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Departnum t 



II of State 1W II y & 

bulletin 



-\e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2050 



May 1981 



FY 1982 ASSISTANCE 
Africa / 18 
East Asia / 26 
Europe / 38 
Middle East / 48 
South Asia / 68 
Western Hemisphere / 69 




Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 81 / Number 2050 / May 1981 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. 

Secretary of State 

WILLIAM J. DYESS 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Acting Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1986. 





For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 12 issues plus annual index — 

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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



CONTENTS 



he Secretary 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the 

"MacNeil/Lehrer Report" 
Secretary Haig Interviewed on 

"Meet the Press" 
Secretary Haig Interviewed for 

Spanish Television 
Secretary Haig Interviewed at 

Breakfast Meetings 



frica 



I FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 
Africa (Lannon Walker) 

I Military Assistance to Liberia 
(Department Statement) 

anada 

Maritime Boundary Treaty With 
Canada (Mark B. Feldman, 
Rozanne Ridgway) 

epartment 



. 



FY 1982 Authorization Request 
(Secretary Haig) 

st Asia 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 
Asia (Michael Armacost) 

Visit of Japanese Foreign Minis- 
ter (Secretary Haig, Masayoshi 
Ito) 



conomics 

Sixth International Tin Agree- 
ment (Michael Calingaert) 



nergy 

I Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (Edward L. Morse) 

I Energy Security and Internation- 
al Preparedness (Edward L. 
Morse) 



Europe 

38 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 

Europe (Raymond C. Ewing) 

39 Northern Ireland (President Rea- 

gan) 
41 Situation in Poland (Statement by 
White House Press Secretary) 

41 Poland's First Deputy Prime 

Minister Visits U.S. (Vice 
President Bush, Mieczyslaw 
Jagielski) 

42 NATO Defense Ministers Posi- 

tion on Poland (Statement by 
Deputy White House Press 
Secretary) 

42 Poland -A Profile 

Foreign Aid 

43 AID Bilateral Assistance Pro- 

grams (M. Peter McPherson) 

Middle East 

48 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 
the Middle East (Morris 
Draper, Joseph W. Twinam) 

52 Hostage Agreements Trans- 
mitted to the Congress (Depart- 
ment Explanatory Statement) 

54 U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear Co- 
operation Agreement (Joint 
Statement, Supplementary In- 
formation) 

54 Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to 

Lebanese President Sarkis) 

Narcotics 

55 International Narcotics Control 

(Joseph H. Linnemann) 



Refugees 



59 



60 



FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests 
for Migration and Refugee As- 
sistance (W. R. Smyser) 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests 
for African Refugees (W. R. 
Smyser) 



Security Assistance 

62 FY 1982 Security Assistance Re- 
quests (James L. Buckley, 
Richard R. Burt) 

South Asia 

68 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 

South Asia (Jane A. Coon) 

Western Hemisphere 

69 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 

Latin America (John A. 
Bushnell) 

71 U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to 

Nicaragua (Department State- 
ment) 

72 Economic Assistance to El Sal- 

vador (Department Statement) 

Treaties 

73 Current Actions 

Chronology 

77 March 1981 

Press Releases 

77 Department of State 

Publications 

78 Department of State 

Index 



- 




New Feature 

Map and Chart Series 
on U.S. Foreign Relations 

As part of the Bureau of Public Affairs' continuing effort to 
provide more and better graphic reference materials, the 
Department of State Bulletin will publish, from time to time, 
new series of maps, charts, and graphs on important elements 
of U.S. foreign relations. Introducing this new series is a map 
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (page 40) and charts on 
development assistance (page 45) and budget and personnel 
(page 25). 

Subjects to be illustrated in upcoming issues of the 
Bulletin will include national security agreements, interna- 
tional organizations, trade relations, international investment 
and other topics of current interest. 

Much of this material eventually will be assembled, 
reprinted, and offered for sale by the Superintendent of Docu 
ments. The material is written and compiled in the Bureau of 
Public Affairs by Harry F. Young; maps and graphics are 
prepared with the assistance of the Office of the Geographer, 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 

The Editors 



HE SECRETARY 



Eiterview on the "MacNeillLehrer 
eport" 



Secretary Haig's interview for the 
jiblic Broadcasting System's "MacNeil/ 
f.hrer Report" with Robert MacNeil and 
\m Lehrer on March 13, 1981. 1 

i Yesterday a top State Department 
ficial, who insisted on remaining 
onymous, said the situation in El 
ilvador wasn't that big a deal, and, 
effect, asked the press to cool it. 
hy isn't El Salvador that big a deal 
y more? 

A. I wouldn't suggest that it's not 
jat big a deal. I think the issue is that 
1 1 do have a tendency to indulge in 
•isodic preoccupations, if you will, with 
lie event or another on the strategic 
I rizon. And, to some degree, while El 
I lvador is extremely important, it is a 
uation which we neither established 
I r set for ourselves. But, even in the 
:e of that, there are many equally im- 
rtant issues at large today -the situa- 
>n in Afghanistan, the tense situation 
Poland, and other global manifesta- 
ins of illegal Soviet interventionism in 
veloping states. And I think it's impor- 
i at that we not exclude concern about 
j ese other vital issues -East- West rela- 
ys at large, arms control, and a host 
other matters of equal importance. 

Q. What happened then? Why did 
Salvador, in your opinion, get out 
proportion in terms of these other 
ijor problems? 

A. I don't think it's a usual thing. I 
link that we found a situation which 
is just becoming clear to the Carter 
iministration that we had a mass of 
tervention in this hemisphere through 
iba, the Soviet Union and other 
astern European allies, and Libya, 
hich was creating a crisis that had to 
l . dealt with, with both firmness and 
■omptness. So it's understandable that 
eople would be preoccupied with the 
'ent. 

I think the comments made yester- 
ly were not designed to belittle the im- 
)rtanee of El Salvador but to suggest 
lat we have other matters of equal im- 
)rtance in our search for world peace 
id international stability. 



Q. Did this anonymous State 
Department official misspeak when he 
said — that's a direct quote — when he 
said it wasn't a big deal? 

A. No. I don't suggest that he 
misspoke. I think he was attempting, in 
a dialectic fashion, to suggest that there 
are other problems and that we 
shouldn't be exclusively preoccupied with 
the El Salvadoran situation. 

Q. Didn't you, in effect, make it a 
pretty big deal by choosing it as a 
symbol and virtually saying so, that 
this was going to be the first place to 
draw the line against international in- 
terventionism? 

A. No, not at all, in the sense of 
your question. We did not bring about 
the events in El Salvador, we found 
them. And we found the situation 
serious and somewhat out of hand in the 
context of the intrusion of Cuban ar- 
maments and Soviet-supplied equipment 
to a guerrilla movement. All of this, of 
course, culminated in a large offensive in 
El Salvador in January. So it wasn't a 
contrived situation to draw the line on. 
And I would suggest, incidentally, that 
we in the West and we Americans must 
be as concerned about illegal Soviet in- 
terventionism in El Salvador, in Africa, 
in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, 
and wherever international law is 
violated and the rule of force is applied 
against people who are seeking self- 
determination and social change. 

Q. Didn't you say to yourselves — 
perhaps you in particular— "Look, let's 
grab this one because we can quickly 
establish in the eyes of the world, the 
Soviets included, that there's going to 
be quite a sharp change in foreign 
policy from the way it was handled in 
the Carter Administration"? 

A. I wouldn't want to suggest it, 
again, in as sharply drawn terms as 
you've posed in your question. Clearly, 
we have a situation that was serious, 
that was running rampant in the sense 
of the arms shipments that were moving 
into this hemisphere. And clearly, 
whether it had been there or been in 
Africa, I think the response would have 
been the same, because clearly, we do 
wish to make it evident. And we want 
the Soviet leadership to understand that 



whereas we may have been less than 
vigorous in opposing these actions in the 
past, they are no longer acceptable if we 
are to maintain a spirit of improving 
East- West relations. 

Q. The reversal of this request 
now that the press not be too preoc- 
cupied with it, are you saying: "We, 
the Administration, blew it a bit, and 
we overplayed it, and you overplayed 
it," or just, "We and the press 
overplayed it"? 

A. Not at all. I don't think it's a 
value judgment on either side. It's a sug- 
gestion that there are other events of 
some significance that must not be 
overlooked on the contemporary scene, 
and I hope that they would not be. 

Q. A couple of times already, you 
have said: "We had a situation." Does 
that mean that that bad situation has 
now gone away? It's not as severe and 
critical as it was? 

A. Not at all. But I think after the 
January offensive, which failed, and the 
return of the guerrilla movement to 
classic guerrilla tactics, which are 
serious and which are hurting the peace 
and stability and social progress in El 
Salvador, we will also continue to be 
faced with a large influx of armaments 
to prepare for the next round. 

We moved promptly, both with ex- 
pressions of concern and the termination 
of assistance to Nicaragua, which had 
been the main platform for the introduc- 
tion of these armaments, and we found 
that there has been some slackening of 
those arms movements into El Salvador. 
There is some evidence today, for exam- 
ple, that the guerrillas, themselves, are 
hard pressed for ammunition and addi- 
tional weapons. We've had some assur- 
ances, both public and private, from the 
Government of Nicaragua that they are 
not going to be involved in this kind of 
activity. 

Also, I will be frank with you, we 
have some countering evidence to sug- 
gest that the activity is merely to look 
for new entry routes through other third 
countries. 

Q. By Nicaragua or by the — 

A. By the overall movement -the 
Cuban-directed effort in this hemisphere, 



lay 1981 



The Secretary 



which includes coordination with leftist, 
Marxist-Leninist elements in a number 
of Central American states. 

Q. The Cuban involvement, then, 
has not slackened. Is that what you're 
saying? 

A. I think it would be difficult to say 
that it has not slackened. We have 
witnessed some drop off in the level of 
activity we had witnessed before we 
took the positions we did. There is a 
considerable amount of armaments from 
Eastern Europe in the pipeline. Whether 
they are going to remain in Cuba or re- 
main in Nicaragua, remains to be seen. 

Q. As a matter of policy, are you 
and the others in the Administration 
going to — I don't know how to put 
it— are you going to quit talking about 
El Salvador as much as you have until 
now? 

A. Not at all. I think you don't 
establish ground rules; you must deal 
with events as they occur. The situation 
in El Salvador is an important one; it's a 
serious one. It's been the subject of a 
great deal of controversy, as you know. 
There has been a great deal, I think, of 
misunderstanding with respect to U.S. 
objectives and motives there. 

For example, I find that despite the 
fact that we repeatedly introduce any 
comments on the internal situation in El 
Salvador with the clear objective that 
we have set for ourselves -to avoid ex- 
treme outcomes of the left or the right 
and a desire to achieve social change, 
social progress, economic development, 
and a free choice by the people of El 
Salvador -there seems to be always a 
great deal of emphasis on the $25 
million or $35 million of military 
assistance on the so-called Vietnam 
parallel. This I don't think is justified by 
the situation. That is our problem: We 
have to cope with it by reiterating on 
every occasion what our objectives are. 

Q. Can I ask you to make the ob- 
jective more precise for us? Is it to 
strengthen the Duarte junta forces so 
that they can destroy, wipe out, and 
defeat the guerrillas by military ac- 
tion? Or is it to bring about some kind 
of political negotiations and a settle- 
ment before that takes place? 

A. Let me describe it as, basically, 
twofold. First, it is to terminate or to 
see that the influx of arms to the ex- 
treme left in El Salvador from external 
sources, whose objectives are clearly not 
those of the Salvadoran people, are ter- 
minated. That's one facet of our objec- 
tive. The second is to create the cir- 



cumstances to provide the Duarte gov- 
ernment, which we view as the best and 
most solid platform for future social 
reform and an ultimate democratic proc- 
ess in the country, and to do that 
through the early realization of elec- 
tions, the electoral process. And it 
seems today that most of the elements 
in El Salvador are in favor of the elec- 
tions with the exception of the extreme 
left, which I don't think would fare very 
well in such elections, which says 
something in its own right. 

What we're talking about is prevent- 
ing the introduction of illicit arms, and 
beyond that, advice, control, and direc- 
tion which is also evident; and to bring 
about an early manifestation of the will 
of the people and their own self-determi- 
nation, and to decide for themselves 
what kind of government they want. 

Q. Does that involve militarily 
defeating the guerrilla movement? 

A. I think that's a question which is 
hard to answer. I think the Archbishop 
of San Salvador -Bishop Rivera -over 
the weekend, commented that the guer- 
rillas have lost the support of the people, 
that they are viewed as not interested in 
the welfare and the social development 
of El Salvador. Whether they determine 
that on their own right and abandon 
bloodshed, terrorism, and murder for a 
ballot box contest, which we would hope, 
is a question that only time can answer. 

Q. One of the questions that has 
been raised about American policy 
among other Western allies — like 
West Germany, which is a social 
democratic government — is that your 
policy appears to be making the guer- 
rillas appear monolithically Marxist- 
Communist-led and -motivated, where- 
as they say there are a lot of people in 
that movement with whom they — 
social democrats — are sympathetic, 
who are liberals and non-Communists. 
How do you assess the complexion of 
the guerrilla movement? 

A. I think essentially it's leadership, 
with command and control. Its external 
support is Marxist-Leninist. There are, 
of course, a number of elements who 
have associated themselves with the 
guerrilla action which could not be fairly 
described as Marxist-Leninist. For ex- 
ample, the Socialist Party, itself, and 
their leadership joined the Marxist- 
Leninist group and, unfortunately, the 
consequence of that was to discredit that 
movement in the eyes of the people of 
El Salvador. 



I think President Duarte has ex- I 
pressed a willingness to discuss issuetl 
internally with any of the elements w 1 
are willing to abandon bloodshed and J 
terrorism for the political process. Ar.'l 
of course, we are strictly comfortable J 
with that outcome, although there arcl 
skeptics that it will rarely occur until i 
external command and control ceases! 

We have picked up a network of I 
electronic command and control in Ell 
Salvador that far exceeds what we sail 
during the Sandinista phase of the 
Nicaraguan revolution. It is sophisti- 1 
cated; it is externally run and extern;! 
manipulated. I don't think we should I 
lose sight of that. 

Q. Many of the papers today ha 
front page stories about the so-call 1 
deemphasizing of El Salvador, quolij 
a top State Department official whcp 
anonymous. What is the purpose of 
this procedure — announcing policy 
through an unnamed State Departrm 
official, when we know who the 
official is, and only the public doesi; 
know. What is the purpose of that'ik 
you approve of it, and are you goin t< 
continue it? 

A. I asked myself this morning • go 
the unnamed official was. I think it v s 
Mr. [John A.] Bushnell, our Acting | 
Assistant Secretary for Latin Ameri 31 
Affairs, and I think he made a comn lit 
at the outset of what was entitled a 
"background" briefing. Your viewers ir. 
may or may not understand that "ba i- 
ground" means that direct attributio is 
not made, although you can make re r- 
ence to "a high official." 

This is a question, I think, whicl hi 
press is best able to answer. We ha\ 
complied with the desires of the pre io 
a "background" basis. Sometimes it 
enables the briefing itself, or the bri lei 
to be somewhat more, shall we say, I 
forthcoming in the discussion with t j 
press. And I don't think you yoursel is 
would recommend elimination of the j 
"background" process. However, it r is 
be used with prudence. 

Q. But here we have a case wire 
seemingly, a change in American 
foreign policy toward El Salvador /a 
announced by a State Department 
official, and nobody knows who hes. 

A. It's a 24-hour story, because I : 
decibel entry into "background" by ll 
Bushnell. After all, I think it is deal 
that we're very concerned about thel 
events in El Salvador. We are not tin 
to manipulate the level of attention p< 
the press gives. The purpose of Mr. I 
Bushnell's comments was to ^ugges'l 



Department of State Bufti 



The Secretary 



r.hat there are, indeed, some other 
Invents of significance for the American 
joeople to be concerned with in the 
foreign policy area. 



Q. You told reporters this morn- 
jjing at breakfast that some low-level 
Bmeetings between U.S. officials and 
.■Soviet officials are going to begin fair- 
By soon. When, between whom, and 
IJvvhat is the purpose of them? 

A. I think just the fact of that state- 
ment is sufficiently clear to suggest that 

ve do anticipate talks on a number of 
"i/enues, as a matter of fact. We have 
Itommitted ourselves with our European 
Ijartners, for example, to discuss, under 
Jr.he two-track system for theater nuclear 
.Jnodernization, some negotiations with 
J'.he Soviet Union on theater nuclear 
I, irms control. 

We would have, of course, a dia- 
, logue which I would anticipate would 
;ake place between Ambassador [Anato- 
y E.] Dobrynin, when he returns from 
toscow, and myself. We have a number 
if existing fora which involve U.S. and 
Soviet discussions of longstanding -the 
Standing Consultative Committee, 
nuclear weapons, and a number of other 
J ireas of interface such as rules of 
i ; ;ngagement on the high seas, for exam- 
le. So we have not entered into a 
eriod of isolation vis-a-vis the Soviet 
nion. Precisely, the opposite. 

Q. When you begin your talks 
with Ambassador Dobrynin, are you 
ioing that with the idea that they 
night eventually lead to conversations 
jetween you and Foreign Minister 
I Sromyko, and then maybe finally to a 
;ummit meeting between Mr. Reagan 
rtiit ind Mr. Brezhnev? 

A. Hopefully, of course. I would 
" nope that progress can be made in lower 
•'; .evel talks and then intermediate-level 
': talks at the Foreign Minister level which 
* would suggest, at some point, that a 
::i head of state, or head of government 
1 meeting would be both productive and in 

order. But I would not want to leave 
nl you with the impression that we an- 
n ticipate that this will occur in the very 
or near future. There are too many out- 
nl I standing differences between ourselves 
htl and the Soviet Union which, unfor- 
I tunately, have brought the state of 
'I world peace to a rather precarious level. 
| We have witnessed Soviet interventions 
in Africa, starting in Angola in 1976, 
running through Ethiopia; Southern and 
Northern Yemen; the first Soviet in- 
tervention in Afghanistan followed up by 



May 1981 



direct military intervention a year later; 
the overrunning of Kampuchea, former- 
ly known as Cambodia, by North Viet- 
namese proxies of the Soviet Union. 
I think it's clear to the American 
people -I know it's clear to our Western 
European partners -that were we to 
continue to ignore the Soviet activities, 
the objectives of assuring world peace 
and international stability would be 
gravely threatened. Clearly, the time 
has come for the Soviets to understand 
that this is no longer acceptable action. 

Q. You want them to do something 
to demonstrate to the United States 
that they understand that, before you 
recommend to President Reagan that 
he talk to Brezhnev? 

A. I would anticipate some 
manifestation of good will and under- 
standing that there must be greater 
reciprocity and greater restraint in con- 
temporary action. 

Q. Do you want the troops out of 
Afghanistan? 

A. Our ultimate objective and that 
of our allies, of the Islamic conference, 
and a number of Third World leaders as 
well is to achieve the total withdrawal of 
Soviet forces and the neutrality of 
Afghanistan. That is not an abandoned 
objective by this Administration. 
However, the timing of that is going to 
be associated with guarantees and a se- 
quence that doesn't mean that every last 
Soviet official has to be out of Afghani- 
stan before talks on other substantive 
areas could begin. We must maintain 
flexibility and a progressive sense of 
purpose. 

Q. You mean some token with- 
drawal would indicate good will? 

A. No, no, no. I think we need an 
understanding that this is going to occur 
on a given time schedule, and we need 
some manifestations of other Soviet 
restraint in other areas, not the least of 
which is the recent activity in this 
hemisphere. 

Q. Various State Department 
officials — some named and some not 
named — have indicated in the last day 
or so that you are concerned about the 
situation on the borders of Poland 
and, particularly, the fact that the 
Soviets are going to hold military 
maneuvers. What exactly is the con- 
cern? 

A. I think we are watching very 
carefully two recent manifestations of a 
changing situation in Poland -one being 



a somewhat harder line, recent evidence 
from Moscow related to the internal 
situation in Poland; and secondly, the 
about-to-be-initiated Soyuz exercise, the 
scope of which clearly is approaching, if 
not exceeding the 25,000-man limit pro- 
vided for in the confidence-building 
measures of basket III of Helsinki, 
which incurs, at least, the political liabili- 
ty or obligation of reporting such ac- 
tivities. So we're watching it very, very 
carefully at the moment. 

Q. Has Western intelligence 
estimated or do you have an idea of 
how many Soviet troops it would take 
to subdue Poland if they decided to 
gamble? 

A. I think these estimates have 
been made by responsible people, and 
there are a number of varying estimates 
depending on the circumstances of such 
intervention, should it occur. But I want 
to emphasize that we don't necessarily 
anticipate that such an entry by the 
Soviet Union is inevitable, imminent, or 
acceptable from the Western point of 
view. 

Q. Have the Western allies, now 
that you've had time for consultation — 
you've seen a number of Foreign 
Ministers, and there have been some 
heads of government meetings — now 
agreed on what they would do if the 
Soviets intervened? 

A. I don't make it a habit on na- 
tional television to divulge the conse- 
quences of what have been intense and 
extensive consultations on this issue 
within the alliance and other fora. I 
think I can say, however, without reser- 
vation, that the progress made in these 
discussions has resulted in the broadest 
and most detailed consensus that I've 
witnessed in some time. The bottom line 
of that consensus is that any interven- 
tion by the Soviet Union, directly or in- 
directly, in the internal affairs of Poland 
would have grave and lasting conse- 
quences to East-West relations. 

Q. And have the Soviets 
themselves been informed directly of 
what the consequences would be, even 
though you don't want to make them 
public? 

A. I think the bottom line conse- 
quences have been very clear to the 
Soviet leadership, and I'm very much 
aware that they are acutely conscious of 
them. I don't see that they have any 
desire to move into Poland. 



'Press release 66. 



The Secretary 



Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Secretary Haig was interviewed on 
NBC's "Meet the Press" on March 29, 
1981, by Bill Monroe, NBC News 
(moderator and executive producer); 
Barry Schweid, Associated Press; 
Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Syn- 
dicate; and Marvin Kalb, NBC News. 1 

Q. What can you tell us about the 
outlook in Poland as of this moment? 

A. We've been watching the situa- 
tion with a stepped-up intensity in re- 
cent hours and the situation is still very, 
very tense. There are some good and 
also some continuing worrisome signs. 

Q. The TASS news agency, the 
official Soviet agency, said today that 
Poland is in a state of mounting an- 
archy and accuses the Solidarity Union 
movement of launching an open strug- 
gle against the Polish state. Doesn't 
that have an ominous ring to you? 

A. Indeed it does, and that's very 
consistent with the other worrisome 
trends we've been watching, including 
the military exercise which has been ex- 
tended for an indefinite period, growing 
frictions between the moderate and 
rightist elements in the political leader- 
ship itself, problems within the economic 
situation in Poland, food shortages, and 
some indications of growing frictions be- 
tween the moderates and the extremists 
in the political hierarchy. 

Q. So the situation is no less 
critical than you felt it was a couple of 
days ago? 

A. I think there are some signs that 
perhaps a major crisis can be avoided if 
the moderate elements in the political 
leadership continue to prevail and main- 
tain their influence. 

Q. The United States warned the 
Polish Government— not the Soviets, 
but the Polish Government — 3 days 
ago not to use force against the Polish 
unions. Would Western nations, 
would the United States consider 
some kind of sanctions against the 
Polish Government if they took such 
action that they would regard as 
internal? 



A. I believe it is very hard at this 
juncture to determine whether such ac- 
tions would be internal or external 
despite the fact that internal forces may 
have applied the repression. The key 
issue here is that Poland is facing some 
serious and grave economic and food 
shortage problems, and we in the West, 
the United States and our allies, would 
like to be helpful. But should there be a 
repression, an elimination of the pro- 
gress achieved thus far, and a rolling 
back, if you will, this would become in- 
creasingly complex and difficult for us. 

Q. As the situation stands now, do 
you anticipate the Russians moving 
troops into Poland? 

A. I have said, and I repeat today, 
that that situation is neither imminent 
or inevitable. I do believe that that 
varies hour to hour by various postures 
taken by Soviet forces. And at this mo- 
ment, that posture is at a heightened 
state of readiness, with communications 
in place, and with some indications of in- 
creased posturing which could lead to 
that, so we are watching it very, very 
carefully. 

Q. What would be the effect, do 
you think, on the Soviet empire if the 
Russians moved in? In a sense, 
wouldn't it be good for U.S. objectives 
because it might lead to a dissolution 
of the empire? 

A. In no way. I think any applica- 
tion of force in the internal affairs of the 
Polish people could have unforeseen and 
most dangerous consequences, and I 
don't know of any responsible official in 
this Administration that would welcome 
that outcome. 

Q. Well, then, the United States 
would be well served, I suppose, by 
propping up the Polish economy, and 
yet you are punishing the Russians 
with a grain embargo. Isn't there 
some anomaly there? 

A. There are some inconsistencies, 
as there are always contradictions in the 
conduct of our affairs. Clearly, we do 
seek to help alleviate the suffering and 
the anguish of the Polish people at this 
difficult time. As you know, we inherited 



a grain embargo, and the intentions of 
the President are, of course, to lift that 
at the earliest possible moment. He has 
never favored it, and I have never 
favored it. But the act of doing so, at 
this juncture, could send out very 
deleterious signals in the context of oui 
ability to manage East- West relations 
and the Polish issue specifically. 

Q. Regarding the events of this 
week and the conflict or nonconflict 
between the White House and the 
State Department, you yourself have 
worked in the White House in an ex- 
traordinarily high position, and man) « 
people have said that the problem waii 
more personalities than of ideology 
you were President Reagan, how 
would you have handled the strong 
personality of Alexander Haig? 

A. I have that problem continuous 
ly. I think the situation has clearly bee 
resolved and resolved in a very happy 
way, as the President said on Friday ii 
an interview with the Washington Posi 
You know, there are questions of 
substance - real issues, if you will- in 
foreign policy and questions of form. 
This involved a question of form. That 
has been resolved and resolved very 
happily to my satisfaction, and I know 
from my discussions with the Presider 
with his satisfaction. The time has con 
now to get on with dealing with the 
questions of real issues for the Ameri( 
people in the foreign policy area, and 
that's what I intend to do. 

Q. Then there were not really 
questions of substance or of ideolog 
that were different between the Wh 
House staff and yourself? 

A. I'm not aware of a single in- 
stance thus far in my relationships wi 
President Reagan that we had any 
differences, either of nuance or even t 
tics, in the conduct of the nation's 
foreign affairs. I know I am here be- 
cause he saw certain compatibility be- 
tween our two viewpoints, and I thini 
that is a very happy circumstance for 
the American people. 

Q. Would the events of this wet 
change your behavior in any way, 
subtle or direct? 

A. That suggests other aspects o 
my behavior, day to day. I think the r 
question here -and that comes up 



Department of State Bulle 



The Secretary 



Regularly- is my effectiveness influenced 
Biy these passing events? My answer to 
Bhat is, not in any way at all. You know, 
It is dealing with the real issues that my 
Peport card will be rendered at some 
jjioint in time by the President and by 
whe American people. And so the answer 
Bo that question will have nothing to do 
Ivith these events but rather how we 
jieal with these growing and, I think, un- 
precedented dangers to our nation in the 
floreign policy area. 

Q. Just to pick up a couple of 
ioints here, do you feel that last Tues- 
i lay when you went public with what 
• eemed to be criticism of the crisis 
: nanagement and arrangement with 
j^ice President Bush at the top of that, 
hat some way or another you had 
nade a mistake? 

A. I think there were mistakes 
* nade across the board. There were mis- 
nderstandings. And it was my view 
hat what I revealed in my testimony 
/as totally consistent with the state of 
he nondecision on that issue at the 
ime. But those things happen. Com- 
munications sometimes are not all we 
/ould like to have them. This is an Ad- 
ministration that is evolving in the con- 
jxt of form. I don't think there is much 
f a learning curve to be achieved in the 
rea of substance and that's the impor- 
ant aspect of it, and I'm very comfort- 
rs tble with it. 

i 

Q. How are you going to avoid 
hat kind of misunderstanding in the 
uture? Have you and the President 
% vorked out an arrangement that is 
1 lore precise than the looseness that 
ibviously bred the problem? 

A. Indeed, of course, this is so, and 
involves more regular meetings be- 
een the two of us, and it involves 
me other steps which will be taken in 
le near future in the form area. But I 
ant you to know that I am very, very 
mfortable with the relationship that 
resident Reagan has established with 
e and my role with respect to that 
elationship, and I expect it to be in- 
eeli imate and highly successful in the 
leriod ahead. 

Q. On Poland, you mentioned 
•arlier that there are some good signs. 
J (ou've talked about the worrisome 
ligns. What are the good ones? 



A. The good signs would involve 
some indication that the moderate ele- 
ments in the political structure of 
Poland seem to be surviving well at the 
current moment and maybe will continue 
to prevail. 

Q. Do you feel — let me ask it this 
way — on what basis do you feel the 
United States can complain about a 
Polish suppression of Polish workers? 

A. I think any rollback of the pro- 
gress made with respect to reform in 
Poland would be historically and in- 
evitably a matter of great concern to the 
United States. 

Q. But you have always described 
it as an internal matter, the last Ad- 
ministration and you as well. So if the 
advance is internal, wouldn't the 
retreat be internal as well? 

A. Your question there involves 
what I would call the degree of inter- 
relationship between the political leader- 
ship in Poland and the Soviet Union. 
And, clearly, here the lines are -have 
existed for all the years since the Sec- 
ond World War, and the annexation or 
restructuring of Poland. 

Q. Do you feel, when you mention 
the heightened state of alert of Soviet 
forces — that indeed forces, for exam- 
ple, are being moved out of barracks 
toward borders — has there actually 
been a movement of Soviet forces into 
Poland as part of the recent exercises? 

A. No. There were some adjust- 
ments, especially with sophisticated com- 
munications capabilities, some of which 
are occurring without the participation 
and cognizance of the Polish military 
forces, which is a worrisome sign, in the 
first instance. But I think most of the 
worrisome signs involve readiness 
measures being taken along the Baltic 
military region, in East Germany, and in 
some of the other satellite states. 

Q. President Reagan refers to the 
leftist guerrillas in El Salvador as ter- 
rorists, and he speaks of revolution 
being exported to the Americas. I'd 
like to ask whether the U.S. Govern- 
ment is totally hostile to the left-wing 
guerrillas in El Salvador, whether 
there might be some feeling that some 
of those guerrillas may be, in their 
own minds, genuinely fed up with 
what they look on as oppression, past 
injustice, and right-wing murder 
squads? 



A. Of course, there are very clear 
and strong overtones of those influences 
in the rebel movement. I would suggest 
that the opposition in the first instance, 
the initial revolution which placed the 
current government in place was a con- 
sequence of those extremes of the right. 
And we don't welcome them, and we 
don't endorse them. But what is clearly 
evident to us is that the leftist move- 
ment, the rebel activity, its command, 
control, and direction, now is essentially 
in the hands of external forces- Cuban, 
Nicaraguan, and, of course, indirectly 
Soviet. 

Q. You feel those left-wing guer- 
rillas in El Salvador are in the control 
of, being manipulated by, being domi- 
nated by Communists? 

A. There's no question about that. 
We have very sophisticated, detailed, 
hard evidence to confirm it. For exam- 
ple, the command and control of com- 
munications network that has been im- 
planted in El Salvador, which 
manipulates the rebel activity, is cen- 
tralized outside of El Salvador. 

Q. You have been criticized for 
what your critics look on as an over- 
emphasis on El Salvador altogether 
and for an overemphasis on the 
military aspect of it. What you are 
now saying about the guerrillas, does 
that mean that there is no possibility 
in your mind for a political settlement, 
some kind of compromise that will in- 
volve all sides? 

A. Not at all, we welcome a political 
settlement. Indeed, that's the objective 
we've established for ourselves in the 
conduct of our policies which incidentally 
involve the three-to-one ratio of eco- 
nomic assistance, development 
assistance, to the military assistance. 
Now, President Duarte has called for 
early elections in El Salvador. He 
offered 3 weeks ago to establish an elec- 
toral commission. He's offered amnesty 
to the rebels to come in and join and 
welcomed all parties to participate in 
this electoral commission and early elec- 
tions, which would be a reflection of self- 
determination and the will of the people 
of El Salvador. What we are opposed to 
is the imposition of external assistance 
and direction and, frankly, takeover in 
the subsequent government. 



Mav 1981 



The Secretary 



Q The guerrillas of another sort 
operating in Angola, in fact, it is a 

reverse situation, you have a eftist 
government, you have guerrillas that 
are non-Communist, *e Admimstra, 
tion has called for repeal of the Clark 
amendment which prevented the 
United States from assisting guer- 
rillas. Possibly looking for some con- 
sistency or wondering about con- 
sistency, what is the Administration s 
intentions toward those guerrillas, 
and isn't that an external application 
to a domestic situation? Put another 
way why does the United States have 
a right to do something in another 
country that the Soviets don't have the 
right to do? 

A I'm glad you asked that question, 
because there has been a lot of specula- 
tion some of which is misinformed with 
respect to our future policies toward 
Angola. As you know, we have asked, 
along with a number of other legislative 
reforms, that we lift the so-called Clark 
amendment. We've also asked for addi- 
tional modifications of restrictions on ex- 
ecutive power that involve Pakistan and 
which involve Argentina. This is a mat- 
ter of principle. 

Now, having said that, let me assure 
you that 'a unilateral restriction of 
American policy options in dealing with 
a dynamic and dangerous situation ot 
the kind that exists today in southern 
Africa, automatically a prion, deprives 
us of the kind of influence we would 
want in our efforts in the future to seek 
a negotiated peaceful outcome of 
southern African problems, including 
Namibia, and ultimately and above all, 
the withdrawal, promptly, of Cuban 
forces from Angola. 

Q. Word is beginning to leak out 
that a mission will be going to 
southern Africa, headed by Mr. 
Crocker [Chester A. Crocker, desig- 
nate for Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs], will that mission go to 
Angola, and how will you deal with 
the problem of telling that govern- 
ment about this principle? 



A. As I have been stating publicly 
up until now, we have been in the pro- 
cess of a very thorough review of 
America's southern African policies. 
We've completed the first phase, and 
we'll now move into a second phase 
which involves some active diplomacy, 
and that will indeed include some travel 



by American officials to the area. It will 
involve discussions with the front-line 
states [Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe], with 
South Africa, and with the so-called 
"Five" -our European partners [France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the 
United Kingdom], Canada, and our- 
selves, that have been involved in the 
U N process on Namibia. 

Now, it would be premature for me 
to disclose today precisely who the 
discussions will be held with and the 
particular venues or timing, but this will 
happen very shortly, and I think it will 
tend to disabuse a number of elements 
in our country who have been both con- 
cerned and incredulous about some 
dramatic shifts in American policies in 
southern Africa, which are not justified. 
We will pursue our own policies, and 
they will be different from the previous 
Administration's but not in the context 
of some of the speculative stories that 
you have read recently. 

Q The first visitors to Washing- 
ton these last few months have tended 
to be what Ambassador Kirkpatrick 
[Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations] has 
called the oppressive authoritarians - 
the South Koreans, the Argentines, 
etc., and the South Africans, this 
week -albeit undercover. The -many 
people feel that your policies of 
countering the Soviet Union are very 
well taken, but they question whether 
we are not going overboard in the 
other side in supporting these sorts of 
countries so enthusiastically. Are we 
doing that? 

A I think in some respects that's a 
bum rap. I think the first thing that I 
want to make clear to our viewers is 
that it's been our experience that one 
deals with contesting parties on any 
issue best through a normal relationship 
of confidence and friendship, not by iso- 
lation and the creation of paranoia. In- 
evitably, any negotiating process is best 
served by that kind of a relationship. 
Now, you will note that this past week I 
met with the Foreign Minister of 
Nigeria, who I don't think you would 
categorize as a repressionist, authori- 
tarian diplomat. We have spoken to all 
sides, and we will speak to all sides. And 
we will hope in the period ahead to 
create a degree of confidence in all 
sides, that our efforts in the direction of 



peaceful solutions are going to be credi- 
ble and will be able to influence the out- 
come of events rather than to indulge M 
high-profile public condemnations of 
policies we don't like. These condemna- 
tions should take place in the quietude o ; 
diplomacy and not be tests of manhood, ' 
to refer to that term again. 

Q. In these meetings, for instance 
with the South Koreans and the 
Argentines, were points put forward 
to deal with the human rights viola- 
tions? In effect, is it being dealt with 
in the quiet of diplomacy, as you sug- 
gest? 

A The very act of suggesting that 
to be the case would be a violation of th; 
requirement that we not divulge these 
things publicly. Let me assure you that 
with respect to Korea, our historic rela- 
tionship with that government is going 
to be strengthened and broadened in th 
period ahead. We are not oblivious to 
violations of human rights or other in- 
dividual freedoms that we seek to aspir 
and which we have been assured the 
current leadership seeks to broaden 
itself, and I think recent activities by 
that government confirm that. 

The same would apply specifically t 
Argentina, where we had extensive 
forthcoming and most cordial discus- 
sions with President Viola, and I think 
even the experiences of our sharpest 
critics on the Hill would have confirm* 
that this is a modern, enlightened man 
with whom we best work in a construe 
tive way. Isolation and the creation ot 
insecurity creates the intractable at- 
titudes that have resulted in no progre 
in the past. 

Q The national security adviser, 
Richard Allen, spoke last week and, 
talking about Western Europe, said 
there is outright pacifist sentiment 
there. The last national security ad- 
viser spoke about European self- 
Finlandization, which pretty much 
comes to the same thing. Do you sha 
these views? Do you feel that they ci 
across your efforts to improve rela- 
tions with our West European allies 
A I would first want to emphasize 
that our relationships with our Wester 
European partners have never been as 
good or as promising as they are todaj 
and I say that after the intimate and 
lengthy discussions we have held with 
the key foreign ministers from Europe 
from Canada, and there is a total con- 
vergence of view. 



Department of State Bullel 



The Secretary 



Now, we have these same sen- 
ments that Mr. Allen talked about in 
Europe in our own country. All of these 
eaders in Europe preside over tightly 
alanced constituencies and, of course, 
here are some worrisome overtones 
;hat have been evident for a decade or 
more. Our problem is to work quietly 
with our friends and allies in Europe to 
:ry to develop a consensus of concern 
.bout the threats facing us all, including 
;he one Mr. Allen touched upon with 
which I wouldn't care to give a value 
ludgment. 

But this is the way that we are go- 
ng to succeed in the period ahead, and 
I'm very confident that that's the policy 
)f Mr. Reagan, and it is certainly the 
oolicy of our Department of State, at 
;his juncture. 

Q. Do you feel — and I don't want 
to throw too simplistic sounding a 
question at you when we have less 
than a minute to go— but is it your 
fiew that the United States and the 
Soviet Union can indeed coexist peace- 
fully, or do you feel the Russians are 
aut for what used to be called world 
domination? 

A. I've often said that a question of 
:hat kind is irrelevant. The simple facts 
ire that we are in competition in a 
lumber of fundamental areas and that 

' | will result in competition and confronta- 
tion for the period ahead. What is im- 
portant is that our Soviet partners in 
;his duality, at long last, recognize that 

! Ithey must abide by international rule of 
law and not indulge in the kind of illegal 
interventionism that they have been in- 

r " dulging in in the period past, at an in- 
creasing level and with great dangers to 

r. world peace. 



Interview for Spanish Television 



'Press release 85 of Mar. 31, 1981. 



;:: 



el 



The following interview with 
Secretary Haig was held in the Depart- 
ment of State on March 30, 1981. x 

Q. You are going on your first trip 
overseas as Secretary of State. What 
is the reason to stop in Spain? 

A. Basically, of course, the stop is a 
demonstration of a continuing dialogue 
between the United States and Spain. I 
will seek to report not only on the conse- 
quences of my Middle Eastern trip but, 
more importantly, to discuss bilateral 
relationships between our two govern- 
ments and to emphasize, as strenuously 
as I can, the support of this government 
for the democratic process in Spain 
which has been the subject of some con- 
troversy recently. 

Q. Going back to the events of 
February 23, there is some inspiration 
or perhaps some misunderstanding in 
the political circles and also in the 
Spanish press about the real meaning 
of your first public reaction in the 
State Department about the events 
there. Would you care to comment on 
this? 

A. Clearly, as a consequence of 
misinformation or mischief, the question 
was asked of me the morning that we 
had the first reports of some kind of 
controversy in your Parliament. We 
knew nothing of the situation, and I 
made the offhand comment that this is 
an internal matter and clearly indicated 
we had to find out what it was all about 
before any judgment or any comment 
would be made. 

At that time, there was no knowl- 
edge here in Washington, nor was there 
any knowledge in our Embassy in Ma- 
drid with Ambassador Todman, as to 
either what the situation was all about, 
what the motivations for it were, what 
the objectives of the so-called disturb- 
ance in the Parliament were to have 
been. This was clearly the proper posi- 
tion to take at that time. 

Subsequently, when we learned the 
true character of the situation, our pro- 
nouncements were clear, both to your 
government, to His Majesty, a message 
from the President. And I know of no 
one in the U.S. Government, myself in- 
cluded, who would ever depart from the 
overall objective of supporting the 
democratic process in Spain, which we 
both admire and which we seek to see 
carried forward. 



Q. But do you really have the idea 
also that the special sensibility in 
Spain about any word that comes from 
Washington, especially when our 
democracy is in trouble — and we think 
we can also talk on the side of the 
Latin American democracies? Do you 
think that this comment is a clear sign 
of the Reagan Administration of sup- 
port of democracy [inaudible]. 

A. I think, clearly, anyone who is 
following American policies day-to-day 
knows that the U.S. Government is at 
the vanguard of those democratic na- 
tions which are seeking an extension 
and broadening of the democratic proc- 
ess. That includes continued concern, of 
course, about the achievement of human 
rights and basic human values that are 
the inherent aspects of the democratic 
process. 

With respect to Latin America, I 
have had visitors here such as the Prime 
Minister of Jamaica, who just recently 
presided over an electoral return to the 
democratic process. We have had the 
President of Mexico. The first visit Mr. 
Reagan made, even before his inaugura- 
tion, was with President Lopez Portillo 
of Mexico. There will be a followup 
meeting in a few weeks between the two 
leaders. 

I think nothing is higher on the 
American agenda than the achievement 
of the democratic process worldwide. On 
the other hand, we have felt that in the 
recent past, there has been too much 
public condemnation of traditional 
friends and allies who do not enjoy the 
same level of democratic freedom that 
we do here in the United States. We feel 
that this is best handled in a quiet, 
diplomatic dialogue rather than by 
criticism and condemnation publicly in 
the isolationist regimes that are seeking 
to broaden their base. 

Q. You mentioned before that Am- 
bassador Todman was there. There 
was also some criticism about him in 
the Spanish press. Do you think that 
Mr. Todman has the full confidence of 
the State Department? 

A. Mr. Todman is one of our most 
respected diplomats, and he does enjoy 
our full confidence. I can assure you that 
Ambassador Todman knew nothing of 
the situation developing in your country 
before the fact, and that perhaps is a 
contributor to the controversy with 
respect to my area of competence, 



May 1981 



The Secretary 



before we even knew what the nature of 
the problem was. 

Q. In regard to your visit to 
Spain, as you know, the United States 
and Spain are in negotiation of the ex- 
tension of the bilateral treaty, and 
also you know the Spanish Govern- 
ment promised that it was going to 
make a decision soon about the con- 
tinuation of the Atlantic alliance. 

Talking first about the bilateral 
treaty, could you tell me what are the 
interests of the U.S. Government from 
the military aspect of the treaty for 
the next 5 years? 

A. Of course, we look forward to 
negotiating at an appropriate time an 
agreement to replace and update the 
1976 agreement of friendship and 
cooperation. This involves, as you know, 
the presence today of some American 
forces in Spain. We believe that 
presence meets the joint interests of the 
Spanish and the American people, and 
we would hope to be able to continue 
with appropriate arrangements as deter- 
mined in the upcoming negotiations. 

With respect to this issue, it has 
always been ouf view that these 
agreements are designed to provide to 
both sides an equitable degree of in- 
terest and that they do, in fact, serve 
not only United States and Spanish rela- 
tionships and ties of friendship and 
mutual security relationships, but they 
also fit into the broader context of 
Western security, as well. In that con- 
text, we do not see this issue in any way 
as being in conflict with NATO aspira- 
tions that Spain may or may not have. 

Q. I'd like to ask you if you see 
any advantage or disadvantage in hav- 
ing the two things together. I ask you 
because there are some comments 
from the position on the left, the 
Socialist Party, that the entrance of 
Spain into NATO recreates an im- 
balanced situation in Europe — I mean 
in the East-West relationship. What is 
the U.S. view? 

Also, you have been at NATO for 
a long time now. What's the feeling of 
the European members of NATO about 
this? 

A. As you know from my own 
record, I am a strong advocate of the 
Spanish membership in NATO, but I do 
recognize that this is a decision for the 
Spanish people to make. There is no one 
attempting to interfere with that proc- 
ess. 

I think with respect to balances, our 
great concern today is that imbalances 



have developed and that the member 
governments -the free, independent, 
democratic governments of Western 
Europe -are all threatened by this situa- 
tion. Spain is going to be equally 
threatened, whether it belongs to NATO 
or does not. As a matter of fact, its 
security is best served by a security 
linkage with the rest of Western Europe 
and those who share common values 
with the people of Spain. 

The question sometimes arises about 
costs. It has been our experience in the 
United States that our participation in 
this alliance, although it brings costs, 
that these costs are far less than what 
we would have to apply to our security 
were we not in the NATO alliance and 
were we not to enjoy the benefits of the 
collective capability of our Western 
European partners. 

Q. Do you think that the Spanish 
economy is now in a position to afford 
the cost of integration in NATO? 

A. Clearly, the question is, can 
Spain afford to provide for its own 
security? I think any sovereign nation is 
faced with this challenge, and it is not a 
challenge that can be avoided. 

It would be my basic point that it 
would be less costly for Spain in overall 
security terms and that Spain would ac- 
quire greater defense and greater 
capability as a consequence of its 
alliance with the other Western Euro- 
pean powers, the United States, and 
Canada. 

Q. Perhaps it is a difficult question 
to answer, but do you think there will 
come any economic help, either from 
Congress or from the buildup of 
NATO to Spain if they want to, in the 
bilateral thing, raise the prices of the 
present treaty or in the NATO thing. 
Some feel that they have not enough 
money just to— 

A. This is a question that has to be 
answered by the Spanish people with 
respect to their own security needs. The 
bilateral relationship with the United 
States has always been built and struc- 
tured on what I call equitable sharing. 

The Spanish Government makes con- 
tributions of goods and services in 
strategic locations, and the United 
States makes contributions to be sure 
that Spanish defenses are what they 
should be and to help in that process. 

Incidentally, this same thing occurs 
in the NATO family where some of our 
governments, which are less able to 
make major contributions to infrastruc- 
ture and other aspects of the NATO col- 
lective defenses, enjoy the benefits of 



the collective contributions of those 
powers which are better able to do so. 
So I think there is neither anything con 
tradictory or exclusive about NATO an( 
American-Spanish bilateral relationship I 
in the security area. They are mutually 
reinforceable, and the overall benefits t 
Spain, I think, far outweigh the costs. 

Q. The other thing that is left 
about the reintegration into NATO is 
that there is going to be a problem ol 
perhaps positioning in Spain an 
amount of nuclear weapons or — do yc 
think that this is true or can you 
negotiate — 

A. I am not aware of any pressure 
that would develop in this area beyond 
the traditional and historic pressures 
that we've dealt with in the past 
jointly -America and Spain. I think thf 
is a diversionary issue. 

Q. There is another matter that 
perhaps it meets a situation like we 
think sometimes [inaudible]. Do you 
think the question of Gibraltar will I 
a real problem if it is not solved in 
some way before [inaudible] because 
cannot be allied with a country as pa 
of our territory? 

A. I wouldn't want to presume to 
interject myself as to what is essential 
a Spanish-U.K. issue involving those t> I 
nations and the people of Gibraltar as I 
well. I don't think they need any outsii 
advice from an American diplomat. 

Q. What do you think would be 
the best way to cooperate or to worl 
together — the United States and the 
Western European countries — in de; 
ing with these acts of terrorism tha' 
in countries like Italy or Spain are 
creating too much trouble for our 
foundation of order? 

A. As you know, I have already 
made some rather controversial 
statements on the subject of interna- 
tional terrorism. I believe the time ha; ' 
long since passed where the nations o: i 
the West, those of us which share con p 
mon values and which have been vie- 
timized by the growth of international 
terrorism, that we stand up collective! 
and meet this challenge in a forthrigh 
and direct way. 

In that regard, I have admired th< 
work of your government as it has 
sought to combat this terrorist activit; 
in your provinces. I think it is vitally 
important that we deal with it unilate 
ally as nations, but also collectively. 

We have just had a rash of aircral 



Department of State Bullen 



The Secretary 



/ijackings here involving American 
aitizens in Latin America and this morn- 
Brig one in the Far East, which con- 
Binues. It is time for Western leaders to 
■'ace this issue directly and to begin to 
unish the perpetrators of international 
errorism. I have been one who has 
lointed out that when the Soviet Union 
unds, supports, conducts training 
ourses in the Soviet Union and its 
Castern European satellites, when it 
lligns itself with the provision of arms 
ttfl.nd perhaps more to such state-sup- 
|)orted terrorist activities as those of 
Wadhafi in Libya or Castro in Cuba, that 
Ihey must bear a measure of respon- 
sibility for these activities. And the time 
•las come for us to bring it forcibly and 
llirectly to their attention. 

Q. You know how they made prop- 
iganda that they are just helping 
iberation movements, that they are 
I' lot terrorist organizations. I suppose 
' his is something you must follow and 
' ake a position on. 

A. I, of course, believe that there 
,s( jjas been 2,000 years of civilization 
J vhich has all worked in the direction of 
Improving the prospects for peaceful 
I'hange, a stark and sociological change 
j vithin the provisions of the rules of in- 
ternational law, and not by resort to 

iloodshed and terrorism. Above all, in 
: 1 hose rare exceptions where extraor- 
linary measures are necessary by a 
rjven people who have been suffering 
t |-'rom suppression, it should be internal; 
li t should not be instigated, supported, 
ii ind directed from outside. That, unfor- 
al :unately, is the problem we have seen 
11 vith many of the more sophisticated and 
idvanced stages of international ter- 
rorism. 

Q. I have been following the 
Vladrid Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As you 
*now, we are now in a deadlock. 
a: There is still a strong desire from the 
Soviet Union to have an extended 
military detente and disarmament con- 
ference. Do you think if this is not 
done, if there is not negotiation from 
the Western side, how we can say 
detente [inaudible]. 

A. I think the efforts to improve 
'lEast-West relations must be continuing. 
I We cannot achieve and maintain the 
^support of our people if we are, as 
' [leaders, not perceived to be trying to im- 
prove East- West relations. On the other 
hand, it is very, very clear that some of 
the recent Soviet activity interna- 
tionally -whether it be obstinance at 
CSCE or in the broader provisions of 



May 1981 



the Helsinki accords which spawned all 
of this East- West activity or whether it 
be in the utilization of proxy forces in 
Africa, the Western Hemisphere, or in 
Asia or whether it be direct, blatant 
Soviet interventionism of the kind we 
are witnessing in Afghanistan - the time 
has come for the West to unite together 
and insist on peaceful change rather 
than the rule of force. 

. Q. On these last points that they 
are now talking about, do you think 
that the conditions that the Russians 
are saying they are ready to extend 
the confidence-building measures to 
the Urals, how it [inaudible] if there 
are general concessions from coun- 
tries which are part of the conference 
but are not part of Europe — meaning 
the United States and Canada— do you 
think that this is reasonable or is go- 
ing to be accepted by your delegation 
there? 

A. First, let me emphasize that this 
acceptance of the French proposal for 
confidence-building measures, stretching 
from the Atlantic to the Urals, is clearly 
a very interesting departure from 
previous Soviet positions and perhaps 
offers some promise. However, we will 
note that in both their correspondence 
with the Western European powers and 
the United States, there is a question 
about the extension of these confidence- 
building measures beyond the shoreline 
of Western Europe. And I think there 
are a number of uncertainties raised 
with respect to that issue that will have 
to be explored in the period ahead. But 
in the interim, I think we could look at it 
as a favorable proposal in general. 

Q. Are you happy with the way 
the Western alliance, not only the 15 
but also the 10 from the European 
Economic Community, are working 
with this Madrid meeting? 

A. Yes, I have been very pleased 
with that. We have been in close touch 
with our chief negotiator, Mr. 
Kampelman. I hope to see him when I 
visit Madrid so that we can have a first- 
hand exchange of the progress. But I 
think Western unity has been clear and 
unshaken in these discussions, and that 
is very important. 

Q. Do you have plans to address 
the conference? 

A. I doubt that I would seek to do 
that, but I will seek to have an exchange 
of views and an updated report from 
Ambassador Kampelman. 



Interviews at 
Breakfast Meetings 

Secretary Haig was interviewed at 
two breakfast meetings on March 13, 
1981, by Bill Beecher, The Boston Globe; 
Marvin Kalb, NBC News; Greg Nokes, 
Associated Press; and John Wallace, 
Hearst, and on March 28 by Barrie 
Dunsmore, ABC; Roy Gutman, Reuters; 
Bernie Gwertzman, The New York 
Times; and John Maclean, The Chicago 
Tribune. 



MAR. 13, 1981 1 

Q. There's a story today that a group 
of Green Berets is being assigned to 
El Salvador from Panama, but it's not 
clear whether those are part of the 20 
that the President talked about. 

A. Only 25 guys we talked about 
are moving in there. That's the total in- 
creased authorization. I think it brings 
us to 54. I believe that's right. 

Q. What was that? I'm sorry I 
missed that. You have five of the 
Green Berets going? 

A. No. There's a story today that 
there were Green Berets moving out of 
Panama into El Salvador. They cannot 
be but those we announced last week. 
That would be 25 more men going in but 
as training teams. 

Q. In other words, there are 
Green Berets — 

A. These are not over and above 
what we announced. 

Q. What I read in the paper this 
morning was that you're trying to get 
the public emphasis off the El 
Salvador issue. 

A. No. That's not right. I don't 
know how that got so sharply drawn. 
Whoever on our side made the state- 
ment, clearly, was a little bit off the 
mark. The point I made is that I think 
we suffer somewhat from episodic preoc- 
cupation and that in terms of relative 
importance. You know, there is a total 
preoccupation with this issue and why 
we're engaged in it, and why we fail to 
look at what's going on in Poland 



'Press release 86 of Apr. 3, 1981. 



The Secretary 



today -a huge exercise about to take 
place, stiffening of the line against com- 
munism, continuing problems in Afghan- 
istan. The observation I made was that 
we would be better served, in the long 
run, if we could keep all this in balance. 
That wasn't an effort to say we're going 
to deemphasize El Salvador. After all, 
we didn't trigger El Salvador. I see 
some press people suggest that we trig- 
gered El Salvador and a big draw-the- 
line operation. The problem with El 
Salvador was that we inherited massive 
evidence which had not been collated 
and had not been drawn together, and 
we did that in the first 2 weeks of the 
Administration -really in the first 
week -and it constituted irrefutable 
evidence of massive Cuban, Eastern, 
Soviet involvement. This isn't a case of 
manipulating the news or focus or 
anything else. It was an effort to lay out 
the facts as we saw them and to get a 
reasonable degree of support for the ac- 
tions we felt had to be taken. 

Q. Did you have the feeling that 
for perhaps whatever combination of 
reasons, that a number of our allies 
felt there was too heavy an emphasis 
upon it and cautioned you that per- 
haps the line was being emphasized 
too heavily. 

A. Not really. In fact, just the op- 
posite. What the allies asked was please 
keep fighting the "progaganda" battle. 
They are being victimized by the prop- 
aganda battle in Europe. 

Q. So the United States carried 
the battle. 

A. You make it clear what our ob- 
jectives are in El Salvador. You make it 
clear that we are seeking to avoid ex- 
tremes of the right or the left. I don't 
have to tell you what the problem is. We 
all know what it is. They want our help 
in dealing with that problem. We've had 
French, British, German, and Canadian 
discussions in which I spoke about that 
to all the Foreign Ministers. I would 
have to say that the sense of unity and 
support for our global positions is 
unusually strong. I think we've got a 
very promising situation with respect to 
Western European unity and solidarity 
under a revised American foreign policy. 

Q. Let's focus on some other 
things like Poland and the coming ex- 
ercises. What do you think is the scale 



and objectives of the exercises you 
were talking about? 

A. Frankly, we don't know. We're 
looking at it very very carefully because 
the range of troop concentration could 
be within the confidence-building notifi- 
cation area. 

Q. About 25,000? 

A. Yes. There's some evidence to 
suggest that it might be. 

Q. Does it look like Soviet divi- 
sions will come across the Polish 
border as part of the exercise? 

A. We can't answer that. It's just 
too early to say. 

Q. When you replied to a question 
in Canada about conditions for a sum- 
mit with Brezhnev, you mentioned Af- 
ghanistan, and you mentioned Poland. 
I think you mentioned the situation in 
Poland would have to be clarified as 
long as a threat hangs over Poland, a 
summit doesn't make any sense. Has 
that notice been given to the Soviets 
in any kind of formal way? Has there 
been any effort to — 

A. No. We have had exchanges with 
the Soviets with respect to our new posi- 
tion, and they're very clear on that. It 
now remains to be seen whether we'll 
have some talks in the period ahead. 
They will not be, clearly, at a summit 
level and to ascertain whether or not the 
behavior patterns which are of such con- 
cern to us are going to moderate or con- 
tinue on. 

Q. Is there going to be an effort to 
revive the 1972 agreement and to give 
that a little bit of light if the 
Russians — 

A. No. We are a little preoccupied 
with the 1972 understandings, although 
they were clearly a benchmark from 
which you could measure a lack of rec- 
iprocity. If we go back to them, the 
basic thrusts of them are clear. They are 
a reciprocity commitment. And we 
haven't seen reciprocity. But I don't 
want to overemphasize that particular 
set of understandings, although they 
were agreed upon by both sides. 

Q. Will we respond in any official 
way to the Brezhnev letters? 

A. Yes, of course we'll respond. We 
will respond in due time, and we'll coor- 
dinate with our partners who have 



received similar letters. I would antici- 
pate our responses would be fairly con- 
sistent, our respective response. 

Q. Fairly soon? What kind of 
timing? 

A. No. We have a little work to do 
on it. 

Q. If you think about the Party 
Congress that's just been completed ii 
Moscow and the rather unusual series 
of factors such as no change at the 
top, very little change down below, n« 
innovative ideas in terms of handling 
their own economy, which is in very 
bad shape — what kind of overall senst 
do you get about this leadership in 
terms of its handling its own country. 
its own foreign policy, its own prob- 
lems such as Poland? 

A. I would say consistent. 

Q. Consistent but partly because 
there has been no change but that car 
be arteriosclerotic diplomacy in the 
mind. Do you sense — 

A. Let's go OFF-THE-RECORD or 
this one. [There ensued an OFF-THE- 
RECORD discussion.] 

Q. Did you say earlier that the 
Soviets had planned an early move in- 
to Poland? 

A. No. I don't want to say that. Bi 
in December, readiness measures whicl 
would indicate Soviet capabilities to do 
that were at a very high level. At that 
time the Western nations -I'm giving 
credit to a previous Administration - 
moved with speed and unity to make it 
clear what the cost of that would be. 
And I think it was both timely and effe 
tive in deterring a possible Soviet inter 
vention. 

Q. Is that one of the major 
reasons for not wanting to move to a 
summit, for fear that should a summi 
be scheduled or be held sometime in 
the next 6 months, they would then 
have a free hand to move into Poland 

A. No. 

Q. We're not trying to use the 
summit as a — 

A. No. The problem with the sum- 
mit is that we have a broad range of 
Soviet behavior patterns that have to t 
modified. We have a lot of work that h 
to be done. 

Q. There's word that the Admini 
stration is considering an effort to 



10 



Department of State Bulleti 



The Secretary 



■peal the Clark amendment having to 
i with reservations on the provision 

arms to Angola. The President was 
ked about the possibility of provid- 
g arms to the insurgents in Afghani- 
an saying that that certainly could 

considered. In fact, there's been 
me covert supply for some time, 
though not officially conceded. As 
*rt of our facilities negotiations with 
rnialia, which provide or sell guns, 
[ditional weapons on credit — which, 

fact, will constrain the Russians 
id Cubans in Ethiopa — are we, are 
oi, in this Administration looking to 
more assertive counterstrategy in 
me of these areas of concern? 



A. What we are looking for is a 
versal of Soviet intervention; it is an 
egal intervention. Now the preference 
ould be through moderation on the 
irt of all the powers permitting devel- 
oing states, that are undergoing social 
ta Jange, to do so within their own re- 
purees without resort to bloodshed and 
rrorism. Our approach in dealing with 
tat problem is broad and flexible, and 
e have to be prepared to proceed, in 
le light of a number of alternatives 
)en to the Soviets, to either modify or 
intain it. 

Q. Is Savimbi [Jonas Savimbi, 
resident of the National Union for 
«e Total Independence of Angola] 
)ming here? We heard he was either 
ere last week or — 

A. No. I don't think so. He may be 
>ming. I don't know of any date or 
seed visit. 

Q. When you say illegal Soviet in- 
tervention, you puzzle me. Is there 
;gal interventionism? By what yard- 
tick are you applying that kind of a 
'ord? 



A. What I'm really trying to empha- 
ize, when I use that term, is to suggest 
lat for 2,000 years man has sought to 
stablish a code, both formal and infor- 
lal, of international behavior and rule 
y law. We are a nation of rule by law. 
Vestern civilization is built on that con- 
ept, and what we are trying to empha- 
iize is that what has been a Soviet 
trategy of longstanding -a two-tiered 
trategy, where first, through subver- 
iion, covert activity within a target 
ountry, you create a so-called correla- 
ion of forces which then justifies direct 
ir proxy intervention in a substantial 
vay with arms, troops, and what have 



you -that's a longstanding, classic Marx- 
ist strategy, and it offers no surprises to 
students of Marxism. 

The problem is that we have seen it 
broaden, be extended and, if you will, 
we have witnessed a fundamental modi- 
fication of the so-called Brezhnev doc- 
trine which had historically been applied 
to areas within the sphere of Soviet in- 
terests and is now being applied in 
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, 
and in this hemisphere. This is the crux 
of the core of the problem. 

Q. But the Brezhnev doctrine has 
to do with stepping in to support a 
Socialist state that's in trouble. 

A. Within the social sphere -this 
represents a diversion or an extension of 
the Brezhnev doctrine. 

Q. In the sense that the Russians 
feel that they can now go directly into 
an area where there is not even a 
Communist government in power, a 
Communist movement contending for 
power, and just with impunity — 

A. You can parse that out with two 
points of view, both the point you men- 
tioned and, also, the point of view of 
spheres of influence. We have seen the 
Hungarys and the Czechoslovakias, and 
the only time Soviet troops have been 
used since the Second World War has 
been within the Soviet sphere or the 
Brezhnev doctrine sphere. Their move- 
ment into Afghanistan was an unprece- 
dented departure. Just as the covert and 
proxy activities in Africa and the Per- 
sian Gulf and this hemisphere are an 
unacceptable extension of- 

Q. What could you reasonably ex- 
pect the Russians to do in Afghanistan 
in the near future, when you say 
"moderate" their activity. They have 
between 80,000 and 85,000 troops - 

A. Wrong. Totally wrong. 

Q. Do you think that's within the 
realm of possibility? 

A. Yes, indeed, I do. 

Q. Why? 

A. Because they have no business 
there. 

Q. That was your Brezhnev doc- 
trine. They had a self-proclaimed Com- 
munist government that the State 
Department in April of 1978 totally ig- 
nored, and the President discovered at 
the end of 1979 — as you remember. 



A. You remember. I was popping 
off in Europe. 

Q. I remember that too. 
[Laughter] 

Q. But, you know there was a 
willingness here not even to look at 
the Communists moving in. The only 
point I'm trying to make is that 
Brezhnev could see this as a Com- 
munist government in power within 
the framework of his own doctrine. 

A. The point is that it's an unprece- 
dented move. I would suppose that if we 
are unclear about these things, we invite 
miscalculation on the part of the Soviets. 
And we were unclear. I have always 
believed that our dealings with the 
Soviets are best served by clear delinea- 
tion of lines which cannot be crossed 
without damage to our relationships. I 
think they behave better under that kind 
of a clear situation, and I know mis- 
calculations are inevitably reduced, even 
if it is somewhat more brittle at times. 

Q. How far are we prepared to go 
in El Salvador to prevent a Marxist, a 
Communist takeover there? 

A. I think your question would be 
better posed if you would say how far 
are we prepared to go to prevent Cuban 
interventionism, to call a halt to Cuban 
interventionism in the hemisphere. The 
best answer to that is that we are deter- 
mined to do so. I would intervene if 
necessary. 

Q. How is this, as far as keeping 
this particular government in power in 
El Salvador? 

A. With respect to the regime, to 
the internal affairs of El Salvador, it's 
our belief that that's a problem for the 
people of El Salvador. In that context, 
we believe the best chance for the peo- 
ple to express themselves is through 
elections. We also believe that the 
[President Jose Napoleon] Duarte 
regime is dedicated and has committed 
itself to that proposition -to hold and to 
conduct early elections. It would be in 
our interest and it is our desire for the 
people of El Salvador, of various fac- 
tions and parties, to have it out at the 
ballot box and not with bullets. 

Q. MacGuigan [Mark R. Mac- 
Guigan, Canadian Secretary of State 
for External Affairs] seemed con- 
cerned at the breakfast session you 
had with him that provision of too 
many arms would strengthen the 



May 1981 



11 



The Secretary 



government to such an extent in El 
Salvador that it would feel too secure. 
That might endanger the prospect that 
elections ever be held. 

A. Read what he said in the press 
conference, especially his elaborations. 
They happen to be an exact reflection of 
our private discussion. 

Q. Thinking ahead of U.S. -Soviet 
relations over the course of the next 
couple of years, what you etched out 
seems to put a heavy burden on the 
Russians to make dramatic moves. 
They want to have trade with us; they 
want eventually to get most-favored- 
nation status. 

A. I don't see anything dramatic 
about - 

Q. Certainly the withdrawal of 
85,000 troops from Afghanistan — 

A. We have a firm consensus on 
that. Western powers -it is our posi- 
tion -we have the U.N. resolution on it; 
we have nonaligned states, the Islamic 
conference, everyone. This is a global 
mandate; there is a global consensus 
that the Soviets are to withdraw. 

Q. Are you saying that this is a 
precondition for a summit or renewed 
cooperation with the United States, 
for high technology exports? 

A. I think it's a major factor. I don't 
use terms like "precondition," because if 
we had assurances that certain things 
were going to happen, that would be a 
major improvement in the current 
climate, clearly. It doesn't mean that 
every Soviet corporal has to be out of 
Afghanistan before improving processes 
can begin. 

Q. Doesn't it make some good 
sense for you and [Soviet Foreign 
Minister] Gromyko to sit down reason- 
ably soon, like in several months, and 
you put this to him directly? 

A. What makes sense is that we see 
some signs of moderation, and there are 
a number of flashpoints and pressure 
points where those signs can be evi- 
denced fairly clearly. 

Q. What is our leverage? 

Q. Talking about El Salvador is 
one thing, where you seem to see 
some moderation now. 

A. We are seeing some, not modera- 
tion, I wouldn't refer to that -people are 
being killed, there is bloodshed -but we 
have seen some slackening of the move- 



12 



ment of arms through Nicaragua. And 
we've also seen some evidence of efforts 
on the part of the Cubans to find alter- 
nate routes, and there are still sizable 
amounts of armaments in the pipeline. 
We are as concerned, quite frankly, by 
the movement of arms into El Salvador; 
we are as concerned by the Army in 
Nicaragua -the 50,000-man army in 
Nicaragua with vast amounts of sophisti- 
cated military equipment. We're con- 
cerned about that, as well as being con- 
cerned about the flow of arms into El 
Salvador. 

Q. But don't the Nicaraguans have 
a right to arm their own army with 
arms from wherever they can get 
them? 

A. We're not talking about whether 
they have a right or not; we're talking 
about whether or not these are trends 
which we view with equanimity. We 
don't. 

Q. Four times the size of [former 
Nicaraguan President Anastasio] 
Somoza's army. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Where do you see moderation, 
if the Cubans are seeking alternate 
routes, or just that some routes have 
been blown — 

A. When I say "moderation," it's a 
slowing down of the pace, an indication 
that the guerrillas are hurting for am- 
munition, and that there has been - 
when I say "moderation," I think, maybe 
modification is the better term, but 
there is a slowdown. Yes. It's very 
perceptible. Some of the old air routes 
that we were cognizant of -the radio 
broadcasts from Nicaraguan territory - 
have ceased. But we have, as I say, 
other countering reports that suggest 
that this is not necessarily a decision to 
cease and desist and may rather be - 

Q. How do you see our leverage 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its 
proxies, the Cubans. You're talking 
about hoping that they will moderate 
a pattern that has speeded up in re- 
cent years. Certainly our going or not 
going to the summit doesn't provide 
all that much leverage. 

A. No. 

Q. Where is our leverage, 
regionally? 

A. I think sometimes we are rather 
self-conscious about such things. The 
Soviets are in need of Western credits, 
in need of Western technology, and they 



have an urgent requirement for that. 
They're in need of trade with the Wes. 
They must have international legitime 
they're a regime that must have that. 
It's becoming increasingly clear; for ey. 
ample, in many Third World areas tha 
have embraced the Soviet arms entries 
that leaves a legacy that's less than 
satisfactory -a pervasive Cuban or 
Soviet presence, no provision of a devc 
opmental aid or assistance. 

If you look at the Soviet Union to- 
day in a global sense, they do less in 
developmental assistance than any of 
the larger powers and substantially let 
than some of our small European part 
ners. So what I'm saying, basically, is 
there's a great deal of leverage in all t 
areas I touched upon and, clearly, it's 
now up to us to integrate more clearlj 
with those who share our values and t 
shore up our determination to insist tl 
these dangerous trends are terminate! 
This is in the interest of world peace 
and international stability. It does not 
suggest, for a moment, that we 
Americans are opposed to desirable ai 
necessary social and historic change, 
especially in developing states. We're 
favor of such change. 

Q. Can we go to the North-Sout 
summit in Mexico? 

A. We are conducting discussions 
with the hosts with respect to the pos 
bility of doing so. No decision has bee 
made. But we are giving it serious co 
sideration. 



:o 



Q. I'm still curious as to any cc 
cern here that if this is a big sum- 
mit—lots of countries — that they in 
vite the Russians and invite us and 
both attend, would this backdrop, t s 
North-South backdrop, in fact, be t 
backdrop of a first meeting betweei 
Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev? 

A. I don't anticipate that. 

Q. Because the Russians would 
not be invited, or would not attend' 



A. I don't anticipate it at any rat 
There are a lot of questions to be 
answered with respect to possible pai I 
ticipation by the United States in a 
North-South summit, but we're in the 
process of getting the answers. 

We are not the orchestrators or 1 1 
hosts of this summit. These are matti s 
I don't want to intervene in, in a pub 
way, because it complicates our task. 

Q. You're going to the Middle 



Department of State Bull< n 



The Secretary 



iast. Can you tell us what you hope to 
jccomplish on that trip? 

A. Yes. I'll have a great deal more 
Id say about that as the trip approaches 
jut, clearly, I think it's very important 
liat we continue on with the peace proc- 
ess itself and that we keep the momen- 
|am of that process alive. And, I think 
l.'s very important for a new Ad- 
ministration to get a firsthand feel from 
lie parties directly involved, and 
Deripherally involved, to try to find 
irhere the hangups have been in the 
utonomy talks, where the differences 
re. 

We are on the verge of initiating 
egotiations on the creation of a Sinai 
Peacekeeping force which would permit 
lie withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 
linai. I want to get a careful assessment 
If the parties' views, the nature and 
imposition of that force in the light of 
lie rejection of the U.N. approach. I 
I 'ant to exchange views simultaneously 
In strategic regional concerns, the 
roader sense of the Arab-Israeli 
lispute, and in a broader sense, the ex- 
iting concerns with respect to oil and 
'nergy access -in other words, broad 
jgional strategic concerns. 

Q. Southwest Asia, the Persian 
ulf? 

A. The crescent, if you will, from 
ighanistan through Iran, the Arabian 
eninsula, over the Horn of Africa to 
le northern tier of Africa. 

Q. Could I take you back to an 
" arlier question on Gromyko-Haig? 

I je you considering such a meeting or 

II i there any early discussion of that? 

!A. I would anticipate talks -as 
pistinct from negotiations -to occur 
J romptly. Now the level at which those 
. ' alks will be held is yet to be determin- 
|td, and they will clearly start at some- 
hing less than the Foreign Minister 
,ul evel. 



rat 



:■ 



Q. [Inaudible] 

A. Right now we have to get an 
Embassador in Moscow, and we are in 
he process of trying to select one. 

Q. I don't understand where this 
s all going to happen. You have no 
Vmbassador in Moscow. The people up 
it the U.N.? You've got yourself here 
vith Dobrynin. 

A. I would anticipate it being here 
I Washington, initially. But I don't 
rant to prejudge that. If we're fortunate 
snough to get an Ambassador in place 



.May 1981 



soon, there may be some discussions at 
that end. 

Q. But as you look toward your 
trip to Europe, to the NATO meeting, 
could you parlay that? Could you 
broaden it into something that would 
carry you from Western consulta- 
tions— 

A. Let me get a sequence in here. 
We clearly have been in the process of 
consulting with our European partners. 
I've had extensive personal discussions 
now with five European Foreign Minis- 
ters-NATO Foreign Ministers -if you 
include Canada. We want to be sure that 
we have a good consultative feel for the 
entirety of those who share our values. 
We have the Japanese Foreign Minister 
coming next week. In an Atlantic com- 
munity sense I will be going to ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] and ANZUS [Australia, New Zea- 
land, United States pact], probably in 
June. We will have a NATO ministerial 
in May. And I have a Middle East trip. 
Now all of these steps are designed to 
provide me an opportunity to consult in 
depth on East- West relations. And, 
clearly, these consultative discussions 
are a prerequisite to the kinds of sub- 
stantial talks your question anticipated. 
Necessarily so. 

We've dedicated ourselves to the 
proposition that we are, indeed, going to 
consult in a meaningful sense at the 
time, not just inform after the fact, not 
run what I call solo dances or shady con- 
dominiums. I'm absolutely convinced 
from the talks I've already had with our 
European partners that this is precisely 
what they want, what they anticipate, 
what they welcome, what they feel pro- 
foundly reassured about today. And 
these talks have brought forward to me 
a feeling of a greater consensus which 
includes a greater sense of concern 
about the international situation, a 
shared sense of concern, than I have 
witnessed in many months and years. 
And I think it has exceeded what I had 
hoped for. 

Discussions with [German Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich] Genscher were 
absolutely superb and reassuring to me, 
as they were with Peter Carrington 
[Lord Carrington, British Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs and Minister of Overseas Devel- 
opment], [French Foreign Minister Jean] 
Francois-Poncet, and Mark MacGuigan 
in Canada. This reflects to me an oppor- 
tunity of unprecedented character to 
enable us to strengthen our alliances, 



our regional relationships, to bring about 
the outcomes that I laid out with respect 
to East- West relations. And you've got 
to be prepared, consistent. Sometimes 
this requires give and take. For exam- 
ple, some of our positions have been 
modified as a result of these exchanges. 
I used the term "nobody has a monopoly 
on virtue," but nobody has a monopoly 
on wisdom either. And we enrich and 
strengthen our policy by the kinds of 
consultations that have begun. 

Q. Could you give us an example 
of the modification? 

A. It's clear that despite the fact 
that we were very close, on our objec- 
tive with respect to theater nuclear 
forces, for example, Europeans were 
concerned that we did not give a proper 
decibel in our explanation of our ap- 
proach to the arms control track. Now 
that was a helpful thing, to have that 
advice, because we had no intention of 
not proceeding with the obligations in- 
curred in the December 1979 decision, 
but that kind of advice from our friends 
in Europe was helpful because it helps 
them as they proceed with the other 
track. They need it. You could, I sup- 
pose, suggest that despite the fact that 
in every briefing I've ever given on El 
Salvador, I have emphasized that we are 
seeking to avoid extremes of the right 
and the left, and we are seeking a peace- 
ful political solution through free elec- 
tions. The focus, inevitably, in contem- 
porary reporting was on the flow of 
American arms, military assistance. 
That's understandable. And it means 
that it requires repetition, repetition, 
repetition. But it's helpful to have that 
advice as to how they see our projection 
of our objectives, from their perspective. 
And we go into a consultative approach 
in our foreign policy precisely that way. 
We would expect that there be as much 
flexibility in our consultation with 
friends and those who share our values 
as we have in the past demonstrated in 
those that we negotiated with. 

Q. So that is, you project this 
whole timetable forward. There does 
not appear to be any room for a Haig- 
Gromyko meeting until at least late 
summer or into the General Assembly 
time. 

A. I want to avoid laying out our 
precise scenarios. I think you know from 
what we've said that meaningful talks, 
at higher levels, are some distance 
away. But events, themselves, determine 



13 



The Secretary 



those things in the final analysis, and no 
one can predict that an event might oc- 
cur that would require the compression, 
the telescoping, or stretching out. 

Q. That's something that would be 
negative though, I imagine. 

A. Yes. Something negative or 
something positive. Maybe the Soviets 
would announce tomorrow they're leav- 
ing Afghanistan. 

Q. How do you feel about Poland? 
Has the threat receded a bit today— 
the spokesman yesterday, Bill [Dyess], 
said we did not consider the invasion 
to be either inevitable or imminent— 

A. That's been our position all along 
despite observations by theologians that 
it may be inevitable. [Laughter] You 
remember what I said was that you 
could make a theological case that inter- 
vention might be inevitable. But it can- 
not be our position, and we do not 
believe that it is imminent or inevitable. 
Why? I don't have to draw any circles 
for you on that one. 

Q. I do remember the discussion 
we had, but this is not the point to 
raise it again. 

Q. Do you feel that the situation 
has stabilized a bit in Poland, that 
there is a crosscurrent? 

A. I think, in the light of recent 
events, that the situation is somewhat 
more tense than it was 3 weeks ago. 

Q. When you are in Saudi Arabia, 
are you planning to raise the subject 
of having access to military facilities— 

A. In Saudi Arabia? 

Q. Yes. 

A. I can't foreclose it. That kind of 
a thing may be raised by them. But I'm 
not going over there for that purpose. 

Q. Same question to the other 
stops, including Egypt? Same ques- 
tion. 

A. And the same answer. That's not 
the purpose of my visit. 

Q. No, but Egypt has been — even 
though it is politically very, very 
difficult — more interested in that ques- 
tion than Saudi Arabia — in terms of, 
say, Ras Banas. 

A. Yes, but these are Egyptian 
problems. He's [President Sadat] got to 
deal with this problem. And I'm not go- 
ing over there and embarrass him about, 
and pressure him on, base rights, 



14 



military things. This is a broad assess- 
ment of the peacekeeping process and 
the strategic regional views of the 
various parties. I want to get those, and 
I want to contribute to that dialogue 
which I would hope would now intensify 
in the period ahead on a bilateral basis. 

Q. Is it fair to say that, barring 
dramatic developments — Afghanistan 
or removal of Soviet threat from 
Poland — that it's unlikely or extremely 
unlikely that a summit would be held 
this year? 

A. I don't want to make -for all the 
reasons we talked about -there are too 
many uncertainties, too many unpredict- 
ables. I don't see anybody rushing to it. 

Q. On your relationship with the 
Soviet Union and the points that 
you're trying to get across, do you feel 
that the Russians understand what 
you're saying? 

A. It's too early to say. Much too 
early to say. I've made the point, and I 
sincerely believe that the Soviet leaders, 
both in prudence and conviction, are 
never overly impressed by rhetoric. 
They make their assessments on hard- 
bitten calculations of Western actions 
and, in an important sense, their suspi- 
cion of capitalist society, at large, tends 
to preoccupy them with resource alloca- 
tion. They measure Western will and in- 
tent by the degree to which they assess 
we are putting our money where our 
mouth is. That is the conclusion I've 
drawn about Soviet calculations over the 
extensive period of my public service, 
whether it be conflict in Korea, the 
situation in Vietnam, or problems global- 
ly. And I suppose it served them well. 



MAR. 28, 1981 2 

Q. The wire reports on Poland this 
morning are going to overtake your 
story to get you back to diplomacy, I 
guess. 

A. Yes, I think that's right. It's very 
dangerous, very bad. 

Q. I was talking to a Soviet diplo- 
mat, and they're thinking the next 
month, month and a half, is going to 
be it. It's either going to happen then 
or not. What were the thoughts 
behind the statement; what was the 
analysis of the situation? 

A. There were a number of things, 
not the least of which was a major split 



in the party between hard-liners and 
soft-liners, a continuation of the exercisl 
beyond the scheduled termination date, I 
and the tensions associated with the 
temporary strike and a more perma- 
nent strike. And, I think, there is a 
great deal of concern that this coming f 
weekend could be critical. 

Q. At the congressional inquest, 
during the course of these maneuvers' 
it was suggested that the Russians 
were going to introduce new troops 
into Poland. There's a report this 
morning that they were going to intn 
duce about 30,000 additional troops ii 
to Poland. 

A. No. I wouldn't look to that kind! 
of an event. You're talking about yeste I 
day, when we were talking about inter-! 
nal suppression, and I would anticipate j! 
that. 

Q. I noticed the Polish Govern- 
ment called in our Ambassador the 
other day and their Ambassador cam 
in yesterday here. What is the 
message they're conveying? Any sub- 
stantive message? 

A. No, their economic situation is 
very, very serious. In fact, it's grave ir 
economic terms; we mentioned that in 
yesterday's statement. 

Q. Did you offer them a carrot? 
Earlier, you had said that any signifi 
cant aid would have to await some 
real economic reform being develope 
by the Poles. Clearly, they haven't h 
time to do that. Do you have some ii 
terim plan that would go beyond the 
$80 million deferral? 

A. Without rescheduling? 

Q. Yes. 

A. Their Deputy Prime Minister i | 
due here the first of April and we're 
looking at other possibilities, yes. 

Q. Are there very many other 
possibilities? I've talked to a numbe 
of Polish-Americans, and most of th 
suggestions have already, for the mi t 
part, been done. 

A. There are a number of 
possibilities, sure. There's food -pow- 
dered milk -through the Commodity 
Credit Corporation; there's emergency 
aid- 

Q. But that's stop-gap, one-time 
infusion. Now that they're in that 
situation, the possibility of food rio 
is a very real thing. 



Department of State Bullet 



The Secretary 



A. Yes, it is a real thing, oh yes. It 
is contributed to the increased tensions 
lat exist throughout the country. I 
link it's very, very serious. And the 
ermans say that yesterday was more 
rious than the December period. 

Q. At yesterday's National Securi- 
Council meeting, how did the 
olish situation come up? 

A. I think I notice some cute report- 
ig on that. The fact that I asked the 
fhite House to release the statement 
: hich I took over there and which was 
rafted here -one word was changed 
iitorially-has suddenly been portrayed 
a further diminution of Haig's 
"jithority. I had it done at the White 
e fluse because I thought it would 
' 3t more attention. This is the climate 
' f the times, and you know that as 
ell as I do. Of course it doesn't happen 
ist because you guys create it? 



Q. Is it bad enough to make you 
'ant to resign? 

A. My wife said she only heard me 
^y that twice in my whole life, in 35 
ears, and she didn't know how I could 

° ave gotten eight threats to resign out 

'"'■ f 2 months. 

Q. You're like Henry? 

A. His would be eight threats a day. 

Q. You remember the Salzburg 
peech. 

A. I'm the guy who went over to his 
at there. He told me what he was go- 
fig to do. I told him: "Don't do it." He 
7 ent right ahead and did it. 

Q. If Poland blows up, if you have 
I roblems this weekend, will that be a 
risis dealt with here, there, or 
Mere? 

A. You heard what Meese [Edwin 
leese III, Counselor to the President] 
aid this morning. He said when the 
'resident isn't there, the Vice President 
vill be there. 



Q. And Haig has a guy whose full 
ime job is to make sure the 
^resident's there. [Laughter] 

Q. Any indication that you now 
lave cordon sanitaire around El 
Salvador, that the arms aren't going to 
*et in there; that the situation is go- 
ng to be resolved by the arms we get 
n there? 

A. No, I wish that were true. I'm 
confident arms are still getting in. 
There's been a major drop off, and 



May 1981 



there's some indication of some short- 
ages of arms and ammunition among the 
rebels, but it's still getting in. It's not 
going in the main artery flow, which we 
saw before, which was an airlift from 
Nicaragua; that's stopped. Some of the 
high-profile activities of the Nicaraguans 
have stopped, but there are other ways 
in through Honduras -trucks and covert 
movement. 

Q. Any chance of doing something 
in any kind of forceful way, either by 
ourselves or by Latin countries, to ab- 
solutely cut it off. Yesterday on the 
Hill, you continuously refused to rule 
out any of our assets, suggesting you 
had something in mind. 

A. There are two approaches to a 
problem of that kind. One is locally 
through collective Central American ac- 
tion. And in saying that, you have also 
got to bear in mind that we're talking 
about actions designed to help the social 
condition which are causing the unrest - 
what I call an "internal action" in a 
sense -and then there are actions that 
could be related to control of the prob- 
lem at the source. 

I think any one won't be enough. I 
think it would be wishful thinking to rely 
exclusively on one or the other. If it 
weren't the Cuban, it might be some- 
thing else that's exploiting these long- 
standing historic social problems. We've 
got to help internally in two ways. I 
would hope collective assistance to the 
nations, enhancement of surveillance — 
what I call more technical control mech- 
anisms -for prevention of the infiltration 
from outside; that's the internal. The ex- 
ternal, of course, has got to be focused 
on the source of the problem. 

Q. Cuba? 

A. The Soviet Union. 

Q. How do you get to the source? 
What do you have in mind? 

A. It wouldn't be very bright of me 
to do so. I don't mean to suggest that 
we have a highly polished one-two-three 
step, but we're getting there. 

Q. Are you surprised about 
American public opinion on El 
Salvador? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you expect more support? 

A. Why should we? The American 
people remember that aspect of Viet- 
nam. We might be somewhat disap- 
pointed that it's been so hard to get 



through the clear differences between 
the two. But this is, after all, religious 
groups, especially the Catholics because 
of the nun thing, that are quite worked 
up about the situation, and rightly so. 
But I don't think basically, as I've gone 
through it, there is great concern that 
we're getting ourselves involved in a no- 
win situation. And we're very sensitive 
to not having that happen. It's ludicrous 
to talk about $25 million a year in 
military assistance being another Viet- 
nam when we spent $28 billion a year on 
Vietnam -the height year in 1968 -$28 
billion, and that was before inflation. 

Q. Are you concerned that the 
polls on El Salvador and President 
Reagan's own polls might cause prob- 
lems in getting the additional appro- 
priations for El Salvador? 

A. I don't think anybody can do any . 
better than fight each issue on its 
merits. And if it doesn't help by the 
weight of its own logic then it's very 
possible that the logic is fallacious. 

Q. There's a document floating 
around purporting to be part of the 
cache of Salvadoran documents re- 
leased by the State Department, 
describing a trip to the United States 
by Shafik Handal's brother in early 
1980 [Shafik Handal is head of the 
Communist Party in El Salvador]. Why 
wasn't that document included in the 
materials released? 

A. I don't know. I didn't even know 
about it. 

Q. His effort was to start out at 
the Cuban mission at the United Na- 
tions and travel around making a lot 
of stops in smaller cities in the United 
States, building support for commit- 
tees trying to build a better image for 
the Salvadoran insurgents. 

A. I wasn't aware of it. I can't think 
of any reasons why we wouldn't make it 
available. 

Q. A question about the Middle 
East. When you testified about a week 
or so ago, you said it might be that 
the United States would have to put 
some troops into this multinational 
force for Sinai, but it hadn't been de- 
cided yet. Has a decision been made? 

A. We'll just have to face that one 
when it comes. We are dedicated to the 
proposition that the peace process is 
what we should continue with. And that 
gives you an answer. I feel very strongly 



15 



The Secretary 



that it should be a multinational contri- 
bution, but I don't rule out American 
participation because it may end up be- 
ing the only way we can get some sort 
of force put together. 

Q. We're talking about three bat- 
talions or so? 

A. I wouldn't even think that many. 
You could make some estimates, but the 
parties have to show for this. 

Q. Have the Pakistanis responded 
favorably to the aid package we put to 
them? 

A. I would hold up answering that, 
realizing their attitude toward it. The 
Pakistanis are in a very difficult position. 
They're under great pressure on the 
Afghan thing; they've taken a very 
courageous position on it; they're a 
target of their own. If you're going to 
talk, you have to have something to talk 
with. Their initial reaction was quite 
favorable, but it's been more reserved 
recently. 

Q. What do you envision out of 
the Nigerian visit? 

A. I think an extensive exchange of 
views, more perception, from which we 
learn the situation in southern Africa. 
We certainly hope to achieve a reaffir- 
mation of greater and more constructive 
bilateral relations, which are of benefit 
to both countries for a host of reasons of 
which you know. As you know, we're 
conducting a southern Africa review 
which is nearing completion -at least the 
first phase of it -and it's very helpful to 
me to have this meeting in the context 
of that [review], extremely helpful. 

Q. Have the Nigerians signaled 
that they are overly alarmed by Mrs. 
Kirkpatrick's [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] ac- 
tivities? 

A. I think there's unsettlement 
throughout the southern Africa states, 
the front-line states, and the other black 
African states. Clearly, most of that 
unsettlement comes from uncertainty. 
And I think some of those uncertainties 
can be stripped away in the very near 
future. 

Q. Will you give reassurances to- 
day about broad policy thrusts? 

A. In a broad sense, yes. 

Q. Because I had the impression 
from your remarks yesterday that you 
would pick up Namibia talks where 



they were left off by the previous Ad- 
ministration. 

A. I've had a series of discussions 
with European allies and Canada and 
here. 

Q. Am I right in deducing that 
you are planning on picking up the 
threads of the negotiations? 

A. You can speculate in that way 
and feel comfortable. But don't ask for a 
quote. 

Q. A lot of areas -South Africa 
and elsewhere — have been under ma- 
jor review. Do you have any kind of 
timetable for ending that period of 
major review? 

A. As I said, we are nearing com- 
pletion of the first phase of the southern 
African review that we've talked about, 
and then we're going into another phase 
which would be somewhat more active 
and perceivable. 

Q. Are you going to send some- 
body out to talk to them? 

A. We might go into a diplomatic 
phase; we've been studying a host of 
other broad, longer term problems - 
East- West problems -both second track 
of theater nuclear forces and in a 
broader sense, SALT, but SALT has 
gone much more slowly because we 
haven't had our SALT team in -the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
guy. But that doesn't mean we've 
delayed. We've been doing our inter- 
departmental work on it. I suppose in 
some respects the pace of those things is 
governed also by the perceived need for 
completion. Those things that require an 
urgent resolution, we've had to deal 
with. 

Q. [Soviet Ambassador to the 
U.S.] Dobrynin mentioned when he 
went out the other day that the 
dialogue had begun. Could you 
elaborate? Apart from simply meeting 
with him over the next weeks or 
months, what might be happening? 

A. I think that's about where it will 
be. We don't have an Ambassador in 
Moscow. I would anticipate we would 
use our Ambassador somewhat more 
vigorously than he has been used in the 
past, in the concept of reciprocity, try- 
ing to get a balance in the activity be- 
tween the Soviets and ourselves -a 
balance in venues and in full discussions. 
But it's true, the dialogue has started, 



and these talks go on pretty irregularly i 
and are influenced greatly by the inter- A 
national situation and can add to the 
pace or slow it down. 

Q. So you wouldn't anticipate an; 
meeting between yourself and 
Gromyko, for example, before the 
U.N. General Assembly in September 

A. No. 

Q. Do you have any indication th 
your campaign to make the Soviet lin, 
to terrorism an issue is making any 
headway with the Soviets or not? 

A. Not with the Soviets, but our j 
allies and a number of nations here anl 
particularly vexed by this situation ano 
very much welcome that we have put ;). 
spotlight on it. I think Americans then 
selves welcome the spotlight. It's beenu 
my view all along that we have not, 
internationally or collectively, sufficient 
analyzed the implications of this situa- 
tion and taken a stand with respect to If 
That's not going to do. We all know 
that. And I think we're going to benef 
from that. 

Q. On talking to the Soviets, thi 
seem to draw a very clear line be- 
tween their support of wars of na- 
tional liberation, which they think i 
fully justified and occasionally viole , 
and international terrorism, such as 
blowing up a theater or something 
like that. And that, they say, they s i- 
port neither in fact nor in policy. A 
we still saying that they do, in fact 
and in policy, support hijackings, 
blowing up theaters, that they plan 
and instigate that sort of thing? 

A. Let's put it this way: That's w t 
I talked here all about it's being over- 
simplified, and anything that you 
generalize on and compress tends to 
sweep away contradictions that can g j' 
nitpicked on later. But, I have descril d 
the strategy as a two-tiered one: The 
select a target in which the entire cai es 
represent some hope for exploitation io 
they move in the first year to try to i 
seize control of those issues, and it's j, 
that phase that terrorism, subversior U 
and covert activity is the basic appro p. 
They may then attempt to exacerbate I 
those conditions which are a reflectiofcl 
internal injustices in many respects, 
anguishes, ethnic or any other kind - 
kind we have in Spain or the kind we 
have in Ireland -economic problems 
the kind we have in Italy and in that 
phase, it's an effort to develop in wh;|ir 
the classic Marxist terms is referred 



16 



Department of State Bull tin 



The Secretary 



L'is "a correlation of forces." And when 
iithat correlation of forces is ripe, they 
fjthen apply the so-called wars-of- 
iliberation philosophy in which they main- 
Btain and insist that the social causes are 
' jteuch that they are justified to intervene 
■directly with massive infusions of arms, 
Jjadvisers, proxy forces, or, even worse, 
(direct action, as we saw in the Ogaden, 
Hwhere the Soviet leadership is directing 
hhe Ethiopian forces. 

If we were to ignore that sophisti- 
cated approach and give them carte 
olanche in the so-called wars of libera- 
Ition because of justified social conditions 
• Lin a target country, we've adopted a for- 

■ mula for disaster. And I must say, in 
Jboth of those cases the tactics, tech- 
niques, and the training that they give 
to the forces of "liberation" involve all 

-Ithe things which I'm talking about - 
•blowing up theaters, murder, slaughter 
■ioi innocent civilians. And, of course, 
when the civil war aspect of it starts, 
:lthen it becomes all the more evil, and I 

think we have to be very careful and not 
. oe immobilized so that we don't fail to 
■see the interrelationship between these 
1 two tiers. 

Q. But you're putting the em- 
phasis on that scenario rather than on 
,i, the fact that Carlos may have been 
ils | trained at one time in the Soviet 
j. Union, that the Bader-Meinhoff gang 
,. may have links to the Soviet Union — 

A. I think the emphasis has got to 
>be applied across the board. Our nation 
' is a product of revolution, and it's not a 
question in moral terms of whether the 
a I social injustices ever justify forceful 

change -that's the way a lot of people 
.! like to argue it and that's the basic 

■ Marxist philosophy, you see, in the 
[talons. The basic issue is -the more fun- 
damental issue is -if they're involved in 

igKhe creation of the problem in the first 

•I place -the exploitation and distortion of 
it and then ultimately the direction, com- 

j mand, and control of it -then it doesn't 
! represent a thrust of social justice at all. 
It's a formula for Soviet command and 
control over a particular target area; it's 
stripped of all its moral integrity, if it 

m ever had any in the first place. 

Q. I'd like to know, on whatever 
basis you'd like to tell us, why on 
Tuesday you made the remarks that 
you did, which seem to have set this 
whole thing off, when it seemed today 
that you were aware of what was hap- 
pening and had probably already lost 



the battle? That you knew or that you 
hadn't lost the battle? 

A. I wasn't aware of it. I had 
checked the day before. 

Q. With the President? 

A. No, I just wasn't aware of it. 

Q. That's what a lot of people 
wondered why you did give them that 
answer. 

A. It's a fact: I said yesterday that 
the President had one set of perceptions 
and I had another. Somebody had the 
total picture. 

Q. Do you have any regrets now, 
having spoken out like that — having 
answered the question? 

A. No, I answer questions truthfully 
if I'm asked. I answered it as truthfully 
as I could. 

Q. You seem to have new ground 
rules with the President — set 
meetings with him each week, private 
meetings with him. 

A. But that was set before yester- 
day. 

Q. A few of your deputies, over 
the weekend up in Princeton, were 
giving background estimates of when 
SALT negotiations might resume, and 
one version was why the end of this 
year was conceivable, and the other 
was why it was not. I was wondering 
what the truth was. 

A. [Laughter] I don't think anybody 
can say. The basic approach to this thing 
is, yes, we are going to continue with it. 
We have already committed ourselves to 
do so on theater nuclear forces arms 
control. The President has clearly said 
we're going to continue efforts toward 
verifiable balanced arms control in which 
we are looking for reductions that are 
meaningful. We have also felt that one 
of the aspects of it is the improvement 
of our own strategic situation. Now that 
doesn't mean that everything we're go- 
ing to do has to be in place; what it does 
mean is that we're going to be better 
able to intervene with a new negotiating 
stance when appropriate [inaudible] has 
been received for the systems we an- 
ticipate we will have to have in our 
arsenal in the period ahead. Now that 
got a little twisted across the river -not 
intentionally -there's always a bit of im- 
precision when you answer questions 
like that. Nobody's saying we have to 
have all this buildup completed before 
we get into SALT; but we will feel much 



more confident about our ability to con- 
duct these things realistically when we 
know we have support for the programs 
we're talking about in the strategic area, 
the decisions and the funding for them. 

Q. So that really does rule out this 
year? 

A. No, it won't take that long. 
We've got a defense budget on the Hill, 
and when that budget is in shape and we 
assess that -there will be a number of 
questions to ask. There's a largely 
discredited SALT II; we may seek to 
modify it, we may seek to scrap it and 
start all over again, we may seek 
something more comprehensive, or nib- 
ble at it by functional categories. These 
are the questions that are under con- 
sideration and have to the finalized on 
our side in conjunction with our assess- 
ment of the strategic discussions. 

Q. Do you envision that the 
theater nuclear forces meeting next 
week will lead to negotiations shortly 
or soon? 

A. We intend to move at a 
deliberate pace in conformance with the 
decision of December 1979. There are a 
number of issues that need to be re- 
solved with our allies on approach and a 
number of calculations associated with 
this issue. The Brezhnev speech posed 
some new twists to it which we have re- 
jected out of hand on a moratorium, and 
our allies have done the same. To freeze 
imbalance is not our view of negotiated 
arms control. 



■Press release 67. 
2 Press release 82. 



jlli May 1981 



17 



AFRICA 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



by Lannon Walker 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on March 24, 1981. Mr. 
Walker is Acting Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. 1 

Before summarizing our requests under 
each category of assistance, let me 
highlight for you our policy concerns as 
they are reflected in our budget re- 
quests. Recognizing that U.S. interests 
in Africa are served by progress in 
economic development, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration intends to maximize the 
effectiveness of resources through a 
more coordinated approach to planning, 
budgeting, and implementation of pro- 
grams and projects. And our bilateral 
assistance will increasingly emphasize 
areas of strategic and political priority 
to the United States. 



PRIORITY AREAS 

Southern/central Africa, from Zaire 
south, is a region of considerable 
economic and political interest to the 
United States, one with extensive 
mineral wealth, and a heavy concentra- 
tion of U.S. investment. U.S. interests 
are threatened by regional conflicts and 
instability which invite Soviet and Cuban 
intervention. Our request includes a very 
sizable commitment of economic assist- 
ance to Zimbabwe, a nation whose eco- 
nomic development, political stability, 
and progress are of paramount interest 
to the United States. 

Sudan, the Horn, and Indian Ocean 
nations is a region of strategic value to 
the United States in the pursuit of our 
interests in the Persian Gulf- Southwest 
Asian arena. Sudan, our largest aid re- 
cipient in Africa, is a staunch friend 
which feels threatened by both Libyan 
aggression and instability in the Horn. 
We have negotiated facilities agree- 
ments with Kenya, also a strong friend 
of the West with an open economy and a 
stable government, and Somalia, a na- 
tion with serious economic problems 
compounded by the presence of more 
than a million refugees. 

Liberia, Zaire, Senegal, Cameroon, 
and Gabon are old friends. Let me stress 
here the situation of Liberia, a nation 



which has undergone considerable tur- 
moil in the past year. Our increased aid 
reflects our concern to restore political 
stability and assist the economic 
recovery of a nation where we have 
valuable assets. Liberia's problems are 
immediate, and we must address them 
accordingly. At the same time, we will 
be seeking ways, in our new budget, to 
accommodate the needs of our other old 
friends to demonstrate our consistency. 

The Sahel is a region of West Africa 
where the United States has both 
humanitarian and political interests and 
where we and our allies are engaged in 
a long-term effort to rebuild the 
economies of some of the poorest na- 
tions of the world which have been 
ravaged by drought. Today, our efforts 
in this area have taken on a new impor- 
tance, as fragile governments with a 
tenuous hold on outlying regions could 
become the object of Libyan adven- 
turism. 



FY 1982 PROPOSALS 

Our request for FY 1982 reflects ad- 
justments in the foreign assistance 
budget originally sought by the Carter 
Administration. We have had to take 
certain cuts in line with President 
Reagan's expressed desire and firm in- 
tention to reduce Federal spending in 
almost all areas. But we have also 
sought to protect our priority programs. 

Despite cuts we have taken, our 
total request for FY 1982 includes 
$390.5 million for development 
assistance, an amount almost the same 
as was requested in FY 1981; $216 
million in PL 480; $231 million in 
economic support fund (ESF), represent- 
ing a substantial increase over our 1981 
request and including $60 million for 
southern Africa and $75 million for Zim- 
babwe; $203 million in foreign military 
sales (FMS) including enhanced pro- 
grams in Sudan and Kenya; and $7.5 
million in international military and 
educational training (IMET) funds, also 
representing a large increase over 1981. 

A fuller and more complete reflec- 
tion of the manner in which the Reagan 
Administration will seek to utilize 
resources in pursuit of our foreign policy 
goals in Africa and elsewhere will be evi- 
dent in the FY 1983 budget. 

Before describing our proposals for 
security assistance, let me stress the link 



between the various components of our 
foreign assistance requests for Africa. 
Political stability in Africa, as elsewher 
is very much tied to progress in 
economic development. And in a conti 
nent plagued by declining agricultural 
production, burgeoning balance-of- 
payments deficits, frequent droughts, 
growing numbers of refugees, inade- 
quate health facilities, and lack of basic 
infrastructure, this link becomes even 
more critical. 

Our strategic and political interests 
in Africa are served best when we appl 
the totality of our foreign assistance 
resources toward our -and 
Africa's -goals. They are also served b; 
our support to multilateral developmen 
institutions such as the World Bank 
which, as Secretary Haig pointed out 
last week, are an essential source of 
capital for many developing countries 
which are of importance to us. 



ire 



IN 



ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND 



The ESF provides us with flexible 
resources necessary to carry forward 
our policies in nations afflicted by rapii 
ly changing economic and security pro 
lems. Many nations in Africa fit that 
description. The increases we are re 
questing in the ESF for 1982 reflect 
importance we attach to this resource 
support of our interests in recipient n; 
tions. In this connection, let me stress 
our support for the ESF contingency 
fund which the Administration is prop 
ing. 



4 



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[ft 
est 



ti 



-.!■: 



1ft 



Zimbabwe 

We are proposing $75 million in ESF 
Zimbabwe, a nation which achieved in 
dependence less than a year ago. The 
present government, under the leader 
ship of Prime Minister [Robert] Mugai 
has moved with reasonable success to 
reassure the white community and to 
maintain the basis of the second most 
diversified economy in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Our objective now is to maintf 
and nurture this generally favorable 
state of affairs and help provide the si 
port necessary for Zimbabwe's stable | 
political and economic development. Cl 
ESF assistance will be used to compk 
the refugee resettlement and rural 
reconstruction programs which we 
began in 1979 at the conclusion of the 
war. In addition, we plan to begin 
assisting the Government of Zimbabw 
in rural development as well as techni 
training programs. 



nflnartmont r»f Qtata Rnllp 






ill 



, Southern Africa 

' Ne are requesting $60 million for 

* southern Africa. This program supports 
ong-term U.S. interests in the stability 

'; )f a strategically important region and 
1 j s an essential element in promoting 
j U.S. objectives. This region, rich in 
latural resources, including strategic 
ninerals, has been troubled by war, 
/iolence, and economic disruption 
•esulting from conflicts in Zimbabwe and 
Namibia and by the spillover of turmoil 

* Tom South Africa. Our ESF request for 
I southern Africa consists of three com- 
ponents. 

Botswana. We are requesting $10 
j Trillion for Botswana, a moderate, 
llemocratic, multiparty state which 
i shares our desire for a peaceful resolu- 
;ion of the region's problems. Our 
issistance is necessary to help Botswana 
<eep up the pace of its economic 
development program while coping with 
;he added demands placed on its 
resources by the region's instability. Our 
5SF would be used for agricultural pro- 
duction and planning programs, 
ivestock and range management, and 
mprovement of health services. 

Zambia. For Zambia -a nation of 
tritical importance to regional economic 
ind political stability in central-southern 

rica-we are requesting $20 million, 
ambia is a major source of U.S. cobalt 

iports and supplies our allies with a 
ubstantial portion of their copper re- 
tirements. The Zambian economy has 
leen adversely affected by a number of 
developments including unfavorable 
weather, depressed prices for its prin- 
:ipal export -copper -and regional 
conflicts. Our ESF would be used to 
anance key agricultural imports, to sup- 
port agricultural development and 
"esearch, and for manpower and 
;echnical assistance projects. 

Regional Fund. We request $30 
million in a regional fund to support 
closer cooperation among the nations of 
southern Africa by assisting them to 
rehabilitate and improve transportation 
networks and to address inadequacies in 
food security and skilled manpower. 
Southern African nations are fully 
aware of the benefits of tackling their 
problems in a broader framework, and 
the diplomatic and financial support of 
the United States is an important ele- 
ment in the success of their efforts. 

Their first priority is to rehabilitate 
the deteriorated transportation system, 
particularly vital to the six countries of 
the region which are landlocked. Our 



May 1981 



support, in concert with other Western 
donors, will address this priority as well 
as others identified by the nations of the 
region. 

Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean Area 

For those nations in the strategically im- 
portant Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean 
area, we are proposing a total of $86 
million in ESF. 

Sudan. We are requesting $50 
million in ESF to support Sudan's 
efforts to correct its economic problems 
and help implement the International 
Monetary Fund's economic reform pro- 
gram. As you know, Sudan, under the 
leadership of President [Gaafar 
Mohamed] Nimeiri, has played a strong 
moderating role in a number of African 
and Middle Eastern trouble spots. 
Domestically, the Nimeiri government 
has emphasized both economic develop- 
ment and political reconciliation. Sudan's 
economic problems -inflation, foreign 
exchange shortages, and huge foreign 
arrearages -are compounded by a refu- 
gee population of over 400,000 persons. 
Our proposed ESF would provide 
balance-of-payments support enabling 
the public and private sectors to pur- 
chase spare parts, industrial and 
agricultural raw materials, and equip- 
ment for increasing domestic production 
and expanding exports. It would repre- 
sent a strong indication of U.S. support 
for the economic reforms and political 
moderation that have characterized 
President Nimeiri's government. 

Kenya. We are proposing $10 
million in ESF for Kenya. A moderate, 
friendly Kenya is essential to our policy 
of maintaining stability in this region. 
Kenya has a mixed economy, encourages 
private enterprise, guarantees its people 
personal freedom and civil liberties, and 
permits us access to its port facilities. 
Our ESF is intended to help Kenya 
overcome a temporary balance-of-pay- 
ments constraint and permit the impor- 
tation of essential production inputs. 

Somalia. We are also proposing $20 
million in ESF for Somalia, one of the 
world's poorest countries, and one 
whose economic development process 
has been impeded by a lack of resources, 
a recent, crippling drought, and a 
massive influx of refugees fleeing the 
war in the Ogaden. As we assist 
Somalia's effort to survive and develop, 
both our humanitarian and strategic in- 
terests are engaged. Somalia's strategic 
location in the Horn of Africa and its 



Africa 



proximity to the Persian Gulf were im- 
portant in our decision to negotiate a 
facilities access agreement with the 
Government of Somalia. 

Mauritius, Seychelles, and 
Djibouti. We propose ESF programs 
each totaling $2 million for these coun- 
tries. All three countries occupy 
strategic locations. The Mauritian 
Government has been uniformly respon- 
sive to U.S. requests for access to its 
facilities by units of the Indian Ocean 
task force. Our ESF would contribute to 
Mauritian efforts to correct a 
deteriorating economic situation by help- 
ing the Mauritian Government imple- 
ment its stabilization program and ease 
its foreign exchange constraint. 

The United States maintains a U.S. 
Air Force satellite tracking station in 
the Seychelles. Our ESF assistance 
would provide a commodity import pro- 
gram to finance vital agricultural im- 
ports for the Seychelles and encourage 
the pragmatic aspects of the govern- 
ment's development program. 

Djibouti, which also permits the U.S. 
Navy access to its facilities, is a strong 
proponent of the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts in the Horn. Our ESF would 
support Djiboutian efforts to strengthen 
its infrastructure and develop alter- 
native energy sources. 

Liberia 

And last, but certainly not least, we pro- 
pose $10 million in ESF for Liberia, an 
old friend, a country in which we have 
extensive interests, and whose economy 
is closely linked to ours through both 
U.S. investment and commercial bank- 
ing arrangements. Liberia currently 
faces staggering economic problems, and 
our ESF program would provide bal- 
ance-of-payments and budgetary support 
as Liberia seeks to resolve its long-term 
structural economic problems while 
maintaining its economic development 
programs. 



FMS AND IMET 

This Administration takes very seriously 
its commitment to help African govern- 
ments defend their peoples from both 
regional and external threats. We do not 
believe that U.S. interests are served 
when our African friends regard us as 
unresponsive to their legitimate security 
needs. At the same time, we realize that 
not all of our friends in Africa deserving 
our FMS security assistance support are 



19 



Africa 



able to pay for it at current rates of in- 
terest. Therefore, we are requesting 
FMS financing at reduced interest rates 
for certain African countries. In support 
of our own national security interests 
and foreign policy objectives, we are re- 
questing enhanced support for both 
Sudan and Kenya. Recognizing the value 
this program has as a foreign policy 
resource of considerable long-term value 
to U.S. -African relations, we are also re- 
questing increased IMET for Africa. 

Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean 

In support of our strategic interest in 
this region, we are proposing the follow- 
ing: 

Sudan. We are requesting $100 
million in FMS and $1.3 million in IMET 
for Sudan. Sudan is expected to use the 
FMS funds, which we are proposing at a 
reduced rate of interest, to accelerate its 
military modernization program. For ex- 
ample, we would expect the Sudanese to 
purchase tanks, additional armored per- 
sonnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft 
weapons, and spare parts. Our enhanced 
program request is designed to help 
Sudan deal with the increased tensions 
in the region and the potential threat 
from Libya. Our IMET program would 
complement Sudanese purchases of U.S. 
weapons and provide training in the 
essentials of modern military manage- 
ment. 

Kenya. We request $51 million in 
FMS and $1.3 million in IMET for 
Kenya, which permits the U.S. Navy ac- 
cess to its port facilities. The primary 
objective of our FMS program, all of 
which is proposed at reduced rates of in- 
terest, is to assist in Kenya's armed 
forces modernization. It is expected to 
concentrate on strengthening Kenya's 
air defense and air transport capability 
and to allow continued support of the 
F-5 program and the development of a 
credible mobile antitank force. The 
IMET program will continue to be 
directed toward developing expertise 
and systems needed for effective 
management of Kenya's defense 
establishment and fostering the growth 
of an indigenous training capability. 
Some of this training will be done by 
U.S. mobile training teams in Kenya and 
some training will be in the United 
States. 

Somalia. Fur this country, with 
which we have negotiated a military 
facilities agreement, we are requesting 
$20 million in FMS credits and $0,350 
million in IMET. The FMS credits are 



20 



Military Assistance 
to Liberia 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 1, 1981 1 

The United States has a longstanding 
military assistance program in Liberia. 
During the 1970s we provided annual 
IMET [international military education 
and training] programs ranging up to 
$300,000. FMS [foreign military sales] 
programs were initiated in 1956, and 
credit amounts of up to $1.8 million 
have been extended annually since FY 
1975. Total military assistance through 
FY 1979 was $17.9 million. 

The military leaders of the new 
government have looked to the United 
States for military assistance just as 
they have for economic assistance, but 
as soldiers whose grievances about poor 
living conditions sparked the April coup, 
they have put great emphasis on improv- 
ing the training, living conditions, and 
morale of their military colleagues. 

The United States has responded to 
Liberia's requests for military assistance 
because of our interests and the expecta- 
tions of the Liberians and of our other 
friends around the world that we take 
the lead in helping Liberia. 

In FY 1980 we provided $2.47 
million in FMS credits and $230,000 in 
IMET funds. In FY 1981 we have 
already signed agreements for $1.7 
million in FMS credits and allocated 
$449,000 in IMET programs. In addi- 
tion, we have provided an emergency 
shipment of 20 trucks under provision 
506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

This Administration has decided to 
continue these efforts to upgrade the 
Liberian military through the use of 
mobile training teams and training exer- 
cises as well as providing additional 
FMS credits for military housing con- 
struction and force modernization. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman William J. Dyess. ■ 



ill 



being proposed at reduced rates of 
financing, and it is envisaged that the 
Government of Somalia will purchase air 
defense, communications, and engineer- 
ing equipment. IMET training will be 
related to this equipment. 



I) 



it 



; 



Djibouti. For Djibouti, a strategi- 
cally located nation at the Bab-el- 
Mandeb between the Red Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden, we request $1.0 million in 
FMS credits and $0.1 million in IMET. 
Our FMS would finance an engineering 
company with a mission to create a 
transport and communications in- 
frastructure. 

Southern/Central Africa 

For Southern/Central Africa we are re- 
questing the following in FMS and 
IMET. 

Zaire. We are requesting $10.5 
million in FMS and $1.56 million in IM- 
ET for Zaire. Our security assistance 
relationship with Zaire serves both our 
foreign policy and national security in- 
terests. It also provides the essential 
underpinning for an effort which we am 
our allies are engaged in to encourage 
and help sustain reforms now underway 
in the Zairian Armed Forces. The IME' 
program helps assure the most effectivt 
use of FMS-financed equipment as well 
as provide professional and technical 
training for selected military personnel. 
We expect the Government of Zaire to 
request FMS financing for the mainten 
ance and support of previously supplie* 
C-130 aircraft as well as spare parts fc 
U.S. -supplied ground transport, patrol 
boats, communications equipment, and 
additional jeeps and trucks. 

Botswana. For this country, we ar 
requesting $0.5 million in FMS and $0. 
million in IMET. We expect our FMS t 
help finance purchases for the Botswar 
defense force. 

Gabon. For Gabon, a moderate 
African state in which we have impor- 
tant political and growing economic in- 
terest, we are requesting $2.6 million i 
FMS and $0.1 million in IMET. FMS 
financing would assist Gabon in equip- 
ping its gendarmerie platoons to becon 
a credible patrol force to protect un- 
marked frontiers. 

Cameroon. We request $1.5 millioi 
in FMS and $0.1 million in IMET for 
Cameroon, a friendly African state 
whose security could be jeopardized by 
the Libyan military presence in 
neighboring Chad. Our assistance is pr 
posed for the purchase of jeeps, trucks 
communications equipment, and spare 
parts for previously purchased U.S. 
vehicles. 

Rwanda. We request $1.5 million 
FMS and $0.05 million in IMET for 
Rwanda, to assist that nation strength 
its armed forces' noncombat capability 



Department of State Bullet 



CANADA 



; ^through the purchase of dual purpose 
nonlethal equipment and related train- 
ing. 

.1 
West Africa 

fWe propose only two FMS programs for 
West Africa. 

Liberia. We are proposing $12.3 
million in FMS and $0.6 million in IMET 
'for Liberia. The armed forces there de- 
fend almost entirely on U.S. security 
Assistance for equipment and military 
paining. Our proposed program will 
illow the purchase of new equipment, 
Lill provide training for the Liberian 
■ Army, which has been totally reorga- 
nized since the April 1980 coup, and will 
r lassist Liberia's military housing con- 
struction program, which is the govern- 
ment's top military priority. In view of 
Liberia's economic problems, we propose 
FMS financing at reduced rates of in- 
terest. 



M 



Senegal. We propose $2.0 million in 
FMS and $0,350 in IMET for Senegal. 
Dur security assistance is designed to 
show U.S. support for Senegal's 
moderate foreign policy as well as its 
:ommitment to democracy at home, to 
jromote regional stability, and to con- 
tinue U.S. access to Senegal's excellent 
;ommunieations and transport facilities. 
•Senegal is expected to use the proposed 
inancing to purchase, among other 
terns, jeeps and spare parts for 
engineering equipment. The IMET funds 
will be used for related and professional 
training. 

Let me also highlight the fact that 
*e are proposing several new IMET 
programs — in the Congo, Cape Verde, 
Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Guinea-Bissau. These programs are 
small and designed to allow these coun- 
tries an opening to professional military 
training in the United States. 

Let me again stress the importance 
which this Administration attaches to 
maximizing the effectiveness of our 
foreign policy resources in pursuit of our 
interests in Africa. Those interests are 
increasing, as are Africa's needs. At a 
time of budgetary restraint, we believe 
the requests before this subcommittee 
represent our best attempt to utilize our 
resources in support of our priority in- 
terests. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



May 1981 



Maritime Boundary Treaty 



Following are statements by Am- 
bassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, 
Counselor of the Department of State, 
and Mark B. Feldman, Acting Legal Ad- 
viser, before the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee on March 18, 198 1. 1 



AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY 

I appreciate very much the opportunity 
to appear before you today in connection 
with your consideration of the maritime 
boundary settlement treaty with 
Canada. I am accompanied by the Act- 
ing Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, Mark Feldman. Mr. Feldman was 
the negotiator of the treaty and will be 
the principal witness for the Administra- 
tion as you take up the question of 
whether to recommend that the Senate 
give its advice and consent to this docu- 
ment. 

It seems appropriate, however, 
given all that we have been through 
together, that as you open your con- 
sideration of the question, I share with 
you our view of the events of the past 
months. In addition, there are several 
matters related to the maritime bound- 
ary settlement treaty and the fishery 
treaty, which the Administration has 
asked be returned to it unacted upon, 
which we think will be of interest to this 
committee. 

When Secretary of State Haig ap- 
peared before this committee in connec- 
tion with his confirmation hearings, he 
and you agreed that the question of the 
U.S. -Canadian East Coast maritime 
boundary settlement and fishery 
treaties, which had been before the 
Senate for 2 years, was "a matter of 
priority." Subsequently, Secretary Haig 
assured the committee that he would 
elicit the views of all concerned as he 
prepared his recommendations to the 
President on how best to proceed with 
the question of the future of the 
treaties, linked so that neither could 
come into force without the other. 

In the first week of February, 
Secretary Haig asked that I represent 
him in this review. This is the occasion 
for me to express thanks to you, to the 
members of the committee, to interested 
Members of the House, and to staff 
members who have been so generous 
with their time. You made it possible for 
us to understand the full range and 
depth of the views of Congress on the 



content and the disposition of the 
treaties. There was never any doubt in 
our minds that together we were con- 
cerned not only with our fisheries and 
maritime boundary interests but also 
with our country's interest in a positive 
and constructive relationship with 
Canada. If you will permit me, I would 
like to say thank you to everyone for 
their wisdom and their guidance and 
their willingness to share both with us. 

It was clear as the review proceeded 
that there were only two realistic 
courses of action for the United States 
to pursue with respect to the treaties. 
We could either do nothing or we could 
attempt to advance at least a portion of 
the problem toward a solution. The lat- 
ter course was chosen. The President, 
by his letter to you of March 6, asked 
for your favorable consideration of the 
maritime boundary settlement treaty 
and the recall of the fishery treaty. Dur- 
ing his recent visit to Ottawa he ex- 
plained this action, and his reasons for 
it, to Prime Minister Trudeau. We ap- 
preciate the promptness with which you 
have moved to take up the maritime 
boundary settlement treaty. 

In all of the discussions with the in- 
terested American parties there was no 
one who was against conservation or 
who was against management or, in- 
deed, who was against some document 
to express that portion of our fishery in- 
terest which we have in common with 
Canada. I think it important to say that 
everyone concerned was responsible, 
was alert to the need for perceptive and 
imaginative steps to meet the particular 
fishery resource challenges in our future 
and looked to that future, when we have 
a boundary, to build a pragmatic and 
practical fishery relationship with 
Canada. 

Some believed that the failure to 
achieve progress because of the fishery 
treaty represented the power of a single 
regional bloc to thwart the national in- 
terest. That is an unfair judgment. The 
fishery treaty which we have asked be 
returned, in fact, deals only with the in- 
terests of a single region. What else 
should be key except the views of that 
region? All were concerned, all believed 
that a solution had to be found, that 
somehow progress toward the core prob- 
lem -that is, the lack of a maritime 
boundary -ought to be achieved. The in- 
terests and the views expressed were 



21 



Canada 



not parochial. They were, and are, sen- 
sitive to the concerns of the affected 
region. 

The record should show that we are 
moving to address a problem which 
arises from a dispute over claims that 
the United States does not recognize. 
The President said, in his letter to you 
of March 6, that the United States finds 
no basis in international law for the 
East Coast maritime claims made by 
Canada. We do not recognize them. We 
believe our claim is sound. We do not 
yield on this question. Looking to the 
future, when we intend to exercise 
discretion in law enforcement in all 
areas now claimed by Canada should 
Canada decide also to ratify the 
maritime boundary settlement treaty, 
one must underline that there is a very 
real difference between the use of such 
discretion and recognizing Canada's 
claims. We do not recognize those claims 
and intend, as Mr. Feldman will make 
clear, to pursue vigorously and con- 
fidently the claim we have made. 

Finally, in all of the discussions 
there was a sense that somehow the ex- 
ecutive branch was uncertain about the 
ability of the regional councils to carry 
out the responsibilities given them by 
the Fishery Conservation and Manage- 
ment Act of 1976. I would like to say for 
myself, not only as a result of recent ex- 
perience but because of previous ex- 
periences, that the regional councils are 
institutions which must be given every 
opportunity to exercise the authorities 
given them, and we ought, as a matter 
of posture and of policy, to be confident 
in the ability of those councils and their 
members to carry out their tasks. We 
certainly have no doubt that they will do 
so and that they will do so with insight 
and with respect for the resource. 



MR. FELDMAN 

Ambassador Ridgway has just reviewed 
the political and diplomatic context 
which has led up to this hearing. I am 
pleased to have this opportunity to 
discuss with you the terms and the im- 
plications of the proposed maritime 
boundary treaty with Canada. 

For present purposes a maritime 
boundary delimits the Continental Shelf 
and fisheries jurisdiction of neighboring 
states. The United States and Canada 
have undefined maritime boundaries in 
four areas off their coasts: two in the 
Pacific, off the Strait of Juan de Fuca 



and within and seaward of Dixon En- 
trance, one in the Arctic, and one in the 
Gulf of Maine area in the Atlantic. None 
of these boundaries has been deter- 
mined, but the most pressing problem 
for both countries is the boundary in the 
Atlantic. 

The disputed boundary area includes 
the northeastern portion of Georges 
Bank which is of interest both for its 
rich fisheries and for its hydrocarbon 
potential. As the parties have been 
unable to establish a boundary by 
negotiation, their competition for 
fisheries in the area has become a 
serious irritant in the relations between 
the two countries. If the United States 
and Canada are able to agree on a set- 
tlement of this delicate boundary issue 
by binding third-party adjudication, it 
will be an act of statesmanship in the 
best tradition of friendly relations be- 
tween neighboring states and a signifi- 
cant contribution to the rule of law in in- 
ternational affairs. 

Boundary Adjudication 

The boundary adjudication is of great 
practical importance to the United 
States and Canada because it will affect 
fisheries, potential oil and gas develop- 
ment, and environmental processes of 
great concern to both. The adjudication 
is also of interest to the international 
community at large. The Gulf of Maine 
case will be a landmark that will in- 
fluence the development of international 
law for years to come. One reason is 
that the case will present the first ad- 
judication of a combined Continental 
Shelf-fisheries boundary. 

The leading cases in this area of the 
law have involved only the Continental 
Shelf. The principles of those cases will 
certainly apply but fisheries considera- 
tions also will have to be taken into ac- 
count. The result in this case will be of 
great importance for the future delimita- 
tion of 200-mile economic zones when 
they become established in international 
law. 

A second reason the case is impor- 
tant to the international community is 
that it involves the first use of the 
chamber procedure provided for in the 
Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. Under the chamber procedure 
the parties to a dispute may elect to 
have their case decided by a chamber of 
the Court, i.e., by a selected few of the 
15 members of the Court. 

In 1972 the Court adopted new pro- 
cedures which were intended to simplify 



and expedite proceedings before the 
Court. It was hoped that these pro- 
cedures would attract business to the 
Court, which has not been as active in 
recent years as it should be. Among the 
important features of the new rules are 
provisions recognizing that parties to a 
dispute should have an important in- 
fluence in the composition of ad hoc 
chambers designed to deal with a par- 
ticular case. Under the rules, the partie 
determine the number of Judges to be 
included. The Court elects the members 
of the chamber, but it does so in con 
sulfation with the parties. Thus, the pai 
ties can have a considerable influence o 
the composition of the chamber. 

The chamber procedure is now 
designed to approximate the flexibility 
of arbitration, while at the same time 
assuring the parties of the expertise, 
prestige, and economy of proceedings 
before the Court. A great many people 
will be watching the Gulf of Maine case 
to see if these procedures work. If the> 
do, the World Court should gain new 
prestige and acceptance. 

The Treaty 

Before discussing the terms of the trea 
ty in detail, I would like to outline the 
structure of the treaty package. It con- 
sists of a treaty text of four articles, t\ 
annexes, and a confidential exchange c 
notes which has been provided to the 
Congress. 

• Article 1 of the treaty states the 
basic agreement of the parties to subn 
their dispute to a chamber of the Intel 
national Court of Justice on the terms 
set out in the special agreement, whicl 
is the first annex to the treaty. 

• Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty pr 
vide, in effect, that if the proceedings 
the World Court cannot be organized 
continued as the parties desire becaus< 
of problems, such as the selection or 
replacement of the Judges, either part 
may terminate the special agreement. 
Then the arbitration agreement which 
set forth in the second annex to the 
treaty automatically would enter into 
force. That agreement provides a 
mechanism to insure the ultimate ad- 
judication of the dispute. Both govern 
ments are confident that the case will 
adjudicated by a chamber of the Work 
Court, but they wish to provide 
safeguards in case unforeseen problen 
should arise out of the new procedure: 
which have not been used before. 

• Article 4 of the treaty is the enl 
into force provision. As presently 






22 



Department of State Bullei 



drafted, it provides for the entry into 
force of the treaty on the same date that 
the agreement on East Coast fisheries 
resources, pending before this commit- 
tee, is also brought into force. For the 
reasons explained by Ambassador 
Ridgway, the Administration proposes 
to amend this article so that the bound- 
ary settlement treaty may be brought in- 
to force upon the exchange of in- 

i struments of ratification while the 
fisheries agreement is returned to the 

ii President. We have provided the com- 
mittee suggested language for this pur- 

ai x>se, as well as texts for a number of 
conforming changes and technical ad- 
ustments in the annexes. These latter 
details will not cause any concern in Ot- 
tawa if Canada can accept the basic 
change in article 4. 

Special Agreement 

[n some ways the most interesting docu- 
ment in the treaty package is the an- 
nexed Special Agreement Between the 
Jnited States and Canada to Submit to 
i Chamber of the International Court of 
Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area. 
3 This is the document the parties would 
, e submit jointly to the Court once they 
, lave ratified the treaty. 

• Article I of the special agreement 
describes that the chamber of the Court 
is to be composed of five Judges. We are 
proposing a modification of this provi- 

k, Bon to permit the selection of national 
Judges, which is precluded by the ex- 
sting text. The former U.S. Judge on 
the Court, the late Richard Baxter, was 
i great jurist, but he disqualified himself 
from this case because he had counseled 

.. the State of Maine on this matter before 
joining the Court. If the present U.S. 
Judge, Stephen M. Schwebel, sits on this 
case, Canada would be entitled to ap- 
point one of its nationals as an ad hoc 
Judge. The recommendations of the par- 
ties as to the members of the tribunal 
will be communicated confidentially to 
the Court at the proper time. 

• Article II of the special agreement 
sets forth in paragraph 1 the question 
the chamber is asked to decide; this is a 
critical provision. "The Chamber is re- 
quested to decide, in accordance with 
the principles and rules of international 
daw applicable in the matter between the 
Parties, what is the course of the single 
maritime boundary that divides the con- 
tinental shelf and fisheries zones of the 
parties from a predetermined point in- 
dicated in the agreement to a point to be 
determined by the Chamber within a 
defined area seaward of Georges Bank. 



May 1981 



:i 



!'" 



Article II also requests the chamber to 
describe the course of the maritime 
boundary in certain technical terms, to 
illustrate the maritime boundary on 
selected charts, and to appoint a 
technical expert jointly nominated by the 
parties to assist it in its work. 
Paragraph 4 of article II commits the 
parties to accept the decision of the 
chamber as final and binding upon them. 

• Article III of the special agree- 
ment is a standard disclaimer which 
clarifies that the sole purpose of the 
maritime boundary is to divide the Con- 
tinental Shelf and fishery zones of the 
parties and that the special agreement 
does not constitute recognition of the 
jurisdiction that the other country may 
claim to exercise in the delimited area, 
beyond that otherwise recognized by 
each country. In this connection, the 
United States and Canada maintain dif- 
ferent positions on the breadth of the 
territorial sea, the scope of fisheries 
jurisdiction exercised within the 
200-nautical-mile zone, and the legal 
regime for the Continental Shelf; these 
differences are not affected by the 
special agreement or the maritime 
boundary established thereunder. 

• Article IV of the special agree- 
ment requests the chamber, and 
obligates the parties, to utilize certain 
technical provisions. These provisions 
should help avoid any technical errors 
creeping into the decision to the detri- 
ment of either party. 

• Article V of the special agreement 
provides that proposals made during the 
course of negotiations looking toward a 
maritime boundary settlement will not 
be introduced into evidence or publicly 
disclosed. The article also provides that 
the parties will notify and consult with 
each other before introducing into 
evidence or argument diplomatic or 
other confidential correspondence. 

• Article VI sets forth the pro- 
cedures to be followed in the written 
proceedings, calling for presentation of 
memorials 7 months after the chamber 
has been constituted and counter- 
memorials 6 months later. The chamber 
may extend these time limits at the re- 
quest of either party. 

• Article VII sets forth a procedure 
for a further extension of the maritime 
boundary established by the chamber, if 
that is considered desirable by either 
party. Such an extension may be 
necessary to further define the Con- 
tinental Shelf boundary beyond 
200-nautical miles. If the parties are 
unable to agree on such an extension 
within 1 year of a request to do so, 



Canada 



either party may take the question back 
to the chamber of the International 
Court of Justice constituted under the 
special agreement. 

• Article VIII provides that the 
special agreement enters into force on 
the date the treaty enters into force and 
that it remains in force until it is ter- 
minated in accordance with the provi- 
sions of the treaty. 

Arbitration Agreement 

Now, I would like to describe very brief- 
ly the arbitration agreement which 
would be the governing instrument in 
the case of an ad hoc arbitration pro- 
ceeding. In many respects it is the same 
as the special agreement. The dif- 
ferences can be explained by the fact 
that under the arbitration agreement 
new institutions would have to be 
established while those are in place if we 
proceed before the World Court. Among 
the articles, I will mention only those 
few which differ from the special agree- 
ment. 

• Article VI of the arbitration 
agreement incorporates by reference the 
Rules of Court of the International 
Court of Justice as the applicable rules 
of procedure for the Court of Arbitra- 
tion, to the extent that they are deemed 
appropriate by it. The article states that 
a majority vote of its members governs 
the proceedings of the Court of Arbitra- 
tion. 

• Article VII authorizes the Court 
of Arbitration to fix a seat for its opera- 
tions. 

• Article X provides that the parties 
will jointly share the general expenses of 
the arbitration, while bearing their own 
costs in the preparation and presenta- 
tion of the case. In this connection, I 
should note that the costs of arbitration 
are significantly higher than the pro- 
ceedings before the Court because the 
parties must bear the costs of the Court 
of Arbitration as well as their own ex- 
penses. 

• Article XI establishes a mecha- 
nism for the filling of vacancies which 
may arise during the course of the ar- 
bitration. In general, if the parties are 
unable to agree within a specified time, 
the Court of Arbitration or its president 
would have the authority to fill any 
vacancies. 

• Article XII recites the parties' 
agreement that the decision of the Court 
of Arbitration will be final and binding 
upon them. Either party may refer to 



23 



DEPARTMENT 



the Court of Arbitration any dispute be- 
tween the parties as to the meaning and 
scope of the decision within 3 months at 
the rendering of the decision. 

. Article XIV provides that the ar- 
bitration agreement will enter into force 
as provided in articles II and III of the 
basic treaty which bring the arbitration 
agreement into force automatically it 
either party terminates the special 
agreement. 

I believe the committee is entitled to 
some assessment of our prospects in a 
proceeding of this nature. I have been 
deeply involved in the development ot 
our positions and the legal discussions 
we have had with Canada on this issue 
over the past 6 years. I am confident ot 
the merits of the U.S. position. Of 
course, no one can predict with certainty 
the outcome of an adjudication. There 
always are risks. I am sure that 
Canada's lawyers, too, are confident ot 
their position. However, I can say that 
the State Department lawyers who have 
worked on this issue over the years have 
grown more confident as international 
law has developed in this field. Most of 
all I am confident that the United 
States and Canada will both receive an 
objective and impartial judgment from 
the tribunal we create by this treaty. I 
have no doubt that U.S. interests will be 
well served by this treaty, and we urge 
the Senate to give its advice and consent 
to ratification as soon as possible. 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent ot 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1982 Authorization Request 



by Secretary Haig 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Operations of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2U, 
1981. 1 

At the outset, I want to express the 
pleasure I have of the opportunity to ap- 
pear before the subcommittee that has 
played such an important role over the 
years in the development and evolution 
of the professionalism of our Foreign 

Service. 

It is a great honor for me to appear 
before this committee today. In 
testimony last week before the full 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1 
outlined the international challenges we 
face today and the resources we seek to 
deal with these challenges. One ot those 
resources— the State Department itself— 
is the subject of my testimony today. 

The Department's authorization re- 
quest for fiscal year 1982 and the con- 
tinuation of our activities into 1983 
amount to $2,461,688,000. To put this 
figure into perspective, I would like to 
say a few words about the real re- 
sources this money supports: the 
Foreign Service officers and the State 
Department employees. 

The promise of a consistent, reliable, 
balanced foreign policy can be fulfilled 
only if the foreign policy professionals 
make their proper contribution. They 
are the custodians of the historical 
memory of our actions abroad and a 
crucial asset for the years to come. As 
recent events have demonstrated, they 
have become the first line in many 
respects of the defense of our national 
interests. 

In recent years, the task ot the 
foreign policy professional has become 
much more difficult. Several problems 
deserve particular attention: a tendency 
in recent years to ignore them in policy- 
making; the financial drawbacks of pub- 
lic service itself; a growing volume of 
work without a commensurate increase 
of personnel; the frustration growing 
from the lack of a cohesive American 
leadership globally. Above all, their pro 
fession has become much more danger- 
ous. As violence has mounted against 
our posts abroad, employees have been 
forced to accept extended separations 



S.F< 



F |i 



■ft 



from their families rather than putting 
their loved ones at risk. 

As Secretary of State, I will seek tc 
alleviate these conditions: to improve th 
morale of our professionals, to give 
them their necessary participation in tfi 
making and the execution of our nation' 
foreign policy, to enhance their workinf 
conditions, and to protect them. The 
President has taken the most essential 
step in this process by indicating that 
the Secretary of State— and his depart- 
ment—shall be the general manager of 
American foreign policy. He has given 
his personal attention to the safety of 
our diplomats. 

The budget request placed before 
you reflects a program designed to deal 
with security of personnel, working cor 
ditions, and pay. It is fully responsive t 
the philosophy of management outlined 
above. 

• Security at posts abroad should I 
increased to protect our people and the 
dependents from violence and terronsn 
It is important, too, that we protect 
classified national security information 
from compromise. For this purpose, th. 
Congress enacted a supplemental ap- 
propriation of $6.1 million in 1980 and 
provided an additional $35.8 million in 
1981. To continue this critical security^ 
program, we are requesting another $2 
million in 1982. 

• As Under Secretary [for Manag 
ment Richard T.] Kennedy discussed 
with you in more detail, this authoriza- 
tion request reflects 140 new positions 
to cover growing overseas consular an 
domestic passport workloads and to 
strengthen resource and program 
management for the refugee program 
Additionally, Under Secretary Kenned; 
is conducting an intensive review of ou 
current personnel resources across the 
board. The provisions of the Foreign 
Service Act of 1980 on professional 
development require additional training 
faculty, and support personnel. The 
Department's capability to report and 
analyze political and economic events 
must be strengthened. 

• Also, as part of the Foreign her 
ice Act of 1980, we have initiated the 
pay comparability provisions for the 
Foreign Service. The new Foreign Ser 
ice designations and grade levels are lr 
effect, and we are requesting suppleme 
tal appropriations to cover certain new 



Department of State Bullet 



J.S. Foreign Affairs Costs and Personnel 




Average Annual Share 
of Outlays, 1937-80 



otal Federal Government 
otal Foreign Affairs* 

of which 

Foreign Aid 

Foreign Affairs Administration 
(expenses of Department of State and 
Foreign Service and contributions to 
international organizations and 
conferences) 

Foreign Information & Exchange 

International Financial Programs 

Other 



580 
11 



6.5 

1.4 



.5 

2.4 

.2 



1937-39 


.2% 


1949-51 


12.0% 


(period of intensified 




economic and military 




assistance) 




1959-61 


3.0% 


1968-70 


2.0% 


1980 


-2.0% 


Source. Budget of the United States Government (years 



as indicated.) 



*This approximate figure includes total outlays of the Department of State, Agency 
or international Development (AID), Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), International 
lommunication Agency (USICA), International Development and Cooperation Agency 
DCA), International Trade Commission (ITC), National Security Council (NSC), Overseas 
'rivate Investment Corporation (OPIC), U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Peace 

a -lorps, plus outlays for foreign affairs-related activities for the Departments of 

„ igriculture, Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury. 

ource Budget ot the United States Government. FY 1982 



- _ 



ersonnel FY 1980 



Department of State 
Employment, 1940-80*** 



otal Federal Government 
(civilian employment) 

otal Foreign Affairs** 
(U.S. citizens) 



1.9 


1940 


million 


1950 




1960 


36,000 


1970 


(less than 


1980 


2% of 


** 


total) 





7,000 
16,000 
13,000 
13,000 
13,000 



***Excluding foreign nationals. 



**AII State, AID, Eximbank, USICA, 
DCA, ITC, NSC, OPIC, Peace Corps staff, 
:| >nd USTR employees, plus foreign affairs- 
elated positions in Agriculture, 
Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury, 
is calculated from data received from 
hese departments by the Bureau of 
~'ublic Affairs, Department of State. 



Adapted from statistics in State magazine, 
January 1981 



vtay 1981 



25 



EAST ASIA 



allowances for our employees abroad. 
When fully executed, I believe the 
Foreign Service Act will provide a 
modern, simplified, and supportive per- 
sonnel structure. 

Another aspect of our request 
deserving special comment is the 
refugee program. We should be proud of 
our leadership in dealing with the relief 
and resettlement of refugees, and we 
are prodding other nations to help. The 
1982 authorization request specifies ad- 
ditional resources for Afghan refugees 
in Pakistan and African refugee pro- 
grams as well. 

In addition to authorization of ap- 
propriations, our proposed bill includes 
certain statutory provisions, two of 
which are deserving of more attention. 

• Section 103 would establish a 
selective nonimmigrant visa waiver, on a 
reciprocal basis, for eligible citizens of 
countries with the best records of com- 
pliance with our immigration laws. The 
waiver will increase equity in our 
worldwide consular dealings and, more- 
over, will help offset the evergrowing 
demands on our consular service. 

• Section 104 would remove statuto- 
ry restrictions on passport fees so that 
they could be adjusted administratively 
to cover costs associated with issuing 
passports. This provision would also ex- 
tend passport duration from 5 to 10 
years as a cost-saving measure. 

Both of these changes are absolutely 
essential if we are to meet our statutory 
consular and passport workload re- 
quirements within the resources re- 
quested. 

A final comment concerns the rela- 
tionship between our resources and the 
Department's ability to conduct the 
foreign policy of the United States. Over 
the past several years, the Department's 
staff abroad has been seriously reduced 
while the presence of other agencies has 
grown. If we are to meet the complex 
challenges that confront us, the Depart- 
ment of State must have the necessary 
resources to pursue our objectives. The 
1982 request has already been pared to 
the minimum, as befits these austere 
times. For this reason, I am asking your 
support and the support of your subcom- 
mittee to the full amount that we have 
requested. 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



'Press release 71. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Michael Armacost 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 23, 1981. Mr. Armacost is Acting 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. 1 

It is a pleasure for me to appear today 
to discuss our economic and security 
assistance relationships in East Asia and 
to explain our FY 1982 budget request. 
I would like first to make a few general 
remarks setting the context in which we 
have developed our assistance policy for 
East Asia and the Pacific. 

As you know, the Reagan Adminis- 
tration is deeply committed to 
strengthening the U.S. security posture 
throughout the globe, in response to the 
increasingly serious worldwide challenge 
posed by the Soviet Union in recent 
years. In Asia today, we have a number 
of broad concerns regarding the military 
and economic security of the region, 
ranging from increased Soviet military 
and naval power in the region, to Soviet- 
backed Vietnamese aggression in Indo- 
china, to the need to protect the sea 
lanes which provide the vital flow of 
petroleum from the Middle East to our 
major Asian allies. A sound strategic 
posture in East Asia and the Pacific is 
an essential element of our global 
strength. 

The year's security and economic 
development assistance programs for 
the region are directly related to the 
need to secure U.S. strategic interests in 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as 
to protect the immediate security of 
those nations— Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines, Bur- 
ma, the Pacific Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, Singapore, and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)- 
which will be receiving our aid. We 
believe that security and economic 
assistance to these countries serve well 
the political and strategic interests of 
the United States and constitute an ap- 
propriate and necessary adjunct to our 
expanding defense effort. 

In FY 1982 we propose to increase 
certain aspects of security assistance 



programs in response to growing thre 
from the Soviet Union and its clients. 
Here are the highlights. 

• We are requesting an overall ak 
level of $638,595 million, which 
represents an increase of $58,206 milli 
over FY 1981 and is also slightly high 
than was budgeted by the Carter Ad' 
ministration. 

• We seek increases for Thailand, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia 
Singapore, and Burma, reflecting spec- 
needs in these countries. 

• To maintain support for key 
friends and allies in the highly visible 
and politically important area of devel 
opment assistance, we are proposing 
small increases in economic aid. Their 
modesty reflects our need to balance 
competing aims on a global basis and 
adjust aid levels to fiscal restraints; bi 
they will contribute to strengthening 
recipients' postures in East Asia and 
thus enhance our security. 

• We are also providing economic 
assistance to ASEAN itself, because i 
can play a key role in resolving the 
Kampuchean conflict, reducing the im 
pact of the Soviet presence in the 
region, enhancing access to the Indiai 
Ocean, assisting refugees, reducing n; 
cotics trafficking, and insuring access 
raw materials over trade routes vital 
the United States and Japan. 

• Our proposals for increases in 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits, 
ternational education and military tr; 
ing (IMET), economic support funds 
(ESF), and some direct credit at cone 
sional rates take into account the re; 
that the recipient countries are shoul 
ing larger and larger defense burden 
during a period of economic hardship 
one which is even more severe for 
developing economies than for the 
United States. The decline in grant a 
or the military assistance program 
substantial oil price increases, worsei l 
debt-servicing problems, and inflated 
prices for military hardware and sen I 
ices have been among the key factors , 
undermining the defense procuremer i '. 
programs of our East Asian allies an t - 
friends. 

I would like to turn now to a 
country-by-country breakdown, stres g 






- 



[6 



IB 
: 
ill 

b: 

¥ 

w 

> 



::. 



v 






26 



Department of State Bulldn 



)ur interests in each recipient nation 
)r-in the case of ASEAN - 
nstitution, providing the overall figures 
for each type of assistance, and explain- 
er the justification for these various re- 
quests. 



;il 



r Republic of Korea 

U.S. security is vitally dependent upon 
;he preservation of peace and stability in 
Mortheast Asia in general and the 
Korean Peninsula in particular. Our aid 
n this area is focused on the Republic of 
[« Korea. For several years now there has 
jeen a considerable increase in the size 
ind capabilities of North Korean forces, 
Dosing a formidable threat to the securi- 
y of the South. The evidence continues 
;o indicate that North Korea has not 
Tiled out the use of force, given the ap- 
propriate opportunity, to reunify the 
jeninsula. 

Our contribution to South Korean 
i' security consists of a commitment em- 
jodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 
1954, the maintenance of U.S. forces in 
i Korea, an extensive FMS cash and 
credit program, IMET, and technical 
cooperation in the development of 
ill-selected Korean defense industries. Cur- 

•ent unforeseen Korean economic and 
• iscal problems brought about by 
ib worldwide recession and oil price-driven 
« nflation make U.S. cooperation more 
■important than ever in order to prevent 
'urther slippage in Korea's force 
modernization program. 

We are proposing a $167.5 million 
MS program for FY 1982 which, while 
t remains the largest in East Asia, is 
ery lean considering Korean require- 
ments. Current and proposed levels of 
! FMS help maintain the priorities of 
;b South Korea's force improvement pro- 
[i jram by financing essential equipment 
acquisitions. The major systems which 
Seoul is expected to purchase with FMS 
jll financing include a tactical air control 

system, radar equipment, Harpoon mis- 
;f r|i sile, a further increment in the program 
, : ilfor the coproduction of F-5E/F aircraft, 
r, and part of the F-16 purchase. 

Increased IMET -$1.8 million in FY 
t ' 1982, up from $1.2 million in FY 1981 - 
help South Korean forces acquire the 
requisite training in management, com- 
mand, and control of large forces and 
employment of modern weapons sys- 
tems. The need for this training in- 
creases as the Korean forces become 
more self-sufficient. 

Within the Southeast Asian region, 
which is poorer and less homogeneous 



: May 1981 



than Northeast Asia, U.S. aid is spread 
among a number of recipients to pro- 
mote a variety of U.S. interests, from 
maintenance of U.S. basing in the 
region, to countering the very palpable 
threat of Soviet- Vietnamese aggression, 
to advancing security interests along 
major sea lines of communication. 

The Philippines 

Overall, the Phillippines is the largest 
recipient in the region. This is not only a 
country of longstanding security value to 
the United States but one whose impor- 
tance has been underlined by events of 
recent years. Our ability to project 
power across the Pacific to Southwest 
Asia, in a crisis, is enhanced by our con- 
tinued unhampered use of Clark Air 
Force Base and Subic Naval Base. We 
refuel and reprovision carrier battle 
groups at Subic Bay before sending 
them to the Indian Ocean. Clark Air 
Force Base is the only facility on the 
Pacific route from which a fully loaded 
C-5A transport can fly nonstop to Diego 
Garcia. 

U.S. security assistance is widely 
regarded by the Philippine Government 
and people as quid pro quo for the use 
of the facilities at Clark and Subic. 
Former President Carter, in a letter to 
President Marcos at the time of the 
1979 amendment to the Military Bases 
Agreement, pledged the Administra- 
tion's "best effort" to provide a total of 
$500 million in security assistance over a 
5-year period. We have appreciated the 
favorable congressional actions which 
have given substance to this pledge over 
the past 2 years, and we ask your sup- 
port again for our $100 million request 
for FY 1982, as well as for $1.3 million 
in IMET funds included in this year's re- 
quest. 

We have also requested $38.8 million 
in economic development assistance for 
the Philippines. This is modest in rela- 
tion to the country's needs and the 
nature of our strategic and political in- 
terests and commitment. While real 
GNP in the Philippines grew by 4.7% in 
1980, inflation averaged 18%. The coun- 
try has been running large trade and 
current account deficits and borrowing 
on international financial markets to 
achieve its growth targets. Debt levels 
consequently have been rising steadily. 
Continued borrowing is likely. Increas- 
ing prices for oil imports and erratic 
commodity prices for the country's ex- 
ports have hit the Philippines hard, in 
spite of generally good management of 
the economy. 



East Asia 



Thailand 

Preservation of Thailand's security, 
stability, and independence will be 
critical for the maintenance of peace and 
the security of U.S. interests in the 
Southeast Asian region. President 
Reagan has reaffirmed our commitment 
to Thailand under the Manila pact and 
has made clear our continued support 
for Thai security needs. Thailand, as 
well as its ASEAN neighbors, regard 
our willingness to back such rhetorical 
assurances with more concrete contribu- 
tions to Thai security as a litmus test of 
our attitudes toward the region. 

Our bilateral assistance to Thailand 
is a necessary mix of security and 
development assistance, ESF, and 
refugee relief. Any element by itself is 
insufficient to achieve our objectives. 
Thailand's security is threatened not on- 
ly by external aggression but could also 
be imperiled by a failure to sustain 
economic growth and to respond as to 
the rising expectations of its people. The 
government is making a conscious effort 
to reduce inequities of wealth and in- 
come distribution and to improve stand- 
ards of living in rural areas. Prime 
Minister Prem has acknowledged that 
rural development is a primary objec- 
tive. 

We are seeking assistance increases 
for Thailand this year, in recognition of 
the increased military threat from Viet- 
nam. Two hundred thousand Soviet- 
supplied Vietnamese troops now occupy 
Kampuchea and operate in strength 
along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Dur- 
ing 1980 Vietnamese forces in western 
Kampuchea were strengthened to over 
80,000 troops. Small Vietnamese units 
have frequently carried out recon- 
naissance missions into Thailand, and in 
June a clash between intruding Viet- 
namese troops and Thai defenders pro- 
duced numerous casualties. Vietnamese 
forces heavily outnumber defending Thai 
forces and are capable of mounting 
stronger incursions at any time. 

The U.S. security assistance pro- 
gram is designed to assist Thailand in 
providing for its own security by making 
the necessary force improvements to 
present a plausible deterrent to Viet- 
namese forces, while continuing to con- 
tain and reduce the threat posed by 
domestic insurgency. The FMS financing 
requested for FY 1982 would to be used 
to: 

• Equip additional Marine Corps 
rifle companies; 

• Procure C-130 aircraft, Dragon 



27 



East Asia 



missiles, and UH-1H helicopters; 

• Replace obsolete patrol aircraft; 
and 

• Permit improvements in antitank, 
antiaircraft, and command and control 
systems. 

This $80 million FMS program re- 
quested for Thailand represents a $30 
million increase over the current fiscal 
year, the largest increase for any East 
Asian country. Fifty million dollars of 
the proposed Thai FMS program will be 
extended in the form of direct credits at 
a concessional rate; Thailand would be 
the first East Asian country to receive 
such direct credits. 

Our Thai proposal also includes $10 
million in ESF. Although no ESF was 
proposed for the current year, in each of 
the first 2 fiscal years, $2 million has 
been obtained by reprograming, in 
response to Thailand's urgent need to 
provide additional assistance to Thai 
citizens adversely affected by the 
refugee influx and in security in the 
border area. The proposed IMET level 
for Thailand would increase from the 
current level of $770,000 under the con- 
tinuing resolution to $2 million. These 
increases will help keep force moderniza- 
tion on track by providing training for 
the use of the equipment and systems 
purchased through FMS. 

The $35.8 million requested in 
development assistance for Thailand is 
very small, whether one compares it to 
the $1.1 billion in 1982 loans expected 
from the World Bank, Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, and Japan or to Thailand's 
total FY 1982 external borrowing re- 
quirement of $1.7 billion. Our aid pro- 
gram will provide technical assistance 
and training designed to improve the 
Thai Government's ability to use 
substantial development assistance from 
its other sources more efficiently. 

FMS and development assistance at 
the softest possible terms is an urgent 
requirement if Thailand is to maintain 
its force modernization and development 
efforts. Thailand is expected to incur 
serious debt servicing problems by 1985 
unless current account adjustments are 
made. In recognition of this, the Thai 
Government has decided to forego com- 
mercial borrowing for defense purposes 
and, instead, rely on internal revenues 
and government-to-government loans. 
Our assistance program, with substantial 
direct credits and grants, will reinforce 
that sound economic policy decision. 

Indonesia 

Indonesia is strongly anti-Communist 
and has been a reliable supporter of 



28 



U.S. positions on significant issues such 
as Afghanistan and Iran. As the largest 
ASEAN nation, it is well-suited to con- 
tribute to our long-term interest in 
maintaining regional stability. It is 
strategically located astride the sea 
lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, provides 6% of U.S. petroleum 
imports, and plays a moderating role in 
many multilateral fora. Our relations are 
basically on a sound footing, but our 
support for Indonesian defense and 
development efforts has not kept pace 
with the growth in its strategic impor- 
tance. 

For FY 1982 we propose a 50%, or 
$15 million, increase in FMS funds over 
the current level of $30 million. This in- 
crease aims at restoring Indonesian 
confidence in the U.S. commitment to 
regional security while assisting In- 
donesia to counter the growing Soviet 
and Vietnamese naval presence in 
Southeast Asia. It also adjusts for infla- 
tionary increases in the price of weapons 
systems that have reduced real assist- 
ance levels over the past several years. 

In recent years the Indonesians have 
used FMS credits to modernize their air 
and naval forces. Our currently propos- 
ed increase in FMS credits would permit 
purchase of badly needed mobility equip- 
ment and possibly another C-130. Addi- 
tional IMET is also needed to help offset 
past cuts in Indonesia's IMET program 
and mitigate Indonesian skepticism con- 
cerning U.S. support. 

Our development aid program in In- 
donesia is one of the most effective in 
the world. It remains of great impor- 
tance because of the U.S. stake in the 
success of Indonesian modernization 
efforts. Although Indonesia benefits 
from higher oil prices, which have for 
the first time given the country a 
balance-of-payments surplus, it remains 
by far the poorest of the five ASEAN 
countries, with a per capita income of 
$431. 

Almost all of our aid to Indonesia is 
used for technical assistance designed to 
achieve long-term developmental 
benefits to the Indonesian economy, such 
as agricultural training and research, 
health and social development programs, 
and the provincial development project 
which provides training to low-level 
government officials responsible for 
rural development planning. 

While our economic aid has been 
shrinking, aid programs of other donor 
nations has been increasing. Budgetary 
constraints and severe competition from 



urgent programed requirements in othe 
regions, such as Central America, have 
precluded meeting the pledge of $160 
million in economic aid we made at last 
year's intergovernmental group aiding 
Indonesia. The $75 million in 
developmental assistance and the $30 
million in PL 480 assistance which we 
seek is the absolute minimum we shoul 
allocate to Indonesia. 



i 



a 



Malaysia 

Rich in natural resources and level of 
economic development and solidly anti- 
Communist in orientation, Malaysia, lik 
Indonesia and Singapore, occupies a 
critical strategic position on the Malacc 
Strait. Like its neighbors, it is worried 
by Vietnamese aggression and the in- 
creased Soviet presence in Asia and is 
increasingly desirous of stronger secur 
ty ties with the United States. On its 
own, it has been engaged in a steady 
effort to increase its military forces, in 
eluding plans to double the size of its 
army over the FY 1982-83 period. 

We have requested increased FMS 
credits for Malaysia-up from $10 
million to $12.5 million -for FY 1982 t 
finance a portion of the rehabilitation 
costs of A-4 aircraft purchased with 
prior year FMS credits, as well as to 
help finance some of the equipment 
necessary to double the size of the am 

The significant increase which we 
have requested in Malaysia's IMET pp 
gram for FY 1982 -to $650,000 from 
the $300,000 current level -is an activ 
albeit partial, response to a Malaysian 
request. 

Burma 

Burma is a country of growing intern? 
tional significance and considerable lor 
term economic potential. It is decidedl 
in our interest that Burma remain 
friendly to the United States and our 
other allies and friends in the region a 
that it be kept out of the Soviet sphep 
of influence. 

Recent trends in Burma have beer 
encouraging. Rice production is up to 
level capable of 1 million tons of expor 
per year. The government is stable an 
more willing to cooperate with the 
United States than in past years of 
strong isolationism. 

Our economic development assist- 
ance program in Burma is an importai 
means of broadening our relationship 
and our contacts within the Burmese 
Government. Two-thirds of the $7.5 
million we are requesting will go for 
agricultural assistance designed to 






_ t f»A _ A _ 



East Asia 



:;■ 



enable the Burmese to become self- 
sufficient in foodstuffs they now import. 
The remainder will go for a continued 
U.S. contribution to the development of 
primary health care facilities in rural 
areas. 

Our security assistance program in 
Burma is appropriately modest and is 
aimed at building a warmer bilateral 
relationship. Currently Burma receives 
only token IMET and no FMS credits. 
The FY 1982 proposal would move 
Burma's IMET program from its current 
level of $31,000 to a still modest 
$150,000 program which would permit 
14 or 15 students to be trained. 



it Association of South East Asian 
Nations 

Perhaps the most positive development 
is Southeast Asia over the past 6 years 
has been the emergence of ASEAN as a 
stronger and more cohesive body afford- 
ing both an improved means of coopera- 
tion and consultations among its mem- 
bers, with regard to meeting the Viet- 
nam threat in specific and achieving 
greater policy coordination in general 
and a means by which the United States 
can deal with the member countries as a 
whole. 

We believe that the continued 
growth and development of this 
organization is in our interest, and we 
have, therefore, requested $3.3 million 
for ASEAN to fund several projects in- 
volving training of participants from 
each of the five member countries. The 
amount is very small in relation to 
ASEAN assistance offered by Japan and 
the European Economic Community, 
both of which have recently boosted 
their aid commitments to ASEAN. This 
aid program is an important element of 
the U.S. -ASEAN dialogue and under- 
lines our continuing commitment to the 
area. 

Singapore is a good friend and a 
strong supporter of increased U.S. in- 
volvement in Asia. The Government of 
Singapore provides virtually unlimited 
access to excellent and strategically 
located air and seaport facilities for U.S. 
forces operating in the Indian Ocean. 

As a gesture of U.S. support for 
Singapore, we propose to inaugurate a 
new $50,000 IMET program to provide 
added professional military and technical 
training for personnel who have the 
potential for playing key roles in the 
Singaporean military. The program 
would provide additional assistance to 
Singapore in maintaining the skills 
needed for effective operation and main- 
tenance of U.S. -origin equipment and 



fIV 



en 



enhance managerial skills while pro- 
moting a better understanding of the 
United States. 

Pacific Islands 

We have proposed a $5 million program 
for the South Pacific as a key part of an 
effort to establish beneficial ties with the 
growing number of independent island 
countries. We enjoy an unusually 
favorable strategic position in the South 
Pacific, where there is currently no resi- 
dent Soviet diplomatic or aid presence 
despite repeated Russian efforts to find 
an opening. The very small aid budget 
must cover nine independent countries 
and two autonomous states. We are just 
now initiating our first projects in newly 
independent Vanautu and Kiribati. 

The $20,000 we request for Papua 
New Guinea will assist that government 
to realize its training objective of send- 
ing two to three officers to the United 
States for training. The program will 
enhance efforts to upgrade the Papua 
New Guinea defense force by sending 
officers to the U.S. Naval explosive or- 
dinance demolition training. It will also 
permit some training in coastal 
surveillance and instruction in repair 
and maintenance of various types of 
equipment. 

Conclusion 

In short, what we are proposing for FY 
1982 is a total package of $638,595 
million in various forms of U.S. military 
assistance, economic development, and 
PL 480 aid. It is both appropriate from 
the point of view of strengthening our 
security posture in the East Asia region 
and in tune with current U.S. Govern- 
ment budgetary realities. Through the 
program we are requesting, with its mix 
of security and developmental funding 
and its variety of Asian recipients, we 
believe we can maintain our defense and 
security interests in such countries as 
Korea and the Philippines, while 
strengthening our ties with, and foster- 
ing greater security and stability in, the 
nations of Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific. We have appreciated the sup- 
port of this committee and the House in 
pursuing our foreign assistance goals in 
past years, and we ask for your strong 
support for this submission. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Visit of Japanese 
Foreign Minister 



Japanese Foreign Minister 
Masayoshi Ito made an official visit to 
Washington, D.C, March 23-2U, 1981. 
Following are remarks made to the press 
by Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister 
Ito after the Foreign Minister's meeting 
with the President on March 2U. 1 

Secretary Haig. I'm delighted to have 
an opportunity to meet with you this 
morning to discuss the conversations 
that we've held here in Washington over 
the last 2 days with the distinguished 
Foreign Minister of Japan, Foreign 
Minister Ito. I would like to keep this 
press briefing limited to those discus- 
sions out of deference to our distin- 
guished visitor. He has had extensive 
conversations with the Secretary of 
State -my self -with our Secretaries of 
Defense, the Treasury, and Commerce, 
and with the U.S. Trade Representative. 
This morning he met with Vice Presi- 
dent Bush for about an hour, and he has 
just concluded a very detailed and cor- 
dial discussion with the President. 

Q. How about the National Securi- 
ty Adviser? 

Secretary Haig. He was in attend- 
ance. The discussions ranged far and 
wide, from East- West relations to a 
number of regional foreign policy issues 
and security issues in Asia, Southeast 
Asia, the Pacific -our relationships in 
the trilateral sense. There was great em- 
phasis on a new period of consultation 
between our Japanese friends and the 
United States, and I think, in that con- 
text, there were discussions also with 
respect to the developing world and the 
important role that Japan is playing in 
the developing countries. 

There were, as always, some 
differences that you would anticipate 
between sovereign nations, but on the 
whole, I think the convergence of view, 
especially with respect to the need for 
unity and coherence among the Western 
alliance of nations including Japan, was 
both encouraging and a very good omen 
for the period ahead. 

Foreign Minister Ito. As Secretary 
Haig just explained to you, we have had 
very extensive discussions on a number 



May 1981 



29 



East Asia 



of questions such as East- West rela- 
tions, the tension that exists m the inter- 
national community, and a number of 
bilateral issues. All in all, we had very 
fruitful meetings and through these 
meetings, I explained to the American 
side very clearly that Japan, as a 
member of the Western world, is deter- 
mined to fulfill its responsibility and its 
role for world peace. The primary pur- 
pose of my visit to Washington is to 
reaffirm and strengthen further the rela- 
tionship of trust that exists between our 
two countries, and I feel confident that 
we can do that. 

Q. Has the Reagan Administration 
asked the Japanese Government to 
cooperate in setting some voluntary 
restraints on exports of Japanese 
automobiles? And even if it has not, 
would the Japanese Government and 
the Japanese automobile industry be 
prepared to exercise some voluntary 
restraints in exports? 

Foreign Minister Ito. The other 
question was taken up in my meeting 
with the President as well as with the 
Vice President and also with the 
Secretary of State. Through these 
meetings, I have heard a very clear ex- 
planation of the situation of the 
American auto industry, the plight in 
which that industry finds itself, as well 
as the mood and the moods on the Hill. 

The agreement that came out from 
the meeting is, first, that a major objec- 
tive is to preserve the principle of free 
trade. As to the specifics of what 
methods might be followed in pursuance 
of this objective, there will continue to 
be discussions between the two sides 
and with -through these meetings, at 
this time, we did not go into the 
specifics of what kind of steps might be 
desirable on the part of Japan and so 
forth. 

What we are trying to strive for is 
to bring about satisfactory resolution of 
the problem as soon as possible, hopeful- 
ly, before the Prime Minister's visit. 

Q. Secretary Haig, will you further 
elaborate on the areas of disagree- 
ment? 

Secretary Haig. With respect to the 
automotive question, the Foreign 
Minister described it as it was. We had a 
very free exchange of views and an ex- 
change of conerns on the subject. I 
would not care to add one word to what 
the distinguished Minister said. In the 
area of differences of opinion, or 
differences of emphasis, I think, clearly, 



we've had longstanding problems in the 
area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
exchange of technology and materials 
with respect to this which I would an- 
ticipate will be the subject of further 
discussions between ourselves and our 
Japanese friends with a view toward 
greater flexibility than heretofore on the 

U.S. side. 

There were discussions in the areas 
of great importance to our Secretary of 
Commerce, Mr. [Malcolm] Baldrige, in 
the fishing area, and we will proceed to 
try to resolve these differences in the 
mutual interest of both governments and 
both sectors of our society. I would sug- 
gest that we had discussions not to in- 
dicate that there were differences but 
really to indicate that we have to 
broaden our dialogue in this area and in 
the areas of security-related issues. 

We were able and our defense minis- 
ter was able to outline, clearly, 
American plans in this area, and they 
hope that all of our partners in the com- 
munity of nations will carry their share. 
We have, I think, clarified each others' 
thinking in important ways in our deal- 
ings with the East and West, especially 
in the light, as the Minister pointed out, 
of the continuing Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan and the tensions that that 
has caused internationally. We discussed 
regional balances and the pressures 
developing in the Far Eastern area and 
the need to maintain stability and a con- 
tinuing structure for peace. 

Q. The American side asked the 
Japanese side to undertake voluntary 
restraints because the alternative 
might be mandatory restraints from 
our side? 

Secretary Haig. I'm not going to go 
beyond the statement made by our 
visitor which coincides with the answer I 
would have given you had the question 
come to me, and I think enough was 
said on that subject for now. 

Q. You mean to say that you will 
not say whether a specific request was 
made? 

Secretary Haig. I'm not trying to 
go beyond the description that our 
distinguished visitor laid out, and that 
speaks for itself. We can go through a 
prying exercise, but there'll be no 
response beyond - 

Q. If you didn't come to an agree- 
ment here today, when will you have 
an agreement? What's your deadline? 

Secretary Haig. On what? 



Q. Cutting the imports of Japanese 
cars. And why don't you consider this 
visit a failure because you didn't have 
more of a concrete result? 

Secretary Haig. No. There's no 
failure -that term would be totally inap- 
propriate. There's been no discussion of 
an agreement. We are exchanging views 
on a complex matter, and we will con- 
tinue to do so. 



Q. You have a deadline? 

Secretary Haig. No. We don't have 
a deadline. I'm sorry. There are no 
deadlines. There are no negotiations 
underway. We are merely exchanging 
views on this sensitive and complex 
issue with the view toward our concern 
about the maintenance of free trade in- 
ternationally 



BCOI 

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Q. William Casey [Director of Cen 
tral Intelligence] was reported to have 
asked Prime Minister Suzuki to rendei 
aid to Pakistan. Was this discussed 
with the President and Secretary 
Haig? 

Foreign Minister Ito. I am not 
familiar with the particular report that 
you have just referred to, but in my 
meeting I did explain to Secretary Haig 
about my visit to Pakistan which took 
place last September. I explained to him 
how positively we are providing assist- 
ance to Pakistan, and I explained to him 
also how important Pakistan is, in my 
view, in that part of the world. But I die 
not go into the question of what we 
would like the United States to do, and 
so forth. 

Q. Has the United States at any 
point, either through Secretary Haig 
or President Reagan, expressed the in 
terest that the Japanese should 
perhaps increase their defense spend- 
ing or do more for the defense of the 
West? 

Foreign Minister Ito. In my discus 
sion with the Secretary of Defense then 
were references to the American 
defense budget and the efforts that the 
U.S. Government is making, but there 
was no specific discussion of what the 
United States would like Japan to do 
with respect to Japan's defense budget 
and so forth. There was a general ex- 
pression of expectation that more be 
done by Japan. 



'Press release 72 of Mar. 25, 1981.1 



Department of State Bulletir 



ECONOMICS 






Sixth International Tin Agreement 



by Michael Calingaert 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Treasury, Postal Service, and 
General Government of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on March 19, 
1981. Mr. Calingaert is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Business 
Affairs. 1 

I am very pleased to testify here today 
on behalf of the Administration's request 
for $120 million to meet U.S. obligations 
to the buffer stock of a sixth Interna- 
tional Tin Agreement (ITA). Negotia- 
tions for this new agreement are under- 
way in Geneva right now. The outlines 
of the new agreement are fairly clear, 
and it promises to be far different from 
the existing agreement. 

The Ford Administration decided in 
1976 that the United States would join 
the current, or fifth International Tin 
Agreement, which was ratified by the 
■Senate September 15, 1976. It has been 
extended for the maximum permissible 
period of 1 year and will now expire 
Uune 30, 1982. Thus, if the United 
States joins a new tin agreement, it will 
be liable for financial obligations to that 
agreement in July 1982. 

When the negotiations for a new tin 
agreement are completed, the Ad- 
ministration will carefully review the 
agreement to determine whether it is in 
our national interest to participate. If 
so, it will be sent to the Senate for ad- 
vice and consent to ratification, and the 
necessary authorizing legislation will be 
submitted to both Houses. At this time, 
we do not know the precise details of 
the new agreement, but we do know its 
general provisions. I would like, 
however, to sketch for you the general 
principles which we seek to have incor- 
porated in the new tin agreement, in 
order that it will provide equitable 
benefits for tin consumers as well as tin- 
producing nations. 

Price Stabilization 

For many years, it has generally been 
U.S. policy to examine international 
commodity problems on a case-by-case 



basis and to support the concept of in- 
ternational commodity agreements for 
those few products where there have 
been severe price fluctuations and where 
internationally agreed upon measures 
appeared to offer workable and ap- 
propriate solutions. Although the term 
"commodities" covers a broad range 
from tin and natural rubber, for exam- 
ple, to sugar and coffee, these com- 
modities have a number of common at- 
tributes. 

• They are important revenue 
earners for developing nations. 

• They are principally consumed by 
the industrialized countries. 

• They are subject to cyclical fluc- 
tuations in supply or demand. 

Arising from such varied causes as 
weather conditions or rapid changes in 
economic activity in the industrial world, 
these fluctuations can result in sharp 
surges, upward and downward, in price 
levels. This type of unstable price activi- 
ty causes difficulties for the exporting 
developing nations owing to unpredict- 
able changes in foreign exchange 
receipts, may result in long-term loss of 
markets for the product in question, and 
may discourage investment in new, more 
efficient production capacity. 

In the case of certain products, we 
have advocated use of large buffer 
stocks as an appropriate price stabiliza- 
tion measure, together with supply 
assurances and other measures to en- 
courage production to respond to 
market forces. We have, in these cases, 
viewed buffer stocks as the device most 
likely to be economically efficient and to 
yield benefits for consumers as well as 
producers. 

Simply stated, when a buffer stock 
mechanism is used to stabilize prices in 
an international commodity agreement, 
the organization established by the 
agreement purchases the commodity 
when prices drop below an agreed upon 
point and keeps on buying until the price 
returns to the desired level. Subsequent- 
ly, when prices exceed an agreed upon 
level, sales are made in order to drive 
prices down to the desired range. The 
existence of price-stabilizing commodity 
arrangements is intended to offer an 



enhanced environment for productive 
new investment and to offer the benefits 
of greater market stability to efficient 
producers and to consumers. 

The Foreign Policy Context 

As a group and individually, the develop- 
ing countries have a continuing and 
strong interest in world commodity 
trade. For many of them, raw material 
exports remain an essential source of 
foreign exchange earnings and employ- 
ment. Many of these nations place great 
store, as they evaluate our concern for 
their political stability and development, 
on what we show ourselves ready to do 
to help alleviate commodity market in- 
stability. 

U.S. commodity initiatives in the 
past have, thus, often earned us useful 
political dividends at marginal costs. 
They have contributed to our set of 
cooperative relationships with important 
countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia. Although we 
cannot satisfy many of their demands, 
our demonstrated willingness to listen 
and to act, where possible, is often a 
major plus in our overall relations with 
these countries. This also creates a basis 
for achieving other U.S. economic, 
strategic, and political goals in these 
countries. 

Participation in the International Tin 
Agreement not only provides the United 
States with potential economic benefits 
through price stabilization but also con- 
tributes to our interest in supporting the 
progress and stability of a number of 
friendly developing nations, including 
three key members of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)- 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The 
United States has an important strategic 
interest in supporting these nations in 
the face of increasing Soviet and Viet- 
namese military activity in Southeast 
Asia. The world's fourth largest tin ex- 
porter is Bolivia, a nation whose views 
of the United States have often been col- 
ored by its perception of our tin 
stockpile policy. 

U.S. Objectives in a New Tin 
Agreement 

As members since 1976 of the fifth tin 
agreement, we have determined that the 



May 1981 



31 



Economics 



agreement, in its present form, does not 
promise to provide the benefits we 
would hope for. This problem has 
several elements, including the question 
of supply policies in producing countries. 
A particular element which has become 
a major focus in the negotiations is the 
relatively small size of the buffer stock 
in the current agreement and the low 
point at which export controls may be 
imposed. The result is that the agree- 
ment potentially can serve to defend the 
floor price and assist producers much 
more than it can defend the ceiling price 
and offer commensurate benefits to con- 
sumers. 

Among our primary objectives in 
negotiating a new tin agreement are a 
much larger buffer stock, together with 
agreement that export controls may only 
be imposed as a measure of last resort. 
A working paper, which was acceptable 
to most producers, circulated at the 
December negotiations, proposed a 
buffer stock of 50,000 tons. In contrast, 
the current agreement provides for a 
mandatory buffer stock of only 20,000 
tons, which has never been fully ac- 
quired and might never be, since pro- 
ducers may request a vote to impose ex- 
port controls when only 5,000 tons have 
been purchased by the buffer stock. 

The United States has told other 
participants in the negotiations that we 
still seek improvements in the approach 
proposed in the working paper. We feel 
that a large buffer stock is necessary not 
only to defend the floor price but also to 
defend a ceiling price. The agreement 
will also afford a forum where con- 
sumers can press for assurances that 
future tin supplies will be adequate to 
meet demand at reasonable prices. 



Calculating the U.S. Share 

Monies requested to cover potential U.S. 
contributions to the buffer stock can be 



considered an investment, rather than 
an outright expenditure, since the agree- 
ment will provide that funds in the 
buffer stock account shall be returned to 
members upon termination of the agree- 
ment. Our estimates, based upon 
reasonable and prudent assumptions 
regarding future tin prices and other 
factors, indicate that the total cost of ac- 
quiring, insuring, and storing the large 
buffer stock we seek would be approx- 
imately $850 million. Producers and con- 
sumers will share these costs equally. 
We estimate that the U.S. share of this 
cost would be $120 million. This finan- 
cial obligation is determined by our 
share of votes in the agreement, which, 
in turn, is determined largely by our 
share of world tin consumption. 

We anticipate that the new agree- 
ment will provide for members to make 
direct financial contributions to pay for 
the greater part of the tin to be acquired 
for the buffer stock. Acquisition of the 
remaining portion would be financed by 
borrowing, using existing tin holdings in 
the buffer stock as collateral. To insure 
that the full amount of the buffer stock 
will actually be purchased, we are in- 
sisting that member governments fully 
commit themselves to whatever financ- 
ing is needed for the acquisition and 
maintenance of the full buffer stock. 

Accordingly, our estimate of $120 
million is based upon the U.S. share of 
the entire buffer stock. In actual prac- 
tice, we anticipate that only an initial 
contribution will be required in FY 1982. 
The remainder of the $120 million 
budget authority would remain available 
for the life of the sixth tin agreement to 
enable the United States to make con- 
tributions to the buffer stock account, if 
and when they are called for. 

Conclusion 

If a new tin agreement, such as I have 
outlined here, is intended to benefit both 
consumers and producers, you might 
well wonder why negotiations have 
dragged on through three lengthy 
sessions -April-May 1980, December 



1980, March 1981. The reason is, not 
surprisingly, that other nations par- 
ticipating in the tin agreement do not 
necessarily share our objectives, nor our 
concerns about the cost-benefit analysis. 
Some tin-consuming nations view com- 
modity arrangements, in part, as exten- 
sions of their foreign aid programs and, 
thus, do not insist as strongly as we do 
upon an equitable division of economic 
benefits between producers and con- 
sumers. Some nations also are less con- 
cerned about the agreement's ability to 
defend ceiling prices than they are aboul 
the cash costs of participating in an 
agreement involving a large buffer 
stock. 

At this stage, it is difficult to predict 
exactly how the negotiations for a new 
tin agreement will turn out. I am sure 
you understand that I cannot be very 
specific about our precise negotiating ob 
jectives here in public, since the negotia- 
tions are presently in course. However, 
do want to stress again that once a new 
agreement is reached, the Administra- 
tion will examine it very carefully befon 
a decision is reached to join it and seek 
congressional approval. 



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'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



prt 



32 



Department of State Bulleti 



if. 

fell 



lei 
ft 

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ENERGY 



Energy Policy and Conservation Act 



by Edward L. Morse 

Statement before the Senate Commit- 
tee on Energy and Natural Resources on 
March 2, 1981. Mr. Morse is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. ' 

My primary purpose today is to convey 
to you the support of the Department of 
State for extension of section 252 of the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(EPCA). Section 252 provides the basis, 
through the extension of an antitrust 
defense, for the voluntary cooperation of 
U.S. oil companies in efforts under the 
auspices of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) to minimize adverse 
effects of oil-supply disruptions on the 
United States and our partners in the 
agency. 

Energy Security 

Despite increasingly intense efforts over 
the past decade to define and respond to 
our energy needs, energy security, yet, 
remains a goal rather than a reality for 
the United States and its allies. While 
this is a very broad issue, the fundamen- 
tal problem is our dependence on im- 
ported and, thus, uncertain supplies of 
oil. In the years following the 1973-74 
oil-supply crisis, we grew increasingly 
complacent that we had our energy 
problems if not solved, at least under 
control. This complacency was shattered 
in 1979 by the Iranian revolution and 
the tripling of oil prices which resulted 
from it despite the fact that the actual 
oil-supply shortfall was relatively 
modest. New lessons had to be learned 
and defensive actions taken. 

The fact that no major new run-up 
in oil prices has occurred so far in 
response to the Iran-Iraq war suggests 
that we may be headed in the right 
direction. This favorable result, 
however, has been, to a large extent, the 
product of the coincidence of declining 
demand and high oil stocks in this coun- 
try and elsewhere available to compen- 
sate for the 3.8 million barrels per day 
decline in oil flows. Companies may not 
be holding such large stocks at the 
outset of future oil-supply disruptions. 
We need to join with our allies to study 
carefully the events of the past 2 years, 
anticipate new energy crises which may 



threaten our economies, and develop 
protective measures accordingly. 

The extent to which we are in- 
terdependent with the other Western in- 
dustrialized countries in responding suc- 
cessfully to energy crises dictates that 
we concentrate our efforts to promote 
peacetime energy security in the IEA. 
The IEA is engaged in efforts to re- 
spond to both the short- and the long- 
term aspects of our energy problems. 
Looking at the longer term, the 
dependence of IEA countries on im- 
ported oil has begun to drop off rapidly 
as members have established targets for 
reducing oil imports and joined together 
in pursuing conservation and conversion 
to other fuels. 

The Sharing System 

The IEA's emergency oil-sharing system 
is its key tool for responding to sudden 
oil-market disruptions. It is also the 
foundation upon which all other 
cooperative efforts in the IEA are built. 
International cooperation in minimizing 
ill effects of supply disruptions will only 
be strong if participants remain satisfied 
that the costs of major disruptions will 
be borne equitably. The sharing system 
provides this assurance, even though it 
has never yet been activated. 

However, we now recognize that the 
sharing system is not the appropriate in- 
strument for responding to all emergen- 
cies. Necessarily elaborate in its pro- 
cedures for allocating oil, its use clearly 
is justified only in a major disruption 
where large quantities of oil must be 
allocated. It is not well-suited to han- 
dling situations like that which obtained 
in 1979 when the shortfall was below the 
7% level required to trigger the sharing 
system but sufficient to cause panic in 
the oil market and an upward spiral in 
oil prices. 

During the past 2 years, therefore, 
the IEA has undertaken efforts outside 
the sharing system aimed at forestalling 
unnecessary oil price increases. Most 
recently, in the face of the Iran-Iraq war 
and the oil-supply reductions it 
generated, IEA members met promptly 



and announced concerted actions to 
maintain an orderly market and avoid 
another round of oil-price increases. 
These included commitments to draw on 
stocks as necessary, to discourage pur- 
chases of oil on terms which would exert 
pressure on the oil market and prices, 
and to seek to supply oil to any member 
countries which might suffer a serious 
shortage as a result of this disruption. 

We need, now, to assess the results 
of this experience and the need for fur- 
ther action. To this end, we are embark- 
ing in the IEA on a review of the Inter- 
national Energy Program Agreement 
which defines the functions of the IEA 
and actions to be taken in response to 
oil-market disruptions. We will, of 
course, consult closely with the Congress 
as this study progresses. We have re- 
quested a relatively short extension of 
EPCA section 252 in the expectation 
that hearings on a further extension at 
that time will provide a timely oppor- 
tunity for us to discuss with you the 
results of the study and any implications 
it might have for section 252. 

Extending Section 252 

IEA crisis management would be 
nothing more than words without the 
cooperation of the companies which ac- 
tually import oil into IEA countries. It is 
for this reason that we have sought the 
voluntary cooperation of oil companies 
in the IEA within the framework 
established by section 252. Of course, 
cooperation by oil companies in the 
kinds of information-sharing and oil 
allocation called for in the IEA is 
generally prohibited by U.S. antitrust 
laws. 

It is a long-established tradition of 
the American economic system that ex- 
ceptions to the antitrust laws be granted 
only in extreme circumstances where na- 
tional policy interests outweigh the risks 
of anticompetitive actions. Clearly, the 
need to cope with serious oil-market 
disruptions and minimize the massive 
price runups associated therewith fits 
within this tradition. We are pleased 
that the Congress has concurred in this 
determination by repeatedly extending 
the life of section 252 providing the 
necessary defense to antitrust laws for 
U.S. -company participation in the IEA. 

Of course, that determination was 
facilitated by incorporation into the 
statute of safeguards designed to 



May 1981 



33 



Energy 



minimize the potential for an- 
ticompetitive actions by companies 
benefiting from the section 252 antitrust 
defense. The antitrust authorities 
charged with monitoring oil company in- 
volvement in the IEA indicate to us that 
there has been no evidence of harm to 
consumer interests from this arrange- 
ment. To the contrary, we are convinced 
that section 252 is fundamentally of 
benefit to consumers because it aims at 
reducing unjustified price increases dur- 
ing oil supply disruptions. 

We, therefore, strongly urge the 
committee to recommend extension of 
section 252 as provided in the Energy 
Department's bill. We would further ap- 
peal for your support in obtaining enact- 
ment of the bill prior to the existing 
March 15 expiration date of section 252. 
A lapse in the authority of section 252 of 
even a few days may result in suspen- 
sion of U.S. oil company participation in 
the IEA for weeks. This would be 
disruptive to the work of the IEA, 
would be detrimental to the national in- 
terest if a new disruption was to occur, 
and would reflect badly on the United 
States in our relations with our allies. 



Energy Security and International 
Preparedness 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Edward L. Morse 

Address before "The Outlook for 
Crude Oil" conference sponsored by the 
Energy Bureau, Inc., in Houston on 
March 23, 1981. Mr. Morse is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. 

The outlook for crude oil is a subject 
that has never been more timely or so 
difficult to deal with. The last 2 years 
have been turbulent ones for the oil 
markets. We have seen disruption, revo- 
lution, and war in the Persian Gulf. At 
home, we have moved quickly from a 
complex regulatory environment to com- 
plete crude oil decontrol. On the inter- 
national market, crude oil prices have 
more than doubled since the beginning 
of 1979. International systems of adjust- 
ment and emergency preparedness were 
thus tested by political events. Our con- 
clusion is that they need to be 
strengthened and improved. 

If the past is prologue, can we ex- 
pect more disruption in crude oil sup- 
plies in the years ahead? Although no 
one can really predict, my answer would 
be "yes." I hope I am wrong. In today's 
oil market, stability has become a scarce 
commodity, although there are signs of 
hope. Given the likelihood that we may 
face disruptions, therefore, we must 
both learn from the past and create for 
the future. We need to make an in- 
novative effort to fashion new and im- 
proved mechanisms to increase energy 
security without abandoning -indeed by 
building on -the tested elements of 
market flexibility. 

It is my view that in the years ahead 
energy market pressure and crises re- 
quiring international cooperation will 
come from any one of three quarters. 
One source is the ever-present risk of 
supply disruption associated with 
political conflict. Today's continuing war 
between Iran and Iraq and the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war are but two leading ex- 
amples. I would also include in this 
category threats of destination restric- 
tions for political reasons, for example, 
by Nigeria in carrying out its policy 
toward South Africa or by other pro- 
ducers; domestic clashes over energy 



policy like the recent one between Alber- 
ta and Ottawa which has now resulted in 
a shutting in of 100,000 barrels per day 
of production; and other nonviolent po- 
litical disputes as factors in determining 
oil production and exports. Nor is the 
problem limited to crude availability 
alone. European dependence on the 
Soviet Union for substantial amounts of 
natural gas holds the seeds of future 
problems as well. 

A second source of disruption is sure 
to be social upheaval. This may remind 
many of the strikes and chaos of Iranian 
revolution and its impact on oil produc- 
tion and exports in late 1978 and 1979. 
We need to bear in mind that the over- 
whelming proportion of crude oil traded 
internationally comes from developing 
areas of the world. It is precisely these 
areas that are undergoing unpredictable 
processes of modernization, which is in- 
evitably accompanied by internal social 
stress. Examples are India's continuing 
problem in maintaining oil production in 
its Assam Province in the face of strikes 
and sabotage, problems of terrorism and 
sabotage also exist in Turkey, and the 
continuing threat of similar incidents 
almost anywhere. Nor are industrial 
countries immune to this problem, as 
coal strikes in Britain, Australia, and the 
United States during the last 5 years 
should remind us. 

One other source of market pressure 
with potential for erupting into an un- 
necessary price spiral is the potential no- 
tional shortfalls caused by sudden de- 
mand surges in a market narrowly in 
balance. The unfortunate fact is that 
crude oil production capacity is not be- 
ing expanded in pace with predicted 
paths of energy demand, and there is 
very little we can do about this in the 
short run. A rapid and simultaneous 
economic recovery in the major OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] countries could, there 
fore, quickly lead to crude shortages 
and price pressures without any im- 
mediate available supply response. Coin- 
cidental cold winters hold some of the 
same risks, although healthy stock level: 
can obviate much of that worry. 

Viewing these problems and our lac 



34 



Dfinartmpnt of Rtato Rnllotin 



Energy 



of adequate preparedness, Secretary 
Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the industrial democra- 
cies "have not vet built an effective pro-^ 
gram for dealing with the energy crisis. 
iWe do have one element, the emergency 
, oil allocation system of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). Never imple- 
mented, but tested in several full-scale 
simulations, the IEA-sharing system is 
I designed to counter the catastrophic 
i shortfall -over 7% of combined IEA oil 
I imports. This mechanism can and should 
.1 be improved even though disruptions of 
J this magnitude remain improbable. 
In the oil markets in the years 
: ahead, much smaller crude shortfalls, 
ij say some 2%-4% of IEA consumption, 

I are much more likely -some would 
•I argue inevitable. They can lead to sharp 

I I spot market price spikes, later ratified 
J bv the Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
| porting Countries (OPEC). We believe, 
I therefore, that we need to improve our 

I collective preparedness for these smaller 

I I shortfalls, and we are just beginning the 
( process. Before discussing the ongoing 

I work, however, let me review some 

II lessons from the past that are guiding 
II our current studies. 

Iranian Revolution 

In 1979, Iranian domestic upheaval 
I caused sharp and fluctuating reductions 
9 of oil production at a time when OECD 
S stocks were well below normal levels. 
j For one brief period Iranian production, 
I which 6 months earlier hovered near 6 
I million barrels per day (b/d), completely 
I ceased. You are all familiar with the 
price consequences of that situation. In 
retrospect, I think we made three basic 
mistakes. 

First, the IEA may have con- 
tributed to alarm at the early stages of 
the crisis by flatly projecting a 2 million 
b/d shortfall before, during, and after 
the full response of other producers was 
known. The then-U.S. Secretary of 
Energy, by publicly and frequently an- 
nouncing an inflated national supply 
gap, himself effectively inspired com- 
panies to bid up the price of available 
supplies first on the spot market and 
later in term contracts. 

Second, the IEA decision in March 
1979 to cut imports by 2 million b/d (5% 
of demand) was not effective and in- 
volved no binding commitments on the 
part of governments. 



Third, substantial price pressure 
was caused through a defensive 
stockbuild by governments and com- 
panies, averaging 1 million b/d during 
1979 and 1980. Indeed, in retrospect, 
the pressures on the market in 1979 and 
early 1980 were demand led much more 
than they resulted from an effort by 
OPEC to squeeze consumers. 

These mistakes were compounded by 
a general refusal to recognize the 
substantial structural changes that had 
taken place in the international energy 
market. The percentage of crude dis- 
tributed by the majors (the seven largest 
international oil companies) declined 
from close to 90% to nearer to 50% as 
sales to third-party customers became 
discretionary or were eliminated and 
replaced by rapid growth of govern- 
ment-to-government sales. Two prob- 
lems resulted. First, flexibility in the 
distributional system was severely con- 
strained. Second, the proliferation of 
State-owned oil companies in consuming 
countries meant more players were in- 
volved in efforts to secure adequate 
stocks. Thus, on an international basis, 
the overall minimum desirable stock 
level was substantially higher than it 
had been when the international role of 
the majors was more predominant. 

Clearly, the 1979 experience points 
to the critical importance of adequate 
stock levels to disruption management. 
So, too, does it point to the need for 
good information early in the game and 
credible cooperation between leading oil 
importers. 



Impact of Iran-Iraq War 

Last year, when war broke out between 
Iran and Iraq, we knew what was at 
stake. About 3.8 million b/d in crude ex- 
ports were lost to the world market 
soon after war broke out. No one knew 
how long the war would last, although 
the general view was that it would be 
short. Some feared wider hostilities im- 
periling exports from other Persian Gulf 
ports or traffic through the Straits of 
Hormuz. If the spot market were to 
have become heated, a renewed price 
bulge would have ended hopes for eco- 
nomic recovery in 1981. And, given the 
perceived shortcomings of the IEA in 
1979, in some ways the very framework 
of international energy cooperation was 
also on trial. 



Our task last year was to use wisely 
our initial assets -high stocks and soft 
demand. Meeting within a week of the 
outbreak of the war, the IEA Governing 
Board agreed to absorb crude shortfalls 
with stock drawdowns and to "urge and 
guide" all market participants to refrain 
from any abnormal spot market pur- 
chases. These were first steps, taken to 
avoid any market runup while we waited 
to see how long the conflict would last. 

Another problem was addressed. 
Iran and, in particular, Iraq had shown 
a proclivity to encourage government-to- 
government sales. In many instances 
these sales represented a very high pro- 
portion of individual country imports, in 
some cases virtually all imports. The 
crisis, therefore, had a selective direct 
impact, affecting countries like France, 
Brazil, Turkey, and Italy, substantially, 
but scarcely affecting the United States 
or Germany. Producing countries quickly 
moved to do their part to make up lost 
supply. Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
raised its exports by 1.5 million b/d over 
its preferred production level of 8.5 
million b/d and directed its incremental 
production to those of Iraq's customers 
most severely affected. Consuming coun- 
tries recognized their own responsi- 
bilities as well, as the war dragged on 
longer than previously had been an- 
ticipated. 

At a ministerial-level meeting 
December 9, IEA members reaffirmed 
and extended these decisions, clarified 
the spot market activities that were 
"undesirable" for IEA members, and 
committed even relatively unaffected 
member countries to draw down stocks 
to achieve a balance between oil market 
supply and demand. This was to make 
more oil available through the market to 
countries in and out of the IEA facing 
serious shortfalls. 

I would not attribute the relative 
calm of the spot market during the crisis 
solely or even mostly to the IEA's pro- 
nouncements, but the IEA moves did 
help to solidify and sanction the com- 
pany decisions to refrain from spot 
market purchases. The IEA helped to 
set the psychological climate. Company 
decisions, as always, were taken on 
sound business grounds. Since OECD 
economies were flat or in recession, 
many companies had limited immediate 
needs for oil, given high stocks, and no 
company wished to become a negative 
example. In this respect the severe 
stigma attached to the behavior of some 



35 



May 1981 



Energy 



companies in 1979, particularly the 
Japanese, played a major role in keeping 
companies off the spot market. 

We realized that certain countries 
were particularly dependent on Iraqi and 
Iranian supplies, and special efforts were 
needed to make sure that these coun- 
tries would have access to other sources 
of crude. The most urgent such case was 
Turkey, which depended on the two 
combatants for 70% of normal crude im- 
ports and where financial stringency had 
prevented the accumulation of more 
than 40 days' stocks. 

At Turkey's request, IE A Executive 
Director Lantzke coordinated an infor- 
mal effort to analyze Turkey's needs and 
to examine how the shortfall in oil sup- 
plies might be made up. The United 
States and other IE A members con- 
tacted oil companies to inform them of 
Turkey's needs and to suggest that any 
available and appropriate crude cargoes 
be offered to Turkey. Substantial 
amounts of oil were offered in this infor- 
mal way. As it happened, the timely re- 
sumption of Iraqi pipeline shipments, 



Planning for the Future 

It is in this uncertain environment that 
we find ourselves developing an interna- 
tional energy policy for the future. I am 
not sure any two people would agree on 
what an adequate degree of energy se- 
curity is, but I am confident that all 
would agree that generally we need 
more of it. 

For the United States, protection 
against unforeseen crude oil shortfalls 
must begin with an effective strategic 
petroleum reserve. Earlier this year, we 
began a policy of open solicitations for 
reserve purchases, subject to budgetary 
considerations, of course. It is not clear 
how much oil the Department of Energy 
will be able to purchase through the end 
of the year, but we are very encouraged 
by the offers we have received so far. 
Our intermediate goal for an effective 
national reserve remains 500 million bar- 
rels; our long-term goal is 1 billion 
barrels. 

The strategic petroleum reserve is a 
foundation for crude oil security. We an- 
ticipate it would be used in response to a 



Toqether with industry ...we can design an international energy 
policy that is resilient and effective and build the framework oj 
energy security that is needed to insure renewed and sustained 
economic growth at home and abroad. 



together with purchases from Iran, 
allowed Turkey to meet its current 
needs. 

Looking at the oil market as we 
move out of the winter heating season, 
we can say the situation is improved. 
Growing export volumes from Iran and 
Iraq in the face of continuing weak de- 
mand due to recession and to a surpris- 
ing amount of price-induced conserva- 
tion allow the market to balance. Yet we 
must continue to be cautious. The ex- 
posed Iraqi pipelines through Turkey 
and Syria can be interrupted again. A 
too-rapid effort to rebuild depleted 
stocks on the part of IE A members 
could lead to price pressure in the open 
market. And in light of these needs, 
early production cutbacks by surplus 
Persian Gulf producers could also cause 
difficulties. 



major oil supply interruption and in the 
framework of an IE A response. But it is 
not the all-purpose instrument some peo- 
ple believe it is. It is not a price 
stabilization mechanism or buffer stock 
to be used to intervene in markets. It is 
not to be used to cover small-scale, 
regional, or short-lived supply interrup- 
tions, where private stocks, demand 
restraint, fuel switching, or private 
markets can do the job. 

As important as the building of an 
effective national reserve is, therefore, 
we cannot ignore other measures to im- 
prove energy security and preparedness 
With the Iran-Iraq conflict, IEA mem- 
bers gained greater experience with in- 
formal cooperative measures. We can 
build on this and earlier experiences to 
fashion contingency measures for less 
than catastrophic crude supply interrup- 
tions that minimize marketplace inter- 
vention but prevent unjustified (and 



long-lasting) crude oil price increases. 
We are just beginning an in-depth 
review of international energy policies in 
this area, in the U.S. Government and in 
a high-level ad hoc IEA group. Let me 
mention a few of the ideas which are 
sure to be considered. 

Oil stocks in private hands are an 
important part of our energy security 
system. I believe that the informal stock 
consultations initiated following the out- 
break of the Iran-Iraq war helped estab- 
lish a psychological climate that en- 
couraged stock drawdowns in the early 
stages. We are reviewing our stock 
management and consultation policy to 
see whether improvements can be made. 
It might be advantageous, for example, 
if all IEA nations increased private 
stock levels beyond the current required 
minimum of 90 days of imports. 

There is, of course, a limit to indus- 
trial nations' ability to use public and 
private stocks to cushion supply disrup- 
tions of long duration. The role of de- 
mand restraint in counteracting sus- 
tained oil-supply shortfalls is indispen- 
sable. The United States may now rely 
to a larger extent on the free play of 
market forces to distribute oil domes- 
tically during a shortfall, but we must 
not underestimate the value of coor- 
dinated commitments by industrial coun- 
tries to restrain oil consumption in a 
crisis. We must examine the possible use 
of such domestic policy measures as 
disruption fees or taxes and other 
market-based demand restraint meas- 
ures, perhaps on a regional basis. 

We have, however, too long been 
oriented to demand-side responses in our 
efforts to deal with disruptions. The 
supply-side offers promising avenues to 
pursue as well. It may be useful, for ex- 
ample, to have surge capacity for pe- 
troleum and natural gas and expanded 
storage for such fuels as natural gas. 
The natural gas shortfall in the New 
England area this winter points to the 
need for greater preparedness. Obvious- 
ly serious policy issues, including a liq- 
uified natural gas import policy and 
price decontrol program, are involved, 
and the Administration's review of these 
issues is only beginning. We need to ac- 
celerate the development of nuclear 
energy by streamlining licensing pro- 
cedures, by creating a climate of 
political support for nuclear energy, and 



Energy 



by fostering appropriate marginal cost 
pricing for electricity. We also need to 
reduce rapidly all supply-side restraints 
on coal utilization. 

We need to examine what public 
policies are appropriate to encourage the 
construction and expansion of dual-fired 
industrial facilities. There are many in- 
dustrial processes where alternate fuels 
are feasible, and greater fuel-switching 
capability can help us offset small mar- 
ket disruptions. 

I mentioned the importance of ac- 
curate information on a continuing basis. 
As you know, the U.S. Government and 
the IEA each request a wide range of in- 
formation from the oil industry on a 
regular basis. We are taking a hard look 
at all these information-gathering efforts 
to eliminate duplication and to see what 
is truly necessary. High on my list of 
priorities is preserving the good oil com- 
pany cooperation with the IEA that we 
presently have. This is fundamental to 
the oil-sharing system. I recently 
testified in Congress to request that the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
Section 252 antitrust defense for this 
type of activity be extended for several 
months to allow us to complete our 
review and make proposals for amend- 
ment to the present law. 

All these policies and more will be 
needed to improve the state of American 
energy security. Meaningful energy 
security, however, requires more than 
contingency planning. It requires long- 
term efforts to enhance supply as well. 
We must make a determined effort to 
develop new sources of conventional and 
nonconventional energy at home and 
abroad. Here the record is good and get- 
ting better. U.S. energy production is 
up, coal output quite substantially. Price 
decontrol will help justify marginal oil 
and gas development and secondary and 
tertiary production techniques. Ac- 
celerated leasing of Federal lands will 
also provide scope for significant produc- 
tion increases. Investments in synthetic- 
fuels technologies are up and some ex- 
citing concepts are being explored. The 
President is committed to renewed at- 
tention to nuclear energy's potential. 



Investment Environment 

In closing, a cursory review of efforts to 
enhance conventional energy supplies 
cannot ignore the international invest- 
ment environment. We are justifiably 
proud of the record level of drilling ac- 
tivity in the United States today, but 
this level reflects the more favorable 
climate here for exploration and devel- 
opment more than it does the promise of 
substantial geologic potential. The sad 
fact is that some of the most promising 
areas for development of conventional 
energy sources are not being developed 
as they should be. 

In some cases, like the Middle East 
and the North Sea, this results from in- 
tentional governmental decisions to con- 
serve or to restrict production through 
taxation. We need to inspire innovative 
processes to stimulate the development 
of higher productive capacities. Else- 
where, as in our neighbor to the north, 
discriminatory investment policies, 
which favor domestic over foreign com- 
panies, run the risk of reducing substan- 
tially the optimal development of energy 
capacity. We need to remind the world 
that foreign companies are not the 
bearers of economic dependency, as 
some abstract social theories portray 
them. Rather, capital, which is willing to 
bear risk of exploration and develop- 
ment regardless of its national origin, 
can be harnessed for the well-being of 
all concerned. 

There is, as well, the sad fact that in 
many developing countries it is political- 
ly unacceptable for foreign companies - 
which have the required expertise and 
capital for exploration and develop- 
ment -to carry out work without the 
equity participation of domestic in- 
terests, which do not have the financial 
ability to invest alone. We need to ex- 
amine ways to overcome this political 
barrier, perhaps by fostering the mutual- 
ly advantageous cooperation of oil com- 
panies, national governments, private 
banks, and multilateral lending institu- 
tions. We are now examining this issue 
to see if such proposals make sense for 
U.S. policy and U.S. firms. 

We need, also, to recognize the im- 
pediment to energy resource develop- 
ment, especially in developing countries, 



which results from incompatibilities be- 
tween fiscal regimes here and abroad. 
Here, too, we need to be creative in de- 
veloping acceptable ways to reconcile 
these differences and thereby enhance 
investment in exploration and develop- 
ment. 

Finally, through the IEA's Standing 
Group on Long-Term Cooperation, 
which I chair, we are seeking to en- 
courage more effective energy policies in 
all industrial countries. Jointly, IEA na- 
tions will be reducing the role of oil in 
their economies and moving to en- 
courage new production of oil and alter- 
native sources. 

We have a long road ahead, and the 
risks of renewed crude oil supply prob- 
lems are endemic to today's world. 
Together with industry, however, we 
can design an international energy 
policy that is resilient and effective and 
build the framework of energy security 
that is needed to insure renewed and 
sustained economic growth at home and 
abroad. ■ 



May 1981 



37 



EUROPE 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



by Raymond C. Ewing 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 23, 1981. Mr. Ewing is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for European 
Affairs. 1 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before the subcommittee in support of 
the European portions of the Ad- 
ministration's proposals for security 
assistance in FY 1982. 

As Secretary Haig emphasized to 
the full committee on March 18, the Ad- 
ministration attached importance to 
security assistance as an integral compo- 
nent of our global defense posture and a 
key instrument of our foreign policy. In 
addition to our programs in other 
regions, we need to give urgent atten- 
tion to the security requirement of our 
friends and allies in Europe. I would like 
to discuss each of our major programs in 
that area. 



Spain 

The FY 1982 security assistance pro- 
gram for Spain is crucial to our own 
security because of the access it gives us 
to important Spanish air and sea 
facilities. These bases are the cor- 
nerstone of Spain's defense relationship 
with the West and are Spain's primary 
link with the Atlantic defense system. 
Beyond this, our security assistance pro- 
gram is one of the most effective tools 
we have to show in a tangible way our 
support for Spain's young democracy. 
The assistance provided directly pro- 
motes the modernization and profes- 
sionalization of Spain's Armed Forces. 
This is particularly important in helping 
to bring the Spanish Armed Forces 
closer to West European institutions. 

Our security assistance program for 
the last 5 years has been governed by 
the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Spain. The dollar 
amounts of security assistance that we 
have provided Spain under the treaty 
for each of the last 5 years are $120 
million in foreign military sales (FMS) 
credits, $15 million in our military 
assistance program, $7 million in 
economic support funds (ESF), and $2 
million in international military and 
education training (IMET). This treaty 



expires in September 1981, and we are 
in the process of negotiating a successor 
agreement with the Spanish. For FY 
1982 we are requesting amounts similar 
to those under the treaty in order to 
maintain our continued access to the im- 
portant Spanish facilities. These 
amounts, which we believe are the bare 
minimum necessary to maintain use of 
the facilities, are $150 million in FMS 
credits, $7 million in ESF, and $2.2 
million in IMET. 

The only major change from last 
year is the increase in FMS credits from 
$120 million to $150 million. This is to 
help compensate for the total elimination 
of our military assistance programs, 
which were phased out after FY 1981. 

Portugal 

The United States is encouraged by the 
degree to which stable and democratic 
government in Portugal has developed. 
Portugal has successfully made the 
difficult and delicate transition from an 
authoritarian state to one in which fun- 
damental political liberties are 
respected. Prime Minister Pinto 
Balsemao leads an administration with a 
firm parliamentary majority. 

Portugal is an important NATO ally. 
It shares our commitment to strengthen- 
ing Western security, particularly 
through NATO, and has made available 
the strategically located airfield at Lajes 
in the Azores for this purpose. Both the 
governing coalition and the Socialist-led 
democratic opposition agree that Por- 
tugal should participate as much as 
possible in NATO activities. However, 
Portuguese economic resources are in- 
adequate to support the modernization 
necessary to render such participation 
meaningful. 

Portugal, therefore, looks to the 
United States and other NATO allies for 
security assistance. Providing such aid 
facilitates cooperation with a valued and 
reliable ally and reassures the Govern- 
ment of Portugal of our commitment to 
a substantive role for Portugal in 
NATO. 

For FY 1982, we are proposing $20 
million in grant ESF; $60 million in 
FMS credits, of which $50 million would 
be at concessional interest rates; and 
$2.2 million in IMET. This program will 
help meet basic needs in all three service 
branches and continue to aid the 
economically depressed region of the 
Azores. 



Cyprus 

There have been positive developments 
in the efforts to achieve a solution of the 
Cyprus problem. In August 1980, inter- 
communal talks between the Greek- 
Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots 
resumed under the auspices of the 
United Nations. Both sides have main- 
tained a congenial negotiating at- 
mosphere and have continued a serious 
dialogue on the specific issues. 

We remain convinced that only 
through direct face-to-face negotiations 
can a fair and lasting solution be 
achieved. We continue to support 
strongly the ongoing intercommunal 
talks between the two parties. 

The Administration is requesting 
$7.5 million in ESF for Cyprus in FY 
1982. These funds would be available to 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be 
used mainly for the relief and rehabilita- 
tion of displaced persons. Since 1974, 
the United States has contributed $117 
million through the intermediary of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 

We believe that U.S. assistance to 
Cyprus represents an important and 
tangible indication of U.S. interest in 
Cyprus and our strong commitment to 
promoting a resolution of the problems 
which for years have dominated this 
strife-torn island. 

Greece 



• 



On October 20, 1980, Greece's military 
forces were reintegrated into NATO, 
closing a gap in NATO's southern flank 
which dated from 1974. This important 
action should facilitate progress toward 
an improvement in relations between 
Greece and Turkey. 

On January 1, 1981, Greece became 
the 10th member of the European Com 
munities. This broadening and deepenir 
of Greece's ties with Europe should leai 
to a steady modernization of the Greek 
economy. 

On January 27, 1981, we entered ir 
to active negotiations on a new defense 
and economic cooperation agreement 
with Greece. The negotiations are pro- 
ceeding, and we expect that an effectiv 
and mutually satisfactory agreement w 
result. 

Our proposed program for Greece i 
FY 1982 reflects an awareness of the 
valuable role Greece plays in NATO, 
particularly at this period of critical 
developments in regions bordering on 
the eastern Mediterranean. The progra 






Ktf 



tac 

ttif 

!(0B( 

EC 



38 



Department of State Bullet 



Europe 



is also designed to help provide for 
Greece's self-defense and recognizes that 
Greece is a key ally with a strong 
democratic tradition. 

Accordingly, we have requested 
$260 million in FMS credits to enable 
Greece to obtain spare parts and con- 
tinue its force modernization process. 
We have also requested $1.9 million in 
IMET to allow Greek military personnel 
to obtain advanced training. 

Turkey 

Faced with spiraling political violence 
and a growing paralysis of civilian 
authority, Turkey's military leaders took 
over the government on September 12, 
1980. Bolstered by a remarkable degree 
of support from Turkey's body politic, 
these military leaders are vigorously 
working to overcome political violence 
and restore domestic peace. They have 
repeatedly pledged the restoration of 
representative government in a form 
designed to overcome the difficulties 
that led to the takeover. Like its 
predecessors, the current Turkish 
Government is strongly committed to 
NATO and remains a staunch friend of 
the United States. 

On March 29, 1980, the United 
States and Turkey signed a defense and 
economic cooperation agreement which 
is now being implemented smoothly. 
This new agreement contains no specifiic 
U.S. assistance pledge but rather a best- 
efforts commitment that we shall seek to 
help meet Turkish needs in the security 
and economic fields. 

Turkey's most urgent problem is its 
difficult economic situation. Since 1979, 
the United States has been working with 
other nations and international institu- 
tions to help Turkey stabilize its 
economy. This effort has involved finan- 
cial support needed by Turkey to in- 
troduce badly needed reforms. A com- 
prehensive economic reform program 
was introduced in January 1980, and we 
were pleased by the continuity given to 
this effort by Turkey's current govern- 
ment. Other nations share our recogni- 
tion of the importance of a strong and 
stable Turkey and have joined us in pro- 
viding economic assistance. In 1980, 16 
nations took part in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) consortium which pledged 
economic aid to Turkey. 



Our FY 1982 request addresses 
these challenges. We propose a total 
military assistance program of $403.5 
million, of which $400 million is FMS 
financing and $3.5 million is IMET. We 
also seek $300 million in ESF as part of 
a major multilateral effort under the 
aegis of the OECD, designed to restore 
Turkey's economic health. 

Of the $400 million FMS, $250 mil- 
lion would be direct credit. The FMS 
funds will enable Turkey to begin to 
modernize some of its weapons systems 
and to acquire spares and support equip- 
ment for systems already in its inven- 
tory. 

Considering the complexity and 
magnitude of the economic challenge 
Turkey is facing, our proposed $300 
million ESF program is relatively 
modest. 

In formulating our security assist- 
ance proposals for Greece and Turkey, 
we have been guided by the statement 
of principles contained in section 620C(b) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
The formal certification to this effect, re- 
quired by section 620C(d) of that act, 
will be contained in the formal letter 
transmitting the Administration's 
foreign assistance legislative proposals 
for FY 1982. 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Northern Ireland 

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 17, 1981 1 

St. Patrick's Day is not only the feast 
day of a great man of God, it is a sym- 
bol of the commitment of the Irish peo- 
ple to freedom, to justice, and to the 
value upon which Western civilization is 
built. 

We in the United States know the 
great contribution made by citizens of 
Irish ancestry. From our Revolution to 
the present day, Irish-Americans have 
been at the forefront of the defense of 
freedom. By their labor and by their 
sacrifices, they have been a major force 
in building our nation. 

It is, therefore, gratifying on this St. 
Patrick's Day to be able to pay tribute to 
the great role Ireland and the Irish have 
played in defending and renewing the 
values we cherish. 

But we are also conscious of the 
violence, bloodshed, and despair which 
now haunt all of the people of Northern 
Ireland. This tragedy cannot go un- 
noticed by the United States, which 
owes so much and has such close ties to 
the Irish. 

As an American proud of his Irish 
ancestry and as President, I recognize 
the vital importance to our nation and 
the Western alliance of a peaceful, just, 
and swift solution to current problems in 
Northern Ireland. 

The United States will continue to 
urge the parties to come together for a 
just and peaceful solution. I pray and 
hope that the day will come when the 
tragedy of history which now afflicts 
Northern Ireland will be overcome by 
faith, the courage, and the love of 
freedom and justice of the Irish. 

We will continue to condemn all acts 
of terrorism and violence, for these can- 
not solve Northern Ireland's problems. I 
call on all Americans to question closely 
any appeal for financial or other aid 
from groups involved in this conflict to 
insure that contributions do not end up 
in the hands of those who perpetuate 
violence, either directly or indirectly. 

I add my personal prayers and the 
good offices of the United States to 
those Irish -and, indeed, to all world 
citizens -who wish fervently for peace 
and victory over those who sow fear and 
terror. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 23, 1981. 



May 1981 



39 



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Europe 



Situation in Poland 

STATEMENT BY 
WHITE HOUSE PRESS 
SECRETARY, 
MAR. 26, 1981' 

The White House issued the following 
statement at the conclusion of today's 
National Security Council meeting. 

This statement reflects the views of 
the President of the United States. 

The United States has watched with 
growing concern indications that Polish 
authorities may be preparing to use 
force to deal with continuing differences 
in that country between the authorities 
and labor unions. We are similarly con- 
cerned that the Soviet Union may intend 
to undertake repressive action in 
Poland. 

Our position on the situation in 
Poland has been clear and consistent 
from the outset. We believe Poland 
should be allowed to resolve its own pro- 
blems without outside interference of 
any kind. We have scrupulously im- 
plemented that policy in our statements, 
while acting generously in response to 
Poland's requests to us for economic 
assistance. 

We have welcomed past assurances 
by the Polish Government and Polish 
llabor organizations that they intended to 
resolve their differences peaceably and 
in a spirit of compromise and concilia- 
tion. We continue to believe that this 
path offers the only hope of resolving 
Poland's difficulties on a basis acceptable 
to all parties concerned. 

We would like to make clear to all 
concerned our view that any external in- 
tervention in Poland, or any measures 
aimed at suppressing the Polish people, 
would necessarily cause deep concern to 
all those interested in the peaceful 
development of Poland and could have a 
grave effect on the whole course of 
East- West relations. 

At the same time, we would em- 
phasize our continuing readiness to 
assist Poland in its present economic 
and financial troubles, for as long as the 
Polish people and authorities continue to 
seek through a peaceful process of 
negotiation the resolution of their cur- 
rent problems. It is in this spirit that we 
shall receive Deputy Prime Minister 
Jagielski in Washington next week. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 30, 1981. 




Austria » 



Poland's First Deputy 
Prime Minister Visits U.S. 



Mieczyslaw Jagielski, First Deputy 
Prime Minister of Poland, visited 
Washington, D.C., Apr. 1-5, 1981, and 
met with Vice President Bush and other 
government officials. Following are 
remarks made by the Vice President and 
the First Deputy Prime Minister after 
their meeting at the White House on 
April 2. ' 

Vice President Bush 

We've had a very good discussion with 
First Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski of 
Poland. We had a broad range of discus- 
sions of U.S.-Polish relations. Secretary 
of State Haig was there throughout. 
And Secretary [of the Treasury Donald 
T.] Regan and Secretary [of Commerce 
Malcolm] Baldridge took part in it. I 
should say at the very beginning that 
the Deputy Prime Minister expressed his 
concern over our President, and I told 



May 1981 



him that after my visit today to the 
hospital that I could report to him, first- 
hand, that our President was, indeed, 
doing very well. 

The United States values its con- 
structive relations with Poland, and we 
want to develop those relations further 
on the basis of mutual respect and 
reciprocity. We're following a policy of 
nonintervention in Poland's internal 
affairs, and, of course, we are anxious 
that others do the same, and we're doing 
what we can to insure that. We support 
the policy of the Polish Government, 
which is to use peaceful means to re- 
solve Poland's internal problem. And we 
also welcome the Polish leadership's 
policy of renewal and economic reform. 

We talked a good deal about that, 
the Deputy Prime Minister explaining in 
considerable detail the concerns of the 
Polish people and of his government. 
And we recognize that these economic 
problems can only be resolved through 



41 



Europe 



an economic program which does have 
the full support of the people. We're 
very sympathetic to Poland's economic 
difficulties. And the American people 
have, as I told him, a very strong, com- 
patible, humanitarian interest in the 
welfare of the Polish people. 

For these reasons, I had the pleas- 
ure of confirming what Secretary Haig 
had told the Deputy Prime Minister, and 
that is that the U.S. Government will 
sell at concessionary prices certain dairy 
products -surplus dairy products -to 
Poland. This food, consisting of dried 
milk and butter, was requested by the 
government, and we were pleased to be 
able to reach agreement on that. There 
are other matters that the Deputy Prime 
Minister raised with us in terms of 
things that we might do to help further 
the economy of Poland. Those matters 
are being considered with a matter of 
some urgency, because he impressed 
upon us the problems facing his country. 

We hope that the assistance that we 
can give will help relieve the current 
difficulties. And from our standpoint we 
had a most cordial and productive visit. 

First Deputy 

Prime Minister Jagielski 2 

Just as the Vice President has said it, I 
would like on my own part to confirm 
that our meeting was very interesting 
and that it was very fruitful, above all, 
and very advantageous. This allows us 
to present a wide spectrum of matters 
very important to our country, for 
Poland, from economic problems of 
general meaning and about the means 
that we are taking in our own country, 
Poland, to solve the problems with 
which we are faced and confronted in 
our country in the most effective way, in 
the interest of the whole of our people. 
I have emphasized once again that 
the will of my highest authorities is the 
consistent implementation of the Polish 
Socialist renewal and the solution of all 
swelling problems by political means. It 
is clear that the essential role is as- 
signed to economic matters. And in their 
solution we expect assistance on the 
part of our friends, the United States. 
We are fully cognizant that we must 
solve these matters, referring at this 
point to economic matters, by means of 
our own resources and forces by our 
own work; increasing its productivity, 
reenforcing law and order. But we ex- 
pect also to have assistance from our 



friends. This will be a subsequent con- 
secutive demonstration of efforts to ex- 
pand our economic cooperation as much 
as the historically shaped ties of friend- 
ship. 

I wish to extend my thanks to the 
Vice President and to other interlocutors 



and for the cordial and warm reception 
accorded us. 






'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi 
dential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981. 

z The First Deputy Prime Minister spoke 
in Polish, and his remarks were translated bj 
an interpreter. ■ 



NATO Defense Ministers 
Position on Poland 



STATEMENT BY DEPUTY 
WHITE HOUSE PRESS 
SECRETARY, APR. 9, 1981 1 

The President is very pleased by this 
strong expression of allied unity. 2 It 
reflects the results of the full and exten- 
sive consultations which the Administra- 
tion has had with our European allies 
since January 20. The President, the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, and 
other senior Administration officials 
have met frequently with European 
leaders both here and abroad. This 
series of talks has resulted in common 
understandings on the key problems fac- 
ing the alliance. The President is grati- 



fied that that sense of understanding h; 
been made dramatically clear by the 
statement of the NATO Defense Minis 
ters. He believes the statement has 
made a significant contribution to the 
prospects for world peace. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres 
dential Documents of Apr. 13, 1981. 

2 On Apr. 8, 1981, the NATO Defense 
Ministers, meeting as the Nuclear Planning 
Group in Bonn, issued a statement which si 
ported the linking of Soviet intervention in 
Poland with effective arms control negotia- 
tions. ■ 



jp 



ml 



Poland — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 120,700 sq. mi. (about the size of New 
Mexico). Capital: Warsaw (population 1.6 
million). Other Cities: Lodz (832,000), 
Krakow (705,000), Wroclaw (608,000), Poz- 
nan (544,000). 

People 

Population: 35.7 million (Jan. 1981). Ethnic 
Group: Polish. Religion: Roman Catholic. 
Language: Polish. 

Government 

Type: Communist. Date of Constitution: 

July 22, 1952. Branches: Executive -Chief of 
State (Chairman of the Council of State). 
Legislative- unicameral Parliament. Judicial: 
Supreme Court. Subdivisions: 49 provinces. 
Political Parties: Polish United Workers' 
(Communist) Party, United Peasant Party, 
Democratic Party. Suffrage: Universal and 
compulsory over 18. Trade Unions: Solidari- 
ty Trade Union Federation (independent - 
about 10 million members). Rural Solidarity 
(independent -about 3.5 million members), 
autonomous branch unions (progovernment). 



Economy 

GNP: $108.3 (1978 at 1978 prices). Annua! 
Growth Rate: -0.1% (1979). Per Capita 
GNP: $3,100 (1978). Average Rate of Infl: 
tion: 10% (1980). Natural Resources: Coa 

sulfur, copper, natural gas. Agriculture: 
Grains, sugarbeets, potatoes, hogs, and otf 
livestock. Industry: Iron and steel, chemic 
textiles, food processing, shipbuilding, tran 
portation equipment. Trade (1980): Export 
$17.2 billion: coal, basic materials, agri 
cultural products. Partners- U.S. S.R., 
F.R.G., G.D.R., Czechoslovakia, U.K., 
France, Italy, /mports- $19.1 billion: oil, ir 
ore, other raw materials, grain. Partners - 
U.S.S.R., F.R.G., G.D.R., Czechoslovakia, 
U.S., U.K. Official Exchange Rate: 32.42 
zlotys = US$1.00. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, Warsaw Pact. 



:■■ 



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42 



Dpnartment nf Rtatfi Bulletl 



I "' 
I 



FOREIGN AID 



AID Bilateral Assistance Programs 






by M. Peter McPherson 



Statements before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on March 19, 1981. 
Wr. McPherson made the statements both 
is the Acting Director of the Interna- 
tional Development Cooperation Agency 
IDC A) and as Administrator for the 
Agency for International Development. x 



STATEMENT AS ACTING 
IDCA DIRECTOR 

ilt is an honor for me to appear before 
this committee for the first time. I look 
forward to a close working relationship 
with you as we together seek ways to 
strengthen U.S. development assistance 
programs. 

I appear before you this morning as 
Acting Director of the International 

j Development Cooperation Agency. As 
/ou are aware, this Administration is 
reviewing the structure of IDCA. While 
:he Administration's final recommenda- 
tions are not yet set, and we will consult 
with you before they are, we are com- 
■nitted to the essential idea behind the 
creation of IDCA: that the various 
ievelopment assistance programs of the 

"1 J.S. Government be carefully coor- 
iinated and interrelated and that our 
policies toward developing nations be 
ilearly enunciated and defined. These 
objectives will be achieved within the 
coherent framework of U.S. foreign 

11 Dolicy now being established by Presi- 
ient Reagan and Secretary Haig. 

As I begin this new task, which I 
onsider an extraordinary opportunity, I 
:ave found it useful to review past ex- 
perience as I look to the future. Devel- 
oping countries have made much prog- 
■ess in the 30 years or so since their 
nodern, independent economic growth 
oegan and since the United States first 
aunched the concept of large-scale inter- 
national development assistance. Our 
satisfaction at these accomplishments 
-nust be tempered, however, with con- 
:ern over today's problems and those of 
the rest of this century. 

Over the past 30 years, developing- 
country economies grew faster than the 
industrial nations had ever grown in any 
comparable period. At the same time, 
life expectancy -a useful index of a 
country's health and general living 
standard -rose from 32 years (just 
before World War II) to 50 years, an in- 
crease that took the industrial countries 



the entire 19th century to achieve. Adult 
literacy rose from one-third in 1950 to 
about one-half by 1975, while the 
number of students in primary schools 
more than tripled. 

Substantial progress has been made 
toward economic self-reliance and diver- 
sification. In the early 1950s, many of 
the countries that have achieved these 
advances were just emerging from colo- 
nial status, were torn by unrest or open 
warfare, were dependent upon one or 
two commodities for the bulk of their 
exports, and had barely begun to create 
the educational, research, and govern- 
mental institutions on which modern 
development depends. 

The United States can be proud of 
the contributions we made to this 
historically unprecedented record of 
economic and social advancement. The 
United States was at the forefront of 
the industrial nations in recognizing the 
need for international economic and 
technical assistance to the developing 
countries, in creating programs to pro- 
vide such assistance, in urging other in- 
dustrialized countries to increase their 
aid efforts, in promoting the expansion 
of the burden-sharing multilateral 
assistance agencies. Private U.S. invest- 
ment in developing countries has been 
encouraged and the system of interna- 
tional trade strengthened in recognition 
of the opportunities trade can offer as 
an engine of growth, especially for 
market-oriented economies. 

This progress has also brought home 
to us the reality of problems that persist 
and affect us all ever more directly. We 
have learned that continued progress in 
Third World development is of growing 
importance to our own domestic and in- 
ternational well-being. In the past year 
public awareness of our interdependence 
has been highlighted by the Presidential 
Commission on World Hunger, the 
Brandt Commission, and the "Global 
2000" study. The "Global 2000" report in 
particular presents a sobering picture of 
large-scale interrelated problems caused 
by population growth, energy scarcity, 
forest destruction with attendant soil 
and atmospheric effects, and pressure on 
food production capacity. The hunger 
commission focused on food production 
and effective demand for food, the con- 
straints on growth, and the implications 



for development assistance and for the 
already vast numbers of hungry human 
beings in the poorer countries. The 
Brandt Commission stressed the wider 
framework of economic policies and in- 
stitutions and the need to strengthen 
these policies and institutions if we are 
to have a chance of meeting the prob- 
lems of the next two decades as effect- 
ively as we have the previous three. 

Future directions in all these areas, 
and in the progress generally of the 
developing countries, will have direct im- 
pact on the well-being of the United 
States. U.S. exports to developing coun- 
tries have been expanding much faster 
than exports to industrialized countries 
and now constitute about 40% of the 
total. About 6% of all American jobs in 
manufacturing produce exports to 
developing countries, while the harvest 
of one out of every four farm acres in 
the United States is shipped to the Third 
World. Our growing need for imports of 
raw materials from developing countries 
(of which petroleum is only one) is well 
known. 

The entire planet's ability to sustain 
greatly increased numbers of people, to 
control atmospheric pollution, to pro- 
duce sufficient energy, and to reduce 
stark disparities in income levels and 
employment opportunities that lead to 
heavy pressures to migrate to stronger 
economies, will depend on the rate of 
economic progress in the developing 
countries and the extent to which this 
progress is shared among the entire 
population. Failure to make acceptable 
progress in ameliorating conditions of 
poverty can only lead to domestic in- 
stability and increasing frustration on 
the part of Third World governments 
over the workings of the international 
system and the distribution of economic 
and institutional power in that system as 
it is now constituted. Such instabilities, 
as we know all too well, can quickly spill 
over into regional disequilibrium and 
create opportunities for interventions 
that are to the interest neither of the 
countries directly involved nor to 
ourselves. 

The decision to provide aid to a 
country is, of course, a key foreign 
policy decision. Successive Congresses 
and Administrations, beginning with 
Roosevelt and Truman and continuing 
with President Reagan, have recognized 
the importance to our foreign policy of a 
strong, broad-based foreign assistance 
program. The balance has fluctuated 
over the years between military and 
economic aid and between the meeting 



jMay 1981 



43 



Foreign Aid 



of short or longer term objectives, but at 
no time have we lost sight of the 
tremendous importance such resources 
have to our overall national security in- 
terests. There is no doubt that this Ad- 
ministration shall continue to stress the 
importance of substantial development 
assistance to helping achieve our na- 
tional objectives. 

Technical and economic assistance 
needs vary from country to country, as 
do the degrees and kinds of U.S. in- 
terests; as a result, the array of pro- 
grams we conduct or help finance is also 
quite varied. The total FY 1982 request 
for all foreign economic and financial 
assistance is $8.1 billion, a reduction of 
$1.5 billion from the Carter budget. This 
request represents slightly more than 
1% of the entire Federal budget. 

Bilateral Programs 

Approximately 80% of the FY 1982 re- 
quest is allocated on a bilateral basis. 
The major bilateral programs are: 

AID Development Assistance ($1.9 
billion) concentrates on programs pin- 
pointed to areas of special concern to 
the United States-e.g., the Caribbean- 
that draw on our comparative advan- 
tages and special priorities, as in 
technology transfer, use of the private 
sector, and support for equitable growth 
in a limited number of priority sectors. 

The Economic Support Fund ($2.6 
billion) promotes economic and political 
stability where the United States has 
special security interests. These funds, 
while directed more explicitly to political 
objectives, are very important to achiev- 
ing economic development objectives. 
Budgetary increases this year are 
directed especially to helping meet 
urgent foreign policy priorities in Cen- 
tral America, while providing for en- 
hanced flexibility (in close consultation 
with Congress) to meet ever-changing 
special requirements as they develop 
throughout the year. 

PL 480 Food for Peace ($1.2 
billion, about 5.5 million tons) provides 
Third World countries with food supplies 
to meet national food and nutritional 
needs while they increase their own food 
production. As we integrate develop- 
ment programs more effectively, one of 
my major goals will be the enhanced link 
between food aid and our other develop- 
ment activities. 

Refugee Assistance ($568 million) 
represents a very substantial U.S. pro- 
gram designed to alleviate the misery 



and suffering now found with increasing 
severity worldwide. During 1980, major 
refugee relief programs were supported 
in Kampuchea, Somalia, Pakistan, and 
Zimbabwe. This aid provided immediate 
survival support followed by supplies of 
tools, seeds, and shelter in order to per- 
mit refugees to become self-sustaining, 
either in a foreign land or within their 
own borders. 

Housing Insurance Guarantees 
($150 million in guarantees, no ap- 
propriation required) are designed to 
provide shelter and associated urban 
services to low-income families. Housing- 
guarantee-related efforts now include 
technical assistance for institution 
building and helping countries prepare 
medium- to long-term shelter develop- 
ment plans. 

The Peace Corps ($95 million) 

fields about 6,000 volunteers in over 60 
developing countries. Volunteers now 
carry out important development 
assignments in key basic human needs 
areas. Increasingly, AID and the Peace 
Corps are cooperating on joint ventures 
of common interest, which I am par- 
ticularly proud of as a former Peace 
Corps Volunteer myself. 

Other bilateral activities include 
the Inter-American Foundation ($13 
million proposed in FY 1982) which ex- 
tends grants to local private groups in 
the Caribbean and Latin America. 

Multilateral Programs 

About 20% of this request is for interna- 
tional development institutions, especial- 
ly the multilateral development banks. 
The international character and varied 
financing windows of the banks make 
them especially able to work on difficult 
policy issues and to fund large develop- 
ment infrastructure projects that direct- 
ly increase the productivity of poor peo- 
ple in countries of significant importance 
to the United States. These projects 
often complement U.S. bilateral pro- 
grams, an effort we shall try to 
strengthen. These banks generate about 
$3 from other donors for every $1 we 
provide as well as much larger flows in 
support of development by the banks' 
borrowings from the private banking 
system. 

Multilateral Development Banks. 

The World Bank group, the largest of 
these banks, consists of the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 



Development (IBRD), International 
Development Association (IDA), and th< i r 
International Finance Corporation; 
$1,028 billion is requested in FY 1982, 
of which $850 million is for the IDA an( 
$163 million for the IBRD. 

Regional development banks focus 
their lending within specified geographi 
regions. The principal regional banks ai 
the Inter-American Development Bank 
the Asian Development Bank, and the 
African Development Bank; $450 millio is 
is requested for these regional pro- 
grams. 



'nm 



ipi 



iial 



International Organizations and 
Programs ($260 million). The United 
Nations has the largest number of tech 
nical experts working in developing 
countries, drawn from some 30 agencie 
and programs concerned with develop 
ment. The largest are the U.N. Develo] 
ment Program, the U.N. Children's 
Fund, U.N. Environment Program, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, an< 
the International Fund for Agricultura 
Development (IFAD). IFAD is unique i 
that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] countries are ma 
jor donors. Organization of American 
States assistance programs are a majo 
source of multilateral technical 
assistance for economic and social 
development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 



bo 
sir 



era 

da 



ev 



Private Investment 

This Administration is committed to 
finding practical means of enhancing t 
private sector's role in assistance pro- 
grams and in less-developed country 
development, both in the programs 
noted above and in two special organic 
tions in our bilateral program. 

• The financially self-sufficient 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion provides political risk insurance ai 
loan guarantees to U.S. investors in n< 
or expanding businesses in developing 
countries. 

• The Trade and Development Pre 
gram ($7 million, FY 1982 budget re- 
quest) promotes private sector particip 
tion in Third World development 
through the provision of project plan 
ning services that lead to the sale of 
U.S. technology for project implement 
tion and through the provision of gov- 
ernment-sponsored assistance on a rei 
bursable basis. Directed principally at 



Bill 

il'EI 
aid 


Hit 

B, I 



II ; 



IS|, 

mi 

\i 

fki 

j> 

A 

all 

»ot 



(01 
Btt 

asti 

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-,f Cutn D i il I/- n 



Foreign Aid 



(middle-income countries that can finance 
Itheir own development, it complements 
(development assistance programs which 
Ifocus on the poorer countries. 



■Conclusion 

The development needs of poor coun- 
xies are tremendous, far beyond what 
Ne and others can possibly provide, 
especially at a time when our own 
esources are most limited. The pro- 
grams described today represent a very 
small part of the Federal budget and a 
niniscule share of our national wealth. 
\s the most powerful nation on Earth, 
ve cannot, in my view, afford to neglect 
dut own self-interest -both for national 
security and humanitarian reasons -by 
ailing to provide the investment for 
levelopment in this year's pared-down 
mdget request. I urge this committee to 



lend its full support to the total pro- 
gram. 



STATEMENT AS AID 
ADMINISTRATOR 

In my presentation as Acting Director of 
IDCA, I described in broad strokes the 
importance to the United States of 
development in the Third World, the 
scope of the need, and the full range of 
U.S. economic assistance programs for 
which this Administration seeks your 
support. Now as AID Administrator, I 
will focus on how the bilateral assistance 
programs administered by AID address 
important global problems and U.S. ob- 
jectives. I should like to begin with a 
few indications of areas of special in- 
terest and concern to me, recognizing 



that these must be of a preliminary 
character. 

This Administration is committed to 
increased opportunities for the private 
sector to participate in AID programs. 
As you know, in recent years AID has 
substantially expanded assistance pro- 
vided through private and voluntary 
organizations; this will continue. So, too, 
will our activities in partnership with the 
American agricultural community, par- 
ticularly through the programs encom- 
passed in Title XII of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. I will be searching for 
means of strengthening both these rela- 
tionships in ways that produce effective 
development programs and the least in- 
trusive role for AID while still protect- 
ing the interests we all have as tax- 
payers in efficient use of resources. 

Incorporating opportunities for 
growth of the private commercial sector 



Development Assistance 

"his table compares the official develop- 
nent assistance given by members of the 
)rganization for Economic Cooperation 
■nd Development (OECD) and the Orga- 
ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPEC) and bv Communist countries for 
talendar years 1972, 1975, and 1978. 

Official development assistance refers 
D the transfer of resources (goods, ser- 
lices, and capital) from one country to 
nothcr to help the recipient develop its 
conomy and raise its standard of living, 
'o qualify, such transfers must contain a 
rant element of at least 25% while loans 
nd credits must be concessional (i.e., 
iven on a long-term and low-interest 
>asis). This type of assistance includes 
>oth direct assistance through bilateral aid 
>rograms and contributions to interna- 
lonal financial institutions such as the 
Vorld Bank. 

The OECD consists of 24 developed 
narket economy countries. The organiza- 
ion's 17 major donors of official develop- 
nent assistance belong to the the Develop- 
ent Assistance Committee (DAC). Al- 
lough the United States has always been 
the world's largest donor in absolute 
(igures, most other DAC members allot a 
arger share of their GNP to foreign aid. 
OPEC began to provide appreciable 
imounts of foreign aid in the late 1960s, 
ut for several years the annual total did 
tot exceed $500 million. While the oil 
Jfice increases beginning in 1973 sharply 
ncreased OPEC revenues, other develop- 
ing countries experienced a rise in their oil 
mport bill of over $10 billion in 1974. 



Official Development Assistance* 
($ billions) 



1 — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — \ — i — i — i — i — r~ 

5 10 15 



20 



OECD 

(DAC members) 



OPEC 



Communist 
countries 



CY 

1972 
1975 
1978 

1972 
1975 
1978 

1972 
1975 
1978 



4 5 


11.7 


I 


4.0 


13.6 


I 


5.7 


I 


19.9 



400 million 



5.5 



^~T 



12 



825 million 



*Net disbursements. 



Source: Figures from OECD, Development Co-operation Eftorts and Policies ot the Members ot the Development 
Assistance Committee (chairman's report), 1974 Review. 1979 Review 



%U.S. share 



II 



lay 1981 



45 



Foreign Aid 



in developing countries, and in related 
waysVreasmg avenues for our own 
private sector to expand its associations 
and business, has not previously re- 
ceived the attention it deserves in AID. 
I have already initiated work in AID to 
find important and significant programs 
to involve American financial and manu- 
facturing sectors in investment and ad- 
visory activities. We must be careful 
here to facilitate business involvement 
and not to substitute for private capital. 
Ultimately, the most significant econom- 
ic development will come from vigorous 
free markets in goods and services. I am 
convinced AID can play a significant 
catalytic role and will be back to you for 
advice and counsel as our ideas develop. 

This committee has stressed, in its 
development of the new directions 
legislation, the importance of establish- 
ing a sound and permanent institutional 
base in recipient countries. I am a 
strong believer in emphasizing in our 
programs the special capacity we have 
in the technology transfer area -the pro 
vision of skills, ideas and training, and 
the strengthening of policies, systems, 
and institutions to carry on development 
programs once outside help is no longer 
available. AID is already heavily en- 
gaged in technology transfer, and many 
projects providing technical assistance 
are enhanced by associated resource 
transfers -for example, fertilizer, con- 
traceptives, and some physical plants 
and equipment. As I want to be sure we 
are getting the most benefit from our 
limited resources, and not doing work 
that can better be done by others, I am 
examining AIDs program to see 
whether some shift at the margin 
toward further institution-building and 
technology transfer is possible. 

AID has a very dedicated and able 
staff, highly experienced in the difficult 
job of development. A special strength 
of AID is its overseas mission structure 
which permits productive day-to-day 
dialogue with recipient countries on 
policy and implementation matters. This 
approach enhances the effectiveness of 
our technology and resource transfers. 
Concentration on institution-building and 
associated technology transfer will not 
decrease our staffing needs, and yet 
AID, along with nearly all other parts of 
the government, will see significant staff 
reductions over the next several years. 
To the greatest extent possible, it is my 
intention to protect our overseas mis- 
sions and take the bulk of the reductions 
in Washington. We will be exploring a 



number of further steps to simplify our 
systems to reduce unnecessary workload 
on our staff. This policy has been 
started by my most recent predecessors, 
and I intend to move even further in 
this direction. I will seek your counsel 
and support for any significant changes 
that may be necessary. 

I strongly support the close integra- 
tion of the major components -develop- 
ment assistance, PL 480 [Food for 
Peace program], the economic support 
fund, and housing insurance guaran- 
tees -of our bilateral programs to 
achieve the greatest degree of develop- 
ment benefit. This committee has 
pioneered in this effort, and I intend to 
see that the process is carried forward 
with even greater emphasis. 

Evaluation is an important tool, if 
used properly, in assuring that our 
resources are used well and that we 
learn from past successes and mistakes 
in planning and implementing future 
programs. I intend to continue and ex- 
pand AID'S evaluation program, espe- 
cially the impact evaluations whose 
usefulness has already gained recogni- 
tion by this and other committees ot 
Congress. 



Program Highlights 

These are but a few of the myriad 
issues, concerns, and opportunities that 
confront me as new Administrator. 1 
would now like to focus on the 
highlights of our proposed program. 

Food Production. More than half of 
AID's development assistance budget is 
focused on food-related problems. In- 
creasing food production distribution 
and consumption within a growth with 
equity strategy is a primary goal ot 
AID The magnitude of the world food 
problem demands such attention. Food 
production can be accelerated signifi- 
cantly through better planning, more 
realistic policies, and increased invest- 
ment in research, physical infrastruc- 
ture, and marketing systems. 

In FY 1982 $727.8 million is re- 
quested for this sector. AID's farm level 
efforts to increase food production are 
varied. Through training, technical 
assistance, and financial support AID 
will foster the improvements needed to 
increase the production of the family 
farmers. Our focus on the total farming 
system offers a promising approach to 



research and development of tech- 
nologies most useful to farmers. 
Through additional research -in U.S. 
universities, international agricultural 
research centers, and in the growing na- 
tional research establishments in low- 
income countries -AID intends to stimu 
late the continued development and 
dissemination of improved agricultural 
technologies. . 

The agricultural production policies 
of recipient countries are also critical. 
We have two major instruments for in- 
fluencing policy. First, through technical 
and capital assistance we help reduce 
policy and related institutional im- 
pediments to equitable growth. Second, 
by providing PL 480 food aid in the con- 
text of a long-term agricultural develop- 
ment plan, we encourage policy changes 
to reduce food deficits while addressing 
the worst immediate aspects of such 
shortages on the needy. 

Deforestation. The grave implica- 
tions of a related problem, accelerated 
deforestation, are upon us. This is a 
threat both to rural energy needs and to 
agricultural productivity. Forests are be- 
ing cut for fuelwood at a rate faster 
than the process of natural regrowth. 
Consequently, erosion is increasing and 
the resulting siltation reduces stream- 
flow increases flooding, and affects the 
utilization and maintenance of irrigation 
systems. Adequate supplies of potable 
water are equally threatened. Forestry 
assistance is now a key element of AID I 
program, as is our assistance to help 
developing countries manage their 
natural resources more efficiently and 
productively. 

Energy. Deforestation has itself 

been accelerated by the worldwide fossi 

fuel energy crisis. With the upward 

spiral in the price of petroleum-based 

fuels the pressure on fuelwood supplies 

has intensified. AID is, therefore, giving 

increased emphasis to the development 

and diffusion of alternative rural energy 

sources such as biogas and mimhydro 

as well as more efficient energy conver 

sion devices, such as wood-burning 

stoves. We are also strengthening m 

stitutions for energy planning and polic; 

analysis. Over $77 million is sought for 

all types of energy programs in r Y 

1982 



1 



lib 



Population Growth. Rapid popula- 
tion growth in developing countries ex- 
acerbates food, environment, and energ 



Department of State Bulleti 



Foreign Aid 



(problems. Between 1980 and the year 
J2000 the world's population is expected 
|to increase from about 4V 2 billion to over 
J6 billion people; 90% of that increase 
Iwill take place in the developing coun- 
Jtries. While the demographic situation is 
Bserious, it is not hopeless. Worldwide 
^population growth rates are no longer 
[{rising. Among the 13 most populous 
■developing countries, all have experi- 
Benced crude birthrate declines. However, 
^significant countries and regions of the 
^developing world are still growing at 
jirapid rates that offset development 
Igains and contribute to local and global 
| instability. 

As the largest donor for interna- 
Itional population programs, the United 
{States has played an important part in 
{bringing about decreased population 
Igrowth rates. We have led in developing 
: and disseminating the most widely used 
I contraceptive methods; in providing con- 
traceptives; in developing inexpensive 
(service delivery systems; in training per- 
J sonnel; and increasing motivation for 
I family planning among individuals, com- 
' munities, and national leaders. 

We must continue to assert our lead- 
ership. Today, demand for population 
programs far exceeds available re- 
sources. Our funding request of $253.4 
million for population programs is essen- 
tial to keep up the momentum in the 
highest priority program areas. 

Health. Illness and early death are 
:ommon among the poor in developing 
:ountries. Although infant mortality has 
leclined by almost one-half during the 
last 25 years, 1 out of 10 infants, overall 
in developing countries, fails to reach 1 
ear of age, and in many countries this 
igure is in the range of 2 out of 10. 

Primary health care, a combination 
of the most basic preventive and cura- 
ive health services, is among the most 
iromising means of reducing childhood 
lisease and death, of diminishing poor 
.lygiene and related poor nutrition, as 
'■: well as the often fatal effects of too- 

■ frequent pregnancies. Most developing 
'' nations have made a firm commitment 
to primary health care and many look 
forward to the extremely ambitious goal 
of universal access to primary health 
care by the end of the century. 

AID has been a leader in financing 
primary health care programs since the 
early 1970s and has helped finance near 
ly 50 programs in 36 countries. Part of 
the challenge before us is to help devel- 
oping countries establish systems that 



can be self-sustained through govern- 
ment efforts and participation of local 
communities. We are requesting $120.4 
million in FY 1982 to meet that chal- 
lenge and carry on other priority work 
in the health sector. 

Education. The education problems 
which developing countries face are 
enormous. Indeed, because of the rapid 
growth of the youthful population and 
the acute shortages of teachers and in- 
structional material, developing coun- 
tries face the very real prospect of hav- 
ing more school-age children out of 
school in 1985 than a decade earlier. Our 
strategy is to help developing countries 
find cost-effective ways of improving 
their basic educational programs. 

AID also focuses on critical higher 
level manpower shortages that under- 
mine economic progress in the develop- 
ing world. AID has supported the train- 
ing of over 200,000 professionals in a 
wide range of fields critical to develop- 
ment. I am personally concerned that 
AID's participant training program has 
declined in the last decade, notwith- 
standing continuing high demand for 
American university and specialized 
training. 

In order to help meet these educa- 
tion and training needs, we are request- 
ing $109.6 million for FY 1982, primari- 
ly for programs in Latin America and 
Africa. The bulk of these funds will be 
used to support programs for basic pri- 
mary and nonformal education as well 
as vocational, technical, and professional 
training. 



Geographic Highlights 

Now let me touch on a few geographic 

highlights. 

Africa. Twenty-six percent of our 
development assistance program is 
focused on Africa, including $107.5 
million for the Sahel. The most pressing 
and interrelated problems in Africa to- 
day are declining per capita food produc- 
tion and the rapid depletion of tradi- 
tional energy resources. These problems 
aggravated by serious balance-of-pay- 
ments deficits in many African coun- 
tries, are resulting in much human 
suffering. They also point to potential 
economic and political instability -a mat- 
ter of great concern to U.S. interests in 



- l 



this continent. Resolution of these prob- 
lems has become the highest develop- 
ment priority for most African govern- 
ments and international donors, in- 
cluding AID. 

There is significant food production 
potential in Africa. By the year 2000, 
and perhaps well before that with ade- 
quate investment and supporting 
policies, a number of countries will be 
surplus producers. AID assistance 
strengthens national agricultural 
research systems, small-holder irriga- 
tion, and marketing and distribution 
systems. We also believe that a combina- 
tion of improved agricultural and land 
management practices and expanded 
reforestation programs by AID and 
other donors will ease the energy prob- 
lem. A third approach is to tackle 
population growth directly, which at 
2.7% a year in sub-Saharan Africa is 
higher than in any other region and still 
increasing. There is a growing aware- 
ness among many African leaders that 
the population question needs to be 
faced. To help bridge the food gap, PL 
480 Title I and II programs are being 
maintained as vital to a food-short and 
drought-prone continent. 

Asia. Thirty percent of the develop- 
ment assistance program is concentrated 
in Asia. Several major Asian countries 
have chalked up impressive gains in food 
production. AID assistance in the form 
of fertilizer, financing for irrigation, and 
technical assistance has contributed to 
the Philippines' approaching rice self- 
sufficiency, to impressive wheat produc- 
tion gains in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
and to supporting Indonesian incentive 
pricing policies for rice production. Our 
assistance was a major factor in estab- 
lishing India's agricultural education and 
research system and domestic fertilizer 
capacity, which in turn has contributed 
to its current market self-sufficiency in 
basic grains. 

Notwithstanding this progress, the 
food deficit for the region, as a whole, is 
expected to increase. The gap between 
effective demand and domestic supply 
would become even greater if pervasive 
malnutrition were to be eliminated. 
Through projects assisted by AID and 
other donors that help farmers increase 
food production and provide expanded 
rural employment and income, a 4% an- 
nual growth rate is projected in food 
production for the region. 

While population growth has de- 
clined significantly, thanks in part to 



,, May 1981 



47 



MIDDLE EAST 



AID programs in Thailand and In- 
donesia, the regional annual population 
growth rate is still above 2% and in 
some Asian countries is 3%. We expect 
our continuing family planning assist- 
ance to the major countries of the region 
and substantially expanded programs in 
Bangladesh to help bring about a signifi- 
cant decline in regional population 
growth. 

Latin America and the Caribbean. 

The link between the need for accel- 
erated socioeconomic development and 
U.S. security is most clearly demon- 
strated in the Latin American/Caribbean 
region. AID requests a $265.3 million 
development assistance program in 
Latin America, concentrated in the Cen- 
tral American and Caribbean region, an 
area where socioeconomic problems are 
serious and where the United States has 
vital economic and security interests. 

Unemployment and underemploy- 
ment remain critical problems in Latin 
America. This reflects slow economic 
growth in the region's low-income coun- 
tries, continuing sharp disparities be- 
tween modern and traditional sectors 
within countries, and population growth, 
although declining, still almost 2V2% a 
year. Problems of resource depletion - 
soil, firewood, and others -are reaching 
very serious proportions in some coun- 
tries; the cost of imported petroleum is 
strangling development efforts and mak- 
ing it difficult for many smaller countries 
even to maintain existing programs. Our 
programs serve as catalyst and risk 
taker, attracting complementary public 
and private resources in support of in- 
novative programs benefiting the poor. 

Cooperatives and credit unions as 
well as joint private investment ventures 
with Latin American small enterprise 
and the use of the economic support 
fund to support private enterprise in the 
Caribbean are features of this broad- 
based AID program. 

Importance of ProgTam 

The $1.9 billion we are seeking for the 
development assistance program is near- 
ly one-half billion less than was proposed 
in the Carter budget. This cut does not 
represent a reduction in need for fund- 
ing of agriculture, health, population, 
and other programs around the world. 
Rather it represents the outcome of a 
difficult set of choices in which this Ad- 
ministration has had to give very high 
priority to reaching an appropriate 
balance between income and expendi- 
tures, a process in which every budget 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



Following are statements by Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs Morris Draper 
and Joseph W. Twinam before the Sub- 
committee on Europe and the Middle 
East of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee. 1 



MR. DRAPER, 
MAR. 12, 1981 

I welcome the opportunity to be here to- 
day to testify in support of the Ad- 
ministration's proposals for economic 
and security assistance to Jordan and 
Lebanon. 

These two countries border Israel. A 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict will not be possible 
without their active involvement and 
cooperation. In both countries, there are 
substantial numbers of Palestinians. The 
future of the countries will be affected 
by the way the Palestinian problem -in- 
cluding its political and refugee dimen- 
sions, among others -is handled in the 
process of achieving a just and lasting 
end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. We thus 
have a strong interest in the directions 
the policies of these two countries will 
take over the period ahead. 

While our assistance programs have 
specific objectives tailored to each coun- 
try's needs, they fit within the broad 
regional strategy which the Administra- 
tion intends to develop and carry out. 
These two countries -Jordan and 
Lebanon -have historically been close to 
the United States. They have depended 
on our support in the past while facing 
challenges and crises. In the future, both 
countries will have to cope with poten- 



tially threatening and destabilizing 
trends in the region. They will expect us ■ 
to be helpful and cooperative. Our assist ' 
ance programs there -while fitting 
within our broad strategy -are intended 
to nurture basic relationships of mutual 
trust and confidence and to assist the 
governments in carrying out their 
responsible national priorities. In the 
process, we believe we will be reinforc- 
ing the hopes of these governments to 
be able to promote peace and stability - 
internally and in the international 
arena -with confidence. 



'■ 



Jordan 



a: 



For Jordan in FY 1982, we are propos- 
ing $50 million in foreign military sales 
(FMS) credits, $20 million in economic 
support funds (ESF), and $2 million for 
the international military and education 
training (IMET) program. Except for 
military training, which has been in- 
creased, the levels of assistance for the 
country will be significantly lower than 
the programs for much of the decade ol 
the 1970s. Our determination took into 
account the improving Jordan economy 
and the flow of other external assist- 
ance. The lower levels also reflect the 
constraints involved in our own domest 
economic reform program. The pro- 
grams, however, remain consistent witl >' a 
our goals of building a relationship witl 
Jordan which will endure through ups 
and downs and will provide a good basi 
for further cooperation as we pursue oi 
interests and Jordan strengthens its na 
tional independence. 

Jordan -its progressive leadership, 
its continued economic and social 
development, its stability, and its ability 



had to be scrutinized and virtually every 
program had to be restrained no matter 
how sound the objectives. 

As we reviewed the Carter budget, I 
came to realize how central our develop- 
ment assistance program is to America's 
relations with countries around the 
world. Indeed, for many countries the 
development assistance program is our 
primary expression of participation in 
what for them is most important -their 
rapid economic and social development. 
Thus, this program serves not only our 
generalized interests in helping to solve 
some of the world's most critical prob- 
lems but also our very immediate politi- 
cal interests in achieving a satisfactory 



relationship with countries important b 
us on the three major continents where 
the program is carried out. 

This is a worldwide program, fo- 
cused on a critical set of development 
issues -food, population, health, educa 
tion, and energy. It serves our foreign 
policy interests well and will leave a 
lasting impact on vast numbers of poor 
people. I urge your strong support for 
this lean and effective AID program. 



'The complete transcript of the hearing: 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



tat 

pn 



48 



Middle East 



to defend itself and to make independent 
decisions of its own despite pressures 
and influence exerted by others -is im- 
portant to American foreign policy 
goals. It is important that Jordan re- 
main committed to a policy of preserv- 
ing peace along the border with Israel. 
It is important that Jordan continue its 
constructive policy -directly helpful to 
greater U.S. interests-of providing 
training, guidance, and seconded 
military and security personnel to key 
countries in the gulf region. This rein- 
forces inclinations there to look to the 
United States and the West for equip- 
ment, military orientation, and guidance. 

The substantially increased IMET 
program for Jordan will enroll perhaps 
175 officers in U.S. military courses, 
which will include key members of the 
Jordanian instructor cadre. 

While Jordan has expanded re- 
sources and external funding from which 
to draw, our FMS credit program of $50 
million remains significant. Jordan may 
be facing the prospect of further 
challenges and confrontations with the 
r jf regime in Damascus. Late last year, the 
., Syrians massed significant military 
, forces on Jordan's northern border in 
(0 what was viewed widely as an effort at 
m intimidation. Relations between the two 

i countries currently are cold, and their 
: disagreements have been highlighted in 
, S I the media of both countries. A small 
country, with only limited manpower, 
. Jordan has tried to develop -with our 
■ill assistance and guidance -a reasonable 

■ | deterrent against its far stronger poten- 
;; J tial adversaries in the region. Our 

j assistance program fits sensibly within 
this basic goal, without trying to go 
oeyond it. 

As for economic assistance, we 
should recall that our help to Jordan 

►lover the years -generating significant 
economic and social advancement -has 
— • been a major success. At the beginning 
of our close association, we, together, 

il faced what were considered almost in- 
surmountable economic problems. We 
are pleased with the accomplishments so 
far. Jordan is healthy and has a promis- 
ing future. Jordan will, however, remain 

' dependent on outside help for several 

■ years yet. And we believe we should 
play a continuing role. 

Our economic programs will be con- 
centrated on the Jordan Valley irriga- 
tion project and on programs dealing 
with health, potable water, agriculture, 
and sewage. We have been deeply dis- 
appointed that it has not been possible 
to resolve the riparian issues that would 



permit the construction of the Maqarin 
Dam. We will not seek new funds from 
the Congress until improved political 
conditions in the region permit a new 
approach. Nevertheless, it is a tragedy 
that one of the scarcest national 
resources in the Middle East -water for 
ordinary drinking purposes as well as 
agriculture -still has not been adequate- 
ly harnessed and controlled in the area 
of the Yarmouk River basin where the 
Maqarin Dam might some day be built. 
In the absence of the Maqarin Dam, we 
will continue to examine, however, ways 
in which we could be helpful to Jordan 
on many broad questions of water 
management and use. 

Lebanon 

For Lebanon we are proposing for FY 
1982, $15 million in FMS credits, $5 
million in ESF, and $840,000 for ex- 
panded training of Lebanese military 
officers. 

Our fundamental policies toward this 
pivotal country remain the same. We 
firmly support Lebanon's independence, 
territorial integrity, and sovereignty. 
We consider it important that its unity 
and cohesion be preserved and 
strengthened. We have made clear our 
hope that the day will soon come when a 
genuine political consensus and national 
reconciliation can be achieved. In the 
meantime, we would like to see the 
strengthening of the authority of 
Lebanon's lawful and legitimate govern- 
ment structure and all of Lebanon's na- 
tional institutions. This includes the 
rebuilding national army, which offers 
the only promising means of assuring 
security eventually to all of Lebanon's 
citizens. 

Tied as our two countries have been 
by common traditions, blood and family 
connections, and a historically warm 
friendship, we must maintain our 
humanitarian concern for those innocent 
people who have been victimized by the 
violence, terrorism, and warfare in 
many parts of Lebanon since 1975. We 
have tried to use our influence -in com- 
bination with our assistance programs - 
to make progress toward improved 
stability and an end to the violence. 
While facing formidable problems, 
Lebanese leaders have been trying hard 
also to end the suffering and violence. In 
this connection, we have been impressed 
with the efforts by President Sarkis-at 
the recent Islamic summit in Taif-to 



stop southern Lebanon from being used 
as a battleground with Israel. The 
United States will continue its firm sup- 
port for the U.N. peacekeeping forces in 
southern Lebanon, which offer the only 
realistic near-term means of containing 
the dangers there and working for 
stability. 

The military assistance programs 
are continuations of those we began in 
1976. Our IMET program will be ex- 
panded. This will permit the enrollment 
of military officers, and particularly 
junior officers, in courses at the three 
U.S. service staff colleges, as well as in 
basic and advance officer courses else- 
where. Our FMS credit assistance will 
help Lebanon to continue the reorgani- 
zation and equipping of an additional 
brigade. Equipment will be similar to 
that purchased earlier with FMS credits 
to help rebuild Lebanon's mechanized 
light infantry formations. 

Lebanon has made good use of the 
equipment and training it has received 
from the United States in recent years. 
The army has been able to take over 
some security responsibilities from the 
Arab deterrent forces, and we hope that 
added responsibilities can be undertaken 
stage-by-stage. 

Overall economic conditions have im- 
proved slowly since the end of the civil 
conflict in 1976, but the progress has 
been spotty and uneven. Tense condi- 
tions in the country discourage invest- 
ment and rational economic planning. 
Our relatively modest economic assist- 
ance programs have worked well and 
have been highly visible. In FY 1982 we 
intend to continue programs of support 
for health education, vocational training, 
cooperatives, housing, as well as for 
development planning. 

To sum up, we have continued to 
look at Lebanon from both the policy 
and human perspectives. A stable, pros- 
perous, and independent Lebanon - 
playing its traditonal role as a well- 
spring of moderation, teaching, free 
enterprise, intellectual thought, and tol- 
erance-would contribute to creating the 
kind of Middle East we want. 



MR. TWINAM, 
MAR. 12, 1981 

In the past year, U.S. concern over 
security in Southwest Asia has height- 
ened. To respond to Soviet pressures, as 
well as potentially destabilizing regional 
tensions, the Administration seeks to 



Mav 



1981 



49 



Middle East 



strengthen our relations with the friend- 
ly governments in the Arabian Penin- 
sula. This purpose is manifested in a 
variety of actions, including support for 
the development efforts of the U.S.- 
Oman Joint Commission, our ongoing 
development assistance program in 
Yemen, and our military assistance 
undertakings in both countries. 

Sultanate of Oman 

U.S. relations with the Sultanate of 
Oman have intensified during the past 
year. We concluded an agreement last 
June under which U.S. military forces 
are given access to certain Omani ports 
and airfields under implementing ar- 
rangements as mutually agreed. We will 
upgrade these facilities for our own pur- 
poses and also for Oman's permanent 
use through a military construction pro- 
gram now getting underway. We are in- 
creasing the supply of military equip- 
ment in areas where American equip- 
ment appropriately meets the 
Sultanate's defense needs, and we are 
seeking increased FMS credits to help 
finance some of this equipment. 

We also established last August a 
joint commission, thus strengthening the 
economic dimension to the relationship. 
This commission, supported both in 
funds and personnel jointly by Oman 
and the United States, will be the focal 
point for projects in Oman which might 
benefit from American technology and 
for increased commerical links between 
our two countries. 

Oman is strategically significant 
because of its position overlooking the 
Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the 
gulf. The United States has an interest 
in supporting a friendly and responsible 
government there. Although Oman in 
late 1975 successfully quelled a Marxist- 
oriented insurgency led by the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman 
(PFLO) and supported from South 
Yemen, some leaders of the PFLO are 
still at large and South Yemen has kept 
up its anti-Oman rhetoric. Therefore, 
there is reason for concern that radical 
elements in the region will seek to 
pressure Oman through military and 
political means. Our new military and 
economic program is designed to help 
Oman address these concerns. 

Our intensified relationship with 
Oman builds on a long history of cordial 
relations. It recognizes the remarkable 
progress that Oman has made during 
the past decade in creating a modern 
society and bringing prosperity to its 



an 



populace. When Sultan Qaboos came to 
power in 1970 and set that country on 
the road to development, he was faced 
with one of the most impoverished 
economies in the world and had to fight 
the PFLO insurrection which was then 
at its peak. With great effort and con- 
siderable cost in resources, the Sultan's 
government not only put down the 
rebellion but also built a modern 
economic and social infrastructure 
where virtually nothing existed before. 

Oman has been helped in this 
endeavor by its oil income, but its oil 
resources are small by the standards of 
the region and in relation to the develop- 
ment task it is facing. The Sultanate has 
received substantial economic and 
military assistance from friendly coun- 
tries in its difficult task and will rely on 
similar help in the future. 

Yemen Arab Republic 

The Yemen Arab Republic occupies a 
strategic location on the southern border 
of Saudi Arabia and astride the entrance 
to the Red Sea. It occupies a buffer posi- 
tion between Saudi Arabia and the 
Marxist-led People's Democratic Repub- 
lic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.). After centuries 
of isolation and a period of devastation 
brought about by a long civil war during 
the 1960s, Yemen today is attempting to 
strengthen its central government, to 
achieve security and political order 
throughout its territory, to improve its 
economic development, and to raise the 
standard of living of its population. 

Yemen is poor in natural and in- 
dustrial resources and remains heavily 
dependent upon outside assistance. In 
the past, it has sought aid, both 
economic and military, from a variety of 
sources. The Saudis have been par- 
ticularly generous in their economic 
assistance as have other Arab states. 
The Soviet Union has concentrated its 
assistance on military equipment and 
training. For a long period, Yemen ob- 
tained the bulk of its military supplies 
from the Soviet Union. The Soviets, 
however, also provided very large 
amounts of military aid to the Marxist 
regime in the P.D.R.Y. and as tensions 
between the two Yemens heightened 
during the early 1970s, North Yemen 
expressed interest in obtaining arms 
from the United States. 

The U.S. economic and security 
assistance program in Yemen is part of 
the U.S. effort to counter the Soviet 



challenge in the Middle East and to con 
front the challenge of radical forces in 
the region. Our security assistance effort 
($1.05 million in IMET and $15 million 
in FMS credits) is aimed at providing 
additional training and support for the 
operation and maintenance of the U.S. 
military equipment we sold to North 
Yemen, with Saudi financing, in 1979 
during its border conflict with South 
Yemen. We want to maximize Yemen's 
ability to utilize the equipment we have 
provided. Our security assistance pro- 
vides an alternative to Yemeni reliance 
on the Soviet Union. Our program in 
Yemen is smaller than that of the 
Soviets, who over the last year have 
provided substantial amounts of military 
equipment at very favorable interest 
rates. The Soviets are also providing 
training for over 1,000 Yemenis in the 
Soviet Union. We have sought to em- 
phasize the quality of our own training 
activity. We feel the progress in our 
training of F-5 pilots contrasts 
favorably to the limited success of the 
Soviet MiG-21 program. 

It is equally important that the 
United States contribute to Yemen's 
effort to develop its economic and 
human resources. Our aid program is 
relatively small and complements the 
larger efforts being made by Arab and 
international donors. In the last several 
years, our aid program has had to con- 
centrate on laying a basis for develop- 
ment training in the seriously underde- 
veloped Yemeni technical environment. 
We have now reached a stage where w 
can demonstrate more visibly the huma 
benefits of this effort. It is essential th£ 
the program be fully funded at the re- 
quest level of $21.1 million in order to 
achieve this. Unless we are able to 
operate at the funding level requested, 
we will need to review our economic 
assistance approach and seek even mor 
modest goals. 



MR. DRAPER. 
MAR. 16, 1981 



B 



el 
' 

on 
in 

101 

tii 

E 
if i 

to 

on 
n 



4 
la! 

in 



I am pleased to be here today to testify 
in support of our FY 1982 proposals fo 
economic and military assistance to 

Egypt- 

We are seeking -in security assist- 
ance -$750 million in ESF, as well as 
$900 million in FMS credits, $400 
million of which will be in concessionar 
"direct credits." These security 
assistance proposals will be on top of a 
PL 480 program likely to exceed $300 
million in FY 1982. 






■■■'■ 



Middle East 



Progress in the U.S. -Egyptian 
Relationship 

Our assistance programs for Egypt com- 
plement the Middle East peace process 
and constitute integral elements of the 
coherent strategic approach to the 
region which we are developing in order 
to improve the security situation there. 
Our relationship with Egypt is critically 
important to these two objectives. It is 
remarkable that we have achieved such 
intimate ties, given the fact that 
diplomatic relations between our two 
countries were reestablished only 7 
years ago. These ties are as close as 
they are because of the mutuality of our 
interest. 

Following the October 1973 war, we 
have together moved steadily forward 
on the search for peace in the Middle 
I East, while developing confidence in one 
another's determination. The disengage- 
ment agreements in the Sinai were 
followed by President Sadat's historic 
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, which set in 
motion the dramatic developments 
leading to the Camp David accords and 
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. 

Working from the foundation of a 
common commitment to peace, our two 
countries have developed an equally 
strong record of cooperation with regard 
to the challenges to the region's securi- 
ty. Egypt will have a role to play of high 
importance. It must have the strength to 
,, deter threats and maintain national 
security. This is a principal reason for 
our military assistance programs. 

Starting from a relatively modest 
n "j .economic assistance program after 1974 
', that was small in relation to Egypt's 
needs, we are now devoting over $1 
billion annually in support of President 
Sadat's efforts to free up the economy, 
to achieve self-sustaining growth, and to 
enhance the quality of life for his people. 

The closeness, the importance, and 
'the magnitude of such ties are unusual 
in our other relations worldwide. They 
deserve our full measure of support. 



r 



ir 



Strengthening the Peace 

A little over a year ago, Israel and 
Egypt exchanged Ambassadors, which 
was one of the more dramatic events in 
the process of normalizing relations be- 
tween these two former adversaries. 
The two are adhering scrupulously to 
both the letter and the spirit of the 
Treaty of Peace. The interim boundary 
is open to travel and trade. Israel's 
President Navon visited Egypt and ad- 
dressed the People's Assembly. Israeli 



May 1981 



and Egyptian Ministers and Members of 
Parliament have exchanged visits. 
Scholars, scientists, and businessmen 
are forging new ties in broadening 
fields. Egypt struck from the books all 
laws related to the Arab boycott of 
Israel. Aviation, postal, and communica- 
tion links have been established between 
the two countries. Egypt now sells 
Israel 2 million tons of crude oil annual- 
ly, making Egypt one of Israel's major 
long-term suppliers. Egypt and Israel, 
we are confident, are becoming good 
neighbors. 

Much has been achieved, but much 
remains to be done. Egypt remains com- 
mitted to building on what has been 
negotiated in partnership with the 
United States and Israel. We have 
already joined with the two countries, 
ahead of schedule, to work out security 
arrangements concerned with the final 
phase of Israel's withdrawal from the 
Sinai under the terms of the Peace Trea- 
ty. On his April trip to the region, 
Secretary Haig will be discussing with 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin how the peace process should best 
by advanced and how the core problems 
should be addressed. The Secretary will 
also be talking to some of the other 
leaders in the region to analyze their 
detailed views of a proper course toward 
peace. 

Growing Strategic Cooperation 

President Sadat has been outspoken 
about the threats posed to the region 
through foreign intervention and subver- 
sion. If Egypt is to play its role in our 
common strategic approach to regional 
security problems, it must have help in 
modernizing its armed forces. Egypt has 
been the target of efforts by some Arab 
states to isolate it politically, as punish- 
ment for its commitment to peace, and 
thus has been deprived of some tradi- 
tional sources of outside funding to meet 
its needs. Other traditional donors have 
tended to concentrate on economic 
credits rather than for those that might 
be used for military equipment. Mean- 
while, Egypt's problems with its 
deteriorating inventory of Soviet-origin 
hardware continue to grow. 

Thus, Egypt feels itself dependent 
on us to help satisfy its minimal, 
legitimate defensive needs. These needs 
must be set in the context of the prevail- 
ing instability in the region and the 
adventurism of some of the states there. 



Libya is pursuing a heavy-handed, ag- 
gressive policy, as witnessed by its inter- 
vention in Chad. It is heavily armed 
with modern Soviet equipment. Egypt's 
security concerns embrace the potential 
threat to its neighbor, Sudan, with 
which it has a mutual defense treaty. 
President Sadat sees the overall 
threat in broad strategic terms. He has 
been deeply concerned over the implica- 
tions of the Iranian revolution and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He has 
offered access to Egyptian military 
facilities for U.S. forces in emergencies 
and for common purposes. He has in- 
vited U.S. Air Force and rapid deploy- 
ment force units to participate in joint 
exercises with Egyptian forces. He 
wants to consult with us further and ex- 
tend cooperation compatible with 
Egypt's own national interests. 

Military Assistance 

It was with our broad and coherent 
regional strategy in mind that we de- 
cided to propose an FMS credit level of 
$900 million, or $100 million higher than 
initially planned. When we proposed - 
and the Congress approved -$550 mil- 
lion in FY 1981 as part of an anticipated 
longer term military supply relationship, 
we privately told the Egyptians that 
they could consider a figure of $800 
million for planning purposes in FY 
1982. With the help of cash-flow financ- 
ing, our program allows Egypt to make 
sensible plans to carry out a balanced 
modernization program for the next 
years ahead. 

In planning and placing orders for a 
balanced program, however, Egypt had, 
in effect, mortgaged the $800 million 
funding level it was told we would seek 
for FY 1982. As a result, Egypt would 
be faced with the prospect of not being 
able to place major new orders until FY 
1983-with deliveries, of course, several 
years later still. It is in response to this 
problem that we went to the higher 
figure of $900 million. 

As I stated, we are also proposing 
that $400 million of this new level of 
$900 million be offered in the form of 
concessionary direct credits; the exact 
terms are yet to be decided. Egypt is a 
relatively poor country, measured in per 
capita income terms. While the short- 
term prospects for the economy are 
good, the country will probably face 
some serious problems a few years 
ahead, as it balances needs -including 
defensive needs -with resources. Direct 



51 



Middle East 



credits take into account this problem. 

Finally, we are proposing an ex- 
panded IMET program of $2 million. 
This will help train about 250 officers. 

Economic Assistance Program 

President Sadat's commitment to 
political and economic programs of 
reform, development, and liberalization 
remains as strong as ever. From the 
very outset of his presidency, when he 
released many political prisoners, Presi- 
dent Sadat has encouraged the develop- 
ment of democratic opposition institu- 
tions. Opposition parties are represented 
in the People's Assembly, and an opposi- 
tion press contributes to a spirited 
dialogue on important domestic and for- 
eign issues. A comparison of economic 
conditions prevailing in the mid-1970s 
and at the end of 1980 also demon- 
strates that good progress has been 
made in that field. In the mid-1970s, 
Egypt teetered on the edge of bankrupt- 
cy. In 1979 there was an overall balance- 
of-payments surplus; in 1980 this surplus 
probably was somewhat larger. A free 
foreign exchange market is flourishing, 
tariff barriers have been lowered, agri- 
cultural production has risen somewhat 
above the rate of population growth, and 
major construction projects are under- 
way. 

Foreign assistance, however, re- 
mains absolutely vital; without it there 
would have been no balance-of-payments 
surplus in the past 2 years. With nearly 
half of the population aged 15 or 
younger, and a population growth rate 
of close to 3%, problems lie ahead. 
Inflation is a serious problem. 
Earlier in 1980, it was running at an an- 
nual rate approaching 40%. This prob- 
lem, coupled with increasing consumer 
unhappiness over chronic food supply 
and distribution problems, led President 
Sadat to reorganize his government at 
midyear and personally to assume the 
Prime Minister's role. Since then, the 
government has attempted to deal 
directly with consumer discontent by 
broadened price controls and by increas- 
ing the food supplies in the markets. 
This effort has had some success; at 
year end, the rise in the consumer price 
index had eased sharply. Nevertheless, 
underlying inflationary pressures remain 
strong, and Egyptian officials, including 
the President himself, are well aware 
that trade-offs may have to be made be- 
tween present consumption and future 
investment. 

Egyptian economic policymakers 



confront a dilemma. The legacy of 
Egypt's experiment with economic cen- 
tralism in the 1960s was an overstaffed 
and inefficient public sector industrial 
plant and a declining agricultural sector. 
The Egyptian consumer had been effec- 
tively insulated from the viccisitudes of 
world inflation for over a decade before 
the "open door" policy was announced at 
the end of 1974. That decision -to 
undertake a major economic liberaliza- 
tion by opening the economy to the free 
markets of the West and to allow 
domestic private enterprise to re- 
emerge -meant unavoidable changes in 
patterns of equity. It also meant that 
consumers would be subjected to the 
pressures of rising prices at the very 
time that world inflation reached un- 
precedented levels. 

Therefore, the Government of Egypt 
will be trying simultaneously to increase 



fjitab 





productivity and efficiency throughout 
the economy while preserving and pro 
tecting an historic commitment to a very I 
high degree of economic equity and 
social justice. To undertake such a 
massive domestic effort at the time of a 
truly historic reorientation of its foreign ! 
policy marks the statesmanlike policies 
of the Government of Egypt and Presi- 
dent Sadat. 

To persevere, Egypt requires contin- 
uing support from the United States and 
the Western world. Our large ESF pro 
gram of $750 million recognizes that 
need. 



liter 

>"■ 



iy 



5*1 



ins 

BTli 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Hostage Agreements 
Transmitted to the Congress 



After J/44 days in captivity, the U.S. 
hostages in Iran were freed on January 
20, 1981. Their release came after weeks 
of around-the-clock discussions between 
the U.S. team and an Algerian team, 
selected by the Iranian Government to 
act as intermediary in exchanges leading 
to the hostages' release. The agreements 
which eventually concluded the crisis 
were adhered to in Algiers on January 
19-20, 1981, with Deputy Secretary War- 
ren M. Christopher signing for the 
United States. These argeements were 
transmitted to the Congress by the 
Department of State on March 12, 1981, 
along with an explanatory statement 
summarizing the five documents. 1 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT 
REGARDING DECLARATIONS OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR 
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, THE 
UNDERTAKINGS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND RELATED 
DOCUMENTS ADHERED TO AT 
ALGIERS, JANUARY 19-20, 1981 

Explanation of Agreement 

This agreement relates to the release of 
52 U.S. nationals detained in Iran and to 
the settlement of claims between the 
United States and its nationals and the 



Islamic Republic of Iran and its na- 
tionals. The agreement consists of five 
principal documents: 

(1) The Declaration of the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria (henceforth the 
"Algerian declaration"). 

(2) The Declaration of the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria Concerning Settle- 
ment of Claims by the Government of 
the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (henceforth the "claims settlement 
agreement"). 

(3) The Undertakings of the Govern 
ment of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran With Respect to the 
Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria (henceforth the "undertakings"). 

(4) The Escrow Agreement. 

(5) The Technical Arrangement Be- 
tween Banque Centrale D'Algerie as 
Escrow Agent and the Governor and 
Company of the Bank of England and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
as Fiscal Agent of the United States 
(henceforth the "technical arrangement") 

The Algerian declaration describes 
the overall principles underlying these 
agreements. It states that it is the polic, 
of the United States not to intervene ir 
the internal affairs of Iran, and it 
establishes a mechanism for the 



Ir.« 



& 



u 



rhe 

it 

Hi 






52 



Department of State Bulletir 



Middle East 



quitable settlement of claims between 
he United States and its nationals and 
ran and its nationals. The declaration 
urther establishes a procedure for the 
eturn to Iran of its assets currently 
ield in the United States or by entities 
nder U.S. control. The declaration 
nally describes the measures the 
Jnited States will take with respect to 
ssets of the estate of the former Shah 
f Iran and his close relatives. 

The claims settlement agreement 
stablishes the Iran-U.S. Claims 
ribunal for the purpose of deciding (1) 
laims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) 
.aims of Iranian nationals against the 
'nited States, and (3) certain claims of 
ie United States and Iran against each 
ther. The agreement provides a method 
>r selecting the members of the 
•ibunal. It also provides that all deci- 
ons and awards of the tribunal shall be 
nal and binding and enforceable in the 
)urts of any country. 

The undertakings provide for the 
•ansfer of certain Iranian assets to a 
i ink account in the name of the Banque 
' entrale D'Algerie and provide that 
hen the balance in that account 
;aches at least $7,955 billion that Iran 
mil effect the safe departure of the 52 
.S. nationals detained in Iran. The 
idertakings provide for distribution of 
le funds in that account upon certifica- 
on by Algeria that the 52 Americans 
,ve safely left Iran. A total of $3,667 
lion has been transferred to the 
deral Reserve Bank of New York to 
iy outstanding loans; $1,418 billion re- 
am in an escrow account to pay 
tstanding loans as to which the 
ount owing may be in dispute; and 
e remainder in the account has been 
sferred to Bank Markazi Iran. 
The escrow agreement implements 
ie Algerian declaration and establishes 

escrow account at the Bank of 
ngland in the name of the Banque Cen- 
'ale DAlgerie as escrow agent. 

The technical arrangement is a 
anking document which defines the 
Bsponsibilities of the Bank of England 
ith respect to the escrow agreement 
nd provides for the transfer of funds 
ursuant to the other agreements. 

. 

background Information on 
legotiations 

Ifforts to obtain the release of the 
ostages in Iran began when the 
jnerican Embassy in Tehran was 
eized on November 4, 1979. The direct 



steps leading to the signing of this 
agreement in Algiers on January 19-20, 
1981, however, began on September 12, 

1980, when Ayatollah Khomeini an- 
nounced his four conditions for the 
release of the hostages. Shortly 
thereafter, the Iranian Parliament (Ma- 
jlis) established a commission to draft a 
detailed statement of Iran's position on 
the hostage issue. 

The Majlis, on November 2, 1980, 
approved a more detailed statement of 
conditions for release of the hostages 
and delegated to the executive branch 
the authority to implement these condi- 
tions. The Prime Minister chose to 
negotiate the issue through the Algerian 
Government as intermediary between 
Iran and the United States. Eight days 
later, on November 10, the first U.S. 
response to the Majlis resolution was 
delivered and explained to the Algerian 
negotiating team in Algiers. 

On November 26, 1980, the Algerian 
team delivered a series of Iranian com- 
ments on the U.S. position; the U.S. 
response to these comments and re- 
quests for clarification was delivered to 
Tehran on December 4, 1980. 

The Iranians presented their 
response to the U.S. clarifications to the 
Algerians on December 19, 1980; the 
Algerian team conducted discussions 
with U.S. officials in Washington from 
December 27-30, 1980. The U.S. 
response to that communication was 
delivered to Iran on January 3, 1981. 
Four days later, on January 7, 1981, a 
U.S. negotiating team, headed by Depu- 
ty Secretary of State Warren M. 
Christopher, arrived in Algiers to 
facilitate further exchanges. Negotia- 
tions continued between the U.S. team 
in Algiers and the Algerian team which 
was shuttling between Tehran and 
Algiers. 

The overall agreement was entered 
into on the morning of January 19, 

1981, and the final implementing ar- 
rangements were completed on January 
20, 1981. At that point, the 52 U.S. na- 
tionals were released from Iran. 

Effect of Agreement 

The most immediate and obvious result 
of these agreements is that they effected 
the release of the 52 U.S. nationals who 
had been detained in Iran for 444 days, 
from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 
1981. 

As a result of this agreement, an 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal will be 



established to arbitrate claims— in par- 
ticular, the large number of claims of 
U.S. nationals against Iran. The tribunal 
will consist of nine arbitrators unless the 
two governments agree on a larger 
multiple of three. The United States and 
Iran each appoint one-third of the ar- 
bitrators. The party-appointed ar- 
bitrators appoint, by agreement, the re- 
maining third of the tribunal's members. 

To implement these agreements, 
President Carter issued 10 Executive 
orders* on January 19, 1981, and Presi- 
dent Reagan issued an 11th Executive 
order** on February 24, 1981. 

In addition to directing the establish- 
ment of the escrow account described in 
the agreements (Executive Order 
12276), President Carter also directed 
appropriate transfers of assets in the 
United States and assets held in U.S. 
banks overseas belonging to the Iranian 
Government (Executive Orders 
12277-12281). President Carter revoked 
the trade embargo against Iran (Ex- 
ecutive Order 12282) and placed restric- 
tions upon transfer of property belong- 
ing to the former Shah of Iran (Ex- 
ecutive Order 12284). A commission was 
established to study the issue of compen- 
sation for the U.S. nationals held in Iran 
(Executive Order 12285). President 
Carter additionally ordered the 
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate 
regulations prohibiting claims against 
Iran relating to the seizure of the 
hostages and their subsequent detention 
(Executive Order 12283). 

President Reagan issued Executive 
Order 12294 on February 24, 1981, 
suspending claims against Iran that may 
be presented to the tribunal and provid- 
ing that during the period of this sus- 
pension such claims shall have no legal 
effect in any action now pending in U.S. 
courts. 

Legal Authority 

(1) U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sec- 
tion 2 (Executive Power) and (2) 
International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA) Section 202(a), 
50 U.S.C. 1701(a). 



'For texts of the agreements, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 1981. 

2 The Executive orders are printed in the 
Bulletin of Feb. 1981. 

3 For text see Bulletin of Apr. 1981. ■ 



day 1981 



53 



Middle East 



U.S., Egypt Initial 

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 



Following are the text of a joint 
U.S. -Egypt statement issued in Cairo on 
March 21, 1981, together with supplemen- 
tary information made available to the 
press that day. 



JOINT STATEMENT 

The United States and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt on March 21, 1981, 
took yet another step toward advancing 
and strengthening their ties in mutually 
beneficial areas by completing negotia- 
tions on an agreement between the two 
countries for cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. 

The agreement reflects the intention 
of the two countries to cooperate in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a 
manner that supports energy develop- 
ment and nonproliferation objectives. 
The agreement will permit a number of 
cooperative activities and exchanges be- 
tween the countries when it enters into 
force, including at the outset the 
transfer from the United States to the 
Arab Republic of Egypt of technology 
and equipment for nuclear electric 
generating capacity of about 2,000 
megawatts electric and the enriched 
uranium fuel necessary to support that 
capacity. 

The agreement fully recognizes the 
Arab Republic of Egypt's ratification of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the 
negotiations leading to initialing of the 
agreement, the United States again 
welcomed Egypt's decision to ratify the 
treaty as yet another testament to 
Egypt's strong commitment to peace in 
the region and longstanding support for 
the objectives of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 

The initialed agreement is now being 
referred to both governments with a 
view to completing the necessary pro- 
cedures for its signing and entry into 
force at an early date. 



SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 

United States and Egyptian negotiators 
in Cairo initialed the proposed text of an 
agreement for cooperation between the 
two countries in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy on Saturday, March 21. This 
agreement will specify the terms and 
conditions forming the framework 



within which various cooperative ac- 
tivities and exchanges in this field may 
take place. These include possible pur- 
chase by Egypt from U.S. suppliers of 
nuclear power reactors and low-enriched 
uranium fuel for them, subject to agree- 
ment with these suppliers on the terms 
of any purchases Egypt may decide to 
make. The agreement is, in most 
respects, the same as agreements which 
the United States has concluded with a 
number of other countries; such 
agreements are required by U.S. law for 
the U.S. Government to permit the ex- 
port of nuclear materials and equipment. 
The agreement recognizes Egypt's re- 
cent ratification of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
and during these negotiations the United 
States again welcomed Egypt's decision 
to ratify that treaty. 

The proposed agreement will now be 
referred to both governments. For the 
United States, the further procedures 
necessary before it may enter into force 
are specified in the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, as amended. After review by 
the executive branch, the proposed 
agreement will be submitted to the 
President by the Secretaries of State 
and Energy, accompanied by the views 
and recommendations of the Director of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and the members of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. After the Presi- 
dent has approved the agreement and it 
has been signed by the two parties, it 
will be transmitted to Congress. It may 
enter into force after 60 days of con- 
tinuous congressional session, unless 
during that time the Congress objects by 
concurrent resolution to our concluding 
the agreement. ■ 



Lebanon 



SECRETARY'S LETTER TO 
PRESIDENT SARKIS, 
APR. 7, 1981 

Dear Mr. President: 

I have talked to our Ambassador to Lebanon, 
John Gunther Dean, and have asked him to 
transmit this message to you. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
communicate with you and the Lebanese peo- 
ple. The United States has always held 
Lebanon in special esteem as a free and in- 
dependent democracy adhering to the same 



principles and ideals that Americans prize. In 
this regard, I would like to convey to the 
Government of Lebanon, and to you personal 
ly, Mr. President, my respect and admiration 
for the courageous efforts you have made to 
defend these values in the face of the 
violence which Lebanon has suffered. 

Linked to our respect for the principles 
of the Lebanese republic is our firm support 
for the institutions of the Lebanese Govern- 
ment. Now, Lebanon is facing renewed and 
intensified crises -in Beirut, in Zahleh, and ir 
the south. Against this background of in- 
tolerable violence, I want to reaffirm most 
strongly the support of the United States for 
the Government of Lebanon. You have seen, 
Mr. President, the statement of my govern- 
ment calling on all parties to put an end to 
acts of violence from within or without the 
country, and stressing that it is in the in- 
terest of all Lebanese to support fully the 
constitutional authorities of Lebanon. We are 
also making the most urgent and high level 
contacts with concerned parties in support o: 
your efforts to end this latest round of 
violence. 

I also have reconfirmed to all concerned 
our strong support for U.N. peacekeeping ef 
forts in south Lebanon and for the expansior 
of the Lebanese contingents serving with 
UNIFIL in its area of operations. 

It remains our firm conviction that a 
strong central government, based on the 
democratic principles that you have so con 
sistently and bravely upheld, is the only 
guarantee of security for both the inhabitant 
of Lebanon and her neighbors. Accordingly, 
as we work now to help in putting an im- 
mediate end to this most recent violence, we 
are also calling on all parties, in and out of 
Lebanon, to assist in expanding and strengt 
ening the authority of the Lebanese Govern 
ment in every part of the country. It is only 
in this way that peace and security for all c; 
be restored. 

Please accept, Mr. President, on behalf 
the Government of the United States and 
myself personally, my admiration, apprecia- 
tion, and firm support for your courageous 
efforts to fully translate the ideals of the 
Republic of Lebanon into actuality. 

With warm regards, 

Sincerely, 

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 



I 



1 

mil 



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lie 
it 
sai 
d 



.: 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman William J 
Dyess. ■ 



P 
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Pi 

Sii 
at 



54 



DeDartment of State Bullet 



NARCOTICS 



International Narcotics Control 



by Joseph H. Linnemann 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
m Inter-American Affairs and the Sub- 
■ommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
m March 30, 1981. Mr. Linnemann is 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
'ioNnI Narcotics Matters. 

« Events of the past year, both in the 
United States and abroad, have rein- 
forced our view that international nar- 
:otics control is an integral part of U.S. 
foreign relations. I welcome this oppor- 
ajnity to present the Department's 
jverall international narcotics control 
philosophy, describe our programs, and 
olace our effort in a global context. 

Illicit drug sales in the United States 
are estimated at $65 billion. According 
;o a Fortune magazine report of 1979 
corporate earnings, only Exxon and 
VT&T [American Telephone and Tele- 
graph] exceeded that figure. In contrast, 
;he overall Federal budget devoted to 
;he suppression of drug abuse is roughly 
51 billion. Approximately 95% of that 
i amount is expended here in the United 
States for law enforcement, demand 
•eduction, and addict rehabilitation. The 
•emainder is devoted largely to interna- 
;ional programs planned and im- 
Dlemented by the Bureau of Interna- 
;ional Narcotics Matters. For FY 1982 
:he Department is requesting $37.7 
million for the Bureau's budget, approx- 
mately $2.3 million more than our FY 
1981 planned program. 

The history of prohibition and of il- 
legal immigration to the United States 
demonstrates that our borders cannot be 
sealed to forces attracted by the wealth 
of this country. This does not deter us, 
however, from doing what we can to re- 
duce the illicit drug supply while solu- 
tions to the domestic demand for illicit 
narcotics are sought. The Department's 
role in our international effort is to 
motivate and assist foreign governments 
in curtailing the production of illicit 
drugs at their source and in immobiliz- 
ing major traffickers who smuggle these 
drugs into the United States. 

Since the appointment of the 
Department's Special Adviser on Nar- 
cotics Matters in 1971, we have placed 
highest priority on those drugs that 
have the most serious health, social, and 



economic consequences -heroin, cocaine, 
and marijuana -in that order. Our pri- 
mary goal has been to assist foreign 
governments stem trafficking in these 
drugs as close to the point of initial pro- 
duction as possible. 

The Department follows three gen- 
eral approaches in pursuing that goal: 

• Illicit production control and inter- 
diction through enforcement; 

• Drug income alternatives, where 
necessary; and 

• Demand prevention and reduction. 

Underpinning these approaches is a 
sustained diplomatic effort by the 
Department and our overseas missions 
to secure the cooperation of producing 
and transit countries in the global fight 
against drug abuse. Unless we insure a 
cooperative international environment, 
other U.S. Agencies, such as the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
U.S. Customs Service, or the U.S. Coast 
Guard, could not operate effectively with 
their foreign counterparts. More 
specifically, the Department, through 
government-to-government agreements 
and appropriate international agencies, 
seeks to provide the legal and organiza- 
tional framework -seizure of illicit 
assets, mutual judicial assistance, ship 
boardings, and U.N. drug control con- 
ventions -within which much of our in- 
ternational effort is based. 

The principal focus of our effort, 
within these three general approaches, is 
direct technical assistance. In FY 1982, 
we are requesting $26.9 million for coun- 
try programs, an increase of approx- 
imately $2 million over planned FY 1981 
levels, due largely to increased efforts in 
Southwest Asia and our program in 
Burma. To date, our most successful 
country program has been our support 
of Mexico's efforts to eradicate opium 
poppies. Before the aerial eradication 
program began in 1975, Mexico was the 
leading source of heroin for the United 
States. Substantial amounts of Mexican 
heroin are still being seized, but the 
herbicide program destroys an estimated 
90% of the opium planted. 

Drug Trafficking in Asia 

In Southeast and Southwest Asia, the 
target drug for our proposed program is 
opium and the heroin which is refined 
from it. In Southeast Asia, this means 
the primary focus is in Burma and 
Thailand; in Southwest Asia, Pakistan. 



We shall also propose programs for 
transit countries like Turkey, and in 
both Southeast and Southwest Asia, a 
regional cooperation project. 

As in Latin America, the projects 
proposed are of two general designs - 
supply reductions and demand reduction. 
Supply reduction projects attempt to 
restrict the supply of illicit opiates 
reaching the United States. Enforce- 
ment assistance to police and customs 
agencies and crop-income substitution 
projects fit this design. Demand reduc- 
tion projects are focused on limited de- 
mand for illicit opiates. Frequently, in- 
ternational traffickers get their start in 
their own domestic drug market. At the 
least, a reliable domestic market pro- 
vides a cushion for traffickers suffering 
hard times. We support a domestic pro- 
gram of treatment and rehabilitation of 
drug abusers and propose studies into 
the nature and extent of drug abuse in 
Asia. The Bureau believes demand re- 
duction projects are an integral compo- 
nent of our overall assistance. They aid 
unfortunate individuals in countries 
which are crucial to a successful effort 
against drug abuse. The United States 
advances its own interest while sincerely 
and honestly helping our friends and 
allies. 

Southeast Asia. Opium is grown in 
the rugged hill-country along the 
triborder area of Burma, Thailand, and 
Laos. Hill tribes, ethnically different 
from the nationals of these three states 
and, generally, at a lower level of 
civilization, are the primary cultivators 
of the opium poppy. They practice a 
slash-and-burn form of agriculture, very 
destructive of lumber resources and 
watersheds, as they cultivate the poppy. 

The opium is refined just along the 
border between Burma and Thailand. In 
this wild "no-man's land," covered by 
very heavy jungle, neither Burma nor 
Thailand have the ability to exert control 
consistently. Bands of traffickers and 
opium refiners take advantage of the 
weakness of local governments, the 
difficulties of the terrain, and the crazy 
quilt pattern of ethnic and political in- 
surgencies. Their income from the nar- 
cotics trade means that they are well 
armed and able to corrupt poorly paid 
provincial officials. The so-called Shan 
United Army (SUA) has achieved a pre- 
dominant position in refining and 
trafficking in the Thai-Burmese border 
area. 

Semirefined opium and its deriva- 
tives move to market through various 



May 1981 



55 



Narcotics 



channels. We feel the largest part of 
opium produced in the "Golden Triangle" 
region of Southeast Asia transits 
Thailand before it leaves the region. The 
tendency for opiates to leave the region 
via Thailand is encouraged, at least in 
part, by the relative isolation and con- 
trolled nature of the Burmese and Lao 
societies. Nevertheless, some opiates 
move through Burma by land to the 
Tenasserim coast, then on to Malaysia, 
and elsewhere by sea. We believe the 
major trafficking routes, however, lead 
over land to Bangkok and points south 
in Thailand and Malaysia, then by air 
and traveler concealment to destinations 
outside the region. 

Southwest Asia. Opium is offered 
for sale relatively openly at towns along 
the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. These tribal areas are not sub- 
ject to Pakistani Government law or 
control and have long resisted nontribal 
authority. Opium and refined products 
leave the tribal areas over land or by 
camel caravans and truck. There is also 
clear evidence of movement out by sea 
and by air through Karachi. Some en- 
forcement officials speculate that 
shipments of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
opium to meet the demand of Iran's 
large addict populations frees up a por- 
tion of Iran's production for movement 
into Turkey's eastern province. Opium 
can be refined into morphine base and 
heroin at any point from the Pakistani 
frontier to eastern Turkey. The re- 
fineries used in this process are crude 
and highly mobile. They are not easy to 
locate and destroy. 

Morphine base is also moved to 
Turkey's porous southern coastline 
where it is shipped to points in Italy for 
further refining into heroin and move- 
ment to the United States through Mafia 
channels. Heroin moves directly over 
land to Western Europe where it has 
fueled an addiction epidemic of un- 
precedented proportions and has the 
potential for affecting our Armed 
Forces. 

Programs in Asia 

To counter the threat from opium-heroin 
production in Southeast and Southwest 
Asia, we support programs designed to 
reduce both the supply of and the de- 
mand for opium and heroin. In FY 1982, 
we are requesting $9 million for country 
programs in Southeast Asia and $4.4 
million for programs in Southwest Asia. 
In Southeast Asia, international nar- 
cotics control assistance supports en- 
forcement efforts in Thailand and in 



Burma. In Thailand, commodities such 
as vehicles, narcotics test kits, and train- 
ing are provided to narcotics enforce- 
ment units of the Thai police and 
customs. 

In Burma our assistance supports 
contract maintenance for fixed- and 
rotary-wing aircraft used to curtail 
opium production. Recently, the destruc- 
tion of more than 5,000 acres of poppies 
was made possible by these aircraft to 
ferry personnel to the isolated areas 
where poppies grow. 

Encouraging regional enforcement 
cooperation is also an important goal of 
our assistance. In Southeast Asia, the 
Bureau has pursued this by funding 
police training for students from the five 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] countries at the Thai 
police academy. This goal has also been 
advanced through the activities of the 
Colombo Plan drug adviser, who is 
dedicated to regional cooperation. From 
its inception, the Colombo Plan drug ad- 
visory program has received most of its 
financial support from the United 
States. 

Through the "cross-posting 
program" -one facet of this program - 
the Colombo Plan finances the travel of 
two officers working on the narcotics 
problem in ASEAN countries. These 
officers exchange positions for several 
months to broaden their experience and 
encourage international cooperation 
against narcotics trafficking. We are re- 
questing $150,000 in FY 1982 to support 
the Colombo Plan's efforts. 

In Southwest Asia, political turmoil 
has prevented the Bureau from cooper- 
ating with Iran or Afghanistan. It has 
been estimated that if all the opium 
presently stored in Pakistan were to be 
converted into heroin, Pakistan alone 
could supply the U.S. market at present 
U.S. consumption rates for the next 10 
years. We are attempting to strengthen 
Pakistani narcotics law enforcement 
efforts through training and commodity 
assistance to the Pakistani Narcotics 
Control Board, the Pakistani Customs 
Service, and other agencies with en- 
forcement responsibilities. Additionally, 
we support income-crop substitution pro- 
grams and addict treatment and rehabil- 
itation. In Pakistan, the Bureau is plan- 
ning a significant increase in efforts. A 
total of $1.1 million will be provided for 
the customs and board units and $1.3 
million for the agricultural development 
project in the northwest frontier prov- 
ince to develop alternate income sources. 

Geographic position has helped to 



make Turkey an important trafficking 
route for Southwest Asian heroin on its 
way to Europe and the United States. 
Our assistance is designed to respond to 
the problem of generally tight budgets 
in Pakistan by providing needed com- 
modities and narcotics law enforcement 
training. 

Situation in Latin America 

Latin Americans, because of their 
geographical and cultural proximity, are 
much more attuned to our society than 
the inhabitants of the remote narcotics- 
producing areas of Asia. They are more 
aware of the perceived ambivalent at- 
titude toward drug abuse among major 
elements of our population. They also 
are more aware of our inability to fully 
enforce our own laws against the pro- 
duction here of illicit drugs and mari- 
juana. This relative familiarity with the 
controversy over drug use here adds a 
unique complication to our programs in 
Latin America. 

We frequently must convince influ- 
ential private and public figures that the 
United States -the ready market for 
lucrative exports from their weak 
economies -really wants them to take 
strong and politically difficult measures 
to control illicit production and traffick- 
ing. Otherwise responsible Colombian 
businessmen, for example, have charged 
that their desire to eliminate Colombian 
marijuana production is designed to 
"protect the United States marijuana 
producers' market." And some Carib- 
bean officials, while accepting our pleas 
that they improve their interdiction 
efforts, have noted that our own judicia 
procedures sometimes appear limited to 
apprehending traffickers. 



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Latin America's importance as prim 
supplier of illicit cocaine and marijuana 
for the U.S. market has increased as 
production has expanded in Bolivia, 
Peru, and Colombia. The latter is also a 
major trafficking country. Our program 
ing, based on unqualified successes in 
Turkey and Mexico, has consistently 
sought to attack the actual production i 
the fields. Simultaneously, it attempts ti 
implement projects and contacts towarc 
improving affected governments' com- 
mitments and abilities with regard to 
both the interdiction of drugs as well as 
legal action against major traffickers. 

As Mexico's drive against heroin an 
marijuana production became effective, 
Colombia's role as transit point for co- 
caine and producer of marijuana becam 
predominant. Trafficking earnings are 
now estimated to surpass those of coffe 



' 



56 



n^nnrtmnnt r>.f Cto + /i DiiIIa+i 



Narcotics 



.. the national economy. This Colom- 
lian-U.S. link has quickly proven to be a 
devastating social and economic problem 
for the small Caribbean states - 
lahamas, Jamaica, and others -through 
'hich the traffic passes. It is, therefore, 
bilateral political problem for the 
Jnited States in an area already sen- 
sitive because of economic and security 
hreats. 

Progress in Latin America 

[n FY 1982, $13.5 million, or approx- 
imately 50% of our overall country pro- 
gram assistance, is requested for our 
,atin American initiatives. 

Mexico. The joint U.S. -Mexican 
jampaign to eradicate opium poppy con- 
tinues to be very successful. Our FY 
1982 planning assumes that the Mexican 
jovernment will attain partial self- 
iufficiency in most operational aspects of 
',he eradication program. We shall con- 
dnue to provide support for the remote 
sensing program, which was developed 
n conjunction with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
and we will continue to provide some 
■ :ommodity equipment. Our total input 
will be $5.6 million, down substantially 
'rom $18.5 million in 1978. We shall 
work as closely as possible with the 
Vlexican Attorney General's Office to 
. iustain current controls and diminish 
iirther production of opium from this 
;raditional growing area on our border. 
\s Mexican Government self-sufficiency 
s established, our monitoring will con- 
tinue, but our program costs will be 
-educed appropriately. 

Peru. Our FY 1982 programing con- 
:inues with its long-term drive to 
!■ diminish cocaine production, in part 
ra through improved herbicide eradication 
techniques but primarily through ap- 
propriate participation in, and support 
>; for, a major agricultural program in 
a Peru's principal cocaine-producing area. 
This support includes $2.9 million cover- 
ing a wide spectrum of activities -some 
directly connected with agricultural 
work, others with the Peruvian enforce- 
ment agencies such as the Guardia Civil, 
Peruvian Investigative Police, and Peru- 
vian Customs Service, whose work is 
. essential to the success of control 
through alternative crop programs. 

Our Peruvian programs have been 
designed to coordinate closely with and 
be complemented by the rural develop- 
ment program of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development. We have worked 
- for 2 years to initiate such a project in 
the illicit coca area, which now produces 



May 1981 



an estimated 40-60 metric tons of illicit 
cocaine annually. If sufficient funding 
and multilateral commitment can be 
garnered, we see real possibilities for 
success in effectively diminishing illicit 
Peruvian production. 

Bolivia. Almost all program ac- 
tivities in Bolivia have been suspended 
in the wake of that country's July 17, 
1980, takeover by a military junta close- 
ly connected with cocaine trafficking. 
Resumption of full programing in Bolivia 
depends on a political decision as to the 
possibility of achieving useful antidrug 
results through cooperation with the 
Bolivian Government. In light of the 
consistent reporting which shows com- 
plete complicity between Bolivian 
enforcement agencies, the Bolivian mili- 
tary, and major Bolivian traffickers, 
resumption of programing is currently 
impossible. If the situation changes 
dramatically, we will seek reprograming 
possibilities to reinstate effective 
programs. 

Colombia. Colombia continues to be 
the major processor of cocaine 
hydrochloride, supplying approximately 
70% of the U.S. and world markets. It 
also provides 70% of the marijuana 
smuggled to the United States, with an 
estimated 23,000-25,000 metric tons 
produced in the 1980 harvest. Building 
on previous programs totaling $19.7 mil- 
lion in FY 1980 and FY 1981, the FY 
1982 program will extend support at a 
level of $2.7 million. The majority of this 
new funding-$1.7 million-will be used 
to assist the national police, as the 
primary Colombian Government agency 
for narcotics enforcement. Modest 
amounts will support the Colombian 
Customs Service, the Attorney General's 
Office, and the Mission's project develop- 
ment and support costs. Any effective 
steps to move the Colombians toward at- 
tacking their vast marijuana production 
are hindered by two factors: our own in- 
ability to suppress domestic marijuana 
cultivation in the United States and our 
being prevented from working toward 
eradication through herbicidal spraying. 

Ecuador. We have maintained a 
program in Ecuador because of that 
country's importance as a major traffick- 
ing link for coca derivatives and cocaine 
from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. For 
FY 1982, a funding level of $480,000 
will be provided to support ongoing in- 
terdiction work by enforcement agencies 
and to continue drug abuse education 
efforts. 

Brazil. Since 1979 Brazil has shown 
evidence of becoming an important co- 



caine transshipment country and the 
principal source for acetone and ether 
used in cocaine refinement in Bolivia. 
Fairly sophisticated drug distribution 
networks transship cocaine from Bolivia 
through Brazil for ultimate transport to 
the United States and Europe. Our goal 
is to assist Brazilian federal police in 
curtailing the processing and transship- 
ment of coca derivatives destined even- 
tually for the United States. 

In FY 1981, the United States is 
negotiating a project agreement with 
the federal police, which is under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Justice 
and is the agency within the Brazilian 
Government with primary responsibility 
for narcotics control. Approximately 
$200,000 will support border interdiction 
operations aimed at disrupting traffick- 
ing at key spots on the Colombian and 
Bolivian borders. 

If supported by evaluation of the 
success of the FY 1981 operations, we 
will continue in FY 1982 to support the 
federal police in its border interdiction 
program for cocaine. About $500,000 
will provide commodity support, train- 
ing, and rental of necessary tactical air 
transportation for Brazilian narcotics 
teams in operations border areas and 
other support costs. 

The Caribbean. Trafficking routes 
for 70% of the cocaine and marijuana 
and a major portion of the illicitly pro- 
duced dangerous drugs entering the 
United States pass through the Carib- 
bean. The impact of this flow on the 
United States, especially Florida, has 
long been obvious. The Attorney General 
of Florida has reportedly described the 
trade in cocaine, marijuana, and illicit 
quaaludes in that State alone as "the 
biggest retail business in our State," 
amounting to about $7 billion. But the 
affected Caribbean countries are only 
now beginning to perceive the serious 
social, political, and economic problems 
for themselves stemming from the 
traffic. The matter has been raised 
recently as a priority bilateral issue by 
both the Bahamas and Jamaica; the lat- 
ter is the source of approximately 25% 
of marijuana smuggled into the United 
States. We are undertaking a Caribbean 
regional narcotics program aimed at 
establishing a basis for better coordina- 
tion among the Caribbean countries, 
particularly Jamaica, the Bahamas, the 
Turks and Caicos, and U.S. enforcement 
Agencies -DE A, Coast Guard, and Cus- 
toms. The main thrust of this funding is 
to be used in improving interdiction 
results in the Caribbean, pursuing 



57 



Narcotics 



eradication efforts if deemed feasible, 
and operational support efforts. 

Narcotics Demand Reduction 

In FY 1982, we are requesting $2.1 mil- 
lion to support programs designed to 
reduce demand for illicit drugs in coun- 
tries which are involved in the produc- 
tion or transit of drugs destined for the 
United States. This effort has a direct 
effect on our production control and in- 
terdiction programs. 

We have found that the existence of 
a demand reduction program enhances 
the awareness of local public leaders to 
the potential or actual threat drug abuse 
poses to the host society. This, in turn, 
strengthens the government's commit- 
ment to the production and trafficking 
control programs which we emphasize. 
We have also found, particularly in pro- 
ducing countries, that stable populations 
of illicit drug consumers provide an addi- 
tional economic incentive to illicit pro- 
ducers. These addicts are a ready local 
market for relatively unrefined drugs, 
like opium gum, and serve as a hedge 
against fluctuations of the international 
drug market. 

Finally, large numbers of chronic 
consumers of illicit drugs may de- 
stabilize societies friendly to the United 
States by reducing the availability of 
effective manpower in the workplace; 
supporting corruption, criminal traffick- 
ing elements, and other drug-related 
crime; and exacerbating other economic 
and social problems. Malaysia, for exam- 
ple, has identified the illicit drug prob- 
lem as a major security problem. 

Much of our effort in Europe is tied 
in some way to pump-priming -increas- 
ing European awareness of the scope of 
the problem, sensitizing them to the 
threat posed by the definite spillover 
threat on U.S. and other NATO forces, 
and stimulating European Community 
support for international narcotic con- 
trol programs in production areas. The 
Department has encouraged a col- 
laborative effort with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (F.R.G.)-known 
as the central working group -in which 
[the U.S. Departments of] State and 
Defense, as well as the DEA work with 
several German agencies to increase the 
effectiveness of domestic drug enforce- 
ment and treatment programs, as well 
as programs which affect the U.S. 
military forces stationed in the F.R.G. 
We have also provided limited technical 
assistance to the Government of Italy 
and have consulted with representatives 
of other European governments, and we 



work closely with the Vatican, which has 
identified drug abuse as one of the ma- 
jor problems confronting the family. 

International Narcotics Control 
Training 

Our funded training activities are aimed 
primarily at improving the enforcement 
capability of foreign narcotics officials 
and are designed to increase profes- 
sional cooperation between U.S. enforce- 
ment authorities and those of other 
countries. 

Most of the training is carried out 
by the DEA and the U.S. Customs Serv- 
ice in time-tested courses and in special 
programs designed to meet specific re- 
quirements. Both agencies conduct ad- 
vanced courses for high-level foreign 
officials in their U.S. training centers, 
while training for line officials is general- 
ly offered abroad in special in-country 
programs. Beginning in FY 1982, DEA 
will conduct its advanced international 
narcotics-control training at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center at 
Glynco, Georgia. 

DEA and Customs also provide 
courses to improve domestic training 
capabilities of responsible agencies in the 
cooperating nations. During FY 1980, 
DEA and Customs provided training to 
over 1,100 foreign participants in 
courses overseas and in the United 
States. Both DEA and Customs evaluate 
their portions of the training program. 
The overall training program was 
evaluated by a contractor on behalf of 
the White House Domestic Policy Staff 
in 1980. 

Our funded training also includes the 
executive observation program, through 
which senior foreign government 
officials involved in narcotics-control ac- 
tivities visit this country. Besides expos- 
ing these key visitors to U.S. agencies 
and procedures, this program develops 
personal ties of communication and 
cooperation between U.S. and foreign 
government officials. During FY 1980, 
we funded the visits of 13 senior govern- 
ment officials from 8 countries. 

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 

So far I have spoken mainly of our bi- 
lateral narcotics control efforts, but we 
also work through various multilateral 
agencies and contribute to the U.N. 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNF- 
DAC). I would like to cite here an im- 
portant recent development by which 
the U.N. drug control system will assist 
us in reducing a major form of drug 
abuse in the United States. 



One of the most popular illicit phar 
maceuticals here is methaqualone, first 
marketed under the trade name Quaa- 
lude. Hospital emergency rooms men- 
tions of methaqualone during the first 
three-quarters of 1980 totaled 3,374, up 
almost 100% from the same period in 
1979. Although most of the illicit metha 
qualone has been smuggled from clan- 
destine laboratories in Colombia, it ap- 
pears that in the near future Colombia 
may no longer be a major supplier. For 
some time, we have urged the Colom- 
bian Government to ratify the U.N.'s 
Psychotropic Substances Convention of 
1971 -the international agreement unde 
which the shipment of licit raw material 
for methaqualone, which is later 
diverted to illicit production, can be con 
trolled. The convention has serious 
implications for domestic pharmaceutic; 
industries which makes ratification a 
sensitive economic issue. 

As you know, the U.S. Senate did 
not ratify the convention until last year 
The Colombian legislature did so in 
September 1980, and President [Julio 
Cesar Turbay Ayala] Turbay signed the 
ratification agreement on January 13, 
1981. Colombia can now notify the 
U.N.'s Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
that licit imports of the raw materials 
for methaqualone are prohibited. Ex- 
porting countries, in this case the F.R.( 
and Switzerland, are then obliged to hi 
shipments to Colombia and, in doing si 
cut off supplies now diverted to the 
clandestine laboratories which supply 
the U.S. market. 

The U.N.'s own program activities 
control illicit drugs are funded through 
UNFDAC. Since its establishment in 
1971, UNFDAC has helped to emphasi 
the fact that the problems of drug abu: 
know no national boundaries and, then 
fore, require worldwide cooperation. 
UNFDAC has also been able to work 
with countries whose cooperation is vit 
to U.S. narcotics-control interests but 
where political circumstances inhibit 
U.S. bilateral assistance. 

We plan to contribute up to $3 
million to the fund in FY 1982. The 19 
program will support crop substitution 
projects in countries producing the gri 
majority of illegal opium, notably Bur- 
ma, Thailand, Laos, and Pakistan. 

With the support of Congress, we 
tend to pursue our efforts to suppress 
licit narcotics production and traffickin 
as far from our borders as possible. 



:: 



5! 



'The complete transcript of the hearing 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Orfii 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



58 



non-irtmflnt r\f Qtato Rulloti 



REFUGEES 



FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for 
Migration and Refugee Assistance 



L W. R. 



Smyser 



Statement before the Senate Foreign 
delations Committee on March 27, 1981. 
Ir. Smyser is Acting Director of the 
3ureau for Refugee Programs. 1 

The U.S. response to the worldwide 
•efugee problem can be divided into 
wo major components - refugee relief 
rii ind refugee resettlement. Our basic 
wlicy is to emphasize assistance to 
n 'efugees overseas until they can either 
i>e voluntarily repatriated to their coun- 
ts iry of origin or resettled in place. Re- 
settlement in the United States, or to 
mother third country, is a solution of 
ast resort for a very limited number of 
■efugees. 

tefugee Resettlement 

''or the purpose of admitting refugees 
o the United States, the Department is 
.eeking $294 million in FY 1982 authori- 
sation, which is an increase of $18 
trillion above the level available under 
he terms of the FY 1981 continuing 
esolution. These funds will finance the 
.dmission of 187,000 refugees to the 
nited States, if the President confirms 
hose admission levels following consul- 
,tion with the Congress in September 
accordance with the Refugee Act of 
980. The current proposed FY 1982 ad- 
issions level includes 144,000 Indo- 
hinese refugees and 43,000 refugees 
rom other parts of the world. This pro- 
osed level for FY 1982 is 30,000 below 
he level authorized for this fiscal year 
nd nearly 45,000 below the FY 1980 
onsultations level. 

The anomaly of having decreased ad- 
missions, at a time when nearly $19 
nillion in additional financial authoriza- 
tion is being requested, is explained by 
■ligher fuel costs for transporting 
refugees to this country, along with the 
rr t i full implementation of the Refugee Act 
, of 1980, which requires more equitable 
treatment of refugees selected for ad- 
J mission to the United States. 

ss 
Overseas Refugee Relief Programs 

The most significant policy and financial 
... changes in the FY 1982 refugee pro- 
,'; gram are presented in the overseas 



refugee relief programs. The funds 
sought for these activities are generally 
contributed to international organiza- 
tions such as the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). As the Congress requested, the 
executive branch planned to consolidate 
funding for all refugee-related accounts 
within the migration and refugee 
assistance appropriation effective with 
the beginning of FY 1981. 

The delay in the enactment of the 
Foreign Assistance and Related Pro- 
grams Appropriation Act, however, has 
made it very likely that this consolida- 
tion of accounts will be postponed until 
FY 1982. The effect of this consolidation 
will be to transfer $66 million in require- 
ments from other accounts within the 
Foreign Assistance and Related Pro- 
grams Appropriation Act to the migra- 
tion and refugee assistance appropria- 
tion account. Included in this transfer is 
$52 million for the U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) and $14.25 
million for programs authorized in ac- 
cordance with the authorities of section 
495F of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

Southeast Asia. For overseas 
refugee relief in Southeast Asia, we are 
requesting $60 million, a reduction of 
$31 million from the amount available 
under the terms of the FY 1981 continu- 
ing resolution. These funds will provide 
care and maintenance for Indochinese 
refugees in the nations of first asylum, 
the cash portion of the U.S. contribution 
to the Khmer relief program, and also 
provide English-language and cultural 
orientation training to employable heads 
of households selected for resettlement 
in the United States. 

Middle East. In keeping with our 
commitment to the principle of freedom 
of emigration for Soviet and Eastern 
European Jewish refugees, the Depart- 
ment is requesting $12.5 million to help 
defray the cost of refugee resettlement 
and assistance in Israel. These funds will 
be contributed to the United Israel Ap- 
peal for immediate and long-term 
assistance in Israel to the thousands of 
Jewish refugees who have been allowed 
to leave the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European nations over the past several 
years. 



Africa. To deal with the critical 
needs of refugees in Africa, the Depart- 
ment is seeking $77 million in FY 1982 
authorization. While this is an increase 
of $41.3 million over the amount 
available under the terms of the continu- 
ing resolution, $14.25 million of this in- 
crease reflects the effect of the con- 
solidation in this account of activities 
previously appropriated to the Agency 
for International Development (AID). Of 
the total request for assistance in 
Africa, $65 million will be contributed to 
international organizations involved in 
the provision of relief in that continent, 
and the balance of $12 million will be 
utilized for a variety of emergency and 
bilateral activities, similar to those 
previously funded by AID under the 
authorities of section 495F of the 
Foreign Assistance Act. 

Near East. For refugee relief in the 
Near East, the Department is request- 
ing $92 million, an increase of 
$88,370,000 above the level available 
under the continuing resolution. This in- 
crease includes $52 million resulting 
from the transfer to this account of 
financing for the U.S. Government con- 
tribution to UNRWA, which provides 
essential assistance to Palestinian refu- 
gees. The balance of the request includes 
$24.15 million for assistance through in- 
ternational organizations to the 2 million 
Afghan refugees expected to be in Paki- 
stan in FY 1982, a $15 million adjust- 
ment for UNRWA to incorporate the 
effects of reprograming actions in past 
years and enhanced financial support for 
that organization, and a contribution of 
$1 million to the overall Near East pro- 
gram of the UNHCR. 

Latin America. Another component 
of our overall relief program provides 
assistance to refugees in Latin America. 
Our request for this activity is $1 
million, a decrease of $220,000 below 
the continuing resolution level due to 
certain nonrecurring costs. 

The $6.95 million which we are seek- 
ing for contributions to international 
organizations and resettlement assist- 
ance activities includes requests of $4.45 
million as the U.S. contribution to the 
Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration (ICM), which was previously 
called the Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration, and $1.5 
million as a general contribution to the 
ICRC. The increases of $330,000 in our 
proposed contribution to ICM and 
$500,000 for the ICRC, signify our con- 
tinuing support for these organizations, 



May 1981 



59 



Refugees 



which play a vital role in helping the 
world community deal with the refugee 
crisis. 

The remaining $1 million requested 
for this activity supports projects 
designed to resettle refugees in nations 
other than the traditional countries of 
resettlement. We view this as one of the 
more significant policy initiatives in- 
cluded in this budget, since there are 
certain resource-rich, but population- 
poor, nations throughout the world 
which may be willing to accept refugees 
for permanent resettlement, if interna- 
tional financial assistance is available. 



Administrative Expenses 

The last item in our request is $8.2 mil- 
lion for administrative expenses. This 
increase of $1.4 million over the com- 
parable continuing resolution level 
provides funding to establish 30 new 
positions in the Bureau for Refugee Pro- 
grams, which will strengthen financial 
and program management; to finance an 
enhanced program of evaluation and 
audit; and to meet price increases for 
ongoing activities such as travel, rents, 
and supplies. Despite this period of 
financial stringency, there are certain 
crucial needs in the Bureau which can 
only be met by establishing new posi- 
tions. In particular, I am referring to 
such complex nev/ needs as the refugee 
programs in Pakistan, Somalia, and 
Kampuchea and the management re- 
sponsibilities encumbent upon a program 
which has available over $500 million in 
Federal resources. I would now like to 
discuss briefly the outlines of the FY 
1983 migration and refugee assistance 
authorization needs. For that year, we 
are seeking $460 million in program 
authorization. This request is $93 million 
less than what we are seeking for FY 
1982. This decrease reflects a projected 
reduction in the rate of Indochinese 
refugee resettlement to the United 
States, since the refugee situation in 
Southeast Asia is expected to continue 
to improve, along with other program 
decreases in areas such as Khmer relief. 
The balance of the authorization request 
projects no significant changes from the 
activities which I have just described for 
FY 1982. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and win 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 
African Refugees 



by W. R. Smyser 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Africa and on International 
Organizations of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on March 19, 1981. 
Mr. Smyser is Acting Director of the 
Bureau of Refugee Programs. 1 

I am pleased to discuss with you our 
program of assistance for African 
refugees. At the time of the Department 
of State's testimony before the Africa 
subcommittee last year, Africa's refugee 
problem, although of immense magni- 
tude, was not well known to the world 
community. Today this is no longer the 
case. The world's attention is focusing 
more and more on the needs of the 
several million refugees in Africa. This 
is a welcome development to all people 
who are concerned about the very large 
number of Africans who are victims of 
civil strife and political persecution. I 
should add also that increased world 
awareness of this major humanitarian 
problem is a matter of crucial impor- 
tance to U.S. policy interests. Several 
African countries which are our staunch 
friends are seriously affected by the 
presence within their borders of hun- 
dreds of thousands of homeless and 
destitute refugees. 

The U.S. Government, over the past 
year, has made substantial contributions 
to ongoing multilateral efforts on this 
issue. We and others have worked suc- 
cessfully to raise the world's awareness 
of this critical humanitarian and political 
problem. Subsequently, we have begun 
to see the results of these efforts in in- 
creasing availabilities of international 
assistance for African refugees. There is 
no question that our government's 
efforts were strengthened at each step 
in this process by close collaboration be- 
tween the Administration and concerned 
committees and individuals in the Con- 
gress. We, therefore, look forward to con- 
tinuing in a cooperative effort with you 
and others in Congress to make sure 
that the United States does its share to 
strengthen the international commu- 
nity's refugee relief efforts in Africa. 

The Department's mandate includes 
both the care and maintenance of 
refugees in their countries of asylum 
outside the United States and the reset- 
tlement of refugees in this country. In 






irtk 
■ 

II 



ssist 

(iti 
F 



- 
(tte 
ide 



the African context, the first of these 
functions is by far the more important 
due to the nature of the African refuge 
situation. Nevertheless, in the past yeai 
we have made significant progress in in 
plementing an appropriate African 
refugee admissions program as well, in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
1980 Refugee Act. 

The implementation of our African 
refugee program has been an interde- 
partmental effort. As a result of the 
division of responsibilities within the 
U.S. Government, assistance for 
refugees falls within the mandate of the 
Department of State and assistance for 
internally displaced persons falls almos 
entirely within the mandate of the Age 
cy for International Development (AID 
Further distinctions exist between 
emergency relief assistance for refugee 
and long-term development assistance i 
infrastructure building as these affect 
refugee relief operations and refugee 
resettlement. There is also a distinctior 
between nonfood relief for refugees an 
food assistance. 

Congress has provided funds to 
different agencies and offices to cover 
these assistance needs. But, obviously, 
these functions are often interrelated, 
and distinctions are at times hard to 
draw. Consequently, the Department c 
State has collaborated closely with the 
Department's Bureau of African Affaii 
and offices in other government agen 
cies-all of the Agency for Internatio 
Development, primarily AID's Office o 
Food for Peace and the Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance -to insur 
that the long- and short-term food am 
nonfood needs of the refugees and 
displaced persons in Africa are taken i 
to consideration. 

U.S. Efforts 

For FY 1981, the Department of Statu 
requested a total of $54 million in non 
food aid for African refugees. This 
figure includes $35 million for the U.N 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), $7 million for the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), and $12 million for special pre 
ects and bilateral assistance. Although 
we are operating under the terms of a 
continuing resolution, we are taking 
steps, possibly including reprograming | 
actions and reallocation of other 



Refugees 



I 1 resources available to the Department, 
to insure that nonfood contributions to 
African refugees in FY 1981 will be 
funded, at least, at the $54 million level 

(for the entire fiscal year. To date in FY 
1981, we have pledged $28.3 million to 
the UNHCR's general program for 
Africa and $7 million to the ICRC. We 
are also continuing to support a number 
of urgent bilateral projects through 
voluntary organizations and with the 
assistance of the Public Health Service's 
Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. 

Food contributions to refugees in 
Africa are administered by AID's Office 
of Food for Peace. Our FY 1981 food 
contribution to African refugees is ex- 
pected to total $42 million, which in- 
cludes transport. The levels of our food 
aid in 1982 will be determined later in 
the year when food needs are more 
clearly known. 

For FY 1982, the State Department 
has requested $77 million for nonfood 
aid for African refugees. The Agency 
for International Development's FY 
1 1982 request also includes $20 million 
for long-term resettlement projects for 
refugees and displaced persons. 

The bulk of the funds expended by 
the Department of State for African 
refugees is channeled through interna- 
tional organizations. In FY 1980, for ex- 
ample, 84% of the $56.1 million U.S. 
Government contribution of nonfood 
refugee assistance was made through 
the UNHCR and the ICRC. We intend 
' to continue our multilateral approach in 
FY 1981 and FY 1982. 

Internationalization of African 
refugee relief is clearly our most 
desirable and effective option. This is 
true for two reasons. First, by making 
the international organizations the focal 
point for refugee relief, the responsibili- 
ty for providing needed humanitarian 
assistance correctly rests on all donor 
nations rather than solely on the United 
States. Second, it is in our political in- 
terest to involve other nations in this 
effort. 

I should stress that reliance on inter- 
national organizations does not reduce 
the role of the Department of State in 
the area of African refugee relief. 
Rather, in order to insure that refugees' 
needs are being met and that the inter- 
national organizations remain account- 
able for their activities, we have under- 
taken a multiplicity of functions on a 
continuing basis. These responsibilities 
include monitoring the conditions in 
Africa which create refugee problems; 
evaluating the relief programs carried 



May 1981 



out by the international organizations in 
support of the African refugees; and 
working closely to accomplish these pur- 
poses with a broad group of the in- 
terested parties, including African and 
other governments. 

Since our last appearance before the 
Subcommittee on Africa, our efforts 
have taken many directions. We view as 
some of our more noteworthy ac- 
complishments over the past year: 

• The establishment of the Somalia 
Refugee Working Group in early 1980, 
which, in the initial stages of the Somali 
refugee emergency, provided critically 
needed food and other relief supplies 
and which, I am convinced, assured the 
survival of the refugees; 

• The successful completion of on- 
site situation assessments in Somalia, 
Sudan, Djibouti, Cameroon, Zaire, and 
other African countries which have led 
to realistic planning and more ap- 
propriate responses by the international 
organizations, the U.S. Government, and 
other donors; and 

• The establishment of excellent 
communications and collaboration within 
the U.S. Government and between us 
and affected African governments, other 
donor nations, the private voluntary sec- 
tor, and international organizations. 

In addition to the above, during the 
past year, U.S. funding for African 
refugee relief rose considerably over the 
previous years' levels. Total U.S. 
assistance for African refugees, in- 
cluding food and nonfood and from 
State Department and AID sources, rose 
from $63 million in FY 1979 to nearly 
$105 million in FY 1980. The U.S. con- 
tribution to refugee relief in Somalia 
alone in FY 1980 totaled $53 million. In 
Somalia, our contribution of 114,000 
metric tons of food in FY 1980, valued 
with transport at $35 million, repre- 
sented approximately 80% of all food 
donated to Somali refugees in that year. 
Our contribution of $ 18 million worth of 
nonfood assistance to Somali refugees 
was close to one-half of all such con- 
tributions. In the future, I believe that 
1980 will be seen as a turning point in 
our government's recognition of African 
refugee needs. 

I would like to mention briefly 
another aspect of our African refugee 
program for 1980. That is our African 
refugee admissions program. Most refu- 
gees in Africa traditionally have been 
welcome to remain in African countries 
of asylum. This is a humane and praise- 
worthy attitude, and we should do what 



we can to support its continuation. For- 
tunately, this situation still prevails, and 
we consider it to be in the best interests 
of the African countries and of the in- 
dividual refugees themselves. However, 
in certain instances, settlement in an 
African country is not possible. Last 
year following the enactment of the Ref- 
ugee Act of 1980 and with the help of 
the Department of Justice and of numer- 
ous American voluntary agencies, we ex- 
panded our program of African refugee 
admissions to the United States. This 
program has as its aim to provide reset- 
tlement opportunities to those who are 
in genuine need while avoiding an un- 
necessarily traumatic separation for 
large numbers of people from familiar 
climates and cultures. As part of this ad- 
missions program, we have retained the 
necessary latitude to offer resettlement 
to urgent cases from any country in 
Africa where refugees come to our Em- 
bassies' attention. 

Critical Problems 

Calendar year 1981 promises to present 
new challenges to our African refugee 
program. One of the most troubling 
aspects of the current situation is that 
several ongoing conflicts in Africa will 
probably not soon reach solutions which 
would allow the refugees to return to 
theiv homes. As a result, the monumen- 
tal assistance requirements which have 
arisen over the past few years will per- 
sist. This state of affairs is further ex- 
acerbated by the fact that both the 
asylum countries and the donor coun- 
tries are facing serious internal econom- 
ic difficulties. 

Today's most critical African refugee 
problems are in Somalia, Sudan, 
Djibouti, Zaire, and Cameroon. In 
Somalia the situation is especially acute 
where refugees from the fighting in 
Ethiopia have been arriving at an 
average rate of more than 1,000 a day 
snce October 1979. Earlier this year, 
the Government of Somalia estimated 
thj refugee population in the more than 
35 camps at over 1 million. Some half 
million more refugees in Somalia are 
believed to be struggling to survive out- 
side the camps. However, because num- 
bers of refugees often are difficult to 
estimate, a new assessment of the scope 
of tne Somali refugee population will 
soon be undertaken. The currently esti- 
mated requirements for the refugees in 
Somalia for 1981 are $85 million worth 
of nonfood assistance and 283,000 



61 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



metric tons of food. The U.S. Govern- 
ment intends to continue its support for 
refugee relief in Somalia within the 
framework of the ongoing needs of that 
situatu n. 

Sudan is host to nearly 500,000 
refugees, over 350,000 of whom are 
Ethiopians who have fled either the 
Socialist revolution or widespread on- 
going strife in their home country. Tens 
of thousands of Ethiopian refugees have 
crowded into many of Sudan's cities 
while another even larger group is con- 
centrated in the rural areas of Sudan 
along the Ethiopian border. In addition 
to the Ethiopians in Sudan, nearly 
100,000 Ugandans are living in the 
eastern Equatoria province near the 
1 [ganda and Zaire borders. 

Zaire's already large refugee popula- 
tion grew during the last quarter of 
L980 when tens of thousands of 
residents of the West Nile district of 
Uganda fled disturbances in that area 
and joined the 54,000 Ugandan refugees 
who had come to northeastern Zaire in 
1979. A recent U.S. Government study 
estimated a current total of 80,000- 
100,000 Ugandans living in northeastern 
Z.aire but found that the refugees fre- 
quently move back and forth across the 
border to acquire food and to escape 
military or rebel harassment on both 
sides. In addition to the Ugandans, Zaire 
is hosi to approximately 400,000 other 
refugees, mostly from Angola. 

Following the outbreak of fighting in 
Ndjamena in March 1980, much of the 
population of that city fled across the 
river to Kousseri, a small village in 
northern Cameroon. Approximately 
80 000 Chadian refugees in Cameroon 
are still in need of relief assistance. 

International Conference 

Africa's refugee problems will be at the 
forefront of the world's attention next 
month when an international conference 
for assistance to refugees in Africa 
meets in Geneva April 9-10. The con- 
ference, which is in response to a 
General Assembly resolution calling for 
increased assistance for Africa's 
refugees, is jointly sponsored by the 
U.N. Secretary General's office, the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees, and 
the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). It is expected that a large num- 
ber of European and African countries 
will be represented at the ministerial 
level or above. The composition of the 
U.S. delegation will be announced in the 
near future. 



R2 



FY 1982 Security Assistance 
Requests 



Statements by James L. Buckley, 
Under Secretary for Security Assistance, 
Science, and Technology on March 19, 
1981, and Richard R. Burt, Director. 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, on 
March 23, 1981, both before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Security and 
Science Affairs of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. 1 



UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY, 
MAR. 19, 1981 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before the subcommittee in support of 
the Administration's legislative and bud- 
getary proposals for security assistance 
in fiscal year 1982. I would like to stress 
at the outset that this Administration re- 
gards all of our foreign assistance pro- 
grams as important instruments of U.S. 
policy abroad. Both security and 
development assistance serve our long- 
range interest in stability and in encour- 
aging an international environment con- 



jtanci 
{toyed 



Bit of : 

jdeve 



ducive to peaceful change. If the in- 
creases we are recommending for FY 
1982 development assistance over the 
levels available in this fiscal year are rel 
atively modest in comparison to those 
we are seeking for security assistance, 
this should not be construed as any loss 
of faith in the value of these programs. 
Rather, it stems from our view that 
there is an immediate and pressing need 
to increase the security assistance re- 
sources this country is making available 
to its friends and allies. 

Before turning to the details of our 
security assistance request, I would also 
like to note that this Administration be 
lieves there has been a tendency in the 
past to overemphasize the differences 
between security and development 
assistance and to lose sight of their com 
mon goals. Insufficient coordination at 
times resulted in foreign assistance not 
being employed in the most effective 
manner to support our foreign policy 
and national security interests. To 
remedy this situation, Secretary Haig 



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The United States has supported the 
idea of the conference since its inception 
am I views the success of this conference 
as an important aspect of our policy 
toward Africa in general and toward 
refugee relief in particular. Accordingly, 
for the past few months we have lent 
our support to efforts to insure that the 
conference will satisfy the purposes of 
the recipient and the donor countries 
a! ke. These efforts have included discus- 
si ns with African governments and the 
O- U, the European Community, the 
De -elopment Assistance Council of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the U.N. Secretary 
General's office, and the High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees. We feel confident 
that these efforts have been worthwhile, 
and we are looking forward to the con- 
ference in Geneva as an opportunity to 
express to the African governments and 
the world community our concern over 
the plight of African refugees and our 
support for international efforts to assist 
them. We intend to announce a level of 
U.S. assistance at the conference which 
will be supportive of the needs of 
African refugees. It is our hope that the 
conference will serve to encourage other 
donors also to contribute generously to 
African refugee relief. 



il: 



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a 
\i 



Future Concerns 

A look to the future for improvement ir 
the current refugee situation in Africa i 
not encouraging. Signals in certain part 
of Africa, and the African security situa 
tion in general, are unsettling to the 
point where we would be unwise not to 
anticipate future needs. A disturbing 
proof of this trend is that, over the past 
few years, the number of African refu- 
gees assisted by UNHCR programs has 
grown from 700,000 to over 3 million. I 
is uncertain when this alarming expan- 
sion will cease. 

Given the current conditions and th< 
outlook for the future, it is essential tha 
the channels of communication which 
have developed over the past year re- 
main open and that close collaboration 
with all interested parties continues. Th 
role of our office in this process has 
developed significantly since we last 
testified before the Africa Subcommit- 
tee. We will continue to look to the Con 
gress for support and assistance on 
these important issues. 






■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Oftce 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



DeDartment of State Bulletii 






Security Assistance 



ej 



.s asked me to assist him in providing 
erall policy guidance for foreign 
sistance and to insure that all 
sistance funds and programs are being 
nployed to our best advantage. To this 
id, I will coordinate for the Depart- 
ent of State both security assistance 
id development assistance resource 
locations. I will be working closely 
ith the Under Secretary for Economic 
ffairs who has specific responsibilities 
the economic assistance area. This 
ternoon, however, in accord with your 
vitation, I am here to discuss the 
curity assistance program. 



i eneral Framework 

i his appearance yesterday before the 
11 committee, Secretary Haig empha- 
sed the importance which this Admin- 
Dration attaches to security assistance 

an integral component of our global 
tfense posture and as a key instrument 

our foreign policy [see Current Policy 
o. 264]. In so doing, he underscored 
e increasing challenges which the 
)viets and their clients have posed to 
ir most important interests -in South- 
est and Southeast Asia, Africa, and 
antral America. Clearly these chal- 
nges, as well as those evidenced in the 
lparalleled buildup of Soviet conven- 
)nal and nuclear forces over the past 
;cade, cannot go unanswered. To meet 
,ese challenges, however, we must not 
lly strengthen our own military forces; 
e must also give urgent attention to 
te security requirements of our friends 
id allies, whose strength and support 
institute major pillars of our own 
icurity. 

Security assistance programs con- 
ibute directly to the security of the 
nited States in a number of specific 
ays. 

• They bolster the military capabil- 
iesTof our friends and allies, permitting 
'• lem in some cases to undertake respon- 
fe! bilities which otherwise we ourselves 
light have to assume. Greece and Tur- 
ey are examples of countries whose 
lilitary forces carry out duties which 
re crucial to U.S. security interests, 
ach as contributing to a strong NATO 
outhern flank and stability in the 

(astern Mediterranean. 
• They contribute to the broad 
ooperative relationships we have 
stablished with many nations which 
«rmit either U.S. facilities on their ter- 
itory or access by U.S. forces to their 



facilities in time of threat to mutual in- 
terests. U.S. defense expenditures would 
be immeasurably higher if we did not 
have overseas facilities available for 
emergency situations. 

• They help our friends and allies 
provide for their own defense and fur- 
nish tangible evidence of our support for 
their independence and territorial in- 
tegrity, thus deterring possible aggres- 
sion. For example, the prompt and effec- 
tive assistance we were able to provide 
Thailand last year undoubtedly helped 
bolster Thai resolve in the face of the 
Soviet-supported Vietnamese forces ar- 
rayed along that country's eastern fron- 
tiers. This was a signal which was not 
lost on either friend or foe. 

• They provide a means of demon- 
strating U.S. constancy and willingness 
to stay the course in support of nations 
whose continued survival constitutes a 
basic purpose of our foreign policy. 
Strong and unwavering support for the 
independence and security of Israel has 
been a hallmark of U.S. policy from ad- 
ministration to administration. 

• They help alleviate the economic 
and social causes of instability and con- 
flict. This is particularly important for 
countries whose necessary military ex- 
penditures would otherwise impose 
severe strains on their economies. 

It is within this context, then, that 
the Administration has cast its FY 1982 
security assistance requests. Because of 
the direct relationship of these programs 
to U.S. security interests, we believe 
that they must be viewed as an exten- 
sion of our defense programs and that 
they should enjoy the same high-priority 
funding. As a result, we are recommend- 
ing significantly increased security 
assistance programs and funding levels 
over both the previous administration's 
request and the FY 1981 levels for these 
programs. 

As in previous years, our FY 1982 
budget request will fund five major pro- 
grams: foreign military sales (FMS) fi- 
nancing, the economic support fund 
(ESF), the grant military assistance pro- 
gram (MAP), the international military 
education and training (IMET) program, 
and peacekeeping operations. Since 
Department officials representing our 
regional bureaus are already appearing 
before appropriate subcommittees in 
support of individual country program 
requests, I propose this morning to em- 
phasize the overall scope and purposes 
of our requests on a program-by-pro- 
gram basis. In addition, I would like to 



draw your attention to several new 
features in the budget request and a 
number of changes which we are recom- 
mending in legislation governing these 
programs in order to improve their ef- 
fectiveness in furthering our national in- 
terests. 

FY 1982 Budget Request 

For FY 1982, the Administration is re- 
questing authorizations of appropriations 
of $4.3 billion to finance security 
assistance programs totaling $6.9 billion. 
This represents a total program increase 
of 8.4%, and a budget authority increase 
of 27% over the previous administra- 
tion's request. As compared to FY 1981 
levels, our request constitutes an in- 
crease of 30% and 57%, respectively, in 
program and budget authority. 

Foreign Military Sales Financing. 

Foreign military sales financing assists 
countries in which we have a security in- 
terest to meet their legitimate defense 
needs through the acquisition of needed 
defense articles and services, including 
training. For FY 1982 we are requesting 
an appropriation of $1.48 billion to sup- 
port a total FMS financing program of 
$4.05 billion, to be furnished to 38 coun- 
tries and to provide for one regional pro- 
gram, as compared to an FY 1981 pro- 
gram of $3.05 billion for 35 countries. 
New programs are proposed for Yemen, 
Djibouti, Portugal, the Bahamas, and 
the eastern Caribbean. 

The proposed FY 1982 FMS pro- 
gram consists of three major elements: 

• $2,573 billion which would be ex- 
tended in the form of loans from the 
Federal Financing Bank with repayment 
guaranteed by the Department of 
Defense. No new budget authority is re- 
quired for such guaranties. 

• $500 million in FMS credits for 
Israel (for which $500 million in budget 
authority is requested) on which repay- 
ment would be forgiven; and 

• $981.8 million for FMS credits to 
15 countries and one regional program 
at reduced interest rates (for which an 
equal amount of budget authority is re- 
quested). 

Direct Credits. Before describing 
the major FMS country programs which 
would be funded from this request, I 
would like to discuss briefly the need for 
FMS credits at reduced interest rates. 
As the Congress is aware, FMS financ- 
ing was largely conceived as a means of 



May 1981 



63 






Security Assistance 



assisting developing countries to shift 
from grant military assistance to cash 
purchases at a time when they were ex- 
periencing substantial economic growth. 
Until recently, most nations were mak- 
ing steady progress toward this objec- 
tive. 

The rise in oil prices, however, has 
had a marked impact on economic 
growth throughout the world. Serious 
problems are developing as a number of 
countries amass increasingly large debt 
obligations to OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] mem- 
bers and to the industrialized countries. 
Moreover, there is growing concern 
among a number of security assistance 
recipients regarding the additional debt 
burden they can prudently assume in 
order to finance needed defense articles 
and services. 

This problem has been further ag- 
gravated by the recent increase in in- 
terest rates in this country. In the last 
year, interest rates on FMS-guaranteed 
loans -which are computed on the basis 
of the cost of the money to the U.S. 
Government plus a modest administra- 
tive charge -have risen as high as 15%. 
These two trends -increasing debt 
burdens among recipient countries and 
rising Federal Financing Bank interest 
rates -have combined to produce a situa- 
tion in which countries with particularly 
weak economies are facing serious dif- 
ficulties in financing their purchases 
through this mechanism. 

To deal with this problem and to in- 
sure that legitimate security needs are 
met without further exacerbating 
economic problems, we are proposing 
that a portion of the FY 1982 FMS 
financing program be made available in 
the form of direct U.S. Government 
credits. We plan to offer these credits at 
a rate of interest as low as 3%. The 
countries selected, which include Egypt, 
Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, and Portugal, 
are those facing particularly difficult 
economic situations and in which we 
have important security and foreign 
policy interests. 

Regional Programs. As in previous 
years, the bulk of our FMS financing 
program is allocated to countries of the 
Middle East in support of our major 
security and foreign policy interests in 
that important region. The increased 
levels requested for FY 1982 are also in- 
tended as a response to recent Soviet 
and Soviet-supported moves against 
Afghanistan, in the Horn of Africa, and 
in other areas important to the stability 



64 



of the region. Approximately 57% of the 
total FMS financing program is slated 
for Israel and Egypt. 

As the primary source of assistance 
to Israel, the large FMS financing pro- 
gram reflects deep and abiding U.S. sup- 
port for the independence and security 
of that country. It has enabled Israel to 
maintain its defenses at a level 
necessary to insure its own security. 
Moreover, this increased security has 
helped Israel to pursue peace negotia- 
tions with Egypt. The proposed FY 1982 
FMS financing program of $1.4 billion 
would enable Israel to continue to 
finance its priority military requirements 
for air defense, high-performance air- 
craft, armored and tracked vehicles, ar- 
tillery, missiles, and ammunition. Of this 
amount, $500 million would be forgiven, 
in recognition of the unusually heavy 
burden which defense expenditures im- 
pose upon the Israeli economy. We are 
confident that, with the proposed 
assistance, Israel will continue to be able 
to defend itself against all likely com- 
binations of possible adversaries for the 
next several years. 

For Egypt, which under President 
Sadat has become a major force for 
moderation in the Middle East, the pro- 
posed FMS program of $900 million 
($400 million of which will be in the 
form of credits at reduced interest rates) 
will assist that country in modernizing 
its military force to insure its security 
against significant external threats from 
Libya and other Soviet-supported 
sources of instability in the region. I 
would note that virtually all of these 
credits will be applied to pay for U.S. 
equipment ordered in previous years, in- 
cluding F-16 aircraft, air-defense bat- 
teries, armored-personnel carriers, and 
M60A3 tanks, almost wholly intended to 
replace existing Soviet-origin equipment. 

Turkey would receive the third 
largest FMS program -totaling $400 
million, of which $250 million would be 
provided at reduced interest rates in 
view of the particularly difficult 
economic situation facing that country. 
Other major FMS programs are re- 
quested for Greece ($260 million), Korea 
($167.5 million), Spain ($150 million), 
Sudan ($100 million), Tunisia ($95 
million), and Thailand ($80 million). 

Economic Support Fund. The eco- 
nomic support fund allows us to furnish 
economic assistance in the form of loans 
or grants to selected countries of special 
security and political interest to us. ESF 
can be used to fund commodity import 



programs, economic infrastructure and 
other capital projects, balance-of- 
payment support, and assistance for 
development projects of more direct im 
pact on the poor. We realize that 
economic stability is often a basic 
precondition for political stability. 

For FY 1982, we are requesting a 
total ESF program of $2.6 billion to 
fund 30 country and regional programs 
This represents an increase of 26% ove 
the FY 1981 level and about 6% over 
the previous administration's request. 

Of this amount, we are requesting 
$250 million in unallocated ESF funds 
for use in responding to unforeseen re- 
quirements where such assistance can 
support important foreign policy objec- 
tives. We believe the resulting flexibilit 
to be of the utmost importance in help- 
ing meet unforeseen contingencies. It is 
obviously impossible in March of 1981 t 
predict all needs that may arise during 
fiscal year beginning 7 months from 
now. In the past, we have had to rely c 
supplemental or reprogramings to re- 
spond to developments unanticipated a | 
the time of our budget requests. 

However, experience has shown thi 
neither we nor the Congress have foun 5 
these procedures to be satisfactory. Su 
plemental requests are time-consuming 
and lessen the political and economic ir • 
pact of our assistance. Reprograming i 
also a cumbersome process and require 
sacrificing one important policy objecti 
for another. For example, in the past 2 
years we have had to reprogram to me 
important unanticipated ESF needs in 
Thailand, Liberia, and in countries in t 
eastern Caribbean, Persian Gulf, and 
Southwest Asian regions. 

Reprograming becomes even more 
difficult in fiscal years when most of oi 
programs are earmarked or for compe 
ling policy reasons are otherwise 
unavailable for reprograming. In FY 
1981, for example, about 87% of our 
ESF program is earmarked by law. As 
result, funds which can be shifted frorr 
one purpose to another to respond to u 
foreseen events are severely limited. It 
is, of course, for this reason among 
others that the executive branch con- 
tinues to oppose statutory earmarking. 

I should note that the Congress 
itself recognized this problem when las 
year it adopted an amendment propose 
by the distinguished chairman of this 
committee [Clement J. Zablocki] that 
makes available for any emergency ES 
use up to $50 million in FY 1981 ESF 



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Department of State Bullet 



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Security Assistance 



ids, and permits up to 5% of any ear- 
larked funds to be used for such pur- 

. hse. Inasmuch as our proposed legisla- 
>n contains no FY 1982 earmarkings, 

i'3 do not propose the retention of that 
'ovision. Our request for $250 million 
■unallocated ESF, rather, builds upon 
e purpose that that provision was in- 
Tided to serve, namely, to increase the 
•ailability of ESF to meet requirements 
at cannot be anticipated at the time 
ir annual security assistance programs 
e formulated and proposed to the Con- 
•ess. I can assure you that this 
lallocated ESF would be used only for 
;uations of high priority and in accord- 
ice with the substantive and pro- 
dural standards of the law, including 
irmal reprograming notification re- 
tirements. 

Regional Programs. Turning to our 
'SF country programs, the majority of 
nds requested would be used to pro- 
de economic assistance to the countries 
the Middle East; as has been the case 
previous years, Israel and Egypt 
ould receive the largest amounts. The 
'85 million ESF program we are re- 
lesting for Israel would be in the form 
' a cash transfer, two-thirds grant and 
le-third in loans. Israel is expected to 
;e these funds for balance-of-payment 
ipport, to procure essential com- 

Sodities, and to ameliorate conditions 
hich have produced its current, 
/erheated economy. For Egypt, we are 
jquesting an ESF program of $750 
dllion, also two-thirds in grant and one- 
drd in loans. These funds would be 
sed to finance commodity imports, 
aeded infrastucture improvements, and 
icreased health, education, and 
•ansportation services. 

Important ESF programs are also 
a equested for Turkey ($300 million), 
i >udan ($50 million), Zimbabwe ($75 
lillion), the southern Africa program 
, $60 million), Jamaica ($40 million), El 
ialvador ($40 million), and the Philip- 
« >ines ($50 million). 

Military Assistance Program. In 

Dntrast to previous years, we are pro- 
| osing no new grant military assistance 
: ountry programs. Nevertheless, given 
ne growing challenges to our interests 
1 1 several crucial regions, we wish to re- 
am the flexibility to use such assistance 
| ( i situations where only it can do the job 

.nd which do not meet the criteria for 
I mergency "drawdowns" under section 
i '06(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
j 961, as amended. 



Accordingly, our MAP budget pro- 
posal thus includes, in addition to 
general costs -which consist of ad- 
ministrative expenses and costs related 
to the implementation of prior year pro- 
grams -$100 million in unallocated 
funds. These funds will give the Presi- 
dent the flexibility to provide grant 
military assistance in unforeseen situa- 
tions when diplomatic and political cir- 
cumstances directly related to U.S. na- 
tional interests and the economic situa- 
tion of the proposed recipient so require. 
As with the ESF special requirements 
fund, we would, of course, notify Con- 
gress of each intended use of these 
funds in accordance with standard 
reprograming procedures, and the 
assistance to be provided would be fur- 
nished in accordance with the substan- 
tive authorities and limitations ap- 
plicable to MAP. 

International Military Education 
and Training Program. In the con- 
sidered judgment of our Ambassadors 
abroad, the international military educa- 
tion and training program has been 
perhaps our most cost-effective security 
assistance program. We are requesting 
$47.7 million for this program in FY 
1982, which would allow training and in- 
struction for military and related civilian 
personnel from 72 countries. This com- 
pares to an FY 1981 program of $28.4 
million which provides training for per- 
sonnel from 63 countries. 

Over the years, executive branch 
officials have stressed the benefits which 
accrue to the United States as a result 
of IMET training. This training does far 
more than upgrade the military 
capabilities of allied and friendly nations. 
It also fosters long-range, close, and 
cooperative relationships with military 
and civilian leaders in a number of im- 
portant countries, while exposing them 
to American democratic values and to 
the role of a professional military 
organization under civilian leadership 
and direction. 

This committee's initiative of last 
year to reduce the tuition rates on 
IMET training has facilitated the ex- 
posure of greater numbers of foreign 
students to this valuable program. In- 
deed, these lower training costs have 
finally stopped the long-term decline in 
the annual numbers of students trained 
between FY 1975 and FY 1980 and are 
helping to restore the program to its full 
utility at modest cost. Nevertheless, our 
identified requirements are clearly ex- 
panding, especially in the Persian Gulf 
region, Central America, the Caribbean, 



and Southeast Asia. The increased levels 
we are requesting would meet these re- 
quirements by allowing programs for 
nine more countries than in FY 1981. In 
addition, they would allow remedial ac- 
tion in programs adversely affected by 
underfunding in past years. 



MR. BURT, 
MAR. 23, 1981 

I am pleased to appear before your sub- 
committee today as you continue your 
examination of the Reagan Administra- 
tion's security assistance proposals for 
fiscal year 1982. This is my first ap- 
pearance as an Administration witness 
before a congressional committee. It is 
an experience to which I have long 
looked forward. 

Legislative Proposals 

Last week before your subcommittee, 
Under Secretary of State Buckley went 
into some detail on the Administration's 
FY 1982 security assistance request. I 
will try to avoid going over the same 
ground; instead, after making a few 
remarks on our security assistance and 
arms transfer policies, I will largely 
confine myself to discussing their rela- 
tionship to our plans for creating a new 
strategic consensus in the Persian Gulf 
and wider Middle East. 

We recognize that we are asking for 
a considerable increase in the size of our 
security assistance programs. We also 
realize we have done this in the face of 
belt-tightening in domestic programs 
and a lesser increase in our development 
assistance request. However, as Secre- 
tary Haig said last week before your 
committee, our security assistance goes 
hand-in-hand with our effort to reconsti- 
tute America's defense capabilities. We 
believe that we must confront the chal- 
lenges to our vital interests with no less 
a commitment. 

In addition to the value of the coun- 
try and regional programs themselves, 
important elements in our security 
assistance requests include: 

• The $250 million in unallocated 
funds for economic support fund (ESF) 
special requirements; 

• The $100 million in unallocated 
funds for military assistance program 
special requirements; and 

• The modifications to legislative 
authorities that we have proposed. 



Vlay 1981 



65 



Security Assistance 



The two special requirements funds 
would enable us to respond rapidly in 
unforeseen circumstances where other- 
assistance is not available and where an 
infusion of either ESF economic assist- 
ance or military materiel would make a 
critical difference in the successful pur- 
suit of U.S. political and security in- 
terests. 

Similarly, the legislative proposals 
would support our objectives by: 

• Enhancing our arms cooperation 
efforts with NATO and other allies; 

• Helping to procure high-demand 
equipment in advance to avoid drawing 
down U.S. service inventories in the 
event of urgent foreign needs; 

• Facilitating the performance of 
legitimate and important functions in 
our overseas security assistance pro- 
gram management; and 

• Removing certain severe restric- 
tions on the President's ability to con- 
duct an effective and flexible foreign 
policy. 



Arms Transfer Policy 

Last week, Under Secretary Buckley 
also told this subcommittee that we have 
started a review of conventional arms 
transfer policy. He mentioned those 
general principles that are guiding the 
Administration's approach. Although the 
review is still in progress, I would like to 
elaborate on the Administration's think- 
ing. 

We consider arms transfers to be an 
important implement of our global 
defense posture and our foreign policy. 
We believe they should be used in a 
positive manner to advance our national 
security interests. 

Specifically, we intend to use arms 
transfers for the following purposes: 

• To strengthen the military capabil- 
ities of friends and allies; 

• To enhance important bilateral re- 
lationships we have with other countries; 

• To support our overseas basing 
and access requirements; 

• To send signals to friends and ad- 
versaries alike about American deter- 
mination to act on behalf of its interests. 

Therefore, we are seeking to forge a 
policy that will insure that arms trans- 
fers contribute directly to U.S. security 
interests; neither restraint for its own 
sake nor an unrestricted cash-and-carry 
attitude would accomplish this. In this 
context, I want to assure the subcom- 
mittee that any suggestion of an uncon- 
trolled sales approach would be a com- 
plete misreading of our intentions. In 



fifi 



addition, we are not only reviewing the 
policy itself, but we are looking very 
closely at our managerial and decision- 
making structure to insure that lines of 
authority are not confused and that 
arms transfer decisions are made 
efficiently. 

Middle East/Persian Gulf 

Let me turn now to the Middle East/ 
Persian Gulf. The Administration is ac- 
tively formulating a strategic approach 
to this critical part of the world. Our 
goal is to produce an integrated and 
coherent strategy to defend our inter- 
ests throughout the region. Although 
there are no final conclusions to discuss 
with you today, I would like to give you 
a sense of our objectives and the direc- 
tion in which we are proceeding. 

The United States has a fundamen- 
tal interest in nurturing an environment 
in the region in which the local states 
are able to develop sound political and 
economic institutions and relationships. 
In order to realize our specific objec- 
tives, we must: 

• Demonstrate the ability to counter 
the influence of the Soviets and their 
allies; 

• Insure continued Western access 
to the oil of the Persian Gulf in adequate 
quantities and at a reasonable price; 

• Insure the continued existence 
and strength of our friends in the 
region; and 

• Continue to work toward peace 
between Israel and her neighbors. 

In the wake of Iran's revolution, the 
continued Soviet occupation of Afghani- 
stan, and the accumulation of Soviet 
power in and near the Persian Gulf, 
these objectives are increasingly 
threatened. Regional states are ex- 
periencing the turbulence which accom- 
panies the modernization of traditional 
societies. There exists a regional en- 
vironment of endemic conflict springing 
from political, religious, ethnic, ideologi- 
cal, and economic differences. Revolu- 
tion, external support of opposition 
groups, and conflict between states are 
the rule rather than the exception. Most 
significant, the Soviets, capitalizing on 
their surrogates and their geographical 
proximity to the region, have exploited 
and created opportunities to further 
their interests to the detriment of those 
of the West. 

Our General Approach 

We are resolved to meet these threats. 
This means we and our Western allies 






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will have to assist the local states so 
that they can contribute to regional 
stability and resist intimidation. We 
must be prepared to resist these chal 
lenges directly, if necessary, and we 
must convince both our friends and op- 
ponents that we are able and willing to 
do so. 

We view the Middle East, including 
the Persian Gulf, as part of a larger 
politico-strategic theater -the region 
bounded by Turkey, Pakistan, and the 
Horn of Africa -and we view it as a 
strategic entity requiring comprehensive 
treatment to insure a favorable balance 
of power. It is our strong belief that im- 
proving the security of the region is in 
timately related to progress in the peac< , 
process between Israel and the Arab 
states. In fact, only when local states 
feel confident of U.S. reliability and 
secure against Soviet threats will they 
be willing to take the necessary risks fo 
peace. 

It is, thus, important to handle the 
Arab-Israeli question and other regiona 
disputes in a strategic framework that 
recognizes and is responsive to the 
larger threat of Soviet expansionism. 
This endeavor will require clarifying th< 
roles that we and our friends, both in- 
side and outside the region, can and 
must play, as well as the contributions 
each of us are able to make to this 
mutual effort. U.S. strategy consists of 
several dimensions: 

• Providing security assistance to 
regional states; 

• Maintaining a military presence i 
the region; 

• Building a reinforcement capabili 
ty to deploy the necessary additional 
forces in a contingency; 

• Encouraging a role for local 
states; and 

• Gaining support from our Euro- 
pean and Asian allies. 

Let me address each of these dimei 
sions in turn. 

Security Assistance to Regional 
States. Since you have received our re 
quest for an additional $1 billion in 
security assistance above the last Ad- 
ministration's budget, you are well 
aware of the importance we attach to 
this dimension of our strategy. Much ol 
what we will be asking regional states 
do in our common interests will depend 
upon security assistance resources bein 
available to equip their armed forces. 

Maintaining a Military Presence i 
the Region. During the last years of tr 



Plrtr^^, r+r 



<nl ^* CtQtQ Rillloti 



(1 



: 



Security Assistance 



ter Administration, several impor- 
initiatives were undertaken in this 
l. They include: 

An augmented naval presence, 
:h now consists of the 5-ship 
>EASTFOR [Middle East Force], 
carrier battle groups, and regular 
.oyments of a marine amphibious 

Prepositioned equipment and sup- 
5 at Diego Garcia for a marine am- 
lious brigade; 

A program for periodic exercises; 

Negotiated access agreements 
:h allow us to make facilities im- 
/ements needed to support our 
anced presence. 

Iln Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we 
. reached agreement to use and im- 
/e certain air and naval facilities. In 
ition, Egypt has offered to permit 
. access to certain of its facilities, 
, in consultation with the United 
gdom, the United States is signifi- 
By expanding its facilities on Diego 
cia. 

Certain improvements remain to be 
lie to some of the facilities, and the 
Igan Administration is committed to 
ig so. This will include improving 
ways, taxiways, and aprons; pro- 
ng navigation aids and communica- 
s; improving refueling facilities; and 
iring or constructing storage space. 
FY 1982, we have requested rough- 
4475 million to support our military 
struction program in Southwest 
i. 

In addition to carrying through with 
it has already been initiated, we are 
ewing options for greater access in 
region, increased military construc- 
I and a greater peacetime presence, 
noving further to strengthen our mil- 
| capabilities in the region, however, 
will be sensitive to the political prob- 
is that a permanent presence would 
ail. 



Reinforcement Capabilities. With 
ard to reinforcement capabilities, our 
'.cetime presence in Southwest Asia 
i provide the basis for a rapid re- 
>nse in many contingencies. But what- 
r peacetime military presence we 
intually attain, our ability to defend 
al Western interests against a range 
threats will continue to depend on the 
•lity to augment rapidly our forces 
:re. Specifically, we will be looking at 
.ys to develop and improve on: 

• Our deployable combat forces with 
lining, equipment, and doctrine suited 
likely contingencies; 



el: ay 1981 



,«• 



• Support forces tailored for South- 
west Asia; 

• Mobility capabilities for both inter- 
theater and intratheater movements; 

• Overflight rights, as well as access 
to en route bases and facilities, in order 
to support airlift and sealift operations; 

• Access to and improvement of re- 
gional airfields and ports in order to per- 
mit deployments in time of crisis; 

• Prepositioning of stocks at region- 
al facilities or on maritime preposition- 
ing ships; and 

• Secure land, air, and sea lines of 
communication by which to deploy and 
resupply our forces. 

Clearly, then, we have multiple prob- 
lems-all of which we are now address- 
ing. But our principal goals are two: to 
improve strategic mobility and to pro- 
vide adequate prepositioning and to pro- 
vide the support and resupply necessary 
to sustain forces in Southwest Asia. 

With regard to en route bases, facili- 
ties, and overflight rights, our ability to 
deploy forces rapidly to Southwest Asia 
would depend on en route facilities for 
refueling and to a lesser, but still impor- 
tant extent, on overflight rights. Some 
concrete, positive results have been 
achieved, but a much greater effort is 
needed if we are to approach our re- 
quirements. 

The Role of Local States 

It is self-evident that in coordination 
with the U.S. effort, local states have 
essential contributions to make to re- 
gional security. If they are to be able to 
resist aggression and intimidation, they 
must have confidence that they have 
reliable and capable friends in the West, 
ready to contribute to their stability 
with balanced security and development 
assistance, and ready to support them 
militarily in a crisis. In short, we must 
demonstrate that it pays to be an 
American friend. 

Many of the states of the region can 
play key roles in helping us deter and 
counter Soviet pressures and threats. 
Some states, as I have noted, are 
already making significant contributions. 
We intend to initiate a frank dialogue 
with our regional friends to explore 
their thoughts on regional security, to 
understand the limitations on what they 
can do, to convince them that we are 
sensitive to their concerns, and to per- 
suade them of the need to contribute to 
the common endeavor. As a part of this 
security dialogue, we will make known 
our view that present arms control pro- 
posals for the Indian Ocean area offer 
little prospect for enhancing security. 



Allied Contributions 

With regard to contributions our allies 
can make, it is important for us to 
realize that our Western allies share 
many of our interests and that we can- 
not -and should not -shoulder the entire 
responsibility for the area. We recognize 
that the threat to vital Western inter- 
ests in the Persian Gulf region can be 
met only if all concerned share the 
burden and create a rational division of 
labor to make greater contributions in 
support of our common interests. Our 
allies' stake in the region is at least as 
great as our own, and we are asking 
them to contribute more to its security 
and stability. For obvious reasons, we 
are not seeking a formal NATO role. 
Rather, we have in mind individual but 
complementary efforts in the following 
areas: 

• Increased defense efforts in West- 
ern Europe and Japan can improve U.S. 
flexibility to meet emergencies in South- 
west Asia. 

• Close political relations with na- 
tions throughout Southwest Asia would 
strengthen understanding of Western 
objectives in the region and of our com- 
mon interest in resisting Soviet aggres- 
sion. 

• Security arrangements between 
our allies and countries in Southwest 
Asia can help our friends in that region 
strengthen their capability for self- 
defense. 

• Many of our allies can increase 
their important economic support to 
friendly countries in Southwest Asia and 
in the eastern Mediterranean. 

• Force deployments in Southwest 
Asia by some European states can be 
strengthened and coordinated with U.S. 
military activities in the region. In addi- 
tion, allies with important facilities, both 
en route to and in the region, can ease 
U.S. deployments and planning by 
granting us access to these facilities as 
needed. 

In conclusion, let me just say that 
the stakes are great, and the threats to 
regional stability and U.S. objectives are 
real and serious. We have not done 
enough to answer these threats. All of 
us, both within and without the region, 
must do more on behalf of our common 
security interests. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



67 



SOUTH ASIA 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



by Jane A. Coon 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 23, 1981. Ms. Coon is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs. 1 

I appreciate this opportunity to testify 
on the Administration's proposed 
assistance programs in South Asia for 
FY 1982. It is important to put our pro- 
grams in the context of this Administra- 
tion's broad foreign policy objectives in 
the region. 

The invasion of Afghanistan, the 
turmoil in Iran, and the increasing 
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean 
have had profound implications for our 
relations with the countries of South 
Asia. These developments have greatly 
enhanced the importance we attach to 
the area. We recognize it as the eastern 
flank of a region in which vital interests 
of the United States are at stake. 

If these dramatic political and 
strategic changes have heightened our 
interest in South Asia, they also pose 
new and difficult changes to the achieve- 
ment of our foreign policy objectives 
there. They have prompted this Ad- 
ministration to undertake an urgent 
review of U.S. regional policies. In this 
review, we are giving careful attention 
to the role our assistance programs can 
play in meeting these challenges. 

Let me outline for you the foreign 
policy objectives we wish to achieve in 
this populous region. 

• We seek a South Asia of secure, 
independent, stable states which live at 
peace with one another. 

• We want a region capable of 
resisting aggression and subversion 
from outside. 

• We want a prospering South Asia 
whose governments can act effectively 
to develop their national economies and 
improve the lot of their peoples. 

• We seek to contain the prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons and the poten- 
tial to develop them in the region. 

• We seek friendly and constructive 
ties with all the countries of the region, 
fostered by mutual trust and recognition 
that the United States is a steadfast and 
reliable partner. 

In planning assistance programs for 
an area this large and this diverse, we 



station 

M0 



have a mix of political, developmental, 
and humanitarian objectives. These are 
both complementary and mutually rein- 
forcing. We recognize, for example, that 
the political stability of these coun- 
tries -a prime U.S. foreign policy objec- 
tive in the region -depends on steady 
economic development, a goal to which 
we can make a valuable contribution. As 
the Secretary noted in his testimony last 
week, serious economic dislocations 
"... create conditions for violent disrup- 
tions, with dangerous political conse- 
quences." I submit that we also have an 
abiding American concern for those so 
much less fortunate than we are. The 
Secretary said that "... the United 
States will not forsake its traditional 
assistance to the needy of this 
world -the sick, the desperate refugee." 
As you well know, the poor and 
populous South Asian Subcontinent has 
all too many in these categories. 

Our overall approach in planning our 
assistance has been to devise a set of 
lean programs which best meet this mix 
of interests in South Asia at a time of 
budgetary constraints. This has not been 
an easy task. It has required a careful 
balancing of claims on scarce resources 
and a series of adjustments determined 
both by our broader interests and, quite 
frankly, by deferring ongoing and up- 
coming programs in individual countries. 
In some cases, this has meant scaling 
down from the higher levels proposed by 
the previous Administration. This may 
lead to disappointment on the part of 
the countries in the area. But we hope 
they will recognize that their interests 
will be better served by an economically 
strong and resilient United States which 
this Administration's budgetary policies 
are designed to achieve. 

Working within these limits, we 
have developed programs for the South 
Asian countries which in total funding 
will be roughly equivalent in real terms 
to actual aid levels in 1981. I want to 
focus on how we see the programs in 
terms of our foreign policy objectives in 
each of the regional countries. 

Pakistan 

We are deeply concerned over Pakistan's 
security; Pakistan is now a "front-line" 
state facing 85,000 Soviet soldiers 
across its borders in Afghanistan. 



Pakistan's strategic location, at the 
eastern flank of the Persian Gulf, ma 
it very important that we and our alii ,,,,.,, 
undertake a major effort to help j [(]l [ 3l 

Pakistan resist Soviet pressures and 1 ^ 
become stronger and more self-con- qli ,,, 
fident. We are currently involved in a ;;','. 
extensive review of our relations wit! ' y 
Pakistan, but no final decisions have ; > ',... 
been made. I can assure you that we !,., 
be consulting closely with the Congre j„, 
as we move forward with our conside 



ieverw 

By. 
id en 



tion of this matter 

In the current budget request, 
assistance to this key country is confi 
to $50 million PL 480 and to assistan 
for the 1.7 million Afghan refugees w 
have sought refuge in Pakistan 

India 

We propose a development assistance 
program in India of $110 million, a P 
480 title II program of $148 million, i 
international military and education 
training (IMET) funding of $500,000. 
Our development assistance is target 
on increasing food production, rural 
employment, and improving health ai 
family planning programs. Our title I 
program is primarily humanitarian in 
purpose. 

Reinstituted at congressional in- 
itiative in 1978, our bilateral assistan 
to India is small in comparison with 1 
dian development needs and the func 
it receives from international financi; 
institutions in which the United Stati 
participates. Nonetheless, this progr; 
is a useful asset in our efforts to dev 
a constructive relationship with Indie 

We believe it important to 
demonstrate to this large and power! 
nation -the world's largest democrac 
that despite differences in some regit 
and global policies and perceptions, v 
wish to maintain mutually beneficial 
bilateral relations. The strength of si 
a relationship can help ameliorate th< 
impact of these differences on U.S. i) 
terests in the region. The figure for 
development assistance we have pro- 
posed is comparable to previous level 
and represents a reasonable compror 
between India's needs, our desire to 1 
responsive to some of these needs, ai 
our resource constraints. 



W 
ire tl 



m 

iers 



t 



Bangladesh 

We are requesting a development 
assistance program for Bangladesh o 
$90.4 million, PL 480 programs of 
$102.7 million, and IMET funding of 
$225,000. Our economic assistance cc 
centrates on food production, control 



nonortmont nf Rtate Rlllliifi 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



iulation growth, and generating rural 
ployment. 

The recommended funding for devel- 
nent assistance is comparable to ac- 

outlays in recent years. It is the 
e minimum needed to continue effec- 
; support for that country as it tries 
mild a viable political and economic 
tern. The recommended PL 480 fund- 
is substantially increased over that 
vided in FY 81, a year of unusually 
id harvests. 

We will be reviewing the situation to 
sure that these projected levels are 
•ded. Bangladesh is a moderate and 
reasingly influential Islamic nation. 

take satisfaction in Bangladesh's 
ievement of a large measure of 
oility. Our assistance programs have 
ped encourage Bangladesh to turn 
'ard more pragmatic economic poli- 
;. The government's increasing re- 
ice on more efficient private sector 
;ribution of inputs, such as fertilizer 
[ irrigation, has contributed to the 
st successful series of harvest Bangla- 
h has ever enjoyed. The development 
i more stable Bangladesh takes on 
ater significance when we recognize, 
oast events have shown, that in- 
trility there can arouse passions which 

Soviet Union can be expected to ex- 
it. 



Lanka 

FY 1982 we are proposing $51 

lion in development assistance, $27.2 

lion for PL 480 programs, $25 million 

public housing investment guaran- 
s, and $100,000 for IMET. Develop- 
nt assistance is concentrated on the 
haweli irrigation project, with smaller 
ns going for health, education, and 
dronmental protection projects. 

Sri Lanka is an important and 
derate member of the nonaligned 
nmunity, and we have excellent rela- 
ns. We appreciate the recent agree- 
int it negotiated with us permitting 

■ expansion of Voice of America 
ilities. We welcome its willingness to 
:eive foreign naval vessels in its ports. 

Lanka's commitment to the demo- 
itic process and to a pragmatic pro- 
lim of economic development -which 
I ludes a burgeoning foreign invest- 
Imt sector -serves as a useful model 

■ other developing nations. We pro- 
se to maintain our assistance at levels 
lghly comparable to actual outlays in 
81. In providing it we help assure that 
i Lanka is able to perpetuate its 
erished democratic traditions in an at- 
)sphere of political and economic 
ibility. 



FY 1982 Assistance Requests 



by John A. Bushnell 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23, 
1981. Mr. Bushnell is Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Inter- American Affairs. 1 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before you and your colleagues to dis- 
cuss our proposed bilateral foreign 
assistance for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Our requests for bilateral 
assistance activities in Latin America for 
fiscal year 1982 total $478 million are as 
follows: 

• $265 million of development 
assistance; 

• $120 million of economic support 
funds (ESF); 

• $81.5 million in foreign military 
sales credits (FMS); and 

• $11.1 million for the international 
military education and training program 
(IMET). 

In a separate authorization there is 
about $150 million in PL 480 food 
assistance for Latin America. 

Four aspects of this request are 
worthy of particular notice. 

First, it is carefully targeted by 
country and program to contribute 
directly to U.S. interests. It is not an 
assistance program to meet needs 
throughout Latin America, although 
development problems are urgent in 
almost every country in the region. We 
have proposed no assistance, except 
IMET training, to the larger countries 
in the area whose economies have sus- 



tained relatively good growth rates 
without continuing significant bilateral 
assistance. Absence from the budget 
does not mean these countries are not 
important to us. Not only do they have a 
major impact on U.S. interests bilateral- 
ly, but they now play a major role as full 
partners with us in helping the smaller 
Latin American countries deal with their 
problems. Despite the increasing number 
of ways that our national interests re- 
quire cooperation with our neighbors, 
our proposed assistance programs are 
but 7% of the Administration's 
worldwide foreign assistance request. 

Second, the increase -22% over our 
requests for the current fiscal year— is 
concentrated in two categories: quick- 
disbursing ESF monies to help meet 
critical immediate needs in Central 
America and the Caribbean and modest 
security assistance mainly to the same 
countries. 

Third, the FMS portion of our pro- 
posal includes a critical improvement: 
$31 million of the $81.5 million in pro- 
posed FMS credits are in the form of 
direct credits at concessionary rates for 
countries in whose security we have a 
manifest interest, yet whose weak 
economies and severe financial con- 
straints prevent them from taking ad- 
vantage of credits on standard terms. 

Fourth, this budget may prove to 
depend for its full effectiveness on a re- 
quest not earmarked specifically for 
Latin America. I refer to the Ad- 
ministration's request for a contingency 
fund of $250 million in ESF. We hope 
not to have to use these funds in Latin 



Nepal 

We are requesting a development 
assistance for Nepal of $16.1 million, PL 
480 progams of $2.1 million, and IMET 
funding of $75,000. Our development 
assistance focuses on three 5-year "core 
projects" -in rural development, re- 
source conservation, and health and 
family planning. 

We value our good relations with 
this moderate, nonaligned country 
whose recent decision to return its con- 
tingent to the U.N. peacekeeping mis- 
sion in Lebanon is the latest example of 
its responsible international role. The 
support represented by our assistance 
levels is particularly important today. 
Nepal has embarked upon a difficult 



transition toward more democratic and 
effective government amid increasingly 
serious economic challenges. Our 
assistance contributes to Nepal's 
development efforts and to the sense of 
confidence its leaders need as they ap- 
proach this transition. Nepal's orderly 
progress is important to our objective of 
regional stability. If it falters and major 
disturbances occur, this could have 
serious consequences for the broader 
South Asian area. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



69 



Western Hemisphere 



America. However, our recent experi- 
ences, which have often involved painful 
and difficult reprogramings, and the 
uncertain situations we face in several 
countries, suggest the wisdom of build- 
ing this flexibility into a budget other- 
wise limited to essentials foreseeable 
now. 

The Need for Bilateral Aid 

Before turning to particular programs, I 
would like to observe that for some 
years there has been a tendency to de- 
emphasize the need for U.S. bilateral 
assistance for Latin America. Our major 
contributions to regional development 
have been concentrated in multilateral 
institutions that play a key role in the 
maintenance of a healthy world econ- 
omy. The richer countries of Latin 
American -Mexico, Brazil, and Argen- 
tina, for example -need and can obtain 
far greater resources from these institu- 
tions than we could provide bilaterally. 
Indeed, the reflows to us from countries 
where we no longer have programs 
would finance half of our total develop- 
ment assistance program for Latin 
America. The reflows of principal and 
interest from Brazil, Chile, and Colom- 
bia alone will provide over $121 million 
in FY 1982. 

Several of the relatively better-off 
countries are themselves beginning to 
provide significant assistance to their 
less fortunate hemispheric neighbors. 
The contribution of the new Mexican- 
Venezuelan facility and the similar finan- 
cing by Trinidad will exceed $1.5 billion 
of concessional assistance for Central 
America and the Caribbean over 3 
years. 

The greatest assistance that we can 
provide to Latin America, especially in 
these economically troubled times, is a 
healthy economy of our own to provide 
markets for their goods and thereby 
generate jobs for their workers. When 
considering Latin America in its entire- 
ty, trade, technology transfers, access to 
our capital markets, and other interfaces 
are more important than bilateral or 
multilateral assistance. 

It is when we consider our ability to 
advance specific U.S. interests in par- 
ticular countries that bilateral assistance 
programs become of critical importance. 
Over three-quarters of our total request 
for bilateral assistance in FY 1982 for 
Latin America and the Caribbean is con- 
centrated on the most vulnerable coun- 
tries in Central America and the Carib- 
bean. Of these, El Salvador, Jamaica, 



70 



and the island states of the eastern 
Caribbean are of the most concern. 

Central America 

For Central America we are asking for 
$114 million in bilateral development 
assistance and $60 million in economic 
support funds in 1982. The $114 million 
is nearly half of our total Latin America 
development assistance budget and rep- 
resents a 33% increase over our 1981 re- 
quest. The immediacy of the economic 
and strategic challenge in Central Amer- 
ica creates a greater need for flexible 
and quick-disbursing ESF resources 
than in the past. 

Because El Salvador has been most 
affected by outside interference, it has 
our largest proposed program. In 1980, 
El Salvador's output fell by over 8%, 
and it will likely drop further this year 
even with the assistance we and others 
are providing. Commercial credit for the 
privately owned manufacturing sector 
has almost disappeared. Agricultural 
production has been disrupted by the 
lack of credit and the insurgency. 
Without substantial assistance, these 
economic difficulties will undercut Presi- 
dent Duarte's efforts to deal with the in- 
surgency and bring stability to El Salva- 
dor. To help meet this emergency, two- 
thirds of the ESF we are requesting for 
Central America will go to El Salvador, 
$40 million, and our proposal for 
development assistance there is the 
largest in the hemisphere at $35 million. 

But if the lion's share of our pro- 
posed assistance package for El Salva- 
dor is economic, it is also evident that 
externally armed guerrillas cannot be 
defeated with fertilizers alone. Since 
January 16, we have provided substan- 
tial military assistance through emergen- 
cy grants and FMS reprograming. We 
must follow through with enough of a 
military assistance package to help the 
government bring the insurgency to an 
end and thereby permit economic and 
social reforms to work and free elections 
to be held. To this end, the most signifi- 
cant increase in this year's security 
assistance budget request is a $25 
million FMS program for El Salvador, 
$17 million of which would be in direct 
credits. 

In Nicaragua we have quite different 
purposes. The private businessmen, 
small farmers, free labor unions, and 
many others who have held on for more 



El 
jig 
ft 
t 

\ 



Ii 
psi 

ilan 
fci 
ire 
nati 

<: 
i 

tons 



than a year as a strong force against 
those who would establish a totalitari 
state have earned our continued sup- 
port. We would like to be able to pro- 
it -so long as the Marxist-led govern- 
ment accepts a pluralist society and e 
support from Nicaragua for the guer- 
rillas in El Salvador. We are encoura 
by signs that this support has been 
reduced. We have under review whet 
the steps Nicaragua is taking may 
justify a resumption of our current ai 
program. If so, we want to be in a po 
tion to respond in the future to the 
needs of the private sector which act: 
a moderating force on the more extre 
elements of the government. 

For these reasons we have re- 
quested $35 million in development 
assistance and ESF in the FY 1982 b 
get. So long as the outcome remains 
potentially favorable, the investment 
risk worth taking. Failure to budget 
the outcome we desire in Nicaragua 
would be defeatism of the first order 
But you can be sure we shall not deli 
the proposed assistance to Nicaragua 
this year or next, unless the governm 
there maintains the pluralism and noi 
tervention called for by their own pul 
policies 

Other countries of Central Ameri 
are watching Nicaragua and El Salva 
dor, knowing that their own security 
be affected. We propose to maintain 
development assistance to Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Costa Rica at about 
1981 levels. We propose to increase < 
FMS program for Honduras from $5 
million in FY 1981 to $10 million, in- 
cluding $4.5 million in direct credits. 
This will help Honduras protect itsell 
against the dangers of foreign-suppo: 
insurgency and help its efforts to sto 
the use of Honduran territory to sup 
guerrillas in El Salvador. 

International military and educat 
training programs for El Salvador ar 
Honduras are also being increased to 
reinforce our FMS programs. Their j 
pose is to help train professionally co 
petent military forces which can curb 
subversion, halt the infiltration of an 
and men from abroad, and use U.S. 
manufactured equipment effectively 
are proposing to continue in FY 1982 
the small IMET program for Costa F 
that was established through reprogr 

ing in FY 1981. 

■alo 



Caribbean 

Another priority in the FY 1982 bud} 
is the area some call our "third 
border" -the Carribbean. These islani 



_ L r*i _i 



■■:! 



Ills 

jtn 

S( 

to 

k 



i 






iff 



Western Hemisphere 



es find themselves critically strained 
tagnant agricultural sectors, the low 
>ut of industries, and unemployment 
s of up to 35%, all contributing to 
ontent and political instability which 
te Cuban adventurism. Nearly one- 
d of total development assistance 
one-half of the ESF we are re- 
iting for the hemisphere is for the 
ibbean, $89 million and $60 million 
lectively. 

Our assistance efforts in the Carib- 
i have the following objectives: 

To strengthen friendly ties and 
Deration among the islands, including 
t security measures among the small- 
island states to enable them to pro- 

themselves, maintain law and order 

preserve their territorial integrity 

national sovereignty; 

» To promote political and social in- 
itions so as to strengthen democratic 

constitutional processes; and 

• To expand the productive sector 

nable nations to increase their 

>urce base and move toward econom- 

;lf-sufficiency. 

Approximately one-third of our aid 
he Caribbean will go to regional in- 
ations such as the Caribbean Devel- 
lent Bank. We will work closely with 
;r major donors such as Canada and 
stern Europe, and we shall deal with 
small Caribbean countries on a 
onal basis. 

In Jamaica, years of weak economic 
lagement have taken a terrible toll - 
3ars of negative growth. Prime 
ister Seaga's decisive electoral vic- 
I last October turned Jamaica away 
ti policies which had led it close to 
kruptcy. Seaga is determined to 
core economic health to Jamaica by 
lulating private investment and 
owing sound economic policies, sup- 
ted by the international financial in- 

J utions buttressed by bilateral pro- 
ms. The outcome of this effort to 
i Jamaica to recovery under West- 
oriented principles is being followed 
sely throughout the Caribbean. 
Our national interests require that 
help Jamaica succeed. We are 
sady engaged in a major program for 
naica, linked to the massive assist- 
:e and economic program being nego- 

f ted between Jamaica and other inter- 
t ional donors. We expect this pro- 
jjim-a large part of which is aimed at 
Invigorating the private sector -to 
I 'n the economy from negative to 

-Isitive growth by the end of the year. 

a 



Hay 1981 



The problem for FY 1982 is to maintain 
momentum. Earlier attempts to solve 
Jamaican problems have faltered short 
of success, making each new attempt 
more difficult. 

We are asking for $19 million in 
development assistance for FY 1982- 
twice our FY 1981 program -and $40 
million in ESF. Our bilateral programs 
are largely focused on helping to 
revitalize Jamaica's private sector and 
undertake special programs in energy. 
They are designed to complement Presi- 
dent Reagan's initiative for stimulating 
private foreign investment in Jamaica. 

We are also requesting $1 million in 
security assistance for Jamaica to con- 
tinue the $1.5 million FMS program we 
began with the new government this 
year through reprograming. Direct 



credit is requested in view of Jamaica's 
already large foreign debt service 
burden over the next several years. 

We intend to strengthen ties among 
the small island states of the eastern 
Caribbean through joint security meas- 
ures as well as economic cooperation. 
The crucial problem is unemployment, 
particularly of youths just entering the 
labor force -the groups most susceptible 
to Cuban-inspired exploitation. We plan 
to target $20 million in ESF toward 
stimulating employment generating 
enterprises. The FMS program of $7.5 
million is primarily for a regional Coast 
Guard program of the eastern Caribbean 
states. 

Frankly, we are late in supporting 
this regional coast guard in which the 
British have taken a lead. We had hoped 



U.S. Suspends Economic Aid 
to Nicaragua 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 1, 1981 1 

After a careful review the President has 
defined a comprehensive U.S. policy on 
assistance to Nicaragua. The policy 
takes into account Nicaraguan support 
for violence in El Salvador, the provi- 
sions of U.S. law, the positive responses 
of the Nicaraguan Government to our 
concerns, and U.S. national security in- 
terests in the region. It envisages the 
possibility of a continuing assistance 
relationship with Nicaragua. 

Given the Government of 
Nicaragua's involvement in activities 
supporting violence in El Salvador, the 
President has decided to invoke the pro- 
visions of section 533(f) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. That section calls for a 
termination of ESF [economic support 
funds] assistance to Nicaragua if the 
President determines that its govern- 
ment is supporting violence in another 
country. It also makes all outstanding 
ESF loans due and payable in that 
event. 

This Administration has made 
strong representations to the 
Nicaraguans to cease military support to 
the Salvadoran guerrillas. Their re- 
sponse has been positive. We have no 
hard evidence of arms movements 
through Nicaragua during the past few 
weeks, and propaganda and some other 



support activities have been curtailed. 
We remain concerned, however, that 
some arms traffic may be continuing and 
that other support very probably con- 
tinues. 

Important U.S. security interests 
are at stake in the region. We want to 
encourage a continuation of recent 
favorable trends with regard to 
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran 
guerrillas. We also want to continue to 
assist moderate forces in Nicaragua 
which are resisting Marxist domination, 
working toward a democratic alter- 
native, and keeping alive the private sec- 
tor. 

Recognizing the Nicaraguan 
response to date and taking into account 
our national security interests in the 
region, the President has decided to use 
his special authority under section 
614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
to maintain outstanding fully disbursed 
ESF loans to the Government of Nica- 
ragua -that is, not to call for their im- 
mediate repayment. 

We are considering a resumption of 
PL 480 and, later, development 
assistance if the favorable trends there 
continue. We do not rule out the even- 
tual resumption of ESF assistance at a 
later time should the situation in Nica- 
ragua improve. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
acting Department spokesman William J. 
Dyess. ■ 



71 



Western Hemisphere 






to respond in FY 1980 to Barbados' re- 
quest for coastal patrol and army equip- 
ment, but the Barbados Government in- 
formed us it could not afford the stand- 
ard FMS credit terms. For FY 1982, we 
will mix both guaranteed loans and 
direct credits to achieve an intermediate 
interest rate for Barbados. For the even 
smaller states in the area, even these 
terms are beyond their means; direct, 
concessional credits in FY 1982 are 
crucial to meeting their needs. 

We are also proposing a major in- 
crease in FMS for the Dominican Repub- 
lic to $7 million including $4 million of 
direct credit. We have been working 
with this democratic country on a pro- 
gram to introduce some modern equip- 
ment to begin replacing the U.S. arms 
acquired 20 to 30 years ago. A small $1 
million FMS program is proposed for 
the Bahamas which has recently estab- 
lished a defense force. 

South America 

Our commitment to our close and impor- 
tant friends in South America is not 
lessened by the emphasis we are giving 
to the Caribbean Basin. The most 
serious South American development 
problems are in the Andean countries. 
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia all have 
mineral reserves which boost their long- 
term prospects, but they are now trying 
to cope with chronic economic problems, 
including serious unemployment and 
rapid population growth. All have per 
capita incomes less than one-tenth of our 
own. These problems contribute to in- 
stability and stimulate narcotics traffick- 
ing. 

The assistance we are proposing 
builds on existing bilateral and local 
efforts. Development assistance pro- 
grams in FY 1982 total $11.6 million for 
Ecuador and $30 million for Peru. In 
Ecuador, President Roldos has initiated 
an extensive development program. In 
Peru, President Belaunde's plans focus 
on developing economically deprived 
areas and significantly expanding 
employment. 

We have FMS programs for only 
three countries in South America - 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The pro- 
grams for Peru and Ecuador, each of 
which is proposed at $6 million, are 
modestly larger than the FY 1981 pro- 
grams. The proposed $12.7 million pro- 
gram for Colombia remains at the FY 
1981 level. Small new IMET programs 
are also being proposed for Venezuela 



Economic Assistance to 
El Salvador 

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 24, 1981 1 

The Administration has approved pro- 
ceeding with reprograming of an addi- 
tional $63.5 million in economic 
assistance to the Government of El 
Salvador for FY 1981. This assistance is 
urgently needed to help the government 
deal with the economic situation, 
especially to finance essential imports of 
food and of agricultural chemicals and 
industrial materials for the private sec- 
tor. 

With this additional aid we will be 
providing a total of $126.5 million in 
economic aid this fiscal year, over three 
times our military aid. 

In keeping with the Administration's 
commitment to hold down expenditures, 
we intend to provide the additional $63.5 
million through reprograming rather 
than by supplemental appropriations. 
We are working out the precise details 
of reprograming of PL 480, develop- 
ment assistance, economic support 
funds, and other credits. We will be con- 
sulting with the Congress and other 
governments as implementation pro- 
ceeds. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman William J. 
Dyess. ■ 



and Brazil, in keeping with the recom- 
mendation of the conference committee 
on the FY 1981 foreign assistance 
authorization bill which we fully support. 
Finally, the Administration is recom- 
mending repeal of the provision in Sec- 
tion 620B of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
which prohibits all military sales and 
assistance to the Government of Argen- 
tina. Although we are proposing no 
assistance for Argentina in FY 1982, the 
strategic interests we share with Argen- 
tina require that we have the flexibility 
to consider sales of defense articles and 
services if that would be in our interest. 



Conclusion 

In conclusion, I would like to stress 
again the importance of the proposed 
ESF contingency fund to our efforts to 



EA' 



r 







BRbC 

Aria 
1,1! 



p 



strengthen both security and develop 
ment. Events in the past 2 years in t 
hemisphere, particularly in El Salvad 
and Jamaica, have tested our ability 
move quickly with economic support 
funds to meet rapidly changing situa- 
tions. With the cooperation of Congr* 
we have done relatively well, but oft* 
by sacrificing important objectives el; 
where. The $250 million ESF conting 
cy fund this Administration is reques 
is essential to enable us to respond n 
rapidly to critical situations where 
reprogramings may prove insufficienl 
counterproductive. 

Regarding security, the total FM 
assistance we are requesting, $81.5 
million, is an increase of 27% over oi 
FY 1981 budget. But more importan 
than the increase is the tailoring of I 
terms to economic needs; $31 million 
dollars of the FMS request is for the 
very important direct credits on cone 
sional terms -at not less than 3% int 
est and up to 12 years repayment. E 
so, the total FMS request for La?tin 
America is but 2% of our worldwide 
FMS request proposal and falls subsi 
tially below the program levels for tr 
region in the mid 1970s. 

Finally, let me emphasize the im 
tance of the international military ec 
tion and training program. The num 
of Latin American students trained 
under IMET reached an all-time low 
FY 1980, less than half the average 
nual level of the 1970s. Thanks to tr 
change that this subcommittee initia 
in the FY 1981 legislation providing 
incremental costing of IMET, we ho 
to turn that statistic around this yea 
We are requesting $11.1 million in b 
1982, an increase of 22% over our 1 
request. Even with the ability to pre 
more training per IMET dollar, we l 
more dollars if we are to meet the ti 
ing needs of the region and preserve 
capacity to cooperate with our neigh 
on shared security interest. 

Compared to the stakes in Latin 
America, we are not asking for muc 
the way of assistance. Carefully tar- 
geted, the small amounts we are re- 
questing can have a significant impa 
and provide concrete evidence of oui 
commitment to the development ano 
curity of our closest neighbors. 



'The complete transcript of the heari p 
will be published by the committee and vl 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing C ce, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



REATIES 



irrent Actions 



PLTI LATERAL 

{culture 

ivention on the Inter-American Institute 
Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at 

.shington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force 
1980. 

zifications deposited: Ecuador, Jan. 30, 

!1; Nicaragua, Feb. 12, 1981. 



tarctica 

i Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington 
;. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1. TIAS 4780. 
:ession deposited: Italy, Mar. 18, 1981. 



'..,, iation, Civil-Navigation 

lendment of annex I of the 1956 
•eements on joint financing of certain air 
ligation services in Greenland and the 
roe Islands and in Iceland (TIAS 4048, 
19). Adopted by the ICAO Council at Mon- 
al Dec. 16, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 
1980. 

■ llisions 

( nvention on the international regulations 
.1 preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with 
] dilations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
I tered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 
■J cessions deposited: Guinea, Jan. 19, 1981; 
4 ldives, Jan. 14, 1981. 

' mmodities — Common Fund 

. reement establishing the Common Fund 
I Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
i-neva June 24, 1980. ' 

matures: F.R.G., Mar. 10, 1981; Ireland, 

ilippines, Feb. 24, 1981; Malawi, Zaire, 
lor. 17, 1981. 

tification deposited: Indonesia, Feb. 24, 

31. 

nservation 
I nvention on international trade in en- 
ngered species of wild fauna and flora, 
th appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
73. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 
49. 

tification deposited: Argentina, Jan. 8, 
SI.- 

'cessions deposited: China, Jan. 8, 1981; 
vanda, Oct. 20, 1980; Suriname, Nov. 17, 
'80; 2 Zambia, Nov. 24, 1980. 2 

nendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
'73, on international trade in endangered 

■ecies of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
iopted at Bonn June 22, 1979. 1 
:ceptance deposited: Botswana, Nov. 19, 
180; F.R.G., May 7, 1980; Liechtenstein, 

Dpr. 21, 1980; Mauritius, Sept. 23, 1980; 

ogo, Jan. 5, 1981; U.K., Nov. 28, 1980. 3 

onsular 

ptional protocol, to the Vienna convention 
n consular relations (TIAS 6820), concerning 



the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done 
at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force 
Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Malawi, Feb. 23, 1981. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers 
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 
1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for 
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037. 
Ratification deposited: Canada, Feb. 19, 
1981. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, export, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th 
session of the UNESCO general conference. 
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972. 4 
Acceptance deposited: Peru, Oct. 24, 1979. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR 
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 
14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978. 4 
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Feb. 25, 
1981. 

. Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 4, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited : Brazil, Jan. 19, 1981. 

Energy 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
research and development on radiation 
damage in fusion materials, with annexes. 
Done at Paris Oct. 21, 1980. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1980. 

Signatures: Canada, European Atomic Ener- 
gy Community, Japan, Switzerland, U.S., 
Oct. 21, 1980. 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
energy technology systems analysis, with an- 
nex. Done at Paris Nov. 13, 1980. Entered 
into force Nov. 13, 1980. 
Signatures: Australia, Belgium, Commission 
of the European Communities, Denmark, 
F.R.G., Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
U.S., Nov. 13, 1980. 

Implementing agreement for the establish- 
ment of the economic assessment service for 
coal, with annex. Done at Paris Nov. 20, 
1975. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1975. 
TIAS 9775. 
Signatures: Australia, Sept. 26, 1980; Japan, 

Sept. 24, 1980. 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
research and development on the production 
of hydrogen from water, with annexes. Done 
at Paris Oct. 6, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 
6, 1977. 
Signature: U.K., Sept. 23, 1979. 



Implementing agreement for the establish- 
ment of the biomass conversion technical in- 
formation service. Done at Paris May 24, 
1978. Entered into force May 24, 1978. 
Signatures: Italy, Dec. 4, 1979; Japan, Sept. 
24, 1980; New Zealand, Oct. 5, 1979; 
Switzerland, Nov. 21, 1979. 6 

Implementing agreement for a program of 

research, development, and demonstration on 

forestry energy, with annex. Done at Tokyo 

Apr. 13, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 13, 

1978. 

Signatures; Switzerland, July 17, 1980; U.K., 

Apr. 10, 1980. 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
research, development, and demonstration on 
enhanced recovery of oil, with energy. Done 
at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered into force 
May 22, 1979. 
Signatures: U.K., Feb. 1, 1980. 

Implementing agreement foi a program of 
research, development, and demonstration on 
hot dry rock technology, with annex. Done at 
Paris Sept. 18, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 
1, 1979. 
Signature: Japan, Feb. 23, 1981. 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
research and development and demonstration 
on energy conservation in the pulp and paper 
industry, with annexes. Done at Paris Feb. 
18, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 18, 1981. 
Signatures: Belgium, Canada, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, U.K., 
U.S., Feb. 18, 1981. 

Supplement to the implementing agreement 
of Oct. 6, 1977, for the establishment of a 
project on small solar power systems, with 
annex. Done at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered 
into force May 22, 1979. 
Signature: Italy, Jan. 19, 1980. 

Implementing agreement for a program of 
research and development on energy conser- 
vation through energy storage, with annex. 
Done at Paris Sept. 22, 1978. Entered into 
force Sept. 22, 1978; for the U.S. Feb. 21, 
1979. 
Signature: Belgium, Oct. 16, 1979. 

International Court of Justice 

Declarations recognizing as compulsory the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute of the Court. 
Declaration deposited: Malta, Jan. 23, 1981. 

Labor 

Instrument for the amendment of the con- 
stitution of the International Labor Organiza- 
tion. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946; re- 
entered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980. 
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 
Jan. 30, 1981. 

Instrument for the amendment of the con- 
stitution of the International Labor Organiza- 
tion. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered 



lay 1981 



73 



Treaties 



into force Apr. 20, 1948. HAS 1868. 
Acceptances deposited: Botswana, Feb. 27, 
1978; Cape Verde, Apr. 3, 1979; Comoros, 
Oct. 23, 1978; Djibouti, May 3, 1978; 
Grenada, July 9, 1979; Lesotho, June 2, 1980; 
St. Lucia, Apr. 9, 1980; Vietnam, Socialist 
Republic of, Jan. 17, 1980; Zimbabwe, 
June 6, 1980. 

Convention (ILO No. 53) concerning the mini- 
mum requirement of professional capacity for 
masters and officers on board merchant ships. 
Adopted at Geneva, Oct. 24, 1936. Entered 
into force for the U.S. Oct. 29, 1939. 54 Stat. 
1683; TS 950; 3 Bevans 281. 
Ratification deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3, 1978. 

Convention (ILO No. 55) concerning the 
liability of the shipowner in case of sickness, 
injury, or death of seamen. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 24, 1936. Entered into force for 
the U.S. Oct. 29, 1939. 54 Stat. 1683; TS 
951; 3 Bevans 287. 
Ratification deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3, 1978. 

Convention (ILO No. 58) fixing the minimum 
age for the admission of children to employ- 
ment at sea. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 24, 
1936. Entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 29, 
1939. 54 Stat. 1705; TS 952; 3 Bevans 294. 
Ratifications deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3, 
1978; Grenada, July 9, 1979; Seychelles, 
Feb. 6, 1978. 

Convention (ILO No. 74) concerning the cer- 
tification of able seamen. Adopted at Seattle 
June 29, 1946. Entered into force for the 
U.S. Apr. 9, 1954. 5 UST 605; TIAS 2949. 
Ratification deposited: Guinea-Bissau, 
Feb. 9, 1977. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention 
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), relating to 
amendments to the convention. Done at Lon- 
don Nov. 12, 1975. 1 

Acceptance deposited: New Zealand, Feb. 13, 
1981. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 

1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 

4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 

Nov. 14, 1975. 1 

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, Feb. 20, 

1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 

1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 

4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 

Nov. 17, 1977. ' 

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, Feb. 20, 

1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. 1 

Acceptances deposited: Chile, Mar. J6, 1981; 
Sri Lanka, Mar. 17, 1981. 



Convention on facilitation of international 
maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London 
Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 
1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Accession deposited: Guinea, Jan. 19, 1981. 

Amendments of article VII of the convention 

on facilitation of international maritime 

traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London 

Nov. 19, 1973. ' 

Acceptance deposited: Hungary, Feb. 9, 

1981. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological 
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Mar. 2, 1981. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien- 
na Oct. 26, 1979. 1 

Ratification deposited: German Democratic 
Republic, Feb. 5, 1981. 2 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1. 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Feb. 26, 1981. 6 

Patents, Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international recogni- 
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the 
purposes of patent procedure, with regula- 
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. 
Ratification deposited; U.S.S.R., Jan. 22, 

1981. 

Pollution 

Protocol relating to intervention on the high 
seas in cases of pollution by substances other 
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. ' 
Accession deposited: Liberia, Feb. 17, 1981. 

Postal 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Enters into force July 
1, 1981. 

Signatures: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cen- 
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, German 
Democratic Republic, F.R.G., Greece, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, 
Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Democratic 



Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lu, 
embourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mona 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norw; jit 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Polai 
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, San 
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leo 
Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland. 
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Unitei 
Arab Emirates, U.K. (including overseas t 
ritories), U.S., Uruguay, Upper Volta, 
U.S.S.R., Yemen Arab Republic, Democra 
Republic of Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zai 
bia, Oct. 26, 1979; Venezuela, Oct. 24, 19' 
1979. 

Constitution of the universal postal union 

with final protocol. Done at Vienna July 1 

1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. Til 

5881. 

Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, Dec 

11, 1980. 

Additional protocol to the constitution of 
universal postal union with final protocol 
signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at 
Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force , 
1, 1971, except for article V of the additic 
protocol which entered into force Jan. 1, 
1971. TIAS 7150. 

Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, Dec 
1980. 






Second additional protocol to the constitu 
of the universal postal union of July 10, 1 
general regulations with final protocol an 
annex, and the universal postal conventio 
with final protocol and detailed regulatior 
Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered 
force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Ratifications deposited: Liberia, Nov. 28, 
1980; Saudi Arabia, May 11, 1979. 

Money orders and postal travellers' check 
agreement, with detailed regulations witr 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct 
1979. Enters into force July 1, 1981. 
Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, 
bados, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burund 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ch: 
Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyp: 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, E, 
Finland, France, Gabon, F.R.G., Greece, 
Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indones; 
Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Republic of 
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, 
Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Netherlands, Netherlands A 
tilles, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Roman' 
Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzi 
land, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turl 
U.S., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vatican Cit; 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yemen A 
Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Oct. 26, 1975 



7A 



.ubber 

iternational natural rubber agreement, 
979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered 
lto force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Feb. 24, 1981. 

>. 

k 

!' 



afety at Sea 

international convention for the safety of life 
t sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
lov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 
980. TIAS 9700. 
cceptance deposited: Indonesia, Feb. 17, 



981. 

rotocol of 1978 relating to the international 
onvention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 
HAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. 

nters into force May 1, 1981. 
iccession deposited: Denmark, Nov. 27, 



980. 

atellite Communications System 

Lgreement relating to the International 
'elecommunications Satellite Organization 
NTELSAT), with annexes. Done at 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
orce Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
iccession deposited: Somalia, Mar. 27, 1981. 



•perating agreement relating to the Interna- 
lonal Telecommunications Satellite Organiza- 
lon (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 

f>rce Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
ignature: Ministry of Posts and Tele- 
ommunications, Somalia, Mar. 27, 1981. 

pace 

igreement governing the activities of states 
! n the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
idopted at New York Dec. 5, 1979. 1 
Signature: Netherlands, Jan. 27, 1981. 



Convention on registration of objects 
lunched into outer space. Done at New York 
an. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 
976. TIAS 8480. 
Iccession deposited: Netherlands, Jan. 26, 



981. 

Telecommunications 

nternational telecommunication convention 
vith annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 
Porremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into 
orce Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976. 
, HAS 8572. 

Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Feb. 10, 
1981. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking of 
lostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 
1979. ' 
Accession deposited: Barbados, Mar. 9, 1981. 

Tourism 

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization 
(WTO). Done at Mexico City Sept. 27, 1970. 
Entered into force Jan. 2, 1975; for the U.S. 
'Dec. 16, 1975. TIAS 8307. 



Notification of withdrawal deposited: El 
Salvador, Jan. 28, 1980; effective Jan. 28, 
1981. 

Transportation 

Agreement on the international carriage of 
perishable foodstuffs and on the special equip- 
ment to be used for such carriage (ATP), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. 
Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976. 4 
Accession deposited: Morocco, Mar. 5, 1981. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. ' 
Signatures: Poland, Jan. 22, 1981; Hungary, 
Jan. 26, 1981; Haiti, Jan. 28, 1981; 
Mauritania, Mar. 4, 1981; Cyprus, Mar. 17, 
1981. 

Ratification deposited: Iraq, Jan. 23, 1981; 
Ethiopia, Feb. 23, 1981; Cuba, Mar. 16, 1981. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at 
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force 
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Notification of adherence: India, Mar. 9, 
1981. 

Notification of succession: Papua New 
Guinea, Mar. 16, 1981. 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of whal- 
ing, 1946. Adopted at the 32d meeting of the 
International Whaling Commission, Brighton 
July 21-26, 1980. Entered into force Nov. 26, 

1980, except for certain amendments that 
entered into force Feb. 23, 1981. 

Wheat 

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971. Open for 
signature at Washington from Mar. 24 
through May 15, 1981. Enters into force July 

I, 1981, if by June 30, 1981, certain provi- 
sions have been met. 

Signature: Norway, Mar. 25, 1981. 

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the inter- 
national wheat agreement, 1971, as extended) 
(TIAS 7144, 9878). Done at Washington Mar. 

II, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980. 
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Mar. 23, 
1981. 7 

1981 protocol for the first extension of the 
food aid convention, 1980. Open for signature 
at Washington from Mar. 24 through May 15, 

1981. Enters into force July 1, 1981, if by 
June 30, 1981, certain provisions have been 
met. 

Signature: Norway, Mar. 25, 1981. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. 1 
Ratifications deposited: U.S.S.R., Jan. 23, 
1981; Rwanda, Mar. 2, 1981; Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Mar. 12, 1981. 



Treaties 



World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 

world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 

Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 

17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 

Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, Jan. 9, 

1981. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. Signed at 
Washington May 14, 1953. Entered into force 
Dec. 14, 1953. TIAS 2880. 
Termination: Papua New Guinea, Sept. 16, 
1975. 

Agreement relating to operation of United 
States military flights through RAAF Base 
Darwin. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Canberra Mar. 11, 1981. Entered into force 
Mar. 11, 1981. 

Belgium 

Agreement in the field of radioactive waste 
management. Signed at Mol and Washington 
Jan. 7 and 19, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 
19, 1981. 

Brazil 

Record of discussion concerning salted cattle 
hides and manufactured leather products. 
Signed at Brasilia Aug. 13, 1980. Entered in- 
to force Oct. 1, 1980. 

Canada 

Agreement with respect to social security. 
Signed at Ottawa Mar. 11, 1981. Enters into 
force on the first day of the second month 
following the month in which each govern- 
ment shall have received from the other 
government written notification that it has 
complied with all statutory and constitutional 
requirements for the entry into force of this 
agreement. 

Denmark 

General security of information agreement. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen 
Jan. 23 and Feb. 27, 1981. Entered into force 
Feb. 27, 1981. 

Dominica 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Dominica. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Bridgetown and 
Roseau May 15 and 22, 1980. Entered into 
force May 22, 1980. Supersedes agreement of 
Dec. 16, 1966, and Jan. 11, 1967 (TIAS 
6206). 

Ecuador 

Agreement extending the agreement of Sept. 
18, 1975 (TIAS 8282), relating to the 
cooperative program in Ecuador for the 



May 1981 



75 



Treaties 

observation and tracking of satellites and 
space vehicles. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Quito Dec. 4 and 16, 1980. Entered into 
force Dec. 16, 1980. 

Egypt 

Agreement concerning the "Egypt Today- 
Memphis" exhibit. Signed at Cairo Mar. 1, 
1981. Entered into force Mar. 1, 1981. 

Agreement for the establishment and opera- 
tion of an OMEGA navigation system 
monitoring station. Signed at Alexandria 
June 14, 1980. Entered into force June 14, 
1980. 

France 

Agreement relating to the employment of 
dependents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Paris Feb. 
18, 1981. Enters into force on the first day of 
the first month following date of receipt of 
last notification that each party has com- 
pleted the procedures required by its legisla- 
tion to enforce the agreement. 

German Democratic Republic 

Agreement regarding the establishment of 
branch offices of the commercial sections of 
the embassies of the United States and the 
German Democratic Republic. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Jan. 30, 1981. 
Entered into force Jan. 30, 1981. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to privileges and im- 
munities to the accorded Department of 
Defense personnel temporarily in Haiti for 
the purpose of survey and relief operations. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au- 
Prince Aug. 19 and 21, 1980. Entered into 
force Aug. 21, 1980. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
17, 1979, as amended (HAS 9595, 9715), 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au- 
Prince Dec. 17, 1980, and Feb. 5, 1981. 
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981. 

Iran 

Agreement of cooperation. Signed at Ankara 
Mar. 5, 1959. Entered into force Mar. 5, 
1959. TIAS 4189. 

Notification of termination: Nov. 19, 
1979; effective Nov. 19, 1980. 

Jamaica 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 
8, 1977 (TIAS 8824). Signed at Kingston Feb. 
6, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1981. 

Japan 

Agreement extending the Sept. 12, 1977 
(TIAS 8734), joint determination and joint 



communique for reprocessing of special 
nuclear material of U.S. origin, with ex- 
change of notes and related letter. Signed at 
Washington Feb. 24, 1981. Entered into 
force Feb. 24, 1981. 

Kuwait 

International express mail agreement with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Kuwait and 
Washington Feb. 28 and Mar. 11, 1981. 
Entered into force Mar. 11, 1981. 

Lebanon 

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Beirut Sept. 17, 1980, 
and Feb. 10, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 
10, 1981. 

Montserrat 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Montserrat. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Bridgetown 
and Plymouth Jan. 13 and Feb. 9, 1981. 
Entered into force Feb. 9, 1981. Supersedes 
agreement of April 3 and May 16, 1968 
(TIAS 6493). 

Mozambique 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 
28, 1979 (TIAS 9635), with minutes of 
negotiation. Signed at Maputo Feb. 23, 1981. 
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1981. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to storage of preposi- 
tioned war readiness materials by U.S. 
forces. Effected by exchange of notes at The 
Hague Jan. 15, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 
15, 1981. 

Pakistan 

Agreement relating to scientific and technical 
cooperation. Signed at Washington Mar. 2, 
1981. Entered into force Mar. 2, 1981. 

Peru 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 
26, 1978 (TIAS 9604), with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Lima Feb. 5, 1981. 
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981. 

Portugal 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the United States. Signed at Washington 
Oct. 16, 1980. 
Entered into force: Mar. 4, 1981. 

St. Kitts/Nevis 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in St. Kitts/Nevis. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Bridgetown and Basseterre May 15, 1980, 
and Jan. 13, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 
13, 1981. Supersedes agreement of Dec. 19, 
1966, and Jan. 10, 1967 (TIAS 6209). 



HR( 



St. Lucia Hjcc 

Agreement relating to the establishment of 
Peace Corps program in St. Lucia. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Bridgetown and 
Castries May 15 and July 8, 1980. Entered 
into force July 8, 1980. Supersedes 
agreements of Oct. 19 and Nov. 10, 1965 
(TIAS 5902). 



Senegal 

Agreement regarding the establishment anc 
operation of a space vehicle tracking and 
communication facility. Effected by exchang 
of notes at Dakar Jan. 30 and Feb. 5, 1981 
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981. 



-' 

:.;■- 
ml • 
ton 



I 

Seen 



[Ml 

I 
Sin 



Singapore 

Memorandum of understanding for the ex- 
change of individual personnel between the 
U.S. Army Western Command and the 
Republic of Singapore Armed Forces. Sigm 
at Singapore Jan. 5, 1981. Entered into for i 
Jan. 5, 1981. \i» 

ftre: 

Sudan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sa : 
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 197! ■ 
Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum 
Feb. 14, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 14, 
1981. 

Thailand 

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct 
4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462, 
9717), relating to trade in cotton, wool, anc 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products 
Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok ; 
Nov. 13 and 27, 1980. Terminated Jan. 1 
1981. 



Turkey 

Implementing agreement regarding the cor 
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to the Agency for International 
Development. Signed at Ankara Feb. 7, 19 
Entered into force Feb. 7, 1981. 



Venezuela 

Agreement in the field of energy research 
and development, with annex. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 6, 1980: Entered into for 
Mar. 6, 1980. 



Agreement on agricultural cooperation. 
Signed at Caracas Apr. 10, 1980. Enters in 
force upon signature or upon the entry int( 
force of the July 11, 1980, agreement for 
scientific and technological cooperation, 
whichever date is later. 



'Not in force. 

2 With reservationis). 

3 Extended to the Bailiwick of Jersey, tl 
Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Isle of Man, 
Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Ter- 
ritories, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencie: 
Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcain 
Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, and 
Saint Helena and Dependencies. 

4 Not in force for the U.S. 

B Subiect to ratification. 

6 Witn statement. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). ■ 



a 



CHRONOLOGY 



PRESS RELEASES 



•arch 1981 



Mrch2 

■ State Department announces that it is 
kng $25 million in military aid to El 
Jvador. Twenty more U.S. noncombat 
Btary advisers are to join the 25 advisers 
Kady there, in addition to 9 administrative 
I. support personnel, bringing to 54 the 
111 involved in the security assistance pro- 
am. 

I Secretary Haig instructs U.S. Represen- 
■ve to the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference 
leek to insure that negotiations do not end 
l:he coming session (scheduled to resume 
■r. 9) of the conference pending a U.S. 
1/ernment policy review. 

Arch 6 

I U.S. announces its decision to sell addi- 
tfial military equipment to Saudi Arabia as 
^■t of a policy to strenghten Western securi- 
linterests in the Middle East and Persian 

I f. 

U By a vote of 114 to with 22 abstentions 
M -hiding U.S.), U.N. General Assembly 
iif ipts a resolution condemning South Africa 
<i blocking a settlement in Namibia and urg- 

I I trade sanctions against South Africa. 

Iirch9 

.] Tenth session of the Third U.N. Law of 
I ; Sea Conference resumes in New York, 
i,r. 9-Apr. 24. 

Foreign Minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher 
t the Federal Republic of Germany makes 
I cial visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 9-11. 

irch 10 

" President Reagan makes official visit to 
J-nada, Mar. 10-11. 

irch 11 

Effected by an exchange of notes at 

■ .nberra, U.S. and Australia agree to U.S. 
I r Force use of RAAF Base Darwin for 

I -52 aircraft staging operations for sea 
rveillance in the Indian Ocean area and for 
vigation training purposes. 

arch 13 

Pending a complete review of U.S. 
J) \ateral relations with Mozambique, U.S. 
mporarily suspends food aid to that coun- 



Egypt technology and equipment for a 
nuclear electric generating capacity of ap- 
proximately 2,000 megawatts and the en- 
riched uranium fuel used to support the 
capacity. 

March 23 

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito 
makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 
23-24. 

March 26 

Following a National Security Council 
meeting, the White House issues a statement 
noting its growing concern that Polish 
authorities may be preparing to use force to 
settle continuing difficulties in that country 
and that the Soviet Union may intend to 
undertake repressive action in Poland and 
warns of the grave effect of such actions on 
the whole course of East- West relations. It 
also repeats U.S. readiness to assist Poland 
in its current economic and financial 
difficulties as long as the people and 
authorities continue to seek a peaceful resolu- 
tion of their problems. 

March 29 

Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad 
and Tobago dies. 

March 30 

Prime Minister Andreas A. M. van Agt 
and Foreign Minister Christoph A. van Der 
Klaauw of the Netherlands make an official 
visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 30- Apr. 1. 

President Reagan is wounded in an at- 
tempted assassination. Also wounded were 
the President's press secretary, James S. 
Brady; a Secret Serviceman, Timothy J. Mc- 
Carthy; and a D.C. police officer, Thomas K. 
Delahanty. Twenty-five-year-old John W. 
Hinckley, Jr., is arrested and charged with 
the assassination attempt. 

March 31 

The Allied Special Consultative Group on 
long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) 
meets in Brussels. U.S. delegation is headed 
by Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger. 

Turkish Foreign Minister liter Turkmen 
makes official visit to U.S. Mar. 31-Apr. 9, 
and to Washington, D.C, Mar. 31-Apr. 1 ■ 



arch 15-18 

During a private visit to the U.S., Argen- 
ne President-designate Viola meets in 
'ashington, D.C, with the President and 
ice President, Secretaries of State and 
efense, Members of the Congress, and other 
.S. officials, Mar. 16-17. 

larch 21 

U.S., Egypt initial agreement for 
^operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
nergy which allows the U.S. to transfer to 



Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. Date Subject 

55 3/3 Haig: remarks at EOB, Feb. 27. 

*56 3/6 U.S. Organization for the Inter- 
national Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Consultative Committee 
(CCITT), study group A, Mar. 
25. 

*57 3/6 U.S. Organization for the Inter- 
national Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), study 
groups 10 and 11, Apr. 9. 

•58 3/6 CCIR, study group 8, Apr. 2. 

*59 3/6 CCIR, study group 2, Mar. 27. 

*60 3/6 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCC), Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group on 
radio communications, Mar. 
19. 

*61 3/6 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment, Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
working group on U.N./OECD 
investment undertakings, Mar. 
30. 

*62 3/11 Haig, Shamir: news conference, 
Feb. 24. 

*63 3/11 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. sworn in 
as Under Secretary for Politi- 
cal Affairs (biographic data). 

*64 3/12 Haig, Genscher: remarks to the 
press, Mar. 9. 

*65 3/13 Haig, MacGuigan: press brief- 
ing, Ottawa, Mar. 11. 

66 3/17 Haig: interview on "MaeNeil/ 

Lehrer Report." 

67 3/13 Haig: remarks at a breakfast 

meeting with media corre- 
spondents. 

*68 3/18 Haig: statement before House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. 
69 3/19 Haig: statement before Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. 

*70 3/20 U.S., Hong Kong amend textile 
agreement, Mar. 13. 

71 3/24 Haig: statement before House 

Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Operations. 

72 3/25 Haig, Ito: remarks following 

meeting with the President. 

*73 3/26 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Intellectual Property, 
Apr. 21. 

*74 3/26 CCITT, study group D, Apr. 10. 

*75 3/26 Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law, Apr. 10. 

*76 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, working group 

on radiocommunications, Apr. 
16. 

*77 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk 
cargoes, working group on 
subdivision and stability, Apr. 
22. 



Aa\ 1981 



77 



PUBLICATIONS 



*78 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, working group on 
life-saving appliances, Apr. 22. 

♦79 3/26 CCITT, study group C, Apr. 23. 

*80 3/26 CCIR, study group 2, Apr. 24 

*81 3/26 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment, Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
Apr. 28. 
82 3/26 Haig: remarks at a breakfast 
meeting with news 
correspondents. 

*83 3/26 Dean Fischer sworn in as 
Department spokesman 
(biographic data). 

*84 3/30 Program for the official working 
visit of Prime Minister 
Andreas A. M. van Agt and 
Foreign Minister Christoph A. 
van der Klaauw of the 
Netherlands to Washington, 
D.C., Mar. 30- Apr. 1. 
85 3/31 Haig: interview on "Meet the 
Press," Mar.29. 

'Not printed in the Billetin. ■ 



GPO Sales 



Publications may be ordered by catalog or 
stock number from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20U02. A 25% discount is 
nuide on orders for 100 or more copies of any 
one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices 
shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual sum- 
maries which describe the people, history, 
government, economy, and foreign relations 
of each country. Each contains a map, a list 
of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a 
reading list. (A complete set of all 
Background Notes currently in stock -at 
least 140 -$16; 1-year subscription service 
for approximately 77 updated or new 
Notes-$21; plastic binder-$2.) Single copies 
of those listed below are available (by country 
name or pub. number) for $1; $1.25 for 
foreign mailing. 

Albania Pub. 

Algeria Pub. 

Belgium Pub. 

Botswana Pub. 

Central African 

Republic Pub. 

El Salvador Pub. 

European Community . . . Pub. 

France Pub. 

Gabon Pub. 

Guinea Pub. 

Hong Kong Pub. 

Hungary Pub. 

Ivory Coast Pub. 

Malawi Pub. 



8217 


7pp. 


7821 


8pp. 


8087 


8pp. 


8046 


4pp. 


7970 


7pp. 


7794 


4pp. 


9155 


8pp. 


8209 


8pp. 


7968 


4pp. 


8057 


4pp. 


8126 


4pp. 


7915 


8pp. 


8119 


4pp. 


7900 


4pp. 



Netherlands Pub. 7967 8pp 

Netherlands Antilles .... Pub. 8223 4pp 

Sierra Leone Pub. 8069 6pp 

Somalia Pub. 7881 7pp 

Swaziland Pub. 8174 7pp. 

Your Trip Abroad. This pamphlet, published 
by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, provides 
helpful hints for Americans traveling abroad. 
Topics include passports, visas, reservations, 
money, marriage, legal assistance, registering 
with American Consuls, destitute assistance, 
drug arrests, and what to do about U.S. 
Customs and Immigration when you return 
home. Pub. 8872, 31pp. (Cat. No. S1.69:155.) 

Documents on Disarmament— 1978. This 
publication contains basic documents on arms 
control and disarmament developments dur- 
ing 1978. Included are speeches, meeting 
reports, treaty documents, and index. ACDA 
Pub. 107. 852pp. (Stock No. 
002-000-00075-0.) $8.50. 

World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1969-1978. This volume serves as 
a basic data source on world military expendi- 
tures and arms transfers for 145 countries 
over a 10-year period. Includes raw and com- 
parative data and statistics, graphs, and 
tables. ACDA Pub. 108. 166pp. (Stock No. 
002-000-00078-4.) $5.00. 

United States Contributions to Interna- 
tional Organizations. This 28th Annual 
Report to the Congress transmits to the 
President and to the Congress the report on 
U.S. contributions to international organiza- 
tions. It also describes the various U.N. agen- 
cies to which the United States contributes. 
Pub. 9140. 112pp. (Cat. No. S:179:149.) 

INR — Intelligence and Research in the 
Department of State. This publication 
describes the role of the Bureau of Intelli- 
gence and Research in the field of intelligence 
and in the Department of State. It also in- 
cludes a working description of intelligence. 
Pub. 9157. 16pp. 

Rural Roads. Agreement with Syria. TIAS 

9638. 29pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9638.) 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

Agreement with Other Governments. 

TIAS 9650. 63pp. (Cat. No. S9.10:9650.) 
Border Sanitation Problems. Agreement 

with Mexico. TIAS 9658. 7pp. $1.25. 

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9658.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 

Bolivia. TIAS 9659. 12pp. $1.25. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9659.) 
International Sugar Agreement, 1977. 

Agreement with Other Governments. 

TIAS 9664. 371pp. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9664.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 

Indonesia. TIAS 9665. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9665.) 
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. 

Agreement with Macao. TIAS 9666. 3pp. 

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9666.) 
Earth Sciences and Environmental Studies. 

Memorandum of Understanding With the 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and 






Northern Ireland. TIAS 9668. 5pp. 

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9668.) 
Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital — 

Grants-in-Aid for Medical Care and 

Treatment of Veterans and Reliability 

tion of the Hospital Plant. Agreement 

with the Philippines. TIAS 9669. 17pp. 

$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9669.) 
Economic Assistance — Loan and Grant. 

Agreement with Israel. TIAS 9670. 5pj 

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9670.) 
Establishment of Temporary Purchasing 

Commission. Agreement with the Unic 

of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 967 

7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9671.) 
Telecommunications. Agreement with 

Egypt. TIAS 9672. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9672.) 
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air 

Navigation Services in Iceland and ir 

Greenland and the Faroe Islands. 

Agreement with Other Governments. 

TIAS 9673. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:9673.) 
Commodity Imports. Agreement with Sud; 

TIAS 9674. 23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:9674.) 
Settlement of Claims. Agreement with tht 

People's Republic of China. TIAS 9675 

6pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9675.) 
Atomic Energy — Reprocessing of Special 

Nuclear Material. Agreement with 

Japan. TIAS 9676. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. N. 

S9.10:9676.) 
Aviation — Preclearance. Agreement with 

Canada. TIAS 9677. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9677.) 
Economic Assistance — Loan and Grant. 

Agreement with Turkey. TIAS 9678. 

7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9678.) 
Extradition. Agreement with Norway. TL 

9679. 31pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:967 
Health Cooperation. Agreement with Isr; 

TIAS 9680. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:9680.) 
Technical Cooperation in Educational Pi 

grams. Agreement with Saudi Arabia, 

TIAS 9681. 12pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. 

S9.10:9681.) 
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income and 

Capital Gains. Convention with the 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland. TIAS 9682. 46pp. 

$2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9682.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement w 

Egypt. TIAS 9683. 31pp. $2.00. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9683.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with 

Canada. TIAS 9684. 66pp. (Cat. No. 

S9.10:9684.) 
Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with t 

Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 9' 

5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9685.) 
Atomic Energy — Technical Information 

change and Cooperation in Nuclear 

Safety Regulation. Agreement with 

France. TIAS 9686. 21pp. $1.50. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:9686.) 
Atomic Energy — Technical Information 

change and Cooperation in Nuclear 

Safety Matters. Agreement with 

Sweden. TIAS 9687. 16pp. $1.50. (Ca1 

No. S9.10:9687.)B 



.;. 






INDEX 



May 1981 

Vol. 81, No. 2050 

Afghanistan. Secretary Haig Interviewed at 

Breakfast Meetings 9 

Africa 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa 

(Walker) 18 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African 

Refugees (Smyser) 60 

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast 

Meetings 9 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the 
Press" 4 

Arms Control. Secretary Haig Interviewed 
at Breakfast Meetings 9 

Canada. Maritime Boundary Treaty With 
Canada (Feldman, Ridgway) 21 

Commodities. Sixth International Tin Agree- 
ment (Calingaert) 31 

Congress 

AID Bilateral Assistance Programs (McPher- 
son) 43 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(Morse) 33 

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration 
and Refugee Assistance (Smyser) 59 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa 
(Walker) 18 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African Ref- 
ugees (Smyser) 60 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Asia (Arma- 
cost) 26 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe 

(E wing) 38 

1 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Latin Amer- 
ica (Bushnell) 69 

f FY 1982 Assistance Requests for South Asia 
(Coon) 68 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle 
East (Draper, Twinam) 48 

FY 1982 Authorization Request (Haig) 24 

FY 1982 Security Assistance Requests (Buck- 
ley, Burt) 62 

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the Con- 
gress (Department explanatory state- 
ment) 52 

International Narcotics Control (Linne- 
mann) 55 

Maritime Boundary Treaty With Canada (Feld- 
man, Ridgway) 21 

Sixth International Tin Agreement (Calin- 
gaert) 31 

Department and Foreign Service. FY 1982 
Authorization Request (Haig) 24 

Developing Countries. AID Bilateral Assist- 
ance Programs (McPherson) 43 

East Asia and the Pacific. FY 1982 Assist- 
ance Requests for Asia (Armacost) .... 26 

Egypt. U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear Coopera- 
tion Agreement (joint statement, sup- 
plementary information) 54 

d El Salvador 

Economic Assistance to El Salvador (Depart- 
ment statement) 72 

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast 

Meetings 9 

imi Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the 

Press" 4 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/ 
Lehrer Report" 



Energy 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(Morse) 33 

Energy Security and International Prepared- 
ness (Morse) 34 

Europe 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe 
(Ewing) 38 

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast 
Meetings 9 

Foreign Aid 

AID Bilateral Assistance Programs (McPher- 
son) 43 

Economic Assistance to El Salvador (Depart- 
ment statement) 72 

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration 
and Refugee Assistance (Smyser) 59 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa 
(Walker) 18 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Asia (Arma- 
cost) 26 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe 
(Ewing) 38 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Latin Amer- 
ica (Bushnell) 69 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for South Asia 
(Coon) 68 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle 
East (Draper, Twinam) 48 

FY 1982 Security Assistance Requests (Buck- 
ley, Burt) 62 

Military Assistance to Liberia (Department 
statement) 20 

U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to Nicaragua 
(Department statement) 71 

Government Organization. Secretary Haig 
Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 4 

Human Rights. Secretary Haig Interviewed 
on "Meet the Press" 4 

Iran. Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the 
Congress (Department explanatory state- 
ment) 52 

Japan. Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister 
(Haig, Ito) 29 

Latin America and the Caribbean. FY 1982 
Assistance Requests for Latin America 
(Bushnell) 69 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele- 
vision 7 

Lebanon. Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to 
Lebanese President Sarkis) 54 

Liberia. Military Assistance to Liberia (De- 
partment statement) 20 

Middle East 

Energy Security and International Prepared- 
ness (Morse) 34 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle 
East (Draper, Twinam) 48 

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast 
Meetings 9 

Narcotics. International Narcotics Control 
(Linnemann) 55 

Nicaragua 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/ 
Lehrer Report" 1 

U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to Nicaragua (De- 
partment statement) 71 

NATO 

NATO Defense Ministers Position on Poland 
(statement by deputy White House press 
secretary) 42 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele- 
vision 7 



Nuclear Policy. U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement (joint statement, 
supplementary information) 54 

Poland 

NATO Defense Ministers Position on Poland 
(statement by deputy White House press 
secretary) 42 

Poland -A Profile 42 

Poland's First Deputy Prime Minister Visits 
U.S. (Bush, Jagielski) 41 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the 
Press" 4 

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/ 
Lehrer Report" 1 

Situation in Poland (statement by White House 
press secretary) 41 

Presidential Documents 

Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to Lebanese 
President Sarkis) 54 

Northern Ireland (Reagan) 39 

Publications 78 

Refugees 

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration 
and Refugee Assistance 59 

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African 
Refugees (Smyser) 60 

Security Assistance. FY 1982 Security 
Assistance Requests (Buckley, Burt) ... 62 

South Asia. FY 1982 Assistance Requests for 
South Asia (Coon) 68 

Spain. Secretary Haig Interviewed for 
Spanish Television 7 

Terrorism 

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast 
Meetings 9 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele- 
vision 7 

Trade. Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister 
(Haig, Ito) 29 

Treaties 

Current Actions 73 

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the Con- 
gress (Department explanatory state- 
ment) 52 

Maritime Boundary Treaty With Canada (Feld- 
man, Ridgway) 21 

Sixth International Tin Agreement (Calin- 
gaert) 31 

United Kingdom. Northern Ireland (Rea- 
gan) 39 

Name Index 

Armacost, Michael 26 

Buckley, James L 62 

Burt, Richard R 62 

Bush, Vice President 41 

Bushnell, John A 69 

Calingaert, Michael 31 

Coon, Jane A 68 

Draper, Morris 48 

Ewing, Raymond C 38 

Feldman, Mark B 21 

Haig, Secretary 1, 4, 7, 9, 24, 29, 54 

Ito, Masayoshi 29 

Jagielski, Mieczyslaw 41 

Linnemann, Joseph H 55 

McPherson, M. Peter 43 

Morse, Edward L 33, 34 

Reagan, President 39 

Ridgway, Rozanne L 21 

Smyser, W. R 59,60 

Twinam, Joseph W 48 

Walker, Lannon 18 



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■fe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2051 



June 1981 




Department of State 

bulletin 



~ 



Volume 81 / Number 2051 / June 1981 



sS 



Cover Photo: 

Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki 

and President Reagan. 

( White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman ) 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. 

Secretary of State 

WILLIAM J. DYESS 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Acting Chief. Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



ica 



■3( 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1986. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 

Documents, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 12 issues plus annual index — 

$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign} 

Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign) 

Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (for. n) 



M 



CONTENTS 



Te Secretary 

ii A New Direction in U.S. Foreign 

Policy 
1 Question-and- Answer Session 
Following Address Before 
ASNE 
fl NATO and the Restoration of 
American Leadership 
Foreign Policy and the American 
Spirit 
I Visit to the Middle East and 

Europe 
2! Interview for Great Decisions 
21 Interview for NBC Television 
■ Interview for ABC Television 



Irica 



Internal Situation in Zimbabwe 
(Letter to the Congress) 



Cmada 



U.S. -Canada Consultations on 

Garrison Diversion Unit (Joint 

Press Release) 
Maritime Boundary Treaty and 

Fishery Agreement (Message to 

the Senate) 

ist Asia 

Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia 
(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.) 



3 



i:onomics 

Global Economic Interdepend- 
ence (Deane R. Hinton) 

The Airbus: Challenge to U.S. 
Aircraft Industry (Harry Kopp) 



FEATURE 

1 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki (Arrival and Departure Remarks, 

Joint Communique) 

2 Japan— A Profile 



Europe 

41 U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales 
Limitation to the U.S.S.R. 
(President Reagan) 

41 Dutch Prime Minister Meets 

With Vice President Bush (Vice 
President Bush, Andreas A.M. 
van Agt) 

42 Turkish Foreign Minister Meets 

With Vice President Bush 
(White House Statement) 

42 Ataturk Centennial Year (White 

House Statement) 

Middle East 

43 U.S. Policy Toward the 

Middle East and Persian Gulf 
Region (Peter D. Constable) 

44 Iran Claims Procedures (De- 

partment Statement) 

45 11th Report on Sinai Support 

Mission (Message to the Con- 
gress) 

46 Arms Sales to Morocco; West- 

ern Saharan Conflict (Morris 
Draper) 

47 Sale of AW ACS to Saudi Ara- 

bia (Department Statement) 

Refugees 

49 U.S. Contributions to 

Refugee Relief in Southeast 
Asia and Pakistan (W. R. 
Smyser) 



Security Assistance 

51 Reprograming Proposal for El 
Salvador (James L. Buckley) 

South Asia 

53 Aid to Pakistan (Jane A. Coon) 

United Nations 

54 U.S. Perspective of the 

35th General Assembly 

55 Namibia (Western Five State- 

ment) 

58 International Conference on 

Assistance to Africa's Refugees 
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick) 

59 African Refugee Relief Day 

(Proclamation) 

Western Hemisphere 

59 El Salvador (Department 

Statement) 

Treaties 

60 Current Actions 

Chronology 

62 April 1981 

Press Releases 

63 Department of State 

Publications 

63 Department of State 

64 GPO Sales 

Index 



SPECIAL (see Center Section) 

Atlas of United States Foreign Relations: International Organizations 

i S ulHSlfep|NTSJ 



\ 



| JUL I 5 1981 
DEPOSITOR 



FEATURE 




Prime Minister Suzuki signs President 
Reagan's guest book. 

(White House photo hy Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



Feature 



isit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki 



Japanese Prime Minister Zenko 
:uki made an official visit to the 
tied States May J,-9, 1981, and to 
shington, D.C., May 7-8, 1981. 
lowing are remarks made at the ar- 
al ceremony on May 7, a joint com- 
nique issued, and departure remarks, 
h on May 8. 1 



:RIVAL CEREMONY 1 

;sident Reagan 

Prime Minister, Madam Suzuki, it's 
eat honor for Nancy and me, in be- 
f of the American people, to welcome 
i to the United States. We're de- 
ited to be your hosts during your first 
it in both our Administrations. The 
>ple of Japan and the people of 
lerica are friends of separate pasts. 
i have a different language, different 
:estry, and yet together, our actions 
/e helped to shape the future. 
Today, we have a chance to bring 
I shness and a new direction to the 
;C3p friendship between our peoples. 
A e custom, when leaders of our two na- 
1 ns meet, is to look back, to measure 
J A' far we've come. It's true that we've 
i : 'omplished much in a relatively short 
M riod of time. Today, however, you and 
!| /ill look forward. We'll chart the 
I ;ure course of our friendship for 
] ace. You and I hold a sacred trust, a 
:red trust of two of the world's great- 
: nations. Our countries are economic 
iders in the world of sophisticated 
;hnology, industry, and science. And 
cause we're leaders, great tides swirl 
3und us, forces of independence, prog- 
5S, and friendly competition. 

As you have said, the choices we 
ike will determine the fate of genera- 
>ns. What we create must blend into 
e future as the poet Shelley described 
e west wind— a tumult of mighty har- 
onies. You have said that harmony is 
e keynote of your government's philos- 
'hy, and harmony is a philosophy I ad- 
re very much. Harmony requires 
'erences to be joined in pursuit of 
;her ideals. It is the philosophy that 
m have said you want to share with 
le world. It is the foundation of a 
lilosophy necessary to mold strength 
ito greatness. 

Japan has been a harmonious and 
jiyal ally whose people understand that 



une1981 



free societies must bear the responsi- 
bility of freedom together. And Japan 
and the United States understand and 
work with each other because of the 
strong ties that we have built upon the 
principles of a harmonious relationship. 

We, in America, are grateful for the 
strong measures that you have taken to 
penalize the Soviet Union for its violent 
aggression in Afghanistan. You have 
come to the aid of countries resisting 
Soviet expansion. You have rescued 
refugees, imposed sanctions against 
tyrants, and offered economic assistance 
to the oppressed. The people of Japan 
stand with Americans, Europeans, and 
people of other democracies in a com- 
munity of free powers. But even in this 
world community of leadership, Japan 
and the United States stand out in their 
achievements. The economic forces at 
our command are the basis of a powerful 
guarantee of progress in peace. They 
are the essential tools with which we can 
help others to advance and to insure 
freedom. Our most valuable research, 
our people -or resource, I should say, 
have the strength to carry out their 
dreams, and in our dreams, we both 
yearn to be the best. Our mutual search 
for excellence, for achievement, for gen- 
uine security is conducted in the spirit of 
harmony. 

There is a hill in Boston where 
dreams are made and sometimes shat- 
tered. Runners beaded in sweat and 
panting for breath must conquer that 
hill to win—a demanding foot race 
known as the Boston Marathon. It is 
called Heartbreak Hill. About 2 weeks 
ago, a young man from Japan raced up 
that hill and won. His name, Toshihiko 
Seko, a sales clerk from Tokyo. After 
the race, he told us that he was 
motivated by respect for the American 
who had won last year. In Japan, he 
said, when you respect somebody, you 
show it by going beyond his 
achievements. Well, Mr. Seko is not only 
an awesome athlete, he is a gracious and 
wise man. And let me say, Mr. Seko has 
earned the respect of a pack of 
American runners who look forward to 
the pleasure of meeting him again next 
year. 

Let us continue to be challenged by 
our accomplishments, by the accomplish- 
ments of each other. Let us compete in 
the same contests with each victory be- 
coming the next goal to conquer. But let 
us also always remember and let the 
world be aware, Japan and America will 
go forward together. [Applause] 



Prime Minister Suzuki 2 

Thank you very much for your very 
warm welcome. Let me express my 
heartfelt thankfulness for your truly 
remarkable recovery from the unfor- 
tunate incident and my delight that you 
are now standing here in very good 
health and with that winning smile that 
is now known throughout the world. 
[Applause] 

The world is now beset by unprece- 
dentedly complex political, economic, 
and social challenges. I am convinced, 
however, that the industrialized democ- 
racies, by strengthening their coopera- 
tion and solidarity and by addressing 
these challenges with firm determina- 
tion, can dispel misery, oppression, and 
violence from the face of this Earth and 
can bring peace, justice, freedom, and 
prosperity to the international communi- 
ty. Japan and the United States are 
great powers whose combined national 
products account for one-third of the 
world's total. Close coordination be- 
tween our two countries can contribute 
immeasurably to the peace and security 
of the entire world. 

I have come to hold a candid ex- 
change of views with you about the 
responsibilities Japan and the United 
States should discharge and the roles we 
should play in the current international 
situation. It is, also, my earnest desire 
to consolidate the bond of friendship and 
expand, further, the horizons of coopera- 
tion between our two countries. I must 
add that the opportunity to talk with 
you so soon after you have assumed the 
Presidency in such trying times but with 
the full and sacred trust and mandate of 
the American people, I regard as very 
timely and significant. 

The moment I set foot on American 
soil this time I sensed the aspirations of 
the American people to build a society 
filled with vitality. The Japanese people 
have profound respect for the American 
people who are now embarked on the 
new beginning under your leadership. 
We wish to advance hand-in-hand with 
you toward realizing the aspirations of 
the international community by expand- 
ing our cooperation with your country 
and by strengthening the ties between 
our two peoples, both of whom aspire to 
peace and to societies filled with vigor or 
vitality. 

I know that the talks that will begin 
shortly will mark an important step for- 
ward in our common enterprise. [Ap- 
plause] 



1 



Feature 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE 1 

At the invitation of the Government of 
the United States, the Prime Minister 
and Mrs. Suzuki paid an official visit to 
the United States from May 4 through 
9. President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Suzuki met in Washington on May 7 and 
8 for a comprehensive and fruitful 
review of the current international situa- 
tion and U.S.-Japan relationship. They 
pledged that they would work closely 
together in pursuit of world peace and 
prosperity. The President and the Prime 
Minister, recognizing that the alliance 
between the United States and Japan is 
built upon their shared values of 
democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their 
solidarity, friendship and mutual trust. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister viewed with concern the Soviet 
military build-up and the Soviet ac- 
tivities in the Third World as seen in its 
military intervention into Afghanistan 
and its behavior elsewhere. They 
reaffirmed their position that the Soviet 
intervention into Afghanistan cannot be 
condoned and that the immediate, un- 
conditional and total withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops should be realized. They 



restated their view that the problems of 
Poland should be resolved by the Polish 
people themselves without any external 
interference and that any intervention in 
Poland would have a serious adverse 
effect on world peace. They shared the 
view that should intervention in Poland 
occur, the Western industrialized 
democracies should cooperate and imple- 
ment their policies in concert. 

Affirming their interest in the peace 
and stability of Asia, the President and 
the Prime Minister agreed: 

• To continue respectively to ex- 
pand cooperative relations with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China, 

• To promote the maintenance of 
peace on the Korean Peninsula as impor- 
tant for peace and security in East Asia, 
including Japan, 

• To continue their cooperation in 
support of the solidarity of ASEAN and 
its quest for the greater resilience and 
development of its members. 

The President and the Prime Mini- 
ster placed high value on the respective 
role each country is playing in this 
regard as exemplified recently by the 
President's decision to maintain U.S. 



Japan— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 381,945 sq. km. (147,470 sq. mi.); 
slightly smaller than California. Capital: 
Tokyo (pop. 11.372 million). Other Cities: 
Yokohama (2.67 million), Osaka (2.658 
million), Nagoya (2 million), Kyoto (1.4 
million). Terrain: Rugged, mountainous 
islands. Climate: Varies from subtropical to 
temperate. 

People 

Population (1980): 117 million. Annual 
Growth Rate: 0.8%. Ethnic Groups: 0.6% 
Korean. Religions: Shintoism and Buddhism; 
0.8% Christian. Language: Japanese. 
Literacy: 99%. Life Expectancy: Males 73 
yrs., females 78 yrs. 

Government 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Date of 
Constitution: May 3, 1947. Branches: Ex- 
ecutive-Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment). Legislative -bicameral Diet (House of 
Representatives and House of Councilors). 
Judicial Civil law system with Anglo-Ameri- 
can influence. Subdivisions: 47 prefectures. 
Political Parties: Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Demo- 
cratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito (Clean 



Government Party), Japan Communist Party 
(JCP). Suffrage: Universal over 20. 

Economy 

GNP (1980): $990 billion. Real Growth Rate: 
6% 1979, 6.1% 1969-79. Per Capita GNP 
(1980): $8,460. Natural Resources: Negligi- 
ble mineral resources, fish. Agricultural Prod- 
ucts: Rice, vegetables, fruits, milk, meat, 
natural silk. Industrial Products: Machinery 
and equipment, metals and metal products, 
textiles, autos, chemicals, electrical and elec- 
tronic equipment. Trade (1979): Exports - 
$101.1 billion: machinery and equipment, 
metals and metal products, textiles. Part- 
ners -U.S. 28%, EC 10.8%, Southeast Asia 
20.9%, Communist countries 6%. Imports - 
$98.7 billion: fossil fuels, metal ore, raw 
materials, foodstuffs, machinery and equip- 
ment. Partners -U.S. 18%, EC 5.6%, South- 
east Asia 20.7%, Communist countries 5%. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, Inter- 
national Court of Justice (ICJ), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), International Energy Agency (IEA), 
International Labor Organization (ILO), 
INTELSAT. ■ 



ijtffl 
Istab 

fear 



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Itosi 
itev 



i 



ground forces in Korea and by the 
Prime Minister's visit to ASEAN coun- j 
tries this January. 

They agreed that an early and com 
prehensive political settlement of the 
Kampuchean problem, including the 
withdrawal of foreign forces, through ;j 
international conference based on the 
resolutions of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations is important for th( i 
restoration of a durable peace in In- 
dochina. 

The President and the Prime Mini 
ster affirmed that the maintenance of 
peace and security in the Middle East, 
particularly in the Gulf region, is highl; 
important for the peace and security o: 
the entire world. They agreed that the 
determined efforts of the United State: 
in the face of fragile security condition 
in the region contribute to restoring 
stability, and that many countries, in- 
cluding Japan, are benefiting from thei - 
They also agreed that the process of 
achieving a comprehensive peace in th< 
Middle East should be further promote 
to strengthen the security of the area. 

In the process of reviewing the in- 
ternational situation, the President an< 
the Prime Minister took note of the 
presence of various elements of instab: 
ty in other areas of the world, and par 
ticularly with respect to some parts of 
Africa and Central America, they ex- 
pressed their concern about the exist- 
ence of conditions affecting peace and 
stability. 

The President and the Prime Mini 
ster recognized the role that interna- 
tional efforts toward genuine arms cor 
trol and disarmament should play in at 
vancing world peace and stability, en- 
couraging restraint and responsibility 
international affairs, and promoting th 
security of the West as a whole. 

The Prime Minister stated his viev 
that it is important for the industrializ 
democracies to have a shared recogni- 
tion of the various political, military ai 
economic problems of the world and tc 
cope with them in a consistent mannei 
in order comprehensively to provide fc 
the security of the West as a whole. 

In meeting these international 
challenges to their peace and security, 
the President and the Prime Minister 
recognized that all Western industriali 
ed democracies need to make greater 
efforts in the areas of defense, world 
economic improvement, economic coop 
eration with the Third World, and 
mutually supportive diplomatic ini- 
tiatives. 



" I 



K 



Department of State Bullet 



a 



: 



Feature 



The President and the Prime 
lister reaffirmed their belief that the 
>.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Coopera- 
and Security is the foundation of 
,ce and stability in the Far East and 
defense of Japan. In insuring peace 
1 stability in the region and the 
ense of Japan, they acknowledged 
desirability of an appropriate divi- 
n of roles between Japan and the 
ited States. The Prime Minister 
ted that Japan, on its own initiative 
i in accordance with its Constitution 
1 basic defense policy, will seek to 
ke even greater efforts for improving 
defense capabilities in Japanese ter- 
jries and in its surrounding sea and 
space, and for further alleviating the 
ancial burden of U.S. forces in Japan. 
e President expressed his understand- 
of the statement by the Prime 
nister. They recognized their common 
ijerest in contributing to the defense of 
Jpan, and expressed the hope for even 
Sire fruitful dialogue between the two 
cintries on security matters. In this 
l^ard, they looked forward to the 
I leduled meetings in June on security 
•itters by representatives of the two 
( vernments both at the ministerial and 
I rking levels. 

The President and the Prime Minis- 
1 ■ agreed upon the importance of the 
] ationship between the industrialized 
« intries and the developing countries. 
' ey expressed their hope that construc- 
I e progress will be made in dealing 
■ th the countries of the south through 
• rious means, in particular through the 
I scussion scheduled for Ottawa and 
''•'sxico. 

They affirmed that political, econom- 
and social stability of developing 
untries is indispensable for the mainte- 
i nee of peace and stability of the 

I )rld. The Prime Minister stated that 

II e Government of Japan will strive to 
pand and improve its official develop- 
ent assistance under the New Medium 
;rm Target and that the Government 

\ ill strengthen its aid to those areas 

1 hich are important to the maintenance 
' peace and stability of the world. 
They also stated that they will eon- 

'nue to assist the victims of interna- 
onal instability through their aid to In- 

ixihinese, Afghan, and African 
?fugees. 

The President and the Prime 
linister discussed various problems fac- 
ig the world economy. In this connec- 
on, they expressed their concern about 
le rising pressure toward protectionism 
l many countries and affirmed that the 




The receiving line at the state dinner; from left to right are Mrs. Suzuki, Mrs. Reagan, 
Prime Minister Suzuki shaking hands with Secretary Haig, and Mrs. Haig greets the 
President (behind the Secretary). 

(White House photo by Michael Evans) 



United States and Japan are determined 
to continue their efforts to maintain and 
strengthen free and open trade prin- 
ciples embodied in the GATT 
framework. In this regard, the President 
expressed his appreciation for the volun- 
tary action taken by the Government of 
Japan to restrain the export of auto- 
mobiles to the United States at a time 
when the United States automobile in- 
dustry is passing through a difficult ad- 
justment period. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister highly valued the role the Sum- 
mit Meeting of the Seven Industrialized 
Nations plays in securing the stability 
and development of the world economy. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister expressed their satisfaction 
with the close bilateral economic rela- 
tionship and noted the prospects for a 
further expansion of these ties. They 
shared the view that economic issues be- 
tween the two countries have been and 
should continue to be given early and 
mutually satisfactory solutions in the 
spirit of goodwill and cooperation. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister highly valued the report of the 
Japan-United States Economic Relations 



Group which contains recommendations 
that will contribute to the long-term 
development of the United States-Japan 
economic relations. They agreed that the 
two governments should address the 
various recommendations for possible 
implementation. They also expressed the 
hope that the recommendations would 
be studied in such fora as the 
U.S. -Japan Businessmen's Conference. 

They reconfirmed the importance of 
the dialogue between the two countries 
through various fora including the 
United States- Japan sub-cabinet group. 

The President and the Prime Minis- 
ter, noting that the energy problem con- 
tinues to be critical to the healthy devel- 
opment of the world economy, re- 
affirmed the need for the two countries 
to make further efforts, together with 
other industrialized countries, in such 
fields as increase of energy production, 
promotion of development and use of 
alternative energy sources, and conser- 
vation of energy. 

The President and the Prime Minis- 
ter, in recognition of vital importance of 
preventing nuclear weapons prolifera- 
tion, reaffirmed the need to continue to 
promote international efforts to this end. 
They shared the view, on the other 
hand, that the role of nuclear energy 



une1981 



Feature 



ought to be further expanded under ap- 
propriate safeguards to meet the in- 
creasing energy needs of the world and 
that the United States and Japan have 
special responsibility to cooperate fur- 
ther in promoting the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. In this connection, the 
President endorsed the view of the 
Prime Minister that reprocessing is of 
particular importance to Japan. The 
President and the Prime Minister thus 
agreed that the two governments should 
promptly start consultations with a view 
to working out a permanent solution at 
an early date on such pending issues as 
the continued operation of the Tokai 
Reprocessing Facility and the construc- 
tion of an additional reprocessing plant 
in Japan. 

Underscoring their belief that 
cultural exchange is an important ele- 
ment in fostering mutual understanding 
and friendship, the President welcomed 
the announcement of the Prime Minister 
that the Government of Japan has made 
a financial contribution to the 
Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and 
that it has announced its intention to 
give substantial financial assistance 
respectively to the Japan Society of New 
York and, in a continuing manner, to 
the Special Japan-U.S. Exchange Pro- 
gram of "Youth for Understanding" 
which is to commence next fiscal year. 

Finally, the Prime Minister ex- 
pressed his sincere appreciation to the 
President for the warm reception he has 
received during his visit to the United 
States. The Prime Minister extended an 
invitation to the President to visit 
Japan. The President thanked the Prime 
Minister for his gracious invitation, and 
said that he hoped to visit Japan at a 
mutually convenient time. 



DEPARTURE REMARKS 1 

President Reagan 

This has been a most fruitful meeting 
for both our countries. We have estab- 
lished a bond of friendship. In fact, last 
night, the Prime Minister referred to it 
that we were buddies. And we have 
come to an agreement, or at least dis- 
covered, perhaps I should say, that 
we're in agreement on a number of 
broad issues—economic, political, mili- 
tary—and have established a base 
whereby we can have full consultation, 
and any possible difference or misunder- 
standing that might arise that we can be 
in instant contact to resolve it. So, we're 
most grateful and honored that the 
Prime Minister has been here, and as I 
say, I think we're all much better for 
what has been decided in the meetings 
we've held. 

Prime Minister Suzuki 2 

Thank you very much for your kind 
words. As you've just said, through the 
2 days of talks with you we have been 
able to establish between us an un- 
shakable basis of friendship and mutual 
trust. And this is the greatest treasure 
that I take home from my visit to the 
United States to Japan. 

Also, in the course of our 2-day 
talks, we touched on a broad range of 
issues, political-economic and other 
issues, including the questions of the 
relationship between the developing and 
the developed parts of the world and, 
also, including the question of how the 
countries in the West should cooperate 
together in securing, in a comprehensive 
manner, the security of the West as a 
whole. 



IE 



We did engage in very forthright 
and open exchanges of views and, as a,< 
result, we were able to confirm that w< 
have a basic convergence of views and 
perceptions about the important matte 
that face the international community 
today. We were also able to reaffirm 
that we are both dedicated to the com- 
mon goal of securing world peace and 
stability and prosperity, and we 
reaffirmed our common resolve to join 
our hands together and move vigorous 
forward to that end. 

We also agreed that we will always 
be in very close touch. We will com- 
municate with each other very closely, 
consult very closely on these global 
issues, as well as on the problems that 
we may have in our bilateral relations 
On the basis of mutual trust and frienc 
ship that I have been able to establish 
with you as true partners and as true 
friends, we can certainly contribute 
together to the further advancement o 
the relations between our two countrie 

My visit this time has been very, 
very fruitful thanks to your kind 
cooperation, and I'm happy to report t 
you that I'm perfectly satisfied with th 
very fruitful visit that I've been able tc 
have. Thank you very much. [Applause 



■ 



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ratio 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Pn 
dential Documents of May 11, 1981, which 
also includes the exchange of toasts betwe« 
the President and the Prime Minister folloi 
ing a dinner at the White House on May 7. 

2 The Prime Minister spoke in Japanese 
and his remarks were translated by an inte 
preter. ■ 



Department of State Bulleti 



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THE SECRETARY 



4 



l New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy 



San 



Secretary Haig's address before the 
nerican Society of Newspaper Editors 
SNE) on April 24, 1981. 1 



w« 



iin 



>me 100 days have elapsed since Presi- 
nt Reagan's inauguration. In the field 
foreign affairs, the first controversial 
eps have been taken. To paraphrase 
ark Twain, these actions have pleased 
ore than a few and astonished the 
st. Although we have not remade the 
orld, a new direction is evident. 

We are acting to restore confidence 
American leadership through a more 
bust defense of U.S. ideals and in- 
rests and a more realistic approach to 
ie dangers and opportunities of the in- 
rnational situation. It is my purpose 
day to outline briefly the philosophy 
;hind the new direction: this Admini- 
ration's view of the realities of the 
orld and the tasks before us. 

A French statesman once remarked 
lat the true business of government 
.as to foresee problems and to adminis- 
:r appropriate remedies while time re- 
amed. In our approach to foreign 
fairs, we have sought to distinguish be- 
veen the symptom of the problem and 
a ie problem itself, the crisis and its 

luse, the ebb and flow of daily events 
Pi id the underlying trend. The problems 
: lat beset us are clearly symptomatic of 
jj seper disorders, and it is to these fun- 
; amental movements of international 
■s olitics that we must direct our 
> ?medies. 

• Worldwide inflation, caused in 
art by astounding increases in the cost 

i f oil, interrupts balanced economic 
rowth essential to the aspirations of 
oth developing and developed nations. 

• Limited resources and political 
isturbance impede the eradication of 
unger, poverty, disease, and other im- 
ortant humanitarian goals. 

• Disruption from abroad threatens 
more vulnerable West, as we draw 

nergy and raw materials from regions 
a which the throes of rapid change and 
onflict prevail. 

• Soviet military power grows re- 
entlessly as Moscow shows an increas- 
ng readiness to use it both directly and 
>y proxy and obstructs the achievement 
)f a more just international order. 

We must understand that these con- 
iitions are interrelated; they play upon 
:ach other; and the danger is, therefore, 



all the greater. If present trends are not 
arrested, the convergence of rising 
international disorder, greater Western 
vulnerability, and growing Soviet mili- 
tary power will undo the international 
codes of conduct that foster the peaceful 
resolution of disputes between nations. 
The symptoms of this breakdown -ter- 
rorism, subversion, and conquest -are 
already apparent. The ideals and safety 
of democratic societies are under 
assault. 

Imaginative remedies might have 
prevented the current danger. Unfor- 
tunately, as these ominous developments 
gathered strength over the last decade, 
America's confidence in itself was 
shaken, and American leadership fal- 
tered. The United States seemed unable 
or unwilling to act when our strategic 
interests were threatened. We earned a 
reputation for "strategic passivity," and 
that reputation still weighs heavily upon 
us and cannot be wished away by 
rhetoric. What we once took for granted 
abroad -confidence in the United 
States -must be reestablished through a 
steady accumulation of prudent and suc- 
cessful actions. 

Before others can repose confidence 
in us, we must ourselves be confident. 
The Reagan foreign policy, therefore, 
begins with a justifiable pride in our 
country, its ideals, and in its achieve- 
ments. Government by the people and a 



Reagan's program to restore confidence 
in American leadership abroad. Our ac- 
tions are directed toward three projects: 

First, to enlarge our capacity to 
influence events and to make more effec- 
tive use of the full range of our moral, 
political, scientific, economic, and mili- 
tary resources in the pursuit of our in- 
terests; 

Second, to convince our allies, 
friends, and adversaries -above all the 
Soviet Union -that America will act in a 
manner befitting our responsibilities as a 
trustee of freedom and peace; and 

Third, to offer hope and aid to the 
developing countries in their aspirations 
for a peaceful and prosperous future. 

The President has established clear 
priorities in the pursuit of these proj- 
ects. Understanding that American eco- 
nomic weakness would cripple our 
efforts abroad, he has proposed a revolu- 
tionary program to restore inflation-free 
economic growth. This program recog- 
nizes that America's strength is meas- 
ured not only in arms but also in the 
spirit of individual enterprise, the sound- 
ness of the dollar, and the proper role of 
government in a free society. 

Fundamental to this approach is also 
the belief that economic recovery must 
be accompanied by a prompt correction 
of defects in our military posture. For 
too long, we have ignored this fact: The 



We are acting to restore confidence in American leadership through 
a more robust defense of U.S. ideals and interests and a more realistic 
approach to the dangers and opportunities of the international 
situation. 



society under law are great principles to 
defend. Regard for individual liberty at 
home translates into a concern for 
human rights abroad. 

Moreover, we are fully conscious of 
our historic role in the defense of free- 
dom. Together with our allies, we have 
shared peace and prosperity. The United 
States continues to be the natural an- 
chor for the free societies of the Atlantic 
and Pacific. Our objective remains sim- 
ple and compelling: a world hospitable to 
our society and our ideals. 

Confidence in ourselves -the crucial 
psychological element in any foreign 
policy -is evident throughout President 



military strength required by the United 
States can be achieved only through 
sacrifice and consistent purpose. We 
have proposed a heavy investment in 
our Armed Forces to assure safety for 
ourselves and the generations to come. 

Our economic and military programs 
have not lessened the need for balanced 
economic and security assistance abroad. 
This helps allies and friends to join us in 
contributing to the general security. It 
also adds to the flexible instruments of 
influence required for a successful 
foreign policy. 

These efforts to strengthen 
America's economic and military capa- 



June1981 



The Secretary 



bilities provide the foundation for an 
American diplomacy that includes the 
following aims: restraining the Soviet 
Union; reinvigorating our alliances; 
strengthening our friends; and a more 
effective approach to the developing 
countries. 

Restraining the Soviet Union 

A major focus of American policy must 
be the Soviet Union, not because of ideo- 
logical preoccupation but simply because 
Moscow is the greatest source of inter- 
national insecurity today. Let us be plain 
about it: Soviet promotion of violence as 
the instrument of change constitutes the 
greatest danger to world peace. 

The differences between the United 
States and the Soviet Union concern the 
very principles of international action. 
We believe in peaceful change, not the 
status quo. The peoples of the world 
seek peace, prosperity, and social 
justice. This is as desirable as it is in- 
evitable. The United States could no 
more stand against such a quest than we 
could repudiate our own revolution. We 
were the first to proclaim that individual 
liberty, democracy, and the rule of law 
provided the best framework for the im- 
provement of the human condition. And 
we have led the attempt since the Sec- 
ond World War to maintain two prin- 
ciples of international action: the peace- 
ful resolution of disputes and the pro- 
scription of outside intervention in the 
affairs of sovereign nations. 

In contrast, Soviet policy seeks to 
exploit aspirations for change in order 
to create conflict justifying the use of 
force and even invasion. Moscow con- 
tinues to support terrorism and war by 
proxy. 

There is an additional dimension to 
the danger. In regions sensitive to West- 
ern interests, in the littorals of critical 
sea passages, in areas that hardly affect 
Soviet security, you will find Moscow 
taking a keen interest in conflict. Thus, 
Western strategic interests, as well as 
the hopes for a more just international 
order, are at stake. 

Our objective must be to restore the 
prospects for peaceful resolution of 
conflict. We can do this by demonstrat- 
ing to the Soviet Union that aggressive 
and violent behavior will threaten 
Moscow's own interests. We can do this 
by demonstrating, as we are doing in El 
Salvador today, that a government bent 
on making necessary reforms will not be 
overthrown by armed intervention sup- 
ported by Moscow or its surrogates. We 



can do this by never accepting the 
Soviet occupation of other countries, 
such as Afghanistan. 

Only the United States has the 
pivotal strength to convince the 
Soviets -and their proxies -that violence 
will not advance their cause. Only the 
United States has the power to persuade 
the Soviet leaders that improved rela- 
tions with us serve Soviet as well as 
American interests. We have a right, in- 
deed a duty, to insist that the Soviets 
support a peaceful international order, 
that they abide by treaties, and that 



. . . Soviet promotion of violence 
as the instrument of change 
constitutes the greatest danger to 
world peace. 



they respect reciprocity. A more con- 
structive Soviet behavior in these areas 
will surely provide the basis for a more 
productive East- West dialogue. 

Reinvigorating Alliances 

Another essential element in the restora- 
tion of our leadership is the strengthen- 
ing of our alliances. From the outset of 
this Administration, we have placed a 
high priority on repairing the damage 
done to these alliances in recent years. 
Rebuilding alliance solidarity is a pre- 
condition for redressing the East- West 
military imbalance and for constraining 
Soviet international behavior. 

Perhaps the most useful concept to 
govern these critical relationships is 
"consultation." Consultation should mean 
more than the formal act of soliciting 
opinions. It suggests what alliances real- 
ly mean: shared interests, reliable per- 
formance, and sensitivity to each other's 
concerns. 

We have acted to restore consulta- 
tion as a useful instrument of alliance 
communication and solidarity. President 
Reagan's numerous meetings with heads 
of state and foreign ministers, as well as 
my own, have been marked by refresh- 
ing exchanges of views. A warm 
welcome awaits a United States willing 
to listen before it acts. 

We are moving already beyond ex- 
changes of views toward common strate- 
gic perceptions and concrete acts. We 
and our allies are taking common steps 
to restrain Soviet aggression and to 
restore our strength. 



lined 






1 



• On Poland, we have collectively 
sent a firm signal to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets are now well aware that inlifi 
tervention would bring severe and last- 
ing consequences. Indeed, the restraint 
we have seen offers some evidence of 
the benefits of alliance cohesion and 
resolve. Simultaneously, the West is 
working together to help the Polish pec 
pie economically, so they can deal with 
their own problems. 

• On theater nuclear forces, we an< 
our allies have reaffirmed our commit- 
ment to modernization of NATO's 
theater nuclear capabilities based on 
NATO's so-called two-track decision of 
1979. We will also make a serious effor 
to pursue European theater nuclear 
arms control with the Soviets. 

• In critical regions such as the Mil 
die East and Southwest Asia, we have 
launched a new, intensive effort aimed 
at achieving common approaches to pre 
tect our vital interests and to help 
assure peace. At a meeting of allies in- 
terested in southern Africa earlier this 
week in London, we began to reach cor 
sensus on a realistic and fair approach 
to the important problem of Namibia. 

• On economic challenges, we are i 
experiencing slower growth and high 
inflation. Here again we understand th; 
international cooperation is essential to 
solve each of our national problems. Fo 
example we have reaffirmed our belief 
free trade as we consult with Japan to 
alleviate the plight of the auto industry 
in the United States. 

Looking toward the NATO minis- 
terial meeting early next month and th 
Ottawa economic summit in July, the 
most advanced nations in the world arc 
coming together to meet the challenge 
from Soviet expansionism, regional in- 
stability, and economic interdependence 



Strengthening U.S. Friends 

The reinvigoration of our alliances mus 
be accompanied by the strengthening o 
our friends as well. This is particularly 
important in the Middle East and Soutl 
west Asia, a region where violent actio) 
by the Soviet Union and its surrogates 
demands a more effective Western 
response. 

The President's purpose in sending 
me recently to the area was to seek the 
wisdom of our friends on the issues of 
peace and security. But he also sent a 
message. The United States is fully 
cognizant of regional complexities and 
the necessity to proceed with the peace 



-:■- 

I 

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-: 
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i 






Department of State Bulletii 



»i 



I he becretary 



rocess. At the same time, we are deter- 
lined to strengthen our friends and to 

1 ' ork with them against the threat posed 

y the Soviet Union and its surrogates. 
• hese great projects must go forward 
)gether if we are to shake off our 
putation for strategic passivity in the 
rea and safeguard Western interests. 

n pa 

resh Approach to 
i leveloping Countries 

lestraint of the Soviets, the reinvigora- 
lon of our alliances, and the strengthen- 
lg of our friends are crucial aspects of 
he Reagan foreign policy. But the 
nderlying tensions of international 
ffairs go beyond the themes of allies 
nd adversaries. A fresh American ap- 
proach to the developing countries is 
ssential if we are to treat the roots of 
iternational disorder. 

The developing countries, sometimes 
rouped together as the Third World, 
ire a vastly varied multitude of states, 
most of them beset by severe economic 
.nd political problems. What once united 
hem -the memory of colonialism -is 
ading. The new emphasis is on the 
uture, not the past. 

The West in general and the United 
States in particular hold the key to that 
uture. It is we who demonstrate by our 
iwn history how to combine freedom 
ind development, political stability and 
conomic progress. Two guidelines 
should govern our actions. 

• We must show that friends of the 
Jnited States benefit from our friend- 
ship, even in the face of Soviet- 
supported intervention. 

• We must offer hope that the 
United States and its allies are not some 
form of closed club, hostile to the prob- 
lems and frustrations attending develop- 
ment. 

Our record on the issues of increas- 
ing concern to the future of the develop- 
ing countries offers a sharp contrast to 
that of the East. We support economic 
development; the East does not. We 
assist the refugees; the East refuses 
relief. We offer the peaceful mediation 
of dispute; the East offers only arms of 
conflict. The developing countries are 
beginning to recognize where their best 
hopes lie, and it is in both the interests 
of humanity and our own national 
security that we promote such a trend. 

In reviewing the causes of the Sec- 
ond World War and prospects for peace 
in the future, Winston Churchill conclud- 
ed: "How absolute is the need of a broad 



Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Address Before ASNE 



At the conclusion of the Secretary's 
address before the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) on April 24, 
1981, (see previous article), he answered 
the following questions from the au- 
dience. 1 

Q. Since one month ago today, when 
you expressed in a congressional hear- 
ing dissatisfaction with the emerging 
crisis management arrangement, and 
especially since the Situation Room in- 
cident a week later, we have heard lit- 
tle about your role as vicar or general 
manage 1- 

The role that you announced at 
the outset had been given to you by 
President Reagan. Could you speak a 
little bit about how you see your role 
now? Have you renegotiated it or re- 
defined it in subsequent meetings with 
the President, and are you satisfied 
with it and with crisis management as 
it is working now with the formula- 
tion of American foreign policy? 

A. First, let me assure you that I 
am very comfortable with my relation- 
ships with the President and with the 
White House. I have spoken almost daily 
to the President, either personally or 
telephonically, since the events you 
described. I am absolutely convinced 



path of international action pursued by 
many states in common across the 
years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of 
national politics." 

As we enter the final decades of the 
20th century, it is the task of the United 
States to lead the pursuit of this broad 
path, beckoning toward a more peaceful 
and prosperous international order. 
Knowledge of the obstacles before us 
will protect us against false optimism. 
Knowledge of ourselves will protect us 
against despair. Our difficulties will not 
disappear overnight. Yet we should not 
dwell too much on the troubles of the 
moment. The free nations of the Atlan- 
tic and the Pacific represent the greatest 
concentration of talent and wealth in the 
world. We are a community of peoples 
devoted to human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law. 

Our prospects are bright. Only con- 
stancy of purpose is required to preserve 
successfully the liberty that is the 
treasure of our civilization. 



that I am doing precisely what he 
brought me on board to do, and he has 
reaffirmed this to me, and I am very, 
very comfortable with it. 

I would add again that the kinds of 
report cards that sometimes fascinate 
the contemporary observers are really 
going to receive their important value 
judgment in the context of performance. 
In that context, while I am not overly 
self-confident, I do feel we have made 
some constructive initiatives that time 
will tell whether or not they reap the 
harvest I anticipate. 

Q. There have been reports that 
the Administration may lift the grain 
embargo against the Soviet Union. 
You, yourself, have said that such an 
action could send a deleterious signal 
to the Soviets. 

Have you at this point received 
any assurances from the Russians that 
they will practice restraint around 
Poland? Or is this decision, as Senator 
Mathias has suggested, a reward to 
the Russians for the absence of bad 
behavior? 

A. First, let me suggest to you that 
had it been a little bit before 11:00 this 
morning, I would have said there had 
been no decision made on this subject. I 
can no longer say that since I've just 
pa rt'cipated in a Cabinet meeting where 
a decision was made. And there will be 
an announcement with respect to this 
issue at 4:00 today from the White 
House, and I understand there has 
already been an uncharacteristic degree 
of leakage with that. [Laughter] 

I will not attempt to characterize the 
motivations behind what the President's 
decision will be when it is announced, 
other than to suggest to you that this 
decision was based on a longstanding 
commitment of the President before his 
election. It was structured on a number 
of factors, including some that you 
touched upon in your question. 

With respect to my own view on 
this, it has been clear from the outset, it 
has always been my policy when a deci- 
sion is made, to fully support that deci- 
sion by the President, and I do in this 
instance. And so when it is announced, 
you'll know what I am supporting. 

Q. Can I read into that that you 
have not received any assurances from 
the Soviets that they will practice 
restraint around Poland? 



'Press release 122. 



June 1981 



The Secretary 



A. I would suggest to you that I 
would never make it a habit in a public 
forum to discuss whatever discussions 
may have been underway in diplomatic 
channels between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union. I think it's a counter- 
productive practice, and I intend to 
avoid it. I have in the past. So I'm sorry 
to flick your question away so uncere- 
moniously. 

Q. Four American women mis- 
sionaries were murdered in El Salva- 
dor last December. Their families have 
become increasingly impatient about 
some report of what happened, and 
some of them are charging U.S. com- 
plicity in a cover-up of the crime. Can 
you tell us when we might expect 
some information about what hap- 
pended to those women on a road that 
was entirely controlled by forces of 
the government we are supporting in 
El Salvador? 

A. I think I would want to make the 
point, and make it very clearly and une- 
quivocally here, that this government, 
the United States, has been actively 
working on this problem as diligently as 
I think human capabilities would permit. 

We've had the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation in El Salvador, helping the 
Duarte government with respect to this 
investigation. There has been some 
progress. That cooperation between our 
Justice Department and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation continues today. 

Our charge there, Mr. Chapin, has 
been actively engaged in this matter on 
a daily basis and reports almost weekly 
or daily to us on this. I will just suggest 
to you that there has been progress. 
This is an anguishing problem. I 
wouldn't want anyone to believe for a 
moment that this Administration either 
favors, would harbor, or would even 
evidence a modicum of sympathy to ex- 
cesses or extremes from either the right 
or the left in El Salvador. 

Q. Why is it taking so long? 

A. I think you might ask the same 
questions about the situation in Atlanta, 
equally dreadful or even more so. These 
are complex and difficult problems. And 
I know that you will give this the objec- 
tivity that has characterized your ap- 
proach to these matters. [Laughter and 
applause] 

Q. I hope I'll always be as fair as 
you've been when you've complained — 
[Laughter and applause] 



Q. You mentioned in your speech 
the effort to find common approaches 
to the Middle East. And you, in your 
trip and utterances before then, have 
spoken of the urgent importance of a 
consensus of strategic concerns in the 
Middle East area between Arabs and 
Jews. 

Now this sale of aircraft and 
other things, AWACS [airborne warn- 
ing and control systems], to Saudi 
Arabia seems to have polarized into a 
repeat of the 1978 battle here over 
another Saudi sale. Given this situa- 
tion, did the policy formation process 
contribute to the struggle that we 
now seem to have in prospect in 
Washington, or was it inevitable? 
And, given the developments now, can 
you pull off this Saudi sale without 
severely damaging the basis e u one 
end or the other of the U.S. alliances 
in the Middle East, either the Saudi 
end or the Israeli end? And what hap- 
pens if you don't pull it off at all? 

A. That is a very, very important 
question and one which reflects a great 
deal of thought. And, indeed, it would 
take another 30 minutes to answer it in 
the detail that it deserves. 

But let me suggest that with respect 
to the earlier assurances given by the 
Carter Administration on the situation 
and the provision of arms to Saudi 
Arabia: That commitment and that 
assurance -it wasn't really a com- 
mitment -that assurance was given at a 
time when the strategic situation in the 
Middle East was fundamentally different 
than it is today. We've witnessed a 
number of very traumatic events in the 
intervening period: the collapse and fall 
of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet double 
intervention in Afghanistan, the increas- 
ing difficulties in southern Yemen 
emerging from the Horn of Africa, and 
a whole new set of security threats to 
the nations of the region. 

So there are grounds for reassess- 
ing. That reassessment was made by the 
Carter Administration just prior to the 
inauguration. They had concluded with 
some nuances of difference on the aerial 
surveillance capability that they would 
proceed to seek this enhancement of 
Saudi capability. 

They asked us at the time whether 
or not we would support them in their 
movement to the Hill. We asked them 
not to do so because we felt since we 
were going to have to carry this burden, 
we would like to make the decision, we 
would like to introduce it and bear the 
burden of seeing it through. I think that 
was the correct decision. 



In the meantime, this issue has 
raised a great deal of concern in Jeru 
salem -understandable I must say. Sorr 
of it is a reflection of a lot of misinfor- 
mation and exaggeration in terms of 
capability of the system. There has beei < 
no decision as to when we are going to 
proceed with this decision -taking it to 
the Hill, if you will. Senator [Howard] 
Baker just returned from his own 
assessment in the area, and I spent 
some hours with him this week, and he 
spoke to the President about it yester- 
day. 

We are in the process now of look- 
ing at the technical arrangements and 
the modalities for the transfer of the 
system. And I would suggest that it 
would be wise and prudent not to pre- 
judge this situation and draw the kinds 
of conclusions your question asks for ur 
til this process has been completed and 
until we see precisely what we're dealin 
with and not deal with what are now 
still a number of phantoms. That's a 
joke. [Laughter] 

Q. I'd like to follow up on that 
question regarding the AWACS deci- 
sion. In the early 1970s, we were told 
that the arms sale program to Iran 
would stabilize the region, hold down 
oil prices, and provide a pillar of 
strength in the Persian Gulf. Now 
we're being told the same thing about 
the arms sales to Saudi Arabia. If it 
didn't work in Iran, why should we 
think it will work in Saudi Arabia? 



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A. I would suggest that the prem- 
ises of your question also suggest a 
course of action in Iran that I do not 
believe the Reagan Administration 
would have pursued. And I leave my 
answer very brief to suggest to you~-no 
would a similar situation that we saw ir 
Iran occur in this Administration in 
Saudi Arabia. 

Q. It may have occurred to you 
that some of your problems with the 
White House might be eased if you 
were to repeat the statement made by 
another famous political general. Do 
you remember what General Sherman 
said about the Presidency? If 
nominated, I will not run; if elected, 1 
will not serve. Would you welcome ar 
opportunity to say that now before us 

A. Almost increasingly, with every 
passing hour. [Laughter] Let me sugges 
something to you because you asked a 
serious question as you always do. 
[Laughter] Would anyone in his right 
mind choose the course of Secretary of 



Department of State Bulletin 



m 



p 



': 



ite as a path to the White House? I 
n't think so. And I can assure you in 
case that was never a consideration, 
i proud to be the Secretary of State 
the United States of America. [Ap- 
luse] And I'm proud to serve Presi- 
nt Reagan, and I will do so just so 
jig as he wants me here and I feel I 
n make a constructive contribution, 
n not here for political objectives. 

Q. It has been suggested that the 
rmal balance between the Depart- 
;nt of Defense and the Department 
State has been disturbed in that the 
:fense Secretary has been openly 
aking statements on foreign policy, 
id to use a specific example: in the 
cent decision to provide AWACS 
anes to the Saudi Arabia aid 
ckage. Would you agree that such a 
r - sturbance has occurred? When you 
cepted your appointment, you said 
iu alone would articulate foreign 
tlicy for the President. 

A. I suppose I could fumble through 
response and it won't change your 
ind one way or the other if you 
'.rceive there are any problems be- 
reen Cap Weinberger and myself. Let 
e assure you, there are no problems. 

I meet weekly with Cap for break - 
st. We talk daily on the telephone. I 
ive the utmost confidence in Cap's 
lility to do the job he's been brought 
»re to do, and I am extremely comfort- 
)le with the way he's doing it. In fact, I 
and back in awe and admiration. 

When you get the questions of na- 
Dnal security, of course, there are 

Fways interface areas of complexity and 
fficulty. And I suppose with maturity 

e'll get a little better at sorting those 
. at. I can assure you, Secretary Wein- 
I ;rger and I are in total agreement in 

/erything he does and says. If I felt 
I :herwise, I would tell him so, and I 

ould expect him to be as frank with 
I le. So I'm sorry, I can't help you with 
I lat answer. 

Q. I made a quick note about 
omething you said in your speech, 
nd that was, I believe, that our allies 
hould be made aware of the benefit of 
ur friendship — of the friendship of 
he United States. 

And I wonder— harking back to 
vhat the Canadians did in a very 
leroic effort to bring some of our 
American Embassy people out of 
Tehran, which caused some risk and 
eopardy to their own Embassy there, 
ind since then we have continued the 
'ears of haggling with the Canadians 



over fishing rights treaties and other 
things — how you would explain to the 
Canadians the benefit of our friend- 
ship in view of their historic and 
heroic efforts in our behalf? 

A. I just recently had the opportuni- 
ty to do just that along with the Presi- 
dent in our recent visit to Canada, a 
visit that I think was marked and char- 
acterized by the greatest cordiality and 
mutual respect and elegant dialogue 
from start to finish. And that's not 
always been the case in the recent past, 
as you will recall. 

Because of the intimacy that we en- 
joy with our northern neighbors and the 
great interfaces across the entire spec- 
trum within the relationships between 
states -commercial, economic, social, 
cultural, financial, energy of course - 
there would be, from time to time, very 
vexing differences of approach. And one 
of those is the northeast and also recent- 
ly has been the western problem. The 
western problem's been largely solved, 
thanks to patience and careful and 
mutually patient activity on the part of 
both governments. 

In the northeast we are still some- 
what torn because of the inability of this 
Administration to have supported in the 
Congress arrangements which our Cana- 
dian neighbors might have reason to an- 
ticipate would go through in terms of 
treaties. We are working on that prob- 
lem daily, and I can tell you progress is 
being made. And, while I can't speak for 
our Canadian partners— I wouldn't pre- 
sume to do so -I would say that the 
dialogue and relationships between our 
two governments have never been bet- 
ter. 

Q. Your speech gives the detailed 
statement of your foreign policy goals 
and attitudes. Apart from a reference 
to European nuclear arms control, you 
made no reference at all to general 
arms control negotiations with the 
Soviet Union — that is, an extension of 
SALT — which at one point was a 
centerpiece of foreign policy for 
several Democratic and Republican 
Administrations. Would you please ex- 
plain the omission? 

A. I suppose you could— in a speech 
of about 20 minutes of the character of 
this one which was more philosophic 
rather than operational in terms of 
framework— find a number of omissions 
that would disturb one advocate or 
another of a particular point of view. 

So the only way to answer the ques- 
tion for you is to go directly to the ques- 



tion you've asked, and that is the 
policies of the Reagan Administration 
with respect to arms control in general. 
You'll note I didn't talk about human 
rights or nonproliferation or a number 
of other things, equally important from 
my point of view, in my speech. 

I would suggest this: that President 
Reagan has reiterated repeatedly his 
support for an equitable, balanced arms 
control agreement with the Soviet 
Union. I think he has also suggested 
that he not only seeks control and 
limitations of these arms but he is a 
strong advocate for reduction in the 
levels of strategic armament between 
East and West. 

We are in a process today in this 
Administration of assessing the full 
range of possibilities in this area. We 
are doing so in the context of the broad 
approach that I did touch upon in my 
speech, and that is a recognition and a 
day-to-day assessment of corresponding 
international Soviet behavior throughout 
the world. 

In recognition of the fact that we 
have had a SALT II agreement which 
fell on the rocks, not just in Afghani- 
stan, but probably on the rocks of its 
own substantive inadequacy which would 
have not sustained it favorably in the 
U.S. Senate with or without an Afghani- 
stan. 

So we are assessing the former ap- 
proach under SALT II. We are assess- 
ing other approaches that might be more 
hopeful and more realistic in the context 
of reductions. We are looking at possibly 
functional arms restraint approaches. 
And, at the proper moment, we will be 
prepared to enter into negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on limitations. 

I hope I've answered your question. 
I'm sorry I belabored it, but I will accept 
the lumps that if it wasn't in the speech, 
it wasn't in the speech intended to in- 
clude that subject. 

Q. You contrasted the broad 
thrust of American policy with the 
Soviet Union in terms of peaceful 
resolution of disputes. Why have you 
asked for a repeal of the Clark amend- 
ment, and what are your intentions 
toward Jonas Savimbi [President, Na- 
tional Union for the Total Independ- 
ence of Angola] in Angola? 

A. We have, at the outset of this 
Administration, put together a number 
of what I call disabling legislative 
restraints on the conduct of American 
foreign policy by the President of the 
United States. 



June 1981 



The Secretary 



The Clark amendment fits into that 
category along with a number of other 
legislative disabling type legislative ac- 
tions that were really, I think, in a 
broad historic sense, a consequence of 
Vietnam, Watergate, and a number of 
other wrenching experiences of the past 
decade. 

We have asked for the elimination of 
these disabling legislations -and there 
are a number of them, the Clark amend- 
ment included -because we feel that 
they border on the unconstitutional if 
they don't cross that line. We feel that 
they are an a priori inhibition on 
presidential policy which is self-defeating 
in the extreme as those who share our 
values abroad and those who do not 
share our values assess our ability to 
deal with the day-to-day dynamics of in- 
ternational affairs. 

With respect to the impact of a 
repeal of the Clark amendment on the 
southern African problem, it does not 
prejudge that someone has made a deci- 
sion to pursue actions which would be in 
violation of the Clark amendment; not at 
all. It does respect the reality that an 
American President who goes into a 
contemporary effort to solve the 
anguishing problems of southern Africa 
with one arm tied behind him with 
respect to that issue is deprived of the 
kind of flexibility the American people 
would expect our President to have. 

Q. As I understand the effect of 
the Clark amendment, it is simply to 
prohibit the export of American aid to 
Jonas Savimbi. 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And if you withdraw the 
amendment or repeal it, I'm asking 
how is that consistent with your state- 
ment that our purpose in dealing with 
nations is the peaceful resolution of 
disputes? 



A. Very simply. It would be our 
hope that at some point in the future, 
effective American policy would bring 
about the withdrawal of Cuban proxy 
forces from Angola where they have no 
right to be and where they represent a 
fundamental violation of the good order 
I described in my speech. 

And it would be my assessment as 
well that in our efforts to effect that, 
and to effect a reconciliation in Angola 
of the many diverse elements -one of 
which is the Savimbi movement -with 
the central government, that we are bet- 
ter served without this kind of a restric- 
tive, disabling piece of legislation. It 
does not suggest for a moment that 
anyone is going to engage in the internal 
intervention in Angolan affairs. 

Q. I would like to know which 
are, in your opinion, the governments 
of the Western Hemisphere more iden- 
tified with the Soviet Union and serve 
the interests of the Moscow regime in 
this continent? 

A. I think there can be little doubt, 
after so many years, that the Govern- 
ment of Cuba is largely under the sway 
of Soviet influence. It has been serving 
the purposes of the Soviet Union exten- 
sively in recent history. One would sug- 
gest that the still yet to be definitized 
outcome of events in Nicaragua would 
suggest a growing influence from the 
Soviet Union and Cuba in the Sandinista 
government. It's not necessarily in its 
final stages, and there are many ele- 
ments in Nicaragua today who oppose 
vigorously further dependence on Cuba 
and the Soviet Union. 

And I would hope that our policies 
would be designed to recognize the ex- 
istence of those forces and to be a 
source of encouragement and strength 
for them in the pursuit of our own 
policies vis-a-vis Nicaragua. I won't go 
beyond that because I suppose I could 
get into a lot of debates on that. 



Sicrel 



Q. In the Soviet U;>ion today then 
are a number of Jewish refusniks, so- 
called, and other dissidents who re- 
main behind bars in apparent direct 
violation of the Helsinki accords — 
Anatoli Shcharanskiy and Yuri Orloff 
and Victor Brailovsky and Ida Nudell, 
the list goes on and on. I don't expect 
you to tell me directly— and I wouldn' 
want you to tell me directly — if any- 
thing specifically is underway. But is 
there a chance of future prisoner ex- 
changes as have occurred in the past 
to get some of these people out? 

A. Clearly, in the broad context of 
your questions, this is one of the main 
focuses of our work in Madrid, the 
CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe]. I must say that & 
thus far we have been notoriously unsuc- 
cessful in budging the current level of 
Soviet intransigence in this area and a 
number of related areas. 

I can assure you that it is a funda- 
mental aspect of our policy to do all tha is 
we can to assist in the quest for freedor 
of these suppressed peoples and popula- 
tions and individuals as well. Some, as 
you know, have recently just come out. 
We just had a father and son come out 
of the Soviet Union. We have offered 
them haven, as is historically our policy 
But I do think we have not had the suc- 
cess that we had visualized in CSCE, 
although we've had some, and we must 
continue our efforts. 



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Department of State Bulletin 



NATO and the Restoration of American Leadership 



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[Secretary Haig 

Commencement address before the 
iuating class at Syracuse University, 
racuse, New York, on May 9, 1981. 1 

iduation is a time for rejoicing. It 
uld also be a time for introspection 
en we examine our directions in life, 
h as individuals and as a nation. This 
rning, with your indulgence, I would 
i to say a few words about America 

I where America is going, particularly 
foreign policy. And I want to call 

ir attention specifically to one of our 
st precious legacies— the Atlantic 
! - ance. 

Americans have been described as a 
>ple constantly in search of them- 
ves. The vast number of schools and 
leges, adult and home-education 
ses, tell a story of a relentless desire 
self-improvement. We are not 
islied with the present. As President 
agan has described it so well, we are 
samers of a better future. 
All of us know that in recent years, 
have spent a great deal of time and 
Drt examining our society with a 
tical eye. Observers from abroad 
scribed us as confused, lacking in 
lfidence, and unsure of our purposes, 
e most fundamental questions were 
<ed: Did our democratic institutions 

II work? Were they worth defending? 
luld we offer anything to the world? 
as the dream over? 

I believe this period of a perhaps ex- 
ssive American introspection has come 
an end. We are more certain of 
rselves today than we have been for a 
lg time. A profound national consen- 
s has emerged. Our democratic institu- 
ms work. They are worth defending, 
ir ideals and our liberty do offer a 
'table example to a world desperately 
arching for peace and prosperity. The 
earn lives. 

This consensus, this reassertion of 
merican self-confidence, is the very 
isis of the President's foreign policy, 
ur objectives are straightforward: We 
ant a world hospitable to our society 
id ideals. And our objectives can be 
:hieved if we restore American leader- 
lip. 



lajor Points in U.S. Approach 

et me give you a sense of our direction 
y discussing briefly four major points in 
ur approach: 



• First, our insistence on restraint 
and reciprocity in East- West relations; 

• Second, our determination to 
strengthen our alliances, particularly the 
Atlantic alliance; 

• Third, our intention to play a con- 
structive role in the Third World; and 

• Fourth, our firm resolve to 
strengthen our economy and our 
defenses. 

Restraint of Soviet Union. An in- 
sistence on restraint and reciprocity in 
East- West relations is the central theme 
of our foreign policy. If we are seriously 
interested in a world where there can be 
peaceful change, where nations can set- 
tle disputes short of war, then we must 
act to restrain the Soviet Union. Soviet 
actions or the actions of Moscow's surro- 
gates threaten Western strategic in- 
terests. Even more importantly, it is 
Soviet reliance on force and the threat 
of force to create and exploit disorder 
that undermines the prospect for world 
peace today. 

Reinvigoration of Alliances. The 

next point must be to strengthen our 
alliances, especially the Atlantic alliance. 
The beginning of wisdom is to establish 
the consensus and confidence with our 
allies that has been missing in recent 
years. The key to this is genuine con- 
sultation, which has several elements. 
We must be good listeners; we must be 
frank with one another; we must work 
for the common good; and we should 
give each other the benefit of the doubt. 
Candor will serve the alliance well, but 
surely it will be more effective in quiet 
diplomacy than through the medium of 
public criticism. 

Approach to Third World. The 

third point is our intention to play an ac- 
tive and constructive role in the Third 
World. It is important to do this for our 
own interests. Just as important, how- 
ever, we should do our part for the well- 
being of the developing countries. 

An American approach to the Third 
World clearly requires an acknowledg- 
ment of the problem presented by Soviet 
policy. But this acknowledgment must 
come on a foundation of understanding 
for the problems facing the developing 
countries. The West has a great deal to 
offer: economic and technical assistance, 
cooperation in the settlement of dis- 
putes, access to an international com- 



mercial and financial system. We have 
also shown through the example of our 
own societies that freedom and economic 
development are compatible. 

The approach from the East is 
different. Moscow offers a poor model of 
economic achievement, and the Soviets 
disclaim any obligation to give financial 
assistance to the developing countries. 
Instead, the Soviet Union and its surro- 
gates are heavily involved in stoking 
conflict with arms and troops. The 
names and places have become familiar 
to us over the past decade: the Cubans 
fighting in Africa, the Vietnamese con- 
quering Kampuchea. More recently, we 
have seen the Soviets themselves invade 
Afghanistan and the Libyans seize Chad. 
And in our own hemisphere, there is in- 
controvertible evidence that Soviet arms 
are threatening an established govern- 
ment in El Salvador. 

We have no monopoly on wisdom in 
approaching this complex situation. Still, 
we must prevent the Soviets and their 
surrogates from destroying what the 
West and the developing countries can 
achieve together. 

Strengthening U.S. Economy and 
Defenses. Finally, the fourth element in 
the President's approach is the restora- 
tion of the economic vitality and military 
strength of the United States. This is as 
crucial to foreign policy as it is to 
domestic purpose. Without a healthy 
American economy, we cannot strength- 
en our leadership abroad. Without an 
improved American military capability, 
we cannot restrain the Soviet Union. 

Restraint of the Soviets, reinvigor- 
ation of our alliances, a new approach to 
the Third World, a healthier U.S. 
economy and a stronger military —these 
are the signals of our determination to 
restore our leadership in the world. It is 
going to be very difficult, and we cannot 
accomplish our objectives alone. In this 
age of interdependence, freedom and 
peace depend upon concerted action be- 
tween the United States and its allies. 
Having just returned from a consulta- 
tion with the NATO allies in Rome, I 
want to review briefly the prospects for 
a reinvigorated Atlantic alliance. 



une1981 



11 



i ne aecreiary 



Prospects for NATO 

Finding fault with the Atlantic alliance 
has become a good-sized industry, giving 
employment to thousands of critics on 
both sides of the ocean. When we ex- 
amine the assets of the Atlantic allies, 
however, a more promising picture 
emerges. We have the talent and the 
wealth among us to maintain a favorable 
balance of power with the Soviet Union. 
We can work together to restrain Soviet 
interventionism abroad. But we can do 
these things only if we think seriously 
about the alliance itself. We must 
remember why it was founded, what 
holds it together, and why it is crucial to 
the future —especially your future. An 
entire generation has grown up with 
NATO as much a fact of life as the elec- 
tric light. You who do not know a world 
without NATO will soon take up the 
burdens of my generation. 

NATO today presents two para- 
doxes. It is a military alliance uniting 
nations whose way of life and principles 
do not exalt the military virtues. It is a 
highly successful deterrent to war, yet 
its very success makes it easy to take 
NATO —and peace -for granted. 

The alliance survives these para- 
doxes because the Atlantic family of na- 
tions is inspired by a common faith in 
the capacity of all men for self-govern- 
ment. No hereditary aristocracy, no 
religious orthodoxy, no master race, no 
privileged class, no gang of terrorists 
has a right to rule a people by force. As 
free peoples, we obey the laws passed by 
governments we have freely chosen. Our 
military forces take orders from elected 
civilian authority. Our young people en- 
joy freedom of thought, able to question 
even the worth of their own societies. 
These deeply held principles lead us to 
oppose aggression, tyranny, and ter- 
rorism. 

A clear constrast exists between 
NATO and the Soviet-dominated War- 
saw Pact. NATO is a voluntary defen- 
sive alliance pledged to strengthen free 
institutions and designed to deter ag- 
gression. The Warsaw Pact's armed 
forces have been used principally to 
deprive their own peoples of the right of 
self-government. 

A similar contrast between the 
values of NATO and the values of the 
Soviet Union may be seen on East- West 
exchanges. The Soviets are anxious to 
import Western credit, Western tech- 
nology, Western consumer goods and 
machinery, and Western food to save 
their system from its economic failures. 
The most controlled Soviet export, 



12 



however, is human talent, those who 
wish to vote with their feet for oppor- 
tunity in the West. 

In fact, the Soviet system is showing 
signs of spiritual exhaustion. We are 
proud of our artists, scientists, and 
social critics; theirs are censored, exiled, 
sent on false pretenses to mental institu- 
tions, or condemned to forced labor. We 
are proud of the life of the mind to 
which Syracuse University is a living 
monument. The Soviets are afraid of the 
intellectual and spiritual life of their 
peoples. 

The commitment of the allied coun- 
tries to peace and freedom inspires not 
only our common response to the crisis 
in Poland but also our work in the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation 
(the Helsinki accords) in Europe on 
behalf of individual rights and contact 
between peoples. The Atlantic nations 
constitute an enduring natural communi- 
ty with many cultural, economic, and 
organizational links beside NATO itself. 
NATO lives because it is rooted in the 
ideals of this community. The alliance 
speaks to our deeply cherished beliefs. 

Do we still need the Atlantic alli- 
ance? Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
explained the need for NATO to the 
American people in 1949 by saying that 
it was "the statement of the facts and 
lessons of history." Two world wars had 
shown that aggression aimed at the 
domination of Europe threatened the 
survival of the United States and in- 
evitably involved us in war. Out of this 
bitter experience, we abandoned our 
historic policy of aloofness from Euro- 
pean alliances. Our participation in 
NATO remains essential to the task of 
keeping the peace in Europe. 

Allied strength and unity, not lack of 
Soviet ambition, have protected us. And 
allied weakness or disunity may tempt 
the Soviets. Indeed, we face today 
perhaps a more complicated challenge 
than was contemplated by the founders 
of NATO. The Soviet Union today is a 
power with a global military reach. 
Soviet forces are stronger than our own 
in some categories. And Soviet sur- 
rogates in Africa, Asia, and Central 
America, have been exploiting conflicts 
to the detriment of both the local 
peoples and Western strategic interests. 

We should not exaggerate the 
strength of our adversary. Moscow faces 
an unenviable present and a gloomy 
future. A list of formidable problems 
confronts it, ranging from the hostility 
of China to the difficult Polish situation, 
from economic failures to ideological 
sterility. But these weaknesses should 



not make us too comfortable. A state as 
powerful and ambitious as the Soviet j 
Union may be more dangerous because | 
its weaknesses run to the heart of its 
system. That is why the first task of 
American leadership and the Atlantic 
alliance is to establish new restraints oi 
Soviet behavior. 



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Recent Progress 

Let me conclude by reporting to you on 
the recent progress we have made 
toward strengthening the alliance. At a 
meeting of NATO's North Atlantic 
Council earlier this week in Rome, we 
reaffirmed alliance solidarity and our 
belief in the values of Western democ- 
racy. In formal sessions and a host of i) 
formal meetings, the NATO govern- 
ments freely achieved a consensus in 
order to bolster the common defense. 
Our approach reflected a very realistic 
Western attitude toward the problems 
of arms modernization and arms contrc 
In announcing that negotiations with tl 
Soviet Union on limiting theater nuclea 
weapons could commence by the end ol 
the year, we and our allies demonstrati 
that free peoples were not afraid to tal 
with an adversary. In agreeing, at the 
same time, that NATO would moderniz 
its defenses, the alliance also showed 
that negotiations must be supported by 
a sound military posture. 

This is only the beginning, of cours 
but already a change for the better car 
be detected in the spirit of our cooper- 
ation. Clearly our allies welcome a mor 
robust American leadership, informed 
a more sensitive appreciation of their 
problems. 

Today is also a beginning for you. 
You have heard me patiently -perhaps 
not so patiently -talk about ideals and 
identity, leadership and alliance, dange 
and opportunity. Your future is in youi 
own hands. But the intangibles of 
Western civilization, the inner strength 
the real intellectual and spiritual 
treasures of free men are also in your 
hands. Cherish those things and cherisl 
the instrument of their protection, the 
Atlantic alliance. Perhaps Benjamin 
Disraeli captured the moment of your 
graduation best when he wrote that "tl 
youth of the nation are the trustees of 
posterity." It is my privilege today to 
wish you the very best as you commeni 
your trusteeship. 



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■Press release 142. 



Department of State Bulletir 



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The Secretary 



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►reign Policy and the American Spirit 



'mmSecretary Haig 

lintsT. 

Commencement address before the 

luating class at Hillsdale College, 

\lsdale, Michigan, on May 16, 1981. ' 



Spanish philosopher once wrote that 
true mission of higher education was 
.each vital ideas. Perhaps the most 
|il idea you can learn from your col- 
? years is that self-respect is funda- 
Intal to the individual. I would add 
self-respect is also fundamental to 
nation. 

At times, over the past several 
its, it must have seemed to you that 
country had forgotten this idea. The 
terican people experienced profound 
examination and even self-doubt, 
nehow the great motivating goals of 
past had lost their power. We 
rched, seemingly in vain, for an ob- 
rive to guide the future. Our con- 
mce was shaken; our values were 
^stioned; our institutions were 
acked. 
A loss of momentum and confidence 
lome was bound to affect our stand- 
in the world. Our self-doubt trans- 
ted itself to others who depended on 
Doubt of the present easily became 
r for the future. 

I believe this era in our national life 
now drawn to a close. We have re- 
covered ourselves as Americans. We 
• confident again, our values are 
;ind, and our institutions are worth 
ending. 

America's new confidence is founded 
an old tradition: respect for the irre- 
I ;ssible genius of the individual. One of 
.' marks of this genius is man's ability 

B glimpse a remote future and to be in- 
red by it. As the President has put it: 
nericans have begun to dream again 
a better future. Americans have 
igun to believe again that this future, 
-note though it may seem, can be 
ached. 

The resurgence of the American 
irit has led to a remarkable consensus 
our national life. Never have I seen 
ch a firm and consistent consensus 
nong the people, the Congress, and the 
<ecutive. The issue is not whether we 
ould strengthen America but how 
lickly we can do so. The issue is not 
hether we should defend our interests 
iroad but how vigorously we can do so. 

In my view, the renewal of 
merican self-respect, pride, and confi- 



dence is the most important develop- 
ment in the world today. With this in- 
gredient we can act to restore American 
leadership. With the restoration of 
American leadership, the achievement of 
a more peaceful and prosperous world 
becomes less remote. 

The President has a clear sense of 
our objectives in foreign policy and a 
coherent program to restore American 
leadership. There should be no mystery 
about American purposes abroad. We 
want a world hospitable to our society 
and to our ideals. We seek a world 
where there can be peaceful change, 
where nations can settle disputes short 
of war. We shall work to restore the 
prospect of a world free from threats of 
force or the use of force. 

Let me discuss very briefly the main 
lines of action in our foreign policy. 

First, we shall insist on greater 
restraint and reciprocity in East- West 
relations. If we are seriously interested 
in a world where there can be peaceful 
change, where nations can settle dis- 
putes short of war, then we must act to 
restrain the Soviet Union and its surro- 
gates. The improvement of our military 
capabilities, despite the cost, underlines 
our resolve in dealing with Moscow. 

Our second line of action is to re- 
invigorate our alliances and friendships. 
A basic step is the restoration of a sense 
of confidence and trust in our leadership 
of the Western world. Irritants are be- 
ing removed. We are seeking a larger 
consensus among our allies on common 
actions. And friends exposed to dangers 
believe once more that the United States 
will help them. On my trip to the Middle 
East and during the recent NATO con- 
ference in Rome, the change was evi- 
dent. Our allies and friends are deeply 
appreciative of a more robust American 
leadership but also one more sensitive to 
their interests. 

Third, we are seeking a more just 
and responsible relationship with the 
Third World. The developing states are 
beginning to see the difference between 
the offers of the East and the offers of 
the West. The Soviets bring weapons, a 
pervasive presence, and, eventually, a 
client-state relationship. The West 
brings economic development, science, 
technology, and humanitarian assistance. 
We will encourage the movement 
toward association with the West. It is 



in our interest to do so, and it offers the 
best hope for the developing states 
themselves. 

Fourth, and finally, the President 
has advocated a revolutionary program 
to cure America's economic ills. The 
combination of spending and tax cuts, 
the regulatory reforms, are essential 
elements of fiscal responsibility. We 
have seen, very clearly, that an ailing 
American economy ultimately does great 
harm to our foreign policy. 

The framework for action that I 
have outlined today draws upon an 
American consensus convinced of the 
worth of our society and the rightness of 
our cause. It is neither a boast nor a call 
to arms. Moderation and a willingness to 
negotiate will always be an essential 
part of American statecraft. But there 
must be restraint by others as well. Our 
allies -and our adversaries --must know 
that we are reliable. We shall not be 
passive when our interests are 
threatened. 

Clearly, the restoration of American 
leadership in the world will not be easy. 
As Justice Learned Hand once put it: 
We shall have to be content with short 
steps; we shall be obliged to give and 
take; and in the end, we shall have 
fabricated an imperfect instrument. But 
as we take these steps, we go forward 
made confident by the spirit of liberty - 
the spirit of America. We strive to make 
of our country, in Hand's words, a 
signal, a beacon, a standard to which the 
best hopes of mankind will ever turn. 

Your generation now begins to 
assume this arduous task. It is your 
privilege to be able to do so in an atmos- 
phere of fresh pride and confidence. 
Perhaps Benjamin Disraeli captured to- 
day's moment best when he said that the 
youth of the nation are the trustees of 
posterity. As you become the trustees of 
America's future, I ask only that you act 
with a sense of honor and a brave 
heart. 



2 Press release 148 of May 18, 1981. 



une1981 



13 



The Secretary 



Secretary Haig Visits 

the Middle East and Europe 



Secretary Haig departed 
Washington, D.C., on April 3, 1981, to 
visit Egypt (April 4-5), Israel (April 
5-6), Jordan (April 6-7), Saudi Arabia 
(April 7-8), Italy (April 8), Spain (April 
8-9), the United Kingdom (April 9-11), 
France (April 11), the Federal Republic 
of Germany (April 11), and returned to 
Washington on April 11. 

Following are remarks he made on 
various occasions during that trip. 1 



ARRIVAL REMARKS 
CAIRO, APR. 4, 1981' 

I and my party are delighted to be here 
in Cairo. It is appropriate that President 
Reagan would have asked me to initiate 
my foreign travel to the Middle East. It 
is equally significant that our first stop 
would be here in Egypt, for Egypt is a 
nation with a special destiny. In ancient 
times, its contributions to civilization 
have been legendary. 

Today Egypt is engaged in a unique 
experiment that combines faith and 
science toward the objective of human 
development. Under your illustrious 
leader, progress has already been 
remarkable. It has been his objective to 
insure development, stability, and securi- 
ty for the entire region. I want you to 
know that President Reagan shares that 
vision for this area. He is personally 
dedicated to the proposition that a 
strong Egypt is absolutely indispensable 
to peace and stability in this region and 
globally. And it is unfortunate this 
morning that my stop here in Cairo is 
clouded once again by growing tensions 
for peace and stability in Europe. 

President Sadat is a worldwide lead- 
er, a man whose own vision has enabled 
us— through his historic visit to Jeru- 
salem, through his participation in the 
Camp David accords— to already bring 
peace between Egypt and Israel— what 
a few short years ago seemed an illusory 
dream. And so I and my party are here 
today to drink of the wisdom of you and 
of President Sadat, to learn how best we 
Americans can participate in a partner- 
ship which seeks to enhance the security 
of this region which will enable us to 
carry forward with the peace process 
with Israel within the confines of the 
Camp David accords; and finally, most 
importantly, to broaden and strengthen 
those bonds of friendship between the 



people of America and the people of 

Egypt. 



REMARKS, 

CAIRO, APR. 5, 198F 

President Sadat 

Let me seize this opportunity to express 
my gratitude to President Reagan who 
sent me our dear friend, Secretary Haig, 
to the area here in this precise moment. 

First of all, I wanted him to know 
how we lived with all our sentiment, the 
anxiety for the incident that took place 
in Washington, and thank God President 
Reagan stayed in good shape and is per- 
forming his duties, but I wanted my 
friend to convey to our dear American 
people how we lived the anxiety with 
them with all our feelings. 

This is a happy occasion — a very 
happy occasion— also for the second 
time to meet with my dear friend, 
Secretary Haig. After he was appointed 
Secretary of State, I'm not exaggerating 
when I say the proper man in the proper 
position and in the proper moment is not 
my idea only, but in February I was ad- 
dressing the European Parliament and I 
felt the same thing toward Secretary 
Haig, and I was very happy and proud 
because Haig is a friend, to hear this 
from the Europeans. It is time that the 
United States resumes its role as the 
first superpower that is responsible for 
peace all over the world. Secretary Haig 
has been known among all of us as a 
man of vision, and his appointment has 
filled us with joy. We have followed the 
very strenuous hours when he was doing 
hearings in the Congress and the 
Senate, and it filled us with happiness 
and joy to see a man in the State 
Department with a vision and decision 
like my friend, Secretary Haig. 

Today we had a very fruitful and 
constructive discussion. We have spent 
together 2 hours, and we have spent 
also with our delegation the necessary 
moments to let each other know the 
position of the other. And the peace 
process, as I have often said, we could 
have never achieved anything without 
the United States acting as a full part- 
ner, that's what I told my friend, 
Secretary Haig. 



I am happy to tell you that I found 
him fully acquainted with all the details 
We must not forget that he has alreadj 
his share in this peace process since 
1974. I had him fully acquainted with a 
the details, and I was very happy also t 
survey the situation with him in the an 
and in the various parts of the world. 
And as I told you, it has been a very 
fruitful and positive discussion and ex- 
change of views. 

On the bilateral side, I need not tel 
you that we enjoy a marvelous relation 
between the two countries— the United 
States and Egypt— and I seize this op- 
portunity also to ask Secretary Haig ai 
the distinguished delegation with him t 
convey our gratitude for the gallant 
American people, the President, and th 
Senate and the Congress for the under 
standing and the help that we have 
received from them. For us, we feel in- 
debted to them, and all I can say is this 
like I told Secretary Haig and his 
distinguished delegation, that they can 
count on us as true friends. We shall 
always be with them, either in the darl 
hour or the bright one. Secretary Haig 
is a man we admire, and I told him we 
shall always be very happy to receive 
him here in Egypt whenever it is con- 
venient to him. And let me ask him to 
convey to President Reagan all our vei 
best wishes and congratulations for his 
safety and convey to the gallant Amer 
can people our admiration and our tru» 
friendship. 

Secretary Haig 

On behalf of President Reagan, the 
American delegation now visiting your 
country, and, of course, myself in a ve- 
personal as well as official way, let me 
express our gratitude for these extren 
ly fruitful discussions we've had with 
your government officials, and most irr 
portantly, the lengthy discussion that 1 
had with you personally this morning. 
It clearly underlines the fundamen 
convergence of Egyptian and America 
policies with respect first to the peace 
process, where this Administration — I 
know I speak for President Reagan- 
will continue to participate as full part 
ners; for the quality and the great vah 
of the strategic appraisal which you pr 
vided to me this morning, which I can 
confirm closely coincides with Presider 
Reagan's own world view; and thirdly, 



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Department of State Bulletir 



I lie oci/iciai y 



t thank you. We certainly recognize the 
Jfcionary statesman of our time, the 
[kn who made peace in the Middle East 
Issible, the man who epitomized 
Itesmanship and its interrelationship 
Mth binding friendship. There is a 
Jong interrelationship between the 

I And to thank you again, in a per- 
Inal sense, for your counsel to me. 
I'ter all we came here to drink of your 
Isdom, to take counsel, and to find 
fcts on the three areas I've just touched 
Ion: the peace process, the strategic 
luation in the area and globally, and 
lit important and fundamental area, 
Iryptian-American relationship on the 
lateral side. In every area of our 
licussion, the outcome has been highly 
■ccessful, and I know we are very 
■;ased. 

I Q. What did you accomplish in 
itese meetings with regard to some of 

le outstanding issues — the presence 
I Americans in the multinational 

tree, the state of Ras Banas base, the 

irategic relationship between the 
jhited States and Egypt over the 

liviet expansionism? 

President Sadat: We have dis- 
ssed this really— every item that you 
;ntioned— thoroughly. And I can tell 
u that we have reached agreement on 
rtain points, and we have left to our 
ies certain points for preparation but 
a whole, as I told you, both of us are 
timistic for the future. 

Q. Have you discussed the Pale- 
inian question and the possibility of 
e resumption of the autonomy talks, 
id what other items concerning the 
iddle East Peace process do you 
ive in mind? 

Secretary Haig: As I said, we came 
re to learn— to learn first-hand the 
I ews of the parties with respect to the 
I :ace process. I think my discussions 
I ith President Sadat clarified for me 

• >ncerns here in Egypt, with respect to 
I e process, and I think it carried for- 

ard in the context of convergence of 
lews between the U.S. position today 
lid President Sadat's position. All of 
: lis suggests to me a reason for some 

• itimism that this process will continue, 
id it will continue in a constructive 

. ay; I think as one looks over his 
roulder at the past history of the situa- 
on, one can only remark that the 
Aievements already accomplished have 
?en remarkable and historic. And that 
momentum must continue, and we are 
jsdicated to do so both in the context of 
'ie autonomy talks to the period ahead, 



in the context of the peacekeeping ar- 
rangements in the Sinai which will per- 
mit the complete withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Sinai by the April 1982 
deadline. I think our discussions here 
provided bases for optimism as we look 
at the challenges of the future. 

Q. Following your discussions, 
will Egypt accept armed American 
military units in the multinational 
force? 

President Sadat: Let me tell you 
this. We shall be going to the United 
Nations — maybe you remember when 
we went to the Security Council for the 
redeployment of the U.N. forces accord- 
ing to the peace process— to the peace 
treaty between us and Israel — the 
Soviet Union threatened to use the veto. 
We shall be going to the United Nations. 
After that, what you have already asked 
will be raised, and it will depend upon 
what will come out as a position from 
the side of the Soviet Union. 

Q. There has been a report from 
Saudi Arabia— a newspaper report — 
that another Arab country might 
restore diplomatic relations with 
Egypt. Could you comment on that? 

President Sadat: We didn't discuss 
this because my position on this is 
known, and Secretary Haig has already 
declared his position in the hearings 
before the Congress and the Senate. For 
that reason, there was no need to raise 
it because it is not a matter to be 
discussed. 

Q. We have a report that Soviet 
President Brezhnev is going to the 
Warsaw summit in Prague. Do you see 
this as a development that signifies 
the worsening of the Polish situation, 
or has that eased since you left the 
country? 

Secretary Haig: I think the situa- 
tion remains more tense than it has 
been, and we've been watching Soviet 
military steps with growing concern. 
Clearly, this mini-summit— as you refer 
to it that way— may be an important oc- 
casion with respect to future Soviet ac- 
tion in respect to the Polish situation. I 
would merely want to reiterate what we 
have stated and restated— that any 
Soviet interventionism in Poland or any 
internal repression would have far- 
reaching consequences in East- West 
relations, both in scope and in time. 

Q. Do you agree with the proposi- 
tion that the instability in the area 
needs to put more pressure on han- 



dling the Palestinian question as very 
important in order to keep stability? 

Secretary Haig: We've talked about 
addressing a strategic consensus in the 
area of the Middle East and in a global 
sense as well. Some have interpreted 
that as a lessening of American interest 
in the peace process itself in the resolu- 
tion of a longstanding historic problem. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 

We continue to maintain the firm ob- 
jective of continuing the momentum of 
the peace process as a full partner, as I 
mentioned, but we see also a funda- 
mental interrelationship between the 
sense of security and a convergence of 
strategic thinking here in this area as a 
fundamental catalyst to making the 
peace process more successful and to 
achieving the momentum we seek. So 
these are not mutually contradictory; 
they are mutually reinforcing objectives. 

Q. [Inaudible] or to put more em- 
phasis on security before — 

Secretary Haig: Not at all. We 
don't put more emphasis on either. We 
put priority on both, and these are twin 
objectives, intimately interrelated in 
which progress in one tends to assist 
progress in the other. They are not in 
competition, they are not mutually ex- 
clusive, and it isn't a question of 
priority. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENTS, 
BEN GURION AIRPORT, 
APR. 5, 1981 4 

Foreign Minister Shamir 

It is a pleasure to welcome you on your 
first visit to Israel as Secretary of State. 
We are convinced that your important 
mission will strengthen the forces of 
peace in our region. The bonds between 
our two peoples are not only bonds of 
mutual interests, of a common strategic 
outlook, and of the rejection of totali- 
tarian ideologies and aggression, they 
are founded on a deep commitment to 
shared values of freedom, democracy, 
and social justice. Our common devotion 
to these ideals provides the most solid 
guarantee that our partnership in the 
quest for peace and security for this 
region will continue and bear fruit. On 
behalf of all of us in Israel, we wish 
President Reagan and the other Ameri- 
cans who were wounded with him a 
speedy recovery and a long healthy life. 
We wish you and your colleagues a very 
pleasant and rewarding stay in Israel. 



une1981 



15 



The Secretary 



Secretary Haig 

It is a wonderful opportunity to see you 
again so shortly after our constructive 
discussions in Washington just a short 
time ago. President Reagan has asked 
me to express his personal greetings to 
the people of Israel and to tell you how 
much he admires your many achieve- 
ments and your dedication to freedom 
and to democracy. 

It gives me great pleasure to report 
that the President is well on the way to 
full recovery. And if his physical 
recovery is as rapid as the recovery of 
his sense of humor, I am confident that 
we'll be all the better served. 

For me a visit to Israel is always a 
privilege. I have long admired your 
courage, your independence, and, in- 
deed, your idealism. On this occasion, 
my wife will discover for the first time 
the ancient and modern wonders that 
make Israel so unique. 

The purpose of my trip here and 
elsewhere in the region is to discuss 
with our friends how we can meet the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union and its 
surrogates in the entire area, but we are 
equally interested in an exchange of 
views on how to advance the peace proc- 
ess. I can tell you already that I found 
President Sadat and other Egyptian 
leaders dedicated to strengthening peace 
between Egypt and Israel— a dedication 
shared by the Government and the peo- 
ple of Israel, I am confident. The Camp 
David accords, testimony to the courage 
and wisdom of Prime Minister Begin, 
provide a solid basis for the goal we 
share together — peace and security for 
Israel and for its neighbors. As our 
dialogue begins with Prime Minister 
Begin, with you, with the other leaders 
of Israel, I want to affirm that our com- 
mitment to Israel's security and to its 
well-being is central to American policy 
in the Middle East. President Reagan 
and I recognize that Israel has an impor- 
tant role to play in our common effort to 
safeguard our strategic interests in this 
region. We are looking forward to hear- 
ing your views, confident that these dis- 
cussions will add yet another chapter to 
that long— over 30-year— history of 
Israeli-American friendship— a friend- 
ship which is reinforced by the strategic 
importance of this nation to the vital in- 
terests of America, to peace and stabili- 
ty in this area, and to global peace and 
stability as well. 



STATEMENTS, 
JERUSALEM, APR. 6, 1981 5 

Prime Minister Begin 

I wish to express our deep gratitude to 
the Secretary of State and his colleagues 
for the visit. Today, too, we had a very 
fruitful discussion about national and in- 
ternational problems and bilateral issues 
between the United States and Israel, 
which the Secretary of State, yesterday, 
in his beautiful speech, called and rightly 
so, allies. So today, after finalizing our 
discussions, I can say that on very 
serious points, we reached understand- 
ing, and these discussions I believe 
wholeheartedly will bear fruit in the 
future, and there will be closer coopera- 
tion between the United States and 
Israel which indeed, as the Secretary of 
State said, are allies. We share common 
ideals, we have a community of in- 
terests, we shall stand by each other for 
great causes of mankind. 

Secretary Haig 

I just want to underline your own com- 
ments that this all too brief 24-hour stay 
here in Jerusalem, in Israel, has been 
highly productive. It's enabled us to 
learn, and that's the purpose of this 
visit, and to learn in the vitally impor- 
tant areas of the peace process, of such 
importance to Israel and its neighbors to 
extend further our mutual understand- 
ing and convergence of outlook in the 
area of broad strategic threats to the 
Middle East region, to include tradi- 
tional military threats from unfriendly 
superpowers, to include assessments of 
proxy activity, and to include some very 
important discussions on the overall 
issue of international terrorism. Beyond 
that, we had a very fruitful dialogue on 
a number of bilateral issues — economic, 
security-related issues — between the 
United States and Israel. 

Q. Did the subject of the supply of 
AWACS [airborne warning and con- 
trol system] planes to Saudi Arabia 
come up in your discussions, and did 
you come to any agreement? 

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, the 
question came up. We expressed our 
opinion. Yes, of course, we deem it to be 
a very serious threat to Israel, and we 
said so with candor to the Secretary of 
State. 

Q. Could you please tell us or give 
us some examples of what you re- 



ferred to when you talked about closed 
cooperation between the United State 
and Israel? 

Prime Minister Begin: I think bot 
terms are very clear. I think cooperatio '" 
is a clear English word, and closer 
means closer than in the past. 

Q. Some examples? 

Prime Minister Begin: I suppose 
life itself will prove the examples, and 
both of us will be patient, because we 
know each other so well from the Unite 
States. 



- 
I 

in& 

-' 
■ 

Q. Is the AWACS deal firm, and * 
what will the United States do to con [* 
pensate Israel? 

Secretary Haig: I think we've had 
the benefit of the Government of Israel 
view, the Prime Minister's own view on 
this subject. We will return to Washing 
ton armed with that information. I 
would prefer not to engage in any publ: 
discussions on this matter at this time 
until we complete our trip. We have 
already seen enough press speculation 
on the subject to include the reports of 
decisions made in Washington a week 
ago. 



Ill 

Sei 
m 
kii 
I 
I 
fei 



: e 



Q. You've spoken here about 
American commitment to Israel's 
security and well-being. You talked 
also about the hopes for some sort of 
strategic alliance between the states 
in the region against Soviet penetra- 
tion. Number one, how can you squat 
the circle of concern for Israel's 
security with Israel's worries about 
supplies of American military equip- 
ment, specifically AWACS to the 
Saudis — how did you manage to ex- 
plain this contradiction? 



■>S. 



tin 



& 



Secretary Haig: I think it's impor- 
tant to remember, as we talk of our 
broad strategic objectives in this area, 
that development of a consensus with 
respect to the growing threat of Soviet 
imperialism, and as we view the equalb 
important priority of proceeding with 
the Middle East peace process, that we 
understand clearly what we are talking 
about. 

These are not mutually competing < 
mutually exclusive objectives. It does n 
mean that we have established a set of 
priorities between the one and the othe 
It means that they are mutually rein- 
forcing and that in progress with one 
you can contribute to the progress with 



Bti 



16 



Department of State Bulletii 



;i:r 
ia 



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li 



I lie W^WI «^ IUI J 



# other. In that respect, I think all of 
m nations of this region— of the Middle 

Hst, Arabs as well as Israelis— are 
Bier a growing threat of increased 
.K-taking by the Soviet leadership, 
Iher directly as we've seen in 
/fejhanistan, or indirectly as we see 
Bough the increased employment of 
fcxies, Cubans, elements of the PLO 
■destine Liberation Organization], 
!jya— all of these activities represent 
Bidamental threats to all of the peace- 
ling, freedom-oriented nations of the 
Ipon. And I think that is a reality 
■ich, of course, its acceptance and its 
uierstanding and coordination with 
£;pect to it is intimately related also to 
1> peace process itself. No one is naive 
|Dut it, but they are mutually reinforc- 
;. 

Q. Did you bring up the settle- 
imts in the West Bank? 

Secretary Haig: I want to em- 
lasize that the policy of the Reagan 
fl [ministration is not to indulge in 
iblic criticism of longstanding friends 
sd allies. And that where we have 
Bferences, those differences will be 
rf cen up directly in the intimacy of 
jjilomatic interchange. 

Q. You spoke about the peace 
I Dcess. Are there any new ideas to 
new the autonomy talks, and if yes, 
■ len? 

Secretary Haig: I think we've been 

• i the process of a fact-finding trip. I 
I ve not completed that fact-finding, 

I i d upon completion of this trip, we will 
. i sess the prospects. I want to em- 

asize that we feel very strongly that 
. ] is process must move promptly, and 
I / trip and my visit here today and my 
$ ;it to Egypt yesterday and the day 
fore, were all associated with our 
1 x>rts to keep the momentum going on 

)-"e peace process. 
Q. You've had both visits here and 
Egypt. One of the items on the 
;enda, of course, was this multina- 
onal force for policing of the Sinai, 
fter these discussions, do you see 
ly basic problem in moving forward 
■ that force? Is there an explicit ac- 
jptance of the same kind of force, in- 
uding Americans, in both these 
ipitals? 

Prime Minister Begin: In the 

eace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, 
|, U.N. force is being mentioned, as part 
[ the security arrangements in the 
Inai. But the formation of such a U.N. 
prce depends on the decision of the 
;ecurity Council. And this is the reason 



ea 

U 



why all those who negotiated the Peace 
Treaty between Egypt and Israel— 
namely Egypt, Israel, and the United 
States— took into consideration the 
possibility that such a U.N. force forma- 
tion will become impossible because of 
the Soviet Union in the Security Council 
casting a veto vote. And, therefore, 
there is a letter on behalf of the United 
States of President Carter, addressed 
jointly to President Sadat and to myself, 
promising a multinational force. On this, 
the discussions will go on. We hope that 
such a multinational force will, in time, 
be formed. This is now the subject of 
discussions among the three parties — 
the United States, Egypt, and Israel. 

Secretary Haig: I think the Prime 
Minister has answered the question. Our 
discussions are continuing, and this visit 
has provided additional information to 
the United States, which will enable us, 
hopefully, to bring it to a successful con- 
clusion. And I am reasonably optimistic 
that that will be the outcome. 

Q. How do you evaluate the supply 
of rockets by German firms to coun- 
tries like Libya? 

Secretary Haig: I suppose you've 
caught me unaware. I wasn't aware that 
there were such rockets, unless you're 
talking about some of the earlier 
speculation on contracts. I don't consider 
myself an expert on the subject, so I'll 
avoid answering it. 

Prime Minister Begin: I would like 
to add that any supply to a country like 
Libya — one of the most irresponsible in 
our region — especially by Germany, of 
deadly weapons, is from any human 
point of view, most repulsive. Because 
the German people must never forget 
what was done under the National- 
Socialist regime to our people. And if 
they should provide enemies with deadly 
weapons which may be turned against 
Israel, it would be a crime against 
humanity. 

Q. Does Israel want American 
participation in the Sinai peacekeep- 
ing force? And what is the Israeli 
Government reaction to the Reagan 
Administration sounding the alarm 
bells about a Soviet threat to the Mid- 
dle East? 

Prime Minister Begin: To the first 
question, the answer is positive. To the 
second question, it is that I believe it is 



not an artificial alarm sounded by the 
Government of the United States — by 
the President and his advisers. There is 
such a threat, in all the years, we could 
have seen that many countries, during 
the last few years— I suppose between 
six and seven, I cannot on the spot make 
the real count — were taken over either 
by proxy by the Soviet Union or as in 
Afghanistan, directly through Soviet in- 
vasion. So it is not an artificial alarm. It 
is one of the most serious issues con- 
cerning our era, our time, and the free 
world is shrinking and is in permanent 
danger. Parts of it already were taken 
over by totalitarianism, others are in 
peril. And, therefore, all free men 
should stand together to defend liberty. 

Q. On the issues that have been of 
central concern — the resumption of 
the autonomy talks, the supply of the 
American advanced weaponry to Saudi 
Arabia, the question of expanding 
autonomy talks, the matters of south 
Lebanon and of Lebanon itself— how 
many of these issues have you reached 
any specific agreement on? 

Secretary Haig: I think that with 
respect to the overall approach to the 
peace process, we are in general agree- 
ment. There may be some differences 
with respect to timing, which hopefully 
will be clarified in the period ahead. 
With respect to the situation in 
Lebanon, I think there are few 
differences that I'm aware of. We view 
the brutality of the Syrian action against 
the Christian enclave as a very, very 
serious turn of events, which is unac- 
ceptable by any measure of appropriate 
international standards of conduct, and 
we would hope that there would be an 
immediate return to a wholly valid 
cease-fire, not only in that critical 
enclave area, but in Beirut, where addi- 
tional shellings have occurred, and that 
this will be done promptly. The conse- 
quences of a failure to a return to a 
cease-fire, of course, are most, most 
serious. 

Q. Has the United States of 
America acted, or can the United 
States act, in such a way as to call a 
halt to the bloodshed? 

Secretary Haig: We've taken a 
number of measures, and some unprece- 
dented measures, in the last 48 hours 
dealing bilaterally with nations that can 
apply influence to the situation, through 
the United Nations, through the Secre- 
tary General, Kurt Waldheim, whose 
emissary will be in Beirut tomorrow. 



:une1981 



17 



The Secretary 



And I am very hopeful, though I am yet 
unable to express optimism, that there 
will be a return to restraint and law and 
order and sanity. 

Q. Is Israel to be compensated in 
any way in terms of military hard- 
ware, or anything like that, for the 
supply of the AWACS to Saudi 
Arabia? 

Secretary Haig: I think there's 
been a great deal written on this sub- 
ject. I do not like to use the term "com- 
pensation." I like to focus on the U.S. 
objective to insure that Israel maintains 
its current qualitative edge and the long- 
term adherence of the United States to 
that objective. As you know, there have 
been a number of measures under dis- 
cussion publicly. But I do not like to use 
the term "compensation." It has an over- 
tone which does not characterize U.S. 
objectives with respect to it. 

Q. There will be an increase, I 
take it, whether compensating it or 
not, perhaps that is what the Prime 
Minister was referring to? 

Prime Minister Begin: I suppose 
that the last word belongs to the 
Secretary of State. Yet, because you 
need a certain expression, I would like 
to say that I share completely and, 
therefore, I think, deliberately, to 
answer this question as well. I share 
completely the view of the Secretary of 
State, that the word "compensation" is 
completely out of order. I don't think 
"compensation" is possible, but in the 
Middle East, there is going on an arms 
race — many countries, the Soviet Union, 
and also Western countries sent massive 
armaments, sophisticated weapons to 
the Middle East, the Arab countries. We 
live in peace with Egypt. We believe the 
Peace Treaty will hold on — will be 
lasting. This is the assurance given also 
to the Secretary of State by President 
Sadat. You have it, of course, through 
me. But other countries are in a state of 
war with Israel, and Israel is in perma- 
nent danger, and therefore, Israel 
should be strengthened. And I do hope it 
will be strengthened. But no problem, 
and no term of "compensation" is at all 
usable. 



DEPARTURE REMARKS, 
AMMAN, APR. 7, 1981 6 

First, I regret that my very full schedule 
here and the press of time have 
prevented a full press conference with 
you. I do want to, in departing Jordan, 



emphasize that the talks I had with His 
Majesty King Hussein, His Highness 
Crown Prince Hassan, and the 
distinguished Foreign Minister have 
been far-ranging and have been ex- 
tremely helpful. They've been frank in 
the Western sense of that term. 

They have involved regional matters, 
bilateral matters, and global matters as 
well. And I think on the broad strategic 
and regional matters the American side 
has been very impressed that there is an 
essential convergence of view between 
the leadership here in Jordan and our 
own views in Washington. 

The continuing devotion of King 
Hussein and the Jordanian Government 
to the achievement of a just and lasting 
peace in the area is in full harmony with 
the objectives of my government. There 
are different ideas about how best to 
reach these noble goals. Indeed, one of 
my principal aims during this visit was 
to exchange views with His Majesty on 
these very, very important subjects. 

I leave Jordan with a continuing 
deep admiration for His Majesty, the 
government, and the people of this 
wonderful country. We Americans have 
long enjoyed the close and friendly rela- 
tionship with Jordan. The King himself 
is one of our oldest and most trusted 
friends in this area of the world. And I 
look forward to a new period of a 
strengthening, if you will, of the 
bilateral relationships between Jordan 
and the United States and to strengthen 
the bonds which have served both of our 
nations so well in this region for such an 
extended period. Again, I thank you for 
your hospitality and your courtesy. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 
RIYADH, APR. 8, 1981 7 

I would like to make a formal departure 
statement summarizing the impressions 
and results of this very wonderful visit 
here in Saudi Arabia. 

His Majesty King Khalid has been 
most gracious in receiving me, and I am 
very grateful for his kindness and for 
the kindness of his officials here — the 
Foreign Office, the Foreign Minister, the 
meeting we've had with other distin- 
guished officials of the Government of 
Saudi Arabia. This visit has made me 
deeply appreciative of the Saudi Arabian 
warm hospitality from the very moment 
we arrived to the moment of departure. 
Your dedication to building a better 
world and the wisdom of your leaders 
are qualities for which your country is 
most famous. 



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18 



President Reagan sent me here to 
discuss our mutual concerns about the 
threats to security of the region and to i s ' 
exchange views on ways to advance th« S> : 
cause of peace in the Middle East. Our H> 
dialogues have yielded fresh insights oi * 
both of these issues, and the conversa- 
tions were most cordial, productive, an " 
in true friendship, most frank in the 
spirit of the longstanding and close ties 
between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. The views expressed to me her 
will be of great benefit to President 
Reagan as he considers our policy 
toward the Middle East. 

We've also benefited from the Sauc 
perspective on other matters including 
the welfare of the gulf area and intern; n 
tional economic situation. A clearer pic •, in 
ture has emerged of the ways whereby 
we might achieve our common goals of 
both peace and prosperity. 

Above all, I believe that the founds 
tion has been laid during this trip for ti 
strengthening of U.S. -Saudi relations. 
And this in turn will contribute signifi- 
cantly to our mutual security and that 
the entire region. In conclusion, Your 
Royal Highness, I would like to thank 
you personally again for the wonderful 
and constructive character of our visit 
here. 

Q. Do you still believe in the 
Camp David agreement after your 
visitation with the Saudis? 

A. I think we've had the benefit 
here as we assess the future of the 
peace process itself, to consider the 
views of our Saudi friends. As you 
know, the process has been underway, 
and we are going to continue with tha' 
process and with a view toward being 
sure that we have the counsel of our 
friends in the area, and that includes, 
course, very importantly the Saudi 
views. So this has been a very, very 
helpful exchange for us, as we sought 
sharpen up and enlighten our own ap- 
proaches to this historic and anguishin 
problem. 

Q. I understand you're very 
troubled about the situation in Leba- 
non. Could you tell us if you raised 
that here, and if your Saudi counter- 
parts have suggested any mutual ac- 
tion or actions? 

A. We've had extensive discussion 
on the situation in Lebanon and, I thin 
a rather clear convergence of views on 
this subject with our Saudi hosts. And 
think this morning we have some basis 
for increased optimism— a sign of fort 



Department of State Bulleti 



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)ming position from Syria which is an 
icouragement to us all. We know we 
ill have to watch carefully and do our 
2st to assist along with the other na- 
ons in the region which have a vital 
pneern in this, and I would include con- 
jrting of our efforts with the Saudi 
overnment. I think the situation looks 
bmewhat better this morning thanks to 
modified or new position which ap- 
ears to be coming from Damascus. And 
r e're very pleased with that. 

Q. What is this new position of 
lamascus? 

A. I think I would prefer not to 
Dmplicate a process which offers great 
romise until it develops somewhat fur- 
ler. 

Q. How are you going to handle 
'hat seems to be a contradiction that 
as developed on this trip — the 
I eagan Administration's perception of 
I fie Soviet Union as the primary threat 
) the Middle East and the Persian 
ulf and what we've heard both in 
ordan and in Saudi Arabia, countries 
lat see Israel as the primary threat 
) the stability of the area? 

A. Again, I want to emphasize that 
lese are not contradictions; precisely 
le opposite. They are interrelated — 
mtually interrelated— problems as we 
ave emphasized throughout each of our 
;ops on this trip. We are not adopting 
ny particular priority, in other words, 
) place the Soviet regional threats 
head of the urgency of progress in the 
eace process; not at all. What we have 
mphasized is that these are interrelated 
ecause clearly a failure to achieve prog- 
ess in the peace process offers the 
•oviet Union troubled waters in which 
o fish. And, therefore, we seek progress 
i both, and progress in one contributes 
o progress in our ability to deal with 
he other. 

Q. Does that mean you think you 
lave achieved a strategic consensus? 

A. I think we had no intention of 
innealing, if you will, or crystalizing a 
:omplete consensus. This is our first 
dsit to the area; these were our first 
liscussions. I must say that I am ex- 
.remely gratified to find that an essen- 
;ial agreement in the broad strategic 
ireas of concern to the region exists 
lere in Riyadh with our own view. That 
ioes not mean that sovereign nations do 
not have differences of opinion as how 
<oest to proceed and deal with these mat- 
ters. But I think the basic assessment is 
I very, very close between the two na- 
;tions. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 
ROME, APR. 8, 1981 8 

First, I want to emphasize what a great 
pleasure and delight it is to meet again 
with my old friend, Foreign Minister 
Colombo who, as you know, was the 
first Foreign Minister to visit the United 
States after the Reagan Administration 
came into office. I had an opportunity to 
give him a report on the excellent state 
of President Reagan's health, and we 
also had an opportunity to continue the 
very cordial and intimate discussions 
that we started in Washington some 
weeks ago. 

I briefed him on our recent visit to 
the Middle East during which we 
focused on three objectives. The first 
was the establishment of a warm rela- 
tionship with the leaders of the region in 
the four countries we visited — Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. I 
noted that this objective was success- 
fully accomplished and even exceeded 
our highest expectations. I noted that 
we also discussed in great detail the 
problem of external threats to the 
region from the Soviet Union and its 
surrogates. We achieved a substantial 
consensus on the importance of the 
peace process in the Middle East and 
the peaceful ultimate resolution of long- 
standing Arab-Israeli differences. In that 
regard I emphasized that these two ob- 
jectives — concern about external aggres- 
sion on the one hand and the need for 
progress in the peace process on the 
other hand — were not mutually ex- 
clusive; were not in competition with 
one another but were, instead, mutually 
reinforcing. Middle East peace— a high 
priority for U.S. policy— can best be 
achieved in a climate of overall security. 

In the assessment I gave your 
Foreign Minister, we also discussed a 
number of other matters. We discussed 
the situation in Poland, of course, and 
other danger spots worldwide as well as 
the major threats to Western societies. 
And I want to emphasize that I ex- 
pressed the full support of the American 
Government and President Reagan for 
the Italian Government's firmly held 
position of defiance to the blight of in- 
ternational terrorism. And I assured the 
Foreign Minister that the United States 
and Italy are united in our determina- 
tion to eliminate this international 
blight. And I noted that— fortunately 
for all of us — Italy's institutions have 
well stood the test of a recent upsurge 
of international terrorism here and 
internationally as well. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
MADRID, APR. 9, 1981 9 

Foreign Minister Perez Llorca and the 
Government of Spain have been most 
hospitable during my brief stop in 
Madrid. The audience so graciously 
granted to me by the King and the 
meetings with Prime Minister Calvo 
Sotelo and the Foreign Minister were 
extremely useful. They covered a broad 
range of issues of interests to both of 
our countries. We covered the results of 
my trip to the Middle East, we discussed 
events and affairs in the African Conti- 
nent, bilateral relationships between 
Spain and the United States, and East- 
West relationships, especially Poland. 
All in all, I think we had a most con- 
structive and valuable series of discus- 
sions. It gave me great pleasure to meet 
the Minister of Defense Oliart, and I 
was also extremely pleased to have met 
the Secretary General of the Spanish 
Socialist Party, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez. We 
had a lengthy and extensive discussion 
earlier this morning. 

The promise of Spain's future in 
world affairs is equal to its luminous 
past. The United States welcomes 
Spain's increased international role and 
its every contribution to the solution of 
pressing problems that face all Western 
democracies. Spain has been an ex- 
emplary host to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
and I had breakfast this morning with 
the U.S. Senior Representative to that 
conference, Mr. Max Kampelman, which 
was also invaluable. Now I want to con- 
clude my brief opening remarks with an 
important comment. 

For over 5 years both Republican 
and Democratic Administrations in 
Washington have admired the growth of 
Spanish democracy. When the Cortes 
was seized illegally on February 23 and 
24, the Spanish reaction to it confirmed 
the vitality of your own democratic in- 
stitutions here in Spain. The United 
States and I, myself, are determined to 
continue our unflinching support for 
democracy in Spain as characterized by 
America's bipartisan policy in the past. 
It continues at present, and it will carry 
on unflinchingly in the future. 

Q. During the course of your con- 
versations with the Spanish 
authorities, have you discussed the 
possibility of stationing nuclear arms 
or allied arms on Spanish territory? 

A. It has long been, as you know, 
American policy not to discuss such 
questions, but your question has no 
relevance to our discussions today. 



June 1981 



19 



The Secretary 



Q. What is the present state on 
the negotiations on the bilateral 
treaty, and what is going to happen by 
September if nothing has been agreed 
to? 

A. We had very useful and very 
constructive discussions on the require- 
ment to develop a new agreement be- 
tween the United States and Spain and 
to insure that this new agreement would 
take cognizance of the changing condi- 
tions in most countries and especially 
the newly democratically established 
regime here in Spain. We— both sides- 
agreed to the urgency of launching im- 
mediately discussions and negotiations 
between the two parties with the view 
toward arriving at a new agreement at 
the earliest possible date, and these 
discussions will commence almost im- 
mediately. 

Q. Given the kind of tensions in 
Europe, how important in strategic 
terms would you appraise the eventual 
entry of Spain into NATO, and how 
important are the joint U.S.-Spanish 
base facilities? 

A. With respect to the question of 
Spanish entry or Spanish association 
with both the economic and security fora 
in Western Europe today, I have stated 
repeatedly in the recent past and during 
my tenure here in Europe as Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces that this is 
a question to be decided by the people of 
Spain. I have also suggested that when 
such a decision is made to proceed or 
not to, that the Spanish Government will 
have the full support of the U.S. 
Government on the position they take. 
Now, it goes without saying, and I 
would be hypocritical today were I to 
suggest that my past position on this 
subject has not been in favor of greater 
integration of Spain into economic, 
political, and security fora now existing 
in Western Europe. 

As to the second question, it goes 
without saying, the American bases, 
which are separate and distinct from the 
first question and which have been the 
consequence of bilateral agreement be- 
tween the two governments, remain the 
utmost importance not only to the 
United States but I think to Western 
collective security as a whole, and in the 
same respect it makes a major contribu- 
tion to the security of Spain as well. 

Q. With regard to the agreement 
which you indicated is to be im- 
mediately negotiated between the 
Governments of the United States and 



Spain, are you contemplating this in 
the context or the nature of an interim 
or bridge type of an agreement that 
will prepare the way for later acces- 
sion to NATO on the part of Spain, or 
are you considering it in terms of a 
treaty to cover a period of years 
similar to those covered under 
previous extensions of the agreement? 

A. It wouldn't be my intention to 
get ahead of the discussions and negotia- 
tions which will take place, but clearly 
the bilateral relationship between Spain 
and the United States will be addressed 
on its own merits in the light of the 
changing interests of both sides and, 
especially as I said in my answer to the 
earlier question, of taking full 
cognizance of the new democratic estab- 
lishment and government here in Spain. 
To be more responsive to your question, 
that involves an entirely new treaty for 
an as yet unspecified period of time. 

Q. First, allow me to address a 
few comments in representation of my 
colleagues and friends, the Cuban ex- 
iles, in this community who have 
asked me to extend to you again our 
best wishes for the prompt recovery of 
President Reagan. With respect to my 
specific question, I would like to know 
whether the Reagan Administration 
and you, in the context of your 
statements regarding increased rela- 
tions with your true friends and allies 
in the American continent, whether 
you are aware who are your true 
friends and who are your simulated 
friends? 

A. I think it goes without saying 
that the traditional friends of the United 
States are, in general, those who share 
our common values and aspirations, who 
respect and seek to enlarge and broaden 
the democratic process and the fun- 
damental values for which our own na- 
tion, which we share in common here 
with the people in Spain, and one need 
not go beyond any other qualifications at 
this juncture. 

Q. Can you tell us whether or not 
there was any discussion today or 
would you envisage any discussion in 
connection with the bases in Spain as 
to their use for either logistical or 
other support in the Middle East, as is 
being discussed with other NATO 
countries in connection with a rapid 
deployment force? 

A. I think in fairness to our host, I 
should be very specific that no such 
discussion took place today with respect 
to the future utilization of those bases 



jtiatior 

J&& 

lit the 
iJiicai 
id ass 



which we now hold and would hope to j 
continue to hold under a new agreement 
with the Government of Spain and I 
think such discussions would be pre- 
mature at this time. 

Q. Do you expect them to take 
place? 

A. I think clearly the kinds of 
negotiations which we would conduct in 
the period ahead would encompass the 
potential utilization of the facilities 
which would be provided by the Govern- 
ment of Spain, and I am confident that 
both the Government of Spain would 
want to know this, and I am equally 
confident that we would like to know to 
what use these facilities can be made 
without prejudging what the answer 
would be. 

Q. I would like you to tell me 
what you would answer to a Spanish 
general who had a coup in mind and 
bearing in mind what your own in- 
terest and their interest might be? 

A. I'm afraid I don't know any such 
characters, but I should repeat a joke if 
you would like to hear it— but I'll save i 
for my next visit. 



:;■- 



-.:.:.: 



jsteii 
is 

.-■ 



Q. Would you give us your 
private view on the support lent by th 
Socialist Party of Spain to the Sandi- 
nistas in Nicaragua and your com- 
ments regarding a meeting that was 
held the day before your arrival here 
in Madrid, a meeting that was clearly 
against NATO? 

A. With respect to the first part of 
your question, I would prefer not to giv 
a value judgment on the activities of on 
or another political party here in 
Europe, but I would like to emphasize 
that our estimate of the current situa- 
tion in Nicaragua— in Managua— is tha 
the essential direction of the governmer 
is now in the hands of that extreme 
left— the Sandinistas— who are receiv- 
ing both support and direction in large 
degree from Communist Cuba, and that 
this estimate notwithstanding, is also 
true that there are a number of 
elements of more moderate persuasion 
both in the government and in the body 
politic of Nicaragua— these include an 
entrepreneurial class, they include 
elements of the church, labor move- 
ments, and some of the agrarian 
elements. So the final chapter has not 
been written with respect to the future 
orientation of Nicaragua. 

For that reason, I think the policies 
of all democratic parties in the Western 
world should be to pursue actions which 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



i ne oecreiary 



' would result in a pluralist outcome in 

• licaragua rather than to enforce a 
ituation which is already largely, but 
ot exclusively, entrenched. I may add, 
ery recently — about a week ago — the 
J.S. Government made a determination 
jhat the involvement of the Government 
f Nicaragua in the exportation of arms 
nd assistance to the rebel forces in El 
Salvador was a violation of U.S. statute 
vhich has required the formal termina- 
ion of the levels of U.S. assistance to 
hat government. At the same time, we 
iave emphasized to the leadership in 
danagua that if the recent restraint 
lemonstrated by that government with 

I espect to El Salvador is broadened and 
lontinued into the future that we will 
eassess this decision and that as a 
nanifestation of our good faith with 
espect to that decision, we have not in- 
isted that, in accordance with the law — 
hat is, we made an exception to that 
aw — by not demanding repayments of 
hose resources already provided under 
recent levels of assistance to Nicaragua. 
•Ve have also indicated a willingness to 
:ontinue to extend food assistance under 
J.S. regulation PL 480. 

Q. In the case of the too rapid 
;ventual access of Spain into NATO, 
vould this mean that the Rota Base 
vould be used to base the new U.S. 
Trident submarine and that Zaragosa 

s night be used to base the B-l 
>ombers in support of any possible 

■ eventuality in Israel? 

A. No. I've made it a habit of avoid- 
ng discussion of contingencies which 

• iave not yet been addressed or which 

• < Ne have not yet been faced with. I found 

I I to be a very sterile practice pursued 
I }y some less-than-prudent public 

officials. So I am afraid I am going to 
jlnave to tell you I don't have the answer 
A :o that question, and that doesn't mean 
i chat I'm even thinking about one. 

Q. Could you let us in on the 
views you have expressed to the 
Spanish authorities on East- West rela- 
tions and more specifically, on the 
situation in Poland? 

A. I don't think I make it a habit of 
i revealing the contents of diplomatic ex- 
changes of the kind that were held this 
morning, but it is certainly no secret 
that the United States, and I believe 
your government as well, has been 
watching the situation in Poland with 
great concern and interest. We have 
, been somewhat relieved by the recent 
ij turn of events, to include the statements 



of Chairman Brezhnev, but we remain 
concerned by the level of military pre- 
paredness and readiness demonstrated 
by Soviet forces and those of the War- 
saw Pact, and I think we both remain 
dedicated to the proposition that the 
situation must be very, very carefully 
monitored in the days and hours ahead, 
and it will so be. 

Q. As you know, your remark on 
the night of February 23 that what 
was happening here was an internal 
matter, has been widely disseminated 
and commented upon. I am just 
wondering if you, in light of what's 
been said since then, regret in any 
way that the Spanish military there 
might be a misapprehension despite 
the spectacular presence of yourself 
here today and the visit and so forth, 
that there is lukewarmness toward 
democracy in Spain, particularly in 
light of the policies of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration toward Latin America? 

A. First, with respect to your ques- 
tion, I suppose it will continue to persist 
among those whose appetites are in- 
satiable with respect to it, so I think 
maybe it would be helpful for me to ex- 
plain precisely where that delectable 
quotable quote came from. 

On the morning in Washington of 
the event, I had just been closeted for 
about 3 hours with the Foreign Minister 
of France, and as I walked out, one of 
my assistants said: "Before you go 
before the press, you better know 
there's been some kind of a terrorist act 
in the Cortes in Spain. We don't know 
what it is or what the situation is at all, 
so be careful." 

And as I met the press shortly as we 
were leaving, one asked me what about 
it, and I said this is an internal matter, 
and I think I mumbled, we have to find 
the facts, but that was never reported. 

Subsequently, of course, both 
through misunderstanding in some in- 
stances' and mischief in others, it got an 
entirely different portrayal here in 
Spain. Clearly, I regret that. I regret it 
first because it was a fundamental 
distortion of reality, and I always regret 
when that happens. And, secondly, I 
regret it because it in no way — in no 
way — represents American policy either 
under the Democratic Administration 
that preceded us or the Republican Ad- 
ministration under President Reagan. 
And I would suggest as I did before, 
anyone who persists in maintaining that 
position is either not very bright or ter- 
ribly mischievous. And, incidentally, as 
soon as the situation was clarified, the 



U.S. Government sent communications 
to the Government of Spain and Presi- 
dent Reagan, a communication to his 
Majesty the King, with respect to our 
continuing support to the democratic 
process here in Spain. Somehow, those 
things never get reported. 



REMARKS, 

LONDON, APR. 10, 1981 10 

Q. I wonder if you would care to re- 
spond to a question on talking about 
the possible European plan on the in- 
volvement of the PLO in negotiations. 
Is that something that your govern- 
ment could countenance? 

A. I think it is premature. We are 
now engaged in a peace process which 
has been underway, and we hope to 
keep that momentum moving and will in 
the period ahead. So it's too early to 
answer a question of the kind you just 
asked. I thought you were going to ask 
what I was doing here — I am prepared 
to address that. 

Q. Is there any change of empha- 
sis after what you have heard on the 
Middle East while you were there? 

A. I must emphasize to you that we 
had three purposes before our trip: the 
first was to establish a relationship with 
the leaders of the area, to let them know 
that when we talk about consultation 
and President Reagan's Administration, 
we mean that we take their views into 
account in the formulation of our own 
policies and before those policies are for- 
mulated, so we, of course, learned a 
great deal from such a visit and ex- 
change; secondly, we were in the 
business of trying to develop a consen- 
sus of concern about external threats to 
the area, the situation in Afghanistan, 
the tense situation here in Europe, in 
Eastern Europe, in Poland — all, I think, 
have sharpened sensitivities worldwide 
to the implications of Soviet imperialism; 
and thirdly, to emphasize that the peace 
process itself is high on our agenda as it 
has always been and that talking about a 
strategic consensus is not placing our 
emphasis on the peace process in a 
lower priority; precisely the opposite. 
We feel progress with one contributes to 
progress with the other, and if they are 
mutually interrelated then they are 
parallel tracked, and I think that in that 
context our trip was highly successful 
and I feel very, very comfortable that 
the process has begun — good relation- 
ships, a hope for a continuation of 
momentum in the peace process, and a 
developing consensus of concern. 



June 1981 



21 



The Secretary 



Q. Do you think that there is any 
difference of emphasis, though, be- 
tween your government's position and 
the European position of the U.K. 
position? Is there any difference of 
emphasis there? We're not suggesting 
a row— 

A. No, we've had a number of ex- 
changes on this subject, and it may be 
premature to make that statement but 
thus far, no. And I think we are very 
anxious to get on with the peace proc- 
ess, and it remains to be seen whether 
we are going to be fortunate or not or 
the parties are to make the progress 
which we all seek both here in Europe 
and back in the United States. 



REMARKS, 

PARIS, APR. 11, 1981 11 

I'll just make a few brief comments to 
describe my activities here in Paris this 
morning. They involved discussions with 
your Foreign Minister, Jean Francois- 
Poncet, and discussions just now with 
President Giscard. They involved first a 
debriefing of my recent trip to the Mid- 
dle East and visit to Spain and yester- 
day London. We touched upon the situa- 
tion, of course, in Poland, Afghanistan, 
and we had more detailed discussions 
about the very serious situation at the 
moment in Lebanon. As always these 
discussions were frank, cordial, and 
very, very constructive. 

Q. What is your reaction to the re- 
cent Israeli military intervention in 
Lebanon? 

A. Our position has consistently and 
regularly been that we are opposed to 
any use of force by any of the parties 
concerned, and we would actively and 
strenuously support a cease-fire and a 
peaceful process. 

Q. Have you made these feelings 
known to the Israeli Government? 

A. I don't make it a habit of stating 
publicly the character of our discussions, 
but you can be sure that they are consis- 
tent with our public position. 

Q. Will there be a common accord 
by the United States and France for 
the return of peace in Lebanon? 

A. I think we have this morning 
conducted a number of detailed discus- 
sions between the foreign office here and 
my delegation and with respect to ac- 
tions to be taken in the future on 



Lebanon. We clearly see a role for the 
United Nations in the situation, and 
perhaps it would be necessary if the par- 
ties themselves cannot deal with it effec- 
tively to consider a peacekeeping force 
of some kind. We do feel that the matter 
is urgent and needs our intense atten- 
tion in the period ahead, and we are in- 
volved in a number of coordinated 
diplomatic activities. 

Q. Were there any areas in which 
American policy and French policy are 
at odds? 

A. I am sure there are because we 
are two sovereign nations, and it would 
be historically unprecedented for two 
sovereign nations to coincide in every in- 
uendo and nuance of the conduct of 
foreign affairs. But I am very, very 
pleased with the overall convergence of 
French and American policy with 
respect to the major issues — especially 
East- West and the situation in Afghani- 
stan, the situation in Poland, and the 
need to deal urgently with the problem 
in Lebanon. 



DEPARTURE REMARKS, 
BONN, APR. 11, 1981 12 

I will just make a few remarks and I 
would preface them with a quote from 
my old German-speaking mentor, Dr. 
Kissinger, who said: "If you knew every- 
thing I knew, you'd agree with every- 
thing I am about to say." 

We've had very, very good discus- 
sions here in Bonn with the Foreign 
Minister and his colleagues and with the 
Chancellor. These discussions involved a 
review in the spirit of the new con- 
sultative attitude of the Reagan Admin- 
istration, of the impressions we gained 
on our recent trip to the Middle East — 
the capitals of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia — additional comments and 
impressions as a result of our visit to 
Madrid, Spain; the discussions held 
yesterday and today in London and 
Paris, and Rome the night before. Our 
discussions ranged from the trip itself to 
an analysis of the current situation in 
Afghanistan and Poland, East- West 
relations in general. 

We discussed the issue of the tac- 
tical nuclear force modernization and the 
parallel aspect of the second track which 
involves the early discussions for arms 
control in Geneva or whatever appro- 
priate location is decided on as has 
always been the case — and especially so 
following the recent visit of the Foreign 



22 



Minister to Washington. Our discussions 
have been intimate, detailed, and frank 
in the spirit of a Western sense of frank. 
I am very, very pleased to have had this 
opportunity, and I am grateful to the 
Chancellor for giving us so much of his 
time on a Saturday and to my friend, 
Mr. Genscher, who has been equally 
generous. 

Q. As a result of your swing 
through the Middle East, do you 
believe it will be helpful or unhelpful 
for the West Germans to sell tanks 
and other military equipment to Saudi 
Arabia? 

A. I wouldn't presume to intervene 
in an issue of internal policy delibera- 
tions here in West Germany. I think it 
would be wrong and inappropriate, 
clearly. The United States is dealing 
with a similar problem with respect to 
F-15 enhancement and AW ACS air- 
craft, and our decision is to proceed with 
that, with the modalities yet to be 
determined. 

Q. There seems to be great con- 
cern about a remark that Defense 
Secretary Weinberger made last week 
that he felt that if the situation in 
Poland continued to be threatening, it 
would mean that there could be no 
discussions between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on theater 
nuclear forces. Do you have a different 
attitude, and did an occasion arise to- 
day for you to explain that attitude to 
Mr. Genscher and the Chancellor? 

A. I think that what Mr. 
Weinberger said here is consistent with 
the policy that all of our Western na- 
tions and the United States have taken, 
and that is: to express profound concern 
about the consequences of direct Soviet 
interventionism, or internal suppression, 
that would have profound consequences 
for a considerable period of time for the 
conduct of East- West relations, in- 
cluding arms control and such things as 
assistance to the needs of the Polish 
people as well. And we want this to be 
determined and resolved by a peaceful 
process determined by the people of 
Poland. 

Q. What is the current situation? 
Have you compared notes, and is it 
still as tense as it has been — mili- 
tarily— around Poland? 

A. I guess the answer to that ques- 
tion is that we were all somewhat re- 
lieved by the recent statement of Mr. 
Brezhnev which reflected greater 
moderation. We continue to watch the 
military situation carefully. In the light 
of that statement, I would say that thert 

Department of State Bulletin 



'if ' 



The Secretary 



fpg , i some easing of a sense of concern that 
it. I re felt for a period of time here, start- 



Interview for Great Decisions 



ig last week. 

Q. Once more back to the state- 



ent 



1(1 •>;; 

tie 

lent of Mr. Weinberger. As I remem- 
ier, he didn't mention any invasion; he 
aid "pressure" would be enough not 
o come together to a meeting. Would 
ou agree? 

A. I have to be careful on that, 
>ecause I haven't talked to Mr. Wein- 
jerger about what he said. Until I do I 
.vouldn't get into the nuances of your 
question. 

Q. Would you say pressure is 
snough or— 

A. You are trying to put me in a 
position I think you think you have him 
n. I would like to be sure of what Mr. 
Weinberger said. We are talking about 
internal repressions or external inter- 
vention based on Soviet decisions and 
management. 

Q. What do you think of the pro- 
jected visit of Mr. Brezhnev to Bonn? 

A. I understand such a thing is 
under consideration. This is a decision 
for the leadership here in Bonn to make. 
Clearly, there has been nothing in the 
American demeanor and President 
Reagan's demeanor which suggests that 
we would not expect to continue a 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. And we 
expect our partners to do the same. 

Q. You have said that you want to 
have a chance to consult with the 
allies while our policy takes form. 
What did they ask you to do about the 
SALT talks, and what have you been 
able to tell them? 

A. Frankly they have asked us to do 
nothing about the SALT talks; and I 
think that's because we have kept them 
abreast of the situation in Washington, 
which involves a thorough review of the 
overall SALT situation. I am confident 
that our allies will patiently await the 
completion of that review. It has not 
been completed. 

Q. What is your estimate? 

A. I think it is too early to make an 
estimate. 

Q. You indicated that the dialogue 
could take place between Mr. 
Brezhnev and the leadership of West 
Germany. Do you favor a dialogue be- 
tween the President of the United 
States and Mr. Brezhnev? 



Secretary Haig was interviewed by 
Ken Sparks on March 16, 1981, for Great 
Decisions 1981. ' 

Q. What are the principal goals of this 
Administration in foreign policy over 
the next 4 years? And what would you 
say are the principal differences in Mr. 
Reagan's foreign policy from that of 
his predecessors? 

A. Without trying to draw too many 
sharp distinctions, I think the 
dominating concern of this Administra- 
tion is the recognition that the decade 
we have now entered is at once 
simultaneously the most dangerous and 
perhaps the most promising that free 
societies have faced, certainly since the 
Second World War. It is our belief that 



A. At the right time, of course. But 
I think we have made it very clear — and 
the President has made it very clear 
himself — that he would anticipate 
indulging in summitry, but that it should 
be well prepared and that the conse- 
quences of such a summit meeting would 
anticipate a successful outcome. That 
means the preparation is thorough and 
detailed. And I don't foresee such a 
meeting in the near future. 

Q. You spoke about a certain eas- 
ing of the concern about Poland. Does 
this mean that American observations 
indicated the military forces brought 
up toward the Polish borders east and 
west for maneuvers are now being 
returned to their barracks? 

A. When I say that, that value judg- 
ment involves an assessment of the re- 
cent statement of Mr. Brezhnev as well 
as our assessment of the military situa- 
tion which still reflects a high state of 
readiness but which is somewhat im- 
proved. 



'Press releases pertaining to this trip, 
but which are not printed here, are No. 99 of 
Apr. 16, 1981, 100 of Apr. 16, 101 of Apr. 
16, 103 of Apr. 22, and 109 of Apr. 24. 

2 Press releases 87 of Apr. 6 and 96 of 
Apr. 16. 

3 Press release 97 of Apr. 16. 

J Press release 98 of Apr. 16. 

5 Press release 102 of Apr. 22. 

6 Press release 104 of Apr. 16. 

7 Press release 105 of Apr. 23. 

8 Press release 106 of Apr. 23. 

9 Press release 108 of Apr. 10. 

10 Press release 110 of Apr. 24. 

"Press release 111 of Apr. 24. 

12 Press release 112 of Apr. 28. ■ 



this is going to require a somewhat 
different approach to our foreign affairs 
problems. It means we're going to have 
to recoil from the post- Vietnam syn- 
drome—as it's been referred to— and, 
once again, have our weight felt in the 
international community. 

We hope to do this in a very 
measured and modified way, recognizing 
that the post- World War II unique 
superiority that we Americans enjoyed 
is no longer ours. The basic themes will 
be as I stated in my recent testimony 
before the Foreign Relations Committee: 
a consistency in policy; not to veer day- 
to-day based on the pressures of momen- 
tary headlines, but a consistent set of 
themes which we will follow; reliability, 
so that traditionally friendly nations, 
those which share our values, can apply 
those values, although in distinctly 
different and unique ways in the context 
of their own self-determination; and, 
finally, most importantly of all, I think, 
is balance --to recognize that conduct of 
foreign affairs represents the careful, 
measured, sophisticated integration of 
political, economic, and security-related 
aspects of our conduct abroad. That 
must be part of an integrated mosaic. 

Q. You have concentrated most of 
your experience in recent years on 
European affairs. How does it feel to 
find yourself faced at the beginning of 
your new job with the crisis in El 
Salvador? 

A. It's not new to me. I guess I left 
the trolley in the post-Cuban missile 
crisis situation when I worked for Jack 
Kennedy and for Cy Vance and was the 
Defense Department representative on 
the interdepartmental framework that 
dealt with, at that time strangely 
enough, Cuban subversion in Central 
America and in the hemisphere. 

So it's ironic and rather frustrating 
that here, once again, we're faced with 
the export of Cuban subversion, ar- 
maments, and interventionism in an im- 
perialist way in this hemisphere. 

Q. There are reports that the land 
distribution program in El Salvador is 
having a great deal of success now. To 
what extent do the socioeconomic 
issues in that country enter into our 
foreign policy? 



June 1981 



23 



The Secretary 



A. Profoundly, of course, and we 
seek to see a broadening of the political 
situation in El Salvador, the evolution to 
a more pluralistic structure. And you're 
right, there has been some success with 
the Duarte reforms in the first phase of 
the so-called land reform where the 
large estates have been broken up. But, 
as has been the case, in our experience 
there are also many growing pains with 
this kind of profound change, and pro- 
duction levels are down. And we must 
always be careful not to try to impose 
some external theology of fundamental 
changes in a society which may not be 
ready for those changes. We saw that in 
Iran; it brought about the collapse of the 
Shah. I think it is vitally important that 
we not become too pedantic in our 
reform efforts while we continue sen- 
sitively to urge them and to provide the 
means to assist their realization. 

Q. In 1962 President Kennedy 
brought the matter of the Cuban 
missile crisis before the Organization 
of American States (OAS) and thus he 
gained a great deal of support for his 
blockade of Cuba. Does this Ad- 
ministration intend to bring up the 
situation in El Salvador before the 
OAS? 

A. Clearly, I've been over to the re- 
cent OAS meeting here in Washington 
and briefed a number of the foreign 
ministers who participated on the con- 
cern that we had for the situation in El 
Salvador. We're considering now 
whether or not it might be fruitful to 
formally introduce this issue into the 
OAS organization itself. There are some 
pluses and minuses to that, and we need 
to make a very careful assessment. 

Q. When does this Administration 
intend to get down to serious talks 
with the Soviet Union, then? What 
issues do you think will likely be 
given priority in such talks? 

A. I think President Reagan has 
made it very clear that he feels that the 
recent Soviet activity in the Third World 
and in this hemisphere— if one wants to 
tick off examples of the kind of activity 
I'm talking about, of course, the two in- 
terventions in Afghanistan, the second 
being a massive, overt invasion of that 
country; the activities in Africa, starting 
with Angola, Ethiopia, then over to 
southern Yemen, northern Yemen; the 
activities of Soviet proxies such as 
Libya, which today is invading Chad; 
and we find the familiar pattern of first 
proxy forces and the accompaniment of 
Soviet advisers with those forces. 

These kinds of activities — the ac- 



tivities we see in El Salvador, the activi- 
ty we see in Kampuchea, formerly Cam- 
bodia—are all unacceptable patterns of 
international behavior if the Soviets an- 
ticipate enjoying the benefits of improv- 
ing East- West relations. I include in that 
transfer of technology, credits, trade, 
agricultural support. Perhaps most im- 
portantly of all, for a Soviet regime 
which has been increasingly engaged in 
imperialist activities abroad, interna- 
tional legitimacy. This is a question of 
importance to Soviet leaders, and I 
think it's vitally important that we relin- 
quish that legitimacy only in the context 
of our assessment of their behavior. 

Q. On the subject of the summit 
meetings, do you see them as useful 
simply to sign and conclude agree- 
ments that have already been reached 
through diplomatic channels? Or are 
they useful, as President Brezhnev in- 
dicated, to clear away misunderstand- 
ings and to pave the way for future 
agreements? 

A. They serve both purposes, and I 
think the rigid or theological position 
with respect to summitry can be self- 
defeating. On the other hand, it's clear 
that summitry should be used most spar- 
ingly. It's clear that summitry must be 
well prepared in advance. If it is not, it 
could frequently result in the kind of 
summitry we've witnessed in the past in 
recent history where euphoria and ex- 
pectations precede the event, followed 
by a rather disappointed and depressed 
outcome. 

I think that summitry demands a 
most careful preparation. It must be 
designed to achieve a purpose, and that 
purpose must be clearly visualized prior 
to the meeting of our heads of state. 

Q. Do you think that the grain em- 
bargo is going to be lifted against the 
Soviets, whether or not they get out 
of Afghanistan? 

A. I don't necessarily put a series of 
specific conditions for the lifting of the 
embargo. I think we all know that this 
Administration, and President Reagan 
especially would never have launched 
such a grain embargo in exclusion of 
other pressures against the Soviet Union 
in the wake of Afghanistan. He's not for 
it, and I'm not for it. 

On the other hand, we're there now, 
and a precipitous lifting of that embargo 
could have grave consequences of 
Western unity as we prepare such 
crucial issues as coordinating our con- 
tingency measures on the tense situation 
in Poland. It could be viewed as a 
business-as-usual approach to a situation 
which needs further clarification. And 



I'm talking about ongoing Soviet activity 
abroad which is illegal, interventionist, 
imperialist, and poses a great threat to 
international stability and peace. 

Q. But on the subject of the em- 
bargo again, do you think the Soviets 
will buy our wheat if the embargo is 
lifted? 

A. I think, clearly, Soviet trade 
must— I think we made some 
statements on that — they need our 
wheat just as they need other resources 
in the agricultural sector. They need 
wheat from other providing nations as 
well. Their own crop has not been very 
successful, and, as a matter of fact, 
their agriculture in general has been in 
shambles, despite the fact that they have 
allocated larger and larger segments of 
their population to agriculture. So this is 
another one of the systematic failures of 
the Soviet Marxist-Leninist system. 

Q. What kind of outcome would be 
best from the U.S. point of view of the 
situation in Poland? That is, would we 
rather see peace and tranquillity 
among the workers in the government 
once again, or is the continuation of 
the unstable situation an indication of 
the failure of the Communist system 
and is that, therefore, better for us do 
you think? 

A. First and foremost, we would 
seek to have, whatever the outcome, the 
consequence of the wishes and the will 
of the people free of coercion or in- 
tervention from external powers. 
Secondly, we welcome greater freedom 
and the achievements that have already 
been realized as a result of these 
pressures. And, thirdly, of course, we 
would hope that the process would be 
peaceful. 

Q. It's been reported, too, that 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union are continuing to observe the 
provisions of the SALT II Treaty, even 
though the treaty has not been 
ratified. Do you favor that? And, if it 
is in our best interests to have the 
Soviets continue observing the provi- 
sions of SALT II, would it not, then, 
be better to have it ratified and, 
therefore, bind them to the provisions 
of it? 

A. No. I think our suggestions that 
the Soviets in this interim period could 
find themselves through restraint and 
moderation in their strategic efforts, 
and we have suggested we would be 
equally guided by such restraint, does 
not represent an endorsement of SALT 
II, hardly at all. 



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24 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



As a matter of fact, I seriously 
aubt that SALT II would weather a 
;st on the Hill; and, indeed, it was 
ithdrawn by the earlier Administration 
cause it would not survive such a test. 

Clearly, we are not happy in this 
.dministration with SALT II, and there 
re several reasons for it. The first is a 
roader one, a question of linkage, as to' 
whether or not it serves any useful pur- 
ose to enter into functional relation- 
hips with the Soviet Union while it's 
ngaged in this unacceptable interna- 
ional behavior in the developing world. 

And the second is the technical flaws 
i the treaty itself, and there are many, 
'hey involve concern that there are not 
ruly reductions in strategic armaments, 
t involves imbalances between large- 
ield, land-based ballistic capabilities be- 
; is ween the two sides. It involves con- 
erns about transfer of technology and 
he implications of the so-called protocol 
n the agreements. 

All of these suggest to me that we 
leed a new treaty negotiated by this Ad- 
ninistration; and that in that process, 
ve will also rectify some of the strategic 
mbalances which have been developing 
ind which will be at their apex, if you 
vill, at their most serious imbalance 
)eriod in the middle of this decade in 
.985 to 1986. 

Q. As a general proposition, do 
/ou see arms control agreements as a 
jood way to manage our strategic 
jroblems with the Soviets? 

A. Well, of course. President 
Reagan and I have always favored a 
verifiable, balanced arms control agree- 
ment. On the other hand, arms control 
for arms control sake can be very 
deluding if we believe, for example, that 
these functional areas can ever be 
viewed as something overriding and can 
be entered into without consideration of 
ongoing Soviet activity globally. That's 
self-defeating, self-deluding, and could 
lead to the international tensions which 
we would hope to eliminate as a result 
of arms control. 

Q. In the Middle East, will the 
Camp David accords continue to 
govern our policy there? 

A. One frequently tends to complain 
about a lack of progress in Arab-Israeli 
disputes, but if one looks back, as I am 
able to do from my experiences in the 
National Security Council working with 
Dr. Kissinger in 1969, it follows that 
progress through shuttle diplomacy, 
some of the stops and starts of the re- 
cent and past Administrations, and the 



ultimate achievements of Camp David 
viewed against U.N. Resolutions 242 
and 338, one must marvel at the prog- 
ress that has been made. 

That does not suggest that the re- 
maining obstacles to a comprehensive 
settlement are any less intractable; they 
are not. We intend to proceed with the 
peace process. We intend to do so in the 
context of some other ongoing efforts, 
and that is to address the strategic 
regional issues of great concern to 
Arabs and Jews and the free world at 
large, and that's again Soviet interven- 
tionism and exploitation through proxies 
or directly of the development and set- 
tlements in that area. 

I hope we're not going to be 
dominated by my preoccupation with 
Arab-Israeli disputes, with oil diplomacy, 
while they're going to view the area as a 
regional whole; I see these as mutually 
reinforcing efforts — that is, Arab-Israeli 
peace settlements — and a consensus for 
regional defenses against Soviet inroads. 

Q. President Reagan has made 
statements advocating a fairly strong 
feeling of support for the Israelis, 
both in the West Bank issue, the 
Palestinian issue, and yet we have 
gone ahead and made the arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia, something that the 
Israelis oppose. How do we balance, if 
I may phrase it this way, what appears 
to be our conflicting interests in the 
Middle East? 

A. This is not a simple task, of 
course, and sometimes we must deal 
with what I call narrow contradictions in 
order to achieve a broader consensus of 
an improved overall climate. 

It's been my experience that perhaps 
the most difficult problem and the 
greatest obstacle to progress in the 
peace effort is the creation of in- 
securities. When one side or the other is 
racked with insecurities, it becomes 
more intractable at the negotiating 
table, whether it be Arabs or Jews. 

And I think it's very important that 
we recognize that there is a new situa- 
tion in the Middle East: the collapse of 
the Shah of Iran that had been a 
stabilizing force and is now a destabiliz- 
ing force; the Iraq-Iran conflict; the 
Soviet interventionism in Afghanistan. 
All of these factors have raised insecuri- 
ty among the moderate Arab states 
traditionally friendly to the United 
States and our objectives. It's very im- 
portant that our Saudi friends know that 
we are with them in their security 
challenge, and we intend to be. 

Q. You mentioned the Shah, who, 
of course, prior to the Khomeini 



takeover of Iran, was our staunchest 
ally in the Persian Gulf. Now that the 
hostages are safely home once again, 
are we likely to resume some sort of 
relationship with Iran and try to blunt 
the Soviet influence there? 

A. I think it's far too early to say. 
This will depend in large measure on the 
subsequent performance of the govern- 
ment, or whatever government ultimate- 
ly prevails in Iran. I think the important 
thing to remember, as President Reagan 
says, we're not going to be dominated by 
a spirit of revenge, and our basic objec- 
tive is a friendly, moderate, pro- Western 
Iran. It's that long-term strategic objec- 
tive that we must always keep in mind 
as we deal with the vicissitudes or inade- 
quacies of the day-to-day performance of 
the regime there. 

Q. Human rights was the major 
emphasis of the Carter Administra- 
tion's foreign policy. Statements by 
some members of this Administration, 
yourself included, indicate that the 
emphasis will change under President 
Reagan. How will the human rights 
factor be considered in our foreign 
policy decisions from now on? 

A. This has been the subject of a lot 
of controversy and, I think, misinforma- 
tion. No one has ever suggested that 
human rights is not a fundamentally im- 
portant aspect of all that we do in the 
conduct of our affairs abroad. It is an 
essential and universal aspect of that 
conduct. 

On the other hand, we have felt, and 
I think with justification, that when you 
break out this objective in a functional 
way and create special authorities to 
measure the achievements of human 
rights outside the mainstream of the 
conduct of our affairs where this issue is 
not weighed and integrated with the 
other functional objectives that we seek 
to achieve, that distortions can creep in. 

In the last Administration we found 
ourselves in a ludicrous position of 
bludgeoning friends and traditional allies 
in admittedly less than acceptable 
authoritarian regimes to the degree 
which in several instances we successful- 
ly contributed to the collapse of that 
regime and its replacement by a 
totalitarian alternative where human 
rights is no longer by ideological convic- 
tion an issue that they are concerned 
with. 

So we have to deal with this issue 
with greater sensitivity. And I've also 
stated that in some respects we will find 
terrorism replaces our concerns about 
human rights violations in an open socie- 
ty, because terrorism is perhaps the 
greatest single violator of human rights 



June 1981 



25 



The Secretary 



that has ever been seen today. And I 
would suggest that it needs far more at- 
tention than it's been getting. 

Q. Beginning with the time that 
you were in the White House with 
President Nixon and Secretary Kiss- 
inger, we have seen a drastic change 
in the status of China from that of an 
enemy to almost an applicant for a 
quasi-ally status. To what extent in 
the developing relations with China 
should we take into account the effect 
of our relations upon Moscow, do you 
think? 

A. I have stated that one of the 
great challenges of this period facing 
Americans in foreign policy will be, on 
the one hand, to avoid poking sticks in 
the polar bear's cage while continuing 
with the realization of the strategic im- 
perative to maintain improving relation- 
ships with the People's Republic of 
China nurtured by a very carefully or- 
chestrated set of conflicting objectives 
that we are going to have to manage. 

I'm confident that it is very do-able 
and, in some respects, that issue will be 
solved by the respective behavior and 
conduct of the two regimes involved. 

Q. You have spent your whole life, 
your whole adult life, working on 
foreign policy, both in war and in 
peace. And yet many Americans re- 
main disillusioned about what they 
have seen as the costly effects of help- 
ing our neighbors and our allies and 
containing our enemies. What advice 
would you have for Americans who 
are concerned about what they should 
do about foreign policy? 

A. First, I think they've got to 
avoid being captured by contemporary 
sloganeering, whether it suggests excess 
hyper- American activity abroad or 
whether it suggests, as has been the 
case in the recent past, that we 
withdraw from there. The simple facts 
are that we Americans have an obliga- 
tion to make sure that those values that 
you and I cherish are broadened and 
strengthened in the international com- 
munity. 

And if we overlook illegal interven- 
tionisms, whether it be in Africa or 
Afghanistan or in our own front yard in 
this hemisphere, we're leaving a legacy 
of increased risk-taking which could con- 
front us as it did in the Second World 
War with the ultimate challenge to our 
vital interests. We must take these on, 
we must participate in the world com- 
munity, which shares our values. 



Interview for NBC Television 



pes? 



Secretary Haig was interviewed for 
NBC television by Marvin Kalb on April 
U, 1981. ^ 

Q. What were your hopes when 
you took over this job? What did you 
want to accomplish? 

A. I think, like many Americans, I 
spent a considerable period of time 
before the inauguration worrying about 
the drift of American foreign policy, the 
lack of consistency and reliability in our 
dealings with friends and potential foes, 
and a lack of balance, if you will, in the 
conduct of our foreign policy, sometimes 
giving greater emphasis to theology and 
letting the more realistic aspects of the 
challenges facing us abroad fall into sec- 
ond place and second consideration. 

Q. You're talking about the Carter 
Administration? 

A. I'm mainly talking about post- 
Vietnam America, post- Watergate 
America, and I think the American peo- 
ple choose what they want for leader- 
ship and, if they're not happy with it, 
then they change it. I think they chose 
Mr. Carter for perceived style and found 
it wanting with the experience of it. 

Q. And they chose Mr. Reagan for 
what purpose? 

A. I think Americans everywhere 
have a thirst to reinvigorate America's 
world mission, its world role and respon- 
sibilities, to recognize that the United 
States has been in a very defensive 
mode for a considerable period, since 
Vietnam, and that the losses to the vital 
interests of America have been grievous. 

One looks at the Third World— in 
Africa, recently in his own hemisphere, 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East; one 
can only be gravely concerned about the 
implications of either America's unwill- 
ingness or inability to deal with the in- 
creasing risk-taking on the part of the 
Soviet Union and its proxies. I think this 
is the heart of the matter that disturbed 
America. 

Q. When you say "risk-taking on 
the part of the Soviet Union and its 
proxies," give me some examples of 
what you have in mind. 

A. I think if one would go back to 
the pattern that was launched in 
Angola, where at that time the ex- 
ecutive branch— President Ford— was 



anxious with a modest investment to 
challenge the use of Cuban forces to in- 
stall a proxy government there. 

At that time the legislature in a 
post- Vietnam, post- Watergate demeanor 
did not sustain the executive leadership 
the President tried to put forth. Subse- 
quently we saw in Ethiopia, we saw in 
southern Yemen, in northern Yemen, we 
saw an institution of a puppet regime in 
Afghanistan almost 2 years ago and o 
to learn that within a year it did not 
meet the criteria of total subjugation to 
the Soviet Union, and a direct, blatant 
intervention occurred. 

We saw the overrunning of Cam- 
bodia, or Kampuchea, by proxy forces of 
the Soviet Union from Hanoi. And here 
recently, in the last months of the 
Carter Administration and the early 
weeks of this Administration, we saw 
the activity in El Salvador which could 
have reestablished the gang in this 
hemisphere, an additional Cuban 
beachhead having already realized con- 
siderable success in the Nicaraguan 
model. All of these things I think disturb 
Americans. They certainly disturb me as 
an individual, and I know they disturb 
the President. 

Q. What do you both want to ac- 
complish, though? Do you want to 
stop the Russians? How do you do 
that? 

A. I don't assume that the Soviet 
leadership is seeking a conflict, but I do 
assume— and I think past history has 
confirmed— that where there are 
vacuums, where there is vacillation on 
the part of the United States and its 
allies in standing up for their vital in- 
terests, that these vacuums are going to 
be filled in ways that do not meet our 
vital interests and which, indeed, put 
our interests in jeopardy. 

What we are seeking to do is, first, 
to recognize this fact and to espouse and 
develop policies which are prepared to 
challenge these illegal interven- 
tionisms— not necessarily with force but 
with a great panorama of demographic 
assets available to the United States and 
to our allies. 

In political and economic terms the 
West enjoys vastly superior assets to 
those of the Soviet Union in political and 
economic and moral terms. I think it's 
awfully important that we do a better 
job of bringing them together under a 
common concept which meets the vital 



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'Press release 89 of Apr. 5, 1981. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



terests of not only the United States 
,t those who share our values 
roughout the world. 

Q. How do you think you're doing 
far? 

A. I think it's much too early to 
ake a judgment call on that. You 
iow, foreign policy isn't a business of 
lckstering or packaging or rhetoric; it's 
consequence of day in and day out per- 
rmance which contributes to an overall 
sessment and a sense of credibility 
id confidence in those with whom you 
sal. 

I noted some expected that if I 
Duld travel abroad, I had an agenda of 
etoric that you get pluses and minuses 
1. This is an irrelevant aspect of the 
mduct of foreign policy. Foreign policy 
going to be built and developed in an 
olutionary way by day-to-day profes- 
onal dealing and management with our 
hole panorama of assets to be sure 
lat our vital interests are protected and 
:panded. 

Q. Concretely in El Salvador, for 
(ample, do you feel that you've done 
ell? One doesn't hear as much these 

i ays about El Salvador as we did a 

. juple of months ago. 

A. I think it's a little early to say 
hether we've done well. But history 
ever tells you what would have hap- 
ened had you proceeded on a different 
ourse than what you did. 

I would suggest, had we not moved 
le way we did on El Salvador in the 
arly days of this Administration to 
ring pressure on Nicaragua, that was 
lvolved in a massive shipment of arms 
' ito El Salvador to provide economic 
1 nd military assistance to a hard-pressed 
egime in El Salvador— with a ratio, in- 
identally, of three to one in favor of 
economic decisions— that we might be 
vitnessing today a creation of another 
1 Nicaragua in El Salvador. 

As it is, we find a situation where 
he rebels are now on the defensive, 
where the armament shipments from 
Nicaragua have been dramatically re- 
duced — not terminated, but re- 
duced—and we're looking at a whole dif- 
ferent range of problems. And that is 
the ability, once again, to manage away 
excesses of the right or the left in an 
evolution toward what we hope to be a 
more pluralistic structure in El Salva- 
dor. 

Q. I don't want to put you in a 
position of claiming that you are per- 



sonally, or the Administration is, 
responsible for a success there, but 
doesn't it add up to that? Don't you 
feel that as a result of the action that 
you have taken, that you have ac- 
complished what you just described? 

A. No. I think that's a little too 
sharply drawn and gives very little 
credit to the courageous people of El 
Salvador who are, themselves, both the 
victims and the cutting edge of whatever 
successes were achieved. 

But I think successful foreign policy 
anticipates problems, and it takes ac- 
tions which prevent less than happy out- 
comes. I think the pressures that we 
have applied in Central America have 
achieved something. I think we've seen a 
change in the demeanor of many of the 
other threatened countries of the 
region — Panama, Mexico to some 
degree. 

Q. Do you mean a stiffening of 
their spines? 

A. A recognition that the 
hemisphere is once again threatened by 
excessive interventionism from Cuba 
and a more robust posture against that 
interventionism. We see the same in Co- 
lombia, we see it in the larger countries 
to the south in Latin America, and I 
think all of this augurs well for the 
future if we can continue to maintain 
our policies and to support those policies 
that are necessary here at home, 
especially in the Congress. 

Q. What are some of the problems 
that you've come upon in the last 
several months in terms of your ability 
to implement policy? 

A. I think we have a rather happy 
situation, so I'm not going to put out the 
crying towel. We have a unique con- 
vergence in America today of a popular 
move which is willing to bear the 
sacrifices of correcting our defense defi- 
ciencies and tightening its belt to be 
sure our domestic economy is put back 
on a sound track. 

We have a Senate which is also 
responsive to that same outlook, and we 
have a House which is equally suppor- 
tive in general. And, of course, we have 
an executive branch which not only has 
been in the forefront of espousing such 
policies but is thus far realizing a usual 
degree of effectiveness in getting the 
support for it. 

That could be short lived, and the 
stakes which would be made could derail 
that. But I think it's a very happy set of 
circumstances the way the American 



people, the legislature, and the executive 
branch are all of one mood. There are 
many dissenters, of course. You read 
about them every day. 

Q. Let's talk about perception for 
just a moment. There is a percep- 
tion—and it will be no surprise to 
you — in this town that you, yourself, 
have undergone some kind of major 
change in the last month — 3 or 4 
weeks at any rate — from being a 
man seen as on top of everything, 
firmly in control, to being what one 
official here once described as a 
wounded lion. Do you feel yourself a 
wounded lion? 

A. I suppose if you look back over 
history, successful Secretaries of State 
have seldom been winners on the 
popularity hit parade. And I didn't come 
here to run a popularity contest, nor do 
I think my effectiveness is going to be 
judged on such things. 

I'm here to do the work for the 
President of the United States and the 
American people to reinvigorate and to 
turn around what had been failing 
foreign policy. And the report card on 
that is going to be a measure of my ef- 
fectiveness in doing so. So I neither feel 
as a different fellow, a wounded eagle, 
or a lion. I'm a fellow who has a lot of 
work to do, who intends to get on to the 
substance of that work as I have been 
doing. And I'll let the popularity polls 
take care of themselves. 

Q. Do 
dued? 

A. Not at all. I don't suggest for a 
moment that one in public life that finds 
himself at the vortex of public con- 
troversy enjoys it. I don't enjoy it any 
more than you would or any other 
American citizen, but I've seen enough 
government to know that it is essentially 
an irrelevant aspect of the work that has 
to be done and the final measure of 
whether or not I succeed in that work. 

Q. People who know you very well 
say that your natural predisposition is 
to be very tough, very aggressive, and 
very energetic in pursuit of your aims. 
Is it possible that that may run in con- 
flict with the team-player approach 
that we hear is desired out of the 
White House? 

A. No, not at all. My discussions 
with the President — and they have been 
regular and intimate, as recent as this 
morning — suggest to me that he's com- 



you feel in any sense sub- 



June 1981 



27 



The Secretary 



■ 



fortable that I am doing what he hired 
me on to do; and that, after all, is the 
real measure of whether or not I fit into 
the team or have a style that may be 
abrasive to one fellow or another. 
Again, results are the current measure 
of effectiveness. 

Q. You're in for the duration. 
Your sense is that that is what you 
want to do. 

A. Of course. I didn't turn my life 
upside down to come down here. I only 
intended to make a brief try at it. 

Q. On issues of straight substance 
now, at the very beginning of the Ad- 
ministration in relations with the 
Soviet Union, we heard a lot of things 
about the Russians cheating, lying, 
stealing, et cetera, and we don't hear 
that kind of a line now. It is not what 
one would call a very good relation- 
ship, but it isn't, at the same time, 
brutally antagonistic. What do you 
want out of that relationship? What 
would you like to see develop? 

A. I think in the first instance, in 
order not to succumb to the leading 
aspects of your question, let me suggest 
that in the early weeks of this Ad- 
ministration, it was necessary and 
desirable for our Administration team, if 
you will, starting with the President, to 
make very clear what its world view 
was. And I think that has been very 
decisively and sometimes rather precise- 
ly outlined. 

That doesn't have to be repeated on 
a day-to-day basis, and the very act of 
doing so can be counterproductive. With 
respect to the Soviet Union, we clearly 
view the Soviet Union as the major 
threat to vital American interests; not 
the only one but the major threat. And 
any suggestion to the contrary seems to 
me to be overlooking recent events 
around the world, indeed, events since 
the Second World War. 

So the fact of setting that record 
straight is, obviously, a desirable aspect 
of our foreign policy. Does that mean 
that we want to adopt a mode of total 
brittleness, confrontation, and isolation 
of the Soviet Union? Not at all. We want 
them to be on notice that when they 
abide by the accepted rules of interna- 
tional law, they will find a willing and 
welcome partner here in the United 
States, and they will enjoy the benefits 
of trade and credit and technology 
transfer and perhaps some reduction in 
levels of armament that both sides feel 
compelled to maintain today. 



28 



But we're a far cry from having 
achieved that millenium, if you will, and 
that's going to be the task in the weeks 
and months ahead, and it's going to re- 
quire dialogue between ourselves and 
the Soviet Union. Above all, it's going to 
require American policies which are will- 
ing to stand up to these challenges as 
they develop day-to-day, as we have had 
to do in El Salvador. 

Q. There has been a great deal of 
talk about the possibility of Soviet in- 
tervention in Poland. It hasn't hap- 
pened yet; maybe it won't happen. 
Why do you think it hasn't happened 
just yet? 

A. I think basically because the 
Soviet leadership knows that the price 
of such an intervention would be almost 
incalculable from their point of view. In 
the final analysis, however, they're going 
to do what they think is necessary for 
their vital interests. This is what makes 
nations tick. 

I think the activities of the allied na- 
tions in early December may have had 
an impact on what was clearly a decision 
to desist after building up substantial 
force capabilities to intervene. 

Q. They were on the edge of in- 
tervention; then it stopped. 

A. I think that was the judgment of 
most of the more respected analysts at 
the time. Now, I'm not sure we reached 
that in the recent crisis. I felt and, in- 
deed, the President, Vice President, and 
our Cabinet team concluded that they 
were still in a political phase on Friday 
night when I left Washington. It frankly 
never got too much higher than the level 
of concern that we had at that time; in 
subsequent days, there has been some 
retrenchment in our concern, both on 
political and military assessments. 

Q. What are the actual constraints 
that operate right now on the Soviet 
Union as far as Poland is concerned? 

A. I think there are a host of con- 
straints. One is that we in the West 
have done very well in staying togeth- 
er—unified and coordinated— in our ap- 
proach to the problem. There's hardly 
been a communication, a public state- 
ment, a signal that has not been coor- 
dinated among the allies and those of us 
who share common concerns about this 
problem. 

Secondly, I think the Soviets them- 
selves recognize that the problems in 
Poland today are horrendous in political 
and economic terms; and that if they 
move into this situation, they will be 



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assuming burdens of almost incalculable 
magnitude, and to include the possibility f 
of active resistance by the Polish peop' 
And so it cannot be in their interests to 
do this unless at some point their judg- 
ment is that the risks of not doing so 
are outweighed by these very serious 
risks of doing so. 

Q. There are some students of tin 
subject who say, as you well know, 
that perhaps the Russians have waitei 
too long. 

A. I suppose, again, such an 
analysis could be made. On the other 
hand, I think it's awfully important thai 
those of us with official responsibility 
never succumb to the theological syn- 
drome that Soviet intervention is in- 
evitable in Poland. Such a conclusion, o 
even such a public statement of such a 
conclusion, could increase dramatically 
the brutality, and the decisionmaking 
process might be moved forward, even 
the thesis were correct. 

I don't happen to share that, and I 
think we've got to work as actively and 
diligently as we can to help the Polish 
people, with others, overcome their 
economic contradictions and to make it 
clear to the Soviets that either external 
intervention or internal repres- 
sion—which is equally onerous and 
dangerous — are not acceptable if they 
wish to enjoy a standing in the interna- 
tional community that even compares 
with past history. 

Q. Why is it in the interests of th 
United States to send aid to Poland? 
After all, Poland is in the Eastern or 
bit, it's a satellite country, it's well- 
known it's now undergoing a 
phenomenal kind of peaceful revolu- 
tion; it is a member of the Communis 
Party, a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
Why is it in our interests to help 
them? 

A. First, I think we have adopted i 
policy which is built only on our vital in 
terests to keep the political process and 
the moderating process alive internally 
in Poland; this is going to require a 
modicum of ability to feed their people 
to keep their economy functioning— anc 
that means economic and foodstuff sup- 
port. 

We also should be, I believe as we 
must, influenced by the humanitarian 
aspects of this issue. American foreign 
policy has always given a high measure 
of cognizance to the humanitarian objec 
tives which we Americans espouse and 
support. 



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II 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



So from both an interest point of 
sibiftw and a humanitarian point of view, I 
ink clearly we have this obligation. We 
stsi )uld expect that we would not be 
jadi jne, that those who share our values 
uld also contribute and, even perhaps 
ore importantly, those in whose orbit 
)land has been historically — the Soviet 
nion — must also bear a heavy measure 
the economic burden of the internal 
buation in Poland today. 

Q. Is it possible that the Russians 
ay, in time, adapt to the new 
alities in Poland? 

A. I don't think one can discount 
.at, and one must work diligently to 
•ing that outcome about. I think it's far 
'0 early yet to tell. 

Q. You're aware that you're 
jcoming the darling of a lot of 
berals in Washington? 

A. I suppose life is replete with con- 
adictions. 

Q. Seriously, there are people who 
ly that Secretary Haig and this Ad- 
ministration does represent the flex- 
jiility that is required in the execution 
if an intelligent foreign policy. Do you 
:el that you may be an odd-man out 
' i this sense? Much harder statements 
re coming out from other people. 

A. I don't know that I have to be 
' ?lf-conscious about my inability to make 
) igorous statements, either in the recent 
' ast or in the more distant past. I do 
. elieve that what I have been saying is 
■ bsolutely consistent with the views of 
! le President of the United States. 
I 'hat, after all, is what I'm here to 
' spouse. I'm his Secretary of State. 
No, I don't see these subtle con- 
radictions that you're speaking of, and I 
on't necessarily believe that the liberal 
i the flexible mentality. And I don't 
ven like the handle "liberal" or "conser- 
ative." It's lost its meaning in a contem- 
iorary sense in many ways. 



Q. How would you describe 
yourself? 

A. A liberal in the sense that I'm an 
optimist, that I believe essentially in the 
perfectibility of man, although probably 
with a greater degree of patience than 
some liberals might. 

On the other hand, I also believe 
that international affairs, per se, are 
structured on the vital interests of na- 
tions. Those interests are inevitably go- 
ing to clash with our own, and we must 
deal with those clashes on the basis of 
strength, reliability, consistency and 
coherence in policy. And we haven't 
been too good at that. I suppose historic 
critiques of democratic systems have 
pointed out that is one of our 
vulnerabilities, and we have to be con- 
stantly conscious of it. 

Q. Your top staff- some of these 
people still not confirmed. A couple of 
weeks ago up on the Hill you ex- 
pressed your own unhappiness that 
this process is so slow. It still is slow 
and you still don't have your people 
together and confirmed. What can you 
do about it? What are you going to do 
about it? 

A. We have been working the prob- 
lem together with the White House 
staff, which has an equal stake in this 
although they have a number of more 
constituencies to manage in that sense, 
and with the Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on the Hill. And I'm optimistic that 
this problem, to the degree that it is a 
problem, will be resolved very rapidly. 

Q. It hasn't happened that rapidly 
yet. What about Senator Helms? Is he 
the problem? 

A. That's a question that Senator 
Helms would have to answer. My rela- 
tionships with Senator Helms have been 
absolutely unique and unusually cordial 
from the very day I came in; in fact, 
from the time that I went through the 
all-too-brief confirmation process. So I'm 
not aware that he's created any un- 
necessary obstacles for me and, if he 
were to have, then I would be very con- 
fident in sitting down with him and 
discussing them to resolve the problem. 



Q. Why is it, then, that there are 
so many of your assistant secretaries 
who aren't confirmed? Where do you — 

A. I think your focus is here in the 
Department of State, and I think you'd 
find similar situations in other executive 
branches. 

Q. No. I appreciate that. Just from 
the point of view of the Department. 

A. I think it's been a problem of 
new systems, new conflict of interest, 
and probably a degree of intense con- 
cern about the philosophic compatibility 
of appointments. I'd like to see that 
myself, but I'm very, very comfortable 
with that, providing it doesn't drag out 
and prevent the effectiveness the tax- 
payers must expect from our executive 
branch. 

Q. Has it prevented that effec- 
tivness yet? 

A. No. Not yet. Not yet. 



'Press release 121 of Apr. 23, 1981. 



June 1981 



29 



The Secretary 



Interview for ABC Television 



Secretary Haig was interviewed for 
ABC television by Barrie Dunsmore on 
April 17, 198 1. 1 

Q. Evidently, the United States has 
now, more or less, decided to provide 
a large arms package to Saudi Arabia, 
and this has set up a buzz saw of op- 
position from Israel and its supporters 
on Capitol Hill. Is there some 
possibility that that will be delayed 
now because of this opposition? 

A. I noticed some press speculation 
with respect to the timing. The clear 
point I want to make is, there has not 
been a decision with respect to timing. 
There are a number of important 
technical considerations that have to be 
resolved that will influence ultimate tim- 
ing, and that decision hasn't been made 
by the President yet. 

Q. But a decision has been made, 
at least in principle, to provide Saudi 
Arabia with this equipment? 

A. Yes, that's correct, and as you 
know, this is an issue that has been 
under discussion between the United 
States and Saudi Arabian officials for 
almost 2 years. It was largely concluded 
at the time this Administration came in- 
to office. We have continued on with 
those discussions. 

Q. The columnist William Safire 
yesterday suggested that you and 
Defense Secretary Weinberger actual- 
ly misled the President by saying a 
secret deal had been arranged by the 
Carter Administration that you were 
obliged to carry through on. Is that 
the case? 

A. I don't know of any secret deals 
of any kind, and I don't make it a habit 
of commenting on speculative articles of 
that kind. I think the case has been 
clearly presented to the Congress as it 
has evolved, and they are abreast of the 
current situation. Our public disclosures 
have been consistent with the facts as 
they have developed. 

Q. What would be the impact of a 
defeat on Capitol Hill of that arms 
package for Saudi Arabia, in terms of 
our relations with Saudi Arabia and 
the Middle East generally? 

A. I think, clearly, when the deci- 
sion has been made to proceed with the 
notification in accordance with estab- 
lished procedures on the Hill, if there 
were to be a setback, it would clearly 



30 



represent a grievous setback in 
American relationships with Saudi 
Arabia. There is no other way of parsing 
it out —it's just that simple! 

On the other hand, I don't think we 
will proceed under the assumption that 
we're going to lose. 

Q. What would the impact of such 
a defeat on U.S. relations be with 
Israel? 

A. It's clear -and our Israeli friends 
have made it evident —that they are not 
happy with this package, or at least cer- 
tain aspects of it, especially the aerial 
surveillance aspect. I think this in itself 
suggests that we have a certain amount 
of technical work to do to be sure that, 
to the degree possible, legitimate con- 
cerns by the Government of Israel are at 
least alleviated. 

Q. Also in the Middle East, there 
is a report today that the Israelis were 
prepared to make major strikes 
against the Syrian forces in Lebanon, 
and that while you were in Jerusalem, 
you managed to dissuade them from 
taking such action. Could you 
enlighten us at all on that report? 

A. I wouldn't make it a policy to at- 
tribute decisions taken in Israel to my 
actions one way or another. I think it 
has been clear that the consistent policy 
is to work as actively as we can to pre- 
vent the resort to force by any of the 
parties involved in this tragic situation. 

Q. On that trip, we were told by a 
senior official in your party that we 
were on the verge of a major outbreak 
of hostilities in Lebanon. That led 
some of us to conclude that the 
Israelis had hinted that they were 
about to go in, and you couldn't stop 
the fighting in south Lebanon. 

A. No. I think the basic reality of 
the situation in Lebanon is that, to the 
degree that the Christian militias are 
threatened by Syrian military activity, 
as they become increasingly in jeopardy, 
there are strong motivations in Israel to 
take counteraction to preserve that ele- 
ment of the Lebanese society. I think 
that is a clear fact understood by all 
sides, and it suggests restraint by all 
parties. 

Q. We have been marched up and 
down the hill on the possibility of an 
intervention in Poland for several 
months now. Is there some kind of a 
danger in this kind of approach? And 



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ission 



do you think the Soviets are really 
listening to us when we warn against ^ 
intervention? 

A. I think the Soviets will make 
decisions on what they calculate to be 
their own vital interests, as is always 
the case with sovereign nations. I think 
we have made our position crystal clear 
with respect to that. I think the deter- 
minations made by the Soviet leader- 
ship, of course, include considerations of 
the impact that that will have on East- 
West relations at large, and relations 
specifically with the United States. 

All of these factors, I am sure, are 
included in Soviet calculations. I would 
not necessarily attribute Soviet motiva- 
tions or Soviet decisions exclusively to 
American rhetoric. 

Q. Where do we stand now on the 
subject of the likelihood of an in- 
tervention with the formation of a 
new farmers' union now? In your 
mind, does that make chances less or 
greater that the Soviets may feel com- 
pelled to move in? 

A. I would rather not offer a value 
judgment at this juncture. I think we 
have seen some lessening of the ten- 
sions, both in political and military 
terms in the past week, and I think we 
are gratified that this at least continues 
a peaceful political process in the 
reforms that are taking place within the 
Polish society and among the Polish peo- 
ple. We would hope that these im- 
provements would continue without ex- 
ternal or internal repression. 

Q. There was some confusion in 
some peoples' minds about the pros- 
pects for talks at a reasonably high 
level between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, with different peo- 
ple suggesting that what the Soviets 
may or may not do in Poland having a 
bearing on such talks. What are the 
prospects of high-level talks, such as 
between yourself and Foreign 
Minister Gromyko in the next few 
weeks or months? 

A. These things are largely to be 
decided in the period ahead. President 
Reagan has made it clear that he in- 
tends to continue a dialogue with the 
Soviet Union. That is both to our advan- 
tage and to theirs. However, he has also 
made it clear that linkage is a prevailing 
concept in his Administration, and that 
is that these talks— the pace, the scope, 
and the level of them— will be deter- 
mined by corresponding Soviet interna- 
tional behavior in the broadest sense of 
that term— that's the American policy. 



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13 



Department of State Bulletin 






Wis 



Q. Do you sense any basic dif- 

mce between the United States and 

Hies on this subject, and par- 

ilarly on the subject of talks to 

i)uce nuclear weapons in Europe? 






A. No. I think the United States 
our Western European partners are 
me mind. We had visiting 
shington yesterday, for a lengthy 
:ussion with President Reagan — very 
ailed discussions — the Secretary 
leral of NATO who was representing 
collective view of the alliance. In 
;e discussions, as in earlier discus- 
is — with Mrs. Thatcher when she 
ted Washington and other foreign 
listers of our NATO countries— we 
rmed the American commitment to 
I ere by the decisions and consensus 
lived at in December of 1979, to pro- 
Id on two tracks; one being the 
liernization of our long-range theater 
■ abilities in Western Europe and the 
|er the initiation of discussions with 
I Soviet Union, with a view toward 
|| ing reductions in the long-range 
later nuclear threat. We intend to 
» ceed and honor these two tracks and 
llneet our commitments and obliga- 



Q. I know this is not your favorite 

■ pject, but I think it is no longer a 

lor game that Washington 

d netimes plays about who is up and 
v o is down, because it does affect 
t conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 

1 w seriously Ho you think you have 

■ :n hurt by the recent differences 
J l have had with the senior White 

I use staff? 

A. I read a great deal about that in 
t ■ press. I think my relationships with 
t ! senior White House staff are very, 

II -y good at the moment. I think, in the 
1 al analysis, my effectiveness is going 
ij be a direct measure of how I perform 
1 ' substantive responsibilities for Presi- 
i nt Reagan. In that context, I feel I am 
1 ecuting those responsibilities in con- 
l*mance with the President's policy. 

i tat, after all, is what I was hired to 
J ; and I intend to continue in precisely 
I at vein. 

Q. One of the questions which I 
jn frequently asked, and I do not 
ive the answer to it, so I'll ask you: 
re you going to remain Secretary of 
;ate? 

A. I didn't make the fundamental 
1 langes in my own life that were 
iecessary to come to Washington with a 
I ew toward having it an interim period 
ji my life. I intend to stay and continue 



to do my job as long as I can make a 
constructive contribution. I have no 
reason to believe that that is not the 
case. 

Q. If you had anything to do over, 
over the past couple of months, were 
there any things that you said or did 
which if you could take back, you 
would take them back? 

A. Not necessarily, no. I think this 
is a lively town in Washington, and 
again, I think the American people at 
large will measure my effectiveness and, 
indeed, measure the effectiveness of this 
Administration by how well it is per- 
ceived to meet their vital interests in the 
domestic and international conduct of 
our business. I'm optimistic about that. 

Q. What is your estimate of the ex- 
tent of penetration by Soviet in- 
telligence services, the KGB or other- 
wise, into this country? 

A. I think we would be naive if we 
did not understand that this is a very 
key aspect of Soviet international con- 
duct. It's a fundamental aspect of their 
philosophic roots. It involves efforts to 
penetrate, with influence and otherwise, 
the body politic across a very broad 
spectrum of nations with which they do 
business. It would be naive to expect 
otherwise. 

The degree to which they have been 
successful in doing that is not a matter 
of grave concern to me. However, I 
think it is a matter to which we have to 
be constantly alert. 

Q. Is this Administration doing 
anything in particular— taking any 
particular steps — to address this prob- 
lem? 

A. I would prefer to let the At- 
torney General, who is fundamentally 
responsible for the internal security of 
the United States, and the Director of 
Central Intelligence, who is primarily 
but not exclusively responsible for our 
external security arrangements, to 
answer that question. 

Q. But you are not overly con- 
cerned about the problem? You're con- 
cerned, but not overly concerned? 

A. No. I would hope I am construc- 
tively alert to the problem, and I would 
be a supporter for policies by those who 
are responsible for formulating those 
policies in this Administration to pru- 
dent measures which would improve our 
posture. 



'Press release 114. 



AFRICA 

Internal Situation 
in Zimbabwe 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
APR. 3, 1981 1 

In accordance with the provisions of Section 
720 of the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I am 
submitting the following report on the inter- 
nal situation in Zimbabwe. 

There is considerable evidence to indicate 
that the transition to majority rule in Zim- 
babwe, which was consummated at Lancaster 
House and came into effect on April 18, 
1980, is now gathering momentum both 
economically and politically. 

Economically, Zimbabwe has made con- 
siderable progress in the 1 1 months since in- 
dependence. Real growth for 1980 is 
estimated to have been 8-10 percent. Infla- 
tion averaged between 12 percent and 15 
percent for the year. With the announcement 
of a high pre-planting price and a good rainy 
season, Zimbabwe is expecting a million-ton 
maize surplus this harvest. The mining sector 
remains solidly prosperous despite some 
uncertainty about a possibly increased 
government role. 

In the July 1980 budget and the 
February 1981 economic policy statement, 
"Growth with Equity," the government has 
committed itself to the maintenance of a mix- 
ed economy aimed at satisfying black aspira- 
tions and assuring white confidence by at- 
tracting foreign investment and aid to 
generate continued economic growth. 

Zimbabwe's economic success is partly 
associated with the fact that more than 90 
percent of the country's white population, 
about 200,000 people, have chosen to stay in 
Zimbabwe. We estimate that about 20,000 
whites have left, 15,000 of them have gone to 
South Africa. Nevertheless, white emigration 
has led to some dislocations in areas of the 
economy dependent upon mechanical and 
technical expertise, e.g. railroad maintenance 
and telecommunications. The country's 5,000 
white commercial farmers have almost all 
stayed in Zimbabwe. 

Politically, the dire predictions which 
were heard at the time of independence have 
not come to pass. Black-white political con- 
flict has been inconsequential. The expected 
Ndebele-Shona political conflict has 
materialized; however, despite two bloody 
clashes in Bulawayo, the tension has been 
contained by the existing political and 
military structures and senior leaders on both 
sides have responded to the problems which 
have arisen with a view toward the long-term 
best interests of the country. On the whole, 
the political scene has been marked by in- 
creasing stability and the enhancement of the 
authority of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. 

The process of military integration of 
ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary 
Army] and ZANLA [Zimbabwe African Na- 
tional Liberation Army] continues to move 
forward slowly despite the collapse of three 



Jne1981 



31 



CANADA 



of the eleven integrated battalions in last 
month's difficulties. Most observers now 
believe that Zimbabwe will for at least the 
near term have a larger army than was in- 
itially anticipated, due to the fact that most 
of the remaining 25,000 guerrillas will prob- 
ably be incorporated into the new national 
army. 

As noted in detail in the 1981 "Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices," in- 
dependent Zimbabwe on the whole has a good 
record in living up to the guarantees on civil 
liberties contained in the Lancaster House ac- 
cords, in particular those contained in Annex 
C. Zimbabwe continues to be a functioning, 
multi-party, parliamentary democracy in 
which the rights of the population as set 
forth in the constitution are respected. 

The basic rights called for in the agree- 
ment such as the right to life, personal liber- 
ty, freedom from torture and inhuman treat- 
ment, freedom from deprivation of property, 
privacy and freedom of conscience, expres- 
sion, and assembly are in effect. Thus, for ex- 
ample, at the time of this report, there are no 
persons under detention in Zimbabwe 
because of their political views. In order to 
end South African control of the press, the 
government purchased controlling interest 
from the Argus Groups and invested it in a 
national press board which appears so far to 
operate independently. The electronic media 
are sometimes criticized for being overly en- 
thusiastic about government policies. 

The House of Assembly and the Senate 
which were set up pursuant to the Lancaster 
House agreement have proven to be active 
political bodies in which substantive and 
frank debate is the order of the day. Regular- 
ly scheduled elections continue to be held, 
most recently at the local level. Nevertheless, 
disturbances led to the postponement of local 
government elections in Bulawayo following 
clashes between partisans of competing 
political parties. 

The court system rcognized in the Lan- 
caster House agreement functions as set 
forth in the agreement. Thus, for example, 
ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front] Secretary General 
Edgar Tekere, who was charged with the 
murder of a white farmer, was freed by the 
court under a law passed by the former 
regime to protect government officials. While 
many Zimbabweans may have lamented 
Tekere's release, it was widely noted that, as 
promised, Prime Minister Mugabe's govern- 
ment did not interject itself in any way into 
the judicial process. The public service and 
the police also operate as set forth in the 
Lancaster House agreement. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Charles H. 
Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, and Clement J. Zabiocki, 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981.) ■ 



U.S.-Canada Consultations on 
Garrison Diversion Unit 



On April 23, 1981, representatives of the 
United States and Canada met in 
Washington to begin a formal process of 
consultations on the Garrison Diversion 
Unit, a multipurpose water resource 
project in the State of North Dakota. 

The U.S. representatives reiterated 
previous assurances to Canada that the 
United States would honor its obliga- 
tions under the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909 not to pollute waters flowing 
across the boundary to the injury of 
health or property in Canada and its 
commitment that no construction poten- 
tially affecting waters flowing into 
Canada would be undertaken until it is 
clear that this obligation would be met. 
U.S. representatives reviewed the 
history of the Garrison Diversion Unit, 
provided information on its current 
status, and indicated they were resolved 
to address the technical issues in a man- 
ner that responds to Canada's concerns. 

North Dakota officials described 
possible phased development of the proj- 
ect which would provide for construction 
of features having no impact upon 
waters flowing into Canada and would 
subject other features to experimental 
tests, conducted in consultation with 
Canada, to identify those features that 
could be constructed to the satisfaction 
of both North Dakota and Manitoba. 

The U.S. representatives indicated 
they intend to continue to study various 
alternatives for project development. 

Canadian representatives stated that 
Canada remains opposed to the Garrison 
Diversion project as currently designed 
and authorized because it contains 
features which, if built, would lead to 
serious harm to Canadian waters, in 
contravention of the treaty. They ex- 
plained their central concern that the 
transfer of water from the Missouri 
River basin into the Hudson Bay basin 
would introduce into Canadian waters 
foreign fish species, parasites, and 
diseases (biota), which would do serious 
and irreversible damage to the 
multimillion-dollar commercial and 
native subsistence fishery on Lake Win- 
nipeg. They reiterated their position 
that, in the absence of agreed 
technological means of preventing the 
transfer of biota, the Garrison project 
should be modified to eliminate any 
transfer of water. 



Both sides expressed satisfaction 
with the meeting as a useful step in ad 
vancing mutual understanding of the 
Garrison project. There was agreemen 
to continue the process of consultation 
including technical discussions, over th 
coming months. 

The delegations were headed by 
Raymond C. Ewing, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs, Depar 
ment of State, and Edward G. Lee 
Assistant Under Secretary for U.S 
Affairs, Department of External Affaii 



Press release 113 of Apr. 23, 1981. ■ 

Maritime Boundary 
Treaty and 
Fishery Agreement 



MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
APR. 21, 1981 1 

On March 6, 1981, I asked the Chairman o: 
the Committee on Foreign Relations to un- 
couple two pending treaties, signed March 
29, 1979, relating to East Coast fishery an> 
maritime boundary matters. I made this re 
quest after members of the Senate leaders 
advised me the treaties could not be ratine 
as they were. 

My goal, as I am sure is yours, is to 
resolve the fishery problem and at the sam 
time fortify our strong and close relations! 
with Canada. 

Our two nations have built a friendship 
based on good will and mutual respect, 
recognizing that we both have independent 
national interests to pursue. I believe that 
proposed course of action will ensure the & 
tlement of the maritime boundary by an in- 
partial and binding procedure, and that it \ 
allow a future fisheries relationship with 
Canada to be based on better known facts 
and circumstances. 

Therefore, I recommend that the Senat 
give advice and consent to ratification of tl 
Treaty Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Govern- 
ment of Canada to Submit to Binding Disp 
Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritim 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, signei 
at Washington, March 29, 1979, subject to 
technical amendments including an amend- 
ment which would allow it to be brought in 
force without the entry into force of the ac 
companying fishery agreement. And, I re- 



32 



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EAST ASIA 



Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia 



by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Address before the Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council in California on 
April 2U, 1981. Ambassador Stoessel is 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs. 



It is my distinct pleasure to be here with 
you on the west coast of our nation. I 
must confess that the pressures of work 
in Washington these past 2 months 
make it all the more pleasant to be here 
as a result of your kind invitation. And 
the important tasks which this Adminis- 
tration has begun to address require 
your full participation and understand- 
ing in order that we have consensus and 
support. 

The Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council justifiably ranks at the top of 
the councils around our great country. I 
speak with full personal conviction when 
I say that your role is essential in con- 
tributing to public understanding of the 
most pressing and complex international 
issues of our day. It is up to you and the 
other councils to provide the framework 
for interaction between our foreign 
policy officials and the informed Ameri- 
can citizens without whose support our 
policies can neither prevail nor be effec- 
tive. Let me express the Department of 
State's appreciation for those efforts 
along with my personal gratitude for 
your kindness in inviting me here today. 

I want to share with you some 
thoughts about the main foreign policy 
priorities of President Reagan and his 
Administration. We are planning ahead. 
Our reviews of policy priority issues 
have been intensive and productive. Ob- 
viously, there is much yet to be done, 
but clear trends of our policy are 



quest that the Senate return to me without 
further action the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Canada on East 
Coast Fishery Resources, signed at Washing- 
ton, March 29, 1979. 

I believe that the course of action out- 
lined above is in the best interest of the 
United States and will contribute to the close 
and cooperative relationship with Canada 
that we seek. 

Ronald Reagan 



already discernible. And we have begun 
to apply them. 

I would like in particular today to 
place special emphasis on our foreign 
relations priorities in Asia, where our in- 
terests and commitments are long stand- 
ing and where this Administration will 
place special and continuing emphasis. 

Basic Elements 

First, let me mention four basic 
elements of our overall foreign policy ap- 
proach-four anchors for us as we look 
at the turbulent world scene. 

First, we have recognized that, 
beyond simply asserting our role as 
leaders of the free world, we must act 
as leaders. Responsible American leader- 
ship is of the utmost importance in 
achieving our aim of a just and stable 
world order. We must be strong, bal- 
anced, consistent, and reliable in our 
policies and our actions, and we must 
proceed with prudence and sensitivity 
with regard to the interests of our allies 
and friends consulting fully with them as 
we work together for the more secure 
and prosperous world we all desire. 

Second, we have seen and acted on 
the need to improve our own defenses. 
We must strengthen our military posi- 
tion in order to compensate for the 
tremendous buildup of Soviet military 
power which has been going on for the 
past two decades. We must keep in mind 
the saying that "defense may not be 
everything, but without it there is 
nothing." 

Third, we are concerned in a very 
basic way by the worldwide pattern of 
Soviet adventurism. We seek a greater 
degree of moderation and restraint as 
well as commitment to abide by inter- 
national law in Soviet behavior, but only 
the evident strength of our nation and of 
our friends and allies will serve the 
quest for stability with the Soviet Union. 

Fourth, and of utmost importance, 
is the essential task of restoring viabili- 
ty, productivity, and balance in our 
domestic economy. This has been a pri- 
mary objective of President Reagan's 
policies and much has been accomplished 



in a remarkably short time. We also 
recognize the significance and impor- 
tance of our actions in the international 
economic context, and we believe that 
our forthright attack on problems at 
home fits our longer international effort 
to contribute to building a more pros- 
perous, stable, and equitable world 
order. Without this effort to set our 
economic house in order, none of the 
above stated priorities will be possible to 
carry out. 

In our emphasis on the above 
elements of our policy, we will take care 
that our policies throughout the world 
are conducted with consistency and 
clarity. It is also essential that our 
efforts be focused within a framework 
which permits actions and policies in one 
region to be mutually reinforcing in 
another region. 

U.S. Interests in Asia 

Turning now to Asia in particular, our 
interests are diverse and long standing. 
They encompass security and economic 
commitments on the one hand and 
friendship and cultural affinity with the 
peoples of the region on the other. Our 
security arrangements are spelled out in 
bilateral treaties with Japan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines; our trilateral 
treaty with Australia and New Zealand 
(ANZUS); and the Manila pact, under 
which we have a commitment to the 
security of Thailand. In a broad sense, 
then, we are committed to peace and 
stability throughout the region. 

In recent years, we have recognized 
that our Asian security policy is related 
to our larger task of coping with the 
strategic challenge posed by our prin- 
cipal adversary, the Soviet Union, and 
by the aggressive actions of nations 
which receive its backing and act as its 
proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge 
is global in character, and what we do in 
Asia will be consistent with our efforts 
elsewhere. 

On the economic and commercial 
front, the indicators point to a solid rela- 
tionship. Total U.S. trade with East 
Asia equals our trade with all of West- 
ern Europe. 

Let me discuss the key relationships 
we have in the region and the key ques- 
tion: What are the Reagan Administra- 
tion's policy priorities? 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 27, 1981. ■ 



June 1981 



33 



East Asia 



Japan 

Our relationship with Japan is not only 
the cornerstone of our policy in Asia but 
one of the most close and vital relation- 
ships in our global alliance structure. As 
the relationship has matured, we have 
forged a productive partnership to deal 
with many of the most serious chal- 
lenges of our times. 

As part of our security agreement 
with Tokyo, we maintain a credible 
deterrent force in East Asia. The 
Japanese have undertaken an increasing- 
ly larger contribution to the costs of 
maintaining these forces. Together, we 
have worked out guidelines for joint 
defense planning and continue to consult 
extensively on defense issues. 

Our economic ties are no less impor- 
tant. Bilateral trade between our two 
nations exceeded $51.5 billion in 1980. 
Japan is our largest market after 
Canada and our best customer for agri- 
cultural products, as more acreage in 
the United States is devoted to produc- 
ing food for Japan than within Japan 
itself. 



amounts of economic assistance to 
developing countries, accepting the 
responsibilities of the world's second 
largest economic power. 

We welcome and encourage a major 
Japanese role in world affairs. We will 
look to Japan to exercise leadership in 
dealing with the complex challenges con- 
fronting the international community. In 
this regard, we welcome the visit to our 
country in early May of Prime Minister 
Suzuki as a unique opportunity to take 
stock of our mutual interests and to 
devise common strategies. 



China 

Our relations with China are governed 
by the terms of the joint communique of 
January 1, 1979, establishing diplomatic 
relations between our two countries. 
These ties, now over 2 years old, are 
firmly grounded on both sides in enlight- 
ened self-interest and mutual respect. 
They represent a return to an historic 
pattern of friendship and productive 



Our relationship with Japan is not only the cornerstone of our 
policy in Asia but one of the most close and vital relationships in our 
global alliance structure. 



No relationship, no matter how 
solid, is without some rough spots. Our 
large bilateral trade deficit and the auto 
import question are two economic issues 
which both countries will need to 
resolve. On the trade deficit, I might 
note that a positive trend has emerged, 
which will contribute to a more balanced 
relationship. So far in 1981, our exports 
to Japan have risen dramatically -46% 
since 1978 -while our imports rose by 
only 8% during the same period. 

Our two nations are firmly linked as 
equal partners in a full spectrum of 
regional and global interests. We have 
welcomed the emergence of a more ac- 
tive Japanese foreign policy and 
Japanese initiatives in dealing with 
many different issues of global concern. 
In addition to its involvement in Asian 
and Pacific questions, Japan has demon- 
strated its willingness to play an active 
and constructive role in the Middle East, 
Africa, and Latin America. Japan has 
made a commitment to provide greater 



dialogue between the American and 
Chinese people. 

We recognize that the 1 billion peo- 
ple of China play a very important role 
in the maintenance of global peace and 
stability. Our many interests intersect 
many points along the way. Our policies 
toward Soviet expansion and hegemon- 
ism run on parallel tracks. In Southwest 
Asia, particularly, we stand together in 
demanding Soviet withdrawal from Af- 
ghanistan and a halt to Soviet south- 
ward expansion. We each place em- 
phasis on bolstering the security of Paki- 
stan and other neighboring states, while 
seeking to improve our respective rela- 
tions with India. 

In our relationship with China, we 
will strengthen the institutional frame- 
work within which economic, cultural, 
scientific, and technological programs 
between our two peoples can reach their 
fullest potential. We are making great 
progress in this regard. As many as 100 



Chinese delegations visit the United 
States each month. More than 70,000 
Americans visited China last year. Our 
two-way trade reached $4.9 billion last 
year, doubling that in the previous year 

Equally important, our two govern- 
ments have established a pattern of fre- 
quent and extremely useful consultatior 
between our highest leaders and diplo- 
mats. We will continue the serious dia- 
logue on international security matters 
which now takes place in an atmosphen 
of friendship and candor. 

Regarding Taiwan, this Administra- 
tion intends to implement faithfully the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the law passed b 
Congress which sets the parameters for 
our nonofficial ties on the basis of a 
longstanding and warm friendship with 
the people of Taiwan. Our conduct of 
this relationship with Taiwan will be 
responsible, respectful, realistic, and 
consistent with our international obliga- 
tions. 



Korea 

This Administration's approach to our 
relations with South Korea offers a solii 
demonstration of our intention to be a 
reliable friend and ally there, as else- 
where in Asia. In this regard, we have 
moved quickly to affirm our security 
commitment to the Republic of Korea 
and to lay to rest any notion that this 
Administration will contemplate with- 
drawing U.S. forces from South Korea 
in the foreseeable future. Our solid sup- 
port for South Korea is essential to the 
efforts to reduce tensions on the Korea; 
Peninsula. President Reagan personally 
delivered the U.S. commitment to 
Korean President Chun, during the lat- 
ter's visit to Washington earlier this 
year. President Chun's visit, just as the 
upcoming visit of Prime Minister Suzuk 
of Japan, points up our emphasis on ke; 
security relationships. 

South Korea has also become a ma- 
jor economic partner of the United 
States. It was our ninth largest trading 
partner last year and our third largest 
market of agricultural products. Our 
trade with Korea is remarkably in 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



balance, and our growing economic rela- 
(ionships strongly undergird our impor- 
r (ant security cooperation. 

ir, VSEAN 

' finally, let me mention our relations 
e vith the countries comprising the Asso- 
" :iation of South East Asian Nations 
ASEAN). The ASEAN group includes 
he countries of Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philip- 
rt jines. Born out of economic self-interest 
, 13 years ago, ASEAN has successfully 
d Dranched out into key political areas. It 
l las played a major role in dealing with 
1 the danger of Vietnamese hegemony in 
the region, including Vietnam's aggres- 
sion against and occupation of Kam- 
puchea. Our ASEAN friends know, as 
we know, that it is only through the 
Soviet Union's supply of weapons and 
assistance that Vietnam is able to sus- 
tain these aggressive actions. The 
United States firmly supports the U.N. 
General Assembly resolution sponsored 
by ASEAN which condemns Vietnamese 
aggression and calls for withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and 
for an international conference under 
auspices of the U.N. Secretary General. 
Secretary Haig's planned attendance at 
the ASEAN conference in Manila this 
June will afford us a timely opportunity 
to consult with our Asian friends on 
common objectives. 



Conclusion 

I would like to close my remarks by ex- 
pressing conviction that in the first 100 
days of this Administration we have laid 
the solid foundations for regaining the 
confidence of our friends and the respect 
of our adversaries. This has been 
achieved during a series of official visits 
to Washington by key leaders, the re- 
cent trip to the Middle East by the 
Secretary, and the ongoing consultations 
with our European allies. We are re- 
assuming the responsibilities of leader- 
ship. None of us minimizes the problems 
and the amount of work involved in at- 
taining this objective. But we do not 
shrink from the challenges ahead, and I 
submit that, in Asia as elsewhere, the 
Reagan Administration has made a good 
start on the long road that lies ahead. ■ 



Global Economic Interdependence 



by Deane R. Hinton 

Address before the Center for Inter- 
national Business in Dallas on April 8, 
1981. Mr. Hinton is Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. 

Probably the most important single 
postwar economic phenomenon has been 
the growth in global interdependence. 
Economic power -once concentrated in 
the United States almost to the point of 
dominance -is today widely diffused and 
widely shared. During the 1970s, the 
share of U.S. GNP devoted to interna- 
tional trade rose dramatically. Our ex- 
ports and imports were about 11% of 
GNP in 1970 and over 22% of GNP in 
1979. Before World War II they were 
less than 5%. Similarly the importance 
of trade -especially trade in oil -has 
rapidly increased in other OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] countries and in the 
developing world. 

As we all know, increasing interna- 
tional trade enhances economic prosper- 
ity through greater specialization and 
economies of scale. International com- 
petition spurs efficiency and retards in- 
flation. Interdependence also makes 
cooperation essential. In an interdepend- 
ent world the domestic economic policies 
of one country can create important 
benefits or pose major difficulties for its 
trading partners. Moreover, many 
economic problems, such as energy, food 
security, population pressure, and finan- 
cial stability, are truly global in 
character. Only in cooperation with 
others can they be effectively tackled. 

Let me illustrate my theme of in- 
terdependence by sketching out some of 
the impacts on the world economy of the 
substantial increase in oil prices in 1979. 
I will then concentrate on the five major 
economic challenges which we now 
face -stagflation, energy security, finan- 
cial stability, structural adjustment, and 
population growth. In each of these 
problems the fact of interdependence is 
key. 

Interdependence Illustrated 

The more than doubling of OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] oil prices in less than 15 
months markedly shifted the real terms 
of trade between oil producers and the 



rest of the world. In effect, a massive 
new excise tax, the incidence of which 
depended on patterns of consumption of 
imported oil, was levied on the world. 

The primary impact on oil importers 
was twofold. First, a sharp increase in 
energy prices that ran through the 
system from crude oil to alternate fuels 
to textiles made from feedstocks, etc. In 
short, a major additional inflationary 
shock was administered to the world 
economy. Second, the tax impact was a 
significant depressant on growth as real 
aggregate demand decreased in import- 
ing countries. 

The oil shock was even more 
devastating to the poorer countries 
where the ability to adjust is so much 
less. Oil-importing developing countries 
suffered growth retardation and direct 
inflation. They suffered again when their 
imports of industrial and investment 
goods from us and other developed 
countries increased in price and when 
demand for their exports to the richer 
countries dropped off as growth slowed 
in their principal markets. Developing 
nations were left facing higher import 
prices with lower export earnings and 
little room for adjustment. This was bad 
enough, but their problems did not end 
there. 

As the economic situation worsened 
in the developed countries, declining in- 
dustries clamored for protection. 
Already facing quota restraints 
throughout the developed world on 
labor-intensive imports such as shoes 
and textiles, wealthier, less developed 
countries (LDCs) like Brazil, Mexico, 
India, and Korea, saw a new wave of 
protectionism in Europe and North 
America begin to extend to other in- 
dustries-steel, electronics, and perhaps 
autos as well. 

At the same time, the poorer 
LDCs -those with fewer possibilities of 
earning their way by exporting - 
discovered that Western governments 
and legislatures -trying to reduce infla- 
tion by cutting budget deficits -often 
saw foreign aid as a prime target. If 
governments did not focus on foreign 
aid, legislatures, including the U.S. Con- 
gress, certainly did. Thus, at a time 
when the developing countries most 
need help to increase their agricultural 
output and to develop alternative energy 
resources and thereby reduce their 
burgeoning import bills, the growth of 



June 1981 



35 



Economics 



foreign assistance has slowed. Less aid 
means reduced opportunities for the 
developing countries to earn their way. 
In turn our exports -increasingly impor- 
tant for our economic health since today 
one out of six U.S. jobs is export 
related -face slowing demand in what 
recently has been our fastest growing 
export market, the developing country 
market. Moreover, these examples are 
only some of the perverse effects flow- 
ing from the oil shock on the stability of 
the world trade and financial system. 
What policy conclusions should we 
draw from these developments? As I see 
it, the oil shock heightens the criticality 
of dealing with five major world-level 
economic challenges, each of which 
would have existed anyway but general- 
ly in less acute form. In each case the 
challenge is rooted in interdependence. 
In each case I believe the key to rational 
responses is closer international coopera- 
tion. These five challenges are: 

First, to fight the new phenomenon 
of stagflation, the industrial countries 
need to employ a combination of 
demand-restraint and supply-side 
measures to improve productivity, bring 
down inflation, and restore growth. The 
markets for foreign exchange and 
traded goods transmit economic effects 
from one economy to another. Com- 
patibility among national economic 
policies -achieved through close coopera- 
tion-is thus essential. 

Second, the constraints on world 
economic growth imposed by rising oil 
prices and limited supplies of energy 
must be loosened. To do this will require 
national and cooperative international 
policies to increase energy availability 
and reduce energy demand. 

Third, increased interdependence 
has generated an enormous expansion in 
the volume of international financial 
transactions. While the private markets 
thus far have been able to handle the 
bulk of this financing, governments 
must work to strengthen the Bretton 
Woods institutions which mobilize 
resources and help maintain confidence. 
Otherwise the so-called recycling prob- 
lem could imperil the functioning of an 
increasingly fragile world financial 
system. 

Fourth, difficult structural ad- 
justments are necessary because of 
changing international patterns of 
specialization. Protectionist policies, if 
widely adopted, would severely damage 
the open trading system that con- 
tributed so importantly to historically 



unparalleled growth in the 1950s and 
1960s. Structural adjustment and 
adherence to free-market principles -in 
cooperation with partners who also ad- 
just and keep their markets open - 
should facilitate increased prosperity in 
the future. 

Fifth, world population is growing 
at about 1.7% per annum, but it is grow- 
ing unevenly. While the developed coun- 
tries have near-zero growth, the devel- 
oping regions show rates of 2-3%, and 
thus anticipate a doubling of their popu- 
lations in the next 25-35 years. It is no 
coincidence that El Salvador, the coun- 
try with the highest population density 
in Latin America, is beset by revolu- 
tionary conflict. If potential population 
explosions are not contained, we and our 
children will live in a world of countless 
El Salvadors. 

Fighting Stagflation 

It has been said that if you examine 
disaster reports, economic or otherwise, 
there are almost always two factors at 
work -bad judgment and bad luck. 
Regardless of how the current economic 
situation developed, the new Administra- 
tion took office facing, as President 
Reagan put it, "the worst economic mess 
since the Great Depression." Our recent 
economic experience has been a dreary 
concatenation of sluggish growth, high 
unemployment, persistent inflation, 
unstable financial markets with widely 
fluctuating interest rates, acute distress 
in several key industries, and declining 
productivity. 

The Administration is attempting to 
reinvigorate the economy with a far- 
reaching program of monetary and fiscal 
restraint and policies intended to release 
the inherent vigor of the private sector. 
The President's program would 
stimulate growth by cutting government 
spending and using tax cuts to induce 
private sector saving and productive in- 
vestment. Reducing the role of govern- 
ment in capital markets and the burden 
of government regulation should further 
improve the possibilities for private in- 
vestment. While other governments may 
apply a different mix of policies, depend- 
ing on the structure of their economies 
and the tools available, the objectives we 
all share are more savings and real in- 
vestment, a better balance between 
growth and inflation, and a revival of 
productivity growth. 

As we go forward, we and our part- 
ners need to keep in mind both the 
positive and negative effects of in- 



terdependence. Early in the last decade, 
the simultaneous and sustained growth 
of the developed economies created 
severe supply bottlenecks, leading to 
some skyrocketing commodity prices. 
After a cooling-off period, in 1977-78 
the United States got out in front in 
economic expansion thereby providing 
growth stimulus and an excellent export 
market for our trading partners. Our 
trade deficit surged to almost $29 billion 
(f.o.b. basis) in 1978. Then as expansion 
picked up in Europe, we earned a large 
bilateral surplus, which helps to offset 
our continuing deficits with Japan. 

Currently, a number of our Euro- 
pean friends -whose exchange rates are 
under some pressure from a relatively 
strong dollar -are nervous about the 
high level of U.S. interest rates. They 
could offset this by hiking their own 
rates, but in many cases, with their 
economies already suffering from high 
unemployment, they are reluctant to 
move monetary policy in a depressive 
direction. 

As we have noted, interdependence 
does not just work one way -from the 
United States to others. Nor does this 
dynamic interplay among economies 
mean that countries should follow inden 
tical economic strategies. What it does 
mean is that our respective economic 
policymakers should remain in close con 
sultation. The process of continuous ex- 
changes of view by telephone across the 
Atlantic and Pacific and to Ottawa be- 
tween central bank, treasury, and 
finance ministry officials; in Paris at the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development; at the International 
Monetary Fund; and at the regularly 
scheduled summits of the industrialized 
democracies (President Reagan will at- 
tend the Ottawa summit in July), helps 
coordinate the economic policies of the 
major countries and assures that key 
policymakers are aware of the likely 
consequences of their actions on their 
partners. 

Energy Security 

As I noted earlier, OPEC price policy 
can have a devastating effect on world 
economic balance. Even worse, our un- 
due physical dependence on oil from the 
Middle East poses dangers for peace 
and Western political freedom of action. 
We, the Europeans, and the Japanese 
are not invulnerable to political 
blackmail. Recently we have seen how 
political disruption, revolution, and war 
in the Persian Gulf can threaten 
Western energy supplies. Clearly inter- 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



Economics 



l e lational systems of adjustment and 
imergency preparedness need to be 
itrengthened and improved. Viewing 
hese vulnerabilities. Secretary Haig told 
he Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hat the industrial democracies "have 
lot yet built an effective program for 
iealing with the energy crisis." 

For the United States, protection 
gainst unforeseen crude oil shortfalls 
nust begin with an effective strategic 
>etroleum reserve (SPR). We anticipate 
;hat the SPR would be used in response 
;o a major oil supply interruption and in 
;he framework of a coordinated interna- 
tional response. 

But the SPR is not an all-purpose in- 
strument. It is not a price stabilization 
mechanism or a buffer stock to be used 
to intervene in markets. Distribution 
problems caused by small-scale, regional, 
or short-lived supply interruptions 
should be solved by the market using 
private stocks, demand restraint, and 
fuel switching. 

Building an effective SPR is impor- 
tant, but energy security is a global 
problem. U.S. demand restraint, stock 
drawdown, and fuel switching during a 
I crisis will not moderate oil price in- 
creases or relieve physical scarcity 
unless other consuming nations take 
similar action. The West already has in 
place the emergency oil allocation 
system of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) designed to counter a 
catastrophic shortfall -over 7% of com- 
bined IEA oil imports. 

But what should we do to meet 
smaller and more likely crude shortfalls, 
say on the order of 2-4% that, as oc- 
curred during the Iranian revolution, 
also have the potential to lead to sharp 
price hikes? One answer may lie in the 
collective IEA response to the oil supply 
disruption caused by the Iran-Iraq con- 
flict. In that case, IEA members agreed 
to informal cooperative measures to 
draw down stocks, restrain demand, and 
share available supplies. We can build on 
this and earlier experiences to fashion 
contingency measures for less than 
catastrophic crude supply interruptions. 
Such measures can help to stabilize and 
calm oil markets and prevent unjustified 
(and long-lasting) crude oil price in- 
creases. 

IEA members are reviewing stock 
management and consultation policies to 
see whether improvements can be made. 
For example, it might be advantageous 
if all IEA nations increased private 
stock levels beyond the current required 
minimum of 90 days of imports. Yet, the 
use of public and private stocks is a 



limited weapon against supply disrup- 
tions of long duration. Coordinated 
efforts to restrain demand are also in- 
dispensable. IEA members should ex- 
amine the possible use of domestic policy 
measures such as disruption fees or 
taxes and other market-based restraint 
measures which could contribute to a 
cooperative effort. 

We have, however, too long concen- 
trated on demand-side responses to 
disruptions. The supply side offers prom- 
ising opportunities as well. Surge capaci- 
ty for petroleum and natural gas and ex- 
panded storage for such fuels as natural 
gas would improve energy security. 
Long-term efforts to develop new 
sources of conventional and nonconven- 
tional energy at home and abroad are 
essential. 

Here the record is good and improv- 
ing. U.S. energy production is up; coal 
output quite substantially. Price decon- 
trol will stimulate marginal oil and gas 
development and justify more use of 
secondary and tertiary recovery tech- 
niques. Accelerated leasing of Federal 
lands will also provide scope for signifi- 
cant production increases. Investment in 
synthetic-fuel technologies is increasing 
and some exciting concepts are being ex- 
plored. We need to accelerate the 
development of nuclear energy by 
streamlining licensing procedures, by 
creating a climate of political support for 
nuclear energy, and by fostering ap- 
propriate marginal cost pricing for elec- 
tricity. We also need to reduce rapidly 
all supply-side constraints -for example, 
port and rail congestion -on coal utiliza- 
tion. 

Even a cursory review of efforts to 
enhance conventional energy supplies 
cannot ignore the international invest- 
ment environment. The sad fact is that 
some of the most promising conventional 
energy sources are not being developed 
as they should be. 

Elsewhere, as in our neighbor to the 
north, discriminatory investment 
policies, which favor domestic over 
foreign companies, risk reducing 
substantially the optimal development of 
energy capacity. We need to remind 
others that foreign companies do not 
foster economic dependency. Rather, 
capital willing to bear the risks of ex- 
ploration and development, regardless of 
its national origin, must be harnessed 
for the well-being of all concerned. Un- 
fortunately, in many developing coun- 
tries political considerations stressing 
local control of resource development 
have precluded investment by foreign 
companies which have the necessary ex- 



pertise and capital. We need to examine 
ways to overcome such political barriers, 
perhaps by fostering the mutually ad- 
vantageous cooperation of oil companies, 
national governments, private banks, 
and multilateral lending institutions. In 
Washington we are examining whether 
proposals such as increasing the already 
large World Bank energy development 
program make sense. 

We need also to recognize the im- 
pediment to energy resource develop- 
ment, especially in developing countries, 
which results from incompatibilities be- 
tween fiscal regimes here and abroad. 
Creative ideas to reconcile differences in 
granting tax credits must be developed. 

We have a long road ahead. The 
risks of another oil shock are real. 
Together with industry and our Western 
partners, however, we can design an in- 
ternational energy policy that is resilient 
and effective and build the framework of 
energy security that is needed to insure 
sustained economic growth at home and 
abroad. 



Financial Stability 

The 1979-80 oil price increase as in 
1973-74 presented the world with an 
enormous balance-of-payments problem. 
But this time the starting situation - 
judged in terms of the overall LDC debt 
position and developed-country bank 
asset-liability ratios -is not nearly so 
good. The total OECD current-account 
balance swung from a 1978 surplus of $9 
billion to a 1980 deficit of about $74 
billion. The LDC current account shifted 
from a $30.5-billion deficit to a 
$62-billion deficit in 1980. OPEC's cur- 
rent account switched from a $5 billion 
surplus in 1978 to a $120 billion surplus 
in 1980. Balance-of-payments adjust- 
ments required by this second oil shock 
are likely to be slower than in the 1970s, 
especially for developing countries 
whose growth and development goals 
are increasingly jeopardized. 

The major industrial countries 
should be able to cope without excessive 
difficulty. The largest deficits in 1980 
were in Germany and Japan, $13 and 
$17 billion respectively. These countries 
will be able to finance their deficits, but 
the side effects could be serious -slower 
growth along with intensified export 
competition to reduce the deficits. These 
circumstances exacerbate protectionist 
tendencies everywhere. 

The financing problems of the non- 
oil developing countries are more 
difficult. Their collective current-account 
deficit roughly doubled from 1978 to 



June 1981 



37 



Economics 



1980, and it is unlikely that the recycling 
which occurred after the first oil shock 
in 1974 can be repeated as easily. 
Restrictive monetary policies and the 
resulting higher interest rates in 
developed countries have reduced the 
growth and increased the cost of inter- 
national liquidity on which borrowers de- 
pend. Furthermore, private banks are 
increasingly wary of the risks inherent 
in lending to developing countries. The 
result is a decline in the share of 
current-account deficits financed by 
private long-term flows, more recourse 
to short-term borrowing, and slower 
reserve accumulation. These methods of 
financing cannot be relied upon in the 
long run, however, and some developing 
countries already confront serious prob- 
lems. 

LDCs, facing increased competition 
for loanable funds from developed coun- 
tries, will have to pay higher interest 
rate spreads adding to their debt service 
burdens -already large in many cases. 
As the outlook worsens, private banks 
will insist that borrowing nations under- 
take difficult adjustment measures in 
order to return their current-account 
deficits to sustainable levels. 

The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), because it requires that a country 
develop and implement an economic ad- 
justment program as a condition to 
granting access to its extensive 
resources, has a major role to play in 
facilitating adjustment. The IMF has 
been adapting its own policies to cope 
with the more difficult global financial 
situation. In the past, countries have 
been reluctant to ask for IMF assistance 
until their difficulties were almost 
beyond help. The Fund has recently in- 
creased the potential size of its loans to 
respond to larger financing needs and 
lengthened its terms to meeting coun- 
tries' political requirements for more 
gradual adjustment. Traditional demand 
management tools such as reducing 
fiscal and current-account deficits and 
tightening the money supply are still im- 
portant to the IMF, but increasingly the 
Fund is turning to longer term supply- 
side oriented programs. 

To finance Fund programs, IMF 
members have doubled their 
quotas -adding both to the Fund's 
resources and to members' borrowing 
rights. The IMF is currently evaluating 
the merits of borrowing in the private 
markets. The success of this approach, 
however, depends on continued coopera- 
tion among the developed countries and 
others in strong economic or surplus 



positions. The IMF provides a 
mechanism for this cooperation as 
evidenced by the recent Fund negotia- 
tion with Saudi Arabia for a quota in- 
crease. The negotiations yielded for the 
Fund, inter alia, a $5-billion line of 
credit from Saudi Arabia in each of the 
next 2 years. 

The future scope for prudent bank 
lending is heavily dependent on world 
trade growth and on developing coun- 
tries' ability to participate in the expan- 
sion. With increased exports developing 
countries can earn the foreign exchange 
necessary for debt service repayment 
and justify further borrowing for invest- 
ment purposes. Consequently, access to 
developed-country markets is critical for 
developing countries. Indeed, if their ex- 
port markets remain depressed or if pro- 
tectionism spreads, more and more 
developing countries will require debt 
rescheduling to avoid outright default. 



Adjustment and Trade Problems 

I have already noted that mounting 
structural difficulties in key industrial 
sectors have increased pressures for pro- 
tectionist measures in most developed 
countries. One motive is preservation of 
domestic jobs and minimization of the 
social costs of adjustment in declining in- 
dustries. 

But, at least in the United States, 
there is strong evidence that changes in 
consumer demand, differential produc- 
tivity gains and technological 
change -not imports -are by far more 
important explanations for employment 
declines in some industries. Further, 
trade protection is an expensive means 
of job preservation; the costs involved 
can be several times the wages of those 
workers whose jobs were actually lost. 
And protection is inflationary. President 
Reagan has, therefore, correctly resisted 
strong political pressure for quota pro- 
tection against Japanese autos. We hope 
Europe will do so as well. 

The case is different when unfair 
trade practices are involved. There is, 
however, a sharp difference between 
protecting firms from unfair competi- 
tion-such as we do with our recently 
revised trigger price mechanism aimed 
at steel producers who were dump- 
ing -and restricting imports when there 
has been no dumping and imports are 
not a significant cause of injury. Accord- 
ing to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, restrictions on auto im- 
ports from Japan are unjustified for just 
these reasons. In order to maintain an 
open trading system and the substantial 



benefits it offers all countries, we and 
others must practice self-restraint, not 
only in opposing protectionism but also 
in avoiding measures that artificially 
subsidize exports. The Administration 
will be vigorous in the defense of free- 
market principles at home and will de- 
mand equal vigilance from our trading 
partners. 

The long-run solution to problems of 
trade and adjustment lies with our own 
domestic economic policies. Some of our 
industrial problems are being caused by 
the pervasive stagflation of the past few 
years which has fostered low real invest- 
ment and high unit labor costs. To the 
extent that these problems are related 
to macroeconomic factors, we can all 
hope that the recently announced 
economic policy shifts will be efficacious 
and will provide industry with the 
necessary boost. 

On the other hand, insofar as struc- 
tural problems are the result of perma- 
nent shifts in comparative advantage or 
the failure to diagnose the market effec- 
tively, our efforts should not be aimed at 
providing crutches -assistance which 
often becomes permanent and, in the 
long-run, industrially debilitating. 
Rather, we should look ahead to new 
products and product lines. Instead of 
pouring resources into yesterday's in- 
dustries, let us anticipate tomorrow's de- 
mand and put American ingenuity to 
work. 

This may well mean greater expend- 
iture on research and development as 
well as more aggressive sales strategies. 
It may require more cooperative ar- 
rangements with workers, forebearance 
from equity holders, and supply-side in- 
terventions by government. It will also 
mean continuing work with our partners 
to keep markets open to international 
trade. This Administration is committed 
to that kind of program. We are acting 
on taxes, on depreciation rules, and on 
deregulation. These are positive, 
forward-looking actions. Much depends, 
however, on positive export efforts from 
American industry. 

Population 

A sociologist, on noting a very long line 
for a movie, commented "There you see 
the need for reducing the population." 
"Oh, no," responded his economist com- 
panion, "you just need to build a second 
cinema." This difference of approach lies 
at the center of discussions on popula- 
tion growth. Take Mexico, our near 
neighbor: the population is now around 
68 million. As recently as 1960 it was 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



Economics 



ily half that size. This means that, 
erely to maintain their low standard of 
ng, for every school, road, hospital, 
id house existing in 1960, another 
ust have been built. 

This is the' burden that the develop- 
ig countries bear. Investment in human 
apital competes with investment in pro- 
ductive capital. While family planning 
an assist couples to produce just the 
umber of children they desire, it is only 
s the economic structure changes that 
he preferred family size will decline, 
"his requires a long-term effort. But it 
an happen. In one developing country 
fter another, the completed family size 
; falling -in Mexico, among others. But 
vhile the rate of growth has slowed it is 
till a positive rate and the flow into the 
vercrowded cities gives unreal 
stimates of, say, a Mexico City of 31 
nillion in the year 2000. 

The United States has been a leader 
n responding to requests for the 
leveloping countries for development 
>rojects linked to family planning 
issistance. To ease off in these efforts 
vould merely increase the burden for 
he next generations -here and there. 

Conclusion 

fears ago, there was a saying that when 
he United States caught a cold, the 
world got pneumonia. Over the years, 
,his linkage crossed many borders. 
Developing countries still use the 
inalogy to describe their relations with 
:he developed countries. Yet the truth of 
:he matter is that no nation, not even 
the United States, is totally immune 
from economic illnesses transmitted 
imong nations. 

As I have pointed out, recent energy 
>roblems have served to highlight some 
if our structural problems and to ex- 
icerbate them. The nature of these 
iroblems is such that the United States 
an't solve them alone. Still it is within 
>ur power to work responsibly with 
thers to find cooperative solutions. This 
5 America's interest in a complex in- 
erdependent world. ■ 



The Airbus: Challenge to U.S. 
Aircraft Industry 



by Harry Kopp 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on March 19, 1981. Mr. Kopp is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Econom- 
ic and Business Affairs. 1 

For the last several years, the U.S. air- 
craft industry has been under serious 
challenge. In 1976 about 90% of the free 
world's commercial jets were U.S.-built. 
With the introduction of the airbus, 
however, our share began to decline, 
and today we can claim only about 70%. 
The airbus— the A-300 and A-310— is a 
good plane brought to market at the 
right time to threaten our lead. It com- 
bined payload, range, and economy at- 
tractively for shorter and intermediate 
hops, finding a niche in the market 
where U.S. manufacturers had no exact 
competitor aircraft in production to 
meet it at that time. The airbus has sold 
extremely well in Europe and the Middle 
East and has made inroads elsewhere. 

The outlook is for increasing com- 
petition from airbus and others. Airbus 
has planned a new generation of single- 
aisle and twin-aisle carriers, the SA-1 
and SA-2 for short hauls, the TA-9— an 
improvement on the 300 series— and the 
TA-11 long-haul plane to compete for 
the intercontinental market. Japan 
hopes to enter the market with engines 
and perhaps airframes. 

In the future, competition from such 
unlikely sources as Brazil and even Indo- 
nesia, for commuter-type aircraft, 
should not be discounted. Moreover, the 
challenge to U.S. firms is in our own 
domestic market as well as abroad. At 
the same time, the industry appears to 
be becoming increasingly international- 
ized, with joint ventures and component 
supply networks crisscrossing national 
borders. For example, although we re- 
gard the European airbus as a com- 
petitor, approximately one-third of the 
value of each airbus sold is in U.S. com- 
ponents, with jet engines the most im- 
portant of these. 

I will leave details concerning the in- 
dustry and its prospects to other Ad- 
ministration witnesses. It is against this 
background, however, that the impact of 
government policy on the industry 
should be assessed. 



Losses in the Middle East 

In no other area in the world were the 
successes of the competition so spectacu- 
lar and our own sales performance so 
dismal as in the Middle East last year. 
Jet aircraft sales in the region climbed 
to $1,977 million, of which U.S. sup- 
pliers won only $259 million, or 13%, as 
compared with U.S. sales of over $1.5 
billion the year before. Airbus, in con- 
trast, selling $1.7 billion, captured 87% 
of the Middle Eastern market. Using a 
Department of Commerce formula that 
$1 billion in exports gained or lost 
equals 40,000 jobs, the drop from 1979 
to 1980 of $1.3 billion, if not made up in 
sales elsewhere, equates to 50,000 jobs 
lost for only 1 year. 

In an excellent report received just 
this month, our regional civil air attache 
in Tunis notes that the enormous decline 
in U.S. fortunes was not likely due to 
technical considerations, a lack of effort 
on the part of our manufacturers, nor 
even to the quality of the airbus. Rather, 
pivotal factors most mentioned by his 
contacts were: 

• Financing; 

• Political considerations, including 
foreign policy controls; 

• High-level political support for air- 
bus; and 

• The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac- 
tices Act. 



Financing 

Export-Import Bank financing has 
played a crucial part in U.S. aircraft 
sales in the past 2V2 years, typically ac- 
counting for about 40% of the bank's 
direct loan portfolio. Nevertheless, the 
industry, on average, has received a 
lower percent of direct credit cover as a 
portion of total export value than other 
U.S. capital goods exports— 44% last 
year as against 63% for nonaircraft pur- 
chases. 

Today, Europeans do better by air- 
bus, with terms we have not been able 
to meet. Airbur offers 85% of export 
value, repayable in francs, marks, and 
dollars at a composite rate of 7.95% 
over 10 years. Normally, Eximbank can- 
not come close to this; although, in 
several highly competitive cases, it has 
offered 75-10-15 coverage, with the sup- 



une1981 



39 



Economics 



plier and the purchaser covering the 
10% and 15% respectively. In such 
deals, Eximbank's interest rate today 
typically would be 9.25% at 10-year 
term. In other cases when competition is 
less direct or not verified, Eximbank 
support has been, of necessity, much 
lower and, in some cases, has consisted 
of guarantees only, with no direct 
credits. 

It would be in the long-term interest 
of all industrialized countries to bring 
the export financing price war under 
control, and, indeed, in an ideal world, 
financing costs would be determined by 
market forces alone. In this regard, we 
are continuing efforts with other in- 
dustrial nations to work out better 
ground rules to limit credit competition 
but with little success so far. In the 
meantime, our aircraft industry is faced 
with the very real problem of how to 
meet the superior European govern- 
ment-backed credit terms. 

Foreign Policy Controls 

The impact of foreign policy controls has 
been particularly strong in the Middle 
East. South African sales have also been 
affected and, to some extent, sales to 
Chile, with the denial until recently of 
Eximbank facilities. Our antiboycott 
legislation does not appear to have 
directly influenced sales so far. Nor have 
munition controls had a noticeable 
effect. 

The requirement for a validated 
license under the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 affects aircraft exports 
primarily in two areas: exports to police 
and military entities in South Africa and 
exports to the four countries determined 
to have repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism — Iraq, 
Libya, Syria, and the People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of Yemen. For South 
Africa, we have denied applications to 
sell about $2 million in aircraft to the 
police and military. Sales to civilian end 
users have been routinely approved. 

Restrictions on aircraft sales to the 
four countries designated as repeated 
supporters of terrorist acts have 
resulted in our failure to approve 
licenses for sales of more than $500 
million. Additional licenses may not have 
been sought because the prospect of ap- 
proval was so slender. Whenever the 
U.S. Government withholds a license, 
the reliability of the United States as a 
commercial supplier can come under 
question. The Arab Air Carriers 
Organization passed a resolution last 
year decrying the denial of aircraft to 
some of its members. U.S. aircraft 
manufacturers have told us that their 



customers are now demanding penalty 
clauses in sales contracts in case of ex- 
port license denial. 

Disincentives 

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
appears to have been a complicating fac- 
tor in sales in the Middle East. There 
are complaints that the act has caused 
fears and misunderstandings that lead to 
confused negotiations. A contact is 
reported commenting in regard to a loss 
to airbus that "only Americans are naive 
and innocent." 

There is also concern in the Middle 
East about section 911/913 of our tax 
code and the difficulty that this causes in 
recruitment of U.S. technicians. This 
problem, however, does not appear to 
figure heavily in the case of aircraft 
sales. 



Inducements to Industry and Sales 

All industrialized countries, including 
our own, provide government induce- 
ments to aircraft manufacture and sales, 
but on balance, our industry clearly 
trails. European government induce- 
ments typically consist of developmental 
grants, low- or no-interest development 
loans and guarantees, highly favorable 
export financing terms, marketing sub- 
sidies, and currency exchange subsidies. 
Japan provides a similar but perhaps 
less comprehensive range of induce- 
ments. We have, of course, provided Ex- 
imbank support, and for defense ends, a 
number of supports in facilities and 
research and development assistance. 
An important difference separating our 
industry from most others is that most 
foreign firms are nationalized or have at 
least some equity participation by 
governments. 

As the subcommittee is aware, a 
separate code, the Agreement on Trade 
in Civil Aircraft, was negotiated during 
the recently completed Tokyo Round of 
trade negotiations. This has been signed 
by the United States, the European 
Community, Austria, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Romania, Sweden, and Swit- 
zerland and is in force. Article VI of the 
agreement states that signatories 
"should seek to avoid adverse effects of 
trade in civil aircraft in the sense of Ar- 
ticles 8.3 and 8.4 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," 
i.e., that injury to another signatory's 
domestic industry or serious prejudice to 
the interest of another signatory should 



be avoided. Displacement of another 
country's exports in a third country 
could fall under the concept of "serious 
prejudice." Article 11, however, 
recognizes that subsidies are widely use< 
as important instruments for the promo- 
tion of social and economic policy objec- 
tives, and the right of signatories to use 
such subsidies is not restricted. What is 
left unclear and yet to be sorted out is 
where legitimate economic and social ob 
jectives end and injury and' prejudice 
begin. There is room for wide difference 
in interpretation, and substantial burden 
of proof will rest on the complainant in 
cases brought up under the agreement. 
I have restricted myself largely to a 
description of the situation our aircraft 
industry faces, with reference to the im- 
pact of government policy. I have delib- 
erately avoided speculating on what 
policy is likely to be, or ought to be, in 
the future: Given the emergence of 
strong competition from the airbus, the 
U.S. Government can no longer take for 
granted American dominance of the 
world market for civil aircraft. A 
healthy export sector continues to be a 
major foreign policy goal of the United 
States and an important element in 
maintaining our influence in the world. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



40 



Department of State Bulletir 



EJROPE 



US. Lifts Agricultural Sales 
limitation to the U.S.S.R. 



RESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
*R. 24, 1981 1 

|m today lifting the U.S. limitation on 
Kitional agricultural sales to the 
liet Union as I promised to do during 
It year's Presidential campaign. My 
Iministration has made a full and com- 
Ite study of this sales limitation, and I 
l.ched my decision after weighing all 
lions carefully and conferring fully 
In my advisers, including members of 
• Cabinet and the National Security 
uncil. We have also been consulting 
;h our allies on this matter. 

As a Presidential candidate, I in- 
ated my opposition to the curb on 
es, because American farmers had 
;n unfairly singled out to bear the 

den of this ineffective national policy, 
lso pledged that when elected Presi- 
lt I would "fully assess our national 
urity, foreign policy, and agricultural 
eds to determine how best to ter- 
nate" the decision made by my 
idecessor. 



This assessment began as soon as I 
entered office and has continued until 
now. In the first few weeks of my 
Presidency, I decided that an immediate 
lifting of the sales limitation could be 
misinterpreted by the Soviet Union. I, 
therefore, felt that my decision should 
be made only when it was clear that the 
Soviets and other nations would not 
mistakenly think it indicated a weaken- 
ing of our position. 

I have determined that our position 
now cannot be mistaken: The United 
States, along with the vast majority of 
nations, has condemned and remains op- 
posed to the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and other aggressive acts 
around the world. We will react strongly 
to acts of aggression wherever they take 
place. There will never be a weakening 
of this resolve. 



1 Read to reporters by deputy press 
secretary Larry M. SpeaKes (text from Week- 
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Apr. 27, 1981). ■ 



tutch Prime Minister Meets With 
Ice President Bush 



Prime Minister Andreas A. M. van 
jt and Foreign Minister Christoph A. 
m Der Klaauw of the Netherlands 
ode an official visit to Washington, 
,C, March 30- April 1, 1981. Following 
~e remarks made by the Prime Minister 
id Vice President Bush following a 
eeting on March SI. 1 

ice President Bush 

e've just had a delightful visit with 
"ime Minister van Agt, and I told him 
>w much the President had been look- 
g forward to seeing him. And I know 
om having visited the President in the 
>spital, prior to this visit, that today 
>w much our President regrets not be- 
g able to receive this very, very dis- 
iguished visitor on this beautiful day 
ire at the White House. 

Our talks, we think, on the Ameri- 
.n side, have been extremely useful, 
ispite the overlying concerns that 
r erybody feels about our President. 
at these talks do testify to the continu- 



ing importance which the United States 
places on our transatlantic ties, in- 
cluding those with all of the members of 
NATO. 

In that connection, the President 
asked me to extend, through the Prime 
Minister, to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix 
our hope that she will come to the 
United States in 1982. A visit by Her 
Majesty would be a fitting culmination of 
our joint celebration during that year of 
our bicentennial of U.S. -Dutch relations. 

The Prime Minister also comes to us 
as Chairman of the European Council. I 
have welcomed this opportunity to ex- 
change views on issues of concern to the 
Community and, of course, bilateral con- 
cerns to the United States. And I know 
we feel— and I'm sure I speak for Secre- 
tary Haig and all who were privileged to 
meet with the Prime Minister — that 
there is a mutual understanding on 
many issues. 

There is a mutual understanding of 
the situation, for example, in the Middle 
East and of our efforts there, efforts in 
which they have played a key role. The 



Netherlands and the United States are 
also allies in NATO, which I mentioned, 
and which, of course, remains the 
backbone of our mutual security. In our 
talks, I reiterated the U.S. determina- 
tion, as President Reagan has made 
clear, to pursue vigorously the two 
tracks of NATO's December 1979 deci- 
sion on theater nuclear weapons, both 
modernization and arms control. 

We discussed Poland and were in 
strong agreement that the Polish people 
must be allowed to work out a solution 
to their own problems. Outside interven- 
tion or internal suppression in Poland 
would have severely — you'd have severe 
negative effects on East- West relations. 

We discussed a little bit, to some 
degree, the crisis in Afghanistan, 
brought about by this illegal invasion 
and occupation of the country. We 
talked about the regional security of the 
Caribbean. We discussed, to some 
degree, El Salvador. I explained that 
American policy is designed to help that 
country defend itself against attacks 
from Marxist guerrillas that are sup- 
ported and trained by Communist coun- 
tries. The Duarte government must be 
given the opportunity to institute its 
reform programs. 

We had a very fruitful meeting. I ex- 
pressed my regrets to the Prime 
Minister that he did not have the oppor- 
tunity to be received and to meet and to 
discuss these issues with our President. 
But it was a tribute to our friendship 
that our President being absent, the 
Prime Minister was willing to accord us 
every courtesy and come here and to 
have these fruitful discussions. 

Prime Minister van Agt 

Let me first say, again, how much we 
were shocked by the events of yester- 
day. We wish, again, the President, 
wholeheartedly, a speedy and full 
recovery. 

The meetings we had today have, no 
doubt, further contributed to the ex- 
cellent relations between the United 
States and Europe. Our historic relation- 
ship has proved to be essential at the 
most crucial moments in our past and 
will continue to be so in the future. To- 
day we are strongly united in an alliance 
aimed at our common single goal — pre- 
serving peace and freedom in the world. 
At the same time, we are dedicated to 
contribute to national and international 
efforts to improve the quality of life for 
the millions in the world who are in the 
most serious need. 



ine1981 



41 



Europe 



The European Council, meeting in 
the Netherlands last week, further em- 
phasized the need for the closest possi- 
ble cooperation between the European 
Communities and the United States in 
solving the extremely serious economic 
problems we are facing. The only way to 
win the economic fight is through well- 
coordinated, joint efforts. 

You mentioned the fact that our 
countries are preparing for the celebra- 
tion next year of the 200th anniversary 
of our diplomatic and trade relations. 
They are the oldest, unbroken, con- 
tinuously peaceful relations between the 
United States and any other foreign 
power. 

The announcement you just made to 
extend an invitation to Her Majesty 
Queen Beatrix to visit your great coun- 
try in 1982 fills us with a great sense of 
gratitude. Your gracious invitation will 
enable our Queen to continue a tradition 
which has become a symbol of our 
friendship in all times. We regard your 
invitation as a seal on that unalterable 
and unique relationship between our 
countries across the ocean. 

I'm convinced that these celebra- 
tions, highlighted by your visit of our 
Queen, will serve their high purpose in 
contributing to an increased recognition 
of our respective shares in efforts to im- 
prove the lot of mankind. 

May I, repeatedly, thank you for 
your willingness to receive us today 
under such extraordinary, exceptional 
circumstances. I said to you already, we 
would not have been surprised in case 
you would have cancelled entirely, or at 
least partly, the program which had 
been prepared for the visit long before. 
Now the gratitude is ours. We had very 
valuable and instructive talks. We spoke 
as allies and friends. And I'm sure these 
talks will contribute to our common 
efforts. 

Again, I ask you, we'll convey our 
best wishes, friendship, respect, and 
sympathy to your President. 

Vice President Bush 

May I just share with the people here on 
the lawn what I told you. I did visit the 
President in the hospital this morning, a 
very short visit, but I was very pleased 
at the way he looked. He in his typical, 
unfailing thoughtfulness asked me to 



Turkish Foreign Minister Meets 
With Vice President Bush 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
APR. 2, 1981' 

Vice President Bush today met with 
liter Turkmen, the Foreign Minister of 
Turkey, who has come to the United 
States at the invitation of Secretary 
Haig. The meeting included senior 
officials from both Turkey and the U.S. 
Government. 

The Vice President and the Foreign 
Minister reviewed, in a cordial way, a 
number of bilateral and international 
issues. They discussed in particular the 
need for all NATO allies to continue con- 
certed efforts to enhance their defense 
posture in response to existing threats 



in Southwest Asia and Europe. The Vi< 
President also noted with satisfaction 
Turkish efforts to improve bilateral rek 
tions with Greece and Turkish support 
for the ongoing intercommunal talks or 
Cyprus. 

The Vice President took special no 
of the excellent state of the Turkish- 
American relationship and the signifi- 
cance of this year, which marks the 
centennial of the birth of Mustafa Kern 
Ataturk, the founder of modern Turke' 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981. 



Ataturk Centennial Year 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
APR. 2, 1981 1 

Beginning on May 19, Turkey will 
launch a year of celebration to com- 
memorate the centennial anniversary of 
the birth of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the 
founder of the Republic of Turkey. 
Ataturk was a great national leader in 
times of war and peace. He was, and he 
remains, first in the hearts of his coun- 
trymen. For Turkey and its people, the 
Ataturk centennial year is as important 
an event as the 1976 bicentennial was 
for us. 

In observance of this centennial 
year, events are being planned in the 
United States and other countries to 
acknowledge the significance of Ataturk 
to the Western World. Indeed, the tur- 
bulence of our era calls to mind the en- 
during wisdom of Ataturk's goal -"Peace 
at Home, Peace Abroad." 

The visit of Turkish Foreign Minis- 
ter Turkmen in this centennial year 
gives us cause to take note of the great 
value and importance of Turkish-Ameri- 
can relations. The United States of 



America and the Republic of Turkey 
have been firm friends and allies for 
more than a generation. Beginning wit 
Harry Truman, every American Presi- 
dent has viewed a strong and stable 
Turkey as an essential goal of Americ; 
policy. This is no less the case in the 
Reagan Administration. In recent yeai 
the United States has been working 
vigorously with other nations to provi( 
Turkey the resources necessary to 
regain economic health and to meet it: 
important goals as a member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). The United States fully sup- 
ports the efforts of the Turkish Coven 
ment to eradicate terrorism and to cat 
out basic reforms that will assume the 
long-term stability of Turkish democra 
and the well-being of the Turkish peop 
In commemorating the Ataturk ce 
tennial, the United States and its peop 
extend best wishes to the Republic of 
Turkey and its people. 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981. 



convey his regards here and then also 
asked about my wife, and everything 
seemed so normal. And I just thought 
I'd tell this group what I've told you, 
that we feel very relieved in this country 
at what appears to be a very speedy 



recovery. And I know he would want i 
to say, as you leave these grounds, far 
well, and God-speed, and come back. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pre: 
dential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981. ■ 



42 



Department of State Bullet 



MIDDLE EAST 



l.S. Policy Toward the Middle East 
rid Persian Gulf Region 



UPeter D. Constable 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
the Middle East and Europe of the 
use Foreign Affairs Committee on 
ril 6, 1981. Mr. Constable is Deputy 
distant Secretary for Near Eastern 
i South Asian Affairs. 1 

elcome the opportunity provided by 
s hearing today to draw together the 
rious aspects of our assistance pro- 
im and to provide an integrated pic- 
e of our policies toward the Middle 
st and Persian Gulf region. 

This is an area of global strategic 
;nificance, critical to the security of 
3 United States and our allies. It is an 
3a vulnerable to direct Soviet aggres- 
m and to indirect Soviet subversion, 
lis vulnerability has increased substan- 
,lly over the past 3 years with the col- 
)se of the Shah's regime in Iran, the 
viet invasion of Afghanistan, and con- 
lued instability caused by regional 
jputes. The Administration is deter- 
ned to carry out a broad strategy to 
rest and reverse the negative trends 
the region, while strengthening its 
curity and stability. It is vitally impor- 
nt that the key nations of the area re- 
ain independent and feel secure. We 
te consulting continuously with them to 
id ways to insure we achieve these 
>als. A strategy is, therefore, under- 
ay, within which our military and 
:onomic assistance programs will play 
critical part. The unfinished business 
' completing the peace process will go 
ind-in-hand with our efforts to improve 
le security environment in the region, 
ur approach takes into account threats 
id developments in contiguous areas, 
fe will carry out a coherent and con- 
stent policy in full awareness of the in- 
srrelationships between tensions in 
efferent regions and theaters. 

Within this context, I will now 
sscribe our key national objectives in 
le area, the threats we perceive, and 
le policies which the Administration 
ill pursue to advance these objectives. 

.S. Objectives 

le have three fundamental objectives in 
le region today. 



First, we have a compelling interest 
in promoting the security of our friends 
in that part of the world, including 
Israel, Egypt, and the other moderate 
governments. In advancing this impor- 
tant objective, we have an important ad- 
vantage over potential adversaries — we 
seek not to dominate the governments 
and peoples involved but to work with 
them to build a strong environment for 
stability and independence. 

Second, we have a clear interest in 
assuring the security and availability of 
resources vital not only to the United 
States but to the industrial and develop- 
ing world, generally. 

Third, both we and our friends in 
the region share an interest in protec- 
ting vital transportation and communica- 
tions routes to assure the passage of 
vital resources and commodities and to 
deny to any power the capacity to 
threaten or intimidate cooperative rela- 
tionships within the free world. 

It is evident that the objectives we 
pursue in this area derive clearly from 
vital U.S. national interests. We believe, 
however, that these interests are fully 
compatible with, indeed complementary 
to, the interests and objectives of friend- 
ly and independent-minded governments 
in the Middle East and South Asia. 
These mutual interests are the basis on 
which we will build as we work to 
strengthen our relationships and ad- 
vance our objectives. 

Regional Challenges 

We do not, of course, operate in a 
vacuum. There are threats and chal- 
lenges to which our policies respond. 

The first and most dramatic is 
Soviet expansionism. This takes the 
form of direct military intervention, as 
the world has seen clearly in the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. It can also take 
more indirect forms through the projec- 
tion of Soviet influence by support for 
radical regimes, as in South Yemen or 
Libya, or exploitation of subversive 
elements and unresolved conflicts. 
Unless this Soviet threat is addressed 
squarely and with flexibility by the 
United States, its allies, and its friends 
in the region, it will seriously endanger 
the achievement of our objectives. 

Second, and related, are regional 
disputes and conflicts which threaten 



regional stability and which provide fer- 
tile opportunities for external exploita- 
tion. Such disputes can not only affect 
the security of important states in the 
region but directly affect production and 
distribution of oil supplies, as we have 
seen recently in the Iraq-Iran war. In 
the central regional conflict— the Arab- 
Israeli dispute — substantial progress has 
been made toward a settlement with the 
conclusion and implementation of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. However, 
deep divisions and unresolved issues re- 
main between Israel and its other Arab 
neighbors which will continue to affect 
U.S. interests, relationships, and objec- 
tives until they can be composed on 
broadly accepted terms. 

Finally, the forces of political 
change, the process of social develop- 
ment, and the strains of rapid economic 
growth all have potential for destabiliz- 
ing societies in this as in other parts of 
the world. The fall of the Shah's govern- 
ment 2 years ago was a dramatic il- 
lustration both of the corrosive effect of 
these changes on regimes that lack the 
strength, cohesion, and resiliency to 
cope and of sudden damage which Iran's 
radicalization has caused to our political, 
economic, and security interests. 

The escalating pressures for change 
underline the importance of policies that 
recognize and respect the deeply in- 
grained values and aspirations of the 
peoples of the region, at a time when we 
insist on respect for our own. It is a 
time in the history of our own relations 
with governments in the area to concen- 
trate on wide areas of shared interest 
and common threats and to display 
special sensitivity to our differences. 

While I have given some emphasis to 
the destabilizing dangers of rapid 
modernization, it is important also to 
note that many governments and 
peoples in the area are coping well with 
the focus of change, with the problems 
of development, and the dislocations of 
modernization. 

Shape and Elements of U.S. Policy 

An effective policy approach to the chal- 
lenges and opportunities of the Middle 
East today must be carefully crafted of 
a variety of elements and instruments. 
The military and economic assistance 
programs which. we have presented to 
the Congress have been fashioned, 
within the limits of current budget 
stringencies, to play a key part in our 
strategy. They complement and support 
the other aspects of a policy that is 
forward-looking, not merely reactive; a 



une1981 



43 



Middle East 



policy that is open to new opportunities 
to build on common interests. We shall 
watch closely not only the rhetoric but 
actions to judge where new bases for 
cooperation are present, either to com- 
bat external threats to the region's 
security or to assist in resolving 
dangerous local disputes. 

Secretary Haig is, as you know, 
traveling to the Middle East this week 
[Secretary Haig made an official visit to 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia 
April 3-8] to talk with valued friends 
about our views and to solicit their 
views and concerns. This will make an 
important contribution as the Ad- 
ministration elaborates its policy ap- 
proach to the Middle East. 

U.S. Policy 

We intend to meet the Soviet challenge 
by developing a coherent approach to 
the security of the region. A central 
feature of this effort is the improvement 
of our capability to project military 
power worldwide to meet demonstrable 
threats. The President's budget request 
for a 17% increase in defense spending 
in FY 1982 gives substance and credibili- 
ty to this aspect of our approach. 

We are engaged in planning and 
consultation for an upgrading of our mil- 
itary presence and access in the vicinity. 
We have negotiated with a number of 
countries, such as Oman, agreements 
that provide us with the use of facilities 
under mutually agreed conditions. We 
will be meeting our own obligation to 



construct and improve facilities even as 
we examine carefully what additional 
facilities might be required. 

We will be concentrating on pro- 
viding to our friends in the region 
greater security assistance to permit 
them to improve their own defensive 
capabilities. We seek to build genuine 
partnerships with governments which 
share our concerns and desire our 
assistance. We recognize that the 
governments with which we are cooper- 
ating are, and should be, the first line of 
defense against threats to their security; 
we stand prepared, however, to provide 
support when required in defense of our 
common interests. We have, therefore, 
carefully balanced the limited resources 
available at this time with our interest in 
bolstering meaningful security relation- 
ships in the security assistance program 
for FY 1982. 

We will cooperate and coordinate 
closely with our allies on all facets of our 
response to the strategic threat to the 
region. We have recently held high-level 
consultations with a number of our 
closest allies, both on the nature of the 
threat to the free world's interests in the 
Middle East and on appropriate and 
effective responses. 

Even while building upon our com- 
mon interest in strengthening the securi- 
ty of the region, we will pursue a 
vigorous diplomacy designed to assist in 
settlement of destabilizing disputes. 
Foremost among these is, of course, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict where historic prog- 
ress has been achieved in the Egyptian- 



Iran Claims Procedures 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 27, 1981 1 

The Department of State has received 
the following information from the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran concerning possible negotiations of 
claims settlements directly with the par- 
ties concerned. 

With respect to claims exceeding 
$250,000 (U.S.), relevant Iranian 
organizations are prepared to start 
negotiations with the U.S. parties con- 
cerned. It is suggested that the negotia- 
tions be carried out in London. It is, of 
course, necessary that the American 
claimants inform, by cable, the precise 
but concise list of their true claims along 
with evidence (as the foundation of the 
negotiations to be carried out on the 



basis of goodwill) to Iranian parties 
directly involved, as well as to the Inter- 
national Legal and Financial Claims 
Committee, located at Bank Markazi 
Iran, Central Bank of Iran. The time 
and the program of the negotiations will 
be subsequently notified to the U.S. 
claimants by the Iranian parties or the 
said committee. 

The Department invites U.S. 
claimants with claims of $250,000 or 
more to provide information concerning 
their claims to the appropriate Iranian 
authorities insofar as practicable by 
telex. The Department has urged Iran to 
designate representatives with authority 
to negotiate and conclude claims set- 
tlements as soon as possible. 



Israeli treaty. This achievement has 
given to two of our important allies am 
friends in the Middle East a greater 
degree of security and confidence toda; 
than either had enjoyed for the previoi 
three decades. 

This is a signal achievement which 
we Continue to believe provides one coi 
nerstone for a just and viable resolutio 
of the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflic 
We will continue to work with Israel ai 
Egypt and our other friends in the are; 
to build on the accomplishments of the 
Camp David process for resolution of 
the remaining aspects of this conflict. 
We will also support the efforts of the 
United Nations and Islamic conference 
to work toward a negotiated settlemen 
of the Iraq-Iran war based on principle 
of the territorial integrity of both parti 
and noninterference in each other's in- 
ternal affairs. 

We will continue to provide econon 
ic assistance where needed and to pro- 
mote closer commercial and cultural tk 
with governments and peoples of the 
region. Roughly 50% of our global 
economic assistance is directed to the 
Middle East, where Egypt and Israel 
are the principal recipients. At the san 
time, we have important commercial 
relations with many of the states and s 
common interest in a strong and stable 
international economic system. The 
financial significance of the Middle Eas 
has increased dramatically over the las 
decade. The West remains dependent 
upon petroleum supplies from area pro 
ducers while they have acquired an im- 
portant stake in access to Western tec; 
nology and capital markets. This 
mutuality of interest underscores the 
need and basis for closer economic and 
financial cooperation. It also dramatize 
our shared interest in the orderly movs 
ment of goods, commodities, and capit; 
between the West and the Middle East 

With increased exchanges and clost 
contact comes the clear need for better 
knowledge of one another. We must 
take opportunity not only to explain ou 
society and values but to learn about th 
values and concerns of the ancient but 
vigorous cultures of the region. Ex- 
changes of citizens, particularly of 
students from the region in our college! 
and universities, have an absolutely 
essential role to play. Not only do they 
acquire knowledge and skills and an ac- 
quaintance with our values, political 
processes, and aspirations, but they car 
add to our own application of a sensitiv 
ty to their hopes and dreams for the 
future. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 



44 



Department of State Bulletir 



Middle East 



A particularly good example of our 
hange program is the international 
itary education and training (IMET), 
)gram which is a part of our security 
istance request. These training pro- 
ims are among our soundest invest- 
nts for the future. In many parts of 
world, for a variety of historical 
isons, important political leaders often 
lerge from military ranks. A whole 
neration of the brightest young 
litary leaders from some of the coun- 
es in the region is being trained by 
nericans and, in most cases, in 
nerican institutions. Their association 
th individual Americans and an in- 
nation to look to the United States 
d the West for military doctrine and 
entation can pay significant dividends. 

Iiecific Assistance Programs 

I early, our programs of security and 
lonomic assistance constitute one ma- 
- instrumentality of our policies in the 
tddle East. Over the past few weeks, 
i have set forth in some detail to the 
■propriate committees of the Congress 
e specific programs we are proposing 
r FY 1982. 

For Israel, we are proposing a corn- 
nation of programs totaling $2,185 
illion, of which $1.4 billion will be for 
reign military sales (FMS) financing 
id $785 million for economic support 
nding (ESF). This total is the same as 
at authorized by the Congress for FY 
)81 and, therefore, reflects the high im- 
>rtance we attach to Israel's military 
■curity and its economic strength in a 
;riod of budgetary stringency in the 
nited States. Firm and consistent sup- 
)rt for Israel has been and will remain 
central element of American foreign 
)licy. A strong, secure, and democratic 
rael contributes to the realization of 
ir overall strategic goals in the region 
id adds to the overall deterrent capaci- 
' of the free nations of the world. 

For Egypt, we are proposing $900 
illion in FMS financing, of which $400 
illion will be in concessionary direct 
•edits, as well as $750 million in ESF. 
we include the sum of up to $313 
illion in PL 480 commodities, our 
derail assistance to Egypt will be well 
rer $1.9 billion, the second largest 
lateral assistance program in the 
orld, exceeded only by that for Israel. 

Our relationship with Egypt has 
>come broad and deep, with important 
ilitary security and strategic com- 
ments. Our assistance programs will 
3lp Egypt to maintain its national 



1 1th Report on Sinai Support Mission 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
APR. 15, 1981' 

I am pleased to transmit herewith the 
Eleventh Report of the United States Sinai 
Support Mission. It covers the Mission's ac- 
tivities during the six-month period ending 
April 1, 1981. This report is provided in ac- 
cordance with Section 4 of Public Law 
94-110 of October 13, 1975. 

The Sinai Support Mission was estab- 
lished in January 1976 to implement the 
United States Proposal in the September 
1975 Second Sinai Disengagement Agree- 
ment to install and operate a tactical early 
warning system in the Sinai Peninsula. The 
United States continued to operate the early 
warning system until January 25, 1980, 
under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty. 

Because it was not possible to gain 
United States Security Council agreement to 
assume responsibility for supervising the 
security arrangements called for by the 
Peace Treaty, the United States agreed dur- 
ing September 1979 talks with Egypt and 
Israel to monitor adherence to the Treaty's 
military limitations. Verification inspections, 
conducted by the Sinai Field Mission, began 
in April 1980 and will continue until April 25, 
1982, the scheduled date for total Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai. 

My Administration has initiated bilateral 
discussions with both Parties on the security 



arrangements to be implemented in the Sinai 
following Israel's final withdrawal. The 
United States intends to carry out its com- 
mitment to ensure the establishment and 
maintenance of an acceptable alternative 
multinational force if it proves impossible for 
the United Nations to support the security 
arrangements under the Treaty. We share 
the desire of both Parties to move forward 
expeditiously on this question. We will keep 
the Congress fully informed and will consult 
as our discussions of this matter progress. 

Funding of the Sinai Support Mission for 
Fiscal Year 1981 is authorized under Chapter 
6, Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
"Peacekeeping Operations," at $16 million. 
For Fiscal Year 1982, only $10 million is be- 
ing requested, a level that will fund both the 
Mission's operations during its final months 
and the projected costs of its phaseout after 
April 25, 1982. 

Our nation has contributed substantially 
to the promotion of peace in this critical part 
of the Middle East, and the Congress can be 
proud of the accomplishments of the Sinai 
Support and Field Missions. I am counting on 
your continued support for this aspect of our 
efforts to achieve a lasting peace in the Mid- 
dle East. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 20, 1981.1 



security and to enhance its capacity to 
deter regional threats and challenges, 
while accelerating efforts to free up the 
economy, to achieve self-sustaining 
growth, and to improve the quality of 
life for Egypt's poorer people. 

While smaller, our programs 
elsewhere in the region fit into our 
broad strategic approach and comple- 
ment the peace process. 

In Jordan, we are proposing $50 
million in FMS credits and $20 million in 
ESF. These programs are smaller than 
had been the case for much of the 
decade of the 1970s, and take into ac- 
count Jordan's improving economy and 
the flow of assistance from other na- 
tions. Our programs, however, recognize 
Jordan's importance not only to the 
peace process but to the broader securi- 
ty environment to the region. Jordan 
has carried on a constructive policy — of 
direct assistance to greater American in- 
terests — in providing training, guidance, 
and seconded military security personnel 
to key countries in the gulf region. Now, 



it must deal with high tensions caused 
by a tense relationship with its northern 
neighbor, Syria. 

We are proposing $15 million in 
FMS credits and $5 million in ESF for 
Lebanon. These programs represent a 
continuation of those we began several 
years ago aimed at strengthening 
Lebanon's capacity to bring security and 
stability to its people, who are beset by 
terrible problems from within and with- 
out. Lebanon is in need of these pro- 
grams not so much because of their 
monetary value, but rather, because 
they reflect our moral and political sup- 
port. We are determined to help pre- 
serve and strengthen Lebanon's inde- 
pendence, its viability, and its national 
unity. 

For Oman, we are proposing $40 
million in FMS and $15 million in ESF. 
Located in a key strategic position, 
Oman commands the Straits of Hormuz, 
through which the bulk of the world's oil 
supply passes. Oman, thus, plays an im- 
portant role in the region's security. Its 
sense of responsibility has been apparent 



une1981 



45 



Middle East 



in its agreement with us on facilities ac- 
cess rights. Our FMS credits will help 
give Omani military forces additional 
flexibility and defensive strength. 
Economic assistance will be carried out 
through the mechanism of a joint com- 
mission that will identify areas of 
cooperation in economic development. 

Our other program in the gulf is a 
relatively small economic development 
and military assistance program in the 
Yemen Arab Republic. For FY 1982 we 
have proposed $21.1 million in develop- 
ment assistance and $15 million in FMS, 
of which $10 million would be in conces- 
sionary direct credits. Like Oman, 
Yemen occupies a geographically 
strategic position, bordering Saudi 
Arabia and South Yemen which, as a 
Soviet client state, has chronically 
threatened the integrity and stability of 
North Yemen. We are contributing to 
the country's ability to cope with 
military threats and subversion, while 
also improving the conditions of life in 
one of the most underdeveloped areas of 
the world. 

We are requesting $6 million for 
programs in the West Bank and Gaza, 
which are administered by U.S. private 
voluntary organizations, as well as $4 
million for activities to promote regional 
cooperation involving Israel and other 
states. These programs, while modest in 
size, can make significant contributions 
to the overall peace process. 

These are the essential elements of 
the strategy we will be pursuing to 
serve important U.S. interests in the 
Middle East. They provide the context 
in which our programs of security and 
economic assistance should be viewed. 



Arms Sales to Morocco; 
Western Saharan Conflict 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Morris Draper 

Statement before Subcommittees on 
African and International Security Af- 
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on March 25, 1981. Mr. Draper is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 1 

I am pleased to appear before you to 
review recent and impending arms sales 
to Morocco, among other issues. I would 
like to put these sales issues into the 
context of our overall policy approach to 
North Africa, with particular reference 
to the states of Morocco, Tunisia, 
Algeria, and Mauritania, as well as the 
conflict in the Western Sahara region. 
In the most general sense, we have 
welcomed the emergence — or in some 
cases, the reemergence — of these coun- 
tries on the world stage, after having 
struggled for their independence in the 
relatively recent past. They are proud of 
their accomplishments since then. They 
have earned our respect. 

The United States wants good, 
friendly relations with all these North 
African states on the basis of mutual 
respect and, whenever possible, shared 
interests and concerns. However, rela- 
tions with another North African coun- 
try — Libya— cannot improve as long as 
Libya follows policies in support of inter- 
national terrorism and interferes in the 
internal affairs of independent states. 

Morocco 

Morocco is important to broad U.S. in- 
terests and occupies a pivotal strategic 
area. We intend to maintain and rein- 
force our historically close relationship 
with reliability and consistency as our 
watchwords. Morocco has shared and 
has agreed with many of our foreign 
policy priorities and objectives. Like the 
United States, Morocco has been con- 
cerned over the challenges posed by the 
Soviets and their surrogates and client 
states. Morocco strongly opposed and 
criticized the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; it voted for U.N. condem- 
nation of the Soviet actions and spon- 
sored similarly condemnatory resolutions 
at the Islamic summit conference. 
Morocco has been a responsible neighbor 
to many states in Africa. It sent troops 
to Zaire on two occasions to help that 
country deal with subversion generated 



by outsiders. Until 1963 Morocco was 
the home for American strategic bases. 
An American naval facility operated in 
Morocco up to 1978 when it was finally 
closed, at our initiative. Morocco has 
consistently welcomed visits by 
American naval warships, including 
those which are nuclear powered. 

While Morocco has been part of the 
Arab consensus critical of the Egyptian- 
Israeli peace treaty and the Camp David 
accords, on the whole, it has been a 
voice of reason and pragmatism in the 
world's councils, advising pragmatic 
policies as regards the Middle East and 
decrying sterile negativism. 

For these reasons, and others, we 
intend to carry on a relationship that 
assures Morocco that it will be able to 
count on us as a steadfast and reliable 
friend. 

Algeria 

Algeria is an important country. We 
carry on a great deal of trade and obtaii 
much of our energy requirements there. 
Algeria has great influence in interna- 
tional forums. It wields influence far 
beyond what its wealth, its population, 
and its political power ordinarily would 
warrant because it is consistently well- 
prepared to make its mark on key 
North-South issues. It makes effective 
use of its revolutionary credentials, and 
it steers a course which avoids becoming 
beholden to any single state. 

It is important that we nurture an 
improved relationship with the increas- 
ingly pragmatic Algerian leadership. 
Their policies are in an interesting and 
evolving stage. Algeria also has under- 
taken important international respon- 
sibilities, as witness its professional and 
balanced efforts to bring about the 
release of the American hostages from 
Iran. Algerian officials, in this instance, 
displayed dedication, discretion, and 
resourcefulness. It is interesting that 
Algeria has sought no explicit reward or 
expression of gratitude from us for its 
important efforts. It would be short- 
sighted of the United States not to try 
to expand the improving and mutually 
beneficial relations which have been 
developing between our two countries in 
the recent past. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle cabi 



inisia 

ke Morocco, the friendly country of 
inisia has had a close relationship with 
e United States since gaining its in- 
cidence. We have admired the deter- 
ination of Tunisian leaders to ac- 
ilerate the country's economic and 
,cial development. Tunisia, in many 
aspects, has been a model for construc- 
ve progress. The United States is 
-termined to assist Tunisia in resisting 
?orts from the outside to undermine its 
[dependence and integrity. Our two 
entries should grow closer. 



Organization of African Unity (OAU) to 
bring about a settlement based on a 
cease-fire and further expression of the 
wishes of the inhabitants of this region. 

• In principle, the United States 
supports an exercise to determine the 
wishes of the inhabitants of the Western 
Sahara. There are, however, many in- 
stances in history when exercises in self- 
determination have led to results other 
than the establishment of fully independ- 
ent states. The history of Puerto Rico is 
instructive in this regard. 

U.S. Attitude Toward Moroccan Arms 
Requests 

The United States, as in the past, will 
look at all arms requests from its friend, 
Morocco, on a case-by-case basis. In our 
decisions, we will take into account all 
relevant factors, including conditions in 
the area, the arms balance in the region, 
the legitimate defensive needs of Moroc- 
co, Morocco's capacities to pay for and 
absorb such equipment, and the state of 
our dialogue on key issues. There will be 
nothing unusual about this approach. It 
will be the same for other friends. 

It is, however, the prevailing view of 
this Administration that America's allies 
and close associates should expect 
understanding and reliable support. It 
would not be in the spirit of this Ad- 
ministration's policy if support for 
America's traditional and historic 
friends— to meet reasonable and 
legitimate needs— were withheld or 
made conditional, other than under ex- 



[auritania 

lauritania is a poor and undeveloped 
ountry striving to work out its national 
estiny in a bicultural society, 
lauritania has struggled throughout its 
xistence as an independent state to lm- 
,rove the lot of its citizens. A few days 
go, an effort was made to overthrow 
he government. As we made clear in 
he aftermath of that unsuccessful coup 
ittempt, we strongly support 
Mauritania's independence and ter- 
ritorial integrity. 

rhe Western Saharan Conflict 

rhe single most serious issue which com- 
Dlicates the interrelationships of these 
cey North African states is the struggle 
jver the future of the Western Saharan 
-egion. Our friends there remain deeply 
divided. Let me make clear American 
policy attitudes toward that important 

First, we hope that an early, j - « _ k. S _ 

peaceful, negotiated end to the conflict Q a |- ft f AW ACS tO SaUCII ArSDia 

can be achieved. The struggle is a drain 9 
on human and economic resources. It 
could be the tinderbox for wider conflict 
in the region. It is a potential cause of 
greater instability and higher tensions in 
North Africa. As long as the struggle 
continues and remains unresolved, it will 
interfere with the proper development of 
cordial relations between Algeria and 
Morocco. 



traordinary circumstances— our military 
assistance is, of course, subject to cer- 
tain basic conditions laid down in legisla- 
tion. 

We will continue to encourage 
Morocco to find and to explore ways 
toward a peaceful, negotiated settlement 
of the Western Saharan conflict. We will 
not however, make decisions on military 
equipment sales explicitly conditional on 
unilateral Moroccan attempts to show 
progress toward a peaceful negotiated 
settlement. This position recognizes the 
reality that there are players other than 
Morocco in the Western Saharan conflict 
with a capacity to influence the outcome. 
To the degree that Morocco has con- 
fidence in American policies, to that 
same degree will our counsel be valued 
not only on approaches to the Western 
Sahara issue but on other regional and 
global issues as well. This position is 
consistent with our behavior toward 
other traditional and historic friends of 
the United States. 

M-60 Tank Request. Over 7 
months ago, Morocco asked to buy 108 
M-60 main battle tanks. Secretary Haig 
approved this sale and authorized infor- 
mal and formal notifications to the Con- 
gress. This sale is a reasonabale 
response to Morocco's legitimate defen- 
sive needs. It fits in logically with 
Morocco's multiyear modernization pro- 
gram antedating the fighting in the 
Western Sahara. The M-60s will not be 
ready for delivery to Morocco for 3 
years, by which time we hope the 



• The United States is neutral as 
regards the final status of the Western 
Saharan territory. 

• A military solution to this conflict 
is neither possible nor desirable. No side 
can win a clearcut victory in military 
terms. 

• Whatever the immediate future, 
the United States will support all serious 
efforts aimed at a genuine negotiating 
process that can lead to an early 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. We, 
therefore, support the efforts of the 



June 1981 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 23, 1981 1 

Sale of AW ACS [airborne warning and 
control systems] to Saudi Arabia would 
not constitute a realistic threat to Israel. 
The reasons for this are: 

• AW ACS would be used primarily 
to protect Saudi oil fields; 

• AW ACS essentially is a flying 
radar platform which can detect and 
follow movement of airborne aircraft; it 
cannot detect militarily significant 
ground activity, and it will have no radio 
monitoring, photoreconaissance, or in- 
telligence gathering capabilities; 

• It could not be used with the com- 
bat aircraft of other countries without 
extensive joint training and 



U.S.-supplied computer and communica- 
tions equipment; 

• Saudi AW ACS operations will de- 
pend on U.S. spare parts, maintenance, 
and support of operations; and 

• An AW ACS aircraft flying close 
enough to Israel to monitor its aircraft 
would be vulnerable to being shot down 
by Israeli fighter aircraft. 

Obviously, prudent Israeli planners 
would have to take a Saudi AW ACS into 
account in their calculations. But the 
overwhelming impact of the sale will be 
to enhance Saudi" defensive capabili- 
ties— not to threaten Israel. 

'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 



47 



Middle East 



Western Saharan issue will have ap- 
proached a solution. 

The tanks are not suitable for the 
rugged desert terrain where much of the 
fighting in the Western Sahara and 
southern Morocco is taking place, nor 
would it be cost effective or tactically 
sound to employ a relatively slow- 
moving, highly expensive, heavily 
armed, tracked vehicle against the light 
and rapid landrover units used by the 
Polisario. 

OV-10 and F-5 Aircraft. Shortly 
after taking office, Secretary Haig also 
reviewed and approved the scheduled 
delivery of six OV-10 reconnaissance 
aircraft and 20 F-5E/F fighter aircraft, 
the elements of a 1979 Moroccan arms 
request which was the subject of exten- 
sive congressional hearings over a year 
ago. It was in the context of those hear- 
ings, and that arms package, that the 
previous Administration agreed there 
should be a relationship between U.S. 
willingness to supply arms to Morocco 
for defense against Polisario attacks in 
Morocco proper and the Western Sahara 
on the one hand, and Moroccan forth- 
comingness in the search for a com- 
promise political settlement of the 
Saharan dispute of the other. Before 
leaving office, the last Administration 
had decided that Morocco had shown 
goodwill and had demonstrated a deter- 
mination to achieve progress. 

The first four OV-lOs have arrived 
in Morocco; the remaining two arrive in 
April. These are the first arms to be 
delivered so far under that much 
publicized 1979 arms request. Fourteen 
F-5 fighter aircraft will be delivered this 
year, beginning in the summer, and the 
remaining six in 1982. Morocco cancelled 
its request for 24 helicopters which 
formed part of its original 1979 request. 

Progress in Negotiations 

We reviewed progress in Saharan 
negotiations during our testimony before 
the House Subcommittee on Africa last 
December. We noted at that time that, 
in return for a postponement of OAU 
consideration of the Polisario's applica- 
tion for admission during the chiefs of 
state summit early last summer, Moroc- 
co had agreed to cooperate with the ef- 
forts of the OAU Wisemen's mediation 
committee. Morocco, the Polisario, and 
Algeria sent delegations to a meeting of 
the five-nation mediation committee in 
Freetown last September. 

The OAU committee heard state- 
ments by the various parties and, short- 
ly thereafter, recommended that a UN- 



supervised cease-fire be put in place by 
December 15, 1980, to be followed by an 
internationally supervised referendum to 
determine the future status of the 
Western Sahara. Despite domestic 
political opposition, Morocco accepted 
the cease-fire but showed initial 
resistance to a referendum. 

During the proceedings of the U.N. 
Fourth Committee in October, Morocco 
introduced a resolution recommending a 
U.N. deferral of the issue inasmuch as 
the OAU mediation effort was in prog- 
ress. After consultation with us, Moroc- 
co affirmed before the Fourth Commit- 
tee its willingness to cooperate diligently 
with OAU mediation efforts, including 
the OAU mandate as it related to a free 
choice for the inhabitants of the 
Western Sahara. 

Unfortunately, the cease-fire has not 
been achieved. The Polisario has not 
publicly agreed to the cease-fire and has 
continued its attacks. Recently, a 
Polisario spokesman said that "the time 
for a referendum is past." We do not 
know whether that position is in con- 
crete. The Polisario organization 
cotinues to insist that negotiations must 
take place only between the Poli- 
sario — as the legitimate representative 
of the Saharan population— and Moroc- 
co. 

Steps Toward a Settlement 

Standing in the way of a negotiated set- 
tlement is the absence of any specific 
ongoing process to give reality to the 
OAU recommendations for a cease-fire 
and a referendum. Possible next steps 
toward launching such a process might 
include: 

• The establishment of an active 
working-level committee to grapple with 
the complexities of implementing a 
cease-fire and referendum; 

• Specific suggestions for estab- 
lishing voter eligibility in a referendum 
on the future status of the Western 
Sahara; and 

• OAU coordination and consulta- 
tion with the United Nations on im- 
plementing its call for a U.N. supervised 
cease-fire. 

The time for execution of the OAU 
recommendations is overdue, especially 
since the question of the Polisario's ad- 
mission into the OAU will probably arise 
at the OAU summit in Nairobi next July. 
Admission could complicate OAU efforts 
to encourage a settlement, for it would 



confer at least qualified legitimacy on 
the Polisario as the spokesman of the 
people of the Western Sahara. Morocco 
would object and would probably con- 
sider withdrawal from the OAU. This 
would be a serious development. Aside 
from this possibility, divisive OAU 
debates over the Saharan issue could 
also detract seriously from OAU efforts 
to seek the withdrawal of Libyan forces 
from Chad. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEFUGEES 



T 

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief 
Southeast Asia and Pakistan 



: 



W. R. Smyser 



Statement before the Subcommittee 
i Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
ouse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
arch 26, 1981. Mr. Smyser is Acting 
irector of the Bureau for Refugee Pro- 
•aras. 1 

am pleased to have this opportunity to 
scuss U.S. policies and contributions to 
ifugee relief in Southeast Asia and 
akistan. Since many of you have 
jcently visited refugee camps in Asia, I 
o not need to remind you that some of 
le world's most massive and persistent 
ifugee situations are in this part of the 
rorld. Nor do I need to describe the suf- 
Bring, insecurity, and deprivation many 
lefugees experience as they await a 
jlhance for repatriation, resettlement in 
Jheir country of first asylum, or possibly 
resettlement in another country. In- 
Itead, I would like to focus on the scope 
tf our program, particularly through 
| ontributions to international organiza- 
ions and our projected needs for the 
i oming fiscal year. 

teview of U.S. Participation 

3efore turning to the ever-increasing 
jroblem of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
'. would like to review our participation 
n international relief and resettlement 
Drograms for Indochinese refugees and 
the people of Kampuchea. Fortunately, 
these international efforts have helped 
meet emergency needs and avert the 
full-scale tragedies that we feared might 
Dccur when we appeared before you last 
(rear. But conditions both inside Kam- 
puchea and in the first-asylum countries 
in Southeast Asia are still extremely 
precarious. While we and the rest of the 
international community may be able to 
reduce our support somewhat in the 
:oming year, we must be as vigilant as 
2ver to potential changes in the refugee 
flows and impact in the region. 

In Southeast Asia, the refugee situa- 
;ion is still a staggering problem in 
luman terms, a serious threat to the 
Deace and stability of Southeast Asia, 
ind a particular burden to Thailand. 
Some 1.2 million Indochinese refugees 
lave fled their homeland since 1975. Of 
the 1 million refugees resettled outside 
Southeast Asia, 465,000 have been 



resettled in the United States. Almost 
200,000 Indochinese refugees are cur- 
rently in UNHCR [U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees] camps in Southeast 
Asia awaiting resettlement. About 
122,000 Khmer refugees are in UNHCR 
holding centers, many of whom we 
believe will enter the third-country 
resettlement stream. 

Despite the progress since the 
height of the crises in 1979, the problem 
persists. During calendar year 1980, 
140,000 Lao, Hmong, and Vietnamese 
refugees fled the Indochinese states 
seeking new homelands; another 20,000 
Khmer from the holding centers entered 
this resettlement stream. We expect 
that refugees will continue to arrive in 
first-asylum countries at about the same 
rate as 1980. 

Five years after the fall of Saigon, 
Vietnam remains committed to a policy 
of repression at home and aggression 
beyond its borders in Kampuchea. Un- 
fortunately, there is little hope of an 
early resolution of the refugee problems 
created by that regime and its clients in 
Laos and Kampuchea. 

Within this context, U.S. policy 
toward the refugee situation from In- 
dochina has four objectives: 

• To seek a humanitarian resolution 
of the problem; 

• To involve the world community 
in resolving this international problem; 

• To reduce tension in the region 
and reinforce the stability of the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] countries; and 

• To afford refuge in the United 
States to those persons with a claim on 
our consideration. 

In seeking to achieve the objectives 
of our refugee policy, the U.S. Govern- 
ment works with: 

• The ASEAN states and Hong 
Kong to insure maintenance of the prin- 
ciple of first asylum for refugees; 

• The international community to 
absorb large numbers of refugees for 
resettlement and to finance refugees' 
care and maintenance in first-asylum 
countries; and 

• The UNHCR as the principal in- 
ternational organization responsible for 
the protection and the care of refugees. 



The Indochinese refugee problem 
originates in the policies of the Com- 
munist governments of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Kampuchea and the resulting condi- 
tions in those countries. Whole classes of 
people have been politically persecuted 
and disadvantaged. Unprecedented state 
control of their societies has severely 
constricted individual freedom of activi- 
ty. The reordering of the economies of 
these societies and the extension of Viet- 
nam's military forces into Kampuchea 
have strained their economic resources 
and activities and depressed living 
standards. All these factors have con- 
tributed to the refugee flows we con- 
tinue to witness. 

The United States continues to ex- 
plore all means by which this interna- 
tional problem can be resolved. Of the 
three traditional means to resolve 
refugee problems, only resettlement of 
the Indochinese in third countries has, 
so far, been effective. Political con- 
siderations, pressing domestic economic 
and social concerns, and national and 
racial antipathies virtually rule out local 
resettlement in other Southeast Asian 
countries. Indeed, governments of these 
countries have forcibly rejected refugees 
until assured of their eventual resettle- 
ment elsewhere. As for voluntary 
repatriation, the application of 
repressive doctrinaire Communist 
policies within Vietnam, Laos, and Kam- 
puchea makes it impossible for the 
former upper- and middle-classes to 
return to their homelands. Indeed, for 
any group, the act of departure, 
regardless of motivation, is grounds for 
persecution, and those caught seeking to 
escape are severely punished. 

While essentially unable to moderate 
the repressive policies of these regimes, 
some limited success has been achieved 
in indirectly influencing these refugee- 
creating governments to adjust their 
policies in the direction of moderating 
refugee flows. Vietnam bowed to world 
criticism at the Geneva conference in 
July 1979 and terminated its expulsion 
of its Chinese minority. Subsequently, 
the United States, through the good of- 
fices of the UNHCR, negotiated an 
orderly departure program with the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam under 
which persons in Vietnam are allowed to 
depart for the United States directly. 



June 1981 



49 



Refugees 



A total of 1,357 persons left Viet- 
nam under the program in December 
and January, and we expect that 
another 1,800 Vietnamese will leave in 
the next few months. Vietnamese 
authorities have responded affirmatively 
to our suggestion to expand the agreed- 
upon list of people eligible to leave 
under the program, and we are now 
moderately optimistic about the future 
of the orderly departure program. We, 
also, hope that this program will be a 
safe and effective alternative to risky 
clandestine departures. 

In addition, international relief ef- 
forts have had a major impact on condi- 
tions inside Kampuchea and have en- 
couraged as many as 300,000 Khmer to 
return to their homes from their tran- 
sient status in Thailand, Vietnam, and 
Laos. 

Current U.S. Policy 

For the present, U.S. policy toward the 
Indochinese refugees is primarily focus- 
ed on resettlement in this country and 
other industrial countries. We are par- 
ticularly concerned that other countries 
involved in this international effort 
maintain their degree of involvement as 
exhibited at the Geneva conference. In 
this respect, we associated ourselves on 
two occasions last year, most recently in 
December, with UNHCR's appeal to 
resettlement countries to continue their 
commitments. We will pursue this mat- 
ter again this year. Resettlement oppor- 
tunities in developing countries are also 
being actively pursued. 

The Khmer in UNHCR holding 
centers present a special and delicate 
problem. Since their status and interest 
in repatriation were uncertain, we held 
back from seeking their resettlement, 
pending clarification of that situation by 
the UNHCR. Recently, the UNHCR has 
suggested that more resettlement oppor- 
tunities be provided to the Khmer. In 
response to this request, we estimate 
that we will be able to accept, under our 
program, 25,000 to 30,000 Khmer over 
the next few months. 

UNHCR attempts to foster volun- 
tary repatriation have not been suc- 
cessful so far, with the exception of a 
very modest program of return to Laos. 
The Department continues to support 
UNHCR's ongoing efforts to encourage 
Lao in refugee camps and Khmer in the 
holding centers to return voluntarily to 
their homelands. And we have supported 
UNHCR's assistance to Khmer who have 
already returned to their villages as a 
means to attract others from Thailand. 



One of our primary concerns over the 
years has been to insure that repatria- 
tion be truly voluntary. We continue to 
be alert to the possibility of forced 
repatriation and, at this time, believe 
that these voluntary repatriation pro- 
grams are soundly based, though with 
modest prospects. 

We must be realistic about the 
numbers of Indochinese refugees who 
will remain in first-asylum camps in the 
coming year. Given projected arrivals 
and offtake by third countries, we 
believe that the United States should 
plan on the resettlement of up to 
144,000 Indochinese refugees in FY 
1982, as compared with the authorized 
level of 168,000 for FY 1981. As you 
know, however, actual admissions levels 
are determined by the President follow- 
ing the congressional consultations in 
September, in accordance with the 
Refugee Act of 1980. We will continue 
to monitor the situation in Southeast 
Asia, third-country resettlement rates, 
and the availability of resources to in- 
sure that our resettlement program is 
appropriate to the situation. 

For FY 1982, the Department of 
State is seeking $29 million for the 
UNHCR programs meeting the needs of 
Indochinese refugees located in the 
ASEAN nations or Hong Kong. This 
contribution will enable us to continue 
our practice of meeting 30% of the cost 
of the UNHCR's program for the care 
and maintenance of these refugees. 

In Kampuchea, we hope that con- 
tinued improvements will approach to 
minimum food self-sufficiency by CY 
1982. However, the outlook for 
agricultural production inside Kam- 
puchea remains uncertain. The interna- 
tional community may have to revise its 
present requirements. We remain com- 
mitted to assuring the Khmer people the 
humanitarian relief they need in order 
that they may cease to need interna- 
tional relief as quickly as possible. But 
mindful of concerns about development 
assistance inside Vietnamese-occupied 
Kampuchea, we and other donors have 
pressed for the termination of activities 
by the U.N. Joint Mission for Cambo- 
dian Relief as soon as the Khmer are 
able to feed themselves or if shortfalls in 
food self-sufficiency continue, as soon as 
they are manageable. 

For Khmer relief in FY 1982 the 
Department is seeking $20 million as the 
cash component of our contribution. 
These funds will be provided to interna- 
tional organizations or private voluntary 
organizations involved in this essential 
operation. If, as we hope, Kampuchea is 



approaching self-sufficiency in food pro- 
duction by early 1982, we expect to be ' 
able to reduce our nonfood contribution; 
from the $30 million programed for FY 
1981 to a level of $20 million in FY 
1982. Such an amount will allow us to 
maintain our policy of meeting about 
one-third of the total contributions 
made. In addition to these sums, $10 
million was provided in FY 1981 for the 
care and maintenance of Khmer in 
holding centers in Thailand, and a 
similar amount is budgeted for FY 1982 
Finally, although it is not a refugee 
relief activity, the Department is also 
seeking $10 million to finance English- 
language training and cultural orienta- 
tion in Southeast Asia for refugees 
selected for resettlement in the United 
States. The intent of this program is to> 
ease the initial strain of the resettlemer 
process on refugee sponsors and the 
American communities in which they 
settle and to speed the process by whicl 
the refugees reach self-sufficiency. In 
the current year, this program operates 
under the auspices of the UNHCR but i 
financed for refugees bound for the 
United States by this program. 

Afghan Refugees 

While refugee emergencies have for- 
tunately abated somewhat in Southeast 
Asia, another problem grows in Wester 
Asia. Today, 15 months after the Sovie 
invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of 
Afghans continue to flee into Pakistan 
every day. The 1.7 million Afghans now 
in Pakistan represent one-tenth of the 
population of Afghanistan and constitui 
the largest refugee group in the world 
today. Since December, they have been 
entering Pakistan at the rate of 130,001 
per month, many after their homes wer 
bombed, crops destroyed, and flocks 
killed. They have endured great hard- 
ships in their flight to refuge. 

About 40% of the refugees are 
children under the age of 12, with the 
remainder fairly equally divided betwee 
adult men and women. Grouped in tent 
villages established and administered bj 
the Pakistan Government near the 
Afghan border, the refugees are subjed 
to the harsh extremes of heat and cold 
which are characteristic of that region. 

The people and Government of 
Pakistan have responded most generous 
ly to the needs of the refugees. It is 
estimated that the Pakistan Governmen 
itself bears around half the cost— or 
about $100 million in 1980— of the total 
relief effort. Indirect costs to land and 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



ter resources caused by the concen- 
ition of refugees are borne entirely by 
kistan. 

After the massive buildup of popula- 
n in January and February last year, 
5 UNHCR assumed a role as the lead 
ency in mobilizing and coordinating in- 
■national relief efforts. Working with 
e Pakistan Government, the UNHCR 
veloped a support program in the 
ring of 1980 and then issued special 
peals for about $100 million, divided 
out equally between food and nonfood 
eds. 

For 1981 the UNHCR originally 
idgeted $52.5 million for Afghan pro- 
ams, on the basis of a population of 
1 million Afghans in Pakistan at the 
id of September 1980. Clearly, the 
ibsequent population increases will 
irce the budget higher, and the 
NHCR and the Pakistan Government 
•e now reviewing new relief planning 
stimates. The World Food Program, 
hich channels the food component of 
le international assistance, estimates 
ir this year a need for 312,000 tons of 
)mmodities with an estimated value of 
120 million. The U.S. Government has 
■nt its best efforts to support this 
umanitarian program, which also 
ndergirds our political interests in this 
;rategically critical area. In FY 1980 
■e contributed $43.7 million in cash and 
>od to the relief effort, or nearly one- 
alf of the total food and cash channeled 
irough international organizations. 

This fiscal year we have thus far 
lade two new contributions to the 
ifghan relief program: food with an 
stimated value of $28 million and a 
.ledge of $18 million for the UNHCR. 

We expect the refugee population in 
'akistan to increase to at least 2 million 
n FY 1982, for which we will need a 
otal of $24 million for our proposed 
:ontribution to the UNHCR's Pakistan 
>rogram. Food for Peace will provide 
significant supplies of foodstuffs in FY 
1982. The level of this donation will be 
ietermined later this year following an 
issessment of the food needs of Afghan 
•efugees in Pakistan. 

The enormity of this problem and its 
impelling human and political dimen- 
sions require continued international 
support. Because its full extent is still 
emerging, the plight of Afghan refugees 
Dlaces a claim of priority upon the atten- 
;ion and generosity of the world com- 
nunity. 

■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
ae available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Reprograming Proposal 
for El Salvador 



by James L. Buckley 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on April 29, 
1981. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss 
the Administration's proposal to 
reprogram FY 1981 assistance funds to 
provide additional economic assistance 
to El Salvador. 

As you know, we notified Congress 
on April 3 with regard to our intention 
to reprogram FY 1981 foreign 
assistance for El Salvador and for 
Liberia. We noted then that, because of 
the urgent need for additional economic 
support fund (ESF) assistance for these 
two countries and the limited availability 
of non-earmarked FY 1981 ESF, the 
President intends to exercise his authori- 
ty under Section 614(a) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to 
reprogram limited amounts of ESF ear- 
marked by legislation for these coun- 
tries. 

This particular exercise in the pain- 
ful reprograming process illustrates 
why, as a matter of policy, the Ad- 
ministration is seeking an alternative, 
less disruptive way to meet unforeseen 
contingencies. In this case, we have had 
to draw $21 million each from funds ear- 
marked for Egypt and Israel. Fortunate- 
ly, these governments have been 
understanding of the urgent need for us 
to be able to transfer to El Salvador and 
Liberia quick-dispersing funds that had 
been earmarked for them. Their 
response has been generous and 
statesmanlike. 

The need of Egypt and Israel for 
these funds, however, continues to exist. 
We are, therefore, increasing our re- 
quest for ESF funding in FY 1982 for 
Israel and Egypt by $21 million each 
and are reducing our request for 
unallocated ESF funds by a like amount. 
These adjustments, in effect, reflect an 
allocation of the special requirements 
fund we have requested mandated by 
events that have occurred between the 
time we first made our FY 1982 request 
and this presentation. 

The economic emergencies we have 
been called upon to meet this past 



month in both El Salvador and Liberia 
have stretched existing resources to the 
limit. Time has not permitted a resort to 
a request for supplemental appropria- 
tions which, in any event, ought to be 
considered a measure of last resort. The 
problems created any time one seeks to 
reduce funding that other countries have 
been led to count upon would have made 
the task impossible without serious 
diplomatic setbacks had the Govern- 
ments of Egypt and Israel been less will- 
ing to accommodate over $40 million of 
reprograming requests. 

Given the economic problems and 
uncertainties facing so much of the 
Third World, it is impossible for us to 
anticipate today what countries we may 
need to provide with new or additional 
economic assistance a year or so hence 
as a matter of vital American self- 
interest. 

It, therefore, seems to us, in the 
light of recent experience, that it is both 
sensible and prudent to establish a con- 
tingency ESF fund for FY 1982, subject 
to all the safeguards that the Congress 
presently imposes on the reprograming 
process. Such a fund will enable us to 
meet unforeseen needs without the dif- 
ficulties and risks to international good 
will that are an inevitable part of exist- 
ing procedures. 

Let me now turn to the specifics of 
our proposal for additional economic 
assistance for El Salvador. 

U.S. Proposals 

The total package amounts to $63.5 
million to be used for the following pur- 
poses: 

• $24.9 million in ESF assistance 
will be used in the next 3 months to pro- 
vide foreign exchange to the private sec- 
tor to import new materials and equip- 
ment needed to revive industrial and 
agricultural production. 

• $13.5 million in PL 480 title II aid 
will help finance food imports. We 
believe it will cover most, if not all, of 
El Salvador's requirements for wheat 
and edible oil for the rest of the year. 

• An extra $8 million will be added 
to the $22 million currently available 
under Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) guaranty programs. El Salvador 
has traditionally financed industrial and 
agricultural imports with foreign corn- 



June 1981 



51 



Security Assistance 



mercial financing. Commercial bank 
lines of credit to El Salvador have dried 
up as a result of political violence and 
uncertainty. The CCC guaranty serves 
to reestablish commercial bank financing 
for critical imports of tallow, soybean 
meal, cotton seed meal, bone meal, and 
powdered milk. 

• An additional $7.1 million in 
development assistance loans will be 
added to existing agricultural programs 
providing credit and to an employment 
program to construct labor-intensive 
public works in low-income areas. 

• Disbursements of $10 million will 
be accelerated under an existing housing 
guarantee program for the construction 
of low-income housing in two cities in El 
Salvador. This program is to guarantee 
long-term financing to El Salvador by a 
U.S. mortgage company. 

The need for economic assistance is 
pressing. The GDP in 1980 fell 9% below 
the level in 1979. Export earnings have 
fallen sharply. A special mission recently 
returned from El Salvador estimates 
that the foreign exchange shortfall for 
1981 may reach $150 million. We based 
our reprograming on this estimate. It 
could go higher. We will need to review 
the situation later this summer to deter- 
mine whether any further commitments 
on our part will be necessary. 

A failure on our part to respond 
promptly with the additional assistance 
we are requesting would be a 
devastating blow to the economy, 
perhaps bringing down the Duarte 
government and with it hopes for 
economic and social reform and a 
peaceful solution to the conflict through 
elections. The private sector would lose 
hope in the future of the country and 
abandon any support for the govern- 
ment. Production would decline further. 
Serious food shortages could develop. 
The government would be forced to slow 
down progress in agrarian reform. The 
increase in hunger, poverty, and 
unemployment would lead to greater 
political polarization. The United States 
would appear to be seeking a military 
solution. 

It is also well to remember the im- 
portance of others in helping El 
Salvador meet its immediate needs. In- 
ternational financial institutions and 
other governments are providing 
assistance. For example, the conces- 
sionary credit terms for purchasing oil 
through the joint facility of Mexico and 
Venezuela should result in loans to El 
Salvador of $53 million in 1981. The In- 
ternational Monetary Fund is working to 



conclude a compensatory financing facili- 
ty of about $40 million for El Salvador 
in 1981. It has been asked by the 
government to negotiate a standby 
drawing as well that would be about $40 
million. A failure now to provide the ad- 
ditional assistance we are requesting 
would leave these donors in doubt about 
our commitment to do our share in 
economic assistance for El Salvador. 

The additional, fast disbursing funds 
we are now requesting will bring our 
total commitment for economic 
assistance to El Salvador this year to 
$126.5 million. This is significantly more 
than three times the military 
assistance— $35 million— we are pro- 
viding. This reflects our judgment and 
that of President Duarte's government 
as to his country's most pressing needs. 
As a matter of fact, all parties in- 
terested in the welfare of El Salvador 
and its people understand the urgency of 
the need for quick and effective 
economic assistance if the country is to 
remain afloat. There is admitted 
disagreement among people of good will 
as to the wisdom of America's military 
assistance, but there is little as to the 
kind of economic assistance we propose 
to extend through the requested 
reprograming. 

And it is because of the critical im- 
portance of maintaining the viability of 
the Salvadoran economy that the guer- 
rillas have intensified their war of 
economic attrition by which they hope to 
collapse the economy and with it, the 
government. 

Current Situation in El Salvador 

For a proper perspective on the situa- 
tion in El Salvador today, it is necessary 
to understand that its economic prob- 
lems go far beyond the disruptions that 
can be expected in a country engaged in 
a bloody insurgency. The fact is that 
with the failure of the military offensive 
launched last January, the revolutionary 
leadership has made a quantum jump in 
its efforts to paralyze the economy. In 
order to disrupt transportation, the 
revolutionaries have blown up bridges, 
ambushed trucks, and blocked highways. 
To deprive the country of electric power, 
they have attacked power stations and 
blown major transmission lines affecting 
an estimated one-third of the nation's 
electricity. Some of the most intense 
fighting in the past has involved the pro- 
tection of critically important hydroelec- 
tric dams from guerrilla attack. These 
concerted attempts to disrupt the 
economy have even been extended to 



commercial activity as witness the in- 
discriminate bombings of markets and 
commercial offices. 

President Duarte estimates that 
economic sabotage results in about $15 
million in destruction each month. Our 
economic assistance will not restore 
facilities destroyed by sabotage or 
directly employ those put out of work as 
a consequence. It will help the govern- 
ment to meet immediate needs for food, 
foreign exchange to buy seed and fer- 
tilizer, and domestic credit to finance 
agriculture and industry. It will help 
restore confidence in the economy. It 
will allow the government to use its own 
resources to rebuild the infrastructure 
destroyed by the guerrillas and 
stimulate construction that will provide 
jobs for the unemployed. 

We respectfully submit that the 
emergency economic assistance that the 
requested reprograming can alone pro- 
vide is essential to the achievement of 
an El Salvador in which the people can 
be given the chance to determine their 
own destiny through the electoral proc- 
ess to which the Duarte government is 
committed. His government has con- 
sistently made clear its determination to 
take the country to elections as the best 
path to resolve the conflict in El 
Salvador. 

This commitment was reaffirmed 
just last Saturday by the Vice President 
and Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces. Both the Christian Democrats 
and the military are clearly determined 
to hold fair elections. 

The response of the guerrillas to the 
prospects of elections since the establish 
ment of the electoral council has been in 
teresting. They are now attacking the 
offices of the council and the provincial 
authorities where records are kept that 
would enable registration of voters to gc 
forward. More than 15 of these offices 
have been attacked in one way or 
another over the past few weeks. Plain- 
ly, they hope to disrupt the electoral 
process, which, it must be remembered, 
will be the first honest one in the coun- 
try's history. It is a pattern to weaken 
the government's reforms like the guer- 
rillas' war of attrition against the 
economy. 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



ikid to Pakistan 



l] Jane A. Coon 

I Statement before the Subcommittees 
H Asian and Pacific Affairs and on In- 
wnational Economic Policy and Trade 
uthe House Foreign Affairs Committee 
I April 27, 1981. Ms. Coon is Deputy 
usistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
id South Asian Affairs. 1 

Iim pleased to be here today to testify 
I connection with the Administration's 
Iquest for changes in Section 669 of 
le Foreign Assistance Act. The Ad- 
linistration firmly believes that con- 
fessional approval of this proposed 
Inendment is in our national interest 
lid will permit the United States to 
Irry out important policies in a region 
reatened by the Soviet Union and 
I itical to our well-being. 

We are proposing that the waiver 
ovision contained in Section 669 of the 
)reign Assistance Act be amended to 
'nform with that contained in section 
''0 of the same act. The amended 
nguage would also parallel the waiver 
■ovisions of the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
)n Act. We believe this would remove 
i anomaly in the law whereby countries 
igaged in transfers of reprocessing 
ems are treated differently from those 
ansferring or receiving enrichment 
aterials or technology. It would pro- 
de the President with needed flexibility 
id permit him to pursue a consistent 
Dnproliferation policy within the con- 
:xt of our overall national security in- 
vests. 

ection 669 and Pakistan 

fhy do we wish to change this provision 
f the law? As you know, the sanctions 
ave been applied in only the case of one 
juntry — Pakistan. Two years ago we 
ispended development assistance and 
or international military education and 
•aining (IMET) program to Pakistan, 
'ur relations deteriorated. There was a 
rowing sense of isolation and insecurity 
l Pakistan. This in no way contributed 
) a solution of the problem which 
rompted the application of our sanc- 
ons. 

Much has changed in this region in 
le past 2 years with the collapse of 
ran and the Soviet invasion of 
ighamstan. We believe that the United 
tates should have the flexibility to build 
cooperative relationship with Pakistan 



in the face of a dangerous and growing 
threat from the Soviet Union to this 
vital region. 

The Administration — and the 
previous one— recognized that the vital 
interests of the United States and its 
allies are engaged in this region. The 
Soviets, through their invasion of 
Afghanistan, have demonstrated their 
willingness to intervene militarily in 
Southwest Asia. The Soviet Army is 
now on the border of the populous In- 
dian subcontinent, and Pakistan is a 
front-line state. The Soviet pressure on 
Pakistan is real, and the implications are 
far-reaching throughout South and 
Southwest Asia. Pakistan stands on the 
eastern flank of the Persian Gulf. 

Although the development of our 
strategy for the Southwest Asia region 
is not yet complete, it is obvious that 
local states must be able to contribute to 
regional stability and to resist intimida- 
tion. This is particularly true of those 
states which, like Pakistan, are strategi- 
cally located and most immediately 
threatened. A stronger, more self- 
confident Pakistan capable of resisting 
direct or indirect Soviet pressures 
through Afghanistan is, thus, essential 
for the protection of free world interests 
in the region. 

Pakistan has, so far, withstood 
Soviet pressure and provided refuge to 
nearly 2 million Afghan refugees. Its 
resources, however, are limited as will 
be its ability to withstand prolonged 
pressure if it feels it is doing so alone. 
Pakistan deserves our support, and we 
are in the process of developing a closer 
and more cooperative bilateral relation- 
ship. 

We intend to construct a new rela- 
tionship with Pakistan in a measured 
way, seeking to evolve over the long 
term a durable and credible relationship 
which will serve the best interests of us 
both. In this respect, we intend to be 
fully conscious of Pakistan's position as 
a leader in both the nonaligned move- 
ment and the Islamic community of na- 
tions. We need to restore confidence on 
both sides. This is done better by actions 
than by words. In our discussions in 
Islamabad and here in Washington, we 
believe we have made a very good begin- 
ning. 

When we first sent to the Congress 
our request for this change in section 
669, we were in the very early stages of 
our dialogue with the Pakistanis. At that 
time we could only say, with specificity, 
that we hope to resume an IMET pro- 
gram in FY 1982. We were aware, 
however, that any substantial assistance 
for Pakistan in the context of building a 



new relationship would require modifica- 
tion of section 669. 

As a result of our recent discussions 
with Foreign Minister [of Pakistan] 
Agha Shahi, we will be requesting 
authorization for $100 million under the 
economic support fund (ESF) in FY 
1982. We also plan to discuss with the 
Pakistanis a more substantial long-term 
program. We will be returning to the 
Congress with more specific requests 
but probably not for the FY 1982 
budget. Clearly, modification of section 
669 is essential to moving ahead with 
economic assistance and IMET in FY 
1982 and a more substantial package in 
the future. 

The Administration believes that 
favorable action on the proposed amend- 
ment would also attes to the recogni- 
tion, by the legislative branch, of 
Pakistan's critical position and to the 
breadth of American support for 
Pakistan during this time of trial. 

Allies and Donor Countries 

Resumption of economic assistance to 
Pakistan would also permit us to make a 
more meaningful contribution to the im- 
portant collective effort on Pakistan's 
behalf. Since the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, our allies and other donor 
countries have substantially increased 
their support. Japan and France, for ex- 
ample, have doubled their assistance in 
the past year. Total pledges at the 
Pakistan aid consortium increased 40% 
last year to a total of $1,020 million. Our 
contribution was $50 million in PL 480. 

With Western encouragement and 
support, the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] reached agreement on a 
3-year extended fund facility to assist 
Pakistan in structural economic ad- 
justments. In January Western 
creditors, including the United States, 
agreed to an 18-month debt rescheduling 
package. We understand Saudi Arabia is 
considering substantial increases in its 
aid to Pakistan. 

Our friends and allies have recog- 
nized the importance of supporting 
Pakistan and have made significant con- 
tributions. A number of these countries 
have repeatedly stressed to us the im- 
portance of more vigorous U.S. par- 
ticipation in a collective effort. 



Nonproliferation 

Our proposed amendment to section 669 
in no way reflects a diminution of con- 
cern by this Administration over the 



une1981 



53 



UNITED NATIONS 



threat of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. We remain convinced that the 
spread of nuclear explosives capability 
and testing of nuclear devices threatens 
global security and, in fact, detracts 
from the security of states pursuing 
such programs. 

The issue is how best to pursue our 
nonproliferation interests as well as our 
regional security interests. We do not 
believe that there is any necessary 
conflict in the pursuit of both objectives. 
We certainly cannot claim that sanctions 
have been successful. We would suggest, 
rather, that our interests would be bet- 
ter served by addressing the underlying 
security concerns of countries such as 
Pakistan and by developing more useful 
and cooperative relations which could 
engage us with them in a positive 

fashion. 

The proposed amendment to section 
669 is an important— indeed essential— 
buildingblock in a new relationship. It is 
a necessary step which will permit us to 
provide assistance to this beleaguered 
country. But your action will also have 
symbolic value. Not only Pakistan, but 
others among our allies and friends, are 
looking to the United States to 
demonstrate its commitment to support 
those friends who are standing in the 
way of a Soviet thrust into this vital 
area. 



U.S. Perspective of 

the 35th General Assembly 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



i 



The 35th General Assembly opened on 
September 16, 1980, and concluded all 
but four items of its work on Decem- 
ber 19. Discussions on Namibia, agree- 
ment on agenda and procedures for 
launching global negotiations on interna- 
tional economic issues, election of two 
judges to the International Court of 
Justice, and a vote on a proposal to 
enlarge the Security Council were defer- 
red until meetings of the Assembly in 

1981. 

This 35th regular session ot the 
Assembly took place in a period of in- 
creasingly international tension. Some 
85,000 Soviet military continued to oc- 
cupy Afghanistan. Fifty-two American 
diplomatic personnel were held in Iran. 
War between Iran and Iraq threatened 
the security of the Persian Gulf, and 
tensions among other Middle East states 
continued to be high. Two hundred thou- 
sand Vietnamese troops continued to oc- 
cupy Kampuchea. There were increasing 
strains and uncertainties in East- West 
relations. Ever-increasing numbers of 
refugees worldwide presented political, 
economic, and humanitarian challenges. 
The world economy was plagued by 
stagflation, huge payments deficits, ten- 
sion between oil producers and con- 
sumers, and increased concern about the 
ability of the international economic and 
financial system to function effectively. 
Although the General Assembly ad- 
dressed itself to many of these issues, it 
was, on the whole, a rather quiet, transi- 
tional session, maintaining a record on 
issues rather than taking strong new in- 
itiatives. In part, this may have been a 
reflection of the interaction between the 
U S. presidential election and interna- 
tional affairs. The work of the 35th ses- 
sion was also affected by two emergency 
special sessions of the Assembly in 1980 
under the "uniting for peace" pro- 
cedure—one in January on the situation 
in Afghanistan; the other in July on the 
question of Palestine, and by a special 
session on development held in late 
August. In addition, the Security Coun- 
cil took up Middle East and southern 
African issues. Discussion of the situa- 
tion in Namibia was postponed pending 
the outcome of the preimplementation 
meeting which took place in January 
1981 in Geneva. 



Afghanistan 

A resolution on the situation in 
Afghanistan, sponsored by the Islamic 
nations, was adopted by an overwhelm- 
ing majority which included the United 
States. The majority was larger than 
that for a similar resolution passed in 
January 1980 by an emergency special 
session of the General Assembly. This 
session was called after the Soviet 
Union had vetoed a Security Council 
resolution dealing with the situation in 
Afghanistan created by the invasion of 
Soviet troops in December 1979. 

The resolution passed by the 35th 
General Assembly reaffirms the key pre 
visions of the January resolution calling 
for withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Afghanistan; the right of the Afghan 
people to self-determination free from 
outside interventions; and a peaceful 
solution based on the sovereignty, ter- 
ritorial integrity, and the nonahgned 
character of Afghanistan. In addition, l 
suggests the appointment of a repre- 
sentative of the Secretary General to 
work toward a political solution in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the res< 
lution. As a first step toward fulfilling tr 
objectives of the resolution, Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim appointed U.N 
Under Secretary General Xavier Perez 
de Cuellar as his personal represented 
on Afghanistan in February 1981. 



Kampuchea 

The United States strongly supported £ 
resolution offered by member states of 
the Association of South East Asian Ni 
tions (ASEAN) and approved by a larg 
majority, calling for an early interna- 
tional conference to negotiate 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Kampuchea and selection, under U.N. 
supervision, of a truly representative 
government by the Khmer people 

As it did the previous year, the 
United States supported, on a technics 
basis, the acceptance of the credentials 
of the representative of the Governme 
of Democratic Kampuchea. The U.S. 
position was that the present regime n 
Kampuchea, led by Heng Samrm, was 
installed by Vietnam through its milite 
invasion of Kampuchea and is main- 
tained in power by a Vietnamese occu; 
tion force of 200,000 troops. The regn 



54 



Department of State Bullet 



United Nations 



is not have a superior claim to the 
mpuchean seat in the General 
sembly; therefore, the Assembly 
mid seat the representative of the 
rernment whose credentials were ac- 
ited by the previous General 
sembly. The conclusion that the Heng 
mrin regime does not represent a 
)erior claim is supported by most of 

governments of the region, 
cretary of State Edmund Muskie 
,de clear in his statement of 
ptember 15 that this position on the 
hnical question of credentials does 
t imply U.S. Government recognition 
the Democratic Kampuchea regime, 
pport for it, or approval of its heinous 
ting of human life. 

At the December 1980 conference of 
nor nations, the United States pledg- 
a basic $25 million and up to an addi- 
nal $20 million on a matching basis 

FY 1981 for the ongoing Kam- 
chean relief effort. 

an-Iraq War 

le General Assembly did not act on 
is issue. However, the Security Coun- 
adopted a resolution on September 
I, calling for both sides to cease 
istilities and resolve their differences 
lacefully. After consultations with 
;curity Council members Secretary 
eneral Waldheim appointed former 
■vedish Premier Olof Palme to serve as 
s personal emissary to the two govern- 
ments to work on a settlement. 

liddle East 

he 35th General Assembly adopted, by 
rge majorities, 12 resolutions on the 
jestion of Palestine and the situation in 
le Middle East in addition to the two 
assed during the 6-day emergency 
Decial session on the question of 
alestine held, despite U.S. opposition, 
l July 1980. Of all these resolutions, the 
'nited States voted in favor of only one, 
r hich reaffirmed the applicability of the 
eneva convention of 1949 to the ter- 
itory occupied by Israel as a result of 
le 1967 war. 

The United States voted against or 
bstained on the remaining resolutions 
)r a variety of reasons. It found them 
nrealistic and one-sided, not taking into 
ccount the legitimate rights and con- 
erns of both sides in the Middle East 
onflict. The United States found par- 
!cularly disturbing a resolution ques- 
ioning for the first time the adequacy of 
ecurity Council Resolution 242 as a 
asis for a Middle East settlement. 



Together with other Western nations, 
the United States also voted against a 
resolution criticizing the Camp David 
peace process. 

Southern Africa 

In explanation of its vote on agenda 
item 28, "Policies of Apartheid of the 
Government of South Africa," the 
United States reiterated its strong op- 
position to apartheid and its firm com- 
mitment to work for its eradication. 
However, the United States was again 
forced to vote against a majority of the 
17 subsections of the resolution because 
they contained language and proposed 



Namibia 



The following statement was issued 
by the Governments of Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States 
on April U, 1981. ' 

Following the regretable failure of the 
preimplementation meeting at Geneva to 
give effect to the U.N. plan for Namibia, 
the governments of the Western five 
have been engaged in extensive con- 
sultations to reassess the situation in 
southern Africa and prospects for a 
negotiated settlement for the territory. 
Bilateral discussions at ministerial level 
have taken place on several occasions 
over the last 2 months at which the 
Namibia issue was considered by the 
five. 

The Western five remain committed 
to an internationally accepted settlement 
for Namibia and are continuing their 
common efforts toward this goal. A 
meeting of senior officials of the five will 
be held in London during the week of 
April 20 at the conclusion of consulta- 
tions in Africa by the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary-designate for African Affairs, 
Mr. Chester Crocker. 

The London meeting will provide an 
opportunity to review the results of all 
these consultations and consider future 
courses of action. The Western five hope 
this will assist them in the process of 
formulating proposals on how progress 
can be made toward the mutually agreed 
objective of early independence for 
Namibia. 



'USUN press release 19. 



actions which the United States could 
not accept. There was little attempt on 
the part of the sponsors of the apartheid 
resolution to negotiate texts which 
would reflect a wider consensus in op- 
position to apartheid which exists in the 
international community. 

The 35th General Assembly agreed 
to defer discussion on Namibia until 
after the U.N. -sponsored preimplemen- 
tation meeting in Geneva in January 
1981, which all parties to the negotia- 
tions on Namibian independence would 
attend. The United States attended as 
one of the five-member Western contact 
group which has been working for Nami- 
bian independence since 1978. The objec- 
tive of the conference was to set the 
date for a cease-fire in the guerrilla war 
as the first step in implementing a 
previously agreed-upon U.N. plan for 
elections and independence. In his 
remarks at the conclusion of the 
meeting, U.N. Under Secretary General 
Brian Urquhart noted that South Africa 
felt it would be "premature" to proceed 
with implementation at this time. The 
question of Namibia was then taken up 
at a meeting of the resumed General 
Assembly in March 1981. 

Zimbabwe 

On April 18,1980, Zimbabwe, formerly 
Southern Rhodesia, became independent 
and was admitted to U.N. membership 
on August 25. Zimbabwe's admission to 
the United Nations was the culmination 
of a long and difficult effort to establish 
an internationally recognized govern- 
ment representative of all the people of 
that nation. Zimbabwe's admission was 
also a triumph for people of that nation. 
Zimbabwe's admission was also a 
triumph for many U.N. members, par- 
ticularly the United Kingdom and the 
front-line states of southern Africa, 
whose untiring efforts facilitated the 
signing of the Lancaster House 
agreements and the election of a 
representative government in Zim- 
babwe. 

Western Sahara 

The Assembly adopted an Algerian 
resolution, on which the United States 
abstained, calling for negotiations to set- 
tle the future of .the people of Western 
Sahara but prejudging the outcome by 
declaring that they should lead to the 
creation of an independent Saharan 
state and referring to the Polisario 
[Popular Liberation Front for Rio de 
Oro and Saguia El Hamra] as "repre- 
sentative of the people of Western 



une 1981 



55 



United Nations 



Sahara." The United States, in its state- 
ment to the committee, explained that it 
is neutral on the eventual status of the 
territory which can be decided only after 
due consultation with the people of the 
territory. It voted for a Moroccan 
resolution in which Morocco pledged to 
cooperate with the Organization for 
African Unity in settling the issue. 

Cyprus 

Intercommunal talks for a settlement of 
the Cyprus dispute recommenced under 
U.N. sponsorship in September 1980 in 
Nicosia. The Assembly decided to 
postpone the Cyprus debate until the 
36th General Assembly. 

Disarmament and Arms Control 

Of the 44 resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly in the field of arms 
control and disarmament, the most 
noteworthy — on allegations of chemical 
weapons use — was also the most con- 
troversial. Cosponsored by eight 
Western nations and strongly supported 
by the United States, the resolution 
called for an investigation, under the 
aegis of the U.N. Secretary General, of 
reports of chemical weapons use in re- 
cent conflicts. 

Although no countries are mention- 
ed by name in the resolution, it reflects 
the concern of the United States and 
other nations about reports that lethal 
and incapacitating chemical weapons 
have been used by Communist forces in 
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. 
Significantly, this is the first time the in- 
ternational community has endorsed ac- 
tion to deal with a problem which 
threatens the viability of an important 
international agreement (the 1925 
Geneva protocol). 

Other resolutions adopted urged the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. to ratify 
SALT II and begin additional negotia- 
tions on limiting strategic nuclear 
weapons, approved in principle the im- 
plementation of a U.N. study on conven- 
tional weapons disarmament, and pro- 
vided for the establishment of 
preparatory committees for the 1982 
second General Assembly special session 
on disarmament and the 1983 U.N. Con- 
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy. 

An Indian Ocean as a zone of peace 
resolution was adopted by consensus for 
the first time. This resolution leaves to 
the ad hoc committee on the Indian 
Ocean to decide at its 1981 meetings 
whether to hold an Indian Ocean con- 



ference later in 1981. The resolution, 
while by no means perfect from the U.S. 
point of view, allows a shift of focus 
away from naval forces alone and pro- 
vides a basis for continuing discussions 
on the fundamental security problems 
facing the Indian Ocean region. 

The session continued a trend which 
saw the nonaligned and other nations of 
the world increasingly anxious to see 
some concrete results from the super- 
powers on such issues as nuclear arms 
control, the comprehensive test ban, and 
the prohibition of chemical weapons and, 
at least, to begin multilateral negotia- 
tions on these issues. 

Refugees 

The humanitarian, financial, and political 
pressures created by 3.5 million African, 
over 1 million Afghan, 255,000 In- 
dochinese refugees, and the exodus of 
150,000 Cubans and Haitians to the 
United States focused world attention 
on the problems of refugees. In his 
opening speech to the meeting of the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council in 
July 1980, Ambassador Donald F. 
McHenry, U.S. Permanent Represent- 
ative to the United Nations, called for a 
better management of this "worldwide 
crisis" and a reformulation of interna- 
tional attitudes on refugees. 

At the General Assembly, the 
United States supported a resolution 
that endorsed the work of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), noted the High 
Commissioner's efforts to contribute to 
the improvement of coordination among 
U.N. agencies and other relevant inter- 
national organizations, called upon the 
international community to share the 
burden of assisting refugees and dis- 
placed persons, and authorized the 
UNHCR to allocate up to $10 million an- 
nually for refugees and displaced per- 
sons in emergency situations. 

The United States cosponsored a 
Federal Republic of Germany resolution 
that called for governments to focus on 
the political origins of refugee flows and 
the means to avert them and called on 
member states to submit to the 
Secretary General their comments and 
recommendations on ways and means to 
improve international cooperation to 
avert new flows of refugees; the resolu- 
tion was adopted by a large margin. A 
U.S. -supported resolution calling for an 
International Conference on Assistance 
to Refugees in Africa to be held in 
Geneva, April 9 and 10, 1981, was ap- 
proved. A Canadian resolution, adopted 



by consensus, established flagrant viola* 
tions of human rights as a cause for 
massive flows of refugees. 

The United States pledged $75.7 
million for the first 9 months of 1981 ft 
the programs of the UNHCR and ex- 
pects to contribute $16.5 million for the 
final quarter of the year. 

Human Rights 

The General Assembly adopted some 3! 
resolutions, a good number of which 
consolidated earlier human rights ad- 
vances. There was progress on such 
matters as redesignation of the U.N. 
Human Rights Division to the status of 
a Center, safeguards against summary 
executions, and reinforcement for the 
Human Rights Commission's working 
group on disappearances. A resolution 
welcomed Sri Lanka's offer to host a 
seminar on human rights in Asia in 
1981. 

The General Assembly also adoptee 
three resolutions concerning human 
rights situations in specific Latin 
American nations. The United States 
supported a resolution on Bolivia and 
another accepting the latest report on 
the human rights situation in Chile. 
Although it shares the concern of othe 
nations over the level of violence and 
violations of human rights occurring 
daily in El Salvador, the United States 
abstained on a resolution on El Salvad 
which it found unbalanced and unhelpf 
in ending the violence. 

Women's Issues 

The U.N. -sponsored mid-Decade Work 
Conference on Women, which took pla 
in Copenhagen in July 1980, completec 
program of action for the second half 
the Decade for Women. The program 
was adopted by an overwhelming ma- 
jority which the United States could n< 
join because of objectionable language 
which grouped Zionism with racism, c< 
lonialism, and neocolonialism and 
directed that assistance for Palestiniar 
refugees be provided in consultation 
with the Palestine Liberation Organize 
tion as the representative of the Pales 
tinian people. The program was again 
voted on as a resolution at the 35th 
Genera] Assembly and again the Unite 
States voted against it. 

However, the United States pledgi 
its support and participation in nation; 
and international endeavors aimed at 
fulfilling the conference in 1976. The 
United States supported other resolu- 
tions concerning the International 



56 



Department of State Bulleti 



United Nations 



?arch and Training Institute for the 
ancement of Women, assistance for 
ale refugees, and the voluntary fund. 

tection of Diplomats 

he wake of the hostage situation, the 
die nations offered a resolution, 
>ed by consensus, which urges states 
isure, in conformity with their inter- 
onal obligations, the protection and 
ty of diplomatic and consular mis- 
si calls on states to consider becom- 
parties to relevant conventions; in- 
s states to report to the Secretary 
eral serious violations of the protec- 

security, and safety of diplomatic 
sions; requests the Secretary General 
rork with member nations on addi- 
al protective measures; and asks the 
retary General to report on this sub- 
to the next General Assembly, 
ile the resolution is not as strong as 
United States would have liked, it is 
mportant reaffirmation of the need 
irotect diplomatic envoys and a fur- 
• step in international efforts against 
■orism. 

'elopment 

34th session of the General 
embly inaugurated a period of in- 
ie activity on economic and develop- 
lt issues, leading to a special session 
he General Assembly on development 
August 1980. The main purpose of 
special session was to reach agree- 
nt on procedures and agenda for a 
nd of global negotiations on such in- 
lational economic issues as trade, 
elopment, energy, and money and 
ince, to be launched in January 1981. 
reement could not be reached at the 
cial session, and discussions were 
.tinued at the 35th General Assembly 
i small negotiating group headed by 
U.N. General Assembly President, 
nsiderable ground was covered in nar- 
king differences, but substantial 
'erences still remain before global 
jotiations can be launched. 
The Group of 77 (representing 121 
sloping nations) insisted on inclusion 
items calling for the reform of the in- 
national monetary system and finan- 
1 institutions but was unwilling to 
•ee on a serious discussion of energy 
cing and supply issues on which the 
ropean Economic Community was in- 
ting. The United States, although sup- 
ping the European Community's ob- 
tives on energy, remained primarily 
icerned with obtaining an acceptable 
± on monetary issues. A greater 
jree of agreement was reached on a 



text on procedures, but there was still 
concern that this text did not adequately 
protect the decisionmaking authority of 
such specialized international agencies 
as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. 

At the resumed General Assembly 
session in January, the decision was 
made to authorize General Assembly 
President Rudiger von Wechmar 
(Federal Republic of Germany) to con- 
tinue to pursue work on this issue with a 
view to resuming formal negotiations 
later this year. 



tiveness. The proposal has not been 
voted on and remains on the Assembly 
agenda. 

The General Assembly elected five 
nonpermanent members of the Security 
Council to serve for 2-year terms. These 
are Ireland, Japan, Panama, Spain, and 
Uganda. The members of the Security 
Council for 1981 are China, France, Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, Ireland, 
Japan, Mexico, Niger, Panama, the 
Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Uganda, the 
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 



International Development Strategy Budget and Secretariat Staffing 



The international development strategy, 
a document outlining programs and 
goals for economic development during 
the Third United Nations Development 
Decade, was agreed upon at the special 
session on development in August 1980 
and adopted by consensus at the General 
Assembly. The United States endorsed 
the strategy but, along with most other 
developed countries, expressed reserva- 
tions on many points covered in the 
document. These included the establish- 
ment of fixed growth and aid targets, a 
process to which the United States has 
long been opposed. The United States 
also was not satisfied that energy issues 
were sufficiently treated in the docu- 
ment. 

Other development issues included a 
resolution adopted by consensus calling 
for a conference on the least developed 
countries to be held in Paris in Septem- 
ber 1981 to consider the special prob- 
lems of about 30 least developed coun- 
tries. The General Assembly also 
adopted by consensus a series of 25 
country- specific resolutions calling for in- 
creased economic and disaster relief 
assistance and a resolution to hold a 
Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy in Nairobi in August 
1981. 

Security Council Expansion and 
Membership 

India and other nations sponsored a pro- 
posal to expand the Security Council 
from 15 to 21 members. The United 
States opposes the expansion because it 
believes the Security Council as current- 
ly composed reflects the balance of in- 
terests in today's world relevant to ques- 
tions of peace and security. In addition, 
the United States believes that enlarging 
the size of the Council would hinder its 
ability to act quickly and lessen its effec- 



The United States voted against a sup- 
plement of $91.4 million to the biennial 
U.N. budget which was ultimately ap- 
proved. (The total budget for 1980-81 is 
now $1.4 billion.) This vote, in which the 
United States was joined by 19 other 
countries accounting for a total of 79% 
of regular budget assessments, reflected 
the U.S. belief that increases in one area 
of the U.N. budget should be matched 
by offsetting reductions, particularly of 
low priority activities, elsewhere. The 
vote also expressed U.S. dissatisfaction 
that the Secretariat had taken inade- 
quate measures to absorb, as national 
governments are forced to do, increases 
in costs of previously approved pro- 
grams due to inflation and currency fluc- 
tuations. 

The United States cooperated in 
developing a new formula for determin- 
ing the number of U.N. Secretariat jobs 
each member nation may fill with its 
citizens. In response to criticism from 
developing nations that too much weight 
was given to the amount of a nation's 
contributions, the new formula 
decreases the weight given to the 
amount of a nation's contributions from 
66% to 57%. However, it increases the 
total number of jobs available to each 
nation by broadening the base of exist- 
ing jobs subject to geographical distribu- 
tion from what the United States con- 
sidered an unrealistic low of 2,700 to 
3,350. 



USUN press release 16 of Apr. 10, 1981. 



ne1981 



57 



United Nations 



International Conference on 
Assistance to Africa's Refugees 



The International Conference on 
Assistance to Refugees in Africa was 
held April 9-10, 1981, in Geneva. 
Following is a statement made to that 
conference by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, head 
of the U.S. delegation and U.S. Am- 
bassador to the United Nations, on 
April 9. ' 

It is my pleasure to bring you greetings 
from our President, Ronald Reagan. 
Because he is deeply moved by the 
suffering of Africa's refugees and 
desired to express, in a compelling 
fashion, the solidarity of the U.S. 
Government and the American people, 
President Reagan had initially 
designated Vice President George Bush 
to head the U.S. delegation. When his 
injury made it necessary for the Vice 
President to remain in the United 
States, President Reagan asked me to 
attend — less as our Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations than as 
one of the members of the U.S. Cabinet 
who operates in the field of foreign 
affairs. The President also asked me to 
personally express his devout hopes for 
a successful conference. And the Vice 
President requested that I express his 
regrets that he cannot be with you to- 
day. The President, the Vice President, 
and the Secretary of State are following 
our proceedings with great interest. I 
will report to them on the conference 
soon after I return to the United States. 

To draw attention to this confer- 
ence, a bill of the U.S. Congress and a 
proclamation of the President have 
designated today, April 9th, as African 
Refugee Relief Day. 

The United States not only has links 
with Africa, Africa is present in the 
United States. The African heritage is 
one of our component parts. Americans 
have many links with Africa, links which 
President Reagan's Administration fully 
intends to reinforce and expand. 
Twenty-six million of our people trace 
their ancestral roots to Africa. The ex- 
change of students, teachers, mis- 
sionaries, businessmen, and diplomats 
between the United States and Africa 
has a long history fruitful to both sides. 
The rich influences of Africa in our 
culture and society are fixed in the na- 
tional fabric. 

My message today is simple: We feel 
deeply the suffering of Africa's millions 
of refugees forced by political, economic, 



and natural catastrophes to leave their 
homes in the search for safety and even 
for survival. 

We sympathize also with the coun- 
tries in which refugees have sought and 
found asylum — with the strain that 
growing refugee populations put on 
scarce resources and difficult conditions 
in their host countries. We want to help. 
We mean to do so. 

U.S. Concern 

Contrary to some reports, the Govern- 
ment of the United States cares a great 
deal about our relations with the nations 
of Africa. This concern is reflected in 
the careful review of African policy and 
in the consultations now being carried 
out by our new Assistant Secretary- 
designate, Chester Crocker. Even more 
dramatic evidence of the U.S. Govern- 
ment's concern is found in its new 
budget. While deep cuts are being made 
in most domestic and foreign expend- 
itures, the Administration has recom- 
mended to the Congress a 30% increase 
in our overall aid for Africa — the first 
real increase in African aid in a number 
of years. 

My Administration's special concern 
with refugees has already been made 
clear. Last month some $50 million in 
assistance was committed to the Govern- 
ment of Zimbabwe to help in war recon- 
struction efforts and other activities and 
programs of direct benefit to the 
thousands of returnees in that country. 
Moreover, the United States has con- 
sistently and generously contributed to 
humanitarian programs for the relief of 
African refugees. 

Today I am pleased to announce 
here that during the 2 years of 1981 and 
1982, the United States will further 
make available, dependent in part on 
congressional authorization, a total of 
$285 million to programs assisting 
African refugees. 

That pledge is not only an expres- 
sion of our desire to help but also of our 
conviction that something can be 
done— that the problems of the African 
refugees are not beyond solution. 

Grounds for Hope 

Most tragically the staggering number 
of refugees come on top of the many 
burdens that Africa already bears. Most 



asylum countries in Africa are strug- 
gling against great odds to meet the 
needs of their own people. Moreover, 
African development needs and popula: 
tion growth, together with declining pe 
capita food production, combine with 
Africa's refugee crises to threaten gen- 
uine disasters. Secretary General [of tfa 
Organization of African Unity Edem] 
Kodjo recently posed the issue in stark 
terms when he said that "by the end of 
the century, Africa will either be saved 
or completely destroyed." 

Even though the number of Africai 
refugees continues to grow — having 
more than doubled in the Horn in 
1980- 

we remain hopeful and for several 
reasons. 

The first ground for hope is the 
generosity of the African countries 
themselves. The more than two dozen 
asylum countries have repeatedly 
demonstrated the time-honored Africai 
tradition of hospitality to strangers. 
Even though most asylum countries in 
Africa are struggling against great od( 
to meet the needs of their own people, 
they have often committed sizable 
amounts from their own resources to 
assist refugees, permitting the 
newcomers to resettle permanently. 
Most have permitted the refugees to u( 
arable lands and available social serv- 
ices. These African countries are, 
therefore, the first donors. 

The second ground for hope lies in 
the excellent efforts of a variety of inb 
national agencies, public and private, i 
eluding the International Committee o 
the Red Cross and the many other 
voluntary humanitarian organizations- 
many of whose representatives are pr< 
ent among us today. The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees has worke 
valiantly to meet the staggering incres 
in worldwide refugee needs over the 
past 5 years. 

The third ground for hope is founc 
in the growing response of the interna 
tional community and recognition of tr 
need for a massive coordinated effort t 
assist the millions of uprooted, homele 
Africans. There is also increasing 
awareness among those willing to help 
of the importance of tailoring the 
assistance to the concrete circumstanC' 
of the refugees and their host countrie 
We believe a more systematic study of 
these circumstances can result in still 
more effective help. 

A final reason for hope is the retui 
during the past year, of many thousan 
of former refugees to their homes in 
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea, a 



58 



Department of State Bulleti 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



vement that illustrates the possibility 

eversing the trend. 

Reversing the negative trends and 
ring the problems will not only re- 
re an intelligent, generous effort by 
ions outside Africa, it will also re- 
re a determination to achieve peace 
Africa. An end to military adventures 
i violent politics is necessary, and we 
I on all the countries of this area to 
I peaceful solutions to Africa's prob- 
is no matter how difficult or intract- 
e they may appear. 

If we all — in and out of Africa — work 
ether to solve the problems of 
pica's destitute millions, the result will 
better lives and more hopeful futures 

the refugees and greater stability for 
:ir hosts. In this effort you can count 
the United States. 



'USUN press release 18. 



frican Refugee 
elief Day 



IOCLAMATION 4833, 
3 R. 9, 1981 1 

le American people are blessed with 
jedom and material abundance, yet 
ey are not deaf to the cries of agony 
Dm those who suffer deprivation. To- 
(.y, cries for help are heard from Africa 
here more than 4 million of our fellow 
iman beings have been displaced. 

The United States applauds the hu- 
anitarian efforts of the nations which 
ike in these refugees. Host nations are 
ten themselves poor in resources and 
ieir willingness to accept refugees is 
cemplary of the best in the human 
tirit. 

Americans are a compassionate peo- 
e and will do their part, either through 
)vernment or through voluntary con- 
ibutions. 

With this in mind, Congress has, by 
int resolution, requested me to desig- 
ite April 9, 1981, as African Refugee 
elief Day and to call upon the people of 
le United States to observe that day by 
creasing their awareness of the plight 
; the African refugee. Further, I call on 
mericans of all faiths to involve them- 
:lves directly in this problem with their 
rayers and with contributions to recog- 
ized private voluntary agencies which 
rovide care and relief to African 
:fugees. 



Now, Therefore, I, Ronald 
Reagan, President of the United States 
of America, do hereby designate April 9, 
1981, as African Refugee Relief Day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have here- 
unto set my hand this ninth day of 
April, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty-one, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of 
America the two hundred and fifth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 13, 1981. ■ 



El Salvador 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 9, 1981 1 

The killing of some 20 civilians in El 
Salvador 2 days ago is part of a continu- 
ing tragedy in that country. Violence — 
from left and right — threatens all hopes 
of reform and democratic progress in 
that country. The goal of U.S. policy 
toward El Salvador is to help break this 
vicious pattern. 

These most recent killings reinforce 
our determination to support the cen- 
trist government of the country, a 
government that is beset by extremist 
forces on the far right and far left who 
oppose its policies of political, social, and 
economic reform. 

The extremist forces deliberately in- 
stigate violence in the knowledge that 
progress can be stopped only in that 
way. Such incidents will unfortunately 
continue until the Government of El 
Salvador can demonstrate its ability to 
restore stability in the country and end 
acts of violence by all parties. 

We are communicating with the 
Government of El Salvador in an effort 
to learn the facts of this most recent 
tragedy. 



■Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman William J. Dyess. ■ 



une1981 



59 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Convention on the Inter-American Institute 
for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at 
Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force 
Dec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919. 
Ratification deposited : Bolivia, Apr. 8, 
1981. 

Antarctica 

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 
Accession deposited : Peru, Apr. 10, 

1981. 

Notification of succession deposited : 

Papua New Guinea, Mar. 16, 1981. 

Aviation, Civil 

Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Accession deposited : Kiribati, Apr. 14, 1981. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos 
Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered into force Oct. 
24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Accession deposited : Kiribati, Apr. 14, 1981. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the develop- 
ment, production, and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and on their destruction. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 

1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 

Accession deposited : Uruguay, Apr. 6, 1981. 

Commodities— Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980. 1 
Signature : Brazil, Apr. 16, 1981. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 

1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 
8249. 

Accessions deposited: Liberia, Mar. 11, 1981; 
Mozambique, Mar. 25, 1981. 
Reservations withdrawn: South Africa, Feb. 
17, 1981. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973, on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979. 1 
Acceptances deposited : Denmark, Feb. 25, 
1981; Switzerland, Feb. 23, 1981. 

Cultural Property 

Statutes of the International Center for the 
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of 
Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi 



60 



Nov.-Dec. 1956, as amended Apr. 24, 1963, 

and Apr. 14-17, 1969. Entered into force 

May 10, 1958; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1971. 

TIAS 7038. 

Notification of withdrawa l: U.K., 

Dec. 30, 1980; effective Dec. 30, 1981. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited : Zimbabwe, Mar. 19, 
1981. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 
1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited : Sudan, Apr. 13, 1981. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at 
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 
30, 1977. TIAS 8765. 
Accession deposited : Solomon Islands, 
Mar. 13, 1981. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. Done 
at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1978. 2 
Accession deposited : Mexico, Mar. 24, 1981. 3 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 2 
Accession deposited : Mexico, Mar. 23, 1981. 

International covenant on economic, social, 

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

1976. 2 

Accession deposited : Mexico, Mar. 23, 1981. 

Hydrographic Organization 

Convention on the International Hydro- 
graphic Organization, with annexes. Done at 
Monaco May 3, 1967. Entered into force 
Sept. 22, 1970. TIAS 6933. 
Accession deposited: Belgium, Mar. 10, 1981. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad 
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The 
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force 
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Accession deposited: Barbados, Mar. 5, 1981. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention 

on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at 

London Oct. 12, 1971. ' 

Acceptance deposited: Belgium, Mar. 19, 

1981. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental 

Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed 

at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force 

Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, Mar. 4, 

1981. 



Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London 
Nov. 14, 1975. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Apr. 14, 1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Apr. 14, 1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at Londc 
Nov. 15, 1979. ' 

Acceptances deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 2, 
1981; Spain, Apr. 14 , 1981. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations 
Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Enten 
into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapte: 
II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 
1978." TIAS 8733. 

Territorial application: Notification by U.K. 
that treaty shall be applicable to Hong Koi 
effective Apr. 15, 1981. 

Pollution 

Protocol relating to intervention on the hij 
seas in cases of pollution by substances otl 
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. ' 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, Mar. 5, 
1981. 

International convention on the establishm 

of an international fund for compensation 

oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

Dec. 18, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 16, 

1978. 2 

Accession deposited: Maldives, Mar. 16, 

1981. 

Program-Carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution of 
programme-carrying signals transmitted b 
satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. 
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979. 2 
Ratification deposited: Italy, Apr. 7, 1981. 

Property — Industrial 

Nice agreement concerning the internatior 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of 
June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Genev; 
May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 
1979. 2 

Accession deposited: Denmark, Mar. 3, 
1981. 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the internatioi 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 19' 
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 197 
Entered into force May 1, 1981. 
Accession deposited: Norway, Mar. 25, 198: 

International convention for the safety of 1 

at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 

Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 

1980. TIAS 9700. 

Accession deposited : Singapore, Mar. 16, 

1981. 

Department of State Bullet 



Treaties 



llite Communications System 

ention on the international maritime 
lite organization (INMARSAT), with an- 
Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered 
force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
ssion deposited : Philippines, Mar. 30, 

: ication deposited : Chile, Feb. 26, 1981. 

•ating agreement on the international 
time satellite organization (INMARSAT), 

annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. 
!red into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
ature s: Chile, Feb. 26, 1981; Philippines, 

30, 1981. 

orism 

rnational convention against the taking of 
ages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. ' 
ission deposited : Trinidad and Tobago, 
1, 1981. 

isportation 

ement on the international carriage of 
shable foodstuffs and on the special 
pment to be used for such carriage 
P), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 
970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976. 2 
jssion deposited : German Democratic 
ublic, Apr. 14, 1981. 

kties 

ma conventions on the law of treaties, 
i annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 
ered into force Jan. 27, 1980. 2 
fication deposited : Chile, Apr. 9, 1981. 

eat 

1 protocol for the first extension of the 
I aid convention, 1980. Done at 
ihington Mar. 24, 1981. 1 
latere: Sweden, Apr. 6, 1981. 

1 protocol for the sixth extension of the 
■at trade convention, 1971. Done at 
shington Mar. 24, 1981. » 
natures: Brazil, Apr. 28, 1981; Egypt, 
■. 24, 1981; Sweden, Apr. 6, 1981; 
usia, Apr. 22, 1981. 



lvention on the elimination of all forms of 
crimination against women. Adopted at 
v York Dec. 18, 1979. 1 
nature: Brazil, Mar. 31, 1981. 
ification deposited : Mexico, Mar. 23, 
1. 

lvention on the political rights of women. 

le at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered 

) force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 

6. TIAS 8289. 

ification deposited : Mexico, Mar. 23, 

II. 

5r-American convention on the granting of 
itical rights to women. Signed at Bogota 
y 2, 1948. Entered into force Apr. 22, 
9; for the U.S. May 24, 1976. TIAS 8365. 
iession deposited : Mexico, Mar. 24, 
H. 



BILATERAL 

Dominica 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Bridgetown and Roseau Dec. 11, 
1980, and Feb. 4, 1981. Entered into force 
Feb. 4, 1981. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Sept. 
28, 1977 (TIAS 8944). Signed at Santo Do- 
mingo Feb. 20, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 
20, 1981. 

The Gambia 

Agreement relating to radio communications 
between amateur stations on behalf of third 
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Banjul Mar. 17, 1981. Entered into force 
Apr. 16, 1981. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 

14, 1980 (TIAS 9738), with agreed minutes. 
Signed at Accra Mar. 31, 1981. Entered into 
force Mar. 31, 1981. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
8, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8936, 9291, 
9611, 9714), relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at Hong 
Kong Mar. 13, 1981. Entered into force Mar. 
13, 1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981. 

Israel 

First amendment to agreement of Dec. 3, 
1980, proving additional grant funds to sup- 
port the economic and political stability of 
Israel. Signed Mar. 27, 1981. Entered into 
force Mar. 27, 1981. 

Malaysia 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kuala Lumpur Dec. 5, 1980, and 
Feb. 27, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 27, 
1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981. 

Mexico 

Agreement of cooperation regarding pollution 
of the marine environment by discharges of 
hydrocarbons and other hazardous 
substances, with annexes. Signed at Mexico 
City July 24, 1980. Entered into force provi- 
sionally July 24, 1980. 
Entered into force : Definitively, Mar. 30, 
1981. 

Agreement on cooperation in cases of natural 
disasters. Signed at Mexico City Jan. 15, 
1980. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 

15, 1980. 

Entered into force : Definitively, Mar. 18, 
1981. 



NATO 

Agreement concerning the application of part 
IV of the agreement on the status of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national 
representatives, and international staff, Sept. 
20, 1951 (TIAS 2992), to the officials of 
NATO civilian bodies located on the territory 
of the United States of America. Signed at 
Brussels Mar. 3, 1981. Entered into force 
Mar. 3, 1981. 

Niger 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Niamey Mar. 11 and June 9, 1980. 
Entered into force June 9, 1980. 

Norway 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the U.S., with annex and agreed minutes. 
Signed at Washington Jan. 26, 1981. Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by 
exchange of notes, upon the completion of in- 
ternal procedures of both governments. 

Philippines 

Memorandum of understanding for the ex- 
change of individual personnel between the 
U.S. Army Western Command and the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Signed at 
Manila Mar. 25, 1981. Entered into force 
Mar. 25, 1981. 

Poland 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Sept. 15, 1980, and 
Mar. 20, 1981. Entered into force Mar. 20, 
1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981. 

St. Lucia 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Bridgetown and Castries Dec. 11, 
1980, and Jan. 27, 1981. Entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1981. 

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Bridgetown and Kingstown Dec. 
11, 1980, and Jan. 20, 1981. Entered into 
force Jan. 20, 1981. 

Senegal 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 

of agricultural commodities of 

May 16, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes 

Dec. 23, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 23, 

1980. 



me 1981 



61 



CHRONOLOGY 



Sudan 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. and its 
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum 
May 17, 1980. Entered into force for 1979/80 
debt June 19, 1980. 
Entered into force for 1980/81 debt : 
Apr. 14, 1981. 

Sweden 

Technical exchange and cooperative arrange- 
ment in the field of nuclear safety research 
and development, with appendix. Signed at 
Bethesda and Studs vik Jan. 27 and Feb. 23, 
1981. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1981. 

Switzerland 

International express mail agreement, with 

detailed regulations. Signed at Bern and 

Washington Dec. 7, 1978, and 

Jan. 22, 1979. 

Entered into force : Feb. 1, 1979. 

Turkey 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480 
Title I agricultural commodity agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Ankara Mar. 27, 
1981. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1981. 

United Kingdom 

Arrangement relating to the employment of 
dependents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Jan. 14 and 15, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 
15, 1981. 

World Health Organization 

Memorandum of understanding regarding 
United States EPA collaboration in the inter- 
national program on chemical safety. Signed 
at Washington and Geneva Jan. 19 and Mar. 
19, 1981. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1981. 

Zaire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480 
Title I agricultural commodity agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa Mar. 10, 
1981. Entered into force Mar. 10, 1981. 



April 1981 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

3 With reservation and declarations. 

4 Chapter II not in force for the U.S. 



April 1 

Of the $75 million in economic support 
funds to Nicaragua, the U.S. suspends the re- 
maining $15 million because of that country's 
assistance to guerrillas in El Salvador. 
However, recognizing the necessity to retain 
U.S. influence in Nicaragua and to continue 
incentives for moderates there, the U.S. did 
not demand immediate repayment of out- 
standing fully disbursed loans already extend- 
ed to that country and will consider a 
resumption of aid should the situation in 
Nicaragua improve. 

April 2 

Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw 
Jagielski visits U.S. to discuss U.S. -Polish 
relations and to seek economic aid for that 
country. The U.S. announces that it will pro- 
vide food aid to Poland— 30,000 tons of dried 
milk and 30,000 tons of butter— which will be 
sold below world market prices for Polish 
currency. 

April 3 

Secretary Haig makes official visit to the 
Middle East -Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia April 3-8. He also makes stops 
in Rome, Madrid, London, Paris, and Bonn 
April 8-11. 

April 6 

U.S. asks the International Court of 
Justice to dismiss U.S. claims against Iran 
for damages resulting from seizing and 
holding U.S. hostages. If Iran fails to live up 
to the agreement signed Jan. 19, in Algeria, 
the petition reserves the right to reinstitute 
proceedings. 

April 8 

Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group 
in Bonn, NATO Defense Ministers issue a 
statement noting that Soviet intervention in 
Poland would undermine the prospects for ef- 
fective arms control negotiations. 

April 9 

International Conference on Assistance to 
Refugees in Africa convenes in Geneva April 
9-11. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the U.N., heads 
the U.S. delegation. 

April 10 

Thirty-five nations, including NATO (ex- 
cept U.S. and Turkey) and all members of the 
Warsaw Pact (except Romania) sign Conven- 
tional Weapons Convention (CWC) which is 
primarily designed to protect civilians from 
incendiaries, land mines, and booby traps. 
The U.S. is reviewing its position on the 
question of signing the Convention. The Con- 
vention will remain open for signature for a 
full year. 



April 14 

Governments of the Western 
Five— Canada, France, the Federal Reput 
of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States— issue a statement concern) 
the failure of the preimplementation meeti 
in Geneva to give effect to the U.N. plan f 
Namibia. They reiterate their commitment 
an internationally acceptable settlement fo 
that country. 

The space shuttle Columbia, safely lane 
concluding the successful first demonstrati 
of a new approach to extraterrestrial travi 
and opening a new era in space travel. 

April 15 

U.S. announces that Maksim 
Shostokovich, son of the late Soviet compc 
Dmitri, and his son will be admitted to thi: 
country as refugees. The two sought politi 
asylum in West Germany on April 12. 

Hans Christ, a Salvadoran national am 
suspect in the killing of Jose Rodolfo Vien 
head of El Salvador's Agrarian Reform In 
stitute, and two American advisers, is ar- 
rested in Miami by Federal authorities. 

April 17 

Prime Minister Nguza Karl-i-Bond of 
Zaire resigns. 

April 21 

U.S. announces decision to sell a new 
multimillion-dollar arms package, including 
five radar planes— AW ACS (airborne war 
ing and control system) planes — to Saudi 
Arabia. 

April 23 

Nsinga Udjuu Ongwakeb Untube, a 
former Interior Minister, is appointed Prii 
Minister of Zaire. 

April 24 

After 15 months, U.S. lifts ban on sale 
agricultural goods and phosphates to the 
Soviet Union. 

April 27 

Poland's 15 Western creditor govern- 
ments, including the U.S. Government, ag 
in Paris to reschedule Polish official debt 
payments coming due May 1-Dec. 31, 198 

April 30 

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheii 
makes official visit to Washington, D.C. tc 
meet with the President and the Secretan 
State. 

Prince Charles, heir apparent to the 
British throne, makes a private visit to 
Washington, D.C, and Norfolk, 
Williamsburg, and Yorktown, Va. During 
visit, the Prince was guest of honor at a 
White House dinner and also had brief 
meetings with the President and Secretar 
State. ■ 



April 12 

U.S. launches space shuttle Columbia, the 
first such space vehicle which can be reflown. 



62 



Department of State Bulle 



RESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



apartment of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
ice of Press Relations, Department of 
te, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Haig: interview for Spanish 

television, Mar. 30. 
Haig: remarks on arrival in 

Cairo, Apr. 4. 
Department of State Library 

dedication ceremony. 
Haig: interview for "Great 

Decisions '81." 
U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCIR), 
study group 1, Apr. 23 and 
24. 
CCIR, study group 4, 

Apr. 29. 
U.S., Poland sign textile 
agreement, Sept. 15, 1980, 
and Mar. 20, 1981. 
Haig, Laingen: awards cere- 
mony for former hostages. 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on subdivision, 
stability, and load lines, 
May 5. 
Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, working group on in- 
ternational data flows, 
May 14. 
Haig: arrival remarks, Cairo, 

Apr. 4. 
Haig, Sadat: remarks from 
the Barrages, Cairo, 
Apr. 5. 
Haig, Shamir: arrival state- 
ments, Ben Gurion Airport, 
Apr. 5. 
Haig, Begin: statements, 

Jerusalem, Apr. 5. 
Haig, Shamir: dinner toasts, 

Jerusalem, Apr. 5. 
Haig, Navon: question-and- 
answer session, Jerusalem, 
Apr. 6. 
Haig, Begin: statements fol- 
lowing Jerusalem meeting, 
Apr. 6. 
Haig: remarks to U.S. Em- 
bassy staff, Amman. 
Haig: departure remarks, 

Amman, Apr. 7. 
Haig: statement upon depar- 
ture from Riyadh. 
Haig: statement upon depar- 
ture from Rome, Apr. 8. 
Haig: statement upon death 
of General Omar Bradley. 
Haig: news conference, 
Madrid, Apr. 9. 



*109 4/24 Haig: statement following 
meeting with British 
Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington, London, 
Apr. 10. 

110 4/24 Haig: remarks following 

meeting with British Prime 
Minister Thatcher, London, 
Apr. 10. 

111 4/24 Haig: remarks to the press, 

Paris, Apr. 11. 

112 4/28 Haig: departure remarks, 

Bonn, Apr. 11. 

113 4/23 U.S., Canada Consultations 

on Garrison Diversion 
Unit. 

114 4/17 Haig: interview by Barrie 

Dunsmore, ABC-TV. 

*115 4/22 U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group A, May 28. 

♦116 4/22 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on radiocommunications, 
May 7. 

*117 4/22 U.S., Korea establish a spe- 
cific limit on one additional 
textile category. 

*118 4/22 U.S., Haiti amend textile 

agreement, Dec. 17, 1980 
and Feb. 5, 1981. 

*119 4/22 U.S., Malaysia sign new tex- 
tile agreement, Dec. 5, 
1980 and Feb. 27, 1981. 

"120 4/22 U.S., Korea agree to modifi- 
cations of bilateral textile 
agreement. 

121 4/23 Haig: interview by Marvin 

Kalb, NBC -TV, Apr. 14. 

122 4/24 Haig: speech to American 

Society of Newspaper 
Editors. 
122A 4/24 Question-and-answer session 
following Newspaper 
Editors Convention speech. 

♦123 4/28 Haig, Luns: press briefing, 
White House, Apr. 16. 

*124 4/28 Haig: statement before 

House Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations. 

♦125 4/28 SCC, SOLAS, May 27. 

♦126 4/28 CCITT, study group D, 

Modern Working Party, 
May 19-20. 

*127 5/1 Ambassador William E. 

Brock to address Confer- 
ence on U.S. Trade and In- 
vestment in Africa, New 
Orleans, May 8. 

♦128 4/30 Bicentennial theater opens 
at the Department of 
State. 

♦129 4/30 U.S., India amend textile 
agreement, Apr. 22 and 
23. 

♦130 4/30 U.S., Sri Lanka amend tex- 
tile agreement, Mar. 16. 

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■ 



Department of State 



Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Haig 

Security and Development Assistance, 
Mar. 19, 1981 (Current Policy #271). 

Interview on "Meet the Press," Mar. 29, 
1981 (Current Policy #264). 

A New Direction in Foreign Policy, Apr. 24, 
1981 (Current Policy #275). 

Africa 

Aid for African Refugees, Acting Director for 
Refugee Programs Smyser, Mar. 19, 1981 
(Current Policy #268). 

Background Notes on Ghana (Feb. 1981). 

Background Notes on Seychelles (Mar. 1981). 

Background Notes on Togo (Mar. 1981). 

Background Notes on Zimbabwe (Jan. 1981). 

African Refugees (GIST, Apr. 1981). 

Asia 

Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia, Under Sec- 
retary for Political Affairs Stoessel, 
Apr. 24, 1981 (Current Policy #274). 

East Asia 

Background Notes on Vietnam (Feb. 1981). 

U.S.-China Agricultural Trade (GIST. 
Apr. 1981). 

U.S.-China Relations (GIST, Mar. 1981). 

U.S.-China Economic Relations (GIST, 
Mar. 1981). 

U.S.-China Science and Technology Ex- 
changes (GIST, Mar. 1981). 

Economics 

Global Economic Interdependence, Assistant 

Secretary Hinton, Apr. 8, 1981 (Current 

Policy #273). 
1978-79 Trade of Non-NATO Europe, Japan, 

With Communist Countries, Jan. 16, 1981 

(Special Report #78). 
U.S. Export Expansion (GIST, May 1981). 

Energy 

Energy Security and International Prepared- 
ness, Deputy Assistant Secretary Morse, 
Mar. 23, 1981 (Current Policy #272). 

Europe 

Background Notes on Canada (Mar. 1981). 
Background Notes on Liechtenstein 

(Mar. 1981). 
Background Notes on Malta (Mar. 1981). 
Background Notes on Portugal (Apr. 1981). 

Foreign Aid 

Development Assistance for the Third World, 
Acting Director McPherson, International 
Development Cooperation Agency, Mar. 19, 
1981 (Current Policy #267). 



63 



Publications 



Latin America & the Caribbean 

Bilateral Assistance, Acting Assistant Secre- 
tary Bushnell, Mar. 23, 1981 (Current 
Policy #269). 

El Salvador, Under Secretary Stoessel, 
Mar. 19, 1981 (Current Policy #265). 

Background Notes on Bermuda (Feb. 1981). 

Background Notes on Haiti (Feb. 1981). 

Middle East 

Middle East Regional Security, Director of 
Politico-Military Affairs Burt, Mar. 23, 
1981 (Current Policy #270). 

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to Con- 
gress, Department statement (two declara- 
tions, the undertakings, and related docu- 
ments) Mar. 12, 1981 (Selected Documents 
#19). 

Background Notes on Algeria (Feb. 1981). 

Background Notes on North Yemen (Dec. 
1980). 

Background Notes on South Yemen (Dec. 
1980). 

Military Affairs 

U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements (seven 
treaties), Apr. 1981 (Special Report #81). 

Pacific 

Background Notes on New Zealand (Jan. 

1981). 
U.S. and the South Pacific (GIST, Mar. 1981). 

Population 

Population Growth and Foreign Policy, 
Ambassador Benedick, Jan. 27, 1981 (Cur- 
rent Policy #263). 

Security Assistance 

FY 1982 Proposals for Security Assistance, 
Under Secretary Buckley Mar. 19, 1981 
(Current Policy #266). 

United Nations 

U.N. Decade for Women (GIST, 
Mar. 1981). ■ 



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S9.10:9778.) 
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S9.10:9781.) 
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of Certain Debts. Agreement with 
Turkey. TIAS 9783. 10pp. $1.25. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9783.) 
Prisoner Transfer. Agreement with Pep 
TIAS 9784. 14pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9784.) 
Finance— Consolidation and Reschedulin 
of Certain Debts. Agreement with 
Turkey. TIAS 9786. 16pp. $1.50. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:9786.) 
Prisoner Transfer. Agreement with Panam 
TIAS 9787. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9787.) 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Import Licensing Procedures. Agree- 
ment with Other Governments. TIAS 
9788. 27pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9788. 
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No. S9.10:9790.) 
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and Technical Exchange. Agreement 
with the Netherlands. TIAS 9792. 25pp. 
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9792.) 
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ices. Agreement with Somalia. TIAS 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl 
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No. S9. 10:9795.) 
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the 
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No. S9. 10:9799.) 
Scientific Cooperation. Memorandum of 
Understanding with Belgium. TIAS 980< 
7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9800.) 



64 



Department of State Bulletir 



Publications 



fenbursement of Income Taxes. Agree- 
JTment with the Customs Cooperation 
^Council. TIAS 9801. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 
|S9.10:9801.) 

jhmoditv Imports — Loan No. 263-K-053. 
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|23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9802.) 
nmoditv Imports -Grant. Agreement 
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((Cat. No. S9. 10:9803.) 
Ide in Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan, 
p TIAS 9804. 7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. 
JS9.10:9804.) 

ricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Pakistan. TIAS 9805. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9805.) 

nmodity Imports -Loan No. 263-K-054. 
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imbursement of Income Taxes. Agree- 
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ivileges and Immunities for Military 
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: minal Investigations. Agreement with 
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iminal Investigations. Agreement with 
Turkey. TIAS 9810. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9810.) 
•ricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Mauritius. TIAS 9811. 8pp. $1.25 (Cat. 
No. S9.10:9811.) 

uble Taxation -Taxes on Estates, In- 
heritance and Gifts. Convention with 
France. TIAS 9812. 46pp. $2.25. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:9812.) 
;changes in Education and Culture. 
Agreement with Italy. TIAS 9813. 16pp. 
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9813.) 
omic Energy — Liquid Metal-Cooied Fast 
Breeder Reactors. Agreement with 
Japan. TIAS 9814. 30pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9814.) 
cpress Mail Service. Agreement with the 
Netherlands. TIAS 9816. 27pp. $1.75. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:9816.) 
ade in Textiles and Textile Products. 
Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 9817. 
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9817.) 
gricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Guyana. TIAS 9818. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9818.) 
rade in Textiles and Textile Products. 
Agreement with the People's Republic of 
China. TIAS 9820. 26pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9820.) 
tomic Energy — Reprocessing of Special 
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Japan. TIAS 9821. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. 
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arcotic Drugs— Additional Cooperative 
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(Cat. No. S9.10:9829.) 
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Italy. TIAS 9832. 5pp. $1. (Cat. No. 

S9.10:9832.) 
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Somalia. TIAS 9833. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat. 

No. S9. 10:9832.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 

Jordan. TIAS 9834. 16pp. $1.50. (Cat. 

No. S9. 10:9834.) 
Trade — Visa System for Textile Exports. 

Agreement with the People's Republic of 

China. TIAS 9836. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 

S9.10:9836.) 
Narcotic Drugs — Cooperation to Curb 

Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Colom- 
bia. TIAS 9838. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. 

S9.10:9838.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 

Sierra Leone. TIAS 9840. 8pp. $1.25. 

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9840.) 
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. 

Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 9842. 

3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9842.) 
Air Transport Services. Agreement with 

Finland. TIAS 9845. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat. 

No. S9. 10:9845.) ■ 



Iune1981 



65 



Itii l;ifrn-4Hil 




Bulletin 

hull vi in 




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NDEX 



une 1981 
'ol.81, No. 2051 



fghanistan. U.S. Perspective of the 35th 

P General Assembly 54 

frica 

fifrican Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59 
Iternational Conference on Assistance to 

I, Africa's Refugees (Kirkpatrick) 58 

Lestion-and-Answer Session Following Ad- 

f dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7 

I.S. Perspective of the 35th General Assem- 

[ bly 54 

merican Principles 

I' New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Haig) 5 
.oreign Policy and the American Spirit 

! (Haig) 13 

[rms Control 

|rms Sales to Morocco; Western Saharan 

! Conflict (Draper) 46 

secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci- 
sions 23 

isia. Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia (Stoes- 

sel) 33 

viation. The Airbus: Challenge to U.S. Air- 
craft Industry (Kopp) 39 

anada 

laritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree- 
ment (message to the Senate) 32 

[ .S. -Canada Consultations on Garrison Diver- 
sion Unit (joint U.S. -Canadian press re- 
lease) 32 

hina. Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great 

Decisions 23 

laims. Iran Claims Procedures (Department 
statement) 44 

Congress 

dd to Pakistan (Coon) 53 

'he Airbus: Challenge to U.S. Aircraft Indus- 
try (Kopp) 39 

i.rms Sales to Morocco; Western Saharan Con- 
flict (Draper) 46 

lth Report on Sinai Support Mission (mess- 
age to the Congress) 45 

nternal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the 
Congress) 31 

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree- 
ment (message to the Senate) 32 

deprograming Proposal for El Salvador (Buck- 
ley) 51 

J.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in South- 
east Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) 49 

J.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per- 
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43 

"yprus. U.S. Perspective of the 35th General 
Assembly 54 

Developing Countries 

Foreign Policy and the American Spirit 
(Haig) 13 

Global Economic Interdependence (Hinton) 35 

Economics. Global Economic Interdependence 
(Hinton) 35 

El Salvador 

El Salvador (Department statement) 59 

3uestion-and-Answer Session Following Ad- 
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7 

Reprograming Proposal for El Salvador (Buck- 
ley) 51 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci- 
sions 23 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi- 
sion 26 

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and 
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14 



Energy. Global Economic Interdependence 
(Hinton) 35 

Europe. Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East 
and Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Sha- 
mir) 14 

Foreign Aid 

Aid to Pakistan (Coon) 53 

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per- 
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43 

Human Rights. U.S. Perspective of the 35th 
General Assembly 54 

Industrialized Democracies. Global Eco- 
nomic Interdependence (Hinton) 35 

International Organizations. Atlas of United 
States Foreign Relations: International 
Organizations A 

Iran. Iran Claims Procedures (Department 
statement) 44 

Israel. Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC 
Television 30 

Japan 

Japan- A Profile 2 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki 
(Reagan, Suzuki, joint communique) .... 1 

Kampuchea 

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in 
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smv- 
ser) 49 

U.S. Perspective of the 35th General 
Assembly 54 

Lebanon 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi- 
sion 30 

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and 
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14 

Middle East 

11th Report on Sinai Support Mission (mes- 
sage to the Congress) 45 

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad- 
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci- 
sions 23 

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and 
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Sha- 
mir) 14 

U.S. Perspective of the 35th General Assem- 
bly 54 

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per- 
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43 

Morocco. Arms Sales to Morocco; Western 
Saharan Conflict (Draper) 46 

Namibia. Namibia (Western five statement) 55 

Netherlands. Dutch Prime Minister Meets 
Vice President Bush (Bush, van Agt) ... 41 

NATO. NATO and the Restoration of 
American Leadership (Haig) 11 

Pakistan 

Aid to Pakistan (Coon) 53 

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in 
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) . 49 

Poland 

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad- 
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi- 
sion 30 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci- 
sions 23 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi- 
sion 26 

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and 
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14 

Presidential Documents 

African Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59 

11th Report on Sinai Support Mission 
(message to the Congress) 45 

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the 
Congress) 31 

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree- 
ment (message to the Senate) 32 

U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales Limitation to the 
U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 41 



Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki 
(Reagan, Suzuki, joint communique) .... 1 

Publications 

Department of State 63 

GPO Sales 64 

Refugees 

African Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59 

International Conference on Assistance to 
Africa's Refugees (Kirkpatrick) 58 

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in 
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) . 49 

Saudi Arabia. Sale of AW ACS to Saudi 
Arabia (Department statement) 47 

Security Assistance 

Reprograming Proposal for El Salvador 
(Buckley) 51 

Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia (Department 
statement) 47 

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per- 
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43 

South Asia. U.S. Policy Toward the Middle 
East and Persian Gulf Region (Con- 
stable) 43 

Terrorism. U.S. Perspective of the 35th 
General Assembly 54 

Treaties 

Current Actions 60 

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree- 
ment (message to the Senate) 32 

Turkey 

Ataturk Centennial Year (White House state- 
ment) 42 

Turkish Foreign Minister Meets With Vice 
President Bush (White House state- 
ment) 42 

U.S.S.R. 

A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Haig) 5 

Foreign Policy and the American Spirit .... 13 

NATO and the Restoration or American 
Leadership (Haig) 11 

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad- 
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi- 
sion 30 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci- 
sions 23 

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi- 
sion 26 

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and 
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14 

U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales Limitation to the 
U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 41 

United Nations. U.S. Perspective of the 35th 
General Assembly 54 

Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe 
(letter to the Congress) 31 

Name Index 

Begin, Menahem 14 

Buckley, James L 51 

Bush, Vice President 41 

Constable, Peter D 43 

Coon, Jane A 53 

Draper, Morris 46 

Haig, Secretary 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 23, 26, 30 

Hinton, Deane R 35 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 58 

Kopp, Harry 39 

Reagan, President 1, 31, 32, 41, 45, 59 

Sadat, Anwar al- 14 

Shamir, Yitzhak 14 

Smyser, W. R 49 

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 33 

Suzuki, Zenko 1 

van Agt, Andreas A. M 41 



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