Department of State bulletin

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Postage and Fees Paid

Department of State

STA-501

Second Class

^

U.S.IW

1

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. See inside front cover for subscription rates and mailing address.

Departnum t

II of State 1W II y &

bulletin

-\e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2050

May 1981

FY 1982 ASSISTANCE
Africa / 18
East Asia / 26
Europe / 38
Middle East / 48
South Asia / 68
Western Hemisphere / 69

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 81 / Number 2050 / May 1981

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Acting Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.

For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Price: 12 issues plus annual index —

$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign)

Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign

Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (I ei|

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.

CONTENTS

he Secretary

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the

"MacNeil/Lehrer Report"
Secretary Haig Interviewed on

"Meet the Press"
Secretary Haig Interviewed for

Spanish Television
Secretary Haig Interviewed at

Breakfast Meetings

frica

I FY 1982 Assistance Requests for
Africa (Lannon Walker)

I Military Assistance to Liberia
(Department Statement)

anada

Maritime Boundary Treaty With
Canada (Mark B. Feldman,
Rozanne Ridgway)

epartment

.

FY 1982 Authorization Request
(Secretary Haig)

st Asia

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for
Asia (Michael Armacost)

Visit of Japanese Foreign Minis-
ter (Secretary Haig, Masayoshi
Ito)

conomics

Sixth International Tin Agree-
ment (Michael Calingaert)

nergy

I Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (Edward L. Morse)

I Energy Security and Internation-
al Preparedness (Edward L.
Morse)

Europe

38 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for

Europe (Raymond C. Ewing)

39 Northern Ireland (President Rea-

gan)
41 Situation in Poland (Statement by
White House Press Secretary)

41 Poland's First Deputy Prime

Minister Visits U.S. (Vice
President Bush, Mieczyslaw
Jagielski)

42 NATO Defense Ministers Posi-

tion on Poland (Statement by
Deputy White House Press
Secretary)

42 Poland -A Profile

Foreign Aid

43 AID Bilateral Assistance Pro-

grams (M. Peter McPherson)

Middle East

48 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for
the Middle East (Morris
Draper, Joseph W. Twinam)

52 Hostage Agreements Trans-
mitted to the Congress (Depart-
ment Explanatory Statement)

54 U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear Co-
operation Agreement (Joint
Statement, Supplementary In-
formation)

54 Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to

Lebanese President Sarkis)

Narcotics

55 International Narcotics Control

(Joseph H. Linnemann)

Refugees

59

60

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests
for Migration and Refugee As-
sistance (W. R. Smyser)

FY 1982 Assistance Requests
for African Refugees (W. R.
Smyser)

Security Assistance

62 FY 1982 Security Assistance Re-
quests (James L. Buckley,
Richard R. Burt)

South Asia

68 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for

South Asia (Jane A. Coon)

Western Hemisphere

69 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for

Latin America (John A.
Bushnell)

71 U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to

Nicaragua (Department State-
ment)

72 Economic Assistance to El Sal-

vador (Department Statement)

Treaties

73 Current Actions

Chronology

77 March 1981

Press Releases

77 Department of State

Publications

78 Department of State

Index

-

New Feature

Map and Chart Series
on U.S. Foreign Relations

As part of the Bureau of Public Affairs' continuing effort to
provide more and better graphic reference materials, the
Department of State Bulletin will publish, from time to time,
new series of maps, charts, and graphs on important elements
of U.S. foreign relations. Introducing this new series is a map
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (page 40) and charts on
development assistance (page 45) and budget and personnel
(page 25).

Subjects to be illustrated in upcoming issues of the
Bulletin will include national security agreements, interna-
tional organizations, trade relations, international investment
and other topics of current interest.

Much of this material eventually will be assembled,
reprinted, and offered for sale by the Superintendent of Docu
ments. The material is written and compiled in the Bureau of
Public Affairs by Harry F. Young; maps and graphics are
prepared with the assistance of the Office of the Geographer,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

The Editors

HE SECRETARY

Eiterview on the "MacNeillLehrer
eport"

Secretary Haig's interview for the
jiblic Broadcasting System's "MacNeil/
f.hrer Report" with Robert MacNeil and
\m Lehrer on March 13, 1981. 1

i Yesterday a top State Department
ficial, who insisted on remaining
onymous, said the situation in El
ilvador wasn't that big a deal, and,
effect, asked the press to cool it.
hy isn't El Salvador that big a deal
y more?

A. I wouldn't suggest that it's not
jat big a deal. I think the issue is that
1 1 do have a tendency to indulge in
•isodic preoccupations, if you will, with
lie event or another on the strategic
I rizon. And, to some degree, while El
I lvador is extremely important, it is a
uation which we neither established
I r set for ourselves. But, even in the
:e of that, there are many equally im-
rtant issues at large today -the situa-
>n in Afghanistan, the tense situation
Poland, and other global manifesta-
ins of illegal Soviet interventionism in
veloping states. And I think it's impor-
i at that we not exclude concern about
j ese other vital issues -East- West rela-
ys at large, arms control, and a host
other matters of equal importance.

Q. What happened then? Why did
Salvador, in your opinion, get out
proportion in terms of these other
ijor problems?

A. I don't think it's a usual thing. I
link that we found a situation which
is just becoming clear to the Carter
iministration that we had a mass of
tervention in this hemisphere through
iba, the Soviet Union and other
astern European allies, and Libya,
hich was creating a crisis that had to
l. dealt with, with both firmness and
■omptness. So it's understandable that
eople would be preoccupied with the
'ent.

I think the comments made yester-
ly were not designed to belittle the im-
)rtanee of El Salvador but to suggest
lat we have other matters of equal im-
)rtance in our search for world peace
id international stability.

Q. Did this anonymous State
Department official misspeak when he
said — that's a direct quote — when he
said it wasn't a big deal?

A. No. I don't suggest that he
misspoke. I think he was attempting, in
a dialectic fashion, to suggest that there
are other problems and that we
shouldn't be exclusively preoccupied with
the El Salvadoran situation.

Q. Didn't you, in effect, make it a
pretty big deal by choosing it as a
symbol and virtually saying so, that
this was going to be the first place to
draw the line against international in-
terventionism?

A. No, not at all, in the sense of
your question. We did not bring about
the events in El Salvador, we found
them. And we found the situation
serious and somewhat out of hand in the
context of the intrusion of Cuban ar-
maments and Soviet-supplied equipment
to a guerrilla movement. All of this, of
course, culminated in a large offensive in
El Salvador in January. So it wasn't a
contrived situation to draw the line on.
And I would suggest, incidentally, that
we in the West and we Americans must
be as concerned about illegal Soviet in-
terventionism in El Salvador, in Africa,
in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia,
and wherever international law is
violated and the rule of force is applied
against people who are seeking self-
determination and social change.

Q. Didn't you say to yourselves —
perhaps you in particular— "Look, let's
grab this one because we can quickly
establish in the eyes of the world, the
Soviets included, that there's going to
be quite a sharp change in foreign
policy from the way it was handled in
the Carter Administration"?

A. I wouldn't want to suggest it,
again, in as sharply drawn terms as
you've posed in your question. Clearly,
we have a situation that was serious,
that was running rampant in the sense
of the arms shipments that were moving
into this hemisphere. And clearly,
whether it had been there or been in
Africa, I think the response would have
been the same, because clearly, we do
wish to make it evident. And we want
the Soviet leadership to understand that

whereas we may have been less than
vigorous in opposing these actions in the
past, they are no longer acceptable if we
are to maintain a spirit of improving
East- West relations.

Q. The reversal of this request
now that the press not be too preoc-
cupied with it, are you saying: "We,
the Administration, blew it a bit, and
we overplayed it, and you overplayed
it," or just, "We and the press
overplayed it"?

A. Not at all. I don't think it's a
value judgment on either side. It's a sug-
gestion that there are other events of
some significance that must not be
overlooked on the contemporary scene,
and I hope that they would not be.

Q. A couple of times already, you
have said: "We had a situation." Does
that mean that that bad situation has
now gone away? It's not as severe and
critical as it was?

A. Not at all. But I think after the
January offensive, which failed, and the
return of the guerrilla movement to
classic guerrilla tactics, which are
serious and which are hurting the peace
and stability and social progress in El
Salvador, we will also continue to be
faced with a large influx of armaments
to prepare for the next round.

We moved promptly, both with ex-
pressions of concern and the termination
of assistance to Nicaragua, which had
been the main platform for the introduc-
tion of these armaments, and we found
that there has been some slackening of
those arms movements into El Salvador.
There is some evidence today, for exam-
ple, that the guerrillas, themselves, are
hard pressed for ammunition and addi-
tional weapons. We've had some assur-
ances, both public and private, from the
Government of Nicaragua that they are
not going to be involved in this kind of
activity.

Also, I will be frank with you, we
have some countering evidence to sug-
gest that the activity is merely to look
for new entry routes through other third
countries.

Q. By Nicaragua or by the —

A. By the overall movement -the
Cuban-directed effort in this hemisphere,

lay 1981

The Secretary

which includes coordination with leftist,
Marxist-Leninist elements in a number
of Central American states.

Q. The Cuban involvement, then,
has not slackened. Is that what you're
saying?

A. I think it would be difficult to say
that it has not slackened. We have
witnessed some drop off in the level of
activity we had witnessed before we
took the positions we did. There is a
considerable amount of armaments from
Eastern Europe in the pipeline. Whether
they are going to remain in Cuba or re-
main in Nicaragua, remains to be seen.

Q. As a matter of policy, are you
and the others in the Administration
going to — I don't know how to put
it— are you going to quit talking about
El Salvador as much as you have until
now?

A. Not at all. I think you don't
establish ground rules; you must deal
with events as they occur. The situation
in El Salvador is an important one; it's a
serious one. It's been the subject of a
great deal of controversy, as you know.
There has been a great deal, I think, of
misunderstanding with respect to U.S.
objectives and motives there.

For example, I find that despite the
fact that we repeatedly introduce any
comments on the internal situation in El
Salvador with the clear objective that
we have set for ourselves -to avoid ex-
treme outcomes of the left or the right
and a desire to achieve social change,
social progress, economic development,
and a free choice by the people of El
Salvador -there seems to be always a
great deal of emphasis on the $25
million or $35 million of military
assistance on the so-called Vietnam
parallel. This I don't think is justified by
the situation. That is our problem: We
have to cope with it by reiterating on
every occasion what our objectives are.

Q. Can I ask you to make the ob-
jective more precise for us? Is it to
strengthen the Duarte junta forces so
that they can destroy, wipe out, and
defeat the guerrillas by military ac-
tion? Or is it to bring about some kind
of political negotiations and a settle-
ment before that takes place?

A. Let me describe it as, basically,
twofold. First, it is to terminate or to
see that the influx of arms to the ex-
treme left in El Salvador from external
sources, whose objectives are clearly not
those of the Salvadoran people, are ter-
minated. That's one facet of our objec-
tive. The second is to create the cir-

cumstances to provide the Duarte gov-
ernment, which we view as the best and
most solid platform for future social
reform and an ultimate democratic proc-
ess in the country, and to do that
through the early realization of elec-
tions, the electoral process. And it
seems today that most of the elements
in El Salvador are in favor of the elec-
tions with the exception of the extreme
left, which I don't think would fare very
well in such elections, which says
something in its own right.

What we're talking about is prevent-
ing the introduction of illicit arms, and
beyond that, advice, control, and direc-
tion which is also evident; and to bring
about an early manifestation of the will
of the people and their own self-determi-
nation, and to decide for themselves
what kind of government they want.

Q. Does that involve militarily
defeating the guerrilla movement?

A. I think that's a question which is
hard to answer. I think the Archbishop
of San Salvador -Bishop Rivera -over
the weekend, commented that the guer-
rillas have lost the support of the people,
that they are viewed as not interested in
the welfare and the social development
of El Salvador. Whether they determine
that on their own right and abandon
bloodshed, terrorism, and murder for a
ballot box contest, which we would hope,
is a question that only time can answer.

Q. One of the questions that has
been raised about American policy
among other Western allies — like
West Germany, which is a social
democratic government — is that your
policy appears to be making the guer-
rillas appear monolithically Marxist-
Communist-led and -motivated, where-
as they say there are a lot of people in
that movement with whom they —
social democrats — are sympathetic,
who are liberals and non-Communists.
How do you assess the complexion of
the guerrilla movement?

A. I think essentially it's leadership,
with command and control. Its external
support is Marxist-Leninist. There are,
of course, a number of elements who
have associated themselves with the
guerrilla action which could not be fairly
described as Marxist-Leninist. For ex-
ample, the Socialist Party, itself, and
their leadership joined the Marxist-
Leninist group and, unfortunately, the
consequence of that was to discredit that
movement in the eyes of the people of
El Salvador.

I think President Duarte has ex- I
pressed a willingness to discuss issuetl
internally with any of the elements w 1
are willing to abandon bloodshed and J
terrorism for the political process. Ar.'l
of course, we are strictly comfortable J
with that outcome, although there arcl
skeptics that it will rarely occur until i
external command and control ceases!

We have picked up a network of I
electronic command and control in Ell
Salvador that far exceeds what we sail
during the Sandinista phase of the
Nicaraguan revolution. It is sophisti- 1
cated; it is externally run and extern;!
manipulated. I don't think we should I
lose sight of that.

Q. Many of the papers today ha
front page stories about the so-call 1
deemphasizing of El Salvador, quolij
a top State Department official whcp
anonymous. What is the purpose of
this procedure — announcing policy
through an unnamed State Departrm
official, when we know who the
official is, and only the public doesi;
know. What is the purpose of that'ik
you approve of it, and are you goin t<
continue it?

A. I asked myself this morning • go
the unnamed official was. I think it v s
Mr. [John A.] Bushnell, our Acting |
Assistant Secretary for Latin Ameri 31
Affairs, and I think he made a comn lit
at the outset of what was entitled a
"background" briefing. Your viewers ir.
may or may not understand that "ba i-
ground" means that direct attributio is
not made, although you can make re r-
ence to "a high official."

This is a question, I think, whicl hi
press is best able to answer. We ha\
complied with the desires of the pre io
a "background" basis. Sometimes it
enables the briefing itself, or the bri lei
to be somewhat more, shall we say, I
forthcoming in the discussion with t j
press. And I don't think you yoursel is
would recommend elimination of the j
"background" process. However, it r is
be used with prudence.

Q. But here we have a case wire
seemingly, a change in American
foreign policy toward El Salvador /a
announced by a State Department
official, and nobody knows who hes.

A. It's a 24-hour story, because I :
decibel entry into "background" by ll
Bushnell. After all, I think it is deal
that we're very concerned about thel
events in El Salvador. We are not tin
to manipulate the level of attention p<
the press gives. The purpose of Mr. I
Bushnell's comments was to ^ugges'l

Department of State Bufti

The Secretary

r.hat there are, indeed, some other
Invents of significance for the American
joeople to be concerned with in the
foreign policy area.

Q. You told reporters this morn-
jjing at breakfast that some low-level
Bmeetings between U.S. officials and
.■Soviet officials are going to begin fair-
By soon. When, between whom, and
IJvvhat is the purpose of them?

A. I think just the fact of that state-
ment is sufficiently clear to suggest that

ve do anticipate talks on a number of
"i/enues, as a matter of fact. We have
Itommitted ourselves with our European
Ijartners, for example, to discuss, under
Jr.he two-track system for theater nuclear
.Jnodernization, some negotiations with
J'.he Soviet Union on theater nuclear
I, irms control.

We would have, of course, a dia-
, logue which I would anticipate would
;ake place between Ambassador [Anato-
y E.] Dobrynin, when he returns from
toscow, and myself. We have a number
if existing fora which involve U.S. and
Soviet discussions of longstanding -the
Standing Consultative Committee,
nuclear weapons, and a number of other
J ireas of interface such as rules of
i; ;ngagement on the high seas, for exam-
le. So we have not entered into a
eriod of isolation vis-a-vis the Soviet
nion. Precisely, the opposite.

Q. When you begin your talks
with Ambassador Dobrynin, are you
ioing that with the idea that they
night eventually lead to conversations
jetween you and Foreign Minister
I Sromyko, and then maybe finally to a
;ummit meeting between Mr. Reagan
rtiit ind Mr. Brezhnev?

A. Hopefully, of course. I would
" nope that progress can be made in lower
•'; .evel talks and then intermediate-level
': talks at the Foreign Minister level which
* would suggest, at some point, that a
::i head of state, or head of government
1 meeting would be both productive and in

order. But I would not want to leave
nl you with the impression that we an-
n ticipate that this will occur in the very
or near future. There are too many out-
nl I standing differences between ourselves
htl and the Soviet Union which, unfor-
I tunately, have brought the state of
'I world peace to a rather precarious level.
| We have witnessed Soviet interventions
in Africa, starting in Angola in 1976,
running through Ethiopia; Southern and
Northern Yemen; the first Soviet in-
tervention in Afghanistan followed up by

May 1981

direct military intervention a year later;
the overrunning of Kampuchea, former-
ly known as Cambodia, by North Viet-
namese proxies of the Soviet Union.
I think it's clear to the American
people -I know it's clear to our Western
European partners -that were we to
continue to ignore the Soviet activities,
the objectives of assuring world peace
and international stability would be
gravely threatened. Clearly, the time
has come for the Soviets to understand
that this is no longer acceptable action.

Q. You want them to do something
to demonstrate to the United States
that they understand that, before you
recommend to President Reagan that
he talk to Brezhnev?

A. I would anticipate some
manifestation of good will and under-
standing that there must be greater
reciprocity and greater restraint in con-
temporary action.

Q. Do you want the troops out of
Afghanistan?

A. Our ultimate objective and that
of our allies, of the Islamic conference,
and a number of Third World leaders as
well is to achieve the total withdrawal of
Soviet forces and the neutrality of
Afghanistan. That is not an abandoned
objective by this Administration.
However, the timing of that is going to
be associated with guarantees and a se-
quence that doesn't mean that every last
Soviet official has to be out of Afghani-
stan before talks on other substantive
areas could begin. We must maintain
flexibility and a progressive sense of
purpose.

Q. You mean some token with-
drawal would indicate good will?

A. No, no, no. I think we need an
understanding that this is going to occur
on a given time schedule, and we need
some manifestations of other Soviet
restraint in other areas, not the least of
which is the recent activity in this
hemisphere.

Q. Various State Department
officials — some named and some not
named — have indicated in the last day
or so that you are concerned about the
situation on the borders of Poland
and, particularly, the fact that the
Soviets are going to hold military
maneuvers. What exactly is the con-
cern?

A. I think we are watching very
carefully two recent manifestations of a
changing situation in Poland -one being

a somewhat harder line, recent evidence
from Moscow related to the internal
situation in Poland; and secondly, the
about-to-be-initiated Soyuz exercise, the
scope of which clearly is approaching, if
not exceeding the 25,000-man limit pro-
vided for in the confidence-building
measures of basket III of Helsinki,
which incurs, at least, the political liabili-
ty or obligation of reporting such ac-
tivities. So we're watching it very, very
carefully at the moment.

Q. Has Western intelligence
estimated or do you have an idea of
how many Soviet troops it would take
to subdue Poland if they decided to
gamble?

A. I think these estimates have
been made by responsible people, and
there are a number of varying estimates
depending on the circumstances of such
intervention, should it occur. But I want
to emphasize that we don't necessarily
anticipate that such an entry by the
Soviet Union is inevitable, imminent, or
acceptable from the Western point of
view.

Q. Have the Western allies, now
that you've had time for consultation —
you've seen a number of Foreign
Ministers, and there have been some
heads of government meetings — now
agreed on what they would do if the
Soviets intervened?

A. I don't make it a habit on na-
tional television to divulge the conse-
quences of what have been intense and
extensive consultations on this issue
within the alliance and other fora. I
think I can say, however, without reser-
vation, that the progress made in these
discussions has resulted in the broadest
and most detailed consensus that I've
witnessed in some time. The bottom line
of that consensus is that any interven-
tion by the Soviet Union, directly or in-
directly, in the internal affairs of Poland
would have grave and lasting conse-
quences to East-West relations.

Q. And have the Soviets
themselves been informed directly of
what the consequences would be, even
though you don't want to make them
public?

A. I think the bottom line conse-
quences have been very clear to the
Soviet leadership, and I'm very much
aware that they are acutely conscious of
them. I don't see that they have any
desire to move into Poland.

'Press release 66.

The Secretary

Interview on "Meet the Press"

Secretary Haig was interviewed on
NBC's "Meet the Press" on March 29,
1981, by Bill Monroe, NBC News
(moderator and executive producer);
Barry Schweid, Associated Press;
Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Syn-
dicate; and Marvin Kalb, NBC News.1

Q. What can you tell us about the
outlook in Poland as of this moment?

A. We've been watching the situa-
tion with a stepped-up intensity in re-
cent hours and the situation is still very,
very tense. There are some good and
also some continuing worrisome signs.

Q. The TASS news agency, the
official Soviet agency, said today that
Poland is in a state of mounting an-
archy and accuses the Solidarity Union
movement of launching an open strug-
gle against the Polish state. Doesn't
that have an ominous ring to you?

A. Indeed it does, and that's very
consistent with the other worrisome
trends we've been watching, including
the military exercise which has been ex-
tended for an indefinite period, growing
frictions between the moderate and
rightist elements in the political leader-
ship itself, problems within the economic
situation in Poland, food shortages, and
some indications of growing frictions be-
tween the moderates and the extremists
in the political hierarchy.

Q. So the situation is no less
critical than you felt it was a couple of
days ago?

A. I think there are some signs that
perhaps a major crisis can be avoided if
the moderate elements in the political
leadership continue to prevail and main-
tain their influence.

Q. The United States warned the
Polish Government— not the Soviets,
but the Polish Government — 3 days
ago not to use force against the Polish
unions. Would Western nations,
would the United States consider
some kind of sanctions against the
Polish Government if they took such
action that they would regard as
internal?

A. I believe it is very hard at this
juncture to determine whether such ac-
tions would be internal or external
despite the fact that internal forces may
have applied the repression. The key
issue here is that Poland is facing some
serious and grave economic and food
shortage problems, and we in the West,
the United States and our allies, would
like to be helpful. But should there be a
repression, an elimination of the pro-
gress achieved thus far, and a rolling
back, if you will, this would become in-
creasingly complex and difficult for us.

Q. As the situation stands now, do
you anticipate the Russians moving
troops into Poland?

A. I have said, and I repeat today,
that that situation is neither imminent
or inevitable. I do believe that that
varies hour to hour by various postures
taken by Soviet forces. And at this mo-
ment, that posture is at a heightened
state of readiness, with communications
in place, and with some indications of in-
creased posturing which could lead to
that, so we are watching it very, very
carefully.

Q. What would be the effect, do
you think, on the Soviet empire if the
Russians moved in? In a sense,
wouldn't it be good for U.S. objectives
because it might lead to a dissolution
of the empire?

A. In no way. I think any applica-
tion of force in the internal affairs of the
Polish people could have unforeseen and
most dangerous consequences, and I
don't know of any responsible official in
this Administration that would welcome
that outcome.

Q. Well, then, the United States
would be well served, I suppose, by
propping up the Polish economy, and
yet you are punishing the Russians
with a grain embargo. Isn't there
some anomaly there?

A. There are some inconsistencies,
as there are always contradictions in the
conduct of our affairs. Clearly, we do
seek to help alleviate the suffering and
the anguish of the Polish people at this
difficult time. As you know, we inherited

a grain embargo, and the intentions of
the President are, of course, to lift that
at the earliest possible moment. He has
never favored it, and I have never
favored it. But the act of doing so, at
this juncture, could send out very
deleterious signals in the context of oui
ability to manage East- West relations
and the Polish issue specifically.

Q. Regarding the events of this
week and the conflict or nonconflict
between the White House and the
State Department, you yourself have
worked in the White House in an ex-
traordinarily high position, and man) «
people have said that the problem waii
more personalities than of ideology
you were President Reagan, how
would you have handled the strong
personality of Alexander Haig?

A. I have that problem continuous
ly. I think the situation has clearly bee
resolved and resolved in a very happy
way, as the President said on Friday ii
an interview with the Washington Posi
You know, there are questions of
substance - real issues, if you will- in
foreign policy and questions of form.
This involved a question of form. That
has been resolved and resolved very
happily to my satisfaction, and I know
from my discussions with the Presider
with his satisfaction. The time has con
now to get on with dealing with the
questions of real issues for the Ameri(
people in the foreign policy area, and
that's what I intend to do.

Q. Then there were not really
questions of substance or of ideolog
that were different between the Wh
House staff and yourself?

A. I'm not aware of a single in-
stance thus far in my relationships wi
President Reagan that we had any
differences, either of nuance or even t
tics, in the conduct of the nation's
foreign affairs. I know I am here be-
cause he saw certain compatibility be-
tween our two viewpoints, and I thini
that is a very happy circumstance for
the American people.

Q. Would the events of this wet
change your behavior in any way,
subtle or direct?

A. That suggests other aspects o
my behavior, day to day. I think the r
question here -and that comes up

Department of State Bulle

The Secretary

Regularly- is my effectiveness influenced
Biy these passing events? My answer to
Bhat is, not in any way at all. You know,
It is dealing with the real issues that my
Peport card will be rendered at some
jjioint in time by the President and by
whe American people. And so the answer
Bo that question will have nothing to do
Ivith these events but rather how we
jieal with these growing and, I think, un-
precedented dangers to our nation in the
floreign policy area.

Q. Just to pick up a couple of
ioints here, do you feel that last Tues-
i lay when you went public with what
• eemed to be criticism of the crisis
: nanagement and arrangement with
j^ice President Bush at the top of that,
hat some way or another you had
nade a mistake?

A. I think there were mistakes
* nade across the board. There were mis-
nderstandings. And it was my view
hat what I revealed in my testimony
/as totally consistent with the state of
he nondecision on that issue at the
ime. But those things happen. Com-
munications sometimes are not all we
/ould like to have them. This is an Ad-
ministration that is evolving in the con-
jxt of form. I don't think there is much
f a learning curve to be achieved in the
rea of substance and that's the impor-
ant aspect of it, and I'm very comfort-
rs tble with it.

i

Q. How are you going to avoid
hat kind of misunderstanding in the
uture? Have you and the President
% vorked out an arrangement that is
1 lore precise than the looseness that
ibviously bred the problem?

A. Indeed, of course, this is so, and
involves more regular meetings be-
een the two of us, and it involves
me other steps which will be taken in
le near future in the form area. But I
ant you to know that I am very, very
mfortable with the relationship that
resident Reagan has established with
e and my role with respect to that
elationship, and I expect it to be in-
eeli imate and highly successful in the
leriod ahead.

Q. On Poland, you mentioned
•arlier that there are some good signs.
J (ou've talked about the worrisome
ligns. What are the good ones?

A. The good signs would involve
some indication that the moderate ele-
ments in the political structure of
Poland seem to be surviving well at the
current moment and maybe will continue
to prevail.

Q. Do you feel — let me ask it this
way — on what basis do you feel the
United States can complain about a
Polish suppression of Polish workers?

A. I think any rollback of the pro-
gress made with respect to reform in
Poland would be historically and in-
evitably a matter of great concern to the
United States.

Q. But you have always described
it as an internal matter, the last Ad-
ministration and you as well. So if the
advance is internal, wouldn't the
retreat be internal as well?

A. Your question there involves
what I would call the degree of inter-
relationship between the political leader-
ship in Poland and the Soviet Union.
And, clearly, here the lines are -have
existed for all the years since the Sec-
ond World War, and the annexation or
restructuring of Poland.

Q. Do you feel, when you mention
the heightened state of alert of Soviet
forces — that indeed forces, for exam-
ple, are being moved out of barracks
toward borders — has there actually
been a movement of Soviet forces into
Poland as part of the recent exercises?

A. No. There were some adjust-
ments, especially with sophisticated com-
munications capabilities, some of which
are occurring without the participation
and cognizance of the Polish military
forces, which is a worrisome sign, in the
first instance. But I think most of the
worrisome signs involve readiness
measures being taken along the Baltic
military region, in East Germany, and in
some of the other satellite states.

Q. President Reagan refers to the
leftist guerrillas in El Salvador as ter-
rorists, and he speaks of revolution
being exported to the Americas. I'd
like to ask whether the U.S. Govern-
ment is totally hostile to the left-wing
guerrillas in El Salvador, whether
there might be some feeling that some
of those guerrillas may be, in their
own minds, genuinely fed up with
what they look on as oppression, past
injustice, and right-wing murder
squads?

A. Of course, there are very clear
and strong overtones of those influences
in the rebel movement. I would suggest
that the opposition in the first instance,
the initial revolution which placed the
current government in place was a con-
sequence of those extremes of the right.
And we don't welcome them, and we
don't endorse them. But what is clearly
evident to us is that the leftist move-
ment, the rebel activity, its command,
control, and direction, now is essentially
in the hands of external forces- Cuban,
Nicaraguan, and, of course, indirectly
Soviet.

Q. You feel those left-wing guer-
rillas in El Salvador are in the control
of, being manipulated by, being domi-
nated by Communists?

A. There's no question about that.
We have very sophisticated, detailed,
hard evidence to confirm it. For exam-
ple, the command and control of com-
munications network that has been im-
planted in El Salvador, which
manipulates the rebel activity, is cen-
tralized outside of El Salvador.

Q. You have been criticized for
what your critics look on as an over-
emphasis on El Salvador altogether
and for an overemphasis on the
military aspect of it. What you are
now saying about the guerrillas, does
that mean that there is no possibility
in your mind for a political settlement,
some kind of compromise that will in-
volve all sides?

A. Not at all, we welcome a political
settlement. Indeed, that's the objective
we've established for ourselves in the
conduct of our policies which incidentally
involve the three-to-one ratio of eco-
nomic assistance, development
assistance, to the military assistance.
Now, President Duarte has called for
early elections in El Salvador. He
offered 3 weeks ago to establish an elec-
toral commission. He's offered amnesty
to the rebels to come in and join and
welcomed all parties to participate in
this electoral commission and early elec-
tions, which would be a reflection of self-
determination and the will of the people
of El Salvador. What we are opposed to
is the imposition of external assistance
and direction and, frankly, takeover in
the subsequent government.

Mav 1981

The Secretary

Q The guerrillas of another sort
operating in Angola, in fact, it is a

reverse situation, you have a eftist
government, you have guerrillas that
are non-Communist, *e Admimstra,
tion has called for repeal of the Clark
amendment which prevented the
United States from assisting guer-
rillas. Possibly looking for some con-
sistency or wondering about con-
sistency, what is the Administration s
intentions toward those guerrillas,
and isn't that an external application
to a domestic situation? Put another
way why does the United States have
a right to do something in another
country that the Soviets don't have the
right to do?

A I'm glad you asked that question,
because there has been a lot of specula-
tion some of which is misinformed with
respect to our future policies toward
Angola. As you know, we have asked,
along with a number of other legislative
reforms, that we lift the so-called Clark
amendment. We've also asked for addi-
tional modifications of restrictions on ex-
ecutive power that involve Pakistan and
which involve Argentina. This is a mat-
ter of principle.

Now, having said that, let me assure
you that 'a unilateral restriction of
American policy options in dealing with
a dynamic and dangerous situation ot
the kind that exists today in southern
Africa, automatically a prion, deprives
us of the kind of influence we would
want in our efforts in the future to seek
a negotiated peaceful outcome of
southern African problems, including
Namibia, and ultimately and above all,
the withdrawal, promptly, of Cuban
forces from Angola.

Q. Word is beginning to leak out
that a mission will be going to
southern Africa, headed by Mr.
Crocker [Chester A. Crocker, desig-
nate for Assistant Secretary for Afri-
can Affairs], will that mission go to
Angola, and how will you deal with
the problem of telling that govern-
ment about this principle?

A. As I have been stating publicly
up until now, we have been in the pro-
cess of a very thorough review of
America's southern African policies.
We've completed the first phase, and
we'll now move into a second phase
which involves some active diplomacy,
and that will indeed include some travel

by American officials to the area. It will
involve discussions with the front-line
states [Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe], with
South Africa, and with the so-called
"Five" -our European partners [France,
Federal Republic of Germany, and the
United Kingdom], Canada, and our-
selves, that have been involved in the
U N process on Namibia.

Now, it would be premature for me
to disclose today precisely who the
discussions will be held with and the
particular venues or timing, but this will
happen very shortly, and I think it will
tend to disabuse a number of elements
in our country who have been both con-
cerned and incredulous about some
dramatic shifts in American policies in
southern Africa, which are not justified.
We will pursue our own policies, and
they will be different from the previous
Administration's but not in the context
of some of the speculative stories that
you have read recently.

Q The first visitors to Washing-
ton these last few months have tended
to be what Ambassador Kirkpatrick
[Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the United Nations] has
called the oppressive authoritarians -
the South Koreans, the Argentines,
etc., and the South Africans, this
week -albeit undercover. The -many
people feel that your policies of
countering the Soviet Union are very
well taken, but they question whether
we are not going overboard in the
other side in supporting these sorts of
countries so enthusiastically. Are we
doing that?

A I think in some respects that's a
bum rap. I think the first thing that I
want to make clear to our viewers is
that it's been our experience that one
deals with contesting parties on any
issue best through a normal relationship
of confidence and friendship, not by iso-
lation and the creation of paranoia. In-
evitably, any negotiating process is best
served by that kind of a relationship.
Now, you will note that this past week I
met with the Foreign Minister of
Nigeria, who I don't think you would
categorize as a repressionist, authori-
tarian diplomat. We have spoken to all
sides, and we will speak to all sides. And
we will hope in the period ahead to
create a degree of confidence in all
sides, that our efforts in the direction of

peaceful solutions are going to be credi-
ble and will be able to influence the out-
come of events rather than to indulge M
high-profile public condemnations of
policies we don't like. These condemna-
tions should take place in the quietude o;
diplomacy and not be tests of manhood, '
to refer to that term again.

Q. In these meetings, for instance
with the South Koreans and the
Argentines, were points put forward
to deal with the human rights viola-
tions? In effect, is it being dealt with
in the quiet of diplomacy, as you sug-
gest?

A The very act of suggesting that
to be the case would be a violation of th;
requirement that we not divulge these
things publicly. Let me assure you that
with respect to Korea, our historic rela-
tionship with that government is going
to be strengthened and broadened in th
period ahead. We are not oblivious to
violations of human rights or other in-
dividual freedoms that we seek to aspir
and which we have been assured the
current leadership seeks to broaden
itself, and I think recent activities by
that government confirm that.

The same would apply specifically t
Argentina, where we had extensive
forthcoming and most cordial discus-
sions with President Viola, and I think
even the experiences of our sharpest
critics on the Hill would have confirm*
that this is a modern, enlightened man
with whom we best work in a construe
tive way. Isolation and the creation ot
insecurity creates the intractable at-
titudes that have resulted in no progre
in the past.

Q The national security adviser,
Richard Allen, spoke last week and,
talking about Western Europe, said
there is outright pacifist sentiment
there. The last national security ad-
viser spoke about European self-
Finlandization, which pretty much
comes to the same thing. Do you sha
these views? Do you feel that they ci
across your efforts to improve rela-
tions with our West European allies
A I would first want to emphasize
that our relationships with our Wester
European partners have never been as
good or as promising as they are todaj
and I say that after the intimate and
lengthy discussions we have held with
the key foreign ministers from Europe
from Canada, and there is a total con-
vergence of view.

Department of State Bullel

The Secretary

Now, we have these same sen-
ments that Mr. Allen talked about in
Europe in our own country. All of these
eaders in Europe preside over tightly
alanced constituencies and, of course,
here are some worrisome overtones
;hat have been evident for a decade or
more. Our problem is to work quietly
with our friends and allies in Europe to
:ry to develop a consensus of concern
.bout the threats facing us all, including
;he one Mr. Allen touched upon with
which I wouldn't care to give a value
ludgment.

But this is the way that we are go-
ng to succeed in the period ahead, and
I'm very confident that that's the policy
)f Mr. Reagan, and it is certainly the
oolicy of our Department of State, at
;his juncture.

Q. Do you feel — and I don't want
to throw too simplistic sounding a
question at you when we have less
than a minute to go— but is it your
fiew that the United States and the
Soviet Union can indeed coexist peace-
fully, or do you feel the Russians are
aut for what used to be called world
domination?

A. I've often said that a question of
:hat kind is irrelevant. The simple facts
ire that we are in competition in a
lumber of fundamental areas and that

' | will result in competition and confronta-
tion for the period ahead. What is im-
portant is that our Soviet partners in
;his duality, at long last, recognize that

! Ithey must abide by international rule of
law and not indulge in the kind of illegal
interventionism that they have been in-

r" dulging in in the period past, at an in-
creasing level and with great dangers to

r. world peace.

Interview for Spanish Television

'Press release 85 of Mar. 31, 1981.

;::

el

The following interview with
Secretary Haig was held in the Depart-
ment of State on March 30, 1981. x

Q. You are going on your first trip
overseas as Secretary of State. What
is the reason to stop in Spain?

A. Basically, of course, the stop is a
demonstration of a continuing dialogue
between the United States and Spain. I
will seek to report not only on the conse-
quences of my Middle Eastern trip but,
more importantly, to discuss bilateral
relationships between our two govern-
ments and to emphasize, as strenuously
as I can, the support of this government
for the democratic process in Spain
which has been the subject of some con-
troversy recently.

Q. Going back to the events of
February 23, there is some inspiration
or perhaps some misunderstanding in
the political circles and also in the
Spanish press about the real meaning
of your first public reaction in the
State Department about the events
there. Would you care to comment on
this?

A. Clearly, as a consequence of
misinformation or mischief, the question
was asked of me the morning that we
had the first reports of some kind of
controversy in your Parliament. We
knew nothing of the situation, and I
made the offhand comment that this is
an internal matter and clearly indicated
we had to find out what it was all about
before any judgment or any comment
would be made.

At that time, there was no knowl-
edge here in Washington, nor was there
any knowledge in our Embassy in Ma-
drid with Ambassador Todman, as to
either what the situation was all about,
what the motivations for it were, what
the objectives of the so-called disturb-
ance in the Parliament were to have
been. This was clearly the proper posi-
tion to take at that time.

Subsequently, when we learned the
true character of the situation, our pro-
nouncements were clear, both to your
government, to His Majesty, a message
from the President. And I know of no
one in the U.S. Government, myself in-
cluded, who would ever depart from the
overall objective of supporting the
democratic process in Spain, which we
both admire and which we seek to see
carried forward.

Q. But do you really have the idea
also that the special sensibility in
Spain about any word that comes from
Washington, especially when our
democracy is in trouble — and we think
we can also talk on the side of the
Latin American democracies? Do you
think that this comment is a clear sign
of the Reagan Administration of sup-
port of democracy [inaudible].

A. I think, clearly, anyone who is
following American policies day-to-day
knows that the U.S. Government is at
the vanguard of those democratic na-
tions which are seeking an extension
and broadening of the democratic proc-
ess. That includes continued concern, of
course, about the achievement of human
rights and basic human values that are
the inherent aspects of the democratic
process.

With respect to Latin America, I
have had visitors here such as the Prime
Minister of Jamaica, who just recently
presided over an electoral return to the
democratic process. We have had the
President of Mexico. The first visit Mr.
Reagan made, even before his inaugura-
tion, was with President Lopez Portillo
of Mexico. There will be a followup
meeting in a few weeks between the two
leaders.

I think nothing is higher on the
American agenda than the achievement
of the democratic process worldwide. On
the other hand, we have felt that in the
recent past, there has been too much
public condemnation of traditional
friends and allies who do not enjoy the
same level of democratic freedom that
we do here in the United States. We feel
that this is best handled in a quiet,
diplomatic dialogue rather than by
criticism and condemnation publicly in
the isolationist regimes that are seeking
to broaden their base.

Q. You mentioned before that Am-
bassador Todman was there. There
was also some criticism about him in
the Spanish press. Do you think that
Mr. Todman has the full confidence of
the State Department?

A. Mr. Todman is one of our most
respected diplomats, and he does enjoy
our full confidence. I can assure you that
Ambassador Todman knew nothing of
the situation developing in your country
before the fact, and that perhaps is a
contributor to the controversy with
respect to my area of competence,

May 1981

The Secretary

before we even knew what the nature of
the problem was.

Q. In regard to your visit to
Spain, as you know, the United States
and Spain are in negotiation of the ex-
tension of the bilateral treaty, and
also you know the Spanish Govern-
ment promised that it was going to
make a decision soon about the con-
tinuation of the Atlantic alliance.

Talking first about the bilateral
treaty, could you tell me what are the
interests of the U.S. Government from
the military aspect of the treaty for
the next 5 years?

A. Of course, we look forward to
negotiating at an appropriate time an
agreement to replace and update the
1976 agreement of friendship and
cooperation. This involves, as you know,
the presence today of some American
forces in Spain. We believe that
presence meets the joint interests of the
Spanish and the American people, and
we would hope to be able to continue
with appropriate arrangements as deter-
mined in the upcoming negotiations.

With respect to this issue, it has
always been ouf view that these
agreements are designed to provide to
both sides an equitable degree of in-
terest and that they do, in fact, serve
not only United States and Spanish rela-
tionships and ties of friendship and
mutual security relationships, but they
also fit into the broader context of
Western security, as well. In that con-
text, we do not see this issue in any way
as being in conflict with NATO aspira-
tions that Spain may or may not have.

Q. I'd like to ask you if you see
any advantage or disadvantage in hav-
ing the two things together. I ask you
because there are some comments
from the position on the left, the
Socialist Party, that the entrance of
Spain into NATO recreates an im-
balanced situation in Europe — I mean
in the East-West relationship. What is
the U.S. view?

Also, you have been at NATO for
a long time now. What's the feeling of
the European members of NATO about
this?

A. As you know from my own
record, I am a strong advocate of the
Spanish membership in NATO, but I do
recognize that this is a decision for the
Spanish people to make. There is no one
attempting to interfere with that proc-
ess.

I think with respect to balances, our
great concern today is that imbalances

have developed and that the member
governments -the free, independent,
democratic governments of Western
Europe -are all threatened by this situa-
tion. Spain is going to be equally
threatened, whether it belongs to NATO
or does not. As a matter of fact, its
security is best served by a security
linkage with the rest of Western Europe
and those who share common values
with the people of Spain.

The question sometimes arises about
costs. It has been our experience in the
United States that our participation in
this alliance, although it brings costs,
that these costs are far less than what
we would have to apply to our security
were we not in the NATO alliance and
were we not to enjoy the benefits of the
collective capability of our Western
European partners.

Q. Do you think that the Spanish
economy is now in a position to afford
the cost of integration in NATO?

A. Clearly, the question is, can
Spain afford to provide for its own
security? I think any sovereign nation is
faced with this challenge, and it is not a
challenge that can be avoided.

It would be my basic point that it
would be less costly for Spain in overall
security terms and that Spain would ac-
quire greater defense and greater
capability as a consequence of its
alliance with the other Western Euro-
pean powers, the United States, and
Canada.

Q. Perhaps it is a difficult question
to answer, but do you think there will
come any economic help, either from
Congress or from the buildup of
NATO to Spain if they want to, in the
bilateral thing, raise the prices of the
present treaty or in the NATO thing.
Some feel that they have not enough
money just to—

A. This is a question that has to be
answered by the Spanish people with
respect to their own security needs. The
bilateral relationship with the United
States has always been built and struc-
tured on what I call equitable sharing.

The Spanish Government makes con-
tributions of goods and services in
strategic locations, and the United
States makes contributions to be sure
that Spanish defenses are what they
should be and to help in that process.

Incidentally, this same thing occurs
in the NATO family where some of our
governments, which are less able to
make major contributions to infrastruc-
ture and other aspects of the NATO col-
lective defenses, enjoy the benefits of

the collective contributions of those
powers which are better able to do so.
So I think there is neither anything con
tradictory or exclusive about NATO an(
American-Spanish bilateral relationship I
in the security area. They are mutually
reinforceable, and the overall benefits t
Spain, I think, far outweigh the costs.

Q. The other thing that is left
about the reintegration into NATO is
that there is going to be a problem ol
perhaps positioning in Spain an
amount of nuclear weapons or — do yc
think that this is true or can you
negotiate —

A. I am not aware of any pressure
that would develop in this area beyond
the traditional and historic pressures
that we've dealt with in the past
jointly -America and Spain. I think thf
is a diversionary issue.

Q. There is another matter that
perhaps it meets a situation like we
think sometimes [inaudible]. Do you
think the question of Gibraltar will I
a real problem if it is not solved in
some way before [inaudible] because
cannot be allied with a country as pa
of our territory?

A. I wouldn't want to presume to
interject myself as to what is essential
a Spanish-U.K. issue involving those t> I
nations and the people of Gibraltar as I
well. I don't think they need any outsii
advice from an American diplomat.

Q. What do you think would be
the best way to cooperate or to worl
together — the United States and the
Western European countries — in de;
ing with these acts of terrorism tha'
in countries like Italy or Spain are
creating too much trouble for our
foundation of order?

A. As you know, I have already
made some rather controversial
statements on the subject of interna-
tional terrorism. I believe the time ha; '
long since passed where the nations o: i
the West, those of us which share con p
mon values and which have been vie-
timized by the growth of international
terrorism, that we stand up collective!
and meet this challenge in a forthrigh
and direct way.

In that regard, I have admired th<
work of your government as it has
sought to combat this terrorist activit;
in your provinces. I think it is vitally
important that we deal with it unilate
ally as nations, but also collectively.

We have just had a rash of aircral

Department of State Bullen

The Secretary

/ijackings here involving American
aitizens in Latin America and this morn-
Brig one in the Far East, which con-
Binues. It is time for Western leaders to
■'ace this issue directly and to begin to
unish the perpetrators of international
errorism. I have been one who has
lointed out that when the Soviet Union
unds, supports, conducts training
ourses in the Soviet Union and its
Castern European satellites, when it
lligns itself with the provision of arms
ttfl.nd perhaps more to such state-sup-
|)orted terrorist activities as those of
Wadhafi in Libya or Castro in Cuba, that
Ihey must bear a measure of respon-
sibility for these activities. And the time
•las come for us to bring it forcibly and
llirectly to their attention.

Q. You know how they made prop-
iganda that they are just helping
iberation movements, that they are
I' lot terrorist organizations. I suppose
' his is something you must follow and
' ake a position on.

A. I, of course, believe that there
,s( jjas been 2,000 years of civilization
J vhich has all worked in the direction of
Improving the prospects for peaceful
I'hange, a stark and sociological change
j vithin the provisions of the rules of in-
ternational law, and not by resort to

iloodshed and terrorism. Above all, in
: 1 hose rare exceptions where extraor-
linary measures are necessary by a
rjven people who have been suffering
t |-'rom suppression, it should be internal;
li t should not be instigated, supported,
ii ind directed from outside. That, unfor-
al :unately, is the problem we have seen
11 vith many of the more sophisticated and
idvanced stages of international ter-
rorism.

Q. I have been following the
Vladrid Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As you
*now, we are now in a deadlock.
a: There is still a strong desire from the
Soviet Union to have an extended
military detente and disarmament con-
ference. Do you think if this is not
done, if there is not negotiation from
the Western side, how we can say
detente [inaudible].

A. I think the efforts to improve
'lEast-West relations must be continuing.
I We cannot achieve and maintain the
^support of our people if we are, as
' [leaders, not perceived to be trying to im-
prove East- West relations. On the other
hand, it is very, very clear that some of
the recent Soviet activity interna-
tionally-whether it be obstinance at
CSCE or in the broader provisions of

May 1981

the Helsinki accords which spawned all
of this East- West activity or whether it
be in the utilization of proxy forces in
Africa, the Western Hemisphere, or in
Asia or whether it be direct, blatant
Soviet interventionism of the kind we
are witnessing in Afghanistan - the time
has come for the West to unite together
and insist on peaceful change rather
than the rule of force.

. Q. On these last points that they
are now talking about, do you think
that the conditions that the Russians
are saying they are ready to extend
the confidence-building measures to
the Urals, how it [inaudible] if there
are general concessions from coun-
tries which are part of the conference
but are not part of Europe — meaning
the United States and Canada— do you
think that this is reasonable or is go-
ing to be accepted by your delegation
there?

A. First, let me emphasize that this
acceptance of the French proposal for
confidence-building measures, stretching
from the Atlantic to the Urals, is clearly
a very interesting departure from
previous Soviet positions and perhaps
offers some promise. However, we will
note that in both their correspondence
with the Western European powers and
the United States, there is a question
about the extension of these confidence-
building measures beyond the shoreline
of Western Europe. And I think there
are a number of uncertainties raised
with respect to that issue that will have
to be explored in the period ahead. But
in the interim, I think we could look at it
as a favorable proposal in general.

Q. Are you happy with the way
the Western alliance, not only the 15
but also the 10 from the European
Economic Community, are working
with this Madrid meeting?

A. Yes, I have been very pleased
with that. We have been in close touch
with our chief negotiator, Mr.
Kampelman. I hope to see him when I
visit Madrid so that we can have a first-
hand exchange of the progress. But I
think Western unity has been clear and
unshaken in these discussions, and that
is very important.

Q. Do you have plans to address
the conference?

A. I doubt that I would seek to do
that, but I will seek to have an exchange
of views and an updated report from
Ambassador Kampelman.

Interviews at
Breakfast Meetings

Secretary Haig was interviewed at
two breakfast meetings on March 13,
1981, by Bill Beecher, The Boston Globe;
Marvin Kalb, NBC News; Greg Nokes,
Associated Press; and John Wallace,
Hearst, and on March 28 by Barrie
Dunsmore, ABC; Roy Gutman, Reuters;
Bernie Gwertzman, The New York
Times; and John Maclean, The Chicago
Tribune.

MAR. 13, 19811

Q. There's a story today that a group
of Green Berets is being assigned to
El Salvador from Panama, but it's not
clear whether those are part of the 20
that the President talked about.

A. Only 25 guys we talked about
are moving in there. That's the total in-
creased authorization. I think it brings
us to 54. I believe that's right.

Q. What was that? I'm sorry I
missed that. You have five of the
Green Berets going?

A. No. There's a story today that
there were Green Berets moving out of
Panama into El Salvador. They cannot
be but those we announced last week.
That would be 25 more men going in but
as training teams.

Q. In other words, there are
Green Berets —

A. These are not over and above
what we announced.

Q. What I read in the paper this
morning was that you're trying to get
the public emphasis off the El
Salvador issue.

A. No. That's not right. I don't
know how that got so sharply drawn.
Whoever on our side made the state-
ment, clearly, was a little bit off the
mark. The point I made is that I think
we suffer somewhat from episodic preoc-
cupation and that in terms of relative
importance. You know, there is a total
preoccupation with this issue and why
we're engaged in it, and why we fail to
look at what's going on in Poland

'Press release 86 of Apr. 3, 1981.

The Secretary

today -a huge exercise about to take
place, stiffening of the line against com-
munism, continuing problems in Afghan-
istan. The observation I made was that
we would be better served, in the long
run, if we could keep all this in balance.
That wasn't an effort to say we're going
to deemphasize El Salvador. After all,
we didn't trigger El Salvador. I see
some press people suggest that we trig-
gered El Salvador and a big draw-the-
line operation. The problem with El
Salvador was that we inherited massive
evidence which had not been collated
and had not been drawn together, and
we did that in the first 2 weeks of the
Administration -really in the first
week -and it constituted irrefutable
evidence of massive Cuban, Eastern,
Soviet involvement. This isn't a case of
manipulating the news or focus or
anything else. It was an effort to lay out
the facts as we saw them and to get a
reasonable degree of support for the ac-
tions we felt had to be taken.

Q. Did you have the feeling that
for perhaps whatever combination of
reasons, that a number of our allies
felt there was too heavy an emphasis
upon it and cautioned you that per-
haps the line was being emphasized
too heavily.

A. Not really. In fact, just the op-
posite. What the allies asked was please
keep fighting the "progaganda" battle.
They are being victimized by the prop-
aganda battle in Europe.

Q. So the United States carried
the battle.

A. You make it clear what our ob-
jectives are in El Salvador. You make it
clear that we are seeking to avoid ex-
tremes of the right or the left. I don't
have to tell you what the problem is. We
all know what it is. They want our help
in dealing with that problem. We've had
French, British, German, and Canadian
discussions in which I spoke about that
to all the Foreign Ministers. I would
have to say that the sense of unity and
support for our global positions is
unusually strong. I think we've got a
very promising situation with respect to
Western European unity and solidarity
under a revised American foreign policy.

Q. Let's focus on some other
things like Poland and the coming ex-
ercises. What do you think is the scale

and objectives of the exercises you
were talking about?

A. Frankly, we don't know. We're
looking at it very very carefully because
the range of troop concentration could
be within the confidence-building notifi-
cation area.

Q. About 25,000?

A. Yes. There's some evidence to
suggest that it might be.

Q. Does it look like Soviet divi-
sions will come across the Polish
border as part of the exercise?

A. We can't answer that. It's just
too early to say.

Q. When you replied to a question
in Canada about conditions for a sum-
mit with Brezhnev, you mentioned Af-
ghanistan, and you mentioned Poland.
I think you mentioned the situation in
Poland would have to be clarified as
long as a threat hangs over Poland, a
summit doesn't make any sense. Has
that notice been given to the Soviets
in any kind of formal way? Has there
been any effort to —

A. No. We have had exchanges with
the Soviets with respect to our new posi-
tion, and they're very clear on that. It
now remains to be seen whether we'll
have some talks in the period ahead.
They will not be, clearly, at a summit
level and to ascertain whether or not the
behavior patterns which are of such con-
cern to us are going to moderate or con-
tinue on.

Q. Is there going to be an effort to
revive the 1972 agreement and to give
that a little bit of light if the
Russians —

A. No. We are a little preoccupied
with the 1972 understandings, although
they were clearly a benchmark from
which you could measure a lack of rec-
iprocity. If we go back to them, the
basic thrusts of them are clear. They are
a reciprocity commitment. And we
haven't seen reciprocity. But I don't
want to overemphasize that particular
set of understandings, although they
were agreed upon by both sides.

Q. Will we respond in any official
way to the Brezhnev letters?

A. Yes, of course we'll respond. We
will respond in due time, and we'll coor-
dinate with our partners who have

received similar letters. I would antici-
pate our responses would be fairly con-
sistent, our respective response.

Q. Fairly soon? What kind of
timing?

A. No. We have a little work to do
on it.

Q. If you think about the Party
Congress that's just been completed ii
Moscow and the rather unusual series
of factors such as no change at the
top, very little change down below, n«
innovative ideas in terms of handling
their own economy, which is in very
bad shape — what kind of overall senst
do you get about this leadership in
terms of its handling its own country.
its own foreign policy, its own prob-
lems such as Poland?

A. I would say consistent.

Q. Consistent but partly because
there has been no change but that car
be arteriosclerotic diplomacy in the
mind. Do you sense —

A. Let's go OFF-THE-RECORD or
this one. [There ensued an OFF-THE-
RECORD discussion.]

Q. Did you say earlier that the
Soviets had planned an early move in-
to Poland?

A. No. I don't want to say that. Bi
in December, readiness measures whicl
would indicate Soviet capabilities to do
that were at a very high level. At that
time the Western nations -I'm giving
credit to a previous Administration -
moved with speed and unity to make it
clear what the cost of that would be.
And I think it was both timely and effe
tive in deterring a possible Soviet inter
vention.

Q. Is that one of the major
reasons for not wanting to move to a
summit, for fear that should a summi
be scheduled or be held sometime in
the next 6 months, they would then
have a free hand to move into Poland

A. No.

Q. We're not trying to use the
summit as a —

A. No. The problem with the sum-
mit is that we have a broad range of
Soviet behavior patterns that have to t
modified. We have a lot of work that h
to be done.

Q. There's word that the Admini
stration is considering an effort to

10

Department of State Bulleti

The Secretary

■peal the Clark amendment having to
i with reservations on the provision

arms to Angola. The President was
ked about the possibility of provid-
g arms to the insurgents in Afghani-
an saying that that certainly could

considered. In fact, there's been
me covert supply for some time,
though not officially conceded. As
*rt of our facilities negotiations with
rnialia, which provide or sell guns,
[ditional weapons on credit — which,

fact, will constrain the Russians
id Cubans in Ethiopa — are we, are
oi, in this Administration looking to
more assertive counterstrategy in
me of these areas of concern?

A. What we are looking for is a
versal of Soviet intervention; it is an
egal intervention. Now the preference
ould be through moderation on the
irt of all the powers permitting devel-
oing states, that are undergoing social
ta Jange, to do so within their own re-
purees without resort to bloodshed and
rrorism. Our approach in dealing with
tat problem is broad and flexible, and
e have to be prepared to proceed, in
le light of a number of alternatives
)en to the Soviets, to either modify or
intain it.

Q. Is Savimbi [Jonas Savimbi,
resident of the National Union for
«e Total Independence of Angola]
)ming here? We heard he was either
ere last week or —

A. No. I don't think so. He may be
>ming. I don't know of any date or
seed visit.

Q. When you say illegal Soviet in-
tervention, you puzzle me. Is there
;gal interventionism? By what yard-
tick are you applying that kind of a
'ord?

A. What I'm really trying to empha-
ize, when I use that term, is to suggest
lat for 2,000 years man has sought to
stablish a code, both formal and infor-
lal, of international behavior and rule
y law. We are a nation of rule by law.
Vestern civilization is built on that con-
ept, and what we are trying to empha-
iize is that what has been a Soviet
trategy of longstanding -a two-tiered
trategy, where first, through subver-
iion, covert activity within a target
ountry, you create a so-called correla-
ion of forces which then justifies direct
ir proxy intervention in a substantial
vay with arms, troops, and what have

you -that's a longstanding, classic Marx-
ist strategy, and it offers no surprises to
students of Marxism.

The problem is that we have seen it
broaden, be extended and, if you will,
we have witnessed a fundamental modi-
fication of the so-called Brezhnev doc-
trine which had historically been applied
to areas within the sphere of Soviet in-
terests and is now being applied in
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf,
and in this hemisphere. This is the crux
of the core of the problem.

Q. But the Brezhnev doctrine has
to do with stepping in to support a
Socialist state that's in trouble.

A. Within the social sphere -this
represents a diversion or an extension of
the Brezhnev doctrine.

Q. In the sense that the Russians
feel that they can now go directly into
an area where there is not even a
Communist government in power, a
Communist movement contending for
power, and just with impunity —

A. You can parse that out with two
points of view, both the point you men-
tioned and, also, the point of view of
spheres of influence. We have seen the
Hungarys and the Czechoslovakias, and
the only time Soviet troops have been
used since the Second World War has
been within the Soviet sphere or the
Brezhnev doctrine sphere. Their move-
ment into Afghanistan was an unprece-
dented departure. Just as the covert and
proxy activities in Africa and the Per-
sian Gulf and this hemisphere are an
unacceptable extension of-

Q. What could you reasonably ex-
pect the Russians to do in Afghanistan
in the near future, when you say
"moderate" their activity. They have
between 80,000 and 85,000 troops -

A. Wrong. Totally wrong.

Q. Do you think that's within the
realm of possibility?

A. Yes, indeed, I do.

Q. Why?

A. Because they have no business
there.

Q. That was your Brezhnev doc-
trine. They had a self-proclaimed Com-
munist government that the State
Department in April of 1978 totally ig-
nored, and the President discovered at
the end of 1979 — as you remember.

A. You remember. I was popping
off in Europe.

Q. I remember that too.
[Laughter]

Q. But, you know there was a
willingness here not even to look at
the Communists moving in. The only
point I'm trying to make is that
Brezhnev could see this as a Com-
munist government in power within
the framework of his own doctrine.

A. The point is that it's an unprece-
dented move. I would suppose that if we
are unclear about these things, we invite
miscalculation on the part of the Soviets.
And we were unclear. I have always
believed that our dealings with the
Soviets are best served by clear delinea-
tion of lines which cannot be crossed
without damage to our relationships. I
think they behave better under that kind
of a clear situation, and I know mis-
calculations are inevitably reduced, even
if it is somewhat more brittle at times.

Q. How far are we prepared to go
in El Salvador to prevent a Marxist, a
Communist takeover there?

A. I think your question would be
better posed if you would say how far
are we prepared to go to prevent Cuban
interventionism, to call a halt to Cuban
interventionism in the hemisphere. The
best answer to that is that we are deter-
mined to do so. I would intervene if
necessary.

Q. How is this, as far as keeping
this particular government in power in
El Salvador?

A. With respect to the regime, to
the internal affairs of El Salvador, it's
our belief that that's a problem for the
people of El Salvador. In that context,
we believe the best chance for the peo-
ple to express themselves is through
elections. We also believe that the
[President Jose Napoleon] Duarte
regime is dedicated and has committed
itself to that proposition -to hold and to
conduct early elections. It would be in
our interest and it is our desire for the
people of El Salvador, of various fac-
tions and parties, to have it out at the
ballot box and not with bullets.

Q. MacGuigan [Mark R. Mac-
Guigan, Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs] seemed con-
cerned at the breakfast session you
had with him that provision of too
many arms would strengthen the

May 1981

11

The Secretary

government to such an extent in El
Salvador that it would feel too secure.
That might endanger the prospect that
elections ever be held.

A. Read what he said in the press
conference, especially his elaborations.
They happen to be an exact reflection of
our private discussion.

Q. Thinking ahead of U.S. -Soviet
relations over the course of the next
couple of years, what you etched out
seems to put a heavy burden on the
Russians to make dramatic moves.
They want to have trade with us; they
want eventually to get most-favored-
nation status.

A. I don't see anything dramatic
about -

Q. Certainly the withdrawal of
85,000 troops from Afghanistan —

A. We have a firm consensus on
that. Western powers -it is our posi-
tion-we have the U.N. resolution on it;
we have nonaligned states, the Islamic
conference, everyone. This is a global
mandate; there is a global consensus
that the Soviets are to withdraw.

Q. Are you saying that this is a
precondition for a summit or renewed
cooperation with the United States,
for high technology exports?

A. I think it's a major factor. I don't
use terms like "precondition," because if
we had assurances that certain things
were going to happen, that would be a
major improvement in the current
climate, clearly. It doesn't mean that
every Soviet corporal has to be out of
Afghanistan before improving processes
can begin.

Q. Doesn't it make some good
sense for you and [Soviet Foreign
Minister] Gromyko to sit down reason-
ably soon, like in several months, and
you put this to him directly?

A. What makes sense is that we see
some signs of moderation, and there are
a number of flashpoints and pressure
points where those signs can be evi-
denced fairly clearly.

Q. What is our leverage?

Q. Talking about El Salvador is
one thing, where you seem to see
some moderation now.

A. We are seeing some, not modera-
tion, I wouldn't refer to that -people are
being killed, there is bloodshed -but we
have seen some slackening of the move-

12

ment of arms through Nicaragua. And
we've also seen some evidence of efforts
on the part of the Cubans to find alter-
nate routes, and there are still sizable
amounts of armaments in the pipeline.
We are as concerned, quite frankly, by
the movement of arms into El Salvador;
we are as concerned by the Army in
Nicaragua -the 50,000-man army in
Nicaragua with vast amounts of sophisti-
cated military equipment. We're con-
cerned about that, as well as being con-
cerned about the flow of arms into El
Salvador.

Q. But don't the Nicaraguans have
a right to arm their own army with
arms from wherever they can get
them?

A. We're not talking about whether
they have a right or not; we're talking
about whether or not these are trends
which we view with equanimity. We
don't.

Q. Four times the size of [former
Nicaraguan President Anastasio]
Somoza's army.

A. Yes.

Q. Where do you see moderation,
if the Cubans are seeking alternate
routes, or just that some routes have
been blown —

A. When I say "moderation," it's a
slowing down of the pace, an indication
that the guerrillas are hurting for am-
munition, and that there has been -
when I say "moderation," I think, maybe
modification is the better term, but
there is a slowdown. Yes. It's very
perceptible. Some of the old air routes
that we were cognizant of -the radio
broadcasts from Nicaraguan territory -
have ceased. But we have, as I say,
other countering reports that suggest
that this is not necessarily a decision to
cease and desist and may rather be -

Q. How do you see our leverage
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its
proxies, the Cubans. You're talking
about hoping that they will moderate
a pattern that has speeded up in re-
cent years. Certainly our going or not
going to the summit doesn't provide
all that much leverage.

A. No.

Q. Where is our leverage,
regionally?

A. I think sometimes we are rather
self-conscious about such things. The
Soviets are in need of Western credits,
in need of Western technology, and they

have an urgent requirement for that.
They're in need of trade with the Wes.
They must have international legitime
they're a regime that must have that.
It's becoming increasingly clear; for ey.
ample, in many Third World areas tha
have embraced the Soviet arms entries
that leaves a legacy that's less than
satisfactory -a pervasive Cuban or
Soviet presence, no provision of a devc
opmental aid or assistance.

If you look at the Soviet Union to-
day in a global sense, they do less in
developmental assistance than any of
the larger powers and substantially let
than some of our small European part
ners. So what I'm saying, basically, is
there's a great deal of leverage in all t
areas I touched upon and, clearly, it's
now up to us to integrate more clearlj
with those who share our values and t
shore up our determination to insist tl
these dangerous trends are terminate!
This is in the interest of world peace
and international stability. It does not
suggest, for a moment, that we
Americans are opposed to desirable ai
necessary social and historic change,
especially in developing states. We're
favor of such change.

Q. Can we go to the North-Sout
summit in Mexico?

A. We are conducting discussions
with the hosts with respect to the pos
bility of doing so. No decision has bee
made. But we are giving it serious co
sideration.

:o

Q. I'm still curious as to any cc
cern here that if this is a big sum-
mit—lots of countries — that they in
vite the Russians and invite us and
both attend, would this backdrop, t s
North-South backdrop, in fact, be t
backdrop of a first meeting betweei
Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev?

A. I don't anticipate that.

Q. Because the Russians would
not be invited, or would not attend'

A. I don't anticipate it at any rat
There are a lot of questions to be
answered with respect to possible pai I
ticipation by the United States in a
North-South summit, but we're in the
process of getting the answers.

We are not the orchestrators or 1 1
hosts of this summit. These are matti s
I don't want to intervene in, in a pub
way, because it complicates our task.

Q. You're going to the Middle

Department of State Bull< n

The Secretary

iast. Can you tell us what you hope to
jccomplish on that trip?

A. Yes. I'll have a great deal more
Id say about that as the trip approaches
jut, clearly, I think it's very important
liat we continue on with the peace proc-
ess itself and that we keep the momen-
|am of that process alive. And, I think
l.'s very important for a new Ad-
ministration to get a firsthand feel from
lie parties directly involved, and
Deripherally involved, to try to find
irhere the hangups have been in the
utonomy talks, where the differences
re.

We are on the verge of initiating
egotiations on the creation of a Sinai
Peacekeeping force which would permit
lie withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
linai. I want to get a careful assessment
If the parties' views, the nature and
imposition of that force in the light of
lie rejection of the U.N. approach. I
I 'ant to exchange views simultaneously
In strategic regional concerns, the
roader sense of the Arab-Israeli
lispute, and in a broader sense, the ex-
iting concerns with respect to oil and
'nergy access -in other words, broad
jgional strategic concerns.

Q. Southwest Asia, the Persian
ulf?

A. The crescent, if you will, from
ighanistan through Iran, the Arabian
eninsula, over the Horn of Africa to
le northern tier of Africa.

Q. Could I take you back to an
" arlier question on Gromyko-Haig?

I je you considering such a meeting or

II i there any early discussion of that?

!A. I would anticipate talks -as
pistinct from negotiations -to occur
J romptly. Now the level at which those
. ' alks will be held is yet to be determin-
|td, and they will clearly start at some-
hing less than the Foreign Minister
,ul evel.

rat

:■

Q. [Inaudible]

A. Right now we have to get an
Embassador in Moscow, and we are in
he process of trying to select one.

Q. I don't understand where this
s all going to happen. You have no
Vmbassador in Moscow. The people up
it the U.N.? You've got yourself here
vith Dobrynin.

A. I would anticipate it being here
I Washington, initially. But I don't
rant to prejudge that. If we're fortunate
snough to get an Ambassador in place

.May 1981

soon, there may be some discussions at
that end.

Q. But as you look toward your
trip to Europe, to the NATO meeting,
could you parlay that? Could you
broaden it into something that would
carry you from Western consulta-
tions—

A. Let me get a sequence in here.
We clearly have been in the process of
consulting with our European partners.
I've had extensive personal discussions
now with five European Foreign Minis-
ters-NATO Foreign Ministers -if you
include Canada. We want to be sure that
we have a good consultative feel for the
entirety of those who share our values.
We have the Japanese Foreign Minister
coming next week. In an Atlantic com-
munity sense I will be going to ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] and ANZUS [Australia, New Zea-
land, United States pact], probably in
June. We will have a NATO ministerial
in May. And I have a Middle East trip.
Now all of these steps are designed to
provide me an opportunity to consult in
depth on East- West relations. And,
clearly, these consultative discussions
are a prerequisite to the kinds of sub-
stantial talks your question anticipated.
Necessarily so.

We've dedicated ourselves to the
proposition that we are, indeed, going to
consult in a meaningful sense at the
time, not just inform after the fact, not
run what I call solo dances or shady con-
dominiums. I'm absolutely convinced
from the talks I've already had with our
European partners that this is precisely
what they want, what they anticipate,
what they welcome, what they feel pro-
foundly reassured about today. And
these talks have brought forward to me
a feeling of a greater consensus which
includes a greater sense of concern
about the international situation, a
shared sense of concern, than I have
witnessed in many months and years.
And I think it has exceeded what I had
hoped for.

Discussions with [German Foreign
Minister Hans-Dietrich] Genscher were
absolutely superb and reassuring to me,
as they were with Peter Carrington
[Lord Carrington, British Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs and Minister of Overseas Devel-
opment], [French Foreign Minister Jean]
Francois-Poncet, and Mark MacGuigan
in Canada. This reflects to me an oppor-
tunity of unprecedented character to
enable us to strengthen our alliances,

our regional relationships, to bring about
the outcomes that I laid out with respect
to East- West relations. And you've got
to be prepared, consistent. Sometimes
this requires give and take. For exam-
ple, some of our positions have been
modified as a result of these exchanges.
I used the term "nobody has a monopoly
on virtue," but nobody has a monopoly
on wisdom either. And we enrich and
strengthen our policy by the kinds of
consultations that have begun.

Q. Could you give us an example
of the modification?

A. It's clear that despite the fact
that we were very close, on our objec-
tive with respect to theater nuclear
forces, for example, Europeans were
concerned that we did not give a proper
decibel in our explanation of our ap-
proach to the arms control track. Now
that was a helpful thing, to have that
advice, because we had no intention of
not proceeding with the obligations in-
curred in the December 1979 decision,
but that kind of advice from our friends
in Europe was helpful because it helps
them as they proceed with the other
track. They need it. You could, I sup-
pose, suggest that despite the fact that
in every briefing I've ever given on El
Salvador, I have emphasized that we are
seeking to avoid extremes of the right
and the left, and we are seeking a peace-
ful political solution through free elec-
tions. The focus, inevitably, in contem-
porary reporting was on the flow of
American arms, military assistance.
That's understandable. And it means
that it requires repetition, repetition,
repetition. But it's helpful to have that
advice as to how they see our projection
of our objectives, from their perspective.
And we go into a consultative approach
in our foreign policy precisely that way.
We would expect that there be as much
flexibility in our consultation with
friends and those who share our values
as we have in the past demonstrated in
those that we negotiated with.

Q. So that is, you project this
whole timetable forward. There does
not appear to be any room for a Haig-
Gromyko meeting until at least late
summer or into the General Assembly
time.

A. I want to avoid laying out our
precise scenarios. I think you know from
what we've said that meaningful talks,
at higher levels, are some distance
away. But events, themselves, determine

13

The Secretary

those things in the final analysis, and no
one can predict that an event might oc-
cur that would require the compression,
the telescoping, or stretching out.

Q. That's something that would be
negative though, I imagine.

A. Yes. Something negative or
something positive. Maybe the Soviets
would announce tomorrow they're leav-
ing Afghanistan.

Q. How do you feel about Poland?
Has the threat receded a bit today—
the spokesman yesterday, Bill [Dyess],
said we did not consider the invasion
to be either inevitable or imminent—

A. That's been our position all along
despite observations by theologians that
it may be inevitable. [Laughter] You
remember what I said was that you
could make a theological case that inter-
vention might be inevitable. But it can-
not be our position, and we do not
believe that it is imminent or inevitable.
Why? I don't have to draw any circles
for you on that one.

Q. I do remember the discussion
we had, but this is not the point to
raise it again.

Q. Do you feel that the situation
has stabilized a bit in Poland, that
there is a crosscurrent?

A. I think, in the light of recent
events, that the situation is somewhat
more tense than it was 3 weeks ago.

Q. When you are in Saudi Arabia,
are you planning to raise the subject
of having access to military facilities—

A. In Saudi Arabia?

Q. Yes.

A. I can't foreclose it. That kind of
a thing may be raised by them. But I'm
not going over there for that purpose.

Q. Same question to the other
stops, including Egypt? Same ques-
tion.

A. And the same answer. That's not
the purpose of my visit.

Q. No, but Egypt has been — even
though it is politically very, very
difficult — more interested in that ques-
tion than Saudi Arabia — in terms of,
say, Ras Banas.

A. Yes, but these are Egyptian
problems. He's [President Sadat] got to
deal with this problem. And I'm not go-
ing over there and embarrass him about,
and pressure him on, base rights,

14

military things. This is a broad assess-
ment of the peacekeeping process and
the strategic regional views of the
various parties. I want to get those, and
I want to contribute to that dialogue
which I would hope would now intensify
in the period ahead on a bilateral basis.

Q. Is it fair to say that, barring
dramatic developments — Afghanistan
or removal of Soviet threat from
Poland — that it's unlikely or extremely
unlikely that a summit would be held
this year?

A. I don't want to make -for all the
reasons we talked about -there are too
many uncertainties, too many unpredict-
ables. I don't see anybody rushing to it.

Q. On your relationship with the
Soviet Union and the points that
you're trying to get across, do you feel
that the Russians understand what
you're saying?

A. It's too early to say. Much too
early to say. I've made the point, and I
sincerely believe that the Soviet leaders,
both in prudence and conviction, are
never overly impressed by rhetoric.
They make their assessments on hard-
bitten calculations of Western actions
and, in an important sense, their suspi-
cion of capitalist society, at large, tends
to preoccupy them with resource alloca-
tion. They measure Western will and in-
tent by the degree to which they assess
we are putting our money where our
mouth is. That is the conclusion I've
drawn about Soviet calculations over the
extensive period of my public service,
whether it be conflict in Korea, the
situation in Vietnam, or problems global-
ly. And I suppose it served them well.

MAR. 28, 19812

Q. The wire reports on Poland this
morning are going to overtake your
story to get you back to diplomacy, I
guess.

A. Yes, I think that's right. It's very
dangerous, very bad.

Q. I was talking to a Soviet diplo-
mat, and they're thinking the next
month, month and a half, is going to
be it. It's either going to happen then
or not. What were the thoughts
behind the statement; what was the
analysis of the situation?

A. There were a number of things,
not the least of which was a major split

in the party between hard-liners and
soft-liners, a continuation of the exercisl
beyond the scheduled termination date, I
and the tensions associated with the
temporary strike and a more perma-
nent strike. And, I think, there is a
great deal of concern that this coming f
weekend could be critical.

Q. At the congressional inquest,
during the course of these maneuvers'
it was suggested that the Russians
were going to introduce new troops
into Poland. There's a report this
morning that they were going to intn
duce about 30,000 additional troops ii
to Poland.

A. No. I wouldn't look to that kind!
of an event. You're talking about yeste I
day, when we were talking about inter-!
nal suppression, and I would anticipate j!
that.

Q. I noticed the Polish Govern-
ment called in our Ambassador the
other day and their Ambassador cam
in yesterday here. What is the
message they're conveying? Any sub-
stantive message?

A. No, their economic situation is
very, very serious. In fact, it's grave ir
economic terms; we mentioned that in
yesterday's statement.

Q. Did you offer them a carrot?
Earlier, you had said that any signifi
cant aid would have to await some
real economic reform being develope
by the Poles. Clearly, they haven't h
time to do that. Do you have some ii
terim plan that would go beyond the
$80 million deferral?

A. Without rescheduling?

Q. Yes.

A. Their Deputy Prime Minister i |
due here the first of April and we're
looking at other possibilities, yes.

Q. Are there very many other
possibilities? I've talked to a numbe
of Polish-Americans, and most of th
suggestions have already, for the mi t
part, been done.

A. There are a number of
possibilities, sure. There's food -pow-
dered milk -through the Commodity
Credit Corporation; there's emergency
aid-

Q. But that's stop-gap, one-time
infusion. Now that they're in that
situation, the possibility of food rio
is a very real thing.

Department of State Bullet

The Secretary

A. Yes, it is a real thing, oh yes. It
is contributed to the increased tensions
lat exist throughout the country. I
link it's very, very serious. And the
ermans say that yesterday was more
rious than the December period.

Q. At yesterday's National Securi-
Council meeting, how did the
olish situation come up?

A. I think I notice some cute report-
ig on that. The fact that I asked the
fhite House to release the statement
: hich I took over there and which was
rafted here -one word was changed
iitorially-has suddenly been portrayed
a further diminution of Haig's
"jithority. I had it done at the White
e fluse because I thought it would
' 3t more attention. This is the climate
' f the times, and you know that as
ell as I do. Of course it doesn't happen
ist because you guys create it?

Q. Is it bad enough to make you
'ant to resign?

A. My wife said she only heard me
^y that twice in my whole life, in 35
ears, and she didn't know how I could

° ave gotten eight threats to resign out

'"'■ f 2 months.

Q. You're like Henry?

A. His would be eight threats a day.

Q. You remember the Salzburg
peech.

A. I'm the guy who went over to his
at there. He told me what he was go-
fig to do. I told him: "Don't do it." He
7ent right ahead and did it.

Q. If Poland blows up, if you have
I roblems this weekend, will that be a
risis dealt with here, there, or
Mere?

A. You heard what Meese [Edwin
leese III, Counselor to the President]
aid this morning. He said when the
'resident isn't there, the Vice President
vill be there.

Q. And Haig has a guy whose full
ime job is to make sure the
^resident's there. [Laughter]

Q. Any indication that you now
lave cordon sanitaire around El
Salvador, that the arms aren't going to
*et in there; that the situation is go-
ng to be resolved by the arms we get
n there?

A. No, I wish that were true. I'm
confident arms are still getting in.
There's been a major drop off, and

May 1981

there's some indication of some short-
ages of arms and ammunition among the
rebels, but it's still getting in. It's not
going in the main artery flow, which we
saw before, which was an airlift from
Nicaragua; that's stopped. Some of the
high-profile activities of the Nicaraguans
have stopped, but there are other ways
in through Honduras -trucks and covert
movement.

Q. Any chance of doing something
in any kind of forceful way, either by
ourselves or by Latin countries, to ab-
solutely cut it off. Yesterday on the
Hill, you continuously refused to rule
out any of our assets, suggesting you
had something in mind.

A. There are two approaches to a
problem of that kind. One is locally
through collective Central American ac-
tion. And in saying that, you have also
got to bear in mind that we're talking
about actions designed to help the social
condition which are causing the unrest -
what I call an "internal action" in a
sense -and then there are actions that
could be related to control of the prob-
lem at the source.

I think any one won't be enough. I
think it would be wishful thinking to rely
exclusively on one or the other. If it
weren't the Cuban, it might be some-
thing else that's exploiting these long-
standing historic social problems. We've
got to help internally in two ways. I
would hope collective assistance to the
nations, enhancement of surveillance —
what I call more technical control mech-
anisms-for prevention of the infiltration
from outside; that's the internal. The ex-
ternal, of course, has got to be focused
on the source of the problem.

Q. Cuba?

A. The Soviet Union.

Q. How do you get to the source?
What do you have in mind?

A. It wouldn't be very bright of me
to do so. I don't mean to suggest that
we have a highly polished one-two-three
step, but we're getting there.

Q. Are you surprised about
American public opinion on El
Salvador?

A. No.

Q. Did you expect more support?

A. Why should we? The American
people remember that aspect of Viet-
nam. We might be somewhat disap-
pointed that it's been so hard to get

through the clear differences between
the two. But this is, after all, religious
groups, especially the Catholics because
of the nun thing, that are quite worked
up about the situation, and rightly so.
But I don't think basically, as I've gone
through it, there is great concern that
we're getting ourselves involved in a no-
win situation. And we're very sensitive
to not having that happen. It's ludicrous
to talk about $25 million a year in
military assistance being another Viet-
nam when we spent $28 billion a year on
Vietnam -the height year in 1968 -$28
billion, and that was before inflation.

Q. Are you concerned that the
polls on El Salvador and President
Reagan's own polls might cause prob-
lems in getting the additional appro-
priations for El Salvador?

A. I don't think anybody can do any .
better than fight each issue on its
merits. And if it doesn't help by the
weight of its own logic then it's very
possible that the logic is fallacious.

Q. There's a document floating
around purporting to be part of the
cache of Salvadoran documents re-
leased by the State Department,
describing a trip to the United States
by Shafik Handal's brother in early
1980 [Shafik Handal is head of the
Communist Party in El Salvador]. Why
wasn't that document included in the
materials released?

A. I don't know. I didn't even know
about it.

Q. His effort was to start out at
the Cuban mission at the United Na-
tions and travel around making a lot
of stops in smaller cities in the United
States, building support for commit-
tees trying to build a better image for
the Salvadoran insurgents.

A. I wasn't aware of it. I can't think
of any reasons why we wouldn't make it
available.

Q. A question about the Middle
East. When you testified about a week
or so ago, you said it might be that
the United States would have to put
some troops into this multinational
force for Sinai, but it hadn't been de-
cided yet. Has a decision been made?

A. We'll just have to face that one
when it comes. We are dedicated to the
proposition that the peace process is
what we should continue with. And that
gives you an answer. I feel very strongly

15

The Secretary

that it should be a multinational contri-
bution, but I don't rule out American
participation because it may end up be-
ing the only way we can get some sort
of force put together.

Q. We're talking about three bat-
talions or so?

A. I wouldn't even think that many.
You could make some estimates, but the
parties have to show for this.

Q. Have the Pakistanis responded
favorably to the aid package we put to
them?

A. I would hold up answering that,
realizing their attitude toward it. The
Pakistanis are in a very difficult position.
They're under great pressure on the
Afghan thing; they've taken a very
courageous position on it; they're a
target of their own. If you're going to
talk, you have to have something to talk
with. Their initial reaction was quite
favorable, but it's been more reserved
recently.

Q. What do you envision out of
the Nigerian visit?

A. I think an extensive exchange of
views, more perception, from which we
learn the situation in southern Africa.
We certainly hope to achieve a reaffir-
mation of greater and more constructive
bilateral relations, which are of benefit
to both countries for a host of reasons of
which you know. As you know, we're
conducting a southern Africa review
which is nearing completion -at least the
first phase of it -and it's very helpful to
me to have this meeting in the context
of that [review], extremely helpful.

Q. Have the Nigerians signaled
that they are overly alarmed by Mrs.
Kirkpatrick's [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] ac-
tivities?

A. I think there's unsettlement
throughout the southern Africa states,
the front-line states, and the other black
African states. Clearly, most of that
unsettlement comes from uncertainty.
And I think some of those uncertainties
can be stripped away in the very near
future.

Q. Will you give reassurances to-
day about broad policy thrusts?

A. In a broad sense, yes.

Q. Because I had the impression
from your remarks yesterday that you
would pick up Namibia talks where

they were left off by the previous Ad-
ministration.

A. I've had a series of discussions
with European allies and Canada and
here.

Q. Am I right in deducing that
you are planning on picking up the
threads of the negotiations?

A. You can speculate in that way
and feel comfortable. But don't ask for a
quote.

Q. A lot of areas -South Africa
and elsewhere — have been under ma-
jor review. Do you have any kind of
timetable for ending that period of
major review?

A. As I said, we are nearing com-
pletion of the first phase of the southern
African review that we've talked about,
and then we're going into another phase
which would be somewhat more active
and perceivable.

Q. Are you going to send some-
body out to talk to them?

A. We might go into a diplomatic
phase; we've been studying a host of
other broad, longer term problems -
East- West problems -both second track
of theater nuclear forces and in a
broader sense, SALT, but SALT has
gone much more slowly because we
haven't had our SALT team in -the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
guy. But that doesn't mean we've
delayed. We've been doing our inter-
departmental work on it. I suppose in
some respects the pace of those things is
governed also by the perceived need for
completion. Those things that require an
urgent resolution, we've had to deal
with.

Q. [Soviet Ambassador to the
U.S.] Dobrynin mentioned when he
went out the other day that the
dialogue had begun. Could you
elaborate? Apart from simply meeting
with him over the next weeks or
months, what might be happening?

A. I think that's about where it will
be. We don't have an Ambassador in
Moscow. I would anticipate we would
use our Ambassador somewhat more
vigorously than he has been used in the
past, in the concept of reciprocity, try-
ing to get a balance in the activity be-
tween the Soviets and ourselves -a
balance in venues and in full discussions.
But it's true, the dialogue has started,

and these talks go on pretty irregularly i
and are influenced greatly by the inter- A
national situation and can add to the
pace or slow it down.

Q. So you wouldn't anticipate an;
meeting between yourself and
Gromyko, for example, before the
U.N. General Assembly in September

A. No.

Q. Do you have any indication th
your campaign to make the Soviet lin,
to terrorism an issue is making any
headway with the Soviets or not?

A. Not with the Soviets, but our j
allies and a number of nations here anl
particularly vexed by this situation ano
very much welcome that we have put ;).
spotlight on it. I think Americans then
selves welcome the spotlight. It's beenu
my view all along that we have not,
internationally or collectively, sufficient
analyzed the implications of this situa-
tion and taken a stand with respect to If
That's not going to do. We all know
that. And I think we're going to benef
from that.

Q. On talking to the Soviets, thi
seem to draw a very clear line be-
tween their support of wars of na-
tional liberation, which they think i
fully justified and occasionally viole ,
and international terrorism, such as
blowing up a theater or something
like that. And that, they say, they s i-
port neither in fact nor in policy. A
we still saying that they do, in fact
and in policy, support hijackings,
blowing up theaters, that they plan
and instigate that sort of thing?

A. Let's put it this way: That's w t
I talked here all about it's being over-
simplified, and anything that you
generalize on and compress tends to
sweep away contradictions that can g j'
nitpicked on later. But, I have descril d
the strategy as a two-tiered one: The
select a target in which the entire cai es
represent some hope for exploitation io
they move in the first year to try to i
seize control of those issues, and it's j,
that phase that terrorism, subversior U
and covert activity is the basic appro p.
They may then attempt to exacerbate I
those conditions which are a reflectiofcl
internal injustices in many respects,
anguishes, ethnic or any other kind -
kind we have in Spain or the kind we
have in Ireland -economic problems
the kind we have in Italy and in that
phase, it's an effort to develop in wh;|ir
the classic Marxist terms is referred

16

Department of State Bull tin

The Secretary

L'is "a correlation of forces." And when
iithat correlation of forces is ripe, they
fjthen apply the so-called wars-of-
iliberation philosophy in which they main-
Btain and insist that the social causes are
' jteuch that they are justified to intervene
■directly with massive infusions of arms,
Jjadvisers, proxy forces, or, even worse,
(direct action, as we saw in the Ogaden,
Hwhere the Soviet leadership is directing
hhe Ethiopian forces.

If we were to ignore that sophisti-
cated approach and give them carte
olanche in the so-called wars of libera-
Ition because of justified social conditions
• Lin a target country, we've adopted a for-

■ mula for disaster. And I must say, in
Jboth of those cases the tactics, tech-
niques, and the training that they give
to the forces of "liberation" involve all

-Ithe things which I'm talking about -
•blowing up theaters, murder, slaughter
■ioi innocent civilians. And, of course,
when the civil war aspect of it starts,
:lthen it becomes all the more evil, and I

think we have to be very careful and not
. oe immobilized so that we don't fail to
■see the interrelationship between these
1 two tiers.

Q. But you're putting the em-
phasis on that scenario rather than on
,i, the fact that Carlos may have been
ils | trained at one time in the Soviet
j. Union, that the Bader-Meinhoff gang
,. may have links to the Soviet Union —

A. I think the emphasis has got to
>be applied across the board. Our nation
' is a product of revolution, and it's not a
question in moral terms of whether the
a I social injustices ever justify forceful

change -that's the way a lot of people
.! like to argue it and that's the basic

■ Marxist philosophy, you see, in the
[talons. The basic issue is -the more fun-
damental issue is -if they're involved in

igKhe creation of the problem in the first

•I place -the exploitation and distortion of
it and then ultimately the direction, com-

j mand, and control of it -then it doesn't
! represent a thrust of social justice at all.
It's a formula for Soviet command and
control over a particular target area; it's
stripped of all its moral integrity, if it

m ever had any in the first place.

Q. I'd like to know, on whatever
basis you'd like to tell us, why on
Tuesday you made the remarks that
you did, which seem to have set this
whole thing off, when it seemed today
that you were aware of what was hap-
pening and had probably already lost

the battle? That you knew or that you
hadn't lost the battle?

A. I wasn't aware of it. I had
checked the day before.

Q. With the President?

A. No, I just wasn't aware of it.

Q. That's what a lot of people
wondered why you did give them that
answer.

A. It's a fact: I said yesterday that
the President had one set of perceptions
and I had another. Somebody had the
total picture.

Q. Do you have any regrets now,
having spoken out like that — having
answered the question?

A. No, I answer questions truthfully
if I'm asked. I answered it as truthfully
as I could.

Q. You seem to have new ground
rules with the President — set
meetings with him each week, private
meetings with him.

A. But that was set before yester-
day.

Q. A few of your deputies, over
the weekend up in Princeton, were
giving background estimates of when
SALT negotiations might resume, and
one version was why the end of this
year was conceivable, and the other
was why it was not. I was wondering
what the truth was.

A. [Laughter] I don't think anybody
can say. The basic approach to this thing
is, yes, we are going to continue with it.
We have already committed ourselves to
do so on theater nuclear forces arms
control. The President has clearly said
we're going to continue efforts toward
verifiable balanced arms control in which
we are looking for reductions that are
meaningful. We have also felt that one
of the aspects of it is the improvement
of our own strategic situation. Now that
doesn't mean that everything we're go-
ing to do has to be in place; what it does
mean is that we're going to be better
able to intervene with a new negotiating
stance when appropriate [inaudible] has
been received for the systems we an-
ticipate we will have to have in our
arsenal in the period ahead. Now that
got a little twisted across the river -not
intentionally -there's always a bit of im-
precision when you answer questions
like that. Nobody's saying we have to
have all this buildup completed before
we get into SALT; but we will feel much

more confident about our ability to con-
duct these things realistically when we
know we have support for the programs
we're talking about in the strategic area,
the decisions and the funding for them.

Q. So that really does rule out this
year?

A. No, it won't take that long.
We've got a defense budget on the Hill,
and when that budget is in shape and we
assess that -there will be a number of
questions to ask. There's a largely
discredited SALT II; we may seek to
modify it, we may seek to scrap it and
start all over again, we may seek
something more comprehensive, or nib-
ble at it by functional categories. These
are the questions that are under con-
sideration and have to the finalized on
our side in conjunction with our assess-
ment of the strategic discussions.

Q. Do you envision that the
theater nuclear forces meeting next
week will lead to negotiations shortly
or soon?

A. We intend to move at a
deliberate pace in conformance with the
decision of December 1979. There are a
number of issues that need to be re-
solved with our allies on approach and a
number of calculations associated with
this issue. The Brezhnev speech posed
some new twists to it which we have re-
jected out of hand on a moratorium, and
our allies have done the same. To freeze
imbalance is not our view of negotiated
arms control.

■Press release 67.
2Press release 82.

jlli May 1981

17

AFRICA

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

by Lannon Walker

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on March 24, 1981. Mr.
Walker is Acting Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs. 1

Before summarizing our requests under
each category of assistance, let me
highlight for you our policy concerns as
they are reflected in our budget re-
quests. Recognizing that U.S. interests
in Africa are served by progress in
economic development, the Reagan Ad-
ministration intends to maximize the
effectiveness of resources through a
more coordinated approach to planning,
budgeting, and implementation of pro-
grams and projects. And our bilateral
assistance will increasingly emphasize
areas of strategic and political priority
to the United States.

PRIORITY AREAS

Southern/central Africa, from Zaire
south, is a region of considerable
economic and political interest to the
United States, one with extensive
mineral wealth, and a heavy concentra-
tion of U.S. investment. U.S. interests
are threatened by regional conflicts and
instability which invite Soviet and Cuban
intervention. Our request includes a very
sizable commitment of economic assist-
ance to Zimbabwe, a nation whose eco-
nomic development, political stability,
and progress are of paramount interest
to the United States.

Sudan, the Horn, and Indian Ocean
nations is a region of strategic value to
the United States in the pursuit of our
interests in the Persian Gulf- Southwest
Asian arena. Sudan, our largest aid re-
cipient in Africa, is a staunch friend
which feels threatened by both Libyan
aggression and instability in the Horn.
We have negotiated facilities agree-
ments with Kenya, also a strong friend
of the West with an open economy and a
stable government, and Somalia, a na-
tion with serious economic problems
compounded by the presence of more
than a million refugees.

Liberia, Zaire, Senegal, Cameroon,
and Gabon are old friends. Let me stress
here the situation of Liberia, a nation

which has undergone considerable tur-
moil in the past year. Our increased aid
reflects our concern to restore political
stability and assist the economic
recovery of a nation where we have
valuable assets. Liberia's problems are
immediate, and we must address them
accordingly. At the same time, we will
be seeking ways, in our new budget, to
accommodate the needs of our other old
friends to demonstrate our consistency.

The Sahel is a region of West Africa
where the United States has both
humanitarian and political interests and
where we and our allies are engaged in
a long-term effort to rebuild the
economies of some of the poorest na-
tions of the world which have been
ravaged by drought. Today, our efforts
in this area have taken on a new impor-
tance, as fragile governments with a
tenuous hold on outlying regions could
become the object of Libyan adven-
turism.

FY 1982 PROPOSALS

Our request for FY 1982 reflects ad-
justments in the foreign assistance
budget originally sought by the Carter
Administration. We have had to take
certain cuts in line with President
Reagan's expressed desire and firm in-
tention to reduce Federal spending in
almost all areas. But we have also
sought to protect our priority programs.

Despite cuts we have taken, our
total request for FY 1982 includes
$390.5 million for development
assistance, an amount almost the same
as was requested in FY 1981; $216
million in PL 480; $231 million in
economic support fund (ESF), represent-
ing a substantial increase over our 1981
request and including $60 million for
southern Africa and $75 million for Zim-
babwe; $203 million in foreign military
sales (FMS) including enhanced pro-
grams in Sudan and Kenya; and $7.5
million in international military and
educational training (IMET) funds, also
representing a large increase over 1981.

A fuller and more complete reflec-
tion of the manner in which the Reagan
Administration will seek to utilize
resources in pursuit of our foreign policy
goals in Africa and elsewhere will be evi-
dent in the FY 1983 budget.

Before describing our proposals for
security assistance, let me stress the link

between the various components of our
foreign assistance requests for Africa.
Political stability in Africa, as elsewher
is very much tied to progress in
economic development. And in a conti
nent plagued by declining agricultural
production, burgeoning balance-of-
payments deficits, frequent droughts,
growing numbers of refugees, inade-
quate health facilities, and lack of basic
infrastructure, this link becomes even
more critical.

Our strategic and political interests
in Africa are served best when we appl
the totality of our foreign assistance
resources toward our -and
Africa's -goals. They are also served b;
our support to multilateral developmen
institutions such as the World Bank
which, as Secretary Haig pointed out
last week, are an essential source of
capital for many developing countries
which are of importance to us.

ire

IN

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

The ESF provides us with flexible
resources necessary to carry forward
our policies in nations afflicted by rapii
ly changing economic and security pro
lems. Many nations in Africa fit that
description. The increases we are re
questing in the ESF for 1982 reflect
importance we attach to this resource
support of our interests in recipient n;
tions. In this connection, let me stress
our support for the ESF contingency
fund which the Administration is prop
ing.

4

m

[ft
est

ti

-.!■:

1ft

Zimbabwe

We are proposing $75 million in ESF
Zimbabwe, a nation which achieved in
dependence less than a year ago. The
present government, under the leader
ship of Prime Minister [Robert] Mugai
has moved with reasonable success to
reassure the white community and to
maintain the basis of the second most
diversified economy in sub-Saharan
Africa. Our objective now is to maintf
and nurture this generally favorable
state of affairs and help provide the si
port necessary for Zimbabwe's stable |
political and economic development. Cl
ESF assistance will be used to compk
the refugee resettlement and rural
reconstruction programs which we
began in 1979 at the conclusion of the
war. In addition, we plan to begin
assisting the Government of Zimbabw
in rural development as well as techni
training programs.

nflnartmont r»f Qtata Rnllp

ill

, Southern Africa

' Ne are requesting $60 million for

* southern Africa. This program supports
ong-term U.S. interests in the stability

'; )f a strategically important region and
1 j s an essential element in promoting
j U.S. objectives. This region, rich in
latural resources, including strategic
ninerals, has been troubled by war,
/iolence, and economic disruption
•esulting from conflicts in Zimbabwe and
Namibia and by the spillover of turmoil

* Tom South Africa. Our ESF request for
I southern Africa consists of three com-
ponents.

Botswana. We are requesting $10
j Trillion for Botswana, a moderate,
llemocratic, multiparty state which
i shares our desire for a peaceful resolu-
;ion of the region's problems. Our
issistance is necessary to help Botswana
<eep up the pace of its economic
development program while coping with
;he added demands placed on its
resources by the region's instability. Our
5SF would be used for agricultural pro-
duction and planning programs,
ivestock and range management, and
mprovement of health services.

Zambia. For Zambia -a nation of
tritical importance to regional economic
ind political stability in central-southern

rica-we are requesting $20 million,
ambia is a major source of U.S. cobalt

iports and supplies our allies with a
ubstantial portion of their copper re-
tirements. The Zambian economy has
leen adversely affected by a number of
developments including unfavorable
weather, depressed prices for its prin-
:ipal export -copper -and regional
conflicts. Our ESF would be used to
anance key agricultural imports, to sup-
port agricultural development and
"esearch, and for manpower and
;echnical assistance projects.

Regional Fund. We request $30
million in a regional fund to support
closer cooperation among the nations of
southern Africa by assisting them to
rehabilitate and improve transportation
networks and to address inadequacies in
food security and skilled manpower.
Southern African nations are fully
aware of the benefits of tackling their
problems in a broader framework, and
the diplomatic and financial support of
the United States is an important ele-
ment in the success of their efforts.

Their first priority is to rehabilitate
the deteriorated transportation system,
particularly vital to the six countries of
the region which are landlocked. Our

May 1981

support, in concert with other Western
donors, will address this priority as well
as others identified by the nations of the
region.

Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean Area

For those nations in the strategically im-
portant Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean
area, we are proposing a total of $86
million in ESF.

Sudan. We are requesting $50
million in ESF to support Sudan's
efforts to correct its economic problems
and help implement the International
Monetary Fund's economic reform pro-
gram. As you know, Sudan, under the
leadership of President [Gaafar
Mohamed] Nimeiri, has played a strong
moderating role in a number of African
and Middle Eastern trouble spots.
Domestically, the Nimeiri government
has emphasized both economic develop-
ment and political reconciliation. Sudan's
economic problems -inflation, foreign
exchange shortages, and huge foreign
arrearages -are compounded by a refu-
gee population of over 400,000 persons.
Our proposed ESF would provide
balance-of-payments support enabling
the public and private sectors to pur-
chase spare parts, industrial and
agricultural raw materials, and equip-
ment for increasing domestic production
and expanding exports. It would repre-
sent a strong indication of U.S. support
for the economic reforms and political
moderation that have characterized
President Nimeiri's government.

Kenya. We are proposing $10
million in ESF for Kenya. A moderate,
friendly Kenya is essential to our policy
of maintaining stability in this region.
Kenya has a mixed economy, encourages
private enterprise, guarantees its people
personal freedom and civil liberties, and
permits us access to its port facilities.
Our ESF is intended to help Kenya
overcome a temporary balance-of-pay-
ments constraint and permit the impor-
tation of essential production inputs.

Somalia. We are also proposing $20
million in ESF for Somalia, one of the
world's poorest countries, and one
whose economic development process
has been impeded by a lack of resources,
a recent, crippling drought, and a
massive influx of refugees fleeing the
war in the Ogaden. As we assist
Somalia's effort to survive and develop,
both our humanitarian and strategic in-
terests are engaged. Somalia's strategic
location in the Horn of Africa and its

Africa

proximity to the Persian Gulf were im-
portant in our decision to negotiate a
facilities access agreement with the
Government of Somalia.

Mauritius, Seychelles, and
Djibouti. We propose ESF programs
each totaling $2 million for these coun-
tries. All three countries occupy
strategic locations. The Mauritian
Government has been uniformly respon-
sive to U.S. requests for access to its
facilities by units of the Indian Ocean
task force. Our ESF would contribute to
Mauritian efforts to correct a
deteriorating economic situation by help-
ing the Mauritian Government imple-
ment its stabilization program and ease
its foreign exchange constraint.

The United States maintains a U.S.
Air Force satellite tracking station in
the Seychelles. Our ESF assistance
would provide a commodity import pro-
gram to finance vital agricultural im-
ports for the Seychelles and encourage
the pragmatic aspects of the govern-
ment's development program.

Djibouti, which also permits the U.S.
Navy access to its facilities, is a strong
proponent of the peaceful resolution of
conflicts in the Horn. Our ESF would
support Djiboutian efforts to strengthen
its infrastructure and develop alter-
native energy sources.

Liberia

And last, but certainly not least, we pro-
pose $10 million in ESF for Liberia, an
old friend, a country in which we have
extensive interests, and whose economy
is closely linked to ours through both
U.S. investment and commercial bank-
ing arrangements. Liberia currently
faces staggering economic problems, and
our ESF program would provide bal-
ance-of-payments and budgetary support
as Liberia seeks to resolve its long-term
structural economic problems while
maintaining its economic development
programs.

FMS AND IMET

This Administration takes very seriously
its commitment to help African govern-
ments defend their peoples from both
regional and external threats. We do not
believe that U.S. interests are served
when our African friends regard us as
unresponsive to their legitimate security
needs. At the same time, we realize that
not all of our friends in Africa deserving
our FMS security assistance support are

19

Africa

able to pay for it at current rates of in-
terest. Therefore, we are requesting
FMS financing at reduced interest rates
for certain African countries. In support
of our own national security interests
and foreign policy objectives, we are re-
questing enhanced support for both
Sudan and Kenya. Recognizing the value
this program has as a foreign policy
resource of considerable long-term value
to U.S. -African relations, we are also re-
questing increased IMET for Africa.

Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean

In support of our strategic interest in
this region, we are proposing the follow-
ing:

Sudan. We are requesting $100
million in FMS and $1.3 million in IMET
for Sudan. Sudan is expected to use the
FMS funds, which we are proposing at a
reduced rate of interest, to accelerate its
military modernization program. For ex-
ample, we would expect the Sudanese to
purchase tanks, additional armored per-
sonnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft
weapons, and spare parts. Our enhanced
program request is designed to help
Sudan deal with the increased tensions
in the region and the potential threat
from Libya. Our IMET program would
complement Sudanese purchases of U.S.
weapons and provide training in the
essentials of modern military manage-
ment.

Kenya. We request $51 million in
FMS and $1.3 million in IMET for
Kenya, which permits the U.S. Navy ac-
cess to its port facilities. The primary
objective of our FMS program, all of
which is proposed at reduced rates of in-
terest, is to assist in Kenya's armed
forces modernization. It is expected to
concentrate on strengthening Kenya's
air defense and air transport capability
and to allow continued support of the
F-5 program and the development of a
credible mobile antitank force. The
IMET program will continue to be
directed toward developing expertise
and systems needed for effective
management of Kenya's defense
establishment and fostering the growth
of an indigenous training capability.
Some of this training will be done by
U.S. mobile training teams in Kenya and
some training will be in the United
States.

Somalia. Fur this country, with
which we have negotiated a military
facilities agreement, we are requesting
$20 million in FMS credits and $0,350
million in IMET. The FMS credits are

20

Military Assistance
to Liberia

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 1, 19811

The United States has a longstanding
military assistance program in Liberia.
During the 1970s we provided annual
IMET [international military education
and training] programs ranging up to
$300,000. FMS [foreign military sales]
programs were initiated in 1956, and
credit amounts of up to $1.8 million
have been extended annually since FY
1975. Total military assistance through
FY 1979 was $17.9 million.

The military leaders of the new
government have looked to the United
States for military assistance just as
they have for economic assistance, but
as soldiers whose grievances about poor
living conditions sparked the April coup,
they have put great emphasis on improv-
ing the training, living conditions, and
morale of their military colleagues.

The United States has responded to
Liberia's requests for military assistance
because of our interests and the expecta-
tions of the Liberians and of our other
friends around the world that we take
the lead in helping Liberia.

In FY 1980 we provided $2.47
million in FMS credits and $230,000 in
IMET funds. In FY 1981 we have
already signed agreements for $1.7
million in FMS credits and allocated
$449,000 in IMET programs. In addi-
tion, we have provided an emergency
shipment of 20 trucks under provision
506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

This Administration has decided to
continue these efforts to upgrade the
Liberian military through the use of
mobile training teams and training exer-
cises as well as providing additional
FMS credits for military housing con-
struction and force modernization.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman William J. Dyess. ■

ill

being proposed at reduced rates of
financing, and it is envisaged that the
Government of Somalia will purchase air
defense, communications, and engineer-
ing equipment. IMET training will be
related to this equipment.

I)

it

;

Djibouti. For Djibouti, a strategi-
cally located nation at the Bab-el-
Mandeb between the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden, we request $1.0 million in
FMS credits and $0.1 million in IMET.
Our FMS would finance an engineering
company with a mission to create a
transport and communications in-
frastructure.

Southern/Central Africa

For Southern/Central Africa we are re-
questing the following in FMS and
IMET.

Zaire. We are requesting $10.5
million in FMS and $1.56 million in IM-
ET for Zaire. Our security assistance
relationship with Zaire serves both our
foreign policy and national security in-
terests. It also provides the essential
underpinning for an effort which we am
our allies are engaged in to encourage
and help sustain reforms now underway
in the Zairian Armed Forces. The IME'
program helps assure the most effectivt
use of FMS-financed equipment as well
as provide professional and technical
training for selected military personnel.
We expect the Government of Zaire to
request FMS financing for the mainten
ance and support of previously supplie*
C-130 aircraft as well as spare parts fc
U.S. -supplied ground transport, patrol
boats, communications equipment, and
additional jeeps and trucks.

Botswana. For this country, we ar
requesting $0.5 million in FMS and $0.
million in IMET. We expect our FMS t
help finance purchases for the Botswar
defense force.

Gabon. For Gabon, a moderate
African state in which we have impor-
tant political and growing economic in-
terest, we are requesting $2.6 million i
FMS and $0.1 million in IMET. FMS
financing would assist Gabon in equip-
ping its gendarmerie platoons to becon
a credible patrol force to protect un-
marked frontiers.

Cameroon. We request $1.5 millioi
in FMS and $0.1 million in IMET for
Cameroon, a friendly African state
whose security could be jeopardized by
the Libyan military presence in
neighboring Chad. Our assistance is pr
posed for the purchase of jeeps, trucks
communications equipment, and spare
parts for previously purchased U.S.
vehicles.

Rwanda. We request $1.5 million
FMS and $0.05 million in IMET for
Rwanda, to assist that nation strength
its armed forces' noncombat capability

Department of State Bullet

CANADA

; ^through the purchase of dual purpose
nonlethal equipment and related train-
ing.

.1
West Africa

fWe propose only two FMS programs for
West Africa.

Liberia. We are proposing $12.3
million in FMS and $0.6 million in IMET
'for Liberia. The armed forces there de-
fend almost entirely on U.S. security
Assistance for equipment and military
paining. Our proposed program will
illow the purchase of new equipment,
Lill provide training for the Liberian
■ Army, which has been totally reorga-
nized since the April 1980 coup, and will
r lassist Liberia's military housing con-
struction program, which is the govern-
ment's top military priority. In view of
Liberia's economic problems, we propose
FMS financing at reduced rates of in-
terest.

M

Senegal. We propose $2.0 million in
FMS and $0,350 in IMET for Senegal.
Dur security assistance is designed to
show U.S. support for Senegal's
moderate foreign policy as well as its
:ommitment to democracy at home, to
jromote regional stability, and to con-
tinue U.S. access to Senegal's excellent
;ommunieations and transport facilities.
•Senegal is expected to use the proposed
inancing to purchase, among other
terns, jeeps and spare parts for
engineering equipment. The IMET funds
will be used for related and professional
training.

Let me also highlight the fact that
*e are proposing several new IMET
programs — in the Congo, Cape Verde,
Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
and Guinea-Bissau. These programs are
small and designed to allow these coun-
tries an opening to professional military
training in the United States.

Let me again stress the importance
which this Administration attaches to
maximizing the effectiveness of our
foreign policy resources in pursuit of our
interests in Africa. Those interests are
increasing, as are Africa's needs. At a
time of budgetary restraint, we believe
the requests before this subcommittee
represent our best attempt to utilize our
resources in support of our priority in-
terests.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

May 1981

Maritime Boundary Treaty

Following are statements by Am-
bassador Rozanne L. Ridgway,
Counselor of the Department of State,
and Mark B. Feldman, Acting Legal Ad-
viser, before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on March 18, 198 1.1

AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY

I appreciate very much the opportunity
to appear before you today in connection
with your consideration of the maritime
boundary settlement treaty with
Canada. I am accompanied by the Act-
ing Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, Mark Feldman. Mr. Feldman was
the negotiator of the treaty and will be
the principal witness for the Administra-
tion as you take up the question of
whether to recommend that the Senate
give its advice and consent to this docu-
ment.

It seems appropriate, however,
given all that we have been through
together, that as you open your con-
sideration of the question, I share with
you our view of the events of the past
months. In addition, there are several
matters related to the maritime bound-
ary settlement treaty and the fishery
treaty, which the Administration has
asked be returned to it unacted upon,
which we think will be of interest to this
committee.

When Secretary of State Haig ap-
peared before this committee in connec-
tion with his confirmation hearings, he
and you agreed that the question of the
U.S. -Canadian East Coast maritime
boundary settlement and fishery
treaties, which had been before the
Senate for 2 years, was "a matter of
priority." Subsequently, Secretary Haig
assured the committee that he would
elicit the views of all concerned as he
prepared his recommendations to the
President on how best to proceed with
the question of the future of the
treaties, linked so that neither could
come into force without the other.

In the first week of February,
Secretary Haig asked that I represent
him in this review. This is the occasion
for me to express thanks to you, to the
members of the committee, to interested
Members of the House, and to staff
members who have been so generous
with their time. You made it possible for
us to understand the full range and
depth of the views of Congress on the

content and the disposition of the
treaties. There was never any doubt in
our minds that together we were con-
cerned not only with our fisheries and
maritime boundary interests but also
with our country's interest in a positive
and constructive relationship with
Canada. If you will permit me, I would
like to say thank you to everyone for
their wisdom and their guidance and
their willingness to share both with us.

It was clear as the review proceeded
that there were only two realistic
courses of action for the United States
to pursue with respect to the treaties.
We could either do nothing or we could
attempt to advance at least a portion of
the problem toward a solution. The lat-
ter course was chosen. The President,
by his letter to you of March 6, asked
for your favorable consideration of the
maritime boundary settlement treaty
and the recall of the fishery treaty. Dur-
ing his recent visit to Ottawa he ex-
plained this action, and his reasons for
it, to Prime Minister Trudeau. We ap-
preciate the promptness with which you
have moved to take up the maritime
boundary settlement treaty.

In all of the discussions with the in-
terested American parties there was no
one who was against conservation or
who was against management or, in-
deed, who was against some document
to express that portion of our fishery in-
terest which we have in common with
Canada. I think it important to say that
everyone concerned was responsible,
was alert to the need for perceptive and
imaginative steps to meet the particular
fishery resource challenges in our future
and looked to that future, when we have
a boundary, to build a pragmatic and
practical fishery relationship with
Canada.

Some believed that the failure to
achieve progress because of the fishery
treaty represented the power of a single
regional bloc to thwart the national in-
terest. That is an unfair judgment. The
fishery treaty which we have asked be
returned, in fact, deals only with the in-
terests of a single region. What else
should be key except the views of that
region? All were concerned, all believed
that a solution had to be found, that
somehow progress toward the core prob-
lem-that is, the lack of a maritime
boundary -ought to be achieved. The in-
terests and the views expressed were

21

Canada

not parochial. They were, and are, sen-
sitive to the concerns of the affected
region.

The record should show that we are
moving to address a problem which
arises from a dispute over claims that
the United States does not recognize.
The President said, in his letter to you
of March 6, that the United States finds
no basis in international law for the
East Coast maritime claims made by
Canada. We do not recognize them. We
believe our claim is sound. We do not
yield on this question. Looking to the
future, when we intend to exercise
discretion in law enforcement in all
areas now claimed by Canada should
Canada decide also to ratify the
maritime boundary settlement treaty,
one must underline that there is a very
real difference between the use of such
discretion and recognizing Canada's
claims. We do not recognize those claims
and intend, as Mr. Feldman will make
clear, to pursue vigorously and con-
fidently the claim we have made.

Finally, in all of the discussions
there was a sense that somehow the ex-
ecutive branch was uncertain about the
ability of the regional councils to carry
out the responsibilities given them by
the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976. I would like to say for
myself, not only as a result of recent ex-
perience but because of previous ex-
periences, that the regional councils are
institutions which must be given every
opportunity to exercise the authorities
given them, and we ought, as a matter
of posture and of policy, to be confident
in the ability of those councils and their
members to carry out their tasks. We
certainly have no doubt that they will do
so and that they will do so with insight
and with respect for the resource.

MR. FELDMAN

Ambassador Ridgway has just reviewed
the political and diplomatic context
which has led up to this hearing. I am
pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss with you the terms and the im-
plications of the proposed maritime
boundary treaty with Canada.

For present purposes a maritime
boundary delimits the Continental Shelf
and fisheries jurisdiction of neighboring
states. The United States and Canada
have undefined maritime boundaries in
four areas off their coasts: two in the
Pacific, off the Strait of Juan de Fuca

and within and seaward of Dixon En-
trance, one in the Arctic, and one in the
Gulf of Maine area in the Atlantic. None
of these boundaries has been deter-
mined, but the most pressing problem
for both countries is the boundary in the
Atlantic.

The disputed boundary area includes
the northeastern portion of Georges
Bank which is of interest both for its
rich fisheries and for its hydrocarbon
potential. As the parties have been
unable to establish a boundary by
negotiation, their competition for
fisheries in the area has become a
serious irritant in the relations between
the two countries. If the United States
and Canada are able to agree on a set-
tlement of this delicate boundary issue
by binding third-party adjudication, it
will be an act of statesmanship in the
best tradition of friendly relations be-
tween neighboring states and a signifi-
cant contribution to the rule of law in in-
ternational affairs.

Boundary Adjudication

The boundary adjudication is of great
practical importance to the United
States and Canada because it will affect
fisheries, potential oil and gas develop-
ment, and environmental processes of
great concern to both. The adjudication
is also of interest to the international
community at large. The Gulf of Maine
case will be a landmark that will in-
fluence the development of international
law for years to come. One reason is
that the case will present the first ad-
judication of a combined Continental
Shelf-fisheries boundary.

The leading cases in this area of the
law have involved only the Continental
Shelf. The principles of those cases will
certainly apply but fisheries considera-
tions also will have to be taken into ac-
count. The result in this case will be of
great importance for the future delimita-
tion of 200-mile economic zones when
they become established in international
law.

A second reason the case is impor-
tant to the international community is
that it involves the first use of the
chamber procedure provided for in the
Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Under the chamber procedure
the parties to a dispute may elect to
have their case decided by a chamber of
the Court, i.e., by a selected few of the
15 members of the Court.

In 1972 the Court adopted new pro-
cedures which were intended to simplify

and expedite proceedings before the
Court. It was hoped that these pro-
cedures would attract business to the
Court, which has not been as active in
recent years as it should be. Among the
important features of the new rules are
provisions recognizing that parties to a
dispute should have an important in-
fluence in the composition of ad hoc
chambers designed to deal with a par-
ticular case. Under the rules, the partie
determine the number of Judges to be
included. The Court elects the members
of the chamber, but it does so in con
sulfation with the parties. Thus, the pai
ties can have a considerable influence o
the composition of the chamber.

The chamber procedure is now
designed to approximate the flexibility
of arbitration, while at the same time
assuring the parties of the expertise,
prestige, and economy of proceedings
before the Court. A great many people
will be watching the Gulf of Maine case
to see if these procedures work. If the>
do, the World Court should gain new
prestige and acceptance.

The Treaty

Before discussing the terms of the trea
ty in detail, I would like to outline the
structure of the treaty package. It con-
sists of a treaty text of four articles, t\
annexes, and a confidential exchange c
notes which has been provided to the
Congress.

• Article 1 of the treaty states the
basic agreement of the parties to subn
their dispute to a chamber of the Intel
national Court of Justice on the terms
set out in the special agreement, whicl
is the first annex to the treaty.

• Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty pr
vide, in effect, that if the proceedings
the World Court cannot be organized
continued as the parties desire becaus<
of problems, such as the selection or
replacement of the Judges, either part
may terminate the special agreement.
Then the arbitration agreement which
set forth in the second annex to the
treaty automatically would enter into
force. That agreement provides a
mechanism to insure the ultimate ad-
judication of the dispute. Both govern
ments are confident that the case will
adjudicated by a chamber of the Work
Court, but they wish to provide
safeguards in case unforeseen problen
should arise out of the new procedure:
which have not been used before.

• Article 4 of the treaty is the enl
into force provision. As presently

22

Department of State Bullei

drafted, it provides for the entry into
force of the treaty on the same date that
the agreement on East Coast fisheries
resources, pending before this commit-
tee, is also brought into force. For the
reasons explained by Ambassador
Ridgway, the Administration proposes
to amend this article so that the bound-
ary settlement treaty may be brought in-
to force upon the exchange of in-

i struments of ratification while the
fisheries agreement is returned to the

ii President. We have provided the com-
mittee suggested language for this pur-

ai x>se, as well as texts for a number of
conforming changes and technical ad-
ustments in the annexes. These latter
details will not cause any concern in Ot-
tawa if Canada can accept the basic
change in article 4.

Special Agreement

[n some ways the most interesting docu-
ment in the treaty package is the an-
nexed Special Agreement Between the
Jnited States and Canada to Submit to
i Chamber of the International Court of
Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area.
3 This is the document the parties would
,e submit jointly to the Court once they
, lave ratified the treaty.

• Article I of the special agreement
describes that the chamber of the Court
is to be composed of five Judges. We are
proposing a modification of this provi-

k, Bon to permit the selection of national
Judges, which is precluded by the ex-
sting text. The former U.S. Judge on
the Court, the late Richard Baxter, was
i great jurist, but he disqualified himself
from this case because he had counseled

.. the State of Maine on this matter before
joining the Court. If the present U.S.
Judge, Stephen M. Schwebel, sits on this
case, Canada would be entitled to ap-
point one of its nationals as an ad hoc
Judge. The recommendations of the par-
ties as to the members of the tribunal
will be communicated confidentially to
the Court at the proper time.

• Article II of the special agreement
sets forth in paragraph 1 the question
the chamber is asked to decide; this is a
critical provision. "The Chamber is re-
quested to decide, in accordance with
the principles and rules of international
daw applicable in the matter between the
Parties, what is the course of the single
maritime boundary that divides the con-
tinental shelf and fisheries zones of the
parties from a predetermined point in-
dicated in the agreement to a point to be
determined by the Chamber within a
defined area seaward of Georges Bank.

May 1981

:i

!'"

Article II also requests the chamber to
describe the course of the maritime
boundary in certain technical terms, to
illustrate the maritime boundary on
selected charts, and to appoint a
technical expert jointly nominated by the
parties to assist it in its work.
Paragraph 4 of article II commits the
parties to accept the decision of the
chamber as final and binding upon them.

• Article III of the special agree-
ment is a standard disclaimer which
clarifies that the sole purpose of the
maritime boundary is to divide the Con-
tinental Shelf and fishery zones of the
parties and that the special agreement
does not constitute recognition of the
jurisdiction that the other country may
claim to exercise in the delimited area,
beyond that otherwise recognized by
each country. In this connection, the
United States and Canada maintain dif-
ferent positions on the breadth of the
territorial sea, the scope of fisheries
jurisdiction exercised within the
200-nautical-mile zone, and the legal
regime for the Continental Shelf; these
differences are not affected by the
special agreement or the maritime
boundary established thereunder.

• Article IV of the special agree-
ment requests the chamber, and
obligates the parties, to utilize certain
technical provisions. These provisions
should help avoid any technical errors
creeping into the decision to the detri-
ment of either party.

• Article V of the special agreement
provides that proposals made during the
course of negotiations looking toward a
maritime boundary settlement will not
be introduced into evidence or publicly
disclosed. The article also provides that
the parties will notify and consult with
each other before introducing into
evidence or argument diplomatic or
other confidential correspondence.

• Article VI sets forth the pro-
cedures to be followed in the written
proceedings, calling for presentation of
memorials 7 months after the chamber
has been constituted and counter-
memorials 6 months later. The chamber
may extend these time limits at the re-
quest of either party.

• Article VII sets forth a procedure
for a further extension of the maritime
boundary established by the chamber, if
that is considered desirable by either
party. Such an extension may be
necessary to further define the Con-
tinental Shelf boundary beyond
200-nautical miles. If the parties are
unable to agree on such an extension
within 1 year of a request to do so,

Canada

either party may take the question back
to the chamber of the International
Court of Justice constituted under the
special agreement.

• Article VIII provides that the
special agreement enters into force on
the date the treaty enters into force and
that it remains in force until it is ter-
minated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the treaty.

Arbitration Agreement

Now, I would like to describe very brief-
ly the arbitration agreement which
would be the governing instrument in
the case of an ad hoc arbitration pro-
ceeding. In many respects it is the same
as the special agreement. The dif-
ferences can be explained by the fact
that under the arbitration agreement
new institutions would have to be
established while those are in place if we
proceed before the World Court. Among
the articles, I will mention only those
few which differ from the special agree-
ment.

• Article VI of the arbitration
agreement incorporates by reference the
Rules of Court of the International
Court of Justice as the applicable rules
of procedure for the Court of Arbitra-
tion, to the extent that they are deemed
appropriate by it. The article states that
a majority vote of its members governs
the proceedings of the Court of Arbitra-
tion.

• Article VII authorizes the Court
of Arbitration to fix a seat for its opera-
tions.

• Article X provides that the parties
will jointly share the general expenses of
the arbitration, while bearing their own
costs in the preparation and presenta-
tion of the case. In this connection, I
should note that the costs of arbitration
are significantly higher than the pro-
ceedings before the Court because the
parties must bear the costs of the Court
of Arbitration as well as their own ex-
penses.

• Article XI establishes a mecha-
nism for the filling of vacancies which
may arise during the course of the ar-
bitration. In general, if the parties are
unable to agree within a specified time,
the Court of Arbitration or its president
would have the authority to fill any
vacancies.

• Article XII recites the parties'
agreement that the decision of the Court
of Arbitration will be final and binding
upon them. Either party may refer to

23

DEPARTMENT

the Court of Arbitration any dispute be-
tween the parties as to the meaning and
scope of the decision within 3 months at
the rendering of the decision.

. Article XIV provides that the ar-
bitration agreement will enter into force
as provided in articles II and III of the
basic treaty which bring the arbitration
agreement into force automatically it
either party terminates the special
agreement.

I believe the committee is entitled to
some assessment of our prospects in a
proceeding of this nature. I have been
deeply involved in the development ot
our positions and the legal discussions
we have had with Canada on this issue
over the past 6 years. I am confident ot
the merits of the U.S. position. Of
course, no one can predict with certainty
the outcome of an adjudication. There
always are risks. I am sure that
Canada's lawyers, too, are confident ot
their position. However, I can say that
the State Department lawyers who have
worked on this issue over the years have
grown more confident as international
law has developed in this field. Most of
all I am confident that the United
States and Canada will both receive an
objective and impartial judgment from
the tribunal we create by this treaty. I
have no doubt that U.S. interests will be
well served by this treaty, and we urge
the Senate to give its advice and consent
to ratification as soon as possible.

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent ot
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1982 Authorization Request

by Secretary Haig

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Operations of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2U,
1981.1

At the outset, I want to express the
pleasure I have of the opportunity to ap-
pear before the subcommittee that has
played such an important role over the
years in the development and evolution
of the professionalism of our Foreign

Service.

It is a great honor for me to appear
before this committee today. In
testimony last week before the full
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1
outlined the international challenges we
face today and the resources we seek to
deal with these challenges. One ot those
resources— the State Department itself—
is the subject of my testimony today.

The Department's authorization re-
quest for fiscal year 1982 and the con-
tinuation of our activities into 1983
amount to $2,461,688,000. To put this
figure into perspective, I would like to
say a few words about the real re-
sources this money supports: the
Foreign Service officers and the State
Department employees.

The promise of a consistent, reliable,
balanced foreign policy can be fulfilled
only if the foreign policy professionals
make their proper contribution. They
are the custodians of the historical
memory of our actions abroad and a
crucial asset for the years to come. As
recent events have demonstrated, they
have become the first line in many
respects of the defense of our national
interests.

In recent years, the task ot the
foreign policy professional has become
much more difficult. Several problems
deserve particular attention: a tendency
in recent years to ignore them in policy-
making; the financial drawbacks of pub-
lic service itself; a growing volume of
work without a commensurate increase
of personnel; the frustration growing
from the lack of a cohesive American
leadership globally. Above all, their pro
fession has become much more danger-
ous. As violence has mounted against
our posts abroad, employees have been
forced to accept extended separations

S.F<

F0|i

■ft

from their families rather than putting
their loved ones at risk.

As Secretary of State, I will seek tc
alleviate these conditions: to improve th
morale of our professionals, to give
them their necessary participation in tfi
making and the execution of our nation'
foreign policy, to enhance their workinf
conditions, and to protect them. The
President has taken the most essential
step in this process by indicating that
the Secretary of State— and his depart-
ment—shall be the general manager of
American foreign policy. He has given
his personal attention to the safety of
our diplomats.

The budget request placed before
you reflects a program designed to deal
with security of personnel, working cor
ditions, and pay. It is fully responsive t
the philosophy of management outlined
above.

• Security at posts abroad should I
increased to protect our people and the
dependents from violence and terronsn
It is important, too, that we protect
classified national security information
from compromise. For this purpose, th.
Congress enacted a supplemental ap-
propriation of $6.1 million in 1980 and
provided an additional $35.8 million in
1981. To continue this critical security^
program, we are requesting another $2
million in 1982.

• As Under Secretary [for Manag
ment Richard T.] Kennedy discussed
with you in more detail, this authoriza-
tion request reflects 140 new positions
to cover growing overseas consular an
domestic passport workloads and to
strengthen resource and program
management for the refugee program
Additionally, Under Secretary Kenned;
is conducting an intensive review of ou
current personnel resources across the
board. The provisions of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 on professional
development require additional training
faculty, and support personnel. The
Department's capability to report and
analyze political and economic events
must be strengthened.

• Also, as part of the Foreign her
ice Act of 1980, we have initiated the
pay comparability provisions for the
Foreign Service. The new Foreign Ser
ice designations and grade levels are lr
effect, and we are requesting suppleme
tal appropriations to cover certain new

Department of State Bullet

J.S. Foreign Affairs Costs and Personnel

Average Annual Share
of Outlays, 1937-80

otal Federal Government
otal Foreign Affairs*

of which

Foreign Aid

Foreign Affairs Administration
(expenses of Department of State and
Foreign Service and contributions to
international organizations and
conferences)

Foreign Information & Exchange

International Financial Programs

Other

580
11

6.5

1.4

.5

2.4

.2

1937-39

.2%

1949-51

12.0%

(period of intensified

economic and military

assistance)

1959-61

3.0%

1968-70

2.0%

1980

-2.0%

Source. Budget of the United States Government (years

as indicated.)

*This approximate figure includes total outlays of the Department of State, Agency
or international Development (AID), Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), International
lommunication Agency (USICA), International Development and Cooperation Agency
DCA), International Trade Commission (ITC), National Security Council (NSC), Overseas
'rivate Investment Corporation (OPIC), U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Peace

a -lorps, plus outlays for foreign affairs-related activities for the Departments of

„ igriculture, Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury.

ource Budget ot the United States Government. FY 1982

- _

ersonnel FY 1980

Department of State
Employment, 1940-80***

otal Federal Government
(civilian employment)

otal Foreign Affairs**
(U.S. citizens)

1.9

1940

million

1950

1960

36,000

1970

(less than

1980

2% of

**

total)

7,000
16,000
13,000
13,000
13,000

***Excluding foreign nationals.

**AII State, AID, Eximbank, USICA,
DCA, ITC, NSC, OPIC, Peace Corps staff,
:| >nd USTR employees, plus foreign affairs-
elated positions in Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury,
is calculated from data received from
hese departments by the Bureau of
~'ublic Affairs, Department of State.

Adapted from statistics in State magazine,
January 1981

vtay 1981

25

EAST ASIA

allowances for our employees abroad.
When fully executed, I believe the
Foreign Service Act will provide a
modern, simplified, and supportive per-
sonnel structure.

Another aspect of our request
deserving special comment is the
refugee program. We should be proud of
our leadership in dealing with the relief
and resettlement of refugees, and we
are prodding other nations to help. The
1982 authorization request specifies ad-
ditional resources for Afghan refugees
in Pakistan and African refugee pro-
grams as well.

In addition to authorization of ap-
propriations, our proposed bill includes
certain statutory provisions, two of
which are deserving of more attention.

• Section 103 would establish a
selective nonimmigrant visa waiver, on a
reciprocal basis, for eligible citizens of
countries with the best records of com-
pliance with our immigration laws. The
waiver will increase equity in our
worldwide consular dealings and, more-
over, will help offset the evergrowing
demands on our consular service.

• Section 104 would remove statuto-
ry restrictions on passport fees so that
they could be adjusted administratively
to cover costs associated with issuing
passports. This provision would also ex-
tend passport duration from 5 to 10
years as a cost-saving measure.

Both of these changes are absolutely
essential if we are to meet our statutory
consular and passport workload re-
quirements within the resources re-
quested.

A final comment concerns the rela-
tionship between our resources and the
Department's ability to conduct the
foreign policy of the United States. Over
the past several years, the Department's
staff abroad has been seriously reduced
while the presence of other agencies has
grown. If we are to meet the complex
challenges that confront us, the Depart-
ment of State must have the necessary
resources to pursue our objectives. The
1982 request has already been pared to
the minimum, as befits these austere
times. For this reason, I am asking your
support and the support of your subcom-
mittee to the full amount that we have
requested.

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

'Press release 71. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

by Michael Armacost

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
March 23, 1981. Mr. Armacost is Acting
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs.1

It is a pleasure for me to appear today
to discuss our economic and security
assistance relationships in East Asia and
to explain our FY 1982 budget request.
I would like first to make a few general
remarks setting the context in which we
have developed our assistance policy for
East Asia and the Pacific.

As you know, the Reagan Adminis-
tration is deeply committed to
strengthening the U.S. security posture
throughout the globe, in response to the
increasingly serious worldwide challenge
posed by the Soviet Union in recent
years. In Asia today, we have a number
of broad concerns regarding the military
and economic security of the region,
ranging from increased Soviet military
and naval power in the region, to Soviet-
backed Vietnamese aggression in Indo-
china, to the need to protect the sea
lanes which provide the vital flow of
petroleum from the Middle East to our
major Asian allies. A sound strategic
posture in East Asia and the Pacific is
an essential element of our global
strength.

The year's security and economic
development assistance programs for
the region are directly related to the
need to secure U.S. strategic interests in
the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as
to protect the immediate security of
those nations— Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines, Bur-
ma, the Pacific Islands, Papua New
Guinea, Singapore, and the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-
which will be receiving our aid. We
believe that security and economic
assistance to these countries serve well
the political and strategic interests of
the United States and constitute an ap-
propriate and necessary adjunct to our
expanding defense effort.

In FY 1982 we propose to increase
certain aspects of security assistance

programs in response to growing thre
from the Soviet Union and its clients.
Here are the highlights.

• We are requesting an overall ak
level of $638,595 million, which
represents an increase of $58,206 milli
over FY 1981 and is also slightly high
than was budgeted by the Carter Ad'
ministration.

• We seek increases for Thailand,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia
Singapore, and Burma, reflecting spec-
needs in these countries.

• To maintain support for key
friends and allies in the highly visible
and politically important area of devel
opment assistance, we are proposing
small increases in economic aid. Their
modesty reflects our need to balance
competing aims on a global basis and
adjust aid levels to fiscal restraints; bi
they will contribute to strengthening
recipients' postures in East Asia and
thus enhance our security.

• We are also providing economic
assistance to ASEAN itself, because i
can play a key role in resolving the
Kampuchean conflict, reducing the im
pact of the Soviet presence in the
region, enhancing access to the Indiai
Ocean, assisting refugees, reducing n;
cotics trafficking, and insuring access
raw materials over trade routes vital
the United States and Japan.

• Our proposals for increases in
foreign military sales (FMS) credits,
ternational education and military tr;
ing (IMET), economic support funds
(ESF), and some direct credit at cone
sional rates take into account the re;
that the recipient countries are shoul
ing larger and larger defense burden
during a period of economic hardship
one which is even more severe for
developing economies than for the
United States. The decline in grant a
or the military assistance program
substantial oil price increases, worsei l
debt-servicing problems, and inflated
prices for military hardware and sen I
ices have been among the key factors ,
undermining the defense procuremer i '.
programs of our East Asian allies an t -
friends.

I would like to turn now to a
country-by-country breakdown, stres g

-

[6

IB
:
ill

b:

¥

w

>

::.

v

26

Department of State Bulldn

)ur interests in each recipient nation
)r-in the case of ASEAN -
nstitution, providing the overall figures
for each type of assistance, and explain-
er the justification for these various re-
quests.

;il

r Republic of Korea

U.S. security is vitally dependent upon
;he preservation of peace and stability in
Mortheast Asia in general and the
Korean Peninsula in particular. Our aid
n this area is focused on the Republic of
[« Korea. For several years now there has
jeen a considerable increase in the size
ind capabilities of North Korean forces,
Dosing a formidable threat to the securi-
y of the South. The evidence continues
;o indicate that North Korea has not
Tiled out the use of force, given the ap-
propriate opportunity, to reunify the
jeninsula.

Our contribution to South Korean
i' security consists of a commitment em-
jodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954, the maintenance of U.S. forces in
i Korea, an extensive FMS cash and
credit program, IMET, and technical
cooperation in the development of
ill-selected Korean defense industries. Cur-

•ent unforeseen Korean economic and
• iscal problems brought about by
ib worldwide recession and oil price-driven
« nflation make U.S. cooperation more
■important than ever in order to prevent
'urther slippage in Korea's force
modernization program.

We are proposing a $167.5 million
MS program for FY 1982 which, while
t remains the largest in East Asia, is
ery lean considering Korean require-
ments. Current and proposed levels of
! FMS help maintain the priorities of
;b South Korea's force improvement pro-
[i jram by financing essential equipment
acquisitions. The major systems which
Seoul is expected to purchase with FMS
jll financing include a tactical air control

system, radar equipment, Harpoon mis-
;fr|i sile, a further increment in the program
,:ilfor the coproduction of F-5E/F aircraft,
r, and part of the F-16 purchase.

Increased IMET -$1.8 million in FY
t' 1982, up from $1.2 million in FY 1981 -
help South Korean forces acquire the
requisite training in management, com-
mand, and control of large forces and
employment of modern weapons sys-
tems. The need for this training in-
creases as the Korean forces become
more self-sufficient.

Within the Southeast Asian region,
which is poorer and less homogeneous

: May 1981

than Northeast Asia, U.S. aid is spread
among a number of recipients to pro-
mote a variety of U.S. interests, from
maintenance of U.S. basing in the
region, to countering the very palpable
threat of Soviet- Vietnamese aggression,
to advancing security interests along
major sea lines of communication.

The Philippines

Overall, the Phillippines is the largest
recipient in the region. This is not only a
country of longstanding security value to
the United States but one whose impor-
tance has been underlined by events of
recent years. Our ability to project
power across the Pacific to Southwest
Asia, in a crisis, is enhanced by our con-
tinued unhampered use of Clark Air
Force Base and Subic Naval Base. We
refuel and reprovision carrier battle
groups at Subic Bay before sending
them to the Indian Ocean. Clark Air
Force Base is the only facility on the
Pacific route from which a fully loaded
C-5A transport can fly nonstop to Diego
Garcia.

U.S. security assistance is widely
regarded by the Philippine Government
and people as quid pro quo for the use
of the facilities at Clark and Subic.
Former President Carter, in a letter to
President Marcos at the time of the
1979 amendment to the Military Bases
Agreement, pledged the Administra-
tion's "best effort" to provide a total of
$500 million in security assistance over a
5-year period. We have appreciated the
favorable congressional actions which
have given substance to this pledge over
the past 2 years, and we ask your sup-
port again for our $100 million request
for FY 1982, as well as for $1.3 million
in IMET funds included in this year's re-
quest.

We have also requested $38.8 million
in economic development assistance for
the Philippines. This is modest in rela-
tion to the country's needs and the
nature of our strategic and political in-
terests and commitment. While real
GNP in the Philippines grew by 4.7% in
1980, inflation averaged 18%. The coun-
try has been running large trade and
current account deficits and borrowing
on international financial markets to
achieve its growth targets. Debt levels
consequently have been rising steadily.
Continued borrowing is likely. Increas-
ing prices for oil imports and erratic
commodity prices for the country's ex-
ports have hit the Philippines hard, in
spite of generally good management of
the economy.

East Asia

Thailand

Preservation of Thailand's security,
stability, and independence will be
critical for the maintenance of peace and
the security of U.S. interests in the
Southeast Asian region. President
Reagan has reaffirmed our commitment
to Thailand under the Manila pact and
has made clear our continued support
for Thai security needs. Thailand, as
well as its ASEAN neighbors, regard
our willingness to back such rhetorical
assurances with more concrete contribu-
tions to Thai security as a litmus test of
our attitudes toward the region.

Our bilateral assistance to Thailand
is a necessary mix of security and
development assistance, ESF, and
refugee relief. Any element by itself is
insufficient to achieve our objectives.
Thailand's security is threatened not on-
ly by external aggression but could also
be imperiled by a failure to sustain
economic growth and to respond as to
the rising expectations of its people. The
government is making a conscious effort
to reduce inequities of wealth and in-
come distribution and to improve stand-
ards of living in rural areas. Prime
Minister Prem has acknowledged that
rural development is a primary objec-
tive.

We are seeking assistance increases
for Thailand this year, in recognition of
the increased military threat from Viet-
nam. Two hundred thousand Soviet-
supplied Vietnamese troops now occupy
Kampuchea and operate in strength
along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Dur-
ing 1980 Vietnamese forces in western
Kampuchea were strengthened to over
80,000 troops. Small Vietnamese units
have frequently carried out recon-
naissance missions into Thailand, and in
June a clash between intruding Viet-
namese troops and Thai defenders pro-
duced numerous casualties. Vietnamese
forces heavily outnumber defending Thai
forces and are capable of mounting
stronger incursions at any time.

The U.S. security assistance pro-
gram is designed to assist Thailand in
providing for its own security by making
the necessary force improvements to
present a plausible deterrent to Viet-
namese forces, while continuing to con-
tain and reduce the threat posed by
domestic insurgency. The FMS financing
requested for FY 1982 would to be used
to:

• Equip additional Marine Corps
rifle companies;

• Procure C-130 aircraft, Dragon

27

East Asia

missiles, and UH-1H helicopters;

• Replace obsolete patrol aircraft;
and

• Permit improvements in antitank,
antiaircraft, and command and control
systems.

This $80 million FMS program re-
quested for Thailand represents a $30
million increase over the current fiscal
year, the largest increase for any East
Asian country. Fifty million dollars of
the proposed Thai FMS program will be
extended in the form of direct credits at
a concessional rate; Thailand would be
the first East Asian country to receive
such direct credits.

Our Thai proposal also includes $10
million in ESF. Although no ESF was
proposed for the current year, in each of
the first 2 fiscal years, $2 million has
been obtained by reprograming, in
response to Thailand's urgent need to
provide additional assistance to Thai
citizens adversely affected by the
refugee influx and in security in the
border area. The proposed IMET level
for Thailand would increase from the
current level of $770,000 under the con-
tinuing resolution to $2 million. These
increases will help keep force moderniza-
tion on track by providing training for
the use of the equipment and systems
purchased through FMS.

The $35.8 million requested in
development assistance for Thailand is
very small, whether one compares it to
the $1.1 billion in 1982 loans expected
from the World Bank, Asian Develop-
ment Bank, and Japan or to Thailand's
total FY 1982 external borrowing re-
quirement of $1.7 billion. Our aid pro-
gram will provide technical assistance
and training designed to improve the
Thai Government's ability to use
substantial development assistance from
its other sources more efficiently.

FMS and development assistance at
the softest possible terms is an urgent
requirement if Thailand is to maintain
its force modernization and development
efforts. Thailand is expected to incur
serious debt servicing problems by 1985
unless current account adjustments are
made. In recognition of this, the Thai
Government has decided to forego com-
mercial borrowing for defense purposes
and, instead, rely on internal revenues
and government-to-government loans.
Our assistance program, with substantial
direct credits and grants, will reinforce
that sound economic policy decision.

Indonesia

Indonesia is strongly anti-Communist
and has been a reliable supporter of

28

U.S. positions on significant issues such
as Afghanistan and Iran. As the largest
ASEAN nation, it is well-suited to con-
tribute to our long-term interest in
maintaining regional stability. It is
strategically located astride the sea
lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, provides 6% of U.S. petroleum
imports, and plays a moderating role in
many multilateral fora. Our relations are
basically on a sound footing, but our
support for Indonesian defense and
development efforts has not kept pace
with the growth in its strategic impor-
tance.

For FY 1982 we propose a 50%, or
$15 million, increase in FMS funds over
the current level of $30 million. This in-
crease aims at restoring Indonesian
confidence in the U.S. commitment to
regional security while assisting In-
donesia to counter the growing Soviet
and Vietnamese naval presence in
Southeast Asia. It also adjusts for infla-
tionary increases in the price of weapons
systems that have reduced real assist-
ance levels over the past several years.

In recent years the Indonesians have
used FMS credits to modernize their air
and naval forces. Our currently propos-
ed increase in FMS credits would permit
purchase of badly needed mobility equip-
ment and possibly another C-130. Addi-
tional IMET is also needed to help offset
past cuts in Indonesia's IMET program
and mitigate Indonesian skepticism con-
cerning U.S. support.

Our development aid program in In-
donesia is one of the most effective in
the world. It remains of great impor-
tance because of the U.S. stake in the
success of Indonesian modernization
efforts. Although Indonesia benefits
from higher oil prices, which have for
the first time given the country a
balance-of-payments surplus, it remains
by far the poorest of the five ASEAN
countries, with a per capita income of
$431.

Almost all of our aid to Indonesia is
used for technical assistance designed to
achieve long-term developmental
benefits to the Indonesian economy, such
as agricultural training and research,
health and social development programs,
and the provincial development project
which provides training to low-level
government officials responsible for
rural development planning.

While our economic aid has been
shrinking, aid programs of other donor
nations has been increasing. Budgetary
constraints and severe competition from

urgent programed requirements in othe
regions, such as Central America, have
precluded meeting the pledge of $160
million in economic aid we made at last
year's intergovernmental group aiding
Indonesia. The $75 million in
developmental assistance and the $30
million in PL 480 assistance which we
seek is the absolute minimum we shoul
allocate to Indonesia.

i

a

Malaysia

Rich in natural resources and level of
economic development and solidly anti-
Communist in orientation, Malaysia, lik
Indonesia and Singapore, occupies a
critical strategic position on the Malacc
Strait. Like its neighbors, it is worried
by Vietnamese aggression and the in-
creased Soviet presence in Asia and is
increasingly desirous of stronger secur
ty ties with the United States. On its
own, it has been engaged in a steady
effort to increase its military forces, in
eluding plans to double the size of its
army over the FY 1982-83 period.

We have requested increased FMS
credits for Malaysia-up from $10
million to $12.5 million -for FY 1982 t
finance a portion of the rehabilitation
costs of A-4 aircraft purchased with
prior year FMS credits, as well as to
help finance some of the equipment
necessary to double the size of the am

The significant increase which we
have requested in Malaysia's IMET pp
gram for FY 1982 -to $650,000 from
the $300,000 current level -is an activ
albeit partial, response to a Malaysian
request.

Burma

Burma is a country of growing intern?
tional significance and considerable lor
term economic potential. It is decidedl
in our interest that Burma remain
friendly to the United States and our
other allies and friends in the region a
that it be kept out of the Soviet sphep
of influence.

Recent trends in Burma have beer
encouraging. Rice production is up to
level capable of 1 million tons of expor
per year. The government is stable an
more willing to cooperate with the
United States than in past years of
strong isolationism.

Our economic development assist-
ance program in Burma is an importai
means of broadening our relationship
and our contacts within the Burmese
Government. Two-thirds of the $7.5
million we are requesting will go for
agricultural assistance designed to

_ t f»A _ A _

East Asia

:;■

enable the Burmese to become self-
sufficient in foodstuffs they now import.
The remainder will go for a continued
U.S. contribution to the development of
primary health care facilities in rural
areas.

Our security assistance program in
Burma is appropriately modest and is
aimed at building a warmer bilateral
relationship. Currently Burma receives
only token IMET and no FMS credits.
The FY 1982 proposal would move
Burma's IMET program from its current
level of $31,000 to a still modest
$150,000 program which would permit
14 or 15 students to be trained.

it Association of South East Asian
Nations

Perhaps the most positive development
is Southeast Asia over the past 6 years
has been the emergence of ASEAN as a
stronger and more cohesive body afford-
ing both an improved means of coopera-
tion and consultations among its mem-
bers, with regard to meeting the Viet-
nam threat in specific and achieving
greater policy coordination in general
and a means by which the United States
can deal with the member countries as a
whole.

We believe that the continued
growth and development of this
organization is in our interest, and we
have, therefore, requested $3.3 million
for ASEAN to fund several projects in-
volving training of participants from
each of the five member countries. The
amount is very small in relation to
ASEAN assistance offered by Japan and
the European Economic Community,
both of which have recently boosted
their aid commitments to ASEAN. This
aid program is an important element of
the U.S. -ASEAN dialogue and under-
lines our continuing commitment to the
area.

Singapore is a good friend and a
strong supporter of increased U.S. in-
volvement in Asia. The Government of
Singapore provides virtually unlimited
access to excellent and strategically
located air and seaport facilities for U.S.
forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

As a gesture of U.S. support for
Singapore, we propose to inaugurate a
new $50,000 IMET program to provide
added professional military and technical
training for personnel who have the
potential for playing key roles in the
Singaporean military. The program
would provide additional assistance to
Singapore in maintaining the skills
needed for effective operation and main-
tenance of U.S. -origin equipment and

fIV

en

enhance managerial skills while pro-
moting a better understanding of the
United States.

Pacific Islands

We have proposed a $5 million program
for the South Pacific as a key part of an
effort to establish beneficial ties with the
growing number of independent island
countries. We enjoy an unusually
favorable strategic position in the South
Pacific, where there is currently no resi-
dent Soviet diplomatic or aid presence
despite repeated Russian efforts to find
an opening. The very small aid budget
must cover nine independent countries
and two autonomous states. We are just
now initiating our first projects in newly
independent Vanautu and Kiribati.

The $20,000 we request for Papua
New Guinea will assist that government
to realize its training objective of send-
ing two to three officers to the United
States for training. The program will
enhance efforts to upgrade the Papua
New Guinea defense force by sending
officers to the U.S. Naval explosive or-
dinance demolition training. It will also
permit some training in coastal
surveillance and instruction in repair
and maintenance of various types of
equipment.

Conclusion

In short, what we are proposing for FY
1982 is a total package of $638,595
million in various forms of U.S. military
assistance, economic development, and
PL 480 aid. It is both appropriate from
the point of view of strengthening our
security posture in the East Asia region
and in tune with current U.S. Govern-
ment budgetary realities. Through the
program we are requesting, with its mix
of security and developmental funding
and its variety of Asian recipients, we
believe we can maintain our defense and
security interests in such countries as
Korea and the Philippines, while
strengthening our ties with, and foster-
ing greater security and stability in, the
nations of Southeast Asia and the
Pacific. We have appreciated the sup-
port of this committee and the House in
pursuing our foreign assistance goals in
past years, and we ask for your strong
support for this submission.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Visit of Japanese
Foreign Minister

Japanese Foreign Minister
Masayoshi Ito made an official visit to
Washington, D.C, March 23-2U, 1981.
Following are remarks made to the press
by Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister
Ito after the Foreign Minister's meeting
with the President on March 2U.1

Secretary Haig. I'm delighted to have
an opportunity to meet with you this
morning to discuss the conversations
that we've held here in Washington over
the last 2 days with the distinguished
Foreign Minister of Japan, Foreign
Minister Ito. I would like to keep this
press briefing limited to those discus-
sions out of deference to our distin-
guished visitor. He has had extensive
conversations with the Secretary of
State -my self -with our Secretaries of
Defense, the Treasury, and Commerce,
and with the U.S. Trade Representative.
This morning he met with Vice Presi-
dent Bush for about an hour, and he has
just concluded a very detailed and cor-
dial discussion with the President.

Q. How about the National Securi-
ty Adviser?

Secretary Haig. He was in attend-
ance. The discussions ranged far and
wide, from East- West relations to a
number of regional foreign policy issues
and security issues in Asia, Southeast
Asia, the Pacific -our relationships in
the trilateral sense. There was great em-
phasis on a new period of consultation
between our Japanese friends and the
United States, and I think, in that con-
text, there were discussions also with
respect to the developing world and the
important role that Japan is playing in
the developing countries.

There were, as always, some
differences that you would anticipate
between sovereign nations, but on the
whole, I think the convergence of view,
especially with respect to the need for
unity and coherence among the Western
alliance of nations including Japan, was
both encouraging and a very good omen
for the period ahead.

Foreign Minister Ito. As Secretary
Haig just explained to you, we have had
very extensive discussions on a number

May 1981

29

East Asia

of questions such as East- West rela-
tions, the tension that exists m the inter-
national community, and a number of
bilateral issues. All in all, we had very
fruitful meetings and through these
meetings, I explained to the American
side very clearly that Japan, as a
member of the Western world, is deter-
mined to fulfill its responsibility and its
role for world peace. The primary pur-
pose of my visit to Washington is to
reaffirm and strengthen further the rela-
tionship of trust that exists between our
two countries, and I feel confident that
we can do that.

Q. Has the Reagan Administration
asked the Japanese Government to
cooperate in setting some voluntary
restraints on exports of Japanese
automobiles? And even if it has not,
would the Japanese Government and
the Japanese automobile industry be
prepared to exercise some voluntary
restraints in exports?

Foreign Minister Ito. The other
question was taken up in my meeting
with the President as well as with the
Vice President and also with the
Secretary of State. Through these
meetings, I have heard a very clear ex-
planation of the situation of the
American auto industry, the plight in
which that industry finds itself, as well
as the mood and the moods on the Hill.

The agreement that came out from
the meeting is, first, that a major objec-
tive is to preserve the principle of free
trade. As to the specifics of what
methods might be followed in pursuance
of this objective, there will continue to
be discussions between the two sides
and with -through these meetings, at
this time, we did not go into the
specifics of what kind of steps might be
desirable on the part of Japan and so
forth.

What we are trying to strive for is
to bring about satisfactory resolution of
the problem as soon as possible, hopeful-
ly, before the Prime Minister's visit.

Q. Secretary Haig, will you further
elaborate on the areas of disagree-
ment?

Secretary Haig. With respect to the
automotive question, the Foreign
Minister described it as it was. We had a
very free exchange of views and an ex-
change of conerns on the subject. I
would not care to add one word to what
the distinguished Minister said. In the
area of differences of opinion, or
differences of emphasis, I think, clearly,

we've had longstanding problems in the
area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
exchange of technology and materials
with respect to this which I would an-
ticipate will be the subject of further
discussions between ourselves and our
Japanese friends with a view toward
greater flexibility than heretofore on the

U.S. side.

There were discussions in the areas
of great importance to our Secretary of
Commerce, Mr. [Malcolm] Baldrige, in
the fishing area, and we will proceed to
try to resolve these differences in the
mutual interest of both governments and
both sectors of our society. I would sug-
gest that we had discussions not to in-
dicate that there were differences but
really to indicate that we have to
broaden our dialogue in this area and in
the areas of security-related issues.

We were able and our defense minis-
ter was able to outline, clearly,
American plans in this area, and they
hope that all of our partners in the com-
munity of nations will carry their share.
We have, I think, clarified each others'
thinking in important ways in our deal-
ings with the East and West, especially
in the light, as the Minister pointed out,
of the continuing Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and the tensions that that
has caused internationally. We discussed
regional balances and the pressures
developing in the Far Eastern area and
the need to maintain stability and a con-
tinuing structure for peace.

Q. The American side asked the
Japanese side to undertake voluntary
restraints because the alternative
might be mandatory restraints from
our side?

Secretary Haig. I'm not going to go
beyond the statement made by our
visitor which coincides with the answer I
would have given you had the question
come to me, and I think enough was
said on that subject for now.

Q. You mean to say that you will
not say whether a specific request was
made?

Secretary Haig. I'm not trying to
go beyond the description that our
distinguished visitor laid out, and that
speaks for itself. We can go through a
prying exercise, but there'll be no
response beyond -

Q. If you didn't come to an agree-
ment here today, when will you have
an agreement? What's your deadline?

Secretary Haig. On what?

Q. Cutting the imports of Japanese
cars. And why don't you consider this
visit a failure because you didn't have
more of a concrete result?

Secretary Haig. No. There's no
failure -that term would be totally inap-
propriate. There's been no discussion of
an agreement. We are exchanging views
on a complex matter, and we will con-
tinue to do so.

Q. You have a deadline?

Secretary Haig. No. We don't have
a deadline. I'm sorry. There are no
deadlines. There are no negotiations
underway. We are merely exchanging
views on this sensitive and complex
issue with the view toward our concern
about the maintenance of free trade in-
ternationally

BCOI

Sixl

0i

if n :
Hi '■'
jreta

fairs

[US I1

ay in
the

tit

It

Q. William Casey [Director of Cen
tral Intelligence] was reported to have
asked Prime Minister Suzuki to rendei
aid to Pakistan. Was this discussed
with the President and Secretary
Haig?

Foreign Minister Ito. I am not
familiar with the particular report that
you have just referred to, but in my
meeting I did explain to Secretary Haig
about my visit to Pakistan which took
place last September. I explained to him
how positively we are providing assist-
ance to Pakistan, and I explained to him
also how important Pakistan is, in my
view, in that part of the world. But I die
not go into the question of what we
would like the United States to do, and
so forth.

Q. Has the United States at any
point, either through Secretary Haig
or President Reagan, expressed the in
terest that the Japanese should
perhaps increase their defense spend-
ing or do more for the defense of the
West?

Foreign Minister Ito. In my discus
sion with the Secretary of Defense then
were references to the American
defense budget and the efforts that the
U.S. Government is making, but there
was no specific discussion of what the
United States would like Japan to do
with respect to Japan's defense budget
and so forth. There was a general ex-
pression of expectation that more be
done by Japan.

'Press release 72 of Mar. 25, 1981.1

Department of State Bulletir

ECONOMICS

Sixth International Tin Agreement

by Michael Calingaert

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Treasury, Postal Service, and
General Government of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on March 19,
1981. Mr. Calingaert is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business
Affairs.1

I am very pleased to testify here today
on behalf of the Administration's request
for $120 million to meet U.S. obligations
to the buffer stock of a sixth Interna-
tional Tin Agreement (ITA). Negotia-
tions for this new agreement are under-
way in Geneva right now. The outlines
of the new agreement are fairly clear,
and it promises to be far different from
the existing agreement.

The Ford Administration decided in
1976 that the United States would join
the current, or fifth International Tin
Agreement, which was ratified by the
■Senate September 15, 1976. It has been
extended for the maximum permissible
period of 1 year and will now expire
Uune 30, 1982. Thus, if the United
States joins a new tin agreement, it will
be liable for financial obligations to that
agreement in July 1982.

When the negotiations for a new tin
agreement are completed, the Ad-
ministration will carefully review the
agreement to determine whether it is in
our national interest to participate. If
so, it will be sent to the Senate for ad-
vice and consent to ratification, and the
necessary authorizing legislation will be
submitted to both Houses. At this time,
we do not know the precise details of
the new agreement, but we do know its
general provisions. I would like,
however, to sketch for you the general
principles which we seek to have incor-
porated in the new tin agreement, in
order that it will provide equitable
benefits for tin consumers as well as tin-
producing nations.

Price Stabilization

For many years, it has generally been
U.S. policy to examine international
commodity problems on a case-by-case

basis and to support the concept of in-
ternational commodity agreements for
those few products where there have
been severe price fluctuations and where
internationally agreed upon measures
appeared to offer workable and ap-
propriate solutions. Although the term
"commodities" covers a broad range
from tin and natural rubber, for exam-
ple, to sugar and coffee, these com-
modities have a number of common at-
tributes.

• They are important revenue
earners for developing nations.

• They are principally consumed by
the industrialized countries.

• They are subject to cyclical fluc-
tuations in supply or demand.

Arising from such varied causes as
weather conditions or rapid changes in
economic activity in the industrial world,
these fluctuations can result in sharp
surges, upward and downward, in price
levels. This type of unstable price activi-
ty causes difficulties for the exporting
developing nations owing to unpredict-
able changes in foreign exchange
receipts, may result in long-term loss of
markets for the product in question, and
may discourage investment in new, more
efficient production capacity.

In the case of certain products, we
have advocated use of large buffer
stocks as an appropriate price stabiliza-
tion measure, together with supply
assurances and other measures to en-
courage production to respond to
market forces. We have, in these cases,
viewed buffer stocks as the device most
likely to be economically efficient and to
yield benefits for consumers as well as
producers.

Simply stated, when a buffer stock
mechanism is used to stabilize prices in
an international commodity agreement,
the organization established by the
agreement purchases the commodity
when prices drop below an agreed upon
point and keeps on buying until the price
returns to the desired level. Subsequent-
ly, when prices exceed an agreed upon
level, sales are made in order to drive
prices down to the desired range. The
existence of price-stabilizing commodity
arrangements is intended to offer an

enhanced environment for productive
new investment and to offer the benefits
of greater market stability to efficient
producers and to consumers.

The Foreign Policy Context

As a group and individually, the develop-
ing countries have a continuing and
strong interest in world commodity
trade. For many of them, raw material
exports remain an essential source of
foreign exchange earnings and employ-
ment. Many of these nations place great
store, as they evaluate our concern for
their political stability and development,
on what we show ourselves ready to do
to help alleviate commodity market in-
stability.

U.S. commodity initiatives in the
past have, thus, often earned us useful
political dividends at marginal costs.
They have contributed to our set of
cooperative relationships with important
countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Malaysia. Although we
cannot satisfy many of their demands,
our demonstrated willingness to listen
and to act, where possible, is often a
major plus in our overall relations with
these countries. This also creates a basis
for achieving other U.S. economic,
strategic, and political goals in these
countries.

Participation in the International Tin
Agreement not only provides the United
States with potential economic benefits
through price stabilization but also con-
tributes to our interest in supporting the
progress and stability of a number of
friendly developing nations, including
three key members of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The
United States has an important strategic
interest in supporting these nations in
the face of increasing Soviet and Viet-
namese military activity in Southeast
Asia. The world's fourth largest tin ex-
porter is Bolivia, a nation whose views
of the United States have often been col-
ored by its perception of our tin
stockpile policy.

U.S. Objectives in a New Tin
Agreement

As members since 1976 of the fifth tin
agreement, we have determined that the

May 1981

31

Economics

agreement, in its present form, does not
promise to provide the benefits we
would hope for. This problem has
several elements, including the question
of supply policies in producing countries.
A particular element which has become
a major focus in the negotiations is the
relatively small size of the buffer stock
in the current agreement and the low
point at which export controls may be
imposed. The result is that the agree-
ment potentially can serve to defend the
floor price and assist producers much
more than it can defend the ceiling price
and offer commensurate benefits to con-
sumers.

Among our primary objectives in
negotiating a new tin agreement are a
much larger buffer stock, together with
agreement that export controls may only
be imposed as a measure of last resort.
A working paper, which was acceptable
to most producers, circulated at the
December negotiations, proposed a
buffer stock of 50,000 tons. In contrast,
the current agreement provides for a
mandatory buffer stock of only 20,000
tons, which has never been fully ac-
quired and might never be, since pro-
ducers may request a vote to impose ex-
port controls when only 5,000 tons have
been purchased by the buffer stock.

The United States has told other
participants in the negotiations that we
still seek improvements in the approach
proposed in the working paper. We feel
that a large buffer stock is necessary not
only to defend the floor price but also to
defend a ceiling price. The agreement
will also afford a forum where con-
sumers can press for assurances that
future tin supplies will be adequate to
meet demand at reasonable prices.

Calculating the U.S. Share

Monies requested to cover potential U.S.
contributions to the buffer stock can be

considered an investment, rather than
an outright expenditure, since the agree-
ment will provide that funds in the
buffer stock account shall be returned to
members upon termination of the agree-
ment. Our estimates, based upon
reasonable and prudent assumptions
regarding future tin prices and other
factors, indicate that the total cost of ac-
quiring, insuring, and storing the large
buffer stock we seek would be approx-
imately $850 million. Producers and con-
sumers will share these costs equally.
We estimate that the U.S. share of this
cost would be $120 million. This finan-
cial obligation is determined by our
share of votes in the agreement, which,
in turn, is determined largely by our
share of world tin consumption.

We anticipate that the new agree-
ment will provide for members to make
direct financial contributions to pay for
the greater part of the tin to be acquired
for the buffer stock. Acquisition of the
remaining portion would be financed by
borrowing, using existing tin holdings in
the buffer stock as collateral. To insure
that the full amount of the buffer stock
will actually be purchased, we are in-
sisting that member governments fully
commit themselves to whatever financ-
ing is needed for the acquisition and
maintenance of the full buffer stock.

Accordingly, our estimate of $120
million is based upon the U.S. share of
the entire buffer stock. In actual prac-
tice, we anticipate that only an initial
contribution will be required in FY 1982.
The remainder of the $120 million
budget authority would remain available
for the life of the sixth tin agreement to
enable the United States to make con-
tributions to the buffer stock account, if
and when they are called for.

Conclusion

If a new tin agreement, such as I have
outlined here, is intended to benefit both
consumers and producers, you might
well wonder why negotiations have
dragged on through three lengthy
sessions -April-May 1980, December

1980, March 1981. The reason is, not
surprisingly, that other nations par-
ticipating in the tin agreement do not
necessarily share our objectives, nor our
concerns about the cost-benefit analysis.
Some tin-consuming nations view com-
modity arrangements, in part, as exten-
sions of their foreign aid programs and,
thus, do not insist as strongly as we do
upon an equitable division of economic
benefits between producers and con-
sumers. Some nations also are less con-
cerned about the agreement's ability to
defend ceiling prices than they are aboul
the cash costs of participating in an
agreement involving a large buffer
stock.

At this stage, it is difficult to predict
exactly how the negotiations for a new
tin agreement will turn out. I am sure
you understand that I cannot be very
specific about our precise negotiating ob
jectives here in public, since the negotia-
tions are presently in course. However,
do want to stress again that once a new
agreement is reached, the Administra-
tion will examine it very carefully befon
a decision is reached to join it and seek
congressional approval.

Er

!>"■
(1

im
ji

|(y|

left

US

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

prt

32

Department of State Bulleti

if.

fell

lei
ft

ft

ENERGY

Energy Policy and Conservation Act

by Edward L. Morse

Statement before the Senate Commit-
tee on Energy and Natural Resources on
March 2, 1981. Mr. Morse is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs. '

My primary purpose today is to convey
to you the support of the Department of
State for extension of section 252 of the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA). Section 252 provides the basis,
through the extension of an antitrust
defense, for the voluntary cooperation of
U.S. oil companies in efforts under the
auspices of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) to minimize adverse
effects of oil-supply disruptions on the
United States and our partners in the
agency.

Energy Security

Despite increasingly intense efforts over
the past decade to define and respond to
our energy needs, energy security, yet,
remains a goal rather than a reality for
the United States and its allies. While
this is a very broad issue, the fundamen-
tal problem is our dependence on im-
ported and, thus, uncertain supplies of
oil. In the years following the 1973-74
oil-supply crisis, we grew increasingly
complacent that we had our energy
problems if not solved, at least under
control. This complacency was shattered
in 1979 by the Iranian revolution and
the tripling of oil prices which resulted
from it despite the fact that the actual
oil-supply shortfall was relatively
modest. New lessons had to be learned
and defensive actions taken.

The fact that no major new run-up
in oil prices has occurred so far in
response to the Iran-Iraq war suggests
that we may be headed in the right
direction. This favorable result,
however, has been, to a large extent, the
product of the coincidence of declining
demand and high oil stocks in this coun-
try and elsewhere available to compen-
sate for the 3.8 million barrels per day
decline in oil flows. Companies may not
be holding such large stocks at the
outset of future oil-supply disruptions.
We need to join with our allies to study
carefully the events of the past 2 years,
anticipate new energy crises which may

threaten our economies, and develop
protective measures accordingly.

The extent to which we are in-
terdependent with the other Western in-
dustrialized countries in responding suc-
cessfully to energy crises dictates that
we concentrate our efforts to promote
peacetime energy security in the IEA.
The IEA is engaged in efforts to re-
spond to both the short- and the long-
term aspects of our energy problems.
Looking at the longer term, the
dependence of IEA countries on im-
ported oil has begun to drop off rapidly
as members have established targets for
reducing oil imports and joined together
in pursuing conservation and conversion
to other fuels.

The Sharing System

The IEA's emergency oil-sharing system
is its key tool for responding to sudden
oil-market disruptions. It is also the
foundation upon which all other
cooperative efforts in the IEA are built.
International cooperation in minimizing
ill effects of supply disruptions will only
be strong if participants remain satisfied
that the costs of major disruptions will
be borne equitably. The sharing system
provides this assurance, even though it
has never yet been activated.

However, we now recognize that the
sharing system is not the appropriate in-
strument for responding to all emergen-
cies. Necessarily elaborate in its pro-
cedures for allocating oil, its use clearly
is justified only in a major disruption
where large quantities of oil must be
allocated. It is not well-suited to han-
dling situations like that which obtained
in 1979 when the shortfall was below the
7% level required to trigger the sharing
system but sufficient to cause panic in
the oil market and an upward spiral in
oil prices.

During the past 2 years, therefore,
the IEA has undertaken efforts outside
the sharing system aimed at forestalling
unnecessary oil price increases. Most
recently, in the face of the Iran-Iraq war
and the oil-supply reductions it
generated, IEA members met promptly

and announced concerted actions to
maintain an orderly market and avoid
another round of oil-price increases.
These included commitments to draw on
stocks as necessary, to discourage pur-
chases of oil on terms which would exert
pressure on the oil market and prices,
and to seek to supply oil to any member
countries which might suffer a serious
shortage as a result of this disruption.

We need, now, to assess the results
of this experience and the need for fur-
ther action. To this end, we are embark-
ing in the IEA on a review of the Inter-
national Energy Program Agreement
which defines the functions of the IEA
and actions to be taken in response to
oil-market disruptions. We will, of
course, consult closely with the Congress
as this study progresses. We have re-
quested a relatively short extension of
EPCA section 252 in the expectation
that hearings on a further extension at
that time will provide a timely oppor-
tunity for us to discuss with you the
results of the study and any implications
it might have for section 252.

Extending Section 252

IEA crisis management would be
nothing more than words without the
cooperation of the companies which ac-
tually import oil into IEA countries. It is
for this reason that we have sought the
voluntary cooperation of oil companies
in the IEA within the framework
established by section 252. Of course,
cooperation by oil companies in the
kinds of information-sharing and oil
allocation called for in the IEA is
generally prohibited by U.S. antitrust
laws.

It is a long-established tradition of
the American economic system that ex-
ceptions to the antitrust laws be granted
only in extreme circumstances where na-
tional policy interests outweigh the risks
of anticompetitive actions. Clearly, the
need to cope with serious oil-market
disruptions and minimize the massive
price runups associated therewith fits
within this tradition. We are pleased
that the Congress has concurred in this
determination by repeatedly extending
the life of section 252 providing the
necessary defense to antitrust laws for
U.S. -company participation in the IEA.

Of course, that determination was
facilitated by incorporation into the
statute of safeguards designed to

May 1981

33

Energy

minimize the potential for an-
ticompetitive actions by companies
benefiting from the section 252 antitrust
defense. The antitrust authorities
charged with monitoring oil company in-
volvement in the IEA indicate to us that
there has been no evidence of harm to
consumer interests from this arrange-
ment. To the contrary, we are convinced
that section 252 is fundamentally of
benefit to consumers because it aims at
reducing unjustified price increases dur-
ing oil supply disruptions.

We, therefore, strongly urge the
committee to recommend extension of
section 252 as provided in the Energy
Department's bill. We would further ap-
peal for your support in obtaining enact-
ment of the bill prior to the existing
March 15 expiration date of section 252.
A lapse in the authority of section 252 of
even a few days may result in suspen-
sion of U.S. oil company participation in
the IEA for weeks. This would be
disruptive to the work of the IEA,
would be detrimental to the national in-
terest if a new disruption was to occur,
and would reflect badly on the United
States in our relations with our allies.

Energy Security and International
Preparedness

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

by Edward L. Morse

Address before "The Outlook for
Crude Oil" conference sponsored by the
Energy Bureau, Inc., in Houston on
March 23, 1981. Mr. Morse is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs.

The outlook for crude oil is a subject
that has never been more timely or so
difficult to deal with. The last 2 years
have been turbulent ones for the oil
markets. We have seen disruption, revo-
lution, and war in the Persian Gulf. At
home, we have moved quickly from a
complex regulatory environment to com-
plete crude oil decontrol. On the inter-
national market, crude oil prices have
more than doubled since the beginning
of 1979. International systems of adjust-
ment and emergency preparedness were
thus tested by political events. Our con-
clusion is that they need to be
strengthened and improved.

If the past is prologue, can we ex-
pect more disruption in crude oil sup-
plies in the years ahead? Although no
one can really predict, my answer would
be "yes." I hope I am wrong. In today's
oil market, stability has become a scarce
commodity, although there are signs of
hope. Given the likelihood that we may
face disruptions, therefore, we must
both learn from the past and create for
the future. We need to make an in-
novative effort to fashion new and im-
proved mechanisms to increase energy
security without abandoning -indeed by
building on -the tested elements of
market flexibility.

It is my view that in the years ahead
energy market pressure and crises re-
quiring international cooperation will
come from any one of three quarters.
One source is the ever-present risk of
supply disruption associated with
political conflict. Today's continuing war
between Iran and Iraq and the 1973
Arab-Israeli war are but two leading ex-
amples. I would also include in this
category threats of destination restric-
tions for political reasons, for example,
by Nigeria in carrying out its policy
toward South Africa or by other pro-
ducers; domestic clashes over energy

policy like the recent one between Alber-
ta and Ottawa which has now resulted in
a shutting in of 100,000 barrels per day
of production; and other nonviolent po-
litical disputes as factors in determining
oil production and exports. Nor is the
problem limited to crude availability
alone. European dependence on the
Soviet Union for substantial amounts of
natural gas holds the seeds of future
problems as well.

A second source of disruption is sure
to be social upheaval. This may remind
many of the strikes and chaos of Iranian
revolution and its impact on oil produc-
tion and exports in late 1978 and 1979.
We need to bear in mind that the over-
whelming proportion of crude oil traded
internationally comes from developing
areas of the world. It is precisely these
areas that are undergoing unpredictable
processes of modernization, which is in-
evitably accompanied by internal social
stress. Examples are India's continuing
problem in maintaining oil production in
its Assam Province in the face of strikes
and sabotage, problems of terrorism and
sabotage also exist in Turkey, and the
continuing threat of similar incidents
almost anywhere. Nor are industrial
countries immune to this problem, as
coal strikes in Britain, Australia, and the
United States during the last 5 years
should remind us.

One other source of market pressure
with potential for erupting into an un-
necessary price spiral is the potential no-
tional shortfalls caused by sudden de-
mand surges in a market narrowly in
balance. The unfortunate fact is that
crude oil production capacity is not be-
ing expanded in pace with predicted
paths of energy demand, and there is
very little we can do about this in the
short run. A rapid and simultaneous
economic recovery in the major OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] countries could, there
fore, quickly lead to crude shortages
and price pressures without any im-
mediate available supply response. Coin-
cidental cold winters hold some of the
same risks, although healthy stock level:
can obviate much of that worry.

Viewing these problems and our lac

34

Dfinartmpnt of Rtato Rnllotin

Energy

of adequate preparedness, Secretary
Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the industrial democra-
cies "have not vet built an effective pro-^
gram for dealing with the energy crisis.
iWe do have one element, the emergency
, oil allocation system of the International
Energy Agency (IEA). Never imple-
mented, but tested in several full-scale
simulations, the IEA-sharing system is
I designed to counter the catastrophic
i shortfall -over 7% of combined IEA oil
I imports. This mechanism can and should
.1 be improved even though disruptions of
J this magnitude remain improbable.
In the oil markets in the years
: ahead, much smaller crude shortfalls,
ij say some 2%-4% of IEA consumption,

I are much more likely -some would
•I argue inevitable. They can lead to sharp

I I spot market price spikes, later ratified
J bv the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
| porting Countries (OPEC). We believe,
I therefore, that we need to improve our

I collective preparedness for these smaller

I I shortfalls, and we are just beginning the
( process. Before discussing the ongoing

I work, however, let me review some

II lessons from the past that are guiding
II our current studies.

Iranian Revolution

In 1979, Iranian domestic upheaval
I caused sharp and fluctuating reductions
9 of oil production at a time when OECD
S stocks were well below normal levels.
j For one brief period Iranian production,
I which 6 months earlier hovered near 6
I million barrels per day (b/d), completely
I ceased. You are all familiar with the
price consequences of that situation. In
retrospect, I think we made three basic
mistakes.

First, the IEA may have con-
tributed to alarm at the early stages of
the crisis by flatly projecting a 2 million
b/d shortfall before, during, and after
the full response of other producers was
known. The then-U.S. Secretary of
Energy, by publicly and frequently an-
nouncing an inflated national supply
gap, himself effectively inspired com-
panies to bid up the price of available
supplies first on the spot market and
later in term contracts.

Second, the IEA decision in March
1979 to cut imports by 2 million b/d (5%
of demand) was not effective and in-
volved no binding commitments on the
part of governments.

Third, substantial price pressure
was caused through a defensive
stockbuild by governments and com-
panies, averaging 1 million b/d during
1979 and 1980. Indeed, in retrospect,
the pressures on the market in 1979 and
early 1980 were demand led much more
than they resulted from an effort by
OPEC to squeeze consumers.

These mistakes were compounded by
a general refusal to recognize the
substantial structural changes that had
taken place in the international energy
market. The percentage of crude dis-
tributed by the majors (the seven largest
international oil companies) declined
from close to 90% to nearer to 50% as
sales to third-party customers became
discretionary or were eliminated and
replaced by rapid growth of govern-
ment-to-government sales. Two prob-
lems resulted. First, flexibility in the
distributional system was severely con-
strained. Second, the proliferation of
State-owned oil companies in consuming
countries meant more players were in-
volved in efforts to secure adequate
stocks. Thus, on an international basis,
the overall minimum desirable stock
level was substantially higher than it
had been when the international role of
the majors was more predominant.

Clearly, the 1979 experience points
to the critical importance of adequate
stock levels to disruption management.
So, too, does it point to the need for
good information early in the game and
credible cooperation between leading oil
importers.

Impact of Iran-Iraq War

Last year, when war broke out between
Iran and Iraq, we knew what was at
stake. About 3.8 million b/d in crude ex-
ports were lost to the world market
soon after war broke out. No one knew
how long the war would last, although
the general view was that it would be
short. Some feared wider hostilities im-
periling exports from other Persian Gulf
ports or traffic through the Straits of
Hormuz. If the spot market were to
have become heated, a renewed price
bulge would have ended hopes for eco-
nomic recovery in 1981. And, given the
perceived shortcomings of the IEA in
1979, in some ways the very framework
of international energy cooperation was
also on trial.

Our task last year was to use wisely
our initial assets -high stocks and soft
demand. Meeting within a week of the
outbreak of the war, the IEA Governing
Board agreed to absorb crude shortfalls
with stock drawdowns and to "urge and
guide" all market participants to refrain
from any abnormal spot market pur-
chases. These were first steps, taken to
avoid any market runup while we waited
to see how long the conflict would last.

Another problem was addressed.
Iran and, in particular, Iraq had shown
a proclivity to encourage government-to-
government sales. In many instances
these sales represented a very high pro-
portion of individual country imports, in
some cases virtually all imports. The
crisis, therefore, had a selective direct
impact, affecting countries like France,
Brazil, Turkey, and Italy, substantially,
but scarcely affecting the United States
or Germany. Producing countries quickly
moved to do their part to make up lost
supply. Saudi Arabia, in particular,
raised its exports by 1.5 million b/d over
its preferred production level of 8.5
million b/d and directed its incremental
production to those of Iraq's customers
most severely affected. Consuming coun-
tries recognized their own responsi-
bilities as well, as the war dragged on
longer than previously had been an-
ticipated.

At a ministerial-level meeting
December 9, IEA members reaffirmed
and extended these decisions, clarified
the spot market activities that were
"undesirable" for IEA members, and
committed even relatively unaffected
member countries to draw down stocks
to achieve a balance between oil market
supply and demand. This was to make
more oil available through the market to
countries in and out of the IEA facing
serious shortfalls.

I would not attribute the relative
calm of the spot market during the crisis
solely or even mostly to the IEA's pro-
nouncements, but the IEA moves did
help to solidify and sanction the com-
pany decisions to refrain from spot
market purchases. The IEA helped to
set the psychological climate. Company
decisions, as always, were taken on
sound business grounds. Since OECD
economies were flat or in recession,
many companies had limited immediate
needs for oil, given high stocks, and no
company wished to become a negative
example. In this respect the severe
stigma attached to the behavior of some

35

May 1981

Energy

companies in 1979, particularly the
Japanese, played a major role in keeping
companies off the spot market.

We realized that certain countries
were particularly dependent on Iraqi and
Iranian supplies, and special efforts were
needed to make sure that these coun-
tries would have access to other sources
of crude. The most urgent such case was
Turkey, which depended on the two
combatants for 70% of normal crude im-
ports and where financial stringency had
prevented the accumulation of more
than 40 days' stocks.

At Turkey's request, IE A Executive
Director Lantzke coordinated an infor-
mal effort to analyze Turkey's needs and
to examine how the shortfall in oil sup-
plies might be made up. The United
States and other IE A members con-
tacted oil companies to inform them of
Turkey's needs and to suggest that any
available and appropriate crude cargoes
be offered to Turkey. Substantial
amounts of oil were offered in this infor-
mal way. As it happened, the timely re-
sumption of Iraqi pipeline shipments,

Planning for the Future

It is in this uncertain environment that
we find ourselves developing an interna-
tional energy policy for the future. I am
not sure any two people would agree on
what an adequate degree of energy se-
curity is, but I am confident that all
would agree that generally we need
more of it.

For the United States, protection
against unforeseen crude oil shortfalls
must begin with an effective strategic
petroleum reserve. Earlier this year, we
began a policy of open solicitations for
reserve purchases, subject to budgetary
considerations, of course. It is not clear
how much oil the Department of Energy
will be able to purchase through the end
of the year, but we are very encouraged
by the offers we have received so far.
Our intermediate goal for an effective
national reserve remains 500 million bar-
rels; our long-term goal is 1 billion
barrels.

The strategic petroleum reserve is a
foundation for crude oil security. We an-
ticipate it would be used in response to a

Toqether with industry ...we can design an international energy
policy that is resilient and effective and build the framework oj
energy security that is needed to insure renewed and sustained
economic growth at home and abroad.

together with purchases from Iran,
allowed Turkey to meet its current
needs.

Looking at the oil market as we
move out of the winter heating season,
we can say the situation is improved.
Growing export volumes from Iran and
Iraq in the face of continuing weak de-
mand due to recession and to a surpris-
ing amount of price-induced conserva-
tion allow the market to balance. Yet we
must continue to be cautious. The ex-
posed Iraqi pipelines through Turkey
and Syria can be interrupted again. A
too-rapid effort to rebuild depleted
stocks on the part of IE A members
could lead to price pressure in the open
market. And in light of these needs,
early production cutbacks by surplus
Persian Gulf producers could also cause
difficulties.

major oil supply interruption and in the
framework of an IE A response. But it is
not the all-purpose instrument some peo-
ple believe it is. It is not a price
stabilization mechanism or buffer stock
to be used to intervene in markets. It is
not to be used to cover small-scale,
regional, or short-lived supply interrup-
tions, where private stocks, demand
restraint, fuel switching, or private
markets can do the job.

As important as the building of an
effective national reserve is, therefore,
we cannot ignore other measures to im-
prove energy security and preparedness
With the Iran-Iraq conflict, IEA mem-
bers gained greater experience with in-
formal cooperative measures. We can
build on this and earlier experiences to
fashion contingency measures for less
than catastrophic crude supply interrup-
tions that minimize marketplace inter-
vention but prevent unjustified (and

long-lasting) crude oil price increases.
We are just beginning an in-depth
review of international energy policies in
this area, in the U.S. Government and in
a high-level ad hoc IEA group. Let me
mention a few of the ideas which are
sure to be considered.

Oil stocks in private hands are an
important part of our energy security
system. I believe that the informal stock
consultations initiated following the out-
break of the Iran-Iraq war helped estab-
lish a psychological climate that en-
couraged stock drawdowns in the early
stages. We are reviewing our stock
management and consultation policy to
see whether improvements can be made.
It might be advantageous, for example,
if all IEA nations increased private
stock levels beyond the current required
minimum of 90 days of imports.

There is, of course, a limit to indus-
trial nations' ability to use public and
private stocks to cushion supply disrup-
tions of long duration. The role of de-
mand restraint in counteracting sus-
tained oil-supply shortfalls is indispen-
sable. The United States may now rely
to a larger extent on the free play of
market forces to distribute oil domes-
tically during a shortfall, but we must
not underestimate the value of coor-
dinated commitments by industrial coun-
tries to restrain oil consumption in a
crisis. We must examine the possible use
of such domestic policy measures as
disruption fees or taxes and other
market-based demand restraint meas-
ures, perhaps on a regional basis.

We have, however, too long been
oriented to demand-side responses in our
efforts to deal with disruptions. The
supply-side offers promising avenues to
pursue as well. It may be useful, for ex-
ample, to have surge capacity for pe-
troleum and natural gas and expanded
storage for such fuels as natural gas.
The natural gas shortfall in the New
England area this winter points to the
need for greater preparedness. Obvious-
ly serious policy issues, including a liq-
uified natural gas import policy and
price decontrol program, are involved,
and the Administration's review of these
issues is only beginning. We need to ac-
celerate the development of nuclear
energy by streamlining licensing pro-
cedures, by creating a climate of
political support for nuclear energy, and

Energy

by fostering appropriate marginal cost
pricing for electricity. We also need to
reduce rapidly all supply-side restraints
on coal utilization.

We need to examine what public
policies are appropriate to encourage the
construction and expansion of dual-fired
industrial facilities. There are many in-
dustrial processes where alternate fuels
are feasible, and greater fuel-switching
capability can help us offset small mar-
ket disruptions.

I mentioned the importance of ac-
curate information on a continuing basis.
As you know, the U.S. Government and
the IEA each request a wide range of in-
formation from the oil industry on a
regular basis. We are taking a hard look
at all these information-gathering efforts
to eliminate duplication and to see what
is truly necessary. High on my list of
priorities is preserving the good oil com-
pany cooperation with the IEA that we
presently have. This is fundamental to
the oil-sharing system. I recently
testified in Congress to request that the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Section 252 antitrust defense for this
type of activity be extended for several
months to allow us to complete our
review and make proposals for amend-
ment to the present law.

All these policies and more will be
needed to improve the state of American
energy security. Meaningful energy
security, however, requires more than
contingency planning. It requires long-
term efforts to enhance supply as well.
We must make a determined effort to
develop new sources of conventional and
nonconventional energy at home and
abroad. Here the record is good and get-
ting better. U.S. energy production is
up, coal output quite substantially. Price
decontrol will help justify marginal oil
and gas development and secondary and
tertiary production techniques. Ac-
celerated leasing of Federal lands will
also provide scope for significant produc-
tion increases. Investments in synthetic-
fuels technologies are up and some ex-
citing concepts are being explored. The
President is committed to renewed at-
tention to nuclear energy's potential.

Investment Environment

In closing, a cursory review of efforts to
enhance conventional energy supplies
cannot ignore the international invest-
ment environment. We are justifiably
proud of the record level of drilling ac-
tivity in the United States today, but
this level reflects the more favorable
climate here for exploration and devel-
opment more than it does the promise of
substantial geologic potential. The sad
fact is that some of the most promising
areas for development of conventional
energy sources are not being developed
as they should be.

In some cases, like the Middle East
and the North Sea, this results from in-
tentional governmental decisions to con-
serve or to restrict production through
taxation. We need to inspire innovative
processes to stimulate the development
of higher productive capacities. Else-
where, as in our neighbor to the north,
discriminatory investment policies,
which favor domestic over foreign com-
panies, run the risk of reducing substan-
tially the optimal development of energy
capacity. We need to remind the world
that foreign companies are not the
bearers of economic dependency, as
some abstract social theories portray
them. Rather, capital, which is willing to
bear risk of exploration and develop-
ment regardless of its national origin,
can be harnessed for the well-being of
all concerned.

There is, as well, the sad fact that in
many developing countries it is political-
ly unacceptable for foreign companies -
which have the required expertise and
capital for exploration and develop-
ment-to carry out work without the
equity participation of domestic in-
terests, which do not have the financial
ability to invest alone. We need to ex-
amine ways to overcome this political
barrier, perhaps by fostering the mutual-
ly advantageous cooperation of oil com-
panies, national governments, private
banks, and multilateral lending institu-
tions. We are now examining this issue
to see if such proposals make sense for
U.S. policy and U.S. firms.

We need, also, to recognize the im-
pediment to energy resource develop-
ment, especially in developing countries,

which results from incompatibilities be-
tween fiscal regimes here and abroad.
Here, too, we need to be creative in de-
veloping acceptable ways to reconcile
these differences and thereby enhance
investment in exploration and develop-
ment.

Finally, through the IEA's Standing
Group on Long-Term Cooperation,
which I chair, we are seeking to en-
courage more effective energy policies in
all industrial countries. Jointly, IEA na-
tions will be reducing the role of oil in
their economies and moving to en-
courage new production of oil and alter-
native sources.

We have a long road ahead, and the
risks of renewed crude oil supply prob-
lems are endemic to today's world.
Together with industry, however, we
can design an international energy
policy that is resilient and effective and
build the framework of energy security
that is needed to insure renewed and
sustained economic growth at home and
abroad. ■

May 1981

37

EUROPE

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

by Raymond C. Ewing

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
March 23, 1981. Mr. Ewing is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs. 1

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee in support of
the European portions of the Ad-
ministration's proposals for security
assistance in FY 1982.

As Secretary Haig emphasized to
the full committee on March 18, the Ad-
ministration attached importance to
security assistance as an integral compo-
nent of our global defense posture and a
key instrument of our foreign policy. In
addition to our programs in other
regions, we need to give urgent atten-
tion to the security requirement of our
friends and allies in Europe. I would like
to discuss each of our major programs in
that area.

Spain

The FY 1982 security assistance pro-
gram for Spain is crucial to our own
security because of the access it gives us
to important Spanish air and sea
facilities. These bases are the cor-
nerstone of Spain's defense relationship
with the West and are Spain's primary
link with the Atlantic defense system.
Beyond this, our security assistance pro-
gram is one of the most effective tools
we have to show in a tangible way our
support for Spain's young democracy.
The assistance provided directly pro-
motes the modernization and profes-
sionalization of Spain's Armed Forces.
This is particularly important in helping
to bring the Spanish Armed Forces
closer to West European institutions.

Our security assistance program for
the last 5 years has been governed by
the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Spain. The dollar
amounts of security assistance that we
have provided Spain under the treaty
for each of the last 5 years are $120
million in foreign military sales (FMS)
credits, $15 million in our military
assistance program, $7 million in
economic support funds (ESF), and $2
million in international military and
education training (IMET). This treaty

expires in September 1981, and we are
in the process of negotiating a successor
agreement with the Spanish. For FY
1982 we are requesting amounts similar
to those under the treaty in order to
maintain our continued access to the im-
portant Spanish facilities. These
amounts, which we believe are the bare
minimum necessary to maintain use of
the facilities, are $150 million in FMS
credits, $7 million in ESF, and $2.2
million in IMET.

The only major change from last
year is the increase in FMS credits from
$120 million to $150 million. This is to
help compensate for the total elimination
of our military assistance programs,
which were phased out after FY 1981.

Portugal

The United States is encouraged by the
degree to which stable and democratic
government in Portugal has developed.
Portugal has successfully made the
difficult and delicate transition from an
authoritarian state to one in which fun-
damental political liberties are
respected. Prime Minister Pinto
Balsemao leads an administration with a
firm parliamentary majority.

Portugal is an important NATO ally.
It shares our commitment to strengthen-
ing Western security, particularly
through NATO, and has made available
the strategically located airfield at Lajes
in the Azores for this purpose. Both the
governing coalition and the Socialist-led
democratic opposition agree that Por-
tugal should participate as much as
possible in NATO activities. However,
Portuguese economic resources are in-
adequate to support the modernization
necessary to render such participation
meaningful.

Portugal, therefore, looks to the
United States and other NATO allies for
security assistance. Providing such aid
facilitates cooperation with a valued and
reliable ally and reassures the Govern-
ment of Portugal of our commitment to
a substantive role for Portugal in
NATO.

For FY 1982, we are proposing $20
million in grant ESF; $60 million in
FMS credits, of which $50 million would
be at concessional interest rates; and
$2.2 million in IMET. This program will
help meet basic needs in all three service
branches and continue to aid the
economically depressed region of the
Azores.

Cyprus

There have been positive developments
in the efforts to achieve a solution of the
Cyprus problem. In August 1980, inter-
communal talks between the Greek-
Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots
resumed under the auspices of the
United Nations. Both sides have main-
tained a congenial negotiating at-
mosphere and have continued a serious
dialogue on the specific issues.

We remain convinced that only
through direct face-to-face negotiations
can a fair and lasting solution be
achieved. We continue to support
strongly the ongoing intercommunal
talks between the two parties.

The Administration is requesting
$7.5 million in ESF for Cyprus in FY
1982. These funds would be available to
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be
used mainly for the relief and rehabilita-
tion of displaced persons. Since 1974,
the United States has contributed $117
million through the intermediary of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

We believe that U.S. assistance to
Cyprus represents an important and
tangible indication of U.S. interest in
Cyprus and our strong commitment to
promoting a resolution of the problems
which for years have dominated this
strife-torn island.

Greece

•

On October 20, 1980, Greece's military
forces were reintegrated into NATO,
closing a gap in NATO's southern flank
which dated from 1974. This important
action should facilitate progress toward
an improvement in relations between
Greece and Turkey.

On January 1, 1981, Greece became
the 10th member of the European Com
munities. This broadening and deepenir
of Greece's ties with Europe should leai
to a steady modernization of the Greek
economy.

On January 27, 1981, we entered ir
to active negotiations on a new defense
and economic cooperation agreement
with Greece. The negotiations are pro-
ceeding, and we expect that an effectiv
and mutually satisfactory agreement w
result.

Our proposed program for Greece i
FY 1982 reflects an awareness of the
valuable role Greece plays in NATO,
particularly at this period of critical
developments in regions bordering on
the eastern Mediterranean. The progra

Ktf

tac

ttif

!(0B(

EC

38

Department of State Bullet

Europe

is also designed to help provide for
Greece's self-defense and recognizes that
Greece is a key ally with a strong
democratic tradition.

Accordingly, we have requested
$260 million in FMS credits to enable
Greece to obtain spare parts and con-
tinue its force modernization process.
We have also requested $1.9 million in
IMET to allow Greek military personnel
to obtain advanced training.

Turkey

Faced with spiraling political violence
and a growing paralysis of civilian
authority, Turkey's military leaders took
over the government on September 12,
1980. Bolstered by a remarkable degree
of support from Turkey's body politic,
these military leaders are vigorously
working to overcome political violence
and restore domestic peace. They have
repeatedly pledged the restoration of
representative government in a form
designed to overcome the difficulties
that led to the takeover. Like its
predecessors, the current Turkish
Government is strongly committed to
NATO and remains a staunch friend of
the United States.

On March 29, 1980, the United
States and Turkey signed a defense and
economic cooperation agreement which
is now being implemented smoothly.
This new agreement contains no specifiic
U.S. assistance pledge but rather a best-
efforts commitment that we shall seek to
help meet Turkish needs in the security
and economic fields.

Turkey's most urgent problem is its
difficult economic situation. Since 1979,
the United States has been working with
other nations and international institu-
tions to help Turkey stabilize its
economy. This effort has involved finan-
cial support needed by Turkey to in-
troduce badly needed reforms. A com-
prehensive economic reform program
was introduced in January 1980, and we
were pleased by the continuity given to
this effort by Turkey's current govern-
ment. Other nations share our recogni-
tion of the importance of a strong and
stable Turkey and have joined us in pro-
viding economic assistance. In 1980, 16
nations took part in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) consortium which pledged
economic aid to Turkey.

Our FY 1982 request addresses
these challenges. We propose a total
military assistance program of $403.5
million, of which $400 million is FMS
financing and $3.5 million is IMET. We
also seek $300 million in ESF as part of
a major multilateral effort under the
aegis of the OECD, designed to restore
Turkey's economic health.

Of the $400 million FMS, $250 mil-
lion would be direct credit. The FMS
funds will enable Turkey to begin to
modernize some of its weapons systems
and to acquire spares and support equip-
ment for systems already in its inven-
tory.

Considering the complexity and
magnitude of the economic challenge
Turkey is facing, our proposed $300
million ESF program is relatively
modest.

In formulating our security assist-
ance proposals for Greece and Turkey,
we have been guided by the statement
of principles contained in section 620C(b)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
The formal certification to this effect, re-
quired by section 620C(d) of that act,
will be contained in the formal letter
transmitting the Administration's
foreign assistance legislative proposals
for FY 1982.

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Northern Ireland

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAR. 17, 19811

St. Patrick's Day is not only the feast
day of a great man of God, it is a sym-
bol of the commitment of the Irish peo-
ple to freedom, to justice, and to the
value upon which Western civilization is
built.

We in the United States know the
great contribution made by citizens of
Irish ancestry. From our Revolution to
the present day, Irish-Americans have
been at the forefront of the defense of
freedom. By their labor and by their
sacrifices, they have been a major force
in building our nation.

It is, therefore, gratifying on this St.
Patrick's Day to be able to pay tribute to
the great role Ireland and the Irish have
played in defending and renewing the
values we cherish.

But we are also conscious of the
violence, bloodshed, and despair which
now haunt all of the people of Northern
Ireland. This tragedy cannot go un-
noticed by the United States, which
owes so much and has such close ties to
the Irish.

As an American proud of his Irish
ancestry and as President, I recognize
the vital importance to our nation and
the Western alliance of a peaceful, just,
and swift solution to current problems in
Northern Ireland.

The United States will continue to
urge the parties to come together for a
just and peaceful solution. I pray and
hope that the day will come when the
tragedy of history which now afflicts
Northern Ireland will be overcome by
faith, the courage, and the love of
freedom and justice of the Irish.

We will continue to condemn all acts
of terrorism and violence, for these can-
not solve Northern Ireland's problems. I
call on all Americans to question closely
any appeal for financial or other aid
from groups involved in this conflict to
insure that contributions do not end up
in the hands of those who perpetuate
violence, either directly or indirectly.

I add my personal prayers and the
good offices of the United States to
those Irish -and, indeed, to all world
citizens -who wish fervently for peace
and victory over those who sow fear and
terror.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Mar. 23, 1981.

May 1981

39

d>
a
o

m

a

03
Q.

OS

</>

t_

(0

CD

■a

c

(0

O

l-
<

s

F

2

Q

Z "^

■c «

I

ro

i

3 £
Z aj

^

I]
1?

5

Z D)

<S "5

0)

c

< 03

ft-a
c

c8

E.+3

„ to iC £
co 03 *£? n>

to "^ J?

"^ .-§ .s »

3 c s; c

a, a> p to
o io hi2
o 'E = "2
O ftW £

S go

2 £*

c .2 (-1 c
« >3 c <3

g ..o

^ ro

S-.

03
a

H O - .

C . o 75 ^
£ >>-C -§ CO

£ ftOtfP

05 §> *

11 i

u S.3

>> 0)

3„V|'o 1

i

s.'

IS |S

OCT E 3

qj o

0 -d

1 2

a a,

03 <-j

*-* -— '
^ -3" w

-H-S
JS o

ft

£ to
O o>

0)

"75 ol

<« b,
5

°- S
o c

" •&

CD

O
tS

-a o to

"73I

ft5"

-a L

p CO

-"Bis?;

_,_a> o of

« fa g J B

'So <

a

to „r o> s- c

to

C OJ

>H _C

0) 7£

<! to a)

03

o>

CO

o

2 S 33 _
•■5 £ b c2t3

c '5 -^ >- £ t3

J- O ■ -t-1
Kri ^4 cd rt

Xj- ro j_, n

as t3 <;

c

03 <u 5

is 'S °

o > to

«Qs i-£

f> 03 S J fT O

<p

E

0)

E
O

o

CO
0.

Europe

Situation in Poland

STATEMENT BY
WHITE HOUSE PRESS
SECRETARY,
MAR. 26, 1981'

The White House issued the following
statement at the conclusion of today's
National Security Council meeting.

This statement reflects the views of
the President of the United States.

The United States has watched with
growing concern indications that Polish
authorities may be preparing to use
force to deal with continuing differences
in that country between the authorities
and labor unions. We are similarly con-
cerned that the Soviet Union may intend
to undertake repressive action in
Poland.

Our position on the situation in
Poland has been clear and consistent
from the outset. We believe Poland
should be allowed to resolve its own pro-
blems without outside interference of
any kind. We have scrupulously im-
plemented that policy in our statements,
while acting generously in response to
Poland's requests to us for economic
assistance.

We have welcomed past assurances
by the Polish Government and Polish
llabor organizations that they intended to
resolve their differences peaceably and
in a spirit of compromise and concilia-
tion. We continue to believe that this
path offers the only hope of resolving
Poland's difficulties on a basis acceptable
to all parties concerned.

We would like to make clear to all
concerned our view that any external in-
tervention in Poland, or any measures
aimed at suppressing the Polish people,
would necessarily cause deep concern to
all those interested in the peaceful
development of Poland and could have a
grave effect on the whole course of
East- West relations.

At the same time, we would em-
phasize our continuing readiness to
assist Poland in its present economic
and financial troubles, for as long as the
Polish people and authorities continue to
seek through a peaceful process of
negotiation the resolution of their cur-
rent problems. It is in this spirit that we
shall receive Deputy Prime Minister
Jagielski in Washington next week.

■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Mar. 30, 1981.

Austria »

Poland's First Deputy
Prime Minister Visits U.S.

Mieczyslaw Jagielski, First Deputy
Prime Minister of Poland, visited
Washington, D.C., Apr. 1-5, 1981, and
met with Vice President Bush and other
government officials. Following are
remarks made by the Vice President and
the First Deputy Prime Minister after
their meeting at the White House on
April 2. '

Vice President Bush

We've had a very good discussion with
First Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski of
Poland. We had a broad range of discus-
sions of U.S.-Polish relations. Secretary
of State Haig was there throughout.
And Secretary [of the Treasury Donald
T.] Regan and Secretary [of Commerce
Malcolm] Baldridge took part in it. I
should say at the very beginning that
the Deputy Prime Minister expressed his
concern over our President, and I told

May 1981

him that after my visit today to the
hospital that I could report to him, first-
hand, that our President was, indeed,
doing very well.

The United States values its con-
structive relations with Poland, and we
want to develop those relations further
on the basis of mutual respect and
reciprocity. We're following a policy of
nonintervention in Poland's internal
affairs, and, of course, we are anxious
that others do the same, and we're doing
what we can to insure that. We support
the policy of the Polish Government,
which is to use peaceful means to re-
solve Poland's internal problem. And we
also welcome the Polish leadership's
policy of renewal and economic reform.

We talked a good deal about that,
the Deputy Prime Minister explaining in
considerable detail the concerns of the
Polish people and of his government.
And we recognize that these economic
problems can only be resolved through

41

Europe

an economic program which does have
the full support of the people. We're
very sympathetic to Poland's economic
difficulties. And the American people
have, as I told him, a very strong, com-
patible, humanitarian interest in the
welfare of the Polish people.

For these reasons, I had the pleas-
ure of confirming what Secretary Haig
had told the Deputy Prime Minister, and
that is that the U.S. Government will
sell at concessionary prices certain dairy
products -surplus dairy products -to
Poland. This food, consisting of dried
milk and butter, was requested by the
government, and we were pleased to be
able to reach agreement on that. There
are other matters that the Deputy Prime
Minister raised with us in terms of
things that we might do to help further
the economy of Poland. Those matters
are being considered with a matter of
some urgency, because he impressed
upon us the problems facing his country.

We hope that the assistance that we
can give will help relieve the current
difficulties. And from our standpoint we
had a most cordial and productive visit.

First Deputy

Prime Minister Jagielski2

Just as the Vice President has said it, I
would like on my own part to confirm
that our meeting was very interesting
and that it was very fruitful, above all,
and very advantageous. This allows us
to present a wide spectrum of matters
very important to our country, for
Poland, from economic problems of
general meaning and about the means
that we are taking in our own country,
Poland, to solve the problems with
which we are faced and confronted in
our country in the most effective way, in
the interest of the whole of our people.
I have emphasized once again that
the will of my highest authorities is the
consistent implementation of the Polish
Socialist renewal and the solution of all
swelling problems by political means. It
is clear that the essential role is as-
signed to economic matters. And in their
solution we expect assistance on the
part of our friends, the United States.
We are fully cognizant that we must
solve these matters, referring at this
point to economic matters, by means of
our own resources and forces by our
own work; increasing its productivity,
reenforcing law and order. But we ex-
pect also to have assistance from our

friends. This will be a subsequent con-
secutive demonstration of efforts to ex-
pand our economic cooperation as much
as the historically shaped ties of friend-
ship.

I wish to extend my thanks to the
Vice President and to other interlocutors

and for the cordial and warm reception
accorded us.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi
dential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981.

zThe First Deputy Prime Minister spoke
in Polish, and his remarks were translated bj
an interpreter. ■

NATO Defense Ministers
Position on Poland

STATEMENT BY DEPUTY
WHITE HOUSE PRESS
SECRETARY, APR. 9, 19811

The President is very pleased by this
strong expression of allied unity.2 It
reflects the results of the full and exten-
sive consultations which the Administra-
tion has had with our European allies
since January 20. The President, the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and
other senior Administration officials
have met frequently with European
leaders both here and abroad. This
series of talks has resulted in common
understandings on the key problems fac-
ing the alliance. The President is grati-

fied that that sense of understanding h;
been made dramatically clear by the
statement of the NATO Defense Minis
ters. He believes the statement has
made a significant contribution to the
prospects for world peace.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres
dential Documents of Apr. 13, 1981.

2On Apr. 8, 1981, the NATO Defense
Ministers, meeting as the Nuclear Planning
Group in Bonn, issued a statement which si
ported the linking of Soviet intervention in
Poland with effective arms control negotia-
tions. ■

jp

ml

Poland — A Profile

Geography

Area: 120,700 sq. mi. (about the size of New
Mexico). Capital: Warsaw (population 1.6
million). Other Cities: Lodz (832,000),
Krakow (705,000), Wroclaw (608,000), Poz-
nan (544,000).

People

Population: 35.7 million (Jan. 1981). Ethnic
Group: Polish. Religion: Roman Catholic.
Language: Polish.

Government

Type: Communist. Date of Constitution:

July 22, 1952. Branches: Executive -Chief of
State (Chairman of the Council of State).
Legislative- unicameral Parliament. Judicial:
Supreme Court. Subdivisions: 49 provinces.
Political Parties: Polish United Workers'
(Communist) Party, United Peasant Party,
Democratic Party. Suffrage: Universal and
compulsory over 18. Trade Unions: Solidari-
ty Trade Union Federation (independent -
about 10 million members). Rural Solidarity
(independent -about 3.5 million members),
autonomous branch unions (progovernment).

Economy

GNP: $108.3 (1978 at 1978 prices). Annua!
Growth Rate: -0.1% (1979). Per Capita
GNP: $3,100 (1978). Average Rate of Infl:
tion: 10% (1980). Natural Resources: Coa

sulfur, copper, natural gas. Agriculture:
Grains, sugarbeets, potatoes, hogs, and otf
livestock. Industry: Iron and steel, chemic
textiles, food processing, shipbuilding, tran
portation equipment. Trade (1980): Export
$17.2 billion: coal, basic materials, agri
cultural products. Partners- U.S. S.R.,
F.R.G., G.D.R., Czechoslovakia, U.K.,
France, Italy, /mports- $19.1 billion: oil, ir
ore, other raw materials, grain. Partners -
U.S.S.R., F.R.G., G.D.R., Czechoslovakia,
U.S., U.K. Official Exchange Rate: 32.42
zlotys = US$1.00.

Membership in
International Organizations

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, Warsaw Pact.

:■■

JA'

i

s

ill

ef

Y,

42

Dpnartment nf Rtatfi Bulletl

I "'
I

FOREIGN AID

AID Bilateral Assistance Programs

by M. Peter McPherson

Statements before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 19, 1981.
Wr. McPherson made the statements both
is the Acting Director of the Interna-
tional Development Cooperation Agency
IDC A) and as Administrator for the
Agency for International Development. x

STATEMENT AS ACTING
IDCA DIRECTOR

ilt is an honor for me to appear before
this committee for the first time. I look
forward to a close working relationship
with you as we together seek ways to
strengthen U.S. development assistance
programs.

I appear before you this morning as
Acting Director of the International

j Development Cooperation Agency. As
/ou are aware, this Administration is
reviewing the structure of IDCA. While
:he Administration's final recommenda-
tions are not yet set, and we will consult
with you before they are, we are com-
■nitted to the essential idea behind the
creation of IDCA: that the various
ievelopment assistance programs of the

"1 J.S. Government be carefully coor-
iinated and interrelated and that our
policies toward developing nations be
ilearly enunciated and defined. These
objectives will be achieved within the
coherent framework of U.S. foreign

11 Dolicy now being established by Presi-
ient Reagan and Secretary Haig.

As I begin this new task, which I
onsider an extraordinary opportunity, I
:ave found it useful to review past ex-
perience as I look to the future. Devel-
oping countries have made much prog-
■ess in the 30 years or so since their
nodern, independent economic growth
oegan and since the United States first
aunched the concept of large-scale inter-
national development assistance. Our
satisfaction at these accomplishments
-nust be tempered, however, with con-
:ern over today's problems and those of
the rest of this century.

Over the past 30 years, developing-
country economies grew faster than the
industrial nations had ever grown in any
comparable period. At the same time,
life expectancy -a useful index of a
country's health and general living
standard -rose from 32 years (just
before World War II) to 50 years, an in-
crease that took the industrial countries

the entire 19th century to achieve. Adult
literacy rose from one-third in 1950 to
about one-half by 1975, while the
number of students in primary schools
more than tripled.

Substantial progress has been made
toward economic self-reliance and diver-
sification. In the early 1950s, many of
the countries that have achieved these
advances were just emerging from colo-
nial status, were torn by unrest or open
warfare, were dependent upon one or
two commodities for the bulk of their
exports, and had barely begun to create
the educational, research, and govern-
mental institutions on which modern
development depends.

The United States can be proud of
the contributions we made to this
historically unprecedented record of
economic and social advancement. The
United States was at the forefront of
the industrial nations in recognizing the
need for international economic and
technical assistance to the developing
countries, in creating programs to pro-
vide such assistance, in urging other in-
dustrialized countries to increase their
aid efforts, in promoting the expansion
of the burden-sharing multilateral
assistance agencies. Private U.S. invest-
ment in developing countries has been
encouraged and the system of interna-
tional trade strengthened in recognition
of the opportunities trade can offer as
an engine of growth, especially for
market-oriented economies.

This progress has also brought home
to us the reality of problems that persist
and affect us all ever more directly. We
have learned that continued progress in
Third World development is of growing
importance to our own domestic and in-
ternational well-being. In the past year
public awareness of our interdependence
has been highlighted by the Presidential
Commission on World Hunger, the
Brandt Commission, and the "Global
2000" study. The "Global 2000" report in
particular presents a sobering picture of
large-scale interrelated problems caused
by population growth, energy scarcity,
forest destruction with attendant soil
and atmospheric effects, and pressure on
food production capacity. The hunger
commission focused on food production
and effective demand for food, the con-
straints on growth, and the implications

for development assistance and for the
already vast numbers of hungry human
beings in the poorer countries. The
Brandt Commission stressed the wider
framework of economic policies and in-
stitutions and the need to strengthen
these policies and institutions if we are
to have a chance of meeting the prob-
lems of the next two decades as effect-
ively as we have the previous three.

Future directions in all these areas,
and in the progress generally of the
developing countries, will have direct im-
pact on the well-being of the United
States. U.S. exports to developing coun-
tries have been expanding much faster
than exports to industrialized countries
and now constitute about 40% of the
total. About 6% of all American jobs in
manufacturing produce exports to
developing countries, while the harvest
of one out of every four farm acres in
the United States is shipped to the Third
World. Our growing need for imports of
raw materials from developing countries
(of which petroleum is only one) is well
known.

The entire planet's ability to sustain
greatly increased numbers of people, to
control atmospheric pollution, to pro-
duce sufficient energy, and to reduce
stark disparities in income levels and
employment opportunities that lead to
heavy pressures to migrate to stronger
economies, will depend on the rate of
economic progress in the developing
countries and the extent to which this
progress is shared among the entire
population. Failure to make acceptable
progress in ameliorating conditions of
poverty can only lead to domestic in-
stability and increasing frustration on
the part of Third World governments
over the workings of the international
system and the distribution of economic
and institutional power in that system as
it is now constituted. Such instabilities,
as we know all too well, can quickly spill
over into regional disequilibrium and
create opportunities for interventions
that are to the interest neither of the
countries directly involved nor to
ourselves.

The decision to provide aid to a
country is, of course, a key foreign
policy decision. Successive Congresses
and Administrations, beginning with
Roosevelt and Truman and continuing
with President Reagan, have recognized
the importance to our foreign policy of a
strong, broad-based foreign assistance
program. The balance has fluctuated
over the years between military and
economic aid and between the meeting

jMay 1981

43

Foreign Aid

of short or longer term objectives, but at
no time have we lost sight of the
tremendous importance such resources
have to our overall national security in-
terests. There is no doubt that this Ad-
ministration shall continue to stress the
importance of substantial development
assistance to helping achieve our na-
tional objectives.

Technical and economic assistance
needs vary from country to country, as
do the degrees and kinds of U.S. in-
terests; as a result, the array of pro-
grams we conduct or help finance is also
quite varied. The total FY 1982 request
for all foreign economic and financial
assistance is $8.1 billion, a reduction of
$1.5 billion from the Carter budget. This
request represents slightly more than
1% of the entire Federal budget.

Bilateral Programs

Approximately 80% of the FY 1982 re-
quest is allocated on a bilateral basis.
The major bilateral programs are:

AID Development Assistance ($1.9
billion) concentrates on programs pin-
pointed to areas of special concern to
the United States-e.g., the Caribbean-
that draw on our comparative advan-
tages and special priorities, as in
technology transfer, use of the private
sector, and support for equitable growth
in a limited number of priority sectors.

The Economic Support Fund ($2.6
billion) promotes economic and political
stability where the United States has
special security interests. These funds,
while directed more explicitly to political
objectives, are very important to achiev-
ing economic development objectives.
Budgetary increases this year are
directed especially to helping meet
urgent foreign policy priorities in Cen-
tral America, while providing for en-
hanced flexibility (in close consultation
with Congress) to meet ever-changing
special requirements as they develop
throughout the year.

PL 480 Food for Peace ($1.2
billion, about 5.5 million tons) provides
Third World countries with food supplies
to meet national food and nutritional
needs while they increase their own food
production. As we integrate develop-
ment programs more effectively, one of
my major goals will be the enhanced link
between food aid and our other develop-
ment activities.

Refugee Assistance ($568 million)
represents a very substantial U.S. pro-
gram designed to alleviate the misery

and suffering now found with increasing
severity worldwide. During 1980, major
refugee relief programs were supported
in Kampuchea, Somalia, Pakistan, and
Zimbabwe. This aid provided immediate
survival support followed by supplies of
tools, seeds, and shelter in order to per-
mit refugees to become self-sustaining,
either in a foreign land or within their
own borders.

Housing Insurance Guarantees
($150 million in guarantees, no ap-
propriation required) are designed to
provide shelter and associated urban
services to low-income families. Housing-
guarantee-related efforts now include
technical assistance for institution
building and helping countries prepare
medium- to long-term shelter develop-
ment plans.

The Peace Corps ($95 million)

fields about 6,000 volunteers in over 60
developing countries. Volunteers now
carry out important development
assignments in key basic human needs
areas. Increasingly, AID and the Peace
Corps are cooperating on joint ventures
of common interest, which I am par-
ticularly proud of as a former Peace
Corps Volunteer myself.

Other bilateral activities include
the Inter-American Foundation ($13
million proposed in FY 1982) which ex-
tends grants to local private groups in
the Caribbean and Latin America.

Multilateral Programs

About 20% of this request is for interna-
tional development institutions, especial-
ly the multilateral development banks.
The international character and varied
financing windows of the banks make
them especially able to work on difficult
policy issues and to fund large develop-
ment infrastructure projects that direct-
ly increase the productivity of poor peo-
ple in countries of significant importance
to the United States. These projects
often complement U.S. bilateral pro-
grams, an effort we shall try to
strengthen. These banks generate about
$3 from other donors for every $1 we
provide as well as much larger flows in
support of development by the banks'
borrowings from the private banking
system.

Multilateral Development Banks.

The World Bank group, the largest of
these banks, consists of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (IBRD), International
Development Association (IDA), and th< ir
International Finance Corporation;
$1,028 billion is requested in FY 1982,
of which $850 million is for the IDA an(
$163 million for the IBRD.

Regional development banks focus
their lending within specified geographi
regions. The principal regional banks ai
the Inter-American Development Bank
the Asian Development Bank, and the
African Development Bank; $450 millio is
is requested for these regional pro-
grams.

'nm

ipi

iial

International Organizations and
Programs ($260 million). The United
Nations has the largest number of tech
nical experts working in developing
countries, drawn from some 30 agencie
and programs concerned with develop
ment. The largest are the U.N. Develo]
ment Program, the U.N. Children's
Fund, U.N. Environment Program, the
Food and Agriculture Organization, an<
the International Fund for Agricultura
Development (IFAD). IFAD is unique i
that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] countries are ma
jor donors. Organization of American
States assistance programs are a majo
source of multilateral technical
assistance for economic and social
development in Latin America and the
Caribbean.

bo
sir

era

da

ev

Private Investment

This Administration is committed to
finding practical means of enhancing t
private sector's role in assistance pro-
grams and in less-developed country
development, both in the programs
noted above and in two special organic
tions in our bilateral program.

• The financially self-sufficient
Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion provides political risk insurance ai
loan guarantees to U.S. investors in n<
or expanding businesses in developing
countries.

• The Trade and Development Pre
gram ($7 million, FY 1982 budget re-
quest) promotes private sector particip
tion in Third World development
through the provision of project plan
ning services that lead to the sale of
U.S. technology for project implement
tion and through the provision of gov-
ernment-sponsored assistance on a rei
bursable basis. Directed principally at

Bill

il'EI
aid
0

Hit

B, I

II ;

IS|,

mi

\i

fki

j>

A

all

»ot

(01
Btt

asti

«n
HI

-,f Cutn D i il I/- n

Foreign Aid

(middle-income countries that can finance
Itheir own development, it complements
(development assistance programs which
Ifocus on the poorer countries.

■Conclusion

The development needs of poor coun-
xies are tremendous, far beyond what
Ne and others can possibly provide,
especially at a time when our own
esources are most limited. The pro-
grams described today represent a very
small part of the Federal budget and a
niniscule share of our national wealth.
\s the most powerful nation on Earth,
ve cannot, in my view, afford to neglect
dut own self-interest -both for national
security and humanitarian reasons -by
ailing to provide the investment for
levelopment in this year's pared-down
mdget request. I urge this committee to

lend its full support to the total pro-
gram.

STATEMENT AS AID
ADMINISTRATOR

In my presentation as Acting Director of
IDCA, I described in broad strokes the
importance to the United States of
development in the Third World, the
scope of the need, and the full range of
U.S. economic assistance programs for
which this Administration seeks your
support. Now as AID Administrator, I
will focus on how the bilateral assistance
programs administered by AID address
important global problems and U.S. ob-
jectives. I should like to begin with a
few indications of areas of special in-
terest and concern to me, recognizing

that these must be of a preliminary
character.

This Administration is committed to
increased opportunities for the private
sector to participate in AID programs.
As you know, in recent years AID has
substantially expanded assistance pro-
vided through private and voluntary
organizations; this will continue. So, too,
will our activities in partnership with the
American agricultural community, par-
ticularly through the programs encom-
passed in Title XII of the Foreign
Assistance Act. I will be searching for
means of strengthening both these rela-
tionships in ways that produce effective
development programs and the least in-
trusive role for AID while still protect-
ing the interests we all have as tax-
payers in efficient use of resources.

Incorporating opportunities for
growth of the private commercial sector

Development Assistance

"his table compares the official develop-
nent assistance given by members of the
)rganization for Economic Cooperation
■nd Development (OECD) and the Orga-
ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC) and bv Communist countries for
talendar years 1972, 1975, and 1978.

Official development assistance refers
D the transfer of resources (goods, ser-
lices, and capital) from one country to
nothcr to help the recipient develop its
conomy and raise its standard of living,
'o qualify, such transfers must contain a
rant element of at least 25% while loans
nd credits must be concessional (i.e.,
iven on a long-term and low-interest
>asis). This type of assistance includes
>oth direct assistance through bilateral aid
>rograms and contributions to interna-
lonal financial institutions such as the
Vorld Bank.

The OECD consists of 24 developed
narket economy countries. The organiza-
ion's 17 major donors of official develop-
nent assistance belong to the the Develop-
ent Assistance Committee (DAC). Al-
lough the United States has always been
the world's largest donor in absolute
(igures, most other DAC members allot a
arger share of their GNP to foreign aid.
OPEC began to provide appreciable
imounts of foreign aid in the late 1960s,
ut for several years the annual total did
tot exceed $500 million. While the oil
Jfice increases beginning in 1973 sharply
ncreased OPEC revenues, other develop-
ing countries experienced a rise in their oil
mport bill of over $10 billion in 1974.

Official Development Assistance*
($ billions)

1 — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — \ — i — i — i — i — r~

5 10 15

20

OECD

(DAC members)

OPEC

Communist
countries

CY

1972
1975
1978

1972
1975
1978

1972
1975
1978

4 5

11.7

I

4.0

13.6

I

5.7

I

19.9

400 million

5.5

^~T

12

825 million

*Net disbursements.

Source: Figures from OECD, Development Co-operation Eftorts and Policies ot the Members ot the Development
Assistance Committee (chairman's report), 1974 Review. 1979 Review

%U.S. share

II

lay 1981

45

Foreign Aid

in developing countries, and in related
waysVreasmg avenues for our own
private sector to expand its associations
and business, has not previously re-
ceived the attention it deserves in AID.
I have already initiated work in AID to
find important and significant programs
to involve American financial and manu-
facturing sectors in investment and ad-
visory activities. We must be careful
here to facilitate business involvement
and not to substitute for private capital.
Ultimately, the most significant econom-
ic development will come from vigorous
free markets in goods and services. I am
convinced AID can play a significant
catalytic role and will be back to you for
advice and counsel as our ideas develop.

This committee has stressed, in its
development of the new directions
legislation, the importance of establish-
ing a sound and permanent institutional
base in recipient countries. I am a
strong believer in emphasizing in our
programs the special capacity we have
in the technology transfer area -the pro
vision of skills, ideas and training, and
the strengthening of policies, systems,
and institutions to carry on development
programs once outside help is no longer
available. AID is already heavily en-
gaged in technology transfer, and many
projects providing technical assistance
are enhanced by associated resource
transfers -for example, fertilizer, con-
traceptives, and some physical plants
and equipment. As I want to be sure we
are getting the most benefit from our
limited resources, and not doing work
that can better be done by others, I am
examining AIDs program to see
whether some shift at the margin
toward further institution-building and
technology transfer is possible.

AID has a very dedicated and able
staff, highly experienced in the difficult
job of development. A special strength
of AID is its overseas mission structure
which permits productive day-to-day
dialogue with recipient countries on
policy and implementation matters. This
approach enhances the effectiveness of
our technology and resource transfers.
Concentration on institution-building and
associated technology transfer will not
decrease our staffing needs, and yet
AID, along with nearly all other parts of
the government, will see significant staff
reductions over the next several years.
To the greatest extent possible, it is my
intention to protect our overseas mis-
sions and take the bulk of the reductions
in Washington. We will be exploring a

number of further steps to simplify our
systems to reduce unnecessary workload
on our staff. This policy has been
started by my most recent predecessors,
and I intend to move even further in
this direction. I will seek your counsel
and support for any significant changes
that may be necessary.

I strongly support the close integra-
tion of the major components -develop-
ment assistance, PL 480 [Food for
Peace program], the economic support
fund, and housing insurance guaran-
tees-of our bilateral programs to
achieve the greatest degree of develop-
ment benefit. This committee has
pioneered in this effort, and I intend to
see that the process is carried forward
with even greater emphasis.

Evaluation is an important tool, if
used properly, in assuring that our
resources are used well and that we
learn from past successes and mistakes
in planning and implementing future
programs. I intend to continue and ex-
pand AID'S evaluation program, espe-
cially the impact evaluations whose
usefulness has already gained recogni-
tion by this and other committees ot
Congress.

Program Highlights

These are but a few of the myriad
issues, concerns, and opportunities that
confront me as new Administrator. 1
would now like to focus on the
highlights of our proposed program.

Food Production. More than half of
AID's development assistance budget is
focused on food-related problems. In-
creasing food production distribution
and consumption within a growth with
equity strategy is a primary goal ot
AID The magnitude of the world food
problem demands such attention. Food
production can be accelerated signifi-
cantly through better planning, more
realistic policies, and increased invest-
ment in research, physical infrastruc-
ture, and marketing systems.

In FY 1982 $727.8 million is re-
quested for this sector. AID's farm level
efforts to increase food production are
varied. Through training, technical
assistance, and financial support AID
will foster the improvements needed to
increase the production of the family
farmers. Our focus on the total farming
system offers a promising approach to

research and development of tech-
nologies most useful to farmers.
Through additional research -in U.S.
universities, international agricultural
research centers, and in the growing na-
tional research establishments in low-
income countries -AID intends to stimu
late the continued development and
dissemination of improved agricultural
technologies. .

The agricultural production policies
of recipient countries are also critical.
We have two major instruments for in-
fluencing policy. First, through technical
and capital assistance we help reduce
policy and related institutional im-
pediments to equitable growth. Second,
by providing PL 480 food aid in the con-
text of a long-term agricultural develop-
ment plan, we encourage policy changes
to reduce food deficits while addressing
the worst immediate aspects of such
shortages on the needy.

Deforestation. The grave implica-
tions of a related problem, accelerated
deforestation, are upon us. This is a
threat both to rural energy needs and to
agricultural productivity. Forests are be-
ing cut for fuelwood at a rate faster
than the process of natural regrowth.
Consequently, erosion is increasing and
the resulting siltation reduces stream-
flow increases flooding, and affects the
utilization and maintenance of irrigation
systems. Adequate supplies of potable
water are equally threatened. Forestry
assistance is now a key element of AID I
program, as is our assistance to help
developing countries manage their
natural resources more efficiently and
productively.

Energy. Deforestation has itself

been accelerated by the worldwide fossi

fuel energy crisis. With the upward

spiral in the price of petroleum-based

fuels the pressure on fuelwood supplies

has intensified. AID is, therefore, giving

increased emphasis to the development

and diffusion of alternative rural energy

sources such as biogas and mimhydro

as well as more efficient energy conver

sion devices, such as wood-burning

stoves. We are also strengthening m

stitutions for energy planning and polic;

analysis. Over $77 million is sought for

all types of energy programs in r Y

1982

1

lib

Population Growth. Rapid popula-
tion growth in developing countries ex-
acerbates food, environment, and energ

Department of State Bulleti

Foreign Aid

(problems. Between 1980 and the year
J2000 the world's population is expected
|to increase from about 4V2 billion to over
J6 billion people; 90% of that increase
Iwill take place in the developing coun-
Jtries. While the demographic situation is
Bserious, it is not hopeless. Worldwide
^population growth rates are no longer
[{rising. Among the 13 most populous
■developing countries, all have experi-
Benced crude birthrate declines. However,
^significant countries and regions of the
^developing world are still growing at
jirapid rates that offset development
Igains and contribute to local and global
| instability.

As the largest donor for interna-
Itional population programs, the United
{States has played an important part in
{bringing about decreased population
Igrowth rates. We have led in developing
:and disseminating the most widely used
I contraceptive methods; in providing con-
traceptives; in developing inexpensive
(service delivery systems; in training per-
J sonnel; and increasing motivation for
I family planning among individuals, com-
' munities, and national leaders.

We must continue to assert our lead-
ership. Today, demand for population
programs far exceeds available re-
sources. Our funding request of $253.4
million for population programs is essen-
tial to keep up the momentum in the
highest priority program areas.

Health. Illness and early death are
:ommon among the poor in developing
:ountries. Although infant mortality has
leclined by almost one-half during the
last 25 years, 1 out of 10 infants, overall
in developing countries, fails to reach 1
ear of age, and in many countries this
igure is in the range of 2 out of 10.

Primary health care, a combination
of the most basic preventive and cura-
ive health services, is among the most
iromising means of reducing childhood
lisease and death, of diminishing poor
.lygiene and related poor nutrition, as
'■: well as the often fatal effects of too-

■ frequent pregnancies. Most developing
'' nations have made a firm commitment
to primary health care and many look
forward to the extremely ambitious goal
of universal access to primary health
care by the end of the century.

AID has been a leader in financing
primary health care programs since the
early 1970s and has helped finance near
ly 50 programs in 36 countries. Part of
the challenge before us is to help devel-
oping countries establish systems that

can be self-sustained through govern-
ment efforts and participation of local
communities. We are requesting $120.4
million in FY 1982 to meet that chal-
lenge and carry on other priority work
in the health sector.

Education. The education problems
which developing countries face are
enormous. Indeed, because of the rapid
growth of the youthful population and
the acute shortages of teachers and in-
structional material, developing coun-
tries face the very real prospect of hav-
ing more school-age children out of
school in 1985 than a decade earlier. Our
strategy is to help developing countries
find cost-effective ways of improving
their basic educational programs.

AID also focuses on critical higher
level manpower shortages that under-
mine economic progress in the develop-
ing world. AID has supported the train-
ing of over 200,000 professionals in a
wide range of fields critical to develop-
ment. I am personally concerned that
AID's participant training program has
declined in the last decade, notwith-
standing continuing high demand for
American university and specialized
training.

In order to help meet these educa-
tion and training needs, we are request-
ing $109.6 million for FY 1982, primari-
ly for programs in Latin America and
Africa. The bulk of these funds will be
used to support programs for basic pri-
mary and nonformal education as well
as vocational, technical, and professional
training.

Geographic Highlights

Now let me touch on a few geographic

highlights.

Africa. Twenty-six percent of our
development assistance program is
focused on Africa, including $107.5
million for the Sahel. The most pressing
and interrelated problems in Africa to-
day are declining per capita food produc-
tion and the rapid depletion of tradi-
tional energy resources. These problems
aggravated by serious balance-of-pay-
ments deficits in many African coun-
tries, are resulting in much human
suffering. They also point to potential
economic and political instability -a mat-
ter of great concern to U.S. interests in

- l

this continent. Resolution of these prob-
lems has become the highest develop-
ment priority for most African govern-
ments and international donors, in-
cluding AID.

There is significant food production
potential in Africa. By the year 2000,
and perhaps well before that with ade-
quate investment and supporting
policies, a number of countries will be
surplus producers. AID assistance
strengthens national agricultural
research systems, small-holder irriga-
tion, and marketing and distribution
systems. We also believe that a combina-
tion of improved agricultural and land
management practices and expanded
reforestation programs by AID and
other donors will ease the energy prob-
lem. A third approach is to tackle
population growth directly, which at
2.7% a year in sub-Saharan Africa is
higher than in any other region and still
increasing. There is a growing aware-
ness among many African leaders that
the population question needs to be
faced. To help bridge the food gap, PL
480 Title I and II programs are being
maintained as vital to a food-short and
drought-prone continent.

Asia. Thirty percent of the develop-
ment assistance program is concentrated
in Asia. Several major Asian countries
have chalked up impressive gains in food
production. AID assistance in the form
of fertilizer, financing for irrigation, and
technical assistance has contributed to
the Philippines' approaching rice self-
sufficiency, to impressive wheat produc-
tion gains in Pakistan and Bangladesh,
and to supporting Indonesian incentive
pricing policies for rice production. Our
assistance was a major factor in estab-
lishing India's agricultural education and
research system and domestic fertilizer
capacity, which in turn has contributed
to its current market self-sufficiency in
basic grains.

Notwithstanding this progress, the
food deficit for the region, as a whole, is
expected to increase. The gap between
effective demand and domestic supply
would become even greater if pervasive
malnutrition were to be eliminated.
Through projects assisted by AID and
other donors that help farmers increase
food production and provide expanded
rural employment and income, a 4% an-
nual growth rate is projected in food
production for the region.

While population growth has de-
clined significantly, thanks in part to

,, May 1981

47

MIDDLE EAST

AID programs in Thailand and In-
donesia, the regional annual population
growth rate is still above 2% and in
some Asian countries is 3%. We expect
our continuing family planning assist-
ance to the major countries of the region
and substantially expanded programs in
Bangladesh to help bring about a signifi-
cant decline in regional population
growth.

Latin America and the Caribbean.

The link between the need for accel-
erated socioeconomic development and
U.S. security is most clearly demon-
strated in the Latin American/Caribbean
region. AID requests a $265.3 million
development assistance program in
Latin America, concentrated in the Cen-
tral American and Caribbean region, an
area where socioeconomic problems are
serious and where the United States has
vital economic and security interests.

Unemployment and underemploy-
ment remain critical problems in Latin
America. This reflects slow economic
growth in the region's low-income coun-
tries, continuing sharp disparities be-
tween modern and traditional sectors
within countries, and population growth,
although declining, still almost 2V2% a
year. Problems of resource depletion -
soil, firewood, and others -are reaching
very serious proportions in some coun-
tries; the cost of imported petroleum is
strangling development efforts and mak-
ing it difficult for many smaller countries
even to maintain existing programs. Our
programs serve as catalyst and risk
taker, attracting complementary public
and private resources in support of in-
novative programs benefiting the poor.

Cooperatives and credit unions as
well as joint private investment ventures
with Latin American small enterprise
and the use of the economic support
fund to support private enterprise in the
Caribbean are features of this broad-
based AID program.

Importance of ProgTam

The $1.9 billion we are seeking for the
development assistance program is near-
ly one-half billion less than was proposed
in the Carter budget. This cut does not
represent a reduction in need for fund-
ing of agriculture, health, population,
and other programs around the world.
Rather it represents the outcome of a
difficult set of choices in which this Ad-
ministration has had to give very high
priority to reaching an appropriate
balance between income and expendi-
tures, a process in which every budget

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

Following are statements by Deputy
Assistant Secretaries for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs Morris Draper
and Joseph W. Twinam before the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle
East of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. 1

MR. DRAPER,
MAR. 12, 1981

I welcome the opportunity to be here to-
day to testify in support of the Ad-
ministration's proposals for economic
and security assistance to Jordan and
Lebanon.

These two countries border Israel. A
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict will not be possible
without their active involvement and
cooperation. In both countries, there are
substantial numbers of Palestinians. The
future of the countries will be affected
by the way the Palestinian problem -in-
cluding its political and refugee dimen-
sions, among others -is handled in the
process of achieving a just and lasting
end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. We thus
have a strong interest in the directions
the policies of these two countries will
take over the period ahead.

While our assistance programs have
specific objectives tailored to each coun-
try's needs, they fit within the broad
regional strategy which the Administra-
tion intends to develop and carry out.
These two countries -Jordan and
Lebanon -have historically been close to
the United States. They have depended
on our support in the past while facing
challenges and crises. In the future, both
countries will have to cope with poten-

tially threatening and destabilizing
trends in the region. They will expect us ■
to be helpful and cooperative. Our assist '
ance programs there -while fitting
within our broad strategy -are intended
to nurture basic relationships of mutual
trust and confidence and to assist the
governments in carrying out their
responsible national priorities. In the
process, we believe we will be reinforc-
ing the hopes of these governments to
be able to promote peace and stability -
internally and in the international
arena -with confidence.

'■

Jordan

a:

For Jordan in FY 1982, we are propos-
ing $50 million in foreign military sales
(FMS) credits, $20 million in economic
support funds (ESF), and $2 million for
the international military and education
training (IMET) program. Except for
military training, which has been in-
creased, the levels of assistance for the
country will be significantly lower than
the programs for much of the decade ol
the 1970s. Our determination took into
account the improving Jordan economy
and the flow of other external assist-
ance. The lower levels also reflect the
constraints involved in our own domest
economic reform program. The pro-
grams, however, remain consistent witl >'a
our goals of building a relationship witl
Jordan which will endure through ups
and downs and will provide a good basi
for further cooperation as we pursue oi
interests and Jordan strengthens its na
tional independence.

Jordan -its progressive leadership,
its continued economic and social
development, its stability, and its ability

had to be scrutinized and virtually every
program had to be restrained no matter
how sound the objectives.

As we reviewed the Carter budget, I
came to realize how central our develop-
ment assistance program is to America's
relations with countries around the
world. Indeed, for many countries the
development assistance program is our
primary expression of participation in
what for them is most important -their
rapid economic and social development.
Thus, this program serves not only our
generalized interests in helping to solve
some of the world's most critical prob-
lems but also our very immediate politi-
cal interests in achieving a satisfactory

relationship with countries important b
us on the three major continents where
the program is carried out.

This is a worldwide program, fo-
cused on a critical set of development
issues -food, population, health, educa
tion, and energy. It serves our foreign
policy interests well and will leave a
lasting impact on vast numbers of poor
people. I urge your strong support for
this lean and effective AID program.

'The complete transcript of the hearing:
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

tat

pn

48

Middle East

to defend itself and to make independent
decisions of its own despite pressures
and influence exerted by others -is im-
portant to American foreign policy
goals. It is important that Jordan re-
main committed to a policy of preserv-
ing peace along the border with Israel.
It is important that Jordan continue its
constructive policy -directly helpful to
greater U.S. interests-of providing
training, guidance, and seconded
military and security personnel to key
countries in the gulf region. This rein-
forces inclinations there to look to the
United States and the West for equip-
ment, military orientation, and guidance.

The substantially increased IMET
program for Jordan will enroll perhaps
175 officers in U.S. military courses,
which will include key members of the
Jordanian instructor cadre.

While Jordan has expanded re-
sources and external funding from which
to draw, our FMS credit program of $50
million remains significant. Jordan may
be facing the prospect of further
challenges and confrontations with the
rjf regime in Damascus. Late last year, the
., Syrians massed significant military
, forces on Jordan's northern border in
(0 what was viewed widely as an effort at
m intimidation. Relations between the two

i countries currently are cold, and their
: disagreements have been highlighted in
,SI the media of both countries. A small
country, with only limited manpower,
. Jordan has tried to develop -with our
■ill assistance and guidance -a reasonable

■ | deterrent against its far stronger poten-
;;J tial adversaries in the region. Our

j assistance program fits sensibly within
this basic goal, without trying to go
oeyond it.

As for economic assistance, we
should recall that our help to Jordan

►lover the years -generating significant
economic and social advancement -has
— • been a major success. At the beginning
of our close association, we, together,

il faced what were considered almost in-
surmountable economic problems. We
are pleased with the accomplishments so
far. Jordan is healthy and has a promis-
ing future. Jordan will, however, remain

' dependent on outside help for several

■ years yet. And we believe we should
play a continuing role.

Our economic programs will be con-
centrated on the Jordan Valley irriga-
tion project and on programs dealing
with health, potable water, agriculture,
and sewage. We have been deeply dis-
appointed that it has not been possible
to resolve the riparian issues that would

permit the construction of the Maqarin
Dam. We will not seek new funds from
the Congress until improved political
conditions in the region permit a new
approach. Nevertheless, it is a tragedy
that one of the scarcest national
resources in the Middle East -water for
ordinary drinking purposes as well as
agriculture -still has not been adequate-
ly harnessed and controlled in the area
of the Yarmouk River basin where the
Maqarin Dam might some day be built.
In the absence of the Maqarin Dam, we
will continue to examine, however, ways
in which we could be helpful to Jordan
on many broad questions of water
management and use.

Lebanon

For Lebanon we are proposing for FY
1982, $15 million in FMS credits, $5
million in ESF, and $840,000 for ex-
panded training of Lebanese military
officers.

Our fundamental policies toward this
pivotal country remain the same. We
firmly support Lebanon's independence,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty.
We consider it important that its unity
and cohesion be preserved and
strengthened. We have made clear our
hope that the day will soon come when a
genuine political consensus and national
reconciliation can be achieved. In the
meantime, we would like to see the
strengthening of the authority of
Lebanon's lawful and legitimate govern-
ment structure and all of Lebanon's na-
tional institutions. This includes the
rebuilding national army, which offers
the only promising means of assuring
security eventually to all of Lebanon's
citizens.

Tied as our two countries have been
by common traditions, blood and family
connections, and a historically warm
friendship, we must maintain our
humanitarian concern for those innocent
people who have been victimized by the
violence, terrorism, and warfare in
many parts of Lebanon since 1975. We
have tried to use our influence -in com-
bination with our assistance programs -
to make progress toward improved
stability and an end to the violence.
While facing formidable problems,
Lebanese leaders have been trying hard
also to end the suffering and violence. In
this connection, we have been impressed
with the efforts by President Sarkis-at
the recent Islamic summit in Taif-to

stop southern Lebanon from being used
as a battleground with Israel. The
United States will continue its firm sup-
port for the U.N. peacekeeping forces in
southern Lebanon, which offer the only
realistic near-term means of containing
the dangers there and working for
stability.

The military assistance programs
are continuations of those we began in
1976. Our IMET program will be ex-
panded. This will permit the enrollment
of military officers, and particularly
junior officers, in courses at the three
U.S. service staff colleges, as well as in
basic and advance officer courses else-
where. Our FMS credit assistance will
help Lebanon to continue the reorgani-
zation and equipping of an additional
brigade. Equipment will be similar to
that purchased earlier with FMS credits
to help rebuild Lebanon's mechanized
light infantry formations.

Lebanon has made good use of the
equipment and training it has received
from the United States in recent years.
The army has been able to take over
some security responsibilities from the
Arab deterrent forces, and we hope that
added responsibilities can be undertaken
stage-by-stage.

Overall economic conditions have im-
proved slowly since the end of the civil
conflict in 1976, but the progress has
been spotty and uneven. Tense condi-
tions in the country discourage invest-
ment and rational economic planning.
Our relatively modest economic assist-
ance programs have worked well and
have been highly visible. In FY 1982 we
intend to continue programs of support
for health education, vocational training,
cooperatives, housing, as well as for
development planning.

To sum up, we have continued to
look at Lebanon from both the policy
and human perspectives. A stable, pros-
perous, and independent Lebanon -
playing its traditonal role as a well-
spring of moderation, teaching, free
enterprise, intellectual thought, and tol-
erance-would contribute to creating the
kind of Middle East we want.

MR. TWINAM,
MAR. 12, 1981

In the past year, U.S. concern over
security in Southwest Asia has height-
ened. To respond to Soviet pressures, as
well as potentially destabilizing regional
tensions, the Administration seeks to

Mav

1981

49

Middle East

strengthen our relations with the friend-
ly governments in the Arabian Penin-
sula. This purpose is manifested in a
variety of actions, including support for
the development efforts of the U.S.-
Oman Joint Commission, our ongoing
development assistance program in
Yemen, and our military assistance
undertakings in both countries.

Sultanate of Oman

U.S. relations with the Sultanate of
Oman have intensified during the past
year. We concluded an agreement last
June under which U.S. military forces
are given access to certain Omani ports
and airfields under implementing ar-
rangements as mutually agreed. We will
upgrade these facilities for our own pur-
poses and also for Oman's permanent
use through a military construction pro-
gram now getting underway. We are in-
creasing the supply of military equip-
ment in areas where American equip-
ment appropriately meets the
Sultanate's defense needs, and we are
seeking increased FMS credits to help
finance some of this equipment.

We also established last August a
joint commission, thus strengthening the
economic dimension to the relationship.
This commission, supported both in
funds and personnel jointly by Oman
and the United States, will be the focal
point for projects in Oman which might
benefit from American technology and
for increased commerical links between
our two countries.

Oman is strategically significant
because of its position overlooking the
Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the
gulf. The United States has an interest
in supporting a friendly and responsible
government there. Although Oman in
late 1975 successfully quelled a Marxist-
oriented insurgency led by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman
(PFLO) and supported from South
Yemen, some leaders of the PFLO are
still at large and South Yemen has kept
up its anti-Oman rhetoric. Therefore,
there is reason for concern that radical
elements in the region will seek to
pressure Oman through military and
political means. Our new military and
economic program is designed to help
Oman address these concerns.

Our intensified relationship with
Oman builds on a long history of cordial
relations. It recognizes the remarkable
progress that Oman has made during
the past decade in creating a modern
society and bringing prosperity to its

an

populace. When Sultan Qaboos came to
power in 1970 and set that country on
the road to development, he was faced
with one of the most impoverished
economies in the world and had to fight
the PFLO insurrection which was then
at its peak. With great effort and con-
siderable cost in resources, the Sultan's
government not only put down the
rebellion but also built a modern
economic and social infrastructure
where virtually nothing existed before.

Oman has been helped in this
endeavor by its oil income, but its oil
resources are small by the standards of
the region and in relation to the develop-
ment task it is facing. The Sultanate has
received substantial economic and
military assistance from friendly coun-
tries in its difficult task and will rely on
similar help in the future.

Yemen Arab Republic

The Yemen Arab Republic occupies a
strategic location on the southern border
of Saudi Arabia and astride the entrance
to the Red Sea. It occupies a buffer posi-
tion between Saudi Arabia and the
Marxist-led People's Democratic Repub-
lic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.). After centuries
of isolation and a period of devastation
brought about by a long civil war during
the 1960s, Yemen today is attempting to
strengthen its central government, to
achieve security and political order
throughout its territory, to improve its
economic development, and to raise the
standard of living of its population.

Yemen is poor in natural and in-
dustrial resources and remains heavily
dependent upon outside assistance. In
the past, it has sought aid, both
economic and military, from a variety of
sources. The Saudis have been par-
ticularly generous in their economic
assistance as have other Arab states.
The Soviet Union has concentrated its
assistance on military equipment and
training. For a long period, Yemen ob-
tained the bulk of its military supplies
from the Soviet Union. The Soviets,
however, also provided very large
amounts of military aid to the Marxist
regime in the P.D.R.Y. and as tensions
between the two Yemens heightened
during the early 1970s, North Yemen
expressed interest in obtaining arms
from the United States.

The U.S. economic and security
assistance program in Yemen is part of
the U.S. effort to counter the Soviet

challenge in the Middle East and to con
front the challenge of radical forces in
the region. Our security assistance effort
($1.05 million in IMET and $15 million
in FMS credits) is aimed at providing
additional training and support for the
operation and maintenance of the U.S.
military equipment we sold to North
Yemen, with Saudi financing, in 1979
during its border conflict with South
Yemen. We want to maximize Yemen's
ability to utilize the equipment we have
provided. Our security assistance pro-
vides an alternative to Yemeni reliance
on the Soviet Union. Our program in
Yemen is smaller than that of the
Soviets, who over the last year have
provided substantial amounts of military
equipment at very favorable interest
rates. The Soviets are also providing
training for over 1,000 Yemenis in the
Soviet Union. We have sought to em-
phasize the quality of our own training
activity. We feel the progress in our
training of F-5 pilots contrasts
favorably to the limited success of the
Soviet MiG-21 program.

It is equally important that the
United States contribute to Yemen's
effort to develop its economic and
human resources. Our aid program is
relatively small and complements the
larger efforts being made by Arab and
international donors. In the last several
years, our aid program has had to con-
centrate on laying a basis for develop-
ment training in the seriously underde-
veloped Yemeni technical environment.
We have now reached a stage where w
can demonstrate more visibly the huma
benefits of this effort. It is essential th£
the program be fully funded at the re-
quest level of $21.1 million in order to
achieve this. Unless we are able to
operate at the funding level requested,
we will need to review our economic
assistance approach and seek even mor
modest goals.

MR. DRAPER.
MAR. 16, 1981

B

el
'

on
in

101

tii

E
if i

to

on
n

4
la!

in

I am pleased to be here today to testify
in support of our FY 1982 proposals fo
economic and military assistance to

Egypt-

We are seeking -in security assist-
ance-$750 million in ESF, as well as
$900 million in FMS credits, $400
million of which will be in concessionar
"direct credits." These security
assistance proposals will be on top of a
PL 480 program likely to exceed $300
million in FY 1982.

■■■'■

Middle East

Progress in the U.S. -Egyptian
Relationship

Our assistance programs for Egypt com-
plement the Middle East peace process
and constitute integral elements of the
coherent strategic approach to the
region which we are developing in order
to improve the security situation there.
Our relationship with Egypt is critically
important to these two objectives. It is
remarkable that we have achieved such
intimate ties, given the fact that
diplomatic relations between our two
countries were reestablished only 7
years ago. These ties are as close as
they are because of the mutuality of our
interest.

Following the October 1973 war, we
have together moved steadily forward
on the search for peace in the Middle
I East, while developing confidence in one
another's determination. The disengage-
ment agreements in the Sinai were
followed by President Sadat's historic
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, which set in
motion the dramatic developments
leading to the Camp David accords and
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Working from the foundation of a
common commitment to peace, our two
countries have developed an equally
strong record of cooperation with regard
to the challenges to the region's securi-
ty. Egypt will have a role to play of high
importance. It must have the strength to
,, deter threats and maintain national
security. This is a principal reason for
our military assistance programs.

Starting from a relatively modest
n"j .economic assistance program after 1974
', that was small in relation to Egypt's
needs, we are now devoting over $1
billion annually in support of President
Sadat's efforts to free up the economy,
to achieve self-sustaining growth, and to
enhance the quality of life for his people.

The closeness, the importance, and
'the magnitude of such ties are unusual
in our other relations worldwide. They
deserve our full measure of support.

r

ir

Strengthening the Peace

A little over a year ago, Israel and
Egypt exchanged Ambassadors, which
was one of the more dramatic events in
the process of normalizing relations be-
tween these two former adversaries.
The two are adhering scrupulously to
both the letter and the spirit of the
Treaty of Peace. The interim boundary
is open to travel and trade. Israel's
President Navon visited Egypt and ad-
dressed the People's Assembly. Israeli

May 1981

and Egyptian Ministers and Members of
Parliament have exchanged visits.
Scholars, scientists, and businessmen
are forging new ties in broadening
fields. Egypt struck from the books all
laws related to the Arab boycott of
Israel. Aviation, postal, and communica-
tion links have been established between
the two countries. Egypt now sells
Israel 2 million tons of crude oil annual-
ly, making Egypt one of Israel's major
long-term suppliers. Egypt and Israel,
we are confident, are becoming good
neighbors.

Much has been achieved, but much
remains to be done. Egypt remains com-
mitted to building on what has been
negotiated in partnership with the
United States and Israel. We have
already joined with the two countries,
ahead of schedule, to work out security
arrangements concerned with the final
phase of Israel's withdrawal from the
Sinai under the terms of the Peace Trea-
ty. On his April trip to the region,
Secretary Haig will be discussing with
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin how the peace process should best
by advanced and how the core problems
should be addressed. The Secretary will
also be talking to some of the other
leaders in the region to analyze their
detailed views of a proper course toward
peace.

Growing Strategic Cooperation

President Sadat has been outspoken
about the threats posed to the region
through foreign intervention and subver-
sion. If Egypt is to play its role in our
common strategic approach to regional
security problems, it must have help in
modernizing its armed forces. Egypt has
been the target of efforts by some Arab
states to isolate it politically, as punish-
ment for its commitment to peace, and
thus has been deprived of some tradi-
tional sources of outside funding to meet
its needs. Other traditional donors have
tended to concentrate on economic
credits rather than for those that might
be used for military equipment. Mean-
while, Egypt's problems with its
deteriorating inventory of Soviet-origin
hardware continue to grow.

Thus, Egypt feels itself dependent
on us to help satisfy its minimal,
legitimate defensive needs. These needs
must be set in the context of the prevail-
ing instability in the region and the
adventurism of some of the states there.

Libya is pursuing a heavy-handed, ag-
gressive policy, as witnessed by its inter-
vention in Chad. It is heavily armed
with modern Soviet equipment. Egypt's
security concerns embrace the potential
threat to its neighbor, Sudan, with
which it has a mutual defense treaty.
President Sadat sees the overall
threat in broad strategic terms. He has
been deeply concerned over the implica-
tions of the Iranian revolution and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He has
offered access to Egyptian military
facilities for U.S. forces in emergencies
and for common purposes. He has in-
vited U.S. Air Force and rapid deploy-
ment force units to participate in joint
exercises with Egyptian forces. He
wants to consult with us further and ex-
tend cooperation compatible with
Egypt's own national interests.

Military Assistance

It was with our broad and coherent
regional strategy in mind that we de-
cided to propose an FMS credit level of
$900 million, or $100 million higher than
initially planned. When we proposed -
and the Congress approved -$550 mil-
lion in FY 1981 as part of an anticipated
longer term military supply relationship,
we privately told the Egyptians that
they could consider a figure of $800
million for planning purposes in FY
1982. With the help of cash-flow financ-
ing, our program allows Egypt to make
sensible plans to carry out a balanced
modernization program for the next
years ahead.

In planning and placing orders for a
balanced program, however, Egypt had,
in effect, mortgaged the $800 million
funding level it was told we would seek
for FY 1982. As a result, Egypt would
be faced with the prospect of not being
able to place major new orders until FY
1983-with deliveries, of course, several
years later still. It is in response to this
problem that we went to the higher
figure of $900 million.

As I stated, we are also proposing
that $400 million of this new level of
$900 million be offered in the form of
concessionary direct credits; the exact
terms are yet to be decided. Egypt is a
relatively poor country, measured in per
capita income terms. While the short-
term prospects for the economy are
good, the country will probably face
some serious problems a few years
ahead, as it balances needs -including
defensive needs -with resources. Direct

51

Middle East

credits take into account this problem.

Finally, we are proposing an ex-
panded IMET program of $2 million.
This will help train about 250 officers.

Economic Assistance Program

President Sadat's commitment to
political and economic programs of
reform, development, and liberalization
remains as strong as ever. From the
very outset of his presidency, when he
released many political prisoners, Presi-
dent Sadat has encouraged the develop-
ment of democratic opposition institu-
tions. Opposition parties are represented
in the People's Assembly, and an opposi-
tion press contributes to a spirited
dialogue on important domestic and for-
eign issues. A comparison of economic
conditions prevailing in the mid-1970s
and at the end of 1980 also demon-
strates that good progress has been
made in that field. In the mid-1970s,
Egypt teetered on the edge of bankrupt-
cy. In 1979 there was an overall balance-
of-payments surplus; in 1980 this surplus
probably was somewhat larger. A free
foreign exchange market is flourishing,
tariff barriers have been lowered, agri-
cultural production has risen somewhat
above the rate of population growth, and
major construction projects are under-
way.

Foreign assistance, however, re-
mains absolutely vital; without it there
would have been no balance-of-payments
surplus in the past 2 years. With nearly
half of the population aged 15 or
younger, and a population growth rate
of close to 3%, problems lie ahead.
Inflation is a serious problem.
Earlier in 1980, it was running at an an-
nual rate approaching 40%. This prob-
lem, coupled with increasing consumer
unhappiness over chronic food supply
and distribution problems, led President
Sadat to reorganize his government at
midyear and personally to assume the
Prime Minister's role. Since then, the
government has attempted to deal
directly with consumer discontent by
broadened price controls and by increas-
ing the food supplies in the markets.
This effort has had some success; at
year end, the rise in the consumer price
index had eased sharply. Nevertheless,
underlying inflationary pressures remain
strong, and Egyptian officials, including
the President himself, are well aware
that trade-offs may have to be made be-
tween present consumption and future
investment.

Egyptian economic policymakers

confront a dilemma. The legacy of
Egypt's experiment with economic cen-
tralism in the 1960s was an overstaffed
and inefficient public sector industrial
plant and a declining agricultural sector.
The Egyptian consumer had been effec-
tively insulated from the viccisitudes of
world inflation for over a decade before
the "open door" policy was announced at
the end of 1974. That decision -to
undertake a major economic liberaliza-
tion by opening the economy to the free
markets of the West and to allow
domestic private enterprise to re-
emerge -meant unavoidable changes in
patterns of equity. It also meant that
consumers would be subjected to the
pressures of rising prices at the very
time that world inflation reached un-
precedented levels.

Therefore, the Government of Egypt
will be trying simultaneously to increase

fjitab

0

productivity and efficiency throughout
the economy while preserving and pro
tecting an historic commitment to a very I
high degree of economic equity and
social justice. To undertake such a
massive domestic effort at the time of a
truly historic reorientation of its foreign !
policy marks the statesmanlike policies
of the Government of Egypt and Presi-
dent Sadat.

To persevere, Egypt requires contin-
uing support from the United States and
the Western world. Our large ESF pro
gram of $750 million recognizes that
need.

liter

>"■

iy

5*1

ins

BTli

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Hostage Agreements
Transmitted to the Congress

After J/44 days in captivity, the U.S.
hostages in Iran were freed on January
20, 1981. Their release came after weeks
of around-the-clock discussions between
the U.S. team and an Algerian team,
selected by the Iranian Government to
act as intermediary in exchanges leading
to the hostages' release. The agreements
which eventually concluded the crisis
were adhered to in Algiers on January
19-20, 1981, with Deputy Secretary War-
ren M. Christopher signing for the
United States. These argeements were
transmitted to the Congress by the
Department of State on March 12, 1981,
along with an explanatory statement
summarizing the five documents.1

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT
REGARDING DECLARATIONS OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, THE
UNDERTAKINGS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS ADHERED TO AT
ALGIERS, JANUARY 19-20, 1981

Explanation of Agreement

This agreement relates to the release of
52 U.S. nationals detained in Iran and to
the settlement of claims between the
United States and its nationals and the

Islamic Republic of Iran and its na-
tionals. The agreement consists of five
principal documents:

(1) The Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria (henceforth the
"Algerian declaration").

(2) The Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning Settle-
ment of Claims by the Government of
the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran (henceforth the "claims settlement
agreement").

(3) The Undertakings of the Govern
ment of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran With Respect to the
Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria (henceforth the "undertakings").

(4) The Escrow Agreement.

(5) The Technical Arrangement Be-
tween Banque Centrale D'Algerie as
Escrow Agent and the Governor and
Company of the Bank of England and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
as Fiscal Agent of the United States
(henceforth the "technical arrangement")

The Algerian declaration describes
the overall principles underlying these
agreements. It states that it is the polic,
of the United States not to intervene ir
the internal affairs of Iran, and it
establishes a mechanism for the

Ir.«

&

u

rhe

it

Hi

52

Department of State Bulletir

Middle East

quitable settlement of claims between
he United States and its nationals and
ran and its nationals. The declaration
urther establishes a procedure for the
eturn to Iran of its assets currently
ield in the United States or by entities
nder U.S. control. The declaration
nally describes the measures the
Jnited States will take with respect to
ssets of the estate of the former Shah
f Iran and his close relatives.

The claims settlement agreement
stablishes the Iran-U.S. Claims
ribunal for the purpose of deciding (1)
laims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2)
.aims of Iranian nationals against the
'nited States, and (3) certain claims of
ie United States and Iran against each
ther. The agreement provides a method
>r selecting the members of the
•ibunal. It also provides that all deci-
ons and awards of the tribunal shall be
nal and binding and enforceable in the
)urts of any country.

The undertakings provide for the
•ansfer of certain Iranian assets to a
i ink account in the name of the Banque
' entrale D'Algerie and provide that
hen the balance in that account
;aches at least $7,955 billion that Iran
mil effect the safe departure of the 52
.S. nationals detained in Iran. The
idertakings provide for distribution of
le funds in that account upon certifica-
on by Algeria that the 52 Americans
,ve safely left Iran. A total of $3,667
lion has been transferred to the
deral Reserve Bank of New York to
iy outstanding loans; $1,418 billion re-
am in an escrow account to pay
tstanding loans as to which the
ount owing may be in dispute; and
e remainder in the account has been
sferred to Bank Markazi Iran.
The escrow agreement implements
ie Algerian declaration and establishes

escrow account at the Bank of
ngland in the name of the Banque Cen-
'ale DAlgerie as escrow agent.

The technical arrangement is a
anking document which defines the
Bsponsibilities of the Bank of England
ith respect to the escrow agreement
nd provides for the transfer of funds
ursuant to the other agreements.

.

background Information on
legotiations

Ifforts to obtain the release of the
ostages in Iran began when the
jnerican Embassy in Tehran was
eized on November 4, 1979. The direct

steps leading to the signing of this
agreement in Algiers on January 19-20,
1981, however, began on September 12,

1980, when Ayatollah Khomeini an-
nounced his four conditions for the
release of the hostages. Shortly
thereafter, the Iranian Parliament (Ma-
jlis) established a commission to draft a
detailed statement of Iran's position on
the hostage issue.

The Majlis, on November 2, 1980,
approved a more detailed statement of
conditions for release of the hostages
and delegated to the executive branch
the authority to implement these condi-
tions. The Prime Minister chose to
negotiate the issue through the Algerian
Government as intermediary between
Iran and the United States. Eight days
later, on November 10, the first U.S.
response to the Majlis resolution was
delivered and explained to the Algerian
negotiating team in Algiers.

On November 26, 1980, the Algerian
team delivered a series of Iranian com-
ments on the U.S. position; the U.S.
response to these comments and re-
quests for clarification was delivered to
Tehran on December 4, 1980.

The Iranians presented their
response to the U.S. clarifications to the
Algerians on December 19, 1980; the
Algerian team conducted discussions
with U.S. officials in Washington from
December 27-30, 1980. The U.S.
response to that communication was
delivered to Iran on January 3, 1981.
Four days later, on January 7, 1981, a
U.S. negotiating team, headed by Depu-
ty Secretary of State Warren M.
Christopher, arrived in Algiers to
facilitate further exchanges. Negotia-
tions continued between the U.S. team
in Algiers and the Algerian team which
was shuttling between Tehran and
Algiers.

The overall agreement was entered
into on the morning of January 19,

1981, and the final implementing ar-
rangements were completed on January
20, 1981. At that point, the 52 U.S. na-
tionals were released from Iran.

Effect of Agreement

The most immediate and obvious result
of these agreements is that they effected
the release of the 52 U.S. nationals who
had been detained in Iran for 444 days,
from November 4, 1979, to January 20,
1981.

As a result of this agreement, an
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal will be

established to arbitrate claims— in par-
ticular, the large number of claims of
U.S. nationals against Iran. The tribunal
will consist of nine arbitrators unless the
two governments agree on a larger
multiple of three. The United States and
Iran each appoint one-third of the ar-
bitrators. The party-appointed ar-
bitrators appoint, by agreement, the re-
maining third of the tribunal's members.

To implement these agreements,
President Carter issued 10 Executive
orders* on January 19, 1981, and Presi-
dent Reagan issued an 11th Executive
order** on February 24, 1981.

In addition to directing the establish-
ment of the escrow account described in
the agreements (Executive Order
12276), President Carter also directed
appropriate transfers of assets in the
United States and assets held in U.S.
banks overseas belonging to the Iranian
Government (Executive Orders
12277-12281). President Carter revoked
the trade embargo against Iran (Ex-
ecutive Order 12282) and placed restric-
tions upon transfer of property belong-
ing to the former Shah of Iran (Ex-
ecutive Order 12284). A commission was
established to study the issue of compen-
sation for the U.S. nationals held in Iran
(Executive Order 12285). President
Carter additionally ordered the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate
regulations prohibiting claims against
Iran relating to the seizure of the
hostages and their subsequent detention
(Executive Order 12283).

President Reagan issued Executive
Order 12294 on February 24, 1981,
suspending claims against Iran that may
be presented to the tribunal and provid-
ing that during the period of this sus-
pension such claims shall have no legal
effect in any action now pending in U.S.
courts.

Legal Authority

(1) U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sec-
tion 2 (Executive Power) and (2)
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) Section 202(a),
50 U.S.C. 1701(a).

'For texts of the agreements, see
Bulletin of Feb. 1981.

2The Executive orders are printed in the
Bulletin of Feb. 1981.

3For text see Bulletin of Apr. 1981. ■

day 1981

53

Middle East

U.S., Egypt Initial

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Following are the text of a joint
U.S. -Egypt statement issued in Cairo on
March 21, 1981, together with supplemen-
tary information made available to the
press that day.

JOINT STATEMENT

The United States and the Arab
Republic of Egypt on March 21, 1981,
took yet another step toward advancing
and strengthening their ties in mutually
beneficial areas by completing negotia-
tions on an agreement between the two
countries for cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.

The agreement reflects the intention
of the two countries to cooperate in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a
manner that supports energy develop-
ment and nonproliferation objectives.
The agreement will permit a number of
cooperative activities and exchanges be-
tween the countries when it enters into
force, including at the outset the
transfer from the United States to the
Arab Republic of Egypt of technology
and equipment for nuclear electric
generating capacity of about 2,000
megawatts electric and the enriched
uranium fuel necessary to support that
capacity.

The agreement fully recognizes the
Arab Republic of Egypt's ratification of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the
negotiations leading to initialing of the
agreement, the United States again
welcomed Egypt's decision to ratify the
treaty as yet another testament to
Egypt's strong commitment to peace in
the region and longstanding support for
the objectives of the Nonproliferation
Treaty.

The initialed agreement is now being
referred to both governments with a
view to completing the necessary pro-
cedures for its signing and entry into
force at an early date.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

United States and Egyptian negotiators
in Cairo initialed the proposed text of an
agreement for cooperation between the
two countries in peaceful uses of nuclear
energy on Saturday, March 21. This
agreement will specify the terms and
conditions forming the framework

within which various cooperative ac-
tivities and exchanges in this field may
take place. These include possible pur-
chase by Egypt from U.S. suppliers of
nuclear power reactors and low-enriched
uranium fuel for them, subject to agree-
ment with these suppliers on the terms
of any purchases Egypt may decide to
make. The agreement is, in most
respects, the same as agreements which
the United States has concluded with a
number of other countries; such
agreements are required by U.S. law for
the U.S. Government to permit the ex-
port of nuclear materials and equipment.
The agreement recognizes Egypt's re-
cent ratification of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and during these negotiations the United
States again welcomed Egypt's decision
to ratify that treaty.

The proposed agreement will now be
referred to both governments. For the
United States, the further procedures
necessary before it may enter into force
are specified in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended. After review by
the executive branch, the proposed
agreement will be submitted to the
President by the Secretaries of State
and Energy, accompanied by the views
and recommendations of the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the members of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. After the Presi-
dent has approved the agreement and it
has been signed by the two parties, it
will be transmitted to Congress. It may
enter into force after 60 days of con-
tinuous congressional session, unless
during that time the Congress objects by
concurrent resolution to our concluding
the agreement. ■

Lebanon

SECRETARY'S LETTER TO
PRESIDENT SARKIS,
APR. 7, 1981

Dear Mr. President:

I have talked to our Ambassador to Lebanon,
John Gunther Dean, and have asked him to
transmit this message to you.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
communicate with you and the Lebanese peo-
ple. The United States has always held
Lebanon in special esteem as a free and in-
dependent democracy adhering to the same

principles and ideals that Americans prize. In
this regard, I would like to convey to the
Government of Lebanon, and to you personal
ly, Mr. President, my respect and admiration
for the courageous efforts you have made to
defend these values in the face of the
violence which Lebanon has suffered.

Linked to our respect for the principles
of the Lebanese republic is our firm support
for the institutions of the Lebanese Govern-
ment. Now, Lebanon is facing renewed and
intensified crises -in Beirut, in Zahleh, and ir
the south. Against this background of in-
tolerable violence, I want to reaffirm most
strongly the support of the United States for
the Government of Lebanon. You have seen,
Mr. President, the statement of my govern-
ment calling on all parties to put an end to
acts of violence from within or without the
country, and stressing that it is in the in-
terest of all Lebanese to support fully the
constitutional authorities of Lebanon. We are
also making the most urgent and high level
contacts with concerned parties in support o:
your efforts to end this latest round of
violence.

I also have reconfirmed to all concerned
our strong support for U.N. peacekeeping ef
forts in south Lebanon and for the expansior
of the Lebanese contingents serving with
UNIFIL in its area of operations.

It remains our firm conviction that a
strong central government, based on the
democratic principles that you have so con
sistently and bravely upheld, is the only
guarantee of security for both the inhabitant
of Lebanon and her neighbors. Accordingly,
as we work now to help in putting an im-
mediate end to this most recent violence, we
are also calling on all parties, in and out of
Lebanon, to assist in expanding and strengt
ening the authority of the Lebanese Govern
ment in every part of the country. It is only
in this way that peace and security for all c;
be restored.

Please accept, Mr. President, on behalf
the Government of the United States and
myself personally, my admiration, apprecia-
tion, and firm support for your courageous
efforts to fully translate the ideals of the
Republic of Lebanon into actuality.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

I

1

mil

i

lie
it
sai
d

.:

'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman William J
Dyess. ■

P
U

Pi

Sii
at

54

DeDartment of State Bullet

NARCOTICS

International Narcotics Control

by Joseph H. Linnemann

Statement before the Subcommittee
m Inter-American Affairs and the Sub-
■ommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
m March 30, 1981. Mr. Linnemann is
Acting Assistant Secretary for Interna-
'ioNnI Narcotics Matters.

« Events of the past year, both in the
United States and abroad, have rein-
forced our view that international nar-
:otics control is an integral part of U.S.
foreign relations. I welcome this oppor-
ajnity to present the Department's
jverall international narcotics control
philosophy, describe our programs, and
olace our effort in a global context.

Illicit drug sales in the United States
are estimated at $65 billion. According
;o a Fortune magazine report of 1979
corporate earnings, only Exxon and
VT&T [American Telephone and Tele-
graph] exceeded that figure. In contrast,
;he overall Federal budget devoted to
;he suppression of drug abuse is roughly
51 billion. Approximately 95% of that
i amount is expended here in the United
States for law enforcement, demand
•eduction, and addict rehabilitation. The
•emainder is devoted largely to interna-
;ional programs planned and im-
Dlemented by the Bureau of Interna-
;ional Narcotics Matters. For FY 1982
:he Department is requesting $37.7
million for the Bureau's budget, approx-
mately $2.3 million more than our FY
1981 planned program.

The history of prohibition and of il-
legal immigration to the United States
demonstrates that our borders cannot be
sealed to forces attracted by the wealth
of this country. This does not deter us,
however, from doing what we can to re-
duce the illicit drug supply while solu-
tions to the domestic demand for illicit
narcotics are sought. The Department's
role in our international effort is to
motivate and assist foreign governments
in curtailing the production of illicit
drugs at their source and in immobiliz-
ing major traffickers who smuggle these
drugs into the United States.

Since the appointment of the
Department's Special Adviser on Nar-
cotics Matters in 1971, we have placed
highest priority on those drugs that
have the most serious health, social, and

economic consequences -heroin, cocaine,
and marijuana -in that order. Our pri-
mary goal has been to assist foreign
governments stem trafficking in these
drugs as close to the point of initial pro-
duction as possible.

The Department follows three gen-
eral approaches in pursuing that goal:

• Illicit production control and inter-
diction through enforcement;

• Drug income alternatives, where
necessary; and

• Demand prevention and reduction.

Underpinning these approaches is a
sustained diplomatic effort by the
Department and our overseas missions
to secure the cooperation of producing
and transit countries in the global fight
against drug abuse. Unless we insure a
cooperative international environment,
other U.S. Agencies, such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA),
U.S. Customs Service, or the U.S. Coast
Guard, could not operate effectively with
their foreign counterparts. More
specifically, the Department, through
government-to-government agreements
and appropriate international agencies,
seeks to provide the legal and organiza-
tional framework -seizure of illicit
assets, mutual judicial assistance, ship
boardings, and U.N. drug control con-
ventions-within which much of our in-
ternational effort is based.

The principal focus of our effort,
within these three general approaches, is
direct technical assistance. In FY 1982,
we are requesting $26.9 million for coun-
try programs, an increase of approx-
imately $2 million over planned FY 1981
levels, due largely to increased efforts in
Southwest Asia and our program in
Burma. To date, our most successful
country program has been our support
of Mexico's efforts to eradicate opium
poppies. Before the aerial eradication
program began in 1975, Mexico was the
leading source of heroin for the United
States. Substantial amounts of Mexican
heroin are still being seized, but the
herbicide program destroys an estimated
90% of the opium planted.

Drug Trafficking in Asia

In Southeast and Southwest Asia, the
target drug for our proposed program is
opium and the heroin which is refined
from it. In Southeast Asia, this means
the primary focus is in Burma and
Thailand; in Southwest Asia, Pakistan.

We shall also propose programs for
transit countries like Turkey, and in
both Southeast and Southwest Asia, a
regional cooperation project.

As in Latin America, the projects
proposed are of two general designs -
supply reductions and demand reduction.
Supply reduction projects attempt to
restrict the supply of illicit opiates
reaching the United States. Enforce-
ment assistance to police and customs
agencies and crop-income substitution
projects fit this design. Demand reduc-
tion projects are focused on limited de-
mand for illicit opiates. Frequently, in-
ternational traffickers get their start in
their own domestic drug market. At the
least, a reliable domestic market pro-
vides a cushion for traffickers suffering
hard times. We support a domestic pro-
gram of treatment and rehabilitation of
drug abusers and propose studies into
the nature and extent of drug abuse in
Asia. The Bureau believes demand re-
duction projects are an integral compo-
nent of our overall assistance. They aid
unfortunate individuals in countries
which are crucial to a successful effort
against drug abuse. The United States
advances its own interest while sincerely
and honestly helping our friends and
allies.

Southeast Asia. Opium is grown in
the rugged hill-country along the
triborder area of Burma, Thailand, and
Laos. Hill tribes, ethnically different
from the nationals of these three states
and, generally, at a lower level of
civilization, are the primary cultivators
of the opium poppy. They practice a
slash-and-burn form of agriculture, very
destructive of lumber resources and
watersheds, as they cultivate the poppy.

The opium is refined just along the
border between Burma and Thailand. In
this wild "no-man's land," covered by
very heavy jungle, neither Burma nor
Thailand have the ability to exert control
consistently. Bands of traffickers and
opium refiners take advantage of the
weakness of local governments, the
difficulties of the terrain, and the crazy
quilt pattern of ethnic and political in-
surgencies. Their income from the nar-
cotics trade means that they are well
armed and able to corrupt poorly paid
provincial officials. The so-called Shan
United Army (SUA) has achieved a pre-
dominant position in refining and
trafficking in the Thai-Burmese border
area.

Semirefined opium and its deriva-
tives move to market through various

May 1981

55

Narcotics

channels. We feel the largest part of
opium produced in the "Golden Triangle"
region of Southeast Asia transits
Thailand before it leaves the region. The
tendency for opiates to leave the region
via Thailand is encouraged, at least in
part, by the relative isolation and con-
trolled nature of the Burmese and Lao
societies. Nevertheless, some opiates
move through Burma by land to the
Tenasserim coast, then on to Malaysia,
and elsewhere by sea. We believe the
major trafficking routes, however, lead
over land to Bangkok and points south
in Thailand and Malaysia, then by air
and traveler concealment to destinations
outside the region.

Southwest Asia. Opium is offered
for sale relatively openly at towns along
the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. These tribal areas are not sub-
ject to Pakistani Government law or
control and have long resisted nontribal
authority. Opium and refined products
leave the tribal areas over land or by
camel caravans and truck. There is also
clear evidence of movement out by sea
and by air through Karachi. Some en-
forcement officials speculate that
shipments of Afghanistan and Pakistan
opium to meet the demand of Iran's
large addict populations frees up a por-
tion of Iran's production for movement
into Turkey's eastern province. Opium
can be refined into morphine base and
heroin at any point from the Pakistani
frontier to eastern Turkey. The re-
fineries used in this process are crude
and highly mobile. They are not easy to
locate and destroy.

Morphine base is also moved to
Turkey's porous southern coastline
where it is shipped to points in Italy for
further refining into heroin and move-
ment to the United States through Mafia
channels. Heroin moves directly over
land to Western Europe where it has
fueled an addiction epidemic of un-
precedented proportions and has the
potential for affecting our Armed
Forces.

Programs in Asia

To counter the threat from opium-heroin
production in Southeast and Southwest
Asia, we support programs designed to
reduce both the supply of and the de-
mand for opium and heroin. In FY 1982,
we are requesting $9 million for country
programs in Southeast Asia and $4.4
million for programs in Southwest Asia.
In Southeast Asia, international nar-
cotics control assistance supports en-
forcement efforts in Thailand and in

Burma. In Thailand, commodities such
as vehicles, narcotics test kits, and train-
ing are provided to narcotics enforce-
ment units of the Thai police and
customs.

In Burma our assistance supports
contract maintenance for fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft used to curtail
opium production. Recently, the destruc-
tion of more than 5,000 acres of poppies
was made possible by these aircraft to
ferry personnel to the isolated areas
where poppies grow.

Encouraging regional enforcement
cooperation is also an important goal of
our assistance. In Southeast Asia, the
Bureau has pursued this by funding
police training for students from the five
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] countries at the Thai
police academy. This goal has also been
advanced through the activities of the
Colombo Plan drug adviser, who is
dedicated to regional cooperation. From
its inception, the Colombo Plan drug ad-
visory program has received most of its
financial support from the United
States.

Through the "cross-posting
program" -one facet of this program -
the Colombo Plan finances the travel of
two officers working on the narcotics
problem in ASEAN countries. These
officers exchange positions for several
months to broaden their experience and
encourage international cooperation
against narcotics trafficking. We are re-
questing $150,000 in FY 1982 to support
the Colombo Plan's efforts.

In Southwest Asia, political turmoil
has prevented the Bureau from cooper-
ating with Iran or Afghanistan. It has
been estimated that if all the opium
presently stored in Pakistan were to be
converted into heroin, Pakistan alone
could supply the U.S. market at present
U.S. consumption rates for the next 10
years. We are attempting to strengthen
Pakistani narcotics law enforcement
efforts through training and commodity
assistance to the Pakistani Narcotics
Control Board, the Pakistani Customs
Service, and other agencies with en-
forcement responsibilities. Additionally,
we support income-crop substitution pro-
grams and addict treatment and rehabil-
itation. In Pakistan, the Bureau is plan-
ning a significant increase in efforts. A
total of $1.1 million will be provided for
the customs and board units and $1.3
million for the agricultural development
project in the northwest frontier prov-
ince to develop alternate income sources.

Geographic position has helped to

make Turkey an important trafficking
route for Southwest Asian heroin on its
way to Europe and the United States.
Our assistance is designed to respond to
the problem of generally tight budgets
in Pakistan by providing needed com-
modities and narcotics law enforcement
training.

Situation in Latin America

Latin Americans, because of their
geographical and cultural proximity, are
much more attuned to our society than
the inhabitants of the remote narcotics-
producing areas of Asia. They are more
aware of the perceived ambivalent at-
titude toward drug abuse among major
elements of our population. They also
are more aware of our inability to fully
enforce our own laws against the pro-
duction here of illicit drugs and mari-
juana. This relative familiarity with the
controversy over drug use here adds a
unique complication to our programs in
Latin America.

We frequently must convince influ-
ential private and public figures that the
United States -the ready market for
lucrative exports from their weak
economies -really wants them to take
strong and politically difficult measures
to control illicit production and traffick-
ing. Otherwise responsible Colombian
businessmen, for example, have charged
that their desire to eliminate Colombian
marijuana production is designed to
"protect the United States marijuana
producers' market." And some Carib-
bean officials, while accepting our pleas
that they improve their interdiction
efforts, have noted that our own judicia
procedures sometimes appear limited to
apprehending traffickers.

Ill

i

i
i

i

if

ut

ID

iiii

mi
in
B

K

i
te

iie
isi

;'.)!
[0

■■■

Bl
It

;ii

sti
it,

if;

Latin America's importance as prim
supplier of illicit cocaine and marijuana
for the U.S. market has increased as
production has expanded in Bolivia,
Peru, and Colombia. The latter is also a
major trafficking country. Our program
ing, based on unqualified successes in
Turkey and Mexico, has consistently
sought to attack the actual production i
the fields. Simultaneously, it attempts ti
implement projects and contacts towarc
improving affected governments' com-
mitments and abilities with regard to
both the interdiction of drugs as well as
legal action against major traffickers.

As Mexico's drive against heroin an
marijuana production became effective,
Colombia's role as transit point for co-
caine and producer of marijuana becam
predominant. Trafficking earnings are
now estimated to surpass those of coffe

'

56

n^nnrtmnnt r>.f Cto + /i DiiIIa+i

Narcotics

.. the national economy. This Colom-
lian-U.S. link has quickly proven to be a
devastating social and economic problem
for the small Caribbean states -
lahamas, Jamaica, and others -through
'hich the traffic passes. It is, therefore,
bilateral political problem for the
Jnited States in an area already sen-
sitive because of economic and security
hreats.

Progress in Latin America

[n FY 1982, $13.5 million, or approx-
imately 50% of our overall country pro-
gram assistance, is requested for our
,atin American initiatives.

Mexico. The joint U.S. -Mexican
jampaign to eradicate opium poppy con-
tinues to be very successful. Our FY
1982 planning assumes that the Mexican
jovernment will attain partial self-
iufficiency in most operational aspects of
',he eradication program. We shall con-
dnue to provide support for the remote
sensing program, which was developed
n conjunction with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and we will continue to provide some
■ :ommodity equipment. Our total input
will be $5.6 million, down substantially
'rom $18.5 million in 1978. We shall
work as closely as possible with the
Vlexican Attorney General's Office to
. iustain current controls and diminish
iirther production of opium from this
;raditional growing area on our border.
\s Mexican Government self-sufficiency
s established, our monitoring will con-
tinue, but our program costs will be
-educed appropriately.

Peru. Our FY 1982 programing con-
:inues with its long-term drive to
!■ diminish cocaine production, in part
ra through improved herbicide eradication
techniques but primarily through ap-
propriate participation in, and support
>; for, a major agricultural program in
a Peru's principal cocaine-producing area.
This support includes $2.9 million cover-
ing a wide spectrum of activities -some
directly connected with agricultural
work, others with the Peruvian enforce-
ment agencies such as the Guardia Civil,
Peruvian Investigative Police, and Peru-
vian Customs Service, whose work is
. essential to the success of control
through alternative crop programs.

Our Peruvian programs have been
designed to coordinate closely with and
be complemented by the rural develop-
ment program of the Agency for Inter-
national Development. We have worked
- for 2 years to initiate such a project in
the illicit coca area, which now produces

May 1981

an estimated 40-60 metric tons of illicit
cocaine annually. If sufficient funding
and multilateral commitment can be
garnered, we see real possibilities for
success in effectively diminishing illicit
Peruvian production.

Bolivia. Almost all program ac-
tivities in Bolivia have been suspended
in the wake of that country's July 17,
1980, takeover by a military junta close-
ly connected with cocaine trafficking.
Resumption of full programing in Bolivia
depends on a political decision as to the
possibility of achieving useful antidrug
results through cooperation with the
Bolivian Government. In light of the
consistent reporting which shows com-
plete complicity between Bolivian
enforcement agencies, the Bolivian mili-
tary, and major Bolivian traffickers,
resumption of programing is currently
impossible. If the situation changes
dramatically, we will seek reprograming
possibilities to reinstate effective
programs.

Colombia. Colombia continues to be
the major processor of cocaine
hydrochloride, supplying approximately
70% of the U.S. and world markets. It
also provides 70% of the marijuana
smuggled to the United States, with an
estimated 23,000-25,000 metric tons
produced in the 1980 harvest. Building
on previous programs totaling $19.7 mil-
lion in FY 1980 and FY 1981, the FY
1982 program will extend support at a
level of $2.7 million. The majority of this
new funding-$1.7 million-will be used
to assist the national police, as the
primary Colombian Government agency
for narcotics enforcement. Modest
amounts will support the Colombian
Customs Service, the Attorney General's
Office, and the Mission's project develop-
ment and support costs. Any effective
steps to move the Colombians toward at-
tacking their vast marijuana production
are hindered by two factors: our own in-
ability to suppress domestic marijuana
cultivation in the United States and our
being prevented from working toward
eradication through herbicidal spraying.

Ecuador. We have maintained a
program in Ecuador because of that
country's importance as a major traffick-
ing link for coca derivatives and cocaine
from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. For
FY 1982, a funding level of $480,000
will be provided to support ongoing in-
terdiction work by enforcement agencies
and to continue drug abuse education
efforts.

Brazil. Since 1979 Brazil has shown
evidence of becoming an important co-

caine transshipment country and the
principal source for acetone and ether
used in cocaine refinement in Bolivia.
Fairly sophisticated drug distribution
networks transship cocaine from Bolivia
through Brazil for ultimate transport to
the United States and Europe. Our goal
is to assist Brazilian federal police in
curtailing the processing and transship-
ment of coca derivatives destined even-
tually for the United States.

In FY 1981, the United States is
negotiating a project agreement with
the federal police, which is under the
responsibility of the Ministry of Justice
and is the agency within the Brazilian
Government with primary responsibility
for narcotics control. Approximately
$200,000 will support border interdiction
operations aimed at disrupting traffick-
ing at key spots on the Colombian and
Bolivian borders.

If supported by evaluation of the
success of the FY 1981 operations, we
will continue in FY 1982 to support the
federal police in its border interdiction
program for cocaine. About $500,000
will provide commodity support, train-
ing, and rental of necessary tactical air
transportation for Brazilian narcotics
teams in operations border areas and
other support costs.

The Caribbean. Trafficking routes
for 70% of the cocaine and marijuana
and a major portion of the illicitly pro-
duced dangerous drugs entering the
United States pass through the Carib-
bean. The impact of this flow on the
United States, especially Florida, has
long been obvious. The Attorney General
of Florida has reportedly described the
trade in cocaine, marijuana, and illicit
quaaludes in that State alone as "the
biggest retail business in our State,"
amounting to about $7 billion. But the
affected Caribbean countries are only
now beginning to perceive the serious
social, political, and economic problems
for themselves stemming from the
traffic. The matter has been raised
recently as a priority bilateral issue by
both the Bahamas and Jamaica; the lat-
ter is the source of approximately 25%
of marijuana smuggled into the United
States. We are undertaking a Caribbean
regional narcotics program aimed at
establishing a basis for better coordina-
tion among the Caribbean countries,
particularly Jamaica, the Bahamas, the
Turks and Caicos, and U.S. enforcement
Agencies -DE A, Coast Guard, and Cus-
toms. The main thrust of this funding is
to be used in improving interdiction
results in the Caribbean, pursuing

57

Narcotics

eradication efforts if deemed feasible,
and operational support efforts.

Narcotics Demand Reduction

In FY 1982, we are requesting $2.1 mil-
lion to support programs designed to
reduce demand for illicit drugs in coun-
tries which are involved in the produc-
tion or transit of drugs destined for the
United States. This effort has a direct
effect on our production control and in-
terdiction programs.

We have found that the existence of
a demand reduction program enhances
the awareness of local public leaders to
the potential or actual threat drug abuse
poses to the host society. This, in turn,
strengthens the government's commit-
ment to the production and trafficking
control programs which we emphasize.
We have also found, particularly in pro-
ducing countries, that stable populations
of illicit drug consumers provide an addi-
tional economic incentive to illicit pro-
ducers. These addicts are a ready local
market for relatively unrefined drugs,
like opium gum, and serve as a hedge
against fluctuations of the international
drug market.

Finally, large numbers of chronic
consumers of illicit drugs may de-
stabilize societies friendly to the United
States by reducing the availability of
effective manpower in the workplace;
supporting corruption, criminal traffick-
ing elements, and other drug-related
crime; and exacerbating other economic
and social problems. Malaysia, for exam-
ple, has identified the illicit drug prob-
lem as a major security problem.

Much of our effort in Europe is tied
in some way to pump-priming -increas-
ing European awareness of the scope of
the problem, sensitizing them to the
threat posed by the definite spillover
threat on U.S. and other NATO forces,
and stimulating European Community
support for international narcotic con-
trol programs in production areas. The
Department has encouraged a col-
laborative effort with the Federal
Republic of Germany (F.R.G.)-known
as the central working group -in which
[the U.S. Departments of] State and
Defense, as well as the DEA work with
several German agencies to increase the
effectiveness of domestic drug enforce-
ment and treatment programs, as well
as programs which affect the U.S.
military forces stationed in the F.R.G.
We have also provided limited technical
assistance to the Government of Italy
and have consulted with representatives
of other European governments, and we

work closely with the Vatican, which has
identified drug abuse as one of the ma-
jor problems confronting the family.

International Narcotics Control
Training

Our funded training activities are aimed
primarily at improving the enforcement
capability of foreign narcotics officials
and are designed to increase profes-
sional cooperation between U.S. enforce-
ment authorities and those of other
countries.

Most of the training is carried out
by the DEA and the U.S. Customs Serv-
ice in time-tested courses and in special
programs designed to meet specific re-
quirements. Both agencies conduct ad-
vanced courses for high-level foreign
officials in their U.S. training centers,
while training for line officials is general-
ly offered abroad in special in-country
programs. Beginning in FY 1982, DEA
will conduct its advanced international
narcotics-control training at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center at
Glynco, Georgia.

DEA and Customs also provide
courses to improve domestic training
capabilities of responsible agencies in the
cooperating nations. During FY 1980,
DEA and Customs provided training to
over 1,100 foreign participants in
courses overseas and in the United
States. Both DEA and Customs evaluate
their portions of the training program.
The overall training program was
evaluated by a contractor on behalf of
the White House Domestic Policy Staff
in 1980.

Our funded training also includes the
executive observation program, through
which senior foreign government
officials involved in narcotics-control ac-
tivities visit this country. Besides expos-
ing these key visitors to U.S. agencies
and procedures, this program develops
personal ties of communication and
cooperation between U.S. and foreign
government officials. During FY 1980,
we funded the visits of 13 senior govern-
ment officials from 8 countries.

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control

So far I have spoken mainly of our bi-
lateral narcotics control efforts, but we
also work through various multilateral
agencies and contribute to the U.N.
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNF-
DAC). I would like to cite here an im-
portant recent development by which
the U.N. drug control system will assist
us in reducing a major form of drug
abuse in the United States.

One of the most popular illicit phar
maceuticals here is methaqualone, first
marketed under the trade name Quaa-
lude. Hospital emergency rooms men-
tions of methaqualone during the first
three-quarters of 1980 totaled 3,374, up
almost 100% from the same period in
1979. Although most of the illicit metha
qualone has been smuggled from clan-
destine laboratories in Colombia, it ap-
pears that in the near future Colombia
may no longer be a major supplier. For
some time, we have urged the Colom-
bian Government to ratify the U.N.'s
Psychotropic Substances Convention of
1971 -the international agreement unde
which the shipment of licit raw material
for methaqualone, which is later
diverted to illicit production, can be con
trolled. The convention has serious
implications for domestic pharmaceutic;
industries which makes ratification a
sensitive economic issue.

As you know, the U.S. Senate did
not ratify the convention until last year
The Colombian legislature did so in
September 1980, and President [Julio
Cesar Turbay Ayala] Turbay signed the
ratification agreement on January 13,
1981. Colombia can now notify the
U.N.'s Commission on Narcotic Drugs
that licit imports of the raw materials
for methaqualone are prohibited. Ex-
porting countries, in this case the F.R.(
and Switzerland, are then obliged to hi
shipments to Colombia and, in doing si
cut off supplies now diverted to the
clandestine laboratories which supply
the U.S. market.

The U.N.'s own program activities
control illicit drugs are funded through
UNFDAC. Since its establishment in
1971, UNFDAC has helped to emphasi
the fact that the problems of drug abu:
know no national boundaries and, then
fore, require worldwide cooperation.
UNFDAC has also been able to work
with countries whose cooperation is vit
to U.S. narcotics-control interests but
where political circumstances inhibit
U.S. bilateral assistance.

We plan to contribute up to $3
million to the fund in FY 1982. The 19
program will support crop substitution
projects in countries producing the gri
majority of illegal opium, notably Bur-
ma, Thailand, Laos, and Pakistan.

With the support of Congress, we
tend to pursue our efforts to suppress
licit narcotics production and traffickin
as far from our borders as possible.

::

5!

'The complete transcript of the hearing
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Orfii
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

58

non-irtmflnt r\f Qtato Rulloti

REFUGEES

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for
Migration and Refugee Assistance

L W. R.

Smyser

Statement before the Senate Foreign
delations Committee on March 27, 1981.
Ir. Smyser is Acting Director of the
3ureau for Refugee Programs.1

The U.S. response to the worldwide
•efugee problem can be divided into
wo major components - refugee relief
rii ind refugee resettlement. Our basic
wlicy is to emphasize assistance to
n 'efugees overseas until they can either
i>e voluntarily repatriated to their coun-
ts iry of origin or resettled in place. Re-
settlement in the United States, or to
mother third country, is a solution of
ast resort for a very limited number of
■efugees.

tefugee Resettlement

''or the purpose of admitting refugees
o the United States, the Department is
.eeking $294 million in FY 1982 authori-
sation, which is an increase of $18
trillion above the level available under
he terms of the FY 1981 continuing
esolution. These funds will finance the
.dmission of 187,000 refugees to the
nited States, if the President confirms
hose admission levels following consul-
,tion with the Congress in September
accordance with the Refugee Act of
980. The current proposed FY 1982 ad-
issions level includes 144,000 Indo-
hinese refugees and 43,000 refugees
rom other parts of the world. This pro-
osed level for FY 1982 is 30,000 below
he level authorized for this fiscal year
nd nearly 45,000 below the FY 1980
onsultations level.

The anomaly of having decreased ad-
missions, at a time when nearly $19
nillion in additional financial authoriza-
tion is being requested, is explained by
■ligher fuel costs for transporting
refugees to this country, along with the
rrt i full implementation of the Refugee Act
, of 1980, which requires more equitable
treatment of refugees selected for ad-
J mission to the United States.

ss
Overseas Refugee Relief Programs

The most significant policy and financial
... changes in the FY 1982 refugee pro-
,'; gram are presented in the overseas

refugee relief programs. The funds
sought for these activities are generally
contributed to international organiza-
tions such as the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). As the Congress requested, the
executive branch planned to consolidate
funding for all refugee-related accounts
within the migration and refugee
assistance appropriation effective with
the beginning of FY 1981.

The delay in the enactment of the
Foreign Assistance and Related Pro-
grams Appropriation Act, however, has
made it very likely that this consolida-
tion of accounts will be postponed until
FY 1982. The effect of this consolidation
will be to transfer $66 million in require-
ments from other accounts within the
Foreign Assistance and Related Pro-
grams Appropriation Act to the migra-
tion and refugee assistance appropria-
tion account. Included in this transfer is
$52 million for the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) and $14.25
million for programs authorized in ac-
cordance with the authorities of section
495F of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Southeast Asia. For overseas
refugee relief in Southeast Asia, we are
requesting $60 million, a reduction of
$31 million from the amount available
under the terms of the FY 1981 continu-
ing resolution. These funds will provide
care and maintenance for Indochinese
refugees in the nations of first asylum,
the cash portion of the U.S. contribution
to the Khmer relief program, and also
provide English-language and cultural
orientation training to employable heads
of households selected for resettlement
in the United States.

Middle East. In keeping with our
commitment to the principle of freedom
of emigration for Soviet and Eastern
European Jewish refugees, the Depart-
ment is requesting $12.5 million to help
defray the cost of refugee resettlement
and assistance in Israel. These funds will
be contributed to the United Israel Ap-
peal for immediate and long-term
assistance in Israel to the thousands of
Jewish refugees who have been allowed
to leave the Soviet Union and Eastern
European nations over the past several
years.

Africa. To deal with the critical
needs of refugees in Africa, the Depart-
ment is seeking $77 million in FY 1982
authorization. While this is an increase
of $41.3 million over the amount
available under the terms of the continu-
ing resolution, $14.25 million of this in-
crease reflects the effect of the con-
solidation in this account of activities
previously appropriated to the Agency
for International Development (AID). Of
the total request for assistance in
Africa, $65 million will be contributed to
international organizations involved in
the provision of relief in that continent,
and the balance of $12 million will be
utilized for a variety of emergency and
bilateral activities, similar to those
previously funded by AID under the
authorities of section 495F of the
Foreign Assistance Act.

Near East. For refugee relief in the
Near East, the Department is request-
ing $92 million, an increase of
$88,370,000 above the level available
under the continuing resolution. This in-
crease includes $52 million resulting
from the transfer to this account of
financing for the U.S. Government con-
tribution to UNRWA, which provides
essential assistance to Palestinian refu-
gees. The balance of the request includes
$24.15 million for assistance through in-
ternational organizations to the 2 million
Afghan refugees expected to be in Paki-
stan in FY 1982, a $15 million adjust-
ment for UNRWA to incorporate the
effects of reprograming actions in past
years and enhanced financial support for
that organization, and a contribution of
$1 million to the overall Near East pro-
gram of the UNHCR.

Latin America. Another component
of our overall relief program provides
assistance to refugees in Latin America.
Our request for this activity is $1
million, a decrease of $220,000 below
the continuing resolution level due to
certain nonrecurring costs.

The $6.95 million which we are seek-
ing for contributions to international
organizations and resettlement assist-
ance activities includes requests of $4.45
million as the U.S. contribution to the
Intergovernmental Committee for
Migration (ICM), which was previously
called the Intergovernmental Committee
for European Migration, and $1.5
million as a general contribution to the
ICRC. The increases of $330,000 in our
proposed contribution to ICM and
$500,000 for the ICRC, signify our con-
tinuing support for these organizations,

May 1981

59

Refugees

which play a vital role in helping the
world community deal with the refugee
crisis.

The remaining $1 million requested
for this activity supports projects
designed to resettle refugees in nations
other than the traditional countries of
resettlement. We view this as one of the
more significant policy initiatives in-
cluded in this budget, since there are
certain resource-rich, but population-
poor, nations throughout the world
which may be willing to accept refugees
for permanent resettlement, if interna-
tional financial assistance is available.

Administrative Expenses

The last item in our request is $8.2 mil-
lion for administrative expenses. This
increase of $1.4 million over the com-
parable continuing resolution level
provides funding to establish 30 new
positions in the Bureau for Refugee Pro-
grams, which will strengthen financial
and program management; to finance an
enhanced program of evaluation and
audit; and to meet price increases for
ongoing activities such as travel, rents,
and supplies. Despite this period of
financial stringency, there are certain
crucial needs in the Bureau which can
only be met by establishing new posi-
tions. In particular, I am referring to
such complex nev/ needs as the refugee
programs in Pakistan, Somalia, and
Kampuchea and the management re-
sponsibilities encumbent upon a program
which has available over $500 million in
Federal resources. I would now like to
discuss briefly the outlines of the FY
1983 migration and refugee assistance
authorization needs. For that year, we
are seeking $460 million in program
authorization. This request is $93 million
less than what we are seeking for FY
1982. This decrease reflects a projected
reduction in the rate of Indochinese
refugee resettlement to the United
States, since the refugee situation in
Southeast Asia is expected to continue
to improve, along with other program
decreases in areas such as Khmer relief.
The balance of the authorization request
projects no significant changes from the
activities which I have just described for
FY 1982.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and win
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for
African Refugees

by W. R. Smyser

Statement before the Subcommittees
on Africa and on International
Organizations of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 19, 1981.
Mr. Smyser is Acting Director of the
Bureau of Refugee Programs.1

I am pleased to discuss with you our
program of assistance for African
refugees. At the time of the Department
of State's testimony before the Africa
subcommittee last year, Africa's refugee
problem, although of immense magni-
tude, was not well known to the world
community. Today this is no longer the
case. The world's attention is focusing
more and more on the needs of the
several million refugees in Africa. This
is a welcome development to all people
who are concerned about the very large
number of Africans who are victims of
civil strife and political persecution. I
should add also that increased world
awareness of this major humanitarian
problem is a matter of crucial impor-
tance to U.S. policy interests. Several
African countries which are our staunch
friends are seriously affected by the
presence within their borders of hun-
dreds of thousands of homeless and
destitute refugees.

The U.S. Government, over the past
year, has made substantial contributions
to ongoing multilateral efforts on this
issue. We and others have worked suc-
cessfully to raise the world's awareness
of this critical humanitarian and political
problem. Subsequently, we have begun
to see the results of these efforts in in-
creasing availabilities of international
assistance for African refugees. There is
no question that our government's
efforts were strengthened at each step
in this process by close collaboration be-
tween the Administration and concerned
committees and individuals in the Con-
gress. We, therefore, look forward to con-
tinuing in a cooperative effort with you
and others in Congress to make sure
that the United States does its share to
strengthen the international commu-
nity's refugee relief efforts in Africa.

The Department's mandate includes
both the care and maintenance of
refugees in their countries of asylum
outside the United States and the reset-
tlement of refugees in this country. In

irtk
■

II

ssist

(iti
F

-
(tte
ide

the African context, the first of these
functions is by far the more important
due to the nature of the African refuge
situation. Nevertheless, in the past yeai
we have made significant progress in in
plementing an appropriate African
refugee admissions program as well, in
accordance with the provisions of the
1980 Refugee Act.

The implementation of our African
refugee program has been an interde-
partmental effort. As a result of the
division of responsibilities within the
U.S. Government, assistance for
refugees falls within the mandate of the
Department of State and assistance for
internally displaced persons falls almos
entirely within the mandate of the Age
cy for International Development (AID
Further distinctions exist between
emergency relief assistance for refugee
and long-term development assistance i
infrastructure building as these affect
refugee relief operations and refugee
resettlement. There is also a distinctior
between nonfood relief for refugees an
food assistance.

Congress has provided funds to
different agencies and offices to cover
these assistance needs. But, obviously,
these functions are often interrelated,
and distinctions are at times hard to
draw. Consequently, the Department c
State has collaborated closely with the
Department's Bureau of African Affaii
and offices in other government agen
cies-all of the Agency for Internatio
Development, primarily AID's Office o
Food for Peace and the Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance -to insur
that the long- and short-term food am
nonfood needs of the refugees and
displaced persons in Africa are taken i
to consideration.

U.S. Efforts

For FY 1981, the Department of Statu
requested a total of $54 million in non
food aid for African refugees. This
figure includes $35 million for the U.N
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), $7 million for the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), and $12 million for special pre
ects and bilateral assistance. Although
we are operating under the terms of a
continuing resolution, we are taking
steps, possibly including reprograming |
actions and reallocation of other

Refugees

I1 resources available to the Department,
to insure that nonfood contributions to
African refugees in FY 1981 will be
funded, at least, at the $54 million level

(for the entire fiscal year. To date in FY
1981, we have pledged $28.3 million to
the UNHCR's general program for
Africa and $7 million to the ICRC. We
are also continuing to support a number
of urgent bilateral projects through
voluntary organizations and with the
assistance of the Public Health Service's
Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.

Food contributions to refugees in
Africa are administered by AID's Office
of Food for Peace. Our FY 1981 food
contribution to African refugees is ex-
pected to total $42 million, which in-
cludes transport. The levels of our food
aid in 1982 will be determined later in
the year when food needs are more
clearly known.

For FY 1982, the State Department
has requested $77 million for nonfood
aid for African refugees. The Agency
for International Development's FY
1 1982 request also includes $20 million
for long-term resettlement projects for
refugees and displaced persons.

The bulk of the funds expended by
the Department of State for African
refugees is channeled through interna-
tional organizations. In FY 1980, for ex-
ample, 84% of the $56.1 million U.S.
Government contribution of nonfood
refugee assistance was made through
the UNHCR and the ICRC. We intend
' to continue our multilateral approach in
FY 1981 and FY 1982.

Internationalization of African
refugee relief is clearly our most
desirable and effective option. This is
true for two reasons. First, by making
the international organizations the focal
point for refugee relief, the responsibili-
ty for providing needed humanitarian
assistance correctly rests on all donor
nations rather than solely on the United
States. Second, it is in our political in-
terest to involve other nations in this
effort.

I should stress that reliance on inter-
national organizations does not reduce
the role of the Department of State in
the area of African refugee relief.
Rather, in order to insure that refugees'
needs are being met and that the inter-
national organizations remain account-
able for their activities, we have under-
taken a multiplicity of functions on a
continuing basis. These responsibilities
include monitoring the conditions in
Africa which create refugee problems;
evaluating the relief programs carried

May 1981

out by the international organizations in
support of the African refugees; and
working closely to accomplish these pur-
poses with a broad group of the in-
terested parties, including African and
other governments.

Since our last appearance before the
Subcommittee on Africa, our efforts
have taken many directions. We view as
some of our more noteworthy ac-
complishments over the past year:

• The establishment of the Somalia
Refugee Working Group in early 1980,
which, in the initial stages of the Somali
refugee emergency, provided critically
needed food and other relief supplies
and which, I am convinced, assured the
survival of the refugees;

• The successful completion of on-
site situation assessments in Somalia,
Sudan, Djibouti, Cameroon, Zaire, and
other African countries which have led
to realistic planning and more ap-
propriate responses by the international
organizations, the U.S. Government, and
other donors; and

• The establishment of excellent
communications and collaboration within
the U.S. Government and between us
and affected African governments, other
donor nations, the private voluntary sec-
tor, and international organizations.

In addition to the above, during the
past year, U.S. funding for African
refugee relief rose considerably over the
previous years' levels. Total U.S.
assistance for African refugees, in-
cluding food and nonfood and from
State Department and AID sources, rose
from $63 million in FY 1979 to nearly
$105 million in FY 1980. The U.S. con-
tribution to refugee relief in Somalia
alone in FY 1980 totaled $53 million. In
Somalia, our contribution of 114,000
metric tons of food in FY 1980, valued
with transport at $35 million, repre-
sented approximately 80% of all food
donated to Somali refugees in that year.
Our contribution of $ 18 million worth of
nonfood assistance to Somali refugees
was close to one-half of all such con-
tributions. In the future, I believe that
1980 will be seen as a turning point in
our government's recognition of African
refugee needs.

I would like to mention briefly
another aspect of our African refugee
program for 1980. That is our African
refugee admissions program. Most refu-
gees in Africa traditionally have been
welcome to remain in African countries
of asylum. This is a humane and praise-
worthy attitude, and we should do what

we can to support its continuation. For-
tunately, this situation still prevails, and
we consider it to be in the best interests
of the African countries and of the in-
dividual refugees themselves. However,
in certain instances, settlement in an
African country is not possible. Last
year following the enactment of the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 and with the help of
the Department of Justice and of numer-
ous American voluntary agencies, we ex-
panded our program of African refugee
admissions to the United States. This
program has as its aim to provide reset-
tlement opportunities to those who are
in genuine need while avoiding an un-
necessarily traumatic separation for
large numbers of people from familiar
climates and cultures. As part of this ad-
missions program, we have retained the
necessary latitude to offer resettlement
to urgent cases from any country in
Africa where refugees come to our Em-
bassies' attention.

Critical Problems

Calendar year 1981 promises to present
new challenges to our African refugee
program. One of the most troubling
aspects of the current situation is that
several ongoing conflicts in Africa will
probably not soon reach solutions which
would allow the refugees to return to
theiv homes. As a result, the monumen-
tal assistance requirements which have
arisen over the past few years will per-
sist. This state of affairs is further ex-
acerbated by the fact that both the
asylum countries and the donor coun-
tries are facing serious internal econom-
ic difficulties.

Today's most critical African refugee
problems are in Somalia, Sudan,
Djibouti, Zaire, and Cameroon. In
Somalia the situation is especially acute
where refugees from the fighting in
Ethiopia have been arriving at an
average rate of more than 1,000 a day
snce October 1979. Earlier this year,
the Government of Somalia estimated
thj refugee population in the more than
35 camps at over 1 million. Some half
million more refugees in Somalia are
believed to be struggling to survive out-
side the camps. However, because num-
bers of refugees often are difficult to
estimate, a new assessment of the scope
of tne Somali refugee population will
soon be undertaken. The currently esti-
mated requirements for the refugees in
Somalia for 1981 are $85 million worth
of nonfood assistance and 283,000

61

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

metric tons of food. The U.S. Govern-
ment intends to continue its support for
refugee relief in Somalia within the
framework of the ongoing needs of that
situatu n.

Sudan is host to nearly 500,000
refugees, over 350,000 of whom are
Ethiopians who have fled either the
Socialist revolution or widespread on-
going strife in their home country. Tens
of thousands of Ethiopian refugees have
crowded into many of Sudan's cities
while another even larger group is con-
centrated in the rural areas of Sudan
along the Ethiopian border. In addition
to the Ethiopians in Sudan, nearly
100,000 Ugandans are living in the
eastern Equatoria province near the
1 [ganda and Zaire borders.

Zaire's already large refugee popula-
tion grew during the last quarter of
L980 when tens of thousands of
residents of the West Nile district of
Uganda fled disturbances in that area
and joined the 54,000 Ugandan refugees
who had come to northeastern Zaire in
1979. A recent U.S. Government study
estimated a current total of 80,000-
100,000 Ugandans living in northeastern
Z.aire but found that the refugees fre-
quently move back and forth across the
border to acquire food and to escape
military or rebel harassment on both
sides. In addition to the Ugandans, Zaire
is hosi to approximately 400,000 other
refugees, mostly from Angola.

Following the outbreak of fighting in
Ndjamena in March 1980, much of the
population of that city fled across the
river to Kousseri, a small village in
northern Cameroon. Approximately
80 000 Chadian refugees in Cameroon
are still in need of relief assistance.

International Conference

Africa's refugee problems will be at the
forefront of the world's attention next
month when an international conference
for assistance to refugees in Africa
meets in Geneva April 9-10. The con-
ference, which is in response to a
General Assembly resolution calling for
increased assistance for Africa's
refugees, is jointly sponsored by the
U.N. Secretary General's office, the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, and
the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). It is expected that a large num-
ber of European and African countries
will be represented at the ministerial
level or above. The composition of the
U.S. delegation will be announced in the
near future.

R2

FY 1982 Security Assistance
Requests

Statements by James L. Buckley,
Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology on March 19,
1981, and Richard R. Burt, Director.
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, on
March 23, 1981, both before the Subcom-
mittee on International Security and
Science Affairs of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.1

UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY,
MAR. 19, 1981

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee in support of
the Administration's legislative and bud-
getary proposals for security assistance
in fiscal year 1982. I would like to stress
at the outset that this Administration re-
gards all of our foreign assistance pro-
grams as important instruments of U.S.
policy abroad. Both security and
development assistance serve our long-
range interest in stability and in encour-
aging an international environment con-

jtanci
{toyed

Bit of :

jdeve

ducive to peaceful change. If the in-
creases we are recommending for FY
1982 development assistance over the
levels available in this fiscal year are rel
atively modest in comparison to those
we are seeking for security assistance,
this should not be construed as any loss
of faith in the value of these programs.
Rather, it stems from our view that
there is an immediate and pressing need
to increase the security assistance re-
sources this country is making available
to its friends and allies.

Before turning to the details of our
security assistance request, I would also
like to note that this Administration be
lieves there has been a tendency in the
past to overemphasize the differences
between security and development
assistance and to lose sight of their com
mon goals. Insufficient coordination at
times resulted in foreign assistance not
being employed in the most effective
manner to support our foreign policy
and national security interests. To
remedy this situation, Secretary Haig

(jtlOI

lairs v

ec

id

is a]

JtlOI

U
m
jets
w

ira

The United States has supported the
idea of the conference since its inception
am I views the success of this conference
as an important aspect of our policy
toward Africa in general and toward
refugee relief in particular. Accordingly,
for the past few months we have lent
our support to efforts to insure that the
conference will satisfy the purposes of
the recipient and the donor countries
a! ke. These efforts have included discus-
si ns with African governments and the
O- U, the European Community, the
De -elopment Assistance Council of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, the U.N. Secretary
General's office, and the High Commis-
sioner for Refugees. We feel confident
that these efforts have been worthwhile,
and we are looking forward to the con-
ference in Geneva as an opportunity to
express to the African governments and
the world community our concern over
the plight of African refugees and our
support for international efforts to assist
them. We intend to announce a level of
U.S. assistance at the conference which
will be supportive of the needs of
African refugees. It is our hope that the
conference will serve to encourage other
donors also to contribute generously to
African refugee relief.

il:

lit

a
\i

Future Concerns

A look to the future for improvement ir
the current refugee situation in Africa i
not encouraging. Signals in certain part
of Africa, and the African security situa
tion in general, are unsettling to the
point where we would be unwise not to
anticipate future needs. A disturbing
proof of this trend is that, over the past
few years, the number of African refu-
gees assisted by UNHCR programs has
grown from 700,000 to over 3 million. I
is uncertain when this alarming expan-
sion will cease.

Given the current conditions and th<
outlook for the future, it is essential tha
the channels of communication which
have developed over the past year re-
main open and that close collaboration
with all interested parties continues. Th
role of our office in this process has
developed significantly since we last
testified before the Africa Subcommit-
tee. We will continue to look to the Con
gress for support and assistance on
these important issues.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Oftce
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

DeDartment of State Bulletii

Security Assistance

ej

.s asked me to assist him in providing
erall policy guidance for foreign
sistance and to insure that all
sistance funds and programs are being
nployed to our best advantage. To this
id, I will coordinate for the Depart-
ent of State both security assistance
id development assistance resource
locations. I will be working closely
ith the Under Secretary for Economic
ffairs who has specific responsibilities
the economic assistance area. This
ternoon, however, in accord with your
vitation, I am here to discuss the
curity assistance program.

i eneral Framework

i his appearance yesterday before the
11 committee, Secretary Haig empha-
sed the importance which this Admin-
Dration attaches to security assistance

an integral component of our global
tfense posture and as a key instrument

our foreign policy [see Current Policy
o. 264]. In so doing, he underscored
e increasing challenges which the
)viets and their clients have posed to
ir most important interests -in South-
est and Southeast Asia, Africa, and
antral America. Clearly these chal-
nges, as well as those evidenced in the
lparalleled buildup of Soviet conven-
)nal and nuclear forces over the past
;cade, cannot go unanswered. To meet
,ese challenges, however, we must not
lly strengthen our own military forces;
e must also give urgent attention to
te security requirements of our friends
id allies, whose strength and support
institute major pillars of our own
icurity.

Security assistance programs con-
ibute directly to the security of the
nited States in a number of specific
ays.

• They bolster the military capabil-
iesTof our friends and allies, permitting
'• lem in some cases to undertake respon-
fe! bilities which otherwise we ourselves
light have to assume. Greece and Tur-
ey are examples of countries whose
lilitary forces carry out duties which
re crucial to U.S. security interests,
ach as contributing to a strong NATO
outhern flank and stability in the

(astern Mediterranean.
• They contribute to the broad
ooperative relationships we have
stablished with many nations which
«rmit either U.S. facilities on their ter-
itory or access by U.S. forces to their

facilities in time of threat to mutual in-
terests. U.S. defense expenditures would
be immeasurably higher if we did not
have overseas facilities available for
emergency situations.

• They help our friends and allies
provide for their own defense and fur-
nish tangible evidence of our support for
their independence and territorial in-
tegrity, thus deterring possible aggres-
sion. For example, the prompt and effec-
tive assistance we were able to provide
Thailand last year undoubtedly helped
bolster Thai resolve in the face of the
Soviet-supported Vietnamese forces ar-
rayed along that country's eastern fron-
tiers. This was a signal which was not
lost on either friend or foe.

• They provide a means of demon-
strating U.S. constancy and willingness
to stay the course in support of nations
whose continued survival constitutes a
basic purpose of our foreign policy.
Strong and unwavering support for the
independence and security of Israel has
been a hallmark of U.S. policy from ad-
ministration to administration.

• They help alleviate the economic
and social causes of instability and con-
flict. This is particularly important for
countries whose necessary military ex-
penditures would otherwise impose
severe strains on their economies.

It is within this context, then, that
the Administration has cast its FY 1982
security assistance requests. Because of
the direct relationship of these programs
to U.S. security interests, we believe
that they must be viewed as an exten-
sion of our defense programs and that
they should enjoy the same high-priority
funding. As a result, we are recommend-
ing significantly increased security
assistance programs and funding levels
over both the previous administration's
request and the FY 1981 levels for these
programs.

As in previous years, our FY 1982
budget request will fund five major pro-
grams: foreign military sales (FMS) fi-
nancing, the economic support fund
(ESF), the grant military assistance pro-
gram (MAP), the international military
education and training (IMET) program,
and peacekeeping operations. Since
Department officials representing our
regional bureaus are already appearing
before appropriate subcommittees in
support of individual country program
requests, I propose this morning to em-
phasize the overall scope and purposes
of our requests on a program-by-pro-
gram basis. In addition, I would like to

draw your attention to several new
features in the budget request and a
number of changes which we are recom-
mending in legislation governing these
programs in order to improve their ef-
fectiveness in furthering our national in-
terests.

FY 1982 Budget Request

For FY 1982, the Administration is re-
questing authorizations of appropriations
of $4.3 billion to finance security
assistance programs totaling $6.9 billion.
This represents a total program increase
of 8.4%, and a budget authority increase
of 27% over the previous administra-
tion's request. As compared to FY 1981
levels, our request constitutes an in-
crease of 30% and 57%, respectively, in
program and budget authority.

Foreign Military Sales Financing.

Foreign military sales financing assists
countries in which we have a security in-
terest to meet their legitimate defense
needs through the acquisition of needed
defense articles and services, including
training. For FY 1982 we are requesting
an appropriation of $1.48 billion to sup-
port a total FMS financing program of
$4.05 billion, to be furnished to 38 coun-
tries and to provide for one regional pro-
gram, as compared to an FY 1981 pro-
gram of $3.05 billion for 35 countries.
New programs are proposed for Yemen,
Djibouti, Portugal, the Bahamas, and
the eastern Caribbean.

The proposed FY 1982 FMS pro-
gram consists of three major elements:

• $2,573 billion which would be ex-
tended in the form of loans from the
Federal Financing Bank with repayment
guaranteed by the Department of
Defense. No new budget authority is re-
quired for such guaranties.

• $500 million in FMS credits for
Israel (for which $500 million in budget
authority is requested) on which repay-
ment would be forgiven; and

• $981.8 million for FMS credits to
15 countries and one regional program
at reduced interest rates (for which an
equal amount of budget authority is re-
quested).

Direct Credits. Before describing
the major FMS country programs which
would be funded from this request, I
would like to discuss briefly the need for
FMS credits at reduced interest rates.
As the Congress is aware, FMS financ-
ing was largely conceived as a means of

May 1981

63

Security Assistance

assisting developing countries to shift
from grant military assistance to cash
purchases at a time when they were ex-
periencing substantial economic growth.
Until recently, most nations were mak-
ing steady progress toward this objec-
tive.

The rise in oil prices, however, has
had a marked impact on economic
growth throughout the world. Serious
problems are developing as a number of
countries amass increasingly large debt
obligations to OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] mem-
bers and to the industrialized countries.
Moreover, there is growing concern
among a number of security assistance
recipients regarding the additional debt
burden they can prudently assume in
order to finance needed defense articles
and services.

This problem has been further ag-
gravated by the recent increase in in-
terest rates in this country. In the last
year, interest rates on FMS-guaranteed
loans -which are computed on the basis
of the cost of the money to the U.S.
Government plus a modest administra-
tive charge -have risen as high as 15%.
These two trends -increasing debt
burdens among recipient countries and
rising Federal Financing Bank interest
rates -have combined to produce a situa-
tion in which countries with particularly
weak economies are facing serious dif-
ficulties in financing their purchases
through this mechanism.

To deal with this problem and to in-
sure that legitimate security needs are
met without further exacerbating
economic problems, we are proposing
that a portion of the FY 1982 FMS
financing program be made available in
the form of direct U.S. Government
credits. We plan to offer these credits at
a rate of interest as low as 3%. The
countries selected, which include Egypt,
Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, and Portugal,
are those facing particularly difficult
economic situations and in which we
have important security and foreign
policy interests.

Regional Programs. As in previous
years, the bulk of our FMS financing
program is allocated to countries of the
Middle East in support of our major
security and foreign policy interests in
that important region. The increased
levels requested for FY 1982 are also in-
tended as a response to recent Soviet
and Soviet-supported moves against
Afghanistan, in the Horn of Africa, and
in other areas important to the stability

64

of the region. Approximately 57% of the
total FMS financing program is slated
for Israel and Egypt.

As the primary source of assistance
to Israel, the large FMS financing pro-
gram reflects deep and abiding U.S. sup-
port for the independence and security
of that country. It has enabled Israel to
maintain its defenses at a level
necessary to insure its own security.
Moreover, this increased security has
helped Israel to pursue peace negotia-
tions with Egypt. The proposed FY 1982
FMS financing program of $1.4 billion
would enable Israel to continue to
finance its priority military requirements
for air defense, high-performance air-
craft, armored and tracked vehicles, ar-
tillery, missiles, and ammunition. Of this
amount, $500 million would be forgiven,
in recognition of the unusually heavy
burden which defense expenditures im-
pose upon the Israeli economy. We are
confident that, with the proposed
assistance, Israel will continue to be able
to defend itself against all likely com-
binations of possible adversaries for the
next several years.

For Egypt, which under President
Sadat has become a major force for
moderation in the Middle East, the pro-
posed FMS program of $900 million
($400 million of which will be in the
form of credits at reduced interest rates)
will assist that country in modernizing
its military force to insure its security
against significant external threats from
Libya and other Soviet-supported
sources of instability in the region. I
would note that virtually all of these
credits will be applied to pay for U.S.
equipment ordered in previous years, in-
cluding F-16 aircraft, air-defense bat-
teries, armored-personnel carriers, and
M60A3 tanks, almost wholly intended to
replace existing Soviet-origin equipment.

Turkey would receive the third
largest FMS program -totaling $400
million, of which $250 million would be
provided at reduced interest rates in
view of the particularly difficult
economic situation facing that country.
Other major FMS programs are re-
quested for Greece ($260 million), Korea
($167.5 million), Spain ($150 million),
Sudan ($100 million), Tunisia ($95
million), and Thailand ($80 million).

Economic Support Fund. The eco-
nomic support fund allows us to furnish
economic assistance in the form of loans
or grants to selected countries of special
security and political interest to us. ESF
can be used to fund commodity import

programs, economic infrastructure and
other capital projects, balance-of-
payment support, and assistance for
development projects of more direct im
pact on the poor. We realize that
economic stability is often a basic
precondition for political stability.

For FY 1982, we are requesting a
total ESF program of $2.6 billion to
fund 30 country and regional programs
This represents an increase of 26% ove
the FY 1981 level and about 6% over
the previous administration's request.

Of this amount, we are requesting
$250 million in unallocated ESF funds
for use in responding to unforeseen re-
quirements where such assistance can
support important foreign policy objec-
tives. We believe the resulting flexibilit
to be of the utmost importance in help-
ing meet unforeseen contingencies. It is
obviously impossible in March of 1981 t
predict all needs that may arise during
fiscal year beginning 7 months from
now. In the past, we have had to rely c
supplemental or reprogramings to re-
spond to developments unanticipated a |
the time of our budget requests.

However, experience has shown thi
neither we nor the Congress have foun 5
these procedures to be satisfactory. Su
plemental requests are time-consuming
and lessen the political and economic ir •
pact of our assistance. Reprograming i
also a cumbersome process and require
sacrificing one important policy objecti
for another. For example, in the past 2
years we have had to reprogram to me
important unanticipated ESF needs in
Thailand, Liberia, and in countries in t
eastern Caribbean, Persian Gulf, and
Southwest Asian regions.

Reprograming becomes even more
difficult in fiscal years when most of oi
programs are earmarked or for compe
ling policy reasons are otherwise
unavailable for reprograming. In FY
1981, for example, about 87% of our
ESF program is earmarked by law. As
result, funds which can be shifted frorr
one purpose to another to respond to u
foreseen events are severely limited. It
is, of course, for this reason among
others that the executive branch con-
tinues to oppose statutory earmarking.

I should note that the Congress
itself recognized this problem when las
year it adopted an amendment propose
by the distinguished chairman of this
committee [Clement J. Zablocki] that
makes available for any emergency ES
use up to $50 million in FY 1981 ESF

si>.

(8,1

l cm
idoi
•:":;
ana!
ipiii

■■:'

lati

:■"■

•§

pi

Department of State Bullet

to

nd

Security Assistance

ids, and permits up to 5% of any ear-
larked funds to be used for such pur-

. hse. Inasmuch as our proposed legisla-
>n contains no FY 1982 earmarkings,

i'3 do not propose the retention of that
'ovision. Our request for $250 million
■unallocated ESF, rather, builds upon
e purpose that that provision was in-
Tided to serve, namely, to increase the
•ailability of ESF to meet requirements
at cannot be anticipated at the time
ir annual security assistance programs
e formulated and proposed to the Con-
•ess. I can assure you that this
lallocated ESF would be used only for
;uations of high priority and in accord-
ice with the substantive and pro-
dural standards of the law, including
irmal reprograming notification re-
tirements.

Regional Programs. Turning to our
'SF country programs, the majority of
nds requested would be used to pro-
de economic assistance to the countries
the Middle East; as has been the case
previous years, Israel and Egypt
ould receive the largest amounts. The
'85 million ESF program we are re-
lesting for Israel would be in the form
' a cash transfer, two-thirds grant and
le-third in loans. Israel is expected to
;e these funds for balance-of-payment
ipport, to procure essential com-

Sodities, and to ameliorate conditions
hich have produced its current,
/erheated economy. For Egypt, we are
jquesting an ESF program of $750
dllion, also two-thirds in grant and one-
drd in loans. These funds would be
sed to finance commodity imports,
aeded infrastucture improvements, and
icreased health, education, and
•ansportation services.

Important ESF programs are also
a equested for Turkey ($300 million),
i >udan ($50 million), Zimbabwe ($75
lillion), the southern Africa program
, $60 million), Jamaica ($40 million), El
ialvador ($40 million), and the Philip-
« >ines ($50 million).

Military Assistance Program. In

Dntrast to previous years, we are pro-
| osing no new grant military assistance
: ountry programs. Nevertheless, given
ne growing challenges to our interests
1 1 several crucial regions, we wish to re-
am the flexibility to use such assistance
|( i situations where only it can do the job

.nd which do not meet the criteria for
I mergency "drawdowns" under section
i '06(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
j 961, as amended.

Accordingly, our MAP budget pro-
posal thus includes, in addition to
general costs -which consist of ad-
ministrative expenses and costs related
to the implementation of prior year pro-
grams-$100 million in unallocated
funds. These funds will give the Presi-
dent the flexibility to provide grant
military assistance in unforeseen situa-
tions when diplomatic and political cir-
cumstances directly related to U.S. na-
tional interests and the economic situa-
tion of the proposed recipient so require.
As with the ESF special requirements
fund, we would, of course, notify Con-
gress of each intended use of these
funds in accordance with standard
reprograming procedures, and the
assistance to be provided would be fur-
nished in accordance with the substan-
tive authorities and limitations ap-
plicable to MAP.

International Military Education
and Training Program. In the con-
sidered judgment of our Ambassadors
abroad, the international military educa-
tion and training program has been
perhaps our most cost-effective security
assistance program. We are requesting
$47.7 million for this program in FY
1982, which would allow training and in-
struction for military and related civilian
personnel from 72 countries. This com-
pares to an FY 1981 program of $28.4
million which provides training for per-
sonnel from 63 countries.

Over the years, executive branch
officials have stressed the benefits which
accrue to the United States as a result
of IMET training. This training does far
more than upgrade the military
capabilities of allied and friendly nations.
It also fosters long-range, close, and
cooperative relationships with military
and civilian leaders in a number of im-
portant countries, while exposing them
to American democratic values and to
the role of a professional military
organization under civilian leadership
and direction.

This committee's initiative of last
year to reduce the tuition rates on
IMET training has facilitated the ex-
posure of greater numbers of foreign
students to this valuable program. In-
deed, these lower training costs have
finally stopped the long-term decline in
the annual numbers of students trained
between FY 1975 and FY 1980 and are
helping to restore the program to its full
utility at modest cost. Nevertheless, our
identified requirements are clearly ex-
panding, especially in the Persian Gulf
region, Central America, the Caribbean,

and Southeast Asia. The increased levels
we are requesting would meet these re-
quirements by allowing programs for
nine more countries than in FY 1981. In
addition, they would allow remedial ac-
tion in programs adversely affected by
underfunding in past years.

MR. BURT,
MAR. 23, 1981

I am pleased to appear before your sub-
committee today as you continue your
examination of the Reagan Administra-
tion's security assistance proposals for
fiscal year 1982. This is my first ap-
pearance as an Administration witness
before a congressional committee. It is
an experience to which I have long
looked forward.

Legislative Proposals

Last week before your subcommittee,
Under Secretary of State Buckley went
into some detail on the Administration's
FY 1982 security assistance request. I
will try to avoid going over the same
ground; instead, after making a few
remarks on our security assistance and
arms transfer policies, I will largely
confine myself to discussing their rela-
tionship to our plans for creating a new
strategic consensus in the Persian Gulf
and wider Middle East.

We recognize that we are asking for
a considerable increase in the size of our
security assistance programs. We also
realize we have done this in the face of
belt-tightening in domestic programs
and a lesser increase in our development
assistance request. However, as Secre-
tary Haig said last week before your
committee, our security assistance goes
hand-in-hand with our effort to reconsti-
tute America's defense capabilities. We
believe that we must confront the chal-
lenges to our vital interests with no less
a commitment.

In addition to the value of the coun-
try and regional programs themselves,
important elements in our security
assistance requests include:

• The $250 million in unallocated
funds for economic support fund (ESF)
special requirements;

• The $100 million in unallocated
funds for military assistance program
special requirements; and

• The modifications to legislative
authorities that we have proposed.

Vlay 1981

65

Security Assistance

The two special requirements funds
would enable us to respond rapidly in
unforeseen circumstances where other-
assistance is not available and where an
infusion of either ESF economic assist-
ance or military materiel would make a
critical difference in the successful pur-
suit of U.S. political and security in-
terests.

Similarly, the legislative proposals
would support our objectives by:

• Enhancing our arms cooperation
efforts with NATO and other allies;

• Helping to procure high-demand
equipment in advance to avoid drawing
down U.S. service inventories in the
event of urgent foreign needs;

• Facilitating the performance of
legitimate and important functions in
our overseas security assistance pro-
gram management; and

• Removing certain severe restric-
tions on the President's ability to con-
duct an effective and flexible foreign
policy.

Arms Transfer Policy

Last week, Under Secretary Buckley
also told this subcommittee that we have
started a review of conventional arms
transfer policy. He mentioned those
general principles that are guiding the
Administration's approach. Although the
review is still in progress, I would like to
elaborate on the Administration's think-
ing.

We consider arms transfers to be an
important implement of our global
defense posture and our foreign policy.
We believe they should be used in a
positive manner to advance our national
security interests.

Specifically, we intend to use arms
transfers for the following purposes:

• To strengthen the military capabil-
ities of friends and allies;

• To enhance important bilateral re-
lationships we have with other countries;

• To support our overseas basing
and access requirements;

• To send signals to friends and ad-
versaries alike about American deter-
mination to act on behalf of its interests.

Therefore, we are seeking to forge a
policy that will insure that arms trans-
fers contribute directly to U.S. security
interests; neither restraint for its own
sake nor an unrestricted cash-and-carry
attitude would accomplish this. In this
context, I want to assure the subcom-
mittee that any suggestion of an uncon-
trolled sales approach would be a com-
plete misreading of our intentions. In

fifi

addition, we are not only reviewing the
policy itself, but we are looking very
closely at our managerial and decision-
making structure to insure that lines of
authority are not confused and that
arms transfer decisions are made
efficiently.

Middle East/Persian Gulf

Let me turn now to the Middle East/
Persian Gulf. The Administration is ac-
tively formulating a strategic approach
to this critical part of the world. Our
goal is to produce an integrated and
coherent strategy to defend our inter-
ests throughout the region. Although
there are no final conclusions to discuss
with you today, I would like to give you
a sense of our objectives and the direc-
tion in which we are proceeding.

The United States has a fundamen-
tal interest in nurturing an environment
in the region in which the local states
are able to develop sound political and
economic institutions and relationships.
In order to realize our specific objec-
tives, we must:

• Demonstrate the ability to counter
the influence of the Soviets and their
allies;

• Insure continued Western access
to the oil of the Persian Gulf in adequate
quantities and at a reasonable price;

• Insure the continued existence
and strength of our friends in the
region; and

• Continue to work toward peace
between Israel and her neighbors.

In the wake of Iran's revolution, the
continued Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan, and the accumulation of Soviet
power in and near the Persian Gulf,
these objectives are increasingly
threatened. Regional states are ex-
periencing the turbulence which accom-
panies the modernization of traditional
societies. There exists a regional en-
vironment of endemic conflict springing
from political, religious, ethnic, ideologi-
cal, and economic differences. Revolu-
tion, external support of opposition
groups, and conflict between states are
the rule rather than the exception. Most
significant, the Soviets, capitalizing on
their surrogates and their geographical
proximity to the region, have exploited
and created opportunities to further
their interests to the detriment of those
of the West.

Our General Approach

We are resolved to meet these threats.
This means we and our Western allies

The

>'.

reai

IB

ski

will have to assist the local states so
that they can contribute to regional
stability and resist intimidation. We
must be prepared to resist these chal
lenges directly, if necessary, and we
must convince both our friends and op-
ponents that we are able and willing to
do so.

We view the Middle East, including
the Persian Gulf, as part of a larger
politico-strategic theater -the region
bounded by Turkey, Pakistan, and the
Horn of Africa -and we view it as a
strategic entity requiring comprehensive
treatment to insure a favorable balance
of power. It is our strong belief that im-
proving the security of the region is in
timately related to progress in the peac< ,
process between Israel and the Arab
states. In fact, only when local states
feel confident of U.S. reliability and
secure against Soviet threats will they
be willing to take the necessary risks fo
peace.

It is, thus, important to handle the
Arab-Israeli question and other regiona
disputes in a strategic framework that
recognizes and is responsive to the
larger threat of Soviet expansionism.
This endeavor will require clarifying th<
roles that we and our friends, both in-
side and outside the region, can and
must play, as well as the contributions
each of us are able to make to this
mutual effort. U.S. strategy consists of
several dimensions:

• Providing security assistance to
regional states;

• Maintaining a military presence i
the region;

• Building a reinforcement capabili
ty to deploy the necessary additional
forces in a contingency;

• Encouraging a role for local
states; and

• Gaining support from our Euro-
pean and Asian allies.

Let me address each of these dimei
sions in turn.

Security Assistance to Regional
States. Since you have received our re
quest for an additional $1 billion in
security assistance above the last Ad-
ministration's budget, you are well
aware of the importance we attach to
this dimension of our strategy. Much ol
what we will be asking regional states
do in our common interests will depend
upon security assistance resources bein
available to equip their armed forces.

Maintaining a Military Presence i
the Region. During the last years of tr

Plrtr^^, r+r

<nl ^* CtQtQ Rillloti

(1

:

Security Assistance

ter Administration, several impor-
initiatives were undertaken in this
l. They include:

An augmented naval presence,
:h now consists of the 5-ship
>EASTFOR [Middle East Force],
carrier battle groups, and regular
.oyments of a marine amphibious

Prepositioned equipment and sup-
5 at Diego Garcia for a marine am-
lious brigade;

A program for periodic exercises;

Negotiated access agreements
:h allow us to make facilities im-
/ements needed to support our
anced presence.

Iln Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we
. reached agreement to use and im-
/e certain air and naval facilities. In
ition, Egypt has offered to permit
. access to certain of its facilities,
, in consultation with the United
gdom, the United States is signifi-
By expanding its facilities on Diego
cia.

Certain improvements remain to be
lie to some of the facilities, and the
Igan Administration is committed to
ig so. This will include improving
ways, taxiways, and aprons; pro-
ng navigation aids and communica-
s; improving refueling facilities; and
iring or constructing storage space.
FY 1982, we have requested rough-
4475 million to support our military
struction program in Southwest
i.

In addition to carrying through with
it has already been initiated, we are
ewing options for greater access in
region, increased military construc-
I and a greater peacetime presence,
noving further to strengthen our mil-
| capabilities in the region, however,
will be sensitive to the political prob-
is that a permanent presence would
ail.

Reinforcement Capabilities. With
ard to reinforcement capabilities, our
'.cetime presence in Southwest Asia
i provide the basis for a rapid re-
>nse in many contingencies. But what-
r peacetime military presence we
intually attain, our ability to defend
al Western interests against a range
threats will continue to depend on the
•lity to augment rapidly our forces
:re. Specifically, we will be looking at
.ys to develop and improve on:

• Our deployable combat forces with
lining, equipment, and doctrine suited
likely contingencies;

el:ay 1981

,«•

• Support forces tailored for South-
west Asia;

• Mobility capabilities for both inter-
theater and intratheater movements;

• Overflight rights, as well as access
to en route bases and facilities, in order
to support airlift and sealift operations;

• Access to and improvement of re-
gional airfields and ports in order to per-
mit deployments in time of crisis;

• Prepositioning of stocks at region-
al facilities or on maritime preposition-
ing ships; and

• Secure land, air, and sea lines of
communication by which to deploy and
resupply our forces.

Clearly, then, we have multiple prob-
lems-all of which we are now address-
ing. But our principal goals are two: to
improve strategic mobility and to pro-
vide adequate prepositioning and to pro-
vide the support and resupply necessary
to sustain forces in Southwest Asia.

With regard to en route bases, facili-
ties, and overflight rights, our ability to
deploy forces rapidly to Southwest Asia
would depend on en route facilities for
refueling and to a lesser, but still impor-
tant extent, on overflight rights. Some
concrete, positive results have been
achieved, but a much greater effort is
needed if we are to approach our re-
quirements.

The Role of Local States

It is self-evident that in coordination
with the U.S. effort, local states have
essential contributions to make to re-
gional security. If they are to be able to
resist aggression and intimidation, they
must have confidence that they have
reliable and capable friends in the West,
ready to contribute to their stability
with balanced security and development
assistance, and ready to support them
militarily in a crisis. In short, we must
demonstrate that it pays to be an
American friend.

Many of the states of the region can
play key roles in helping us deter and
counter Soviet pressures and threats.
Some states, as I have noted, are
already making significant contributions.
We intend to initiate a frank dialogue
with our regional friends to explore
their thoughts on regional security, to
understand the limitations on what they
can do, to convince them that we are
sensitive to their concerns, and to per-
suade them of the need to contribute to
the common endeavor. As a part of this
security dialogue, we will make known
our view that present arms control pro-
posals for the Indian Ocean area offer
little prospect for enhancing security.

Allied Contributions

With regard to contributions our allies
can make, it is important for us to
realize that our Western allies share
many of our interests and that we can-
not-and should not -shoulder the entire
responsibility for the area. We recognize
that the threat to vital Western inter-
ests in the Persian Gulf region can be
met only if all concerned share the
burden and create a rational division of
labor to make greater contributions in
support of our common interests. Our
allies' stake in the region is at least as
great as our own, and we are asking
them to contribute more to its security
and stability. For obvious reasons, we
are not seeking a formal NATO role.
Rather, we have in mind individual but
complementary efforts in the following
areas:

• Increased defense efforts in West-
ern Europe and Japan can improve U.S.
flexibility to meet emergencies in South-
west Asia.

• Close political relations with na-
tions throughout Southwest Asia would
strengthen understanding of Western
objectives in the region and of our com-
mon interest in resisting Soviet aggres-
sion.

• Security arrangements between
our allies and countries in Southwest
Asia can help our friends in that region
strengthen their capability for self-
defense.

• Many of our allies can increase
their important economic support to
friendly countries in Southwest Asia and
in the eastern Mediterranean.

• Force deployments in Southwest
Asia by some European states can be
strengthened and coordinated with U.S.
military activities in the region. In addi-
tion, allies with important facilities, both
en route to and in the region, can ease
U.S. deployments and planning by
granting us access to these facilities as
needed.

In conclusion, let me just say that
the stakes are great, and the threats to
regional stability and U.S. objectives are
real and serious. We have not done
enough to answer these threats. All of
us, both within and without the region,
must do more on behalf of our common
security interests.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

67

SOUTH ASIA

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

by Jane A. Coon

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
March 23, 1981. Ms. Coon is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs. 1

I appreciate this opportunity to testify
on the Administration's proposed
assistance programs in South Asia for
FY 1982. It is important to put our pro-
grams in the context of this Administra-
tion's broad foreign policy objectives in
the region.

The invasion of Afghanistan, the
turmoil in Iran, and the increasing
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean
have had profound implications for our
relations with the countries of South
Asia. These developments have greatly
enhanced the importance we attach to
the area. We recognize it as the eastern
flank of a region in which vital interests
of the United States are at stake.

If these dramatic political and
strategic changes have heightened our
interest in South Asia, they also pose
new and difficult changes to the achieve-
ment of our foreign policy objectives
there. They have prompted this Ad-
ministration to undertake an urgent
review of U.S. regional policies. In this
review, we are giving careful attention
to the role our assistance programs can
play in meeting these challenges.

Let me outline for you the foreign
policy objectives we wish to achieve in
this populous region.

• We seek a South Asia of secure,
independent, stable states which live at
peace with one another.

• We want a region capable of
resisting aggression and subversion
from outside.

• We want a prospering South Asia
whose governments can act effectively
to develop their national economies and
improve the lot of their peoples.

• We seek to contain the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and the poten-
tial to develop them in the region.

• We seek friendly and constructive
ties with all the countries of the region,
fostered by mutual trust and recognition
that the United States is a steadfast and
reliable partner.

In planning assistance programs for
an area this large and this diverse, we

station

M0

have a mix of political, developmental,
and humanitarian objectives. These are
both complementary and mutually rein-
forcing. We recognize, for example, that
the political stability of these coun-
tries-a prime U.S. foreign policy objec-
tive in the region -depends on steady
economic development, a goal to which
we can make a valuable contribution. As
the Secretary noted in his testimony last
week, serious economic dislocations
"... create conditions for violent disrup-
tions, with dangerous political conse-
quences." I submit that we also have an
abiding American concern for those so
much less fortunate than we are. The
Secretary said that "... the United
States will not forsake its traditional
assistance to the needy of this
world -the sick, the desperate refugee."
As you well know, the poor and
populous South Asian Subcontinent has
all too many in these categories.

Our overall approach in planning our
assistance has been to devise a set of
lean programs which best meet this mix
of interests in South Asia at a time of
budgetary constraints. This has not been
an easy task. It has required a careful
balancing of claims on scarce resources
and a series of adjustments determined
both by our broader interests and, quite
frankly, by deferring ongoing and up-
coming programs in individual countries.
In some cases, this has meant scaling
down from the higher levels proposed by
the previous Administration. This may
lead to disappointment on the part of
the countries in the area. But we hope
they will recognize that their interests
will be better served by an economically
strong and resilient United States which
this Administration's budgetary policies
are designed to achieve.

Working within these limits, we
have developed programs for the South
Asian countries which in total funding
will be roughly equivalent in real terms
to actual aid levels in 1981. I want to
focus on how we see the programs in
terms of our foreign policy objectives in
each of the regional countries.

Pakistan

We are deeply concerned over Pakistan's
security; Pakistan is now a "front-line"
state facing 85,000 Soviet soldiers
across its borders in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's strategic location, at the
eastern flank of the Persian Gulf, ma
it very important that we and our alii ,,,,.,,
undertake a major effort to help j[(]l[3l

Pakistan resist Soviet pressures and 1 ^
become stronger and more self-con- qli,,,
fident. We are currently involved in a ;;','.
extensive review of our relations wit! 'y
Pakistan, but no final decisions have ; > ',...
been made. I can assure you that we !,.,
be consulting closely with the Congre j„,
as we move forward with our conside

ieverw

By.
id en

tion of this matter

In the current budget request,
assistance to this key country is confi
to $50 million PL 480 and to assistan
for the 1.7 million Afghan refugees w
have sought refuge in Pakistan

India

We propose a development assistance
program in India of $110 million, a P
480 title II program of $148 million, i
international military and education
training (IMET) funding of $500,000.
Our development assistance is target
on increasing food production, rural
employment, and improving health ai
family planning programs. Our title I
program is primarily humanitarian in
purpose.

Reinstituted at congressional in-
itiative in 1978, our bilateral assistan
to India is small in comparison with 1
dian development needs and the func
it receives from international financi;
institutions in which the United Stati
participates. Nonetheless, this progr;
is a useful asset in our efforts to dev
a constructive relationship with Indie

We believe it important to
demonstrate to this large and power!
nation -the world's largest democrac
that despite differences in some regit
and global policies and perceptions, v
wish to maintain mutually beneficial
bilateral relations. The strength of si
a relationship can help ameliorate th<
impact of these differences on U.S. i)
terests in the region. The figure for
development assistance we have pro-
posed is comparable to previous level
and represents a reasonable compror
between India's needs, our desire to 1
responsive to some of these needs, ai
our resource constraints.

W
ire tl

m

iers

t

Bangladesh

We are requesting a development
assistance program for Bangladesh o
$90.4 million, PL 480 programs of
$102.7 million, and IMET funding of
$225,000. Our economic assistance cc
centrates on food production, control

nonortmont nf Rtate Rlllliifi

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

iulation growth, and generating rural
ployment.

The recommended funding for devel-
nent assistance is comparable to ac-

outlays in recent years. It is the
e minimum needed to continue effec-
; support for that country as it tries
mild a viable political and economic
tern. The recommended PL 480 fund-
is substantially increased over that
vided in FY 81, a year of unusually
id harvests.

We will be reviewing the situation to
sure that these projected levels are
•ded. Bangladesh is a moderate and
reasingly influential Islamic nation.

take satisfaction in Bangladesh's
ievement of a large measure of
oility. Our assistance programs have
ped encourage Bangladesh to turn
'ard more pragmatic economic poli-
;. The government's increasing re-
ice on more efficient private sector
;ribution of inputs, such as fertilizer
[ irrigation, has contributed to the
st successful series of harvest Bangla-
h has ever enjoyed. The development
i more stable Bangladesh takes on
ater significance when we recognize,
oast events have shown, that in-
trility there can arouse passions which

Soviet Union can be expected to ex-
it.

Lanka

FY 1982 we are proposing $51

lion in development assistance, $27.2

lion for PL 480 programs, $25 million

public housing investment guaran-
s, and $100,000 for IMET. Develop-
nt assistance is concentrated on the
haweli irrigation project, with smaller
ns going for health, education, and
dronmental protection projects.

Sri Lanka is an important and
derate member of the nonaligned
nmunity, and we have excellent rela-
ns. We appreciate the recent agree-
int it negotiated with us permitting

■ expansion of Voice of America
ilities. We welcome its willingness to
:eive foreign naval vessels in its ports.

Lanka's commitment to the demo-
itic process and to a pragmatic pro-
lim of economic development -which
I ludes a burgeoning foreign invest-
Imt sector -serves as a useful model

■ other developing nations. We pro-
se to maintain our assistance at levels
lghly comparable to actual outlays in
81. In providing it we help assure that
i Lanka is able to perpetuate its
erished democratic traditions in an at-
)sphere of political and economic
ibility.

FY 1982 Assistance Requests

by John A. Bushnell

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23,
1981. Mr. Bushnell is Acting Assistant
Secretary for Inter- American Affairs.1

I welcome this opportunity to appear
before you and your colleagues to dis-
cuss our proposed bilateral foreign
assistance for Latin America and the
Caribbean. Our requests for bilateral
assistance activities in Latin America for
fiscal year 1982 total $478 million are as
follows:

• $265 million of development
assistance;

• $120 million of economic support
funds (ESF);

• $81.5 million in foreign military
sales credits (FMS); and

• $11.1 million for the international
military education and training program
(IMET).

In a separate authorization there is
about $150 million in PL 480 food
assistance for Latin America.

Four aspects of this request are
worthy of particular notice.

First, it is carefully targeted by
country and program to contribute
directly to U.S. interests. It is not an
assistance program to meet needs
throughout Latin America, although
development problems are urgent in
almost every country in the region. We
have proposed no assistance, except
IMET training, to the larger countries
in the area whose economies have sus-

tained relatively good growth rates
without continuing significant bilateral
assistance. Absence from the budget
does not mean these countries are not
important to us. Not only do they have a
major impact on U.S. interests bilateral-
ly, but they now play a major role as full
partners with us in helping the smaller
Latin American countries deal with their
problems. Despite the increasing number
of ways that our national interests re-
quire cooperation with our neighbors,
our proposed assistance programs are
but 7% of the Administration's
worldwide foreign assistance request.

Second, the increase -22% over our
requests for the current fiscal year— is
concentrated in two categories: quick-
disbursing ESF monies to help meet
critical immediate needs in Central
America and the Caribbean and modest
security assistance mainly to the same
countries.

Third, the FMS portion of our pro-
posal includes a critical improvement:
$31 million of the $81.5 million in pro-
posed FMS credits are in the form of
direct credits at concessionary rates for
countries in whose security we have a
manifest interest, yet whose weak
economies and severe financial con-
straints prevent them from taking ad-
vantage of credits on standard terms.

Fourth, this budget may prove to
depend for its full effectiveness on a re-
quest not earmarked specifically for
Latin America. I refer to the Ad-
ministration's request for a contingency
fund of $250 million in ESF. We hope
not to have to use these funds in Latin

Nepal

We are requesting a development
assistance for Nepal of $16.1 million, PL
480 progams of $2.1 million, and IMET
funding of $75,000. Our development
assistance focuses on three 5-year "core
projects" -in rural development, re-
source conservation, and health and
family planning.

We value our good relations with
this moderate, nonaligned country
whose recent decision to return its con-
tingent to the U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sion in Lebanon is the latest example of
its responsible international role. The
support represented by our assistance
levels is particularly important today.
Nepal has embarked upon a difficult

transition toward more democratic and
effective government amid increasingly
serious economic challenges. Our
assistance contributes to Nepal's
development efforts and to the sense of
confidence its leaders need as they ap-
proach this transition. Nepal's orderly
progress is important to our objective of
regional stability. If it falters and major
disturbances occur, this could have
serious consequences for the broader
South Asian area.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

69

Western Hemisphere

America. However, our recent experi-
ences, which have often involved painful
and difficult reprogramings, and the
uncertain situations we face in several
countries, suggest the wisdom of build-
ing this flexibility into a budget other-
wise limited to essentials foreseeable
now.

The Need for Bilateral Aid

Before turning to particular programs, I
would like to observe that for some
years there has been a tendency to de-
emphasize the need for U.S. bilateral
assistance for Latin America. Our major
contributions to regional development
have been concentrated in multilateral
institutions that play a key role in the
maintenance of a healthy world econ-
omy. The richer countries of Latin
American -Mexico, Brazil, and Argen-
tina, for example -need and can obtain
far greater resources from these institu-
tions than we could provide bilaterally.
Indeed, the reflows to us from countries
where we no longer have programs
would finance half of our total develop-
ment assistance program for Latin
America. The reflows of principal and
interest from Brazil, Chile, and Colom-
bia alone will provide over $121 million
in FY 1982.

Several of the relatively better-off
countries are themselves beginning to
provide significant assistance to their
less fortunate hemispheric neighbors.
The contribution of the new Mexican-
Venezuelan facility and the similar finan-
cing by Trinidad will exceed $1.5 billion
of concessional assistance for Central
America and the Caribbean over 3
years.

The greatest assistance that we can
provide to Latin America, especially in
these economically troubled times, is a
healthy economy of our own to provide
markets for their goods and thereby
generate jobs for their workers. When
considering Latin America in its entire-
ty, trade, technology transfers, access to
our capital markets, and other interfaces
are more important than bilateral or
multilateral assistance.

It is when we consider our ability to
advance specific U.S. interests in par-
ticular countries that bilateral assistance
programs become of critical importance.
Over three-quarters of our total request
for bilateral assistance in FY 1982 for
Latin America and the Caribbean is con-
centrated on the most vulnerable coun-
tries in Central America and the Carib-
bean. Of these, El Salvador, Jamaica,

70

and the island states of the eastern
Caribbean are of the most concern.

Central America

For Central America we are asking for
$114 million in bilateral development
assistance and $60 million in economic
support funds in 1982. The $114 million
is nearly half of our total Latin America
development assistance budget and rep-
resents a 33% increase over our 1981 re-
quest. The immediacy of the economic
and strategic challenge in Central Amer-
ica creates a greater need for flexible
and quick-disbursing ESF resources
than in the past.

Because El Salvador has been most
affected by outside interference, it has
our largest proposed program. In 1980,
El Salvador's output fell by over 8%,
and it will likely drop further this year
even with the assistance we and others
are providing. Commercial credit for the
privately owned manufacturing sector
has almost disappeared. Agricultural
production has been disrupted by the
lack of credit and the insurgency.
Without substantial assistance, these
economic difficulties will undercut Presi-
dent Duarte's efforts to deal with the in-
surgency and bring stability to El Salva-
dor. To help meet this emergency, two-
thirds of the ESF we are requesting for
Central America will go to El Salvador,
$40 million, and our proposal for
development assistance there is the
largest in the hemisphere at $35 million.

But if the lion's share of our pro-
posed assistance package for El Salva-
dor is economic, it is also evident that
externally armed guerrillas cannot be
defeated with fertilizers alone. Since
January 16, we have provided substan-
tial military assistance through emergen-
cy grants and FMS reprograming. We
must follow through with enough of a
military assistance package to help the
government bring the insurgency to an
end and thereby permit economic and
social reforms to work and free elections
to be held. To this end, the most signifi-
cant increase in this year's security
assistance budget request is a $25
million FMS program for El Salvador,
$17 million of which would be in direct
credits.

In Nicaragua we have quite different
purposes. The private businessmen,
small farmers, free labor unions, and
many others who have held on for more

El
jig
ft
t

\

Ii
psi

ilan
fci
ire
nati

<:
i

tons

than a year as a strong force against
those who would establish a totalitari
state have earned our continued sup-
port. We would like to be able to pro-
it -so long as the Marxist-led govern-
ment accepts a pluralist society and e
support from Nicaragua for the guer-
rillas in El Salvador. We are encoura
by signs that this support has been
reduced. We have under review whet
the steps Nicaragua is taking may
justify a resumption of our current ai
program. If so, we want to be in a po
tion to respond in the future to the
needs of the private sector which act:
a moderating force on the more extre
elements of the government.

For these reasons we have re-
quested $35 million in development
assistance and ESF in the FY 1982 b
get. So long as the outcome remains
potentially favorable, the investment
risk worth taking. Failure to budget
the outcome we desire in Nicaragua
would be defeatism of the first order
But you can be sure we shall not deli
the proposed assistance to Nicaragua
this year or next, unless the governm
there maintains the pluralism and noi
tervention called for by their own pul
policies

Other countries of Central Ameri
are watching Nicaragua and El Salva
dor, knowing that their own security
be affected. We propose to maintain
development assistance to Honduras,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica at about
1981 levels. We propose to increase <
FMS program for Honduras from $5
million in FY 1981 to $10 million, in-
cluding $4.5 million in direct credits.
This will help Honduras protect itsell
against the dangers of foreign-suppo:
insurgency and help its efforts to sto
the use of Honduran territory to sup
guerrillas in El Salvador.

International military and educat
training programs for El Salvador ar
Honduras are also being increased to
reinforce our FMS programs. Their j
pose is to help train professionally co
petent military forces which can curb
subversion, halt the infiltration of an
and men from abroad, and use U.S.
manufactured equipment effectively
are proposing to continue in FY 1982
the small IMET program for Costa F
that was established through reprogr

ing in FY 1981.

■alo

Caribbean

Another priority in the FY 1982 bud}
is the area some call our "third
border" -the Carribbean. These islani

_ L r*i _i

■■:!

Ills

jtn

S(

to

k

i

iff

Western Hemisphere

es find themselves critically strained
tagnant agricultural sectors, the low
>ut of industries, and unemployment
s of up to 35%, all contributing to
ontent and political instability which
te Cuban adventurism. Nearly one-
d of total development assistance
one-half of the ESF we are re-
iting for the hemisphere is for the
ibbean, $89 million and $60 million
lectively.

Our assistance efforts in the Carib-
i have the following objectives:

To strengthen friendly ties and
Deration among the islands, including
t security measures among the small-
island states to enable them to pro-

themselves, maintain law and order

preserve their territorial integrity

national sovereignty;

» To promote political and social in-
itions so as to strengthen democratic

constitutional processes; and

• To expand the productive sector

nable nations to increase their

>urce base and move toward econom-

;lf-sufficiency.

Approximately one-third of our aid
he Caribbean will go to regional in-
ations such as the Caribbean Devel-
lent Bank. We will work closely with
;r major donors such as Canada and
stern Europe, and we shall deal with
small Caribbean countries on a
onal basis.

In Jamaica, years of weak economic
lagement have taken a terrible toll -
3ars of negative growth. Prime
ister Seaga's decisive electoral vic-
I last October turned Jamaica away
ti policies which had led it close to
kruptcy. Seaga is determined to
core economic health to Jamaica by
lulating private investment and
owing sound economic policies, sup-
ted by the international financial in-

J utions buttressed by bilateral pro-
ms. The outcome of this effort to
i Jamaica to recovery under West-
oriented principles is being followed
sely throughout the Caribbean.
Our national interests require that
help Jamaica succeed. We are
sady engaged in a major program for
naica, linked to the massive assist-
:e and economic program being nego-

f ted between Jamaica and other inter-
t ional donors. We expect this pro-
jjim-a large part of which is aimed at
Invigorating the private sector -to
I 'n the economy from negative to

-Isitive growth by the end of the year.

a

Hay 1981

The problem for FY 1982 is to maintain
momentum. Earlier attempts to solve
Jamaican problems have faltered short
of success, making each new attempt
more difficult.

We are asking for $19 million in
development assistance for FY 1982-
twice our FY 1981 program -and $40
million in ESF. Our bilateral programs
are largely focused on helping to
revitalize Jamaica's private sector and
undertake special programs in energy.
They are designed to complement Presi-
dent Reagan's initiative for stimulating
private foreign investment in Jamaica.

We are also requesting $1 million in
security assistance for Jamaica to con-
tinue the $1.5 million FMS program we
began with the new government this
year through reprograming. Direct

credit is requested in view of Jamaica's
already large foreign debt service
burden over the next several years.

We intend to strengthen ties among
the small island states of the eastern
Caribbean through joint security meas-
ures as well as economic cooperation.
The crucial problem is unemployment,
particularly of youths just entering the
labor force -the groups most susceptible
to Cuban-inspired exploitation. We plan
to target $20 million in ESF toward
stimulating employment generating
enterprises. The FMS program of $7.5
million is primarily for a regional Coast
Guard program of the eastern Caribbean
states.

Frankly, we are late in supporting
this regional coast guard in which the
British have taken a lead. We had hoped

U.S. Suspends Economic Aid
to Nicaragua

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 1, 19811

After a careful review the President has
defined a comprehensive U.S. policy on
assistance to Nicaragua. The policy
takes into account Nicaraguan support
for violence in El Salvador, the provi-
sions of U.S. law, the positive responses
of the Nicaraguan Government to our
concerns, and U.S. national security in-
terests in the region. It envisages the
possibility of a continuing assistance
relationship with Nicaragua.

Given the Government of
Nicaragua's involvement in activities
supporting violence in El Salvador, the
President has decided to invoke the pro-
visions of section 533(f) of the Foreign
Assistance Act. That section calls for a
termination of ESF [economic support
funds] assistance to Nicaragua if the
President determines that its govern-
ment is supporting violence in another
country. It also makes all outstanding
ESF loans due and payable in that
event.

This Administration has made
strong representations to the
Nicaraguans to cease military support to
the Salvadoran guerrillas. Their re-
sponse has been positive. We have no
hard evidence of arms movements
through Nicaragua during the past few
weeks, and propaganda and some other

support activities have been curtailed.
We remain concerned, however, that
some arms traffic may be continuing and
that other support very probably con-
tinues.

Important U.S. security interests
are at stake in the region. We want to
encourage a continuation of recent
favorable trends with regard to
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. We also want to continue to
assist moderate forces in Nicaragua
which are resisting Marxist domination,
working toward a democratic alter-
native, and keeping alive the private sec-
tor.

Recognizing the Nicaraguan
response to date and taking into account
our national security interests in the
region, the President has decided to use
his special authority under section
614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act
to maintain outstanding fully disbursed
ESF loans to the Government of Nica-
ragua-that is, not to call for their im-
mediate repayment.

We are considering a resumption of
PL 480 and, later, development
assistance if the favorable trends there
continue. We do not rule out the even-
tual resumption of ESF assistance at a
later time should the situation in Nica-
ragua improve.

'Made available to news correspondents
acting Department spokesman William J.
Dyess. ■

71

Western Hemisphere

to respond in FY 1980 to Barbados' re-
quest for coastal patrol and army equip-
ment, but the Barbados Government in-
formed us it could not afford the stand-
ard FMS credit terms. For FY 1982, we
will mix both guaranteed loans and
direct credits to achieve an intermediate
interest rate for Barbados. For the even
smaller states in the area, even these
terms are beyond their means; direct,
concessional credits in FY 1982 are
crucial to meeting their needs.

We are also proposing a major in-
crease in FMS for the Dominican Repub-
lic to $7 million including $4 million of
direct credit. We have been working
with this democratic country on a pro-
gram to introduce some modern equip-
ment to begin replacing the U.S. arms
acquired 20 to 30 years ago. A small $1
million FMS program is proposed for
the Bahamas which has recently estab-
lished a defense force.

South America

Our commitment to our close and impor-
tant friends in South America is not
lessened by the emphasis we are giving
to the Caribbean Basin. The most
serious South American development
problems are in the Andean countries.
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia all have
mineral reserves which boost their long-
term prospects, but they are now trying
to cope with chronic economic problems,
including serious unemployment and
rapid population growth. All have per
capita incomes less than one-tenth of our
own. These problems contribute to in-
stability and stimulate narcotics traffick-
ing.

The assistance we are proposing
builds on existing bilateral and local
efforts. Development assistance pro-
grams in FY 1982 total $11.6 million for
Ecuador and $30 million for Peru. In
Ecuador, President Roldos has initiated
an extensive development program. In
Peru, President Belaunde's plans focus
on developing economically deprived
areas and significantly expanding
employment.

We have FMS programs for only
three countries in South America -
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The pro-
grams for Peru and Ecuador, each of
which is proposed at $6 million, are
modestly larger than the FY 1981 pro-
grams. The proposed $12.7 million pro-
gram for Colombia remains at the FY
1981 level. Small new IMET programs
are also being proposed for Venezuela

Economic Assistance to
El Salvador

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAR. 24, 19811

The Administration has approved pro-
ceeding with reprograming of an addi-
tional $63.5 million in economic
assistance to the Government of El
Salvador for FY 1981. This assistance is
urgently needed to help the government
deal with the economic situation,
especially to finance essential imports of
food and of agricultural chemicals and
industrial materials for the private sec-
tor.

With this additional aid we will be
providing a total of $126.5 million in
economic aid this fiscal year, over three
times our military aid.

In keeping with the Administration's
commitment to hold down expenditures,
we intend to provide the additional $63.5
million through reprograming rather
than by supplemental appropriations.
We are working out the precise details
of reprograming of PL 480, develop-
ment assistance, economic support
funds, and other credits. We will be con-
sulting with the Congress and other
governments as implementation pro-
ceeds.

'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman William J.
Dyess. ■

and Brazil, in keeping with the recom-
mendation of the conference committee
on the FY 1981 foreign assistance
authorization bill which we fully support.
Finally, the Administration is recom-
mending repeal of the provision in Sec-
tion 620B of the Foreign Assistance Act,
which prohibits all military sales and
assistance to the Government of Argen-
tina. Although we are proposing no
assistance for Argentina in FY 1982, the
strategic interests we share with Argen-
tina require that we have the flexibility
to consider sales of defense articles and
services if that would be in our interest.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to stress
again the importance of the proposed
ESF contingency fund to our efforts to

EA'

r

0

BRbC

Aria
1,1!

p

strengthen both security and develop
ment. Events in the past 2 years in t
hemisphere, particularly in El Salvad
and Jamaica, have tested our ability
move quickly with economic support
funds to meet rapidly changing situa-
tions. With the cooperation of Congr*
we have done relatively well, but oft*
by sacrificing important objectives el;
where. The $250 million ESF conting
cy fund this Administration is reques
is essential to enable us to respond n
rapidly to critical situations where
reprogramings may prove insufficienl
counterproductive.

Regarding security, the total FM
assistance we are requesting, $81.5
million, is an increase of 27% over oi
FY 1981 budget. But more importan
than the increase is the tailoring of I
terms to economic needs; $31 million
dollars of the FMS request is for the
very important direct credits on cone
sional terms -at not less than 3% int
est and up to 12 years repayment. E
so, the total FMS request for La?tin
America is but 2% of our worldwide
FMS request proposal and falls subsi
tially below the program levels for tr
region in the mid 1970s.

Finally, let me emphasize the im
tance of the international military ec
tion and training program. The num
of Latin American students trained
under IMET reached an all-time low
FY 1980, less than half the average
nual level of the 1970s. Thanks to tr
change that this subcommittee initia
in the FY 1981 legislation providing
incremental costing of IMET, we ho
to turn that statistic around this yea
We are requesting $11.1 million in b
1982, an increase of 22% over our 1
request. Even with the ability to pre
more training per IMET dollar, we l
more dollars if we are to meet the ti
ing needs of the region and preserve
capacity to cooperate with our neigh
on shared security interest.

Compared to the stakes in Latin
America, we are not asking for muc
the way of assistance. Carefully tar-
geted, the small amounts we are re-
questing can have a significant impa
and provide concrete evidence of oui
commitment to the development ano
curity of our closest neighbors.

'The complete transcript of the heari p
will be published by the committee and vl
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing C ce,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

REATIES

irrent Actions

PLTI LATERAL

{culture

ivention on the Inter-American Institute
Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at

.shington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force
1980.

zifications deposited: Ecuador, Jan. 30,

!1; Nicaragua, Feb. 12, 1981.

tarctica

i Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington
;. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1. TIAS 4780.
:ession deposited: Italy, Mar. 18, 1981.

'..,, iation, Civil-Navigation

lendment of annex I of the 1956
•eements on joint financing of certain air
ligation services in Greenland and the
roe Islands and in Iceland (TIAS 4048,
19). Adopted by the ICAO Council at Mon-
al Dec. 16, 1980. Entered into force Dec.
1980.

■ llisions

( nvention on the international regulations
.1 preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with
] dilations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972.
I tered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
■J cessions deposited: Guinea, Jan. 19, 1981;
4 ldives, Jan. 14, 1981.

' mmodities — Common Fund

. reement establishing the Common Fund
I Commodities, with schedules. Done at
i-neva June 24, 1980. '

matures: F.R.G., Mar. 10, 1981; Ireland,

ilippines, Feb. 24, 1981; Malawi, Zaire,
lor. 17, 1981.

tification deposited: Indonesia, Feb. 24,

31.

nservation
I nvention on international trade in en-
ngered species of wild fauna and flora,
th appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
73. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
49.

tification deposited: Argentina, Jan. 8,
SI.-

'cessions deposited: China, Jan. 8, 1981;
vanda, Oct. 20, 1980; Suriname, Nov. 17,
'80;2 Zambia, Nov. 24, 1980.2

nendment to the convention of Mar. 3,
'73, on international trade in endangered

■ecies of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249).
iopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.1
:ceptance deposited: Botswana, Nov. 19,
180; F.R.G., May 7, 1980; Liechtenstein,

Dpr. 21, 1980; Mauritius, Sept. 23, 1980;

ogo, Jan. 5, 1981; U.K., Nov. 28, 1980.3

onsular

ptional protocol, to the Vienna convention
n consular relations (TIAS 6820), concerning

the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done
at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force
Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Malawi, Feb. 23, 1981.

Containers

International convention for safe containers
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2,
1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Ratification deposited: Canada, Feb. 19,
1981.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and
preventing the illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership of cultural property.
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th
session of the UNESCO general conference.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.4
Acceptance deposited: Peru, Oct. 24, 1979.

Customs

Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov.
14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.4
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Feb. 25,
1981.

. Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4,
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 4, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Brazil, Jan. 19, 1981.

Energy

Implementing agreement for a program of
research and development on radiation
damage in fusion materials, with annexes.
Done at Paris Oct. 21, 1980. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1980.

Signatures: Canada, European Atomic Ener-
gy Community, Japan, Switzerland, U.S.,
Oct. 21, 1980.

Implementing agreement for a program of
energy technology systems analysis, with an-
nex. Done at Paris Nov. 13, 1980. Entered
into force Nov. 13, 1980.
Signatures: Australia, Belgium, Commission
of the European Communities, Denmark,
F.R.G., Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
U.S., Nov. 13, 1980.

Implementing agreement for the establish-
ment of the economic assessment service for
coal, with annex. Done at Paris Nov. 20,
1975. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1975.
TIAS 9775.
Signatures: Australia, Sept. 26, 1980; Japan,

Sept. 24, 1980.

Implementing agreement for a program of
research and development on the production
of hydrogen from water, with annexes. Done
at Paris Oct. 6, 1977. Entered into force Oct.
6, 1977.
Signature: U.K., Sept. 23, 1979.

Implementing agreement for the establish-
ment of the biomass conversion technical in-
formation service. Done at Paris May 24,
1978. Entered into force May 24, 1978.
Signatures: Italy, Dec. 4, 1979; Japan, Sept.
24, 1980; New Zealand, Oct. 5, 1979;
Switzerland, Nov. 21, 1979.6

Implementing agreement for a program of

research, development, and demonstration on

forestry energy, with annex. Done at Tokyo

Apr. 13, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 13,

1978.

Signatures; Switzerland, July 17, 1980; U.K.,

Apr. 10, 1980.

Implementing agreement for a program of
research, development, and demonstration on
enhanced recovery of oil, with energy. Done
at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered into force
May 22, 1979.
Signatures: U.K., Feb. 1, 1980.

Implementing agreement foi a program of
research, development, and demonstration on
hot dry rock technology, with annex. Done at
Paris Sept. 18, 1979. Entered into force Oct.
1, 1979.
Signature: Japan, Feb. 23, 1981.

Implementing agreement for a program of
research and development and demonstration
on energy conservation in the pulp and paper
industry, with annexes. Done at Paris Feb.
18, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 18, 1981.
Signatures: Belgium, Canada, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, U.K.,
U.S., Feb. 18, 1981.

Supplement to the implementing agreement
of Oct. 6, 1977, for the establishment of a
project on small solar power systems, with
annex. Done at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered
into force May 22, 1979.
Signature: Italy, Jan. 19, 1980.

Implementing agreement for a program of
research and development on energy conser-
vation through energy storage, with annex.
Done at Paris Sept. 22, 1978. Entered into
force Sept. 22, 1978; for the U.S. Feb. 21,
1979.
Signature: Belgium, Oct. 16, 1979.

International Court of Justice

Declarations recognizing as compulsory the
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court.
Declaration deposited: Malta, Jan. 23, 1981.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the con-
stitution of the International Labor Organiza-
tion. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946; re-
entered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
Jan. 30, 1981.

Instrument for the amendment of the con-
stitution of the International Labor Organiza-
tion. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered

lay 1981

73

Treaties

into force Apr. 20, 1948. HAS 1868.
Acceptances deposited: Botswana, Feb. 27,
1978; Cape Verde, Apr. 3, 1979; Comoros,
Oct. 23, 1978; Djibouti, May 3, 1978;
Grenada, July 9, 1979; Lesotho, June 2, 1980;
St. Lucia, Apr. 9, 1980; Vietnam, Socialist
Republic of, Jan. 17, 1980; Zimbabwe,
June 6, 1980.

Convention (ILO No. 53) concerning the mini-
mum requirement of professional capacity for
masters and officers on board merchant ships.
Adopted at Geneva, Oct. 24, 1936. Entered
into force for the U.S. Oct. 29, 1939. 54 Stat.
1683; TS 950; 3 Bevans 281.
Ratification deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3, 1978.

Convention (ILO No. 55) concerning the
liability of the shipowner in case of sickness,
injury, or death of seamen. Adopted at
Geneva Oct. 24, 1936. Entered into force for
the U.S. Oct. 29, 1939. 54 Stat. 1683; TS
951; 3 Bevans 287.
Ratification deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3, 1978.

Convention (ILO No. 58) fixing the minimum
age for the admission of children to employ-
ment at sea. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 24,
1936. Entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 29,
1939. 54 Stat. 1705; TS 952; 3 Bevans 294.
Ratifications deposited: Djibouti, Aug. 3,
1978; Grenada, July 9, 1979; Seychelles,
Feb. 6, 1978.

Convention (ILO No. 74) concerning the cer-
tification of able seamen. Adopted at Seattle
June 29, 1946. Entered into force for the
U.S. Apr. 9, 1954. 5 UST 605; TIAS 2949.
Ratification deposited: Guinea-Bissau,
Feb. 9, 1977.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), relating to
amendments to the convention. Done at Lon-
don Nov. 12, 1975.1

Acceptance deposited: New Zealand, Feb. 13,
1981.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,

1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS

4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London

Nov. 14, 1975.1

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, Feb. 20,

1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,

1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS

4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London

Nov. 17, 1977. '

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, Feb. 20,

1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.1

Acceptances deposited: Chile, Mar. J6, 1981;
Sri Lanka, Mar. 17, 1981.

Convention on facilitation of international
maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London
Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5,
1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Accession deposited: Guinea, Jan. 19, 1981.

Amendments of article VII of the convention

on facilitation of international maritime

traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London

Nov. 19, 1973. '

Acceptance deposited: Hungary, Feb. 9,

1981.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.
TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Mar. 2, 1981.

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection

Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien-
na Oct. 26, 1979.1

Ratification deposited: German Democratic
Republic, Feb. 5, 1981.2

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1. 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Feb. 26, 1981. 6

Patents, Microorganisms

Budapest treaty on the international recogni-
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the
purposes of patent procedure, with regula-
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.
Ratification deposited; U.S.S.R., Jan. 22,

1981.

Pollution

Protocol relating to intervention on the high
seas in cases of pollution by substances other
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. '
Accession deposited: Liberia, Feb. 17, 1981.

Postal

General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Enters into force July
1, 1981.

Signatures: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia
Soviet Socialist Republic, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, German
Democratic Republic, F.R.G., Greece, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Democratic

Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lu,
embourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mona
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norw; jit
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Polai
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, San
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leo
Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sri
Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland.
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Unitei
Arab Emirates, U.K. (including overseas t
ritories), U.S., Uruguay, Upper Volta,
U.S.S.R., Yemen Arab Republic, Democra
Republic of Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zai
bia, Oct. 26, 1979; Venezuela, Oct. 24, 19'
1979.

Constitution of the universal postal union

with final protocol. Done at Vienna July 1

1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. Til

5881.

Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, Dec

11, 1980.

Additional protocol to the constitution of
universal postal union with final protocol
signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at
Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force ,
1, 1971, except for article V of the additic
protocol which entered into force Jan. 1,
1971. TIAS 7150.

Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, Dec
1980.

Second additional protocol to the constitu
of the universal postal union of July 10, 1
general regulations with final protocol an
annex, and the universal postal conventio
with final protocol and detailed regulatior
Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered
force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Liberia, Nov. 28,
1980; Saudi Arabia, May 11, 1979.

Money orders and postal travellers' check
agreement, with detailed regulations witr
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct
1979. Enters into force July 1, 1981.
Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Austria,
bados, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burund
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ch:
Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyp:
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, E,
Finland, France, Gabon, F.R.G., Greece,
Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indones;
Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Republic of
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco,
Mozambique, Netherlands, Netherlands A
tilles, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Roman'
Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzi
land, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turl
U.S., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vatican Cit;
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yemen A
Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Oct. 26, 1975

7A

.ubber

iternational natural rubber agreement,
979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
lto force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Feb. 24, 1981.

>.

k

!'

afety at Sea

international convention for the safety of life
t sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
lov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
980. TIAS 9700.
cceptance deposited: Indonesia, Feb. 17,

981.

rotocol of 1978 relating to the international
onvention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
HAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.

nters into force May 1, 1981.
iccession deposited: Denmark, Nov. 27,

980.

atellite Communications System

Lgreement relating to the International
'elecommunications Satellite Organization
NTELSAT), with annexes. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
orce Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
iccession deposited: Somalia, Mar. 27, 1981.

•perating agreement relating to the Interna-
lonal Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
lon (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into

f>rce Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
ignature: Ministry of Posts and Tele-
ommunications, Somalia, Mar. 27, 1981.

pace

igreement governing the activities of states
! n the Moon and other celestial bodies,
idopted at New York Dec. 5, 1979.1
Signature: Netherlands, Jan. 27, 1981.

Convention on registration of objects
lunched into outer space. Done at New York
an. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15,
976. TIAS 8480.
Iccession deposited: Netherlands, Jan. 26,

981.

Telecommunications

nternational telecommunication convention
vith annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-
Porremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into
orce Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976.
, HAS 8572.

Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Feb. 10,
1981.

Terrorism

International convention against the taking of
lostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,
1979. '
Accession deposited: Barbados, Mar. 9, 1981.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization
(WTO). Done at Mexico City Sept. 27, 1970.
Entered into force Jan. 2, 1975; for the U.S.
'Dec. 16, 1975. TIAS 8307.

Notification of withdrawal deposited: El
Salvador, Jan. 28, 1980; effective Jan. 28,
1981.

Transportation

Agreement on the international carriage of
perishable foodstuffs and on the special equip-
ment to be used for such carriage (ATP),
with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970.
Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.4
Accession deposited: Morocco, Mar. 5, 1981.

UNIDO

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. '
Signatures: Poland, Jan. 22, 1981; Hungary,
Jan. 26, 1981; Haiti, Jan. 28, 1981;
Mauritania, Mar. 4, 1981; Cyprus, Mar. 17,
1981.

Ratification deposited: Iraq, Jan. 23, 1981;
Ethiopia, Feb. 23, 1981; Cuba, Mar. 16, 1981.

Whaling

International whaling convention and
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of adherence: India, Mar. 9,
1981.

Notification of succession: Papua New
Guinea, Mar. 16, 1981.

Amendments to the schedule to the interna-
tional convention for the regulation of whal-
ing, 1946. Adopted at the 32d meeting of the
International Whaling Commission, Brighton
July 21-26, 1980. Entered into force Nov. 26,

1980, except for certain amendments that
entered into force Feb. 23, 1981.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971. Open for
signature at Washington from Mar. 24
through May 15, 1981. Enters into force July

I, 1981, if by June 30, 1981, certain provi-
sions have been met.

Signature: Norway, Mar. 25, 1981.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the inter-
national wheat agreement, 1971, as extended)
(TIAS 7144, 9878). Done at Washington Mar.

II, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Mar. 23,
1981.7

1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention, 1980. Open for signature
at Washington from Mar. 24 through May 15,

1981. Enters into force July 1, 1981, if by
June 30, 1981, certain provisions have been
met.

Signature: Norway, Mar. 25, 1981.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979.1
Ratifications deposited: U.S.S.R., Jan. 23,
1981; Rwanda, Mar. 2, 1981; Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Mar. 12, 1981.

Treaties

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the

world cultural and natural heritage. Done at

Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec.

17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, Jan. 9,

1981.

BILATERAL

Australia

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income. Signed at
Washington May 14, 1953. Entered into force
Dec. 14, 1953. TIAS 2880.
Termination: Papua New Guinea, Sept. 16,
1975.

Agreement relating to operation of United
States military flights through RAAF Base
Darwin. Effected by exchange of notes at
Canberra Mar. 11, 1981. Entered into force
Mar. 11, 1981.

Belgium

Agreement in the field of radioactive waste
management. Signed at Mol and Washington
Jan. 7 and 19, 1981. Entered into force Jan.
19, 1981.

Brazil

Record of discussion concerning salted cattle
hides and manufactured leather products.
Signed at Brasilia Aug. 13, 1980. Entered in-
to force Oct. 1, 1980.

Canada

Agreement with respect to social security.
Signed at Ottawa Mar. 11, 1981. Enters into
force on the first day of the second month
following the month in which each govern-
ment shall have received from the other
government written notification that it has
complied with all statutory and constitutional
requirements for the entry into force of this
agreement.

Denmark

General security of information agreement.
Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen
Jan. 23 and Feb. 27, 1981. Entered into force
Feb. 27, 1981.

Dominica

Agreement relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Dominica. Effected
by exchange of letters at Bridgetown and
Roseau May 15 and 22, 1980. Entered into
force May 22, 1980. Supersedes agreement of
Dec. 16, 1966, and Jan. 11, 1967 (TIAS
6206).

Ecuador

Agreement extending the agreement of Sept.
18, 1975 (TIAS 8282), relating to the
cooperative program in Ecuador for the

May 1981

75

Treaties

observation and tracking of satellites and
space vehicles. Effected by exchange of notes
at Quito Dec. 4 and 16, 1980. Entered into
force Dec. 16, 1980.

Egypt

Agreement concerning the "Egypt Today-
Memphis" exhibit. Signed at Cairo Mar. 1,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 1, 1981.

Agreement for the establishment and opera-
tion of an OMEGA navigation system
monitoring station. Signed at Alexandria
June 14, 1980. Entered into force June 14,
1980.

France

Agreement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of letters at Paris Feb.
18, 1981. Enters into force on the first day of
the first month following date of receipt of
last notification that each party has com-
pleted the procedures required by its legisla-
tion to enforce the agreement.

German Democratic Republic

Agreement regarding the establishment of
branch offices of the commercial sections of
the embassies of the United States and the
German Democratic Republic. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington Jan. 30, 1981.
Entered into force Jan. 30, 1981.

Haiti

Agreement relating to privileges and im-
munities to the accorded Department of
Defense personnel temporarily in Haiti for
the purpose of survey and relief operations.
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-
Prince Aug. 19 and 21, 1980. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug.
17, 1979, as amended (HAS 9595, 9715),
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
made fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-
Prince Dec. 17, 1980, and Feb. 5, 1981.
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981.

Iran

Agreement of cooperation. Signed at Ankara
Mar. 5, 1959. Entered into force Mar. 5,
1959. TIAS 4189.

Notification of termination: Nov. 19,
1979; effective Nov. 19, 1980.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Aug.
8, 1977 (TIAS 8824). Signed at Kingston Feb.
6, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1981.

Japan

Agreement extending the Sept. 12, 1977
(TIAS 8734), joint determination and joint

communique for reprocessing of special
nuclear material of U.S. origin, with ex-
change of notes and related letter. Signed at
Washington Feb. 24, 1981. Entered into
force Feb. 24, 1981.

Kuwait

International express mail agreement with
detailed regulations. Signed at Kuwait and
Washington Feb. 28 and Mar. 11, 1981.
Entered into force Mar. 11, 1981.

Lebanon

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Beirut Sept. 17, 1980,
and Feb. 10, 1981. Entered into force Feb.
10, 1981.

Montserrat

Agreement relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Montserrat. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Bridgetown
and Plymouth Jan. 13 and Feb. 9, 1981.
Entered into force Feb. 9, 1981. Supersedes
agreement of April 3 and May 16, 1968
(TIAS 6493).

Mozambique

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of June
28, 1979 (TIAS 9635), with minutes of
negotiation. Signed at Maputo Feb. 23, 1981.
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1981.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to storage of preposi-
tioned war readiness materials by U.S.
forces. Effected by exchange of notes at The
Hague Jan. 15, 1981. Entered into force Jan.
15, 1981.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to scientific and technical
cooperation. Signed at Washington Mar. 2,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 2, 1981.

Peru

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr.
26, 1978 (TIAS 9604), with memorandum of
understanding. Signed at Lima Feb. 5, 1981.
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981.

Portugal

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts
of the United States. Signed at Washington
Oct. 16, 1980.
Entered into force: Mar. 4, 1981.

St. Kitts/Nevis

Agreement relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in St. Kitts/Nevis.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Bridgetown and Basseterre May 15, 1980,
and Jan. 13, 1981. Entered into force Jan.
13, 1981. Supersedes agreement of Dec. 19,
1966, and Jan. 10, 1967 (TIAS 6209).

HR(

St. Lucia Hjcc

Agreement relating to the establishment of
Peace Corps program in St. Lucia. Effected
by exchange of letters at Bridgetown and
Castries May 15 and July 8, 1980. Entered
into force July 8, 1980. Supersedes
agreements of Oct. 19 and Nov. 10, 1965
(TIAS 5902).

Senegal

Agreement regarding the establishment anc
operation of a space vehicle tracking and
communication facility. Effected by exchang
of notes at Dakar Jan. 30 and Feb. 5, 1981
Entered into force Feb. 5, 1981.

-'

:.;■-
ml •
ton

I

Seen

[Ml

I
Sin

Singapore

Memorandum of understanding for the ex-
change of individual personnel between the
U.S. Army Western Command and the
Republic of Singapore Armed Forces. Sigm
at Singapore Jan. 5, 1981. Entered into for i
Jan. 5, 1981. \i»

ftre:

Sudan

Agreement amending the agreement for sa :
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 197! ■
Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum
Feb. 14, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 14,
1981.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct
4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462,
9717), relating to trade in cotton, wool, anc
manmade fiber textiles and textile products
Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok ;
Nov. 13 and 27, 1980. Terminated Jan. 1
1981.

Turkey

Implementing agreement regarding the cor
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to the Agency for International
Development. Signed at Ankara Feb. 7, 19
Entered into force Feb. 7, 1981.

Venezuela

Agreement in the field of energy research
and development, with annex. Signed at
Washington Mar. 6, 1980: Entered into for
Mar. 6, 1980.

Agreement on agricultural cooperation.
Signed at Caracas Apr. 10, 1980. Enters in
force upon signature or upon the entry int(
force of the July 11, 1980, agreement for
scientific and technological cooperation,
whichever date is later.

'Not in force.

2With reservationis).

3Extended to the Bailiwick of Jersey, tl
Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Isle of Man,
Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Ter-
ritories, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencie:
Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcain
Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, and
Saint Helena and Dependencies.

4Not in force for the U.S.

BSubiect to ratification.

6Witn statement.

'Applicable to Berlin (West). ■

a

CHRONOLOGY

PRESS RELEASES

•arch 1981

Mrch2

■ State Department announces that it is
kng $25 million in military aid to El
Jvador. Twenty more U.S. noncombat
Btary advisers are to join the 25 advisers
Kady there, in addition to 9 administrative
I. support personnel, bringing to 54 the
111 involved in the security assistance pro-
am.

I Secretary Haig instructs U.S. Represen-
■ve to the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference
leek to insure that negotiations do not end
l:he coming session (scheduled to resume
■r. 9) of the conference pending a U.S.
1/ernment policy review.

Arch 6

I U.S. announces its decision to sell addi-
tfial military equipment to Saudi Arabia as
^■t of a policy to strenghten Western securi-
linterests in the Middle East and Persian

I f.

U By a vote of 114 to 0 with 22 abstentions
M -hiding U.S.), U.N. General Assembly
iif ipts a resolution condemning South Africa
<i blocking a settlement in Namibia and urg-

I I trade sanctions against South Africa.

Iirch9

.] Tenth session of the Third U.N. Law of
I ; Sea Conference resumes in New York,
i,r. 9-Apr. 24.

Foreign Minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher
t the Federal Republic of Germany makes
I cial visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 9-11.

irch 10

" President Reagan makes official visit to
J-nada, Mar. 10-11.

irch 11

Effected by an exchange of notes at

■ .nberra, U.S. and Australia agree to U.S.
I r Force use of RAAF Base Darwin for

I -52 aircraft staging operations for sea
rveillance in the Indian Ocean area and for
vigation training purposes.

arch 13

Pending a complete review of U.S.
J) \ateral relations with Mozambique, U.S.
mporarily suspends food aid to that coun-

Egypt technology and equipment for a
nuclear electric generating capacity of ap-
proximately 2,000 megawatts and the en-
riched uranium fuel used to support the
capacity.

March 23

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito
makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Mar.
23-24.

March 26

Following a National Security Council
meeting, the White House issues a statement
noting its growing concern that Polish
authorities may be preparing to use force to
settle continuing difficulties in that country
and that the Soviet Union may intend to
undertake repressive action in Poland and
warns of the grave effect of such actions on
the whole course of East- West relations. It
also repeats U.S. readiness to assist Poland
in its current economic and financial
difficulties as long as the people and
authorities continue to seek a peaceful resolu-
tion of their problems.

March 29

Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad
and Tobago dies.

March 30

Prime Minister Andreas A. M. van Agt
and Foreign Minister Christoph A. van Der
Klaauw of the Netherlands make an official
visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 30- Apr. 1.

President Reagan is wounded in an at-
tempted assassination. Also wounded were
the President's press secretary, James S.
Brady; a Secret Serviceman, Timothy J. Mc-
Carthy; and a D.C. police officer, Thomas K.
Delahanty. Twenty-five-year-old John W.
Hinckley, Jr., is arrested and charged with
the assassination attempt.

March 31

The Allied Special Consultative Group on
long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)
meets in Brussels. U.S. delegation is headed
by Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger.

Turkish Foreign Minister liter Turkmen
makes official visit to U.S. Mar. 31-Apr. 9,
and to Washington, D.C, Mar. 31-Apr. 1 ■

arch 15-18

During a private visit to the U.S., Argen-
ne President-designate Viola meets in
'ashington, D.C, with the President and
ice President, Secretaries of State and
efense, Members of the Congress, and other
.S. officials, Mar. 16-17.

larch 21

U.S., Egypt initial agreement for
^operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
nergy which allows the U.S. to transfer to

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

55 3/3 Haig: remarks at EOB, Feb. 27.

*56 3/6 U.S. Organization for the Inter-
national Telegraph and Tele-
phone Consultative Committee
(CCITT), study group A, Mar.
25.

*57 3/6 U.S. Organization for the Inter-
national Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR), study
groups 10 and 11, Apr. 9.

•58 3/6 CCIR, study group 8, Apr. 2.

*59 3/6 CCIR, study group 2, Mar. 27.

*60 3/6 Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCC), Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
radio communications, Mar.
19.

*61 3/6 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Investment, Tech-
nology, and Development,
working group on U.N./OECD
investment undertakings, Mar.
30.

*62 3/11 Haig, Shamir: news conference,
Feb. 24.

*63 3/11 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. sworn in
as Under Secretary for Politi-
cal Affairs (biographic data).

*64 3/12 Haig, Genscher: remarks to the
press, Mar. 9.

*65 3/13 Haig, MacGuigan: press brief-
ing, Ottawa, Mar. 11.

66 3/17 Haig: interview on "MaeNeil/

Lehrer Report."

67 3/13 Haig: remarks at a breakfast

meeting with media corre-
spondents.

*68 3/18 Haig: statement before House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
69 3/19 Haig: statement before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.

*70 3/20 U.S., Hong Kong amend textile
agreement, Mar. 13.

71 3/24 Haig: statement before House

Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Operations.

72 3/25 Haig, Ito: remarks following

meeting with the President.

*73 3/26 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Intellectual Property,
Apr. 21.

*74 3/26 CCITT, study group D, Apr. 10.

*75 3/26 Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, Apr. 10.

*76 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, working group

on radiocommunications, Apr.
16.

*77 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk
cargoes, working group on
subdivision and stability, Apr.
22.

Aa\ 1981

77

PUBLICATIONS

*78 3/26 SCC, SOLAS, working group on
life-saving appliances, Apr. 22.

♦79 3/26 CCITT, study group C, Apr. 23.

*80 3/26 CCIR, study group 2, Apr. 24

*81 3/26 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Investment, Tech-
nology, and Development,
Apr. 28.
82 3/26 Haig: remarks at a breakfast
meeting with news
correspondents.

*83 3/26 Dean Fischer sworn in as
Department spokesman
(biographic data).

*84 3/30 Program for the official working
visit of Prime Minister
Andreas A. M. van Agt and
Foreign Minister Christoph A.
van der Klaauw of the
Netherlands to Washington,
D.C., Mar. 30- Apr. 1.
85 3/31 Haig: interview on "Meet the
Press," Mar.29.

'Not printed in the Billetin. ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. 20U02. A 25% discount is
nuide on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual sum-
maries which describe the people, history,
government, economy, and foreign relations
of each country. Each contains a map, a list
of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a
reading list. (A complete set of all
Background Notes currently in stock -at
least 140 -$16; 1-year subscription service
for approximately 77 updated or new
Notes-$21; plastic binder-$2.) Single copies
of those listed below are available (by country
name or pub. number) for $1; $1.25 for
foreign mailing.

Albania Pub.

Algeria Pub.

Belgium Pub.

Botswana Pub.

Central African

Republic Pub.

El Salvador Pub.

European Community . . . Pub.

France Pub.

Gabon Pub.

Guinea Pub.

Hong Kong Pub.

Hungary Pub.

Ivory Coast Pub.

Malawi Pub.

8217

7pp.

7821

8pp.

8087

8pp.

8046

4pp.

7970

7pp.

7794

4pp.

9155

8pp.

8209

8pp.

7968

4pp.

8057

4pp.

8126

4pp.

7915

8pp.

8119

4pp.

7900

4pp.

Netherlands Pub. 7967 8pp

Netherlands Antilles .... Pub. 8223 4pp

Sierra Leone Pub. 8069 6pp

Somalia Pub. 7881 7pp

Swaziland Pub. 8174 7pp.

Your Trip Abroad. This pamphlet, published
by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, provides
helpful hints for Americans traveling abroad.
Topics include passports, visas, reservations,
money, marriage, legal assistance, registering
with American Consuls, destitute assistance,
drug arrests, and what to do about U.S.
Customs and Immigration when you return
home. Pub. 8872, 31pp. (Cat. No. S1.69:155.)

Documents on Disarmament— 1978. This
publication contains basic documents on arms
control and disarmament developments dur-
ing 1978. Included are speeches, meeting
reports, treaty documents, and index. ACDA
Pub. 107. 852pp. (Stock No.
002-000-00075-0.) $8.50.

World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1969-1978. This volume serves as
a basic data source on world military expendi-
tures and arms transfers for 145 countries
over a 10-year period. Includes raw and com-
parative data and statistics, graphs, and
tables. ACDA Pub. 108. 166pp. (Stock No.
002-000-00078-4.) $5.00.

United States Contributions to Interna-
tional Organizations. This 28th Annual
Report to the Congress transmits to the
President and to the Congress the report on
U.S. contributions to international organiza-
tions. It also describes the various U.N. agen-
cies to which the United States contributes.
Pub. 9140. 112pp. (Cat. No. S:179:149.)

INR — Intelligence and Research in the
Department of State. This publication
describes the role of the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research in the field of intelligence
and in the Department of State. It also in-
cludes a working description of intelligence.
Pub. 9157. 16pp.

Rural Roads. Agreement with Syria. TIAS

9638. 29pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9638.)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Agreement with Other Governments.

TIAS 9650. 63pp. (Cat. No. S9.10:9650.)
Border Sanitation Problems. Agreement

with Mexico. TIAS 9658. 7pp. $1.25.

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9658.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Bolivia. TIAS 9659. 12pp. $1.25. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9659.)
International Sugar Agreement, 1977.

Agreement with Other Governments.

TIAS 9664. 371pp. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9664.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Indonesia. TIAS 9665. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9665.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.

Agreement with Macao. TIAS 9666. 3pp.

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9666.)
Earth Sciences and Environmental Studies.

Memorandum of Understanding With the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland. TIAS 9668. 5pp.

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9668.)
Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital —

Grants-in-Aid for Medical Care and

Treatment of Veterans and Reliability

tion of the Hospital Plant. Agreement

with the Philippines. TIAS 9669. 17pp.

$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9669.)
Economic Assistance — Loan and Grant.

Agreement with Israel. TIAS 9670. 5pj

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9670.)
Establishment of Temporary Purchasing

Commission. Agreement with the Unic

of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 967

7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9671.)
Telecommunications. Agreement with

Egypt. TIAS 9672. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9672.)
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air

Navigation Services in Iceland and ir

Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

Agreement with Other Governments.

TIAS 9673. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:9673.)
Commodity Imports. Agreement with Sud;

TIAS 9674. 23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:9674.)
Settlement of Claims. Agreement with tht

People's Republic of China. TIAS 9675

6pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9675.)
Atomic Energy — Reprocessing of Special

Nuclear Material. Agreement with

Japan. TIAS 9676. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. N.

S9.10:9676.)
Aviation — Preclearance. Agreement with

Canada. TIAS 9677. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9677.)
Economic Assistance — Loan and Grant.

Agreement with Turkey. TIAS 9678.

7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9678.)
Extradition. Agreement with Norway. TL

9679. 31pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:967
Health Cooperation. Agreement with Isr;

TIAS 9680. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:9680.)
Technical Cooperation in Educational Pi

grams. Agreement with Saudi Arabia,

TIAS 9681. 12pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9681.)
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income and

Capital Gains. Convention with the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland. TIAS 9682. 46pp.

$2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9682.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement w

Egypt. TIAS 9683. 31pp. $2.00. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9683.)
Express Mail Service. Agreement with

Canada. TIAS 9684. 66pp. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9684.)
Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with t

Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 9'

5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9685.)
Atomic Energy — Technical Information

change and Cooperation in Nuclear

Safety Regulation. Agreement with

France. TIAS 9686. 21pp. $1.50. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9686.)
Atomic Energy — Technical Information

change and Cooperation in Nuclear

Safety Matters. Agreement with

Sweden. TIAS 9687. 16pp. $1.50. (Ca1

No. S9.10:9687.)B

.;.

INDEX

May 1981

Vol. 81, No. 2050

Afghanistan. Secretary Haig Interviewed at

Breakfast Meetings 9

Africa

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa

(Walker) 18

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African

Refugees (Smyser) 60

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast

Meetings 9

Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the
Press" 4

Arms Control. Secretary Haig Interviewed
at Breakfast Meetings 9

Canada. Maritime Boundary Treaty With
Canada (Feldman, Ridgway) 21

Commodities. Sixth International Tin Agree-
ment (Calingaert) 31

Congress

AID Bilateral Assistance Programs (McPher-
son) 43

Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(Morse) 33

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration
and Refugee Assistance (Smyser) 59

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa
(Walker) 18

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African Ref-
ugees (Smyser) 60

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Asia (Arma-
cost) 26

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe

(E wing) 38

1 FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Latin Amer-
ica (Bushnell) 69

f FY 1982 Assistance Requests for South Asia
(Coon) 68

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle
East (Draper, Twinam) 48

FY 1982 Authorization Request (Haig) 24

FY 1982 Security Assistance Requests (Buck-
ley, Burt) 62

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the Con-
gress (Department explanatory state-
ment) 52

International Narcotics Control (Linne-
mann) 55

Maritime Boundary Treaty With Canada (Feld-
man, Ridgway) 21

Sixth International Tin Agreement (Calin-
gaert) 31

Department and Foreign Service. FY 1982
Authorization Request (Haig) 24

Developing Countries. AID Bilateral Assist-
ance Programs (McPherson) 43

East Asia and the Pacific. FY 1982 Assist-
ance Requests for Asia (Armacost) .... 26

Egypt. U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear Coopera-
tion Agreement (joint statement, sup-
plementary information) 54

d El Salvador

Economic Assistance to El Salvador (Depart-
ment statement) 72

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast

Meetings 9

imi Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the

Press" 4

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Report"

Energy

Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(Morse) 33

Energy Security and International Prepared-
ness (Morse) 34

Europe

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe
(Ewing) 38

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast
Meetings 9

Foreign Aid

AID Bilateral Assistance Programs (McPher-
son) 43

Economic Assistance to El Salvador (Depart-
ment statement) 72

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration
and Refugee Assistance (Smyser) 59

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Africa
(Walker) 18

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Asia (Arma-
cost) 26

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Europe
(Ewing) 38

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for Latin Amer-
ica (Bushnell) 69

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for South Asia
(Coon) 68

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle
East (Draper, Twinam) 48

FY 1982 Security Assistance Requests (Buck-
ley, Burt) 62

Military Assistance to Liberia (Department
statement) 20

U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to Nicaragua
(Department statement) 71

Government Organization. Secretary Haig
Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 4

Human Rights. Secretary Haig Interviewed
on "Meet the Press" 4

Iran. Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the
Congress (Department explanatory state-
ment) 52

Japan. Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister
(Haig, Ito) 29

Latin America and the Caribbean. FY 1982
Assistance Requests for Latin America
(Bushnell) 69

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele-
vision 7

Lebanon. Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to
Lebanese President Sarkis) 54

Liberia. Military Assistance to Liberia (De-
partment statement) 20

Middle East

Energy Security and International Prepared-
ness (Morse) 34

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for the Middle
East (Draper, Twinam) 48

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast
Meetings 9

Narcotics. International Narcotics Control
(Linnemann) 55

Nicaragua

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Report" 1

U.S. Suspends Economic Aid to Nicaragua (De-
partment statement) 71

NATO

NATO Defense Ministers Position on Poland
(statement by deputy White House press
secretary) 42

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele-
vision 7

Nuclear Policy. U.S., Egypt Initial Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement (joint statement,
supplementary information) 54

Poland

NATO Defense Ministers Position on Poland
(statement by deputy White House press
secretary) 42

Poland -A Profile 42

Poland's First Deputy Prime Minister Visits
U.S. (Bush, Jagielski) 41

Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the
Press" 4

Secretary Haig Interviewed on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Report" 1

Situation in Poland (statement by White House
press secretary) 41

Presidential Documents

Lebanon (Secretary's Letter to Lebanese
President Sarkis) 54

Northern Ireland (Reagan) 39

Publications 78

Refugees

FY 1982 and FY 1983 Requests for Migration
and Refugee Assistance 59

FY 1982 Assistance Requests for African
Refugees (Smyser) 60

Security Assistance. FY 1982 Security
Assistance Requests (Buckley, Burt) ... 62

South Asia. FY 1982 Assistance Requests for
South Asia (Coon) 68

Spain. Secretary Haig Interviewed for
Spanish Television 7

Terrorism

Secretary Haig Interviewed at Breakfast
Meetings 9

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Spanish Tele-
vision 7

Trade. Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister
(Haig, Ito) 29

Treaties

Current Actions 73

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to the Con-
gress (Department explanatory state-
ment) 52

Maritime Boundary Treaty With Canada (Feld-
man, Ridgway) 21

Sixth International Tin Agreement (Calin-
gaert) 31

United Kingdom. Northern Ireland (Rea-
gan) 39

Name Index

Armacost, Michael 26

Buckley, James L 62

Burt, Richard R 62

Bush, Vice President 41

Bushnell, John A 69

Calingaert, Michael 31

Coon, Jane A 68

Draper, Morris 48

Ewing, Raymond C 38

Feldman, Mark B 21

Haig, Secretary 1, 4, 7, 9, 24, 29, 54

Ito, Masayoshi 29

Jagielski, Mieczyslaw 41

Linnemann, Joseph H 55

McPherson, M. Peter 43

Morse, Edward L 33, 34

Reagan, President 39

Ridgway, Rozanne L 21

Smyser, W. R 59,60

Twinam, Joseph W 48

Walker, Lannon 18

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Postage and Fees Paid

Department of State

STA-501

Second Class

A

I

l(

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. See inside front cover for subscription rates and mailing address.

3

\'/jQ£t

hidtenn

■fe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2051

June 1981

Department of State

bulletin

~

Volume 81 / Number 2051 / June 1981

sS

Cover Photo:

Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki

and President Reagan.

( White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman )

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Acting Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

ica

■3(

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of

Documents, U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Price: 12 issues plus annual index —

$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign}

Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign)

Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (for. n)

M

CONTENTS

Te Secretary

ii A New Direction in U.S. Foreign

Policy
1 Question-and- Answer Session
Following Address Before
ASNE
fl NATO and the Restoration of
American Leadership
Foreign Policy and the American
Spirit
I Visit to the Middle East and

Europe
2! Interview for Great Decisions
21 Interview for NBC Television
■ Interview for ABC Television

Irica

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(Letter to the Congress)

Cmada

U.S. -Canada Consultations on

Garrison Diversion Unit (Joint

Press Release)
Maritime Boundary Treaty and

Fishery Agreement (Message to

the Senate)

ist Asia

Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia
(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)

3

i:onomics

Global Economic Interdepend-
ence (Deane R. Hinton)

The Airbus: Challenge to U.S.
Aircraft Industry (Harry Kopp)

FEATURE

1 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki (Arrival and Departure Remarks,

Joint Communique)

2 Japan— A Profile

Europe

41 U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales
Limitation to the U.S.S.R.
(President Reagan)

41 Dutch Prime Minister Meets

With Vice President Bush (Vice
President Bush, Andreas A.M.
van Agt)

42 Turkish Foreign Minister Meets

With Vice President Bush
(White House Statement)

42 Ataturk Centennial Year (White

House Statement)

Middle East

43 U.S. Policy Toward the

Middle East and Persian Gulf
Region (Peter D. Constable)

44 Iran Claims Procedures (De-

partment Statement)

45 11th Report on Sinai Support

Mission (Message to the Con-
gress)

46 Arms Sales to Morocco; West-

ern Saharan Conflict (Morris
Draper)

47 Sale of AW ACS to Saudi Ara-

bia (Department Statement)

Refugees

49 U.S. Contributions to

Refugee Relief in Southeast
Asia and Pakistan (W. R.
Smyser)

Security Assistance

51 Reprograming Proposal for El
Salvador (James L. Buckley)

South Asia

53 Aid to Pakistan (Jane A. Coon)

United Nations

54 U.S. Perspective of the

35th General Assembly

55 Namibia (Western Five State-

ment)

58 International Conference on

Assistance to Africa's Refugees
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick)

59 African Refugee Relief Day

(Proclamation)

Western Hemisphere

59 El Salvador (Department

Statement)

Treaties

60 Current Actions

Chronology

62 April 1981

Press Releases

63 Department of State

Publications

63 Department of State

64 GPO Sales

Index

SPECIAL (see Center Section)

Atlas of United States Foreign Relations: International Organizations

iSulHSlfep|NTSJ

\

| JUL I 5 1981
DEPOSITOR

FEATURE

Prime Minister Suzuki signs President
Reagan's guest book.

(White House photo hy Bill Fitz-Patrick)

Feature

isit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki

Japanese Prime Minister Zenko
:uki made an official visit to the
tied States May J,-9, 1981, and to
shington, D.C., May 7-8, 1981.
lowing are remarks made at the ar-
al ceremony on May 7, a joint com-
nique issued, and departure remarks,
h on May 8.1

:RIVAL CEREMONY1

;sident Reagan

Prime Minister, Madam Suzuki, it's
eat honor for Nancy and me, in be-
f of the American people, to welcome
i to the United States. We're de-
ited to be your hosts during your first
it in both our Administrations. The
>ple of Japan and the people of
lerica are friends of separate pasts.
i have a different language, different
:estry, and yet together, our actions
/e helped to shape the future.
Today, we have a chance to bring
I shness and a new direction to the
;C3p friendship between our peoples.
A e custom, when leaders of our two na-
1 ns meet, is to look back, to measure
J A' far we've come. It's true that we've
i : 'omplished much in a relatively short
M riod of time. Today, however, you and
!| /ill look forward. We'll chart the
I ;ure course of our friendship for
] ace. You and I hold a sacred trust, a
:red trust of two of the world's great-
: nations. Our countries are economic
iders in the world of sophisticated
;hnology, industry, and science. And
cause we're leaders, great tides swirl
3und us, forces of independence, prog-
5S, and friendly competition.

As you have said, the choices we
ike will determine the fate of genera-
>ns. What we create must blend into
e future as the poet Shelley described
e west wind— a tumult of mighty har-
onies. You have said that harmony is
e keynote of your government's philos-
'hy, and harmony is a philosophy I ad-
re very much. Harmony requires
'erences to be joined in pursuit of
;her ideals. It is the philosophy that
m have said you want to share with
le world. It is the foundation of a
lilosophy necessary to mold strength
ito greatness.

Japan has been a harmonious and
jiyal ally whose people understand that

une1981

free societies must bear the responsi-
bility of freedom together. And Japan
and the United States understand and
work with each other because of the
strong ties that we have built upon the
principles of a harmonious relationship.

We, in America, are grateful for the
strong measures that you have taken to
penalize the Soviet Union for its violent
aggression in Afghanistan. You have
come to the aid of countries resisting
Soviet expansion. You have rescued
refugees, imposed sanctions against
tyrants, and offered economic assistance
to the oppressed. The people of Japan
stand with Americans, Europeans, and
people of other democracies in a com-
munity of free powers. But even in this
world community of leadership, Japan
and the United States stand out in their
achievements. The economic forces at
our command are the basis of a powerful
guarantee of progress in peace. They
are the essential tools with which we can
help others to advance and to insure
freedom. Our most valuable research,
our people -or resource, I should say,
have the strength to carry out their
dreams, and in our dreams, we both
yearn to be the best. Our mutual search
for excellence, for achievement, for gen-
uine security is conducted in the spirit of
harmony.

There is a hill in Boston where
dreams are made and sometimes shat-
tered. Runners beaded in sweat and
panting for breath must conquer that
hill to win—a demanding foot race
known as the Boston Marathon. It is
called Heartbreak Hill. About 2 weeks
ago, a young man from Japan raced up
that hill and won. His name, Toshihiko
Seko, a sales clerk from Tokyo. After
the race, he told us that he was
motivated by respect for the American
who had won last year. In Japan, he
said, when you respect somebody, you
show it by going beyond his
achievements. Well, Mr. Seko is not only
an awesome athlete, he is a gracious and
wise man. And let me say, Mr. Seko has
earned the respect of a pack of
American runners who look forward to
the pleasure of meeting him again next
year.

Let us continue to be challenged by
our accomplishments, by the accomplish-
ments of each other. Let us compete in
the same contests with each victory be-
coming the next goal to conquer. But let
us also always remember and let the
world be aware, Japan and America will
go forward together. [Applause]

Prime Minister Suzuki2

Thank you very much for your very
warm welcome. Let me express my
heartfelt thankfulness for your truly
remarkable recovery from the unfor-
tunate incident and my delight that you
are now standing here in very good
health and with that winning smile that
is now known throughout the world.
[Applause]

The world is now beset by unprece-
dentedly complex political, economic,
and social challenges. I am convinced,
however, that the industrialized democ-
racies, by strengthening their coopera-
tion and solidarity and by addressing
these challenges with firm determina-
tion, can dispel misery, oppression, and
violence from the face of this Earth and
can bring peace, justice, freedom, and
prosperity to the international communi-
ty. Japan and the United States are
great powers whose combined national
products account for one-third of the
world's total. Close coordination be-
tween our two countries can contribute
immeasurably to the peace and security
of the entire world.

I have come to hold a candid ex-
change of views with you about the
responsibilities Japan and the United
States should discharge and the roles we
should play in the current international
situation. It is, also, my earnest desire
to consolidate the bond of friendship and
expand, further, the horizons of coopera-
tion between our two countries. I must
add that the opportunity to talk with
you so soon after you have assumed the
Presidency in such trying times but with
the full and sacred trust and mandate of
the American people, I regard as very
timely and significant.

The moment I set foot on American
soil this time I sensed the aspirations of
the American people to build a society
filled with vitality. The Japanese people
have profound respect for the American
people who are now embarked on the
new beginning under your leadership.
We wish to advance hand-in-hand with
you toward realizing the aspirations of
the international community by expand-
ing our cooperation with your country
and by strengthening the ties between
our two peoples, both of whom aspire to
peace and to societies filled with vigor or
vitality.

I know that the talks that will begin
shortly will mark an important step for-
ward in our common enterprise. [Ap-
plause]

1

Feature

JOINT COMMUNIQUE1

At the invitation of the Government of
the United States, the Prime Minister
and Mrs. Suzuki paid an official visit to
the United States from May 4 through
9. President Reagan and Prime Minister
Suzuki met in Washington on May 7 and
8 for a comprehensive and fruitful
review of the current international situa-
tion and U.S.-Japan relationship. They
pledged that they would work closely
together in pursuit of world peace and
prosperity. The President and the Prime
Minister, recognizing that the alliance
between the United States and Japan is
built upon their shared values of
democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their
solidarity, friendship and mutual trust.

The President and the Prime
Minister viewed with concern the Soviet
military build-up and the Soviet ac-
tivities in the Third World as seen in its
military intervention into Afghanistan
and its behavior elsewhere. They
reaffirmed their position that the Soviet
intervention into Afghanistan cannot be
condoned and that the immediate, un-
conditional and total withdrawal of the
Soviet troops should be realized. They

restated their view that the problems of
Poland should be resolved by the Polish
people themselves without any external
interference and that any intervention in
Poland would have a serious adverse
effect on world peace. They shared the
view that should intervention in Poland
occur, the Western industrialized
democracies should cooperate and imple-
ment their policies in concert.

Affirming their interest in the peace
and stability of Asia, the President and
the Prime Minister agreed:

• To continue respectively to ex-
pand cooperative relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China,

• To promote the maintenance of
peace on the Korean Peninsula as impor-
tant for peace and security in East Asia,
including Japan,

• To continue their cooperation in
support of the solidarity of ASEAN and
its quest for the greater resilience and
development of its members.

The President and the Prime Mini-
ster placed high value on the respective
role each country is playing in this
regard as exemplified recently by the
President's decision to maintain U.S.

Japan— A Profile

Geography

Area: 381,945 sq. km. (147,470 sq. mi.);
slightly smaller than California. Capital:
Tokyo (pop. 11.372 million). Other Cities:
Yokohama (2.67 million), Osaka (2.658
million), Nagoya (2 million), Kyoto (1.4
million). Terrain: Rugged, mountainous
islands. Climate: Varies from subtropical to
temperate.

People

Population (1980): 117 million. Annual
Growth Rate: 0.8%. Ethnic Groups: 0.6%
Korean. Religions: Shintoism and Buddhism;
0.8% Christian. Language: Japanese.
Literacy: 99%. Life Expectancy: Males 73
yrs., females 78 yrs.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Date of
Constitution: May 3, 1947. Branches: Ex-
ecutive-Prime Minister (Head of Govern-
ment). Legislative -bicameral Diet (House of
Representatives and House of Councilors).
Judicial Civil law system with Anglo-Ameri-
can influence. Subdivisions: 47 prefectures.
Political Parties: Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Demo-
cratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito (Clean

Government Party), Japan Communist Party
(JCP). Suffrage: Universal over 20.

Economy

GNP (1980): $990 billion. Real Growth Rate:
6% 1979, 6.1% 1969-79. Per Capita GNP
(1980): $8,460. Natural Resources: Negligi-
ble mineral resources, fish. Agricultural Prod-
ucts: Rice, vegetables, fruits, milk, meat,
natural silk. Industrial Products: Machinery
and equipment, metals and metal products,
textiles, autos, chemicals, electrical and elec-
tronic equipment. Trade (1979): Exports -
$101.1 billion: machinery and equipment,
metals and metal products, textiles. Part-
ners -U.S. 28%, EC 10.8%, Southeast Asia
20.9%, Communist countries 6%. Imports -
$98.7 billion: fossil fuels, metal ore, raw
materials, foodstuffs, machinery and equip-
ment. Partners -U.S. 18%, EC 5.6%, South-
east Asia 20.7%, Communist countries 5%.

Membership in International
Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ), International
Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), International Energy Agency (IEA),
International Labor Organization (ILO),
INTELSAT. ■

ijtffl
Istab

fear

lit*
Itosi
itev

i

ground forces in Korea and by the
Prime Minister's visit to ASEAN coun- j
tries this January.

They agreed that an early and com
prehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean problem, including the
withdrawal of foreign forces, through ;j
international conference based on the
resolutions of the General Assembly of
the United Nations is important for th( i
restoration of a durable peace in In-
dochina.

The President and the Prime Mini
ster affirmed that the maintenance of
peace and security in the Middle East,
particularly in the Gulf region, is highl;
important for the peace and security o:
the entire world. They agreed that the
determined efforts of the United State:
in the face of fragile security condition
in the region contribute to restoring
stability, and that many countries, in-
cluding Japan, are benefiting from thei -
They also agreed that the process of
achieving a comprehensive peace in th<
Middle East should be further promote
to strengthen the security of the area.

In the process of reviewing the in-
ternational situation, the President an<
the Prime Minister took note of the
presence of various elements of instab:
ty in other areas of the world, and par
ticularly with respect to some parts of
Africa and Central America, they ex-
pressed their concern about the exist-
ence of conditions affecting peace and
stability.

The President and the Prime Mini
ster recognized the role that interna-
tional efforts toward genuine arms cor
trol and disarmament should play in at
vancing world peace and stability, en-
couraging restraint and responsibility
international affairs, and promoting th
security of the West as a whole.

The Prime Minister stated his viev
that it is important for the industrializ
democracies to have a shared recogni-
tion of the various political, military ai
economic problems of the world and tc
cope with them in a consistent mannei
in order comprehensively to provide fc
the security of the West as a whole.

In meeting these international
challenges to their peace and security,
the President and the Prime Minister
recognized that all Western industriali
ed democracies need to make greater
efforts in the areas of defense, world
economic improvement, economic coop
eration with the Third World, and
mutually supportive diplomatic ini-
tiatives.

"I

K

Department of State Bullet

a

:

Feature

The President and the Prime
lister reaffirmed their belief that the
>.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
and Security is the foundation of
,ce and stability in the Far East and
defense of Japan. In insuring peace
1 stability in the region and the
ense of Japan, they acknowledged
desirability of an appropriate divi-
n of roles between Japan and the
ited States. The Prime Minister
ted that Japan, on its own initiative
i in accordance with its Constitution
1 basic defense policy, will seek to
ke even greater efforts for improving
defense capabilities in Japanese ter-
jries and in its surrounding sea and
space, and for further alleviating the
ancial burden of U.S. forces in Japan.
e President expressed his understand-
of the statement by the Prime
nister. They recognized their common
ijerest in contributing to the defense of
Jpan, and expressed the hope for even
Sire fruitful dialogue between the two
cintries on security matters. In this
l^ard, they looked forward to the
I leduled meetings in June on security
•itters by representatives of the two
( vernments both at the ministerial and
I rking levels.

The President and the Prime Minis-
1 ■ agreed upon the importance of the
] ationship between the industrialized
« intries and the developing countries.
' ey expressed their hope that construc-
I e progress will be made in dealing
■ th the countries of the south through
• rious means, in particular through the
I scussion scheduled for Ottawa and
''•'sxico.

They affirmed that political, econom-
and social stability of developing
untries is indispensable for the mainte-
i nee of peace and stability of the

I )rld. The Prime Minister stated that

II e Government of Japan will strive to
pand and improve its official develop-
ent assistance under the New Medium
;rm Target and that the Government

\ ill strengthen its aid to those areas

1 hich are important to the maintenance
' peace and stability of the world.
They also stated that they will eon-

'nue to assist the victims of interna-
onal instability through their aid to In-

ixihinese, Afghan, and African
?fugees.

The President and the Prime
linister discussed various problems fac-
ig the world economy. In this connec-
on, they expressed their concern about
le rising pressure toward protectionism
l many countries and affirmed that the

The receiving line at the state dinner; from left to right are Mrs. Suzuki, Mrs. Reagan,
Prime Minister Suzuki shaking hands with Secretary Haig, and Mrs. Haig greets the
President (behind the Secretary).

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

United States and Japan are determined
to continue their efforts to maintain and
strengthen free and open trade prin-
ciples embodied in the GATT
framework. In this regard, the President
expressed his appreciation for the volun-
tary action taken by the Government of
Japan to restrain the export of auto-
mobiles to the United States at a time
when the United States automobile in-
dustry is passing through a difficult ad-
justment period.

The President and the Prime
Minister highly valued the role the Sum-
mit Meeting of the Seven Industrialized
Nations plays in securing the stability
and development of the world economy.

The President and the Prime
Minister expressed their satisfaction
with the close bilateral economic rela-
tionship and noted the prospects for a
further expansion of these ties. They
shared the view that economic issues be-
tween the two countries have been and
should continue to be given early and
mutually satisfactory solutions in the
spirit of goodwill and cooperation.

The President and the Prime
Minister highly valued the report of the
Japan-United States Economic Relations

Group which contains recommendations
that will contribute to the long-term
development of the United States-Japan
economic relations. They agreed that the
two governments should address the
various recommendations for possible
implementation. They also expressed the
hope that the recommendations would
be studied in such fora as the
U.S. -Japan Businessmen's Conference.

They reconfirmed the importance of
the dialogue between the two countries
through various fora including the
United States- Japan sub-cabinet group.

The President and the Prime Minis-
ter, noting that the energy problem con-
tinues to be critical to the healthy devel-
opment of the world economy, re-
affirmed the need for the two countries
to make further efforts, together with
other industrialized countries, in such
fields as increase of energy production,
promotion of development and use of
alternative energy sources, and conser-
vation of energy.

The President and the Prime Minis-
ter, in recognition of vital importance of
preventing nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion, reaffirmed the need to continue to
promote international efforts to this end.
They shared the view, on the other
hand, that the role of nuclear energy

une1981

Feature

ought to be further expanded under ap-
propriate safeguards to meet the in-
creasing energy needs of the world and
that the United States and Japan have
special responsibility to cooperate fur-
ther in promoting the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. In this connection, the
President endorsed the view of the
Prime Minister that reprocessing is of
particular importance to Japan. The
President and the Prime Minister thus
agreed that the two governments should
promptly start consultations with a view
to working out a permanent solution at
an early date on such pending issues as
the continued operation of the Tokai
Reprocessing Facility and the construc-
tion of an additional reprocessing plant
in Japan.

Underscoring their belief that
cultural exchange is an important ele-
ment in fostering mutual understanding
and friendship, the President welcomed
the announcement of the Prime Minister
that the Government of Japan has made
a financial contribution to the
Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and
that it has announced its intention to
give substantial financial assistance
respectively to the Japan Society of New
York and, in a continuing manner, to
the Special Japan-U.S. Exchange Pro-
gram of "Youth for Understanding"
which is to commence next fiscal year.

Finally, the Prime Minister ex-
pressed his sincere appreciation to the
President for the warm reception he has
received during his visit to the United
States. The Prime Minister extended an
invitation to the President to visit
Japan. The President thanked the Prime
Minister for his gracious invitation, and
said that he hoped to visit Japan at a
mutually convenient time.

DEPARTURE REMARKS1

President Reagan

This has been a most fruitful meeting
for both our countries. We have estab-
lished a bond of friendship. In fact, last
night, the Prime Minister referred to it
that we were buddies. And we have
come to an agreement, or at least dis-
covered, perhaps I should say, that
we're in agreement on a number of
broad issues—economic, political, mili-
tary—and have established a base
whereby we can have full consultation,
and any possible difference or misunder-
standing that might arise that we can be
in instant contact to resolve it. So, we're
most grateful and honored that the
Prime Minister has been here, and as I
say, I think we're all much better for
what has been decided in the meetings
we've held.

Prime Minister Suzuki2

Thank you very much for your kind
words. As you've just said, through the
2 days of talks with you we have been
able to establish between us an un-
shakable basis of friendship and mutual
trust. And this is the greatest treasure
that I take home from my visit to the
United States to Japan.

Also, in the course of our 2-day
talks, we touched on a broad range of
issues, political-economic and other
issues, including the questions of the
relationship between the developing and
the developed parts of the world and,
also, including the question of how the
countries in the West should cooperate
together in securing, in a comprehensive
manner, the security of the West as a
whole.

IE

We did engage in very forthright
and open exchanges of views and, as a,<
result, we were able to confirm that w<
have a basic convergence of views and
perceptions about the important matte
that face the international community
today. We were also able to reaffirm
that we are both dedicated to the com-
mon goal of securing world peace and
stability and prosperity, and we
reaffirmed our common resolve to join
our hands together and move vigorous
forward to that end.

We also agreed that we will always
be in very close touch. We will com-
municate with each other very closely,
consult very closely on these global
issues, as well as on the problems that
we may have in our bilateral relations
On the basis of mutual trust and frienc
ship that I have been able to establish
with you as true partners and as true
friends, we can certainly contribute
together to the further advancement o
the relations between our two countrie

My visit this time has been very,
very fruitful thanks to your kind
cooperation, and I'm happy to report t
you that I'm perfectly satisfied with th
very fruitful visit that I've been able tc
have. Thank you very much. [Applause

■

fcre

:
■-
st. A

•::'

mat

j I

ratio

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Pn
dential Documents of May 11, 1981, which
also includes the exchange of toasts betwe«
the President and the Prime Minister folloi
ing a dinner at the White House on May 7.

2The Prime Minister spoke in Japanese
and his remarks were translated by an inte
preter. ■

Department of State Bulleti

up]
in
fe
n

'■'■'

K,

r:.
tbt

mi

nt b1

mil

ton

is

m

THE SECRETARY

4

l New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy

San

Secretary Haig's address before the
nerican Society of Newspaper Editors
SNE) on April 24, 1981.1

w«

iin

>me 100 days have elapsed since Presi-
nt Reagan's inauguration. In the field
foreign affairs, the first controversial
eps have been taken. To paraphrase
ark Twain, these actions have pleased
ore than a few and astonished the
st. Although we have not remade the
orld, a new direction is evident.

We are acting to restore confidence
American leadership through a more
bust defense of U.S. ideals and in-
rests and a more realistic approach to
ie dangers and opportunities of the in-
rnational situation. It is my purpose
day to outline briefly the philosophy
;hind the new direction: this Admini-
ration's view of the realities of the
orld and the tasks before us.

A French statesman once remarked
lat the true business of government
.as to foresee problems and to adminis-
:r appropriate remedies while time re-
amed. In our approach to foreign
fairs, we have sought to distinguish be-
veen the symptom of the problem and
a ie problem itself, the crisis and its

luse, the ebb and flow of daily events
Pi id the underlying trend. The problems
: lat beset us are clearly symptomatic of
jj seper disorders, and it is to these fun-
; amental movements of international
■s olitics that we must direct our
> ?medies.

• Worldwide inflation, caused in
art by astounding increases in the cost

i f oil, interrupts balanced economic
rowth essential to the aspirations of
oth developing and developed nations.

• Limited resources and political
isturbance impede the eradication of
unger, poverty, disease, and other im-
ortant humanitarian goals.

• Disruption from abroad threatens
more vulnerable West, as we draw

nergy and raw materials from regions
a which the throes of rapid change and
onflict prevail.

• Soviet military power grows re-
entlessly as Moscow shows an increas-
ng readiness to use it both directly and
>y proxy and obstructs the achievement
)f a more just international order.

We must understand that these con-
iitions are interrelated; they play upon
:ach other; and the danger is, therefore,

all the greater. If present trends are not
arrested, the convergence of rising
international disorder, greater Western
vulnerability, and growing Soviet mili-
tary power will undo the international
codes of conduct that foster the peaceful
resolution of disputes between nations.
The symptoms of this breakdown -ter-
rorism, subversion, and conquest -are
already apparent. The ideals and safety
of democratic societies are under
assault.

Imaginative remedies might have
prevented the current danger. Unfor-
tunately, as these ominous developments
gathered strength over the last decade,
America's confidence in itself was
shaken, and American leadership fal-
tered. The United States seemed unable
or unwilling to act when our strategic
interests were threatened. We earned a
reputation for "strategic passivity," and
that reputation still weighs heavily upon
us and cannot be wished away by
rhetoric. What we once took for granted
abroad -confidence in the United
States -must be reestablished through a
steady accumulation of prudent and suc-
cessful actions.

Before others can repose confidence
in us, we must ourselves be confident.
The Reagan foreign policy, therefore,
begins with a justifiable pride in our
country, its ideals, and in its achieve-
ments. Government by the people and a

Reagan's program to restore confidence
in American leadership abroad. Our ac-
tions are directed toward three projects:

First, to enlarge our capacity to
influence events and to make more effec-
tive use of the full range of our moral,
political, scientific, economic, and mili-
tary resources in the pursuit of our in-
terests;

Second, to convince our allies,
friends, and adversaries -above all the
Soviet Union -that America will act in a
manner befitting our responsibilities as a
trustee of freedom and peace; and

Third, to offer hope and aid to the
developing countries in their aspirations
for a peaceful and prosperous future.

The President has established clear
priorities in the pursuit of these proj-
ects. Understanding that American eco-
nomic weakness would cripple our
efforts abroad, he has proposed a revolu-
tionary program to restore inflation-free
economic growth. This program recog-
nizes that America's strength is meas-
ured not only in arms but also in the
spirit of individual enterprise, the sound-
ness of the dollar, and the proper role of
government in a free society.

Fundamental to this approach is also
the belief that economic recovery must
be accompanied by a prompt correction
of defects in our military posture. For
too long, we have ignored this fact: The

We are acting to restore confidence in American leadership through
a more robust defense of U.S. ideals and interests and a more realistic
approach to the dangers and opportunities of the international
situation.

society under law are great principles to
defend. Regard for individual liberty at
home translates into a concern for
human rights abroad.

Moreover, we are fully conscious of
our historic role in the defense of free-
dom. Together with our allies, we have
shared peace and prosperity. The United
States continues to be the natural an-
chor for the free societies of the Atlantic
and Pacific. Our objective remains sim-
ple and compelling: a world hospitable to
our society and our ideals.

Confidence in ourselves -the crucial
psychological element in any foreign
policy -is evident throughout President

military strength required by the United
States can be achieved only through
sacrifice and consistent purpose. We
have proposed a heavy investment in
our Armed Forces to assure safety for
ourselves and the generations to come.

Our economic and military programs
have not lessened the need for balanced
economic and security assistance abroad.
This helps allies and friends to join us in
contributing to the general security. It
also adds to the flexible instruments of
influence required for a successful
foreign policy.

These efforts to strengthen
America's economic and military capa-

June1981

The Secretary

bilities provide the foundation for an
American diplomacy that includes the
following aims: restraining the Soviet
Union; reinvigorating our alliances;
strengthening our friends; and a more
effective approach to the developing
countries.

Restraining the Soviet Union

A major focus of American policy must
be the Soviet Union, not because of ideo-
logical preoccupation but simply because
Moscow is the greatest source of inter-
national insecurity today. Let us be plain
about it: Soviet promotion of violence as
the instrument of change constitutes the
greatest danger to world peace.

The differences between the United
States and the Soviet Union concern the
very principles of international action.
We believe in peaceful change, not the
status quo. The peoples of the world
seek peace, prosperity, and social
justice. This is as desirable as it is in-
evitable. The United States could no
more stand against such a quest than we
could repudiate our own revolution. We
were the first to proclaim that individual
liberty, democracy, and the rule of law
provided the best framework for the im-
provement of the human condition. And
we have led the attempt since the Sec-
ond World War to maintain two prin-
ciples of international action: the peace-
ful resolution of disputes and the pro-
scription of outside intervention in the
affairs of sovereign nations.

In contrast, Soviet policy seeks to
exploit aspirations for change in order
to create conflict justifying the use of
force and even invasion. Moscow con-
tinues to support terrorism and war by
proxy.

There is an additional dimension to
the danger. In regions sensitive to West-
ern interests, in the littorals of critical
sea passages, in areas that hardly affect
Soviet security, you will find Moscow
taking a keen interest in conflict. Thus,
Western strategic interests, as well as
the hopes for a more just international
order, are at stake.

Our objective must be to restore the
prospects for peaceful resolution of
conflict. We can do this by demonstrat-
ing to the Soviet Union that aggressive
and violent behavior will threaten
Moscow's own interests. We can do this
by demonstrating, as we are doing in El
Salvador today, that a government bent
on making necessary reforms will not be
overthrown by armed intervention sup-
ported by Moscow or its surrogates. We

can do this by never accepting the
Soviet occupation of other countries,
such as Afghanistan.

Only the United States has the
pivotal strength to convince the
Soviets -and their proxies -that violence
will not advance their cause. Only the
United States has the power to persuade
the Soviet leaders that improved rela-
tions with us serve Soviet as well as
American interests. We have a right, in-
deed a duty, to insist that the Soviets
support a peaceful international order,
that they abide by treaties, and that

. . . Soviet promotion of violence
as the instrument of change
constitutes the greatest danger to
world peace.

they respect reciprocity. A more con-
structive Soviet behavior in these areas
will surely provide the basis for a more
productive East- West dialogue.

Reinvigorating Alliances

Another essential element in the restora-
tion of our leadership is the strengthen-
ing of our alliances. From the outset of
this Administration, we have placed a
high priority on repairing the damage
done to these alliances in recent years.
Rebuilding alliance solidarity is a pre-
condition for redressing the East- West
military imbalance and for constraining
Soviet international behavior.

Perhaps the most useful concept to
govern these critical relationships is
"consultation." Consultation should mean
more than the formal act of soliciting
opinions. It suggests what alliances real-
ly mean: shared interests, reliable per-
formance, and sensitivity to each other's
concerns.

We have acted to restore consulta-
tion as a useful instrument of alliance
communication and solidarity. President
Reagan's numerous meetings with heads
of state and foreign ministers, as well as
my own, have been marked by refresh-
ing exchanges of views. A warm
welcome awaits a United States willing
to listen before it acts.

We are moving already beyond ex-
changes of views toward common strate-
gic perceptions and concrete acts. We
and our allies are taking common steps
to restrain Soviet aggression and to
restore our strength.

lined

1

• On Poland, we have collectively
sent a firm signal to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets are now well aware that inlifi
tervention would bring severe and last-
ing consequences. Indeed, the restraint
we have seen offers some evidence of
the benefits of alliance cohesion and
resolve. Simultaneously, the West is
working together to help the Polish pec
pie economically, so they can deal with
their own problems.

• On theater nuclear forces, we an<
our allies have reaffirmed our commit-
ment to modernization of NATO's
theater nuclear capabilities based on
NATO's so-called two-track decision of
1979. We will also make a serious effor
to pursue European theater nuclear
arms control with the Soviets.

• In critical regions such as the Mil
die East and Southwest Asia, we have
launched a new, intensive effort aimed
at achieving common approaches to pre
tect our vital interests and to help
assure peace. At a meeting of allies in-
terested in southern Africa earlier this
week in London, we began to reach cor
sensus on a realistic and fair approach
to the important problem of Namibia.

• On economic challenges, we are i
experiencing slower growth and high
inflation. Here again we understand th;
international cooperation is essential to
solve each of our national problems. Fo
example we have reaffirmed our belief
free trade as we consult with Japan to
alleviate the plight of the auto industry
in the United States.

Looking toward the NATO minis-
terial meeting early next month and th
Ottawa economic summit in July, the
most advanced nations in the world arc
coming together to meet the challenge
from Soviet expansionism, regional in-
stability, and economic interdependence

Strengthening U.S. Friends

The reinvigoration of our alliances mus
be accompanied by the strengthening o
our friends as well. This is particularly
important in the Middle East and Soutl
west Asia, a region where violent actio)
by the Soviet Union and its surrogates
demands a more effective Western
response.

The President's purpose in sending
me recently to the area was to seek the
wisdom of our friends on the issues of
peace and security. But he also sent a
message. The United States is fully
cognizant of regional complexities and
the necessity to proceed with the peace

-:■-

I

y.

-:
ten

n

i

Department of State Bulletii

»i

I he becretary

rocess. At the same time, we are deter-
lined to strengthen our friends and to

1 ' ork with them against the threat posed

y the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
• hese great projects must go forward
)gether if we are to shake off our
putation for strategic passivity in the
rea and safeguard Western interests.

n pa

resh Approach to
i leveloping Countries

lestraint of the Soviets, the reinvigora-
lon of our alliances, and the strengthen-
lg of our friends are crucial aspects of
he Reagan foreign policy. But the
nderlying tensions of international
ffairs go beyond the themes of allies
nd adversaries. A fresh American ap-
proach to the developing countries is
ssential if we are to treat the roots of
iternational disorder.

The developing countries, sometimes
rouped together as the Third World,
ire a vastly varied multitude of states,
most of them beset by severe economic
.nd political problems. What once united
hem -the memory of colonialism -is
ading. The new emphasis is on the
uture, not the past.

The West in general and the United
States in particular hold the key to that
uture. It is we who demonstrate by our
iwn history how to combine freedom
ind development, political stability and
conomic progress. Two guidelines
should govern our actions.

• We must show that friends of the
Jnited States benefit from our friend-
ship, even in the face of Soviet-
supported intervention.

• We must offer hope that the
United States and its allies are not some
form of closed club, hostile to the prob-
lems and frustrations attending develop-
ment.

Our record on the issues of increas-
ing concern to the future of the develop-
ing countries offers a sharp contrast to
that of the East. We support economic
development; the East does not. We
assist the refugees; the East refuses
relief. We offer the peaceful mediation
of dispute; the East offers only arms of
conflict. The developing countries are
beginning to recognize where their best
hopes lie, and it is in both the interests
of humanity and our own national
security that we promote such a trend.

In reviewing the causes of the Sec-
ond World War and prospects for peace
in the future, Winston Churchill conclud-
ed: "How absolute is the need of a broad

Question-and-Answer Session
Following Address Before ASNE

At the conclusion of the Secretary's
address before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) on April 24,
1981, (see previous article), he answered
the following questions from the au-
dience.1

Q. Since one month ago today, when
you expressed in a congressional hear-
ing dissatisfaction with the emerging
crisis management arrangement, and
especially since the Situation Room in-
cident a week later, we have heard lit-
tle about your role as vicar or general
manage1-

The role that you announced at
the outset had been given to you by
President Reagan. Could you speak a
little bit about how you see your role
now? Have you renegotiated it or re-
defined it in subsequent meetings with
the President, and are you satisfied
with it and with crisis management as
it is working now with the formula-
tion of American foreign policy?

A. First, let me assure you that I
am very comfortable with my relation-
ships with the President and with the
White House. I have spoken almost daily
to the President, either personally or
telephonically, since the events you
described. I am absolutely convinced

path of international action pursued by
many states in common across the
years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of
national politics."

As we enter the final decades of the
20th century, it is the task of the United
States to lead the pursuit of this broad
path, beckoning toward a more peaceful
and prosperous international order.
Knowledge of the obstacles before us
will protect us against false optimism.
Knowledge of ourselves will protect us
against despair. Our difficulties will not
disappear overnight. Yet we should not
dwell too much on the troubles of the
moment. The free nations of the Atlan-
tic and the Pacific represent the greatest
concentration of talent and wealth in the
world. We are a community of peoples
devoted to human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law.

Our prospects are bright. Only con-
stancy of purpose is required to preserve
successfully the liberty that is the
treasure of our civilization.

that I am doing precisely what he
brought me on board to do, and he has
reaffirmed this to me, and I am very,
very comfortable with it.

I would add again that the kinds of
report cards that sometimes fascinate
the contemporary observers are really
going to receive their important value
judgment in the context of performance.
In that context, while I am not overly
self-confident, I do feel we have made
some constructive initiatives that time
will tell whether or not they reap the
harvest I anticipate.

Q. There have been reports that
the Administration may lift the grain
embargo against the Soviet Union.
You, yourself, have said that such an
action could send a deleterious signal
to the Soviets.

Have you at this point received
any assurances from the Russians that
they will practice restraint around
Poland? Or is this decision, as Senator
Mathias has suggested, a reward to
the Russians for the absence of bad
behavior?

A. First, let me suggest to you that
had it been a little bit before 11:00 this
morning, I would have said there had
been no decision made on this subject. I
can no longer say that since I've just
pa rt'cipated in a Cabinet meeting where
a decision was made. And there will be
an announcement with respect to this
issue at 4:00 today from the White
House, and I understand there has
already been an uncharacteristic degree
of leakage with that. [Laughter]

I will not attempt to characterize the
motivations behind what the President's
decision will be when it is announced,
other than to suggest to you that this
decision was based on a longstanding
commitment of the President before his
election. It was structured on a number
of factors, including some that you
touched upon in your question.

With respect to my own view on
this, it has been clear from the outset, it
has always been my policy when a deci-
sion is made, to fully support that deci-
sion by the President, and I do in this
instance. And so when it is announced,
you'll know what I am supporting.

Q. Can I read into that that you
have not received any assurances from
the Soviets that they will practice
restraint around Poland?

'Press release 122.

June 1981

The Secretary

A. I would suggest to you that I
would never make it a habit in a public
forum to discuss whatever discussions
may have been underway in diplomatic
channels between ourselves and the
Soviet Union. I think it's a counter-
productive practice, and I intend to
avoid it. I have in the past. So I'm sorry
to flick your question away so uncere-
moniously.

Q. Four American women mis-
sionaries were murdered in El Salva-
dor last December. Their families have
become increasingly impatient about
some report of what happened, and
some of them are charging U.S. com-
plicity in a cover-up of the crime. Can
you tell us when we might expect
some information about what hap-
pended to those women on a road that
was entirely controlled by forces of
the government we are supporting in
El Salvador?

A. I think I would want to make the
point, and make it very clearly and une-
quivocally here, that this government,
the United States, has been actively
working on this problem as diligently as
I think human capabilities would permit.

We've had the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation in El Salvador, helping the
Duarte government with respect to this
investigation. There has been some
progress. That cooperation between our
Justice Department and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation continues today.

Our charge there, Mr. Chapin, has
been actively engaged in this matter on
a daily basis and reports almost weekly
or daily to us on this. I will just suggest
to you that there has been progress.
This is an anguishing problem. I
wouldn't want anyone to believe for a
moment that this Administration either
favors, would harbor, or would even
evidence a modicum of sympathy to ex-
cesses or extremes from either the right
or the left in El Salvador.

Q. Why is it taking so long?

A. I think you might ask the same
questions about the situation in Atlanta,
equally dreadful or even more so. These
are complex and difficult problems. And
I know that you will give this the objec-
tivity that has characterized your ap-
proach to these matters. [Laughter and
applause]

Q. I hope I'll always be as fair as
you've been when you've complained —
[Laughter and applause]

Q. You mentioned in your speech
the effort to find common approaches
to the Middle East. And you, in your
trip and utterances before then, have
spoken of the urgent importance of a
consensus of strategic concerns in the
Middle East area between Arabs and
Jews.

Now this sale of aircraft and
other things, AWACS [airborne warn-
ing and control systems], to Saudi
Arabia seems to have polarized into a
repeat of the 1978 battle here over
another Saudi sale. Given this situa-
tion, did the policy formation process
contribute to the struggle that we
now seem to have in prospect in
Washington, or was it inevitable?
And, given the developments now, can
you pull off this Saudi sale without
severely damaging the basis e u one
end or the other of the U.S. alliances
in the Middle East, either the Saudi
end or the Israeli end? And what hap-
pens if you don't pull it off at all?

A. That is a very, very important
question and one which reflects a great
deal of thought. And, indeed, it would
take another 30 minutes to answer it in
the detail that it deserves.

But let me suggest that with respect
to the earlier assurances given by the
Carter Administration on the situation
and the provision of arms to Saudi
Arabia: That commitment and that
assurance -it wasn't really a com-
mitment -that assurance was given at a
time when the strategic situation in the
Middle East was fundamentally different
than it is today. We've witnessed a
number of very traumatic events in the
intervening period: the collapse and fall
of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet double
intervention in Afghanistan, the increas-
ing difficulties in southern Yemen
emerging from the Horn of Africa, and
a whole new set of security threats to
the nations of the region.

So there are grounds for reassess-
ing. That reassessment was made by the
Carter Administration just prior to the
inauguration. They had concluded with
some nuances of difference on the aerial
surveillance capability that they would
proceed to seek this enhancement of
Saudi capability.

They asked us at the time whether
or not we would support them in their
movement to the Hill. We asked them
not to do so because we felt since we
were going to have to carry this burden,
we would like to make the decision, we
would like to introduce it and bear the
burden of seeing it through. I think that
was the correct decision.

In the meantime, this issue has
raised a great deal of concern in Jeru
salem -understandable I must say. Sorr
of it is a reflection of a lot of misinfor-
mation and exaggeration in terms of
capability of the system. There has beei <
no decision as to when we are going to
proceed with this decision -taking it to
the Hill, if you will. Senator [Howard]
Baker just returned from his own
assessment in the area, and I spent
some hours with him this week, and he
spoke to the President about it yester-
day.

We are in the process now of look-
ing at the technical arrangements and
the modalities for the transfer of the
system. And I would suggest that it
would be wise and prudent not to pre-
judge this situation and draw the kinds
of conclusions your question asks for ur
til this process has been completed and
until we see precisely what we're dealin
with and not deal with what are now
still a number of phantoms. That's a
joke. [Laughter]

Q. I'd like to follow up on that
question regarding the AWACS deci-
sion. In the early 1970s, we were told
that the arms sale program to Iran
would stabilize the region, hold down
oil prices, and provide a pillar of
strength in the Persian Gulf. Now
we're being told the same thing about
the arms sales to Saudi Arabia. If it
didn't work in Iran, why should we
think it will work in Saudi Arabia?

(1(3=

itttl

cast

i)

-'. '

n

•:'

P
Jensi
ling

■;:>
sal

ilaj

all

A,

Pf

5 !
KB

B

tass

i

nil

A. I would suggest that the prem-
ises of your question also suggest a
course of action in Iran that I do not
believe the Reagan Administration
would have pursued. And I leave my
answer very brief to suggest to you~-no
would a similar situation that we saw ir
Iran occur in this Administration in
Saudi Arabia.

Q. It may have occurred to you
that some of your problems with the
White House might be eased if you
were to repeat the statement made by
another famous political general. Do
you remember what General Sherman
said about the Presidency? If
nominated, I will not run; if elected, 1
will not serve. Would you welcome ar
opportunity to say that now before us

A. Almost increasingly, with every
passing hour. [Laughter] Let me sugges
something to you because you asked a
serious question as you always do.
[Laughter] Would anyone in his right
mind choose the course of Secretary of

Department of State Bulletin

m

p

':

ite as a path to the White House? I
n't think so. And I can assure you in
case that was never a consideration,
i proud to be the Secretary of State
the United States of America. [Ap-
luse] And I'm proud to serve Presi-
nt Reagan, and I will do so just so
jig as he wants me here and I feel I
n make a constructive contribution,
n not here for political objectives.

Q. It has been suggested that the
rmal balance between the Depart-
;nt of Defense and the Department
State has been disturbed in that the
:fense Secretary has been openly
aking statements on foreign policy,
id to use a specific example: in the
cent decision to provide AWACS
anes to the Saudi Arabia aid
ckage. Would you agree that such a
r- sturbance has occurred? When you
cepted your appointment, you said
iu alone would articulate foreign
tlicy for the President.

A. I suppose I could fumble through
response and it won't change your
ind one way or the other if you
'.rceive there are any problems be-
reen Cap Weinberger and myself. Let
e assure you, there are no problems.

I meet weekly with Cap for break -
st. We talk daily on the telephone. I
ive the utmost confidence in Cap's
lility to do the job he's been brought
»re to do, and I am extremely comfort-
)le with the way he's doing it. In fact, I
and back in awe and admiration.

When you get the questions of na-
Dnal security, of course, there are

Fways interface areas of complexity and
fficulty. And I suppose with maturity

e'll get a little better at sorting those
. at. I can assure you, Secretary Wein-
I ;rger and I are in total agreement in

/erything he does and says. If I felt
I :herwise, I would tell him so, and I

ould expect him to be as frank with
I le. So I'm sorry, I can't help you with
I lat answer.

Q. I made a quick note about
omething you said in your speech,
nd that was, I believe, that our allies
hould be made aware of the benefit of
ur friendship — of the friendship of
he United States.

And I wonder— harking back to
vhat the Canadians did in a very
leroic effort to bring some of our
American Embassy people out of
Tehran, which caused some risk and
eopardy to their own Embassy there,
ind since then we have continued the
'ears of haggling with the Canadians

over fishing rights treaties and other
things — how you would explain to the
Canadians the benefit of our friend-
ship in view of their historic and
heroic efforts in our behalf?

A. I just recently had the opportuni-
ty to do just that along with the Presi-
dent in our recent visit to Canada, a
visit that I think was marked and char-
acterized by the greatest cordiality and
mutual respect and elegant dialogue
from start to finish. And that's not
always been the case in the recent past,
as you will recall.

Because of the intimacy that we en-
joy with our northern neighbors and the
great interfaces across the entire spec-
trum within the relationships between
states -commercial, economic, social,
cultural, financial, energy of course -
there would be, from time to time, very
vexing differences of approach. And one
of those is the northeast and also recent-
ly has been the western problem. The
western problem's been largely solved,
thanks to patience and careful and
mutually patient activity on the part of
both governments.

In the northeast we are still some-
what torn because of the inability of this
Administration to have supported in the
Congress arrangements which our Cana-
dian neighbors might have reason to an-
ticipate would go through in terms of
treaties. We are working on that prob-
lem daily, and I can tell you progress is
being made. And, while I can't speak for
our Canadian partners— I wouldn't pre-
sume to do so -I would say that the
dialogue and relationships between our
two governments have never been bet-
ter.

Q. Your speech gives the detailed
statement of your foreign policy goals
and attitudes. Apart from a reference
to European nuclear arms control, you
made no reference at all to general
arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union — that is, an extension of
SALT — which at one point was a
centerpiece of foreign policy for
several Democratic and Republican
Administrations. Would you please ex-
plain the omission?

A. I suppose you could— in a speech
of about 20 minutes of the character of
this one which was more philosophic
rather than operational in terms of
framework— find a number of omissions
that would disturb one advocate or
another of a particular point of view.

So the only way to answer the ques-
tion for you is to go directly to the ques-

tion you've asked, and that is the
policies of the Reagan Administration
with respect to arms control in general.
You'll note I didn't talk about human
rights or nonproliferation or a number
of other things, equally important from
my point of view, in my speech.

I would suggest this: that President
Reagan has reiterated repeatedly his
support for an equitable, balanced arms
control agreement with the Soviet
Union. I think he has also suggested
that he not only seeks control and
limitations of these arms but he is a
strong advocate for reduction in the
levels of strategic armament between
East and West.

We are in a process today in this
Administration of assessing the full
range of possibilities in this area. We
are doing so in the context of the broad
approach that I did touch upon in my
speech, and that is a recognition and a
day-to-day assessment of corresponding
international Soviet behavior throughout
the world.

In recognition of the fact that we
have had a SALT II agreement which
fell on the rocks, not just in Afghani-
stan, but probably on the rocks of its
own substantive inadequacy which would
have not sustained it favorably in the
U.S. Senate with or without an Afghani-
stan.

So we are assessing the former ap-
proach under SALT II. We are assess-
ing other approaches that might be more
hopeful and more realistic in the context
of reductions. We are looking at possibly
functional arms restraint approaches.
And, at the proper moment, we will be
prepared to enter into negotiations with
the Soviet Union on limitations.

I hope I've answered your question.
I'm sorry I belabored it, but I will accept
the lumps that if it wasn't in the speech,
it wasn't in the speech intended to in-
clude that subject.

Q. You contrasted the broad
thrust of American policy with the
Soviet Union in terms of peaceful
resolution of disputes. Why have you
asked for a repeal of the Clark amend-
ment, and what are your intentions
toward Jonas Savimbi [President, Na-
tional Union for the Total Independ-
ence of Angola] in Angola?

A. We have, at the outset of this
Administration, put together a number
of what I call disabling legislative
restraints on the conduct of American
foreign policy by the President of the
United States.

June 1981

The Secretary

The Clark amendment fits into that
category along with a number of other
legislative disabling type legislative ac-
tions that were really, I think, in a
broad historic sense, a consequence of
Vietnam, Watergate, and a number of
other wrenching experiences of the past
decade.

We have asked for the elimination of
these disabling legislations -and there
are a number of them, the Clark amend-
ment included -because we feel that
they border on the unconstitutional if
they don't cross that line. We feel that
they are an a priori inhibition on
presidential policy which is self-defeating
in the extreme as those who share our
values abroad and those who do not
share our values assess our ability to
deal with the day-to-day dynamics of in-
ternational affairs.

With respect to the impact of a
repeal of the Clark amendment on the
southern African problem, it does not
prejudge that someone has made a deci-
sion to pursue actions which would be in
violation of the Clark amendment; not at
all. It does respect the reality that an
American President who goes into a
contemporary effort to solve the
anguishing problems of southern Africa
with one arm tied behind him with
respect to that issue is deprived of the
kind of flexibility the American people
would expect our President to have.

Q. As I understand the effect of
the Clark amendment, it is simply to
prohibit the export of American aid to
Jonas Savimbi.

A. That's correct.

Q. And if you withdraw the
amendment or repeal it, I'm asking
how is that consistent with your state-
ment that our purpose in dealing with
nations is the peaceful resolution of
disputes?

A. Very simply. It would be our
hope that at some point in the future,
effective American policy would bring
about the withdrawal of Cuban proxy
forces from Angola where they have no
right to be and where they represent a
fundamental violation of the good order
I described in my speech.

And it would be my assessment as
well that in our efforts to effect that,
and to effect a reconciliation in Angola
of the many diverse elements -one of
which is the Savimbi movement -with
the central government, that we are bet-
ter served without this kind of a restric-
tive, disabling piece of legislation. It
does not suggest for a moment that
anyone is going to engage in the internal
intervention in Angolan affairs.

Q. I would like to know which
are, in your opinion, the governments
of the Western Hemisphere more iden-
tified with the Soviet Union and serve
the interests of the Moscow regime in
this continent?

A. I think there can be little doubt,
after so many years, that the Govern-
ment of Cuba is largely under the sway
of Soviet influence. It has been serving
the purposes of the Soviet Union exten-
sively in recent history. One would sug-
gest that the still yet to be definitized
outcome of events in Nicaragua would
suggest a growing influence from the
Soviet Union and Cuba in the Sandinista
government. It's not necessarily in its
final stages, and there are many ele-
ments in Nicaragua today who oppose
vigorously further dependence on Cuba
and the Soviet Union.

And I would hope that our policies
would be designed to recognize the ex-
istence of those forces and to be a
source of encouragement and strength
for them in the pursuit of our own
policies vis-a-vis Nicaragua. I won't go
beyond that because I suppose I could
get into a lot of debates on that.

Sicrel

Q. In the Soviet U;>ion today then
are a number of Jewish refusniks, so-
called, and other dissidents who re-
main behind bars in apparent direct
violation of the Helsinki accords —
Anatoli Shcharanskiy and Yuri Orloff
and Victor Brailovsky and Ida Nudell,
the list goes on and on. I don't expect
you to tell me directly— and I wouldn'
want you to tell me directly — if any-
thing specifically is underway. But is
there a chance of future prisoner ex-
changes as have occurred in the past
to get some of these people out?

A. Clearly, in the broad context of
your questions, this is one of the main
focuses of our work in Madrid, the
CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe]. I must say that &
thus far we have been notoriously unsuc-
cessful in budging the current level of
Soviet intransigence in this area and a
number of related areas.

I can assure you that it is a funda-
mental aspect of our policy to do all tha is
we can to assist in the quest for freedor
of these suppressed peoples and popula-
tions and individuals as well. Some, as
you know, have recently just come out.
We just had a father and son come out
of the Soviet Union. We have offered
them haven, as is historically our policy
But I do think we have not had the suc-
cess that we had visualized in CSCE,
although we've had some, and we must
continue our efforts.

aduatu

.;, S3

|jbei
forei

we.
Aim

ielf-i
•:-

I

■:■'■
All
ktw
ite:
k
Hi*

•Press release 122A.

i\

-:

me
stli

:.'

II

Bi
i
I

II

10

Department of State Bulletin

NATO and the Restoration of American Leadership

cirs

t st
sisi

[Secretary Haig

Commencement address before the
iuating class at Syracuse University,
racuse, New York, on May 9, 1981. 1

iduation is a time for rejoicing. It
uld also be a time for introspection
en we examine our directions in life,
h as individuals and as a nation. This
rning, with your indulgence, I would
i to say a few words about America

I where America is going, particularly
foreign policy. And I want to call

ir attention specifically to one of our
st precious legacies— the Atlantic
!- ance.

Americans have been described as a
>ple constantly in search of them-
ves. The vast number of schools and
leges, adult and home-education
ses, tell a story of a relentless desire
self-improvement. We are not
islied with the present. As President
agan has described it so well, we are
samers of a better future.
All of us know that in recent years,
have spent a great deal of time and
Drt examining our society with a
tical eye. Observers from abroad
scribed us as confused, lacking in
lfidence, and unsure of our purposes,
e most fundamental questions were
<ed: Did our democratic institutions

II work? Were they worth defending?
luld we offer anything to the world?
as the dream over?

I believe this period of a perhaps ex-
ssive American introspection has come
an end. We are more certain of
rselves today than we have been for a
lg time. A profound national consen-
s has emerged. Our democratic institu-
ms work. They are worth defending,
ir ideals and our liberty do offer a
'table example to a world desperately
arching for peace and prosperity. The
earn lives.

This consensus, this reassertion of
merican self-confidence, is the very
isis of the President's foreign policy,
ur objectives are straightforward: We
ant a world hospitable to our society
id ideals. And our objectives can be
:hieved if we restore American leader-
lip.

lajor Points in U.S. Approach

et me give you a sense of our direction
y discussing briefly four major points in
ur approach:

• First, our insistence on restraint
and reciprocity in East- West relations;

• Second, our determination to
strengthen our alliances, particularly the
Atlantic alliance;

• Third, our intention to play a con-
structive role in the Third World; and

• Fourth, our firm resolve to
strengthen our economy and our
defenses.

Restraint of Soviet Union. An in-
sistence on restraint and reciprocity in
East- West relations is the central theme
of our foreign policy. If we are seriously
interested in a world where there can be
peaceful change, where nations can set-
tle disputes short of war, then we must
act to restrain the Soviet Union. Soviet
actions or the actions of Moscow's surro-
gates threaten Western strategic in-
terests. Even more importantly, it is
Soviet reliance on force and the threat
of force to create and exploit disorder
that undermines the prospect for world
peace today.

Reinvigoration of Alliances. The

next point must be to strengthen our
alliances, especially the Atlantic alliance.
The beginning of wisdom is to establish
the consensus and confidence with our
allies that has been missing in recent
years. The key to this is genuine con-
sultation, which has several elements.
We must be good listeners; we must be
frank with one another; we must work
for the common good; and we should
give each other the benefit of the doubt.
Candor will serve the alliance well, but
surely it will be more effective in quiet
diplomacy than through the medium of
public criticism.

Approach to Third World. The

third point is our intention to play an ac-
tive and constructive role in the Third
World. It is important to do this for our
own interests. Just as important, how-
ever, we should do our part for the well-
being of the developing countries.

An American approach to the Third
World clearly requires an acknowledg-
ment of the problem presented by Soviet
policy. But this acknowledgment must
come on a foundation of understanding
for the problems facing the developing
countries. The West has a great deal to
offer: economic and technical assistance,
cooperation in the settlement of dis-
putes, access to an international com-

mercial and financial system. We have
also shown through the example of our
own societies that freedom and economic
development are compatible.

The approach from the East is
different. Moscow offers a poor model of
economic achievement, and the Soviets
disclaim any obligation to give financial
assistance to the developing countries.
Instead, the Soviet Union and its surro-
gates are heavily involved in stoking
conflict with arms and troops. The
names and places have become familiar
to us over the past decade: the Cubans
fighting in Africa, the Vietnamese con-
quering Kampuchea. More recently, we
have seen the Soviets themselves invade
Afghanistan and the Libyans seize Chad.
And in our own hemisphere, there is in-
controvertible evidence that Soviet arms
are threatening an established govern-
ment in El Salvador.

We have no monopoly on wisdom in
approaching this complex situation. Still,
we must prevent the Soviets and their
surrogates from destroying what the
West and the developing countries can
achieve together.

Strengthening U.S. Economy and
Defenses. Finally, the fourth element in
the President's approach is the restora-
tion of the economic vitality and military
strength of the United States. This is as
crucial to foreign policy as it is to
domestic purpose. Without a healthy
American economy, we cannot strength-
en our leadership abroad. Without an
improved American military capability,
we cannot restrain the Soviet Union.

Restraint of the Soviets, reinvigor-
ation of our alliances, a new approach to
the Third World, a healthier U.S.
economy and a stronger military —these
are the signals of our determination to
restore our leadership in the world. It is
going to be very difficult, and we cannot
accomplish our objectives alone. In this
age of interdependence, freedom and
peace depend upon concerted action be-
tween the United States and its allies.
Having just returned from a consulta-
tion with the NATO allies in Rome, I
want to review briefly the prospects for
a reinvigorated Atlantic alliance.

une1981

11

i ne aecreiary

Prospects for NATO

Finding fault with the Atlantic alliance
has become a good-sized industry, giving
employment to thousands of critics on
both sides of the ocean. When we ex-
amine the assets of the Atlantic allies,
however, a more promising picture
emerges. We have the talent and the
wealth among us to maintain a favorable
balance of power with the Soviet Union.
We can work together to restrain Soviet
interventionism abroad. But we can do
these things only if we think seriously
about the alliance itself. We must
remember why it was founded, what
holds it together, and why it is crucial to
the future —especially your future. An
entire generation has grown up with
NATO as much a fact of life as the elec-
tric light. You who do not know a world
without NATO will soon take up the
burdens of my generation.

NATO today presents two para-
doxes. It is a military alliance uniting
nations whose way of life and principles
do not exalt the military virtues. It is a
highly successful deterrent to war, yet
its very success makes it easy to take
NATO —and peace -for granted.

The alliance survives these para-
doxes because the Atlantic family of na-
tions is inspired by a common faith in
the capacity of all men for self-govern-
ment. No hereditary aristocracy, no
religious orthodoxy, no master race, no
privileged class, no gang of terrorists
has a right to rule a people by force. As
free peoples, we obey the laws passed by
governments we have freely chosen. Our
military forces take orders from elected
civilian authority. Our young people en-
joy freedom of thought, able to question
even the worth of their own societies.
These deeply held principles lead us to
oppose aggression, tyranny, and ter-
rorism.

A clear constrast exists between
NATO and the Soviet-dominated War-
saw Pact. NATO is a voluntary defen-
sive alliance pledged to strengthen free
institutions and designed to deter ag-
gression. The Warsaw Pact's armed
forces have been used principally to
deprive their own peoples of the right of
self-government.

A similar contrast between the
values of NATO and the values of the
Soviet Union may be seen on East- West
exchanges. The Soviets are anxious to
import Western credit, Western tech-
nology, Western consumer goods and
machinery, and Western food to save
their system from its economic failures.
The most controlled Soviet export,

12

however, is human talent, those who
wish to vote with their feet for oppor-
tunity in the West.

In fact, the Soviet system is showing
signs of spiritual exhaustion. We are
proud of our artists, scientists, and
social critics; theirs are censored, exiled,
sent on false pretenses to mental institu-
tions, or condemned to forced labor. We
are proud of the life of the mind to
which Syracuse University is a living
monument. The Soviets are afraid of the
intellectual and spiritual life of their
peoples.

The commitment of the allied coun-
tries to peace and freedom inspires not
only our common response to the crisis
in Poland but also our work in the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation
(the Helsinki accords) in Europe on
behalf of individual rights and contact
between peoples. The Atlantic nations
constitute an enduring natural communi-
ty with many cultural, economic, and
organizational links beside NATO itself.
NATO lives because it is rooted in the
ideals of this community. The alliance
speaks to our deeply cherished beliefs.

Do we still need the Atlantic alli-
ance? Secretary of State Dean Acheson
explained the need for NATO to the
American people in 1949 by saying that
it was "the statement of the facts and
lessons of history." Two world wars had
shown that aggression aimed at the
domination of Europe threatened the
survival of the United States and in-
evitably involved us in war. Out of this
bitter experience, we abandoned our
historic policy of aloofness from Euro-
pean alliances. Our participation in
NATO remains essential to the task of
keeping the peace in Europe.

Allied strength and unity, not lack of
Soviet ambition, have protected us. And
allied weakness or disunity may tempt
the Soviets. Indeed, we face today
perhaps a more complicated challenge
than was contemplated by the founders
of NATO. The Soviet Union today is a
power with a global military reach.
Soviet forces are stronger than our own
in some categories. And Soviet sur-
rogates in Africa, Asia, and Central
America, have been exploiting conflicts
to the detriment of both the local
peoples and Western strategic interests.

We should not exaggerate the
strength of our adversary. Moscow faces
an unenviable present and a gloomy
future. A list of formidable problems
confronts it, ranging from the hostility
of China to the difficult Polish situation,
from economic failures to ideological
sterility. But these weaknesses should

not make us too comfortable. A state as
powerful and ambitious as the Soviet j
Union may be more dangerous because |
its weaknesses run to the heart of its
system. That is why the first task of
American leadership and the Atlantic
alliance is to establish new restraints oi
Soviet behavior.

!or

V"

•'.■

Itl

IS

uric
itxai

!| '

idie

Recent Progress

Let me conclude by reporting to you on
the recent progress we have made
toward strengthening the alliance. At a
meeting of NATO's North Atlantic
Council earlier this week in Rome, we
reaffirmed alliance solidarity and our
belief in the values of Western democ-
racy. In formal sessions and a host of i)
formal meetings, the NATO govern-
ments freely achieved a consensus in
order to bolster the common defense.
Our approach reflected a very realistic
Western attitude toward the problems
of arms modernization and arms contrc
In announcing that negotiations with tl
Soviet Union on limiting theater nuclea
weapons could commence by the end ol
the year, we and our allies demonstrati
that free peoples were not afraid to tal
with an adversary. In agreeing, at the
same time, that NATO would moderniz
its defenses, the alliance also showed
that negotiations must be supported by
a sound military posture.

This is only the beginning, of cours
but already a change for the better car
be detected in the spirit of our cooper-
ation. Clearly our allies welcome a mor
robust American leadership, informed
a more sensitive appreciation of their
problems.

Today is also a beginning for you.
You have heard me patiently -perhaps
not so patiently -talk about ideals and
identity, leadership and alliance, dange
and opportunity. Your future is in youi
own hands. But the intangibles of
Western civilization, the inner strength
the real intellectual and spiritual
treasures of free men are also in your
hands. Cherish those things and cherisl
the instrument of their protection, the
Atlantic alliance. Perhaps Benjamin
Disraeli captured the moment of your
graduation best when he wrote that "tl
youth of the nation are the trustees of
posterity." It is my privilege today to
wish you the very best as you commeni
your trusteeship.

::.:

to

■Press release 142.

Department of State Bulletir

'■;

'•'

The Secretary

■

,.';.!

►reign Policy and the American Spirit

'mmSecretary Haig

lintsT.

Commencement address before the

luating class at Hillsdale College,

\lsdale, Michigan, on May 16, 1981. '

Spanish philosopher once wrote that
true mission of higher education was
.each vital ideas. Perhaps the most
|il idea you can learn from your col-
? years is that self-respect is funda-
Intal to the individual. I would add
self-respect is also fundamental to
nation.

At times, over the past several
its, it must have seemed to you that
country had forgotten this idea. The
terican people experienced profound
examination and even self-doubt,
nehow the great motivating goals of
past had lost their power. We
rched, seemingly in vain, for an ob-
rive to guide the future. Our con-
mce was shaken; our values were
^stioned; our institutions were
acked.
A loss of momentum and confidence
lome was bound to affect our stand-
in the world. Our self-doubt trans-
ted itself to others who depended on
Doubt of the present easily became
r for the future.

I believe this era in our national life
now drawn to a close. We have re-
covered ourselves as Americans. We
• confident again, our values are
;ind, and our institutions are worth
ending.

America's new confidence is founded
an old tradition: respect for the irre-
I ;ssible genius of the individual. One of
.' marks of this genius is man's ability

B glimpse a remote future and to be in-
red by it. As the President has put it:
nericans have begun to dream again
a better future. Americans have
igun to believe again that this future,
-note though it may seem, can be
ached.

The resurgence of the American
irit has led to a remarkable consensus
our national life. Never have I seen
ch a firm and consistent consensus
nong the people, the Congress, and the
<ecutive. The issue is not whether we
ould strengthen America but how
lickly we can do so. The issue is not
hether we should defend our interests
iroad but how vigorously we can do so.

In my view, the renewal of
merican self-respect, pride, and confi-

dence is the most important develop-
ment in the world today. With this in-
gredient we can act to restore American
leadership. With the restoration of
American leadership, the achievement of
a more peaceful and prosperous world
becomes less remote.

The President has a clear sense of
our objectives in foreign policy and a
coherent program to restore American
leadership. There should be no mystery
about American purposes abroad. We
want a world hospitable to our society
and to our ideals. We seek a world
where there can be peaceful change,
where nations can settle disputes short
of war. We shall work to restore the
prospect of a world free from threats of
force or the use of force.

Let me discuss very briefly the main
lines of action in our foreign policy.

First, we shall insist on greater
restraint and reciprocity in East- West
relations. If we are seriously interested
in a world where there can be peaceful
change, where nations can settle dis-
putes short of war, then we must act to
restrain the Soviet Union and its surro-
gates. The improvement of our military
capabilities, despite the cost, underlines
our resolve in dealing with Moscow.

Our second line of action is to re-
invigorate our alliances and friendships.
A basic step is the restoration of a sense
of confidence and trust in our leadership
of the Western world. Irritants are be-
ing removed. We are seeking a larger
consensus among our allies on common
actions. And friends exposed to dangers
believe once more that the United States
will help them. On my trip to the Middle
East and during the recent NATO con-
ference in Rome, the change was evi-
dent. Our allies and friends are deeply
appreciative of a more robust American
leadership but also one more sensitive to
their interests.

Third, we are seeking a more just
and responsible relationship with the
Third World. The developing states are
beginning to see the difference between
the offers of the East and the offers of
the West. The Soviets bring weapons, a
pervasive presence, and, eventually, a
client-state relationship. The West
brings economic development, science,
technology, and humanitarian assistance.
We will encourage the movement
toward association with the West. It is

in our interest to do so, and it offers the
best hope for the developing states
themselves.

Fourth, and finally, the President
has advocated a revolutionary program
to cure America's economic ills. The
combination of spending and tax cuts,
the regulatory reforms, are essential
elements of fiscal responsibility. We
have seen, very clearly, that an ailing
American economy ultimately does great
harm to our foreign policy.

The framework for action that I
have outlined today draws upon an
American consensus convinced of the
worth of our society and the rightness of
our cause. It is neither a boast nor a call
to arms. Moderation and a willingness to
negotiate will always be an essential
part of American statecraft. But there
must be restraint by others as well. Our
allies -and our adversaries --must know
that we are reliable. We shall not be
passive when our interests are
threatened.

Clearly, the restoration of American
leadership in the world will not be easy.
As Justice Learned Hand once put it:
We shall have to be content with short
steps; we shall be obliged to give and
take; and in the end, we shall have
fabricated an imperfect instrument. But
as we take these steps, we go forward
made confident by the spirit of liberty -
the spirit of America. We strive to make
of our country, in Hand's words, a
signal, a beacon, a standard to which the
best hopes of mankind will ever turn.

Your generation now begins to
assume this arduous task. It is your
privilege to be able to do so in an atmos-
phere of fresh pride and confidence.
Perhaps Benjamin Disraeli captured to-
day's moment best when he said that the
youth of the nation are the trustees of
posterity. As you become the trustees of
America's future, I ask only that you act
with a sense of honor and a brave
heart.

2Press release 148 of May 18, 1981.

une1981

13

The Secretary

Secretary Haig Visits

the Middle East and Europe

Secretary Haig departed
Washington, D.C., on April 3, 1981, to
visit Egypt (April 4-5), Israel (April
5-6), Jordan (April 6-7), Saudi Arabia
(April 7-8), Italy (April 8), Spain (April
8-9), the United Kingdom (April 9-11),
France (April 11), the Federal Republic
of Germany (April 11), and returned to
Washington on April 11.

Following are remarks he made on
various occasions during that trip.1

ARRIVAL REMARKS
CAIRO, APR. 4, 1981'

I and my party are delighted to be here
in Cairo. It is appropriate that President
Reagan would have asked me to initiate
my foreign travel to the Middle East. It
is equally significant that our first stop
would be here in Egypt, for Egypt is a
nation with a special destiny. In ancient
times, its contributions to civilization
have been legendary.

Today Egypt is engaged in a unique
experiment that combines faith and
science toward the objective of human
development. Under your illustrious
leader, progress has already been
remarkable. It has been his objective to
insure development, stability, and securi-
ty for the entire region. I want you to
know that President Reagan shares that
vision for this area. He is personally
dedicated to the proposition that a
strong Egypt is absolutely indispensable
to peace and stability in this region and
globally. And it is unfortunate this
morning that my stop here in Cairo is
clouded once again by growing tensions
for peace and stability in Europe.

President Sadat is a worldwide lead-
er, a man whose own vision has enabled
us— through his historic visit to Jeru-
salem, through his participation in the
Camp David accords— to already bring
peace between Egypt and Israel— what
a few short years ago seemed an illusory
dream. And so I and my party are here
today to drink of the wisdom of you and
of President Sadat, to learn how best we
Americans can participate in a partner-
ship which seeks to enhance the security
of this region which will enable us to
carry forward with the peace process
with Israel within the confines of the
Camp David accords; and finally, most
importantly, to broaden and strengthen
those bonds of friendship between the

people of America and the people of

Egypt.

REMARKS,

CAIRO, APR. 5, 198F

President Sadat

Let me seize this opportunity to express
my gratitude to President Reagan who
sent me our dear friend, Secretary Haig,
to the area here in this precise moment.

First of all, I wanted him to know
how we lived with all our sentiment, the
anxiety for the incident that took place
in Washington, and thank God President
Reagan stayed in good shape and is per-
forming his duties, but I wanted my
friend to convey to our dear American
people how we lived the anxiety with
them with all our feelings.

This is a happy occasion — a very
happy occasion— also for the second
time to meet with my dear friend,
Secretary Haig. After he was appointed
Secretary of State, I'm not exaggerating
when I say the proper man in the proper
position and in the proper moment is not
my idea only, but in February I was ad-
dressing the European Parliament and I
felt the same thing toward Secretary
Haig, and I was very happy and proud
because Haig is a friend, to hear this
from the Europeans. It is time that the
United States resumes its role as the
first superpower that is responsible for
peace all over the world. Secretary Haig
has been known among all of us as a
man of vision, and his appointment has
filled us with joy. We have followed the
very strenuous hours when he was doing
hearings in the Congress and the
Senate, and it filled us with happiness
and joy to see a man in the State
Department with a vision and decision
like my friend, Secretary Haig.

Today we had a very fruitful and
constructive discussion. We have spent
together 2 hours, and we have spent
also with our delegation the necessary
moments to let each other know the
position of the other. And the peace
process, as I have often said, we could
have never achieved anything without
the United States acting as a full part-
ner, that's what I told my friend,
Secretary Haig.

I am happy to tell you that I found
him fully acquainted with all the details
We must not forget that he has alreadj
his share in this peace process since
1974. I had him fully acquainted with a
the details, and I was very happy also t
survey the situation with him in the an
and in the various parts of the world.
And as I told you, it has been a very
fruitful and positive discussion and ex-
change of views.

On the bilateral side, I need not tel
you that we enjoy a marvelous relation
between the two countries— the United
States and Egypt— and I seize this op-
portunity also to ask Secretary Haig ai
the distinguished delegation with him t
convey our gratitude for the gallant
American people, the President, and th
Senate and the Congress for the under
standing and the help that we have
received from them. For us, we feel in-
debted to them, and all I can say is this
like I told Secretary Haig and his
distinguished delegation, that they can
count on us as true friends. We shall
always be with them, either in the darl
hour or the bright one. Secretary Haig
is a man we admire, and I told him we
shall always be very happy to receive
him here in Egypt whenever it is con-
venient to him. And let me ask him to
convey to President Reagan all our vei
best wishes and congratulations for his
safety and convey to the gallant Amer
can people our admiration and our tru»
friendship.

Secretary Haig

On behalf of President Reagan, the
American delegation now visiting your
country, and, of course, myself in a ve-
personal as well as official way, let me
express our gratitude for these extren
ly fruitful discussions we've had with
your government officials, and most irr
portantly, the lengthy discussion that 1
had with you personally this morning.
It clearly underlines the fundamen
convergence of Egyptian and America
policies with respect first to the peace
process, where this Administration — I
know I speak for President Reagan-
will continue to participate as full part
ners; for the quality and the great vah
of the strategic appraisal which you pr
vided to me this morning, which I can
confirm closely coincides with Presider
Reagan's own world view; and thirdly,

y

i
i

-V

|01

in

B,

■lit,

ita
litl

Pi

iris
it'll

KB
iproc
liiii

■:;-

ten
li!m
111

ier

Hit

14

Department of State Bulletir

I lie oci/iciai y

t thank you. We certainly recognize the
Jfcionary statesman of our time, the
[kn who made peace in the Middle East
Issible, the man who epitomized
Itesmanship and its interrelationship
Mth binding friendship. There is a
Jong interrelationship between the

I And to thank you again, in a per-
Inal sense, for your counsel to me.
I'ter all we came here to drink of your
Isdom, to take counsel, and to find
fcts on the three areas I've just touched
Ion: the peace process, the strategic
luation in the area and globally, and
lit important and fundamental area,
Iryptian-American relationship on the
lateral side. In every area of our
licussion, the outcome has been highly
■ccessful, and I know we are very
■;ased.

I Q. What did you accomplish in
itese meetings with regard to some of

le outstanding issues — the presence
I Americans in the multinational

tree, the state of Ras Banas base, the

irategic relationship between the
jhited States and Egypt over the

liviet expansionism?

President Sadat: We have dis-
ssed this really— every item that you
;ntioned— thoroughly. And I can tell
u that we have reached agreement on
rtain points, and we have left to our
ies certain points for preparation but
a whole, as I told you, both of us are
timistic for the future.

Q. Have you discussed the Pale-
inian question and the possibility of
e resumption of the autonomy talks,
id what other items concerning the
iddle East Peace process do you
ive in mind?

Secretary Haig: As I said, we came
re to learn— to learn first-hand the
I ews of the parties with respect to the
I :ace process. I think my discussions
I ith President Sadat clarified for me

• >ncerns here in Egypt, with respect to
I e process, and I think it carried for-

ard in the context of convergence of
lews between the U.S. position today
lid President Sadat's position. All of
: lis suggests to me a reason for some

• itimism that this process will continue,
id it will continue in a constructive

. ay; I think as one looks over his
roulder at the past history of the situa-
on, one can only remark that the
Aievements already accomplished have
?en remarkable and historic. And that
momentum must continue, and we are
jsdicated to do so both in the context of
'ie autonomy talks to the period ahead,

in the context of the peacekeeping ar-
rangements in the Sinai which will per-
mit the complete withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Sinai by the April 1982
deadline. I think our discussions here
provided bases for optimism as we look
at the challenges of the future.

Q. Following your discussions,
will Egypt accept armed American
military units in the multinational
force?

President Sadat: Let me tell you
this. We shall be going to the United
Nations — maybe you remember when
we went to the Security Council for the
redeployment of the U.N. forces accord-
ing to the peace process— to the peace
treaty between us and Israel — the
Soviet Union threatened to use the veto.
We shall be going to the United Nations.
After that, what you have already asked
will be raised, and it will depend upon
what will come out as a position from
the side of the Soviet Union.

Q. There has been a report from
Saudi Arabia— a newspaper report —
that another Arab country might
restore diplomatic relations with
Egypt. Could you comment on that?

President Sadat: We didn't discuss
this because my position on this is
known, and Secretary Haig has already
declared his position in the hearings
before the Congress and the Senate. For
that reason, there was no need to raise
it because it is not a matter to be
discussed.

Q. We have a report that Soviet
President Brezhnev is going to the
Warsaw summit in Prague. Do you see
this as a development that signifies
the worsening of the Polish situation,
or has that eased since you left the
country?

Secretary Haig: I think the situa-
tion remains more tense than it has
been, and we've been watching Soviet
military steps with growing concern.
Clearly, this mini-summit— as you refer
to it that way— may be an important oc-
casion with respect to future Soviet ac-
tion in respect to the Polish situation. I
would merely want to reiterate what we
have stated and restated— that any
Soviet interventionism in Poland or any
internal repression would have far-
reaching consequences in East- West
relations, both in scope and in time.

Q. Do you agree with the proposi-
tion that the instability in the area
needs to put more pressure on han-

dling the Palestinian question as very
important in order to keep stability?

Secretary Haig: We've talked about
addressing a strategic consensus in the
area of the Middle East and in a global
sense as well. Some have interpreted
that as a lessening of American interest
in the peace process itself in the resolu-
tion of a longstanding historic problem.
Nothing could be further from the truth.

We continue to maintain the firm ob-
jective of continuing the momentum of
the peace process as a full partner, as I
mentioned, but we see also a funda-
mental interrelationship between the
sense of security and a convergence of
strategic thinking here in this area as a
fundamental catalyst to making the
peace process more successful and to
achieving the momentum we seek. So
these are not mutually contradictory;
they are mutually reinforcing objectives.

Q. [Inaudible] or to put more em-
phasis on security before —

Secretary Haig: Not at all. We
don't put more emphasis on either. We
put priority on both, and these are twin
objectives, intimately interrelated in
which progress in one tends to assist
progress in the other. They are not in
competition, they are not mutually ex-
clusive, and it isn't a question of
priority.

ARRIVAL STATEMENTS,
BEN GURION AIRPORT,
APR. 5, 19814

Foreign Minister Shamir

It is a pleasure to welcome you on your
first visit to Israel as Secretary of State.
We are convinced that your important
mission will strengthen the forces of
peace in our region. The bonds between
our two peoples are not only bonds of
mutual interests, of a common strategic
outlook, and of the rejection of totali-
tarian ideologies and aggression, they
are founded on a deep commitment to
shared values of freedom, democracy,
and social justice. Our common devotion
to these ideals provides the most solid
guarantee that our partnership in the
quest for peace and security for this
region will continue and bear fruit. On
behalf of all of us in Israel, we wish
President Reagan and the other Ameri-
cans who were wounded with him a
speedy recovery and a long healthy life.
We wish you and your colleagues a very
pleasant and rewarding stay in Israel.

une1981

15

The Secretary

Secretary Haig

It is a wonderful opportunity to see you
again so shortly after our constructive
discussions in Washington just a short
time ago. President Reagan has asked
me to express his personal greetings to
the people of Israel and to tell you how
much he admires your many achieve-
ments and your dedication to freedom
and to democracy.

It gives me great pleasure to report
that the President is well on the way to
full recovery. And if his physical
recovery is as rapid as the recovery of
his sense of humor, I am confident that
we'll be all the better served.

For me a visit to Israel is always a
privilege. I have long admired your
courage, your independence, and, in-
deed, your idealism. On this occasion,
my wife will discover for the first time
the ancient and modern wonders that
make Israel so unique.

The purpose of my trip here and
elsewhere in the region is to discuss
with our friends how we can meet the
threat posed by the Soviet Union and its
surrogates in the entire area, but we are
equally interested in an exchange of
views on how to advance the peace proc-
ess. I can tell you already that I found
President Sadat and other Egyptian
leaders dedicated to strengthening peace
between Egypt and Israel— a dedication
shared by the Government and the peo-
ple of Israel, I am confident. The Camp
David accords, testimony to the courage
and wisdom of Prime Minister Begin,
provide a solid basis for the goal we
share together — peace and security for
Israel and for its neighbors. As our
dialogue begins with Prime Minister
Begin, with you, with the other leaders
of Israel, I want to affirm that our com-
mitment to Israel's security and to its
well-being is central to American policy
in the Middle East. President Reagan
and I recognize that Israel has an impor-
tant role to play in our common effort to
safeguard our strategic interests in this
region. We are looking forward to hear-
ing your views, confident that these dis-
cussions will add yet another chapter to
that long— over 30-year— history of
Israeli-American friendship— a friend-
ship which is reinforced by the strategic
importance of this nation to the vital in-
terests of America, to peace and stabili-
ty in this area, and to global peace and
stability as well.

STATEMENTS,
JERUSALEM, APR. 6, 19815

Prime Minister Begin

I wish to express our deep gratitude to
the Secretary of State and his colleagues
for the visit. Today, too, we had a very
fruitful discussion about national and in-
ternational problems and bilateral issues
between the United States and Israel,
which the Secretary of State, yesterday,
in his beautiful speech, called and rightly
so, allies. So today, after finalizing our
discussions, I can say that on very
serious points, we reached understand-
ing, and these discussions I believe
wholeheartedly will bear fruit in the
future, and there will be closer coopera-
tion between the United States and
Israel which indeed, as the Secretary of
State said, are allies. We share common
ideals, we have a community of in-
terests, we shall stand by each other for
great causes of mankind.

Secretary Haig

I just want to underline your own com-
ments that this all too brief 24-hour stay
here in Jerusalem, in Israel, has been
highly productive. It's enabled us to
learn, and that's the purpose of this
visit, and to learn in the vitally impor-
tant areas of the peace process, of such
importance to Israel and its neighbors to
extend further our mutual understand-
ing and convergence of outlook in the
area of broad strategic threats to the
Middle East region, to include tradi-
tional military threats from unfriendly
superpowers, to include assessments of
proxy activity, and to include some very
important discussions on the overall
issue of international terrorism. Beyond
that, we had a very fruitful dialogue on
a number of bilateral issues — economic,
security-related issues — between the
United States and Israel.

Q. Did the subject of the supply of
AWACS [airborne warning and con-
trol system] planes to Saudi Arabia
come up in your discussions, and did
you come to any agreement?

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, the
question came up. We expressed our
opinion. Yes, of course, we deem it to be
a very serious threat to Israel, and we
said so with candor to the Secretary of
State.

Q. Could you please tell us or give
us some examples of what you re-

ferred to when you talked about closed
cooperation between the United State
and Israel?

Prime Minister Begin: I think bot
terms are very clear. I think cooperatio '"
is a clear English word, and closer
means closer than in the past.

Q. Some examples?

Prime Minister Begin: I suppose
life itself will prove the examples, and
both of us will be patient, because we
know each other so well from the Unite
States.

-
I

in&

-'
■

Q. Is the AWACS deal firm, and *
what will the United States do to con [*
pensate Israel?

Secretary Haig: I think we've had
the benefit of the Government of Israel
view, the Prime Minister's own view on
this subject. We will return to Washing
ton armed with that information. I
would prefer not to engage in any publ:
discussions on this matter at this time
until we complete our trip. We have
already seen enough press speculation
on the subject to include the reports of
decisions made in Washington a week
ago.

Ill

Sei
m
kii
I
I
fei

: e

Q. You've spoken here about
American commitment to Israel's
security and well-being. You talked
also about the hopes for some sort of
strategic alliance between the states
in the region against Soviet penetra-
tion. Number one, how can you squat
the circle of concern for Israel's
security with Israel's worries about
supplies of American military equip-
ment, specifically AWACS to the
Saudis — how did you manage to ex-
plain this contradiction?

■>S.

tin

&

Secretary Haig: I think it's impor-
tant to remember, as we talk of our
broad strategic objectives in this area,
that development of a consensus with
respect to the growing threat of Soviet
imperialism, and as we view the equalb
important priority of proceeding with
the Middle East peace process, that we
understand clearly what we are talking
about.

These are not mutually competing <
mutually exclusive objectives. It does n
mean that we have established a set of
priorities between the one and the othe
It means that they are mutually rein-
forcing and that in progress with one
you can contribute to the progress with

Bti

16

Department of State Bulletii

;i:r
ia

k
li

I lie W^WI «^ IUI J

# other. In that respect, I think all of
m nations of this region— of the Middle

Hst, Arabs as well as Israelis— are
Bier a growing threat of increased
.K-taking by the Soviet leadership,
Iher directly as we've seen in
/fejhanistan, or indirectly as we see
Bough the increased employment of
fcxies, Cubans, elements of the PLO
■destine Liberation Organization],
!jya— all of these activities represent
Bidamental threats to all of the peace-
ling, freedom-oriented nations of the
Ipon. And I think that is a reality
■ich, of course, its acceptance and its
uierstanding and coordination with
£;pect to it is intimately related also to
1> peace process itself. No one is naive
|Dut it, but they are mutually reinforc-
;.

Q. Did you bring up the settle-
imts in the West Bank?

Secretary Haig: I want to em-
lasize that the policy of the Reagan
fl [ministration is not to indulge in
iblic criticism of longstanding friends
sd allies. And that where we have
Bferences, those differences will be
rf cen up directly in the intimacy of
jjilomatic interchange.

Q. You spoke about the peace
I Dcess. Are there any new ideas to
new the autonomy talks, and if yes,
■ len?

Secretary Haig: I think we've been

• i the process of a fact-finding trip. I
I ve not completed that fact-finding,

I i d upon completion of this trip, we will
. i sess the prospects. I want to em-

asize that we feel very strongly that
. ] is process must move promptly, and
I / trip and my visit here today and my
$ ;it to Egypt yesterday and the day
fore, were all associated with our
1 x>rts to keep the momentum going on

)-"e peace process.
Q. You've had both visits here and
Egypt. One of the items on the
;enda, of course, was this multina-
onal force for policing of the Sinai,
fter these discussions, do you see
ly basic problem in moving forward
■ that force? Is there an explicit ac-
jptance of the same kind of force, in-
uding Americans, in both these
ipitals?

Prime Minister Begin: In the

eace Treaty between Egypt and Israel,
|, U.N. force is being mentioned, as part
[ the security arrangements in the
Inai. But the formation of such a U.N.
prce depends on the decision of the
;ecurity Council. And this is the reason

ea

U

why all those who negotiated the Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel—
namely Egypt, Israel, and the United
States— took into consideration the
possibility that such a U.N. force forma-
tion will become impossible because of
the Soviet Union in the Security Council
casting a veto vote. And, therefore,
there is a letter on behalf of the United
States of President Carter, addressed
jointly to President Sadat and to myself,
promising a multinational force. On this,
the discussions will go on. We hope that
such a multinational force will, in time,
be formed. This is now the subject of
discussions among the three parties —
the United States, Egypt, and Israel.

Secretary Haig: I think the Prime
Minister has answered the question. Our
discussions are continuing, and this visit
has provided additional information to
the United States, which will enable us,
hopefully, to bring it to a successful con-
clusion. And I am reasonably optimistic
that that will be the outcome.

Q. How do you evaluate the supply
of rockets by German firms to coun-
tries like Libya?

Secretary Haig: I suppose you've
caught me unaware. I wasn't aware that
there were such rockets, unless you're
talking about some of the earlier
speculation on contracts. I don't consider
myself an expert on the subject, so I'll
avoid answering it.

Prime Minister Begin: I would like
to add that any supply to a country like
Libya — one of the most irresponsible in
our region — especially by Germany, of
deadly weapons, is from any human
point of view, most repulsive. Because
the German people must never forget
what was done under the National-
Socialist regime to our people. And if
they should provide enemies with deadly
weapons which may be turned against
Israel, it would be a crime against
humanity.

Q. Does Israel want American
participation in the Sinai peacekeep-
ing force? And what is the Israeli
Government reaction to the Reagan
Administration sounding the alarm
bells about a Soviet threat to the Mid-
dle East?

Prime Minister Begin: To the first
question, the answer is positive. To the
second question, it is that I believe it is

not an artificial alarm sounded by the
Government of the United States — by
the President and his advisers. There is
such a threat, in all the years, we could
have seen that many countries, during
the last few years— I suppose between
six and seven, I cannot on the spot make
the real count — were taken over either
by proxy by the Soviet Union or as in
Afghanistan, directly through Soviet in-
vasion. So it is not an artificial alarm. It
is one of the most serious issues con-
cerning our era, our time, and the free
world is shrinking and is in permanent
danger. Parts of it already were taken
over by totalitarianism, others are in
peril. And, therefore, all free men
should stand together to defend liberty.

Q. On the issues that have been of
central concern — the resumption of
the autonomy talks, the supply of the
American advanced weaponry to Saudi
Arabia, the question of expanding
autonomy talks, the matters of south
Lebanon and of Lebanon itself— how
many of these issues have you reached
any specific agreement on?

Secretary Haig: I think that with
respect to the overall approach to the
peace process, we are in general agree-
ment. There may be some differences
with respect to timing, which hopefully
will be clarified in the period ahead.
With respect to the situation in
Lebanon, I think there are few
differences that I'm aware of. We view
the brutality of the Syrian action against
the Christian enclave as a very, very
serious turn of events, which is unac-
ceptable by any measure of appropriate
international standards of conduct, and
we would hope that there would be an
immediate return to a wholly valid
cease-fire, not only in that critical
enclave area, but in Beirut, where addi-
tional shellings have occurred, and that
this will be done promptly. The conse-
quences of a failure to a return to a
cease-fire, of course, are most, most
serious.

Q. Has the United States of
America acted, or can the United
States act, in such a way as to call a
halt to the bloodshed?

Secretary Haig: We've taken a
number of measures, and some unprece-
dented measures, in the last 48 hours
dealing bilaterally with nations that can
apply influence to the situation, through
the United Nations, through the Secre-
tary General, Kurt Waldheim, whose
emissary will be in Beirut tomorrow.

:une1981

17

The Secretary

And I am very hopeful, though I am yet
unable to express optimism, that there
will be a return to restraint and law and
order and sanity.

Q. Is Israel to be compensated in
any way in terms of military hard-
ware, or anything like that, for the
supply of the AWACS to Saudi
Arabia?

Secretary Haig: I think there's
been a great deal written on this sub-
ject. I do not like to use the term "com-
pensation." I like to focus on the U.S.
objective to insure that Israel maintains
its current qualitative edge and the long-
term adherence of the United States to
that objective. As you know, there have
been a number of measures under dis-
cussion publicly. But I do not like to use
the term "compensation." It has an over-
tone which does not characterize U.S.
objectives with respect to it.

Q. There will be an increase, I
take it, whether compensating it or
not, perhaps that is what the Prime
Minister was referring to?

Prime Minister Begin: I suppose
that the last word belongs to the
Secretary of State. Yet, because you
need a certain expression, I would like
to say that I share completely and,
therefore, I think, deliberately, to
answer this question as well. I share
completely the view of the Secretary of
State, that the word "compensation" is
completely out of order. I don't think
"compensation" is possible, but in the
Middle East, there is going on an arms
race — many countries, the Soviet Union,
and also Western countries sent massive
armaments, sophisticated weapons to
the Middle East, the Arab countries. We
live in peace with Egypt. We believe the
Peace Treaty will hold on — will be
lasting. This is the assurance given also
to the Secretary of State by President
Sadat. You have it, of course, through
me. But other countries are in a state of
war with Israel, and Israel is in perma-
nent danger, and therefore, Israel
should be strengthened. And I do hope it
will be strengthened. But no problem,
and no term of "compensation" is at all
usable.

DEPARTURE REMARKS,
AMMAN, APR. 7, 19816

First, I regret that my very full schedule
here and the press of time have
prevented a full press conference with
you. I do want to, in departing Jordan,

emphasize that the talks I had with His
Majesty King Hussein, His Highness
Crown Prince Hassan, and the
distinguished Foreign Minister have
been far-ranging and have been ex-
tremely helpful. They've been frank in
the Western sense of that term.

They have involved regional matters,
bilateral matters, and global matters as
well. And I think on the broad strategic
and regional matters the American side
has been very impressed that there is an
essential convergence of view between
the leadership here in Jordan and our
own views in Washington.

The continuing devotion of King
Hussein and the Jordanian Government
to the achievement of a just and lasting
peace in the area is in full harmony with
the objectives of my government. There
are different ideas about how best to
reach these noble goals. Indeed, one of
my principal aims during this visit was
to exchange views with His Majesty on
these very, very important subjects.

I leave Jordan with a continuing
deep admiration for His Majesty, the
government, and the people of this
wonderful country. We Americans have
long enjoyed the close and friendly rela-
tionship with Jordan. The King himself
is one of our oldest and most trusted
friends in this area of the world. And I
look forward to a new period of a
strengthening, if you will, of the
bilateral relationships between Jordan
and the United States and to strengthen
the bonds which have served both of our
nations so well in this region for such an
extended period. Again, I thank you for
your hospitality and your courtesy.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT,
RIYADH, APR. 8, 19817

I would like to make a formal departure
statement summarizing the impressions
and results of this very wonderful visit
here in Saudi Arabia.

His Majesty King Khalid has been
most gracious in receiving me, and I am
very grateful for his kindness and for
the kindness of his officials here — the
Foreign Office, the Foreign Minister, the
meeting we've had with other distin-
guished officials of the Government of
Saudi Arabia. This visit has made me
deeply appreciative of the Saudi Arabian
warm hospitality from the very moment
we arrived to the moment of departure.
Your dedication to building a better
world and the wisdom of your leaders
are qualities for which your country is
most famous.

w>

lime
•em

pev
Q.

i
mpli

:• ■''
IS

iSo
It

if a
:ca

it SI
Ik

\

18

President Reagan sent me here to
discuss our mutual concerns about the
threats to security of the region and to is'
exchange views on ways to advance th« S>:
cause of peace in the Middle East. Our H>
dialogues have yielded fresh insights oi *
both of these issues, and the conversa-
tions were most cordial, productive, an "
in true friendship, most frank in the
spirit of the longstanding and close ties
between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. The views expressed to me her
will be of great benefit to President
Reagan as he considers our policy
toward the Middle East.

We've also benefited from the Sauc
perspective on other matters including
the welfare of the gulf area and intern; n
tional economic situation. A clearer pic •, in
ture has emerged of the ways whereby
we might achieve our common goals of
both peace and prosperity.

Above all, I believe that the founds
tion has been laid during this trip for ti
strengthening of U.S. -Saudi relations.
And this in turn will contribute signifi-
cantly to our mutual security and that
the entire region. In conclusion, Your
Royal Highness, I would like to thank
you personally again for the wonderful
and constructive character of our visit
here.

Q. Do you still believe in the
Camp David agreement after your
visitation with the Saudis?

A. I think we've had the benefit
here as we assess the future of the
peace process itself, to consider the
views of our Saudi friends. As you
know, the process has been underway,
and we are going to continue with tha'
process and with a view toward being
sure that we have the counsel of our
friends in the area, and that includes,
course, very importantly the Saudi
views. So this has been a very, very
helpful exchange for us, as we sought
sharpen up and enlighten our own ap-
proaches to this historic and anguishin
problem.

Q. I understand you're very
troubled about the situation in Leba-
non. Could you tell us if you raised
that here, and if your Saudi counter-
parts have suggested any mutual ac-
tion or actions?

A. We've had extensive discussion
on the situation in Lebanon and, I thin
a rather clear convergence of views on
this subject with our Saudi hosts. And
think this morning we have some basis
for increased optimism— a sign of fort

Department of State Bulleti

!

;.„.;
3'it

bead

m

'"■
tm
si
-

n

i lie ucv/iciai y

)ming position from Syria which is an
icouragement to us all. We know we
ill have to watch carefully and do our
2st to assist along with the other na-
ons in the region which have a vital
pneern in this, and I would include con-
jrting of our efforts with the Saudi
overnment. I think the situation looks
bmewhat better this morning thanks to
modified or new position which ap-
ears to be coming from Damascus. And
re're very pleased with that.

Q. What is this new position of
lamascus?

A. I think I would prefer not to
Dmplicate a process which offers great
romise until it develops somewhat fur-
ler.

Q. How are you going to handle
'hat seems to be a contradiction that
as developed on this trip — the
I eagan Administration's perception of
I fie Soviet Union as the primary threat
) the Middle East and the Persian
ulf and what we've heard both in
ordan and in Saudi Arabia, countries
lat see Israel as the primary threat
) the stability of the area?

A. Again, I want to emphasize that
lese are not contradictions; precisely
le opposite. They are interrelated —
mtually interrelated— problems as we
ave emphasized throughout each of our
;ops on this trip. We are not adopting
ny particular priority, in other words,
) place the Soviet regional threats
head of the urgency of progress in the
eace process; not at all. What we have
mphasized is that these are interrelated
ecause clearly a failure to achieve prog-
ess in the peace process offers the
•oviet Union troubled waters in which
o fish. And, therefore, we seek progress
i both, and progress in one contributes
o progress in our ability to deal with
he other.

Q. Does that mean you think you
lave achieved a strategic consensus?

A. I think we had no intention of
innealing, if you will, or crystalizing a
:omplete consensus. This is our first
dsit to the area; these were our first
liscussions. I must say that I am ex-
.remely gratified to find that an essen-
;ial agreement in the broad strategic
ireas of concern to the region exists
lere in Riyadh with our own view. That
ioes not mean that sovereign nations do
not have differences of opinion as how
<oest to proceed and deal with these mat-
ters. But I think the basic assessment is
I very, very close between the two na-
;tions.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT,
ROME, APR. 8, 19818

First, I want to emphasize what a great
pleasure and delight it is to meet again
with my old friend, Foreign Minister
Colombo who, as you know, was the
first Foreign Minister to visit the United
States after the Reagan Administration
came into office. I had an opportunity to
give him a report on the excellent state
of President Reagan's health, and we
also had an opportunity to continue the
very cordial and intimate discussions
that we started in Washington some
weeks ago.

I briefed him on our recent visit to
the Middle East during which we
focused on three objectives. The first
was the establishment of a warm rela-
tionship with the leaders of the region in
the four countries we visited — Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. I
noted that this objective was success-
fully accomplished and even exceeded
our highest expectations. I noted that
we also discussed in great detail the
problem of external threats to the
region from the Soviet Union and its
surrogates. We achieved a substantial
consensus on the importance of the
peace process in the Middle East and
the peaceful ultimate resolution of long-
standing Arab-Israeli differences. In that
regard I emphasized that these two ob-
jectives— concern about external aggres-
sion on the one hand and the need for
progress in the peace process on the
other hand — were not mutually ex-
clusive; were not in competition with
one another but were, instead, mutually
reinforcing. Middle East peace— a high
priority for U.S. policy— can best be
achieved in a climate of overall security.

In the assessment I gave your
Foreign Minister, we also discussed a
number of other matters. We discussed
the situation in Poland, of course, and
other danger spots worldwide as well as
the major threats to Western societies.
And I want to emphasize that I ex-
pressed the full support of the American
Government and President Reagan for
the Italian Government's firmly held
position of defiance to the blight of in-
ternational terrorism. And I assured the
Foreign Minister that the United States
and Italy are united in our determina-
tion to eliminate this international
blight. And I noted that— fortunately
for all of us — Italy's institutions have
well stood the test of a recent upsurge
of international terrorism here and
internationally as well.

NEWS CONFERENCE,
MADRID, APR. 9, 19819

Foreign Minister Perez Llorca and the
Government of Spain have been most
hospitable during my brief stop in
Madrid. The audience so graciously
granted to me by the King and the
meetings with Prime Minister Calvo
Sotelo and the Foreign Minister were
extremely useful. They covered a broad
range of issues of interests to both of
our countries. We covered the results of
my trip to the Middle East, we discussed
events and affairs in the African Conti-
nent, bilateral relationships between
Spain and the United States, and East-
West relationships, especially Poland.
All in all, I think we had a most con-
structive and valuable series of discus-
sions. It gave me great pleasure to meet
the Minister of Defense Oliart, and I
was also extremely pleased to have met
the Secretary General of the Spanish
Socialist Party, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez. We
had a lengthy and extensive discussion
earlier this morning.

The promise of Spain's future in
world affairs is equal to its luminous
past. The United States welcomes
Spain's increased international role and
its every contribution to the solution of
pressing problems that face all Western
democracies. Spain has been an ex-
emplary host to the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe,
and I had breakfast this morning with
the U.S. Senior Representative to that
conference, Mr. Max Kampelman, which
was also invaluable. Now I want to con-
clude my brief opening remarks with an
important comment.

For over 5 years both Republican
and Democratic Administrations in
Washington have admired the growth of
Spanish democracy. When the Cortes
was seized illegally on February 23 and
24, the Spanish reaction to it confirmed
the vitality of your own democratic in-
stitutions here in Spain. The United
States and I, myself, are determined to
continue our unflinching support for
democracy in Spain as characterized by
America's bipartisan policy in the past.
It continues at present, and it will carry
on unflinchingly in the future.

Q. During the course of your con-
versations with the Spanish
authorities, have you discussed the
possibility of stationing nuclear arms
or allied arms on Spanish territory?

A. It has long been, as you know,
American policy not to discuss such
questions, but your question has no
relevance to our discussions today.

June 1981

19

The Secretary

Q. What is the present state on
the negotiations on the bilateral
treaty, and what is going to happen by
September if nothing has been agreed
to?

A. We had very useful and very
constructive discussions on the require-
ment to develop a new agreement be-
tween the United States and Spain and
to insure that this new agreement would
take cognizance of the changing condi-
tions in most countries and especially
the newly democratically established
regime here in Spain. We— both sides-
agreed to the urgency of launching im-
mediately discussions and negotiations
between the two parties with the view
toward arriving at a new agreement at
the earliest possible date, and these
discussions will commence almost im-
mediately.

Q. Given the kind of tensions in
Europe, how important in strategic
terms would you appraise the eventual
entry of Spain into NATO, and how
important are the joint U.S.-Spanish
base facilities?

A. With respect to the question of
Spanish entry or Spanish association
with both the economic and security fora
in Western Europe today, I have stated
repeatedly in the recent past and during
my tenure here in Europe as Supreme
Commander of Allied Forces that this is
a question to be decided by the people of
Spain. I have also suggested that when
such a decision is made to proceed or
not to, that the Spanish Government will
have the full support of the U.S.
Government on the position they take.
Now, it goes without saying, and I
would be hypocritical today were I to
suggest that my past position on this
subject has not been in favor of greater
integration of Spain into economic,
political, and security fora now existing
in Western Europe.

As to the second question, it goes
without saying, the American bases,
which are separate and distinct from the
first question and which have been the
consequence of bilateral agreement be-
tween the two governments, remain the
utmost importance not only to the
United States but I think to Western
collective security as a whole, and in the
same respect it makes a major contribu-
tion to the security of Spain as well.

Q. With regard to the agreement
which you indicated is to be im-
mediately negotiated between the
Governments of the United States and

Spain, are you contemplating this in
the context or the nature of an interim
or bridge type of an agreement that
will prepare the way for later acces-
sion to NATO on the part of Spain, or
are you considering it in terms of a
treaty to cover a period of years
similar to those covered under
previous extensions of the agreement?

A. It wouldn't be my intention to
get ahead of the discussions and negotia-
tions which will take place, but clearly
the bilateral relationship between Spain
and the United States will be addressed
on its own merits in the light of the
changing interests of both sides and,
especially as I said in my answer to the
earlier question, of taking full
cognizance of the new democratic estab-
lishment and government here in Spain.
To be more responsive to your question,
that involves an entirely new treaty for
an as yet unspecified period of time.

Q. First, allow me to address a
few comments in representation of my
colleagues and friends, the Cuban ex-
iles, in this community who have
asked me to extend to you again our
best wishes for the prompt recovery of
President Reagan. With respect to my
specific question, I would like to know
whether the Reagan Administration
and you, in the context of your
statements regarding increased rela-
tions with your true friends and allies
in the American continent, whether
you are aware who are your true
friends and who are your simulated
friends?

A. I think it goes without saying
that the traditional friends of the United
States are, in general, those who share
our common values and aspirations, who
respect and seek to enlarge and broaden
the democratic process and the fun-
damental values for which our own na-
tion, which we share in common here
with the people in Spain, and one need
not go beyond any other qualifications at
this juncture.

Q. Can you tell us whether or not
there was any discussion today or
would you envisage any discussion in
connection with the bases in Spain as
to their use for either logistical or
other support in the Middle East, as is
being discussed with other NATO
countries in connection with a rapid
deployment force?

A. I think in fairness to our host, I
should be very specific that no such
discussion took place today with respect
to the future utilization of those bases

jtiatior

J&&

lit the
iJiicai
id ass

which we now hold and would hope to j
continue to hold under a new agreement
with the Government of Spain and I
think such discussions would be pre-
mature at this time.

Q. Do you expect them to take
place?

A. I think clearly the kinds of
negotiations which we would conduct in
the period ahead would encompass the
potential utilization of the facilities
which would be provided by the Govern-
ment of Spain, and I am confident that
both the Government of Spain would
want to know this, and I am equally
confident that we would like to know to
what use these facilities can be made
without prejudging what the answer
would be.

Q. I would like you to tell me
what you would answer to a Spanish
general who had a coup in mind and
bearing in mind what your own in-
terest and their interest might be?

A. I'm afraid I don't know any such
characters, but I should repeat a joke if
you would like to hear it— but I'll save i
for my next visit.

:;■-

-.:.:.:

jsteii
is

.-■

Q. Would you give us your
private view on the support lent by th
Socialist Party of Spain to the Sandi-
nistas in Nicaragua and your com-
ments regarding a meeting that was
held the day before your arrival here
in Madrid, a meeting that was clearly
against NATO?

A. With respect to the first part of
your question, I would prefer not to giv
a value judgment on the activities of on
or another political party here in
Europe, but I would like to emphasize
that our estimate of the current situa-
tion in Nicaragua— in Managua— is tha
the essential direction of the governmer
is now in the hands of that extreme
left— the Sandinistas— who are receiv-
ing both support and direction in large
degree from Communist Cuba, and that
this estimate notwithstanding, is also
true that there are a number of
elements of more moderate persuasion
both in the government and in the body
politic of Nicaragua— these include an
entrepreneurial class, they include
elements of the church, labor move-
ments, and some of the agrarian
elements. So the final chapter has not
been written with respect to the future
orientation of Nicaragua.

For that reason, I think the policies
of all democratic parties in the Western
world should be to pursue actions which

20

Department of State Bulletin

i ne oecreiary

' would result in a pluralist outcome in

• licaragua rather than to enforce a
ituation which is already largely, but
ot exclusively, entrenched. I may add,
ery recently — about a week ago — the
J.S. Government made a determination
jhat the involvement of the Government
f Nicaragua in the exportation of arms
nd assistance to the rebel forces in El
Salvador was a violation of U.S. statute
vhich has required the formal termina-
ion of the levels of U.S. assistance to
hat government. At the same time, we
iave emphasized to the leadership in
danagua that if the recent restraint
lemonstrated by that government with

I espect to El Salvador is broadened and
lontinued into the future that we will
eassess this decision and that as a
nanifestation of our good faith with
espect to that decision, we have not in-
isted that, in accordance with the law —
hat is, we made an exception to that
aw — by not demanding repayments of
hose resources already provided under
recent levels of assistance to Nicaragua.
•Ve have also indicated a willingness to
:ontinue to extend food assistance under
J.S. regulation PL 480.

Q. In the case of the too rapid
;ventual access of Spain into NATO,
vould this mean that the Rota Base
vould be used to base the new U.S.
Trident submarine and that Zaragosa

s night be used to base the B-l
>ombers in support of any possible

■ eventuality in Israel?

A. No. I've made it a habit of avoid-
ng discussion of contingencies which

• iave not yet been addressed or which

• < Ne have not yet been faced with. I found

I I to be a very sterile practice pursued
I }y some less-than-prudent public

officials. So I am afraid I am going to
jlnave to tell you I don't have the answer
A :o that question, and that doesn't mean
i chat I'm even thinking about one.

Q. Could you let us in on the
views you have expressed to the
Spanish authorities on East- West rela-
tions and more specifically, on the
situation in Poland?

A. I don't think I make it a habit of
i revealing the contents of diplomatic ex-
changes of the kind that were held this
morning, but it is certainly no secret
that the United States, and I believe
your government as well, has been
watching the situation in Poland with
great concern and interest. We have
, been somewhat relieved by the recent
ij turn of events, to include the statements

of Chairman Brezhnev, but we remain
concerned by the level of military pre-
paredness and readiness demonstrated
by Soviet forces and those of the War-
saw Pact, and I think we both remain
dedicated to the proposition that the
situation must be very, very carefully
monitored in the days and hours ahead,
and it will so be.

Q. As you know, your remark on
the night of February 23 that what
was happening here was an internal
matter, has been widely disseminated
and commented upon. I am just
wondering if you, in light of what's
been said since then, regret in any
way that the Spanish military there
might be a misapprehension despite
the spectacular presence of yourself
here today and the visit and so forth,
that there is lukewarmness toward
democracy in Spain, particularly in
light of the policies of the Reagan Ad-
ministration toward Latin America?

A. First, with respect to your ques-
tion, I suppose it will continue to persist
among those whose appetites are in-
satiable with respect to it, so I think
maybe it would be helpful for me to ex-
plain precisely where that delectable
quotable quote came from.

On the morning in Washington of
the event, I had just been closeted for
about 3 hours with the Foreign Minister
of France, and as I walked out, one of
my assistants said: "Before you go
before the press, you better know
there's been some kind of a terrorist act
in the Cortes in Spain. We don't know
what it is or what the situation is at all,
so be careful."

And as I met the press shortly as we
were leaving, one asked me what about
it, and I said this is an internal matter,
and I think I mumbled, we have to find
the facts, but that was never reported.

Subsequently, of course, both
through misunderstanding in some in-
stances'and mischief in others, it got an
entirely different portrayal here in
Spain. Clearly, I regret that. I regret it
first because it was a fundamental
distortion of reality, and I always regret
when that happens. And, secondly, I
regret it because it in no way — in no
way — represents American policy either
under the Democratic Administration
that preceded us or the Republican Ad-
ministration under President Reagan.
And I would suggest as I did before,
anyone who persists in maintaining that
position is either not very bright or ter-
ribly mischievous. And, incidentally, as
soon as the situation was clarified, the

U.S. Government sent communications
to the Government of Spain and Presi-
dent Reagan, a communication to his
Majesty the King, with respect to our
continuing support to the democratic
process here in Spain. Somehow, those
things never get reported.

REMARKS,

LONDON, APR. 10, 198110

Q. I wonder if you would care to re-
spond to a question on talking about
the possible European plan on the in-
volvement of the PLO in negotiations.
Is that something that your govern-
ment could countenance?

A. I think it is premature. We are
now engaged in a peace process which
has been underway, and we hope to
keep that momentum moving and will in
the period ahead. So it's too early to
answer a question of the kind you just
asked. I thought you were going to ask
what I was doing here — I am prepared
to address that.

Q. Is there any change of empha-
sis after what you have heard on the
Middle East while you were there?

A. I must emphasize to you that we
had three purposes before our trip: the
first was to establish a relationship with
the leaders of the area, to let them know
that when we talk about consultation
and President Reagan's Administration,
we mean that we take their views into
account in the formulation of our own
policies and before those policies are for-
mulated, so we, of course, learned a
great deal from such a visit and ex-
change; secondly, we were in the
business of trying to develop a consen-
sus of concern about external threats to
the area, the situation in Afghanistan,
the tense situation here in Europe, in
Eastern Europe, in Poland — all, I think,
have sharpened sensitivities worldwide
to the implications of Soviet imperialism;
and thirdly, to emphasize that the peace
process itself is high on our agenda as it
has always been and that talking about a
strategic consensus is not placing our
emphasis on the peace process in a
lower priority; precisely the opposite.
We feel progress with one contributes to
progress with the other, and if they are
mutually interrelated then they are
parallel tracked, and I think that in that
context our trip was highly successful
and I feel very, very comfortable that
the process has begun — good relation-
ships, a hope for a continuation of
momentum in the peace process, and a
developing consensus of concern.

June 1981

21

The Secretary

Q. Do you think that there is any
difference of emphasis, though, be-
tween your government's position and
the European position of the U.K.
position? Is there any difference of
emphasis there? We're not suggesting
a row—

A. No, we've had a number of ex-
changes on this subject, and it may be
premature to make that statement but
thus far, no. And I think we are very
anxious to get on with the peace proc-
ess, and it remains to be seen whether
we are going to be fortunate or not or
the parties are to make the progress
which we all seek both here in Europe
and back in the United States.

REMARKS,

PARIS, APR. 11, 198111

I'll just make a few brief comments to
describe my activities here in Paris this
morning. They involved discussions with
your Foreign Minister, Jean Francois-
Poncet, and discussions just now with
President Giscard. They involved first a
debriefing of my recent trip to the Mid-
dle East and visit to Spain and yester-
day London. We touched upon the situa-
tion, of course, in Poland, Afghanistan,
and we had more detailed discussions
about the very serious situation at the
moment in Lebanon. As always these
discussions were frank, cordial, and
very, very constructive.

Q. What is your reaction to the re-
cent Israeli military intervention in
Lebanon?

A. Our position has consistently and
regularly been that we are opposed to
any use of force by any of the parties
concerned, and we would actively and
strenuously support a cease-fire and a
peaceful process.

Q. Have you made these feelings
known to the Israeli Government?

A. I don't make it a habit of stating
publicly the character of our discussions,
but you can be sure that they are consis-
tent with our public position.

Q. Will there be a common accord
by the United States and France for
the return of peace in Lebanon?

A. I think we have this morning
conducted a number of detailed discus-
sions between the foreign office here and
my delegation and with respect to ac-
tions to be taken in the future on

Lebanon. We clearly see a role for the
United Nations in the situation, and
perhaps it would be necessary if the par-
ties themselves cannot deal with it effec-
tively to consider a peacekeeping force
of some kind. We do feel that the matter
is urgent and needs our intense atten-
tion in the period ahead, and we are in-
volved in a number of coordinated
diplomatic activities.

Q. Were there any areas in which
American policy and French policy are
at odds?

A. I am sure there are because we
are two sovereign nations, and it would
be historically unprecedented for two
sovereign nations to coincide in every in-
uendo and nuance of the conduct of
foreign affairs. But I am very, very
pleased with the overall convergence of
French and American policy with
respect to the major issues — especially
East- West and the situation in Afghani-
stan, the situation in Poland, and the
need to deal urgently with the problem
in Lebanon.

DEPARTURE REMARKS,
BONN, APR. 11, 198112

I will just make a few remarks and I
would preface them with a quote from
my old German-speaking mentor, Dr.
Kissinger, who said: "If you knew every-
thing I knew, you'd agree with every-
thing I am about to say."

We've had very, very good discus-
sions here in Bonn with the Foreign
Minister and his colleagues and with the
Chancellor. These discussions involved a
review in the spirit of the new con-
sultative attitude of the Reagan Admin-
istration, of the impressions we gained
on our recent trip to the Middle East —
the capitals of Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia — additional comments and
impressions as a result of our visit to
Madrid, Spain; the discussions held
yesterday and today in London and
Paris, and Rome the night before. Our
discussions ranged from the trip itself to
an analysis of the current situation in
Afghanistan and Poland, East- West
relations in general.

We discussed the issue of the tac-
tical nuclear force modernization and the
parallel aspect of the second track which
involves the early discussions for arms
control in Geneva or whatever appro-
priate location is decided on as has
always been the case — and especially so
following the recent visit of the Foreign

22

Minister to Washington. Our discussions
have been intimate, detailed, and frank
in the spirit of a Western sense of frank.
I am very, very pleased to have had this
opportunity, and I am grateful to the
Chancellor for giving us so much of his
time on a Saturday and to my friend,
Mr. Genscher, who has been equally
generous.

Q. As a result of your swing
through the Middle East, do you
believe it will be helpful or unhelpful
for the West Germans to sell tanks
and other military equipment to Saudi
Arabia?

A. I wouldn't presume to intervene
in an issue of internal policy delibera-
tions here in West Germany. I think it
would be wrong and inappropriate,
clearly. The United States is dealing
with a similar problem with respect to
F-15 enhancement and AW ACS air-
craft, and our decision is to proceed with
that, with the modalities yet to be
determined.

Q. There seems to be great con-
cern about a remark that Defense
Secretary Weinberger made last week
that he felt that if the situation in
Poland continued to be threatening, it
would mean that there could be no
discussions between the United States
and the Soviet Union on theater
nuclear forces. Do you have a different
attitude, and did an occasion arise to-
day for you to explain that attitude to
Mr. Genscher and the Chancellor?

A. I think that what Mr.
Weinberger said here is consistent with
the policy that all of our Western na-
tions and the United States have taken,
and that is: to express profound concern
about the consequences of direct Soviet
interventionism, or internal suppression,
that would have profound consequences
for a considerable period of time for the
conduct of East- West relations, in-
cluding arms control and such things as
assistance to the needs of the Polish
people as well. And we want this to be
determined and resolved by a peaceful
process determined by the people of
Poland.

Q. What is the current situation?
Have you compared notes, and is it
still as tense as it has been — mili-
tarily—around Poland?

A. I guess the answer to that ques-
tion is that we were all somewhat re-
lieved by the recent statement of Mr.
Brezhnev which reflected greater
moderation. We continue to watch the
military situation carefully. In the light
of that statement, I would say that thert

Department of State Bulletin

'if '

The Secretary

fpg , i some easing of a sense of concern that
it. I re felt for a period of time here, start-

Interview for Great Decisions

ig last week.

Q. Once more back to the state-

ent

1(1 •>;;

tie

lent of Mr. Weinberger. As I remem-
ier, he didn't mention any invasion; he
aid "pressure" would be enough not
o come together to a meeting. Would
ou agree?

A. I have to be careful on that,
>ecause I haven't talked to Mr. Wein-
jerger about what he said. Until I do I
.vouldn't get into the nuances of your
question.

Q. Would you say pressure is
snough or—

A. You are trying to put me in a
position I think you think you have him
n. I would like to be sure of what Mr.
Weinberger said. We are talking about
internal repressions or external inter-
vention based on Soviet decisions and
management.

Q. What do you think of the pro-
jected visit of Mr. Brezhnev to Bonn?

A. I understand such a thing is
under consideration. This is a decision
for the leadership here in Bonn to make.
Clearly, there has been nothing in the
American demeanor and President
Reagan's demeanor which suggests that
we would not expect to continue a
dialogue with the Soviet Union. And we
expect our partners to do the same.

Q. You have said that you want to
have a chance to consult with the
allies while our policy takes form.
What did they ask you to do about the
SALT talks, and what have you been
able to tell them?

A. Frankly they have asked us to do
nothing about the SALT talks; and I
think that's because we have kept them
abreast of the situation in Washington,
which involves a thorough review of the
overall SALT situation. I am confident
that our allies will patiently await the
completion of that review. It has not
been completed.

Q. What is your estimate?

A. I think it is too early to make an
estimate.

Q. You indicated that the dialogue
could take place between Mr.
Brezhnev and the leadership of West
Germany. Do you favor a dialogue be-
tween the President of the United
States and Mr. Brezhnev?

Secretary Haig was interviewed by
Ken Sparks on March 16, 1981, for Great
Decisions 1981. '

Q. What are the principal goals of this
Administration in foreign policy over
the next 4 years? And what would you
say are the principal differences in Mr.
Reagan's foreign policy from that of
his predecessors?

A. Without trying to draw too many
sharp distinctions, I think the
dominating concern of this Administra-
tion is the recognition that the decade
we have now entered is at once
simultaneously the most dangerous and
perhaps the most promising that free
societies have faced, certainly since the
Second World War. It is our belief that

A. At the right time, of course. But
I think we have made it very clear — and
the President has made it very clear
himself — that he would anticipate
indulging in summitry, but that it should
be well prepared and that the conse-
quences of such a summit meeting would
anticipate a successful outcome. That
means the preparation is thorough and
detailed. And I don't foresee such a
meeting in the near future.

Q. You spoke about a certain eas-
ing of the concern about Poland. Does
this mean that American observations
indicated the military forces brought
up toward the Polish borders east and
west for maneuvers are now being
returned to their barracks?

A. When I say that, that value judg-
ment involves an assessment of the re-
cent statement of Mr. Brezhnev as well
as our assessment of the military situa-
tion which still reflects a high state of
readiness but which is somewhat im-
proved.

'Press releases pertaining to this trip,
but which are not printed here, are No. 99 of
Apr. 16, 1981, 100 of Apr. 16, 101 of Apr.
16, 103 of Apr. 22, and 109 of Apr. 24.

2 Press releases 87 of Apr. 6 and 96 of
Apr. 16.

3Press release 97 of Apr. 16.

J Press release 98 of Apr. 16.

5Press release 102 of Apr. 22.

6Press release 104 of Apr. 16.

7Press release 105 of Apr. 23.

8Press release 106 of Apr. 23.

9 Press release 108 of Apr. 10.

10Press release 110 of Apr. 24.

"Press release 111 of Apr. 24.

12Press release 112 of Apr. 28. ■

this is going to require a somewhat
different approach to our foreign affairs
problems. It means we're going to have
to recoil from the post- Vietnam syn-
drome—as it's been referred to— and,
once again, have our weight felt in the
international community.

We hope to do this in a very
measured and modified way, recognizing
that the post- World War II unique
superiority that we Americans enjoyed
is no longer ours. The basic themes will
be as I stated in my recent testimony
before the Foreign Relations Committee:
a consistency in policy; not to veer day-
to-day based on the pressures of momen-
tary headlines, but a consistent set of
themes which we will follow; reliability,
so that traditionally friendly nations,
those which share our values, can apply
those values, although in distinctly
different and unique ways in the context
of their own self-determination; and,
finally, most importantly of all, I think,
is balance --to recognize that conduct of
foreign affairs represents the careful,
measured, sophisticated integration of
political, economic, and security-related
aspects of our conduct abroad. That
must be part of an integrated mosaic.

Q. You have concentrated most of
your experience in recent years on
European affairs. How does it feel to
find yourself faced at the beginning of
your new job with the crisis in El
Salvador?

A. It's not new to me. I guess I left
the trolley in the post-Cuban missile
crisis situation when I worked for Jack
Kennedy and for Cy Vance and was the
Defense Department representative on
the interdepartmental framework that
dealt with, at that time strangely
enough, Cuban subversion in Central
America and in the hemisphere.

So it's ironic and rather frustrating
that here, once again, we're faced with
the export of Cuban subversion, ar-
maments, and interventionism in an im-
perialist way in this hemisphere.

Q. There are reports that the land
distribution program in El Salvador is
having a great deal of success now. To
what extent do the socioeconomic
issues in that country enter into our
foreign policy?

June 1981

23

The Secretary

A. Profoundly, of course, and we
seek to see a broadening of the political
situation in El Salvador, the evolution to
a more pluralistic structure. And you're
right, there has been some success with
the Duarte reforms in the first phase of
the so-called land reform where the
large estates have been broken up. But,
as has been the case, in our experience
there are also many growing pains with
this kind of profound change, and pro-
duction levels are down. And we must
always be careful not to try to impose
some external theology of fundamental
changes in a society which may not be
ready for those changes. We saw that in
Iran; it brought about the collapse of the
Shah. I think it is vitally important that
we not become too pedantic in our
reform efforts while we continue sen-
sitively to urge them and to provide the
means to assist their realization.

Q. In 1962 President Kennedy
brought the matter of the Cuban
missile crisis before the Organization
of American States (OAS) and thus he
gained a great deal of support for his
blockade of Cuba. Does this Ad-
ministration intend to bring up the
situation in El Salvador before the
OAS?

A. Clearly, I've been over to the re-
cent OAS meeting here in Washington
and briefed a number of the foreign
ministers who participated on the con-
cern that we had for the situation in El
Salvador. We're considering now
whether or not it might be fruitful to
formally introduce this issue into the
OAS organization itself. There are some
pluses and minuses to that, and we need
to make a very careful assessment.

Q. When does this Administration
intend to get down to serious talks
with the Soviet Union, then? What
issues do you think will likely be
given priority in such talks?

A. I think President Reagan has
made it very clear that he feels that the
recent Soviet activity in the Third World
and in this hemisphere— if one wants to
tick off examples of the kind of activity
I'm talking about, of course, the two in-
terventions in Afghanistan, the second
being a massive, overt invasion of that
country; the activities in Africa, starting
with Angola, Ethiopia, then over to
southern Yemen, northern Yemen; the
activities of Soviet proxies such as
Libya, which today is invading Chad;
and we find the familiar pattern of first
proxy forces and the accompaniment of
Soviet advisers with those forces.

These kinds of activities — the ac-

tivities we see in El Salvador, the activi-
ty we see in Kampuchea, formerly Cam-
bodia—are all unacceptable patterns of
international behavior if the Soviets an-
ticipate enjoying the benefits of improv-
ing East- West relations. I include in that
transfer of technology, credits, trade,
agricultural support. Perhaps most im-
portantly of all, for a Soviet regime
which has been increasingly engaged in
imperialist activities abroad, interna-
tional legitimacy. This is a question of
importance to Soviet leaders, and I
think it's vitally important that we relin-
quish that legitimacy only in the context
of our assessment of their behavior.

Q. On the subject of the summit
meetings, do you see them as useful
simply to sign and conclude agree-
ments that have already been reached
through diplomatic channels? Or are
they useful, as President Brezhnev in-
dicated, to clear away misunderstand-
ings and to pave the way for future
agreements?

A. They serve both purposes, and I
think the rigid or theological position
with respect to summitry can be self-
defeating. On the other hand, it's clear
that summitry should be used most spar-
ingly. It's clear that summitry must be
well prepared in advance. If it is not, it
could frequently result in the kind of
summitry we've witnessed in the past in
recent history where euphoria and ex-
pectations precede the event, followed
by a rather disappointed and depressed
outcome.

I think that summitry demands a
most careful preparation. It must be
designed to achieve a purpose, and that
purpose must be clearly visualized prior
to the meeting of our heads of state.

Q. Do you think that the grain em-
bargo is going to be lifted against the
Soviets, whether or not they get out
of Afghanistan?

A. I don't necessarily put a series of
specific conditions for the lifting of the
embargo. I think we all know that this
Administration, and President Reagan
especially would never have launched
such a grain embargo in exclusion of
other pressures against the Soviet Union
in the wake of Afghanistan. He's not for
it, and I'm not for it.

On the other hand, we're there now,
and a precipitous lifting of that embargo
could have grave consequences of
Western unity as we prepare such
crucial issues as coordinating our con-
tingency measures on the tense situation
in Poland. It could be viewed as a
business-as-usual approach to a situation
which needs further clarification. And

I'm talking about ongoing Soviet activity
abroad which is illegal, interventionist,
imperialist, and poses a great threat to
international stability and peace.

Q. But on the subject of the em-
bargo again, do you think the Soviets
will buy our wheat if the embargo is
lifted?

A. I think, clearly, Soviet trade
must— I think we made some
statements on that — they need our
wheat just as they need other resources
in the agricultural sector. They need
wheat from other providing nations as
well. Their own crop has not been very
successful, and, as a matter of fact,
their agriculture in general has been in
shambles, despite the fact that they have
allocated larger and larger segments of
their population to agriculture. So this is
another one of the systematic failures of
the Soviet Marxist-Leninist system.

Q. What kind of outcome would be
best from the U.S. point of view of the
situation in Poland? That is, would we
rather see peace and tranquillity
among the workers in the government
once again, or is the continuation of
the unstable situation an indication of
the failure of the Communist system
and is that, therefore, better for us do
you think?

A. First and foremost, we would
seek to have, whatever the outcome, the
consequence of the wishes and the will
of the people free of coercion or in-
tervention from external powers.
Secondly, we welcome greater freedom
and the achievements that have already
been realized as a result of these
pressures. And, thirdly, of course, we
would hope that the process would be
peaceful.

Q. It's been reported, too, that
both the United States and the Soviet
Union are continuing to observe the
provisions of the SALT II Treaty, even
though the treaty has not been
ratified. Do you favor that? And, if it
is in our best interests to have the
Soviets continue observing the provi-
sions of SALT II, would it not, then,
be better to have it ratified and,
therefore, bind them to the provisions
of it?

A. No. I think our suggestions that
the Soviets in this interim period could
find themselves through restraint and
moderation in their strategic efforts,
and we have suggested we would be
equally guided by such restraint, does
not represent an endorsement of SALT
II, hardly at all.

Asa
$

(.18

;;■■
0

ley ii

ily
lino

"-
-■
like
tl
-
itisl

•a

24

Department of State Bulletin

The Secretary

As a matter of fact, I seriously
aubt that SALT II would weather a
;st on the Hill; and, indeed, it was
ithdrawn by the earlier Administration
cause it would not survive such a test.

Clearly, we are not happy in this
.dministration with SALT II, and there
re several reasons for it. The first is a
roader one, a question of linkage, as to'
whether or not it serves any useful pur-
ose to enter into functional relation-
hips with the Soviet Union while it's
ngaged in this unacceptable interna-
ional behavior in the developing world.

And the second is the technical flaws
i the treaty itself, and there are many,
'hey involve concern that there are not
ruly reductions in strategic armaments,
t involves imbalances between large-
ield, land-based ballistic capabilities be-
; is ween the two sides. It involves con-
erns about transfer of technology and
he implications of the so-called protocol
n the agreements.

All of these suggest to me that we
leed a new treaty negotiated by this Ad-
ninistration; and that in that process,
ve will also rectify some of the strategic
mbalances which have been developing
ind which will be at their apex, if you
vill, at their most serious imbalance
)eriod in the middle of this decade in
.985 to 1986.

Q. As a general proposition, do
/ou see arms control agreements as a
jood way to manage our strategic
jroblems with the Soviets?

A. Well, of course. President
Reagan and I have always favored a
verifiable, balanced arms control agree-
ment. On the other hand, arms control
for arms control sake can be very
deluding if we believe, for example, that
these functional areas can ever be
viewed as something overriding and can
be entered into without consideration of
ongoing Soviet activity globally. That's
self-defeating, self-deluding, and could
lead to the international tensions which
we would hope to eliminate as a result
of arms control.

Q. In the Middle East, will the
Camp David accords continue to
govern our policy there?

A. One frequently tends to complain
about a lack of progress in Arab-Israeli
disputes, but if one looks back, as I am
able to do from my experiences in the
National Security Council working with
Dr. Kissinger in 1969, it follows that
progress through shuttle diplomacy,
some of the stops and starts of the re-
cent and past Administrations, and the

ultimate achievements of Camp David
viewed against U.N. Resolutions 242
and 338, one must marvel at the prog-
ress that has been made.

That does not suggest that the re-
maining obstacles to a comprehensive
settlement are any less intractable; they
are not. We intend to proceed with the
peace process. We intend to do so in the
context of some other ongoing efforts,
and that is to address the strategic
regional issues of great concern to
Arabs and Jews and the free world at
large, and that's again Soviet interven-
tionism and exploitation through proxies
or directly of the development and set-
tlements in that area.

I hope we're not going to be
dominated by my preoccupation with
Arab-Israeli disputes, with oil diplomacy,
while they're going to view the area as a
regional whole; I see these as mutually
reinforcing efforts — that is, Arab-Israeli
peace settlements — and a consensus for
regional defenses against Soviet inroads.

Q. President Reagan has made
statements advocating a fairly strong
feeling of support for the Israelis,
both in the West Bank issue, the
Palestinian issue, and yet we have
gone ahead and made the arms sales
to Saudi Arabia, something that the
Israelis oppose. How do we balance, if
I may phrase it this way, what appears
to be our conflicting interests in the
Middle East?

A. This is not a simple task, of
course, and sometimes we must deal
with what I call narrow contradictions in
order to achieve a broader consensus of
an improved overall climate.

It's been my experience that perhaps
the most difficult problem and the
greatest obstacle to progress in the
peace effort is the creation of in-
securities. When one side or the other is
racked with insecurities, it becomes
more intractable at the negotiating
table, whether it be Arabs or Jews.

And I think it's very important that
we recognize that there is a new situa-
tion in the Middle East: the collapse of
the Shah of Iran that had been a
stabilizing force and is now a destabiliz-
ing force; the Iraq-Iran conflict; the
Soviet interventionism in Afghanistan.
All of these factors have raised insecuri-
ty among the moderate Arab states
traditionally friendly to the United
States and our objectives. It's very im-
portant that our Saudi friends know that
we are with them in their security
challenge, and we intend to be.

Q. You mentioned the Shah, who,
of course, prior to the Khomeini

takeover of Iran, was our staunchest
ally in the Persian Gulf. Now that the
hostages are safely home once again,
are we likely to resume some sort of
relationship with Iran and try to blunt
the Soviet influence there?

A. I think it's far too early to say.
This will depend in large measure on the
subsequent performance of the govern-
ment, or whatever government ultimate-
ly prevails in Iran. I think the important
thing to remember, as President Reagan
says, we're not going to be dominated by
a spirit of revenge, and our basic objec-
tive is a friendly, moderate, pro- Western
Iran. It's that long-term strategic objec-
tive that we must always keep in mind
as we deal with the vicissitudes or inade-
quacies of the day-to-day performance of
the regime there.

Q. Human rights was the major
emphasis of the Carter Administra-
tion's foreign policy. Statements by
some members of this Administration,
yourself included, indicate that the
emphasis will change under President
Reagan. How will the human rights
factor be considered in our foreign
policy decisions from now on?

A. This has been the subject of a lot
of controversy and, I think, misinforma-
tion. No one has ever suggested that
human rights is not a fundamentally im-
portant aspect of all that we do in the
conduct of our affairs abroad. It is an
essential and universal aspect of that
conduct.

On the other hand, we have felt, and
I think with justification, that when you
break out this objective in a functional
way and create special authorities to
measure the achievements of human
rights outside the mainstream of the
conduct of our affairs where this issue is
not weighed and integrated with the
other functional objectives that we seek
to achieve, that distortions can creep in.

In the last Administration we found
ourselves in a ludicrous position of
bludgeoning friends and traditional allies
in admittedly less than acceptable
authoritarian regimes to the degree
which in several instances we successful-
ly contributed to the collapse of that
regime and its replacement by a
totalitarian alternative where human
rights is no longer by ideological convic-
tion an issue that they are concerned
with.

So we have to deal with this issue
with greater sensitivity. And I've also
stated that in some respects we will find
terrorism replaces our concerns about
human rights violations in an open socie-
ty, because terrorism is perhaps the
greatest single violator of human rights

June 1981

25

The Secretary

that has ever been seen today. And I
would suggest that it needs far more at-
tention than it's been getting.

Q. Beginning with the time that
you were in the White House with
President Nixon and Secretary Kiss-
inger, we have seen a drastic change
in the status of China from that of an
enemy to almost an applicant for a
quasi-ally status. To what extent in
the developing relations with China
should we take into account the effect
of our relations upon Moscow, do you
think?

A. I have stated that one of the
great challenges of this period facing
Americans in foreign policy will be, on
the one hand, to avoid poking sticks in
the polar bear's cage while continuing
with the realization of the strategic im-
perative to maintain improving relation-
ships with the People's Republic of
China nurtured by a very carefully or-
chestrated set of conflicting objectives
that we are going to have to manage.

I'm confident that it is very do-able
and, in some respects, that issue will be
solved by the respective behavior and
conduct of the two regimes involved.

Q. You have spent your whole life,
your whole adult life, working on
foreign policy, both in war and in
peace. And yet many Americans re-
main disillusioned about what they
have seen as the costly effects of help-
ing our neighbors and our allies and
containing our enemies. What advice
would you have for Americans who
are concerned about what they should
do about foreign policy?

A. First, I think they've got to
avoid being captured by contemporary
sloganeering, whether it suggests excess
hyper- American activity abroad or
whether it suggests, as has been the
case in the recent past, that we
withdraw from there. The simple facts
are that we Americans have an obliga-
tion to make sure that those values that
you and I cherish are broadened and
strengthened in the international com-
munity.

And if we overlook illegal interven-
tionisms, whether it be in Africa or
Afghanistan or in our own front yard in
this hemisphere, we're leaving a legacy
of increased risk-taking which could con-
front us as it did in the Second World
War with the ultimate challenge to our
vital interests. We must take these on,
we must participate in the world com-
munity, which shares our values.

Interview for NBC Television

pes?

Secretary Haig was interviewed for
NBC television by Marvin Kalb on April
U, 1981. ^

Q. What were your hopes when
you took over this job? What did you
want to accomplish?

A. I think, like many Americans, I
spent a considerable period of time
before the inauguration worrying about
the drift of American foreign policy, the
lack of consistency and reliability in our
dealings with friends and potential foes,
and a lack of balance, if you will, in the
conduct of our foreign policy, sometimes
giving greater emphasis to theology and
letting the more realistic aspects of the
challenges facing us abroad fall into sec-
ond place and second consideration.

Q. You're talking about the Carter
Administration?

A. I'm mainly talking about post-
Vietnam America, post- Watergate
America, and I think the American peo-
ple choose what they want for leader-
ship and, if they're not happy with it,
then they change it. I think they chose
Mr. Carter for perceived style and found
it wanting with the experience of it.

Q. And they chose Mr. Reagan for
what purpose?

A. I think Americans everywhere
have a thirst to reinvigorate America's
world mission, its world role and respon-
sibilities, to recognize that the United
States has been in a very defensive
mode for a considerable period, since
Vietnam, and that the losses to the vital
interests of America have been grievous.

One looks at the Third World— in
Africa, recently in his own hemisphere,
Southeast Asia, the Middle East; one
can only be gravely concerned about the
implications of either America's unwill-
ingness or inability to deal with the in-
creasing risk-taking on the part of the
Soviet Union and its proxies. I think this
is the heart of the matter that disturbed
America.

Q. When you say "risk-taking on
the part of the Soviet Union and its
proxies," give me some examples of
what you have in mind.

A. I think if one would go back to
the pattern that was launched in
Angola, where at that time the ex-
ecutive branch— President Ford— was

anxious with a modest investment to
challenge the use of Cuban forces to in-
stall a proxy government there.

At that time the legislature in a
post- Vietnam, post- Watergate demeanor
did not sustain the executive leadership
the President tried to put forth. Subse-
quently we saw in Ethiopia, we saw in
southern Yemen, in northern Yemen, we
saw an institution of a puppet regime in
Afghanistan almost 2 years ago and o
to learn that within a year it did not
meet the criteria of total subjugation to
the Soviet Union, and a direct, blatant
intervention occurred.

We saw the overrunning of Cam-
bodia, or Kampuchea, by proxy forces of
the Soviet Union from Hanoi. And here
recently, in the last months of the
Carter Administration and the early
weeks of this Administration, we saw
the activity in El Salvador which could
have reestablished the gang in this
hemisphere, an additional Cuban
beachhead having already realized con-
siderable success in the Nicaraguan
model. All of these things I think disturb
Americans. They certainly disturb me as
an individual, and I know they disturb
the President.

Q. What do you both want to ac-
complish, though? Do you want to
stop the Russians? How do you do
that?

A. I don't assume that the Soviet
leadership is seeking a conflict, but I do
assume— and I think past history has
confirmed— that where there are
vacuums, where there is vacillation on
the part of the United States and its
allies in standing up for their vital in-
terests, that these vacuums are going to
be filled in ways that do not meet our
vital interests and which, indeed, put
our interests in jeopardy.

What we are seeking to do is, first,
to recognize this fact and to espouse and
develop policies which are prepared to
challenge these illegal interven-
tionisms— not necessarily with force but
with a great panorama of demographic
assets available to the United States and
to our allies.

In political and economic terms the
West enjoys vastly superior assets to
those of the Soviet Union in political and
economic and moral terms. I think it's
awfully important that we do a better
job of bringing them together under a
common concept which meets the vital

A. I

ilea;

|K.!0

Ulster
conseq
imanc

jjtot

no'

:.:•:
etoric
i*
■duct

(ding

< 1

am;
I! I
iii
k

\

Ml

■■-:

IS

1

SI

I

■ ;

>

'Press release 89 of Apr. 5, 1981.

26

Department of State Bulletin

The Secretary

terests of not only the United States
,t those who share our values
roughout the world.

Q. How do you think you're doing
far?

A. I think it's much too early to
ake a judgment call on that. You
iow, foreign policy isn't a business of
lckstering or packaging or rhetoric; it's
consequence of day in and day out per-
rmance which contributes to an overall
sessment and a sense of credibility
id confidence in those with whom you
sal.

I noted some expected that if I
Duld travel abroad, I had an agenda of
etoric that you get pluses and minuses
1. This is an irrelevant aspect of the
mduct of foreign policy. Foreign policy
going to be built and developed in an
olutionary way by day-to-day profes-
onal dealing and management with our
hole panorama of assets to be sure
lat our vital interests are protected and
:panded.

Q. Concretely in El Salvador, for
(ample, do you feel that you've done
ell? One doesn't hear as much these

i ays about El Salvador as we did a

. juple of months ago.

A. I think it's a little early to say
hether we've done well. But history
ever tells you what would have hap-
ened had you proceeded on a different
ourse than what you did.

I would suggest, had we not moved
le way we did on El Salvador in the
arly days of this Administration to
ring pressure on Nicaragua, that was
lvolved in a massive shipment of arms
' ito El Salvador to provide economic
1 nd military assistance to a hard-pressed
egime in El Salvador— with a ratio, in-
identally, of three to one in favor of
economic decisions— that we might be
vitnessing today a creation of another
1 Nicaragua in El Salvador.

As it is, we find a situation where
he rebels are now on the defensive,
where the armament shipments from
Nicaragua have been dramatically re-
duced— not terminated, but re-
duced—and we're looking at a whole dif-
ferent range of problems. And that is
the ability, once again, to manage away
excesses of the right or the left in an
evolution toward what we hope to be a
more pluralistic structure in El Salva-
dor.

Q. I don't want to put you in a
position of claiming that you are per-

sonally, or the Administration is,
responsible for a success there, but
doesn't it add up to that? Don't you
feel that as a result of the action that
you have taken, that you have ac-
complished what you just described?

A. No. I think that's a little too
sharply drawn and gives very little
credit to the courageous people of El
Salvador who are, themselves, both the
victims and the cutting edge of whatever
successes were achieved.

But I think successful foreign policy
anticipates problems, and it takes ac-
tions which prevent less than happy out-
comes. I think the pressures that we
have applied in Central America have
achieved something. I think we've seen a
change in the demeanor of many of the
other threatened countries of the
region — Panama, Mexico to some
degree.

Q. Do you mean a stiffening of
their spines?

A. A recognition that the
hemisphere is once again threatened by
excessive interventionism from Cuba
and a more robust posture against that
interventionism. We see the same in Co-
lombia, we see it in the larger countries
to the south in Latin America, and I
think all of this augurs well for the
future if we can continue to maintain
our policies and to support those policies
that are necessary here at home,
especially in the Congress.

Q. What are some of the problems
that you've come upon in the last
several months in terms of your ability
to implement policy?

A. I think we have a rather happy
situation, so I'm not going to put out the
crying towel. We have a unique con-
vergence in America today of a popular
move which is willing to bear the
sacrifices of correcting our defense defi-
ciencies and tightening its belt to be
sure our domestic economy is put back
on a sound track.

We have a Senate which is also
responsive to that same outlook, and we
have a House which is equally suppor-
tive in general. And, of course, we have
an executive branch which not only has
been in the forefront of espousing such
policies but is thus far realizing a usual
degree of effectiveness in getting the
support for it.

That could be short lived, and the
stakes which would be made could derail
that. But I think it's a very happy set of
circumstances the way the American

people, the legislature, and the executive
branch are all of one mood. There are
many dissenters, of course. You read
about them every day.

Q. Let's talk about perception for
just a moment. There is a percep-
tion—and it will be no surprise to
you — in this town that you, yourself,
have undergone some kind of major
change in the last month — 3 or 4
weeks at any rate — from being a
man seen as on top of everything,
firmly in control, to being what one
official here once described as a
wounded lion. Do you feel yourself a
wounded lion?

A. I suppose if you look back over
history, successful Secretaries of State
have seldom been winners on the
popularity hit parade. And I didn't come
here to run a popularity contest, nor do
I think my effectiveness is going to be
judged on such things.

I'm here to do the work for the
President of the United States and the
American people to reinvigorate and to
turn around what had been failing
foreign policy. And the report card on
that is going to be a measure of my ef-
fectiveness in doing so. So I neither feel
as a different fellow, a wounded eagle,
or a lion. I'm a fellow who has a lot of
work to do, who intends to get on to the
substance of that work as I have been
doing. And I'll let the popularity polls
take care of themselves.

Q. Do
dued?

A. Not at all. I don't suggest for a
moment that one in public life that finds
himself at the vortex of public con-
troversy enjoys it. I don't enjoy it any
more than you would or any other
American citizen, but I've seen enough
government to know that it is essentially
an irrelevant aspect of the work that has
to be done and the final measure of
whether or not I succeed in that work.

Q. People who know you very well
say that your natural predisposition is
to be very tough, very aggressive, and
very energetic in pursuit of your aims.
Is it possible that that may run in con-
flict with the team-player approach
that we hear is desired out of the
White House?

A. No, not at all. My discussions
with the President — and they have been
regular and intimate, as recent as this
morning — suggest to me that he's com-

you feel in any sense sub-

June 1981

27

The Secretary

■

fortable that I am doing what he hired
me on to do; and that, after all, is the
real measure of whether or not I fit into
the team or have a style that may be
abrasive to one fellow or another.
Again, results are the current measure
of effectiveness.

Q. You're in for the duration.
Your sense is that that is what you
want to do.

A. Of course. I didn't turn my life
upside down to come down here. I only
intended to make a brief try at it.

Q. On issues of straight substance
now, at the very beginning of the Ad-
ministration in relations with the
Soviet Union, we heard a lot of things
about the Russians cheating, lying,
stealing, et cetera, and we don't hear
that kind of a line now. It is not what
one would call a very good relation-
ship, but it isn't, at the same time,
brutally antagonistic. What do you
want out of that relationship? What
would you like to see develop?

A. I think in the first instance, in
order not to succumb to the leading
aspects of your question, let me suggest
that in the early weeks of this Ad-
ministration, it was necessary and
desirable for our Administration team, if
you will, starting with the President, to
make very clear what its world view
was. And I think that has been very
decisively and sometimes rather precise-
ly outlined.

That doesn't have to be repeated on
a day-to-day basis, and the very act of
doing so can be counterproductive. With
respect to the Soviet Union, we clearly
view the Soviet Union as the major
threat to vital American interests; not
the only one but the major threat. And
any suggestion to the contrary seems to
me to be overlooking recent events
around the world, indeed, events since
the Second World War.

So the fact of setting that record
straight is, obviously, a desirable aspect
of our foreign policy. Does that mean
that we want to adopt a mode of total
brittleness, confrontation, and isolation
of the Soviet Union? Not at all. We want
them to be on notice that when they
abide by the accepted rules of interna-
tional law, they will find a willing and
welcome partner here in the United
States, and they will enjoy the benefits
of trade and credit and technology
transfer and perhaps some reduction in
levels of armament that both sides feel
compelled to maintain today.

28

But we're a far cry from having
achieved that millenium, if you will, and
that's going to be the task in the weeks
and months ahead, and it's going to re-
quire dialogue between ourselves and
the Soviet Union. Above all, it's going to
require American policies which are will-
ing to stand up to these challenges as
they develop day-to-day, as we have had
to do in El Salvador.

Q. There has been a great deal of
talk about the possibility of Soviet in-
tervention in Poland. It hasn't hap-
pened yet; maybe it won't happen.
Why do you think it hasn't happened
just yet?

A. I think basically because the
Soviet leadership knows that the price
of such an intervention would be almost
incalculable from their point of view. In
the final analysis, however, they're going
to do what they think is necessary for
their vital interests. This is what makes
nations tick.

I think the activities of the allied na-
tions in early December may have had
an impact on what was clearly a decision
to desist after building up substantial
force capabilities to intervene.

Q. They were on the edge of in-
tervention; then it stopped.

A. I think that was the judgment of
most of the more respected analysts at
the time. Now, I'm not sure we reached
that in the recent crisis. I felt and, in-
deed, the President, Vice President, and
our Cabinet team concluded that they
were still in a political phase on Friday
night when I left Washington. It frankly
never got too much higher than the level
of concern that we had at that time; in
subsequent days, there has been some
retrenchment in our concern, both on
political and military assessments.

Q. What are the actual constraints
that operate right now on the Soviet
Union as far as Poland is concerned?

A. I think there are a host of con-
straints. One is that we in the West
have done very well in staying togeth-
er—unified and coordinated— in our ap-
proach to the problem. There's hardly
been a communication, a public state-
ment, a signal that has not been coor-
dinated among the allies and those of us
who share common concerns about this
problem.

Secondly, I think the Soviets them-
selves recognize that the problems in
Poland today are horrendous in political
and economic terms; and that if they
move into this situation, they will be

■y-
|tke«
lata

i.l

alitie:

A,

it, at
lijtl

il

assuming burdens of almost incalculable
magnitude, and to include the possibility f
of active resistance by the Polish peop'
And so it cannot be in their interests to
do this unless at some point their judg-
ment is that the risks of not doing so
are outweighed by these very serious
risks of doing so.

Q. There are some students of tin
subject who say, as you well know,
that perhaps the Russians have waitei
too long.

A. I suppose, again, such an
analysis could be made. On the other
hand, I think it's awfully important thai
those of us with official responsibility
never succumb to the theological syn-
drome that Soviet intervention is in-
evitable in Poland. Such a conclusion, o
even such a public statement of such a
conclusion, could increase dramatically
the brutality, and the decisionmaking
process might be moved forward, even
the thesis were correct.

I don't happen to share that, and I
think we've got to work as actively and
diligently as we can to help the Polish
people, with others, overcome their
economic contradictions and to make it
clear to the Soviets that either external
intervention or internal repres-
sion—which is equally onerous and
dangerous — are not acceptable if they
wish to enjoy a standing in the interna-
tional community that even compares
with past history.

Q. Why is it in the interests of th
United States to send aid to Poland?
After all, Poland is in the Eastern or
bit, it's a satellite country, it's well-
known it's now undergoing a
phenomenal kind of peaceful revolu-
tion; it is a member of the Communis
Party, a member of the Warsaw Pact,
Why is it in our interests to help
them?

A. First, I think we have adopted i
policy which is built only on our vital in
terests to keep the political process and
the moderating process alive internally
in Poland; this is going to require a
modicum of ability to feed their people
to keep their economy functioning— anc
that means economic and foodstuff sup-
port.

We also should be, I believe as we
must, influenced by the humanitarian
aspects of this issue. American foreign
policy has always given a high measure
of cognizance to the humanitarian objec
tives which we Americans espouse and
support.

ttral!

sdict

list

Itj

M
1

V

f

6

II

Department of State Bulletin

The Secretary

So from both an interest point of
sibiftw and a humanitarian point of view, I
ink clearly we have this obligation. We
stsi )uld expect that we would not be
jadi jne, that those who share our values
uld also contribute and, even perhaps
ore importantly, those in whose orbit
)land has been historically — the Soviet
nion — must also bear a heavy measure
the economic burden of the internal
buation in Poland today.

Q. Is it possible that the Russians
ay, in time, adapt to the new
alities in Poland?

A. I don't think one can discount
.at, and one must work diligently to
•ing that outcome about. I think it's far
'0 early yet to tell.

Q. You're aware that you're
jcoming the darling of a lot of
berals in Washington?

A. I suppose life is replete with con-
adictions.

Q. Seriously, there are people who
ly that Secretary Haig and this Ad-
ministration does represent the flex-
jiility that is required in the execution
if an intelligent foreign policy. Do you
:el that you may be an odd-man out
' i this sense? Much harder statements
re coming out from other people.

A. I don't know that I have to be
' ?lf-conscious about my inability to make
) igorous statements, either in the recent
' ast or in the more distant past. I do
. elieve that what I have been saying is
■ bsolutely consistent with the views of
! le President of the United States.
I 'hat, after all, is what I'm here to
' spouse. I'm his Secretary of State.
No, I don't see these subtle con-
radictions that you're speaking of, and I
on't necessarily believe that the liberal
i the flexible mentality. And I don't
ven like the handle "liberal" or "conser-
ative." It's lost its meaning in a contem-
iorary sense in many ways.

Q. How would you describe
yourself?

A. A liberal in the sense that I'm an
optimist, that I believe essentially in the
perfectibility of man, although probably
with a greater degree of patience than
some liberals might.

On the other hand, I also believe
that international affairs, per se, are
structured on the vital interests of na-
tions. Those interests are inevitably go-
ing to clash with our own, and we must
deal with those clashes on the basis of
strength, reliability, consistency and
coherence in policy. And we haven't
been too good at that. I suppose historic
critiques of democratic systems have
pointed out that is one of our
vulnerabilities, and we have to be con-
stantly conscious of it.

Q. Your top staff- some of these
people still not confirmed. A couple of
weeks ago up on the Hill you ex-
pressed your own unhappiness that
this process is so slow. It still is slow
and you still don't have your people
together and confirmed. What can you
do about it? What are you going to do
about it?

A. We have been working the prob-
lem together with the White House
staff, which has an equal stake in this
although they have a number of more
constituencies to manage in that sense,
and with the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on the Hill. And I'm optimistic that
this problem, to the degree that it is a
problem, will be resolved very rapidly.

Q. It hasn't happened that rapidly
yet. What about Senator Helms? Is he
the problem?

A. That's a question that Senator
Helms would have to answer. My rela-
tionships with Senator Helms have been
absolutely unique and unusually cordial
from the very day I came in; in fact,
from the time that I went through the
all-too-brief confirmation process. So I'm
not aware that he's created any un-
necessary obstacles for me and, if he
were to have, then I would be very con-
fident in sitting down with him and
discussing them to resolve the problem.

Q. Why is it, then, that there are
so many of your assistant secretaries
who aren't confirmed? Where do you —

A. I think your focus is here in the
Department of State, and I think you'd
find similar situations in other executive
branches.

Q. No. I appreciate that. Just from
the point of view of the Department.

A. I think it's been a problem of
new systems, new conflict of interest,
and probably a degree of intense con-
cern about the philosophic compatibility
of appointments. I'd like to see that
myself, but I'm very, very comfortable
with that, providing it doesn't drag out
and prevent the effectiveness the tax-
payers must expect from our executive
branch.

Q. Has it prevented that effec-
tivness yet?

A. No. Not yet. Not yet.

'Press release 121 of Apr. 23, 1981.

June 1981

29

The Secretary

Interview for ABC Television

Secretary Haig was interviewed for
ABC television by Barrie Dunsmore on
April 17, 198 1.1

Q. Evidently, the United States has
now, more or less, decided to provide
a large arms package to Saudi Arabia,
and this has set up a buzz saw of op-
position from Israel and its supporters
on Capitol Hill. Is there some
possibility that that will be delayed
now because of this opposition?

A. I noticed some press speculation
with respect to the timing. The clear
point I want to make is, there has not
been a decision with respect to timing.
There are a number of important
technical considerations that have to be
resolved that will influence ultimate tim-
ing, and that decision hasn't been made
by the President yet.

Q. But a decision has been made,
at least in principle, to provide Saudi
Arabia with this equipment?

A. Yes, that's correct, and as you
know, this is an issue that has been
under discussion between the United
States and Saudi Arabian officials for
almost 2 years. It was largely concluded
at the time this Administration came in-
to office. We have continued on with
those discussions.

Q. The columnist William Safire
yesterday suggested that you and
Defense Secretary Weinberger actual-
ly misled the President by saying a
secret deal had been arranged by the
Carter Administration that you were
obliged to carry through on. Is that
the case?

A. I don't know of any secret deals
of any kind, and I don't make it a habit
of commenting on speculative articles of
that kind. I think the case has been
clearly presented to the Congress as it
has evolved, and they are abreast of the
current situation. Our public disclosures
have been consistent with the facts as
they have developed.

Q. What would be the impact of a
defeat on Capitol Hill of that arms
package for Saudi Arabia, in terms of
our relations with Saudi Arabia and
the Middle East generally?

A. I think, clearly, when the deci-
sion has been made to proceed with the
notification in accordance with estab-
lished procedures on the Hill, if there
were to be a setback, it would clearly

30

represent a grievous setback in
American relationships with Saudi
Arabia. There is no other way of parsing
it out —it's just that simple!

On the other hand, I don't think we
will proceed under the assumption that
we're going to lose.

Q. What would the impact of such
a defeat on U.S. relations be with
Israel?

A. It's clear -and our Israeli friends
have made it evident —that they are not
happy with this package, or at least cer-
tain aspects of it, especially the aerial
surveillance aspect. I think this in itself
suggests that we have a certain amount
of technical work to do to be sure that,
to the degree possible, legitimate con-
cerns by the Government of Israel are at
least alleviated.

Q. Also in the Middle East, there
is a report today that the Israelis were
prepared to make major strikes
against the Syrian forces in Lebanon,
and that while you were in Jerusalem,
you managed to dissuade them from
taking such action. Could you
enlighten us at all on that report?

A. I wouldn't make it a policy to at-
tribute decisions taken in Israel to my
actions one way or another. I think it
has been clear that the consistent policy
is to work as actively as we can to pre-
vent the resort to force by any of the
parties involved in this tragic situation.

Q. On that trip, we were told by a
senior official in your party that we
were on the verge of a major outbreak
of hostilities in Lebanon. That led
some of us to conclude that the
Israelis had hinted that they were
about to go in, and you couldn't stop
the fighting in south Lebanon.

A. No. I think the basic reality of
the situation in Lebanon is that, to the
degree that the Christian militias are
threatened by Syrian military activity,
as they become increasingly in jeopardy,
there are strong motivations in Israel to
take counteraction to preserve that ele-
ment of the Lebanese society. I think
that is a clear fact understood by all
sides, and it suggests restraint by all
parties.

Q. We have been marched up and
down the hill on the possibility of an
intervention in Poland for several
months now. Is there some kind of a
danger in this kind of approach? And

ilail)0
liteW1

4, No

«v
shir.gtc

ission

do you think the Soviets are really
listening to us when we warn against ^
intervention?

A. I think the Soviets will make
decisions on what they calculate to be
their own vital interests, as is always
the case with sovereign nations. I think
we have made our position crystal clear
with respect to that. I think the deter-
minations made by the Soviet leader-
ship, of course, include considerations of
the impact that that will have on East-
West relations at large, and relations
specifically with the United States.

All of these factors, I am sure, are
included in Soviet calculations. I would
not necessarily attribute Soviet motiva-
tions or Soviet decisions exclusively to
American rhetoric.

Q. Where do we stand now on the
subject of the likelihood of an in-
tervention with the formation of a
new farmers' union now? In your
mind, does that make chances less or
greater that the Soviets may feel com-
pelled to move in?

A. I would rather not offer a value
judgment at this juncture. I think we
have seen some lessening of the ten-
sions, both in political and military
terms in the past week, and I think we
are gratified that this at least continues
a peaceful political process in the
reforms that are taking place within the
Polish society and among the Polish peo-
ple. We would hope that these im-
provements would continue without ex-
ternal or internal repression.

Q. There was some confusion in
some peoples' minds about the pros-
pects for talks at a reasonably high
level between the United States and
the Soviet Union, with different peo-
ple suggesting that what the Soviets
may or may not do in Poland having a
bearing on such talks. What are the
prospects of high-level talks, such as
between yourself and Foreign
Minister Gromyko in the next few
weeks or months?

A. These things are largely to be
decided in the period ahead. President
Reagan has made it clear that he in-
tends to continue a dialogue with the
Soviet Union. That is both to our advan-
tage and to theirs. However, he has also
made it clear that linkage is a prevailing
concept in his Administration, and that
is that these talks— the pace, the scope,
and the level of them— will be deter-
mined by corresponding Soviet interna-
tional behavior in the broadest sense of
that term— that's the American policy.

died
st fe
H
H*
iters

'&&

.!(?:

a1

1 ti '

to ■

"Hi,

III I
utii
i ii<
ton

I if

hi

D

U

1,
ft
SB

■

13

Department of State Bulletin

Wis

Q. Do you sense any basic dif-

mce between the United States and

Hies on this subject, and par-

ilarly on the subject of talks to

i)uce nuclear weapons in Europe?

A. No. I think the United States
our Western European partners are
me mind. We had visiting
shington yesterday, for a lengthy
:ussion with President Reagan — very
ailed discussions — the Secretary
leral of NATO who was representing
collective view of the alliance. In
;e discussions, as in earlier discus-
is — with Mrs. Thatcher when she
ted Washington and other foreign
listers of our NATO countries— we
rmed the American commitment to
I ere by the decisions and consensus
lived at in December of 1979, to pro-
Id on two tracks; one being the
liernization of our long-range theater
■ abilities in Western Europe and the
|er the initiation of discussions with
I Soviet Union, with a view toward
|| ing reductions in the long-range
later nuclear threat. We intend to
» ceed and honor these two tracks and
llneet our commitments and obliga-

Q. I know this is not your favorite

■ pject, but I think it is no longer a

0 lor game that Washington

d netimes plays about who is up and
v o is down, because it does affect
t conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

1 w seriously Ho you think you have

■ :n hurt by the recent differences
J l have had with the senior White

I use staff?

A. I read a great deal about that in
t ■ press. I think my relationships with
t ! senior White House staff are very,

II -y good at the moment. I think, in the
1 al analysis, my effectiveness is going
ij be a direct measure of how I perform
1 ' substantive responsibilities for Presi-
i nt Reagan. In that context, I feel I am
1 ecuting those responsibilities in con-
l*mance with the President's policy.

i tat, after all, is what I was hired to
J ; and I intend to continue in precisely
I at vein.

Q. One of the questions which I
jn frequently asked, and I do not
ive the answer to it, so I'll ask you:
re you going to remain Secretary of
;ate?

A. I didn't make the fundamental
1 langes in my own life that were
iecessary to come to Washington with a
I ew toward having it an interim period
ji my life. I intend to stay and continue

to do my job as long as I can make a
constructive contribution. I have no
reason to believe that that is not the
case.

Q. If you had anything to do over,
over the past couple of months, were
there any things that you said or did
which if you could take back, you
would take them back?

A. Not necessarily, no. I think this
is a lively town in Washington, and
again, I think the American people at
large will measure my effectiveness and,
indeed, measure the effectiveness of this
Administration by how well it is per-
ceived to meet their vital interests in the
domestic and international conduct of
our business. I'm optimistic about that.

Q. What is your estimate of the ex-
tent of penetration by Soviet in-
telligence services, the KGB or other-
wise, into this country?

A. I think we would be naive if we
did not understand that this is a very
key aspect of Soviet international con-
duct. It's a fundamental aspect of their
philosophic roots. It involves efforts to
penetrate, with influence and otherwise,
the body politic across a very broad
spectrum of nations with which they do
business. It would be naive to expect
otherwise.

The degree to which they have been
successful in doing that is not a matter
of grave concern to me. However, I
think it is a matter to which we have to
be constantly alert.

Q. Is this Administration doing
anything in particular— taking any
particular steps — to address this prob-
lem?

A. I would prefer to let the At-
torney General, who is fundamentally
responsible for the internal security of
the United States, and the Director of
Central Intelligence, who is primarily
but not exclusively responsible for our
external security arrangements, to
answer that question.

Q. But you are not overly con-
cerned about the problem? You're con-
cerned, but not overly concerned?

A. No. I would hope I am construc-
tively alert to the problem, and I would
be a supporter for policies by those who
are responsible for formulating those
policies in this Administration to pru-
dent measures which would improve our
posture.

'Press release 114.

AFRICA

Internal Situation
in Zimbabwe

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
APR. 3, 19811

In accordance with the provisions of Section
720 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I am
submitting the following report on the inter-
nal situation in Zimbabwe.

There is considerable evidence to indicate
that the transition to majority rule in Zim-
babwe, which was consummated at Lancaster
House and came into effect on April 18,
1980, is now gathering momentum both
economically and politically.

Economically, Zimbabwe has made con-
siderable progress in the 1 1 months since in-
dependence. Real growth for 1980 is
estimated to have been 8-10 percent. Infla-
tion averaged between 12 percent and 15
percent for the year. With the announcement
of a high pre-planting price and a good rainy
season, Zimbabwe is expecting a million-ton
maize surplus this harvest. The mining sector
remains solidly prosperous despite some
uncertainty about a possibly increased
government role.

In the July 1980 budget and the
February 1981 economic policy statement,
"Growth with Equity," the government has
committed itself to the maintenance of a mix-
ed economy aimed at satisfying black aspira-
tions and assuring white confidence by at-
tracting foreign investment and aid to
generate continued economic growth.

Zimbabwe's economic success is partly
associated with the fact that more than 90
percent of the country's white population,
about 200,000 people, have chosen to stay in
Zimbabwe. We estimate that about 20,000
whites have left, 15,000 of them have gone to
South Africa. Nevertheless, white emigration
has led to some dislocations in areas of the
economy dependent upon mechanical and
technical expertise, e.g. railroad maintenance
and telecommunications. The country's 5,000
white commercial farmers have almost all
stayed in Zimbabwe.

Politically, the dire predictions which
were heard at the time of independence have
not come to pass. Black-white political con-
flict has been inconsequential. The expected
Ndebele-Shona political conflict has
materialized; however, despite two bloody
clashes in Bulawayo, the tension has been
contained by the existing political and
military structures and senior leaders on both
sides have responded to the problems which
have arisen with a view toward the long-term
best interests of the country. On the whole,
the political scene has been marked by in-
creasing stability and the enhancement of the
authority of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

The process of military integration of
ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary
Army] and ZANLA [Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Liberation Army] continues to move
forward slowly despite the collapse of three

Jne1981

31

CANADA

of the eleven integrated battalions in last
month's difficulties. Most observers now
believe that Zimbabwe will for at least the
near term have a larger army than was in-
itially anticipated, due to the fact that most
of the remaining 25,000 guerrillas will prob-
ably be incorporated into the new national
army.

As noted in detail in the 1981 "Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices," in-
dependent Zimbabwe on the whole has a good
record in living up to the guarantees on civil
liberties contained in the Lancaster House ac-
cords, in particular those contained in Annex
C. Zimbabwe continues to be a functioning,
multi-party, parliamentary democracy in
which the rights of the population as set
forth in the constitution are respected.

The basic rights called for in the agree-
ment such as the right to life, personal liber-
ty, freedom from torture and inhuman treat-
ment, freedom from deprivation of property,
privacy and freedom of conscience, expres-
sion, and assembly are in effect. Thus, for ex-
ample, at the time of this report, there are no
persons under detention in Zimbabwe
because of their political views. In order to
end South African control of the press, the
government purchased controlling interest
from the Argus Groups and invested it in a
national press board which appears so far to
operate independently. The electronic media
are sometimes criticized for being overly en-
thusiastic about government policies.

The House of Assembly and the Senate
which were set up pursuant to the Lancaster
House agreement have proven to be active
political bodies in which substantive and
frank debate is the order of the day. Regular-
ly scheduled elections continue to be held,
most recently at the local level. Nevertheless,
disturbances led to the postponement of local
government elections in Bulawayo following
clashes between partisans of competing
political parties.

The court system rcognized in the Lan-
caster House agreement functions as set
forth in the agreement. Thus, for example,
ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe African National
Union-Patriotic Front] Secretary General
Edgar Tekere, who was charged with the
murder of a white farmer, was freed by the
court under a law passed by the former
regime to protect government officials. While
many Zimbabweans may have lamented
Tekere's release, it was widely noted that, as
promised, Prime Minister Mugabe's govern-
ment did not interject itself in any way into
the judicial process. The public service and
the police also operate as set forth in the
Lancaster House agreement.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Charles H.
Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and Clement J. Zabiocki,
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981.) ■

U.S.-Canada Consultations on
Garrison Diversion Unit

On April 23, 1981, representatives of the
United States and Canada met in
Washington to begin a formal process of
consultations on the Garrison Diversion
Unit, a multipurpose water resource
project in the State of North Dakota.

The U.S. representatives reiterated
previous assurances to Canada that the
United States would honor its obliga-
tions under the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 not to pollute waters flowing
across the boundary to the injury of
health or property in Canada and its
commitment that no construction poten-
tially affecting waters flowing into
Canada would be undertaken until it is
clear that this obligation would be met.
U.S. representatives reviewed the
history of the Garrison Diversion Unit,
provided information on its current
status, and indicated they were resolved
to address the technical issues in a man-
ner that responds to Canada's concerns.

North Dakota officials described
possible phased development of the proj-
ect which would provide for construction
of features having no impact upon
waters flowing into Canada and would
subject other features to experimental
tests, conducted in consultation with
Canada, to identify those features that
could be constructed to the satisfaction
of both North Dakota and Manitoba.

The U.S. representatives indicated
they intend to continue to study various
alternatives for project development.

Canadian representatives stated that
Canada remains opposed to the Garrison
Diversion project as currently designed
and authorized because it contains
features which, if built, would lead to
serious harm to Canadian waters, in
contravention of the treaty. They ex-
plained their central concern that the
transfer of water from the Missouri
River basin into the Hudson Bay basin
would introduce into Canadian waters
foreign fish species, parasites, and
diseases (biota), which would do serious
and irreversible damage to the
multimillion-dollar commercial and
native subsistence fishery on Lake Win-
nipeg. They reiterated their position
that, in the absence of agreed
technological means of preventing the
transfer of biota, the Garrison project
should be modified to eliminate any
transfer of water.

Both sides expressed satisfaction
with the meeting as a useful step in ad
vancing mutual understanding of the
Garrison project. There was agreemen
to continue the process of consultation
including technical discussions, over th
coming months.

The delegations were headed by
Raymond C. Ewing, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs, Depar
ment of State, and Edward G. Lee
Assistant Under Secretary for U.S
Affairs, Department of External Affaii

Press release 113 of Apr. 23, 1981. ■

Maritime Boundary
Treaty and
Fishery Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,
APR. 21, 19811

On March 6, 1981, I asked the Chairman o:
the Committee on Foreign Relations to un-
couple two pending treaties, signed March
29, 1979, relating to East Coast fishery an>
maritime boundary matters. I made this re
quest after members of the Senate leaders
advised me the treaties could not be ratine
as they were.

My goal, as I am sure is yours, is to
resolve the fishery problem and at the sam
time fortify our strong and close relations!
with Canada.

Our two nations have built a friendship
based on good will and mutual respect,
recognizing that we both have independent
national interests to pursue. I believe that
proposed course of action will ensure the &
tlement of the maritime boundary by an in-
partial and binding procedure, and that it \
allow a future fisheries relationship with
Canada to be based on better known facts
and circumstances.

Therefore, I recommend that the Senat
give advice and consent to ratification of tl
Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada to Submit to Binding Disp
Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritim
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, signei
at Washington, March 29, 1979, subject to
technical amendments including an amend-
ment which would allow it to be brought in
force without the entry into force of the ac
companying fishery agreement. And, I re-

32

Department of State Bulletir 1

§ k ^ .-s t?

5- 2
S a,2_

© C15 so

^ b ^
. e ©>

63 © o

SS *- ?*< SO

• S ¥> ^ -^

"«■§ a-^

Si

J* CO

535 o
r? «

5.1

so --O

© ho

m

pi
O
H

Q

w

W
X
H

■
mi

laiiii

d

S

. o
3 S S

so
o

o

co -si

'I I5

SO (^

J3 V-

O

_ ©

<*> t^ "co ^

2 "*3 2 •-

SO .2 SO £

■s "Se — ^

53 £ © ^

635 -£ © <+£s

*—| SO SO ©

S>5.

a,

CO
•iO
"53

I 1

(3

S

c

T3

CO § CO

co a. 05

C£ CO -<o •

©5 2 £

ais 55

63 ^r ©
•e^ "» so

o g~3

to » »

p^ so £-

2 W -SO

55 co £

^> ^
'§ < T3

©^n

CO

i«

s2 -«°
55 co

S so

55 r

©

— o

c»

« 5~ t5 <o cc

© ^ -S -*i -
S o H ■

5- -<o -ri -2
© co -S e

S^ ^ "-o -<o

1 1 §£

so 5- .^

© o
«^ ^

©2 so

?^ Q5
<o -

so -Si

<fs rt SO

63

Cli

53 ^S

o © e-i <» so

E t3 ^ -g =C3 *

55 55 S ^ S

-o -Si .^ p_ ^

*~o „, *<o Ci5

* iO so -??

«1

-s -S -se -si

S j3 CO so

2 •" S « «

CO 535 © S

S s£ ©

CO

a

§15

535 *~

co 535 o SS ^
S S O » «

O

~o CB .2

5 co •§ g f

© so CO © S.

CO

a

©

so

CO

a

63

65 ,

?• ?• CO .

© jj si

1 - I

F o 5

» ®* C

|5 §

<S> SO Q

K £ 535

= >i .CO

CO 2

© ©

■■o 5,

53 -i

-^ k

so ©
CO "=-

'5?

CD

oS

a,

1^

535 ?

k ^
O so

1

©
Ci5
©

« a

S~ so
^ TO.
« §

© 5

CO »
N 615 _©
615 -^.

e © h

-Sj -© 55

53 ©

< so

"53

615
so

53
C15

cj

615

C3

CO

©

6C

§•'

655

III

o 5 ■"

535 ©5 so

s © J

S> 655 •"

S o) s

?ss

st <3

C55 »

o S

55 155 -s£
U f «

.'-§ 53 S ©

"© g CO <»

v. s? .2 ©

0 O -§ -s3

s 1 o ?-s

S ^ .2 ° .&

r .2 ss *- -si

S a 2 s k

O 5»S t ?
-o C15 K g s£

c5 535 © a S

-2 §

^ t? V " co

e § o s .2
£; k, 2> "S

•■§ -| 1 :-s s

5 ? S g «j

^ © sS •§ -Si

SS CO so so

615 S

b "^

©

^5
©

©

655

©
CO

s

S Ci5

© -«

^- 63

» to S

s^ -^

2 "<3

63 615

h a

g °

© '^o

"53 S is

■§

55
-<o

o

a

CO

615

63

•co ©
>— o

© K

a ©

53 53
« -2

•^ k
©_ o

55 co

^ "S

535 -s£

©

o .

so
63 '
-a;

©

so
55
<Si

S2

53

i pi

> s-

; ©

-55

©

■^ CO

-2 63
53 >

-63
C15

V.

-§

aso-

I

-o ,
g a.

© "^

00 rt

i-i o

«h —
O _g

<■§

O CP cS

£6

5 ^
<* o

3.2

J 8

>a O
.go

3 *-l

4-3

CS

o

p— <

JS

CO

c

4J

G

'£

u

0

o

CS

rt -Q

'■£3

c

cS

5:

E

:

O

4-J

£

C
<1>

3

CO

,

CO

p

P

3

„D

CO

B)

0)

G

53

xz

CP

cfl

CO

(i i

-M

(J

CP

s §

"2.5

■s-S

3. 0)

CP *■

cp

CS Lh

cp 5

J -o

CS

>

cu

J3

01 co

.2

CP CS

.5 2;

■2,"0
0) cp

M g

s -e

0)

I

cp

cp cp

cs „,

ag

CS .

2 *

cS__ ~

c'n 2

o PQ cS m

*> _ - cs

T3 +J

.■5 E

E -a

.-J CS
CO

CD cS

o *3

■ S cS _•

. cS £

Di >-s cs

3

CP

c
o

I-

"§

I

>

W >>"0 he

<4-l

O) CD O

rS -fi -u
'2

3

C co" - >

O iu CM g

C <ii CJ5 —

'•g •£ J S -

5.£-o

.2 3 § I

CS g 05

3 >»c pa

= -° ° ~; ■
" re cs

Si g oq [g

& ,

■" c"P^
CO ? „, cp

>2

CO
CU

vn cp

CS j«s

ta|

^1

cp ~

■C Si CO

o o

<p3^,.

G
o

"2 '"•5

CS cS cp
cp C o

% u c

cp cp

3

CO

c

° s

>>„

c o

3 CO

cS CP Cp

a; CO

rv >> co

a

'^

cS

■§

S
P
u

J3

H

&

a.M-

^-5"°
c3iS°5

CO OJ ^=

CO C75 ^ CP

O C cp *j

CP

cS

a

• - cp CO

CS h-) "O

G ni *

>- Si J3

cp -C

-y ^ >>

— 3 £

O . -H

cp >>

£-§
£

CO CO

CS c
n O

cp o; cp
t- 12 "o

co .3 —

'■a ■"

o o

c

x

rt

!-. CP '

c c cp

2-o cp

CS CS

cS cp
cp .S

►J-J3

G
-C -~) ^

^ 53

CS cp 2
cS cp .3

•= £.2,

>- O r>

C ° O
- £ cp
c « o

<? -3 -C

c

o

CO

c

■o

o

c

CD

CP

3

"D

"5 co

o> c

-1 O

E

O CO

o

>- z

i_

<" —

cp

-° 7>

-Q

E£

E

cp E

03

S3

2

D □

CO

a>

E
a>

5

o

3
o

C3

g

<

CO

o

co^

p sz

CD 3

■9 o
-1 CO

CO
— Q.

a o

>-.£
□> —

UJ LU

CD

CO o —
P O CD (0 O

222ZZlHOC0CO0]|-I-I-DDNN

p

CO

o ,_

^cpIsS o-E^S^co §>§

SEEEcTrl^EESbksi

^' CO D CD 41 jPOCOCO-PDOcD-QCOCO

<mmoo oooooo2y j^5

Angola Mauritius
Botswana Mozambique
Cape Verde Sao Tome and
Comoros Principe
Djibouti Seychelles
Equatorial Guinea Swaziland
Guinea-Bissau Zimbabwe
Lesotho

c

TO

0!

u
O
ro

CO

<

Australia Lebanon
China New Zealand
India Philippines
Iran Saudi Arabia
Iraq Syria

Afghanistan Malaysia
Burma Maldives
Cyprus Mongolia
Indonesia Nepal
Israel Pakistan
Japan Singapore
Jordan Sri Lanka
Kampuchea Thailand
Kuwait Yemen (Sanaa)
Laos

Bahrain Qatar
Bangladesh Solomon Islands
Bhutan United Arab Emirates
Fiji Vietnam
Oman Western Samoa
Papua New Guinea Yemen (Aden)

CD

a
o

LU

Belgium Norway
Byelorussia Poland
Czechoslovakia Turkey
Denmark Ukraine
France USSR
Greece United Kingdom
Luxembourg Yugoslavia
Netherlands

Albania Italy
Austria Malta
Bulgaria Portugal
Finland Romania
Hungary Spain
Iceland Sweden
Ireland

CO
CD

■o »-

CD O

"- O

CO Q.

E CD

CD
o

CO

o

o

E

CO Q.
E CD

C5

CO

CO

o

a3
E
<

Argentina Guatemala
Bolivia Haiti
Brazil Honduras
Canada Mexico
Chile Nicaragua
Colombia Panama
Costa Rica Paraguay
Cuba Peru
Dominican Republic United States
Ecuador Uruguay
El Salvador Venezuela

T3

p

CO o
-o °>

1*

^y o

p i-

CO

o

CO

E

CO

-3

Bahamas St Lucia
Barbados St. Vincent and the
Dominica Grenadines
Grenada Suriname
Guyana

CO CD

" P

S C CD

2 O 5

IT)

cr> en
en en

m o

CD CD

CO

(0

o

a)

E

<

TO

"E

(0

a>

CO S

t/5 o £

m £ c

S Sfi to

6

a>

3t

o •

rt co

■s s

<o

.2 ° c

N CD

a-" o
A -— - *

T3 C -O

— - *

13 £

cd c

V

E- b^

"" _Q

S 3
O O ft

">"&£
<d .5 cd

00 CO O)

C ni J3

CJ !> CO

<•-

C3 co

ii

<« ^

*- 2
cd ft

u

_. CD
— ca XS

•a 3 ~

SJ 3 C

B CD gj

4J-B -^

• 3 T3 t.

* E"B

OS b 3

■=1 =

•-CD CD
W S

Og£

S c £
-=00

c-

ca CD

si

CO O
>) o
CO CD

hp „
B u „

■C g c

CS P. CD
CD O «*h
C O 9>

0 ^
ft. 5

S 0

•oO
ca .

XI c«

'0 -0

*■« ■«

CD CD

ca xi

O CO

« E

« 0
2 0

1*5

s §

Eh J3

B O

§.2

3<2

* ^

& 3

■cr

CD 0>

3s 1-

*? iS

« ea"

ll< CO

S;g

£ 'to

I— UJ

3 3 3

•- CO

co g 3

^•2 2
^'E°

u, o C

CD Q O
hO ,T3

3 (tT ea
_o g >

r-i "E ™

112

"si
.§£3

;w

. >-,

n-ja

ca - ^

o >->-o P*
3 « 5 -3

CS

eg

TT

ca

^^

SI

CS

ca "a

CO

52

Oh

a

CD

-

■p

3

3

■a

C3

E

H

V:

c

3

CD*

-a

0

'3

3

3

ca
Oh

1

£S

JS 3
■gt=

"3 ia"

ca

03

1

'0

=3

2

E2JS

o

ra
a
o

to

x: §,£ S ^ ™ ™-g

U;cEJS»c

c o o -J «J ,•= >

to
o

3

O
O
X

0)

iS On 2

ro -o =j y

c to en DC
S | 2 to

OiuZO

'g.S §3 its

2 * £< S S

to en r $ £

'l'?<(D t/}

55c o

i§ -

o °

o .o

<J ®.2">.Sf

-- S-* .tl -Q ? 0>

» P S °

m bo ? tu m

s | -s I o £

CO

£

t3 += >,JJ a!

<u -n • — i O e£2

E-h-oj: 2 as o

A •- p

S n » O

- 4) S

-g 2? w> to

§ s~-bb g.2 m "2 « -5 |
§ S 2* ~.a co- | go a £

-, c O .fi
k a c a>
O "^ T3 3

3^1 II rig5 a

£ 2 a .=5 o ,£<?>?■££

- H ©

03 i-5 Z

a
o

5

c
co

a>

•D

C

:>

o

5

o

(1

u.

<•

<

o

u

DDDD

6-°

CD C

£

,«- tu

ej2 .

cO o sj

lid If 5

c h •- o< S a

J3 E -s o -o 3

2 o co

03 .a 13

. X =3

CS 01 N

|sg

S -01

O lis
rfl O^

^T =« 5?

S « P

-u [V] oo

c ?
9> -r>

3*'

O O ^ H «

■ o o-g 2 -<

O1 W 00 CO T— ' "1

H< £<

c
d>

E

CL

o

>
Q

03

c
o

08

i—

<u

D.
O

o
o

E
o

c
o

O
UJ

c
o

w

N

03
O)

a&o

C <U "i
^ S £

a <u »h
a ■" a

0J

0)

o

os O

"2 >:-

C CD

_20

E °

o

s §<

. —

"3 -Si

-a T3

o3 <D

B C-,

03 a,

03 C

OS -o
a. cu

§ 8

OJ &h

03 o»

£Z

—i 0J

-a -w
a ,.-

_o3 bO
a; b

£ o
_-Q
aT £
o S
0) s
Qj 3
!~ -i

O J

C TO

3 p-5

X

^

„

'3

15

D

EM

..

3

>

4-J

aj

:

&h

Ph

3

_

H

CO

>>

c
j5

X

o

E

~

/.

1)

u

CS]

*J

~

w

'5

c

■?t

03

03

„

53
a,
S3

0)

0)

Is

—

it
C

y.

-f.

3

a

1}

0

O

X

y

' —

£

5

ou

c

w

u

o

u a
o CD

V. £■

c a,
.2 o

■a ^

03 l_l

bo -a
^ c

O S3
CD C

-c o
E-i+3

co

'r* to

c,Q=o

£ot:

o W o
5 ■ cd

O to _c

■+3 o +j

.2 CD O

&2<g

fa g tg

° aj J,

— "° e
rt— n
C S°

2 'E ^

H_> H-2 >
CS » «

c s, -^

<u c ffi

c — 'C

>>? s

"? bo 3

5 c °

O.E3 u

e

03

-C C
-t^» • —

a> "a
o -a

£ c
c 3

s °

c ^

c

c

bo

o o

Bi

8^

03 .to

j= o

.a a-

C Oh

03 O

bo o

Rj

J2 o

Oh#

2 °
o. 00

oj -a

-^ s

" o

o o

03 u

o.W
£ a

OS
O O)

"" Oh

° s

to b

2h

n3

a

•H

03 c

oj .a

o 7

& -2.

^ 2

W g

acq
1 2

to -C

In "^

03 -

S 8*

"w .£

S OJ o ,

ja -a «y

«.a-p

£ i. O

| g a

.2 E W
£°0
o Z

"213

OS Q

tO h3

"O 03
C C

a- JJ
o

«4-H 0)

8°^

^ a.2

3 £3 a
O 3 o3
B W Oh

-C ■"

° -C

CO H-J

-^ to

e>

o

CO
CL

CO

W

s_

(0

0)

c

CO

o

<

.2 r° js

N 2 <U © II

S3 fc-s5 fc.8

^2 a g.su.8

C« r- „. <D r.

H -a t.

S § •£ -2 ■*-' ss c

S o C Ol c ? o

+3 «w _. a> g > B

<! ;g Id ^ t. c £

+-> 5 £ O .43 Q,

fe ^ So «, «* <* 2

^ H 5- B ir1 C

c

o

'.,_.

TO

CD

en

a.

CD

o

_Q

cd
.a

o

E

U

a>

E

E

_c

<u

-*-1

z
o

E

CD

g.2
v, c

CD CD

u

ro

■C E

UJ

CJ

*; cd

5

O

C (D
3 >-

O
u

n

LO

o 51

D

u<

D

tr-
ee
+j
3

o

(-. o

^ o

co 3

§ 2
8 ft

Co
£u

a) O

T3

-t-> aj

S3 ES>

M ca

.. ed r S> ■

cu ca i — '

"° o '

S J3 "9 "5

u 3 p

N 0) O

o&ias

ca
ca o 'o

ai 5 X C

^ 2 - 5 S"
• • g Js -a -Q

J3 W 12 -C cfl

" "r-" •• -

«* » »^

flj .. *H o 3

.2 CO 4* tS CD

3
O

«<o

« « -<
e co ca —

o

*jO c

&

•J3 CD

£
o
o

W ©

"3 §
pO

-go

is

oO
"*- O

CO

C13 CO
CO 5

"ca o
. '■% 6

g m£

^Ji-SogZ

'5 ^-5

-1- r-

4-> »-

ca <u

C

3

;
O

1> en

.Sec

1-3 3

3 r-

O 08 CD

.a £ B u

ca

§ CO

cu ba

■p 3

ca o

b$

=« CO"

bfi u

Is

e 'E -2 "o

op o -e 'S

C cp
O -T3

3 3

a *

2 ca

0) o

3 2,

* 3
co co

CO 3 r:

S si

^ ° -

-a o j

3 S.-S || g
2 o ^ O o ■■—

H<5 a^WaW W 8

^2
o -C
o ca

O CO

_. o
ca c

as

CD -C

ca ■—

id

3 '43

' CO

0J *M

OJ

-2-S

3 -M

ca ca

c
a>

E

>
o

■o

0)

c
o>

75

c

O

o3~ C

CO _r ^.

_a; .2 |>
II ix

° o 3
M- 2 «

. , *-< (—

HOC

ho a os
<p tf c

0) c 3
mCOtfi

.S <p c

-Q C 03
05 O T3
fc, cp 3

<< J CO

'E. °

CO o3

-a o

i£

N C
o3 03

CO 03

■s-g

N

5 1

p. a
o c
a> o3

Cm H

3> - £

^1
■SI'S

h E os"
^£>

T3 r* 03

.■Sel

-§>

03 0)

3om2

■2 s-
.22 5

- 8- £ -

3 & a; os
H £> >-i S

^ c xi z. -c

&||

c 3. c
o cr o3

OHO

13

^ Cfi Q >5

^o J^ --g

O >> 03 c« -2 g
C/ cp ■•- to 03

3111 |s.

.23 ,-? g-J^ -2
■ u rt P

ni

^"«|'^

cp 03

MP-,

. O 03

.5 E r-

3 g c3 <" «2 J5

§2

o3

C
03

S 5>o

o 03
« -a
J C

9)

!E
w £

11

o H
bo

— ^ •= a,

a3 -C to .O.

§■< ££

OS

'*■' a>
oS -£

CO 4-3

03 M

■a

; C

C .a
cp i«

E>
cp s

>

o -a

I:

03 b

C -43

5 ^

CD

^ >

•£ o
cp S

1 £
I-

K.5

o o
a> g

^ 3>

* CO
CO ^o

§,-2

g- CO

p-^
3 ^

co C

!— ' CP

03

C

^T -
CTJ o3

T-l C

CO

0)

03 c J= >>

C § > co' -^-^

O cy
i T3

'5b!

3 »S'

a)

S 2

C _o

"S °
c u
a*

II

-a u

< m

tt:

T3 -c .- «j

■re
QJ C

c o

Q> "J

i- CO

O a>

o „
* I * « §

2i3-° to c S
. 3 -o .SJ .2 c

= . 9J * C J3 <U

^ C+^P rf l.

g^ S-E.a.2

g +j co Jo »
O •- a) .5 ^3

b «, T3 cp to -r

^"g §i

E ? C >

ui tit » -

-^ _ ^T3 ft

8^

gCQ

tp

2 5 -

■Sq W cpH

C5

CD

O

E

03

CO

CO

CD

■a

ja

- $.2

£ c E

. <i> cs
E EN

JS§

i> ^-c'cS
5 c S3

N fi OT

<d 2 o
c E tm

CD CD 3

e«

ccf ^

.. c o

.2 5S

CO •{■<

"C

bjo g

2 §

3"2

0> rt

g^

CO

J> G >iW cy <u

;S> 3 ° ^ *i P .2 -'-'•- m r- ►

~ « s z -S s>s -a a J § •

c« >g x -_* cS nj c -5 — e

p c«
_, jo _r ho *-

»- c rt fc -g c

•g|S jrc--

"3 - b

o ™

5 £
5E » col

CLi -C O

C T3 >. ©

CD £3 CD OT

<3J GO -

«s <;

^ rt o> _r
cS 5 .-« .5 ^
cd > c: c — -

o J- 3

ca o

co

cc! ca ca

ri

— t*
o" o

g3 J

ssz^g^ll^^l^l^

£g grSig

o e -o ca c

ca

.£ c co

eg SW>t)0 E

"*< of fii CD

! .9} d f o> 2 O q

2"S

oj c 0) ~ a, nj

■w 2 CQ n a.-C .^

2-5 .. =a ca O o - u _? .c .;= ca

o c a op

3 -3*~ S-C m O

c 4S M ^
tarj cs g -

^ -a a «<
« §m

>- ho -

S g rt '
c 5 ^

'3 ™ C

p -c •= ca

3 t.

OS- ^.O o 7= »> >2

scat s|*g.u5s-

g . oiSffi
S fc J3 2 -

■S O al g c«

cnjorscacaolrt-^a^

<mmmi3 §uqm£oo

S go;

CO 5

W fc. *. "g r=« C j-

1<J Sm02 §

c .-a •— -r O

hp c s C -. ^ ^

c d o 3 k

o
£
o

o » o

> rt co

I— I Q <D

* s c

. S c

c rt rt

2-g

CO

o
cy b 2

n.

3

o
O

CO ,

o a;

° >

o

aj &
§1

^-•' i-

O ^

£3 -2 £

C > 0)

o
a. co

3 ■

CO i
CO

■^ Sf CD
CD 'co f_,

S'S ■

c a co
c £ -S

T3 O >-!
Cfl O

CD §

E

-

o

-;

-

ja

u

CD

T)

CO

T3

c

-

crt

O

fa

tf

o

_ o
a. oo

§2

So c

CD

c 5 -a

0) CD „

£ £75

O -w CD

'•S -" ^
g * §

- 1°

(>. TO

CD QJD .
-CO"-)

_b a cd

"o i °

CD C co

■" o bo
2 o c
cs ""

.£ ^=2

u CO

Di>"
^- 1--
-m i

c o

CD

£^

^ CO

CD cci

co-_g

o T3 .

X

CD

'So
o.£ £

he CD

-O CD

C a>

CD .

"O -^

ccj c^

<~ a>

c

- * S

O £ >

ho CD CD
S > -C
Co*-*

.§ S .£

£ T3 co

O <D CD

C P hC

O 00 C

o s ca

CD ccj j=

-3 c °
rt n .,

.2 „ So

C8 JZ
C -"

£ JO

1- C3

CD

o -a
E^
o o

a.?*
op

3 £ JS

!&

° >

o o

u v.

CD hO

w
a>

(0
CO

JQ
(0

O

0)

3
O)
(0

a>

.s-'H

<n

5 g

" in

<! 3

a S

ja

H J

sl'i

o

° <u'53

^S| §
2 — o *j

S 3 m 2

* Z~ £

c o ^-e
^ ^ ^-, ' i

I. J " c
g- §>-53 to

^ 2 | a

Q.

LU

CO
>-

o
o
o

?

<2

'c
to

*^
3

co

£?cn
o to
> o

— o

CO
O)

CO

c

CD
CO

o

(0

J;

CO

CO
en

CO

!o

is

CO

e

CO

C3

CO
CO

B

=J

11

M

c

^2

Sec

8s

.a as

< S

o c
CO ,o

§ g
be S

S-.

Op

£p . s

~ CO
■2 M

<4H o

+? fe

$ _

S-.a

g i

to

en

CO i

en X

c «
6 .a

o ,>-

"3

CO

^ Co

CO

3
_ O
en -Q

C en
5 CO

■a -5

U cj

c +3
2 5
E'S

CO CO

j= -a

O ecl

c

£3 co
o o o

— CO
.Q C
3 _M

51

CO
tj

3

C
CO

3
tn +-» en

«j o c

s °-""

I O. en

C0M

« o

EC]

<« __, CJ in
o rf^" _co

$ g * *£

£ £ cO E W

5 e s g

^ o ^p

■o< 1° If
S " &^^

cp ■— St o

C -U CO .0 C

c P ,2 -=13

■J3 £ 2 tsl .a

oo2§

■M

CO o

c >>

w H co

sl'lll

.. >vC« bo.E

S-a'-S.s-S
« g M. § §

'§ -So g

MC M. fa

• Sao o co

-Q

en

E

CD

Co

*L_

E

c

en

CD

3

o

CD

3

o

JD

CO
CO

E

0)

E

X)

c

Z)

co
<

o

<

O

D0D

,0

i

1 /

.', ^

0 !

^

/^Shf

K

<■? j' * \ \ 1

' 'd

<vr?

l^X^5

% V

••<d

V*w

.3

C< =«js

'w

ssociatio
ns (ASE
conomic
ong Soul
tates.

>>T3

.2 E-1

<.2 v £ m

'cO

<P nj O ra to

a> a)

c *-

o o

1967,
Asian
lewor
perati
'ommi

unded in
uth East
es a frarr
itical coo]
ia's non-C

si

o o rg o m

s

fctn S a,<!

Oh

cS

c

~

os -o

0?

J

c

'E

^

'^

p

X

H

M

of

c/f

.-;

Ti

~

ix

G

C

C

Oj

_x

z

ti

X

r-

P

C

s

g

;
E

'S
-

^
>

-5 S

01

3 -2

O O CO

T3 C £
- C VI oi
CC CO cs » S3

■2 S2

o oS H

co E-i

o> -o
he os ,

^:£
13 -a

2£

g be

S o

£ 6

gj 2

o a
be in .
-i CD +J

o

CO

3

3
a)

=
c
o

E
E
c
U

Sh

01

£

E
a>

B £
-v 3 <U 3J

n oi

<2 oj T3

CO -t-*

C co

Kl

a>

'3

C o
0) o
T3 co

Oi oj

c

D

^ a)
co ^-v
<D CO

-o -a
3 c
13 _oj
c co

.3

CO W

ME

. 2 c

r «i

^ C
- cS
cS >>
2 3
CO

S c *

i$, S "O

ffl Q OJ

c

GO ^-* *— «

l&cs
bec_> c

C . C8
03 oj -?

W-§0

CD

J3 3
05 -3 '■£

0-Z -£+.

2 - a> +J

° -fi m c

J 3 S"C

»!*!

£1.1 3

of .2 S~

3 § S3IV2

co

01

J3

0)
CO

01

3 §

S 6

— 0>

O) OS

o aj

2<2

S oj

e-s

o

E-i os

is-".

c <y J3

0) r ™

ST +j v-
.£ &£

O +3

■*■ c

C OS

j= E
•" o

co TD
OS hO

CS _0-

co" 03
OS '

co cd

c c

o> 0J
w &. h

co o ™

S 3 S2
co >> g

.2 >,£
g -C O)

•§ " 8

M^ &
c *± ^
■a JS o>
£3^

01 a.,

00.0
, be ,„ «

T3 !^
C O)
CS ^D

-t-» tr^
o> J

1* 2 o

1 D US

£ £

0)

C 0)

» s

S^c0^

a o> o<

c S "

os -a

c c
c

cS

o •
£ v

O T3

cS 01

5 be

- cS O
2 os 9- os

R c

o> JS 5 — o>

f3 . e s «

o> 01 £ 2

ii "O

oDshU o oi

5^

4) -O

■£ =>

5 02
S of

— >>

be . <p
o g 8

Is

.2

'oi
.. 4>

CTi o
OS c

i%

go

>-
4) ^

«2
"S °

i-l 03
3

01 "5 15
rt «o "S

"b m c

PJ 0; C

^H Oj

o>

W C

^ c ho

M5 3

CD O

05 01 ^

O
If <°

o >=^
ft — ! 73

£
c
o

oi .

nS '

s i « I i

« w § » .£ 73

+-• oi _ ;rs G b

<D — C O nS 5

*-> H -b c <u °

°g 8 §c.<2

•2 2-S 1 tt+J

13 Sfi >i u o 8

« 2 o ° o P

C I.. CU __ £

fi, c >-. o o oi

3 C

o :■

t4-H O

3 <P

O 73

TO O

3 Ol

2 .Si
n 'C

SI c

S 3

o£?

o
ft

EL 3

a)^' ft S $

_e be P t* >

£ c fe o o cu

H .s ft *> <»h s-

c S

s- O

ftLO

•—
01

JZ

3

£

Ih

^C,

D

01

o

£

ft

w

X X

Cu

i- Sh
<<

<

c

EAST ASIA

Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Address before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council in California on
April 2U, 1981. Ambassador Stoessel is
Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

It is my distinct pleasure to be here with
you on the west coast of our nation. I
must confess that the pressures of work
in Washington these past 2 months
make it all the more pleasant to be here
as a result of your kind invitation. And
the important tasks which this Adminis-
tration has begun to address require
your full participation and understand-
ing in order that we have consensus and
support.

The Los Angeles World Affairs
Council justifiably ranks at the top of
the councils around our great country. I
speak with full personal conviction when
I say that your role is essential in con-
tributing to public understanding of the
most pressing and complex international
issues of our day. It is up to you and the
other councils to provide the framework
for interaction between our foreign
policy officials and the informed Ameri-
can citizens without whose support our
policies can neither prevail nor be effec-
tive. Let me express the Department of
State's appreciation for those efforts
along with my personal gratitude for
your kindness in inviting me here today.

I want to share with you some
thoughts about the main foreign policy
priorities of President Reagan and his
Administration. We are planning ahead.
Our reviews of policy priority issues
have been intensive and productive. Ob-
viously, there is much yet to be done,
but clear trends of our policy are

quest that the Senate return to me without
further action the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada on East
Coast Fishery Resources, signed at Washing-
ton, March 29, 1979.

I believe that the course of action out-
lined above is in the best interest of the
United States and will contribute to the close
and cooperative relationship with Canada
that we seek.

Ronald Reagan

already discernible. And we have begun
to apply them.

I would like in particular today to
place special emphasis on our foreign
relations priorities in Asia, where our in-
terests and commitments are long stand-
ing and where this Administration will
place special and continuing emphasis.

Basic Elements

First, let me mention four basic
elements of our overall foreign policy ap-
proach-four anchors for us as we look
at the turbulent world scene.

First, we have recognized that,
beyond simply asserting our role as
leaders of the free world, we must act
as leaders. Responsible American leader-
ship is of the utmost importance in
achieving our aim of a just and stable
world order. We must be strong, bal-
anced, consistent, and reliable in our
policies and our actions, and we must
proceed with prudence and sensitivity
with regard to the interests of our allies
and friends consulting fully with them as
we work together for the more secure
and prosperous world we all desire.

Second, we have seen and acted on
the need to improve our own defenses.
We must strengthen our military posi-
tion in order to compensate for the
tremendous buildup of Soviet military
power which has been going on for the
past two decades. We must keep in mind
the saying that "defense may not be
everything, but without it there is
nothing."

Third, we are concerned in a very
basic way by the worldwide pattern of
Soviet adventurism. We seek a greater
degree of moderation and restraint as
well as commitment to abide by inter-
national law in Soviet behavior, but only
the evident strength of our nation and of
our friends and allies will serve the
quest for stability with the Soviet Union.

Fourth, and of utmost importance,
is the essential task of restoring viabili-
ty, productivity, and balance in our
domestic economy. This has been a pri-
mary objective of President Reagan's
policies and much has been accomplished

in a remarkably short time. We also
recognize the significance and impor-
tance of our actions in the international
economic context, and we believe that
our forthright attack on problems at
home fits our longer international effort
to contribute to building a more pros-
perous, stable, and equitable world
order. Without this effort to set our
economic house in order, none of the
above stated priorities will be possible to
carry out.

In our emphasis on the above
elements of our policy, we will take care
that our policies throughout the world
are conducted with consistency and
clarity. It is also essential that our
efforts be focused within a framework
which permits actions and policies in one
region to be mutually reinforcing in
another region.

U.S. Interests in Asia

Turning now to Asia in particular, our
interests are diverse and long standing.
They encompass security and economic
commitments on the one hand and
friendship and cultural affinity with the
peoples of the region on the other. Our
security arrangements are spelled out in
bilateral treaties with Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines; our trilateral
treaty with Australia and New Zealand
(ANZUS); and the Manila pact, under
which we have a commitment to the
security of Thailand. In a broad sense,
then, we are committed to peace and
stability throughout the region.

In recent years, we have recognized
that our Asian security policy is related
to our larger task of coping with the
strategic challenge posed by our prin-
cipal adversary, the Soviet Union, and
by the aggressive actions of nations
which receive its backing and act as its
proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge
is global in character, and what we do in
Asia will be consistent with our efforts
elsewhere.

On the economic and commercial
front, the indicators point to a solid rela-
tionship. Total U.S. trade with East
Asia equals our trade with all of West-
ern Europe.

Let me discuss the key relationships
we have in the region and the key ques-
tion: What are the Reagan Administra-
tion's policy priorities?

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Apr. 27, 1981. ■

June 1981

33

East Asia

Japan

Our relationship with Japan is not only
the cornerstone of our policy in Asia but
one of the most close and vital relation-
ships in our global alliance structure. As
the relationship has matured, we have
forged a productive partnership to deal
with many of the most serious chal-
lenges of our times.

As part of our security agreement
with Tokyo, we maintain a credible
deterrent force in East Asia. The
Japanese have undertaken an increasing-
ly larger contribution to the costs of
maintaining these forces. Together, we
have worked out guidelines for joint
defense planning and continue to consult
extensively on defense issues.

Our economic ties are no less impor-
tant. Bilateral trade between our two
nations exceeded $51.5 billion in 1980.
Japan is our largest market after
Canada and our best customer for agri-
cultural products, as more acreage in
the United States is devoted to produc-
ing food for Japan than within Japan
itself.

amounts of economic assistance to
developing countries, accepting the
responsibilities of the world's second
largest economic power.

We welcome and encourage a major
Japanese role in world affairs. We will
look to Japan to exercise leadership in
dealing with the complex challenges con-
fronting the international community. In
this regard, we welcome the visit to our
country in early May of Prime Minister
Suzuki as a unique opportunity to take
stock of our mutual interests and to
devise common strategies.

China

Our relations with China are governed
by the terms of the joint communique of
January 1, 1979, establishing diplomatic
relations between our two countries.
These ties, now over 2 years old, are
firmly grounded on both sides in enlight-
ened self-interest and mutual respect.
They represent a return to an historic
pattern of friendship and productive

Our relationship with Japan is not only the cornerstone of our
policy in Asia but one of the most close and vital relationships in our
global alliance structure.

No relationship, no matter how
solid, is without some rough spots. Our
large bilateral trade deficit and the auto
import question are two economic issues
which both countries will need to
resolve. On the trade deficit, I might
note that a positive trend has emerged,
which will contribute to a more balanced
relationship. So far in 1981, our exports
to Japan have risen dramatically -46%
since 1978 -while our imports rose by
only 8% during the same period.

Our two nations are firmly linked as
equal partners in a full spectrum of
regional and global interests. We have
welcomed the emergence of a more ac-
tive Japanese foreign policy and
Japanese initiatives in dealing with
many different issues of global concern.
In addition to its involvement in Asian
and Pacific questions, Japan has demon-
strated its willingness to play an active
and constructive role in the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America. Japan has
made a commitment to provide greater

dialogue between the American and
Chinese people.

We recognize that the 1 billion peo-
ple of China play a very important role
in the maintenance of global peace and
stability. Our many interests intersect
many points along the way. Our policies
toward Soviet expansion and hegemon-
ism run on parallel tracks. In Southwest
Asia, particularly, we stand together in
demanding Soviet withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan and a halt to Soviet south-
ward expansion. We each place em-
phasis on bolstering the security of Paki-
stan and other neighboring states, while
seeking to improve our respective rela-
tions with India.

In our relationship with China, we
will strengthen the institutional frame-
work within which economic, cultural,
scientific, and technological programs
between our two peoples can reach their
fullest potential. We are making great
progress in this regard. As many as 100

Chinese delegations visit the United
States each month. More than 70,000
Americans visited China last year. Our
two-way trade reached $4.9 billion last
year, doubling that in the previous year

Equally important, our two govern-
ments have established a pattern of fre-
quent and extremely useful consultatior
between our highest leaders and diplo-
mats. We will continue the serious dia-
logue on international security matters
which now takes place in an atmosphen
of friendship and candor.

Regarding Taiwan, this Administra-
tion intends to implement faithfully the
Taiwan Relations Act, the law passed b
Congress which sets the parameters for
our nonofficial ties on the basis of a
longstanding and warm friendship with
the people of Taiwan. Our conduct of
this relationship with Taiwan will be
responsible, respectful, realistic, and
consistent with our international obliga-
tions.

Korea

This Administration's approach to our
relations with South Korea offers a solii
demonstration of our intention to be a
reliable friend and ally there, as else-
where in Asia. In this regard, we have
moved quickly to affirm our security
commitment to the Republic of Korea
and to lay to rest any notion that this
Administration will contemplate with-
drawing U.S. forces from South Korea
in the foreseeable future. Our solid sup-
port for South Korea is essential to the
efforts to reduce tensions on the Korea;
Peninsula. President Reagan personally
delivered the U.S. commitment to
Korean President Chun, during the lat-
ter's visit to Washington earlier this
year. President Chun's visit, just as the
upcoming visit of Prime Minister Suzuk
of Japan, points up our emphasis on ke;
security relationships.

South Korea has also become a ma-
jor economic partner of the United
States. It was our ninth largest trading
partner last year and our third largest
market of agricultural products. Our
trade with Korea is remarkably in

34

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

balance, and our growing economic rela-
(ionships strongly undergird our impor-
r (ant security cooperation.

ir, VSEAN

' finally, let me mention our relations
e vith the countries comprising the Asso-
" :iation of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN). The ASEAN group includes
he countries of Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philip-
rt jines. Born out of economic self-interest
, 13 years ago, ASEAN has successfully
d Dranched out into key political areas. It
l las played a major role in dealing with
1 the danger of Vietnamese hegemony in
the region, including Vietnam's aggres-
sion against and occupation of Kam-
puchea. Our ASEAN friends know, as
we know, that it is only through the
Soviet Union's supply of weapons and
assistance that Vietnam is able to sus-
tain these aggressive actions. The
United States firmly supports the U.N.
General Assembly resolution sponsored
by ASEAN which condemns Vietnamese
aggression and calls for withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and
for an international conference under
auspices of the U.N. Secretary General.
Secretary Haig's planned attendance at
the ASEAN conference in Manila this
June will afford us a timely opportunity
to consult with our Asian friends on
common objectives.

Conclusion

I would like to close my remarks by ex-
pressing conviction that in the first 100
days of this Administration we have laid
the solid foundations for regaining the
confidence of our friends and the respect
of our adversaries. This has been
achieved during a series of official visits
to Washington by key leaders, the re-
cent trip to the Middle East by the
Secretary, and the ongoing consultations
with our European allies. We are re-
assuming the responsibilities of leader-
ship. None of us minimizes the problems
and the amount of work involved in at-
taining this objective. But we do not
shrink from the challenges ahead, and I
submit that, in Asia as elsewhere, the
Reagan Administration has made a good
start on the long road that lies ahead. ■

Global Economic Interdependence

by Deane R. Hinton

Address before the Center for Inter-
national Business in Dallas on April 8,
1981. Mr. Hinton is Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affairs.

Probably the most important single
postwar economic phenomenon has been
the growth in global interdependence.
Economic power -once concentrated in
the United States almost to the point of
dominance -is today widely diffused and
widely shared. During the 1970s, the
share of U.S. GNP devoted to interna-
tional trade rose dramatically. Our ex-
ports and imports were about 11% of
GNP in 1970 and over 22% of GNP in
1979. Before World War II they were
less than 5%. Similarly the importance
of trade -especially trade in oil -has
rapidly increased in other OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] countries and in the
developing world.

As we all know, increasing interna-
tional trade enhances economic prosper-
ity through greater specialization and
economies of scale. International com-
petition spurs efficiency and retards in-
flation. Interdependence also makes
cooperation essential. In an interdepend-
ent world the domestic economic policies
of one country can create important
benefits or pose major difficulties for its
trading partners. Moreover, many
economic problems, such as energy, food
security, population pressure, and finan-
cial stability, are truly global in
character. Only in cooperation with
others can they be effectively tackled.

Let me illustrate my theme of in-
terdependence by sketching out some of
the impacts on the world economy of the
substantial increase in oil prices in 1979.
I will then concentrate on the five major
economic challenges which we now
face -stagflation, energy security, finan-
cial stability, structural adjustment, and
population growth. In each of these
problems the fact of interdependence is
key.

Interdependence Illustrated

The more than doubling of OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] oil prices in less than 15
months markedly shifted the real terms
of trade between oil producers and the

rest of the world. In effect, a massive
new excise tax, the incidence of which
depended on patterns of consumption of
imported oil, was levied on the world.

The primary impact on oil importers
was twofold. First, a sharp increase in
energy prices that ran through the
system from crude oil to alternate fuels
to textiles made from feedstocks, etc. In
short, a major additional inflationary
shock was administered to the world
economy. Second, the tax impact was a
significant depressant on growth as real
aggregate demand decreased in import-
ing countries.

The oil shock was even more
devastating to the poorer countries
where the ability to adjust is so much
less. Oil-importing developing countries
suffered growth retardation and direct
inflation. They suffered again when their
imports of industrial and investment
goods from us and other developed
countries increased in price and when
demand for their exports to the richer
countries dropped off as growth slowed
in their principal markets. Developing
nations were left facing higher import
prices with lower export earnings and
little room for adjustment. This was bad
enough, but their problems did not end
there.

As the economic situation worsened
in the developed countries, declining in-
dustries clamored for protection.
Already facing quota restraints
throughout the developed world on
labor-intensive imports such as shoes
and textiles, wealthier, less developed
countries (LDCs) like Brazil, Mexico,
India, and Korea, saw a new wave of
protectionism in Europe and North
America begin to extend to other in-
dustries-steel, electronics, and perhaps
autos as well.

At the same time, the poorer
LDCs -those with fewer possibilities of
earning their way by exporting -
discovered that Western governments
and legislatures -trying to reduce infla-
tion by cutting budget deficits -often
saw foreign aid as a prime target. If
governments did not focus on foreign
aid, legislatures, including the U.S. Con-
gress, certainly did. Thus, at a time
when the developing countries most
need help to increase their agricultural
output and to develop alternative energy
resources and thereby reduce their
burgeoning import bills, the growth of

June 1981

35

Economics

foreign assistance has slowed. Less aid
means reduced opportunities for the
developing countries to earn their way.
In turn our exports -increasingly impor-
tant for our economic health since today
one out of six U.S. jobs is export
related -face slowing demand in what
recently has been our fastest growing
export market, the developing country
market. Moreover, these examples are
only some of the perverse effects flow-
ing from the oil shock on the stability of
the world trade and financial system.
What policy conclusions should we
draw from these developments? As I see
it, the oil shock heightens the criticality
of dealing with five major world-level
economic challenges, each of which
would have existed anyway but general-
ly in less acute form. In each case the
challenge is rooted in interdependence.
In each case I believe the key to rational
responses is closer international coopera-
tion. These five challenges are:

First, to fight the new phenomenon
of stagflation, the industrial countries
need to employ a combination of
demand-restraint and supply-side
measures to improve productivity, bring
down inflation, and restore growth. The
markets for foreign exchange and
traded goods transmit economic effects
from one economy to another. Com-
patibility among national economic
policies -achieved through close coopera-
tion-is thus essential.

Second, the constraints on world
economic growth imposed by rising oil
prices and limited supplies of energy
must be loosened. To do this will require
national and cooperative international
policies to increase energy availability
and reduce energy demand.

Third, increased interdependence
has generated an enormous expansion in
the volume of international financial
transactions. While the private markets
thus far have been able to handle the
bulk of this financing, governments
must work to strengthen the Bretton
Woods institutions which mobilize
resources and help maintain confidence.
Otherwise the so-called recycling prob-
lem could imperil the functioning of an
increasingly fragile world financial
system.

Fourth, difficult structural ad-
justments are necessary because of
changing international patterns of
specialization. Protectionist policies, if
widely adopted, would severely damage
the open trading system that con-
tributed so importantly to historically

unparalleled growth in the 1950s and
1960s. Structural adjustment and
adherence to free-market principles -in
cooperation with partners who also ad-
just and keep their markets open -
should facilitate increased prosperity in
the future.

Fifth, world population is growing
at about 1.7% per annum, but it is grow-
ing unevenly. While the developed coun-
tries have near-zero growth, the devel-
oping regions show rates of 2-3%, and
thus anticipate a doubling of their popu-
lations in the next 25-35 years. It is no
coincidence that El Salvador, the coun-
try with the highest population density
in Latin America, is beset by revolu-
tionary conflict. If potential population
explosions are not contained, we and our
children will live in a world of countless
El Salvadors.

Fighting Stagflation

It has been said that if you examine
disaster reports, economic or otherwise,
there are almost always two factors at
work -bad judgment and bad luck.
Regardless of how the current economic
situation developed, the new Administra-
tion took office facing, as President
Reagan put it, "the worst economic mess
since the Great Depression." Our recent
economic experience has been a dreary
concatenation of sluggish growth, high
unemployment, persistent inflation,
unstable financial markets with widely
fluctuating interest rates, acute distress
in several key industries, and declining
productivity.

The Administration is attempting to
reinvigorate the economy with a far-
reaching program of monetary and fiscal
restraint and policies intended to release
the inherent vigor of the private sector.
The President's program would
stimulate growth by cutting government
spending and using tax cuts to induce
private sector saving and productive in-
vestment. Reducing the role of govern-
ment in capital markets and the burden
of government regulation should further
improve the possibilities for private in-
vestment. While other governments may
apply a different mix of policies, depend-
ing on the structure of their economies
and the tools available, the objectives we
all share are more savings and real in-
vestment, a better balance between
growth and inflation, and a revival of
productivity growth.

As we go forward, we and our part-
ners need to keep in mind both the
positive and negative effects of in-

terdependence. Early in the last decade,
the simultaneous and sustained growth
of the developed economies created
severe supply bottlenecks, leading to
some skyrocketing commodity prices.
After a cooling-off period, in 1977-78
the United States got out in front in
economic expansion thereby providing
growth stimulus and an excellent export
market for our trading partners. Our
trade deficit surged to almost $29 billion
(f.o.b. basis) in 1978. Then as expansion
picked up in Europe, we earned a large
bilateral surplus, which helps to offset
our continuing deficits with Japan.

Currently, a number of our Euro-
pean friends -whose exchange rates are
under some pressure from a relatively
strong dollar -are nervous about the
high level of U.S. interest rates. They
could offset this by hiking their own
rates, but in many cases, with their
economies already suffering from high
unemployment, they are reluctant to
move monetary policy in a depressive
direction.

As we have noted, interdependence
does not just work one way -from the
United States to others. Nor does this
dynamic interplay among economies
mean that countries should follow inden
tical economic strategies. What it does
mean is that our respective economic
policymakers should remain in close con
sultation. The process of continuous ex-
changes of view by telephone across the
Atlantic and Pacific and to Ottawa be-
tween central bank, treasury, and
finance ministry officials; in Paris at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; at the International
Monetary Fund; and at the regularly
scheduled summits of the industrialized
democracies (President Reagan will at-
tend the Ottawa summit in July), helps
coordinate the economic policies of the
major countries and assures that key
policymakers are aware of the likely
consequences of their actions on their
partners.

Energy Security

As I noted earlier, OPEC price policy
can have a devastating effect on world
economic balance. Even worse, our un-
due physical dependence on oil from the
Middle East poses dangers for peace
and Western political freedom of action.
We, the Europeans, and the Japanese
are not invulnerable to political
blackmail. Recently we have seen how
political disruption, revolution, and war
in the Persian Gulf can threaten
Western energy supplies. Clearly inter-

36

Department of State Bulletin

Economics

le lational systems of adjustment and
imergency preparedness need to be
itrengthened and improved. Viewing
hese vulnerabilities. Secretary Haig told
he Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hat the industrial democracies "have
lot yet built an effective program for
iealing with the energy crisis."

For the United States, protection
gainst unforeseen crude oil shortfalls
nust begin with an effective strategic
>etroleum reserve (SPR). We anticipate
;hat the SPR would be used in response
;o a major oil supply interruption and in
;he framework of a coordinated interna-
tional response.

But the SPR is not an all-purpose in-
strument. It is not a price stabilization
mechanism or a buffer stock to be used
to intervene in markets. Distribution
problems caused by small-scale, regional,
or short-lived supply interruptions
should be solved by the market using
private stocks, demand restraint, and
fuel switching.

Building an effective SPR is impor-
tant, but energy security is a global
problem. U.S. demand restraint, stock
drawdown, and fuel switching during a
I crisis will not moderate oil price in-
creases or relieve physical scarcity
unless other consuming nations take
similar action. The West already has in
place the emergency oil allocation
system of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) designed to counter a
catastrophic shortfall -over 7% of com-
bined IEA oil imports.

But what should we do to meet
smaller and more likely crude shortfalls,
say on the order of 2-4% that, as oc-
curred during the Iranian revolution,
also have the potential to lead to sharp
price hikes? One answer may lie in the
collective IEA response to the oil supply
disruption caused by the Iran-Iraq con-
flict. In that case, IEA members agreed
to informal cooperative measures to
draw down stocks, restrain demand, and
share available supplies. We can build on
this and earlier experiences to fashion
contingency measures for less than
catastrophic crude supply interruptions.
Such measures can help to stabilize and
calm oil markets and prevent unjustified
(and long-lasting) crude oil price in-
creases.

IEA members are reviewing stock
management and consultation policies to
see whether improvements can be made.
For example, it might be advantageous
if all IEA nations increased private
stock levels beyond the current required
minimum of 90 days of imports. Yet, the
use of public and private stocks is a

limited weapon against supply disrup-
tions of long duration. Coordinated
efforts to restrain demand are also in-
dispensable. IEA members should ex-
amine the possible use of domestic policy
measures such as disruption fees or
taxes and other market-based restraint
measures which could contribute to a
cooperative effort.

We have, however, too long concen-
trated on demand-side responses to
disruptions. The supply side offers prom-
ising opportunities as well. Surge capaci-
ty for petroleum and natural gas and ex-
panded storage for such fuels as natural
gas would improve energy security.
Long-term efforts to develop new
sources of conventional and nonconven-
tional energy at home and abroad are
essential.

Here the record is good and improv-
ing. U.S. energy production is up; coal
output quite substantially. Price decon-
trol will stimulate marginal oil and gas
development and justify more use of
secondary and tertiary recovery tech-
niques. Accelerated leasing of Federal
lands will also provide scope for signifi-
cant production increases. Investment in
synthetic-fuel technologies is increasing
and some exciting concepts are being ex-
plored. We need to accelerate the
development of nuclear energy by
streamlining licensing procedures, by
creating a climate of political support for
nuclear energy, and by fostering ap-
propriate marginal cost pricing for elec-
tricity. We also need to reduce rapidly
all supply-side constraints -for example,
port and rail congestion -on coal utiliza-
tion.

Even a cursory review of efforts to
enhance conventional energy supplies
cannot ignore the international invest-
ment environment. The sad fact is that
some of the most promising conventional
energy sources are not being developed
as they should be.

Elsewhere, as in our neighbor to the
north, discriminatory investment
policies, which favor domestic over
foreign companies, risk reducing
substantially the optimal development of
energy capacity. We need to remind
others that foreign companies do not
foster economic dependency. Rather,
capital willing to bear the risks of ex-
ploration and development, regardless of
its national origin, must be harnessed
for the well-being of all concerned. Un-
fortunately, in many developing coun-
tries political considerations stressing
local control of resource development
have precluded investment by foreign
companies which have the necessary ex-

pertise and capital. We need to examine
ways to overcome such political barriers,
perhaps by fostering the mutually ad-
vantageous cooperation of oil companies,
national governments, private banks,
and multilateral lending institutions. In
Washington we are examining whether
proposals such as increasing the already
large World Bank energy development
program make sense.

We need also to recognize the im-
pediment to energy resource develop-
ment, especially in developing countries,
which results from incompatibilities be-
tween fiscal regimes here and abroad.
Creative ideas to reconcile differences in
granting tax credits must be developed.

We have a long road ahead. The
risks of another oil shock are real.
Together with industry and our Western
partners, however, we can design an in-
ternational energy policy that is resilient
and effective and build the framework of
energy security that is needed to insure
sustained economic growth at home and
abroad.

Financial Stability

The 1979-80 oil price increase as in
1973-74 presented the world with an
enormous balance-of-payments problem.
But this time the starting situation -
judged in terms of the overall LDC debt
position and developed-country bank
asset-liability ratios -is not nearly so
good. The total OECD current-account
balance swung from a 1978 surplus of $9
billion to a 1980 deficit of about $74
billion. The LDC current account shifted
from a $30.5-billion deficit to a
$62-billion deficit in 1980. OPEC's cur-
rent account switched from a $5 billion
surplus in 1978 to a $120 billion surplus
in 1980. Balance-of-payments adjust-
ments required by this second oil shock
are likely to be slower than in the 1970s,
especially for developing countries
whose growth and development goals
are increasingly jeopardized.

The major industrial countries
should be able to cope without excessive
difficulty. The largest deficits in 1980
were in Germany and Japan, $13 and
$17 billion respectively. These countries
will be able to finance their deficits, but
the side effects could be serious -slower
growth along with intensified export
competition to reduce the deficits. These
circumstances exacerbate protectionist
tendencies everywhere.

The financing problems of the non-
oil developing countries are more
difficult. Their collective current-account
deficit roughly doubled from 1978 to

June 1981

37

Economics

1980, and it is unlikely that the recycling
which occurred after the first oil shock
in 1974 can be repeated as easily.
Restrictive monetary policies and the
resulting higher interest rates in
developed countries have reduced the
growth and increased the cost of inter-
national liquidity on which borrowers de-
pend. Furthermore, private banks are
increasingly wary of the risks inherent
in lending to developing countries. The
result is a decline in the share of
current-account deficits financed by
private long-term flows, more recourse
to short-term borrowing, and slower
reserve accumulation. These methods of
financing cannot be relied upon in the
long run, however, and some developing
countries already confront serious prob-
lems.

LDCs, facing increased competition
for loanable funds from developed coun-
tries, will have to pay higher interest
rate spreads adding to their debt service
burdens -already large in many cases.
As the outlook worsens, private banks
will insist that borrowing nations under-
take difficult adjustment measures in
order to return their current-account
deficits to sustainable levels.

The International Monetary Fund
(IMF), because it requires that a country
develop and implement an economic ad-
justment program as a condition to
granting access to its extensive
resources, has a major role to play in
facilitating adjustment. The IMF has
been adapting its own policies to cope
with the more difficult global financial
situation. In the past, countries have
been reluctant to ask for IMF assistance
until their difficulties were almost
beyond help. The Fund has recently in-
creased the potential size of its loans to
respond to larger financing needs and
lengthened its terms to meeting coun-
tries' political requirements for more
gradual adjustment. Traditional demand
management tools such as reducing
fiscal and current-account deficits and
tightening the money supply are still im-
portant to the IMF, but increasingly the
Fund is turning to longer term supply-
side oriented programs.

To finance Fund programs, IMF
members have doubled their
quotas -adding both to the Fund's
resources and to members' borrowing
rights. The IMF is currently evaluating
the merits of borrowing in the private
markets. The success of this approach,
however, depends on continued coopera-
tion among the developed countries and
others in strong economic or surplus

positions. The IMF provides a
mechanism for this cooperation as
evidenced by the recent Fund negotia-
tion with Saudi Arabia for a quota in-
crease. The negotiations yielded for the
Fund, inter alia, a $5-billion line of
credit from Saudi Arabia in each of the
next 2 years.

The future scope for prudent bank
lending is heavily dependent on world
trade growth and on developing coun-
tries' ability to participate in the expan-
sion. With increased exports developing
countries can earn the foreign exchange
necessary for debt service repayment
and justify further borrowing for invest-
ment purposes. Consequently, access to
developed-country markets is critical for
developing countries. Indeed, if their ex-
port markets remain depressed or if pro-
tectionism spreads, more and more
developing countries will require debt
rescheduling to avoid outright default.

Adjustment and Trade Problems

I have already noted that mounting
structural difficulties in key industrial
sectors have increased pressures for pro-
tectionist measures in most developed
countries. One motive is preservation of
domestic jobs and minimization of the
social costs of adjustment in declining in-
dustries.

But, at least in the United States,
there is strong evidence that changes in
consumer demand, differential produc-
tivity gains and technological
change -not imports -are by far more
important explanations for employment
declines in some industries. Further,
trade protection is an expensive means
of job preservation; the costs involved
can be several times the wages of those
workers whose jobs were actually lost.
And protection is inflationary. President
Reagan has, therefore, correctly resisted
strong political pressure for quota pro-
tection against Japanese autos. We hope
Europe will do so as well.

The case is different when unfair
trade practices are involved. There is,
however, a sharp difference between
protecting firms from unfair competi-
tion-such as we do with our recently
revised trigger price mechanism aimed
at steel producers who were dump-
ing-and restricting imports when there
has been no dumping and imports are
not a significant cause of injury. Accord-
ing to the U.S. International Trade
Commission, restrictions on auto im-
ports from Japan are unjustified for just
these reasons. In order to maintain an
open trading system and the substantial

benefits it offers all countries, we and
others must practice self-restraint, not
only in opposing protectionism but also
in avoiding measures that artificially
subsidize exports. The Administration
will be vigorous in the defense of free-
market principles at home and will de-
mand equal vigilance from our trading
partners.

The long-run solution to problems of
trade and adjustment lies with our own
domestic economic policies. Some of our
industrial problems are being caused by
the pervasive stagflation of the past few
years which has fostered low real invest-
ment and high unit labor costs. To the
extent that these problems are related
to macroeconomic factors, we can all
hope that the recently announced
economic policy shifts will be efficacious
and will provide industry with the
necessary boost.

On the other hand, insofar as struc-
tural problems are the result of perma-
nent shifts in comparative advantage or
the failure to diagnose the market effec-
tively, our efforts should not be aimed at
providing crutches -assistance which
often becomes permanent and, in the
long-run, industrially debilitating.
Rather, we should look ahead to new
products and product lines. Instead of
pouring resources into yesterday's in-
dustries, let us anticipate tomorrow's de-
mand and put American ingenuity to
work.

This may well mean greater expend-
iture on research and development as
well as more aggressive sales strategies.
It may require more cooperative ar-
rangements with workers, forebearance
from equity holders, and supply-side in-
terventions by government. It will also
mean continuing work with our partners
to keep markets open to international
trade. This Administration is committed
to that kind of program. We are acting
on taxes, on depreciation rules, and on
deregulation. These are positive,
forward-looking actions. Much depends,
however, on positive export efforts from
American industry.

Population

A sociologist, on noting a very long line
for a movie, commented "There you see
the need for reducing the population."
"Oh, no," responded his economist com-
panion, "you just need to build a second
cinema." This difference of approach lies
at the center of discussions on popula-
tion growth. Take Mexico, our near
neighbor: the population is now around
68 million. As recently as 1960 it was

38

Department of State Bulletin

Economics

ily half that size. This means that,
erely to maintain their low standard of
ng, for every school, road, hospital,
id house existing in 1960, another
ust have been built.

This is the' burden that the develop-
ig countries bear. Investment in human
apital competes with investment in pro-
ductive capital. While family planning
an assist couples to produce just the
umber of children they desire, it is only
s the economic structure changes that
he preferred family size will decline,
"his requires a long-term effort. But it
an happen. In one developing country
fter another, the completed family size
; falling -in Mexico, among others. But
vhile the rate of growth has slowed it is
till a positive rate and the flow into the
vercrowded cities gives unreal
stimates of, say, a Mexico City of 31
nillion in the year 2000.

The United States has been a leader
n responding to requests for the
leveloping countries for development
>rojects linked to family planning
issistance. To ease off in these efforts
vould merely increase the burden for
he next generations -here and there.

Conclusion

fears ago, there was a saying that when
he United States caught a cold, the
world got pneumonia. Over the years,
,his linkage crossed many borders.
Developing countries still use the
inalogy to describe their relations with
:he developed countries. Yet the truth of
:he matter is that no nation, not even
the United States, is totally immune
from economic illnesses transmitted
imong nations.

As I have pointed out, recent energy
>roblems have served to highlight some
if our structural problems and to ex-
icerbate them. The nature of these
iroblems is such that the United States
an't solve them alone. Still it is within
>ur power to work responsibly with
thers to find cooperative solutions. This
5 America's interest in a complex in-
erdependent world. ■

The Airbus: Challenge to U.S.
Aircraft Industry

by Harry Kopp

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on March 19, 1981. Mr. Kopp is
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Econom-
ic and Business Affairs.1

For the last several years, the U.S. air-
craft industry has been under serious
challenge. In 1976 about 90% of the free
world's commercial jets were U.S.-built.
With the introduction of the airbus,
however, our share began to decline,
and today we can claim only about 70%.
The airbus— the A-300 and A-310— is a
good plane brought to market at the
right time to threaten our lead. It com-
bined payload, range, and economy at-
tractively for shorter and intermediate
hops, finding a niche in the market
where U.S. manufacturers had no exact
competitor aircraft in production to
meet it at that time. The airbus has sold
extremely well in Europe and the Middle
East and has made inroads elsewhere.

The outlook is for increasing com-
petition from airbus and others. Airbus
has planned a new generation of single-
aisle and twin-aisle carriers, the SA-1
and SA-2 for short hauls, the TA-9— an
improvement on the 300 series— and the
TA-11 long-haul plane to compete for
the intercontinental market. Japan
hopes to enter the market with engines
and perhaps airframes.

In the future, competition from such
unlikely sources as Brazil and even Indo-
nesia, for commuter-type aircraft,
should not be discounted. Moreover, the
challenge to U.S. firms is in our own
domestic market as well as abroad. At
the same time, the industry appears to
be becoming increasingly international-
ized, with joint ventures and component
supply networks crisscrossing national
borders. For example, although we re-
gard the European airbus as a com-
petitor, approximately one-third of the
value of each airbus sold is in U.S. com-
ponents, with jet engines the most im-
portant of these.

I will leave details concerning the in-
dustry and its prospects to other Ad-
ministration witnesses. It is against this
background, however, that the impact of
government policy on the industry
should be assessed.

Losses in the Middle East

In no other area in the world were the
successes of the competition so spectacu-
lar and our own sales performance so
dismal as in the Middle East last year.
Jet aircraft sales in the region climbed
to $1,977 million, of which U.S. sup-
pliers won only $259 million, or 13%, as
compared with U.S. sales of over $1.5
billion the year before. Airbus, in con-
trast, selling $1.7 billion, captured 87%
of the Middle Eastern market. Using a
Department of Commerce formula that
$1 billion in exports gained or lost
equals 40,000 jobs, the drop from 1979
to 1980 of $1.3 billion, if not made up in
sales elsewhere, equates to 50,000 jobs
lost for only 1 year.

In an excellent report received just
this month, our regional civil air attache
in Tunis notes that the enormous decline
in U.S. fortunes was not likely due to
technical considerations, a lack of effort
on the part of our manufacturers, nor
even to the quality of the airbus. Rather,
pivotal factors most mentioned by his
contacts were:

• Financing;

• Political considerations, including
foreign policy controls;

• High-level political support for air-
bus; and

• The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.

Financing

Export-Import Bank financing has
played a crucial part in U.S. aircraft
sales in the past 2V2 years, typically ac-
counting for about 40% of the bank's
direct loan portfolio. Nevertheless, the
industry, on average, has received a
lower percent of direct credit cover as a
portion of total export value than other
U.S. capital goods exports— 44% last
year as against 63% for nonaircraft pur-
chases.

Today, Europeans do better by air-
bus, with terms we have not been able
to meet. Airbur offers 85% of export
value, repayable in francs, marks, and
dollars at a composite rate of 7.95%
over 10 years. Normally, Eximbank can-
not come close to this; although, in
several highly competitive cases, it has
offered 75-10-15 coverage, with the sup-

une1981

39

Economics

plier and the purchaser covering the
10% and 15% respectively. In such
deals, Eximbank's interest rate today
typically would be 9.25% at 10-year
term. In other cases when competition is
less direct or not verified, Eximbank
support has been, of necessity, much
lower and, in some cases, has consisted
of guarantees only, with no direct
credits.

It would be in the long-term interest
of all industrialized countries to bring
the export financing price war under
control, and, indeed, in an ideal world,
financing costs would be determined by
market forces alone. In this regard, we
are continuing efforts with other in-
dustrial nations to work out better
ground rules to limit credit competition
but with little success so far. In the
meantime, our aircraft industry is faced
with the very real problem of how to
meet the superior European govern-
ment-backed credit terms.

Foreign Policy Controls

The impact of foreign policy controls has
been particularly strong in the Middle
East. South African sales have also been
affected and, to some extent, sales to
Chile, with the denial until recently of
Eximbank facilities. Our antiboycott
legislation does not appear to have
directly influenced sales so far. Nor have
munition controls had a noticeable
effect.

The requirement for a validated
license under the Export Administration
Act of 1979 affects aircraft exports
primarily in two areas: exports to police
and military entities in South Africa and
exports to the four countries determined
to have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism — Iraq,
Libya, Syria, and the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen. For South
Africa, we have denied applications to
sell about $2 million in aircraft to the
police and military. Sales to civilian end
users have been routinely approved.

Restrictions on aircraft sales to the
four countries designated as repeated
supporters of terrorist acts have
resulted in our failure to approve
licenses for sales of more than $500
million. Additional licenses may not have
been sought because the prospect of ap-
proval was so slender. Whenever the
U.S. Government withholds a license,
the reliability of the United States as a
commercial supplier can come under
question. The Arab Air Carriers
Organization passed a resolution last
year decrying the denial of aircraft to
some of its members. U.S. aircraft
manufacturers have told us that their

customers are now demanding penalty
clauses in sales contracts in case of ex-
port license denial.

Disincentives

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
appears to have been a complicating fac-
tor in sales in the Middle East. There
are complaints that the act has caused
fears and misunderstandings that lead to
confused negotiations. A contact is
reported commenting in regard to a loss
to airbus that "only Americans are naive
and innocent."

There is also concern in the Middle
East about section 911/913 of our tax
code and the difficulty that this causes in
recruitment of U.S. technicians. This
problem, however, does not appear to
figure heavily in the case of aircraft
sales.

Inducements to Industry and Sales

All industrialized countries, including
our own, provide government induce-
ments to aircraft manufacture and sales,
but on balance, our industry clearly
trails. European government induce-
ments typically consist of developmental
grants, low- or no-interest development
loans and guarantees, highly favorable
export financing terms, marketing sub-
sidies, and currency exchange subsidies.
Japan provides a similar but perhaps
less comprehensive range of induce-
ments. We have, of course, provided Ex-
imbank support, and for defense ends, a
number of supports in facilities and
research and development assistance.
An important difference separating our
industry from most others is that most
foreign firms are nationalized or have at
least some equity participation by
governments.

As the subcommittee is aware, a
separate code, the Agreement on Trade
in Civil Aircraft, was negotiated during
the recently completed Tokyo Round of
trade negotiations. This has been signed
by the United States, the European
Community, Austria, Canada, Japan,
Norway, Romania, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland and is in force. Article VI of the
agreement states that signatories
"should seek to avoid adverse effects of
trade in civil aircraft in the sense of Ar-
ticles 8.3 and 8.4 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties,"
i.e., that injury to another signatory's
domestic industry or serious prejudice to
the interest of another signatory should

be avoided. Displacement of another
country's exports in a third country
could fall under the concept of "serious
prejudice." Article 11, however,
recognizes that subsidies are widely use<
as important instruments for the promo-
tion of social and economic policy objec-
tives, and the right of signatories to use
such subsidies is not restricted. What is
left unclear and yet to be sorted out is
where legitimate economic and social ob
jectives end and injury and' prejudice
begin. There is room for wide difference
in interpretation, and substantial burden
of proof will rest on the complainant in
cases brought up under the agreement.
I have restricted myself largely to a
description of the situation our aircraft
industry faces, with reference to the im-
pact of government policy. I have delib-
erately avoided speculating on what
policy is likely to be, or ought to be, in
the future: Given the emergence of
strong competition from the airbus, the
U.S. Government can no longer take for
granted American dominance of the
world market for civil aircraft. A
healthy export sector continues to be a
major foreign policy goal of the United
States and an important element in
maintaining our influence in the world.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

40

Department of State Bulletir

EJROPE

US. Lifts Agricultural Sales
limitation to the U.S.S.R.

RESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
*R. 24, 19811

|m today lifting the U.S. limitation on
Kitional agricultural sales to the
liet Union as I promised to do during
It year's Presidential campaign. My
Iministration has made a full and com-
Ite study of this sales limitation, and I
l.ched my decision after weighing all
lions carefully and conferring fully
In my advisers, including members of
• Cabinet and the National Security
uncil. We have also been consulting
;h our allies on this matter.

As a Presidential candidate, I in-
ated my opposition to the curb on
es, because American farmers had
;n unfairly singled out to bear the

den of this ineffective national policy,
lso pledged that when elected Presi-
lt I would "fully assess our national
urity, foreign policy, and agricultural
eds to determine how best to ter-
nate" the decision made by my
idecessor.

This assessment began as soon as I
entered office and has continued until
now. In the first few weeks of my
Presidency, I decided that an immediate
lifting of the sales limitation could be
misinterpreted by the Soviet Union. I,
therefore, felt that my decision should
be made only when it was clear that the
Soviets and other nations would not
mistakenly think it indicated a weaken-
ing of our position.

I have determined that our position
now cannot be mistaken: The United
States, along with the vast majority of
nations, has condemned and remains op-
posed to the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and other aggressive acts
around the world. We will react strongly
to acts of aggression wherever they take
place. There will never be a weakening
of this resolve.

1 Read to reporters by deputy press
secretary Larry M. SpeaKes (text from Week-
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Apr. 27, 1981). ■

tutch Prime Minister Meets With
Ice President Bush

Prime Minister Andreas A. M. van
jt and Foreign Minister Christoph A.
m Der Klaauw of the Netherlands
ode an official visit to Washington,
,C, March 30- April 1, 1981. Following
~e remarks made by the Prime Minister
id Vice President Bush following a
eeting on March SI.1

ice President Bush

e've just had a delightful visit with
"ime Minister van Agt, and I told him
>w much the President had been look-
g forward to seeing him. And I know
om having visited the President in the
>spital, prior to this visit, that today
>w much our President regrets not be-
g able to receive this very, very dis-
iguished visitor on this beautiful day
ire at the White House.

Our talks, we think, on the Ameri-
.n side, have been extremely useful,
ispite the overlying concerns that
rerybody feels about our President.
at these talks do testify to the continu-

ing importance which the United States
places on our transatlantic ties, in-
cluding those with all of the members of
NATO.

In that connection, the President
asked me to extend, through the Prime
Minister, to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix
our hope that she will come to the
United States in 1982. A visit by Her
Majesty would be a fitting culmination of
our joint celebration during that year of
our bicentennial of U.S. -Dutch relations.

The Prime Minister also comes to us
as Chairman of the European Council. I
have welcomed this opportunity to ex-
change views on issues of concern to the
Community and, of course, bilateral con-
cerns to the United States. And I know
we feel— and I'm sure I speak for Secre-
tary Haig and all who were privileged to
meet with the Prime Minister — that
there is a mutual understanding on
many issues.

There is a mutual understanding of
the situation, for example, in the Middle
East and of our efforts there, efforts in
which they have played a key role. The

Netherlands and the United States are
also allies in NATO, which I mentioned,
and which, of course, remains the
backbone of our mutual security. In our
talks, I reiterated the U.S. determina-
tion, as President Reagan has made
clear, to pursue vigorously the two
tracks of NATO's December 1979 deci-
sion on theater nuclear weapons, both
modernization and arms control.

We discussed Poland and were in
strong agreement that the Polish people
must be allowed to work out a solution
to their own problems. Outside interven-
tion or internal suppression in Poland
would have severely — you'd have severe
negative effects on East- West relations.

We discussed a little bit, to some
degree, the crisis in Afghanistan,
brought about by this illegal invasion
and occupation of the country. We
talked about the regional security of the
Caribbean. We discussed, to some
degree, El Salvador. I explained that
American policy is designed to help that
country defend itself against attacks
from Marxist guerrillas that are sup-
ported and trained by Communist coun-
tries. The Duarte government must be
given the opportunity to institute its
reform programs.

We had a very fruitful meeting. I ex-
pressed my regrets to the Prime
Minister that he did not have the oppor-
tunity to be received and to meet and to
discuss these issues with our President.
But it was a tribute to our friendship
that our President being absent, the
Prime Minister was willing to accord us
every courtesy and come here and to
have these fruitful discussions.

Prime Minister van Agt

Let me first say, again, how much we
were shocked by the events of yester-
day. We wish, again, the President,
wholeheartedly, a speedy and full
recovery.

The meetings we had today have, no
doubt, further contributed to the ex-
cellent relations between the United
States and Europe. Our historic relation-
ship has proved to be essential at the
most crucial moments in our past and
will continue to be so in the future. To-
day we are strongly united in an alliance
aimed at our common single goal — pre-
serving peace and freedom in the world.
At the same time, we are dedicated to
contribute to national and international
efforts to improve the quality of life for
the millions in the world who are in the
most serious need.

ine1981

41

Europe

The European Council, meeting in
the Netherlands last week, further em-
phasized the need for the closest possi-
ble cooperation between the European
Communities and the United States in
solving the extremely serious economic
problems we are facing. The only way to
win the economic fight is through well-
coordinated, joint efforts.

You mentioned the fact that our
countries are preparing for the celebra-
tion next year of the 200th anniversary
of our diplomatic and trade relations.
They are the oldest, unbroken, con-
tinuously peaceful relations between the
United States and any other foreign
power.

The announcement you just made to
extend an invitation to Her Majesty
Queen Beatrix to visit your great coun-
try in 1982 fills us with a great sense of
gratitude. Your gracious invitation will
enable our Queen to continue a tradition
which has become a symbol of our
friendship in all times. We regard your
invitation as a seal on that unalterable
and unique relationship between our
countries across the ocean.

I'm convinced that these celebra-
tions, highlighted by your visit of our
Queen, will serve their high purpose in
contributing to an increased recognition
of our respective shares in efforts to im-
prove the lot of mankind.

May I, repeatedly, thank you for
your willingness to receive us today
under such extraordinary, exceptional
circumstances. I said to you already, we
would not have been surprised in case
you would have cancelled entirely, or at
least partly, the program which had
been prepared for the visit long before.
Now the gratitude is ours. We had very
valuable and instructive talks. We spoke
as allies and friends. And I'm sure these
talks will contribute to our common
efforts.

Again, I ask you, we'll convey our
best wishes, friendship, respect, and
sympathy to your President.

Vice President Bush

May I just share with the people here on
the lawn what I told you. I did visit the
President in the hospital this morning, a
very short visit, but I was very pleased
at the way he looked. He in his typical,
unfailing thoughtfulness asked me to

Turkish Foreign Minister Meets
With Vice President Bush

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
APR. 2, 1981'

Vice President Bush today met with
liter Turkmen, the Foreign Minister of
Turkey, who has come to the United
States at the invitation of Secretary
Haig. The meeting included senior
officials from both Turkey and the U.S.
Government.

The Vice President and the Foreign
Minister reviewed, in a cordial way, a
number of bilateral and international
issues. They discussed in particular the
need for all NATO allies to continue con-
certed efforts to enhance their defense
posture in response to existing threats

in Southwest Asia and Europe. The Vi<
President also noted with satisfaction
Turkish efforts to improve bilateral rek
tions with Greece and Turkish support
for the ongoing intercommunal talks or
Cyprus.

The Vice President took special no
of the excellent state of the Turkish-
American relationship and the signifi-
cance of this year, which marks the
centennial of the birth of Mustafa Kern
Ataturk, the founder of modern Turke'

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981.

Ataturk Centennial Year

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
APR. 2, 19811

Beginning on May 19, Turkey will
launch a year of celebration to com-
memorate the centennial anniversary of
the birth of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the
founder of the Republic of Turkey.
Ataturk was a great national leader in
times of war and peace. He was, and he
remains, first in the hearts of his coun-
trymen. For Turkey and its people, the
Ataturk centennial year is as important
an event as the 1976 bicentennial was
for us.

In observance of this centennial
year, events are being planned in the
United States and other countries to
acknowledge the significance of Ataturk
to the Western World. Indeed, the tur-
bulence of our era calls to mind the en-
during wisdom of Ataturk's goal -"Peace
at Home, Peace Abroad."

The visit of Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Turkmen in this centennial year
gives us cause to take note of the great
value and importance of Turkish-Ameri-
can relations. The United States of

America and the Republic of Turkey
have been firm friends and allies for
more than a generation. Beginning wit
Harry Truman, every American Presi-
dent has viewed a strong and stable
Turkey as an essential goal of Americ;
policy. This is no less the case in the
Reagan Administration. In recent yeai
the United States has been working
vigorously with other nations to provi(
Turkey the resources necessary to
regain economic health and to meet it:
important goals as a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The United States fully sup-
ports the efforts of the Turkish Coven
ment to eradicate terrorism and to cat
out basic reforms that will assume the
long-term stability of Turkish democra
and the well-being of the Turkish peop
In commemorating the Ataturk ce
tennial, the United States and its peop
extend best wishes to the Republic of
Turkey and its people.

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981.

convey his regards here and then also
asked about my wife, and everything
seemed so normal. And I just thought
I'd tell this group what I've told you,
that we feel very relieved in this country
at what appears to be a very speedy

recovery. And I know he would want i
to say, as you leave these grounds, far
well, and God-speed, and come back.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pre:
dential Documents of Apr. 6, 1981. ■

42

Department of State Bullet

MIDDLE EAST

l.S. Policy Toward the Middle East
rid Persian Gulf Region

UPeter D. Constable

Statement before the Subcommittee
the Middle East and Europe of the
use Foreign Affairs Committee on
ril 6, 1981. Mr. Constable is Deputy
distant Secretary for Near Eastern
i South Asian Affairs.1

elcome the opportunity provided by
s hearing today to draw together the
rious aspects of our assistance pro-
im and to provide an integrated pic-
e of our policies toward the Middle
st and Persian Gulf region.

This is an area of global strategic
;nificance, critical to the security of
3 United States and our allies. It is an
3a vulnerable to direct Soviet aggres-
m and to indirect Soviet subversion,
lis vulnerability has increased substan-
,lly over the past 3 years with the col-
)se of the Shah's regime in Iran, the
viet invasion of Afghanistan, and con-
lued instability caused by regional
jputes. The Administration is deter-
ned to carry out a broad strategy to
rest and reverse the negative trends
the region, while strengthening its
curity and stability. It is vitally impor-
nt that the key nations of the area re-
ain independent and feel secure. We
te consulting continuously with them to
id ways to insure we achieve these
>als. A strategy is, therefore, under-
ay, within which our military and
:onomic assistance programs will play
critical part. The unfinished business
' completing the peace process will go
ind-in-hand with our efforts to improve
le security environment in the region,
ur approach takes into account threats
id developments in contiguous areas,
fe will carry out a coherent and con-
stent policy in full awareness of the in-
srrelationships between tensions in
efferent regions and theaters.

Within this context, I will now
sscribe our key national objectives in
le area, the threats we perceive, and
le policies which the Administration
ill pursue to advance these objectives.

.S. Objectives

le have three fundamental objectives in
le region today.

First, we have a compelling interest
in promoting the security of our friends
in that part of the world, including
Israel, Egypt, and the other moderate
governments. In advancing this impor-
tant objective, we have an important ad-
vantage over potential adversaries — we
seek not to dominate the governments
and peoples involved but to work with
them to build a strong environment for
stability and independence.

Second, we have a clear interest in
assuring the security and availability of
resources vital not only to the United
States but to the industrial and develop-
ing world, generally.

Third, both we and our friends in
the region share an interest in protec-
ting vital transportation and communica-
tions routes to assure the passage of
vital resources and commodities and to
deny to any power the capacity to
threaten or intimidate cooperative rela-
tionships within the free world.

It is evident that the objectives we
pursue in this area derive clearly from
vital U.S. national interests. We believe,
however, that these interests are fully
compatible with, indeed complementary
to, the interests and objectives of friend-
ly and independent-minded governments
in the Middle East and South Asia.
These mutual interests are the basis on
which we will build as we work to
strengthen our relationships and ad-
vance our objectives.

Regional Challenges

We do not, of course, operate in a
vacuum. There are threats and chal-
lenges to which our policies respond.

The first and most dramatic is
Soviet expansionism. This takes the
form of direct military intervention, as
the world has seen clearly in the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. It can also take
more indirect forms through the projec-
tion of Soviet influence by support for
radical regimes, as in South Yemen or
Libya, or exploitation of subversive
elements and unresolved conflicts.
Unless this Soviet threat is addressed
squarely and with flexibility by the
United States, its allies, and its friends
in the region, it will seriously endanger
the achievement of our objectives.

Second, and related, are regional
disputes and conflicts which threaten

regional stability and which provide fer-
tile opportunities for external exploita-
tion. Such disputes can not only affect
the security of important states in the
region but directly affect production and
distribution of oil supplies, as we have
seen recently in the Iraq-Iran war. In
the central regional conflict— the Arab-
Israeli dispute — substantial progress has
been made toward a settlement with the
conclusion and implementation of the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. However,
deep divisions and unresolved issues re-
main between Israel and its other Arab
neighbors which will continue to affect
U.S. interests, relationships, and objec-
tives until they can be composed on
broadly accepted terms.

Finally, the forces of political
change, the process of social develop-
ment, and the strains of rapid economic
growth all have potential for destabiliz-
ing societies in this as in other parts of
the world. The fall of the Shah's govern-
ment 2 years ago was a dramatic il-
lustration both of the corrosive effect of
these changes on regimes that lack the
strength, cohesion, and resiliency to
cope and of sudden damage which Iran's
radicalization has caused to our political,
economic, and security interests.

The escalating pressures for change
underline the importance of policies that
recognize and respect the deeply in-
grained values and aspirations of the
peoples of the region, at a time when we
insist on respect for our own. It is a
time in the history of our own relations
with governments in the area to concen-
trate on wide areas of shared interest
and common threats and to display
special sensitivity to our differences.

While I have given some emphasis to
the destabilizing dangers of rapid
modernization, it is important also to
note that many governments and
peoples in the area are coping well with
the focus of change, with the problems
of development, and the dislocations of
modernization.

Shape and Elements of U.S. Policy

An effective policy approach to the chal-
lenges and opportunities of the Middle
East today must be carefully crafted of
a variety of elements and instruments.
The military and economic assistance
programs which. we have presented to
the Congress have been fashioned,
within the limits of current budget
stringencies, to play a key part in our
strategy. They complement and support
the other aspects of a policy that is
forward-looking, not merely reactive; a

une1981

43

Middle East

policy that is open to new opportunities
to build on common interests. We shall
watch closely not only the rhetoric but
actions to judge where new bases for
cooperation are present, either to com-
bat external threats to the region's
security or to assist in resolving
dangerous local disputes.

Secretary Haig is, as you know,
traveling to the Middle East this week
[Secretary Haig made an official visit to
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
April 3-8] to talk with valued friends
about our views and to solicit their
views and concerns. This will make an
important contribution as the Ad-
ministration elaborates its policy ap-
proach to the Middle East.

U.S. Policy

We intend to meet the Soviet challenge
by developing a coherent approach to
the security of the region. A central
feature of this effort is the improvement
of our capability to project military
power worldwide to meet demonstrable
threats. The President's budget request
for a 17% increase in defense spending
in FY 1982 gives substance and credibili-
ty to this aspect of our approach.

We are engaged in planning and
consultation for an upgrading of our mil-
itary presence and access in the vicinity.
We have negotiated with a number of
countries, such as Oman, agreements
that provide us with the use of facilities
under mutually agreed conditions. We
will be meeting our own obligation to

construct and improve facilities even as
we examine carefully what additional
facilities might be required.

We will be concentrating on pro-
viding to our friends in the region
greater security assistance to permit
them to improve their own defensive
capabilities. We seek to build genuine
partnerships with governments which
share our concerns and desire our
assistance. We recognize that the
governments with which we are cooper-
ating are, and should be, the first line of
defense against threats to their security;
we stand prepared, however, to provide
support when required in defense of our
common interests. We have, therefore,
carefully balanced the limited resources
available at this time with our interest in
bolstering meaningful security relation-
ships in the security assistance program
for FY 1982.

We will cooperate and coordinate
closely with our allies on all facets of our
response to the strategic threat to the
region. We have recently held high-level
consultations with a number of our
closest allies, both on the nature of the
threat to the free world's interests in the
Middle East and on appropriate and
effective responses.

Even while building upon our com-
mon interest in strengthening the securi-
ty of the region, we will pursue a
vigorous diplomacy designed to assist in
settlement of destabilizing disputes.
Foremost among these is, of course, the
Arab-Israeli conflict where historic prog-
ress has been achieved in the Egyptian-

Iran Claims Procedures

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 27, 19811

The Department of State has received
the following information from the
Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran concerning possible negotiations of
claims settlements directly with the par-
ties concerned.

With respect to claims exceeding
$250,000 (U.S.), relevant Iranian
organizations are prepared to start
negotiations with the U.S. parties con-
cerned. It is suggested that the negotia-
tions be carried out in London. It is, of
course, necessary that the American
claimants inform, by cable, the precise
but concise list of their true claims along
with evidence (as the foundation of the
negotiations to be carried out on the

basis of goodwill) to Iranian parties
directly involved, as well as to the Inter-
national Legal and Financial Claims
Committee, located at Bank Markazi
Iran, Central Bank of Iran. The time
and the program of the negotiations will
be subsequently notified to the U.S.
claimants by the Iranian parties or the
said committee.

The Department invites U.S.
claimants with claims of $250,000 or
more to provide information concerning
their claims to the appropriate Iranian
authorities insofar as practicable by
telex. The Department has urged Iran to
designate representatives with authority
to negotiate and conclude claims set-
tlements as soon as possible.

Israeli treaty. This achievement has
given to two of our important allies am
friends in the Middle East a greater
degree of security and confidence toda;
than either had enjoyed for the previoi
three decades.

This is a signal achievement which
we Continue to believe provides one coi
nerstone for a just and viable resolutio
of the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflic
We will continue to work with Israel ai
Egypt and our other friends in the are;
to build on the accomplishments of the
Camp David process for resolution of
the remaining aspects of this conflict.
We will also support the efforts of the
United Nations and Islamic conference
to work toward a negotiated settlemen
of the Iraq-Iran war based on principle
of the territorial integrity of both parti
and noninterference in each other's in-
ternal affairs.

We will continue to provide econon
ic assistance where needed and to pro-
mote closer commercial and cultural tk
with governments and peoples of the
region. Roughly 50% of our global
economic assistance is directed to the
Middle East, where Egypt and Israel
are the principal recipients. At the san
time, we have important commercial
relations with many of the states and s
common interest in a strong and stable
international economic system. The
financial significance of the Middle Eas
has increased dramatically over the las
decade. The West remains dependent
upon petroleum supplies from area pro
ducers while they have acquired an im-
portant stake in access to Western tec;
nology and capital markets. This
mutuality of interest underscores the
need and basis for closer economic and
financial cooperation. It also dramatize
our shared interest in the orderly movs
ment of goods, commodities, and capit;
between the West and the Middle East

With increased exchanges and clost
contact comes the clear need for better
knowledge of one another. We must
take opportunity not only to explain ou
society and values but to learn about th
values and concerns of the ancient but
vigorous cultures of the region. Ex-
changes of citizens, particularly of
students from the region in our college!
and universities, have an absolutely
essential role to play. Not only do they
acquire knowledge and skills and an ac-
quaintance with our values, political
processes, and aspirations, but they car
add to our own application of a sensitiv
ty to their hopes and dreams for the
future.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

44

Department of State Bulletir

Middle East

A particularly good example of our
hange program is the international
itary education and training (IMET),
)gram which is a part of our security
istance request. These training pro-
ims are among our soundest invest-
nts for the future. In many parts of
world, for a variety of historical
isons, important political leaders often
lerge from military ranks. A whole
neration of the brightest young
litary leaders from some of the coun-
es in the region is being trained by
nericans and, in most cases, in
nerican institutions. Their association
th individual Americans and an in-
nation to look to the United States
d the West for military doctrine and
entation can pay significant dividends.

Iiecific Assistance Programs

I early, our programs of security and
lonomic assistance constitute one ma-
- instrumentality of our policies in the
tddle East. Over the past few weeks,
i have set forth in some detail to the
■propriate committees of the Congress
e specific programs we are proposing
r FY 1982.

For Israel, we are proposing a corn-
nation of programs totaling $2,185
illion, of which $1.4 billion will be for
reign military sales (FMS) financing
id $785 million for economic support
nding (ESF). This total is the same as
at authorized by the Congress for FY
)81 and, therefore, reflects the high im-
>rtance we attach to Israel's military
■curity and its economic strength in a
;riod of budgetary stringency in the
nited States. Firm and consistent sup-
)rt for Israel has been and will remain
central element of American foreign
)licy. A strong, secure, and democratic
rael contributes to the realization of
ir overall strategic goals in the region
id adds to the overall deterrent capaci-
' of the free nations of the world.

For Egypt, we are proposing $900
illion in FMS financing, of which $400
illion will be in concessionary direct
•edits, as well as $750 million in ESF.
we include the sum of up to $313
illion in PL 480 commodities, our
derail assistance to Egypt will be well
rer $1.9 billion, the second largest
lateral assistance program in the
orld, exceeded only by that for Israel.

Our relationship with Egypt has
>come broad and deep, with important
ilitary security and strategic com-
ments. Our assistance programs will
3lp Egypt to maintain its national

1 1th Report on Sinai Support Mission

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
APR. 15, 1981'

I am pleased to transmit herewith the
Eleventh Report of the United States Sinai
Support Mission. It covers the Mission's ac-
tivities during the six-month period ending
April 1, 1981. This report is provided in ac-
cordance with Section 4 of Public Law
94-110 of October 13, 1975.

The Sinai Support Mission was estab-
lished in January 1976 to implement the
United States Proposal in the September
1975 Second Sinai Disengagement Agree-
ment to install and operate a tactical early
warning system in the Sinai Peninsula. The
United States continued to operate the early
warning system until January 25, 1980,
under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty.

Because it was not possible to gain
United States Security Council agreement to
assume responsibility for supervising the
security arrangements called for by the
Peace Treaty, the United States agreed dur-
ing September 1979 talks with Egypt and
Israel to monitor adherence to the Treaty's
military limitations. Verification inspections,
conducted by the Sinai Field Mission, began
in April 1980 and will continue until April 25,
1982, the scheduled date for total Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai.

My Administration has initiated bilateral
discussions with both Parties on the security

arrangements to be implemented in the Sinai
following Israel's final withdrawal. The
United States intends to carry out its com-
mitment to ensure the establishment and
maintenance of an acceptable alternative
multinational force if it proves impossible for
the United Nations to support the security
arrangements under the Treaty. We share
the desire of both Parties to move forward
expeditiously on this question. We will keep
the Congress fully informed and will consult
as our discussions of this matter progress.

Funding of the Sinai Support Mission for
Fiscal Year 1981 is authorized under Chapter
6, Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act,
"Peacekeeping Operations," at $16 million.
For Fiscal Year 1982, only $10 million is be-
ing requested, a level that will fund both the
Mission's operations during its final months
and the projected costs of its phaseout after
April 25, 1982.

Our nation has contributed substantially
to the promotion of peace in this critical part
of the Middle East, and the Congress can be
proud of the accomplishments of the Sinai
Support and Field Missions. I am counting on
your continued support for this aspect of our
efforts to achieve a lasting peace in the Mid-
dle East.

Ronald Reagan

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 20, 1981.1

security and to enhance its capacity to
deter regional threats and challenges,
while accelerating efforts to free up the
economy, to achieve self-sustaining
growth, and to improve the quality of
life for Egypt's poorer people.

While smaller, our programs
elsewhere in the region fit into our
broad strategic approach and comple-
ment the peace process.

In Jordan, we are proposing $50
million in FMS credits and $20 million in
ESF. These programs are smaller than
had been the case for much of the
decade of the 1970s, and take into ac-
count Jordan's improving economy and
the flow of assistance from other na-
tions. Our programs, however, recognize
Jordan's importance not only to the
peace process but to the broader securi-
ty environment to the region. Jordan
has carried on a constructive policy — of
direct assistance to greater American in-
terests— in providing training, guidance,
and seconded military security personnel
to key countries in the gulf region. Now,

it must deal with high tensions caused
by a tense relationship with its northern
neighbor, Syria.

We are proposing $15 million in
FMS credits and $5 million in ESF for
Lebanon. These programs represent a
continuation of those we began several
years ago aimed at strengthening
Lebanon's capacity to bring security and
stability to its people, who are beset by
terrible problems from within and with-
out. Lebanon is in need of these pro-
grams not so much because of their
monetary value, but rather, because
they reflect our moral and political sup-
port. We are determined to help pre-
serve and strengthen Lebanon's inde-
pendence, its viability, and its national
unity.

For Oman, we are proposing $40
million in FMS and $15 million in ESF.
Located in a key strategic position,
Oman commands the Straits of Hormuz,
through which the bulk of the world's oil
supply passes. Oman, thus, plays an im-
portant role in the region's security. Its
sense of responsibility has been apparent

une1981

45

Middle East

in its agreement with us on facilities ac-
cess rights. Our FMS credits will help
give Omani military forces additional
flexibility and defensive strength.
Economic assistance will be carried out
through the mechanism of a joint com-
mission that will identify areas of
cooperation in economic development.

Our other program in the gulf is a
relatively small economic development
and military assistance program in the
Yemen Arab Republic. For FY 1982 we
have proposed $21.1 million in develop-
ment assistance and $15 million in FMS,
of which $10 million would be in conces-
sionary direct credits. Like Oman,
Yemen occupies a geographically
strategic position, bordering Saudi
Arabia and South Yemen which, as a
Soviet client state, has chronically
threatened the integrity and stability of
North Yemen. We are contributing to
the country's ability to cope with
military threats and subversion, while
also improving the conditions of life in
one of the most underdeveloped areas of
the world.

We are requesting $6 million for
programs in the West Bank and Gaza,
which are administered by U.S. private
voluntary organizations, as well as $4
million for activities to promote regional
cooperation involving Israel and other
states. These programs, while modest in
size, can make significant contributions
to the overall peace process.

These are the essential elements of
the strategy we will be pursuing to
serve important U.S. interests in the
Middle East. They provide the context
in which our programs of security and
economic assistance should be viewed.

Arms Sales to Morocco;
Western Saharan Conflict

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

by Morris Draper

Statement before Subcommittees on
African and International Security Af-
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on March 25, 1981. Mr. Draper is
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 1

I am pleased to appear before you to
review recent and impending arms sales
to Morocco, among other issues. I would
like to put these sales issues into the
context of our overall policy approach to
North Africa, with particular reference
to the states of Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Mauritania, as well as the
conflict in the Western Sahara region.
In the most general sense, we have
welcomed the emergence — or in some
cases, the reemergence — of these coun-
tries on the world stage, after having
struggled for their independence in the
relatively recent past. They are proud of
their accomplishments since then. They
have earned our respect.

The United States wants good,
friendly relations with all these North
African states on the basis of mutual
respect and, whenever possible, shared
interests and concerns. However, rela-
tions with another North African coun-
try— Libya— cannot improve as long as
Libya follows policies in support of inter-
national terrorism and interferes in the
internal affairs of independent states.

Morocco

Morocco is important to broad U.S. in-
terests and occupies a pivotal strategic
area. We intend to maintain and rein-
force our historically close relationship
with reliability and consistency as our
watchwords. Morocco has shared and
has agreed with many of our foreign
policy priorities and objectives. Like the
United States, Morocco has been con-
cerned over the challenges posed by the
Soviets and their surrogates and client
states. Morocco strongly opposed and
criticized the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan; it voted for U.N. condem-
nation of the Soviet actions and spon-
sored similarly condemnatory resolutions
at the Islamic summit conference.
Morocco has been a responsible neighbor
to many states in Africa. It sent troops
to Zaire on two occasions to help that
country deal with subversion generated

by outsiders. Until 1963 Morocco was
the home for American strategic bases.
An American naval facility operated in
Morocco up to 1978 when it was finally
closed, at our initiative. Morocco has
consistently welcomed visits by
American naval warships, including
those which are nuclear powered.

While Morocco has been part of the
Arab consensus critical of the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty and the Camp David
accords, on the whole, it has been a
voice of reason and pragmatism in the
world's councils, advising pragmatic
policies as regards the Middle East and
decrying sterile negativism.

For these reasons, and others, we
intend to carry on a relationship that
assures Morocco that it will be able to
count on us as a steadfast and reliable
friend.

Algeria

Algeria is an important country. We
carry on a great deal of trade and obtaii
much of our energy requirements there.
Algeria has great influence in interna-
tional forums. It wields influence far
beyond what its wealth, its population,
and its political power ordinarily would
warrant because it is consistently well-
prepared to make its mark on key
North-South issues. It makes effective
use of its revolutionary credentials, and
it steers a course which avoids becoming
beholden to any single state.

It is important that we nurture an
improved relationship with the increas-
ingly pragmatic Algerian leadership.
Their policies are in an interesting and
evolving stage. Algeria also has under-
taken important international respon-
sibilities, as witness its professional and
balanced efforts to bring about the
release of the American hostages from
Iran. Algerian officials, in this instance,
displayed dedication, discretion, and
resourcefulness. It is interesting that
Algeria has sought no explicit reward or
expression of gratitude from us for its
important efforts. It would be short-
sighted of the United States not to try
to expand the improving and mutually
beneficial relations which have been
developing between our two countries in
the recent past.

46

Department of State Bulletin

Middle cabi

inisia

ke Morocco, the friendly country of
inisia has had a close relationship with
e United States since gaining its in-
cidence. We have admired the deter-
ination of Tunisian leaders to ac-
ilerate the country's economic and
,cial development. Tunisia, in many
aspects, has been a model for construc-
ve progress. The United States is
-termined to assist Tunisia in resisting
?orts from the outside to undermine its
[dependence and integrity. Our two
entries should grow closer.

Organization of African Unity (OAU) to
bring about a settlement based on a
cease-fire and further expression of the
wishes of the inhabitants of this region.

• In principle, the United States
supports an exercise to determine the
wishes of the inhabitants of the Western
Sahara. There are, however, many in-
stances in history when exercises in self-
determination have led to results other
than the establishment of fully independ-
ent states. The history of Puerto Rico is
instructive in this regard.

U.S. Attitude Toward Moroccan Arms
Requests

The United States, as in the past, will
look at all arms requests from its friend,
Morocco, on a case-by-case basis. In our
decisions, we will take into account all
relevant factors, including conditions in
the area, the arms balance in the region,
the legitimate defensive needs of Moroc-
co, Morocco's capacities to pay for and
absorb such equipment, and the state of
our dialogue on key issues. There will be
nothing unusual about this approach. It
will be the same for other friends.

It is, however, the prevailing view of
this Administration that America's allies
and close associates should expect
understanding and reliable support. It
would not be in the spirit of this Ad-
ministration's policy if support for
America's traditional and historic
friends— to meet reasonable and
legitimate needs— were withheld or
made conditional, other than under ex-

[auritania

lauritania is a poor and undeveloped
ountry striving to work out its national
estiny in a bicultural society,
lauritania has struggled throughout its
xistence as an independent state to lm-
,rove the lot of its citizens. A few days
go, an effort was made to overthrow
he government. As we made clear in
he aftermath of that unsuccessful coup
ittempt, we strongly support
Mauritania's independence and ter-
ritorial integrity.

rhe Western Saharan Conflict

rhe single most serious issue which com-
Dlicates the interrelationships of these
cey North African states is the struggle
jver the future of the Western Saharan
-egion. Our friends there remain deeply
divided. Let me make clear American
policy attitudes toward that important

First, we hope that an early, j - « _ k. S _

peaceful, negotiated end to the conflict Qa|- ftf AW ACS tO SaUCII ArSDia

can be achieved. The struggle is a drain 9
on human and economic resources. It
could be the tinderbox for wider conflict
in the region. It is a potential cause of
greater instability and higher tensions in
North Africa. As long as the struggle
continues and remains unresolved, it will
interfere with the proper development of
cordial relations between Algeria and
Morocco.

traordinary circumstances— our military
assistance is, of course, subject to cer-
tain basic conditions laid down in legisla-
tion.

We will continue to encourage
Morocco to find and to explore ways
toward a peaceful, negotiated settlement
of the Western Saharan conflict. We will
not however, make decisions on military
equipment sales explicitly conditional on
unilateral Moroccan attempts to show
progress toward a peaceful negotiated
settlement. This position recognizes the
reality that there are players other than
Morocco in the Western Saharan conflict
with a capacity to influence the outcome.
To the degree that Morocco has con-
fidence in American policies, to that
same degree will our counsel be valued
not only on approaches to the Western
Sahara issue but on other regional and
global issues as well. This position is
consistent with our behavior toward
other traditional and historic friends of
the United States.

M-60 Tank Request. Over 7
months ago, Morocco asked to buy 108
M-60 main battle tanks. Secretary Haig
approved this sale and authorized infor-
mal and formal notifications to the Con-
gress. This sale is a reasonabale
response to Morocco's legitimate defen-
sive needs. It fits in logically with
Morocco's multiyear modernization pro-
gram antedating the fighting in the
Western Sahara. The M-60s will not be
ready for delivery to Morocco for 3
years, by which time we hope the

• The United States is neutral as
regards the final status of the Western
Saharan territory.

• A military solution to this conflict
is neither possible nor desirable. No side
can win a clearcut victory in military
terms.

• Whatever the immediate future,
the United States will support all serious
efforts aimed at a genuine negotiating
process that can lead to an early
peaceful settlement of the conflict. We,
therefore, support the efforts of the

June 1981

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 23, 19811

Sale of AW ACS [airborne warning and
control systems] to Saudi Arabia would
not constitute a realistic threat to Israel.
The reasons for this are:

• AW ACS would be used primarily
to protect Saudi oil fields;

• AW ACS essentially is a flying
radar platform which can detect and
follow movement of airborne aircraft; it
cannot detect militarily significant
ground activity, and it will have no radio
monitoring, photoreconaissance, or in-
telligence gathering capabilities;

• It could not be used with the com-
bat aircraft of other countries without
extensive joint training and

U.S.-supplied computer and communica-
tions equipment;

• Saudi AW ACS operations will de-
pend on U.S. spare parts, maintenance,
and support of operations; and

• An AW ACS aircraft flying close
enough to Israel to monitor its aircraft
would be vulnerable to being shot down
by Israeli fighter aircraft.

Obviously, prudent Israeli planners
would have to take a Saudi AW ACS into
account in their calculations. But the
overwhelming impact of the sale will be
to enhance Saudi" defensive capabili-
ties—not to threaten Israel.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

47

Middle East

Western Saharan issue will have ap-
proached a solution.

The tanks are not suitable for the
rugged desert terrain where much of the
fighting in the Western Sahara and
southern Morocco is taking place, nor
would it be cost effective or tactically
sound to employ a relatively slow-
moving, highly expensive, heavily
armed, tracked vehicle against the light
and rapid landrover units used by the
Polisario.

OV-10 and F-5 Aircraft. Shortly
after taking office, Secretary Haig also
reviewed and approved the scheduled
delivery of six OV-10 reconnaissance
aircraft and 20 F-5E/F fighter aircraft,
the elements of a 1979 Moroccan arms
request which was the subject of exten-
sive congressional hearings over a year
ago. It was in the context of those hear-
ings, and that arms package, that the
previous Administration agreed there
should be a relationship between U.S.
willingness to supply arms to Morocco
for defense against Polisario attacks in
Morocco proper and the Western Sahara
on the one hand, and Moroccan forth-
comingness in the search for a com-
promise political settlement of the
Saharan dispute of the other. Before
leaving office, the last Administration
had decided that Morocco had shown
goodwill and had demonstrated a deter-
mination to achieve progress.

The first four OV-lOs have arrived
in Morocco; the remaining two arrive in
April. These are the first arms to be
delivered so far under that much
publicized 1979 arms request. Fourteen
F-5 fighter aircraft will be delivered this
year, beginning in the summer, and the
remaining six in 1982. Morocco cancelled
its request for 24 helicopters which
formed part of its original 1979 request.

Progress in Negotiations

We reviewed progress in Saharan
negotiations during our testimony before
the House Subcommittee on Africa last
December. We noted at that time that,
in return for a postponement of OAU
consideration of the Polisario's applica-
tion for admission during the chiefs of
state summit early last summer, Moroc-
co had agreed to cooperate with the ef-
forts of the OAU Wisemen's mediation
committee. Morocco, the Polisario, and
Algeria sent delegations to a meeting of
the five-nation mediation committee in
Freetown last September.

The OAU committee heard state-
ments by the various parties and, short-
ly thereafter, recommended that a UN-

supervised cease-fire be put in place by
December 15, 1980, to be followed by an
internationally supervised referendum to
determine the future status of the
Western Sahara. Despite domestic
political opposition, Morocco accepted
the cease-fire but showed initial
resistance to a referendum.

During the proceedings of the U.N.
Fourth Committee in October, Morocco
introduced a resolution recommending a
U.N. deferral of the issue inasmuch as
the OAU mediation effort was in prog-
ress. After consultation with us, Moroc-
co affirmed before the Fourth Commit-
tee its willingness to cooperate diligently
with OAU mediation efforts, including
the OAU mandate as it related to a free
choice for the inhabitants of the
Western Sahara.

Unfortunately, the cease-fire has not
been achieved. The Polisario has not
publicly agreed to the cease-fire and has
continued its attacks. Recently, a
Polisario spokesman said that "the time
for a referendum is past." We do not
know whether that position is in con-
crete. The Polisario organization
cotinues to insist that negotiations must
take place only between the Poli-
sario— as the legitimate representative
of the Saharan population— and Moroc-
co.

Steps Toward a Settlement

Standing in the way of a negotiated set-
tlement is the absence of any specific
ongoing process to give reality to the
OAU recommendations for a cease-fire
and a referendum. Possible next steps
toward launching such a process might
include:

• The establishment of an active
working-level committee to grapple with
the complexities of implementing a
cease-fire and referendum;

• Specific suggestions for estab-
lishing voter eligibility in a referendum
on the future status of the Western
Sahara; and

• OAU coordination and consulta-
tion with the United Nations on im-
plementing its call for a U.N. supervised
cease-fire.

The time for execution of the OAU
recommendations is overdue, especially
since the question of the Polisario's ad-
mission into the OAU will probably arise
at the OAU summit in Nairobi next July.
Admission could complicate OAU efforts
to encourage a settlement, for it would

confer at least qualified legitimacy on
the Polisario as the spokesman of the
people of the Western Sahara. Morocco
would object and would probably con-
sider withdrawal from the OAU. This
would be a serious development. Aside
from this possibility, divisive OAU
debates over the Saharan issue could
also detract seriously from OAU efforts
to seek the withdrawal of Libyan forces
from Chad.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

48

Department of State Bulletin

FEFUGEES

T

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief
Southeast Asia and Pakistan

:

W. R. Smyser

Statement before the Subcommittee
i Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
ouse Foreign Affairs Committee on
arch 26, 1981. Mr. Smyser is Acting
irector of the Bureau for Refugee Pro-
•aras.1

am pleased to have this opportunity to
scuss U.S. policies and contributions to
ifugee relief in Southeast Asia and
akistan. Since many of you have
jcently visited refugee camps in Asia, I
o not need to remind you that some of
le world's most massive and persistent
ifugee situations are in this part of the
rorld. Nor do I need to describe the suf-
Bring, insecurity, and deprivation many
lefugees experience as they await a
jlhance for repatriation, resettlement in
Jheir country of first asylum, or possibly
resettlement in another country. In-
Itead, I would like to focus on the scope
tf our program, particularly through
| ontributions to international organiza-
ions and our projected needs for the
i oming fiscal year.

teview of U.S. Participation

3efore turning to the ever-increasing
jroblem of Afghan refugees in Pakistan,
'. would like to review our participation
n international relief and resettlement
Drograms for Indochinese refugees and
the people of Kampuchea. Fortunately,
these international efforts have helped
meet emergency needs and avert the
full-scale tragedies that we feared might
Dccur when we appeared before you last
(rear. But conditions both inside Kam-
puchea and in the first-asylum countries
in Southeast Asia are still extremely
precarious. While we and the rest of the
international community may be able to
reduce our support somewhat in the
:oming year, we must be as vigilant as
2ver to potential changes in the refugee
flows and impact in the region.

In Southeast Asia, the refugee situa-
;ion is still a staggering problem in
luman terms, a serious threat to the
Deace and stability of Southeast Asia,
ind a particular burden to Thailand.
Some 1.2 million Indochinese refugees
lave fled their homeland since 1975. Of
the 1 million refugees resettled outside
Southeast Asia, 465,000 have been

resettled in the United States. Almost
200,000 Indochinese refugees are cur-
rently in UNHCR [U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees] camps in Southeast
Asia awaiting resettlement. About
122,000 Khmer refugees are in UNHCR
holding centers, many of whom we
believe will enter the third-country
resettlement stream.

Despite the progress since the
height of the crises in 1979, the problem
persists. During calendar year 1980,
140,000 Lao, Hmong, and Vietnamese
refugees fled the Indochinese states
seeking new homelands; another 20,000
Khmer from the holding centers entered
this resettlement stream. We expect
that refugees will continue to arrive in
first-asylum countries at about the same
rate as 1980.

Five years after the fall of Saigon,
Vietnam remains committed to a policy
of repression at home and aggression
beyond its borders in Kampuchea. Un-
fortunately, there is little hope of an
early resolution of the refugee problems
created by that regime and its clients in
Laos and Kampuchea.

Within this context, U.S. policy
toward the refugee situation from In-
dochina has four objectives:

• To seek a humanitarian resolution
of the problem;

• To involve the world community
in resolving this international problem;

• To reduce tension in the region
and reinforce the stability of the
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] countries; and

• To afford refuge in the United
States to those persons with a claim on
our consideration.

In seeking to achieve the objectives
of our refugee policy, the U.S. Govern-
ment works with:

• The ASEAN states and Hong
Kong to insure maintenance of the prin-
ciple of first asylum for refugees;

• The international community to
absorb large numbers of refugees for
resettlement and to finance refugees'
care and maintenance in first-asylum
countries; and

• The UNHCR as the principal in-
ternational organization responsible for
the protection and the care of refugees.

The Indochinese refugee problem
originates in the policies of the Com-
munist governments of Vietnam, Laos,
and Kampuchea and the resulting condi-
tions in those countries. Whole classes of
people have been politically persecuted
and disadvantaged. Unprecedented state
control of their societies has severely
constricted individual freedom of activi-
ty. The reordering of the economies of
these societies and the extension of Viet-
nam's military forces into Kampuchea
have strained their economic resources
and activities and depressed living
standards. All these factors have con-
tributed to the refugee flows we con-
tinue to witness.

The United States continues to ex-
plore all means by which this interna-
tional problem can be resolved. Of the
three traditional means to resolve
refugee problems, only resettlement of
the Indochinese in third countries has,
so far, been effective. Political con-
siderations, pressing domestic economic
and social concerns, and national and
racial antipathies virtually rule out local
resettlement in other Southeast Asian
countries. Indeed, governments of these
countries have forcibly rejected refugees
until assured of their eventual resettle-
ment elsewhere. As for voluntary
repatriation, the application of
repressive doctrinaire Communist
policies within Vietnam, Laos, and Kam-
puchea makes it impossible for the
former upper- and middle-classes to
return to their homelands. Indeed, for
any group, the act of departure,
regardless of motivation, is grounds for
persecution, and those caught seeking to
escape are severely punished.

While essentially unable to moderate
the repressive policies of these regimes,
some limited success has been achieved
in indirectly influencing these refugee-
creating governments to adjust their
policies in the direction of moderating
refugee flows. Vietnam bowed to world
criticism at the Geneva conference in
July 1979 and terminated its expulsion
of its Chinese minority. Subsequently,
the United States, through the good of-
fices of the UNHCR, negotiated an
orderly departure program with the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam under
which persons in Vietnam are allowed to
depart for the United States directly.

June 1981

49

Refugees

A total of 1,357 persons left Viet-
nam under the program in December
and January, and we expect that
another 1,800 Vietnamese will leave in
the next few months. Vietnamese
authorities have responded affirmatively
to our suggestion to expand the agreed-
upon list of people eligible to leave
under the program, and we are now
moderately optimistic about the future
of the orderly departure program. We,
also, hope that this program will be a
safe and effective alternative to risky
clandestine departures.

In addition, international relief ef-
forts have had a major impact on condi-
tions inside Kampuchea and have en-
couraged as many as 300,000 Khmer to
return to their homes from their tran-
sient status in Thailand, Vietnam, and
Laos.

Current U.S. Policy

For the present, U.S. policy toward the
Indochinese refugees is primarily focus-
ed on resettlement in this country and
other industrial countries. We are par-
ticularly concerned that other countries
involved in this international effort
maintain their degree of involvement as
exhibited at the Geneva conference. In
this respect, we associated ourselves on
two occasions last year, most recently in
December, with UNHCR's appeal to
resettlement countries to continue their
commitments. We will pursue this mat-
ter again this year. Resettlement oppor-
tunities in developing countries are also
being actively pursued.

The Khmer in UNHCR holding
centers present a special and delicate
problem. Since their status and interest
in repatriation were uncertain, we held
back from seeking their resettlement,
pending clarification of that situation by
the UNHCR. Recently, the UNHCR has
suggested that more resettlement oppor-
tunities be provided to the Khmer. In
response to this request, we estimate
that we will be able to accept, under our
program, 25,000 to 30,000 Khmer over
the next few months.

UNHCR attempts to foster volun-
tary repatriation have not been suc-
cessful so far, with the exception of a
very modest program of return to Laos.
The Department continues to support
UNHCR's ongoing efforts to encourage
Lao in refugee camps and Khmer in the
holding centers to return voluntarily to
their homelands. And we have supported
UNHCR's assistance to Khmer who have
already returned to their villages as a
means to attract others from Thailand.

One of our primary concerns over the
years has been to insure that repatria-
tion be truly voluntary. We continue to
be alert to the possibility of forced
repatriation and, at this time, believe
that these voluntary repatriation pro-
grams are soundly based, though with
modest prospects.

We must be realistic about the
numbers of Indochinese refugees who
will remain in first-asylum camps in the
coming year. Given projected arrivals
and offtake by third countries, we
believe that the United States should
plan on the resettlement of up to
144,000 Indochinese refugees in FY
1982, as compared with the authorized
level of 168,000 for FY 1981. As you
know, however, actual admissions levels
are determined by the President follow-
ing the congressional consultations in
September, in accordance with the
Refugee Act of 1980. We will continue
to monitor the situation in Southeast
Asia, third-country resettlement rates,
and the availability of resources to in-
sure that our resettlement program is
appropriate to the situation.

For FY 1982, the Department of
State is seeking $29 million for the
UNHCR programs meeting the needs of
Indochinese refugees located in the
ASEAN nations or Hong Kong. This
contribution will enable us to continue
our practice of meeting 30% of the cost
of the UNHCR's program for the care
and maintenance of these refugees.

In Kampuchea, we hope that con-
tinued improvements will approach to
minimum food self-sufficiency by CY
1982. However, the outlook for
agricultural production inside Kam-
puchea remains uncertain. The interna-
tional community may have to revise its
present requirements. We remain com-
mitted to assuring the Khmer people the
humanitarian relief they need in order
that they may cease to need interna-
tional relief as quickly as possible. But
mindful of concerns about development
assistance inside Vietnamese-occupied
Kampuchea, we and other donors have
pressed for the termination of activities
by the U.N. Joint Mission for Cambo-
dian Relief as soon as the Khmer are
able to feed themselves or if shortfalls in
food self-sufficiency continue, as soon as
they are manageable.

For Khmer relief in FY 1982 the
Department is seeking $20 million as the
cash component of our contribution.
These funds will be provided to interna-
tional organizations or private voluntary
organizations involved in this essential
operation. If, as we hope, Kampuchea is

approaching self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction by early 1982, we expect to be '
able to reduce our nonfood contribution;
from the $30 million programed for FY
1981 to a level of $20 million in FY
1982. Such an amount will allow us to
maintain our policy of meeting about
one-third of the total contributions
made. In addition to these sums, $10
million was provided in FY 1981 for the
care and maintenance of Khmer in
holding centers in Thailand, and a
similar amount is budgeted for FY 1982
Finally, although it is not a refugee
relief activity, the Department is also
seeking $10 million to finance English-
language training and cultural orienta-
tion in Southeast Asia for refugees
selected for resettlement in the United
States. The intent of this program is to>
ease the initial strain of the resettlemer
process on refugee sponsors and the
American communities in which they
settle and to speed the process by whicl
the refugees reach self-sufficiency. In
the current year, this program operates
under the auspices of the UNHCR but i
financed for refugees bound for the
United States by this program.

Afghan Refugees

While refugee emergencies have for-
tunately abated somewhat in Southeast
Asia, another problem grows in Wester
Asia. Today, 15 months after the Sovie
invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of
Afghans continue to flee into Pakistan
every day. The 1.7 million Afghans now
in Pakistan represent one-tenth of the
population of Afghanistan and constitui
the largest refugee group in the world
today. Since December, they have been
entering Pakistan at the rate of 130,001
per month, many after their homes wer
bombed, crops destroyed, and flocks
killed. They have endured great hard-
ships in their flight to refuge.

About 40% of the refugees are
children under the age of 12, with the
remainder fairly equally divided betwee
adult men and women. Grouped in tent
villages established and administered bj
the Pakistan Government near the
Afghan border, the refugees are subjed
to the harsh extremes of heat and cold
which are characteristic of that region.

The people and Government of
Pakistan have responded most generous
ly to the needs of the refugees. It is
estimated that the Pakistan Governmen
itself bears around half the cost— or
about $100 million in 1980— of the total
relief effort. Indirect costs to land and

50

Department of State Bulletin

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

ter resources caused by the concen-
ition of refugees are borne entirely by
kistan.

After the massive buildup of popula-
n in January and February last year,
5 UNHCR assumed a role as the lead
ency in mobilizing and coordinating in-
■national relief efforts. Working with
e Pakistan Government, the UNHCR
veloped a support program in the
ring of 1980 and then issued special
peals for about $100 million, divided
out equally between food and nonfood
eds.

For 1981 the UNHCR originally
idgeted $52.5 million for Afghan pro-
ams, on the basis of a population of
1 million Afghans in Pakistan at the
id of September 1980. Clearly, the
ibsequent population increases will
irce the budget higher, and the
NHCR and the Pakistan Government
•e now reviewing new relief planning
stimates. The World Food Program,
hich channels the food component of
le international assistance, estimates
ir this year a need for 312,000 tons of
)mmodities with an estimated value of
120 million. The U.S. Government has
■nt its best efforts to support this
umanitarian program, which also
ndergirds our political interests in this
;rategically critical area. In FY 1980
■e contributed $43.7 million in cash and
>od to the relief effort, or nearly one-
alf of the total food and cash channeled
irough international organizations.

This fiscal year we have thus far
lade two new contributions to the
ifghan relief program: food with an
stimated value of $28 million and a
.ledge of $18 million for the UNHCR.

We expect the refugee population in
'akistan to increase to at least 2 million
n FY 1982, for which we will need a
otal of $24 million for our proposed
:ontribution to the UNHCR's Pakistan
>rogram. Food for Peace will provide
significant supplies of foodstuffs in FY
1982. The level of this donation will be
ietermined later this year following an
issessment of the food needs of Afghan
•efugees in Pakistan.

The enormity of this problem and its
impelling human and political dimen-
sions require continued international
support. Because its full extent is still
emerging, the plight of Afghan refugees
Dlaces a claim of priority upon the atten-
;ion and generosity of the world com-
nunity.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
ae available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Reprograming Proposal
for El Salvador

by James L. Buckley

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on April 29,
1981. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology. '

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss
the Administration's proposal to
reprogram FY 1981 assistance funds to
provide additional economic assistance
to El Salvador.

As you know, we notified Congress
on April 3 with regard to our intention
to reprogram FY 1981 foreign
assistance for El Salvador and for
Liberia. We noted then that, because of
the urgent need for additional economic
support fund (ESF) assistance for these
two countries and the limited availability
of non-earmarked FY 1981 ESF, the
President intends to exercise his authori-
ty under Section 614(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to
reprogram limited amounts of ESF ear-
marked by legislation for these coun-
tries.

This particular exercise in the pain-
ful reprograming process illustrates
why, as a matter of policy, the Ad-
ministration is seeking an alternative,
less disruptive way to meet unforeseen
contingencies. In this case, we have had
to draw $21 million each from funds ear-
marked for Egypt and Israel. Fortunate-
ly, these governments have been
understanding of the urgent need for us
to be able to transfer to El Salvador and
Liberia quick-dispersing funds that had
been earmarked for them. Their
response has been generous and
statesmanlike.

The need of Egypt and Israel for
these funds, however, continues to exist.
We are, therefore, increasing our re-
quest for ESF funding in FY 1982 for
Israel and Egypt by $21 million each
and are reducing our request for
unallocated ESF funds by a like amount.
These adjustments, in effect, reflect an
allocation of the special requirements
fund we have requested mandated by
events that have occurred between the
time we first made our FY 1982 request
and this presentation.

The economic emergencies we have
been called upon to meet this past

month in both El Salvador and Liberia
have stretched existing resources to the
limit. Time has not permitted a resort to
a request for supplemental appropria-
tions which, in any event, ought to be
considered a measure of last resort. The
problems created any time one seeks to
reduce funding that other countries have
been led to count upon would have made
the task impossible without serious
diplomatic setbacks had the Govern-
ments of Egypt and Israel been less will-
ing to accommodate over $40 million of
reprograming requests.

Given the economic problems and
uncertainties facing so much of the
Third World, it is impossible for us to
anticipate today what countries we may
need to provide with new or additional
economic assistance a year or so hence
as a matter of vital American self-
interest.

It, therefore, seems to us, in the
light of recent experience, that it is both
sensible and prudent to establish a con-
tingency ESF fund for FY 1982, subject
to all the safeguards that the Congress
presently imposes on the reprograming
process. Such a fund will enable us to
meet unforeseen needs without the dif-
ficulties and risks to international good
will that are an inevitable part of exist-
ing procedures.

Let me now turn to the specifics of
our proposal for additional economic
assistance for El Salvador.

U.S. Proposals

The total package amounts to $63.5
million to be used for the following pur-
poses:

• $24.9 million in ESF assistance
will be used in the next 3 months to pro-
vide foreign exchange to the private sec-
tor to import new materials and equip-
ment needed to revive industrial and
agricultural production.

• $13.5 million in PL 480 title II aid
will help finance food imports. We
believe it will cover most, if not all, of
El Salvador's requirements for wheat
and edible oil for the rest of the year.

• An extra $8 million will be added
to the $22 million currently available
under Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) guaranty programs. El Salvador
has traditionally financed industrial and
agricultural imports with foreign corn-

June 1981

51

Security Assistance

mercial financing. Commercial bank
lines of credit to El Salvador have dried
up as a result of political violence and
uncertainty. The CCC guaranty serves
to reestablish commercial bank financing
for critical imports of tallow, soybean
meal, cotton seed meal, bone meal, and
powdered milk.

• An additional $7.1 million in
development assistance loans will be
added to existing agricultural programs
providing credit and to an employment
program to construct labor-intensive
public works in low-income areas.

• Disbursements of $10 million will
be accelerated under an existing housing
guarantee program for the construction
of low-income housing in two cities in El
Salvador. This program is to guarantee
long-term financing to El Salvador by a
U.S. mortgage company.

The need for economic assistance is
pressing. The GDP in 1980 fell 9% below
the level in 1979. Export earnings have
fallen sharply. A special mission recently
returned from El Salvador estimates
that the foreign exchange shortfall for
1981 may reach $150 million. We based
our reprograming on this estimate. It
could go higher. We will need to review
the situation later this summer to deter-
mine whether any further commitments
on our part will be necessary.

A failure on our part to respond
promptly with the additional assistance
we are requesting would be a
devastating blow to the economy,
perhaps bringing down the Duarte
government and with it hopes for
economic and social reform and a
peaceful solution to the conflict through
elections. The private sector would lose
hope in the future of the country and
abandon any support for the govern-
ment. Production would decline further.
Serious food shortages could develop.
The government would be forced to slow
down progress in agrarian reform. The
increase in hunger, poverty, and
unemployment would lead to greater
political polarization. The United States
would appear to be seeking a military
solution.

It is also well to remember the im-
portance of others in helping El
Salvador meet its immediate needs. In-
ternational financial institutions and
other governments are providing
assistance. For example, the conces-
sionary credit terms for purchasing oil
through the joint facility of Mexico and
Venezuela should result in loans to El
Salvador of $53 million in 1981. The In-
ternational Monetary Fund is working to

conclude a compensatory financing facili-
ty of about $40 million for El Salvador
in 1981. It has been asked by the
government to negotiate a standby
drawing as well that would be about $40
million. A failure now to provide the ad-
ditional assistance we are requesting
would leave these donors in doubt about
our commitment to do our share in
economic assistance for El Salvador.

The additional, fast disbursing funds
we are now requesting will bring our
total commitment for economic
assistance to El Salvador this year to
$126.5 million. This is significantly more
than three times the military
assistance— $35 million— we are pro-
viding. This reflects our judgment and
that of President Duarte's government
as to his country's most pressing needs.
As a matter of fact, all parties in-
terested in the welfare of El Salvador
and its people understand the urgency of
the need for quick and effective
economic assistance if the country is to
remain afloat. There is admitted
disagreement among people of good will
as to the wisdom of America's military
assistance, but there is little as to the
kind of economic assistance we propose
to extend through the requested
reprograming.

And it is because of the critical im-
portance of maintaining the viability of
the Salvadoran economy that the guer-
rillas have intensified their war of
economic attrition by which they hope to
collapse the economy and with it, the
government.

Current Situation in El Salvador

For a proper perspective on the situa-
tion in El Salvador today, it is necessary
to understand that its economic prob-
lems go far beyond the disruptions that
can be expected in a country engaged in
a bloody insurgency. The fact is that
with the failure of the military offensive
launched last January, the revolutionary
leadership has made a quantum jump in
its efforts to paralyze the economy. In
order to disrupt transportation, the
revolutionaries have blown up bridges,
ambushed trucks, and blocked highways.
To deprive the country of electric power,
they have attacked power stations and
blown major transmission lines affecting
an estimated one-third of the nation's
electricity. Some of the most intense
fighting in the past has involved the pro-
tection of critically important hydroelec-
tric dams from guerrilla attack. These
concerted attempts to disrupt the
economy have even been extended to

commercial activity as witness the in-
discriminate bombings of markets and
commercial offices.

President Duarte estimates that
economic sabotage results in about $15
million in destruction each month. Our
economic assistance will not restore
facilities destroyed by sabotage or
directly employ those put out of work as
a consequence. It will help the govern-
ment to meet immediate needs for food,
foreign exchange to buy seed and fer-
tilizer, and domestic credit to finance
agriculture and industry. It will help
restore confidence in the economy. It
will allow the government to use its own
resources to rebuild the infrastructure
destroyed by the guerrillas and
stimulate construction that will provide
jobs for the unemployed.

We respectfully submit that the
emergency economic assistance that the
requested reprograming can alone pro-
vide is essential to the achievement of
an El Salvador in which the people can
be given the chance to determine their
own destiny through the electoral proc-
ess to which the Duarte government is
committed. His government has con-
sistently made clear its determination to
take the country to elections as the best
path to resolve the conflict in El
Salvador.

This commitment was reaffirmed
just last Saturday by the Vice President
and Commander in Chief of the armed
forces. Both the Christian Democrats
and the military are clearly determined
to hold fair elections.

The response of the guerrillas to the
prospects of elections since the establish
ment of the electoral council has been in
teresting. They are now attacking the
offices of the council and the provincial
authorities where records are kept that
would enable registration of voters to gc
forward. More than 15 of these offices
have been attacked in one way or
another over the past few weeks. Plain-
ly, they hope to disrupt the electoral
process, which, it must be remembered,
will be the first honest one in the coun-
try's history. It is a pattern to weaken
the government's reforms like the guer-
rillas' war of attrition against the
economy.

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

52

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

ikid to Pakistan

l] Jane A. Coon

I Statement before the Subcommittees
H Asian and Pacific Affairs and on In-
wnational Economic Policy and Trade
uthe House Foreign Affairs Committee
I April 27, 1981. Ms. Coon is Deputy
usistant Secretary for Near Eastern
id South Asian Affairs.1

Iim pleased to be here today to testify
I connection with the Administration's
Iquest for changes in Section 669 of
le Foreign Assistance Act. The Ad-
linistration firmly believes that con-
fessional approval of this proposed
Inendment is in our national interest
lid will permit the United States to
Irry out important policies in a region
reatened by the Soviet Union and
I itical to our well-being.

We are proposing that the waiver
ovision contained in Section 669 of the
)reign Assistance Act be amended to
'nform with that contained in section
''0 of the same act. The amended
nguage would also parallel the waiver
■ovisions of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
)n Act. We believe this would remove
i anomaly in the law whereby countries
igaged in transfers of reprocessing
ems are treated differently from those
ansferring or receiving enrichment
aterials or technology. It would pro-
de the President with needed flexibility
id permit him to pursue a consistent
Dnproliferation policy within the con-
:xt of our overall national security in-
vests.

ection 669 and Pakistan

fhy do we wish to change this provision
f the law? As you know, the sanctions
ave been applied in only the case of one
juntry — Pakistan. Two years ago we
ispended development assistance and
or international military education and
•aining (IMET) program to Pakistan,
'ur relations deteriorated. There was a
rowing sense of isolation and insecurity
l Pakistan. This in no way contributed
) a solution of the problem which
rompted the application of our sanc-
ons.

Much has changed in this region in
le past 2 years with the collapse of
ran and the Soviet invasion of
ighamstan. We believe that the United
tates should have the flexibility to build
cooperative relationship with Pakistan

in the face of a dangerous and growing
threat from the Soviet Union to this
vital region.

The Administration — and the
previous one— recognized that the vital
interests of the United States and its
allies are engaged in this region. The
Soviets, through their invasion of
Afghanistan, have demonstrated their
willingness to intervene militarily in
Southwest Asia. The Soviet Army is
now on the border of the populous In-
dian subcontinent, and Pakistan is a
front-line state. The Soviet pressure on
Pakistan is real, and the implications are
far-reaching throughout South and
Southwest Asia. Pakistan stands on the
eastern flank of the Persian Gulf.

Although the development of our
strategy for the Southwest Asia region
is not yet complete, it is obvious that
local states must be able to contribute to
regional stability and to resist intimida-
tion. This is particularly true of those
states which, like Pakistan, are strategi-
cally located and most immediately
threatened. A stronger, more self-
confident Pakistan capable of resisting
direct or indirect Soviet pressures
through Afghanistan is, thus, essential
for the protection of free world interests
in the region.

Pakistan has, so far, withstood
Soviet pressure and provided refuge to
nearly 2 million Afghan refugees. Its
resources, however, are limited as will
be its ability to withstand prolonged
pressure if it feels it is doing so alone.
Pakistan deserves our support, and we
are in the process of developing a closer
and more cooperative bilateral relation-
ship.

We intend to construct a new rela-
tionship with Pakistan in a measured
way, seeking to evolve over the long
term a durable and credible relationship
which will serve the best interests of us
both. In this respect, we intend to be
fully conscious of Pakistan's position as
a leader in both the nonaligned move-
ment and the Islamic community of na-
tions. We need to restore confidence on
both sides. This is done better by actions
than by words. In our discussions in
Islamabad and here in Washington, we
believe we have made a very good begin-
ning.

When we first sent to the Congress
our request for this change in section
669, we were in the very early stages of
our dialogue with the Pakistanis. At that
time we could only say, with specificity,
that we hope to resume an IMET pro-
gram in FY 1982. We were aware,
however, that any substantial assistance
for Pakistan in the context of building a

new relationship would require modifica-
tion of section 669.

As a result of our recent discussions
with Foreign Minister [of Pakistan]
Agha Shahi, we will be requesting
authorization for $100 million under the
economic support fund (ESF) in FY
1982. We also plan to discuss with the
Pakistanis a more substantial long-term
program. We will be returning to the
Congress with more specific requests
but probably not for the FY 1982
budget. Clearly, modification of section
669 is essential to moving ahead with
economic assistance and IMET in FY
1982 and a more substantial package in
the future.

The Administration believes that
favorable action on the proposed amend-
ment would also attes to the recogni-
tion, by the legislative branch, of
Pakistan's critical position and to the
breadth of American support for
Pakistan during this time of trial.

Allies and Donor Countries

Resumption of economic assistance to
Pakistan would also permit us to make a
more meaningful contribution to the im-
portant collective effort on Pakistan's
behalf. Since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, our allies and other donor
countries have substantially increased
their support. Japan and France, for ex-
ample, have doubled their assistance in
the past year. Total pledges at the
Pakistan aid consortium increased 40%
last year to a total of $1,020 million. Our
contribution was $50 million in PL 480.

With Western encouragement and
support, the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] reached agreement on a
3-year extended fund facility to assist
Pakistan in structural economic ad-
justments. In January Western
creditors, including the United States,
agreed to an 18-month debt rescheduling
package. We understand Saudi Arabia is
considering substantial increases in its
aid to Pakistan.

Our friends and allies have recog-
nized the importance of supporting
Pakistan and have made significant con-
tributions. A number of these countries
have repeatedly stressed to us the im-
portance of more vigorous U.S. par-
ticipation in a collective effort.

Nonproliferation

Our proposed amendment to section 669
in no way reflects a diminution of con-
cern by this Administration over the

une1981

53

UNITED NATIONS

threat of proliferation of nuclear
weapons. We remain convinced that the
spread of nuclear explosives capability
and testing of nuclear devices threatens
global security and, in fact, detracts
from the security of states pursuing
such programs.

The issue is how best to pursue our
nonproliferation interests as well as our
regional security interests. We do not
believe that there is any necessary
conflict in the pursuit of both objectives.
We certainly cannot claim that sanctions
have been successful. We would suggest,
rather, that our interests would be bet-
ter served by addressing the underlying
security concerns of countries such as
Pakistan and by developing more useful
and cooperative relations which could
engage us with them in a positive

fashion.

The proposed amendment to section
669 is an important— indeed essential—
buildingblock in a new relationship. It is
a necessary step which will permit us to
provide assistance to this beleaguered
country. But your action will also have
symbolic value. Not only Pakistan, but
others among our allies and friends, are
looking to the United States to
demonstrate its commitment to support
those friends who are standing in the
way of a Soviet thrust into this vital
area.

U.S. Perspective of

the 35th General Assembly

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

i

The 35th General Assembly opened on
September 16, 1980, and concluded all
but four items of its work on Decem-
ber 19. Discussions on Namibia, agree-
ment on agenda and procedures for
launching global negotiations on interna-
tional economic issues, election of two
judges to the International Court of
Justice, and a vote on a proposal to
enlarge the Security Council were defer-
red until meetings of the Assembly in

1981.

This 35th regular session ot the
Assembly took place in a period of in-
creasingly international tension. Some
85,000 Soviet military continued to oc-
cupy Afghanistan. Fifty-two American
diplomatic personnel were held in Iran.
War between Iran and Iraq threatened
the security of the Persian Gulf, and
tensions among other Middle East states
continued to be high. Two hundred thou-
sand Vietnamese troops continued to oc-
cupy Kampuchea. There were increasing
strains and uncertainties in East- West
relations. Ever-increasing numbers of
refugees worldwide presented political,
economic, and humanitarian challenges.
The world economy was plagued by
stagflation, huge payments deficits, ten-
sion between oil producers and con-
sumers, and increased concern about the
ability of the international economic and
financial system to function effectively.
Although the General Assembly ad-
dressed itself to many of these issues, it
was, on the whole, a rather quiet, transi-
tional session, maintaining a record on
issues rather than taking strong new in-
itiatives. In part, this may have been a
reflection of the interaction between the
U S. presidential election and interna-
tional affairs. The work of the 35th ses-
sion was also affected by two emergency
special sessions of the Assembly in 1980
under the "uniting for peace" pro-
cedure—one in January on the situation
in Afghanistan; the other in July on the
question of Palestine, and by a special
session on development held in late
August. In addition, the Security Coun-
cil took up Middle East and southern
African issues. Discussion of the situa-
tion in Namibia was postponed pending
the outcome of the preimplementation
meeting which took place in January
1981 in Geneva.

Afghanistan

A resolution on the situation in
Afghanistan, sponsored by the Islamic
nations, was adopted by an overwhelm-
ing majority which included the United
States. The majority was larger than
that for a similar resolution passed in
January 1980 by an emergency special
session of the General Assembly. This
session was called after the Soviet
Union had vetoed a Security Council
resolution dealing with the situation in
Afghanistan created by the invasion of
Soviet troops in December 1979.

The resolution passed by the 35th
General Assembly reaffirms the key pre
visions of the January resolution calling
for withdrawal of foreign forces from
Afghanistan; the right of the Afghan
people to self-determination free from
outside interventions; and a peaceful
solution based on the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity, and the nonahgned
character of Afghanistan. In addition, l
suggests the appointment of a repre-
sentative of the Secretary General to
work toward a political solution in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the res<
lution. As a first step toward fulfilling tr
objectives of the resolution, Secretary
General Kurt Waldheim appointed U.N
Under Secretary General Xavier Perez
de Cuellar as his personal represented
on Afghanistan in February 1981.

Kampuchea

The United States strongly supported £
resolution offered by member states of
the Association of South East Asian Ni
tions (ASEAN) and approved by a larg
majority, calling for an early interna-
tional conference to negotiate
withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Kampuchea and selection, under U.N.
supervision, of a truly representative
government by the Khmer people

As it did the previous year, the
United States supported, on a technics
basis, the acceptance of the credentials
of the representative of the Governme
of Democratic Kampuchea. The U.S.
position was that the present regime n
Kampuchea, led by Heng Samrm, was
installed by Vietnam through its milite
invasion of Kampuchea and is main-
tained in power by a Vietnamese occu;
tion force of 200,000 troops. The regn

54

Department of State Bullet

United Nations

is not have a superior claim to the
mpuchean seat in the General
sembly; therefore, the Assembly
mid seat the representative of the
rernment whose credentials were ac-
ited by the previous General
sembly. The conclusion that the Heng
mrin regime does not represent a
)erior claim is supported by most of

governments of the region,
cretary of State Edmund Muskie
,de clear in his statement of
ptember 15 that this position on the
hnical question of credentials does
t imply U.S. Government recognition
the Democratic Kampuchea regime,
pport for it, or approval of its heinous
ting of human life.

At the December 1980 conference of
nor nations, the United States pledg-
a basic $25 million and up to an addi-
nal $20 million on a matching basis

FY 1981 for the ongoing Kam-
chean relief effort.

an-Iraq War

le General Assembly did not act on
is issue. However, the Security Coun-
adopted a resolution on September
I, calling for both sides to cease
istilities and resolve their differences
lacefully. After consultations with
;curity Council members Secretary
eneral Waldheim appointed former
■vedish Premier Olof Palme to serve as
s personal emissary to the two govern-
ments to work on a settlement.

liddle East

he 35th General Assembly adopted, by
rge majorities, 12 resolutions on the
jestion of Palestine and the situation in
le Middle East in addition to the two
assed during the 6-day emergency
Decial session on the question of
alestine held, despite U.S. opposition,
l July 1980. Of all these resolutions, the
'nited States voted in favor of only one,
rhich reaffirmed the applicability of the
eneva convention of 1949 to the ter-
itory occupied by Israel as a result of
le 1967 war.

The United States voted against or
bstained on the remaining resolutions
)r a variety of reasons. It found them
nrealistic and one-sided, not taking into
ccount the legitimate rights and con-
erns of both sides in the Middle East
onflict. The United States found par-
!cularly disturbing a resolution ques-
ioning for the first time the adequacy of
ecurity Council Resolution 242 as a
asis for a Middle East settlement.

Together with other Western nations,
the United States also voted against a
resolution criticizing the Camp David
peace process.

Southern Africa

In explanation of its vote on agenda
item 28, "Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of South Africa," the
United States reiterated its strong op-
position to apartheid and its firm com-
mitment to work for its eradication.
However, the United States was again
forced to vote against a majority of the
17 subsections of the resolution because
they contained language and proposed

Namibia

The following statement was issued
by the Governments of Canada, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
on April U, 1981. '

Following the regretable failure of the
preimplementation meeting at Geneva to
give effect to the U.N. plan for Namibia,
the governments of the Western five
have been engaged in extensive con-
sultations to reassess the situation in
southern Africa and prospects for a
negotiated settlement for the territory.
Bilateral discussions at ministerial level
have taken place on several occasions
over the last 2 months at which the
Namibia issue was considered by the
five.

The Western five remain committed
to an internationally accepted settlement
for Namibia and are continuing their
common efforts toward this goal. A
meeting of senior officials of the five will
be held in London during the week of
April 20 at the conclusion of consulta-
tions in Africa by the U.S. Assistant
Secretary-designate for African Affairs,
Mr. Chester Crocker.

The London meeting will provide an
opportunity to review the results of all
these consultations and consider future
courses of action. The Western five hope
this will assist them in the process of
formulating proposals on how progress
can be made toward the mutually agreed
objective of early independence for
Namibia.

'USUN press release 19.

actions which the United States could
not accept. There was little attempt on
the part of the sponsors of the apartheid
resolution to negotiate texts which
would reflect a wider consensus in op-
position to apartheid which exists in the
international community.

The 35th General Assembly agreed
to defer discussion on Namibia until
after the U.N. -sponsored preimplemen-
tation meeting in Geneva in January
1981, which all parties to the negotia-
tions on Namibian independence would
attend. The United States attended as
one of the five-member Western contact
group which has been working for Nami-
bian independence since 1978. The objec-
tive of the conference was to set the
date for a cease-fire in the guerrilla war
as the first step in implementing a
previously agreed-upon U.N. plan for
elections and independence. In his
remarks at the conclusion of the
meeting, U.N. Under Secretary General
Brian Urquhart noted that South Africa
felt it would be "premature" to proceed
with implementation at this time. The
question of Namibia was then taken up
at a meeting of the resumed General
Assembly in March 1981.

Zimbabwe

On April 18,1980, Zimbabwe, formerly
Southern Rhodesia, became independent
and was admitted to U.N. membership
on August 25. Zimbabwe's admission to
the United Nations was the culmination
of a long and difficult effort to establish
an internationally recognized govern-
ment representative of all the people of
that nation. Zimbabwe's admission was
also a triumph for people of that nation.
Zimbabwe's admission was also a
triumph for many U.N. members, par-
ticularly the United Kingdom and the
front-line states of southern Africa,
whose untiring efforts facilitated the
signing of the Lancaster House
agreements and the election of a
representative government in Zim-
babwe.

Western Sahara

The Assembly adopted an Algerian
resolution, on which the United States
abstained, calling for negotiations to set-
tle the future of .the people of Western
Sahara but prejudging the outcome by
declaring that they should lead to the
creation of an independent Saharan
state and referring to the Polisario
[Popular Liberation Front for Rio de
Oro and Saguia El Hamra] as "repre-
sentative of the people of Western

une 1981

55

United Nations

Sahara." The United States, in its state-
ment to the committee, explained that it
is neutral on the eventual status of the
territory which can be decided only after
due consultation with the people of the
territory. It voted for a Moroccan
resolution in which Morocco pledged to
cooperate with the Organization for
African Unity in settling the issue.

Cyprus

Intercommunal talks for a settlement of
the Cyprus dispute recommenced under
U.N. sponsorship in September 1980 in
Nicosia. The Assembly decided to
postpone the Cyprus debate until the
36th General Assembly.

Disarmament and Arms Control

Of the 44 resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly in the field of arms
control and disarmament, the most
noteworthy — on allegations of chemical
weapons use — was also the most con-
troversial. Cosponsored by eight
Western nations and strongly supported
by the United States, the resolution
called for an investigation, under the
aegis of the U.N. Secretary General, of
reports of chemical weapons use in re-
cent conflicts.

Although no countries are mention-
ed by name in the resolution, it reflects
the concern of the United States and
other nations about reports that lethal
and incapacitating chemical weapons
have been used by Communist forces in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.
Significantly, this is the first time the in-
ternational community has endorsed ac-
tion to deal with a problem which
threatens the viability of an important
international agreement (the 1925
Geneva protocol).

Other resolutions adopted urged the
United States and the U.S.S.R. to ratify
SALT II and begin additional negotia-
tions on limiting strategic nuclear
weapons, approved in principle the im-
plementation of a U.N. study on conven-
tional weapons disarmament, and pro-
vided for the establishment of
preparatory committees for the 1982
second General Assembly special session
on disarmament and the 1983 U.N. Con-
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy.

An Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
resolution was adopted by consensus for
the first time. This resolution leaves to
the ad hoc committee on the Indian
Ocean to decide at its 1981 meetings
whether to hold an Indian Ocean con-

ference later in 1981. The resolution,
while by no means perfect from the U.S.
point of view, allows a shift of focus
away from naval forces alone and pro-
vides a basis for continuing discussions
on the fundamental security problems
facing the Indian Ocean region.

The session continued a trend which
saw the nonaligned and other nations of
the world increasingly anxious to see
some concrete results from the super-
powers on such issues as nuclear arms
control, the comprehensive test ban, and
the prohibition of chemical weapons and,
at least, to begin multilateral negotia-
tions on these issues.

Refugees

The humanitarian, financial, and political
pressures created by 3.5 million African,
over 1 million Afghan, 255,000 In-
dochinese refugees, and the exodus of
150,000 Cubans and Haitians to the
United States focused world attention
on the problems of refugees. In his
opening speech to the meeting of the
U.N. Economic and Social Council in
July 1980, Ambassador Donald F.
McHenry, U.S. Permanent Represent-
ative to the United Nations, called for a
better management of this "worldwide
crisis" and a reformulation of interna-
tional attitudes on refugees.

At the General Assembly, the
United States supported a resolution
that endorsed the work of the United
Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), noted the High
Commissioner's efforts to contribute to
the improvement of coordination among
U.N. agencies and other relevant inter-
national organizations, called upon the
international community to share the
burden of assisting refugees and dis-
placed persons, and authorized the
UNHCR to allocate up to $10 million an-
nually for refugees and displaced per-
sons in emergency situations.

The United States cosponsored a
Federal Republic of Germany resolution
that called for governments to focus on
the political origins of refugee flows and
the means to avert them and called on
member states to submit to the
Secretary General their comments and
recommendations on ways and means to
improve international cooperation to
avert new flows of refugees; the resolu-
tion was adopted by a large margin. A
U.S. -supported resolution calling for an
International Conference on Assistance
to Refugees in Africa to be held in
Geneva, April 9 and 10, 1981, was ap-
proved. A Canadian resolution, adopted

by consensus, established flagrant viola*
tions of human rights as a cause for
massive flows of refugees.

The United States pledged $75.7
million for the first 9 months of 1981 ft
the programs of the UNHCR and ex-
pects to contribute $16.5 million for the
final quarter of the year.

Human Rights

The General Assembly adopted some 3!
resolutions, a good number of which
consolidated earlier human rights ad-
vances. There was progress on such
matters as redesignation of the U.N.
Human Rights Division to the status of
a Center, safeguards against summary
executions, and reinforcement for the
Human Rights Commission's working
group on disappearances. A resolution
welcomed Sri Lanka's offer to host a
seminar on human rights in Asia in
1981.

The General Assembly also adoptee
three resolutions concerning human
rights situations in specific Latin
American nations. The United States
supported a resolution on Bolivia and
another accepting the latest report on
the human rights situation in Chile.
Although it shares the concern of othe
nations over the level of violence and
violations of human rights occurring
daily in El Salvador, the United States
abstained on a resolution on El Salvad
which it found unbalanced and unhelpf
in ending the violence.

Women's Issues

The U.N. -sponsored mid-Decade Work
Conference on Women, which took pla
in Copenhagen in July 1980, completec
program of action for the second half
the Decade for Women. The program
was adopted by an overwhelming ma-
jority which the United States could n<
join because of objectionable language
which grouped Zionism with racism, c<
lonialism, and neocolonialism and
directed that assistance for Palestiniar
refugees be provided in consultation
with the Palestine Liberation Organize
tion as the representative of the Pales
tinian people. The program was again
voted on as a resolution at the 35th
Genera] Assembly and again the Unite
States voted against it.

However, the United States pledgi
its support and participation in nation;
and international endeavors aimed at
fulfilling the conference in 1976. The
United States supported other resolu-
tions concerning the International

56

Department of State Bulleti

United Nations

?arch and Training Institute for the
ancement of Women, assistance for
ale refugees, and the voluntary fund.

tection of Diplomats

he wake of the hostage situation, the
die nations offered a resolution,
>ed by consensus, which urges states
isure, in conformity with their inter-
onal obligations, the protection and
ty of diplomatic and consular mis-
si calls on states to consider becom-
parties to relevant conventions; in-
s states to report to the Secretary
eral serious violations of the protec-

security, and safety of diplomatic
sions; requests the Secretary General
rork with member nations on addi-
al protective measures; and asks the
retary General to report on this sub-
to the next General Assembly,
ile the resolution is not as strong as
United States would have liked, it is
mportant reaffirmation of the need
irotect diplomatic envoys and a fur-
• step in international efforts against
■orism.

'elopment

34th session of the General
embly inaugurated a period of in-
ie activity on economic and develop-
lt issues, leading to a special session
he General Assembly on development
August 1980. The main purpose of
special session was to reach agree-
nt on procedures and agenda for a
nd of global negotiations on such in-
lational economic issues as trade,
elopment, energy, and money and
ince, to be launched in January 1981.
reement could not be reached at the
cial session, and discussions were
.tinued at the 35th General Assembly
i small negotiating group headed by
U.N. General Assembly President,
nsiderable ground was covered in nar-
king differences, but substantial
'erences still remain before global
jotiations can be launched.
The Group of 77 (representing 121
sloping nations) insisted on inclusion
items calling for the reform of the in-
national monetary system and finan-
1 institutions but was unwilling to
•ee on a serious discussion of energy
cing and supply issues on which the
ropean Economic Community was in-
ting. The United States, although sup-
ping the European Community's ob-
tives on energy, remained primarily
icerned with obtaining an acceptable
± on monetary issues. A greater
jree of agreement was reached on a

text on procedures, but there was still
concern that this text did not adequately
protect the decisionmaking authority of
such specialized international agencies
as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.

At the resumed General Assembly
session in January, the decision was
made to authorize General Assembly
President Rudiger von Wechmar
(Federal Republic of Germany) to con-
tinue to pursue work on this issue with a
view to resuming formal negotiations
later this year.

tiveness. The proposal has not been
voted on and remains on the Assembly
agenda.

The General Assembly elected five
nonpermanent members of the Security
Council to serve for 2-year terms. These
are Ireland, Japan, Panama, Spain, and
Uganda. The members of the Security
Council for 1981 are China, France, Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Ireland,
Japan, Mexico, Niger, Panama, the
Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Uganda, the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the
United States.

International Development Strategy Budget and Secretariat Staffing

The international development strategy,
a document outlining programs and
goals for economic development during
the Third United Nations Development
Decade, was agreed upon at the special
session on development in August 1980
and adopted by consensus at the General
Assembly. The United States endorsed
the strategy but, along with most other
developed countries, expressed reserva-
tions on many points covered in the
document. These included the establish-
ment of fixed growth and aid targets, a
process to which the United States has
long been opposed. The United States
also was not satisfied that energy issues
were sufficiently treated in the docu-
ment.

Other development issues included a
resolution adopted by consensus calling
for a conference on the least developed
countries to be held in Paris in Septem-
ber 1981 to consider the special prob-
lems of about 30 least developed coun-
tries. The General Assembly also
adopted by consensus a series of 25
country- specific resolutions calling for in-
creased economic and disaster relief
assistance and a resolution to hold a
Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy in Nairobi in August
1981.

Security Council Expansion and
Membership

India and other nations sponsored a pro-
posal to expand the Security Council
from 15 to 21 members. The United
States opposes the expansion because it
believes the Security Council as current-
ly composed reflects the balance of in-
terests in today's world relevant to ques-
tions of peace and security. In addition,
the United States believes that enlarging
the size of the Council would hinder its
ability to act quickly and lessen its effec-

The United States voted against a sup-
plement of $91.4 million to the biennial
U.N. budget which was ultimately ap-
proved. (The total budget for 1980-81 is
now $1.4 billion.) This vote, in which the
United States was joined by 19 other
countries accounting for a total of 79%
of regular budget assessments, reflected
the U.S. belief that increases in one area
of the U.N. budget should be matched
by offsetting reductions, particularly of
low priority activities, elsewhere. The
vote also expressed U.S. dissatisfaction
that the Secretariat had taken inade-
quate measures to absorb, as national
governments are forced to do, increases
in costs of previously approved pro-
grams due to inflation and currency fluc-
tuations.

The United States cooperated in
developing a new formula for determin-
ing the number of U.N. Secretariat jobs
each member nation may fill with its
citizens. In response to criticism from
developing nations that too much weight
was given to the amount of a nation's
contributions, the new formula
decreases the weight given to the
amount of a nation's contributions from
66% to 57%. However, it increases the
total number of jobs available to each
nation by broadening the base of exist-
ing jobs subject to geographical distribu-
tion from what the United States con-
sidered an unrealistic low of 2,700 to
3,350.

USUN press release 16 of Apr. 10, 1981.

ne1981

57

United Nations

International Conference on
Assistance to Africa's Refugees

The International Conference on
Assistance to Refugees in Africa was
held April 9-10, 1981, in Geneva.
Following is a statement made to that
conference by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, head
of the U.S. delegation and U.S. Am-
bassador to the United Nations, on
April 9. '

It is my pleasure to bring you greetings
from our President, Ronald Reagan.
Because he is deeply moved by the
suffering of Africa's refugees and
desired to express, in a compelling
fashion, the solidarity of the U.S.
Government and the American people,
President Reagan had initially
designated Vice President George Bush
to head the U.S. delegation. When his
injury made it necessary for the Vice
President to remain in the United
States, President Reagan asked me to
attend — less as our Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations than as
one of the members of the U.S. Cabinet
who operates in the field of foreign
affairs. The President also asked me to
personally express his devout hopes for
a successful conference. And the Vice
President requested that I express his
regrets that he cannot be with you to-
day. The President, the Vice President,
and the Secretary of State are following
our proceedings with great interest. I
will report to them on the conference
soon after I return to the United States.

To draw attention to this confer-
ence, a bill of the U.S. Congress and a
proclamation of the President have
designated today, April 9th, as African
Refugee Relief Day.

The United States not only has links
with Africa, Africa is present in the
United States. The African heritage is
one of our component parts. Americans
have many links with Africa, links which
President Reagan's Administration fully
intends to reinforce and expand.
Twenty-six million of our people trace
their ancestral roots to Africa. The ex-
change of students, teachers, mis-
sionaries, businessmen, and diplomats
between the United States and Africa
has a long history fruitful to both sides.
The rich influences of Africa in our
culture and society are fixed in the na-
tional fabric.

My message today is simple: We feel
deeply the suffering of Africa's millions
of refugees forced by political, economic,

and natural catastrophes to leave their
homes in the search for safety and even
for survival.

We sympathize also with the coun-
tries in which refugees have sought and
found asylum — with the strain that
growing refugee populations put on
scarce resources and difficult conditions
in their host countries. We want to help.
We mean to do so.

U.S. Concern

Contrary to some reports, the Govern-
ment of the United States cares a great
deal about our relations with the nations
of Africa. This concern is reflected in
the careful review of African policy and
in the consultations now being carried
out by our new Assistant Secretary-
designate, Chester Crocker. Even more
dramatic evidence of the U.S. Govern-
ment's concern is found in its new
budget. While deep cuts are being made
in most domestic and foreign expend-
itures, the Administration has recom-
mended to the Congress a 30% increase
in our overall aid for Africa — the first
real increase in African aid in a number
of years.

My Administration's special concern
with refugees has already been made
clear. Last month some $50 million in
assistance was committed to the Govern-
ment of Zimbabwe to help in war recon-
struction efforts and other activities and
programs of direct benefit to the
thousands of returnees in that country.
Moreover, the United States has con-
sistently and generously contributed to
humanitarian programs for the relief of
African refugees.

Today I am pleased to announce
here that during the 2 years of 1981 and
1982, the United States will further
make available, dependent in part on
congressional authorization, a total of
$285 million to programs assisting
African refugees.

That pledge is not only an expres-
sion of our desire to help but also of our
conviction that something can be
done— that the problems of the African
refugees are not beyond solution.

Grounds for Hope

Most tragically the staggering number
of refugees come on top of the many
burdens that Africa already bears. Most

asylum countries in Africa are strug-
gling against great odds to meet the
needs of their own people. Moreover,
African development needs and popula:
tion growth, together with declining pe
capita food production, combine with
Africa's refugee crises to threaten gen-
uine disasters. Secretary General [of tfa
Organization of African Unity Edem]
Kodjo recently posed the issue in stark
terms when he said that "by the end of
the century, Africa will either be saved
or completely destroyed."

Even though the number of Africai
refugees continues to grow — having
more than doubled in the Horn in
1980-

we remain hopeful and for several
reasons.

The first ground for hope is the
generosity of the African countries
themselves. The more than two dozen
asylum countries have repeatedly
demonstrated the time-honored Africai
tradition of hospitality to strangers.
Even though most asylum countries in
Africa are struggling against great od(
to meet the needs of their own people,
they have often committed sizable
amounts from their own resources to
assist refugees, permitting the
newcomers to resettle permanently.
Most have permitted the refugees to u(
arable lands and available social serv-
ices. These African countries are,
therefore, the first donors.

The second ground for hope lies in
the excellent efforts of a variety of inb
national agencies, public and private, i
eluding the International Committee o
the Red Cross and the many other
voluntary humanitarian organizations-
many of whose representatives are pr<
ent among us today. The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees has worke
valiantly to meet the staggering incres
in worldwide refugee needs over the
past 5 years.

The third ground for hope is founc
in the growing response of the interna
tional community and recognition of tr
need for a massive coordinated effort t
assist the millions of uprooted, homele
Africans. There is also increasing
awareness among those willing to help
of the importance of tailoring the
assistance to the concrete circumstanC'
of the refugees and their host countrie
We believe a more systematic study of
these circumstances can result in still
more effective help.

A final reason for hope is the retui
during the past year, of many thousan
of former refugees to their homes in
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea, a

58

Department of State Bulleti

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

vement that illustrates the possibility

eversing the trend.

Reversing the negative trends and
ring the problems will not only re-
re an intelligent, generous effort by
ions outside Africa, it will also re-
re a determination to achieve peace
Africa. An end to military adventures
i violent politics is necessary, and we
I on all the countries of this area to
I peaceful solutions to Africa's prob-
is no matter how difficult or intract-
e they may appear.

If we all — in and out of Africa — work
ether to solve the problems of
pica's destitute millions, the result will
better lives and more hopeful futures

the refugees and greater stability for
:ir hosts. In this effort you can count
the United States.

'USUN press release 18.

frican Refugee
elief Day

IOCLAMATION 4833,
3R. 9, 19811

le American people are blessed with
jedom and material abundance, yet
ey are not deaf to the cries of agony
Dm those who suffer deprivation. To-
(.y, cries for help are heard from Africa
here more than 4 million of our fellow
iman beings have been displaced.

The United States applauds the hu-
anitarian efforts of the nations which
ike in these refugees. Host nations are
ten themselves poor in resources and
ieir willingness to accept refugees is
cemplary of the best in the human
tirit.

Americans are a compassionate peo-
e and will do their part, either through
)vernment or through voluntary con-
ibutions.

With this in mind, Congress has, by
int resolution, requested me to desig-
ite April 9, 1981, as African Refugee
elief Day and to call upon the people of
le United States to observe that day by
creasing their awareness of the plight
; the African refugee. Further, I call on
mericans of all faiths to involve them-
:lves directly in this problem with their
rayers and with contributions to recog-
ized private voluntary agencies which
rovide care and relief to African
:fugees.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald
Reagan, President of the United States
of America, do hereby designate April 9,
1981, as African Refugee Relief Day.

In Witness Whereof, I have here-
unto set my hand this ninth day of
April, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and eighty-one, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of
America the two hundred and fifth.

Ronald Reagan

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Apr. 13, 1981. ■

El Salvador

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 9, 19811

The killing of some 20 civilians in El
Salvador 2 days ago is part of a continu-
ing tragedy in that country. Violence —
from left and right — threatens all hopes
of reform and democratic progress in
that country. The goal of U.S. policy
toward El Salvador is to help break this
vicious pattern.

These most recent killings reinforce
our determination to support the cen-
trist government of the country, a
government that is beset by extremist
forces on the far right and far left who
oppose its policies of political, social, and
economic reform.

The extremist forces deliberately in-
stigate violence in the knowledge that
progress can be stopped only in that
way. Such incidents will unfortunately
continue until the Government of El
Salvador can demonstrate its ability to
restore stability in the country and end
acts of violence by all parties.

We are communicating with the
Government of El Salvador in an effort
to learn the facts of this most recent
tragedy.

■Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman William J. Dyess. ■

une1981

59

TREATIES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute
for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at
Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force
Dec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, Apr. 8,
1981.

Antarctica

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1961. TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 10,

1981.

Notification of succession deposited:

Papua New Guinea, Mar. 16, 1981.

Aviation, Civil

Convention on international civil aviation.
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Apr. 14, 1981.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos
Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered into force Oct.
24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Apr. 14, 1981.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,

1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
TIAS 8062.

Accession deposited: Uruguay, Apr. 6, 1981.

Commodities— Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.1
Signature: Brazil, Apr. 16, 1981.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,

1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
8249.

Accessions deposited: Liberia, Mar. 11, 1981;
Mozambique, Mar. 25, 1981.
Reservations withdrawn: South Africa, Feb.
17, 1981.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3,
1973, on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249).
Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.1
Acceptances deposited: Denmark, Feb. 25,
1981; Switzerland, Feb. 23, 1981.

Cultural Property

Statutes of the International Center for the
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of
Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi

60

Nov.-Dec. 1956, as amended Apr. 24, 1963,

and Apr. 14-17, 1969. Entered into force

May 10, 1958; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1971.

TIAS 7038.

Notification of withdrawal: U.K.,

Dec. 30, 1980; effective Dec. 30, 1981.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4,
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Mar. 19,
1981.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Sudan, Apr. 13, 1981.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International
Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov.
30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited: Solomon Islands,
Mar. 13, 1981.

Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done
at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force
July 18, 1978.2
Accession deposited: Mexico, Mar. 24, 1981.3

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2
Accession deposited: Mexico, Mar. 23, 1981.

International covenant on economic, social,

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,

1976.2

Accession deposited: Mexico, Mar. 23, 1981.

Hydrographic Organization

Convention on the International Hydro-
graphic Organization, with annexes. Done at
Monaco May 3, 1967. Entered into force
Sept. 22, 1970. TIAS 6933.
Accession deposited: Belgium, Mar. 10, 1981.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Accession deposited: Barbados, Mar. 5, 1981.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention

on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at

London Oct. 12, 1971. '

Acceptance deposited: Belgium, Mar. 19,

1981.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental

Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed

at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force

Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, Mar. 4,

1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975.1
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Apr. 14, 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.1
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Apr. 14, 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernment
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at Londc
Nov. 15, 1979. '

Acceptances deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 2,
1981; Spain, Apr. 14 , 1981.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations
Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Enten
into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapte:
II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29,
1978." TIAS 8733.

Territorial application: Notification by U.K.
that treaty shall be applicable to Hong Koi
effective Apr. 15, 1981.

Pollution

Protocol relating to intervention on the hij
seas in cases of pollution by substances otl
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. '
Accession deposited: Bahamas, Mar. 5,
1981.

International convention on the establishm

of an international fund for compensation

oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels

Dec. 18, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 16,

1978.2

Accession deposited: Maldives, Mar. 16,

1981.

Program-Carrying Signals

Convention relating to the distribution of
programme-carrying signals transmitted b
satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979.2
Ratification deposited: Italy, Apr. 7, 1981.

Property — Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the internatior
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of
June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Genev;
May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6,
1979.2

Accession deposited: Denmark, Mar. 3,
1981.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the internatioi
convention for the safety of life at sea, 19'
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 197
Entered into force May 1, 1981.
Accession deposited: Norway, Mar. 25, 198:

International convention for the safety of 1

at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London

Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,

1980. TIAS 9700.

Accession deposited: Singapore, Mar. 16,

1981.

Department of State Bullet

Treaties

llite Communications System

ention on the international maritime
lite organization (INMARSAT), with an-
Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered
force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
ssion deposited: Philippines, Mar. 30,

:ication deposited: Chile, Feb. 26, 1981.

•ating agreement on the international
time satellite organization (INMARSAT),

annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
!red into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
atures: Chile, Feb. 26, 1981; Philippines,

30, 1981.

orism

rnational convention against the taking of
ages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. '
ission deposited: Trinidad and Tobago,
1, 1981.

isportation

ement on the international carriage of
shable foodstuffs and on the special
pment to be used for such carriage
P), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept.
970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.2
jssion deposited: German Democratic
ublic, Apr. 14, 1981.

kties

ma conventions on the law of treaties,
i annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.
ered into force Jan. 27, 1980.2
fication deposited: Chile, Apr. 9, 1981.

eat

1 protocol for the first extension of the
I aid convention, 1980. Done at
ihington Mar. 24, 1981.1
latere: Sweden, Apr. 6, 1981.

1 protocol for the sixth extension of the
■at trade convention, 1971. Done at
shington Mar. 24, 1981. »
natures: Brazil, Apr. 28, 1981; Egypt,
■. 24, 1981; Sweden, Apr. 6, 1981;
usia, Apr. 22, 1981.

lvention on the elimination of all forms of
crimination against women. Adopted at
v York Dec. 18, 1979.1
nature: Brazil, Mar. 31, 1981.
ification deposited: Mexico, Mar. 23,
1.

lvention on the political rights of women.

le at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered

) force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,

6. TIAS 8289.

ification deposited: Mexico, Mar. 23,

II.

5r-American convention on the granting of
itical rights to women. Signed at Bogota
y 2, 1948. Entered into force Apr. 22,
9; for the U.S. May 24, 1976. TIAS 8365.
iession deposited: Mexico, Mar. 24,
H.

BILATERAL

Dominica

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Roseau Dec. 11,
1980, and Feb. 4, 1981. Entered into force
Feb. 4, 1981.

Dominican Republic

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Sept.
28, 1977 (TIAS 8944). Signed at Santo Do-
mingo Feb. 20, 1981. Entered into force Feb.
20, 1981.

The Gambia

Agreement relating to radio communications
between amateur stations on behalf of third
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at
Banjul Mar. 17, 1981. Entered into force
Apr. 16, 1981.

Ghana

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr.

14, 1980 (TIAS 9738), with agreed minutes.
Signed at Accra Mar. 31, 1981. Entered into
force Mar. 31, 1981.

Hong Kong

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug.
8, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8936, 9291,
9611, 9714), relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at Hong
Kong Mar. 13, 1981. Entered into force Mar.
13, 1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981.

Israel

First amendment to agreement of Dec. 3,
1980, proving additional grant funds to sup-
port the economic and political stability of
Israel. Signed Mar. 27, 1981. Entered into
force Mar. 27, 1981.

Malaysia

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kuala Lumpur Dec. 5, 1980, and
Feb. 27, 1981. Entered into force Feb. 27,
1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981.

Mexico

Agreement of cooperation regarding pollution
of the marine environment by discharges of
hydrocarbons and other hazardous
substances, with annexes. Signed at Mexico
City July 24, 1980. Entered into force provi-
sionally July 24, 1980.
Entered into force: Definitively, Mar. 30,
1981.

Agreement on cooperation in cases of natural
disasters. Signed at Mexico City Jan. 15,
1980. Entered into force provisionally Jan.

15, 1980.

Entered into force: Definitively, Mar. 18,
1981.

NATO

Agreement concerning the application of part
IV of the agreement on the status of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national
representatives, and international staff, Sept.
20, 1951 (TIAS 2992), to the officials of
NATO civilian bodies located on the territory
of the United States of America. Signed at
Brussels Mar. 3, 1981. Entered into force
Mar. 3, 1981.

Niger

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange
of notes at Niamey Mar. 11 and June 9, 1980.
Entered into force June 9, 1980.

Norway

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts
of the U.S., with annex and agreed minutes.
Signed at Washington Jan. 26, 1981. Enters
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by
exchange of notes, upon the completion of in-
ternal procedures of both governments.

Philippines

Memorandum of understanding for the ex-
change of individual personnel between the
U.S. Army Western Command and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Signed at
Manila Mar. 25, 1981. Entered into force
Mar. 25, 1981.

Poland

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Sept. 15, 1980, and
Mar. 20, 1981. Entered into force Mar. 20,
1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981.

St. Lucia

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Castries Dec. 11,
1980, and Jan. 27, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 27, 1981.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Kingstown Dec.
11, 1980, and Jan. 20, 1981. Entered into
force Jan. 20, 1981.

Senegal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales

of agricultural commodities of

May 16, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes

Dec. 23, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 23,

1980.

me 1981

61

CHRONOLOGY

Sudan

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum
May 17, 1980. Entered into force for 1979/80
debt June 19, 1980.
Entered into force for 1980/81 debt:
Apr. 14, 1981.

Sweden

Technical exchange and cooperative arrange-
ment in the field of nuclear safety research
and development, with appendix. Signed at
Bethesda and Studs vik Jan. 27 and Feb. 23,
1981. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1981.

Switzerland

International express mail agreement, with

detailed regulations. Signed at Bern and

Washington Dec. 7, 1978, and

Jan. 22, 1979.

Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1979.

Turkey

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Ankara Mar. 27,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1981.

United Kingdom

Arrangement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Jan. 14 and 15, 1981. Entered into force Jan.
15, 1981.

World Health Organization

Memorandum of understanding regarding
United States EPA collaboration in the inter-
national program on chemical safety. Signed
at Washington and Geneva Jan. 19 and Mar.
19, 1981. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1981.

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa Mar. 10,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 10, 1981.

April 1981

1 Not in force.

2 Not in force for the U.S.

3 With reservation and declarations.

4 Chapter II not in force for the U.S.

April 1

Of the $75 million in economic support
funds to Nicaragua, the U.S. suspends the re-
maining $15 million because of that country's
assistance to guerrillas in El Salvador.
However, recognizing the necessity to retain
U.S. influence in Nicaragua and to continue
incentives for moderates there, the U.S. did
not demand immediate repayment of out-
standing fully disbursed loans already extend-
ed to that country and will consider a
resumption of aid should the situation in
Nicaragua improve.

April 2

Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw
Jagielski visits U.S. to discuss U.S. -Polish
relations and to seek economic aid for that
country. The U.S. announces that it will pro-
vide food aid to Poland— 30,000 tons of dried
milk and 30,000 tons of butter— which will be
sold below world market prices for Polish
currency.

April 3

Secretary Haig makes official visit to the
Middle East -Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia April 3-8. He also makes stops
in Rome, Madrid, London, Paris, and Bonn
April 8-11.

April 6

U.S. asks the International Court of
Justice to dismiss U.S. claims against Iran
for damages resulting from seizing and
holding U.S. hostages. If Iran fails to live up
to the agreement signed Jan. 19, in Algeria,
the petition reserves the right to reinstitute
proceedings.

April 8

Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group
in Bonn, NATO Defense Ministers issue a
statement noting that Soviet intervention in
Poland would undermine the prospects for ef-
fective arms control negotiations.

April 9

International Conference on Assistance to
Refugees in Africa convenes in Geneva April
9-11. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the U.N., heads
the U.S. delegation.

April 10

Thirty-five nations, including NATO (ex-
cept U.S. and Turkey) and all members of the
Warsaw Pact (except Romania) sign Conven-
tional Weapons Convention (CWC) which is
primarily designed to protect civilians from
incendiaries, land mines, and booby traps.
The U.S. is reviewing its position on the
question of signing the Convention. The Con-
vention will remain open for signature for a
full year.

April 14

Governments of the Western
Five— Canada, France, the Federal Reput
of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States— issue a statement concern)
the failure of the preimplementation meeti
in Geneva to give effect to the U.N. plan f
Namibia. They reiterate their commitment
an internationally acceptable settlement fo
that country.

The space shuttle Columbia, safely lane
concluding the successful first demonstrati
of a new approach to extraterrestrial travi
and opening a new era in space travel.

April 15

U.S. announces that Maksim
Shostokovich, son of the late Soviet compc
Dmitri, and his son will be admitted to thi:
country as refugees. The two sought politi
asylum in West Germany on April 12.

Hans Christ, a Salvadoran national am
suspect in the killing of Jose Rodolfo Vien
head of El Salvador's Agrarian Reform In
stitute, and two American advisers, is ar-
rested in Miami by Federal authorities.

April 17

Prime Minister Nguza Karl-i-Bond of
Zaire resigns.

April 21

U.S. announces decision to sell a new
multimillion-dollar arms package, including
five radar planes— AW ACS (airborne war
ing and control system) planes — to Saudi
Arabia.

April 23

Nsinga Udjuu Ongwakeb Untube, a
former Interior Minister, is appointed Prii
Minister of Zaire.

April 24

After 15 months, U.S. lifts ban on sale
agricultural goods and phosphates to the
Soviet Union.

April 27

Poland's 15 Western creditor govern-
ments, including the U.S. Government, ag
in Paris to reschedule Polish official debt
payments coming due May 1-Dec. 31, 198

April 30

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheii
makes official visit to Washington, D.C. tc
meet with the President and the Secretan
State.

Prince Charles, heir apparent to the
British throne, makes a private visit to
Washington, D.C, and Norfolk,
Williamsburg, and Yorktown, Va. During
visit, the Prince was guest of honor at a
White House dinner and also had brief
meetings with the President and Secretar
State. ■

April 12

U.S. launches space shuttle Columbia, the
first such space vehicle which can be reflown.

62

Department of State Bulle

RESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

apartment of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
ice of Press Relations, Department of
te, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Haig: interview for Spanish

television, Mar. 30.
Haig: remarks on arrival in

Cairo, Apr. 4.
Department of State Library

dedication ceremony.
Haig: interview for "Great

Decisions '81."
U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Radio Consulta-
tive Committee (CCIR),
study group 1, Apr. 23 and
24.
CCIR, study group 4,

Apr. 29.
U.S., Poland sign textile
agreement, Sept. 15, 1980,
and Mar. 20, 1981.
Haig, Laingen: awards cere-
mony for former hostages.
Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on subdivision,
stability, and load lines,
May 5.
Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on in-
ternational data flows,
May 14.
Haig: arrival remarks, Cairo,

Apr. 4.
Haig, Sadat: remarks from
the Barrages, Cairo,
Apr. 5.
Haig, Shamir: arrival state-
ments, Ben Gurion Airport,
Apr. 5.
Haig, Begin: statements,

Jerusalem, Apr. 5.
Haig, Shamir: dinner toasts,

Jerusalem, Apr. 5.
Haig, Navon: question-and-
answer session, Jerusalem,
Apr. 6.
Haig, Begin: statements fol-
lowing Jerusalem meeting,
Apr. 6.
Haig: remarks to U.S. Em-
bassy staff, Amman.
Haig: departure remarks,

Amman, Apr. 7.
Haig: statement upon depar-
ture from Riyadh.
Haig: statement upon depar-
ture from Rome, Apr. 8.
Haig: statement upon death
of General Omar Bradley.
Haig: news conference,
Madrid, Apr. 9.

*109 4/24 Haig: statement following
meeting with British
Foreign Secretary Lord
Carrington, London,
Apr. 10.

110 4/24 Haig: remarks following

meeting with British Prime
Minister Thatcher, London,
Apr. 10.

111 4/24 Haig: remarks to the press,

Paris, Apr. 11.

112 4/28 Haig: departure remarks,

Bonn, Apr. 11.

113 4/23 U.S., Canada Consultations

on Garrison Diversion
Unit.

114 4/17 Haig: interview by Barrie

Dunsmore, ABC-TV.

*115 4/22 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT),
study group A, May 28.

♦116 4/22 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on radiocommunications,
May 7.

*117 4/22 U.S., Korea establish a spe-
cific limit on one additional
textile category.

*118 4/22 U.S., Haiti amend textile

agreement, Dec. 17, 1980
and Feb. 5, 1981.

*119 4/22 U.S., Malaysia sign new tex-
tile agreement, Dec. 5,
1980 and Feb. 27, 1981.

"120 4/22 U.S., Korea agree to modifi-
cations of bilateral textile
agreement.

121 4/23 Haig: interview by Marvin

Kalb, NBC -TV, Apr. 14.

122 4/24 Haig: speech to American

Society of Newspaper
Editors.
122A 4/24 Question-and-answer session
following Newspaper
Editors Convention speech.

♦123 4/28 Haig, Luns: press briefing,
White House, Apr. 16.

*124 4/28 Haig: statement before

House Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations.

♦125 4/28 SCC, SOLAS, May 27.

♦126 4/28 CCITT, study group D,

Modern Working Party,
May 19-20.

*127 5/1 Ambassador William E.

Brock to address Confer-
ence on U.S. Trade and In-
vestment in Africa, New
Orleans, May 8.

♦128 4/30 Bicentennial theater opens
at the Department of
State.

♦129 4/30 U.S., India amend textile
agreement, Apr. 22 and
23.

♦130 4/30 U.S., Sri Lanka amend tex-
tile agreement, Mar. 16.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Haig

Security and Development Assistance,
Mar. 19, 1981 (Current Policy #271).

Interview on "Meet the Press," Mar. 29,
1981 (Current Policy #264).

A New Direction in Foreign Policy, Apr. 24,
1981 (Current Policy #275).

Africa

Aid for African Refugees, Acting Director for
Refugee Programs Smyser, Mar. 19, 1981
(Current Policy #268).

Background Notes on Ghana (Feb. 1981).

Background Notes on Seychelles (Mar. 1981).

Background Notes on Togo (Mar. 1981).

Background Notes on Zimbabwe (Jan. 1981).

African Refugees (GIST, Apr. 1981).

Asia

Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia, Under Sec-
retary for Political Affairs Stoessel,
Apr. 24, 1981 (Current Policy #274).

East Asia

Background Notes on Vietnam (Feb. 1981).

U.S.-China Agricultural Trade (GIST.
Apr. 1981).

U.S.-China Relations (GIST, Mar. 1981).

U.S.-China Economic Relations (GIST,
Mar. 1981).

U.S.-China Science and Technology Ex-
changes (GIST, Mar. 1981).

Economics

Global Economic Interdependence, Assistant

Secretary Hinton, Apr. 8, 1981 (Current

Policy #273).
1978-79 Trade of Non-NATO Europe, Japan,

With Communist Countries, Jan. 16, 1981

(Special Report #78).
U.S. Export Expansion (GIST, May 1981).

Energy

Energy Security and International Prepared-
ness, Deputy Assistant Secretary Morse,
Mar. 23, 1981 (Current Policy #272).

Europe

Background Notes on Canada (Mar. 1981).
Background Notes on Liechtenstein

(Mar. 1981).
Background Notes on Malta (Mar. 1981).
Background Notes on Portugal (Apr. 1981).

Foreign Aid

Development Assistance for the Third World,
Acting Director McPherson, International
Development Cooperation Agency, Mar. 19,
1981 (Current Policy #267).

63

Publications

Latin America & the Caribbean

Bilateral Assistance, Acting Assistant Secre-
tary Bushnell, Mar. 23, 1981 (Current
Policy #269).

El Salvador, Under Secretary Stoessel,
Mar. 19, 1981 (Current Policy #265).

Background Notes on Bermuda (Feb. 1981).

Background Notes on Haiti (Feb. 1981).

Middle East

Middle East Regional Security, Director of
Politico-Military Affairs Burt, Mar. 23,
1981 (Current Policy #270).

Hostage Agreements Transmitted to Con-
gress, Department statement (two declara-
tions, the undertakings, and related docu-
ments) Mar. 12, 1981 (Selected Documents
#19).

Background Notes on Algeria (Feb. 1981).

Background Notes on North Yemen (Dec.
1980).

Background Notes on South Yemen (Dec.
1980).

Military Affairs

U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements (seven
treaties), Apr. 1981 (Special Report #81).

Pacific

Background Notes on New Zealand (Jan.

1981).
U.S. and the South Pacific (GIST, Mar. 1981).

Population

Population Growth and Foreign Policy,
Ambassador Benedick, Jan. 27, 1981 (Cur-
rent Policy #263).

Security Assistance

FY 1982 Proposals for Security Assistance,
Under Secretary Buckley Mar. 19, 1981
(Current Policy #266).

United Nations

U.N. Decade for Women (GIST,
Mar. 1981). ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20J,02. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual sum-
maries which describe the people, history,
government, economy, and foreign relations
of each country. Each contains a map, a list
of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a
reading list. (A complete set of all Back-
ground Notes currently in stock— at least
140— $16; 1-year subscription service for ap-
proximately 77 updated or new Notes— $21;
plastic binder— $2.) Single copies of those
listed below are available for $1; $1.25 for
foreign mailing.

Algeria Pub.7821 8pp

Bermuda Pub.7901 4pp

El Salvador Pub.7794 4pp

Ghana Pub.8089 7pp

Haiti Pub.8287 4pp

New Zealand Pub.8251 8pp

North Yemen Pub.8170 6pp

South Yemen Pub.8368 4pp

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Multilateral. TIAS 9629. 3636pp. (Cat.

No. S9.10:9629.)
Alexandria Wastewater System Expansion.

Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 9699.

22pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9699.)
Atomic Energy- Research Participation and

Technical Exchange in Loss of Fluid

Test (LOFT) Program. Agreement with

the Netherlands. TIAS 9703. 8pp. $1.25.

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9703.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

the Republic of Korea. TIAS 9733. 5pp.

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9733.)
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET). Agreement with Barbados.

TIAS 9743. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:9743.)
. Atomic Energy— Cooperative Research on

Power Burst Facility (PBF) and

Nuclear Safety Research Reactor

(NSRR). Agreement with Japan. TIAS

9748. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9748.)
Narcotic Drugs -Additional Cooperative

Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.

Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9750. 5pp.

$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9750.)
Economic, Scientific and Technological, and

Educational and Cultural Cooperation.

Agreement with Greece. TIAS 9754.

12pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9754.)
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses.

Protocol with Canada. TIAS 9759. 43pp.

$2.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9759.)

Atomic Energy -Enriched Uranium Trans
fer for Research Reactor in Yugoslavia

Agreement with the International Atoml
Energy Agency and the Socialist Federa. "
Republic of Yugoslavia. TIAS 9767. 13pt
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9767.)
Agricultural Development and Plaiuiin. f
Center. Agreement with the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
TIAS 9778. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9778.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wit
Guinea. TIAS 9779. 36pp. $2.00. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9779.)
Criminal Investigations. Agreement wit
Algeria. TIAS 9780. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat. Nc
S9.10:9780.)
Tracking Stations. Agreement with Austr;
lia. TIAS 9781. 17pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9781.)
Finance -Consolidation and Reschedulin
of Certain Debts. Agreement with
Turkey. TIAS 9783. 10pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9783.)
Prisoner Transfer. Agreement with Pep
TIAS 9784. 14pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9784.)
Finance— Consolidation and Reschedulin
of Certain Debts. Agreement with
Turkey. TIAS 9786. 16pp. $1.50. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9786.)
Prisoner Transfer. Agreement with Panam
TIAS 9787. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9787.)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Import Licensing Procedures. Agree-
ment with Other Governments. TIAS
9788. 27pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9788.
Air Transport Services. Agreement with tl
Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 978!
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9789.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wi
Nicaragua. TIAS 9790. 21pp. $1.50. (Ca
No. S9.10:9790.)
Economic and Military Cooperation. Agrei
ment with Oman. TIAS 9791. 3pp. $1.0C
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9791.)
Atomic Energy -Research Participation
and Technical Exchange. Agreement
with the Netherlands. TIAS 9792. 25pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9792.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Egypt. TIAS 9793. 19pp. $1.50. (Cat. N<
S9. 10:9793.)
Furnishing of Defense Articles and Serv-
ices. Agreement with Somalia. TIAS
9794. 6pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9794.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Tanzania. TIAS 9795. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9795.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the
Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS
9796. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9796.)
Parcel Post. Agreement with the Hungariai
People's Republic. TIAS 9797. 119pp.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9797.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Jamaica. TIAS 9799. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9799.)
Scientific Cooperation. Memorandum of
Understanding with Belgium. TIAS 980<
7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9800.)

64

Department of State Bulletir

Publications

fenbursement of Income Taxes. Agree-
JTment with the Customs Cooperation
^Council. TIAS 9801. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
|S9.10:9801.)

jhmoditv Imports — Loan No. 263-K-053.
^Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 9802.
|23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9802.)
nmoditv Imports -Grant. Agreement
iwith Egypt. TIAS 9803. 21pp. $1.50.
((Cat. No. S9. 10:9803.)
Ide in Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan,
p TIAS 9804. 7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
JS9.10:9804.)

ricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Pakistan. TIAS 9805. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9805.)

nmodity Imports -Loan No. 263-K-054.
Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 9806.
23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9806.)
imbursement of Income Taxes. Agree-
ment with the International Sugar
Organization. TIAS 9807. 4pp. $1.00.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9807.)
ivileges and Immunities for Military
Personnel. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS
9808. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9808.)
: minal Investigations. Agreement with
Colombia. TIAS 9809. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9809.)

iminal Investigations. Agreement with
Turkey. TIAS 9810. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9810.)
•ricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Mauritius. TIAS 9811. 8pp. $1.25 (Cat.
No. S9.10:9811.)

uble Taxation -Taxes on Estates, In-
heritance and Gifts. Convention with
France. TIAS 9812. 46pp. $2.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9812.)
;changes in Education and Culture.
Agreement with Italy. TIAS 9813. 16pp.
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9813.)
omic Energy — Liquid Metal-Cooied Fast
Breeder Reactors. Agreement with
Japan. TIAS 9814. 30pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9814.)
cpress Mail Service. Agreement with the
Netherlands. TIAS 9816. 27pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9816.)
ade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 9817.
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9817.)
gricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Guyana. TIAS 9818. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9818.)
rade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with the People's Republic of
China. TIAS 9820. 26pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9820.)
tomic Energy — Reprocessing of Special
Nuclear Material. Agreement with
Japan. TIAS 9821. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9821.)
arcotic Drugs— Additional Cooperative
Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9822. 5pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9822.)
lant Protection -Mediterranean Fruit Fly.
Agreement with Peru. TIAS 9823. 11pp.
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9823.)
issurances Relating to Middle East Peace.
Memorandum of Agreement with Israel.
TIAS 9825. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9825.)

Middle East Peace. Agreement with Israel.

TIAS 9826. 2pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9826.)
Middle East Peace. Agreement with Egypt.

TIAS 9827. 2pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9827.)
Assurances, Consultations, and United

States Policy on Middle East Peace.

Agreement with Israel. TIAS 9828. 10pp.

$1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9828.)
Middle East Peace. Memorandum of Agree-
ment with Israel. TIAS 9829. 4pp. $1.00.

(Cat. No. S9.10:9829.)
Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with

Italy. TIAS 9832. 5pp. $1. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9832.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Somalia. TIAS 9833. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat.

No. S9. 10:9832.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Jordan. TIAS 9834. 16pp. $1.50. (Cat.

No. S9. 10:9834.)
Trade — Visa System for Textile Exports.

Agreement with the People's Republic of

China. TIAS 9836. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9836.)
Narcotic Drugs — Cooperation to Curb

Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Colom-
bia. TIAS 9838. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9838.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Sierra Leone. TIAS 9840. 8pp. $1.25.

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9840.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.

Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 9842.

3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9842.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with

Finland. TIAS 9845. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat.

No. S9. 10:9845.) ■

Iune1981

65

Itii l;ifrn-4Hil

Bulletin

hull vi in

Background Notes

Background Notes are concise, authoritative pamphlets
describing about 170 countries of the world, as well as
selected international organizations. They contain the
most current information on each country's people,
culture, geography, history, government, economy, and
political conditions. Background Notes also include
reading list, travel notes, and maps.

Approximately 60 Background Notes are updated and
published each year. Price $16.00 per year, domestic;
$20.00, foreign.

Department of State Bulletin

This monthly magazine is an indispensable foreign policy
reference tool— no library, research center, or world af-
fairs specialist should be without it. The Bulletin presents
the official record of U.S. foreign policy, including major
addresses of the President and the Secretary, statements
to the Congress; special features and analytical articles
on international affairs by State Department experts; list
of treaties and other agreements; and a brief chronology
of world events.

Subscription to the Department of State Bulletin includes
an annual index. Price: $19.00 per year, domestic; $23.75
foreign.

Order Form for New Subscriptions

D Background Notes (BGN)

Annual subscription of approximately 60 Notes:
$16.00, domestic; $20.00, foreign

' Department of State Bulletin (DSB)
Annual subscription of 12 issues plus index: $19.00, domestic; $23.75, foreign

Mail to:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Enclosed is $_

□ check or □ money order (payable

to Superintendent of Documents) or charge to my

Deposit
Account No.

]-□

Order No.

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit
Card No.

Expiration date
Month /Year

Please Print

Company or personal name

Additional address line

Street address

City

(or Country)

State

Zip Code

For Office Use Only

Quantity

Charges

Enclosed

To he mailed

Subscriptions

Postage

Foreign handling

MMOB

OPNR

. UPNS
. Discount
Refund

NDEX

une 1981
'ol.81, No. 2051

fghanistan. U.S. Perspective of the 35th

P General Assembly 54

frica

fifrican Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59
Iternational Conference on Assistance to

I, Africa's Refugees (Kirkpatrick) 58

Lestion-and-Answer Session Following Ad-

f dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7

I.S. Perspective of the 35th General Assem-

[ bly 54

merican Principles

I' New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy
(Haig) 5
.oreign Policy and the American Spirit

! (Haig) 13

[rms Control

|rms Sales to Morocco; Western Saharan

! Conflict (Draper) 46

secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci-
sions 23

isia. Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia (Stoes-

sel) 33

viation. The Airbus: Challenge to U.S. Air-
craft Industry (Kopp) 39

anada

laritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree-
ment (message to the Senate) 32

[ .S. -Canada Consultations on Garrison Diver-
sion Unit (joint U.S. -Canadian press re-
lease) 32

hina. Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great

Decisions 23

laims. Iran Claims Procedures (Department
statement) 44

Congress

dd to Pakistan (Coon) 53

'he Airbus: Challenge to U.S. Aircraft Indus-
try (Kopp) 39

i.rms Sales to Morocco; Western Saharan Con-
flict (Draper) 46

lth Report on Sinai Support Mission (mess-
age to the Congress) 45

nternal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
Congress) 31

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree-
ment (message to the Senate) 32

deprograming Proposal for El Salvador (Buck-
ley) 51

J.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in South-
east Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) 49

J.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43

"yprus. U.S. Perspective of the 35th General
Assembly 54

Developing Countries

Foreign Policy and the American Spirit
(Haig) 13

Global Economic Interdependence (Hinton) 35

Economics. Global Economic Interdependence
(Hinton) 35

El Salvador

El Salvador (Department statement) 59

3uestion-and-Answer Session Following Ad-
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7

Reprograming Proposal for El Salvador (Buck-
ley) 51

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci-
sions 23

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi-
sion 26

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14

Energy. Global Economic Interdependence
(Hinton) 35

Europe. Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East
and Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Sha-
mir) 14

Foreign Aid

Aid to Pakistan (Coon) 53

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43

Human Rights. U.S. Perspective of the 35th
General Assembly 54

Industrialized Democracies. Global Eco-
nomic Interdependence (Hinton) 35

International Organizations. Atlas of United
States Foreign Relations: International
Organizations A

Iran. Iran Claims Procedures (Department
statement) 44

Israel. Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC
Television 30

Japan

Japan- A Profile 2

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki
(Reagan, Suzuki, joint communique) .... 1

Kampuchea

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smv-
ser) 49

U.S. Perspective of the 35th General
Assembly 54

Lebanon

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi-
sion 30

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14

Middle East

11th Report on Sinai Support Mission (mes-
sage to the Congress) 45

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad-
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci-
sions 23

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Sha-
mir) 14

U.S. Perspective of the 35th General Assem-
bly 54

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43

Morocco. Arms Sales to Morocco; Western
Saharan Conflict (Draper) 46

Namibia. Namibia (Western five statement) 55

Netherlands. Dutch Prime Minister Meets
Vice President Bush (Bush, van Agt) ... 41

NATO. NATO and the Restoration of
American Leadership (Haig) 11

Pakistan

Aid to Pakistan (Coon) 53

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) . 49

Poland

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad-
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi-
sion 30

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci-
sions 23

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi-
sion 26

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14

Presidential Documents

African Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59

11th Report on Sinai Support Mission
(message to the Congress) 45

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
Congress) 31

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree-
ment (message to the Senate) 32

U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales Limitation to the
U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 41

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki
(Reagan, Suzuki, joint communique) .... 1

Publications

Department of State 63

GPO Sales 64

Refugees

African Refugee Relief Day (proclamation) . 59

International Conference on Assistance to
Africa's Refugees (Kirkpatrick) 58

U.S. Contributions to Refugee Relief in
Southeast Asia and Pakistan (Smyser) . 49

Saudi Arabia. Sale of AW ACS to Saudi
Arabia (Department statement) 47

Security Assistance

Reprograming Proposal for El Salvador
(Buckley) 51

Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia (Department
statement) 47

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf Region (Constable) 43

South Asia. U.S. Policy Toward the Middle
East and Persian Gulf Region (Con-
stable) 43

Terrorism. U.S. Perspective of the 35th
General Assembly 54

Treaties

Current Actions 60

Maritime Boundary Treaty and Fishery Agree-
ment (message to the Senate) 32

Turkey

Ataturk Centennial Year (White House state-
ment) 42

Turkish Foreign Minister Meets With Vice
President Bush (White House state-
ment) 42

U.S.S.R.

A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy
(Haig) 5

Foreign Policy and the American Spirit .... 13

NATO and the Restoration or American
Leadership (Haig) 11

Question-and-Answer Session Following Ad-
dress Before ASNE (Haig) 7

Secretary Haig Interviewed for ABC Televi-
sion 30

Secretary Haig Interviewed for Great Deci-
sions 23

Secretary Haig Interviewed for NBC Televi-
sion 26

Secretary Haig Visits the Middle East and
Europe (Begin, Haig, Sadat, Shamir) . . 14

U.S. Lifts Agricultural Sales Limitation to the
U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 41

United Nations. U.S. Perspective of the 35th
General Assembly 54

Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(letter to the Congress) 31

Name Index

Begin, Menahem 14

Buckley, James L 51

Bush, Vice President 41

Constable, Peter D 43

Coon, Jane A 53

Draper, Morris 46

Haig, Secretary 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 23, 26, 30

Hinton, Deane R 35

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 58

Kopp, Harry 39

Reagan, President 1, 31, 32, 41, 45, 59

Sadat, Anwar al- 14

Shamir, Yitzhak 14

Smyser, W. R 49

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 33

Suzuki, Zenko 1

van Agt, Andreas A. M 41

; LIBRA"!

■9999 06352 801