 2038 



May 1980 



Iran / 1, 36 



Olympic Boycott / 14, 35 



Persian Gulf / 63 




■'^x^'M* "• 



Dppartnipnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2038 / May 1980 



Cover: 

Peace Palace at the Hague, Netherlands, 
headquarters of the 
International Court of Justice. 

(Photo courtesy of the United Nations) 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affedrs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Depftrtment of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



EDMUND S. MUSKIE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the pubUcation of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
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CONTENTS 



SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

Visit of Egyptian President Sadat (PrcsiiU'iit Carter, Presidviif Sadat. Wliitf 

House St'ateiiieiit) 
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Pre-iideiit Carter. Prime Miiii.ttei' Begii 

White House Statement) 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Marks First Anniversary (President Carter) 



ie President 

U.S. Actions Against Iran 
I (President Carter, E.reciitiue 

I Ordem, Memorandum for the 

Seovtar// of the Trea.iuri/. 
Message to the Confiress, State 
Department Preifs Release) 
U.S. Course in a Changing World 
News Conference of April 17 
News Conference on March 14 



ie Vice President 

U.S. Call for an Olympic Boycott 



le Secretary 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Our 
Broader Strategy 



terview 

Deputy Secretary Christopher 
Interviewed on "Issues and 
Answers" 



Europe 



Treaties 



frica 



Visit of Kenyan President Moi 

(White HoKse Statement) 
Publications 



ast Asia 

Human Rights Conditions in 
Non-Communist Asia (Pa- 
trieia M. Derian, Riehard C. 
Holbrooke) 



33 German Chancellor Visits U.S. 

(Joint Press Statement) 
35 Transactions Prohibited for 

Olympic Games (White House 

Statement) 
35 Publications 



Middle East 



3(i 



60 



62 



U.S. Presses Case in World 
Court on American Hostages 
in Iran (Roberts B. Owen) 

U.N. Inquiry Commission Sus- 
pends Activities (White Hous 
Statement) 

Iran Chronology, March 1980 

Middle East Peace Process: A 
Status Report (Seeretarj/ 
Vanee) 

Arms Sales to Egypt (Depart- 
ment Statement) 



Military Affairs 

63 Protecting U.S. Interests in the 
Persian Gulf Region (Harold 
Rr,nrn) 



Nuclear Policy 

67 Exports of Nuclear Fuels Ex- 
tended (Letter to the Congress) 



Cui'reiit Actions 



Chronology 



70 



March 1980 



Press Releases 

70 Department of State 

Publications 

71 "The Eagle and the Shield" 

71 International Law Digest, 1977 

72 1951 U.N., Western Hemisphere 

Foreign Relations Volume 
72 GPO Sales 



Index 










Seated from right to left: Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State; 
Stephen M. Schwebel. Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State: Thomas J. 
Dunnigan, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague; David Small, 
Assistant Legal Adviser and Ted L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser (both of the Department 
of State); and Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in The 

Hague. (InU-rnal].,iial Cc.urt of Justice photo) 

For text of Mr. Owen's oral argument see page 36. 



E PRESIDENT 



.S. Actions Against Iran 



FoUinriiiii (tir Pn si, lent tVfc/rr'x 
iiiiicciin lit. Executive orders, 
oivikIiiiii fill' till Secretary of tlic 
xiiri/. and II iiicsnage to the Coii- 
i of April 7. 19t<(K and a Depart - 
' (f State presft releaxe of April SJ 



SIDENTS ANNOUNCEMENT. 

IL 7, 1980 

since Iranian terroi'ists imprisoned 
rican Embassy personnel in Tehran 

in Novembei; these 50 men and 
en and their safety, their health, and 

future have been our central con- 

We've made every effort to obtain 

release on honorable, peaceful, and 
mitarian terms, but the Iranians 

I'efused to i-elease them or even to 
ove the inhumane conditions under 
h these Americans are being held 
•ve. 

^he events of the last few days have 
laled a new and significant dimension 
is matter. The militants controlling 
embassy have stated they are willing 
rn the hostages over to the Govern- 

of Iran, but the government has re- 
1 to take custody of the American 
ages. This lays bare the full responsi- 
■ of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
)lutionaiy Council for the continued 
U and outi-ageous holding of the in- 
nt hostages. The Iranian Govei'n- 
. can no longer escape full responsi- 
' by hiding behind the militants at 
'Embassy. It must be made clear that 
■ailure to release the hostages will in- 
; increasingly heavy costs to Iran 
CO its interests. 
I have today ordered the following 

First, the United States of America 
eaking diplomatic relations with the 
?rnment of Iran. The Secretaiy of 
s has informed the Government of 
that its Embassy and consulates in 
Jnited States are to be closed imme- 
'ly. All Iranian diplomatic and consu- 
fficials have been declared pemona 
grata and must leave this country 
lidnight tomorrow. 

Second, the Secretai-y of the Treas- 
will put into effect official .sanctions 
ibiting e.xports from the United 
es to Iran, in accordance with the 
tions approved by 10 members of the 
. Security Council on January loth. 



in the resolution which was vetoed by the 
Soviet Union. Although shipment of food 
and medicine were not included in the 
U.N. Security Council vote, it is e.\- 
pected that e.xports even of these items 
to Iran will be minimal or nonexistent. 

Third, the Secretaiy of Ti-easuiy will 
make a formal inventoiy of the assets of 
the Iranian Government, which were fro- 
zen by my previous order, and also will 
make a census or an inventoi-y of the out- 
standing claims of American citizens and 
corporations against the Government of 
Iran. This accounting of claims will aid in 
designing a program against Iran for the 
hostages, for the hostages' families, and 
other U.S. claimants. We are now prepar- 
ing legislation, which will be introduced 
in the Congress, to facilitate processing 
and paying of these claims. 

Fourth, the Secretary of State and 
the Attorney General will invalidate all 
visas issued to Iranian citizens for future 
enti-y into the United States, effective 
today. We will not reissue visas, nor will 
we issue new visas, except for compelling 
and proven humanitarian reasons or 
where the national interest of our own 
countiy requires. This directive will be 
interpreted very strictly. 

In ordei- to minimize injury to the 
hostages, the United States has acted at 
all times with exceptional patience and 
restraint in this crisis. We have sup- 
ported Secretary General Waldheim's ac- 
tivities under the U.N. Security Council 
mandate to work for a peaceful solution. 
We will continue to consult with our allies 
and other friendly governments on the 
steps we are now taking and on additional 
measures which may be required. 

I am committed to resolving this 
crisis. I am committed to the safe return 
of the American hostages and to the 
preservation of our national honor The 
hostages and their families, indeed, all of 
us in America, have lived with the reality 
and the anguish of their captivity for 5 
months. The steps I have ordered today 
are those that are necessaiy now. Other 
action may become necessaiy if these 
steps do not produce the prompt release 
of the hostages. 



EXECUTIVE ORDERS, 
APRIL 7, 1980 

Amendment of Delegation of Authority 
With Respect to Entry of Certain 
Aliens Into the United States 

By the authority ve.-ited in me as Pre.-^ident by 
the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, including Section 215 of the Immi- 
gration and Nationality Act, as amended 
(8 U.S.C. 1185), and Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, it is hereby ordered 
as follows: 

1-101. Aiiiendiueiit. 

Section 1-101 of E.xecutive Order i2172 of 
November 2(5, 1979, is amended by deleting 
"holding nonimmigrant visas,". 

1-102. Effective Date. 

This order is effective immediately. 

Jimmy Carter 

Prohibiting Certain TVansactions 
With Iran 

By the authority vested in me as President by 
the Constitution and statutes of the United 
States, including Section 203 of the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1702)! Section 301 of Title 3 of the 
United States Code, and Section 301 of the Na- 
tional Emergencies Act (.50 U.S.C. 1631), in 
order to take steps additional to those set 
forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of 
November 14, 1979, to deal with the threat to 
the national security, foreign policy and econ- 
omy of the United States referred to in that 
Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
461 (1979) adopted on December 31, 1979, it is 
hereby ordered as follows: 

1-101. The following are prohibited effec- 
tive immediately notwithstanding any con- 
tracts entered into or licenses granted before 
the date of this Order: 

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, of any items, commodities or 
products, except food, medicine and supplies 
intended strictly for medical purposes, and do- 
nations of clothing intended to be used to re- 
lieve human suffering, from the United States, 
01' from any foreign countiy, whether or not 
originating in the United States, either to or 
destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental en- 
tity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran 
or any other person or body for the purposes 
of any enterprise carried on in Iran. 

(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, rail- 
way or other land transport of United States 
registi'ation or owned by or under charter to 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States or the carriage (whether or not 
in bond) by land transport facilities across the 



1980 



The President 



United States of any of the items, commodities 
and products covered by paragraph (a) of this 
section which are consigned to or destined for 
Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any 
person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise 
carried on in Iran. 

(c) The shipment from the United States 
of any of the items, products and commodities 
covered by paragraph (a) of this section on 
vessels or airci'aft i-egistered in Iran. 

(d) The following acts, when committed 
by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States in connection with any transac- 
tion involving Iran, an Iranian governmental 
entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an 
Iranian governmental entity, or any person in 
Iran: 

(i) Making available any new credits or 
loans; 

(ii) Making available any new deposit 
facilities or allowing substantial increases in 
non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date 
of this Order; 

(ill) Allowing more favorable terms of 
payment than are customarily used in interna- 
tional commercial transactions; or 

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslike 
manner in exercising any rights when pay- 
ments due on existing credits or loans are not 
made in a timely manner. 

(e) The engaging by any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States in any 
sei'vice contract in support of an industrial 
project in Iran, except any such conti'act en- 
tered into prior to the date of this Order or 
concerned with medical care. 

(f) The engaging by any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States in any 
transaction which evades or avoids, or has the 
purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of 
the prohibitions set forth in this section. 

1-102. The prohibitions in section 1-101 
above shall not apply to transactions by any 
person subject to. the jurisdiction of the United 
States which is a non-banking association, cor- 
poration, or other organization organized and 
doing business under the laws of any foreign 
counti-y. 

l-10:i. The Secretan- of the Ti-easury is 
delegated, and authorized to exercise, all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et aeq. ) to cany out the pur- 
poses of this Order The Secretai-y may redele- 
gate any of these functions to other officers 
and agencies of the Federal government. 

1-104. The Secretary of the Ti-easury shall 
ensure that actions taken pursuant to this 
Order and Executive Order No. 12170 are ac- 
counted for as required by Section 401 of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641). 

1-105. This Order is effective immedi- 
ately. In accord with Section 401 of the Na- 
tional Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641) and 
Section 204 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall 
be immediately transmitted to the Congi'ess 
and published in the Federal Reyi.ster. 

Jimmy Caktkk 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
APRIL 7, 1980 

In connection with my decision today to close 
Ii'anian diplomatic facilities in the United 
States, I am directing that the Uniformed 
Division of the Secret Service provide any as- 
sistance necessary to the Secretaiy of State 
and the Attorney General in order to make my 
decision effective, including control of move- 
ment of persons and jiroperty into and out of 
Iranian diplomatic facilities in the District of 
Columbia. 

Jimmy (,'arter 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
APRIL 7, 1980 

Pui-suant to Section 204(b) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, .50 U.S.C. 
1703, I hereby repoi't to the Congress that I 
have today exercised the authority granted by 
this Act to take certain trade, financial and 
other mea.sures against Iran and its nationals. 

1. On November 14, 1979, I took the step 
of blocking certain property or interests in 
property of the Government of Iran, its in- 
strumentalities and controlled entities and the 
Central Bank of Iran. At that time the United 
States Embassy in Tehran was occupied and 
American pei'sonnel were being held hostage 
there in flagrant violation of international law. 
In addition, Iran had threatened suddenly to 
withdi'aw its assets from United States banks, 
to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, 
and to repudiate obligations owed to the 
United States and to United States nationals, 
li-an's actions attacked the foundations of the 
intei'national legal order as well as the stability 
of the world economy and the intei'national 
monetary system. 

2. The extraordinary threat to the na- 
tional security, foreign policy, and economy of 
the United States, which I determined existed 
on November 14, continues toda,y. The United 
States has used every diplomatic and legal 
means available to it to end this extraordinary 
threat, but without avail. Iran has ignored or 
rebuffed a decision by the International Court 
of Justice, resolutions by the Security Council 
<jf the United Nations and efforts by the Sec- 
retaiy General of the United Nations and 
others to resolve the underlying problems. 

'■',. In light of the above, it is necessary for 
me to order the following to be prohibited: 

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, of any items, commodities or 
products, except food, medicine and supplies 
intended strictly for medical purposes, and do- 
nations of clothing intended to be used to re- 
lieve human suffering, from the United States 
or from any foreign country, whether or not 
originating in the United States, either to or 
destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental en- 
tity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran, 



(jr any other person or body for the purpi 
of any entei'i)rise carried on in Iran. 

(bl The shipment by vessel, aircraft 
way or other land transport of United St 
registration or owned by or under charte 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of I 
United States or the carriage (whether o 
in bond) by land transport facilities acros 
United States of any of the items, commi 
and products covered by subparagi'a]jh (: 
this paragi'aph which are consigned to or 
fined for Iran, an Iranian governmental ( 
or any person or body in Iran, or to any ( 
prise carried on in Iran. 

(c) The shipment from the United S 
of any of the items, products and common 
covered by subjjaragraph (a) of this para 
on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran. 

(d) The following acts, when commi 
liy any person subject to the jurisdiction 
United States in connection with any tra 
tion involving Iran, an Iranian governmt 
entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran o 
Iranian governmental entity, or any pers 
Iran: 

(i) Making available any new cred 
loans; 

(ii) Making available any new dep 
facilities or allowing substantial increase 
non-dollar deposits which exist as of the 
of the Order; 

(ill) Allowing more favorable tern 
payment than are customarily used in in 
tional commercial transactions; or 

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslik 
manner in exercising any rights when p; 
ments due on existing credits or loans ai 
made in a timely manner 

(e) The engaging by any person sub 
the jurisdiction of the United States in a 
service contract in support of an industr 
project in Iran, except any such contract 
tered into prior to the date of the Order 
concerned with medical care. 

(f) The engaging by any pei-son sub 
the jurisdiction of the United States in a 
transaction which evades or avoids, or h 
purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, 
the prohibitions set forth above. 

Attached is a copy of this Executive Ore 
which I am transmitting pursuant to 50 
1641(b). 

4. The prohibitions in paragraph '■'> : 
shall not apply to transactions by any pe 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
which is a non-banking association, corp' 
tion, or other organization organized ant 
business under the laws of any foreign C' 

5. The above measures are being ta 
furtherance of the objectives of Resoluti 
adopted by the Security Council of the I 
Nations (jn December 31, 1979, and woul 
been s|)ecifically mandated by the Secur 
Council cm January 13, 1980, but for a ve 
the Soviet Union. 

6. This action is taken with respect 
Iran and its nationals for the reasons de; 
in this report. 

Jimmy (' 



The President 



'ARTIMKNT PRESS 
,EASK S. 
. S. 19S(t 

Revocation for Iranian Officials 

•tive immediately, all visas according 
matic or official status to Iranians in 
Jnited States, other than those on 
business, are revoked. 
The decision has been made pursuant 
e authority conferred on the Secre- 
of State by Section 221(i) of the Im- 
ation and Nationality Act. It applies 
inian officials and employees, includ- 
nose acci-edited to the United States, 
heii' immediate families, attendants, 
ervants. It does not apply to Ira- 
accredited to or employed by the 
ed Nations or other international oi- 
ations in the United States. 
This action is taken in connection 
the termination of relations between 
hiited States and Iran. The termina- 
)f I'elations is necessary because of 
jntinuing failure of the Govei-nment 
in to put an end to the unlawful de- 
)n of U.S. citizens in Tehi'an, Ii'an. 



U.S. Course in a Changing World 



Texts uf White House items frc 
e House press releases. ■ 



Aililrcsff and (.fccrptx from 
(liicsli(in-an(l-aiixii-cr acsxion hcfurc the 
American Societ// of Xewftpapcr 
Eilitors at the Waxhington Hilton Hotel 
in Wasliinr/ton. D.C. on April 111. 
l!)Sii. > 

As you may know, for the last 2 days I've 
been meeting with President Sadat of 
Egypt. I've been very eager to get him 
out of the country before he decides to 
enter the late Presidential primaries. 
[Laughter] I think I'd rather run against 
anyone in this countiy than he. Let me 
say at the beginning that our meetings 
these last 2 days have been very signifi- 
cant. President Sadat's historic visit to 
Jerusalem initiated the process of 
peacekeeping which finally culminated in 
the Camp David accords. And through 
his efforts and those of Prime Minister 
Begin, with whom I will meet next week, 
we have already achieved one resulting 
miracle: a Ti'eaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel. 

Its terms are being honored meticul- 
ously by both sides. Now we are engaged 
in negotiating to insure peace and secu- 
rity for Israel and its neighbors and for 
full autonomy for the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. We come to 
these current talks, in which we are al- 
ready participating, encouraged that the 
full agreements carried out at Camp 
David, with a solemn commitment from 
all three nations, will also be fully hon- 
ored, as has the treaty between Egypt 
and Israel. 

President Sadat and I talked of many 
issues. I was not surprised to find him 
sharing my own thoughts and my own 
concerns and my own ideas about the 
course of international events. I would 
like to discuss with you today some of the 
most urgent imperatives of American 
foreign policy with special emphasis in 
one particular area of the world. It's im- 
portant that we take a hard, clear look 
together not at some simple world, either 
of universal goodwill or of universal hos- 
tility, but the comple.x, changing, and 
sometimes dangerous world that really 
exists. 

It's not one world but many It's no 
longer a world that is structured and con- 
trolled by competition among colonial 
powers. It's a more complicated world, 
where national, rehgious, and ethnic as- 
sertions are fragmenting old boundaries 



and old alignments. It's a world of con- 
flicting ideologies, of unequal wealth, and 
of uneven resources. It's a world in which 
the capacity for destructive violence is at 
once alarmingly dispersed to every single 
small terrorist band and awesomely con- 
centrated in the nuclear arsenals of the 
superpowers. It's in just such a changing 
world — uncertain, suspicious, shifting, 
searching for balance — that we pursue 
peace and security, not only for ourselves 
in this great nation but for every human 
being on Earth. 

We have so much youthful vitality 
that we sometimes forget that we are a 
mature nation in the best sense. We've 
been a democratic republic now for two 
centuries, and we are the strongest na- 
tion on Earth. But we live among chal- 
lenges which are, every day, a test of our 
maturity and our will and the skill of the 
American people to deal with rapidly 
changing and unpredictable times. 

In many languages and out of many 
unfamiliar cultures other peoples con- 
stantly ask America for a response to 
myriad — and often conflicting — concerns. 
Nations ask us for leadership, but at the 
same time they demand their own inde- 
pendence of action. They ask us for aid, 
but they I'eject any interference. They 
ask for understanding, yet they often de- 
cline to understand us in return. Some 
ask for protection but are wary of the ob- 
ligations of alliance. Others ask for firm- 
ness and certainty, but at the same time 
they demand flexibility required by the 
pace of change and the subtlety of events. 
The world asks, with impatience, for all 
these things at once. They ask for them 
today, not tomori'ow. 

Iran 

Nowhere do we face the challenges I've 
just described more directly than we do 
in Iran. No single situation so aggi-avates 
the American people, so tests our matur- 
ity, so tries our patience, so challenges 
our unity, as does the continued captivity 
of American hostages in the Tehran Em- 
bassy. No other single event seems so 
clearly to mirror the disorder of our times. 
This disregard for diplomatic propri- 
ety and for international law is a special 
threat to the small nation, the weak na- 
tion, the nation without economic or mili- 
tary or political power or influence. And 



1980 



The President 



it also comprises a part of the competing 
pressures on a great and a powerful na- 
tion like ours. 

This crisis calls on us to act with 
courage, and also with wisdom, that will 
both produce results and preserve life. 
I'm deeply proud of the steady strength 
that has been demonstrated in America 
in dealing with the irresponsible Iranian 
authorities who've been unwilling to act 
or unable to cany out their frequent, sol- 
emn commitments. The leaders of the 
Iranian Government lack the cohesion 
and resolve to bring order to their own 
chaotic land or to decide on a basis for 
ending this illegal detention of hostages 
which has created international crisis. 

For long months, ours has been a 
restraint of strength, despite outrageous 
provocation. I do not regret that 
restraint, which was designed to protect 
American lives and to e.xplore with Ira- 
nian Government officials and with U.N. 
officials and with mediators working with 
us a way to resolve this crisis peacefully. 
But it has become necessary, because 
Iran would not act in accordance with in- 
ternational law and with their own inter- 
ests, for us to act again. The steps I've 
taken this week, to end diplomatic rela- 
tions and to impose sanctions, are firm 
and substantive, and we hope that they 
will be persuasive. 

America v.ill continue the careful and 
considered e.xercise of its power. We will 
pursue every and, I repeat, even' legal 
use of that power to bring our people 
home free and safe. But the hard, sad re- 
ality is that a small number of zealots en- 
gaged in a power struggle within Iran are 
using the innocent American hostages for 
their own advancement, with serious ad- 
verse consequences to all Iranian people. 

In the interests of the people of Iran 
and of their possible future as a unified 
and peaceful nation living in freedom, it is 
imperative that the Iranian Government 
resolve this crisis. Every day that the 
crisis continues, Iran is further isolated 
from the rest of the world. Every day 
that the American Embassy remains a 
prison pushes Iran further into lawless- 
ness, down and down the spiral of disor- 
der. 

With a return of rationality, interna- 
tional lawlessness need not be Iran's fate. 
Bankruptcy, political as well as moral, 
need not be Iran's future. 

If interference from outside is a 
threat, the threat does not come from the 
United States. 

The challenge in that area of the 
world — as in some others — comes from 



the intersection of two historic trends. 
One is the rising demand for development 
and for self-determination which is felt, 
and deeply felt, throughout what we call 
the Third World. The United States re- 
sponds with sympathy to that demand. 
The other trend is Soviet expansionism, 
which we are determined to oppose. 

In 1946, the United States stood firm 
against Soviet occupation of northern 
Iran, against Soviet-sponsored subver- 
sion in Greece, against Soviet demands 
on Turkey. Historically, American 
strength has been used to help the coun- 
tries of the Persian Gulf area to protect 
their stability and to retain their own 
sovereignty. 

The reality of the world today is that 
Moscow exploits unrest — not to address 
the discontent that underlies that unrest, 
not to overcome the inequalities that give 
rise to unrest, but to expand its own 
dominion and to satisfy its imperial objec- 
tives. 

Afghanistan 

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has re- 
vealed for the world the hypocrisy of its 
courtship of the Third World. It has 
shown that it will not be deterred by 
principle or decency or by international 
law or by world public opinion or by the 
opposition of freedom-loving and patriotic 
Afghanis. And it has made this known in 
a region which is at once politically vol- 
atile and economically crucial. 

The subjugation of Afghanistan rep- 
resents the first direct intrusion of Soviet 
Armed Forces beyond the borders of the 
Warsaw Pact nations since the Second 
World War. The explosiveness of this re- 
gion, its great natural wealth and the 
Soviet willingness to use the armed 
forces which have been developed during 
the Kremlin's enormous military buildup 
during the last 15 years ai'e what combine 
to make the invasion of Afghanistan so 
unsettling to the future of international 
peace. 

In southwest Asia, unstable and un- 
controllable forces are at work. The 
Soviets have, with their invasion, dis- 
turbed these forces of historic, religious, 
economic, and ethnic conflict that are be- 
yond the control of the Soviets and that 
could lead to much more serious direct 
confrontation with other nations which 
have vital interests in this region. 

Nor can the world turn away from 
the harsh truth that the occupation of Af- 
ghanistan is marked by appalling inhu- 
manity. We must not forget, and our allies 
and other nations must not forget, that 



today, at this moment, evei-y day, the 
Soviet Union is violating human stanc 
ards of decency and violating human 
rights ill the grossest kind of way. H 
dreds of Afghan freedom fighters 
dying every week, some in brutal ma: 
executions. Entire villages are being 
wiped out. More than 800,000 people 
have fled the country. Terror tactics, 
eluding the use of chemical weapons, 
the trademark of the ruthless attemp 
crush Muslim resistance and to instal 
Soviet form of peace — a peace of bi'ut 
armed suppression. 

Earlier this year, 103 other meml 
of the United Nations joined us in coi 
demning the Soviet invasion of Afgh; 
tan and demanding the immediate wi 
drawal of the invading forces. Soviet 
zens have never been informed of thi 
U.N. action. This unprecedented con 
demnation was significant but, becau 
the principle at stake, because of the 
tion's importance to Western security 
cau.se of the savagerj' of the Soviet a; 
sault which continues until now, and 
cause of the Soviet Union's use of its 
troops directly in such a conflict, it's 
perative that we continue to meet th 
challenge of the invasion with calm a 
unshakeable resolution. 

The measures that I've ordered 
designed to enhance peace. They inci 
the embargo on further gi'ain sales, 
tightened controls on high technolog 
trade, limitations of fishing in U.S. 
waters, strengthening of our naval p 
ence in the Indian Ocean, intensificat 
of our development of rapid deploym 
forces and our capacity to deploy the 
and to use them, and our offer to ass 
states in the region to maintain their 
security. These are necessaiy steps o 
course which we must and we will pe 
sist. 

We cannot know with certainty t 
motivations of the Soviet move into 
Afghanistan — whether Afghanistan i 
purpose or the prelude. Regardle;^ 
motives, there can be no doubt that t 
Soviet invasion poses an increased tl 
to the independence of nations in the 
gion and to the world's access to vita 
sources and to vital sea lanes. 

But our interest in peace and st; 
ity in the region goes far beyond eco- 
nomics. We cannot wish away the fac 
that conflict and tension in the regioi 
could endanger the broader peace. A 
the invasion of Afghanistan does indi 
foreshadow a pattern of Soviet beha 
then for the coming years, American 
must accept the truth that we are in 
challenging and very difficult times. 



Department of State Bu, 



The President 



ver more interdependent world, to 
ne that aggression need be met only 

it occui's at one's own doorstep is to 
t new adventures and to risk new 
•ery serious miscalculations. Oui' 
;e is clear. By responding firmly, we 
d to halt aggression where it takes 

and to deter it elsewhere. 
Let me underline for you this most 
point in our policy. America and 
ricans are not motivated by relent - 
lostility, by a desire for indiscrimi- 
confrontation or a I'eturn to the cold 
But for America simply to accept 
H occupation and domination of Af- 
istan as an accomplished fact would 
ynical signal to the world that could 
encourage further aggression, fur- 
tension, and further danger to world 

It's America's I'esponsibility to re- 
r and register in concrete terms our 
mnation of the Soviet invasion for 
ig as that invasion continues. 

Olympic Games 

extremely important that we not, in 
vay, condone Soviet aggression. We 
ecall the e.xperience of 1936, the 
of the Berlin Olympic Games. They 
used to inflate the prestige of an 
tious dictator. Adolf Hitler, to show 
lany's totalitarian strength to the 
n in the sports arena as it was being 
to cow the world on the banks of the 

B. 

The parallel with the site and timing 
e 1980 Olympics is striking. Let me 
'our attention to one compelling simi- 
y between the Nazi view of the 1936 
tpics as a propaganda victoiy and the 
al Soviet view of the 1980 Summer 
es. I'd like to read to you a passage 
this year's edition of the "Handbook 
'arty Militants" issued in Moscow foi- 
et Party activists, and I quote: 

The ideological struggle between East and 
i.s directly involved in the selection of the 
; whei-e the Olympic Games take place, 
tleci.^ion to award the honor of holding the 
lipic Games to the capital of the world's 
'Socialist state is convincing testimony ot 
eneral recognition of the historic im- 
ince and correctness of the foreign policy 
e of liin- country and of the enormous sei- 
of the Soviet I'liion in the stiaiggle for 

Let me I'epeat a pai't of that: 

The decision to award the honor of holding 
)lympic Games to the capital of the world's 
Socialist state is convincing testimony of 
?eneral recognition of the historic im- 
ance and correctness of the foreign policy 
■■^e of oui- countiT, and of the enormous 



services of the Soviet Uriioji m the struggle for 
(leace. 

A few weeks ago I met with Ameri- 
can athletes in the White House. I e.\- 
plained the Soviet stake in the Olympics, 
and the moral and political reasons why 
the United States will not send a team to 
the Moscow games. I understand the sac- 
rifice that has been asked from these men 
and women for the sake of the security of 
their countiy and their world. The Soviet 
leaders certainly understand it. But for 
our not sending a team to Moscow, this is 
far more than a symbolic gesture. It's a 
direct i-epudiation — in the phrase of their 
own pi-opaganda handbook — of the "cor- 
rectness" of their foreign policy. 

Under Olympic principles, and this is 
vei-y important, athletes represent their 
nations. Athletes who are not part of a 
national team cannot compete in the 
Olympics. The United States does not 
wish to be represented in a host country 
that is invading and subjugating another 



the restoration of a neutral, nonaligned 
Afghanistan, with a government that 
would be responsive to the needs and the 
wishes of the people of that countiy 

Although the Soviets have talked 
about the withdrawal of their troops, 
they have actually shown no interest in 
such proposals. There are no signs at this 
time of a Soviet withdrawal. As a matter 
of fact, within this last week, we have 
proof that the Soviets are moving addi- 
tional troop units across the border into 
Afghanistan. We must be prepared to 
hold our course and to impose the costs of 
aggression for as long as this is necessary. 

We thus face what could be a pro- 
ti-acted time of strain in East-West rela- 
tions. To enhance stability as much as 
possible in this predictable and difficult 
period, w-e will continue to maintain a 
stable militaiy balance, both through our 
own steady defense modernization, and 
through negotiated arms limits that are 
equitable and verifiable. This objective 
— a stable balance — is advanced bv the 



With (t return af rationalitij, international lawlessness need not be Iran's 
fate. Bankriiptcij. politicid as well as ))ioral, need not he Iran's future. 



nation in direct violation of human de- 
cency and international law. If legal ac- 
tions are necessaiy to enforce the deci- 
sion not to send a team to Moscow, then I 
will take those legal actions. 

All of these decisions do require sac- 
rifice, and I've acted to assure that the 
burdens of those sacrifices are shared as 
equally as possible among all Americans. 
The American people have demonstrated 
that they are willing to bear their share 
of the burden, but it is also vital that the 
burden of sacrifice be shared among our 
allies and among other nations. 

East-West Relations 

Neither we nor oui' allies want to destroy 
the framework of East-West relations 
that has yielded concrete benefits to so 
many people. But, ultimately, if we con- 
tinue to seek the benefit of detente while 
ignoring the necessity for deterrence, we 
would lose the advantages of both. 

It is essential that our intentions be 
absolutely clear. The measures we've 
taken against the Soviet Llnion since the 
invasion will remain in effect until there 
is total withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. Then, and only then, we 
would be prepared to join with Afghanis- 
tan and its neighbors in a guarantee of 
the true neutrality and noninterference in 
Afghanistan's internal affairs. We support 



SALT II Ti'eaty. In a period of height- 
ened tensions, it is all the more im- 
portant that we have reliable constraints 
on the competition in strategic nuclear 
weapons. SALT is an integral part of our 
national security policy. I remain commit- 
ted to the ratification of this treaty, and 
the United States intends to abide by its 
obligations under international law and to 
take no action inconsistent with its intent 
or purpose, so long as the Sovets act with 
similar restraint. 

The U.S. Approach 

The course we pursue, therefore, in this 
turbulent world is steady, firm, and fair. 

It's the course of a strong, stable na- 
tion practicing mature restraint but in- 
sisting on justice — the policy we pursue 
in Iran. 

It's the course of a resolute nation, 
hopeful of good relations but determined 
to deter aggression — the course we pur- 
sue in dealing with the Soviet Union. 

It's the course of'the peacemaker — 
the same role to which the United States 
is committed in the Middle East and, in- 
deed, throughout the world. 

It's the course of an understanding 
nation, sensitive to the tides of change 
and to the rights and the needs of all 
people — America's rightful approach, 
proper approach, to the revolutionary 



'. 1 980 



The President 



climate in which a new nirki is now com- 
ing to life. 

Our mission is to promote order, not 
to enforce our will; oui' mission is to pro- 
tect our citizens and our national honor, 
not to harm nor to dishonor others; to 
compel restraint, not to provoke confron- 
tation; to support the weak, not to domi- 
nate them; to assure that the foundations 
of our new world are laid upon a stable 
superpower balance, not built on sand. 

This is a worthy mission for a great 
nation, for a caring people, and for loyal 
friends. It is the historical mission of the 
United States of America, and the 
United States of America will fulfill this 
mission. 



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION 

Q. I have two questions on your 
speech. You referred to frequent solemn 
commitments made by the Iranian 
Government officials. What were these 
commitments and who made them? And 
on Soviet expansion, is there any con- 
nection, or have you found any connec- 
tion between the Iranian militants that 
are holding the hostages and the 
Soviets, and have you given any diplo- 
matic recognition to thi.s by way of 
communications with the Soviets? 

A. The commitments were made di- 
rectly to us and through intermediaries 
that several things would happen: First, 
that frequent and adequate vi.sits coukl 
be made to the American hostages to de- 
termine their physical and their psycho- 
logical well-being, to assure that they 
were getting adequate medical care, and 
were living under conditions that were 
humane. 

We also had firm commitments, in- 
cluding a report to us from the highest 
Iranian officials in the government, that 
through a unanimous vote within the 
Revoiutionai-y Council, as approved by 
the students and a|)proved by Khomeini, 
that the hostages would be transferred 
from conti-ol of the tei-rorist .students to 
the government itself. These kinds of 
commitments were made from time to 
time, and invai-iably before the commit- 
ments were cai-ried out, they were eithei' 
aborted or those responsible for carr\-ing 
them out, through timidity, failed to kee]) 
their commitments. 

I cannot say that we have jjroof that 
the terroi'ists who hold the hostages in 
the compound are controlled by the 
Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party in Iran is 
relatively small in numbei-. In ivcent 



months it has been highly supportive 
of Khomeini and the mullahs and those 
who are close to him, possibly as a politi- 
cal ploy to seek some better treatment 
from the Ayatollah Khomeini. 

The Soviets, in recent weeks, have 
had a very strong and constant radio 
propaganda effort going into Iran ex- 
pressing their approval of the actions 
taken by the militants in the comi^ound. 
We com])lained to the Soviet Unicjn 



Our course is clear. By respondhiq 
firuilt/. we intend to halt aggression 
ivhere it takes place and to deter it 
elsewhere. 



strongly and repeatedly and, for awhile, 
that propaganda effort was assuaged. In 
recent days, however, it has built u]) 
again. 

Q. Continuing on the issue of the hos- 
tages, you said in your speech just now 
that you will use every legal power that 
you have to free the hostages, and the 
other day in your formal statement, 
you said that other actions may be nec- 
essary if the hostages are not promptly 
freed. TSvo questions: What kind of 
legal power are you thinking about 
using and, two, what do you mean by 
"prompt"? What is the timetable, if you 
will, for the actions that you might 
take, particularly in the light of the 
very violent threats that are now being 
made by the militants? 

A. I think it would be ill-advised for 
me, as President, having the ultimate au- 
thority and responsibility for the nation's 
actions, to spell out in any sort of detail 
an e.xact time schedule or exactly what 
options are available to us. 

Under international law, however, 
since we are an aggrieved nation caused 
by not only the action of terrorists but 
also having the terrorist actions condoned 
by and even supported by the govern- 
ment, the breadth of the rights that we 
have to take action to redress this griev- 
ance is quite extensive. 

Q. On the subject of, for instance, 
allied support — we are getting reports 
thai you — conflicting reports as to 
whether or not they are going to sup- 
port us or not. What kind of specific 
commitments are you getting from 
them to either withdraw their envoys or 
to apply similar sanctions as you have 
applied? 

A. Through my own perscjnal mes- 



sages, either with cables or on the tel 
phone, I have relayed my urging to th 
allies to give us their full support. Th^ 
support has been, on occasion, effecti 
On other occasions, we have been dis; 
pointed. 

Recently, since the effort that ha: 
been made to have the hostages tl•an^ 
ferred or released has been ineffectivi 
we have increased our effort to get th 
allies to act on their own initiative to 
the release of the hostages. 

I talked to some of the Eurojiean 
leaders very recently. Yesterday and ' 
day, the foreign ministers of many na 
met in Lisbon. They have decided to 
to the Iranian officials to demand tha' 
hostages be released immediately anc 
insist upon a time schedule for the rel 
of the American hostages. Options th 
are available to them if such action is 
forthcoming would have to be choser 
those autonomous and independent n. 
tions and their leaders. 

We have suggested such things a 
the imposition of the sanctions as vot 
by the U.N. Security Council, blocke 
legally by the veto of the Soviet Unii 
and also the withdrawal of their diph 
matic personnel from Iran or possible 
breaking of relations with Iran. I can 
tell you what those allies and other 
fi-iends of ours might actually do, but 
are putting as much proper effort as | 
sible to induce the allies to act strong 
and in a concerted way, hopefully to 
break the present deadlock and to res 
the crisis. 



Q. I have a couple of political 
questions. Why did you let Secretar 
Vance take the fall for the U.N. rest 
tion vote on the Israeli settlements' 
Shouldn't you have fired him or taK 
responsibility yourself as Eisenhow 
did with the V2 and Kennedy did wi 
the Bay of Pigs? 

A. Cy and I considered that thei 
was enough blame or culpability to g( 
around, and we both took a maximun 
amount, politically speaking. And as 
said to news people, personally, I'm r 
sponsible for anything that goes on ir 
nation. It would obviously have been 
ter in retrospect for me to study very 
carefully the text of the U.N. resoluti 
for which I approved a positive vote. 

My understanding was that then 
were no inferences in the text at all t 
Jerusalem and that we would clearlj 
make sure that the world understood 



The President 



d not favor demanding publicly the 
mtling of the existing settlements. 

two items had been discussed be- 
1 me and Begin at Camp David, and 

undei'stood our jjosition. And I feel 
and felt then, that for us to be 
y on the record as favoring those 
arts of the resolution are in con- 
■tion to the fui'ther peace pi'ospects 
ve ai'e now pursuing. 
Uit it was a matter of Cy Vance 

responsible for what happened at 
tate Department. I'm responsible 
■en'thing that ha])pens in the go\- 
ent, including the error that was 

a. On another point, you've been 
ted of manipulating foreign affairs 
ijlitica! advantage. There was a 
e House celebration of the Camp 
1 accord 2 days before the \ew^ 
iprimary, when in fact the actual 
'ersary date was the day after the 
(York primary. There was a 7: IS 
press conference to announce the 
through on the hostages the day 

t Wisconsin primary, and the next 
at fell through. Your ix)llster, Pat 
"ell, said that the press conference 
big impact on the Wisconsin pri- 
Your press secretary, Jody Pow- 
aid it was not. Which one is right, 
vhat do you say to your critics 
tthis? 

i. I think Jody is right. And I think 
esults of the New York primary 
M that holding of a reception at the 

House on a Sunday afternoon to 
lemorate the anniversai-y of the 

Treaty did not materially affect the 
me of the voters' decisions in New 

[Anyone who said that I have con- 
i recent events in foreign policy to 
fe-election obviously doesn't under- 
the political process. If I could con- 
international events to help me in 
lection, I would have made several 
fences in what has actually occurred. 

fi. You spoke rather eloquently a 
lite ago about Soviet expansion. 
»rnor Reagan suggested earlier this 
i; and others have charged rather 
?fully that there would never have 
an Iran, never have been an Af- 
listan and the kind of Soviet expan- 
ism that we're talking about cur- 
ly, if world leaders had not really 
ijconfidence in American leadership 
^jAmerican resolution during your 
Ijiinistration. They cite, for example. 
Ition in Somalia, Ethiopia, Y'emen, 



and nip-flops on such things as the 
Soviet troops in Cuba and the I .N. vote 
on Palestine. What's your response to 
this kind of fundamental criticism'.' 

A. I think the people in the Ki'emlin 
would agree completely with what Mr. 
Reagan has said. That the invasion of Af- 
ghanistan was not the fault of, nor the re- 
si)onsibility of, President Brezhnev and 
the Politburo but was the responsibility 
of the President of the United States. 
That's obviously a ridiculous claim that 
could only damage our nation's prestige 
coming from a responsible person and 
help the Soviets in their claim that they 
had adequate provocation from this coun- 
tiy to take this unwarranted action. And 
I'm sure the same response would come 
from the terrorists who hold our hostages 
captive in the American Embassy in 
Tehran. I think they would agree with 
candidate Reagan that this was really not 
their responsibility or their fault, but the 
United States is somehow culpable foi' 
this abhorrent and inhumane action. 

So, I do not agree at all with the 
premise which predicated those 
statements, but I'm sure that our 
enemies or our abusers in the Kremlin or 
in the compound among the terrorists 
would agree completely. 

Q. I'm not exactly sure that their 
intention was to say that you are in col- 
laboration with the Kremlin here; I 
think the argument is — 

A. I don't maintain that they claim 
that I was in collaboration. But what I 
say is that that line of argument that an 
invasion of a sovereign country with 
100,000 troops or the taking over of a 
compound with innocent American hos- 
tages is somehow the fault of the United 
States or its Pi-esident is completely fall- 
acious and does not help our country and 
does not help us resolve those issues that 
are so important for us to resolve. 

Q. No, but the basic line of argu- 
ment is somewhat different. They're 
saying that if we have a long history of 
inaction, inability, to deal effectively 
with our commitments around the 
world, that that then leads and mis- 
leads other world leaders, particularly 
in the Soviet Union, to believe that they 
can take actions with impunity without 
expecting to get any kind of retaliation 
from the United States. I think that's 
the basic argument and it traces back 
to this charge that there is this sense 
among a lot of world leaders of a weak 
leadership in the White House, in the 
United States during this particular 
critical period around the world. Now 



that contributes to these miscalcula- 
tions by other national leaders. 

A. Your interpretation of what they 
might have meant when they said this or 
that is interesting to me hut I find it still 
lacking in conviction. 

The record is that our nation has al- 
ways stood firm and resolved against ag- 
gression. The Soviets have used their 
surrogates to go into nations with troops, 
ostensibly at the invitation of the host 
government. This occurred in Angola, as 
you well know, with Cuban troops, I 
think in 197.5-76. I has occurred before 
and since then, when the Soviets invaded 
Czechoslovakia, when they invaded Hun- 
gary, when they took over East Germany, 
took over Poland. I don't believe that 
anybody could say that was because the 
United States was weak or vacillating. 

We have made steady progress, in 
my judgment, in expanding the beneficial 
impact of our nation throughout the 
world. The Communi.st government phi- 
losophy, and what occurs within those na- 
tions, is not attractive enough to gain 
adherents without the use of violence or 
force. It's not an accident that East Ger- 
many has a wall built around it. It's not 
designed to keep people out of East Ger- 
many; it's designed to keep people in East 
Germany. And had the Soviets been sue- . 
cessful in selling to one of their neighbors 
in Afghanistan the attractiveness of a to- 
talitarian government under communism, 
similar to what exists in Moscow, then 
they would not have had to put 100,000 
troops into an innocent country to subju- 
gate those people and to force them to ac- 
cept a puppet government. 

This week we have seen in Cuba a 
bankrupt nation, kept alive economically, 
by the skin of their teeth, only with the 
infusion of $3 or $4 million a day from the 
Soviet Union. When they temporarily 
opened the gates to the Embassy of Peni, 
10,000 Cubans filled that Embassy to es- 
cape political persecution and economic 
deprivation in Cuba. So for anyone to 
claim that it's actions of the United 
States, or a failure of democracy or the 
failure of a President that has caused 
these kinds of forceful actions, in the ab- 
sence of convincing ideological truths that 
have changed the shape of the world, 
that's a completely fallacious example. 

Our resolve is steady. NATO is 
strong. We've got many new friendships. 
Our country is now building up for the 
first time our military forces, after a 
long, steady decline. We have very good 
interrelationships with our allies. Our ef- 
forts toward peace are very sound and 



1980 



The President 



progressive and successful. I have no 
apology ai all to make for our country, or 
for the administration which I head. 

Q. Somewhat along this same line: 
You spoke today of how we are respond- 
ing firmly— by responding firmly we in- 
tend to halt aggression where it takes 
place and to deter it elsewhere. I think 
one of the things that troubles a lot of 
people is that— speaking specifically now 
of our reaction to the Soviet incursion 
into Afghanistan, aside from our not 
going to the Olympics, which has a 
moral force, but which will not stop the 
games, and aside from our not selling 
grain to the Soviets, who do seem able 
to obtain it elsewhere — in dealing with 
a country which does not appear to be 
swayed by moral considerations in in- 
ternational affairs, what else can we do 
to halt aggression? Is there anything 
else that we can do, beyond the moral 
force of whatever policies we espouse? 

A. As President I have available to 
me the resources of the strongest nation 
on Earth, economically, politically, and 
militarily. The judgment that I have to 
make when we're faced with a challenge 
or with a responsibility is to decide which 
of those powers or forces that exist sub- 
stantially at my command to be e.xecuted. 
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, I 
decided to exercise the economic and 
political authority of this countiy and not 
to go to war and to exercise what military 
resources we have. 

Politically, we went to the United 
Nations, along with other countries, and 
in an absolutely unprecedented fashion, 
an ovei"whelniing portion of the nations of 
the world, including some nations that 
are subservient to the Soviet Union or 
dependent upon the Soviet Union, voted 
to condemn the Soviets and to call for the 
withdrawal of their troops from Afghanis- 
tan. Thirty-four Muslim nations, not all of 
whom are our friends at all, some very 
closely aligned with the Soviet Union, 
voted unanimously to condemn the 
Soviets and demanded that the Soviets 
withdraw. 

I made a speech to the joint session 
of the Congress, the State of the Union 
speech, and spelled out the commitments 
that we would make to maintain steadily, 
even if we have to stand alone, the eco- 
nomic contraints, our absence from par- 
ticipation in the Olympics, and so forth. 
We are inducing — I think we'll have sub- 
stantial success — other nations to join us 
in these restraints. We go further than 
other nations, but we ai-e the leader of 



the world. We're not as vulnerable as 
some others are to economic or political 
l)ressure put on them by the Soviet Un- 
ion because of proximity and because of 
our innate strength. So I think it's neces- 
saiy for us to go a little further than the 
other countries. 

I don't believe there's any doubt in 
my mind or in most people's minds that a 
very clear signal has been sent to the 
Soviet Union: Your action in Afghanistan 
is condemned: it will not be accepted; the 
status quo will not be revived that 
existed prior to Afghanistan; and further 
aggression by you will result in the possi- 
ble exercise of additional authority and 
power by the United States and other 
countries above and beyond economic and 
political actions. 



'Text from White House pres.s release. ■ 

News Conference 
of April 1 7 
(Excerpts) 

Since last November, 5.'-! Amei'ieans have 
been held captive in Tehran, contrary to 
eveiy principle of international law and 
human decency. The United States began 
to implement a series of nonviolent but 
punitive steps designed to bring about 
the I'elease of our hostages. 

In.Januaiy we received infoi-mation 
and signals from the Iranian authorities 
that they were prepared to enter into 
serious discussions to bring about the i'e- 
lease of the hostages. At that time the 
United States decided to defer additional 
sanctions, and then these discussions re- 
sulted in commitments from the top au- 
thorities in Iran including a transfer of 
the hostages to government control to be 
followed by their release. 

These commitments were not ful- 
filled. Earlier this month, April the 7th, I 
announced a series of economic and polit- 
ical actions designed to impose additional 
bui'dens on Iran because their govern- 
ment was now directly involved in con- 
tinuing this act of international ter- 
rorism. This process is moving forward. 
We've imposed economic sanctions, and 
we have broken diplomatic relations with 
Iran. Recently, a number of other nations 
have recalled their ambassadors, and 



these countries are now considering 
tions that they may be prepared t(i ii 
in the near future. 

Even while these deliberations c 
tinue, officials in Iran talk about not 
solving the hostage issue until July c 
even later. We are beyond the time f 
gestures. We want oui' people to b 
five. Accordingly, I am today ordei'ii 
additional set of actions. 

First, 1 am ])rohibiting all finan< 
transfers by persons subject to the j 
diction of the United States to any p 
or entity in Iran except those directl 
lated to the gathering of news and f; 
remittances. As of today, any such ti 
action will become a criminal act. 

Second, all imports from Iran ti 
United States will be barred. 

Third, 1 intend t(j exercise my s 
tory authority to ])rotect American c 
zens abroad by prohibiting travel to 
and by prohibiting any transactions 
tween Americans and foreign persoi 
lating to such travel or the presence 
Americans in Iran. 

Again, this authority will not n( 
used to interfere with the right of tl" 
press to gather news. However, it is 
responsibility and my obligation, gi\ 
the situation in Iran, to call on Amei 
journalists and news-gathering orga 
tions to minimize, as severely as ) 
their presence and their activities 

Fourth, I am ordering that all i 
lary equipment previously purchasei 
the Government of Iran, which I hai 
previously impounded, be made aval 
for use by the U.S. militai-y forces oi 
sale to other countries. 

And finally, I will ask Congres 
di.scretionaiy authority to pay repar; 
to the hostages and to their families 
of the more than .$S billion in fi-ozen 
nian assets in the United States. The 
assets will be available to satisfy ( 
and other commercial claims of Ame 
firms against Iranian Governmen; ei 
titles and to reimburse claims of the 
United States for the heavy military 
other costs we have incurred becaus 
Iran's illegal actions. 

If a constructive Iranian respon: 
not forthcoming .soon, the United St 
should and will proceed with other n 
ures. We will legally forbid shipment 
food and medicine, and the U.N. C'h: 
as you know, stipulates interruption 



Department of State Bt 



The President 



luiiiciitions as a legitimate sanction, 
dingly, I am prepared to initiate 
Itations with the member nations of 
']LSAT to bar Iran's use ofinterna- 
1 communications facilities. 
lie measures which I am announc- 
)day are .still nonbelligerent in na- 
They are a continuation of our ef- 
to resolve this crisis by peaceful 
s. The authorities in Iran should 
e, howevei-, that the availability of 
■ful measures, like the jwtience of 
nierican jieople, is i-unning out. I 
)nii)elled to repeat what I have said 
evious occasions: Other actions are 
ible to the I'nited States and may 
ne necessaiT if the Government of 
refuses to fulfill its solemn intema- 

responsibility. The American hos- 

must be freed. 



iJ. What have you accomplished 
these sanctions so far, and have 
let a deadline before summer for a 
ijelligerent stand? And also, did you 
any reason to believe that the al- 
ire going to back up our actions, or 
ney fair weather friends? 

\. From the veiy beginning of the 
in Iran brought about by the 
re of our hostages, I have had two 
in mind from which we have never 
ted: First of all, to protect the inter- 
)f our country and its principles and 
ards and secondly, and along with it 
equal basis, to protect the lives of 
ostages and to work as best I could 

• the most difficult possible circum- 
es to secure the release of our hos- 

safely and to freedom. 
•Ne have had three options available 
: economic, political, and military. So 
;e have only exercised the economic 
he |>olitical measures — in the (In- 
itional] Court of Justice, in the 
?d Nations, in our own economic ac- 

which are now inflicting punishment 
an's economy, and in the marshaling 
pport among other countries. 
I can't predict to you exactly what 

• nations will do. In recent days, I 
communicated with almost all of the 
r nations' leaders, asking them to 
peaceful action, economic and politi- 
join with us in convincing Iran that 
are becoming increasingly isolated 
the rest of the civilized world, and 
asingly vulnerable to dissension and 

I-nentation within, and to danger from 
out, particularly the Soviet Union to 
lorth of Iran. 
Recently, our allies and friends have 



withdrawn their ambassadors to decide 
what they should do in the future. I 
understand from some of the leaders that 
next week they will have another meet- 
ing to decide what further steps to take 
now that Bani-Sadr, the President of 
Ii'an, and others have refused to take ac- 
tion to release the hostages after our al- 
lies had demanded directly that Iran take 
this action. 

If this additional set of sanctions that 
I've described to you today and the con- 
certed action of our allies is not success- 
ful, then the only next step available, that 
I can see, would be some sort of militan' 
action which is the prerogative and the 
right of the United States under these 
circumstances. 

Q. Why didn't you embargo food 
right now as some of us had been led to 
believe you had already decided to do? 

A. We have considered extending 
the embargo to food and drugs, which is 
obviously an item that w^e could include. 
We, first of all, are complying with the 
U.N. Security Council definition of sanc- 
tions and we ai'e encouraging now our al- 
lies to take similar action. 

Secondly, because of decisions made 
by us, the attitude of the American 
people, the attitude of shippers of food 
and drugs, this trade is practically 
nonexistent. As I pointed out to you to- 
day, unless there is immediate action on 
the part of Iran, these items and the in- 
terruption of communications are still 
available to us for a decision by me. 



Q. There's been some ambiguity, 
perhaps partly deliberate, about the 
circumstances and timing of military 
measures, if they are to be taken, 
against Iran. One element of that am- 
biguity was a remark you made in an 
inter>iew with the European television 
last week that suggested that if our al- 
lies support us sufficiently in taking 
sanctions, then it might be less neces- 
sary for you to take unilateral military 
measures. 

My question is, to w hat extent does 
the timing of military measures depend 
on what our allies do and to what ex- 
tent does it depend simply on the 
Iranian response? 

A. It depends on three factors. One 
is the effectiveness of the accumulation of 
economic and political sanctions that we 
have taken against Iran. Secondly, it de- 
pends upon the effectiveness of the sanc- 
tions to be imposed upon Iran by other 
nations in the world, including some of 



our key allies. And thirdly and most im- 
portantl.y, of course, it depends upon the 
response of Iran to these actions and the 
condemnation of the rest of the world. 

I do not feel it appropriate for me to 
set a specific time schedule for the im- 
position of further actions which may in- 
clude militai-y action, but it's an option 
available to me. 

I think our key allied leaders under- 
stand the timeframe under which we are 
acting and making our plans and, then- de- 
cisions next week, I think, will be col- 
ored, perhaps, by the messages that I 
have exchanged with them, both by cable 
and by direct telephone conversations, 
which continue. 

Q. There have been reports that 
you have designated Hamilton Jordan 
as your special envoy on Iran to negoti- 
ate on the hostages and that generally, 
he has become one of your top foreign 
policy advisers. Could you explain to us 
some of these new functions of his and 
his qualifications for them and also 
confirm a report that on one or more of 
his secret missions he wore a wig and 
other disguises? 

A. I've never known about any dis- 
guises or wigs. Hamilton is not one of my 
major foreign policy advisers. He does 
not claim to be an expert on foreign pol- 
icy. Hamilton is very valuable to me in 
the proper interrelation of foreign policy 
decisions with domestic decisions. He 
does attend most of our high-level dis- 
cussions on both domestic matters and 
foreign policy matters. 

Almost eveiy member of the White 
House staff who is involved directly or 
indirectly in international affairs and also 
those in the State Department and per- 
haps even those in the Justice Depart- 
ment have been involved at various times 
in the attempt that we have made to con- 
vince the Iranian Government and their 
officials to release the hostages. This does 
include Hamilton, but he's not designated 
exclusively at all to play this role. 

Q. You mentioned that there's a 
statement from Iranian officials that 
they may not consider the hostage 
question until July. Without talking 
about a deadline, is that acceptable? 
Could it go on that long? 

A. I would think that would be an 
excessive time for us to wait. 

Q. Despite the compelling objec- 
tive of obtaining the release of the hos- 
tages, what is the possibility that a fu- 
ture military action by the United 



The President 



states, even including a blockade, 
might be too high a price to pay in 
terms of the damage to the allied oil 
supplies, and the further risk of war? 

A. That's a balance that I will have 
to assess and on which make the ultimate 
decision. I have not discussed specific 
military steps with our allies that I might 
take. I think they are familiar through 
news reports and through just common- 
sense analysis of those available to us 
that the interruption of commerce with 
Iran is a kind of step that would be avail- 
able. We announced in November, I think 
November the 20th, that this was one of 
those steps that we would reserve for 
ourselves to take in the future. I think we 
used the phrase, "interruption of com- 
merce with Iran." It would be severe in 
its consequences for Iran and much less 
severe for any particular customer of 
Iran. 

Because of sanctions against Iran 
and because of the fragmented nature of 
their own economic system and because 
of their inability to buy adequate spare 
parts and continue their exploratoi-y op- 
erations of the production of oil, their 
shipments of oil in the international mar- 
kets have dropped precipitously. So a 
total interruption of Iranian oil shipments 
to other countries would not be a devas- 
tating blow to those countries. It would 
certainly be an inconvenience; it would 
certainly be serious. And we have been 
tning to avoid that kind of action, and we 
are still attempting to avoid that kind of 
action. But I cannot preclude that option 
for the future if it becomes necessary. 

Q. Some of your critics, especially 
those who work for Senator Kennedy, 
have suggested that your announce- 
ments and actions on Iran — many of 
them seem timed to influence the presi- 
dential primaries. They cite the an- 
nouncement the morning of the Wis- 
consin primary and, I'm sure, will point 
out that today's announcements and 
this press conference come just a few 
days before the Pennsylvania primary. 
What's your response to that? 

A. I would like for you to look at the 
calendar since the first of January and 
find a time that wasn't immediately be- 
fore or immediately after a primai-y. As 
you know, we have 35 primaries this year 
in a period of about 5 months, which is an 
average of 7 primaries per month. And I 
have never designed the announcement of 
an action to try to color or modify the ac- 
tions of voters in a primary. These occur- 
rences are too serious for our nation. And 



the particular instance to which you refer 
in Wisconsin was a time when we had ne- 
gotiated for many weeks in anticipation of 
such an announcement that the hostages 
would be transfen-ed to control of the 
government and subsequently released. 
That decision came through official 
action by the Iranian Government, the 
Revolutionai-y Council. President Bani- 
Sadr made the announcement himself 
early in the morning our time, about 
noontime Iranian time. It was a com- 
pletely appi'opriate time for it to be an- 
nounced. But I do not make, and have not 
made, and will not make decisions nor 
announcements concerning the lives and 
safety of our hostages simply to derive 
some political benefit from them. 

Q. It seems a lot of people we've 
seen don't find your effectiveness too 
great these days. We find this in the 
polls and elsewhere, and at least it's not 
as high as they'd like, as good as they'd 
like. My question is this: Is the job 
today of being President too big, too 
complex for a President, any President? 
Are there too many factors outside of 
your control to be effective? 

A. The job is a big one; there's no 
doubt about that. Under any normal cir- 
cumstances, being President is not an 
easy task. The greatness and strength of 
our country, the support of the American 
people, the derivation through demo- 
cratic processes of authority and respon- 
sibility, and the ability to act is a reassur- 
ing thing to me and all my predecessors 
who've served in this office and lived in 
this house. 

This year, almost in a unique way, 
we've had additional responsibilities. I 
think it's been 25 or 30 years, for in- 
stance, since an incumbent Democratic 
president had to run a political campaign 
while he was still in office. I don't deplore 
that. The right of my opponents to run is 
theirs. But that's an additional complicat- 
ing factor. It was obviously an additional 
burden for our entire nation, not just for 
me, to have American hostages captured 
in Iran and to have the Soviet Union in- 
vade Afghanistan, which was a departure 
from 25 years of policy on their part not 
to u.se their own military forces to cross 
the borders into a previously undomi- 
nated country. 

The combination of these three fac- 
tors, in addition to very high interest 
rates and inflation rates, brought about 
primarily by worldwide escalation in oil 



prices, has made this an extremely di 
cult job even compared to normal tim 
don't deplore it. I'm not ti-ying to avo 
the responsibilities, and I believe tha 
action of the American people so far t 
ing the electoral process has not been 
complete endorsement of what I havt 
done or of what I have accomplished. 
I think the results so far compared to 
what was anticipated 6 months ago ir 
spite of these unpredictable kinds of 
crises that have afflicted our nation h 
been veiy gratifying to me and an im 
tion that the American people are fai 
well satisfied. We've got problems, yi 
But I am not despairing, and I am nc 
fearful; I don't think the American p( 
should be either. 

Q. Do the sanctions that you ; 
nounced today bar the families of h 
tages and other humanitarian-mina 
Americans from traveling, assumii 
course, that the terrorists will allov 
them into the Embassy? 

A. Yes, it would unless they had 
ceived a specific pei-mit either from t 
State Department oi' the Attorney 
General. 

Q. You have just recently enco« 
aged foreign auto makers to invest 
plants in this country presumably 1< 
hold more jobs here. But in recent 
the auto workers are complaining 
they've lost a significant number o: 
jobs. And they are suggesting putti 
restrictions on foreign imports, at 1 
as a short-term remedy, and they're 
planning to be here and lobby for tl 
wonder how you feel about restrict: 
on imports? 

A. I'd like to respond to your qu 
tion without it being characterized as 
criticism of anyone. I remember the I 
few months that I was President sitti 
in the Cabinet room, over just adjace 
the Oval Office, talking to the leader; 
the American automobile maiiufaclurt 
manufacturing fu-ms — all of the lead 
there, all the firms represented, en- 
couraging them to comply with the in 
jiending legislation in the Congress ti 
quire the production of small and effii 
automobiles for the American market 

Their unanimous reply was that 
was an inai)[iroi.iriate thing for them ' 
do, that the market was not there foi 
small and efficient automobiles. Sul)- 
sequent events, which could not be c( 
pletely predictable, have shown that 
American people are now demanding 



10 



Department of State Bur 



The President 



•I- 111 conserve energy, the small and 
: automobiles, precisely the kind 
1:1 1 we were encouraging them to 
> t-ai's ago or more. 
! his moment eveiy single small, 
automobile that can be produced 
I lean manufacturers has a ready 
Uecause they are now in a tran- 
1 iod from the large gas-guzzling 
'lies to the manufacture of the 
id efficient cars, there is a vei7 
I ime for employment and Ameri- 
I .(luction because the market's not 
■e lor the big, heavy, inefficient auto- 
)iles. 

So to replace the number of cars that 
ericans could be producing that are 
ill and efficient that are not being pro- 
ed, foreign imports are coming in at a 
/ high level. There are several things 
, we could do — prevent those foreign 
; from coming in, deprive the Ameri- 
consumer from buying them, which 
lid drive up the price of domestically 
luced small cars enormously or would 
lit in Americans having to buy the 
e and inefficient gas guzzlers which 
I do not want. 

I think that would be ill-advised, so 
are ti-ying to cari-y over, as best we 
(luring this transition phase, minimal 
lage to the American automobile 
ker, as I described in my statement, 
juraging the American manufacturers 
hift toward the small and efficient 
as rapidly as possible, and as an ad- 
mal thing, encouraging Volkswagen 
other foreign manufacturers to come 
the United States to employ Ameri- 
automobile workers — highly trained 
) produce the foreign-designed cars 
ing that period. 
Later, I have no doubt that the 
erican manufacturers who are highly 
petent and who make superb vehicles 
rapidly shift to the small and efficient 
;. When they do, I think the foreign 
iorts, even those manufactured here, 
have a much more competitive 
•ket. 

But I cannot freeze now imports of 
small foreign cars that American con- 
lers want just to protect an industry 
: is now transferring its attention to 
small cars to be manufactured here. 

Q. 1 would like to get back to the 
IJect of Iran if we might. There have 
in published reports that the Soviet 
ion has already taken some steps to 
mter the effects of a boycott or a 
ckade, should you decide to take 
\\n it route as the days go on, the reports 
it truckloads of various food supplies 



y IS 



and other commodities are already 
coming across the Soviet border into 
Iran. Do you have any independent 
confirmation of this; and don't you 
think if it is true this would undermine 
any future type of a naval blockade? 

A. The fact is that I guess histori- 
cally there has been a fairly substantial 
level of trade between the Soviet Union 
and Iran. Before the recent revolution 
there were plans afoot for substantial in- 
creased shipments of natural gas from 
Iran into the Soviet Union in exchange 
for the barter of goods and perhaps hard 
cash. 

The rail lines and the road system 
which interconnects Iran and the Soviet 
Union are quite limited in their capacity. 
They may be used now at capacity. I don't 
i-eally know the specifics about that. But 
I think that the quantity of goods that 
would be interrupted by a possible block- 
ade, which I'm not predicting now specif- 
ically will take place, could not possibly 
be filled or replaced by the limited trans- 
portation routes by land, either from 
Turkey or Iraq or the Soviet Union, cer- 
tainly not from Afghanistan at this time. 

Q. I was wondering, is it your be- 
lief the American people will continue 
indefinitely to provide the main defense 
of Western Europe when there's a story 
in the papers this morning that showed 
pluralities in both West German and 
Britain now oppose backing the United 
States in a future dispute with the 
Soviet Union? 

A. The United States has never 
provided the majority of or the over- 
whelming portion of troops or fighting 
equijjment in Europe for the defense of 
Western F^urope against the Warsaw 
Pact. The number of troous that America 
has in all in the Eurojjean theater is 
about 300,000. We and our NATO allies 
combined have, I think, more than 2 mil- 
lion. I don't remember the e.xact figure. 
We have always provided the stra- 
tegic nuclear umbrella for the protection 
of Europe, and we've had direct control, 
as you know, over most of the tactical nu- 
clear weapons. I saw results of a poll 
today from Germany that showed that 
over" ^iO';;- of the people in West Germany 
Federal Republic of Germany favor a 
boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the 
Federal Republic of Germany 

I think the NATO alliance is as 
strong now as it has been in any time in 
my memory, since the war Under very 
difficult economic circumstances, the 
major nations in the alliance have com- 
mitted themselves to a real growth in de- 



fense expenditures. Under heavy 
pressure, propaganda efforts by the War- 
saw Pact nations, the allies voted last 
December to go ahead with a moderniza- 
tion of theater nuclear forces — a very 
difficult decision. And my own personal 
relationship with the leaders in those 
countries, both the heads of state and 
military and diplomatic, show a veiy 
strong commitment to the alliance and a 
very strong support for us. 

I have sometimes been disappointed 
at the rapidity of action and the sub- 
stance of the action taken by some of our 
allies in the Iranian and the Afghanistan 
question. But we look at things from a 
different perspective. We are much more 
invulnerable than they are to any sort of 
conventional attack. Germany, for in- 
stance, is a divided counti-y — 17 million 
Germans live under Communist rule in 
East Germany, and Berlin is especially 
exposed. 

Most European countries have a 
much higher dependence on foreign trade 
than do we. But I think within the 
bounds of the limitations and difference of 
perspective, although I have sometimes 
been disappointed, I think they have per- 
formed adequately And I believe re- 
cently, the last few days and I believe 
next week, we will see a strong rush of 
support to join us in the boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics, which will be a heavy 
propaganda and psychological blow to the 
Soviet Union in condemnation of their in- 
vasion, and I believe their support for us 
in Iran will prove that the premise of 
your question that we don't have their 
support and cooperation is inaccurate. 



Q. In the last 10 days you've talked 
with the leaders of Israel and Egypt at 
length about their negotiations on 
Palestinian autonomy. And you've said, 
today in fact, that the problems look 
less formidable now. Can you tell us 
where the give is and where you see the 
hope that these two parties might reach 
agreement by May '26th or any other 
time in the near future? 

A. I am not able and have never 
been able to speak for Egypt or to speak 
for Israel. The negotiation is basically be- 
tween those two countries. We have faced 
much more formidable obstacles in the 
past than we presently face, both prior to 
the Camp David accords and also prior 



11 



The President 



to the Mideast peace treaty conclusion. 
Now we are cariying out the Camp 
David agreement. When I discuss these 
matters with President Sadat or Prime 
Minister Begin, they have never deviated 
one iota from the e.xact language and the 
exact provisions of the Camp David ac- 
cords. It's looked on almost as a sacred 
document. 

There are differences of interpreta- 
tion about what is actually meant by "a 
refugee" or what is actually meant by 
"fuUautonomy" and so forth. But we're 
now in the process of negotiating how- 
much authority and power and influence 
and responsibility to give to the self- 
governing authority, how exactly it will 
be composed — those are the two basic 
questions— and how that self-governing 
authority is to be chosen. And once that's 
decided, Israel is completely ready to 
withdraw their military government, the 
civilian administration, to withdraw their 
own forces and to redeploy them in 
specified security locations and to let 
those new duties and responsibilities be 
assumed by the Palestinian Arabs who 
live in the West Bank/Gaza. That will be 
a major step for^ward, and if we can ac- 
complish that then the details of exactly 
how to administer water rights and 
exactly how to administer land and how 
to administer other specific elements of 
security like controlling terrorism, which 
are now the difficult issues being negoti- 
ated, I think will be resolved without 
delav. 



Text from White House press release. 



News Conference 
of March 14 
(Excerpts) 



Q. Is Israel keeping faith with the 
Camp David accords and the au- 
tonomy talks when, by government 
policy, it continues to confiscate the 
land of Palestinians".' 

A. There is nothing specifically in 
the Camp David accords concerning the 
settlements themselves. There is an 
agreement in the treaty between Israel 
and Egypt about settlements that have 
been established in the Sinai region, 
which is Egyptian territory. I might 
say concerning that, that our policy is 
set by me, as President. There has been 
no change in our policy. That policy is 
guided by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 
338, the basis of all of our negotiations; 
by every word in the Camp David ac- 
cords, signed by me on behalf of our na- 
tion; and by Begin and Sadat on behalf 
of Israel and Egypt. We intend to carry 
out that agreement. 

Right now we are indulged in some 
very difficult but very important dis- 
cussions and negotiations to establish 
full autonomy on the West Bank, Gaza 
area. I believe that these discussions 
can be successful. It's crucial to our 
own nation's security that they be suc- 
cessful, that we have peace in the Mid- 
dle East; and it's, I think, crucial to the 
whole region that these discussions be 
successful. 

I might add one other point. It's 
not easy. We've had tedious negotia- 
tions at Camp David. We had tedious 
negotiations almost exactly a year ago, 
when we finally concluded and signed 
the Mideast peace treaty. Our princi- 
ples are well known by Prime Minister 
Begin and by President Sadat, and I 
stay constantly in touch with them and 
our negotiators to make sure that we 
are successful. 

I believe that we will have peace in 
the Middle East, with a secure Israel 
behind recognized borders, with the 
Palestinian question being resolved in 
all its aspects, and with peace between 
Israel and its neighbors. 

Q. You say the policy is set by 
you. 

A. Yes. 

Q. And this is a question about 
the recent mixup on the U.N. resolu- 
tion. My question really goes to proc- 



ess. The resolution was not the res 
olution that you wanted. .Are you t, 
only one who can determine that it 
not the resolution you want'.' Does . 
your staff not know when it's not i. 
resolution that you want, or is it pi 
sible that some of your foreign pel f 
advisers are trying to make policy t[ 
you'.' 

A. I don't think anybo(l\' in my 
Administration doubts that I'm the > 
who .sets the policy. The U.N. resoli 
tion, as it was passed, was not in ac 
cordance with the policy that I have 
tablished. It was not in accordance u 
the agreements that I had made wit 
Prime Minister Begin, well understi 
by President Sadat. 

We had agreed among us that w 
did nut approve, as an A.merican Go 
ernment, of the settlements on the 
West Bank and Gaza area — that the 
were an obstacle to peace. But we a 
had agreed that during the time oft 
negotiations, we would not call for t 
dismantling of existing settlements. 
That was to be resolved as an issue 
the ongoing negotiations. 

Also, President Sadat, Prime 
Minister Begin, and I agreed on a ps- 
graph in the Camp David accords c( 
cerning Jerusalem. It called for — an^ 
we still believe that there should 
be — an undivided Jerusalem but th; 
those who look upon those places in 
Jerusalem as holy places should hav 
unimpeded access to them for worsl 

This resolution in the United N 
tions violated those two very import 
and basic principles. Those issues h 
not yet been resolved. There is notl 
in this resolution at the United Nat 
that established the permanent stat 
of the West Bank and Gaza area. Tl 
will be established after a 5-yeai- in 
val period, during which full autono 
is enjoyed by the residents of the ai 
So, the resolution was in violation o! 
policy. 

i might say that I have absolut 
confidence in Secretary Vance. I ha 
seen him days and days and weeks 
negotiating to achieve the security 
Israel and the peace of Israel. It wa; 
honest breakdown in communicatioi 
between me and the United Nation; 
I'm responsible for anything that g( 
wrong in this government, and I'm 
also responsible, on occasion, for thi 
that go right. Secretary Vance is rt 
sponsible for the State Department 
But to say exactly how the commun 



12 



Department of State Buf 



The President 



(ike down is very difficull to do. 
I made it known as c|iiickly as I 
■I'd it that this resolution ilid 
I he jioliey and disavowed our 



(J. (liven the fact this is an elec- 
year, do \<>u still intend to push 
id with Senate ratification of 
,1 '.' If so. when will you ask the 
itc to ratify SALT? The second 
-tiori deals with the Trident suh- 
ine. When that hegins sea trials in 
, I think under the SALT I 
enuiit you will need to hetfin de- 
missioning Polaris suhmarines to 
«ilhin the limits of the SALT I 
■ement. Will you besin decommis- 
ins Polaris submarines when Tri- 
hesins its sea trials, or will you 
for technical violation of the 
r I agreement? 

A. The agreement which we pres- 
, liiive with the Soviet Union, 
h 1 intend to honor as long as they 
ndcale, is to comply with all the 
- nl' the interim SALT agreement, 
h i~ known as SALT L 
SALT II has been signed by me 
I'l-rsident Brezhnev. I consider it 
!iL' on our two countries. It has not 
" (11 ratified. We will observe very 
■]■;. lo make sure that the Soviets 
>\\ with this agreement. I will not 
lir Senate to ratify SALT II until I 
■ liance to consult very closely 
congressional leadership on 
lite side, particularly Majority 
h t P>yrd and others who work with 
iMith Democrats and Republicans. 
I H cause of the Soviet invasion of 
; Kitiistan, it is obvious that we 
,1(1 not be successful in ratifying the 
,T II Treaty at this time. It is still 
he calendar. It will not be brought 
ntil after that consultation takes 
e. I will also continue to consult 
congressional leadership as far as 
pliance with SALT II is concerned. 
But my present intention, within 
bounds of reciprocal action on the 
et Union and consultations with the 
Ate and, to some degree, the House 
ership, I intend to comply with the 
■isions of SALT II. 

Q. I'm a bit confused by that last 
Wer. You both said that you re- 
ied the treaty that you signed as 
ling on this country and that you 
lid consult on compliance with it. 
less the question then comes down 
whether or not the United States, 
bsence of ratification, would ob- 



serve the provisions of S.\LT II and 
the notion that it's in its own best 
interests and, I suppose, inviting 
Soviet ccmiparable action. Is that 
what you're saying to us'.' 

A. Ordinarily, when a treaty is 
signed between the heads of two na- 
tions, the presumption is that the 
treaty will be honored on both sides ab- 
sent some further development. One 
further development that would cause 
me to i-enounce the treaty would be 
after consulting with the Members of 
the Senate to determine an interest of 
our nation that might cause such a re- 
jection; in which case I would notify the 
Soviet Union that the terms of the 
treaty were no longer binding. 

So, there will be two provisos in 
the continued honoring of the SALT II 
Treaty. One is that the Soviets recipro- 
cate completely, as verified by us, and, 
secondly, that the consultations that I 
will continue with the Senate lead- 
ership confirm me in my commitment 
that it's in the best interests of our 
country to do so. 

Q. Can you give us some new 
word on the hostage situation in Iran'.' 
Is the .Administration content to just 
wait until the parliament is elected, 
or do you have any plan to re.solve 
this'.' Do you plan to bring any more 
pressures on Iran'.' 

A. We are not content for the inno- 
cent American hostages to be held by 
terrorists for one single day. This is an 
abhorrent act in direct violation not 
only of international law but the very 
Islamic principles which these militants 
profess to espouse and to support. We 
have done everything we possibly could 
in the last 4 months to honor the princi- 
ples of our nation, to protect the inter- 
ests of our nation, to try to preserve in 
every way the health and the lives of 
those hostages, and to work for their 
freedom. 

I don't know when they'll be re- 
leased. We have constant negotiations 
and attempts to provide continuing 
communication with the leaders of Iran. 
I believe that when there's a stable 
government in Iran, which may possi- 
bly occur after the elections— the vote, 
as you know, began today. But our past 
few days have been characterized by 
bitter disappointments, because, in ef- 
fect, commitments that had been made 
by the newly elected President and ad- 
ministration of Iran were not honored, 
because prior to these parliamentary 



elections, they obviously do not have 
the authority to speak and carry out 
their own commitment. Whether they'll 
have that authority after the elections 
are completed I don't know. I certainly 
hope so. 

Q. Why did we let in over 9,000 
Iranians to come here and be citizens 
of this country after they took our 
hostages'.' Was that an accident or 
what happened'.' 

A. No, it's not an accident. There's 
a difference between a great and a free 
and compassionate democratic nation on 
the one hand, and other countries from 
which refugees flee, looking for free- 
dom, looking for the right to worship as 
they please, trying to escape possible 
persecution. We have screened the im- 
migrants very closely, and in every in- 
stance, they have been determined to 
have a real, genuine, legal interest, and 
reason for coming to our country. 

It would not be advisable for us, it 
would not be humane for us, it would 
not even be decent for us, in my opin- 
ion, when we have an intense confron- 
tation — an extremely emotional con- 
frontation—with a revolutionary 
country like Iran to refuse to accept 
refugees who are trying to escape cir- 
cumstances there and coming to our na- 
tion for a haven. This was a decision 
made by me, it's in accordance with the 
American law, and I believe it's in the 
best interests of our own country to do 



Text from Weeklv Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Mar. 17, 1980. ■ 



^''/1980 



13 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



U.S. Call for an Olympic Boycott 



Address before the U.S. Oh/mpic 
Coiiiii/iffec House of Delegnfen in Ciil- 
orailo Spriii(/s, Colorado, on April IJ, 
198i). > 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to 
you on behalf of the honorary President 
of the U.S. Olympic Committee — the 
President of the United States. And I am 
delighted to be in the lovely community 
of Colorado Springs, the home of the 
U.S. Olympic Committee. 

I speak to you as leaders dedicated 
to amateU)- sjjort and as citizens 
dedicated to America's best interests. I 
know that everyone in this room loves 
our country. And I want to e.xpress the 
nation's gratitude for your efforts at Lake 
Placid to persuade the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) to move or 
postpone the Moscow games. I thank 
your leaders as well for stating that the 
committee would be guided by the 
President's decision on the best interests 
of the nation. 

As we meet today, the lesson of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still waits 
to be drawn. History holds its breath; for 
what is at stake is no less than the future 
security of the civilized world. If one 
nation can be subjugated by Soviet 
aggression, is any sovereign nation truly 
safe from that fate? If 100,000 Russian " 
troops, and the barbaric use of lethal gas, 
and the specter of nightly assassinations 
— if these fail to alarm us, what will? If 
the Soviet lunge toward the most 
strategic oil-rich spot on Earth fails to 
unite us, what will? And if we and our 
allies and friends fail to use every single 
peaceful means available to preserve the 
peace, what hope is there that peace will 
long be preserved? 

While history holds its breath, 
America has moved decisively. To show 
the Soviet Union that it cannot invade 
another nation and still conduct business 
as usual with the United States, our 
country has embargoed 17 million tons of 
grain, tightened controls on high 
technology trade, limited Soviet fishing 
in our waters, raised our defense budget 
to upgrade all aspects of our forces, 
strengthened our naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, intensified development of 
our rapid deployment forces, and offered 
to help other -sovereign states in the 
region to maintain their security. 



On April 12, 1980, by a vote of 1,604 to 
797, the U.S. Olympic Committee agreed 
not to send a U.S. team to the 1980 
01.\-m))ic Games in Moscow. 

In the U.N. General Assembly, the 
United States joined more than 100 other 
nations in an unprecedented majority 
calling for the immediate, unconditional, 
and total withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan. But the President, the 
Congress, and the American people 
understand that a world which travels to 
the Moscow games devalues its condem- 
nation and offers its complicity to Soviet 
propaganda. 

I am convinced that the American 
people do not want their athletes cast as 
pawns in that tawdry propaganda 
charade. And I urge you to respect that 
undeniable consensus. Your decision 
today is not a question of denying our 
Olympic team the honor they deserve; for 
the American people, as you know, deep- 
ly respect the sacrifice we are asking 
our athletes to make. It is no longer a 
question of whether participation in the 



the President and Congress have made 
clear that the Olympic boycott is a 
genuine element of America's response 
the invasion of Afghanistan. It is an un- 
ambiguous statement of our national re- f 
solve. It is a keystone in our call to our 
allies for solidarity. 

We must not — anri cannot — break (? 
that link between America's power to I' 
check aggression and America's call for f- 
an Olympic boycott. Your vote is a test ¥'• 
our will, our confidence, our values, ami' 
our power to keep the peace through If; 
peaceful means. It is not a partisan f 
issue — for both political parties resourif 
ingly supported the President's action i 
Congress. It is not a parochial issue; foi 
the American people overwhelmingly I- 
agree that we must not go to Moscow, fr 

And it is not just a national issue— '■ 
for citizens and governments throughoi »' 
the world share our judgment. From hi ft" 
exile in Gorky, Andrei Sakharov — the u I' 
silenceable father of human rights and t ^- 
father of the Russian H-bomb — calls or \\ 
America, saying that "a united positior ;■. 
un the Moscow Olympic Games must . 
viously be a basic part" of the world's r 



. . . if we and our allies fail to use every single peaceful means available to 
preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved? 



Moscow Olympics confers legitimacy on 
Soviet aggression. When the Communist 
Party prints a million handbooks to tell 
its top activists that the Summer Games 
mean world respect for Soviet foreign 
policy, surely that issue is behind us. 

Nor is it a question of drawing a line 
between sports and politics. That line the 
Soviets long ago erased. When billions of 
rubles are diverted to the games from 
Soviet domestic needs; when Moscow and 
other Olympic cities are purged of dissi- 
dents who might speak out; when Soviet 
children who might meet Western people 
and ideas on the streets are packed off to 
internal exile; when Soviet emissaries 
roam the globe offering athletes 
expense-paid trips to Moscow; when 
Soviet sports officials distort the number 
of teams committed to participating — 
surely the issue of Soviet politics in 
Soviet sports is also behind us. 

Above all, the decision you will make 
today is not a choice between a sports 
i.ssue and a national security i.s.sue; for 



sponse. This morning, as many as 50 
nations — leading political and sports 
powers — await your signal to join us. 

Athletes and sports organizations 
and national bodies around the world 
await your lead to mobilize their com- 
mitment. They do so for good reason. 
Today virtually every industrial nation 
Earth is dangerously dependent on Pet 
sian Gulf oil. How could we convince th 
Soviets not to threaten the gulf, if a bl( 
was dealt to our deterrent? How could 
our government send a message to 
Moscow, if tomorrow's Pra vda brags 
that our policies have been repudiated? 

It is fitting that the same ancient i 
tion that gave us the Olympics also gav 
us democracy; for your decision here is 
truly a referendum on freedom. 



14 



Department of State Bulle 



i 



The Vice President 



rHi Olympic Games 

Ills it is also a referendum on 
I as character and fundamental 
Ttie athletes here, and the ath- 
- nil represent, may have been born 
: 'iiifration after the Berlin Olym- 
!iii as their advisers and trustees, 
ar the responsibility of linking that 
111 their duty. For the story of Hi- 
iM is more than an unspeakable 
lore than a study in tyranny. It 
hionicle of the free world's 
of opportunities not seized, ag- 
s in not opposed, appeasement not 
.dnnfd. 

y the fall of 1935, the Nazis had 
^sl the notorious Nuremberg laws re- 
i I lie Jews to iionpersons aiifl were 
i : their military muscle. For a hope- 
inrht, Amei'ican opinion was 
izod — and editorials and amateur 
' ( unions across the country urged a 
t of the Berlin Olympics. An Amer- 
( iriber of the International Olympic 
:r ittee, Ernest Jahncke, made the 
a ost eloquently when he wrote the 
-oiii of the IOC. 

Ill riimiiiittee permits the games to be 
Germany, . . . there will be nothing 
, t listinguish [the Olympic idea] from the 
d eal. ... It will take . . . years to re- 
al ih the prestige of the games and the 
fi nee of the peoples of the world. Sport 
1 1 e its beauty and its nobility and be- 
lt is it has already become in Nazi Ger- 
n; in ugly, ignoble affair. 

le call for a boycott was rejected. 
d le reasons for rejection are bone 
II; f — even across all these decades. 
! ilrag sports into the arena of poli- 

K y were told. It will destroy the 

■ u- movement, they were told. It 

l\ penalize our American athletes, 

lie told. Solutions to political prob- 
- IV not the responsibility of sporting 

. I liey were told. Let us take our 
1 nil blacks to Berlin and beat the 
'.i thi-y were told. If America refuses 
? we will be the only ones left out in 
« (1, they were told. 

ich reasons prevailed. Only weeks 
'Viiiorican attendance was assured, 

roi'lis took the Rhineland; and Hi- 

■ allied Germany for the games. His 
p-ations cast uncanny foreshadows. 

■ ' expelled foreign journalists, who 
i le truth about persecution. He or- 
<■-' his vicious propaganda concealed 

1 iifoiKn visitors. And he too looked 
' (1 to legitimacy. As Joseph Goeb- 

■ lasted on the eve of the Olympics, 
'ich e.xpected the games "to turn 
ck and create a friendly world at- 



titude toward Nazi political, economic, 
and racial aims." 

It worked. Not even Jesse Owens' 
magnificent personal triumph diminished 
Hitler's international propaganda 
success — a coup he linked directly to his 
master race doctrine. We revere Jesse in 
death as in life; for he was an exemplary 
American, an inspiration to millions 
everywhere, and a personal friend loved 
by many of you here today But neither 
Jesse's achievements in Berlin nor any 
words spoken at the games prevented 
the Reich from exploiting the Olympics 
toward their own brutal ends. Listen to 
Nazi War Minister Albert Speer's report 
on the Fuhrer's mood as the happy spec- 
tators left Berlin: "Hitler was exulting 
over the harmonious atmosphere that 
prevailed. . . . International animosity 
toward Nazi Germany was plainly a thing 
of the past, he thought." Before long, the 
Nazi war machine scarred the face of 
Eui'ope, and .soon the night closed in. 

The Need for Sacrifice 

We are far from that time — but not from 
that script. Like you, I understand the 
ideals of sport — for sportsmanship is 
synonymous with fair play. Like you, I 
am in awe of the Olympic tradition — 
stretching over centuries, reaching out 
across cultures. 

And like every American, I know the 
exhilaration of Olympic victory. Few 
moments in my life match the electricity 
I felt at Lake Placid. And few human ex- 
periences can compare to the years of 
sacrifice, pain, and yearning that you and 
our athletes have invested in this sum- 
mer. But I also know, as you know, that 
some goals surpass even personal 
achievement. To any young athletes who 
feel singled out for suffering, I say, it is 
war above all that singles out our young 
for suffering. And it is war that our 
peaceful resolve can prevent. 

Everyone across the board is being 
asked to sacrifice. We need only ask the 
farmers of the midlands if they have sac- 
rificed. Or ask the workers in our export 
industries if they have sacrificed. Or ask 
the computer companies whose products 
have been embargoed. Or ask the busi- 
nesses whose years of planning have 
come undone. Or ask the young sailors in 
the Indian Ocean task force. Or ask the 
American families whose taxes support 
our defense budget. Or ask the Afghan 



athlete who faces the Soviets not on a 
field in Moscow but as a resistance 
fighter in Kabul. 

A heavy burden lies on your shoul- 
ders. We recognize the enormous price 
we are asking our athletes to pay. We 
recognize the tremendous sacrifice we are 
asking of sports officials. But on behalf of 
the President of the United States, I as- 
sure you that our nation will do every- 
thing wathin its power to insure the suc- 
cess of the Los Angeles games: to help 
the Olympic Committee restore its fi- 
nances; to provide even greater assist- 
ance to the development of amateur 
sport; and, above all, to recognize the tioie 
heroism of our athletes who do not go to 
Moscow. 

I believe all Americans will thank 
you — both for the contribution you make 
to our national security and to the further 
integrity you confer on amateur sport; 
for I believe that the Olympic movement 
will be forever strengthened by your 
courage. You vdll have restored to the 
modern Olympics the ancient "truce of 
the gods." No nation may serve as the 
Olympic host while invading and sub- 
jugating another: That was the rule for 
the Greek city-states, and that must be 
the rule again today. 

Forty-five years ago, when an Amer- 
ican official took his stand against Berlin, 
he said this: 

Place your great talents and influence in 
the service of the spirit of fair play and 
chivalry — instead of the service of brutality, 
force, and power. . . . Take your rightful place 
in the history of the Olympics. . . . The Olym- 
pic idea [has been rescued] from the remote 
past. You have the opportunity to rescue it 
from the immediate present — and to safeguard 
it for posterity. 

His words reach out to us across the 
decades. History rarely offers us a second 
chance. If we fail to seize this one, his- 
tory itself may fail us. 



'Te-\t from White House press release. 



IH980 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



U.S. Foreign Policy: Our 
Broader Strategy 



Statciiiciif bffiin- the St'iiatc 
Foreign Rchttiinin Coiiniiittic mi Mairli 
.'?. 19SII. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to join with 
you in looking beyond immediate events 
to America's overall posture and purposes 
in the world. 

For the past 4 months, our primary 
concern has been drawn to an area of 
immediate crisis — southwest Asia and 
the Persian Gulf. Terrorism in Iran and 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan have 
required concentrated attention. But 
even as we address these current chal- 
lenges, we must constantly place our re- 
sponse to specific events within our 
broader strategy. Our present actions 
must not only meet immediate crises; 
they must advance our long-term inter- 
ests as well. 

Over the past several years I have 
met with the committee many times on 
specific elements of our foreign policy. 
These hearings offer an opportunity to 
consider America's wide-ranging inter- 
ests, how they relate to each other, and 
our overall course. 

I hope these hearings can also serve 
another purpose; to help crystallize broad 
agreement on the general course that 
best suits America's interests and needs 
in the coming decade. 

I do not suggest that a full consensus 
behind a detailed foreign policy is now 
likely. In a world of extraordinary and 
gi'owing comple.xity, a world in which our 
interests are diverse, we cannot escape 
choices which in their nature are the stuff 
of controversy. 

But I do believe that despite differ- 
ences on decisions that we have made and 
that we and (jthers will make during the 
1980s, our nation can now shape a new 
foreign policy consensus about our goals 
in the world and the essential strands of 
our strategy to pursue them. 

This consensus can be built around 
agreement on two central points. 

• First, the United States must 
maintain a military balance of power. Our 
defense forces must remain unsurpassed. 
Our strategic deterrent must be unques- 
tionable. Our conventional forces must be 
strong enough and flexible enough to 



16 



meet the full range of military threats we 
may face. As a global power, we must 
maintain the global military balance. Our 
strength is important to our own safety, 
to a strong foreign policy free from coer- 
cion, to the confidence of allies and 
friends, and to the future of reciprocal 
arms control and other negotiations. Our 
strength also buttresses regional balances 
that could be upset by the direct or indi- 
rect use of Soviet power. 

• The second central point is this; 
that our military strength, while an es- 
sential condition for an effective foreign 
policy, is not in itself a sufficient condi- 
tion. We must nurture and draw upon our 
other strengths as well — our alliances and 
other international ties, our economic re- 
sources, our ability to deal with diversity, 
and our ideals. By drawing fully on these 
strengths, we can help shape world 
events now in ways that reduce the 
likelihood of using military force later. A 
global American foreign policy can suc- 
ceed only if it has both these dimensions. 

Some have argued that a strong re- 
sponse to Soviet militan' growth and ag- 
gression is overreaction. But to disregard 
thi- growth (if Soviet militaiy programs 
and budgets or to explain away aggres- 
sion as a defensive maneuver is to take 
refuge in illusicm. 

It is just as illusoi-y, and just as 
dangerous, to believe that there can be a 
t'lirtress America or that the world will 
follow our lead solely because of our mili- 
taiT strength. America's future depends 
not only on oui- growing militai-y power; it 
also requires the continued pursuit of en- 
ergy security and arms control, of human 
rights and economic development abroad. 

As we look to the 19H()s, our first ob- 
ligation is to see the W(irld clearly We 
confront a serious and sustained Soviet 
challenge, which is both militan' and 
political. Their militan' buildup continues 
unabated. The Soviet Union has shown a 
greatei- willingness to employ that power 
directly and through others. In that 
sense, Afghanistan is a manifestation of a 
larger problem, evident also in F.thiopia. 
South Yemen, Southeast Asia, an<l else- 
wheiv. 

The world economic order is under- 
going dramatic change. An energy crisis 
has rocked its foundations. F]conomic in- 
terdependence has become a dailv reality 



for the citizens of even* nation. At th' 
same time, the assertion of national i 
pendence has reshaped the political g, 
raphy of the planet. There is a profu 
of different .systems and allegiances i 
iliffusion of political and military pow 
Within nations, we see an acceleratir- 
rise in individual expectations. 

These challenges reijuire a full A 
lean engagement in the world^a reS' 
to defend our vital interests with fori 
necessaiT and to address ixitential ct 
of conflict before they erupt. These Y 
ings can help illuminate how best to i 
and serve the wide range of interest; 
have in a world grown increasingly c 
plex. 

In my remarks today, 1 will disci 
eight central American interests for 
coming years. Each is broad in its ov 
terms. But I do not believe that any 
these interests can be narrowed, mu 
less disregarded, without doing dam 
to the others. 

• Our most basic interest, and i 
priority, is the physical security of oi 
nation — the safety of our people. Th 
quires strong defense forces and stn 
alliances. 

• It also refjuires that we and o 
lies firmly and carefully manage a se 
area of concern: F]ast-West relations. 

• A third interest — controlling 1 
growth and spread of nuclear and otl 
weapons — enhances our collective se 
rity and international stability. 

• Fourth, we must confront the 
global energy crisis and strengthen t 
international economy; for doing so i 
tral to (lur well-being as a people an( 
strength as a nation. 

• A fifth interest, peace in trou 
areas nf the woiid. reduces potential 
thi'eats of w idei- war and )•emove^ 
tunities f(i)- (lUr rivals to extend theii 
fluence. 

• Our dii)lomacy in troubled rej. 
and our ability to pursue our global i 
nomic goals are strengthened by imi 
a sixth interest; broadening our ties 
other nations — with China, foi' exan 
and throughout the Third World. 

• The advancement of human r 
is m<ire than an ideal. It, too, is an ii 
est. Peaceful gains for freedom are ; 



Department of State B' 



The Secretary 



!.i«anl stability ahmad and Kivater 

i! , Inf AmtTii-a. 
\ii(l finally, we cannot disregard 
!vst in addressing environmental 
1- longer term global ti-ends that 
. lil our future. 

■ i!>iiit of each of these interests 
-lia|K' the kind of world we want to 
:< li is important — as a part of this 
oncejition and because failure in 
.1 lan lead to failure in another. 
;iii we say that our security is more 
I, lied by the growth of Soviet mili- 
\ If or by the strains we can fore- 
' international economy? By the 
(if nuclear weapons in the hands 
■nal nations or by the prospect of 
d political turmoil in many re- 
! he world? 
i hard fact is that we must face 
' hese and other challenges simul- 
>. Clearly, our interests do collide 
iilar circumstances. There will be 
. ;i|inig the difficult task of weighing 
II rrests against each other, moving 
: !\\ ard whenever possible. 
' ii- cour.se in the world must be de- 
, a mix of interests, sensibly bal- 
i, meeting always the central im- 
! i\ r of national security for our 
ii\ and our people. No simple slogan 
mic jjriority can answer in advance 
lilcinmas of the coming decade. 
N r can we define our security 
v~ts in ways that e.xclude any region. 
I) so could leave beyond the lines of 
interest nations of genuine im- 
ance to our well-being or tempt 
■rs to believe that we were ceding to 
n new spheres of influence. 
Certainly, we will always have re- 
al priorities. As I shall discuss in 
e detail, by histoiy strategic location, 
shared values, our allies in Europe 
the Far P^a.st are central to our plan- 
;. as is our hemisphere. 
We have also, in recent years, re- 
ided to new dangers in a region of 
.ving strategic importance — southwest 
1 and the Persian Gulf. Because of its 
;ent urgency and its relevance to our 
rail foreign policy, let me begin there. 

Ithwest Asia and the Persian Gulf 

first concern is the continued, illegal 
jntion of Americans in Tehran. Rarely 
e our determination and our judgment 
n so severely tested as in our efforts 
ree them. We will not rest until all of 

people are free. As long as their cruel 
Tient continues, this matter will re- 



y 1980 



main at the fiirefnint iif iiur national 
agenfla. 

We have pursued a policy of firmness 
and restraint. This is the most practical 
course consistent with our national honor 
and the safety of the hostages. Interna- 
tional condemnation of Iran and the eco- 
nomic measures which have raised the 
costs to Iran of their illegal actions are 
bringing home to Iranians the fact that 
the holding of the hostages is harmful to 
their interests and to the success of their 
revolution. But divisions within Iran have 
prevented progress. 

We continue to work toward a peace- 
ful resolution of the crisis. The United 
States agreed to the U.N. commission of 
inquiry to hear Iran's grievances and to 
work for a re.solution of the hostage 
crisis. We regret that the commission was 
unable to cany out its full mandate in 
Tehran. But we continue to support its 



We will nuf rest until all of our 
people are free. 



mission. We are prepared to see its work 
go fonvard as soon as positive conditions 
exi.st. 

We are reviewing again our options 
in the event tangible progress is not now 
made. 

There is only one question at issue 
here: the illegal detention of our diplo- 
matic personnel and American citizens in 
contravention of international law and 
practice. We accept Iran's revolution as a 
fact; we do not question the right of the 
Iranian people to determine their own fu- 
ture; we do not reject Iran's desire to 
bring its grievances to the attention of 
the world. But Iran must first live up to 
its fundamental responsibilities for the 
safety, well-being, and relea.se of the hos- 
tages. . 

Several broader conditions in the 
area also converge to demand our atten- 
tion. 

• One is our direct interest in the 
Persian Gulf region. Roughly one-quarter 
of the oil we import comes from this area 
of the world. For our allies, the propor- 
tion is higher— two-thirds in the case of 
Western Europe, three-fourths for Japan. 
Loss of this oil would create havoc not 
only in the world economy but for the se- 
curity of our alliances. 

Our stake in the region, however, in- 
volves more than oil. Peace and stability 



in the area are critical to the future of our 
friends there and affect the broader 
peace. Our strength and skill in support- 
ing their independence will demonstrate 
to them and to others the constancy of 
our purpose in the world. 

• Another condition is the potential 
for turmoil and instability, caused by ten- 
sions between and within nations. 

• A third condition is the geographic 
accessibility of this critical region to the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan increases and dramatizes the 
potential threat to the security of nations 
there and to the world's free access to 
natural resources and shipping routes. 

That is the fact, whatever we may 
speculate about Soviet aims; for inten- 
tions cannot be known with certainty. 
Even if they could, intentions can change. 
Our response must be based upon Soviet 
capabilities and Soviet behavior. To re- 
spond firmly to these realities now is not 
to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be pru- 
dent. 

Thus we are moving to deal with a 
new .security situation. We have in- 
creased our own naval presence there and 
we are working with others on access to 
additional air and naval facilities in the 
region. We are consulting with others on 
steps to reinforce the deterrence to any 
future Soviet aggression. 

These steps serve an explicit and 
unmistakable purpose. As President Car- 
ter has said: "An attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be re- 
pelled by any means necessary, including 
militai-y force." 

We are also acting to impose a seri- 
ous and sustained price for the aggression 
that is being committed against Afghanis- 
tan. The steps we have taken— on grain. 
on technology, on the Olympics, and in 
other areas — have two purposes. 

First, by responding firmly to ag- 
gression, we seek to deter it elsewhere. 
To pursue business as usual in the face of 
aggression is to tempt new adventures or 
risk miscalculation. 

Detente cannot be divorced from de- 
terrence. To oppose aggression now is to 
promote peace in the future— to foster 
the conditions for progress in East-West 
relations. To assume that we can obtain 
the benefits of detente while ignoring the 
need for deterrence would be short- 
sighted and dangerous. To assume that 
detente is divisible, that aggression need 
be met onlv when it directly threatens 



17 



The Secretary 



one's own region, could encourage ag- 
gi'ession elsewhere. 

Deterrence requires sacrifice. Tlie 
United States is willing to bear its share. 
It is vital that the burden of sacrifice he 
shared among all our allies — for the sake 
of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and 
for the sake of the public support which 
makes those alliances strong. 

The Soviet invasion is not only a 
challenge to our interests but to those of 
our allies as well. While there should be a 
division of labor, it must be an e(|uitable 
one. 

We do not seek nor are we asking oui- 
allies to dismantle the framework of 
East-West relations. We do ask that they 
take measures designed to deter the 
Soviets from new adventures that could 
produce new cri.ses. It is important that 
we and our allies stand together in our 
condemnation of aggression. 

This firm stand also serves a second 
purpose: the withdrawal of all Soviet 
militai-y forces from Afghanistan. 

Western pressures do not stand 
alone. The Soviet actions have been 
swiftly and strongly condemned by the 
overwhelming majority of the nations of 
the world. The Soviets are facing a 
staunch, broadly based Afghan resist- 
ance. These factors all combine to impose 
a continuing cost on the Soviets for theii' 
aggression. 

We also support efforts to restore a 
neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a 
government that would be responsive to 
the wishes of the Afghan people. With 
the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, 
we would join with Afghanistan's neigh- 
bors in a guarantee of true neutrality and 
of noninterference in Afghanistan's 
internal affairs. 

Let me be clear that so long as 
Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, the 
sanctions we have undertaken in re- 
sponse to the Soviet invasion will remain 
in force. We see no sign of Soviet with- 
drawal. The evidence is of a continuing 
buildup. 

Lei me be equally clear, however, 
that our intention is to remove the sanc- 
tions when Soviet troops are fully with- 
drawn from Afghanistan. This would in- 
clude the tighter criteria we announced 
last week governing exceptions from con- 
trols on high technology exports to the 
Soviet Union. However, the changes we 
have proposed in the list of items to be 
controlled would, if adopted by the Coor- 
dinating Committee for Elast-West Ti'ade 
Policy (COCOM), remain in place; such 
changes were being considered even be- 



f'cire the invasion of Afghanistan, as nec- 
cssaiT to pnjmote Western security 
interests and to reflect the state of Soviet 
technology 

Nor will we altc-i- our firm position 
(ipposing participation at the Mosc<iw 
Olympics. The February deadline has 
passed. 

Our response to the immediate situa- 
ti(]n is part of our long-term strategy in 
the region, as we work with others to- 
ward a cooperative security framewoi-k. 
( )ur purpose is not to dominate any na- 
tion; our purpose is to help the nations of 
the region preserve their independence 
and build their strength so that they can 
resist domination by others. 

We advance this objective in several 
ways. 

• We are persisting in our efforts for 
[leace in that broad region. A comprehen- 
sive settlement between Israel and its 
neighbors remains a paramount American 
goal. It would strengthen the security of 
Israel, to which we remain unshakably 
committed. It would enhance the security 
of Israel's neighbors and the stability of 
the region as a whole. 

• In South Asia, mutual suspicions be- 
tween India and Pakistan harm the secu- 
rity of both and heighten the regional 
danger We will continue to support their 
efforts to resolve the issues dividing 
them. We seek good relations with both. 
Our assistance to either one is not di- 
rected at the other 

• We are wcu'king with the nations of 
the region to foster their economic prog- 
ress and political stability. The conditions 
inviting internal disorder cannot be rem- 
edied by militaiT force. They can be met 
as governments move to meet the expec- 
tations of their people in their own ways 
and within their own traditions. 

• We are strengthening the basis for 
security cooperation in the region — 
through militaiy a.ssistance, through ac- 
cess to facilities, and through our in- 
creased presence. We have reaffirmed in 
these new circumstances our commitment 
to the 1959 agreement of cooperation 
with Pakistan. The nature of our eco- 
nomic and security assistance will depend 
both on Pakistan's assessment of its 
needs and our own resource capabilities. 

• Finally, we seek to improve our re- 
lations with nations throughout the area, 
wherever there is a basis of shared inter- 
ests. Our diplomacy is grounded in sup- 
port for the independence of others and 
respect for their traditions and concerns. 

I have concentrated on our approach 
in this one area because of its immediate 



importance and because it illustrato a 
more genei'al proposition; Globally, as 
well as in this region, our posture must 
he to maintain our own and allied mililali- 
strength while [nirsuing an active, af- I'' 
fii-mative diplomacy Both sei've the ful ' 
range of our interests. 

U.S. Security 

Our most fundamental intei'est is to 
maintain our security through an as-iir 
balance of military power F'or more !h; 
I.') yeai-s there has been a steady growt 
in Soviet military programs and budgci 
They have doubled their defense effoi't 
over the past two decades. There is no 
sign of abatement in this trend. 

During most of that same period n 
own efforts, in real terms, decreased. \ 
have i-eversed this downward trend. F^ 
if it were to continue, the curi'ent o\<n 
balance in military forces would be 
dangerously altered. 

The increases in defense spending 
that this Administraticm has proposed : 
(|uire sacrifice at a time of economic dii ii 
culty They are sacrifices we must mak 
now for the sake of our future secui'ity 
As we proceed, we should not undeiisi 
mate our existing strength. We want n 
dangerous miscalculations of our ixiwci 
oi- our will. t 

Simple U.S. -Soviet force compari- I 
sons, for example, ignore the principle; 
collective security that are the core nf . 
defense strategy. On the whole, our all 
make a significantly greater militai'>- ci I 
tribution than Soviet allies. Combined •' 
NATO strength rests upon an economic *' 
foundation more than twice the size of |i 
that of the Warsaw Pact. And our al- !■ 
liances also have a fundamental cohesii *■ 
that is far less certain on the Warsaw t 
Pact side. 

A fair measurement of the balance '• 
must also account for the fact that the (' 
Soviets have fully one-fourth of their t 
ground and tactical air forces deployed j- 
along their border with China. 

More broadly, our purpose in the 
wcjrld is in basic harmony with the dee] 
determination of nations around the 
world to defend their sovereignty. A pi: 
pose in conflict with nationalism — a qU( 
to dominate and control others — preser 
far more difficulties and dangers, as th( 
Soviets are leai-ning from the nationalif 
in Afghanistan. 

Most important, we are moving m 
orderly fashion to anticipate and remed 
the potential gaps in our defenses — 
strategic, theater nucleai; and con- 



18 



Department of State Bull 



The Secretary 



i.^'iial. Our real defense programs are 
wrj.- Reinstatement of draft registra- 
>\ 1 I advance our capacity for sharp 
a ' - in military personnel should a 
. > nsis i'e(|Uire it. 
I |M)rtray an America standing inv 

I Ir in the face of growing danger may 
.-limnable, but it also is patently 

I "ui security begins with the balance 
laii'uic forces. The Soviet nuclear ar- 

I I (< institutes the one creflible, direct 
Ml lo the continental United States. 

, i'liiively deter that danger we must 

r a I apability for certain and appro- 
I I aliation to any level of attack. 
I also maintain forces which are, 
[lerceived to be, essentially 

1 .aiciit to those of the Soviet Union, 
111(1 the possible military or political 

I ijui'nces that an imbalance might 

I h.'se re(|uirements — flexible re- 
-1 and essential e(|uivalence — are 
n ' il by our programs to modernize 
I iii|M()ve the three elements of our 
1 'it strategic force: the MX mobile 
iia-rd missile, the Ti-ident sub- 
iii and missile programs, and the 
NIK hed cruise missiles for our 
; It'll bombers. 
I )iir security is also based upon col- 
.1 ili'fense. The security of oui' alllies 
M-inymous with our own. 
riir Soviet Union, with its Warsaw 
1 allies, has increased its capability to 
;' 1 heavy attack, with little warn- 
'• urope. To counter that danger, 
ii Carter in 1977 recommended to 
I I a Long-Term Defense Program to 
' ii\ I' allied capabilities in each of 10 
' a II as ranging from air defense to 
: Uiiir posture. The program was 
• ti il m 1978. It is being implemented. 
I,a-t December in response to Soviet 
•" ' nuclear modernization, the NATO 
I -!i is agreed to a plan for moderniz- 
1 111! I heater nuclear forces while we 
I i|ual negotiated limits on both 
~. These force improvements reflect a 
riiiii perception in NATO of the grow- 
' It to Eui-ope — and a common de- 
mn to respond. I will not pretenfl 
rr is unanimity in the alliance on 
111 national issues. But NATO is 
li 111 its central role, and the alliance 
alaiig progress to guarantee that its 
111 lilies will be sufficient to meet its 
:a: lulls. 

\\i have security interests in Asia 
lar In those in Europe. We are com- 
I a III maintaining our strength in 
1 ' 'ur close association and alliance 
1 .la pan reflect strong economic ties 



and shared security interests. Our de- 
fense coopei'ation is e.xpanding. .Japan's 
self-defense forces are undergoing steady 
impntvement. We have urged Japanese 
leaders to e.xpand these programs, within 
the limits set by the Japanese constitu- 
tion. 

We attach great importance to our al- 
liances with our ANZUS (security treaty 
among Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States] partners — Australia and 
New Zealand. We stand firmly behind our 
other security commitments in the re- 
gion. 

In response to the confirmed sharp 
buildup in North Korea, we are maintain- 
ing our strength in that area. At the same 
time, the strength of our South Korean 
ally is growing. Next year, for example, 
South Korean defense spending is ex- 
pected to reach nearly 6% of its gross na- 
tional product, compared to roughly A^ in 
the early 1970s. 

Conclusion of a revised base agree- 
ment with the Philippines has been an 



. . . if n'c fthorf change our prngra))i.<i 
(if .■^ecKrifi/ af;f<}stance how, we will 
be shortcliaiigiiig our own future 
safefg. 



important, positive development for the 
sustained defense of the region. 

Our forces in East Asia not only rein- 
force our security commitments there; 
because of their mobility they help pro- 
tect interests that we and our Asian allies 
share outside the immediate region, such 
as those in the Persian Gulf. 

Our European and Asian alliances 
have long encompassed our major defense 
priorities. They do not, however, define 
the perimeters of our security interests. 
We must also be prepared to reinforce the 
capacity for resistance to aggression in 
areas beyond our alliances. Let me take a 
few moments to address this important 
(lUestion. 

With an inescapable stake in the 
health of the international economy, we 
cannot idly watch vital resources fall 
under the control of an outside force. Our 
interests require that we be able and will- 
ing to help others resist challenges to 
their sovereignty and to counter, in par- 
ticular, a growing Soviet ability to project 
its power. 

Our ability to project our power is 



unsurpassed. Hut improvements must be 
made. F^nhancing the mobility of our 
rapid deployment forces will be an impor- 
tant step foi-ward. Plans for maritime 
prepositioning ships and a new large 
cargo aircraft will further strengthen our 
ability to respond (|uickly when crises 
occur 

The confidence of our friends and our 
political influence in the world depend, in 
part, upon our military strength and our 
will to use it if necessaiT. We must be 
seen as fully reliable. Our strength must 
be perceived as fully sufficient to meet 
realistic threats. 

Certainly there are limits to what we 
can and should do. We would undermine 
the confidence of our friends and allies 
through bellicose pronouncements or a 
posture that implied an interest in domi- 
nating other sovereign states. The use of 
American militaiy force is not a desirable 
American policy response to the purely 
internal politics of other nations. As the 
President said in his State of the Union 
address, "... our power will never be 
used to initiate a threat to the security of 
any nation or to the rights of any human 
being." 

No easy formula can determine in 
advance when we should use military 
force beyond our alliance areas. The 
proper response in each case must be a 
function of the importance and immediacy 
of the American and allied interests at 
risk; the source and character of the 
threat; the potential involvement of 
friends and allies within and beyond the 
region affected; the prospects for success 
and the potential costs of our involve- 
ment; and other factors. 

Our system rightly gives responsibil- 
ity to both the President and the Con- 
gress for committing our militaiy forces 
to combat. To sustain such a commitment 
requires a firm public base. 

Obviously, direct militai-y involve- 
ment is not our preference. The best an- 
swer to outside pressure is indigenous 
strength. Sensible programs of security 
assistance and arms supply can help our 
friends build their own capacity to resist. 
A policy which concentrated solely on our 
own militan' strength and failed to pro- 
vide for legitimate security needs of our 
friends would be worse than short- 
sighted. It would be dangerous; for such 
a ])olicy would increase the danger of con- 
flicts and international confrontations 
that might be avoided if local security 
balances are preserved. 

Let me emphasize that if we short- 
change our programs of security assist- 
ance now, we will be shortchanging our 
own future safety. Such programs are not 



19 



The Secretary 



gifts to other nations; they are invest- 
ments which serve our security interests 
as well as theirs. 

East-West Relations 

As we fulfill the needs of defense and de- 
terrence, our second interest is in fash- 
ioning a relationship with the Soviet 
Union in which our fundamental competi- 
tion is bounded by restraint. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and their adven- 
turism in Africa and Asia have done real 
damage to this relationship and to the 
immediate prospects for a more peaceful 
v\orld. 

We are prepared to impose costs on 
aggression for as long as necessary. We 
will promote America's interests and val- 
ues in all of our dealings. But we seek no 
cold war, no indiscriminate confrontation. 
It is not in our interest, even during a 
period of heightened tensions, to disman- 
tle the framework of East-West relations 
constructed over more than a generation. 
Even if we could discount the direct im- 
plications of an unbounded competition 
for our own interests — and we cannot — 
our relations with our allies and oui- cred- 
ibility throughout the world would still 
call for a diligent, good faith American ef- 
fort to sustain a framework for peace. 

Thus, even as we have responded to 
Soviet aggression, we have also held to 
our formal obligations. We are denying 
specific benefits to the Soviet Union, but 
we have not abrogated formal agree- 
ments. Progress has been suspended, but 
when Soviet behavior allows, the door to 
a more stable and mutually beneficial 
relationship — a competition bounded by 
restraint and a regard for each other's 
interests — will be open. 

Meanwhile, we should avoid framing 
our discussions of East- West relations in 
ways that suggest a false choice between 
e.xtremes: between some Utopian state of 
perfect detente on the one hand or, on the 
other, a condition of implacable hostility. 
In fact, realism and safety re(|uire that 
we conduct relations in the continuum be- 
tween those two poles. At times there 
will be greater progress in areas of 
mutual interest. At others, as now, the 
adversarial elements in our relations will 
be prominent. There will always be ele- 
ments of both. 

In seeking to deter further aggres- 
sion and pressing for an end to the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, we are working to 
create the conditions that will enable us 
to return to Imilding a more stable rela- 
tionship. 



20 



Arms Control 

A third and related area of emphasis is 
arms control. Our interests have been 
well served by the arms control agree- 
ments to which the United States and the 
Soviet Union are parties. In IWio we 
halted poisonous nuclear weajjons tests in 
the atmosphere. The SAUT I Interim 
Agreement froze the number of (offensive 
strategic missiles when the Soviets were 
building up in that area and we Vv'ere not. 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Tr-eaty headed 
off a potentially ccjstly and destabilizing 
arms race in these defensive weapons. In 
the same fashion, the SALT II Ti-eaty 
would serve this country's paramount se- 
curity interests. 

We must all think through veiy care- 
fully the conse(|Uences of a no-SAUT 
world. What would that w(jrld look like? 

• Without SALT, there would be no 
agreed limit on the number of strategic 



We nnist all think through vera 
cavefulhj the consequences of a no- 
SALT world. What would that 
world look like;' 



systems the Soviets could build. They 
could easily reach a total of 3,000 delivery 
systems over the next •") years, more than 
700 beyond what the treaty allows. 

• "without SALT, there would be no 
limits on the number of separate 
warheads each missile can cai-ry. Each of 
the Soviet Union's heaviest missiles — the 
SS-18s — could theoretically deliver 20 oi- 
even 30 nuclear warheads, instead of the 
10 the treaty allows. On those 308 SS-18s 
alone, the Soviets could mount as many 
additional warheads as their entire stra- 
tegic force holds today. 

• Without SALT, our own defense 
|)lanning would be seriously com])licateil. 
For example, the MX program would be 
more difficult to design and build and less 
certain to achieve its purpose. 

• Without the treaty, our ability to 
monitor Soviet strategic force.s — and thus 
evaluate Soviet capabilities — could be 
impaired, since there woukl be no con- 
straints on the deliberate concealment of 
those forces. 

• Without the treaty, the likely in- 
crease in Soviet strategic capabilities 
would compel further defense expendi- 
tures that could compound our already 
difficult budget choices. 



The security advantages of SALT I 
have been reinforced by recent events. 
At a time of increased tensions between 
the su|)erpowers, effective mutual con- 
straints on strategic arms become all ilh 
more important. 

For these compelling reasons of se- 
curity, we should move ahead with ratif 
cation at the earliest feasible time. In tl 
interim, it is most important that both 
sides continue to observe the mutual coi 
straints of SALT I and SALT II. Our .iv 
strategic programs ai'e consistent witli 
those agreements. We will, of coursf, 
continue to review our strategic arm- d 
((uirements with the Congress, and we 
will keep a close watch on Soviet acth.ii 
to see that they are exercising a siniilai- 
degree of restraint. 

For the same reasons, we will inn- 
tinue wherever feasible to pursue bal 
anced and verifiable arms control agree 
ments at other levels — in the mutual an 
balanced force reduction talks, on anti- 
satellite warfare, on banning nucleai- 
weapons tests, on chemical warfare, air 
in other areas. The theater nuclear i'tm 
negotiating offer remains on the table. 
And we have called upon the Soviet 
Union to pursue it with us. 

None of these efforts is undertake) 
as a favor to others; each one serves th 
national security interests of the Unite 
States, as well as others. 

Our willingness to seek restraint h 
strategic weapons reinforces other criti 
cal arms control efforts. In particular, v 
must be concerned about the spread of 
nuclear weapons. The technology is los: 
its mysteiy Six countries have already 
carried out nuclear explosions. At least 
dozen more could produce a weapon 
within a few years of deciding to do so. 
The risks in this progression are self- 
evident. Regional nuclear arms races 
have become a real danger. The preseni 
of nuclear arms in volatile areas multi- 
plies the chance that they will be used. 

Thus we continue to press for the 
widest adherence to the Nuclear Non- 
proliferation Ti-eaty. We are urging oth( 
to take necessai-y .steps to bring the 
treaty of Tlatelolco into full force. And 
vigoi-ously support the im|)rovement ar 
application of International Atomic P]n- 
ergy Agency safeguards. 

In 1977 President Carter also initi 
ated the International Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Flvaluation, to involve both prodi 
ing and consuming nations in a joint 
search for ways to realize the benefits ( 
nuclear power while limiting the risks 
that nuclear weapons will be developed 
This was not a negotiation that resolve( 



Department of State Built 



The Secretary 



ill. rrnces; it was a tet-hnical study 
II iiitiinated problems and possible 

1 das provided a better understand- 
lii' economics, technology, and 
Miciated with the nuclear fuel 
:!id it produced consensus on a 
of middle-range goals. These in- 
I r hr possible value of an interna- 
:i\ ii'gime to manage excess 

ini, stronger fuel supply assur- 
>r consumers under effective non- 
ition controls, and conversion of 
I reactors from use of highly en- 
iianium fuels. Differences remain 
a,i\ areas, but the essential task has 
I advanced by this common effort. 
Mni-c countries will approach the nu- 
: r w capons threshold in the decade 
1(1, some with uncertain intentions in 
(.11- of tension and conflict. The time 
all ling to reduce the appeal of nuclear 
|ii ills and to develop safer ways to ad- 
,- l.iritimate energy needs is slipping 
\ I Hir nonproliferation efforts are 
( \ ital now than ever before. 

rt;,\ Crisis and the World Economy 

n (i. It is plainly in our interest to act 
i<i forestall a future energy disaster 
(|iiiti' simply, that is what we could 
, \\'i' now import some 40% of the 
(il. iiin we use. This year alone, the 

I hese imports will come to some 

a. II. That energy dependence fuels 
aition. It strains the dollar It 
n- nur balance of payments. It in- 
1 ' - our vulnerability. 

much as anything else we do in 
iiiig decade, our effort to gain con- 

ur energy future — to conserve, to 

aii.l our own production, and to de- 
i,' iM'W and renewable fuels — will de- 
not only the quality of our lives 
but the strength of our position 
a. Aorld. 
\\. must also recognize the profound 
■> umees of the global energy crisis 
• '•■ lar consuming nations whose eco- 
la health affects our own. Our allies 

I I more dependent than we on the 

1 ion and pricing decisions of OPEC 
i/.ation of Petroleum E.xporting 
ii-s] and on political events in oil 
iiig nations. 
Thi' jxiint is vividly illustrated by the 
lit' nf Turkey, which now spends 

of all its export earnings to pay 

inports. Because of a shortage of 

IS only able to keep its industiy 

' • I 'iiing at something less than 50'7f of 

la. iiy. It would be hard to exaggerate 

-I rains that the energy crisis places 



on many nations such as this democratic 
and strategically placed ally. 

The developing countries are even 
more burdened by the rising price of oil, 
the inflation it helps to fuel, and the debts 
it brings. This year, developing countries 
will spend on oil and debt servicing alone 
three times what they will receive in out- 
side economic assistance from all the in- 
dustrial democracies and the OPEC coun- 
tries. 

The United States has a direct stake 
in the economic vitality of developing 
countries. They are increasingly impor- 
tant as partners in trade — both as mar- 
kets and sources of supply. And the polit- 
ical effect of their economic stagnation 
can have serious consequences for us — 
with major social disruptions, a reversal 
of jjrogress toward democratic rule and 
human rights, and new openings for vio- 
lence and radicalism. 

In short, our economy and ultimately 
our security depend upon whether we can 
gain control over our own energy future, 
and whether the world economy can 
manage the hard transition ahead. We 



being strengthened in other ways — 
through negotiation of commodity agree- 
ments, progress on the common fund, and 
more funding for the multilateral devel- 
opment banks. 

The International Monetaiy Fund, in 
particulai; has a key role in helping coun- 
tries through this time of adjustment and 
also in recycling OPEC's enormous 
surpluses. To fulfill these vital missions, 
the increase in IMF quotas scheduled for 
later this year is essential. We also have a 
stake in assuring the necessary capital for 
the World Bank, the International Devel- 
opment Association, and the regional de- 
velopment banks. 

Let there be no mistake. The years 
ahead will be tiying ones for the interna- 
tional economy. The trend in oil prices is 
alarming. The OPFX' countries will con- 
tinue to run massive surpluses — 
estimated at over $100 billion for 1980— 
which means coiTesponding deficits for 
other nations. The developing countries 
will be hardest hit — and faced with the 
painful choice between stunted growth 
and deeper debt. 



. . . our ecoHonii/ and idfiniately our securittf (lepe)id upon ivhether we can 
gain control over o»r uivn e ii erg y future, and whether the world economy 
can manage the hard transition ahead. 



have made some progress in the past few- 
years. While our economy was gi-owing 
last year, our oil consumption declined. 
The elements of a national energy policy 
are taking shape. 

Continued progress at home will give 
impetus to our international efforts — 
working with other consumers for more 
stringent consei-vation and developing 
new energy resources through World 
Bank financing and our bilateral assist- 
ance. 

As we grapple with the energy prob- 
lem, it is important that we not lose sight 
of our broader economic interests or 
jeopardize the real progress that has been 
made in the past few years to open and 
strengthen the international economy 

Despite the persistence of protec- 
tionist impulses in times of economic dif- 
ficulty, the Tokyo Roimd of trade negoti- 
ations was able to agree upon significant 
reductions in barriers to trade — a result 
which both improves our access to foreign 
markets and helps to curb inflation at 
home. Current economic strains must not 
erode this major achievement. 

The global economic structure is 



The steps we have taken only buy us 
more time. We must use that time to 
make fundamental adjustments in our en- 
ergy consumption and production pat- 
terns. Our older industries must be 
streamlined and retooled to meet the in- 
evitable challenge of a more open and 
competitive world economy. More in- 
vestment must be earmai'ked for new 
product lines and advanced technology. 
For that is necessary to restore the bal- 
ance in international commerce — and to 
assure future pi'osperity for the Ameri- 
can people. 

Regional Peace 

A fifth element in our global strategy is 
to help achieve peaceful resolutions of 
disputes in troubled regions of the world. 
The task is an imposing one, and it is not 
without costs. It is always difficult to 
work for accommodations which cannot 
fully satisfy the demands of any side, be- 
cause they must be accepted by all sides. 
We must be prepared for frustration. 

But working for peace is directly rel- 
evant to our interests in collective secu- 



hy 1980 



21 



The Secretary 



rity and the freeddiii of other nations 
from outside domination. Regional con- 
flicts pose the danger of wider confronta- 
tions. Disputes between our allies — as in 
the case of Greece and Turkey — weaken 
the common defense. And as a magnet 
draws iron, Third World conflict seems 
to draw the interest of the Soviets, the 
Cubans, or others prepared to exploit 
disorder. 

We can take satisfaction that real 
pi'ogress in the pursuit of peace has been 
made. 

The 1979 Peace Treaty Between Is- 
rael and Egypt is an historic achieve- 
ment. We have no more urgent diplomatic 
pi-iority than the effort to complete and 
broaden that peace so that Israel, the 
neighboring Arab states, and the Pales- 
tinian people will be able to live securely 
and with dignity. 

Our immediate attention must be on 
the auton(jmy negotiations. Ambassador 
Linowitz (Persnnal Representative of the 
President to the Middle East Peace Ne- 
gotiations 1 has worked hard and ably to 
focus and accelerate the talks, which have 
now begun to center on the substantive 
issues that lie at the veiy heart of the 
negotiations — issues like security, water, 
and land. We have no illusion about the 
comple.xity and sensitivity of the prob- 
lems that remain. But in this evolutional^ 
process we have overcome seemingly in- 
tractable obstacles before. 

The President has invited President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to Wash- 
ington for talks in April. They know that 
the Camp David process provides the 
best opportunity in 30 years to bring the 
security of peace to the Middle East. We 
cannot let it slip away. 

There has also been an historic 
breakthrough in southern Africa. The na- 
tion of Zimbabwe will soon become a real- 
ity, through the realism of the parties, 
the skill of British diplomacy, the com- 
mitment of other African states, and be- 
cause of the constructive role played by 
the United States. The steadfastness of 
the Congi-ess in resisting attempts to lift 
sanctions prematurely played a signifi- 
cant part in assuring that bargaining and 
balloting, not bullets, are shaping 
Rhodesia's future. 

I want to be sure the importance of 
this event is understood. We have a wide 
range of interests in Africa — security 
interests, economic intere.sts, an interest 
in political cooperation on all global is- 
sues. In my judgment no policy could 
have served those interests better than 
our stalwart support for the principle of 
majority rule, with minority rights, in 



22 



Rhodesia. And nothing could have 
weakened us more there than to waver in 
this crucial effort. 

Peace and stability are at risk in 
other parts of the world — in the eastern 
Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, in 
northwest Africa, in our own hemis- 
phere. All of those cases have some bear- 
ing upon American interests. At the same 
time there are, of course, practical limits 
on what we — or any one nation — can do. 

The nature of our involvement will 
vaiy — from support for the efforts of 
others, to mediation ourselves, to helping 
maintain a balance of forces if that is re- 
c|uired to induce the parties to settle. But 
in each case we are detei'mined to employ 
the influence we have to develop work- 
able alternatives to war 

We advance regional peace in another 
tangible way, by striving to limit the de- 
structiveness of war when it cannot be 
prevented. Since 1977 the United States 
has taken the lead in working toward ne- 
gotiated limits on conventional arms 
transfers. While we remain convinced 
that such agreements can contribute to a 
safer world, we do not at this time fore- 
see progress. 

In the absence of agi'eefl interna- 
ticmal restraint, we do not plan to reduce 
further the ceiling on our owns arms 
transfers. But the other elements of our 
arms transfer policy continue to serve our 
interests. Arms transfers must be based 
im assessments of U.S. foreign policy and 
national security interests. The policy has 
a dual effect: 

• To facilitate those arms transfers 
that clearly promote the security of the 
United States anfl our allies and friends, 
and 

• To restrain transfers that are in 
excess of legitimate defense needs, that 
c(iuld promote regional arms races or in- 
crease instability, or that otherwise do 
not advance U.S. interests. 

In short, our purpo.se in supplying 
arms is .security, not profit. 

Positive Bilateral Relations 

Sixth, we have an interest in building 
positive bilateral relations with all coun- 
tries, wherever there is a basis of shared 
concerns. Scores of new countries — and 
new centers of power — have emerged 
since the end of the Sec<jnd World Wan 
The inlei-national landscape — and thus 
the nature of diplomacy — has been al- 
tered fundamentally. Questions of direct 



importance to us are determined not in a 
few capitals but among 1.55. Our access t 
resources and to defense facilities cannot 
simply be declared; it must be agreed. W 
seek positive relations around the world 
not because we have a compulsion to be 
liked but because our intere.sts and the 
well-being of our people are at stake. 

This interest in a broad network of 
relationships is reflected in our interna- 
tional approach. 

• This Administration has worked 
especially hard to strengthen our core 
partnerships with our traditional allies, 
there appear to be new strains among u; 
they flow principally from the fact that 
we are facing up to hard, new challenyi- ' 
together. 

• We often have an interest in \\ 1 1 
ing with nations \A'hose ideologies arv dil 
ferent from ours. In a diverse worM our 
exact scale of values will be replicated 
rarely if at all. It would make no sen>' • 
limit our influence by refusing to pui'.~N> 
specific areas of shared interest with 
other nations because of broader dis- 
agreement. 

This is why we oppose, in princiiilf 
countiy-by-country limitations on oui- ai 
and trade programs. Obviously we will 
not have such relationships when there 
not yet a basis for cooperation — as is n- 
the case in Cuba and Vietnam. But uiir 
diplomacy is undercut when such . 

restrictions are cast in law. i 

The establishment of full diplomatic *' 
relations with the People's Republic of 
China illustrates the value of an open 
approach. It is, in its own terms, an ac- 
complishment of historic importance — ai f 
achievement of economic as well as dip- 
lomatic meaning, global as well as re- 
gional significance. Normalization is nut 
an end in itself. It is the beginning of coi 
tinuing efforts to improve our relations k> 
with Beijing. Similarly, we are working 
toward improved relations with the na- 
tions of Eastern Europe. 

• The pursuit of our interests also 
requires that we stress an inclusive forir 
of diplomacy, in which all who have a 
stake also have a role and are encourage- 
to accept a share of the responsibility foi 
hard decisions. Our diplomacy on 
Namibia and Zimbabwe is a case in poini 
Such multilateral efforts are time-con- 
suming and complex. But building co- 
alitions is a process that Americans, wit! 
our own i)luralistic traditions, well under 
stand. Abi'oad, no less than at home, on 
many issues it is the only way to achieve 
workable results. 

Our intere.st does not i-(M|uii-e that 



Department of State Bulie; 



The Secretary 



• '•<■ likf us or always side with us. 
' lu'ii- willingness to find aivas of 
iiiTest or balanced compi-omise 
' interests may dash. A (|Uest for 
\ is not realistic, nor is it iv- 

.1 i he Soviets may demand ideolog- 

iit ii\; we can serve oui- intei'ests in 

■M i if diversity 

In I Ills context, let nie dispute the 

■si Kin that in oui- dealings with the 

I \\i ii'ld we have to choose between 

. I'! 'loaches: competing with Soviet 

- in the Third Woidd by seeing 

iping nations pi-imarily through 

West prism or dealing with the 

I World primarily in terms of Third 

i I'lublems. These are sometimes 

iiird as e.xclusive options. 

Uii the choices pre.sented — between 
-.ei-est in Third World concerns and a 
mination to counter Soviet in-roads 
■ false. In fact, the two are twin 
ds ill a single strategy, for the best 

■u\ for competing with the Soviets 

iddi'css the jiractical interests of 
1 World countries themselves — not 

hi'ir security concerns but their 
ii iiiiiiomic and jxilitical justice as 



I would be misleading, of course, to 
I o\ rr our real differences with de- 
_'l ing countries on a wide range of is- 
ie Rut we can bargain most effectively, 
( r mutual benefit, when they are con- 
I I hat we share the goals of e(|uita- 
iiiinmic growth and political inde- 
I ■iii-f. 

irtainly there have been painful 
- pnintments and setbacks. But be- 
>■ \M' have supported those goals, our 
; (Ills with most of the nations of Af- 
; Latin America, and Asia are better 
.; I 111 y have been for many years. 

iu an Rights 

I 1 11th way in which we advance 
•i ivsts in the world — indeed our 
III 111 security — is through support 
iiiiaii lights. When the two con- 
[- - human rights and national secur- 
>'-art' uttered in the same breath, it is 
ti til I'.xpress an unavoidable conflict, a 
iiiiintal tension between the pursuit 
urn id and the pursuit of the practi- 

1 -I i-ongly reject the idea that there 
iiidamental incompatibility between 
1 iiMiit of human rights and the pur- 
1 ~ilf-interest. By this, I do not 
1 III say that there can never be a 
HI between human rights concerns 
M lurity concerns. We cannot escape 
mill ilecisions that must be made in 



such cases. We must constantly weigh 
how best to encourage the advancement 
of human rights while maintaining our 
ability to conduct essential business with 
government.s — even unpopular ones — in 
countries where we have important secu- 
rity interests. 

But the fact remains that over the 
longer term, our pursuit of human rights 
is not only generally compatible with our 
national security, it contributes to that 
security. 

We know from our own national ex- 
perience that the drive for human free- 
dom has tremendous force and vitality. It 
is universal. It is resilient. And, ulti- 
mately, it is irrepressible. Just in the past 
several years, we have seen that drive 
for a fuller voice in economic and political 
life gain new expression in Portugal and 
Spain and Greece; in Nigeria and Ghana 
and Upper Volta; in Ecuador, Peru, and 
the Dominican Republic; and elsewhere. 
These countries make a compelling case 
for the projiosition that the tide in the 
world is I'unning toward human rights 
and that it is in our interest to support it. 

The United States cannot claim 
credit for these developments. But we 
can find proof in them that our policy of 
furthering human rights is not only con- 
sistent with American ideals; it is con- 
sistent with the aspirations of others. 

Our support for those aspirations en- 
ables us to regain the political high 
ground in competition for world influ- 
ence. It stands in vivid contrast to the 
practices of the Soviet Union abroad, as 
Afghanistan demonstrates, and at home, 
as the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov 
again makes clear. In short, our willing- 
ness to press for human rights progress 
gives credibility to our commitment to 
freedom. And it is that commitment 
which has always been one of America's 
mo.st enduring strengths in the world. 

Our support for human rights serves 
our interests in another way. As Presi- 
dent Carter put it in his State of the 
Union address. 

In repressive regimes, popular frustra- 
tions often have no outlet except through vio- 
lence. But when peoples and their govern- 
ments can approach their problems 
together — through open, democratic 
methods— the basis for stability and peace is 
far more solid and far more enduring. 

As the President suggested, 
divergent views cannot be long repressed 
without sowing the seeds of violent con- 
vulsi(m. And once the ties are broken 
between a government and its people, 
outside intervention cannot secure its 



long-term survival. Thus it is profoundly 
in our national interest to support con- 
structive change before such ties erode 
and the alternatives of radicalism or re- 
pression drive out moderate solutions. 

How each society manages change is 
a matter for it to decide. We cannot and 
should not write social contracts for 
others. But we can help others promote — 
in their own ways — peaceful and orderly 
reform. 

We do that by clearly expressing our 
opposition to official torture, arbitrary 
arrest, and other abuses of individual 
liberties. Whatever short-term cjuiet they 
may provide, they engender long-term 
bitterness. 

We do it by reinforcing efforts to 
open economic and political institutions to 
broader national participation, so that 
they are better able to accommodate con- 
flicting views and interests. 

And we do it by focusing develop- 
ment assistance on helping governments 
meet the basic human needs of their 
people. In doing our part to meet the 
greatest moral challenge of our times — 
the plight of hundreds of millions of 
human beings who lack adei_|Uate food or 
health care — we are also addressing the 
root causes of instability. We must recog- 
nize, in the demand of these people for 
their basic human rights, that stability 
can only come through peaceful progress, 
not through a desperate effort to pre- 
serve the status ijuo. 

Nowhere do we see more clearly the 
race between radical and peaceful change 
than in Central America today. And 
nowhere is our commitment to peaceful 
change more clearly tested. In Nicaragua 
our challenge is to join with others in the 
region to help the Nicaraguan people and 
government succeed in building a stable, 
healthy, democratic society out of the 
debris of dictatorship and civil war. We 
cannot guarantee that democracy will 
take hold there. But if we turn our backs 
on Nicaragua, we can help guarantee that 
democracy will fail. 

P'ailure to appropriate needed Amer- 
ican aid has jeopardized our interests. It 
has weakened the position of the private 
sector, which would receive the majority 
of our assistance. It has made it more dif- 
ficult for the Nicaraguan Government to 
pursue a development strategy that in- 
cludes important roles for both the public 
and private sectors. And it has played 
into the hands of the Cubans. Those who 
are most concerned about the potential 
for radical revolution in Latin America 



1980 



23 



The Secretary 



and growing Cuban influencf in the re- 
gion should be the strongest supporters 
of our efforts to help Nicaragua build a 
better future. 

Our essential challenge in El Sal- 
vador is similar. In October reformist 
militai-y officers overthrew a militaiy dic- 
tator in order to forestall the outbreak (jf 
a violent and bloody civil war. The Revo- 
lutionaiy .Junta of Government, which in- 
cludes the Christian Democratic Party, is 
committed to peaceful, sweeping change. 
An impressive agrarian reform has al- 
ready turned moi'e than 224,000 hectares 
of land over to the rural poor The ulti- 
mate success of the program will depend 
heavily on our ability to provide technical 
and economic assistance. 

The dangers of the situation ai'e cleai' 
in the tragic and despicable assa.ssination 
of Archbishop Romero. If reform fails, FA 
Salvador will become a battleground be- 
tween the radical left and the radical 
right. A moderate solution is still possi- 
ble. It is in our interest. We will pursue 
this interest by helping the Government 
of FA Salvadoi- i)ursue progress. 

In short, we pursue our human 
rights objectives not only because they 
are right but because we have a stake in 
the stability that comes when people can 
e.xpress their hopes and find their futures 
freely. Oui- ideals and our interests 
coincide. 

Environmental Concerns 

F^ighth and finally, we cannot define our 
interests so narrowly as to e.xclude from 
our immediate attention a .series of other 
global trends that darken the horizon. We 
face a world population that could double 
in the ne.xt generation, ovenvhelming our 
global resources: already, for example, 
the world's tropical forests are disappear- 
ing at a rate of .50 acres a minute. The 
worldwide flood of refugees displaced 
from their homes — some 7-8 million 
people today — is growing. The enormous 
international traffic in narcotics costs our 
society nearly $50 billion each year and 
destroys thousands of lives. The mount- 
ing wave of international terrorism 
strikes at the vei-y heart of civilized 
order. 

Imagine for a moment h(jw different 
our world c(ju1(1 be for our children if we 
do not address these problems now on an 
urgent basis. T<i i-elegate these matters 
permanently to the back burner of our 



foreign jxilicy is to invite even more seri- 
ous consequences for us in the future. 

• Thus we have increased our bilat- 
eral aid commitment in family planning. 
The United States is the world's leading 
donoi- in this ai'ea. 

• We have focused greatei' attention 
and greatei- resources on efforts to deal 
with such potentially harmful environ- 
mental trends as the shrinking global 
base of troi)ical forests and farmland and 
the creeping spread of deserts. 

• The United States has taken a 
leading role in relief and resettlement of 
refugees, ])articularly in Southeast Asia 
where the need has iDeen most acute. 
Humanitarian considerations alone would 
compel our generous response. Our politi- 
cal and sti-ategic interests reinforce that 
requii'ement; for massive refugee flows 



We face a world pupidotion thai 
could double in flu- next generation, 
overwhelm I ng our glohal re- 
sources .... 



heighten lensi(jns in i'egi(]ns already un- 
settled by political and military conflict. 
We must help friendly governments 
which are risking severe internal strains 
as they shoulder a growing refugee 
burden. 

• Wheiwer possible, we have 
strengthened our bilateral c(Joperation 
with governments striving to halt the 
production of narcotics within their 
borders. 

The steps that we take now to ad- 
di'ess such global issues can prevent our 
being engulfed by them later. But let me 
make a fundamental ))oint here: On 
these — and (m many of the other chal- 
lenges I have discussed this morning — 
there can be no exclusively American so- 
lutions. There can only be international 
answers, or there will be no answers at 
all. 

The blight of terrorism is an espe- 
cially urgent case in point. No nation can 
defeat it alone. We have been working ac- 
tively through the United Nations and 
other multilateral institutions to build an 
international consensus on the criminality 
of terrorist tactics. International conven- 
tions — on aircraft sabotage, hijacking, 
the pi-otection of diplomats, and against 
the taking of hostages — play a crucial 
part. We need wider support for the prin- 
ciples that governments should not give 
in to terrorist blackmail and that both 



th(ise who commit and those who suppo) 
terrorism have to be punished. Evei-y 
feasible step — unilateral and multilat- 
eral — must be employed. 

In this and many other areas, the 
truth is that we cannot assure our futun 
security without a framewoi'k for global 
cooperation on issues that affect many L 
nations and many peoples. That is why 
\M' have welcomed and supported the 
growing strength of regional associatinii 
such as the Organization of American 
States, the Organization of African I in 
and the Assiiciati(in of South Kast Asiai 
Nations. 

And that is why we need to sup|Hir 
and continue to help sti'engthen. the 
United Nations and its affiliated insti 
tutions. It is a center of global politicf 
The collective expi'ession of world opini 
embodied in recent U.N. votes on Af 
ghanistan and Iran demonstrates lluii n 
interests can be advanced there. In tin' 
Middle East and elsewhere, its peaceket 
ing ojiei'ations reduce tensions. On n In 
gees: on the fight against hunger, illitcr 
acy, and disease: on strengthening inii i 
national resistance to terrorism; and un 
other issues of imjjortance to us, tin 
United Nations is making a concrete 
contribution. 

Certainly, there ai'e limits to what 
ternational organizations can accomplis 
But to dismiss them as irrelevant or in 
conse(|Uential would be folly. The sinipli 
fact is that we need them and they neei 
our support. The institutions of interna 
tional cooperation and international law 
are essential to the practical advani'c nl 
oui' interests in the woi'ld. 



Conclusion 



i 



24 



1 know that no one is more acutely awa. 
of the breadth and complexity of our ch^ 
lenges than the members of this commH 
tee. We face a broad agenda. It re(iuire; 
constant, hard choices among compelliiK 
yet competing interests. In a dangerous 
W(irld, it requires a willingness to defew 
our vital interests with force when neoe 
saiy and a diplomacy of active and con- 
structive engagement to reduce the dar< 
gers we may confront. It requires sac- 
i-ifice in resources for our defense and 
helj) for other nations, in reduced con- 
sumption of energy, and efforts to contr 
inflation. It will test our wisdom and ou 
persistence. 

We will be badly served if we fail t( 
understand a world of rapid change and 
shy away from its complexity. The flat 
truth is that complex problems can sel- 



Department of State Bulls 



INTERVIEW 



II 1h' ri'Sdlved l\v simple sdlutions. 
Sninc have said that we are ti-yinj; to 
(in much. I say that we cannot afford 
: III less, in our own national interest. 

Some say that in tiying to do too 
' li, we have accomplished too little. I 
, I hat in strengthening our military 
Kiuie. in reemphasizing and 
I •nirthening NATO, in negotiating the 
- 1 ;r 1 1 Ti'eaty, in normalizing relations 
'.■]] ( hina, in helping achieve peace be- 
■,en Israel and Egypt and a fi-amework 
a 1 (iinprehensive peace in the Middle 
. t, in advancing peace in Zimbabwe, in 
I I'anama Canal treaties, in the suc- 
i^t'ul multilateral trade negotiations 
.1 ni her improvements in the interna- 
i lal economic system, in closer ties to 
I i'liii)ing nations, and in promoting 
I Km rights — in all these areas, I say 
I air im the right road, even if it is a 
; and difficult one. 
Some say that in seeking peaceful 
iige toward human justice in every 
a li (if the world, we encourage 
r; icalism. I say that the world is chang- 
u , that human beings everywhere will 
d land a better hfe. The United States 
n ^t offer its own vision of a better fu- 
•. iir the future will belong to others. 
Slime have said that the executive 
a legislative branches cannot coUabo- 
r; e effectively on foreign policy. I say 
tl t the record over the past few years 
^ ill en a good one. 

Seine say that America is in a period 
lecline. I am convinced they are 
wmg. 

There is no question that the years 
( mile present a somber prospect. 
II t challenge in Afghanistan and ba- 
il , energy crisis, revolutionary explo- 
i> w hen expectations run ahead of 
;j irress — such current events are all too 
li 'ly tii be harbingers of the trends of 
t' c( lining decade. This is the reality we 

front. 

But it is also a reality that our 
(lengths — military, economic, and 
p itical — give us an unmatched capacity 
fi world leadership. We can succeed if 
« combine power with determination, 
B'sistence, and patience. We can make 
f )gress if we promote the full range of 
( • interests and use the full range of our 

1 engths. 



Deputy Secretary Christopher 
Interviewed on "Issues and Answers" 



'Press release 68. The complete traii- 
fiipt (if the hearings will be published by 
ilji ciimmittee and will be available from 
i\' Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
( vernment Printing Office, Washington, 
T'C. 20402. ■ 



l)v))iilii Sccrctarii of State WoD'eii 
Chrifttaphcr irns liitcrririred on ABC's 
"Issncfi and Aiisircrs" on April IS , 
1981), bji Bob Clark and Barrie 
Din/fonorc of ABC S'cwft. 

Q. There are reports today that Presi- 
dent Carter has a.sked this country's 
major allies to break off diplomatic re- 
lations with Iran next month if the hos- 
tages haven't been released by then. Is 
this true? 

A. Let me put that in context for 
you. As you know, the President, last 
Monday, the 7th of April, took a series of 
serious steps with I'espect to Iran. We 
really entered a new phase where we're 
going to be very determined and very de- 
liberate. 

We've asked our allies to join us in 
taking severe economic sanctions against 
Iran. The allies asked their ambassadors 
in Tehran to meet with President Bani- 
Sadr to let him know the seriousness of 
the matter. And now those ambassadors 
are returning to their capitals. We hope 
and expect that the allies will be acting 
with respect to tho.se matters of economic 
sanctions within the next few days. Per- 
haps they'll act jointly on the 21st of April 
at the time of the foreign ministers' meet- 
ing of the European Community. 

Now if that doesn't work, if there's 
no progress, if the hostages are not re- 
leased, the President has asked the allies 
to seriously consider further diplomatic 
steps. He's expressed the hope that they 
will join us in taking the kind of diplo- 
matic steps that we took last week. 

Now as far as that date, I don't want 
to confirm any specific date or even a 
particular month, but I will say the 
timeframe is not a long one. The Presi- 
dent said yesterday it's not a matter of 
months, and it's not more than a matter 
of several weeks. 

Q. You say the President has asked 
the allies to take the— if further eco- 
nomic sanctions don't work — to take 
the sort of diplomatic sanctions that we 
took last week, and that was a total 
breakoff of diplomatic relations with 
Iran. So the President has asked our al- 
lies to do that. Is that correct? 

A. Yes, he asked them to do that if 
there was no progress and if the hostages 
had not been released after these other 



sanctions had had an opiioitunity to be ef- 
fective. 

Q. Ever since the President made 
his announcement various spokesmen 
for the government have hinted about 
the possibility of using the military op- 
tion if these things don't work out. But 
it's been nothing more than hints, and 
as a matter of fact, the other day ,lody 
Powell I White House press secretary] 
seemed to be backing away a little bit 
from that. How realistic is a military 
option? 

A. Let me talk to you about the op- 
tions that remain. The President took a 
number of very serious steps last 
Monday. As you know, he broke diplo- 
matic relations. He took the steps with 
respect to visas. He put into effect severe 
economic sanctions. He called for a cen- 
sus of the claims against Iran. Now those 
steps deserve some time to work. We also 
deserve to give our allies an opportunity 
to join us. 

But if those things are not effective, 
then the President will obviously have to 
consider the other options that are open 
to him. He has some nonmilitary options 
that are left. They are somewhat difficult 
to implement, but they are serious steps 
and he'll have to consider those. Out be- 
yond those there are military options. 
The President has always reserved the 
right to take options that would be per- 
missible under international law of a mili- 
tai-y character if nothing else worked. 

I think that's where we ai'e now. The 
President has taken severe steps. We 
hope that they will be effective. If they're 
not effective, then there are other options, 
both nonmilitary and militai-y in character, 
that the President will consider. 

Q. It seems, however, that the Ad- 
ministration is quite happy to let the 
news media speculate on what the other 
options, the military options might be. 
My question is that when the students 
or the militants are threatening to kill 
the hostages if even the slightest mili- 
tary action is taken, how realistic does 
that option become? 

A. I think the President is detei- 
mined that we will succeed in our goals 
with respect to the hostages. We've al- 
ways had twin goals and that is to secure 
their safe release and at the same time 
not do anything to impair the credibility 
and honor of the United States, not give 



Jy 1980 



25 



Interview 



in to ten-orism. We continue to pursue 
those goals and will keep all of our op- 
tions before us. We're not going to tele- 
graph our decisions. I understand it's 
natural for there to be speculation about 
them, but the President is moving delib- 
erately. But we are on a new course of 
determination and deliberation in order 
to increase the [iressure. 

Q. But the student militants hold- 
ing the ho.stages said this weekend that 
they have put explosives in the walls of 
the U.S. Emhassy and will, in their 
words, "blow the hostages sky high" if 
we take any slightest military action. 
How do you deal with threats like that 
whether they're credible or not, and at 
the same time even talk about military 
action? 

A. We have to weigh them very care- 
fully. There are so many statements com- 
ing out of Iran that one can't credit any 
particular statement. We have heard that 
statement before. Nevertheless, we will 
have to do what we think is in the best 
interests of the hostages and in the best 
interests of our countiy. We will tiy to 
weigh as well as we can the many 
statements that come out of Tehran, but 
at the same time I think we can't give 
credibility to any one claim, any one 
charge, any one pressure point from theii' 
side. 

Q. .And ar iher statement that has 
come out of Iran this weekend comes 
from President Bani-Sadr who said yes- 
terday that he will invite an interna- 
tional organization to visit the hostages 
to check on their health and monitor 
\ isits to them. Would you see this as a 
hopeful development? 

A. That statement appai-ently came 
in connection with his meeting with the 
ambassadors from the European Commu- 
nity. Frankly, from their .standpoint, that 
was a very disappointing meeting. He did 
not pi-omise that the hostages would be 
released. He did not give any indication 
that he had a jilan for that. What he did 
say is that perhaps an international or- 
ganization such as the Red Cross could 
visit. 

Now naturally we would welcome 
such a visit. We always have said that 
anyone who could see the hostages, who 
could determine their condition, some re- 
liable outside observer to do that would 
be desirable. Rut that's not the real solu- 
tion. The real solution is to get them re- 
leased. We have heard so many indi- 
cations that they would let international 



26 



agencies in to inspect them or to see them 
that fi'ankly we've become somewhat 
skeptical. We'll be glad if it happens, but 
that isn't the end of the line. The end of 
the line is to get them released. 

Q. -And in that meeting you speak 
of. President Bani-Sadr also said he re- 
jected a demand by representatives of 
our allies that the hostages be released 
by a specified date. Is that a setback at 
this stage to our continued and escalat- 
ing efforts to involve our allies in this 
process? 

A. No, I would think it would be 
helpful in that regard because those am- 
bassadors will go back and report to their 
capitals that Bani-Sadr is not under the 
pre.sent circum,slances prepared to do 
anything. And I think that will encourage 
the allies. It certainly ought to encourage 
them to take the kind of economic sanc- 
tions we're asking them to take. 

Q. Let's talk about the allies for a 
moment. This week the President ex- 
pressed disappointment with what the 
allies had done to that point. What 
makes you think that you're going to 
get the kind of cooperation in terms of 
economic sanctions that we want? It 
was easy enough for us to do it, after 
all, because it didn't really cost us any- 
thing, but it would cost countries like 
Germany and Italy a great deal to do 
that. 

A. It wasn't cost free here. As a mat- 
ter of fact, we've asked for sacrifices 
from Americans all across the board both 
in respect to Iran and Afghanistan. And, 
fortunately, the American people have 
been united, and they've been tei-rific on 
this subject. 

Now the allies during the months of 
Januai-y, February and March — while 
there was a real negotiating track, while 
there was a possibility of achieving some- 
thing either through the United Nations 
or through other negotiating efforts — had 
suggested that we not press for the sanc- 
tions. But I think they realize that that 
phase has come to an end. And I hope 
that they will understand the seriousness 
of the matter now. We're looking for ac- 
tion from them at this point, not words. 

Q. Do you hope — I mean do you 
really think you're going to get it, and 
what would be the timeframe again? 

A. I would hope, as I said earlier, 
that when their ambassadors come back 
and give this report that that will give 
them a realistic picture of what's happen- 
ing in Iran. And then they're going to 



meet in the Eui'opean Community, I | 
understand, on the 21st of April. And it r 
my hope that they will take action at th.l' 
time to impose the sanctions as if the 
U.N. resolution had not been vetoeil li\ 
the Soviet Union, that is that they v\ ill 
ban all shipments to Iran e.xcept foi- fooi 
and medicine. 

Q. -Are we threatening our allies I 
even implicitly by suggesting that, if I 
they don't go along, we'll have to I 
blockade the Persian Gulf and they'll I 
have to cut off trade anyway? 

A. The statement of a reality sume 
times communicates itself as a threat . I 
think the fact is that if we are not etTcc- 
tive with the sanctions that are in place 
now and if the allies don't join us ami i 
the subsequent nonmilitaiy actions that 
we might take — if none of those things 
works, then we'll have to consider othe 
options, and those may be less attractix 
than the options that are open to us \\n\ 

Q. Is there somewhere down the 
road another type of threat, that is th 
threat that has been talked about froi 
time to time over the past ♦) months o 
putting more realistic pressure on thi 
allies perhaps in the form of letting 
them know that we will have to redu( 
our support to NATO unless they give 
us more help in this crisis in the Per- 
sian Gulf area? 

A. I'd like to respond to that by sa; 
ing that our alliance is really the bedro( 
of our .security. Our allies are important 
to us, and we're important to them. Sc 
don't think we're talking about the .secu 
rity relationship here. We're talking 
about what good allies and good friends 
do for each other when there is ti'ouble 

Now this is not just trouble for 
America. This is trouble for the world i 
a whole. They happen to be our ho.stage 
but the principle involved is a principle 
international law. It's a principle of inte 
national human rights. And so I think t 
allies will want to join us in resolving tl 
pi-oblem. 

Q. But we are approaching the 
(i-month mark now in the holding oft 
hostages and we've gotten precious 
little help from the allies. Doesn't the 
moment come where we have to get 
tougher, and the question is being 
asked increasingly editorially across 
the country who really needs allies wl 
don't stand with us at critical momen 

A. We need our allies. One hundrec 
and sixty-two days have gone on. I thin 



Department of State Buiie 



Interview 



r're aware of that. I think they're 
re that we're in a new phase of this 
. from their standpoint as well as from 
standpoint. And I'm hopeful that they 
the situation in terms that will cause 
to take some action within the next 
3 weeks. 

Q. Do you feel that the U.S. Olym- 
Coinmittee'.s decision yesterday will 
» to bring around some of the allies 
he subject of boycotting the Olym- 

A. Yes, I think that was a most wel- 
e decision. I think the Olympic Com- 
ee deserves our congratulations. The 
; President said it was a referendum 
reedom, and the refei-endum came out 
It. 

I think it's a vei-y good bet that our 
(S will join us, our principal ones, in 
Eotting the Olympics. I think we'll see 

happening over the course of the 
: month. And I think the whole proc- 
lis gi'eatly strengthened by what hap- 
Bd in Colorado yesterday. 

My own feeling is that the Olympics, 

Key do ever take place, will only be a 
low of what was expected before the 
tal invasion of Afghani-stan. 

Q. You sound very hopeful that our 
m or allies will join us. Can you be a 
lit e more specific? .\re you talking 
al ut all of our major allies in Europe: 
Btain, France, Germany, Italy, all of 
tl-^e'.' 

A. Kach one is a somewhat separate 
, ami each of them has different rela- 
-liips with their Olympic committees. 
' 1 think I'll just stand on the point 
I lielieve that at the end of a month 
! iiiiw, or at least befoi'e May 25th, 

II find most of oui- major allies — oui' 
cipal allies — joining us in boycotting 
( Mympic Games. 

Q. One of the anomalies of this 
as I week has been the feud between 
ri and Iran heating up once again. 
1 \ seriously do we consider that par- 
1 iar problem? Could it be a factor in 
I" hostages' future? 

.\. We know about that mainly by 

'. It we read in the newspapers. As you 

\\. we don't have diplomatic relations 

I I rtin now, but we have not had dip- 
it ir relations with Iraq for some time. 

II not involved in any way in the con- 
rr-y between the two of them. It's a 

;.-t;iiiding controversy. It has roots in 
-' iiic |iroblems, religious problems. 



boundai-y problems between them. But 
we're out of that picture. 

Now as far as the relationship to the 
hostage situation, that's a very hard cal- 
culus to make, but I would have to say 
that on balance that anything that in- 
creases instability in the area tends to 
add an additional threat to the hostages. 
But it's nothing that we can do anything 
about at the present time. It's only some- 
thing that we're watching from the 
sidelines, not involved. 

Q. We're not involved at the mo- 
ment, but I think one of Iraq's concerns 
is that the Soviet Union would attempt 
to exploit the situation in Iran, and de- 
spite the fact that the Iraqis, as you 
know, have been receiving aid from 
Russia for a long time, they evidently 
are very concerned about that possibil- 
ity. Is the United States concerned, and 
what would our response be if Iraq 
were threatened by the Russians? 

A. Our response would be a serious 
one if any of the countries in the Middle 
East were invaded by the Soviet Union. 
If the Soviet Union were to invade Iran 
or to invade Iraq, we would have a reac- 
tion somewhat similar to the invasion of 
Afghanistan. 

That's exactly the kind of a problem 
that we foresaw when we said that the 
invasion of Afghanistan was a ma.jor in- 
ternational matter, a violation of interna- 
tional law, and something that the inter- 
national community had to respond to 
with strength and determination. 

Q. What do you see at the moment 
as the role of the Soviet Union? Are the 
Russians indeed supporting Iran as 
they appear to be in this conflict with 
Iraq, or could there be something else 
beneath the surface that might revive 
their old alliance with Iraq? 

A. Right now I see the Soviet Union 
having their hands full in Afghanistan. 
Just before coming up here, I read an 
analysis of the comparability between the 
difficulties the Soviet Union is having in 
Afghanistan and those that we had in 
Vietnam. They're obviously not a com- 
pletely parallel situation, but let me say 
that the Soviet Union is having a great 
deal of difficulty in Afghanistan. Their 
generals are asking for more troops. 
They're having a great difficulty using 
the Afghan Army They're pouring in ad- 
ditional troops. It's now well over 
100,000, probably over 110,000. 

So I would say that's the main pre- 



occupation of the Soviets at the present 
time. It's veiy hard to read their inten- 
tions with respect to Iraq. 

Q. You say the Soviets are having a 
great deal of trouble in Afghanistan. Is 
this good or bad in the long run? Does 
it reduce the danger that they might 
eventually try to drive on to the Persian 
Gulf because their hands are so full 
now in Afghanistan or what is danger? 

A. I think the combination of the in- 
ternational pressure on them because of 
the action they've taken and the difficulty 
they're having will tend to deter them in 
the future. Our whole policy with respect 
to that invasion has been first to make 
them pay a heavy cost for that and, sec- 
ond, to deter them from taking com- 
parable action in the future. 

I think they are being shown that 
when they try to go in and take over an 
independent country, shoot up its 
mosques, and execute a number of its 
people, that they can't easily subjugate 
that kind of a countiy The Afghan people 
are a brave and determined people and 
they're giving the Soviets a great deal of 
difficulty. If I were sitting in the Soviet 
Union, I would not regard that as the 
kind of event that would encourage me to 
repeat it. 

Q. It's been announced that Secre- 
tary Vance will meet with Soviet For- 
eign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next 
month. What would be the purpose of 
that meeting? is there any hope to im- 
prove U.S. -Soviet relations as long as 
the Afghan affair goes on? 

A. I'd have to quarrel with your 
premise. That was certainly not an- 
nounced from here. There have been no 
specific arrangements for such a meeting 
in Vienna. 

That being said, let me say that I 
think it's important for us to keep the 
lines of communication open to the Soviet 
Union. We've been meeting here with 
their diplomatic officials. Secretaiy Vance 
met, as you know, with Ambassador Dob- 
i-ynin the other evening. We do not want 
to go back to the cold war situation with 
the Soviet Union and at the right mo- 
ment we want to continue whatever con- 
tacts we can with them that might be of a 
useful nature. But I don't know whether 
such a meeting will take place in Vienna. 

Q. What is our response to recent 
Soviet suggestions on arms control? Are 



;980 



27 



Interview 



we interested in arms control with the 
Russians at all at this point? 

A. Yes, I think we intend to try to 
keep the fabric of East- West relations in 
order, and one of the ways we can do that 
is to pursue arms control negotiations 
with them. They're in our interest. 
They're perhaps in our mutual interests. 
So we've been meeting with them on a 
number of arms control matters, the 
mutual and balanced force reductions, the 
negotiations in central Europe. Other ne- 
gotiations go foi-ward. 

We continued to talk to them about 
the SALT Treaty and to indicate to them 
our desire not to prevent its subsequent 
ratification when the right time comes. 
So I would say that arms control, the 
prospect of arms control, is one of the 
avenues for possible improvement of our 
relations with the Soviet Union if and 
when the situation stabilizes. 

Q. Prime Minister Begin of Israel 
is arriving in Washington this week 
close on the heels of President Sadat of 
Egypt who met with President Carter 
this past week and delivered some very 
strong expressions of concern here 
about Israeli settlements on the West 
Bank. 

The question is hanging at the 
moment as to whether or not Mr. Car- 
ter plans to deliver a tough message to 
Mr. Begin that "it is a time to bring an 
end to your government's settlement 
policy or we're going to have to get 
tough in some way." Would you expect 
that the President will indeed deliver 
such a message? 

A. We look foi-ward to Prime Minis- 
ter Begin's visit just as we did to Presi- 
dent Sadat's. We had a good session with 
President Sadat — constructive — and 
made progress. I think we'll have the 
same kind of a session with Prime Minis- 
ter Begin. 

As you know, the autonomy talks 
have gone on for some time. Ambassador 
Linowitz [Personal Representative of the 
President for the Middle East Peace Ne- 
gotiations] has indicated that progress 
has been made, but the two meetings 
with the heads of state give an opportu- 
nity to give a new impetus to the au- 
tonomy negotiations. I think the Presi- 
dent wall be exploring with Prime Minis- 
ter Begin ways in which those autonomy 
talks can be speeded up looking toward 
some ver>' substantial progress by the 
year-end deadline of Mav 26th. 



Q. It's now been well over a year 
and a half since the Camp David sum- 
mit. There's been a great deal of 
tongue-clucking by the Administration 
about both the settlements on the West 
Bank and the lack of progress on Pales- 
tinian autonomy, but nothing happens. 

We do have the capability of get- 
ting very tough with Israel through the 
threat of cutting off economic and mili- 
tary aid for instance. Why are the Pres- 
ident and this Administration so reluc- 
tant to apply real pressure on Israel? 

A. You say nothing has happened, 
and I just have to disagree with you on 
that. Egypt and Israel have diplomatic 
relations. Traffic goes back and forth be- 
tween the countries. They've exchanged 
ambassadors. That's a very historic step. 
So a great deal has happened. 

In addition to that, I would remind 
you — I believe it's correct to say — that all 
elements of the Camp David agreement 
have been abided by up to the present 
time, some of them even in advance of 
the deadlines. So we're not dissatisfied 
with the progress under the Camp David 
agreement. And I think the President 
will be talking with Prime Minister Begin 
in the same frame of mind as he did with 
President Sadat: How can we keep this 
progress going? We together have taken 
these important steps. We've made this 
progi'ess. Now let's keep moving down 
the line. 

Q. Do you really mean to say that 
you are not dissatisfied with the con- 
tinuing expansion of Israeli settlements 
on the West Bank? 

A. Our view on that is well known. 
Yes, we think the settlements are an ob- 
stacle to progress in this area. We've told 
the Israelis that not only for months but 
for a long time, but I think that particu- 
lar aspect does not prevent our making 
progress on the autonomy talks. Indeed, 
that is one of the issues that will have to 
be discussed, and progress made on it as 
well, in connection with the autonomy 
talks. 

Q. A general question on I'.S. for- 
eign policy: In a political year, virtually 
everything the President does at least is 
open to the possibility that he's doing it 
for political reasons. Tb what extent 
has the campaign infringed upon for- 
eign policy over the last few months? 



A. I haven't seen any indication thi' 
it has. Indeed, perhaps the opposite is " 
more true. I think foreign policy has inl 
fringed on the campaign. Sitting here ii 
the State Department we ask for and g 
a great deal of the President's time. He 
occupies himself on foreign policy natu- 
rally a great deal of his time, especially! 
the midst of crises such as the Iran crisj 
and the Afghanistan crisis. So the Presr 
dent has been prevented from campaig'' 
ing, and he's been having to rivet his a ' 
tention on these matters of foreign poll , 
So I would say the effect has been mori ' 
the other way. ' 

I 

Q. It is noted that he has made a 
couple of important announcements 
vis-a-vis Iran on primary days, and h 
famous news conference on the morr 
ing of the Wisconsin primary escapee 
no one's attention. It's certainly 
sometimes — the impression is certair; 
there that there is a connection be- 
tween the two. 

A. I was there that morning and t 
reason he made that statement that 
morning was because Bani-Sadr had 
made a speech in Iran that day that re 
quired a response. We had waited for t 
speech. We had waited for an indicati'. 
that progress might be made, and tin- 
President responded in due course in 
good order But the triggering event 
there was not the Wisconsin primary 1 i 
the speech made by Bani-Sadr I' 

Q. When Senator Kennedy accu: ,■ 
the President on the campaign trail 5 
he has repeatedly, of betraying Isra^ . 
now doesn't that impinge on the con , 
duct of foreign policy? Doesn't that -> fi, 
of box the President in in getting 
tougher with Israel for instance? 

A. The President is absolutely con* 
mitted to the security of Israel. He is 
committed to making the process work 
He has not betrayed Israel. Indeed, oi 
support for Israel is one of the main el 
ments of American foreign policy. So it 
just inaccurate to charge the President 
with that. ■ 



28 



Department of State Bui!' 



I^RICA 



i^it of Kenyan President Moi 



/', , siiiciif Ddiiicl r. amp Mai of 
,' nuulr a state visit to the United 

. Fihruavji 19-JJ, 19S(l. While in 
: In Hilton, he met with President 
II ; and other government of'fieials. 
iuiring is the text of the White House 

■ii/ent issued on Feburari/ J(l.' 

iident Carter met this morning for 
our and 15 minutes in the Cabinet 
m with President Daniel arap Moi 
e Republic of Kenya. President 
lis in Washington on a 4-day state 
at the invitation of President Car- 
In addition to their meeting this 
ning, the two leaders will meet 
|n tonight at a state dinner in the 
Ite House. 

'The two Presidents reviewed the 
close relations which exist be- 
W^i the United States and the 
l< ublic of Kenya. They discussed 
'■ 'Inpments in East Africa anrl the 
iifaiice of regional cooperation and 
■1 ■^^anding in that area. They also 
■ I \\(m1 developments in southern Af- 
aiiil agreed upon the importance of 
n elections and a i)eaceful settlement 
n imbabwe-Rhoilesia. 

The two Presidents discussed the 

I ■ Union's invasion of Afghanistan 
iLjit-ed on concerted action in not 

uipating in the Olympic Games in 
( n\\ . They also discussed a range of 

- concerning regional stability in 
I'l rsian Gulf and Indian Ocean 
-, including the measures required 
I isiiri' mutual security in that re- 

Tlii- two Presidents also discussed 
III! pi-dblems in the Middle East, 
ML' w hich President Carter ex- 
~ril his gratitude for Kenya's sup- 
ami President Moi's personal 

II -I in efforts to secure the release 

III iliplomats being held hostage in 

I bilateral issues were also re- 
\i i|, including U.S. assistance pro- 
lix in Kenya. 



I ' \t from Weekly Compilation of 
:■ iitial Documents of Feb. 25, 1980, 

I also contains President Carter's and 
iliiit Moi's exchange of remarks at the 

I I ceremony on Feb. 20 and their din- 
lasts that evening. ■ 




President Moi and President Carter iwh 



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CORRECTION 

In the April 1980 issue, the first sen- 
tence of the last paragraph on page 6 
should read: "The United States has 
often taken the lead and is a major par- 
ticipant in both emergency and long- 
range Sahelian programs." 



29 



EAST ASIA 



Human Rights Conditions 
in Non-Communist Asia 



Statements by Assistant Secretari/ 
fur East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Richard C. Holbrooke a)id Assistant 
Secretari/ for Hnniaii Rights and Hu- 
man itariaii Affairs Patricia M. Derian 
before the Subcommittees on Interna- 
tional Organizations and Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign 
Affairs Conimittee on February 6, 
198(1. 1 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
HOLBROOKE 

I am very pleased to have the opportu- 
nity to appear before you to speak 
about our human rights policies in Asia. 

Let me begin by reaffirming that 
human rights is an integral element in 
U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. In our 
relations with any specific country, 
there must, by necessity, be a number 
of objectives — national security con- 
cerns, economic and commercial ties, 
cultural relations, broad foreign policy 
goals, and, of course, human rights. 
Over the past 3 years in East Asia, we 
have made significant progress on the 
human rights front without damaging 
or subordinating our other objectives. 

As Vice President Mondale said in 
May of 1978, the refugee problem is the 
number one human rights issue in East 
Asia today. During the past 5 years, 
the Communist regimes of Indochina — 
Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea — have 
dislocated hundreds of thousands of 
people in those countries; the number 
may be in the millions. 

In Kampuchea the Pol Pot regime 
began the destruction and forced mi- 
gration of the Khmer population. This 
has been perpetuated and compounded 
by the Vietnamese invasion and subju- 
gation of Kampuchea. Nearly half a 
million Khmer refugees are now in 
Thailand and on the Thai border. Mas- 
sive numbers of Khmer have been killed 
or starved. The food denial policy of the 
Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin re- 
gime is perhaps the most egregious 
example of continuing human rights 
violations in Kampuchea. 

In 1978 Hanoi began sending its 
ethnic minorities and "undesirables" 
out to sea in boats, leaving them to 



wash up on the shores of neighboring 
countries. Finally, the largest Laotian 
city is now in Thailand at the refugee 
camp of Nong Khai, and it increases 
every day as new refugees arrive from 
Laos. 

The initial burden of this refugee 
migration has fallen on Hong Kong and 
the members of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and most especially on Thailand. They 
have responded with compassion, pro- 
viding shelter and first asylum, until 
the refugees can be systematically re- 
settled. The United States has made a 
major effort to ease the refugee burden 
on ASEAN, working with the United 
Nations and international voluntary or- 
ganizations to feed, shelter, and reset- 
tle the refugees. Thus the issue of 
human rights has been the key to our 
response to the continuing tragedy in 
Indochina. I believe we all have a duty 
to try to keep the world's attention fo- 
cused on this situation. 

At the same time, we are also see- 
ing significant progress in human rights 
conditions in the non-Communist coun- 
tries of East Asia. Our own attention to 
the human rights cause has contributed 
to this progress, without jeopardizing 
our other very important objectives in 
our relations with these countries. In 
fact, U.S. relations with the countries 
of non-Communist Asia have improved 
across the board in recent years. 

Let me cite a few examples. In 
Korea the assassination of President 
Park last October sent a profound shock 
through the Republic of Korea. The 
period of adjustment and transition is 
now underway, and the present interim 
Government in Seoul is dedicated to the 
goal of a more broadly based political 
system. Work is underway to write and 
adapt a new constitution to enable na- 
tional elections for a President this 
year. 

With regard to the Philippines, 
where we have manifold, complex, and 
close relations, there have been a 
number of recent improvements in the 
human rights situation. The govern- 
ment has responded positively to 
domestic criticism of military abuses in 



the areas of active insurgency. One 
week ago there were elections for go 
ernors, mayors, and thousands of less 
officials, for the first time since 19711 

In Indonesia the government cok 
pleted on schedule its 3-year prograr 
to release approximately 30,000 prist, 
ers detained in the wake of the 1965 
coup attempt by the Indonesian Com 
munist Party. This resolves a major 
focus of international concern. The 
United States, international organiza 
tions, and Indonesia are cooperating 
ease the situation in East Timor. WI 
problems remain, I believe your visif 
there, Chairman Wolff [Lester L. W( 
of New York], showed that on this fr 
too, progress is being made. 

I do not mean by these comment 
to underestimate the problems that S' 
face us. Asia encompasses a cultural 
linguistic, political, and economic div 
sity unsurpassed in any other region! 
the world. Some governments face e«i 
ternal military threats or internal 
armed insurrections and have con- 
sequently suspended constitutional 
guarantees of freedom or instituted 
martial law. Others enjoy a shaky 
political stability which tends to expa 
perceptions of sedition and seditious 
tivity. In a great many Asian countri 
governments must cope with aspira- 
tions of ethnic and cultural groups 
which threaten the stability of the sc 
cial order. 

I recognize that the next decade 
will be a difficult one for all of the coi 
tries of Asia, and particularly for tht 
cause of freedom in that part of the 
world. On balance, however, I believ 
that America's championing of freedc 
in Asia has already contributed to an 
improvement in the basic human con^ 
tion in this part of the world and tha 
we shall continue to see further prog 
ress in the future. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIA! 

I welcome the opportunity to partici- 
pate in this joint hearing of the Asiai 
and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee an( 
the Subcommittee on International C 
ganizations. 

The letter of invitation from the 
subcommittees asked me to evaluate 



30 



East Asia 



nan rights conditions in non- 
mmunist Asia; review the process by 
ich the State Department's human 
hts reports on the countries in this 
a are prepared; assess the effect of 
• policy in promoting changes in 
nan rights conditions in the coun- 
>s in question; comment on whether 
sacrifice moral and diplomatic influ- 
:e by continuing assistance to human 
hts-violating countries; and, finally, 
'culate on the possibility of the non- 
mmunist countries of Asia joining 
tret her to address their human rights 
i),l.lcms. 

r.cfore addressing these questions, 
1 Diild like to mention briefly three 
ii ini-tant human rights issues in Coni- 
n nist Asia. First, Vietnam's internal 
p icii's, particularly toward ethnic 
Cinise, have generated a large refu- 
a ■ (xikIus, leading uncountable nuni- 
s III drown at sea. Second, the Viet- 
ni >e invasion and occupation of 
t nipuchea have aggravated the 
.1 le.T of mass famine. Third, while the 
F .Iil,''s Republic of China has engaged 
Mine j-elaxation of strict internal 
;i lols, the removal of Democracy 
\ 11 t(i a less accessible location is dis- 
a )(iiiiting. 

I would like to turn now to the 
-tiiin of human rights conditions in 
1 i4'ommunist East Asia. As you 
jw, last week the Department of 
-ite submitted to the Congress 
igthy and comprehensive reports on 
nan rights conditions in 154 coun- 
"es, including those of non-Communist 
St Asia. Therefore, my prepared re- 
rks this morning will simply high- 
ht the most important concerns in 
•h. 



e interim government under Presi- 
nt Choi released most political pris- 
ers and has abrogated emergency 
■asure 9, which severely restricted 
lividual rights. However, martial law 
ovisions, announced immediately 
er President Park's death, have 
iced significant limits on the exercise 
political and civil rights. A small 
mber of dissidents have been ar- 
jted and sentenced to prison for 
iging peaceful demonstrations, 
esident Choi has stated his commit- 
jnt to a more liberalized political sys- 
m, and amendment of the constitution 
underway in the National Assembly 
lich has resumed operation with the 
rticipation by the opposition party. 



Philippines 

Since 1972 President Marcos has exer- 
cised unrestrained executive authority 
under martial law. Political and civil 
rights are greatly restricted. Rights 
are more restricted in rural provinces, 
particularly where there are active in- 
surgencies. Reports of the incidence of 
military abuses of civilians in outlying 
areas have significantly increased dur- 
ing 1979. The government tried and 
dismissed some military personnel for 
abuses and held hearings in several lo- 
cations on the problem. The govern- 
ment admits to holding 579 persons as 
public order violators — persons accused 
of subversion, sedition, and rebellion. 
Most of these persons can be considered 
as political prisoners and are held in the 
Manila area. The clergy, which became 
more critical of Marcos in 1979, alleges 
that additional numbers are held in the 
provinces. Local elections, the first 
since 1971, were recently held. 



Indonesia 

Detainees from the 1965 coup attempt 
were either released before December 
31, 1979, or, in 23 cases, are being 
brought to trial. Although no reliable 
figures are available, it appears that 
many thousands of East Timorese have 
died" of hunger and in warfare since 
1975, and this subject has been a mat- 
ter of international concern. This year 
East Timor has been opened up to relief 
efforts by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross and the Catholic Re- 
lief Service and to diplomatic and jour- 
nalists visits. A congressional delega- 
tion visited the island last month. 

Other Indonesian human rights is- 
sues include the broad powers of deten- 
tion held bv security authorities, the 
lack of bail' and habeas corpus in exist- 
ing legal codes, and the need to replace 
the anti-subversion law and the old 
Dutch penal code. The government has 
introduced legislation in Parliament, a 
draft law on criminal procedures, which 
is designed to replace the series of co- 
lonial laws which now provide the pri- 
mary guidance for the legal system. 

Taiwan 

For the past quarter century, Taiwan 
officials have considered the country 
still in a civil war situation. Some posi- 
tive trends have been overshadowed by 
government actions taken after opposi- 



tion demonstrations in Kaohsiung last 
December 10. Taiwan authorities began 
a general crackdown on the leadership 
of Foniiu^a magazine which had or- 
ganized the demonstration. About 24 
people were arrested and charged with 
the capital crime of "sedition" and will 
reportedly be tried by military tribu- 
nals. Among those arrested were the 
prominent Taiwanese legislator (Wong 
Shin Shay) and several members of the 
Presbyterian Church. Another 37 are 
still in custody, and it appears that they 
will be tried in civil courts, presumably 
on lesser charges. Three opposition 
magazines were also closed. 

Thailand 

Parliamentary government was rees- 
tablished with national elections in 
March, the martial law order permit- 
ting detention without trial was re- 
pealed, and prisoners were released. 
The government has retained some re- 
strictions on media content and an 
internal security law with arbitrary de- 
tention provisions. Both measures are 
seldom used. Although Thailand ini- 
tially took steps to forcibly repatriate 
Khmer refugees, they have reversed 
this policy and work closely with 
foreign and international organizations 
to provide assistance to refugees. 



Malaysia 

During 1979 the government invoked 
the Internal Security Act to arrest par- 
ticipants in a strike by union members 
against the national airline on the 
grounds that this constituted interfer- 
ence with an essential service. This ac- 
tion provoked strong reactions vvfithin 
Malaysia and abroad, and all detainees 
were subsequently released. 

An insurgent threat and the possi- 
bility of communal conflict are cited to 
justify legislation which makes it legal 
to arrest and detain, without trial, per- 
sons suspected of activities that 
threaten general "civic order." 

Singapore 

On January 31, Amnesty International 
issued a report accusing the Singapore 
Government of systematically stifling 
political dissent by continuing to detain 
people without trial and maltreating 
prisoners. Political power in Singapore 
is concentrated in one ruling party, the 
People's Action Party. It dominates the 
Parliament, having won all seats in the 
past three elections with approximately 



ay 1980 



31 



East Asia 



709c of the vote. In Singapore discus- 
sion of certain ethnically sensitive top- 
ics is prohibited. 

The press is circumspect in its 
treatment of the government, due, at 
least in part, to the need for annual re- 
newal of publishing licenses. The gov- 
ernment enjoys broad popular support, 
and its record in economic and social 
matters is excellent. The Amnesty re- 
port contends, however, that signifi- 
cant advances in the social and eco- 
nomic areas have been accompanied by 
rigorous internal political repression. 

Japan 

Japan is a parliamentary democracy in 
which democratic institutions are well- 
established. Human rights are guaran- 
teed by the Japanese Constitution and 
secured by a just and efficient legal 
system. Freedoms of speech, press, re- 
ligion, and assembly are guaranteed by 
law and respected. In 1979 Japan com- 
pleted ratification of the International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 

Burma 

Burma has an authoritarian system of 
government under president Ne Win. 
Freedom of expression is limited. Pub- 
lic criticism of the leadership is not tol- 
erated nor is political assembly nor 
organizing outside of government- 
sponsored mass and party organiza- 
tions. The exact number of political 
prisoners is uncertain but believed by 
observers to be between 150 and 250. 

Human Rights Reports 
and Policies 

I would like next to address the other 
questions posed in your letter of invita- 
tion. Several concern the process by 
which the human rights reports are 
written. Last year, Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher and two of 
the deputies serving in my office tes- 
tified before the House Subcommittee 
on International Organizations. The 
process remains essentially the same 
today. It is also fully described in the 
introduction to the 1979 report sub- 
mitted last week. 

In answering the question as to 
whether U.S. pressure brings about 
changes in human rights policies, I 
realize I am up against the perennial 



32 



bottom line. Does the policy make a 
difference? 

There is no doubt that the human 
rights issue has come to the center of 
world attention over the past several 
years. There has been a geometric in- 
crease in world consciousness, and sig- 
nificant improvements in human rights 
conditions have occurred in every re- 
gion of the world over the past 3 years. 
When improvements are made, we 
prefer to regard them as the results of 
decisions made by the governments and 
peoples involved. But I am confident 
that the policy has contributed to an 
environment in which such changes are 
much more likely. 

Military Assistance to Violators 

Let me now address the issue of 
whether the United States sacrifices its 
moral and diplomatic influence by con- 
tinuing military assistance to severe 
violators of human rights. Human 
rights remain a very high priority in 
foreign policy decisionmaking. There 
are also security interests which may 
require, on occasion, the provision of 
U.S. assistance to a serious human 
rights violator. In such cases, we have 
undertaken in clear, direct, and persis- 
tent ways to emphasize our concerns 
about human rights conditions no mat- 
ter how important the security re- 
lationship. The U.S. Government uses 
all other means at its disposal, includ- 
ing private diplomatic interchange, 
symbolic public acts, careful review of 
economic aid programs, and prohibition 
of the export of police equipment. 

Regional Institutions 

I turn last to the final question in your 
letter to Secretary Vance. "Is it possi- 
ble for non-Communist countries to 
join together to address their own 
human rights problems?" You have 
raised a profound and important ques- 
tion. I hope it will be one we can 
explore further. 

The year 1979 saw considerable 
progress in the building of regional and 
international institutions for the pro- 
tection of basic human rights. These in- 
stitutions can do the most to advance 
and to secure human freedoms. You are 
familiar with the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity's call for the establishment of 
a permanent pan-African body for the 
protection of human rights. 



In our own hemisphere, the Ameri I 
can Convention on Human Rights re- 
cently came into force. An Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights has 
been established and is meeting in 
Costa Rica. In Western Europe, the 
Council of Europe's Human Rights 
Commission and Court of Human 
Rights continue to be active. 

Unfortunately, such activity as yi 
has no analogue in non-Communist or 
Communist Asia. Clearly it is not for 
outsiders to prescribe the precise form 
regional human rights cooperation 
might take, but one could imagine the 
ASEAN states investigating the possi 
bility of establishing a human rights or 
ganization in the framework of that as. 
sociation. There is also the possibility i| 
nonmember states being prepared to 
associate themselves in this particular 
activity. 

Whatever form institutions finallj 
take, it is vital that those interested i 
and committed to human rights in thei 
region join together and discuss what 
kinds of institutions they can fashion. 
Creating a regional human rights con-* 
sciousness, a necessary prelude to anj 
institution, will be a long and difficult 
task. There will be formidable obstacli 
along the way — some put there by sor 
of the governments affected — but I h 
lieve the goal is attainable. 

It is my hope that most govern- 
ments eventually will accept what 
President Carter pointed out in the 
State of the Union address to the Cor 
gress January 23. He said: "... whe 
peoples and their governments can ap 
proach their problems together — 
through open, democratic methods — 
the basis for stability and peace is far 
more solid and far more enduring." 

There is no more important task 
non-Communist East Asia than to forg 
a regional commitment to internation- 
ally recognized human rights and to 
craft regional machinery which can in 
sure that these rights are protected ar 
enhanced for the peoples of the regior 
The United States is ready to do wha 
it can to promote such a regional effor 
In the final analysis, the task only car 
be accomplished by the peoples con 
cerned. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ai 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Department of State Bullet 



HJROPE 



lerman Chancellor Visits U.S. 



(hniicclldr HehiiKt Schmidt nftlic 
'■,/, ..(/ Rcpiihlic ofGcniiaiii/ iikuIc an 
> risit 1,1 the Uiiifi'd States March 
:isi). While ill Washington. D.C. 
',/:. // -t-/)'j, /'(' met H'ith President 
( ri, r and other (joverniiient officials. 
Ilh.iriiiq is the text of the joint press 
<ii, nil lit issneil on March 5. • 



li'sideiit Carter and the Chancellor of 
!.■ Federal Republic of Germany, 
Mmut Schmidt, held a lengfthy con- 
irsatiun in Washington, March 5, 
(ring the Chancelloi''s official visit to 
^jshington, March 4-6. The Chancel- 
1 ■, w ho last met with the President in 
, nt' 1979, was in Washington at the 
1 esident's invitation. 

The conversation between the 
L'sident and the Chancellor covered a 
I Ic range of political, security, and 
{ iiKimic issues of mutual interest for 
t • t wo countries. Their meeting fol- 
1 .eil an intensive period of high-level 
c isultations between the two govern- 
r nts, including visits to Washington 
; 1 llonn by the respective Foreign 
; Misters and several exchanges be- 
t i-cii the President and the Chancel- 
1 . The President and the Chancellor 
i •(■(■(! on the necessity of continuing 
I SI' close consultations in order to as- 
- ■(■ full coordination of the policies 
f Idwed by the two countries on major 
i ernational issues. They also agreed 
t it intensified bilateral and multilat- 
i il cdusultations between all of the 
^ 'Stern allies were essential, particu- 
1 ly in light of the current interna- 
t nal situation. 

The Chancellor expressed his high- 
respect and admiration for the 
sident's exceptional statesmanship 
the crisis caused by the illegal and 
horrent holding of the hostages in 
hran and for the courage and pa- 
nce shown by the American people. 

In their review of the international 
uation, the President and the Chan- 
llor agreed that the Soviet invasion of 
■ghanistan had created a serious 
reat to international peace and secu- 
y. They confirmed their determina- 
I'n, together with their allies, to take 
e measures necessary in the circum- 
nces to guarantee their security and 
fend international stability as also 
ited in the joint Franco-German dec- 
•ation of February 5, 1980. 

They reiterated their governments' 
ndemiiation of the Soviet invasion 



lay 1980 




Chancellor Schmidt and President Carter (White Huuse photo b 



and called upon the Soviet Union im- 
mediately to withdraw its forces from 
Afghanistan. They noted with satisfac- 
tion that their assessments of the impli- 
cations of the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan were quite close, and they 
agreed upon the measures which each 
country should take in response to the 
Soviet'action, including the need for 
urgent assistance to Turkey and Paki- 
stan. The President noted with satis- 
faction the decision of the Federal 
government to coordinate Western as- 
sistance to Turkey in 1980. The Presi- 
dent and the Chancellor expressed the 
determination of their governments to 
make major contributions to the com- 
mon effort of assisting Turkey and 
Pakistan. In this connection, the Chan- 
cellor proposed a debt rescheduling for 
Pakistan. 

The President and the Chancellor 
agreed that the independence of the 
countries of the Third World is an es- 
sential element of world peace and sta- 
bility. They underlined the necessity 
not only to recognize the independence 
and self-reliance of the Third World 
countries but also to assist those coun- 



tries economically and politically on the 
basis of equal partnership. 

The President and the Chancellor 
discussed the importance of increased 
efforts to strengthen NATO defenses. 
They reaffirmed their strong support 
for the NATO Long-Term Defense Pro- 
gram and for the NATO aim of m an- 
nual real growth in defense spending. 
The President noted the strong efforts 
of the Federal Republic in the defense 
field in recent years and welcomed the 
Chancellor's statement that the Federal 
Republic would achieve 3% real growth 
in its 1980 defense budget as it has in 
the past. The President reviewed U.S. 
defense programs which have been 
made much more urgent in the light of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 
Chancellor agreed that it was essential 
for America's allies to share equitably 
in collective defense efforts to meet the 
needs of the common defense. 

The President and the Chancellor 
agreed that the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan has also had a seriously det- 
rimental effect on the economic rela- 
tions of the West with the U.S.S.R. 
They agreed on the importance of tak- 
ing, in coordination with their allies, 
the necessary measures. They also 



33 



Europe 



agreed that in shaping economic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union cai-e must 
be taken not to strengthen the 
U.S.S.R.'s armament efforts and mili- 
tary potential. 

The President expressed his sup- 
port for the proposal announced Feb- 
ruary 19 by the Foreign Ministers of 
the European Community aimed at 
reestablishing a neutral, nonaligned, 
and independent Afghanistan, on the 
basis of total and prompt withdrawal of 
Soviet troops. 

The President and the Chancellor 
agreed that participation in the Olym- 
pic Games would be inappropriate as 
long as Soviet occupation in Afghanis- 
tan continues. The President stated 
that the United States would not par- 
ticipate in the Olympic Games in Mos- 
cow. The Chancellor emphasized that it 
is up to the Soviet Union to create the 
conditions that athletes from all coun- 
tries will be able to participate in the 
Olympic Games and that at present 
such conditions do not exist. 

The President and the Chancellor 
reiterated their countries' commitment 
to the reduction of tension throughout 
the world. They agreed that in the cur- 
rent period of heightened tensions it is 
desirable to maintain the framework of 
East-West relations that has been built 
over two decades. 

The President and the Chancellor 
stressed their continuing support for 
the arms control negotiations. The 
Chancellor welcomed the President's 
recent statement that he planned to 
seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty 
by the U.S. vSenate as soon as this was 
practicable. The President and the 
Chancellor agreed that the NATO allies 
should continue to press ahead with 
their December 20, 1979, initiative in 
the MBFR (mutual and balanced force 
reduction] talks in Vienna, their long- 
range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) 
deployment decision of last December 
12 as well as their offer for negotiations 
in the framework of SALT III aiming at 
limitations on U.S. and Soviet LRTNF 
on the basis of equality. They ex- 
pressed regret that the Soviet Union 
had responded negatively to the U.S. 
proposal, based on the December 12 de- 
cision within the alliance, on arms con- 
trol negotiations involving long-range 
theater nuclear forces. They reaffirmed 
the determination of the alliance to 
keep this offer on the table. They ex- 
pressed their concern that the continu- 
ing Soviet LRTNF arms buildup in- 
creases the existing imbalance. 



34 



The President and the Chancellor 
agreed that at the upcoming follownp 
meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe which will 
take place in Madrid this fall, the allies 
should conduct a thorough review of the 
implementation of all aspects of the 
Helsinki Final Act anfl consider propos- 
als aimed at furthering the objectives of 
the Final Act. In this respect, they 
reaffirmed the position taken by the 
Foreign Ministers of the alliance on De- 
cember 14, 1979. 

Having in mind the need to achieve 
a comprehensive peace settlement in 
the Middle East, the President and the 
Chancellor discussed the latest de- 
velopments in that region, in particular 
the autonomy negotiations currently 
underway between Egypt and Israel 
within the Camp David framework. 
They agreed on the urgent need for 
progress in these negotiations. 

The President and the Chancellor 
reviewed the current international eco- 
nomic situation, with particular em- 
phasis on the energy problem and fi- 
nancial questions arising from the re- 
cent sharp increases in oil prices. They 
agreed that the program adopted by the 
seven-nation economic summit in Tokyo 
last June remained valid and that its 
objectives should be pursued. They 
stressed the need for further urgent 
efforts aimed at expanding alternate 
sources of energy, in particular coal, 
nuclear, renewable resources as well as 
coal gasification and liquefaction, and 
reducing energy consumption by all 
means possible. They pledged to coop- 
erate with other nations in taking new 
medium- and long-term actions to these 
ends in the International Energy 
Agency and at the Venice economic 
summit. 

They expressed particular concern 
over the worsening economic conditions 
of the developing countries resulting in 
large measure from the continued in- 
crease in energy prices and expressed 
the readiness of their governments, to- 
gether with other countries, including 
the OPEC countries [Organization of 
Petroleum Countries], to seek ways to 
help oil-importing developing countries 
produce more energy. They agreed that 
in the present circumstances healthy 
growth by these countries is essential 
to a prosperous world economy and that 
both the OPEC countries and the indus- 
trial countries should help. 

The two heads of government ex- 
changed views about the actions they 
are taking to overcome inflation and 



achieve sound and sustained growth. 
The President described the Adminis- 
tration's program of fiscal restraint, 
efforts to reduce energy consumption 
and to increase energy supplies, and 
steps to curtail present rates of infla- 
tion. The Chancellor expressed confi- 
dence in the prospects of success of 
these actions and described the curreij* 
stance of monetary and fiscal develop- 
ment and energy policy in the Federa 
Republic of Germany. The President 
and the Chancellor stressed the impoifi 
tance of resisting protectionist mea-- 
ures that would impede trade, retaid 
growth, and add to inflation. 

The two heads of government 
agreed that the key to success in the 
economic field is to be found in holdin 
to present economic policies over a .su 
tained period. They shared the view 
that if these policies are continued an 
strengthened, the main industrial coux 
tries can restore noninflationary 
growth from which all will benefit. 

The President and the Chancello) 
saw in this visit further proof of theii 
fundamental commitment to the Nort 
Atlantic alliance and of the close 
friendship and partnership between 
their countries. They were agreed th i 
it is not only the common security 
interests that link the two countries t 
gether but also their common principl 
and values, their democratic way of 
life, and their belief in the inalienabh 
rights of man. 



' Lists omitted here of those F.R.G. 
ficials in the Chancellor's party and the U. 
officials with whom he met. Text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ment.s of Mar. 10, 1980, which also includ' 
the President's and Chancellor's remarks 
reporters on Mar. 5 and their dinner toas 
that evening. ■ 



Department of State Bulle' 



Europe 



transactions 
frohibited for 
(lympic Games 



VHITK HOl'SE STATEMENT, 

\\K. L'S. 1980' 

ii invasion of Afghanistan by the 
•\ 1. 1 Llnion and the continuing inter- 
' rr Ijy the Soviet Union in the 
' lal affairs of that country consti- 
in unusual and extraordinary 
: to the national security, foreign 
, and economy of the United 
u. ,-. An overwhelming majority of 
t ■ IN. General Assembly, including 
c iiitries of varying political and reli- 
nk persuasions, economic strength, 
i -cdgraphical circumstance, have 
iimI ill a condemnation of the 
\ 111 Union's aggression. 
In response to the Soviet action, 
President has taken certain national 
ruse measures. He has also imposed 
a umber of restraints on normal eco- 
I iiif. cultural, and political exchanges 
V h the Soviet Union. These have in- 
c di'd an embargo on grain and other 
8 -icultural products, an embargo on 
I isphate shipments, and the applica- 
! II I if more rigorous restrictions on the 
e Kirt of high technology and other 
; atc'gic commodities. 

With i-espect to the Moscow Sum- 
r r Olympics, the President has 
a Kiiinced that neither he nor the 
.- II rican people would support the 
! tuipation in the Olympics by the 
l.-^. Olympic Team, and he has urged 
is. luisinesses not to participate in or 
|itrihute to the holding of the summer 
mes in Moscow. 

The President is now taking addi- 
nal steps to make clear the U.S. 
vernment's firm opposition to par- 
ipation in the Moscow summer 
mes. He has today directed the Sec- 
tary of Commerce to take the follow- 
j actions; 

1. To deny all pending validated 
ense applications for goods and tech- 
logy to be used in support of or in 
nnection with the Summer Olympic 
.mes in Moscow; 

2. To revoke all outstanding export 



licenses for Olympic-related exports 
that have not already been shipped; 

3. To impose validated license con- 
trols on all exports not now requiring 
validated licenses to be used in support 
of or in association with the Summer 
Olympic Games in Moscow. No such 
licenses shall be granted; 

4. To prohibit other transactions 
and payments associated with all 
Olympic-related exports. Among other 
transactions, the order will bar NBC 
fi'om making any further payments or 
exports under its contracts relating to 
the U.S. television rights for the Olym- 
pic Games. (NBC has previously an- 
nounced that it would not exercise 
these rights if no U.S. team took part 
in the games.) 



' Read to news correspondents by 
White House press secretary Jociy Powell 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Mar. 31, 1980). ■ 



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ay 1980 



35 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S. Presses Case in World Court on 
American Hostages in Iran 



Oil Mdirh /,s'. /.'>. (iiifl :n, l!)Sn, tin 
lull riKilidi/iil Court (if . Justice iini ti> 
hear iiral argi>iiivii1x mi the case coii- 
rvviiiiifi United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehi'an hnmiilil h// tin 
United Sfdtrs afidiiisf til, hi, null- R(- 
piiblir (if Iran. At tli is pliiis, . tlir 
riiili, I Stairs iiiailr its final a lyii iiii'iils 
nil till iiirisilirtiiiii iifllir Ciiini anil III, 
inrrits nf llii vasr. On Drrvinhrr 1.',, 
I!t:tl. Ill, Ciiiirl hail i/rantiil III, I'.S. 
rri/iirst I'lir intiriin inrasni'rs of jirnlrr- 
tiiin. rrsrrrini/ til rllirr prnri-ril i ni/s fur 
a latrr ilalr. 

Rcprcsciiliiifi till Uiiilcil Stall s in 
this rasr irerv Rahcrts B. Oiren. Lvi/al 
Ailviscr iiflli,' n,'parliiicnt of State, as 
Agent: Stephen M. Sehirehel, Depiiti/ 
Legal Ailriser nf the Depart ineiil nf 
Stall . as Depiilii Agent anil Cminsel: 
Thninas.J. Diinnii/an. Charge il'Af- 
faires. a.i.. uftlie U.S. Einhassij in The 
Hiigni , as Depiilii Agent; and David 
Sn'iall. Assistant' Legal Adviser, Ted L. 
Sliin. Allnrneg-Adviser (both nf the 
Depart inent nf State), and Hugh V. 
Siiiinn. Jr.. See, mil Sirrelari/ nf the 
U.S. EiiiUassii in Tile Haiiiii. as 
Advisers. 

Till fillnieing is taken frinn the 
U.S. nral argiiiiieni made In the Cuiirt 
hji Mr. Oiven. 



MAR. IS. 198(1 

Once again I have the honor to appear 
before the Court as Agent of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of 
America in the case concerning United 
States Diplniiiatie and Consular Staff 
in Tehran. As we commence the pres- 
ent hearing, I should like to emphasize 
the extraordinary importance of the 
case which we will be presenting to the 
Court . 

I start from the premise that the 
paramount purpose of the United Na- 
tions, as recited in the opening words of 
the first article of the U.N. Charter, is 
to maintain international peace and se- 
curity. Similarly, the maintenance of 
peaceful relations among states is the 
essential function of this Court and of 
those i)rineiples of international law 
under which nations conduct their dip- 
lomatic relations. To the extent that a 
state uses force to assault the 
mechanisms of peaceful diplomacy, it 



36 



strikes at the jugular of the entire sys- 
tem by which the world seeks to main- 
tain the peace. 

These principles have been so uni- 
foi'mly I'ecognized that for literally cen- 
turies no state has used force against 
the diplomatic envoys and embassies of 
another. Occasionally, rebellious politi- 
cal groups or individuals have assaulted 
embassies and diplomats, but govern- 
ments have not. For centuries interna- 
tional wars have come and gone, but by 
univei'sal agreement embassies and 
their diplomatic staffs have been re- 
garded as inviolable from official inter- 
ference through the use of force. 

That great tradition of recognizing 
and honoring the inviolability of embas- 
sies and diplomats has now been shat- 
tered for the first time in modern his- 
tory. On 4 November 1979, the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran, and more than 60 
of its personnel, were forcefully seized 
with the cooperation and endorsement 
of the Government of the Islamic Re- 
public of Iran. Moreover, this shatter- 
ing attack upon the mechanisms of 
peaceful relations among nations was 
not a temporary aberration for which 
apology and reparation were quickly 
made; the captivity of 53 American 



diplomatic agents and staff has con- 
tinued under the official auspices of thi 
Iranian Government for 4% months. It 
seems hard to believe, but the attack oi 
the American Embassy in Tehran oc- 
currefl more than one-third of a year 
ago, and 53 of my countrymen are still 
held in precarious captivity as I stand 
before the Court today. 

During these hearings, as the 
Court listens to the argument of the 
Government of the United States, I 
would respectfully request that the 
Court continuously bear in mind the 
implications of the Iranian conduct in 
terms of the cause of world peace and 
the cause of fundamental human rights 
and freedoms. Consider, if you will, 
what would happen to the fabric of in- 
ternational relations if this Court and 
the world community were to exhibit 
any degree of tolerance for what the 
Iranian Govei'nment has done and con- 
tinues to do. Such tolerance would 
promote repetition, and repetition 
would lead, tragically, to the unravel- 
ing of orderly international relations. 
It is for this reason that I submit, ver 
seriously, that in this case the Court 
has a compelling responsibility to con- 
demn, in the most severe terms, the 



THE LEGAL ADVISER 

Roberts B. Owen was born in Boston and 
grew up in Cambridge, Mass. He attended 
the Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, 
N.H. He entered the Naval officer training 
program in 1943, was commissioned in 
1945, and served on a troop transport in 
the North Atlantic in 1945-46. 

After his discharge from the Navy, Mr. 
Owen attended Harvard and graduated 
with honors in 1948. He then attended 
Harvard Law School and graduated with 
honors in 1951. In 1951-52 he was a Ful- 
bright scholar at Queens' College in Cam- 
bridge, England, and received a diploma in 
Comparative Legal Studies. 

From 1952 until 1979, Mr. Owen prac- 
ticed law in Washington, D.C., with the 
law firm of Covington & Burling. He spe- 
cialized in trial and appellate practice cov- 
ering a wide variety of subject matters 
with some emphasis upon antitrust litiga- 
tion and />r,i bono litigation on behalf of 
citizens groups. 

Mr. Owen was sworn in as the Legal 




A<lvisfr to the Departnn 
tober 4, 1979. ■ 



Department of State Bullet! 



FECIAL 



Isit of Egyptian President Sadat 



I'l, sideiit A>iwar al-Sadaf of the 
I' Iicpublic of Egypt made an offi- 
r/sit to Washington, D.C, April 
I . mSO, to meet with President 
h I- and other government officials. 
iiiriiif/ are an excha)ige of dinner 
Is at the White House on April 8 
II White House statement issued on 



:HANGE OF TOASTS. 

K. S, 1980> 



'i-iident Carter 

I t nf all, let me welcome everyone 
L '. In our great country we have a lot 
o e thankful for. I won't take my en- 
il time to describe the blessings that 
<i lave in the United States but one 
f le blessings that we have tonight is 
■1 ave two very close friends to come 
\isit us, along with their family and 
■ official family from Egypt. Some- 
.] s when people walk into a home, 
h. e is an instant feeling of warmth 
n friendship and common purpose and 
■ 1 a degree of love. And that is the 
; w f feel when the Sadats come to 
i; us at the White House. 

That is not the only thing I am 
h kful for. Every day, when the elec- 
pnigresses through its long and 
iinus route, I am thankful that one 
i: is not running against me in the 
'i v'\ States. [Laughter, Applause] 
t( w (luld you like to run against 
1 ar Sadat for President of the 
I cii States? [Laughter] I would 
;s that he is possibly the most pop- 
man not only in our country but in 
t parts of the world, because he has 
onstrated in his own life in a unique 
exemplary way statesmanship, un- 
tanding of others in a strong and 
passionate and self-confident man- 
and the epitome of political 
■age. 

When he decided in his fashion to 
e an historic trip to Jerusalem, it 
Isformed the attitude of the world. 
te was a shock that went through 
Bty in almost every nation on Earth 
a thrill that one person could 
jge instantly a discouraging and 
1 debilitating deadlock which had 
^n four wars in 30 years. 
It is hard to think back now on 
e troubled times because so much 
[changed in the last 30 months — a 



time when Israel was hated and de- 
spised by almost all Arab governments, 
when no Arab leader had the temerity 
to even meet with or talk to or recog- 
nize diplomatically or acknowledge the 
right of Israel to exist, and President 
Sadat decided to change all that. And 
he was received with gratitude and 
friendship and with courage by Prime 
Minister Begin and the people of Israel. 

A lot has happened since then, and 
the response has been extraordinary — 
an unprecedented achievement of an 
accord, an agreement, a mutual com- 
mitment between Israel and Egypt 
after 13 days of intense negotiations at 
Camp David when the limit of, I would 
say, human commitment and tenacity 
and perseverance and patience was 
tested, and we came out with a signed 
document that laid the groundwork for 
the future.^ 

I have reread this document lately, 
and it is filled not only with achieve- 
ment but with promise. It would be in- 
conceivable that we would let this 
promise slip from our grasp and end the 
hopes and the confidence and the aspi- 
rations of two troubled peoples and, in- 



deed, the entire world with failure. It is 
inconceivable. * 

It is important for us to remember 
that peace between Israel and Egypt is 
not a threat to others. It is a possibility 
for the realization of the hopes of the 
Palestinians and the hopes of all Israel's 
neighbors and, indeed, all the nations of 
the Arab world to live in peace and to 
slowly but inevitably remove hatred 
from their hearts and to seek for com- 
mon understanding. It is not easy. No 
one claims that it is easy. It hasn't been 
easy so far, but it is important. 

The two countries have set May 
26th as a goal date for the consumma- 
tion of the expectations at Camp David, 
and I think we should not forget the 
promise that still exists in a live and 
vital way of success. 

I just summarized on a piece of 
paper the elements — the basic 
elements — of the Camp David accords. 
It is a brief document. And I would 
hope that all of you might get a copy of 
it and just read it over because it is, in- 
deed, extraordinary. It specifies that 
the U.N. Security Council Resolution 
242 will be a basis for future negotia- 
tions in the relationships between Is- 
rael and all its neighbors. It expresses 
a firm commitment to the respect for 
the territory and the independence and 




J'rosidenI Sadat and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



1980 



Special 



the integrity and the sovereignty of all 
nations andthe right for them to live in 
peace behind recognized and secure 
borders. 

It specifies that the relationship 
that has now developed between Israel, 
and Egypt should not be confined to 
those two nations, but the same kind of 
thrust should extend to the relationship 
between Israel and all its neighbors. It 
is a foundation for future success with 
nations that so far have not chosen to 
take advantage of this wonderful 
opportunity. 

This document specifies the organi- 
zation of a .self-governing authority in 
the West Bank and Gaza derived 
through free elections held by the 
people who live in those two troubled 
areas. And with the establishment of a 
self-governing authority, Israel has 
agreed to withdraw the military gov- 
ernment and the civilian administration 
associated with it and then to withdraw 
all its troops from the occupied ter- 
ritories and then the remainder of those 
troops to be located in specified secu- 
rity locations. 

The people of those two territories 
are granted autonomy and, as Prime 
Minister Begin said many times in the 
presence of President Sadat and me, 
not just autonomy, full autonomy — full 
autonomy, he said many, many times. 

It is important for us to know that 
the agreement calls for a strong local 
police force and for that local police 
force to be interrelated with law en- 
forcement officials in Jordan and in 
Egypt and in other surrounding 
countries. 

It is important for us to remember 
that security arrangements should be 
agreed upon; that there should lif a 
recognition of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people; that the Pales- 
tinians have a right to participate in the 
determination of their own future; and 
that the Palestinian question should be 
resolved in all its aspects; and that the 
nations involved — that is Egypt, Is- 
rael, we and others — should provide 
for the resolution of the problem of the 
Palestinian refugees. 

You can see how far-reaching this 
document is, and Prime Minister Begin, 
President Sadat, and I are pledged to 
carry out all these agreements on our 
word of honor and on the honor of the 
nations that we represent. It is a sol- 
emn commitment which cannot be 
lightly ignored or violated. 

The world now may be skeptical 
about the prospects of success. But the 
world is not nearly so skeptical now as 
it was before Camp David or before the 



Peace Treaty was signed between Is- 
rael and Egypt. We have overcome dif- 
ficulties in the past, and the United 
States plays a full role in assuring that 
the negotiations now underway will be 
successful. 

A week from now. Prime Minister 
Begin will be here, and he has the same 
commitment to the success of this effort 
as is shared between President Sadat 
and myself. We cannot afford to fail be- 
cause of these two nations committed to 
peace and led by courageous men who 
are determined not to fail. 

Tonight I would like to propose a 
toast to the people of Egypt, a proud 
and ancient nation, which has provided 
leadership for the world through many 
generations and for its great leader. 
President Anwar Sadat, his lovely wife, 
and all the human characteristics that 
are so fine and noble, which they repre- 
sent, and I would like to propose a toast 
to peace. 

President Sadat 

My dear friend. President Carter, Mrs. 
Carter, dear friends: Thank you for 
your kind words and genuine hospital- 
ity. As you well know, it is always a 
pleasure for us to visit your great coun- 
try and work with you for the noble 
cause of peace and friendship among 
nations. The historic steps we have 
taken together on the road to peace 
constitute the most positive contribu- 
tion to that cause. 

We are determined to pursue our 
mission until a comprehensive settle- 
ment is achieved. This was our pledge 
when we started together, and it re- 
mains our firm commitment. If a com- 
prehensive settlement was a necessity 
at the time we began our endeavor, it is 
an absolute must today. 

The talks we had today confirmed 
my confidence in your unwavering 
commitment to justice and morality. 
You have demonstrated once again your 
sensitivity to other people suffering a 
denial of rights. You have proven your 
determination to stand firm by your 
commitments. 

You set a shining example for 
genuine concern and unselfish concern 
for peace and stability in every corner 
of the world. You fully realize the 
interdependence and community of 
interests between all nations. Today, as 
ever, you shouldered your responsibil- 
ity with vision and courage. 

In the weeks and months ahead, we 
shall continue to work together for the 
consolidation of peace. We shall spare 
no effort in our concerted drive to ef- 
fect a genuine change in the West Bank 



and Gaza. A real transfer of authorityffl 
must take place, and a new era of rec- 
onciliation should begin. This would bd 
in the interest of all nations, not the i 
Palestinian people alone. No one bene! 
fits from the continuation of occupatio' 
and the perpetuation of conflict. Nn on 
profits from the escalation of tension 
and the deepening of suspicion and ili^ 
trust among those who live in the san 
region. Everyone stands to gain f)'(jni 
just and lasting peace in the cradle of 
civilization. 

I am happy to say that we are quit|v 
satisfied with the development of our ' ,, 
cooperation in various fields. This is 
greatly appreciated by every Egyptiai 
We are determined to intensify the ' - 
creative exchange between our peoj)!* 
for the good of all nations. Such a 
healthy and sound relationship based ( 
mutual respect and trust can promote 
higher degree of universal under- 
standing and cooperation. It sets a 
model for human interaction and sol- 
idarity with those who believe in the 
oneness of the destiny of man. Let us 
pledge to continue this march and 
reinforce our friendship in every poss 
ble way. 

Dear friends, permit me to ask y 
to rise in a tribute to our great frienc 
President Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Ca 
ter, to all of you present tonight, to 
every American who lent us his suppo 
and understanding and to the ever- 
growing friendship between our na- 
tions. God bless you all. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
APR. 9, 1980» 



President Sadat and President Cartel 
have completed 2 days of extensive 
talks in which they reviewed careful! 
and in depth a wide range of issues, i 
eluding the Middle East, southwest 
Asia, Africa, and the remaining issue 
in the current autonomy negotiations 
The talks were held in the spirit 
the close relationship which Presiden' 
Sadat and President Carter have de- 
veloped along with Prime Minister 
Begin in working together to bring 
peace to the Middle East. Both leade: 
reaffirmed their conviction that the 
Camp David agreement and the sub- 
sequent Peace Treaty Between Egyp' 
and Israel have produced the first tai 
gible steps, after decades of conflict, 
toward achieving real peace in that 
troubled area of the world. President 
Carter praised the scrupulous im- 
plementation of the Peace Treaty, at 
times even ahead of schedule, noting 
that both President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin have proved to the 

Department of State Bulla' 



1 



Special 



<isit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin 



Prime Minister Menaheni Begin of 
•r Slate of Israel made an official visit 
Washington, D.C., April ii -17, 
io, to meet with President Carter and 
•,er govennnent officials. Following 
'. an exchange of dinner toasts at tlie 
lite House on April 15 and a White 
use statement issued on April 17. 



i:CHANGE OF TOASTS, 
J'R. 15, 1980' 



fesident Carter 

I (iiild like, first of all, to welcome all 
iMiu to the White House. We are ex- 
1111 'ly (lelig'hted to have our guests 
111 Israel come here to see us again, 
■U( ularly Prime Minister Begin and 
lu\ely wife. 

.All-. Prime Minister, as you may 

A\ . this is an election year in the 

l ilrd States. I don't know if the word 

h gotten to Israel yet. |Laughter) But 

f ave noticed that when Prime Minis- 

rin and I agree, we both prosper, 

!\ in public acclaim but also 

' I irally. When we don't quite agree, 

: iln'T one of us benefits substantially. 

uuhter] Lately, for instance, my 
1 jjdlicies have caused him some 
t uhle, as you may have noticed a 
■; nth or so ago, on the West Bank of 
iiirdan, and I might say that our 
leri'ement also caused me some 
iiliK' on the east bank of the Hudson 
• IT. I Laughter, Applause] 

When Prime Minister Begin comes 
!) hv White House, it's an e.xperience 
ily of a personal pleasure but also 
lu' realization of the making of 
y . There are a few people in this 
M who, because of personal courage 
.1 1 integrity and deep commitment and 
sitivity to others and tenacity, are 



able to change the course of human 
events. And obviously, our visitor to- 
night. Prime Minister Begin, is one of 
those men. 

This is an historic house, and the 
friendship that binds our two countries 
together and the tremendous achieve- 
ments of this great statesman, I think, 
make a good confluence of both pleas- 
ure and history. 

Monday will be the 32d birthday 
of the nation of Israel. I can't be in Is- 
rael; I wish I could. I am sending, Mr. 
Prime Minister, my mother to repre- 
sent me on that delightful occasion. 

As you know, 2 years ago we were 
together on the South Lawn of the 
White House to celebrate the 30th an- 
niversary of the founding of the State of 
Israel. 

On that occasion, I thought that it 
would be good for our nation to com- 
memorate with the large group of 
American Jewish citizens and all of 
us — the 220 million of us — the terrible 
historic lesson that we learned from the 
Holocaust. Since then, the committee 
has been to Israel and to some of the 
devastating locations in Europe to as- 
sess how our own nation might com- 
memorate this historic and blighting 
event in the passage of human life and 
through human history. 

We have now appointed the 
Holocaust commission to establish a 
proper memorial in our country, an 
outgrowth directly of the 30th anniver- 
sary event on the South Lawn of our 
White House. 

I think it is obvious that when 
Prime Minister Begin was elected 
Prime Minister, and obviously for the 
25 or 30 years prior to that, many 
people said it is impossible to bring 
peace to Israel, and particularly be- 
tween it and its most powerful Arab 



rid their dedication to sparing their 
jple the agony of war. 

In their discussions, the two Presi- 
its asserted again their joint deter- 
lation to pursue to successful conclu- 
n within the Camp David framework 
\ current autonomy negotiations as 
)ther step toward a comprehensive 
ice settlement in the Middle East, 
ey focused on ways to accelerate the 
ice process and to resolve the re- 
ining issues in the negotiations. 

President Carter plans to pursue 
;se discussions in an equally thor- 



ough examination next week with 
Prime Minister Begin. 

The two Presidents reaffirmed that 
the objective of the parties is to do ev- 
erything possible to reach agreement 
by the May 26 goal set out in the 
agreement which President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin sent President 
Carter at the time they signed their 
Peace Treaty. 



'Text from White House press release. 

^For text of the Camp David accords, 
see Bulletin of October 1978, p. 7. 

^List of participants in the discussions 
omitted here (text from White House press 
release). ■ 



neighbors. Prime Minister Begin 
proved those people to be wrong. 

It has been less than 2V4 years — it 
is hard to believe — since the historic 
meeting between Prime Minister Begin 
and President Saflat in Jerusalem, an 
act that literally shook the world and 
inspired all human beings to believe 
that peace was indeed possible, even 
among the most historic and bitter of 
enemies. 

It was less than a year following 
that when Prime Minister Begin met 
with President Sadat at Camp David 
and came forward with an 
agreement — the Camp David 
accords — that was announced here in 
the White House one Sunday afternoon. 

This agreement is now the basis for 
our current search for a comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East. It is founded 
on the principles espoused in U.N. 
Resolution 242. It calls for an honoring 
of the sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity and the political independence 
not only of Israel but of all nations in 
the Middle East. 

It is committed to the proposition 
that each nation there, with a special 
emphasis on Israel, has a right to live in 
peace behind recognized and secure 
borders. This accord, or agreement, 
signed with our word of honor and with 
our nation's honor, calls for the estab- 
lishment of a self-governing authority 
among the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza area. It calls for Israel, 
after the establishment or inauguration 
of this self-governing authority, to 
withdraw its military government, the 
civilian administration. And then it 
calls for withdrawal of Israeli Armed 
Forces and a redeployment of them to 
specified security locations. 

It calls for a strong police force 
among the people who live on the West 
Bank and the Gaza area, with proper 
liaison to be established with the adja- 
cent police forces in Israel, Jordan, and 
Egypt. 

It calls for a preeminent recogni- 
tion of the need for all of us to guaran- 
tee the security of Israel and its 
neighbors. It calls for the recognition of 
the legitimate rights of the Palestin- 
ians. It calls for Palestinians' right to 
participate in the determination of their 
own future. It calls for us to resolve the 
Palestinian question in all its aspects. 
And it calls on us to resolve the refugee 
problem. 

This combination, which was care- 
fully hammered out between Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat at 
Camp David, is still the binding docu- 
ment under which we are presently en- 
gaged in further pursuit of peace. It is 



|iy 1980 

I 



Special 



almost impossible again to believe that 
13 months ago Israel and Egypt were in 
a state of war, a state that had con- 
tinued over a period of 30 years. And 
last year, at this same place — the White 
House of the United States of 
America — that Peace Treaty was 
signed. 

It has been observed meticulously. 
And I might add my voice to President 
Sadat's in saying that Israel has hon- 
ored the difficult terms of this treaty 
with truthfulness and with honor; and I 
might add, with generosity. Its terms 
were very strict, but those terms have 
been met not grudgingly at the last 
minute but ahead of time and with an 
extra expression of a common commit- 
ment to peace. 

Israel has already withdrawn from 
more than two-thirds of the Sinai and, 
in a time when oil is particularly pre- 
cious, has relinquished oil wells that 
were on acknowledged Egyptian terri- 
tory but were developed by, discovered 
by Israel. We have guaranteed Israel to 
meet its needs for oil in the future if its 
supply should be interrupted, and, of 
course, our country will carry out this 
commitment meticulously as well. 

Now there is full diplomatic 
relations — recognition of each other. 
An exchange of ambassadors, open bor- 
ders, tourism is building day-by-day 
between these two ancient enemies who 
are now friends. 

This is an exciting time, and we 
have made a lot of progress. Now we 
are moving to the next step — how to 
carry out those detailed, complicated, 
very carefully negotiated agreements 
at Camp David; how to define the self- 
governing authority; how to set up the 
procedure for the elections. They are 
difficult issues. We acknowledge them 
to be so. 

Last week President Sadat was 
here with me. We discussed those dif- 
ficult issues. Today, with Prime Minis- 
ter Begin, we have discussed them as 
well. As we walked toward Prime 
Minister Begin's car at noon today, we 
both acknowledged — I started to say 
admitted — we both acknowledged that 
we have had even more difficult times 
in the past, but when he and I and 
President Sadat have set our minds to 
overcoming an obstacle or answering a 
difficult question, so far — and I knock 
on wood — we have never failed. 

It would be a tragedy, having come 
this far, to fail. As I said earlier, Prime 
Minister Begin represents those 
characteristics that can insure success, 
and those characteristics are shared by 
his heroic partner in this effort, Presi- 
dent Sadat — courage, sensitivity. 




Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, and Secretary Vance (background) iWhite 

Hi)Use photd hy Jack Kifrhtlinger) 



tenacity. And I think that this will bode 
well for the world in the future. 

I might say in closing that our na- 
tion also has a special relationship with 
Israel — a relationship built on mutual 
respect and admiration; a shared past 
and a shared future; a realization that 
one of the most vital aspects of the se- 
curity of the United States of America 
is a strong, free, independent, peaceful, 
and secure Israel. We have made com- 
mitments in the past to Israel that are 
vital to them. We have committed our- 
selves never to negotiate with nor rec- 
ognize the PLO (Palestine Liberation 
Organization] until after the PLO has 
acknowledged U.N. Resolution 242 as a 
basis for peace and also recognized Is- 
rael's right to exist. 

We have expressed ourselves 
strongly and forcefully and consistently 
as being opposed to the establishment 
of any independent Palestinian state in 
the West Bank area, and we believe 
very strongly, and I am sure Prime 
Minister Begin shares this belief, that 
Jerusalem should be undivided and that 
all should have access to the worship 
places there. 

I might close by saying that we be- 
lieve that together we can continue to 
achieve a just and a lasting peace for all 
in the Middle East, and, a little more 
than a year ago when we signed the his- 
toric Peace Treaty Between Israel and 
Egypt, Prime Minister Begin said, and 
I would like to quote his words in clos- 
ing: "Peace unto you — shalom, xalaain 
forever." 



I would like to ask all of you to r 
and join me in a toast. To the brave ; 
free people of Israel in one of the 
world's great nations and to a coura 
ous and enlightened, farsighted, anc 
successful leader of those free peopl 
Prime Minister Begin and his lovely 
wife. 

Prime Minister Begin 

The President just said that when v. 
agree, we both prosper. Therefore, 
would like to say immediately that 1 
agree with the President that 
Jerusalem should remain undivided. 
[Laughter, Applause] 

This is a unique week in our life, 
started with Remembrance Day of tl 
greatest tragedy that ever took plac' 
the annals of mankind since God 
created man and man let loose the 
Devil. And it will end with the great 
victory a persecuted ancient people 
achieved through the sacrifices of it 
best men during the rule of our inde 
pendence in the land of our forefathe 

We use the word "Holocaust. 
What does it mean? Nothing more t 
a word, but that wound will not be 
healed for generations — many gene 
tions to come. We lost IVz million of < 
children. We lost our sages, our prol 
sors, our doctors, our rabbis, our 
brains, our hearts, our beloved one 
Such is the wound in our hearts. Ar 
there it will be to the last day of ou 
lives. 

But there is the command to liv 



Department of State Bull 



Special 



le divine command to overcome, to 
iiiiinue, to struggle for a just cause 
lit 11 it wins the day and, therefore, 
\vv the tragedy, we struggled, we 
ive sacrifices, and, with God's help, 
e won the day, and a country of our 
A'n and means to defend our people. 

During this memorable week, I 
lok around and see the world in tur- 
loil and liberty in danger. In Iran, the 
lost reactionary revolution that ever 
appened in the history of mankind 
)ok place. Customs and laws which 
ere sacrosanct for ages, not only in 
me of peace but even during war, are 
eing trampled under foot with incom- 
rehensible dark fanaticism and abso- 
itely intolerable blind hatred. 

There are the hostages there — for 
le last 5 months. Perhaps I can say 
lat no other nation in the world under- 
:ands the American people these days 
etter than our nation does. Nobody 
an understand as we do what it means 
) see our sons and citizens kept hos- 
.ige, threatened with their lives, get- 
ng ultimata which we cannot fulfill, 
nd look upon the families who spend 
eepless nights and restless days 
linking of their dear ones, longing for 
lem — loving wives and mothers. 

We feel deeply for the President, 
ho is so preoccupied with this human 
nd humanitarian question, and for all 
tie American people. As I spent a cer- 
ain period of my life in Russia not, as 
he previous Soviet Ambassador in our 
ountry before they severed diplomatic 
elations with us told me, "not in too 
ood conditions." [Laughter] 

Some people ask me: "In your 
pinion, you know the Russians, what 
yfould they have done?" I gave an un- 
quivocal answer. "The very same day 
hey would have marched on Tehran, 
nd they wouldn't have given a damn 
or the hostages." They would have 
onquered Tehran. The Khomeini army 
s a mob. It is no match for any army, 
lot for the Soviet Army. But this is the 
lifference: The American people try 
very avenue, accept patience and pain 
ust to make sure that the hostages 
ome back home alive and well. 

We have had such experiences — 
low many, how many. Our children 
vere taken hostages not only our men. 
A.nd just 10 days before I came to this 
?reat country, five of our children were 
taken hostage and threatened with 
[death, and one boy 2Vz years old — I 
law the little coffin that I will never 
|forget — got killed. 

Four other children — 1 year, 2 
years old, babies — were saved by our 
soldiers. In the spirit of self-sacrifice 
which our army has got in itself, with 



iVIay 1980 



their blood, 11 boys — 11 soldiers — 
were wounded, several of them se- 
verely. One of them got killed. Four 
children were saved, although 
wounded; wounded children, hostages. 

This is the first reason why we are 
so grateful to the President that he 
found time to invite President Sadat 
and me and my colleagues and to deal 
with our problems of the Middle East 
and the bilateral relations we have, al- 
though his mind is with the hostages 
and their families, as the minds of all 
the American people are. At .such a 
juncture, to find time for such talks is a 
measure of devotion and of moral 
greatness. 

The Soviet Union invaded Af- 
ghanistan in one of the most dangerous 
and serious moves after the Second 
World War. Some people compare it 
with the invasion into Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968. It is not a true compari- 
son. It is a fact that Czechoslovakia 
went through a horrible tragedy. The 
Czechs and the Slovaks started to 
breathe some freedom under the man, 
who is already forgotten, Dubchek, and 
that beginning of liberty was crushed 
by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries. 

But still, Czechoslovakia was in the 
Soviet orbit, and then the famous, or 
infamous, Brezhnev doctrine was 
created which even Yugoslavia and 
Romania — two Communist 
countries — did not recognize — no 
country in the world ever recognized. 
Afghanistan never was in the orbit. It 
is a neighbor of the Soviet Union, of the 
so-called Socialist countries. It was in- 
vaded. It is an ancient people, a fight- 
ing people. They do fight the huge 
Soviet Army of more than 100,000 sol- 
diers; they resist as any proud people 
should an invader. 

But to the world, there is a grave 
danger every day. Through Baluchis- 
tan, the Soviet Army can reach the In- 
dian Ocean in no time, and there is no 
real force to stop them there. 

Iran may become a Communist 
country anytime. We know the tactics. 
There is the Tudeh Party, the most 
servile to Moscow e.xcept the French 
Communist party — w^ell organized, the 
only really organized group in Tehran. 
And they, the Communists, support 
Khomeini with his fanaticism because, 
since the days of Lenin, the Com- 
munists have developed a theory which 
is called a revolutionary situation. It 
means strikes, disorders, fights on the 
street, demonstrations, and in this at- 
mosphere, they used to say, power lies 
on the street. Bow and take it. Then 



they take it. And with the long border 
between Iran and the Soviet Union — 
1,500 miles — who can stop it if such a 
thing happens? And it may happen any- 
time, any day. 

Therefore, we live in a dangerous 
period. But there is one solace: Free na- 
tions can, if they wish to, stand to- 
gether. 

The great people of the United 
States have many allies throughout 
the world, but I would say, looking out 
of experience into this world, that there 
are two categories of American allies. 
The first are allies, and the .second are 
reluctant allies. May I tell you that Is- 
rael belongs to the first category. 

We are a small nation, but may I 
have the chutzpah to say — 
[laughter[ — a courageous nation. No, 
no, no — not me, the nation is courage- 
ous. It is conceived in courage and born 
in fight and reborn in resistance to 
tyranny, to oppression. And we are 
your ally in good and in bad days, we 
stand by you and stand with you, and 
we shall always be together and defend 
liberty so that tyranny never wins its 
night. 

Under these circumstances, may I 
ask the following question: Should Is- 
rael be weakened or should it be 
strengthened? I know your attitude to- 
ward the so-called Palestinian state 
ruled by the PLO. That organization is 
bent on the destruction of Israel. It will 
not destroy Israel. How can it? It never 
will. But it is bent on it. It wrote about 
this destruction brazenly. It never 
changed it, not one word. 

But even a corridor leading to such 
a Palestinian state would be a mortal 
danger to us. No peace. Peace is lost 
and bloodshed, more even than in 
Lebanon, much more. And, therefore, 
we must be very careful, very careful. 

There are some who say, especially 
in Europe, that now, after the Soviet 
invasion into Afghanistan — and as 
there is oil in the Earth beneath the 
surface of the sheikdoms, which only 
the free West could have taken out be- 
cause otherwise it would still be be- 
neath the surface. 

Some people say that now we must 
find favor with the Islamic world — with 
the Arab world — even at the expense 
of Israel. They say so cynically. This is 
called expediency and with our experi- 
ence of our generation in the 1930s in 
Europe, we do know now that expe- 
diency is not a realistic policy. To the 
contrary; it takes revenge on those' who 
sacrifice ideals for the sake of expe- 
diency. At Israel's expense, at the ex- 
pense of our security, of the lives of our 
children, I believe that the United 



Special 



States will never, under no circum- 
stances, adopt such a policy, and as we 
are your ally, the United States is our 
ally and we will always stand together. 

Israel shouldn't be weakened. Is- 
rael fulfilled a very serious role — I say 
so without boasting — with every gov- 
ernment it had, under all governments 
in the Middle East, to stop Soviet ex- 
pansionism indirectly and directly. I 
remember when there was a threat of 
Syrian invasion into Jordan with Soviet 
help. We were asked — it is now dis- 
closed in two books written by two 
Americans — to bring about the putting 
to an end of that danger, and we put it 
to an end. And there is another exam- 
ple which I prefer not to mention to- 
night. 

We really fulfilled the role and we 
can do .so in the future. May I also say with 
humble pride, the army of Israel is not 
the worst in the world. So Israel should 
be strengthened for Israel's sake, it 
deserves — we suffered so much, we 
lost so many — but also for the sake of 
the free world should be strengthened, 
mustn't be weakened under any circum- 
stances. This, the rea.son why we did so 
much for peace. 

Yes, last year and a month ago we 
signed the Peace Treaty. Now I think I 
will ask a rhetorical question. Nobody 
is going to answer it, but I will put it 
and I, myself, will reply to it. Who is 
the architect of the Peace Treaty Be- 
tween Egypt and Israel? And the an- 
swer is the President of the United 
States, Mr. Jimmy Carter. [Applause] 

It was the turning point in the an- 
nals of the Middle East. Let us imagine 
the state of war for 31 years — five 
wars, five meetings on the battlefield. 
The Secretary of State, who is here, 
will remember how moving it was that 
moving scene which we shall never 
forget when wounded soldiers of Egypt 
and Israel met at El Arish together 
with the President of Egypt and me and 
the Secretary. 

And the invalids who bodily suf- 
fered in the wars embraced each other, 
shook hands, and said to each other, as 
the President of Egypt and I said to 
each other: "No more war. We shall 
never again raise arms against each 
other." Could there be more beautiful 
words than those simple words? "No 
more war. We shall not raise arms 
against each other." 

We also gave proof to the oldest of 
philosophical teasers: that every war is 
avoidable. What is absolutely inevitable 
is peace. Peace must come. We gave 
sacrifice for it. The President already 
mentioned it, therefore, I will not 



repeat — that oil well, that our oil fields, 
with the help of an American company, 
but with the toil of our men — how much 
toil did we invest in it? Now we get the 
oil, that quantity, but how much do we 
have to pay for it? You better don't ask. 
[Laughter] And every month the prices 
go up. But you should also remember 
this: Out of that money we all pay, and 
every several months, more and more, 
there goes a million dollars per day for 
a terrorist organization with a Nazi 
philosophy called PLO. And all of us 
share in that million unwillingly, but in 
fact. 

And for 9 months, the whole bur- 
den of fulfillment of the Peace Treaty 
commitment was on our shoulders. We 
did it. We fulfilled it— to the date, to 
the day, to the dot. Now, there is a 
mutual commitment of normalization of 
relations. Again, both sides do it 
honorably. 

Now there is the question. May I, 
Mr. President, quote you and, through 
this quotation requote myself. There is 
the question of the full autonomy for 
the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, in 
my language, the proper language — 
[laughter] — and the Gaza district. And 
we want to keep what we promised, 
what we wrote, and what we 
signed — full autonomy for our 
neighbors. We will deliver them in 
peace and in human dignity and in jus- 
tice and in liberty. We don't want to 
oppress them. We don't want to op- 
press anybody. 

You should know that in the Bible, 
scores of times it is written love a 
stranger, don't do any wrong to a 
stranger because you were strangers in 
Egypt — not in Egypt of President 
Sadat, another Egypt, much older one. 

But this is written in the Bible. We 
don't want to do any v/rong to anybody. 
We never want to do any wrong. We 
just came to the land of our forefathers. 
And therefore, we want to grant to give 
them, to assure them this full au- 
tonomy. We shall do so. There are dif- 
ficulties with that negotiation. My 
dear friend. Dr. Burg, the Minister of 
Interior, who is here, is the head of the 
negotiating team — all of you know him 
now as a wonderful man, mighty sense 
of humor which we need very badly 
sometimes, sage — and they achieve 
much, not enough yet. 

We now face difficulties, yes. But 
we shall solve them. We want to have it 
solved by the 26th of May, as we prom- 
ised each other, as a goal not as a dead- 
line. We believe in lifelines, not in 
deadlines. So, we shall do our best. 



Before I came here, there were 
rumors in the American press and alsc 
in the Israeli press that pressure is 
going to be exerted on me and my col- 
leagues. And God knows what is going 
to happen in the Cabinet Room when 
we meet. As we already met, and we 
talked for hours on end, I can attest 
that nothing happened in the Cabinet 
Room, and no pressure was exerted an 
no confrontation took place. And the 
Cabinet Room, as it became a familiar 
place to me, was the same Cabinet 
Room in which all of us felt friendship 
for each other, understanding for each 
other, and together we looked for solu 
tions and for formulations and all the 
brains worked and on both sides sat 
some brainy people who did their best 
and who will do so in the future. 

So there is hope that we may mee 
the date. If we don't, the sky is not oi 
our heads, we shall continue negotiat- 
ing until we reach the agreement whicl 
is necessary. We want it with all our 
hearts, and we shall honor it as we do 
honor the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty and all its commitments. The 
people of Israel will next week cele- 
brate, as the President said, the day ( 
independence when glory came back t 
our ancient people, when we got our 
Parliament, our government, our 
army — all the attributes of sovereignt 
in the land of our forefathers. 

From generation to generation, 
this day will be always a great holidaj 
in our hearts, amongst our people. Bu 
during the holiday, we shall also alway 
remember our friends — remember yoi 
Mr. President, and all of you dear 
friends, leaders, and representatives of 
the great American people. We shall 
stand together, and together we shall 
labor for liberty so that it will win the 
day and triumph in the world. 

I raise my glass to the great 
American people, which is the guaran- 
tee to the success of liberty throughoi 
the world, the President of the Unitec 
States, my dear friend, who contrib- 
uted so much to peace in the Middle 
East between Egypt, Israel and in th( 
future between other states and Israe 
I say to all of you, as it is our tradition 
L'chrii))! . 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
APR. 17, 19802 

Prime Minister Begin and President 
Carter have completed 2 days of exter 
sive talks following the talks with 
President Sadat last week on the re- 
maining issues in the autonomy negoti 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



Special 



idiis and on global security and the 
; vial ion in the Middle East. These 
Iks were held in the traditional spirit 
, friendship and close cooperation 
Mirh characterizes relations between 
U' I'nited States and Israel. 

1 'resident Carter reaffirmed the 
iie-ianding American commitment to 
tt security and well-being of Israel 
; (I I ti the achievement of a just and 
Uting peace between Israel and its 
liuhhors. Prime Minister Begin reit- 
laiiMl Israel's warm friendship for the 
liitiil States and its strong support 
1- ihe firm role of the United States in 
1 liniig to preserve the security and in- 
( pciidence of the states of the Middle 
hst. 

The President and Prime Minister 
insider that these talks have been 
llpt'ul in advancing the autonomy 
igdiiations. They reaffirm their dedi- 
(■ii.n to the Camp David agreement of 
ptcmber 17, 1978, their satisfaction 
ci- I he smooth implementation of the 
laiv of Peace Between Israel and 
:\ pt of March 26, 1979, and their de- 
■ iimiation to pursue to successful con- 
Msiim within the Camp David 
iinu'work the current autonomy 
igdtiations as another step toward a 
(inprehensive settlement in the Middle 
ist. They reiterate their view that 
sting peace can be achieved in the 
ddle East only through a comprehen- 
e settlement. 

Prime Minister Begin reaffirmed 
3 objective set out in his and Presi- 
nt Sadat's letter to President Carter 
March 26, 1979, to do everything 
ssible to reach agreement by May 26, 
80, the 1-year goal they set for them- 
Ives in that letter. President Carter 
affirmed the determination of the 
lited States to do everything it ap- 
opriately can to assist Israel and 
;ypt to achieve that goal. To this end, 
has been agreed, following consulta- 
ms with the Government of Egypt, 
at the negotiating delegations of 
jypt, Israel, and the United States 
11 meet for accelerated negotiations in 
. .th Israel and Egypt beginning before 
(lai e end of April in Herzliya. 

Prime Minister Begin and Presi- 
nt Carter affirmed the determination 
their two countries to continue to 
])rk closely together in every sphere 
|d in particular in the joint effort they 
ve undertaken together with Presi- 
nt Sadat to bring a just, lasting, and 
mprehensive peace to the Middle 
f\tei 1st. 



Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
Marks First Anniversary 



'Text from White House press release. 
, 2 List of participants in the discussions 
litted here (text from While House press 
lease). ■ 



The foUoH'uig reinarkfi were madr 
at a White House reception on March 
23, 1980, bi) President Carter, co)>i- 
Dieniorating the first antiivernarji of the 
Treaty of Peace Between Egt/pt a)id 
Israel . ' 

President Carter 

A year ago, many of you joined us here 
at the White House for a thrilling mo- 
ment: the signing of a peace treaty be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. We stood in 
the bright spring sunshine, filled with a 
hope of a new beginning for a nation 
which I love here and for two nations in 
a region which had long been at war. 

We knew the difficulties ahead, yet 
we were exhilarated by the prospects 
for peace. We watched the leaders of 
two great peoples who had long been 
enemies embrace each other and em- 
bark on a new and a promising 
relationship — two men of courage. 
President Anwar Sadat and Prime 
Minister Menahem Begin. They as- 
tonished the world. They had silenced 
for awhile the voices of cynicism and 
hatred and despair. They had done the 
impossible. They had achieved peace. 

That day culminated a year and a 
half of patient and often very difficult 
negotiations following President 
Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. I 
remember the moment at Camp 
David — it was a Sunday afternoon— 
when we suddenly knew that peace was 
possible. And I remember the moment 
in Cairo, following my visit to 
Jerusalem, when we were able to pro- 
claim to the world that a treaty be- 
tween these two great nations was at 
last within our reach, and then the 
ceremony here, bringing to an end 30 
years of war. 

Prime Minister Begin spoke to all 
of us that day: "Peace unto you," he 
said. "Shalotii, salaam forever." Many 
things have happened since that day 
almost exactly a year ago, things which 
once seemed even beyond dreaming. 
The borders have been opened. Ambas- 
sadors have been exchanged between 
the two countries, based on full diplo- 
matic recognition. Ordinary citizens 
have become sightseers in a neighbor- 
ing land from which they had long been 
completely excluded. It's no longer 
harder to'travel between Tel Aviv and 



Cairo than it is between Tel Aviv or 
Cairo and New York. Israelis and 
Egyptians in all walks of life have 
clasped each other's hands on the 
streets of Jerusalem and in Cairo, 
Alexandria, and Tel Aviv, in friendship. 
Israel has returned a large part of 
the Sinai to Egypt, and Egypt has ac- 
celerated the normalization process 
even faster than we had envisioned a 
year ago. The doubters had history on 
their side, for these things had never 
happened before. Yet the practical 
dreamers also had history on their side 
as well, for now it has been proven 
that we need not repeat old patterns of 
hatred and death, of suffering and dis- 
trust. 

Benjamin Franklin, who negotiated 
the treaty with England following the 
American Revolution, said that he had 
never seen a peace made, however ad- 
vantageous, that was not censured as 
inadequate. No treaty can possibly em- 
body every aim of any particular party 
to a treaty. What a treaty can do, 
through negotiation and compromise, is 
to protect the vital interests of each of 
the parties involved. That's what was 
done here 12 months ago. 

We all know that our work is in- 
complete until the peace can be ex- 
tended to include all who have been in- 
volved in the conflict of the past in the 
Middle East. We must prove to all 
people in the Middle East that this 
peace between Egypt and Israel is not a 
threat to others but a precious oppor- 
tunity. 

When I stood before the Knesset at 
a moment when it seemed that the 
peace treaty prospects had reached an 
impasse, Prime Minister Begin re- 
minded us that this must be a peace not 
of months and years but forever. We've 
come to the first year. We must now 
look at the world as it is and find ways 
to continue living in peace with one 
another. 

This treaty between Egypt and Is- 
rael is only one step on the way to a 
comprehensive peace throughout this 
troubled region. At Camp David, 
President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, 
and I agreed on a second step, which is 
now underway — negotiations to provide 
full autonomy to the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza. That concept of- 
fers a first real hope for keeping our 
common pledge— a pledge made by all 
three of us — to resolve the Palestinian 
problem in all its aspects while fully 



yieiiiay 1980 
J 



Special 



protecting' the security and the future 
of Israel. 

The autonomy talks will lead to a 
transitional arrangement. Further 
negotiations will be required after 3 
years or so to determine the final status 
of the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt, Is- 
rael, and the United States are now 
committed to the success of this course 
that we set for ourselves at Camp 
David, a course based on these accords 
and on U.N. Re.solutions 242 and 338. 
As we all three pledged at Camp David, 
through these current negotiations Is- 
rael can gain increased security, and 
the Palestinians can participate in the 
determination of their own future and 
achieve a .solution which recognizes 
their legitimate i-ights. 

For the past 10 months our 
negotiators have done the patient work 
of defining these difficult issues. As we 
meet today, Ambassador Sol Linowitz 
[personal representative of the Presi- 
dent for the Middle East peace 
negotiations] is in Israel, and he will 
soon be going to Egypt to help move 
the talks forward. And ne.xt month I 
will be meeting here with Pi'esident 
Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin. 
It's time for us to review the progress 
that we've made so far and to discuss 
the way to move forward even faster. 
These two summit meetings are not 
meant to replace the negotiators who 
have worked so hard and have come so 
far but to help them to expedite their 
vital work. I look forward to seeing 
these two men once again. They are my 
friends. 

In the 13 days at Camp David and 
the meetings I've had with them before 
and since, I've come to know them well. 
Both the men have deep religious con- 
victions. Both are men whose personal 
sense of the history of their own nations 
has shaped their lives since early child- 
hood. It should never be forgotten that 
after a generation of unsuccessful ef- 
forts engaging the talents of a legion of 
fine statesmen, it took courage and vi- 
sion to create this first major step to- 
ward peace. It will also require courage 
and vision — perhaps even more — and a 
commitment to fulfill not only the letter 
but the spirit of the Camp David ac- 
cords and to realize our dreams of a 
permanent peace. 

The period between now and the 
completion of the talks will certainly 
not be easy as we work to resolve some 
of the most comple.x and emotional is- 
sues in the entire world. Both Egypt 
and Israel will now be facing difficult 
decisions in making an effort to answer 
difficult questions, and they will need 
patience and understanding — theirs 



and also ours. Yet in the resolution of 
these questions lies a great promise for 
achieving the comprehensive peace 
which is coveted by Egypt, Israel, the 
United States, and all people of good 
will everywhere. 

The United States will continue to 
work patiently and constructively with 
both Egypt and Israel as a full partner 
in'the negotiations. These negotiations 
presently ongoing are the road to 
peace. They can succeed. They must 
succeed. 

Let me make one thing clear. 
Domestic politics cannot be allowed to 
create timidity or to propose obstacles 
or delay or to subvert the spirit of 
Camp David, or to imply a lack of com- 
mitment to reach our common goal. 
This is time when we must continue 
that political vision that made possible 
the treaty which we celebrate today. 
As Prime Minister Begin said here last 
year: "... now is the time for all of us 
to show civil courage in order to pro- 
claim to our peoples and to others: No 
more war, no more bloodshed, no more 
bereavement." 

At Camp David, we invited others 
to adhere to the framework of peace 
and to join in the negotiations. The 
negotiations must be based on a com- 
monly accepted foundation. As these 
talks move forward, let me reaffirm 
two points. We will not negotiate with 
the Palestinian Liberation Organiza- 
tion, nor will we recognize the PLO 
unless it accepts Resolutions 242 and 
338 and recognizes Israel's right to 
exist. And we oppose the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state. 

The United States, as all of you 
know, has a warm and a unique re- 
lationship of friendship with Israel that 
is morally right. It is compatible with 
our deepest religious convictions, and it 
is right in terms of America's own 
strategic interests. We are committed 
to Israel's security, prosperity, and fu- 
ture as a land that has so much to offer 
to the world. A strong Israel and a 
strong Egypt serve our own security 
interests. 

We are committed to Israel's right 
to live in peace with all its neighbors, 
within secure and recognized borders, 
free from terrorism. We are committed 
to a Jerusalem that will forever remain 
undivided, with free access to all faiths 
to the holy places. Nothing will deflect 
us from these fundamental principles 
and commitments which I've just out- 
lined. 

As you all know, also, the United 
States has broadened and has deepened 
its valuable friendship with Egypt, the 
largest and the most powerful and the 



most influential Arab nation on Earth. 
President Sadat, with his heroism, has 
brought about profound changes not 
only in the rest of the world but in 
Egypt's own internal life. And he has 
made Egypt a leader among nations in 
the pursuit of peace. We support 
Egypt's security and its well-being, am 
we will work with Egypt to insure a 
more prosperous and a peaceful life for 
the Egyptian people. 

As President Sadat said at this 
house a year ago: "Let there be no mon 
wars or bloodshed between Arabs and I 
Israelis. Let there be no more suffering li 
or denial of rights. Let there be no 
more despair or loss of faith. Let no 
mother lament the loss of her child. Let 
no young man waste his life on a con- 
flict from which no one benefits. Let u: 
work together until the day comes 
when they beat their swords into plow- 
shares and their spears into pruning- 
hooks." 

Isaiah, in chapter 42 in the Bible, 
says of a great servant of God, "A 
bruised reed he will not break; a dimly 
burning wick he will not quench ... I 
have given you, as a covenant to the 
people, a light to the nations to open 
the eyes that are blind." 

Today, as the earth is reborn in 
springtime after a long winter, we lift 
high that dimly burning wick of peace 
before the nations of the world. In its 
light all can see that, amid the disap- 
pointment and the dangers, mankind 
can still prevail against its own evils, 
against its own past, against all the ef- 
forts that would separate us one from 
another and make us enemies. We mus) 
not be mean nor stingy nor lacking in 
courage. We must not betray the trust 
of those whose faith is in us. 

Down through the centuries the 
children of Abraham have spoken dailj 
of their longing for peace in their 
greetings. President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin are children of Ab- 
raham, and they are men of peace. I asl 
your prayers that full peace may yet be 
ours. I pray that the dimly burning 
wick which we have lit may yet ignite a 
blazing flame of peace that will light tb 
world. 

I and President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin join in with you in our 
fervent prayer: Peace, shaloni, 
salaam. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980, 
which also includes the remarks on this oc 
casion by Ashraf Ghorbal. Egyptian Am- 
bassador to the United States, and Ep- 
hraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the 
United States. ■ 



Department of State Bulletii 



Middle East 



•SI' lit" conduct which has been pur- 
I l'\ Iran and thus to create the 
iiiium deterrent against its repeti- 
\i\ any country in any part of the 

ler of Presentation 

lould like now to explain the order in 
ich we propose to present our case to 
Court. At the outset I propose to 
lew the factual events which have 
urred during the 4V2 months that the 
lerican hostages have been held in 
tivity in Tehran. At the hearing 
ich the Court held on December 10, 
described a number of the relevant 
nts, but in the ensuing 3 months 
re have emerged a number of addi- 
iial facts which are plainly relevant 
t)ur case on the merits, and I would 
glad of an opportunity to present 
m to the Court. 

Thereafter, we would appreciate it 
ne Court would hear from my col- 
gue, Mr. Stephen Schwebel, who ap- 
irs as Counsel in the case. Mr. 
webel will develop our argument to 
effect that the current dispute be- 
en the United States and Iran falls 
larely within the jurisdiction of the 
Brt and that there is no valid reason 
f/ the Court should not proceed to 
(idicate the claims currently being 
(sented by the United States. 

Following Mr. Schwebel's presen- 
on, I would appreciate it if the 
:irt would allow me to resume the 
;ument and to develop, in additional 
lail, the specific substantive claims 
anced by the United States as 
inst Iran. I would propose to include 
hin that discussion a point which, in 

view, deserves particular attention 
amely, that although the U.S. Em- 
sy in Tehran was originally seized 
a mob of people who did not purport 
ie agents of the Government of Iran, 
jact, the mob received almost im- 
iiiate support and endorsement from 

government and have since been 
(rating with the authorization of the 
»f of state of the Islamic Republic of 
n. As a result, as I shall explain in 
re detail, the Government of Iran is 

rnationally responsible for all of the 
duct upon which the U.S. claims in 
5 case are based. 

In the course of describing those 
ms I shall also observe that, al- 
ugh the Government of Iran has 
:gested that it has grievances of 
ious kinds against the United 
tes, none of those grievances has 
n presented to this Court, and none 



can be treated as having any relevance 
whatever to these proceedings. No such 
alleged grievance can be allowed to 
interfere with or detract from the 
pending claims of the United States. 

Finally, I shall develop our conten- 
tions as to the relief which we seek in 
this litigation. In essence, we seek a 
series of declarations which will conclu- 
sively establish to all within the inter- 
national community that the Govern- 
ment (jf Iran has committed gross viola- 
tions of its international obligations to 
the United States and that it is bound 
to put an end to the present unlawful 
situation. 

We also seek a declaration to the 
effect that Iran's unlawful conduct has 
given rise to an obligation to make rep- 
arations to the United States. As indi- 
cated in our Memorial [January 15, 
19801, the determination of the amount 
of damage that is due to the United 
States must necessarily be postponed 
until Iran's ongoing unlawful conduct 
has been brought to an end, but it is, 
nevertheless, important that the Court 
now affirm that the United States is en- 
titled to reparation in an amount to be 
subsequently determined. 

Sources of Information 

As a preliminary matter, I should make 
one comment about the factual sources 
upon which we have had to rely in for- 
mulating our claims. Since the U.S. na- 
tionals who would normally be supply- 
ing the relevant information to the U.S. 
Government are now in captivity, all 
normal sources of information have 
been completely unavailable to us 
throughout the crisis, and to a very 
large extent we have had to rely on 
press reports of actions taken and 
statements made by the Government of 
Iran. Under some circumstances, of 
course, isolated press reports may be of 
questionable reliability, but the events 
that have occurred in Tehran over the 
last 4% months have been so dramatic 
that they have been covered by a mul- 
titude of reporters whose reports are 
substantially unanimous as to the es- 
sential fact.s, giving a clear indication of 
substantial reliability. In any event, as 
to many of the events in the story, the 
press reports are all that we have — not 
through any fault of the U.S. Govern- 
ment but as a direct result of the un- 
lawful conduct of the Government of 
Iran. 

The fact that the Respondent in 
this case is responsible for depriving us 
of direct proof of our allegations, I re- 
spectfully submit, entitles the United 



States here to rely upon the pi'inciple 
laid down by the Court in the Corfu 
CliaiiHcl case. There the Court took 
note of the predicament of a state which 
had been made the victim of a breach of 
international law and which for that 
reason was unable to obtain direct proof 
of its claims. The Court stated as 
follows: 

Such a State should be alloweil a more 
liberal recour.se to inferences of fact and cir- 
cumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence 
is admitted in all sy.stems of law, and its use 
is recognized by international decisions. It 
must be regarded as of special weight when 
it is based on a series of facts linked to- 
gether and leading logically to a single con- 
clu.sion. ll.C.J. RcportK 19i<J. p. 18] 

It is our submission, of course, that 
the inferences of fact and circumstantial 
evidence upon which the United States 
is entitled to rely here overwhelmingly 
demonstrate multiple and flagrant vio- 
lations of international law by the Gov- 
ernment of Iran. 

I should note also that many of the 
facts to which I will give special em- 
phasis during my argument are re- 
ferred to in our Memorial with appro- 
priate citations to the source materials. 
When I refer to a fact which could not 
be inclufled within our Memorial, I shall 
be relying upon the Supplemental 
Documents which the Court has given 
us permission to submit. We have 
supplied the Registrar with a typewrit- 
ten version of our presentation which 
contains appropriate citations to 
sources and which also contains head- 
ings to which we shall not refer during 
our oral rendition. 

Political Structure in Iran 

Turning to the facts, I propose to start 
with one brief comment on the political 
structure which has existed within Iran 
throughout the relevant period. As the 
Court is aware, the Islamic revolution 
in Iran began in late 1978. The former 
Shah left the country, and the reins of 
power thereupon came into the hands of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. With great 
rapidity, the Ayatollah established 
himself as the de facto chief of state, 
and he has been, without any question, 
the supreme political authority in Iran 
ever since that time. 

Throughout the period with which 
this case is concerned, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini has been in direct control of 
the Iranian Armed Forces; he has re- 
ceived foreign envoys, accepted resig- 
nations of prime ministers and other 



ly 1980 



37 



Middle East 



officiiils, delegated authority to the 
Revolutionary Council, and, in general, 
exercised ultimate control over all ini- 
|)ortant governmental decisions. To 
date the Ayatollah and his immediate 
colleagues have admittedly been 
operating as an interim government, 
but under the Constitution which was 
formally adopted in December 1979, the 
Ayatollah will continue to be the su- 
preme authority in the political struc- 
ture of Iran. Indeed, although Mr. 
Rani-Sadr has now been elected Presi- 
ilent. Principles 5, 107, and 110 of the 
Iranian Constitution expressly place 
the ultimate power to govern in the 
hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
is identified by name in the Constitu- 
tion, and that constitutional arrange- 
ment will obviously continue in force 
even after the installation of a new- 
legislature in April or May. 

It .should be emphasized addition- 
ally that the Ayatollah's role is not 
titular; as demonstratefl by additional 
facts which I shall describe in a mo- 
ment, the Ayatollah Khomeini enjoys 
ultimate power of decision over the en- 
tire governmental apparatus and over 
the so-called militant students who 
have been holding the American hos- 
tages in captivity for so long. Against 
that political background I should like 
now to turn to the autumn of 1979, 
when the story of this case begins. 

Attack on the Kmbassy and the 
Iranian (Jovernment's Responsibility 

Before describing what happened on 4 
November 1979, the date of the actual 
seizure of the American Embassy, I 
should like to refer to two significant 
events which occurred before and after 
4 November. The two dates involved 
are 1 November 1979 and 1 January 
1980. The two dates have something in 
common; On each an Iranian mob 
threatened to attack a foreign embassy, 
and on each the Government of Iran 
look effective action and protected the 
embassy in question. 

Let me begin with 1 November 
1979. P^our days previously the Ayatol- 
lah Khomeini had delivered an inflam- 
matory speech saying, in effect, that all 
of the problems of Iran stemmed from 
America, and, in the next few days, the 
U.S. p^mbassy in Tehran heard rumors 
that a mass demonstration in the vicin- 
ity of the Emba.ssy was planned for 1 
November. On the morning of 1 
November, the people in the Embassy 
took stock of the security situation and 
concluded that there were a sufficient 



38 



number of Iranian police in the area to 
deal with the planned demonstration, 
and, in that conclusion, they were cor- 
rect. At one point during the day, there 
were as many as 5,000 demonstrators 
marching back anfl forth in front of the 
Embassy, but the Chief of Police was 
present with adequate forces, and the 
government kept the entire situation 
under complete control. We think it is 
indisputable that on 1 November the 
Government of Iran recognized its duty 
to provide complete protection for the 
Embassy and all those within its walls, 
and on that day the government fulfil- 
led its duty in a completely satisfactory 
way. 

Exactly the same phenomenon oc- 
curred 2 months later, although a dif- 
ferent embassy was involved. On 1 
January 1980, a large mob physically 
attacked the Soviet | Tehran] Embassy 
in Tehran, |of the Soviet Union,! but, 
again, the security forces of the Iranian 
Government wer'e on hand to prevent 
its seizui'e. Regrettably, those forces 
were unable to prevent the defilement 
of a Soviet flag, but the news films of 
the attack of 1 January, as well as the 
films of a second attack on the Soviet 
Embassy on 3 January, graphically por- 
ti'ayed the security forces of the Gov- 
ernment of Iran protecting the Em- 
bassy premises. As I shall indicate in a 
moment, the events of 1 November and 
1 and 3 January stand out in dramatic 
contrast with the events which began to 
unfold on 4 November 1979. 

At this point in these proceedings 
the Court is certainly familiar with the 
story in general terms. It has been told 
in the Application which we filed on he- 
half of the United States [November 
29, 1979], it was amplified in our Re- 
quest for Interim Measures of Protec- 
tion (November 29, ]979| and in the 
oral argument which we presented to 
the Court on 10 December, and it has 
been laid out in considerable detail in 
the Memorial which we submitted on 15 
January. Nevertheless, I would like to 
touch briefly on some of the more im- 
portant facts which have particular sig- 
nificance in the context of these pro- 
ceedings on the merits. 

First of all, the evidence makes 
clear that the Government of Iran, in- 
cluding the Ayatollah Khomeini, either 
knew or should have known in advance 
that the U.S. Embassy was going to be 
attacked by an organized group of 
people who claim to be university stu- 
dents. In the preceding days the 
AvatoUah had made a number of 



speeches calling for anti-American 
demonstrations, and the students hav.|i 
since publicly proclaimed that when 
they attacked the Embassy they werej 
acting in response to the Ayatollah's 
call to "intensify their attacks against | 
America." 

Moreover, the students have re- 
cently revealed that prior to the attai 
they consulted with a man named .Mns 
Kho'ini, an official of the Iranian Govii 
ernment's broadcasting organization. It 
They wanted to know whethei' the pr |i 
posed attack would be consistent w itl 
the policy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and he confirmed that it would. 
Moreover, Mr. Kho'ini then contacu-i 
Mr. Ghotbzadeh — then in charge nl 
Iranian broadcasting and now the 
Foreign Minister of Iran — to urge hii 
to support the attack when it occun-e 
and, as we know, that support was 
given. All of these facts are set forth i 
our Supplemental Documents Nos. !,'■ 
and 111. In addition, the son of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini has stated thai 
before the attack, he was in touch ui 
the attackers, although he has said th 
he did not know an attack would ac- 
tually be made. 

On 1 November, as I mentioned i. 
earlier, the police authorities were fu : 
aware that in that period there was ; :i 
very real danger that the current dei 
onstrations in the Embassy area niig 
lead to an attack, and the police had 
demonstrated through their actions u 
November that they had the ability t 
deal with and thwart any such attack 
they wished to do so. The simple fact Lt 
that on 4 November, when an attack i li 
tually occurred, they evidently made m 
deliberate choice iiof to do their dutj 

On 4 November there was a dem 
onstration of approximately 3,000 
people in front of the American Em- 
bassy. The size of the crowd was not 
unmanageable; it was substantially 
smaller than the crowds of 5,000 and 
moi'e than the Iranian security forces 
had previously demonstrated their 
ability to control. But, 4 November 
they evidently decided to stay out of 
the way. The relatively small group 
which carried out the assault on the 
American Embassy was harflly a for- 
midable military force, and, yet, ac- 
cording to eyewitnesses, the Iranian 
security personnel stationed in the ar 
simply "faded" from the scene. Since 
that was exactly the opposite of the 
conduct which they had displayed du j 
ing the much larger demonstration 3 
days before, it is hard to believe thai 
their mysterious withdrawal resultet 



Department of State Bullc 



Middle East 



n anything nther than a ilelibei'ate 
tical decision by their superiors. 
Now, this last conclusion is sup- 
ed by the dramatic events which 
)wed. As soon as the attack began, 
)onsible officials in the Embassy 
an to make repeated calls for help to 
Iranian Foreign Ministry, and all 
h calls were ignored. Responsible 
lian officials were certainly aware of 
need for help. It happens that the 
erican Chai-ge d'Affaires, Mr. Bruce 
ngen, was at the Foreign Ministry 
he time of the attack, and he made 
ated, urgent, and personal appeals 
he Iranian Foreign Minister seeking 
ernment assistance. Although ample 
iirity forces were available, abso- 
ly nothing was done to prevent the 
ick from going forward and 
eeding. 

Moreover, the deliberateness of the 
sion to allow, and indeed encour- 
, the attack is made clear by yet 
ther significant event. It appears 
, as a result of the repeated Ameri- 
requests for assistance, specific or- 
B were actually given to an official 
nrity force known as the "Revolu- 
ary Guards." According to a sub- 
lient official statement, as reflected 
age 85 of our Memorial, the Revolu- 
lary Guards were actually ordered 
Iroceed to the Embassy im- 
(iately, but, instead of being or- 
fed to terminate the attack which 
then going on or to clear the Em- 
y grounds of intruders, they appar- 
y were ordei'ed to protect the at- 
ers. According to the statement to 
ich I have just referred, the students 
ir thanked the Revolutionary Guards 
itheir support in taking possession of 
Embassy. 

All this makes it apparent that 
n the Embassy was seized and the 
f;ives taken, w-hether or not the 
fernment of Iran had a role in ac- 
ly planning the attack, the govern- 
it was itself an active participant in 
entire venture. The il( facta chief of 
,e incited the attack, the police au- 
rities did nothing to prevent it, the 
eign Minister did not respond to 
s for help, and the Revolutionary 
irds provided protection for the 
Ibassy attackers. As we will em- 
size in later portions of our argu- 
it, it is difficult to imagine a course 
onduct which more flagrantly vio- 
:s uniformly recognized norms of in- 
lational law. 

The complicity of the Iranian Gov- 
ment in the operation has been 



shown again and again by that gdvern- 
ment's own subsequent conduct. Start- 
ing on the very day of the attack and 
continuing in the days and weeks that 
followed, a whole series of Iranian Gov- 
ernment officials — from the Ayatollah 
Khomeini down through the gov- 
ernmental structure — have treated the 
invading militants as national heroes. 
On 4 November the Ayatollah tele- 
phoned the students to approve of their 
captui'e of the American diplomats, the 
Foreign Minister "endorsed" that ac- 
tion, the commander of the Revolu- 
tionary Guards pledged continuing sup- 
port by his forces, the public prosecu- 
tor joined in, and — perhaps strangest 
of all — the jiidh-innj expressly en- 
dorsed these plain violations of the law. 

In connection with these official 
endorsements of the actions taken by 
the militant students, I suppose that it 
might conceivably be suggested that 
the Government of Iran felt powerless 
to prevent such violations of law and, 
therefore, should not be criticized too 
harshly for participating in and con- 
doning this course of conduct. As a 
matter of law, of course, no such de- 
fense could be accepted, and it is also 
refuted by the./Wr/.s. Indeed, refutation 
is to be found in an event which took 
place just 2 days after the seizure of the 
American Embassy. 

On 6 November an Iranian mob 
seized the Consulate of Iraq in retalia- 
tion for an Iraqi seizure of an Iranian 
Consulate, but, within a matter of 
hours, the Ayatollah Khomeini had is- 
sued an order directing that the Iraqi 
Consulate be surrendered by the mob, 
and they obeyed by 5:00 p.m. These 
facts, which reemphasize the practical 
control e.xereised throughout this 
period by the Ayatollah Khomeini, are 
set forth at pages 203 and 204 of our 
Memorial. From 4 November down to 
the present day the Ayatollah has sim- 
ply not chosen to exercise his power to 
free the hostages and clear the 
Embassy. 

U.S. Reactions to the Seizure 

Protests by the United States began to 
be heard by the Government of Iran 
from the moment of the inception of the 
attack. As I have mentioned earlier, 
the beginning of the attack prompted 
immediate calls for help from the senior 
U.S. official in Tehran, Mr. Laingen, 
who vigorously protested the govern- 
ment's failure to prevent the attack 
and demanded that the Government of 



Iran fulfill its duty to protect the Em- 
bassy and its i)ersonnel. 

Moreover, as soon as it became ap- 
parent that the seizure of the Embassy 
and the American diplomats was moi'e 
than temporary, the President of the 
United States summoned a former U.S. 
AttoriK'y General, Mr. Ramsey Clark, 
to Washington and commissioned him a 
special emissary t(i travel to Iran and 
seek the release of the hostages. Mr. 
Clark's principal res])onsibility was tn 
negotiate with the authorities in 
Tehran, and he set off for Iran on 7 
November, stopping in Istanbul to 
change planes. 

That was as fai' as he got. By the 
time Mr. Clark reached Istanbul, the 
Government of Iran, through the 
Ayatollah Khomeini and others, had 
stated very clearly that the hostages 
would not be released until the United 
States had fulfilled certain political de- 
mands, including particularly the ex- 
tradition of the former Shah, who was 
then undergoing treatment for cancer 
in a New York hospital. On 7 
November, when Mr. Clark had 
reached Istanbul, the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini proclaimed that discussions be- 
tween the United States and Iran could 
not even begin until the Shah had been 
turned over to the Iranian authorities. 
Demonstrating his power in the official 
hierarchy in Iran, the Ayatollah for- 
bade any official of the Government of 
Iran or of the Revolutionary Council to 
meet with Mr. Clark or any other U.S. 
envoy. 

I need hardly i-emincl the Court 
that under the U.N. Charter, all .states, 
including Iran, have an obligation to 
seek to resolve disputes by peaceful 
means, including of course negotiation, 
and yet on 7 November, as reflected at 
page 204 of our Memorial, the Ayatol- 
lah decreed that there could be abso- 
lutely no negotiations with any Ameri- 
can envoy until after the Shah had been 
extradited. Iran had, in effect, declared 
its intention to pursue its goal by coer- 
cion, the seizure of hostages, instead of 
by negotiation. According to a state- 
ment issued on 20 November by the 
Ayatollah's son, there were other ele- 
ments within the Government of Iran 
who favored discussions with President 
Carter's special envoy, but that view 
was flatly rejected by the Ayatollah and 
he, after all, was and is the ultimate au- 
thority in Iran. 

This is not to say that there were 
no conversations between Mr. Clark 
and the authorities of Tehran. As a 
matter of fact, while Mr. Clark was in 



1980 



39 



Middle East 



Islanhul hi- had a serk's of tflejihone 
conversations with senior members of 
the Iranian .n'overnmental structure, in- 
chi(lin,u- the Ayatollah Beheshti, who 
was then Secretary of the Revolu- 
tionai-y Council; Mr. Ghotbzadeh, then 
Minister for National Guidance; and 
Mr. Bani-Sadr, the supervisor of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that 
time. During these conversations Mr. 
Clark made it very clear that the 
United States regarded the seizure of 
the hostages and the Embassy as to- 
tally illegal and unjustifiable. Although 
Mr. Clai-k nevei' had an opportunity to 
carry out the essential function that he 
was supposed to perform — namel\ to 
oi)en negotiations with the Government 
(if Iran — nevei'theless, he managed to 
lodge unet[uivocal pi'otests which made 
clear — if, indeed, any clarification was 
needed — that an enormously important 
dispute had arisen between the two 
states. 

Such protests were repeatedly voic- 
ed as the United States pursued its ef- 
forts to resolve the dispute. On 9 
Novembei', just 5 days after the hos- 
tages had been seized, Ambassadoi' 
Donald McHenry, the U.S. Permanent 
ReiJivsentative to the United Nations, 
[Ji'esented to the U.N. Security Council 
the letter which is set out at page 133 of 
our Memorial. In that letter the United 
States asserted that the action taken by 
the Government of Iran against our 
Embassy and diplomatic personnel 
struck at the "fundamental norms by 
which states maintain communication, 
and violate the very basis for the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security and of comity between states." 
The United States requested the Secu- 
rity Council to consider what might be 
done to secure the release of the hos- 
tages, and over the next several weeks 
the Security Council and the General 
Assembly responded with a series of 
statements and resolutions calling upon 
Iran to release the hostages without 
delay. These statements are set forth in 
our Memorial at pages 134, 135, 140, 
and 27-28. I will have more to say 
about the actions of the United Nations 
at a later point, Init I should simjjly 
note hei-e in passing that from an early 
point in the crisis, the conduct of the 
Government of Iran was vigorously 
protested both by the United States 
and by the United Nations. 

During the time it was making 
these public protests with respect to 
Iran's illegal conduct, the United States 
was also employing diplomatic channels 
for the same purpose. During the first 



few days following the Embassy 
takeover, the United States asked 
other governments which maintained 
embassies in Tehran to make de- 
marches on the Iranian Foreign Minis- 
try calling upon Iran to release the 
American hostages. Indeed, other 
countries have pursued that goal so 
vigorously that on 30 November, as in- 
dicated at page 132 of our Memorial, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini confessed that 
"ijrobably nut a day passes" without 
such messages from third countries 
being received by the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry. 

Iran's I'se of the Hostages 
for Political Coercion 

Thus far in my argument I have em- 
phasized four basic facts: first, that the 
Government of Iran very clearly was 
aware that it had an obligation to pi'o- 
tect the American Embassy and its 
diplomatic personnel from the mob; 
second, that it had the capability of 
doing so; third, that the Government of 
Iran made an apparently deliberate 
political decision that the Embassy and 
its pei'sonnel should be seized and im- 
|)lemented that decision not only by 
failing to provide protective security 
forces but by sending in the Revolu- 
tionary Guards to insure that the in- 
vaders would succeed in their mission; 
and fourth, that the United States 
reacted promptly, peacefully, and con- 
structively to those events. 

At this point, then, I would like to 
turn to another aspect that I have 
touched upon but not yet emphasized; 
namely, that the Government of Iran, 
once it had accomplished the capture of 
the American hostages, decided to use 
those hostages as a political instrument 
for coercing the United States into 
taking specific political actions desired 
by the Iranian authorities. 

As the Court is aware, various 
different kinds of political action have 
been demanded by the Iranians during 
the crisis, but at the beginning of the 
dispute the single most basic demand 
was that the United States send the 
former Shah back to Iran for prosecu- 
tion. As early as 7 November the 
Ayatollah and the students began to 
demand the extradition of the Shah, 
and the same demand was echoed at 
every level of the Iranian Government. 
On 7 November, for example, in 
discussing the question whether Mr. 
Clark would be received by the Iranian 
Government, the Avatollah Khomeini 



declared that the return of the Shah 
was a precondition not only for release 
of the hostages but for the mere operi' 
ing of discussions with the United 
States. As stated 2 days later on the 
Tehran radio, the Ayatollah was abso- 
lutely firm in the position that until the 
deposed Shah had been extradited, 
there could be no negotiations with an 
American envoys. The declaration to 
that effect is set forth at page 206 of 
our Memorial. 

The efforts of the Iranian Govern- 
ment to coerce the U.S. Government 
reached an initial crescendo on 17 
November: At that time the Ayatollah 
Khomeini had decided that certain 
female and black hostages then held 
captive in the American Embassy 
shoukl be released, and on 17 
November the Ayatollah issued an off; 
cial decree to that effect which was 
broadcast over the Tehran radio, as in 
dicated at page 95 of our Memorial. In 
the decree it was stated explicitly tha' 
once the specified hostages had been 
released the remaining American hos- 
tages would be held under arrest unti 
the American Government had re- 
turned the Shah to Iran for trial and he 
had retui-ned all of the wealth that he 
had allegedly plundered. 

I submit that the Iranian decree ( 
17 November, as set forth at page 95 ol 
our Memorial, is a unique document ir 
the history of modern international re 
lations and quite appalling in its impH 
cations. In that official pronouncemen 
the government not only confirmed its 
role in bringing about and endorsing 
the seizure of the Embassy and the hoi 
tages, it also confirmed that the Irania 
Government itself was holding diplomj 
tic personnel captive in an attempt to 
bring about desired political action. A' 
I shall subsequently explain when I ao 
dress the merits of our claims, it is th 
position of the United States that the 
conduct of the Iranian Government, as 
exemplified in the decree of 17 
November, in a very real sense consti 
tuted compound or multiplied violation 
of international law: The Government i 
Iran violated the law when it failed to 
protect the Embassy and the America 
diplomatic personnel; it compounded 
that violation when it supported and 
endorsed the capture; and it com- 
pounded the violation again when it 
began to use the hostages as an instru 
ment of coercion or blackmail. As I 
stanfl here today, this brutal strategy 
a negation of the rule of law, has not 
attained its stated objective; on the 
other hand, for international peace it 
has raised grave risks which have bee 



40 



Department of State Bulle- 



Middle East 



(Jiily because of the self-control 
. ^. Govefiinient and the Ameri- 



Kostraint 

lentally, if I may be permitted a 
onal aside, I happen to reside only 
,v blocks from the Iranian Embassy 
Washington, and I pass the Ii'aniaii 
)assy almost every day on my way 
id from the State Department. Al- 
: every day over the past iVi 
ths I have been struck anew by the 
V' of the fact that while our Em- 
y and our diplomats in Iran have 
in a state of captivity, the Em- 
y of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
ihington has been fully protected by 
United States and has been going 
t its business in a perfectly peace- 
ashion without the slightest moles- 
n of any kind. 

IFor 4y2 months our Embassy has 

physically held captive and has 

totally unable to function as an 

'lassy, and the Iranian Embassy in 

Ihington has been functioning with- 

Knterruption throughout. 
For 4^2 months — more than one- 
of the year — the American hos- 
■s have been imprisoned and for at 
part of this time, bound hand and 
and intimidated and threatened 
ttiarassefl in inhumane conditions, 

Kthe Iranian diplomats still in 
ington have been left free to come 
^0 as they please, to carry out their 
matic duties, and to enjoy the or- 
iry peaceful pleasures of life. 
IFor the past 4'/2 months the prem- 
iand records and documents and ar- 
3S of the American Embassy in 
•an have been ransacked, used at 
by the militants in Tehran, and dis- 
ed in the public press by high Ira- 
officials, while the Iranian prem- 
and archives in Washington have 
1 preserved inviolate. 
I submit that the restraint thus 
onstrated by the United States 
Id not be regai'ded as a sign of 
<ness. It should be i-egarded as a 
of strength, a demonsti'ation of the 
ty of the U.S. Government and the 
■rican people to overcome and con- 
the very strong and understandable 
Dtation to strike back at Iran. In 
;lecision to exercise such restraint 
U.S. commitment to the rule of law 
played a great part, and we are 
ified by the fact that our commit- 
t has been supported by almost 
ersal approbation of our restraint 
by a correspondingly universal 



condemnaliiin of the conduct of the 
Government of Iran, especially as re- 
flected in the pi'oceedings of the United 
Nations. 

Nevertheless, we feel very 
strongly, indeed, that if such condem- 
nation is to operate as a deterrent to 
repetition of the Iranian conduct, either 
in Iran or elsewhere, there is one more 
element that must be added; namely, a 
final judgment of this Court on the 
merits of the claims of the United 
States. It is because we believe that a 
clear and emphatic judgment is bound 
to be a deterrent to future and similar 
violations of international law that we 
have been moving forward as vigor- 
ously as we can in pursuit of a final 
decision. 

Iranian Government's Control 

At this point I should like to pause to 
comment on a relatively recent de- 
velopment which some may regard as 
undercutting our claim that the Gov- 
ernment of Iran itself continues to be a 
wholehearted participant in the viola- 
tions of international law that have oc- 
curred in this case. In very recent 
weeks, according to press accounts, 
there has developed a certain tension 
between some elements of the Iranian 
Government and the so-called militants 
occupying the Embassy compound. The 
newly elected President, Mr. Bani- 
Sadr, and some of his colleagues have 
criticized the students for their recent 
independence of action, asserting that 
the students are improperly attempting 
to act as "a government within a gov- 
ernment." I respectfully submit, how- 
ever, that this recent tension should 
not be permitted to obscure the funda- 
mentally important fact that from 4 
November down to the pi'esent time, 
the students have repeatedly em- 
phasized their subservience to the or- 
ders of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Again 
and again they have stated to the world 
that they would obey any instructions 
received from the Imam, who continues 
to be the supreme authority in Iran and 
to whom even the elected President is 
answerable under the Constitution. On 
17 November, as I noted earlier, the 
Ayatollah directed the .students to re- 
lease certain specified hostages, and 
the students obeyed. On 28 December 
the students were asked whether an 
order from the Ayatollah to release the 
rest of the hostages would be obeyed, 
and they replied unequivocally in the 
affirmative. In very recent days there 
mav have arisen reason to doubt that 



the students will obey oi-ders tVom Mr. 
Bani-Sadi" but as recently as 10 March 
the students reiteratefl their willing- 
ness to bow to the authoi'ity of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Such recent reaf- 
firmations are reflected in several of 
the Supplemental Documents which we 
will be .submitting to the Court.' 

The power to control the fate of the 
hostages, therefore, lies in the Ayatol- 
lah's hands, and he has decided against 
their release for the time being. In- 
stead he has publicly announced that 
the question of the hostages is for the 
National Assembly to decide.^ That 
body will not even take office until late 
April at the earliest, and it may not 
begin functioning until the month of 
May.'' In the interim the Ayatollah 
supports the continuerl detention of the 
hostages. It is, thus, entirely cleai- that 
the internationally wrongful acts for 
which the Unitefl States seeks judicial 
redress have been and are under the 
continuous control of the leader of the 
Government of Iran, which must take 
full responsibility for the conduct of 
which we complain here. 

U.S. Efforts in the United Nations 

As I mentioned earlier all of the U.S. 
reactions to the conduct of the Govei'n- 
ment of Iran have been peaceful actions 
taken within the law, and I would like 
at this point to describe for the Court 
the additional actions which the United 
States has taken in seeking to bring 
about a solution to its ongoing dispute 
with Iran over the hostages and the 
Embassy. Those efforts started with 
the immediate dispatch of Mr. Ramsey 
Clark on a mission to negotiate with the 
Government of Iran, but after an e.x- 
tended stay in Istanbul seeking to open 
negotiations Mi-. Clark returned to the 
United States totally rebuffed. 

The ne.xt step was to take the mat- 
ter up with the United Nations. On 9 
November 1979, as I mentioned earlier. 
Ambassador McHenry urgently re- 
quested on behalf of the United States 
that the Security Council undertake 
immediate deliberations as to what 
might be done and the same day the 
President of the Security Council ex- 
pressed, and I quote, "profound con- 
cern over the prolonged detention of 
American diplomatic personnel in 
Iran." I might note, incidentally, that it 
now seems odd that a statement issued 
on 9 November, just 5 days after the 
attack on the Embassy, should have 
referred to the prolonged detention of 



1980 



41 



Middle East 



the hosUKt's. Littlf (liii we know that 
that detention would still be continuin.u 
almost 5 months later. 

At any fate, in his statement of 9 
November the President of the Secu- 
rity Council called attention to the vio- 
lations of international law involved. As 
indicated at page 134 of our Memorial, 
he urged "that the principle of the in- 
violability of diplomatic personnel and 
establishments be respected in all cases 
in accoi'dance with intei'nationally ac- 
cepted norms," and on the same day the 
President of the U.N. General Assem- 
bly appealed to the Ayatollah Khomeini 
for the release of the hostages — as 
demonstrated at page 135 of our Memo- 
rial. 

Ironically, it was shortly after these 
U.N. declarations that the authoi'ities 
in Iran began to threaten criminal trials 
of the hostages. The Ayatollah Kho- 
meini made a series of such threats 
himself, and as indicated at page 183 of 
our Memorial, the U.S. Government I'e- 
sponded with a .series of statements 
charging that any such trials would be 
clear violations of international law. 
The same protest was also asserted by 
the Secretary General of the United 
Nations on 20 November. 

It was on 25 November, with cap- 
tivity and thi'eats of trial continuing, 
that the Secretary General exercised 
his e.xtraordinai-y authority under Arti- 
cle 99 of the U.N, Charter to convene 
the Security Council in an urgent effort 
to resolve the crisis which the Secre- 
tary General characterized as a serious 
threat to the international peace and 
security. He made a full statement to 
the Security Council on 27 November 
statmg in pai-t that over the preceding 
3 weeks he had been continuously in- 
volved in efforts to find a means of re- 
solving the problem. At the same time 
he announced that the then Foreign 
Minister of Iran, Mi'. Rani-Sadr, had 
requested that the meeting of the Secu- 
rity Council be adjourned until 1 De- 
cember in order to allow him to partici- 
pate personally. The Council grant- 
ed that i-eiiuest. In fact, when the 
Security Council reconvened on 1 De- 
cember the Iranian Government had 
changed its mind and boycotted the 
meeting. 

The initial i-esult of the Security 
Council deliberations, as the Court is 
aware, was Security Council Resolution 
457 (December 4, 19791, which is re- 
printed in our Memorial at page 140. In 
that resolution the Security Council 
reaffirmed "the solemn obligation of all 



42 



States Parties to both the Vieinia Con- 
vention on Diplomatic Relations . . . 
and the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations ... to respect the inviolabil- 
ity of diplomatic personnel and . . . 
premises," and it also called upon Iran 
to immediately release the hostages. 
In this connection I should point 
out one significant aspect of the lan- 
guage of Resolution 457. As I men- 
tioned earliei' in my argument, the 
evidence cleaidy establishes that the 
Government of Iran was a direct and 
active and continuing participant in the 
capture and continuing detention of the 
hostages, and those facts seem to have 
been clearly recognized by the Security 
Council. The resolution of 4 Decembei' 
urgently called upon the Government of 
Iran — not the students but the gov- 
ei'nment itself — "to release im- 
mediately the personnel of the Em- 
bassy of the United States . . . ." In 
another portion of the resolution the 
Council called upon the two govern- 
ments "to take steps to resolve peace- 
fully the remaining issues between 
them," but in the earlier paragraph re- 
lating directly to the hostages, there 
was no call "to take steps" to achieve 
the hostages' release. On the contrary, 
there was simply a direct command to 
the Government of Iran "to release," 
thus recognizing the fact that in sub- 
stance, if not in form, the hostages 
were and are in the custody of the Ira- 
nian Govermnent. 

U.S. Efforts in the ICJ 

Throughout this period — in the months 
of November and December 1979 — the 
U.S. Government continued its efforts 
to achieve a resolution of the dispute 
through peaceful means, and for pres- 
ent purposes the most important of 
those efforts was our institution of the 
present proceeding before this Court. 
When we filed our Application on 29 
November we had in mind two different 
kinds of commitments previously made 
by the Government of Iran. First, in 
each of four different treaties, as cited 
in our Application, Iran had formally 
acquiesced in and bound itself to the 
proposition that a dispute of the kind 
presented here is within the jui'isdic- 
tion of this Court. Frankly, we did iKtt 
see how Iran could make any plausible 
argument that this dispute is not within 
the jurisdiction of this Court, and, in 
fact, Iran has not done so. Secondly, at 
the time we filed oui- Application we 
had in mind that as a member of the 
United Nations, Iran has formally un- 
dertaken, pursuant to Article 94, para- 



graph 1, of the U.N. Charter, to compl 
with the decision of this Court in any 
case to which Iran might be a party. 
Accordingly, it was the hope and expei 
tation of the United States that the 
Government of Iran, in compliance wit 
its formal commitments and obliga- 
tions, would obey any and all (jrders 
and judgments which might be entere 
by this Court in the course of the pre; 
ent liti.gation. 

These considerations prompted th 
United States, when it filed its Applie; 
tion on 29 November, to file simultanijf 
ously a request for an indication of pr 
visional measures. As the Court is full 
aware, we respectfully requested the 
earliest possible hearing on that re- 
quest, and the Court acknowledged tl 
gravity of the matter by allowing botl 
parties full argument on 10 December 

The Court will recall that on the 
day before the hearing, the Minister fi 
Forei.gn Affairs of Iran made a fmiiKi 
submission to the Court in the form ul 
letter transmitted by telegram. Al- 
though we will have more to say almi ; 
the letter of 9 December at a later ll 
point, I should like to note now two I 
significant aspects of that letter. My I 
first point appears in the first para- | 
graph of the letter and, indeed, in thi i 
first sentence of that paragrajih, wliii 
I should like to quote: 

First of all, the Government of the I 
lamic Republic of Iran wishes to expre.ss 
respect for the International Court of Ju 
tiee, and for its distinguished member.-i, f 
what they have achieved in the quest for 
just and equitable solutions to le.eal con- 
flicts between States. 

Again, that seemed to us to be a 
good sign in terms of the likelihood th 
Iran would obey any orders entered 1 
the Court. 

The second significant feature of 
the Iranian letter of 9 December, I 
submit, was the total absence of any 
legal or factual argumentation to the 
effect that the Iranian seizure of the 
hostages and the Embassy was lawfu 
Although the U.S. Application and R^ 
quest for Provisional Measures had 
made clear that we were accusing the- 
Govei'nment of Iran of flagrant and 
plain violations of Ii-an's international 
legal obligations under the four cited 
treaties, the Iranian letter of 9 De- 
cember made absolutely no I'esponse 
those charges. The Court will recall 
that the letter simply took the positic 
that the Court should not take cogni- 
zance of the case on the theoi'y that th 
seizui'e of the hostages was only "a 



Department of State Bulle' 



Middle East 



rginal and secondary aspect" of a 
rer problem. The net result of that 
nian position on 9 December, I re- 
ctfully submit, was and is that the 
/ernment of Iran has virtually con- 
ed the total illegality of the course 
onduct upon which it embarked on 4 
vember 1979. 
At this point, incidentally, I should 
e note of the fact that a second mes- 
e was conveyed by Iran to the Court 
t 2 days ago. I will not discuss that 
5sage separately, however, because 
>ally is simply a reitei'ation of the 
sage of 9 December. Two or three 
tences of the earlier message have 
n omitted and the position of 
ither sentence has been changed, but 
substance of the two is absolutely 
ntical. Thus in substance, if not in 
m, all that Iran has chosen to say to 
Court about the case is set forth in 
message of 9 December — and we 
rl that letter as a concession of 
jality. 

Furthermore, and more impor- 
3 1\', there is other documentary evi- 
• ri' that confirms such a concession. 
■ fnrt is that in the 4y2 months since 
h attack on the Embassy, both the 
i«- President of Iran, Mr. Bani-Sadr, 
T the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. 
T tli/.adeh, have expressly acknowl- 
' mI I hat the seizure of the Embassy 
'lie hostages was carried out in 
i: liii i)f the Vienna Convention on 
' liiinatic Relations, and another gov- 
i iii'iii offiejal has expressly acknowl- 
■i\ the I'esiJuiisibility of the Iranian 
ji ei'iiment for all that has transpired. 
1 St- significant facts are set forth in 
^i plcmental Documents 18, 115, and 
3 as well as at page 23 of our 
■I iKirial. 

I'll fore the recess I had been pur- 
L! I chronology of the proceedings in 
:i (a SI' and I had reached 15 De- 
elirr when the Court announced its 
rniiiKius decision to order provisional 
ii siircs calling upon Iran to insure 
1 iiimiediate release of the hostages 
till' immediate restoration of the 
ii-cs of the Embassy to U.S. con- 
. 1 think it is fair to say that the 
111 generally regarded that pro- 
I iircment by the Court as a major 

I Inward the solution of the crisis 
Imped that that would turn out to 

II It is ti-agic that it has not as yet. 
The Government of Iran has re- 

,i.jiijil not only unmoved by the 
" rt's action but, if I may say so, de- 
t. As reflected in an annex at page 



I 1980 



141 of oui' Memorial, on l(i December — 
just 7 flays after he had expressed pro- 
found respect for the Court — the 
Foreign Minister of Iran referred to the 
Court's provisional measures as a 
"prefabricated verdict" which was 
"clear ... in advance," and instructed 
the Iranian Embassy here in The 
Hague officially to reject the decision. 
That reaction, I submit, simply reem- 
phasizes the responsibility of the Gov- 
ernment of Iran for the seizure and con- 
tinuing captivity of the hostages. 

Security Council Resolution 461 

The United States, disappointed by 
Iran's decision to continue in this illegal 
course of conduct, thereafter returned 
to the U.N. Security Council and 
sought further action from the Council. 
On 31 December 1979, the Security 
Council adopted Re.solution 461, which 
is set forth in our Memorial at pages 27 
and 28. In that resolution the Security 
Council again recognized that the hos- 
tages were being held in Iran in viola- 
tion of international law and that the 
situation resulting from the conduct of 
Iran could have grave consequences for 
international peace and security. The 
resolution also took into account the 
order of this Court of 15 December and 
reemphasized the responsibility of 
states to refrain, in their international 
relations, from the threat or use of 
force. The resolution then urgently 
called, once again, on the Government 
of Iran to release the hostages im- 
mediately and announced the decision 
of the Security Council, in the event of 
noncompliance by Iran, to adopt effec- 
tive measures under articles 39 and 41 
of the U.N. Charter. Although the Se- 
curity Council has since been prevented 
from carrying out its decision to adopt 
effective measures against the Gov- 
ernment of Iran, the fact remains that 
the members of the Security Council 
were unanimous in expressing the view 
that the conduct of which we complain 
here constitutes a plain violation of in- 
ternational law and that the hostages 
should be released immediately. 

U.N. Commission of Inquiry 

My discussion has now reached the 
point in January when the United 
States filed its Memorial. Since 2 
months have now elapsed since that 
filing, and since that 2-month period has 
encompassed some events in which the 
Court has a proper interest, I intend to 



turn to this new subject nov\'. Re- 
grettably, since the hostages remain 
in cajitivity, the fundamental problem 
of which we comjilain here has not been 
altered in any of its legal essentials, but 
there have been a number of develop- 
ments which are worthy of comment 
and which are reflected in the Supple- 
mental Documents which we are sub- 
mitting to the Court. In summarizing 
these events, I shall not attempt to 
trace through every twist and turn of 
Ii-anian politics. As the Court is aware 
fi-om the jHihlic press, over the past 2 
months thei'e has been literally an out- 
pouring of varied and confusing and in- 
consistent political statements from 
many different figui'es on the Iranian 
political scene, and I must content my- 
self here with a summary of only the 
most significant events based on the 
supplementary documents. 

One major political development 
occurred in late January when Mr. 
Bani-Sadr was elected President of the 
Islamic Republic. I think it fair to say 
that the world generally regarded the 
installation of the new President as a 
hopeful event which might well lead to 
a new element of stability on the Ira- 
nian political scene, thus perhaps im- 
proving the chance that the Ii'anian 
Government would begin to behave re- 
sponsibly with respect to the hostages. 

Then in February the Secretary 
General of the United Nations decided, 
building on his January discussions in 
Tehran, to foi'm a commission to visit 
Iran as an aid toward the solution of the 
hostage crisis. The commission was of- 
ficially established by the SecretaiT 
General on 2(1 February;'' in the last 
several weeks, as the Court is aware, 
the commission has visited Iran and 
conducted a series of interviews. On 11 
March it left Iran with its task un- 
finished because the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini had, in effect, refused to create 
the conditions necessary for the com- 
pletion of the commission's work.^ 

You have asked us to respond to a 
question as to whether the commission 
of inquiry in any way affects the juris- 
diction of the Court with respect to 
these proceedings, and I should like to 
give a detailed answer to that question 
at this point. In our view, the answer to 
the question is very clearly no. To dem- 
onstrate that that is so, I should refer 
at once to the official announcement of 
the establishment of the commission on 
20 February.** The announcement of the 
Secretary General is short, and I should 
like to read it in its entirety. 

I wish to announce the establishment of 



43 



Middle East 



a fommissi(]n of inquiry to uiiderUikt' a 
factfinding mission to Iran to hear Iran's 
grievances anil to allow an early solution of 
the crisis between Iran and the United 
States. Iran desires to have the commission 
s|)eak to each of the hostages. 

'rile Secretary General's stateiiieiU 
then listed the names of the five mem- 
bers of the commission and then he con- 
tinued as follows: 

The members from Algeria and Ven- 
ezuela will serve as the Co-Chairmen of the 
commission. The commission, which will 
leave for Tehran from Geneva over the 
weekend, will complete its work as soon as 
possible and submit its report to the Secre- 
tary (leneral. 

It should be noted that, as stated 
by the Secretary General, the commis- 
sion's responsibilities were very lim- 
ited, both in terms of function and in 
terms of subject matter. As to function, 
the commission of in(|uiry was to serve 
as a factfinding body, which obviously 
makes clear that it was not to reach 
le.gal judgments or otherwise engage in 
the function of adjudication as such. In 
addition, so far as the process of finding 
facts is concerned, the subject matter is 
confined to what the Secretary General 
described as "Iran's grievances." The 
Secretary General also expressed the 
hope that the process of allowin.g Iran 
to e.xpress its grievances — and having 
the commission find the facts with re- 
spect thereto — would promote an early 
solution to the crisis between the two 
governments, but neither the Secretary 
General nor the two governments gave 
the commission any responsibility 
whatever with respect to the adjudica- 
tion of the claims of the United States. 
That function remains entirely, and we 
think veiT clearly, within the jurisdic- 
tion of this Court. The conclusions 
which I have just expressed are fully 
corroborated, I submit, by the state- 
ments made by officials of both of the 
governments involved. On the U.S. 
side, on 20 February following the es- 
tablishment of the commission, the 
While House declared that both the 
United States and Iran "have concurred 
in the establishment of the commission, 
IIS pi-aposcd hji the Secretary General." 
The statement'' took specific note of the 
Secretary General's statement that the 
commission "will undertake a factfind- 
ing mission." While the statement in- 
cluded language to the effect that the 
commission would hear grievances of 
"both sides," its reference in that re- 
gard was in the context of the stated 
hope that the cominission would help 
bring about the early release of the hos- 



tages for whose welfare the American 
people have been concerned for so many 
months. The White House statement 
flatly asserted the position of the 
United States that the commission "will 
not be a tribunal." 

Subsequent statements by U.S. of- 
ficials are consistent on this point. In a 
press briefing on 23 February,^ the 
State Department spokesman reiter- 
ated the understanding that the pur- 
poses of the commission were to hear 
Iran's grievances and to bring about an 
early end to the crisis. He emphasized 
that "the official mandate is as stated in 
the Seci'etary General's own release on 
this subject." That position was reem- 
phasized by the spokesman on 2(i Feb- 
ruary when he said: 

The Secretary General has outlined the 
objectives of the commission that he put 
together and sent to Iran. He has projected 
what it is: we a.gree with that.^ 

In response to questions at a press 
conference the following da.v, the Sec- 
retary of State of the United States re- 
jjeated this understantling of the com- 
mission's objective and also added the 
following: 

Let me say that the understanding of 
the United Nations and ourselves has been 
clearly set forth by the Secretary General. 
He was asked what the mandate was after a 
question had been raised as to the nature of 
the mandate, and he confirmed it was as he 
had originally stated it. 

I think the terms of reference and the 
understanding with respect to those terms 
of reference was clear, remains clear, and I 
think they have been correctly reflected by 
what the Secretary General has said.'" 

The Iranian Government has also 
iTiade relevant statements on this sub- 
ject, and those statements clearly indi- 
cate the understanding on the part of 
Iran that the commission has no func- 
tion with respect to the claims which 
are presently pending before this 
Court. In announcing the establishment 
of the commission, President Bani-Sadr 
stated the Iranian view that the com- 
mission was to engage in "an inquiry 
and investigation into past American 
intervention in the internal affairs cjf 
Iran throu.gh the regime of the former 
Shah and investigation of their 
treachery, crimes, and corruption."" 
Similarly, in a inessage issued on 23 
February, the Ayatollah Khomeini re- 
ferred to the commission as a body 
which is "investigating and studying 
past U.S. interventions in Iran's inter- 
nal affairs through the bloodletting 



Shah regime."'- And in an interview on 
25 February, President Bani-Sadr 
stated to German correspondents that 
"it is the task of the committee to in- 
vestigate the crimes of the Shah and hi 
dependence on the United States and ti 
make the results known to the world 
public. The committee has no other 
mission."'^ 

It is evident, I submit, that neithe 
the Secretary General nor either of ih 
two governments involved has evei' 
viewed the commission as having any I 
responsibility for the adjudication of \ 
the U.S. claims which are now before | 
this Court. Even if the commission ha i 
met with full success in its mission to i 
Iran, the United States would still he 
presenting its claims here today. It is 
thus very clear, we submit, that the 
jurisdiction of this Court has been am 
remains unaffected by the activities ol 
the U.N. commission. 

Perhaps the best way for me to 
conclude my discussion of the commis- 
sion is to quote from Judge Lachs' 
opinion in the Aegean Sen Coiifiiieiila 
Shelf case. In discussing the relation- 
ship between the functions of the Coui 
and other methods of peaceful settle- 
ment of dis])utes. Judge Lachs used 
language which to my mind precisely 
fits the crisis in U.S. -Iranian relations 
since 4 November, and I would like tu 
(|Uote: 

The frequently unorthodox nature of 
the problems facing States today require 
as many tools to be used and as many av- 
enues to be opened as possible in order h 
resolve the intricate and frequently mult 
dimensional issues involved, it is some- 
times desirable to apply several methods 
the same time or successively. Thus no ii 
compatibility should be seen between the 
various instruments and fora to which 
states may resort, for all are mutually 
complementary. Notwithstanding the 
interdependence of issues, some may be 
isolated, given priority and their solutior 
sought in a separate forum. In this way i 
may be possible to prevent the aggravatit 
of a dispute, its degeneration into a con- 
flict. Within this context, the role of the 
Court as an institution serving the peacef 
resolution of disputes should, despite ap 
pearances, be of growing importance. 

The U.S. Government consented ) 
the establishment of the U.N. commii 
sion in the hope that by providing Ira 
with an opportunity to air its griev- 
ances, the climate would be that much 
more favorable for the release of the 
hostages and the eventual resolution 
other issues now pending between th( 
two states. Unfortunately, the commis- 



Department of State Bulle 



Middle East 



it,i.h 

( V la 

(llMM 

(1- ca 
■| 

t-lu: 
Ciim 



•ffoi'ls have not yet borne fruit. 
1(1 I think this is the critical point 
ly Judge Lachs in the passage I 
noted, the Secretary General's 
It to allow Iran to air its griev- 
>>• establishing the commission 
t and is not in any way incom- 
with the simultaneous pursuit of 
^e before this Court or with the 
- full and prompt consideration of 
ise on the merits, 
hat concludes my discussion of the 
d background underlying the 
■; of the United States, and I 
1 like now to turn for just a mo- 
iii a ijreliniinary review of the 



' niniary of Substantive 
I sal I*rinciples 

As the Court will recall fi-om the 
ai'ing which took place on 10 I)e- 
iihei', the United States relies in this 
-e upon four treaties, the first and 
ist significant of which is the 1961 
eniia Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
ns. As we pointed out to the Court at 
U time, the purpose of that conven- 
n, to which both the United States 
(1 Iran have long been parties, was to 
lity a set of pi'inciples which have 
en finnly established in customary 
I'l'national law for centuries. The es- 
itial principle involved is that diplo- 
itic agents and theii' staff and the 
ibassy premises in which they serve 
joy an immunity and inviolability 
lich must be respected in all events 
d that in no circumstances may the 
L'eiving state arrest or incarcerate 
eh jjersons or enter or seize such 
emises. One of the essential provi- 
)ns of the Vienna convention, article 
, reads as follows: 

1. The premise.s of the mission shall be 
/iolable. The agents of the receiving 

ite may not enter them, except with the 
nsent of the head of the mission. 

2. The receiving state is under a spe- 
ll duty to take all appropriate steps to 
otect the premises of the mission against 
y intrusion or damage and to prevent any 
sturbance of the peace of the mission or 
pairment of its dignity. 

3. The premises of the mission, their 
rnishings and other property thereon and 
e means of transport of the mission shall 

immune from search, requisition, at- 
chment, or execution. 

As I shall explain later in our pre- 
station, the Iranian course of conduct 
iat commenced on 4 November has in- 
uded flagrant and very serious multi- 



ple violations of every one of these 
three paragraphs of article 22. 

Turning from the physical ])reniises 
to the more important (|uestion of the 
immunity of the people within such 
diplomatic premises, article 29 of the 
same Vienna convention provides that 
every diplomatic agent "shall be inviol- 
able" and "free from any form of arrest 
and detention." Moreover, article 31 
requires that every such agent enjoy 
complete "immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving State." 
There is absolutely no doubt but that 
the Government of Iran had a duty to 
prevent any seizure or detention of any 
of the U.S. diplomatic agents and staff 
in Tehran. Under article 9 of the 
Vienna convention, Iran could, in ef- 
fect, have e-xpelled any of the American 
diplomats whom Iran considered objec- 
tionable, but the Government of Iran 
was totally without any legal right to 
seize, or to allow the seizure of, any of 
the American diplomatic personnel in- 
volved in this controversy. 

The basic rights that I have just 
been describing find relevant elabora- 
tion in a number of other treaty provi- 
sions to which we will be referring at a 
later point in our presentation. For 
present purposes it is enough to say 
that additional relevant guarantees of 
protection are set forth in the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
ti(jns, in the New York Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents, and in the 1955 bilateral Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights between the United 
States and Iran. Under the latter 
treaty, for example, the Government of 
Iran was and is under a legal obligation 
to insui-e that all U.S. nationals in Iran 
receive "the most constant protection 
and security," as well as "reasonable 
and humane treatment," but as we will 
later describe to the Court treaty pro- 
visions of this kind, as incorporated in 
the four treaties to which I have re- 
ferred, have been violated by Iran on a 
multiple and daily basis for the past ■i'^ 
months. 

[At this point in the proceedings, 
Mr. Schwebel summarized the U.S. ar- 
guments on the jurisdiction of the 
Court to render judgment. 

• The United States and Iran are, 
as members of the United Nations, par- 
ties to the Statute of the Court. 

• The United States and Iran are 
parties to four conventions whose 



paramount provisions Iran has violalcd 
and continues to violate. 

• These four conventions or their 
protocols give to the Coui't jurisdiction 
to render judgment upon any dispute 
that arises between the i)arties to those 
conventions over theii' intei-pi'etation (ji' 
application. 

• Thei'e is a dispute between the 
United States and Iran. 

• That dispute is over the interpre- 
tation or application of the conventions. 

• Resort to alternative means of 
third-party settlement, which are re- 
ferred to in these conventions, is en- 
tirely optional. There is no requirement 
of preliminary recourse to such alterna- 
tive procedures. 

• Even \f arqueiido preliminary re- 
course to these alternative means of 
peaceful settlement, namely arbitration 
or conciliation, were to be viewed as 
normally required, on the facts of thin 
case such recourse would not be. 

• In any event, any need for such 
recourse has been obviated in this ca.se 
by the lapse of time. 

• The remerlies sought by the 
United States in this case are appropri- 
ately addressed to the violations by 
Iran of the four conventions in ques- 
tion; accordingly, the Court has juris- 
diction to grant those remedies. 

Mr. Schwebel then expanded on 
these points, and Mr. Owen i-esumed 
his presentation to the Court. | 



MAR. 19, 19S(I 

It is now my privilege to i-esume the 
argument on behalf of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, and I propose now to discuss 
the U.S. claim on the merits as against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Iran's Nonparticipation in Court 

At the outset I would like to make one 
preliminary comment about the fact 
that the Government of Iran has delib- 
erately decided not to participate in the 
proceedings before this Court. There 
are situations, of course, where it is not 
fair to infer anything substantive about 
the merits of the case from an absence 
of this kind, but for a series of reasons 
we think that it is very apparent that 
this is not such a situation. In the first 
place, there is absolutely no reason at 
all why Iran, if it had any defense to 
make in this proceeding, should not 
have appeared here to make it. In vari- 
ous countries of the world, inclufling 



lay 1 980 



45 



Middle East 



the United Kingdom, France, and the 
United States, the intensely strained 
relations which arose as between Iran 
and the United States last November 
have triven rise to a very high volume of 
civil litigation in which the Government 
of Iran appears as a litigant, both of- 
fensively and defensively. There are 
almost 200 such cases now pending in 
many different courts, and the Gov- 
ernment of Ii'aii has demonstrated its 
ability to litigate with vigoi- in any 
forum that it chooses. It has i-etained 
able counsel in several different coun- 
tries and mustered all of the arguments 
that could possibly be presented in such 
cases. So far as we know, out of all the 
different courts involved, this is the 
only coui't in which Iran has failed to 
appear. 

In such circumstances, I suggest, 
the reason for the Iranian absence is 
clear: If Iran had any possible defense 
to be pi'esented on the mei'its, it would 
be here to present it, but it has none. 

Indeed, I sugge.st that that conclu- 
sion is supported by the letters which 
the Government of Iran sent to the 
President of the Court on 9 December 
aiifl 16 March. Those letters did not 
present disrespectful or casual com- 
ment. They set forth a most respectful 
and carefully thought-out position, and 
for that reason their silence on certain 
matters is as significant as their actual 
words. The fact that Ii-an made abso- 
lutely no attempt to argue that its con- 
duct with respect to the hostages in the 
Embassy is legally defensible is a mat- 
ter. I submit, of which the Court is en- 
titled t(j take note. 

World Opinion on Seizure 

Moreover, the indefensibility of Iran's 
conduct is corroborated by the truly 
unanimous reaction of the countries of 
the world. Obviously, there are many 
countries in which the Iranian revolu- 
tion is i-egarded with great sympathy 
and approval. There are many countries 
that will support Iranian positions on 
different issues, provided that there 
are grounfls for doing so. So far as we 
know, however, there is not a single 
country in the world which has 
suggested in any way that the Iranian 
conduct in seizing the Embassy and the 
hostages was justified within the 
framework of international law. The 
absolutely unanimous view that Iran 
has broken the rules is reflected in the 
vote of the Security Council on 4 De- 
cember, and in the outpouring of opin- 



46 



ion from countries all over the world 
within the last 4V2 months. That opin- 
ion, I should emphasize, is shared by 
states representing every shade of 
political and economic, and even reli- 
gious, persuasion. It is shared by the 
largest countries in the world and by 
the smallest. It is shared by the rich- 
est, the poorest, and by the East and 
West; by the aligned and 
nonaligned — in fact, by everyone. 

The Iranian Government would 
clearly prefer that this were not so. 
Seeking to mollify, to some degree at 
least, the worldwide criticism which 
has come raining down upon the Iranian 
Government since the seizure of the 
hostages, the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Ghotbzadeh, has suggested that 
the orflinary rules of diplomatic immu- 
nity are essentially irrelevant because, 
he has said, they were devised by, and 
for the benefit of, what he refers to as 
"the big powers." It is Mr. 
Ghotbzadeh's theory that the purpose 
of the international legal principles in- 
volved is to prevent prosecution of "the 
crimes that the representatives of the 
big powers have committed in the small 
countries," a comment which is re- 
flected at page 223 of our Memorial. 

Along the same lines, the grandson 
and adviser of the Ayatollah Khomeini 
has asserted, as indicated at page 130 of 
our Memorial, that the Embassy sei- 
zui-e has found favor in the Third 
World, that the seizure of diplomats as 
hostages is not regarded by Third 
World populations as violating interna- 
tional law, and that "the poor and un- 
derprivileged despise the legal and 
meddlesome minds of the rich and 
powerful." 

The actual reactions of such states 
demonstrate that this Iranian thesis is 
factually incorrect in every particular. 
The views of the smaller countries, in- 
cluding countries in the Thii-d World, 
are reflected in the records of the U.N. 
Security Council debates during De- 
cember and January. Just as one exam- 
ple, let me refer to the views expressed 
by the representative of Zaire, who 
explicitly called on the Government of 
Iran to bring itself into compliance with 
the principles of international law. He 
stated as follows: 

We in the Third Work! who continue 
unswervingly to strive for the democratiza- 
tion of international relations, for a more 
just and equitable system of international 
relations, protected from fear, arbitrary 
actions, and the rule of force, but guaran- 
teed by the force of law, attach the utmost 
importance to this, bearing in mind the 



means available to us, because we are coi 
vinced that in a world without principles 
and laws we should be the losers.'" 

The same theme was urged by th 
i-epresentative of Panama, appealing 
the Iranian authorities to "cease theit 
illegal and inhuman detention of per- 
sons protected by international law." 
He stated: 

. . . for a small country, e.xistence as 
nation is only possible in a world in whicl 
law and order prevail. The sole weapon 
the only defense of a small nation, lies pi 
cisely in the maintenance of the legal sys 
tem that governs international relations. 

Again, the respresentative of 
Gabon referred to the long-establishi 
principles of diplomatic immunity an 
made the following observation: 

Respect for these diplomatic customs 
even more fundamental for countries sue 
as ours, which owe their very existence i 
the face of power politics and hegemony 
all kinds to the recognition of this intern 
tional law. . . .'" 

And finally, the same position w; 
summed up by the representative of 
Portugal in the following terms: 

In any country the rule of law is the 
best defense of ordinary people against ( 
pression and tyranny. Similarly, betwee 
states, international law is the only defer 
of the small, poor, and weak countries 
against the rich and powerful.''' 

It is simply inaccurate for the Gc 
ernment of Iran to suggest that there 
an element of world opinion which re 
gards their hostage-taking as lawful. 
There is not. The small and nonaligne 
countries, together with the major 
powers from East and West, includin 
such countries as the Soviet Union, t 
United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, am 
France, are totally agreed that the s( 
zure of the American Embassy anfl tl 
capturing of the American hostages ii 
Tehran constitute flagrant and con- 
tinuing violations of international law 

The principles of international la- 
which this Court is being asked to vii 
dicate are of deep concern to all state 
for they are indispensable to a civiliz( 
international order. Moreover, al- 
though I regret the need to make thi; 
observation, there is clear evidence 
that the world is entering upon a new 
era of terrorism in which the seizure 
hostages, including particularly diplo 
matic hostages, is a political techniqu 
which is being used with increasing fr 
(juency. In most such cases, it is true 
(liplomatic agents have been seized b; 



Department of State Bullet 



Middle East 



rorist groups whu reflect at must a 
iiority political position within the 
'ticular country involved, but it is, 

ertheless, the fact that in the past 
;arle diplomats from a great many 
ferent countries have been seized 
1 detained for political purposes. Just 
3ne recent episode, the seizure of the 
minican Embassy in Colombia, dip- 
lats from no less than 14 different 
mtries were taken captive, including' 
lomats from Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, 
sta Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
ypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, 
naica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
itzerland, Uruguay, the United 
ites, the Vatican, and Venezuela. 

Every one of these episodes, of 
irse, reflects a teri'ibly serious situa- 
1 for the affected states. But the 
erity of the episode in Tehran far 
■eeds any of the other examples, 
h qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Tehran the host government itself 
'"tieipated from the outset, seizing a 
ge number of hostages and main- 
ling their captivity for months on 
I in order to achieve its political pur- 
es. From the point of view of the fu- 
■e of international relations and 
rid peace, the events elaborated in 

present record are truly frightening 
1 ominous. Unless the world commu- 

V takes every possible step toward 
idemning and discouraging such con- 

t, the rule of international law will 

I gravely imperiled. 
ck of Relevant Exceptions 
t Diplomatic Immunity 

fore I begin my discussion of the par- 
jlar substantive I'ules which Iran has 
■lated since 4 November 1979, I 
)uld like to address myself to the 
■ond question put by the President of 
' Court yesterday. That is, "whether 
tate may have an inherent right in 

V extreme circumstances to override 
obligations under the rules of diplo- 

:tic and consular law to respect the 
'iolability of diplomatic and consular 
rsonnel and premises, and if so, in 
lat circumstances." As discussed in 
r Memorial at pages 49 and 53, there 
ve been suggestions that the general 
le of inviolability is subject to a few 
tremely narrow exceptions. Argu- 
ly, the police agents of a state may 
prehend a diplomatic agent who is ac- 
ally in the act of committing a crime 
briefly use force to restrain a diplo- 
itic agent who is engaged, for exam- 
i, in an actual assault upon another 
rson. Even these limited exceptions. 



hiiwevei', ai'e controversial, particulai'l,\' 
in regai-d to the inviolabilitv of pivni- 
ises. 

In any event, we submit that by no 
stretch of the imagination can any of 
these possible exceptions have any aj)- 
plication in the present case. The 
American Embassy and its personnel 
were not seized to avert an imminent 
peril of the kind envisaged in these pos- 
sible exceptions to the rule of inviola- 
bility. Instead, as indicated by the 
statements of the Government of Iran, 
the apparent purpose of the seizure and 
of the prolonged detention of the hos- 
tages was and is to coerce the United 
States into complying with certain Ira- 
nian demands. Iran is under no obliga- 
tion to maintain diplomatic relations 
with the United States or to permit the 
United States to maintain an Embassy 
in Iran or even to tolerate the presence 
in Iran of some officials whom Iran may 
consider objectionable. But having es- 
tablished diplomatic relations with the 
United States, Iran is obligated to re- 
spect the inviolability of the U.S. dip- 
lomatic mission and its personnel, an 
obligation which exists even in time of 
war.^^ 

In short, any exceptions to the rule 
of inviolability have no application in 
this case, and this Court was absolutely 
correct when it stated in its order of 15 
December that the rule of inviolability 
is "unqualified." 

Categories of U.S. Claims 

Against that background, I should like 
now to turn to the specific claims as- 
serted here by the United States. As 
we see it, there are five broarl 
categories of unlawful conduct from 
which those claims arise. They are, 
first, the seizure and continuing deten- 
tion of the American hostages in 
Tehran. Second, the harsh treatment 
and other conditions associated with 
that detention. Third, the interrogation 
and threatened trial of the hostages. 
Fourth, the invasion and occupation of 
the U.S. diplomatic and consular 
premises in Tehran. And fifth, the fail- 
ure of the Iranian Government to bring 
the perpetrators of these crimes to jus- 
tice. 

Seizure and Detention 
of the Hostages 

In setting forth the U.S. claims as they 
arise from the seizure and continuing 
detention of the American diplomatic 



agents and staff in Tehran, \\v are re- 
lying upon what is probably {hv oldest 
and most fundamental rule of diplo- 
matic law. 

As I indicated yestcriia,\ , it has 
been established customai-y intei'na- 
tional law for centuries that every dip- 
lomatic agent enjoys diplomatic immu- 
nity and that under no circumstances 
may he be seized by the receiving state, 
either as a hostage or for any other 
purpose. The rule of personal inviola- 
bility was followed even in early civili- 
zations, simply because a diplomat can- 
not perform his functions without such 
a rule. Many authorities view the prin- 
ciple of inviolability as the core or cen- 
tral principle from which all diplomatic 
privileges and immunities have been 
derived. It is a rule which has found 
such universal acceptance that accord- 
ing to one leading authority, as set 
forth in our Memorial at page 40, from 
the Ifith century down to the present 
time no receiving state has authorized 
or condoned a breach of a diplomat's 
personal violability. 

This is not to say that there have 
not been instances when a diplomatic 
agent has been unlawfully detained. 
The point is that although there have 
been such instances, the practice has 
been for the receiving state to recog- 
nize the seizure as a violation of inter- 
national law and to make amends in one 
way or another. For example, in 1917 
the American Minister to Guatemala 
was briefly detained by the Guatemalan 
police. In that case, however, the 
President of Guatemala immediately 
apologized and issued orders that the 
officers involved be punished. Simi- 
larly, in 1932 when the American Minis- 
ter in Ethiopia was attacked by police 
officers, the Ethiopian Government 
brought about the prosecution of the 
officers and gave broad publicity to the 
resulting sentences. 

I think it is truly safe to say that, 
with the possible exception of the pres- 
ent Government of Iran, there is not a 
single government in the world which 
would dissent from the fundamental 
proposition that every diplomat is enti- 
tled to absolute personal immunity from 
attack or seizure, except in exceptional 
circumstances which are not relevant 
here. 

The universal acceptance of these 
principles, of course, led to their inclu- 
sion in the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, and that conven- 
tion gives rise to the most important 
claims asserted by the United States in 
this proceeding. Specifically, article 29 



47 



Middle East 



of the convention pi-ovidi-s in the most 
explicit terms that "the pei'son of a 
diplomatic agent shall he inviolable," 
that he shall not he liable to any form (jf 
ai'rest or detention," and that "the re- 
ceiving State shall treat him with due 
respect" and "take all appropriate steps 
to prevent any attack on his pei'son, 
freedom, or dignity." All of these prin- 
ciples constitute simply a codification of 
previously existing law. In addition, 
the 19fil convention added the principle 
that the same privileges and immunities 
should be enjoyed by the members of 
the administrative and technical staff of 
a diplomatic mission. The relevant pro- 
vision of the 19(Jl Vienna convention is 
article 37. 

With these fundamental principles 
in mind, it I'eally requii'es no argumen- 
tation to demonstrate that on 4 
November 1979, the Government of 
Iran embarked on a course of conduct 
which violated these principles in the 
most flagrant and indisputable way. At 
that time, with the assistance of the 
government's Revolutionary Guards, 
the so-called student followers of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini physically captured 
some 63 U.S. nationals and a number of 
non-Americans as well. In addition, 
three U.S. diplomats have been physi- 
cally confined within the pi'emises of 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry, bringing 
the total number of detained Americans 
up to (i(i individuals. That total, of 
course, does not include the six addi- 
tional Americans who were able to slip 
away from the Embassy at the time of 
the attack and achieve a safe refuge and 
eventual escape through the goo(l of- 
fices of the Canadian Government. As 
to the ()() Americans who have actually 
been in captivity, all but two enjoyed 
diplomatic status either as agents or 
staff. The other two are an educator 
and a businessman who happen to have 
fallen into the hands of the student fol- 
lowers of the Ayatollah, and as to those 
two individuals we claim no personal 
inmiunity as such. On the other hand, 
as indicated in our Memorial, those two 
individuals, being present in the Em- 
bassy, were entitled to the immunities 
arising from theii- presence there, and 
as U.S. nationals within Iran they were 
separately entitled to receive "the most 
constant protection and security" under 
the treaty of amity between the United 
States and Iran. 

Of the fi4 persons who were and are 
entitled to diplomatic immunity 13 were 
released on 20 November pursuant to 
an order issued by the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini. In that same order the Avatollah 



48 



commanded, in effect, that the remain- 
ing 51 di])lomatic agents and staff he 
continued in confinement, and their 
confinement continues to this day. As I 
mentioned earlier, three of them, one of 
whom is the American Charge d'Af- 
faires Mr. Bruce Laingen, are confined 
in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and 
the other 48 are held by the so-called 
militant students. 

hired Responsibility 

of the Iranian Government 

As I noted yesterday, we think it is 
really beyond dispute that since 4 
November all of the confined Ameri- 
cans have been under the continuous 
authority of the Ayatollah, to whom the 
student captors have repeatedly 
pledged their allegiance. On 17 
November, when the Ayatollah di- 
rected that 13 be released and that the 
remainder be detained, the students 
obeyed with precision. A few weeks 
ago, when the President and the 
Foreign Minister sought to bring about 
the transfer of the hostages from the 
custody of the students to the custody 
of the government, the students cjuickly 
focused on the cjuestion whether the 
transfer had been ordered by the 
Ayatollah. They made claim that if the 
Ayatollah issued such an order for a 
transfer they would obey, but when he 
declined to do so they retained the hos- 
tages in their custody. It may be that 
some officials of the Islamic Republic 
would prefer that the hostages be re- 
leased, but it is the will of the Ayatol- 
lah that has controlled to this day. 
Undei' the cii'cumstances, I re- 
s|)ectfully submit, the Court has no real 
alternative but to attribute the conduct 
of the students to the Government of 
Iran. Time and again since 4 November 
officials of the Iranian Government 
have acknowledged that the students 
are acting on behalf of the state, '^ and 
the facts have been publicly recognized 
by nations throughout the world. We 
have reviewed the debates in the Secu- 
rity Council in December with respect 
to the responsibility of the Government 
of Iran in carrying out these violations 
of international law, and those debates, 
as well as the resulting resolution, 
make clear that all of those who partici- 
pated were agreed on the responsibility 
of the Iranian Government itself.^" As 
soon as the Ayatollah, the chief of 
state, decides that the hostages are to 
be released, they will be, but so long as 
he adheres to the belief that the deten- 
tion of the hostages serves his political 



purjjoses, they will pi'esumably rema 
in captivitN'. 

It should he noted that in a very 
real sense this conduct on the part ol 
the Iranian Government constitutes ; 
retreat from the standards which Ira 
itself has eiiflorsed for many years. I 
1924, for example, an Iranian mob at 
tacked and killed one Maj. Robert In' 
brie, an American Vice Consul in 
Tehran, and the Persian Government 
immediately recognized that by failiri 
to protect Maj. Imbrie it had violatei 
an international legal obligation whic 
it owed to the United States. At tha 
time the government acknowledged i 
responsibility, agreed to pay an inde 
nity to the Major's widow, and initiat 
action to apprehend and punish the c 
fenders. More than 50 years ago the 
Government of Iran recognized its lei 
responsibilities, but it has refused to 
so today. 

At a much eai'lier point in my pr 
sentation, I made mention of the fac 
that the conduct of the Iranian Gov- 
ernment toward the hostages repre- 
sents compound violations of interna- 
tional law, and the point, I think, is 
well illustrated by the Imbrie case t^ 
which I have just I'eferred. Under til 
treaties upon which the United State 
relies, the Government of Iran has h 
a continuing obligation to protect U. 
nationals from seizure or other harir 
and to prevent such crimes from goi 
forward, and this duty of protection : 
pi-evention arises under article 29 of 
19(il Vienna Convention on Diploma 
Relations, under articles 2 and 4 oft 
New York Convention on the Prevei 
tion and Punishment of Crimes Agai 
Internationally Protected Persons Ii 
eluding Diplomatic Agents, and und( 
article II of the 1955 treaty of amity 
Economic Relations, and Consular 
Rights between the United States ai 
Iran. In other words, the conduct wh 
we have described to the Court at si 
length has violated Iran's duties of p) 
tection and pi'evention under severa 
different treaties and yet, I submit, 
that it would be a vast understatemi 
to suggest that the Government of I 
is guilty of nothing more than a failu 
to protect the Americans and prevei 
the crimes. The most significant fact 
that, far from merely failing to proti 
the individuals and prevent the crim 
the Iranian Government itself has p; 
ticipated in the seizure and in the co 
mission of the crimes, thereby com- 
pounding the violations many times 
over. Where a policeman fails to pre 
Vent a kidnapping from taking place, 
may be criticized at one level, but 



Department of State Bull 



Middle East 



gre he affirmatively participates in 
kidnapping:, he is engaged in a fai- 
re flagrant violation of the law. 

nditions of Hostafjes' Captivity 

this point I would like to turn to a 
ited, but somewhat different set of 
svances stemming from the seizure 
he hostages. It relates to the condi- 
is under which these U.S. nationals 
e been held in captivity. It would be 
thing if the Iranian Government 
I placed these individuals under 
ise ai'rest and allowed them to con- 
ie to live in relatively humane condi- 
is. Such conduct would, of course, 
e constituted a serious and totally 
icceptable violation of international 
, but it would not have been nearly 
gregious as the conduct which has 
urred in fact. 
As I embark upon this aspect of the 
e, I should remind the Court that we 
■not, of course, have access to the 53 
ividuals who remain in captivity in 
Iran today and, therefore, cannot 
ish the Court with any very con- 
te information as to e.xactly the con- 
ons under which these hostages 
'e been existing for the past several 
nths. On the other hand, the Court 
ft' also recall that on 20 November, 13 
he hostages were released, and 
ise released hostages have provirled 
U.S. Government with detailed in- 
mation as to the manner in which 
y were treated during the first 2y2 
eks of theii' captivity. Affidavits con- 
ling such information are available 
the Court's /// caiiura inspection, if 
y are desired. Although there ap- 
irs to have been some variation as 
ong the treatment of different hos- 
;es, it is fair to say that the condi- 
ns which existed during the first 2V2 
eks of incarceration were harsh, 
thout going into great detail I might 
ipl\' give some examples of the kind 
treatment meted out to these people 
the early period of their confinement. 

The female hostages were tied to 
•aight chairs facing the wall and kept 
that position for 16 hours a day. All 
ndows were boarded up, and inside 
ctric lights kept burning 24 hours a 
y, thus inhibiting sleep. The hostages 
■re frequently blindfolded — the 
nishment for attempting to speak to 
other hostage or for disagreeing with 
e of the guards was to be blindfolded 
many hours at a time. Hands were 
pt either bound or handcuffed at 
?ht, thus inhibiting sleep. Some bos- 
ses were required to sleep on the cold 
re floor with their hands tied, with- 



out blankets or other amenities. In 
some cases changes of clothing were not 
permitted and a bath or shower was 
permitted only rarely. Several hostages 
were repeatedly threatened with guns 
and other weapons. On one occasion a 
student who was interrogating a woman 
hostage showed her his revolver to let 
her know that one of its several cham- 
bers was loaded and then proceeded to 
intimidate her by pointing the gun at 
her and repeatedly pulling the trigger. 
Happily, he stopped in time, but the 
experience must have been terrifying. 
The hosta.ges have not been permitted 
to see newspapers or obtain news in 
any othei' fashion. We also know that on 
a number of occasions some of the hos- 
tages had been paraded blindfolded 
before hostile and chanting crowds. I 
submit that if one closes one's eyes and 
imagines the sort of terror that would 
necessarily be evoked by that treat- 
ment, one gets some inkling of what 
these people have been put through. 

Despite repeated requests to allow 
contact between the hostages and their 
government, all such contact has been 
absolutely prohibited. On a few isolated 
occasions an outside observer has been 
allowed to see some of the hostages, 
presumably because such visits have 
served the interests of their captors. 
But the Secretary General of the 
United Nations was not allowed to see 
any of the hostages during his visit in 
late December and early January, and 
the U.N. commission was denied access 
to the hostages in the Embassy despite 
the prior assurances of the Iranian 
Government. 

All of these actions, we submit, 
have constituted flagrant violations of 
the international legal obligations which 
the Iranian Government owes to the 
United States and to the hostages 
themselves. 

Under article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
and article 34 of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, all of the Ameri- 
can diplomatic and consular officials 
have been continuously entitled to 
"freedom of movement and travel" 
within Iran and, under articles 27 and 
35 of the same convention, they have 
been continuously entitled to free com- 
munication with their government. 

All of those fundamental rights, 
which are absolutely essential to the 
performance of diplomatic and consular 
functions, have been totally denied for 
41/2 months. Instead of being left free to 
go about their diplomatic and consular 



duties, they have been confined like 
common criminals. As indicated during 
the Security Council's debate, particu- 
larly by the representative of Portugal, 
the (lovernment of Iran has im])osed 
upon these hostages, what that repre- 
sentative described as "an inexcusable 
form of cruel and inhuman treatment." 

I think it is striking, incidentally, 
that at the begiiuiing of the Second 
World War, when the Axis and Allied 
Powers went to war against one 
another, the practice of each g:overn- 
ment was to politely escort the diplo- 
matic agents of the enemy out of the 
country or intern them in comfortable 
quarters pending exchange, whereas 
here the Iranian Government, with 
which the United States is not at war, 
has subjected our people to harsh 
confinement. 

Moreover, over and above the 
other severe aspects of this confine- 
ment, it is apparent that some or all of 
these individuals have been subjected 
to grueling interrogation under condi- 
tions which by definition constitute 
coercion — as illustrated, for example, 
by the woman who was so alarmingly 
interrogated at the point of a loaded 
revolver. 

Apparently, the AyatoUah Kho- 
meini and his followers have been hop- 
ing to find evidence that some of the.se 
hostages are, to use their words, 
"spies" and have permitted coercive in- 
terrogation for that purpose. All of this 
has been done under the auspices of the 
Ayatollah who explicitly stated on 18 
November, as indicated at page 215 of 
our Memorial, that his student follow- 
ers were properly carrying on these 
so-called investigations. The Ayatollah 
declared as follows: "What our nation 
has done is to arrest a bunch of spies 
who, according to the norins, should be 
investigated, tried, and treated in ac- 
cordance with our own laws." 

Needless to say, this treatment of 
the hostages constitutes an independ- 
ent and gross violation of international 
law. Article 31 of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Diplomatic Relations provides 
in the most straightforward terms that 
every diplomatic agent "shall enjoy 
immunity from the criminal juri.sfliction 
of the receiving State" ami that he shall 
not be "obliged to give evidence as a 
witness." If the clear terms of the con- 
vention preclude interrogation of these 
Americans in an official courtroom of 
Iran, a fhrfiori the convention pre- 
cludes interrogation behind closed 
doors under hostile and coercive condi- 
tions as apparently endorsed by the 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Again, it is dif- 



ay 1980 



49 



Middle East 



fic-ult tu think of a more gruss violation 
of international law than locking up 
diplomatic envoys and subjecting them 
to this kind of treatment. As the Court 
I'ecognized in the provisional measures 
which it indicated on 15 December, it 
seems clear that for the past 4% months 
the Government of Iran has been sub- 
jecting the American hostages in 
Tehran to, what the Court described as 
"privation, hardship, anguish, and even 
danger to life and health." 

It should be noted that even if all of 
the 53 Americans still in captivity in 
Tehran were ordinary U.S. nationals, 
as contrasted with diplomatic agents 
and staff, the ti'eatment which has been 
meted out to them by the Iranian Gov- 
ernment would, nonetheless, be far 
below the minimum standard of treat- 
ment which is due to all aliens, par- 
ticularly as viewed in the light of fun- 
damental standards of human rights. 
Paragraph 4 of article II of the 1955 
treaty of amity between the United 
States and Iran explicitly requires Iran 
to provide reasonable and humane 
treatment in every respect to U.S. na- 
tionals in Iranian custody, together 
with the most constant protection and 
security. The right to be free from arbi- 
trary ari'est and detention and interro- 
gation and the right to be treated in a 
humane and dignified fashion are surely 
rights guaranteed to these individuals 
by fundamental concepts of interna- 
tional law. Indeed, nothing less is re- 
quired by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 

Allegations of Espionage 

As I indicated a moment ago, at various 
times during the last 4V'2 months the 
Iranian Government has attempted to 
justify its treatment of the American 
hostages by asserting that some of the 
hostages are .spies who have violated 
the laws of Iran and who, therefore, 
may be treated as common criminals. 

Yesterday Judge Gros posed three 
questions about such allegations, and 
perhaps this is an appropriate point for 
me to provide the answers. 

He asked whether, in any diploma- 
tic exchanges prior to 4 November 
1979, the Government of Iran voiced 
criticisms to the effect that the U.S. 
diplomatic and consular personnel in 
Iran had engaged in espionage or other 
unlawful actions against the Govern- 
ment of Iran. The answer is that on 
several occasions during that period 
representatives of the Iranian Govern- 
ment suggi'sted to American officials in 



very general terms that the United 
States was somehow engaged in some 
sort of conspiracies or subversive ac- 
tions against the new Iranian Govern- 
ment, but on each of those occasions the 
American representatives unequivo- 
cally denied the charges and askefl the 
Government of Iran to produce any evi- 
dence that it might have to support its 
allegations. At no time did any Iranian 
official respond to these requests by 
presenting any evidence oi' other mate- 
rial bearing on any alleged conspiracy 
or acts of subversion attributable to the 
United States. 

Moreover, I should emphasize that 
none of the generalized suggesti(jns 
made by the Iranian officials related to 
any of the diplomatic or consular staff 
in Iran. At no time during the period 
involved did the Iranian Government 
raise any question about the propriety 
of any activities of the Amei'ican Em- 
bassy in Tehran. In response to Judge 
Gros' question whether the Iranian au- 
thorities ever indicated an intention to 
declare any member of the U.S. diplo- 
matic or consular staff persona iitin 
grata, or "unacceptable," the answer is 
that they did not. 

Next, Judge Gros has referred to 
the repeated suggestion, as advanced 
by the Ayatollah Khomeini and others, 
that the American Embassy in Tehran 
was not really a proper diplomatic mis- 
sion but instead a "den of espionage." 
The response of the United States is 
that the charge is untrue; the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Tehran was a normal diploma- 
tic mission operating as such missions 
normally do. 

In response to Judge Gi-os' further 
question whether the United States 
was involved in sabotage operations in 
Kurdistan or Khuzestan, or had plans of 
intervention in Ii'an, the answer is no. 

Apart from the answers which I 
have just given, I should also make 
clear that for at least two reasons, the 
Iranian allegations of spying, which 
have been advanced in an effort to jus- 
tify the seizure of the Embassy, cannot 
properly enter into this Court's de- 
cisionmaking process in any way at all. 
In the first place, those Iranians most 
closely associated with the spy charges 
apparently do not appreciate the fact 
that the collection and transmission of 
information about the host country is 
one of the most fundamental functions 
that diplomatic agents are expected to 
perform. I have no doubt that when the 
U.S. Embassy was operating in Tehran 
there was a flow of information about 
Iran from that Embassv to the State 



Department in Washington and that 
there is today a flow' of information 
about the United States from the Ira 
nian Embassy in Washington to the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran. 
Such activity obviously is normal anci 
proper as confirmed by the fact that a 
tide 3 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations explicitly lists 
such activities as a normal part of di] 
lomatic agents' functions. 

Second, and pei'haps more impor 
tantly, even if there had been some f 
called spying on the part of one or mo 
of the hostages, proof to that effect 
would, nevertheless, be absolutely ir 
relevant to the present proceedings. 
Long-established principles of intern 
tional law and long-established state 
pi-actice make clear that if a diploma' 
or consular agent engages in espiona 
or other unlawful conduct directed 
against the receiving state, that does 
not give the i-eceiving state the right 
arrest him or interrogate him or subj^ 
him to any other aspect of the crimir 
prosecution process. Under article 31 
the diplomatic convention it is clear 
that every such agent enjoys comple 
immunity from the criminal jurisdict 
of the receiving state, no matter hov 
displeased that state may be with pa 
ticular conduct. This is not to say, oi 
course, that the receiving state is wit 
out a remedy. Obviously, it has the 
right at any time and for any reason 
declare a diplomatic agent perfiuna n 
(I rata and thus, in effect, bring aboul 
his expulsion from the country. 

Exactly that remedy has been ct 
tinuously available to the Governmer 
of Iran if it was dissatisfied in any w 
with the conduct of any of the U.S. 
diplomatic and consular personnel. B 
instead of invoking the only lawful rei 
edy available to it, the Iranian Gov- 
ernment chose instead the flagrantly 
unlawful alternative of seizing the di] 
lomatic agents and confining them fo' 
months on end in harsh and inhuman' 
conditions. There is no possible way, 
submit, that that conduct can be jus- 
tified. 

Threat of Trials 

Before I leave the subject of the trea 
ment of the hostages, I should mentii 
one additional problem which, though 
has not actually come into existence : 
yet, constitutes a potential threat in t 
future. As the Court will recall from 
our earlier oral presentation and our 
Memorial, over the past 4'/2 months, 
various different figures on the Irani, 



50 



Department of State Bulle 



Middle East 



itical scene have advanced the notidn 
t at some point in the future some or 
of the American hostages would be 
on trial in the criminal courts of 
n. These suggestions have been ad- 
iced by Foreign Minister 
itbzaileh, by the students, and, in- 
'd, bv the Avatdllah Khomeini him- 
F. 
Moreover, different types of penal- 
have been threatened as appropri- 
sentences following such criminal 
lis. One Ii-anian magistrate, as indi- 
ed on page 107 of our Memorial, has 
■gestefl that the hostages should be 
litted into slavery, but the more 
^uent suggestion has been that once 
hostages have been tried and con- 
ed, they should be brought before a 
ig s(iuad, as indicated for example, 
)age 101 of our Memorial. Although 

lifficult to tell how seriously these 
gestions have been advanced, they 

on an ominous significance when it 
ecalled that in recent months over 
Iranian nationals have been tried in 
emptory fashion before revolu- 
lary courts and then put to death. 
Needless to say, any kind of crimi- 
prosecution of any of these hostages 
lid constitute fresh violations of the 
ress prohibition set forth in article 
)f the Vienna Convention on Diplo- 
ic Relations. I will not labor the 
It at this time, however, because al- 
jgh threats of criminal prosecution 
e heard with great frequency at an 
lier stage of the crisis, there have 
n relatively fewer such suggestions 
■e early December, perhaps because 
15 December this Court expressly 
ed upon the Government of Iran to 
vide to all American diplomatic and 
sular agents immunity from criminal 
secution. Nevertheless, the Sup- 
Tiental Documents which we have 
n submitting to the Court demon- 
ite that occasional threats of crimi- 
trials are still being made^' and for 
t reason, as I shall indicate later in 
submission, we have included an 
ropriate provision on the subject in 
prayer for relief. 

)lations of Premises 
i Archives 

It concludes my discussion of the 
atment of the hostages, and at this 
nt I would like to turn to a different 
iject, namely the legal violations af- 
ting the physical properties of the 
iijited States in Tehran. By physical 
perties I refer both to the real es- 
the Embassy in Tehran and the 
isulates in Tabriz and Shiraz — and 



Sy 1980 



also to another important category of 
property, namely the files, records, and 
equipment located within the.se build- 
ings. All of these properties, of course, 
were seized in the early days of 
November 1979. 

As to the seizure of these pi'op- 
erties I will not dwell on the facts. The 
Court will recall that on 4 November 
the students assaulted the compound, 
cut chains, removed window bars, at- 
tempted to set fire to the Chancery, 
burned through steel doors with 
torches, and by these methods gained 
possession of all of the buildings in the 
compound — possession which was then 
confirmed by the presence of the Rev- 
olutionary Guards. Some hours after 
the seizure of the Embassy, similar sei- 
zures were made of the U.S. Consulates 
in Tabriz and Shiraz, again with the 
cooperation of the Revolutionary 
Guards. Obviously, the Embassy com- 
pound remains in the control of the 
militant students, but the U.S. Gov- 
ernment has no reliable information as 
to the current status of the two con- 
sular properties. 

Once again, there can be no possi- 
ble dispute as to whether the physical 
invasion of the diplomatic and consular 
premises of the United States was 
lawful. Article 22 of the Vienna Con- 
vention of Diplomatic Relations is as 
explicit as it can be on that point. 
Similarly, article 27 of the Vienna Con- 
vention on Consular Relations explicitly 
provides that the receiving states shall 
respect and protect the consulate 
premises. The importance of such re- 
spect and protection is emphasized by 
the fact that under article 27 the con- 
sular premises are to be protected even 
where consular relations have been 
severed or where a consular post has 
been closed. 

At an earlier point in my argument 
I commented on how striking it is that 
the legal principles on which we rely in 
this case are so uniformly regarded as 
valid, and the principle of the inviola- 
bility of the premises of a diplomatic or 
consular mission is no exception. Over 
the years, of course, there have been 
relatively rare occasions when a mis- 
sion has been attacked, but this appears 
to be the first case in many centuries in 
which a receiving state itself has par- 
ticipated in the attack and then re- 
tained possession of the premises and 
attempted to use that unlawful posses- 
sion to political advantage. 

At this point it may be appropriate 
for me to remind the Court of the 



marked inconsistencies that have oc- 
curred as between different actions 
taken by the Ii'anian Government. Yes- 
terday I mentioned that both before 4 
November and after that date, threats 
of attack were made against the Em- 
bassies of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and on those other occa- 
sions the Iranian Government acknowl- 
edged in a straightforward fashion that 
it had an obligation to protect the mis- 
sions involved. On those occasions it 
deliberately obeyed the rules of inter- 
national law, but on 4 November and 
since, the Iranian Government has de- 
liberately disobeyed those rules. In so 
doing I respectfully submit it has indis- 
putably subjected itself to liability to 
the Government of the United States. 

With respect to physical prop- 
erties, I should also refer, at least 
briefly, to the fact that as widely re- 
ported in the press the militant stu- 
dents who have occupied the Embassy 
premises for the past 4V'2 months appear 
to have thoroughly ransacked all of the 
diplomatic and consular archives and 
documents upon which they could lay 
their hands. Indeed, there have been 
recent press reports to the effect that 
when the students discovered that 
some private documents had been 
shredded, that is torn up, in order to 
preserve their privacy, they painstak- 
ingly pieced the shreds together in 
order further to invade the privacy of 
the Embassy records. 

Moreover, the occupiers of the 
Embassy have not refrained from using 
these private records in public from 
time to time; to use their own words, 
they have "exposed" groups of Em- 
bassy documents, claiming that they 
prove this or that with respect to al- 
leged American espionage, and I think 
it is remarkable how little sympathy 
these supposedly dramatic exposures 
have elicited in other countries of the 
world. The fact is, of course, that there 
is the universal recognition that it is to- 
tally illegitimate to seize the archives 
and documents of a diplomatic or con- 
sular mission. Under the express terms 
of article 24 of the diplomatic conven- 
tion and article 33 of the consular con- 
vention, all such archives and docu- 
ments are to be inviolable at all times 
and wherever they may be. 

It seems particularly shocking that 
these fundamental |)rinciples of diplo- 
matic law should tie tossed aside so 
casually, not only by the militant stu- 
dents and not only by the Iranian Gov- 
ei-nment at large but even by the Ira- 



51 



Middle East 



nian f'nrei.an Minister, the chief of the 
Iranian diplomatic service. In an inter- 
view, which is i-eprinted at page 110 of 
our Memorial, the Foi-eign Minister 
proudly announced that the govern- 
ment had taken possession of the U.S. 
Embassy's documents and planned to 
make such use of them as might be di- 
rected by the Ayatullah Khomeini. I 
think that any one of us would be 
hard-pressed to think of a more out- 
rageous violation of international legal 
principles applicable tcj the inviolability 
of the iJi'emises and archives of di|)l(]- 
matic missions. 

Insofar as the substantive claims of 
the United States are concerned, I 
want to make one more major final 
point. Judging by the outpouring of 
criticism that has rained down upon the 
Government of Iran as a direct result of 
the course of conduct which commenced 
on 4 November, virtually every country 
in the world is saying to itself, "there 
but for the gi'ace of God go I." Coun- 
tries throughout the world recognize 
that if this can happen to American 
diplomats in Tehran, it can happen to 
other diplomats wherever any diploma- 
tic mission is located. 

Iran's Duly To Prosecute 
or Kxtradite Offenders 

It is quite obvious to the Court, I am 
sure, that one of the principal reasons 
for our bringing this case here and one 
of the principal reasons why our bring- 
ing of the case has received such wide 
acclaim is the widely shared concern 
that a way must be found to deter 
similar seizures in the future. The need 
to create a deterrent, I submit, is an 
overwhelmingly important factor in the 
present proceedings. 

In this respect it seems to us vi- 
tally important to look to the provisions 
of the New York Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Pei'- 
sons Including Diplomatic Agents. That 
convention, to which both the United 
States and Iran are party, defines cer- 
tain crimes which are plainly involved 
in this case, and it then tacitly recog- 
nizes that if such crimes are to be pre- 
vented in the future, a strong element 
of deterrence is required. Not surpris- 
ingly, the element of deterrence con- 
templated by the convention is prosecu- 
tion on the conventional theory that if 
an offender is forcefully prosecuted, 
similar offenses are less likely to occur 
in the years ahead. Specifically, article 
7 of the convention explicitly provides 



52 



that when a crime of this kind is com- 
mitted within a specific state, that state 
shall have a duty, if it does not extra- 
dite the offender, to submit his case 
"without exception whatsoever and 
without undue delay" to the appropri- 
ate prosecuting authorities for the pur- 
pose of prosecution. 

On the facts before the Court in 
this case, therefore, the Government of 
Iran has had a continuing duty ever 
since 4 November to submit to the ap- 
propriate prosecuting authority the 
case or cases against thcjse who have 
been responsible for the commission of 
crimes against the U.S. Embassy and 
its personnel in Tehran. 

Having in mind the evidence indi- 
cating the complicity of senior Iranian 
officials in the seizure of the Embassy 
and the hostages, you have asked for 
our views as to the implications for the 
purposes of this case of our suggestion 
that there is a duty on the part of the 
Iranian authorities to set the prosecu- 
torial machinery in motion. Our answer 
is that Iran's obligation under interna- 
tional law to submit alleged offenders 
to its competent authorities for prose- 
cution, if it does not extradite them, is 
in no way affected by the circumstances 
that some of the accomplices in the 
crimes may have been official person- 
nel. Neither the New York convention 
nor customary international law recog- 
nizes any exception to the obligation for 
alleged offenders who occupy gov- 
ernmental office. States have, in pi'ac- 
tice, prosecuted governmental officials 
for acts that violated diplomatic immu- 
nity, as witness the Guatemalan and 
Ethiopian episodes which I mentioned 
earlier. 

The Court may be concerned that a 
declai'ation that Iran is required to 
submit alleged offenders to its compe- 
tent authority for prosecution could not 
be effectively implemented where high 
governmental officers are implicated in 
the crimes, or where the goverinnent, 
as a matter of policy, has encouraged or 
acquiesced in the commission of the 
crimes. I submit, however, that politi- 
cal or practical difficulties in the im- 
plementation of the Court's judgment 
do not detract from the entitlement of 
the United States to such a judgment. 
Moreover, the Court should render an 
affirmative declaration as to the duty to 
submit for prosecution in order to pro- 
vide the maximum deterrent against fu- 
ture crimes of this kind. It is impor- 
tant, we submit, that the Court declare 



to the world that the duty to proseei 
and to submit for prosecution exists 
such circumstances. Even if the Gov- 
ernment of Iran persists in its role a 
an outlaw, the vast majority of state 
will obey the rules declared by this 
Coui't, and the probability of such 
obedience will be an important deter 
I'ent against future violations of the 
rules of diplomatic relations. It is foi 
this reason that the United States is 
persisting in seeking a declaration tl 
the Government of Iran has a duty t 
submit foi' prosecution those who ha 
committed these offenses. 

On this question of providing de 
torrents against future violations of 
such laws, I should add that our clai 
in this respect does not solely depen 
on the New York Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crinif 
Against Internationally Protected P^ 
sons. On the contrary, even if that c 
vention had never come into existen 
our claim would find, we think, amp 
support in customary international Is 

For example, an effort was madi 
codify customary international law t 
this subject in the 19(il Harvard dr; 
convention on the international resp 
sibility of states for injuries to alien 
and article 13 of that draft conventii 
provides as follows: 

Failure to exercise due diligence to 
ford protection to an alien by way of prei 
live or deterrent measures is wrongful if 
act is generally recognized as criminal b 
the principal legal systems of the world. 

In other words, where a state oi 
a duty to protect an alien, that duty 
compasses a duty to deter future at- 
tacks, and I have previously referrec 
the fact that under the 1955 treaty i 
amity between the United States an 
Iran, the Government of Iran has ha 
continuing duty to provide all U.S. 
tionals with the most constant prote 
tion and security. Similarly, as I ha' 
also noted, under article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic R 
tions, Iran had a special duty to take 
appropriate steps to prevent attack: 
upon our diplomatic personnel, and 
submit that that duty also encompa: 
a duty to submit the cases of offend 
for prosecution and thereby deter ft 
ture attack. 

The existence of such a duty ha 
been recognized by international tri 
bunals. An example is a case entitle 
The Claim of Walter M. Dexter, wh 
was decided in the 1940s by the U.S 
Mexican Claims Commission. The of 
fense in that case was murder, and 
claim under international law was tl 



Department of State Bui 



Middle East 



Mexican Government had failed not 
y to prevent the murder but also to 
)rehend and punish the offender. The 
dinp of the tribunal on this point was 
follows: 

The authorities of the Mexican Govern- 
it were under an obligation to tal<e ap- 
priate measures for the apprehension 

punishment of those participating in the 
rder of Dexter and failure to do so estab- 
es Mexican liability under international 

By the same token, we respectfully 
imit that the failure of the Iranian 
vernment to prosecute the perpe- 
tors of the crimes involved in this 
e establishes Iranian liability to the 
ited States and its affected nation- 

This brings me to the conclusion of 
argument with respect to the sub- 
ntive claims which we are asserting 
his case. As I have indicated, the 
e does not involve one or two or 
lee isolated acts in violation of inter- 
lional law. On the contrary, com-' 
incing on 4 November, the Govern- 
nt of Iran has brought about a 
ady stream of offensive actions 
ch have been continuing minute by 
iiute and hour by hour and day by 

for AV2 months. When one considers 
entire breadth of the case, literally 
idreds of different offenses have 
n committed. But for present pur- 
ees, it is useful to break these bun- 
ds of different actions down into five 
jor categories: the seizure and con- 
Uing detention of the hostages; the 
•sh and inhumane treatment imposed 
)n them; the totally unlawful inter- 
.ation to which they have been sub- 
ted; the seizure and continued hold- 

of the diplomatic and consular 
ilities of the United States in Iran, 
luding the ransacking and defilement 
.he archives and documents; and the 
ure on the part of the Government of 
n to prosecute those who have, in 
t, been carrying out the govern- 
nt's oi'ders. 

During my description of these ac- 
ities, I have not attempted to iden- 
,• for the Court every single treaty 
)vision which has been violated by 
;h separate action. I have focused in- 
ad upon the fundamental treaty pro- 
ions and principles for the sake of 
rity. In our Memorial, however, we 
ve identified a series of additional 
aty provisions which have been vio- 
ed by the same courses of conduct 
ich I have been describing during my 
^sentation. 



Iran'.s Response to U.S. Claims 

Having summarized, and I hope 
clarified, the substantive claims of the 
United States I want to pause briefly to 
consider again the question whether the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has any possi- 
ble defense against those claims. As I 
noted earlier in my argument, although 
the Government of Iran has been given 
every encouragement by this Court to 
appear and present defenses, and al- 
though the Iranian Government has 
demonstrated its continuing ability to 
litigate effectively and vigorously in 
other courts, it has deliberately chosen 
not to present any substantive defense 
to the present claims. 

We are left then with the narrow 
question of whether the letter of 9 De- 
cember, which was presented to the 
Court in the name of the Foreign Minis- 
ter of Iran just before this Court's prior 
hearing, or its virtually verbatim copy 
— the letter received just 2 days ago — 
contain any factual or legal argumenta- 
tion which should be taken into account 
by the Court in reaching its decision on 
the merits. 

On that score, I have nothing to 
add to what the Court itself said on this 
subject in its order of 15 December. Al- 
though I hesitate to characterize the 
Court's own words I think it is fair to 
summarize the Court's comments of the 
Iranian position in these terms. 

First, although the Government of 
Iran has suggested that its hostage- 
taking should be regarded merely as a 
secondary or marginal aspect of a 
larger dispute, that suggestion is laid to 
rest by the contrary view of the Secre- 
tary General and the Security Council 
of the United Nations, both of whom 
regard the hostage-taking in and of it- 
self as a serious threat to international 
peace. 

Second, if the Government of Iran 
really believes that its own conduct 
should be considered together with, and 
as justified by allegedly grave misdeeds 
on the part of the United States, it 
could have responded accordingly by 
presenting such alleged offenses in a 
counter-memorial, but having failed to 
act, Iran is scarcely in a position to 
argue that its own inaction should pre- 
clude the Court from considering the 
legitimate claims of the United States. 
As the Court observed on 15 December, 
there is no reason why the Court should 
decline to take cognizance of one aspect 
of the dispute on the basis of an asser- 
tion that the dispute has other aspects 



which have not been brought ht'foi-e it. 

In short, on 15 December the Court 
could perceive no obstacle to its consid- 
eration of the present claims of the 
United States, and those claims con- 
tinue today to be both unanswered and, 
I submit, unanswerable. 

vSince Iran has failed to defend, 
within the meaning of article 53 of the 
Court's Statute, we must enable the 
Court to sati.sfy itself both that it has 
jurisdiction of the case and that the 
claims are well founded in fact and law. 
With all due respect, I submit that 
since neither the facts nor the law are 
subject to serious dispute, the require- 
ments of article 53 have been fully met 
and that the United States is, there- 
fore, entitled to judgment on the merits 
of our claims. 

Iranian Assurances of 
Embassy Protection 

In the course of our presentation, I be- 
lieve that we have given complete an- 
swers to a number of the questions 
which were posed by three Members of 
the Court ye.sterday. But according to 
my reckoning there are two questions 
to which we have not yet responded. 
That is, two questions posed yesterday. 
One posed by .Judge Gros and one by 
Judge Tarazi. In order to fulfill our ob- 
ligations to the Court I would like now 
to state each of the two questions and 
the answer of the Government of the 
United States. 

First, Judge Gros pointed out that 
the Memorial of the United States re- 
fers to three undertakings which were 
given by the Government of Iran to the 
Government of the United States with 
respect to the protection of the Em- 
bassy, and Judge Gros has asked that 
we communicate these undertakings to 
the Court. The answer of the United 
States is as follows: 

On Sunday, 21 October, there was 
a meeting between the Iranian Prime 
Minister, the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
the Iranian Ambassador to Sweden, the 
American Charge d'Affaires, and the 
visiting Director of Iranian Affairs from 
the U.S. Department of State, The 
American Charge d'Affaires informed 
the Iranians of plans for the former 
Shah to come to the United States, and 
he explained our concern about the pos- 
sible public reaction in Tehran. He re- 
quested assurances that the Embassy 
and its personnel would be adequately 
protected. The Foreign Minister gave 
those assurances without hesitation. On 



53 



Middle East 



the following day. 22 Octiiber, the 
American Charjje d'Affaires and the 
visiting Director of Iranian Affairs 
again met with the Foreign Minister. 
The Charge, in a discussion of the 
Shah's travel to the United States, 
again rec|uested assui-anees that the 
American Embassy and its personnel 
would be protected. The Foreign Minis- 
ter renewed his assurances that protec- 
tion would be pi'ovided. The Shah, inci- 
dentally, ai-rived in the United States 
the next day, 23 October. On 31 Oc- 
tober, the Embassy security officer met 
with the Commander of the Iranian Na- 
tional Police at the American Embassy. 
The Police Commander told the secu- 
rity office!- that the police had been told 
to provide full protection for the 
American personnel. This is our answer 
to Judge Gros' question. 

The following day, 1 November, 
there was a demonstration of 5,000 
people around the Embassy and com- 
plete security was provided. Three 
days later, however, the assurances 
were breached, and the Embassy was 
sacked under the protection of the Gov- 
ernment of Iran. 

Judge Tarazi has asked whether 
responsible U.S. authorities were 
aware of the fact that granting of au- 
thorization to the former Shah to visit 
the United States in order to obtain 
medical treatment for cancer might 
possibly lead to the occupation of the 
Embassy and the seizure of the hos- 
tages. The answer is that such officials 
were aware that the admission of the 
Shah miglit result in some sort of vio- 
lence against the Embassy, and it was 
precisely for this rea.son that the 
United States I'equested assurances 
from the Iranian Government that 
adequate protection for the Embassy 
would be provided following the arrival 
of the Shah in the United States. As I 
have just indicated, clear and firm as- 
surances were provided on three occa- 
sions during the last days of October, 
and on 1 November, at which point the 
Shah had been in the United States for 
more than a week, the Government of 
Iran honored its assurances in full. The 
breach of those assurances occurred 3 
days later, giving rise to the tragedy 
with which we are concerned in this 
case. 

Relief Sought b\ (he 
United States 

Finally, I should like to turn to the 
question of the relief which we seek in 



54 



the Court's final judgment. In such a 
judgment we are seeking three quite 
separate types of relief. To over 
simplify, we seek first declarations to 
the effect that various actions attribut- 
able to the Government of Iran have 
violated various legal principles, em- 
bodied not only in customary interna- 
tional law but in the four specific 
treaties on which we rely. Second, we 
seek a judgment that in order to bring 
the foi'egoing violations to an end, the 
Government of Iran shall take certain 
specific corrective steps. And third, 
since grave injury has been done both 
to the United States and to its nationals 
in Tehran, we seek a decision by the 
Court that the United States aiid its 
affected nationals are entitled to re- 
cover financial reparations in an 
amount which cannot yet be determined 
but which can and should be determined 
in a subsequent proceeding to be con- 
ducted when Ii'an's unlawful conduct 
has been terminated. 

I shall now briefly discuss these 
separate forms of relief. First, I think 
that there is and can be no question 
whatever but that the United States is 
entitled to a declaration that in the 
ways specified in detail in oui- Memo- 
rial, the Government of Iran has vio- 
lated and is continuing to violate its in- 
ternational legal obligations to the 
United States and its nationals. It has 
long been a part of the jurisprudence of 
this Court that such declarations serve 
the vital function of establishing the 
legal situation between the parties with 
binding force so that the legal position 
thus established cannot again be called 
into question insofar as the legal effects 
ensuing therefrom are concerned. For 
that proposition I would refer the Court 
to the decision in the case of the hi- 
fcrpretafiuii uf Jiidgii/eittf: A'o.s. 7 ami S 
(Factovij at Churzuic), Juilgiiiviit Xti. 
11. 19J7, P.C.I..]., Serieti A. Xo. l.i, at 
page 20. 

In reliance upon that well- 
established principle, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment is respectfully requesting that 
the Court adjudge and declare that the 
Government of Iran, through the con- 
duct described in our Memorial, has 
violated its international legal obliga- 
tions to the United States, as provided 
by articles 22, 24-27, 29, 31, 37, 44, and 
47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplo- 
matic Relations; articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 
33-36, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Consular Relations; articles 2, 
13, and 18-19 of the 1955 treaty of 
aniitv between the United States and 



Iran, and articles 2, 4, and 7 of the N 
York Convention on the Prevention a 
Punishment of Crimes Against Interr 
tionally Pi'otected Persons Including 
Diplomatic Agents. 

With all due respect to the Cour 
the clarity of the facts and the legal 
principles is such that we consider oi 
right to the specified declarations to 
beyond dispute. This brings me to th 
question of whether the Court shoulc 
now direct the Government of Iran t 
take specific action to terminate its c 
tinuing unlawful conduct. In suggesti 
an affirmative answer to that questi{ 
I am keenly aware of the fact that at 
earlier stage in this case we asked tl 
Court for somewhat similar relief in t 
form of provisional measures and thf 
Iran's subsequent refusal to comply 
with the resulting provisional measui 
has surely created doubt as to whet? 
it will comply with the final judgmen 
this Court. In response, I will simpl; 
draw an obvious legal distinction. 

Within the community of intern; 
tional legal scholars there is at least 
some doubt as to whether an indicat 
of provisional measui-es under ai-ticle 
of the Court's Statute is binding ant 
enforceable, but there can be no equ 
alent doubt about a judgment of the 
Court on the merits. Conceivably, tl 
authorities in Iran have felt that the 
weve not legally bound by the provi 
sional measures indicated by the Coi 
on 15 December. But article 94 of th 
U.N. Charter specifically requires 
obedience to the final judgment on t 
merits and pi-ovides for its enforce- 
ment. 

In these circumstances, I submi 
the only proper assumption that can 
now be made is that if the Court no\ 
incorporates, in its final judgment, s 
propriate directions for the terminal 
of Iran's continuing unlawful conduc 
the Government of Iran will bow to 
U.N. Charter and obey. As to the ri^ 
of the United States to such relief, \ 
think the law is clear. In the Court'^ 
1971 advisory opinion in the Xamihi 
case, it was very clearly held that oi 
the Court has made a binding deterr 
nation that an unlawful situation is i 
existence, and I will now quote the 
Court's langauge: 

It would be failing in the discharge oi 
judicial functions if it did not declare tha 
there is an obligation, especially upon th 
members of the United Nations, to bring 
that situation to an end. [/.('../. Reports 
1971. p. 821 

The present unlawful situation i 



Department of State Bui 



Middle East 



Iran can be terminated, if not coni- 
tely remedied, by obedience to the 
visions which we have requested in 
Memorial. 



,R. 20, 198(1 

)rdei- to terminate the unlawful situ- 
)n in Iran, the United States re- 
ctfully requests that the Court 
ude within its final judgment the 
owing five provisions. 

1. The Government of Iran shall 
lediately insure that the premises of 
U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Con- 
ites are restored to the possession of 
!. authorities under their exclusive 
trol and shall insure their inviola- 

y and effective protection as pi'o- 
d foi' by the treaties in force 
A'een the two states and by general 
rnational law. 

2. The Government of Iran shall in- 
? the immediate release, without 
exception, of all persons of U.S. na- 
ality who are or have been held in 
Embassy of the United States or in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 

ran, or who are or have been held 
lostages elsewhere, and afford full 
;ection to all such persons in accord- 
i with the treaties in force between 
two states and with general inter- 
onal law. 

3. The Government of Iran shall, as 
a that moment, afford to all the 
omatic and consular personnel of 
United States the protection, 
'ileges, and immunities to which 

/ are entitled under the treaties in 
e between the two states and under 
eral international law, including 
lunity from any form of criminal 
sdiction and freedom and facilities 
?ave the territory of Iran. 

4. The Government of Iran shall, in 
rding the diplomatic and consular 
5oiniel of the United States the pro- 
ion, privileges, and immunities to 
ch they are entitled, including im- 
lity from any form of criminal juris- 
ion, insure that no such personnel 

!l be obliged to appear on trial or as 
itness, deponent, source of informa- 
, or in any other role, in any pro- 
lings, whether formal or informal, 
iated by or with the acquiesence of 
Iranian Government, whether such 
eeedings be denominated a trial, 
nd jury, international commission, 
itherwise. 

Before I move on to the fifth para- 

Sph in this series of affirmative steps 
erminate the Iranian violations, I 



should note, with respect to the fourth 
paragi-aph, that it will have no effect on 
the U.N. commission assembled by the 
Secretary General, if indeed that com- 
mission ever resumes its functions. The 
fourth paragraph would prohibit any of 
the hostages from being obliged to give 
evidence before any sort of commission, 
but it has never been contemplated that 
the Secretary General's commission 
would take testimony or evidence from 
the hostages. It is true that it was con- 
templated that the commission would 
visit the hostages and speak to them, 
primarily for the purpose of assessing 
their health, welfare, and general 
status, but the commission has no au- 
thority to interrogate the hostages in 
any substantive sense and will not do 
so. Accordingly, the fourth paragraph, 
which is squarely based upon article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, will not interfere with any 
legitimate international efforts to re- 
solve the crisis. 

This brings me to the fifth and last 
of the declarations which we are re- 
questing in order to bring an end to the 
Iranian violations of international law. 
This last declaration would read as fol- 
lows: 

5. The Government of Iran shall 
submit to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution, or extradite 
to the United States, those persons re- 
sponsible for the crimes committed 
against the personnel and premises of 
the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in 
Iran. 

As I have previously stated, we re- 
gard such a declaration of the utmost 
importance, in order to maximize the 
possibility that persons who engage in 
hostage-taking, and particularly in 
taking of diplomatic hostages, will be 
properly punished, thus creating a de- 
terrent against such future violations of 
the fundamental rules of diplomatic 
law^ 

Finally, we seek financial repara- 
tions from Iran, and we think that 
there can be no doubt whatever as to 
our entitlement to such a remedy. As 
flemonstrated at page 78 of our Memo- 
rial, this Court has repeatedly held that 
where, as here, a state has committed a 
breach of its international legal obliga- 
tions, it must pay reparations in order 
to wipe out as far as possible all of the 
consequences of its illegal acts so as to 
reestablish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed if such 
acts had not been committed. In short, 
when the damage has been done, the 



United Slates and its nationals must he 
made whole insofai' as possible. 

At the pi-esent time, of course, it is 
not possible to measure the damage, in 
part because the political situation in 
Ii'an pi'ecludes us from obtaining essen- 
tial information and in part because the 
damage is actually continuing day by 
<lay. For example, we know that there 
has been substantial physical damage to 
the buildings included within the Em- 
bassy compound, but it would take an 
extensive technical evaluation of the 
damage in order to put a financial value 
on it, and there is no way that such an 
evaluation can be made now. Again, we 
know that individual hostages have 
been subjected to severe psychological 
stress and may have sustained physical 
injury as well, but by definition we 
cannot have access now for the purpose 
of determining an appropriate repara- 
tion figure. When the hostages have re- 
turned home and the U.S. premises 
have been returned to our control, it 
will be possible to make the necessary 
evaluations, but not before. 

Despite the impossibility of deter- 
mining the amount of reparations at 
this stage, we believe that we are 
clearly entitled now to an immediate 
declaration which will make clear to the 
world, including the Government of 
Iran, that reparations in some amount 
will eventually be rlue. The issue of our 
entitlement to some amount of repara- 
tions is ripe for judicial decision; given 
the nature of the Iranian conduct and 
the clarity of the Iranian violations, I 
can think of no conceivable reason why 
our right to reparations should not now 
be declared in principle, thus narrowing 
the remaining issues between the par- 
ties; and we think it likely that such a 
declaration will accelerate the final res- 
olution of the dispute. As pointed out at 
page 79 of our Memorial, the Court's 
1974 opinion in the Fiylwricii JiiriKdir- 
fidii case makes plain that it is entirely 
proper for the Court to make a general 
declaration establishing the principle 
that compensation is due, even though 
a further proceefling may be necessary 
in order to receive evidence and estab- 
lish the amount. As I conclude my ar- 
gument with respect to the terms of the 
judgment, I wish to formally confirm to 
the Court that the final submissions of 
the U.S. Government are as stated at 
pages 80 and 81 of its Memorial. 

I shall now address myself to the 
several questions which were posed 



55 



Middle East 



yfsti-i-(l;iy and this iiKiniiiip; by a 
luiniht'i- of different judges of the 
Court. 

Quest iim of Deferral 
of Oral IVoeeeclinss 

Judtre Morozov's first cjuestion recalls 
that on 19 February — which happens to 
have been one day prior to the an- 
nouncement by the Secretary General 
of the formation of the U.N. 
commission — the U.S. Government re- 
(|Uested the President of the Court to 
liefer oral proceedings in this case for 
the time being, with the result that the 
present hearings have taken place some 
3 weeks later than they otherwise 
would. Judge Morozov's first (juestion 
correctly suggests that there was a re- 
lationship between the proposed work 
of the proposed U.N. commission and 
the U.S. request for a brief postpone- 
ment. Against that background Judge 
Morozov has asked the following tjues- 
tion: 

If the establishment by the United Na- 
tions of a special commission, and the ac- 
tivity of that commission, does not relate 
specifically to the question of the release of 
the hostages, and if the Court should, ac- 
cording to the U.S. Government, consider 
the case as one of urgency, what was the 
reason why the U.S. Government has 
wasted approximately 1 month before pur- 
suing the defense, with the assistance of 
the Court, of its diplomatic and consular 
staff detained in Tehran? 

In order to understand the reason 
for our request on 19 Februai'y, it is 
important to understand that there is a 
distinction between what the U.N. 
commission was directed to do, in terms 
of actual work, and the side-effects 
v\hich might be expected to result from 
that work. As we have previously ex- 
plained, the commission was sent to 
Iran in order to give Iran a chance to 
air its grievances. The commission was 
to hear Iran's grievances and make a 
report with respect thereto, but it was 
not part of the commission's function to 
hear the U.S. grievances with respect 
to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. On 
the othei- hand, it was the hope of the 
Secretary General and the U.S. Gov- 
eriuiient that, once Iran had been given 
an opportunity to air its grievances 
before the commission, this would, in 
fact, lead the Government of Iran to 
release the hostages. 

Again.sl that factual background I 
would answer Judge Morozov's ques- 
tion in this fashion. We knew that any 
oral hearings before this Court on the 
merits would involve strong charges 



56 



against Iran, and we thought that those 
charges might be an irritant which 
might cause the Iranian authorities to 
continue the captivity of the hostages, 
whether Iran's grievances had been 
heard by the U.N. commission or not. 
We wanted to do nothing which might 
unfavorably affect the hostages. That 
was the reason for our request for the 
relatively brief 3-week postponement, 
but, as I shall subsequently explain, the 
situation is different today. Today, with 
the captivity of the hostages continu- 
ing, we urgently need the Court's as- 
sistance in resolving the hostage dis- 
pute, and at the conclusion of my pi'e- 
sentation I will ask the Court, with re- 
spect, to render its decision as rapidl.\' 
as possible. 

Question of Restraint, Asset.s 
Freeze, and U.S. Threats of Force 

As Judge Morozov has correctly noted, 
during the presentation on behalf of the 
United States, we have called attention 
to the policy of restraint which the 
United States has followed in its rela- 
tions with Iran during the hostage 
crisis. In this connection Judge 
Morozov has asked the following ques- 
tion: 

How would the U.S. Government ex- 
plain such well-known acts on its part as 
the freezing of Iranian investments in the 
United States and abroad which, according 
to the press and broadcast reports, amount 
to some $12 billion? 

The facts are that for many years 
the Iranian Government has maintained 
very large deposits in U.S. banks, both 
in the United States and abroad. In the 
early days of November, shortly after 
the seizure of the American Embassy, 
Iranian Government officials 
threatened suddenly to withdraw all 
Iranian funds from U.S. banks, to re- 
fuse to accept payment in dollars for 
oil, and to repudiate obligations owed 
to the United States and to U.S. na- 
tionals. Given the enoi'nious sums of 
money involved, those threatened ac- 
tions by the Government of Iran consti- 
tuted nothing less than an attack on the 
stability of the world economy and the 
international monetary system. 
Moreover, the threat by the Iranian 
Government to repudiate all of the 
loans made by U.S. banks and other in- 
stitutions constituted a totally unlawful 
threat and placed in jeopardy billions of 
dollars of U.S. claims against the Gov- 
ernment of Iran. 

For these reasons the United 
States came forward with a peaceful re- 
sponse which we considered totally ap- 
propriate under accepted principles of 



international law and comity among r 
tions. In response to Iran's efforts to 
harm the U.S. economy and the dolla. 
and having in mind Iran's unlawful d 
tention of American hostages, the 
President of the United States simpl; 
froze all Iranian assets in U.S. contrr 
for the time being, in part simply to 
make it possible for U.S. claimants t( 
be made whole if the Government of 
Iran carried through with its threats 
repudiate all of its obligations to sucl 
claimants. At the same time the U.S 
Government has made it clear that on 
the hostages have been released the 
United States will be willing to open 
negotiations looking toward a mutual 
settlement of claims, which in turn w 
lead to the lifting of the freeze. In th 
meantime, the United States regards 
the freeze of Iranian assets as a jus- 
tified, prudent, and proportional mes. 
ure of restraint in the circumstances^ 

In his second question Judge 
Morozov has also asked the following; 

Is it possible to regard such acts |tl 
is. 1 take it, the freezel, as well as thre; 
to use other unilateral measures of coer 
cion, and threats to use force against th 
Islamic Republic of Iran, as in conformi 
with the U.N. Charter and with paragr; 
47 (B) of the Court's order of 15 Decemi 
1979, which required the U.S.Governms 
not to take any action, and to insure thai 
action is taken, which may aggravate th 
tension between the two countries or re 
der the existing dispute more difficult o 
solution? 

In I'esponding io that question I 
should note at the outset that the 
freezing of the assets occurred more 
than a month before the entry of the 
Court's order of 15 December, and w 
are quite confident that it was not tl 
Court's intention, when it entered th 
order, to call upon the United States 
lift the existing assets freeze. 
Moreover, as we pointed out in the 
course of the hearings which took pi; 
on 10 December, under the jurispru- 
dence of this Court and accepted pri 
ciples of international law, obedience 
a provision of the kind cited by Judg 
Morozov is required only on a I'eciprt 
basis — which means that the United 
States would be obliged to obey the 
order only if Iran did so as well. In ff 
the United States has complied with 
the order, but Iran obviously has no 

As to the suggestion in Judge 
Morozov's question that the United 
States may have threatened to use 
force against Iran, there have been i 
such threats in fact, although the 
United States has drawn attention b( 
to the rights of the United States unc 
international law and to the use of fo 



Department of State But 



Middle East 



> icion bv Ii'an in violation of 
■ iiiiIi,e:ations under paragraphs 3 
I of article 2 of the U.N.' Charter. 
Court is aware, every effort 
las been made by the United 
111 seeking a solution to the pres- 
ri-is has been peaceful. 
liiilge Morozov's third question 
iK'ther the actions to which he 
-I in his second question — 
J particularly, again, the U.S. 
if Iranian assets — are in com- 

with the provisions of the 1955 

aly of amity between the United 
ites and Iran. 

The answer is that the assets 
eze — which constituted a peaceful 
iponse to the hostile actions pre- 
usly taken by the Government of 

-did not violate the treaty of 
ity. As we have previously explained 
let ail, on 4 November 1979, the Gov- 
ment of Iran began to engage in sus- 
led violations of several articles of 
treaty of amity, including article 2, 
•agraph 4, article 13, article 18, and 
icle 19. Accordingly, under accepted 
nciples of treaty law, as codified in 
Vienna Convention on the Law of 
>aties, the United States was under 
obligation, after 4 November, to ex- 
d to Iran the treaty benefits to 
ich Iran would have been entitled if 
lad itself complied with the treaty of 
ity. There has been no violation of 
t treaty by the United States. 



■estion of Request 
Arbitration 

his fourth question Judge Morozov 
> asked whether the United States 
;r made a written suggestion to the 
vernment of Iran directed to bring- 

the present dispute to arbitration as 
jvided for in article XXI, paragraph 
of the 1955 treaty of amity. The an- 
er is that the United States made no 

h suggestion, and in that connection 
vfould make two brief observations. 

St, as we i-ead article XXI, para- 
aph 2, of the 1955 treaty of amity, it 
nply does not provide for arbitration; 
leed, it makes no mention of arbitra- 
n. That provision does contemplate 

possibility that disputes between 

parties may be "satisfactorily ad- 
;ted by diplomacy," but I would re- 
nd the Court that on 7 November the 
'atollah Khomeini flatly forbade any 
jlomatic negotiations between the 
governments. I might add that this 
ohibition was in clear violation, in our 
w, of Iran's obligation under para- 
aph 1 of article XXI of the treaty of 
lity, which in effect required Iran to 



provide an opportunity for consulta- 
tions. I respectfully submit that there 
is absolutely no basis for a .suggestion 
that the United States has failed to live 
up to any of its obligations under article 
XXI or to satisfy any of the precondi- 
tions to filing suit in this Court under 
that article. 

In his fifth question Judge Morozov 
has similarly inquired whether the 
United States, through a written 
suggestion to Iran, sought to bring the 
dispute to arbitration as provided for 
by article 13 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Per- 
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 

With respect, I believe that the 
United States has addressed that ques- 
tion in its Memorial, at pages 42 and 43 
and also, if I may say so, in the presen- 
tation made here by Mr. Schwebel. We 
have urged, and continue to urge, that 
article 13's provision for arbitration as- 
sumes a respondent state party which 
recognizes its obligation to settle its 
disputes by peaceful means, including 
negotiation and arbitration. From the 
very outset of the crisis on 4 
November, however, the Government 
of Iran has been committed to a course 
of coercion and has flatly refused to 
have direct contact with U.S. officials. 
The answer to the question, therefore, 
is that the United States did not make a 
suggestion of arbitration to Iran for the 
simple reason that, in our judgment, 
such a suggestion would have been 
completely futile. Indeed, we believe 
that Iran's refusal to allow such discus- 
sions has stopped Iran from asserting 
that the U.S. application was prema- 
ture or should have been preceded by a 
formal suggestion that the dispute be 
arbitrated. 

Conversely, ever since the time 
when Mr. Ramsey Clark made his 
aborted effort to open negotiations, the 
United States has maintained and de- 
clared its willingness to seek a peaceful 
solution and has pursued a number of 
avenues to that end. 

Question of Obligation 
To Prosecute or Extradite 

Turning to Judge Morozov's sixth ques- 
tion, he has inquired as to the basis for 
the submission in the U.S. Memorial 
that the Government of Iran has an ob- 
ligation either to submit to its compe- 
tent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution or to extradite to the 
United States those persons responsi- 



ble for the crimes committed against 
the personnel and premises of the U.S. 
Embassy and Consulates in Iran. As 
Judge Morozov has noted, that submis- 
sion appears at page 80 of the Memo- 
rial. 

The basis for the submission is ar- 
ticle 7 of the New York Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally P'l-o- 
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents. Under that article Iran has a 
duty either to take steps toward prose- 
cution of the offenders or to extradite 
them, and under the treaty the choice is 
Iran's. The treaty does not require ex- 
tradition, but it permits it as an altei-- 
native to submission for prosecution. 

The fact is that there is no extradi- 
tion treaty between the United States 
and Iran, and under international law, 
absent .such a treaty, there is generally 
no obligation to extradite, but, at the 
same time, international law does not 
prohibit extradition without a treaty. 
Consistent with this last principle, arti- 
cle 8 of the New York convention pro- 
vides in paragraph 2 that a state which 
makes extradition conditional on an ex- 
tradition treaty iiiai/ consider the New 
York convention as a legal basis for ex- 
tradition for crimes covered by it. 

Question of a "Larger Dispute" 

Finally, Judge Morozov has referred to 
the Iranian assertion that the dispute 
before the Court is only part of a larger 
dispute between the two countries, 
and, in that connection, Judge Morozov 
has inquried whether the United States 
recognizes the existence of such a 
larger dispute between the United 
States and Iran. 

I can answer the question only in 
this fashion. At various times in recent 
months, as I indicated yesterday, vari- 
ous officials of the Iranian Government 
have voiced generalized allegations of 
misconduct as against the United 
States, and, of course, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment recognizes that such allega- 
tions have been made. On the other 
hand, the Government of Iran has 
never brought forward any specific dis- 
pute for peaceful resolution, and the 
U.S. Government is, therefore, not in a 
position to describe the characteristics 
of the dispute, if any, which the Iranian 
authorities believe to exist. It may be 
that, during its visit to Tehran, the 
U.N. commission heard specific allega- 
tions of a concrete nature, but the pro- 
ceedings of the commission were not 
public, and the United States does not 
know what grievances, if any, were 



ay 1980 



57 



Middle East 



pi-esented t(i the commission before il 
departed from Tehran. 

Question of Applicabilitj 
of Consular Convention 

First, Judge Oda has asked whether 
there are any personnel among the hos- 
tages to whom the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations alone applies. 
Our answer is that all of the U.S. con- 
sular personnel involved were serving 
in a diplomatic mission on 4 November, 
with the result that under article 70 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations — to which Judge Oda has 
referred — all such consular personnel 
were and are entitled to exactly the 
same privileges and immunities as are 
enjoyed by diplomatic agents under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
tions. In short, there are no personnel 
among the hostages to whom the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions alone applies. 

Judge Oda's first question also in- 
quired as to the significance which the 
United States attaches to article 70 of 
the consular convention. The signifi- 
cance is exactly that implied by Judge 
Oda — that all of the fliplomatic and con- 
sular agents held captive in Tehran are 
entitled to the same privileges and im- 
munities; namely, the privileges and 
immunities conferred by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 

Question ()f U.S. Consulates 

In his second question Judge Oda has 
pointed out that at page 60 of the U.S. 
Memorial we set forth our then current 
knowledge of the status of the U.S. 
Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, whose 
operations were suspended in February 
1979. Judge Oda has asked the United 
States to supply any available informa- 
tion as to what has happened to these 
Consulates from February 1979 on- 
wards, and I am afraid that we are not 
in a position to add very much to the 
facts which were set forth in the Memo- 
rial. All that I can add is to say that 
from Febi'uary 1979 until the seizure of 
these Consulates in November 1979, 
the premises were under the custodial 
care of local employees. In November, 
of course, both of the Consulates were 
seized, and the United States has no 
information as to the status of the 
properties since that time. 

As his third and final question 
Judge Oda has inciuired whether it is 
the contention of the United States, in 
so far as the Tabriz and Shiraz Consul- 
ates are concerned, that Iran has an 



obligation to do anything more than 
protect the consular premises. As an 
example, Judge Oda has asked whether 
we contend that Iran has an obligation 
to accord full facilities for the operation 
of these two consulates. 

I should point out that up until the 
present time, at any rate, Iran has evi- 
dently desired to maintain consular re- 
lations with the United States. Iran 
currently operates four consulates in 
the United States, located in Houston, 
San Francisco, Chicago, and New York 
City. To the extent that Iran wishes to 
continue such relations, it has an obli- 
gation to afford the United States full 
facilities, on a recipi'ocal basis, for the 
operation of our corresponding consular 
posts in Iran. In these proceedings we 
are not contending that Iran has an ob- 
ligation to maintain consular relations 
between the two countries, but, so long 
as consular relations exist, Iran must 
accord us full consular facilities and the 
immunities that follow therefrom. 

Question of Exceptions 
to Diplomatic Immunity 

Turning to your own question, I shall 
be pleased to attempt the further 
clarification you have requested of oui- 
views concerning exceptions to the ob- 
ligations normally owed a diplomatic 
mission. You have asked specifically if 
the receiving state, convinced of un- 
lawful activity on its territory by the 
sending state's diplomatic mission or 
other services, may, by reason of sanc- 
tion, necessity, or self-defense, depart 
from the obligations normally incum- 
bent upon it with i-espect to diplomatic 
and consular relations. 

First, let me say that such excep- 
tions to the general rule of inviolability 
as have been discussed in the Intei'na- 
tional Law Commission and elsewhere 
relate to the right of an individual — 
such as an individual police officer — to 
defend himself against an actual assault 
or similar action by a diplomatic agent. 
As I said in my answer to your earlier 
question, even such very limited excep- 
tions are controversial and, of course, 
can have no conceivable application to 
the present case. 

On the other hand, your question 
may refer to self-defense in a different 
sense; that is, the state's inherent right 
to self-defense, as confirmed in article 
51 of the U.N. Charter. I would ob- 
serve that the right of self-defense is 
emphatically not a right to act law- 
lesslv. The state, when it acts in the 



exercise of its right of self-defense oi 
on the basis of the ultimate necessiti( 
of national existence, does not operat 
in a realm beyond the reach of intern 
tional law. The law of armed conflict- 
with which, of course, the Court is 
familiar — embodies a whole host of n 
straints upon state conduct, even in t' 
most compelling of circumstances. W 
think it most significant that the takii 
of hostages is absolutely proscribed, 
even in armed conflict. Moreover, au 
thorities from Grotius to Lauterpach 
agree that if a state like Iran feels its 
injured by another, some form of re- 
prisals may be appropriate, but repr 
als against the diphtmats of the offen 
ing state, either as individuals or as 
mission, are absolutely prohibited. T 
necessity for continuing respect for 
diplomatic inviolability, even in time 
war, is crystallized in article 44 of th 
Vienna convention, which obligates 
receiving state to permit and facilita 
the departure of diplomats represent 
ing a country with which that state is 
war. Indeed, if Iran were now at wa 
with the United States, it would have 
clear obligation, under article 45 of t 
convention, to "respect and protect I 
United States Embassy." 

Finally I should note that if Iran 
any time had felt that its supreme se( 
rity interests so required, it could, o 
course, have compelled all U.S. dipU 
matic personnel to depart from Iran 
a wholesale basis, but I submit that 
there can be no possible legal justific 
tion for what it did in fact on 4 
November 1979. 

Question of .Mandate 
of U.N. Commission 

Finally, Judge Gros has inquired as 1 
the grievances which, according to tl 
understanding of the U.S. Governme 
Iran may bring before the U.N. com 
mission. 

First, I would point out that the 
commission has suspended its opera- 
tions for the time being. Assuming, 
however, that the commission resum 
its work, the Secretary General has d 
clared that the commission's function 
will be to hear whatever grievances 
Iran may wish to bring before it. Th; 
is to say, the commission would recei 
whatever lawfully obtained informati 
the Iranians wanted to present to thi 
commission and, thereafter, the com- 
mission would report on the basis of 
that information. I should emphasize 
however, that the commission is not 
be a tribunal which would reach concl 



58 



Department of State Bulle 



Middle East 



which would be binding either on 
or on the United States. 
: wish to make one further obser- 
n on the subject. In this case the 
ed States has advanced very spe- 
claims against Iran, and this 
t, I submit, has a duty to decide 
her those claims are valid. If Iran 
ors any alleged grievances which it 
ders to constitute some sort of 
ise against the claims of the United 
s, it has been afforded every op- 
mity to bring those defenses be- 
this Court. The fact is that Iran 
iresented no defenses or coun- 
aims here, and for that reason I re- 
fully submit that the Court cannot 
arly concern itself with any griev- 
1 or allegations which may have 
voiced by Iran elsewhere, 
n concluding my observations on 
e Gros' question I should like again 
fer the Court to Judge Lachs' 
on in the Aegean Sea Coiiti)ieiifal 
case and to the Court's opinion in 
CAU Council case. Judge Lachs, 
properly in our view, pointed out 
■'notwithstanding the interdepend- 
of issues some may be isolated, 
1 priority, and their solution 
It in a separate form." While Iran 
mds that its grievances, whatever 
may be, are interconnected with 
laims of the United States before 
jourt, a contention that the United 
s has not accepted, Iran has cho- 
to use Judge Lachs' phrase, to 
e those grievances from these 
■edings and to air them before a 
•ate body, namely, the U.N. com- 
on. But that choice — Iran's 
e — not to utilize the processes of 
]ourt cannot constitute an obstacle 
e Court's consideration of the 
s of the United States over which 
]ourt assuredly has jurisdiction. It 

be extraordinary, to say the 
, to adopt a rule which permits a 
ndent state to frustrate resort to 
3ourt merely by referring to 
ralized and entirely hypothetical 
ises or counterclaims which it re- 

to present as such to the Court 
vhich it intends to handle instead 
igh an entirely nonjudicial hearing 
•e some other forum. To quote the 
t in the ICAO Council case: 

^he competence of the Court must de- 
on the character of the dispute sub- 
Id to it and on the issues thus raised, 
,|n those defenses on the merits or 
■ considerations which become rel- 
; only after the jurisdictional issues 
been settled. 



1980 



RKFERENCES 

Throughout his oral argument, Mr. 
Owen referred to several documents 
which were printed in earlier issues of 
the Department of State Bulletin. 

Issue of January 1980 

U.S. Application to the ICJ, p. 38. 

Request for Interim Measures of Pro- 
tection, p. 40. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 457 
of Dec. 4, i979, p. 51. 

Is.sue of February 1980 

Oral argument before the ICJ by At- 
torney General Civiletti and Depart- 
ment of State Legal Adviser Owen on 
Dec. 10, 1979, p. 41. 

Text of the Court order of Dec. 15, 



1979, p. 49. U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 4(il of Dec. 3l', 1979, p. 
08. 

Issue of March 1980 

Announcement of January 15, 1980, 
that the United States had filed its 
Memorial with the ICJ, p. 60. 

Issue of April 1980 

White House statement of February 20, 

1980, concerning the establishment of 
the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 
47. 

In addition, a monthly chronology 
of events concerning Iran from 
November 1979 through February 1980 
is printed in the above issues of the 
Bulletin. ■ 



This rule, we submit, applies a 
fortiori when the respondent has not 
even appeared in order to present such 
potential defenses or other consid- 
erations for which it is openly seeking 
consideration elsewhere. 

Conclusion of Argument 

On behalf of the U.S. Government I be- 
lieve that I have now .submitted an an- 
swer to every question which has been 
propounded by the Court and I would 
propose now to conclude the presenta- 
tion of the U.S. Government. 

In doing so I would hark back to 10 
December, at which time the Court was 
considering the U.S. request for an in- 
dication of provisional measures, and I 
took the liberty of urging the Court to 
act on that request with the maximum 
possible expedition. I emphasized that 
at that time more than 50 American 
lives were in imminent peril and that it 
was critically important to those indi- 
viduals, as well as the world community 
and the rule of law, that the judicial 
function be performed as quickly as 
possible. The U.S. Government is 
grateful to the Court for its action in 
responding to that appeal and granting 
the requested relief just 5 days after 
the request was heard. 

I hope that the Court will recall 
also that in the days immediately fol- 
lowing the Court's order of 15 De- 
cember the United States pressed for- 
ward with this case as rapidly as possi- 
ble. We filed our Memorial on 15 
January, well ahead of the schedule 



that would be followed in a normal case. 
Moreover, it was our hope at that time 
that the Iranian Government would file 
a counter-memorial on 18 February, in 
accordance with the orders of the 
Court, in order that the parties could 
come to grips with the dispute between 
them. In mid-February we were still 
anxious to proceed with this case as 
rapidly as possible. 

In one of his c|uestions. Judge 
Morozov has pointed out that on 19 
February we found it necessary to ask 
this Court for a brief postponement of 
any further oral hearings. The reason, 
as I have explained, was that the Sec- 
retary General's appointment of the 
U.N. commission had raised the hope 
that when the commission had heard 
Iran's grievances the Government of 
Iran would decide to release the hos- 
tages, and we were concerned that if 
we appeared before the Court and made 
strong charges against Iran, as we have 
in these past 3 days, the confinement of 
the hostages might be unnecessarily 
continued. I want to assure the Court, 
however, that throughout the entire 
period the United States has been de- 
termined to press the case forward just 
as rapidly as it could, consistent with 
the welfare of the Americans who are in 
captivity in Tehran. 

As you know, our tenuous hopes 
for a quick release of the hostages in 
February were shattered in early 
March when the U.N. commission 
found itself unable to pursue its mis- 
sion. In short, the situation today is 
very different than it was when we 



59 



Middle East 



asked for the brief delay in the hear- 
ings. The signals, if I may use that 
term, that are coming out of Iran 
suggest that the detention of the hos- 
tages may continue indefinitely and no 
one in this courtroom has any way of 
knowing how long the Government of 
Iran will continue to hold the hostages. 
Since the U.S. Government continues 
to view this Court as the most promis- 
ing hope for bringing about the ultimate 
release of the hostages through the 
entry of a binding and enforceable final 
judgment, the United States wishes at 
this time to press forward to judgment 
as rapidly as possible. 

Given the fact that I once urged 
expedition upon the Court and then 
urged a brief delay, I am reluctant to 
presume upon the Court by requesting 
expeditious action now, and yet I feel 
duty bound to do so. In making this re- 
quest the primary focus of my govern- 
ment's interest is upon the well-being 
of the 53 Americans still held in captiv- 
ity, but my government is motivated by 
broader concerns as well. As I stated in 
my opening remarks 2 days ago, if it 
becomes clear that a country like Iran 
can seize diplomatic agents and hold 
them hostage for indefinite periods of 
time in order to coerce desired political 
action, it can only lead to a complete 
unraveling of the fabric of peaceful in- 
ternational relations. For these reasons 
our call for judgment is urgent. Since 
the dispute before the Court continues 
to imperil international peace, I submit 
that the high responsibilities imposed 
upon the Court by the U.N. Charter 
call for the entry of the final judgment 
requested in this case as rapidly as pos- 
sible. 

On behalf of the Government of the 
United States of America, I respect- 
fully request that the Court enter 
judgment in favor of the United States 
and against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. 



'For these and other indications of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's control over the hos- 
tage situation, see Supplemental Docu- 
ments 13, 21, 34, 58, 62, 65, 66, 72, 101, 
102, 115, 117, 133, 134, 135, and 140. 

'■^ Supplemental Documents 100, 102, 
134, 135, and 141. 

' Supplemental Documents 107 and 
152. 

'' Supplemental Document 156. 

^ Supplemental Documents 149, 151, 
161, and 162. 

'" Supplemental Document 156. 

' Supplemental Document 157. 

" Supplementa] Document 158. 

" Supplemental Document 159. 

'" Supplemental Document 160. 

" Supplemental Document 90. 

'^ Supplemental Document 100. 



60 



'^ Supplemental Document 106. 

'" U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, 1 Dec. 1979, 
at p. 58. 

15 U.N. doc. S/PV. 2176, 2 Dec. 1979, 
at p. 47. 

■« U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 22. 

" U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 12. 

'* See, for example, articles 44 and 45 
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 

'' See, for e.xample. Memorial, pp. 
16-18, 92, 95, and 215; Supplemental 
Documents 3, 21, 65, 72, 79, 100, 115. 129, 
130, 135, and 139. 

2" See, for example, U.N. doc. S/PV. 
2175 at 11 (Norway), 12 (Portugal), 28-30 
(Bolivia), 38 (Nigeria); S/PV. 2176 at 22 
(Federal Republic of Germany), 23-25 
(Austria), 33-35 (Malawi), 42 (Panama), 53 
(Spain); S/PV. 2177 at 5 (Swaziland), 11 
(Belgium); S/PV. 2182 at 26 (Singapore). 

2> Supplemental Documents 20, 37, 40, 
117, and 138. ■ 



PUBLICATION OF 
PROCEEDINGS 

At the conclusion of the case concerning 
United States Dlploiiiatie and Coii- 
sular Staff ill Tehran, the International 
Court of Justice will publish the ver- 
batim te.xts of the Court's 
proceedings — including the oral argu- 
ment, the U.S. Memorial, and all Sup- 
plemental Documents — in its Plead- 
ings, Oral Arguments, and Documents 
series. ■ 



U.N. Inquiry 
Commission Suspends 
Activities 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 10. 19801 

The commission of inquiry, after con- 
sulting with Secretary General | Kurt | 
Waldheim and the authorities in 
Tehran, has decided that it should sus- 
pend its activities in Tehran for several 
days. The commission will return to 
New York to confer with the Secretary 
General. We understand it is prepared 
to return to Tehran in accordance with 
its mandate and the instructions of the 
Secretary General when the situation 
requires. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 
1980. ■ 



Iran Chronology, 
March 1980 



March 3 

After waiting 3 days for a decision 
Iranian authorities, the U.N. commissi 
of inquiry presses Iran to end uncertaii. 
over seeing hostages. 

March 4 

Iranian militants set new condition 
a meeting between the hostages and tV 
commission of inquiry stating that sucl 
meeting, during which the members cc 
inquire into the living conditions and hi 
of the hostages, would only be possibli 
provided the commission's report man; 
to convince the United Nations that th 
Shah and the United States were guilt 
"crimes" against Iran. 

March 6 

Militants, under pressure from In 
authorities, agree to surrender hostag 
governing Revolutionary Council. 

March 7 

Iranian Government announces th 
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh will be { 
custody of the hostages. 

March 8 

Militants and Ghotbzadeh accuse i 
other of lying over whether Khomeini 
approved a plan under which the inqu 
commission could meet with the hosta 
thereby blocking plans for the transfe 

March 10 

Khomeini supports militants' mov 
which blocked hostage transfer. 

Commission of inquiry departs In- 
after failing to see hostages. 

March 16 

Iran holds first round of parliame 
elections. Returns indicate clergy- 
dominated Islamic Republic Party lea' 

March 18-20 

International Court of Justice res 
sitting to hear oral arguments on the 
concerning United States Diploinntic 
Cointiitar Staff in Tehran brought by 
United States against Iran. During th 
period, the United States makes final 
guments on the jurisdiction of the Coi 
and the merits of the case. 

March 19 

Based on information from the 13 
tages released November 20 concernii 
humane treatment of the remaining h 
tages, U.S. renews its request to the 
ternational Court of Justice to order 1 
to speed up their release. 

March 20 

Fearing the hostages will be held 
definitely, the U.S. again urges ICJ ji 
to hand down an order as quickly as p 
ble to release them. 

Department of State Bu 



Middle East 



\iiili:issaflors representing nine mem- 
■ '.■ Common Market and Greece, 
III that their governments con- 
. ill a king relations with Iran if all else 
to win release of the hostages. 

h23 

)eposetl Shah departs Panama for 
it despite U.S. fears that his depar- 
would damage efforts to free the hos- 



h24 

!hah arrives in Cairo, the sixth coun- 
which he has sought refuge. Presi- 
Sadat says Shah's stay in Egypt will 
rmanent. 

slamic clerical groups call for demon- 
ions to protest the Shah's move from 



■'earn of U.S. physicians, including the 
on heart surgeon Dr. Michael E. De- 
■, flv to Cairo to prepare for surgery 

s Shah. 

Ih 26 

.yatollah Mohammed Beheshti, leader 
Islamic Republican Party, announces 
rors holding trials for those hostages 
ed of espionage if the Shah is not re- 
d to Iran to stand trial. 

Ih 27 

»ecause of charges of irregularities 
aud in the first round of parliamen- 
^lections, Iran postpones indefinitely 
econd round, thereby delaying any de- 
on the hostages, 
levolutionary Council, urged by 
dent Bani-Sadr, appoints a seven- 
)er commission to look into the alleged 
jlarities. 

ih28 

ihah undergoes surgery, 
ran publicizes an alleged message 
President Carter to Khomeini admit- 
'past mistakes" in U.S. policy toward 
Carter Administration denies allega- 



h .30 

J.S. and its Western allies are said to 
major efforts to pressure Iran to take 
to release hostages. Bani-Sadr re- 
dly receives two letters — delivered 
viss emissaries — from President Car- 
arning that if steps are not taken to 
se the hostages, the U.S. would ini- 
actions against Iran which would in- 

An embargo on trade of all goods ex- 
food and medicine; 

Expulsion of Iranian diplomats from 
J.S.; and 

A request that U.S. allies take lim- 
!conomic steps against Iran and with- 

their representatives. 

;h 31 

J.S. gives Iran until April 1 to an- 
ce steps to remove hostages from 
ants' control or face new U.S. eco- 
c and political retaliations. ■ 

1980 



Middle East Peace Process: 
A Status Report 



hy Secretary Vance 

StafcDiciit before the Senate 
Foreign Relatioiifi Coiiiiiiittee on Mareh 
JO. 19S()^ 

There has been a great deal of discussion 
about the subject of today's hearings: the 
events surrounding the U.S. vote in the 
U.N. Security Council on March 1. I 
know that all of us here are aware of the 
importance of approaching our discus- 
sions today with a view to their possible 
impact on our efforts for a comprehensive 
peace. In this regard. Ambassador Lino- 
witz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Repre- 
sentative of the President for the Middle 
East Peace Negotiations] is leaving to- 
morrow for a round of particularly sensi- 
tive negotiations with the Egyptians and 
Israelis. 

Over the years the United States has 
been forthright in stating its position on 
these issues. We have made clear: 

• Our unwavering support for Is- 
rael's security and well-being: 

• Our longstanding commitment to 
the indejiendence and tei-ritorial integrity 
of all the states of the Middle East, in- 
eluding Israel's right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries; 

• Our support for Security Council 
Resolution 242 in all its parts as the 
foundation of a comprehensive peace 
settlement; 

• Our belief confirmed by Egypt and 
Israel at Camp David that negotiations 
are necessaiy for the purpose of carrying 
out all the pi-ovisions and principles of 
Resolutions 242 and 338; 

• Our conviction, shared b\' Egypt 
and Israel, that a comprehensive peace 
must include a resolution of the Pales- 
tinian problem in all its aspects; 

• Our firm position that we will not 
recognize or negotiate with the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] so 
long as the PLO does not recognize Is- 
rael's right to exist and does not accept 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 

• Our unswerving commitment to 
the negotiating process laid out at Camp 
David; and 

• Our strong view that in the 
interim the parties should conduct them- 
selves in accordance with international 
law and common-sense restraint so as to 
build trust that a sequence of successful 
negotiations can bring about a just, hon- 
orable, and lasting peace for all. 



After nearly 30 years of stalemate 
and strife, we finally have seen concrete 
jjrogress toward peace thi-ough negoti- 
ations. President Sadat, Prime Minister 
Begin, and President Carter embarked 
on a process that has led to the Camp 
David frameworks, the Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty, and the present negoti- 
ations to establish full autonomy in the 
West Bank and Gaza. At the request of 
the parties, the United States is a full 
partner in these negotiations. 

It is important to stress that the ob- 
jective of all three partners is a peaceful 
settlement compatible w ith the Camp 
David accords and achieved through ne- 
gotiation. The approach which has begun 
to bear fruit in the last 2 years is to reach 
accommodation on those issues that can 
be tackled now and then to use the prog- 
ress made in the present stage to facili- 
tate resolution of the tougher issues in 
later phases of negotiations. It is critical 
to this process that each side gain trust 
that a negotiated settlement on fair terms 
is possible. 

Let me turn now to several specific 
issues. 

The Present Negotiations 

The current negotiations provide the con- 
text for concrete discussion of individual 
issues. It is important to define what the 
current negotiations are and what they 
are not. 

They are not, for example, designed 
to define the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to 
permanent institutions in these areas are 
to be resolved in a later negotiation 
where the Palestinians can participate in 
the determination of their own future 
through the process set forth in the Camp 
David accords. Our concern is that uni- 
lateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome 
of those negotiations and, therefore, to 
undercut the avenue to a peaceful and 
honorable resolution of these complex is- 
sues. 

The current negotiations are an 
effort to establish a self-governing au- 
thority in the West Bank and Gaza for a 
transitional period while fully protecting 
Israel's security. In order for that effort 
to succeed, some important issues will 
have to be resolved. 

The current negotiations must also 
define the powers and responsibilities of 
the self-governing authority to be exer- 



61 



Middle East 



ciserl in the West Bank and Gaza. These 
arrangements should assure full au- 
tonomy for the inhabitants of these ter- 
ritories while providing for the legitimate 
security concerns of the parties involved. 

There is, also, the question of how 
the elections will be conducted which will 
produce the freely elected body called for 
by the Camp David frameworks. Those 
elections should assure that that body has 
the popular support necessary to carry 
out, during the transitional period, its re- 
sponsibilities as agreed among the par- 
ties. 

On the (juestion of security, let me 
reaffirm the statement in the Camp 
David accords that: "All necessaiy meas- 
ures will be taken and provisions made to 
assure the security of Israel and its 
neighbors during the transitional period 
and beyond." That commitment is an in- 
tegral part of the Camp David 
frameworks, and this Administration in- 
tends to see that it is honored in full. 



The U.N. Resolution 

In Februaiy, we were faced with a draft 
resolution on the question of Israeli 



settlements which was circulated in the 
Security Council. 

We disagi-eed with a refei'eiice in the 
resolution to dismantling e.xisting 
.settlements and sought unsuccessfully to 
have it removed. As often happens in the 
II. N. Security Council, therefore, we 
stated our reservations without opposing 
the resolution as a whole. President Car- 
ter has stated clearly our view that this 
call for dismantling was neither proper 
nor practical. 

As you know, we did succeed in re- 
moving paragraph seven of the draft, 
which callefl on Israel to assui'e the e.xer- 
cise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, 
thereby wrongly implying that it is not 
already doing so. 

There was a misunderstanding, how- 
ever, with regard to our position on other 
references to Jerusalem in the resolution. 
The President understood that all refer- 
ences to Jerusalem would be removed be- 
fore we would vote for the resolutions, 
believing that in the present phase of the 
autonomy negotiations it would not be 
helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a 
U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I 
believed that what the President wished 



Arms Sales to Egypt 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
FEB. 25, 1980' 

Over the past several days, we have 
had a number of questions about pro- 
posed American arms supply relation- 
ship with Egypt. As you know. Assist- 
ant Secretary of Defense, David 
McGiffert, has been in Cairo discussing 
a proposed program with the Egyptian 
Government. Those discussions, which 
took place over a period of about 5 
days, are not complete, and Mr. 
McGiffert is now on his way back to 
Washington. Let me address what is 
the result of that meeting. This is 
necessarily going to be general, in that 
we must still deal with specifics with 
the Hill; some of it remains to be re- 
fined in specific terms. 

The discussions concerning the 
U.S. military assistance in Cairo in- 
cluded Minister of Defense Kamal Has- 
san Ali, Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
Lt. Gen. Ahmed Badawi, and other 
Ministry of Defense officials. The team 
from the United States was led by As- 
sistant Secretary McGiffert. 

The U.S. team conveyed President 
Carter's decision concerning the 
amount of dollar credits potentially 



62 



available for defense purchases and his 
decision that the United States was 
prepared to consider for sale to Egypt 
M60A3 tanks and F-15 and F-KJ air- 
craft. 

In light of these decisions by Presi- 
dent Carter, the Egyptian Government 
has provided to the U.S. team a request 
for military equipment and other serv- 
ices, including 40 F-16 aircraft, about 
250 M50A3 tanks, and a variety of other 
equipment. The United States w^ill 
submit the major items requested to 
the U.S. Congress for review in ac- 
cordance with U.S. legal requirements. 

With respect to F-15 aircraft, the 
Egyptian Government expressed ap- 
preciation for the offer of the United 
States and decided to postpone action 
on that offer until a later time so as to 
devote available resources to the bal- 
anced equipment acquisitions outlined 
above. The Egyptian Government 
hopes in due course to order such F-15 
aircraft as may be necessary for its de- 
fense needs. 

The program agreed to by the two 
governments is a step in the long-term 
program based on the common interests 
of the two governments and peace and 
security in the area. 



'Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Hodtling 
Carter III. ■ 



to have removed was the reference to 
Jerusalem and related material contai 
in paragraph seven. I was mistaken a 
have accepted full responsibility for tl 
misunderstanding. 

As Ambassador McHeniy (Dunal 
McHeniy, U.S. Ambassador to thi 
United Nations] stated in the Seciirit 
Council immediately following the mi; 
the United States considers Resdhui' 
465 as recommendatory' rather than hk 
ing. With regard to the references in 
resolution to "Palestinian and other A 
lands," it is our position that this phr; 
should not be construed as in any wa; 
prejudicing the outcome of the auton( 
negotiations or negotiations on the fii 
status of the West Bank and Gaza. 

As the President unequivocally 
stated on March 3, our pohcies with r 
spect to settlements in occupied terri 
and with respect to Jerusalem, have 
changed. I think it is important that 
take a moment to reiterate briefly ou 
policies on these two issues. 

Settlements in Occupied Tferrit 

U.S. policy toward the establishmen 
Israeli settlements in the occupied te 
ritories is unequivocal and has long I 
a matter of public record. We considi 
to be contrary to international law ai 
impediment to the successful conclu;- 
of the Middle East peace process. W 
have consistently urged Israel to hal 
tions to create new settlements or tc 
seize land to expand existing ones. V 
regard such restraint as particularly 
portant while the autonomy negotiat 
are underway. 

The Camp David frameworks d 
refer specifically to Israeli settlemer 
the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheli 
certain questions concerning the stai 
the settlements during the transitioi 
period will obviously have to be reso 
in the course of the autonomy negoti 
ations. 

The permanent resolution of the 
settlements issue must then be decic 
the subsequent negotiations on the f 
status of the occupied territories. 

Jerusalem. Our policy on Jerus; 
has remained consistent under the p 
four Presidents. As President Carte 
stated on March 3, our position on tl 
status of Jerusalem has not changed 
That position remains as indicated b 
President in his letter to President S 
signed at the time of the Camp Davi 
cords. 

With respect to the future of 
Jerusalem, it has been our consisten 
position that the final status of the c 
must be settled in the context of ne};. 



Department of State Bi 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



ns for a final peace. We believe that 
itever solution is eventually agreed 
n should preserve Jerusalem as an 
ivided city. It should provide for free 
ss to the Jewish, Muslim, and Chris- 
holy sites without distinction or dis- 
nination for the free exercise of wor- 
. The solution should assure the basic 
(ts of all the city's residents. We have 
?n no position on exactly how the final 
us of Jerusalem might be defined. 

Peace Process 

um, there has been no change in U.S. 
y as we continue our dedicated ef- 
; toward a comprehensive settlement, 
ore turning to your questions, I would 
to say a few final words about the 
die East peace process as a whole. 
r the past 3 years, there is no foreign 
y goal on which the President and I 
'. worked harder than a genuine peace 
le Middle East. The achievement at 
fp David, the Peace Treaty Between 
pt and Israel, the launching of nego- 
ons to establish full autonomy in the 
t Bank and Gaza are historic accom- 
iments, particularly when viewed 
nst the past history of this tragic con- 
It is critically important that we con- 
rate our full and undivided attention 
ie autonomy negotiations and do all 
an to give these talks the best possi- 
)rospect for success. The autonomy 
itiations offer the first real opportu- 
for Palestinians living in the West 
< and Gaza to achieve full autonomy 
in the context of assured Israeli se- 
,y, as the next step toward achieving 
■.t, lasting, and comprehensive peace 
ement. 

As reflected in the agreement 
hed at Camp David, such a peace is 
)ly in the interests of the United 
es, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, 
of the world. Every decision we have 

-and will make — is designed to 
e us toward that goal. 
With this in mind, the President has 
,ed President Sadat and Prime Minis- 
Begin each to come to Washington in 
</ April to discuss with him how best 
an accelerate the movement toward 
mutual objective. 



Protecting U.S. Interests 
in the Persian Gulf Region 



'Press release 63. The complete tran- 
pt of the hearings will be published by 
committee and will be available from 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 
■. 20402. ■ 



hi/ Harold Brown 

Address befure the Council on 
Foreign Relatiuns in New Y'ork CiJij on 
March I!. 198(1. Mr Brown is Secrefari/ 
of Defense.' 

The 197()s clo.sed with the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan. The i980s opened 
with the ensuing debate, both in this 
country and around the world, about 
how to respond to the invasion. At 
times confused, at times angry, at 
times profound, this debate is not yet 
resolved. 

In my remarks today, I want to 
talk about U.S. interests — some of 
them vital — in that part of the world, 
about the nature of the challenge pre- 
sented by the Soviet threat there, 
about our response to that challenge, 
and particularly about how our military 
capabilities fit into an overall security 
policy framework for the region and 
contribute to that response. 

While recent events in Afghanistan 
are of critical significance, they are by 
no tneans the entire problem. Any dis- 
cussion of the appropriate U.S. re- 
sponse must begin by placing these 
specific events — the invasion and its 
consequences — in the broader context 
of historical and possible or likely fu- 
ture developments. 

The full context of the Soviet inva- 
sion includes historical Russian ambi- 
tions in that region, a 20-year buildup 
of Soviet military forces, the more re- 
cent development of Soviet power pro- 
jection capabilities, and the very recent 
upheavals in the Islamic world. 

Interpretations of the reasons for 
the Soviet invasion vary. The simple 
fact is that their motives are very likely 
to be mixed, and we don't know the 
exact mixture. But policymakers cannot 
avoid dealing with both the specific 
incident — the invasion — and the longer 
range question of how to deter such ac- 
tions in the future. Reflecting this, the 
U.S. response since the December in- 
vasion has been on two levels: 

• Extracting a real price from the 
Soviets for this specific case of outright 
aggression and 

• Continuing to design a strategy 
and to develop a set of economic, politi- 
cal, diplomatic, and military measures 
to deter or defeat similar Soviet moves 



in the future — moves that could more 
directly threaten U.S. interests. 

U.S. In (crests 

U.S. interests related to the Persian 
Gulf-southwest Asian region, certainly 
in the short term, focus on the safe and 
speedy release of the Americans held 
hostage in Tehran. For the longer 
term, our interests can be stated quite 
simply: 

• To insure access to adequate oil 
supplies; 

• To resist Soviet expansion; 

• To promote stability in the re- 
gion; and 

• To advance the Middle East 
peace process, while insuring — and, in- 
deed, in order to help insure — the con- 
tinued security of the State of Israel. 

Let us look more closely at each of 
these in turn. 

Oil is the lifeblood of modern indus- 
trial societies. Sixty percent of the 
world's imported petroleum comes from 
this region: about 13'7f of the oil con- 
sumed in the United States and much 
higher percentages for our allies — 45% 
for Germany and 75% for France and 
for Japan. 

The loss of this oil to the economies 
of the West and the industrialized Far 
East would be a blow of catastrophic 
proportions. 

Even given success in the much 
needed effort to reduce American de- 
pendence on imported oil, the loss of 
Persian Gulf supplies would do irrepar- 
able damage to our allies and friends. 
In fact, Soviet control of this area 
would make virtual economic vassals of 
much of both the industrialized and the 
less developed worlds. The U.S.S.R. 
would not even need actually to inter- 
rupt the flow of oil. 

Russian dreams and schemes of ex- 
pansion and dominion in this region go 
back to Tsarist days. But our long term 
interests, and those of the area, are 
best served if the countries of that re- 
gion are free to develop in their own 
ways, not subject to foreign pressure of 
domination. Putting Soviet power 
astride, vast oil resources would, for 



63 



Military Affairs 



the first tiiiif, give the Soviet state in- 
ternational economic levei'age on a par 
with its military might. 

Stability in the region does not 
mean the absence of change. It iloes re- 
quire a strong measure of security for 
each of its states and opportunities for 
the nonviolent re.solution of local ten- 
sions and differences. The influences of 
both the industrialized West and Is- 
lamic fundamentalism will continue to 
touch directly the lives of individuals 
and the future of nations in that region. 
But thei-e is a role for us to play in 
building individual and collective local 
security, while at the same time dis- 
couraging such destabilizing develop- 
ments as the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 

The Middle East peace process is a 
fundamental component of U.S. policy 
as is our commitment to the security of 
Israel. These aspects of striving for a 
stable and secure Middle East have 
taken on new significance in the wake 
of the recent events in Iran and Af- 
ghanistan. 

The road to peace in the Middle 
East is long, steep, and hazardous. But 
progress along that road has been — 
viewed overall — one of the great suc- 
cess stories in international affairs. In 
197;^ Israel and Egypt were at war. 
When this Administration took office, 
the only international exchanges be- 
tween the two nations came from the 
barrels of guns used in border attacks. 

In 3 short years, we have witnes- 
sed the Camp David accords, the 
frameworks for a comprehensive peace, 
and open borders and exchanges of am- 
bassadors. In pursuing peace we will 
continue to honor our national commit- 
ment to the security of Israel. We will 
also work with our Arab friends to pro- 
vide a security framework that helps 
protect the region from Soviet expan- 
sionism and any consequent threats to 
the free flow of oil which is so impor- 
tant to them and the rest of the world. 

As we seek to advance these four 
interests, our determination to respond 
to any threat to them is clear. As 
President Carter said in his State of the 
Union speech: "An attempt by any out- 
side force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an as- 
sault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force." 



International Complications 
for the Soviets 

Before I elaborate on our strategy and 
capabilities to deter any such threat in 
the future, I would like to outline sev- 
eral othei' factors which compound 
Soviet calculations in the area and could 
contribute to the solution of our prob- 
lems there. 

First and foremost of these is the 
resurgence of Islam, reinforcing an his- 
toric trend toward nationalism in that 
part of the world. Unlike the Soviet 
Union, we are not seeking to insulate a 
large Islamic population from the influ- 
ences of their religious tradition. We do 
not seek to suppress religious activism 
in the Islamic world. And this is true 
even with respect to Iran. As we have 
made clear many times during the con- 
tinuing hostage crisis, if there is an ex- 
ternal threat to Iran's Islamic revolu- 
tion, it comes from the Soviet Union, 
not from the United States. 

Second, and related to the first, is 
the active resistance of nationalistic 
peoples to outside domination. Recent 
events in Afghanistan remind us — and, 
more immediately no doubt, the Soviets 
— of the timeless truth of Toynbee's de- 
scription of the classic problem of in- 
vaders: 

... an overweening self-confidence, bred 
by this mistaken belief in their own invin- 
cibility, then leads them on to court disas- 
ter by rashly attacking still unbroken 
peoples whose spirit and capacity for 
resistance takes them by surprise. 

I do not mean to imply that the 
Soviets cannot prevail in Afghanistan. 
They can — but only at a price, and it is 
a steep one. And whatever problems 
the forces of religion and independence 
which are sweeping the area create for 
us, let us not forget that ultimately 
they can help inhibit Soviet expan- 
sionism. 

Third World concerns have played 
what is to some observers a surprising 
role in the aftermath of the Soviet inva- 
sion. Afghanistan had been friendly, 
indeed pro-Soviet. An underdeveloped 
nation, it historically has been a buffer 
state between great power rivals. The 
swift dispatch of Soviet tanks, helicop- 
ter gunships, and tens of thousands of 
troops to suppress "friendly" Afghanis- 
tan rightly shocked much of the Third 
World. 

Our allies and the other indus- 
trialized democracies — and, to take a 
different example, China as well — share 
our interests and concerns in the area — 
and, by and large, our evaluation of the 
dangers — even if they do not accept 



every element of our formulas for 
dealing with the situation. Western 
Europe and Japan, even more than W( 
depend on the oil resources of the re- 
gion. Many of our allies have historic 
ties to countries there. 

While we seek allied support in tl 
region, we must realize that direct co 
tributions are not the only way th. 
help. For example, increased allien I •■•> 
tributions to their own security pi. .1 
us greater flexibility in the measuiv- 
we must take to bolster our milit;iri 
capabilities for meeting threats to thi 
peace and our common interests in ih 
Persian Gulf and southwest Asia. 

These diverse factors can help u.- 
meet the challenge posed by the 
Soviets — indeed, they are an indis- 
pensable part of the total response. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that tl 
United States must take the lead in oj 
ganizing a comprehensive response td 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and( 
must be an effective deterrent to stil "l' 
more dangerous actions they migiii 
otherwise be tempted to take in thi- 1 
ture. This comprehensive response 
must have many facets — military am 
nonmilitary. 



Nonmilitary Components 
of Deterrence 

The first nonmilitary ingredient is ar 
effective, long term energy policy to 
reduce our dependence on imported ( 
This objective is crucial to our natior' 
security in the future. 

However, it must also be clearly 
understood that no conceivable comb 
nation of measures — conservation, 
stockpiling, or alternate energy 
sources — can totally eliminate the ne 
term security problem that is create< 
by threats to the gulf and its oil. Tht 
hard fact is that there is nothing the 
United States — or our industrial woi 
partners or the less developed 
countries — can do in the coming dec- 
ade, or probably even the next, that 
would save us from severe damage ii 
the bulk of the oil supply from the P 
sian Gulf were cut off for a sustained 
period. 

The issue here is not, as some ha 
claimed, one of going to war for the C 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries or to avoid waiting in gas 
lines. Conservation is necessary in a 
event. But to advocate it as a substiti 
for U.S. leadership in strengthening 
the security of the area is simply to 
to grasp, or to wish away, the gravit 
of the true situation, as it affects noi 



64 



Department of State Bull 



Military Affairs 



I'Ut our allies and ffiends. Even 
'>■ self-sufficient America would 
■cure in a world in which West- 
H|)e or Japan or Tui'key or 
<iuld be made energy hostages 
lid-iile power. 

Till' second nonmilitary aspect is 
(inline assistance to those countries 
1' ivgion that are grappling with 
''Mems of development. A par- 
important example is the case 
l\' Turkey. Economic uncer- 
nds to fuel political instability. 
.1 country solve its internal 
Ml IIS enables it to deal more effec- 
\ v\ ith common security and other 
1 11! I concerns. We look to our 
ni- in the industrialized world and 
>r uralthy oil producers in the area 
?ar their full share of this part of 
:ask. 

Itary Components 
»eterrence 

me turn now to the military compo- 
(S. In our military planning for the 
^ian Gulf and southwest Asia — as 
ed across the board — our first ob- 
ve is to deter; that is, we seek to 
le clear that there will be major 
p and penalties associated with ag- 
Ision. We must be able, if need be, 
fcfeat aggression at various levels. 
jiout question, such an ability and 
livill to use it constitute the most 
;tive deterrent. 

Before I move on to discuss the 
s of forces that are necessary to 
y out this objective, let me make 
general observations about the 
:ary components of our response. 
First, while the terms "rapid de- 
ment forces" and "power projec- 
' are relatively new additions to the 
on, the military missions they sig- 
are not new at all. The United 
es has been in the rapid deploy- 
t and power projection business for 
ag time. If you doubt that, ask the 
ines who 5 years ago celebrated 
r 200th amiivei-sary. 
In both World Wars, in Korea, and 
1 in Vietnam, we showed that we 
e able to sustain very large military 
es very far from our shores. What- 
• our other difficulties in those 
s, the logistics capability which the 
ted States demonstrated was im- 
;sive indeed. Moreover, it has long 
1 a part of our military doctrine to 
eady to engage in contingencies in 
ote areas, without unacceptably 
promising our ability to maintain 



ileterrence and defense in other thea- 
ters. 

Second, I reject altogether the 
proposition that we should not develop 
the capability to use military forces ef- 
fectively because we might then be 
tempted to use them unwisely. I be- 
lieve the American people and their 
political and military leaders are wise 
enough — and, one might add, experi- 
enced enough — to understand and ac- 
cept a few simple truths. 

• Military forces alone cannot solve 
all the world's problems. 

• Their commitment is a very seri- 
ous business. 

• Such forces and the will to use 
them when necessary are essential to 
the defense of our vital interests. 

• Those interests must be carefully 
defined. 

We must be guided by the lessons 
of history and not haunted by its 
ghosts. 

Third, there have been some press 
reports of alleged U.S. reliance on a 
"trip wii-e" strategy, in which we 
would, by preference or necessity, 
quickly resort to theater nuclear 
weapons to defend against Soviet at- 
tack in the area. Several points need to 
be made. Any direct conflict between 
American and Soviet forces cai'ries the 
risk of intensification and geographical 
spread of the conflict. We cannot con- 
cede to the Soviets full choice of the 
arena or the actions. 

But that by no means implies that 
escalation to the use of nuclear weapons 
will be the consequence of a U.S.- 
Soviet clash in southwest Asia. In part 
to make such a result less likely, a 
major portion of our effort in the region 
is devoted to improving the conven- 
tional strength we can bring to bear 
there. In fact, given U.S. capabilities 
and those of others whose interests 
would be threatened by Soviet aggres- 
sion, given the difficulties inherent in 
any Soviet military actions beyond its 
borders in rugged terrain and hostile 
surroundings, and given our wide range 
of options both to exploit other Soviet 
vulnerabilities and to defend against at- 
tack, conventional deterrence and de- 
fense are feasible goals. 

My fourth general observation is 
that this overall response is, and must 
be, a multilateral one, involving local 
forces, U.S. forces, and those of other 
countries outside the region. For 
example, we are working with several 
countries in the region for increased 



U.S. access to local facilities. We are 
talking with both potential contributors 
and potential recipients concerning 
programs of economic support and se- 
curity assistance — which are necessary 
complements to oui' other efforts. And 
we are consulting with countries both in 
the region and outside concerning mili- 
tary cooperation there. 

Despite the complexities inher'ent 
in multilateral action by independent 
nations, on the whole we have been 
quite successful in our endeavors, and 
we expect this to continue. I should 
note that in many instances, we seek 
not formal, public guarantees and 
agreements but rather the establish- 
ment of a pattern of quiet consultation 
and parallel pursuit of common security 
goals. 

Meeting the objective of deterrence 
will require a combination of local 
forces for self-defense, U.S. forces 
present in the area, and, as appropri- 
ate, U.S. and other forces capable of 
rapid deployment to reinforce 
threatened areas. 

In most cases — indeed, to some 
degree in all cases — local forces in a 
country under attack or directly 
threatened would mobilize for its de- 
fense. We cannot hope, nor do we plan, 
to defend peoples in the region who will 
not help defend themselves. By that 
same token, where we are involved, we 
do not expect to stand alone. Because 
aggression against one could spread to 
threaten all, others in the regions may 
well — and surely ought to — join in the 
collective defense. The kinds of assist- 
ance they would contribute would vary 
greatly from case to case, ranging from 
providing necessary access and support 
facilities to mobilizing forces that would 
stand alongsifle our own to deter and 
engage an enemy. 

In addition to indigenous forces, 
deterrence involves both U.S. military 
presence in a troubled region and U.S. 
forces which can be quickly moved to it. 
What is important is the ability rapidly 
to move forces into the region with the 
numbers, mobility, and firepower to 
preclude initial adversary forces from 
reaching vital points. It is not neces- 
sary for our initial units to be able to 
defeat the whole force an adversary 
might eventually have in place. It is 
also not necessary for us to await the 
firing of the first shot or the prior ar- 
rival of hostile forces; many of our 
forces can be moved upon strategic 
warning and some upon receipt of even 
very early and ambiguous indications. 

An effective U.S. response to ag- 



65 



Military Affairs 



gression in this or other troublespots 
consists of several inp'edients. The 
first — an enhanced continuing 
peacetime presence — will involve 
primarily naval forces. Our current 
naval power in the region is greatly 
superior to that of the Soviet Union in 
the area. It provides us with an im- 
mediate tactical air capability. I might 
add that the Fi-ench also have a pow- 
erful naval force in the Indian Ocean. 
Further, we are continuing to make im- 
provements, begun several years ago, 
in the facilities on Diego Garcia. We 
will have a permanent presence in the 
region that is much greater than it was 
a year ago. 

Prepositioning of equipment is the 
vital second ingredient. We have begun 
a program to procure a number of 
maritime prepositioning ships, which 
will give us greater flexibility and avoid 
the problems of large, permanent U.S. 
bases overseas in sensitive areas. 

As a near term option, we are now 
actively assembling a seven-ship force 
of commercial-type vessels, including 
roll-on, roll-off ships, break-bulk cargo 
ships, and tankers to provide us with 
this capability within the next several 
months. These ships will be loaded with 
unit equipment, supplies, fuel, and 
water that would enable a Marine am- 
phibious brigade of some 10,000 men, as 
well as several U.S. Air Force fighter 
squadrons, to operate until further 
logistic support can arrive from the 
United States. 

The loaded ships will be preposi- 
tioned within a few days' sailing dis- 
tance of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea 
area. In an emergency they could move 
to a designated port near the objective 
and join up there with personnel and 
planes flown directly from U.S. bases. 
This arrangement will provide us the 
capability of responding to a crisis in 
the area in days rather than weeks. 

Mobility — especially air and sealift 
capabilities — is the third ingredient. 
We are not without such capabilities 
today. For example, the first land- 
based tactical aircraft could be in the 
region in a matter of hours and signifi- 
cant units backed up by AWACS [air- 
borne warning and control system] 
within a few days. The first isattalion of 
the 82d Airborne Division could arrive 
within 48 hours of a movement order; 
the entire division could close in in 
about 2 weeks. A full Marine amphibi- 
ous force (one division and air wing) 
could be deployed in 4 weeks. 

Moreover, we are now programing 



66 



major improvements to our rapid de- 
ployment capabilities. Several years 
ago, we started procurement of KC-10 
aerial tankers, and we are now ac- 
celerating our purchases. We have also 
begun a long-term pi'ogram for pro- 
curement of a new "CX" transport 
aircraft — either of new design or based 
on an existing aircraft — for long- 
distance deployment of out-sized 
cai-gos. We are also, as an interim 
measure, in the process of acquiring 
high-speed civilian ships which have 
immediate military sealift potential. 

Fourth is the access and transit 
rights which I alluded to earlier. We 
are intensively — and I judge success- 
fully — negotiating increased access to 
port, airfield, and other facilities to im- 
prove our ability to sustain naval and 
aircraft deployments. 

Let me again emphasize the differ- 
ence between seeking access and seek- 
ing permanent bases. Essentially, we 
are asking various countries in the area 
to enable us to come more effectively to 
their assistance if and when they need 
and want us. This is far different from 
asking them to host permanent U.S. 
garrisons. 

Frequent deployment and exer- 
cises in the area comprise another 
key ingredient. We have increased the 
scale and pace of our periodic naval task 
force deployments in the region. 

For example, to take a specific 
point in time, last October the U.S.S. 
Mklivaij carrier battle group was con- 
ducting an exercise in the Indian Ocean 
with naval units from the United King- 
dom and Australia. Additionally, four 
ships of the U.S. Mideast force were on 
station in the Persian Gulf. A second 
aircraft carrier battle group from the 
western Pacific arrived in the Arabian 
Sea in December. Since that time, more 
than 150 carrier-ba.sed tactical aircraft 
and 14 warships have been continuously 
available in the Persian Gulf and Ara- 
bian Sea to maintain a visible U.S. 
presence. 

Our ability to project air power at 
extended distances has been further 
demonstrated by three B-52 sea sur- 
veillance and three airborne warning 
and control missions flown in the Indian 
Ocean area. Finally, a Marine amphibi- 
ous unit will arrive in the Arabian Sea 
later this month. And even earlier, we 
deployed tactical aircraft there — for 
example, F-15s and AWACS to Saudi 
Arabia — as part of our response to the 
threat to North Yemen. 

In the debate growing out of the 



Persian Gulf crisis, we seem sometirii 
to labor under attack from a curious 
combination of critics. On the one hai 
there are those who pound the pu'liu 
and call for ill-defined tough measuit 
— often to cure problems for which 
there is no military solution — while ; 
the same time deriding our military 
pabilities. On the other hand, diffcit 
voices declare that we face no real 
problems except those created by mi 
own overreaction and thus need not 
concerned about our military cajjahil 
ities. 

Adopting either attitude as our 
tion's polic.v would leave our secui-iiy 
great hazard and would give a seiiou 
and dangerously wrong signal to the 
Soviet Union. 

Conclusion 

The policies and the approach I have 
outlined are not steps toward war. 
They are designed to build strength 
to prevent war. What we are doing c 
stitutes a necessary and reasonable 
sponse to real needs. The massive 
growth of Soviet military capabilitif 
a fact. Their willingness to use surr 
gates and, indeed, units of the Red 
Army to assert military and politica 
power outside the borders of the So^ 
Union has been demonstrated. The 
United States and the nations to wl 
we have the closest ties are now, ar 
will be for a long time, linked by a 
highly vulnerable lifeline to the Mid 
East and the Persian Gulf. 

Perhaps the Soviets will never 
move to threaten that lifeline. Perhi 
the more "benign" interpretations of 
their invasion of Afghanistan — if tht 
word "benign" can be used at all — a 
correct. But, as policymakers and a 
responsible citizens and world leade 
we cannot safely assume that it is. - 
deed, the actions that we must take 
guard against the consequences of t 
immediate threat posed by recent a 
gressive Soviet behavior are probal: 
the most effective way to moderate 
ture Soviet actions over the long te 

We are not saying to the Soviet 
Union that competition is the only p 
between us. We remain willing to c( 
erate in those areas where our intert 
overlap, as in the case of SALT. Bu 
where they threaten our interests, i 
will meet them on that ground as Wi 

We must demonstrate to the So' 
Union that: 

• The invasion of Afghanistan ii 



DeDartment of State Bui 



« 



1! 



fcCLEAR POLICY 



TREATIES 



, iluniighout that part of the world 
L^is IK it ruled from Moscow, as a 
us violation of the noi'ms of inter- 
nal behavior; 

■ Their stated justification for it is 
Tsally reg'arded as a transparent 
^presentation; and 
' The international community be- 
s that similar steps in the future 
the gravest dangers for the 
ts as well as for the rest of us. 

^'or the United States to assume its 
r role in deterring such aggres- 
in the future, we must have 
aate military capability and the 
use it if necessary. If we intend 
main a major world power, and to 
irve our own pluralistic and eco- 
2 systems, then we must engage 
the long haul in an economic re- 
ing, a program to reduce our de- 
snce on imported energy, and, not 
, an enhancement of our military 
)ility, including an ability to deploy 
s rapidly to areas far from but 
to us, in a security framework that 
to stabilize such regions, 
"■hese tasks will not be easy. They 
)t be done as a one-time crash pro- 
. They will not be inexpensive. 
If we fail to carry them out, the 
pentury will be a dangerous one 
id for our ideals, for our society, 
or our children. 



IText from Defense Department press 
►e 87-80. ■ 



si ports off Nuclear 
'I els Extended 



TER TO THE CONGRESS, 

7, 1980' 

^luclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
^A) amended the Atomic Energy Act 
ablish new criteria for nuclear ex- 
. Included was a requirement that the 
have a right to consent to the reproc- 
g of fuel exported from the U.S. 
)ur agreements with the European 
lie Energy Community (EURATOM) 
t contain .such a right. To avoid dis- 
ng cooperation with EURATOM, the 
A included a proviso permitting con- 
d cooperation until March 10, 1980, if 
ATOM agreed to negotiations con- 
ng our cooperation agreements, 
n July 1978, EURATOM agreed to 
ssions on the agreements on the un- 



derstanding that the issues being studied in 
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation (INFCE) would not be ad- 
dressed in the US-EURATOM discussions 
until completion of INFCE, and that the 
results of INFCE would be taken into ac- 
count in the final negotiations. We have 
had two rounds of such discussions with 
EURATOM— in November 1978 and Sep- 
tember 1979. A third meeting is scheduled 
for April 1980, shortly after INFCE con- 
cludes its work. 

To continue nuclear cooperation with 
EURATOM after March 10, 1980, we have 
to extend our waiver of the provision re- 
lating to U.S. approval of reprocessing. 
Under the law, this can be done only on an 
annual basis, and only after a Presidential 
determination that failure to cooperate 
would seriously prejudice the achievement 
of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or 
would otherwise jeopardize the common 
defense and security. The Act further pro- 
vides for notification to the Congress of any 
such determination. 

During the November 1978 and Sep- 
tember 1979 discussions with EURATOM, 
progress was made in clarifying the issues 
and positions relating to our agreement for 
cooperation. Our next session with 
EURATOM, in April 1980, will be our first 
chance to deal with the substantive issues 
addressed in INFCE and to determine how 
we can factor the results of that study into 
our agreement for cooperation. Our con- 
tinued cooperation with EURATOM during 
this period is essential to demonstrating 
our reliability as a reliable partner in the 
sensitive area of energy supply— and thus 
improving the prospects for international 
acceptance of measures to limit prolifera- 
tion. 

For these reasons, I have determined 
that failure to continue peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with the European Atomic 
Energy Community would be seriously 
prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. 
non-proliferation objectives and would 
otherwise jeopardize the common defense 
and security of the U.S. I will therefore 
issue, in the immediate future, an Execu- 
tive Order extending the waiver of the ap- 
plication of the relevant export criterion of 
the NNPA for an additional twelve months 
from March 10, 1980. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, 
President of the Senate (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Feb. 11, 1980). ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTIL.XTERAL 

Agriculture 

International agreement for the creation at 
Paris of an International Office for Epizoo- 
tics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 
1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for 
the U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141. 
Accession deposited: Angola, Apr. 6, 1979. 
Convention on the Inter-American Insti- 
tute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done 
at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.' 
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Mexico, 
Mar. 6, 1980. 

Antarctic 

Recommendations relating to the fur- 
therance of the principles and objectives of 
the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at Washing- 
ton Oct. 5, 1979, at'the 10th Antarctic 
Treaty consultative meeting. Enters into 
force when approved by all the contracting 
parties whose representatives were enti- 
tled to participate in meetings held to con- 
sider measures. 

Atomic Energy 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 14, 1974, for the supply of uranium 
enrichment services for a nuclear power 
facility in Yugoslavia. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Belgrade and Vienna 
Feb. 26, 1980. 
Entered into force: Feb. 26, 1980. 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Mar. 13, 1980. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
Done at Montreal Oct. 16, 1974. ^ 
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Feb. 15, 
1980; El Salvador, Nicaragua, Feb. 13, 
1980; U.K.. Feb. 29, 1980. 
Entered into force: Feb. 15, 1980. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual 
text of the convention on international civil 
aviation (Chicago, 1944; TIAS 1591), with 
annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Mar. 18, 
1980. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations 

for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with 

regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 

Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 

8587. 

Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 29, 

1980; Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora. 



67 



Treaties 



with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 

3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 

TIAS 8249. 

Ratification deposited: Israel, Dec. 18, 

1979. 

Containers 

International convention for safe contain- 
ers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 
1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037. 
Ratification deposited: Poland, Jan. 14, 
1980. 

Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 22, 
1980; Italy, Oct. 31, 1979. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, e.xport, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th 
session of the UNESCO general confer- 
ence. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.^ 
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Jan. 30. 
1980.= 

Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the U.N. Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization. Con- 
cluded at London Nov, 16, 1945. Entered 
into force Nov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 
Acceptances deposited: Botswana, Sept. 
24, 1979; Equatorial Guinea, Nov. 29, 1979; 
Sao Tome and Principe, Jan. 22, 1980. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 
1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited: Burma, Mar. 7, 1980. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 
1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. ^ 
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12. 
1980. 

International covenant on economic, social 

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

1976.2 

Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 

1980. 

Labor 

Instrument for the amendment of the con- 
stitution of the International Labor Or- 
ganization. Adopted at Montreal Oct. 9, 
1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 19'18; 
reentered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 
1980. TIAS 1868. 
Readmission: U.S., Feb. 18, 1980. 

Law 

Statute of the International Institute for 
the unification of private law. Done at 
Rome Mar. 15, 1940. Entered into force 
Apr. 21, 1940; for the U.S. Mar. 13. 1964. 
TIAS 5743. 



68 



Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, Jan. 1, 
1980. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 

1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. En- 
tered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 
6629. 

Accessions deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980; 
Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979. 

Amendments to the international conven- 
tion on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), relat- 
ing to amendments to the convention. 
Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.' 
Acceptance deposited: German Democratic 
Republic, Feb. 21, 1980. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization. 
Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered 
into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptances deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 
1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980. 

Amendments to Articles 17 and 18 of the 
convention of Mar. 6, 1948, on the Inter- 
governmental Maritime Consultative Or- 
ganization (TIAS 4044). Done at London 
Sept. 15, 1964. Entered into force Oct. 6, 

1967. TIAS 6285. 

Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 
1980. 

Amendment to Article 28 of the convention 
of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Inter- 
governmental Maritime Consultative Or- 
ganization (TIAS 4044, 6285). Done at 
Paris Sept. 28, 1965. Entered into force 
Nov. 3, 1968. TIAS 6490. 
Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 
1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London 
Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 
1978. TIAS 8606. 

Acceptance deposited: Burma. Jan. 29, 
1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at 
London Nov. 14. 1975.' 
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria. Mar. 4. 
1980; Burma, Jan. 29, 1980; Ghana, Feb. 5, 
1980; Maldives, Feb. 25, 1980; Portugal, 
Mar. 3, 1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 
4, 1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at 
London Nov. 17, 1977.' 
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 4, 
1980; German Democratic Republic, Ghana, 
Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Dec. 14. 1979; Mal- 
dives, Feb. 25, 1980. 

Convention on facilitation of international 



maritime traffic, with annex. Done at I 

don Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force 

5, 1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TI/ 

6251. 

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Jan. 

1980. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorologies 
Organization. Done at Washington Oct 
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23. 1950 
TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, Mar. 18, 198 

Nuclear Material 

Convention on the physical protection 
nuclear material, with annexes. Adopts 
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Open for signatui 
Vienna and New York Mar. 3, 1980. Er 
into force on the 30th day following th 
date of deposit of the 21st instrument 
ratification, acceptance, or approval. 
Signature: Dominican Republic, U.S., 
3, 1980. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the preve> 
of pollution of the sea by oil, with ann 
as amended. Done at London May 12, 1 
Entered into force July 26, 1958; for t 
U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109, 8 
Acceptances deposited: German Demo 
tic Republic, Jan. 25. 1979;'' ■' Republi 
Korea. July 31. 1978; Qatar. Jan. 31. 

International convention on civil liabil 

for oil pollution damage. Done at Bru; 

Nov. 29. 1969. Entered into force Jun 

1975.2 

Accession deposited: China. Jan. 30, 1 

International convention relating to ii 
vention on the high seas in cases of oi 
lution casualties, with annex. Done at 
Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into 
May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Ratification deposited: Portugal. Feb. 
1980. 



Patents — Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international i 

ognition of the deposit of microorgani. 

for the purposes of patent procedure, 

regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 2; 

1977.' 

Ratification deposited: France, Feb. i. j, 

1980. 

Pollution 

Convention on the prevention of mari 

pollution by dumping of wastes and ol 

matter, with annexes. Done at Londo 

Mexico City, Moscow, and Washingto 

Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug 

1975. TIAS 8165. 

Ratification deposited: Portugal, Apr 

1978. 

Accessions deposited: Papua New Gui 

Mar. 10, 1980; South Africa, Aug. 7, : 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protectior 
industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, . 



Department of State Bu 



5ii 



Treaties 



Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
les 1-12 entered into force May 19, 
for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 
entered into force Apr. 26, 1970, for 
,S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
ieation from World Intellectual Prop- 
organization of deposit of accession: 
Feb. 4, 1980. 

"mark registration treaty, with regu- 
is. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973. 
;sion deposited: U.S.S.R., Feb. 7, 



-s into force: Aug. 7, 1980. 

erty — Intellectual 

9ntion establishing the World Intel- 
d Property Organization. Done at 
holm, Julv 14, 1967. Entered into 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 
TIAS 6932. 
sion deposited: Colombia, Feb. 4, 



ications 

ttes of the international center for the 
ration of serial publications. Done at 
Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11 
2, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 
for the U.S. Mar. 31, 1978 (provi- 

ly). 

sion deposited: Senegal, July 12, 



.1 Discrimination 

national convention on the elimination 

(forms of racial discrimination. 

ted at New York Dec. 21, 1965. En- 

into force Jan. 4, 1969.^ 

cation deposited: Gabon, Feb. 29, 



eees 

tool relating to the status of refugees. 

at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 
orce Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 

TIAS 6577. 

sions deposited: Colombia, Mar. 4, 

Liberia, Feb. 27, 1980. 



national natural rubber agreement. 
Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Enters 
orce Oct. 1, 1980, provided certain 
tions have been met. 
tures: France, U.S., Jan. 8, 1980; In- 
.ia. Mar. 17, 1980; Malaysia, Jan. 28, 

ieation deposited: Malaysia, Jan. 29, 



y at Sea 

national convention for the safety of 
, sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 

Entered into force May 26, 1965. 

5780. 
Jtances deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 

Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; Yemen (Sana), 
9, 1979. 

ieation of denunciation: Argentina, 
5, 1979, effective Dec. 5, 1980. 



1980 



International convention for the safety of 
life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at Lon- 
don Nov. 1, 1974. Enters into force Mav 25, 
1980. 

Proclaimed by the President: Jan. 28, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Dec. 5, 
1979; China, Jan. 7, 1980. 
Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Jan. 9, 
1980. 

Approval deposited: Hungary, Jan. 9, 1980. 
Accession deposited: Peru, Dec. 4, 1979. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects 
launched into outer space. Done at New 
York Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force 
Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS 8480. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, Mar. 6, 
1980. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, with 
annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En- 
tered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978, 
definitively Jan. 2, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited: Dominican Repub- 
lic, Mar. 19, 1980; Indonesia, Feb. 27, 1980. 

Telecommunications 

Final Acts of the World Administrative 
Radio Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. En- 
tered into force Jan. 1, 1979. ^ 
Approvals deposited: Federal Republic of 
Germany, Jan. 3, 1980;^* Paraguay, July 10, 
1979. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking 

of hostages. Adopted at New York Dee. 19, 

1979.' 

Signatures: Greece, Mar. 18, 1980; Sweden, 

Feb. 25, 1980. 

Trade 

International dairy arrangement. Done at 

Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 

Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623. 

Acceptance deposited: Australia, Feb. 1, 

1980. 

Transportation 

Agreement on the international carriage of 
perishable foodstuffs and on the special 
equipment to be used for such carriage 
(ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 
1976.2 

Senate advice and consent to accession: 
Mar. 20, 1980. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial De- 
velopment Organization, with annexes. 
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
Signatures: Australia. Mar. 3, 1980; Iraq, 



Feb. 26, 1980; Ivory Coast, Feb. 21, 1980; 
Laos, Mar. 5, 1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the wheat trade convention (part of the in- 
ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. 
Entered into force June 23, 1979, with re- 
spect to